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### *The doctrine of 'the consent of the governed in Plato*

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In Plato Today, R.H. Crossman concluded that Plato would have abjured the three major forms of government on which the Greek philosopher was invited to comment during his imaginary tour of the twentieth century. Plato was seen to reject Anglo-American democracy, Soviet communism, and European fascism. He rejected these ideals for one basic reason; they all assumed that happiness and social well-being were attained by all men in material security and political equality. A "dictatorship of the best" which displaced political equality by benevolent paternalism was more in keeping with Plato's own ideal. Crossman implied that Plato's model for social well-being was more akin to the English squirearchy of the eighteenth century, or, indeed, to feudal models than to anything we know in present history. Plato's 'squirearchy', of course, would not be a landed gentry. It would be an aristocracy, -but an aristocracy of the mind. But -we hear Crossman wondering - are we then forbidden from identifying Plato's model with anything we know from our own past? While it is true that Plato's idealism forces us to place his model outside actual history, it is also true that he little supposed that his ideal aristocracy could emerge from any social class but the old Athenian 'gentry' whose political influence had been eroded away by the rise of democratic life and the instability that marked it.

Crossman thus observed an element in Plato's thinking that would be root and branch of K.R. Popper's indictment: Plato's unwonted distrust of the ordinary man. But what Crossman saw as a romantic pessimism akin to the worst fears of W.B. Yeats, Popper saw as a high flown cynicism, hateful to fellow feeling and detestable to all moral goodness. Crossman wrote on the eve of the storm that was to break in Europe in the late 1930's. Popper, driven by racial mania from his own land, wrote at the height of the storm's violence. In The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper saw Plato as the avowed enemy of the moral sanction and trust that must underlie a responsible and free society. He saw Plato as one who sacrificed individual dignity to a groundless theory of 'natural kinds'. In so doing, Popper believed, Plato was setting up a wholly unverifiable theory of historical destiny - a theory that was not only unverifiable but morally repugnant as well. Popper's critique was incisive, topical, and passionate. What Crossman had seen as an out-moded paternalism which was insufficient to the needs either of Plato's time or of our own, Popper condemned as the ferocious megalomania born of a small man's distrust and selfish conceit. In their different ways, both authors believed that Plato had wholly misunderstood the piety and the profound bravery of Socrates, a man whom both regarded as a martyr to moral conscience. In the deepest sense possible, Socrates was indeed both martyr and rebel. He was a man who put public authority and small minded prejudice to shame. For Crossman he was an inevitable figure, a hero who will always be with us. For Popper he was a stalwart and unflinching man whose very goodness was disgracefully converted by Plato to the vilest of ends.

This thesis does not intend either to dispose of or to prove the well considered beliefs of either Crossman or Popper, two of this century's most incisive critics of Plato. My object in presenting this thesis is more humble. I intend only to consider the growth and the Socratic

provenance of Plato's doctrine of political consent. Plato's doctrine of the consent of the governed will be seen to grow from an ideal of personal commitment to moral obligation to an ideal of the perfected state. I believe that we find in Socrates' notion of consent every element basic to the choice a free man makes in obeying laws. But the Socratic teaching would, with whatever result, inspire Plato toward a theory of political idealism which exalts the free man, in imagined historical time, above his fellows. This thesis will have accomplished its purpose if we can trace out Plato's metamorphosis of Socrates from citizen to ruler, while giving due attention at the same time to the theory of political consent which accompanied the change we mention here. While no subject in the Platonic corpus receives more attention than the humanity or the inhumanity of Plato's politics, I know of no sustained attempts to describe the growth and development of his doctrine of political consent. That doctrine must be basic to all judgements of value we choose to pass upon its author.

T.G.O.

Durham, England

April, 1977

THE DOCTRINE OF 'THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED'

IN PLATO

THOMAS G OSLER

M. Litt. THESIS

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". . . Violence, less and less restricted by a system of laws built up over the centuries, strides naked and victorious over the earth, caring not one jot that its sterility has been demonstrated and proved many times before in history. It is not just course violence itself that is triumphant, but also its shrieks of self-justification. The world is overrun by the brazen conviction that force can do everything, while justice can do nothing. . . ."

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

Nobel Address, 1970

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## Chapter I

### The Problem of Political Consent in Plato Generally Considered

In this chapter I shall provide only a general outline of Plato's theory of political consent. I shall also provide a summary statement of problems that are common to his own and other theories.

In Book IV of the Republic Socrates speaks of sophrosune as unanimity or harmony (*ἁρμονία, ἄρμονία*). By speaking of sophrosune in this way he extends its popular meaning of obedience to rulers and control of appetite (*κρίσειν ... αὐτοῦ*)<sup>1</sup> to include his conception of political agreement or consent. We learn at 431E 7 that sophrosune is common to rulers and ruled. It extends throughout the whole of society, being characteristic of no one class. It is, rather, oneness of mind or unanimity of mind between the naturally superior and inferior elements, both in society and individual, concerning the class and the characteristic of soul respectively that should rule both the ideal community and its citizens. Plato's conception of sophrosune therefore indicates agreement between rulers and ruled. We further learn (Ibid.) that if this principle of agreement exists in any society it is to be found in the one which Socrates and Glaucon are describing, a society which is founded on principles of nature (428E). Such a society will be amenable to the distinct class interests of its citizens. The end to be achieved by this society is justice (*δικαιοσύνη*), which obtains in the presence of sophrosune. We may say that justice, the end to be achieved, denotes the presence of sophrosune, where the latter means agreement between the three parts of the soul and the three classes of the community.

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<sup>1</sup> James Adam, The Republic of Plato, (London, 1969) Vol 1, p. 233 n 30

On what philosophical grounds does Plato base his theory? We might rephrase this question and ask: to what form of government would men consent given that the natural condition of soul obtained? When Socrates speaks of unanimity within soul and community he is speaking of a condition that is natural to men, a condition to which men have a proclivity whether in fact their present lives conform to it. Plato develops his doctrine, then, within a teleological framework. We may offset the Socratic paradox, οὐδείς ἐὼν ἀρετάνης - no man commits wrong willingly - with a corollary: all men wish the good. The practical expression of this dictum, in political terms, is the achievement of sophrosune in community and individual. It is, then, to membership of a community which reflects sophrosune in the individual soul that Plato believes all men would willingly consent.

The requirement that sophrosune should be the basis of consent indicates Plato's belief that man's natural condition is one in which reason and human temperament conform to nature. The Timaeus (90A) provides us with a succinct statement of this conception. It is said there that our noblest soul (the rational aspect of man) has a kinship with the heavens, that man is not an earthly but a heavenly growth. This statement captures the essential character of Plato's theory of man: that human life is continuous with nature, that the universe has a purposive, rational basis in conformity with which it is man's inherent nature to live. Plato assumes that society with government is an integral part of this scheme. The presence of sophrosune in soul and community entails the conformity of reason with nature, or, which is to say the same thing, the agreement of reason and will. Accord between these, as expressed in the tripartite doctrine of soul and state, is the mark of men's living in accordance with the rational order of nature. A government to which men would willingly consent would be one

which would foster the natural condition of soul, the expression of which would be sophrosune and the effect of which would be a community founded on principles of nature. (Republic 428 E). We should mark that the presence of sophrosune in soul and state denotes the citizens' acceptance that society with government (the polis) is integral to the scheme of nature. We should note that membership of the community Plato describes denotes the realization of their needs and interests by its citizens.

This will serve as a very general statement of the doctrine that underlies Plato's political theory. It will be useful at this point to expand on the method that Plato uses to describe consent. What bearing does his teleological framework have on this subject? Theories of consent have frequently assumed that political obligation springs from a covenant by which some legitimate form of rule is established. Theories which trace legitimacy of rule to a covenant may or may not assume that political life is natural to man. But they share a common difference with Platonic theory. They are concerned, primarily, to explain the legitimacy of political obligation, it being assumed that political life is required of man in consequence of his nature conceived initially as pre-political. They are not concerned with the question: what single form of rule would realize man's ends, to what form of rule do men therefore have a potential duty to subject themselves? The theories which we are referring to here arise in post antiquity from the Christian doctrine of the corruption of nature. They regard political life as being a discrete stage in the regeneration of nature. Assuming that men have a duty, consequent upon a primordial act of disobedience to subject themselves to political order, these theories are concerned to describe the basis of legitimate rule in any given state.

Therefore, these theories do not explain consent to law on the assumption that political life - society with government - is an integral feature of human nature. That is to say, they do not assume that man's life is political in its origin. For this reason, they do not make the idealist assumption, characteristic of Plato, that man's ends could be achieved by membership in some one form of political community.<sup>2</sup>

Plato's theory of consent, then, is not based on a conception of the discrete origin of the need for political life. Nor does he assert a clear distinction between natural and positive law as a means of explaining consent. Hooker, for example, in presupposing the corruption of human nature assumes that the law of nature requires "public regiment" as a consequence of the former<sup>3</sup> (as well as for the need of fellowship). He therefore posits natural law as being prior both to the Fall and to the

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<sup>2</sup> The point is well illustrated by Hooker: "The case of man's nature standing therefore as it doth, some kinds of regiment the Law of Nature doth require; yet the kinds thereof being many, Nature tieth not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrary." Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, (London, 1969) Vol 1, p 192.

Hooker assumes that society with government is natural to man, describing his reason for this belief in terms of men's need for fellowship (Op. Cit., p 188). In this he reminds us of Plato: *Γίγνεσθαι εαίνον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγὼ ΝΑΙ, ἔπειδ' ἡ τυγχάνει ἡρώων ἄκλαστος οὐκ κύσαρχος, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν εὐδαιμόνων.* : Republic 369B 11. But he also assumes with Augustine that society with government is required as a consequence of the corruption of human nature (p 190). In thus describing political life as being required as a consequence of some primordial act, Hooker assumes a discrete origin, in the life of man, of the need for political life. In this he differs both from Plato, who regards society with government as an integral feature of human life, and from Plato's opponents, the Sophists, who attributed the need for political life to material necessity alone and not moral necessity as well. Thus with Hooker, political life is required both as a consequence of man's corrupted nature and for the common, material, needs of fellowship as well. The duty to obey the laws of a particular form of rule, or, that is, a specific political obligation, is attributed by him to: ". . . an order expressly or secretly agreed upon the manner of their (men's) union in living together." (p 188)

<sup>3</sup> "Howbeit, the corruption of our nature being presupposed, we may not deny but that the Law of Nature doth now require of necessity some kind of regiment; . . ." (p 191). (My italics)

establishment of political community. Emphasizing men's natural inclination to political life, he speaks of natural law as that which binds men absolutely despite any "solemn agreements amongst themselves what to or not to do. (p 188)<sup>4</sup> This, - natural law - is the "first foundation" of political community (Ibid.): the second is the "order expressly or secretly agreed upon . . ." (Cf n 2), to which we must add the Augustinian point of emphasis relating to the Fall. As a result of the Fall man is required in obedience to God's will, to subject himself to political order.

What we have said above in reference to Hooker is useful to our understanding of Plato's own conception of men's need for political life. Plato's conception, in contrast to Hooker's, is evolutionary. It is not contractual, where, by 'contractual' we imply an agreement which establishes political life as distinct from moral life, and which establishes positive law as distinct from natural law. For our purposes in this chapter a brief discussion of Laws 676A - 683E and Republic 369A - 374D will serve to illustrate Plato's view. In these two passages, Plato's method is to treat the moral and political lives of man as coextensive. It is his intention to reduce the idea of political community to its simplest form in order that we may begin to see what is entailed in a discussion of the polis. Also, in the Laws passage, he wishes to discuss the probable course of society's moral and political evolution. Since the Laws passage is cast on a wider plain than the Republic treatment, we may begin by considering it

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<sup>4</sup> He quotes Aristotle, Rhetoric 1: c 13, who would seem to be putting a similar point of view: "Ἔσσι γὰρ, ὁ φανερύουσαι οἱ πάντες φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, καὶ μὴ δεμῖα κοινῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἢ συνθήκη."

In respect of Aristotle, however, one should refer to Gough (J.W. Gough, The Social Contract, (Oxford, 1967) (p 14). Aristotle, like Plato, was opposed to the conception of the discrete origin of political life, where its origin is attributed to a contract (συνθήκη: Cf. infra pp 15 ff) which has no moral basis and where political life is assumed to secure material needs alone.

first. At the very outset of Laws III, at 676A, the Athenian asks what may we suppose to have been the origin of government (πολιτείας δ' ἀρχὴν εἶνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι). He wishes to determine how we may discover the origin of the present condition of life. His question bears on the development of politics as they move either toward good or evil. He puts his question in an historical form and we may regard what follows as an attempt to trace the life of man down to the present age (. . . εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν καθ' ἑστέκοντα προελήλυθε πάντα; 78B). Underlying the Athenian's question is the assumption that men have the potential ability to mould a good quality of life. Included in this would be the ability to make formal choices of government. This fact, indeed, brings us unwittingly to the beginning of legislation (81C), the prerequisite of which is men's giving legal definition to some polis by the setting up of constitutions. (. . . ἀντοὶ μὲν νομοθέσαι. . . ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας ὀκλήσουσιν 81D). But the sorts of communities that exist prior to any such arrangements are themselves said to be polities (πολιτείας: 80D); and the description of life running from 79A to 80C, which deals with patriarchal societies, emphasizes Plato's belief that some sort of law, however primitive, is always to be found among men. That is to say, there is always some form of polity among men, some form of moral, if not specifically constitutional, form of life. Comparing this to the conception of the Republic, for a moment, we may say that the difference between a primitive community and the ideal community described there (428E 7) is that between the most obvious features of the life of man and his moral purpose. The two are continuous. The 'natural' man is a being of physical need. But he also has a moral end within the scheme of nature.

Plato says, then, in the Laws, that acts of men do in fact give rise to specific forms of constitution. But he does not attribute political life to men's need for order as a consequence of some primordial act. His description of the origin of constitutions does not proceed on any such initial distinction between moral and political life. Plato assumes, rather, that the difference between a simple - or 'natural' society - and a complex one rests on degrees of development. But this conception does not proceed on the assumption that the history of man's moral life provides a precondition of political life. In Plato, society with government (the polis) is not categorically distinct from 'society' conceived as governed by a natural though not a positive law, the latter being brought into being by human act.

We have said that Plato regards political life as being an integral feature of human nature. His theory of consent derives from a teleological frame of reference that sees human will as potentially, through all time, in accord with nature. He posits no radical incident in the life of man (as does Hooker, following Augustine) which severs man from his original nature and which necessitates political life. Consequently, the word 'polis' denotes for Plato both moral and political life. He does not distinguish the latter from the former by positing, ab initio, a radical cleavage within man's history from which political life arises as a response to a moral requirement. For Plato, moral and political life are not discrete moments in human life. This fact distinguishes his evolutionary conception of human society from the later, contractual, theory.

In the Laws passage the Athenian develops his discussion of the present times by means of a speculative account of three ages: an antideluvian time,

a period of primitive societies, and the present. The era before the flood, much like our own, was a political age. After the cataclysm there was a loss of civilization including a general loss of memory (78A). Through many generations the simple folk who had survived came to rediscover the arts of civilization (78D). It is from them that contemporary life developed. This suggests that the Athenian is not recounting an age in which there was no political life. The three ages he cites are continuous in that they are all political ages. Clearly, the picture he gives us does not include a radical incident placed at a point in history. The element of myth is present here: the notion of history as cyclic, which reminds us of the Politicus myth; the notion of the loss of memory, and the theory that knowledge is acquired through its invocation. At times of cataclysm, God has provided that some basic arts should remain so that life might continue. The Athenian's account is, as he has said, a picturing of the movement of society from goodness to evil. Plato is here speaking of political life as a timeless effect of man's moral life. He is tracing through time what seems to him to be an appropriate characterization of moral and political life, the attempt of man through time to realize his moral end. The notion that political life had an origin in time or that it exists from a discrete event in man's moral life does not belong to this picture.

Though in this passage of the Laws there is no reference to the ideal polis, the teleological frame of reference is present. The Athenian offers his account in the light of this frame of reference. He gives us a dynamic picture of the near loss of polity and its gradual regrowth. His picture of the patriarchal community is of particular interest to us. We may make the following remarks about it. The natural ends of a polis are most clearly

understood if we first picture life as at a primitive stage. This is what Plato intends by his description of patriarchal communities. He is not depicting a pre-political, or natural, community in the sense we have discussed above. Nor is it his intention to hark back to a noble age. The picture he gives is not itself an evocation of a past, ideal condition. It is rather a description of justice at its most rudimentary level. In the context of the Republic, from which this picture does not depart, the Athenian's description is propaedeutic to the definition and refinement of justice. It is a picture of justice at its most obvious level, the division of labour and exchange of goods.

What may we say, then, of the prescriptive element which we clearly see here? We learn, for example, that the primitive folk were simple-minded (*εὐθύθεοι ὄντες* : 79C 3), lacking the shrewdness of modern men. They were free from the war-like arts disguised under the name of law-suits and factions (*ὄνομα που δίκαι καὶ σείσεις λεγόμεναι* : 79 D 4). These people were more simple, brave, temperate, and in every way more just than we (. . . *εὐγθέστεροι . . . δικαιότεροι* ; 79E). There is, here, something of the unanimity of temperament with which we associate the three classes of the Republic. Yet here, as in the similar picture of primitive communities which the Republic gives us, we have only part of the requirements of the natural polis. The quality of life in the primitive community was good but only because the material needs of its members were available in sufficient supply just to sustain life and their necessitous condition drew them together. It was this, rather than the conscious will for justice which must mark the consummation of the natural polis, which formed the basis of their sense of kinship. What we see here is justice in its most apparent form, cooperation at the material

level of life. Society, even in its most ideal conception, will incorporate the fulfilment of material needs. It is the achievement of these needs, together with a conscious will for justice that takes account of non material needs, that will characterize the natural, or ideal polis. But we see the most obvious expression of justice within the context of a primitive community, a community whose life is not moulded by a techne of rule adequate to the fulfilment of all of its natural ends and whose life, as portrayed here in the Laws, is directed toward the one end of material survival. What Plato shows us here are simply the basic needs of the polis unfashioned by a techne of rule which is sufficient to the realization of all of a community's ends. But we cannot demonstratively picture a society's basic needs if we take a complex community as our example. Plato would tell us that the communities of the present age not only fail to exhibit justice in its simplest form, but nor do these communities have adequate knowledge of the ends of political life. The patriarchal community, then, pictures justice in its simplest form. It does not exemplify what Plato calls in the Republic, the natural polis ( *κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεθῆσθαι πόλις* ). The latter can only be achieved by the application of a political techne as described in the Republic or by the rule of law as described in the Laws. If, indeed, the patriarchal community fulfilled either of these criteria then the account of the rise of constitutions and the rise of the Dorian alliance (684A ff) and its eventual failure through ignorance of true political ends would not have been germane to the Athenian's portrayal of history.

As the patriarchal community of the Laws was said to be simple and just, so the primitive community of the Republic (369A ff) is said to be a

healthy city (372E 8). Here, as in the Laws, Plato does not give a sufficient example of the natural polis. Again, he is presenting an image of justice at its most apparent level, material cooperation (370A). He does this by describing a minimal community, Glaucon's city of pigs.<sup>5</sup> This, again, is a reduction of a polis to a statement of its most obvious needs (. . . *πολύσαι δὲ ἀσκήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἡρέστερα χρειαί* : 369C 8). Again, this is not the invocation of a noble age. The community may be called just if only because it exhibits justice at the obvious level of material cooperation. But as the patriarchal community has no techne of rule, or none which is adequate to the natural polis, neither has this. It is only just because, in its simplicity, the cause of injustice cannot be instanced. But lacking the techne of rule adequate to the maintenance of the ideal or natural polis, the community cannot be expected to withstand the incursions of injustice in its growth from simplicity. A picture more complex than that

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<sup>5</sup> Gregory Vlastos asks, what is the necessary if not the sufficient condition of a polis?

"That the ideal polis which is described in the Republic is meant to have all the attributes of a state (including supreme control over the use of physical coercion in a given territorial area and maintenance of a legal order in that area) is clear. But though these are sufficient conditions for the existence of a polis they are apparently not necessary for Plato, else he would not have called the primitive community in 369 ff. which clearly antecedes the existence of a state (no provision for governmental functions) a "polis"." (Gregory Vlastos, "Justice and Happiness in the Republic": Plato A Collection of Critical Essays, ed., Gregory Vlastos (New York, 1971) Vol 1 p 73: n 22).

I think we may answer Vlastos' query by drawing attention to the evolutionary aspect of Plato's moral and political theory. What we have said above about primitive communities (in Plato's conception of them) indicates that material cooperation is the necessary condition of a polis, while the political techne, as described by Plato in the Republic and the Laws, is sufficient to the realization of all the true ends of a polis.

We shall see in Ch III that men's initial consent to the rule of philosophers is sufficient to the origin of the ideal polis described in the Republic, while the prior existence of a political techne adequate to the community's maintenance is necessary for its origin.

of the primitive community is required in order to instance these incursions. So, we must elaborate our picture of the healthy city. Socrates therefore turns the healthy city, the city of pigs, into a luxurious city (372E 9). He does so in order to picture injustice. He sees this in the acquisition of wealth which becomes the object of the community's life. The economic division of labour which characterized the simple community has run amok. In sum, we are now to discover imbalance. Sophrosune, the mark of a just life, is absent. Justice, at the obvious level of stark economic need, has been superseded by the pursuit of wealth. Wealth has become the community's end. During the course of history the true ends of the polis, which only primitive times exemplify in small part, have never been effectively achieved by men. What Socrates now wishes to do is to elaborate the question of justice, departing from the first instance of it which we have seen.

Thus, at 374A, the division of labour is recalled (*ἡμολογηθῆμεν δὲ . . . τέχνας.*). Having depicted justice at its most apparent level and having suggested the origin of injustice, we must now elaborate the picture of the healthy city as if injustice had not interrupted its course, or as if justice had been restored to the luxurious city. We must show that the pursuit of economic ends was not sufficient to the growth of the natural polis. Thus, we must develop our concept of the division of labour. We learn that if the concept of doing one's own work applies to anything, it must surely apply to the work of our guardians (*τῶν φυλίκων*). This first mention of the guardians and the following discussion of the first education prepare us for the main purposes of the Republic: the definition of justice in the natural polis. The description of the healthy city has helped us to ascertain a rudimentary form of justice. We now wish to

establish a continuity between this form of justice and the form of justice that would be necessary to the life of the natural polis. The earlier books of the Republic were devoted to a discussion of the moral and political theories that must result from men's failure to achieve a life not governed by economic need. The earlier books therefore describe the political philosophies of simple and luxurious communities.

The notion of the primitive, minimal, community, therefore serves Plato's wish to establish continuity between man's economic life and his other, more ultimate, ends. By reducing the polis to a statement of its most elementary needs, he wishes to build on this groundwork; he wishes to show that man's continuity with nature can and ought to be expressed in the polis. The notion that man's political life is categorically distinguishable from his moral life, the notion that the ideal form of life is a noble age in the past, - these do not belong to Plato's pictures of primitive life. What we rather see in these pictures is a rudimentary form of justice and men's failure to choose a life of justice, their failure to make justice the basis of their conscious acts. The practical expression of their surmounting this failure takes us back to Plato's discussion of sophrosune in Republic IV.

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Enough has been said, for purposes of this chapter, of Plato's conception of the ends of an ideal (or natural) polis. We shall discuss this subject more fully, within the context of consent, in subsequent chapters. A subject that will be of great importance to us is the phusis-nomos contrariety. It will be appropriate to raise this problem in the present chapter. I shall discuss the problem here in the context of Laws III and statements made by

Aristotle in the Politics. Basic to the problem is a subject we have already mentioned in reference to Christian thought: the notion of the origin of political society in contract or covenant. We have briefly mentioned this same conception in reference to the Sophists (nn, 2 supra). We may complete this chapter by expanding on this subject.

In Politics III (1279b ff.) Aristotle proposes that the end of political association is, properly speaking, a good quality of life ( $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu \epsilon\hat{\upsilon} \zeta\eta\eta$  : 1280a30 ff.). Should a given community have wealth or mutual protection as its end then the community in question is not different from an alliance, the only real difference being the proximity of their respective members ( $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\iota \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \eta \kappa\omicron\iota\upsilon\nu\omega\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha \sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\alpha\chi\acute{\iota}\alpha, \tau\hat{\omega}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu \epsilon\acute{\omicron}\pi\omega \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\zeta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\upsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha \mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\upsilon \tau\hat{\omega}\nu \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\theta\epsilon\nu \sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\omega\nu$  : 1280b9 ff.). Furthermore, when we regard a community itself as nothing more than an alliance we regard it in the same way as did Lycophron the Sophist in his explanation of the basis of political life: the guarantee of men's just claims against one another, law being regarded as a covenant ( $\sigma\upsilon\nu\theta\acute{\eta}\kappa\eta$  : 1280b11 ff.). Now Aristotle implies that Lycophron did not hold nomos to be that which makes citizens virtuous or just. If that is so then Aristotle cannot have supposed that Lycophron's notion about men's just claims against one another ( $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\eta}\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma \tau\hat{\omega}\nu \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ ; Ibid.) carried significant moral weight. The phrase must refer, rather to material relations only. In any case, it does not satisfy Aristotle, who would seem to be citing it as a view contrary to his own and who takes men's attention to civic good and evil to be the means to good government ( $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota} \delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\varsigma \delta\iota\kappa\omicron\sigma\kappa\omicron\pi\alpha\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\nu \acute{\omicron}\sigma\alpha\iota \varphi\rho\omicron\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\zeta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\sigma\omicron\chi\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$  . 1280b6). The point is this: in Aristotle's opinion  $\sigma\upsilon\nu\theta\acute{\eta}\kappa\eta$  , or a covenant for material cooperation, is not the real grounds of political association (Cf. Gough, Ibid.). Plato has implied as much

in the passages we have dealt with above. He makes the point explicitly when, for example, he comes to examine the failure of the Dorian League in the Laws.

The basis of the league was mutual assistance (Cf Aristotle, 1280a ff.). Here, the Athenian speaks similarly of the purpose of the league and the basis of government in each member polis. The end, either of the league or of the communities taken individually, consisted of pledges of mutual aid. (*βασιλευὶα τρεῖς βασιλευομέναις πόλεις τριστῶς ὄρουσαν ἀλλήλοισ ἐκάστας, καὶ νόμους* : 684A 2). But for what ends? The description about covenants and pledges at the beginning of the Athenian's discussion (Ibid.) would appear to be a statement about honourable intentions between kings and peoples (*ὄρουσαν . . . βοηθήσειν δὲ βασιλῆς τε βασιλευσιν ἀδικουμένοις καὶ δήμοις καὶ δήμοι δήμοις καὶ βασιλευσιν ἀδικουμένοις* : 684AB). But the end of both the alliance and the communities was efficiency in warfare (685E) and the object of attainment most highly praised was political power (687AB). The Athenian goes on to say that political associations which have only the latter as their end are not sufficient to engendering the whole of virtue (688B). The bilateral agreements (*ὄρουσαν ἀλλήλοισ*) of which he speaks have, then, the same implications in respect of the ends of political life as has the notion of *συνθήκη* as described by Aristotle: these are covenants for material security alone.

In rejecting the notion that political association has protection for military purposes as a chief end, the Athenian also rejects the view that the acquisition of wealth is a chief end of political life. (687B). The purpose of the present discussion, is, in fact, to ascertain the true basis of political association, the true desires of men which the polis ought to

embody (687B - 85A). Plato has asserted that justice can be seen at the obvious level of material need. But we have seen that he supposes that societies fail to achieve their true aim if they hold material security to be man's greatest concern. Here, in the Laws passages we are now discussing, he raises, in conjunction with the league's failure, the question of men's social and political attitudes in societies whose ends are wholly material. In beholding a large and powerful object - the armed might, say, of a community - would not knowledge of its use make a man happy and successful (686E)? Would not such knowledge win praise, great wealth, and distinction (87E)? In rejecting the view that material security or prosperity are sufficient to the ends of political life, Plato, similarly as Aristotle, is rejecting a concept put by many of the Sophists, a concept which provided an answer in terms of men's material desires to the questions: what are the ends of political life? what is the basis of political obligation? The full implications of the Sophistic answers will become clear in the next chapters. Here, I wish only to provide an outline of the place of the Sophistic answer in Greek political thought and indicate the challenge Plato puts to it.

At Laws 690B, in the Athenian's discussion of what Saunders has called the Seven Titles to Authority<sup>6</sup>, the Athenian states that it is according to nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*) that the strong should rule the weak. He means by this that unskilled or ignorant men (*τῶν ἀνεπιστήμων*) should submit to the rule and the lead of prudent and wise men (*τῶν δὲ φρονούντων*). He states

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<sup>6</sup> Trevor J. Saunders, trans. Plato The Laws, (Penguin, 1970), p 137

that this natural condition amounts to the rule of law without force over willing subjects (. . . κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ἐν τοῦ νόμου ἐκούσων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' οὐ βίαιου πεφυκῶσαν).<sup>7</sup> This statement, insisting that the strong and prudent should rule, qualifies an earlier statement (684C): that most men believe that law-givers should enact laws which people accept willingly. By the strong and prudent the Athenian obviously means, in the context of the passages we are now considering, men who are not ignorant in respect of the greatest human interests (688C 8); that is, men who do not regard material security as sufficient to the origin and the ends of political life. This conception envisages accord between reason and appetite in the individual, between the rule of law and the obedience of subjects in the polis.<sup>8</sup> This doctrine opposes current formulations of the phusis-nomos contrariety.

A common formulation of the contrariety presupposed a discontinuity between phusis, an ultimate moral law, and nomos, the conventional or artificial morality of the polis. It regarded the polis as permanently riven between two conflicting moral laws. Nomos, if thus regarded, - as conventional morality - was interpreted as standing for the moral convictions of ordinary men. Phusis, on the other hand, was regarded as a moral ideal opposed to received, customary, notions. The theory held that nomos concealed moral truth, that it concealed a brute fact of nature: that those disaffected by the morality of ordinary men ought to be given

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<sup>7</sup> The connotation of κατὰ φύσιν . . . πεφυκῶσαν is that rule by some of the others is: (1), natural; (2), that rule, and subjection to rule, do not essentially imply men's unwilling subjection to 'the strong'. Subjection to the rule of others rather implies the subjects' belief that they stand to realize their interests under the rule of the strong and prudent. Here, the Athenian curtly rejects both the aristocratic, heroic theory and the theory that political life is artificial, having no moral sanction "according to nature". (See pp 18 ff.)

<sup>8</sup> Cf 698AB, and n 1 in Loeb ed. pp 208, 209.

political power and rule in their own right. Heroic men, rather than be subject to conventional moral practice, should in fact rule by right of nature (Cf Ch 11 n 12). The polis should be adapted to their needs. These needs, though approved by nature, are no different from the needs of lesser men. They are in fact material needs. Men differ, however, in their intelligence and ability. The majority of men, who are only strong as a collectivity, should give way to men who are their own masters. If the polis were adapted to the needs of the latter it would then exist according to nature. Conventional morality would be seen as an unnatural contrivance issuing from the covenants of weak men who conceal, by their praise of equality, their real intentions in so doing - their inability to be independent masters of their own wants. We may regard this conception as the paradigm of an aristocratic theory which opposed the law of nature to the laws of conventional morality, which opposed phusis to nomos. But nomos was often conceived without reference to an ideal of true, natural morality. We may call the latter the prudential conception. It regarded nomos as the product of all possible moral tenets and all possible value tenets which overtly approve moral action, the right regard of others. Consequently, it made no distinction, based on nature as a moral and valuative referent, between one class of men - heroes, say, - and another, - ordinary men. The archetype of the theory is not the hero of aristocratic belief but the adroit man, whoever he may be, who feels 'bound' to regard others well only so long as it pays him, materially, to do so. The adroit, or prudent man of the theory does not suppose he is bound in conscience or in natural duty to exercise right regard if it is disadvantageous to do so. For him, justice - right regard of others - is an intermediary benefit only: since men praise conventional respect for one another (as in the

Aristocratic theory) from the want of skill to be self-sufficient, it is the prudent man's object to seem to be just while at the same time converting justice (other-regard) to his favour at the expense of any who would impede him. Since political life is held to have no natural foundation which would bind men to be just (in the absence of legal constraints), since no moral onus behoves men to found political society, then the polis, as a community organized under public constraints, is described as having a discrete origin in time, being thought to arise from material necessity alone (Cf n 4 supra).<sup>9</sup> The corollary drawn by the theory's proponents is that moral and political obligation 'bind' men only conditionally. That men are thus 'bound' to obey is explained by positing a hypothetical covenant in the past. But the theory's real purport is that men are only required to regard one another well so long as it is materially necessary to do so: that is to say, the duty to respect others well is not a natural obligation. It obtains only so long as there is sufficient power to compel men's right regard of one another, or only so long as there are sufficient material grounds to make it imprudent to disregard others. The Aristocratic and Platonic theories both differ from this conception in seeing the present condition of the polis as perversion of nature, both theories holding phusis to be a moral referent.

In this chapter we have raised the general question, on what grounds did Plato explain political obligation? We have said that his answer rests

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<sup>9</sup> It may be emphasized that the traditional Christian doctrine, which Hooker certainly exemplified (if he also anticipated Locke) attributed the origin of political life to man's response to a prior moral requirement, as well as to material (or social) need. The prudential conception which we have described above assumes that morality per se is a product of political and social life.

on a teleological conception of man's interests. We have emphasized that this conception, as developed by Plato, does not assume a distinction characteristic of the later contractual theory, between natural and positive law, a distinction which, in its inception, posited a radical cleavage between man's moral and political lives. We have shown that he does not assume that political life has a discrete origin in time, a conception (with the difference noted) which is common to the later contractual theory and to the theory of contract current in his own time. Plato's major concern is the evolution of the polis conceived as integral to the life of man. Here, he takes exception to the Sophistic view that man's only ends are material, that political life may be attributed to material necessity and has only material needs as its ends. The question which his own theory poses to the Sophistic view is this: if we do not assume that some moral or natural sanction underlies the founding of and the continued life of a given community, then on what basis can we explain political obligation? The materialist answer, as it comes to us from his dialogues, was, that coercion external to the individual together with the individual's material needs are sufficient justifications for obedience to law. By this, the theory implied that right regard of others is contingent. It is not unconditional. Right regard of others is required of a man only if it would be materially imprudent to act with disregard. The theory therefore held that political life, understood as an effect of men's willingness to obey laws of supposed advantage to all, is (ultimately) not integral to the life of the truly successful man.<sup>10</sup> This is so because the latter, adroitly acting to secure his advantage, finally becomes

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<sup>10</sup> While it is true that philosophers are said in the Republic to have a life better than the political life (520C ff.), it is not true that they can achieve this life without belonging to the ideal community or without maintaining, by their rule, a society in which the interests of the other two classes are realized. (Ch IV).

the source of law. Justice becomes his good and an intermediary advantage or a disadvantage to others. (Cf Republic 365A ff.). In challenging this conception Plato places all of his emphasis on the question of man's needs, developing his own view from that of Socrates who, as the Apology and the Crito confirm, believed that it must pay a man to obey what law truly enjoins: to regard others well even if one's material interests go forfeit. This conception would satisfy Plato's own beliefs about the truly just men. However, since it did not take account of a form of political life that would perfect all of man's needs, it only served as a point of departure for Plato's final theory of consent to law. In the next chapter we shall devote our attention to Socrates' theory of the good or worthy man - the truly just man - and the truly just man's consent to law.

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We may complete this chapter by commenting briefly on the social contract theory and Platonic political thought. I have said that Plato's theory is evolutionary and not contractual. (p 5 supra) We have emphasized that the contractual theory of post antiquity posited natural law as the moral basis of political community. The existence of political community therefore implied, as its necessary condition, men's sense of moral onus. The foundation of political community was seen to be a response to divine will and a response to men's social needs. We have said that the notion of contract, as it developed in antiquity, was explained on the basis of a supposed dichotomy between men's overt approval of justice and their inner intentions, between what they were 'bound' by nomos to do - regard one another well - and their real belief, that justice was only an intermediary advantage to the agent, its practice being contingent on material

considerations. We shall discuss this conception more fully in the next chapter in connection with Socrates' conception of a man's interests and a man's duty to obey law. But the problem itself would result in a tendency in some political thinkers to idealize the notion of contract along Platonic lines. It will be useful to make a few remarks about this matter here.

In criticizing the notion of contract as explained by the phusis-nomos contrariety, Barker said:

"Laws are valid because they enshrine the will of the members of a community to do what they feel they ought to do. They are strong, not in proportion to the force ready to execute them, but in proportion to the amount of readiness to obey them." (my italics).<sup>11</sup>

In criticism of Barker, Popper saw this statement as an objection to the contract theory. He asked:

"What can be meant by it? The theory attacked stresses the 'will', or better, the decision of the individual, more than any other theory; in fact, the word 'contract' suggests an agreement by 'free will'; it suggests, perhaps more than any other theory, that the strength of the laws lies in the individual's readiness to accept them. How can [this,] [Barker's statement] be an objection against the contract theory? The only explanation seems to be that Barker does not think the contract to spring from the 'moral will' of the individual, but rather from a selfish will; and this interpretation is the more likely as it is in keeping with Plato's criticism." (my italics).<sup>12</sup>

Barker was attacking the notion of contract as we find it in Glaucon's statement (Republic 359A ff.), where the covenant made by men entails the constraint which men impose upon themselves for material reasons alone. Popper wondered why the notion of contract must be regarded solely in these terms. He saw 'contract' in terms of "protectionism" (Ibid.),

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<sup>11</sup> Earnest Barker, MA., Greek Political Theory, Plato and His Predecessors, (London, 1918) p 161.

<sup>12</sup> K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, The Spell of Plato, (London, 1966) Vol 1, p. 115.

involving the protection of the rights of the weak against the strong.

It is true that Barker only spoke of the social contract in conjunction with the view that Glaucon expresses. It may perhaps seem that what he said was intended as a general attack on the social contract theory. The point he was drawing attention to was the conception of justice as external regimen only, together with the inference, drawn by the prudentialists, that justice has no place in the individual's internal life (Cf. Popper, Op.Cit. n 46 p 261). Barker was referring to Plato's ideal conception of justice: that the practice of justice truly pays a man. In this, he was opposing the prudential conception. (That is, he was opposing prudentialism qua materialism.) Elsewhere, Barker has made the following, more systematic statement about the contractual notion:

"There must always be something in the nature of an organized community - in other words, a potential body of subjects, already cohering in virtue of a common social will, as well as a potential ruler ready to assume the burden of government in agreement with that will - before there can be any contract between rulers and subjects." <sup>13</sup>(my italics.)

Barker is saying that a social contract or contract of society is a wider notion than that of governmental or political contracts, the latter purporting to specific agreements between rulers and subjects. The contract of society is the necessary condition of this. Political authority, to be legitimate, must be assumed to have been invested. Its investment implies a moral sanction. Barker goes on to say:

"We must therefore hold, if we are thinking in terms of contract, that besides the contract of government, there is also a contract of society, a social contract proper . . . We shall therefore say that the contract of government creates potestas, but only potestas; we shall say that the contract of society creates societas itself; and, we shall recognize that societas is greater than potestas, or at any rate prior to potestas."<sup>14</sup> (his italics).

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<sup>13</sup> Sir Earnest Barker, Social Contract Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau, (London, 1971) p xii

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

Now, what Barker has said both here and above is, on the face of it, at least compatible with the statement in Greek Political Theory that Popper queried. We must take Barker's criticism there to be directed against those who have used the contract notion as though no moral sanction preceded the founding of a political community. In his later remarks, he defined a social contract properly conceived. He stated that a duty to obey laws (what the presence of potestas would signify) could be conceived as valid only if we assumed a sense of moral will, or, that is, a social contract to begin with.<sup>15</sup> Popper's resentment at Barker's earlier statement really bears on a supposed, outright rejection of the social contract theory conceived as a necessary assumption toward explaining the legitimacy of some form of rule, in favour of an idealism that unfairly assumes the moral incapacity of ordinary men. Popper holds that the idea of social contract is inimical to any political conception (like those of Callicles, or, in his opinion, Plato) which in fact favours the well-being of some as against

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<sup>15</sup> So far as this goes, Plato's conception of primitive communities (See above) could be said to involve the idea of 'social contract', if, by this expression we imply "a potential body of subjects, already cohering in virtue of a common social will, . . ." (above). A social contract, so defined, would underlie Plato's theory of society even if men have never caught sight of the ideal constitution. But we have seen that Plato's conception does not make use of the social contract theory in order to posit a categorical distinction between 'society' and 'political' society. In Hooker, for example, the social contract may be described as involving both what natural law requires as a result of the Fall and a man's sense of the need of fellowship with others. This conception posits a clear distinction between 'society' and 'political' society.

Here we may note with Guthrie that it is misleading to speak of the social contract theory. The notion of social contract, at least as Barker discussed it, is amenable both to Plato and, say, to Hooker. What is really at issue between Popper and Barker is the latter's sympathy with Platonic idealism (or historicism) and the former's suspicion of it, and not whether the one accepts and the other rejects the social contract theory. (See W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists, (Cambridge, 1971) p 142, n 1.

that of others on the erroneous pretext that there are natural subjects and rulers.<sup>16</sup> But let us, for the moment, take the meaning of 'social contract', in a wider sense. Let us suppose, as Barker would seem implicitly to have supposed in Greek Political Theory, that 'social contract' is a wide enough expression to include, say, a sense of moral onus that would have to precede the founding of Plato's ideal state. By doing this, we shall see more clearly what is implicit in the notion of social contract as conceived on an ideal plain. By doing this we shall clarify the sense in which Plato's theory, while it may be said to involve the idea of social contract in its widest possible sense, is evolutionary and not contractual.<sup>17</sup>

Let us briefly consider, then, the idea of social contract, the notion of idealism, and the notion of the regimen imposed on men which political community entails.

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<sup>16</sup> This criterion would also be required by John Rawls, who defines the social contract (the "original position" or the "veil of ignorance") in terms of a hypothetical condition in which no a priori assumptions can be made as to natural differences (differences, say, between natural rulers and subjects) among the parties to an agreement that would found a political society. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (London, 1972), pp11 ff.

<sup>17</sup> We shall remember that the prudentialists did not hold that moral onus is prior to political community. (Cf p 18 f. supra). On their view, then, moral onus could not precede the founding of a given community. For this reason, the notion of social contract, as defined by Barker, may be said to be assumed in Plato's political theory. The prudentialists could not assume a social contract, however, for they regarded nomos as the product of all possible moral and valuative tenets which overtly approve moral action, the right regard of others (Ibid.). But that implied that no man was bound by nature or by conscience to regard others well. Where, then, would be Popper's necessary 'moral will' or, for that matter, Barker's societas? Plato may assume that there are natural rulers and subjects, but he does not assume with the prudentialists that political community owes everything to nomos and nothing to phusis - nothing, that is, to a natural will.

We may consider, to begin with, the Augustinian element in Hooker. If political life did not exist originally, but its necessity arose from some discrete event, then political authority must be seen to be invested.<sup>18</sup> It was within this frame of reference, rather than one which sees political life as a timeless feature of human life, that the traditional (Christian) theory moved. If, moreover, man's ultimate end is the regeneration of his nature and if political life is only a moment in this regenerative need, then political community could not itself be thought sufficient to the final attainment of man's ends. Hooker inferred from this hypothesis that political regimen primarily orders men's external lives.<sup>19</sup>

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18 "Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so. [For only God has original and final authority over men. See next note.] But approbation they not only give who personally declare their assent . . . , but also when others do it in their names by right originally at least derived from them." Op. Cit. p 194.

19 The final ends of man are described by Hooker in terms of the rewards and punishments due the inner man and rendered by God. "Now rewards and punishments do always presuppose something willingly done well or ill; without which respect though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is a benefit and not a reward, the other simply a hurt but not a punishment." p 188. His object (Ibid. and foll.) is to determine how men came to have the power of reward and punishment over one another in external actions (p 187). So far as a man's inward life is concerned, we can only look to reward and punishment from God (Ibid.). Consequently, the laws of a Commonweal (p 188) are, he says, "ordained for external order and regiment amongst man." (Ibid.). Such laws (positive laws) are only "perfect" if they presume the inner obstinacy of man. But they are designed "so as to frame his outward actions, that they be of no hinderance unto the common good for which societies are instituted." (Ibid.). Hooker, then, presumes both the corruption of nature and he also sees political society as the means (though not the end) towards man's well-being, or, we might say, his inward well-being. Hooker is implying in all of this that a man's outward acts are sufficient evidence that the man consents to law. This is to be inferred from his view of man's final ends, though he also holds that it is a function of positive laws to enable a man to see his natural duties more clearly than he would do in a state of nature. (p 192).

It is quite clear from Barker's writings that he wished to prescind the notion of historical origin from the social contract theory. He has implied, rather, that the distinction between 'moral will' and 'political authority' (societas and potestas) is, really, a logical one.<sup>20</sup> It is not one which literally posits a natural epoch from which men are assumed suddenly to have emerged.<sup>21</sup> The distinction, when seen in this light, is one which avoids positing a discrete historical event as though that were the origin of political life.<sup>22</sup> It emphasizes, rather, the assumption we must make if, in supposing political authority to be 'legitimate', (and in assuming, therefore, that men have undertaken to obey laws), we do not mean that it originates without a prior moral sanction and is maintained by compulsion alone.<sup>23</sup> The social contract theory maintains, then, (despite different points of view among its proponents), that political life implies moral will, that legitimate authority implies a moral sanction. We cannot, then, speak of the origin of political life (on the social contract hypothesis) without assuming men's sense of moral obligation to begin with. It was for these reasons that we saw that Plato could be regarded as one whose political theory involves the idea of social contract. Barker, implicitly at any rate, so regarded him. We have used Richard Hooker's work as the paradigm for our explanation of the traditional Christian notion. We have seen that in Hooker an historical fact is clearly

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<sup>20</sup> It is Barker's rejection of the historical hypothesis which explains his apparent dismissal of contractual thinking in Greek Political Theory. Here, I take exception to Guthrie's view that in that work Barker was in fact dismissing the theory of social contract even if he uses the expression in reference to the theory that Glaucon puts at Republic 359A ff. (See Guthrie, Op.Cit.)

<sup>21</sup> See Barker's criticism of Rousseau, Social Contract, p xxxii f.

<sup>22</sup> See R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozeley, Plato's Republic, a Philosophical Commentary, (London, 1964) pp 71 ff.

<sup>23</sup>

See H.A. Prichard, "Green; Political Obligation", in Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest, (London, 1968), pp 54 ff. esp. pp 76 ff.

present. But this was required by the assumption that the need for political life arose as much from a discrete (moral) event in the life of man - the Fall - as from social necessity. It is inherent to this conception that political life is not a timeless feature of human life. But having assumed this much and having therefore worked from an historical hypothesis, Hooker was then chiefly concerned to explain the legitimacy of political authority in any given state on the basis that natural law (a moral law) was the prior requirement of men's authority over one another. We have seen that in Hooker's case, since men's final ends are not political, the notion of an ideal political society is not germane to his conception of consent. We have seen that for this same reason Hooker believed that positive laws - the laws of political community - primarily order men's external lives. We have also emphasized that in his case a man's outward acts are sufficient evidence of a man's consent to law, or of his consent to political authority.

Plato's and Hooker's conceptions are both teleological. Both believe, that is to say, that political life is required of man's moral nature. This belief, so far as it pertains to political consent, implies in both cases that consent is confirmatory. This means, in Plato's case, that consent to the laws of the natural polis would confirm a prior obligation: men's duty to submit to a certain form of rule, the ideal state. Since this form of rule would complete or perfect human nature Plato's conception of consent is ideal and evolutionary (Cf. p 5, p 11 n 5 supra). In Hooker's case, political society is necessary as a means to the attainment of ends conceived not to be political; though political society is natural (as being required by natural law), it is also the case that it does not complete human ends. Since, also, men are required from the Fall to submit

themselves to political regimen, consent therefore (as in Plato's case) implies a confirmation: by establishing political authority and thereafter consenting to it, men confirm their knowledge of what divine will requires. But so far as political society does not complete human ends, to that extent Hooker's position is not ideal. Though his position is not ideal, we have observed that it is historical. But so far as political society arises in time in response to some prior event, to that extent Hooker's conception is not evolutionary. For Hooker, time is not a grid on which we can trace man's attempts to bring a final political order into being. For him, time is less than the whole of man's life. Man's institutions, confined by time, are not sufficient to the sum of his ends. For these reasons Hooker had to emphasize, as Plato need not have, that men would be bound by moral law even if there were no political community.<sup>24</sup> The condition of man, after the Fall, must be a moral one. It must be a condition that supplies the grounds, or, that is, the basis of origin, of a duty to obey the laws of any given state. In positing a distinction between natural and positive law, in supposing that man's ends cannot be completed or perfected by political life, Hooker's conception is contractual and not evolutionary. What he shares in common with Plato is his confirmatory notion of political consent. Consent implies men's confirmation of a moral onus.

We have said in reference to the Sophists (the prudentialists) that nomos - moral or political custom - was thought to be the product of men's

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"The laws which have been hitherto mentioned (the laws of man's nature) do bind men absolutely even as they are men, although they have no settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do." (Ec Pol., pp 187-88).

overt approval of moral action (p 18, p 25 n 17 supra). This distinction between men's outward approval of laws and their inner beliefs is of importance to the Socratic theory of consent. In Socrates' case the problem of consistency between outward act and inward belief would lead to a conception of true and nominal consent to law. We shall deal fully with Socrates' view in the next chapter. For now, we need only observe that the supposed rift between the external and the inward man would have an important bearing on the idealism which characterizes Plato's theory of consent and his belief that the natural polis would complete or perfect the needs of man.

Finally, we may make the following observations about the social contract and idealism in reference to an interpretation of this problem by H.D. Lewis.<sup>25</sup> In Lewis's opinion Plato's most characteristic theories underline those principles that are basic to the conception of a social contract (p 80).

"It is our duty - or if not a duty at least an enlightened and elevated form of self-interest - to supply one another's needs, independently of the artificial sanction imposed by the State. And this is a clear repudiation of the individualism of the sophists. The claims of morality are seen to lie deeper than mutual agreements, and society is entitled to our service independently of our private convenience (The philosopher rulers, for example, assume office as a burden). But while this proves that morality itself is not rooted in a contract, it reflects no discredit on the idea of a contract as the basic feature of one special instrument for the promotion of moral ends, namely, the State." (Ibid. my italics).

In the first place we must observe that Lewis is speaking of what Barker described as societas, or pre-existing moral will. But it becomes clear that he is also referring to something like a contract of government, or

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<sup>25</sup> H. D. Lewis, "Plato and The Social Contract", Mind, 1939, 78-81

a political contract, between rulers and ruled in the ideal state.<sup>26</sup>

Consequently (he suggests) the idea of partnership emerges as soon as

Socrates enters upon the constructive part of the Republic: "Men 'gather into one settlement many partners and helpers'. 'They exchange services and goods.'" (his italics).<sup>27</sup> The idea of exchange already implies an

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<sup>26</sup> We must be chary of using the expressions "contract of government" or 'political contract' in reference to the subjection of the subject classes to the rulers in the Republic. These expressions derive from medieval thought (Gough, Op.Cit. Ch 11) and refer to mutual affirmations of existing rights and duties by peoples and princes. They refer, then, to the general conception underlying medieval political thought (which we have seen reflected in Hooker) that since political authority does not exist ab initio it must be seen to be invested. It is clear, however, that Plato's theory, which does not rest on a distinction between natural and positive law, assumes that some form of political authority always exists. Moreover, it is also clear that the subject class of the Republic does not 'contract' with the rulers on the basis of interests already conceived to be in being, or, that is, on the basis of interests that have not been perfected by a science or techne of rule.

While emphasizing this, we must note that Plato's ideal state divides, naturally, into rulers and subjects, a presupposition which he shares in common with medieval thought which assumed government to be sui generis and which devised the notion of the political contract on the basis of this assumption (Cf Barker, Social Contract, p xiv). We may further note that the pledges between rulers and ruled described in the Laws are themselves much more akin to what we can call a 'political contract' without distorting the pragmatic savour of this phrase. (Cf. re the Laws, Lewis, Op.Cit. p 79 and Gough (Op.Cit. Ch 1.) Rankin sees the pledges of Laws 684A rather as a contract "providing for the orderly occupation of new lands", than as a governmental contract. (H.D. Rankin, Plato and the Individual, (London, 1974), p 105.

Finally we should observe that Crossman spoke of the relation between rulers and ruled in the Republic almost as if he saw a political contract underlying it: "In the eyes of the young Plato, there must always be a ruling aristocracy and a subject people. The latter were the producers and distributors of material wealth, . . . . The former had the paternal care of the state at heart. Living on the labour of the subject masses, they gave them in return security, justice, and defence." (R.H.S. Crossman, Plato Today, (London, 1963), p 65. Cf. p 85). This description may well be apt so long as we remember that the interests of subjects and rulers are not conceived by Plato as existing 'naturally', but rather, as being perfected by a techne of rule. This conception, basic to Plato's theory, is not germane to the medieval conception. Unless we are aware of this then the application of the 'political contract' to Plato's theory in the Republic is very misleading.

<sup>27</sup> The quotes are from Lindsay's translation.

explicit or implicit contract.<sup>28</sup> These points struck Lewis as underlining the fact that Plato's ideal community would be a partnership. "The city must be one in the sense that all its members acquiesce in its government. As elsewhere in Plato's thought, the principle of unity is of paramount importance." (his italics). Plato's deepest concern is the "vital and living unity" which underlines human relationships. We find embodied in this unity "the cardinal principle of justice . . . . Similarly, temperance which is almost equated with justice, is thus defined." (his italics). Plato answers the Sophists, on the question of individualism, in terms of the perfection of the individual soul, a perfection which "is reflected in the acquiescence in a social order whereby (the individual's perfection) is best attained. Justice is 'writ large' in the city. Hence the emphasis on free and informed co-operation between ruler and subject." (p 81). Finally, while we allow that the authority of the rulers is absolute, we must not forget that this authority "is represented as derived from the subjects. The dependence of the former on the latter has always to be emphasized." (Ibid.)

Lewis' conception of the social contract, as it applies to Platonic thought, is obviously idealistic. He described the social contract in terms of Plato's evolutionary theory: in terms, that is, of the completion or perfection of human needs and interests. Together with this, he saw the most important principles of the social contract theory embodied in Plato's chief concern was "political freedom" (Ibid.), his concept of a city composed of "allies and helpers", not rulers and slaves. The points arising

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<sup>28</sup> For the moral nuance of this idea see Aristotle's Rhetoric in Gough Op.Cit.

from Lewis' thoughts on Plato that are of main interest to us are the conceptions of freedom which he sees embodied in Plato's use of social contract theory, and also, his observation that political authority is derived from the subjects of the ideal community.<sup>29</sup>

First, we may concentrate for a moment on the section from Lewis quoted above. Lewis, in conformity with social contract thinking, has implied that a sense of moral will must be presumed as logically prior to political obligation. He has said that duty (or some form of elevated interest) exists independently of the artificial sanctions of the state. But can we properly regard the sanctions of Plato's ideal state as 'artificial' as though implying a wider sphere of life? Here, we may recall the point made above (n 10). If we grant that the philosopher rulers have a life better than the political life we must also remember that they cannot achieve this life unless they rule and the other classes consent to their rule. We may say, on these grounds, that the ideal community is only contributory to the philosophers' ends. But membership of some one community - the ideal community - is necessary to the achievement of these ends, while membership also completes the ends of the other two classes. We see for this reason, and for the reasons which follow, that the doctrine of the state's artificiality is not compatible with Plato's theory, a theory which is evolutionary and not contractual.

We have said before now that in Plato's view political life is an integral feature of human nature, that he does not conceive political life as being a discrete feature of human history. So far as the latter

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<sup>29</sup> We shall consider this latter point in more detail in Ch III. Here, I wish only to deal with this notion of derivation with specific reference to social contract thinking.

conception is concerned, the state might be regarded as artificial in that the need for political life is thought to exist, in part, as a consequence of some prior act of man (the original disobedience); but it might also be regarded as natural so far as natural law impels men toward political life in response to their common social needs.<sup>30</sup> We have said that in both Plato and Hooker the ultimate ground of their political theories is teleological, that their doctrines of consent are confirmatory (pp 21,22 supra). That means that for neither thinker can political obligation, which implies an undertaking legitimizing political authority, be attributed wholly to human sanction, where, we mean by the latter, that a duty to obey the laws of a given form of rule originates in a human commitment and does not therefore confirm a prior moral requirement.<sup>31</sup> Both assume a moral onus to begin with and a sense of interest that move men, in Plato's case, toward the realization of some one, ideal, form of rule, and, in Hooker's case, toward the founding of political societies which, owing to their limited effect on human life (the outward regimen that they impose), cannot complete or perfect human ends. For this reason, the notion that the state's sanction is artificial applies aptly to Hooker's thinking, for his hypothesis implies that political life is of convenience to men though it cannot perfect their ends.<sup>32</sup> Locke, indeed, would advance this theory,

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<sup>30</sup> Hooker obviously held this to be the case. See further, Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. F.W. Maitland (Cambridge, 1968), p 89.

<sup>31</sup> The notion that political obligation originates in a human commitment typifies Locke's thinking. See infra pp. 37 ff.

<sup>32</sup> Hooker tells us, on the one hand, that "public regiment . . . seemeth evidently to have risen from deliberate advice, consultation, and composition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful." (Cf. Gierke, Op.Cit.). He goes on to say that there is "no impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that men might have lived without public regiment." (continued on page 35.)

attributing political obligation to human commitment alone and relinquishing the theological supposition that men are required by God's will to subject themselves to political order, and thereby confirm God's will by so doing. In Locke, political obligation implies a human undertaking as its necessary and sufficient conditions, while the law of nature requires men to honour whatever pacts they make. So long as we allow that political life does not fulfil human ends we may properly suppose that the state's sanction is artificial, as furthering though not completing human ends. Given that we mean by this that the state's sanctions imply a moral will to begin with, as the necessary condition of those sanctions, then we must also prescind from the doctrine of the state's artificiality the Sophistic hypothesis that men are only 'bound' to obey laws from material necessity, that men are not bound to regard one another well 'by nature'. However, it is misleading to apply the conception of artificial sanction, as Lewis did, to Plato. He tells us both that the social contract theory lies imbedded in the essential meaning of Plato's political theory and that the theory "emphasizes the ultimate artificiality of the State." (p 79). But Plato's conception is perfectionist. He holds that the moral onus which men would confirm by submitting to the order of an ideal form of political life is, properly, compatible with the pursuit of ends which that form of life would complete. Here, political life is not conceived as a convenience which is less than the sum of human ends (Cf. on note 10, p 20 supra). It perfects human ends. This fact underlies Plato's conception of the natural polis. So long as we regard the state as only contributory to

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32 (continued from page 34)

But he then says that we must presuppose the Fall and the Law of Nature's requirement of public regiment. (p 191). To the notion of convenience, then, he adds the notion of a moral onus upon men resulting from the Fall, to subject themselves to public regiment.

any human ends, then we may regard political life as itself being 'artificial'. But if we see this conception as being the essence of Plato's political theory then we must regard his idealism as an added thought and not as the substance of his thinking. Lewis, rather like Barker (implicitly) in Greek Political Thought, devoted his effort to showing that the social contract theory is not an 'immoralist' doctrine, or, simply, an 'a-moralist' doctrine. But he loaded the theory with Platonic nuances which, it must be pointed out, the theory does not usually carry. We may grant with him that Plato's thinking does repudiate the individualism of the Sophists. We may grant that Plato must repudiate this if he accepts that political life implies moral will (or an elevated form of self-interest). With these criticisms in mind we may now consider Lewis' belief that the social contract theory underlies Plato's conceptions of political freedom and the derivation of the rulers' absolute authority. To understand Lewis' meaning we may briefly consider Locke's conception that men's obligation to obey laws implies a human commitment or undertaking.

We have noted that the concept of a political contract springs from the assumption that government is sui generis. This concept is characteristic of Platonic thinking (with the reservations noted above, n 26), while, in its medieval dress, it typifies Hooker as well. The concept of the political contract, thus defined, is unfavourable to the conception that government exists from human acts alone. The concept belongs, rather, to the assumption that consent is confirmatory. Putting aside, for now, the relative distinctions between Plato and Hooker, the political contract implies that a moral onus is the necessary condition of political

society, that government exists, potentially,<sup>33</sup> awaiting men's legitimizing it and thus confirming a prior onus to do so. Men's subjection to political authority is sufficient to the confirmation. Where government is assumed to exist from human sanctions alone, we remove the notion of a social contract from both idealistic and teleological spheres. We no longer assume that moral will implies men's attempts to realize a political order whose life is equal to the realization of their final ends; nor need we assume that political life is a discrete moment in human history, that its existence implies men's testifying to a requirement of natural law or divine will that they subject themselves to political order. We must rather assume that political society implies moral will, that an undertaking to obey common laws is both necessary and sufficient for a duty to obey positive laws, the laws of a political society. We assume, then, that political society implies a commitment. In obeying laws, men confirm an undertaking to which they have committed themselves in response to no prior requirement. Assuming that moral will is itself the necessary condition of political life, we may then say that political society exists from men's considerations of their interests and that moral will, implicit in an undertaking to obey common laws, is implied in the existence of any state. Here, we shall emphasize again, with Hooker, that men's external acts are sufficient evidence of their consent to laws (n 19 supra). We shall assume that men's expectations about their interests, together with their acceptance, implied by their undertaking, that the right to pursue their interests is limited, are the necessary and sufficient grounds for an obligation to obey common laws.

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. Gierke, Op.Cit.

If we consider the social contract in these lights then we have applied Locke's criteria to the concept.<sup>34</sup> Essential to these criteria is our relinquishing the view that government is sui generis. Government, rather, is wholly dependent on human acts. Assuming this to be so, then we may accurately suppose that the state and its sanctions are artificial. Obviously, this will mean against Plato, but against Hooker as well, that men are wholly free - morally free - to establish political authority. That will mean that political life is not vertically 'located' in human history. It will also mean that we cannot determine from history what form of rule

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. Second Treatise, sec 135, where Locke quotes Hooker on the 'natural' foundation of "public societies" and the 'order, expressly or secretly agreed upon' that founds a particular political society. (Cf. n 2 supra). We should also note that Locke agrees with Hooker (Second Treatise, Op.Cit.) that positive law addresses men's outward actions. We must emphasize, however, that Locke nowhere uses Hooker's theological supposition as a means of justifying the founding of political society. Human reason, a sense of interest, together with moral will, are the sole justifications of this. (If anything, Locke denies the theological supposition explicitly. Cf sec. 13 Op.Cit. The theological supposition need not imply the concept of divine right - a theory Locke inveighs against in the Second Treatise - but the theory was used, it would seem, by Filmer, in close connection with the theological supposition.) He stresses, rather, that a political undertaking implies men's absolute freedom to enjoin political order on themselves (secs. 87-95) and that positive laws must be conformable to the law of nature which is a declaration of the will of God (sec 135). Here we must emphasize Locke's repeated claim that political society must be of convenience to men (secs 13,95,136). Together with this we should remark that an undertaking which founds a political society implies men's recognition (the recognition both of citizens and of those they invest with power), through willingness to obey common laws, of limits to the pursuit of their interests. Since men are under no prior requirement to sanction public authority and only do so for their own convenience there must obviously be limits to the power of government, and it becomes clear in sec 136 that the 'conformity' of which Locke spoke in the previous section implies those very limits, limits which are conformable to reason and the law of nature (or the will of God). Locke's intention here, as always, is practical, not ideal.

We may remark, in sum, that Locke has displaced the theological supposition, which assumes in the first place a divine commandment to enter political society, by the assumption that divine will or the law of nature would require men to honour a political undertaking should they give one. (Cf. John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, ed. W. von Leyden, (Oxford, 1970), p 53 f.)

would satisfy men's needs and interests, it being assumed that the pursuit of these is always subject to moral conscience and natural law conceived as wider than political life.<sup>35</sup>

The notion of moral freedom in Locke, is closely related to his conception of individual consent. Locke has been criticized for holding that the law of nature or reason can be vouched to justify majority rule, the conclusion of a minority by a majority in an on-going political community (sec 96). Gough held that the majority principle makes the notion of individual consent ineffectual. (Op.Cit.). Indeed, on Locke's hypothesis, men are free to found a political community. Locke says repeatedly that only a man's consent can put him out of a state of nature. But thereafter he is bound by majority decisions. Since Locke justified

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<sup>35</sup> We have said that Plato held political life to be an integral feature of human nature, that he held political life to be a timeless feature of human life. It follows from this that history, considered, for example, as cyclic rather than discrete, must itself contain at least the possibility of a state which would complete or perfect human ends. Without rehearsing Popper's thesis here, the idealist or "historicist" conception of Plato forms the basis of Popper's criticism. (Cf. Popper, n 6 pp 208 ff.). Plato's theory, of course, distinguishes between natural subjects and natural rulers. If we use history, as Popper supposed Plato did, as our source for verifying this distinction, then we use it with an ethical purpose in mind. We use it as a means of justifying authority. (This is true whether we devote attention to an 'upward' or 'downward' cycle of history.) Such a concept must hold, at bottom, that a duty to submit to a certain form of rule in fact precedes men's consenting to that form of rule. In such a case consent must be confirmatory. It must confirm a prior obligation. Locke's conception, as we are showing in these pages, rests on entirely different grounds. In Locke, authority can only be justified by our first assuming an undertaking from which, and only from which, a political obligation could be said to arise.

We may note here that Lewis supposed the ideal rulers' authority to derive from the subjects. It would have been more appropriate to say that the rulers' authority is actualised by the subjects' consent. The rulers' authority does not originate in an act of consent. In Hooker, the authority of a given government could be said to originate in an act of consent even if it is also true that men are required by divine will, in the first place, to submit to political authority. But in Plato, since political life is coextensive with human life, political (continued on page 40)

the latter on the basis of natural law it would seem that he sacrifices the notion of individual consent (which must be given to inaugurate political authority) for the majority rule principle, as if majorities had a natural right to impose their wishes. To justify the majority principle as itself being based on the law of nature simply disguises the fact that individual consent belongs only to the inauguration of a political community.<sup>36</sup> Gough was concerned to point out that on Locke's own showing (secs 96, 97, 98) the notion of individual consent is not compatible with the majority rule principle, that we do not solve this problem merely by asserting the dubious claim that the latter principle conforms to natural law. There is, however, another reason why Locke spoke of the majority principle as being natural.

The majority principle in Locke surely underlines the fact that while men undertake to found political societies for their greater convenience and security, any man may be expected to know that the pursuit of his interests is limited by moral law or the law of nature both prior to and after a political undertaking. The greater convenience of political society does not imply the fulfilment of all individual ends. It only implies security to human life. The majority principle, therefore, has at least this much affinity with natural law: Locke places all of his emphasis on the convenience of political society to men. To undertake to obey common laws is not to testify to a prior commandment. But it is

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35 (continued from page 39)

authority cannot itself originate, even if men can alter constitutions. In consistency with this conception, Plato's idealism requires men to discover the right, or natural, constitution.

<sup>36</sup> J. W. Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy, Eight Studies, (Oxford, 1968) pp 47 ff. esp. pp 60 ff.

to testify to the fact that there are natural obligations, that a man is bound by natural law to honour any undertaking he may give. To found political society, therefore, is to undertake to obey common laws, and thereafter to testify to one's own commitment by obeying. The majority principle, then, carries moral weight. Gough did not emphasize this fact. In "coming out of" the state of nature in order to enjoy the greater convenience to life under common laws, a man must be expected to accept a condition of life in which he is no longer his own executive. Moreover, majorities and minorities will be inevitable where political society is of convenience to life, where it secures men in the pursuit of their interests, but does not guarantee the fulfilment of their ends. There is, then, an affinity between individual consent, the consent which inaugurates a political community, and a man's consent thereafter. It is a moral affinity. The great difference between the state of nature and the political condition is that under the latter, men have a duty to obey positive laws. But they have a natural duty to honour any pacts they make. Consequently, if they undertake to have positive laws they have a duty to honour this undertaking. Where they accept by this undertaking that political life only secures and does not perfect individual ends then regard for others must be implicit in the undertaking to secure general interests. That is to say, by their undertaking men bind themselves to respect the interests of others through their willingness to obey positive laws.<sup>37</sup> Locke saw, as a

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<sup>37</sup> We could say, ideally, that by their undertaking men give recognition to one of the laws of nature: that all men have rights, that it is prima facie wrong that one man's interests should outweigh another's. But we must also remember that in Locke's case the law of nature does not command men to enter political society. Ultimately, the point we must emphasize is that given an undertaking to obey laws, then, despite the motives of individuals or their inward sentiments, they have an obligation to honour that undertaking.

consequence of this, that men would have to obey majority decisions. He vouched the law of nature or reason to justify the point because, ultimately, it must be in the light of this knowledge that a man's consent would begin. Given that we emphasize the moral weight rather than the historical weight of the doctrine of individual consent, we are then emphasizing a man's testament to his own commitment which his consent to law, subsequent to an undertaking, would satisfy. And by stressing this point we emphasize what must be implicit in individual consent: a man's knowledge that he is bound by his undertaking. 'Individual consent', then, has moral reference. In order for individual consent in an on-going community to have effective meaning it must be the case that a man will be bound in that community by the same knowledge with which his consent began: the knowledge that the pursuit of his interests is limited by moral law. As a man was free to undertake to obey positive laws so he must be responsible thereafter for honouring his commitment.

Locke's political theory emphasizes a moral onus men take upon themselves by undertaking to obey positive laws. His theory stresses the importance of a compromise - a political undertaking - which itself implies moral will and a man's freedom to enjoin political obligation upon himself. In order for the moral freedom which precedes the inauguration of a political community to have real weight we must associate it with the responsibility that is consequent upon a man's undertaking, his responsibility to honour an agreement which results in security to, if not the perfection of, human ends. Where we assume, as Locke does, that government is not sui generis, that its existence depends wholly on human acts, and where we assume as well that an undertaking implies moral will, then we

we might use Barker's statement (quoted above, n 11) as a general description of Locke's position. But we shall remember that Barker's statement was, if anything, favourable to Platonic theory and to idealism. For Locke, the individual's readiness to obey laws must spring from the human sanction which is the "original" of political authority. Plato assumes that political life is an integral feature of human nature; his idealism assumes the possibility of the perfection of human ends. The sanction with which the ideal community would begin does not spring from the initial submission of men to philosophic rule. We must trace it, rather, to the natural onus upon them to submit to a certain form of rule. Consequently, we might say that the actualization of the ideal state derives from those who consent to its rule (Cf n 35). But we cannot say that the potential subjects are free to enjoin political order on themselves, where, we mean by this, that consent to law implies an undertaking from which political obligation originates. By consenting to philosophic rule, those who consent are already subjects. By their consent they confirm a prior obligation. Moreover, Plato assumes that some form of political authority always exists. When Lewis spoke of political freedom (p 81) he cannot have intended the freedom which an undertaking implies in Locke. He must rather have intended an ideal conception of freedom, a conception which must describe freedom in terms of the perfection of human ends.

Finally, it was suggested by M. B. Foster<sup>38</sup> that we cannot appropriately speak of the consent of the third class of the Republic. Foster held that in order for 'consent' to have meaning it must imply the individual's freedom to enjoin political order on himself. The third class, since it

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<sup>38</sup> M.B. Foster, "Some Implications of A Passage in Plato's Republic", Philosophy, 1936, pp 301-308.

does not enjoin political order upon itself, may only be said to acquiesce in the regimen of the ideal state. Foster's criteria for consent are obviously those which would satisfy Locke. They oppose any theory of political obligation which posits an initial distinction between natural subjects and natural rulers. I shall not here discuss the propriety of restricting the notion of consent, as Foster would have us do, only to those theories which do not assume (in some sense) that government is sui generis. We may observe, rather, that the conception of the social contract has widely differing applications. Plato would seem to have used the concept on an ideal plain to describe the willingness of the third class of the Republic to submit to a certain form of rule, and, indeed, the willingness of the rulers to impose the regimen of that form of rule on themselves. If there is a sense in which it is inappropriate to speak of the 'consent of the governed' in Plato, let us note with Foster (and with Locke as well) that the third class is not self-ruled in the sense which satisfied their criteria of consent. Since the third class, by acquiescing in the rule of the philosophers, confirms a prior obligation to do so, we must then admit (with attention to Foster's point) that they are not 'free' to impose the community's order on themselves. That order exists sui generis. It awaits men's submission to it. Its order is not founded on a compromise which implies men's recognition that they will be bound by majority decisions in a society in which ends cannot be perfected. The author of the ideal conception read man's moral life from man's attempt, through time, to realize his true ends.

It will now be appropriate to discuss the Socratic provenance of Plato's doctrine of consent. We shall do so by examining Socrates' covenant with the laws of Athens as described in the Apology and the Crito.

Socrates' Covenant with the Laws of Athens

It will be appropriate to begin our discussion of the Socratic theory of consent by examining what is implicit in Socrates' covenant with the laws of Athens which Plato describes in the Crito. I shall discuss the Crito with reference to the Apology. The two dialogues, taken as a whole, present us with a common subject which I shall call Socrates' dilemma. But before we discuss this subject I shall devote the first part of this chapter to setting out the main features of Socrates' covenant. I shall mention other subjects which complement this and which are germane to this chapter as a whole.

What strikes us first about the covenant is that it is an agreement between Socrates and the laws of Athens. Plato does not describe the covenant as an agreement with other men. But we may wonder whether Plato is not simply suggesting by way of metaphor that Socrates in fact has a covenant with his fellow citizens to obey the laws, that his duty of obedience depends on this covenant. This question is basic for it raises the question, what is the ground of Socrates' duty to obey? It also raises the question, in what respects does Plato's use of the doctrine of covenant differ (as it surely does differ) from current usage? In order to answer these questions we must first mark five features of the covenant. Socrates is told that he owes his nurture to the laws (50D); he is further told that the relationship between himself and the laws is not one of equality (50E); thirdly, the laws tell Socrates that evidence of his agreement has been seen to exist in his actions and not in words (52D). The laws next tell Socrates that blame must attach to men rather than to themselves for

the predicament in which he now finds himself (54C). Finally, Socrates is told that if he disobeys the laws of Athens, then the eternal laws, the brothers of men's laws in Hades, will themselves have been disobeyed (Ibid.). We should emphasize that the laws tell Socrates that if he refuses to accept the verdict passed on him he will return an evil for an evil, a wrong for a wrong (*ἀντιδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακούργησας*:54C 1). Assuming that Socrates would quit Athens wronged by men (Ibid.) the laws imply that their discussion with Socrates pertains to a wrong committed by men but not by themselves. In this, men are seen to abuse law or to maladminister it while law itself is blameless.

We may note in reference to these points that Plato assumes that the obligation to obey arises from Socrates' confirmation of this obligation in his day to day acts. Furthermore, his duty to obey the laws of Athens implies a duty to obey the eternal laws. It is further implied that he cannot invoke the latter to justify disobeying the former. Therefore, his duty to obey cannot be conditional on conformity between the laws of Athens and the eternal laws, for the laws imply that there is complete accord between themselves and their brothers. This means in practical terms that Socrates has no appeal from the decision of the court that found him guilty of impiety even if its finding was unjust. That in itself might be regarded as an abuse of law. But to disobey the court's finding must itself result in a disavowal of law. In saying that Socrates would return an evil for an evil should he disobey the court the laws imply that the court's decision was an unjust one. But their emphasis is placed on the duty to obey and not on a right of conscience to disobey. The only alternative Socrates has to obedience is quitting the community. That alternative,

of course, is not open to him should he disobey an injunction of the laws by doing so. If, then, as the Apology suggests, Socrates is bound in conscience to follow his own convictions, the Crito claims that there can be no conflict of duty between the laws of Athens and the requirements of the eternal laws. Consequently, so long as Socrates had remained content to be a citizen of Athens he had thereby incurred a duty of obedience. He could not then appeal to a higher law to revoke an agreement which had been seen to exist from his life as a member of the community.

Given these facts what may we here say of Socrates' right of dissent? A brief comparison with Antigone's case in the play of Sophocles will be instructive. While Antigone sees contrast, if not antithesis,<sup>1</sup> between a higher law and an edict of Creon, Socrates sees a resolvable conflict between higher laws and men's attitudes to them as evidenced in their regard for the laws of the community. We may say that Socrates dissents as does Antigone in the Theban play. But Socrates dissents because he believes men's usage of the laws is not in accord with what the laws and their brothers truly enjoin. We shall recall that the laws remind Socrates that men and not the laws are to blame for his demise. We shall see, moreover, that the Crito affirms what the Apology implies: that Socrates dissents from men's abuse of the laws but not from the laws themselves. Socrates is seen to dissent on behalf of the laws. He does not dissent for the sake of one law as contrasted with another. He believes that his own case denotes conflict between men and law per se, and his general position in the two dialogues is that this conflict could be resolved.

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<sup>1</sup> For the view that the law of nature and conventional law are antithetic see pp. 50 ff.

It is implicit in the Antigone that Creon's edict over-steps the bounds of the written laws and thus confounds the rightful demands of these with the immoral demands of the unwritten laws.<sup>2</sup> Here the problem is different. Two kinds of law, the written and the unwritten, have distinct if unopposed demands. These demands must not be confused. The problem of the Apology and the Crito is that conventional law conforms to the demands, or exemplifies the demands of the higher laws. It is a man's duty to attest to this fact. This means that men's honour or abuse of the one entails honour or abuse of the other. Here, it is not a question of distinguishing two spheres of law, which, while they make distinct demands on the person, might both be served equally so long as their separate demands are not confused. Rather, it is a question of bringing men's attitudes into conformity with the higher laws through their regard for the laws of the community. To put the matter shortly, we note an under-current of idealism in the two Platonic dialogues which is foreign to the more conservative view of the Antigone. While Creon's hubris compels Antigone to obey one law and disobey another, Plato suggests that while Socrates, too, confronts a dilemma he may yet choose to serve what is essentially one moral requirement and escape the dilemma's horns.

Plato believes, then, that Socrates' conflict is between a man and his fellow citizens' interpretation of the laws. We may recall that Plato has not seen fit to query whether there is equality between the individual and his fellow citizens. Rather, the laws ask Socrates whether equality exists between themselves and him. Had Plato put the former question then

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<sup>2</sup> "He who observes the laws of his country and remains bound in honour to the eternal laws stands high in his city's regard. But he who is presumptuous and over-bold is a disgrace and lives beyond the pale of men's laws (ἀπὸ πόλις): 367-371 (νόμος . . . χάρις).

the relationship between Socrates and the laws might have been dealt with within the framework of a covenant between him and his fellow citizens, where the assumption was that the laws themselves had sprung from a covenant among equal partners and owed their existence wholly to that. But the emphasis rather is that Socrates and his fellow citizens have been nurtured by the laws. Although this may tell against an interpretation which sees the covenant with the laws as a metaphor of a covenant a man has with his fellow citizens we must recall that the laws hold out to the citizen the right to persuade them if they, the laws, seem to be in error (*εἰ γὰρ καλῶς εἰ ποιοῦμεν*,:51E 7). Plato suggests by this that the laws are not intransigent. That lends a note of ambiguity to the picture: on the one hand the laws say there is complete accord between themselves and their brothers; on the other hand, they are amenable to persuasion. That can only be directed toward men, those who administer the laws. Thus, while the duty of obedience does not carry with it a right or a duty of disobedience subject to failure of conformity between men's laws and the higher laws, the laws of Athens are seen to be subject to change or to better administration. This can only mean that while the demands of the Athenian laws are the same as those of the eternal laws, the Athenians act in disregard of this fact. We must emphasize in respect of this that so far as Socrates can judge, persuading men toward a better regard of the laws does not constitute disobedience.

For the reasons given above there is certainly justice in the claim that the *προσοποποιία* of the laws has in view a dialogue between a man and his conscience, or, more widely, between a man and the consciences of his fellow citizens (Cf. Burent, p 200). In this sense the notion of a

covenant with the laws is metaphorical. But the intimate connection between the laws of Athens and the eternal laws indicates that the former are not the product of human invention. Taking this together with the facts that the laws provide nurture and that Socrates has always associated law with virtue (53C), Plato is emphasizing that the duty to obey the laws is natural, that this duty does not arise from an undertaking. This fact is suggested, and, I think, supported from the fact that while Socrates might confirm that he has a duty of obedience he has no right to invoke a standard of law or justice higher than or distinct from that of the city's laws as grounds for disclaiming this duty. We may look here for what is implicit in the inequality which is said to exist between Socrates and the laws. To illustrate Plato's meaning we may refer to the current notion of covenant with which he implicitly contrasts Socrates' covenant in the Crito.

We shall recall that the Leucophron had suggested that law is a covenant that assures men's just claims against one another (*ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων*, : Politics 1280B 11). In the absence of further evidence we can take that to mean that law exists as a means of securing men in the pursuit of their interests, but that it is not the primary function of law to make men virtuous (Ibid.). If we infer from this that the duty of obedience arises from a covenant which men make among themselves then, as I have suggested, we might speak of equality as obtaining among those who make the covenant. At any rate, the subsequent duty to obey could be said to depend equally on all members of the community so formed honouring the laws which spring from the covenant. But this doctrine, as the Republic shows us, was regarded by many as implying that equality itself was unnatural, that by nature any creature will seek its own advantage (*πλεονεξία*), and, by

law, it is forcibly constrained to honour equality (359C). Indeed, the emphasis that was placed on the doctrine, as Plato's reports show, was such as to treat the question whether a man should obey the law in terms of whether it was advantageous to do so. We should note that while the Crito does not state that the question of advantage is beside the question whether a man has an obligation to obey, the dialogue does claim that a duty of obedience is not conditional on it materially profiting a man to obey.

The combined notions of Leucophron and those we receive from Glaucon in the Republic point to two aspects of the doctrine of covenant which the Crito challenges: that law does not pertain to virtue, or, that is to say, that it is not a function of law to make men virtuous, but rather to secure them in the pursuit of their interests; secondly, that law is unnatural restraint. Leucophron's statement, as it stands, need not bear an immoralist connotation.<sup>3</sup> But Glaucon's statement, in so far as it opposes what is just by nature to what is just by law (νόμῳ δὲ βία παρ-  
 ἄγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐργίαν. : Ibid.) does bear this connotation; for, his conception lends itself, as he proceeds to explain, to the belief that

<sup>3</sup> Guthrie notes that Leucophron's conception as it stands could be similar to that propounded by the author of the speech against Aristogeiton: "laws were instituted against nature because nature is disorderly and law introduces impartiality and equal justice for all." (W.C.K. Guthrie, The Sophists, (Cambridge, 1971, p 143). What is true of Leucophron is, I think, also true of Protagoras in that the latter would seem to have regarded nature, as if not opposed to nomos, then indifferent to it. But we must remark that Protagoras stressed what Leucophron would seem not to have emphasized; that it is virtue (ἀιδώς and δίκη) more than men's just claims against one another that brings order to human life and puts men out of a state of nature. (Cf. nn 5, 6 infra).

the man who succeeds in life will convert the law to his advantage by appearing to be just (or by appearing to honour equality), that what truly profits a man is public approbation (*ἔσχατα γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα*. κτλ:361A). What is common to Leucophron's and to Glaucon's statements is that it is to a man's interest or advantage to obey law. Glaucon's interpretation (the immoralist interpretation) is that it is only a man's external interests - his material wants combined with his reputation with others - that his appearing to be just will promote. In so speaking Glaucon has reduced the Republic's debate about justice to the question whether justice is desirable and for what consequences it is desirable. Indeed, Plato feels bound to answer the Sophistic question about justice on the same ground that the Sophists discussed it: whether being just truly profits a man. We may add here that this will be of considerable importance to his conception in the Republic of men's consent to the philosophic community. (Ch17).

In the Crito Plato converts the received notion of covenant to the view that it is not only a man's external interests that his covenant might be expected to promote. For he associates the doctrine, positively, with Socrates' notion of a man's truest interest, the well-being of the soul. In challenging the received view Plato throws his weight against the theory he would later recite through Glaucon: that men would have no interest in obeying law but for their supposing it to be to their external advantage to do so, and that conventional justice, the justice of nomos, pays a man less well than the dictates of nature, with the result that the duty to obey becomes conditional on the selfish advantage that accrues to a man from obeying if he is an unsuccessful man, or from

acquiring the favour of the laws (appearing to obey) if he is a successful man.<sup>4</sup> He begins to develop his own theory in the Crito where he suggests, as he does in the Apology, that law concerns more than a man's external interests. He implies in these two dialogues that a man has a duty to obey the law even if some external interest of his is not thus served. Here Plato is seen to reject the immoralist connotation of equality along with the notion that law arises in a covenant. He puts his own view by maintaining that the citizen is not the equal of the law, that the citizen, by accepting the benefits of membership of the community, confirms an obligation to obey. This entitles the citizen to persuade the laws or even to leave the community should he find it to his dissatisfaction. But it does not entitle the citizen to revoke the duty of obedience either by an appeal to a higher law or from the sense of material advantage. The received notion of covenant claimed that the duty of obedience springs from the latter motive (a man's practical advantage, whatever it might be), implying that justice and the laws of communities are caused by human agency alone. This theory might carry with it an immoralist conception of men's interests, as, for example, when a man's interests are seen to be promoted by his converting the law to his favour to the detriment of others. Plato's conception in the Apology and

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<sup>4</sup> "And justice lies midway between both of these (τοῦ μὲν ἀπίστου ὄντος, εἴτε ἀδικῶν μὴ δεδῶκε δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, εἴτε ἀδικουμένου εὐμάρτυτος ἰδύνατος ἢ ) and is not honoured as a real good, but is only honoured in the lack of being able to do wrong. One who had the power to do injustice and to be a real man would never covenant with anybody to do no wrong nor to suffer it. Only a simpleton would do that." (359B) The 'real' man of whom Glaucon speaks would be able to live in a 'law-bound' state as though he himself were the source of law. That implies that the real man would not regard himself as any man's equal. Presumably, he would become the source of law by having acquired the laws' favour. (See Republic 365 in toto.) By so doing he would give the lie to men's praise of justice and equality; he would show, by his actions, that he did not believe that these had any natural or unconditional hold on a man.

The Crito is an explicit rejection of this point of view.

We should mark that in altering the notion of covenant Plato is denying that the obligation to obey the community's laws is artificial. This doctrine, regardless of its connotations, must regard the duty to obey as being of human design if a present obligation to obey is seen to rest on a common undertaking from which such obligation springs.<sup>5</sup> We have

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We may call this the conventionalist doctrine. What concerns us here is the assumption of many of its proponents that the virtues, justice, piety, etc. originate in human will and owe nothing to divine will. This implies both that political life is artificial and that the validity of a community's laws depends on common consent. The latter was essentially the view of Protagoras as reported in Plato's accounts of him. Where the doctrine could depart from Protagoras' own interpretation is in the connotation which its immoralist detractors placed on the justice of the common consent; for they insisted on a cleavage between the benefits to be gained from natural justice (τὴν Πλουτωνίου, ὅτι πάντα φύσιν δίκαιον παρέσκει ὡς ἀγαθόν, Republic 359C) and those to be acquired from the justice of conventional opinion. The latter was said to be necessary (ἀναγκαῖον: 358C) to the interests of the weak but was not itself truly beneficial (οὐκ ὡς ἀγαθόν: Ibid.). Protagoras, in saying that αἰδώς and δίκη were imparted to all men in common, means that men acquired moral sense through divine intervention. We should note that he implied by this that the existence of political life stands or falls with the existence of moral sense (αἰδώς and δίκη), for the latter does not exist in man's natural condition (Ἐρμῆν, πέμπει ἀγόντα, εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην ἵν' εἴεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναρμῆα. Protagoras 322C). Man's life prior to the intervention of Hermes was a condition of aggression and suffering. It also lacked civic art, πολιτικὴ τέχνη. Protagoras implies that society's having moral sense, which Hermes imparted, is both necessary and sufficient to its having civic art. In holding this belief Protagoras may be called a conventionalist, for what he claims is that given men's moral sense then political sense proceeds from agreements among men as to what is just and right (ἔπει, οἷα γ' ἴδ' ἕκαστος πόλει δίκαια καὶ ἄλλα δοκῶ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι ἀρετῆ, εἰς ἀνδράσιν νομίζω. Theaetetus 167C. Cf. on 172AB Op.Cit. n 6). Since the cleavage between nature and convention is foreign to Protagoras' view, and because he claims that moral sense is shared by men in common, his belief that some men are more adept than others at teaching what is beneficial or profitable carries with it the belief that human good pertains to the well-being of society as a whole and not to the particular well-being of either the weak by nature or the strong by nature. But this conception is not idealistic, for although αἰδώς and δίκη are shared by all men Protagoras implies that it is common consent and not an ideal norm which gives validity to a community's laws. Had he implied that αἰδώς and δίκη could obtain without civic art he might have claimed that man's natural condition was itself moral. Yet the sense of 322C stands against this. Protagoras, no less than Plato, assumes that political life and moral life are coextensive. But the doctrine of the Theaetetus (see next note) stands against Plato's theory because it implies that a sufficient criterion of a community's consent is its agreement, at any time, as to what is just. While this entails common moral sense, it precludes an ideal referent of justice whose confirmation is not only implicit in men's consent to laws but which is also assumed to be a final and rational basis of a society whose form would perfect human needs.

seen in Ch 1 that Plato rejects this conception where it denotes the discrete origin of political life. What he rejects is the implicit belief of this conception that the obligation to obey law is artificial, where this means that justice or political virtue are products of human enactment. We may say in reference to Protagoras' theory that while it does not carry an immoralist connotation it is compatible with a belief in the discrete origin of political life, with the belief that the obligation to obey law is artificial, as depending (given the presence of *δικαίως* and *δίκην*) on human will. (Cf. n 8 *infra*). In rejecting the conception of discrete origins Plato provides an objective sanction for obedience to law and in so doing he infers that since political life does not originate in human enactment that the duty to obey the laws of the community is natural. He therefore rejects the notion that a present obligation to obey originates in human will. This conception, as it is developed in Plato's time, might imply that nature is morally indifferent to law. But it might imply too, as in the case of Callicles of the Gorgias or in the theory cited by Glaucon in the Republic, that nature and law are antagonistic, that there is a law of nature that stands over and above convention and is opposed to it. This is the view that Plato attacks. The immoralism which attaches to this view is more the object of his attack than the view of Protagoras that nomos, in keeping men at a remove from nature, is basic to the well-being of human life.<sup>6</sup> But while rejecting this view, Plato

<sup>6</sup> At Theaetetus 172AB Socrates states that there are those who believe with Protagoras that while men differ in their ability to assess what is truly advantageous it is also true that justice and injustice, piety and impiety, have no natural existence of their own (*ὡς οὐκ ἔσσι φύσει ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον*) but become true on the basis of common consent (*τὸ κοινῆ δόξαν τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἀληθές*) and remain true from the time they are adopted and for so long as they are maintained (*τοτε ὅτιν*) (continued on page 56)

devotes his main attention to discrediting the former view which maintains that nomos must conceal the truth about what men take to be their true or natural interests. The latter conception too, however, is distinct from Plato's theory of political life, for in supposing that nomos is the legitimate basis of a community's consent it implicitly rejects the view that knowledge of a universal criterion of justice could legitimize consent. That can only mean that αἰδώς and δίκη are not paradigms from which justice can be ideally known and on which a conventional morality which is universally valid can be founded. On Protagoras' view, moral

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6 (continued from page 55)

δοξῆ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῆ χρόνον. ). Those who accept this doctrine, then, admit to degrees of ability in assessing what is advantageous, profitable, or good (ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῆ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα εἶθεσθαι), and their point of emphasis is that justice and the other virtues are conventional, as depending for their validity on common opinion and enactment. Socrates does not say in exactly what respect those who maintain this theory are departing from Protagoras' conception (καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ μὴ πάντῃσι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ), unless it is from an immoralist construction upon the doctrine which was foreign to Protagoras' own view. We know, for example, that he believed that the moral sense on which they were based was to be honoured by all men in preference to the life of nature (καὶ νόμον γε θεὸς παρ' ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυναμένον αἰδῶς καὶ δίκης μετασκευεῖν κτείνεῖν ὡς νόσον πόλεως. :Protagoras 322D). The report of Protagoras' thought in the Theaetetus does not depart from this view, for it is there implied that the man who is able to teach what is beneficial will not assume that the justice of common consent must give place to a higher order of justice. Rather, he will cause what a given society regards as beneficial (χρηστὰ) both to be and to seem beneficial (167C). If Plato emphasizes the possible relativism of this doctrine in the Theaetetus it will be remembered from the Protagoras that the wise man, no less than any other citizen, must share in common moral sense. Those, however, who did disvalue the conventional virtues, or the virtues of common consent, and contrasted them with the justice of nature, took the Protagorean doctrine in a transvalued sense and claimed that conventional justice thwarted rather than promoted what is truly advantageous. Here we may cite Laws 890A (ὁ δ' ἂν μετὰθῶνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τεχνῆ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐ δὴ ἐν φύσει.), where Plato adapts the Theaetetus' conception of conventional justice to the view which held that true justice is not rendered valid by common consent. True justice, rather, consists in the success of force (τὸ δικαιώστικόν ὅτι εἰς ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος, ). In contrast to this conception Protagoras maintains that true justice is based on a fundamental sense of justice or right which is common to a community's members.

sense is both necessary and sufficient to a community's having civic art, but the community's present agreement as to what is just satisfies the presence of justice and consent in that community. This implies that conventional justice - what a given community accepts as its moral norms - is sanctioned by a present agreement as to what is just rather than by a universal criterion of justice, the knowledge of which would perfect political life. The criterion of consent for Protagoras is, as Guthrie points out, factual and not normative.<sup>7</sup> Plato's conception differs from this.

In seeking to counter the claim that external advantage legitimizes consent Plato, no less than his naturalist opponents, subordinates the factual question, whether there is agreement in a community as to what is just, to the normative question, what criterion of justice fulfils a man's truest needs. Plato, then, defends the validity of nomos on the basis of his belief in a natural standard of justice which makes the fulfilment of those needs possible. A man's obedience to the demands of this natural criterion underlies his obedience to the laws of the community. In supposing that this is so, Plato is making a claim that differs from Protagoras' belief. Protagoras believes that moral sense underlies the possibility of civic art. But Plato suggests that a community's consent is ultimately legitimized by a universal, rational criterion of justice rather than only by a present agreement as to what is just. In rejecting the notion of the discrete origin of political life Plato also rejects what is implicit in this theory, that the laws of the community are artificial, as being dependent on human sanction. He therefore assumes, as against Protagoras, that a man's consent is legitimized by his obeying a natural criterion of justice. This means that the duty to

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<sup>7</sup> Guthrie, Op.Cit. p 137.

obey the laws of the community is natural since this duty proceeds from the demands of a criterion of justice which itself is universal or natural.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> If we allow that moral and political life are co-extensive then it could be said on this view that men may choose to obey the community's laws, but it could not be said that they have chosen ab initio whether there should be law or some form of positive enforcement, where a sense both of obligation and interest would underlie that choice. It is doubtful whether we meet with the latter view, which is essentially the view of Locke, in antiquity. The case which Glaucon cites in the Republic clearly indicates that the proponents of the theory he describes assumed that only a sense of interest (or external advantage) could underlie such a choice. We should emphasize that for these thinkers the theory of discrete origin carried with it an immoralist connotation. Protagoras, too, regards the natural condition as lacking morality. The historical myth of the Protagoras, however, illustrates an important respect in which both he and Plato are of one mind: that given morality, there must be some form of positive enforcement or political order. Where they differ is in their conceptions of what is sufficient for consent. Since Protagoras believes that a community's agreement as to what is just is sufficient he does not imply, as Plato does, that consent must verify or confirm, if only implicitly, a man's belief in a natural criterion of justice. Consent, or the duty to obey, are therefore legitimized by agreement, not by confirmation of a natural criterion. Here we should emphasize that in Protagoras' case the view that the laws of the community are artificial means that a community's agreement as to what is just is sufficient for consent, that change is inherent to law. Yet the 'original' of consent is, for Protagoras, the agreement of the community, not the sanction of the individual. He, no more than Plato, assumes that consent ultimately implies a moral choice that must be free of positive command. Were this implicit in Protagoras' view he would have needed to regard the natural condition of man as moral but not political. But both he and Plato are committed to the view that political community is the efficient source of a citizen's belief of what is just or beneficial. For this reason, it could be said that Protagoras, as much as Plato, supposes that the duty to obey the laws of the community is 'natural'. But that could not mean in Protagoras' case (as it must in Plato's) that a citizen's confirmation of belief in a universally valid criterion of justice legitimizes consent. For then, the question whether consent is given must be normative and not factual. For Protagoras, men's sharing moral sense underlies political life, but agreement as to what is just establishes consent.

We find a primary source for Plato's own conception in the Apology and the Crito. There, the particular construction Plato places on the doctrine of covenant is that the duty to obey is not rendered valid ab initio by an undertaking, that an agreement as to what is just is not itself sufficient for consent. Rather, a man has a primary duty to obey eternal laws. It is then open to a man to confirm this duty by obeying the laws of the community. Plato suggests by this that a man recognizes kinship between the laws of his city and the higher laws. He recognizes that his duty to obey the laws of the community conforms to the duty to obey higher laws, that the duty to obey is natural and is compatible with a man's desire to realize his true interests. So far, then, we have dealt with two approaches which Plato discusses in respect of the question of political consent. These derive from the fundamental question, what is the legitimate basis of men's consent to law: an agreement or an undertaking as to what is just and lawful, founded on a common moral sense, or, men's implicit confirmation, through obeying laws, of an ideal criterion of justice, the knowledge of which would perfect human needs? We have mentioned another problem which Plato regarded as of first importance: whether there is parity of duty among the members of a community to obey its laws? An important corollary attaches to this question: whether any individual or group of individuals, to the exclusion of others, is the source of law and the duty to obey? (Cf. n 4 supra)

The Apology and the Crito deal importantly with a subject we have not discussed in any detail: on what grounds may an individual legitimately challenge political authority? In dealing with this subject these dialogues focus our attention on the question of the parity of duty to obey laws, the source of law, and a man's interest in obeying laws.

Here, although Plato emphasizes the notion of kinship between eternal laws and a community's laws, we do not yet find the purport to political theory of his developed belief, mentioned above, in an ideal criterion of justice. At this point in our chapter it will be useful to indicate in further detail the points of doctrine in either dialogue which assist us in understanding the doctrine of consent which both dialogues offer as a whole. We shall then discuss within the context of the Apology itself, Socrates' challenge to his accusers to show him that he had been unjust. Following this, we shall refer again to the early books of the Republic in conjunction with the Apology, to illustrate further the Socratic theory of consent. Finally, we shall complete this chapter by offering a more detailed consideration of the Crito and its relation to the doctrine of the Apology.

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I have said in the first section of this chapter that Plato develops a theory of covenant in the Crito which is in opposition to the received view. In order to analyse further his conception of Socrates' treatment of the question of consent we may discuss the subject under two heads: Plato's statement of Socrates' moral position in the Apology and the Crito; the implications of this position to Plato's political thought. First, a general statement about the consistency of Socrates' position in the two dialogues.

We have said that contemporary opinion treated the question about the validity of conventional justice in terms of the question whether it profits a man to obey the laws of the community. In the Apology and the Crito Plato repudiates the belief that a man's consent to the laws is

in his defence, that he has always made a public profession of his beliefs (32A ff.). We shall see that Socrates' notion of public profession, whether by means of act or statement of belief underlies the fact that he has no rightful alternative to obeying the law. It will be sufficient at this point in the discussion to illustrate this conception briefly. It was within full view of public opinion that Socrates dissented from the belief that obedience to the law depends on material security. It was in this same spirit of public profession that he expressed his disapproval of the illegal actions of the Thirty. Moreover, he implies that it would be in full view of the law that he would carry out his mission, though in so doing he might be subject to certain arrest and condemnation. When he says in the Apology that his duty to obey conscience overrides a contrary verdict of the court, Socrates is saying that if he is to desist from his mission then the law must force him to desist. But given his belief that obedience to the law does not depend on material interest, and given his public profession of this belief, then his position is that in seeking to fulfill his mission he would not evade the consequences, legal or otherwise, of so doing. He is also saying that a man might ~~act~~ from a conscientious decision which met with society's disapproval and condemnation and yet still be bound to obey the law. This is the position that is common to both dialogues. It is the source of consistency between them. Thus, Socrates imagines a possible condition the court might hold out to him: "This time, Socrates, we shall not follow Anytus' advice, but will free you on the condition that you cease to spend time in your investigations and in your love of inquiry. If you are seen to continue this practice you will be put to death" (29CD). Socrates says that his reply

conditional on the external or material advantages that accrue from obedience. He describes the Socratic attitude in this matter by means of a dilemma: could a man avoid breaking faith with the established laws which he had always believed it was his duty to obey if, in disagreeing with the verdict of a legally established court, he believed that his duty to obey his conscience had a claim on him that was prior to that court's decision? The question is ultimately resolved by Socrates' belief that the discharge of the duty of obedience to the laws is compatible with what it is in man's best interest to do. With this conception Socrates combines his belief that while the duty to obey conscience is prior to the duty to obey the laws, it does not supersede the latter duty. Rather, the former duty is consonant with the duty to obey the laws.<sup>9</sup> For purposes of convenience I shall regard the first of Socrates' resolutions as his moral position, and the second as his political position. Socrates says in the Apology that he would carry out his mission, if released by the court, despite subsequent arrest and its consequences. He claims in the Crito that it is wrong to disobey law. If the substance of his teaching was that the soul's well-being is a man's primary concern then he would have been inconsistent with this principle if, in the case of the Crito, he had chosen to accept offers of assistance that would have led to his escape from Athens. Had he done so he would have contravened a verdict of the court that had been legally given. He could have implied by this action that obedience to the laws is conditional on a material interest, the security of his life. We must remember here what Socrates has said

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<sup>9</sup> Socrates does not mean that merely by obeying the laws is it probable that a man stands to act in his best interest. He rather means that a man must obey the laws in order to act in his best interest. Only by maintaining this position can Socrates resolve the dilemma of obedience to conscience and to law which the two dialogues put before him.

to the court would be: "If you set me free on this condition, men of Athens, I shall both respect and love you but I shall obey divine command rather than you, and so long as I remain alive and am able I shall not stop philosophising." (Ibid.) Socrates implies by this that so long as the law leaves him free to do so, he will continue with his mission. He does not say, however, that he would attempt to evade the consequences of doing so. He therefore puts himself openly at the laws' disposal.<sup>10</sup> In so doing he proceeds in his actions from conscience and also attests to his duty to obey the law.

We may now begin to examine in more detail the nature of Socrates' moral position: his belief that the discharge of the duty of obedience is compatible with what it is in a man's best interest to do. Socrates' belief in this turns on the following question: whether a man contravenes his interests by disregarding public approval and so disgraces himself (Apology 28B). The Crito provides a corollary to the belief that disregard of public approval occasions disgrace: a man could not be serving his best interests if he did not requite an injustice done him even if by so doing he would disobey the laws. In denying these claims Socrates is denying Crito's claim that a man who disobeyed an unconscionable decision of a court would be acting in his best interest. He is also denying that if a man did not disobey he would be a cause of disgrace and shame both to himself and others. This distinction of view between Socrates and Crito is vital and will occupy our attention below. First, however, it is important to emphasize that in denying Crito's claims Socrates is

<sup>10</sup> Cf. εἴδ' ἄλλως ἔσει τούτου πράξεων, ἀποθανεῖν: (29D), with: εἰ δὲ τις ψῆσι πᾶσι ἐμῶν πύποσε τι μάθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδικά ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴσασιν οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει. : (33B).

also denying that the man who obeys conscience implies by so doing that disobedience to the established laws could be justified. Had Socrates proposed the latter view he would effectively have affirmed either the contemporary belief, which is implicit in Crito's plea (see below), that in seeking his advantage a man assumes he is the equal of the law, or the idealistic belief in a law of nature whose demands supersede the laws of common consent. These facts bear as much on the political as the moral aspect of Socrates' position. We shall see that they are bound up with the belief, implicit in the Crito, that a man's duty to obey the laws of the community is natural.

We have said that Plato describes Socrates' position in the Crito by means of a dilemma. This method involves us from the start with two senses of a man's well-being or of action which it is in a man's interest to do. Crito's position is that if Socrates breaks faith with the established laws he will avoid being a cause of disgrace to those whom common opinion would expect to assist him in escaping (45E,46A). Crito implies by this that Socrates will have requited a wrong done to him; for he will have acted in the obvious and, apparently, legitimate, interest of security to his life. By doing this he will have avoided bringing shame upon himself. (Ibid.) Now given Crito's position Socrates' answer to it is paradoxical, for what he in effect says is that if he yields to Crito's entreaty he cannot then serve what it is truly in his interest to do. By yielding to Crito's entreaty he would incur shame. To serve his interest, and avoid incurring shame, Socrates believes he must bear the shame of having committed injustice (Apology 39B). What Socrates is saying to Crito is that a man is so bound in conscience to obey the laws which, by his former actions, he has agreed to obey, that he cannot

rightfully suspend the covenant so established, though he might avoid an injustice to himself by so doing. He is also saying that by obeying the laws of the community a man cannot be acting contrary to his true interest, though obedience might entail suffering evil. But the man who uses his influence even to escape an unconscionable verdict returns an evil for an evil. In so doing he fails to act in his best interest. This is compatible with Socrates' claim in the Apology that he must obey his conscience; for he believed it was in his truest interest to do this, and, as we have seen, a vital corollary to this claim is that Socrates would not avoid the consequences of his actions. In the context of the Crito and Socrates' covenant with the laws Socrates is implying that if we use as a pretext for escaping Athens the fact that the court judged the case wrongly (i.e. unconscionably) we then admit that requiting wrong is only effectively countermanded by law if a man is unable to requite wrong. Plato indicates by Crito's ready acquiescence in Socrates' proposal of this pretext (50C2, 50A4, Cp 49C2 ff.) that Crito accepts that the condition of a man's obedience to law is that the law must secure a man's interests. If it does not, then it is to be disobeyed given that a man has the ability to disobey it. Crito thus proposes that the laws of common consent are not a final arbiter of right action or of action which it is in a man's interest to do (45C: Ἐγὼ δὲ, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σκεπτόν προδοῦναι, ἔξω σωθῆναι,). In effect, Crito proposes that it is right that Socrates should disobey the law, that it is right that he should requite an injustice men have done to him; for Socrates has the ability to save himself if only he will do so. Only in this way can Socrates act beneficially (46A3), so as to win public approval and avoid disgrace. Plato models Crito's belief on the values of common opinion.

It was against these same values that Socrates posed his defence in the Apology. The question which is common to both dialogues is whether beneficial action, or action which is right, entails unconditional obedience to the laws. This question underlies the moral emphasis, as outlined above, of Socrates' position and the challenge that Crito opposes to it.<sup>11</sup> Underlying the moral emphasis of the argument is the question what actions of a man complement the acquisition of his truest interest. Here it will be important for us to consider Socrates' summary statement of his mission at Apology 29D ff.

First, a general outline of the problem which that statement raises. Socrates says that his mission was to teach men that their primary concern is the soul's well-being. We shall see that he implies by this that a necessary condition of justice is that a man's beliefs should be truly reflected by his actions. We find the basis of this conception in Socrates' belief that a man should be and not seem to be just, that it cannot repay a man to seem to be just while not being so. We should mark that this conception is opposed to the view which Callicles of the Gorgias typifies (488B, 490A, 491E f.) which associates justice with mastery and advantages over others, and injustice with the emasculation of the strong by the laws and customs of general consent (492A).<sup>12</sup> This means, in sum, that

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<sup>11</sup> It would perhaps be more precise to say that Crito, rather than actively opposing Socrates' own belief, is an unwitting proponent of the view that injustice can be beneficial. It is important to Plato's purpose that Crito should imply that this is so when he maintains that it is right that Socrates should yield to his advice; for by maintaining this position Crito implies that he supports the theory of contract that Plato seeks to counter in his statement of Socrates' own conception of the theory (See ahead pp 108ff). The belief that is implicit in Crito's plea is that a man would be just when it profited him to be so, but would be unjust, were he able, when injustice brought greater benefit than justice. To hold this position is to maintain that the laws of common consent only effectively invalidate unjust action when a man is not strong enough to be unjust.

<sup>12</sup> (page 66)

Socrates believes that by disobeying or dishonouring the laws a man can neither do what is right nor act in his best interest. He therefore believes that obedience to the laws is compatible with the fulfilment of a man's truest interest. We must regard Socrates' conception about consistency between belief and action (his conception that men should be and not seem to be just) as basic to these problems and as having an important bearing on his theory of consent to the laws. In Plato's Apology he discusses his views about belief and action within the context of his conception of a man's true well-being: that the latter consists in a man's acting so as to benefit both himself and others. Since we wish to examine this notion with reference to consent and the doctrine of contract it will be useful to recall here the main features of the conventionalist

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Callicles, like Socrates, believes that a man should be and not seem to be just. For this reason, both may be said to disavow the cautionary ethic implicit in Crito, that a man should disobey the laws when he is able should it repay him to do so. This theory recommends obedience or disobedience depending on what a man's capabilities are. But Callicles condemns those who are not able to disobey the laws and customs of general consent, for in their praise of the latter they conceal their real beliefs (492B). While Callicles means by 'right' action, action which achieves advantage over others, he, no less than Socrates, believes that the just man cannot be one who conceals what he truly believes (484A . . . , *επιαναστῶς ἀνθρώπων δεσπότης ἡγέμερος ὁ δούλος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ σὺν φύσει δικαίον.*)

We have said that the question posed by the Apology and the Crito is whether beneficial or right action entails unconditional obedience to the laws. By unconditional obedience we shall mean the following: that true obedience to the laws, on Socrates' terms, excludes a man's winning public approval by giving the appearance of justice to his actions, while acting from motives which implicitly exclude the interests of others; that a man's obedience is required even when he has the ability to disobey. It is important to mark that these criteria are implicit in Socrates' position (pp 77 ff.). It is important to observe, however, that unconditional obedience does not entail a man's remaining in a community should he wish to leave, provided that escape from the laws is not implicit in his departure; that unconditional obedience does not debar a man from persuading the laws.

view of contract which Socrates opposes. Plato's ultimate interpretation of the conventionalist theory springs from Socrates' rejection of the conception of men's interests that was often implicit in the theory of justice which the conventionalist view maintained:<sup>13</sup> that one man's interests implicitly exclude the pursuit by another man of his interests; that given the ability either to disobey the laws or to convert them to one's own advantage, a man should do so. In either case, a man obeys the laws or disobeys them from consideration of his interests. The theory maintains, then, that a sufficient reason for the existence of conventional justice and law is the security to and the protection of a man's interests that obedience to the laws affords.<sup>14</sup> Plato, as we have suggested (p57), devotes his main attention to the moral implication which he knew that the doctrine might easily carry: that nomos conceals the truth about what men take to be their real interests. A major aspect of the doctrine which Plato criticizes is its supposition that a sufficient demonstration of

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<sup>13</sup> It should be remembered that Protagoras, whom we must regard as a conventionalist, did not belong to the immoralist camp. Cf nn5, 6 supra. It is important to emphasize in respect of this that the view of contract which Plato rejects is one which assumes a natural condition of men and a discrete origin of political life in order to assert that a man's true well-being consists of action which is of disadvantage to another.

<sup>14</sup> The view is succinctly rejected in Plato's last political work, the Laws, where the Athenian gives a terse statement of his own view as compared to that of most other men: . . . οὐ, τὸ σῶζεσθαι εἰ καὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀνθρώπιος ἐπιβίωσεν ἡγούμενοι καθάπερ οἱ πολλοί, τὸ δ' ὡς βελτίστους γίνεσθαι εἰ καὶ εἶναι εὐσθύνει χρόνον ὅσον ἂν ᾧσιν.: 707D. This statement echoes the conception which Plato expresses in the Apology and the Crito through consideration of Socrates' mission and his relationship with the laws of Athens: What we should note in the Laws passage is the contrast between the attainment of moral excellence over time and mere existence. We shall see that this same conception underlies Socrates' notion of covenant in the Crito, where the idea of contract is implicitly adapted to a conception of natural ends.

whether a man is just is given by a man's overt approval of the laws and by his apparent willingness to obey them. The basis of Plato's criticism of this aspect of the doctrine is implicit in Socrates' consideration of beneficial action at Apology 29D ff.

Before we examine the Apology further we may first summarize briefly the topics to which the notion of beneficial action is related. Socrates implies in his summary of his protreptic work that he has dedicated his teaching both to his own profit and to that of others. We have said that he carried out this work in full view of the laws and of public opinion, and that he would not evade the legal consequences of doing so (p 61). This fact, together with a conception of justice (or right action) as regard for self and beneficial regard for others, will be seen to characterize Socrates' theory of obedience to law. We have already indicated that the latter concept is of importance to his notion of a man's best interest or his true well-being (p 66). We should also emphasize that the ground of his mission, as stated in Plato's Apology, was his belief that the practice of justice requires more of a man than his regard for material interests: either his own or those of others. We have indicated that there is a close association between the concept of a man's interests and Plato's treatment of Socrates' belief (implicit in the Apology and the Crito) that a man should seek to be and not seem to be just (pp 65 ff). With respect to the notion of consent, that conception will be seen to imply that a man would fail to act in his best interest, even if he obeyed the laws, if his regard for others sprang from material or prudential motive; it implies that such a man could not truly obey the laws. In sum, it implies that a man's external acts are insufficient evidence of consent.

These notions underlie the doctrine of consent as we find it in the Apology and the Crito. They serve to distinguish Plato's conception of the distinction between the Socratic and the conventionalist theories. They are the roots of Socrates' notion of consistency between belief and action from which Plato's developed theory of consent departs.

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Socrates' treatment of beneficial action is prefaced by his statement that the charges brought against him had been the result of long-standing slander and ill will (ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆ τε καὶ φθόνου.: 28A) of which Meletus who brought the charge, and Anytus, who supported it from political motives, were only specific cases.<sup>15</sup> In all tangible respects the charge was brought on moral and religious grounds. Whatever political (viz. factional) grounds there could have been for it had to remain implicit since Socrates could not be charged in respect of any personal affiliations that transpired prior to the amnesty of 403. Despite this, Socrates points to two events in Athens' recent past which could have won the condemnation of both the political parties.<sup>16</sup> The indictment specifies moral issues alone: that Socrates does not believe in the gods the state believes in but in other strange divinities, that he is a corruptor of the young. Why then would Plato have him assert a disclaimer of party loyalty

<sup>15</sup> Thus, at 19B, Socrates says that Meletus trusted in the current prejudice against him when he brought his charge (... διαβολῆ ... ἣ δὲ καὶ πίστεων Μελέτιος...).

<sup>16</sup> 32B: ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ (during democracy's rule) μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠδικεῖσθην ἢ μὴν μηδὲν ποιεῖν πᾶρα τοῦ νόμου (καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισμένη); 32D: "Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐκέλευε ἡ ἀρχὴ (the oligarchy) ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἐπ' αὐτὰ οὐσὶ ὥστε ἄδικόν τε ἐργάσασθαι, : In both cases Socrates states that his actions were governed by moral considerations alone. If, on either of these occasions he had been arrested, but released on a condition similar to that actually cited in the Apology (p 61 supra), there is no reason to suppose that his stand would have been any different. He would then surely have spoken similarly to the way Plato makes him speak in respect of the actual condition he cites. He would have said (continued on page 70)

in his defence? There are two reasons for this which we shall develop below: in the minds of Socrates' accusers (those who actually brought the charge) Socrates' alleged disloyalty to the community's traditional precepts implies criticism of the government that would uphold these precepts. Plato, while not denying Socrates' criticism of traditional moral attitudes, makes it clear through Socrates' disclaimer of party loyalty (Cf n 16) that the moral position of Socrates' case (Cf p 61 supra), which the Apology raises in its treatment of beneficial action, is sufficiently abstract as to be undeserving of any implication of factional allegiance. If, then, disloyalty to the present power is implicit in the spirit of the indictment (and we are affirming that it is) then that fact serves Plato well in combining the question of consent to the community's established government with his treatment of the charge of irreligion and corruption. We shall see that these two questions are in fact treated by him as natural complements.

We have said that Plato's doctrine of consent is characterized by his rejection of the view that nomos conceals what men take to be their real interests (pp 56, 66 supra). The latter notion is characterized by the dictum 'Justice consists in benefiting one's friends and harming one's enemies' (. . . τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἀρελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; : Republic 336A). This notion, whose implications permeate the thought of the Republic,<sup>17</sup> underlies the charge against Socrates and his answer to the charge in the Apology.

With respect to our interpretation of Socrates' attitude to the charge and his conception of beneficial action, we may begin with some

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(continued from page 69)

that the ruling party would need forcibly to restrain him if it was embarrassed by his attitude and his actions with respect to what justice and obedience to laws require of a man.

17(page 71).

remarks about his definition of the good or worthy man at Apology 28B ff. (Cf p62 supra). There, Socrates defines the good man as one who will only consider (*σκοπεῖν*) whether his projected acts are those of a good or a bad man. He states that fear of material consequences ought not to weigh (*ὑπολογίζεσθαι*) in a man's considerations about his actions, that the man who acts from material motive is one from whom little good could be expected. It is important that we fix an exact meaning to the phrase, ὄσον εἰ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄρετός ἐσσι, (B 7). Burnet points out that Socrates' interlocutor ( at 28B2 ) thinks that it is only of his folly that Socrates should be ashamed ( p 118 ). This would mean that by the interlocutor's standard, Achilles must be counted as a poor fool for not considering the certain death that must follow his slaying Hector.

17. We should note, without at this point developing the subject, that Plato adapts the values of tradition to his own political conception. At Republic 375C, for example, he adapts Polemarchus' definition of justice (336A, supra) to his description of the temperament of the new community's guardians: τοὺς οἰκίους πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολέμιους καλεπούς . Polemarchus' definition of justice is unacceptable to Socrates because by it, justice entails not only rendering benefit, but also, doing harm. Unless by 'doing harm', Polemarchus had meant action which morally improves an evil man (and from the context of Republic 335B ff. we may be sure he had not meant this), his definition must also be problematic; for as the Republic's further treatment of justice will show, the dictum 'benefiting friends, harming enemies' serves the prudential theory of justice which describes the 'friend', for example, as one whom it materially pays a man to benefit even if the friend is not a good man and the enemy, whom it pays to injure, is (See infra, p.78f).

What we wish to note here is that Plato's reformism is marked not by abandoning tradition but by revising it. Thus Polemarchus' belief that justice consists in benefiting friends, harming enemies will be ultimately revised by Plato to take the form of the Socratic notion which we find in the Apology, that justice consists in benefiting both oneself and others. We shall see that this conception underlies Plato's characterization of the guardians at 375C. But his description of the guardians there springs from a traditional tenet which belongs no less to the values current among politically ambitious men such as Ismenias of Thebes (336A), or to men of decent piety such as Polemarchus, than to the revised values of the reformed society he describes in the Republic.

Socrates takes the interlocutor to assume that material considerations, danger of life or death, are the conditions that should naturally determine a man's actions.<sup>18</sup> The Achilles illustration shows that what the interlocutor meant was that the worthy man will make material considerations the standard of his actions, whether right or wrong. For by that standard, Achilles, who had a vested interest in keeping Hector alive, did not act in this interest. He is therefore, according to the interlocutor's standard, to be counted as a fool. The point Socrates makes is that Achilles foreswore this consideration in the belief that he was bound to avenge Patroclus' death. Socrates' illustration shows that considerations of life and death did not deter him from doing so; and Socrates implies that he was not thereby, *φάυλος*, for having refused to consider the prolongation of his life in lieu of doing what he believed to be right. Such considerations would, rather, have resulted in shame (*κτεαγέλαστος* 28D 2). Instead of this, Achilles showed himself to be a good or worthy man.

It is important to draw attention to what Socrates is saying at 28B ff. in respect of a man's motive in doing right action. The Achilles illustration implies, contrary to the interlocutor's position, that considerations of material cost are not properly germane to a man's determination to do right action. This is made explicit at 28E f.

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<sup>18</sup> It may be noted that there is an important affinity between what Socrates says here about the good or worthy man and his description of the prudentialist view of justice at Republic 360D: that men will praise the man who has the power to do wrong but refuses to do so, though they will think him a mindless and wretched man (*ἀθλιώτατος, ἄνοητότατος*). The importance of this conception to the moral and political theory of the Apology and the Crito will become apparent later in the chapter.

The interlocutor had implied that knowledge of material consequences is a sufficient incentive to a man's avoiding shame in his actions (*ἐπισηδύματα*). But Socrates emphasizes that shame of not doing what a man believes to be right (*βέλτιστον*), regardless of material consequences to himself, is the sole motive of the good or worthy man (28D 6 - 10). Socrates means by this that material motive makes a man unworthy even if a man who acts from such motive does what is right. Thus, at 28E f he implies that his own motive for standing ground in battle (This was action which was right in respect of others, the community whose bidding he fulfilled.) could be attributed to fear of suffering disgrace from not doing what common opinion and common sanction believed to be right, if, by that same standard, he might have avoided disapproval by disobeying a divine command which he interpreted as a rightful command despite what others might have supposed. Thus, Socrates would not have lived up to his criterion of the worthy man, if, during military commission, he had behaved as most would expect and require a man to behave, but had on another occasion disobeyed a command of Delphi from fear, say, of public censure (*φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλ' ὀκτιῶν πράξει...*:29A). Such action would have been strange and inconsistent (*δένει*: 28D 10<sup>19</sup>). It would have been so by the criterion of the good man who does what is right not only because common opinion deems some action right but, ultimately, because he believes he must do what is right. The man who does what is right only

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19 Tredennick (Penguin) goes further than most by his "shockingly inconsistent". That is a good compromise, though, between Fowler's "terrible thing" and Burnet's "strange conduct". For it brings out the idea which I have emphasized above that considerations of death, fear of reputation, - in a phrase, material considerations - are no real measure of a man's worth even if the man, calculating his own advantage, does what is right from these motives.

because common opinion or personal expediency requires right action of him is not a man of much worth. This notion is an essential feature of Socrates' reply to his interlocutor.

Socrates further emphasizes that to have quit the station the god had assigned to him would have been to show himself guilty of the lack of knowledge - knowledge of one's own ignorance - which he censures in other men. He lends a strong moral tone to this form of ignorance, saying that it is most shameful (*ἀντιγὴ ἢ ἐπιπέδιστος*), and he describes it as the ignorance of supposing that death is the worst of evils. He means by this that the man who is moved in action from material considerations displays deep ignorance of morally right action. The latter requires a man to avoid actions that are evil and shameful, actions which one knows to result in injustice to others (disobeying a better being, whether divine or human) while being unconcerned about actions whose result to oneself one does not know to be good or evil (*Πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ἢν οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἔσονται, . . . φοβήσομαι καὶ φεύξομαι*: 29B 7-9). We may infer Socrates' meaning from the context. He means that the man who denies this criterion lacks knowledge of his own ignorance. He lacks conscientious knowledge.<sup>20</sup> That he lacks this knowledge (and so denies the Socratic

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<sup>20</sup> It may be emphasized that Socrates saw his duty to the god as being fulfilled by spending his life examining his own state of wisdom and that of others (28E 5), that his response to the oracle given to Chaerephon was rational. Since the oracle always gave its petitioners an ambiguous answer (Cf 21B 4) Socrates would not be expected to act without thought as to what the oracle can have meant. Here, we must remember his belief that no god speaks falsely (21B 7-8), that he believed it was of the utmost importance to give first place to his discovery of what the oracle had meant (*ὅπως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔδοξε εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστον ποιεῖσθαι*—21E3-5). Thus, his attempts to confute the oracle were devoted to establishing for himself the truth (or, rather, what truth) the oracle can have enunciated (*ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνυγέλκτος ἢ μάντιά γενοιτο*: 22A 6-7).  
(continued on page 75)

criterion) is shown by his presumption that death is the worst of personal evils, a presumption which governs his actions in respect of others. Thus, Achilles, had he failed to avenge Patroclus, would have shown that his fear of death had a prior claim on him than a duty to a kinsman. So Socrates, had he reneged his god's command, would have shown that public approval provides the final sanction of a man's actions. We should note, finally, that Socrates implies that it is a man's want of conscientious knowledge that would constitute a true charge of injustice (*ὡς ἀληθῶς . . . δεικνῶς* :29A 1), that lack of such knowledge is tantamount to disbelief in gods (Ibid.).

In sum, then, his reply to his interlocutor indicates his belief that in order for a man to be worthy he must exercise regard for another from the belief that it is morally required to treat others well. We shall see that this conception is a main-stay of Socrates' theory of consent: that a man's regard for another, as shown by his obeying a community's laws, does not qualify as true consent if the man obeys from material considerations. This conception underlies Socrates' belief that a man's external acts are not sufficient evidence of consent (Cf pp 52, 68 supra).

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20 (continued from page 74)

Now the oracle's meaning for Socrates was that that man is wise who, like Socrates, knows that he is worth very little in respect of wisdom (23B). From this point (so Burnet) there could no longer be any question of Socrates seeking to confute the oracle. Rather, he would attest to what he took its meaning to be: that human wisdom rests in a man's awareness of his own ignorance. The moral aspect of Socrates' obedience to the god's statement, of which he gives a hint at 22D 7 (*ἐκδοτος ἡδίου καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλα τὰ μέγιστα σωφρονιστὸς εἶναι*—), becomes dominant from 28B ff, where he speaks of what I have called men's want of conscientious knowledge.

It is useful to point out that Socrates says that the god's meaning was put through his name (*προσκεκρήσθαι δὲ εἰ ἐγὼ ἐρῶ ὄνομα* :23A 8-9), that the god was using him as an example (*ἐνὶ παραδείγματι ποιούμενος* Ibid.). This passage underlines the idea that Socrates believed himself to be the god's instrument (*προσκεκρήσθαι*) for putting the conception that a man is wise who is aware of his own ignorance, and that Socrates' obedience to the god, as related to us by Plato, took the form of his encouraging men toward rational examination of self.

Socrates has shown by reference to the possibility that he might have quit his station from fear of public censure, that to have done so would have indicated his own lack of conscientious knowledge. He would have shown that he had himself supposed that the discharge of duty was conditional on a material consideration, fear of the consequences of public disapproval. We see in this his belief that a man does not truly consent to a rightful command unless he is moved to fulfil it from the belief that right action is unconditionally required. We may call this aspect of Socrates' theory of consent the consent of conscience. (Cf p 61 supra). But in calling it this we shall note that the doctrine is prudential, for it ultimately implies that wrong-doing could not profit a man (See infra pp 84-87). Socrates saw it as his duty to the god to put this conception before his fellow citizens. So far as that is true the notion of conscientious consent points to his belief that an injunction of the court forbidding him to pursue his mission could not be considered as final. But it points as well to the more general belief that a man's material well-being is not the condition his doing right action, or action beneficial to another. Since wrong-doing could not profit a man, consent from conscience implies that a man's right regard of others is necessary to the acquisition of his true well-being. Underlying this belief is Socrates' conception that obedience to law from the motive of material interest is not true consent.

We have said that the question of Socrates' disloyalty enables Plato to combine the question of consent to the community's established government with his treatment of the charge of irreligion and corruption (p 70 supra). The pivotal question in this is the notion of the consent of conscience by which Plato illustrates Socrates' conception of consent and the practice of justice, contrasting this with the theory which he

sees implicit in his accusers' stance. This question brings to light the full significance of Socrates' notion of beneficial action so far as that conception pertains to the doctrine of political consent. His theory of beneficial action opposes the conventional theory that a man's pursuit of his interests implicitly excludes the interests of others. (Cf n 12 supra) It denies the main tenet of this theory, that a man's exercise of regard for others from weakness or from fear of not doing so is sufficient for consent to the laws, Socrates implies, by rejecting this notion, that consent from fear is nominal and not true consent. At Apology 28B ff. Socrates had censured the moral ignorance implicit in a man's being moved in action from material consideration (p74 supra). He has implied that this ignorance amounts to a want of conscientious knowledge, that it rests in a man's belief, held from deep moral ignorance, that the duty to regard another well is conditional. Here, a man's determination to do right action would not rest in the shame of not doing it; it would rest in his considerations of what the materially profitable course of action would be. From Apology 29D ff. Socrates further clarifies his rejection of this, the prudentialist case for right action. His rejection stands as a denial of its implicit theory of consent. In the Apology and Crito, Plato rejects the prudentialist conceptions by dramatically portraying Socrates' conceptions of beneficial action and consent to the laws. He achieves this in the Apology by showing that Anytus' and Meletus' accusation is ironical; for in supposing that Socrates has done injustice, they in fact exemplify a main tenet of the prudentialist theory, that justice, or right regard of another can entail injustice. The Crito, assuming that Socrates has had wrong done him, attests to his own belief that requital of wrong does not

lie within the bonds of morality. These matters form the basis of our further study of the Apology and the Crito.

We may now return to our study of Apology 29D ff. In stating that nothing short of force will prevent him from pursuing his mission Socrates says that he has the utmost regard and affection (Burnet) for his fellow citizens, but he will obey the god rather than they. He states that he will force men (παρακελούμενός τε καὶ ἐνδ'εὐκύνειος : 29D 5,6) toward rational self-examination (ἐρήσομαι . . . ἐλέγξω, : 29E 4,5), that he will do this for their own benefit (νεωτέρω καὶ πρεσβυτέρω . . . ποιήσω, : 30A 2,3). He describes his own regard for others, which he expresses in his elenctic activity, in terms of reproaching men (ὀνειδίζω) for their wrong-headed notions about moral good, or virtue (ἀρετή). We want to show that underlying this statement (29D - 30A) is the view that a man's regard of others indicates that the man himself is just only if he believes that his own material well-being is not a condition of his doing right action, or of his doing action that has beneficial result to another. For now, we should recall in respect of this the view of his accusers that Socrates, by pursuing his activities, has exhibited the worst disregard for his city's customs, a disregard worthy of condemnation. But Socrates here explains that he has directed his reproach, or his 'disregard', toward exposing the ignorance of his kinsmen (τοῖς ἀνθρώποις : 39A 4). Here, as at 28B ff., he carries on with the question of material well-being. He interprets men's ignorance in terms of their devotion to wealth, reputation, honour (χρήματα, δόξα, τιμή). In saying that he reproaches men for this he highlights his own belief that virtue (ἀρετή) does not rest in men's material respect for one another (30B). If, by expressing this belief, he injures men and does

not benefit them, then, says Socrates, he is guilty of injustice (Cf *εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰντα λέγων . . . βλαβερά* :30B 5,6). These statements emphatically raise the question, in what does beneficial action consist? They set the pace for Socrates' final answer to the charge of impiety and corruption. We may now turn to our final treatment of these matters.

First, a short statement of Socrates' notion of beneficial action so far as this bears specifically on consent. This statement will serve, in part, as a brief review of ground we have already covered (Cf. p66 supra). It will also serve to underline the balance of topics which belong to our assessment of Socrates' notion of consent. Plato portrays Socrates' attitude to right action by giving dramatic emphasis to the benefit Socrates has provided other men, his concern for (*ἐπιμέλεια*) the true well-being of others. A vital aspect of Socrates' teaching, as described in the Apology, is his proposal that the truly just man (the good or worthy man) believes that the perpetration of material injury, for his own security's sake, would be of greater injury to himself than to the recipient (30CD). An important corollary attaches to this: it is that right action - action in regard of others - includes a man's considerations of his own true well-being; 'right action', then, implies action that is truly (not materially) beneficial to oneself. We may call this Socratic prudentialism. Socrates attests to his own notion of consent to law by denying the current prudentialist belief that a god (or a man) might compel a man to injure another unjustly. By denying this belief, Socrates denies two proposals that attach to it: that 'justice', where this means obeying laws, can entail injustice, and that justice is a real benefit to another man but only an intermediary benefit to oneself. Here we must remark that consent of conscience and consent to law will both be seen to figure as elements of

true consent. We have said that Socrates gives expression of his own consent to the laws by acting in their full view (p 61 supra). By consenting to conscience he shows to men what a truly just man's motive in consenting to law is: he consents to law from the belief that to do so is right (Cf on 28E f., p 73 supra). Here, we must draw attention to the corollary above: it implies that the truly just man consents to law in the belief that right action entails the acquisition of his truest interest. In respect of this point we must emphasize that Socrates, by acting in full view of the laws, has given dramatic expression to his belief that a man's exercise of regard for others through obeying laws is not, properly, conditional on material security (Cf pp 72-73 supra). His expression of this belief denies a principal tenet of the prudentialist theory; for by refusing to desist from his mission, he has shown that an injunction of his fellow citizens bidding him to desist could not be right. We should briefly note one other feature of Socrates' position which is of importance to these matters: his proposals imply that obedience to law and the exercise of other-regarding action are true and not false reflections of human nature.<sup>21</sup> His proposals support a claim of the Crito, that the duty

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<sup>21</sup> This notion is intimately connected with another one we have mentioned before now: that a man's external acts are not sufficient evidence of consent (p75 supra). A brief resume of this question will be appropriate at this point. We see an implicit demonstration of what is sufficient for consent from what Socrates has said at Apology 28E f. (pp75, 79supra): there, he implied that mere obedience to laws (the external act of obeying them) that society requires a man to obey is not sufficient for consent). The man's consent is only true consent if it is a case of the consent of conscience. In the broad context of Plato's argument with prudentialism the man who would deny this implies that the act of regarding another well is not unconditionally required and is a false reflection of human nature: viz; the prudentialist implies that men's hortations to regard one another well (to practise justice) are only a cover for their natural inclination to do the opposite. This denies two fundamental claims made by Plato: that the truly just man consents to law in the belief that (continued on page 80)

to obey laws of political community is itself natural. In that regard it will be useful to recall here Socrates' belief that the duty to obey conscience precedes, though it does not supersede the duty to obey established laws (p 61 supra).

We have indicated the importance to our discussion of Apology 30CD. Something now needs to be said of its dramatic significance. There, Socrates forcefully states that Anytus and Meletus are unjust men, men who, in their attempt to kill a man unjustly, commit the worst of evils. He says that their action is more evil than any material injury ( $\alpha\pi\omicron\kappa\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\epsilon\ .\ .\ \acute{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\lambda\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu\ .\ .\ \acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\iota\mu\acute{\omega}\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$ ) he could sustain from their injustice. He states, moreover, that those who attempt to kill a man such as himself ( $\epsilon\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\kappa\alpha\ \acute{\omicron}\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\omega}\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$ ) - one who had taught that men's primary concern is the soul's well-being - would injure themselves far more than they could that man. Indeed, he states that they would not be able to injure him, for to suppose that a better man might suffer injury from a worse is to suppose, wrongly, that the laws of God or man ( $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\mu\iota\omicron\nu$ ) would permit or sanction such injury. Now, despite this strong statement, we may assume that Anytus and Meletus<sup>22</sup> believed that Socrates had himself committed injustice. But how does Plato interpret this belief? At Apology 30CD Socrates does not speak of them as if they were well intentioned but profoundly mistaken men. He speaks of them, rather, as men who knew they were committing injustice by bringing their charge against him. Here, Plato wishes to dramatize the accusation and to fix

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21 (continued from page 81.)

it is in his true interest to do so and not from material convenience; the truly just man believes that he is required unconditionally (required by nature) to regard others well.

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It is useful to note that Socrates speaks of his new accusers as though they were one man ( $\acute{\omicron}\nu\kappa\omicron\varsigma\ \mu\acute{\iota}\nu\ \acute{\iota}\sigma\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\omicron\varsigma\ .\ .\ .\ ;\ \mu\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\omega}\ \acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\omicron\sigma\acute{\iota}\ \nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu\ \mu\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\omega}\ ,\ .\ .\ .$ ). This indicates that as far as Plato was concerned their similarity of motive overrides any particular differences. As Socrates is a paradigm of justice, so they exemplify injustice. Cf. n 15 supra.

the place of Anytus and Meletus in the process against Socrates. He wishes to point out that they, the upholders of nomos, have acted as if they knew that they were doing wrong to a man and believed that they were doing so for their own profit. Plato believes that they have misunderstood Socrates' reproach of Athens. But he avowedly believes that they have interpreted it, unjustifiably, as truly damaging, when they should have known it to be beneficial. To put it shortly, they hold Socrates to have committed injustice by having damaged their reputations as worthy men, by having called in question the knowledge of the 'καλοὶ καγαθοὶ' and reducing it to a pose. Plato, regarding that as the motive which underlies their charge, indicates that they exemplify a deep seated moral ignorance, an ignorance that does not absolve them since it is the ignorance of supposing that material harm (in our case, Socrates' 'disregard' of men's repute) is the worst of evils. (We should note that Plato implies, in the context, that they regard this evil as worthy of requital, not of punishment<sup>23</sup>). Here, at 30CD, Plato recalls the earlier association Socrates had made between this kind of

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23 Socrates says that they are attempting to kill a man unjustly, (*ἀνδρα ἄδικως ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποκτείνουσα*: 30D 5). That implies that in Plato's view the injury done to Socrates was not done in the spirit of 'impartial justice'. That is to say, it was not done in the spirit of punishment, fairly considered to be deserved for acts believed to be criminal. Here there is marked contrast with Achilles' position (supra). Achilles slew Hector in the name of justice and for shame of not doing what justice required. Had he slain Hector from material consideration (and Plato emphatically supposes he did not), then his material well-being would have been his motive in doing right action. He would, then, not have been a good or worthy man. But the case of Anytus and Meletus, is implicitly far worse, for by killing a man unjustly they both act from material motive and do wrong as well. The thought underlying "*ἀνδρα . . . ἀποκτείνουσα*" is that Socrates' accusers, believing that he has done wrong, also believe that a wrong deserves a wrong (not impartial justice) in return. That can only mean, as we shall presently see, that Anytus and Meletus exemplify the dark view that justice, the advantage of the stronger power, entails injustice. Here, the 'stronger power' is common opinion (Cp. p 74 supra), the prejudice against Socrates, and Anytus and Meletus are its agents, implicitly believing it to be the sole source of justice.

ignorance and the want of conscientious knowledge (p 74 f. supra). He wants to have Socrates spell out to his accusers that they, the champions of law and tradition, exemplify through their misunderstanding of his mission, the worst transgressions against the very meaning of law and custom, the transgressions of radical, secular thought. Plato wishes to make it clear that Socrates' accusers, in believing that he has committed injustice, are themselves at least complicit in true injustice (Cf *ὡς ἄλλοις . . . δικάζουσιν* ; p 75 supra). Thus he calls them unjust men. Here, the irony of their case; it is they, not Socrates, who imply disbelief in gods. In this they reveal a profound ignorance of right action and a man's true interest. We may regard Apology 30CD as the dramatic focal point in this dialogue with respect to Plato's treatment of prudentialism and beneficial action, the latter being the subjects that underlie his notion of justice and consent. It is important to draw attention to Apology 30CD at this point in our discussion, for what Plato says there is vital to our further treatment of Socrates' notion of consent. With this in mind we may now give further consideration to Plato's belief that Anytus and Meletus represent the want of conscientious knowledge. Their want of conscientious knowledge implies their acceptance of the prudentialist notion of justice. Here, Socrates' challenge to Meletus to prove him a wilful corruptor of the young is relevant.

In the exchange with Meletus (25B 5-26A) Plato has dealt with the paradox "No man willingly does wrong" so as to bring out its prudential force in common sense terms. We may first consider the general run of the argument and then deal with those aspects of it which are germane to our subject. The argument is that a man could not wrong his associates (the young) if he knew that to do so would result in his own injury. Meletus'

accusation that Socrates has willingly corrupted the young must be false,<sup>24</sup> for injury of the young very likely brings about one's own injury.

Consequently, the man who injures others morally must be ignorant of his interests. He must be ignorant of action which is beneficial to himself. This point serves Socrates' belief that Meletus is himself a man corrupted from want of true moral education, a man who seeks from deep ignorance to do evil to a man whom he will not recognize as a kinsman who benefits both the young and society by his actions.<sup>25</sup> Socrates justified his claim that Meletus must be lying by putting the paradox in the prudential form 'No man would seek to injure himself.' In this way he could imply, unparadoxically, that no man would willingly do wrong (corrupt the young), that the

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<sup>24</sup> "ψευδῆ" (or ψεύδεις, Adam.), at 26A, is rendered "lying" by all translators I am aware of, except Tredennick, who prefers "... your accusation is false." The idea which most translators want, that Meletus is guilty of a brazen lie, takes a deeper hue from the greater context to which the argument belongs. If, within the argument's own context, we accept that no man would willingly injure himself, then the man who denies this is simply not to be believed (πάντα... οὐδένα : 25E 6). Such a man must be lying. But Plato also wants to show, within the argument's broader context, that Meletus (and Anytus) do not know that by attempting to harm Socrates they will harm themselves more than they will him. He wants to show that Anytus and Meletus, in believing that Socrates had committed injustice, mark themselves as guilty of the want of conscientious knowledge. If this type of ignorance is culpable then it is not going too far to call one of its victims a liar (rather than, say, a simpleton who needs our pity) for implicitly believing the unbelievable, that a man would injure himself. Here, as later (30CD) Plato will only deal harshly with the ignorance of conscience and its motives. As Socrates' interlocutor at 28B ff. wants to make out that Socrates is a shameful fool, so Plato, in the earlier passage, wants to make use of prudentialism to make Meletus look like a fool.

<sup>25</sup> οὐ δὲ συγγενίσθαι μὲν μοι δεδίδαξι ἐργασίαι καὶ ἡθελήσας, : 26A 4.

man who disagreed would have to be suggesting that a man, while doing harm to others, could be said to be injuring himself willingly (i.e. with the knowledge that he would bring harm upon himself). But this defies common sense (Cf n 24).

By putting the paradox in this common sense form Plato prepares us for the wider issue of the case: that Socrates' accusers have acted as if they believed, in deep ignorance of their true well-being, that injuring another from material motive could be profitable. But that belief is the product of perverse education. To establish on common sense grounds that no man would wish to injure himself invites Anytus and Meletus to explain to Socrates in what way, if it is in his interest that the young should be good, he has injured them. It cannot have been from the desire to injure himself. Consequently, he must have acted in ignorance of the knowledge that improves the young. But if that is so, then Anytus and Meletus should not sue for his punishment, for since he did not know he was causing injury to the young then he cannot have acted with ill intent in their regard. To have done so must have brought injury to himself. His purpose in using the paradox in a demonstratively common sense way establishes common ground between him and his accusers: that no man would act so as to bring injury upon himself. We should emphasize that at 25C ff. Socrates does not specify, except in common sense terms, the kind of evil a man is likely to bring upon himself who makes the young bad (25E 3). In terms of Socratic prudentialism, real injury is injury to the soul. We may infer this from 30CD where Socrates says that men who attempt to do evil (in this case, material injury) will harm themselves more than they will their victims. The reason given at 25C ff. for guarding against corruption of the young is that this will

probably (*κινδυνεύσω*) result in injury to oneself. But this need only imply the belief that it is not in society's material interest that the young be corrupted. What Socrates has wanted to do here is establish agreement with Meletus that men who commit 'voluntary wrong' (See n 26) contravene their interests. He does not there establish that voluntary wrong must result in injury to the agent's soul. He only establishes that a man who makes the young morally worse will likely act against his own interests in doing so. He has come to trial for having corrupted the young. He has therefore brought potential harm upon himself, but it cannot be from failure to know that a man endangers himself who makes the young morally worse. On what grounds, then, can his accusers suppose that he had acted with ill intent?

The shared conviction, that no man acts so as to injure himself, points to, though it does not imply without qualification, the proposal made from 28B ff. that the man who lacked conscientious knowledge would do greater injury to himself than to one he intended injuring. Such a man must be ignorant of his true well-being; for he acts so as to injure himself. That is to say, the man who supposes that injustice is profitable and who acts with the knowledge that he is injuring others, is a man who does wrong unwillingly, where 'unwillingly' implies that the man acts in deep ignorance of what his true interest is; for, no man who knew that injury of another would result in his own injury could act so as to injure another. The burden of proof in the case against Socrates rests on Anytus and Meletus who must show that Socrates, in harming the young (his kinsmen) acted with ill intention. But Socrates has stated that he could not have known that the results of his actions (his teaching) were evil, and therefore, did

not know that he would likely suffer their ill effects. Clearly then, if Socrates did not know that he was doing wrong he would be in need of *μάθους*, not *κόλλους* since, if he learnt that his activity was destructive of himself and others, he would cease to do what he now does unwillingly.<sup>26</sup> But in bringing Socrates before a court Meletus and Anytus must have assumed that he had acted with ill intention and in ignorance of action that would profit him, or, that is, that he committed voluntary wrong. Underlying Socrates' denial that he did commit voluntary wrong and his lesson in equitable procedure is his challenge to his accusers to show him, if they will, what justice and beneficial action are; for if they reject

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26 What construction are we to put on 'voluntary or involuntary wrong-doing' (corrupting the young) at 25D ff.? Plato has contrived Socrates' rejection of Meletus' claim that he, Socrates, did wrong willingly, by having Meletus agree that 'doing wrong willingly' = 'knowing that one is injuring oneself.' But it is unlikely, on prudential grounds, that anyone would accept this equivalence as true to human nature. Surely, then, the man who does wrong 'willingly' must be one who believes, in deep ignorance of his best interest, that wrong-doing is, or can be, profitable to himself. Therefore, when Socrates says at 26A that the courts are places to bring men who are in need of punishment rather than instruction his implicit meaning is that they are places to bring men guilty of injustice, men who, in deep ignorance of their true interest, have sought to inflict injury on others. These are men who do voluntary wrongs. The corrected form of the equivalence above must then be: 'doing wrong' willingly = 'injuring an individual in the deeply mistaken belief that wrong-doing is profitable.' If Meletus could prove this of Socrates then his arraignment would be justified; for in that case, Socrates would have known that he was causing injury. But he denies this allegation on the prudential ground that no man could willingly injure himself. (Here, the plea he makes is based on common sense.) Therefore, if his actions have resulted in corruption of the young, and he has brought injury upon himself by his actions, he must have acted in ignorance of his own interests. Only if he knew that he had been causing injury (and had thought that to be profitable) would he deserve punishment.

We may rephrase 'doing wrong willingly' to read 'acting with intent to do injustice.' (Cf *ἐπιχειρῶν*, 30CD). Now the man who acts with such intent harms himself more than he does his victims (*Ibid.*). In that case, he must be ignorant of action that would truly profit him and would not commit injury if he knew that it leads to his own injury. Such a man must do injustice unwillingly, where 'unwillingly' means 'acting in contravention of action that would truly profit one'. But this man is guilty if he does know (unlike Socrates) that he is committing injustice. Socrates implies that he himself has acted unwillingly because he has not known that his actions would cause injury both to himself and to others.

the improbable position that a man would willingly injure himself then they must suppose that Socrates knew that he was doing wrong and that he acted in the mistaken belief that this could profit him. Socrates' denial, on prudential grounds, that he knew he was corrupting the young and his plea for instruction instead of punishment serve to oppose his beliefs about justice and beneficial action to those of his accusers. They also serve to generate his accusers' real motive for charging him: that he has assailed their reputations as men who have knowledge that improves the young.

Socrates says later (29A) that his accusers would have had a true cause against him if he had acted in contravention of action he had known to be right, fulfilling the god's bidding (Cf p 76). Had he so acted he would have lacked conscientious knowledge, his duty to fulfil his mission being conditional on material considerations, - considerations of public approval. But this would have implied disobeying the oracle. If Socrates is to be arraigned for disbelief in gods (as well as for corrupting the young) surely this act, his disobeying the oracle, would be a just cause against him. His statement from 28B ff. is an emphatic statement of his belief that the good or worthy man will not permit material convenience to be the condition of his doing right action. Had Socrates disobeyed a better being (ἄλλο...θεῶν: 29B 7, 8) he would have shown that right action is conditional on material convenience. His mission would have been a farce, for he would have shown that a stronger power (public approval) was itself the final arbiter of right action. But had he shown this, then he should, in consistency with that, have yielded to the unjust commands which he cites at 32B-D (Cf. n 16 supra). With these thoughts in mind we may emphasize that at 26A (See n 26) he implies that the man in need of punishment is one who knows he has done wrong and who has acted from the lack of conscientious

knowledge, or, that is, from the belief that wrong-doing could be profitable to him. The latter belief is amenable to the prudential conception that justice - obeying a stronger or better being, for example, - entails injustice - saving one's life or one's reputation at the expense of others.

Presumably, Meletus will not drop his charge on the strength of Socrates' plea that he did not know he was causing injury. He must therefore suppose that Socrates has acted with ill intent, not knowing that this would jeopardise his, Socrates', own best interests (Meletus and Anytus should at least have brought witnesses to show that Socrates did wrong - which they did not do (34AB) - even if they accepted Socrates' plea that he did not know that was doing injury to others). The danger Socrates has incurred cannot have resulted from his ignorance of the fact that it is imprudent to corrupt the young. Both he and his accusers know that it is in society's interest that the young should not become morally worse. Yet if he has come to trial, he must have acted toward others with ill intention. On Plato's interpretation of Socratic prudentialism, the paradox, as stated at 25C, opposes Socrates' real belief about self-injury since, as stated there, it only means that we have a material interest in educating the young. (Cf. on 'κακόν' at 25E 3, p 104 infra). If moral education consists of no more than furthering this interest, then the benefit of right regard which men expect from one another has no more than a material basis. The Socratic application of the paradox implies, in opposition to this, that a man's material well-being is subordinate to his true interest. Now, the Apology shows that the man who exercises Socratic disregard (Cf. p 78 supra) will likely receive evil (material injury) in return. But since such a man does not suppose that material injury is real injury<sup>27</sup>, then, in exercising

<sup>27</sup>  
 ἀποκτείνε μεντὲν ἴσως ἢ ἐξέλασεν ἢ ἀτεμώσεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα  
 (continued on page 90)

'disregard' of others he will not believe that he is acting so as to injure himself. If he is, it behoves his accusers to explain why he is. Their implicit answer is that material injury is real injury.<sup>28</sup> That this is Plato's view of their mind is shown from 30D (See n 27) where Socrates points to Anytus and Meletus by name in conjunction with the view that material evil is the worst of evils that can befall a man. Socrates' accusers must show in the case at hand that Socrates has committed wrong by the pursuit of his mission. To prove the case they must show that he has corrupted the young with ill intent. But if they accept on common sense grounds that he could not have known he was corrupting the young but still do not drop their charge, they must still believe he has acted with ill intent. In Plato's belief they can only show that Socrates has damaged men's reputations for moral knowledge and that they regard this - Socratic disregard - as true injury, injury worthy of punishment. Only in this way can they show that Socrates has brought injury upon himself. In showing this they prove that they are themselves the results of a perverse education, for they show that they believe that right regard of others is rooted in men's material

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27 (continued from page 89)

ὅσους μὲν ἴσως οἴεσθαι καὶ ἄλλος εἰς πονὸς μέγιστα κακὰ, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἴσθαι, (30D ff.). Here Socrates declaims the view that material injury qua the recipient is real. But he is equally concerned with the intention of the agent in inflicting material injury: ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον προσεῖν ἢ οὐτοσί νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτενεῖν. (Ibid.).

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Here, 'material injury' connotes Socratic 'disregard' of men's reputations, together with the common sense view that Socrates ought to have known that his disregard of others would one day result in his own undoing (ἀποκτενεῖς . . . ἀτερνώσειν above). The view that material injury is not real carries two meanings: that the intention to injure another marks a man as unjust, even if real injury is injury to the soul, and the unjust man cannot truly injure the just man; that the man who exercises Socratic 'disregard', though he damages men's reputations, acts for the good of their souls (See ahead, pp 100ff.). In conformity with the prudentialism of the paradox, such a man acts (in Socrates' view) in his own true interest.

considerations. For this reason they condemn themselves, in Plato's belief, of the moral ignorance of which Socrates convicted them (Cf. p 77 supra). We have said that their stand exemplifies radicalism. We shall see that their position, since it implies a conception of a man's kinsmen wholly opposed to Socrates', also implies an opposed theory of consent to law. The conception of beneficial action that Socrates puts in the Apology lies at the heart of this difference (Cf. pp108 ff.).

The prudential turn of the paradox, with its applications either to common sense prudentialism or Socratic prudentialism, underlies the questions of beneficial action and injury. Socrates claims that he could not have committed voluntary wrong precisely because wrong-doing leads to the agent's own injury. It is important to stress this point because the unjust man who does commit voluntary wrong believes, in deep ignorance of his true well-being, that wrong-doing can be profitable. We have said that Socrates imputes this doctrine to his accusers (30CD). At 25C ff. he maintained that if he injured others (made them morally worse) he would likely receive injury in return. But in terms of Socratic prudentialism the only real injury is injury to a man's soul. Had he intended to corrupt the young he must then have been ignorant of his own true interest. The injury he would receive would not be the injuries corrupted men could do to him, however severe, but the injury he would have done to himself by making the young morally worse. We have said that this conception does not follow without qualification from the statement at 25C ff. Indeed, Socrates here intends to make opposition with his own view, basing the opposition on the commonly shared views that no man acts so as to injure himself, that

society has an obvious interest in the moral education of the young. For the statement, if taken in a materialist sense opposes Socrates' own conception of prudentialism. The discussion at 25C ff. has two functions: it asserts that it is not in any man's interests that the young be corrupted; it serves Socrates' plea that if he has made the young worse he cannot then have known the grounds of his own or society's interests. If he is wrong in not believing that our interest in educating the young rests on obvious, material grounds, then he must lack skill in teaching the young, he must lack the knowledge that makes men good or worthy (Cf 30B 5, 6). The broad issue to which these questions belong is the notion of techne, or skill, - skill in teaching the young and in living with one's kinsmen (See infra, pp 102 ff.).

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There is general agreement among commentators that the charge brought against Socrates conceals a political motive. We have agreed with this view (p 70 supra). A brief assessment of the matter will be useful at this point. A good general treatment of the problem is offered by Crossman.<sup>29</sup> He has said that Socrates' accusation was compounded of the facts that his aristocratic following, being moved by the negative side of his teaching, regarded him as a useful arm in their efforts to depose the democratic regime; while the democracy, since its only arm against disorder lay in its affirmations of traditional belief had inevitably to condemn him. Crossman believes this was not unjustified. Athens was a dying city unable to accommodate new views of life which the social criticism either of Socrates or of other intellectuals implied. While the city relied for its

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<sup>29</sup> R. H. Crossman, Plato Today, (London, 1963) pp 32 ff. (Cf pp 181 ff.).

survival on a traditional belief become more formal than substantial, it was still justified in identifying Socrates, owing both to the destructive aspect of his teaching and to his associations, with those who contemned tradition but could only displace it with violent disregard of traditional values. Here we must note Crossman's view on the question of justification, and we should note that others, too, (both Burnet and Hackforth), have noted the loyalty to the democracy and the zealous concern for it exemplified by Anytus. While Burnet, Taylor, and Crossman have all seen a concealed political motive behind the charge, Hackforth<sup>30</sup> suggested that if the charge were political then, since Socrates was not likely to abate his criticism of the democracy after 403 a specific charge of political disloyalty could probably have been brought.

Hackforth was concerned with the empirical genesis of the charge and the trial and preferred to take the charge at its face value as indicating moral offences alone rather than implying as well a charge of *μισοδημία* (Ibid.). While noting Hackforth's disagreement with the majority view we can grant that while the charge does not mask a political offence that we can positively cite, Socrates' defence yet has strong political implications. If the regime of the Thirty seemed (with good reason) to its opponents to epitomise the radical challenge to traditional order, and if, indeed, Socrates' critical activity implied that traditional belief was not sufficient to make men virtuous, we have every reason to suppose that Anytus' concern for social stability (Cf Hackforth, p 76) is strongly tinged by the belief that criticism of tradition implies allegiance with political

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30. R. Hackforth, The Composition of Plato's Apology, (Cambridge, 1933) p 73.

sentiments that undermine it. If the charge against Socrates is not formally political, Plato none-the-less makes the question of consent to law combined with the moral issue of prudentialism the major thrusts in Socrates' defence. Why else would Socrates have referred, though the amnesty made this unnecessary, to past events in which he showed at near cost to his life his unwillingness to be complicit in unjust acts which had political and legal sanction, if he had not supposed that the question of a man's consent to law and a man's motive in obeying law were not major issues in the charge against him? Here the question of Socrates' associations with his fellow citizens is of importance. Taking the charge on its face value as a charge of impiety, Plato sets Socrates' conception of prudentialism against what he takes, if the truth were known, to be tacit grounds of the charge: that a man who had associations with those opposed to the democracy must himself oppose the traditions the democracy purportedly upholds. His sometime associations with aristocratic sympathisers, together with the supposed sympathy with anti-traditional doctrines which that could imply, furnished in his accusers' minds sufficient grounds for a charge of impiety. But their conception of a man's interests, as adduced by Socrates in his defence, makes them and not him the representatives of the challenge to traditional morality which they fear. (See infra, pp 100 ff.)

Now the most important feature of Socrates' teaching is, for our purposes, his idea about conscientious knowledge and the worthy man's motive in obeying laws (pp 73, 83 supra). We may note with the claim of the indictment, that Socrates does not believe in the gods the state believes in, that, indeed, his god is not a figure of worship peculiar to the city of which he is a citizen. That it is not is shown from his

statement that he would pursue his mission wherever he might.<sup>31</sup> That means that his duty to pursue his mission, or to obey his god, must underlie his consent to any community's laws. Together with this we must note his disclaimer of party loyalty or affiliation. This disclaimer is linked to his protreptic statement in that the ideal of duty and self-interest that he pursues does not come to rest in the support of one political force against another; his associations with men, whoever they might be, are in aid of a uniform doctrine of moral obligation and political consent that applies not only to his fellow citizens but to others as well.

Why did his accusers suspect, or, indeed, misunderstand this doctrine? We may agree with Crossman that what they feared was the negative political activities of those of Socrates' following known to be opposed to democratic rule. We find the basis for our interpretation that the charge covers political disloyalty in the implicit equation Socrates' accusers make between the community's traditional moral practices and the political sentiment that purports to uphold them; for we may suppose the accusers to have intended that their charge would include an implication of political disloyalty if it is also the case that they believed that democratic sentiment alone was equal to sustaining and approving rightful moral and religious practice. But it is just this which Socrates implicitly denies in his defence when he challenges his accusers to show him that by teaching his doctrine of a man's true well-being he has injured his kinsmen, while he explicitly emphasizes (with a view to the implication that he would act against his best interests by refusing to desist from his mission) both that he has eschewed on prudential grounds conventional means of advising

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<sup>31</sup> Cf 37D - 38A.

the community (31C 3 ff.), and that he has never placed the sanction of political power before what he knew the laws truly to enjoin, before what he knew to be right (32A ff.). We may recall here our earlier assertion that Anytus and Meletus, in claiming to uphold nomos exemplify, in Plato's mind, transgressions against it. Plato has cast them in the role of men who exemplify, if unwittingly, those same radical views of politics and morality which they themselves fear and to which they suspect Socrates to have been a party. Socrates implies in his defence that it is he and not they who upholds nomos. His reason rests on a distinction he makes between what we have called nominal and true consent. This distinction stands opposed to the implicit view of his accusers which we see in their response to Socrates' question, "Who is it that knows the laws?" (24D 11). Their implicit answer is that a community's moral traditions are the sole source of its laws and the sole source of a man's knowledge of his duty to others.<sup>32</sup>

Socrates opposes to his accusers' charge the apparent truism that political activity, where this means participation in the public offices of the community, must be discharged in view of the community's well-being. We may add that he shows no disaffection with the discharge of civic functions consequent upon being an Athenian citizen. But he does temper this view with the conviction that a man will achieve greater benefit both for himself and for others by advising the community as a private person (*ἰδιωτεύων*: 32A 1) than as a holder of public office or as an assemblyman (*δημοκρατεύων*: Ibid.). Underlying this apolitical position is a distinction

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<sup>32</sup> The potential immoralism which Plato grafts on to the charge arises from Socrates' challenge to his accusers to show him in what a man's interests consist. The question whether Plato is fair in his treatment of the accusers is not easy to answer. We can sympathize with Crossman's view (a view largely shared by others) that the accusation was justified if only because it was inevitable. But our treatment of the doctrine of (continued on page 97)

belief, which he opposes to common sense prudentialism, that obedience to laws is compatible with a man's true interest and that beneficial action entails unconditional obedience to laws (Cf. pp 61,63-68, and n 12 supra). These matters underlie a fundamental point which Plato wants the Apology to illustrate, that Socrates was a true kinsman to his fellow citizens, while they, in rejecting his mission, show themselves to be ignorant of the grounds of kinship.

The claim of the indictment that Socrates is impious and that he has wronged his kinsmen reduces to the belief, shared by Socrates and his accusers, that the man who does wrong or who acts with ill intention with regard to his kinsmen, contravenes his interests. Socrates' notion of the consent from conscience, which entails the belief that wrong-doing cannot profit a man (p 77) therefore raises the question, with respect to what interest of a man should a man perform right action or action beneficial to another? We have said that Socrates carried out his mission, in which he put his answer to this question, in full view of the laws, that he left himself at society's disposal in so doing. In this, he exemplified his conception of unconditional obedience to law, demonstrating his conviction that the performance of the duties of citizenship indicate that a man is just (or that he truly obeys law) only if he believes that right regard of others entails the acquisition of his own true interest. This denies the view of common sense prudentialism that right regard of others is an intermediary benefit to oneself, that the practice of justice is contingent on its materially benefiting a man to act with right regard toward others. We may emphasize that Socrates saw it as in his true interest and that of others that he should continue in the course he was convinced was right (Cf n 20).<sup>33</sup> By carrying out his mission in full view of the laws he left

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<sup>33</sup> Cf Apology 31 DE.

society free to accept or reject him. He would not contravene whatever decision it might make. In this way he exemplified his belief that a man's considerations of what it is in his true interest to do are compatible with his obeying laws.

Socrates' associations with his fellow citizens do not conceal his motive in doing what he believed to be right. Rather, they reflect his motive, being a testament to his belief that it is in a man's true interest to regard others well. By leaving himself at society's disposal while in the prosecution of his mission he underlined his belief that a man's consent to law is only true consent if it is a case of consent from conscience. His question at 24D 11 introduces an important link between his notions of consent and a man's considerations of his interests. Lying at the root of this question is Plato's belief that Socrates' accusers, by acting as if they believed that law could sanction wrong-doing in defence of any interest, deny Socrates' conception of the basis of consent to law. We should briefly reassess the grounds on which Plato asserts this claim.

Socrates had challenged his accusers to show him that he had wronged others. Accordingly, he required that they show him in what way he had endangered himself. The charge of the indictment, that he had acted with intent to destroy accepted values, masked, in Plato's view, the real grounds of the charge, that by exposing the emptiness of men's reputations for knowledge, Socrates had brought himself into disfavour with established order. Socrates and his accusers were both agreed that a man acts against his interests who injures others, that he is guilty of wrong if he has acted with ill intent. But their rejection of Socrates' mission indicated to Plato that the connotation they attached to this shared conception is that right regard of others is determined from a man's considerations of good

repute - from material considerations. To this idea Socrates opposed the weight of his moral teaching, that the good or worthy man determines to do right action from considerations of his true interest, apart from what common opinion approves. This is so whether a man is fulfilling public duties or acting as a private person. In denying that he has done wrong Socrates therefore also denies that he has acted so as to benefit himself. It is on these grounds that he denies the indictment's claim that he has been unjust. In denying the charge that he has corrupted the young he therefore denies the common sense claim that a man brings real injury upon himself who acts without consideration for his repute with others, or, that is, who acts without regard for his material well-being.

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The question Socrates asks at 24D 11, "Who is it that knows the laws?" is rooted in the questions: "Is there anything more important than that the young should turn out as well as possible?", and, "Who makes the young better?" (24D-D1). The analogy from techne, involving the concept of care for oneself, underlies these questions. The notion of techne, as used in the Apology, is basic to the doctrine of consent so far discussed. First, a general statement of its bearing on our subject.

Socrates uses the analogy in conjunction with the principle discussed above (n 26) that a man who wrongs his kinsmen must be ignorant of his interests. The indictment against Socrates rests on moral grounds: Socrates has committed injustice, being a man who corrupts the young. To have wronged his kinsmen, means, in the context of the answer Socrates gives to the charge, to have made the young morally worse with the result of wronging his society and bringing injury upon himself. But Socrates denies that he did wrong. He denies this on the prudential grounds that he cannot

have injured his kinsmen in the knowledge that he was doing so, since anyone will agree that a man who injures others contravenes his own interests. If in his relations with others Socrates has brought injury upon himself, he wishes his accusers to show him in what way he has done so. We have said that their implicit answer is that Socrates has brought disrepute - material injury - upon himself. Here we must note that in denying the indictment's claim that he had wronged others Socrates is also denying that he had brought moral injury upon himself, implying by this that he cannot have done real injury - moral injury - to his kinsmen. We have noted that the techne analogy is used in conjunction with prudentialism: would it be in a man's interests to act with disregard (without care) in his dealings with others? The conception of care (*περίεργος*) pertains both to a man's knowledge of some skill - in our case, the skill that improves the young - and his concern for himself: first, his skill qua his relations with the young; second, the social ramifications of this work. We have said that the notion of consent from conscience bears on the question, with respect to what interest of a man should a man perform right action - action beneficial to another (p 98)?<sup>34</sup> In conjunction with this question we must explain the connotations which attach to 'care' or 'concern for oneself' in one's work. Socrates combines the question, "Who improves the young?" (or, 'Who has skill in moral instruction?') with the question of a man's interests in his relations with others so as to give the belief he shares

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<sup>34</sup> 'Right action' could simply be action that does not impede the material well-being of another man. But Socrates implies in the Apology that a man is just only if he believes that his own material well-being is not a condition of his doing right action, or action with beneficial result to another. (Cf p 78 supra). He supposes, moreover, that he will have truly benefited men if he convinces them of this belief even if he must sustain injury in so doing.

with his accusers, 'No man voluntarily acts so as to injure himself.', two applications (Cf pp 85-88 supra). We may briefly review these applications.

We may ask what sort of evil the man who makes others morally worse will receive from them?<sup>35</sup> The Socratic intention of the principle, 'No man voluntarily seeks to injure himself.' is that a man would injure himself morally - or truly injure himself - who wronged others, not knowing that to do so is detrimental to a man's true well-being even if it results in material profit. To state this notion at its most paradoxical, had Socrates quit his mission he would have done so from the motive of material security - the fear of death (29A). But this was to admit that the materially prudent-ial course of action was the condition of doing what was right - accepting the community's hypothetical offer to get him free, on the understanding that he would be condemned if he continued with his mission. But that was to fail to act either in his own true interest or in that of others. It was both to admit that the community was the final source of law and to disobey the god (Cf pp 79 and 96 supra). The 'benefit' he would receive from the community by quitting his mission would have been security to his material well-being, but this could not have been a moral benefit; viz., such a benefit could not confirm him in his belief that he was a better man than his accusers, a man whom they could not truly injure (Cf 30CD). Such

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35 We assume, by asking this question, that Socrates would make his community morally worse by quitting his mission. (For by quitting his mission he would concede that a man's material concerns are the sum of his well-being.) The community 'benefits' him by not killing or banishing him. But Socrates' acceptance of this benefit makes him morally worse, for he must cease to do right action - obey the god- in order to enjoy the benefit. To disobey the god, however, who is better than Socrates (Cf  $\epsilon\tilde{\omega}\dots\theta\epsilon\tilde{\omega}$  29B 7) is, in his view, both evil and shameful.

a 'benefit', rather, must have made Socrates a worse man, for its enjoyment was conditional on his forsaking what he saw as a duty to the god, and, indeed, a duty to his fellow citizens. But he then must have supposed that wronging another - the god - for the material benefit he would receive from the community - could be a profit rather than a detriment to him. Also, he would have conceded that right action, action which benefits another, is conditional on the agent's material considerations. For Socrates would have consented to the laws of the community from fear of death. But this would be to abandon the god's mission in favour of the community's injunction that he quit his mission. Had he supposed this to be more prudent than the continued prosecution of his mission, he must then in fact have abandoned belief in the god; for he would have admitted that the materially profitable course of action - consenting to the community's injunction - was the right course of action. But Socrates cannot both maintain this belief and believe, at the same time, in a god who permits no real injury to befall a just man, a man who fulfils its bidding. Socrates in fact believed that to abandon his mission was to bring evil upon himself, the kind of evil that makes men morally worse; for by quitting his mission he would abandon his belief that material injury is not true injury. To have abandoned this belief he must have become a worse man.

This conception is built upon the more obvious meaning of prudentialism; that no man would act with respect to others (as Socrates did) so as to incur their disfavour, thus bringing potential (material) injury upon himself. The question, would it be in a man's interests to injure others or to act without care in respect of them could simply be asking

(as at 25C ff.): would it pay to make others, the young, morally bad (*μοχθηρόν*) when we know that some day they might do us some injury? Could a man really be said to have skill in his relations with others who thus brought material injury upon himself? We may refer here to the statement at 25C ff. At 25E 3<sup>36</sup>, 'κακόν' simply refers to the evil a man would incur from another's ill intentions, from one who had been made corrupt. Socrates combines this notion of evil to the self (material injury inflicted by another) with the notion of evil men (*οἱ . . . πούηροι*: 25C 7) who bring evil upon their kinsmen and good men who bring good to give the two applications of the paradox we have discussed above (pp 83-92). At 30CD, Socrates states that he himself has incurred the prospect of what Anytus, Meletus, and others (*οἷος . . . καὶ ἄλλος εἰς*) regard as the greatest of evils - material injury. But his statement (*Ibid.*) that material injury incurred by the victim is not nearly so great an evil as the agent's motive in causing injury (killing a man unjustly), together with his denial, on prudential grounds, that he has intentionally injured others, (Cf n 26) confirms his own intention in respect of the principle that no man would voluntarily act so as to injure himself: that a man who incurred material injury in his relations with others could not, by that reason, have sustained true injury. We have said that the notion of consent from conscience raises the question with respect to what interest of a man should a man perform right action, or action beneficial to another? Underlying Socrates' discussion with Meletus at 25C ff. are the questions: with respect to what interests of a man, or, indeed, of society, should we educate the young? What are the real consequences of making the young worse (*μοχθηρόν*)? If we answer these questions from

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ἔγω δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίᾳς ἤκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι εἴαν τινα μοχθηρόν ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τε λαβεῖν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, . . . ;

material considerations, then the kind of evil is that intended at 25E3 by 'κακόν', material injury alone. The prudent man, the man who knows his best interests, will be one who has learnt that it cannot profit him to contravene his material well-being. This conception will be root and branch of his moral education. He will have learnt, when young, that right regard of others is recommended from the obvious material needs of the self. He will have learnt as well that material evil is the worst of evils, the worst evil that can befall a man. But this teaching opposes Socrates' belief that a man's regard for his material well-being is not a sufficient ground on which to base his relations with others - whether the young or one's fellow citizens - a feature of the case he had left open at 25C ff. in order to generate his accusers' implicit answer to the question: in what does right regard of others consist? They must know, for they accuse him of injustice, of wilful disregard of the moral needs of the young and hence of society. Yet Socrates knows that he will probably incur injury if he makes the young worse. In what way, then, has he disregarded his kinsmen and brought injury upon himself? On what basis has he committed voluntary wrong?

His accusers must answer that Socrates has lacked skill in his relations with them, - in his relations with his society (for which they act as advocates) and its requirements of him as a citizen. But if Socrates' doctrine of a man's interests is damaging, then to whom is it damaging? Those who survived its ill effects should now come forward to accuse him (33C ff.). Since, however, none do come forward yet he finds himself on trial, he must still have wilfully disregarded others and lacked knowledge of his own interests in so doing. His accusers accept that he

cannot have caused injury without knowing that it is folly to make the young worse. For it is plain to any man that we stand to injure ourselves if we do not tend to their moral education. But his accusers still regard Socrates as culpably ignorant of action which would benefit both himself and others, for they do not drop their charge. His plea for instruction generates his accusers' implicit answer that Socrates has not learnt what others have: that a man's material well-being is the basis on which right regard of others is determined. This belief denies Socrates' theory of conscientious knowledge and a man's true interest. It therefore also denies Socrates' avowed belief that the 'disregard' of others which he has practised is beneficial.

Socrates dedicated his reproach of Athens, his 'disregard' of others, to his conception of conscientious knowledge and a man's true interest. He put this conception before all citizens, before the young, before foreigners, teaching what he believed any man should know about the grounds of a man's relations with others. Briefly stated, he believed that a man who is 'skilled' in his relations with others - a man who profits in his relations with others - should be any man. We may mark what he says at 23B: that the oracle must have meant that that man ( *ὁβριος ὑμῶν . . . .* ) - any man - is wisest who, like Socrates, knows he is of little worth in respect of wisdom, that he, Socrates, is only an exemplar, the god's instrument, in putting this view before men. A man who was wise would not let fear of death (or any material consideration) be the condition of or stand in the way of his doing what he believed was right. The man who was not wise would do so and would fail to act in his true interest. This means that any man should act from conscience (Cf p 74 supra and n 20), that moral

education must consist in putting this knowledge before man. We have said that Socrates' stand in the Apology is apolitical (p 96 supra). We mean by this that his position was not partisan. While that is true, we must remember that he was willing to fulfil the duties consequent upon being an Athenian citizen. But he implicitly disclaims personal allegiance to party (p 95 supra). We should also mark that his mission, while its prosecution illustrates a general theory of consent to law, is not a call for a particular form of rule. He does not oppose his city's political structure. What he does oppose is men's attitudes to law as seen in current values - values which he exposes in his defence. His theme is the choice a man makes in obeying the laws of a present form of rule. On this theme he bases his conviction that a man is self-ruled who acts from conscience in exercising right regard of others, in doing what law ought to order a man to do.

While the analogy from techne will be used by Plato in the Republic to illustrate a theory of political consent developed on lines of class interest, he makes use of the concept in the Apology to exemplify Socrates' belief that any man might exercise true prudential skill in his relations with others and that any man is responsible for conscientious knowledge. Since, typically, the analogy implies the exercise of skill upon 'matter' inferior to the agent of the skill we must show how Plato used the analogy in the Apology to explain Socrates' basic notion of one man's duty to another, a notion which he developed in terms of his conception of a man's true interest. Here, divisions of political function on lines of class interest is neither assumed nor implied. The analogy is rather used to illustrate the general question Socrates puts to his accusers, who believe themselves to be advocates of moral good, 'What does prudence counsel in

respect of a man's regarding others well?' A man's answer to this question will indicate his conception of a man's interests, his conception of the benefit that comes to a man from exercising right regard of others. It will indicate whether he believes a man stands to gain anything other than material security from his exercise of right regard of others. It will indicate at the same time whether he believes that right action could entail anything more than a man's regard for another's material well-being. In short, his answer will indicate his conception of society's interest in moral education and his conception of the just man, the man who regards his kinsmen well.

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Socrates believed that by the prosecution of his mission he was aiding the god (23B). He gave help to the god by pointing out to men what he took the god's oracle to him to mean: that he was the god's instrument in showing men that human wisdom amounts to a confession of ignorance. We have described this wisdom, in its moral aspect, as being conscientious knowledge. So far as conscientious knowledge pertains to a man's conception of his interests in his relations with others, we may describe Socrates' service to the god as being devoted to his encouraging men to learn, from consideration of their interests, how a god would have men regard one another. An important nuance from the techne analogy underlies Socrates' relation with the god. Socrates ascertained on rational grounds what the god must have intended by its oracle (Cf n. 20). He was the god's instrument, benefiting the god by ascertaining its meaning. In this, he was as one subordinate or inferior to the god, being convinced that he must regard the god's business as of the utmost importance.<sup>37</sup> It was from rational consideration that he came

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<sup>37</sup> ... ὅπως δὲ ἀγκυραίων ἔδοξε εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιέσθαι — ἴσον οὖν, σκοποῦναι τὸν χρησμὸν τε λέγει, ... :21E 4,5.

to believe that he had a mission from the god to his fellow citizens. By encouraging them toward rational reflection about their interests he believed he was benefiting the god, a better being whom he believed he must serve. He believed, at the same time, that no man who acted in the service of the god could sustain true injury, that such a man must himself be a 'better' man whom others could not injure (Cf 30CD). The notion of techne, so far as it underlies Socrates' relation with the god, exemplified what Plato inferred from the example of Socrates to be a rational choice, a choice from a man's true interest that a man makes in obeying an objective moral law. Socrates described this choice as being open to any man. In the Apology, Plato portrayed Socrates' consent to the god by showing that Socrates consented to what he believed law truly enjoined upon him: to regard others well, both the god and his fellow citizens, without consideration for material security. On this conception Plato based a theory of the self-ruled man. The Apology epitomizes this theory. Socrates died in the prosecution of a mission which he believed he would abandon at the prejudice of his true interest (Cf pp 103ff. supra). By its prosecution he not only died; he also exemplified true consent to law. He did so both by acting in full view of the laws of his city and from his belief that he could sustain no evil by acting as he believed the god would have him act. In this Plato regarded him as an exemplar of a man's consent to moral law, as an exemplar of man's conception of his own interests as evidenced by his obeying a better being and by obeying the laws of his city. In short, Socrates benefited the god by rational reflection upon the meaning of its oracle. He himself thereby benefited by the knowledge that no real harm could come to a man who acted as a god would have him act, a man who acted from conscience in his relations with others.

We have stated that the doctrine of consent in the Apology has both

theoretical and practical aspects (p 97 supra). These involve Socrates' conceptions of a man's true interest and his notion of the source of law in communities (P 96), and, as a practical complement to these conceptions, his testament to them in his actions as a citizen.<sup>38</sup> The analogy from techne, so far as it describes Socrates' relation with the god, exemplifies his conception of a truly just man's consent to law. For this reason the analogy complements the practical aspect of the doctrine of consent, serving to exemplify a man's belief, attained on rational grounds, that it must be in his true interest to regard others well. We have said that Socrates' accusers exemplify common sense prudentialism (pp 81-84). Accordingly, we have indicated that their implicit notion of the just man - the good or worthy man - derives from the view that the just man regards others well from material considerations. Plato devoted the first three books of the Republic to a full description of this point of view, a point of view that maintains that material security is the only ground of justice. There, his account of common sense prudentialism serves his ultimate intention to discuss political consent within the context of a society in which the needs and interests of three classes of citizen are conceived as realized. In the Apology his conceptions of true and nominal consent do not depart from the context of current political life. We see both here and in the Crito, on the plain of actual politics, Plato's opposition to the view that a man's material considerations are sufficient for consent to law and right regard of others. It will be useful at this point in our discussion to clarify further those aspects of prudentialism that are common to the early books of the Republic and the theory of consent in the Apology. Here, we shall be chiefly interested in making use of the Republic to clarify the implicit view of Socrates' accusers that justice - obeying a stronger power - entails

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Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῶν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους ἀλλ' ὁ ὑμῶν ἐμῶν, ἔργα. : 32A 4,5.

wronging others. Hence, the importance to our discussion of a central question of the Apology: what does prudence counsel in respect of a man's regarding others well (p 107)? We shall deal with the Republic in this chapter only to the extent that it throws valuable light on the doctrine of consent in the Apology. When we have done this we may take up again our consideration of the Crito in order to complete our discussion of the Socratic conception of consent.<sup>39</sup>

We have said that the analogy from techne in the Apology complements the practical aspect of the doctrine of consent, that it exemplified Socrates' belief, attained on rational grounds, that it must be in a man's true interest to regard others well (p 110 supra), that he himself had a duty to put this view before men. When he says, at 32A 4,5 that he will let his actions be his witness to the fact that he has never yielded to injustice through fear of death he implies that the truly just man demonstrates by his actions - his outward activity - his belief that right regard of others is not contingent on material considerations. Such a man believes he must become a worse man - a man lacking the benefit of knowing what a god would require of men - if he acts unjustly. That is to say, he would lack the moral benefit of knowing that it cannot profit a man, but must rather injure a man, to wrong others. (Cf pp 102, 104 supra). In contrast to this, the truly just man is one whose actions are consistent with his belief that the better man - the man who refrains from injustice - cannot be injured by a worse man. Such a man's outward actions will reflect this belief. In consistency with the demonstration given at 32A 4, 5 ff. Socrates

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<sup>39</sup> We have dealt at sufficient length in this chapter with Socratic and common sense prudentialism as they occur in the Apology to justify specific reference to the Republic, an obviously later work, so far as the Republic assists us in defining the Socratic theory of consent. For example, the notion of covenant (συνθήκη), as explained on prudential grounds by Glaucon, finds a natural contrast in the Crito where, we have suggested, Socrates' doctrine is consistent with the Apology. It is not before Plato develops his actual conception of an ideal community (Republic 369B ff.) that the Platonic and Socratic conceptions of consent become viably distinct. For this reason, the early books of the Republic are germane to our specific treatment of the Socratic conception. Our present chapter is the natural place for specific reference to these books of the Republic.

has described his mission as an activity that has not been dependent on material considerations. It has been an activity that has been truly beneficial to others (29D ff.). Moreover, from what we know of Socrates' relation with the god (pp 108, 109 supra) we know that he believed that by serving the god and his fellow citizens he was acting in his own true interest as well, that he himself benefited from his protreptic activity. These features of Socrates' position indicate his belief that the practice of justice, both in his day to day life and in the prosecution of his peculiar duty, had a result - the acquisition of his true well-being - that was continuous with its practice. This idea underlies Socrates' belief that obedience to law, where this implies a man's true consent, is compatible with a man's acquisition of his true interest.<sup>40</sup>

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We should emphasize that Socrates was a better man owing to the service he gave the god (pp 102, 104 supra). Here, he was as one inferior to a superior; he was as one who was benefited by his response to a superior being, the god. That exemplifies a main feature of the techne analogy (p 107 supra). But together with this, we must emphasize the point of the practical illustration given at 32A 4,5ff. There, Socrates implies that in his day-to-day life as a citizen he has acted toward others as a god would have a man act (Cf. *ἐβούθουν τοῖς δίκαιοις*; 32E 5), regarding other men as being 'better' than himself in the sense that any man owes a duty to another. Peculiar to Socrates' conception is his belief that by regarding others well, where a man is not moved to do so from material consideration, a man demonstrates skill or prudence in his relations with others. Since Socrates supposes he is only an exemplar of conscientious knowledge (Cf p 106), his notion of skill as conveyed to us in the practical illustration points to a conception of moral equality among men: the responsibility of any man to act justly in his relations with others.

We may emphasize that the notion of compatibility entails the belief that the better man (the truly just man) will always act as a god would have a man act: from conscience in respect of others (p 107 supra). He will believe that to do so is in his true interest and that consent from conscience is the basis of true consent to law. Socrates exemplified his belief that consent from material considerations is less than true consent by exercising right regard of others in full view of the laws of Athens. He thus gave his city complete freedom to witness, to accept, or to reject his own conception of justice and consent to law. At his trial, then, he put himself at his city's disposal, entrusting his fate not only to its decision but also to the god: *νομίζω γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ ἐγὼ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι μᾶλλον ἐμοὶ εὖ ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν*. 35D6 ff. (His statement (Ibid.)) (Continued on page 113.)

As the truly just man's outward activity reflects his inner belief, so too does his ostensible consent to law - his day to day life in which he fulfils the duties of citizenship - reflect conscientious consent. We may regard the just man's outward activity here defined as his continuing consent. We may say that the latter is the outward manifestation of the consent of conscience, that it reflects the just man's belief that he is bound in conscience to regard others well: it will reflect a man's being moved to the practice of justice from the belief that he is morally required to regard others well. The Apology demonstrates this conception of justice. It is a conception which opposes common sense prudentialism, its notion of justice, and its theory of consent to law. It is a theory which underlines a main feature of the social contract theory as we described this theory in Chapter 1: that a man's consent to law implies a natural duty to regard others well. But the notion of a man's initial subjection to political order, which would imply on historical grounds a categorical distinction between natural and positive law, was not applicable to the Socratic conception. Indeed it was to the moral rather than to the historical emphasis of contractual thinking that Locke's conception of individual consent was devoted. But the emphasis in Locke was on limitations to the pursuit of interests which a man's moral knowledge, as evidenced by his obeying laws, must impose upon him (pp 39 ff. Ch 1). In Socrates' case, however, all emphasis is placed on a man's knowledge of conscience, and, with that, on his belief that such knowledge itself entails a man's acquisition of his

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40 (continued from page 112)

that he believes in the gods as do none of his accusers consists with his belief that no real harm could come to a man who acted in a god's service. If he were to implore his judges (*Σειρομαι* : 35 C,D), instead of teaching and persuading them, he would encourage them to disbelieve in gods (35 D) - to disbelieve, that is, that a better man cannot be truly harmed.)

true interest: that a man acquired his true interest in the exercise of justice, in the exercise of the right regard of others. Again, a man's consent from conscience implies his knowledge of how a god would have a man act in respect of others. Socrates believed that a man's consent to law, if it is true consent, is the natural effect of what a god would require. On this conception he based his belief that a man's duty to obey divine law precedes, though it does not supersede, his duty to obey the laws of his city. We see this conception in the Apology and the Crito taken together. The Socratic conception categorically opposes the doctrine of covenant (*συνθήκη*) which Plato describes in the Republic. The implicit thrust of Socrates' opposition is against the moral implications which follow on the Sophistic conception of the discrete origins of political life. These implications come to rest in Glaucon's statement (360D) that no man is just of his own will but of necessity (*οὐδεις ἑκων δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζόμενος*). The thought expressed in this phrase opposes the Socratic conception that a man's rational considerations must lead to the conviction that a god would not sanction<sup>41</sup> a man's doing wrong to others, that it must

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41 Together with Socrates' conception at Apology 30CD that it is not a god's will (*οὐ. . . θεριτόν*) that a worse man could injure a better - *οὐδέ γάρ ἄν δύνασσο* - we shall remember that Socrates believed he was aiding, or benefiting, the god by the prosecution of his mission (pp 108 supra). We shall recall as well that Socrates believed he was acting in his own true interest by prosecuting this mission. In short, his relationship with the god stands as an exemplar of how a god would have a man regard another, better, being - whether a god or a man (Cf 29B7). Here we may note the wide construction that is properly to be placed on *'θεριτόν'*: "allowed by the laws of god and men, righteous" (L & S, Intermediate Ed. p 361).

In the context of the Apology the concept underlying *'θεριτόν'* is that men's laws ought to conform to those of a god. Socrates treats this concept, throughout, on prudential lines: Injuring a better man (or attempting to do so) must make a man morally worse (30 D5); it must deprive him of the benefit of being a good man. We have seen that Socrates must become morally worse if he abandons his mission. If he did so he could not then be confirmed in the belief that he was a better man whom (continued on page 15)

be in a man's true interest to regard others well. In the Republic, as in the Apology, Plato develops the notion of consent in conjunction with the question of divine sanction. Socrates and his interlocutors treat the problem in terms of the questions: whether it is rational, and therefore profitable, to regard justice as having an absolute claim on a man; what does the existence of law imply about men's considerations of their interests? The treatment of these questions is ranged, historically, from the secular, contemporary views of Thrasymachus and Glaucon that justice is the stronger man's advantage and that right regard of others is not natural, to the provenance of these views, as rehearsed by Adeimantus, in traditional conceptions about deity and what the gods sanction.

We have indicated that Socrates' conception of techne in the Apology, so far as it denotes a man's skill in his relations with others, exemplifies his conception of a truly just man's consent to law. We have said that Socrates' conception in the Apology is conveyed to us in both theoretical and practical terms. The former of these is marked by the analogy from techne which underlies the notion of conscientious knowledge; the latter, by a practical illustration which describes the skilled or truly just man's consent to law in his day-to-day acts,<sup>42</sup> in his acts as a member of a political community. We have seen that such a man will act as a god would require a man to act. We have further noted that the Socratic conception of consent from conscience may be regarded, in its outward manifestation,

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41 (continued from page 114).

worse men could not injure (p 103<sup>supra</sup>). In Socrates' conception of deity, therefore, the question 'What would a god sanction?' must reduce to the question 'What does prudence counsel in respect of a man's regarding others well?' (pp 72, 107, 111<sup>supra</sup>).

42 Cf on 'εργα', n 38 supra.

as a man's continuing consent. The moral implications of the Socratic conception of the activity of justice, which illustrates Socrates' doctrines of consent to law and the self-ruled man, oppose the conception of the discrete origin of political life as described by Plato in the Republic. That conception maintains that kinship is dependent on material necessity alone, that a man's right regard of others implies only his want of material self-sufficiency, that justice has no natural claim on a man. The theories of justice which Plato records in the early books of the Republic proceed from the view that justice is another man's good, that its practice is only of intermediary benefit to the agent. We find here, in explicit detail, the implications to moral education of the Sophistic answer to the question: what does prudence counsel in respect of a man's regarding others well? The purport of this question to political theory is determined by our answers to two other questions: what is the source of law and right action (justice) in political communities; what man could be said, from the evidence of his actions as a citizen, to 'know the laws', (pp 96 , 100 supra), or, that is, to know what law truly enjoins on a man?

Socrates quite clearly indicates in the Apology by means of the analogy from techne, that the moral life of a state is not self-dependent, that consent to a state's laws, where it is true consent, is the natural effect of what a god would require of a man (Cf p 114 and n 41 Ibid.) By maintaining this view he denies that a man's regard for the material well-being of others is sufficient for consent to law and right regard of others. The following corollaries attach to Socrates' position: a man cannot be said to lack skill, and therefore to have failed in achieving happiness or success, who wins the disfavour of others; if, in his relations with others, a man has not acted from considerations of his own material well-being, the

man is both just and successful. In Plato's belief, Socrates' accusers in the Apology implicitly deny this position and its corollaries by accusing Socrates of wrong-doing. By their accusation they in fact exemplify the prudentialist tenet that justice consists in benefiting friends and in harming enemies. By their accusation, they imply that Socrates was ignorant of his own interests in his incurring the ill favour of others. Finally, they imply by their action in accusing him that a community's moral tradition - that political community - is the sole source of law.

The self-ruled man of Socratic theory believes he has a covenant with other men. The Apology explains this conception by putting the view that a man's right regard of others, as reflected by his external practice of justice, is true consent to law when it is a case of the consent of conscience. The self-ruled man's consent to law, is, on the Socratic theory, a natural effect of what a god would require. Thus his covenant with men reflects divine will. This conception denies the Sophistic view that men praise justice from the want of material self-sufficiency, that obedience to law from material insufficiency is sufficient grounds for men's consent, for their recommendation of and their practice of the right regard of others. Common sense prudentialism supposes that justice is an external, artificial quality only, supposing that its practice conceals men's true disposition. While that is so, the prudentialists yet recommend the practice of justice to the man who would be skilful in his actions; for such a man, since he wishes to win men's favour, does not wish to seem unjust in the eyes of those whose favour he seeks, those who praise and recommend the practice of justice. Indeed, the skilful man's real object is to divert public favour to himself, to become the 'other man' of Thrasymachus' description - the man who is advantaged by men's practice of justice. Ultimately, the

skilful man, succeeding from the favour others show him, will be able to go beyond what public opinion approves. He will be able to achieve complete injustice.<sup>43</sup> By doing so he will live according to men's true inclination. In his view, to succeed in political life is to live as would a materially self-sufficient man, a man who would succeed in a natural condition in which there were no moral strictures on men's actions. The skilful man, then, according to the theory, attains success by overcoming nomos, by showing from the example of his own life that nomos has no legitimate, or natural hold on him. He proves the case put by Glaucon that the skilled man does not assume he has a covenant with other men (Cf n 4 p 53 supra), that men will praise the practice of justice and so deceive themselves from their fear of suffering injustice (. . . ἐπαινοῦσιν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν [the just man] ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους δίκαιον τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον .: 360D 27). According to the theory, then, the source of law in communities is men's recommendation of justice from material insufficiency and the use which skilful men make of this recommendation. In consequence of this, any man who had the power to exercise injustice but who refused to do so would be most miserable and irrational (ἀθλιώτατος . . . ἀνοητότατος : Ibid.), for a man can have no grounds for practising justice other than material necessity. These views proceeded from the assumption that a community's moral life is self-dependent. In holding that moral custom must originate in material necessity, the common sense prudentialists supposed as well that a man's response to moral habit must be sufficient for consent to law. The immoralist complexion which this view takes derives from the claim that while men's right regard of one another is approved by custom, reason itself can only

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The essence of the view is stated by Glaucon at 362A: εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ, φησὶν οὖν τὸν ἀδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδύμενα πρῶτα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἀδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν. . . . In the paragraph above, I have provided a brief statement of this view.

approve right regard, or justice, conditionally. We have previously alluded to Socrates' belief that the man who does what is right because common opinion or personal expediency requires right action of him is not a man of much worth (p 74 supra). His meaning is explained by the doctrine of conscientious consent and exemplified by the practical illustration of Apology, 32A ff. Socrates held that a man's right regard of others, as seen from his consent to law, is a natural requirement which is justified by rational consideration of interests. He believed that consent is to be understood both as a response to custom and as a response to reason. When a man consents from reason, or from consideration of his true interest, he exemplifies the consent of the self-ruled man, the man who believes that his covenant with others is a natural effect of what a god would require. Such a man in Socrates' view consents truly. He is the better man whom worse men cannot injure. Such a man will always act so as to regard others well, be they stronger or weaker men. In short, his consent to law both belongs to custom and transcends it. Since that is so, no human sanction could be good against a man's true consent, for by consenting truly a man exercises right regard of others and so acts as a god would require. Together with this we shall remember that Socrates acted in full view of the laws of his city. By doing so he testified to his belief that a man's material well-being is not a condition of his right regard of others, of his consent to law. These facts bring us back to the question at Apology 24D 11, 'Who is it that knows the laws?' and to the notions of prudentialism that underlie the question. The broad issue which pervades these aspects of the Apology is the notion of moral custom (pp 78, 79 supra and 96 supra) and Plato's



what custom requires of a man. His ignorance of the requirements of custom will reveal his ignorance of what a god would require of a man in respect of a man's regard of others. Socrates implicitly levels these charges at his accusers, at men who see themselves as the champions of nomos and as the guardians of the moral well-being and education of the young. In contrast to the view they have of themselves as upholders of moral good Socrates treats his accusers as men who do great injury to themselves by condemning him, as men who act in deep ignorance of their true well-being. He thus assails them as men who lack prudential skill, implicitly accusing them of being unfit to see to the education of the young.

Socrates' charge accords with his statement that he himself was never anyone's teacher (33A). For he taught the young, or, for that matter, anyone who would listen to him, that well-being does not consist in material prosperity, reputation, or honour (29E). In teaching this he was not teaching a skill that would accord with conventional notions of virtue. On his own belief, he was teaching a skill which would rather result in conscientious knowledge from a confession of ignorance. On the one hand, his elenctic activity had its negative side: it sought to dissolve reputations for knowledge. But at another level it sought to teach men that right action is more to be valued than material well-being. On the positive side, then, Socrates' teaching was intended to have a specifically moral result - a result which he interpreted in terms of the advantage to the agent of other-regarding action - an advantage which material loss could not prejudice.<sup>44</sup> It was on these grounds that Socrates would justify to men the conventional requirement that they should regard one another well. To do so serves a

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<sup>44</sup> Socrates says that he does not know the consequences of death, but he does know that it is wrong to harm a better being, either a god or a man: 29B7. Cf. on 32E 5, n 40 supra.

man's true interest. The man who obeys laws from consideration of his true interest, and not from considerations of his material well-being, is a man who can be said to 'know the laws', a good or worthy man.

Socrates' position was bound to conflict with the beliefs of his accusers since they interpreted his conception of prudential skill - being rooted, as it was, in a search for the rational grounds of moral action - not only as a challenge to their own ability to instil virtue in the young (Cf 22D 7) but as an affront to received tradition as well. To his accusers' implicit claim that prominent men - Alcibiades and Critias - had been corrupted by their associations with him (33A), Socrates might answer that he could not have intended to harm the characters of men. He might claim, paradoxically, that to do so would have been to bring harm upon himself. At any rate, his disclaimer of responsibility for his associates turning out well or badly is marked by his statement that he never promised nor gave instruction to anyone (33B). That meant, in the last analysis, that he had not attempted to undermine commonly accepted values, nor to teach skills that would enable a man to turn the latter to his material advantage. Rather, he had sought and had encouraged others to seek the real grounds of prudential action. His accusers' suspicion that his activities had the purpose of disrupting the exercise of conventional duties marked them, in Plato's eyes, as men ignorant of those same grounds of prudential action. Plato saw them as men who would describe commonly accepted values as no more than the product of a man's conformity to the external incentives his society might put before him. Hence, Socrates' invocation of the Athenian citizen who cares for wealth, reputation and honour (29D 7). To the ad hominem charge that Socrates had corrupted important men, Plato opposed the case of Anytus, the exemplar of material success.

The theory of consent in the Apology answers each part of the charge laid against Socrates, the corruption charge and the charge of implicit atheism or unconventional religious belief.<sup>45</sup> In his apology, Socrates gave prior place to individual conscience - a man's testament to what a god would require - as the source of the conventional requirement that men should regard one another well. The conflict between Socrates and his accusers is rooted in Socrates' conception that consent is a response both to custom and to reason (p 119: supra). To this conception we must oppose his accusers' equation of antinomian sentiment with Socrates' call for self-examination. We may understand by this that they are affirming what Socrates denies: that consent from custom - or, if we like, conformity to tradition - is sufficient for consent to law. In contrast to Socrates, his accusers effectively believed that a man's consent to law, his right regard of others, resides in an uncritical conformity to received values. Here we must mark Plato's ironic association of the accusers' position with a materialist or secular inference which 'common sense' prudentialism drew from traditional moral sentiment. Socrates' accusers, Anytus in particular, are appropriately cast by Plato not only as the supporters of tradition but also as unwitting exemplars of the new, materialist ethic. It was from their conflicting values together with Socrates' explanation of the true grounds of a man's response to custom that Plato constructed the Apology's conception of

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45 Against Burnet's explanation that the charge refers to nonconformity in religious practice (p 104) we must weigh the fact that Socrates was known to be scrupulous in the discharge of ritual duties (Hackforth, p 59). Pointing to Apology 29A and 35D, where Socrates makes reference to what he regards as plausible grounds for a charge of atheism, Hackforth believed that these references must refer to implications of atheism in the actual charge, rather than, as Burnet would have it, merely the non-acknowledgement of the worship prescribed by convention (nomos): Burnet, Ibid.

political consent.<sup>46</sup>

We noted in Ch 1 that the early books of the Republic describe the political theories of simple and luxurious communities (p 13). We have now suggested that in the Apology Plato sets Socrates' theory of consent against the implicit materialism of his accusers' position - a materialism which takes the form of a perfervid devotion to the restored democracy and to its political and social traditions.<sup>47</sup> While Socrates' notion of consent from conscience describes obedience to law as being a response both to custom and to reason, his accusers implicitly maintain against this position that the city's ostensible traditions are the sole source of its laws. Socrates' belief that a man's consent to law (where this is true consent or the self-ruled man's consent) is a reflection of divine will is met by the accusers' implicit claim that

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<sup>46</sup> Crossman spoke of Socrates' appeal to the common sense and the critical faculty of the ordinary man. He said that "its innate humility is . . . the deadliest enemy of absolutism in all its forms. Its simple assertion that all men are equal in their ignorance of the final values is the dissolvent of vested interests in knowledge and in social power". (Crossman Op.Cit. p 186). R. S. Bluck expresses this same sentiment when he distinguishes Socrates' position from that of Anytus and Meno in the Meno. He sees the distinction as that between a view of arete which regards the latter as a moral conception, and a view which sees it as a social-political conception alone. R. S. Bluck, Plato's Meno (Cambridge, 1961) pp 125-126.

These statements point to our own distinction between the self-ruled man who consents truly to law and the man who consents nominally, from external incentives alone.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. 29E: "ὁ ἀριστος . . . ἰσχυρὸς, καὶ κτλ : The reference is to Periclean Athens (Burnet, Adam), which epitomized for Plato the luxurious city whose political theories he would describe in detail in the Republic.

At Apology 31C 5, Socrates says that his auditors might find it strange that he has devoted his private life to interfering (πολυπραγμοσύνη) in the affairs of others, while he has not pursued the conventional interest of public or political activity (Ibid.). In conjunction with his belief that he has been sent to his city as a gift from the god (31A 8) he claims that something beyond usual human motives - material motives - (οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπινα . . . : 31B). Cf. Burnet's note) - has prompted him to neglect his own affairs, prompting him to concern himself with the affairs (continued on page 125).

Socratic rationalism (n 20 supra) is a groundless basis for consent and for participation in the life of one's city (Cf. n 48). To the Socratic claim that consent to law is, properly, an act from consideration of one's true interest (pp 108 ff.) his accusers oppose the belief that outward conformity to law and custom is a sufficient basis for consent. Together with these facts we may emphasize that Socrates' theism, with its implication of universal authority (pp 93 ff.) stands in contrast to the orthodoxy of his accusers, challenging them to state their own case for piety and for veneration of the gods.<sup>48</sup>

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47 (continued from page 124.)

and interests of others (εὖ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἄει', : B2). His statement at 31B-B5 is both an implicit indictment of current politics, in which men concern themselves with matters other than moral virtue (arete: B5. Cf on 29E), their true interest, and a paradoxical claim that he has not tended to his own concerns, his material or political interests. Cf Burnet's note on 31C 5 regarding the allusion in "πολυπραγμονῶν" to Pericles' claim that Athens does not hold those who remain aloof from affairs of state to be quiet men (ἀπράγμονα) but useless men (ἀχρεῖον).

Underlying Socrates' claim that he has been neglectful of his own concerns is his conception of the activity of the just man: his consent from conscience and his continuing consent. At 31B f. Socrates implies that his own activity, in which we find the essence of his theory of political consent, has marked him in the eyes of others as a useless man, hostile to the proper concerns and activities of a citizen (Cf. p 97 ), while he believes that his activity has been dedicated both to his own well-being and to that of other citizens.

48 Burnet's thesis that the charge of non-conformity amounted only to non-acknowledgement of the worship prescribed by nomos does not take account, as Hackforth showed, of Socrates' disavowal of atheism. (See n 45). Plato, it seems to me, was intent on raising the issue of atheism in the Apology as a means of embarrassing Socrates' accusers. In his view it was they and not Socrates who had acted so as to contravene divine will. (See above, n 40 and n 41 re Apology 30CD). Hackforth's philological demonstration that the charge bears the implication of atheism surely finds additional support from Plato's over-all treatment of the accusation. If Socrates has good grounds for suggesting that his accusers act as if they did not believe in gods (Cf. n 40 ad fin.) it is because he is defending himself against a claim which he believes the indictment may just as well have made.

While challenging his accusers to state their own case for piety and religious duty, Socrates is also challenging them to explain to him the basis of a man's consent to law. Plato used the concept of techne in the Apology to describe Socrates' notion of the self-ruled man's consent (p 119 supra). By means of the concept of techne, Socrates had raised the question of prudential skill as exhibited in men's right regard for one another, arguing that the man who obeys conventional requirements from conscience or reason (pp 108 ff.) is the man who truly consents to law. Believing he had a mission from the god to encourage men toward rational consideration of their interests, Socrates held that no injunction of the court could be valid against this duty. But he also satisfied the natural claim that no man is above the law by acting in the laws full view.<sup>49</sup> Thus, the concept of techne, and with it, Socrates' pursuit of his mission, implies that the community is not the sole source of law. But it also implies that no man may presume to be above the laws. Socrates used the analogy in the Apology to explain the moral and prudential grounds of man's consent to law. Though he questioned the wisdom of the community in rejecting him, he did not use the analogy specifically to describe political science, or that is, the science by whose rule men might justly submit to be governed given that some man had this science.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> pp 62, 98 supra; Cf. pp 80, 103, and n 40.

<sup>50</sup> Statesman 299BC is often cited as a late indication of Plato's view of the democracy which put Socrates to death. (Burnet, p 103; G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, (Boston, 1966) pp 280; J.B. Skemp, Plato's Statesman, (London, 1962) p 208, n 1; Cp Hackforth, p 77).

In the Statesman Plato maintains that rule by law is essential to the governance of states when we reject the direct application of political science. Given that we reject political science, then any form of government together with the consent of its citizens must be (continued on page 127)

So far as Socrates was concerned, his mission was dedicated to the moral well-being of individuals. All implications of the radical reform of government that Plato would later see in his mission are subordinate, in the Apology, to Socrates' conception of the moral basis of a man's

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50 (continued from page 125.)

rooted in respect for custom, however unsatisfactory this may be with comparison to rule by political science. Now the impossibility of the application of political science would seem to eliminate, in Plato's mind, the grounds for consent as explained by Socrates in the Apology. There, Socrates showed that rational consideration of one's interests, leading to consent from conscience, provides the moral basis of consent to law. (Cf Skemp, Ibid.). We have said in the text above that the techne analogy in the Apology is not, specifically, devoted to the science of government. (But see n 52.). It is rather devoted to a conception of the self-ruled man's consent to the laws of a society of which he is a citizen though not the ruler. But in the later work, Plato tells us that societies must reject any man who would call for examination of conventional principles. His reason is that where there is no real possibility of political science, there can be no wisdom greater than the wisdom of the laws (299C; Cp Socrates' question at Apology 24D 11: "Who is it that knows the laws?"). Plato is saying that if we must reject political science as being practicable we must also reject the right to examine the moral basis of received tradition. Where we reject both of these, then government must work strictly within the limits of a constitution which imitates, so far as possible, rule by theoretical knowledge (Δεῖ δὴ καὶ τοιαύτας γε, . . . πολιτείας, . . . μηδέποτε κεκρένων ἀποδοῖς τῶν νόμων μηδὲν ποιεῖν πλὴν ἐὰν γεγραμμένα καὶ παλαιὰ ἔθνη, : 301A); and consent must proceed from veneration for custom (οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖν τῶν νόμων εἶναι σοφώτερον : 299C).

This can only mean that in the later work Plato had come to equate the Apology's notion of self-rule with possession of the science of ruling others. That accounts for the bitterness with which he invokes the Apology, while , at the same time, maintaining that where political science does not obtain men who would examine the grounds of law and ancestral custom are a danger to social stability (ἐὰν κατὰ συγγράματα μὲν ἀναγκάζοιμεν ἕκαστον γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰρημέων . . . ἄρα οὐ σοῦ κακοῦ σοῦ προὔθεν μείζον ἀν' ἐσὶ σοῦτο γίγνεται κακόν ; : 300A). The notion of the self-ruled man has, in Plato's thinking, given way to a more exclusively political conception which has social order, and not the individual's confirmation of moral law, as its initial reference for the theory of government and consent. If we must admit democracy as a possible form of constitution, while at the same time we reject the possibility of political science, then, Plato would seem to be saying, we must concede to the demands of Socrates' accusers who themselves believed that no man could be wiser than the laws. Plato's late concession to this belief must, however, be offset by his conviction that Socrates was one who in fact had political science. I believe that it is to these facts that we must attribute Plato's apparent endorsement of the community that would punish or reject any of its citizens who wished to know the grounds of moral custom (Cf Hackforth, Ibid.).

consent to law. To his accusers' implicit claim that no man is wiser than the laws (Cf n 50), Socrates gave, as his defence, his conception of true prudential skill: his conception of the moral grounds of obedience to law and right regard of others. He implied that his accusers lacked knowledge of these grounds. In the Apology, then, Plato ranged Socrates against his accusers not as spokesman for a new political order but as a man who dissented from conventional views of respect for law and custom, as a man who believed he had a duty to impart conscientious knowledge to any who would hear him. Of great importance to Socrates' apology is his accusers' implicit claim that his past associations, together with his alleged interest in speculative science, marked him as a man disloyal to nomos and to democratic rule, as one who had sympathized with the contemporary belief, popular among the aristocracy, in the validity of nature as against the artificial claims of law and moral custom.<sup>51</sup> But in Socrates' view, his accusers' suspicion that his actions favoured contemporary radicalism to the disadvantage of the established form of rule were groundless. Plato's description of the Socratic theory of consent disposes of that charge by devoting attention not to questions about forms of rule but to the more fundamental question of

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51 Hackforth traces the indictment's implicit charge of atheism to Socrates' alleged sympathy with the phusikoi. But while we may accept Hackforth's grounds for this in other respects, it is difficult to agree with him, as against Burnet, that the indictment has no political implications. (Hackforth, p 76). Surely, Socrates' alleged sympathy with speculative science, the influence the latter could have on received values and the democracy which upheld them, and Socrates' past associations with men hostile to the democracy, mark the indictment as both political and social in its implications.

the moral grounds of a man's consent to law in any society.<sup>52</sup> A main question of the Apology - the question which receives attention in the early books of the Republic - is whether the Socratic attitude to conventional belief is beneficial, either to oneself or to others. On the Apology's evidence we know that Athens did not believe that it was. But in rejecting Socrates' mission Plato believed that Athens had exercised reprisal, not justice. In so doing, it exemplified to Plato's mind the belief that the worthy man acts from considerations of repute, honour, and material security, that Athens would teach Socrates that a prudent man's consent to law must derive from these considerations. It would teach Socrates that consent to law from any other motive is not only groundless, but also unjust; for men's considerations of material well-being are themselves the sole source of law with its requirement that men should regard one another well. Athens would therefore reject Socrates' doctrine of a man's covenant with others (p 117 supra). He, on his part, would challenge his city's rejection of this doctrine as one citizen among equals. Though there are hints in the Apology of the existence of a formal political science, these remain suppressed, or at any rate, they are not a main feature of the Apology's doctrine of consent. There, Socrates assumes that he is the equal of other citizens and he described, with reference to what a god would require of any man, a just man's consent to law. Here, he describes the consent of the self-ruled

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52. For an indication in the Apology itself of the political implications as opposed to strictly individual and moral implications of Socrates' argument, see 36C 6: *εὖν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, as contrasted with *πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*; and, balancing this: *τῶν τῆς πόλεως* (C8), as contrasted with *πρὶν ἀνεῖς τῆς πόλεως*. Burnet's statement that *ἐπιμέλεια τῆς πόλεως* is, in principle, the same as *ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ* is to be noted (p 154). It was on the analogy of the individual who seeks his proper interest that Plato would construct his theory of the state which achieved its true interest. But this would be a state whose order depended on the exercise of political science.

man who is an equal among other citizens. It is only in the Apology, the Crito, and the early books of the Republic that we clearly find this point of emphasis in Plato's doctrine of consent.

Before returning to our consideration of the Republic we may make the following brief remarks about Anytus as he appears in the Meno. At 71E, in answer to Socrates' request for a definition of a man's virtue, Meno states that it consists in tending to the business of the city, that the virtuous man acts so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to avoid suffering harm himself. Later in the dialogue Anytus is seen to agree with this definition when he warns Socrates (who has been exposing the inability of great men to teach virtue) not to speak ill of men, and implies that in Athens it is easy to punish or reward men according to their merits.<sup>53</sup> We have seen that Socrates rejects this same notion of virtue - justice regarded as reward and retribution<sup>54</sup> - in the Apology, where he opposed a man's ostensible, social interest in practising justice - a man's external interests - to his consideration of his true well-being. Anytus, who despises the 'new learning' and who counsels Meno to avoid the sophists is seen in the Meno to invoke a definition of justice which, on Plato's showing in the Republic, is root and branch of the prudential, political theories which Anytus regards as a threat to social stability. As Koyre has put it: "The Sophist lacks the inhibitions of the conformist: thus, he reveals the true essence of the latter."<sup>55</sup> We have seen that in the Apology Plato has invoked this same essence in Socrates' challenge to his accusers to show him the

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53 Cf Bluck, Op.Cit., on  $\rho\acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$  at Meno 94E 5, pp 385 ff.

54 Op.Cit., p 218, on 71E 3,4.

55 Alexandre Koyré, Discovering Plato, trans. L.C. Rosenfield (New York)

grounds on which he has acted against his own best interests and committed injustice.

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Socrates' peculiar duty - a duty which he exercised in full view of the laws - was to teach men what a god would require of a man in his regard of others. His elenctic activity was devoted to his dispelling men's beliefs in the value of material well-being and good repute as valid bases for a man's consent to law, and, through his consent, his right regard of others. The Socratic distinction between the strictly social or external grounds (Cf pp 123ff. and n 47) raised a fundamental question which would exercise Plato's attention in subsequent works: what relative value must we attach, on the one hand, to consent from conscience (or consent from reason), and, on the other hand, to consent from customary requirement? To what extent could Socrates' conception of consent be applied to social and political, in distinction to personal, reform? In the early books of the Republic Plato prepares the ground for his own political theory by pitting the Socratic doctrine, which we have seen in the Apology, of the truly just man's consent, against the conventionalist or materialist conception of a man's consent to law.

We have already described in brief detail the principal feature of the conventionalist notion of justice and consent, as pictured in the Republic, which oppose the Socratic conception (pp 117-119 supra). It would be outside our purpose to give a detailed analysis of each of the arguments,

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55 (continued from page 130.)

Alexandre Koyré, Discovering Plato, trans. L.C. Rosenfield (New York, 1945), p 12 n 9.

beginning from Republic 1, which lead, finally, to Socrates' account of the natural state - the polis κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθῆσα (428E) -, its form of rule, and the consent of its classes. Rather, we shall concentrate on one basic theme which is common to the Apology and to the Republic sections in question: Plato's characterization of the conventionalist belief that the Socratic notion of other-regard is imprudent and anti-social (Cf n 47).<sup>56</sup> His characterization of conventionalism in the Republic reflects the temperament of Athens, a city in whose judgment Socrates was a useless and unjust man. Plato believed Athens to be guilty of great ignorance in its condemnation of Socrates. In the Republic he let Socrates' interlocutors put the case for the conception of justice he believed lay in back of the charge of the accusers of the Apology: that material considerations form the natural basis of a man's regard for others; that a man could have no other grounds than these for the performance of action that benefits others. In the Republic Plato draws attention to the immoralist implication which this theory could have: that the exercise of other-regarding action conceals a prudent man's real wish, his desire to give the force of truth to his actions by converting the strictures of conventional moral opinion to his own material ends - his desire to seem just without being so. (pp 118<sup>3</sup>-9 ). By drawing attention to this conception Plato demonstratively contrasted Socratic individualism with the Sophistic ideal of material self-sufficiency. He described the Sophistic interpretation of the traditional moral tenets which society holds out to its members, contrasting this with Socrates' conception of the truly just man's grounds for right action. Here, as in the Apology, Plato

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<sup>56</sup> By 'conventionalist belief', I mean both the sentiments of common opinion, as, say, described by Meno, and the inferences which Sophistic thinkers drew from these.

is concerned with the question whether a man's ostensible conformity to custom satisfies his consent to law. He concludes that in actual societies, men's ostensible acceptance of customary moral belief holds out little hope for the achievement of personal virtue. He yet believed that the Socratic model for consent, involving consent from reason and consent from custom, could be applied on a social scale. In Chapter IV, we shall see that he found the means for this application in the virtue of sophrosune.

In his treatment of sophrosune Plato will combine the Socratic notion of consent from reason with a new concept of customary consent. His new theory of consent from custom will address the problem of consent from material need. Unless Plato intends by his resolution of this problem that consent from custom, while it will not be a self-ruled man's consent, will none-the-less be true consent, then he will not have answered the Sophistic conviction that men's ostensible regard for one another conceals their natural inclinations. If the doctrine of sophrosune does not oppose this conviction then the ideal community's approval of justice, as shown through the consent of its classes, will resemble political reality as the Sophists describe it; for the consent of the subject citizens, if it only conceals their real inclinations, will confirm the Sophistic belief that consent to law is only an external agreement, that 'justice' is the benefit of those who rule. In that case, the relationship Plato envisages between the rulers, who will consent to membership of the community from reason, and the subjects, whose consent will be rooted in custom, will be one of tension and not harmony.<sup>57</sup> These are the bare facts of sophrosune as it

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57 This will be true even if the principal benefit the rulers derive from membership of the community is not a material one. We take up this matter more fully when we discuss the third class's consent in Ch IV.

relates to the doctrine of consent in the Republic. Plato sees in the virtue of sophrosune the solution to the problem which Socrates' interlocutors had put to him: on what grounds does it profit a man to practise justice and so regard others well?

Adeimantus had said that he would clarify Glaucon's statement (362E), that justice is only a secondary or intermediary benefit to the agent, by tracing men's approval of justice to its roots in traditional moral teaching; while Glaucon, for his part, had fleshed out the bones of Thrasymachus' doctrine that the just man is the man who benefits the stronger power. The Republic's three main introductory speeches departed from the picture of common piety which Cephalus had presented. Taking up Polemarchus' admission that the just man harms neither friend nor enemy (336A), the following speeches showed how contemporary Sophistic theories of political consent derived from the traditional belief that justice is less rewarding than injustice. They showed that a man's material considerations must be his sole motive for the practice of justice if its practice is to be in any way profitable; for both tradition and common opinion (ἴδια τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ παιγῶν) have dishonoured and contemned (ἀτιμάζω . . . ὑπερορᾶν) the man whom we agree, from approved standards of conduct (δόξη . . . καὶ νόμῳ) to be better, if weaker, than evil men who have been praised for their material success (εὐδαιμονίζειν). Tradition has taught that temperance (sophrosune) and justice, while praiseworthy and noble (καλόν) are hard and difficult to achieve. Licence and injustice, which are only shameful by the standards of received opinion, are easier to achieve and more profitable (Cf 364 AB). The Sophists' case, put by Thrasymachus, is thus explained at the level of ordinary opinion by Glaucon and Adeimantus.

The latter give us the real purport of men's approval of justice: the man who practises temperance and justice is only 'better' κατὰ νόμον. But in men's private belief he is weak. For if such a man ever has the power to do wrong surely he will then act so as to profit himself truly. Indeed, if he does not, he must be irrational and wretched (p 118 supra). In short, prudence may counsel us to disregard the moral standards of the man who, in common belief, is judged to be better than the unjust man. Clearly, then, a man could have no grounds for practising justice beyond material necessity. Life is more pleasant for the self sufficient man, the man who can dispense with moral strictures. Men's approval of justice is really a form of deceit which arises from their fear of injustice and their desire for material security (Ibid).

Taylor has said that Adeimantus' contribution to the Republic's introductory discussion is "independent of all speculation about moral origins."<sup>58</sup> Indeed, Adeimantus spoke only of customary moral requirement and of the grounds on which tradition recommends the practice of justice. But Adeimantus' chief question was one which Socrates had exercised in the Apology: 'What would a god require of a man in the man's relations with others?' Glaucon and Thrasymachus had dealt with a more immediately political question which springs from the basic moral one. Glaucon's position, that material necessity alone moves men to regard one another well, was the corollary to Thrasymachus' assertion that the just man is the man who acts so as to benefit the stronger power. Both positions were a denial of Socrates' conception, as described in the Apology, that the just man - the

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<sup>58</sup> A. E. Taylor, Plato, The Man and His Works, (London, 1955), p 271.

man who consents truly to law - is a better man whom worse men cannot injure. Both deny Socrates' conception of the moral grounds of a man's obeying a better being, whether a man or a god (Cf nn 40, 31 supra). Both deny the moral grounds of Socrates' conception of political consent: that the truly just man does not consent to law and exercise right regard of others from considerations of his material well-being. What Adeimantus had described was the moral tradition which lay behind the secular paradigm on which Trasymachus had based his theory of the just man and on which Glaucon described a current sophistic theory of political consent. Adeimantus had shown that Glaucon's theory was at least amenable to the traditional moral belief that the gods are moved to favour men who make a show of piety. As with veneration of the gods, so with men's regard for one another: the sufficient criterion of a man's being just is his exercise of right regard from the material respect which others require of him. Moreover, a man's own material needs form the only prudential criterion of his exercise of justice.

In holding that material considerations were the sufficient criterion of justice, Glaucon and Adeimantus also posited a prudential standard of action - injustice - which could be more profitable than justice, the demand which men make of one another. They held that the just man - the man whom common opinion agreed was better than the unjust man (364AB) - did not exemplify truth (*ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον*)<sup>59</sup> in his relations with others. They meant by this that moral action is, at best, a secondary benefit, that common opinion's approval of justice only conceals the truth of men's real inclinations. They also meant that the practice of justice was only contingent on material considerations, that a man was only bound from considerations of his material well-being to regard others well.

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<sup>59</sup> Cf p 118 and n 43 Ibid.

The theory's prohibition on injustice was prudential. But in prohibiting injustice it was rejecting Socrates' notion of the worthy man, for in holding that justice was a secondary benefit to the agent the theory denied that its practice could have any result for the agent beyond material benefit.

In terms of strictly secular political theory, Glaucon's view could imply that the practice of justice was sanctioned only by the community's agreement that wrong-doing was evil. As against Socrates' notion of covenant, Glaucon's theory implied that men were not bound by nature, or by what a god would require, to regard one another well. But he none-the-less borrowed from the traditional theology in assessing the value which his theory places on justice. We see the influence of tradition in the proponent's view that the man who would not refrain from wrong-doing, if he had the power, is *ἀνόγcos* (360D. Cf 364 AB). Moreover, the belief that the man who would do no wrong is wretched (*ἄθλιος*) indicates that men's exhortations to practise justice - the exhortations of nomos - must conceal what men truly believe (Cf n 59): that justice is only an intermediary benefit to the agent. As against Socrates, then, the theory held not only that there was no source of law external to social or political community, but also, that by practising justice a man could only act, provisionally, in his true interest; for a man could not achieve his true interest until he had lent truth to his actions by overcoming nomos. But that could only mean that a man's true end is not reflected in society's ostensible approval of justice. The man who believes that it is, has no grounds (other than his faith in nomos) for this belief (*ἀνόγcos*). Nor can he profit from his belief (*ἄθλιος*). Truth, rather, is revealed in a man's ability to abandon moral scruples in favour of material ends (362 AB).

We see, then, that Glaucon's political theory combined the view that justice is a human convention only, with the traditional moral view that the gods - stronger powers than men - would be complaisant to injustice. Considered by itself, we need not regard the view that injustice can be profitable as 'immoralist' (though in Socrates' opinion, such belief is the mark of ignorance).<sup>60</sup> But we must regard as immoralist the belief that wrong-doing can be sanctioned. Glaucon had said that justice is the product of men's material needs, that a man's exercise of justice from material considerations is sufficient to his being a just man. But he tintured this view with reference to traditional teaching about the gods' complaisance toward unjust men, and he concluded that since no man has any prudential grounds in supposing that justice is his true good, the man who really profits from its exercise can only have done so by regarding stronger men well at the expense of weaker men or just men. Glaucon meant by this that a man would achieve his greatest good by assuming that he had no covenant with other men - a covenant which forbade wrong-doing. But he also meant that 'the stronger power' sanctions this assumption. His notion of covenant, therefore, denies Socrates' conception both in prudential and in moral terms, for it assumes that the real source of law (that which requires a man's right regard of others) is the stronger power, and it assumes, as against Socrates' notion of moral ignorance, that wrong-doing could profit a man. Glaucon's theory of political consent agrees with Thrasymachus' assertion (343 C) that justice is the other (stronger) man's

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<sup>60</sup> Cf Socrates' statement to Thrasymachus at 348E: *εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶδῃσιν, κακίαν μὲντοι ἢ ἀισχρὸν ἀπὸ ὑπολόγῃς, εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινὲς, εἴχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες.* That is to say, while some people hold injustice to be profitable, they will maintain that it is shameful and evil. Such people will not sanction injustice.

good. This is the real truth which nomos conceals. His theory lays down the assumptions which 'the many' make about nomos, and purports to show that these assumptions confirm Thrasymachus' conception about just and unjust men.

Thrasymachus' doctrine of justice is the contrary of Socrates' conception. While Socrates explained in the Apology that the self-ruled man did not act from material considerations, Thrasymachus asserted in the Republic an ideal of the materially self-sufficient man. Socrates had said in the Apology that the just man, acting from considerations of his true interest, was both the equal of other men, and self-ruled both in his relations with them and in his fulfilment of divine requirement. Thrasymachus states the bare facts behind the case of Glaucon and Adeimantus, that the 'better' man - the man who would refrain from injustice - is a man who cannot exemplify 'truth' in his actions. Thrasymachus, whose account of justice is really the conclusion to Glaucon's account of a man's covenant to do no wrong, denies that the man who consents to law has any grounds for doing so beyond the external compulsion which he cannot override.

In Ch IV we shall see, in conjunction with the doctrine of sophrosune, how Plato sought to render compatible the notions of consent from material and non-material need. At present, it is necessary for us to consider in further detail how Thrasymachus' and Glaucon's theories of consent find unwitting support in the beliefs of Socrates' accusers in the Apology. Our examination of this subject will lead us to our final consideration of Socrates' covenant with the laws in the Crito.

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Polemarchus had proposed that the just man benefits those who seem to be friends and harms those whom he supposes to be enemies (334C). But he revised this definition when Socrates had pointed out that if we mistake the friend (who is really good) for the enemy (who is truly evil), we shall have reversed Simonides' dictum - that justice is benefiting friends and harming enemies - and established a potentially immoral definition of justice (πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος: 334D 5). This conclusion, at which Polemarchus halted, established as his own belief, that we must know which men are good, and which evil, before we can be sure of Simonides' definition (335A f.). But Socrates then pointed out that it is not the just man's part (δικαίου ἄνδρος: 335B; ἔργον: 335D) to harm anyone - whether friend or not (οὔτε φίλοι οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα, : 335D). While Polemarchus had suggested that the just man gives their due to friends and to enemies, Socrates changed the connotation of 'harm' (βλάπτειν: 335B ff.) to moral injury, basing his rejection of both Polemarchus' definitions on the grounds that the just man, by definition, never acts so as to make others morally worse (Ibid.). Plato thus introduced into Socrates' discussion with Polemarchus two different views of the value of the just man to us. By way of contrast with Polemarchus' position, he had proposed a different criterion of the effect of the just man upon others: the just man does not worsen the characters of others. In regarding the just man as one who would benefit friends and harm enemies, Polemarchus can only have been considering the external effects of justice: for him, the just man is one who benefits good men and harms evil men in some material sense.<sup>61</sup> Thrasymachus, who takes up the thread of the argument, at least

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Hence, the possibility of the immoral conclusion at 334D 5: πονηρὸς . . . λόγος . If we are mistaken about who the friend, or the good man, is (and the enemy and the evil man), then it is just to injure (continued)

agrees that justice is only an external benefit, holding that the just man benefits those who can command his material respect.

We should observe that by 'harming enemies' (βλάπτειν) Polemarchus had not meant wronging enemies, or doing injustice to them. He had only epitomized a traditional belief about the just man: the man who benefits friends and harms enemies. But he did not broach the question, which, of just or unjust acts, are the more profitable for the agent. He only implied, by way of contrast to Socrates' conception of the value of the just man to society, that we can only define justice in terms of the external effects of a man's acts.<sup>62</sup> Polemarchus, who serves as a point of departure for Thrasymachus, confined his definition of justice to men's most obvious need in practising it: the preservation of material well-being which its

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61 (continued from page  
 friends and benefit enemies (334C). That would be an immoral conclusion if the mistake we make (Ἀμαρτάνουσιν : Ibid.) involves, not an honest misjudgment of friends and enemies, but rather, a misjudgment of what it is (Socratically) in our best interest to do: to refrain from injustice. If we make a moral mistake in this matter we then suppose that it could be profitable to injure good men (whom we then regard as enemies) and benefit evil men (whom we regard as friends). But both mistakes, either the honest one or the immoral one, leave out of account the effect of justice or injustice on the agent of the act. Polemarchus is only concerned with justice as an external activity, and he believes - without making an immoralist deduction himself - that only material considerations can prompt our determining which men are good and which evil.

62 Obviously, by Polemarchus' revised definition (334C), it cannot profit a man to be unjust (for he will not seem to be a friend and a good man). But the disadvantage of being unjust, in this case, results from the harm that just men will do to the man known to be unjust. There is contrast here with Plato's remedial theory of punishment. By that theory, unjust men - far from being 'harmed' by punishment are benefited by it (Cf Republic 380 BC, 445 A). That is so even if the salutariness of punishment demands the extreme penalty of death. Had Polemarchus vouched the belief that injustice could be profitable, it would have been consistent with his conception of justice (as external benefit and harm) to have maintained that the unjust man would be better off if he escaped the just man's notice. His unrevised definition, at least, is amenable to this belief, while his revised definition does not accommodate Plato's remedial theory which implies that wrong-doing is not profitable.

practice brings to society. On these grounds Thrasymachus would build his ideal of the materially self-sufficient man. The moral mistake to which Polemarchus' definition (334C) could lead was its implicit assumption that injustice could be profitable. From Socrates' point of view this constitutes a moral mistake because it is a mistake of belief, it is a mistake which misassesses a man's real interest. Polemarchus had not suggested, on his own belief, that wrong-doing could be sanctioned. But in Socrates' view, that is the true immoralism which ignorance of interests, fanned by degraded moral teaching, must lead to. He suggests to Polemarchus that the traditional belief they had been discussing cannot really be attributed to Simonides or to any other wise man (335E). It is much more likely that it comes from some tyrant - Periander, Xerxes, or Ismenias of Thebes. Socrates based this conjecture on the grounds that the belief he had discussed with Polemarchus is open to a view of justice that springs from moral ignorance and so serves the interests of tyranny.<sup>63</sup>

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63 Socrates says in his concluding words with Polemarchus that in no case is it just to harm anyone (*οὐδ' ἀποῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῶν ἔρῶν ὅν βλάπτειν*. : 335E 4). Degraded moral education teaches that injustice can be profitable. From the point of view of degraded belief, *βλάπτειν* (*Ibid.*) connotes doing material wrong, together with the advantage that could attach to doing such wrong. Socrates' conclusion is an inference from his own conception (335B ff.) of the just man's function and his value to society: the just man does not harm the characters of men, either by act or by expression of his beliefs. The effect of men's being truly harmed will show itself in their belief, which the truly just man denies, that wronging another in some external sense can truly harm the recipient or profit the agent. At 335E 4, *βλάπτειν* would thus seem to carry a double meaning: harming a man in some external sense and harming a man by making him morally worse. The conception of justice which Socrates put to Polemarchus involves the concept of techne and, with it, the concept of true prudential skill. Hence Socrates' allusion to the beliefs of wise and blessed men (*ζῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν* ;: 335E).

Admittedly, Socrates does not make mention in the relevant passage (335B ff.) of the just man's acts or expressions of belief. But he does contrast the just man's function (*ἔργον*), and, implicitly, his value to society, with Polemarchus' view. The notion of function must surely involve both moral belief and consequent acts.)

Thrasymachus is the Republic's true advocate of tyranny. He is a proponent of the view that the unjust man lends the force of truth to his actions. Together with his belief that political community is the sole source of law, he maintains a political ideal which raises the materially self-sufficient man above the strictures of moral custom (nomos).

Thrasymachus not only denies Socrates' belief that injustice cannot profit a man, he equates injustice with virtue (348E). In doing so, he denies Socrates' concept of the better man and with it, his doctrine of political consent.

It was argued by G. B. Kerford that in the Republic Thrasymachus sets up injustice as a moral ideal. His equation of injustice with virtue, his belief that men would fulfil their natures through injustice, show that Thrasymachus - though he does not use the language of phusis - nomos belongs among the proponents of natural right.<sup>64</sup> I have indicated that Thrasymachus' ideal, so far as it is related to political consent, is later embellished by Glaucon's statement that the skilful man succeeds in political life as would a self-sufficient man in a natural condition in which (it is assumed) there would be no moral strictures (Cf p 118). Glaucon's theory of covenant provides a theoretical basis for the 'drift' of societies to tyranny, while Adeimantus proposed that traditional belief itself assumes that injustice is sanctioned by nature and that justice is sanctioned only by nomos. The three positions are complementary in that they all oppose phusis to nomos. So far as that is so, Kerford is surely right in placing Thrasymachus in the 'phusis-nomos' camp. But Thrasymachus' theory of consent, so far as it opposes Socrates' theory of the better man

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<sup>64</sup> G.B. Kerford, "The Doctrine of Thrasymachus In Plato's Republic". Durham University Journal, XI (ix) pp 19-27. Cf p 27.

in the Apology, denies that men are bound, unconditionally, to regard one another well. For this reason we cannot easily regard his theory as being a moral ideal.<sup>65</sup> His equation of injustice with virtue is, in effect, an immoralist doctrine which claims that commonly accepted moral requirements are only conditionally binding.<sup>66</sup>

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Cf. D.A. Rees on Kerford, in Adam Vol 1, p xxx.

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Kerford confirms his own acceptance of this interpretation, as being true of Thrasymachus' position, in his note 33 to p 27, Ibid.

"There is nothing to suggest that Thrasymachus thought that weaker men were consulting their interests by being just and obeying laws when unable to resist. Rather they ought to break them on all occasions when they have a reasonable chance of escaping detection." Cf. 348D 6-9: *συ δὲ οἷε με ἴσως τοὺς γὰρ βαλλόμενα ἀπο-  
ξέρνουσας, λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, . . . καὶ ἐὰν τοιαῦτα,  
ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ.*

If, by saying that a man ought to break laws when he can escape detection, we mean that law 'binds' him, only conditionally, to regard others well, then we have opposed some self-assertive standard - phusis, say - to a moral standard - nomos. Our position is that nature sanctions self-assertion, while convention forbids it.

Antiphon's belief that nomos, rather than reflecting nature, opposes it, may well be a source on which Plato drew in constructing the arguments of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus. But I do not think that Antiphon, in On Truth, went so far as to suggest that a man ought to disobey the laws when unseen by others. His statement at 11: 60, that for the most part, nomos is in opposition to phusis - *ὅτι ἐὰν πολλὰ εἴη κατὰ νόμον δικαίων πολεμίων ἐφ' ἑσέε κέρτα* - does not positively assert, in addition to this, that nomos binds men only conditionally. However, there is at least an affinity between Republic 348D 6-9 (*λανθάνῃ*) and Antiphon 11:40: *ἐὰν οὖν νόμοι παραβιάνων ἢ ἐφ' ἃ λάθῃ τοὺς ὁμολογούσας, καὶ ἀισχύνης καὶ Σημίας ἀπήλλακται, μὴ λάθων δ' οὐ.*

Antiphon holds that nomos is hostile to nature (*πολεμίων*). But rather than suggesting that nature sanctions a standard that we ought to pursue (if able), he rather combines a view which sees nature as indifferent to moral custom with a pessimism about the power of nomos to counteract nature. Cf 11: 80: *Ἔσθιν οὖν οὐδὲν ἐφ' ἧ φύσεως φιλιώτερα, οὐδ' οἰκειώτερα ἀφ' ἧν οἱ νόμοι ἀποτρέπουσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἐφ' ἃ προερέπουσιν; VI: 165ff.: *ἄνθρωποι δὲ, φιλίωσας τοῖς προσεγγένοις τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ ἐκ νόμον δίκαιον οὐχ ἰκανὸν ἐπικούρην, κτλ.**

If, in Socrates' view, we are mistaken about who the good man is and who the enemy, then the mistake could be one of honest misjudgment. But it could be the moral mistake of misassessing the true friend and the real enemy.<sup>67</sup> If, however, on either count, men hold that it belongs to the just man to benefit some and harm others, then they are mistaken about the just man's function or his activity in society. For the just man acts only to benefit others. To misconceive the just man's function, is, on Socrates' view, to define justice only in terms of its external benefits and sanctions. The man who acts with right regard toward others from external incentives lacks true prudential skill. In Socrates' view, men who are only just from external incentives are nominally just. They are men of little worth, for they are ignorant of a man's true interest. For this reason, they are also ignorant of the moral grounds (or the true prudential grounds) of right action. The belief that injustice could be profitable, arising from a misconception of the value of justice to the individual and to society, characterizes this ignorance. But if a man believes that injustice could be sanctioned, and therefore acts on this belief, he is guilty of true wrong-doing, for he acts from ignorance of what a better being - a god or a man - would require.<sup>68</sup> Such a man acts upon

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67 We make the mistake of supposing that it could be profitable to spurn (*ἀσεβάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν*) men who are good *κατὰ νόμον* (the better, though weaker men of Republic 364 AB), and praise evil men. We shall then hold with those whose beliefs Adeimantus describes that licence and injustice are shameful, not by nature, but in opinion and by conventional sanctions alone (*δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ ἀιωχρῶν*). It will only be from conventional agreement (*ὁμολογῶντες*), though not from inner conviction, that we believe that weaker or poorer men are better than evil men (Republic 364 AB). Cf n 61 supra.)

68 To this conception one must add the Socratic corollary: that the wrong-doer must harm himself far more than he does his victim. Cf pp 88 f.; nn 27, 28 p 89f.; pp 100 ff. supra.

the belief that men's approval of justice, their overt regard for one another, conceals the natural truth that justice is another's good (ἄλλοίριον ἀγαθόν : Republic 343 C) and a detriment (βλάβη) to the man who obeys and serves the other, stronger, man (τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπερεσθύντος). The political force of this view comes to rest in Thrasymachus' belief that the just man who obeys laws cannot be self-ruled; for by obeying, he serves an interest that is not, finally, his own.

At Republic 343C, Thrasymachus says that injustice rules those who are good-natured - those who are guileless and just (ἡ δὲ ἀδικία . . . ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐθυδικῶν τε καὶ δεισίων,). He is not speaking of the nominally just man, but of those who refuse from conscience to do wrong. Such men are naive, for they lack real knowledge of a man's interests.<sup>69</sup> In his belief, such men do not know the grounds for obeying laws: men's inability to profit from injustice, or, the provisional advantage that could come from regarding the 'other man' well. The naive man's beliefs are wide of the mark, for he supposes that justice has a natural claim on him, that he must regard any man well. He does not know that the only claim on him is the needs of those who are stronger than he - those who rule in their own interest though not in his. If he obeys laws from the conviction that he is bound in conscience to do so, he can only serve the interest of others; but he can serve no real interest of his own. In saying this, Thrasymachus denies that a man who is not the arbiter of the laws can be self-ruled; that is, he is saying, as against Socrates that there are no moral grounds for obeying laws. The "guileless and the just" believe that they are bound, unconditionally, to regard others well, while Thrasymachus holds, in contradiction of this, that a man's only ground for obeying is the compulsion

<sup>69</sup> καὶ οὕτω πόρρω . . . , ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι ἡ τῶν δικαιοσύνη . . . ἀλλοίριον ἀγαθὸν εἰς ὄνει, . . . 343C.

which the stronger power, acting in its own interest, can bring to bear on him. He holds that injustice rules the naive because they cannot profit from their conception that they are morally bound to regard others well.<sup>70</sup>

We have noted above that Thrasymachus admits of two kinds of just man: the Socratically just and the nominally just. The terms he uses to describe just men (*ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐθικῶν*: 343C; *πάνυ γενναίων εὐθικῶν* : 348D.), while they could refer to men who lack the ingenuity to practise injustice, refer significantly to men who are just from conviction. (Cf *ὡ εὐθέως-κατε Σώκρατες*, : 343 D). Socrates had described such men in the Apology

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<sup>70</sup> The phrase, *τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐθικῶν* (Ibid.), has been variously translated: Cornford: "innocents who are called just" (p 25); Guthrie, The Sophists: "genuinely simple and just" (p 89); Lees: "simple and just" (p 72); Shorey: "simple in every sense of the word" (p 67).

Given that Thrasymachus is making a frontal attack on Socrates' own beliefs, "*ὡς ἀληθῶς*" denotes those who are just from conviction, not from material convenience. Thrasymachus says a little further on (344A) that these people suffer injustice but are unwilling to do wrong. In his view such people are miserable and wretched (*ἀθλιωτάτους*). Quite clearly, he is speaking of those who have no basis for their conviction, not of those who regard others well from necessity of external force.

Thrasymachus' division of men into rulers and ruled perhaps obscures the fact, stated at 338DE, that his conception of justice applies to any form of constitution, be it democracy or otherwise. For this reason, his conception of men who are "guileless and just" does not imply that these people (qua subjects) believe that it is just to obey other men (qua rulers) no matter what they order. Thrasymachus wants to contrast this attitude (the attitude of those whom Socrates would call nominally just men) with the attitude of the guileless and just - those who are *εὐθικοί* because they believe that justice prohibits wrong doing absolutely. Thrasymachus believes that Socrates should disabuse himself of this belief, for on his view justice is required from external coercion alone, not from a natural duty. Whatever the form of constitution under which a man lives, only the coercion of 'other' men binds him to obey laws.

Given Thrasymachus' premise that injustice is a man's real end, and that only external compulsion 'binds' men to obey laws, Thrasymachus would agree with Glaucon that men's covenant to do no wrong is provisional and not binding. On his premise, democratic equality is a farce; for in a democracy the 'other man' is only the majority which coerces the individual to obey its laws. (Cf. n 4 p53 supra). On Thrasymachus' premises, 'justice' must have its roots in an initial distinction between rulers and ruled. We have seen that Glaucon would explain this same concept on the basis of the discrete origins of political and moral life (Ch 1 p 19).

as self-ruled. In holding that there are no moral grounds for obeying laws, Thrasymachus believes that by obeying laws a man can, at the very most, serve no more than a social interest, an interest that is only provisionally advantageous to him and which he should shun if that were advantageous and he were able. Not only does he maintain that the Socratically just do not act in their own interest, he also regards as false their conviction that men are bound, unconditionally, to regard others well.

Polemarchus, it will be recalled, had allowed that the dictum, 'benefiting friends, harming enemies', would not be a good definition of justice if it meant that we sometimes mistake who the real friend and enemy are: we must have knowledge who they are. A similar distinction, from the point of view of the interest of rulers, is rehearsed from Republic 339 C ff. Socrates and Thrasymachus both agree that justice is advantageous, but Socrates had queried Thrasymachus' qualification that justice is the advantage of the stronger; for the ruler (the stronger) might mistakenly legislate so as to fail to achieve his own interest (*, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἴκοντες καὶ δυνεῖς προσείτωσιν*, : 339 E). But by the 'ruler', Thrasymachus had really meant the ruler properly so called (*, καὶ ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί*, : 341 A) - the ruler who, ideally, makes no mistake in legislating in his own interest (Ibid.). He had therefore meant that justice, by definition, is the advantage of the stronger (of those who rule). On historical grounds, it will often work out that those who have power will contravene their own interest. But Thrasymachus had meant that all legislation, by its nature, aims at securing the interest of those who govern even if mistakes are, in fact, sometimes made.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Thrasymachus will allow that rulers sometimes err (340A), but he does not suppose that this defeats his position. Nor need it; for Thrasymachus (continued on page

So far in our discussion of Thrasymachus we have seen with his belief that justice (what a man owes another, stronger than himself) is the product of legislation, he had defined the proper work of rule as legislation in the interest of government. We have seen that his definition holds good for any manner of constitution. Together with this conception he has combined the belief that no man who obeys laws can be self-ruled. The free man (*ἐλευθεριώτερον* : 344 CD)<sup>72</sup> is, properly speaking, the unjust man who can convert men's approval of justice (other-regarding action) to his own ends. Freedom, so defined, is a quality of which Thrasymachus approves. The free man, or materially self-sufficient man, is for Thrasymachus the ideal paradigm of the ends of legislation: the successful maintenance of

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believes (as Socrates himself believes) that error is incidental to the work or function of rule or craftsmanship. A ruler - one who, by nature, seeks his own advantage - errs in proportion as he lacks wisdom: *ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδὲν ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων, ἢ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι . . . ὁ ἄρχων ἡμάρταν*: 340E.

Given that a ruler failed to act in his own interest, and it was therefore just for the ruled to act accordingly, with the result that they bring disadvantage to the ruler - *τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀδύμωρον δῆπου προσέειπε τοῖς ἡγεσσι τοῖς ἐν* . . . : 339 E - Thrasymachus could answer that legislation which resulted in the rulers' loss would be bad legislation.

We should note, also, that there is nothing preventing Thrasymachus, on his own accounting of the ruler's function, from maintaining that a ruler would, on occasion, act in his subjects' interest if he knew that this would be advantageous for himself. The point is, that the able ruler always secures his own advantage whether this brings loss or gain to his subjects. Accordingly, the function of government is to legislate in its own interest. Cf. 338 E: *τοῦτε ὄντι ἔστιν, ὡ βέλτισσα, ὁ λέγω ἐν ἀπόσσει τοῖς πόλεσιν ταῦτον εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθ' ἑστέρας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον*. Cf. Laws 714 C, where the Athenian rehearses what some people hold the natural definition of government to be (*τὸν φύσει ὄρον τοῦ δικαίου*): "that the laws ought not to aim either at war or at goodness in general, but ought to have regard to the benefit of the established polity, whatever it may be, so that it may keep power forever and never be resolved." (Bury in Loeb). The Athenian further specifies that the people who hold this definition mean, by 'polity, the 'stronger power' (Ibid.).

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Freedom, for Thrasymachus, is relative to a man's ability to act independently of the claims of others on him. Hence the comparative: *ἐλευθεριώτερον*.

its authority by government. Thrasymachus assumes that the acquisition of their ends by the governed could be, but are not by definition, the real object of government. The proper work of government is to maintain its authority. At this point we may note two things: Thrasymachus' concept of justice, since it rejects the Socratic notion of self rule, is incompatible with Socrates' notion of moral equality (Cf. n 40); since his definition of justice and the function of government applies to any manner of constitution, the immoralist value with which he colours the work of rule extends to all constitutions, democratic or otherwise.<sup>73</sup>

73

Scholars have noted a possible inconsistency in Thrasymachus' definitions of justice and injustice at 344 CD. Thrasymachus' statement, from *ὄντως, ὡς Σώκρατες*, runs as follows:

Thus, Socrates, when injustice is asserted on a sufficiently great scale, it is stronger, freer, more masterful than justice. As I was saying from the start, it turns out that justice is the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is what profits a man himself and is for his advantage.

Guthrie sees inconsistency in this. Thrasymachus is contending: "that (a) justice is the interest of the ruling power, . . ., but (b) it is not just for the ruler to seek his own interest, i.e. justice." (p 94 *Op.Cit.* See too, Kerford, *Op.Cit.* note 21 to p 22, and for his disagreement with the thesis Guthrie supports, see pp 23 ff.)

I have suggested above (n 71) that in view of Thrasymachus' definition of the function of government, we have no reason to suppose that a ruler might not act in his subjects' interest. It is in the ruler's interest that the subjects should obey him (exercise justice in respect of him); but government, in addition to this, is fulfilling its real end so long as it maintains authority. If a government were able to exercise injustice toward this object, surely, on Thrasymachus' account, it would do so.

Thrasymachus' position is, as we have stated, a denial of Socrates' conception of the self-ruled man. This is the man who is unwilling to do wrong and who, presumably, if called upon to do wrong in the name of the laws, would refrain from doing so (Cf. n 16). Such a man, far from being nominally just, will not accept - either in belief or in act - that the commands of government are a priori just; for he does not believe that justice - acting with right regard toward some (be they stronger or weaker) entails doing wrong to others. Men who are just in Thrasymachus' sense (and in Glaucon's: *ὅτι γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀδίκᾳ ἀλλὰ τὸ πλάττειν . . .*: 344C. Cf 358E 360D) assume that it is just to regard the rulers well (the stronger, who make the laws) no matter what they command. A government  
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At Republic 343 D ff. Thrasymachus specifically refers to the lives of just and unjust men in a democratic state. He says that when each holds office, the just man, because he is just (*διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι*; 345E) will not make use of public property for his own benefit (*ἐκ δὲ τῶν δημοσίων*; indeed, he will win the enmity of friends and associates through his unwillingness to compromise his moral beliefs on their behalf (*ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλη λυκοῦς υπέρειν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον*). We may note that Thrasymachus sees tyranny to be implicit in democracy as he has described it; for his description of the unjust man's rise to absolute power (344 A ff.) is continuous with the picture of just and unjust men he has completed. He has contrasted the Socratically just man with his nominal counterpart, showing that the latter, from his ability to convert public trusts (*δηροσία*: Ibid.) to his own ends, gains power and becomes the object of men's praise and obedience, while the former, who is unwilling to do so, must fail in life. Thrasymachus has stated, in sum, that Socrates is a social anomaly. But he said more than this. The setting he has used to make his point is quite clearly democratic Athens, a city whose laws Socrates believed he truly obeyed. It is fair to say that Thrasymachus

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that legislates in view of Thrasymachus' ideal paradigm will be able to command wrong-doing and see it achieved. In Thrasymachus' belief, this government, or the man who controls it, has achieved complete injustice (348 D ff.); for the man (or the government) has been able to achieve injustice without suffering reprisal from its subjects - from those who are weaker and who must regard the rulers well if they are to avoid suffering injustice.

Thrasymachus has told Socrates that to obey laws from any motive but that of the nominally just man is wide of the mark of a man's real grounds for regarding others well (*καὶ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος*: 343C. Cf n. 69). His description of a man's rise to tyranny (344 AB) implies that at the end of the day injustice rules men's lives, that the successful ruler will use any means, just or unjust, to maintain authority. Justice, on Thrasymachus' view, is a means to an end: the ability to be unjust when injustice pays. Here we may note that (344 C6) could denote either the man who rules or some tyrant in the making. If this man follows a man's real ends his object will be self-dependence: the ability (as Thrasymachus conceives it) to be unjust without making reparations.

seized the argument with which Polemarchus began.<sup>74</sup> Polemarchus and Socrates had not actually reached whatever political implications lay in the common belief that justice entails harming some and benefiting others. Thrasymachus took hold of the matter. Premising his tirade on the belief that injustice rules men's lives, he converted a common belief about justice into a doctrine of political consent. This doctrine showed that the truly just man, the anomalous and imprudent Socrates, has no valid grounds for obeying laws from the motive which he chooses.

Thrasymachus, in regarding justice as a means to the true end of material self-sufficiency, presents a view of the just man which is the antithesis of Socrates' notion. We have said that while political reformism is at least implicit in Socrates' theory of consent, this is suppressed in favour of his concept of the self-ruled man who is the equal of other citizens (p 129 supra). Socrates' theory of consent does not lay emphasis on forms of political constitution. It rather stresses that a man's consent to law, if it is true consent, is a testament to his knowledge of what a god would require of him in his relations with others. This concept entailed Socrates' belief that material injury, suffered by a man, could not prejudice him in the acquisition of his true well-being. It also entailed his belief that a man must become worse who acts with injustice toward others. In opposition to this view, Thrasymachus has maintained in the Republic that a man's well-being exists in proportion as the man is materially secure. He also held that tyrannical rule is an ultimate form of life for a man, that it is an ultimate form of political constitution.

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74 καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πόλλας γὰρ καὶ διαλεγόμενος ἡμῶν μετὰ δὲ ὄρμα ἀνεκκαρβάνεσθαι σοῦ λόγου, κτλ. : 336B.

Men's exercise of justice implies this form of rule, for men regard others well in proportion as they are weaker than or dependent on 'other men' who are better and stronger than they. Such dependence is, at least, the only valid or prudential ground for the exercise of justice. While Socrates held that consent to law both belongs to custom and transcends it, Thrasymachus had posed a radical cleavage between the laws' injunctions to regard others well and a man's true end. This cleavage resulted in his view of the legislator whose end is to maintain his authority, and whose authority carries such autonomy as to permit injustice.

The received belief that justice consists in benefiting friends and harming enemies becomes more than a retributory theory of justice in the arguments of Thrasymachus and Glaucon; for here, we find the received notion in combination with the belief that injustice stands sanctioned by the nature of political power. Polemarchus' notion about justice had implicitly raised the question of the just man's use or his value to his kinsmen (Cf. n 63). It also raised the notion of prudential skill (Ibid.). The political dimension which Thrasymachus added to the discussion has deep implications for Socrates' attitude in the Apology to his accusers, men whom he regards as both ignorant and unjust. We have dealt with these matters at sufficient length in this chapter in relation to the specific question of prudential skill. It is hoped that what remains will provide a sufficient summary of Socrates' doctrine of consent in the Apology and Crito.

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Socrates' theory of political consent defines the activity of a just man in terms of consent from conscience and continuing consent ( p 12 supra).

His doctrine, like that of Thrasymachus, sets up an ideal of the autonomous man. Also, like Thrasymachus's doctrine, the setting for Socrates' ideal is democratic Athens. In the Apology and the Crito, Socrates implicitly opposes his conception of a just man's consent to law to the conception, common among the Sophists, of the discrete origins of political life. Socrates' doctrine, unlike that of Thrasymachus', does not accept as an initial premise a natural distinction between rulers and ruled. It rather proceeds from a view of man as subordinate, by nature, to law. Socrates had explained this concept in the Apology with reference to a man's exercise of justice as seen through his obeying laws. Given that this were true consent, Socrates saw in a man's obedience his response to a god's requirement. He carries on with this same theme in the Crito where he personifies the laws of Athens in order to illustrate kinship between these laws and eternal laws and the just man's subordination to both. In both dialogues he described a man's moral autonomy in terms of his motive in choosing to obey laws.

Socrates describes his consent to law in terms of a tripartite hierarchy: the god, the polis, the individual. In the Crito, the polis, personified by the laws of Athens, is the individual's parent. On the one hand, Socrates is moved to obey the god from considerations of his interests; we have described this as consent from conscience or reason. On the other hand, he is not entitled to disobey the laws of Athens. These laws are his surrogate parent, and since they are akin to divine laws so their commands should reflect the commands of those laws. Only by continuing to consent to the laws of Athens by acting in their full view can Socrates

both attest to his conception of action that a god would require of a man and to his belief that no true harm can befall the just man. Fundamental to his thinking in the Crito is his concept of the individual as the offspring, the progeny, the slave of the laws. This notion strongly underlines Socrates' beliefs that the duty to obey the laws - political obligation - is natural, and that a man consents truly to law if he consents from conscience. A passage from Republic VII will help to illustrate Socrates' notion in the Crito, of the laws as parents.

At Republic 537 E, after he has described the education which will ensure the success of intellectual (dialectical) training in the ideal community, Socrates reverts to the moral education in present day Athens. In Book VI<sup>75</sup> he had censured the acquisitive life of Athens, a city whose habits most citizens believe to be rooted in traditional customs. The Sophists, however, have explained men's allegiance to custom in terms of material selfishness. This has led to wide-spread mistrust of philosophy on the public's part. They see the philosopher as tradition's enemy, even if it is their own acquisitive power which Thrasymachus exhibited in his speech in Book I. Thrasymachus, and others like him, have become the spokesmen of society's implicit rebellion against traditional and conventional belief. Plato describes this condition as misology, a term of broad application which may refer as much to the public's mistrust of intellectuals as to the ambitious man's dislike of the niceties of debate (336 D). In Republic III (411 E), Socrates had described the misologist as one who achieves his ends by violence and who spurns persuasion (*,καὶ πειθοῖ μὲν ἐὰν λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χαίρει, . . .*). In Book VII he again takes up the subject of misology, this time attributing it to a man's engaging in argument

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The implications to consent which we find in Book VI will be dealt with in the next chapter.

without having learnt the spirit of its disinterested essence. He describes the man ill trained in argument as one who has ceased to believe in the convictions that were instilled in him when young. It is as if he had foster parents (εὐν φαισκόντων γονέων; 538A) whom he had obeyed in the years before he knew they were not his own. Incapable of discovering who his real parents are, he becomes attached to those who flatter him and convince him that the duty to honour those who raised him is no longer upon him. Plato is describing in this metaphor the cleavage that has grown in Athens between men's respect for custom and their desire for material power. His description points to the politics of present day Athens, a city in which men have ceased to be concerned about common origins and who shun this common interest in favour of party allegiances.

The metaphor which we have just noted is not unlike the Apology's description of Socrates who, though he himself professed ignorance, would not abandon his search for his 'true parents'. He would not abandon disinterested enquiry. But nor would he abandon his duty to his foster parents, the laws of Athens. By continuing to consent to the laws, even when certain death will result, Socrates attests to his belief that the injury which has been done him cannot prejudice his true well-being. In this, his stand is the same as his refusal to commit injustice when, by all obvious standards, it was prudent to do so (n 16). This feature of Socrates' case exemplified his consent from conscience, his moral autonomy.

The Crito emphasizes that the duty to obey laws is natural: that while the duty to obey divine law precedes a man's consent to the laws of his city, it does not supersede it. The metaphor of Republic VII complements the personification of the laws of Athens in the Crito. Here, the laws are seen as Socrates' progenitors (οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγγενήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, ...: 50D).

But they are also the brothers of the laws in Hades (54 C). We may say that they are surrogate parents, akin to the eternal laws which are the ultimate source of a man's obligations. In obeying the laws of Athens, Socrates must attest to his duty to act in his relations with others as a god would require. He must act from the sanctions of divine law. These sanctions neither permit wrong-doing nor its requital. Socrates has been wronged. But it cannot have been by any legitimate sanction of man that this has happened. If men have abused laws, Socrates may not repay in kind. By this reasoning, he starkly opposed the conception of a man's worth which we have seen in the traditional, retributory notion of justice. He opposed the idea of kinship which underlay that notion, an idea which could lead to the view that wrong-doing could be sanctioned.

When, in the Apology, Socrates said he would obey the god rather than men, it was not with a view to disobeying the laws of Athens. It was rather with a view to demonstrating before men what true obedience to law entails: a man's exercising right regard of others, through obeying laws, from the belief that to regard others well is unconditionally required. This conception emphasized the moral aspect of Socrates' case. We have referred to this as consent from conscience. The conception of 'parenthood' in the Crito emphasizes that political obligation is natural. We have seen that Socrates described the latter concept in terms of a hierarchy among the gods (here conceived as the brothers of the laws of Athens), the polis, and the individual. The hierarchy which Socrates establishes in the Crito does not presume the perfection of political society. It rather presumes that by consenting truly to law a man achieves his true interest. Socrates had developed this concept on grounds of his belief that consent from custom is the natural effect of what reason or conscience requires. In Ch IV we

shall examine the implications of this concept to Plato's ideal political theory. In the remainder of this chapter we may briefly reassess Socrates' relationship with his city and its rejection of his mission.

Kerford stated that Thrasymachus could not have held the position of legal positivism that has sometimes been attributed to him, for had he held this position then his admiration for injustice would have been irrelevant.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, together with Thrasymachus' approval of a man's ability to be unjust with success, he erects injustice as an ideal of freedom. But this conception surely implies that the tyrant - whether one man or many - is, if the truth were known, the ultimate source of law. It therefore implies that a man has no source of appeal, beyond the laws which a government imposes, on which to base right action. Thrasymachus allows that some men are 'truly' just (just by Socrates' standard); that is to say, he does allow that some men are just from grounds other than external compulsion.<sup>77</sup> But he maintains, along with Glaucon, that such people have no rational ground (*ἀλόγως* : 360 D; 364 AB) on which to base this moral and prudential conception. Those who agree with Socrates (those who are just from conviction and who are not nominally just) will believe with him both that a man ought to obey laws, and (if they reject legal positivism) that the source of men's duty to regard one another well is remote from the laws (though certainly akin to the laws) which enjoin men to do so. Socrates bases the rightness of his actions, in the Apology, on this belief; for

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<sup>76</sup> Op.Cit. p 27

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.: Kerford refers to this fact to dispose of the thesis that Thrasymachus' position is that of psychological egoism (Cf. p 19). But the fact to which Kerford refers would seem to have strong affinities with what he calls "position 1": that "Moral obligation has no real existence, but is an illusion in men's minds (ethical nihilism).": Ibid.

he denies that his city can justly prohibit him from pursuing his mission. His accusers could maintain, as against Socrates, that since the city is itself the source of law and right action, that Socrates cannot be just and continue to pursue his mission, for he would then contravene its ordinance. In fact, however, Socrates' conditional release remains hypothetical. He invoked its possibility in conjunction with his belief that a just man will always act in full view of the laws, attesting before all citizens to his belief that his actions have been just. Again, it might have been from no more than conscientious mistake - not moral mistake - that his accusers believed Socrates guilty of wrong-doing. But Plato certainly did not write the Apology with this view in mind. Had he done so, he would not have had Socrates imply that his accusers were unjust men (30 D 5). Plato believes that they were unjust men because they rejected Socrates' mission. By it, he sought to explain what he took the grounds of right action to be. In rejecting his mission they reject his concept of a man's covenant with others. The conception of a man's kinsmen which his accusers represent is at least that of the nominally just man. In Plato's view, the accusers, despite their professed loyalty to Athens, have acted in ignorance of justice and in favour of the political authority they represent. In this chapter, we have traced the grounds of the accusation to current Sophistic theories which claim that a man can have no legitimate loyalty to any authority other than the ruling power.

We have said that a man's continuing consent may be regarded as the outward manifestation of his consent from conscience. Socrates' refusal to yield to Crito's advice and escape prison is, in one sense, simply an example of his unwillingness to act from fear of death. His attitude, while in prison is, in one sense, simply an example of his unwillingness to act

from fear of death. His attitude, while in prison, is wholly consistent with his belief that a man's real well-being is not prejudiced by material injury. But his attitude also reflects an ideal conception of the impartiality of justice. At Crito 51E, the laws tell Socrates that he has, by his acts, entered into an agreement with them to do what they order. This means that the man who approves, tacitly, of the administration of the laws agrees in practice ( $\epsilon\acute{\rho}\gamma\omega$ ) to obey them. We may say that the man shows his inward agreement by his outward acts. Here, a man's acts are understood by Socrates in the same sense as at Apology 32 A (Cf p 123, n 38). His acts are a practical complement to his conception of a man's interests. By continuing to consent to the laws while even under sentence of death, Socrates is not vindicating the men who passed sentence upon him. Indeed, he believes that this sentence is unjust. But his stance is not negative. He is not admitting that 'other men' are themselves the source of law and that, by submitting to the city's sentence, he is merely accepting personal loss. Socrates believes, rather, that he will harm the state and not simply 'other men' if he absconds; for he will have acted not only in breach of an unjust decision that men have made, but also in breach of an impartial law which says that the judgment of the courts will be final (50 B). In this, Socrates may be said to obey the laws conceived as involving the common good of society rather than the good of 'the other man' and one's own loss.

Chapter III

Toward The Doctrine of Consent in the Republic

In this chapter I want only to cite two problems which underlie Plato's theory of consent. It is hoped that the resolution of one, if not both of these problems will emerge, satisfactorily, in the course of the two following chapters. The first problem concerns the origin of the ideal community. The second, which is not unrelated to this, is whether, and to what extent, Plato would countenance violence as a means to the establishment of a society in which ideal ends would be achieved. Both these topics are complementary to our understanding of sophrosune - the virtue which, in Plato's conception of it, is the mainstay of his theory of consent in an on-going society.

The hope Socrates expresses in Republic VI that society might consent to philosophic rule is circumscribed by the fact that Plato offers no programme of positive action by which the ideal community is to be realized. The community's origins are apocryphal and Plato's conception of its origins remains implicit. In a famous passage of the Republic (592B) Plato tells us that even if the community is a practical impossibility, the just man will still live by its tenets. But when Adeimantus suggested that the philosopher would have accomplished much by abstaining from political rivalries (496E) Socrates answered that such a man will have attained less than he might, for he will not have lived in a community amenable to his nature. Plato never loses sight of quietism, which we may define as abstention from active engagement in political reform<sup>1</sup>; and we must emphasize that quietism, and not active engagement, dominates his thinking.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf Ch II pp 120-129; and n 50 p 127 .

But Plato regards as second-best the very accomplishment of which Adeimantus spoke. It is here that we find the significance for him of the community's origin, and with it, the means to the fulfilment of the philosophic nature. Since Plato also believes that philosophic rule is necessary to the perfection of society itself, he is willing to state in Republic VI that it is not unreasonable to assume public acceptance of philosophic rule. We should emphasize with Adam that Plato's verdict on the society's realization (,οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατα γε. : 502 C) is less than optimistic. But if we suppose that the quietism of 592 B is the sole object of Plato's theory, we lose sight of his assumption in Book VI that consent to philosophic rule in a Greek city state is not impossible. We also lose sight of his conception of the restoration of justice to a community which has failed, in the course of time, to achieve its natural ends. With his belief that the philosophic nature is not realized in present society Plato thus emphasizes that philosophers have a political function to fulfil. He believes that the perfection of society depends on the exercise of that function. He further assumes that we can only conceive this function as effectively realized if we assume that philosophers have been given consent to rule. In short, we must assume the public's confirmation of the philosopher's natural capacity to rule. We may here note that Plato's conception of capacity, or will, is of major importance to the theory of consent: both of the philosopher's consent to rule and the consent to their rule of the subordinate classes.<sup>2</sup>

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It will be shown in the next chapter that 'capacity' (δύναμις) and 'will' are closely related concepts in Plato. A citizen's capacity to do his proper work is explained in Plato through his concept of justice (δικαιοσύνη). It is by means of this concept - justice and the tripartite soul, that Plato explains a citizen's consent to do his (continued on page 163)

Plato assumes in Republic VI that society has the potential ability to consent to philosophic rule. It will be useful for us to discuss the attitude to the public mind which he there expresses. Society's unwillingness to recognize the man of philosophic nature, its refusal to distinguish him from the politician, is brought out clearly at 498E. Plato does not there imply that society is incapable of making this distinction. What he rather says is that society has never experienced the difference between the adornments of rhetoric and Socratic dialectic, which is uncontrived:

*οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γινόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον. . . ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡς περὶ νῦν ξυμπισσόμεθα.* Plato, of course, contrives the form of this sentence to mock Gorgias (See Adam on 498E 29). But his intention is serious, for he believed that Socratic dialectic, unlike rhetoric, was natural and uncontrived. Furthermore, he felt that political rhetoric lay at the root of society's unwillingness to respond to the philosopher.

Thus, at 493 CD Plato speaks harshly of the Sophists, holding that there is no distinction between the Sophist who teaches that the criterion of right is what placates undisciplined public will and the politician who acts on the assumption. It is not clear whether, on balance, Plato's hostility is directed more vigorously at the public in general or the Sophists and the politicians in particular. We must regard this question from the point of view of a basic assumption in Plato: that were there to be political reforms of a positive kind, these must come from above. Plato conceives reform on the basis of Socrates' analogy from techne.

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2 (continued from page 162)

proper work. Plato's concept of sophrosune is essential to this notion, sophrosune being the agreement or concord of the 'parts' of the soul to do their proper work, and the classes of the state to contribute to the states' ends.

Society's initial response to philosophic rule must derive (if we discount violent methods) from the prior exercise of political techne which would be found in combination with quietism.

With Plato's claim that the potentially able ruler is often emasculated by attention to public opinion we must offset his claim in Book VI that society in general might manifest sufficient shame (*δίοχυσθίνας*: 501E) to recognize the difference between the philosopher and the conventional politician. Plato therefore suggests that together with our assumption of consent in Book VI we may also assume such degree of moral reform in the public as will enable the philosopher to obtain rule. Plato is saying that the practical execution of the philosopher's political function is at least conditioned by the public's willingness to be activated by true political science.

There is irony in Socrates' observation that the Sophists and politicians regard themselves as rivals (*ἀντιτέχνους*: 493A). Far from being opposed to one another, they in fact stand on the same ground; for the politician acquires his art from the Sophists (or rhetors<sup>3</sup>) and contribute to society's instability in his actions as much as they in their teaching. What is of greatest concern to Plato in this matter is that rhetoric stands as an obstacle to truly effective political science: the potentially able ruler either succumbs to rhetoric himself, or, if he has strength against the ambitions that rhetoric enflames, he must remain of no use to society. To Plato's mind rhetoric, as used by the politicians, is an

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<sup>3</sup> It should be mentioned that the Sophists believed that virtue could be taught. The rhetors, such as Isocrates, for example, believed good conscience in the pupil can be assumed. They taught the art of persuasion on that basis. One can consider Méno 95 C for a description of the rhetor's attitude in this matter.

inversion of true political art. By means of the latter, the ruler would mould the characters of the citizens. He would not preserve himself from the danger of falling out of grace with them by tending to the needs of undisciplined will, whether his own will for the fruits of power, or theirs for the material benefits he might bestow. This thought, strongly expressed in the Gorgias (512B-13B) is similar to the claim made at Republic 489C that it is not natural that rulers should subserve uneducated or undisciplined public demand. (ὅτι τῶν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀρ-  
χισθαι, ὅτι ἂν εἴη ἀληθεία τε ὄφελος ἦ .) To understand the full meaning of this statement we must interpret it in the light of what Plato took to be implicit in Socratic dialectic: the conception of rule as a techne. In keeping with his customary plea of ignorance Socrates interpreted this negatively, so far as political reform was concerned, addressing the concept to his notion of the self-ruled man. But Plato saw in it the basis of social reform. Implicit in the Socratic and the Platonic conceptions of techne is the belief that questions of moral conduct must ultimately reduce to a conception of moral practice based on knowledge. What was significant in Socrates' conception of moral techne was his belief that public men, the Athenian κίλοι κίγαθοι were unable to teach virtue. Furthermore, the public teachers who purported to train men in the persuasive use of language failed by their art to impart moral competence. Socrates maintained this belief to the end in conjunction with his own conception of the moral grounds of a man's consent to law. His claim that the Athenians could not impart virtue, won for him the enmity of those who saw the traditional moral education as the source of the restored democracy's strength. Socrates' attitude in this and his habit of abstention from active participation in political affairs formed the basis of Plato's discussion of political science and the reformed polis.

At Republic 493A Socrates speaks of the Sophists' habit of forming their knowledge of man on what they have learnt of citizens' wants in the assembly or public gathering places. It is as if one were acquiring knowledge of a large and powerful animal (ὄρέγματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ) so that one might placate it, knowing what makes it most savage or gentle (καλεπώτερον ἢ πρόσεται). The thought is that the public is alternatively appeased or angered by rhetoric: by the base rhetoric which Plato even supposes to be repellent to the public (499E). But if rhetoric could tame the public, so too could speaking to the public in the manner of dialectic (πράον: 499E-500A). In view of his metaphor of the great beast Plato cannot be said to have regarded the Athenian democracy as gentle or mild.<sup>4</sup> But if he speaks of the public in terms of irrationality (493A), he also alludes to its πρόσεται in terms of a capacity for rational response to political reform. The public will become quiet if we speak in other than contentious terms (γῆ φιλονεικῶν), that is, if we speak in the manner of dialectic. This is to assume a quality in the public which is distinct from the irrationality of the beast. It is to assume in the public a capacity, or a potential will, to accept philosophic rule. It is the task of our next chapter to explain the connotation of the rationality of the subject classes' response to reform and to philosophic rule.

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<sup>4</sup> See Adam, on 500A. He says that πράον is an allusion to "the universally admitted πρόσεται of the Athenian δῆμος". He cites Aristotle, Pol Ath xxii:4: εἴ ἐπιθυμῶν τῶν δήμου πρόσεται. There, Aristotle is speaking of the people during the time of the democracy's growth at Athens. Plato's metaphor of the beast is consistent with his own dislike of democracy, with whose growth (we may infer) he associates the people's loss of its customary mildness (πρόσεται). Plato's reference to this quality at least suggests his view that law, rather than holding a recalcitrant people at bay, should restore its customary habit of mild submission.

Plato's theory of consent, then, involves not only the familiar fact that the duty of the epikouroi consists in the preservation of true belief (ᾠθιᾷ δόξα), but also, that consent to philosophic rule entails an initial capacity for reform on society's part. The public's response to this inherent capacity would be sufficient to the community's origin. If, then, we assume that consent to philosophic rule was secured by rational means we shall want to know, by way of complementing this conception, what construction to place on the maintenance in the community of true belief - the condition of mind that would guarantee continued consent to philosophic rule. Plato's suggestion in Book VI that the public is capable of rational response to philosophic rule should find implicit confirmation in his conception of sophrosune. If we can confirm this then we shall have gone far toward dispelling the view that the third class is moved to obedience only through fear,<sup>5</sup> or that sophrosune, so far as the mentality of the third class is concerned, implies that this class would consent to law and would observe moral custom with the same attitude of mind that moves men in unreformed society.<sup>6</sup> Here we should recall a point which we made in Ch II: that unless sophrosune denotes true consent then Plato will not have answered the sophistic contention that men's obedience to law conceals the fact that justice is the rulers' advantage. If the third class maintains this belief, then the ideal city will be a community of two conflicting minds. As Cornford assumed (Op.Cit.), something less than true belief, namely fear, will characterize the consent of the third

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<sup>5</sup> Francis M. Cornford, "Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato", C.Q., VI 1912, pp 246 ff.

<sup>6</sup> R.D. Archer-Hind, The Phaedo Of Plato, (London, 1883) pp 180 ff. We shall show in Ch IV that while Archer-Hind's interpretation was instructive, it cannot be accepted without qualification.

class. The third class' consent will, in this case, be ostensible though not real. But if that is true of its continuing consent, what of the conditions that marked the community's origin? Could the third class, if it is moved only by fear, suppose that the community had originated in anything but men's submission to philosophic rule from fear of its proponents' decisive, superior strength? One further thought may be added at this point: if tension, rather than harmony, marks the ideal community's life then the order to which its subject classes submit cannot truly reflect the order of the cosmos to which, in Plato's belief, the ideal community belongs. This point brings to our attention the importance of Plato's doctrine of necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) in the Timaeus. In Ch IV we shall refer to this doctrine in order to throw valuable light on the Republic's doctrine of consent.

In this chapter I have raised the subject of the ideal community's origins. I have indicated with reference to Book VI that the doctrine of initial consent should at least be consistent with the doctrine of sophrosune if fear and irrationality are not the dominant characteristics of the consent of the third class. What, then, may we say at this point about Plato's notion of violence as a means to the attainment of political ends?

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I have said in the first section of this chapter that quietism, as opposed to active engagement in politics, dominates Plato's thinking in respect of the question of origins. I have implied that we would have obvious grounds for supposing that violence marks the community's origin if the great body of its citizens subsequently consent to its laws from fear. In that case, not only can we reasonably suppose that violence was

a means to the origin of philosophic rule, but that the fear of its assertions would also mark the community's continuing life. If that is the case in an on-going society, we have every reason to suppose that the public's confirmation of the philosophers' natural capacity to rule is no more than the effect of the cynicism which Glaucon, rehearsing an influential theory of justice, described in Book II. I have drawn attention to this point in order to emphasize that the spirit in which the community endures should at least be consistent with the spirit in which it begins. My case for this derives from the evidence of Book VI, where, I believe, we find a general sentiment in Plato that is compatible with the doctrine of sophrosune in Book IV. My view of the matter is that violence does not belong to the spirit of Plato's intentions. But his intentions yet involve both living and future generations of men. While the thought of violence repels him we yet wonder what immediate force could set his aims of reform in motion, and therewith bring to fruition the doctrine of consent in Book IV. I do not feel that the question of initial violence - perhaps itself a form of necessity for Plato - can be satisfactorily resolved. But the question is relevant if the ideal community is the achievement in historical time of natural, human ends. It will be useful, then, to note some basic features of the case which are available from Plato's own texts.

Plato tells us that the ideal community might come into being through the work of chance (*ἀνάγκη εἰς ἐκ τύχης παραβάλλει* : 499B). He associates, as being simultaneous with the workings of chance, the city's obedience to philosophic rule (*καὶ εἴ ποτε κακήκοασι* : Ibid.). He describes its obedience as temperance and quiet submission arising from persuasion (*Ἐὰρ οὖν, . . . πειθομένῃ πῃ ἐκείνους, . . . καὶ εἰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ νόου ἀκούοντες πράττονται ; καὶ πολὺ γὰρ . . . εἰ σωφρονούσιν* .s501CD). In these passages

there is no tangible hint of a real distinction, on the one hand, between inaugural means, and, on the other hand, ends to be achieved. We may consider, in addition to these passages, Plato's description of the 'ship of fools' where we see a distinction between political science and the 'art' of grasping the helm - a distinction which brooks no link between political science and, at any rate, common methods of gaining power. On the side of the possibility of violent origins we may consider the implications of Republic 541B, where Plato proposes the expulsion of the adult population of the present city as being necessary to the achievement of a new society. We should consider, as well, the implications of Republic 415E where Plato, in Popper's view, is describing the invasion by a warrior class of mysterious origins.<sup>7</sup>

In respect of Republic 488 DE, an earlier generation of scholars believed that Plato is speaking about two incompatible things: a true science of navigation, and a bogus skill of seizing the helm.<sup>8</sup> This interpretation of the passage runs as follows: we are to regard Athens as a ship owner (or master)<sup>9</sup> whose crew, with the exception of the one really skilled sailor among them, vie with one another in persuading or compelling ( ἢ πείθουτες ἢ βιάζόμενοι ) the owner to let them take the helm (κυβέλλειν). They all condemn the true sailor as useless (ἀχρηστον), not recognizing that he has real skill, for they do not believe that his science is relevant to their

<sup>7</sup> Popper, Op.Cit. p 226 (CF sec. (d) of n 31 of Ch IV Op.Cit.)

<sup>8</sup> T.D. Seymour, "On Plato's Ship of Fools", C.R., XVI 1902, pp 385-387.; Paul Shorey, "Note on Plato, Republic 488D," C.R., XX 1906 pp 247-248

Mention must also be made of Adam's notes on the passage together with his Appendix 1 to Book VI p 74 F.

<sup>9</sup> Should we translate κυβέλλειν as owner or master? The point is that κυβέλλειν stands for the demos, the collective sovereign of Athens. See Seymour, p 386 (Col. 1).

methods of gaining control.<sup>10</sup> This interpretation strongly distinguishes true navigational skill from persuasive or compulsive methods of seizing the tiller - methods, that is, of obtaining Athens' consent to rule.<sup>11</sup> More recent scholars, while not denying this distinction between science of rule and seizure of power, have treated the passage as stating essentially one idea: that there is a true science of navigation, but the sailors deny that this is so because they do not recognize that it is possible to acquire navigational skill by means of the 'useless' sailor's science.<sup>12</sup>

Seymour pointed out that there is at least continuity between the sailors' methods and their objective (n 11 supra.). Given that Plato (on the quietist interpretation) would insist on a different method of obtaining power, there is no intrinsic reason for us to suppose that he does not himself anticipate continuity of method (i.e. means of obtaining power) with formal acquisition of consent to rule. At this point, it will be useful to consider Adam's contribution to the subject of the 'ship of state'.

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<sup>10</sup> At 488E Shorey read *οἷομένω* for *οἷομένοι* of the MSS. In his view, it is the truly skilled sailor who does not believe that true navigational skill is found in combination with a 'skill' of gaining control by violent methods. See C.R. Op.Cit. p 248 and Shorey's notes h, i, and j, pp 20-21 of his trans. in Loeb.

<sup>11</sup> Seymour, against Campbell and Jowett, held *ὅπως ἄρξουσιν* (488 D 1) to be parallel with *ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσου* (D 4). He mentioned that both verbs have the inceptive force of attain power, obtain control (p 387: Col. 1). That is, on his view, (Ibid.), the sailors - though not the true sailor - believe that politics is essentially an art of acquiring power by beseeching the owner to let them rule.

<sup>12</sup> Shorey believed that the true pilot does not hold with the other sailors' 'skill' of getting control. He took *μήτε εἴχου σου μήτε μελέου* (E-1) to refer to this false skill. Cornford, on the other hand, treats the Greek of E-1 as the "instruction and practice" which provides knowledge how to steer (*ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσου* : "keep control of the helm") The sailors reject the idea that this knowledge is compatible with skill of navigation. See Cornford's trans. p 195-96. See also, Lees' trans. in Penguin and Grube in Plato's Thought, p 274.

Adam held, as against Stallbaum and Ast, that the passage at 488 DE, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, does not imply two arts: a scientific art of pilotage (ruling in the crew's interest, say)<sup>13</sup> and a separate art of enforcing and maintaining authority - that is to say, an art we can call the art of maintaining the sailors' willing consent (when once consent had been given). In support of his claim that ἐν τοῖς πλοῖοις . . . ἐν τοῖς πλοῖοις does not imply a special art - an art of maintaining control - Adam points to Statesman 293A: . . . ἕνα ἔκαστος ἕνα δόκον . . .; and 293C: καὶ ἐκόντων ἢ ἀκόντων (Cf. 296E f.), where it is said that the consent of either patient or citizen should not be regarded as a condition of the right performance of medical or political science. On this, Adam says: "The pilot cares just as little whether people wish him to steer as whether they do not: his art has nothing whatever to do with the sentiments with which the passengers regard his rule." (p 74)

In dealing with the Republic text Adam emphasizes the parallel of thought with the Statesman at the expense of the fact that scientific rule will obtain in the first place only if the scientific ruler somehow acquires consent.<sup>14</sup> We may interpret the Statesman passage as suggesting that where scientific rule already exists the consent of the citizens could be suspended, though there, the condition in which this would be true would be that of a purely theoretical constitution and not a constitution which Plato is proposing

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Adam does not draw this inference, but it is quite possible to conceive of a (Platonically) skilled ruler governing in a manner that is in the citizens' interest, though they remain recalcitrant. I say that this is a possible construction, though I do not suppose - as I think Adam does - that maintaining willing consent is not, properly, part of the rulers' art. It is possible to conceive of a right minded ruler and unwilling subjects. But I do not feel that this catches the main sense of Plato's over-all view. This subject remains for consideration in the next chapter.

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Adam nowhere suggests, to my knowledge, that acquisition of power would be violent - or, that is, without willing consent. If, however, the scientific ruler cares little whether citizens approve of his rule, I can see no reason to suppose that acquisition of power would have excluded violence.

for men in historical time. In the Statesman, Plato is making essentially the same suggestion that he is making in Republic VI about the actual exercise of scientific rule: that the ruler would not be enslaved to the demands of lower appetite and therefore be ineffective as a ruler. So far as Adam is emphasizing this particular point, we must agree with him. But suspension of consent - even if we are thinking only in theoretical terms - must at least involve its acquisition. This, indeed, is implicit in Adam's suggestion, "If others wish his services [the scientific ruler's services] it is their business to apply to him, not his to sue for the opportunity of doing them a service", (as is the case with government in present society: Cf 589 NV, 536 BC). We may agree with Adam's precise point that the text at 488B 7 (in view of *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις φάσκουσας μηδὲ διδάκτον εἶναι Ibid.*) does not speak of the art of steering as having two aspects: an 'art' of rule, and an 'art' which could be said to entail consent, where those who are governed so bridle the ruler with their demands that he cannot rule effectively (as Athens itself grants anyone his day of power who can cajole or force it to heed his pleas). But it is difficult to agree that the reason for this is a fortiori that the will of those who are ruled is irrelevant to scientific rule. It must be relevant to scientific rule (on the quietist assumption, at any rate) if the ideal reformer does not beseech the public to let him rule, and yet, we assume, as Plato does in Book VI, that he might become ruler. In order to become ruler he must at least have persuaded the public that they ought not, as they do now, condemn him as useless:

"To begin with, then, teach this parable to the man who is surprised that philosophers are not honoured in our cities, and try to convince him that it would be far more surprising if they were honoured. . . . And say to him further: You are right in affirming that the finest spirits among the philosophers are of

no service to the multitude. But bid him blame for this uselessness, not the finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make use of them." (489B: Shorey)

Surely, this apology implies that the philosopher must have acquired consent should he ever become ruler.

We may say that the passage at 488 DE has to do with one art whose basic principles remain the same whether practised or not, but an art which is always potentially practicable, and would become actually so should those who are to be steered seek the expert helmsman's advice and obey it. But this does not exclude the true helmsman's seeking the ship's consent, even if he himself spurns as useless conventional methods of gaining, and with it, maintaining the peoples' consent.

Finally, the passage says that knowledge of the seasons, the sky, the winds, etc. belongs to the true science of helmsmanship. The sailors believe that this knowledge is useless to their purposes (*τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ' ἤγετι ἂν τῷ ὄντι. . . ἀρχηστὸν σφίσι καλῆσθαι . . .*) and are intent, not on any science of navigation, but on methods of overpowering the owner of the ship (*αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ αἶτι τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δογμένους καὶ πάντα ποιούγμεν, ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ: 488C*). The 'ship of state' parable had begun with sailors imploring the master (or owner) - the demos - to give them the helm. It had pictured undisciplined seamanship together with the absence of navigational science. Its actual counterpart is democratic Athens, a city that lacks effective government and is ever won over by the influence of those who seek power - those who reject as useless, a science which distinguishes between government (*ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει: Adam*) and present means to its attainment. Plato ends the parable (489B) by speaking, not of a ship master (the demos) being overpowered by influential demands, but of the other side of this coin -

of a would-be helmsman (κυβερνήτην : 489B-1) who cannot effectively exercise power because, rather than ruling, he is enslaved to public demand: οὐ γὰρ ἔχει εὖσιον κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ: Ibid.

(Adam was emphasizing this aspect of the case). The parable therefore describes the ineffectiveness both of government and men's consent to government at Athens. This is a society in which there is no real division of labour (no real consensus, one could say) between government and citizenship, a society which equates government with the activities of those who seek power and influence. The essence of the democracy, in Plato's opinion, was competition for these laurels. He has contrasted this with a science of rule whose practitioner will not be moved by these same competitive objects, for the latter anticipate no real distinction between ruler and ruled. This very distinction is essential to the political science that will remain inoperative until the 'sailors' recognize the 'true helmsman.'

Plato's doctrine of consent opposes the absolute sovereignty which the Athenian assembly now exercises to his own concept of the sovereignty of the expert ruler. It anticipates a division of function between government and governed which, when once established, will be as complete in its distinction between rulers and ruled as the present, popular sovereignty, is incomplete. If we ask whether Plato's philosophers would effectuate their ideals by democratic means, and our criterion for these means is that which Plato describes in the 'ship of state', we must answer that he held participation in present politics to be of no use toward political reform. We must stress that reform is his object. Present means of gaining influence are, on his view, indistinct from the ends which politicians pursue. But it is just as true, on the quietist hypothesis at least, that Plato's means would not be radically distinct from the ends to

be achieved. While the 'true helmsman' seeks reform, the other 'sailors' will not move outside the current system of politics. They will tolerate no distinction between seaman and helmsmen. We know from what we have seen of the 'true helmsman' that he must remain outside the system which will not recognize this distinction.

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Popper suggested that the ideal community would come into being by violence. In one passage he refers to, 415E, Plato lends a Spartan flavour to his description of the guardians' lives. Here, presumably, Plato is speaking both of the rulers and the auxiliaries (epikouroi), and he is concerned, in the passage, with the suppression of rebellion ( *εἰ τις μὴ ἑθέλοι εἰς νόμοις πείθεσθαι* ). He emphasizes in this passage both an allegiance between rulers and auxiliaries ( *προσάγων ἡγουμένων τῶν ἀρχόντων* ) and the security they will need in order to hold down revolt within the city ( *ὅθεν τοὺς τε ἔνδον μάλιστα ἂν κατέχοιεν* ). Adam's suggestion (Ibid.) lends some support to Popper's view in that he allows that the militarism we remark here would strike Athenians "as a dangerous and tyrannical exaggeration of Spartan usages." But there is no clear evidence to support Popper's belief that Plato is speaking, specifically, of an invasion. Rather, his pre-occupation is with the auxiliaries' work in an on-going society, and along with this statement about suppression he also refers to the auxiliaries' protective role. We cannot rule out Popper's conception of a sudden, violent invasion. But the language Plato uses does not actually confirm this. Indeed, this is one of those passages which may fairly be said to raise up conjectures about origins rather than to provide specific answers. ( See further, n 39 Ch IV ).

There is, however, one passage where Plato does clearly associate violence with the inauguration of reform. This is at 541AB, where Plato speaks of the expulsion (*ἐκπέριψασιν*) of all inhabitants over the age of ten. We may remark that despite the obvious note of violence which Plato sounds here, he discusses the expulsion just after referring, once more, to the philosophers' quietism at 540E. Here, he recalls the difference between what philosophers honour, justice, and what is presently honoured in political life. The philosopher is said to scorn these honours (*εἰνὸν μὲν νῦν εἰρήν καὶ φρονήσασθαι*). We know, from our previous discussion of the 'ship of state', that the honours Plato is referring to are those which come from seeking political power, while, at the same time, rejecting the philosopher's view that alteration in the composition of society is implicit in political science. Plato says, at 540E, that justice is implicit in this science, that Justice will be the philosophers' aim when they reorganize (*διοκκενωρήσωντες*) their city (*Ibid.*); that is, when they change its composition. We must allow that here, Plato has associated justice with radical and, indeed, violent reformative measures. This is so even if he has once again referred to the philosopher who remains quiet and whom society rejects, and to the politicians who compete for power and who win society's approval.

We have said that the origin of the ideal community in the Republic is apocryphal. In Book IX Plato returns to the essentially Socratic position that quietism is itself an end (592A). Adam draws attention to this in reply to the question of origins raised by Grote:

"We cannot understand from whence the force is to come, tending and competent to generate it [the community]. But when it is once begun there is no reason it might not have continued."  
(quoted in Adam, on 499C; Vol 11 p 38).

We may answer Grote's question in terms of Plato's assumption in Book VI that the realization of the ideal state entails the consent of those who are to be governed; that is to say, its origin is dependent on a response to the ideal ruler's techne, or science of rule, that is sufficient to the implementation of reforms that he is capable of instituting. Since the origins of the community are apocryphal, Plato's conception of its origins is continuous with his conception of the ideal reformer as ruler. This is so because his activity prior to becoming ruler is, properly speaking, a political activity. It is his object to bring the ideal community into being. Yet his activity prior to becoming ruler is at least to be distinguished from his activity as a ruler in that in the former case Plato is usually silent on the question of compulsion. We sense stark means to bring about ends. But Plato provides us with no real programme. Plato's references to compulsion usually carry with them the assumption that consent has been given (Cf 519 CE; 520 A, on persuasion and compulsion). This implies a prior act of the community's consent to his rule, or its having become aware, through the philosopher's example of quietism, that its true interest can be achieved by philosophic rule.

Chapter IVPlato's Conceptions of Sophrosune and Eros as Bases of Political Consent

In Chapter 11 we dealt with Socrates' concept of the self-ruled man. We noted that this concept, while it had ideal political implications (n. 52), was devoted to explaining the moral grounds of a man's consent to law in any society. In Socrates' belief, if a man consented truly to law he practised justice from the belief that right regard of others was both consonant with what a god would require and in a man's true interest. A worthy man's observance of customary requirements (nomoi) was the external effect of the consent of conscience. A man's consent from conscience resulted from consideration of his interests and might otherwise be called consent from reason (p 130 f.).

Socrates' political philosophy does not explicitly distinguish (as Plato's does) between a man's truly consenting to law and his being truly just. He had been concerned to point out the difference between worthy men, who consent truly, and nominally just men. Plato's ideal concept of the state, the state whose citizens would achieve their natural ends, envisages the true consent of all citizens while only the rulers of the state would be truly just men. Plato's notion of the ideal state considers the Socratic concept of self-rule. It attempts to combine this concept with a solution to the contemporary theory, graphically explained by Thrasymachus, of consent from motive of material security.

In his description of the third class of Plato's state, R.S. Bluck<sup>1</sup> points to one essential condition of consent to philosophic rule.

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<sup>1</sup> R.S. Bluck, "Plato's 'Ideal State'", C.Q.N.S. 1X 1959 pp 166-168, at p 168. Cf. nn 5,6, Ch 111

"They [the third class] may be tolerably just, having their reasoning faculty in the ascendant, and manifest virtue of a kind; but this virtue will only be what Plato elsewhere describes as political or civic virtue, based on habit and opinion and subject to corruption through persuasion".

The ascendancy of the reasoning faculty, of course, connotes the control by reason (λογιστικόν) of appetite (ἐπιθυμητικόν). That is to say, 'reason' must take counsel for the whole soul if, in Plato's way of describing a just man in Republic IV, a man is to be temperate. We want to show that a man's being temperate is both necessary and sufficient to his willing consent to membership of the ideal community. Bluck assumes that there would be consent of a kind. But he also seems to assume what many others have taken for granted: that consent to ideal rule would not be different in attitude of mind from the consent of nominally just men. But in pointing to 'reason's' ascendancy in the ruled, Bluck does draw attention to a feature about the third class and its consent which has not received sufficient notice: the attitude to philosophic rule which the subject classes' outward consent reflects. While we wish to emphasize this fact, it is necessary to remember that the third class is not self-ruled, that it is not therefore truly just. It is true, however, that if the third class membership entertains the same attitude about the profitability of justice as do those of whom Glaucon and Adeimantus have spoken, then demotic virtue, as Plato conceives it, is no more than a continuation in the ideal community of the contemporary beliefs about justice which the earlier books of the Republic have described. In Plato's opinion, these were time honoured attitudes grown corrupt from his city's excessive material power. If these same attitudes dominate the minds of the ruled, then 'reason' cannot effectively rule their souls. Tension, the reverse of sophrosune, will mark the life of the ideal

society. We have more to say about this subject. But first we must observe that temperance and justice, as Plato discusses them in Republic IV, are very proximate notions. We should begin this chapter by distinguishing them.

Before we consider this distinction we may first point out that Plato follows Socrates in stipulating that material benefits or goods - the 'human' goods of Apology 31B (Cf. n 47 Ch 11) - are of profit to a man conditional on the man's soul being just. Plato carries this Socratic conviction into his concept of the tripartite state.<sup>2</sup> It is important to note this point because while justice and temperance pervade the whole state, only one class, the rulers, have a specific need which is not material, or strictly political and social. These are the needs of intellect (*νοῦς*). The subordinate classes, while their members will be just, fulfil needs which we must construe as material. The *epikouroi* fulfil their particular need in patriotic commitment to the rulers' direction of the state's political life. Their specific need - we may call it the honour-loving need - may be regarded, within Plato's hierarchy of needs, as material, since its perspectives (unlike the rulers' particular need) are social or political. The *demiourgoi* - the workers and craftsmen of the third class - supply the 'necessary goods' of the state. By so doing, they also find fulfilment of their particular need. Again, this

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Cf Apology 30A 8: In respect of bodily goods or wealth, Socrates says: οὐκ ἐκ πραγμάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς πράγματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ σοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια. Similarly, at Republic 443E, he says of the just man's pursuit of the same kind of goods - external goods -: ἐν πάσῃ τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ οὐσμάζοντα δικαίῳ μὲν καλῶν πράξεσιν, ἢ ἂν κλυτὰν εἴη ἔξεν σώξῃ σε καὶ συναπεργάζεσθαι, σοφίῳ δὲ εἴη επισκεπτοῦσαν εἰσεῖν εἴη πράξετε ἐπιστήμην, κτλ.

need is a material one. While the two lower classes do not rise above the fulfilment of material needs, the craftsmen and subordinate guardians are yet just and temperate.

Plato's concept of sophrosune has been described by scholars as denoting consent, willing acceptance, agreement: the agreement of the parts of the soul to do their work, the agreement of the classes of the ideal society to perform their social function.<sup>3</sup> In Book IV he describes justice (δικαιοσύνη) as a capacity, a power, or an ability. At 433B Socrates tells us that it was justice which provided the possibility (εἴη δύναμις) for the growth and development of the other virtues (σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, φρόνησις) in the city. Also, justice preserves these virtues so long as it is present (εἴσπτερ ἂν ἐνῆ). Justice is therefore wider than the other virtues, and consent (here ὁμοδοξία) is designated as being one factor among those it preserves by its presence. We may note that justice is further described as each citizen (and, indeed, women, children, and slaves) doing his proper work and refraining from meddlesomeness (ὅτι τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος εἰς ἧν ἔπραττεν καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμονεῖ: 433D). Justice is the ability of each member of the community to do his own work (ἡ τοῦ ἑκάστου ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις: Ibid.) Further on (443B) Plato describes justice as the power (δύναμις) which furnishes men and cities of the kind just described: men in whom the three principles of the soul do their own work. This work reflects the presence of sophrosune which was earlier described (442D) as the agreement (ὁμοδοξίᾳ) between the ruling faculty of the soul (τὸ ἄρχον) and its two subject faculties

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Those who have drawn attention to the denotation of consent (or the equivalent) in sophrosune, are: Cornford, in his trans. p 125; Larson, in his paper "The Platonic Synonyms ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ and ΣΟΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ", American Journal of Philology, 72 1951 pp 395-414, at p 406; and Shorey. See Larson, Op. Cit., p 396, on Shorey in The Unity of Plato's Thought.

(*εὖ ἀρχομένη*) that 'reason' ought to rule. Here then, we see the proximity of the two Platonic notions of justice and temperance. Given that temperance is a state of harmony or agreement among the parts - a condition of consent - and that justice is the present ability or capacity to preserve an end, then we have a division of labour between the two which Plato has described in terms of will or agreement (temperance) and end (justice).

We may add to the above that Plato has already spoken of the city in which reason rules as being well advised (*εὖβουλον*) and truly wise (*τῷ ὄντι σοφίην*): 427DE. Here, he was speaking with particular reference to the rulers of the state. In virtue of their rule, a city founded on natural principles would be wise as a whole. The later description of temperance and justice which we have just examined assumes as its point of reference a city in which natural ends or abilities are realized. Consent, or temperance, is seen to be a concomitant feature of the realization of these ends.

We must now examine the importance of the notion of temperance to Plato's conception of it as an external agreement between ruling and subject classes. We shall see that he regards external consent to philosophic rule as being a reflection of the individual's belief that his interests are fulfilled from membership of the community. (Here, the 'individual' is as much the philosopher as the subject citizen.) We shall also see that unless Plato intended that the consent of the subject classes should be willing consent that the political society which he describes in the Republic must be recalcitrant to the wider, natural order to which the society belongs. In order to develop these matters further, it will be appropriate at this point

to consider the basic features of the tripartite doctrine of the soul as Plato sets out this doctrine in Republic IV.

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At Republic 431D, Socrates emphasizes the external aspect of the relation between rulers and subjects:

And will you observe in your city that the appetites in the majority of the people who belong to the lowest rank (πολλοῖς τε καὶ φουλοῖς) are dominated by the desire and wisdom which are found in the few who are best?

This passage emphasizes that while the ruling class is self-ruled, the subject classes are ruled externally.<sup>4</sup> The distinction between self-rule and submission to external authority forms, within the context of the ideal state, two modes of consent we have previously mentioned: consent from reason and consent from custom. We have indicated that in the reformed society, the subjects' consent must not be a continuation of contemporary moral attitudes if consent to philosophic rule - and hence sophrosune - is to reflect the natural order of which the community is a part. If, at 431D, Plato were implying that 'reason' only rules the souls of the self-ruled then the thesis that tension (and not harmony) underlies the community's life would have force. Those whom he designates as πολλοῖς τε καὶ φουλοῖς (Ibid. Cf. 431C) would be those in whom 'reason' does not rule: at least the whole of the third class membership. What grounds do we have for rejecting this as Plato's meaning?

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<sup>4</sup> At 431C Socrates says that simple and moderate appetites (ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ μετριᾶς) are guided by consideration (λογισμῶν), with the help of reason and right opinion. This condition is found in the few who are best educated. He is referring to self-ruled men, philosopher rulers. He implies in this passage that other men - those who belong to the lowest rank - will never have this ability to be self-ruled. External control must always be a factor in their lives. But this does not also imply that 'reason' - given philosophic rule - will not rule in the souls of the subject classes. (Cf. 389 D,E . . . ἀδικοῦς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια περὶ ἐσωδᾶς ἡδονῶν; )

Our rejection of the above thesis must derive from consideration of what Plato means by the rule of reason in the soul. He means, to begin with, that a man is temperate - or he consents to do his proper work - when 'reason' takes counsel for the needs of the whole soul. We shall understand his conception of an external agreement between rulers and subjects from his conception of justice and temperance in the soul.

When we speak of the consent or agreement of each faculty to do its own work we shall remember that each element of the soul is ultimately regarded by Plato as a form of motive or desire.<sup>5</sup> But in order to distinguish each faculty of soul within the context of sophrosune, Plato distinguishes between that which desires per se (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) and that which qualifies desire (τὸ λογιστικόν).<sup>6</sup> He also posits 'spirit' (τὸ θυροειδές) as that which acts as 'reason's' ally. When sophrosune is present, and 'reason' therefore rules the soul, the faculties of the soul (including 'reason') consent to do their work. That is to say, the individual realizes his power or ability to be just. When 'reason' does not rule, it will not then take counsel for the whole soul (ἐν ὑπέρ ἀπάσης εἰς ψυχῆς προσιδέει : 441E). Rather, it will cease to perform its proper work, and 'spirit' will exhort it to pursue the ends of physical appetite.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Cf Vlastos, in *Collected Essays*, Op. Cit. p 89 n 62.

<sup>6</sup> Cf Adam's note, p 250 on 437E, and Cornford, in "Psychology and Social Structure", p 260 f. n 2.

<sup>7</sup> It will be remembered that 'spirit' is always conceived by Plato as 'reason's' ally. This is true whether 'reason' is doing its proper work or not. See Adam's appendix IV to Book IV Vol 1.

We must regard consent - either true or nominal consent - as the result of the determinations of the rational part of the soul: for while Plato ascribes consciousness to 'reason' in its desiderative function (as at 441E for example), and consciousness to 'spirit' in its hortatory role,<sup>8</sup> he only ascribes material impulse, which has no ability to qualify ends, to 'appetite' or physical desire. Obviously, then, Plato regards 'reason' as providing the determinations of 'epithumetic' no less than those of 'rational' men. The difference is that when the 'rational' man determines ends he does so qua being *σώφρων*, each faculty of soul performing its proper work. This means that the rational man acts with the good of the whole soul in view, both 'reason' and 'spirit' presiding over (*προϊστέρον*) physical impulse (445A). The epithumetic man, on the other hand, is one in whom 'reason', no more than any other faculty of soul, consents to do its own work. This must mean that 'reason' in the epithumetic man qualifies 'appetite', not in view of the whole soul's needs, but only in view of the satisfaction of material ends. We may understand the exchange of functions at 443D ff. (*πολυπραγμοσύνη*) in this light.

Consent, therefore, in its inward sense, denotes 'reason's' qualifications of a man's ends with the good of the whole soul in view. When 'reason' rules - and sophrosune is therefore present - then a man who is just externally will be one who consents, inwardly, to the rule of 'reason'. The consent of the epithumetic man, by contrast, could only be external. He would consent to law and regard others well only with material considerations in view. In terms of Plato's analysis of the soul, therefore, the third class could be correctly called epithumetic if its regard for

<sup>8</sup> τῷ δὲ θυμοειδῶ ὑπὸ νόῳ εἶναι καὶ ξυγγίῳ τούτου; : Ibid.

the philosophic regime and its laws were only external. Sophrosune could not then characterize the souls of the members of this class. In that case, the distinction between self-rule and external rule which we have noted in respect of Republic 431D must denote the suppression of the third class rather than its willing consent. In terms of Plato's conception of justice in Book IV this would mean that the third class, though it consented outwardly to philosophic rule, would be a class consisting of unjust men; for since it lacked sophrosune it would therefore also lack the ability to achieve the ends of justice. That is to say, the members of the third class would not be inwardly just.

To this point in our discussion we have indicated that the rule of reason in the soul guarantees that a man will act in view of the good of the whole soul. We have previously noted Plato's stipulation that material benefit is of profit to a man conditional on the soul's being just. We noted, along with this, that the needs or "human goods" which the subordinate classes fulfil are material needs. We have also noted that external rule must always be a factor in the lives of the subjects. This raises the subject of the two modes of consent: consent from reason and consent from custom. The former marks the consent of the rulers who are truly just men; the latter, the consent of the subject classes who, while they are able to realize the ends of justice and (we are arguing) achieve inward consent, are not themselves truly just men.

We showed in Ch 1<sup>9</sup> that we find an ideal version of the social contract theory in the Republic. In the following sections of this chapter we shall consider the relationship among the ideal community's classes with

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<sup>9</sup> Ch 1 pp 30 ff esp. p33 .



would seem to want between the ruling and subject classes of the Republic. Plato also wishes to achieve affiliation by means of a myth of common origins. We shall examine the implications of the myth in the fourth section of the chapter. The ascent of eros is germane to Plato's political doctrine in the Republic precisely because the latter is an organic theory which Plato infers from his concept of justice as it is present within or absent from the soul of the individual. Finally, the doctrine entails cooperation between philosopher and respondent. The latter, in the political analogy, will be seen in a broad but real sense to underlie cooperation together with mutual achievement of ends between ruler and subject. The obvious substance of the analogy, then, will be seen in the growth within society itself of one class within it toward the achievement of self-rule, while the cooperation between ruling and subject classes is essential for this achievement. In a wide sense, then, the doctrine of eros will be seen to apply to the achievement of their own ends by the subordinate classes. For all these reasons we should be able to draw some inferences from the eros doctrine to Plato's concept of the community's origin.

We said in the last chapter that we would need to explain what was denoted by the rationality of the subject classes' response to reform and to philosophic rule. We may emphasize at this point in our discussion that the eros doctrine has an important bearing on the rationality of the subject classes. Some general remarks on the subject will be sufficient here. We suggested we would find confirmation of the subject classes' rationality in Plato's doctrine of sophrosune. We have seen in this chapter that the presence of sophrosune in the soul denotes the individual's inward consent to the rule of reason. By describing the public's consent to philosophic rule as rational, we shall mean, then, that 'reason' rules

in the souls of those who consent willingly to philosophic rule. We are arguing in this chapter that the third class, while its members are not self-ruled, are yet described by Plato as being inwardly just. That their consent is rational means, therefore, that they are inwardly just men, men in whom reason takes counsel for the good of the whole soul.

Thus, when Plato speaks of the soul's growth in the Symposium, or of the channelling of desire in the Republic, at 485B, he is speaking of men who have the potential ability to attain knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*). But with such men, as with just subjects in a reformed community, 'reason' must take counsel for the whole soul's needs. Both the self-ruled man - the philosopher ruler - and the subject who is ruled externally - must at least share this common characteristic if the consent of the latter to philosophic rule is to be rational in the sense explained. Rational consent, therefore, denotes the presence of sophrosune in the soul and the willing consent of the subject classes. Moreover, it also denotes the philosophers' consent to rule the society. It denotes a man's consent to membership of the ideal community from consideration of the whole soul's needs. So far as a man's consent to the order of the society derives from these considerations, his consent is rational. Since this conception denotes a common characteristic between rulers and ruled (given that subjects are inwardly just men) then rational consent - consent from the rule of reason in the soul - will denote any citizen's willing consent to the political status - either that of subject or ruler - for which his life in the community is best suited. A citizen's rational or willing consent will further denote his conviction that the place which he occupies in the society is sufficient to his attainment of the particular need of his soul. The notion of reciprocity inherent to this conception will be dealt with more fully in the final section of the chapter.

We have also remarked that Plato describes the movement of eros in the Symposium in terms of a continuous ascent. We have suggested that the continuity he envisages there has illustrative bearing on his conception of the transition from present to reformed society. The ascent we observe in the Symposium is a continuous movement of the soul from recognition of εὖ καλόν in physical objects, through laws and customs, through to the branches of learning, and, finally, to perception of nobility and fairness (μὲν εὖ καλόν) in its own right, independent of material or social reference. Scholars have disagreed about the construction we should place on Diotima's words to Socrates at 209E:

"And you, also, Socrates, might be initiated into these aspects of eros. But I wonder if you could apprehend the highest mysteries for whose sake these stages [the stages of the soul's initial growth which are preparatory to the highest mysteries] are the same for one who approaches the mysteries in the right frame of mind."

Cornford believed the sentence signaled a demarcation by Plato of the limit Socrates had reached in his own philosophy.<sup>10</sup> He attributed this to the fact that, "Socrates' philosophy was a philosophy of life in this world while Plato's was centred in another world and this (209E) is the point where they part company." But the other world of which Cornford spoke not only signals Plato's metaphysical theory, it is also the point of reference for his radical theory of political reform. It was personal reform, rather than political, that characterized Socrates' theory.<sup>11</sup> We may therefore agree with Cornford that while the Symposium ascent is an ideal tribute to Socrates, it is also a departure point for Plato's own concepts. While Socrates' notion of consent was characterized by

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<sup>10</sup> "The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium", in Vlastos, Op.Cit., Modern Studies, 11, p 125.

<sup>11</sup> Cf n 52, Ch 11.

'ignorance' leading to conscientious knowledge, Plato's concept explicitly assumes political science.

While Cornford's view of the passage, and the opinion of other scholars,<sup>12</sup> dwell on Diotima's opening words it may be suggested that the notable departure occurs at the third preparatory stage of the ascent (210E ff.) where Socratic question-and-answer, leading to confession of ignorance, merges into Plato's theory of Knowledge. I have suggested that the continuity which we observe in the gradual ascent which the Symposium pictures is at least analogous to Plato's concept of the origin of the ideal community and to the continuing consent of its classes to the regime he describes in the Republic. We may complete this section of the chapter by further broadening our notion of the analogy's bearing on consent. The points here raised will be seen, in the final section of this chapter, to bear on the consent of all classes.

Socrates' theory of consent in the Apology and the Crito was, to use Cornford's thought, a philosophy for this world. His theory of consent was based on his concept of conscientious knowledge. This was both a moral and a prudential concept which grew from his characteristic confession of ignorance and his belief, as reported in the Apology, that he must encourage his kinsmen in this same confession. We saw in Ch 11 (p 121) that Socrates, in the Apology, discussed the notion of techne in terms of prudential skill, in terms, that is, of the benefit he imparted to the god from the pursuit of his mission, while he, in turn was benefited by the god from the knowledge that a truly just man could suffer no real harm. We see the practical effect of this doctrine in Socrates' conviction that while he would obey the laws he must, finally, consent to his own intellectual promptings. The result of this conviction was conscientious knowledge: the consent of conscience and

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<sup>12</sup> Bury, in his ed. of the Symposium pp 123-24: Grube, Op.Cit., p 104 n 1; Taylor, Op.Cit. p 229 n 1.

and Socrates' concept of the self-ruled man. Such a man would be a true kinsman to his fellow citizens in any state he belonged to.

We have seen that the Symposium marks a transition from Socratic to Platonic thought. The novice or initiate of the description aspires to knowledge. Here, knowledge ceases to be associated with the confession of ignorance as being itself an end. Knowledge is now positive. Obviously, the analogy we have pointed to between the ascent of eros in the Symposium and the progress to reform in the Republic must entail this fact. We noted above that rational, or willing, consent, as determined from the doctrine of sophrosune, was common as between rulers and ruled in the Republic. Given that 'reason' rules in the souls of the subordinate classes of the Republic, then the channelling of desire which Socrates described at 485B (though he was obviously referring to desire in the man who seeks knowledge) will encompass the regimentation of desire in the subordinate classes.

We said at the end of the last chapter that the activity of the philosopher prior to becoming ruler is political activity. Given our assumption of willing consent to philosophic rule, it is the philosopher's purpose to effect a conversion from contemporary values to a reformed prudential belief - a form of belief that is consonant with the philosopher's moral knowledge. What is common to this concept and the Symposium doctrine is the picture which they both furnish of the orientation of desire toward a hierarchy of natural ends. In the ideal state Plato describes in the Republic, all these ends must be satisfied if the society's members consent willingly to the regime imposed upon them.



The passage at Republic 485B is, in effect, a short statement of the Symposium ascent. We should note here that the philosophic nature is said to be unwilling to neglect any part of knowledge, whether its lesser or greater, its less valuable or more valuable parts. Similarly, the initiate in the Symposium will move upward within a hierarchy of objects conventionally judged to be beautiful or noble - *εἰ καλὰ σώματα; εὖ ἐν τοῖς νομοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδύμασι καλοῦ*. But within each level of the hierarchy he will discover the type or kind of object which is truly valuable as an instance of beauty itself (*ἀπὸ εὖ καλοῦ*), the highest member of the hierarchy. In time, he will contemplate this highest member. Eros, as quest for knowledge, will have attained its goal. Plato's description of the ascent of eros is an ideal description of the fulfilment of an ultimate need, - intellectual need. But we see that eros is also a generic term which applies to human desire in general - men's desire for good things and well-being or happiness. Eros thus conceived is both an ideal and a social concept. It moves in its course through society's tangible needs to the abstract needs of intellect.

Socrates says at Republic 421C that each class in the state should receive the share of happiness which is its natural due (*ἕκαστον ὅπως ἑκάστοις εὖ ἐθνεσιν ἢ φύσει ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταληφθέντος εὐδαιμονίας*). He repeats this stipulation more emphatically at 519E, where he says that it is not the function of law to be concerned with the happiness of one class in the state but rather, to produce this condition in the whole city. Just before this, Glaucon had said it would not be just to compel philosophers, who are able to enjoy a life that is superior to political life, to take charge of the community. Glaucon is referring here to the need that is peculiar to philosophic nature - the intellectual life. Socrates says that

philosophers cannot be permitted the uninterrupted pursuit of this interest. They have a political function to perform. Were they at liberty to dissociate themselves from political life it would be because they had grown spontaneously (*ἀνεύρομασι* : 520B) and owed no debt to the state. But, as it is, the state has nurtured the philosophers both for their own ends and for those of its other members (*Ibid.*). In consequence of this fact, they must share the labours and honours (*πράων τε καὶ ἰσῶν*: 519E) of those whom they will rule. They will share the honours and labours of these men regardless of their relative value (*εἴτε χαλοτέρῳ εἴτε σπουδαιότερον* ). Here, Plato is clearly referring to the three needs whose fulfilment the reformed community makes possible. Two of these needs do not transcend material or political life. The philosopher's need - a need that is better than the political life (*ὅν ἀμείνον*: 519E) - is yet dependent for its achievement on the education the state has provided (520C) and on the fulfilment, by the philosophers, of a political function. In these passages, Plato is moving in the ambit of his previous description of the philosopher's ascent from the cave (514A ff.). In sympathy with that metaphor he describes the honours and labours which philosophers must share as idols or images (*εἰδωλά* : 520C). The philosophers, however, will be returning to a cave which receives them without hostility (Cp 517A). Belonging to the cave metaphor, then, is Plato's tacit assumption of consent to philosophic rule.

If the consent the philosophers receive is true consent - the rational or willing consent of men in whom 'reason' rules - then the images cannot be barriers against the citizens' consent. They must, rather, be the basis of the community's implicit origin and its continuation. They must be the basis of the citizens' consent from custom, and they must be fashioned in

conformity with the true archetypes of justice and good which the philosophers know and upon which they base their own consent to the community. The images must serve, then, as a link between the political life and its needs, and the better life which brings fulfilment to the philosophers. They must represent beliefs, opinions, or customs which are consonant with the philosophers' knowledge. This interpretation of the philosophers' return to a cave which accepts their rule provides us with a synthesis of the ideal and social aspects of eros that we have described.

On what grounds, complementary to our assumption of willing consent, can we base this synthesis? Socrates had described the honours of the cave in terms of their relative worth (*εἴτε φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι* : 519E). Earlier, when he had spoken of the channelling of desire at 485B (Cf n 14) he stated that philosophers are drawn to (*ἐρώσιν*) the learning which makes essence or being plain to them (*ἐξείνγς εἴς οὐσίς τῆς ἀτι οὐσίς*). Moreover, philosophers do not neglect any part of this learning, whether its greater or its lesser, its more valuable or its less valuable aspects. Later, when he speaks of the philosophers' return to the cave (520C) he tells us that they will know better than those who live there (*τῶν ἐκεῖ*) what each of the idols is and of what it is a semblance (Shorey): *καὶ γινώσκουθε εἰλασσε εἰ εἶδωλα ἄρα εἴτε καὶ ὧν*. The reason is that they have acquired true knowledge (*διὰ τὸ εὐαληθῆ εὐρασκεύαι*) of things which are noble, just and good (*καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν περὶ*). Since they have this knowledge, it is their task to rule: to establish in the community conventions concerning justice and good (Cf. 484D).

We have noted previously (p 181, n 2) that Socrates had spoken of the just man's pursuit of external goods. The goods which he mentioned (443E) are, typically, the occupations which would engage citizens in any community including an ideal one: the acquisition of wealth, tending of the body, political activity.<sup>15</sup> He implied there that given that a man was temperate he was fit to pursue such activities. Together with his pursuit of external goods, a man who is temperate will regard the just and noble action as that which tends to preserve the condition of the soul which sophrosune denotes: a man's inward consent or the rule of reason in his soul. We have seen that Plato later discusses the philosopher's concern for the 'parts' of learning - its greater and lesser aspects (4-85B); he also said that philosophers will share the labours and honours of the cave-dwellers, for the city's law seeks to bring about the well-being of the whole community. The goods which the cave-dwellers pursue, the labours which occupy them, figure in the list of needs and interests - what we have called external goods - that Socrates provides at 443E, where he speaks of those who pursue these goods as being just men. These are the citizens, whether rulers or subjects, of the ideal community. The philosophers' concern for the goods which other men desire is marked by their establishment of conventions concerning justice. These conventions produce men who are temperate - men whose beliefs about justice will be consonant with the philosophers' knowledge of justice.

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<sup>15</sup> Political activity (πολιτικόν) would obviously be an external good - an intermediary benefit - to philosophically minded citizens. Since such activity would consume the lives of the epikouroi of Plato's ideal city, it would be their primary good. We may further note that the acquisition of wealth (πλούτου κτήσιν), as here described, is not specific to the acquisition of power through wealth. Indeed, it could not be, if the man who turns to τιθήσασθαι is sophron.

Implicit in the philosopher's attainment of knowledge is his awareness of its greater and lesser parts - his awareness of its forms (εἶδη), and its true instances among the material and political concerns of men. He cannot attain his own ends unless, from his knowledge of justice (and hence his knowledge of good), he can satisfy the needs of other citizens even if these needs are of less worth than his own pursuits. But while he satisfies these needs, his rule must not be disputed. Given that the citizens are inwardly just men they will pursue the goods that bring them fulfilment; but at the same time, they will accept the conventions and beliefs about moral value which the philosophers will establish. If they do not accept the philosophers' conventions about moral value, they are not just men even though they outwardly submit to the order the philosophic regime establishes. In that case, sophrosune, so far as it denotes the agreement of the classes as to what class of men (ὄντας : 431E) should rule in the state, denotes an external agreement only. The subject class, the third class, is then ruled from material considerations only; 'reason', in the souls of its members, cannot take counsel for the whole soul's needs, and the third class must only be nominally just. Eros, in its ideal aspect, could not then encompass the subject citizens' conception of their needs as being fulfilled from membership in the reformed community. In the Symposium, Plato has told us that in order for 'reason' to realize its own ends, eros in the soul must first pass from what is noble or fair in material form, through to its presence in social and political form (εἶς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἐπι-  
 κηδυσίμοις καλόν : 210C), then finally, to its intellectual forms. The point of analogy with the Republic's social and political philosophy is that the peculiar need of the rulers - intellectual need - cannot be

effectively realized unless society's two other needs are realized as well.

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The concept of a social contract, so far as it applies in an ideal sense to Plato's thought in the Republic, is based on a concept of cooperation among the three classes of citizens. In the preceding section of this chapter we have noted in a general way certain features of Plato's eros doctrine which have a bearing on his social and moral philosophy. We want to indicate in greater detail how this doctrine can be applied to his concept of the origin of consent to philosophic rule and to the continuation of consent in the ideal state.

We shall show in the last section of the chapter how the growth of eros in the soul has, as the climax to its political analogy, the growth of one class in the ideal state toward the condition of self-rule. This condition is entailed by the achievement of their natural end by the members of the ruling class. The condition of self-rule would obtain, in Plato's view, given the achievement of the hierarchy of natural ends the Republic anticipates. History, however, in no way guarantees the evolution of the ideal state. Men, together with chance (499B, p 169 supra), must act to bring the state into being. As we noted in Ch 111 (Ibid.), if affiliation rather than antagonism obtains among the classes of the ideal state, then we have no reason to suppose that the spirit in which the state begins is not continuous with its on-going life. With this assumption, however, we must keep in view our admission that we cannot eliminate the possibility of violence as a means to the state's origin. Its origin, and the means to its origin, are apocryphal. We have, then, three questions to deal with: ultimately, the concept of eros which, in its political aspect,

underlines the growth of one class to the condition of self-rule, but which also underlines the perfection of all classes; related to this, the doctrine of sophrosune, which points to the willing consent of the society's members to the régime imposed upon them. To begin with, there is the question of origins: here we should emphasize that despite the uncertain origin of the state, there is no logical hiatus between its existence and the present condition of man. Though the state's emergence would represent a radical departure from the course of recorded history, its emergence would also bring to fruition ends that are natural and potential. However uncertain and unlikely the state's origin, both its possible origin and its continuing life are implied by Plato's conception of the three natural classes of men. In light of this fact, we should be able to infer some connection between the doctrine of eros and the community's origin. We may turn to this question first.

From Plato's conception of the ideal city's origins, we must infer that he rejected the view expressed by Glaucon that fear or mistrust are the essential motive characteristics of men's practice of justice and so, also, of their consent to law. To Glaucon's view that men are moved by fear to be just, Adeimantus opposed the view - Plato's own view - that it is mutual need of one another that compels men to live under law (372 A. Cf. 369C). What substantive distinction does either see between, on the one hand, fear, and, on the other, the need which the members of a society have of one another (*ἐν ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονίας χάρις εἶναι τῆ̄ προς ἄλλήλους*. Ibid.)? This question is essential to our interpretation of Plato's conception of the relations between the classes of the ideal city: our answer to it should begin with our considering Plato's view of 'appetite' - that is,

economic or material need - in primitive society. Of particular importance is his conception of economic need as forming the material basis on which either philosophic or tyrannical eros must rest. Upon his conception of economic need, then, Plato builds his theory of competition and cooperation in societies and the detriment and the benefit that each, respectively, imparts; upon the same ground he also builds his conception of the evolution within society of self-ruled men and men enslaved to appetite, or self-determined men.<sup>16</sup>

At Republic 367A, Adiemantus proposed that if we could prove that justice was an advantage to the soul, and injustice a disadvantage, then we should each be our own best guardian and should not have to guard against one another's injustice.<sup>17</sup> We should rather fear the presence of injustice, regarding it an evil. Glaucon had said a few pages before (360D) that our fear of injustice (and, implicitly, our desire for it) moves us to practise the deceit of praising justice.<sup>18</sup> The two contrasting views of fear that we see here are the Socratic: what is truly to be feared is injury to the soul<sup>19</sup>; and the "conventionalist"<sup>20</sup>: namely, that only fear of material

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<sup>16</sup> I shall use the expression self-determined man to denote the antithesis of Plato's self-ruled man. The appropriateness of this expression will become apparent later in the chapter.

<sup>17</sup> ἄρα γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγξω . . . οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν ἢ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶς ἀντὶ ἢν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φυλάξῃ. Στεδῶς ἢ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγιστῷ κακῷ ζήνοικος ἦ.

<sup>18</sup> . . . δὴ τὸν ἀδικεῖσθαι φοβού Cf. pp 118 ff. supra.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Ch. 11 on μοχθηρόν, pp 104 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Ch. 11 n 5 and Ch 11 pp 136 ff.

deprivation moves men to practise justice, that regard for a man's material well-being is sufficient to its practice.<sup>21</sup> Here, we must note that in the Republic, the third class's particular need is that of material fulfilment. But we must remark too that this class cannot be just if fear and deception are characteristic of its consent to philosophic rule. Of great importance for our consideration, then, is Plato's concept of the fulfilment of the material or economic need and its possible combination with true consent. (We shall recall, here, that the members of the third class cannot be truly just since they are externally ruled.)

Plato's concept of the place of material need in society will be seen to derive, initially, from his conception of the primitive city in the Republic (371B - 372D). Here, his view of justice at the level of economic need serves as a counter to Glaucon's conception. Plato, of course, will tell us that economic satisfaction is necessary though not sufficient to society's well-being. But his conception of justice, even at its most primitive expression - at the level where it is to be seen clearly only in external, economic relations among men - advances friendship, and not fear, as the dominant motive in men's practising justice. Our treatment, then, of Plato's conception of the ideal state's origin must entail as its most important feature the contrast he sees between fear and mutual need. This contrast, we have said, is essential to his conception of the relations among the classes of the ideal state. We should therefore expand somewhat on our account of the primitive or health city of Republic 11 in order to appreciate the contrast Plato makes there between mutual need and fear.

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<sup>21</sup> While the latter conception does not necessarily lead to immoralism in thought, it can be a spring-board to it, as, for example, when we regard justice as deception. (Cf. last note, and Cf. Ch 11 nn 61-63.

In Ch 1 (pp 5 ff.) we indicated that in the Republic and the Laws (676A ff.) Plato is not depicting a golden age or a time of innocence. Indeed, both at Republic 371E - 72A and at 372E, Socrates asks whether our method of analysis is going to demonstrate the origin both of justice and injustice in cities. Our first quoted reference has the primitive city in view, the second, the fevered or luxurious city. In the former, Plato is looking for justice and injustice, or, simply, the quality of moral value as it exists in materially primitive conditions. The healthy or primitive city, is, then, conceivably historical. Like the extensive and speculative picture of history which the Laws depicts (p 9 supra), the picture the Republic gives us of the primitive city is not mythical. There, Plato wishes to describe the nature of moral value in a society which, unlike the fevered city, is not capable of material excess. We said in Ch 1 that the primitive city is just if only because the cause of injustice cannot there be instanced (p 11). The justice and injustice of which Plato here speaks is conditioned by exchange of goods, or, that is, by economic need; since the city, at this primitive stage of its development depends for its survival on cooperation among citizens, its life is not yet characterized by autarky (material self-sufficiency: 369B) in which Plato sees a principle cause of injustice - the cause of injustice he is looking for. With autarky must ultimately come the moral outlook which emphasizes men's independence from one another (... καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχεν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτοῦ πράττειν ; 370A Cf 464CD). So long as that attitude is lacking, society is subject to and not master of its material circumstances.<sup>22</sup> Then, too,

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By mastery of material circumstances we mean, here, a potentially unlimited ability to acquire wealth. (Cf. 374D).

its moral outlook will be traditional and not radical (*ὀφθαλμοὺς τοῦ θεοῦ, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἐξυπνοῦνται ἄλλήλοις*, . . . 372BC). Friendship, and not hostility, will be seen to be the general characteristic of the inhabitants' relations with one another. With this, Plato is saying as well that given man's inability to achieve excessive material power, the moral attitude that regards material self-sufficiency as a good end will also be lacking. We should make two further points about the primitive city: first, the citizens' simplicity and their goodness are conditioned by the external, material circumstances of their lives, and do not transcend these.<sup>23</sup> So long as its citizens' lives are conditioned by such circumstances (together with a moral tradition that accompanies these circumstances: 372 BC) rather than by knowledge of moral ends, then they are powerless to prevent and, indeed, would regard as naturally beneficial (372C ff.) the growth of wealth.<sup>24</sup> Secondly, Plato regards the autonomy of the self-ruled man - the philosopher - as a potential, if ideal, social end. But the autonomy Plato seeks, while it is a natural end, cannot grow directly from the primitive city. Its growth toward wealth and luxury are inevitable, while the consummation of the end which Plato seeks will require that society be purged of its excesses. The principle that 'one man is fitted for one task' which existed by nature in the healthy city must be restored (374A) before the autonomy Plato seeks can be achieved. Thus Plato introduces the class of guardians at 374E and proceeds to examine the

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. F.V. Merriman, "The Rise And Fall Of The Platonic Kallipolis", *Mind*, N.S. XXIV, 1915, pp 1-14, at p 10.

<sup>24</sup> The lack of knowledge about moral ends is exemplified by Cephalus and Polemarchus whose attitudes about wealth and justice reflect the healthy city's inability to stem the tide of material excess and the moral attitude that accompanies it (Cf. n 21 supra).

function (*εὐὲ εἰν φυλάκων* : Ibid.) that this class will perform toward the maintenance of this principle. We should here consider his statements about fear and affiliation so far as the introduction of the guardian class elicits these tempers for our examination. When we have completed this topic, enough should then have been said about the community's origin so that we may see an implicit association between this subject and the doctrine of eros. We have already broached the subject of the citizens' fear of the rulers in Ch 111 (pp 168-169). We may consider the issue in further detail here in respect of the guardian class and its relationship with the third class. We may begin with Plato's conception of a myth of brotherhood (414 C ff.) as being means toward achieving affiliation among the classes.

To begin with, what do we learn from the myth about Plato's concept of origins? First, it is necessary that the citizens accept their division into classes if the principle cited at 374A is to be restored; and Plato supposes that the class division does in fact conform to natural distinctions (423D, 428E). But he also wishes to interpret these distinctions, mythically, in order to secure in the citizens, by way of belief, a sentiment of common origins or brotherhood (414E). This sentiment, he supposes, will secure them in the belief that the division of function among them, since they will believe it to be inherent to their ancestry, also conforms to nature (416D). The purpose of the myth, then, is to ensure acceptance among the citizens of the class division and, at the same time, to instil in them a sense of common origin. We have observed that Plato regards material need (the only need the healthy city fulfilled), whether in the healthy city or the reformed city, as being wholly governed by external agency: in the healthy city it is guided and controlled by nature; in the reformed city, where it coexists with society's two other needs, from the knowledge of the

rulers. Where material or economic life has moved beyond the bonds of natural limitation (Cf n 22 supra) its ends, in Plato's view, are limited neither by knowledge (Cf n 24 supra) nor by nature alone. The moral ignorance which thus ensues and which sees material ends as men's only ends is marked by an immoralist individualism (Cf n 20 supra) that is foreign both to the primitive city and to the reformed community. The sentiment of common origin, along with men's acceptance of the division into classes which the myth promotes, therefore links the reformed and the primitive communities together. There, what existed by nature - the principle of the division of labour - is restored in the form of the class distinctions and by way of the knowledge of moral ends which permit the fulfilment of society's two other needs: the patriotic and the intellectual needs. It is as if the ideal community had itself grown naturally from the primitive community in which Plato sees the seeds of its growth. It would seem, then, to be Plato's implicit hope that the myth, promoting as it does the citizens' acceptance of the principle of the division of labour, would come to be regarded by them as describing the natural course of the society's evolution (416D). But we must admit that the myth of brotherhood assumes and cannot obviate the purgation of society's material excesses. Along with this, it assumes the introduction of rigid class divisions that had not existed before. These are needed, in Plato's view, to ensure the realization of natural ends which history will not of itself ensure.

Plato had founded the life of the primitive community on conceivable historical grounds (p 204 supra). Its growth to excess was also conceived as historically inevitable. In history's course, Plato saw loss of affiliation among men; he saw this loss exemplified in Sophistic theories of political and social life, theories that assumed that individualism

and fear, as opposed to mutual need and cooperation, formed the essential grounds for men's practice of justice. The myth of brotherhood exemplifies cooperation and mutual need. It therefore reflects a quality that is found in society's earliest state and whose loss Plato abjures. But there is an important and obvious respect in which the myth has no link with history: it assumes class divisions and the control and guidance of economic need by moral knowledge. The sense of affiliation that the myth aims at promoting therefore assumes a rigid class hierarchy which affiliation, and not fear, underlies. We have already noted (p 202 supra) that Plato sees economic need as the material basis on which philosophic or tyrannical eros must rest. We said (Ibid.) that this conception is of particular importance to our understanding of the distinction he makes between fear and the need society's members have of one another. We have now seen that the myth of brotherhood with which Plato wishes to justify the class divisions to the citizens aims at promoting affiliation among them. The citizens, indeed, are to believe that the evolution of the three classes is natural.<sup>26</sup> Here we should emphasize that this belief would have an important link with factual history on Plato's view of it: the citizens' belief marks their acceptance of the statement Socrates makes at 373B,D that material pursuits must not exceed the limits of necessity in states. And it is true of the

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 , καίτοι οὐκ οἶδα ὅποια τὸ λῆγῃ ἢ πρότερον λόγοις, χρώμενος ἐρῶ καὶ  
 ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν ἀδούς τοὺς ἄρχοντας πισθεῖν καὶ τοὺς  
 σοφιστικῶς, εἴτετα δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ βολίῃ: 414D. Plato implies (414C)  
 that the best educated citizens - the philosophers - would cease to believe  
 the myth. But they will believe it in their youth (414D). If, as he  
 wishes, the myth did become a part of the community's customary belief,  
 then it should at least reflect and not conceal ends of which the philosopher  
 rulers will have knowledge. Here, the end in question is cooperation, a  
 condition which Sophistic thinkers had seen as concealing the facts of  
 human nature (Cf on ἀληθείας ἐρόμενον : Ch 11 p 135 ), but which Plato  
 sees as true to nature and as exhibited among his three classes as also in  
 the work of the parts of the soul.

primitive or healthy city that nature indeed (if only for a time) held society's material or economic capacity within the limits of necessary wants. Given the restoration of this natural material condition through the agency of moral knowledge Plato believes that society's two other needs could be realized. That will mean that philosophic and not tyrannical eros would grow from society's material base. With these matters in mind, what further statements should we make about Plato's conceptions of fear and affiliation in respect of the bearing that these have on the reformed society's origin?

We may answer this question by first pointing out that Adeimantus has implied what Plato will later confirm (573 ff. ), that fear is the tyrant's companion.<sup>27</sup> On the Sophistic interpretation of justice, it is fear that leads men to its practice in the first place. But its practice, far from eliminating fear, is really a deceit which the prudent man converts to his advantage; the practice of justice had really meant benefiting the power stronger than yourself and injuring the weak, were that consonant with serving the strong.<sup>28</sup> Finally, the tyrant, perhaps paradoxically, was the man who had the greatest cause for fear (Cf. n 27). We observed in Ch 11<sup>29</sup> that Plato supplies the formula 'benefiting friends, harming enemies' (being gentle to friends and fierce to enemies: 375C) to the guardians' attitude in their work. We shall now consider further his application of this stock notion to his own projected reforms. In doing this, we shall develop his conception of autarky, or independence, to which we have already

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27 Republic 365B:

28 Cf nn. 20, 21 supra and n. 7 Ch 1.

29 N. 17 p 71 Ch 11.

briefly referred in connection with material self-sufficiency (p 204 supra). Our consideration of these matters will complete our treatment of Plato's conception of origins, while it will also serve as a bridge toward our final treatment of Plato's application of the doctrine of eros to political consent.

At Republic 369B Socrates refers to autarky in the sense of material self-sufficiency. What he there condemns as an end (370A) is the individual's quest for material independence from others. (Later, at 387D, he refers with approval to a man's independence from others. But there, he is speaking of independence in the sense of moral steadfastness - particularly in the face of death. There, the autarkic man is one whose moral outlook will be less dependent than that of most on purely material concerns, and when Socrates says that the autarkic man has least need of anybody else he means, in the specific context of the passage, that the independent man, the good man (*ψάρον . . . ἡγήσεται* : 387D) will be less concerned than others at the loss to him of a friend's physical person. Implicitly, then, the friend's true value does not cease with his death. (Cf. p 72 f.). Therefore, at 369B autarky refers to economic independence - the material independence of individuals from one another. Plato disapproves of this. At 387D he speaks of the moral self-sufficiency of the good man, the man who does not believe that all values end in material wants. Here, Plato approves of independence. He praises a man's steadfastness in the face of death, his belief that death is not a terrible thing (*οὐ δεινόν* : Ibid.). We should observe that between his two references to autarky Plato has begun his discussion of the guardian class, and that his approval of moral constancy (387D) certainly has special reference to that class (387C). Economic dependence of men upon one another, which once existed naturally, has now been restored; the economic factor, once unable to exceed limitations imposed by nature, is now once again

externally controlled. Plato's approval of autarky at 387D does not therefore abolish, but rather supplements the sense of autarky - material independence - which he criticizes at 370A.

The question might be asked: could Plato, at 387D, be speaking about constancy among all his citizens? The moral constancy of which he speaks there is preparatory to the independence of the self-ruled man whose growth toward independence is a main purpose of the ideal state to achieve. Moral independence could not, in Plato's view, have existed in the primitive city; for there, a man's goodness could only have been determined from external limitations to material power together with his response to established moral custom. The independence of which Socrates speaks at 387D will exist only in germ, in the form of courage, in the guardian young. (The moral independence which Plato wishes to develop in some of his citizens has no precedent in his view except in the phenomenon of Socrates. Cf. Adam's note on 387D 25, p 133 Vol. 1). Their courage, since they are not themselves self-ruled men must, like the appetite of the third class, be subject to external control; it too must be subject to moral custom. But the particular quality of which Plato speaks at 387D is the courage of men upon whose lack of fear the state's survival - at least its physical survival - depends. Their freedom from fear, their courage, is vital to the protective function they serve. If this quality existed in any of those whom they ruled and protected it would have to be otiose, since the city's survival does not depend on freedom from fear existing in this class. The freedom from fear of which Plato speaks cannot, on his view, exist in the third class membership. If it did, then the quality of moral independence would also exist at least in germ in this class as well as in the guardian class. This cannot be so, for Plato holds that material life in a morally good society is always subject

to external order: either an order imposed by nature and immemorial custom, or an order imposed by knowledge and a revived custom. Conceivably, we may divide his citizens into those in whom moral courage is essential, since it is a stage (a dependent stage) in the growth toward self-rule or moral independence (In others, courage is a patriotic end in itself.); and those in whom the quality is inessential and not to be found. If it could be found in them Plato could not, on his own terms of the distinction he makes between knowledge and customary belief, make any fair distinction between the material need and the honour loving and intellectual needs.<sup>30</sup>

The quality of courage, then, which leads to moral independence, does not characterize the third class membership. It is yet true on our account of Plato's thought that fear is not the third class's dominant motive in obeying the laws. Nor can we imagine that they are moved to the practice of justice through deceit. What further references, in addition to the myth of brotherhood, can we make to the Republic text to show that this is so?

We have seen that Plato abjures one form of independence, material self-sufficiency, and sanctions another, moral self-sufficiency. We shall best understand his use of the stock notion, that justice consists in helping friends and harming enemies, with reference to this distinction. In doing this we shall determine how the importation of this concept into the customary belief of the reformed state affects the third class's attitude to the rulers. When this is done we shall have completed our discussion of fear

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<sup>30</sup> Plato's distinction between knowledge and belief was perhaps insufficiently noticed by Demos, "Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrine of the Ideal State", C.Q., N.S. VII pp 164 ff. If, as Demos holds, the rulers' political activity is directed only at the city's outward regimen (p 171) while the subject is left "full authority to fashion the inner city" (Ibid.) then, it seemed to Demos, the subject should be (potentially, at any rate?) as complete and just a man as the ruler. But if that is so, why can he not qualify as ruler?

as it relates to political consent.<sup>31</sup>

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30 (continued from p 212)

If the rulers' specialized or political function pertains only to governing the state, while reason, other than in its non-specialized sense, is spread among all citizens, it seems to me that this fact is not sufficient for the claim Demos makes that non-rulers are as complete men as rulers. If they were as complete then, presumably, philosophers would have no need to mould the citizens' characters in conformity with their knowledge (Republic 501B). We are maintaining that while the subjects consent truly, and while reason rules their souls and while they are inwardly just men, they cannot be truly just (p 180); for their response to the rulers' regimen lies in the conformity of their belief to the rulers' knowledge. This means that the subjects' being just men is wholly dependent on the rulers' knowledge. The fact that reason rules their souls is not then sufficient for their possessing, even potentially, the moral independence Socrates discusses at 387C,D. (Cf. Demos on 'courage', p 172.). If it were sufficient, then Plato has none but completely arbitrary grounds for distinguishing between ruler and subject. Finally, the third class citizen may have courage of a kind (Cf. Demos Ibid.). But it cannot be the kind of courage that leads to moral independence, or, that is, to the kind of Socratic freedom from fear of material loss to which Plato refers at 387D. Only if a man had knowledge could he have freedom from this fear.

31

It is useful to indicate at this point that in his discussion of autarky in Plato, Popper tells us that the reference at 387D " is one of the few scattered passages in the Republic reminiscent of Socratic teaching; . . ." The doctrine referred to is that of moral self-sufficiency. He further says (Ibid.) that 387D directly contradicts the Republic's main doctrine. In saying this, he points to 369B,C ff. where Plato's discussion of dependence typifies as against Socrates, the main drift of the Republic's argument. But surely no contradiction is to be seen between the two passages (Cf. p 210 f. supra). It would be more correct to say that Plato believes that the realization or restoration of material dependence is a necessary condition of the achievement of the moral independence discussed at 387D. The restoration of material dependence comes in the form of the external control of society's economic or material factor. The class which fulfils its need in material activity is dependent on the guardians for protection. They, in turn, are dependent on the third class for 'necessary' sustenance. It is this conception, rather than a contradiction in Plato's thinking, which lies behind the "spiritual naturalism" which, in Popper's view, marks his thought. Cf OSE n. 25 to Ch V, p 240; Ch V, pp 75-79.

What Popper detests (his text, Ibid.) is the political cleavage Plato makes between those whom he sees as (categorically) dependent - the third class, and those who are not - the promising young and the rulers. Socrates would seem to have felt that moral self-sufficiency was attainable by any man (p 106 supra). Yet he does not seem to have felt that he was materially self-sufficient. At Apology 36D,E he says, if somewhat facetiously, that a state benefactor such as himself should receive a grant of free meals from the state he benefited! Is there not something here of the cleavage Plato

As Adeimantus had rehearsed the religious and customary lore which resulted by its evolution into secular form in the Sophistic theory of justice (Cf. p 136 supra), so it is with him that Socrates discusses the reformed community's primary education (377-411). The education in music and gymnastic will, Socrates hopes (416B), be proof against the guardians' becoming brutal, to the third class's detriment, and against their exercising violence from their position of greater strength (Ibid.). Plato shows a tendency in Book III to regard as enemies hostile forces external to the state, to regard the classes within the state as friends: we observe at 414B an implicit tendency to regard the auxiliaries - the state's 'spirit' - as friends of the people, the state's 'appetite'. This implication is confirmed at 463B. Thus, sophrosune in soul and state are not wholly analogous. While Socrates will say in his discussion of the soul that 'spirit' never makes common cause with 'appetite', while he will emphasize that 'spirit' is always 'reason's' ally, we should notice his insistence in respect of the society's external justice - the relations among the classes - that the auxiliaries will be friends both to the rulers and to the people.<sup>32</sup> The points we have raised here will be our main points of reference in regard to Plato's theory of independence (autarky) and the relations among the classes.

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31 (continued from page  
 makes between moral dependency (Athens) and self-sufficiency (Socrates)?  
 Plato politicizes Socratic personalism, and there he disagrees with  
 Socrates that moral self-sufficiency is attainable by any man. But he does  
 not contradict Socrates in supposing that there is a difference between  
 material dependency and moral independence.

32

Plato implies in Book III (416A,B) that so long as ignorance did not dominate the rulers' souls the auxiliaries must always be helpers and not enemies of the people. The meaning of 'helping' or of 'being an ally to' is broader in its application to the state than to the soul where, Plato insists, we never find 'spirit' making common cause with 'appetite'.

The primary education has, as a major aim, the elimination of the traditional belief that gods are complaisant to entreaty. With the elimination of this belief, the notion that justice is another's good and one's own loss, will have no place in the society (392B). The poets will not be allowed to utter it (Ibid.). The guardians must be constant in their sense of friendship for one another (387C,D, 386A) and toward this object all poetry that suggests the complaisance of gods to injustice or their changeableness will not be allowed. What part will the third class have in this education? The question is important, for we want to know what is implied by the presence of sophrosune in this class. We do know that it is not their nature to be morally self-sufficient. Moreover, it is apparent that Plato regards the active elimination of fear as necessary to self-sufficiency: the early education is to be a time of testing (412E - 414B); understandably, absence of fear in those who guard and rule will be a different matter from its absence in those who do not go to war and whose principal need is material security. Let us say, in the hope of proving it, that Plato wishes his third class to be free from fear in the passive sense that no cause for it will be placed before them. A guardian must be brought before fear to

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32 (continued from page

(Cf. p 185 and n. 7 supra). The two cases of sophrosune - its existence in soul and state - are not wholly analogous because 'appetite' is the soul's irrational factor, while the third class membership is ruled by 'reason' (which conforms to the rulers' reason) in their souls. The fact that the auxiliaries will help the people therefore allows for reciprocity among the three classes of the state (Cf n. 31), rather than between only two factors as in the soul. The two cases would seem to be analogous, though, in that in the event that ignorance (ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ λιποῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ) did not dominate the rulers' souls, the auxiliaries would aid them in despoiling the people (416A,B): Plato is saying that should unrest come it must come from above - from failure of reason in the rulers' souls; he implies, on analogy with the doctrine of the soul, that unrest would not come from collusion (Cf. κοινωνήσαντα ; 440B) between auxiliaries and third class. This note provides at least a partial answer to objections to Plato's class divisions raised in Adam's note on 416B 9 (p 198 Vol. 1.).

develop both the courage that thinks little of material loss and the sense of friendship which does not aim at material advantage or independence (Cf. on 387D, p 210 supra). It is toward these ends that Plato emphasizes that the early education must induce comradeship among the guardians. We have observed his stipulation that the guardians will also be friends of the people (p 214 ,15 ). But we have noted now a temperamental distinction between the guardians' sophrosune and the third class's. Our assessment of the friendship of the two classes depends on our being able to define the distinction exactly. Toward this distinction we may first consider the possible effect of the musical education upon the third class membership. When we have done this we shall be in a position to assess how Plato sees the education of the third class as complementing the restoration both of the material dependence and of the friendship that will mark the life of the reformed society. We shall make this assessment in the final section of the chapter.

The education of the third class presents difficult problems of interpretation. We can only deal here with those matters that tell us something about the third class membership's attitude of mind. We may begin by drawing attention to a point we made earlier. In Plato's view, if ambition for political power is not an end coincident with the acquisition of wealth, then those who fulfil their own end (together with the state's material needs) by economic activity can be temperate (Cf. n. 15 and text, p 198). The separation of the pursuit of material ends from the exercise of political power is of first importance to Plato. The moral laxity or ignorance (*ἀκολασία*) of which Socrates speaks at 416A f. would arise from failure of good education in the guardians (. . . , *εἰς ἃ ὄντι καλῶς*

πεπαιδευμένοι εἶσιν ;:416B). Such failure must blind them to the function of ruling and guardianship which they would understand to end in the acquisition of wealth (. . . ,σφρασιωτικῆς γὰρ , . . . οὐ χρηματιστικῆς : 415E). It is therefore in the union of power and wealth that Plato sees the rise of tyranny and the complete loss of temperance (Cf n. 32). But economic activity can embody temperance so long as those who engage in it neither have nor desire political power. These presuppositions result in the fact that while the whole of Plato's society will be materially dependent (the two upper classes, for sustenance; the lowest class, for security), only one class, the rulers, is morally self-sufficient. The points rehearsed in this paragraph are essential to our understanding of the influence upon the third class of the state's early education.

We have characterized the activity of the third class as economic activity. But it is not exclusively so. Numbers of Plato's craftsmen will be poets and artists. The state's material goods, which the third class will supply, are not all 'necessary' goods. Indeed, many of these goods - those produced by craftsmen in art and poetry - will have a crucial moral influence upon the guardian young. The point is strongly made at 401B ff., a section of the Republic that has important implications for our understanding of the third class. The section shows, as does no other in the Republic, that the third class participates in the musical education. Its participation must be more than incidental, for at least artists and poets contribute positively to the education. We should devote some attention to this fact. While doing so we shall recall that a major quality which the early education begins to instil - moral courage - is unnecessary in the third class membership (pp 211, 212 and n 30), for it is not in their nature to be morally

self-sufficient. We are arguing, rather, that they will be free from fear; but this freedom is passive, it is not actively acquired. Their freedom involves neither testing for constancy of belief in the face of psychological grounds to change one's mind (413 C), nor testing for gross fear alone (Ibid.; 413D,E. Cf. 467D-468A). Plato therefore seems to see the influence of music upon them as an inducement to a passive, not an active, disposition to virtue. At the same time, gymnastic will have no apparent influence at all. We may note at this point that the quoted section we are about to discuss involves Plato's conception of the movement of eros toward philosophy's ends (403B). The passage therefore brings to our attention his conception of eros as it relates to the classes of the state.

Socrates tells us that only those craftsmen (and poets) will be permitted to practise their art who, by natural skill ( $\epsilonὐφύωνς$  : 401C), can track out the nature of beauty and elegant form ( $\epsilonὐσχημόνους$  : Ibid.). His attribution of their ability to natural skill<sup>33</sup> raises the question in what way Plato understands that a craftsman will acquire his skill. Certainly, those, whether poets or artisans, who cannot impose the image of good character ( $\epsilonἰς \dots τοῖς ποιήμασιν$  : 401B) upon their work will be forbidden ( $\betaυκνωδυσέου$ ) from practising their art in the community. Indeed, the rulers must superintend the craftsmen and compel them in these matters. Is Plato's statement, here, in the form of a general injunction to the craftsmen or is he saying

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<sup>33</sup> Shorey gives "happy gift of nature" for  $\epsilonὐφύωνς$  ; Lindsay, "happy gift"; Cornford, "instinct". These renderings seem to me to give the right sense. Davies' and Vaughn's "by the power of genius", Jowett's "gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful", seem excessive. Cf. Lees, whose rendering also seems excessive.

they will be directly supervised? When seen in conjunction with what he has called the natural skill of given artists to do good work, his statement suggests that in his view artists with desirable ability will grow up spontaneously and be able to follow the rulers' canons in their work. Their conception of the moral good of their work, then, though by it they make a crucial contribution, will be as insensible (Shorey, Archer-Hind<sup>34</sup>) or as far removed from knowledge (*καὶ εὐθὺς . . . λαυθάυγ* : 401D) as will be its reception by those that it affects, the guardian young. Later in the Republic (467A) Plato's attitude to craftsmen would seem to fill out the view expressed about their talents at 401B,C: the guardians' education will be supervised directly by the rulers, while craftsmen will learn by apprenticeship to their parents. Plato, then, seems to concede some measure to chance in a craftsman's acquisition of desirable skill, while he implies (Ibid.) that the rulers must concede no such latitude in the guardians' education: <sup>1</sup> *ἢ οὐν εὐερίους . . . ; καταγέλαστος μιν εἶναι, ἔργα, εἶγ* .

While good craftsmen, with their insensible ability, seem to be on the same 'musical' footing as those for whom their fine works are made, Plato would seem to hold that the rulers' supervision of the craftsmen can be vicarious, while supervision of the young of the ruling classes must be direct. The craftsmen's participation in the education, while therefore real, is indirect.<sup>35</sup>

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34 Archer-Hind, Op. Cit. p 154.

35 At 467A Socrates is speaking about craftsmen generally. At 401B ff., one could almost think that he is making a special case of craftsmen in fine art. But there is no reason why what he says there does not apply to craftsmen in general. This is surely suggested by his statement at Republic 434A that it is of little account whether members of the third class exchange their occupations. That at least indicates that Plato cannot, without giving more explanation than he does, see any degree of difference in the value to society of the exercises of one profession among the third class membership over any other in that class. So long as occupations that end in material products do not cease to be dependent for their value on externally imposed

A craftsman can do no more, in Plato's view, than exemplify moral and aesthetic canons in material form by means of natural or instinctual skill. He does not have knowledge of the canons he obeys.

The instinct for good, when present in artists, has grown up spontaneously. Their instinctive response to what is fair and to elegant form is consistent with the moral dependence which Plato believes must mark the third class, for the artists respond by natural inclination to external directives which establish moral canons within which they must work. So long as artists and poets remain within these canons the work they do must influence positively the guardian young for whom it is intended. While, then, the third class membership is dependent, the material sphere within which its members work, is of positive value to the society's well-being. We have said that Plato would seem to concede some measure to chance in the craftsman's acquisition of his skills. But obviously, he would remove as many of the causes that induce bad work as could be removed. The craftsman's instinct, so far as it can give no account of the products it produces, has no firmer guarantee of consistency than has right belief in moral action. The rulers must be vigilant in maintaining their canons if maximum good, and no evil, is to come of material productions. But the tests and inducements to self-sufficiency that are necessary in the guardians' education (p 217) are of no use in the lives of those whose impulses for good can be no more than instinctive. Their natural ability, since it cannot become self-ordering, would be too given, if left to itself, to the vagaries of chance not to be constantly subject, for its continued production of good, to external canons. It is under the influence of such direction that the craftsmen's instinctive

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35 (continued from page  
orders, those who fulfil material ends can exchange their occupations  
without injury to the state.

spontaneous abilities would grow. Left entirely to chance, there could be no guarantee of their continued usefulness.<sup>36</sup>

We have shown with reference to the craftsmen in arts that the influence of music upon the third class is real, for the craftsmen are able by instinctive response to moral and aesthetic good to fulfil the rulers' canons on this subject. For this reason, they are able to make a positive contribution to the community's life. We shall return to this fact when we complete our study of the influence of the eros doctrine upon Plato's political theory. What is true of the craftsmen in art is also true of other members of the third class (n. 35). With the craftsmen's instinctive ability to contribute to the society's needs we must associate their passive tendency toward virtue. We shall recall that we see in this tendency the main basis of distinction between the guardians' sophrosune and that of the third class (p 216 ): we are maintaining that while both classes will be free from fear, the third class will have no cause for it and the guardians will overcome it (Ibid.). We have now seen that the musical education penetrates to the third class. Owing to this, the members of this class should be able, as inwardly just men<sup>37</sup>, to impart benefit to the society to which they belong. Their participation in the musical education surely indicates that they share in

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<sup>36</sup> Plato seems to anticipate some degree of deterioration (*δυναστάριος*) in the craftsmen when he says, at 421A, that such deterioration as did take place would cause no injury to the state so long as it did not take place among guardians. We might take him to mean that the likelihood of deterioration could be expected in proportion as a craftsman's (or any other subject's) abilities were instinctive and not capable of becoming self-ordered and that we would here find the chief source of rebellion against the laws. But it is not entirely clear whether, in fact, Plato does mean this. Right opinion, while it is instinctive, should be a constant guarantee of willing obedience among the third class given, of course, that their right opinion is engendered by external rule. See further, pp 253 ff. and n 54 infra.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. pp 187, 198 supra.

right belief. Let us return, then, to Plato's conception of the friendship that exists between the guardians and the people of the community. This conception, together with what we have said about the third class's participation in the primary education, will complete our study of the third class's passive response to the political order of the community.

Plato can only suppose that the third class is inwardly just if he maintains that fear of the guardians will not characterize this class's attitude of mind in their practice of justice. His conception of the third class as being included in the restoration to society of material dependence and of the fulfilment of mutual needs indicates that he does not believe that fear typifies the beliefs of that class's members. These conclusions are indicated by Plato's application to his society of the stock phrase 'gentle to friends, fierce to enemies': by 'friends' he intends those who are and those who are not morally dependent, the rulers and subjects of the state; while 'enemies' must usually mean external aggressors, it may also indicate rebellious forces within the state. We should consider the places in Plato's text where the stock phrase and the notion behind it demonstrate his conception of the relations among his classes. We shall want to consider 414B, 415E, 417AB. Also, we should consider 412CD, 463B, and 464AD. A succinct appraisal of these passages will complete our study of the passive character of the third class and will confirm our view that fear does not characterize its members' practice of justice. We shall deal with the three latter passages more fully in the last section of the chapter.

The community's origin entails the restoration to society of the material dependence which Plato conceives as once having existed naturally (pp 204 ff.). Friendship, and not fear (*Ibid.*), had been the characteristic

motive in men's practice of justice until, with growth in material power, they had come to see material self-sufficiency as a good (Ibid.). Together with this, they had come to believe that fear was men's motive in the practice of justice (pp 202, 209 ). Elimination of fear should then come with the restoration of material dependence, since material activity would once more be externally controlled - now by knowledge rather than by nature. Also, the restoration should have provided a material basis for the growth of philosophic eros (Cf. pp 202 , 208 , 209 ). Toward establishing these two ideas we have considered the myth of brotherhood, noting its connection with Plato's view of factual history ( 208 ); we have maintained that the third class responds passively to the regime, that fear is not placed before this class (p 215); we have considered their share in the primary education and we have suggested that Plato sees its effect on them as an inducement to a passive disposition to virtue (p 218). Our examination of the Republic sections quoted above will confirm that friendship, and not fear, characterizes the relation between the third class and the guardians. It will also establish, as far as is possible, the connection we want between Plato's concept of origins and eros (pp 206 , 210).

The presence of friendship at 414B is clearly seen to involve three classes (Cf. n. 32 supra) and we have noted that the passage conveys the idea of reciprocity (Ibid. Cf. p 190). If the notion of reciprocal help is more than an isolated idea, it ought to be consistent with the statement Socrates makes at 415E where he says, upon completing his discussion of the myth, that the guardian young or auxiliaries will have the task of suppressing rebellion within the state and of repelling aggression from outside.<sup>38</sup> We

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... ὁθεὺς τοὺς τε εὐδὸν μάλιστα ἂν κερταίον, εὐ εἰς γὰρ ἐθέλει  
 τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, ...

briefly referred to this statement in Ch 111 (p 176 ) as being a statement that could allude to violent origins. The allusion would be pertinent to the subjects' consent in an on-going society in proportion as the statement reflected a continuous condition of hostility - a state of fear - between subject and ruling classes. What grounds do we have for rejecting the view that the statement contains this implication? First, we shall recall Plato's belief that should unrest arise in the state, the auxiliaries will always assist the rulers (n. 32). Also, in the event that 'reason' should fail in the rulers, they will cease to know their own good and will suppose that it lies in wealth. (Cf. 415E - 16A and 417B). But it is plain that the state could not survive should the rulers become thus ignorant (417AB). It is also plain that where the rulers are ignorant of their own good, fear dominates both them and the subjects (Ibid.). In the passages under review Plato devotes his main attention to the fear and hostility which he supposes must arise when the rulers should see wealth as their end (Cf. p 216 ). What, then, are we to say about rebellion among the subjects which Plato mentions at 415E?

We should first observe that the rebellion he there speaks of would not be fatal to the state's survival. What is fatal to its survival is failure of 'reason' in the rulers. The unrest Plato speaks of at 415E therefore has a different source. It is a form of unrest that would not injure the state and which would arise among subjects. Since the auxiliaries never make common cause with the third class against the rulers (n. 32), we know that Plato is here speaking of rebellion among the third class. We have said that Plato allows for a degree of deterioration among the third class membership (n. 36). It is possible that at 415E he is thinking of this as a cause of rebellion. (See, however, n. 54 infra.) The passage does not suggest however that anything like a continuous state of fear or hostility characterizes the

relations between rulers and people. Moreover, Plato is not there thinking of the third class as a whole. His language suggests that he is thinking of individuals who rebel, not of a whole class that rebels (Cf. n. 38). He is admitting that there could be rebellion among some individuals from time to time. Plato does speak of the subjects as a whole at 414B where he says that the latter will not wish to work harm against the state (. . . οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλήσονται . . . κακοεργεῖν . . .). Could he mean by this that the subjects will be unwilling to disobey the rulers from fear? If that were Plato's mind then the restoration of material dependence which the regime brings could not entail the elimination of fear as a dominant motive in the practice of justice. Furthermore, no clear meaning could attach to Plato's statement (Ibid.) that rulers and people are friends. In view of these facts, the recalcitrance Plato mentions at 415E does not characterize the subjects generally. Should there be recalcitrance among the third class membership it must come from individuals within the class, but not from the class as a whole. This is what we must take Plato to mean at 415E. The rulers with the help of the auxiliaries would suppress rebellion when it arose. But rebelliousness does not characterize as a whole the class in which it would arise. If we read 414B with 415E we see that while friendship could be disrupted between the rulers and some of the third class it is yet the dominant characteristic which marks relations between the classes. We should make further mention, at this point, of Popper's view of Republic 415E (OSE p 226). The continuity of our text will remain clearer if we confine what we wish to say to a note.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> We cannot raise all of Popper's points here, but the following remarks should be made. First, there is a problem of sequence at 415E. Popper was (continued on page 226)

39 (continued from page 225)

able to make ample use of this. The transition from Socrates' completion of the myth to the guardians' entry into the city is sudden. Socrates has also admitted that it would require at least one generation before the citizens believed the myth (414D). Thus we have a problem in sequence of events. The problem points to possibilities of violence in the community's origin, to difficulties in transition from present to future. While we admit this, it is quite clear from Plato's text that the myth emphasizes the citizens' common origin (p 206 f. supra); and while its acceptance by all of them assumes that some form of purgation has taken place (p 2 supra), it is by no means clear that the purging force came from outside the state. Socrates declares quite abruptly that we should arm these sons of the earth (τούτους εὐὸς γήγενεῖς: 415E). Popper's translation is not accurate. He refers to "the earth born" and tells us that they are one race who conquer a sedentary population. He translates the Greek as if Plato clearly had not meant those men among the citizens who are to bear arms, but rather, a single conquering war horde. (Cf. J.A. Faris, "Is Plato's a Caste State, Based on Racial Differences?", CQ, XLIV, 1950, pp 38-43, at p 42.) But Plato's language clearly points to the guardians of the myth. It in no way suggests that those whom he will arm are of alien origin.

The myth describes common origins. The guardians' entry into the city is not inconsistent with this. What 415E does show is that recalcitrance among the third class membership is possible. We have dealt with this in the text above. Furthermore, at 415E Plato does have something specific to say about foreign aggression. But it hardly confirms Popper's thesis. Should an alien force come it will be as a wolf coming against the fold. At 416AB Plato uses the metaphor of the wolf that preys upon the fold and the dog that protects it. Here, rulers and auxiliaries who despoil the people are likened to wolves (λύκοις ὁμοιωθήναι .). Plato seems to be implying that should the rulers become ignorant of their own ends their rule will approximate that of alien aggressors. This interpretation is not improbable; for at 416B, Plato tells us that the rulers must take every precaution (φυλάκτεον πανεὶ τρόπῳ) against the auxiliaries becoming ferocious masters instead of benevolent allies. In terms of his metaphor, the auxiliaries must be like dogs (assistants or allies: βοηθήων), not wolves or fierce (alien?) masters (δεισέουσι ἀγρίοις .). In any case, Plato is clearly contrasting those who assist the weaker and who are their friends with wolves who are enemies - even alien enemies. The injunction at 416C that guardians must be 'gentle to friends' implies, in the context, that 'enemies' would either be foreign aggressors or that they would be like foreign aggressors. Our thesis that Plato here likens ignorance in rulers to the ferocity of alien conquerors is a tempting one in view of Popper's thesis that the ideal community itself originates in conquest.

We have said that the myth implies purgation and possible difficulties of transition. But its dominant theme is the citizens' common origin and their affiliation. Our view of the myth is borne out by Plato's text. Our view is also consistent with his conception of reform as the restoration to a society of mutual dependence among its people. The notion of origin by conquest is not clearly borne out by 415E. Nor does that notion have any clear connection with Plato's concept of restoration.

In note 39 we reaffirmed the possibility of violent means to the community's origin. But our discussion of 415E has also given us grounds for believing that Plato does not see fear as characterizing the third class's continued consent. We need now to make our last remarks about their passive nature and their absence of fear: we need final confirmation that while this class's members fulfil their ends in material activity they are, characteristically, inwardly just and consent truly to the community's laws. To complete these matters we need to consider more fully what is implied by reciprocity among the classes. In considering this matter we shall recall the association we have made between the restoration of material dependence and the growth of philosophic eros (p 223).

At Republic 412CD Socrates proposes that the best guardians are those that would be most regardful of the state (*φυλακτικώτατος πόλιως*). His statement entails his conception of the material dependence of the classes and the mutual or reciprocal aid they furnish one another. Here, and at 464D, we mark Plato's conception of cooperation. His developed notion of cooperation or mutual dependence proceeds from relations among classes, not individuals. He first put his belief that mutual need and not fear is the essential ground of justice when he discussed the healthy or primitive city. Though the cooperation we see there is among individuals (370D), the society's members belong to one class, for they engage in one form of activity - economic or materially productive activity. The restoration both of material and moral dependence, in Plato's view, entailed the introduction of two new classes - auxiliaries and philosopher rulers. The introduction of the guardian class is discrete; for though its presence ensures the attainment of natural ends, a society's attainment of these ends is not guaranteed by history (Cf. p 207 supra). In Plato's view, history is witness to the

growth of independence as described at 370A where we see independence in the form of material self-sufficiency. The theory of cooperation he puts at 412CD and 464D displaces individualism (370A). It sets in its place a theory of cooperation among classes. It assumes that a necessary condition of an individual's being happy is that he belong to the class appropriate to his nature.

Is this also a sufficient condition? For the self-ruled man (the philosopher), occupancy of a place within the guardian class is at least a necessary means to happiness. Since no other citizen has a life better than the political life (520A), it would seem for the rest of Plato's citizens that belonging to the appropriate class (auxiliary class or economic class), together with being temperate, would be sufficient for happiness. Since, then, their lives are completed within the class they belong to, and since that denotes that their lives begin and end in membership of a political community, we can only speak of their happiness as being realized by their occupancy of the classes to which they belong. They have no 'higher' happiness. For them, moreover, happiness entails their submission to external rule. We shall deal again with these matters in the following section of the chapter. For now let us observe that textual grounds for Plato's conceptions of classes and individual happiness are supplied by his doctrine that should 'reason' fail in the rulers, fear must then dominate society. When that happens all men see their ends resting in material security, in power together with wealth. It is Plato's object to perfect the material need, a natural end for most citizens. But this requires the introduction of two other classes whose needs he assumes to be natural. His statements about the society's happiness at 420B, 519A can have no meaning if not premised on his belief

that there are natural classes of men and that the individual's happiness depends on his belonging to the right class.<sup>40</sup>

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At Republic 412CD Socrates refers to the guardians' attitude to the benefit they derive from membership of the community: they will believe that when their society prospers, they too will prosper.<sup>41</sup> The notion of concern for or regard for others (*κηδόμενοι*) that we observe here therefore entails the achievement by the guardians of their own need. Here also, the testing of the guardian's sense of patriotism is implicit in the perfection of their need (Cf, 413A ff.). A guardian's love of that which benefits him is therefore complemented by his moral courage, or his active disposition to virtue (Cf. p 217 supra). It is specified by myth of brotherhood that the third class reciprocates the guardians' friendship. This is emphasized

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While in the primitive society there was only one class - the economic class - Plato applies the concept of one-man-one-job as readily to that society as to his reformed society (Cf 423D). In the former, cooperation could only be among individuals. But these individuals already belong to one of Plato's classes. They belong to one class in the sense that they have a common end, material fulfilment, and they cannot live beyond necessary means. The presence of the two other classes is necessary to the completion of Plato's doctrine of the soul. But Plato is also dealing with an historical factor; for these classes cannot arise without the prior growth of power and wealth. (Cf. Merriman, Ibid.). Until society is purged of these, the virtues of courage and wisdom and the classes in which these are found cannot begin to evolve with any success. They cannot evolve from the healthy city because, indeed, it effectively lacks these virtues. At any rate, it cannot prevent the growth to excess. The healthy city must first become a fevered city where men are not divided into natural classes but arbitrarily (in Plato's view) by wealth and poverty.

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καὶ γὰρ εὐνοῖα γὰρ μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ἢ θυμώτερον ἡγοῖτο εἰ ἀνὰ  
καὶ ἑκαστῶ καὶ ἑκαστοῦ γὰρ εἰς πράξεσσι οἴετο συμβαίνειν καὶ  
ἑκαστῶ εἰς πράξεσσι, καὶ δὲ, συνουσίῳ.

again at 463B. It is implied at 420B<sup>42</sup> that the third class will be happy. Therefore, their sense of affiliation also entails the achievement by them of their peculiar need. But their attitude of mind cannot be marked by moral courage. Therefore, reciprocity of feeling among the classes is characterized both by moral dependence and by the courage that leads to moral self-sufficiency. The attitude of mind preparatory to the latter is described by Socrates at 464D. The description he gives there of the guardians' sense of patriotism is to be contrasted with the sense of individualism, or material self-sufficiency, he describes at 370A. Plato's conception of the imparting of benefit and of the fulfilment of ends which we have observed here in general terms points to the completion of our study of the temperamental distinction between guardians and third class. (Cf. pp 216, 221 supra). It also brings together the doctrines of sophrosune and eros. We shall begin this section of the chapter by completing what we need to say about Republic 463B - 464D.

Plato's concept of friendship involves the requital of good will and the attainment of mutual interests. His conception as expressed at 412CD and 463B involves good will among classes, while the individual's happiness depends on his belonging to the appropriate class. We should understand Republic 464D as implying further criticism of the notion of material self-sufficiency Socrates rejects at 370A. It is also an alternative to that notion. We shall discuss this alternative below. Republic 463B complements the concept of friendship among the classes which Socrates discusses at 414B. Republic 464D counters the notion of material self-sufficiency and the sense

✓ 42 ἔργον, γὰρ, ὅτι θαντασὸν μὲν ἂν οὐδὲν εἶη, εἰ καὶ οὐτοι οὕτως ἐν δαίμοντασται εἶσι, οὐ μὲν πρὸς αὐτοσ βλεῖπονται ἐν πόλει οὐκίσομεν, ὅπως ἐν αὐτῶν ἔθνοσ ἕσται διαφερόντως ἐν δαίμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅ αὐ γάλλισα ὄλη ἢ ἡ πόλισ.

of material egoism (*πληρονησία*) that accompanies it. Both sections strongly emphasize Plato's concept of the organic nature of the state (462C ff.). It is in this organic conception that we find the main influence of the eros doctrine, its influence upon social cohesion. We have seen that the transition from present to reformed society could not be smooth even if it was Plato's hope that subsequent generations of citizens should believe that their origin was natural. Though the community could not have evolved from an earlier society, it would yet reflect and restore a characteristic of an earlier time: the material dependence of men upon one another and hence their friendship. With respect to the latter, we have yet to assess Plato's notion of the education of the third class (Cf. p 216 supra). Here, we have given grounds for accepting that the third class participates passively in the primary education (pp 216-221 supra). Also, we have emphasized that fear does not generally characterize its members' consent to law. Both these considerations, absence of fear in the third class and its participation in the early education entail the eros doctrine. We shall presently assess the education of the third class with reference to this doctrine.

The conditions of material dependence and friendship must be present if eros is to take the course Plato wants it to take. Republic 463B-464D has its greatest interest for us at this point. We see there that community of property among the guardians, together with the furnishing of wages and sustenance (*μισθοδοσίας τε καὶ τροφῆς*: 463B. Cf 464C) by the third class provide the material basis for the community's survival and for affiliation among its classes. So far as that is true, they provide the material basis from which philosophic eros can grow. The community of wives and children and the common ownership of property are indispensable conditions of friendship between guardians and people (464AB, 464D. Cf 417AB). The

communism of the ruling and auxiliary class is, Socrates says, the cause of common feeling among all citizens (463E, 464A). Expressed in another way, Socrates is saying that if we prohibit guardians from possessing personal, material wealth, we then separate the exercise of power and its ends from the desire for material security; the latter becomes desire for self-sufficiency and wealth when it ceases to be externally governed, or, in the case of the rulers of the ideal state, when they should become ignorant of their own end. The desire for security, then, must not be primary among those who exercise power.<sup>43</sup> Since communism is not applied to the third class membership, it must be Plato's belief that this same desire is primary among them. This is wholly consistent with his belief that only among the guardian class is the active elimination of fear necessary to a man's being just. Again, the lack of family attachment among the guardians would tend, in Plato's view, toward disinterestedness in a guardian's sense of regard for others. Lack of family affiliation, in his view, will promote the disinterested courage he desires in the guardian class. Plato believes that in proportion as a young guardian or an auxiliary sees his own ends as unsatisfied in material security or in personal affiliation,<sup>44</sup> would his regard for others be the less rooted in material motive or, that is, in the desire

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<sup>43</sup> Plato outlines the society's military policy at 422D-23A. It is a policy of divide and conquer, of taking advantage of wealth and poverty in other states when this would be good policy for the ideal state's survival. This policy will be necessary, Socrates says, for a state whose armed force will be relatively small. In these passages he speaks only of external relations, and there is no indication that militarism, or power for its own sake, characterizes the guardians' relations with those whom they protect.

<sup>44</sup> We mean by 'personal' affiliation, affiliation on the basis of material fulfilment or material consideration alone.

for security and possession of external goods. Indeed, their education must, if it is to be effective, wholly eliminate this motive for section.<sup>45</sup>

None of this typifies the third class membership. But we have said that its members are not generally typified by the motive of fear, the motive which the Sophists believed to be common to all who practice justice (nn 20, 21 supra). While desire for material security thus constitutes the third class's motive for practising justice, they do not fear the guardians. Nor, if they are inwardly just and consent truly to the regime, can they desire power or wealth. While the guardians, together with the auxiliaries, possess power they do not suppose that its end rests in material self-sufficiency, nor in security for themselves (Cp 370A and 464D. Cf n. 43 supra). While, then, the guardians as well as the third class are materially dependent, both classes have distinct desires: the guardians, for patriotism and knowledge, the third class, for security.

The facts just stated underlie Plato's concept of the friendship that obtains between subject and ruling classes. His concept seeks to render compatible consent from material motive, which we have elsewhere called consent from custom (Ch 11, p 133 ), and consent from reason. The former cannot be nominal consent (Ch 11 pp 97 ff.), for unlike the latter it must in some way at least recognize a basis for consent distinct from its own motive. Here, it will be important to assess Plato's conception of the

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<sup>45</sup> Guardians will be praised or dispraised for great acts of bravery or for acts of cowardice that do not typify their class (468A). Outstanding bravery is even sufficient for posthumous elevation from the 'silver' into the 'gold' class (468E). Patriotism, which is strongly conditioned by the guardians' communism, is, in Plato's view, the very opposite temper of the individualism that typifies material self-sufficiency.

third class's education. Both motives for consent must, if friendship is to obtain between the classes, signify consent from a man's true interest, or true consent.<sup>46</sup> Yet it is only the consent given from the latter of these motives that can signify the consent of the self-ruled man. This man, the philosopher, has an end that transcends membership of one of the state's classes (Cf p 228 ). We said earlier (p 189 ; Cf p 200 ) that it is here that we find the substance of the analogy between the ascent of eros and the Republic's political doctrine. While Plato's concept of the historical origin of the society has no point of analogy with the eros doctrine, the myth of the brotherhood with its justification of the common origin of the classes provides us with the evolutionary basis the analogy needs. The notions of ascent and of the soul's growth, which the eros doctrine provides have as their political counterpart, the growth of one class within the ideal society toward the condition of self-rule. Necessary to the achievement of self-rule is cooperation between subject and ruling classes. Expressed in another way, we may say that friendship among classes whose ends are distinct is essential to the growth of philosophic eros. Its opposite, tyrannical eros, implies an unnatural and arbitrary division of men all of whom see material security as their end, a division of men into the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak (Cf 423A).

Socrates proposes that we know of no greater evil for a state than that which divides it (διωρῆ: 462B), making it many; nor any greater good than that which binds it together (ἑνωσῆ : Ibid.), making it one. If we compare 464D with 370A it is clear that the evil he speaks of is the desire for material self-sufficiency; the good, material dependence and friendship. We have said that Plato wants to implant a sense of disinterested courage

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<sup>46</sup> Cp the Socratic conception, p 97 Ch 11. Socrates' conception of consent did not presume classes ( p 128 ).

in the guardians, that their education must eliminate material ends as their own motives to action; the guardians must not see their own ends as satisfied in material security or in personal affiliation. These ends, when they move those who have power, introduce the pleasures and pains of individuals (*ἡδοναίς τε καὶ ἀλγηδύνας ἐρροιοῦντας ἰδίων ὄντων ἰδέας*, : 464D) and therefore tend toward disunity. Plato means that these ends would militate against the guardians' end of patriotism and against the division of men into natural classes. Common ownership of property, then, is a condition of the achievement of their end. If we think in terms of the eros doctrine, we see that the disinterestedness of the guardians, their eschewing material ends on their own behalf, reflect the ascent of eros as set out in the Symposium.

Socrates says at Republic 403C that love of fairness and nobility is the end or purpose of the musical education (*δοῦναι δὲ πρὸς ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ μουσικῇ εἰς τὴν εὐνοίαν καλοῦ ἔρωτος*). What we have said above in respect of the guardians' disinterested attitude in regard to material ends is consistent with the Symposium's conception of the perception of *εὖ κλον* at the level both of physical objects and customary practices (*εὖ ἐπιτελεσθέντα*). We should comment on this subject. But we need only do so to the extent that we are satisfied that the ascent of eros in the Symposium is analogous, at these early stages, to the Republic's education in music and gymnastic. Of equal importance to us is Plato's notion of the effect of the education in music upon the third class whose natural end forms the material basis for the growth within society of philosophic eros.

Plato has indicated that should fear generally characterize the third class's attitude of mind it would be because the guardians had come to see material security together with wealth as comprising their own ends (Cf. n 32; Republic 417AB). The ends of both classes would then be the same. Therefore,

the class division of the ideal state would no longer exist; for fear from the want of security, and with it the desire for power, would dominate all citizens. Men would be divided arbitrarily into rich and poor, not as by nature, into classes that have distinct ends. Here, the class divisions of the Republic are seen to comply with the eros doctrine. While eros embraces the three needs of men (Cf p 194 f. and n 13 supra), the class divisions are reflected in the ascent by the fact that perception of fairness and nobility at the ascent's early stages reflects the Republic's conception of the guardians' ends: the regard for others that is neither rooted in material motive nor satisfied by possession of external goods (Cf. Republic 387D, p 210 supra). The common ownership of property among the guardians, which promotes this attitude, is a complement in terms of social relationship to the Symposium's logical and moral doctrine: namely, in that the initiate of the ascent learns to value nobility, not in its manifold instances; rather, he values it as being common to classes of objects, to physical beings and to moral customs. Eros is desire. Its realization as intellectual desire, leading to knowledge of the forms (Cf Republic 485B) and the desire to beget virtue (Cf. Republic 500D - 501A) is dependent on the earlier training in moral attitude which the Republic's doctrine about music and gymnastic describes. The ascent of eros in the guardian young therefore entails the quality of their regard for others. The ascent is only possible if their regard for others entails a sense of self-regard that is impartial to one's own material well-being, that is impartial to particular material ends.

It is clear then that the ascent of eros in its early stages has as its social and political counterpart the education of the guardian young in music and gymnastic. We have said that eros embraces the three needs of men.

But its ascent is only clearly reflected in the lives of the guardian young and the auxiliaries; for indeed, its ascent only begins with the growth of the belief that considerations of one's material well-being are not the only bases for the practice of justice, for the pursuit of one's end and interest. Love of nobility in moral action, moral courage - must also be a basis. But the third class will suppose that material considerations are sufficient bases (Cf. p 211 supra). We have emphasized in respect of this that the third class participates vicariously in the ideal state's education. We have also seen that if fear, the motive of the nominally just man, broadly characterized the consent of its members, that this would contradict the very basis of Plato's class divisions: fear and disunity will arise when 'reason' fails the rulers; the preventive against these is the allocation of citizens into the classes that complete their needs. Such allocation produces friendship. How, then, shall we assess Plato's view of the education of the third class? How is their education entailed by the eros doctrine?

We have observed that moral courage is inessential in the members of the third class. But it was our conviction that the third class as a whole are inwardly just. We have now seen that if they feared the rulers that would contradict Plato's conception of class divisions. To consent from fear or to practise justice from fear is to act as does the nominally just man. Socrates proposes at Republic 430C that the guardians' right opinion about things to be feared and not be feared cannot develop without education. Right opinion which is not based on education is, he says, the right opinion of a beast or a slave. Plato's concept of the classes' friendship for one another prevents us from allowing that he could be referring here, with consistency to the doctrine of friendship, to the consent of the third class;

for then, the third class must be nominally just men. They must be men who are not inwardly just but who practise justice from fear. Therefore, when Socrates calls the guardians' courage civic courage, or a citizen's courage (*πολιτικόν*), he cannot be implying that the demotic or popular morality of the reformed society is, by contract with civic courage, either slavish or lacking in education. That would mean that the third class are nominally just. He says their virtue is instinctive (Cf p 218 *supra*). Whatever he means by this - and we are not sure his meaning can be satisfactorily shown - he cannot mean that the third class are nominally just. We shall show this in what follows.

Socrates says that the rulers will fashion demotic virtue in accordance with their knowledge (... ἡ ἐκείνῳ ὄρεται μελετήσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἕθνη καὶ ἰδέσθαι καὶ δημοσίᾳ... ὄρεται κακὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσεβὸν οἷον γενέσθαι... ζυγπάσης εἴης δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; 500D). Plato must then believe that the right opinion that will typify the society's popular beliefs and practises will be compatible with the rulers' knowledge. This means that he knows that justice excludes wrong-doing;<sup>47</sup> and as he will conform to this fact, so the members of the third class will believe this fact and conform to it. If this means nothing more than that the rulers' demiurgic power only produces outward conformity to law, then the third class will fear the rulers, and Plato's concept of friendship will be anomalous. We have said that the reciprocity among the classes indicates that the analogy between soul and state is not wholly exact (n 32). But we also showed that it is quite exact in respect of the fact that the state's 'reason' and the state's 'spirit' will always be allies - even when 'reason' should fail. In the latter case, fear and disunity

<sup>47</sup> ... καὶ θεωρέουσιν οὐκ ἄδικούσας οὐκ ἄδικούμεναι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντων καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχουσιν, εὐσεβῶς περὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀφοροῦσθαι; 500C.

result. Allegiance cannot then last for long, for the tripartite state will soon cease to exist. But if, while the state survives, its 'appetite' is fundamentally recalcitrant to its 'reason' and its 'spirit', then the analogy between soul and state is very flawed. The flaw is completely apparent if we assume that the third class is nominally just. But despite difficulties in Plato's conception of the third class's response to philosophic rule, we shall see that Plato cannot easily be convicted of such a flaw in his analogy.

In his useful discussion of demotic virtue, Archer-Hind was of the opinion that the virtue Socrates discusses at Republic 500D has substantially the same connotation as that which he discussed in the Phaedo at 69AB and 82A. For reasons we shall give below, we are in agreement, though not without reservations, with the view Archer-Hind put. Our general acceptance of his position will lead us to the conclusion that the elimination of fear from the third class membership is essential to the ascent of eros we have discussed above: the ascent begins with belief in a higher motive for the practice of justice than is exemplified in considerations of one's material well-being; but the ascent also implies the classes' friendship for one another. It implies the restoration of material dependence and the realization by each class of its peculiar need.

In order to reach our conclusion, we must return to Plato's substantive doctrine of the third class's education, his doctrine of the third class's right opinion. First, two scholarly opinions which disagree with our own. Cornford held that conviction about things to be feared, the right and lawful belief about such things,<sup>48</sup> could not typify the third class membership. They are moved to obedience only by fear of punishment. Cornford's thesis must reject the interpretation we have given above of 500CD. His

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<sup>48</sup> δόξῃς : 429C; δόξῃς ὁρθῆς : 430B. Cf 430C.

thesis implicitly maintained that the third class's conformity to the rulers' knowledge is no more than external; they would believe, since they consented from fear, that injustice could be profitable.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, their consent or their practice of justice must only reflect the intemperance and indiscipline (*ἀκολασία*) of their inner natures. More recently, J. Malcolm has held in reference to Plato's doctrine of line and cave, that the "value particulars" that the ordinary, uneducated man accepts correspond to the shadows on the cave wall. He holds, on the basis of Republic 430C, that this man could have no share of the education in music and gymnastic.<sup>50</sup> It is our belief that the ordinary man so described - the slavish man of 430C - exists in small numbers in the ideal state (Cf n 36 supra). But his type does not characterize the third class. As we have seen, Plato's concept of friendship gives us strong evidence for rejecting Cornford's view and for rejecting the view that the morality of the cave wall typifies Plato's third class. The temperamental distinction between the guardians and the third class does not turn on the imposition upon the third class by the guardians and auxiliaries of an order to which its members are inwardly and by nature recalcitrant. If they were, then they must be temperate from fear or from an outward restraint that corresponds to a want of sophrosune in their souls (*ἀκολασία*).<sup>51</sup>

Archer-Hind said that Republic 500D-501A describes demotic virtue as being:

"(1) formed by the philosophers for the multitude, (2) not on utilitarian principles, (3) with knowledge of the good, but (4) accepted by the multitude on utilitarian principles and without knowledge of good."<sup>52</sup>

<sup>49</sup> "Psychology and Social Structure", p 251.

<sup>50</sup> John Malcolm, "The Line and the Cave", *Phronesis*, Vol. 6-7, pp 38-45. See esp. pp 43 ff.

<sup>51</sup> Phaedo 68E: ἀκολασία ἐνε σ' ἰσχυρῶς ἐστίν; ; 69A ἐνὰ δε' ἀκολασίαν ἰσχυρῶς ἀσυνετόν.

<sup>52</sup> The Phaedo of Plato, p. 154.

It is Plato's hope, he says, (Ibid.), that the demotic virtue as set out at Republic 500D-501A would supersede that set out at 554C, where Plato describes the moral attitude of the oligarchic man. This man supposes that injustice could be profitable (. . . λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν). He practises justice through the self-restraint that arises from fear for the loss of material wealth (. . . φοβῶ περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας ἐπείρουζ; 544D). Such a man is outwardly just. In him, 'reason' does not take counsel for the whole soul's needs (οὐ πείθει, ὅσα οὐκ ἔμενον, οὐδ' ἰγέρων λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀναγκῆ καὶ φόβῳ . . . Ibid.). Rather, it rules only with a view to 'appetite' and its desire for material wealth (οὐσία). Clearly, the moral attitude Socrates describes at 554C is similar to the slavish right opinion (ἀνδραποδωδῆ) he describes at 430C (Cf 430C: ἀνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, ; 554B ad fin. : τὴν ἀπειθεσίαν). At 430C, Socrates inveighs against slavish right opinion, saying that it is happenstance, unabiding (νόμιμον). (Or, without conformity to law, if we read νομίμον). At Phaedo 69B, he declaimed against the same slavish attitude, saying it had no health or truth in it (. . . σε καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστι οὐδ' ἀληθείας ἔχει . . .). In either case, it is only an external show of justice. The man whom it typifies lacks sophrosune.

We may well agree with Archer-Hind that the demotic virtue Socrates describes at Republic 500D-501A is meant to supersede that discussed at 554CD where he describes the attitude of nominally just men. Is this not truer to Plato's meaning than Cornford's view where virtue will be that of men who are just only from fear and external regimen (Cf n 49)? Yet Archer-Hind supposes that this virtue is a refined form of ἀκολασία. Can we accept this view? Indeed, he said that their virtue will be far more refined than that described at 554CD. Since, however, they lack knowledge of good, they only accept the ethical code of the rulers because

they have convinced them (on utilitarian grounds) that it is advantageous for them to do so (p 152):

"As they hold [the code] , therefore, it is utilitarian; as he conceives it, not so: thus they are still, though in a far more refined sense, *δι' ἀκολασίαν σφραγισμένοι.*" (Ibid.).

We shall grant that the third class accepts the code on utilitarian grounds. Here, the force of 'utilitarian' must be that they accept the code from considerations of their material security. So far as that is so, their attitude is utilitarian. But we need to know in just what sense their temperance is a refined form of that described at 554CD; we need to know whether it is really accurate to say that their attitude is, at the end of the day, simply a form of *ἀκολασία* . While it has material security in view, it cannot involve deception, or 'seeming justice' (*ἐν οἷς εὐδοκίμῃ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι* , . . . 554C ad fin.). The latter typifies nominal justice. Archer-Hind might have observed this when he implied that the third class's moral attitude would be a refined form of *ἀκολασία* (p 151 f.). The refinement must entail the doctrine of the tripartite soul and the rule of 'reason'; and sophrosune, when seen in conjunction with the doctrine of friendship, entails the inward justice of the members of the third class; it entails their absence of fear. This fact, in turn, implies the absence in them of desire for wealth or power (Cf p 233 supra). Where these desires are lacking, a man may be just from motive of material security but if the man is also temperate in Plato's sense, his justice cannot be an effect of indiscipline within the soul. (Cf p 187, supra). Does his justice consist, then, in an instinctive, passive acceptance of the code, an acceptance we must still regard as a form of *ἀκολασία* . This is closer to the mark. But

we have difficulty in supposing that their virtue, as being instinctive, would not be "from the philosopher" (p 153); for Socrates tells us at Republic 401BC that the abilities of good artists and poets will be instinctive (ἐφύωσ : Cf pp 219 - 221 supra). Yet these abilities will surely grow within the environment the philosophic state provides. They cannot grow up as if entirely by chance, as if lacking any cause. They will grow spontaneously. Yet when they do appear, they will appear in response to the philosophic code and regimen (Ibid.). The third class will not be able to furnish an account of their virtue or its companion abilities. These will be based on right opinion. But they will come from the environment the philosophers provide, not from divine dispensation as they do in present society.<sup>53</sup>

Finally, we may ask what degree of difference there is between the utilitarian conception of the third class and the apparently non-utilitarian conception of the philosophic rulers. Our treatment of these matters will complete our study of the third class. It will also furnish the conclusions we want in regard to the third class and the eros doctrine (Cf p 239 supra). These matters will bring us to the end of our study of Plato's notion of the consent of the governed.

Archer-Hind implied that the third class's consent would be a refined form of ἀνολαιοία. His thesis has its most probable basis in the statement we made earlier about the healthy city (p 205). We said that the city was powerless to prevent the growth of luxury, that it would welcome its growth. We also said that in both the healthy and the reformed communities material need is subject to external control, in the one case by nature, in the other, by knowledge. The question whether the third class's consent is a refinement of ἀνολαιοία takes its main significance from the connotation that attaches

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<sup>53</sup> Cp Republic 500D - 501A with Meno 99E (Archer-Hind's selection no. v, p 150 Op.Cit.

to external control. If the doctrine of friendship has meaning, the latter must connote no less than the inward consent of the third class. It must therefore connote their belief that their own interest is compatible with that of the rulers and the auxiliaries; it must mean that consent from motive of material security is compatible with the motives of patriotism and intellectual need. That will be true no matter how great the gulf between the philosophers' and the third class's conceptions of morality (Cf Archer-Hind, p 152). The two moralities are not sundered from one another (see Ibid.). But they would be sundered if the gulf between them was that between moral ignorance (what we usually mean by ἀνοησία) and knowledge or right opinion based on knowledge. Were that the case, then the ascent of eros, while it begins with the education of the guardian young, could not encompass the consent of the third class. The third class could not then have the share of happiness that was its natural due (Cf pp 215, 245 and n 42 supra).

We have said that Plato would seem to anticipate some degree of deterioration among the third class membership (n 36 supra). He says that such deterioration as would take place would be no danger to the state. Socrates speaks of deterioration in terms of a man's effecting a semblance of justice (προποικισμένοι εἶναι γὰρ ὄντες πόλιν οὐδὲν δεινόν : 421A). The semblance of justice or deception that we note here surely implies belief in the profitability of injustice. (The state will be destroyed if guardians should seem to be just. Ibid.). The man who has such belief cannot be happy; for the society ruled by such belief is not a happy one (. . . εὐὸν εὐὸν οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαμονεῖν . . . Ibid.). Where happiness is absent, deception and outward regimen are a man's only signs of justice. Plato believes that deception and

outward regimen must mark some members of the third class. Those who are thus characterized cannot be happy. It is of these reaclacitrant citizens that Plato is speaking at 415E (Cf n 38 supra); for he holds that friendship in fact dominates the relationship between ruling and subject classes, that each class must have its share of happiness. In the case of the subjects, of course, happiness must include the desire to be ruled; for it is obvious that rebellious subjects cannot be happy. It is these subject, not the third class as a whole, who are sundered from the philosopher. This is so, because it is their moral attitude and not that of the majority, that is not compatible with the philosophers'. It is these subjects upon whom the society's education has no lasting effect. These subjects are nominally just men. But it is perhaps not enough to say that they are simply members of the third class. We need a more precise statement of their origin. We shall confine this statement to the following note.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> We have said that there are difficulties in explaining the third class's instinct for justice - the third class's right opinion (p 238). Obviously, the explanation must finally turn on the distinction between knowledge, the ability to give an account, and the lack of this ability, right opinion. In a thesis which deals with Plato's political philosophy, we cannot deal effectively with his epistemology. The two subjects are certainly related; for the class divisions of the state finally turn on the distinction between the self-ruled man, the man who has moral knowledge, and the externally ruled who do not. In this note we shall make no attempt to deal formally with the epistemological distinction. Rather, we shall deal with a subject immediately relevant to the doctrine of consent that the distinction raises: what difference does Plato see, if any, between those who are members of the third class by original disposition and those who, as is stated at 468A, fail to exhibit courage? This problem is important because it raises the further question: what is the source of rebellion against the laws which the state is able to withstand (Cf n 36)? We shall not attempt to provide a complete answer to this question. But the following points should be made.

Provided that any cause for fear is removed from those whose natural desire was always seen to rest in material security, they will practise justice without deception. Mere instinctive response to the society's moral environment will be sufficient for their doing so. It is not at all obvious that such citizens as these (those who, throughout their lives have been members of the third class) could ever be a source of rebellion. Is it, then,

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a surd remainder from within this class; or is the source those who have been proven to be fit members of this class rather than the class of auxiliaries to which they were originally assigned?

The question is not easily answered. First, we must take into consideration Plato's tendency to compare, unfavourably, the auxiliaries' life with that of the artisans (421AB, 466B). But beside this comparison, we must place Socrates' oftenrepeated claim that the city is not founded for the especial ( *διαφροσύνης* : 420B) happiness of any one class (420B, 421C, 519E, 466A, 590A). The end desired by the third class is valued less by Plato than the ends desired by the other two classes; but that does not mean the third class does not receive the share of happiness that is its natural due ( *ἐλάττω ὅπως . . . εὐδαιμονίας* : 421C). Secondly, we must appreciate Plato's belief that no evil or good of consequence arises from small natured men (491D, 495B). With this sentiment, we must note his statement that degenerate craftsmen ( *διαφθαρμένες* : 421C) are no great danger to a state. Finally, we must recall Plato's tendency to equate irrationality ( *ἄκοιδαιρία* ) with 'reason's' failure in potentially strong-natured men (Cf. 491D, 495B). The man who willingly accepts external rule is, in degree of justice, second only to the self-ruled man (590E). Since he is temperate (Ibid.), he is not irrational or morally ignorant. Among whom, then, do we find the rebellious residue in the state, the individuals that would rebel (415E. Cf n 38)? Clearly, they will be assigned to the third class. But must they have originated within this class? Is an unproven instinct for justice a more natural source of rebellion than is failure to overcome fear and, with it, the failure to acquire moral courage?

Beside Plato's sentiment that no great good or evil can come from small natured men we need to set the statement we made earlier (p 204) that the crucial cause of evil to society - the desire for material self-sufficiency - is not present in the healthy or primitive city. If it is not present there, nor should it be present among the third class when material dependence is restored. Socrates' statements at 421B, 466B imply the gradations in the value of ends which Plato applies to the three lives of the community: the smallest natured citizens, the third class, will certainly be those whose lives end in material security. But when we consider the value gradations beside the separation of class functions that is vital to the state's survival, we see that Plato is referring at least as much to separation between the exercise of power and the desire for material security, as he is to the fact that it does not endanger the state if some artisans - small natured men - should degenerate. The case of the reduced auxiliary is different. Failure to acquire virtue in one who was being trained to lead surely implies desire for material security in the same man. It is here that we must look for potential indiscipline in the state. It is the combination of these ends that must, potentially, ruin the state. It is the appearance of the combination of these desires that the guardians must suppress. It seems more likely that such desires would appear in one whose capacity for virtue had been tried and found wanting, rather than in one whose instinctive virtue had never been tested. Socrates says that degeneracy among the latter occurs. But its occurrence must be anomalous. Why, indeed, if the motive of fear has been removed from the third class would some of its members degenerate? Plato has not furnished a precise answer to this question. Their degeneracy, at any rate, must be less a source of actual rebellion than that of auxiliaries which, though the state can withstand its appearance in individuals, must none the less be suppressed. It must be suppressed because its presence in individuals, rather than degeneracy in the artisans, implies the potential ruin of the state.

Since the nominally just man of Plato's state would believe that injustice could be profitable, then 'reason' cannot rule his soul. Even if such men obeyed the laws habitually, they would not be temperate in the Republic's sense where the presence of temperance entails harmony of the parts of the soul. The 'right opinion' of such citizens - which conceals their real belief - will be that of beast or slave. Archer-Hind held that the right opinion of the third class would be a refinement of this. The moral code would be held by them on a utilitarian basis; their right opinion would grow, as we have seen, from instinctive response to the philosophic environment. Yet, for Archer-Hind, this was still a form of ἀκολασία:

P 153: "[they would be] just, temperate, etc. . . . not because they choose [virtue] as being better, [but] because virtue is more natural and therefore more easy and pleasant to them [than vice]. Therefore . . . they must be classed with οἱ δὲ ἀκολασίαν σεσωρημένοι". If the difference between the nominally just man and the usual third class citizen is only a difference of degree (a refinement), then 'reason's' obeying 'appetite' will typify the third class. "Reason" will not rule the souls of its members. But that denies Plato's statements in the Republic that 'reason' does rule the souls of the subjects, that therefore, the subjects are just and temperate.<sup>55</sup> Will the typical members of the third class, then, have an attitude of mind that is distinct from a refined form of ἀκολασία? Or is the distinction between this form of ἀκολασία and the temperance of the third class only a verbal one? For reasons we shall now give we must see more than a verbal distinction in the difference.

Archer-Hind's reason for regarding a man's instinctive preference for justice as a form of ἀκολασία, lies in the fact that the man does not

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Cf p 203 supra on Republic 433D; p 205 and n 4 on Republic 389D; p 207

choose to be just. That means that his preference for justice comes from no effort of his own (ἀλλὰ θεῖν μοίρα . . . ὅτι δὲ παραγίγνηται : Meno 99E). Such men no more choose virtue than do the men at Republic 554CD convince themselves that virtue is preferable to its opposite (οὐ πείθων, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖν, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ). The 'instinctive' man simply has, unaccountably, a preference to be just. The man lacking this preference is just from compulsion and fear (δυνάμει καὶ φόβῳ : Ibid.). The question of choice is important, and we shall deal with it presently. First we need to answer the following question: can we easily think of ἀκολασία in any form as excluding the belief that injustice could be profitable? The third class cannot be happy if they entertain this notion. Nor, then, can they be temperate.

Archer-Hind assigned ἀκολασία to the 'instinctive' man because he does not choose to be just; he simply is just. He finds it more pleasant to be so. If, as Archer-Hind says, such a man only values material ends,<sup>56</sup> what substantive difference could there be between this 'instinctive' man and the man who believes that injustice could be profitable? Certainly, the 'instinctive' man so described prefers justice on no real grounds of temperance. If we say that his case is one of ἀκολασία, then 'reason' cannot rule his soul. The only difference would seem to be that the one man will court injustice to achieve his ends (. . . λαβείσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν : 554CD); the other, presumably, finds it unpleasant to do so. He would not choose injustice for himself; but, if he is not ruled by 'reason' in his soul, will he deny, if asked, that injustice can profit a man? If he were to deny this, he must at least believe, implicitly, that the unjust man would be better off if he escaped detection; for, the instinctively just man, on Archer-Hind's account of him, only values

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<sup>56</sup> ". . . we observe . . . that the virtue which these *θεῖν* follow . . . is the ordinary utilitarian virtue." p 153.

external ends. Such a man must admit that injustice could profit a man.<sup>57</sup>  
 We have said that in his preference for justice, the man recognizes none but material ends. If that is so, his right opinion is that of beast or slave. Such a man is *δίκολωτος* because his preference for justice does not result from 'reason's' rule in the soul. Indeed, the man even lacks the promptings of a better part within him (Cf. on the man described at Republic 554CD: *ἐπιεκαὶ ἐνὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίη κατέχει ἄλλης κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας*).

How, then, are we to understand the attribution to the third class of a refined indiscipline? Can they be happy if they recognize no needs but their own? We have wanted to show that if their virtue is only a form of indiscipline and is also instinctive (Cf on Republic 401BC, p 243 supra), then the third class must lack temperance; the attribution of the tripartite doctrine to them can then have no meaning. They must recognize none but material ends and they must entertain the belief that injustice could profit a man. On either count, their belief opposes the philosophers' knowledge of ideal justice.

We say that they will recognize needs other than their own and that they are inwardly just, or temperate, men (Cf pp 248, 49 supra). The compatibility we see (Ibid.; pp 257, 58 supra) between consent from material need (consent from custom) and consent from reason takes its meaning from these claims; so, too, the fact that 'reason' rules the souls of the members of this class. Our basis for these claims lies in the fact that Plato says their right opinion is in the track of the philosophers' knowledge (. . . *τοὺς δημιουργοὺς τοὺς ἐθρυνῶς δυναμένους ἔχοντάς τιν ἐν τῷ κελού τε καὶ ἐυοργάνους φύνεν* . . . 401C). But if the third class's right opinion is only a form of indiscipline then they cannot be temperate. While they obey the

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57 Cf Ch 11 pp 140 ff and nn 61-63.

philosophers, they will entertain the belief that injustice could profit a man. Their response to the philosophers' code would not grow spontaneously; it would not be instinctive. It could only exhibit a preference founded on fear. In unreformed society, they might have a natural preference for justice. But since their preference is incompatible with recognition of ends other than their own, they cannot consent willingly to the philosophers' rule. Plato tells us, however, that the poets and artists of the ideal state will do fine work by instinct alone. So also, then, will they be just men by instinct. For Plato, the effect upon the soul of the ideal state's environment must result in its assimilation to justice and nobility. The assimilation affects all classes of the state: Cf. 500D: *εὐσεβῆ . . . ἀρομοιοῦνθα* (said of the philosophers. Cf n 47 and text to note, p 238); 401E: *εἰς εἴη ψυχῆν . . . καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός* (said of the guardian young); *εὐρυῶς δυναμένους ἰχθυέειν εἴη σοῦ καλοῦ . . . φύσει* (said of the artists and poets). Common to the artisans' instinctive right opinion and the guardians' knowledge is the assimilation of both justice and nobility. Archer-Hind said that there is a gulf between knowledge and right opinion. But the concept of assimilation surely suggests that the philosophers will know that wrong-doing cannot profit a man, the artisans will believe that this is so. The concept also suggests the orientation of desire toward mutually beneficial ends (519E): *ποιῶν μετὰ δίδουαι ἀλλήλοις εἴη ἡμελείας, ἣν ἂν εἴησθε εὐ κοινὸν δυνατὰ ὡσεὶ ἡμελείην . . .*) and the attainment of their ends by all classes.

Finally, we need to consider the choice Plato's citizens make in obeying the philosophers' code, the choice both of subjects and rulers. Here, we need to remember that his citizens respond to a hierarchy of ends, that he does not attach equal value to these ends. We shall understand Plato's conception of choice and the subjects' response to philosophic rule by considering Socrates' statement from Republic 500C to 502A. We shall see, if we

relate this section to his statements about happiness at Republic 420B, 519E, 520C, that the conception of choice entails conformity between the rulers' knowledge and the subjects' belief. The conformity itself entails a distinction among ends that is based on a hierarchy of values. This distinction eliminates opposition of ends so far as possible. The conformity entails the presence of sophrosune (inward consent) among all classes and the realization of class ends. These facts entail the doctrine of eros which we therefore see as a social and political conception. We need to make the following final remarks on these subjects.

Socrates proposes that if the philosopher should be compelled ( $\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$   $\delta\nu\alpha\gamma\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta$   $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\tau\alpha\iota$  : 500D) to fashion both himself and the rest of society (Ibid.) in conformity with his knowledge ( $\acute{\alpha}$   $\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\tau$   $\acute{\alpha}\rho\eta$ ), we must suppose that he will be a good craftsman of demotic virtue. We may understand the idea of compulsion as follows: the philosopher is compelled by his knowledge of good to regard the other citizens well, that is, to be a just man (Cf 520E). By practising justice (here, forming the characters of citizens as well as his own), the philosopher makes the attainment of his own end possible (520E, 521A). We have said that the subjects' belief is in conformity with the philosophers' knowledge. We mean by this that the choice which they make is, in most cases, instinctive. It is an instinct for right opinion based on the philosophers' knowledge; it is a preference they do not desire to justify. While a man's knowledge must compel him to practise justice, Plato says it is both by persuasion and compulsion that philosophers (the law the philosophers impose: 519E) will attempt to achieve the happiness (Ibid.) which every class shares. We have seen that there will be some degree of recalcitrance. Where it exists, compulsion from external agency will be

applied. Where such compulsion did not lead to inward consent, its aim must be mere obedience, the obedience of the nominally just man; for the most part, persuasion leading to right opinion, will underlie the rulers' object in maintaining consent. This is so if friendship, and not hostility, generally characterizes the relationship between subject and ruling classes. Right opinion which is engendered by persuasion, will, like the compulsion of knowledge, entail a man's practise of justice from the belief that he may only attain his true interest if he regards others well. By means of the ideal state, Plato would hope to achieve this attitude in those whose perfection lies in the achievement of material ends (p 228). The doctrine of eros assists us in understanding this conception. Through the eros doctrine we may understand Plato's conception of a hierarchy of ends that are unopposed though of unequal value.

A man's belief that he attains his true interest through the practice of justice and that wrong-doing cannot profit him will be expressed at three levels of desire: the desire for material security; for patriotic fulfilment; for knowledge. Plato attributes value to these desires in two senses: first, in proportion as they are disinterested in regard to personal, material well-being and exemplify, to that extent, the life of moral self-sufficiency. The morally sufficient, or self-ruled, man, has a life better than the political life (521A). His life is the state's highest achievement. Complementing this notion is Plato's belief that the state's survival depends on the fulfilment by each class of its function. We know, from what we have said about fear and the consent of the third class, that fear must move men to obedience when 'reason' fails the rulers. Then, the natural ends of men - their perfection together with their happiness - will not be realized. It would not be surprising, Socrates says to Glaucon, if the philosophers were

the happiest men of the state (Cf n 42). On the one hand, they are happiest because their lives are the most complete; they are morally self-sufficient men. But it is not our purpose, he says, that any one class should be surpassingly happy (*ὑπερποῦντας* : Ibid.). Clearly, the happiness of one class of men must not exclude that of any other. In other words, 'happiness' cannot complement the exercise of the three functions unless each class receives happiness in proportion to the work it achieves in making the philosophic, independent life possible. The achievement of this end implies the elimination of fear and the attainment of happiness, or perfection, by the three classes. It also implies that a scale or hierarchy of values must characterize the state's life. This scale comprises the greater and the lesser parts of 'nobility', its higher and lower forms of expression (Cf pp 193-197 supra).

We have said that two of the state's ends do not transcend material or political life (p 215); we have also said that the ascent of eros begins with the education of the guardian young, with the exercise of their function by the auxiliaries. While this education, together with the auxiliaries' fulfilment of their end, does not transcend political life, both induce impartiality of feeling in the agent in his considerations of his material well-being (p 236). To the extent that the agent is impartial, the end he desires is of greater value than the end of material security. But we have shown that the assimilation of the three classes of citizens to justice and nobility includes the third class's recognition of ends distinct from their own (p 250 ). They differ from the nominally just man in that they recognize as legitimate, ends that are not material (Cf p 198; pp 215-17). Owing to their ability to make such recognition, the ascent of eros, through society's hierarchy of ends, is consistent with the doctrine of friendship,

among the classes. It is also consistent with the distinction Plato made in the Phaedo between a real or true cause ( $\epsilon\iota\ \tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\ \kappa\acute{o}\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\tilde{\omega}\ \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota$  : 99B), and that without which the latter would never have ostensible expression ( $\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\ \delta\tilde{\upsilon}\ \kappa\acute{o}\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\nu\ \delta\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\ \delta\tilde{\iota}\nu\ \pi\omicron\tau\ \acute{\epsilon}\tilde{\gamma}\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\nu$  : Ibid.). In the Republic, the 'necessary' cause - the material cause - is the law and custom from which the philosopher moulds demotic virtue ( $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\tilde{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\tau\eta\ \delta\epsilon\upsilon\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu$  : 501B). Law and custom, together with men's instinctive ability to be just, serve as 'necessary' bases for the conversion of eros in society from material self-sufficiency to material dependence and moral self-sufficiency. Moreover, it is from law and custom that tyrannical eros might also grow. It is in the potentiality of eros for good or evil that we find Plato's distinction between self-ruled and self-determined men (n 16 supra). Here, as with, friendship between ruling and subject classes, an indispensable condition whether of self-rule or self-determinancy, is the separation from or the union of political power with, wealth and material security.

It is from the separation of power and security that we find the implicit meaning of the quiet submission ( $\eta\pi\alpha\delta\acute{o}\epsilon\upsilon\varsigma$  : 493A Cf p 166 Ch 111 and n 4) of the subject class to philosophic rule. Here, too, we find Plato's conception of the material, or 'necessary', basis, from which moral self-sufficiency can grow. The law and custom with which Plato's ruler works, since it induces friendship among his classes, is amenable to the third class's perception of justice. They value justice because its practice brings material security. But they recognize as valid the ends of the other two classes. For these reasons, the third class is not, as a whole, recalcitrant to the rule of the philosophers: their practice of justice need not be motivated from fear for the loss of material security; for the desire for

power has been removed from those whose need ends in material security.<sup>55</sup>

We have said that the philosopher is a self-ruled man. Socrates says that we should be imposing just commandments on just men (*δικαία γὰρ δὴ δικάσις ἐπιτάξομεν* : 520E) when they hear that they must go down (*καταβατέον* : 520C) into the cave - to share the burdens of ruling the state. (*ξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει* : 520D). The commandment imposed on the philosophers is consonant with the knowledge of justice and nobility that compels them to regard their fellow citizens well (500D). So far as they will act in accord with the commandment that they must rule they are self-ruled men, men who impose the duty of political obligation upon themselves. By descending into the cave, they show their willing subjection to the law of the state which bids that they rule. Again, in accordance with this law, they secure the means to their own true interest: to lead the life which is better than political life. We find here Plato's final answer to Thrasymachus who claimed that just men - men who obey law - cannot be self-ruled. By obeying, such men serve an interest that is not, finally, their own (p 145 supra). With the difference between Socrates' and Thrasymachus' points of view we find Plato's distinction between self-ruled and self-determined men.

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Though they value justice because it brings material security, Plato is far from supposing that their attitude is one of ignorance (*ἀραθία* : 444A). Indeed, such men will regard the just and noble action (*δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πράξιν* : 443E. Cf p 198 supra) as that which induces sophrosune, a condition of the soul that they will value. Plato's doctrine of assimilation (p 250 supra) is consistent with this conception only if we assume (as we have said in our exposition) that the instinctive right opinion (*εὐενοῦς* : Ibid.) of the third class denotes the presence of sophrosune in their souls and does not denote a form (however refined) of *ἀκολασία*. Can we, for this reason, be sympathetic with Demos' approach to the subject class (n 30 supra); namely, that the subject can be as complete and just a man as the ruler"? Plato's distinction between knowledge and opinion gives his own grounds for why this is not so. But is there so obvious a distinction between the artisan and auxiliary? What degree of difference is there between the auxiliary who is impartial to personal material ends, and the artisan, whose soul is temperate? We have tried to show that the distinction arises from the active and passive elimination of fear in men. This may satisfy the distinction between artisans and guardians who become rulers. But it is not clear that the distinction is proven as between artisan and auxiliaries.

In order to achieve the good or the evil ends of eros respectively, both men must have political power. But in the one case, power is joined with the desire for material security; it recognizes no need but this one. In the other case, power is exercised on behalf of the three natural needs of men. Here, those whose desire ends in material security recognize needs other than their own. They do so because they are temperate.

There will be vestiges of nominal justice in the ideal state. Men who are nominally just do not willingly respond to the external commands of the state, nor do they recognize their validity; for these men suffer ignorance. In Plato's view, they are self-determined men. They recognize no external, moral law. Such men desire to exceed others in the acquisition of material ends (πλεονεκειν : 349C). In the provision of his ends, the self-determined man supposes that wrong-doing can be of advantage to him (πλεονεζειν : 359C). Plato has described self-determination in terms of material self-sufficiency. The latter is the end which the nominally just man seeks. It is the admitted presence of this desire in the ideal state that must form its residual, recalcitrant element. We have attempted to show in this chapter that recalcitrance, so defined, does not typify Plato's third class. While such recalcitrance as does exist must be assigned to the third class while the state survives, it is the power of thought in the soul that exercises a far more potent force for good or evil (518E). The state's ruin will come from potentially gifted natures, not from those who are simply amenable to the imposition of virtue from an external source, from the ministrations of philosophic rule. In such men, virtue should easily grow from habit and custom (εμπροκεισθη εθουσι σε και δοκησεν: Ibid.). We have wanted to show that the ends of Plato's citizens, whether or not they graduate from customary habit to knowledge, are amenable to one common view that injustice does not profit a man. The

doctrine of friendship, together with the concepts of sophrosune and eros indicate the broad presence of this view among Plato's three classes.

Errata:

- (1): Two pages are numbered 61. The pages are to be read consecutively.
- (2): Re p 32: the sentence beginning four lines from last line of text should read as follows:
- Together with this, he saw the most important principles of the social contract theory embodied in Plato's political thought. Lewis held, moreover, that Plato's chief concern was " political freedom " ( Ibid. ), his concept of a city composed of " allies and helpers " , not rulers and slaves.
- (3): Re p 76: eleven lines from last line of text: read of between condition and his .
- (4): Re p 89: eleven lines from first line of text: read he between that and was .
- (5): Re p 131: the sentence beginning six lines from asterisks should read as follows as far as the first bracket: The Socratic distinction between the strictly social and external grounds of a man's consent and its moral, or individual grounds
- (6): Re p 211: seven lines from first line of text: read it between independence and is .
- (7): Re p 233: two lines from first line of text: read action for section.
- (8): Re p 234; ten lines from first line of text: read out the .

Re (1) above: in this volume only, the two pages numbered 61 became reversed due to a binder's error. Read the second of these pages so as to follow page 60; read the first so as to follow the second.

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