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### *Charles Gore and the Christology of the early twentieth century*

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### Summary of Thesis.

If the Church at the beginning of the nineteenth century was in a state of somnolence, by 1840 she had shaken off her sleep and was showing signs of activity. By this time theology had begun to be challenged by the ascendancy of new forms of thought. These all called for a restatement of traditional teaching and, in one way or another, were concerned with problem of revelation. Among the factors which contributed to the need for restatement may be numbered the following. First evolution with its challenge of the traditional understanding of the creation; secondly ESSAYS AND REVIEWS with a new interpretation of Inspiration, and giving support to Biblical criticism.

The distinctive Christology of Charles Gore began with his teaching on Inspiration in LUX MUNDI. There, inspiration is seen to incorporate an idealizing of history; and to contain literature, drama, myth - though the latter does not mean falsehood. On this literature Jesus based His teaching, though He does not guarantee the historical character or the authorship of the books He used.

He was God conditioned in, and acting solely through, manhood. As such He was subject to human limitations or knowledge. He was conscious of Himself as Son of God but this did not interfere with His properly human growth and development. He abandoned the prerogatives of divinity, or those attributes inconsistent with manhood, Thus He became the example for all men; but not only so, He is the new life of the Christian. Gore's theory came under fire in the late nineteenth century, receiving support from only a few such as Driver and R.L. Ottley, Even Liddon was shocked at the very idea when it was first presented in LUX MUNDI. It was very searchingly and consistently scrutinised in the Church Quarterly Review. In this the critic showed himself to be conservative and at times even fundamentalist. Further criticism and developments of his theory are apparent in the works of Weston, Forsyth and Mackintosh, and Temple.

Weston maintained the idea of a continuous restraint on the part of the Incarnate. He could not isolate the period of the Incarnation.

The real difficulty lay in understanding how the Incarnate could resume attributes he had abandoned. He proposed a single self-consciousness of the Logos and the Incarnate, though this did not mean one will.

Forsyth stressed the element of redemption or reconciliation, and the freedom of God. He found a kenosis indispensable to the interpretation of Christ's Person. This self emptying was an act prior to the Incarnation; and it was a choice, once made, by which the Incarnate must live.

Temple's structure of Reality is important for the understanding of his Christology. He found Kenoticism intolerable, but his own theory is kenotic. He could not conceive of the Logos ceasing His cosmic functions, but his alternative was more difficult. Like Weston he refused to isolate the thirty years of the Incarnation.

Gore at the LUX MUNDI school form a distinctive watershed in British Theology. They centred theology on the Incarnation. Gore's own Expression of it commanding the field for over forty years. Kenoticism, however, is not distinctly Christological. Underlying it is the idea of sacrifice. But most important of all, our Lord's own interpretation of Himself makes it appear that He thought of Himself as the Servant of God. Kenoticism, therefore, represents His out-pouring of Himself in his life rather than how He became man.

CHARLES GORE

AND THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE

EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

A DISSERTATION

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

IN THE

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM.

BY

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A REVIEW OF CHRISTOLOGICAL THINKING  
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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The beginning of the nineteenth century in England was attended by great calm in which the Napoleonic wars were like the rumblings of thunder in the distance. The majority of the people were not affected by these wars. But the changes which took place throughout the nineteenth century were to touch in some way most of the people. On the one hand there was the rapid development of the physical sciences with the consequent revaluation of the world and man's place in it. This included the advances in archaeology and anthropology, with their effect on Theology. On the other hand there were the various problems facing the proletariat, and the working out of a social ethic in the Church. There were also reforms of one sort or another in society, as well as within the church and the Universities. Add to this the controversies and ritual trials of that century with the effect which these had on the faithful; and the picture with which we are left is sufficient to justify a certain amount of generalisation.

As one writer <sup>1</sup> has well expressed it, if the Church was 'somnolent' at the beginning of the century, by 1840 she had shaken off her sleep and was showing signs of activity.

Before attempting to deal with the changes which affected Christological thought, reference must be made to the norm of Christology at that time. It has frequently been remarked that the Evangelicals laid their emphasis chiefly on the doctrine of the Atonement, with a corresponding neglect of the doctrine of the Incarnation. The Oxford movement marked the renewal, in the Church of England, of the emphasis on the latter. It should be observed here that the Christology of Chalcedon as elaborated by Hooker remained the accepted norm<sup>2</sup>. So that until the time of Gore, towards the end of the century, there was no constructive work on the subject.

Another matter which deserves to be mentioned here is the idea of evidences which persisted well into the century. Christianity was held to be attested by the twin 'evidences' of miracles and prophecy. The burden of the theory was that revelation needed some guarantee of its authenticity, and that this was provided by the so-called evidences. This argument we can see being used by J.B. Mozley in his Bampton lectures for 1865 at a point where he tried to show the superiority of Christianity over Mohammedanism.<sup>3</sup>

".....the Gospel is adapted to perpetuity for this cause especially, with others, that it was founded upon a true calculation,

And a foresight of the permanent need of evidence;  
our Lord admitting the inadequacy of His own mere  
word, and the necessity of a rational guarantee to  
His revelation of His own nature and commission."

Mozley's words are weak - at least, today - and His interpretation of our Lord's miracles here ~~are~~<sup>is</sup> certainly unjustifiable. Sometime before, Coleridge had uttered in exasperation "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. "There was no need for evidences, for 'the Bible and Christianity are their own sufficient evidence'.

Maurice himself had seen the defect of the argument. Writing about two decades before J. B. Mozley, he rejected the notion that anything should be believed as true simply because it was supported by an event out of the ordinary. Hence he taught that since the Bible testified to the divine order of the universe, as it also testified to a more than human power pervading it, such extraordinary events were no proper guarantee of the natural order. His argument may be summed up in this sentence:

"Now if it is meant by this that a miracle or prodigy, as such, proves the divine commission

of the person who enacts it, we have the strongest reason for rejecting such a notion, for the Bible commands us to reject it." <sup>4</sup>

But Maurice went further than this and assigned to miracles a new place in apologetics. The sense of the numinous must be purified and justified; man must be seen to be other than the 'victim of a set of blind natural agents'. The miracles of the Bible, Old and New Testaments, witness that man is not the servant of these natural agents but of a God who is King of the world; and whose Son was revealed as the "ruler of the winds and the waves; the sustainer and restorer of animal life; the healer and tamer of the human spirit." And so we come to a positive view of miracles in theology which may best be expressed in his own words: <sup>5</sup>

"We confess, and rejoice to confess, that there is an habitual appointed course of things; that each agent, voluntary or involuntary, has his proper place in the scheme; that no one link of this agency will be ever needlessly broken or dispensed with.

But we say that no dishonour is put upon any of these agents, when he, who has assigned them their place keeps them in their own relation to each other, imparts to them powers, withdraws the veil which conceals himself the prime worker, and so explains the meaning of his ordinances, the secret of their efficiency, the reason of their abuse. It is in this sense that we say the miracles are evidences of the truth of Christianity. If Christianity be the manifestation of a spiritual kingdom; if it be the satisfaction of the dream of past ages; if it be that which was to exhibit all the complications of after ages what is the law which governs them, and who is the Giver of that law, then we cannot see how it could enter the world without miracles, or how those miracles should not be such as the Bible affirms that they were."

Maurice, therefore, preserves what another age has been guilty of overlooking - the fact that revelation itself is miraculous. <sup>6</sup> And in addition he pointed out that the Biblical miracles not only supported, but belonged to the idea of the Incarnation.

Without them there would be an inexplicable gap in the Gospel records. What was needed was a new apologetic, and events were going to force the Church to reevaluate and reformulate what had for so long been taken for granted.

The coming into prominence of the hypothesis of evolution dealt a severe blow to orthodoxy in the mid-nineteenth century. The theory is commonly attached to Darwin even though it did not originate with him. The first sign of evolution appeared in a work called THE VESTIGES OF THE NATURAL HISTORY OF CREATION. This book created quite a stir not only for its 'unorthodox' doctrine, but also because it was published anonymously.<sup>7</sup> The author's intention was not to question the fact of creation, but to discourse on the manner of it. It was his belief that the theory supported the argument from design; in fact his concept of God and of creation was no different from that of the eighteenth century Deists.<sup>8</sup> It was therefore left to Charles Darwin to develop the theory and to show by a mass of evidence that it was not to be lightly regarded. His research showed him certain characteristics of some creatures, such as the lion's strength or the lizard's change of colour, which enabled those animals to survive while others did not.

He deduced from this the process of natural selection, meaning by 'natural' the absence of deliberate arrangement from outside.<sup>9</sup> The appearance in 1871 <sup>of the</sup> DESCENT OF MAN <sub>^^</sub> caused more alarm than his earlier work THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.<sup>10</sup> In the DESCENT OF MAN the process of evolution was extended to the human race, asserting that man evolved from the lower animals.

There were two main effects of these works of Darwin. In the first place the Argument from Design received a severe blow. The idea of a careful design in the world was now seen to contrast sharply with a 'nature red in tooth and claw.' And secondly the creation of Genesis was called in question since man now seemed to owe his origin to impersonal forces. In the latter case the idea of revelation was not far in the background;<sup>11</sup> and the 'battle of faith' became one of Moses versus Darwin. Concerned with this battle the opponents of Darwin neglected to differentiate the proper realms of science and religion.<sup>12</sup> There were some who did not share in the 'battle of false antithesis', but who were able to appreciate the work of Darwin for what it was worth.

One of these was R.W. Church who wrote to Prof. Asa Gray: <sup>13</sup>

".....I believe I must confess that I owe my first interest in the subject to the once famous VESTIGES; and I remember thinking at the time it came out, that the line taken against it was unphilosophical and unsatisfactory;..... Mr. Darwin's book, partly from the greater gravity and power of the writer and partly from, I think, a little wisdom in the public, has not made such an outcry.....One wishes such a book to be more explicit. But it is wonderful "shortness of thought" to treat the theory itself as incompatible with ideas of a higher and spiritual order."

Even Liddon, who was shocked by Gore's Essay in LUX MUNDI, granted that evolution, if proven true, would not contradict the original creation. <sup>14</sup> It was 'one way of describing what we can observe of God's continuous action upon the physical world.' But conservatism died a slow death and, even as late as 1886, Dean Burgon was still disclaiming man's descent from an ape. <sup>15</sup>

Shortly after the publication of Darwin's ORIGIN OF SPECIES, there appeared a composite work entitled ESSAYS AND REVIEWS. There was little unity in the work, and that lay in the desire of the writers to handle their material freely though in a becoming manner. The writers themselves did not wish to state anything inconsistent with the position of ministers in the church; but they were concerned about the wide-spread reticence on matters of a religious nature. Jowett himself deplored the clergy's opposition to the intellectual tendencies of the age; their refusal to permit enquiries into the background of the Church. <sup>16</sup> Perhaps we should do well to reflect that the real cause of alarm in the book was not what was said, but the suddenness with which new thought was thrust upon the people, and the fact that all but one of the writers was a clergyman. The consecration of the moderate Temple was to meet with great objection on account of his choice not to withdraw his article from the volume. What, then, did these men teach? To this we must turn our attention.

All the essays in the volume cannot be treated here, but we shall attempt to give in broad outlines the teachings of those relevant to our purpose. There are four of these. The first is Rowland Williams' review of "Bunsen's Biblical Researches." He began by posing an important question for the time, which is whether God trained mankind by a faith which has reason and conscience as kindred; or one to "whose miraculous tests their pride must bow." <sup>17</sup> He went further to suggest that if Anglican research and fair statement were to be continued, decisions provisionally based on imperfect evidence would have to be revised. And so he saw Bunsen's glory partly in the fact that he neither "paltered" with conscience nor evaded the problems; and partly in the fact that he applied his vast erudition in elucidating the records; in tracing the Holy Spirit elsewhere, but chiefly in His Hebrew sanctuary. <sup>18</sup> He also looked with approval on Bunsen's extension of the Biblical chronology beyond the accepted 6,000 years of Archbishop Ussher. Bunsen regarded the Pentateuch as Mosaic - not written by Moses but embodying his teaching.

Of similar joy to Williams was Bunsen's attitude to the prophets - not foretelling Jesus' birth in Isaiah 7:16 for example, So we should not distort the prophets to prove the divine word incarnate and reason back to prophecy from the Incarnation. His treatment shows in him tremendous enthusiasm for the work of Bunsen. See for example this statement near the end of his review:

"Any points disputable or partially erroneous, which may be discovered in his many works, are as dust in the balance, compared with the mass of solid learning, and the elevating influence of a noble and Christian spirit." 19

His review also constituted a challenge to the then accepted understanding <sup>of inspiration</sup> as when he refused to admit that the writers were 'passionless machines' or that Luther and Milton were not inspired.

The second essay of importance was that by Baden Powell "On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity." He began by remarking on the unwillingness of divines to face critical questions seriously.

He contrasted the emphasis placed on external evidences, supported by authenticated records, with the subordinate place given to internal evidence derived from the Gospels and morals. His thesis was that people viewed events through the medium of their prejudices. Thus they were unprepared to judge sudden or remarkable occurrences, and their representations were only recollections of impressions.<sup>20</sup> He further argued that testimony could apply to sensible facts and prove an extraordinary or inexplicable phenomenon. But testimony could not reach to the supernatural. So he concluded that miracles were not expected, nor could alleged ones be credited. It was also his belief that evidential reasoning of miracles as the sole or principal attestation of divine revelation had lost ground. But he regarded the true force of Christian evidences to lie in the union and combination of external and internal testimony, the latter being the test of the former. Whereas Paley spoke to his generation new forms of speculation rendered his arguments obsolete. Whereas Paley could not conceive of revelation without miracles, miracles to him constituted one of the main difficulties of Christianity.

He concluded that we neither had nor could have evidence of a deity working miracles. The essay called for a new apologetic; but on the whole was too negative.

The third essay is Goodwin's on the "Mosaic Cosmogony." Early in the essay he wrote:

"It would have been well if theologians had made up their minds that those things for the discovery of which man has faculties specially provided are not fit objects of a divine revelation."

It was an underlying belief of Goodwin's that theologians too often tried to delineate the contents of revelation as well as to define the manner of it. This he saw as the chief cause of the problems concerning Genesis 1. He noted that there had been attempts at reconciling religion and Geology; but regarded them as being at variance with each other and mutually destructive. How could the word 'day' in Genesis 1 be regarded as meaning a long period, when a similar interpretation was not given the word in the fourth commandment? <sup>21</sup> He regarded as unfounded Buckland's assertion that the object of the Mosaic narrative was not to state how but by whom the world was made.

But his own view that the greater part of the narrative contains a minute and orderly account of the manner of the creation is not borne<sup>out</sup> by the evidence. It is quite clear that Goodwin distinguish between scientific and non-scientific language here. The Mosaic narrative is not a scientific treatise. His acceptance of the philosophy of evolution is apparant<sup>y</sup> when he states that the plan of providence for man's education was a progressive one; <sup>22</sup> and when he claimed that God might have ordained things differently from the first daring speculator.

The fourth and last of the essays to be considered is that by Benjamin Jowett. <sup>23</sup> His essay was by far the most important because of the subject with which he was dealing, and because it was so ably put forward. He began by referring to the divergent views on interpretation of Scripture, differences which were based either on individual or denominational prejudices. <sup>24</sup> This involved revelation - whether it was given beside or through human faculties, and whether it was an interruption or fulfilment of the laws of nature.

Though the interpreting of Scripture needed a 'vision and faculty divine', yet in externals of interpretation such as the meaning of words, connexion of sentences, texts, facts, the same rules apply to the Old and New Testaments as to other books. The interpreter's task was to 'read Scripture like any other book, with a real interest and not merely a conventional one.' <sup>25</sup>

Concerning the question of prophecy Jowett felt that the student must discern how far its details were minutely fulfilled. Absence of fulfilment might show that he mistook the letter for the Spirit in expecting it. Jowett made three very important and far-reaching comments on inspiration. First, the nature of inspiration was only known by the examination of Scripture, <sup>26</sup> not of part only but of the whole. Such inspiration was reconcilable not only with the mixture of good and evil in the Old Testament; it was also consistent with the imperfect and opposite aspects of truth in Job or Ecclesiastes, as well as with the inaccuracies of language in the Pauline Epistles. Secondly Inspiration 'must conform to all well-ascertained facts of history or of science.' There was therefore no need for elaborate reconcilements of revelation and science; "they reconcile themselves the moment any scientific truth is distinctly ascertained." <sup>27</sup>

And thirdly, inspiration must expand and take in the results of historical inquiries. The origin of Scripture was not a part of its interpretation and inspiration was only partly important to the interpreter. Commenting on the prevailing reticence concerning difficulties in theology, he uttered one of his better known statements: "Doubt comes in at the window when Inquiry is denied at the door." His essay was a plea for freedom of inquiry into the texts though with proper safeguards. Thus he insisted that there was one meaning in Scripture - that of the first readers or hearers. <sup>28</sup> Therefore the <sup>interpreter</sup> should place himself in the position of the first writer. And when interpreted like any other book, the Bible would be seen to be unlike them. <sup>29</sup>

As had happened before the publication of the volume raised a storm of protests in which the writers were indiscriminately condemned as atheists. Among the critics were men as far apart as Frederic Harrison and Samuel Wilberforce, bishop of Oxford. Harrison welcomed the appearance of ESSAYS AND REVIEWS as an indication that the Church was at last becoming enlightened. Their volume had destroyed the very foundation of the Tractarian super-structure and had shown beyond doubt that Christianity for the modern man was now meaningless.

Thus Harrison urged the writers to stop calling themselves Christians - for Christians were fundamentalists. <sup>30</sup>

Either they stuck to the "broad principles on which the Protestantism of Englishmen rests," or they should become positivists like himself. Perhaps the thought that the Essayists may have lent support to the position held by Harrison increased Wilberforce's alarm over the volume. Zealous for the cause of religion and of Christianity, he was too easily inclined to dismiss the book as tending to infidelity if not to atheism. In a telling epigram he challenged the uncertain position in which the writers had found themselves.

"They believe too much not to believe more, and they disbelieve too much not to disbelieve everything." <sup>31</sup>

Even so the latter part of this statement is far too sweeping. A later bishop of Oxford, Charles Gore was to use a similar argument against the ready acceptance of the new theology in the early part of this century. Wilberforce suggested to the writers that they ought not to remain clergymen of the established Church. Righteous indignation and 'liberal agnosticism' had thus joined forces to expel the common enemy of Church and human intellect.

Far less hostile were the views of such men as Stanley, Church and Westcott. None of them could accept unquestioningly the position of the essayists. To Stanley it was too negative and had said nothing that was essentially new. But he was quite opposed to the 'fanatical desire' of Frederic Harrison to draw away the multitude of believers to his own perilous position. The essayists had not denied miracles; they had placed Christianity beyond the reach of accidents, whether of science or criticism. Church was not surprised that the book gave rise to consternation. In a letter to Prof. Asa Gray, he expressed the opinion that it was a reckless book; that the writers were not sufficiently clear in their own minds to have justified their bringing such 'revolutionary views' before the public. Nevertheless he considered the method of handling the situation perilous for everyone.<sup>32</sup> The book itself was condemned in Convocation but, as Westcott observed, it was the assailants rather than the essayists who were like to do most harm.<sup>33</sup> Wilberforce's opinion that the book would have little effect on the English mind was unduly optimistic, for their teaching has very largely been absorbed into the Church.

Before ESSAYS AND REVIEWS and the rise of Biblical criticism in England, fundamentalism prevailed. The books of the Bible were regarded as a verbatim record of a divine dictation. This view was supported by some theologians such as Burgon.<sup>34</sup> That is why, on matters affecting the Bible, there was such an outcry; for it seemed that the divine inspiration was being denied. The controversy concerning ESSAYS AND REVIEWS, therefore, was really part of a much wider problem; even though at first it did not affect the general public. The criticism of the Bible had been for some time a feature of continental theology. Perhaps the most infamous of the Biblical critics were the Tubingen school. Baur, the leader, was well known for his hypothesis that there were two rival factions in the apostolic period - the Petrine and the Pauline; that these two were resolved by a synthesis in the second century.<sup>35</sup> The Tubingen hypothesis carried with it the rejection of the Pauline authorship of all the epistles save Romans, Galatians, 1 & 2 Corinthians. They also dated the Gospels in the second century.

About the same time that the ESSAYS AND REVIEWS controversy was coming to an end, another storm was brewing in South Africa.

J. W. Colenso, bishop of Natal had published a commentary on Romans in which were discovered some heretical teaching. But what caused even greater alarm was the appearance of his work on the Pentateuch and Joshua in which he denied the historical accuracy of these books. He went further to write "The Bible itself is not God's word; but assuredly God's word will be heard in the Bible, "and also that "The ordinary knowledge of Christ was nothing more than that of any educated Jew of his age." <sup>36</sup> Faced with a pastoral problem, the mathematician sought to find an answer for his converts; but "working sums on Mt. Sinai" was not approved. He was condemned by Tractarians and Evangelicals; and even so sympathetic a person as F. D. Maurice considered his views deplorable. His efforts cost him his bishopric and exposed the Church to a long and disturbing schism.

The effects of such incidents as Colenso's, and knowledge of critical movements in Germany, caused Biblical criticism to be viewed with suspicion in England. But the saner approach of the three great Cambridge scholars was to be ultimately of more lasting value.

In Lightfoot we find not so much a theologian as a historian. To him theology is indebted for the elucidation of the true texts of the Ignatian epistles; and his contribution to patristic studies generally cannot be overestimated. He wrote, somewhat prophetically in 1863, that "if we could only discover the letters that ordinary people wrote to each other without any thought of being literary, we should have the greatest possible help to the understanding of the language of the New Testament generally."<sup>37</sup> His work on the Pauline epistles was his contribution to the establishment of the New Testament language, as well as a comment on his statement above. His appointment to the See of Durham checked the flow of his writings; the tribute paid him by Dean Church was a well deserved one:

"..... I am worldly enough, too, to feel a great rising of heart at the recognition, with such, and not inadequate honour, of the first scholar of the English Church."

Hort is reckoned to have been the greatest theologian of the three. He was noted for his exactness which meant that his work was usually slow. Of the three, who had planned to write a commentary on the New Testament for Macmillan, his contribution was the smallest.<sup>39</sup> In the same year that he delivered the Hulsean lectures THE WAY THE TRUTH AND THE LIFE,

he was also examining in the Natural Science tripos. With his scientific training he was able to appreciate, better than many others, the work of Darwin. His greatest works are the WH text of the New Testament in which he collaborated with Westcott; and the Revised version of the Bible in which he fought to establish the worth of primary texts over a majority of less important and later ones. Westcott, the mystic, was also an exact scholar and perhaps too much so.<sup>40</sup> Yet his prophetic insight has made his exposition of the New Testament to be of great value to the student. He was concerned to establish the Incarnation as the centre of history;<sup>41</sup> and he was suspicious of the so-called proofs. The work of these scholars paved the way for the destruction of the Tubingen school of theology but, most important, they helped to establish the fact that Biblical criticism was not contrary to acceptance of the revelation contained in the Bible. They have been criticised as being so absorbed with the New Testament that they did not 'attempt to grapple with the problems raised by the study of the Old Testament.'<sup>42</sup> We must allow that there is some truth in this; but the magnitude of their task on the New Testament should make us see that it was not possible for them to cope with the Old Testament as well.

Another figure who influenced English Religious thought in the nineteenth century was Matthew Arnold. To say that he was not orthodox would be to utter a platitude; he embodied what has come to be expressed as Liberal Protestantism. Arnold was extremely anxious to purge religion of what he described as Aberglaube or over belief. In what does this Aberglaube consist? In order to answer this question properly, we must take note of what was a very significant point for his argument. He distinguished between the language of the Bible, which he termed poetic; and the language of the Creeds, which he termed scientific. Thus the language of the Bible is "language thrown out at an object of consciousness not fully grasped, which inspired emotion." Whereas scientific language "goes beyond what is admittedly certain and verifiable.....If we want here, as we do want, to have what is admittedly certain and verifiable, we must content ourselves with very little." <sup>43</sup>

It is this little with which Arnold wanted to content himself. And it is with an eye to preserving this little that he sought to rid religion of the absolute and personal God of metaphysics. Thus 'God', which was the same for him as the 'Eternal', was an expression for the "power that makes for conduct or righteousness."

To many, however, this power became personal in so far as emotion was brought into play. He adopted the same point of view with reference to 'Christ'. Jesus did not give any scientific definition to the term; he held the Messiah to be what the Jews themselves had not quite understood him to be - "the chosen bringer of God's salvation." - and he did this by showing what salvation really was. Then by refusing to commit himself to any of the popular names for Messiah - by preferring the simple unostentatious term 'Son of Man' - Jesus was closing the doors to the Jewish theosophy and transforming their "materializing Aberglaube."

Arnold then attacked the so called evidence of Christianity - miracles and prophecy. His thesis was that men were always prone to seek the miraculous but that gradually they were being loosed from their reliance upon miracles as evidence. So whether <sup>they</sup> were attacked or not was immaterial; the Zeit Geist was already sapping the proof from miracles. <sup>44</sup>  
In fact miracles could prove nothing; what would it prove if, for example, he should turn his pen into a pen-wiper?

Looking at the New Testament narratives of miraculous cures Arnold was confident that, if medical practitioners were to investigate the relation between disease and moral fault, this might increase the importance of moral therapeutics. Jesus was a doctor who saw the connexion and was able to heal those unclean or "uncleared, unpurified spirits." But, of course, his followers saw thaumaturgy in everything he did and bent his language accordingly. They did not conscientiously set out to deceive, they only saw what they were looking for.

"The good faith of the Bible writers is above all question, it speaks for itself; and the very same criticism, which shows us the defects of their exegesis and of their demonstration from miracles, establishes their good faith.....His reporters, we must remember, are men who saw thaumaturgy in all that Jesus did, and who saw in all sickness and disaster visitations from God, and they bend his language accordingly." <sup>45</sup>

So Arnold had rescued the Bible from Theology and had been able to understand and present Jesus far better than any of the apostles. The book may, not unjustly, be described as the triumph of half truths. For Arnold was able to use some of what Biblical scholars were saying, while reaching conclusions which reduced God and Christ to mere shadows, and the Bible to

an uninspiring conglomeration of 'truths' about the eternal. Little was left upon which a living faith could be based. We must remember, too, that for him conduct was three-fourths of life; and that he regarded religion as morality tinged with emotion. In the preface to GOD AND THE BIBLE he wrote:

"At the present moment two things about the Christian religion must surely be clear to anybody with eyes in his head. One is, that men cannot do without it; the other they cannot do with it as it is." <sup>46</sup>

These words summarise his whole approach; he was anxious to reform but he was also <sup>anxious</sup> to preserve. The big question is: Is what he preserves a sufficient basis of faith for a personal being? Arnold's policy was one which led him to discard a great deal of what was revealed, a policy which was, in fact, defining the scope of revelation.

Lastly, a word must be said of kenotic Christology as a whole. This type of Christology has been called kenotic because it is based on the very *ekenosen* in Phil. 2:7. There is a verse of one of Charles Wesley's hymns which runs as follows:

"He left His Father's home above  
(So free, so infinite His grace)  
Emptied himself of all but love  
And bled for Adam's helpless race:  
'Tis mercy all, immense and free  
For, O my God, it found out me. <sup>47</sup>

But whether Wesley was thinking of anything like later kenotic Christology (anymore than was Paul) is something which we have no right to presume.

Kenotic Christology was first systematised by Thomasius of Erlangen, A Lutheran theologian. What he sought to do was to give to the manhood its proper place without destroying the unity of the Incarnate. The Lutheran Christology in which he was trained was based upon Luther's axiom finitum est capax infiniti. This form of Christology attributed to the Incarnate one indissoluble life; teaching also that divine attributes may be predicated of the human nature since there was a mutual transference of properties. In this union the manhood is impersonal and is replaced by the pre-existent divine personality. <sup>48</sup>  
On the other hand the Calvinist Christology rejected the tenet of Lutheran Christology by declaring finitum non est capax infiniti. It suggested a double existence of the Logos - totus

extra carnem as well as totus in carne - simultaneously within and without the incarnate state.<sup>49</sup> Neither of these theories did justice to the Gospel picture of Jesus, the one asserting the unity of the incarnate and obscuring His humanity; the other maintaining the reality of the humanity while endangering the unity of His person.

In grappling with the problem Thomasius proposed that in becoming man the Logos renounced or emptied himself of His divine mode of existence. He distinguished between the immanent attributes of God, such as truth, holiness, love; and the relative attributes such as omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience. At the Incarnation the Logos emptied Himself of the relative attributes while maintaining the immanent ones. Within the incarnate state he exercised the moral lordship of truth and love; his miracles were the works of His Father through Him; the relation with the creation was broken. This theory was carried further by Gess who postulated an absolute self-depotentiation<sup>50</sup> both physical and moral attributes being laid aside. This self abandoned logos became the human soul of the Christ.

The depotentiation of the Logos also involved the "cessation of the Word from His existence within the divine Being during the period of the earthly life." <sup>51</sup> So that in the Incarnate we have one consciousness and one will. The theory of Martensen, though it taught a relative kenosis, was very similar to the Calvinist position. It asserted that the Logos continued His functions in the world while existing in a state of self limitation during the Incarnation. <sup>52</sup> As self limited we see not the naked God but deity framed in the ring of humanity. <sup>53</sup> As he increased in stature so too His consciousness of His divinity increased. It is this milder form of kenosis which influenced Charles Gore, and we shall attempt to deal with it in the next chapter. What they have been trying to do must be admitted when one reflects on the Lutheran and Calvinist systems. But they all have serious faults. The first virtually asserts a double consciousness; the second is monothelite; whereas the third borders very closely on Docetism.

NOTES ON CHAPTER 1:

1. J. R. H. Moorman, A History of the Church in England, page 351.
2. R. L. Ottley, The Doctrine of the Incarnation, p. 560,  
Cf. C. Gore, Dissertations, page 196.
3. Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics, page 160.
4. F. D. Maurice, The Kingdom of Christ, vol.2. page 170.
5. F. D. Maurice, Op. cit., vol.2. p. 173. We shall not give here any treatment of revelation. Suffice it to say that, on the whole, the problem of revelation was involved in many of the theological disputes of the century.
6. Alan Richardson, Op. cit., p. 164-168 passion.
7. S. C. Carpenter, Church and People, 1789-1889, p. 468  
Cf. Alec Vidler, The Church in the Age of Revolution, p. 115. Richardson, The Bible in the Age of Science, p. 48.
8. Vidler, Op. cit., p. 116, where the following sentence is quoted: "The Eternal one arranged for everything before hand, and trustēd all to the operation of the laws of his appointment."

9. Carpenter, Op. cit., p. 468.
10. This book was published in 1859.
11. See Vidler Op. cit., p. 117 on Pusey.
12. The words of Maurice Reckitt in MAURICE TO TEMPLE puts the case very well:

"It was seen that the researches of Darwin and their fruits were being employed to raise in a revolutionary form the ultimately theological question, 'What is man?' But it was far less often seen that whatever answers biologists might provisionally propose to the question were irrelevant to the issues with which religion was essentially concerned. As a result of this myopia churchmen plunged recklessly into a field in which they neither had nor were authorised to assume any particular competence, that of biology, while continuing to neglect the sphere of sociology in regard to which the Church, as the guardian of the doctrine of man, has a primary responsibility....." 103

13. Mary C. Church, Life and Letters of Dean Church,  
p. 154.
14. S. C. Carpenter, Op. cit., p. 487.
15. A. R. Vidler, Op. cit., p. 118.

"When the Natural Philosopher claims that MAN shall be held to be the product of EVOLUTION - and to be descended from an ape - we are constrained to reject his hypothesis with derision. It is plainly irreconcilable with the fundamental revelations of Scripture .....An hypothesis is gratuitously put forth utterly destitute of scientific proof, and flouted by such a first-rate Naturalist as Sir Richard Owen."

16. Basil Willey, More Nineteenth Century Studies, p. 141.  
"I am sorry that the Clergy are so determinedly set against all the intellectual tendencies of the age .....The real facts and truths of Christianity are quite a sufficient basis for a national Church, but they want to maintain a conventional Christianity into which no one is to enquire, which is always being patched and plastered with evidences and apologies."

17. Rowland Williams essay 'Bunsen's Biblical Researches; in ESSAYS AND REVIEWS, p. 51.
18. Williams, Op. cit. p. 53.
19. Williams, ibid. p. 93.
20. Baden Powell in ESSAYS AND REVIEWS, p. 106.
21. Goodwin "Mosaic Cosmogony" in ESSAYS AND REVIEWS. p. 241. He quotes with approval Archdeacon Pratt.
22. Gore et al. share this position.
23. "On the Interpretation of Scripture."
24. Jowett, Op. cit., p. 342.
25. Jowett, Op. cit., p. 337., cf. p. 377.
26. Ibid, p. 382. Non nisi ex Scriptura Scripturum potes interpretari.
27. Jowett was moving along the right lines generally, but might he not have taken too much for granted here?
28. Cf. p. 338, the office of an interpreter.
29. For the summary of Jowett's argument, see page 404.
30. Basil Willey, op. cit. p. 165. Two things are apparent here: (1) Harrison's lack of discrimination in thinking that all Christians were fundamentalists;

(2) his mis-understanding of the problems and the position occupied by the writers, for they did not deny the veracity of the Biblical revelation.

31. Basil Willey, *ibid*, p. 170.

32. Mary C. Church, *Life of R. W. Church*, p. 157:

*Cf.* also P. 155 *ibid*.

"It seems to me, with many good and true things in it, a reckless book; and several of the writers have not got their thoughts and theories into such order and consistency to warrant their coming before the world with such revolutionary views. But there has been a great deal of unwise panic, and unjust and hasty abuse; and people who have not an inkling of the difficulties which beset the questions are for settling them in a summary way, which is perilous for everyone."

33. Carpenter, *op. cit.* p. 509f.

34. See Alan Richardson, *Christian Apologetics*, p. 202, n.l.

35. Carpenter, *op. cit.*, p. 501f., Vidler, *op. cit.*, p. 104f.

36. J. R. H. Moorman op. cit., p. 380, cf. Carpenter,  
op. cit. p. 505, on Cheyne.
37. Carpenter, op. cit. p. 513.
38. Life of Church, p. 272 of. Lightfoot of Durham,  
Eden & Mc Donald, p. 12.
39. Carpenter, op. cit. p. 516.
40. Carpenter, ibid, p. 517.
41. Life and Letters of B. F. Westcott, vol. 1. p. 214.
42. Vidler, op. cit. p. 133.
43. Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p.32.
44. Arnold, op. cit. p. 96.
45. Arnold ibid. p. 106.
46. Quoted from Willey, Nineteenth Century Studies, p. 273.
47. Sydney Cave, The Doctrine of the Person of Christ,  
p. 175.
48. H. R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus <sup>HB</sup>  
Christ, p. 240. Cf. <sup>(F.F.)</sup> Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 373f; 96-114.  
<sup>KB.</sup> <sup>A.M. Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, 161f; 257f.</sup>
49. Mackintosh, op. cit. p. 243f. Cf. also <sup>(F.F.)</sup> Bruce op.  
cit., pp. 114-132. <sup>HB.</sup>

50. Sydney Cave, The Doctrine of the Person of Christ,  
p. 180, Frank Weston, The One Christ, p. 104.
51. Weston, *ibid*, p. 106, Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 240  
Cave, *op. cit.* p. 182, n. 2.
52. Weston, *op. cit.* p. 104.
53. Martensen, Christian Dogmatics, p. 264, Cave *op. cit.*  
p. 182, Weston, *op. cit.* p. 108.

## 2. CRITIQUE OF GORE'S CHRISTOLOGY:

The appearance of the kenotic idea in LUX MUNDI was incidental to another, and also a very important theme - inspiration. It is important to bear three things in mind at the outset. The first is that LUX MUNDI was a study which had the Incarnation as its centre, and to which other aspects of the Christian religion were related. Secondly that the writers had as their aim the succouring of a 'distressed faith.' They felt themselves compelled by the circumstances of the time to help those who were afflicted by current theological discussions to hold fast that which they had received. And thirdly, that they were writing for people who still believed in the divine dictation of the Bible, and that they themselves were accepting, to some extent, the conclusions of the critical method. These points will help us to understand the reaction caused by Gore's essay, as well as to consider whether or not the aim of the writers was achieved.

Gore, like the other contributors, was not prepared to be shackled by the too great conservatism and literalism of his day; even though he would not have tolerated innovation for its own sake. And so these writers were able to go part of the way with the Biblical critics and to show much more appreciation of their work than many of their contemporaries were able to do. Their attitude is well summarised in this excerpt from the Preface:

"The real development of theology is the process in which the Church, standing firm in her old truths, enters into the apprehension of the new social and intellectual movements of each age: and because the truth makes her free is able to assimilate all new material, to welcome and give its place to all new knowledge, to throw herself into the sanctification of each new social order, bringing forth out of her treasures things new and old, and showing again and again her power of witnessing under changed conditions to the catholic capacity of her faith and life." <sup>1</sup>

Before considering Gore's Christology as it was hinted at in LUX MUNDI, it is necessary to make a few remarks on his understanding of inspiration. For it is this, more than the former, with which Gore was dealing; and out of it came the ideas which he developed more fully later on. After a lengthy discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church, Gore directed the second part of the essay to the inspiration of Scripture.

In working out the implications of this subject he observes, as a principle, that the doctrine of inspiration is not one of the bases of <sup>the</sup> Christian faith but belongs to the superstructure. This distinction was most important because the attitude to the Bible adopted even by theologians made inspiration a 'dogma' as opposed to a 'theologoumenon'. From this point it is easy for him to differentiate the vocations of nations, the Jews being in the words of St. Athanasius - the 'sacred school for all the world of the Knowledge of God and of the spiritual life.'" 2

Thus there are various degrees of inspiration just as there are various kinds of inspired literature - "For the supernatural fertilizes and does not annihilate the natural." <sup>3</sup> And in support Gore cites the rejection of Montanism by the Church. Beginning with the Bible, then, he notes the affinity of the Jewish creation narrative to that of other races. But he also notes their difference - the action of God in creating and sustaining man, despite his sin - as exemplifying the supernatural inspiration of the Jewish narrative. By speaking of Jewish inspiration as supernatural Gore meant that theirs was more direct and intense than the indirect inspiration of natural religion. Thus throughout Genesis, for example, we find that the 'animating motive' of their work is to remind the chosen people of how God dealt with them, This, of course, would apply to the Pentateuch as a whole, and especially to the Mosaic discourses of Deuteronomy.

What of the inspiration of the prophets? Gore finds here the most obvious instances; for the prophets claim to be the very instruments of the Spirit.

As such they are able to understand what God is doing, and be better able to foresee what He will do. But Gore is emphatic that their predictive knowledge is of a general kind, and not such as would enable them to unravel the mysteries which can properly be foreseen only by God.

"The prophetic inspiration is thus consistent with erroneous anticipations as to the circumstances and the opportunity of God's self revelation, just as the apostolic inspiration admitted of Paul expecting the second coming of Christ within his own life time." <sup>4</sup>

In spite of this Gore is still able to maintain, as well he might, that prophecy and fulfilment so correspond as to make us sure that these men spoke God's word. And further, that they imparted a knowledge of God and of the spiritual life which could only be put down to Divine communication and not to human ingenuity.

Turning to the New Testament Gore points out that Jesus, if he were the revealer of the Father, would have taken steps to have His message transmitted to His Church and be preserved from substantial alloy. As such He expended a great deal of effort in training them for the time when they would be empowered by the Holy Spirit to be His witnesses. The Church therefore sees them as men specially qualified to interpret Christ to the world and 'understands by their inspiration an endowment which enables men of all ages to take their teaching as representing and not misrepresenting, His teaching and Himself.'<sup>5</sup> Of the sub-apostolic writers - taking Luke as an example - he shows that the inspiration of the writer is not such as would lead him to dispense with the 'ordinary means or guarantees of accuracy.' And on this score the preface to the third Gospel is worthy of great consideration. The result of these considerations is the lesson that to believe in the inspiration of Scripture means that we must 'put ourselves to school' with each of the inspired writers - both those to whom we feel particularly drawn and those we feel disposed to bypass.

He cites 2 Tim. 3:16 which makes inspiration a positive endowment and therefore generally didactic.

Next he points out that there is an air of historical truth pervading the records from Abraham downwards in which every effort is made to present facts as they happened without emphasizing the best elements or obscuring the worst. <sup>6</sup> But then Gore knows that the Church cannot insist on the historicity of the earliest records. Within the Pentateuch itself there is evidence of remote developments being attributed to the first founders. Or in Chronicles there is an idealising of Israel's history which is not the same as conscious perversion. Inspiration is consistent with this form of idealising of history; but Gore questions whether it involves the miraculous communication of facts not otherwise to be known. And his answer is in the negative. Distinguishing further the various literary forms in the Bible he notes the existence of drama as well as myths. And here it must be emphasised that he is treating his material purely on literary grounds; for he decisively rejected the view of the more radical critics for whom the miraculous was unhistorical.

On the other hand he is careful to define myth as not being fiction:

"A myth is not a falsehood; it is a product of mental activity, as instructive and rich as any later product, but its characteristic is that it is not yet distinguished into history, and poetry and philosophy." 7

It is on the basis of this definition that he concludes that the early records are nevertheless inspired - that they represent truth in literary form which accorded well with the primitive mind of man.

Passing on Gore attempts to deal with the problem of our Lord's use of the Old Testament - to distinguish carefully His purpose in the various sayings from the conclusions which writers of the nineteenth <sup>century</sup> reached.

"Our Lord, in His use of the Old Testament, does indeed endorse with the utmost emphasis the Jewish view of their own history. He does thus imply, on the one hand, the real inspiration of their canon in its completeness, and, on the other hand, that He himself was the goal of that inspired leading and the standard of that inspiration." 8

Thus in answer to the question as to whether Christ here precluded critical enquiry Gore proposes a simple negative. Nothing in His references either to Jonah or to the Flood or Psalm 110 was meant to forestall Biblical criticism. It was not His purpose to give revelation on natural knowledge. This leads Gore to distinguish between what Jesus revealed and what He used. He revealed Godhead and manhood and their mutual relationships. But He used human nature, its conditions of experience, its growth and limitation of knowledge. It is at this stage that Gore comes close to Docetism. The point which he wishes to make is not difficult to see; but his manner of putting the case is far from flattering. St. Athanasius in his DE INCARNATIONE also referred to the manhood as the organon of the Logos.<sup>9</sup>

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The defect of this manner of expressing the relation of the two natures in Christ is the fact that it does not give sufficient weight to the meaning of VERBUM CARO FACTUM. Christ was too much MAN to be simply using human nature. There is a sense in which He was deeply involved in humanity; and Gore and Athanasius suggest an aloofness - only momentary, of course - which does less than justice to the facts.

Having observed that Jesus used human nature with all its limitations does not imply fallibility or liability to human delusion. But that He restrained His Deity succumbing, as it were, to the thought forms of His own day. He exhibits supernatural insights into men's lives and characters, but never omniscience where matters of natural knowledge are concerned. This self-emptying is a deliberate sacrificial act on His part. "Indeed God declares His almighty power most chiefly in this condescension, whereby He 'beggared Himself' of divine prerogatives, to put Himself in our place." 10

It must here be observed that this is just an adumbration of one of the salient features of Gore's Christology. The theory itself was to be more fully developed in the Bampton Lectures and later. One of two attitudes was possible. First, a sober and careful thinker might have scrutinised what Gore wrote and appreciated the point he was trying to make. There is much in his theory of inspiration which, though less narrow, is nonetheless in conformity with Scripture.

And secondly, the possibility existed that, by too hasty reading and unwillingness to expand to meet the writers' breadth of view, what he wrote could have been misunderstood. The latter attitude was, unfortunately, the one which prevailed; and LUX MUNDI seemed to fail in its aim, at least for the time. <sup>11</sup>

Having dealt briefly with LUX MUNDI, we must go on to consider more widely the Christology of Charles Gore as he developed it in his major works. Gore wrote as one who believed that the 'religion of the Incarnation is pre-eminently a religion of experience and fact.' And he sought to understand Christ as a believer, and to see Him as He appeared to His earliest witnesses. Of great importance to the understanding of Christ is a proper understanding of nature and of miracles; and it is from this point that he begins.

In whatever sense men believe in God, they believe that nature is God's ordinance, that nature's laws are God's laws, and that knowledge of nature is knowledge of God. <sup>12</sup>

The question is: when we contemplate nature, does it suggest presumptions for or against Christ? There are some who see nature as inscrutable and mechanical, disclosing no mind, no purpose, no 'first cause'. This position Gore sees as the result of excluding from the mind classes of fact which really exist in nature. From the point of view of metaphysics and morals the universal mind and divine righteousness are disclosed in nature. These are inseparable from the idea of personality. What is nature's testimony with regard to the supernatural Christ? In the first place Gore notes the unity and order of nature, that there is nothing arbitrary or detachable about it. Secondly, that nature represents progress and advance; and thirdly that this development represents a progressive revelation of God. This unfolding of the divine qualities reaches its climax in Christ; so that Christ is not inconsistent with nature, but is profoundly natural. <sup>13</sup>

Gore would define nature as a progressive development of life.

The term supernatural, therefore, is relative and depends on what at "each new stage of life appears supernatural from the point of view of what lies below it. "Just as the purely physical part of man cannot account for the operation of conscience and the power of choice; so too here man cannot account for the operation of the divine being. This interpretation of nature and the supernatural is influenced by the concept of evolution. Gore has taken a great step in accepting the concept and trying to interpret his theology in terms of it. But he has avoided the immanentist position to which this form of philosophy eventually led. Thus he states that "God is progressively revealed, and at the last with intensified reality in Christ."<sup>14</sup> That note of finality is a necessary differentiating factor. Of course it would not be enough to stop here; the complete picture would involve our taking account of the reality of sin. Sin is not natural, being a corruption of man's true nature. So that Christ, apart from consummating, restores the ~~order~~<sup>order</sup> which had been disrupted; and redemption will appear natural as we take stock of the contrast between man's sinfulness and God's goodness.

Once grant that our nature is not what it should be and we must also see redemption as the obvious corollary. The lasting value of Jesus' work is to be found in the fact that Jesus knows men and knows, better than any human being could, "the nature and seat of man's disease." <sup>15</sup> Gore sums up his theory of Christ's 'naturalness' thus:

"In a word, brethren, the Son <sup>of</sup> Man will seem in the highest sense natural to you in proportion as you are human, in proportion, that is, as what you are in contact with is not merely things or laws or minds, but persons, not problems merely but characters." <sup>16</sup>

What then of the relation of miracles to nature? While admitting that much Christian language justifies the objection that nature contradicts Christ because of His miracles, Gore nevertheless set out to show that miracles are reasonable. He put forward the provisions first that the will of God is a force in nature working to a moral end in man; and second, that sin has disrupted the order and made it necessary for God to react.

If these two points were admitted so must also the reason-  
ableness of miracle:

"For miracle depends on the one side on God's  
character, on the other side on the consequences  
of sin." 17

Sound as this may seem when it pertains to human  
beings, it seems to fall flat when applied to the nature  
miracles of the Gospels. The double dependence in the  
sentence quoted above does not really explain the stilling  
of the storm, or the walking on the lake. Something more  
is needed to explain these, for they were compelling signs  
to the disciples who witnessed them. And here we must  
insist that no consideration is given them as evidence,  
since our Lord did not intend them as such. But that they  
made an impression on men whose tradition included Joshua's  
causing the sun to stand still; and Elijah's raising of the  
widow's son is remarkable.

A miracle, defines Gore, "is an event in physical  
nature which makes unmistakeably plain the presence and direct  
action of God working for a moral end." 18

This special action of God, apart from His usual action in nature, is motivated by man's spiritual blindness. So that in the miracle or sign there is a forceful reminder of a personal force at work. The miracle is God's protest against the overpowering blindness - a breach of the natural order - which is intended to teach men the true character of that order. Thus the miracle of the Resurrection is a breach of the natural order, but in itself is only a vindication of the real order of the world. He then moves to the position that Jesus as incarnate could only be miraculous to us. Christ is a new nature which has come into the world; and therefore His miracles are not mere portents as Arnold's penwiper miracle; they are all of a piece with His person and mission. In other words the miracles of Jesus cannot be understood without reference to His person and purpose. Jesus is unique even on a humanitarian estimate; the Word made flesh is an event which cannot be repeated.

Turning to the historicity of Christ Gore proceeds to consider the documents of the New Testament.

He goes a long way in accepting the critical conclusions of his day, as he shows in the matter of the authorship and dates of various books. Gore would have the interested reader start with Paul's epistles - that is, those which could be regarded as authentic. There Paul shows Christ to be in co-ordination with the Father in the divine function and offices; that he shows Christ as guiding the Israelites during their wanderings in the desert. But His Incarnation teaching was not developed into a theology even though it is unmistakeable in character. Discussion of Gore's theory of kenoticism must be deferred to a later stage. Suffice it only to point out that he does build a theology upon what could hardly be called sufficient basis for one.

Against the tendency to eliminate the miraculous from the Gospels Gore tried to show that St. Mark's gospel, though predominantly miraculous, is nevertheless far from imaginative. Despite the fact that the other synoptists differ from Mark in parts, yet the unity of the picture of Christ which they present is far from accidental.

Collaboration on the subject being improbable, we can only assume that Christ made on them all the impression which the gospels represent. He also noted that there was no naturalistic Christ hidden behind the miraculous Christ. In the prevailing critical attitude of the time the objectors had lost sight of one important fact - that Christ cannot be known apart from the witness borne to Him by the early Church. For the application of critical methods to the Bible may have seemed, to some, to have left the door open for a rejection of the accuracy of the picture presented by the apostles. Finally he shows the Johannine picture to be essentially the same as the Pauline, the pre-existence of Christ being the main interest in the former case.

At this point, we must move on to consider that theory which was merely hinted at in LUX MUNDI, the theory known as kenoticism. We note at the outset that Gore accepts the idea of growth as applied to Jesus Christ- and not merely physical growth.

And so in the Bampton lectures he asserts:

"There was a real growth in mental apprehension and spiritual capacity, as in bodily stature." <sup>19</sup>

But as he was careful to admit growth, so too he was careful to point out that Jesus was different. Thus "He passes through each imperfect stage of manhood to completeness." This idea of growth was important for his theory - in fact it may be said to be one of the pillars on which the whole structure is built.

Gore saw the Incarnate as a "'means devised' propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem," directed and adapted to serve a twofold purpose. "That purpose included on the one side a clearer revelation of God's mind and being to man in terms intelligible to him, and on the other hand the exhibition of the true ideal of human nature." <sup>20</sup> How can the Incarnate satisfactorily do this? Gore does not have a convincing answer to give here. The humanity should not be so human as to refract the divine Being; it could not be too pure or infallible so long as it was human and fitted to man.

His conclusion is that the Incarnate 'retained and expressed His own relation to the Father;' he received also in the days of His flesh the consciousness of His own and of the Father's being, "and the power to reveal that which He knew." Thus we are given a being whom we can only describe as confusing. For if the Incarnate were conscious of His own and of the Father's being, if He had power to reveal that which He knew, then His declaration in Mark 13:32 and parallels is problematical. No one knows save the Father. If He were conscious of His own being, did He know, as Son of God, the time of the end?

It is not very easy to follow Gore's views on the subject, for he seems at times to be moderate whereas at other times one may call him extreme. We ought, then, to look carefully at what he says if we are to get a true picture of what he taught. In the first place, holding the self-emptying to be the method of the Incarnation, he affirms that Christ abjured the prerogative of equality with God.

If Christ were to exemplify real manhood it was necessary for Him to be without the exercise of such divine prerogatives as do not conform with manhood. He saw in Phil. 2:5-11 the true expression of the divine method, being amply supported by 2 Cor. 8:9. The idea of a monarch abdicating or that of a rich man temporarily living in the slums have their evils, though one must admit, their limited value as well. For the rich man does not in effect become poor since he may at any time return to his riches. The example of a "Good King Wenceslas" would have been much more valuable; for it speaks of that same stepping down and that willingness to serve which fit the Pauline picture.

Notice must be taken of the instances in which Gore speaks of 'abandonment' as opposed to 'limitation'. It is the idea of abandonment to which Weston took exception, <sup>21</sup> and it must be admitted that Gore speaks more of abandonment than of limitation. The question we must answer is:

Is there any difference in the two terms as Gore uses them, or does he intend them to be synonymous? This will involve a careful examination of his use of the terms. Gore's thesis is based upon Phil. 2:7 and 2 Cor. 8:9 which to him assert the method of the Incarnation. His exposition of these passages is as follows: Jesus, in His pre-existent state, "was living in the permanent characteristics of the life of God." It was His right to remain so, but He so emptied Himself as to assume the "permanent characteristics of the human or servile life."<sup>22</sup> The very way in which this is expressed suggests that Christ divested Himself of something of His Godhead in order to become man. But we must not prejudge the issue.

How was it possible for Jesus to assume the permanent characteristics of humanity? There are many places in which Gore suggests an abandonment, even though what is abandoned seems to vary. Thus he speaks of a self-abandonment or a self-effacement of the Son.<sup>23</sup> This enables Him to abjure His rightful superiority or the prerogatives of equality.<sup>24</sup>

It is also an abandoning of "what He possessed", or His own divine prerogatives.<sup>25</sup> We also find that Gore speaks of an abandonment of attributes, very much in the same manner as Thomasius. Thus he writes:

"The personality is, then, throughout the same; but in regard to the divine attributes, what He retained in exercise and what He abandoned - whether He abandoned only the manifest glory, or also, for example, the exercise of the divine omniscience - we could hardly form any judgement of a priori."<sup>26</sup>

Gore hesitates where Thomasius was more explicit; we do not know whether Christ abandoned any attributes save omniscience. But there was no doubt in his mind that whatever was 'inconsistent with a really human experience' was abandoned.

Gore also speaks of an abandonment of "'riches' which belonged to the previous divine state of the Son."<sup>27</sup> Thus he compares the kenosis to the abandonment, by a rich man, of a life of wealth in order that he share with the poor their life of poverty.

The self-surrender of the Son has as its counterpart the surrender of the Father - the giving up of His Son. <sup>28</sup> The idea of the giving up of the Son is unfortunately combined with the giving up of the son to be a missionary. The two ideas are quite unrelated, in that Gore ignores the fact that the Son of God is united in will to the Father. The idea of the earthly father giving up a son who might be unwilling does not, therefore, apply. In other places we read not of an abandonment of attributes or prerogatives, but of an abandonment of the exercise of the latter. Thus during the sphere or period of the incarnate life, the Son ceased 'from the exercise of those divine functions and powers, including the divine omniscience' which would have been inconsistent with a truly human experience. At the same time that he asserts the cessation, in the Incarnate, of any functions inconsistent with humanity, he also rejects the idea of any cessation of the Son's function in the Godhead.

There could be no suggestion of an abandonment of His cosmic role, nor of the procession of the Holy Spirit. <sup>29</sup> He insists that the abandonment was not absolute, but was limited to a certain sphere. What does he mean by this 'Sphere'?

J. S. Wild rejects the suggestion that the word refers to His human nature; and prefers to interpret it as meaning "the incarnate state of the Son of God in its entirety." <sup>30</sup> He also admits that Gore does not explain himself. The problem is a serious one and a solution seems impossible. But Wild's interpretation would involve some activity of the Babe, a suggestion which Archbishop Temple felt compelled to reject. The abandonment of exercise resembles the idea of limitation. Gore believes that the Son lived and acted under conditions of limitation which were proper to a human being. So that the Son restrained the natural action of the divine being. <sup>31</sup> In some of the cases where Gore speaks of abandonment, he also speaks of limitation. <sup>32</sup> If it could be argued that he was extreme, it could also be argued that he was moderate.

But the way in which he explains this abandonment makes him appear more extreme than moderate; and therefore Weston is right in linking him with Thomasius. <sup>33</sup>

The consciousness of the Incarnate presented a great deal of difficulties, and Gore allowed to it more than half of his volume of DISSERTATIONS. His historical survey shows certain passing references to the matter, but nothing serious was really done about it. He himself could not countenance the idea of two juxtaposed consciousnesses, and criticises Archbishop Temple for suggestion it. <sup>34</sup> What does he say positively on the subject? Quoting Luke 2:49 he suggests that, even at twelve, Jesus was conscious of His unique Sonship. <sup>35</sup> But as to whether at that age He was conscious of His Messianic mission as Son of David, Gore refused to commit himself. Nevertheless he asserts that Jesus' concept of Messianship during His ministry was inseparable from proper divine sonship.

Again the divine sonship is asserted at the baptism in Jordan. Gore draws attention to the 'pre-eminent dignity of the person of Jesus' in His relation to John the Baptist. This pre-eminent dignity was attended throughout His ministry by a consciousness of properly divine sonship. As in the case of the boy of twelve, so in the case of the grown man, this consciousness of sonship was not incompatible with properly human growth.

Gore's theory, then, suggests to us two consciousnesses in the Incarnate.

"It is no doubt true that as God He possessed potentially and at every moment the divine as well as the human consciousness." <sup>36</sup>

Granted this, the question which we feel disposed to ask is: what influence did this have on His teaching and work? Or we may even go further and ask: how were the two consciousnesses related in the one person?

Gore's answer would be that while as Son He knows the Father and reveals Him to whom He will, yet He never appears to teach out of omniscience but rather as conditioned by human nature.<sup>37</sup> He exhibited extraordinary consciousness not only towards God but also towards the world. His supernatural illumination is analogous to that vouchsafed to prophets and apostles. "It is not necessarily divine consciousness." So that Gore would attribute to Jesus no more than prophetic insight; and he offers, as reasons justifying his conclusion, our Lord's need for information, His anxiety and surprise, in general His human 'passions'- if we may so call them. In other words, Gore is attributing to our Lord a quiescent divine consciousness. Perhaps this may explain his employment of the term 'potentially'. Jesus possessed this consciousness, but was so limited by human conditions that He did not bring it into action.

Gore saw the difficulty of employing human language to express the truth which he perceived. The idea of two juxtaposed consciousnesses is as difficult as that of a single consciousness. He puts the dilemma thus:

"I need to guard myself against ascribing to our Lord during 'the days of His flesh' a merely human consciousness. As one reads the Gospels there always appears in the background, if one may reverently use such a word, the strictly divine consciousness, which is suggested in the phrase 'no man knoweth the Son save the Father, or the Father save the Son,' and is even more apparent in the whole tone of authority which marked the utterance and action of Jesus. He did not so appear as to admit of His being thought of in merely human terms. But he did appear as subject to human limitations and therefore to all the trials which beset the properly human spirit." 38

The next problem to be considered is that of Biblical inerrancy and our Lord's supposed preclusion of criticism. It must be remembered that the advocates of verbal inspiration pressed into service our Lord's references to the Flood, Jonah and Psalm 110 as guarantees of their historical nature. In keeping with his thesis Gore points out that It was not Christ's mission to reveal scientific truths; that He should have done so would have detracted from His main purpose. Apart from which it would have had the same dangers as the three temptations, had He given in to them.

"Once more, while as very Son Jesus knows the Father as He is known of Him, and reveals Him to whom He will, He does not appear to teach out of an absolute divine omniscience, but rather as conditioned by human nature." <sup>39</sup>

Thus our Lord could use the Old Testament, scriptures, and His lessons can be seen to inhere in them, even though we may be uncertain of their authorship.

If we may put it another way, our Lord was more concerned with the value of the Old Testament teaching rather than with the minutiae of higher criticism. But His own attitude cannot be held to be directly for or against.

What of our Lord's attitude to these Old Testament scriptures in general? Gore observes, with much justice, that Jesus moved from the mundane concepts of His contemporaries to the Old Testament scriptures with their higher ideals.<sup>40</sup> This is true of His approach as a whole, but especially where the idea of Messiahship is concerned. See, for instance, the world of difference introduced by Him in simply moving from the Christ of Psalm 110 as popularly understood, to that of Luke 24:26, 27. Moreover, he notes Christ's understanding of His purpose as fulfilling the Old Testament. But he does not regard this as binding us to accept Jewish traditions about authorship.

".....What the divine Spirit could inspire, Jesus in that same Spirit, could recognise and use. Further, He must have alluded to the books of the Old Testament by their recognised names,- the names by which men will refer to them when they are speaking ordinary human language." <sup>41</sup>

He was not attributing error or deficiency of knowledge to our Lord. His language is sufficiently cautious to exclude any such charge. It could not even be argued that Jesus was evading the issue - the question simply did not arise.

The passage which Gore treated with the utmost gravity is that which refers to Psalm 110. He places it in a group with Psalm 45 as referring not to the Messiah, but to a king. <sup>42</sup> He understands the question in the light of other questions put by our Lord to His hearers. To those who charged Him with being in league with Beelzebub; to the young man who called Him 'good'; to these and many others He bade 'consider your principles'.

If we can understand the questions, then the reference to Psalm 110 could not be construed as giving an infallible guarantee to Jewish tradition, as in fact it does not. This conclusion is reasonable, provided we accept that Jesus taught under conditions imposed by a properly human consciousness. But Gore points out that Jesus did not yield Himself up to fallible human reasonings.

What, then, of His reference to the end of the world and the uncertainty with which it seemed to be shrouded? Our Lord did not intend to reveal otherwise inaccessible information. Thus His references to the Trinity, for example, are overheard rather than directly proclaimed. Concerning life beyond the grave His communications are reserved; little information is given while men's thoughts are "rectified, spiritualised and moralized." The old metaphors of Gehenna and Abraham's bosom are retained, but no disclosure is made to supplement them; and so too is the Jewish belief in good and bad spirits.

Thus he states:

"The reserve which is noticeable in the content is not noticeable also in the method of our Lord's communications." <sup>43</sup>

He did not dispense answers to His disciples but trained them to do a great deal for themselves. Gore's idea of reserve has this merit - that it is consistent with the method of teaching generally employed by Jesus. It is also consistent with His mission as a whole, a mission which did not involve making any dramatic disclosures. Notice that Jesus did not reveal His identity but led men to recognise Him as the Messiah. But Gore's idea of reserve can be challenged if it is brought to bear on His knowledge of the end. Jesus did not disclose the time of the end; He did not lead His hearers to any certain knowledge of the time except that He mentioned features which would precede the end. Most important of all He Himself stated that the Son did not know - only <sup>He</sup> Father.

The reserve which Gore notes in the method of His teaching does not rule out the possibility that He knew.....The answer lies in the fact of Christ's being limited by the conditions of a nature which to Him was not 'natural'. "Reserve" is certainly not the best word here, useful as it may be.

Where the term reserve may serve some purpose is in the Ascension narrative of the Acts. As can be seen from our Lord's words prior to the Resurrection, the emphasis is placed on His not knowing. But in Acts 1:6,7, in answer to a specific question, He rejected the need to know. But this passage does not in itself suggest any new knowledge which He did not have prior to the Resurrection. The future was left vague and indefinite. "There was mistake", writes Gore, "but it was on the part of the disciples, and not of our Lord." One only needs to read 1 Thes. 4 to realise the justice of this statement.

For what was common to Paul was common to all the disciples. Jesus, then, gave no positive teaching about the end. He was empowered to reveal that which He knew; but He did not know and therefore could not reveal the end. So 'He left it vague and indefinite.' <sup>44</sup>

The argument passes on to a consideration of the relation of Christ's humanity to sin. We are struck, he asserts, not only by His likeness but by His unlikeness to ourselves. "In Him humanity is sinless." This sinlessness is in no way connected with lack of real human faculties; for this would obviously be to postulate a docetic Christ. Temptations for Him were real but were overcome because His will was always attuned to the Father's. "To say that He was sinless is to say that He was free." He was morally free - by which is meant not only that He could choose between good and evil; but that He habitually chose the good in preference to the evil, His will being in tune with the Father's.

Sin was for Him the disease which He came to heal, the havoc of an intruder whom He had to expel.

"He did not sin, because none of His faculties were disordered, there was no loose or ungoverned movement in His nature, no movement save under the control of His will.

He could not sin, because sin being what it is, rebellion against God, and He being what He was, the Father's Son in manhood, the human which was His instrument of moral action, could not choose to sin." <sup>45</sup>

"In Jesus Christ humanity was sinless." Gore repudiates the suggestion that man was made perfect and cites Clement in support of such rejection.

"They shall learn from us that he was not perfect in respect of his creation, but in a fit condition to receive virtue." Without wishing to divert attention to another subject, we ask what is the meaning of Genesis 1:31? And what do we mean by the Fall in Christian tradition?

Was man, after the Fall, in a fit condition to receive virtue? These are questions to which Gore has provided no answer; and we do not feel that Clement has satisfactorily explained the relation between the creation and the Fall.

Although Jesus betrayed none of the dogmatism of a renowned teacher, one is nevertheless struck by the authority with which He spoke. Unlike the prophets He spoke with an authority that was innate and not delegated. But He also spoke in language which betrayed no sense of sinfulness or unworthiness. Such an impression was being made on them that Jesus was taking the place of God or having the 'values of God' for their souls.<sup>46</sup> Gore then goes on to consider the critics of the alternatives "aut Deus aut homo non bonus." The real force of these alternatives has been too greatly overlooked. If Jesus were not God, then by creating the impression He did in men's minds was to enact a colossal imposture.

"The implication of infallible, exclusive authority which seems to inhere in the words and tone of Jesus seem to me to express, if not the jealousy of God, then some such quality as lies at the heart of all spiritual tyranny and false sacerdotalism." <sup>47</sup>

The force of Gore's argument can hardly be over-estimated. The miracles which Jesus did were signs pointing in a certain direction, and underlying claims which He was making for Himself. The prophets also performed remarkable feats, but they worked only as instruments of God. Then, too, we must bear in mind the great 'I am' passages of the fourth Gospel. <sup>48</sup> Here were explicit claims being made and claims which were nothing short of divinity. However much we may argue about the title 'Son of Man' which Jesus used in the synoptic Gospels, we must also consider the claims of such a passage as Mark 2:28 - the Son of Man is lord even of the sabbath.

Jesus was too direct to have been misunderstood, and His hearers were always faced with the question: what think ye of Christ?

But there were, and still are, criticisms of the moral perfection of Jesus. These are based on such acts of His as the cursing of the barren figtree or the woes pronounced on the scribes and pharisees. Gore firmly maintains that our Lord was not being spiteful or vengeful. He saw in the cursing of the figtree a doom pronounced on the outward show of fruitfulness. It was a miracle of judgement 'very penetrating in its significance.' Similarly the woes on the scribes and pharisees were probably directed at that class of them who were "deeply corrupted by formalism, self-righteousness, hypocrisy and self-seeking." Thus the prophetic picture of God and the Biblical doctrine of sin make the wrath of God against sin and the awfulness of final judgement remain quite essential and permanent elements of "the truth as it is in Jesus."

This miracle story has much moral content for us today and as Dr. Richardson put it "only those commentators who have no understanding of the Christological interpretation of the miracle stories," will fail to recognise this moral or religious value.<sup>49</sup> Gore would have agreed with him that the only *raison d'etre* of miracles in the Gospels was to point to who Jesus is.

As far as Gore was concerned, the Virgin Birth was an indispensable part of the Christian tradition. He calls attention to the fact that many writers, believers as well as unbelievers, rejected or doubted it. And it would appear that Gore was intolerant of this latter attitude,<sup>50</sup> for he regarded the denial of one as being the denial of the other. He puts this scepticism down to two causes. The first is the silence of Mark and John, together <sup>with</sup> the apostolic epistles; the second is the apparent discrepancy between the narratives of Matthew and Luke.<sup>51</sup>

The premise of his argument is threefold. In the first place he assumes the historical truth of the synoptists and John; in the second place he assumes the reality of the Resurrection and the possibility of miracles; and in the third place he assumes that Jesus Christ was Son of God incarnate. He then questions: could anyone doubt the historicity of the incarnation once he admits the miraculous personality and the Resurrection, and the idea of the Incarnation as best interpreting His person?

Beginning with the silent records, he points out that the original function of the apostles was to be witnesses. This limited their activity to the time of their association with Christ. Not only was His birth outside their limits, it would have been a grave distortion to have begun with it. He then undertakes to show that in these writings, which are 'silent' about the Virgin Birth, there was evidence that the authors believed it. But his argument is on the whole unconvincing, and often seems forced. <sup>52</sup>

Is there any reason to believe that Mark 6:3 was altered because that evangelist said nothing previously to remove misunderstanding? Do Galatians 4:4 and Romans 1:3 prove anything beside the fact of Christ's real humanity? Why does Gore overlook John 8:41? It does not seem, pace Westcott, that the argument here refers to the Fatherhood of God. It was their physical descent from Abraham to which Jesus referred and which prompted this reply. The verse reminds us of the Matthaean story, and especially of Joseph's intention to put Mary away.

What of the two narratives in Matthew and Luke? In the case of the latter he suggests that it was based on an early Jewish narrative. The story itself derived from Mary and breathes the 'spirit of the Messianic hope' before being frustrated in the rejection of the Messiah. The aged Simeon could foresee doom, but this and other prophetic utterances did not anticipate the work of the Child. He is untroubled by the difficulties concerning the census as well as by the problem of angelic appearances, and is able to set them aside.

On the other hand the version of Matthew shows traces of coming from Joseph. It is the latter's perplexities which are in question. He dismisses the suggestion that the prophecies created the events, pointing out not only Luke's agreement with Matthew about Jesus' birthplace, although the former did not connect this with prophecy; but also that there were other prophecies not used by Matthew which might have suggested, but could not have produced, the events recorded by him. <sup>53</sup> Yet Matthew did not refer to them. His conclusion is that the events taught Christians to read prophecy afresh.

Despite the fact that the narratives are independent, they are not incompatible; and he gives a harmony of the two. <sup>54</sup> Again the genealogies show differences, but this does not disturb him as they agree on the essential point - that Jesus was descended from David.

He ends with an insistence on belief in the Virgin Birth of Jesus, showing that despite some denials, it was held in the Church of both East and West. He, being who He was, His birth could not be other than miraculous. The circumstances of His life and His resurrection were likewise miraculous, and differed so greatly from the life of any national heroes as to exclude the idea that the birth narratives were legendary.

Ut quid enim descendebat? It is unfortunate that Gore could not give more space to answering this question. Who Christ is<sup>is</sup> closely bound up with what He does. In his RECONSTRUCTION he rejects the Shakespearean or Renaissance estimate of man as being contrary to that of the prophet or reformer. The Christian view, he asserts, is of mankind so far on the wrong road that he needs to be, and can only be, redeemed by God. The Bible represents a distinction between creature and Creator just as righteousness is opposed to sin.

Because of the distinction between God and man there is need for the redemption of man; and by redemption Gore means the actual restoration of man into the moral likeness of God. Both the Old Testament and the New speak of the kingdom of God. This he defines as a perfected fellowship between man and God. But sin, being what it is, there cannot be such fellowship unless there is agreement between both parties. And similarly there could be no fellowship between man except they unite together in obedience to God and in correspondence with His will. Only one thing could change the face of God towards man and that is repentance - the change of his own heart and will.

On some difficult aspects of the Old and New Testaments Gore is careful to point out that there is no distinction in the mind or disposition of Father or Son. Any distinction which has been made he declares unscriptural.<sup>55</sup> Thus he shows the New Testament as contradicting this Marcionite heresy when it says:

God so loved the world that He gave.....The same compassion which is evident in the Son is evident also in the Father. Next Gore rejects the punitive theory of the Atonement which is also unscriptural. Christ's death - His sacrifice on the cross - was a voluntary act on His part. St. John faithfully reports the words of Christ who claimed power to lay down and to take again His own life. From this point of view alone Christ's death could not be construed as a punishment<sup>for this</sup> is alientation from God. This principle which Gore accepts brings to mind another problem. The sacrifice of Christ may be regarded as eternal, springing from the love of God. If God punished Christ, is not this punishment of the nature of eternity? Is it not also of the nature of fiction and blasphemy?

From a consideration of Christ's work for us Gore goes on to consider His work in us; for the two are not mutually exclusive, but one has the other as its compliment.

First of all he speaks of Christ as our example - He in whom humanity was made perfect. Christ's life on earth was one continuous life of obedience. The standard which He set is in sharp contrast to modern ideas of human independence. In great contrast <sup>to</sup> us, too, is His self-restraint in which every passion was controlled by His will, the latter being moved only by the Spirit. Elsewhere Gore had written: "Jesus Christ is the Catholic man." <sup>56</sup> Like all truly great men Christ transcends His age; but unlike them He is not subject to the limitation which makes our manhood "narrow and isolated, merely local or national." And therefore we can each see ourselves in Him <sup>ir</sup>regardless of the race to which we belong. But can this example appeal to many? Jesus foresaw this contingency when He said "Narrow is the gate and straitened the way, that leadeth unto life, and few be they that find it." <sup>57</sup> And the New Testament itself shows a contempt for majorities.

Jesus is no mere example, however. It was expedient for the disciples that they should be without Him in order that they might receive the gift of the Spirit.

"The Spirit is the life-giver, but the life with which He works in the Church is the life of the Incarnate, the life of Jesus." 58

Jesus is more than a remotely historical figure; the moral forces which were at work in His life "are all without exception, and without deterioration, at work in our life today." Jesus is the same yesterday, today and forever; and His demand on our lives is the same as it was on the lives of His contemporaries.

The New Theology must be given special treatment here because the trend which it represented could not be taken into account in his previous works. As its name implies it was new, but it might be said that it carried to extremes Gore's representation of Christ as Consummator of nature. The New Theology was based on a philosophy of immanence, one of its tenets being that man and God are of one substance. Thus R. J. Campbell, one of its chief exponents, could find no dividing line between "our being and God's."

Gore challenged this and rightly exposed its one-sided nature, pointing out that it fell far short of the best either in philosophy or in religion. <sup>59</sup> What Campbell seemed to have lost sight of, that Gore confidently asserts - that transcendence was as much a part of the Christian concept of God as was immanence. He shows the superiority of the Christian concept to be three-fold. First, that it had a much stronger moral power than the pantheism which was a natural corollary of this type of philosophy; that immanence would lead to an a-moral state. Secondly he points to the distinctive revelation of the Jews and Christians which gives a more secure basis to our religious beliefs than mere speculation. And thirdly, he shows that the Christians concept, being a via media between Deism and pantheism, is more comprehensive and more intellectually satisfying.

The next point at which the New Theology proved to be defective was in its concept of sin. The failure to represent sin as it really is lay in the firm commitment to the philosophy of evolution.

And so this school regarded sin as belonging to the animal nature out of which we have developed, and is only a phase which is being outgrown. <sup>60</sup> Campbell, therefore, could conceive of no such thing as a Fall, holding only that the coming of finite creatures into being is itself a fall. <sup>61</sup> And he could not tolerate, as a result, the idea of God's wrath against sin. Gore took his stand on the side of the Bible where both the prophets and our Lord Himself showed great indignation against sin. He goes further and shows that our Lord placed the greatest emphasis on sins of a spiritual nature and not on those of a physical nature. Thus our Lord has shown that sin lies rooted in man's will, but shows no sign of regarding it as a temporary error which can be outgrown. The whole New Testament and the Church's doctrine are in conformity with this view. of sin.

Gore sees the virtue of the Christian view of sin to lie in its moral effects.

Let men know God's love and 'the freedom of which their nature is capable;' let them realise that only one thing bars their way to communion with God, and immediately they are inspired with hope. The possibility exists that man will regain mastery over himself. But if it is allowed that the fault lies in the body, sin will be regarded as a misfortune. This tendency at one time prevailed and was the cause of an extreme ascetism.<sup>62</sup> The natural conclusion would be to let things run their course; and it is in this way that the New Theology's view weakens the moral appeal.

What, then, of the divinity of Jesus Christ? Since God and man are not distinct, therefore Christ differs from each man only in degree. "For what Christ is, we are all in various degrees capable of becoming."<sup>63</sup> Since man possesses what might be called the latent divinity, this teaching also asserts a gradual incarnation in humanity.<sup>64</sup> This position is far more intolerable to Gore than the "old-fashioned Unitarianism which said that Christ is not God."

He insists that this view of Christ is sub-Christian, that Christ was the Son of God who became true man but new man. <sup>65</sup> Thus Jesus Christ is divine and none of the sons of men can be said to be so.

"Thus He lived very God, but under conditions of manhood and human experience, a true human life - hiding not Himself from His own flesh, but bearing all the burden of a proper manhood in a world of sin. He makes His life, what man's life should be - a free-will offering to God His Father." <sup>66</sup>

Gore's expression here of the person of Christ is a marked improvement on the theory of abandonment which he elsewhere stressed. And Christ's life, as he represented it in that last sentence, seems much nearer to what Paul's kenosis meant.

Whereas the Deists recognised miracles - at least in the form of occasional visits from the absent watch-maker diety - the immanentists could find no place for the miraculous.

So that two tendencies arose. In the first, miracles of healing were explained away as examples of the power of mind over matter; in the second the nature miracles were denied altogether. Gore's reply to this is that God, though manifested in the world, is not limited by it. God's action in the Incarnation was abnormal, but it was prompted by an equally abnormal circumstance - the sinful state of the world. Had God not acted in this way His action would have been mechanical and not rational. Thus the Incarnation is God's great act of redemption or recreation to restore a disordered world. 67

Examining, next, the miracles reported in the Bible, he points out that these were signs and were not intended merely as portents. They were the counterparts of Christ's teaching, so closely interwoven, that to discredit the one would be to discredit the other. If Jesus' teaching were regarded as authentic so too must the miracles be.

He insists that Christ's miracles must be interpreted as laws of His nature - works which to lower beings must necessarily appear supernatural, whereas to Christ they are natural. He is equally insistent on the authenticity of the Resurrection. This event, together with Christ's subsequent appearances to the apostles, was the basis of that confidence upon which the Church was founded. <sup>68</sup> There may be discrepancy in the accounts, but this did not militate against the fact itself. There was a definite result of the Resurrection:

"If we may so express it, their lives were driven round a sharp corner, or set on a new basis." <sup>69</sup>

That basis was God's vindication of His Son in the reversal of the event of Calvary.

NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO:

1. LUX MUNDI, Preface, p. ~~19~~. xix<sup>4</sup>
2. "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration," an Essay by C. Gore in LUX MUNDI, p. 341. See Athanasius, DE INCARNATIONE, xii.5. Cross edition, p. 19.
3. Gore, op. cit., p. 343.
4. Op. cit., p. 346.
5. Ibid., p. 347.
6. Ibid., pp. 352ff.
7. Ibid., 356.
8. Ibid., pp. 358f.
9. See, for example. De. Inc. viii. 3; ix.2.
10. LUX MUNDI, p. 360, m.2. Gore regards it throughout as an act of self-sacrifice.
11. G. L. Prestige, LIFE OF CHARLES GORE, p. <sup>105</sup>LUX Mundana, stupor mundi, G.W.J. Sparrow Simpson in Northern Catholicism, p. 64.
12. THE INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD (Bampton Lectures) p. 29.

13. Bampton Lectures, pp.33ff.
14. Op. cit., 35.
15. Ibid., p. 39. cf. pp. 40f. On Christ as both Consummator and Redeptor.
16. Ibid. p. 39.
17. Ibid. p. 44.
18. Ibid. p. 45.
19. Ibid. p. 145.
20. Ibid. p. 156.
21. Frank Weston, THE ONE CHRIST, pp. 110f.
22. C. Gore, DISSERTATIONS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE INCARNATION, p. 89. For the whole, cf. also Bampton Lectures, p. 157f.
23. Bampton Lectures, p. 111.
24. Dissertations, p.89; Bampton Lectures, p. 111. 230; CAN WE THEN BELIEVE? p.193. n.7.
25. Bampton Lectures, 158, 9. cf. also Dissertations, p.89; THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BELIEF. p.510. Speaking of Christ's self-sacrifice, Gore writes:

"It consists in this, that one who existed in the nature of God consented to abandon this to us inconceivable glory of life, in order to accept the conditions and limitations and sufferings of real manhood."

26. Bampton Lectures, 159; cf. Can We Then Believe? 194, where Gore writes very much the same thing:

"In seeking to realise the meaning of the Incarnation we are bound to recognize that within that sphere what we behold is not God in the whole of His attributes merely veiling Himself in humanity, but God having abandoned whatever was inconsistent with a really human experience, in order that by such self-emptying His real self, which is love, might be truly manifested."

27. Reconstruction, p. 510.  
28. Bampton Lectures, p.159.

29. Dissertations, pp. 92f; cf. *ibid.* 206. On p. 93 of this work, Gore does not, however, rule out completely the exercise of omniscience. He does, however, limit it to another sphere.

"Nor can we dissociate the fulfilment of these functions from the exercise of omniscience."

30. J. S. Wild, Summary of THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST IN CONSERVATIVE BRITISH PROTESTANTISM OF THE PRESENT TIME, p. 16.

31. Dissertations, pp.94f., cf. Reconstruction, pp. 521ff.

32. Gore speaks of limitation for example in the Bampton Lectures, p. 160, Dissertations, p.95., Cf. pp. 94, 204, 206, where abandonment and limitation are synonymous.

33. Frank Weston, *op. cit.*, p.133.

34. Can We Then Believe? p. 194, n.7.

35. Bampton Lectures, p.145. Cf. Dissertations, p.78, n.2. See also Reconstructions, pp. 350-364 for Sonship and Messiahship.

36. Dissertations. p. 97. Cf. Bampton Lectures, pp. 156f.
37. Bampton Lectures, p.<sup>22</sup>147; cf. Dissertations, p.80.
38. Can We Then Believe? p.195.
39. Bampton Lectures, 147; of Dissertations, p.80.
40. Bampton Lectures, p.193.
41. Ibid., p. 196.
42. See Bampton Lectures, p.197. Cf. G. W. Anderson in the New Peake:

"In all probability it refers to a king of pre-exilic Judah. It begins with an oracle of Yahweh delivered, presumably, by a priest or cultic prophet, assuring the king of lofty status and of the subjugation of his enemies."

43. Bampton Lectures, p.180.
44. Reconstructions, p.450.
45. Bampton Lectures, pp.166f.
46. Reconstruction, p.349. Cf. Ritschl's value idea.
47. Ibid, 349.
48. See John 4:26; 6:51; 8:58; and also 9:37; 10:11.

49. Alan Richardson, THE MIRACLE STORIES OF THE GOSPELS;  
pp. 55f.
50. W. R. Inge, OUTSPOKEN ESSAYS, Series 1.p. 12.
51. Dissertations, pp. 3f.
52. See for example, his arguments on the second Adam,  
p.11; on the Wedding at Cana, p.9; and especially  
his relating Revelation 12 to the Matthaean version  
o f the Nativity.
53. Dissertations, pp.34f.
54. Ibid. p.37.
55. Reconstruction, p.591.
56. Bampton Lectures, p.168.
57. Matthew 7:14, R.V.
58. Bampton Lectures, p.218.
59. THE NEW THEOLOGY AND THE OLD RELIGION, pp.44f.
60. N.T.O. R. p.61.
61. Ibid., p.62f.
62. Ibid., p.79.
63. Ibid., p.86, a quotation from Lodge's Catechism.
64. Ibid., p.85.
65. Ibid., p.90.Cf. p.95 where he writes:

"It is true manhood we see in the  
sinless Jesus but new manhood: a  
second Adam in divines power to  
redress the balance of the first."

66. Ibid., p.90. Cf. p.94 on the Incarnation as a  
recreative act.
67. Ibid., p.114. cf. 94.
68. Ibid., p.118.
69. Ibid., p. 121.

### 3. ITS IMPACT ON CHRISTOLOGICAL THINKING

#### A - In the Nineteenth Century.

To say that Gore's essay in LUX MUNDI was not well received would be to utter something of an understatement. In the year following the first appearance of the volume, ten editions were published - a fact which does not necessarily prove the popularity of the writers. Even before the volume was published, Gore discovered that all was not going to meet the approval of their readers. Not that he wished to change the conclusions to which his studies had led him; but he was sensitive by nature and would have preferred not to have caused anyone grief. He was particularly concerned about his friend Liddon whose position, oddly enough, was in the same relation to Gore's in 1889 as was Pusey's to the Bampton Lecturer of 1866.

"I hear from Paget that evil rumours have reached you of our Essay book - LUX MUNDI. I believe you will approve almost all of it. What you will like least are a few pages, I am afraid, of my essay."

I send it herewith, so that, if you wish,  
you may know the worst." <sup>1</sup>

Whereas Liddon approved the earlier of the essay the  
latter part, as was expected, filled him with alarm.

"I did not suspect," he wrote, <sup>2</sup> that he had  
constructed a private kennel for liberalising  
ideas in Theology within the precincts of the  
Old Testament ~~and as much of the New Testament~~  
and as much of the New Testament as bears upon  
it."

And ~~also~~:

"LUX MUNDI is a proclamation of revolt against  
the spirit and principles of Dr. Pusey and Mr.  
Keble."

Liddon was not hostile but he was not encouraging  
either. He desired of Gore a modification or even  
an abandonment of the second part of the essay, as he  
feared that that might endanger the Tractarian position. <sup>3</sup>  
He even suggested that the essay be subjected to epis-  
copal censorship before publication.

This attitude greatly disturbed Gore who was reluctant to publish the essay, and <sup>who</sup> only went through with it on the encouragement of Dean Church.

It is a pity that Liddon had to occupy a position so much at variance with Gore's. There were already many who showed hostility without understanding the problems involved, and without carefully considering the solutions which were attempted. Gore's attitude to critical studies could not be compared with that of the author of "Bunsen's Biblical Researches" in ESSAYS AND REVIEWS. IT is true that Gore accepted some of the conclusions of the critics, but not without carefully sifting the evidence. If by 'liberalising & ideas' Liddon meant Gore's differentiating of the Old Testament literature into myths, drama history, and so forth, he would be hard put to it to show how, in so doing, the latter had done injustice to the sacred writings.

For Gore's theory of inspiration proclaimed that God was the source of the Bible, but that fallible men expressed themselves through the medium they were best able to use. Thus he was primarily concerned to defend the content of the Biblical revelation.

What was also surprising was Liddon's charge that the Lux Mundi school revolted against the principles of Pusey and Keble. Pusey was a great Hebrew scholar in his day. There could be no doubt about his knowledge of Biblical criticism on the continent, and of his acceptance of some of the views then current. But his attitude towards criticism and the critical method would have differed from that of his German counterparts. Pusey was what a later generation would have called conservative; and the same can be said of Gore. Nevertheless we are bound to view with sympathy the fears which prompted Liddon's remarks. The work of the Tübingen scholars was not so distant in the memory; and only the sober and patient work of Driver and the Cambridge trio relieved the suspicion which many felt on this matter.

A great many of the criticisms against LUX MUNDI were hostile. Of Fr. Ignatius of Llanthony and Arch-deacon Denison little need be said. Their attack on Gore was severe, but they probably did more harm to themselves and their cause than to him. The reviewer in the Church Quarterly Review protested against Gore's attitude to the sacred text. On the question of prophecy, he held very firmly to the belief that "the whole predictive announcement was supernaturally freed from liability to mistake." <sup>4</sup> He charged Gore with referring too much of the prophets' message to their fallible mind, On the other hand the theory which he offered left nothing to them. The charge is unjust, for Gore strongly emphasised the dependence of the prophets upon the Holy Spirit, though he admitted the influence of their age upon their manner of expressing themselves. <sup>5</sup>

It would not be unfair to say that the criticisms resulted from fundamentalism. This is revealed in the unwillingness to admit that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, or that the present book of Isaiah is a composite work.

But when the value of the warnings about Lot's wife and Noah are made dependent upon on their being actual events,<sup>8</sup> then we feel that the reviewer is claiming too much. For if his argument on this matter is correct, what must be said of the story of Dives and Lazarus? Is it valueless or, if it has value, can it necessarily be said to be based on an actual event? Again the premise for arguing against Gore's interpretation of Psalm 110 is wrong.<sup>7</sup> The force of our Lord's words does not depend on Davidic authorship. Jesus is arguing from the position of His hearers and the beliefs held by them, not from His own beliefs. A further question may be asked of the reviewer: If Jesus had employed His omniscience in His teaching, would it have been right or wrong?

Gore himself was surprised at the controversy over his essay and sought, in the tenth edition, to answer some of the critics. He pointed out, with some justice, that due regard for the writers' point of view would have obviated some of the criticisms.<sup>8</sup>

In considering the charges against his essay, he remarks that their aim, as a group, was not to question how the books of the Bible came into being. This would have involved a more voluminous composition, and he himself was not equipped for the task. What they had in fact purposed to do was to divert anxious minds from questions which were insoluble, and to centre their attention on Christ - the basis of our faith. He insists that the analytical method should be acknowledged. Yet his position is not one of capitulation to the modern climate of thought. There is still for him the need to be on guard against the destructive element.

"But like the scientific movement of our time, the critical movement has been accompanied by all the arbitrariness and tendency to push things to extremes which appears to be an inseparable attendant upon living and vigorous movements, ecclesiastical and secular." 9

It is hard to see how Gore's attitude to criticism could have been challenged in view of his own clear statement at the end of that provocative essay. The warning he sounds must be stated in his own words:

"But if we thus plead that theology may leave the field open for free discussion of these questions which Biblical criticism has recently been raising, we shall probably be bidden to 'remember Tübingen', and not be overtrustful of a criticism which at least exhibits in some of its most prominent representatives a great deal of arbitrariness, of love of 'new views' for their own sake, and a great lack of that reverence and spiritual insight which is at least as much needed for understanding the books of the Bible, as accurate knowledge and fair investigation."<sup>10</sup>

In the absence of any clear proof that Gore's writings contradicted what he here expresses, his position is justified.

He represents the analytical method as being in direct succession to Origen and other allegorizing fathers. But in the absence of a definite understanding of inspiration - even in the Roman Church - it would not have been easy to press charges against adherents of Biblical criticism.

We must consider some of the criticisms of his major works on the kenotic doctrine. The reviewer of the Bampton Lectures for 1891 <sup>11</sup>. strongly emphasises, as a double premise, that the Bible is the test of truth; and that the Church is a living voice asserting that truth. Therefore he calls in question Gore's attitude to the Church's witness - an attitude which suggests that the Church has erred. To which he objected:

"Since the fully accepted decrees of the Church are certain truth, they may rightly be used as sources of theological thought infallibly teaching all which they necessarily imply.....<sup>12</sup>

This language is strong and unjustifiable. If we were to press the last words above to their logical conclusion, might we not find ourselves with as many doctrines as the rules which the Pharisees gave to the Jews? The extremity to which the reviewer has moved is no justification for what otherwise is a valid criticism of Gore.

While appreciating in the book the strong sense of the 'unity of God's work in nature and in grace', the reviewer nevertheless charges Gore with confusing the real distinction between the natural and the supernatural. He acknowledges that it is the same God who creates and sustains, redeems and sanctifies. But <sup>he</sup> contends that in revelation and grace natural laws are superseded by a more immediate and personal intervention of God. In a passage from the lectures he lauds what he considers Gore's approval of the distinction which he here draws; though he expresses his regret at the blurring of natural and supernatural elsewhere. To deal with the last first, it is obvious that his criticism is just.

Gore does put forward a theory <sup>13</sup> which he was later to challenge in R. J. Campbell and others of the New Theology school. In his first lecture Gore uses language which goes a long way in damaging his position. Thus he writes:

"In presenting Jesus Christ to you, as Christians believe on Him, I must necessarily present to you one who, though human, is yet, what is called miraculous and supernatural. It will be my endeavour in the next lecture, so to interpret these words 'supernatural' and 'miraculous' as to make it apparent that the supernatural in Jesus is not unnatural, and the miraculous not the 'reversal' or the 'suspension' of nature; rather, that Jesus Christ incarnate is the legitimate climax of natural development, so that the study of nature - if only in that term moral nature is included - is the true preparation for welcoming the Christ." <sup>14</sup>

While asserting that Christ, even on a humanitarian estimate, remains unique, Gore does not satisfactorily represent that unique position of Christ. Though he points to Christ as Redeptor as well as Consummator, he does not press this home in the Bampton Lectures.

That there was any ignorance in the Incarnate the reviewer would not allow. He cannot believe that His marvelling at unbelief or asking questions are proof of ignorance; neither do His prayers, or agony in the garden, or cry of dereliction constitute such proof. That our Lord's knowledge differed from the illumination of prophets is a reasonable and sound objection to Gore. If He were only inspired as the prophets were,<sup>15</sup> the theory fails to do justice to the fact that He was God. It does not safeguard Christ's unique position such as is emphasised by St. John.<sup>16</sup> The reviewer's treatment of Mark 13: 32 is quite unsatisfactory.

While the statement does not show habitual ignorance - the choice of word is unfortunate - yet there is nothing to show that in that discourse Jesus was speaking with "every minute and accurate knowledge of many future details." <sup>17</sup> If as Gore shows Jesus depended upon His Father for His message; <sup>18</sup> and if the human is the only medium of expression of the divine, then limitation of knowledge would better express what Gore means than ignorance. For though the prophets received their message from God none of them was God incarnate; and this is a distinguishing feature which should be enough to destroy the analogy.

If the reviewer looked with severity on Gore's statements in the Bampton Lectures concerning the ignorance of the Incarnate, the appearance of the Dissertations did nothing to appease. Whereas the Bampton Lectures showed ambiguity on this point, the careful wording of the Dissertations and the method of the argument declare unmistakably the writer's point of view.

The theory of ignorance is indissolubly bound up with the idea of abandonment as presented by Gore. The reviewer rightly rejects the abandonment, preferring St. Basil's interpretation of the Son's knowledge as derived from the Father; and interpreting this passage (Mark 13:32) as meaning that 'the Divine knowledge of the Son was not translated into the mode of his human mind.'<sup>19</sup> That there was limitation or restraint cannot be doubted; but the ignorance on which Gore insisted exposed him to this censure:

"The truth is that it is not the 'positive evidence' from Holy Scripture at all, but an arbitrary impatience of leaving unexplained a 'juxtaposition' of what is Divine and what is human, that is to be the observed as the cause of the theory which the Dissertations defend."<sup>20</sup>

There is some truth in the charge. But it is impossible to agree that the incarnate "possesses omniscience and at times makes use of it."

There is one question which it leaves unexplained: why did Christ say that the Son did not know? He might well have said, as He did in Acts 1:7, it is not for you to know. The reviewer also treats with severity Gore's dismissal of patristic writers on this point. He challenges the latter's acceptance of the opinion of a few whose chance remarks were in agreement with his own, and questions his orthodoxy. <sup>21</sup> He concludes, after a few remarks on the writers Gore favoured, that to both fathers and schoolmen his was an untenable hypothesis. He criticises a tendency which was true not only of Gore, but of kenotists generally, that they impaired the Church's emphasis on the assumption of manhood. And he asserts the truth of the Athanasian Creed - not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking up of manhood into God. Kenoticism started, or seemed to start, from the wrong end.

There is another criticism of kenoticism to which some consideration must be given. This appeared in the Church Quarterly Review of 1898:

"The readiness to accept modern theories of kenoticism.....seems to proceed not so much from the supposed satisfactory nature of the theories themselves, as from the fact that they afford an easy mode of getting rid of certain sayings of our Lord <sup>about</sup> ~~and~~ Noah and Moses and David and Jonah." 22

Whether applied to Gore or to any other, we can find no justification for an opinion such as this. Especially in the case of Gore the charge is most unjust. We must beware of judging harshly the protagonists of this line of thought. Set as they were on largely fundamentalist principles, and conscious of the havoc done by critics on the continent, they were so overcautious as to misunderstand Gore on this matter.

There should, today, be considerably few who do not hold his position on the sayings concerning Noah, Moses, and so forth. Far from getting rid of them, he enriched them by considering them in their context and discussing them against the background of our Lord's teaching generally.

B. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

While there were many who were hostile to the theory advanced by Gore, there were also some who adhered to it. Among those who approved the new views were Driver of Cambridge and R.L. Ottley. Whereas it could be said that in the last decade of the nineteenth century there was great opposition to kenoticism; in the first twenty-five years of this century there was correspondingly greater acceptance of it. The most outstanding Christologists of this period would be Frank Weston, P. T. Forsyth, H. R. Mackintosh, and William Temple.

It is our aim to review briefly the writings of three of these as typifying a direct line of development from Gore, and also as exemplifying an improvement on the type of Christology which he espoused. First of all, Weston who criticised kenoticism generally, but whose thesis restates Christology in terms which render it kenotic. Secondly Forsyth who, like H. R. Mackintosh after him, laid great emphasis on the soteriological basis of Christology; and who allowed for a plerosis as complementing the kenosis. Thirdly Temple who, like Weston, is kenotic though he seems hostile to that theory. But he is also included because he stands at the end of the period under review and is regarded as one of those in whom is to be found the true succession to Gore.

The problem which faced Weston was that of accounting for the presence of creating and created will in a single Person, without some modification of the omnipotence of God the Son. <sup>23</sup>

He began by reviewing the three broad lines followed in Christology, in which he finds that the Logos in His universal state is too completely separated from the Logos in His incarnate state. <sup>24</sup> And explains his task as being that of formulating a theory which would not separate the two states, but would provide for the "reality, ~~performance~~ <sup>permanence</sup>, and co-existence of the two states of the Incarnate." Thus his premise is that the Creeds and the Chalcedonian Definition are lines of limitation. He emphasises that the union does not involve a mingling of the natures; and that the each remains in the proper possession of its attributes. <sup>25</sup> In approaching the problem of the unlimited Logos, he notes briefly the views of early Christologists and expresses his preference for the Athanasian position. But even this school is at fault in placing together the Logos as self limited and the Logos as self-limiting. They must be separate.

"For the act of self-limiting is as different from the state of being self-limited as an act of choice between two actions is different from the act of performing the selected action." 26

What are his objections to the earlier Christologies? Weston puts them in three sections: first and fundamentally is the error "that the ego of manhood must, in some sense, be necessarily a man. The Antiochene teachers could not conceive of anyone who was not a man exercising human functions humanly and completely; and in this failure they had many followers." This type of teaching required a great limitation of the eternal Son and created a difficulty similar to kenoticism. Secondly if the divine Person may so limit his proper powers as to be the ego of man that the human nature taken of Mary should have been constituted in him as its proper self. Another self beside him was unnecessary. So Weston argues against this that the ego of Christ is the eternal Son of God, that the manhood of Christ was personal and constituted in the self-limited Logos.

And further that whereas we may differentiate actions which are proper to either the human or divine nature, we cannot conceive of even human action being performed without the divine nature. Thirdly, against ideas of composition of personality, Weston refutes any suggestion of suspended activity of the Logos or of gradual union. For it distinguishes, impossibly, the babe from the crucified; its logical conclusion would be Nestorianism and it would rob the Atonement of its meaning.

In criticising the kenotic theories Weston observes that they all have as their basis the deliberate sacrifice of the eternal Son in order that He may be the 'adequate subject of the manhood He willed to assume.'<sup>22</sup> But he also notes that the various manifestations of the theory carry with them nearly as many errors. Thus Thomasius' theory had postulated a double consciousness of the Incarnate in spite of the abandonment of His powers; Whereas Godet strongly teaches the cessation of the Word from His cosmic functions during the period of the Incarnation.

And this poses a problem of the first order. Less extreme kenotists did not require a complete abandonment of ~~divine~~ powers. Martensen, for instance, allowed for the continued cosmic functions of the Logos; but he regarded the Incarnate as deity framed in the ring of humanity.<sup>28</sup> If Martensen came close to Apollinarius in making the Logos Christ's soul, his theory was advantageous in leaving to the Logos the power over Himself. While Gore tended to follow this latter trend, he yet taught a complete self-abandonment by the Logos for the duration of the Incarnation. We must see the Incarnate as at once actually ignorant and at the same time an infallible teacher. This theory, to him, suffered from the dual conception of the Logos as unlimited and self-abandoned; so that basically Gore ~~represented~~ the same error as Thomasius.

In general whereas Weston can approve their efforts to give proper place to the manhood, he rejects the idea of abandonment.

He suggests instead that Paul taught an emptying of the characteristics of equality with God so that the Son may assume the characteristics of slavery. With the result that the contrast lies between the freedom of the Son and the limitation of the slave.<sup>29</sup> Moreover he stresses the eternity of the divine attributes, rejecting as false the notion that God has accidental attributes which may be laid aside at will.<sup>30</sup> How the attributes were thereafter resumed becomes difficult to conceive.

"It is surely a much richer thought that the self-limitation is continuous from the moment of the conception onwards; that at every moment He willed to live in conditions of manhood, and that in His acceptance of the law that governs this life lies the value of the Incarnation as an act of divine self sacrifice. In time and through eternity the Christ is God the Son, self-limited in manhood."<sup>31</sup>

The isolation of the period of the Incarnation is for him intolerable, and his theory of the eternity of the union is a real gain for the Church. Even at his best Gore did not allow for the continuous, or rather the eternal, union of the two natures in Christ.

How, then, is the problem to be resolved? Weston offers many points which are worthy of our consideration. First of all that the Person who became incarnate is purely divine, and that His Incarnation in no way hindered His divine activities in the universe. That the Incarnation is to men a theophany while, at the same time, it is to God an anthropophany. His manhood is His own proper nature 'constituted in His own divine person as self-limited.' This manhood is like ours in every other respect save sin; for having been united with the Son at the conception it remained sinless. Neither could the manhood be construed as merely an external organ. It is a premise of Weston's theory that perfect manhood is manhood aided by God; <sup>32</sup> and therefore he emphasises this point strongly, and with it the idea that an abandoned Logos would have meant that manhood was reconciled to God unaided.

But setting aside the theory of abandonment does not rob the Incarnation of its sacrificial aspect, for God could only become man at great cost. <sup>33</sup>

Weston has a great deal to say about the consciousness of the Incarnate; and he begins by asserting that the Incarnate knew Himself only in "so far as his human soul could mediate that knowledge." <sup>34</sup> Consonant with his emphasis on the enduring nature of the union, Weston explains his conception of the self-consciousness of Christ.

"For myself, the daylight shines most fully at the point in which I am able to assign to the universal sphere of Logos-activity all the self-limitation that was necessary for the mediation of Christ's consciousness by His manhood." <sup>35</sup>

Again it must be pointed out that with all the good points in his Christology, this is one area in which Gore's shortcoming is noticeable.

Over and over again the act of limitation is represented as one act, at a particular time prior to the Incarnation. Thus he failed to relate the self-consciousness of the Logos to that of the Incarnate. Weston has been able to relate both and to show that there is only one self-consciousness. But this single self-consciousness does not mean that Christ possessed one will.

"All this kind of thought could be avoided were we to bear in mind that the will is a function of a person, inseparable from him. It is not a part of him: it is a mode of his self-manifestation."

Hence the Incarnate who lives and acts in manhood must either cease to be God, or He must exercise His divine will." <sup>36</sup>

Neither does he mean here an annihilation of the human will as he later showed. For he states that Christ can only express Himself in manhood personally and humanly:

"that is, through His divine and human wills. He is the ego of the manhood: and a human will is an essential function of such an ego." <sup>37</sup>

Lastly he shows that the Incarnate underwent a truly human experience; but more than that, He set us a truly human example. Yet Weston stresses that His example was not merely human. For, however He may limit His powers, He can never be other than divine. In addition to which he asserts that the value of redemption lies not in Christ's assumption of weak human nature; but in His true and proper use of it as a sacrifice to God and as a source of power to His people.

Weston ends with a statement of personality - a term which expresses "the quality of being a person or self-conscious subject." <sup>38</sup> It is clear, from this chapter, that for him personality and self-consciousness are almost synonymous. He differentiates six attributes of personality which are self-consciousness, self-determination, self-identity, self-expression, individuality, and unity. <sup>39</sup>

First of all in self-consciousness, each Person of the Trinity knows himself as individual and also as being in the Godhead. The Son has this double consciousness, as well as the consciousness of Himself as distinct from all creatures. So that in a divine Person self-consciousness is omniscience and, in limiting His self-consciousness, the Son limited His omniscience. In the divine omnipotence is self-determination - God's freedom to realize His own Holiness. But each Person of the Trinity is not independent; each Person is free within the relationship of the Godhead. The Incarnate possesses omnipotence, but His omnipotence is conditioned.

"In the Divine Being self-identity is expressed rather in the term eternal." The incarnate Son, though assuming our nature, remains always God. Self-expression is necessary to the realization of self. Self-expression in the Godhead is omnipresence; for the Son it is "the power of existing only in eternal and internal relations to the Father and the Spirit." Man is not independent - the human self is not exclusive; and this exclusiveness is ruled out of the spiritual life.

Despite the unity of the Godhead each Person is conceived as individually God: the Father as the source; the Son receiving and dependent; the Spirit as eternally receiving the Godhead from the Father and the Son.<sup>40</sup> While we can see the point which Weston wishes to make, his manner of representing the individuality of the divine Persons is far from satisfactory. What does he mean by postulating receptivity of the 'Godhead' on the part of the Son and the Spirit? He certainly has not made himself clear on this point. On the unity - God is one and so is His will; but the Son and Spirit are not merely moved by the Father.

"The Father originates, the Son images and in imaging freely makes His own; while the Spirit unifies the origination and the image in one active expression of the threefold will."<sup>41</sup>

There are many good things in Weston's description of personality.

But is he not too divisive in the attributes which he presents as explaining personality? We cannot feel that they can all be justified; for the attributes of Individuality and Unity only repeat what in essence belong to the attribute of self-consciousness. We may even ask how far self-identity differs from consciousness of self in the eternal Godhead, or from self determination. But his exposition is valuable for it throws light on his Christology as a whole.

The presentation of P.T. Forsyth has a double basis. In the first place there is a very strong emphasis upon the element of redemption or reconciliation. Underlying his entire work is his belief that "the principle from which we must set out to understand the person of Christ is the soteriological principle. It is from the experience of Christ's salvation that the Church proceeds to the interpretation of the Saviour's person." <sup>42</sup> And secondly that a really positive theology must have regard for the freedom of God.

This is necessary for a proper understanding of the reconciling act of God and His free grace; and it will be seen that his understanding of the so-called physical attributes of God is concerned with giving a proper place to the freedom of God.

Like most of the other kenotists, Forsyth seems to interpret this kenosis as an act prior to the actual Incarnation. It was a single choice once made, an undertaking which, once begun, must be continued to the very end. This act of choice, then, was made within the Godhead; so that His life on earth was the 'obverse of a heavenly eternal deed, and the result of a timeless decision before it here began.'<sup>43</sup>

His sacrifice preceded His Incarnation; His obedience and His love also had their origin before this earthly life. "He consented not only to die but to be born." What He struggled to win was what was His by right; what He chose was the humiliation of the cross. But even here lay His glory - a glory which consisted not in what He did as man, but in what He did in becoming man.

It is the use which the Son made of His freedom in which the moral power of His incarnation is to be found.

Forsyth asserts that a pre-existent Christ cannot be adjusted to the historic Jesus without some doctrine of kenosis. He sees in the Incarnate a Godhead self reduced but real, whose power is revealed in his self humiliation, and whose strength is perfected in weakness. Not that he is unaware of the difficulties raised by such a theory. He admits the impossibility of forming any scientific conception of the precise process of Incarnation. And he observes, for example, that to be without self-consciousness as infinite would be virtual suicide for the infinite. He conceives of the kenosis as a moral plerosis lived out by the Incarnate, but that the plerosis is 'achieved' in the Resurrection and Ascension. The Son as Holy God is morally capable of a dispowering that has no human analogy; and as God He would have a kenotic power over himself.

The question then follows as to whether His self-identification with man involved experience of man's sin. His answer is twofold: First that personal guilt would have impaired the moral power required for such sympathy; since the guilty could not escape himself. And secondly that what was human was not sin but the power to be tempted to sin.<sup>44</sup> Christ could be tempted as man; as God He could not sin. Does this affect the moral freedom which identifies Him with man? Forsyth thinks not, since "absolute holiness is the true freedom and the only divine freedom." So that only the soul identified with God's holiest will could fully use and impart "that freedom which is the ideal of a true humanity."

On the question of attributes Forsyth insists that even the relative attributes could not be parted with entirely.<sup>45</sup> At most they should be thought of as latent, that is, retracted into potentiality.

These attributes are as necessary to Godhead as the immanent attributes which, however, are not wholly immanent but related to the world He created. His solution is that these attributes should not be regarded as renounced; rather we should speak of a new mode of being. Again he shows that an attribute is the 'Being Himself in a certain angle or relation.'

"Thus omniscience and the rest are not so much attributes as functions of attributes, or their modifications." <sup>46</sup>

In which case he shows that omnipotence is the expression of God's love - a love which is the region, nature and the norm of omnipotence. As the humiliation grew so did the power; God's freedom being seen especially in His becoming man.

Forsyth criticises, as a defect of kenotic theories their one-sided emphasis on Christ's humiliation. He feels that balance should be kept between the renunciation and the exaltation; and suggests that we should avoid thinking of two.

Thus he proposes instead that

"it might be better to describe the union of God and man in Christ as the mutual involution of two personal movements raised to the whole scale of the human soul and the divine." <sup>47</sup>

Bearing in mind his thesis - that "the Incarnate is immediately known to us only as the Saviour" - he presses home the view that Christ is there to act on man, not merely to consummate. So that if we attain to Christ, it is only by Christ. He explains the mutual involution as a dual vertical movement whereby man constantly seeks God and God passes into man - a process of constant communion between the human and the divine. This divine mobility is twofold: God's movement to reveal or communicate Himself, and His movement to save. These two movements are seen in Christ who was not acquiring, but unfolding Deity.

Archbishop Temple was primarily a philosopher.

Like Gore he strongly criticised the lack of explanation in the Chalcedonian Definition; but he went even further <sup>and</sup> rejected ~~its~~ terminology as unsatisfactory and basically materialistic. Attention will mainly be focussed on CHRISTUS VERITAS, though his essay on 'The Divinity of Christ' in FOUNDATIONS will also be referred to. Temple begins by considering the structure of reality. This he sees to consist of many grades, each presupposing those lower than itself, and each finding its complement in so far as it is indwelt by a higher. These grades he divides broadly under the headings MATTER, LIFE, MIND, SPIRIT in ascending order. <sup>48</sup> "The lower cannot explain the higher;" but each reveals what it does reveal only when one of the higher grades supervenes upon it. The full definition of Reality, and what is one of the chief pillars of his theory is expressed in this passage:

"Thus we see each grade dependent for its existence on the grades below, and dependent for its own full actualisation on the grades or grades above. Such seems, apart from any theory of its origin or *raison d'etre*, to be in fact the structure of Reality." <sup>49</sup>

Temple re-interpreted the Incarnation in terms of will. How does he understand this? He seems to equate Will and Spirit, <sup>50</sup> asserting that "Will is the only Substance there is in a man;" not a part of him, but himself as a moral and active being. <sup>51</sup> This does not mean a changeable Christ, since "free" will is best seen in dependability rather than the reverse. <sup>52</sup> Will, however, is complemented by Purpose; in fact the one is distinguishable from the other only in so far as the act of thought is distinguishable from thinking. <sup>53</sup> Purpose, though constant, prompts diversity of action; and where man's acts are indeterminate the divine activity varies to meet the circumstances thus created.

"The Will is unswerving, the Purpose unchanged; but the very constancy of the fulfilment of the one purpose requires variations in the method of activity, if the other conditions of the activity, are variable." 54

Here Temple tries to balance the idea of the divine immutability with the idea of adaptability of the divine actions. The thought he expresses is definitely superior to the so-called immutability of God. But does he not make God's action too dependent on man's action? Unfortunately we do not have enough to go on, and so must forego judgement on this matter. Will, he continues, is a "completely unified activity of the whole nature in all its parts;" so that no human act or effort fulfils all that Will implies. Moreover an act of pure will is determined from within, whereas for finite nature environment is very influential. 55

But for the creative Will there is no environment; it supplies the ground of its own action. Following Augustine Temple sets down the diseased will as the seat of sin - for men can only be good by willing to be good, in which willing is the being good.<sup>56</sup> But of course man does not will to be good since he is torn between so many contrary desires. Only in Christ Himself was there no 'enemy of self-will within' since He was intent on doing God's will.

Before considering Temple's Christology, something must be said on his definition of Person and his understanding of value. We need to remember that Temple's restatement was based on his belief that Greek patristic theology was a failure. It had served its purpose - the exclusion of what was fatal to the faith - but it was unscientific, therefore bad theology.<sup>57</sup> His aim was to get away from the 'Substance' theology, which he regarded as materialistic and unsuitable for describing spiritual things. One question which this raises is: was 'substance' in the early centuries materialistic, or did it become so later?

And a second follows naturally: In what sense, then, are we to interpret  $\epsilon\mu\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$  - materialistic or spiritual? No answer is given us in his work. We must also remember his strong emphasis, following the older Temple, that we need a theology based on psychology. <sup>58</sup> In large measure this is exactly what he tried to provide.

Temple understands by 'Person' a "self-conscious and self-determining system of experience," <sup>59</sup> a definition which is basically the same as Weston's. We notice, however, that Person and Will are virtually synonymous. For a Person, though being an individual, is a part of a purpose and is part of his environment. On the question of Value Temple first rejects what he describes as the error of Ritschlianism. Whereas he approves the notion that all religious doctrines are value judgements, he rejects the idea of regarding them as other than "metepphysical and ontological judgements." <sup>60</sup> He would interpret the word 'substance' with Gore to mean the 'real thing'; in which case substance would be equivalent to Value and Existence.

What, then, is his understanding of the word 'Value'?

"Value is the element in real things which both causes them to be, and makes them what they are, and is thus fitly called Substance in so far as this is other or less than their totality." 61

Now there is a great similarity between Will and Value as is seen when Temple says:

"So Will aims at Good in all its forms; and as God makes the world, He beholds it as very good." 62

The upshot of all this is that for Temple God is the sum not only of Will and Personality, but also of Value; and it is this consummation of all things which he sets out to trace in Christ.

In discussing the Godhead of Christ Temple notes the fact that the first disciples regarded Christ as Man, but that there was that in Him which called for greater understanding.

But that with Stephen's commendation of His soul to Jesus we have the devotional groundwork for a theology.<sup>63</sup> And in tracing the development of thought to the full expression of Christ's divinity, Temple recognizes not a dogma imposed, but an experience gradually crystallizing.<sup>64</sup> The Godhead of Jesus, however, does not mean mere identification with Jehovah; instead

".....it is the enlargement and enrichment of the thought of God by the necessity of making room within it for what men had learnt concerning God through the teaching, and still more through the Life, Death, and Resurrection of Jesus Christ."<sup>65</sup>

And so the unity of God does not imply that no other Being may be called God, but that the divine attributes exclude plurality. But having asserted that this unity may be apprehended in its pure simplicity, Temple does not satisfactorily explain how the distinction in the Godhead is to be apprehended.

One of Temple's tenets is the division of Reality into grades - the lower finding their full expression in so far as they are indwelt by the higher, and the higher dependent for their existence on the grades below. With this premise Temple finds in Jesus Christ the one adequate presentation of God and man - the word 'adequate' being duly qualified.

"In Jesus Christ we shall find the one adequate presentation of God - not adequate, of course, to the infinite glory of God in all His attributes, but adequate to every human need, for it shows us God in terms of our own experience. But in Jesus Christ we shall find also the one adequate presentation of man - not man as he is apart from the indwelling of God, but Man as he is in his truest nature, which is only made actual when man becomes the means to the self-expression of God." 66

God supervenes upon humanity. He does not thereby take a human being into fellowship, but acts through the conditions supplied by humanity.<sup>67</sup> It is remarkable that this theory should prove to be so one-sided at this point. Here the emphasis is strongly placed on the condescension of God so that He functions through human conditions. And though he does not hold a *conversio Dei*, yet he does not assert the taking of manhood into God.<sup>68</sup> Of Course Temple is correct in rejecting the idea that Christ assumed a man - for this would only make Him exemplary and individual. Like Gore he held Christ to be not only the climax, but the standard, of revelation. Thus any other revelation varied in perfection in so far as it contradicted or conformed to His revelation. Christ is inclusive, but His inclusiveness is not substantial but spiritual; not quantitative but qualitative.

And since quality, not quantity, is the 'only relevant category under which to conceive the spiritual; it is not impossible to understand how the will of Jesus can be the expression of the infinite God. In addition to this, 'whole' and 'part' are not applicable to what is spiritual.

Temple could not accept kenoticism. In his mind the divesting of the Logos of His powers for the sake of the Incarnation would leave the universe loose of its controlling force; and this would not be. He did not seem able to accept Dr. Mackintosh's presentation of the religious interest in the kenosis. But his own thesis involves a duality which has not been satisfactorily explained.<sup>69</sup> Thus he writes that the Word - the agent of creation - did not cease His creative activity, but added to it the Incarnation and the life of the Incarnate state. This theory creates more difficulties than it solves; for it juxtaposes the unlimited Logos and the Logos incarnate.

On the other hand Temple, like Weston, insists on the eternal nature of the Incarnation. He refuses to isolate the thirty years as an interval of humiliation between two eternities of glory; or as a mere episode. It is true that he regards the Incarnation as an episode, but it is a revealing episode. In regarding the mode of the Incarnation as episodic he means "the acceptance of conditions necessary for the very occurrence of a revelation; but the substance is eternal." Thus the Incarnate has made our condition matter of His own experience, and as a result men can lean on Him for help by virtue of this experience of His. <sup>70</sup>

Finally on Jesus' consciousness he re-asserts Weston's view that Jesus as incarnate had no consciousness which could not be dedi<sup>c</sup>ated by His humanity. But further, that the doctrine of His deity was in no way bound up with the correctness of His opinion concerning the authorship of some Psalms. <sup>71</sup>

There is no difficulty on the question of the reality of His growth or temptation. His temptations were real and He overcame them by the constancy of His will. The strength of the will is shown in certain incapacities; in the case of Jesus, non posse peccare. Do the incapacities really show the strength of the will? Temple's argument is not convincing at this point, especially since he described the Will as "the whole being of a man organised for conduct." With successive victories He grew; His obedience at each stage being perfect. With the deepening of the obedience came the deepening of Love which culminated in the sacrificial outpouring on the cross, and symbolically at the Last Supper.

NOTES ON CHAPTER 3.

1. G. L. Prestige, THE LIFE OF CHARLES GORE, p.102.
2. Letter to Lord Halifax, quoted from Prestige, op. cit. p.105.
3. Prestige, ibid. 103f.
4. CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, April 1890, p.215.  
Quoted in the Review for October 1890, p.220.
5. LUX MUNDI, "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration,"  
by C. Gore. See pp. 352ff.
6. CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW (CQR). April 1890,  
p.204.
7. Ibid. pp.207f; cf. p. 216 where he regards it as  
impossible that arguments used in the New Testament  
should be unsound.
8. LUX MUNDI, Preface to the tenth edition, p.xiii.
9. Ibid., p. xixf.
10. LUX MUNDI, "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration,"  
p. 361.

11. CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, January 1892, pp.  
292f.

12. Ibid., p. 295.

13. Bampton Lectures, p. 35.

"The term supernatural is purely relative to what at any stage of thought we mean by Nature. Nature is a progressive development of life, and each new stage of life appears supernatural from the point of view of what lies below it."

14. Ibid., p. 18, where he speaks of the Incarnation as "the crown of natural development in the universe." On p.229 the bluffing is less apparent.

15. Ibid, p.147.

16. St. John 1:18; 5:37, etc.

17. CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, Jan. 1892 pp. 302f.

18. Bampton Lectures, p.149, where he refers to John 3:34, 8:28, 5:19, 20; 17:8, 11; 15:15.

19. CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW. Jan. 1892, p.309., n.2.

20. CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, 1896, p.310.
21. Ibid, p. 312, n.4. On Gore's ascription of ignorance to the Person of the Divine Son, see p.314.
22. W. L. Knox and A. R. Vidler, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CATHOLICISM, pp.118f.
23. Frank Weston, THE ONE CHRIST, p.13.
24. Ibid. p.16.
25. Ibid., p. 18f.
26. Ibid., p.66.
27. Ibid., pp.103ff.
28. H. Martensen, CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS, pp.263,264.
29. Frank Weston, op. cit., p.117.
30. Ibid., pp.120 et seq.
31. Ibid., pp.124ff.
32. Ibid., p.139. Cf. pp.218f, Christ is the only man to conquer Satan. "Perfect Man conquers, but perfect man is not mere man: he is God-aided man." 219.
- 33/ See p.150. Cf. p.140 on His continual restraint.

34. Ibid., p.153. For the development of the whole subject, see Chapter VII. See also p.198 for his excellent expression of the limitation - the divine knowledge as expressed by His human nature. Note also his treatment of the Incarnate's prayers, chapter XI. The following passages are outstanding, and meet the queries of kenotists very well.

"But primarily we pray because we love God, or want to know Him and because we desire that He will knit our wills with His and empower us to walk in His ways, and to co-operate in the works of His kingdom." p.247.

"Viewed as an act of the Incarnate in the entirety of His being, prayer is the mysterious communion of the Son conditioned in manhood with His Father; it is the inexplicable approach of the Son to the Father in and through our manhood which He has made His very own." 261.

"And lastly, the prayer of the Incarnate is the point in which the divine and human will-powers meet in alliance against Satan's evil will". 261.

35. Ibid., p. 158.
36. Ibid., 169.
37. Ibid., 170.
38. Ibid., p.294.
39. For the whole see pp. 295-317.
40. Ibid., pp. 309ff.
41. Ibid., p. 316.
42. P.T. Forsyth, THE PERSON AND PLACE OF JESUS CHRIST, p.332. Cf. also pp. 5, 6, 9 et passim.
43. Ibid., 271.
44. Ibid., p.302.
45. See pp. 306, 308, 309.
46. Ibid., p. 309.
47. Ibid., p. 333.
48. William Temple, CHRISTUS VERITAS, p.4.
49. Ibid., p.6.

50. William Temple, "The Divinity of Christ, in FOUNDATIONS, p.247.
51. Temple, CHRISTUS VERITAS, pp.61. 147.
52. FOUNDATIONS, p.248.
53. FOUNDATIONS, "The Divinity of Christ," p.249, cf. CHRISTUS VERITAS, p.7.
54. CHRISTUS VERITAS, p.99.
55. Ibid., p.93; cf. FOUNDATIONS, p.248: "The actions of a spiritual Being are not determined from without; but they are determined from within."
56. FOUNDATIONS, p.230f; cf. CHRISTUS VERITAS, pp.126, 134.
57. CHRISTUS VERITAS, p.148.
58. FOUNDATIONS, p.226, cf. 260.
59. CHRISTUS VERITAS, pp.68f; cf. Weston, THE ONE CHRIST, pp.295 - 317.
60. CHRISTUS VERITAS, p.15.
61. Ibid., p.15.

62. Ibid, p.16. Cf. Genesis 1:31; also p.33 for his idea that fellowship is the norm of Value. Does this not equate environment and Value?
63. Lex orandi preceded le credendi is generally accepted.
64. CHRISTUS VERITAS, p.112.
65. Ibid., p.115.
66. Ibid., p.124f.
67. Ibid., p.138.
68. το ἀπροσλήπτου ἀθεραπευτον.
69. See CHRISTUS VERITAS, pp.140ff.
70. Ibid., pp.144f.
71. Ibid, p.147.

#### 4. CONCLUSION.

##### A. Gore's position in the Christology of the period.

The year 1889 marked a decisive watershed in the history of English Theology. Not only did the publication LUX MUNDI focus attention on the Incarnation; but through Gore a definite type of Christology became current, which eventually dominated the writings of Anglican scholars in particular. His influence on Christological thought has been immense, spanning almost the whole of the four decades from 1890.<sup>1</sup> His presentation suffered from all the limitations which normally surround the work of pioneers. Thus there were, and still are, others who, though many years removed, could see better the pitfalls into which these pioneers stumbled.

If Gore can be said to be the rebel who put himself against Church authority in developing his theory, he can also be said to be a champion of the movement back to the Bible. He was critical of the Chalcedonian Definition, as was Temple.

Not because he considered it useless; but because in his opinion its function was negative and secondary. Its purpose was to exclude error not to construct a positive faith; therefore it must be seen in the context of the errors which it was designed to exclude. He was not expounding a philosophy, he was bearing witness to a life - a Person. And the 'history' of that life - that Person - is to be found in the Gospel records and in the testimony of the Church to the indwelling by that Person. The Old Testament is to be seen as the preparation for the coming of this Person into the world. It was not his purpose to treat isolated texts; rather he set himself the task of considering the evidence of Scripture and to base his conclusions on the whole picture.

Charles Gore was a product of his times. His own attitude to the Bible might well be summed up in the words of Benjamin Jowett: "Interpret the Scripture like any other book." Like Jowett he would have said that it was unlike any other book.

The older generation of Tractarians could ignore the new knowledge; but Gore could not and did not. He sought to welcome new knowledge and to find for it a place in Christian thought. And so he was able to encourage Biblical criticism and to accept some of its assured results; even though he exercised, and encouraged the exercise of, great caution in the handling of the texts. He was able to accept and to put to use such 'revolutionary' ideas as evolution, secure in his belief that they contained some truth.

B. Kenosis as a tenable theory.

It is now left for us to consider the problem as to whether kenoticism can be considered as a tenable theory. This would entail giving an answer to the very absorbing question: what did St. Paul mean by <sup>3</sup>ἐκενώσεν ἑαυτὸν? † Without wishing to jump to hasty conclusions it must be said that too much has been made of kenoticism as expressing what has been called the 'mode' of the Incarnation.

It must also be admitted that St. Paul is not famous for systematic thought and that, in actual fact, most of his doctrine has come out in the midst of his pastoral charges. There is no need to go beyond such subjects as Baptism, the Eucharist, or the Resurrection. Writing as he did to various congregations he could not give detailed expression of each to any one congregation. Nevertheless it seems highly unlikely that St. Paul would have left such an important matter hanging in the air, with only chance remarks in Phil. 2:7 and 2 Cor. 8:9. There is no other place in his epistles in which any similar 'theory' is let fall. We should therefore study this word 'kenosis' very carefully to see what it may have meant; because there could be very little doubt that Paul expected his readers to understand what he was saying.

What, then, did he mean? First of all the context may prove in each case to throw a great deal of light on the subject; for the two passages are not altogether dissimilar. In the famous passage in Phillipians it is commonly said that Paul's expression comes in the middle of an ethical exhortation.

The passage has been represented as a description of Christ's attitude which the believer is expected to follow since his life is to be expressive of his communion in and with Christ. And this is supported by the frequent Pauline expression "in Christ Jesus" in Phil. 2:5. Similarly in 2 Cor. 8:9 Paul's great theological 'aside' falls in the middle of an exhortation to charity. It is noticeable that this impoverishment picks up the theme of our Lord's exhortations to poverty.<sup>2</sup> The impoverishment must be voluntary; not merely a detachment from wealth, but a sharing of it. This sharing of wealth, when applied to 2 Cor. 8:9, would not mean that we become divine - for God and man are not of the same nature. It may, and probably does, mean what Paul implies by our adoption and by our being joint-heirs with Christ.<sup>3</sup> Without this positive side the impoverishment or humiliation of Christ would be meaningless for faith.

We must, then, examine the passages in question in some detail. To begin with, there is difference of opinion as to how to translate the Greek word <sup>c</sup>ὑπαρχων. There have been those who have translated it as past, and have therefore been able to draw a sharp contrast between Christ in the form of God and Christ in the form of man. There have been those, on the other hand, who have interpreted it as present, including thereby the idea of continuity.<sup>4</sup> The participle clearly refers to the pre-existence of Christ, even though one feels that it does not rule out the fact of his remaining what He always has been.

The problem which next engages our attention is that of the self-emptying. The words **KEVOS** and **KEVOW** are Semitisms, and their real meaning may well have to be sought in the Old Testament. There has been no dearth of writers to champion the cause of orthodoxy against kenotic Christologists. It has been quite conclusively shown that Christ could not have cast off or abandoned attributes or prerogatives.

The argument of Bishop Weston concerning the mode of resumption of the previously abandoned attributes or prerogatives is still as forceful as ever. There is great difficulty in understanding how some attributes could be inherent in the Godhead and yet be cast off whenever necessary. C.S.C. Williams writes, with great justification, "While theologians may legitimately consider its implications, the term has no metaphysical intention but indicates the abyss of humiliation to which renunciation led the Christ." <sup>5</sup> The verb  $\pi\tau\omega\chi\epsilon\omega$  is a hapax legomenon in the New Testament and therefore we cannot discover what nuance it may have had for Paul and his readers. We must perforce treat 2 Cor. 8:9 with Phil 2:7 as embodying the same kind of teaching even though the image used are different.

These images do not seem to support a kenotic theory of His Person in other words, they do not appear to be distinctly Christological. We must therefore seek for other light. Notice has often been drawn to the fact that the reference to the  $\mu\omicron\rho\phi\eta$   $\delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\upsilon$  may have been suggested by the servant idea, especially as it is represented in Isaiah 53.

There is much more in the parallelism than is usually asserted. Gore himself, on one occasion, wrote these words which he did <sup>not</sup> press: "He makes His life, what man's life should be - a freewill offering to God His Father." Are we not justified in seeing in this passage a very strong sacrifice motif? Following up Gore's own remark we observe that for the Jews the life was in the blood. That offering a sacrifice involved the pouring out we may even say emptying - of the blood. It is not very distant to see in Christ's life a free-will offering an outpouring or emptying of Himself. W.D.Davies has drawn out in detail the parallelism between the last servant song and the hymn of Phil. 2. The list in itself can prove nothing, but the resemblance of the passages is far from accidental. Might not St. Paul have been thinking of Christ as the servant? The parallel passages are set out below:

"Servant Passages"

Isa. 52:13. He shall be exalted. Phil.2:9 God hath highly exalted him.

Isa.53:7. He was oppressed yet he opened not his mouth. Phil.2:8 He humbled himself.

Isa.53:8 ἤχθη εἰς θάνατον

Phil.2:8. ὑπηκούσας μέχρι θανάτου.

Isa.53:12. He hath poured out his soul unto death.

Phil. 2:6 ἑαυτὸν ἐκενόσθη.

Compare also:

Isa.45:23 that unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear.

Phil.2:10. That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow.... and every tongue should confess." 6

Our contention here is not just that the servant motif looms largely, but that ΚΕΝΩΣ itself should be interpreted as an outpouring rather than as an abandonment or rejection of attributes. The idea of emptying or pouring may then explain the statement ὑπηκούσας μέχρι θανάτου.

And this may well be the sense in which Weston put forward his idea of a restraint on the part of Christ which was continuous throughout His life. In Romans 5:19 Paul even suggests that we the many are justified through the obedience of the one - Christ Jesus. A similar idea is expressed in Hebrews 5:8. We should not be surprised that this is so since obedience played a very important role in the life of the Jews. It was disobedience which led to the deaths from manna; to the numerous cases of subservience in Judges. And the great prophets of the eighth century were insistent in their call for Israel to cease her disobedience and to return to Yahweh. Our Lord Himself made obedience the basis of much of His teaching: <sup>7</sup> "blessed are they that hear the word of God and keep it."

Granted that Paul thought of Jesus in terms of the Servant, we must now seek to understand Jesus' estimate of Himself.

We start with the early ministry where our Lord began by deliberately projecting an image of Himself as Messiah. His first sermon - if we may follow Luke here - was based on the Messianic passage, Isaiah 61. And it is significant that, in quoting the passage, Jesus stops short of any reference to vengeance. He began His ministry boldly, and at the same time, with great restraint. It is a fact that the Jews were expecting a Messiah to avenge their sufferings at the hands of foreign powers and to restore the Davidic kingdom. It was incumbent upon Him to purge their minds of any false notions, and to mould them to what He wished them to be. His mission was not one of war, which driving out the oppressor would involve, but one of peace. And this idea breaks the surface climactically in His last journey to Jerusalem. The whole tone of our Lord's sermon in Luke is that He is the Messiah - "today hath this scripture been fulfilled in your ears." 8

For He refers to Himself as the Father's envoy in the clause  $\text{ἀπεστάλην με}$  ; and this is supported by the numerous references, in the fourth Gospel, to the Father as  $\text{ὁ πεμπόωντός με}$  . Then we observe the clause  $\text{ἐχρίσεν με}$  which would translate the Old Testament.  $\text{πνίξ}$  .

A clear acknowledgement of Messiahship is not frequently to be found in the Gospels. This does not necessarily suggest any such thing as a Messianic secret. Jesus was not concealing, but effecting a new orientation of, Messiahship. Few examples are needed to show that Jesus did not surround His mission with secrecy. There is the story of the envoys of John the Baptist to Jesus to certify who He was. Jesus then points to His own activities, using language which brings forcibly to mind the Lukan narrative of His visit to Nazareth. Jesus opened His ministry with the claim that He was anointed to fulfil certain functions and here He claims to be doing just that.

But the sequel to this narrative is itself very important. It was commonly believed that Elijah was to precede the coming of the Messiah. When Jesus, therefore, pointed to John as Elijah who was to come, could there be any doubt about His meaning? Yet it must be admitted that Jesus' claims were not made explicitly. In His usual way He threw out suggestions to His hearers and allowed them to draw conclusions which, very often, were demanded by the suggestions themselves.

Next we look at the question posed by Jesus concerning the Davidic descent of the Messiah. The problem of His knowledge does not concern us here and must be passed by. The question as to whether He disclaimed Messiahship as not being of Davidic line simply does not arise. To raise it at all would be to obscure the greater significance which lies behind the question. The question amply exemplifies Jesus' reinterpretation of the Messiah as being on a plane above the merely mundane and political.

The Messiah is David's Lord. Jesus uses the words of the well known psalm but gives to Messianism a new perspective. It is in His actions, more than in His words, that He makes His claims. There could be no doubt of His meaning after His symbolic ride into Jerusalem. The narrative appears in all the gospels and, in each case He is represented as a king or as bringing in the long awaited kingdom.<sup>9</sup> His action in entering the city as He did was deliberate - intent on showing that He held a different ideal of Messianism. It may only be a coincidence, but the last such joyful entry into the city was made by David when he brought up the ark of God. That was not only a time of festivity but also one of peace.

Another development of the Messianic idea is to be found in Jesus' use of the term 'Son of Man.' The interpretation of the phrase 'bar nasha' has been the subject of much discussion owing to the place it holds in the teaching of Jesus. The two generally accepted principles may be represented as follows.

First that Jesus' use of the term was influenced by the figure in Daniel rather than by that of Enoch. In the former the Son of man appears as an idealized Israel, in the latter as a supernatural person. Secondly that the term, despite its use in Ezekial does not mean merely 'man'. The use of the term in Daniel 7 as well as the use of it by our Lord are against this latter point of view. Prof. James Barr has recently re-examined the theory that the Son of man in Daniel is an idealized Israel. He suggests that the Son of man approximates to what we would call an angel. He further observes that there man seems very often to be brought close to God and to be represented almost as angels. This is not the place to examine his theory, but we can in principle accept his conclusion that: "what we have here in essence is an eschatological appearance of an angelic being as man in heaven." <sup>10</sup>

That Jesus' conception of the Son of man was based on Daniel can be seen from Mk.14:62 and parallels.

In answer to the High Priest's question he replies with a direct reference to Dan. 7:13. The figure of the Son of man as represented in the Similitudes of Enoch does not enter the picture.<sup>11</sup> The Son of man sayings of Jesus can be divided into three broad categories. In the first are those sayings in which the term can be said to mean 'I'. On the whole they are very indirect and only in three cases are any claims made; yet in each of these there is something significant. In Mark 2:10 he claims to be able to forgive sins; When this is compared with Luke 17:22, his reference to the day of the Son of Man, and John 8:56 O 'your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day' - the tremendous claim which He is making here is quite striking. Then in Luke 19:10 he speaks of His missions as that of seeking and saving the lost - a saying which contains the idea of sacrifice. So that these sayings cannot really be said to mean merely 'I' because there loomed over and above them the figure of one who was not just 'man' but God made man.

Secondly there are those sayings which refer either to the Parousia or to the Son of man in heaven. These are not many and are not of importance to the present study. On the whole they speak of the swiftness and suddenness of the Parousia and of the attendant judgment. The third category contains sayings which refer to the sufferings and death of the Son of Man, and generally associate Him with the suffering Servant of Yahweh. Many of the Son of man passages fall into this last category. It is an accepted view that in Jewish thought the Messiah and the suffering servant were not identified before the time of Christ. Both in St. Luke and St. John emphasis is placed on the fact of the rejection of Jesus by His people. He for whom there was no room in the inn had no place to lay His head; similarly little of His work was done in Jerusalem because they sought to kill Him. In considering Jesus' estimate of Himself as a suffering Messiah, we are struck by one of the signs which He gave.

In answer to a request for a sign He pointed to Jonah as a type of His burial and resurrection 'in three days'. Even if we were to allow doubts about the authenticity of Mat. 12:40 as referring to the resurrection, it still does not militate against the force of the typology. For Jonah was sent on a mission and had to be brought back despite his attempt to escape. It would suggest, therefore, the inescapable nature of Jesus' mission and fits in well with that obedience unto death.

In addition to this, there are many prophecies of His death and resurrection at the hands of the Jewish leaders. Despite the mention of crucifixion, which a writer <sup>knowing</sup> the events might refer to, it sounds very unconvincing to describe them as vaticinia ex eventu. The identification of the Son of man and the Servant becomes complete in the difficult ransom passage of Matthew and Mark. This saying takes up the theme of Isaiah 53:11 where the Servant 'bare the sins of many.' St. Luke himself does not contain the passage, but there are two references in the Gospel and Acts which make it highly probable that he, too, was aware of this trend of thought.

The first is Luke 24:27 where Jesus taught them the things concerning Himself, beginning with Moses and the prophets. Quite significantly the travellers were discussing the events of the crucifixion. But we note Jesus' first words to them: "Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into His glory?"

The second passage, Acts 8:35, is also based on the last servant song. It is from this scripture that Philip began to preach Christ to the eunuch - a fact which shows that the idea of vicarious suffering was present to the early christians, and went beyond them to their Master. We must also look at the fourth Gospel where Jesus appears very largely as a giver of life. Of the many references mention need only be made of two. First is the famous eucharistic sermon of chapter 6 where He calls Himself the bread of life - the manna which fed the Israelites in the desert. St. John does not record the eucharistic sayings of the synoptic gospels, but verse 53 of chapter 6 does throw light on Jesus' estimate of Himself.

We must also bear in mind the relation drawn by John between the last supper and the slaying of the passover lamb. Jesus prefigured, in an acted parable, His own sacrificial death. This death was to be salutary for the sins of the world just as the lifting up of the brazen serpent effected the recovery of the nomads. This idea corresponds, to a great extent, with Luke's understanding of the Transfiguration as an exodus.

There remains one other passage which must be treated separately, for here Jesus unmistakably gave what we may regard as the best estimate of Himself. The passage here referred to is the Parable of the Vineyard. The parable was readily understood because it was direct, and couched in imagery with which the Jews were familiar. Jesus' intention seems to <sup>have been</sup> ~~be~~ to point to the continual rejection of the servants or messengers of God; and finally to the rejection of His Son who was the last of these servants. The parable or allegory brings to mind the unchanging nature of God in that He was continually reaching out to the husbandmen.

It is, in effect, a parable of the continual outpouring of Himself by God - an outpouring which is also present in the Son as Himself God. And in a very pointing statement His closing words indicate that He would be killed by those same husbandmen.

The result of all this is to show that whatever else there was in Jesus' estimate of Himself, the sacrifice motif was also very strong. The Gospel records would indicate that this motif did not obtrude in the early ministry of Jesus; but that as His work came more and more before the public gaze, so He began to explain that His mission was not to be the sort of king or Messiah which they expected. And so He enacted the role of the king as presented in Zechariah 9:9, which precluded any similarity to the rulers of the Gentiles. What Paul and the other New Testament writers presented as a picture of Jesus was the picture which He Himself painted.

We conclude, then, that kenoticism can only be tenable in so far as we remember that the root idea is one of sacrifice.

It would be fair to surround Paul's sayings with so much metaphysics as led to the mythical presentation of Thomasius of Erlangen. To fasten upon the one expression <sup>εαυτου</sup> <sup>εκενωσεν</sup> and to base a christology upon it is to do less than justice to the passage as a whole. And we are doing nothing if we are not prepared to judge it in its entirety. We have already noted the parallelism drawn between Isaiah 53 and Phil. 2:5-11. Casual as this may seem it shows an identification in Paul's mind, and identification which does not appear to have started with Paul. If we are prepared to take the passage as a whole, there remains no ground for a doctrine of Christ's Person - that is, it does not explain His 'make-up' nor does it throw any light upon what attributes He abandoned or limited. It is an expression of His method - that He emptied or poured out Himself in sacrifice for the world. It is an expression of the manner of His life.

The idea of abandonment has already been rejected as an unsatisfactory means of explaining the Person of the Incarnate. To suggest that in becoming man Jesus had made an abysmal descent which necessitated His getting rid of Divine attributes, savours of Docetism. The problem here raised reminds us of the Gnostic distinction between God and man, and loses its moral value. The effectiveness of a self-abandoned Logos as a redeemer and as an example is thus highly questionable. St. Paul was proclaiming Christ as one in whom there was no false pride; and was commending to the Phillipians that humility which was exemplified by Christ. Whatever *KEVOW* might mean it rules out metaphysical processes. Our Lord proclaimed His own generosity when He stated: "I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd layeth down his life for the sheep." It is this same generosity which St. Paul is commending to the Corinthians. Now it seems that Paul was not teaching a change in the Person of Christ at the Incarnation anymore than he was saying in Gal. 3:13 that Christ is cursed. So that there is no reason why the three texts ought not to be treated in the same manner.

To say all this is not to deny or to minimise the reality of limitation on the part of Christ. To speak of an abandonment of attributes or prerogatives is to speak of a depotentiated Logos - a concept which is both abhorrent and improbable. There is much in the Gospels which would encourage us to speak of His limitation. We cannot deny the reality of His growth or the limitations which a human 'form' imposed upon Him. Nor can we overlook the fact that He willed to operate under the conditions of humanity. But limitation and abandonment are far from synonymous. The act of Christ in becoming man was unique in that God, for the first time, willed to exist under conditions of manhood. But it is consonant with, and a fitting climax to, God's working in history. Finally let us say that what is of worth in kenoticism is the unswerving will of God as He poured Himself out for His people whom He had made, and whom He loved and still loves.

Notes on Chapter 4.

1. See. J.K. Mozley, SOME TENDENCIES IN BRITISH THEOLOGY, p. 13. Cf. A.M. Ramsey, FROM GORE TO TEMPLE, p.36 (on the period 1890 to 1910). There are some who like J.M. Creed, credit Gore with responsibility for the prevalence of Kenoticism in the Anglican Communion. R. Knox is one who would be less extreme. Yet even he does not deny the tremendous influence wielded by Gore.
2. See Mark 10:21 and parallels.
3. See Galatians 4:45; Romans 8:15 to 17.
4. Among those who favour pre-existence the most famous would be Lightfoot; among those who favour continuity are Maurice Jones and Marvin Vincent.
5. See Williams on Phil. 2:5-7 in the New Peake. Humility rather than humiliation represents the teaching of the passage.
6. W.E. Davies, PAUL AND RABBINIC JUDAISM, p.274.
7. See William Barclay on the Chapter "The Servant of God" in JESUS AS THEY SAW HIM.

8. Luke 4:21. For ideas of being sent see John 5<sup>36</sup>, 6<sup>29</sup>, 5<sup>7</sup> etc.
9. Except in Mark, and, to lesser extent in, Luke he is represented as fulfilling Zechariah's prophecy.
10. See New Peaks, p.735 for a discussion on the Son of Man.
11. Vincent Taylor, JESUS AND HIS SACRIFICE, pp.21-28.
12. T.W. Manson would interpret Son of Man as 'man' here, but this seems unlikely.

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