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STUDIES IN THE
GRAMMATICAL THEORY OF
APOLLONIUS DYSCOLUS

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PREFACE

This series of studies in the grammatical theory of Apollonius Dyscolus has, as its basis, first the desire to examine in some detail the contribution which that author makes towards the history of grammatical analysis in Ancient Greek thought, and thereby to the more general development of linguistic science as a whole, and secondly, the belief that some re-assessment may well be called for in much of the present-day attitude towards the criteria to be employed in the categorisation of the phenomena of language.

To this end, the studies have been divided into four main chapters. In the first, it is intended to analyse the various criteria employed by Apollonius in classifying forms. The second chapter is designed at enumerating the distinct categories that the writer sets up on the basis of the criteria outlined in chapter one. This will be followed by a brief discussion in chapter three of certain fallacies and weaknesses that are encountered in his lines of argument, while the final chapter endeavours to trace the relevance of some aspects of Dyscolus' theorisation to related trends in modern grammatical analysis. Since this is essentially a grammatical study, phonological arguments (except where strongly relevant) are not taken into consideration. However, it is to be admitted that the use of phonological criteria is made quite adroitly on occasions, and we find the use of one level of analysis

within the description of the other, which interchange is perfectly valid. (See below chap. 1, fn. 1.)

Reference numbers throughout refer to the notes which are placed at the end of the respective chapters, and at the conclusion of the final chapter will be found two bibliographies, the first listing works specifically concerned with the writings of Apollonius Dyscolus, while the second lists the main works referred to in the course of this study. Finally, there is appended a glossary of the more important and common terms employed by the writer in his treatise.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

"The real gap² in Dionysius' work was to some extent filled by Apollonius Dyscolus", writes Robins,³ yet he is only prepared to accord to Dyscolus one side of comment in his volume, while Thrax receives some four sides of detailed attention. The almost entire absence of Dyscolus' name⁴ in the files of twentieth century linguistic publications is evidence also of scant knowledge of his works, despite the lavish praise bestowed upon him in classical days by Priscian.⁵ Not only is his work to be valued in its own right, but it is mainly upon Apollonius that we are dependent for our all too meagre knowledge of the writings of earlier 'grammarians' such as Trypho, Habro, Zenodotus and Aristarchus.⁶ As regards his aim in writing, it is difficult to accept this solely as the correction of Homeric texts⁷, especially since he avowedly prefers examples drawn from prose writers⁸, and although Egger⁹ is surprised that Apollonius did not give his principles of analysis of Greek wider application to language as a whole, Robins¹⁰ accurately points out that in antiquity the question of any universality of grammatical structure was scarcely raised. Living at Alexandria in the second century A.D., Apollonius could hardly have failed to be conversant with Latin forms and yet he states (Syntax 111, 59) that infinitives are incapable of denoting number,¹¹ and hence one may conclude that he felt that his theories applied to the particular language being analysed. Although influenced to a certain extent by the analogist¹² viewpoint in the anomalist/analogist controversy¹³, Dyscolus does, on the whole,

pursue an original idea based upon the establishment of theories derived from a close examination of his material. Unlike Dionysius, however, Apollonius does not state precisely what forms the substance of his material, but it is significant that he shows no preference for Attic forms, despite the fact that the age of Hadrian and Antoninus was so famous for the revival of Atticism. We find equal respect being accorded to the various dialects of the Aegean islands and mainland¹⁴; indeed, his work forms a contribution to the field of descriptive linguistics and little concern is shown for a historical survey, with the exception of an occasional essay into the field of etymology.

Of the numerous works¹⁵ reputed to have been written by Dyscolus, there are extant only the four books of the Syntax and the three individual volumes on the Adverb, the Pronoun and the Conjunction. Book 1 of the Syntax deals mainly with the Article, Book 2 with the Pronoun, Book 3 opens with a discussion of the causes of solecisms, before proceeding to deal at greater length with the Verb, while Book 4 (which is fragmentary towards the end) deals with the Preposition and the Adverb (a final section on the Conjunction having been lost). It is certainly unfortunate, although perhaps inevitable, that part of what is said in the three individual volumes is re-iterated in the course of the Syntax (this does lead to some contradictions in argument as will be shown below in chapter 3). The above outline, however, presents an unjustly rosy picture of the substance of his

material and the style of his discussion. His style is indeed made *Δύσκολος* by the introduction of extreme technical jargon¹⁶, of new terminology, of frequent *anacolouthá* in lengthy sentences, together with all too frequent digressions concerning abnormal poetical forms which are in marked contrast with his more usual objective of arguing away the apparent exception.

The text which has been used here is that which constitutes Parts 1, 2, and 3 of *Grammatici Graeci*, published in Leipzig in 1878 and 1910, both volumes consisting of plain text, critical apparatus, commentary and indices. Part 1, which constitutes the whole of Volume 1, is the work of Richard Schneider (1878) and contains the three individual volumes mentioned above. Volume 2 contains two sections; Part 2, containing the text, critical apparatus and commentary for the four books of the *Syntax*, was prepared in 1910 by Gustavus Uhlig, and in the same year, Schneider added the extant fragments of others of *Dyscolus'* works, to comprise Part 3. Both volumes are based for textual purposes upon the earlier editions of Immanuel Bekker, who between 1813 and 1821 published all the extant works of *Apollonius*. Where references are made to the original text in the main typescript and in footnotes, the numbers refer to Uhlig's paragraph numbers in the four books on the *Syntax*, while the numbers in matters connected with the three individual volumes refer to the page and section of Bekker's edition, since Schneider himself has chosen to retain this numeration system.

I.O. A DISCUSSION OF THE CRITERIA EMPLOYED BY DYSCOLUS IN
CLASSIFYING FORMS

In his general classification of words, the criteria employed may be suitably allocated to two main headings, namely, to use the terminology of M. A. K. Halliday,¹⁷ "formal" and "contextual". The former group consists of the traditional grammatical criteria as favoured by Robins¹⁸ and Bazell¹⁹, this group being subdivided into what Bloomfield²⁰ describes as "the two traditional heads for most grammatical discussion, syntactical and morphological". These are here to be understood in the generally accepted manner, namely, on the one hand, the co-occurrence of words and/or parts of words (morphemes) in meaningful sentences, as opposed, on the other hand, to likeness or unlikeness, as between words, of the paradigm of different forms which they may have within total distribution within language.


In addition to these formal criteria, where the appeal is made to the observed forms, syntactical functions and the interrelations of the forms within utterances, there is also to be considered the appeal to criteria which may broadly be termed 'situational' elements, i.e. they are contextual, although this term is not to be confused with the situation concept of behaviour psychologists. This usage here of situational criteria attempts nothing more than categorisation, whereas other writers such as Malinowski and Firth²¹ have developed a

concept, termed 'context of situation', in which, by relating the utterances to the situations in which they were or could have been said (actual as contrasted with potential), they hope to show the manner in which language functions in humanity. The most thorough recent treatment of the role of context in language was provided in 1961 by Tatjana Slama-Cazacu who makes a fine but nevertheless valid distinction between the explicit and implicit context, the latter being termed 'the greatest of all aspects of context, in that it contains all that the hearer knows of the speaker and all that is contained in a certain situation at a given moment.'²² It is important here, however, to bear in mind that we are concerned in this study with the use of contextual criteria with a view to word classification and not, ostensibly at least, with their use towards the clarification of meaning.²³

The appeal to contextual criteria is by no means a new feature of linguistics although it is still viewed with disfavour by writers such as Robins.²⁴ K. J. Dover²⁵ established, within the scope of his own particular sphere of interest at the time, the desirability of going outside the word itself to an examination of its relation to its context. W. S. Allen in his inaugural address at Cambridge in 1957 (On the Linguistic Study of Languages) suggests that linguistics is peculiar amongst the sciences in standing astride two streams of phenomena - on the one side, the phonic material which constitutes speech, and on the other, the practical situation

in which speech operates. These situations, he feels, may be considered as functions of the phonic material which operates within them, i.e. a meaning of the material. It is only when we analyse phonic material by reference to its contextual function that the peculiarly systematic statements become possible which are characteristic of linguistics.

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF RELATIONSHIP OF CRITERIA



As is represented in the above figure, contextual criteria may be conveniently divided into two pairs of sub-groups. On the one side we find logical as opposed to conceptual criteria. The term logical is here used in the sense of the logical relationship of forms within the groups, as for example "given/new", "more/less important", "item/converse", "inclusion/non-inclusion", and "cause/consequence", whereas the conceptual group are concerned with abstract but not mental qualities, such as aspect in the verb, definite/indefinite

connotations in the pronoun. This particular term, 'conceptual' has recently undergone some misinterpretation, notably at the hands of Professor Thomson, in the opening of his book on the Greek Language (Cambridge, 1960). Here the author, to quote D. M. Jones' review²⁶, offers 'some old-fashioned and loosely drawn definitions of grammatical categories in conceptual rather than in formal terms', as when he defines an adjective as 'the name of a quality appertaining to a substantive'.

The second sub-group consists of the pair termed 'situational', respectively outer or non-mental, and inner or mental. Situational criteria thus include cases in which reference is made to objective elements in the outer situation, and those in which the reference is to elements in the mind of the speaker, as e.g. will, wish.²⁷ On the one hand, we may instance the balance of present/absent ideas in the pronoun, and on the other hand, the belief in the interjection denoting a particular 'state of mind' in the speaker.²⁸

1.1.1. The bulk of Apollonius' work that is extant deals mainly with Syntax, the interrelationship of formal features of the parts of speech combined together to produce sentence structure (which Robins²⁹ affirms has nothing to do with the 'meanings' - in the usual sense of the term - of the component words. Apollonius' conception of syntactical relationship derives from a parallel that he draws between syllables, words and sentences (Syntax 1.2). He postulates that there must be a correct order (τὸ δέον) for the positioning

of syllables so that the word may be properly formed (ἡ λέξις).

Feeling that the individual words are put together syntactically to form part of the complete sense (ὁ αὐτοτελής λόγος), he requires that there must also be τὸ δέον in the arrangement of the sentence in order to produce τὸ κατάλληλον, the ultimate perfect harmony required.³⁰ It is on the basis of syntactical criteria that Dyscolus develops his theory of the cause of solecisms, i.e. the breaking of this proper relationship between forms. He feels that the greatest cause of disharmony amongst forms lies in the varying inflections that are to be found in individual words (e.g. cases, numbers, persons, tenses, etc.) as compared with the indeclinable group (τὰ ἄκλιτα), such as prepositions, conjunctions and most adverbs, although he is at the same time fully aware that lack of external agreement is no necessary implication of incongruity. He believes that there is a due order and harmony for all forms, and it is the breaking of this that leads to error. In order to clarify his position, he submits at Syntax 111,10 (although unacceptably to us) that even if οὗτος is used with regard to a female subject or a plurality of subjects, one must not regard οὗτος με ἔτυψεν as a solecism, since no grammatical law of agreement of forms is here broken. Such an argument will undoubtedly find favour with those who oppose the intrusion of semantic considerations into the field of formal grammatical categorisation.³¹ Just as the word is formed from syllables, so both kinds of sentence, i.e. relevant and possible,

depend upon the suitable arrangement of words within the sentence. Again, as with the word itself, we may instance both subdivision into syllables and also the joining together of elements (στοιχεῖα) as in βέλεα βέλη, cf. ἀκρόπολις, καλλιχορος, so also we find a similar process in sentences where e.g. conjunctions may join two sentences into one, whereas the omission of the conjunction will cause a break up of the sense, and he cites, as an example of this (Syntax 1.10), the omission of καὶ in Od. 10, 251/2. Similar parallels are drawn between vowels/consonants and the parts of speech. For in the same way that no consonant can stand without a vowel, so certain parts of speech (i.e. prepositions, articles, conjunctions) make no sense without the provision of a suitable environment.

According to Apollonius (Syntax 111, 51), there are certain limitations imposed upon parts of speech when used in colligation with other forms. Since verbs do not distinguish gender (he excludes the participle from this group, see below 3.4.3.) no limitation is imposed upon them in this respect when colligated with nouns, but on the other hand, since they do distinguish number, the phenomenon of a neuter plural subject followed by a singular verb would suggest an obvious incongruity. Dyscolus suggests that the reason for the acceptance of this syntax lies in the morphological 'coincidentia' of the nominative and accusative neuter plural forms. He implies that γράφει τὰ παιδία is tolerated in the very same manner that one would accept γράφει τοὺς παῖδας, whereas the masculine

plural in the nominative would immediately sound incongruous with the singular verb.³²

The awareness of a properly reasoned and in no way fortuitous order (ταξις) in letters, cases, tenses and genders suggests to Dyscolus that we should look for the same principle to apply to the parts of speech - a curious orthodoxy since he sets out to produce a hierarchy of the eight parts of speech. The noun and the verb are adjudged by Dyscolus (Syntax 1, 14) to be the first necessities of the sentence since, when these are removed, the sense forthwith collapses³³, (similar importance being granted to the pronoun, standing in place of the noun). He is of the opinion that this order is in fact a reflection (μίμημα) of what is required to establish complete sense. The Scholiast, writing on Dionysius Thrax,³⁴ states that every sentence must contain a verb, suggesting that a structure of this basic form is the "favourite sentence-type" of Greek,³⁵ (to use Bloomfield's terminology).³⁶ Discussion of the other parts of speech is based upon varied criteria - syntactically we need only cite the preposition which he feels (1, 26) does not derive its name (πρόθεσις) from any particular significance of its own, but from the fact that it is attached to forms more original³⁷ than itself by apposition or synthesis in order to convey some otherwise lacking relationship, and secondly adverbs (ἐπιρρήματα) which he states derive their name rather from their syntactic function of modifying verbs than from their connotation (Syntax, 1, 9). He then uses the remainder of the four books on the Syntax to deal with certain individual parts

of speech in detail, regarding all except the noun and verb as falling into two classes (1, 36), first those which are used with reference to nouns³⁸ and verbs, and secondly those which are used with reference to or in place of these two principal forms, placing the article, preposition, conjunction and adverb in the first group, and the pronoun and participle in the second group.

In dealing with the two forms of the article, which he terms 'prepositive' and 'postpositive' (1, 142ff.), the criteria employed are mainly of a syntactic nature but they are affected by a false idea of the phonological background. Following what Forbes³⁹ regards as his constant procedure and arguing from function rather than from form, Dyscolus observes at 1. 142 that the essential difference between the two forms lies in the fact that while the prepositive form (ὁ, ἡ, τὸ) is found in full agreement with its noun, no such requirement is made by the postpositive form (ὁς, ἣ, ὅ), this latter requiring rather the addition of a subsequent verb. Despite the awareness of this clear functional difference, however, Dyscolus fails to deduce that they should be allocated to two separate parts of speech, as will be discussed below at 3.4.1. Indeed, he is prepared to admit that the two forms differ in syntax and in form (τάξις / φωνή), and there is also a reference in Part 3 of Grammatici Graeci⁴⁰, emphasising his awareness of the syntactic differences between the two forms. He is aware furthermore of the inability of the protactic^{form} to complete the sense in a sequence such as ὁ γραμματικὸς

ἦλθεν διελέξατο, where a similarly acceptable result may be achieved by the addition of a postpositive form or a conjunction such as καί. But he warns his readers (1, 144) against making the error of assuming that συνητῆρσθαι and συνδέδεσθαι are synonymous.⁴¹

The question of the particle ὦ and its relationship (if any) with the article was a subject for much divided discussion amongst the writers of antiquity. Of the many points raised by Dyscolus in his efforts to segregate the two forms, only a few syntactic points call for comment. In simple syntactic terms, he notes (1, 104) (cf. de Pro. 25) that, while οὐτος rejects the article, one is still able to say ὦ οὐτος (although, as usual, he fails to state in what environment this would be possible). Apollonius infers that ὦ cannot therefore be a part of the article. Furthermore, (on the verge of morphology) he makes the unusual observation that whereas τῶν is analogous to μέων in what Uhlig terms a 'coincidentia generum' between the noun and the article (1, 84), ὦ on the other hand merely exhibits the same phonological form throughout, being colligated with nouns of different numbers and genders. From this, Dyscolus suggests that it would be more appropriate to allocate ὦ to that group of forms which are similarly attached to varying forms of nouns without themselves undergoing any morphological change. He therefore recommends that ὦ be termed 'ἐπίρρημα κλητικὸν ἄκλιτον' on the grounds of its being an affix to the vocative case comparable with μᾶ, νί, which are colligated with the accusative (Syntax 1, 85).

The classification of $\chi\rho\etá$ and $\delta\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ as verbs (mentioned below, 1.1.2) was strongly opposed before the time of Dyscolus on the basis of their supposed many similarities with the adverbial group, namely regular use with verb-forms, retention of the same external form despite changes in the pronouns with which they are colligated. At De Adv. 539, he emphasises that no number of similar features in this direction will automatically imply that two forms are to be allocated to the same part of speech (cf. the protactic article and the pronoun οὗτος, both of which can be used with an anaphoric sense). Syntactically, Dyscolus notes that, in contrast with the adverb, $\chi\rho\etá$ and $\delta\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ cannot be colligated with the nominative of a pronoun as for example in * $\delta\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ ἐγὼ γράφειν cf. εἶθ' ἐγὼ γράφοιμι. His reason for this (111. 72) (although in fact inconsistent with his earlier remarks), to explain the apparent incongruity of $\chi\rho\etá$ being used unchangingly with varied numbers and persons, is that the attached infinitive is the real subject of the verb. Since the infinitive does not change its form, Dyscolus sees no cause for the verb to change its form, and he suggests that the regular construction $\delta\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ φιλολογεῖν is equivalent to $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu$ ἐπεὶ λείπει τὸ $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\nu$, 111. 76. On the further matter of the analysis of the accusative with the infinitive construction, in e.g. λείπει ἐμὲ, / $\delta\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ ἐμὲ ἀκούειν, he argues that it is not true that the infinitive always demands an accusative, but rather that the infinitive is colligated with the particular case

that the other moods of the verb require, hence accounting for the genitive in δεῖ ἐμὲ ἀκούειν Διονυκίου. The connection between a dependent accusative and the verb χρῆ/δεῖ is that the accusative depends upon this verb, taking on the role of the object of the clause (as above with λείπει), since this accusative is required not by the infinitive but rather by the verb χρῆ or δεῖ, (111,78).

At 111, 55, a discussion begins regarding the allocation of the infinitive to either the adverbial or verb class of forms, Apollonius favouring the latter. Varied criteria are employed by him to oppose the idea, allegedly put forward by other writers, of adverbial classification, and to support his own theory that the infinitive is ἡ ἔγκλισις γενικώτατη. On the basis of syntax, he first observes that it is perfectly acceptable for ^{one} person to be referred to by two verbs in separate moods within one sentence as in εἰν ἄν γινώσκῃς, πρόσεχε⁴² (this being in reply to the false argument of other writers that λέξαις γράφαις is unacceptable whereas θέλαις γράφειν is, and therefore γράφειν cannot be a verb form). Secondly he states that there is a fundamental difference between the infinitive and the adverb, namely that the infinitive cannot be colligated with all verbs whereas the adverb (with very few reservations regarding tense restrictions) can be so employed. (His reason for this is given in what are essentially contextual terms, namely that some verbs denote a particular action which makes complete sense on its own through its mood, without requiring the addition of a further verb. On the other hand, such verbs as θέλω require the addition

of a second verb in order to complete the sense). Recalling his earlier argument, that every mood of the verb ^{may} ultimately be reduced to the infinitive, (the meaning of the particular mood in question being supplied through syntactical paraphrase), he concludes (111. 62) that the infinitive ought now to supersede the indicative as occupying first place in the hierarchichal system of verb moods.⁴³

The question of distinguishing between παράθεσις and σύνθεσις (apposition and composition or synthesis) as ways of colligating prepositions with other parts of speech, is treated at length in the opening chapters of the Fourth Book of the Syntax.⁴⁴ He regrets that accent is often of no real help in deciding between the two types especially in verse where metathesis of compound forms is so frequently found, and he believes that the parts of the sentence, even if they are split up amongst themselves, as in ἔπνευε πούλυ κᾶτα, do not lose their property of being compounded forms. He suggests that anastrophe of accent demands metathesis whereas retention of accent and of correct position go together (IV, 9). The question is clarified syntactically however, since nouns joined with prepositions by synthesis receive any added article in front of the preposition, whereas forms compounded by παράθεσις admit the article in between the preposition and the noun. He quotes as examples at IV. 13 παρὰ τοῦ νόμου cf. τοῦ παρανόμου.⁴⁵ The idea of the nominative case and prepositions being colligated by apposition is rejected as impossible by Dyscolus, although he does submit that this is not to

suggest that nouns are incapable of receiving the prepositional affix, as e.g. *περίεργος*, which Dyscolus suggests possesses a force similar to that of the verb *περιεργάζεσθαι* (cf. *ἐπίκουρος*),⁴⁶ (Synt. IV, 17).

The composition/apposition question is dealt with again in Book IV at section 32ff., here in connection with the attaching of prepositions to verbs. Apollonius declares himself to be in favour of the former method of junction. His theory (stated at IV, 40) is that verbs receive the prepositional affix by synthesis, but that this is never done in such a way that other compound tenses are to be derived from a compounded present tense; rather, each individual tense of the verb in turn receives a preposition⁴⁷ which is possible since, in contextual terms, they all denote the same basic sense.⁴⁸ A similar conclusion, reached at IV. 45 from general observation, is made by Dyscolus with reference to the compounding of prepositions with participles. Here the nominative form such as *καταγράφων* will admit no article after the preposition, and hence the form must be allocated to the group of compounds by synthesis. He is prepared then to support his earlier decision about verbal compounding on these very grounds, since he feels that verbs and participles belong to the same basic schema.⁴⁹

H. B. Rosen⁵⁰ plausibly divides compound verbs into different types, and puts forward the opinion that some types were graphically distinct from others in early and late orthography, but not generally

so in classical Attic for example. He suggests that merely descriptive compounds tended to be written and pronounced $\sigma\upsilon\nu\#\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$, $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\#\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$, etc. He believes⁵¹ that the standardising of all types into single written forms goes back to Apollonius Dyscolus, Syntax IV, 32. However, he is wrong in saying that Dyscolus implies that it is impossible to make a graphic distinction between verbal composition of the syntactic kind and the lexical kind (respectively $\sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\omega$ and $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\pi\acute{\epsilon}\mu\pi\omega$). There is nothing in Dyscolus' writing at this point to justify any reference to graphic distinction between syntactical and lexical.⁵² The author merely states that all compound verbs receive their prepositional affix by synthesis, and he argues away the apparent exception.

It is in his analysis of the conjunction that we find an example of the thorough treatment which Dyscolus could give to a subject, and, although this book is not complete, we may begin to appreciate the advance in detailed analysis made by Dyscolus upon earlier writers. Forbes⁵³ quotes Thrax' definition of the conjunction as 'a form that binds together the train of thought in order, and fills up a gap in the speech'. Robins⁵⁴, on the other hand, praises Dyscolus for improving upon Thrax by stating that its function is to join together syntactically other parts of speech.⁵⁵ From the beginning, Dyscolus prepares for a thorough discussion⁵⁶, announcing his intention to reveal differences between form and connotation ($\phi\acute{\omega}\nu\eta$ and $\delta\eta\lambda\acute{o}\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$) (in so far as forms which agree in morphological shape may be

differentiated by the sense), between simple and compound forms, between real and apparent conjunctions, and between enclitic and non-enclitic forms.

1.1.2. As has been suggested in the introduction above (1.0), the recourse to formal criteria in grammatical categorisation has met with generally greater approval from linguistic writers, especially in recent times, than has the appeal to contextual considerations. The recourse, therefore, to morphological criteria is not hard to trace in the writings of Dyscolus. One may instance his comments upon the two-fold form of the article, protactic and hypotactic (1. 80), and his "proof" of the "loss" of original sigma in the nominative singular of the prepositive forms. He notes first that in all other cases the endings of the two forms concur perfectly; secondly, that plurals in -οι correspond to a singular in -ος, which is also suggested by the feminine termination of -η. After observing at 1. 86, with reference to other levels, that interrogative forms must reject the article, since interrogation and the underlying concept of the article contradict each other, he states that ὀνομαστικός cannot be a compound derived from ὀ and ονομαστικός since in morphological terms, one must observe that the ὀ prefix never changes its form (contrast ὀ, ἡ, τὸ). He also notes that compound 'adjectives' have a common form in the nominative singular for two genders.

Similarly, he affirms (11.34) that the inflexion of οὗτος, αὐτή, τοῦτο makes it abundantly clear that it is derived not from the regular article but from a pronominal form (cf. ὅς δ' ἔφη), and it must therefore be treated as a pronoun.

Again, in terms of simple morphological phenomena, he supports his argument that ὦ is not to be regarded as a part of the article (1. 83). He instances points similar to those mentioned above, namely, that a genitive terminating in -ου, and accusative in -ου correspond to a vocative in -ε; nominative and vocative plural forms in all declensions are the same, with this exception; the feminine vocative singular ought to be identical with the nominative feminine singular, and furthermore the other oblique cases of the definite article all require an initial tau; and in any case, the breathing and accent are wrong - all evidencing his feeling for analogy.

Pure morphology is employed as the criterion in De Adv. 542 where the author is confronted with the classification of χρή and δεῖ which had until his day been placed by many in the adverbial class. He here regards temporal augmentation in the past tenses of the indicative as the most potent argument for allocating the above two forms to the verb class (ἐχρήν, etc.), but he points out in the corresponding passage in the Syntax (111. 73) that he does not mean by this that only forms which can be augmented are to be regarded as verbs (this only occurs, as he observes, in the indicative, anyway) but rather that forms which can be augmented show by this

very fact that they are members of the verb class. The last section of the Book on the Adverb (562ff.) is devoted to a comprehensive classification of adverbial forms by their terminations, and, where feasible, he generalises on the meaning of a class e.g. adverbs in $-\theta\epsilon\nu$ indicate the source of motion (597)⁵⁷, and on the origin of a group, e.g. adverbs ending in $-\delta\eta\nu$ originate from nouns or verbs ($\lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\alpha}\delta\eta\nu$, $\kappa\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\beta\delta\eta\nu$) (611).

His ability to handle two morphological arguments is seen in De Adv. 553. Since present participles have separate terminations for the masculine and feminine genders, and a form $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ is found in Il. 1, 565, other writers are quoted by Dyscolus as inclining to the view that $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ is therefore to be regarded as a participle. However, as Dyscolus points out, where is the verb from which it is formed? He then suggests as a basis for comparison the form $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ $\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\upsilon\sigma\theta\epsilon$ in Od. 21, 89, which leads him back to his favouring adverbial classification. In contrast to this, one may observe his less successful handling of morphological phenomena. On a purely morphological basis of eight short observations about forms, he endeavours to prove (De Pro. 13A) that pronouns fall into two distinct groups, on the basis that pronouns which denote genders by their terminations also exhibit regularity of declension in their cases. In so doing, he trembles on the verge of making a conflation of what are in fact two essentially different morphological features. He details the two groups as follows; first those

pronouns which are irregular in their declension (ἀνακόλουθος) and have individual roots for the various numbers and cases and persons (θέματα) as opposed to the second group which do distinguish generic differences and hence exhibit regularity (ἀκολουθία) throughout their declension, as e.g. αὐτόν, ἐκείνους.

With regard to considerations which may affect the allocation to parts of speech (μέρη), he suggests at De. Adv. 575 that, with regard to adverbs ending in -φι⁵⁸, it is the surrounding syntax which is the deciding factor. In the case of forms ending thus, he notes that some are to be classified as adverbs, while others retain the significance and classification of their original case forms (e.g. ~~κατ' ὄρεσφιν~~ = ~~κατ' ὄρους~~, cf. χέδοθεν in Od. 2, 267, which does not denote place of origin). Since he feels that adverbial compounding takes place 'κατὰ μιᾶς συντάξεως', he is obliged to exclude the group of forms which terminate in -φι from the class of 'adverbial' compounds (ἐπιρρηματικὴ παραγωγή) since, as he rightly observes, this particular ending can be found with what he terms 'accusative, genitive and dative' connotations, as e.g. δεξιόφιν, πασσάλοφιν, φρήτρηφι. However, at De Adv. 608, he does accept ?φι as being purely adverbial, the allocation here being on the basis of case equivalence. This question of the determination of the classification of parts of speech is discussed in greater detail as a matter of general principles below at 2.1.2. One notices in this present connection the appeal to morphology

discussed there with reference to the formal ending of the word determining its classification. An example, quotable here, is that found at De Pro. 36C, where in the course of his remarks about τηλικούτος, Dyscolus writes that it is sheer stupidity to state that it is a noun, and then to regard it as being formed from οὐτος; for he feels that it is the ending of the word that decides to which part of speech a compound form is to be allocated. And further, as he points out at De Pro. 37A, τηλικούτος must not be regarded as a compound form since all compound forms of this nature should possess common gender endings in the nominative singular, masculine and feminine.

1.2.0. Those criteria which may be broadly termed 'contextual' will be dealt with under two separate headings, this next section being devoted to the use of logical and conceptual considerations, and the subsequent section (1.2.2.) dealing with the recourse to 'inner' and 'outer' situational criteria. Due to the close relationship of these pairs, it has been found more convenient to treat them together rather than to attempt to divide them into four separate sections.

1.2.1. Apollonius first hints of logical criteria (1. 13) when,

after laying evidence for accepting that there is a reasoned order for letters, tenses, genders etc., he turns to the order of precedence that is to be accorded to the various parts of speech,⁵⁹ commenting that any man who refuses to look for a logical basis for this, merely attributing it to chance, will find himself in the position of denying the influence of order everywhere (this to Dyscolus seems 'πάντη ἡλίθιον'). He deduces that the noun and verb should be accorded priority of place, and of these two the noun should receive first place on the grounds that the qualities of the verb are derived from the state of the noun (τοῖς δὲ σώματιν ἐπικεῖται ἡ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐξ^ἢ ἰδιότης τοῦ ῥήματος, λέγω τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸ πάθος). The verb itself is seen to take precedence over the pronoun (1. 19) since the latter was conceived primarily to clarify any ambiguities of person that may arise in the former. He feels that the pronoun in the nominative case only serves a really useful purpose when the verb itself is unable to make the necessary distinction of person, this being especially noticeable in the third person, which he observed in Synt. 1. 17 as being unlimited in comparison with the more restricted reference of the second and first person forms of the pronoun. Furthermore, he feels (1. 24) that the pronoun must also give way to the article on logical grounds, for if the article is used with the noun and the pronoun is used in place of the noun, then it follows that the article must be older than the pronoun.

In the majority of present day reference works, Dyscolus is generally accorded great credit for developing the idea of the anaphoric sense of the definite article, whereby reference is made back to what is mentioned either implicitly or explicitly in the context, thus establishing what he terms a second identification of a person mentioned before (δευτέρω γνωστῶ).⁶⁰ The idea of anaphora, i.e. reference back to what is known from previous mention, is used by Dyscolus to justify the fact that nouns may both be colligated with and without the definite article, Dyscolus' theory being that when the subject is 'known' through previous mention⁶¹, an article is required to establish the anaphoric relationship, whereas when the subject is unknown, no article can be required. (This argument is applied in the main to the nominative and accusative cases.)⁶² This same point is taken up at a later stage when he remarks (1. 95) that some may find it strange that nouns can be colligated with the article whereas the pronouns that replace these nouns are never preceded by the article, this being all the more unusual in places where the addition of the article would tend to clarify ambiguities in gender. A reason for this is stated in conceptual terms, namely that first and second person pronouns deal with persons actively concerned in the subject matter (1. 96), and hence these indications do not require the addition of the article since no repetition of the particular individual's name is called for, but the person is, as it were, before our very eyes (ὅπ' ὄψιν).

Pronouns of the third person possess their own anaphoric sense and hence do not require the article. Those who feel that forms such as ἔμω, which already possess a demonstrative force, can also be colligated with the article are urged by Dyscolus (1. 100) to observe that the article colligated with such forms refers to the thing possessed and not to the possessor, as he feels is emphasised by the fact that one does not say 'ὁ ἔμω ὁ πατήρ' (which would certainly be acceptable if the article were to refer to the pronoun). By analogy with such phrases as ὁ πατήρ ὁ ἐκείνων where the two articles must refer to one noun, Apollonius concludes that in ὁ πατήρ ὁ ἔμω both articles refer to the one noun and both possess the anaphoric quality. In modern terms, however, one would prefer to say that the first is here being used cataphorically,⁶³ ἔμω explaining it. In cases where possession is involved, he feels (1. 43) that if the article is omitted, a number (πλήθος) of personal possessions is denoted as in δοῦλόσ σου ταῦτα ἐποίησε, while the inclusion of the article suggests to Dyscolus single possession (μοναδικῆς κτήσε). A possessive genitive dependent upon a common noun has the article prefixed to it, whereas the article is omitted with proper nouns and with βάρβαροι since these, even without the article, are capable of denoting the necessary single ownership. [In order to justify the two articles that are found with ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου υἱός, he argues that an article must signify through anaphora a known possessor in order that it may denote a known person or thing that

New Para.

is possessed. In this connection, Dyscolus lists three possibilities of order of words: ὁ πατήρ ἐμὸς ἐστὶ: ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ τρέχει: ὁ πατήρ ὁ ἐμὸς φιλοσοφεῖ. He suggests (1. 132) that it is the type of verb that governs the use and order of words. This idea of the type of verb (stative as opposed to action) recurs at Syntax 1. 119-122, where the author is dealing with the article in interrogative sentences. He notes first that the article is added to a question formed by τίς + a common noun as e.g. τίς ὁ ἄνθρωπος καλεῖται; and also to a participle provided that the main verb is one of calling or naming⁶⁴, as in τίς ὁ δραμῶν καλεῖται; (he further notes a similar construction with ποῖος as ποῖος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔστιν;). He suggests at 1. 130 that interrogative adverbs can be colligated with the article regularly without any of the above verb discrimination (e.g. πῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησεν;). The reason for this is felt by Dyscolus to be that with πῶς etc. the details of the subject of the sentence are 'known', whereas with ποῖος ἄνθρωπος the only fact that can be classed as 'known' is that of the verb action, with the result that the anaphoric nature of the article in conjunction with the subject of the verb is totally incongruous. The real point here, however, which he fails to stress, is the change from attributive to predicative. Any genitive dependent upon one of the interrogative forms such as τίς or πότερος requires, according to Syntax 1. 125, the addition of the article unless the genitive is pronominal.⁶⁵

On the anaphoric nature of pronouns, he states that in the third person (Synt. II,9), the pronoun will only replace a noun that is colligated with an article (the absolute noun possessing no sense of anaphora), and he believes that there is a transfer of the relative sense from the noun to the replacing pronoun. Apollonius believes that the declension of pronouns is bound up with the fact that all pronouns indicate (II.16), either by their demonstrative or anaphoric qualities (II.11), definite individuals. The verb is so endowed, however, only in the first and second persons. He is of the opinion therefore (II.17) that the pronoun possesses several forms in the third person as the only means of distinguishing between otherwise ambiguous individuals. In this connection we may note the essentially logical distinction between the first two persons as opposed to the third. The circumstances attendant upon individuals in the first two persons are felt to be 'τὰ ὑπ' ὄψιν' i.e. known at first hand, whereas the third person refers to something or somebody possibly outside the immediate sphere of the speaker.⁶⁶ Furthermore the awareness of a need to make extra distinction in the third person by the use of distinctive pronominal forms would suggest that the author was also aware of a certain amount of contextual plurality in third person, whereby 'I see me' must normally be rejected, but 'he sees him' may be accepted, two distinct persons being involved.⁶⁷

The discussion of the irregular declension of personal pronouns

as compared with that of nouns leads the author to suggest (II 22) that each person has his own particular noun, the nominative of which may be turned into oblique cases which still retain the basic characteristic of the original nominative (ἴδιον). In order to make even clearer the distinction of the individual qualities of the subjects, we find the creation of different genders, the addition of epithets, and the formation of compounds. The pronoun, on the other hand, is concerned with the basic idea of the reality of the substance (οὐσία), and not with individual characteristics, of the subjects. Hence, he feels that since pronouns reject the host of individually peculiar qualities exhibited by nouns, it is not surprising that they also reject the customary regular declension of nouns, since any pronoun can stand for almost any noun(s).⁶⁸ He further seeks to justify the formation of this abnormal declension amongst many personal pronouns by arguing that it is only to be expected that a form, which is to be used for so many varied nouns, will avoid any limitations imposed upon it by any of the regular declensions. Turning then (II 26) to the more regular declension of the third person forms such as ἐκεῖνος, he suggests that the reason for this greater regularity lies in the fact that the person denoted by ἐκεῖνος is usually placed at some distance from the speaker, and therefore it is wiser to denote the appropriate gender. He further observes that αὐτός requires this distinction of gender since it serves to denote, not distant persons as does ἐκεῖνος, but rather 'absent' persons.⁶⁹

On the subject of the addition of the pronoun in the nominative case in front of the verb, Dyscolus rejects the view (De Pro. 27C) that without the pronoun, our speech becomes impoverished (ἐνδεῆ); for after all, remarks Dyscolus, that is the customary usage.⁷⁰ In logical terms, he inclines to the view that the addition of the pronoun in the nominative case is superfluous, unless there is some definite call for distinction (διακτόλη) as in παρεγενόμην μὲν, οὐ παρέτυχες δέ. The appeal here is to the concept of the 'I/you' contrast and it is this nucleus element which determines the preferred colligation. He notes at the same time, however, the value of the addition of the third person pronoun where the sense is in the least ambiguous. He implies (De Pro. 30A) the undesirability of the nominative of nouns being colligated with verbs in any person except the third, although, as he points out, there are certain exceptions in this respect, depending again upon the connotation of the particular verb in question e.g. verbs of describing (σημαίνοντα ἴδιαις ποιότητος θεῖαι) demand nouns and reject pronouns on the grounds that individual characteristics (ἰδιότης) cannot be conveyed, conceptually speaking, in pronominal forms, which are of a general nature. εἶναι, on the other hand, will admit pronouns since they denote 'existence' and do not demand reference to any particular quality.

While the article (De Pro. 9B) is not used to differentiate persons nor to denote 'existence' (as does the pronoun), its principal significance, other than that of anaphora, is that it marks, not

particular differences, but rather more general distinctions (οὐκ ἰδικῆ διαφορά ἀλλὰ γενικῆ). The noun is said to be incapable of possessing demonstrative force (δεῖξις) (De Pro. 39B) but rather signifies individual qualities (also termed ποιότης), while the pronoun denotes the very contrary characteristics, i.e. deixis, existence, and general differences (δεῖξις, οὐσία, γενικῆ διαφορά). Dyscolus believes that every pronoun possesses either relative or demonstrative connotations (10B), the first and second person being demonstrative, while the third possesses both these qualities (for he regards αὐτός, ἐκεῖνος as demonstrative, and ἐγώ, οὗ, οἱ as relative). Whatever their similarities may be in syntactic terms, (e.g. pronominal use of the article, pronominal use with nouns) Dyscolus rejects any suggestion of their being even a slight case for muddling the article and the pronoun. He further differentiates the two classes (16B) on the basis that pronouns, when employed in answer to interrogative statements, possess a sense of 'primary cognition' (πρώτη γνῶσις) whereas the article contains, in conceptual terms, a sense of 'secondary cognition', recalling to the memory. He feels quite confident that the demonstrative sense in personal pronouns is fully adequate to distinguish persons without an article being added (as also with ἐκεῖνος, αὐτός), although the real reason for articles not being colligated with pronouns⁷¹ is that the article contains the anaphoric sense, the pronoun the demonstrative sense. It is due to their divergent qualities in this respect also that

nouns and pronouns could never be compounded by synthesis (Pro. 39C).

Several points of interest are raised by Dyscolus when he comes to that part of the Syntax dealing with the Verb. First, in III, 21, he affirms that ἄν may be joined with past tenses of the indicative, with the exception of the perfect. The reason for the failure of ἄν to be colligated with the present, future⁷² and perfect tenses of the indicative is felt by the writer to be that the particular force of this conjunction⁷³ refers not to the realm of the factual, but rather to the potential (τὸ δύνᾰσθαι), which concept he feels is best catered for by the aorist, imperfect and pluperfect tenses, on account of their reference to time which is partly or already long past, rather than to present or future. (This relation of 'past' to 'possibility' provides a good example of conceptual opposition).⁷⁴

Dyscolus further suggests that the fact that ἄν is not colligated with the perfect tenses is another proof of his theory that the perfect should not be regarded as a tense denoting completion of action in the past but rather as denoting 'present completion' (συντελείαν ἐνεστῶσαν). The mention of ἐάν, ἵνα (see footnote 73) introduces the topic of aspect within the verb. The absence of any future subjunctive⁷⁵ and the fact that these two conjunctions govern either a present or past ~~indicative~~ ^{subjunctive or optative} leads Dyscolus on to a bare suggestion of the awareness of aspectual differences. Uhlig interprets⁷⁶

Dyscolus' idea (Synt. III, 140) as follows: 'ἐάν δράμω - perfectionem futuram cursus denotet: ἐάν τρέχω - futuram continuationem'. A

similar view is expressed at Synt. III, 101 where the writer suggests that the difference between the optative forms κλειέσθω and κεκλείσθω is that the present form states that the door ought now to be closed, whereas the perfect form states that by now the closing of the door ought to have been long completed (τὴν ἔκπαλαι ὀφείλουσαν διάθεσιν γενέσθαι). He feels similarly that the present optative desires a present state to continue, such as ζῶοιμι (Synt. III, 100), while the aorist optative, e.g. πορθήσεται τὴν ἴλιον desires the outcome of what is not yet real fact, i.e. that the time of battle may be finished and past. The same difference is felt to be true for the present and past tenses of the imperative (III, 102), the present demanding that a present state should continue, while the aorist requires 'ut aliquid absolutum et praeteritum sit'.⁷⁷

and noun

In the sequence of article, followed by a participle, the author sees a variety of interpretations. First, there is the simple temporal significance (Synt. I, 110) as evidenced in ὁ Δίων τυραννήσας ἐμέμφθη, which he equates with ὁ Δίων μετὰ τὸ τυρανῆσαι ἐμέμφθη. In addition to the usual anaphoric sense to be found with the article, there is also the classifying idea (Synt. I, 111) as seen in ὁ καὶς ὁ δειπνήσας, identifying one particular boy out of a group of others, which leads Apollonius to suggest that the idea of 'one out of many' may be connected with the Stoic term 'ἀοριστῶδη μόρια'. At the same time, one notices that the first article is cataphoric⁷⁸ and that the second is in fact the classifying form, referring to one

particular boy who has had his dinner. This may be paralleled in the anticipatory or proleptic use of the article in e.g. ὁ τυραννοκτόνηδας τιμᾶσθω which Dyscolus observes (Syntax 1, 44) has reference to future time of unspecified duration, as in Od. VI, 158/9. At Syntax 1, 114, the sequence of article + participle + imperative is again mentioned in terms of reference to an indefinite future, while the further point is made that this 'indefinite' sense is not conveyed through the past or present tenses of the verb, the clearly defined temporal connotation of these latter being emphasised.

1.2.2. Still operating under the wide heading of contextual as opposed to formal criteria, situational criteria⁷⁹, although forming two sub-groups, will nevertheless be treated in one section. It is important to notice in this connection that in these early days, linguistic studies not yet had achieved full independence from the main line of 'philosophical' interests of the writers of ancient Greece, and hence, as Robins observes, one must not be unduly disturbed at the use of arguments drawn from extra-linguistic sources.⁸⁰ While one is well advised to heed the warning of Adelaide Hahn⁸¹ in her writing on Apollonius, a thorough study of the detailed writings of this author would suggest that there is abundant room

for a consideration of criteria based upon psychological and outer, non-mental situational phenomena. The extent to which such criteria are applied by Apollonius varies, as usual. In the discussion of the eighth and last part of speech at Synt. 1, 28, Dyscolus defines the conjunction as meriting this position since it is powerless by itself, (i.e. when lacking other forms which it may join) just as the limbs of the body are useless except when the main body is present. A second example at a simple level may be seen in 1. 43 where the writer suggests that the inclusion of the prepositive article may denote a feeling of excellence (ἐξοχή) as e.g. in ὁ γραμματικός which he interprets as denoting the accepted opinion of all. Again we may note a similar use of ὁ ποιήτης to refer exclusively to Homer.

In his classification of interrogative forms into two groups (ὀνομαστικά/ἐπιρρηματικά) (these two groups arising from the fact, in Dyscolus' opinion, that the noun and the verb are the most effective parts of speech and are therefore the most likely to be questioned in cases of uncertainty) he classifies (1. 35) the adverbial group as being concerned with unknown feelings (διάθεσις) and attitudes, as for example, πῶς ἀνεγνώ; καλῶς, ῥητορικῶς. The exact interpretation of the term διάθεσις, in its connection with the verb, is discussed at length by Adelaide Hahn⁸². To Apollonius the various moods of the verb are demonstrative of

certain "ψυχικαὶ διαθέσεις" (111. 59), with the noted exception of the infinitive.⁸³ Since the infinitive lacks this modal distinction (to use Hahn's phraseology), Apollonius suggests that this is the reason for the infinitive being able to replace all the other moods of the verb, providing the particular characteristic of the other verb is supplied, as in γράφε → γράφειν σοὶ προτάσσω. This theory of the inflected form of the verb as denoting διαθέσεις is regarded by Robins⁸⁴ as 'a harking back to the Aristotelian doctrine that speech sounds are symbols for the states of the soul'.⁸⁵ To the indicative, Apollonius assigns the quality of ὀριστική or ἀποφατική⁸⁶, the latter being produced by the addition of the negative particle οὐ. In this connection (111. 90), Dyscolus observes that οὐ is not found with the imperative, optative or subjunctive moods since they do not share in this essential quality of statement of fact. He regards the optative as being concerned with the realm of human wishes, the imperative with the issuing of commands, whereas the subjunctive when introduced by a conjunction, assumes the quality of the particular conjunction in question⁸⁷, (111. 92) since Dyscolus feels that each conjunction possesses an individual δύναμις.⁸⁸ With regard to the optative mood (εὐκτική), so called because of its obvious connection with wishes (εὐχαι), it would appear that the addition of the optative adverb was unnecessary (contrast εἴθε ἔγραψεν where the conjunction has a force of its own). Apollonius suggests that

this usage of the optative adverb being colligated with the optative mood (Synt. III, 94) as in εἴθε λαχόην⁸⁹ is comparable to adding ναί in answers to interrogative forms where the verb of action is also repeated (namely, for greater emphasis, εἰς κλείονα ἐπιτάσεις). He draws a firm distinction between optative forms in verbs and these optative adverbs as is discussed below at 3.4.2.

With regard to the naming of the moods, and in particular subjunctive forms, Apollonius suggests that moods which do not depend upon a conjunction, such as the indicative, possess an innate force of their own (see above, Synt. III, 88) and derive their name from this and not from the connotation of any added conjunction (contrast the manner in which the various classes of conjunctions are named according to the particular concept that they denote). Since he sees this quality in the conjunction, he believes that the reason for such clauses as εἰδὼν ἔλεγον being regarded as incongruous is that the inherent force of εἰδὼν conflicts with the past tense in the verb. For this conjunction is felt to denote uncertainty about future matters and things yet to be completed, the same principle being applicable to other conjunctions such as ἵνα when used finally, while he believes that the concept of causality in conjunctions is at variance with the future tenses of the verb (Synt. III, 131).⁹⁰

Turning to pronouns and to more obvious situational criteria, Dyscolus states (Synt. III, 42) that the first and second persons

differ from the third in that whereas the former presuppose persons being present,⁹¹ the third, with the exception of οὗτος, denotes in the mind of the speaker, τὰ ἀπόντα κεχωρισμένα τῶν προσώπων. Dyscolus feels that it is this awareness of the 'absent' quality in the mind of the speaker, not the mere fact of their being third person, that prevents αὐτὸς and ἐκεῖνος from possessing vocative case forms (Apollonius not only connecting the vocative case solely with the second person⁹², but also regarding οὗτος as signifying 'present' persons.)⁹³.

Returning to the analysis of the main parts of speech, the interjection (ἐπιφωνήσις) was never separated off by the Greeks as a part of speech in its own right. Dyscolus regards it (De Adv. 531) as a member of the adverbial group, when he states that adverbs are to be used when verbs are written in or are to be mentally supplied, i.e. in cases where we would often use interjections. The first grammarian to separate them off as an individual part of speech, the first century Roman grammarian, Remmius Palaemon, segregated them by the criterion of their having no denotative meaning as such, but rather signifying a state of mind (nihil docibile habent, significant tamen adfectus animi).⁹⁴

In the same way that it is not possible to attach certain attributive forms to any noun, so also some adverbs will not permit themselves to be attached to any tense, mood or person of the verb, while others are not so unlimited. For example

(De Adv. 533), certain adverbs are noted as possessing a strongly temporal significance, and hence will only be associated with tenses appropriate to this. Apollonius is even prepared to distinguish the more ambiguous tenses of participles and verbs by the addition of e.g. ἔχθέρ as in ἔχθέρ λέγων to mark the imperfect participle.⁹⁵ The influence of personal feeling, evidenced above, in connection with the interjection, is also brought into play when the author turns to consider (De Adv. 537) the classification of the form ὦμοι which is also dealt with at De Pron. 42. After using various criteria, principally morphological and etymological, to prove that it can be neither a verb nor a pronoun, (although all interjections are always conceived of, he feels, in the first person) he comes to his main points. First, he suggests that adverbs of lamentation are by their very nature attached to the first, i.e. speaking person, and hence ὦμοι may still be retained in the adverbial class. Secondly, he adds that the exclamation is the result of a state of mind (cf. the above definition of Remmius Palaemon), and since this is a characteristic of the verb, it follows that ὦμοι must stand as an adverb by virtue of Apollonius' theory of adverbs being used to modify the verb (see below, 1.3.1.).

1.3.0. In addition to the separate use of individual criteria, Dyscolus is aware both of the need and of the value to be gained through using combined criteria as a means of strengthening an argument. In the remaining sections of this chapter, criteria combination will be illustrated, first (1.3.1.) in terms of purely formal considerations; then follow (1.3.2.) examples of syntactical criteria being combined with contextual arguments, and finally (at 1.3.3.) the combination of morphological with contextual criteria is discussed, before a final brief summarising of the use made by Dyscolus of the various criteria (1.4.0.).

1.3.1. His handling of the two groups of formal criteria, syntactical and morphological⁹⁶, may be seen in extracts from De Adverbio and De Conjunctions. In the first passage, (De Adv. 543ff., which is an extension of a previous discussion at De Conj. 497), he unconsciously brings together two groups of formal criteria as a basis for regarding ἔκρητι as an adverb. Whereas other writers such as Trypho had tended, according to Dyscolus, to classify this form solely as a conjunction, he points out that the function of a conjunction is to join together syntactically other parts of speech and sentences,⁹⁷ and he fails to see how it can be possible for a conjunction to assume a negative prefix as is found with ἀέκρητι (De Adv. 544.)

He also notes the possibility of two contrasted negative forms from one root word being found only with adverbs; he therefore compares οὐδέ μινως, ἀδέμνωσ and οὐχ ἔκητι, ἀέκητι. Accordingly, he deduces that ἔκητι cannot be only a conjunction, and stresses his own view (De Conj. 497) that, when ἔκητι is equivalent to ἔνεκα, it is to be regarded as a causal conjunction, whereas, when it is equivalent to ἔκοντηδόν, it must then be regarded as an adverb. From this example of the mingling of formal criteria, we may pass on to the proof which he offers for his theory that each individual tense of the compound verb receives the prepositional affix when it has itself been formed, with the augment added if necessary. His proof here^(iv, 41) is that we find compound past tenses with no corresponding present tense extant, and similarly present and future forms are found with no corresponding past tense (e.g. κατέφαγον, κατοίω). A form such as ἦνεκον, where the compounding was made in the present tense, and then passed as one united form into the past to receive the temporal augment, is regarded as an exception (with the added suggestion that forms thus compounded (e.g. καθίζω) do not differ contextually speaking from the simple verb, whereas on the other hand καταγράφω does). His argument is morphological, although not in conflict with syntactical considerations. He finds himself in the position where his notion of similarity of structure in all these ranks makes him uncertain regarding the morphology of a phrase and syntax of a word on the one hand, and the morphology of

a word on the other hand, which, when considered from the point of view of the word alone, suggests morphology in opposition to syntax.⁹⁸

From this balancing of criteria of a formal nature, one may pass on to consider examples where Dyscolus allowed the claims of syntax to outweigh morphological considerations. Cases of this kind are more in evidence than those of the contrary kind, i.e. where Dyscolus permits morphology to outweigh syntax, suggesting that the author valued the claims of syntax more highly than those of morphology. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that Dyscolus, when dealing with the classification of the parts of speech in terms of general principles of categorisation, does lay down that it is the ending of the word which determines to which part of speech the word is to be allocated (see below 2.1.2.). In De Adv. 551, he notes that πύξ is a substantive on account of its declension and syntax, whereas πύξ and λόξ are both to be regarded as adverbs owing to their being colligated with verbs, and their having no syntax other than that commonly associated with the verb.

He then turns his attention to indeclinable numerals. Despite their unchanging terminations which would suggest their belonging to the adverb group of forms, these numerals are nevertheless to be treated as nouns, since, if they were truly adverbs, they would be used indiscriminately with any singular or plural form of the verb, whereas in reality these numerals are only found in a plural environment.

Hence he deduces that they lack the proper adverbial relationship with the verb, although the important point here, surely, is the absence of any other noun in the nominative case. One may similarly observe (De Adv. 553) that δεῦρο,⁹⁹ while clearly an adverb, assumes an apparently plural formation in Od. 8, 133, (δεῦτε, φίλοι), presumably, according to Dyscolus, after analogy with ἄγε, ἄγετε. Again in De Adverbio 529, we may observe syntactical criteria overriding morphological considerations where Dyscolus turns his attention to the definition of the adverb in general terms. He terms it "an indeclinable part of speech, which is colligated with the moods of the verb, either wholly or partly, and without which the complete idea (διάνοια) is not fully expressed." He states that case forms which do not possess some relationship with the noun but are colligated with reference to the verb assume adverbial syntax, which he details as including loss of declension as for example in τάχῃ περιπατεῖς. With a similar principle in mind, he states that where an 'adjective' qualifies not a noun but a verb, it becomes an adverb, observing that the adverb required a verb to complete its sense (either factually or supplied) in the same way that the adjective requires a substantive.

1.3.2. A further blending of criteria, now syntactical with contextual, is to be seen in the discussion of ἀλλήλων (Synt. 11, 147) where the author observes that any form such as ἀλλήλοι, if found,

would be equivalent to ἄλλοι ἄλλοι which he regards as syntactically unacceptable on the grounds of the two adjacent nominative forms. He then notes that ἀλλήλους differs from other reflexive forms in that it does not denote a passage of action (contextually), as is revealed by the variety of case endings (morphology) which are determined by the particular verb in question (syntax). In De Pro. 42, the discussion of ἄλλος provides a further blending of criteria. In connection with the argument that ἄλλος is to be treated as a noun and not as a pronoun, Dyscolus observes that, in addition to morphological and situational considerations, the genitive plural of pronouns can colligate with οὐδεῖς without the addition of the article, whereas the genitive of nouns requires the article when so colligated, and the latter case is true also of ἄλλος, hence it is to be regarded as a noun. These same two words are also discussed on the basis of varied criteria in Syntax 1, 63, where Dyscolus observes that the article should be attached to ἄλλος where it refers to a complete whole out of which are to be distinguished several component subdivisions, as e.g. οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, οἱ δὲ Αἰολεῖς.¹⁰⁰ Where, on the other hand, ἄλλος does not refer exclusively to a whole class, there is no need for the addition of the article (e.g. ἄλλους ὑβρίζε, μὴ ἡμᾶς). The application of similar criteria is seen in the omission of the article with ἀλλήλους, since the persons involved are thought of in the nominative and accusative cases in ἀλλήλους. Since, furthermore, it would be contrary to syntactic principles to

have two articles in different cases referring to one noun, Dyscolus judges it better to have none, illustrating the priority being accorded to syntactical considerations on this occasion. (Synt.1, 70).

Further criteria combination may be evidenced in the final surviving chapters of the book on the Conjunction and in Syntax 111, 127. In both these places, Dyscolus directs his discussion at a group of forms which are termed expletives (παραπληρωματικά). Earlier writers such as Thrax and Trypho were prepared to regard these forms as merely filling up a gap in the speech (κέχηνός, De Conj. 515), while the Stoics were in favour of their being included in the conjunctive class on the grounds of their significances. By the use of formal arguments (e.g. interchange with other forms, the distributional properties of enclitics) and of contextual considerations (e.g. the increase of ἐκπλήξις through the particle in καλῶς γε, the force acquired in propositions through ἀλλὰ μὴν, the strengthening of the disjunctive idea through ἢ τοί), -(De Adv. 517ff.), Apollonius seeks to establish first of all that these forms have a claim to recognition as a part of speech in their own right, rather than merely as an unjustified incursion of phonetic syllables. He is of the opinion that the cause of uncertainty about their classification as parts of speech is that several forms can stand together with the same force retained.¹⁰¹ He concludes that any detailed classification based upon their connotations is impossible

due to the variety of these latter. Yet it is clear at this stage that Dyscolus is all too vague on the question of "joining syntactically other parts of speech." According to our traditional Greek grammar, it is necessary to distinguish between (a) the true conjunction, (b) the indispensable connective, and (c) the grammatically empty connective which may indeed have a perfectly valid psychological connotation (as e.g. $\delta\eta$, $\alpha\rho\alpha$), but does nothing more in fact than join otherwise unconnected sentences, and indeed can often be dispensed with altogether. In such a case as this, one is prepared to accept the verdict of Forbes¹⁰² that 'the Alexandrians excelled more in the classification of forms than in the analysis of function by which alone syntactical relations can be fully explained.' At the same time, however, one feels that much credit has been withheld from Dyscolus by writers whose ignorance of his detailed writings is the mainspring of their criticism.

An example of Dyscolus possibly being influenced by the Greek liking for macro-micro-cosmic opposition may testify to contextual criteria being accorded priority over others. In the opening of De Conj. (482), the author discusses disjunctive ($\delta\iota\alpha\zeta\epsilon\upsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\eta$) forms. Dyscolus here observes that, just as it is not possible to add the article to every declinable form, so it is not possible to attach any conjunction to any sentence, the sense ($\tau\acute{o}$ $\delta\eta\lambda\acute{o}\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$) determining the exact types of conjunction permitted, i.e. what is acceptable and what is not. The topic of disjunctive conjunctions

provides an example of how Dyscolus could use syntactical and contextual criteria in very close combination. He feels that this particular group were rightly included under the conjunctive group, since they do syntactically connect sentences, the term διαζευκτικῆ being acquired from the manner in which this is achieved. He interprets the connotation of these forms as being that only one of a series of alternatives is possible in reality. Statements which are naturally disjunctive are said to be termed τὰ μαχόμενα by the Stoics, i.e. those which cannot both be in existence at the same time, as opposed to τὰ ἀντικείμενα which are opposed by the introduction of a negative (οὐ, cf. φθέγγομαι). These disjunctive forms are to be carefully distinguished from what he terms subdisjunctive forms (παρδιαζευκτικῆ) (De Conj. 485), in that whereas the former signify that one or other but only one can be factual, the latter denote that one or the other or both are possible (cf. pure copulative forms which automatically establish the possibility of all forms joined in this way). To Dyscolus, the actual fact of συνδέεσθαι is all important; provided that this is achieved, the order of the connectives rests merely upon their individual connotations (487).

The interweaving of syntactical and contextual considerations may also be seen in connection with the form and origin of διότι and καθότι. He believes (De Conj. 508) that, in compounds, διά

and κατά never possess a causal sense (cf. διατρέχω, κατέρχομαι), but this is only true when they are attached by parathesis before an accusative as in διὰ Τρυφῶνα. He therefore infers that the ὅτι in διότι is not a conjunction but rather a declinable form in the accusative denoting causality (the nominative here being excluded since prepositions were not attached to this case by parathesis, and secondly since causal δια never governs any case except the accusative).

The discussion of what he terms 'possessive pronominal forms' at Synt. 11,103 provides an additional illustration of the combination of syntactical and contextual arguments. He observes that in statements containing a possessive form, the subject is either (1) a person or thing which is possessed; (2) a person who is the possessor, or (3) neither the possessor nor the possessed (he instances these three possibilities as follows: ὁ ἕμος ἵππος τρέχει, τὸν ἐμὸν ἄγρον ἔσκαψα, τὸν ἐμὸν υἱὸν ἐδίδαξεν. Where the subject of the sentence is the person or thing which is possessed, the possessive pronouns can only be changed into the genitive of the simple, non-reflexive pronoun. However, he lists εἶναι as creating an exception (ἐμαντοῦ εἶμι οἰκέτης) arguing that it may be colligated with a possessive pronoun and noun in such a way that the subject may be both the possessor and the person possessed. Contextually speaking, the author suggests (Synt. 11, 138) that while compound reflexive pronouns can be declined in any oblique case, the reason for there being no nominative for these forms is that the Greeks denoted the source of

activity by the nominative case, the object of activity by the accusative (except, as he points out, with passive forms). Turning then to more syntactical matters, he adds that in ἔμμαντον ἔπαισα the subject is denoted through the verb and there cannot be two nominatives (i.e. subjects) in any sentence containing one verb. Since the verb does not denote case, the object of activity must be denoted by the oblique cases of the pronoun, the reflexive form being used to denote that the agent and the recipient are one and the same person. Since the oblique cases of the simple pronoun denote a passage of action not to be found with the reflexive form, and since such a connotation cannot be derived from the nominative case, it follows that the nominative of reflexive forms was never formed.

The discussion of ἵνα and ὅρα in the book on the Conjunction (480) provides an example of syntax being used to clarify contextual ambiguities. The author is aware that ἵνα may be employed as a final and also causal conjunction (this latter idea being discussed at greater detail in 3.1.1.). However, he maintains that when it is employed causally, it is colligated with past tenses of the verb, whereas when used in a final sense, it is colligated even with future tenses, although he does make the additional morphological point that e.g. in δὲ ἵνα (ut) γράψω, we are dealing with the aorist subjunctive and not the future indicative as can be proved from verbs where the two forms are not identical (e.g. λαμβάνειν):

1.3.3. The final section of the first chapter is concerned with the manner in which Apollonius sets contextual arguments against purely morphological considerations. The manner in which Dyscolus does manipulate the various criteria provides examples from which to deduce their relative importance to him. It is a stated principle of his grammatical theory that no number of features held in common by two forms will automatically imply that the two forms are to be allocated to the same part of speech. This is seen in connection with the article and the pronoun (De Pro. 4B) whose common features are listed by the author. These may be summarised as (a) in syntactical terms, the substitution of the article for the pronoun in what he terms both protactic (as at Il. 1. 12) and hypotactic positions (Il. 21, 198); (b) the similarity of breathings in e.g. ἄ, οὐ, οὐ¹⁰³; (c) the lack of the vocative in the article and the comparable lack of this case in first and third person pronouns. He then suggests at De Pro. 7C that ὁ and τοῦ, although their forms agree with those of the article, must nevertheless be regarded as pronouns when they are used with pronominal connotations, an example of contextual considerations outweighing those of morphology. Further evidence of this kind is not hard to find. On the basis of pronominal deixis, he ejects τίς from the pronominal class (De Pro. 33A), although he fails to make a clear distinction between the two forms of this word. He then rejects all morphological arguments to the contrary in affirming that, since τίς whether used interrogatively

or otherwise is always indefinite, it is incompatible with the deixis concept of the pronoun and must therefore be allocated to the substantival group.¹⁰⁴

As has been mentioned above, Dyscolus believes that the article, when used with pronominal connotations, must be regarded as a pronoun (e.g. ἐφῆ δ' ὅς), disregarding any contrary claims of morphology. Turning then to the verb, he notes in Synt. 111, 29 that any claims of morphology must also be waved aside when he not only accepts γράφων ἠνιώμην as containing an imperfect participle, but further believes that the form γράφειν must be regarded as the imperfect infinitive in such sequences as ἐχθὲς γράφειν Ἀπολλώνιον συνέβη. A further example, this time from De Adv. 597, occurs where Dyscolus suggests that the -θεν ending in adverbs, e.g. Λέσβοθεν, normally indicates source of motion. However, he is still prepared to accept the over-riding force of contextual arguments, and agree that there are forms in -θεν which retain the basic significance of the original root word (as with ἐμέθεν, which he regards as derived from Doric ἐμεῦ rather than Attic ἐμοῦ). Hence, he concludes that such forms are to be allocated to the same part of speech as the original case form, backing his theory that identity of form does not automatically lead to identity of word class.

Two examples are found in close proximity in the first book of the Syntax to illustrate the combination of formal and contextual

arguments. Since he regards the article as possessing the anaphoric quality (Synt. 1, 43), he can see no possibility (1, 71) of its being colligated with a word such as ἀμφοτέρω, the very nature of which, in Dyscolus' opinion, requires prior mention in its own merit.

The second instance is one of great importance in early Greek grammatical thought, namely the categorisation of the particle ᾧ (1, 73ff.). Trypho and other early writers had apparently acceded to the then generally held view that this particle was in fact the vocative of the true article, their arguments being drawn from its form and from its function which was regarded by them as that of differentiating between nominative and vocative in ambiguous examples as at Od. 3, 375. As has been mentioned above under morphology (1.1.2.), Dyscolus argues to the contrary, regarding these alleged similarities as inconclusive, and he stresses rather that this particle does not adhere to the underlying concept of the article nor does it denote the special quality of the article (ἀναποληΐς), this latter argument being considered by Dyscolus to be of the greatest importance. Other points mentioned here are that this particle is attached exclusively to the second person, being a vocative form, while the article retains its allegiance with the third person, and Dyscolus also adds (1, 83) that, whereas the vocative form in nouns never has a longer final syllable than its nominative form, this principle is invalid if ᾧ is to be regarded as the vocative of the definite article.

1.4.0. While it is clear that Dyscolus finds considerable scope in combining the forces of contextual arguments with those of formal ones to add weight to a theory where necessary, it cannot be overlooked that where the two classes pull, as it were, in different directions, he inclines towards favouring the contextual appeal, suggesting that there is still a need for the re-assessment of the place of such criteria in the field of grammatical categorisation. As he himself states, (Synt. II. 49), the final appeal must be made to the force of reason (ἡ δύνάμις τοῦ λόγου) even when all syntactical considerations are beyond doubt. On the other hand, one must still bear in mind the occasional illustration where a contrary view is upheld, as e.g. at Synt. III, 134, where Dyscolus states that in a clause such as ἔγραψα ἄν in which the indicative verb loses its quality of ὄρισμος, it must nevertheless be still accepted as being indicative on the grounds of its being formally so.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, one notes, in accordance with the view of Robins¹⁰⁶, that where formal criteria imply a divergent categorisation, he inclines to favouring syntactical arguments rather than those of morphology.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

- 1 See further discussion in Hjelmslev (1947: 69-78) and Robins (1965: 48) "Reference to ... phonological shapes in grammar is perfectly compatible with the prime consideration being given to the interrelations within the level in determining the status of analytic elements". For a summary of the Transformationalist view of the relationship of phonology with grammar, see N. Chomsky (1965b: 114ff.), and for a criticism of Dyscolus' unjustified confusion of levels in this respect, see below 4.4.0.
- 2 Referring to the lack of treatment of syntax.
- 3 (1951: 42; see also 1957: 102).
- 4 R. Gamberer (1965: 168) suggests that the only modern critical exegetical work (i.e. A. Thierfelder (1935)) produces a very unfavourable picture of the method and competence of Dyscolus. For a detailed list of works dealing with Apollonius, see below Bibliography 1.
- 5 Cf. Priscian XIV, 1, 1; XV, 3, 13; XVI, 1, 1. For an assessment of the importance of Dyscolus' work for Priscian, see A. Luscher, *De Priscianis Studiis Graecis*, in *Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen* Hft. 44, 1887; cf. also Lersch (1838, pt. 2: 111ff.); Hjelmslev (1935: 5) for similar tributes to the importance of Dyscolus' work; Bernhardt, *Wissenschaftliche Syntax der Griechischen*

- sprache. Berlin. 1829: 37 - 'none before Apollonius had tried to give a scientific basis to Greek syntax.' For a similar view on the original thinking of Dyscolus, see G. Frohne (1844:1ff.)
- 6 On the pre-Alexandrian school, see further Lersch (1838: pt. 1: 55-68), and H. Steinthal (1863: 351ff.) who would not apply the term 'grammarians' to any writer earlier than the Alexandrian school. For a detailed list of these minor 'grammarians', see Egger (1854: 11).
- 7 Jespersen (1922: 20ff.) - "The object of research (at Alexandria) being the interpretation of the old poets". A more acceptable view is that of Robins (e.g. 1951: 38) to the effect that there was a careful study at the Alexandrian school for comparison with the language of Homer with a view to grammatical analysis.
- 8 De Pro. 83B; Synt. II, 49; De Conj. 517.
- 9 Egger (1854: 46).
- 10 Robins (1952: 290). cf. also (1951: 93) - "The terms and categories to be employed can only be decided and justified on an ad hoc basis by reference to the particular language in question." Cf. also (1966: 3).
- 11 Cf. *venturos esse*, but note Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, 1.7, where it is suggested that originally the *-urum* termination was invariable.
- 12 He suggests, for example, $\tilde{\iota}\mu\iota$ rather than $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\mu\iota$, after $\tilde{\iota}\mu\epsilon\nu$; see *Excerpta Gramm. ap Cramer, Anec. Oxon. IV, 346-356.*

- 13 See further F. H. Colson, *Class. Quarterly*, 1919, vol. 13: 24-36.
- 14 For a brief discussion of references to dialect forms, see
G. Frohne (1844: 11-13).
- 15 For a complete list, v. sub Apollonios Dyskolos, *Pauly Real-
Encyclopädie der Altertumswissenschaft*, Stuttgart, 1896, vol. 2:
136. For a more detailed analysis, see Egger (1854: 12ff.).
- 16 Camerer (1965: 168) describes her study as being concerned with
a writer whose work is extremely difficult and on whom but
little work has been done. She suggests that the authentic
ordering of his works still lies in profound darkness, as does
a substantial part of his terminology. An attempt to rectify
the existing order of the Syntax was made in 1852 by L. Lange
(see Bibliog. 1).
- 17 (1961: 244ff.).
- 18 Such an interpretation is felt to be valid in view of remarks
in his works, (1951: 43); (1965: 190, 213, etc.).
- 19 (1962: passim).
- 20 (1935: 184).
- 21 See further Robins (1965: 41, 2), but compare Hornum's review of
this in *JL* 3, No. 1. 1967: 170.
- 22 (1961: conclusions, p. 227ff.).
- 23 See further Ogden, Richards and Malinowski, 'The Meaning of
Meaning', 8th Edition, London, 1946: 296-337. Contrast
J. R. Firth, (*Modes of Meaning, Essays and Studies*, 1951: 118) -
"The main concern of descriptive linguistics is to make state-
ments of meaning."

- 24 Cf. Firth (1957: 223); Robins (1965: 183) and (1951: 43) in which latter passage he condemns Apollonius for his use of logical criteria . (NB. Hoenigswald's review of this work in *Language*, 1957, vol. 29: 180-182). Cf. also Robins (1951: 92) - "Any conception of language as "expressing ideas" is quite inadequate and misleading as the basis of grammar or any other part of linguistic analysis." A similar view is expressed by F. R. Palmer in 'Linguistic Hierarchy', *Lingua*, vol. 7, 1957, esp. 236.
- 25 (1960: 33~~4~~ etc.).
- 26 Greek Through Linguistics, *Class. Review*, June 1963, vol. XIII, fasc. 2: 182.
- 27 Cf. Aristotle, *de Int.* Chap. 1, where the author likens the relation of sounds to emotions with that of signs to sounds, adding that there is a conventional relationship between feeling and speech.
- 28 See below 1.2.2.
- 29 (1951: 42, fn. 1) cf. Hockett, C.F., *Language*, 1961: 45ff.
- 30 Apart from the unwarranted confusion of the phonological and grammatical in Dyscolus' theorising, this suggestion that every unit has an individual structure of its own has an interesting parallel in modern theory, see below 4.4.0.

- 31 e.g. Robins (1959, *passim*). In *Dyscolus*, the solecism is primarily the product of formal rather than contextual inaccuracy, (so *Synt.* III, 10 where he states that solecisms arise through errors 'έν τῇ συντάξει τῶν λέξεων').
- 32 This forms an interesting appeal not only to syntax but rather to the speaker's Sprachgefühl (of. μή put for οὐ in *Thuc.* I, 118: ὄντες καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μή ταχεῖς ἵεναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους. One accepts that μή is used here merely because it feels better within the τοῦ ... ἵεναι context, or as *Dyscolus* would say 'φυσικώτερον'). For a criticism of the appeal to Sprachgefühl, see Robins (1965: 8/9). The Neuter Plural with the Singular Verb structure was explained by J. Schmidt (*Die Pluralbildungen der Indo-Germanischen Neutra*, 1889) as being a borrowing of the feminine singular collectives into the neuter plural. Since, however, Hittite possesses no feminine, Sturtevant prefers to say 'neuter singular collectives' (*Comp. Grammar of the Hittite Language*, 2nd Edition, 1951, pp. 53, 81, 91ff.).
- 33 See Robins (1952: 289ff.).
- 34 Bekker (1816: 841, 2).
- 35 Robins (1965: 234) suggests that the mistaken idea in antiquity that all sentences must contain a verb arose through a confusion of the favourite sentence type with the supposedly only admissible sentence type. See further on the noun and verb, 4.2.2. below.

36 (1935: 171).

37 μεταγενετέραν cf. Robins (1966: 5) - "It is clear from the form in which ancient writers put their statements that they saw the history of grammar as involving a word class system that was progressively expanded through the creation of new classes from the subdivision of classes previously recognised in earlier systems."

38 He is keen to stress for example (Synt. 1, 135) that, in ὁ λόγιος ἄνθρωπος, it is the adjective that refers to the noun and not vice versa.

39 P. B. R. Forbes, Oxford Classical Dictionary, v. sub. Apollonius.
40 (1910, pt. 3: 131) - "The postpositive form whose syntax does not require the same (structure) as that of the prepositive form" (here quoting Synt. I, 80).

41 An interesting, though distant, parallel to this may be found in the account of the Proceedings of the 8th International Congress of Linguists held at Oslo in 1957. On page 251 of this report, Ivanov quotes Gonda as having formal evidence for finding a conjunctive force in forms such as *_ko (this form being here regarded as the form which underlies the relative in IE). This is however a view not supported by writers such as N. E. Collinge. Cf. Adelaide Hahn (1964: 111-130).

42 See below 3.4.3.

43 See below 3.2.1. and 3.4.3.

- 44 Egger (1854: 182ff.) is not impressed with the manner in which Dyscolus handles the preposition, condemning his tendency to go into detailed arguments without summing up his own views clearly and suggesting that there is too much preoccupation with superficial distinctions rather than going to the root of matters.
- 45 See below 3.4.3. regarding his confusion of syntax and word formation in this connection.
- 46 Cf. Lyons (1966b:232) regarding the theory that all nouns are derivable from verbs.
- 47 Lersch (1838; pt. 2: 130) quotes a footnote from Priscian XI, p. 833: Apollonius summus auctor artis grammaticae, docens in primo libro de verbo, immobilem figurationis iuncturam manere, et separatim confirmans componi, τὸ καταγράφω· κατέγραφον, ἐπιγράφω· ἐπέγραφον, et his similia quaecunque intus habent declinationem, hoc est, post praepositionem.
- 48 His proof for this theory is discussed below at 1.3.1.
- 49 See below 3.4.3.
- 50 Eine Laut- und Formenlehre der Herodotischen Sprachform. Heidelberg, 1962: 161.
- 51 *ibid*: 186, fn. 97.
- 52 Although this is not to say that he is generally unaware of the difference between syntactical and lexical levels.
- 53 *Class. Review* (1933), vol. 47: 112.

- 54 (1951: 43).
- 55 Cf. Bekker (1816: 952): Priscian XVI. 1.
- 56 See further discussion below 2.3.1.
- 57 He is aware in syntactical terms that the essential difference between pronouns in -θεν and adverbs with the same termination is that the former can be used with any preposition governing the genitive case while the latter cannot, e.g. ἐξ ἔμεθεν cf. *ἀπὸ Λέσβοθεν (See below 1.3.3. for discussion of pronominal forms such as ἔμεθεν and their connotations).
- 58 On the origin of this form and its place in Mycenaean Linguistics see G. P. Shipp, Mycenaean and Homeric Greek, University of Melbourne, 1961, reviewed by A. J. Beattie in Class. Review, 1963, 179ff., with especial reference to the numerical connotation of this ending. Dyscolus regards it as only a singular form. Note Shipp's suggestion that in Mycenaean it is nearly always instrumental or locative, while in Homer, it is instrumental or locative with a preposition.
- 59 Cf. Lersch (1838, pt. 2: 112ff.) regarding Dyscolus' treatment of the eight parts of speech set up by Aristarchus.
- 60 Synt. II, 10; cf. I, 43.
- 61 But it must be accepted that anaphora, at least in its strictest sense, does not depend upon such an immediate reference.
- 62 Making a pointless note that the genitive and dative cases require the article always since, in the example of indeclinable

nouns, it would be impossible otherwise to determine accurately their case. (Synt. I, 49).

- 63 See further footnote 78 regarding this idea of cataphoric usage.
- 64 See further below 4.5.0. for a discussion of the system of the listing of groups of forms in the writings of e.g. F. W. Householder.
- 65 The fact that one does not say τίς ἄλλων but rather τίς τῶν ἄλλων is regarded by Dyscolus as further evidence for rejecting the view that ἄλλος is a pronoun.
- 66 Note here how he regards the vocative case as being connected with only the second person. Cf. discussion below (1.2.2.) arising from Synt. III, 42, regarding ἐκεῖνος, αὐτός, οὗτος.
- 67 Cf. bipersonal forms with two separated and distinctive personal categories involved in Swahili (nilimwona - I saw him) etc. See also examples quoted in H. P. Houghton, An Introduction to the Basque Language, Leyden, 1961.
- 68 Note how this idea suggests a kind of panmorphology, i.e. deliberate non-integration.
- 69 See below 1.2.2., and especially footnote 93 regarding third person pronominal forms.
- 70 ἡ χρησιμότης τοῦ βίου. Respect for the language of familiar conversation has lead C. C. Fries to use this as material for a new kind of grammar. See his Structure of English, Univ. of Michigan. Note also the remarks of J. R. Firth in the Proceedings of the William Jones Bicentenary Conference, London, 1946: 30ff. Cf. below 2.1.0.

- 71 He will, of course, accept the colligation of the postpositive article with a pronoun. Cf. below, 3.3.1.
- 72 Discussion of the colligation of ἄν with the future indicative may be found in the *Class. Quarterly* (1946: 1ff.) where A. C. Moorhouse concludes (p. 10) that on the whole this syntax is to be regarded as a colloquialism as far as post-Homeric writing is concerned. On the other hand, McCleod (*CQ*, 1956, 111) adds weight to the idea that it is an Attic usage, drawing this conclusion from his observations upon Lucian and the *Solecist*. Hulton (*CQ*, 1957: 139) suggests that we should regard it as parallel to the use of ἄν with the imperfect and aorist indicatives. It is regrettable that none of the above writers even makes reference to Dyscolus' theory.
- 73 Cf. his suggestions at *Synt. III*. 138 (mentioned below at 1.2.2.) that the force of final ἴνα, εἰάν (i.e. uncertainty about the future) prevents their ever being colligated with past tenses. This view is, of course, untrue for ἴνα (cf. Goodwin, 1889, paras. 316, 333).
- 74 The whole question of Dyscolus' treatment^{of ἄν} and especially the point of potential conjunctions is treated at length by Camerer (1965).
- 75 He backs up his arguments morphologically to obviate possible doubts where sigmatic aorist forms and futures might be confused.
- 76 *Grammatici Graeci*, pt. 2: 389. Cf. also J. Gonda, *The Aspectual function of the Rig Vedic Present and Aorist*. 1962. Mouton. The Hague.

- 77 This is probably untrue, however. See further N. E. Collinge, *Archivum Linguisticum*, 1960: 95ff. For a detailed study of the system of tenses and aspects in Greek, see further M. S. Ruipérez, *Estructura del sistema de aspectos y tiempos del verbo griego antiguo*. (Salamanca, 1954). The author here tries to find an overall correspondence between morphological and semantic categories.
- 78 The term 'cataphoric' is here used in the sense developed by M. A. K. Halliday in 'The Linguistic Study of Literary Texts', *Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists*, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 302-7, esp. 304.
- 79 Arguments in favour of situational criteria may be evidenced in nineteenth century writings such as Ph. Wegener, *Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens*, Halle, 1885, pp. 21ff.
- 80 Stated more fully below at 3.0.
- 81 (1951: 48) - "We should not interject any fancy philosophical or psychological notions of mind or soul into the dry and objective statements of one whose style may have won him this cognomen of Dyscolus precisely because it was so free from extraneous augmentation of any such metaphorical and metaphysical trappings."
- 82 Cf. Uhlig (1910: 96): "δέσθετικόν vocabulum usurpat Apollonius non solum de statu activo, passivo, medio qui verborum generibus significantur, et (cum ψυχικῆ coniunctum) de affectionibus

loquentium quae modis verbi declarantur, sed etiam de temporibus verbo denotatis." See below 2.4.3. and, in general, A.E.Hahn (1951).

83 See below 3.4.3.

84 (1951: 43).

85 On this see further Lersch (1838, pt. 2: 129/9) and cf. Aristotle, Int. 1.

86 Cf. Aristotle, Int. 4: "A statement is that about which we can meaningfully ask is it true or false."

87 Cf. the belief of many current writers that the subjunctive is of late origin and, indeed, uncertain in IE. Gonda (The Character of the IE moods, Wiesbaden, 1956, e.g. pp. 103ff.) goes so far as to state that the meaning of modal classes, especially the subjunctive in subordinate clauses, is to be assigned to sentence items other than the verb mood.

88 In Synt. III, 19, he states that, due to their special connotations, ὄψε can never be colligated with the optative nor εἴθε with the imperative, etc.

89 See further Adelaide Hahn (1951: 31).

90 See below 3.1.1. regarding his incorrect treatment of at Synt. III, 131 in this respect.

91 Cf. Lyons (1963: 85) - "Both speaker and hearer are in the context."

92 Dyscolus suggests at Synt. III, 64 that it is the idea of 'personal presence' found in the vocative case that caused writers on letter headings and inscriptions to avoid e.g.

Διονύσιε χαίρε in favour of the more unlimited Διονυσίῳ χαίρειν, with which Dyscolus would understand some verb of 'bidding', which in his opinion denotes the sense of commanding, the particular connotation of the imperative.

- 93 A detailed examination of individual pronouns is given in Beiträge zur Lehre von Griechischen Pronomen aus Apollonius Dyskolus, Gustav Dronke, Rhein. Museum, 1893, Vol. IX: 107-118. In a recent doctoral thesis for the University of Princeton, 1964, J. H. Maguire (Studies in Greek Personal and Demonstrative Pronouns) suggests that differences between pronouns are more in the nature of emphasis and vividness than in the degree of demonstrativity denoted. De Pro. 72B states that ὄδε and οὗτος indicate close proximity to the speaker, whereas ἐκεῖνος supposes 'distance away' (ἀπόστημα). Maguire believes that ὄδε shows the more vivid form of reference, looking at things from the point of view of the speaker, while ἐκεῖνος refers to items of interest in a reference area other than that whose centre is the speaker, and οὗτος contrasts with the other two in that it is essentially more objective, cf. Synt. III, 42; De Pro. 25B, 65A.
- 94 Cf. Robins (1951: 59). It is difficult to see how, in view of Apollonius' writings in Synt. I, 73ff., de Pro. 5B, 16B, etc., the above author can write with regard to ὦ: "Such words had hitherto been treated with the adverbs except for the Greek ὦ which was regarded by the Alexandrians as the vocative of the definite article, ὁ, ἡ, τὸ." On Remmius Palaemon, see further

Charisius, *Ars Grammatica*, 2. 212.

- 95 See further 1.3.3. below and cf. C. E. Bazell (1962: 134) where the point is made that such English phrases as 'tomorrow', 'next year', etc. do not occur with past tenses in English, and yet this phenomenon did not become (at least until recently) regarded as an affair of grammar. Gonda (see above fn. 87) would presumably express the opinion that, in ἐχθέρ + participle or infinitive, the whole idea of 'past' (i.e. the imperfect form) is carried by ἐχθέρ while the verb-form merely co-occurs.
- 96 Robins (1951: 94) affirms that the two classes of formal criteria cannot be considered separately, for morphological classes are only relevant to grammar as having particular syntactic functions. Cf. Hockett (1958: 177) - "The morphology-syntax boundary is not always as clear as one would like to think."
- 97 See Robins (1951: 43, fn. 5); cf. de Adv. 544.
- 98 Cf. Halliday (1961: 261ff.) who suggests that, according to the direction of observation, the syntax of a unit of one rank is the morphology of a structure of another rank and vice versa.
- 99 This form is discussed, with a judgement being pronounced against its adverbial origin, by A. J. Beattie, *The Origin of Greek Δεῦρο*, *TPS*, 1949: 1-21.
- 100 One may observe here an example of 'phoric' usage where Dyscolus notes that the article is required with the partitive

genitive construction as in τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶν Ἕλληνες, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι which he compares with a non-partitive genitive as in ἀνθρώπων ἀκούω. The author again suggests that in the former the underlying idea is to denote the complete whole which is subdivided.

- 101 Cf. Pike "It is merely contrastive meaning that a morpheme lacks in a position of redundancy; it still retains its identificational meaning." (K. L. Pike, Language in relation to a unified theory of the structure of human behaviour. 1954, pt. 1: 99.
- 102 Class. Review, 1933, vol. 47: 112.
- 103 Quoted as an additional argument for rejecting ὦ as part of the article.
- 104 In the opening of De Adverbio, he compares the adverb coupled with the noun with the article prefixed to a verb form and without an additional noun. He observes that the hypotactic article, when lacking a preceding noun, then becomes indefinite as in ὃς μεθύει βλάπτεται since he maintains that it is contextually equivalent to εἴ τις μεθύει βλάπτεται. This view is repeated at Synt. IV, 6 to the effect that if the postpositive article is added to the indefinite τις, the article itself becomes indefinite, which sense is completely contrary to the view expressed on the article in Synt. I, 43.

- 105 Cf. Halliday (1961: 245) - "It follows that, in description, formal criteria are crucial, taking precedence over contextual criteria." Cf. J. R. Firth (Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, Phil. Soc. Public., Oxford, 1953: 15), "References to non-verbal constituents of situations are admissible in corroboration of formal linguistic characteristics, stated as criteria for setting up word classes." Contrast, however, De Pro. 85A: "οὐ φωναῖς μεμέριται τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, σημαίνοντο δέ."
- 106 See below chap. IV, fn. 33.

PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED AND
CATEGORIES ESTABLISHED BY DYSCOLUS

2.0. It is in no way intended in this chapter even to attempt to assess the importance of Dyscolus' theories in the development of the grammatical tradition of the Western World, nor can this essay claim to be a truly comprehensive statement of all that he wished to set up in terms of classes, etc. on the basis of the criteria discussed above. For on both of these accounts, we are at once impeded by the small quantity of his writings that are still extant.¹ The most that can be safely undertaken is a discussion of the several categories that he does establish in the seven books still available to us, noting where relevant, any significant advance made by Dyscolus upon earlier writers, together with some account of the general principles of analysis that he avowedly seeks to follow in the course of his writings.²

While it is a comparatively simple matter to place Dyscolus in the long line of major grammatical theorists, and at the same time, to trace in his works much of what is also found in the writings of others, it may well be, as Egger suggests,³ that in reality he had barely any knowledge of his greatest predecessors' works. It is significant that, although living at Alexandria, probably in the time of Antoninus, he never quotes Latin examples or principles, nor indeed does he make reference to such well known authorities as Dionysius Thrax⁴ and Aristotle, the majority of his references being to such ill-known writers as Habro and Trypho, together with occasional references to the Stoic School.⁵

2.1.0. His liking for the analogist line of thought has been mentioned elsewhere⁶ and it is this approach that is utilised by Dyscolus in solving (at least, for his own way of thinking) such uncertainties and queries as occur for example at Syn. 111, 36, where he states that since $\text{coi} \ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\iota \ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}$ is composed from three words all in the dative case, it follows by analogy that the same is true of $\text{c}\acute{\upsilon} \ \acute{\omega}\nu \ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, his argument being here to support the recognition of $\text{c}\acute{\upsilon}$ as a possible nominative form rather than purely vocative form, as suggested by writers of other works in Dyscolus' day. At De Pro. 63A, in reply to the query regarding the reason for there being no full declension of $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\gamma\epsilon$ (i.e. why the accusative and genitive forms are wanting), he states that dialects are not usually arranged according to the laws of analogy, least of all Attic ($\acute{\epsilon}\xi\omega\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\varsigma\tau\alpha\iota$). At Syntax 1, 60, he condemns the thoughtlessness of those who accept the forms of words as valid merely because they are in regular usage, and who are at the same time totally prepared to ignore the forces of tradition and analogy ($\text{παράδοσις, ἀναλογία}$). Just as tradition is invaluable in correcting faulty readings in the texts of old poets, in emending everyday speech, and in forming an opinion about the usages of nouns in antiquity, so Dyscolus feels that his present enquiry into syntax will correct the various faults that one comes across in speech. It is in this sense that we may consider Dyscolus to have a tendency towards becoming a prescriptive grammarian, feeling his duty to lie in the field of speech pathology.⁷ This tendency

towards prescriptivism is, however, sometimes carried perhaps a little too far - he ~~seems~~ ^{aims at} radical, clear cut decisions⁸ whereas a closer examination might well have led to a somewhat modified conclusion, as for example where he allocates ἐξελθὺς and οὐρανός to the pronominal class without hesitation on the grounds of their denoting a known person (De Pro. 10B, 77B) yet fails to treat the postpositive article accordingly, presumably since he wavers between what he considers to be its pronominal and conjunctive forces.⁹

He may also be said to follow a set of principles of constituent grammar based upon an analysis of distribution. At De Pro. 114B, he suggests that sparsity of usage is a valid argument against general acceptance of a form, dealing here in particular with the dual forms νῶε and φῶε¹⁰ for he regards the sources where these forms do occur as unworthy of serious consideration. Similarly, he writes at Synt., 14, 156, that the majority rule will prove the incorrectness of the 'few' forms, both through comparison of the varying forms, and also when from general observation (ἰστορία), one condemns the ἄλλα λεγόμενα found in individual authors. On the other hand, he implies at De Pro. 27A that the mere fact that forms are not in current usage is by no means to be regarded as proof of the inability of these forms to exist.¹¹ He is therefore prepared to accept a vocative form such as *φέτερε, or *Ἀριστάρχετε, despite the non-existence of these forms in the usage of his day, a fact of which he is well aware (see Synt. 111, 44). The effect of everyday speech is noted in De Adv. 535 where Dyscolus observes

that adverbs (and also 'adjectives' - ἐπιθετικά) should regularly occupy a protactic position in their clause, and he suggests that their frequent postponement to hypotactic positions is in fact 'hyperbaton', this rule being proved by general usage - ἐκ τῆς πολλῆς χρήσεως.¹² Furthermore, at De Adv. 616, he notes a definite trend in everyday speech towards the muddling (διασυγχυνοῦσης) of the particular connotations of local adverbial forms capable of answering to 'ubi', 'quo' and 'unde' (e.g. πρόθεν). Yet he is nevertheless prepared to quote examples, presumably from the everyday speech of his time, to support arguments elsewhere, as at De Pro. 15A 'τὸν ἐμέ', De Pro. 25A 'ὦ οὗτος'. It is to be admitted, however, that the appeal to written language is far less common; there is the statement at De Conj. 508 that Trypho's theory that μὲν γάρ coalesced into one written form can never be accepted since they are never found written in that way (παρειλημμένος), and again at De Pro. 39A, he states that written evidence opposes (τὰ τῆς γραφῆς ἀντέκειτο) the formation of ἡμεδάπος from ἡμεῖς + δάπεδον or ἔδαφος.

2.1.1. In fulfilling his tendency towards prescriptivism, Dyscolus does endeavour to establish more or less water-tight compartments especially with regard to formal categorisation, as for example, the various parts of speech. Although the grounds for categorisation

differ in certain details, Apollonius preserves the eight parts of speech, stated by Aristarchus and defined in greater detail by Dionysius Thrax¹³, viz. Noun (ὄνομα), Verb (ῥῆμα), Participle (μετόχη), Article (ἄρθρον), Pronoun (ἀντωνυμία), Preposition (πρόθεσις), Adverb (ἐπίρρημα) and Conjunction (σύνδεσμος). (These are here arranged in the hierarchichal order set up by Dyscolus in Synt. 1, 13ff.).¹⁴ In De Adv. 530, Apollonius refers to the noun and the verb as being of greater basic importance (θεματικώτερα), the remainder referring in various ways to these two, the noun finally gaining priority of placing as will be shown in greater detail at 4.2.2. Before emphasising that no one part of speech was ever formulated solely to clarify any ambiguities that may arise in another, as e.g. the addition of the article to clarify uncertainties of gender in the noun (Synt. 1, 38), he states that another basis for categorisation (1, 36) is that some forms are solely colligated with nouns and verbs (συμπααραλαμβανόμενοι) i.e. the article, preposition, adverb, and conjunction, while the remaining pair (pronoun and participle) may be employed either in the above manner or alternatively in place of nouns and verbs (ἀνθυπαγομένοι). Mention will be made below at 4.4.0. of his theory resembling 'bound/free' forms as a basis for distinguishing the noun, verb, pronoun and adverb from the preposition, article and conjunction, which latter group are unable to be used absolutely.

2.1.2. Since Apollonius is concerned in the extant works with the properties of the various parts of speech and with the discussion of certain parts of speech in greater detail, it is not surprising that one does come across an attempt to establish principles for general application in analysis, by means of which the classification of forms may be the more satisfactorily achieved. With regard to the principle of substitution of one form for another, Dyscolus feels, with certain reservations, that the mere fact of this being possible is not proof that two forms are arbitrarily to be allocated to the same part of speech.¹⁵ For example, at De Conj. 488, he rejects that suggestion that ἦ and οὔ belong to the same part of speech merely because οὔ can be substituted for ἦ after a verb denoting preference. Furthermore, he stresses (De Pro. 6A) that the fact that two parts of speech do possess certain features in common is still no valid reason for inferring that they must necessarily be ascribed to the same category (as e.g. the discussion at Pro. 5B, regarding similar features of articles and pronouns). There is an additional argument at De Adv. 538 to the effect that not even similarity of syntactical colligation implies automatically that two forms must be allocated to the same part of speech, as is evidenced when he rejects χρῆ and δεῖ from the adverbial group despite the similarities which other writers felt to exist in terms of syntax between these forms and adverbs colligated with verbs.

2.1.3. He secondly seeks to establish two principles of analysis which are often found to be mutually contradictory, namely that the classification of a word is to be decided on the one hand from its ending, while on the other hand the basic sense (τὸ δηλούμενον) is to be the determining factor. Support for the first criterion is found in Syntax II, 163, where Dyscolus suggests that this is to be the criterion in deciding the classification of compound forms. At De Pro. 81C, he suggests that if ἐμαυτοῦ is to be accepted as a pronoun, then αὐτὸς must be regarded similarly, since it is from the ending that the classification is to be determined (so also in general terms, De Pro. 36C, Synt. 11, 4). At De Pro. 39A, he ejects ἡμεδαπός from the pronominal class on the grounds of its ending with a substantival termination.¹⁶ On the other hand, we find an apparent contradiction of this at De Pro. 85A where Dyscolus avers that the decision regarding the allocation of forms to parts of speech must be based not on the form but on the underlying connotation of the word (τὸ σημαίνόμενον) as for example, if the 'ἐξ' sense is present in ἐμέθεν as it is in Διόθεν, then ἐμέθεν must be regarded as an adverb, whereas if this sense is absent, ἐμέθεν is to be treated as pronominal with the genitival property in the secondary category of case (an example of conceptual considerations outweighing those of morphology¹⁷). This principle is reiterated at De Pro. 34A where he speaks of the underlying connotation of τὸς making it abundantly obvious that that form is a noun and not a

pronoun (i.e. referring to indefinite rather than clearly defined individuals), and again at De Conj. 482, where the writer states that disjunctive forms, although apparently at variance with the basic idea of con-junction, must nevertheless be regarded as members of the class of conjunctions since they do in fact join sentences, which is the common quality (τὸ κοινόν) of this group.

2.2.0. Section Two of this chapter is concerned with what may loosely be termed the primary, secondary and tertiary categories set up by Dyscolus. The first of these divisions deals with the units of operation within the grammatical framework, and involves details regarding the use made by Dyscolus of general terms such as λόγος and λέξις. The eight parts of speech (secondary categories) will then be outlined in terms of what Dyscolus has to say of them individually (2.3.1), followed by an analysis of the subdivisions of these where appropriate. Finally, in 2.4.0, 'tertiary' categories will be discussed, this term here applying to the phenomena where a system cuts across a structure and operates at a given place within it, as for example, the categories of person and number in the verb.¹⁸ (At Dyscolus' stage in the development of linguistic theory, it is of no use working with a system and a structure at a higher level than the above). In typological terms, a language such as Greek, in which word order plays a

comparatively unimportant part grammatically speaking, generally marks syntactic relationships and sentence formations by the use of morphological categories, that are determined by the laws of government of forms and that are exhibited by words of different classes. With Greek grammarians also stressing overt agreement between inflected forms if one is to avoid solecisms (as discussed in the opening chapters of Book III of the Syntax), one may conveniently look for further classification at a level of greater delicacy¹⁹ under the traditional headings of case, gender, number, person, etc. Again, it is essential to bear in mind the paucity of our evidence regarding the detailed beliefs of Dyscolus. How much more one would be able to deduce if one knew precisely how much of Priscian's writings are an exact reflection of Dyscolus' ideas.

2.2.1. It is significant to observe the close resemblance between Dyscolus' terms and those retained by Priscian.²⁰ The latter retains Dyscolus' theory in accepting, against the general trend of modern thought, that no subdivision into meaningful units below the level of the word is valid, except in the case of compound forms (Prisc. 11, 3, 14, of Synt. III, 61). Since he could conceive of no grammatical unit lower than the word (lower units to Dyscolus were only what we would term 'phonological'; see below 4.4.0.),

Dyscolus clearly has no concept of what we would term 'the morpheme'.²¹ With regard to compound forms, however, he is very conscious of the etymological difference between compound and original forms (παράγωγα as opposed to πρωτότυπα or σύνθετα as opposed to ἀπλά). For example, at De Conj. 480, he announces his intention to improve upon much earlier futile discussion and to distinguish carefully between σύνθετα and ἀπλά. He is also aware of examples of simple derivation, as, e.g. at Synt. 111, 174, he suggests that possessive nouns and pronouns are derived from the genitival case of original forms and hence are capable of denoting possession (as for example Ἐκτόρειος), and he makes a lengthy morphological attempt to derive ἔκητι from ἀεκάζω at De Conj. 499/500, quoting other examples in support of every phonetic change that is required by this piece of etymology.²² On the all important question of deciding between root forms and terminations, Dyscolus begins but fails to complete his analysis, since he most probably did not possess the technical terminology with which to explain the relation of root to affix. He was, however, fully aware that terminations were not merely fortuitous and haphazard, although his detailed writings on this subject are no longer extant.²³

2.2.2. It is unfortunate that Dyscolus does not adhere to any rigid rules regarding the use of terms with which to describe the

various levels of structure, i.e. sentence, clause and word.

One may illustrate the uses first of the term λόγος as follows:

(1) 'sense', as in Synt. 1, 2 where he speaks of the underlying connotation of each word being a part of the overall sense. This usage in Dyscolus' writing is almost compatible with (2) his 'unit' of 'sense' viz. the sentence as when he speaks of ἔγω being placed at the beginning of a sentence (De Pro. 62A). This point is stressed by Camerer²⁴ where she states that the term λόγος is to be interpreted not only as synonymous with simple sentence (einfachen Satz) but also with complete sense (Sinnganzen), Apollonius coupling the adjective αὐτοτελής with λόγος in this connection (1.2). The same writer also compares this with the Stoic terms 'οὐχ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα' and 'συλλογίσμοι'²⁵. (3) A third meaning given to λόγος by Dyscolus is that of word in the sense of verbal utterance, as e.g. Synt. 11, 44 'ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους πρός τινας'. (4) He frequently extends this usage to express what we would term "speech" as in 'parts of speech' (τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου) (cf. Synt. 1, 60 where he speaks of faults occurring in speech 'τὰ ἐν λόγῳ διαπερόντα', discussed above 2.1^Q). In addition to a rarer use of λόγος as equivalent to ἔννοια in terms of the fundamental idea of a form, a fifth usage of this word can be evidenced from Synt. III, 156 and 178, where, after quoting one syntactical structure, he states that the same principle (ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος) applies equally to a second structure. Finally, there is the use of λόγος in the sense of Reason, as when at Synt. II, 49

he speaks of the force of reason as being the final criterion.

The main use to which Dyscolus puts the term λέξις is that of his basic unit of analysis, i.e. the word, as in Synt. I.4, where he speaks of two words duplicating the same meaning (λέξεις πλεονάζουσι) as e.g. ἔπω and ἐνέπω (cf. λέξις ῥηματική which is equivalent to τὸ ῥῆμα). At a lower level of analysis, one finds συλλαβαί²⁶ being employed as the unit constituting the word, and finally he reaches his lowest unit, τὸ στοιχεῖον, which he regards as the smallest element of speech, the letter of the alphabet, although this latter element is only relevant in formal grammatical terms. There is an overall objective in the combined efforts of the above levels, namely that in a reasoned order they will produce τὸ κατάλληλον.²⁷ For just as combinations of letters produce syllables when arranged in this due order, so sense units are produced by the correct combination of words. Similarly, he maintains (I,2) that, as the word is produced from the correct colligation of syllables, so complete sense is produced by the ordered cohesion of the connotations of individual words.

2.3.1. In dealing with the eight parts of speech, Dyscolus does not make any distinctive advance upon the theories of earlier writers. One observes at once that the article and the participle are still treated as separate groups, while the adjective and the

interjection remain hidden beneath the substantival and adverbial classes respectively. In general, Dyscolus follows the example of Thrax in defining the parts of speech mainly in terms of formal criteria. Egger²⁸ suggests that Dyscolus' ideas are probably fairly traditional but, before his exposition of them, lacked real precision and force. However, there develops a need, as Dyscolus realises, for the introduction of further criteria, which he is capable of applying simultaneously as was shown above, 1.3.2. and 1.3.3. For he finds it difficult to establish verbal categories without multiple criteria since parts of speech do not belong only to formal grammar.

He is aware that certain features (τὰ παρεπόμενα) apply in the case of several parts of speech²⁹ (e.g. the noun denotes number, gender and case; the participle number, gender, case, tense and voice; the verb number, tense, person etc.)³⁰ and it is these tertiary categories together with his ideas regarding "personal existence" (οὐσία), demonstrativity and anaphora, that form the basis of his theories. He considers that the noun possesses no relative nor demonstrative powers (De Pro. 39B) and that all the cases of the noun (with the exception of the vocative) are to be regarded as belonging to the third person (30A). Accordingly he contrasts the noun and pronoun in that the latter may denote anaphora, the demonstrative relationship (δείξις) and what he terms 'οὐσία', (this being rendered by Egger³¹ as 'la rôle personnel'). He

feels that the concept of verbal activity or receptivity (i.e. active as opposed to passive voice) stems from the 'state' (θέσις) of the noun and it is this opposition of active to passive together with modal distinction (διάθεσις) that he regards as the particular characteristic of the verb (I, 16; De Adv. 537). In this respect Dyscolus echoes the idea of Thrax in regarding the verb as signifying 'an activity or a being acted upon'. In addition to this, he also states that every verb denotes action (πρᾶγμα) together with a person expressed in the nominative case (De Pro. 28B, cf. Synt. 1, 17). The dual relationship of the participle, morphologically with his substantival group and syntactically with the verb, caused Dyscolus no small amount of concern and uncertainty, especially since he realised that the participle belonged to the same basic schema as the verb (Synt. IV, 45), and is capable of denoting both gender and action (De Adv. 532).³² He is nevertheless not unaware (Synt. 111, 26) of its failure to make distinctions of person and 'mood' (ψυχικὴ ἔννοια) which he postulates as being an important function of the verb class. Apart from a few brief remarks such as the value of the participle in obviating the need for a conjunction to join two verb forms, he has little to say regarding this form in the extant works, stating at Synt. 111, 190 that a more detailed discussion will be found in Περὶ μετοχῆς.

On the other hand, his general conception of the pronoun is more readily accessible. His definition is stated at De Pro. 10A

with almost unusual simplicity of terminology: 'The pronoun is a part of speech which refers to definite persons (ὀρίσμενος) and carries case and number distinction, but lacks occasionally gender distinction.' He is not unduly perturbed by the obvious irregularity that is found in the declension of personal pronouns, feeling that these are individual roots (θεματὰ ἴδια) to denote the various persons, numbers and cases. He does however suggest in De Pro. 13A that regular declension (ἀκολουθία), as found with ἐκεῖνος and αὐτός, is coupled with distinction of gender. In contrast to the verb, he observes at 28A that the pronoun possesses the means of making personal distinction emphatically where required (διαστολή). Since he is also of the opinion (1.19) that pronouns were formed for the sake of the syntax of verbs (ἔνεκα τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων συνόδου) i.e. since nouns, according to Dyscolus, were not normally colligated with the first or second person of verbs, it is not surprising that he suggests that pronouns possess the case quality of nouns together with the personal distinction of verbs. The particular characteristics of the noun (including our adjectival group) such as quantity, quality, feeling, and any notion of indefiniteness are all rejected by Dyscolus as compatible with the pronoun, which he stresses always denotes clearly defined persons (Pro. 34A, cf. Synt. 11, 24) with the unfortunate result that he is convinced (De Pro. 32A) that pronouns may only be substituted for proper nouns.³³

Previous definitions of the article had stopped short at purely formal characteristics (so e.g. Dionysius Thrax), Dyscolus breaking new ground with his idea that one of its principal features is that of reference back to a known person or thing.³⁴ Unfortunately, at the same time, Dyscolus persisted in binding together both the hypotactic form (ὄς, ἦ, ὅ) and the protactic form (ὁ, ἡ, τὸ) - two forms which were not effectively separated until the work of Maximus Planudius in the fourteenth century A.D.³⁵ In connection with the repetition of the article, Dyscolus states that where a noun is found at the beginning of a phrase, it is permissible for two articles to be found in the phrase whereas, if the pronoun occupies the prior position, only one article may be used (as e.g. ὁ πατήρ ὁ ἐκείνου, cf. ὁ ἐκείνου πατήρ), proving his awareness that position in a phrase can affect the selection of one rather than another form. He observes at Synt. 1, 39 that while no form was invented solely to clarify another, one form is frequently made more intelligible through its accompanying items.³⁶ He realises that the very names of preposition, adverb and subjunctive (ὑποτακτικῆ) indicate an attempt to achieve a particular well-defined position within a structure, while the theory of enclisis (involving loss or change of accent) stresses for him the selective and formative power of position within the sentence.³⁷

It is impossible to derive much from the extant writings regarding Dyscolus' opinions regarding the preposition since most

of what is available in that connection deals with the manner in which prepositions are attached to other parts of speech (Syntax IV, 1-60), i.e. either by synthesis or apposition (παράθεσις) - he quotes σύννοικος as opposed to κατὰ τὸν κτησιφῶντα. However, he takes care at De Conj. 480 to stress the need to reject the Stoic view that the conjunction and preposition belong to the same class (σύνδεσμος; cf. Diog. Laert. VII, 58). He stresses in this connection the principle that where one form can perform the function of two parts of speech the allocation must be made in accordance with the particular function being performed on each occasion. He quotes the example of ἵνα being used as an adverb and conjunction, as also ὄφρα, whose use as an adverb is noted at Il. 8, 66, and as a final conjunction at Il. 1, 524. Since he believes that the preposition is later in origin than the forms to which it is attached (1. 26), he states at 1. 12 that it is the additional environment (i.e. a subsequent case) that determines the exact significance of the preposition, quoting as examples to prove his point the fact that διὰ Ἀπολλωνίου is equivalent to γινώσκοντος Ἀπολλωνίου, whereas διὰ + accusative suggests that Apollonius is in fact the cause (τὸ αἶτιον³⁸). Regarding the other two indeclinable forms, the adverb and the conjunction, more detailed information is available. We do possess his general definition of the adverb (De Adv. 529) as an indeclinable part of speech that modifies all or certain moods of the verb (λέξις ἄκλιτος κατηγοροῦσα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐγκλίσεων καθόλου ἢ μερικῶς).

Since this notion of reference to a verbal category can include verbs which require to be mentally supplied (De Adv. 531), Dyscolus maintains that the interjection (ἐπιφώνησις) is to be retained within the adverb class.³⁹ He observes a clear morphological parallel between neuter adjectival forms (ἐπιθετικά) and many adverbs, and he therefore suggests that when an adjective no longer modifies (ἐπίκειται De Adv. 530) a noun but rather a verb, then it becomes an adverb and assumes adverbial syntax which entails becoming indeclinable (ἀκλισία). He is careful to point out, however, that the latter fact does not imply that all adverbs can be employed in any context and he notes especially the example of adverbs with strong temporal connotations.⁴⁰

Dyscolus suggests in the opening of the book on the conjunction that other writers had dismissed this part of speech merely as a form which connects the train of thought with no particular significance of its own (480). However, Dyscolus sees in the conjunction the ability to join together syntactically the parts of a sentence.⁴¹ While the conjunction lacks the categories found with the major parts of speech, he nevertheless finds in the various members of this group an inherent force (δύναμις) as a result of which he is able to group them contextually under the six headings which survive in De Conjunctione (viz. Disjunctive, Subdisjunctive, Elective, Dubitative e.g. ἄρα, Causal, and Expletive), out of the nineteen

groups which were recorded by Priscian and are listed by Egger (1854: 209/10).

2.3.2. Turning to subdivisions of certain of the above eight parts of speech, we may begin with the substantival group which is subdivided at Synt. 11, 22 into 'proper' and 'common' nouns (ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσις ἐπενοήθη εἰς ποιότητας κοινὰς ἢ ἰδίαις, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, Πλάτων).⁴² We may conveniently term these divisions as being made on the basis of significance (σημασία). On the one hand, there are 'proper' nouns (τὰ κυρία) of which he writes in De Pro. 134A that they always denote the particular characteristics of one individual. On the other hand, he sets up a group of common nouns (τὰ προσηγορικά) which he subdivides variously,⁴³ the most important group (termed τὰ ἐπιθετικά) being defined in De Pro. 32A as those forms which denote quantity or quality or some mental attitude, (πηλικότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ διάθεσιν ψυχῆς), and which are attached to proper nouns. Lersch⁴⁴ compares the view of Aristarchus that the noun indicates a body or thing expressed in general or special ways with the position of the later Alexandrians who found in the noun not only the essence of the thing indicated but particularly a 'general' or 'special' quality, or a 'general' or 'special' sign which that idea, fundamental to the body, gives to it. At the same time, one may deduce from the writings of Apollonius the division

mentioned above (2.2.1.) and made according to the type of noun (κατ'εἶδος) i.e. into original as opposed to compound forms. In the latter class (παράγωγα) he places patronymics (κατρωνυμικά), possessive nouns (κτητικά e.g. Ἐκτόρεος) and degrees of comparison (συγκριτικά, ὑπερθετικά) as found with forms that we would term adjectives.⁴⁵ He sees a close connection between the proper noun and the pronoun in that both denote well-defined persons (Pro. 32A) while on the other hand, he only retained the adjective within the substantival class, according to Egger,⁴⁶ on account of its semantic affinity with the common noun.

With regard to the verb, he tends to make basically contextual divisions. There can be no doubt that he was aware of the difference in syntax created by such verbs as εἶναι, καλεῖσθαι and ὀνομάζεσθαι,⁴⁷ yet there is no apparent awareness of the formal distinction in general terms between subject (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) and predicate within the sentence. He attempts secondly to establish separate groups for verbs which govern different cases. First, he analyses those verbs which take an accusative case as having a common element, namely that the action passes directly from the subject to the object (a detailed synopsis is provided at 111. 159ff.). There is also the hint of awareness of the difference between transitive and intransitive forms, when he deals with the turning of verbs from active to passive voice, a move which he finds impossible with certain verbs.⁴⁸ His theory simply states the hierarchic nature

of the properties of elements, i.e. 111. 157 suggests that if any verb is not followed by an object in an oblique case, it cannot assume a passive form. The difference between the two groups is therefore felt to be dependent upon the syntactic distinction between those verbs which may construct with a second noun under certain conditions and those which may not do so. The group which govern the genitive case form a special class since they are treated as being mainly verbs of 'sensation' (αἴσθησις), which, in Dyscolus' opinion, is generally a passive concept whereby the subjects themselves are affected. On the basis of this idea, he endeavours to account (111. 172) for the obvious syntactic difference between φιλεῖν and ἔρᾶν, feeling that the latter is more of a verb of passion in which the subject is affected by the object (προδιατίθεσθαι). The dative group he summarises at 111. 177 as those which denote a sense of advantage (περικοίησις) and as such he endeavours to account for the indirect object found in e.g. ἄγω σοι τὸν παῖδα (111. 183), the dative after verbs denoting service (ὑπηρέσια) and those verbs which denote mutual inter-action such as μάχεσθαι and κείθεσθαι, in which the two parties involved play an equally influential and effective role.

In Dyscolus' view, pronouns (excluding possessive forms) may be subdivided first on the basis of their being either demonstrative (δεικτικῆ) or "relative" (ἀναφορικῆ). In his opinion, every pronoun represents a specified person with the result that all indefinite

forms are automatically excluded from the pronominal class. At Synt. 1, 96, he suggests that pronouns do provide a means of distinguishing between undefined persons, and secondly that relative or anaphoric forms can only replace a noun that is colligated with an article, the demonstrative forms being used in contexts where the speaker feels it undesirable to use a noun. Personal pronouns possess a sufficiently clear indication of deixis to be able to distinguish between genders in ambiguous cases without the need of an accompanying article, and he also notes the ability of personal forms to supply emphatic usage (28B). Still on a contextual level, he makes a further distinction (Synt. II, 146; cf. De Pro. 85C) between pronominal forms in so far as simple pronouns (i.e. personal forms) allow for a passage of action between the subject and the object (cf. De Adv. 529) whereas compound (i.e. reflexive) forms denote no such passage of action but rather the retention of the action within the subject itself (αὐτοπάθεια) (with the observed exception of ἀλλήλους, Synt. 11, 148).

Little need be said at this point (i.e. as to subdivision) on the five remaining parts of speech.⁴⁹ Dyscolüs' division of the article into pre- and post-positive forms has been mentioned elsewhere (above 1.1.1. and 2.3.1.) while his failure to make a clear distinction between these two types will be discussed below at 3.4.1.

No attempt is made in the extant writings to set up any formal divisions within the participial and prepositional groups (except in so far as he was aware of the effective contextual differences produced by varying syntactical colligations of prepositions, as is mentioned above in fn. 38). Mention has also been made above (2.3.1.) of the listing on a contextual basis of the conjunctive group, and in addition to this, there is a hint of the awareness of the difference between subordinating and co-ordinating conjunctions. Apollonius suggests (Synt. 111, 132, cf. 111, 125) that this is evidenced by the subjunctive mood (ὕποτακτικῆ) on the one hand, which must always be introduced by a conjunction (this latter determining the particular connotation to be adopted by the verb form)⁵⁰, and on the other hand by the co-ordinating force, as far as case is concerned, found with conjunctive and disjunctive forms as in ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ ἐκεῖνος.

2.4.0. In dealing with tertiary categories, it will be convenient to deal with the more widely found categories first, i.e. person, gender, case and number, before proceeding to consider Dyscolus' ideas on those which apply exclusively to the verb and participle, i.e. tense, voice and mood.

2.4.1. With regard to person (πρόσωπον), it would appear from the sparse evidence available to us that Dyscolus is in favour of the retention of the traditional concept of three persons, while at the same time providing a further example of his liking for hierarchical ordering by suggesting (Synt. 11, 170) that the first person takes precedence over the other two. At De Pro. 22B, he rejects the simple idea that the first person is always 'the speaker' (τὸ ἀποφαινόμενον) (cf. Synt. 1. 19) and that the second person is merely the person 'addressed' (cf. Synt. 111, 113), since he believes that the first person plural can reasonably include members of all three persons as he instances with the 'adhortative'⁵¹ form κέμπωμεν which he feels covers the whole range of persons. He also states at De Pro. 23A that the so-called first and second plural forms of the indicative can hardly be regarded as limited to their names. Beyond that, one may notice a distinction made between the first two persons and the third, the former being well defined in terms of context, the latter being often so ill defined as to require a more abundant supply of personal pronouns with which to establish indisputable personal reference (cf. Synt. 1. 17; De Pro. 29A, 40A where Dyscolus suggests that the nominatives (as found in verbs of the first or second person) are limited in their sphere of reference (ὀριζομένη) while the third person is by its very nature 'unlimited', except where the verb denotes an action peculiar to itself such as

ἀσπράττει or βροντῆ). Personal pronouns may be colligated with all persons of the verb, but he is incorrect in adding that nouns may only be colligated with the third person of the verb, although he does make an exception in the case of verbs of calling or being. He further believes that change of person is denoted by the varying terminations of the verb,⁵² and this, which he terms πρόσωπον in De Pro. 22A, the link between pronoun and verb, indicates (i) δεῖξιςωματική - the actual relationship of the speaker to the addressee; (ii) διάθεσις ψυχική - the 'affectus animi' of the speaker, an idea which is qualified by Schneider with the suggestion that this feature is always represented within the first person of the verb (See fn. 73).

He does not see, in the third person of the imperative, the same problem that baffled some of his fellow grammarians (according to Synt. 111, 112) namely that these forms should in fact belong to the second person since they imply a second person being required to pass on instructions to others (i.e. to third persons). He observes carefully here that, with second person imperative forms, it is the number of persons addressed by the speaker that causes a morphological change from singular to plural, whereas with third person forms in the imperative, the corresponding number change is only brought about according to the number of people whom the speaker wishes to affect by his command, the number of the individuals who are being instructed to pass on the command being irrelevant to the morphological shape of the verb form.

Turning to the category of case (πτῶσις), Apollonius was faced with a heritage based mainly upon morphological categories, handed down by earlier grammarians such as Dionysius Thrax. The latter, according to Robins,⁵³ does no more in fact than list the five cases, adding designations drawn upon a semantic basis from the more obvious meanings of each form, whereas Hjelmslev⁵⁴ regards the definitions of Dyscolus as representing 'the culminating point of the Greek school of thought'. The immediate problem, however, lay in the vocative which was regrettably never isolated from the other cases by the Alexandrian writers. Thrax naturally enough included it within his case system, acting upon morphological considerations.⁵⁵ In general terms, the Greeks regarded the case construction as reflecting a relationship (διάθεσις) between subject, verb and object (De Adv. 529) and hence it becomes increasingly difficult to account for the vocative in these terms. He is clearly aware of the problem when he writes at De Pro. 67 B that the vocative is placed by itself and is separated off from the words that follow it. One unusual facet of Dyscolus' ideas with ~~the~~ regard to the vocative is found at Synt. 111, 64, where he states that the use of the vocative assumes the presence of the individuals addressed, on the basis of which he suggests that it was rejected by the writers of epistolary inscriptions (cf. De Pro. 25A).

As regards the other cases, it may well be that we have an

example of the Greeks' especial penchant for binary opposition.⁵⁶

In this particular instance, binary opposition may be considered as existing between the nominative and the other cases, the former being termed ὀρθή, the latter 'oblique' (πλαγίαι),⁵⁷ although he is at pains to point out the basic idea (ἴδιον) of the noun is preserved throughout all its case forms (Synt. 1, 78), the use of the oblique cases depending upon the relation with the verb (cf. Synt. IV, 13ff.).

It is interesting to note in this connection the ideas put forward by Hjelmslev (ibid) to the effect that the Greeks felt a particularly close relationship between the cases of the noun and the voices of the verb. According to this writer, the nominative case and the active case are both accorded the title ἐνέργεια and ὀρθή, while the passive voice and the oblique cases are both referred to as πάθος and πλαγίαι. It is difficult to trace this type of double usage in Dyscolus' writing, however, although he does state at Synt. 11, 142ff. and De Adv. 529 that action in verb forms is denoted through the nominative case, passing then to oblique cases, which in turn denote πάθος, except where passive forms are concerned. Indeed, as Hjelmslev suggests, one must be careful not to take this too far in terms of analogy, both on account of the middle voice (μέση) (which Hjelmslev regards as a logical rather than purely linguistic category) and also on account of the suspicious alignment of the passive voice with the three oblique cases. An alignment of nominative and active as opposed to accusative and passive, as hinted by Dyscolus, would be

preferable; but in any case, the whole discussion was insufficiently clarified at the hands of the Greeks, and was not treated adequately until the writing of Varro.⁵⁸

One may summarise Dyscolus' opinions about the various cases as follows. The accusative (ἀιτιατικὴ), which he believes to be the case most usually governed by transitive verbs, is seen as the case not so much of cause but rather of effect⁵⁹ (but cf. Synt. 1. 12 after prepositions). He accordingly limits the accusative as being passive or receptive. The dative (δοτικὴ), on the other hand, was loosely connected with the idea of giving although he stresses in particular the idea of advantage (περιποίησις) mentioned above,⁶⁰ and which is viewed from the angle of the nouns involved rather than the verb, i.e. the redipient of the action (Synt. 111, 184). He writes incorrectly at 111. 174 that the genitive case is the sole case which may denote possession,⁶¹ since it is bound up ultimately with the idea of dominating. He also believes that the genitive is the case to be used when we do not wish to denote any passage of action from the subject to the object as e.g. αἰσθάνομαι σου. On the basis of the above, it is perhaps easier to appreciate why Hjelmslev concludes that the accusative is the most oblique of the cases, while the genitive and dative denote a κῶθoc which approaches closely to the realm of the nominative itself.

On the category of gender (γένος) Dyscolus' extant writings

offer no new ideas except further evidence for the idea of binary poles of opposition. For, in addition to suggesting at Synt. 11, 23 that the creation of different grammatical genders was aimed at attaining a more accurate distinction between subjects, he speaks of the neuter gender (τὸ οὐδέτερον) as lying in between the masculine and feminine, but being independent of each (Synt. 1, 22: τὸ τούτων (sc. ἀρρενικὸν καὶ θηλυκὸν) ἀποφατικόν).

Similarly, his writing on number offers little in advance of earlier theories. One may note De Pro. 109A where he states that it is acceptable to use a plural with reference to one object or person (ἐφ' ἑνικοῦ μεταλαμβανόμενον), since the plural number (ὁ πληθυντικὸς) is naturally inclusive of one or more matters.⁶² However, to use a singular (τὸ ἑνικόν) or a dual (τὸ δυϊκόν) with reference to plurality would be foolish (he presumably here ignores the contextual ideas behind 'collective' nouns). He also observes that the dual is as limited in its sphere of numerical reference as are the other cardinal numbers, 3, 4, 5, etc.

2.4.2. Dyscolus recognised five moods (ἐγκλίσεις) of the verb, the infinitive, the indicative, the optative, the imperative and the subjunctive, which he deals with individually in terms of their contextual meanings and syntactical colligations. Although he regards the infinitive (ἀπαρέμφατος) as 'τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ῥήματος', he nevertheless sees no justification for its being excluded from the

verb group despite its failure to make distinction of person and modal characteristic which, in addition to tense and voice, he regards as being characteristic of the verb (Synt. 111, 55, 59f.; De Adv. 537). It is significant that, despite the inability of the infinitive to convey modal distinction, (i.e. it contains no ἰδίῃ σημασία, cf. the 'wish' expressed through the optative, etc.) it is still counted as part of the verb. This idea of the moods of the verb denoting ψυχικαὶ διαθέσεις is regarded by Lersch⁶³ as foundering on that very difficulty on which philosophers have often foundered in ancient and modern times, that is, Dyscolus has no idea how to free himself from the formal categories in which the Greek language operates directly. He speaks, for example, at Synt. 111, 134 of the indicative being the origin of the subjunctive and being then influenced by conjunctions in such a way that it takes on the form of the subjunctive. When forms 'changed' from indicative to subjunctive, Dyscolus sees it as a morphological change whereby any penultimate short vowel in the indicative form was lengthened in the corresponding subjunctive form.

As a general principle, he believes (Synt. 111, 88) that the various moods of the verb derive their name from the particular property denoted through them (cf. τὸ δηλούμενον, 111, 125). Since the indicative (ὀριστική) is basically the mood of statement of fact, he feels that it logically follows for it also to assume the title of the mood of negation (ἀποφατική), this latter being

achieved by the addition of the negative particle (τὸ ἀποφατικὸν ἐπίρρημα) i.e. οὐ, for he sees this as the opposition of fact v. denial, (111. 90) (ἡ μαχομένη τῆ ἀποφάσει κατάφασις), and it is on the basis of this theory that he rejects the colligation of οὐ with all the other moods, preferring μὴ ἀπαγόρευσις.⁶⁴

Turning to the optative mood (εὐχτική), we notice that he regards it as possessing an inherent sense of its own, connected with the idea of 'wishing' (εὐχή), although he does not rule out the possibility of adding the optative particle (e.g. εἴθε) with the optative verb forms. He compares this with the colligation of εἴθε + indicative, which is more easily justified on the grounds of the mainly factual basis of the indicative. (εἴθε + infinitive is at once rejected because of the lack of personal distinction.) He is firmly convinced that the automatic association of the optative forms purely with future time is unwarranted, and he evidences such clauses as εἴθε νενηκῆκοι ὁ παῖς. Egger⁶⁵ suggests that Dyscolus is not really aware of the non-temporal differences between aorist and present forms in moods other than the indicative. However, it is significant to note that at Synt. 111, 110, he interprets ζῶοιμι as praying for present continuance while he feels that ζῆσαιμι would in fact be praying for the end of life. The same problem is regarded as existing with the imperative tenses since he is aware that one can hardly order 'what is past' and yet 'past' imperative tenses are found. The hint of the awareness

of aspectual differences within verb forms has been mentioned above in detail at 1.2.2. and needs no further comment here. He does note one similarity between the optative and imperative moods, namely that just as the optative force may be strengthened by the addition of εἴθε, so the imperative property (especially in forms which concur with those of the indicative mood) may be made clearer by the addition of ἄγε.

The idea of an adhortative mood (ὑποθετική) is summarised by Dyscolus at III, 111 as being the result of a confusion of two moods. This so-called adhortative form (by which he means e.g. φεύγωμεν) lacks the second and third person forms while the imperative, in his opinion, lacks first person forms; hence he concludes that there may well have been a confusion with the result that one mood supplies the deficiencies in another. He interprets this adhortative as the mood which avoids the direct issuing of commands, using rather a form of general exhortation which involves the first person (i.e. the speaker) in the command.⁶⁶ He is of the opinion also that those who claim that there is a first person form within the imperative are similarly confusing the imperative with the adhortative. According to Dyscolus we do not give orders to ourselves, but we can exhort each other as at II. 2, 6 which form πέμψαι ought to be changed, the writer says, into πέμψω, giving a singular form which developed into a plural. There is no need for a second person form in the adhortative mood, since there all other persons are encompassed within the first person

form. He even goes so far as to state that λέγωμεν and λέγετε must belong to different moods on the basis of analogy, since in all moods, first and second person plural forms have the same penultimate vowel length. (Syntax III, 110).

We possess a general summary of his view on the subjunctive mood (ὕποτακτική) preserved at Synt. III, 123f., stressing the need of this mood for an introductory conjunction: ... τοῦ μὴ συνιστάσθαι αὐτὴν εἰ μὴ ὑποταγείη τοῖς προκείμενοις συνδέσμοις εἰρήται ὑποτακτική.⁶⁷ There was at the time of Dyscolus' writing a certain amount of confusion regarding the naming of this mood, Dyscolus mentioning other writers who, on the grounds of uncertainty (δισταγμός) implied in e.g. εἰ γράφω, preferred to term this mood διστακτική. Apollonius' reply to this argument is that in itself the subjunctive possesses no such element of uncertainty, this being here supplied by the conjunction. He suggests further (probably somewhat sarcastically) that if we are to name all the moods by virtue of the connotations which they receive from their introductory conjunction, then clearly ἔγραφεν (in εἰ ἔγραφεν) must no longer be regarded as indicative. The problem of the subjunctive is that, whereas the other moods possess their own connotations independent of any conjunction, this is not so with the subjunctive. Since therefore he feels that the subjunctive is incapable of standing on its own, he terms it ὑποτακτική (Synt. III, 132), believing that the connotation of the subjunctive forms is determined by the force of the conjunction (Synt. III, 92).

Of the three verbal tertiary categories, little definite is said by Dyscolus in the extant writings regarding tense (χρόνος). The main contrast for the Greeks was that between present time and past time (ἐνεστῶς cf. παρεληλυθῆσεν), Dyscolus himself clinging very much to the ideas of the Stoics according to Lersch. Hence, he states in the opening of Syntax III that the perfect tense indicates not so much past completion as present perfection.⁶⁸ At two fairly adjacent points in Syntax III, he uses, to describe the perfect tense, first χρόνος κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα παρατεινόμενος, and secondly ἐνεστῶς παρατεινόμενος (which Lersch suggests reveals the influence of the Stoic ἐνεστῶς παρατατικός).⁶⁹

The present tense is regarded as a basis for comparison with the other tenses (Synt. I, 13, of. IV, 21); he suggests that, just as the oblique cases of the noun take their place after the nominative, so the tenses of the verb do so after the present. The present, along with the perfect, is regarded as being concerned with what is factual; the aorist, imperfect and pluperfect being considered as denoting what has partly happened or is already long past (Synt. III, 21). He further believes (I, 114) that the present and past tenses of the indicative are clearly defined (εὐδῆλα) while the future generally acquires an indefinite sense. Since he feels that this latter sense is close to the connotation of imperatives in a connotation such as ὁ τυραννοκτονήσας τιμηθήσεται / τιμᾶσθω, he concludes that every imperative possesses an element of futurity (τοῦ μέλλοντος) and

that the real difference between the two forms is modal rather than temporal (διηλλαχός τῆ ἐγκλίσει);

Turning to the question of voice (διάθεσις), we are fortunate in having at least a summary of Dyscolus' ideas preserved in Synt. III, 147ff. He first observes that not even the infinitive lacks voice - it is a necessity for all moods of the verb, and he discusses at length the relation of active to passive forms. Mention has been made elsewhere of his ideas regarding transitivity and intransitivity in verbs (2.3.2. and 4.2.1) and little need be added here. It is the transference of action from subject to object which is the prerequisite for a verb to be changed from active to passive, and he stresses at Synt. III, 156 that normal transitive verbs such as ἀναγιγνώσκω, if they are used intransitively, i.e. without an object, cannot in that latter context be changed into the passive. On the other hand, he is aware that verbs such as πνέω and ζῶ, which denote no such transfer of activity, require no passive; similarly, if the active form of adverb denotes suffering (πάθος), then clearly no passive form is called for (as e.g. with κοπιῶ).⁷⁰

He says regrettably little regarding the middle voice (μέση), beyond referring to it as the συνεμπῶσις of the active and passive voices, suggesting that the middle is capable of expressing ideas that are attributable to either of these. For example, he feels that ἐποίησάμην is a basically active concept, as opposed to ἔλουσάμην

which he maintains is more passive. It is difficult to understand, however, in this light, a note which he makes at Synt. III, 54 to the effect that the middle lies in between the active and passive voices and has no direct contact with either of them (μεταξὺ τούτων, οὐ προσχωροῦσα οὐδετέρῳ), unless this is meant again to imply binary poles (active and passive) and was mentioned above in connection with the three genders (2.4.1.).

2.4.3. The use of the term διάθεσις and in particular διάθεσις ψυχικῆ has given rise to considerable uncertainty amongst recent editors. While it has been stated above that διάθεσις is the term used by Dyscolus to denote voice in the verb,⁷¹ one cannot ignore its use at e.g. Synt. I, 114 in the phrase ἡ διάθεσις τοῦ μέλλοντος (in the sense of future time), and similar expressions such as εὐχτικῆ διάθεσις, together with the statement at De Adv. 537 that every feeling (πάθος) arises from some διάθεσις, and that this διάθεσις is a characteristic of the verb. An even greater problem has been posed by διάθεσις when coupled with the adjective ψυχικῆ, rendered by Skrzeczka in his writings as 'die Affektion der Seele'. For Uhlig,⁷² διάθεσις means (i) case government by the verb, as at De Pro. 27B and De Adv. 529, referring to the use of oblique cases; (ii) mental attitude, as conveyed by the mood of the verb (Modaldiathese) in which connection, Uhlig believes the adjective ψυχικῆ must be

attached to διάθεσις, and secondly that this connotation does not belong to the infinitive mood. (iii) other verbal categories such as tense and aspect, as mentioned above with regard to the future.

Schneider⁷³ had the same basic groups, but he is harassed by the theory that διάθεσις ψυχική must be attached to the first person, (ibid.).

One feels more inclined, however, to accept the view of Adelaide Hahn⁷⁴ that, bearing in mind the above connotations, together with the regular usage in the sense of voice (e.g. διάθεσις παθητική De Adv. 529), one must infer that διάθεσις on its own means very little, the exact connotation depending on the form attached to it (as e.g. χρονική, ἐνεργητική). This idea of διάθεσις being equivalent to some general term such as 'element' would be borne out by the difference between optative mood (εὐκτική ἔγκλισις) and optative distinction (εὐκτική διάθεσις) in Synt. III, 95. On the more complicated question of the connotation of διάθεσις ψυχική, Hahn believes that, where this term is used of the verb, it is always completely parallel to number and person (as e.g. with regard to the infinitive mood, at Synt. III, 59ff.). Hence she opposes strongly the idea of any interpretation based upon 'mental qualities' or 'attitudes of soul', choosing rather to retain Priscian's idea of 'discretio personarum et modorum'. Nevertheless, there is still to be accounted for the statement by Dyscolus (De Pro. 32B) that 'adjectives' (ἐπιθετικά) may denote διάθεσις ψυχική and (at De Pro. 22A) that person in the verb (πρόσωπον) also indicates the same property.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

- 1 See above 0. for details of these.
- 2 In order to produce as comprehensive a statement as possible, some re-iteration of points made with reference to the different analytical criteria in chapter 1 will be inevitable but restricted to a minimum.
- 3 (1854: 49).
- 4 It is significant that he only makes reference to Dionysius Thrax at De Pro. 4B, where he observes that Apollodorus the Athenian and Dionysius Thrax termed pronouns 'deictic articles'.
- 5 οἱ ἀπὸ Κροῦς, e.g. De Conj. 479, where Dyscolus announces his intention not to be entirely contrary to the Stoic line of thinking (ἐκτὸς τῆς τῶν Κρωικῶν δόξης), and he suggests that it is valuable in a task such as his to extract what is useful from all sources. For a detailed list of the writers quoted by Dyscolus, see also Schneider (1910: 284ff.).
- 6 0., 4.0. and 4.1. cf. Albin Lesky, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, Engl. Transl. 1966: 889: 'He (Apollonius) did not blaze new trails; he always takes his starting point from the parts of speech and proves to be a pedantic analogist.' For a contrary view on Dyscolus 'blazing new trails', cf. Adelaide Hahn (1951: 48); and on the importance of the analysis by parts of speech, cf. Robins (1966: 5ff.). See further below fn.75.

- 7 It is worthwhile to note here the slight return in some contemporary thinking towards prescriptivism, evidenced, for example, in Lyons (1965: 16ff.).
- 8 Egger (1854: 114) - "les décisions tranchantes". Similarly, over hasty judgement is evidenced below at 3.1.1. in connection with the colligation of οὐ with the optative mood.
- 9 cf. above 1.1.1. and below 3.4.1.
- 10 These dual forms are discussed, with special reference to Dyscolus' treatment, in Thierfelder (1935: 31-5).
- 11 cf. here the point made below at 3.4.1. regarding Synt. III, 47 to the effect that ἐμὸς is used as a vocative form instead of the expected ἐμέ at e.g. Od. 19, 406, merely to avoid confusion; cf. also the discussion on frequency and grammaticalness, arising from Transformational Theory, towards the end of 'Transformational Grammar: Form and Theory', W. O. Dingwall, *Lingua*, 1963, vol. 12: 233-275; also R. Quirk, *Acceptability in Language* (Proceedings of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne Phil. Soc., vol. 1, No. 7, 1966: esp. 82). Conversely, one notes the idea at Synt. III, 98 on the impossibility of there being e.g. a passive form of πλουτῶ, a feminine form of ἄρχην; and again, the statement at De. Pro. 26C that reason does not require the formation of vocative forms from the second person plural possessive forms (*ὐμέτερε, *ὐμέτεροι) and hence they are not found.
- 12 cf. Lersch (1838, pt. 1: 76) who, in writing of Apollonius, states

"wir finden dass sich τριβή und λόγος (ἀναλογία) engegengesetzt sind" (We find that regular usage and reason are opposed to each other). Cf. Syntax II, 49, where Dyscolus suggests that we should accept examples from everyday speech (ἐκ τῆς κοίνης φράσεως), from the accurate writings of historians, and especially from the force of reason (τὸ μεῖζον ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς τοῦ λόγου).

13 See Steinthal (1863, pt. 2: 210/1).

14 cf. Egger (1854: 245) who is of the opinion that Dyscolus would have been better advised to have endeavoured to establish more general principles, rather than tending to make comparison between individual words. On the priority allocation of the noun and verb, cf. A. Meillet, *Linguistique historique et générale*. Paris. 1926, vol. 1: 175.

15 But see further examples and discussion below at 4.5.0.

16 See above 1.1.2. for a further example with reference to morphological criteria.

17 See further above 1.3.3., and observe also the note at De Pro. 84A to the effect that a derived form, although retaining the same ending as its original, need not necessarily be allocated to the same part of speech, and similarly, a derived form which does not retain the same ending as its original form need not automatically be allocated to a different part of speech.

Cf. below 2.3.1. regarding ἵνα and ὄφρα, and also Robins (1965: 258).

18 See further Robins (1953: 100, fn. 2).
19 For this term, see Halliday (1961: 272ff.).

- 20 Set out in detail in Robins (1951: 65ff.).
- 21 So also Robins (1959b: 119ff.): "It is certainly a weakness of the classical grammarians that they barely recognised any grammatical unit below the level of the word and certainly never set out with any rigour the establishment of the morphemes of the language."
- 22 For a detailed discussion of ἔκρητι and ἀέκρητι, see further Thierfelder (1935: 75ff.).
- 23 So Egger* (1854: 305).
- 24 (1965: 171).
- 25 Cf. Diog. Laert. Vitae Philosophorum, VII. 63.
- 26 For a general discussion of Dyscolus' unfortunate mingling of grammatical and phonological levels, see further below 4.4.0.
- 27 On this term, see further Camerer (1965: 169).
- 28 (1854: 70/1).
- 29 Such definitions as are available to us show that Dyscolus formulated his definitions mainly in what Lyons (1966b: 217) calls 'Inflexional terms'. See the following footnote for an example.
- 30 So the Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax (Bekker, 1816: 882):
 παραλάβωμεν τὰ νῦν καὶ τὸν Ἀπολλωνίου ὄρον ἐντέλως ἔχοντα· ῥῆμά
 ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου ἐν^{ἰδίῳ} μετασχηματισμοῖς διαφόρων χρόνων δεκτικὸν
 μετ' ἐνεργείας ἢ πάθους, προσώπων τε καὶ ἀριθμῶν προτατικὸν ὅτε
 καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς διεθέσεις δηλοῖ.

- 31 (1854: 114)
- 32 See further 3.4.3., especially fn. 30.
- 33 On this point, cf. Robins (1951: 66) where the incorrectness of Dyscolus' theory, repeated by Priscian, XII. 1.1., is well stressed.
- 34 Cf. De Pro. 6C: 'πᾶσα ἀναφορὰ γνώσεως προηγουμένης ἐστὶ σημαντικὴ' emphasising the importance of previous mention. Contrast the Stoic theory that the definite article (and relative pronoun) were ἄρθρα ἀοριστώδη, a theory clearly contrary to Dyscolus' concept of anaphora. (See further Dion. Halic. de Comp. Verb., 2).
- 35 See further discussion below 3.4.1. It is interesting to note how little Dyscolus has to say with regard to the relative pronoun form, this failure being one of the probable results of his inability to escape from traditional ideas.
- 36 Cf. Lersch (1838, pt. 2: 111f.) where this author quotes Dyscolus as speaking against those who are of the opinion that an independent part of speech cannot serve as a merely approximate explanation of another.
- 37 The question of order being natural or enforced remained a problem for the early grammatical theorists, cf. Cicero, Inst. Or. VII, 24, and Quintilian, IX, 4.
- 38 Cf. Uhlig (1910: 14): 'eorum vis definitur eis vocibus quibuscum coniuncta sunt.' Surely Liddell-Scott-Jones are misleading here in stating that *εὐκκῆμαίνω* (whose absolute use here is quoted by them, v. sub. *εὐκκῆμαίνω*) means to derive one's meaning from

'Context'. On the difference between environment and context, see Lyons (1963: 25).

39 See above 1.2.2.

40 See above 1.2.2. and also fn. 95.

41 See discussion in Robins (1951: 43): cf. Synt. I, 10 where Dyscolus emphasises that the absence of a conjunction can break up the desired unity within sentence structures. One must bear in mind in this connection that σύνδεσμος means to Dyscolus a far wider range of forms than 'conjunction' does to the modern grammarian. Hence, Dyscolus includes as conjunctions all the expletive forms such as δὲ, ἄρα together with forms such as ἄν. On this latter form, as a potential conjunction, see further R. Camerer (1965: 180).

42 Cf. Dlog. Laert. VII, 57, who makes a semantically based distinction between proper nouns denoting individual qualities (ἴδια) and the common noun denoting 'common' qualities (κοινὴ ποιότης). See further Bekker (1816: 842).

43 For a detailed list of these subdivisions, see further Lersch (1838; pt. 2: 115-123).

44 (1838, pt. 2: 113ff.).

45 Lyons (1966b: 216) observes that from Alexandrian times it has been customary to group the noun and adjective together - the distinction of nomen substantivum and nomen adjectivum as separate parts of speech being a medieval development. Cf. V.Brondal

- Les Parties du Discours, Copenhagen, 1948: 25, and J. Wackernagel, Vorlesungen über Syntax, Basle, 1920: 22-3.
- 46 (1854: 87).
- 47 See further discussion below at 4.5.0. Cf. also J. Lyons (1966b: 221) who discusses verbs classified as either 'stative' or 'action', according to whether they denote a state or an activity.
- 48 See below 3.1.1. for his error here with regard to verbs that govern the dative case, and 4.2.0, 4.2.1. regarding the relation of Dyscolus' ideas with modern transformation theory.
- 49 His treatment of adverbs has already been mentioned above, 1.1.2.
- 50 Cf. the modern idea that mood is a property of the clause and not just the verb.
- 51 On this term, see below 2.4.2.
- 52 See further below 3.4.3.
- 53 (1957: 100).
- 54 (1935: 5).
- 55 See further discussion in Hjelmslev (*ibid.*).
- 56 See further N. E. Collinge, *Word*, 19, Fasc. 2, 1963, page 233, esp. fn. 6.
- 57 Cf. E. Sittig, *Das Alten der Anordnung unserer Kasus und der Ursprung ihren Bezeichnung als Fälle*. Stuttgart, 1931.
- 58 de L.L., VIII, 3.
- 59 Note how αἰτία, as final cause, can serve for both these ideas for Aristotle.

- 60 Cf. Robins (1965: 283] for a criticism of any attempt to derive a single meaning from any individual case.
- 61 See below 3.4.1.
- 62 Cf. the idea of marked and unmarked form, where grammatical distinctions may be made in terms of polar opposites such as singular/plural, but also as A and non-A. Here, one may observe that the unmarked form can be neutral as well as negative. For Dyscolus, the plural is contextually unmarked and can import the singular (i.e. in the above terms, non-A can include A) whereas 'one' is 'marked as one only' (singular)).
- 63 (1838, pt. 2: 205ff.).
- 64 See below 3.1.4.
- 65 (1854 $\frac{1}{2}$: 158ff.).
- 66 Cf. Lersch (1838, pt. 2: 206) and Priscian XVIII, 8.
- 67 It is interesting to note that, while elsewhere he quotes extensively from Homer, he here ignores the existence of independent subjunctive forms in that author, cf. Goodwin, (1889: 97, section 284ff.). Similarly, compare Dyscolus' theory with regard to the 'wish' concept of the optative mood above with Goodwin (ibid: 382).
- 68 See above 1.2.1. regarding aspect, and also Synt. III, 21.
- 69 (1838, pt. 2: 212); cf. Diog. Laert. VII, 141.
- 70 Verbs such as περιπατεῖν which are normally intransitive are able to receive third person passive forms (e.g. περιπατεῖται ἢ

ὀδός), since they are concerned with inanimate things (Synt. III, 152, 'ἄψυχα).

71 So Egger (1854: 179) 'la voix du verbe'.

72 See above chap. I, fn. 82.

73 (1878: notes, p. 38).

74 (1951: 43ff.).

ADDENDUM

75 It is regretted that the article by F.W. Householder in *Lingua*, 17, arrived too late for consideration in this connection. (Greek. In 'Word Classes', pp. I-152).

3.0. INCONSISTENCIES AND ERRORS IN DYSCOLUS' ARGUMENTS

In instancing places where Dyscolus' theorisation can be shown to be faulty or, at any rate, inconsistent with his own ideas expressed elsewhere, it is as well to bear in mind the warning of Robins¹ that in the pioneering stage of any one subject, one cannot expect systematic developments or consistent tidiness of method. Lersch² values the work of Dyscolus so highly that he is prepared to endeavour to establish the opinions of Dyscolus from the more copious writings of Priscian. He feels that 'all the previously spun threads re-unite in a point of concentration in Dyscolus, and here, too, general linguistic analysis reaches a conclusion which unmistakably ensures for it for a long time a true value which only later petrified into formalism and schematisation.' Robins¹ is of the opinion that, in passing comments upon ancient scholars, we must remember our privileged position in having an already developed and formulated subject of study, which we owe not least to the profit derived from considering the mistakes of our academic forerunners in Greece and elsewhere. Secondly, he believes that we must be prepared to find grammatical and general linguistic ~~theories~~ speculations produced along with, and buttressed by, theories that would now be considered, not the province of grammar, but of psychology, logic and physics.³ Nevertheless, it is considered expedient at this stage to provide illustrations of the errors in reasoning and understanding which do occur in the extant works of Dyscolus.

3.1.1. One may reasonably begin with examples where Dyscolus is indefensibly incorrect in a dogmatic statement of grammatical fact.

In Syntax III, 90, he denies the acceptability of the sequence of $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}$ with the optative mood, choosing only to accept a colligation such as $\mu\eta\ \gamma\upsilon\acute{o}\iota\eta\varsigma$. The basis of this unjustified objection lies in the fact that he feels that $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}$ can only be properly associated with the mood of the verb that expresses a pure statement of fact, which, to Dyscolus, is achieved only through the indicative. Examples to disprove this theory can readily be seen in traditional grammars such as that of Goodwin.⁴ Dyscolus' essential error here is one of over-generalisation and a disregarding of what, although few in number, constitute concerted examples to the contrary. Later in the same book, (Syntax III, 131) he speaks of the conjunction $\text{\iota}\nu\alpha$ being used in a causal sense. The only reference to such a usage is that in Theodosii Canones, 2, 257, and hence one can safely deduce that it is not a literary usage, if indeed it is a correct statement of grammatical phenomenon, for there are no references to it in traditional grammars such as that mentioned above.

Towards the conclusion of the same book (Synt. III, 178), Dyscolus states that it is not possible to change 'dative' verbs from the active into the passive in the usual manner (i.e. with the result that the original object becomes the subject of the second clause) since he is of the opinion that action cannot be orientated from a pronoun in the dative case, but only from an accusative. Of the many examples cited by Schwyzer,⁵ which one may use to disprove this idea, the

following pair will suffice:

Thuc. I. 82. 1: ἡμεῖς ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα.

Soph. Ant. 408: πρὸς σοῦ τὰ δεῖν' ἐκεῖν' ἐπηκειλημένοι.

3.2.1. Although he has been variously hailed as the first to put Greek grammatical thought upon a really scientific basis,⁶ the title Δύσκολος derived, as it probably is, from extreme difficulties of style, may well be evidence for a certain amount of muddled thinking on the part of that writer. This leads him to a regrettable source of error, namely, inconsistency with ideas expressed elsewhere in his own writings.⁷ Instances of this vary from the very simple to the abstruse. For example, in De Pro. 18B, he states that he is well aware of the change in sense produced by moving the adverb in the sequence ὁ ἄνθρωπος νῦν in order to signify contemporary mankind (i.e. ὁ νῦν ἄνθρωπος). On the other hand, he writes at the beginning of De Adverbio (532) that, because of its specific sphere of reference, the adverb is never placed between the article and the noun, since it can refer to neither; this clearly reflects a momentary neglect of such peculiarly Greek phrases as that quoted above. In contrast to this, he states at Synt. III, 62 that further reflection has caused him to change his earlier opinion regarding the ordering of the moods of the verb, and that first place is now to be allocated to the infinitive. This is, as he is well aware, a contradiction of

what he had proposed in Περὶ Ῥήματος,⁸ where he had apparently favoured the choice of the indicative on the grounds of its possessing greater temporal distinctions than the infinitive.⁹

3.2.2. The exact relationship of the vocative case with the other members of this category was a source of difficulty to the majority of Greek grammarians.¹⁰ Dyscolus was well aware of its connection with the second person, (cf. the 'allocation' of the remaining case forms of nouns to the third person in De Pro. 30A), but he was not convinced, as were other writers of his day, that *cù* had consequently always to be regarded as a vocative form (De Pro. 66A, cf. Synt. III, 35f.). Dyscolus observes that, since the vocative is felt to be a form separated off from the other forms in the sentence, no enclitics may be attached to a vocative form. Since, then, the phrase *cù μου* is found, he affirms that *cù* cannot be a vocative form in this context. Furthermore, he observes that in answer to interrogative forms, we can make use of nominative forms, this being a function with which *cù* is perfectly compatible. In this connection, Schneider¹¹ notes a lack of consistency in Dyscolus' argument. In De Pro., he had agreed with Trypho that *cù* was vocative except where it was colligated with verbs of 'being' or 'addressing'. But in Syntax III, 41, he comes to the conclusion that *cù* is in fact always nominative except

where, in ignorance of some one's name, we address them using *cù*. In Syntax III, 36, also, he places far greater restriction on the use of the vocative case as compared with the nominative: "ὡς μᾶλλον παρακινδυνεύεται ἢ *cù* ἀντωνυμία κατὰ τὴν τῆς κλητικῆς σύνταξιν ὡς οὐ δεόντως παρελημμένη ἥπερ κατὰ τὴν τῆς εὐθείας σύνταξιν", regarding the nominative as the more regularly found and more acceptable usage.

3.2.3. The discussion of the respective qualities of nouns and pronouns, which occupies **part** of the opening stages of the book on the latter, provides further examples of inconsistent reasoning on the part of Apollonius. At De Pro. 9C and 30B, he states that pronouns denote no particular qualities of individuals (ἴδια) but rather simple deixis (the demonstrative characteristic found in all personal pronouns with the exception of the purely anaphoric forms *ἐ*, *οὐ*, *οἶ*), and additionally what he terms substance (οὐσία). On the basis of pronouns denoting οὐσία, he adds weight to his other arguments¹² against the allocation of *τηλικούτος* to the pronominal class. For he observes that, whereas the true pronoun denotes οὐσία (De Pro. 9C), this form denotes the essentially non-pronominal feature of 'quality'. On the other hand, he observes at 38B that this same form is found with an iota suffix, which Dyscolus believes serves to heighten the degree of deixis, just as is found with pronominal forms such as *ούτος*, *ἐκεῖνος*. Also, he adduces as an

argument against the possibility of nouns being compounded with pronouns (De Pro. 39B) the fact that nouns do not possess any sense of deixis (how then can he still plausibly argue for the inclusion of *τηλικούτος* within the class of substantives?), while pronouns on the other hand do possess a sense of personal distinction either absolutely or in direct contradistinction to other persons.

Furthermore, he feels that compound forms in general retain the same basic connotation as the original form out of which they were compounded. Yet at an earlier point (De Pro. 36B), in the course of the discussion of the alleged compounding of *τηλίκος* with *ούτος* to produce *τηλικούτος*, he states that simple forms never denote the same as compounded forms derived from them, and therefore, since *τηλίκος* is contextually equivalent to *τηλικούτος*, the possibility of compounding having taken place is refuted.

3.2.4. Schneider¹³ (quoting Rudolf Skrzeczka)¹⁴ claims to have come across a contradiction of ideas with regard to the forms *οἶκον δέ*. At De Adv. 592, Dyscolus stated that *οἶκον δέ* is employed with adverbial syntax, and yet is not to be regarded as a member of the adverbial group. At De Pro. 84A, he observes that *οἶκον δέ* preserves the correct ending of an original accusative form, but is not to be allocated to the same part of speech as this original form, i.e. to a declinable part of speech, since Dyscolus believes that it is from

the ending of a compound form that the allocation is to be made¹⁵ (he is of the opinion that we are here dealing with two independent forms, as is proved for him, by the accent). It is difficult to see any contradiction here, despite the view of the commentators, for 'adverbial in concept' is fully reconcilable with 'membership of a non-declinable word-class'.

3.3.1. Reference has been made in 2.1.0 above to Dyscolus' liking for radical decisions, and his tendency to over prescriptivism in this respect. One may observe a further example of this over-hasty judgement and invalid conclusion at De Conj. 488 in connection with the form ἦ to which he gives the title 'elective' (διακαθητική).¹⁶ He makes a strange interpretation here to the effect that this form denotes that the first option is to be accepted while the second is to be rejected, as e.g. in βούλομαι φιλολογεῖν ἢ σχολάζειν. He reveals a further weakness at this point, too, in adding, without justification, that since this form ἦ can only be colligated with ἦττον or μᾶλλον, these latter forms are also to be allocated to the group of conjunctions.

The uncertainty amongst early writers regarding the true relationship between simple and compound forms leads into a Dyscolus that produces not only contradiction but also 'fanciful wandering'. The anaphora question, raised at Syntax 1. 43, appears also in the opening

of the book on the Pronoun with reference to the idea that original (i.e. personal) pronouns are not to be termed 'ἀσύναρθροι' since they can always be followed by a postpositive form of the article and occasionally admit even a prepositive article (De Pro. 15B ἐγὼ ὃς ἔγραψα cf. Attic τὸν ἐμέ, together with τὸν ~~ὃς~~ ^{δε. Κροτωνιάδην} cited from Callimachus fr. 315^a, edited O. Schneider). (His incidental theory here that compound forms such as μεάνθρωπος denote a continuous as opposed to intermittent state can hardly be classed as logical deduction following upon systematic observation of the facts). However, he differentiates between articles and pronouns here on the basis of articles being used anaphorically, never demonstratively, while personal pronouns are used demonstratively (with the exception of ἔ, οἶ, οἱ mentioned above, 3.2.3.) and hence articles cannot be colligated in a protactic position with personal (demonstrative) pronouns on the basis of there being no previous person to whom reference may be made (De Pro. 16A: 'ἡ τῶν ἄρθρων σημασία τῶν πρωτοτύπων κατὰ πρόταξιν ἀμοῖρει, δεῖξιν σημαινουσῶν'). This theory is clearly in contradiction to his remarks above regarding τὸν ἐμέ and other forms, which, although few in number, do at least constitute examples which must be taken into account when deducing a general rule.

3.3.2. A further example of this 'wandering' is to be found at Syntax 111.183 where Dyscolus offers the opinion that in a sequence such as $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\ \delta\omicron\iota\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \omicron\iota\nu\omicron\nu$, Homer was justified in placing the dative case form before the accusative on the grounds that the dative form 'embraces' ($\acute{\epsilon}\mu\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$) an accusative form.

While considering a statement such as the above, it is as well to bear in mind the remarks of Adelaide Hahn¹⁷ with regard to Dyscolus: 'It seems to me that no one who studies his writings can fail to be struck by the curious mixture of the subtle and the puerile which they present, but he deserves more credit for the subtle than blame for the puerile.'

3.4.1. In addition to the above examples where Dyscolus is guilty of simple grammatical errors, inconsistency of ideas and 'rambling', one may cite instances where his fault is one of inadequate reasoning. As has been discussed above,¹⁸ Dyscolus' writings at Syntax 1, 142ff show abundant awareness of clear syntactical differences between the two forms of the so-called article, namely, our definite article (the protactic form in Greek) as opposed to our relative pronoun (the hypotactic form). After observing these phenomena, Dyscolus further notes that a demonstrative form e.g. $\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$, as long as it is preceded by a conjunction, can possess

the same connotation as a postpositive form (e.g. Syntax I, 145: ὁ γραμματικὸς παρεγένετο {ὁς/καὶ οὗτος} διελέξατο). However, he is still unwilling to allocate this pronoun to the same part of speech as the postpositive article since he feels that there are too many dissimilar features between the classes of articles and pronouns.

He notes accurately that οὗτος can possess an anaphoric sense equivalent to that of the article, and also the demonstrative sense which is to be found in e.g. καὶ ὅς. He then goes so far as to say that, if a verb is colligated with a preceding article, the article must be a postpositive form (οὐ γὰρ προτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ῥημά ποτε ἐπίφερεται).¹⁹

And again, he states (I, 142/8) in connection with the prepositive article, that it is closely bound up with the case of its noun, while no such requirement is made of the postpositive form (τὰ ὑποτακτικὰ ἄρθρα ἀδιαφορεῖ πρὸς τὸ κατάλληλον τῆς κτίσεως τῶν προτασσομένων αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων πρὸς ἃ καὶ ἀναπέμπει τὴν ἀναφόραν). Whether the reason is the external force of analogy or the close morphological similarity between the two forms, it is nevertheless to be regretted that Dyscolus did not draw the above arguments to their only logical conclusion and allocate the two forms of the article to different parts of speech, especially so since he avowedly makes it one of his guiding principles that no number of similarities between forms must automatically imply that the two forms are to be allocated to the same part of speech.²⁰

A second example of inaccuracy of reasoning is to be found in Syntax III, 147 where the author suggests that it is the force of usage (χρῆσις) that prevents the formation of a regular vocative form from the pronoun ἐμὸς, on account of the possibility arising of confusion between this and the accusative form of the first person pronoun. Yet, at other places²¹ he is fully aware of examples where one form can be subjected to at least two different analyses, and presumably he is here ignoring such dual-purpose forms as κεῖσμαι. Insufficient scrutiny and over hasty deduction are exemplified further in his suggestion at Synt. III, 174 that, whenever we think in terms of possession, we most naturally think in terms of the genitive, which alone conveys this concept - again too radical a decision (here, he is endeavouring to justify the fact that verbs denoting domination govern a genitive case). However, he is clearly overlooking the claim of the dative to denote this concept, and surely it is naive reasoning on the part of Dyscolus to assume that we dominate all that we possess.

Syntax III, 86 affords an interesting example of a false appeal to the order of words. Quoting Iliad 5, 118 as an example, Dyscolus feels that the possibility of ambiguous interpretation, which might well arise with two accusatives as in the clause λέγουσι θέωνα ὑβρίσαι Δίωνα, must be overcome by accepting the suggestion that the first accusative always denotes the active element in the sentence, while

the second signifies the passive (i.e. objective) form, which he regards as the natural order - ἡ ἐνεργητικὴ διάθεσις προτέρα τῆς παθητικῆς.

3.4.2. Mention is made elsewhere²² of Dyscolus being influenced by the ideas of the Analogist school of thought. It may well be that this influence is the cause of his endeavouring to find parallels between what he considers to be similar categories or features of categories. First, one may instance the parallel (ὡςοὔτω) drawn at De Adv. 564, where Apollonius states that adverbs which are derived from prepositions and which terminate in -θεν are so used that they are able to answer the questions 'unde?', 'ubi?', and 'quo?'.²³ Dyscolus compares this with nouns of common gender (κοινότητα γένους), for he feels that the differing prepositions may make the necessary distinction of local form in these adverbs in exactly the same way as the article may determine the gender of substantives which are usually termed 'of common gender',²⁴ (cf. Synt. I, 38/9). Such a parallel as this however, can only be regarded as valid in the most general of terms.

As has been observed above,²⁵ Dyscolus suggests that there is a distinction to be drawn between optative forms in verbs which denote a 'mental state of desiring' together with positive action, and optative adverbs, which he feels denote merely the state of

desiring with no action implied. He sees a parallel to this in e.g. λευκότερος which he believes denotes the quality of 'whiteness' together with a degree of intensity (comparative), as opposed to a form such as ἀμείνων, which he suggests denotes only the degree of intensity (Synt. III, 96). This can only be summarised as a curious idea, on the one hand, that one can make a qualitative analysis and a statement segment by segment of meaning as applied to a syntagma, while on the other hand, we notice a simple error of ascription of meaning to ἀμείνων which surely denotes 'goodness', as much as λευκότερος may be said to denote 'whiteness'.

Unwarranted parallelism is a fault to be evidenced at De. Conj. 505, where the author states that γὰρ is used with the same construction and connotation as ὅτι, except that γὰρ always occupies second place in its clause, and furthermore, the clause, to which it is attached, is placed second, being appended to the rear of the main clause to which it makes reference. He is prepared to regard such places where this rule is broken (e.g. Iliad 2, 284) as mere hyperbata. However, ὅτι can be shown to control a bound clause in effect (i.e. subordinate) while γὰρ is used to introduce a free clause, generally, in fact, a separate sentence.²⁶ There is, therefore, a difference in operation within the sentence structure of which Dyscolus was either ignorant or careless.

Other short examples which may be quoted are, for example, the

suggestion at Synt. III, 60 that there is a valid parallel to be drawn between nouns and verbs in so far that, just as one does not eject common nouns from the substantival group of forms on the grounds of their failing to denote special qualities, so one is not justified in excluding the infinitive from the verb class merely because it fails to denote certain of the special features of the verb, namely number, person and διάθεσις.²⁷ Finally, in connection with heteroclite forms, Apollonius sees what Egger²⁸ terms 'une grande analogie' between verb forms such as φέρω, οἶω, and a pronominal paradigm such as ἐγώ, νῶι, (De Pro. I4C).

3.4.3. Lack of understanding leads Dyscolus into an apparent problem in connection with the acceptance of the infinitive within the verb group, and the rejection of the participle from membership of that group. At Synt. III, 190, he observes that what is true regarding case government of nouns following verbs is also true when nouns are made to be dependent upon a participle, although the latter rejects the personal distinction denoted by the verb, together with what Hahn would again term 'modal distinction' (τὰς παρεκόμενας διάθεσεις ψυχικάς). He then admits that failure to make the above distinctions is the reason for the participle being excluded from the verb group, despite its ability to make temporal distinctions. On the other hand, he argues at length for the inclusion of the

non-person, non-number distinguishing infinitive form within the verb group. Dyscolus sees it as a difficulty but tries to avoid the problem, first by suggesting that the infinitive is the most general member of the verb group (τὸ γενικώτατον ῥῆμα). He then continues (Synt. III, 61) by drawing another invalid parallel, for he states that every derived form can be split up into an original form, together with some element which possesses the same force as the derived form (e.g. Ἐκτορίδης = Ἐκτορὸς υἱός).²⁹ In the same way, he believes that every mood of the verb may be replaced by the infinitive together with a word which denotes the same as the particular mood in question (e.g. περιπατῶ → ὠριόμην περιπατεῖν). Yet this in itself is clearly no just reason for excluding the participle from the verb class while retaining the infinitive (cf. βαδίζω → διατελῶ βαδίζων).³⁰ The crux of the matter will be seen, however, to lie in the fact that contextually the infinitive is part of the verb, whereas it is in syntactical and morphological terms that it stands on its own.

The argument allegedly put forward by other writers that there is no structure in which two verbs in different moods in one sentence refer to one and the same person (as e.g. * λέξαις γράφεις) is used by them in support of their view that the infinitive in e.g. γράφειν θέλεις cannot be classed as a verb form. Apollonius, however, rejects their view (Synt. III, 57) on the grounds that one can acceptably write ἐὼν ἀναγνωσκῆ, πρόσεχε. Although he has probably missed altogether the point of subordination, one must not overlook

the possibility of his being deficient in categories with which to distinguish subordinate clauses. It is not deficiency in this respect but rather inadequate elucidation which suggests a misunderstanding at Synt. IV, 52 where Apollonius states that ἔξον and κάρων are neuter since they are used in colligation with infinitives, as are their original forms in the indicative. He would no doubt have been better advised to have emphasised that this result is obtained by virtue of the infinitive being the subject.

A further example, revealing the limited extent to which verbal analysis had developed in Dyscolus' time, is evidenced at Synt. IV, 12, where the writer observes that whereas, in general terms, prepositions may be compounded with other forms either by synthesis or by apposition, they are only attached to the nominative case of substantives by synthesis. He makes a confusion of syntax with word formation here, as he also does when he states that it is clear from the position of the accent that σύνοικος is similarly formed by synthesis (although, as is pointed out, there are examples to the contrary, e.g. περικλυτός). He adds that words formed by synthesis are found in every case, whereas he believes that this is not true with structures formed by parathesis. Dyscolus is here trying to sort out a confusion amongst earlier writers between derivation and inflection; συν in σύνοικος is merely a productive, bound morpheme, whereas σύν# is a preposition in its own right, proclitic but case governing. It is unfortunate that lack of graphic clarity and phonological evidence hampers our detailed

understanding of the synthesis/parathesis question. Egger³¹ suggests that Dyscolus was aware of the difference between root and ending, but did not possess the technical vocabulary with which to explain the idea of a root form; for he never makes any attempt to break this down in the same way that he analyses derived (i.e. compounded) forms.

A final example, revealing inadequate understanding on the part of Dyscolus, this time in a morphological connection, occurs at De Pro. 132A. Here, the author states, in dealing with reflexive and possessive pronouns, that these forms change their endings to distinguish gender and case, but change their initial syllables to distinguish persons. To differentiate number, however, they alter both (e.g. ἐμὸς, νωιτέρω, ἡμέτεροι). Although no case distinction is required with verbs (they already contain an inherent nominative; De Pro. 28A) Dyscolus observes that verbs do change their endings to denote persons. The reason for this difference is felt by the writer to lie in the fact that pronouns have cases which assume certain terminations and hence any change of case in final syllables would be obliterated if the final syllable were to denote change in the category of person at the same time. Here, however, he is clearly overlooking such forms as κοφῶ, κοφαῖς, and consequently the details of the whole principle of inflexion with its precluding of the simultaneous and matched extrication of categories and formal elements.³²

NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

1 (1951: 4).

2 (1838, pt. 2:111).

3 It is interesting to note in this respect, however, the extent to which members of the Transformationalist school are now prepared to make use of arguments drawn from the fields of logic, psychology and mathematics (so, for example, N. Chomsky, On the notion 'rule of grammar'. Proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium in Applied Mathematics: 6 - 24. American Mathematical Society, 1961.

4 (1889: para. 234; see also Appendix 1, esp. p.375).

5 Griechische Grammatik, Vol. 2, ed. Debrunner: 240/1.

6 Egger (1854: 43): "Pour lui, la grammaire est un ensemble de lois et de règles établies sur l'observation exacte des faits." Cf. also Croiset, Vol. 5: 635; Sandys, Hist. of Class. Scholarship, 1903, vol. 1: 313; and below, 4.0.

7 Cf. Hjelmslev (1953:12): "The description shall be free of contradiction, exhaustive and as simple as possible." In addition to the examples quoted here, one may also note instances mentioned in the text elsewhere, as e.g. 2.1.2. where Dyscolus endeavours to establish two contrary principles regarding the classification of forms (namely, the appeal to the ending of the word, as opposed to the appeal to the underlying connotation) and 4.5.0. regarding the value of the appeal to substitution in the same connection.

8 This reference is suggested by Uhlig (1910: 327).

9 On this inconsistency, see further R. Skrzeczka (1861: 9). On the idea that Dyscolus may well have changed his opinion regarding topics discussed in earlier works, see further R.

Schneider (1864: 473ff.). It is encouraging to compare the theory of Schneider regarding the lateness of the volumes on syntax with Dyscolus' own statement at *De Adv.* 530 to the effect that "It will be shown in greater detail in the *Syntax*....", clearly implying that the *Syntax* volumes were written at a later date than *De Adverbio*.

10 See above 2.4.1. and also Hjelmslev (1935: 4).

11 (1878 notes: 78).

12 See above 1.1.2.

13 (1878 notes: 92).

14 (1847: 17).

15 See further above 2.1.3.

16 On these conjunctions, see further discussion in Thierfelder (1935: 67ff. and esp. 69).

17 (1951: 48, fn. 99).

18 1.1.1.

19 It is difficult to reconcile this statement with his argument discussed below at 3.4.3. to the effect that the infinitive is part of the verb, since he is fully aware of such colligations as τὸ γράφειν (*Synt.* 1, 50). For a more detailed discussion of the colligation of the article with the infinitive, see A. Oguse. *Sur des emplois peu connus de l'infinitif précédé de l'article*. *Revue de Philologie*, Vol. 40, fasc. 1. 1966: 59-67.

20 See above 2.1.0. for a discussion of Dyscolus' tendency to over-prescriptivism in this connection.

- 21 E.g. Synt. III, 31 where he notes cases of *συνεμπτώσις* in verbal homophones such as *νικῶ*, *νικῶ*, *ἔλεγον* etc. On the pronunciation of these forms, and the point of the iota subscript especially, see further ^{E.}H. Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin*, 2nd edition, 1940.
- 22 See further 0, 2.1.0., 4.0., 4.1.
- 23 Schneider, writing on this passage (1878: 170) suggests the following equivalencies: *ἔμπροσθεν* - vorn; *ἐκ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν* - von vorn; *εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν* - nach vorn; cf. Egger (1854: 201); and also note *ἐνθεν* which solely answers to 'inde', because, according to Dyscolus, its Doric equivalent *ἐνθα* supplied the other two connotations.
- 24 See further Lersch (1838, pt. 2: 132ff.) for discussion of this feature of the article.
- 25 1.2.2.
- 26 Cf. Goodwin (1889, para. 714). *ὅτι* clauses are bound in such a way that e.g. 'virtual oratio obliqua' can be shown in their relation to the free clause; with *γάρ* clauses, no such cohesive relationship to the clause containing the explicandum exists.
- 27 See further above 2.4.3.
- 28 (1854: 99).
- 29 This example can be interpreted as meaning that, for example, to produce a patronymic, one treats a patronymic as a grammatical property to be given morphological realisation, that this may be denoted e.g. by the term *υἰός*, and that this element *υἰός*

may then be realised as $-ιδης$, $-αδης$, $-ιαδης$, etc. according to the special dictionary listing of the element symbolised by Ηἶctor, and that the correct application of the morpheme to the name will in fact produce a form 'Ἐκτορίδης. Cf. P. H. Matthews, The Inflectional Component of a word and paradigm grammar. Journal of Linguistics 1965, vol. 1, no. 2; 139ff.

30 Cf. Priscian III, 32: 'participia potestate tamen et vi significationis omnes contient ⁿ modos'. Also note Adelaide Hahn (1951: 43) who believes that we can make periphrastic use of the participle to form any tense and mood of the verb. It is worthwhile here to note Dyscolus' remark at De Adv. 530 regarding the similar force underlying the verb and the participle (δυναμεῖ ἰδίωμα τὸ τοῦ ῥήματος), and his observation that the participle is nevertheless incapable of producing complete sense on its own. On the separate allocation of the participle, see further Lersch (1938, pt. 2: 130-1).

31 (1854: 305).

32 See further C. E. Bazell, Linguistic Typology, University of London Inaugural Lecture, London, 1958: 10.

4.0. DISCUSSION OF ASPECTS OF DYSCOLUS' THEORIES WHICH ARE
COMPATIBLE WITH TRENDS OF MODERN GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS

In this chapter, no attempt is consciously being made towards criticising any aspects of modern grammatical theory, the objective being rather to reveal any facets of Dyscolus' theorisation that can be related to any current or recent trends in analysis. At the same time, one must bear in mind that Dyscolus was writing with the intention of producing a description of the classical Greek language as he knew it from his reading and from how he himself heard it being spoken.¹ This is theoretically at least in keeping with the aims of modern descriptive grammar, which, to quote Robins' definition,² 'sets itself to analyse and describe part of the structure and working of a given language as spoken or written at a particular time amongst members of a particular speech community.' Robins continues by suggesting that 'grammar depends for its existence on the assumption that patterns are discoverable, and that such an analytic technique can be usefully employed towards the discovery of these patterns.' In his own less-polished manner, Dyscolus aims at the discovery of patterns within language, but to him these patterns are very much the result of the force of analogy.³ There can be little doubt that this was a valid search - there are indeed regularities in grammatical forms and functions, and it is part of the task of the analyst to search out and bring to classification these patterns. References

have been made elsewhere⁴ to the view that Dyscolus makes some early contribution towards the establishment of a 'scientific' approach to grammatical theorisation. By modern standards, he falls short, even in some of the most elementary respects,⁵ as has been discussed above in chapter 3. Yet he is nevertheless himself critical and discriminating in reviewing the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, and especially those authors who, he felt, 'lacked a methodical approach'.⁶

4.1. The analogist school of thought may be compared with that of the Realist group,⁷ since both schools incline to the idea that in language there is a level or organisation which is totally independent of deduction by the grammarian, whose task consists rather in the discovery of these regularities and patterns.⁸ One may further compare the idea of the Realist school, outlined by Householder, with Dyscolus' remarks in the opening of the first book of the Syntax. At Syntax 1. 2, he states that letters are joined together to produce syllables, not by mere chance, but according to the demands of the laws of syntax (ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ δέον συντάξει). So also, at Syntax 1. 8, he observes that a solecism is produced by forms being colligated in a manner contrary to this necessary order (ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ δεόντα τῶν λέξεων ἐπικυναφθῆ, τὸ τοιοῦτο καλοῦμεν σολοικισμόν). (This latter idea, however, is not to be confused with the use of order

(τάξις) in Syntax 1.13 etc. in terms of the hierarchical ordering of the parts of speech, etc.). The elements of the various levels of grammar are colligated correctly (or incorrectly) in so far as they correspond (or fail to do so) with this underlying system of organisation, i.e. to use the terminology of generative grammar, it is this 'τὸ δέον' which generates the acceptable structures within a language. It is unfortunate that Dyscolus is here insufficiently explicit to enable one to determine precisely how philosophical or pragmatical he intends this use of τὸ δέον to be. If he believed in it as being the basis for elemental rules to be employed with reference to phonotactic or morphotactic components, then one can see his idea as a distant forerunner of the theory of 'fixed initial constraints' for the development of grammar, discussed by Chomsky⁹ with reference especially to "possible, non-existent forms" in a language, such as /blik/ as opposed to /bnik/ in modern English usage.

4.2.0. One can begin to trace in Dyscolus' writing the germ of an idea based upon the transformation of forms. This is only hinted at primarily in a very simple manner in terms of morpho-phonology, but it can be observed that Dyscolus' theory on the phonological formation of βέλη from βέλεα (Synt. I, 10) is analogous to the transformational rules found in the earliest

writings of Chomsky and others of this school of thought.¹⁰

Furthermore, the idea put forward at 111. 61 that every compound form can be split into an original form together with some element that produces the same sense as the compounded form,¹¹ - the idea there that any mood of the verb can be transformed into the infinitive together with an element that will produce the particular notion of the given mood - these too contain the germ of the same basic idea of transformation. Apollonius is also well aware of the restrictions imposed upon forms by co-occurrence,¹² and he knows only too well that the choice of a first word may well affect the choice of subsequent words, since certain words are found in restricted usage when colligated with other forms.¹³

4.2.1. Probably the most obvious example of transformation in Dyscolus' writing is that found in connection with the transformation from the active verb to its passive form, as recorded in 111. 157ff. He suggests that verbs which require the addition of an oblique case to complete their sense may be changed into the passive, although he does not possess the detailed terminology with which to describe the exact process of the transformation. He does however state at 111. 159 that, with the passive form, the 'sufferer' is found in the nominative case, while the active verb assumes passive formation, being followed by ὑπο with the genitive (he

instances $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta\ \sigma\epsilon \rightarrow \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\iota\ \upsilon\pi\omicron\ \sigma\omicron\upsilon$). This may be readily compared with Chomsky's summary¹⁴ of this particular transformation: "Object and subject are interchanged; verb \rightarrow is + V + en + by".

The above rule of Dyscolus is also fully in keeping with the generalisation made by Robins¹⁵ in discussing transformation analysis: "Subject to certain storable exceptions,¹⁶ from sentences of the structure $NP_1\ V_t\ NP_2$ (Where NP = noun or nominal group, and V_t = a verb that admits the form 'was(was eaten, was seen, etc.)', a lexically corresponding sentence of the form $NP_2\ V_p$ by NP_1 can be produced by applying the transformational processes of word order change, word form change and the addition of 'by'".¹⁷

4.2.2. However, once the transformation has begun, the important question becomes 'what will constitute the "sentence kernels" of the language?'¹⁸ As far as Dyscolus is concerned, there can be little doubt as to what would fill this role, since his writings make it abundantly clear (Synt. 1.14) that, once the noun and the verb are removed, the whole sense forthwith collapses.¹⁹ Although he does grant priority of place to the noun,²⁰ he nevertheless does imply at 111. 8 that no nominative form on its own can constitute a sentence (i.e. without a verb), not even in answer to an interrogative utterance, since in the latter context, one must mentally supply the necessary verb. Since he is fully aware of the ability of the

verb to denote person in all its moods (with the exception of the infinitive), he is assured of the pronominal (if not the substantival) element always being present, assuming that a sentence, consisting solely of a verb, were to be regarded as acceptable (1. 17).

Lyons observes²¹ that since the nineteenth century there has been considerable discussion regarding the relative priority of nouns and verbs from a historical point of view, and he notes the tendency of many scholars to put forward the view that nouns were of verbal origin (see his references). Dyscolus however makes no claim to the universal application of his parts of speech, a view echoed by Lyons who suggests (ib.id) that they should merely be regarded as 'complex cover terms to be employed in the description of a particular language.'

The question of a priority of noun and verb in grammatical analysis has recently become a point of linguistic interest.²² Robins²³ follows the theory of Dyscolus when he speaks of setting up a class of nouns and a class of verbs, with the other word classes being defined in part at least by their syntactic relations with these.²⁴ That there are these basic underlying features of language (i.e. noun and verb) is accepted also by members of the transformationalist school, e.g. Chomsky²⁵ believes that "certain fixed categories (Noun, Verb, etc.) can be found with syntactic representation in the sentences of any one language." Similarly, one can observe how Dyscolus' theory regarding the essential

importance of these two forms touches on the idea of the immediate constituents of a sentence, since they would form the basic minimum pattern for any sentence type.²⁶

4.3.0. The factor which has especially brought Dyscolus into conflict with much recent and current grammatical opinion is that of the choice of multiple criteria with which to establish linguistic categories, as was seen above in chapter 1. This is by no means to suggest, however, that Dyscolus is at variance with the whole of modern thinking on this matter. Lyons opens his article (1966b) by stating that he feels that the traditional 'notional' theory of the parts of speech merits a more sympathetic consideration than it has received from most linguists in recent years. The idea of 'notional' grammar is regarded by Jespersen²⁷ as starting from the assumption that there exist extralingual categories which are independent of the more or less accidental facts of existing languages (cf. Halliday²⁸: 'The context is the relation of the form to non-linguistic features of the situations in which language operates and to linguistic features other than those of the item under attention, these being together "extratextual" features'.) Whereas Dyscolus is prepared to give priority to contextual considerations, and generally to allow them to override arguments drawn from morphology and syntax (see above 1.3.2., 1.3.3.), the

formalist school of thought would tend to allow the appeal to non-verbal constituents of structures only in corroboration of formal characteristics which are being used as criteria for the establishment of word classes. While Dyscolus does not go to the 'extreme' of Bull²⁹ in applying the basis of contextual meaning as the essential appeal in categorisation, he would tend to assume a *via media*, making abundant use, where expedient, of all forms of criteria.

It is interesting to note in this light the remarks made by Uhlenbeck³⁰ to the effect that every single sentence has to be interpreted by the hearer with the help of extra-linguistic, i.e. situational data.³¹ These may be:

- (1) the situation in which the sentence is spoken.
- (2) preceding sentences (if any)
- (3) the hearer's knowledge of the speaker.

These are also stressed by Tatjana Slama-Cazacu, as has been mentioned above 1.0, and these ideas compare favourably with the situational³² ideas expressed by Dyscolus (e.g. *Synt.* I, 96) that the circumstances of the first and second persons are 'known' (i.e. the speaker and the listener), as compared with the 'unknown' third person. Uhlenbeck goes on to question whether in fact the transformationalists have really ignored too much the call of such extralinguistic criteria. (ibid:17).

4.3.1. While on the subject of criteria, it is also worthwhile to note how Dyscolus' treatment of varied criteria discussed above (1.3.1.), where syntactical considerations are regularly given priority over those of morphology where the two differ, can be compared with the view of Robins³³ to the effect that where there is a conflict between morphological and syntactical classification, syntax is almost always accorded priority. For, in the general analysis of languages, states Robins, words are assigned to word classes on the formal basis of syntactic behaviour, supplemented and reinforced by differences of morphological paradigm. This is precisely true for Dyscolus, and it probably accounts for the more abundant use of syntactical criteria (cf. above 1.1.1. and 1.1.2.).

In connection with logical criteria (above 1.2.1.), mention was made of Apollonius' development of the anaphora³⁴ concept in the article (Synt. 1, 43; 2, 10) - a theory for the origin of which Robins³⁵ credits Dyscolus with 'acute insight'. The general idea of 'reference back' is paralleled in the writing of Professor Dover on Greek Word Order,³⁶ in which the author deals with what he terms 'logical determinants'. In treating of these logical categories in word order, Dover distinguishes predictable and dispensable concepts, and he regards the basic Greek utterance as being composed of two logical types, 'nuclei' and 'concomitants'. The nucleus of the utterance is that which is indispensable to the

sense of the utterance and which cannot be predicted from the preceding elements, while the term 'concomitant' covers any part which can be dispensed with on the grounds of its being unreservedly predicted from another part of the sentence. With certain reservations, one may perhaps parallel the use of the article to refer back to a previously mentioned subject with the idea of concomitancy, as opposed to the 'novelty' of the nucleus, to use Dover's terminology. In dealing with a spoken language, the observer can form an assessment of the relationship between the 'given' and the 'new' through contrastive intonations, together with further subtleties if the 'given' is accepted but the 'new' is questioned.³⁷ Otherwise, grammatical features of word order or even of morphemic opposition come into play. That the Greeks and the Romans were also conscious of the idea underlying this 'nucleus/concomitancy' opposition is suggested by Woodcock's note,³⁸ when dealing with purely temporal 'cum' clauses, to the effect that the past subjunctive is used to convey what is 'given' if this occurs in the subordinate clause, while the past indicative is employed for what is 'new' if similarly contained within the subordinate clause. N. E. Collinge³⁹ suggests that the Greek idea along similar lines may be seen in the use of ἐπει, to direct a clause containing the 'given' while ὅτε directs a clause containing the 'new'.

4.4.0. No attempt at grammatical description is worthwhile unless a clear statement is made regarding the units⁴⁰ in which the analyst believes that the particular language in question operates, and with which the external phenomena of language are built up. Dyscolus' idea, as set out in the opening chapters of Syntax 1, and discussed above, especially at 1.1.1., consists of a vertical scale in which the author starts from the minimal unit, viz. τὸ στοιχεῖον,⁴¹ which he subdivides into two groups, φωνήεντα (vocalic elements capable of being uttered by themselves) and συμφώνη (consonants which require the addition of a vocalic element in every context). It is worthwhile here to note that he likens this relationship⁴² to what we would term 'bound' and 'free' forms, i.e. those parts of speech which can be used absolutely (nouns, verbs, pronouns, and 'adverbs' - exclamatory forms, probably our interjection) (Synt. 1. 12), as opposed to the preposition, article and conjunction (these latter requiring a particular syntactical environment).

Dyscolus has no awareness of what we would term 'the morpheme', his lowest unit is this στοιχεῖον which he defines as being indivisible (ἀμέρητος)⁴³ much in the same way that Hockett⁴³ states that morphemes are not composed of phonemes - they are indivisible units. After στοιχεῖον which forms the lowest link in the chain,⁴⁴ the second stage is reached by the joining together of elements to form the syllable, and it is then the combination of these

syllables in due order that brings him to the level of the word. Although Dyscolus only details this analysis in terms of the build up of the more complex from the lower units, there is no reason to doubt that he conceived of it as working in both directions; he is fully aware in other places (Synt. 1, 10; 111, 61) of the 'breaking down' of forms, especially compound forms, into their component parts. Here we may observe a similarity between Dyscolus' view and that of Halliday regarding the relationship of the various units, although the latter is far more adept at keeping the approach free from non-grammatical intrusions. For, unlike Panini, Dyscolus builds up his units of grammatical analysis to the level of the word via phonology. The confusion of the phonological elements of letters (sc. phonemes) and syllables with the grammatical concepts of the word and sentence is an unfortunate weakness, but is perhaps inevitable at this early stage of the development of analysis where the distinction between the various levels of language study had not yet become apparent. This particular distinction between phonology and grammar is still maintained by all linguists and even in a de facto manner by members of the transformationalist school. A particularly clear statement of principle in this respect is given by W. S. Allen's study of Abaza,⁴⁵ the point being made at pp. 145ff. that 'word' tends to be both a grammatical and phonological abstraction, wherein the criteria of both analyses to some extent coincide.⁴⁶

4.4.1. In the same way that Robins⁴⁷ believes that the sentence is by definition grammatically complete in itself, so Apollonius terms his conception of the sentence as 'ὁ αὐτοτελής λόγος' (1.1/2 etc.). For Dyscolus, as for most linguistic thought in the twentieth century, the sentence was the highest unit which he could conceive of as operating within the language structure, but the majority of his work was connected with what was for him the essentially meaningful element of the analysis, namely the word (λέξις). It is important here to note the view expressed at Synt. 1.2 regarding the meaningful quality of the word as being the constituent of the complete sense (or sentence?) (λόγος).⁴⁸ Although he is fully aware that morphological changes in nouns and verbs indicate differences in tertiary categories such as number, case and person, he nevertheless treats the word as forming the basis of his analysis, and it is the interrelation of words with one another within the sentence structure that is his main concern in the Syntax. To this extent at least, Dyscolus is in agreement with the view of Robins⁴⁹ who argues in favour of a word-based grammar, and opposes too much emphasis being placed on the conceptual features of the smallest units. An interesting parallel in this connection is also found in the writings of ~~Bach~~^{εγθα} Siertsema⁵⁰ in her creditable attempt to explain much of the unduly complex terminology of Hjelmslev's earlier work (1953). Miss Siertsema argues strongly in favour of

the word being regarded as the only means of handling a concept, and she suggests that it has never been necessary to make an attempt to find the sign (words) of a language that we know, because they constitute directly given data (pp. 136, 169). Still closer to Dyscolus' above idea is her statement on page 167: "How do we know the meaning of a sentence unit at all if not by the meanings of the words of which it has been constructed?"⁵¹

4.5.0. At de Pro. 65C, Dyscolus states that parts of speech which are identical in form may well be distinguished by their syntax.

Whereas other writers had argued that *cù* must be regarded purely as a vocative form, Dyscolus maintains the possibility of its being accepted also as a nominative form and he adduces, in support of this theory, the syntactical fact that this pronoun is colligated with verbs of 'being' and 'calling', which verbs he observes are used with nominative case forms. This latter appeal to the meaning of words to help list them is noteworthy in view of the similar suggestion put forward in some modern grammars such as that of Householder.⁵² Similar references to a special syntax being found with these verbs are made at Synt. 1, 108; 1, 122; 2, 47, and in De Pro. 30A. He continues this discussion by stating that all nouns, except when used in the vocative case, are to be colligated with the third person of the verb, unless again the verb is one

of 'κλητικ' or 'ὑπαρκτικ'. Pronouns are colligated with the first and second persons of verbs partly at least on account of the limitations imposed upon substantives in these persons, and since he observes ^{this pronoun} ~~as~~ being used with verbs in all cases, he sees no reason to exclude the form from the nominative case. He further notes at 66C that forms joined by copulative conjunctions are for the most part in the same case, and hence in an example such as *cù καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἐκεῖνος*, it is not unreasonable to accept that *cù* is a nominative form. This last point is suggestive of the 'Combination' test put forward by C. E. Bazell verbally at least in an address to the Linguistics Association, his thesis being that to determine whether two forms possess an identical grammatical status one may let them stand in combination and then decide whether they are both acceptable in this new form. This idea of 'combination' is closely allied to the theory of 'substitution' which was developed by Glinz.⁵³ In addition to the test of re-arrangement (Verschiebeprobe) and the test of deletion (Weglassbarkeit), which, as suggested above, would bring Dyscolus back to the noun and verb in the sentence, Glinz produces this third test which he terms 'Ersatzprobe' - a parallel to the American concept of the Substitution Frame. Dyscolus is somewhat uncertain, however, of the validity of this test. In De Pro. 38B, he suggests that the final argument in favour of allocating *τηλικούτο* to the substantival class is that *ἴτιος* (also a noun in his theory) may be substituted for it, and he accordingly

feels obliged to admit that it must belong to the same part of speech as ἴσος. Contrary to this principle, however, at De Pro. 80C (as also at 7A and De Conj. 488), Apollonius postulates that the mere fact that one part of speech may be substituted for another is no guarantee that the two forms must be allocated to the same part of speech (he is here opposing the idea of other writers that ὠτόν must be allocated to the substantival group on the grounds of its being synonymous⁵⁴ with μόνος in Il. 8, 99).

~~One must at the same time not overlook the fact that if X replaces Y, and Y does not, then X and Y are different parts of speech.~~ However,

he still suggests at De Pro. 81B that the essential argument for the inclusion of ὠτόν within the pronominal class is that it may be used in place of a noun, and secondly that one can substitute another third person pronoun for ὠτόν without any change in significance.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

- 1 See further above 2.1.0.
- 2 1951: 93
- 3 For a detailed discussion of Apollonius and the 'analogia' concept, see G. Frohne (1844: 6ff.).
- 4 e.g. chap. 1, fn. 5.
- 5 As, for example, with regard to the three basic canons of science: 'exhaustiveness', 'consistency' and 'economy', this latter being surely of meagre (if indeed any) importance in comparison with the the first two. See further Robins (1965: 8) and cf. also the remark of Hjelmslev, quoted above, chap. 3, fn. 7.
- 6 e.g. Synt. 2, 113 where he advocates the importance of the truly methodical approach, 'τὸν ἐμμεθόδως ἀποδειχθέντα λόγον'.
- 7 See further F. W. Householder, I.J.A.L., 1952, vol. 18, 260-8; cf. Robins (1966: 6).
- 8 cf. the 'analogist' search for patterns with the remarks of R. M. Dixon, Linguistic Science and Logic, Mouton, The Hague, 1963 (= Janua Linguarum Series Minor, No. 28), p. 11: "The scientist will recognise a certain pattern that is common to a number of observations.....Having thus recognised certain patterns, he will compare and correlate them.....A theory is obtained by generalisation upon pattern correlations.....The first function of a scientific theory is that it should be descriptive. Instead of having to refer to each recognised pattern in each observation individually,

we can describe the patterns in toto by means of the theory."
 of. the Transformationalist attitude towards patterns and
 regularities in Chomsky (1965b: 103).

- 9 Chomsky (1965b: 101). See further below fn.55.
- 10 On the attitude of some members of the Transformationalist School
 towards the work of earlier grammarians who write within the
 tradition of the Graeco-Roman School, see Chomsky (1964, esp.
 15ff.).
- 11 See above chap. 3, fn. 29 for discussion of this idea with
 regard to patronymics.
- 12 'Restrictional co-occurrence grammar', - see Halliday (1961: 260),
 Robins (1965: 224). One may quote the limitations observed by
 Dyscolus (Synt. III, 19) on the use of certain temporal adverbs
 as an example of what Halliday (ibid: 272f.) would presumably
 term "Restrictions with a greater degree of delicacy." See fn.56.
- 13 cf. Chomsky (1957: 140ff.).
- 14 (1957: 77), cf. also (1965a:167-8).
- 15 (1965: 242).
- 16 Dyscolus' inaccuracy in regarding 'dative' verbs as one of these
 exceptions is discussed at 3.1.1.
- 17 See further Z. S. Harris, Transformational Theory, Language 1965,
 Vol. 41, No. 3, fasc. I, p. 383.
- 18 On the recent rejection of the idea of sentence 'kernels', cf.
 Lyons (1966a: 119) who quotes Chomsky (1965a: 18); and Matthew's
 review of Chomsky (1965a) in JL 3, No.1, 1967:146; also

Werner Winter, Transformation without kernels. Language 1965, Vol. 41, No. 3, fasc. I, 484ff.

- 19 of. Plato, Cratylus 431B: λόγοι γάρ που ὡς ἐγγῆμαι ἢ τούτων (sc. ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων) ξύνθεσις ἐστὶ and Aristotle, Rhetorica 3, 2: ὄντων δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, although it would be anachronistic to suggest that Plato and Aristotle used these terms in our sense of noun and verb. For a more detailed discussion of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα in this respect, see H. Armbruster (1867: 3-7).
- 20 He states at Synt. 1. 16 that it is from the 'state' of the noun that the essential characteristics of the accompanying verb are derived. τὸ διατιθέσθαι καὶ τὸ διατίθεσθαι σώματος ἴδιον τοῖς δὲ σώμασιν ἐπικείμεναι ἢ θέσις τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἰδιότης τοῦ ῥήματος, λέγω τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸ πάθος. See further fn. 57.
- 21 (1966b: 231) Note how he concludes also that nouns are of prior origin to verbs.
- 22 e.g. J. Firbas (Thoughts on the Communicative Function of the Verb in English, German and Czech, Brno Studies in English, 1959: 42) emphasises the need to discover the relative importance of all the elements of an utterance.
- 23 (1952: 293) cf. 1, 36: τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν μερῶν τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος σύνταξιν.
- 24 It may well be that a favourable comparison can be drawn between (a) Dyscolus' theory (Synt. 1, 36) that the six remaining parts

of speech are to be grouped according to whether they are colligated with and/or used in place of the noun and verb (see further above 2.1.1.) and (b) the idea of Zellig Harris that other elements are shunted to one side of each centre element (String Analysis of Sentence Structure, Papers on Formal Linguistics, No. I, Mouton, The Hague, 1962), although one must bear in mind that, for Harris, there may well be nouns and verbs in his left and right adjuncts.

25 (1965a: 28). See further below fn. 58.

26 Synt. 1. 14: *πᾶς λόγος ἄνευ τούτων οὐ συγκλείεται*, stressing the importance of the noun and verb in the sentence structure, On the noun and verb as the basis for further expansion, cf. E. Bach. Introduction to Transformational Grammars. New York. 1964, p. 34ff.

27 (1924: 55).

28 (1961: 243).

29 (1960: 2). Dyscolus could hardly have agreed with Bull that in his day "the features of objective reality which are pertinent to the problem had been analysed thoroughly by the physical sciences so as to be clearly defined."

30 E. M. Uhlenbeck. An Appraisal of Transformation Theory. *Lingua*, Vol. 12, 1963, pp. 1-18, esp. IIff.

31 On the recent support for a 'widening' of earlier views on context, see J. Lyons (1963: 84, 5).

- 32 With the appeal to inner situational (mental) criteria, cf. Hjelmslev (1953: 5): "Language is the instrument with which man forms thought, feeling, mood, aspiration, will, act."
- 33 (1965: 226), see also (1959: 109) for the expression of a similar view.
- 34 On the general concept of anaphora, see reference to Halliday, chapter 1, fn. 78.
- 35 (1951: 43).
- 36 (1960: 34ff.).
- 37 See further M. A. K. Halliday, *Studies in Linguistic Analysis*, 61, and N. E. Collinge, *Archivum Linguisticum*, 1960, fasc. 2, p. 100.
- 38 *A New Latin Syntax*, p. 235, fn. ii.
- 39 *ibid*, p. 107.
- 40 cf. Halliday (1961: 251): 'the category set up to account for the stretches that carry grammatical patterns is the unit'. 'The relation amongst the units is that going from top (largest) to bottom (smallest) each consists of one or more than one of the unit next below.' See further on grammatical units, Cl. E. Bazell, (1953: 11); C. L. Ebeling, *Linguistic Units*, *Janua Linguarum*, No. 12, Mouton, The Hague. Halliday's line of thinking, in terms of a scale/category grammar, is taken to be equivalent, *mutatis mutandis*, to the ideas developed in this direction by members of the tagmemic school centred around Pike, Longacre and others at the Summer Institute of Linguistics, and hence references to his works are felt to be sufficient in this respect.

- 41 So Roman Jakobson (Fundamentals of Language, Gravenhage, 1956, 7/8, with M. Halle) claims that the search for the ultimate discrete differential constituents of language can be traced back to Plato's conception of τὸ στοιχεῖον (of. Plato, Theatetus 201c, Pol. 278d).
- 42 cf. Hjelmslev (1953: 26) regarding 'selection' in this connection.
- 43 (1955: 15), cf. F. R. Palmer, Linguistic Hierarchy, Lingua 7, 1958, 229/30.
- 44 cf. Hjelmslev (1953: 28): 'The text is a chain, and all the parts (i.e. clauses, words, sentences, syllables, etc.) able to be subdivided'. It is worthwhile, with reference to this author, to note the affinity between Dyscolus' idea regarding personal possessive pronouns and that of Hjelmslev (1953: 24) where the latter, in his usual technical jargon, speaks of the 'solidarity' between morphemes (i.e. inflexional components considered as elements of the content) of different categories within a grammatical form, such that one morpheme of one category is necessarily accompanied by a morpheme of another category, as one may instance in connection with Dyscolus' theory regarding the significance of morphological changes in possessive pronouns to denote varying cases, numbers and persons (see further above 3.4.3.).
- 45 Structure and System in the Abaza Verbal Complex. TPS, 1956, 127-176.
- 46 S. M. Lamb has developed an interesting approach which may be compared with that of Dyscolus, After commencing his analysis

with a sememic network, realised in terms of a lexemic tree, he thus proceeds to the next level down (i.e. the word); then on, via morphemes, which are arranged in a chain, until ultimately the phonological exponents are reached (see further his 'Outline of Stratificational Grammar', Berkeley, 1962, and also 'On alternation, transformation, realisation and stratification', Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics, 17, Georgetown University Press.) On the idea that there exist phonological units independently of grammatical units, i.e. subdivisions of what some writers would term 'morphemes', see also Lamb, Prolegomena to a Theory of Phonology, Language, 1966, (Vol. 42, No. 2), p. 536.

47 (1965: 191).

48 "τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἐκάστης λέξεως παραφριστάμενον νοητὸν τρόπον τινα στοιχεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ λόγου."

49 (1959b: 127-8) cf. (1965: 199).

50 A Study of Glossematics. The Hague, 1955.

51 For a view contrary to that expressed here, see J. Brough, Theories of Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians, (TPS 1951, esp. pp. 45/6) where the meanings of words are regarded as mere stepping stones towards the meaning of the structure as a whole. cf. Eric Hamp, A Glossary of American Technical Linguistic Usage (1925-50) who quotes E. Sapir, Language, New York, 1921: 135: 'In an analytic language, the sentence is always of prime importance, the word is of minor interest.'

- 52 'Lists in Grammars', to be found in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress. Stanford University Press, 1962.
- 53 Die Innere Form Des Deutschen, Berne and Munich, 2nd. Edition, 1961, pp. 89-93 especially for a discussion of Ersatzprobe. See also the review by Moulton in Language, Vol. 29, 1953, 175-180, and vol. 39, 1963, 134-6.
- 54 For a discussion of the role of synonymy in semantics, see J. Lyons, (1963: 77-8, etc.).

ADDENDA

- 55 Cf. A. McIntosh, Patterns and Ranges. Language, 1961 vol. 37, No. 3, pt. I: 325ff.
- 56 On the range of phenomena to be influenced by 'selectional' ideas such as these, cf. Matthews' review of Chomsky (1965a) in JL 3, No. I. 1967: 131-2.
- 57 On the 'directional' character of the Noun/Verb relationship in the theories of the Transformationalist School, cf. Chomsky 1965a: II4-5.
- 58 cf. *ibid*: 35-6 regarding the role of the noun and verb in the context of language learning, and *ibid*: I20-3 on these parts of speech as terminal symbols.

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ABBREVIATIONS:

IJAL	International Journal of American Linguistics
JL	Journal of Linguistics
TAPA	Transactions of the American Philological Association.
TFS	Transactions of the Philological Society.
TCLC	Transactions of the Copenhagen Linguistic Circle.

GLOSSARY OF THE MORE COMMON AND IMPORTANT TERMS USED BY APOLLONIUS

ἀδιαβίβαστος	intransitive
αἰτιατική	the accusative case (sc. πῶς τις)
αἰτιολογικός	causal (used of conjunctions)
ἀκατάλληλος	incongruous, (used of elements at any level incorrectly fitted together)
ἀκαταλληλότης	incongruity
ἄκλιτος	indeclinable
ἀκολουθία	regularity of declension
ἀναλογία	uniformity, consistency
ἀναπόλησις	reference back
ἀναστρόφη	anastrophe (used of accents)
ἀναφορά	reference back to what has been previously mentioned
ἀνθυπάγειν	to use instead of, to substitute for
ἀντιδιαστολή	contra-distinction, contrasted opposition
ἀντωνυμία	the pronoun
ἀόριστος	(i) used of forms which are unlimited in their sphere of reference. (ii) the aorist tense (sc. χρόνος)
ἀπαρέμφατος	the infinitive mood
ἄπλοῦς	simple, i.e. non-compounded forms
ἀποφατικός	negative; used as a special quality of the indicative
ἄπτωτος	indeclinable

ἄρθρον	the article, including the definite article and the relative pronoun
ἀριθμός	the category of number
ἀρσενικόν	the masculine gender (sc. γένος)
ἀκύναρθρον	used of forms that cannot be colligated with the article
ἀκύνθετος	simple, as opposed to compound
αὐτοτέλεια	completion (often with τοῦ λόγου, complete sense)
αὐτοτελής	complete
βαρύς	the grave accent (sc. τόνος)
βραχός	short, used of syllables
γενική	the genitive case (sc. πτώσις)
γένος	(i) class (genus) (ii) gender
γνώσις	recognition, used of articles and demonstrative pronouns
δασύ	the rough breathing (sc. πνεῦμα)
δεικτικός	demonstrative (of pronouns)
δειξίς	demonstrativeness
δηλούμενον	connotation, as opposed to form (φώνη)
διάβασις	transition (e.g. active to passive, subject to object)
διαζευκτικός	disjunctive (used of conjunctions)
διάθεσις	disposition; voice (in the verb). (But see further 2.4.3.)
διάλεκτος	dialect
διάνοια	sense, notion
διαπορητικός	dubitative (used of conjunctions)

διασαφητικός	elective (used of conjunctions)
διαστολή	distinction
διαστακτική	the so-called dubitative mood (sc. ἔγκλισις)
δοτική	the dative case (sc. πῶσις)
δύναμις	(i) force, influence (ii) possibility
δύνητικός	potential (e.g. used of conjunctions)
ἐγχεῖσθαι	to be formed from
ἐγκλίθειν ἐγκλιθίς εἶδος	to throw back the accent as an enclitic the mood in the verb particular kind, type
ἐλλειπής	defective
ἔλλειψις	ellipsis
ἐμπεριεκτικός	able to embrace
ἐναλλαγή	interchange
ἐνδειά	deficiency
ἐνέργεια	action, activity; the active voice in the verb
ἐνεργεία	actual as opposed to potential (δυνάμει)
ἐνεστώς	the present tense (sc. χρόνος)
ἐνικός	singular (number)
ἐννοιά	basic connotation, sense
ἐπέκτασις	lengthening of a word
ἐπιζευκτικός	adjunctive (used of conjunctions governing a subjunctive)
ἐπιθετικόν	(i) the adjective (sc. ὄνομα). (ii) an appendage, as e.g. the adverb before the verb.
ἐπίρρημα	the adverb

ἐπίτασις	intensity
ἐσόμενος	the future tense (rare)
ἐτερόκλητος	heteroclite
εὐθεΐα	the nominative case (sc. πῶσις)
εὐκτική	the optative mood (sc. ἔγκλισις)
θέμα	original form, root word
θεματικός	a primary form, used e.g. of nouns and verbs
θέσις	(i) arrangement, (ii) position, (iii) state
ἴδιον	peculiar characteristic of
ἰδίωμα	a particular property of
κατάλληλος	correctly colligated
καταλληλότης	correct colligation of forms
κατάφασις	affirmation
κλητική	the vocative case (sc. πῶσις)
κοινός	common (used of nouns of common gender etc.)
κτησις	possession
κτητικός	possessive (used of pronouns, etc.)
κύριος	proper (used of nouns)
λέξις	word
λόγος	speech; statement, sentence; argument, reason; principle
μέλλων	the future tense (sc. χρόνος)
μερισμός	allocation to parts of speech
μέρος λόγου	a part of speech
μέση	the middle voice of the verb (sc. διάθεσις)

μεσότης	the middle voice of the verb
μετάβασις	transfer (e.g. of the action from the subject to the object)
μεταλαμβάνεσθαι	to be regarded as
μετάθεσις	transposition
μετοχή	the participle
μοναδικός	single
ὄνομα	the noun
ὀξύς	the acute accent (sc. τόνος)
ὄρθη	the nominative case (sc. πῶσις)
ὄρθος	correct accent (sc. τόνος)
ὀρίζομενος	limited, defined
ὀρισμός	definition
ὀριστική	the indicative mood (sc. ἔγνωνσις)
οὐσία	essence, substance; existence (Sein)
πάθος	the passive state
παθητική	the passive voice (sc. διάθεσις)
παράγω	to derive (e.g. by changing the form of a word)
παραγωγή	derivation
παράθεσις	formation of a compound form by apposition as opposed to synthesis (composition).
παραπληρωματικός	expletive (used of conjunctions)
παρατατικός	the imperfect tense (sc. χρόνος)
παρεπόμενα	categories found in forms (L. accidentia)

παρψηγημένος	past time in general as opposed to present time
παρώνυμον	a derived form
πευστικός	interrogative
πλαγίος	oblique (used of cases other than the nominative)
πλεονάζειν	to be redundant
πληθυντικός	the plural number
πνεῦμα	breathing
ποιότης	quality (as denoted through adjectival forms)
πρόθεσις	the preposition
προσθηγορικός	appellative (used of nouns)
προστακτική	the imperative mood of the verb (sc. ἔγκλισις)
πρόσωπον	the category of person
προτατικός	used in a protactic position, as the definite article
πρωτότυπος	an original, i.e. underived, form
πτῶσις	grammatical inflexion, especially the category of case
πτωτικόν	a form subject to inflexion, usually of case inflexion
ῥῆμα	the verb
σημαινόμενον	significance, connotation
σολοικισμός	solecism
στοιχεῖον	basic element of language, letter of the alphabet
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded from
συγκριτικός	the comparative degree of the adjective
συζυγία	conjugation in verbs, declension in nouns and pronouns
συλλαβή	syllable

σύμφωνα	consonants
σύνδεσμος	conjunction
ὁμοειδέσσις	identity of form
σύνθεσις	compounding of a form by synthesis as opposed to apposition
σύνθετος	a compounded form
σύνταξις	the (correct) arrangement of forms within the structure
σχῆμα	form, shape, schema
τάξις	order, position
τάσις	stress
τόνος	accent
ὕλη	material
ὑπερθετικός	the superlative degree in comparison
ὑπερσυντελικός	the pluperfect tense of the verb (sc. χρόνος)
ὑποθετική	the so-called "adherative" mood (sc. ἔγκλισις)
ὑποκείμενον	literally, the topic under observation; hence, the subject
ὑποτακτικός	the subjunctive mood of the verb; attached in a hypotactic position, e.g. the relative pronoun
φώνη	the form (of a word)
φωνήεντα	vowels
χρῆσις	usage, custom
χρόνος	time in general, and especially, tense in the verb