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CHILDREN'S REACTIONS
TO
MORAL TRANSGRESSION

(Abstract of Thesis)

Maureen Lee

ABSTRACT OF THESIS SUBMITTED FOR
THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF EDUCATION.

University of Durham,
October, 1965.

By Maureen Lee.

Research into moral development in children was for many years based upon the theories of Piaget and Freud. The former emphasised the cognitive aspects of development, seeing the formation of mature moral judgments largely as a function of the mental age of the child. Freud, on the other hand, concentrated upon the child's early dependence on the parents and consequent identification with them which led to the assimilation of their prohibitions and ideals. Later the proponents of Learning Theory suggested that the basis of moral behaviour was the establishment of conditioned reflexes which were generalised by the child to apply to many situations.

The present study reviews recent work in these fields and examines such concepts as internalisation, conscience and guilt which are

inherent in contemporary theories.

An investigation was undertaken into the different responses to transgression made by groups of boys and girls aged 9, 12, and 14 years. The method used was a story-completion test administered to a total sample of 322 children. The story-endings were then statistically analysed.

The most frequently occurring response was the anticipation of discovery and punishment, which was taken to indicate the effectiveness of early conditioning.

As the age of the child increased there was a marked decline in the consistency of individual responses. The explanation offered for this phenomenon is that the child develops from unilateral respect to a morality based on co-operation, and in so doing becomes aware of more subtle aspects of each situation so that a greater variety of behaviour can be justified.

In the higher age groups significantly more reference to confession, apology and reparative techniques were made by girls than by boys. It

is suggested that one of the main reasons for this is the girls' particular social experience which seems to indicate to them the appropriateness of certain actions.

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INTRODUCTION.

For many years the study of the development of moral judgments in the child was hampered by the assumption on the part of parents, educationalists and psychologists alike that there was a unitary trait - morality - which could be trained by appropriate methods so that the child's behaviour would achieve a high level of consistency. Recent research, especially in the U.S.A. has proved that the development of moral judgments and ensuing moral behaviour depends on many highly complex factors and investigators' findings are rarely in total agreement with one another.

Nevertheless it is true to say that nearly all research depends on hypotheses originally propounded by either Freud or Piaget. The former, in the late nineteenth century, formulated a psycho-analytic theory of the emotional and motivational aspects of personality structure which he originally intended to explain all

developmental processes and to provide a background for the explanation of individual differences, including differences in the development of conscience between boys and girls.

Piaget, writing in the 1930s examines the intellectual aspects of moral behaviour and sees a sequence of cognitive stages which develop at approximately the same age in every Western society of similar cultural background. Although Piaget holds pride of place among the developmental psychologists some of his findings were anticipated by Barnes and Schallenger almost forty years earlier.

Barnes, working at the University of Stanford in 1884 told stories of transgression to 2000 children aged between 7 and 16 years, and from their written responses to subsequent questioning concluded that the child thinks punishment just, simply because it comes from adults, and the offences are paid for by the suffering endured. The same year Schallenger in "A Study of Children's Rights as seen by themselves" concluded,

after studying the responses of 3,000 children between 6 and 16, that "young children judge actions by their results, older children look at the motives which prompt them".

In 1902 Barnes used the stories previously told to American children to test a sample of 1047 English children aged 8 to 14 from working and lower middle-class backgrounds. He too found that the children in the lower age-groups advocated extensive use of punitive measures, expiatory punishments always preceding restitutive ones. The older children believed, on the other hand, that explanation was preferable to punishment, and Barnes concluded that English children, in rejecting primitive measures at an earlier age, showed greater maturity than their American counterparts.

Since then, the use of tape-recorders has often superseded that of the written questionnaire thereby eliminating the difficulties of the less literate child, and making possible a more precise evaluation of the child's statement.

Intricate structures have been devised so that children could manipulate dolls, work machines, and play games in test situations without self-consciousness, unaware that their behaviour was being noted and recorded by a hidden experimenter.

More sophisticated statistical processes, too, have enabled the investigator to analyse his findings more precisely and to publish them in terms of quantitative correlations and degrees of significance.

The objects of the present study are to examine the factors which are thought to influence moral development in boys and girls, to test the hypothesis that girls' guilt reactions give evidence of a greater degree of internalisation of moral standards than do boys', and finally, if this hypothesis is proven, to try to explain why it should be so.

THE WORK OF JEAN PIAGET.

Piaget has been criticised by people like Theodora M. Abel, M.R. Harrower, E. Lerner, D. McRae, Jean M. Deutsche, M. Bruce, M.E. Oates and others for having made too sweeping generalisations from the responses of his small sample of Geneva children. But whatever the faults of technique, no student can fail to be impressed by the evidence Piaget produces, the close reasoning of his logic and the scrupulousness of his examination of data.

Piaget observes the child at play and sees four distinct phases in his practice of the rules of a traditional game of marbles. At first the young child of up to two or three years of age responds in a purely motor fashion enjoying and experiencing the handling of the marbles in a random exploratory way. This eventually leads to ritualised schemes or patterns of play, though these are still actuated by purely motor, not collective rules.

Between two and five years of age the child is at the egocentric stage of development and while noting how others play according to codified rules and trying to imitate them, nevertheless does not feel bound in any way by the rules and virtually plays alone although in the company of others. The great consolation of this type of play is that everybody can win all the time.

When the child reaches seven or eight years of age the period of incipient co-operation is beginning. Each wants to win but shows some concern over the control and unification of rules even though he may be very vague about the rules in general, as exemplified by the wide variety of answers given to Piaget. Finally, by the age of eleven or twelve, the details of the game are settled, made known and accepted by all and the codification is complete.

However Piaget discriminates most subtly between the four stages in the practice of the rules and three developmental stages in the

consciousness of rules. In the first stage which begins with motor play but overlaps into the egocentric stage the rules are obviously not thought of as coercive because they are primarily purely exploratory motor activities, and later are seen as interesting examples of what one can do rather than indications of what one ought to do.

The next phase, lasting from about the middle of the egocentric stage until the child is eleven or twelve is certainly the most significant from the point of view of its influence on the moral development of the child. Now rules are seen as sacred and inviolable, emanating from omniscient adults and lasting forever. Every suggested alteration is regarded as a transgression and it is the letter of the law rather than the spirit which must be obeyed. This implies, of course, a heteronomous interpretation of duty: what the adult commands is right and "the good" is identified with implicit obedience. It also

leads to a conception of responsibility as an objective thing not to be modified by changes of circumstance. This stage Piaget describes as the Stage of Moral Realism which he defines as "the tendency the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself".

Before dealing with the causes, dangers and difficulties of moral realism we will mention briefly the final stage of development of the consciousness of rules which comes in at about eleven or twelve years of age normally. The rule is now seen as a law which binds because it is accepted by mutual consent. It is precisely understood instead of only vaguely as in earlier days, rationally held and respected, and yet it is open to alteration or qualification providing there is general agreement on the changes to be made.

The three different stages in the

consciousness of rules can be typified by comments on lying made by children. The first, at the stage of moral realism, said, "Lies are bad because you get punished." At the intermediate stage where the child obeys a generalised rule which is still, however, imposed from outside a representative comment was, "All lies are bad." Finally, at the truly autonomous stage where reciprocity is the determining factor, the illuminating statement was made, "Where would we be if no-one told the truth?" The child here obviously visualises an ideal situation which is to be achieved independently of external pressure.

Piaget is often concerned in his writings to discover what is the relationship between the verbal thought of the child, i.e. the ideas evoked by language through the reconstruction of memories, and his active "concrete" thought, by which he means the practical considerations which determine behaviour. Whether or not the

child's comments on moral judgments are true, conscious realisations or mere parrot-like repetitions of statements made by adults can only be decided after prolonged observation of his reactions in innumerable sets of relevant circumstances. This would necessitate a study of enormous proportions and complexity. Piaget did, indeed, find a certain correspondence in the conduct of games between the child's judgments about rules and his practice of those rules, but concluded that "verbal thought simply lags behind concrete thought, since the former has to reconstruct symbolically and on a new plane, operations that have already taken place on the preceding level." It follows from this that while the child is engaged in an activity he can take full account of his own intentions as well as those of other involved. However, in a later appraisal of the situation, with an entirely objective attitude to responsibility, he may discount those mental states of which he was aware at the time.

It would thus appear that theoretical moral judgment lags behind practical moral judgment, the child behaving in a more mature way than his expressed beliefs would lead one to expect. For instance, evidence of practice in co-operation may have been noted for a year or more before a child makes a statement or reply which demonstrates that he has grasped the idea of the autonomous ethic.

In assessing the value of the child's theoretical moral judgment two other important considerations must be borne in mind. In the first place the child, especially the young child during interrogation, being desirous of pleasing the adult may feel it necessary to give a moral lecture, because he thinks it is expected of him, rather than state his true beliefs. Secondly, if the child is required to make a comment on a story about the misdeeds of some fictitious character he is dealing with third-hand experience which may be very remote from his own. In activities in which he has

participated, on the other hand, the whole of the personalities involved are known to him and even though he may not be consciously aware of these factors they will certainly encourage him to make a more comprehensive consideration of the incident before giving judgment on the rights or wrongs of it.

Piaget considers that the sequence of moral attitudes just described is typical of all children though of course within the broad lines indicated there will be variations in the pace of development because of differences in intelligence, environment, socio-economic levels, parental attitudes etc. His interest is wholly in the cognitive, intellectual aspects of moral growth and he sees the child's inter-relationships with adults and with other children as the most important influence in the process, an influence which, in spite of the differences mentioned, is basically the same in every society. The progression of the child from the morality of constraint to that of co-operation is therefore seen as one of the

most important aspects of education.

The young child at the egocentric stage of development is a realist: that is, he considers the content of his own mind as something external to himself, having its own separate existence. He is therefore very much more interested in the results of his actions than in the motivation which inspires them. His animism prompts him to attribute stereotyped intentions to every event of nature, thus he may talk of "the sun wanting to drive the clouds away", but he still does not subordinate human actions to the intentions which actuated them. At the same time all the rules which order or inhibit his life are apparently constituted and transmitted through the external pressure exercised by adults: parents, relatives or guardians or older children. No matter how conscious the parents may be of the desirability of engendering feelings of mutual respect and cooperation from the earliest possible days rather than of restraint and obligation, it is nevertheless impossible for them to avoid having to impose a multiplicity of rules upon

which everyday habits of cleanliness, feeding, sleeping and exercise will ultimately be based. All manner of rules relating to language, safety, morals, religious practice and social intercourse are also apparently formulated by the parents, and even if they are eminently rational of themselves they do appear to be imposed by adult constraint and are therefore accepted by the child as exterior to himself rather than as innate facts.

It is the conjunction of these two series of causes, childish realism and the constraint exercised by adults, that brings about the development of moral realism in the child. To a certain extent it is a natural and spontaneous product of child thought, because primitive thought does not take intentions into account. The adult also inadvertently consolidates the child's notion of objective responsibility because so many of the commands given do not have reasons which are comprehensible to the child. The most cogent of adult arguments may well appear to him inapplicable and irrelevant.

Ignorance of child psychology too will lead parents to give bad moral training particularly as many of them may themselves have been the victims of their own parents' prudery, prejudice or cruelty and will unwittingly adopt the same vindictive attitude under which they suffered.

But even where the parents are sufficiently enlightened to foresee the dangers of a morality based only on the material consequences of an act and to try to encourage the co-operation which alone will lead to an appreciation of the importance of intention, Piaget believes a certain amount of moral realism is inevitable in the young child. This is because of the very nature of the relationship between the egocentric child and the parent figure. The parent provides food, shelter and warmth for the satisfaction of the child's biological needs, he alone gives or withholds the expressions of love and approval which are responsible for the child's feelings of happiness and security, he is the sun which dominates the child's universe. The utter

dependence and helplessness of the small child engenders a unilateral respect which in turn produces a moral obligation and a sense of duty. Every command from a respected person is the starting point of an obligatory rule. Right is to obey the will of the adult; wrong is to have a will of one's own. As Piaget puts it, "the child begins by regarding these rules not only as obligatory but also as inviolable and requiring to be kept literally. We also showed that this attitude was the result of the constraint exercised by the older children on the younger and of the pressure of adults themselves, rules being thus identified with duties properly so called."

Parental attitudes are thought to be particularly heinous in the matter of clumsiness. Often adults do not understand the lack of co-ordination between eye and muscle which is responsible for so many spills, bumps and breakages and seeing only the extent of the damage done by the child lose their tempers, the degree of anger being proportionate to the

amount of damage. Criticism and punishment for clumsiness given without due consideration of the child's intentions and lack of physical control will obviously do much to encourage objective responsibility in the child. Between six and ten objective and subjective responsibility are to be found at all ages, but the latter predominates as the child develops, particularly if the parents are thought to be just and if the child can see that the parent considers his purpose in their reactions.

As G.E. Moore says in his "Ethics", "it may be urged that in our moral judgments we actually do, and ought to, take account of motives; and indeed that it marks a great advance in morality when men do begin to attach importance to motives and are not guided exclusively in their praise or blame by the "External" nature of the act done or by its consequences."

With regard to objective responsibility, as in so many other respects, the example of

the adult is at least as important as what he has to say. Very often the parent scolds according to the extent of the material damage done even though he does not really regard the act as wicked, or indeed as a moral fault at all. However, the child can only judge by appearances and cannot dissociate what Piaget calls "the police aspect" from the moral aspect. Parents must therefore make a positive effort to treat the child as an equal by acknowledging their own faults and difficulties and by allowing him to co-operate as far as he is able in the satisfying of their material needs. In this way the child will be encouraged to grow quickly out of the morality of constraint into the morality of respect and co-operation where the good of all is seen to be the ultimate aim. If the parents are contradictory, inconsistent in their attitudes or apparently unjust in their treatment of the child, the child's ideas of reciprocity and his considerations of intention rather than results will have to develop through social intercourse with siblings, friends and peers

and will in consequence develop more slowly.

A particularly interesting connection with the concept of objective responsibility is the child's attitude to lying, which is an essential part of egocentric thought because the child tends spontaneously to alter the truth in accordance with his desires. "In the child, therefore, the problem of lies is the clash of the egocentric attitude with the moral constraint of the adult." In the early stages a lie, like a naughty word, is merely something which one is forbidden to say because the child is quite incapable of dissociating what is actually real from what he thinks to be real. Therefore to tell a lie is to commit a moral fault by means of language. Hence the objectivity of the small child's view of lying being anything one must not say.

At a later stage when intention is taken lightly into consideration and a mistake can be distinguished from a lie, a mistake is still thought blameworthy. However, from Lau, a bright eight year old, Piaget elicited this

response when he asked what was the difference between a mistake and a lie. "A boy who tells a lie knows what he is doing, but he doesn't want to say it. The other one (who makes a mistake) does not know." By ten years old the average child should be able to give a good explicit explanation.

A consequence of objective responsibility in lying is that the more improbable the lie the more heinous the young child judges it to be. The boy who said he saw a dog as big as a cow was thought by six year olds to be a fearful reprobate, but another who deceived his mother with a plausible tale of high marks gained at school was much less guilty because his story could have been true. Similarly the longer a tale took to tell and the more complicated it appeared the more severe was the judgment: intentions were simply not taken into account. Up to seven years of age, and even nine in a minority of cases, the material consequences of the lie were generally considered to be all that mattered.

However, by ten years of age usually the whole judgment is reversed so that the exaggerated "whopper" which is unlikely to take in anyone is considered much less heinous than the false report of school marks which might well succeed in deceiving the mother.

The young child believes that lies are only bad because they bring punishment; if they were not punished they would not be wrong. It follows from this that the child who is scolded most must be the naughtiest. Stern thinks that the child of up to seven or eight has difficulty in sticking to the truth not because he wishes to deceive but because he distorts reality in accordance with his desires and tendency to romance. The need to speak the truth only becomes apparent when the child thinks and acts as one of a society founded on respect and co-operation, and this development is normal between ten and twelve years of age. By this time the child's own mind has begun to come into effective contact with others and truth begins to acquire a new

significance and value, so that veracity becomes a moral demand that can justly be made upon him. He now sees for himself that deceiving others destroys mutual trust so "rules will become comprehensible, will become interiorised and will no longer give rise to any judgments but those of subjective responsibility".

Another belief held contemporaneously with objective responsibility is the belief in immanent justice; younger children believing that misdeeds bring their own punishments even though the punishment and the crime appear to be wholly unconnected. Thus the boy who misbehaves at school and falls into the river on the way home is thought to be justly punished for his disobedience, the mishap being mysteriously engineered by his own wrongdoing. Piaget found that this belief in automatic punishments emanating from things themselves invariably decreased with age. At six years old 86% of his sample believed in immanent justice, at 7 - 8 73%, at 9 - 10 the percentage had dropped to 54% and for 11 - 12 year olds was

down to 34%. In a batch of 13 - 14 year old backward children, however, the number of those who believed in immanent justice had risen to 54%, thus indicating that the belief in immanent justice is related to intelligence as well as to maturity.

Piaget asserts that there is some evidence from the behaviour of those who indulge in masturbation and onanism that a belief in immanent justice is to a certain extent innate, because these people tend to demonstrate spontaneous feelings of remorse and a desire for self-punishment. However, without employing the highly immoral procedure of bringing up a sample of children in complete isolation away from all social contact it would be impossible to prove such a hypothesis. Piaget thinks it much more likely that the belief arises from, or at least is encouraged by, parental teaching and by adult constraint in general. Although obviously few parents would believe in immanent justice themselves the frequency of such comments as, "It serves you right" doubtless

tends to build a false association between the punishment and the crime in the child's mind. The most probable explanation is, however, that the child transfers to things feelings which he has acquired under the influence of adult constraint.

The belief diminishes with age, for three reasons. First, because with intellectual advance the child begins to see the inadequacy of immanent justice as a rational explanation of cause and effect: the good do not always prosper. Secondly, as the child grows he sees only too many examples of the imperfections of adult justice in the behaviour of parents and teachers. Finally, because of changing relationships his general movement from the morality of constraint to that of co-operation will make him less inclined to believe in a universal and automatic justice.

Piaget is very concerned with the idea of justice in children and devotes a great deal of attention to the development of mature judgments based on co-operation. He distinguishes

primarily between the expiatory punishment which goes hand in hand with constraint and is of an arbitrary character unconnected with the offence such as smacking, depriving of toys or privileges etc., and the punishments by reciprocity which include a whole range of penalties from censure alone to exclusion from the social group itself. As these punishments are much more closely related to the misdeed and often indeed consequent upon it, they take in such measures as depriving the transgressor of the thing he has misused, doing to the child what he has done himself, e.g. refusing help and demanding restitution - payment for or replacement of broken or stolen objects.

Expiatory punishment, thought just by younger children, is seen as evolving out of two attitudes; the child's own innate desire for vengeance and the adult authority which imposes respect for given orders and respect for vindictiveness when these orders are obeyed. Therefore the passage from expiatory punishment to punishment by reciprocity is merely a special

case of evolution from unilateral to mutual respect. In every domain respect for the adult diminishes in favour of relations for equality and reciprocity between children themselves, and between children and adults. So it is perfectly normal that in the domain of retribution the effects of unilateral respect should tend to diminish with age. "That is why the idea of expiation loses more and more of its power and it is why punishments tend more and more to be ruled by the law of reciprocity alone. So that what remains of the idea of retribution is the notion, not that one must compensate for the offence by a proportionate suffering, but that one must make the offender realise by means of measures appropriate to the fault itself, in what way he has broken the bond of solidarity."

On the question of collective and communicable responsibility Piaget sees this as an educational as well as a psychosociological problem. He defines the classical notion of collective responsibility as the necessity for the whole group to expiate the

faults of one of its members. This feeling of obligation is brought about in primitive societies by the presence of two conditions; a mystical belief in the necessity for some punishment to follow transgression and a feeling of unity and solidarity within the group. The present writer's husband, a Desert Locust Control Officer, once encountered a band of the nomadic Danakil tribe in Ethiopia who rejected all his overtures of friendliness because they mistakenly believed that he had come to punish them for the depredations they had recently carried out on a Christian agricultural settlement. Communications were so bad that news of these depredations could not in fact have reached any official body.

In the modern child, however, the two conditions observed in primitive societies do not exist contemporaneously but rather in successive phases. At first he is subject to adult constraint and believes in objective responsibility and expiatory punishment, but because he is still egocentric and liable to

confuse the self with the non-self he is not a member of the unified group. When he does later enter the society of equals in groups inside and outside of school, he has abandoned adult constraint and operates within an autonomous morality.

It is not therefore surprising that in testing various age groups by his story and question method Piaget found no judgment whatsoever given that could be equated with the classical idea of collective responsibility. He did find, however, that the younger children thought punishment was necessary even if in the process it had to be meted out to the innocent as well as to the guilty. A middle age-group felt it was better not to punish at all than to punish the wrong person, while the oldest children were willing to accept punishment of the whole group if the group had voluntarily decided on solidarity.

It would seem then that in our society as the child grows up freeing himself more and more from adult authority, in contrast to the

primitive civilisation in which puberty introduces the demand for an ever-closer adherence to the will of the elders and the traditions of the tribe, the element of collective responsibility is necessarily lacking from the moral sense of the child.

Finally Piaget deals with retributive, as opposed to distributive justice and notes, as before, that the smaller children thought of punishment as an expiation. The middle group preferred equality of treatment, while the most mature decided on principles of equity, i.e. equality which allows for circumstances like age differences. "We may take it that children who put retributive justice above distributive are those who adopt the point of view of adult constraint, while those who put equality of treatment above punishment are those who in their relations with other children, or more rarely in the relations of mutual respect between themselves and adults have learnt better to understand psychological situations and to judge according to norms of a new moral type."

Although egalitarianism may be instilled into children by scrupulous parents it seems more likely that the idea of equality develops essentially through the children's reactions to one another and sometimes even at the adult's expense. Interrogations into the value of equality as opposed to authority produced four different types of attitude. First there were those who maintained that authority must be upheld at all costs and the persons in a position of power must automatically be right. Then there were those who while upholding the supremacy of obedience nevertheless distinguished between what was just and what was imposed by authority. A third group saw equality as all important, outweighing even such considerations as obedience and friendliness. Lastly there were those who would voluntarily comply with an order which they declared unjust in order to be helpful or agreeable. It was noted that there were no definite stages in these judgments as each child did not pass through each attitude successively. The attitude adopted

depended very much on education, environment and parental outlook.

However, whereas all small children appear to consider expiatory punishment a necessary consequence of transgression against adult authority, no children find that it is needed to establish fair play among themselves. This is, of course, because in their dealings with one another unilateral respect and adult constraint, essential ingredients of expiatory punishment, are lacking. Up to the age of seven or eight years justice appears to be entirely subordinate to adult authority. From eight to eleven the child's ideas are progressively more egalitarian, and from eleven or twelve onwards egalitarian justice is more and more tempered by considerations of equity. Piaget concludes that the formation of mature moral judgments is more than anything else a function of the mental age of the child. "Egalitarian justice", he says, "develops with age at the expense of submission to adult authority and in correlation with solidarity

between children. Egalitarianism would therefore seem to come from the habits of reciprocity peculiar to mutual respect rather from the mechanism of duties that is founded upon unilateral respect."

In consequence of his passionate belief in the necessity for developing in children the autonomous ethic Piaget advocates the use of democratic methods in schools far more extensively than was common at the time of his writing. He sees the teacher not as a priest but as an "elder collaborator" and "simple comrade". Experiment having proved that the only truly effective discipline is that which the children have willed and fully consented, the old demand for meaningless obedience which is no preparation for life, must be dropped altogether. School work must enlist the major part of the child's initiative and activity, and organised social life in which there is neither despotism nor constraint will encourage him to make voluntary and spontaneous efforts in later life. In this respect Piaget

wholeheartedly approves the group work and self-government supported by Dewey, Sanderson, Consinet and others of the Activity School.

Whereas unilateral respect does form in the young child an elementary sense of duty and a primitive sort of control this is not true morality because moral conduct needs more than outward conformity. As long as the law is external to the mind the mind cannot be transformed by it. Co-operation on the other hand is first a source of criticism which in turn leads to reflection and objective verification with the finally desired result of interiorisation of rules.

The Freudian Theory of
Conscience Development.

Freud first got his idea of the existence of the super-ego from the delusions of some of his psychotic patients who described the presence of an unseen observer who commented on their actions and appeared to anticipate their wrongdoing. He concluded that in everyone part of the normal ego was separated from the rest, and its function and activity was threefold, first, to observe the self, secondly, to reprove it for its misdeeds, and thirdly, to provide a model of good behaviour to be copied in the ego-ideal.

This super-ego with psychic energy at its disposal pursues its own ends independently of the ego and is thought to be the "origin of conscience".

Nowhere does Freud lay down a full and complete explanation of the development of conscience, but later writers like Calvin S.Hall and J.C. Flugel have carefully sifted through

his works and extracted from them a theory of elements or sources of the super-ego.

In the child part of his instinctual energy, or libido, is directed on to external objects which he desires to possess or use or influence, but part is directed on to the self (the enduring bodily and mental whole) so that he loves himself as he loves objects outside himself. However, if he becomes aware of the deficiencies of the real self the child's imagination allows him to build up an Ideal-Self as a compensation. The narcissistic or self-loving libido is then directed on to the total-self or Ego Ideal which thus becomes the first source of the super-ego.

The next source is from the process of introjection or incorporation into the child mind of the precepts and moral attitudes of the adults who surround him, most notably, of course, the parents. Moral standards thus pass from generation to generation and form the background of ideologies and cultures.

Because the child is physically weak

compared with the grown-ups and because he is ignorant of the dangers of his environment he is often, of necessity, thwarted in his desires by the very people whom he loves and admires most. So he develops an ambivalent love/hate attitude to those in authority and turns the aggressive feelings which he cannot vent on outer objects or people inwards upon himself. This is thought partially to account for the severity of the super-ego, the other concomitant cause being its assumption of the punitive functions of the external authority. Relations between the ego and the super-ego to a certain extent then reflect the relations between parent and child, so that the super-ego is satisfied when the erring child is punished. "Guilt", says Flugel, "implies a condition of tension between the ego and the super-ego which in turn corresponds to tension between parent and child, and in both cases punishment is the natural method of relief."

In his prolific writings Freud uses the

term "identification" ambiguously and the meaning of the term changes constantly for him. Most often it is used to describe a process which Urie Bronfenbrenner calls "the sequential interplay of forces internal and external which impels the child to take on the characteristics of the parent". Sometimes Freud uses the term to mean the outcome of developmental processes, i.e. the similarity of either motives or behaviour between the child and his chosen model, resulting from the continued attempts of the child to take on the characteristics of that model. In "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" Freud says, "Identification endeavours to mould a person's own ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model."

But whatever his final definition of the word might be, Freud clearly distinguished two ways in which identification might come about. The first of these he called anaclitic identification which was a function of loss of love, real or imagined. Thus the child being

suckled by the mother misses the mother when she is absent and not being certain that his wants will be satisfied, develops anaclitic or dependent identification. This is demonstrated by the young child's imitation of the mother's comforting sounds and gestures which normally accompany the feeding process. This identification is clearly impossible without a large measure of dependence, especially dependence on love. When the parents disapprove of the child's behaviour and apparently withdraw their love by withholding smiles, caresses or agreeable sounds the erring child endeavours to placate them by adopting their standards as his own. The image of the parent becomes a precipitate in the ego, the father or mother is "interiorised" or introjected into the child's personality, and the super-ego is formed. According to Freud then this super-ego is the starting point of religion, conscience, and indeed all human culture. But in "New Introductory Lectures in Psycho-analysis" he makes it clear that in the

process of identification it is the parents' super-ego which is taken as a model and introjected, the parents' ideals and standards as they would have them, not as they actually exist in life. Interesting corroborative evidence of this point was provided by Helper who found children's self-descriptions remarkably similar to their parents' ideal of childhood behaviour.

Thus it will be seen that the child may pattern himself on either the overt behaviour of his parents, or their motives or aspirations, either at the same time or at different times.

The second type of identification described by Freud was a function of fear, fear of an aggressor which Freud called aggressive identification, and this type of identification was often linked in boys with the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Here the father was seen as a powerful, threatening figure, jealous of the boy as a possible rival for the affections of the mother, and only awaiting some sign of

the boy's libidinal cathexes towards her to wreak a terrible castrating vengeance on him. To make this impossible relationship bearable Freud thought the boy assumed the aggressive role of the father which gave him a secure feeling of strength and power.

One of Freud's American followers, Karen Horney, writing in 1936 of "The Neurotic Personality of Our Time", thinks that the permanent destructive jealousy reactions resulting from the Oedipus complex are not nearly so common as Freud assumed, and that they are themselves neurotic formations, artificially generated by an unstable family atmosphere rather than the origin of a neurosis.

Anna Freud, in "The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense", cites many more credible and less dramatic examples of identification with the aggressor than does Sigmund Freud himself, for instance that of the little boy who wanted to play with weapons and armour following an incident in which he had been accidentally but

painfully struck by his games-master. She also describes an interesting case of conscious identification by a little girl who had hitherto been afraid to cross the hall but resolved her difficulty by making peculiar gestures as she went, and explained the source of her new-found courage in these words, "There's no need to be afraid in the hall, you just have to pretend that you're the ghost who might meet you."

Anna Freud holds the opinion that identification with the aggressor is a fairly normal stage in the development of the super-ego because when children do identify themselves in this way they are internalising other people's criticisms of their behaviour and thus with constant repetition providing material from which the super-ego may take shape. "But", she goes on to say, "the internalised criticism is not as yet immediately transformed into self-criticism..... it is dissociated from the child's own reprehensible activity and turned back on the outside world. By means

of a new defensive process identification with the aggressor is succeeded by an active assault on the outside world".

It is not until the child becomes aware of himself as a transgressor and turns the indignation of his super-ego inwards instead of outwards that we can say moral development has begun. This development, of course, is accompanied by those feelings of acute discomfort and self-criticism after transgression which we call guilt.

Thus identification with the aggressor is only a preliminary phase in the formation of the super-ego and a normal way of dealing with conflicts with authority.

Finally Anna Freud deals with a third form of identification, a defensive mechanism which she calls "altruistic surrender". This less usual type of identification comes into being after a conflict or series of conflicts between the child and its parents over the gratification of some instinctual desire. The child's wishes are then transferred to another

person and he derives a vicarious pleasure from actively seeking the fulfilment for another of desires which, because they were initially forbidden, he has renounced for himself. Examples of this kind of behaviour in adults are to be found in the efforts of confirmed spinsters to facilitate suitable alliances for other women of their acquaintance, a necessary condition being the genuine pleasure and interest taken in the operation with a total absence of jealousy.

Because of differences in anatomical structure and consequently in psychological development the formation of the super-ego in girls follows a pattern distinct from that of boys. Freud thought that the woman's passive part in the sexual act might through the centuries have evolved a preference for passive aims in general. He felt that although both male and female sex characteristics were present in girls as in boys, social conditions had forced women into passive situations,

convention had repressed their natural aggressive tendencies, and favoured the development of masochism. In the Vienna of the turn of the century these observations must have been truer than they appear to us today.

In tracing the early development of girls, Freud points out that while in most ways they are more oncoming and intelligent than infant boys, they are usually more docile and more amenable to training in anal control. In the phallic phase they are equally aggressive and find pleasure in masturbation centred round the clitoris.

With the onset of the Oedipus complex, however, their development follows different lines. As with the boy the girl's first love-object is the mother who satisfies her physical needs, but unlike the boy there is no early identification with the father. Often this pre-Oedipus attachment to the mother lasts even beyond the fourth year, and the libidinal wishes towards the mother are oral, anal and

phallic. Ultimately this cathexis for the mother is weakened and the attachment may end in an antagonism. The reasons the child would give for this lessening of affection if she were questioned might vary from complaints about the inadequacy of the milk supply to jealousy of a younger sibling or even resentment at the mother's prohibition of the pleasure of masturbation. But the real reason, Freud believed, was the castration complex: the fact that the girl held the mother responsible for her lack of penis and consequent penis envy. Incidentally this feeling of having been unjustly denied something of value is thought to remain a life-long unconscious motive for competitive activities in some women, even for the pursuit of an intellectual career.

Thus the castration complex, exemplified in the female as penis envy, is responsible for the introduction of the Oedipus complex in the girl whereas in the boy it is responsible for the resolution of that same conflict. At this turning-point three paths are open to the

girl; the first leads to sexual inhibition and neurosis and is taken when the girl, finding her phallic security spoint^l by penis envy, gives up her attachment to the mother and her masturbatory activity. The second leads to a masculinity complex and is taken when the girl refuses to admit her inadequacy and having now more energy at her disposal becomes more active and male and exaggerates her masculine characteristics. The third path leads to normal femininity and is taken when the girl resolves her difficulties by some degree of identification and cathexis with each parent. Emulation of the behaviour of the mother brings her closer to the father and compensates for the lost love relationship with the mother, while identification with the father preserves some of the cathexis for the mother. The relative strength of the two identifications and the success with which they are undertaken determine the nature and severity of the super-ego development in the girl.

Freud did point out, however, that unlike the boy the already "castrated" girl has no incentive for identifying with the aggressor, nor has she the same expectation of physical punishment as the boy, and therefore her super-ego never becomes so severe.

As he says in his Essay, "Some Psychological Consequences of Anatomical Distinction between the sexes"

".....for women what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of the emotional origins as we require it to be in men. Character traits which critics of every epoch have brought up against women - that they show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great necessities of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection and hostility - all these would be amply accounted for by the modification in the formation of their super-ego which we have already inferred."

INVESTIGATIONS OF PIAGET'S
THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT.

Piaget's two-stage theory of moral development, from heteronomous to autonomous control inspired a number of studies in Europe and America over a long period of time.

Harrower in 1934, sought to determine whether Piaget's results with the poorer children of Geneva could be replicated with children of the same age from comparable areas of London. The results did indeed show a marked decrease in moral realism with age, but when she used a control group of children from well-to-do homes quite a different pattern emerged with the very young children from the cultured background giving a high percentage of mature responses. She concluded that the stages of development emphasised by Piaget were not universal characteristics and were to be found only within certain groups subject to constant conditions.

Lerner in the U.S.A. in 1937 showed that high-status parents used less coercive controls and apparently in consequence the upper class

children showed an earlier decrease of moral realism than did the lower class children. MacRae in 1950, while confirming Lerner's proved relationships, did not agree that moral judgment was a unitary factor. Using a cluster analysis of responses he identified four independent factors. He believed that the increasing generalisation and qualification of moral judgments with age is not necessarily accompanied by decreasing parental control (indeed the areas of control may be greatly widened as the child grows to include activities outside the home, school work, friendships, etc.) and that cognitive factors were probably responsible for the apparently greater maturity of upper-class children. E.A. Peel, in 1959, doubted that the development of perception and judgment proceed automatically as a result of pure maturation and affirmed that it must be affected by experience and learning.

An attempt was made by Boehm and Nass in 1962 to study the effects of social class difference on conscience development by taping

the responses of children to stories intended to elicit their attitude to physical aggression, material damage, lying and authority dependence. They found that none of the stories differentiated the working-class from the middle-class children at a statistically significant level, although predictions - that material damage would be more important to the lower class - appeared as trends. When divided into age groups of below 9 and above 9, significant developmental trends appeared which led the researchers to conclude that "age is the only consistently operative factor in development towards maturity". However, in a follow-up study using the same stories Boehm found that academically gifted and upper-class children matured earlier than average children in moral judgments which discriminated between intention and outcome, and that working-class children at both levels of intelligence showed earlier evidence of peer reciprocity and adult independence than did upper-class children.

Cross-cultural studies in patterns of moral standards have demonstrated many remarkable

contrasts. Dennis, for example, in 1943 showed that stories about immanent justice decreased much more slowly in Hopi Indian children than in white Americans, but Havighurst and Neugarten, working with children from 6 different Indian tribes, found that responses indicating belief in immanent justice actually increased with age. This they accounted for by the child's acceptance of the superstitious beliefs of the adults of his tribe.

Earlier, while engaged in the University of Chicago Study of Values with Taba, Havighurst had found that the child's belief in moral realism was definitely associated with cultural factors. Navaho Indian children educated in a white school accepted the prevalent equitable attitude towards school customs and behaviour while believing that the rules of their tribal games were immutable. He concluded that the fault lay in the school where "the teaching of right and wrong is done with reference to isolated concrete acts of

behaviour; relatively little effort is made to help young people to generalise from these situations or to help them develop a coherent moral philosophy."

Liu, in 1950, found a decrease in immanent justice with age in Chinese children, but not with the American control group.

Morris in England, and Durkin in America in 1958, disagreed with Piaget's assertion that the acceptance of reciprocity as a justice principle increases with age. Both they and Kohlberg found that in none of their studies was there an increasing tendency with age to believe in the advisability of giving "tit for tat".

Piaget himself paid little attention to differences of response to his stories made by boys and girls, and subsequently only Medinnus and Morris have dealt seriously with possible sex differences in moral judgments. Medinnus, 1957, "found girls to be less advanced than boys in respect to the concept of

immanent justice and punishment", and Morris, 1958, thought sex differences in judgments were slight, and any apparent superiority in the girls was accounted for by the fact of their earlier pubescence. Boehm and Nass, however, saw in 1961 a trend evident in contemporary studies that girls overall showed more advanced development than did boys.

The fusion of behaviourist and psycho-analytic theory as a basis for recent studies of moral development has tended to lead the centre of interest away from Piaget's developmental stages and his emphasis on the cognitive and evaluative aspects of morality has been replaced by concentration on emotional and unconscious elements. But in connection with work based on Piagetian theory mention must be made of a study in Istanbul in 1952 by Ugurel-Semin who classified 291 4 - 16 year old children in three categories, selfish, equalitarian or generous, according to how they decided to share an issue of nuts with a friend who was temporarily out of the room. She

found that selfishness tended to decrease as the child grew older, equalitarianism increased and so did generosity, but only to a maximum of 7 or 8 years of age, after which it fluctuated. On the socio-economic level there were marked differences. Poor children were least selfish and most generous, rich children were generous rather than equalitarian, and middle-class children were least generous and most selfish. A content analysis of the comments made by the children during the experiment led the investigator to a conclusion with regard to the processes of moral thought which she saw as moving from centralisation to decentralisation in characteristic ways. These moves involved a change from external considerations of the situation in hand to internalisation of moral understanding, from a transient interest in the present activity towards contemplation of life as a whole, from looking at the moral action from an individual standpoint towards reciprocal and cooperative activity,

and finally from unilateral consideration of
the moral rule towards its mutual under-
standing.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FREUDIAN
THEORY OF CONSCIENCE FORMATION.

In successive papers Freud gives increasing emphasis to the importance of the boy's fear of a punitive castrating father as the primary force which brings about the resolution of the Oedipus complex and the development of identification. As the girl does not share this fear Freud concludes that she has no incentive to identify with the father and that her identification with the mother is based primarily on the anaclitic object choice of the earlier pre-sexual phase. "Fear of castration is naturally not the only motive for repression; to start with it has no place in the psychology of women In its place, for the other sex, is found fear of the loss of love, obviously a continuation of the fear of the infant at the breast when it misses its mother." Freud does believe that the girl's identification with her mother is influenced by the resolution of the Oedipus complex, but that this is subordinate to the anaclitic

identification of infancy. "The mother identification of the woman can be seen to have two levels, the pre-Oedipal which is based on the tender attachment to the mother and which takes her as a model, and the later one derived from the Oedipus complex."

Whereas Freud then thought that identification with the aggressor was central to the development of conscience Martin L. Hoffman, at the present time, thinks that ~~that~~ is more likely a temporary mechanism which, especially in males, leads to an aggressive and hostile outlook on the world. Anaclitic identification, on the other hand, is now assumed by most researchers to underly the development of an inner conscience. This first relationship with the mother or nurturant figure is a completely asexual one, and the child's primary super-ego is formed at this stage because of his complete dependency on the mother, not only for food and warmth but also for the smiles and caresses and other assurances of support which she bestows on him when he pleases her.

Sears, in 1953, found, when using a structured doll play situation as an indication of father-identification in 5 year old boys, that there was a positive relationship between the degree of the father's warmth and affection (as reported by the mother during interview) and the son's identification with him.

Payne and Mussen in 1956 used an "actual similarity" index of identification of a sample of high school boys and their fathers obtained by subjecting both to personality and aptitude tests. A positive relationship was found to exist between identification and the boy's conception of the father as warm and kind. The boys' awareness of the fathers' kindness was revealed in story completions.

These and other similar investigations such as those of Bronson (1959) and Mussen and Dister (1960), even though their evidence is sometimes indirect, seem to support the view that love rather than punitiveness is the significant parental variable, but they emphasised the positive rather than the

negative side of anaclitic indentification, i.e. that it relates to receiving parental love, not to being threatened with its withdrawal.

Other general observations would seem to show that identification with the aggressor instead of producing guilt feelings by turning hostility inwards may rather contribute to the development of degrees of self-assertiveness along a continuum from independence and initiative to brutality and sadism. Presumably the type of aggression which was produced would depend upon the model who was emulated. Numerous examples of this were provided in concentration camps where certain classes of prisoner, such as the 'capots', who were given some responsibility, outdid their guards in savagery towards their fellow-suffers. But whatever the circumstances, identification with the aggressor, to be effective, demands some sort of dependency; the child depends on the parent for food, shelter and support, the prisoner depends on

ea /

the guard for life itself and perhaps for
thos/minimal 'comforts' which make it
supportable. e /

Since the end of World War II there has been a striking increase in the number of studies of moral development provoked by considerations of both learning theory and psychoanalytic concepts. The investigations deal with internalisation of moral values as indicated by expressions of guilt, confession and apology, and the parental attitudes which determine this development.

Sanford criticises Freud on the grounds that his theories do not sufficiently account for individual differences in conscience development and exclude environmental factors while emphasising organic causes. He feels that parental love or punishment need not necessarily result in internalisation of the parents' attitudes - they may simply reinforce behaviour directly in accordance with learning principles. The child learns which of his actions please and which displease, which

to integrate into his ego system and which to discard, and so his moral values are based on the familiar process of learning through reinforcement.

Mowrer, in 1950, saw two distinct mechanisms of identification, the first developmental and instigated by biological drives such as the fear of loss of love, and the second defensive and produced by the fear of socially inflicted discomforts like castration. Whereas Freud himself thought that the object choice came first and identification only later when satisfaction through the object choice was denied, Mowrer believes that because infants of both sexes need first the love and care of the mother, both sexes identify initially with the mother. The girl child continues this process and ultimately, like the mother, adopts men as sexual objects. The boy on the other hand eventually becomes aligned with the father. But it is when the normally loved child meets the disciplinary demands of the parents that

he is "thrown into intolerable anxiety" from which relief is obtained only by the acceptance of the parental standards in the formation of the super-ego or conscience.

While accepting Freud's notion of a generalised motive to be like another as the nucleus of the concept of identification, Parsons formulates a very complex sociological theory in which he sees the child as being socialised in four stages, first by the permissiveness of the mother in allowing the child to express himself, then by her support, followed by her denial of reciprocity, i.e. not 'giving in' when he transgresses, and finally by her manipulation of the reward when he conforms. Parsons thinks it is inevitable that cognitive and expressive features of the parents' behaviour should be internalised as well as their moral standards. This is essential for the transmission of culture as well as for the formation of the super-ego. He believes Freud underestimates

the function of learning in the development of sex identity and, most crucial omission of all, fails to analyse the structure of the relationships in which the process of socialisation takes place.

The child passes through not one, but a series of identifications, the nature of which is determined by the roles being taken by both parent and child at successive stages of the child's development. Parsons, like Freud, sees the mother nurturing and the father punitive but with the important distinction that though involving discipline and punishment the father's role is not predominantly hostile. He describes the mother's function as expressive - being warm, affectionate, solicitous for the children and often acting as liaison or mediator between them and the father. The instrumental function which he assigns to the father is concerned with "establishing the desired relations to external goal objects", e.g. working at a job, providing for and controlling the family.

For Parsons a role always means a reciprocal relationship, and at any given stage the child identifies, not with the total personality of the parent, but with those aspects of it which are functional for him at that particular time. His primary infantile identification with the mother as a source of care, for example, takes place when she is in fact playing an instrumental role, by providing for his biological needs. At this stage neither the mother nor the child are differentiated with regard to sex. After the Oedipal phase, however, the instrumental and expressive functions are divided between the parents as previously described and the child has a basis for discriminating between them.

At each level of identification Parsons sees a progressive differentiation. At first the identifications are more diffuse and related to concrete behaviour. Later they become more specific and enduring and their content more abstract, so that even when the same mother serves as a model, what is

internalised by a girl in infancy is quite different from what is internalised by her as a school-child.

When it is obvious to the child that the mother loves the father and approves of his attitudes and sanctions, the child can be motivated to do things which please both mother and father and be rewarded by the mother's love and nurturance. Thus, withdrawal of love techniques on the part of the mother can make the child identify with the father's typical instrumental behaviour in initiating changes and manipulating the environment.

In the experimental field in 1953 Whiting and Child undertook an investigation into the developmental antecedents of guilt and found, among other things, that guilt would be more likely to occur in societies where strict and frequent punishment was enforced than otherwise. A later study across and within three cultures, a Mormon community, a Texan town and a Zuni pueblo found, as was expected, (arguing directly from psychoanalytic theory)

that the degree of internalisation of moral values was positively correlated with the extent to which denial of affection was used as the principal disciplinary technique for the child. The method adopted in this study was to present the subjects with an unfinished story in which the hero had committed some misdemeanour. The children were required to complete the story as they chose, not to state as Piaget would have demanded, "What X ought to do". In this way Whiting hoped to elicit a more genuine response rather than a formula which the child thought appropriate to the occasion.

One of the most painstaking and significant investigations was that of Sears, Maccoby and Levin in 1957 who, by interviewing over a period a very large sample of parents and their children, were able to demonstrate convincingly the existence of very definite patterns of child rearing, and confirm the findings of McKinnon twenty years earlier.

In dealing with the development of

conscience in children they distinguish three different kinds of control; first, an external control - as for instance a mother moving a baby away from a dangerous object; second, self-control based on hope of reward or fear of punishment; and thirdly, inner control from acceptance of the parents' standards. The criteria of conscience control are that it operates when there is no fear of discovery or punishment, and that when temptation is not overcome guilt feelings arise.

According to psychoanalytic theory 5 - 6 was the critical year for conscience development but Sears, Maccoby and Levin point out that having a conscience is not an 'all or nothing affair' at any stage, least of all at this stage. They argued, however, that praise, isolation, withdrawal of love and use of reasoning are all examples of love-oriented behaviour on the part of the mother and in each instance the frequent use of such methods was accompanied by a greater number of high-conscience children than was the lesser use.

Tangible rewards, deprivation of privileges or ^wtreats and physical punishments, on the other hand, tended to produce fewer children of high conscience. However, the withdrawal of love as a training technique is meaningless if the mother is not a warm, loving person to start off with, and therefore the pattern which produced the highest level of conscience in children was that of the kindly, demonstrative mother who, to control the child, threatened this affectionate relationship.

In general their findings supported the theory of identification, "extensive practice of parental roles enhances conscience, we believe, because in the course of such role play the child practises the value statements of his parents and thus makes them his own". Sears elsewhere defines identification as "a secondary motivational system for which 'acting like the mother' is the goal response". It differs from conventional learning because there is no specific training and no overt rewards for individual instances of conformity

to parental standards. The child from the age of two onwards adopts the mannerisms, plays the roles and later absorbs into his own value system many of the estimations, restrictions and ideals of the parents.

Writing in collaboration with Maccoby and Levin again, Sears points out that conscience content is as important as conscience strength. The child must learn, for example, that whereas he must not be aggressive in brutal ways, the demands of the competitive society in which he must grow up will necessitate a good deal of inter-personal aggression.

One of the dangers of strong identification with the parent is that his mildest strictures and those which are meant to cover perhaps only one incident may become permanent and binding all matters of conscience. The child with the overstrong conscience may easily become guilt-ridden, and rigid and inflexible in his judgments. In later life this can lead to an unbearably sanctimonious outlook, and even to cruel and vicious expressions of moral

indignation if earlier hostile feelings have been repressed. At the least the child with the overstrong conscience loses much of the fun of life and is prevented by fear from much normal and desirable experimentation with new ideas and impulses.

The child with the underdeveloped conscience may also be the victim of fear - fear of punishment and the unpleasant consequences of his wrongdoing. His infantile impulses remain strong and demanding so that he may develop into a bullying and aggressive trouble-maker whose moral judgments are based on expediency rather than the interiorisation of real values.

The answer, Sears, Maccoby and Levin feel, lies in the use of reasoning as an influence on and a measure of conscience. "The greater the use of reasoning the greater will be the probability that reasoning as a form of human behaviour will be passed from generation to generation. And it is in the very use of reasoning that man has been developing so rapidly."

In 1958 A.R. Crane undertook a study of pre-adolescent gangs and their influence on the moral development of children, gathering his information from 16 - 20 year old students and their memories of these gangs. He concluded that it is not necessarily from parents that boys learn the real values which activate adult male behaviour because the father is so frequently a little-known figure to his son that he is an unsatisfactory mediator; the important information more often comes to the boy 'pediarchically' through the peer group. The family is not therefore an adequate instrument for socialisation of children, especially boys, because society is 'achievement oriented' and it is the age-homogenous gangs which bridge the gap between kinship relations and achievement relations.

The same year Charles Y. Nakamura, also using the retrospective experiences of his women students, discovered in confirmation of Miller's conflict and displacement theory that children whose parents were dominant and over-

protective tended to displace their criticism of hostility towards their parents more on to other people than did children who had been negatively disciplined.

One hundred and forty of the children whom Sears and Maccoby had used as 5 - 6 year old subjects in their enquiries into development of conscience, were used in a follow-up study on 11 - 12 year olds by Robert E. Grinder in 1962. Grinder devised a ray-gun shooting gallery where the scores gained by the contestants were pre-arranged. However, the children were given the opportunity to cheat in order to gain attractive badges.

It was found on the whole that children who at 5 or 6 showed evidence of strong guilt feelings (it will be remembered that this was considered the critical year for conscience development) had high resistance to temptation at 11 or 12. Resistance was also positively related in boys to admission of guilt when questioned at 5 or 6 and to voluntary confession for girls at the same stage. Grinder, like

Sears, Maccoby and Levin, found that the child with the over-conscientious super-ego over-generalised in his responses and therefore demonstrated feelings of guilt in inappropriate situations.

Aronfreed, Cutick and Fagen in 1962 devised an experiment to test the relative values of cognitive structure, punishment and nurturance on the induction of a self-critical attitude in children after a supposed transgression. A set of toy soldiers surrounded a nurse doll; these had to be gently pushed aside to get the nurse safely into a box. Finally, by trickery on the part of the experimenters the 'nurse' appeared to be broken and the subjects were cued to respond with expressions of guilt or explanation. Part of an initial issue of tootsie ro^ols which was given to each child was withdrawn as punishment each time the attendant soldier was knocked over.

It was found that self-critical response occurred significantly more frequently when adequate instructions were provided during

training periods and when explicit value statements were made, than when they were absent. It did not appear that the self-critical response was dependent upon a kindly encouraging tone being adopted by the experimenter rather than a coldly, formal informative one.

Taking the Freudian idea of identification one stage further, three Jewish-American psychologists Zella Luria, and Miriam and Adena Goldwasser, in 1962 devised a means of finding out whether the socialising or nurturant figures in the child's environment were the more influential in the internalisation of moral values. They took as their subjects Israeli children brought up in two groups each of which had collective ideologies, the first in the Kibbutz where the children while eating and working in a communal establishment were nevertheless with their parents every evening and on the Sabbath. In the Moshav group, on the other hand, the children were away from their parents all the time and nurturant and socialising functions were both undertaken by officers of

the group.

It was found that the Kibbutz children confessed more readily and there was no significant pattern of sex difference in frequency of confession as there was in a control group of Gentile American children where the girls confessed significantly more readily than the boys. The experimenters, however, were not entirely satisfied that confession was a true measure of internalisation of values. This issue will be taken up at a later point.

During the past ten years a number of different investigators, Allinsmith and Greening, Aronfreed, Bronfenbrenner, Heinicke, Hoffman and Saltztein, Miller and Swanson and Unger, have used many different measures for relating parental behaviour with the child's internalisation of moral values and all have obtained results consistent with the general hypothesis that the more the child is disciplined through withdrawal of affection the more likely he is to internalise moral

values. Hoffman said in a review in 1961 that "the use of psychological discipline (which includes techniques which appeal to the child's needs for affection and self-esteem and his concern for others), especially in the context of an affectionate child-parent relationship, appears to foster the development of an internalised moral orientation, especially with respect to one's reactions following the violation of a moral standard."

Nevertheless the picture is still by no means complete. The majority of studies mentioned above use only males as subjects, but where both sexes have been included important differences have been noted with certain parental variables showing stronger relationships for boys and others for girls. (Hoffman and Saltztein, Sears, Rau and Alpert.) In many researches the socio-economic status of the subjects has been made to correspond but this variable has rarely been investigated in its own right. Miller and Swanson, Aronfreed and Bronfenbrenner, however, suggest rather

strongly that the social position of the family influences the inter-relationships between parents and children, as well as the way in which the parent treats the children of like and unlike sex. Bronfenbrenner proposed, in 1963, that the relationship between parental behaviour and internalisation of standards by their children is curvilinear rather than linear, so that there is a point which represents the optimal balance between parental affection and disciplinary techniques as far as their effect on the morality of the children is concerned. As yet there has not been sufficient research to determine whether or not this hypothesis is tenable.

LEARNING THEORY AND MORAL TRAINING.

The adherents of Hull's learning theory see the origin of conscience in conditioning and, like the followers of the psycho-analytic school, focus on reduction of anxiety as the basic moral motive. J.B. Watson's famous "little Albert" experiments in 1920 proved the possibility of producing a conditioned anxiety response by exposing the child to a frightening noise while he was playing with a white rat which he had previously loved. The fear associated with the noise subsequently became attached to the rat even when the noise itself was absent.

During the course of his everyday life the child must learn to refrain from a large variety of activities which are either pleasant or satisfying to him, but are proscribed because of their harmful or disagreeable consequences to others, like destroying property, beating up smaller brothers or sisters, or urinating when and where he pleases. To achieve this, the immediate pleasure must be offset

by an immediate punishment which is greater than the pleasure and if possible occurs before it. Thus the child's anti-social behaviour may be considered as the conditioned stimulus and when attached to the unconditioned stimulus - the slap or scolding from the parent - a conditioned anxiety reaction is produced. After a number of repetitions of this kind the act itself, without the accompanying punishment, will produce the conditioned response and so the child tempted to engage in one of the prohibited activities will experience the unpleasant feelings previously associated with the activity and so refrain from carrying it out.

Obviously a most important principle in this connection is that of generalisation of response, and it was to investigate its connection with moral development that Hartshorne and May undertook their mammoth Character Education Enquiry in 1929. This was a five-year study of boys and girls aged 11 to 16 years from several schools. Classroom tests

athletic contests and parlour games were designed to disclose cheating and other forms of dishonesty. On a large battery of tests they found low correlations which they interpreted as indicating specificity rather than generality especially in such traits as honesty. Their major conclusion was therefore that moral qualities such as honesty and deceit "represent not general ideals but specific habits learned in relation to specific situations which have made one or other response successful". They found a trend towards greater consistency of behaviour with increasing age (sometimes in the wrong direction) but even so there were many lapses. Honesty, however, became more consistent with age than did dishonesty. Other findings were that moral knowledge (the ability to state principles) increased with age and was much more influenced by parents and friends than by teachers and club leaders. Scores in tests of moral knowledge varied with the setting of the examination, the same children often gaining markedly higher scores at home than at school.

Whereas there were no noticeable sex differences in deceitful behaviour, girls between 10 and 13 scored much higher than did boys on moral knowledge.

Hartshorne and May's theory of the specificity of moral conduct has been controverted by Maller, Allport, Eysenck, Valentine and others. They feel that the evidence is not sufficiently lowly correlated to support a hypothesis of complete specificity which, on personality qualities like honesty, persistence, self-control etc., would predict a correlation of zero, and in any case the number of items in any test did not compare with the much greater number generally used to judge a quality like intelligence. Valentine suggests that as with intelligence there is a continuum in all general traits and that few children, if any, will be unflinchingly honest, obedient or self-effacing.

The present writer feels that integration, which has been defined as "a certain dependability or stability of moral conduct" must obviously be incomplete in children

because the child has not had sufficient experience to enable him to define for himself the rules or principles which should govern every aspect of his behaviour. Therefore behaviour which appears inconsistent to the observer may not be thought so by the subject, and no two situations will make quite the same demands on the child.

In support of the notion of generality of conduct Eysenck in "Crime and Personality" describes Willett's recent investigation into motoring offences. It is commonly believed that these are mere technical infringements of the law and have nothing to do with morality. Yet Willett found that one-fifth of his sample of 653 offenders had criminal records for other kinds of misdemeanour and a further 60, though not convicted, were "known to the police". It would seem then that this group, far from being unlucky but law-abiding citizens, included a very much higher proportion of irresponsible and criminal types than the normal population.

Probably behaviour is neither completely

general nor completely specific, but each hypothesis is true up to a certain point. Though the circumstances of the transgressions which are punished in childhood are never exactly the same, there are normally sufficient common components for some generalisation of response to take place. Labelling and explanation by the parent helps the child considerably in making his own mental groupings of those activities which are to be avoided because they are disapproved of by parents, teachers or peers and so expose him to fear, anxiety or punishment.

When temptation is strong the child will be in a state of conflict between the urge to do the forbidden thing and the fear or anxiety which is his conditioned emotional reaction to such a situation. If the conditioning is strong enough he will refrain from committing the deviant act, if not he will yield to temptation. The extent to which he behaves in a socially approved fashion is therefore determined by the strength of the avoidance reaction which he has acquired through the

process of training and conditioning. By an /
large people tend to behave in accordance
with the law of effect: they do what is pleasant
and avoid what is unpleasant. Mowrer posits
also a "law of integrative learning" by which
he asserts that the temporal nearness of the
reward or punishment is the deciding factor
as to whether an act is committed or not. If
reward comes first and punishment later then
the threat of punishment will be relatively in-
effectual: this is why juvenile delinquents
persist in doing pleasurable things which they
know will be punishable by law if and when they
are caught.

The question why all people do not behave
in this way is answered for the exponents of
learning theory by considering the two different
learning processes. Instrumental or rational
learning enables one to strive to overcome
difficulties and resolve problems because such
efforts are rewarding or reinforcing in bringing
about the result we desire - the acquisition of
new skill or the passing of an examination. /

Conditioning, however, works not by reinforcement but by contiguity. Two entirely different stimuli are associated because they occur together in time and space, not because they are rewarded, and whereas the central nervous system is concerned with rational learning it is purely the autonomic nervous system which is involved in conditioning. Mowrer therefore compares the difference between conditioning and learning with the distinction between training and teaching. This would appear to the present writer as a useful basis for the explanation of the transition from the young child's "morality of constraint" to the later "autonomous ethic" where considerations of social or religious principles are of more importance than an automatic inhibition of a desire to deviate.

Where early moral training is concerned conditioning has three obvious advantages over other types of learning:

1. The time element - there is no delay in the

onset of anxiety. (For conditioning to take place the optimum interval between application of conditioned and unconditioned stimuli is half a second.)

2. The inevitability of the punishment - in this case anxiety - which is a far stronger deterrent than possible punishment by a parent or teacher.
3. The fact that punishment, in the form of anxiety, precedes the crime. Indeed it often occurs when the idea of transgression is merely conceived and therefore acts as a strong deterrent.

It is sometimes doubted that the autonomic reactions of fear and anxiety can be sufficiently strong as to act as the determinants of moral behaviour. Behaviour therapists suggest that extreme neurotic fear is a conditioned response rather than the result of repressed desires and as people suffering from neurotic disorders are not infrequently known to commit suicide rather than endure continuous fear and anxiety, it is not unreasonable to believe in the severity of

a conscience acquired by conditioning.

In the course of his investigations into the dimensions and origins of personality, Eysenck has made many valuable discoveries about the differences in children's ability to condition. Spielmann, using a simple test of tapping on a metal plate with a stylus, found that people with extraverted characteristics built up cortical inhibition at an overwhelmingly faster rate than did an introverted group and would therefore probably be much more difficult to condition. Franks, another associate of Eysencks, by conditioning groups of people to blink to a sound which was originally accompanied by a puff of air on the eye did in fact confirm that introverts conditioned twice as easily as extraverts. Several other investigators verified these findings. From this it can be argued that extraverts will tend to have a weaker conscience than introverts because their nervous systems are more resistant to the formation of conditioned responses. This explains why the psychopath, who is at the

extreme end of the scale of extraversion, even if possessed of high intelligence and good upbringing, will yet lie, cheat or steal with complete indifference to both the suffering of his victim and the punishment he knows will be inflicted on himself. If an introvert is emotionally unstable, on the other hand, and is prone to anxiety states, he will be only too ready to be conditioned into a fearful response.

Many studies of criminals link deviant behaviour with strongly extraverted characteristics. Fine, of the U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, found that significantly more traffic violations were made by extraverts than by introverts. Similarly Biesheuvel and White, working with pilots who had been involved in flying accidents, found them more highly extraverted and emotionally unstable than a control group.

In 1928 Lange investigated the hereditary factors in criminality by using the twin method. Assuming that monozygotic twins shared the same hereditary characteristics to a far greater

extent than did fraternal twins, he was successful in proving that the personality traits responsible for deviant behaviour did appear to be largely innate. Later Krantz, Stumpfl, Roganoff, Legras and, more recently, Shields all separately confirmed Lange's findings. This being so it would appear that character education should be adapted to fit the individual child with his unique endowment, whereas, for instance, the extraverted child might respond to summary physical punishment the introverted, anxious type would require a more liberal encouraging approach. However, as the extravert has a high level of pain tolerance "the stick" may not be very effective! But he also has a much greater need for external stimulation so "detention" as a punishment would be much more irksome to him than to the introvert.

Eysenck believes that much delinquent behaviour could be eliminated if children were tested for conditionability, much as they are tested for intelligence in the early days of their school life. If the extremely emotional

extraverts most likely to become problem children or psychopaths were diagnosed sufficiently soon, appropriate methods of rigorous conditioning could be suggested to parents and teachers to enable the children to learn acceptable responses.

Another remedial approach being considered for children who are already disturbed through hyperactivity, destructiveness, negativism, distractability or other undesirable traits is the administration of stimulant drugs such as caffeine and amphetamine which have the effect of decreasing cortical inhibition, increasing excitatory potential and so moving the child along the continuum from extraversion towards introversion. Cutts and Jasper in America, and Lindsley and Henry in England, treating problem children, found that under the influence of benzedrine (another stimulant) marked improvement of behaviour was noted by all observers whereas phenobarbital (a depressant which increases extraversion) aggravated the abnormal condition.

During the brief periods when the children were under treatment they were apparently able to learn many of the socially acceptable conditioned responses which they had previously been unable to acquire, and when administration of the drugs ceased these responses did not extinguish, although of course new responses could not be made so easily. Despite the many ethical objections to the alteration of the basic personality structure by the administration of drugs, it would seem that further research in this field is eminently desirable.

Apart from the differences in conditionability in normal children which make for differences in behaviour there are of course differences in the amount of conditioning to which a child will be subjected. This in turn will depend on the temperament and emotionality of the parent, his social class, religion and education, and many other variable factors, which make the whole process much more complicated than training Pavlov's dogs to salivate.

We usually assume too that all parents, within broad limits, will train their children to conform to the social norms and indeed most of them do insist on lip service at least being paid to such ideals as truthfulness and honesty. But there are in existence small minority populations where the acknowledged aims are frankly anti-social. The present writer has intimate knowledge of an area of an industrial city incongruously known as All Saints where defying the police is the accepted mode of living, local store-keepers are considered fair game, and fathers and mothers are swapped nightly without histrionics or embarrassment. In these conditions the introvert soon becomes the expert at "knocking-off", and the obedient girl the prostitute.

Even in "normal" home conditions there would seem to be no general simple relationship between learning conditions and indices of conscience. Glueck and Rau, for instance, found that parents of delinquent boys used more punitive measures and were more inconsistent

in their modes of discipline than were the parents of non-delinquents, yet Grinder found no such relationship. Kohlberg suggests that there is a relationship between the pattern of enlightened child-oriented disciplinary techniques and social conformity, but that it is not the techniques themselves which are effective so much as the quality of the parent-child relationship.

Whereas much of the work of the exponents of learning theory has been concerned with those aspects of conscience which have a deterrent function, Solomon at Harvard made some interesting suggestions about the concept of guilt. He experimented with puppies, who, after being starved for two days, were allowed into a room containing a dish of horse-meat and another of commercial dog food. As the horse-meat is apparently much more palatable to puppies they made for this at once but were whacked with a newspaper until they learnt to choose the less attractive food. When training was completed they were "tested" in the absence of the

experimenter with minute quantities of dog-food and large dishes of horse-meat. The length of time they resisted temptation varied from six minutes to sixteen days after which time the starving puppy had to be forcibly fed.

Solomon also noted as significant the precise way in which the puppies yielded to temptation. Those who resisted for a long time showed no emotional upset once they had eaten the "forbidden" food, whereas others showed marked emotional disturbance after they had done so. It appeared that those which were whacked in training as they approached food built up a high resistance. Those, on the other hand, who had eaten some of the horseflesh before the whacking commenced could still learn to resist but were more distressed, or guilty, than the others if they yielded. Solomon concluded that delayed punishment (for children as well as for animals) is probably not very effective in producing a high level of resistance to temptation but might well produce strong guilt feelings after a transgression.

Parents then who wished to assist their children to avoid bad behaviour could presumably help more effectively by anticipating when the child intended to do something forbidden and warning him off rather than by allowing him to commit the offence and then punishing him.

Learning theory does not lay down specific rules about the moral training of the child because it stresses the individuality of the child and the need for a tremendous variety of techniques to suit particular cases. It would seem to the present writer that whereas Freudian theories describe certain environmental factors, and Piagetian concepts explain aspects of the child's cognitive structure, both are useful only in providing a backcloth against which moral development takes place. It is, however, left to learning theory to explain how the complex of responses which we call conscience is acquired, and to suggest the practical rational ways in which it can be developed or altered.

CONCEPTS CONCERNED WITH MORAL
DEVELOPMENT.

Internalisation.

As the individual lives in a social context his behaviour can never be completely separated from the environment, but there is a sense in which we can speak of internalisation. It is defined in this way by Aronfreed:

"Internalisation may be conceived of as both a process and a variable characteristic of responses. We may consider a response to be internalised to the extent that its elicitation, under specific stimulus conditions, is independent of external outcomes - that is, to the extent that its reinforcing consequences, those which strengthen or maintain the response, have become intrinsic rather than contingent on external events."

For the concept of internalisation to be meaningful and useful the reinforcing consequences must initially have been dependent on external agencies. Some actions have results that are inherently reinforcing and therefore could not

be classified as examples of internalisation. For example, when the baby responds to the feel of the breast or bottle by sucking, the action is inherently reinforced by the presentation of the milk to satisfy a biological need. This could not, in a psychological sense at least, be termed internalisation! Experiments on animals are useful in demonstrating the application of the concept of internalisation. Solomon in 1953 showed that dogs soon learned to leap over a bar into a "safe" area after a number of severe electric shocks were administered accompanied by a buzzer. The dogs continued to make the response to the signal long after the punishment was discontinued. After a number of similar experiments conducted by others, like Kamin and Wynne, it was concluded that aversive learning was more effective than reward in establishing internalisation. Reward responses in animals had only a very limited stability when the original reinforcement was discontinued even though secondary reinforcers in the form of other external

consequences previously associated with the reward were still present.

Although internalisation was found to be relatively easily produced by the process of negative reinforcement, when a primary need was also present once the punishment was removed the inhibitory effects of aversive learning soon extinguished. (Miller, 1959). This is parallel to the experiments of Schein who found in 1957 that people under severe strain acted in ways out of keeping with their normal established character.

In everyday life behaviour which has all the appearances of being internally oriented may, however, be subtly sustained by small external cues which cannot be replicated under laboratory conditions. The pupil who is tempted to distract his neighbour may inhibit the impulse on seeing, or imagining he sees, the beginnings of a frown on the teacher's face. Reactions which are internalised (i.e. which can be produced without the risk or threat of punishment) may also produce reinforcing

effects. The child who spontaneously "makes up" for her naughtiness by bringing her mother a bunch of flowers may have her tendency reinforced by the sight of her mother's pleasure.

The ability to reflect, evaluate and remember obviously makes human behaviour potentially more independent of external outcomes than it would otherwise be. However, because of the recurrence, albeit infrequently, of reinforcing agencies, it is impossible to dichotomise all moral actions into those which are internally and those which are externally mediated. Rather one must envisage their being placed along a continuum according to their degree of internalisation.

Most writers on the subject think of a high degree of internalisation as synonymous with maturity and reliability. It is generally taken to imply integrity of character, and the ability to adhere to one's principles while resisting external social pressures. However, there are others more concerned with psycho-

analytic enquiry into the origins of neurosis who think that an extremely internalised conscience is too restrictive and makes for a rigid personality insensitive to changes on the social atmosphere.

It would seem, to the present writer, that the responsibility in this matter weighs heavily on the parents who must ensure that the rules their children internalise are concerned with genuine morality and not with mere modes and conventions, no matter how gratifying to the parents polite manners, precise speech and impeccable appearance may be. In the contemporary permissive climate of child rearing practices if the child were taught to discriminate between the behaviour which is essential for the proper conduct of life and that which merely facilitates more sophisticated social intercourse there would be little fear of the development of neurosis.

Social psychologists have pointed out that people tend to be internally oriented in their conduct to the extent that they have control

over their environment and its effect on their behaviour. Conversely, it is said, those whose actions are more frequently imposed upon them by sources outside themselves are more likely to have an external orientation. A person has, of course, numerous points of contact with his social and material environment and the direction of control will often vary considerably from one area to another. However, there are certain spheres in which his influence is relatively stable and definitive, and these include socio-economic status and sex role. For example, people in high ranking positions normally have more responsibility and freedom than those in subordinate positions and consequently have greater power to determine their own actions and to manipulate their environment. This would tend to make their conscience and conduct more internally oriented than those of people in lower status groups.

The structure of present-day industrial society necessitates the existence of a middle-class capable of initiative and independent

of immediate external supervision and the satisfactions and rewards resulting from the fulfilment of these requirements are sufficiently reinforcing to perpetuate the system. Among the working class, on the other hand, generally speaking there is neither the need nor the opportunity for showing drive and self-reliance, and both the physical and psychological environments are more restricting. This difference is reflected in the child rearing practices of the two classes. Bronfenbrenner and Miller and Swanson have illustrated how the average middle-class parents try to induce an internalisation of moral values in their children by explanation and reasoning while lower class parents tend to sensitize them to the external consequences of transgression. This, and their less mature attitude to authority and greater dependence upon external reinforcement in an achievement task has been advanced as the reason for the larger proportion of delinquency among working-class children. It goes without saying, of course,

that the parents' socio-economic level per se has no influence on the child's character. It is only through its effect on the child's social experience that it can facilitate the development of conscience.

The real relevance of the internal versus external orientation of conscience is in respect to its influence on conduct. Broadly speaking one may expect that behaviour will be largely controlled by the cognitive structure which the individual has acquired through the experience of years, although there are numerous examples of a person acting against the dictates of conscience especially when a strong instinctual need, as for instance for sexual satisfaction, is present.

Conscience.

Socrates claimed to be guided in his judgments by an oracle or daimon which some later commentators have taken to be analagous to the Christian "voice of conscience". However, Plato and Aristotle and to a certain extent,

All Greek philosophers saw a close liaison between virtue and the exercise of reason and believed that, as to be virtuous it was only necessary to have knowledge, no man sins intentionally, and evil is synonymous with ignorance.

It was not until the fourth century that St. Augustine in his "Confessions" noted the presence of affective as well as cognitive factors in morality, and from then until the present day all philosophers of note have distinguished between understanding and will. "After the Greeks and up to the 20th century morality became a value system concerned with desires and constraints which intimately affected the welfare of others".

Nowadays, however, under matters for conscience we include cleanliness, forms of self-discipline and personal qualities like perseverance and punctuality as well as those actions which because of their consequences for others are more strictly termed moral. This expanded conception of conscience has come about

through two main influences, the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and the Behaviouristic theories of social learning from Thorndike onwards. In the former case, the super-ego is seen to embrace a variety of internal controls as well as reactions to transgressions, because the small child, with limited powers of speech and cognition in identifying with the parent uncritically accepts his judgments and standards of conduct over a wide field of activities. The behaviourists believe the child adopts those evaluative responses which are rewarded by parents and teachers and eliminates others which are punished, irrespective of whether they are moral or merely desirable or conventional.

Maturation and social interaction (i.e. the changing patterns of the child's role relationships with parents, teachers and peers) are usually thought to be the twin sources of development of the cognitive elements of the child's conscience. The most representative and persistently recurring changes in children's

moral attitudes as confirmed by many investigators including Lerner, McCrae and more recently Boehm are as follows:-

1. The child in time learns to think more of the broader principles of conduct and less of the immediate consequences to himself of transgression. Kohlberg in 1963 found restricted but nonetheless reliable evidence of an appreciation of absolute values in older children.
2. Children gradually lose their belief in moral realism and begin to judge the severity of an offence in terms of intention rather than by the seriousness of its material consequences.
3. Children also lose their belief in immanent justice and begin to see that punishment is related to the fact that transgression has spoilt the harmony of normal relationships.
4. Rules are first accepted by young children as immutable principles emanating from external and omnipotent authority.

cognitive ability, always assuming of course that the normal socialising agencies were also present. More recently Kohlberg has proposed that it is the child's assumption of a complicated series of roles which determines the areas of behaviour dominated by his conscience, each role being responsible for some alteration in his moral thought. Thus both Piaget and Kohlberg appear to assume that provided the approved sequence of common forms of social experience is available to the child, socially desirable patterns of conscience will evolve.

Yet differences in evaluative processes just as significant as those thought to be dependent on age have been found between societies and between social classes within the same society. Harrower in 1934, Lerner in 1937 and McRae in 1954 found, for instance, that working-class children moved from a morality of external constraint to internal control much more slowly than did middle-class children, even when intelligence was taken into account. Other studies, working on psycho-

analytic theory, indicated the effects of certain types of child rearing practices on conscience formation in children. It is an observed fact, also proven experimentally, that there are tremendous changes in moral attitude when people join adult groups with strong religious or political affiliations like the Salvation Army or the Communist Party, and yet this influence takes place in adulthood after the developmental span of childhood and adolescence when one would expect the adult moral character to be already firmly crystallised. So it would seem reasonable to conclude that while cognitive development is certainly a requisite of internalised moral control it is synthesised into conscience in different ways by many and various social influences. It is probable too, that although cognitive and verbal ability is necessary to give expression to the more mature conceptions of morality, the foundations of conscience have been laid in the home in the earliest months of the child's life.

The existence of moral cognition alone,

however, does not guarantee moral behaviour. Adults as well as children can know that a certain type of behaviour is wrong, and still indulge in it. Bandura found that in an experimental situation children imitated a positively reinforced aggressive model even though they subsequently criticised his actions most severely.

The crucial point is that affect is generated by evaluative processes and if sufficiently intense will cause the subject to inhibit his own responses even when external socialising agents are absent. If the affect is not sufficiently strong to overcome the temptation the subject will transgress. The presence of external cues such as adult observers, or the fear of discovery, can also produce the affective intensity necessary to motivate inhibition of the impulse. This is what happens when animals or pre-verbal children whose critical faculties have not developed are trained to refrain from certain habits. Indisputable signs of anxiety, and

mechanisms to reduce anxiety after deviation may be frequently observed even as early as the second year of infancy.

The strength of affect generated by the process of evaluation is only one indication of internalisation. The evaluation itself may be on different levels which represent different degrees of internalisation and different implications for future conduct. For example, an act might be thought good for one of three reasons:

- a) because it is intrinsically good
- b) because it is beneficial to others or
- c) because it advances one's self-interest.

There is evidence of a more internalised orientation of moral judgments with increasing age as described earlier, but Hartshorne and May found that there was no evidence of increased behavioural control, especially where traits like honesty, generosity and altruism were concerned. Nevertheless conduct is not entirely unpredictable and common observation tells us that there is at least a partial relationship

between evaluative standards and social behaviour.

Much has been written by Freud and his disciples on the dangers of repression of the instincts, particularly the sexual instinct and on certain neuroses so caused. Many present-day psychiatrists notably Baruk, while agreeing that in certain cases much suffering has been caused in this way, think that more disturbing consequences result from the repression of conscience. "This repression has far more serious results than the repression of instincts which is at least confined to the limited, individual field of neuropathic disturbances, not on the whole malignant ones. Whereas repression of conscience may determine not only serious psychoses but reactions of a kind to provoke veritable social catastrophes." He believes that it is the gratification of an illicit desire more often than its repression that is responsible for the disintegration of the personality because when conscience goes unheeded and the guilt feelings following the

transgression are similarly kept under, this double repression ultimately has explosive effects.

REACTIONS TO TRANSGRESSION.

There are a number of instrumental responses which reduce the anxiety which normally follows transgression. They are acquired during the process of social learning because the various mechanisms of internalisation invest them with self-reinforcing properties. The variety of these responses in any one child and their elicitation at different times and under differing circumstances may be cited as one of many arguments against the concept of morality as a unitary characteristic.

1. Belief in Immanent Justice.

The experience of the young child would tend to encourage the notion that punishment follows crime automatically. They are more restricted in movement than older children and under closer supervision, and in addition they do not normally have the cunning nor the means to hide the effects of their transgressions. These factors, plus the more important restriction that limited powers of communication

imposes on them, make it difficult for the child to appreciate the true nature of social punishment. Very often in the early years too, the punishment which follows the commission of a fault with extreme promptitude and regularity is intended to condition the child for his own safety when he is incapable of comprehending the danger to himself of his own actions. But it is not surprising that the punishment appears to him to be immanent in the action.

Much of the behaviour of young children borders on the nonvolitional and they often find it almost impossible to differentiate between intention and behaviour. They see punishment attached more frequently to what they do than to what they intend. Only too often the adult measures the severity of the punishment according to the extent of the material damage caused. It is only as children become more articulate and independent and require less rigid supervision that they begin to see the chain of events that links transgression to its consequences and to lose their belief in immanent

justice. Lerner found this decrease in belief to be more pronounced in children from better socio-economic groups, while Theodora Abel suggested that the constraining atmosphere of an institution encouraged subnormal girls to retain it.

Medinnus in 1957 used two Piaget-type stories on 240 lower class children to test belief in immanent justice. Although he did find a decrease with age a more significant fact emerged. This was that when the mishap which followed the transgression in the story was one which came within the children's normal field of experience it was explained by them quite rationally, for instance the boy who cut his finger with the scissors, "Maybe was too little", or "got his finger too close to the scissors". On the other hand, when adequate material was not available to the child from personal observation he tended to explain occurrences by drawing on supernatural sources. The less meaningful the situation was to him the more fanciful were

his explanations.

Belief in immanent justice is an externalised response because it is only held as long as punishment of some sort is seen to follow the crime, even though to the impartial observer it is not in any sense consequent upon it. It is obviously an unsatisfactory basis on which to develop a code of morality because it denies the importance of personal responsibility, and the wise parent will take steps to explain the reasons for punishment as soon as the child is capable of understanding them.

2. Self Criticism.

Henry and Short, Heinicke and Allinsmith, all concur in equating internalisation of moral values with the presence of self-criticism. Usually aversive instrumental responses, like confession and apology for example, are acquired through their effectiveness in avoiding or mitigating punishment, but self-criticism is a punitive rather than an avoidance response.

When a child's punishment includes evaluation or verbal labelling, the criticism, which

is a component of the punishment can be recalled after subsequent transgressions and used as an anxiety reducing response. As its effect is immediately reinforcing the child comes to prefer this sort of punishment - initiated by himself - to the anticipation of anxiety. Very young children may be seen, when they are unaware of the observer, to show signs of discomfort following transgression and to relieve this by criticising themselves. Recent experiments by Aronfreed, 1964, were undertaken to investigate the conditions under which girls would acquire the use of the label "blue" to refer to their own actions after they had been repeatedly exposed to the label as part of the punishment by the experimenter when they produced the "wrong" response. It was found that when the girls were given the label at the termination of punishment (which consisted of a show of annoyance and the withdrawal of candy) they produced it significantly more often than when it accompanied the onset of punishment in the training period before anticipatory anxiety had

had time to develop. This would appear to prove that the function of the self-critical response is to attenuate the anxiety previously associated with transgression and punishment. In the course of daily life, however, parental criticism need not occur at the end of punishment in order to acquire reinforcing properties. Even when it occurs at the onset of punishment, so long as anxiety is attached to transgression and has had time to develop, it can still acquire reinforcing properties which are very tenacious and difficult to extinguish.

An earlier experiment of Aronfreed, Cuttack and Fagen in 1963 already described in this work, suggested that the frequency of a model's critical response was not proportionate to the model's nurturance but was more dependent on his verbal references to the child's performance during training and punishment. This is not to say, of course, that parental nurturance is irrelevant to the child's reproduction of their critical or punitive responses because other studies of child-rearing

practices have proved how important it is in making social punishment effective. Rather, these findings disprove the hypothesis that self-criticism is merely part of the child's tendency to reproduce the reactions of a kindly supportive parent when his affection appears to be withdrawn.

Probably the frequency of evocation and the quality of the self-critical response will be determined by the punishment which originally accompanied it. If this has been particularly severe the child might reasonably be expected to try to avoid rather than invite it. Continuous nagging on the part of the parent will not be likely to encourage a self-critical response either, because its very persistence will destroy its anxiety reducing properties, and the generality of its disapproval will not facilitate the child's clear understanding of the nature of his transgression.

Although Allinsmith, Whiting and others have demonstrated a great variability in the extent to which many internalised reactions

to transgression are mediated by self-evaluation, it has nevertheless a special status on the continuum of internalisation because of its intrinsic reinforcing properties which do not seem to require any kind of external resource.

3. The Negative Affects - Guilt, Fear and Shame.

The term 'moral', by popular usage as well as philosophical definition, may be applied to those cognitive processes which make reference to the consequences or implications for others of any act. Moral cognition, therefore, is the context for the occurrence of both positive and negative affective states.

Following a transgression a non-specific aversive state known as anxiety is usually experienced. This is the foundation upon which the negative affects of fear, shame and guilt rest, the predominance of any one being determined by specific cognitive factors. Thus "the aversive state that follows a transgression may be called guilt to the extent that its

qualitative experience is determined by cognition of the consequences of transgression for others". Dependent as it is on moral cognition, which may have varying degrees of internal or external orientation, guilt does not necessarily indicate a highly internalised condition, although until very recently it was taken as a unitary variable, often the sole indicator of a sensitive conscience.

Followers of the psychoanalytic school have termed guilt "the expression of psychic pain inflicted on the self". They see its origin in the process of identification, i.e. the equation of self with the blaming responses of another. It is also conceived as a self-punishment: the inward turning of aggressive feelings which the child cannot vent upon the parents. Conscience, or the guilt system, they believe to be a unitary system relatively distinct from the rest of the personality, and if the guilt is unconscious and defended against it can only be expressed indirectly. Thus psychoanalysts would say

that every response to transgression represents in some form an expression of guilt. Kohlberg and many others controvert these assumptions and interpret the manifest expressions of guilt on projective tests such as self-criticism and confession, "as the reflection of socialised concerns about good and bad rather than the deep self-punitive trends implied by the Super-ego concept." MacKinnon, finding that people capable of self-criticism when they failed or deviated, also resisted temptation more, discredited the notion of guilt as a turning inward of aggression, and Allansmith asserted that unconscious guilt does not function to prevent deviation as does conscious guilt. However, many psychologists like Sears, Maccoby and Levin still believe with Freud that guilt rests upon self-criticism and is therefore a prerequisite of moral reactions to transgression which are internalised.

Learning Theory dismisses the Freudian concept of guilt, and suggests rather that all

those responses which are taken by others to represent guilt are merely devices found to be instrumental in reducing the anxiety which they associate with the commission of certain acts.

Nevertheless, most societies rely upon guilt as the effective mechanism of moral functioning - hence the smallness of the police force compared with the total population - though some primitive peoples encourage belief in external supernatural controls like ghosts, spirits and voodoo for the maintenance of order. Culture and traditions also determine which of the three types of affect, fear, guilt or shame, will predominate in any society although they are not mutually exclusive and more than one may be present following a specific act.

Whiting and Child describe two mechanisms of control, "moral anxiety" by which they mean guilt, and "objective anxiety" or fear of punishment. When the aversive consequences of the transgression are seen to be dependent on

external sources, e.g. punishment by a parent or adult, the anxiety state which follows the violation may be described as fear. There may, of course, be fear of ridicule or rejection as well as of physical punishment, and fear may be experienced even when there is no explicit threat of punishment. When anxiety is experienced as fear, punishment-seeking is a possible anxiety-reducing response, but techniques like confession and reparation could equally be acquired for the same purpose. Self-criticism, on the other hand, is not likely *not* to be elicited as a fear-reducing response because it does not have observable external consequences, and in addition the kind of training which produces fear and other externally oriented reactions to transgression is not likely to encourage the formulation of self-critical responses. It is likely that in our own society many reactions which are assumed to reflect guilt may, in fact, be motivated by fear.

According to Allin Smith the affective state

of shame follows when the child has violated a rule and has been found out "feels demeaned just as he has been demeaned for such failures in the past". Like guilt it cannot be fundamentally distinguished in terms of internal versus external orientation because it is often experienced when the misdeed is not discovered. Margaret Mead instances primitive tribes like the Ojibwa of North America who will commit suicide because of shame about an act which has not been made public at all.

Just as fear and guilt can be combined, so too shame and guilt may be blended together because the experience which induced shame during the training of the child must also have engendered some awareness of the consequences of the transgressions to others. Nevertheless even though shame can be internalised it is generally a more externally oriented affective state than guilt because of the element of exposure it contains. It is obviously more appropriate, for instance, to label the state following a lapse in toilet behaviour as

shame, rather than guilt.

On the whole guilt is probably more associated with volitional acts or positive commissions rather than with unintentional mistakes or deficiencies. Aronfreed sees the essence of shame as "making visible that which ought not to be permitted to show", and as all misdeeds exhibit the undesirable qualities of the actor it is to be expected that shame would be a more frequently occurring reaction than guilt. But because it is more difficult to analyse the components of shame than those of guilt the two are often confused. As reparation is the appropriate counteraction to guilt, so shame is likely to be followed by some attempt to hide or cover up that which has been exposed. Shame implies a loss of self-respect, a destruction of self image, it is the antonym of pride, and even though it inclines towards external observation it does not need external resolution.

Responses oriented towards External Punishment.

These are the responses which use external

indicators of punishment or punishment-avoidance even though they take place without observation and are to that extent internalised. They include seeking out or provoking punishment, imagining a critical or condemnatory attitude in others, and eliciting assurance that there will be no penalty for the misdemeanour.

Young children especially may be observed seeking out punishment by repeating the transgression or doing other similarly forbidden things till they force the parents to notice them and take appropriate action. Unconsciously adults too may draw censure on themselves by talking about their misdeeds in an attempt to attenuate anxiety. In both these instances the response is reinforced by the anxiety-reducing function of the punishment. If, on the other hand, the reactions of others to one's provocation make it apparent that punishment is definitely not forthcoming anxiety will again be allayed.

Deliberate punishment-seeking by the child

may be used to determine whether or not an act is socially acceptable, especially if he is strongly motivated to perform it and is uncertain as to where it stands in relation to parental approval or disapproval. As with other tentative responses made by the child, punishment-seeking will be reinforced only insofar as the punishment is sufficiently mild and brief to be instrumental in reducing anxiety.

It is important to notice that whereas the child who seeks out punishment in this way may be demonstrating an internalised response such is not the case when a person is discovered in a transgression and resigns himself to the punishment which appears inevitable. Responses which are internalised but which focus on external punitive acts have anxiety attached to the original transgression and therefore their anxiety-reducing value depends on the cue properties of punishment.

4. Confession.

Confession is inherently a response re-

quiring the mediation of an external agent. Fundamentally it is telling another person of one's wrongdoing, but it has its forerunner in the pre-verbal stage when young children relieve their tension after transgression by disclosing the damage or mess to their parents. It is not difficult to see the origins of confession as an anxiety-reducing technique when one remembers that much the same sort of comfort and reassurance from the mother is available to the small child whether he is making known an accidental slip or a peccadillo. This observation leads to the assumption that the confession response would be facilitated by parental nurturance and childish dependency; an assumption which finds some support in Sears' survey of 1957 and Burton's of 1961.

As a specific response to transgression confession is often instrumental in avoiding or mitigating punishment because some parents, valuing the fact that it is a self-initiated reaction, are less severe in their treatment than when they discover the transgression

themselves. In such circumstances the response is strongly reinforced and may be evoked more readily than any other. This was confirmed experimentally by Hill, Levin and Aronfreed all working independently. Confession is also frequently followed by forgiveness and so not only terminates the child's anxiety but also induces a positively affective state through the restoration of the parent's approval. Where material damage or a third party is involved, confession has an additional advantage to the child because it relieves him of the responsibility of deciding how best to resolve the problem much as the Church's Sacrament of Confession transfers the onus of expiation on to a redeemer.

Because they need to know the extent of harm done, where responsibility lies, and how best to discourage further deviance, parents often exhort their children to confess. If, however, considerable pressure were put upon a child because suspicion of his guilt were entertained the reaction would be more

appropriately termed admission rather than confession.

Not all parents withhold or attenuate punishment after confession and many may be inconsistent in their reactions. This very uncertainty could enhance the instrumental value of confession to the child because on the one hand it may be followed by forgiveness, or on the other by punishment - in either case terminating the more painful state of anxiety. If, however, the punishment found to follow confession were particularly severe the response would tend to be inhibited and replaced by an attempt to escape from the consequences of the crime.

5. Reparation.

On the continuum of internalised responses reparative techniques have an intermediate position between self-criticism and confession. Their performance does not necessarily demand the presence of a social agent - for example, when a person's reparation takes the form of a resolution to conform in future - but often

they cannot be carried out without revealing the transgression to the knowledge of others. Basically they are devices for correcting deviation, reducing tension and restoring the status quo. Originally they were learned as behaviour which made the subject acceptable to authority figures, especially parents, and are now used to make him once more acceptable to himself. Reparative techniques are, therefore, learned as instrumental means of avoiding or terminating the painful consequences of transgression and indicate the subject's return, or attempt to return, to normal behaviour and role.

They may take a number of different forms varying from the literal repairing of what has been broken to the expression of goodwill towards those who have suffered from the effects of the transgression. In the latter case the behaviour is more obviously oriented towards ameliorating unpleasant states in others rather than towards correcting material damage, but the child who replaces or restores something

stolen usually also restores the good temper of the person previously offended. Thus it would appear that reparative techniques become internalised through events in which the aversive states of others and their discomfiting effects on the child himself are terminated or reversed by the child's actions. Obviously reparative responses are acquired more readily when evaluative processes are operating and the child consciously intends to relieve the distress of another. Unlike admission of guilt or expression of apology (which may be a meaningless convention) reparation is characterised by some active movement in the direction of a return to acceptable conduct, and is therefore not possible until the child has acquired a reasonable repertoire of social behaviour. However, the rudiments of reparative behaviour may be observed even in very young children when, for instance, they become aware that they have gone too far in their boisterousness, suddenly stop what they are doing and begin to cuddle the

parent they have recently been tormenting in a transparent attempt to placate him.

Reparative techniques also vary in the extent to which they are defined and controlled by external events. At one extreme they may be entirely dependent on the person's awareness of the demands of the external situation and at the other they may be mediated solely by his own initiative and assumption of responsibility. The strongest reinforcement for the internalisation of reparative techniques comes from the consequence of the restoration of parental approval which has the double function of reducing anxiety and inducing a state of positive affect. Reparation does not appear to be evoked equally by all types of transgression. Not surprisingly it follows most often on acts of dishonesty or damage to another's property, or aggression towards the person, and least often following lying, disobedience or sexual misconduct. This is no doubt so because of the less obvious injury to others in the last three categories and the greater need to learn through

experience an appropriate response.

Parents who insist on forms of punishment which are corrective rather than merely retributive may encourage the formation of reparative tendencies. If a child is made to return what he has stolen or replace what he has broken, or comfort the friend he has hurt, not only are the unpleasant consequences of the transgression terminated, but also the foundations are laid for honesty, responsibility and compassion, and the likelihood of these actions being later produced without external influence is greatly increased.

PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES.

Allinsmith has said, "The necessity for eliminating risks makes it difficult to study conscience by observing subjects in ordinary actual life situations. In such situations there is usually a good chance that an immoral act will have social as well as internal repercussions. It is thus necessary to create experimentally a plausible circumstance which permits a tempted subject to violate his norm without fear of discovery. There must be neither an external advantage to him from conformity nor an external disadvantage from misconduct."

In order to identify guilt a real-life situation may be used providing the subject is convinced that he cannot be observed or discovered. Such situations have been contrived, for example with regard to cheating, by Hartshorne and May, and by Mackinnon, though he in fact did observe the testees, but through a one-way screen. On another occasion described by Hartshorne and Maller the

the experimenter himself, disguised as a fellow-subject, tried to cajole the unsuspecting suspects into abandoning the dull prescribed task for a more engaging, forbidden one. The objections to this type of investigation are two-fold. First they make it impossible to examine the attitude of the subject who resists temptation - thus wasting the response of some subjects, and secondly they do not discriminate those who yield in spite of high internalised standards and those who yield because of no internalisation. Even were the sample confined to the violators, a technique would have to be devised to measure the subjects' conscious and unconscious feelings.

Morris, in 1958, investigating the main changes in value judgments in late childhood and adolescence as part of the Summerfield Research, used a series of interviews centred round responses to questions on problem situations of the type commonly encountered in the school, family and social life of the

adolescent. The pupils were first asked what N should do, for example if he has borrowed money from a friend to take a girl to the cinema after his parents have forbidden him to go and the friend then demands instant repayment. After giving the prescriptive response the boys and girls were then asked what, in fact, they thought N actually would do in such a situation. The fact that Morris found a marked discrepancy between the 'should' and 'would' answers, especially among the girls, would seem sufficient reason for not adopting the straightforward interview technique in the present study.

McDonald (Frederick J.) in 1963 asked a large sample of children to judge which of two actions, stealing from an individual or from a corporate owner, was the more reprehensible and why. The two kinds of theft were described to the children in pairs of stories in which the values of the objects taken were comparable and the motives for the theft were identical. Although the range of age, intelligence and socio-economic level of the subjects was wide,

over 50% of the responses were the same - the transgressions were deemed to be equally serious because they could both be categorised as theft. The remaining judgments were classified into ten grades on the basis of the reasons given. This Piaget-type test would appear to offer the child the opportunity of reading the investigator the moral lecture he thinks the adult expects rather than to reveal his own genuine evaluations.

It was for this reason that the present writer turned to projective techniques, believing with Frank that, "how each individual receives and responds to cultural patterning and to parental care, rearing and training will be revealed in his idiomatic perception and his individualised way of thinking, acting and feeling as disclosed by projective tests". Freud mentions the concept of projection as early as 1894 in his paper, "The Anxiety Neurosis", and later ascribed it to forms of behaviour other than neuroses and psychoses although he still saw its function purely as a defence

process against anxiety. Later the term became widely used in the field of clinical psychology in connection with techniques used for diagnostic purposes. In these the subject is presented with a number of non-specific stimuli on to which he projects his own needs which then appear as responses. The basis for the concept lay in the psychoanalytic belief that sentiments which were unacceptable to the ego - because of the inhibiting activity of the super-ego - were projected on to the outside world.

However, when Bellak in 1959 found that by means of post-hypnotic suggestion a patient could be induced to project the feeling of elation - which demanded no censorious activity by the super-ego as it had no disruptive effect on the personality - he went back to Freud's writings and found in "Totem and Taboo" a possible explanation. Here it is said that, ".... projection is not specially created for the purpose of defence, it also comes into being where there are no conflicts. The

projection of inner perceptions on to the outside world is a primitive mechanism which, for instance, also influences our sense perceptions, so that it normally has the greatest share in shaping our outside world".

It is now thought that all present perception is influenced by past perception, and that apperception is the grafting of a meaning or interpretation on to a perception, in the light of past experience. As the meaning will be different, to some slight degree at least, for everyone who perceives, the subjective interpretation is termed "apperceptive distortion", and Bellak suggests that the term "projection" be restricted to the greater degree of apperceptive distortion. Examples of simple projection occur frequently enough in daily life. The boy who comes home in a bad temper because his team has lost the rugby match tells his mother, before she has had time to utter a word, that it is no good "going on" at him because his gear is filthy, it isn't his fault that the pitch was a

quagmire! He sees in her the anger that he himself would like to express.

Inverted projection, on the other hand, is a more complex process and includes another defence mechanism, reaction formation. It can best be understood by examining the following four stages in a typical example.

1. An unconscious libidinous attachment to a forbidden homosexual object is formed.
2. Reaction formation changes the sentiment of love to one of hate.
3. The feeling of aggression is also unacceptable to the super-ego and is repressed.
4. The percept is changed from, "I hate him", to "He hates me".

So the original percept of "I love him" finally emerges as "He hates me", although the first three steps of the sequence remain unconscious.

A further concept which it is necessary to mention in connection with projection is what Gordon Allport terms "adaptive behaviour".

Where a majority of subjects agree on some basic

component of a stimulus, as for instance, most normal, stable people would say that the boy on Card No.1 of the Thematic Apperception Test was playing the violin, or that a man brandishing a revolver suggested aggression more than a picture of a recumbent figure on the beach did, this agreement represents the "objective" nature of the stimulus. Behaviour consistent with this "objective reality" aspect of a stimulus is called by Allport "adaptive behaviour". The more ambiguous the test material presented to a subject the narrower the range of adaptive behaviour which is possible. The Rorschach Test ink blots for instance will produce less adaptive behaviour and more apperceptive distortions than the pictures in the Stanford-Binet test. A subject describing a picture will demonstrate more adaptive behaviour than if he were asked to tell a story about it because in the case of the story he will tend to disregard many objective details of the stimulus which he would include in a verbal description of it. The proportions of

adaptive and projective behaviour vary from person to person because of differences in personality, experience and education and may even vary in the same person if noted at different times and under different circumstances.

The expressive aspects of behaviour, as noted by Allport, may refer to either adaptation or apperceptive distortion and convey the differences in the style in which a person may respond. These variations are personal characteristics and are relatively stable for everyone. For example, one man may consistently write verbose, ponderous sentences while another employs concise, pithy phrases, or one might speak loudly and confidently while another stammers hesitantly. Thus adaptation and apperceptive distortion describe what one does, and expressive behaviour describes how one does it.

Abt postulates a theory of projective psychology which is a great deal wider than Bellak's and at the same time complementary to

it. He sees it as a psychology of protest; against Behaviourism in particular and even against those aspects of academic psychology to which it is most indebted. Projective psychology in this view is a functional study of the individual in respect to his mental structure and properties, concentrating on the active, purposeful behaviour by which the individual manipulates the environment to suit his needs. It combines and reconciles elements of psycho-analytic and Gestalt theory.

Because the practical proponents of projective psychology came originally from the ranks of experimental psychology the formal method of analysis of projective data has taken precedence over the content method. Abt thinks the answer to this would be found in an idiographic approach to the interpretation of projective material rather than the currently popular nomothetic one.

Field theory, in which the behaviour of an organism is regarded as being dependent on the interaction of forces contemporaneously

present within the field and within the organism, is increasingly considered an adequate framework in which to study projective data. As well as being influenced by his interaction with the environment, both physical and social, the personality process is affected by the state and intensity of the subject's needs.

Personality is viewed as a process rather than as a collection of static traits, and therefore any set of projective tests administered at a particular time would only reveal a segment of the total personality. To achieve a more realistic impression of the person in toto the clinician would have to extend his enquiries into the subject's past history and future expectations. "It is clear to all but the overenthusiastic that projective techniques do not aim at a complete formulation of the whole personality since this is actually well beyond the capacities of clinicians today, but rather that they seek to provide a series of significant descriptive statements about the personality which may prove useful with respect

to a particular and often quite restricted purpose."

The self-concept, a learned perceptual system regulating behaviour, determines what stimuli are perceived and what repressed. Therefore the more vague and unstructured the stimulus field the more individual behaviour is dominated by the internal factors in perception. Projective methods for investigating aspects of personality structure are therefore justified by the fact that there is a change in the relative importance of the internal and external factors in perception corresponding to the nature of the various stimulus fields that can be presented to an individual.

As the stimulus field around him becomes more and more unstructured there is a tendency for a person's anxiety to increase markedly. Analytic psychology has stressed that each individual possesses a set of defence mechanisms which operate to maintain a tolerable level of anxiety within him, and so, when the

need to reorganise behaviour in accordance with the requirements of the new situation threatens his equanimity the projective mechanism is called into play, tension is lowered and a feeling of security is restored. In this way the individual daily adjusts to a whole series of changing stimuli by investing them with his own qualities and needs, and his perceptual experiences become transmuted by elements of his own personality.

It is a commonplace belief that people appear most relaxed and secure when acting in surroundings which are normal and familiar to them. The very presentation of novel and strange stimulus materials in a test situation is thought to account for the appearance of strain and anxiety in most subjects. As each person tries to integrate himself within this challenging environment his anxiety increases and unconsciously the protective mechanism is called into play so that he endows the projective materials with his own wishes and values.

In principle then the projection may be effected by the presentation of almost any sort of stimulus material, but it is more important to keep the amount of structure to a minimum so that internal or subjective factors are given the greater freedom to function. In this way the projective data, interpreted validly, reveals the terms in which a person thinks of himself in relation to his physical and social environment. White puts it another way, explaining that projective technique functions to reveal dominant motivational forces which it does because the subject is given "several degrees of freedom to organise a plastic medium in his own way, and since little external aid is provided from conventional patterns, he is all but obliged to give expression to the most readily available forces within himself."

It may be noted in passing that whereas projective tests have been employed clinically principally for diagnostic purposes they have been found to have, in addition, considerable

therapeutic value in the treatment of
neuroses because of the opportunity for
catharsis which they afford.

THE STORY COMPLETION TEST ON
REACTIONS TO TRANSGRESSION.

In this type of projective test the subject is given a story beginning in which there is a moral violation by a child of the same sex and age as himself; a normally pleasant child with whom the subject will feel in sympathy. In order that the transgression will have similar moral implications for all subjects certain criteria are necessary:

- (a) There must be a secret violation of a common moral teaching. Either the hero must be provided with the means of disposing of his ill-gotten gains, or there must be a perfect scapegoat for the aggression, or it must be explicitly stated that "nobody saw him do it."
- (b) There must be a specified act - for example the amount stolen must be stated or the type of aggression described (pinching and punching are both aggressive acts but the possible outcomes are unlike) otherwise differ-

ences in guilt may be explained by differences in interpretation.

- (c) The motive, if not stated, must be self-evident - the theft of money to go to the cinema is obviously in a different class from the theft of money to give to a beggar.
- (d) The act must be directed at a specified category of person because if the relationship of the victim to the hero is not made clear, again the expression of guilt may be affected - it is commonly accepted among children, for instance, that whereas fighting with one's peers is understandable, aggression towards a smaller child is reprehensible.
- (e) Finally, the situation must be defined so that the subject does not imagine extenuating circumstances.

In all, four sets of story-beginnings were prepared: a set each for boys and girls in both the 9+ year group and the 12+ year group, and separate sets for boys and girls in the 14+ year

group: It was felt that the material deemed suitable for the two younger groups would not be appropriate for the young adolescent. In each set there were five story-beginnings dealing separately with stealing, lying, cheating, aggression and disobedience. (See Appendix " A ")

The Sample.

The children tested lived in an industrial Tyneside town. There were 322 children in all, 41 boys and 42 girls from a co-educational primary school, taken from the third-year stream, and 58 boys and 70 girls aged 12+, and 48 boys and 63 girls aged 14+ from the top streams of the twin single-sex Secondary Modern Schools which are fed by the Primary School used for the sample. I.Qs were not available, nor was any accurate measure of the socio-economic level. However, whatever range was present in any one of the groups would probably be similarly represented in all the others because the children were drawn from the same geographic area. As the primary school was large the whole of the

"A" stream normally passed to the local Grammar or Technical High School, so the children selected for the test would be those most likely, in due course, to occupy the top places in the Secondary Modern School. It was hoped, therefore, that the range of I.Qs in the groups would also be comparable. The average ages for the groups were:

<u>Boys.</u>	<u>Girls.</u>
9 years 5 months	9 years 4 months
12 years 3 months	12 years 4 months
14 years 6 months	14 years 8 months

Administration of the Test.

The investigator took the tests in person to the schools involved, having first requested the headteacher not to disclose the nature of the investigation. The children were provided with writing materials and were told that the writer was interested in the ideas of boys or girls of that particular age group, and to help "to get them going" she has provided the beginnings of five stories which they were to complete as they chose. When the duplicated

copies of the story-binnings were distributed they were read out aloud to the children who were then briefly questioned to make sure that such words as "compost heap" for the 9+ and 12+ groups, and "deteriorated" and "Oxfam" for the 14+ groups were understood by everyone.

The children were asked to write their ages in years and months at the top of their page, and then to continue with the story from where it left off. They were assured that it was neither an examination nor a competition and although the work should be legible and comprehensible, writing and spelling were not of primary importance. It was stressed that the work would be valueless unless everyone attempted to complete all five stories, although the order of working did not matter.

Finally, it was made clear that no-one in the school would read the stories, which were only to be used privately to assist in research. The atmosphere with each group was pleasant, informal and friendly and it was not found necessary to forbid conferring. No

time limit was imposed but the children in the primary school finished within the hour. The secondary modern pupils took longer, about one hour and 20 minutes, and some girls in the 14+ group were allowed to finish the work during the morning break which followed the test period.

THE CATEGORISATION OF MORAL CONSEQUENCES.

The writer listed the various types of response she expected to receive from the five story completions in each age group. The stories were then read quickly without being marked and other categories were added to the list in accordance with the responses actually received so that no single comment would go unconsidered. Some anticipated responses, such as justification of the transgression in view of the behaviour of others, and self punishment by the hero, were completely eliminated as no instance of them was found in the sample being tested. The stories were then read carefully by the writer and an impartial judge of some experience and the incidence of each type of response to each story was marked on a separate mark-sheet.

The list of categories then, is a classification and description of the various forms of behaviour demonstrated by the boy or girl after his or her transgression. It also includes his expectations of the behaviour of

others towards him even though initially the act is known only to himself, and indeed could reasonably remain so. The moral consequences in this context therefore refer to the person's direct experience of his own reactions or of the way he expresses those reactions in behaviour, and also to his observation of the behaviour of other people which appears to him to be consequent on his transgression.

Analysis of Categories used in this study.

1. Negative Affect. Refers to unpleasant feelings following the transgression and may be aroused:

- (a) because of the act itself
- (b) because of consequences to others, or
- (c) because of fear of discovery or punishment.

Examples of the first class are, "David felt terrible", "Jean felt ashamed of herself", "Sandra was sorry for what she had done", "Alan felt so awful he couldn't sleep that night", "Michael had nightmares after he went out and left the children". It should be noted,

however, that where sorrow or regret was expressed only rather than explicitly felt, it was not categorised here, e.g. "Charles said he was sorry" was not counted as Negative Affect, as apology, which may be a mere convention and bear no relation to guilt feelings, is listed separately. However, any evidence of remorse, no matter how vague and ill-defined ("Peter felt rotten all day.") and any reference to feelings of malaise due to bad conscience were included.

Negative Affect because of the consequences to others, was only noted, as might have been expected, in Story II. Frequently here the feeling that Timmy, the dog, was being unjustly punished caused unhappiness and when there was anxiety because "Mother said Timmy would have to be put down" this too was categorised here, although strictly speaking the consequences would presumably be at least as unsatisfactory to the young owner as to the dog.

The third type of Negative Affect was

simple to identify, e.g. "Jean was terrified in case the store detective had seen her".

Only the first of the three types was used in the final rating because it was felt that only suffering because of the act itself gave evidence of high internalisation of moral values.

2. Reflection or Evaluation. Refers to the cognitive aspects of behaviour and was noted in several different ways. "She went to her room and thought about what she had done", "John knew it was a mean thing to do to his pals", "Anne couldn't stop thinking about how she had cheated the others", "As soon as she got the petticoat home Jean realised what she had done". If such reflection or evaluation was accompanied by negative affect that of course was categorised separately, e.g. "Sandra knew she shouldn't have gone out and she felt terrible".

3. Discovery. This, along with punishment, was much the most common type of response

recorded and referred, of course, to the discovery of the transgression by another, usually a parent, teacher or friend, even though the story-beginning specifically stated in each case that "No one saw it happen". Discovery normally took place under reasonable circumstances, usually dependent on one of the small accidents and irregularities common in everyday life, e.g. "Sandra's little brother wanted a drink and called down, when she didn't come he went downstairs himself and saw that she was out. Next day he told his Mother". Infrequently discovery was brought about by less likely circumstances as, for example, "When Jean was at the dance a girl in the cloakroom recognised the petticoat as the one that was stolen from the shop that day and told the police."

The reason why discovery and punishment featured so prominently in most of the responses of all the groups will be discussed later.

4. Admission after discovery. Used merely to

indicate that the hero, after being found out, accepted responsibility, e.g. "His Mother said, 'You must have torn those trousers yourself", and Peter said that he had."

5. Punishment after discovery.

- (a) Sensitizing punishment. Denotes any punitive measure designed by the parent to make the child aware of the inadvisability of engaging in the kind of behaviour which has provoked it. Thus it produces avoidance learning. A very wide range of activities can therefore be included under this heading, from the visible anger of the parent or teacher, (which is discomfiting to the child), to the deprivation of treats, pocket-money and free time. It also includes, of course, all forms of physical punishment. Obvious examples are, "When Alan's father heard what he had done he gave him a good thrashing", "The teacher gave Geoff four of the best for cheating", "Sandra's mother gave her a good telling-off for leaving the little ones",

and "Susan's pocket money was stopped for a month and she wasn't allowed to go to the baths either."

(b) Inductive punishment. This, on the other hand, aims at inducing an acceptable attitude in the child to moral behaviour and is largely dependent on shaming, appeals to pride, expressions of disapproval, and withdrawal of love techniques. Thus a parent might be expected to say, "I am deeply hurt by what you have done, John", or, "I cannot love a girl who tells lies like you do, Mary". In fact not one single instance of this kind of response was made by one of the 322 children in the sample.

However, under this heading were also categorised the responses of those parents or teachers who, while reprimanding the transgressor, took pains to stress the reason for their displeasure and tried to develop a more responsible attitude in the hero or heroine, for example, "Sandra's

mother was angry when she heard that Sandra had gone out and then she explained that small children can get into all sorts of mischief and danger when they are left on their own, and so Sandra should never go out and leave them again". The incidence of this type of response was not frequent, however, and was exclusively made by girls.

- (c) Forced restoration. An act was classified under this heading if the hero, after discovery, was made to give back what he had stolen or destroyed either by teacher, parents or friends, for example, "David's father made him take the comic back", "Jean's mother made her use her birthday money to pay for the petticoat she had stolen", or "Brian's mother said he must buy Michael a bar of chocolate out of his pocket money". However, if the hero was enjoined to make some expiatory or propitiatory act not directly related to his own transgression this was not

categorised here but under the heading of reparative techniques.

- (d) Exclusion from the gang. This last type of punishment is a punishment by one's peer group for an offence against them, and is regarded usually by the older children as even more undesirable than punishment by adults. It occurs almost exclusively, as anticipated, in Story III, as for instance "When John's pals realised what he had done they never played with him again". The exclusion, with younger children is usually final. However, with the older children it may be only temporary but is often accompanied by physical punishment too, especially in the case of the 12 year old boys. "When John's pals caught him they gave him a good going over and wouldn't speak to him for a week. Then they forgave him." Here both types of punishment were recorded. In Story 2 for the 14 year old girls there were also some instances of punishment by exclusion from

the gang, when Jennifer decided to tell the whole story to the teacher so that the others' part in her escapade was made known.

6. Confession.

The first sub-division (a) was used when the child, entirely of his own volition, decided to tell what he or she had done. Often the confession was preceded by feelings of shame or guilt or by reflection on the act, but frequently negative affect was not explicitly indicated and it was merely stated boldly for instance, "When Marilyn got home she told her mother what she had done". There is only a slight degree of difference between the second sub-division - confession following suspicion or accusation - and an earlier category - admission after discovery. However, because the writer wanted to be able to get as comprehensive a picture as possible of the variety of responses, both were included initially, though in the final rating admission was not thought to be of importance and was

disregarded, while confession following accusation was counted in with discovery.

This example of confession after suspicion was found in Story 2. "Mother said Timmy couldn't have made a tear like that in her dress and Mary must have done it herself, so she told her how it really happened."

7. Apology.

Voluntary apology - subdivision (a) - was invariably and inevitably coupled with voluntary confession, "David told Mr. Brown what he had done and said he was sorry". Apology following discovery, category (b), occurred fairly often but was not thought to have great significance. It was usually couched in such terms as, "When her mother found the pile of dust under the carpet Linda said she was sorry".

The important difference between feeling sorry and expressing apology in a well-worn formula has already been stressed in the first paragraph on negative affect.

8. Punishment after confession.

The punishments described under this heading

fell into the same four types as the punishments following discovery, viz sensitizing and inductive punishments, forced restoration and exclusion from the gang, and were meted out if the hero confessed voluntarily as well as if he confessed following accusation or suspicion. In actual practice the punishments were often just as severe if the confession was entirely voluntary as they were when preceded by discovery: for example, "Marilyn felt so mean that she told the teacher about handing in Anne's money and none of the class would speak to her again." - This sentence is in fact classified under three headings, negative affect (1A), voluntary confession (6A), and punishment after confession by exclusion from the gang (8D).

9. Reparative Techniques.

These indicate an attempt on the part of the transgressor to return to the relevant norms and standards of behaviour and are therefore applied to a wide variety of activities. The most common form of reparation categorised in all age groups took the form of resolution

as to future behaviour, whether or not this resolution was carried into effect. Thus typical examples are, "Jean made up her mind she would never steal again", "Geoff decided he would never cheat again", "Sandra has never left the children since that day", or more tritely, "Jennifer knew that for her in future honesty would be the best policy". Occasionally the writer made an impersonal comment, "Heather should certainly not say things like that again." This too was counted as a reparative technique.

Another frequently mentioned form of reparation was by putting back voluntarily the thing taken, or replacing, renewing or restoring it to its former state, as for instance, "Anne shared out all her shells among her pals", or "Brian bought two bars of chocolate out of his pocket-money and gave them both to Michael", or "Mary spent that evening stitching the tear in her dress as neatly as she could".

A third kind of reparation anticipated

was a decision to do gratuitously something not directly related to the offence to placate the person offended, as, perhaps, "Linda offered to sweep out the kitchen as well to make it up to her mother". The fact that instances of this kind of reparation were extremely rare will be discussed later.

No single child described reparation through acts of love such as expressions of affection or embraces, nor was there any mention of attentiveness, kindness or giving of any token unconnected with the original deed. This lack appears to the writer to be associated with the forms of punishment commonly resorted to by the parents.

The first two sub-divisions of Category 9 - reparation without discovery and reparation following discovery - could and did include such techniques as resolution, restoration and voluntary performance of additional or unpleasant tasks.

The third class, forced reparation, for example, "Charles' father said he had to tidy

the garden every day for a week", differs very little from a sensitizing punishment and as it was not initiated by the hero himself was not included when classes were later telescoped.

10. Forgiveness.

This was sub-divided into two classes:

- (a) after discovery, and
- (b) after confession.

Typical examples of Group (a) were, "Anne's pals said they would forgive her when she said she was sorry", "Charles' father discovered the clippings under the hedge when he came out but he forgave Charles because he knew he was tired".

After confession adults are expected to be even more magnanimous - "Mrs. Brown said it was alright" (when Jean told her what she had done), "Mrs. Brown said because she had owned up she could have the comic every week", and a comment which came surprisingly often, "Mrs. Brown said it was her fault that Jean had stolen the comic because she forgot to give it to her".

Forgiveness did not necessarily have to be

expressed in words; if it was implicit as in such statements as, "After that John's pals taught him how to play properly to win and they all played together" it was categorised accordingly.

11. No moral consequence reported.

Stories which were classified under this heading described no feelings or thoughts about the transgression, no attempt at reparation, no discovery or punishment by others - in fact no moral consequence of the action whatsoever. A typical example of such a story told how David, having stolen the comic, took it home and put it in a cupboard while he was having tea. Then he went out to play football - some slight description of the game is included - came home and had his supper and read his comic in bed till his mother told him to put the light off.

While one or two of the stories in this group would appear to come from less intelligent children, the majority have a literary style which is certainly not inferior to the

average and would seem to indicate that this indifference to wrongdoing is not due to lack of intelligence.

12. Positive Affect.

This indicates the expression of feelings of happiness, satisfaction or contentment or relief from tension. The first class was positive affect because of the outcome, as for example, "Sandra was delighted when she knew her mother had forgiven her", or "After Heather had told Miss Spence what she had wished, Miss Spence said it was alright and Heather felt as if a load was lifted off her."

The second type of positive affect was that which was engendered by lack of discovery. "David was jolly glad that he had got away with it", or "Anne was happy because the others never found out that she had cheated".

The third type indicated satisfaction following reparative efforts, but did not occur frequently - "Marilyn felt better after she had promised never to do anything like that again".

A fourth type was added after the 14+

group's work was read. This was positive affect because of another's misfortunes. Happily there was only one example of this kind of reaction, a boy who said, "Peter was delighted when he heard that Mr. Graham had died because it served him right for putting him off the team".

13. Any other response.

The last column of the Mark Sheet was left to cover any other type of response which might occur, and as there were a few examples of several types of response not covered by the foregoing classification they were indicated by initials as follows:

P.F.C. - punishment through fortuitous circumstances. This was found only in the youngest children, typical examples being, "John fell down when he was going back into school and he got the cane as well for being late", "When Linda ate the sweets her Mother brought she had a pain in her tummy and had to go to bed instead of going out to play".

- L.F.C. - loss(of ill-gotten gains) through fortuitous circumstances, as for instance, "Jean left her shopping bag on the bus, so she didn't get the petticoat after all", or "John didn't know he had a hole in his trouser pocket and all the marbles fell out on his way into school and rolled down the drain. So he lost the lot".
- N.A.P. - negative affect after punishment indicated unhappiness at being punished, e.g. "David was sad because he got belted". - the majority appear to accept their beating with some forbearance.
- F.R.B.A. - forced restoration by another, usually a parent as, "David's father had to pay for the comic or else Mr. Brown would have fetched a policeman".
- N.A.D. - negative affect after discovery indicated unhappiness or annoyance

at being found out. "Jim was miserable because the teacher got to know the truth", not surprising in this case as the story beginning states that Jim is proud of his school work.

M.A.R. - mother accepts responsibility. Only one example of this was found and that from a 14 year old boy who stated, "Alan's mother said it wasn't his fault that he stole the trunks because she should have bought him a new pair".

Scoring of Tests.

As the aim of the investigation was to discover whether or not girls showed greater internalisation of moral standards than boys did it was necessary to devise some scale or rating on internalisation in terms of which the girls' scores could be compared with those of the boys.

Allinsmith, in interpreting story-endings, attempted to identify guilt in all its forms both conscious and unconscious. He adopted the general criteria :

- a) Direct acknowledgment of self-blame or guilt feelings,
- b) Indirect manifestations of guilt such as attempts at reparation,
- c) Defensive distortions, e.g. subject hiding his remorse by attributing the blame to others or by being punished by others.

The commonest defensive distortion which AllinSmith found, he termed externalisation because the subject in this case feels the pressure of conscience as an external rather than an internal force expressed in the disapproval of others. Children who made this type of response were categorised as showing "extreme guilt". In spite of this AllinSmith comments, "We have implied that externalisation, as coded in the subjects' stories, is actually a defence against guilt. We cannot be certain that this is so because we do not have independent evidence that our subjects were unaware of their inner conflict. Our data lead themselves to other interpretations as well. Punishment, or fear of it, in the

stories may reflect an over-sensitivity to danger on the part of some subjects. They may really be afraid, or anticipating punishment, not just resorting to the defensive distortion of guilt. Danger to the hero in the stories may represent projection by our subjects of their hostility rather than an expression of their guilt."

The present writer would prefer to offer a much simpler explanation of those story-endings in which the child anticipates discovery of the misdeed and punishment by an adult or peer group; namely that it is an experiential expectation well founded in past happenings at home and at school and represents the child's somewhat stoical acceptance of life as he knows it rather than deep unconscious guilt. As Aronfreed has said, "The probability of parental observation and discovery may be quite high from the child's point of view, and in the earlier phases of socialisation the probability may be objectively high." Allin Smith states that the mechanism of externalisation is much

is much less often employed (in story completions) where there has been no discoverable offence, as for instance when the hero has indulged in death wishes about another. This could be taken to give credence to the face-value interpretation of stories ending in discovery and punishment because where discovery by natural means is out of the question the normal child is sufficiently rational to realise this.

In the current investigation the writer assumed that the degree of the child's internalisation of standards would be reflected in the number and type of reactions to transgression he described. Having first categorised every comment or statement which could be in any way relevant, bearing in mind the evaluations made earlier of various types of reaction, the following rating scale was devised:

5 points per story. If the response included:

- a) self-criticism, and
- b) negative affect because of the act

itself, and

- c) a reparative technique undertaken entirely voluntarily all without or before discovery.

4 points per story. If the response included:

- a) negative affect because of the act
itself and
- b) voluntary reparation

OR

- a) self-criticism, and
- b) reparation,
again without or before discovery.

3 points per story. If the response included:

- a) negative affect, OR
- b) self-criticism, OR
- c) reparation without or before discovery.

2 points per story.

- a) If the response was self-initiated, e.g. by voluntary confession but no active form of self-correction was demonstrated.

OR

- b) If the response was externally initiated,

e.g. by discovery, or admission following suspicion or accusation, but included reparation.

1 point per story. If only externally defined consequences such as discovery and punishment or forced reparation were described.

0 points per story. If no moral consequences of the transgression was indicated.

In this way it was hoped that the rating for each child would be as nearly completely objective as possible. If a child mentioned more types of response than the rating catered for, for instance if his story described self-criticism and reparation in the form of resolution followed by discovery and punishment he was awarded the highest mark for which his response would qualify, i.e. 4, so that it was not possible to score more than 5 points on any one story. In actual fact the subjects who indicated high internalisation through self-criticism, remorse and reparation rarely mentioned external consequences like discovery.

In an effort to assess the consistency of results for each child the number of different values of mark obtained by each child over the five stories was also tabulated, and classified as follows:-

- Class I The same mark for each of the five stories, e.g. 3, 3, 3, 3, 3.
- II Two different marks for the five stories, e.g. 3, 3, 2, 2, 3.
- III Three different marks for the five stories, e.g. 3, 4, 4, 3, 0.
- IV Four different marks for the five stories, e.g. 1, 0, 4, 3, 4.
- V A different mark for each of the five stories, e.g. 1, 0, 3, 2, 4.

(Appendix D)

SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULTS
IN GENERAL.

The boys of 9+ have a range of scores from 1 to 12 on all five stories. They have an average score of 5.2 which means for each story an average rating of just over 1, i.e. in the main only externally defined consequences such as discovery and punishment are anticipated.

Girls of 9+ have a range of scores even smaller than that of the boys with a mean score of 5.5, only slightly higher than that of the boys. Their average age is 9 years 4 months as against the boys' 9 years 5 months.

The range of scores for 12+ boys goes from 0 to 16 with a mean score of 7 - an improvement of 1.6 points over the 9+ boys.

The 12+ girls range in scores from 2 to 18 with a mean of 8.5 which is an average of 1.7 points per story - still a "low" score but with an increase of 3 points over the 9+ girls on the total mean score.

The boys of 14+ have a range of 1 to 19 points, and a mean of 7.8, which is an increase

of .8 only over 12+ boys.

The girls of 14+, however, range between 2 and 20 points with a mean total score of 10.1 points, i.e. 2 for each story. This gives them the highest rating on the internalisation of values scale.

This means that the "average" 14+ girl from the chosen sample would either make a self-initiated response such as voluntary confession or apology without demonstrating any active form of self-correction such as reparation, promise or resolution as to future conduct, or if discovered in, or suspected, or accused of transgression she would voluntarily engage in some reparative technique.

It would appear then that there is little, if any, difference in response between boys and girls at the 9+ age level. Boys at 12+ show an increase in maturation as indicated by higher scores, but girls show a much greater increase.

Boys at 14 again show more evidence of consideration of the cognitive aspects of

transgression, but not enough to bring their average mark for each story up to 2. The difference in scores between boys and girls of 14 was greater even than the difference between boys' and girls' scores at 12.

Calculations were made using the standard error of the difference between the means to determine whether or not the difference in scores of boys and girls in the 12 and 14 year old groups were statistically significant or whether they were due to chance deviations. It was found that the Critical Ratio for the 12 age group was 3.28, and for the 14 age group 2.736. As the 't scores' at the .05 and the .01 levels respectively for samples of over 100 degrees of freedom were 1.96 and 2.58 it was concluded that the difference between the scores was statistically significant in both cases and at both levels.

It would appear then that while the response of the boys and girls in the primary school in question is almost identical, the older girls do indeed produce responses showing

much greater evidence of internalisation of moral standards.

The tabulations of consistency of scores (Appendix D) reveal that in the 9+ age group 29% of the boys and 21% of girls obtain the same score on all five stories and are therefore wholly consistent. Almost all of the children in this age group who had two different scores differed by only one mark in one story of the five so that if those who had been classified as I and those who had been classified as II are added together (not an unreasonable procedure under these circumstances) we find that 75.5% of the boys and 78.5% of the girls are relatively consistent in their responses.

The percentage of children who are classed as I drops steadily with increasing age so that at 14 no boys and only 3.2% of the girls are entirely consistent. Moreover in these groups many, indeed most, of the children who gave two types of responses gave two widely differing types, for example, where three stories gained 1 mark, and two stories gained 4 marks. Thus

it would not be reasonable to add together the percentages of the first two classes as was suggested for the younger children. Although 2.1% of the oldest boys and 3.1% of the oldest girls are classed as V the model class for all four groups of older children is III. *modal.*

The writer feels that to account adequately for these marked individual differences would necessitate a much wider and deeper investigation into the background of the children than is possible in the present study. Socio-economic factors, parental practices, specifically religious instruction and numerous other environmental influences could be responsible for the development of beliefs and attitudes.

However, the obvious decrease in individual consistency which accompanies increasing age may perhaps be explained by one general statement based on the beliefs of Piaget and borne out by the analysis of response to different stories in the succeeding chapter.

It would appear that as the child grows older and the constraint imposed upon him by

the adult diminishes, through the growing interaction with other children the principle of equity becomes increasingly important. As he begins to realise that actions are not always starkly black or white, motives and mitigating circumstances are taken into account - this is particularly apparent in the story about the death wish - and so the pattern of his behaviour is more varied and reasoned.

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO
SEPARATE STORIES.

STORY 1, which deals with stealing.

Young boys and girls apparently expect discovery to follow transgression, usually under reasonable circumstances - Mummy walks into the room and seeing her daughter reading the comic paper asks where she got it. Jean's blush brings further suspicious questioning and eventually the truth is out - Jean is punished and hustled back to the shop and made to restore the paper to Mrs. Brown. Or perhaps Father goes into the newsagent's for a football paper and thanks Mrs. Brown for giving Jean her comic. Mrs. Brown apologizes for having forgotten to give Jean the comic and again Jean is discovered in her wrongdoing and duly punished. Quite often the small girls mention forgiveness on the part of Mrs. Brown, "who is really a kind lady", but the boys usually omit this refinement.

In the 12+ group, however, the difference

between boys' and girls' response is most marked. While the boys' attitude is not very different from that of their young brothers - except that they more frequently promise "Never to do it again" - the girls' reaction in this story is noticeably more mature. There are many more instances of negative affect, self-criticism, and most particularly of restitution and resolution without discovery having taken place. Of course it can be argued that restitution may be made because of fear of discovery, even though this fear is not explicitly stated. But even so the unusually large number of girls who scored 4 in this story, indicating a response of negative affect and reparation, or self-criticism and reparation, in each case without discovery, seems to prove that girls of this age group are less happy about stealing than about other forms of misdemeanour. A brush with the Law is not apparently anticipated or overtly feared, but it may well be that because stealing is known to be a criminal matter, whereas lying or

cheating may only draw down the wrath of the family or school authority, it is taken more seriously.

If this is the case then the 14+ girls must have adopted a more sophisticated attitude towards the possibility of legal proceedings because perceptibly fewer of them make self-critical or evaluative comments about their conduct. Much the largest group of them merely expect straightforward discovery and punishment, either by parents, store managers or magistrate's courts.

The 14+ boys' score is only slightly higher than that of the 12+ boys, lower than the 14+ girls' and a great deal lower than that of the 12+ girls. Here again discovery and punishment by a hawk-eyed parental figure of justice is the pattern in $\frac{2}{3}$ of the cases.

STORY 2, which deals with lying.

In this story a dog or a baby brother bears the blame for the hero's misdeed. Though none of the scores are high for this story the lowest are those of the primary

school girls. This is partly because, along with the usual "discovery and punishment" group, there is an unusually large group envisaging no moral consequence of the transgression at all - Mummy never finds out who was really to blame and so everything is fine. Lies, to many of this age group, apparently are not intrinsically bad unless they are found out. This would seem to agree with Piaget's findings with much younger children. It would be interesting to discover whether or not the children who were classified negatively had a lower I.Q. than the rest of the group.

The average score for 12+ boys in this story is 1.3 and for girls 1.7. The much larger number of confessions reported by the girls were provoked, it was stated explicitly, by feelings of sympathy for the dog when he was punished unfairly. This is hardly surprising as girls of this age are notoriously sentimental about animals. However, their feelings for the dog are rarely followed by resolution as to the inadvisability of lying

in general.

The story for the 14+ group, though still dealing with lying, had a slightly different slant as the baby brother, unlike the dog, could not be punished, especially by the teacher, and therefore confession would not be prompted by feelings of sympathy. Confession was, in fact, very, very infrequent and punishment when meted out was for the torn book much more often than for lying. This is a rather surprising example of the incidence of moral realism in a group of older children. However, the explanation may well be that in one's dealings with teachers and headmasters lying is not regarded as particularly reprehensible as long as no one is hurt by it and one is not found out.

STORY 3, which deals with cheating one's
friends or classmates.

As expected, the 9 year olds concentrated on discovery and punishment. Occasionally the circumstances of discovery were dramatic and bore a marked resemblance to events portrayed

on a currently popular series of playlets on Children's Television.

The scores for the 12 year olds, both boys and girls, were much higher - average 1.7. This is not surprising as, with the waning of unilateral respect, offending one's peers is now a much more serious matter than offending one's superiors. Exclusion from the gang, temporarily or in some cases even permanently, is the standard punishment - frequently preceded by various degrees of "beating up". However, the emphasis is still very much on punishment by others and reparative techniques consist exclusively in resolution "never to do it again". Whether the resolution is produced by contrition or fear is impossible to say.

At first sight the score for the 14 year olds, 1.7, the same as for 12 year olds, seems lower than one would have expected. A very large group, half of the boys and almost two-thirds of the girls, anticipated discovery, usually through such realistic circumstances as Marilyn or Geoff's family move being postponed

and their coming back before the end of term and enquiring about the award of the prize or returning months later to the district to stay with relatives or friends and calling in at school. Feelings of guilt, attitudes of self-criticism, and decisions to improve future behaviour are no more frequently mentioned than by the younger children.

However, one interesting factor does emerge which is not covered by any of the categories in the list. This is a very frequent mention, particularly among the girls, of a reappraisal of the "false" friend's qualities after anger has been expressed and punishment or humiliation endured, and a decision that because she is an admirable or likeable person in other ways the injured party is prepared to forget the unpleasant incident and even to be "better friends" in the future. This would seem to indicate a depth and maturity in personal relationships which one does not normally associated with young adolescents. Perhaps it is an early example of Jung's eros principle

at work in women.

STORY 4 - about an aggressive act against
a younger child.

In many ways this is the most interesting and certainly the most debatable of all the five stories. Here the scores from small boys to 14+ girls are on a regular and steadily increasing scale so that one may say broadly that from this experiment it would appear that a guilty attitude towards such acts of aggression develops with age and more strongly with girls than with boys.

Describing how Brian was "discovered" the 9+ boys and girls credit their mothers with acute powers of observation and shrewdness, and interesting examples of social norms arise - the fact that Michael's face is not smeared with chocolate frequently being cited as positive proof that Brian had taken the chocolate from him. "Minding the baby" in these children's experience obviously does not include keeping him clean too!

The emphasis with the twelve year olds is

again on discovery and punishment, though there are more examples here of promises to reform after Susan has been spanked, forbidden to go to the baths, or "kept in" for a month.

(Punishments are much more severe and summary than one's knowledge of the background of these girls would suggest likely in real life.) Discovery comes normally in reasonable circumstances though on one occasion Michael's fury at the injustice he has suffered endows him with immediate and voluble speech!

However it would seem that per se an act of aggression against a younger and weaker child rarely engenders the feelings of shame and guilt that literature would lead us to expect.

In an effort to eliminate completely the factor of fear of discovery the story for the 14 year olds was structured so that the act of aggression in thought could not possibly be known by any natural means. In fact discovery was not mentioned by any of the 14 year old group. In many cases it was stated explicitly

that Peter and Heather realised that their somewhat casual malevolence was in no way the cause of the teacher's accident, and in other cases after unburdening themselves to their mothers they were assured it was "just a coincidence".

Great care was taken in categorising these responses not to include under the heading of reparation any efforts which might be construed as a form of ingratiation in the hope of being reinstated in the team. First those acts were included which were intended to convey sympathy and were accompanied or preceded by feelings of shame, anxiety or guilt. These kindly acts and apologies were always received in the best possible spirit by the teacher and were followed by expressions of relief and even exhilaration on the part of the hero or heroine. Where guilt or anxiety feelings were not explicitly stated as being responsible for the initiation of reparative techniques, acts were only categorised as reparative if it was clear from the context

that they were not motivated by self-interest. Because this story was open to more subjective judgments than the others the categorisation was checked by a second independent judge.

Examination of the scores of the 14 year olds shows that an average score in this case is meaningless because the writers are divided into two distinct groups. In the first group are fourteen boys - nearly one-third of the total sample - who report no moral consequence whatsoever. There are no feelings of guilt, remorse or involvement of any sort - one of the boys is delighted when Mr. Graham dies, "it served him right for putting Peter off the team". But this is the sole example of vindictiveness and comes from a boy whose total rating is low. The others may feel no regret over their hero's malicious sentiments but they frequently express concern for Mr. Graham's recovery.

The second group is subdivided into two, eighteen boys who score 3 points and fifteen who score 4. Thus, of the 48 boys taking

part 33 voluntarily undertake some reparative act like going to hospital to visit the teacher, or coaching the younger boys in his absence, or they experience feelings of guilt, shame or remorse. Fifteen boys in the group explicitly mention both types of reaction. Since, as has been said before, the boys accept no responsibility for what happens to Mr. Graham they know their aggression has no material consequence and so this response appears to be all the more striking.

With the 14+ girls the first group, which apparently carries on normally without thinking about or initiating any sort of behaviour consequent on the transgression, is smaller than that of the boys, one-eighth of the total in fact. The second group of 55 is composed of people who either feel badly about their malevolence or are actively self-critical even to the extent of being unable to sleep or who try, entirely on their own initiative to "make it up". Twenty-one of these girls exhibit two of the three possible reactions,

and two describe all three of them.

Thus it would appear that where aggression is concerned these 14+ girls are particularly sensitive, although both boys and girls have an unexpectedly high score.

This is possibly largely a consequence of the structuring of the story to eliminate fear of discovery as a motive for action. In eliminating fear of discovery the experimenter also eliminated possibility of discovery and so prevented the children from having recourse to the familiar pattern of consequences which recurs most frequently over all the other stories and indeed in all but one of the remaining 28 sets of story scores.

The exclusion of the category of discovery and punishment therefore must push the 14 year old's response either down to the level of the insensitive who have a zero rating or up to the level of those who are impelled to make reparation because, whether it is explicitly stated or not, they are unhappy about their aggressive thoughts. The question now remains

as to why two-thirds of the boys and seven-eighths of the girls chose the latter course.

The answer may well lie again in the structuring of the story. The fact that the teacher has a serious accident subsequent to the hero's malicious wish - even though no responsibility for that accident is accepted - would lead to feelings of guilt and remorse. If nothing unfortunate had happened to the teacher, the "drop dead" imperative would have been forgotten or taken merely as a figure of speech. When the accident coincides with the ill-wishes, however, the latter take on a more literal aspect and even though logical commonsense denies the hero's agency in the accident, the emotions are aroused and regret and contrition are freely expressed. Even in this so-called scientific age there are strong elements of superstition in much of our thinking. If the boys and girls did not believe they were responsible for the accident perhaps they did not quite disbelieve it either.

STORY 5, which deals with disobedience
to a parent.

In the first four groups the pattern of discovery and punishment is again the predominant response. Discovery may be delayed - till next week's thorough cleaning of the bedroom or Daddy's weekend in the garden - but it is almost inevitable. Girls do not appear to feel any more guilty about disobedience than they do about lying. However, in the story there are no serious material consequences of the act of disobedience, nothing is broken, damaged or lost, so the lack of guilt feelings may be attributable to moral realism - if Linda had spilt ink on the carpet, or Charles had carelessly dug up his father's prize gladioli corms the result might have been different.

The story for the older group, while still based on disobedience, also included another element; acceptance of responsibility for young children. The 14+ boys' average is 1, which is lower than the score for both

boys and girls of 12+. A possible reason for the large number who were categorised negatively might be their resentment at having to look after children. If it were against local tradition for a boy of 14 to have to stay in on a Saturday night the hero would feel that in being obliged to do so he would lose face with his friends.

The 14+ girls' average score is higher than that of the boys as one would anticipate. It is part of the girls' accepted role to care for younger siblings and in addition much of the education of the older secondary modern school girl centres round the home and child-care. So it would not be unreasonable to expect very severe guilt feelings when the heroine fails her responsibility in a matter like this. The reason that these did not appear in large numbers is perhaps the obverse of the reason for the high scores in the last story, viz nothing untoward did happen to the children in the absence of their older sister and so, in most cases, she did not feel

unduly perturbed at her disobedience. However, many of the girls, after being discovered and "lectured" by their mothers, affirmed that "she vowed she would never do it again and she never did".

In interpreting the scores gained on these story completions it is important to bear in mind that the writer's object in this study was not to assess the "goodness" or "badness" of girls as compared with boys, but rather to note how they differed in their reactions after transgression. The true measure of morality is resistance to temptation and as the very nature of the tests precluded the use of this measure the value of the study is restricted to the limited illumination it throws on to the thoughts, feelings and resolutions of this group of children after they have committed a misdemeanour.

By far the most frequently occurring response in these stories was the anticipation of discovery and punishment with the expression of remorse and guilt feelings as the minority

reaction.

This would appear to the writer to indicate unmistakably the effectiveness of early conditioning by parents and teachers. Large numbers of the children apparently assume that wrongdoing will be accompanied by some unpleasantness and presumably because of this, normally refrain from all but the more trivial deviations. A close association with the schools and their staffs enabled the writer to confirm her expectation that the children's behaviour in school was general conformist and co-operative, although of course there were exceptions. m

SEX DIFFERENCES IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT.

Freud's theory of differential personality development in the two sexes depends upon the existence of a society in which the father is an omnipotent, militaristic figure dominating the household and engendering such fear in his sons at the Oedipal stage of growth that they internalise his values and judgments and grow up with a severe and rigid conscience. The fact that such a social structure no longer obtains, at least in Britain and America, may explain why some recent studies on moral development have shown that girls have a higher degree of internalisation than boys. Possibly Freud's preoccupation with neurotic patients gave his opinions an unjustified bias, but more likely the parental treatment of boys nowadays is more like that accorded to girls in the society to which Freud belonged.

Hartshorne and May in 1930 found that on tests of moral knowledge and sensitivity to social standards girls consistently gained higher scores than boys, and Sears, Maccoby and Levin

in 1957 reported that more girls than boys evidenced a highly developed conscience. Nevertheless Aronfreed in 1960 concluded that although girls used story endings involving apology and confession significantly more than did boys such responses "may be regarded as somewhat externally orientated corrections of deviance".

It has been suggested that Parson's Sociological Theory of Identification referred to in an earlier chapter could be used to resolve the apparent contradiction between Freud's hypothesis of the superior development of the super-ego in men, supported by data from Terman and Miles, and the findings already quoted of Sears, Maccoby and Levin where guilt was more often apparent in women. The explanation would be that the contrast lies in the differing spheres of activity in which the conscience of boys and girls are involved rather than with their relative strengths. If male morality, following the directions of the instrumental role, is concerned with general

principles of conduct in relation to the outside world, then it is not surprising that in the Terman and Miles test in items based on abstract conceptions like discourtesy, laziness and atheism boys should score highly. Female morality, on the other hand, preoccupied after the manner of the expressive function with individual feelings and active sympathy, would obviously tend to help girls obtain a higher rating in Miller and Swanson, and Sears, Maccoby and Levin's studies where the problems were set in a context of intimate interpersonal relations, one within the family, the other between a child and his teacher.

In common with other investigators Sears, Maccoby and Levin think that girls are more frequently subject to withdrawal of love techniques than are boys. However, in the present study there was no indication of this as not one child, boy or girl, reported the use of this particular type of punishment after the discovery of the transgression.

Aronfreed argues that the more positive

types of inductive technique like suggesting the child corrects the damage he has done or refraining from punishing when he takes the initiative in reparation, encourage him to accept responsibility for his actions. The use of explanation by the parent has, of course, the additional advantage of helping to provide the child with his own resources for evaluating his behaviour. Aronfreed found, as he expected, that the use of inductive punishment was positively related to a high degree of internally motivated reparative action - and that where it was used by the parents external punishment was not mentioned in the response made by the child. This fact may be partly responsible for the somewhat higher scores gained by girls in the present study. Whereas only one boy in one story in the 12+ age group, and two boys in one story in the 14+ age group mentioned appeals to reason as the parental reaction after discovery, seven girls in the 12+ group and twelve girls in the 14 group did so. This would suggest that in

the sample under examination this approach, though not frequently used, is more commonly applied to girls than to boys.

Bronfenbrenner in a recent study asserted that, despite the limitations of the method used, which was a Parent-Activity Inventory, it was clear that the mother's influence in almost every sphere of the home life of 400 students was predominantly greater than the father's. Naturally she was physically present more often, more obviously nurturant, protective and affectionate. But she was also seen as the most important source of power, she set the standards for achievement, she corrected, admonished and rejected more often than the father did. Towards her daughters she was more firm and demanding than towards her sons though giving them both the same love and care. If it were confirmed that this same relationship existed in Britain it would be an additional reason for expecting girls to identify more closely with the mother and to internalise her code of

of morals. Certainly Chasdi in 1952 assumed that older girls had a stronger degree of identification with their mothers than did boys of the same age with their fathers, and used this fact to account for the differential internalisation.

An important point appears to be that the behaviour of fathers and mothers tends to affect sons and daughters in different ways and that therefore the number of variables in child-rearing practices is very large. Hoffman and Saltzstein found, for instance, that boys who gave more internalised responses reported permissiveness in the discipline of both parents and unaffectionate relationships with the mother, who often used techniques indicating the painful consequences of the child's transgression. The "internalised" girls, on the other hand, less often reported their mothers as asking their fathers to "deal with them", than did the "externalised" girls, and also wrote more often of their fathers using rational appeals to them.

Devereux, investigating the effects of different types of family authority on 1400 school-children between 11 and 12 years of age in West Germany, divided his families into five categories. These ranged from the patriarchal, which is strongly dominated by the father, through the patricentric, where the father has relatively more weight but the mother's wishes are consulted, and the egalitarian or democratic in which both parents have equal power, to the matricentric and the matriarchal where, as one would suppose, the mother's authority predominates. From analysis of his data Devereux concluded that a moderate degree of parental role differentiation with an optimum combination of discipline and support was most beneficial for boys. Those from the patricentric homes were rated as highest on responsibility, helpfulness and sociability. The girls, on the other hand, who showed the most desirable behavioural qualities came from the egalitarian or democratic families with little role differentiation, where both parents

did the same kind of things for and with their children. Much more research is obviously needed before findings such as Chasdi's and Bronfenbrenner's can be reconciled with those of Devereux.

It would appear to the present writer that the differences of treatment accorded generally to boys and girls nowadays, in Britain at any rate, are much more slight than those noted in other societies and at other times. Similar tasks are allotted to each in many homes, comparable rewards and privileges are given. It might be hypothesized that in the area from which the sample was drawn there would be greater differences in child-rearing practices between different families than between children of different sexes within the same family.

One factor which has not yet been taken into account and which may be of considerable importance is the influence of the school upon the moral attitude of the child. Whereas the 9+ groups of boys and girls, whose

responses were very similar, came from the same school, the 12+ and 14+ age groups were from single-sex twin Secondary Schools. These Secondary Schools, while drawing their pupils from the same geographical area and from the same co-educational Primary School had different head teachers and entirely different staffs.

The present writer, as an external examiner for Domestic Subjects dealing exclusively with girls, has been able to visit 55 - 60 different schools over a period of five years for the purpose of presiding over practical examinations and assessing the work done. She has noticed that although all candidates obviously wished to create a favourable impression, general standards of co-operativeness, courtesy and politeness appeared to be consistently higher in the single-sex schools than in the co-educational schools. This observation, of course, refers merely to the superficial aspects of behaviour and is not substantiated experimentally or quantitatively.

Nevertheless it may be an indication that headmistresses and women teachers generally, lay more stress on social mores and tend to emphasise the desirability of pleasing and placating others and excusing one's faults more than men teachers do. Such an attitude could be at least partly responsible for the much greater incidence of confession and reparation as responses to the story completion tests on the part of the girls. Though there were some girls who scored very highly on internalisation, the average score for the older girls would lead one to expect a response which was self-initiated but externally oriented, like confession, or voluntary engagement in a reparative technique after discovery.

Luria and Goldwasser found in 1963, as already described, that in Israel, where the treatment of children of both sexes in the kibbutz was very similar, no sex difference in the frequency of the confession response was noted. It would appear, then, that it is not a basic difference in the cognitive or

affective resources available to boys and girls which accounts for the sex differences in the moral consequences of transgression, but rather their particular social experience which seems to indicate to girls the appropriateness of certain actions.

While there is little evidence that specific child-rearing practices are responsible for the development of sex differences in the organisation and operation of conscience, many researchers like Whiting and Child have indicated that there is certainly a tendency in many societies to emphasise the desirability of certain qualities like conformity and adaptability in girls and self-reliance and assertiveness in boys.

Statistics prove that women and girls are much less likely than men and boys to indulge in crime generally and in certain types of crime particularly. This does not mean that women are necessarily more moral, but rather that their role does not exert the same pressure towards aggression, violence or

destruction of property. When women do succumb to the temptation to break the law it is usually to obtain some relatively small material benefit for themselves or their families, for instance by shoplifting or non-payment of hire-purchase instalments. Young girl delinquents, on the other hand, are most frequently convicted of sex offences, being unmanageable or absconding from home.

One final observation on the results of the present study concerns, once more, the expressive role played by women. It may be that in learning this role the girl also learns to be more articulate about her feelings, and so her story endings are fuller, and more descriptive than the boys', indicate a greater number of moral consequences, and so obtain a higher rating on internalisation.

CONCLUSION.

The investigation described in this paper confirms without doubt the development of a more mature moral attitude in the child between the ages of 9 and 15. Cognitive factors are obviously extremely important because there is a marked rise with increasing age in the number of responses indicating the evaluation of one's acts and self-critical comments. Feelings of shame and regret are also more frequently expressed and reparative techniques are undertaken more often.

Much has been written recently by sociologists and moralists about the contemporary non-judgmental attitude of adults, their horror of being thought dogmatic or doctrinaire and the consequent doubt and insecurity of the adolescent who cannot inherit from parents or teachers any absolute values or standards of behaviour. Discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of the present work, and in any case even though the young person can be strongly influenced up to and beyond puberty, the

decisive years for moral training are in infancy and early childhood.

In this period the parent, and to a lesser extent the teacher, is responsible for assisting the child to learn a pattern of behaviour conducive to his own happiness as well as the happiness of those around him, while avoiding morbid guilt. To achieve this aim the child must develop an increasing lucidity of conscience so that he can judge clearly what is good and what is bad and not be troubled by either doubts or scruples. "Conscience is not infallible: it may err like any other human judgment. A man may be blind, if not exactly to his own action, at least to the motives and circumstances of that action." (Rickaby). The child must also be helped by praise and responsibility to have the integrity and courage to act on his judgments, and he must organise a coherent system of values, personal, family, social and religious. In this he will be assisted most by the example of those others whom he respects and

whom he knows treat him honestly.

The following suggestions are put forward for consideration by those concerned in the development of conscience in children. Even though they appear obvious, many intelligent and conscientious parents and teachers perhaps tend to overlook them.

1. It should be realised that the child is initially unaware of the adult scale of values. The father of a very small boy known to the writer, by limiting his smoking saved enough money to buy a watch for his son's birthday. Soon afterwards the child innocently "swapped" it for a cheap model car because he knew nothing of the intrinsic value of the watch nor of the father's sacrifice and wanted the car more than anything else. He could not therefore understand why he incurred such severe wrath from his father. This sort of parental reaction, as well as exaggerated criticism of small faults, excessive scolding and withdrawal of love

- puts the child's conscience out of focus.
2. Carelessness and clumsiness which comes through lack of motor skill, and weaknesses like enuresis, should not be treated on the same level as faults for which the child is responsible, like disobedience or belligerence. If such a discrimination is made the child's conscience becomes distorted. Children are extremely sensitive to injustice and even if no grave psychic disturbance is caused resentment is felt, if not shown. Repressed resentment may of course be harmful later.
 3. Rules and regulations for good manners and conventional behaviour, and which make life more convenient for the parents should not be confused with virtues and vices. Tidiness, cleanliness and punctuality must be taught as desirable qualities but as having no special reference to one's duty to God or one's fellow man.
 4. Threats of punishment from external sources should be avoided. Unhappily the "bogey-

man" still exists, mothers still tell their children "the policeman will come", or in some homes where piety is coupled with ignorance, "God will punish you". This extends the domination of a rigid conscience and retards the development of a sense of personal responsibility. "In the name of education many things are done to children with the sole purpose, it would seem, of making them think they are surrounded by fearful threatening powers that peer into their secret heart and impose heavy penalties for the least sign of independence."

5. Parents whose own emotional life is unstable must resist seeking compensation in the child. Examples abound in life and in literature of mothers especially who concentrate all their affection on small boys making them dependent, unstable and incompetent in judging moral issues.
6. The child's efforts to learn desirable behaviour patterns should be stimulated by

a concern for the general good rather than by fear and punishment, even though judicious administration of the latter may be necessary and useful from time to time. Before the child can develop such a concern, however, he must have as accurate a picture of the world as he is capable of comprehending and so his questions about people, attitudes and values must be answered as truthfully as possible. Acknowledgment of his own, and other people's shortcomings is, then, a further step in the development of a mature outlook. If the area governed by his conscience has been restricted to those matters which may be truly termed moral the child can be more easily made to realise that the feelings of guilt and anxiety which arise in certain situations can be of positive use as a reliable warning system. So long as his conscience is merely a negative, burdensome thing the child will not advance towards the true morality of personal responsibility.

APPENDIX A

STORY BEGINNINGS FOR BOYS 9+ and 12+

1. David was a nice boy who lived near a newsagent's shop and often went in for his father's paper. Sometimes Mr. Brown the newsagent gave him a comic. David was reading the serial story and wanted the last instalment. But the week it came out Mr. Brown was very busy when David went into the shop and didn't give him the comic. David was bitterly disappointed and picked a copy up himself, tucking it into his father's evening paper. No one saw him take it.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT DAVID AND WHAT HAPPENED.

2. Peter had a dog called Timmy with whom he played when he came home from school. One day Timmy tore a hole in Peter's new beach ball. Mother said it couldn't be helped because Timmy was only a puppy and hadn't learned yet how to hold a ball. The following week when he was climbing trees and no-one was about to see him, Peter tore his best shirt. He told Mother Timmy had done it when he was leaping up for the ball.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT PETER AND WHAT HAPPENED.

3. John had a group of pals. They did everything together. At playtime they used to play marbles. John usually lost. One day when a helicopter passed over and everyone was looking upwards John quickly moved his marble so that he won the game and took all the marbles. Nobody noticed how he had cheated.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT JOHN AND WHAT HAPPENED.

4. Brian had a little brother, Michael, whom he loved very much. One day when Brian wanted to go swimming with the other boys, his mother was busy and asked him to go a message first, taking Michael in his push chair. She gave them each a bar of chocolate. Brian ate his quickly but Michael was very slow, so when there wasn't a soul about to see what he did Brian said to Michael "Give me your bar of chocolate or else I'll hit you". Michael couldn't talk much but he understood what Brian meant so he handed over his bar of chocolate; and Brian ate it up.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT BRIAN AND WHAT HAPPENED.

5. Charles was a good boy who loved his parents. One day he was helping in their big garden when his father told him to gather up all the grass clipping and carry them to the compost heap at the very bottom of the garden. But Charles was becoming rather tired so when his father went into the house to get them both a glass of lemonade he stuffed the clippings under the bushes and no one saw him.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT CHARLES AND WHAT HAPPENED.

APPENDIX A

STORY BEGINNINGS FOR GIRLS 9+ and 12+

1. Jean was a nice girl who lived near a newsagent's shop and often went in for her father's paper. Sometimes Mrs. Brown, the newsagent gave her a comic. Jean was reading the serial story and wanted to finish the last instalment. But the week it came out Mrs. Brown was very busy when Jean went into the shop and didn't give her the comic. Jean was bitterly disappointed and picked a copy up herself, tucking it into her father's paper. No one saw her take it.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT JEAN AND WHAT HAPPENED.

2. Mary had a dog called Timmy with whom she played when she came home from school. One day Timmy tore a hole in Mary's new beach ball. Mother said it couldn't be helped because Timmy was only a puppy and hadn't learned yet how to hold a ball. The following week when she was crawling under a fence to take a short cut across the fields Mary tore her dress. No one was about to see what happened so Mary told Mother Timmy had done it.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT MARY AND WHAT HAPPENED.

3. Anne had a group of pals. They did everything together. One Saturday they went on to the beach to see who could collect the biggest pile of shells. Anne did not have as many as the others. Suddenly a helicopter passed over and while they were all looking upwards Anne quickly took a few shells from the piles on each side of hers. Nobody noticed how she had cheated.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT ANNE AND WHAT HAPPENED.

4. Susan had a little sister, Lucy, whom she loved very much. One day when Susan wanted to go swimming with the other girls, her mother was busy and asked her to go a message first, taking Lucy in her push chair. She gave them each a bar of chocolate. Susan ate hers quickly but Lucy was very slow, so when there wasn't a soul about to see what she did Susan said to Lucy "Give me your bar of chocolate or else I'll slap you." Lucy couldn't talk much but she understood what Susan meant, so she handed over her bar of chocolate and Susan ate it up.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT SUSAN AND WHAT HAPPENED.

5. Linda was a good girl who loved her parents. One day she was helping to clean the bedrooms when her mother told her to sweep up all the dust from the lino and carry it downstairs to the dustbin. But Linda was becoming rather tired, so when her mother went away to get them both some sweets she swept the dust under the carpet. Of course no-one saw her.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT LINDA AND WHAT HAPPENED.

APPENDIX A

STORY BEGINNINGS FOR 14+ BOYS.

1. Alan was a happy lad of 14 and a good swimmer. He was competing in the School Swimming Gala and badly wanted a new pair of trunks for the occasion. His mother said there was nothing wrong with the pair he already had, but Alan hated them because they had been his elder brother's. One day when he was out shopping with his mother he saw just the kind of trunks he admired on an open counter in a crowded shop. He quickly slipped a pair into his pocket and no one saw him take them.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT ALAN AND WHAT HAPPENED.

2. Jim was very proud of his neat, tidy school work. One day on the way home from school he and his pals were larking around with a crowd of girls and his maths book was torn. He told his teacher that his little sister had taken it from his school-bag and torn it while he was helping his Dad to wash the car.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT JIM AND WHAT HAPPENED.

3. Geoff and the other boys in his school were collecting money for a new sports pavilion. To urge them on their class teacher offered a small prize for the boy who collected most. Towards the end of the term Geoff's friend David had to go into hospital to have his tonsils out, and asked Geoff to hand in his money for him. Geoff knew that David's family was leaving the district at the end of term and that David would not be coming back to school at all, so instead of handing in David's collection separately he added it to his own. Of course he won the prize. Nobody knew what he had done.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT GEOFF AND WHAT HAPPENED.

4. Peter was good at all sports and had been on the football team so long that he felt he didn't need to practise like the others. He admired Mr. Graham the young games master very much and so was bitterly humiliated when Mr. Graham sent for him alone one day and told him that his form had deteriorated so much recently that he was going to try out a younger boy in his place. Peter said nothing aloud but turned away wishing Mr. Graham would "drop dead". Next day when he got to school he heard that Mr. Graham had been involved in a car crash and was lying in hospital seriously injured.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT PETER AND WHAT HAPPENED.

5. Michael's mother, a widow, was particularly kind to him but as there were no other grown ups in the family she expected a certain amount of help from him in the house. One Saturday evening when she had to go out on business she told Michael to stay in with the little ones, who were in bed, till she came back at about half past eight. However, soon after she had gone some of Michael's friends called and persuaded him to go out with them. He left the radio turned on in the living room so that his brother and sister did not know that they had been left alone. Michael arrived back before his mother did.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT MICHAEL AND WHAT HAPPENED.

APPENDIX A.

STORY BEGINNINGS FOR 14+ GIRLS

1. Jean was a pleasant girl of 14 who liked pretty clothes and went to lots of dances. She was longing for a frilly nylon petticoat to wear under her party dress and her Mother said she could have one before Christmas. However, Jean could not wait that long. One day when she was in a department store she saw just the kind she wanted on an open counter and slipped one into her shopping bag. No one saw her take it.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT JEAN AND WHAT HAPPENED.

2. Jennifer's school work was always neat and tidy, and she was very proud of it. One evening on the way home from school she and her friends were larking about with a group of boys and Jennifer's maths book was torn. She told her teacher that her baby brother had taken it from her school-bag and torn it while she was busy washing up the tea things.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT JENNIFER AND WHAT HAPPENED.

3. Marilyn and her classmates were a very friendly crowd. They were all trying to collect as much as they could for Oxfam, and to urge them on, their teacher offered a small prize for the girl who collected most. Towards the end of term Marilyn's friend Anne was told she had to go into hospital at once to have her tonsils removed and she asked Marilyn to hand in her money for her. Marilyn knew that Anne's family was leaving the district at the end of term and that Anne would not come back to school at all so instead of handing in two lots of money separately she just added Anne's to her own. Of course she won the prize. Nobody knew what she had done.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT MARILYN AND WHAT HAPPENED.

4. Heather was very good at all sports and had been on the hockey team so long that she felt she didn't need to practise like the others. She admired Miss Spence, the young games mistress very much and so was bitterly humiliated when Miss Spence sent for her alone one day and told her that her form had deteriorated so much recently that she was going to try out a younger girl in her place. Heather said nothing aloud but turned away wishing Miss Spence would "drop dead". Next day when she got to school she heard that Miss Spence had been involved in a car crash and was lying in hospital seriously injured.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT HEATHER AND WHAT HAPPENED.

5. Sandra's mother, a widow, was very good to her and shared her interests, but as she had younger children too she had to rely on Sandra a good deal for help in the house. One Saturday evening when she had to go out on business she told Sandra to put the little ones to bed at six o'clock and to stay in with them till she returned about half past eight. After they were safely tucked in some of Sandra's friends called and persuaded her to go out with them. She left the radio turned on in the living room so that her brother and sister did not know they had been left alone. Sandra arrived back just before her mother did.

FINISH THE STORY. TELL ABOUT SANDRA AND WHAT HAPPENED.

APPENDIX B

RESULT (FREQUENCIES)

Total possible score: 25

Scores	Age 9+		Age 12+		Age 14+		Total
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	
0	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
1	2	3	-	-	1	-	6
2	-	-	1	1	-	2	4
3	4	2	-	2	3	-	11
4	9	5	6	-	4	1	25
5	13	11	12	10	3	2	51
6	4	10	10	4	8	3	39
7	4	4	7	10	7	4	36
8	2	5	7	5	2	6	27
9	1	1	5	10	4	10	31
10	1	-	1	8	9	8	27
11	-	1	3	9	2	9	24
12	1	-	2	5	1	3	12
13	-	-	-	2	2	6	10
14	-	-	2	2	-	3	7
15	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
16	-	-	1	-	-	3	4
17	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
18	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
19	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
20	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS	41	42	58	70	48	63	322
MEAN	5.2	5.5	7	8.5	7.8	10.1	

APPENDIX C.

ANALYSIS OF STORY SCORES.

Points	Age 9+		Age 12+		Age 14+	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
<u>STORY 1.</u>						
0	5	6	4	3	2	4
1	28	26	31	19	30	28
2	3	4	12	7	3	7
3	4	6	10	22	7	13
4	1	-	1	19	5	10
5	-	-	-	-	1	1
Average	1.2	1.2	1.5	2.5	1.7	2.0
<u>STORY 2.</u>						
0	12	11	4	5	5	4
1	17	27	37	28	38	43
2	9	2	8	19	4	8
3	3	2	9	14	1	6
4	-	-	-	4	-	2
5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average	1.07	.9	1.3	1.7	1.02	1.3
<u>STORY 3.</u>						
0	5	7	4	1	7	1
1	32	30	32	39	24	39
2	2	4	7	13	2	6
3	2	1	9	13	8	8
4	-	-	5	4	7	8
5	-	-	1	-	-	1
Average	1.02	.97	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7

Points	Age 9+		Age 12+		Age 14+	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
STORY 4.						
0	11	5	6	6	14	8
1	26	30	42	42	-	-
2	3	3	3	12	1	-
3	1	3	5	7	18	21
4	-	1	2	3	15	32
5	-	-	-	-	-	2
Average	.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	2.4	3.2
STORY 5.						
0	5	3	5	8	14	4
1	32	33	44	41	25	22
2	4	6	4	16	6	26
3	-	-	3	4	1	5
4	-	-	2	1	2	6
5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Average	.97	1.07	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.8

APPENDIX D

CONSISTENCY OF INDIVIDUAL SCORES.

Number of children (expressed as a percentage)
classified according to scores (See page 183)

<u>Age</u>	<u>Class</u>	<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>
9+	I	29.2	21.4
	II	46.3	57.1
	III	21.9	19.05
	IV	2.4	2.4
	V	0	0
12+	I	20.7	7.1
	II	46.5	31.4
	III	25.8	48.6
	IV	6.7	12.8
	V	0	0
14+	I	0	3.2
	II	31.25	20.6
	III	50.0	57.1
	IV	16.6	16.0
	V	2.1	3.1

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