

Durham E-Theses

*Freedom and responsibility of the individual in
Epictetus discourses*

Leonard John Ross

How to cite:

Ross, Leonard John (1971) Freedom and responsibility of the individual in Epictetus discourses. Masters thesis, Durham University.

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a <https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/9646/> is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

Abstract

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
EPICTETUS' DISCOURSES, A thesis submitted to
Durham University for the degree of Master of Letters,
March 1971, by L.J.ROSS, B.A.

The thesis examines the philosophic basis and validity of the Stoic freedom expressed in Epictetus' Discourses. The concept of prohairesis, which he introduces into Stoic thought, is central to Epictetus' doctrine and indicates an advance in ancient theory on will.

Aristotle's definition of prohairesis in discussing voluntary action, and its part in phronesis and akrasia, provides a basis for considering the co-ordination of reason and desire, which is important in Epictetus. Plato's Republic, Philebus and Laws also show the involvement of non-rational factors in right conduct. The strict rational system of the Stoics led them to examine free will. Voluntariness was confined to sugkatathesis - the assent to logical conclusions - controlled by the hegemonikon. Two influences in Stoicism from Posidonius to Seneca weakened the strict rational dogmatism: first, an appreciation of the total

Abstract (2)

personality of man involving conscience and feelings as well as reason ; second, a spiritualising tendency towards a religious interpretation of the rational system. X

Epictetus adheres to the Stoics' concept of reason, through which alone his freedom is possible. The relation of human reason to cosmic reason as apospasma eases the apparent lack of freedom in the 'live according to nature' rule. The notion of false phantasiai reveals a subjective element in the initial data of reason, marking a significant intrusion of the non-rational into Epictetus' basically rational position.

The orientation of the subjective phantasiai is controlled by different capacities (dynamis) and characteristics of personality. Each man has a responsibility of maintaining the inner virtue of self-respect, and applying knowledge, aided by a proper understanding of oneself, and possibly by religion. Both the rational and personal aspects of man contribute to an understanding of prohairesis, which is the reciprocation between choice in each decision and the free character, each influencing the other, thus combining the aspects of hegemonikon and sugkatathesis

Abstract (3)

of the Stoa into a single idea of will. Prohairesis embraces three stages of freedom: freedom of choice, freedom from anxiety, and freedom for rational existence.

Considered in relation to modern thought on freedom, Epictetus' theories are notable because they are contained in the Stoic rational monism. His concept of prohairesis exhibits some essential qualities of the 'will', and isolates the aspects of a person which contribute to his free self-identity. Provided that the full benefits of the free personality, as proffered by Epictetus, are appreciated in the term Stoic freedom, rather than just 'resignation to nature', the self-centredness of the Stoic freedom, criticised by Berlin, is valid both philosophically and in practical conduct.

The association of Epictetus' writings with Christian thought is examined in an Epilogue.

The University of Durham

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN EPICTETUS' DISCOURSES

A thesis submitted for the degree of
MASTER OF LETTERS

March 1971

LEONARD JOHN ROSS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to thank most sincerely Professor J.B.Skemp, Professor of Greek in the University of Durham, for supervising my study, and for his willingness to give advice and criticism whenever I have sought it. I wish to thank also Mr.K.W.Mills, M.A. of Durham University, and Professor G.A.Bozonis of the University of Athens, Honorary Fellow in Classics at Durham University 1967-68, both of whom have discussed with me particular aspects of this study.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements		page ii
Contents of chapters one to eight		v
Note on the transcription of Greek terms		xix
Chapter one	INTRODUCTION	1
	1. Purpose of thesis	1
	2. Method of inquiry	11
	3. Epictetus' work, character and writings	14
	Notes	22
Chapter two	ARISTOTLE	31
	1. Purpose and scope of chapter	31
	2. <u>Prohairesis</u> in <u>Nic. Eth. III</u>	34
	3. Desire and reason in <u>prohairesis</u>	41
	4. <u>Akrasia</u> (<u>N.E. VII</u>)	51
	5. Reason and desire in Plato	57
	6. Platonic thought in Epictetus	66
	7. Aristotle, Plato and Epictetus	78
	Notes	82
Chapter three	THE STOICS	104
	1. The new era	104
	2. Theory of knowledge	113
	3. Reason and nature	120
	4. Ethics and freedom	127
	5. Posidonius and the Fourth Academy	131
	Notes	136
Chapter four	SENECA	150
	1. The new humanism	150
	2. Will, personality and conscience	155
	3. Reason and Emotion	164
	4. Duties and the good	168
	5. The religion of Stoicism	171
	Notes	179

Chapter five	EPICTETUS: CONCEPT OF MIND	190
	1. The function of reason	190
	2. The <u>prolepseis</u>	196
	3. The <u>phantasiai</u>	204
	4. Reason as <u>apospasma</u>	232
	5. The <u>hegemonikon</u>	236
	6. Reason and freedom	240
	Notes	245
Chapter six	EPICTETUS: CONCEPT OF MAN	259
	1. Man in the cosmos	259
	2. <u>Oikeiosis</u> in the individual	266
	3. Man's relationship with God	275
	4. Knowledge and education	285
	5. The inner virtues	290
	Notes	296
Chapter seven	<u>PROHAIRESIS AND FREEDOM</u>	312
	1. <u>Prohairesis</u> : a new term	312
	2. The function of <u>prohairesis</u> as decision	321
	3. The function of <u>prohairesis</u> as moral character	335
	4. <u>Prohairesis</u> and freedom	340
	5. Social responsibility	351
	Notes	362
Chapter eight	CONCLUSIONS and an EPILOGUE	379
	Epilogue: Epictetus and Christianity	404
	Notes	433
Appendix I	<u>Prohairesis</u> in Epictetus' works	447
Appendix II	Socratic references in Epictetus' works	450
	Index of principal passages cited	453
	Bibliography	457
	Indices	467

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS ONE TO EIGHT

with page references

Chapter one	INTRODUCTION	page 1
	1. Purpose of the thesis	1
	Stoic freedom becomes a major philosophic concept in Epictetus, 1; Examination of ἐλευθερία; political freedom, 2; freedom of will, 2; inner freedom, 3; escapism of the Hellenistic Age, 6; freedom of will in Epictetus, 7; freedom and rationalism, 8; limitations of a rationalist system, 9; three questions to be examined, 10; the problem of originality in Epictetus, 11.	
	2. Method of the inquiry	11
	<u>Prohairesis</u> a key, 11; this concept clarified by a study of predecessors: Aristotle, Stoics and Seneca, 12.	
	3. Epictetus' works, character and writings	14
	His life, 14; Musonius Rufus, 14; Epictetus' philosophic and religious character, 15-16; Arrian: the <u>Discourses</u> and <u>Encheiridion</u> , 17; nature and purpose of the <u>Discourses</u> , 18; Epictetus' social background, 19.	
Chapter two	ARISTOTLE	31
	1. Purpose and scope of chapter	31
	εὐροια and <u>prohairesis</u> in Epictetus, 31-2; <u>prohairesis</u> first important in Aristotle's account of deliberation, 32; It entails co-ordination of desire and reason, 32; seen also in φρόνησις and <u>akrasia</u> , 33; The contribution of Plato and Aristotle to the problem of desire and reason in right conduct, 34.	

chapter two (contd.)

2. Prohairesis in Nic.Eth III 34
 Virtue in the Ethics, 34-5; voluntary and involuntary actions, 35; prohairesis in the context of wish and deliberation, 36; definition of choice: a voluntary act, 36; shares rational and irrational characteristics, 36-7; it is preceded by deliberation, 37; the sphere of deliberation, 37; final definition of choice, 38; the rational and the irrational in choice, 38; definition of wish, 39; its connection with prohairesis: Ando's interpretation, 39-40; prohairesis and goodness, 40; prohairesis as character, 40-41.
3. Desire and reason in prohairesis (N.E.VI). 41
 Correct reasoning in moral conduct requires φρόνησις, 42; two types of intellectual virtues, 42-3; a definition of prohairesis involving character, 43; it is correct reason plus correct desire, 44; good and bad choice is dependent on φρόνησις, 45; λόγος and ὄρεξις are inseparable in conduct, 45-6; cleverness and natural virtue, 46; Anscombe's criticism of Aristotle's position, 47; Aristotle's arbitrary definition of choice, 48; prohairesis as activity (choice) and character, 48-9; ὄρεξις and λόγος in the practical syllogism, 49-50; phantasia and desire, 50- 51.
4. Akrasia (N.E.VII). 51
 Useful for assessing Epictetus' concept of πάθη, 52; passions and voluntary actions, 52-3; definition of the ἀκρατής, 53; akrasia and ἀκολασία, 53; two kinds

chapter two (contd.)

of knowledge, 54; illustrated by practical syllogism, 54-5; the ἀκρατής fails in the application of knowledge to particulars, 55; conflict of desire in the ἀκρατής, 55-6; two kinds of akrasia and the position of prohairesis, 56-7.

5. Reason and desire in Plato.

57

Plato's consideration of the whole soul, 57-8; three stages in the development of ethics, 58; the divisions of the soul (Republic), 59; θυμός as a driving force, 59-60; psychological conflict, 60; blending of desire and reason in Philebus, 60-1, A mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is best, 61-2; true and false pleasures and phantasiai, 62-3; wish, 63; habituation and education in Laws; 63-4; regulation of desires in childhood, 64-5; their importance in a man's character recognised, 65.

6. Platonic thought in Epictetus.

66

Souilhe's Socratic elements listed, 66-7; Socratic basis of Stoic ethics, 67; self-love, 68-9; self and prohairesis, 69; θεωρία and Stoic apospasma, 69; divine control and its consequences, 70-1; free-will in Plato, 71-3; Dodd's theory of the irrational cosmos, 73-4; Socratic daimon, -as intermediary force, 74-5; characteristics of happiness in Plato and Aristotle, 75-6; desire necessary for happiness, - and prohairesis, 77.

7. Aristotle, Plato and Epictetus

78

The problem of reason and desire in Plato and

Epictetus, 78-9; possibility of direct influence from Plato, 79; the question of Aristotelian influence in the Stoic School, 79-80; comparison of the term prohairesis in Aristotle and Plato, 80-1.

Chapter three THE STOICS 104

1. The new era 104

Development of Stoic system, 104-5; characteristics of the age: freedom from tradition, 105-6; rationalism, 105-6; purpose of philosophy, 106; method of the philosophers: dogmatism and rationalism, 107-8; false approach to philosophy, 108; reason and nature, 109; popularity of Stoicism, 110-11; attention to man's nature, 111; importance in secondary theories, 112.

2. Theory of knowledge 113

a. Phantasiai (Zeno), 113. The process of knowledge, 113; true and false phantasiai, 114; criticism of Sceptics, 114; voluntariness of συγκατάθεσις, 114; φαντασία καταληπτική 115; -in Zeno and Chrysippus, 116.

b. Phantasiai (Chrysippus), 116. Chrysippus' psychological monism, 116; phantasia is a change in the hegemonikon, 116-7; a difficulty in his theory, 117; the Sceptics' position on κατάληψις, 117.

c. Other criteria, 117. the έννοιαι, 118; their origin, 118-9; prolepsis in Epicureans and Epictetus, 119-20.

chapter three (contd.)

3. Reason and nature 120

Reason and nature in the Stoic system, 120; reason as causation and goodness, 120-21; nature as divine purpose and as oikeiosis, 121-2; reason in man, 122; the hegemonikon, 122-3; reason as judgement, 123; hegemonikon as controlling every function of the body, 124; the position of irrational functions (πάθη), 124; definitions of πάθος, 125; the irrational factor in choice, 125-6; importance of Chrysippus' view, 126-7.

4. Ethics and freedom 127

Goodness as perfection of reason, 127; difficulty in making this accord with 'good things' and 'good' actions, 128; the adiaphora, 128-9; moral goodness an internal quality, 129; the difficulty of responsibility in a determined system, 129; problem of free will, 129-31.

5. Posidonius and the Fourth Academy 131

Sceptics attack Stoic doctrines, 131; Stoics concentrate on adiaphora, 132; Posidonius, 132; - shapes Stoicism to meet criticisms: irrational soul, 132; conflict of desire and reason, 133; theory of knowledge, 133; daimon, 134; σμπάθεια, 135; Appreciation of man's whole nature, 135;

Chapter four SENECA 150

1. The new humanism 150

A transition period in the Stoa; 150; greater awareness of human nature, 151; the place of

chapter four (contd.)

duties in moral goodness, 152; Roman influence on virtues, 153; Roman religious influence, 154; the characteristics of Cicero and Seneca's writings, 154-5.

2. Will, personality and conscience 155

Inner responsibility for virtues, 155; moral duties and the good in Cicero, 156; the individual's will in Seneca, 156; general and particular will, 157; will and decision, 158; interest in personality, 158; reason and personality, 159-60; conscientia in Cicero and Seneca, 161; its relation to συνείδησις, 162; conscience in Epictetus, 163; examination of one's conscience, 163-4.

3. Reason and emotion 164

Seneca follows Chrysippus' monism, 164; rational or irrational will produces judgements, 165; doctrine applied to anger, 165; two grades of passion, 165-6; the part of reason and will in emotions, 166; reason and impulse, 167.

4. Duties and the good 168

A broader view of goodness by the Romans, 168; Panaetius and duties, 168-9; goodness not confined to Sapiens, 169; goodness towards externals, 170; consideration for others in Seneca, 171.

5. The religion of Stoicism 171

The religious aspect of Stoicism in Seneca, 171; concept of God in early Stoa, physical theory, 172; Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, 172-3; transition from

chapter four (contd.)

theological theory to religious feeling, 173; religious awareness in Seneca, 173-4; the numinous, 175; influence of Roman pantheism, 175-6; soul in Seneca, 176.

Comparison of Seneca and Epictetus, 176; similar in duties, 176; in other areas a more rational approach by Epictetus, 176-7; the concept of will and prohairesis, 177-8.

Chapter five EPICTETUS: CONCEPT OF MIND 190

1. The function of reason 190

The main aspects of freedom are contained in Epictetus' psychology, 190; he followed Stoic doctrine but with different emphasis, 190-1; a psychological and moral function, 192; characteristics of human reason, 192-3; three aspects, 193-4; the independence and self-analysis of reason, 194; reason consists of phantasiai, 195; reason as apospasma of divine reason, 195; three questions of freedom in doctrine on reason, 195-6.

2. The prolepseis 196

Prolepsis in Epictetus and earlier Stoics, 196; the origin of general concepts, 196-7; three aspects of prolepsis in Epictetus, 197-8; prolepsis of the good, 198; reason related to the good life, 198-9; natural and learned prolepseis, 200-1; use of Stoic principles, 201-2; application of prolepseis in judgements, 202; problem of the practical syllogism, 203; the extent of freedom in applying prolepseis, 203-4.

3. The phantasiai

204

Phantasiai in the Stoa, - a more flexible attitude in Epictetus, 205; four main applications of the term in Epictetus, 206;

a. Phantasiai and motion, 206. Animal and human reason compared, 206; animals act with use, but not understanding of phantasiai, 207; understanding of phantasiai makes man a moral creature, 208.

b. Phantasiai and knowledge, 208. Relation of Epictetus to Stoic doctrine of knowledge, 208; phantasiai as sense data, 208-9; true and false phantasiai, 210; categories of phantasiai, 210-11; three stages in Epictetus' theory: animal cognition, elementary cognition and complex cognition, 211-12.

c. Phantasiai and moral behaviour, 212. Three-fold basis of moral conduct, 212; phantasiai of moral conduct related to phantasiai of cognition, 212-3; phantasiai as suggested 'fancies' and logical ideas, 213-4; subjective nature of a 'fancy', 214-5; 'fancies' can be true or false; 215; confusion of the 'good' and the 'logically correct', 215-6; judgement of reason upon 'fancies', 216-7; criticism of Epictetus' position, 217-9; false 'fancies' a matter for practical concern in Epictetus, 219-20.

d. Phantasiai and emotions, 220. Persuasiveness of false impressions, 220; their subjective origin and man's irrational nature, 221-3; reason must fight the desire-phantasia complex, 223-4; reason may produce counter images, 224; development of desire-phantasia into πάθος, 225;

chapter five (contd.)

πάθος in Epictetus compared with other Stoics, 225-7; Medea, an example of πάθος, 227-8; akrasia, 228-9; desire intrudes the rational monism, 229-30; importance of good emotions, in prohairesis and the desire of the good, 230-2.

4. Reason as apospasma.

232

Apospasma previously important in physical theory, 232; Epictetus uses the theory to extol man's position and freedom, 233; cosmic and individual reason, 233-4; reason as a deity, 234-5; unity of reason produces cosmic obedience, 235; the freedom paradox, 235-6.

5. The hegemonikon.

236

Hegemonikon in the early Stoa, 236-7; a disposition guiding choice in Epictetus, 237; as the factor producing choice, or prohairesis, 238; freedom of the hegemonikon, 238-9; comparison of hegemonikon and prohairesis, 239.

6. Reason and freedom

240

Decisions of reason 'cause' actions, 240; freedom inherent in reason as logic, 240-41; freedom of choice in application of reason to conduct, 241-2; the desiring function in the application of reason as choice, 242-3; the term 'prohairesis' adopted as the total desiring and reasoning personality, 243-4.

Chapter six	EPICLETUS: CONCEPT OF MAN	259
	1. Man in the cosmos.	259
	The principles of <u>φύσις</u> and <u>oikeiosis</u> , 259; <u>oikeiosis</u> in the universe, 260; Stoic physical theory, 260-61; doctrine on death, 261-2; general <u>oikeiosis</u> of man, 262-3; freedom: a moral end, 263; moral self-sufficiency, 264; importance of <u>παρακολούθησις</u> in Epictetus' theory, 265-6.	
	2. <u>Oikeiosis</u> in the individual	266
	From general to individual <u>oikeiosis</u> , 266; two standards, general and individual, 267; <u>dynameis</u> as an aspect of individual personality, 267; capacities and circumstances, 268; freedom in using the <u>dynameis</u> , 269-70; <u>dynameis</u> as controlling virtues, 270-71; their effect on will, 271-2; <u>πρόσωπον</u> as one's role in life, 272-3; - as strength of character, 273-4; Epictetus' position on suicide, 274-5.	
	3. Man's relationship with God.	275
	Epictetus and the religious tradition in Stoicism, 275; religious terminology: God, 276; divine will, 277; divine communication; 277-8; in education, 278; purification, 279; soul, 279; figurative use of language, 280-81; sincerity of Epictetus' belief, 281; his position comparable to mysticism, 281-2; aspects of freedom in his religion, 283; knowledge and prescience, 283-4; a harmony of wills, 284-5;	
	4. Knowledge and education.	285
	Individual responsibility for knowledge, 285-6; two aspects of knowledge, 286; education in	

chapter six (contd.)

philosophic principles, 286; education in self-knowledge, 286-7; moral application of knowledge by askesis, 287-8; self-examination, 288, knowledge and desire, 288-9; habituation, 289-90.

5. The inner virtues. 290

Aidos as moral self-respect, 290-1; - as conscience, 291; faithfulness (τὸ πιστόν), 291-2; additional inner virtues, 292; relation of inner virtues to social virtues, 292-3; the will and prohairesis in virtues, 293-4; the social virtues, 294.

Summary of chapter, 295.

Chapter seven PROHAIREISIS AND FREEDOM 3121. Prohairesis a new term. 312

Prohairesis in the Greek language as 'choice', 312; special philosophic use in Aristotle, 313; προαιρητικά in the Stoa, 313; originality and development of the term in Epictetus, 314; its relationship with the adjectives, προαιρητικός and ἀπροαίρετα, 314-5; comparison with Aristotle, 316; its application to the Stoic freedom, 316-7; a further development in Epictetus as moral character, 318; reasons for this development, 319-20; its significance, 320-1.

2. Function of prohairesis as decision. 321

Distinction of what is, and what is not in our power, 321-2; the three τόποι, 322-3; the chief characteristics of prohairesis, 324; its freedom, 324-5; rational nature of prohairesis, 325-6; prohairesis

Chapter seven (contd.)

prohairesis in συγκατάθεσις, follows reason and nature, 327-8; resignation to circumstances, 328-9; the field of choice, 329; the field of desire, 330; desires restricted to the inner self, 330; criticism of the 'Stoic wheel', 330-31; the place of desire in reason, 331-3; freedom versus action, 333-5.

3. Function of prohairesis as moral character. 335
 Good and bad character depends on prohairesis, 335; prohairesis provides the freedom of self-identity, 336; training in prohairesis produces men of good character, 337-8.; the reciprocating aspect of prohairesis as choice and character, 338; habituation, 339; the self cannot survive death, 339; prohairesis, the totality of self, 340.

4. Prohairesis and freedom. 340
 The meaning of inner freedom, 341; three levels of freedom in Epictetus: a. Freedom of choice, 342.
b. Freedom from anxiety, 342;
 its negative quality, 343; achieved through discipline, 343; act of freedom and state of freedom, 344-5; resignation, 345.
c. Freedom for rational existence, 346. Freedom as a moral value, 346; self-responsibility, 347; free for the positive act of willing, 347-8; prohairesis is active in anticipating God's will, 349; freedom of the self-identity, 349-50; the sphere of freedom extends through self to the whole universe, 350; the relation of the theory to earlier thought, 350-51.

chapter seven (contd.)

5. Social responsibility 351

A utopia of perfect prohairesis, 351-2; importance of self-responsibility, social virtues dependent on prohairesis, 352; attention to field of choice, (ὁρμή), 353-4; duties must be treated as externals, 354-5; the use of ἐκλογή in the process of deliberation on duties, 355-7; no place for the correction of others, 357-8; criminals are punished by the destruction of their prohairesis, 358-60; a difficulty in the determinist outlook, 360-1.

Chapter eight CONCLUSIONS and an EPILOGUE 379

General summary, 379-80; relation of Epictetus to the earlier theories, and to Marcus Aurelius, 380-1; weaknesses in the Stoic rationalism, 381-2.

Freedom through reason, 382-3; the consequences of the material aspect of reason in Epictetus' doctrine, 383-7; the rational aspect of will and the practical syllogism, 387-90.

The uncertainty principle in will, 390-1; will related to the active personality, 391-2; function of desire in will, 392-3; elusiveness of will as a philosophic concept, and the determinist problem, 393-5.

Responsibility to oneself, and the oikeiosis doctrine, 395-7; the position of 'retreat to oneself' criticised, 397-8;

Considerations in support of Epictetus' theories of

chapter eight (contd.)

personal inner liberty: it provides the fullest realisation of the self, 398-400; freedom for intellectual contemplation, 400-1; freedom for the mystic sense, 401-2; the 'feeling' of freedom as a personal value, 402-3.

The special position of Epictetus' theories of will and freedom, 403-4.

An Epilogue: Epictetus and Christianity, 404

Bonhoffer's conclusions, 404-6; dangers of sentimental thinking, 406-8; Stoicism and New Testament teaching, 408-10; the teaching of the Church Fathers, 410-12; St. Augustine, 412-14; Epictetus' popularity with Christian thinkers from the Renaissance, 414-6; Christian enthusiasm checked by Elizabeth Carter (1758), 416-8; a common religious spirit: urgency of preaching, 418; the mystic spirit, 419; the claim on the inner man affecting moral conduct, 419-23. The validity of the common spirit, 423-4; specific parallels in moral theology: the end of man, 425; the will and conscience, 426-8; natural and supernatural virtues, 428-9; conclusions, 429-31.

A NOTE ON THE TRANSCRIPTION OF GREEK TERMS

In order to avoid an abundance of hand-written Greek, I have transcribed the following Greek terms:

ἄδιάφορα	adiaphora
αἰδώς	aidos
ἄκρασία	akrasia
ἀσπασμα	apospasma
ἀσκησις	askesis
δαίμων	daimon
δύναμις	dynamis, dynameis (pl)
ἡγεμονικόν	hegemonikon
λόγος	logos
οἰκείωσις	oikeiosis
προαίρεσις	prohairesis* prohaireseis (pl)
πρόληψις	prolepsis, prolepseis (pl)
φαντασία	phantasia, phantasiai (pl)

*In chapter seven, I have retained this word in Greek script, when referring to the term itself.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose of the Thesis.

The purpose of this inquiry is to provide an interpretation of Epictetus' Discourses which is philosophically useful. In doing so, I shall not be led to examine a diversity of teachings on different subjects since the Discourses are outstanding for their singleness of theme and intent: the message of freedom, and dependent directly on it, the limits of man's moral responsibility.

Freedom had been an important aspect in Stoic ethics from the beginning of the movement, but in Epictetus it becomes the essence and one absolute aim of moral conduct. My task is to find whether the Stoic freedom as contained in Epictetus' work, which is its final and effuse development and presentation, is based on firm philosophical principles and is valid as a moral goal, or whether this 'call to freedom' is an empty cry, the last hope that man has to preserve himself from the troubles of the world.

Freedom, (ἐλευθερία, libertas) was known to the ancient world in two aspects: first as political and social freedom.

This is the freedom commended by Pericles and Thucydides. It entails the freedom of one state from being ruled by another,¹ and the lack of coercion within the city-state, where each citizen knows his function in the state and fulfils it in a free spirit. Those without political freedom were the servile class, and the notion of freedom includes the social distinction between free-born and slaves. The second aspect of freedom is inner freedom. This concept puts freedom within reach of everyone, since the freedom is contained within the thought and will of the individual. It is the freedom of the 'unconquerable soul'.²

Today, a greater number of meanings is covered by our word 'freedom'. Particularly we may note a mid-way aspect between political and inner freedom, namely freedom of action. We can have a notion of freedom or lack of freedom in performing our everyday actions. Modern thinkers, especially those concerned with the philosophy of action, regard this as a fundamental freedom. This mid-way use of 'freedom' emerges partly from the struggle between free-will and determinism in the philosophy of the Christian Era, but which in the ancient world was only just a beginning to be a problem in the Stoic period. This freedom of the will in action should not be confused with the freedom of the will as the inner man. Freedom from passions affecting

our will is also an area of freedom not immediately translatable by ἐλευθερία. It is true that inner freedom embraced freedom from the passions, but this is only derived from its essential quality of having its authority within itself.

That ἐλευθερία was not applied to such notions is no sign that the Greeks did not recognise freedom of action or freedom from passions,³ but they did not think of these as ἐλευθερία, as notions resembling political freedom. For the use of ἐλευθερία for political and social freedom was prior to its application to inner freedom, which was adopted by the Stoics, perhaps first as a metaphor, as we say, using the converse, a man is 'a slave to his passions'.

Why did the Stoics adopt this term from political freedom for their inner freedom? The idea common to both is that of feeling free, enjoying freedom not necessarily from anything or for anything, but in existence, either as a state, or as an individual playing a part in a community, and in the case of inner freedom, the feeling of freedom enjoyed when the individual feels master of everything that is properly his own; and if this has to be reduced to his 'unconquerable soul',⁴ it need not necessarily diminish the sense of freedom.

It has often been remarked that the notion of inner freedom became more intense as political and social freedom became eclipsed,⁵ This is true only in part. The adoption of the word ἐλευθερία for inner freedom at the beginning of the Stoic school, did coincide with the breakdown of the city-state ideal under the Macedonian Empire, and continued with greater intensity under the Roman Empire, which in certain periods displayed keen oppression, destroying political freedom as an ideal.⁶ Accordingly the ideal contained in ἐλευθερία shifted to the inner freedom where it could be maintained as an ideal. To this extent the adoption of the term ἐλευθερία by the philosophers reflects an age of autocratic oppression.

But the concept of inner freedom, though not denoted by ἐλευθερία, had already emerged in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.⁷ with the Socratic teaching that virtue is knowledge, and the Platonic dualism of body and soul, where moral perfection consists in possessing a soul unfettered by earthly associates, and Aristotle's vision of happiness as the contemplative activity of the soul. Thus the emergence of the concept of the inner man and inner responsibility (which is very near to a concept of inner freedom) coincides not so much with a breakdown of political ideals, but with the recognition,

clearly reflected in the fifth century sophists and dramatists, that the accepted foundations of morality, the State religion and the traditional moral code (οἱ νόμοι), were infirm. It was not the catastrophes themselves, for these were nothing new, but the intellectual awakening to the causes of catastrophe that led the fifth century Athenians to re-think their ethics, or rather to think them for the first time, and to discover that the true basis for a man's responsibility is within himself.

The Stoics could develop their concept of freedom readily from their philosophical background of fourth century Athens. It was a natural intellectual step that their teaching should develop from an inner based concept of moral responsibility, irrespective of the loss of political freedom. Similarly in the comparatively liberal age of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries the interest in inner freedom by the existentialist school is due to an intellectual awakening to the limitations, not in this instance of the traditional νόμοι, but of the thorough rationalism of the philosophy of the previous age.

It cannot be denied that the Hellenistic era was dogged with philosophies of retreat, not primarily though by the Cynics, but by the Epicureans and Stoics. And where the inner freedom is proclaimed as an adjunct of the Stoic way of life,

that is of the purely rational life, we may discern the spirit of escapism, and fail to find a useful philosophical concept. But in the later development of Stoicism, when the rational dogmatism is beginning to weaken very slightly and freedom is made the essence of moral life, its exponents had need to analyse this concept more closely, and have recourse to their roots in the fourth century Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and depend less on their avowed certainty in the rational monism of Zeno.

Stoic freedom is never concerned with the political and social freedom. The second aspect, inner freedom, is Epictetus' sole concern,⁸ and for the reasons I have shown, must not be considered unimportant at least to Ancient philosophy. This same aspect of freedom is commonplace in many ethical and religious creeds, and in popular morality. In its outward appearance as "I resign myself to Fate", and "Whatever circumstances demand, that is my will", it may seem, and doubtless was to many of its followers, a form of escapism from responsibility and anxiety; but in its inner feeling of a sense of freedom, of feeling responsible for one's moral existence, in 'the service which is perfect freedom', in the "mea virtute me involvo", rather than the "resigno quae dedit",⁹ is it enough to dismiss it as Isaiah

Berlin does as "sour grapes",¹⁰ or might there not be here something philosophically significant in the concept of freedom and responsibility? This freedom is the centre of Epictetus' teaching and he bases it on a consistent philosophy of nature and mind, and as such the Discourses deserve study.

In the examination of Epictetus' teaching on freedom, two other important ideas emerge: the concept of will, and the Stoic rationalism. The notion of liberty is the more interesting in Epictetus because his doctrines are based on the material determinism demanded by the Stoic rationalism. The concept of will becomes first significant in the Stoic period because the dilemma between free-will and determinism lay exposed in their rational system; this is particularly true of the Middle Stoa. Pohlenz correctly observes that the problem of free-will did not exist for Epictetus¹¹ since he took freedom of choice for granted, observing choice or will to be meaningless unless it was free. But the concept of will and its key position in moral behaviour is very prominent in his teaching on liberty, and against the background of determinism, it is cast in strong relief.

But again, Epictetus is using and developing what was already implicit in earlier Greek thought. The will, and the

struggle of will against reason, of passion against knowledge, was a vital source of Greek tragedy.¹² In Plato a concept of will is seen behind the desire for the Good and the orientation of the soul in the Symposium and Republic; and Aristotle returns to the question particularly in his study of akrasia, and in the part played by will in acquiring knowledge. The spontaneous will, which is here conceived of by the Greeks as something uncaused, proceeding from the man himself, is to become a formulated concept in Epictetus, and it is an aim of this thesis to see how far and how adequately he develops this concept.

"The gods being no more and Christ being not yet, there was between Cicero and Marcus Aurelius a unique moment in which man stood alone". So states Flaubert,¹³ in criticism of Lucretius' physics as being too positive. He might equally have said it of Stoic ethics for the same reason. In the place of religious belief and faith man takes refuge in the certainty of rationalism. For the Greeks, the atheistic period extended from the time of Euripides,¹⁴ but for fifty years, because of the keen sensitivity of the Athenians, and because of the interest in the Mystery religions, the Greeks hovered before plunging into the thorough rationalism of Zeno or Epicurus. If God does not rule, man can choose between a

belief, often in spite of the facts, in a life controlled by reason, well-ordered and systematic, or in an irrational existence where some events remain unexplained. The first choice offers security through the certainty of understanding the world, and leads to an idealism centred on thought; the second is more faithful to the phenomena of human feeling and suffering, and offers realism, and with it the hazards that occur through a fulness of existence.

In the thought of Plato and Aristotle, desire and spontaneous will have their place, and the combination of desire and reason working together is frequently found. The systems of the Hellenistic period were not so compromising, and everything was to be explained or controlled by reason. But because in Epictetus the concepts of will and freedom are so essential to his teaching, the irrational again demands a place. Accordingly we can expect to find Epictetus on the brink of the 'rationalist dissolution',¹⁵ and need show no surprise that apart from Marcus Aurelius, he is the last of the exponents of Stoicism. It is an aim of this thesis to see how far Epictetus can contort the rationalism on which his teaching is based, to embrace the irrational factors that are inherent in his theory of will and freedom.

In Epictetus' Discourses, therefore, I look for evidence

on three questions of philosophical significance:

1. The validity of the Stoic freedom.
2. The extent of the development of the notion of will.
3. The weaknesses of a rational system as a basis for practical ethics.

It is not my intention to discover, from my study, the originality of Epictetus, and his personal contribution to Stoicism. I treat his writings as the final stage of a movement in philosophy, and do not attempt to discern in detail the innovations he made upon his immediate predecessors. Because of the nature of his writings, any such task would present immense difficulties. His extant writings show the marks of well-worn reiterated doctrine, as one would expect of any lecture-room teaching. Throughout this thesis there will be mention of Epictetus' originality on specific points, but nowhere can there be certainty. I wish to study the importance of the Discourses to philosophy as a whole and particularly to Greek philosophy, and in so doing it is sufficient to recognise that in the development of Stoicism the basic principles remain constant, while the emphasis and orientation of the teaching changes: there is a gradual development from the teaching being less concerned with nature,

more concerned with humanity; less concerned with reason, more concerned with will and moral responsibility. Epictetus stands at the end of this development.

2. Method of the Inquiry.

In interpreting the doctrine of freedom in the Discourses, I have extracted a key, namely prohairesis, the faculty of choice, and based the study on an examination of this. The concept is a useful key for three reasons: first, man's freedom is contained in prohairesis alone, and depends on nothing outside it; second, it is the outstanding original contribution of Epictetus, as the formulation of a concept which probably existed before in Stoicism, but had not been expressed by a single term. Thus the study of the term would reflect the important developments in later Stoicism; third the concept is used so frequently in the Discourses that although little is provided in the form of analytical definition, in the course of the work it becomes a comparatively clear concept amidst a rather vague psychological and philosophical vocabulary.

On account of this lack of definition in the Discourses, and because as we have seen above, there is in the concept of

the inner man, a connection with Plato and Aristotle, and a continuation of the teaching of the Stoic movement, knowledge of certain aspects of these philosophies is indispensable to the present study. Accordingly, I have devoted about one third of the thesis to the background chapters on Aristotle and Plato, The Stoics, and Seneca. Most of the terminology of the Discourses, especially in the psychology, is that of the Stoic school, where it is dealt with more definitively than by Epictetus. A great amount of his teaching is also identical with their rationalistic concepts of knowledge and reason. I have said though, that the emphasis changes, and that rationalism is stretched to its limits. In understanding the difficulties and tension involved in this change of emphasis, the work of Plato and Aristotle on the coordination of reason and desire is instructive.

It was however, the particular concept of prohairesis itself which first lead me to consider the Athenian philosophers in connection with Epictetus, since this term is adopted by Aristotle in his discussion on voluntary and involuntary actions in the Ethics, and certain areas of the meaning of this term recur markedly in Epictetus.

I have included the chapter on Seneca as representing Epictetus' immediate predecessor whose work is extant, and

the period in which the change of emphasis, so marked in Epictetus, begins to be established.

Again I do not intend to state what Epictetus derived from earlier philosophies as direct borrowings. The importance of the background chapters is to provide material from the comprehensive and analytical treatment of the Athenian philosophers and the Stoic school, in the light of which facets of Epictetus' teaching may become clearer. I cannot demonstrate that he was consciously aware that he was substantially following, in aspects of his theory, Plato or Aristotle.

There is little in Epictetus' writing that does not contribute to the central notion of prohairesis. Consequently an investigation of his psychological and philosophical doctrines is necessary before a full consideration of prohairesis can be given. Chapters five and six, on the concept of mind, and the concept of man provide an account of this general teaching, in order to reach a definition of prohairesis in Chapter seven, upon which the doctrine of freedom and responsibility is immediately dependent. The philosophical significance of the doctrine is discussed in the conclusion.

3. Epictetus' work, character and writings.

Born about 50 AD, a slave, at Hieropolis in Phrygia, Epictetus spent his formative years in Rome in the service of Epaphroditus, a freedman in Nero's secretariat. Still a slave and now crippled, possibly through ill-treatment at the hands of his master,¹⁶ he was educated at Rome by the Stoic teacher and Roman knight, Musonius Rufus, and continued a pupil of his after he had gained his freedom. He himself enjoyed the reputation of a philosopher and teacher sufficient to warrant his banishment under Domitian in about 90 AD., when he settled in Nicopolis (Actium) in W. Greece. There he founded an educational establishment, and until his death in about 120 AD. he devoted himself to the formal teaching of the Stoic philosophy.

For the main-stream Stoic teaching, Epictetus was dependent upon Musonius Rufus. Substantial fragments of Musonius' teaching remain. These stress that moral progress is within reach of, and should be undertaken by everyone.¹⁷ Practical ethics seem to be given considerable prominence in Musonius, following Panaetius,¹⁸ and the notions of $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ and $\alpha\iota\delta\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, so common in Epictetus, and the askesis programme, are probably inherited from him.¹⁹ Evidence that

Musonius gave special attention to inner freedom is lacking, and he seems to be nearer Seneca than Epictetus in his general orientation. This may be due to his Roman nationality demanding greater social conscience,²⁰ but we cannot assume that the fragments in any way represent the totality of his teaching. Pliny and Tacitus speak of him with high admiration, and the latter also describes his missionary spirit in the army.²¹ His genuine concern and practical devotion stand in contrast to Seneca, and were transferred to Epictetus, who himself admires the assiduous attention of his teacher.²² He is noted by De Vogel as being more a man of character than Seneca.²³

There are three aspects of Epictetus' character which should be mentioned as particularly relevant to the study of his teaching. First is the prophetic nature of his message of freedom, and the missionary zeal with which he propounds it. He himself compares the philosopher's task to an interpreter of oracles.²⁴ He regards his work as practical rather than theoretical. In the day to day teaching of his school he emphasises the need to progress from distinguishing the false and the true in logic, to understanding the good and bad in practical moral conduct.²⁵ His lecture room was a hospital;²⁶ his aim, moral conversion.

Second, commentators have been quick to notice a religious sense in Epictetus' writings.²⁷ A sense of submission and gratitude to God is apparent, and much of his Stoic teaching is couched in religious terms. How far this is a natural result of his missionary zeal, to fix a message with certainty in his hearers' conscience by adopting religious formulae almost as a rhetorical device, and how far it reflects a profound religious feeling in his philosophy, is a problem that may never be solved. I have considered this development in Stoicism in Chapter four, and Epictetus' position in this respect in Chapter six, and will refer to the bearing this aspect of his character has on his theory of freedom, in the conclusion.

Third, Epictetus' teaching is marked by a sincerity and genuine devotion to the cause he preaches. Philosophy is not the babbling (λαλοῦσι) of lofty maxims (τὰ κομψά),²⁸ but the actual wrestling with real situations.²⁹ The only advantage in setting forth principles is the knowledge that they will work in practice, and Epictetus despised those who acted the part of Stoics without applying the teaching they propounded.³⁰ Similarly he despised the pseudo philosophers who believed that a rough cloak and long hair would engage the attention of their audience.³¹ Epictetus, preaching a

message which was his own personal conviction and devotion, saw himself as standing out from the number of such pseudo intellectuals which thronged the large cities.

The work of Epictetus comes to us through the notes made by his devoted pupil Flavius Arrian. Comparison of the Discourses with the style of the rest of Arrian's writings show beyond dispute that the Discourses written by Arrian are a verbatim version of Epictetus' original expositions.³² There were eight books of Discourses, four of which are extant,

In addition to the Discourses, Arrian compiled the Manual, or Encheiridion, as a formalised summary of the teaching of the Discourses. This small manual was a very popular handbook from the time of its publication. Oldfather,³³ rightly comments that Epictetus' philosophic stature suffered because he was known to many only through this work. Anyone who has made the attempt will realise the difficulty of making an adequate summary of the Discourses owing to their loosely composed style and the practical purpose for which they were written. As a handbook of maxims for moralists, particularly Christian moralists, the Manual has been of use. As philosophy, it can be of little account, since it lacks the basis of doctrine. This basis can be gleaned from his more substantial writings, yet because even in the Discourses it is so often

only implicit, it has not been adequately represented in Arrian's summary. The Manual is helpful in that we can be reasonably certain that no major part of Epictetus' teaching has been lost in the Discourses which do not survive. There are also a number of collected fragments from various sources, some from the non-surviving books of Discourses, which are sometimes illuminating.

The Discourses, or diatribes, were not the formal lectures of Epictetus' school. They were designed to be given after the formal teaching, to emphasise points the teacher believed to be important, and in particular the practical application of the teaching.³⁴ Hjmans, in considering the purpose of the Discourses in the teaching programme, stresses their extemporary nature, as being sometimes the chance conversation either with his own pupils or with temporary visitors to the school.³⁵

Consequently, we cannot expect to find in the Discourses the complete teaching of the school, but rather an extract and impressive presentation of the points of the teaching essential for moral conduct; it has to be conceded too, that Epictetus' strong orientation of Stoicism toward inner moral responsibility, in comparison with the more objective writings of earlier Stoics might be only apparent because of this very

pedagogic nature of his extant work. Further, this purpose and nature of the Discourses explains the lack of system and reasoned argument in the exposition of the doctrines. There are many repetitions even within the same Discourse; the same anecdotes and stock illustrations recur. School-room drill in dialogue form is frequent. They are personally directed, and full of exhortation and urgent advice. The closely reasoned lectures which preceded these homilies are not preserved, and this makes the task of interpretation more difficult.

Possibly this difficulty has veered commentators away from devoting much space to Epictetus. Criticisms in the English language are few, and scholars generally have given him scant treatment. They catch his candour and zeal and 'magic words', and rarely seek to probe the validity of the 'call to freedom', and 'shout of joy' contained in his writings.³⁶ In this introduction I have attempted to show what items of philosophical importance we might expect to find in the Discourses. Perhaps this study will demonstrate that they can contribute little that is useful, - it will certainly indicate some weaknesses in his position, but Epictetus, standing at the end of the tradition of Stoicism warrants a re-appraisal, - and a caution:

Epictetus' servile background was not a happy one. As a philosopher in Rome he experienced at first hand the tyranny that was open to the Roman Emperors. His examples and anecdotes frequently refer to the petty duties that men had to perform for their superiors. The evil attractions of the Urbs and the difficulties of leading a moral life were well known to him. His practical advice is to resist temptation and behave with endurance in hardships, to the extent that certain concepts, (e.g. the dynamis) cannot be traced to a general application. Theories are given a twist in the direction of helping man oppressed by anxiety to achieve happiness. Thus will may appear as resignation; theory of knowledge, a theory of sympathetic understanding; virtues as attitudes of mind rather than expressed activity; and freedom itself as undisturbedness. Yet if Epictetus was poor in his social and material background, he was rich intellectually from the teaching of Musonius Rufus and his reading of the Stoics and Plato, and although his theories are undoubtedly influenced in part by his circumstances, it is important to remember that he devoted his life to philosophy, and was continuing a tradition substantial in its dogma, and he was a sincere enough man to base his unshakable moral consciousness and conviction of inner freedom as much on this intellectual

richness as on his material wretchedness.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. The finest exposition of this freedom is the Funeral Speech of Pericles (Thucydides, II 36ff.). Pericles sees the freedom of the State extending to freedom in every-day life, *ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐκπαιδευμάτων ὑποψίαν...* (37). Athenian self-sufficiency (36,3), and their educational system (39-40) were characteristic marks of this freedom. A liberal education (*ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους*) is also commended by Isocrates in Panegyricus, 49 (cf. Areopagiticus, 43). *ἐλευθερία* is frequently conjoined with *αὐτονομία* (political independence), as in Brasidas' speech to the Acanthians (Thuc. IV, esp. 86), and in the more formal language of the Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy, *εἰάν τις βούληται τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἢ τῶν βαρβάρων... Ἀθηναίων σύμμαχος εἶναι καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ ἐλευθέρῳ ὄντι καὶ αὐτόνομῳ.* (Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 123).
2. William Henley, Invictus. Cf. Horace, "Ille potens sui laetusque deget..." Odes III 29, 41. See also notes 4 and 9 below.

3. The tragedies of Euripides frequently involve a struggle between the rational and passionate aspects of a character. The example of Medea is perhaps the most notable, and is twice quoted by Epictetus, (Medea, lines 780 ff. in II 17, 19-21, and lines 1078 - 9 in I 28, 7: θυμὸς δε κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων).
4. This memorable phrase is from 'Invictus' by William Henley, who is one of many to have given poetical expression to the inner freedom. In this poetry, prominence is given to the feeling of freedom. Much of the popularity of Horace's Odes springs from the same feeling.
5. Pohlenz, Freedom p.3; Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational p.237 - 8 and 252 - 3.
6. There still was a certain measure of political freedom under both these empires, particularly in the privileges of self-government, (immunitas and freedom by Foedus) to the cities of the East, especially in Asia Minor. (The extent and degree of freedom is examined by A. M. H. Jones, The Greek City, esp. pp.132 ff, and 171 ff. But

the replacement of democracy by autocracy, no matter how distant or how indulgent destroyed freedom as an ideal.

7. Its growth is well traced by Pohlenz, Freedom pp 45 - 101.
8. Much was made by the Stoics of the paradoxical states of freedom and slavery. Political and social freedom was often seen to exclude personal freedom, whilst a slave is yet free to attain inner freedom. This gave rise to the famous Stoic paradox, "Only the wise man is free, and every fook is a slave" (See the Stoic Paradoxa in Plutarch and Cicero). This paradox frequently finds expression in Epictetus, e.g. II 1, 22: socially, only a free man can be educated, but in fact, only the educated are free. Cf. IV 1, 8.
9. Horace, Odes III 29, 54 - 5. The ode well illustrates Horace's Stoic leanings, in its attention to inner virtue, which can be maintained irrespective of outer circumstances. 'Virtus' here is very close in meaning to the αἰδώς of Epictetus, or even to prohairesis.

10. Isaiah Berlin, Two concepts of Liberty p. 139. The examination of the different aspects of freedom by Berlin pertains closely to the present study, and his work will be referred to in my conclusion.
11. Pohlenz, Freedom p. 152.
12. Again Euripides provides the best examples, in Medea, especially 1075 - 80 (see note 2 above), and Hippolytus 375 - 88, in Phaedra's struggle between knowledge and passion. Hecuba sees man's freedom impeded by desire of wealth etc. causing him to act against his rational nature, μή κατὰ γνώμην (Hecuba 867). These verses are perhaps the earliest formulation of the Stoic paradox, "Only the wise man is free" (See Note 8 above).
13. Gustave Flaubert, Correspondence troisième série 1854 - 69. Paris 1910. The quotation is made by the scholar and theologian Miguel de Unamuno in his chapter on the Rationalist Dissolution in "The Tragic Sense of Life". The earlier chapters of this book, even disentangled from the persuasive rhetoric, offer some

of the most convincing arguments known to me for the limitations of a rationalist philosophy, and first led me to examine and appreciate the significant part played by the irrational in Greek Philosophy.

14. Hecuba, 488 ff:

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί λέγω; πότερ' ἀνθρώπους ὄραν;
ἢ δόξαν ἄλλως τήνδε κεκτηῖσθαι μάτην
ψευδῆ, δοκούντας δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος
τύχην δὲ πάντα τ' ἄν βρότοις ἐπισκοπεῖν;

"What shall I say, Zeus? That thou looks't on men?

Or, that this fancy false we vainly hold

For nought, who deem there is a race of gods,

While chance controlleth all things among men?

(Trans. Way.)

Life is not subject to the good ordering of the gods,

nor to the dictates of reason, but to τύχη

(chance). Euripides is led to consider the force

of the irrational in man's life, notably in the

Bacchae, seeing reason as insufficient to grasp the

full truth about the forces that govern life. (see

Dodds, Bacchae, Introd. xlv, and Greeks and the

Irrational p. 185 - 9.)

15. See note 13 above.

16. So Celsus (Schenkl, Testimonia no. XVII) On the credulity of Celsus' statement see Oldfather, Intro. ix, note 1. In the Discourses Epictetus says little about his own life. Ancient sources therefore consist of scattered testimonia, now compiled in Schenkl's edition, iii-xv, including an inscription from Pisidia (see note 27 below) and a notice in Suidas (De Vogel III, 1231 a). A good modern summary of his life appears in Souilhé's edition, Intro. p. i-ix.
17. De Vogel III, 1227 a - c.
18. De Vogel III, 1229.
19. Hjmans, Askesis pp. 5 - 6, notes an important difference in the training programme of the two philosophers: Musonius recognises a double training, of body and soul (De Vogel III, 1228), whereas Epictetus nowhere concedes this dualism. From the evidence of the one fragment it is probably incorrect to regard a dualism at the basis of Musonius' teaching programme.

20. This view is put by Pohlenz, Die Stoa p.303. But see also Hjmans p.6 and footnote 6.
21. Tacitus Historia III, 81.
22. Epictetus, III 23, 29; I 9, 27 - 31.
23. De Vogel III, 1226 b, note.
24. I 17, 19 - 21; III 1. 37.
25. III 20, 3; IV 4, 13.
26. III 23, 30.
27. An early inscription from Pisidia (Schenkl, Testimonia No. XIX; edited by J. R. S. Sterrett in Papers of American School of Classical Studies at Athens 1884 - 5, 3, p. 315 ff; discussion in Hermes xxiii (1888) p. 542.) suggests that this aspect of his character was quickly recognised in his own lifetime: He showed a 'divine nature' ($\theta\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$).

28. III 16, 7.
29. e.g. I 4, 5 - 12.
30. II 9, 20.
31. IV 8, 5.
32. For a full discussion see Hartmann, Arrian und Epiktet.
33. Vol. 2. p. 479.
34. See Oldfather, Intro. xiii - xiv, and Souilhé, Intro. xxx - xxxvi.
35. Askesis, pp 47 - 8.
36. The principal studies are the works of Bonhoeffer, Th. Colardeau and Hjmans (See bibliography). In the

past, much attention was given to the parallels between Epictetus and St. Paul, especially in England, and these studies are not useful for a general survey of Epictetus' psychology. Bonhöffer's conclusions in 'Epiktet und das Neue Testament', that there was no direct influence between St. Paul and Epictetus, are now generally accepted, and more attention has since been given to the moral and psychological basis of his work, notably by Jeanne de Hir, Fondements Psychologiques et Religieux de la Morale d'Épictète.

CHAPTER TWO

ARISTOTLE

1. Purpose and Scope of this Chapter.

The orientation of Epictetus' teaching is towards a philosophy of freedom of the individual. Man's end is *εὐροια*, a serenity undisturbed by anything exterior to himself, and by virtue of his moral adjustment, free from any conflict within. Perfect freedom, if it can be attained, will achieve this state of *εὐροια*. The source of freedom lies therefore in the individual and nowhere else, in his freedom to choose. Goodness and good action result from the correct use of this freedom; and man's function of making moral choice, or moral decision, is given the term by Epictetus, 'prohairesis'. The prohairesis is the only completely free aspect of the individual; thus good and bad have no significance outside the realm of prohairesis. A thorough investigation of prohairesis is therefore necessary for any interpretation of Epictetus' doctrine of freedom.

This preliminary chapter stems from the importance played by prohairesis in Aristotle's account of the psychology

of right action. There will be opportunity at the end of this chapter to see how far there is common meaning in the use of this term by Aristotle and Epictetus. The fact that the same term occurs in both philosophers in accounting for moral conduct, and is not employed significantly to this purpose by the Stoic school earlier than Epictetus,¹ is sufficient justification for this chapter; and it is hoped, as I remarked in the introduction, that the close account given by Aristotle of the psychological basis of moral action will at any rate illuminate the less formally presented ethico-psychology behind Epictetus' doctrine of freedom.

In this chapter then I shall first consider Aristotle's remarks on deliberation and choice in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. From this will develop the problem of how far reason and how far desire contribute to choice. This problem is basic to any study of ethics particularly when applied to questions of responsibility and social ethics: whether an action is wholly accountable in terms of reason, or whether the irrational in the form of impulse and desire plays a part; if so, how far can the irrational part be called voluntary, and if an action is found to be involuntary, how far can the individual be held responsible for that act: to what extent is he acting freely?

A significant contribution to this problem is made by Aristotle both in his treatment of prohairesis in Book III, and in his consideration of prohairesis in relation to φρόνησις in Book VI.

A consideration on the position of the man of ill-restraint in Book VII not only affords a further comment on prohairesis in demonstrating its essential moral quality, but also entails the whole question of man's control over his desires and passions. This question on how the free man should master passions is prominent in Epictetus, and the analysis Aristotle gives will be useful in forming an interpretation.

The coordination of reason and desire, manifest in Aristotle, is considered also with reference to Plato. Professor E. R. Dodds² sees in the philosophy of Plato a reaction to the fifth century rationalism of the Sophists, and notes that a recognition of the irrational takes increasing prominence in his philosophy. A comparison can be drawn between this and a similar reaction to the stern Stoic rationalism inaugurated by Posidonius,³ and developed by Seneca and Epictetus.

My principal purpose in this chapter is to show how

points of difficulty in Epictetus' doctrine are covered in Plato and Aristotle, not with the same intent, but with far greater analysis and comprehensiveness of thought. Epictetus' teaching on seeking a life of freedom does require an examination of the problems of right thought and action, and therefore I have chosen the most lucid and careful exponents of a full and unrestricted ethical theory in Epictetus' philosophical ancestry, to act as a standard for the interpretation of Epictetus himself. Beside them he is meagre in his own output and mean in stature, neither has he enjoyed an equal weight of later criticism. For this reason there may be some value in a fuller examination here.

2. Prohairesis in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Books I - III of the Ethics are introductory to the principal material of the work, beginning at 1115 a 4, which is an examination of the moral and intellectual virtues. In Bk. I the conclusion is reached that happiness, the supreme end of human life, is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue⁴. This justifies an examination of virtue, which in book II is seen to be concerned with states of character⁵. The kind of εἶδος which constitutes virtue is given in 1107 a 1

as the state of character concerned with choice lying in a mean, that is the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle.⁶ Books IV - V are concerned with the states of character, and book VI with the rational determination of the mean, in the theory of φρόνησις. It is the purpose of book III to examine the nature of activity which constitutes virtue. Already it has been said in book II that states of character correspond to certain kinds of activity⁷. Virtue is the result of action since there is not a previous potentiality⁸.

Little need be said on the section of book III, 1109 b 30 to 1111 b 4 in which voluntary and involuntary actions are analysed. The most important conclusion is the explanation of a voluntary action. First, in discussing 'mixed' actions, (those combining voluntary and involuntary elements), these are voluntary in so far as the moving principle, (ἡ ἀρχή) instrumental to the action lies in the agent, and when the origin of an action is in oneself, (ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή), it is in one's own power to do it or not⁹. Second, a voluntary action is further defined at a 23, as requiring full knowledge about the action on the part of the agent: A voluntary action therefore is an action whose origin lies in the agent who knows the particular circumstances in which he is acting. An important

note is added to this definition, that it is wrong to speak of actions prompted by desire or passions as involuntary; in most cases these are a branch of voluntary actions.

The main concern of book III with reference to Epictetus is the discussion on prohairesis, or in its fuller context, the treatment of wish (βούλησις), deliberation (βούλευσις) and choice (prohairesis) as precedents to action. Virtue was defined as a state of character concerned with choice, (ἕξις προαιρετική),¹⁰ and a definition of προαιρετική and its noun prohairesis has now to be established. This definition is reached through the following stages:

1. Choice and voluntary action, 1111 b 7: Choice falls into the category of voluntary acts, but not all voluntary acts are chosen. Two examples are given of acts which are voluntary, but not from choice: acts of children, and sudden actions (τὰ ἐξάίφνης), i.e. done on the spur of the moment.¹¹

2. What choice is not, 1111 b 11 - 1112 a 16: Choice is shown to be neither desire, (ἐπιθυμία), passion (θυμός), nor wish (βούλησις); i.e. it is not purely appetite, (ὄρεξις); neither is it opinion, (δόξα). Three points might be noted here for reference later on: first, prohairesis - choice - is quite a distinct notion from wish.

Second, Aristotle carefully uses *θυμός* as the term that may be confused with prohairesis, rather than passion (*πάθος*). *θυμός* is always regarded as approaching nearer to the rational self than the *πάθη* or emotions.¹² Third, choice cannot be a judgement because judgements deal with the true and false, but prohairesis with the good and bad. A similar distinction will be found in Epictetus.

3. Preliminary definition of choice, 1112 a 14: 'Choice may be defined as a voluntary action preceded by deliberation'. This clearly relates it to reasoning (Logos) and intelligence (*διάνοια*).

4. Deliberation, 1112 a 18 - 1113 a 14: A definition still has to be reached on deliberation. Two main points are made. First, that we deliberate about things in our power and which are possible to be done.¹³ Second, we deliberate about means not ends.¹⁴ Deliberation is therefore here distinguished from a wish, (*βούλησις*), which is concerned with the end and can have impossibilities as to its object. Deliberation is about things in our control, (*τὰ ἐφ' ἑμῖν*)¹⁵ and is concerned with events that follow in accordance with certain rules and happen in a known way for the most part¹⁶; by a process of analysis it works out a sequence of actions for obtaining an end: A is a means for obtaining end Y; B is a

means of obtaining A, etc.

5. Final definition of Choice, 1113 a 12 - 1113 a 14:¹⁷

Choice is concerned with deliberation. Both have the same thing as their object: a thing chosen is something that is selected as a result of our deliberation¹⁸. Choice is a deliberate desire of things in our power, (βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν). We deliberate and select, then fix ^{ἡμῶν} our choice according to the result of our deliberation.¹⁹ ^{ὀργάνου}

From this definition it is important to note two points: first, that in Aristotle, prohairesis involves a rational and irrational element. It is irrational in so far as it provides an ὄρεξις, or impulse, to act on what is yet inert thought. What kind of ὄρεξις it is, is not stated, and, as Joachim points out, it could take any form, but not the form of βούλησις.²⁰ The prohairesis is rational in so far as it is βουλευτική, that is, following the lead of rational deliberation. Second, in so far as prohairesis is already determined by deliberation, little room is left for any real choosing, but rather to give assent or not to what is already rationally determined. This latter point is important in considering Epictetus' use of the term. Prohairesis is merely the trigger, the gun is already aimed and loaded, though the strength of the gun-powder poses an interesting

problem, but in the realm of akrasia²¹.

6. Wish, (βούλησις), 1113 a 15 - 1113 b 2: Aristotle continues with a passage on βούλησις, repeating that wish is concerned with ends. Joachim remarks that it is a species of ὄρεξις reserved for ends,²² and adds an important observation that the end is not only desirable, but also revealed to our intelligence: νόησις and βούλησις are combined in our grasp of the end. Therefore it may be asked how is deliberation disconnected from the νόησις which suggests the end, since the first step in deliberation must be an appreciation of the end. This helps close the gap between prohairesis and βούλησις, and further strengthens the desire plus reason aspect.

The problem is stated again by Ando,²³ that "deliberation may be the efficient cause of desire as well (as the material),²⁴ and the desire which presupposes such deliberation was called not a prohairesis but a βούλησις. This wish, being a calculated desire, was more highly estimated than ἐπιθυμία or θυμός." In a previous chapter of Ando's work,²⁵ the function of wishing was examined in detail, and this distinction between the two meanings of deliberation was made:

"On the one hand deliberation, or reasoning is an estimation about the end; on the other, the search for

the means to realise a desire. Wish presupposes deliberation in the former sense, but deliberation in the latter sense presupposes wish, and through the co-operation of this deliberation and the wish, results the will (prohairesis), which is called deliberated desire. Will and wish are rational in different senses and both co-exist without contradiction".²⁶

7. The bearing of prohairesis on goodness and vice,

1113 b 3 - 1115 a 2: Aristotle now proceeds to apply his definition of choice to his main subject, virtue, and the result affords an interesting comparison with Epictetus.

Activities in which virtues are exercised deal only with means to an end; actions dealing with means are done by choice, (κατὰ προαίρεσιν), therefore virtue and vice are the result of prohairesis, for prohairesis is where we are free to act, (ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν) and have responsibility, since its objects are within our power to say 'yes' or 'no' to.²⁷

Thus an action done ἐκ προαίρεσεως is an action for which the agent is responsible in that he is exhibiting moral virtue or vice. Because of this, prohairesis is the essential function of a man, and that which displays character; thus it is his most essential self, again a dominant notion in Epictetus.

This has already been shown in the act of prohairesis:²⁸
 for to make the thing deliberated into choice, the agent
 brings the moving principle (ἡ ἀρχή) into himself
 (εἰς ἑαυτόν) and to the ruling part of himself (εἰς τὸ
 ἡγούμενον).

Aristotle adds an interesting concluding note to this
 section²⁹ which again has bearing on Epictetus' teaching,
 that our dispositions (ἔξεις) and actions are not voluntary
 in the same way: we can control action from beginning to end;
 but with ἔξεις we control the beginnings but they are added
 to imperceptibly. Yet in so far as we are free to use them in
 a particular way or not, they are voluntary. This is to say
 that virtue lies in ἔξεις προαιρετικά rather than in
 single virtuous acts. The ἔξεις, which amount to our own
 character, are such that they tend to prompt a choice; this
 added qualification causes prohairesis for Aristotle to
 approximate more closely to a state of being free to choose
 good or evil, and this is its meaning in Epictetus.

3. Desire and reason in Prohairesis. (N.E. Book VI.)

From the above account, it may be concluded that prohairesis
 is for things in our power, and as such, is responsible for

goodness and wickedness, and also that in prohairesis there is a combination of reason and impulse or desire. In this section other passages from book VI of the Ethics, which deals with the intellectual virtues, will be considered in the light of the account of prohairesis given in book iii.

Whilst much of book VI is an analytical account of the intellectual virtues, which do not concern the present study, the purpose of the book is to give meaning to the phrase ὀρθὸς λόγος, which is the determining factor of the mean which guides our conduct in moral virtue.³⁰ The ἕξεις προαιρετικάί which constitute virtue consist in the observing of a mean, that is, discrimination about passion and conduct, determined by a principle, (λόγῳ). Now this logos becomes ὀρθός if it is as a prudent man would determine, (ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσσειαν). Thus the chief aim of book VI is to single out φρόνησις from the other intellectual virtues.

The intellectual virtues are the virtues of the rational soul, and the rational soul has two functions: it is the means of contemplating, (1) invariables; this is the scientific intellect, (τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν);³¹ and (ii) variables, this is the calculating intellect, (τὸ λογιστικόν).³¹

Three elements in the soul control action and attainment of truth: αἰσθησις (sensation), νόυς (intellect), and ὄρεξις (impulse or desire). Affirmation and negation, (κατάφασις and

ἀπόφασίς) are to νόους what pursuit and avoidance (δίωξις, φυγή) are to ὄρεξις.³² Δίσθησις plays no direct part in moral action. Hence, from the conclusions already reached in Book III that moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and that choice is deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true and the desire right, (ὀρθή). The good and bad state of speculative thought (τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν) is truth and falsehood, but the good of the practical intellect, which is the φρόνησις of the λογιστικόν is the attainment of truth corresponding to right desire.³³

Next follows a definition of prohairesis, and the context is important: in book III prohairesis was defined with respect to the voluntary and possibilities, hence its closeness to βούλευσις. Here in book VI it is defined directly in relation to thought and action. Thought alone cannot be a κίνησις of action, for an action implies a good or an end (εὐπραξία), and this is the aim of desire. Prohairesis is the cause (ἡ ἀρχή) of action, and the cause of prohairesis is desire and reasoning directed to some end, (ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἐνεκά τινός).³⁴ arab.

Therefore prohairesis involves thought and a disposition of character, (ἠθικὴ εἶξις).³⁵ Thus prohairesis may be either desire bearing on thought, (ὀρεκτικὸς νόους), or

thought bearing on desire (ὄρεξις διανοητική); and man as ἀρχή (cause of moral action) is a combination of desire and intellect, that is, prohairesis.³⁶

Greenwood remarks³⁷ that the view of prohairesis as ὀρθὸς λόγος and ὀρθὴ ὄρεξις was a major advance in ethical psychology on Aristotle's part, other philosophers having held that prohairesis could be explained totally by logos or by ὄρεξις. The struggle of φρόνησις against ὄρεξις was a common theme in Fifth Century tragedy. A striking example is the contrast between the attitudes of Crysothemis and Electra in Sophocles' 'Electra', the one following and advising φρόνησις, the other carried along through natural filial impulses.³⁸

I now turn briefly to the question what makes choice good choice, since we have seen as a characteristic of prohairesis, that it is responsible for goodness and vice. Goodness and badness of an action must depend on the goodness and badness of both reasoning and desire. Therefore the kind of reasoning that has to do with action, φρόνησις or βούλευσις, can never be called good in itself, whereas other kinds of reasoning can be good in themselves if they attain the truth. The former kind of reasoning can only be good when harmonised with good desire. The two functions in combination: κατὰ φάσις, the attraction of reason, must correspond to, i.e. have the same

object as, $\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\xi\iota\varsigma$ (attraction of desire).³⁹ But before there is good prohairesis, two further conditions must be fulfilled: the logos must be true, and the desire correct.⁴⁰ The correctness of reasoning occasions Aristotle's account of $\phi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$; though even there, as will be seen later in discussing the practical syllogism, this cannot be done, because of its very nature, without reference to the desiring element. For the moment consideration will be given to the correctness of desire and in particular the relation of correctness of desire to correctness of reason. This discussion occurs at 1144 a 20; Greenwood comments on these lines:

"Real goodness or badness of logos and $\delta\acute{\rho}\epsilon\xi\iota\varsigma$ is determined in part by the character of the end to which they lead; and as the character of the end is determined by the character in itself of one of the means combined with the character in itself of the other means, it follows that the character of the logos in itself determines the real character of the $\delta\acute{\rho}\epsilon\xi\iota\varsigma$, and the character of the $\delta\acute{\rho}\epsilon\xi\iota\varsigma$ in itself determines the real character of the logos".⁴¹

This demonstrates that whilst for the purpose of analysis prohairesis or $\phi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ can be divided up into $\delta\acute{\rho}\epsilon\xi\iota\varsigma$ and

logos, in practice they are inseparable. Aristotle helps to clarify the position by splitting the elements and examining their functions when no longer organically fused:⁴² When $\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is dissolved of its virtue element, (i.e. $\delta\acute{o}\rho\epsilon\varsigma\iota\varsigma$) it becomes $\delta\epsilon\iota\nu\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$ (cleverness). Similarly when virtue is deprived of its $\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ element, (i.e. the logical), it becomes natural virtue, ($\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}$). That is, moral virtue and practical knowledge are what they are because they are two things co-operating. Natural goodness is the kind of 'goodness' displayed by animals, doing the right things by instinct, but since they do not do them by choice or will, (prohairesis), they are not good in the true sense.⁴³ Cleverness is a rationally thought out course of action just as $\beta\acute{o}\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is. It is means directed towards an end, but cut off from any idea of willing or choosing this course of action for a particular good; cleverness is the mere capacity for doing things to the aim proposed, (as a computer could work out and follow a means to a proposed end); the aim may be good or bad. But with the fusion of moral virtue and $\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, will or determined choice, (prohairesis) makes its appearance, and the resulting action can be said to be good in the true sense.⁴⁴

This definition of cleverness is pursued by Miss Anscombe

in her essay, Thought and Action in Aristotle⁴⁵ as a means to a possible solution of an ambiguity she discerns in Aristotle's use of the term prohairesis. She states the inconsistency as follows: Prohairesis is what is determined by deliberation, (Book III); the man of ill-restraint does not choose, (προαιρούμενοι) the actions into which his ill-restrained character leads him; the man of ill-restraint, though acting against his convictions, does on occasions determine what to do by deliberation.⁴⁶

Anscombe's resolution of the inconsistency displayed in these theses, is to say that choice is of something determined not by any sort of deliberation. In other words choice and deliberation are not inseparable: there can be deliberation that is not adopted by choice. For as well as deliberation in forming a choice, there is deliberation in executing a choice; this is cleverness, and also (which the essay fails to notice), deliberation in falling from the prohairesis to the position of akrasia.⁴⁷

This solution for the most part corresponds with the account of δεινότης given above. But Miss Anscombe finds this solution imprecise and not entirely satisfactory. Whilst much of the essay is a criticism rather than an interpretation of Aristotle's position, it is worth noting that the main

difficulty is that Aristotle seems to place choice arbitrarily in the chain of deliberation stretching from deliberation of the end, to the immediate thing I can do without having to consider how to do it.⁴⁸ The only guidance Aristotle gives is that choice occurs when the moral character, (ἡθικὴ εἶξις) is involved.

Throughout this section there has been some difficulty, (and Miss Anscombe's essay bears this out) in seeing prohairesis as the kind of activating principle it was seen to be in book III. It is not easy from the discussion in book VI, to put one's finger on a point in the line of thought and action where prohairesis or choice occurs. It rather seems to be a necessary concomitant of φρόνησις and virtue. Our prohairesis is our own character, for through it we are free, or self-determined. But it is unclear where the start of this self-determinism lies. The problem is examined by Joachim.⁴⁹

He uses as a basis for his discussion the distinction between non-rational and rational capacities given in the Metaphysics.⁵⁰ Man's character is at first δυνάμεις τῶν ἐνδυνάτω (i.e. he has rational capacities). These are capabilities for realising opposites; and in order to decide which of the opposites is to be realised, ὄρεξις or prohairesis is necessary.⁵¹ This purposing factor therefore, according to

Joachim's first interpretation is the 'all important factor determining the issue'. The prohairesis is not mere capricious will, but the 'expression of man's nature, the nature, that is, of a reasoning and deliberating as well as desiring being'. Thus man is self-determined from an established character.⁵²

It is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss at length the practical syllogism,⁵³ but attention needs to be drawn to the practical syllogism in so far as it is precisely in this mode of reasoning that δ'ρεξις appears to intrude into logos. φρόνησις is defined as a truth attaining rational quality concerned with action in relation to things that are good for human beings.⁵⁴ It expresses itself in practical syllogisms whose conclusions are prohairesis, (purposes) which immediately become actions. But φρόνησις is not only a rational quality.⁵⁵ Nor conversely are animals capable of it since it requires the power to form universal concepts.⁵⁶

The practical syllogism cannot strictly fall into the class of logical syllogisms, since individualising particulars and individual values are involved both in the minor premise and conclusion. The mode seems to be:

Major premise: a general conception. A thing X is good and should be done by such and such a man.

Minor premise: Particular. I am such a man and this particular is such and such a thing.

Conclusion: I should do X here and now.⁵⁷

The individualising of the logos in the minor premise, converting it from the abstract rule to the singular object shows the intrusion of ὄρεξις, since impulse is directed to particulars rather than to a type of object,⁵⁸ for the particular of the minor premise can only be apprehended by δίσθησις.⁵⁹

Greenwood urges that ὄρεξις is present already in the formulation of the major premise, and brings the fusion of ὄρεξις and logos into this major premise formulated by φρόνησις.⁶⁰ It is sufficient for the present purpose, however, to conclude that the combination of ὄρεξις and logos can be traced to the function of φρόνησις through the practical syllogism.

Here I may add a note on Aristotle's concept of and phantasia⁶¹ (images), especially as the same terms are fundamental to understanding the Stoic theory of knowledge

L 7

which was adopted in principle by Epictetus. Generally in Aristotle, φαινόμενον is a middle term between the receiving of a sense impression and intellection, in the form knowledge of thinking, sometimes described as inert sensation.⁶² The φαινόμενα are accompanied by pleasure and pain, and thereby arise desire.

Now it is the ὄρεξις that accompanies the phantasia that in the first instance is responsible for conduct, thus making desire more necessary than intellect. The object of desire, (the phantasiai) will be either the good or the apparent good. But through the functioning of φρόνησις only the true good will be accepted and posited as an end or βούλησις. When the φρόνησις fails to function, the ὄρεξις will manifest itself in the form of passion or appetite.⁶³ In other words through moral virtue as ἔξεις προαιρετικάι we are responsible for what use we make of the phantasiai. This is the argument with which Aristotle counters Socrates' paradox, no one is willingly wicked, in book III.⁶⁴

4. Akrasia. (N.E. Book VII).

In this section will be considered the account of akrasia, (ill-restraint), which begins book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.

In view of a possible interpretation of Epictetus' position concerning the πάθη (passions), attention should be drawn to three facets of Aristotle's account: 1. The consideration of akrasia as a temptation, through the irrational parts, to vice. 2. The part played by prohairesis in the man of ill-restraint, (the ἀκρατής). 3. The involvement both of irrational and rational elements in the position of the ἀκρατής : again the inter-action of emotion or desire, and reason. These three concerns are so closely inter-related, that rather than discuss each separately, it would seem best to follow through Aristotle's account to appreciate what contributions are made to each.

Moral virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, (περὶ παθῶν καὶ πράξεις),⁶⁵ and this is combined with a rational estimate of the mean as regards passions. That is, it is right (δεῖ) to feel anger or fear for some things and to desire some things up to a certain limit.⁶⁶ Thus voluntary actions must include actions done in giving way to passions, for the irrational passions (τὰ ἄλογα πάθη) are no less part of man than reason is. In this passage the position of akrasia is fore-shadowed when Aristotle asks what difference there is, as regards their voluntary nature, between wrong acts committed deliberately and wrong acts done in anger,

(τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα).⁶⁷

These two types of wrong-doing, though both voluntary actions, are distinguished further in Book V. If a man does an injury from choice or set purpose (ἐκ προαιρέσεως),⁶⁸ he is guilty of injustice. The man who acts from a fit of passion or anger is guilty of a lesser kind of injustice. It is worth noting that Aristotle does not state that actions done from passion (τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ), are done without prohairesis, but merely οὐκ ἐκ πρόνοιας , not from fore-thought.

Such passages as this look forward to the full account of akrasia in book VII, where the man of ill-restraint is defined. He is one who gives way (ἐκστατικός) on account of passion contrary to the ὀρθὸς λόγος , but his passions do not over-master him to the extent that he believes it right to pursue pleasures in a reckless manner.⁶⁹ Thus the man of ill-restraint stands mid-way between the virtuous man who stands firm by his choice, and the truly wicked man (ὁ ἀκόλαστος), who deliberately makes a vicious choice. In the ἀκρατής the ἀρχή is still preserved, and the ἀρχή presumeably is the principle governing his choice.⁷⁰ Thus there are two degrees of wrong-doing, ἀκολασία and akrasia, the former being due from the beginning to wrong appetite, (ὄρεξις), the latter due to the mastery over a good will by desire.

The first part of Aristotle's explanation of the ἀκρατής position concerns the question of whether the ἀκρατής fails knowingly, and if so, in what sense of knowing. Aristotle significantly abandons the view that the virtuous man acts with knowledge but the ἀκρατής with mere opinion. It is rather the degree of conviction that matters, and there can be as much lack of conviction over knowledge as there can over opinion.⁷¹

Aristotle therefore analyses knowledge, dividing it into, 1. the εἶσις of knowledge; 2. the θεωρία of knowledge. The εἶσις is a state of having knowledge; it is a potential rather than an actual. This kind of knowledge, which tends to be general and latent, the ἀκρατής has. The θεωρία is the consciousness of knowing in its application, the actuality of knowing. Hence it is knowing involving particulars and the self, me here and now. The ἀκρατής fails in this. Thus he knows the right principle, but is not actually realising its meaning. Now he can act against an εἶσις, a general knowledge which remains abstract, though he could not act against a realisation of the principle in its particular aspect.⁷²

Aristotle next illustrates this scientifically, (φυσικῶς) in the light of the practical syllogism.⁷³ Briefly the argument

is this. There are two major premises in the form of universal concepts: 1. All sweet things ought not to be tasted; 2. All sweet things are pleasant; and there is a minor premise: This thing here is sweet. The ἀκρατής reaches the conclusion, 'this thing is pleasant and so must be tasted', since the desire involved in major premise 2, overcomes the natural conclusion of the restrained man, 'this thing ought not to be tasted'. Thus the opinion of the ἀκρατής in the conclusion, fails not in itself, (this thing is pleasant), but in the desire, (and so must be tasted). Thus in the case of the ἀκρατής it is possible for a syllogism, the conclusion of which is a bad act, to exist side by side with the knowledge of the major premise, that is, a practical principle which the act violates.⁷⁴

The problems raised by this syllogism are discussed by Joachim⁷⁵ who concludes that the error of the ἀκρατής arises from a collision occurring from the minor premise being a δόξα ἀποθετού⁷⁶ which is enforced by an ἐπιθυμία (desire), and the desire to taste collides with the major premise.

Akrasia has been interpreted as a conflict of desires,⁷⁷ that is, the desire of the good conflicting with the desire of the pleasant, this conflict being decided after an interval of hesitation (which might entail secondary deliberation; see below), by the strength of contending imaginative pictures,

(phantasiai). This interpretation is notable in that it comes very near to Epictetus' theory of persuasive phantasiai overmastering reason, (i.e. reason as Aristotle's rational, βούλησις of the good);⁷⁸ it does however seem to omit the part played by prohairesis in the ἀκρατής.

After an analysis of the objects of akrasia, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia, impetuosity, (προπέτεια) and weakness, (ἀσθένεια). The weak deliberate, but are prevented from keeping to their resolution on account of passion. The impulsive are led on by passion without stopping to deliberate,⁷⁹ There seems to be a difficulty here as regards the notion of prohairesis. The ἀκρατής is one who acts against his prohairesis (παρὰ προαίρεσιν).⁸⁰ In so far as he has made a choice, and a right choice, he must have deliberated, (book III), but now it appears that a certain class of ἀκρατής, the impetuous, act without deliberation. There could possibly be reference to secondary deliberation here, that is, deliberation on whether to depart from the prohairesis.⁸¹ This kind of deliberation is not accompanied by prohairesis, and therefore does not negate the former prohairesis.

This explanation would contradict Burnet's note on 1148 a 6, (μὴ τῷ προαιρέσθαι), in which he states that akrasia is

caused by ἐπιθυμία which excludes βούλευσις. The impulsive type of akrasia is therefore still acting contrary to a prohairesis. A further difficulty however occurs at 1151 a 1 where the term, οἱ ἑκσπαιτικοί, (presumably referring to the impulsive) is used, and contrasted with those who know the right principle but do not keep it, whence it appears that the impulsive, (if the identity is correct) have had no prohairesis, and here we must concur with Burnet⁸² that οἱ ἑκσπαιτικοί are not the ἀκρατής as studied in the previous account.

5. Reason and Desire in Plato.

It has been remarked in an earlier section that Aristotle made an important advance in the theory of conduct by accepting a fusion of desire and reason in the very act of choosing the good. In so far as Aristotle explains his theory in manageable psychological terms, this is a significant contribution.

Yet before him Plato had already appreciated the difficulties of assessing the roles of reason and desire; for as with Aristotle, and in contrast to the Stoics, he was ready to assess the whole soul in all its parts. Thus he was forced

to take account of the irrational as well as the rational. This is shown, as far as the human soul is concerned, in the account of the tripartite soul in the Republic,⁸³ and the same is true of the world soul whose motions include the rational and the irrational: reflection, forethought, deliberation; and joy, fear, love and their opposites.⁸⁴ Whilst the mutual functioning of desire and reason is an idea already present in the Symposium,⁸⁵ a number of critical studies on Plato have shown that in the later dialogues, notably Philebus, Timaeus and Laws, there is greater consideration given to the importance of the irrational functions.⁸⁶

In assessing the parts played by reason and desire in Plato's concept of the good life, it is convenient to consider the three stages in the development of his ethics as given by Walsh:⁸⁷ 1. The cognitivist stage; 2. The psychological stage; 3. The habituation stage. The cognitivist stage, represented chiefly by the Phaedo, regards moral conduct as dependent on knowledge. This is largely the Socratic position, 'virtue is knowledge', with little psychological awareness; Socrates accepted no position of akrasia. The only desire present in Socrates is the noblest: desire for the good and love of knowledge.⁸⁸

The psychological stage is that taken up in the Republic

by the tripartite division of the soul.⁸⁹ The recognition of conflicting motions in the soul causes Plato to divide the soul into a rational (λογιστικόν) and a desiring (ἐπιθυμητικόν) part. This has arisen from the discussion of σωφροσύνη (temperance),⁹⁰ by which virtue the better part of the soul holds mastery over the worse part.⁹¹ The actual psychological conflict is expressed in the anecdote of the thirsty man,⁹² from which it is concluded that impulsive desires (παθήματα)⁹³ are sometimes curbed by reason.

Having established that there are these two elements in the soul, often conflicting, Plato turns to the third, the spirited element (τὸ θυμοειδές). For the present study, this is the most interesting part of the discussion, since this element is neutral as regards reason and unreason, yet it is clearly not reason but some driving force, comparable with the guardians of the ideal state. Its natural function however is to ally itself with reason,⁹⁴ but through bad upbringing (ὕπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς) it could help unreason.⁹⁵ The idea of a driving force behind what reason has deliberated is similar to Aristotle's prohairesis, which was seen to be a partly irrational concept putting into action the conclusions of deliberation, which as yet remained inert thought. Thus θυμός may represent an approach to the will, and lead to

the part of desire in prohairesis.⁹⁶ In Plato's account however there is more emphasis on division in the soul than unity of function. Aristotle attempted to redress the balance in his account of φρόνησις, where his logical, or scientific (φυσικῶς) approach⁹⁷ is more amenable to unity than Plato's analytical and diagrammatic method. But in each can be discerned the three functions: thinking, reacting emotionally, and desiring appetitively.⁹⁸

Plato reaches no solution on the psychological details of the parts functioning together, yet he seems to recognise that once a psychic act begins, the entire soul is thereby functioning.⁹⁹ The passage on temperance and the ἐγκρατής,¹⁰⁰ recognises this virtue as essentially that which produces the correct harmony between the different elements.¹⁰¹ The importance of the tripartite division therefore is that Plato recognises an irrational factor in the mind itself, and can develop a view of moral evil being the result of psychological conflict (στάσις),¹⁰² and that ψυχή tends to make all ἐπιθυμία a dangerous rival of reason, though when the soul is really acting in harmony under the control of reason, the desiring element also finds its fulfilment.¹⁰³

The Philebus presents a closer account of the blending of desire and reason in the good life. I believe this to be a

key dialogue in the present study, on three scores. First it considers certain pleasures to be an essential part of the good life. Plato's analysis of pleasures shows that they are very closely related to the objects of the desiring element in the Republic. In the Republic, desires were held to be necessarily human, therefore the reason in the soul must accommodate them. In Philebus, pleasures are seen to be necessary for the proper functioning of any organism, therefore even human goodness will not be complete without them. It is as if there is now a welcoming of pleasure by Plato rather than a toleration of desires, (which are necessary for the attainment of pleasure). Only the Gods can live a life of pure thought;¹⁰⁴ man should follow a mixed life of pleasure and intelligence: "Imagine one of us choosing to live in the possession of intelligence, thought, knowledge and a complete memory of everything, but without an atom of pleasure, or indeed of pain, in a condition of utter insensibility to such things".¹⁰⁵

Hence in Plato there now appears a combination of reason for the good, and desire for the pleasure, that was seen in Aristotle's concept of φρόνησις; moreover, by combining the two lives, the mixed life has an end, it is τέλος (whereas the two lives severally have no end), and as having an end, the notion of choice-worthiness (τὸ ἄριετόν) can be applied.¹⁰⁶

The second reason for attaching importance to the Philebus is the dominance given to reason in the blend of intelligence and pleasures. Three points may be noted. First that in the blending, the pleasures that be admitted are those amenable to thought. These are the pleasures that require intellectual capacity, and particularly the apprehension of beauty.¹⁰⁷ Second, there is an approach to the Aristotelian doctrine of the 'mean', in considering pleasures as part of the *ἀπειρον* (the unlimited),¹⁰⁸ upon which intelligence must set a limit, and the combination of the limit (reason) upon the unlimited (pleasure and pain) produces the blending, or the mixed life. Thus the four factors defined in 23C-26D, intelligence, the unlimited, the limit and the mixture are involved. This gives rise to the third point, that the two ingredients of the blend are thought and pleasure, and the blending agent is itself thought or intelligence.¹⁰⁹ Thus the good life seems heavily weighted on the side of reason, but of a reason and intelligence that is fully aware of its environment, and which man has as his distinctive power for the intelligent ordering of life with respect to environment.

The third and final reason for the importance of this dialogue in relation to later philosophy, is Plato's classification of pleasures. The sections of the dialogue on true and

false pleasures, and the judgement of them have much in common with the Stoic notion of phantasiai as conceived by Epictetus.¹¹⁰ The notion of pleasure being dependent on memory¹¹¹ in pleasures of anticipation is particularly relevant. Moreover, the other class of false pleasures, those where pleasure is accompanied by pain, shows Plato's awareness still of psychological conflict, and that it is easy to acknowledge such pleasures as good, thereby being led into a position of akrasia.

Before leaving this psychological stage, a comparison of the use of βούλησις (wish) in Plato and Aristotle may be observed. The object of βούλησις¹¹² is a man's true happiness, though man can fail in achieving this through temptation from desire. Thus moral conduct involves correct reaction in the face of emotions in order to attain the end he fundamentally wishes, his βούλησις. Therefore what he wishes (ὃ βούλεται) and what seems best to him (ὅτι ἂν δοξῆ βέλτιστον εἶναι) are identical. To Plato then, instinctive or irrational reaction to moral situations is as essential to ἐπιστήμη as is a purely intellectual attitude.¹¹³

It remains to examine Plato's final stage of ethical theory, that of habituation presented in the Laws. Here the virtue of the common man is not based on knowledge, nor on the reasoning responsibility to control desires, but rather on a process of conditioning. Plato in no way diminishes the role of desire:

on the contrary, desire is seen to be such a strong factor in human behaviour that Plato now sees that his earlier expectation that reason, if properly nurtured, would find the right harmony in accommodating itself to desire, had proved to be too optimistic for the majority of men. Further, it was the conditioning of desires which was the focus of his education programme. This education of the young should not be compared with the popular teaching of the Stoics, who exhorted men to lift themselves above desire and to obey reason. Plato's education system was an attempt to discipline the emotions but not abolish them.

There is in this respect a certain amount of correspondence with the Philebus. The mixed life is again advocated,¹¹⁴ and in pleasures and in pains it is necessary to embrace the mean (ἀσπάρεσθαι τὸ μέσον), and in Laws 653 B the emotions, pleasure, love and their opposites are said to spring up rightly (ὀρθῶς) in an infant's soul. It is the purpose of the education to produce an agreement between the feelings of pleasure and pain, and the law, which is based on reason.¹¹⁵ This education is concerned with controlling the mean in pleasures and pains.¹¹⁶ Music and dancing, for instance, should be regulated to provide just the right amount of pleasure.¹¹⁷

Yet this habituation stage does in one respect at least

come near to the Stoic concept of will, that it should be in accordance with nature. The education process is designed to condition a person to desire of his own accord action in obedience to the laws. In the Laws the individual does not have unrestricted freedom, but his feelings, therefore his will, if properly educated, will be content to follow the laws. This is clear from a closer look at Plato's definition of education at 653 A - C.¹¹⁸ He first remarks that in the infant, goodness and badness first enter the soul through pleasures and pains.¹¹⁹ Eventually a rational account (logos) is grasped, and the child assents to it. This assent as a whole (*ἄποπᾶσα*) is goodness, while the part of it that is rightly trained with respect to pleasure, is education. Education therefore moulds our feelings to accord with the law. The Stoics, however whilst agreeing that the will should accord with the law of nature, did not follow Plato's psychological approach to conditioning, but relied on verbal precepts and maxims of the Stoic school. Plato's theory is more akin to the *ἔξις προαιρετική* of Aristotle, but where the prohairesis is conditioned in childhood and infancy, and even further back than that. This early psychological conditioning is noted by Morrow¹²⁰ as an advance on Spartan upbringing in recognising sentiment as the mainspring of action in the majority of men. Habits, before they really

become part of the individual, must be accompanied by the appropriate feelings of pleasure and pain; mere discipline is not sufficient.

6. Other Platonic trends of thought recurring in Epictetus.

At this point it is convenient to list the principle Socratic elements found in Epictetus' teaching, as collected by Souilhé:¹²¹

1. All men sin voluntarily.
2. Knowledge consists in the understanding of oneself, and a life without refutation (réfutation, ἀνεξέταστος) is not worth living.
3. The understanding of concepts is closely conjoined to the understanding of oneself.
4. From the correct understanding of oneself comes the correct relationship to things exterior.
5. The belief in Providence, which demands on the part of man obedience and submission to the divine will.
6. Man must have a knowledge of his relationships with God which give rise to feelings of divinity and holiness.
7. Self-sufficiency.

8. True knowledge not only guides men to live their lives, but to live them correctly.
9. L'eudémonisme (the spiritual happiness of one's whole composite being).

Several of these points are embraced by the Socratic position, 'virtue is knowledge' and his concept of personal morality. In the fifth century, confusion arose over what comprised the good life, and with it, the criticism of traditional values. Socrates was the first to teach that there was a good as an objective value, both above the individual and at the same time determining the value of the individual. Man must be neglectful of external good things and become conscious of the principal good and strive to acquire knowledge of it.¹²²

However, on the subject of knowledge and right conduct (Soulhé's points numbers 1, 2 and 8), enough has already been said in considering the Aristotelian and Platonic position on akrasia and knowledge.¹²³ Soulhé's remaining points fall into three groups: 1. Those dealing with the importance of the essential self (points 3 and 4); 2. those dealing with the concepts of God and Providence (points 5 and 6); 3. those dealing with the end of life, happiness, a condition of which is self-sufficiency (points 7 and 9). I shall treat these in

order:

1. It was essential to Socrates' teaching that man's interest was ultimately in the self, where alone his good was to be attained. A new meaning was given to σωφροσύνη, no longer 'common sense', but self-control, and with it the terms ἐγκράτεια and akrasia were adopted: mastery of self, and the opposite. This love of self, love of one's personal goodness, and therefore love of knowledge was the one kind of desire that Socrates did allow.¹²⁴

This point of ethical teaching is continued in the Platonic dialogues, with just a hint of modification in the Laws, that the majority of men should recognise the limitation of their own knowledge and trust their betters. These people are criticised for excessive love of self (τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν), and that is love of a badly adjusted self.¹²⁵

The point is taken up by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics.¹²⁶ He justifies φιλαυτία (love of self) provided the love is of the essential self, that is, the most dominant part, just as the most perfect friendship is when the whole character or personality of each is comprehended in the union. This is also the most permanent since moral character is the most permanent possible bond.¹²⁷ The essential self, the dominant part, is τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἕῃν, (as opposed to τὸ κατὰ πάθος), that

is, our reasoned acts are felt to be in the fullest sense our own voluntary acts. It has already been shown from Book III of the Ethics that in any moral action, the responsibility lies in prohairesis, and so prohairesis must exhibit the self in its fullest sense, that is, the self as a responsible person. Man's real self is $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$, for when we talk about being self-restrained or unrestrained, we are ruled or failing to be ruled by rational intelligence (τὸ κρᾶττεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ). The importance of this passage¹²⁸ and its connection with Epictetus is the emphasis on the rational part as the ruling and in every way the highest part of man, in fact the man himself. This is in Epictetus, the prohairesis obedient to a rational hegemonikon (ruling element).¹²⁹

2. The concept of a ruling providence, which is accepted by Epictetus is largely Stoic doctrine. The notion of the divine plays little part in Aristotle's Ethics, apart from the discussion of $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ in Book X, which will be considered under 3 below. $\theta\epsilon\omega\pi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is the activity of the God¹³⁰ which humans can only partake of in so far as they share the divinity. Whilst this theory does approach the Stoic belief that the highest part of man, his reason, is an apospasma (a portion) of the divine reason, it does not come very near to the concept of divine guidance of the universe. Moreover the Aristotelian

doctrine of *θεωρία* is generally viewed by scholars as a Platonic interlude, and it is to Plato we must turn to find closer correlation with the Stoics on this question, and particularly to the later dialogues where the idea of a world soul gains prominence.

Crombie suggests¹³¹ that the development of ethical teaching from the earlier to the later dialogues is that in the earlier works, goodness is what is required by human purposes, whilst in the later works, it is what is required by nature's purposes, 'What is our place in the Cosmos?' Thus Plato comes near the Stoics in regarding a cosmic reason operating on our intelligence, as we have already observed in the Philebus,¹³² making the 'mixed life' good. A number of passages in the Laws demonstrate similar doctrine, that man must regulate his life to accord with what God has ordained. It has already been remarked that the Laws proposes a solution of habituation to the conflict of desires and akrasia, but now further, it seems Plato regards the truest form of human goodness as good only in so far as it obeys a cosmic goodness. How far this two-tier habituation is a result of the growing conviction of human worthlessness, or at least helplessness forced on Plato by experience of contemporary Athens or Syracuse, or merely a logical development of Plato's metaphysics, is in doubt.

We may compromise and suggest that the first habituation is due to the former, and the second, the cosmic, to the latter.

Two passages might be noted in this connection; the first at Laws 715E - 716D. Here God is regarded as the measure of all things, and man must become of like character to God. Before Him man should be ταπεινός (abject) and κεκοσμημένος (properly minded). In being a rhetorical passage, this approaches very near to Epictetus in tone, but there is in addition a great deal of common thought.¹³³ The second passage is at Laws 903 B - C, where God is the one who cares for the preservation and ordering of the whole.¹³⁴ Man's soul is joined with this one body, and what is good for the whole is good for man.

The reasons that led Plato to believe in a Cosmic reason may well be different from those which motivated the Stoics, whose physical theory in many ways does not correspond, but the fact that Plato did hold a doctrine of a permeating world soul in certain later dialogues could account for the later Stoics, particularly Posidonius, for reverting to Plato rather than Aristotle.

If Plato's final ethical position was that man should regulate himself in accordance with the guiding Reason, what was his position on free-will? For Plato, the question of will

did not exist as a problem,¹³⁵ and nowhere are we left in any doubt that man has the responsibility, therefore the means within him, of attaining the good. In Laws X,¹³⁶ it is stated that the will of each man is responsible for the generation of his kind of character. Once the kind of character is fixed by our will, then God has an appointed position in the universe for every different kind of character. Character is the result of the direction of our desires and the nature of our souls. In a parallel passage in the Myth of Er the herald is pronouncing the procedure of the souls choosing their new kind of embodiment, and firmly states that the blame rests with him who chooses: God is blameless.¹³⁷ Yet there is in the choosing of lives, a combination of choice and fate, since the order in which the souls choose is determined by lot, but the number of lives exceeds the number of souls choosing.¹³⁸

A similar combination of choice and fate is contained in the game of draughts metaphor at Laws 903 D, where God is the celestial draughts-player (πεττευτής), who can only move the piece according to the way the dice falls, the dice in this case being men's wills forming their characters. The reversal here should be noted of the more common and Stoic use of the metaphor where man should adjust his life according to the fall of the dice which is God's will.¹³⁹ In either case the dice holds the significance observed by Thomas Hardy, "What curious

creatures these dice be - powerful rulers of us all and yet at my command!¹⁴⁰

The question of celestial puppetry is not so obvious. It has been argued¹⁴¹ that where the puppet metaphor is used¹⁴² man is seen to be a plaything at the mercy of God. I believe closer examination of these passages will show that Plato is here concerned with stage one habituation, that is, habituation of desires through education, rather than stage two, the habituation of human goodness to the divine good. Both instances of the metaphor appear in the context of education rather than theology, and the child is seen to be at the mercy of his desires and emotions. This is clearly the case at 644D, to which reference has already been made,¹⁴³ and the correspondence of terminology in both passages is so close¹⁴⁴ to suggest that this interpretation should be applied also at 804B. It may be remarked that in Epictetus man is clearly given the role of playing a part in a game controlled by God.¹⁴⁵

Professor Dodds¹⁴⁶ draws attention to a striking difference between Plato's view of the natural cosmos, and the Stoic concept. He points to the errant cause (*πλανωμένη αίτία*) of the *Timaeus*, and to the concept of *τυχή* (chance), particularly in *Laws* 709 A - B, *τυχή μετά θεού* (chance cooperating with God), and also to the much discussed passage

about the good and evil souls in Book X.¹⁴⁷ He suggests that from these, reason is not alone in its governance of the world, but that a "junior partner" characterised by its irrational behaviour is also present in Necessity. If this interpretation is correct, then it appears that Plato did recognise an element of irrationality in the Cosmos as well as in man. This would strongly contrast with Epictetus and indeed Aristotle's position, who throughout insist on the rationality of the Universe, and in Epictetus it may be a thorough-going rationalism that inhibits a fully satisfactory concept of will. Plato's position is here more accommodating to the irrational, having established it back in the Cosmos.

Finally, in considering the question of a guiding divinity, there is a more patent and purely Socratic element to be found in Plato, corresponding with Epictetus' view of the divine, namely the belief in a daimon or personal guardian spirit. Socrates' daimon is represented as a personal communication with God, as the voice of God speaking personally, similar to the voices experienced by Joan of Arc, and some religious mystics. Normally this phenomenon indicates an advanced stage of religious experience and awareness, and there is no reason to believe that this was not the case with Socrates.¹⁴⁸

In so far as there is consistency in Plato's use of

daimon, its prime significance is as a force intermediary between man and the divine, providing guidance which clarified by a certain convincing apprehension, overmasters or confirms the power of the intellect. It is interesting to note that in the Myth of Er,¹⁴⁹ the souls waiting for their new lives, have the power of choosing their daimon; thus daimon becomes the "innate human form, the element that remains constant throughout all the accidents and flux of life, that which makes any action of mine my action!"¹⁵⁰ Accordingly, by accepting a daimon we accept the "mysterious bond between human life and beyond", and man can realise his freedom in obeying his daimon; that is, his freedom in choosing his thereafter binding link between himself and the divine. This conclusion on freedom is important, and it is significant that the later Stoics used the same term, daimon, to refer to the guiding spirit in man, which is man's reason, and this is, in the Stoic system, man's direct link with God as the reason of the Universe.¹⁵¹ Whether for Epictetus the daimon recovered its Platonic religious significance will be discussed in Chapter six.

3. Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, happiness has been considered the final end that is desirable in itself and is self-sufficient.¹⁵² Similar considerations of the good life are given by Plato in Philebus, that it must be perfect

(τέλειον) and sufficient (ἱκανόν).¹⁵³

The notion of happiness is closely allied, both in Plato and Aristotle to θεωρία, or contemplation of reality. This is most clearly seen in Plato in Books VI and VII of the Republic. In Aristotle the relationship is brought out in Book X of the Ethics.¹⁵⁴ Happiness is an activity desirable in itself. Such possible activities are actions in accordance with virtue, amusements and contemplation.¹⁵⁵ But the highest virtue will be the virtue of the best part of us, that is, "the part which is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognisance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us."¹⁵⁶ This part is νοῦς (intellect), and its activity is θεωρία, which fulfils the following conditions of happiness: it is the most continuous (συνεχῶς), the most pleasant (ἡδιστή), the most self-sufficient (αὐτάρκεια), loved for its own sake (αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι), the most leisured, and the highest thing in us (κράτιστος τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν); it is indeed the divinest part (θεῖον).¹⁵⁷ In Epictetus the highest good is also seen to be a contemplation of the divine reason, to which one adjusts the prohairesis. This is the process referred to by Epictetus in the purification (κάθαρσις) of the prohairesis.¹⁵⁸

A further point about εὐδαιμονία in Plato is its natural and universal desirability. As ἰκανόν , it must satisfy the whole man, that is, man as a feeling and desiring being. This is indicated by Aristotle's phrase, ἡδίστη καὶ αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι : the happiness of contemplation is pleasurable and to be loved on its own merits. Happiness thus becomes the realisation of an ideal, the ideal of the good. Man's ultimate wish, his βούλησις is for this good and his happiness. So happiness is only possible through desiring the good. Without desiring, goodness would be achieved, but happiness would have no meaning. For Plato, and the Greeks in general, there was a natural attraction or love of the truth, and knowledge of goodness.¹⁵⁹ Significantly, two of the most poetic passages of Plato illustrate this striving towards the real good, which man's nature ultimately desires. The first is in the Symposium where Diotima describes the highest love to be a love of beauty in its divine goodness. Contemplation is possible because there is first the love of contemplating the ideal.¹⁶⁰

The second passage in Republic Book VII, shows the happiness of those who have ascended from the cave and have seen in their vision of the sun, goodness itself. Although here the approach to the truth is a painful and forced process;

once the vision of the truth is contemplated, the soul recognises this to be its happy state, and would be reluctant to depart from his state of contemplating reality.¹⁶¹

I believe Epictetus follows this characteristic Greek doctrine of the soul's natural attraction to the good, in referring to a *φαντασία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, an impression of the good.¹⁶²

In connection with this desire to attain goodness, it seems worth quoting J. P. A. Gould's interpretation of akrasia in Plato:

"It is precisely the absence of a sure and personal spiritual driving force, which, certain of its direction and foundation, is the spring of action in the really moral individual. Such a force is no more intellectual, no more emotional than faith".¹⁶³

Plato uses a concept of spiritualising love, but expressed in the more concrete terminology of Aristotle, this could well describe his concept of prohairesis. Certainly the driving force here described is closely similar to prohairesis in Epictetus.

7. Aristotle, Plato and Epictetus

In the foregoing sections, I have covered aspects of the

philosophy of Plato and Aristotle which involve similar problems to those raised by Epictetus' teaching on freedom. The outstanding contribution from these sections is the coordination of reason and desire in the attainment of goodness and knowledge. Because both Epictetus and Aristotle were assured of the inner nature of virtue, it is possible that the similarities in the approach to the problems of will and desire are coincidental.

The influence from Plato, however, may have been more direct. Frequent allusions and quotations from the Apology and Phaedo by Epictetus, suggest that the library at Nicopolis contained a number of Platonic dialogues. Chiefly however, the direct influence must be regarded as Socratic rather than Platonic, and acquired not only through the Platonic dialogues, but also through the resurgence of Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic period, and the Socratic schools of the fourth century¹⁶⁴ (Megarian, Cynics and Cyrenaian), from which grew the systems of Zeno and Epicurus. The teaching on pleasure by the Cyrenaian School was possibly more important than the Philebus in helping to form the Stoic theory of knowledge and false phantasiai.

How far there was any influence from Aristotle on Epictetus is a question on which there is little evidence. Certainly Aristotle's Ethics are not referred to or quoted by Epictetus.

Parts of the Ethics might have formed a basis for the later Stoic teaching on duties, notably the discussion on friendship in Book IX. The position of Aristotelianism in the Stoic school, especially the later Stoics, is a worth while study, but not within the scope of this thesis.

The occurrence of prohairesis in both philosophers as a term of philosophical importance affords some marked parallels. Basically there are four similarities in the use of the term: first, prohairesis is choice that determines good or bad actions; it is the peculiarly human act that produces moral action, by putting the origin (ἡ ἀρχή) of the action within the agent himself. Second, prohairesis gives assent to a course of action that is already deliberated. In Epictetus the prohairesis judges between true and false phantasiai. The instantaneous act of each individual choice is not an act of deliberation but of acceptance or reflection. Third, prohairesis in Epictetus has a fuller meaning of the total character of the individual, which in turn is responsible for the act of choice, that is, prohairesis in its narrower meaning. In Aristotle, this fuller meaning is present in his theory of ἔξις and especially the ἔξις προαιρετική, which shows choice as being dependent to a degree, on character. Fourth, the elusiveness of the term, noted by Miss Anscombe,¹⁶⁵

reappears in Epictetus. Just as in Aristotle¹⁶⁶ choice is deliberate desire, and we fix our choice as a result of deliberation, so in Epictetus, prohairesis is ill-defined and at times seems a superfluous term in his psychological theory, embracing little more than the term hegemonikon and κρίσις. Could it not be that in both philosophers this very elusiveness signifies the final intrusion of the irrational in an act of choice which could otherwise be adequately be described in fully defined terms? Is it the indefinable yet not incalculable¹⁶⁷ element through which choice becomes will?

These similarities are striking, but not so dependent on any specialist doctrine that we need assume any direct influence. Yet this does not invalidate the usefulness of this chapter in examining Aristotle's approach to the problems of choice, as a means of elucidating Epictetus.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. See Ch. VII, 1, and note 3.
2. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, Ch. VI.
3. See Ch. III, 5, and Ch. IV, 1.
4. Nicomachean Ethics 1102 a 5.
5. 1106 a 10.
6. ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα
τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ. (1107 a 1)
7. 1103 b 23 - 25.
8. 1103 a 32.
9. 1110 a 16.
10. 1107 a 1.
11. These may possibly be equated with the impulsive kind

of akrasia, i.e. προπέτεια ; bk. VII, 1050 b 20.

12. Compare the passage in bk. VII on θυμός, 1149 a 26; θυμός, (as opposed to ἐπιθυμία) hears reason. Cf. also Plato's 'spirited' part of the soul
13. 1112 a 31.
14. 1112 b 13.
15. 1112 b 31.
16. 1112 b 8.
17. A parallel account appears in Eudemian Ethics, 1226 b 16 - 30.
18. 1113 a 4; note the intrusion of κρίναντες and προκριθέν; this is for selecting between alternatives that have to be deliberated. The κρίσις is part of deliberation, not part of choice.
19. 1113 a 12. The problems raised by Aristotle's discussion on choice and action, have most recently been examined by W. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, (1968), pp. 60-81.

20. Joachim, Commentary p. 104.
21. See section 4 of this chapter.
22. Joachim, Op. cit. p. 104.
23. Ando, Aristotle's Theory, p. 267.
24. My brackets; cf. Joachim, Op. cit. p. 107 - 8: prohairesis is the formal, final and efficient cause.
25. Ch. II, 2, p. 132 ff, esp. 134 - 5.
26. Ando, P. 135. This is the 'double version' theory referred to and further elucidated by Walsh, 'Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness', p. 131 - 4.
27. 1113 b 3 - 13.
28. 1113 a 4.
29. 1114 b 30.
30. 1106 b 36, quoted in note 6 above.

31. 1139 a 1 - 15.
32. A comparison may be drawn with the areas of assent (συγκατάθεσις) and desire (ὄρεξις) in Epictetus, i.e. the three τόποι , see Ch. VII, 2.
33. 1139 a 21 - 31.
34. 1139 a 32; again prohairesis implies means not ends, cf. 1112 b 13.
35. From this it follows that ἠθικὴ εἴξις is the contribution to prohairesis that habituates or moderates desire, just as βούλευσις is the contribution that suggests rational possibilities.
36. 1139 a 32 - b 2.
37. Greenwood, Nicomachean Ethics VI, Introduction p. 49.
38. Sophocles, Electra; esp. lines 1021 - 1059. Note the recurrence of εὐφρονῆς (1038), φρονεῖν (1058), and the contrast φύσιν : νόυς (1024). Walsh, Aristotle's

Conception, p. 16 - 20, notes some Euripidean examples.

39. These are the terms used at 1139 a 20 ff. On this aspect see further Anscombe, Thought and Action in Aristotle's Ethics, New Essays, ed. Bamburgh, p. 156 - 7.
40. 1139 a 24 - 26. In this paragraph I have followed Greenwood's Commentary, Op. cit. P. 40 - 41.
41. Greenwood, Op. cit. P. 56.
42. 1144 a 24 ff.
43. This concept of φυσική ἀρετή is most clearly explained in Historia Anámalium, 588 a 18.
44. This is stated perhaps more clearly in the discussion of akrasia at 1152 a 10 ff, where the ἀκρατής (man of ill-restraint) can be said to display but not φρόνησις. For φρόνησις involves deliberate choice, (διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν). Thus the virtuous and wicked man, acting from choice, (ἐκ προαίρεσεως) displays φρόνησις, but not the ἀκρατής.

45. Anscombe, Thought and Action in Aristotle's Ethics,
New Essays, Ed. Bamburgh p. 143 - 158. For a criticism
of this essay, see Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory,
p. 180 - 181
46. Book VI, 1142 b 18.
47. This I have later termed secondary deliberation; see
discussion on akrasia, section 4, below.
48. Anscombe, Op. cit. p. 145 ff.
49. Joachim, Op. cit. p. 108 ff.
50. Metaphysics VIII, 1045 b 27 - 1048 a 24.
51. 1048 a 11.
52. Joachim, Op. cit. p. 109 - 111, admits of a second
interpretation, that prohairesis could occur without
intelligible development or connection with the rest
of man's nature. But the body of evidence, at any
rate from the Nicomachean Ethics seems not to suggest

this second interpretation, especially when prohairesis is seen in its relation to φρόνησις and moral virtue (Bk. VI). This interpretation of Joachim is discussed by Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, p. 178.

53. Full discussion will be found in Ando, Op. cit. p. 274 - 290; Joachim, Op. cit. p. 207 - 213; Greenwood, Op. cit. p. 50 - 52. Anscombe, Op. cit. p. 151-156, and Hardie's lengthy note on 'The Practical Syllogism', Op. cit. p. 241 ff. See also discussion on the practical syllogism that is stated in Bk. VII in connection with akrasia 1147 a 24 ff, in section 4 of this chapter.
54. 1046 b 20.
55. 1140 b 28: ἡ φρόνησις... ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι μετὰ λόγου μόνον.
56. 1141 a 27; 1147 b 4.
57. This generally seems to be the form adopted by Ando, Op. cit. p. 280, and Joachim, Op. cit. p. 209.
58. Joachim, Op. cit. p. 175.

59. Burnet, Nicomachean Ethics, note p. 269 on 1141 b 17; on λίσθησις see Ando, Op. cit. Ch. II, 2, esp. p. 122.
60. Greenwood, Op. cit. p. 51. A similar view is put by Burnet, Op. cit. note p. 269 on 1141 b 15, that the function of the understanding of general concepts (ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον) is to frame rules for the attainment of the true good, which is given as an ὀρεκτόν, having been presented as φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν; cf. Burnet's notes on 1139 a 22 and 1139 a 32, Op. cit. p. 255.
61. See note 60 above. Ando, Op. cit. p. 120 - 1. Walsh, Op. cit. p. 123 - 8 also gives a lucid account.
62. There is an important difference here between Aristotle and the Stoics. In Aristotle, as the stored up λίσθησις or experience, the phantasiai had a function in the intellection process. In the Stoics they were the primary material occurring from the external world for intellection to work upon. From Posidonius onwards there is a gradual return to the more subjective Aristotelian position; and it is significant that in Epictetus, they

have developed ethical connotations, as presentations of good or bad courses of action. Both in Aristotle and the Stoics, they had a purely epistemological function. For a full discussion see Ch. V, 3.

63. Ando, Op. cit. p. 158-9.
64. 1114 a 13 ff, and Burnet's note, Op. Cit. p. 137.
65. 1106 a 17.
66. 1111 a 30.
67. 1111 a 35.
68. 1136 a 1.
69. 1151 a 20-24.
70. cf. Bk. III, 1113 a 6 on prohairesis.
71. This idea of conviction, on which one can base determination or will-power, receives little treatment in Aristotle.

The Stoa thought more of it, especially in the theory of phantasiai, and φαντασία καταληπτική. Aristotle fails to see anything in the nature of the prohairesis as weak will, to cause it to be neglected by the ἀκρατής ; the causes for its abandonment are treated as external to it, as πάθη .

72. 1146 b 31 - 1147 a 24.
73. 1147 a 24 - b 19.
74. See Burnet's note at 1147 a 21 ff, Op. cit. p. 302 - 3.
75. Joachim, Op. cit., pp. 226 - 9. Objections to this interpretation are given by Walsh, Op. cit. pp. 107 ff, and the matter is fully discussed in this work. There is also a detailed commentary in Burnet's notes at 1147 a 33 ff.
76. 1147 b 17.
77. By D. T. Allen, quoted and discussed in Walsh, Op. Cit. p. 124.

78. For the division of appetite into βούλησις , θυμος and ἐπιθυμία , see Walsh, Op. cit. p. 88 and footnote.
79. 1150 b 19 - 22.
80. 1151 a 7; cf. 1148 a 6: μὴ τῷ προαιρέεισθαι .
81. It is surely this kind of deliberation which Ando refers to, Op. cit. p. 274, as being on a level with δεινότης , in his conclusion on deliberation; "Deliberation must contain a moral estimation of passion and conduct besides pure technical cognition such as cleverness or the deliberation used by the incontinent man". Cf. the distinction between θυμός and desire, 1149 a 26 ff.
82. Burnet, note on 1151 a 3.
83. 436 A - 444B.
84. Laws X, 897A.
85. See below, Section 6.

- 86 The main studies are in Walsh, Op. cit. Ch. 2; J. P. A. Gould, The Development of Plato's Ethics; and E. R. Dodds, Plato and the Irrational, p. 16, much of what is said here is to be found also in his work, The Greeks and the Irrational, Ch. 7, where there are also some additional points. Plato's later philosophy is here intended to refer to treatment later than Republic.
87. Walsh, Op. cit. p. 28.
88. For the importance of this basic Socratic desire see Section 7.
89. Republic. IV, 436A - 444B.
90. 430D.
91. 431A.
92. 439A - C.
93. 439D.

94. ἐπίκουρον ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, 441 A; also 440E.
95. 441 A.
96. Walsh, Op. cit. p. 37, seems to dismiss this possibility without fully examining all Plato says on θυμός in this passage. For a much fuller discussion, see Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, pp. 344 - 359.
97. See section 3 above.
98. The question of unity is examined by Crombie, Op. cit., p. 350 f.
99. ἢ ὅλη τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν, ὅταν ὀρμήσωμεν ,436B. L
100. 431D and following.
101. 431E - 432A.
102. Dodds remarks that this advance in psychology was

recognised by later schools, especially Peripatetics, (Aristotle, Mag. Eth. 1182 a 15f), and Posidonius; Greeks and the Irrational, p. 228, note 30.

103. 434E - 435D.
104. Philebus, 33B.
105. 21D - E; trans. Hackforth.
106. Hackforth, Commentary, p. 32.
107. 50B - 52B.
108. 27E.
109. 28C - 32B; the difficulties in the blending doctrine are well noted by Crombie, Op. cit. p. 253 - 4. The metaphysical aspects of the blended life receive full discussion by Professor Buzonis Ὁ Προσδιορισμός τοῦ Ἀληθοῦς ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, Ch. 6, p. 46 - 51.
110. See note 62, above. and Ch. 5. Section 3. The relation of true and false pleasures to goodness is examined by Professor Buzonis: Op. cit., Ch. 7, esp. P. 57.

111. 33B - 36B.

112. Discussed by J. P. A. Gould, Op. cit. p. 47 - 55.
Cf. T. Gould, Love p. 113.

113. Again, cf. Aristotle's φρόνησις.

114. Laws, 792C - D.

115. Whereas in the Philebus we observed that the factors of mind, unlimited, limit and blend were to be applied to intelligence, emotions, reason, and mixed life, in the Laws, 653 B - C (quoted in note 118), the correspondence must be παιδεία (education), ἡδοναί (pleasures), νόμοι (laws) and ἀρετή (goodness).

116. 792D.

117. 812D - E.

118. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν παραγινομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἀν' ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχῆις ἐγγίγνυνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγον λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσιν τῷ λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἔσθ' ἡ συμφωνία ζύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν πρὸς ἀρχὴν μισεῖν... [τὸυτο ἔστι]... παιδεία. (Laws, 653 B-C)

119. As in the Philebus, these pleasures as having moral significance can again be compared with Epictetus' good and bad phantasiai.
120. 792E. See Marrow, Plato's Cretan City, p. 300 - 301.
121. Souilhé, Op. cit. Introduction, p. xliv, footnote.
See also my Appendix II.
122. A brief but illuminating account of Socrates' ethics is given by Pohlenz, Freedom p. 60-68. The most recent examination of the Socratic personality, appears in de Vogel, Philosophia I (1970), pp. 109-151.
123. See section 4 above. A comment on οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνει is to be found in J. P. A. Gould, Op. cit. p. 52 - 54.
124. In this connection Pohlenz, Freedom p. 66, remarks that Socrates took no account of the will because "for the Greeks the will is not an independent function of the soul expressing its urge towards active engagement, but a reaching out to some more or less clearly defined goal that is or will be shown to man by his intellect". Thus already in the desire for goodness there is the germ of Aristotle's worked out theory of prohairesis.

125. Laws 731E - 732B.
126. 1168 b 25.
127. 1156 b 1 - 18.
128. 1168 b 25 - 1169 a 7.
129. The fact that Aristotle stresses the rationality ($\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$) in action does not gainsay what has been said previously on the importance of a combination of reason and desire. The $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ referred to here is the thought inherent in the prohairesis. The difficulty is noted by Burnet, Ethics, note at 1168 b 35, p. 423.
130. 1178 b 22.
131. Op. cit. p. 272 - 3.
132. Philebus 28C. See section 5, above.
133. Cf. Epictetus, III 26, 30-33 (also, II 14, 23-29); In Epictetus however, the word $\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ itself (cf. III 24, 58), is never used for a virtuous state, but is rather the opposite of $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$. In this passage, $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\nu\omega\nu$ is akin to Plato's $\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$.

134. τῷ τῶ παντός επιμελομένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν
καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἔστι συντεταγμένα. (903 B)
135. The question is discussed by Pohlenz, Freedom p. 124 - 128,
and Crombie, Op. cit. p. 275 - 278.
136. Laws 904 B - C.
137. Republic 617E. αἴτια ἐλομένου. θεὸς ἀνάιτιος .
138. Republic 619B.
139. For example in Republic X 604C
140. Thomas Hardy, Return of the Native, Book Third Ch. VII.
141. Dodds, Plato and the Irrational, p. 19.
142. Laws 804B and 644D.
143. See section 4 above, and note 118.
144. For example, θεοῦ τι παίγνιον , 803C.

145. Epictetus, I 24, 20; I 25, 7 - 8.
146. Greeks and the Irrational, p. 20 - 21.
147. Laws, 896 D - 897 D.
148. Riddell, in Appendix A of his edition of The Apology, collects the data from Plato and Xenophon and later sources, which describe the phenomenon. The interpretation which he gives, however, is a rationalist one: "That the voice is a reflexive judgement on proposed actions, but does not supply motives of action" (p. 116) Whilst this conclusion is closely argued, he appears to neglect the religious side of Socrates' character as portrayed in The Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Moreover it is a little presumptuous to allow that Socrates might regard mental acts which were "beyond his ken" as divine, and ourselves to regard them as "unanalysed acts of judgement" (p. 116); and especially so when Socrates is accredited as having a mind "so purified by temperance and self-knowledge, ... endowed with such powerful faculties especially those of observation and causality" (p. 114) Riddell's interpretation is better suited to

- Aristotle's concept of prohairesis, in its rational aspect, when he says the voice had a "critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgement on a purpose already in being" (p. 116). This is also close to the function of prohairesis in Epictetus, for where Epictetus refers to reason as the divination within us, as in I 17, and II 7, the religious or prophetic element does appear to be fully rationalised. The religious significance of the term is discussed by Friedlander I, p. 32 - 44. De Vogel, Philosophia I, (1970), esp. pp. 132-3, puts the evidence for a non-rationalist interpretation of Socratic doctrine.
149. Republic 617E.
150. Friedlander I, p. 38.
151. See Chapter 3, section 5, and also Pohlenz, Freedom p. 142, and Friedlander I, p. 38.
152. 1176 b 4 - 6.
153. Philebus 20D - E; Hackforth, Op. cit. p. 32, compares this with the passage from the Ethics.

154. The passage, 1177 a 12 ff, has been generally regarded as a Platonic interlude.
155. 1176 b 5 - 9.
156. 1177 a 15, trans. Rackham.
157. 1177 a 20 ff.
158. Epictetus, II 23, 42:
159. Republic, 501D:
160. Symposium, 210A to 2 212A; Throughout Socrates' speech $\epsilon\rho\omega\varsigma$ is regarded as a $\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}\mu\omega\nu$, mediating between the individual and pure goodness and beauty. The function of $\epsilon\rho\omega\varsigma$ as leading to goodness is noted by T. Gould, Love, p. 115 - 6, in reference to Phaedrus 237D - 238C.
161. Republic, 516C - 517C.
162. Epictetus, III 3, 4.
163. J. P. A. Gould, Op. cit. P. 54.

164. The importance of these schools is described by Brehier, Hellenistic and Roman Age, Ch. 1.
165. See page 80.
166. 1113 a 4.
167. In both philosophers the prohairesis is essentially rational. It is not to do with emotions, anger and appetite (Ar. Ethics, 1111 b 15f); and Epictetus almost identifies it with the hegemonikon (See Ch. 5.5.). The rational embraces the irrational so perfectly that choice can be left to the irrational in full assurance of its rationality.

CHAPTER THREE

THE STOICS

1. The New Era.

In this chapter will be considered the new era of philosophy that began in Greece in the fourth century B.C. The significant change of approach and purpose that occurred in philosophy from the time of Diogenes the Cynic has direct influence on Epictetus who was writing in the Stoic tradition. Attention will be given to some of the characteristic obstacles of the Stoic system to one endeavouring to teach a convincing theory of the individual's freedom. The chapter therefore is not a comprehensive survey of the Stoic system, but a general appreciation of its distinctive approach as compared with earlier philosophy, and of inherent problems occasioned by this approach.

Certain Stoic theories, notably cognition will need more detailed examination in view of their importance in Epictetus' concept of prohairesis. Because of the lack of continuous extant texts, and the difficulty of distinguishing

commentary from original contributions, the question of the development of the Stoic system will not concern us here, except where there are clearly two conflicting views on a theory. But one aspect of development will be considered, namely the traces of influence from Plato and Aristotle to be found in the period of the Fourth Academy. The change would seem to have shaped Stoicism to Epictetus' advantage in considering freedom of the individual.

The age that saw the inception of the Hellenistic philosophies was characterised by an immense increase in freedom. Cosmopolitanism was probably the chief cause. Local traditions and values, which were the only ones men knew and respected, were no longer significant, nor was it considered important to build on the tradition of the immediate past. Politically, for Athens at any rate, the ideals of the past generation could not guarantee much confidence. In this new situation of the empire of Alexander, man was ready to explore new fields in literature, philosophy and science, free from the inherited traditions of the previous century.¹

A second characteristic of the age was its rationalism, reflected in the attention to literary technique, and in the interest in the practical sciences, astronomy, geography,

mathematics and engineering. The age was immediately attracted by the analysis of verbal reasoning displayed in Aristotle's logic.

Under such conditions, philosophy might be expected to flourish, and could well have done so had philosophers continued to interpret human life as they saw it around them, objectively with a view to the truth as each one imagined it was, hoping their conclusions would benefit mankind, though not too concerned if the masses passed them by. But in the new era philosophers had become public servants and they had a job to do, and so had to fulfil their mission with expediency.

The complaint of the public they were serving has been described as a 'failure of nerve'.² The sudden enormity of freedom had the effect of producing an instability in knowing what was right. When the mores of different regions began to manifest themselves everywhere, it was difficult to apply right or wrong to certain kinds of behaviour. Yet the sense that something must be right was still very strong.³

This moral insecurity was one cause of the failure of nerve. A second cause, to which the former is related was the fear of freedom.⁴ The increased freedom had caused the future to become suddenly more unpredictable. The possibilities of what might happen the day after were increased, and fear of the

Unknown took its grip.⁵ Circumstances could no longer follow a course more or less prescribed by the institutions and traditions of the city-state.

For these two reasons the majority of men were no longer happy. So the philosophers, instead of standing apart from the people and contemplating the nature of the truly happy life in the light of an interpretation of Truth, with the people content to live as they had always lived, now, with the masses no longer content, had to make them happy, and schools for attaining happiness were established. Thus it is not far from the truth to describe Stoicism as 'a system put together hastily, violently to meet a desperate emergency. Some ring wall must be built against chaos'.⁶

The attempts by the Hellenistic philosophers to restore confidence in the worth of a man's own character, that is, his happiness, were characterised by three elements: dogmatism, ἀταραξία, and rationalism. Dogmatism was essential in order to carry conviction to the masses; the object could not be achieved by leaving questions open, especially in an age that was so ready to doubt everything, if in a system of philosophy one detail was left uncertain; ἀταραξία, or freedom from a troubled mind, was an answer to the growth of fear. There was an alternative solution,

namely to interpret human life in terms of irrational factors as well as reason,⁷ but this solution would at once be less convincing, and it was against the spirit of the age.

Rationalism was the acceptable method; a system could only be influential if founded upon logic. Rationalism clearly helps the dogmatic position, and is also effective in making the arguments of the system convincing to the generation that required it.

To achieve success in what was demanded of them, the schools resorted to a noble lie. Having persuaded themselves of a false approach to philosophy, in giving a picture of man as he might be, the ideal sapiens, rather than making an objective study of man as he was, (an ignoble occupation at this time admittedly), they proceeded to persuade their followers that freedom and therefore happiness, consists in living utterly without desire or fear, and that such a life is humanly possible.⁸

This then was the common objective of the three schools with a popular following, the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans. Of these, Stoicism had the strongest appeal, since it was the most positive in that it accepted a purposefulness of life with respect to the absolute: the absolute governing the whole universe is reason; the reason in man, which is his truest

nature, is a portion of the Cosmic Reason; if therefore in everything he is inclined to follow his own reason, he will be fulfilling his absolute purpose, and whether this brings pain or pleasure matters not, because there is no good higher than fulfilling the cosmic purpose, and such is his inclination.

So goodness came to be less allied with human happiness, for happiness is a feeling, and more conjoined to the natural order. Goodness leads to εὐπορία (good running order of the individual within the universe), rather than to happiness, (εὐδαιμονία); you are only 'happy' by virtue of knowing that you have willed your life to accord with nature.

Hence it was of prime importance for the fourth century Schools to have a clearly worked out concept of physis, nature, that is, the cause and course of things in the universe; then to derive logically from this, admitting no factors except those inherent in reason, a theory of human goodness. Accordingly by failing to take an unbiased view of human nature, the Stoic philosophy was built on this false foundation, false in its philosophical assumptions which were the basis for all its ethical and practical manifestations.

For this reason, its founder, Zeno, happened to inaugurate one of the most argumentative schools. Reason and nature, its two basic assumptions were not closely defined,

and were capable of different interpretations. Also failure to pay sufficient regard to man's nature led to contradictions, and also to circular arguments. The School became famous for its paradoxes and contradictions.⁹ The determined concept of nature, colliding with the concept of will in man is an obvious example. From the outset, the Stoics recognised will: the will must accord with nature; but again until Epictetus at least, the concept was ill-defined. It was not his aim to find a solution to the problem of free-will and determinism; rather he intended to interpret freedom, *ἐλευθερία*, as a more positive goal, not so much freedom from (*ἀ-παραξία*, *ἀ-παθής*, etc.) but freedom for, and the essence of this freedom lay in the will. But unable to examine the human will and responsibility openly, he was constrained by a closed system distorted by the exclusion of all but reason.

Why then did the system persist? Firstly, it worked. Whilst the attainment of perfect virtue was out of reach for most men, (all except the self-deceitful, or freaks), the Stoic philosophy did set up a noble aim; for the standard of morality which Stoicism demanded was on any reckoning the highest, and even if men achieved this only in part, they found a satisfaction which they might otherwise have been without. Second, there was no philosopher, until possibly

Plotinus, of such calibre to detach himself from a system, and being confident enough in his reasons for rejecting Stoicism, able to build up an ethical philosophy on more realistic principles. Just as after Plotinus, philosophers had the same difficulty in detaching themselves from Christian theology. Third, Stoicism in the first two-hundred years of its following, secured for itself some of the characteristics of a religious faith, engendering a certain natural response to its precepts and assumption of reason; and a faith dies less quickly than a mere philosophic system, (ceteris paribus),¹⁰

By the time Epictetus was writing, Stoicism had interpreted reason in greater fairness to human nature, particularly through Posidonius and the later Academy, and also the Roman exponents, yet Epictetus never suggests abandoning any of the basic principles of the earliest Stoics. His philosophy feels the restriction, if he himself does not; but it also indicates a natural development within the system's framework towards his own direction of philosophy, the individual's freedom, for which the system was not originally designed.

Within the fabrication of this framework, there was room for attention to details of psychic functions, some of

which were a significant contribution to thought, apart from their relevance to Stoicism. Yet it is interesting to note that the most significant facets of this thinking arose from the very problems and contradictions inherent in the system. The process of cognition, (perception and action) was studied to see how man's reason might interact with cosmic reason. The study of the passions was occasioned by their failure to be comprehended in a rational system, albeit their existence was recognised. The theory of the will, which was developed by Epictetus, was occasioned by the conflict of determinism with an appreciation of man's willing nature; also the study of duties arose from the difficulty of attaching worth to things that are 'indifferent' (ἀδιάφορα).

For philosophy in general, the importance of Stoicism is to be found in these secondary theories. The fabrication of rational assumptions containing these is not philosophically important, except in so far as it demonstrates weaknesses inherent in a purely rationalistic system produced by reasoning men rather than by enlightened men. For mankind suffering from the pessimism, insecurity and lack of confidence which accompanies an age of newly found freedom, the system provided an anchor allowing his moral dignity to be preserved.

2. Theory of Knowledge.

A study of the main points of the Stoic theory of knowledge and its development is necessary for an understanding of Epictetus' use of the term συγκατάθεσις, or intellectual assent, which is the chief area of freedom in which prohairesis can operate.

The Stoics based their theory of knowledge on certain criteria. Of these we may examine first the phantasia, then the other criteria. The doctrines concerned with phantasiai are in two stages, led by Zeno and Chrysippus.

a. Phantasiai, (Zeno): For Zeno, phantasiai was the starting point of knowledge; they were representations coming from without which made an impression on the soul, τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ.¹¹ The process of knowledge is continued by an assentio (συγκατάθεσις) to certain of the phantasiai. Zeno attached credulity, (fidem), that is, gave assent, only to those phantasiai which possessed a certain correct manifestation of those things which are seen.¹² This assentio is understanding, (κατάληψις, comprehensio). If the understanding thus arrived at cannot in any way be criticised by reason, then it is knowledge; if it fails this test of reason, it is lack of knowledge.

Thus Zeno accepted a process of phantasiai - assent - comprehension - knowledge. The difficulty in the theory is in the means of distinguishing the true and false impressions; how can one distinguish whether they have a correct manifestation of the things seen, unless one already has knowledge, - in which case further knowledge would be superfluous.¹³ The Sceptics were quick to criticise the theory on these grounds, saying that κατάληψις was unwarranted since every true phantasia could be confused with an untrue one;¹⁴ the Stoics did allow that if, as in a large number of phantasiai, there were alternatives left open, the truth lay in recognising this and withholding assent, (ἐποχή). The criticism from the Academy caused the Stoics to adjust their theory.

It is important to notice that in the account of the theory of knowledge just referred to,¹⁵ the early Stoics regarded the incidence of phantasiai (τὸ φαντασιωθῆναι) as involuntary, whereas the agreement (τὸ συγκαταθέσθαι) was voluntary, involving a considered reaction from the one who has received the phantasia. This two-fold activity is clearly explained by Sextus Empiricus.¹⁶ This recognition of the agreement as voluntary provided an opening in the Stoic system which Epictetus utilised to good effect in framing his theory of the will. Thus for Zeno mistakes in knowledge are caused

by weaknesses in a man's judgement, not from faults in the actual data, the phantasiai.

The theory of knowledge becomes confused in the use of the term φαντασία καταληπτική. The confusion possibly arises from the difficulty in distinguishing from the texts, the doctrines of Zeno and Chrysippus, and from the likely frequent change of position the Stoics themselves held on this subject on account of the criticism from the Sceptics. The earliest use of this term was to distinguish between phantasiai which are pronounced as true by the assent of the intellect, and those which are manifestly true, without the need of any conscious assent. Sextus Empiricus¹⁷ demonstrates that of the true phantasiai, some are καταληπτικά and some are not. The φαντασίαι καταληπτικά have the power of themselves to force the judgement to assent, and the assent is always correct. At first the φαντασία καταληπτική seems only to be applied to sensual impressions, but later, impressions of right conduct also are said to come to us with such clear distinction (ἐνάργεια) that doubt is impossible: these take us by the hair and drag us to assent.¹⁸ Yet for Zeno the actual stage of κατάληψις is the criterion.

With Chrysippus however, the criterion was the φαντασία καταληπτική itself,¹⁹ since these phantasiai necessarily

involve συγκαταθεσις ; these phantasiai occur as an alteration in the soul (an ἑτεροίωσις , see below), or an awakening to knowledge by an alteration of the patterns which comprise each ἐννόημα , or concept.

This interpretation of φαντασία καταληπτική has two results: first, the voluntariness occasioned by συγκαταθεσις is no longer applicable to these phantasiai, since the assent necessarily follows. Second, if the phantasiai were bound to produce a necessary reaction to right assent, it seems perfectly allowable that there was a kind of phantasia which produces a necessary or instinctive reaction to wrong assent; this could lead to an explanation of the passions, particularly to Chrysippus' re-interpretation (see below), and to Epictetus' view of the phantasiai as a temptation to evil.²⁰

b. Phantasiai, (Chrysippus): De Vogel refers to the modifications made by Chrysippus as a position of psychological monism.²¹ This means that all a person's activities, whether intellectual or physical, are governed by the hegemonikon, or ruling principle, being disposed in a certain way. Accordingly the phantasiai are regarded less as stimuli from without awaiting judgement from the intellect, but rather as an inclination within the mental constitution. They are a changing disposition of the soul, not an impression on the soul, (ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς or ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ)²²

Thus with all phantasiai it now appears that συγκατάθεσις is no longer required, as an independent judging function, and with it has gone also the freedom which it afforded. Yet there are cases when a man may reject a φαντασία καταληπτική because he thinks it is improbable on account of τὴν ἔξωθεν περίστασιν (the circumstances without).²³

However Plutarch's commentary on this very question, shows how Chrysippus tried to hold that while the phantasiai and our mental reaction to them were determined, there was still a part for συγκατάθεσις and therefore will; a phantasia does not of itself cause assent, although it is the direct cause of action. This leaves room for assent, presumeably to the whole phantasia-plus-reaction event. We are left free to assent to this happening or not. Thus it becomes the part of will to acquiesce in what is determined through the phantasiai.²⁴

Under Carneades the Sceptics adopted a less uncompromising attitude to the Stoic concept of κατάληψις, and allowed degrees of probability in phantasiai: πιθανή, περιωδευμένη and ἀπερισπάστος, the third being practical certitude.²⁵ Later Sceptics laid down conditions, (τρόποι) for suspension of judgement.

c. Other Criteria: Apart from the phantasiai, that

occur specifically, the Stoics accepted further criteria for knowledge, that is, the means of acquiring knowledge, in the form of a body of knowledge built up from the years of infancy, by which the individual phantasiai could be judged. In the early Stoics there is little evidence to show that the body of knowledge was innate, and this would be contrary to their physical doctrine.²⁶ Rather knowledge grows up in us through the accumulated φαντασῖαι καταληπτικά, the phantasiai we naturally regard as true. The term given to such knowledge is ἐννοιαί; also ἐννοήματα, prolepsis and notities are used in this connection.

account of the

An account of the ἐννοιαί (concepts) is given by Aetius:²⁷ man is born with a 'tabula rasa' (χάρτην εὐέργον εἰς ἀπογραφὴν) in the hegemonikon, and this is filled with ἐννοιαί which come from our perception and phantasiai whenever we experience similar forms of phantasiai; for example, we form a notion (ἐννοια) of whiteness from the accumulated impressions of white objects.²⁸

By combining the accounts of Aetius²⁹ and Diocles Magnes,³⁰ the prolepseis appear to be the first conception of an object, arrived at "without special mental attention and derived either directly or by some simple and unconscious mental operation from the data given by the senses!"³¹ However, the

origin of the knowledge contained both in $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ and prolepsis was unclear even to the Stoics, who generally accepted both terms as referring to commonly accepted knowledge of principles. Thus $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ are frequently described as $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\acute{\alpha}\iota$ (common notions). Prolepsis, so far as there is any distinction, is a more elementary, less defined knowledge than $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$; for Epictetus at any rate the distinction was technical rather than practical.

Epictetus gives a clear account of the building up of $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$. The passage may be isolated from any particular uses he gives the term, since it occurs in a passage giving praise to God for the wonders of creation; he speaks of the wondrous way man acquires knowledge, and strictly follows the Stoic theory: man guards in the soul many impressions, and when again he is moved by a similar impression, the mind lights upon notions corresponding to the first impressions ($\tau\omicron\upsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omega\varsigma$ $\tau\epsilon\tau\upsilon\pi\omega\kappa\acute{\omicron}\sigma\iota$).³²

A similar theory was adopted by the Epicureans, who altogether had three criteria: $\lambda\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, prolepsis and $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$. The prolepseis were general notions of the mind resulting from $\lambda\iota\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$. Cicero, giving the Epicurean proofs for the existence of God,³⁴ adds two points to the theory, first, that prolepsis is a common notion,³⁵ second it is

innate.³⁶ The Stoics subscribed to the first, in their κοινὰ ἐννοιαί, but not to the second.

Epictetus holds great value in the prolepseis as a measure of judging phantasiai, and any body of proven knowledge, whatever its origin, is covered by the term, but it particularly includes the principles and maxims of the Stoic school.

3. Reason and Nature.

Reason and nature are key concepts in the Stoa, and are both closely related. Logos, or the cosmic reason was the power which generates and sustains the whole universe, and man's part is to act in accordance with this reason, or, as it is more commonly stated, in accordance with nature. Both reason and nature are ill-defined in the Stoic system, and this has led to some of the inherent difficulties encountered in the introduction to this chapter. The basis of the difficulty is that reason was required to embrace more than mere causation. To say that reason is the essence of the universe may stand as far as scientific explanation of matter and generation is concerned, but to say that this same reason is the essence of goodness implies that reason has values,

whereas in fact, in the physical theory, the end or purpose of the Reason was for matter to return to its original state of πνεῦμα (spirit).³⁷

Thus two ideas are confused: reason as a means of accounting for causation, and reasoned thought in working out the best course of action an individual should take. The latter could not be simplified to mere logos as causation, for as Aristotle showed in his theory of φρόνησις, human reason is an inter-play of all the functions of the human mind.

In spite of the ambiguity of the term logos, the Stoics were able to fuse the two ideas quite convincingly: the whole of the natural world is enlivened by λόγοι σπερματικοί emanating from the λόγος σπερματικός.³⁸ Man is endowed with an actual portion of the cosmic reason, an σπασμα, which on account of its identity with the Reason is the highest and best part of man.

Nature (φύσις) also admits of two interpretations: it may be considered as the divine plan, i.e. the logos,³⁹ or as the normal state of being of an individual creature, its nature. In the Stoic system the two ideas were fused, and the second was regarded as a multiple manifestation of the first.⁴⁰ To follow one's own nature, is in fact to follow the purpose for which he or it exists in the universal nature.

The basis of the Stoic ethic was the doctrine of oikeiosis, to live according to nature. A thing is in accordance with nature when determined by its own ruling principle, or hegemonikon. In man the hegemonikon, this highest ruling part, is reason.

Man's distinctive possession of reason as God has it, is often illustrated by the Stoics by contrast with animals. Animals act in a rational manner, with their minds activating their bodies as the phantasiai occur to them, but man applies his own powers of reasoning which enable him to see each situation in the light of universal concepts.⁴⁴ Epictetus draws the distinction that animals have the use of the phantasiai, but man has in addition an understanding of their use.

The reason in man is concentrated in the hegemonikon, and is still seen to combine the two ideas: it is the means of rational thought and judgement, and as being allied to the cosmic reason, it is πνεῦμα or the life-giving force in man; it thus takes on the functions of 'soul', and is responsible for the physiological, (including psychological) functions.⁴² Of these, only the latter manifestation of reason is present in animals. This function consists in receiving a phantasia (impression), followed by inclination or disinclination on the

part of reason to unite itself with the object of the phantasia. Thus reason acts in the interests of the being as designed by providence.⁴³

Human reason has the additional function of distinguishing, as regards the phantasiai, the true from the false, and accordingly giving and withholding assent; it must not yield to the inclinations (ὀρμῆς) until they are known to be in accordance with nature. The presentation of phantasiai then becomes perception and inclination, (i.e. considered will).⁴⁴

This judging function of reason, the typically human part, works primarily by virtue of being able to form and apply general preconceptions, prolepseis. Plutarch⁴⁵ shows that Chrysippus thought we were being less than human if we merely respond to phantasiai; for since some of the phantasiai occurring to man are false,⁴⁶ he must bring his own reason to bear on them in the form of judgements, (συγκατάθεσεις). Thus in the reasonable being, every act is a reasoned act.

The purely animating function of the rational hegemonikon⁴⁷ is seen in those passages which describe the hegemonikon as controlling all the faculties of man.⁴⁸ These physiological faculties (the five senses, language etc.) were regarded as emanations of the hegemonikon. Bréhier remarks,⁴⁹ that whereas Plato and Aristotle made a logical division of the soul

into intellect, desire and a nutritive element, the Stoics accepted a principle of emanation, such that all the body's activities and drives, though not in themselves rational, derive their existence from the rational activity of the hegemonikon. Chrysippus compares the hegemonikon to a spider at the centre of its web, or to a polypus extending its tentacles in a certain direction.⁵⁰ In less picturesque terms, this was Chrysippus' theory that all activity was the result of a ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον (a certain disposition of the hegemonikon). This is the essence of Chrysippus' theory of psychological monism, of which his explanation of phantasiai was but one manifestation.⁵¹

It is in consideration of this animating function of reason, that certain irrational functions become apparent, that is, irrational in the sense that they are opposed to the proper human functioning of reason. In particular, the nature of the πάθη (passions) were discussed in this connection.

An ὄρμη, or urge, results through natural reason from the occurrence of phantasiai. A definition is given:⁵²

τὴν ὄρμην εἶναι φορὰν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι κατὰ τὸ γένος. But in man, there are two types of urges, the reasoned inclination,

ἡ λογικὴ ὄρμη, which is a φορὰ διανόιας ἐπὶ τιτῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν, and ὄρεξις (desire). — ὄρεξις is distinguished from

λογικὴ ὄρμη since it only has the appearance of a λογικὴ ὄρμη, that is, it convinces that it is rational (sufficiently to gain the stamp of rational) when it is not.⁵³

From this theory arose the definitions of the passions. They were clearly disturbances of the soul (πτάια ψυχῆς),⁵⁴ on account of their irrational character.⁵⁵ But being consistent with his psychological monism, Chrysippus regarded them as ὀρμαί, inclinations emanating from the soul. Either a πάθος was ὄρμη πλεονάβουσα,⁵⁶ that is, an over-bearing reaction to a phantasia, that could not listen to reason, or it was an ὄρμη produced by wrong judgement.⁵⁷ This account of the πάθη was later criticised by Posidonius.

In Chrysippus' account, the intrusion of the irrational is seen to lie within the functioning of the hegemonikon itself, and in the case of πάθη, the irrational causes reason to yield to bad action. However, there is an instance where the irrational is seen to manifest itself in a way that it affects neither good nor bad; this is in making a choice where each alternative is equally balanced in the judgement of human reason;⁵⁸ Chrysippus challenges those who consider that in making a choice between alternatives equally balanced, certain adventitious motions (ἐπελευστικὴν τινὰ κίνησιν) in the hegemonikon decide the choice, but these motions are uncaused.

Whilst Chrysippus tends to support the view, he states that the motions must have a cause that is concealed,⁵⁹ which moves our inclination one way or the other. Yet at the same time (and this is the point of Plutarch's 'contradiction'), he does regard such choices as fortuitous (therefore uncaused). From this it appears that *ὁρμή* is not always fully rational, and certain aspects of inclination must be explained by the irrational.

Yet the important thing is that Chrysippus wanted to regard even the irrational factors in choice, or at least in the *πάθη*, as dispositions of the soul, and the whole process is described in stages: 1. A weakening of rational power; 2. An opinion on the good or ill; 3. A judgement on the fitness of the passion; 4. An overbearing state of the soul resulting from the judgement; *ἐκκλίσις* or *ὄρεξις*; 5. The expression of emotions, (laughter, etc.)⁶⁰

On the subject of the *πάθη*, the intellectual monism of Chrysippus was probably adopted by Zeno before him.⁶¹

Strictly, in neither is there any mention that there is a seat of irrational emotions in the soul. The hegemonikon, which is basically rational is termed 'irrational' when it "gives way before the force of impulse and decides on something of which objective reason would not approve."⁶² The conclusion that

λόγος is also logos is of vital importance in the concept of will which was to develop later, where the irrational and rational parts of the willing function are seen to be inseparable.

4. Ethics and Freedom.

There exists a similar dilemma in the Stoic concept of Goodness to that which has already been noticed in the concepts of reason and nature. First, the Stoics required goodness to be the absolute perfection of reason in man, where his wisdom admitted of no error. Thus goodness was expressed as oikeiosis,⁶³ that is, perfecting one's own nature, which will be done only by the constant attention to reason, since in the Stoic system reason was identified with nature.

Watson draws attention to the function of logos as τεχνίτης (craftsman).⁶⁴ Thus man, as possessing logos is a parallel craftsman to nature, and through their logos, their own tendency to design and proportion, they 'gradually construct a parallel universe'. This is man's distinctive oikeiosis, and to achieve it he must perform his highest function, that of τεχνίτης and this involves knowledge of the logos. Only the absolutely wise man will be absolutely good; and goodness

had no meaning for the Stoics unless it was perfect and faultless.

On the other hand, the Stoics wished to combine the absolute value of that goodness with the relative values of the various good things that add comfort or adornment to life. The latter involved altruistic action of a kind, whilst for the former, it was necessary to have complete inward detachment. Goodness was right reasoning, and right reasoning must admit of no uncertainties; certainty can only exist with those things over which the agent has absolute control, hence anything external to the agent cannot have any bearing on the goodness of the individual. Accordingly the Stoics drew a sharp distinction of things in our power and things not in our power.⁶⁵

Altruistic action was concerned with the latter, which the Stoics termed, adiaphora, things indifferent as regard good and bad. And although outside the realm of the good, these adiaphora did vary in value. Those that were considered of value were termed ἀξία, those of no value ἀπαξία. And those things of value were said to be preferred (προηγμένα), that is, they were to be pursued by the virtuous man, but not in such a way that it involved his own moral character; he was not to feel desire towards them.⁶⁶ Virtuous acts were termed κατορθώματα, determined not by the result of the action, since this might depend on externals, but on the state of mind

or reasoning in which it was done. Whereas acts done with a view to adiaphora were termed καθήκοντα or duties, (officia).⁶⁷

The inner quality of moral goodness was stressed in this system. As in Aristotle responsibility was seen to be an essential condition of moral goodness, yet no one could be held responsible for anything apart from the reasoned function of giving assent to phantasiai. Goodness therefore had to follow a determined course, that of reason, and to give the agent some kind of responsibility, he had to will this necessary assent, (necessary if goodness was to be attained). Through the concept of willing, the necessary became good; and this is more than saying, (as Aristotle) that voluntariness is a condition of a good moral action. It was due to the very basis of their system in the materialistic, therefore causative, doctrine of nature, that the Stoics were forced to give a more prominent place to will than previous philosophers, in order to account for responsibility in a necessary moral action.⁶⁸

The problem of will and determinism then immediately confronts the Stoic position, and without ever formulating a proper concept of will, (they were content to leave it more of a *carte blanche* than even reason or nature), they made attempts

at a compromise when criticised on this score.⁶⁹ Two examples of such compromise may be mentioned, both attributed to Chrysippus. The first is in Plutarch,⁷⁰ where he draws a distinction between an antecedent cause, (προκαταρκτική αἰτία) which is Fate, and absolute cause (ἀυτοτελής αἰτία) / which is the assent, or will. The same distinction occurs in Cicero,⁷¹ when we say each thing happens by fate, we mean by antecedent or initiating causes, not the principal causes. The principle cause is in the intelligence and judgement of the agent himself.

The second example occurs in Aulus Gellius⁷² where the division of determined and willed causes seems to be arbitrarily placed in the functions of the mind. We ourselves are responsible for the quality of the peculiar properties of our minds, (ingenia ipsa mentium). When these qualities have been determined by the will, Fate acts upon them accordingly; just as there are two causes of a cylinder continuing to roll down hill, namely, the agent who first pushed it, and the shape of the cylinder; so Fate sets the mind in motion first, though the carrying out of designs is regulated by the individual's own will, and the character of his mind.⁷³ The intelligence or mind, as a principal cause, has the freedom of following possibilities, which may or may not be realised, but the actual

events have also an initiating cause, and must therefore be according to fate.⁷⁴

The discussions, frequent in the mid-Stoa on will and determinism are important in so far as they indicate the significance of willing in moral action. They saw an insoluble contradiction here, and made it necessary to formulate a clearer concept of will. This task remained for Epictetus; but it was not his aim to contribute to the will and determinism debate. Though in forming a concept of will in the restricted fabric of a fully determined universe, his work necessarily gives a point of view worthy of consideration. He was helped in his work by the debaters, particularly by such passages as the second, quoted above.

5. Posidonius and the Fourth Academy.

It remains to consider some significant changes in Stoic doctrines which took place in the first century B.C. The chief reason for modification of doctrines was criticism from the Sceptics against the manifest contradictions in the system. Carneades was the main opponent, particularly against the Stoic criteria of truth.

Stoics parried these attacks for a period by concerning

themselves with a right knowledge and attitude towards the Duties, which were an off-shoot of the main Stoic system, in the area of, adiaphora. This was chiefly the work of Panaetius, reflected by Cicero in his De Officiis.

But the criticism eventually had to be met by a re-examination of more fundamental issues in the system. Posidonius was the first to modify substantially the doctrines of Chrysippus. Posidonius was a scientist and geographer, and his modification appears to be influenced by an understanding of natural phenomena as it actually is.⁷⁵ He is less keen to build a theory on ill-defined assumptions; in this, and in his scientific bias, he resembles Aristotle.

The chief modification was the recognition that man's soul was partly irrational, in having three different functions: λογίεσθαι, θυμῶσθαι, and ἐπιθυμῆν. It will be seen at once that this is a partial return to Aristotle's view of the soul, and opposed to Chrysippus' psychological monism. This change has implications in considering the passions, which Posidonius regarded as irrational and yet perfectly natural, adopting therefore a Platonic dualism of a rational and irrational soul.⁷⁶ Passions are caused by following the irrational part of our nature, they do not follow upon judgement.⁷⁷

A further consequence is the recognition of a moral struggle in man, reminiscent of the struggle in the ἀκρατής of Aristotle, the conflict of desire and reason,⁷⁸ and Posidonius recognises the virtues of σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια (self-control).⁷⁹ Posidonius anticipates Epictetus in recognising in man a real self, consisting of thought and intelligence, rather than flesh and blood.⁸⁰ Connected with this was the approach to self-knowledge (see below).

The abandoning of Chrysippus' monism could also have had repercussions on the relation of the senses and the intellect in the theory of knowledge. The intellect is free to judge on the phantasiai occurring to it from outside. This would be a reversion to Zeno's position⁸¹ which was also adhered to by Epictetus. An illustration of the independence of the intellect from the senses, is Seneca's account of anger.⁸²

Also during this period there is increasing use of the Aristotelian term ὀρθὸς λόγος, which is common in Epictetus. The adoption of this term is not significant of any major change in theory, but does indicate influence from Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines. Applied to the Stoic system, the ὀρθὸς λόγος was the divine reason pervading the universe. This reason is the standard for man's own rational activity.⁸³

It is worth noting the occurrence of the Platonic term daimon in the passage of Posidonius quoted by Galen, where the daimon is identical with the reason in us, which we share with the divine reason, and which is thereby a perfect guide to right activity.⁸⁴ The introduction of the term has been noted by Schmekel as a spiritualising element in the evolution of Stoicism, derived from Platonism, or more probably Pythagoreanism.⁸⁵ This is also suggested by a passage from Diogenes Laertius who connects the idea of a guiding daimon in the individual with the συμφωνία (harmony) of the whole universe.⁸⁶

It may also be that the introduction of the term coincided with the interest in συμπάθεια, or the inter-acting of all the parts of the universe,⁸⁷ Pohlenz regards this as an essential part of Posidonius' theory of knowledge and nature. Trusting in this doctrine, a cult of sympathetic magic gained popularity.⁸⁹

In the Fourth Academy, chiefly represented by Antiochus of Ascalon, a revolution took place which puts an end to the purely critical phase in the development of Platonism, led by the Sceptics, making it once again a positive and speculative philosophy, and the teaching of Antiochus shows the beginning of a philosophy of synthesis, with Plato and Aristotle bearing upon Stoicism. And Stoic doctrines were re-interpreted in this new light.⁹⁰ The chief distinction of the new teaching was its

consideration of man in his entire being; there was a lack of prejudice for appreciating only the reason in man. This led to the important development of stressing the nature of the individual in interpreting the 'live according to nature' rule.⁹¹ This is clearly set forth in Cicero in his De Finibus.⁹² The perfection of each part of man in its individual nature is the true good. The whole of life is a process of perfecting the parts and realising his endowments, particularly the fulfilment of the intellect. This interpretation of man involves concern for health, beauty and social activity for their own sakes, (propter ipsos). For a time therefore the, adiaphora took on greater importance in the Stoic system, but eventually this naturalism became fuller co-ordinated into their basic doctrines. X

But more significantly for Epictetus, this new concept of man's nature demanded self-knowledge. Cicero quotes the Delphic, "noscere nosmet ipsos",⁹³ bidding us to be aware of the powers of the body and mind which we possess; for only by self-knowledge can we fulfil our complete nature.⁹⁴ Many aspects of this naturalistic interpretation of man's being will recur in Epictetus, and much of the change of spirit that appears in Epictetus as distinct from the Early Stoics, should be attributed to this period of Stoicism.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. This is described by Dodds, Greeks and the Irrational p. 236f, as the breaking up of the 'inherited conglomerate'.
2. Murray, Five Stages, Ch. 4.
3. This seems to be in contrast to the present day freedom and permisiveness where belief even in the existence of absolute values is weak.
4. This theory is put by Dodds, Greeks and Irrational, p. 236f.
5. In Epicureanism, the fear was concentrated on fear of the Gods and fear of death (Lucretius Bk. III), and the doctrine of living each day as it comes was accepted. But with those whose belief in absolute values was stronger, fear was far more general.
6. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, p. 32.

7. Here Plato and Aristotle exhibit their truer conception of humanity; and later Stoics followed them in this, see section 5 below.
8. The falsity of this psychology is characteristically noted by Murray: "To be really without fear or desire would mean death, and to die is not to solve the problem of living", Op. cit. p. 121; this same use of a fantastic psychology is noted by Dodds, Op. cit. p. 239 and Pohlenz, Freedom, p. 138.
9. Many of these are to be found in Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantis, and Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum.
10. Lucretius tried to accomplish the same status for Epicureanism, in his De Rerum Natura.
11. SVF I 58.
12. "Propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur." - Cicero, Acad. post. I 11, 40.
13. This is but one example of the circular kind of argument characteristic of the system, referred to in section 1.

14. Sextus Empiricus VII, 252.
15. Cicero, Acad. post. I 11, 40.
16. SVF II 91.
17. SVF II 75.
18. Sextus Empiricus, VII, 257.
19. Watson, Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p. 36.
20. See further, Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 88 f, esp. p. 90.
21. De Vogel, III p. 119.
22. SVF II 56; Sextus Empiricus, VII, 233. See also Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 97.
23. Sextus Empiricus, VII 253, quotes the instance of Admetus and Alcestis.
24. Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantis, 1055 F, and 1057 A 19 f, to end.

25. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. I 227 - 229.
26. Plutarch, Op. cit. 1041 E, uses ἐμφυτος of the prolepseis, but as De Vogel indicates (III p. 125), the word does not mean innate, but rather that the mind is naturally predisposed to having these notions. Sandbach, Ἐννοια and Prolepsis in Stoic Theory, p. 48 - 9, contends for the more literal translation of ἐμφυτος. Reference will be made to this view in Ch. V 2, below.
27. SVF II 83.
28. This must not be confused with the metaphysical forms of Plato. An illuminating account of the growth of ἐννοια is given by Watson, Op. cit., p. 23 - 8.
29. SVF II 83.
30. SVF. II 87.
31. Sandbach, Op. cit. p. 46 - 7.
32. Epict. I 14, 7 - 8. It is necessary to understand that

the τύποι are the impressions left on the mind by the phantasiai.

33. Diogenes Laertius, X 33.
34. De Natura Deorum, I 43 - 4.
35. "In omnium animis eorum notitionem impressit ipsa natura." (De N.D. I 43, ch.16.)
36. "Insitas eorum vel potius innatus cognitiones habemus." (De N.D. I 44, ch.17)
37. This criticism is well put by Bevan, Op. cit. p. 48 - 9.
38. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 136 and 148.
39. Seneca, De Beneficiis, IV 7.
40. Hence arose the 'problem of suffering' and of wickedness. De Vogel, III Paras. 938 - 942, gives evidence of discussion on this problem. For Epictetus' contribution, see Ch. VI, 1.
41. Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1147 b 4.

42. For the association of πνεῦμα and hegemonikon, see Watson, Op. cit., p. 19 - 21.
43. SVF II 229; see Bréhier, Op. cit., p. 167.
44. Bréhier: "La representation devient alors perception, et l'inclination volonté réfléchie."
45. Plutarch, Op. cit. 1057 A.
46. It seems that all phantasiai occurring to animals are true, i.e. natural. Whence Plutarch remarks that God and the Wise Man imprint false phantasiai in man, 1057 A. See also note 53 below.
47. It is worth noting that Chalcidius in his Latin commentary Timaeus, adopts a theory of two hegemonika; 'duo principales vires, una deliberativa altera quae ad adpetendum quid impellit' H. M. Jones, Classical Philology 13, 1918, p. 206, notes that this theory is unique and unlikely to be derived from neo-Platonists. It could be a development of the two branches of functions, one typical of human reason, the other of universal

reason, both of which Chrysippus puts under the direction of a single hegemonikon.

48. SVF II 879.

49. Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 184.

50. SVF II 879.

51. Sextus Empiricus, VII, 237; cf. SVF II 56. The full implications and varying interpretations of this theory are discussed by Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 166 note.

52. SVF III 169.

53. This doctrine of Chrysippus may be compared with his saying reported by Plutarch, Op. cit. 1057 AB:

αὐθις δὲ φησὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς
ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφόν, οὐ συγκατατιθεμένων
οὐδ' εἰκόντων δεομένουσ ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ πραττόντων
μόνον καὶ ὀρμώντων ἐπὶ τὸ φαινόμενον.

54. De Vogel III, para. 952d.

55.

κίνησιν ψυχῆς ἄλογον παρὰ φύσιν

De Vogel III 952 c. cf. SVF III 389.

56.

SVF III 377.

57.

SVF I 208; De Vogel III, 954 b.

58.

Plutarch, Op. cit. 1045 B - F.

59.

ἄδηλους: λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς.

60.

Cf. Aristotle's syllogism in considering the conduct of the ἀκρατής, where stage 2 above corresponds to the major premise, and stage 3 to the minor premise. There is discussion on the various interpretations of Chrysippus' theory in Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 249 f.

61.

De Vogel, III, p. 168 f, also para. 953 d (note), and Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p. 143 recognise a distinction between the positions of Zeno and Chrysippus on the πάθη, on the evidence of a text of Galen (SVF 461). But see Watson, Op. cit. p. 61, note.

62. Watson, Op. cit. p. 61.
63. SVF III 178.
64. Watson, Op. cit. p. 5 - 8.
65. Cf. Aristotle, Nicom. Eth III; but his deliberation was over things that followed in a certain way for the most part. He saw that deliberation did involve a degree of probability.
66. Diogenes Laertius, VIII 102, 103, 105. Again, cf. Aristotle's δαιμότιος, which is directed towards something because the end is known, but it is not driven by any ἀρχή within the agent.
67. SVF III 494; 500.
68. It is interesting to note that Walsh, 'Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness', ends his criticism of Aristotle's akrasia by saying: 'We may say that the absence of the concept of the will produces a serious limitation in Aristotle's analysis of akrasia. Perhaps

we have here one of the points of departure for Stoic moral psychology.

69. The discussions on determinism and will were numerous, and the Stoics must not be blamed for leaving the question unsolved, since the argument was to persist in philosophy to the present day. But the discussions were hampered by the detailed analysis of the process of causation, reason and fate, without a comparable account being given of the concept of will. Consequently 'will' remained as something that was always felt to exist, but always to give way to arguments of determinism. Thus Seneca, Epistle 16, when faced with the question, what use is philosophy if everything is determined, replies that it "teaches us to obey God and endure change". So characteristically the problem is shelved, though Seneca suggests it was a well-worn problem: "sed non est nunc...": It has been argued many times before.
70. Plutarch, Op. cit., 1055 F, et seq.
71. Cicero, De Fato 40 f.

72. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, VII 2; cf. Marcus Aurelius, X 33.
73. "Impetus consiliorum mentiumque nostrorum actionesque ipsas voluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingentia moderantur." The argument is close to Aristotle's statement that we ourselves are partly responsible for our characters, (N.E. 1114 b 21-5); see Ch.2 p.41.
74. The degree of human possibility as against necessity is investigated by Reasor, Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy, who concludes from an examination of the Stoic logic and physics that possibility inheres in the Stoic logos, which is both a power and a cause, Man has the power of choice in συγκατάθεσις, but does not necessarily derive from this any control over circumstances; p. 289 and 296. e/
75. He observed, for example, climatic influences on a persons moral character, De Vogel III, para 1184 a; Such observations lead to a more naturalistic view of man.
76. De Vogel III, paras. 1185 - 6. Dobson, The Posidonius Myth, stresses this dualism; see also note 47 above.

77. Galen, De Plac. 348.
78. διττήν εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ἡμῖν τῶν
στασιαζουσῶν ἀλλήλαις δυνάμεων De Vogel III, para.
1190 a.
79. Nock, Posidonius, p. 3, recognises an Aristotelian
tendency here in Posidonius.
80. Plutarch, De Facie, 944 f; cf. Epictetus IV 1, 32.
81. cf. De Vogel III, para, 989 a note 3, and also Watson,
Op. cit. p. 78, who sees here a reversion towards a
Platonic theory of knowledge.
82. See Ch. IV 3.
83. De Vogel notes that the term was probably used even by
Chrysippus, III, para. 989; cf. 1011a: ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός,
ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος.
But Posidonius took ὀρθὸς λόγος as his actual
criterion, (Sextus Empiricus VII 54.)

84. τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς δαίμονι συγγενεὶ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ἄλλον κόσμον διοικῶντι; De Vogel III, para. 1055. The term 'daimon' is discussed by Dobson, Op. cit. v. 193. See also discussion in Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 260-72, esp. 267-8.
85. De Vogel III, para. 989 note. In her most recent book, Philosophia I (1970), de Vogel has made some important contributions to influences upon Stoicism during 2nd. and 1st. centuries B.C. especially from the Academy and Antiochus; see esp. pp. 372-7.
86. πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ἄλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν; Diogenes Laertius VII 88.
87. Sextus Empiricus, IX 78 - 80.
88. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p. 217.
89. For evidence of this cult, see Dodds, Greeks and the Irrational, p. 246 - 7.
90. De Vogel III, p. 277.
91. De Vogel however, traces this back to Chrysippus, III, 1005 d, note. For the full development of the doctrine, see Ch. IV 2, and VI 2.

92. Cicero, De Finibus V, 24 - 6, and 47 - 59.
93. Cicero, De Finibus V, 44. cf. Epictetus, see Ch. VI 2.
94. Cf. Aristotle's appreciation of self and self love,
Nic. Eth. IX.

CHAPTER FOUR

SENECA

I. The New Humanism.

During the period of transition from Middle to Late Stoics, it will be useful to consider as a link the moral essays of Cicero and Seneca, since much of the orientation of Epictetus' doctrines is foreshadowed in these works.¹

Throughout the whole period of its development certain fundamental aspects of Stoicism remained unchanged: the basic physical doctrine and theory of knowledge underwent little change, and particularly the Stoic insistence on the supremacy of reason continued unassailable.

Yet against this rigid background there was room for a change of emphasis in teaching, and notably for a more compromising and practical attitude towards the concept of virtue. The Stoic paradoxes on moral goodness had been handed down through the School, and receive commentary from Cicero in his Paradoxa. Particularly illustrative of this concept of virtue is Paradoxa III, in stating that any fault is equally bad, since all faults are a negation of virtue. No degrees of good and bad are allowed.²

However, in Stoicism of the late Roman Republic and following, although this orthodox position of the sapiens alone being capable of virtue persists, the emphasis in the moral essays of Seneca and Cicero is on humanity and on the conduct of the ordinary man. It is not surprising to find Terence, the Roman dramatist noted above all for his sensitivity to so many aspects of human behaviour, held in high regard and quoted frequently by Cicero in these essays, as 'familiaris meus!'³ Virtue becomes something more personally felt by the individual.

The paradoxes were the product of the schools, but already, as seen in the previous chapter, many influences, especially from earlier philosophies were gaining strength alongside the orthodox Stoic principles. In the present chapter it will be seen how these influences are reflected in the less scholastic, popular philosophic works of Seneca and Cicero.

Three aspects in particular contribute to the increased humanism in Stoicism expressed by these writers. First, there was a much broader interpretation of what man's nature was, that is his especial nature, or proprium, by which he is distinguished from the animals. Man's paramount distinction, reason, is seen not only to embrace and account for wisdom, but also other aspects of moral goodness, which had hitherto

received little attention from the Stoics. These aspects were chiefly duties in society, magnanimity and orderliness, (ordo et decus).⁴ Virtue was thus seen to comprehend far more of man's daily actions and aspirations. The duties in society (τὰ καθήκοντα) had indeed been treated earlier by Panaetius, but as something divorced from the ideal Stoic concept of goodness.⁵

Second, the stereo-typed personality of the sapiens came to be regarded as an unrealistic medium for moral goodness, and in the De Officiis Cicero departs from the rigid teaching of the Paradoxa, and recognises that nature has endowed men with individual personalities and capabilities; and it is natural and therefore right that our actions should reflect these differences of personality, whilst at the same time maintaining recognition of the laws governing human nature as a whole.⁶ The observation is important since it receives further emphasis in Epictetus in his treatment of the dynameis, (personal capacities).⁷

Also moral goodness was seen to admit of variations in its degree of attainment from individual to individual; this trend of thought also recurs in Epictetus, when speaking of the different inclinations (πρόσωπα) people display in attaining perfection of the prohairesis.⁸

Third, Stoic thought was beginning to be taken up in the literary circles of the Romans. The practical and political outlook of these Roman exponents, notably Cicero, were not content with a philosophy teaching that virtue, which Romans strive to attain qua Romans rather than qua Stoics, was only attainable by the perfect sapiens. It was inevitable that the Romans should modify the theoretical precepts to a practical philosophy of life. Primarily this meant that duties undertaken for the state or community should be given high importance in moral virtue. But also Rome required that the philosophy should give attention more to the whole man. She had not been subjected completely to the rationalism of Greece, and whilst reason was dominant, ~~instinctive~~ natural responses needed accommodating into Roman Stoicism. ~~Instinctive~~ inclinations towards love, friendship, fear and anger needed examining afresh, since these were very real experiences in personal relationships deeply felt by the Roman living his every day life. Certain virtues as constantia, patientia and gravitas were ingrained in the Roman ethos, as a means of living the practical life, involving fear and personal relationships. The moral quality of these virtues brought them close to the virtue of the Stoic sapiens, but differed in that they were moulded for the practical life.

Stoicism tended to adapt accordingly.

In this connection too must be considered the growth of the religious element in Stoicism, and how this was accommodated into the earlier theistic concepts. Also the earliest Stoic precept, 'live according to Nature' would need further examination, since the Greek and Roman natures were not one and the same. Very generally, the Romans were ready to give greater consideration to emotive factors at the expense of a theory of pure reason.

The writings of Cicero, and more especially of Seneca, best illustrate this modification of the Stoic philosophy to the more humanised Roman outlook. Both may be described as syncretists; or Cicero perhaps rather as a commentary on other philosophers of various schools and periods. They piece together thoughts mainly from Stoic writers,¹⁰ in order either to give his own philosophic position on a particular subject of current discussion in the schools, as Cicero did in his treatises on Moral Goodness, on Determinism, and on the Nature of the Gods,¹¹ or in a less theoretical vein, to give advice to friends on practical matters of life, as in Cicero's essays on Friendship and Duties and Old Age, and Seneca's Epistles, (though some are intensely doctrinal) and essays on Anger, Kindness, and so on.

It is this latter category that display the more humanising tendencies in Stoicism outlined above which were to influence the development of Stoicism in the period of the Empire. They are characterised by a lack of close dogma and reference to the detailed logic of the Stoics. Generally a Stoic basis is taken for granted, but a new spirit is seen to be instilled.

2. Will, Personality and Conscience.

The inner nature of moral action is stressed in Cicero and Seneca. Virtue was to be sought in the attitude of mind of the agent, rather than in the appearance of virtuous acts. Stoic doctrine had always taught that virtue was dependent on the inner state of the individual. The virtuous acts, (τα κατορθώματα), were not defined by what was done, but by the state of mind behind the action. This was natural since the Stoics regarded virtue itself as a *δίεθεσις*, a certain state of mind.¹² A great deal of theoretical and idealistic teaching developed from this, such as the inseparability of virtues, and the durability of moral virtue.¹³

Detached from this idealistic concept of virtue, was the ability to choose aright in the matter of adiaphora, and

decisions on what constituted duties (τὰ καθήκοντα).

By the time Cicero was writing, the belief in a perfect virtuous and wise man came to have little practical application, and consequently the duties themselves did begin to rank to some extent as moral actions, and yet these actions could only be considered good if the will to act was good.

In De Officiis Cicero states that a right action is only just when it is voluntary.¹⁵ The same occurs in the Paradoxa, No. 5, in which Cicero considers freedom, which the paradox states to be a necessary concomitant of the wise and virtuous man. Freedom is the ability to live as you wish; the decisions of the will (voluntas atque iudicium) constitute this freedom, and are therefore essential to the virtuous state.¹⁶

The individual's will on each particular occasion he acts is given prominence in Seneca, rather than the more constant general inner concept of a state of mind or a will in accordance with nature. No upright act is done by an unwilling agent;¹⁷ there can only be right conduct if the will to act is right (recta voluntas); and there can only be right will, if one's attitude of mind is right, (habitus animi).¹⁸ Thus the will is seen to be a necessary condition for virtue, lying between the virtuous state and the right action.

Another importance of the will in Seneca is seen in the general direction of one's life towards the good. In order to attain the supreme good, we must persevere; the greater part of progress is the will to progress. Progress must be willed with the whole will.¹⁹ In discussing benefits, great stress is always laid by Seneca on the inclination to give a favour. The important thing is that the kindness is prompted by one's own will.²⁰ In forming the character of pure virtue, unassailable from calamities and misfortunes, again it is the will that is emphasised, namely a general will or decision (iudicium) to be virtuous.²¹

Seneca's position here is important for two reasons: first, he notices a distinction between particular will and general will. One can adopt general will in desiring the good, or the course of nature. This was the position of will in the early Stoa, but Seneca gives the will greater prominence by making the willing simultaneous with if not prior to, the rational decision. In the earlier Stoics the will followed. The specific will operates in forming a decision on each particular set of circumstances, and is in turn partly dependent upon the general will, or the 'habitus animi', for the wishing of moral progress in a general way, 'mente tota volo', may be seen to contribute to the 'habitus animi'. Thus the term,

'habitus animi' has a similar function to the ἕξις προαιρετική in Aristotle,²² and to the προαίρεσις οἷα δεῖ²³ in Epictetus, that is, as a general willing basis from which virtue ensues.

Second, the specific will in Seneca is immediately bound up with the passing of judgement (iudicium) in making a decision. That is the area of freedom assigned by the early Stoics to συγκατάθεσις (assent), and this is now shown to be will (voluntas). The combination of the words 'iudicium' and 'voluntas' is common in Seneca,²⁴ and also occur in Cicero's Paradoxa:²⁵ Consequently they may represent an attempt towards a definition of a rational will, which is to receive fuller treatment in Epictetus' concept of prohairesis, and this will be seen to involve precisely this act of willing and reasoning. In Seneca we see the idea of the individual's freedom in more naturalistic terms of will, in that a natural response (voluntas) towards virtue is the basis for moral conduct, and this response will be rational (iudicium) because its object is virtue.

It was perhaps because will and inclination were being regarded as an essential factor in attaining virtue, that there was also an increased interest in personality during this period, and in the factors that caused men to vary in the direction and

strength of their wills, that is, in their natural propensity towards virtue.

Nature did not endow man with virtue in the same way that she bestowed other gifts. Virtue remains for man a potential only, to be developed according to each individual's inclination and will to obtain the right kind of knowledge and to apply it. Nature has provided a mind which is capable of attaining virtue if it so wishes: 'mentem quae omnem virtutem accipere posset'.²⁶ The mind itself must seek the logical development of the elementary principles;²⁷ this is each individual's responsibility, (nostrum est).

Thus as with Epictetus, the area of freedom is in using and developing nature's gifts. Positions of honour and wealth are ruled by chance, our role (persona) is decided by our own free choice.²⁸ We may assume whatever attitude we like towards these externals.

Again significant was the recognition that reason not only functioned through universal laws, but that its working is also very much affected by our own personalities. For endowments of nature were of two kinds; first, universal, that is reason, from which all morality and propriety is derived, and the second, individual, that is, the special capacities of mind and body of each individual. Thus we should act in

accordance with universal law and with our own particular bent and circumstances.²⁹

Thus in Cicero can be found an area of responsibility, both in assuming a role in the face of duties and externals, and in developing our own particular capacities. Both these areas of freedom receive fuller treatment in Epictetus' notions of πρόσωπον and dynameis.³⁰ Accordingly, with Seneca there are signs of a gradual re-interpretation of the 'live according to nature' formula of oikeiosis. The Stoics throughout regard man's oikeiosis as reason, but in Chrysippus and Cicero this is given a general interpretation based on a state of mind; reason is a state that satisfies definitions of proprium;³¹ life adapts to this in rather a static way. This is taken over by the more dynamic concept of Seneca and Epictetus, where reason is more active intelligence, a willing and reasoning capacity that takes stock of each situation, adapting itself to each new set of circumstances to give a decision.³²

Consequently, the notion of getting to know oneself is common in Seneca. Reason works from a knowledge of the inner personality as well as from externals. Its first instigation to activity is from external things via the senses, but then it must fall back on itself, (in se redit).³³ Thus as in Epictetus, knowledge of oneself becomes vital to right

reasoning. Our own self is reason and must control the passions. The prerequisite of virtue is that our own selves must first belong to us.³⁴ Man is anxious for the future because he has not found his own self, (nemo sibi contigit);³⁵ once we have gained control over ourselves, we become free.

In this connection must be considered the notion of conscientia (conscience), which first becomes important in Seneca. The word in Latin covers a wide range of meanings, but where it can be translated as 'conscience', there were two variations of meaning: first, in a popular sense, it means an inner guide to help us to do the right thing. It is used in this way in Epistle 117, 1.³⁶ Second, it has a more specialised philosophic usage as conscientia animi, meaning either a good or bad conscience. It appears as the latter in De Finibus II, 16, 53 f. and in De Officiis III 21, 85. In Seneca it is more usually the consciousness of doing right: the chief result of a favour bestowed is the conscience of it; the glory of the deed and the possibility of a return favour are minor considerations.³⁷ In Epistle 95, 14, the opposite sense of a bad conscience is meant: the punishment of wickedness is the conscience of it.³⁸

As Pohlenz observes, this concept of a conscience cannot be fitted into the normal Stoic psychological machinery.³⁹

The Greek equivalent συνείδησις occurs rarely in Stoic writings, and where it does appear it refers to the awareness or consciousness which a creature has of its own composition, without any moral element being implied.⁴⁰

Two possible sources for the appearance of conscientia in Seneca remain. It could be a translation from the Greek συνείδησις in its non-Stoic usage, or the purely Roman term, to express the inner voice of conscience. The use of σύνεσις by Euripides⁴¹ illustrates the conotation of a guilty conscience: asked from what affliction he is suffering, Orestes replies that it is the consciousness of having done a terrible crime. This idea grew up, no doubt, independently in both συνείδησις and conscientia. But the Greek συνείδησις assumes more religious and moral connotations: it is born with every soul and makes its abode in it, and inflicts wounds which know no healing.⁴² It puts to shame, teaches and warns. There are numerous instances during the Hellenistic period of this usage.⁴³ But the word in Greek does not normally refer to a good conscience, as it so often does in Seneca.

The most probable answer to the occurrence of conscientia in Seneca is that he adopted the Roman term to refer to a voice of conscience, and allied it with the strong moral and religious overtones of guidance from the current Greek use of the word. The term may denote the same kind of non-

Hellenistic approach as 'voluntas', as being something basic to the concept of virtue, quite independent of reason; for the good, says Seneca, comes from a good conscience, right deliberation and correct action, in that order.⁴⁴ At the same time, its use as bad conscience or guiding spiritual advisor may reflect Pythagorean influences through contemporary Greek sources.

Seneca's adoption of the term, in whatever form, is not followed by Epictetus. Several aspects of moral conscience are, however, contained in the term prohairesis. The criminal, for instance, suffers a bad prohairesis as a result of his wrongdoing.⁴⁵ Again, as we found with 'voluntas', Epictetus reduces the more irrational aspects of the Roman writers to his rational 'prohairesis', and whatever hint there is of the irrational in Epictetus, is contained in prohairesis. The chief virtue to be maintained by prohairesis is τὸ αἰδέημον (self-respect),⁴⁶ and this notion of self-respect has definite associations with our 'conscience'.⁴⁷

One aspect of conscience in our use of the word is common to Epictetus and Seneca, namely the examination of the 'conscience', which really amounts to purifying our inward thoughts, that is, thoughts not yet expressed in action. Great stress is laid on this by Seneca in De Ira III 36, that each

evening one should hold this self examination and commune with oneself, then rest peacefully. There is possibly again a Pythagorean source here, transmitted by the Cynics.⁴⁸ The resemblance to Epictetus is striking,⁴⁹ but neither writer uses the term conscientia or συνείδησις to express this discipline.

3. Reason and Emotion.

The reason why the will became an important factor in Seneca's moral philosophy, becomes clearer with an examination of his attitude towards the emotions. In his teaching on the emotions, Seneca generally follows Chrysippus, who held that the passions were the result of the soul directed in a certain way, (ψυχὴ πῶς ἔχουσα). By adopting this account, Chrysippus maintained a psychological monism, as opposed to Posidonius who believed in a bi-partite division of the soul into rational and irrational. According to Chrysippus, all our activity, whether rational or irrational, can be accounted for by the disposition of the ruling hegemonikon. Thus the emotions were judgements, erring judgements, of the hegemonikon.⁵⁰

Seneca develops this doctrine a stage further by

maintaining that it is the will which causes the judgements, which in turn cause the emotions. The will is something over which we do have control, and which can be directed to the rational or irrational. Seneca explains this doctrine in De Ira, II, 1 - 4, by considering closely and stage by stage, the mental processes involved in entertaining anger after receiving an injury from someone. These are:

1. The phantasia (species) of injury.
2. The desire for revenge.
3. Admitting that one should not have been injured.
4. Admitting that one ought to be revenged.

Thus anger is aroused by the mind giving its assent, (animo adsentiente) at stages 3 and 4, to the phantasiai received in 1 and 2. συγκατάθεσις is therefore involved, and this requires an act of choice, (iudicium).

Seneca proceeds (2, 4 - 5), to distinguish between fleeting emotions, and the ~~injured~~ passions. The first are not true passions but motus animi, or corpora pulsus (3, 2), more physical than psychological, for instance, smiling when another smiles. These are however the beginnings of passion, (principia

proudentia affectibus). The true passions require surrender to these emotions and the consent of the will, (adsensus mentis, 3, 1.). In 3, 5, he states that the passing emotion is the result of impetus, but the excitement to anger is a matter of decision of the will, (voluntate et iudicio).

Reason has no power over the initial shock of the mind, for these impulses are due to entirely external causes which produce an involuntary reaction. But the other kind of impulse which comes from within, (i.e. from our own judgement or decision) can be removed by a rational judgement.⁵¹ Thus the iudicium itself produces an urge (motus), presumably an irrational urge, which must be countered by a further decision producing a rational urge.

The part of the will in emotions again occurs in De Ira I, 8, 1 - 3: Once in the grasp of anger, it is difficult to return to the path of right conduct, since reason has no power when once the passion is admitted and given authority by our own will, (voluntate). Again following Chrysippus, Seneca teaches that the mind becomes one with the passion, not a thing apart, (sepositus, extrinsecus speculator affectus). Passion and reason are a changing of the mind for better or worse.⁵² For the will itself becomes irrational when once it has given its consent to the passion; rational will can then

no longer exist, hence there can be no return to the rational state whilst the passion persists, even though there is a part which disapproves, as is suggested by permiseris.⁵³ Here Seneca betrays Chrysippus' monism, if he can still recognise a 'you' which does not allow the passion. This illustrates the more natural and personal account of the Romans compared with the Greek theorists.⁵⁴

So whilst it is true that Seneca's general attitude to the emotions is to banish them,⁵⁵ he does introduce the less dogmatic position that they are in the last count willed; therefore their extirpation must begin with a re-adjustment within.

Considering further the extent to which reason is dependent on impulse, Seneca's threefold division of moral philosophy is relevant.⁵⁶ The divisions are: 1. The speculative, which decides the function and worth of each thing; 2. The part of impulse, which is to acquire a regular and ordered impulse to things examined by 1; 3, of action which makes impulse and action harmonise.⁵⁷

Seneca's doctrine of impulse may indicate a partial return to Aristotle, favouring the adoption of ὄρεξις and ὄρμη as the incitement to an action, rather than the phantasiai. Again this is consistent with Seneca's emphasis on the will. In Epictetus

the will remains important, but in a fully rational aspect, and consequently, there is a return to phantasiai and reason being the prime motivation of action.

4. Duties and the Good.

Panaetius and Cicero,⁵⁸ in placing emphasis on duties rather than the pure moral goodness of the wise man, caused the Stoics of the Roman Empire to broaden their view of absolute morality, and to consider the relation of duties to moral goodness. The tendency of Cicero's De Officiis was to up-grade duties to approach moral goodness. He regarded the officia (duties) as a second grade moral goodness "quasi secunda quaedam honesta".⁵⁹ Ordinary people must live up to that moral right, (honestum) which comes within their range of comprehension.⁶⁰

Virtue was seen to embrace more than sapientia, which could be accomplished and maintained by the sapiens separate and aloof from the day-to-day activities with fellow men. Thus while Cicero strives to maintain a verbal distinction still between pure moral goodness and duties, in fact duties are felt to be morally good for the ordinary person.

Panaetius' treatment of duties could possibly have

developed as a branch of teaching quite distinct and detached from the main current of Stoicism in a period when the Stoic paradoxes were being attacked, but Cicero, in considering one action as being more right, or more expedient than another,⁶¹ brings the matter of decision making, of reason and will into the realm of daily actions: it became right to prefer one course of action to another. This is even more true of Seneca, who demands that the reasons for conferring any good favours, should be carefully weighed against other considerations.⁶²

After Cicero, Stoic thinkers reverted to a view of morality again more detached from externals, but they were never again allowed to neglect to give an account of an attitude to externals, and its bearing upon the virtuous life. And virtue gradually ceases to be confined to the detached state of the wise man increasing his wisdom through the in-breeding of the precepts of the Stoic logic and theory, but comes to have meaning only in the constant activity of the mind making the right choice in every given situation. The prominence given to the duties in Cicero is not thereafter found in Stoicism, with the possible exception of Marcus Aurelius. Epictetus recognised a close, organic, connection between them and moral goodness, but they were not essential and never given treatment on their own.

Seneca too immediately adopts the more detached attitude to virtue, and expresses that wisdom brings a state that is immune from the blows of fortune.⁶³ Yet his writings lack the technical terminology in dividing the goodness of the sapiens from the 'goodness' that can be achieved with respect to externals. He regards externals as not belonging to a person, but given only on trust, (a notion that is to appear far more prominently in Epictetus). It is not wrong to adopt a right attitude to externals for as long as they are given us, and indeed Seneca appears to allow a closer moral attachment to them than Epictetus. Fortune gives us nothing that is our own;⁶⁴ Reason makes external goods acceptable to us, (commendat), but we must not pursue them too greedily (avidus);⁶⁵ indifferent things, the adiaphora, are chattels (serva),⁶⁶ and are made good or bad by the attitude we adopt towards them. They are therefore a matter for moral concern.⁶⁷ Generally however, Epictetus and Seneca concur here, in seeing attention given to duties as a natural continuation of the concern for one's personal inner virtue, which must be placed first. The highest and purest soul is concerned only with its own good, namely perfecting its reason.⁶⁸

Much of Seneca's teaching in the Epistles and Essays is concerned with involvement with fellow men; he pays much

attention to the true nature of kindness, or an act of goodwill, (to give an interpretation of beneficium rather than a translation.) In his teaching on this subject, he allows a more benevolent and unselfish attitude with respect to duties and externals than any other Stoic writer. He almost approaches a Christian attitude of sacrificial love in the giving of self;⁶⁹ real kindness is done by one who seeing poverty forgets his own. A kindness is a desire to give when one has already given.⁷⁰ Cicero approaches closest to this in De Amicitia, 58. He regards benevolentia as the essence of friendship, but from a rather more selfish point of view, as fulfilling the nature of the self,⁷¹

5. The Religion of Stoicism.

A remarkable development in the Stoicism of Seneca and Epictetus is the religious attitude in their teaching. The developments that begin with these writers are largely responsible for Stoicism being regarded as less of a philosophy, but more a religious way of life. For this was scarcely true of the earliest Stoic teaching.

However, in the early period there was certainly a notion of God. God was conceived as being the active principle

behind the constant generation of the universe. He was defined as πῦρ τεχνικόν .⁷² In the same passage, God is said to produce the λόγοι σπερματικοί, which are the different kinds of spirit that pervade different kinds of matter.

Diogenes,⁷³ refers to God as the λόγος σπερματικός, who is responsible for transforming the whole of substance, as air into water.

From this, God may be seen to subsist in the material objects of the universe, so that Plotinus in his interpretation of Stoicism regards the Stoics as considering the soul to be πνεῦμα πως ἔχον or ὕλη πως ἔχον.⁷⁴ That is, a diffusion of spirit itself, undergoing modification through the λόγοι σπερματικοί, to give life to different existing material things.

The Hymn to Zeus of Cleanthes,⁷⁵ summarises much of this theistic concept of reason and generation. The significant points in the hymn are first, that Zeus is the reason, (Logos), that exists for ever, harmonising all things. Second, everything in earth, sky and sea occurs through Zeus as spirit (daimon), and the whole universe willingly obeys. Third, Zeus is recognised as having many aspects (πολυώνυμος), responsible for different natural phenomena, as a kind of logical pantheism.

Then with particular reference to human beings, the human race is seen to have an image of God within themselves, in possessing reason; and men should banish ignorance, and strive for correctness of opinion, so as to comply with God's will.⁷⁶

Such is the extent to which the notion of God appears in the early Stoics, and it was on this basis that treatises were produced by Cicero, clearly following earlier sources, on the Nature of the Gods, and on Determinism. Yet whilst religious terminology is employed in accounting for the materialism of nature, there is a lack of any truly religious sensitivity. In Seneca, the beginnings of a religious awareness of the divine in nature are seen, and this thought continues through into Epictetus.

Given certain conditions it is an easy transition from a theory of pervading divine reason, to a belief in the in-dwelling of a religious spirit within each person and in natural phenomena. It would however be false to suppose that Stoicism had become a religion in Seneca, or even in Epictetus. In much of Seneca there is little progress from the early Stoics.⁷⁷

But in two passages of Seneca in particular there does seem to be a more certain religious attitude. The first

passage is De Beneficiis IV, 6 - 8. Here nature is defined as, "deus et divina ratio toti mundo partibus eius inserta".

Such a definition could well come from the early Stoics.

Seneca continues by demonstrating the different aspects of God. There is no nature without God. God and nature differ only in function, (officio), and we apply different epithets to Jupiter for different functions, Stator, Liber, and so on.⁷⁸ God is everywhere.⁷⁹

Much of these chapters then are on the same level as Cleanthes' Hymn, but they transcend it in two respects: first, an urge to make God, and not nature, supreme; that is, a desire to see nature and the creator in its personal aspect; second, a consideration of the context shows that Seneca is writing about the unselfish aspect of human kindness; he introduces the subject of God and nature as the finest example of unselfish giving: a beneficium is something that is given freely, as God gives. This again points to a closer personal relationship of God and man, with God having a concern for man, and man feeling an indebtedness.⁸⁰

The second passage is Epistle XLI. Here the religious attitude is more convincing still. The subject of this letter is the perfecting of the soul in accordance with nature. For the soul is the seat of reason; a man's own unhindered possession

is his soul, and reason perfected in the soul.⁸¹ The opening five sections of this epistle admire the holiness of such a soul. Reflection on the nature of the perfected soul evokes an awe similar to that evoked by places of outstanding mysterious natural beauty. It is apt that a verse is quoted from Vergil, in which he describes the religious awe of an Italian site in Aeneid, 8; at such scenes as this the soul is moved by a religionis suspicione (3). The use of the word numen, (it occurs twice in this passage, 3 and 5), suggests that here there is more than a rhetorical elaboration of early Stoic theology. There was no Greek equivalent to numen. To the Romans it signifies the in-dwelling of the religious spirit in different aspects of nature. Here, the soul depends on a numen: Non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare, (5). There has been a transition from logical pantheism to mystical pantheism.

For apart from the use of this word, the whole passage reflects an importation of the Roman pantheistic religion, almost a mystic religion into Stoic doctrine. An influence is seen upon Stoicism of the keen religious sensitivity of the Romans, inherited from their earliest Italian origins. There is a reflection in this Epistle of the kind of pure Italian mystic pantheistic religion which Vergil was endeavouring to

instill, anew into the Romans, when writing his Aeneid, - particularly Book 8.

Seneca's concept of soul⁸² also often shows a strong religious tendency. As our source of freedom (cui non possit obstari), it is like a God dwelling as a guest in a human body (deum in corpore humano hospitantem), an image in the likeness of God.⁸³ Vergil, Aeneid 8, is again quoted,⁸⁴ and this could suggest that Seneca is thinking here in terms of mystical pantheism.

In the foregoing account, I have where appropriate, drawn comparison between the teaching of Seneca and Epictetus. On the question of duties, given so much prominence in Cicero, they both adopt a similar course, that duties are to be undertaken when dictated by the reason in order to maintain one's inner virtue. Duties are a continuation, or the outward expression of the inner virtue, which should be our prime concern.

In other respects, Epictetus generally adopts a more rationalist position. Many of the more irrational aspects of Seneca, such as will, spiritual teaching and religion, conscience, impulse and the like, are present in Epictetus but in more restrained language. He brings the irrational and spiritualising elements all much closer to reason. This will be

seen to be particularly true of the religious aspect. I believe the religious sense in Epictetus is sufficient for him to look upon his moral teaching, particularly his teaching on freedom, as something spiritual, and the development of the more thorough religious aspect of Stoicism, manifest in Seneca, enabled him more easily to think of his work and his goal of freedom, as spiritual fulfilment; yet he is careful not to allow any doctrine to pass his lips which cannot be fitted into the framework of the rational Stoic system. Strict rationalism was never to return to the Stoic school, but the cloak, or strait-jacket, of rationalism was assumed again by Epictetus, and irrational elements developed within rather than alongside this. This is illustrated further in the concept of will.

The obsession with will by Seneca is stressed by Pohlenz and De Vogel⁸⁵ to be an important contribution to Stoicism, and the former recognised it as an essentially Roman contribution. The first condition for being good is to wish it (velle),⁸⁶ and this willing is not taught: velle non discitur,⁸⁷ and is accordingly within the ability of all human beings, not just the wise man.

Epictetus returns to a more purely Greek concept, but not without influence from Seneca, or at least from the Roman trend in Stoicism which he represents. Seneca allows the

freedom of the individual to consist in will, as almost an irrational factor, but the will does not lead to virtue without the analysis of reason (iudicium). In Epistle 81, unschooled will is not advised. The wise man, because of his intellect in the end approaches virtue. In Epictetus freedom exists nowhere but in the rational guiding principle, the hegemonikon, which in its more developed aspect is prohairesis, and although prohairesis involves will, it is never separated from reason, as a concept. Seneca has two concepts operating in conjunction, iudicium (decision) and voluntas (will). Epictetus significantly has one, prohairesis. The distinction is a narrow one, representing influence from the Roman writers, who were taking more account of the irrational, upon the Greek tradition, which had hitherto given a purely rational account of moral conduct. Epictetus followed Seneca in recognising the importance of the irrational elements in a philosophy of moral conduct, but was able to embrace them in a rational system centred on prohairesis.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. The writings to be considered in this chapter are primarily Cicero, De Amicitia; De Senectute; De Officiis; and Seneca, The Epistles and Moral Essays.
2. Cicero, Paradoxa III 2, 2.
3. De Amicitia 89.
4. Cicero, De Officiis I 4. For magnanimity and orderliness, cf. Epictetus' reference to μεγαλόφρον and κόσμησις (see Ch. VI 5). The virtues in Epictetus however, receive scant treatment.
5. To the factors determining correct moral conduct, which are based on Panaetius, Cicero adds the possibility of one course of action being more expedient and more right than another, even though neither may be right in the absolute sense, De Officiis III 1 and 7. The development is typical of the more personal attitude.
6. De Officiis I 31.

7. See Ch. VI 2.
8. Epictetus I 2. Again see Ch. VI 2.
9. The adoption of Stoicism in Roman Literary circles is particularly apparent in the historical essays of Sallust. The two opening chapters of De Coniuratione Catilinae are particularly relevant. Note also Seneca: 'Philosophia non in verbis sed in rebus est.' (Ep. I 16) Philosophy moulds the soul, but also orders our life and guides our conduct.
10. Not least from those Stoics who were themselves introducing into Stoicism, Aristotelian and Socratic, or Pythagorean elements. See Ch. III 5.
11. De Finibus; De Fatum; De Natura Deorum.
12. SVF III 494.
13. De Vogel III, para. 1031 a; Cicero, De Finibus III 43 - 47.
14. See Section 4, below.

15. Nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fuit, si est voluntarium, (I 28).
16. Paradoxa V 34.
17. Omne honestum voluntarium est, (Ep. 66, 16). Cf. Aristotle's condition of voluntariness for a moral action in Nic. Eth. III.
18. Seneca, Ep. 95, 55 f.
19. Volo et mente tota volo, (Ep. 71, 36).
20. De Beneficiis I 6.
21. De Beata Vita IX 3.
22. See Chapter Two, 3.
23. See Chapter Seven, 3.
24. De Ira II 3, 5.

25. Paradoxa V 34.
26. Cicero, De Finibus V, 59. Note also, 'virtutem ipsam natura inchoavit'.
27. Nostrum est as ea principia quae accipimus consequentia exquire, (De Finibus V 60).
28. Ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur, (De Officiis I 115).
29. De Officiis I 110 and 116.
30. See Chapter Six, 2.
31. Cicero, De Officiis I 100 and 131.
32. Seneca, Ep. 61; for Epictetus, see Chapter Six, 1.
33. De Beata Vita, 74.
34. Ep. 71, 36.

35. Ep. 32.
36. Cf. also Cicero, Ad Att. XII 28, 2 etc.
37. De Beneficiis II 33, 1 - 3.
38. Mala facinora conscientia flagellari.
39. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I p. 317.
40. So Chrysippus, (Diogenes Laertius VII 85). This is given the term συναίσθησις by Epictetus (II 2). The reason for this could be because συνείδησις had taken on moral connotations not recognised by the Stoic school. All five instances of συναίσθησις in Epictetus indicate that the term cannot refer to any special personality aspect nor to any technical function in cognition.
41. In I 2.30 the bull is instantly aware of his personal παρασκευή. In II 14,29 it is used hypothetically of cattle: if they had συναίσθησις (as man has), they would laugh at would-be philosopher-cattle. The term here seems identical to the more technical παρακολούθησις. In I 4,10 and II 11,1, it is used of wrong conduct and weakness, συναίσθησις τῶν αὐτοῦ κακῶν,
- 42.

τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀσθενείας ; in neither of these examples is there any idea of the sting of conscience, which is present in the Latin conscientia, when used of the criminal. The final example, in II 21,10 (ἔχω ἤν δέϊ συνάισθησιν τὸν μηδὲν εἰδότες ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα), again refers to the consciousness of some weakness, here ignorance, but without any moral intent. In these instances, Epictetus chooses a word which, until Plotinus at least, appears to be free from any particular philosophic theory, and to translate as 'consciousness' or 'realisation' is most adequate.

41. Euripides, Orestes, 395-6:

- τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀκόλλυσι νόσος;
- ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύννοια δέιν' εἰργασμένος.

42. Philo, De Decalogo 87

43. The use of the term receives thorough analysis by Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, Analytical Index, p. 132, and chapters 1 - 4.
44. Unde subit bonum? ex bona conscientia, ex honestis consiliis, ex rectis actionibus, (Ep. 23, 7.).
45. Epictetus, III 18, 4 - 6; and Fragment, Stobaeus I 3, 50, (Oldfather, Fragment 13).
46. See Chapter Six, 5.
47. A fragment assigned to Epictetus in Schweighauser's edition (No. 97), has reference to conscience (συνείδησις) which God has implanted in us to protect us. Other reasons apart, the thought is here so remote from the Discourses (the nearest approach is the reference to daimon in I 14), that its exclusion from the genuine fragments is generally observed. The fragment does illustrate just the kind of religious thinking which might have influenced Seneca's adoption of the term. The protecting characteristic of συνείδησις noticed in the fragment is possibly reflected in the

single instance of the term τὸ συνειδός in III 22, 94, in reference to the moral control of the Cynic. Its use here is remarkably similar to prohairesis used elsewhere.

48. So Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p. 117.
49. The passage, Epictetus III 13, 7 is particularly noteworthy.
50. See Chapter Three, 3.
51. Alter motus, qui iudicio nascitur iudicio tollitur, (4, 2). Cf. Epictetus προαίρεσις ἀνάγκη βί προαίρεσιν. (I 17, 27). One act of decision (irrational) can displace another (rational).
52. Affectus et ratio in melius peiusque mutatio animi est.
53. De Ira I 8, 1.
54. Cf. Section 2 above, on will and conscience.

55. Seneca refutes Aristotle on the point of emotions being useful for giving spirit to actions, De Ira I 9, 2 - 3; also Ep. 42, 1 - 2.
56. Ep. 89, 14.
57. Cf. Epictetus, who adopts in I 18, 1 τὸ παθεῖν (feeling), as a single origin of assent, choice and desire.
58. In De Officiis.
59. De Officiis III 13.
60. De Officiis III 17.
61. De Officiis I 1 f.
62. Seneca Ep. 81, 10.
63. Ep. 104, 21 - 4; Ep. 95, 10 - 14.
64. Nil dat fortuna mancipio, (Ep. 72), Cf. Ep. 61 and De Beata Vita 20, 5.

65. Ep. 72.
66. Ep. 66, 23.
67. Ep. 32, 10 - 13.
68. Soul is reason: Animus et ratio in anima perfecta, (Ep. 41, 6 - 7). The Epistle is closest in spirit to Epictetus, (cf. his purity in the soul, IV 11, 5 f.). But once a man's soul becomes fully rational, then reason will help him to fulfil all the categories of duties, (Seneca, Ep. 45, 10 - 14).
69. De Beneficiis I 7.
70. De Beneficiis II 14.
71. Cicero, De Amicitia, 79.
72. SVF II 1027.
73. Diogenes Laertius VII 135 f.

74. Plotinus, Enneads IV 7, 4.
75. SVF I 537.
76. Lines 25 - 40.
77. E.g. in Naturales Quaestiones, Praef. 13 - 15:
quid est deus? Mens universi.
78. Cf. Epictetus I 22, 16.
79. De Beneficiis IV 8, 2.
80. De Beneficiis IV 9, 1.
81. Animus et ratio in anima perfecta, (Ep. 41, 8.).
82. Commonly 'animus'; the above passage is outstanding
in using 'anima'.
83. Ep. 31, 11.

84. Evander refers to the Italian Gods, of whom Aeneas must show himself worthy, by moulding his mind in their image.
85. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p. 319; De Vogel III, para. 1216, etc. See also Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 229ff.
86. Ep. 80, 4.
87. Ep. 81, 13.

CHAPTER FIVE

EPICTETUS : THE CONCEPT OF MIND

1. The Function of Reason.

Against the background of Greek and Stoic thought which has been provided, the particular doctrine of Epictetus may now be examined. His doctrine of freedom is contained in a full and proper understanding of the term prohairesis, which is the subject of chapter seven. In this and the following chapter I examine the basis from which his concept of prohairesis evolved, considering first his teaching on reason and second, man's position in the cosmos and society as a rational being. This chapter examines the nature of the reasoning faculty. Today we may call this the concept of mind or 'psychology' for by it we must understand both the mental and feeling activities that occur in the individual.

In general on the concept of reason, Epictetus inherited the main points of traditional Stoic teaching: that reason is the cause of the universe; the universe viewed as a whole is good; therefore reason aims at the good and is in itself good; that there is implanted in man alone of animals a part of the

cosmic reason and that this is his best part; that through this relationship with the reason of the universe, man is able to discern the plan of the universe and the plan of his individual life and adjust his behaviour to this plan; and that is^oso far as man has recourse to reason in planning his activities, he is free.

Epictetus writing as a visionary moralist, not as a scientific materialist, cleaves to this last assertion and basis his theory of freedom on it. Therefore Epictetus attaches greater importance to reason as a capacity, or potential, in man, which is essentially human and which man holds independent for its function of judging, than to the more materialistic concept of reason as a relationship with the cosmic mind. Materialistic speculations do not concern him as they concerned the Milesian School and the Stoics and Epicureans of the third century and were later to concern Plotinus. Epictetus' ethical teaching was centred on the happiness of the individual which lay in his freedom enjoyed during life. This, as with Plato and Aristotle before him, his ethical theory is based on a concept of man rather than derived from a physical theory, although the form and language of the system is retained.¹

In this humanised concept of reason, Epictetus finds that reason has a double function in man: its purpose is first

psychological, requiring *συγκατάθεσις* (assent) and second moral as *παρακολούθησις* (sympathetic understanding). The psychological function is the judgement of the mind upon the ideas presented to it. This is the theory of *συγκαταθεσις*. In I. 1, 4, the reasoning faculty (*ἡ δύναμις ἡ λογική*) is described as the faculty that uses the impressions (*ἡ χρηστική δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις*). Moreover in using the impressions it does not merely react to them in stimulus and response manner, but considers one against the other and makes a decision or judgement (*δύγμα*) Good is the consequence of the correct decision, evil of incorrect. This faculty, because it distinguishes man from beasts, and because it makes him a moral creature, is regarded as man's chief characteristic.²

The moral function derives from the notion that reason is good, therefore moral progress is gained from rationalising one's behaviour, so that it accords with the rational plan of nature. It is the function of man's reason to lead him to a correct understanding of this rational plan. This is *παρακολούθησις*.

These implications of man's rationality appear in IV 7, 7: man possesses the equipment to reckon up everything in the universe and to understand it and thereby to act out his own particular good.³ Thus man's reasoning faculty is not only

χρηστική τᾶις φαντασίαις, but also παρακολουθητική.⁴

Man is born to view God and his universe as a spectator

(θεασάμενος) and an interpreter. (ἐξηγητής)⁵

This special faculty of man is again referred to in III 1,

25 - 6. Man has the ability to use impressions rationally

(λογικός) that is in accordance with nature and perfectly.

(φύσει ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τελέως). This is man's

outstanding faculty (ἐξάίρετον). Such passages place man's

moral responsibility and freedom in the sphere of reason alone,

in educating it and using it to appreciate the design of the

cosmic reason in the world. Whilst it is right to emphasise

the human side of reason in Epictetus, the belief in a cosmic

guiding world - reason provides the absolute background of his

ethical teaching. Hence, reason in Epictetus has a triple

meaning.

1. As πρόνοια : the abstract reason or intelligence responsible for the good order of the universe, its creation, decay and regeneration.

2. As ἡ δύναμις λογική : the reasoning faculty is man, which is free to make right and wrong decisions.

3. As prohairesis: the power, through education, of freely being able to make right moral choice. The fact that Stoics thought that 2. was an actual detachment (an apospasma) of 1. made easier Epictetus' doctrine of prohairesis, which is the natural good state of 2.

Discourse II, 8 illustrates this position on reason; the argument is as follows; the true goodness lies in God; the nature of God is intelligence and reason (νοῦς ὀρθὸς λόγος). Man's moral commitment is due to having within himself a part of God, namely his reasoning faculty, therefore this part of us should be our constant concern.

Epictetus is able to stress the independence of man's reasoning faculty without neglecting its relationship to the cosmic reason. Man's reason, the apospasma, is a continuation of the cosmic reason in substance but not in function. Because it shares with the cosmic reason the substantial attribute, freedom, man's reason is free to operate independently of universal reason. Epictetus clearly says in I 1, that the gods put this faculty entirely under man's control. (7 - 9) It is self-sufficient, self-contemplating and self-analysing. Its self contemplating character is seen at the opening of I 1: αὐτὴν θεωροῦσα καὶ τὰλλα πάντα.(4). In I 17, 1 - 3 it is stated that there is nothing superior to

reason which analyses it, therefore it will analyse itself: αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν διαθρῶσει. This self-analysis is further explained in I 20, 1 - 6. The opening is similar to I 1: reason is found to be self-contemplative; the purpose of reason is the right use of phantasiai: moreover the composition of reason is an arrangement of phantasiai (σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν). Thus in a more subtle sense now, reason is self-contemplative and self sufficient, not subservient to anything outside the individual; it is a body of phantasiai considering and discriminating the phantasiai.

Such at any rate is its nature on a purely psychological level. In its moral aspect, another interpretation may be given to the self-contemplating characteristic, that in the individual an apospasma a substance coextensive with the cosmic reason, contemplates the works of that cosmic reason displayed in the circumstances of that individual's life.

I now turn to examine in what ways the functioning of man's reason may be said to be free in making any particular decision. The question devolves on three aspects:

1. The possibility of freedom in forming the material through which reason operates; that is the prolepseis or preconceptions which form the basis of our judgements.

2. Freedom in giving rational judgement to the incidence of particular impressions, phantasiai, that is, the objects of reason.

3. The possible restriction of freedom by the relationship of human reason to cosmic reason.

I consider these in turn.

2. The Prolepseis.

Epictetus adopted the term prolepseis from earlier Stoic epistemological theory, and gave it great prominence in his own interpretation of reason and right conduct. Earlier Stoics had regarded prolepseis as a branch of ἐπινοιαί, or acquired knowledge.⁶ In Epictetus the term indicates the accumulated knowledge which is the material or data to which we have recourse when making a decision in a particular case. The normal usage of the term in Epictetus then is to embrace the ethical principles and the accepted dogma of the Stoic school; and these are to be used to ascertain correct behaviour in each instance.

Whilst this general meaning is clear, there is some confusion on the origin of the prolepseis and the way they are used. The confusion probably arose because Epictetus tried to

accommodate his different approach to ethics in terms previously used for scientific enquiry into knowledge. With earlier Stoics, the prolepseis were a branch of $\acute{\alpha}\nu\nu\omicron\iota\alpha\iota$, the latter being a general concept⁷ formed by comparing countless similar phantasiai, and they covered primarily the knowledge of moral principles. Epictetus himself, in two very similar passages, describes the formation of concepts of this kind, I 6, 10 and I 14, 7 - 8. Both are introduced as an illustration of the skill and purpose manifest in God's creation, and no doubt Epictetus attached as little importance to their intrinsic contribution to a theory of knowledge⁸ as he does to any other scientific enquiry. From this concept of $\acute{\alpha}\nu\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$, Epictetus inherits two points in his teaching on prolepseis: first, they are concerned with the general rather than the particular.⁹ Second, they comprise, with phantasiai, the substance of the rational process.¹⁰ But Epictetus himself is not so much concerned with how we receive knowledge, but in how we apply the concepts to particulars. He is concerned less with the inductive process, the extraction of general principles from individual phantasiai, but more with the deductive, to ascertain what constitutes right action in a particular instance by applying general principles of moral conduct.

His teaching on prolepseis has three aspects: first,

that in the broadest sense there are prolepseis of certain abstract terms implying moral behaviour, such as justice, goodness and obligation. Second, he asks, what constitutes goodness, nobility, holiness and so on. What general standards are implied by these abstracts? Third, the general standards must be applied correctly in particular judgements leading to action.

The first use of prolepseis implies a belief in an absolute aim in moral conduct. Goodness exists as something just and noble and to be sought,¹¹ similarly holiness. We should aim at the right; everyone has a conception of his duty (πρόληψις τοῦ δέοντος).¹² This usage indicates a firm belief in absolute moral standards. In logical disputations the standards of true and false are absolute: once the necessary truth has been grasped in a particular problem, it is impossible to feel that the truth should be anything contrary to this. So in the sphere of moral behaviour, the concept of good is the standard of our actions.¹³ If both our concept of the good and also the analysis of the moral problem are correct then right action will present itself as being necessary a truth as the true solution in logical dispute.

Whilst the Stoic monism, placing reason as the essential truth of the universe makes this position more tenable for Epictetus than for us today, there is nevertheless a difference

in the logic of disputation and the rational approach to behaviour. In the first, the enquirer does not begin with the conviction that the truth must exhibit certain characteristics which are presented by a certain code. No such qualities in the conclusion are assumed; rather, his approach is to analyse a problem by deducing a series of true statements. Because he is dealing only in words and numbers, material in which logic is already inherent, the true or false is self-evident at each point of the argument. Now a moral act is not inherently good or bad in the same way as a statement is inherently true or false. The goodness of an act lies outside of itself, and is determined by a code of moral principles. The truth of a statement lies in that very statement, even though it may not be evident until the statement is simplified according to certain rules. The rational monism of the Stoic compels him to apply the reason seen in the theory of logic, and to an extent in the creative processes in the universe, to the concept of goodness and moral behaviour.

It is necessary to accept then that the Stoics regarded man's moral sense as necessary since he partook of a rational universe which was good; and because of this, Epictetus regards the moral sense, (that is, the prolepsis of goodness), as innate: we have it naturally because we are rational beings.

Accordingly, he says he has by nature¹⁴ knowledge of what is noble and base. In II 11, 3, the concept (ἐννοια) is ἐμφυτος (inborn or ingrown). We are to apply the natural preconceptions, φυσικὰς προλήψεις.¹⁵

Thus concerning whether the prolepseis are innate or acquired,¹⁶ Epictetus regards the prolepseis in the broadest meaning, man's moral sense, as innate. But in considering the second use of the term, prolepseis as the general rules of behaviour which constitute goodness, they are decidedly acquired. This accounts for the differing code of morals, for example, between the Egyptians and Romans.¹⁷ Different peoples regard different sorts of action as good. Therefore, it is not only necessary to have a moral sense that the good is to be done, but also to know what is good.

On this question Epictetus adopts a Socratic approach of warning against following the opinion of the many. Man tends to make up his opinion on what is good, without probing the question philosophically or receiving instruction.¹⁸ In geometry and music we do not use sounds and lines until we have knowledge of their meaning (οἱ μὴ εἰδότες). Similarly in our moral behaviour, we should not rely on opinion (οἴησις), but seek knowledge through philosophy. By philosophy, Epictetus has in mind the Socratic definitions of

general concepts such as pleasure and virtue.¹⁹

This Discourse (II, 11) thus illustrates an innate stage of common notions or preconceptions, and a more defined stage that is learned. This double aspect is similarly seen in II 17. We have in the first place vague general notions of the good and the just (φυσικὰς καὶ προλήψεις). But before we can apply these concepts to our behaviour, we must ascertain precisely what kind of actions come under the heading of each one. The aim of philosophical instruction is to attain a systematic arrangement (διάθρῳσις) of each of our prolepseis, so that we have a perfectly articulated and equipped knowledge of good action, making easier a moral judgement in any particular situation.²⁰

Epictetus is aware, though reluctantly, that Socratic dialectic will not of its own provide the solution to what constitutes goodness. In shaping one's knowledge of the prolepseis, (which one has always had in a general way), he admits of a certain code of moral principles, which he refers to as κανόνες.²¹ These are certain directions that we brought with us from Zeus our creator (ἐντέταλται). Philosophy itself must work on a certain κανών, or standard of judgement. In II 20, 21, Epictetus affirms that these standards are from nature, (φύσεως).

Thus prolepsis at this second stage appears to be a mixture of philosophic reasoning upon natural concepts of goodness, using principles which we have from Zeus and which are φύσεως. In practice the principles or canons are the precepts of the Stoic school.²² Yet because he calls them natural, they are, on account of the Stoic monism, rational, in the sense that, although not adopted through man's reason, they do lead necessarily to the good life because of their origin from the rational creator.²³

Epictetus is chiefly concerned only with prolepsis in its third aspect, that is, the application of the correct prolepsis to each decision of conduct. Every decision involves judgement upon phantasiai, and the criterion of judgement is the system of prolepseis. Correct judgement is the result of the correct application of prolepseis. This is the beginning of Epictetus' askesis, or moral training: προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις.²⁴

It is significant that the training required for applying the prolepseis is not purely logical training, but training in disciplining the will. We have seen that Epictetus emphasises the comparison of correct behaviour and correct logical disputation, and to a certain degree the prolepseis as general principles can be applied logically to reach a definitive

decision on a particular moral act. But Epictetus, as Aristotle, realises a deficiency in applying the practical syllogism. Epictetus' training requires two things: first, that the prolepseis should be firmly grasped and constantly rehearsed. Since they are not induced with empirical certainty, as logical principles are, they can never carry the same degree of conviction, and often weaken in the face of temptation. Second, the will must be absolutely rational, in the sense that it will not admit to anything contrary to the rational judgement based on correct prolepseis. This involves the development of the rational prohairesis, to be discussed in chapter seven. The rational decision is frequently hampered by feelings, or false phantasiai, as logical solutions are not.

Man's freedom lies in making the moral decision in any particular circumstance, that is, in this very application of prolepseis to particulars. We are not free to choose in an arbitrary manner, our own preconceptions; these, as we have seen in stages one and two, were either natural or acquired through learning. In either case they admit of no variation or freedom, except in the extent to which each individual is driven to gain the correct knowledge and systematisation of the prolepseis, and not to be content with mere opinion; this is his own responsibility, and true freedom can never be

attained without this material upon which to base a rational decision. Accordingly, if man accepts the freedom to hang back in his own opinion, he will not have the correct equipment to enjoy true freedom, the key to which is rational will and judgement. But it is essentially at the third stage, the application of the prolepseis, that man's choice admits variety of behaviour, since although reason drives him to a necessary conclusion, reason may be overmastered by a will not fully rational.

The three stages in Epictetus' conception of prolepseis may be compared to coinage. We accept as the general prolepsis, a coin, perhaps a two-shilling piece. We then learn what may be bought with this coin, such as a pint of beer, or two sandwiches, and so on. These are prolepseis in the second sense, with the commodities properly arranged, and with a proper knowledge of their value to us. The third stage is applying the spending of the two shillings to the commodities that are best suited to us as they each occur, and not being tempted to buy the beer when we would be better off with the sandwiches.

3. The Phantasiai.

Next I consider the particular operation of man's reason

necessitated by the phantasiai, images of various kinds, as they occur to the mind. Traditionally for the Stoics, the phantasiai were the causes of action and of knowledge. This doctrine was compatible with their theory of materialistic determinism, arising from the notion that every psychic event has an exterior, or partly exterior cause. When the later Stoics were puzzled by the problem of will and freedom, the term phantasia remained, but its use was extended and modified to embrace those functions which man feels he is doing freely, particularly in making decisions towards good or evil conduct: there can be a phantasia of the good. As a Stoic, Epictetus has to refer all rational activity to some phantasia. But since his interest is more in the moral purpose of man's freedom, he is forced to interpret the notion of phantasiai more flexibly, to include rational will; and in doing so, he explores many of the weaknesses in the early Stoic use of the term, which had already been criticised by the Sceptics who found it logically deficient.

As with other terms, Epictetus gives no systematic definition, and in interpreting his theory and the use of the word, it is best to distinguish four main fields of meaning where he applies the term:

- a. Phantasia and motion (or action).
- b. Phantasia and knowledge.
- c. Phantasia and right conduct.
- d. Phantasia and emotions.

It is the last two of these divisions which represent not so much a departure, but a significant change of emphasis from the earlier Stoic treatment of rational function. Epictetus is concerned with the ethical and human implications of phantasiai, not merely with the scientific cause and effect notion represented by the first two fields.

a. Phantasiai and Motion.

The use of the term phantasia referring to pure cause and effect action in behaviour is seen in Discourse II 8, 1 - 8, where the nature of the good is investigated by comparing animal and human behaviour. In the animal kingdom, phantasiai are the means of experiencing the external world, that is, pure sense data. They are the necessary antecedent of any movement. Animals 'use' external phantasiai in the sense that they act instinctively upon them. This 'use' applies to any organism that has sense perception.²⁵

Animals however, do not possess understanding (παρακολούθησις) of the use of phantasiai. Notice is drawn to this important distinction in II 14, 15.²⁶ The mere use of phantasiai produces action which is not designed towards any end or good save that of, 1. the animal's own survival, and 2. the service of animal to man in the plan of the cosmos. If animals did have παρακολούθησις, they would no longer be subservient, but capable of voluntary action, and would choose to submit or not, and so become man's equal. Not possessing παρακολούθησις animals are classed as ἄλογα, (without reason).

Because man not only needs to perform the strict biological functions of eating, drinking, resting and procreation, but also must achieve each his own ends (τέλη), which is his moral function, he has χρῆσις (use) and παρακολούθησις of phantasiai.²⁷

These passages indicate two things: first, that phantasiai are the stimulus to action from outside, which is instinctive and irrational in animals, but considered and rational in man. In the case of man however, it is not always totally external: it is external to the prohairesis, but not necessarily to the whole of man's psychological functions. Thus whereas in animals the stimulus is purely objective, in

man it is often partially at least, subjective. This is an important point, and discussed further below.

Second, man's additional endowment of παρακελεύθεις has made him an ethical creature, capable of good and evil. One does not speak of the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) in plants and animals.²⁸ The good involves the capacity to choose, and therefore a recognition of a moral end.²⁹ Man is not content to live like animals and act on the unreflected prompting of the phantasiai, but examines each phantasia, so that he might promote the moral and both of himself and of the cosmos.³⁰

b. Phantasiai and Knowledge.

The application of the term phantasia to the theory of knowledge was its most prominent use in the early Stoa.³¹ Although Epictetus was clearly well schooled in this early Stoic doctrine, he regarded the purely epistemological applications as unimportant. Essentially, in basing a theory of cognition on the received phantasiai, a distinction had to be made between true and false phantasiai. In the transition from using phantasia in the theory of knowledge to theories of moral behaviour, this distinction remains.

Epictetus remarks on the use of phantasia in the strict theory of knowledge are not very edifying. He is content to

trust the evidence of the senses, and declares that he is not concerned with the question of how perception arises.³² He ridicules the criticisms of the Stoic theory by the Academy, without seriously grappling with their arguments.³³ We accept the impressions of exactly those things which the eyes reveal to us.³⁴ The attention of the philosopher should be totally devoted to the inner man.

The most serious mention of cognitive theory is in I.28, and again Epictetus uses the evidence of the senses: if a phantasia occurs to us during the day that it is day, this phantasia is true. If the impression comes that it is night, this is false, because it is impossible to feel that it is night and to remove the feeling that it is day. The phantasia that there is an odd number of stars is neither true nor false, and we must withhold assent. Phantasiai are here presented as ideas or hypotheses, which can correctly be distinguished as true or false, provided our rational machinery is in proper working order. It is notable in this passage that Epictetus uses the word feeling ($\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\iota\nu$) for the mental interpretation of the evidence of the senses. Apart from the sense data, there can be no further logical approach to knowledge of such obvious facts, but there is the feeling or inner conviction that the data must be true.

However, reason is more vital in approaching more sophisticated pieces of knowledge, such as mathematical propositions and philosophical dogma.³⁵ When phantasiai occur in these higher constructs of knowledge, that is, as an hypothesis or general statement, it is of first importance to distinguish the true from the false. Since the notion of a false phantasia was the pivot causing Epictetus to adapt the cognition theory to his account moral behaviour, it is apt that he refers specifically on two occasions to the classification of phantasiai. In I 27, 1 - 2, he gives four categories of phantasiai:

1. that something exists and appears to exist.
2. that something does not exist and does not appear to.
3. that something exists but does not appear to.
4. that something does not exist but appears to.

of these, 1 and 2 are true phantasiai, that is, the phantasia truly represents reality; 3 and 4 are false, where the appearance contradicts reality. The awkward concept of a negated phantasia presented by 2 and 3 is characteristic of the precision of earlier Stoic discussion on phantasia and

cognition, but is not important to Epictetus' adaptation. This is shown by their omission from Epictetus' second instance of classification in I 28:

1. the appearance of things as they are.
2. the appearance of things as they are not.

Both discourses quickly pass from the purely epistemological opening to consider human behaviour.

This is the sum of Epictetus' remarks on phantasiai, as a factor in pure cognitive theory. Three stages can be discerned: 1. Animal cognition, where an experience prompts an immediate and necessary reaction. 2. Elementary cognition, which is the perception of the senses, e.g. that it is night. With these two stages, Epictetus at least, is ready to discount the possibility of false phantasiai. 3. Complex cognition, which is the knowledge or verification of general statements or hypotheses. The phantasia is presented to us as a statement or hypothesis, and Epictetus here admits the possibility of false phantasiai. But he never questions the truth of primary objective sense data (he may believe that theoretically there may be problems, but not worthy of priority), and this

important conclusion follows: that the only statements which can be false are those in which there is a subjective element, that is, phantasiai that occur to us through our reasoning capacity - the results of syllogisms and mathematical hypotheses - and not directly from exteriors.³⁶

c. Phantasiai and Moral Behaviour.

Epictetus provides a threefold basis for moral behaviour: phantasiai, prohairesis and logos. The phantasia in the context of moral behaviour (and this is his principal use of the term), is a fancy for a particular course of action. The prohairesis (choice) and logos (reason), working together in the interests of goodness, then decide whether the fancy is to be adopted or rejected. The problem that presents us here is how Epictetus is justified in employing a term meaningful in cognitive theory, to his theory of moral conduct.

I will first consider the ways this kind of phantasia resembles those discussed previously. First, they are similar to the phantasiai received by animals in so far as man in the first instance is prompted to movement and action by phantasiai. This is clearly stated with reference to the Iliad, which is said to be nothing but phantasiai and the use ($\chi\rho\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) of

phantasiai. The action of each of the characters depends upon the phantasiai occurring to them. Examples are given, such as the phantasia to Paris to abduct Helen and the phantasia to Helen to follow him.³⁷ Accordingly the measure of all man's action is the phantasiai, his 'fancies'. As the initial impulse to activity therefore, these phantasiai resemble those occurring to animals. They differ from them in an important aspect: they are not purely objective, but arise most often from an inner disposition reinforced by a particular external.

There is a further difficulty: Epictetus has shown that animals only have use of phantasiai, but man has use and παρακολούθησις, or appreciation of their purpose. When Epictetus speaks of παρακολούθησις φαντασίων, he is not talking of phantasiai in the sense of 'fancies' or suggested courses of action, but rather the pure objectivity of the external world: that man sees the world as it is and understands its purpose. Such knowledge of the external world has a part in deciding behaviour, but only in so far as, a) it contributes to the store of reason or knowledge (see section one), as for instance, prolepseis, from which a judgement is passed on a suggested 'fancy', or b) it forms the actual sense data which instigates the 'fancy'; for instance, I may see a man being put to death, which gives rise to a 'fancy' that I should pity

him, then I oppose this 'fancy' with the 'idea' reaped from education and past experience, that his death in no way affects me. Thus when Epictetus speaks of understanding the phantasiai, he means the interpretation of external phenomena, not the direct knowledge of whether a suggested course of action is right or wrong.

Secondly, those phantasiai resemble the others in being partially subjective. In this aspect, they most closely resemble the third type of cognitive phantasiai, those conveying knowledge of general statements. For this reason I have adopted the translation 'fancy' for phantasiai covering suggested courses of action. They are suggestions for action which seem to arise from a combination of two sources: an inner disposition and an external phenomenon or set of circumstances. Thus Paris' phantasia to abduct Helen arose from both a lustful disposition and the availability of Helen by divine promise. 'Fancy' also has connotations of desire and want, which I believe are true to Epictetus' use of phantasia in this connection. It is used as an impetuous and, as we shall see, often mistaken suggestion to action. It is not used of two carefully weighed alternative actions. There seems no reason why it should not be extended to the considered rational suggestion to action, but Epictetus sees

that the biggest problem in moral behaviour is in overcoming partially irrational suggestions, and so concentrates his teaching on those suggestions which occur from a not totally rational disposition.

Third, these phantasiai again resemble the third type of cognitive phantasia in that they share the possibility of being true or false. It is this point, and the following, which allows Epictetus to make use of the same term for phantasiai of knowledge and phantasiai of actions: phantasia of knowledge, 'ideas', can be rationally proved correct or incorrect, true or false, or we might say, right or wrong. 'Fancies' also can be right or wrong, but in a moral sense. The word 'right' is used in different senses, it would appear to us, in these statements:

It is right that $2 + 2 = 4$. ('right' = logically correct)

It is right that I go to Church this evening.
(right = morally desirable)

The distinction in meaning was not recognised by Epictetus: correct knowledge is good whether it concerns mathematical

statements or moral behaviour.³⁸

There are two philosophic precedents that should lead Epictetus to equate the two kinds of right, or the two kinds of knowledge, first the Socratic dogma that goodness is knowledge, developed in Plato and in some measure by Aristotle, and second, the rational monism of the Stoics which caused them to regard reason as the judge not only of true and false statements, but of good and bad behaviour, and thereby to develop the notion of the practical syllogism.

This leads to the fourth point of resemblance between fancies and ideas: they are both submitted to the criticism and judgement of reason. Consequently, logical arguments are fit preliminary material on which to exercise the reason before presenting it with the more complex problems of behaviour.³⁹ Reason must give assent (συγκατάσθαι) to a phantasia representing a course of action as it does to a phantasia representing a statement of fact. Right action is dependent upon rational thinking, and the appropriate canons of reason must be used. These are not the canons of logic, the true and false, but of duty (τὸ καθήκον), expedience (τὸ συμφέρον) and personal appropriateness (τὸ κατ' ἐμέ).⁴⁰ There is far less definition attached to such factors than to logical principles, such that logic

alone cannot produce goodness, but only logic co-ordinating with the personal moral choice and moral state of prohairesis.

Epictetus is led to adopt this view of moral behaviour since he follows the Stoic doctrine in identifying the good and reason,⁴¹ and can say that just as the soul must necessarily assent to the true, so it is necessarily attracted by the good.⁴² In either case our full rational equipment must be functioning properly, and in the case of judgements on behaviour, this must include correct prohairesis as well as (assent).

On these points of resemblance, Epictetus can use phantasia to cover both suggestions to moral behaviour (fancies), and statements of general fact (ideas), regarding both as suggestions of knowledge which through reason may be judged right or wrong. Whilst, as we have seen, Epictetus in his day had good reason to adopt this view, today we find it more difficult to regard a proposition to action as knowledge of any kind.

If a suggested course of action occurs to me, it comes as a statement of future intent, or as a command, for example: "Go to Church tonight;" "How about going to Church tonight?" The only sense in which we can call such a future possibility true, is if the intent is later fulfilled. For Epictetus it would be true, if it could be shown to be the right action for me

to do tonight. I cannot know from the statement of intent whether in fact there is church-going for me tonight; but from the fancy, I can infer knowledge that:

- a. I can or cannot go to Church tonight.
- b. I ought or ought not to go to Church tonight.
- c. I want or do not want to go to Church tonight.

Analysed in this way, Epictetus' approach is more easily understood. The knowledge of wanting, ought and can is to an extent verifiable. A knowledge of self should determine what is possible for me to do at any moment. This is the $\gamma\nu\omega\theta\iota\ \sigma\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$, given as an important part of the Stoic askesis. A knowledge of moral goodness will determine whether a particular act ought to be done; this is the application of the Stoic prolepseis. The adjustment and refinement of the prohairesis determines whether the will is correct choice or irrational desire; this refinement, producing right will, is the supreme aim of the Stoic askesis.

There is a further point, that in a system of determined rationalism, knowledge of future intent has more meaning than in a non-determined system. If, ideally, the future can be grasped through reason, by co-extension of human

and divine reason,⁴³ than by comparing the fancies against what one 'knows' one must do to conform to the determined divine plan, the fancy can be shown to be true or false; but the rational precognition is essential.

Whatever the philosophical problems underlying Epictetus' terminology are, it is clear that he regarded those phantasiai which I have termed 'fancies' as one of the greatest problems confronting his pupils who seek moral adjustment. He is particularly concerned with the fancies that are false, realising that a fancy is not so easily discarded as a false intellectual idea, since particulars are involved; one's particular willing self and one's particular circumstances must be the basis for the judgement.⁴⁴ Thus strict reason as logic, can only give a probability; reason must co-ordinate with prohairesis as moral goodness to give certainty. Accordingly, the rational defence to the subjective element in the fancy is weaker than in the case of an idea, and the fancy will continue to convince of its correctness. Further the subjective element is bound up with our emotional disposition, not merely with our intellectual side, which is responsible for the ideas.

Recognising these difficulties, Epictetus first examines more closely the subjective nature of the false phantasia

which leads to evil, and finds this to be connected with desires and emotions. This is the subject of my next section. Second, he considers the nature of goodness in the soul as well as reason, finding in the concept of goodness an element of moral choice (prohairesis), trained by education and the prolepseis. I will consider this in chapter seven.

d. Phantasia and emotions.

I consider now those phantasiai of moral behaviour, or 'fancies', which are false, but which temptingly convince of their truth, thus leading man into misconduct. If these phantasiai can be prevented from occurring, or if correct judgement can be given on them when they do occur, then man will not be led into evil. Such is the aim of Epictetus' philosophical training, or askesis, and we can now look more closely at its psychological basis.

It is a characteristic of the false impressions of moral behaviour, that they are accompanied by a forceful temptation to be acted upon. They have πιθάνοτης (persuasiveness),⁴⁵ and make a forceful impression on the mind. It is said to bite (δάκνῃ), and is uncontrollable.⁴⁶ Clearly Epictetus regards such impressions as temptations to

misconduct.

We have already seen that the phantasiai of this class contain both objective and subjective elements, and in the case of the false phantasiai we now find that they can be almost equated with impulse or desire. In several passages, the term 'phantasia' and some word denoting desire, are interchangeable. A striking instance is III 25, 6. Two parallel examples of a fancy are given, one of a girl, φαντασία παιδισκρίου καλοῦ, and one of finding fault with somebody, προθυμία φέξαι τινά. The urge or desire contained in the parallel word, προθυμία, must be contained in the term 'phantasia' as well.⁴⁷ A similar example is in II 18, 8: when you desire money (ἐπιθυμῆσθης ἀργυρίου), you must bring reason to bear on this irrational impulse. In the same sentence, Epictetus speaks of the hegemonikon being roused by the corresponding phantasiai, that is money causing this same desire.

The irrational nature of the phantasiai is best appreciated by considering a fragment of Aulus Gellius, quoting the fifth book of Discourses.⁴⁸ The mind reacts to phantasiai in two stages: as the phantasiai occur, the mind is struck by the very first species or appearance. The word species itself already suggests a subjective reaction. The reaction is irrational: the person grows pale and is beset by all kinds of

emotional feelings (motibus rapidis). The first stage therefore is emotional activity in the mind. The second stage is the rational consideration of the phantasia, in deciding whether it is true or false.⁴⁹

Of interest here is the initial emotional reaction, in that the emotional state cannot be separated from the phantasia. Furthermore, Epictetus says of the first stage that it is involuntary, not only the occurrence of the phantasia, but the emotional reaction also. Now the phantasia here described is different from those which I have equated with desire. In this passage the most natural interpretation of phantasia is to regard the phantasia as the fancy that something is frightful, whereas the tempting phantasiai we are considering, is a fancy that something is desirable. In the former the emotional state is produced by certain irrational instincts, which cannot be voluntarily eradicated. In the latter case, the state is produced by the irrational desiring or appetitive nature of the individual, which can be trained by habit, and in Epictetus' programme of askesis ranks highest in the three fields (τόποι) of moral exercise.⁵⁰ The desire for money if uncontrolled, is seen to bring with it the same order of emotional disturbance as that produced by fear,⁵¹ but its cause, unlike fear, can be

removed, since mainly it lies within the individual.

In a sense, the phantasiai in Epictetus have become a disguise for what Plato might call an irrational part of the soul, for they are the manifestation of our irrational and desiring personality, becoming manifest when a particular external, riches, for example, triggers it into a practical urge. There follows an immediate interaction between phantasia and desire. The phantasiai are already attractive impressions, and made attractive by the immediate reinforcement of desire to an external. Such externally provoked desires have to be eradicated,⁵² or if not eradicated, prevented from being fulfilled in a corresponding action. How is this to be done?

As soon as the desire-phantasia complex is fixed in the mind, (that is the desire activated by a phantasia, becoming desire for a particular), reason becomes active, and by judging or by combatting the phantasia it might eradicate the desire. The effectiveness of the reason depends on the quality of the rational functions and the strength of the phantasia.⁵³

Two ways of dealing with phantasiai are described, as I have suggested, judging or combatting. These are most likely two ways of describing the same thing, the first from a more logical angle, the second more psychological. By judging, is meant the examination of each phantasia by reason, and producing

a δόγμα (decision), true or false. If the phantasia is found not to conform with nature, it is rejected. The prolepseis are to be used as a standard in this rational judgement. This exercise of judging is given prominence in the Discourses.⁵⁴

The method of combatting deals with images. That is, as the fancy presents itself, reason finds a counter argument with which to oppose it. This is the method most commonly referred to when Epictetus is describing his askesis. If you desire one thing, think of the opposite:⁵⁵ equip yourself with the opposite fancy or idea, τὰς ἐναντίας φαντασίας σαυτῷ πρόβαλε.⁵⁶ For instance, to avoid being drawn into too deep an affection for a son as you kiss him, whisper to yourself, "Tomorrow you will die". Providing the initial phantasia is not overpowering, the opposing arguments and phantasiai will defeat the desire.⁵⁷


However, the task of reason is more difficult because the initial phantasia or desire continues to produce anticipatory images. A string of such images is given in II 18, 15 - 18. From the initial desire of a woman arise pictures in the mind of the desired act taking place, with such persuasive clarity⁵⁸ that reason may easily be overcome: I may picture the consequences, τὰ ἐξῆς ἀναξωγραφῶ.⁵⁹ It is noteworthy that Epictetus uses similar terminology to Plato when describing the anticipa-

tory images of pleasure in the Philebus.⁶⁰ If reason does not fight desire immediately, the desire will form further images: τὰ ἐξῆς ἀναπλάσσουσα ὅσα θέλει καὶ ὡς θέλει.⁶¹

The result of the action of reason on the phantasia will be either, a. that the desire is cast out by the δύγμα, or overcome by opposing 'ideas'; or b. that the desire persists against all reason, in which case its object is either gained and a kind of animal satisfaction ensues, or it fails in its object, producing a peevish character even more unbalanced in reason. If the object of desire is gained, the same desire will be aroused again more forcefully as soon as a suitable external impression occurs, unless some rational adjustment is made. If the desire fails in its object, which generally happens with irrationally conceived desires, a state of πάθος (emotion, passion) is induced. These effects are expressed in the accompanying diagram.

_____ πάθος is defined by Epictetus as an emotional state produced by unfulfilled desire, (θέλειν τι καὶ μὴ γίνεσθαι).⁶² It is turbulent desire in which the irrational element is all the stronger and so more easily provoked into the practical urge by the slightest of external stimuli.⁶³ This state of πάθος is well described in II 18. It is compared to a tempest (χειμῶν) which eventually so

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING
THE GROWTH OF πάθη AND THE ACTIVITY OF REASON



225a

weakens the reason that you do not notice you are doing wrong, and causes it to argue even in favour of your wrong-doing (29 - 32). In this state, desire is quickly roused and grows stronger by habit.

On the question of the *πάθη* there was disagreement amongst the earlier Stoics. Posidonius regarded the *πάθη* as the motions of an irrational part of man, recognising a kind of of rational and irrational dualism. Chrysippus and Zeno maintained a rational monism and regarded *πάθη* to be the result of a negation or perversion of reason, (*κίνησις ψυχῆς ἄλογος... τοῦ λόγου διαστροφάι*).⁶⁴ The view of Zeno and Chrysippus fits Epictetus' interpretation of the *πάθη* : they are produced by wrong judgements or by desire' overmastering reason. At the same time, in the foregoing account, I have drawn attention to part of man's constitution which is outside reason, namely in the basic desires that occur as specific phantasiai when stimulated by an exterior, and in the inward desires formed by habit, which Epictetus terms *πάθη* . Epictetus is concerned with rational and irrational processes, both of which are dependent on prohairesis, which is choice exercised through the whole personality towards the correct orientation of desires and reason. In this interpretation of the *πάθη* , is easily seen the closeness of Epictetus'

psychological position to Chrysippus. The single rational hegemonikon of Chrysippus, whereby it was difficult to account for the irrational dispositions, is developed by Epictetus into the single prohairesis, which is more readily adaptable to give account of the desiring and willing functions.

Epictetus twice quotes the example of Medea, as one acting through passion. In II 17, 19, he introduces the example in the context of unfulfilled desire, of desiring something which does not happen. When her desire - of living with her husband - was not fulfilled, she entertained that kind of phantasia as is necessary in such cases,⁶⁵ that is, a phantasia arising from passion. Her next irrational desire is to take vengeance on Jason by killing their children, which is manifestly against her interests, and realising this she utters: 'What do I care', and Epictetus remarks that this is the outbursting (ἐκπύωσις) of a soul of great force.

This would appear to be the stock example of the Stoic πάθη, that the non-fulfilment of a natural desire (to keep her husband), results in an unnatural and utterly irrational passion for revenge. In the stage of πάθος reason is by-passed, and again arguments are mustered to support the desire, as we saw in II, 18.

The same example occurs in I 28, 7 - 9. Epictetus'

commentary here is that Medea's action was more considered, and she had weighed the profitability of gratifying her own passions against the salvation of her children. Thus she is using reason, but based on a false premise of what constitutes that which is profitable. Here Epictetus uses the example not primarily to illustrate $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$, but the importance of having correct principles. In the first example we may say that the $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ was so strong that reason was discarded; in the second, the reasoning faculty and prolepseis were too weak to judge the phantasiai correctly.⁶⁶

The example of Medea might also have been used by the Stoics to illustrate a position of akrasia, that is of falling into wrong through failure to overcome a desire,⁶⁷ and Epictetus does regard the action of Medea as demanding sympathy rather than blame. But this is inconsistent with Medea's considered deliberation on her action, incorrect though it be.

Medea deliberates and does wrong, (according to I 28, not II 17); the thief, quoted in II 26, 2 does likewise.⁶⁸ He believes that thieving is in his own interest, therefore he follows his occupation. This is a false premise, but he assents to the conclusion as a truth. Again Epictetus seems to want to pardon this man for not doing what he wishes, for he wishes to act in his own interest. Again this comes very

near a position of akrasia, and the Platonic doctrine that no one errs willingly, is common in Epictetus; yet in saying that he assents to the conclusion as true (ἐπιπέπειται), this must represent an act of choice, since prohairesis is active in every decision.⁶⁹

Thus Epictetus is a degree less lenient than Aristotle in respect to the person who does wrong by acting either through passion, or without full knowledge of his conduct. If reason is properly trained, there should be no mistake in the premises, or in the application of them; and πάθη can be avoided by not giving way to persuasive phantasiai in the first place, and by adjusting the prohairesis so that the basic desiring impulses are not directed towards exteriors.

In considering the origin of false phantasiai of moral behaviour, I have referred to a desiring capacity directed to externals, which can be instigated to specific desire or fancy at the presentation of a corresponding external stimulus. I have already noted that Epictetus does not hold a bi-partite division of soul into reason and the irrational, as Posidonius attempted to introduce. We are faced then with the problem of including the desiring functions within Epictetus' rational monism. This question will be discussed more fully in chapter seven, under the functions of the prohairesis. For the

prohairesis has a choosing, directive function, and yet is the very centre of our rational being. But already we can notice that Epictetus' concept of desire is wider than desire directed towards exteriors, causing the alluring and persuasive phantasiai. This is warped desire; the correct orientation of the desiring function should be internal.

The soul is not only endowed with reason, to distinguish true and false, but also with desire, to desire good and repel evil: πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρεκτικῶς κινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐκκλιτικῶς.⁷⁰

It is the nature of the soul to feel moved with desire to the good; when the good appears, it attracts the soul to itself.

The reason faculty which we have from God is the faculty of choice and desire δύναμιν τὴν ὀρμητικὴν... καὶ... ὀρεκτικὴν.⁷¹ By discovering the essential good, we feel pleasure in the soul,

(τὴν ψυχικὴν ἡδονήν).⁷²

In the concept of aidos, the feeling of self-respect, which is a principal virtue in Epictetus' teaching, there is a strong element of properly directed emotion, yet we are born with this feeling as part of our constitution as human beings.⁷³

It is interesting to note that aidos was classified amongst the εὐπαθείαι (good-feelings) by the Middle Stoics.⁷⁴

Epictetus is able to appeal to this emotion, since it causes blushing when involved in certain kinds of misconduct. This

feeling of one's moral worth demonstrates the use of emotional states for good ends.⁷⁵

Good πάθη as well as bad were recognised by earlier Stoics: they regarded πάθη as right when controlled by reason:⁷⁶ fear becomes caution (a combination of feelings still vague in Epictetus), and desire (ἐπιθυμία) becomes will (βούλησις). Accordingly, in I 18, Epictetus can say that in all men, good and bad, thought and action start from a single source, namely, τὸ πάθειν , a feeling to assent, to choose and to desire.

If then there is this basic and natural desiring function in man, what should be its object? It should be aimed at acquiring the good for oneself and for the Cosmos, as demanded by reason. It is naturally attracted by such a clear idea of the good, ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ἐναργῆ ,⁷⁷ in the same way as the baser desires are attracted by an external phantasia. The good desires are internally provoked, by our own rational consciousness, and obedience to God. Our wish should be to satisfy ourselves, and to be splendid before God.⁷⁸ It is precisely in this co-ordination of reason and feeling that the concept or prohairesis operates. Just as it is detrimental for an ill-fancy to be reinforced by externally provoked desire, so it is important that feeling or desire should strengthen a good

phantasia or 'idea' produced by our inner reason.

4. Reason as Apospasma.

From considering the human function of reason, I now turn to the Stoic belief that reason in man is a portion (apospasma) of the cosmic or divine reason. This belief is found to persist in Epictetus, but for a somewhat different purpose. In the early Stoa the belief supported a system of materialistic determinism: the cosmic logos pervaded the whole creation by λόγοι σπέρματικοί enlivening each living thing. Man was endowed with a portion of reason itself so that he might work out for himself that good to which end he was designed. A belief so essential to Stoic doctrine cannot be abandoned even by Epictetus, though he is more concerned with moral action and choice in human beings, than with physically determined courses of motion.

It is natural therefore to find Epictetus concentrating on the aspect of freedom contained in the apospasma theory, rather than the aspect of determined cause. We have seen that freedom is an essential attribute of reason, therefore if the gods give a portion of reason to man, there is a sense in which he becomes free.⁷⁹ Discourse I 1, shows how man's freedom is

not in the body, but in his reasoning faculty. The Gods have given us this portion of themselves, and if our full intent is to care for this, we shall never be hindered. There is here an appeal to a religious response: body is clay, reason is pure; the language here is reminiscent of that in Republic X, where Plato depicts the unfettered and naked soul at its separation from the body.⁸⁰ Reason is given by God; it is God, and should therefore be honoured above all.

A similar construction of a Platonic dualism of body and soul is given in I 3, 3. Man is compounded at birth from two elements, the body and reason; we share the former with the animals, and the latter with the gods. Necessarily therefore, reason is the noblest part of man. Epictetus is self assured that it is: his audience need recourse to a mythology to be persuaded.

Both man and God have intelligence and reason, but because reason is limited by the directive forces, of the individual - his desiring function, the reason need not be co-extensive in its aims and actions. Pure reason of necessity must arrive at the same conclusions on given data, but as we have seen,⁸¹ pure reason cannot operate in the practical syllogism, nor in decisions of moral behaviour. Thus where moral actions are concerned reason cannot assume a cosmic

identity, but only an individual identity, being limited by each person's will. Once the desiring faculty longs only to coincide with the purposes of God and the individual, and for nothing external to these, the will, or prohairesis of such a person is fully rational, and his reason does become co-extensive with God's.

That Epictetus does not regard human reason as materially of a kind with cosmic reason, is seen in I 6, 8. Providence is seen as the supreme designer (τεχνιτης), and amongst the many intricate and co-ordinated aspects of creation, is the human intellect. There is no reference here to the seminal concept of creation and the physical partaking of reason in human minds. The Discourse makes two important points: that there is a rational Providence, and that man's reason has a definite part to play in the universal design; but this reason is left independent to fulfil its part.

Accordingly in persuading pupils to adjust their prohairesis, the apospasma belief has great effect, and Epictetus sometimes appeals to this belief with much rhetoric. Because reason to the Stoics contained all that was right and good, Epictetus can effectively, in a sense mythologise the materialistic doctrine, and refer to the logos as God or Zeus, caring little for the physical theory surrounding it,⁸² but

using it to demonstrate the priority of reason in man and the ethical responsibility contained in the apospasma theory.

He can appeal to our sense of shame (οὐκ ἀισχύνη), when we recall that whenever we entertain impure thoughts, God is in fact present within us.⁸³ He even compares reason to a personal deity or guardian angel (δαίμων), who ever accompanies us, and hears and sees everything we do.⁸⁴

There is however an important sense in which Epictetus uses the apospasma theory as more than a pedagogical device. In I 14, the theory is referred to as a binding force between man's reason and the cosmos. In this instance the freedom is not emphasised, but rather the natural responsibility to conform: "Our souls are bound with God and joined together with Him as portions of His being, and their motion is a motion of that which is his own."⁸⁵ The passage is introduced into a discourse which opens by describing the obedience of all objects of creation obeying God's design. Thus the motions of the reasoning faculty, although they are free as the passage later describes, (7 - 8), ought also, if goodness is to be attained, conform to the reason of the Universe.

This passage does not contradict the instances previously referred to, in which freedom and independence were regarded as the essential quality of human reason. Rather, it

reveals the kind of paradox which we shall find to be basic in Epictetus' concept of freedom. The apospasma theory is a mechanism whereby we are bound to be free and bound to be rational to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the orientation of the desiring function; but in our purest aspect, to be attained through education, the freedom of the reason is aimed at precisely the same end as the cosmic reason has designed for each person; Thus in this purest aspect, we are free to be bound by the governance of the universe. This important concept will recur in considering the nature of the hegemonikon in the next section, and in the concept of προαίρεσις, οἷα δεῖ in chapter seven.

5. The Hegemonikon.

Not much need be said on the hegemonikon, or ruling principle, in Epictetus' psychological system, since he transfers the characteristics which the earlier Stoics gave to hegemonikon, to the prohairesis.

In early Stoic thought, the hegemonikon was considered the guiding element in the soul, and there was considerable discussion as to where in the body it was situated. It was regarded as the highest part of the soul (ἀνώτατον), and the rational part, in that it was responsible for the whole of

the activity of the psyche, impressions (phantasiai), assent (συγκατάθεσις) and inclinations (ἔρμῳ).⁸⁶

A phantasia occurring to the mind gave the hegemonikon a certain disposition or tendency. In general, the hegemonikon was a disposition influencing our whole mental activity, and this disposition could be rational to a greater or lesser degree.⁸⁷

Epictetus adopts the word in its general Stoic usage. It is the reason element with which God has endowed man (as apospasma), but with the additional notion of personal directive function. It may be directed towards pure reason which is its ideal state, or to the neglect of reason by the attraction of earthly interests.⁸⁸ The early Stoics gave it many characteristics of soul, as pervading the body and actually moving it, and in Epictetus likewise, it is our desiring disposition either towards the reason whereof it is compounded, or towards the externals of the body. It is the disposition guiding our choice in moral actions, and its best state is fully rational; the purpose of philosophy is to train the hegemonikon in reason.⁸⁹

This is the same as aiming to have the hegemonikon in accord with nature,⁹⁰ for the course of behaviour directed by reason will be the one that conforms to nature, or the design of the cosmic will. The alternative disposition of the hegemonikon is to be warped by neglect and take interest in the cares of

the body and exteriors. In such cases, it is persuaded to make decisions it would not make, apart from its association with body.⁹¹

In these passages, the hegemonikon is seen as a controlling disposition, which through lack of training can have a tendency towards interests of the body, but if its true rational nature is maintained, will tend always towards the right end. We may discern here an infinite regression, in inquiring what controls the state of the hegemonikon, what part of us is free to neglect it or care for it, if it is our highest part. Here the concept of a controlling element in us is carried a stage further by Epictetus, who makes the main characteristic of the controlling element, its power to make a choice, prohairesis; and this fuller term can be fairly substituted in the passages where hegemonikon is mentioned. The interchangeability of the terms is seen most clearly in III 22, which is addressed to the Cynic, and Epictetus consequently uses the older term, hegemonikon, not prohairesis, (33). Yet the main feature of the guiding principle is its freedom (41), and the Cynic must strive to have his hegemonikon purer than the sun. Exactly the same language is used of the functions of prohairesis in IV 11, 5 - 6. The term prohairesis does occur towards the end of III 22 (103), but in the narrower sense of specific choice

and the use of phantasiai, not as the totality of our choosing disposition, which is its fuller meaning in Epictetus.

Here then the hegemonikon becomes closely identified with prohairesis, but elsewhere we may draw the following distinctions between the two terms:

1. The hegemonikon is allied to the idea of a definite disposition upwards towards reason or downwards towards externals.
2. As such, it is considered as an element existing spacially in the individual, rather than a momentary function of the totality of self.
3. Hegemonikon is less connected with personal will, but rather with some physical motion.⁹² In IV 7, 41, the state of the hegemonikon is said to be willed. It is in the state, good or bad according as you will (θέλεις). So the concept of prohairesis now contains and controls, through acts of choice, the guiding tendency of the hegemonikon. Again in II 22, the κυριεῖον (which we may identify with the hegemonikon, but see note 92), follows prohairesis. It is the sum of one's choosing capacity which ultimately decides the state of the hegemonikon. Thus this latter term ceases to have

any useful purpose.

6. Reason and Freedom.

In conclusion to this chapter I consider the aspects of freedom which have been seen to inhere in man's mental activity.

In Epictetus, the cause (αἰτία) for action is not any exterior event, but the internal decision of reason, or will. Achilles did not grieve because Patroclus was dead, but because he wanted to (ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ).⁹³ Δόγματα are the causes of actions, and these in turn are the result of the activity of reason. The external stimulus, the death of Patroclus, produces a phantasia, but the main contribution to the phantasia was the tendency of the desiring personality, and the lack of knowledge of what death is.

The cause of action then lies in the use of reason. The significant characteristic of reason is that it is free. We have seen this freedom in two senses. First, it is free as being independent of the cosmic logos. God has given us reason free as he himself has it. This aspect of freedom has been examined in the apospasma theory. We have reason that is capable of its own logical deductions, and each man's reason

works freely on its own. But in fact the deductions of reason are necessary deductions. In a logical argument, the chain of reason from one step to the next is a necessity. It follows then that reason can both promote and restrict freedom. It promotes it by dissociating from itself anything that is exterior. Exteriors are a hindrance to free activity, and if reason functions purely, it will take no account of them. It restricts freedom in so far as the course of the ideal function of reason is a necessary course, and this is the same necessary course as the course of the cosmic reason. We have seen that reason involves necessary ideas of goodness as prolepseis or ἔννοιαί, that are fixed in reason as the principles of logic are fixed. If reason is the ultimate goodness as well as the ultimate truth, then the absolute principles of goodness are as necessary as the principles of logic. This is seen particularly in the study of the prolepseis.

From this moral concept of reason - reason as goodness - is derived the second aspect of freedom found in reason. This is the freedom for choosing. This freedom is found not in reason as pure logic, but in logic applied to moral behaviour, the practical syllogism, where some concept of decision or attraction towards the good, must be combined with reason, and become one with it. We have noticed two gaps in the mental

processes where this element outside pure logic has to be supplied. The first was in the fitting of the prolepseis which we correctly hold, to any occurring particular. This involves the notion of desire seen in examining the practical syllogism. The second was the subjective factor in the 'fancies', or false phantasiai. These were seen to arise from a wrongly orientated desiring function, and eventually to develop into the turbulent passions (πάθη). These two points in the mental process are really one and the same. The fitting of prolepseis is dependent on the strength of rational thought; and the giving way to passions, on the strength and mis-direction of the desiring function.

The desiring function is not a separate part of man ranged against reason in Epictetus. Desire is an inherent factor in reason when applied to moral behaviour, and if a wrong desire occurs, it is the result of a rational decision, and as the number of wrong desires increases, so the reason is weaker to deal with them. The subjective or desiring activity that produces the false phantasiai and passions, and which causes the prolepseis to be misapplied is itself the result of reason making choices on countless occasions. In each moral decision there is freedom and responsibility, hence Epictetus cannot hold a position of akrasia. But he does devote

his life to training pupils in precisely these two areas: the fitting of the prolepseis and the eradication of bad desires. And here again the application of oneself to these studies is the act of the choosing reason.

We have seen in the concept of the hegemonikon such a controlling factor which is inclined to adopt or reject the pure activity of reason. Epictetus placed the freedom of choice that so guides us, in the hegemonikon. The hegemonikon is our tendency to adopt a correct prolepsis, and a tendency to avoid falling into πάθη; and this tendency is primarily reason, and the natural freedom which accompanies it, as apospasma.

But because of the element of personal will, which Epictetus believes to exist strongly in reason aimed at moral behaviour, the hegemonikon is a sterile concept. Freedom of choice cannot exist in a tendency one way or another, for this involves the same kind of contradiction that was found in apospasma, which always tends to the determined course of reason. The freedom of choice must be sought in the person's entire moral character and self-determination. This character is responsible for decisions involving choice, and so leads to actions. But also the character itself is the result of the accumulation of such decisions. In Epictetus the hegemonikon

is replaced by the concept of prohairesis which is the whole willing and rational personality, and this demands a fuller view of man than simply his rational or mental aspect.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Consequently, Epictetus attempts to regard reason, wherein alone is freedom, as a piece of equipment enabling man to live the good life. If his definitions are imprecise, it is because his scope of reason was wider than the earlier Stoics. There is evidence in the Discourses that Epictetus was aware of a body of teaching on the subject of reason, and the analysis of its function. He refers to certain parts of reason and their proper arrangement. (IV 7 38) Cf. Zeno's elements of reason, $\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\chi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\alpha$ (IV 8 12). But these references are to treatises on logic rather than on general mental functioning, and it is characteristic that Epictetus nowhere expands these elements of logic. Logic was regarded by him as a good training ground, exercising rational power in the truth of language and syllogisms, and distinguishing true from false. But the real task of reason lay in practical behaviour, that is in distinguishing true and false phantasiai in actions.
2. I 1, 1 - 13; II 9, 4 - 9. 'What am I?' asks Epictetus

in IV 6, 34, 'A rational creature (λογικόν εἶμι βῶον).

3. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα ἀπήλλακται τοῦ δύνασθαι παρακολουθεῖν τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ λογικόν βῶον ἀφορμὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀναλογισμὸν τούτων ἀπάντων, ὅτι τε μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κοῖον τι μέρος καὶ ὅτι τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις εἴκειν ἔχει καλῶς. (IV 7,7)
4. II 8, 4 - 8.
5. IV 1, 105; IV 3, 12; I 6, 13 - 22.
6. Ch. III 2.
7. As for instance in IV 8, 6. Generally in Epictetus, there is no clear distinction between ἐννοια and prolepsis. On the earlier distinctions, see Sandbach, Ἐννοια and Prolepsis in Stoic Theory. p. 45.
8. Cf. Aetius' description (SVF II 83. See Ch. III 2.). These passages largely reflect stock teaching of the Stoics, and are used by Epictetus as illustrations.
9. I 22, 1 - 4.

10. IV 10, 14.
11. I 22, 1.
12. I 22, 7. A similar conviction that there is justice and goodness occurs in II 9 5, and I 28 5.
13. I 26, 1 - 2; II 17, 1 - 6.
14. II 11, 7. This alternative reading, φύσει, suggested by Schenkl, (Editio Maior p. 15⁰), though not adopted in his text which retains φύσιν of the MSS, best fits the sense and context. Cf. the 'natural virtues', Ch. VI 5.
15. I 22, 9.
16. On no account should any theory of μιννήσις as appears in Plato's Meno, be understood by the description, ἔμφυτος, still less in φυσική. The vexed question whether the prolepseis are inborn is eased by realising that the whole of reason is the natural state on man. In this sense reason is implanted when we are born men. Therefore with it is

the primary material as presented by prolepseis at stage one, which occurs almost without any conscious reasoning, and the developments from this, using reason, the prolepsis at stage two. Diocles Magnus recognised the first stage of prolepseis (Diogenes Laertius VII 54.) referring to them as 'a natural conception of the characteristics of a thing, (ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου), leading us to search for closer definitions.' The real difficulty lies in the transfer from logical to ethical theory, since moral principles cannot appear to us to inhere in reason, but to the Stoics, who equated goodness and reason, the problem was not acute, and it was natural for them to apply ἔμφυτος to anything that was part of reason. Thus it is difficult to agree with Sandbach, Op. cit. p. 45, that in Epictetus the prolepseis are inborn in a distinctive sense. Epictetus gives no development of his own on the theory, and we should regard the words 'inborn' and 'natural' as indicating a natural tendency by virtue of reason which is ours by nature. See Watson, Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p. 22 - 3.

17. I 22, 4.
18. II 11, 4 - 20.
19. II 11, 19. Cf. IV 1, 41.
20. II 17, 12 - 13. Cf. II 11, 18.
21. I 25, 1 - 6.
22. For example, 'To guard what is your own' (I 25, 4).
23. III 13, 13.
24. I 22, 9. Cf. II 11, 10; II 17, 7 and 14; IV 1, 41.
25. This excludes plants, which according to Epictetus have no sense perception, (II 8, 4). The hierarchy of living things was therefore:
1. Man, with παρακολούθησις and χρήσις of phantasiai.
 2. Animals, with ~~χρήσις~~ of phantasiai.
 3. Plants, with no use of sense data.

26. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις, ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. Cf. I 6, 13.
27. I 6, 13 - 22.
28. II 8, 4 f.
29. I 6, 18 - 22.
30. II 14, 24f. See further the discussion on man and animals, in Ch. VI 1.
31. See Ch. III 2.
32. I 27, 15 f.
33. II 20, 29. In a standard explanation of the Stoic Theory of vision (II 23, 3) in purely physical terms, Epictetus has no cause to mention phantasiai. This suggests that he regards the phantasiai as something more subjective than simply the received sense data.
34. II 7, 11.
35. II 20, 11; III 21, 15.

36. In this connection should be noted Bonhoffer's second category of phantasiai-of-the-unreal (Epiktet und die Stoa, p. 58), that is, 'those to which there is also something in reality corresponding to the phantasiai.' These are termed φάντασμα ψυχῆς (Diogenes Laertius VII 61.). He also notes the subjective element in phantasiai-of-the-real of ethical and aesthetic qualities (p. 157), of which 'the source is the mind itself,' and he traces the tempting phantasiai back to Chrysippus. Primarily however, as Bonhoffer's analysis shows, the main Stoic teaching on phantasiai contributed to a theory of knowledge, not of ethics.
37. I 28, 12.
38. III 20, 1 - 2.
39. I 26, 1; I 28, 1 - 6.
40. I 28, 5.
41. Ch. III 3.
42. III 3, 2 - 3.

43. See Ch. III 3.
44. Aristotle reaches a similar conclusion in his examination of φρονησις in Nic. Eth. VI. See Ch. II 3.
45. II 22, 6; I 27, 2.
46. III 24, 108. The verb, δάκνει, is similarly used of emotional behaviour (pity and sympathy) by Euripides, Electra, 291.
47. It may be argued that the phantasia is of a physical object (the girl), and the προθυμία of an idea. This may account for Epictetus' choice of words in varying what are really synonyms. For clearly the phantasia in the first instance is not the appearance of the girl, but the temptation which must be overcome (ἤττα) of acting immorally towards her.
48. Aulus Gellius XIX 1, 14 - 21, Epict. Fragment 180 (Schweighauser).

49. For the whole passage, cf. Seneca De Ira II 1 - 4, and Ch. IV 3 above.
50. For the τόποι, see Ch. VII 2.
51. II 18, 8 - 9.
52. This does not deny the presence of internally provoked desires, that is, provoked by our consciousness of the good and the divine purpose, which is the reason within us. These are discussed later in this section.
53. In saying this, one is aware that analysis can complicate rather than simplify Epictetus' theory. In making the analysis I have been disregarding the essential unity in Epictetus, - a unity which will become more obvious when the concept of prohairesis is examined. The phantasia is naturally strong if the reason is weak; the external desire arising in the first place because the irrational element was not properly controlled by reason.
54. Cf. II 18, 25; I 27, 3 - 7.

55. III 12, 7 f.
56. III 24, 88. Note the different use of phantasia:
a mental picture based on reason only.
57. Cf. III 24, 110 - 1.
58. Cf. ὀξύτης , II 18, 24.
59. Cf. II 18, 25.
60. Plato, Philebus, 39B et seqq.
61. III 24, 108.
62. I 27, 10; cf. III 2, 3.
63. II 22, 5 - 7.
64. See Vogel III 953d. See Ch. III 3.
65. So I interpret, εἶχε γὰρ ἤν δει φαντασίαν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ εἶ θέλει
τινὶ μὴ προχωρεῖν. Both Oldfather ("She had the proper

conception of what it means for one's wishes not to come true") and Souilhé (Elle eut une représentation exacte de ce qu'est pour quelqu'un l'échec de ses désirs."), take οἶον as oblique interrogative dependent on φαντασίαν, It is far truer to the context in explanation of πάθη, to take both οἶον and ἦν as relatives: 'She had that kind of phantasia which necessarily results in the failing of one's wishes'. Literally: 'She had that kind of phantasia which is necessary, such as that of what one wishes, not coming to pass' - i.e. a false one.

66. It seems that the Medea quotation was used to show the power of passion over reason: if I intend to do evil, I act from passion overmastering thought (βουλευμάτα). In his commentary on I 28, Epictetus does involve Medea in βουλευμάτα. In II 17, he does not; so I conclude that here we have the stock example used for a slightly different purpose.

67. Ch. II 4.

68. Cf. I 18, 3 - 4.

69. Cf. the practical syllogism in Aristotle's discussion of akrasia. Both Seneca and Epictetus similarly observe a general will and a specific will.
70. III 3, 2.
71. I 1, 12.
72. III 7, 7.
73. I 3, 4.
74. Hjmans, Op. cit. p. 27.
75. Fragment 52 (Schweighauser).
76. SVF III 431; 432.
77. III 3, 4.
78. II 18, 19.
79. I, 1, 12.
80. Plato, Republic X 611 C - D.

81. See Ch. II 3 on φρόνησις in Aristotle, and previous section of this chapter.
82. See Ch. VI.
83. II 8, 11 - 14.
84. I 14, 12; see further Ch. VI 3.
85. I 14, 6 (Trans. Oldfather): ἄλλ' αἱ ψυχὰι μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὔσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα αὐτῶν κινήματα ἅτε οἰκείως καὶ συμφυῆς.
86. SVF. II 836.
87. Some Stoics however, identified the hegemonikon only with a rational governing principle. This was the position of Posidonius; see Ch. III 5.
88. IV 7, 40 - 41.
89. I 26, 15.

90. III 9, 11.

91. I 26, 15.

92. It is noteworthy that where Epictetus does want to describe a controlling element which is more the disposition of the whole person's will and interest (prohairesis), he avoids 'hegemonikon' and uses
 τὸ κυριεῦον ἵ: ὅπου γὰρ ἂν τὸ "ἐγὼ" καὶ τὸ
 "ἐμὸν", ἐκεῖ ἀνάγκη ῥέπειν τὸ ζῶον· εἴ ἐν σαρκί,
 ἐκεῖ τὸ κυριεῦον εἶναι· εἴ ἐν προαιρέσει, ἐκεῖ εἶναι.

(II 22, 19.)

This further illustrates the flexibility of Epictetus' terminology, and the falseness of the procedure of discovering an accurate definition of the term in Epictetus. As a philosophic term, hegemonikon was becoming outmoded, and substitute terms are readily supplied.

93. I 27 - 40.

CHAPTER SIX

EPICTETUS: THE CONCEPT OF MAN

1. Man in the Cosmos

This chapter considers man in his wider aspects than just his psychological functions. This we have seen to be necessary for a full appreciation of Epictetus' use of the term prohairesis. There are two sides to the Stoic concept of man: first, the position of mankind in relation to the functioning of the whole universe; second, the proper functioning of each individual according to his personal circumstances and characteristics. These form the first two sections of this chapter. Arising from the first is the question of man's relationship with God, and Epictetus' religious attitude, and from the second, man's responsibility for acquiring knowledge and certain inner virtues.

The basis of man's position in relation to the whole cosmos has already been explained in considering the cosmic logos.¹ From the concept of the rationally determined cosmos, two principles are derived, physis and oikeiosis. Physis, or nature, is the design or plan of reason to which the universe must conform. Whatever reason has determined, that is the

course of nature. Oikeiosis is the response of each of the parts of the universe to follow its own natural course, and preserve the ends for which it was made.² Following this doctrine, Epictetus says that God has made all things in the universe and the universe itself to be free (ἀκώλυτος), and to have their own end (αὐτοτελής), and the parts to serve the needs of the whole.³

In Epictetus' version of the oikeiosis doctrine, the freedom aspect is again significant. The free functioning of the universe referred to here is the independence of each of the parts to achieve its own end. In gaining its end it is never hampered by another part.⁴

This teleological view of nature was applied to animals and plants. Each part of nature is organised to help God's finest work, man. Providence has provided and maintained the animal kingdom for the service of man (ὑπηρεσία).⁵ The corn grows in order to be harvested.⁶ In the lower works of nature, where there is no reason allowing them to make choices, the course of oikeiosis works smoothly and naturally.⁷

Before turning to man's oikeiosis, it is helpful to consider Epictetus' treatment of the Stoic physical theory. References to it are few and brief, which is in itself significant since his view of man is not essentially a physical

one but moral. It is presented most comprehensively in III 24, 9 - 11, and is basically a Heraclitian doctrine of change and decay. There are three points:

1. The universe is a single state from a single substance, (οὐσία μία).
2. There is periodic change: dissolution and regeneration.
3. All things are full of friends⁸ organising their house with respect to each other.

The last is a further reference to the free running of the universe on the principles of oikeiosis. The most significant point however for Epictetus, is the second,⁹ since it is in recognition of this principle that man must not become attached to exteriors. It is applied to human death in the same Discourse:¹⁰ The destruction of the individual is necessary for the generation of the whole universe. It is change rather than destruction. What is now does not become what is not, but what is not now. The individual will lose his identity, but will become something else which the universe

needs.¹¹ From this we may conclude that Epictetus thought the self identity of the individual was meaningful only during the period from birth to death. The moral progress and achievement in man had no significance after death.¹²

A second importance of the passage is that death is used as an example of the various circumstances which man must face.¹³ He should not exercise his will on any external factor over which he has no control, but only on understanding why such a circumstance has befallen him. We have control not over the material process of regeneration, but only over our attitude of mind towards it whenever it affects us. This proper understanding of why death must occur is explained in II 1, 19; it is to 'complete the revolution of the universe.'¹⁴

Epictetus follows earlier Stoics in using the oikeiosis doctrine as a solution to the problem of suffering.¹⁵ Since man is not detached from the survival of the whole cosmos, he may have to undergo hardship for the sake of the whole. Just as the foot, because it is part of the body, must necessarily become dirty through its service to the body, whereas in its best condition as a foot independent of the body it would be clean.¹⁶

Against such a philosophy of the physical universe we must consider what Epictetus thought to be the oikeiosis of

man. If the rest of nature functioned in order to maintain its highest creature and could even be sacrificed to maintain him, to what end is man directed? From Epictetus' remarks about death, the end is not one of maintenance on a purely physical level: it is not merely to 'complete the revolutions', of universal regeneration, and it is indeed difficult to conceive a moral end of such inconsequence.¹⁷ Man's special endowment is reason and his end must make use of this particular distinction. His reason gives him the power of moral choice,¹⁸ therefore man's end is a moral one.

Man cannot exercise the freedom of reason on deciding on any course of action he pleases, and thereby achieve a moral end, since the course of the universe is already physically determined. Instead, his reason comprises a *δύναμις παρακολουθητική* which aims at understanding the changing circumstances of nature. His will may then be brought to accord correctly with the course of nature. His moral end therefore is to have at every moment a correct will. To be in such a state is to enjoy freedom in its most perfect meaning, which is happiness. Repeatedly Epictetus sees man's end as serenity; man's function (*ἔργον*) is to flow with nature (*τὸ εὐροεῖν*) and to be unhampered (*ἀκώλυτον*). God made man to be happy and calm, (*ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσταθεῖν*).¹⁹

As with other animals, man's end is in himself (*αὐτοτελής*), for he should direct his will towards nothing external, but only at understanding and interpreting correctly the course adopted by nature. He does not thereby achieve any physical end that he can call his own, such as children and consulships and the like, albeit he might be given these, but he does achieve happiness from a right attitude towards these as a result of *παρακολύθησις* . His proper end is to adjust his own hegemonikon to nature, that is, to will by understanding what comes to pass.²⁰

Accordingly man is morally self sufficient. All that God has planned him to have to fulfil his part, he has. This is illustrated well in I 9, 5 - 17. Man will not lack the necessities for his life, just as the animals never fail to be provided with whatever is proper for their way of life and function in nature. This independent and self-sufficient contemplation of the universe appears again at III 13, 6 - 8: We should be satisfied in occupying our time in learning the divine governance. Man cannot devote himself to two purposes, externals and his own hegemonikon, since he will be drawn in contrary directions.²¹ Happiness is the result of being satisfied in what is under each man's control, that is, his will to follow nature.²²

Man's oikeiosis as παρακολούθησις has therefore three important aspects:

1. It gives man a closer relationship with God than with the beasts. God as logos designs; man through logos interprets. This affinity between man and God is referred to in I 9, 4; II 5, 26 and II 13, 6 - 7.
2. Man is self sufficient in achieving his ends. For his end, happiness and freedom, depends only on those things which are under his control, namely his will.
3. The function of παρακολούθησις involves decisions of the reason and will. For the essence of interpreting nature is deciding what our attitude towards it should be. The power of understanding (δύναμις παρακολουθητική) is immediately bound up with the power of moral choice (δύναμις προαιρετική). This is seen in II 23, 8 - 15, where the δύναμις προαιρετική is the faculty which oversees everything and

examines its worth.²³

2. Oikeiosis in the Individual.

It is a mark of Epictetus' teaching that he took the, oikeiosis doctrine a stage further than the early Stoics, and following a trend begun by the Fourth Academy,²⁴ traced the importance of oikeiosis in the individual. Accordingly he is much concerned with individual character and personality.

The foregoing section showed how, oikeiosis in general was derived from a teleological view of creation, and that in mankind it consisted in playing the part of a rational spectator, (*θεωρῆς*),²⁵ and, from a rational interpretation, to adjust one's will according to what one perceives to be the will of nature.

Such a view requires some assessment of individual character and circumstances one meets with. For man there is a teleology for each individual, rather than a generic purpose as with cows, to give milk, or corn, to be harvested. Each man must perceive who he is and for what he is born; and to achieve his own ends, he must act in his own particular manner.²⁶ By a correct interpretation of himself and his own surroundings or circumstances, he will more easily be able to align his will

with God's will: lack of such knowledge leads us to make wrong judgements.²⁷

Accordingly Epictetus sets two standards (ἀναφοραί), by which to judge a man's action: one common (κοινή), the other applying to the individual (ἰδίᾳ).²⁸ The common standard is that man must act using his endowment of reason, the generic proprium, in making moral decisions. The individual standard applies to each man's ἐπιτήδευμα , special capacities, and to his prohairesis, his moral character.

With these two words may be connected the notions of dynameis and πρόσωπον . Dynameis are personal endowments enabling each individual to attain his end. This is the personal equipment given by God to achieve his design for each person, and it entails a necessary dove-tailing of capacity and circumstance. Again this emphasises the aspect of self-sufficiency: each man will never lack what he needs to fulfil the role God has assigned to him. If we imagine something is lacking, then we do not heed His guidance.²⁹ This attitude is well put in Fragment 174 (Schweighauser). "If what I have is not sufficient for me, I am sufficient for it and so it too is sufficient for me."³⁰ Just as the heavenly bodies have capacities enabling them to fulfil their cosmic function, so men have the necessary endowments for their individual ends:

if you are the sun, you have the capacity (*παρασκευή*) to encircle the heavens, likewise, if a man has a capacity for leadership, then he should lead an army; this is his natural end and calling.³¹

This principle is frequently applied to Hercules, notably in I 6, and II 16.³² The first of these opens in illustrating the different dynamis in all parts of the creation (1 - 7); man likewise has received dynamis so that he can confidently face any circumstances he meets with. Hercules was the character he was, because of the circumstances of his labours. His courageous character did not go out to seek the circumstances of danger, but the circumstances once met had a character equal to them.³³

Each man can therefore be assured that he has the capacities necessary for his existence, and can be confident that the end he is made for will not be missed. The same idea was expressed by Whitman referring to the soul venturing on the sea of life:

"O daring joy, but safe; are they not all the seas of God?"³⁴

As long as his aim and will is to achieve God's purpose, man will never be out of his depth. In this way each individual

can share in the Cosmic freedom, that is, in the free working of all the parts.³⁵ In the physical sense therefore, all man's needs are given for the physical end to which he was born, and this gives him the freedom contained in his self-sufficiency which is the ability to realise the physical end independently of exteriors.

But man's true end, as we have seen is the moral one: that of understanding nature so that one can adjust the will to accord with nature. The attainment of the moral end rests with the will. Since everything obeys, by necessity, the commands of universal order (*κόσμος*), it is unreasonable, though because of its freedom not impossible, that the only thing which is under man's control, namely his will, should stand against the cosmos. This is because Cosmic reason has deliberated better than we can since it organises all the parts together.³⁶

Because he has the power of will, man is likely to follow his own inclination (*τὸ ἴδιον*) and to direct his will to externals and not to the internal good of following nature.³⁷ The natural and therefore morally right state of the will is to incline to what is better adjusted to secure things in accordance with nature. If the course (*τὰ εἶης*) were known, there should the will be directed. Epictetus regards

individual characteristics as depending primarily on the extent to which this ideal functioning of the will is maintained and conversely, the functioning of the will depends on character.

Because of this freedom of will, essential to man's moral calling, or oikeiosis, Epictetus cannot say that man is provided with dynameis which enable him to have the will functioning as correctly as he needs, since in every person the τέλος is to have perfect will (that is, to be in perfect accord); nor can he say that a man endowed with a weak character will not be required to face such tough circumstances as a man of strong character. To say this would be to deny freedom of the will, and to assert that we exercise will badly because we were made to will badly. It is through our own fault and by means of our own freedom that we fail to will perfectly.

Accordingly, Epictetus has to adjust the notion of dynameis when applied to the moral end of the individual. His capacities take the form of qualities such as courage and magnanimity (ἀνδρεία , μεγαλοψυχία), which were the dynameis of Hercules,³⁸ and also patience (ὑπομενητικός).³⁹ These qualities are not the same as the physical capacities which constantly attend other creatures, or, to use the example of Epictetus, as we have a hand that is always at the ready

to stop the tiresome circumstance of a dripping nose.⁴⁰ The qualities can be developed to a greater or lesser extent; they are dispositions of the mind rather than physical endowments. For this reason, Epictetus stresses the freedom of these dynameis in man. God has given them to us free from restraint (ἀκώλυτον) and under our control (ἐφ' ἑμῶν),⁴¹ and has committed the qualities to ourselves to maintain.⁴²

Epictetus insists however on referring to such qualities or dispositions as δυνάμεις φυσικάι .⁴³ Thus kindness (εὐγνώμον) and faithfulness (πιστόν) are regarded as natural tendencies for a human being, and if a person decides to develop these qualities and not allow them to grow numb (ἀπονενέκρωνται ; 21), his will in respect to each circumstance will be correctly directed. But man is free to develop or neglect these natural qualities.

In this special application of dynameis to man's moral end, can be discerned the second kind of freedom noted in the conclusion to the last chapter, that of choosing to use the capacities, which if we choose to adopt them, will lead us to correct will at each particular occurrence, and so to freedom in the full sense of existing freely in the course of nature's plan. The importance of the notion of dynameis is that the will is dependent on certain character traits which we can

develop. The extent to which courage, faithfulness and self-respect is consciously maintained in the individual, is responsible for him willing in a certain way. And the maintenance of the qualities is in turn an act of choice, part of our freedom, or prohairesis. I will consider further the nature of these particular qualities in the final section of this chapter.

We have seen that there is a tendency for Epictetus to use dynameis in two ways: in dealing with animals and inanimate creation, these are their natural capacities; but in man they are qualities which he can refuse or choose to maintain. There is a similar double use of the term πρόσωπον, and the inconsistency is more pronounced.⁴⁴

The first of these meanings is likely to be a stock usage of the Stoics; the second more characteristic of Epictetus' own teaching. πρόσωπον is used in the first meaning, significantly in the Encheiridion (17) and in a fragment from Arrian's Homilies, which were used for the more mainstream Stoic teaching. Both passages regard man as an actor playing the role to which God has assigned him; man can choose how he plays the role, but the actual πρόσωπον has been determined.⁴⁶

In the Discourses, the metaphor of an actor playing his

part while it lasts, or playing with pieces in a game, are frequently used, but the term πρόσωπον is transferred from the role fixed by God, to the quality of determination with which we desire to fulfil that role. The πρόσωπον enables us to be a good or a poor actor of that role. It thus becomes very close to what we might call strength or weakness of moral character, or moral determination.

There is one Discourse, I 2, where this particular usage of πρόσωπον is more developed than anywhere else. We are told that through lack of education men differ in deciding what is rational, and often the irrational is mistaken for the rational (5 - 6); one factor which determines our decision is character (πρόσωπον, 8); that is, we wear different masks which reflect a difference in attitude towards externals and duties; there is a point at which a man must call off a duty or a friendship in order to preserve his own moral principles, and save his moral determination; in order to attain some external good a man will sacrifice his true moral conviction; some people sacrifice this more easily than others;⁴⁷ this is an essential factor in making decisions;⁴⁸ and must therefore be an aspect of prohairesis. In 33, the identity of πρόσωπον and prohairesis is very close when Epictetus says 'consider at what price you sell your prohairesis.' When

properly trained we know the point to which it is appropriate to undertake a duty (30). The πρόσωπον is an aspect of will characteristic of the individual, determining the point at which a man weakens and is deflected from his moral determination. Like dynamis it is a factor determining moral choice, and can similarly be raised or lowered by our own decisions. These two aspects of personal character will be important in examining the concept of prohairesis.

Soufflé⁴⁹ aptly translates πρόσωπον as "dignité, personelle," moral worth or prestige of the individual, that is, the desire to maintain what we know to be correct moral behaviour. The word bears this same meaning in IV 2, 10:⁵⁰ man cannot devote himself to externals and to his own interests at the same time; if you submit to the temptation of the world, your own interest (prohairesis) is neglected; different characters (πρόσωπα) cannot mix. The same point is illustrated at IV 7, 13: poverty, if experienced by a good 'actor' will be borne patiently. The extent of personal interest in undertaking a duty recurs in III 24, 49: there is a point where a duty is no longer profitable, that is, where one must betray his moral character.

This leads to a consideration of suicide, for often the alternative to doing something that is against one's

interest, is to face death.⁵¹ Epictetus held that suicide was a proper escape when one's moral dignity was in danger, and the phrase, "the door lies open" was common to refer to suicide, if you must face circumstances that force destruction of prohairesis.⁵² Naturally death was considered an escape from the troubles of the world, but Epictetus cannot condone general suicide since we must fulfil the life and bear the toils that God has prepared for us. The signal to depart is always clear.⁵³ Suicide was therefore no easy way out, but a means for the man of high moral worth to maintain what is his own.

3. Man's relationship with God.

In Chapter ~~Four~~, 5, I considered the religious aspect which Stoicism was beginning to assume under the Roman Empire, possibly through the influence of Roman pantheism. This tendency, and the frequent use of religious language in the Discourses, is sufficient reason for the inquiry of this section, to establish whether Epictetus was a religious man, and if so, what was the effect of his religion on his doctrine of freedom.

The evidence for Epictetus being religious lies in his use of certain religious terminology rather than in his doctrines;

this language falls under five heads:

1. God. Very frequently the divine logos is referred to as God by a variety of terms, ὁ Ζεὺς, θεός, τὸ θεῖον ; God is τὸ δαιμόνιον, intelligence (νοῦς), knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος).⁵⁴
This personification of the logos has several aspects:

- a. There is personification of the creative principle; hence Epictetus can speak of a creator who is a master designer.⁵⁵
- b. There is personification of the endowment principle, allowing him to speak of a Giver. He bestows all things, especially reason and dynameis and freedom.⁵⁶
- c. Because we speak of a giver, the notion of praise and thanksgiving makes sense. Such a notion would be awkward without the personification of the logos.⁵⁷
- d. There is personification of the derivative logos, the avospasma : man carried God around

with him, and each person's aim is to perfect God within him; to change from man to God.⁵⁸

- e. There is personification of ultimate purpose. Epictetus can teach that men should follow God's will and be of one mind with Him (ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἡσυχία).⁵⁹ By personifying the logos as ultimate purpose Epictetus thereby identifies ultimate purpose with divine will, thus providing the logos with a divine responsibility, just as human will makes concepts of responsibility and goodness intelligible. The Stoics were confused in identifying reason with goodness,⁶⁰ but once reason is personified, the concept of divine goodness becomes much easier, for by personification the will intrudes into reason. With this too must be connected aspects of fear of punishment in the form of misery if one disobeys God and rewards in the form of happiness if one obeys.

2. Divine communication. Two words used by Epictetus have connotations of divine communication: The first of these,

daimon, occurs only once (I 14, 12) and could be pure metaphor. The context is that man possesses reason as an apospasma of God's reason, and it is apt to refer to this reason as our guide. Thus it may be correct to classify this instance under 1, d above (the personification of the human logos). But the metaphor is forceful, and strongly suggests some kind of personal communication by a guardian spirit, which makes this passage a unique expression in Epictetus of some thing much more common in other Stoics.⁶¹

The same Discourse also contains the second term under this head, συμπάθεια.⁶² Epictetus refers to the 'sympathy' between God and his creation: each feels the influence of heaven (2); our bodies are so bound up with the universe that they share its affections, and our souls must share it to an even greater degree (5).

3. Education. There are instances where religious language is applied to philosophy and teaching. One would approach philosophy with the same reverence as one would approach the mysteries, and treat teachers as priests.⁶³ The human teacher is to be regarded as the voice of God, almost in the fashion of the Old Testament prophets.⁶⁴

4. Purification. Epictetus frequently exhorts his pupils to purify their guiding principle, that is, the reason within them. This is used of the hegemonikon in III 22, 19, and of the soul in IV 11, 5. Here the phrase καθρότης ἐν ψυχῇ is very reminiscent of Socrates description of κάθαρσις in the Phaedo;⁶⁵ the notion of κάθαρσις was closely connected with the mystery religions, and was the final aim of the initiates. The idea of devotion and consecration (καθωσιωμένος) to God's commands is also present.⁶⁶

5. Soul. Although according to strict Stoic doctrine, there is no place for a Platonic concept of soul, Epictetus commonly refers to the highest part of us, the reason, as soul. The phrase quoted above is typical of a number of passages;⁶⁷ our reason is a little soul.⁶⁸

Such is the religious language of the Discourses, and it indicates at least that Epictetus desired his teaching to have religious overtones. Use of religious language is more frequent in Epictetus than in Socrates (Apology, Crito and Phaedo), yet Socrates is generally considered to be the more religious person.

There are good reasons for this: first, it is known

that Epictetus based his system on rational materialism, and religion as presented by Christianity, is opposed to such a basis. But this need not preclude a rational system from being religious in a certain sense. Second, when instances of religious language do occur in Epictetus, they can readily be applied to some factor in his rational system, (as I have indicated above). Third, Epictetus is inconsistent in the terms he adopts, using 'Zeus' or 'God' as he pleases. Fourth, the practice of presenting rhetoric by personification and mythologising was common in the schools of the Roman Empire, and undoubtedly there are instances where Epictetus introduces religious notions as pure myth.⁶⁹ Metaphors from religious language were found to be effective rhetoric, as did the frequent imagery from the battle field when Epictetus refers to the logos as the commander stationing men at their post, and sounding the recall at death.⁷⁰ And yet Socrates uses the same imagery⁷¹ without it detracting from the truth of the religious aspect.

Sound though these reasons are, they are not cogent to the argument. If such language is used only as imagery of material substances and processes, it is surprising that the imagery is employed more frequently than the plain language. God or Zeus appear more frequently than logos; and

purification of the governing principle, as often as perfection or correction (κατόρθωσις). Even allowing for rhetoric, it is unlikely that Epictetus would want to encourage his pupils to seek the guidance of philosophy by affecting their religious instincts if he himself did not react in some sense religiously to the Stoic teaching.

The honesty and sincerity expressed in Epictetus' teaching is everywhere manifest⁷² that he can scarcely be insincere on this important aspect; and if Seneca can accept Stoicism in a religious sense from his experience of Italian Pantheism, then so can Epictetus also from his influence from Pythagoras and Socrates. Rather, as we saw in chapter four, the adaptation of Stoicism to a religious way of life is easily made. Based on rationalism, the religious idea cannot display all the characteristics of a religion like Christianity,⁷³ but may not be far removed from a rational mysticism, such as is found in Buddhism.

The language used by Epictetus is appropriate to a position of rational mysticism in so far as,

a. there is recognition of a transcendent being in the form of God as logos. This Being, in providing for and designing the course of the whole universe, is in every respect higher than any individual being.

b. there is communication between man and the transcendent Being, represented in Epictetus by the terms daimon and συμπάθεια, and generally in the idea of man following God's commands and waiting upon God.⁷⁴

c. man is moved to contemplate himself and God; man's whole purpose is contemplation of God's universe⁷⁵ and of himself.⁷⁶ (II 14, 20) This inner desire for knowledge of God's purposes, and finding Him immanent in all His works,⁷⁷ is typical of the mystic.⁷⁸

d. there is a longing for man to attain to purity, and therefore to oneness with God.⁷⁹

In addition to these particular mystical characteristics, Epictetus presents his Discourses with a religious fervour and conviction throughout, as though he could maintain faith in those parts of the Stoic system which are logically weak.⁸⁰

He has no doubts about the truth of his doctrine, and the attainment of the perfect truth he professes.

If it is right to interpret Epictetus' religious language as the expression of one genuinely experiencing some kind of religious mysticism, how will this affect his doctrine of freedom? There are two aspects: the religious outlook will offer first a certain kind of knowledge, and second, a certain

kind of will, which is necessary for the attainment of the perfect freedom,

The kind of knowledge experienced is intuitive rather than intellectual; through contemplation and self-meditation, it is possible to share in the knowledge of the universe. There can be immediate knowledge of how one should act to comply with God's design, and we may call such knowledge prescience of God's purpose. The reference to a personal ⁸¹ daimon ⁸¹ is important here. It can make man immediately aware when he is acting in error, for it knows better than we do. Like the Socratic daimon, ⁸² it guards us against wrong desire. It is a check on wrong will rather than a stimulus to right will. ⁸³ We can perhaps see it operating in the restraint that Epictetus encourages his pupils to exercise in the three 'areas' (τόποι) of assent, desire and choice; the negative aspects of these (ἀφορμή and ἐκκλίσις) receive considerable attention.

The natural 'sympathy' described in I 14, 1 - 6 is again indicative of an immediate intuition a man can gain from his relationship with God. Our souls, in interpreting the universe should automatically possess the knowledge which is God's. The language is similar to that of Bergson, "Intuition is the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one

places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and therefore inexpressible." And as an example of intuition, Bergson gives self-knowledge⁸⁴ which is prominent in Epictetus.⁸⁵ For the Stoics, the intuitive knowledge thus gained was also intellectual knowledge, because the God who imparts it is pure reason. It may be thought therefore that the religious dimension adds little in the sphere of knowledge. But it does make us aware of the fulness of knowledge, that is, of a rationality of not only the past or present, but also of the immediate future. Hence I refer to this intuition as rational mysticism.⁸⁶ Possession of this kind of knowledge will make the will more readily accord with what it knows to be the course of nature, and so lead to freedom of will in accord with nature.

The religious attitude, however, has a more direct effect on the will, If there is a conviction that a being mightier, more knowledgeable and better than man exists, then the religious man will desire in reverence to approach as near this being as he can, and to obey Him and follow His will, and thereby to find perfect freedom. In the Greek mystics, this desire consisted in attaining the purification of the soul so that freedom could be gained after death. In Epictetus the desire is for the perfecting of the will so that freedom is attained

during life.⁸⁷ Just as the good is immediately attractive to the soul, so the will of God is immediately attractive to the will of man, and he directs his will in harmony. It is only the personification of God which allows the divine reason to be divine will. Thus the process of contemplating becomes akin to desiring the will of God and allowing His will to affect one's own.⁸⁸

Epictetus frequently places together the ideas of freedom and God: wait on God and He shall set you free;⁸⁹ it is by looking to God that we escape bondage⁹⁰ and become free. It is this looking to God, and yearning to understand his works⁹¹ which makes freedom an experience which leads to happiness, because we feel the freedom of following a responsible will, and can express joy (χαίρω)⁹² at doing whatever He wills. The alternative was to follow a theoretical ideal, only possible through the grasp of perfect reason, which was the position of the perfect Sapiens of the mid-Stoa.

4. Knowledge and Education.

An important result of the enquiry into Epictetus' religious position was the possibility of gaining knowledge by mystical communion with the logos. We saw, however, that

the gaining of knowledge was the responsibility of each individual, and the effort towards gaining knowledge is to be made through education.

The kind of knowledge that is important for the attainment of freedom and directing the will to accord with God's, is twofold: first, the knowledge of what the universe is and all its parts, what God is and what man is; second, the inner knowledge of one's own self. There remains however a third point in education, namely the desire to apply and use the knowledge in the right way. I deal with these three points in turn.

The first part of the education, knowledge of the universe, was taught in the philosophic schools: knowledge of God and man, and good and evil;⁹³ knowledge of what is under one's own control is essential for the proper exercise of prohairesis.⁹⁴ There is no need to say more on this aspect of education; it is the learning of the philosophic principles on which the Stoic system is founded, and the normal course was to progress from logic to moral and practical knowledge.⁹⁵

Secondly there is the personal education. This involves knowledge of self in the full sense of knowing your place in the design of the universe. We are free when we know, and do, God's commands.⁹⁶ The true divination is

within us; through self-examination we can divine what is the will of God.⁹⁷ Similarly in III 24, 34, man has to do each act at the bidding of God, if possible divining what he wishes (μαντευόμενον ἂν θέλει). Not only is the knowledge of self necessary for divining the will of God for the individual, but also for discovering where one falls short of God's will. The beginning of philosophy is to understand the state of the governing principle (the hegemonikon).⁹⁸ Once a man understands himself and the reasons for his wrong judgements, he will make improvement.⁹⁹ The Delphic γνῶθι σεαυτόν (know thyself) is common advice in the Discourses.¹⁰⁰

Accurate perception of this personal knowledge and the knowledge of philosophic principles, must continue in the third stage of education. This is the askesis, or training in the moral application of the knowledge. It is this knowledge which is essential in each moral decision, and if it is lacking, a man is still as a child - ignorant,¹⁰¹ and this leads Epictetus to adopt the Socratic dictum, 'No one errs willingly.'¹⁰² This is the knowledge which in its moral application is lacking to most people, as it is to Medea¹⁰³ and the criminal in II 26, 1 - 3.

The application of philosophic principles in each

individual life was the hardest task of education. Knowledge of the principle is not sufficient, since we too easily forget it in the face of temptation. Accordingly the principles have to be rehearsed over and over again, ταῦτα μελετᾶτε.¹⁰⁴

The knowledge must be deliberately practised each time a moral decision is made. Knowledge of terms and definitions (ὀνόματα) is nothing without training in applying them in the affairs of life.¹⁰⁵ We learn the theory first, and afterwards the practice,¹⁰⁶ The constant practice which Epictetus encourages in the application of knowledge is aimed at helping the will, to apply correct knowledge in each instance. This exercise and rehearsal can conveniently be called askesis (Military training): we must labour (ἐκπονῆν) upon our prohairesis and upon our ἀρετή.¹⁰⁷

Another aspect of askesis is the self-examination¹⁰⁸ of our lives, to see how knowledge has been misapplied. We must converse with ourselves (ἑαυτοῖς λαλεῖν);¹⁰⁹ fellow students should discuss with each other the practical situations of their lives.¹¹⁰ The whole exercise given in Discourse III 8, is an example of this self examination.

The whole process of askesis in education is necessary because knowledge of correct moral behaviour involves the desire to do good. Often a person has the knowledge to do good,

but his will is directed to evil. If knowledge is rehearsed frequently enough, the desiring faculty will follow it. Those who have knowledge of the good would know how to love it also (*καὶ φιλεῖν εἰδέειν*);¹¹¹ the knowledge needs to acquire the conviction which can only come from the will (*πείσαι σαυτόν*) and from the whole character of the person himself. We must persuade ourselves to learn and be in earnest about it (*ἐσπούδακας*);¹¹² the will is to be constantly formed on knowledge of the good.

This aspect of education is similar to the habituation solution which Plato adopts in the Laws.¹¹³ Though the methods of habituation differ, the aim in both cases is the training of the will. Hjmans¹¹⁴ compares the askesis with the habituation process of knowledge in Aristotle,¹¹⁵ where *νοῦς* must be habituated to seeing the truth. Aristotle's concept of *φρόνησις* also provides a helpful commentary here. Epictetus sees, as Aristotle, that knowledge in performing actions needs in addition to the objective knowledge of the good, the desire for the good.¹¹⁶ The desire is trained through askesis. By this habituation in knowledge and right actions, the prohairesis is guided to its perfect state of making the right moral decisions and therefore functioning with full freedom. Yet equally important, the process of

habituation itself in Epictetus is only adopted as a result of a decision of the will, and in this aspect prohairesis is anterior to the askesis.

Education then in Epictetus holds two points of significance in respect to freedom. First it provides the objective knowledge of the world, and of our own self, which enables us more easily to adopt a correct course of action in accordance with nature; second, through askesis, it trains the desiring aspect of knowing, which results in the will to adopt this correct course.

5. The Inner Virtues.

In addition to the qualities of character with which man is endowed as dynamis, already considered in section 2, Epictetus refers to certain other qualities or guiding principles of moral virtue. These I now examine, and see how they are the basis of social virtues.

The virtue most commonly mentioned by Epictetus is aidos, the sense of shame, and therefore we may consider it the most essential. It is the moral self respect or sense of feeling one's moral goodness is unimpaired, and to lose it is to depart from one's moral principles. The notion of such

inner virtues preceding social virtues is central in most Stoic teaching, and may be described as the personalisation of all goodness; it is different in kind from the virtues described in the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, even when these approach near to an inner virtue, as for example, in σωφροσύνη (self restraint). With the Stoics the individual found his own standards, and exercised moral goodness in keeping to it.¹¹⁷ This is illustrated well in the concept of πρόσωπον or moral character, (see section 2, above). The notion of inner virtue is also an important aspect of inner freedom. Freedom of the spirit or mind, because it is based on self respect, can be absolute in a way that political freedom can never be.

This virtue (aidos), is the nearest Epictetus comes to a notion of conscience.¹¹⁸ Blushing is recognised as an outward manifestation of a departure from aidos.¹¹⁹ Accordingly aidos becomes a protection against falling in with the opinion of the many. In III 22, 15, the Cynic adopts this protection, and his aidos is the consciousness of preserving his own moral dignity.¹²⁰

Aidos rarely occurs on its own in Epictetus; normally it is coupled with τὸ πιστόν (faithfulness). It is difficult to find the same kind of significance in τὸ πιστόν

as in aidos. Yet because of its proximity to aidos in Epictetus' thought, we should still consider it an inner virtue. For instance, it occurs in IV 9, 17, along with τὸ αἰδέημον and τὸ σώφρον, both inner virtues; yet the natural idea of τὸ πιστόν is faithfulness in upholding a contract to a friend¹²¹ or a wife.¹²² We may interpret it as the respect for others: through our sense of loyalty we have decided to involve ourselves in a duty towards them. It is significant that in the list of virtues ascribed to the deity, πιστός is included but not aidos.¹²³ The inner sense of shame is not needed in the deity, but faithfulness, in that he can be relied upon to guide the universe, is.

Sometimes the string of virtues is increased further: the essential qualities in Achilles¹²⁴ are αἰδέημων, πιστός, φιλόβενος, and κόσμιος, that is, the addition of respect for guests, and decorum or propriety. In III, 3, 9, brotherly love (φιλαδελφία) is added to self respect and faithfulness. In III 14, 13, justice (δικαιοσύνη) is given as a third virtue. In Encheiridion 23, 3, high-mindedness (τὸ μεγαλόφρον) is third.

There seems to be no clear distinction of inner

virtues and virtues towards others. The inner virtues are chiefly ἡ αἰδώς, τὸ σῶφρον and τὸ μεγαλόφρον, the last two really being contained in the concept of, aidos; those directed towards others are τὸ πιστόν, φιλοδελφία, φιλοξενία, δικαιοσύνη and κόσμησις. Epictetus has no need to draw marked distinctions since he sees virtue towards others as extending from the inner virtues. This is illustrated in II 4, 2 - 4, where friendship and political virtues are immediately jeopardised when self-respect and faithfulness are lost.

The inner virtues have two characteristics: they are natural and are maintained by our own decision of will (prohairesis). They are natural in so much as they are characteristic of man and not the beasts.¹²⁵ Man is born to self respect and trust.¹²⁶ These virtues resemble Aristotle's φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί,¹²⁷ in so far as they are capacities which man alone possesses, but which are not given conscious expression unless accompanied by the will to do so. They are an inborn tendency, rather than an actuality.

For as with the dynameis discussed earlier, man is free to maintain or destroy these virtues within him, and they are maintained by the adjustment of the hegemonikon within the individual. It lies within you (ἔσωθεν) to be

shameless and self-respecting and faithful.¹²⁸ They are under our control, and therefore the result of prohairesis, or deliberate choice. Conversely, nothing need be an object of shame to anyone which is not his own doing.¹²⁹ We are responsible for having our prohairesis exhibiting the qualities of self-respect and faith. These inner qualities or virtues provide the basis of prohairesis as moral character, and at the same time are themselves the effect of prohairesis. Because no one can take away these qualities, except ourselves through an act of choice; they are our person, the 'I'. The person becomes worthless if self-respect and the accompanying virtues are neglected. This is illustrated in the case of Paris and Achilles: their fall was the result of loss of aidos.¹³⁰

The social virtues, as we have seen, are already connected with and derived from the inner virtues; nowhere does Epictetus dwell on the nature of individual virtues towards others, but is content to let these follow naturally from the inner virtues which should be our constant attention.¹³¹ The exact manner of dealing with our obligations to fellow men, (the ἀδίαφορα), and of displaying what are normally considered virtues, is dependent on prohairesis and is discussed in Chapter VII.

The object of this chapter has been to show that Epictetus was aware of certain individual character traits which men display in attaining the end for which they were made; and this end is the freedom resulting from willing at each occurrence the design of the logos. These character traits form a kind of central core to each person's function of prohairesis or will, not dissimilar to Aristotle's *ἕξεις*. The individual character is evident in the development of the dynamis, in the *πρόσωπον*, in our extent and success of education through askesis and in the maintenance of the inner virtues; each of these are habituated in that they tend eventually to settle down to a fairly stable standard.¹³²

In each case this standard has resulted from an act of choice operating many times, for each of these traits are part of our freedom. Together they form the directing factor which guides the prohairesis in each particular moral decision, and we see in them a kind of moral personality, or moral character.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Chapter Five, 4.
2. Diogenes Laertius VII 85; cf. Cicero, De Finibus III 16.
3. Epictetus IV 7, 6.
4. IV 7, 27.
5. I 16, 1 - 5; I 6, 18.
6. II 6, 12.
7. In II 6, 12, Epictetus remarks that if crops did possess power of feeling, they would will to be harvested, - just as man should will the course of nature.
8. πάντα δὲ φίλων μεστά, πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν εἶτα καὶ ἀνθρώπων φύσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὠκειωμένων.

9. Cf. Fragment 134 (Schweighauser).
10. 91 f.
11. Death is compared to a going abroad (ἀποδημία), but involving an even greater change, but not to a state of material non-existence: οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ νῦν μὴ ὂν. οὐκ is a correction inserted into the Bodleian MS, and supported by a parallel passage in Marcus Aurelius XI 35. Thus a materialistic or component identity is maintained, but not a personal or composite identity.
12. See further note 87, below.
13. Cf. IV 10, 15 - 16.
14. This physical explanation of death recurs at III 13, 4 - 5 and IV 7, 15.
15. Cf. Ch. III 3 and note 40.
16. II 5, 24 f.

17. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, p. 48 - 50 points to the difficulty the Stoics had in aligning any moral end with their theory of rational determinism, which is nature, (φύσις). The difficulty is only eased by taking full account of the nature of the individual as well as the nature of the universe. The nature of the universe on its own is devoid of any purpose that can be called morally good.
18. See Ch. Five, 3.
19. IV 4, 22; III 24, 3; cf. Aristotle's description of θεωρία , which he regards as man's highest function, (Ch. II 6).
20. IV 4, 43.
21. IV 10, 25.
22. IV 10, 30.
23. [ἡ προαιρετικὴ δύναμις] μόνη ὅξυ βλέπει καὶ τὰς τ' ἄλλας καθορᾶ, πόσου ἐκάστη ἀξία, καὶ αὐτήν.

24. See Chapter III 5.
25. I 6, 20.
26. I 6, 15 - 25.
27. II 6, 14 - 19.
28. III 23, 4 f.
29. III 26, 27 - 8.
30. Trans. Oldfather, II p. 457 Cf. III 13, 13 - 14.
31. III 22, 5 - 8.
32. Cf. also III 22 57 f, and III 26, 32.
33. Cf. I 2, 30. The bull is fitted to his function of protecting the herd by his capacity of fortitude which is his παρσκαυή (and the term here seems identical to dynamis). The dove-tailing of character and circumstance is emphasised here: immediately there is

possession of a particular capacity (*παρασκευή*), there arise the circumstances of having to use it; or immediately the circumstance occurs, the capacity is there to meet it. God has designed both to fit. Since this is an illustration from the animal kingdom, the character and its use is instinctive: the bull has immediate awareness (*συναίσθησις*) of his powers in the circumstances. Man, endowed with *δύναμις παρακαλουθητική* , requires knowledge of himself and the world before he can so act according to character.

34. Whitman, *A Passage to India*, v.255, (1870).

35. See section 1, above.

36. Fragment 136 (Schweighauser).

37. II 6 15.

38. II 16, 41.

39. III 8, 6.

40. I 6, 30; II 16, 13. Epictetus uses this illustration as a parallel to having courage to meet danger. It is only a parallel if courage is properly developed and maintained by an act of choice.
41. I 6, 40.
42. II 8, 22 - 3.
43. IV 5, 14.
44. Epictetus never directly applies the term dynameis to man's natural capacities, only to qualities.
45. Fragment 174 (Schweighauser).
46. σὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ἔστι, τὸ δοθὲν ὑποκρίνασθαι πρόσωπον καλῶς· ἐκλέξασθαι δ' αὐτὸ ἄλλου, Ench. 17.
47. σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὁ σεαυτὸν εἰδῶς κόσου σεαυτὸν πιπράσκεις· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλων πιπράσκουσιν, I 2, 11.
48. ... ταιούτων ἔστι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον· οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν παρὰ τοῖς εἰσθισμένοις αὐτὸ συνεισφέρειν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀνάγκαις.
(I 2, 28)

49. Souilhé, Op. cit, p. 10 f.
50. Cf. the use of _____ in Ench. 33, 1.
51. The references to suicide reflect the tyrannical reigns of the Roman emperors, notably Nero; see Intro. 3. (Ch. 1.)
52. III 8, 6; IV 1, 170 - 1.
53. This teaching on suicide as an escape from moral degradation, is essentially the same as Socrates, Phaedo 62 A - 62 E from which it was probably derived. This, as other parts in the opening sections of the Phaedo, may well reflect Pythagorean convictions.
54. II 8, 2.
55. I 6, 1 - 6; I 14, 1 - 5; II 14, 26.
56. I 5, 34.
57. III 26, 28; IV 1, 108. I 16, 15 - 21.

58. II 19, 27.
59. II 19, 26.
60. Ch. III 3.
61. See Ch. III 5.
62. In De Divinatione Cicero refers to the principle of
συνπάθεια as "coniunctio naturae at quasi
 concentus et consentus." See note in Pease's Commentary,
 at II 34, and also Ch. III 5, above.
63. III 21, 14 - 16.
64. III 1, 37.
65. Plato, Phaedo 67D.
66. II 16, 46.
67. E.g. II 12, 21.
68. Fragment 176 (Schweighauser).

69. For example, Hercules is deemed to be a specially privileged character because he was the son of a God, (Reason); III 26, 29; II 16, 44.
70. III 26, 29, etc.
71. Plato, Apology 28D.
72. Hjmans, Askesis p. 10 - 11.
73. It may be that the attempt made around 1900 to identify certain doctrines of Epictetus with Christian theology and Ethics has caused a reaction to dissociate Epictetus from any religious thought. (See Epilogue, Ch. VIII).
74. ἐκδέξασθε τὸν θεόν , I 9, 16.
75. II 14, 23 f.
76. II 14, 20.
77. πάρεστιν , I 6, 24.
78. ταῦτα δὲ θεάσασθαι καὶ κατανοῆσαι οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσατε; (I 6, 24.);

- Cf. 'Cloud of Unknowing' p. 93: "It is enough that you should be lovingly moved."
79. II 19, 27.
80. See Ch. III.
81. I 14, 14.
82. See Ch. II 6.
83. So Socrates' daimon' never leads him on, but often calls him back.' (Apology, 31D).
84. Russell, Mysticism and Logic p. 17 - 18.
85. E.g. II 14, 21.
86. Henry Vaughan is outstanding amongst the English mystic poets in recognising a very similar logical principle behind nature to that of the Stoics. Through prayer and sympathy there is communication between the principle and mankind, and man can adjust his life accordingly:

Thus all is hurled
 In sacred hymns and order, The great Chime
 And sympathy of nature. Prayer is
 The world in tune,
 A spirit voyce,
 And vocall joyes
 Whose Eccho is heav'ns blisse.

'Morning Watch' from Silex Scintillans, 1654.

87. See below Note 132, p. 311.

88. Cloud of Unknowing P. 93: 'Let this thing deal with you, and lead you as it will, let it be active and you passive.' Thus the author of 'The Cloud' stresses the passivity of man to God's will. Again, because the divine will is also the rational will, Epictetus requires active intellectual effort on man's part, but the intellectual effort is itself occasioned by the desire to know God and to follow him. The 'prior working of God' is already fixed in the rational will.

89. I 9, 16; see note 74, above.

90. II 16, 42.
91. I 6, 24.
92. II 5, 9.
93. II 14, 19.
94. II 13, 5 - 8.
95. I 17, 12. Hjmans has provided a full examination of this aspect of education, Askesis p. 33 - 53.
96. IV 7, 16.
97. ~~ἔχω τὸν μάντιν ἔσω~~, (II 7, 3).
98. I 22, 15.
99. III 4, 4.
100. III 22, 53.
101. II 1, 15.

102. II 22, 37; I 17, 14.
103. οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει : 'she did not know' (II 17, 21).
104. II 1, 29.
105. II 14, 14 - 19.
106. I 26, 8 - 12 and 17 - 18.
107. I 4, 18. Other terms as γυμνάζειν , μελατᾶν , etc., used to express this askesis, are examined by Hjmans, Op. cit. p. 70 - 1.
108. I 26, 18 Cf. Socrates', βίος ἀνεξέταστος (Apology).
109. III 13, 7; cf. IV 4, 26.
110. II 21, 20.
111. II 22, 3.
112. IV 6, 6 - 8.

113. See Ch. II 6. We may compare also the habituation to right thinking commended by Aristotle in Nic. Eth. II. More strictly, however, Epictetus follows Socrates in habituating the exercise of reason, which of its own then leads to knowledge, provided the reason is not warped by tempting desires.
114. Op. cit. p. 63.
115. Metaphysics 993 b 9.
116. See Ch. II 3, and Ch. V 3.
117. It is noteworthy that 'shame' was not unknown to the earlier Greeks as a basis for moral behaviour. Socrates uses αἰσχρός in a similar way in Apology 28D, etc. Thucydides too uses it in Pericles' Funeral speech (Bk. II 40), and it appears frequently in the tragedies. As a popular guide to behaviour it was probably common, but did not find its way into the more specialised ethical studies.
118. See IV 2, and note.

119. III 7, 27; cf. Fragment 52 (Schweighauser). See Hjmans, Op. cit., p. 29.
120. The idea recurs in IV 8, 33.
121. II 22, 30.
122. II 4, 2.
123. II 14, 13.
124. I 28, 23. Cicero in De Officiis lays great stress on decus (τὸ κόσμιον); see Ch. IV 1.
125. I 28, 20.
126. I 3, 4.
127. See Ch. II 3.
128. II 2, 4.
129. III 26, 8.

130. I 28, 19 - 28.

131. (E.g. IV-10, 13. In perfecting the prohairesis it naturally follows that human relationships are not neglected, I 19, 13;

132. (if man) looks after his personal good, he will regularly be contributing to the common interest; cf. Plato, Apology 30B, 36C, and the earlier Stoics.

132. This of course does not preclude the possibility of raising the standard of attaining to a more perfect freedom. This, after all, is the aim of Epictetus' teaching. But before askesis begins, there is already this habituated core of moral dispositions; as the standard of the core is raised, so the particular acts of moral choice will approach the perfect freedom.

87. In I 9, 16, Epictetus has overstepped his religious enthusiasm, following Socrates, and suggests that freedom comes at death, when the soul is freed from the body. There can be no question of life after death being consistent with Stoic teaching at any period: the rational principle at death will return to pure reason and be formed into something else the universe needs, losing all personal identity; free it might be, but in no sense personal. The freedom thus gained at death is

a release from our own responsibility, and in this sense Epictetus must use it here. The true freedom is mentioned later, (17) that the man who waits on God, caring nought for externals, will easily endure.

A second passage which has been noted as indicating a belief in after-life (Hjman, Askesis p.14, and note 1.), is III 5, 7-11 (cf. IV 10, 13, ἐπινοεῖται ἑαυτὸν) where at death Epictetus is anxious God should find him concerned as he ought to be with his inner will and freedom. But the meaning here is not to be perfect at the hour of death so that we may enjoy freedom thereafter, but so that we can satisfy God and ourselves that we have enjoyed the perfect freedom that he affords in this life.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PROHAIRESIS AND FREEDOM1. Prohairesis: a new term.

The purpose of this chapter is to apprehend, in the light of the discussion on Epictetus' concept of mind and purpose of human life, the full significance of the term προαίρεσις in his Discourses, and its importance to his concept of freedom and responsibility.

Not only is prohairesis a key idea in Epictetus' doctrine, but also he is responsible for its introduction into the Stoic vocabulary, and we must ask why. The common meaning of προαίρεσις in the Greek language had been 'choice' or 'preferment',¹ and this meaning continued into later Greek, with little alteration, except that as the concept of will gradually developed, the term can denote choice as a decisive act of will.²

In Aristotle the word assumed a particular technical meaning to describe a stage in the analysis of man's responsibility for his action but to translate the word by choice is still adequate, provided we understand that it refers to

the particular doctrine of choice set out by Aristotle. With him it became a philosophic term in the discussion of ethics, just as πάθος and βούλησις had become. The word played no part in Stoic philosophy until Epictetus,³ since presumably those writers had no need to distinguish between wishing and an act of will, or choice, and found the words βούλομαι, θέλω, ἐπιθυμῶμαι, βούλησις or voluntas adequate for their purposes. When a word was required for the judgement necessary for συγκατάθεσις, κρίσις was used in place of Epictetus' προαίρεσις. For the judgement which led to knowledge was not immediately associated with the choosing faculty displayed by the will of a person.

In their doctrine of virtue the Stoics had emphasized the distinction between τὰ ἐφ' ἑμῶν and τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἑμῶν, and in the Middle Stoa these became τὰ προαιρετικά and τὰ ἀπροαιρέτα. When these terms were fashionable, it was quite natural for Epictetus to bring back into ethical doctrine the noun, προαίρεσις, with which these adjectives were associated, prohairesis being the faculty we can exercise on τὰ προαιρετικά,⁴ of choosing things which are able to be chosen. Epictetus' use of the term must be considered therefore against this threefold background:

1. as 'choice' in current language. 2. the special philosophic application by Aristotle, 3. its connection with the Stoic adjectives.

It can by no means be certain that Epictetus was the first to adopt the term into common Stoic vocabulary. Certain Discourses give strong indications that the term was generally accepted and bore a distinct meaning in the programme of Epictetus' school. The occurrence of *προαίρεσις* in the opening of Discourse II 16 and I 29, suggests that *προαίρεσις* was contained in a form of catechism used by the school: "Where is the good? - In prohairesis". The freedom aspect of the prohairesis is also a concept in which the pupils are well schooled, as is shown in the opening of II 15.⁵ Whilst these passages assume a regular familiarity with the term, it must be remembered that the discourses were additional sermons on the main body of teaching expounded at lectures, and a systematic analysis of the term might have been given there.

Whether or not Epictetus is original in adopting the term, in his writing, *προαίρεσις* undergoes a development for which he was almost certainly responsible. This development of the term is best considered as extending from its connection with the Stoic divisions *προαιρετικά* and *ἀπροαιρετά*,

as adjectives. The widespread use of these terms in Epictetus' school may be noted from Discourses III 3 and III 7.

Occasionally however, a noun construction is adopted, as in III 10, 18: there is no good or evil ἔξω τῆς προαιρέσεως ; the phrase bears the same meaning as ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις.⁶ Similarly, ἐν προαιρέσει is used⁷ in place of the frequent ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικῶς.⁸

The converse also occurs, and sometimes προαιρετική is used with the article, where we would expect προαίρεσις. For instance, in II 23, 27, the faculty of speech (ἡ φραστική) is contrasted with the prohairesis (ἡ προαιρετική), yet previously, in 19 of the same Discourse, προαίρεσις, the noun, was used with ἡ φραστική.⁹ Another illustration of this interchangeability of noun and adjective is in I 17, 23. Here τὸ προαιρετικόν is used for προαίρεσις in what I believe to be another catechismal use of προαίρεσις, that it is free and unrestrained. Normally, προαίρεσις the noun, is used for this catechism, as in I 12, 9.

On such evidence as this, I believe that Epictetus adopted his term from the adjective, and if so, this would offer a clue to the use he first put it to, namely the faculty that makes the choice, or the actual act of choosing. In most instances of the term, the idea of adopting a free decision on phantasiai is present; thus it is to do with

συγκατάθεσις, but emphasising the free aspect of this process. προαίρεσις gives συγκατάθεσις this additional meaning of personal responsibility or choice, and then immediately it becomes a moral function, or rather, the only moral function, being the act which is responsible for man's good and evil. Here Epictetus meets the Aristotelian sense of προαίρεσις, namely, that point in the chain of events leading to an action where the person takes on the responsibility of the action, by bringing the ἀρχή within himself. The one instance of the verb προαιρέσθαι in Epictetus, bears out this affinity with Aristotle. In II 23, 43, προαιρή is used as a decision taken freely during the course of a general aim or purpose (τὸ προκείμενον); as in Aristotle, each prohairesis is a stage in approaching a general wish (βούλησις). The general purpose is to follow Zeus. In Epictetus the prohairesis adopted is one counter to this purpose, occasioned by attractive externals, namely to be content and make the choice (προαιρή), to stop half-way.

This leads to the special Stoic use of prohairesis as the means of achieving the recognised freedom from fears and anxieties. Man's good, that is, his freedom, depends on a certain kind of prohairesis (ποιὰ προαίρεσις).¹⁰

Choice must not only be free, but in accordance with nature, or necessary choice (προαίρεσις δία βεῖ).¹¹ The paradox contained in this phrase is examined in the following section. Here I wish only to show how the noun, once adopted for choice in making a decision, is readily turned to the moral attitude of acceptance, characteristic of the Stoic ethic.

Whilst it is attractive to consider that Epictetus adopted the noun προαίρεσις as a term on which his theory of freedom must depend since the term is so characteristic of his writing, there are nevertheless a number of discourses where freedom is the central subject, and yet which do not employ the noun προαίρεσις . Most notable amongst these is IV 1, which is often quoted as being the fullest account of the Stoic freedom that is extant in any writer. There is constant reference here to τὰ προαιρετικά and τὰ ἀπροαιρέτα and to choice (ὄρμη), desire and assent (συγκατάθεσις) belonging to τὰ προαιρετικά, but no separate faculty or function is referred to, embracing τὰ προαιρετικά . Another discourse of similar proportions III 24, which is centered on the character of the inner man, has no mention of prohairesis.¹² Accordingly, although the phrase προαίρεσις δία βεῖ is useful as an approach to

the Stoic position of choosing a course in accordance with nature, it must not be thought of as containing something which is essential to the Stoic freedom, and which cannot be expressed in other language.

However, the discourses just mentioned give an account of the Stoic freedom as it was traditionally understood. Their very length and abundance of illustration indicate the use of stock material for a standard, lucid account of this important aspect of the Stoic ethic. The factor which necessitated Epictetus' adoption of the term must be found in a fuller meaning in which the term is used in a number of discourses, - a meaning which hitherto had not been embraced by a single term, because the standard description of Stoic freedom had not developed thus far.

This further stage in the development of the theory in Epictetus is seen where prohairesis becomes the essence of the individual, or the individual will making choices. This could not be embraced by the technical Stoic κρίσις, συγκατάθεσις or βούλησις, for these terms are too theoretical and static, lacking the organic concept of choice in Epictetus, where the whole personality combines in being responsible for moral choice. προαίρεσις was probably first adopted as the act of choice, from the

adjectives, as noted above, but then came to refer to the whole moral character of a man. Thus translators of Epictetus, finding 'choice' an inadequate rendering, have variously supplied 'freedom of choice', 'personal freedom', 'moral character' and 'personne morale'.¹³

Two factors may have caused Epictetus to bring out this fuller meaning of the term. The first was the growing interest in man's inner personality. This trend in Stoicism was stressed in earlier chapters.¹⁴ We have noted that in III 24, there is no occurrence of *προαίρεσις*. There is however a very strong emphasis on the conduct and disposition of the inner man; the example of Odysseus is quoted¹⁵ as one who, because of a certain inner disposition, can maintain his freedom and happiness. From this disposition is derived his goodness.

The second factor is the inherent notion of responsibility in *προαίρεσις* applied to choice. As mentioned above, this was an idea present in Aristotle's use of the term. Prohairesis, as man's responsibility, results in good or bad acts; and soon it is not so much the individual acts of choice which become the centre of responsibility, but the whole of a man's character which in turn accounts for his particular choices. Goodness of character therefore

may be traced to prohairesis, and because of the concentration on inner personality, the term προαίρεσις was ready to fill the deficiency of a term here. Thus prohairesis becomes the essential 'I' of a person.

A number of passages illustrate well this transition of meaning from 'choice' to 'moral character'. In II 23, the noun is avoided in the early part of the discourse (5-29), and ἡ προαιρετικὴ δύναμις is adopted for the faculty that chooses or makes a decision on each act. But at the end of the discourse, when this faculty has been shown to be the highest we possess, we are exhorted to purify the prohairesis, that is, our whole character. A further example is II 10, where at 27, προαίρεσις is used as the power of free choice, and in 29, as our choosing personality dependent on moral virtues.¹⁶

If the conjectures made above are correct, the term prohairesis saw considerable development in the work of Epictetus. For by embracing the notion of the essential 'I', the part of man that is not mere flesh and bones (σάρξ),¹⁷ with the choosing faculty, under a single term, he has made an important contribution to a concept of will, which philosophy was hitherto lacking, in any single term. The willing personality as the essence and source of goodness,

was a development in Epictetus, and the term προαίρεσις enabled him to make this advance, and to give a more positive interpretation of freedom than was traditionally adopted by the Stoics. To reach a full understanding of the term, we must examine separately the function of prohairesis in its narrow application in making a decision, and its function in moral character, displayed as a fuller and further stage of its application.¹⁸

2. The function of Prohairesis in decision.

The function of prohairesis in making decisions, or moral choice, rests upon distinguishing things in our power and things not in our power. Most basically, there is a choice in the use of phantasiai but not in their actual occurrence.¹⁹

Three similes are given in II 5, illustrating well this difference: in the fall of dice, the way it falls is indifferent (ἄδιάφορος), but what move we make from it is ours by choice, (προαιρετικόν). On a voyage, certain things are in our power, such as the selection of crew and a day for sailing, whilst other things, like our safety in bad weather are ἄπροαιρέτα , outside our

field of choice; the decisions are in the hands of the helmsman. Finally, in a game of ball, the ball itself is indifferent, but the throwing and catching is our concern. To have the ball taken from us is outside our power.²⁰

Accordingly, life itself (τὸ ζῆν), is indifferent, but not the use we make of it. What befalls us, namely the future, is ἀπροαιρέτων, not for our decision; but we must exercise decision in making natural use of every outcome.²¹

More specifically Epictetus confines the function of prohairesis to three fields (τόποι). These are clearly set out in III 2, and frequently referred to:²²

1. ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις : desires and aversions.
2. ὁ περὶ τὰς ὀρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς : (choices and refusals, in the specific sphere of duties, and relationships with others.
3. ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις : the consent of the mind and will.

In two instances, II 13, 8 - 9, and I 21, 2, ἐπιβολή (design) and πρόθεσις (purpose) are added to the three above.

These should be included under field 3, being probably technical terms in the logical process of assent to syllogisms.²³ These fields held an important place in Epictetus' educational system, and he doubtless divided them to divide up his askesis programme.

It has been recognised by two commentators, Oldfather and More,²⁴ that this is the one original contribution of Epictetus to Stoicism. But the division of three fields does not really have any significance in Epictetus apart from being a convenient division of school studies, and he may have been the first to apply the τόποι in this way. But there is evidence in the Discourses themselves that there existed separate treatises, for example, on duties, indicating the separate field ἔργα, and on passions, indicating ὁρέξεις, and no doubt also on συγκατάθεσις, a branch of the highly organised subject of logic.²⁵ With such text-books in existence, it requires little originality for a headmaster to organise them into separate fields of study. If there is originality in Epictetus, it must be found in less specific items. However, whilst philosophically the division bears little significance, it may ~~nevertheless~~ be conveniently adopted in the present study to examine more closely the operation of prohairesis.

Before embarking upon this, it is best to assemble the characteristics of prohairesis which Epictetus directly assigns to it:

1. Prohairesis is free. There are three aspects of the freedom of prohairesis.

a. It is free from the cosmic determinism of the universe. God has put prohairesis under our control, and given it to us as he had it himself, - free. Not even God can overmaster it.²⁶ We are set free by God,

ἡλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ .²⁷ Thus in the extent of τὰ προαιρετικά, man has the same freedom of choice as God has in his planning of the cosmos.

b. It need not be hindered by anything external to itself. Its freedom is rather hindered in the choice of an attitude towards an external, for example, of covetousness; this choice will limit its freedom. Therefore Epictetus can say that one prohairesis compels a second prohairesis.²⁸ Self satisfaction will perfect the prohairesis; accordingly, as soon as we entertain an external desire, the correct

state of the prohairesis is destroyed.²⁹

The possibility of prohairesis having the freedom to destroy itself and lose its freedom is important in Epictetus' doctrine.

- c. Following from (b), the prohairesis is able to remain unchanged and unaffected by changes of circumstance.³⁰

2. Prohairesis is the only good and only evil.

It is natural in any ethical system to place goodness in that part of man's action where he makes a free decision and therefore has personal responsibility. This was a guiding principle in Aristotle's Ethics. Accordingly, anything done ἐκ προαιρέσεως can be judged good or bad. In III 2, 19, this is clearly put: Man's good and evil is in prohairesis;³¹ the essence of the good is in having a prohairesis directed in a certain way.³²

3. The prohairesis is essentially rational.

It is implicit from (1) above, that prohairesis is essentially a rational function, since it is the gift of God. Its main concern is rational, - to make decisions (δύματα), and it has the characteristics of the rational hegemonikon discussed in chapter five; a rational hegemonikon should be maintained against the ἀπροαιρέτα.³³ The hegemonikon must be brought into conformity with nature, and thereby be fully

rational; this is to correct the prohairesis.³⁴

I say essentially rational, because it is clear that its best choice is to choose what reason dictates. Yet it is significant that Epictetus does not directly connect the prohairesis with logos, as he does the hegemonikon. For prohairesis, as will and choice, is really outside the rational/irrational characteristics: it is more a concept of desire, not in an irrational sense, but just as ὀρεκτικὴ. But because the Stoic rational monism was so strong, this essential human power of will, to which we can meaningfully apply the 'I', could have no good unless it was considered naturally rational.

Whether or not there is a flaw here in Epictetus' thought, this very fact led him to the important concept of his theory of freedom: that freedom is exercised only through rational choice, thus ideally it is a necessary course. For it is the same necessary logos that promotes both the action of the universe and the action of man; but the individual can adopt this course freely through man's free gift of logos.

His action is then good in two senses: first, because the choice has followed reason, which always promotes the good state of the universe, and second, because the act was personalised by the operation of the individual's freedom, or area of responsibility: the ἀρχή was in him.

Such are the characteristics which Epictetus directly applies to prohairesis, and I now turn to consider its functioning in the three fields of study, taking first, συγκαταθεσις.

συγκατάθεσις occurs in the making of a judgement (κρίσις), or providing a decision (δόγμα) on any given set of circumstances presented as phantasiai. From what has been said above, and in chapter five, if the judgement is to be correct and the decision good, it must be reasonable; and if reasonable, must follow nature. All our actions, thoughts and attitudes, result from δόγματα . **συγκατάθεσις** is the logical assent to a certain action or attitude, resulting from reasoned will (prohairesis) to follow nature. Prohairesis here, as in Aristotle,³⁵ is the orektic factor involved in making the decision ours, and therefore a free decision, or exercise of free will. Further, if the orektic factor is reason-directed, the decision will be good and lead to freedom from the tension and anxiety that occurs when will runs counter to circumstances; this is εὐροια . Hence Epictetus can produce the remarkable phrase, προαίρεσις οἷα δεῖ ,³⁶ which epitomises the paradox here involved, but resolved by the concept of rational will: that free choice if it is to be correct, is necessarily determined by the logos in the universe and the logos in man, which in Epictetus' philosophy is inseparable from will. Thus Epictetus says 'There is one whom I obey - God, and after Him, myself, and God has entrusted me to myself.'³⁷ We must understand nature's will, and we are free

if we conform to Zeus' governance.³⁸ Freedom must be disciplined as other arts; it is not haphazard will, *ὡς ἔτυχεν βούλεσθαι*³⁹ but reasoned desire of what is ordained. As for the Christian, so in Epictetus' freedom, service is an important factor: we are to be free in service, *ὡς ἐλεύθερος, ὡς ὑπηρέτης*.⁴⁰

The objection will be raised that Epictetus is advocating nothing more than the acceptance of the course of events which is the will of God, or resignation to fate: of waiting to see what happens and forcing your will to agree that this is what you wanted. It cannot be denied that in a number of passages, Epictetus does appear to preach such willing acceptance: desire each thing as it happens (*θέλειν ὡς γίγνεται*), and keep your will in harmony; God's will is better than my own, therefore I am willingly a servant; follow events, don't lead them; willingly accept necessity.⁴¹

These passages point to an acceptance of an event, even though it has not already been willed, in the full sense of being rationally grasped by the individual as a necessary event in his life and in the development of the cosmos. In these instances, the prohairesis simply accepts (agrees to) willingly whatever occurs, trusting in the superiority of the will and reason of God to his own. Though in a sense

this denies freedom of choice (for the individual reason has not yet chosen the acceptance), it still brings about the more desirable kind of freedom which the Stoics sought, namely freedom from disturbance of passion and fear.⁴² As we will discover, the full concept of freedom in Epictetus involves more than this, and though he might advocate this as a means to an end in certain practical cases, theoretically the notion of *συγκατάθεσις* must involve, as explained in chapter five, the use of reason to ascertain God's will, and in addition there is the possibility of a religious kind of intuition; knowledge at any rate is essential.

The two remaining fields of study, choice and desire, recoil again upon *συγκατάθεσις*, since every inclination and every desire must be submitted to the rational judgement of *συγκατάθεσις*. The field of choice (*δρμη*) was an inclination towards duty or moral obligation, and therefore really a technical Stoic division of desire, - the desire to help a fellow, or society. The advice on *δρμαι* is given in Encheiridion 2, 2: "Employ inclinations towards duties lightly and in a relaxed manner". Generally the feeling is in Epictetus that *δρμη* is a slightly more allowable kind of desire than *δρεξις*.

In order that desire can be included at all in the three fields, it must be restricted to things in our power, and therefore able to be chosen (τὰ προαιρετικά), since freedom only operates in these fields. This clearly dispenses with covetous desires which are directed at externals, wanting something we have not got. There should be no turbulent passion or obvious irrationality about such desires. As long as the object of desire is external, it must be discounted as contrary to the interests of the will and freedom. In the free man, desires as we understand the term, an outreaching to externals, are denied. This very denial then promotes freedom rather than restricts it, since covetous desires, once allowed, are strongly determined by externals, over which we have no control, and they will probably never be satisfied, and result in an emotional state.⁴³ Desires must therefore be restricted to where they can be satisfied, that is, to the προαιρετικά, things we have control over: ὄρεξις, ὁρμή and συγκατάθεσις.⁴⁴

This position at once reveals the circular argument, or the 'Stoic Wheel' propounded by More,⁴⁵ which critics have indicated to deny the validity of Epictetus' freedom of will. One thing is assured, that free will can only be meaningful with regards to the inner man; but so long as

Epictetus prescribes only an inner freedom (and he always regards this far more highly than any other form of freedom), this is no charge against free will. Wish and desire cannot in Epictetus be a drive towards activity, but inwardly they can be a drive to thought and attitude.

Having reduced the objects of desire to desire (ὄρεξις and ὀρμή) and consent (συγκατάθεσις), the only meaningful object of desire must be συγκατάθεσις . Thus our orektic faculty is to be used in the adoption of assent through prohairesis, and we conclude that Epictetus, like Aristotle,⁴⁶ allowed rationally directed emotions in his concept of prohairesis: to will is to feel rationally.

Desire then is for good,⁴⁷ and provided desire accompanies reason and vice-versa, its objects will always be attained, and there will be no danger of falling into passions.⁴⁸ Attention has already been drawn to this double action of desire and reason in Epictetus, especially in Chapter Six, in the acquisition of right knowledge, and the maintenance of the inner virtues and dynameis, and also in the more general desire for the good examined in Chapter Five. This is seen particularly in III 7, 27 - 8: pleasure (ἡδονή) should be reserved to arouse our desire or earnestness (προθυμία) to do the will of nature. In IV 7, 20, συνορμῶ and συναρέγομαι (following God in choice and desire) occur as

revealing additions to the more common ὁμογνωμονῶν
(being of the same mind or reason, II 16, 42; II 19, 26.)

Two passages, I 4, 1 and Encheiridion 2, show that desires should be deferred till the early training in philosophy is complete. This is consistent with the earlier training being in logic, where reason alone can reach συγκατάθεσις, and only later is training given in practical moral behaviour, where συγκατάθεσις needs reason plus the desiring faculty. When desiring is later allowed, it should accompany reason. In observing this order in his educational programme, a degree of habituation is seen in Epictetus' approach to character training.

In the act of moral choice, desire and reason are bound together in the formation of knowledge, in the maintenance of a virtuous character, and in the particular act of making a judgement on the basis of this acquired core of character. Decisions are the outcome of the free activity of the will in reason and desire. These decisions of the prohairesis cannot be aimed at action, since this would immediately involve desire for externals or for an object involving externals. So that ultimately, all we can have control over is the willing activity of the prohairesis,

not physical activity. We can control by decision our inner disposition or attitude to an event, and therefore our emotions. Examples are given in I 2, 21 - 4:⁴⁹ You decide to put me to death; I decide to die without a tremor. There is a correct attitude in suffering which we can choose to adopt.⁵⁰ Good can be derived from ill-fortune by displaying the correct character; disease and all ills can be turned into something blessed, making one happy.⁵¹ II 16, 16, affords a good comparison with Aristotle: our concern should be with our own action which we alone can control, that is, the decision how we do something, not with getting something; concern for the plan itself (*βουλευόμενος αὐτῆς τῆς βουλῆς*), and not for what one is planning, which involves externals and the accompanying dejection about our proposed actions.

A particular result of concern with attitude not action, is the eradication of fears, since fear is the result of not knowing what is under one's control, and of applying will to avoid things under the control of others.⁵² Death is not fearful, but the fear of death is.⁵³ A right attitude to events removes fear.

Again this appears a weak negative position for a moral philosopher to hold, and raises the question whether

freedom and action are compatible. There are two points: first, the restriction of behaviour to attitude is consistent with Epictetus' concept of the moral end being *παρακολούθησις*: the end is not achievement in action but in understanding. His whole ethic is internally directed and external actions are important only in so far as they result from internal perfection of the prohairesis and freedom. If an action cannot be attained it is to be called off in favour of maintaining freedom.

Second, freedom can never be used unreservedly of actions. There are circumstances under which we are not free to act, or even to execute and act which we may have calculated to be quite in our power. We are free to will the use of our bodies in pursuance of action, but even this will is likely to involve externals, and freedom may be unexpectedly curtailed by paralysis or loss of sight. And even if we can calculate the possibilities of achieving an action, we do not free ourselves from fear or anxieties that there may be trouble.

Epictetus has chosen a philosophy of freedom not of action. Aristotle, with his more practical thought has compromised and proved his usefulness as a moral philosopher. Epictetus has idealised, recognising freedom in typical Stoic

fashion as a quality which loses its value and is immediately destroyed when any possibility of restriction is put upon it; just as the wise man becomes a fool if he deflects ever so slightly from right reason.

In summary, prohairesis in moral decisions functions through reason and desire, mutually employed and directed from a basic core of knowledge and character qualities to effect συγκατάθεσις, which if reason and desire are both right, will be the rational and willed assent to adopt a certain attitude to external circumstances. This will free the mind from fear and other emotional disturbances, which arise when the will runs counter to circumstances.

3. The Function of Prohairesis in Moral Character.

I turn now to the important change of meaning of prohairesis displayed in some discourses, where prohairesis has come to mean the entire moral character of a man. That is, it functions not only in performing each particular act of moral choice, but in forming the essential being of a man as a good or bad character, and as a free individual. Whether fully perfected or not, the prohairesis forms the self-identity of each person. Without prohairesis he may be

pure logos - though the concept is difficult - but he cannot display the personal logos, that is, the part of the logos that is identified with the person because it is free. Thus in IV 5, 12, Epictetus can say, 'You are prohaireisis',⁵⁴ and in II 22, 18 - 19, the ἄγώ and the ἐμόν is in prohaireisis. The use of ἔσωθεν points to the same doctrine, for instance in I 18, 17 - 19: when you are in pain and groaning, you do not groan in the centre of yourself (ἔσωθεν μὴ στενάξῃς). With this Epictetus connects the Delphic command, 'Know thyself', that is, realise that the self is prohaireisis (17). If one is free from the enslavement within, from the passions and the like, the self is realised in its true freedom.⁵⁵

The transition from the function of prohaireisis in moral choice to this fuller function in character is easily discerned, and based on the essential character of the prohaireisis, namely its freedom and capacity for good and evil. If we recognise a responsibility in our cumulative (character) tendency towards good and evil, this must display a freedom, and therefore result from prohaireisis. Each time we make a decision, we do so from a particular moral character, (the moral 'core' discussed in Chapter Six), which has been formed through cumulative acts of choice. If

perfect choices have been maintained throughout, this cumulative moral character, dependent on choices, will be absolutely free, and as formed entirely on our own responsibility, is deserving to be called the self. If we have not made moral choices in accordance with right will, but through an interest in exteriors, it will be difficult to find a part of us which we can really name 'self'. The difficulty is well illustrated by Ibsen when he represents Peer Gynt comparing his life to the layers of an onion, which lacks the live shoot in the centre.⁵⁶

This concept of prohairesis as character is clearly connected with the inner qualities of αἰδώς and τὸ πιστόν. In exercising prohairesis in moral choice, these qualities, being guarded and maintained, lead to full freedom.⁵⁷ If self is in prohairesis, then it is the preservation of self respect and faith that perfects it.⁵⁸

Because prohairesis carries this fuller significance, it becomes clear why Epictetus makes this the single end of his education programme.⁵⁹ By making right moral decisions, the whole moral character is developed; his training therefore is directed towards perfecting prohairesis, that is, in bringing about the correct basic moral character of a man, so that the act of correct moral choice will follow naturally.

This direction of training towards character is emphasised in the case of the Cynic.⁶⁰


Prohairesis in this sense of the essential individual is not always distinct from the prohairesis as choice in decisions. There is as we have noticed previously, a two way process: an accumulation of acts of choice contribute to the prohairesis, and conversely, the prohairesis (as character) is responsible for acts of choice. This is illustrated in IV 2 (especially 4): one cannot perfect the prohairesis by making decisions which are truly free, and at the same time maintain the same kind of habits in respect to one's friends and duties. Here prohairesis appears as determined character resolutions.

Habituation thus becomes an essential factor in the shaping of prohairesis. Habits (ἔθῆς) are confirmed by corresponding actions. Each time we do something, a ἔθῆς receives strength, and the quality of our character depends on every act of choice. The term ἔθῆς is rare in Epictetus, but where it occurs,⁶¹ it denotes the core of moral character that is formed by habituation, and is the basis of prohairesis in the sense we are discussing, and can almost be identified with it.⁶² This converse situation of choices, that is prohairesis as decision, having effect on

prohairesis as good or evil character is expressed in I 29, 1 - 2: if judgements are correct they make prohairesis good. I have attempted to illustrate this dual concept of prohairesis comprehensively in the accompanying diagram, with the large outer circle representing prohairesis as character, and the inner circle representing prohairesis as chosen decision.

A particular aspect of prohairesis as the essential 'I', is the affect of death upon it. The passage that pertains is IV 7, 31. The prohairesis is not affected by any of the fearful events which may happen to the body after death, such as being thrown out unburied. The 'I' is something different from the corpse: it is will (prohairesis). Provided one wills death when it occurs, the 'I' is unaffected. If one does not will it, then indeed there will be fears. The 'I' as will, however, cannot survive after death, since the very existence of will as prohairesis, is dependent on the presentation of phantasiai through the senses. Without the εἶλη (material) of phantasiai, the concept of will is meaningless. Thus with the dissolution of the body, the logos will return to the cosmic supply of pure logos, but the personalising aspect of it as prohairesis, will cease to be. Epictetus is desirous that death should

Diagram illustrating
 THE DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY OF PROHAIRESIS,
 as moral character (outer circle) and moral choice
 (inner circle), and relating these two aspects to
 Epictetus' psychology



find him paying attention to his prohairesis,⁶³ so that in the final challenge, he shall maintain his freedom of existence and not fear death.

Prohairesis in this wider sense of moral character, shares the same characteristics as prohairesis in decision, which were examined in section two: it is free in that it is the personal identity, the individual existing with reference to nothing but itself; the centre of his being (ἑσώθεν) which exists as pure self. Through this freedom it assumes, by habituation of choice, characteristics which are essential to all goodness, τὸ πιστόν and αἰδώς ; and it is the perfection of reason through constant study and self examination. But the reason has to be adopted and willed by the prohairesis, which is the totality of self and the free identity of the whole desiring reasoning being: the personal orektic mechanism is involved: wish to satisfy yourself, (θέλησον); desire (ἐπιθύμησον) to become pure with your pure self (μετὰ καθαρῶ σαυτοῦ), and with God.⁶⁴

4. Prohairesis and Freedom.

In this section I want to summarise Epictetus' concept

of freedom as it has become apparent through the examination of prohairesis.

Freedom is enjoyed only by the inmost self. This inner nature of freedom has been noted in many aspects: first in moral decisions. Decisions are restricted to judgements on phantasiai, which are themselves partly the product of prohairesis exercising right desire.⁶⁵ Second, in the acquisition of knowledge, we are free to discover knowledge about ourselves and the cosmos, and this in turn forms a basis for prohairesis.⁶⁶ Third, we are free to develop and maintain the inner guiding qualities (dynameis) and virtues.⁶⁷ Fourth, we are free to restrict our desires to what is under our control, thereby making desire identical to will.⁶⁸ When freedom ceases to be inner freedom, then it destroys itself; accordingly, freedom of choice must adopt correct choice if freedom is to be maintained.⁶⁹

With this basic notion that freedom is an internal exercise and activity, I turn to three types of freedom displayed in the Discourses, namely freedom of choice, freedom from anxiety, and freedom for existence. These three types are associated with the three stages in the application of the term ἡ προαίρεσις discussed in section one.

A. Freedom of Choice

The freedom to make a right or wrong decision is will. One can will the acceptance of a phantasia or its rejection. The will is both rational and orektic. This is the freedom that the earlier Stoics discovered in συγκατάθεσις, and the development of the will has been traced through the Stoics.⁷⁰ Epictetus does not join in the free-will debate characteristic of many Stoics, but recognising that if there is will it must be free (otherwise the concept is self-contradictory) concentrates on the area to which will is restricted, that is, the συγκατάθεσις of phantasiai, and on the origin of the directive power of the will, which is the prohairesis core of the individual, and this in turn has been formed from accumulative willed decisions. Freedom of will was assumed by Epictetus. The object of his teaching was to educate the will so that it could will the correct judgment and so lead to the second type of freedom.

B. Freedom from Anxiety

The state of freedom for the Stoics was the inner freedom from fear and anxiety, and desires. Such freedom

shows a distinctive negative quality in ἀπάθεια, ἀλυπία, ἀφρβία, ἀταραξία.⁷¹ Since the beginning of Stoicism, the aim of the wise man was to achieve this freedom or unperturbedness of mind (ἀταραξία). In Epictetus, this is the freedom that figures most. Its key is to will the course of nature, and because of our freedom of will, it is possible for each person to will to accept, in the sense of adjusting one's disposition to ~~them, the~~ events that befall. Epictetus devotes his longest and most skillful discourse to this kind of freedom;⁷² its message: give up what is not yours, and make your will accord with God's. Similarly this was the purpose and message of the Encheiridion.⁷³

In these passages and elsewhere, the doctrine is preached that freedom is achieved through discipline rather than by practising the full psychological principles of the freedom, namely that by perfecting his logos through prohairesis and prohairesis through logos, the will naturally follows the cosmic logos. This was the ideal approach to freedom and led to freedom in the third sense. But not unlike Plato in the Laws, Epictetus realised that giving up desires through ascetic training⁷⁴ would in practice achieve this kind of freedom, without any further theorising, and he

much admired the disciplined asceticism of the Cynic.⁷⁵

There are two further points on this kind of freedom. First, the freedom is restricted to a necessity, namely to what is already ordained by the cosmic reason. Here a distinction must be made between a state of freedom and an act of freedom. The freedom of choice (A), resulted in a free act. If there is the possibility of any restrictions at all, an act cannot be fully free. Hence Epictetus had to restrict free actions to the activity of the mind, where there need be no restrictions.

A state of freedom, however, can be restricted and still be meaningful. In fact, only thus does it have any meaning at all; for freedom in all its meanings is essentially freedom from. For freedom from something necessarily implies contact with its opposite: if one is free from danger, he is in reach of safety; if something is free from artificial colouring, it is bound by its own colour. If man is free from evil, he is bound to the good. Now even a free act of will may be regarded as a 'freedom from', namely a freedom from causes outside itself; thus by partaking of the opposite, it becomes self-determined, which is a truism. This explains why free-will, or will, is a very special case of freedom, because any state of freedom, when partaking of the object

opposite to that from which it is free, becomes some positive characteristic, but not identical to freedom itself. For instance, a state of freedom from fear, is a state of easiness of mind. But it is not allowable to call this freedom, as it is allowable to call self-determinism free will. Easiness of mind only embraces freedom from fear. The restriction therefore of 'freedom from' to the proper course of nature, is not to deny freedom in this sense, any more than any other state of freedom is denied by what one is bound to as a result of that freedom.⁷⁶

Second, and this is a more reasonable objection to such freedom being proposed as a moral objective, this freedom displays negative and passive qualities in those who experience it. The cause for this I have explained in discussing resignation, in section two. Certainly, moral action, as understood by Aristotle and in general, cannot be demanded if such a freedom is adopted. In terms of activity prompted by human beings, it does only amount to acquiescence in what is the will of Another. Epictetus frequently describes this freedom as εὐροια, maintaining the good running order of the universe, or as ἀπάθεια, lack of feeling rather than any positive feeling other than the desire to comply. But whilst for practical purposes it

was convenient to preach acquiescence in Another's will, ideally, this will through the common logos and a perfect prohairesis, became identical with the individual's will. It is this theory which leads to the third kind of freedom.

C. Freedom for Rational Existence.

The aim and absolute end of Epictetus' teaching is to perfect the prohairesis, and thereby to achieve freedom. This is man's chief moral commitment or chief ἀρετή, the function that he alone can perform by design of the creative logos. Freedom is regularly used in an evaluative sense, and this causes us to see a weakness in 'freedom from'. In Epictetus it is the ultimate value. This evaluative use of 'freedom' as oppose to the abstract or logical use, which we have seen is in essence negative, has two important characteristics.

The first it shares with 'freedom from' as being a state of freedom, and therefore necessarily bound by the opposite from which it is free. Moral freedom means that the individual's acts are free from any causation or responsibility on the part of others. It is bound therefore by self-responsibility, and this distinguishes it from permissiveness

or licence. Self-responsibility is a moral undertaking, and as such aims at the good, hence it is frequently associated with the notion of self discipline.⁷⁷ If the good is something known and to be aimed at, moral permissiveness becomes a contradiction in terms. Hence we might feel that 'self-responsibility' is an adequate equivalent to this moral freedom. But in Epictetus, as we shall see, self-responsibility does not adequately cover its purpose, for self-responsibility in Epictetus means logos - responsibility, which is at once something larger than self.

The second characteristic of moral freedom is that it is positive, in being directed to action, rather than submissive and negative. Thus it shares this characteristic with free choice: it is freedom for action. If it should appear self-contradictory that moral freedom is both a state and acts of freedom, it may be remembered that the concept of prohairesis offered just the same position as being the function of free acts of choice and freely developed εἴδη, or states of character. Moral freedom then is meaningless unless it shows an opportunity for positive action, even if, as in Epictetus' case, the activity is mental and willing activity.⁷⁸

If then Epictetus' theory of moral freedom is to be

a valid one, we must find in it some positive characteristic in the form, at least, of willed activity. This can be found in the function of prohairesis as moral character. The final end of all study is ἀἰδίον ἡγεμονικόν,⁷⁹ that is, to have one's own hegemonikon or rational guiding principle, in accord with the natural course of events designed by the cosmic logos for each individual. If the design of the cosmos is rational (and this was the fundamental Stoic belief), the unimpeded functioning of reason (logos) in the individual will reach the same end, or 'conclusion' as the cosmic reason. The conclusions of reason are necessary, but its course is free in that it is absolutely dependent upon itself. Reason in the individual is limited only by prohairesis, the totality of the rational-desiring function, and this we have seen to be free. Thus reason through its knowledge of the world and of the individual, calculates, and conquers all desires so that prohairesis wills events which actually occur.

Through the rational monism, Epictetus' moral freedom is actively engaged on anticipation of God's will, for this is reason, rather than on resignation after his will is manifest through events. In this constant application of reason to understand nature, the follower of freedom is

inwardly active and in great earnest. Towards this one must be φιλόπρονος,⁸⁰ not to the making of money or seeking of reputation (φιλόδοξον). What comes to pass, comes from our own self and from God,⁸¹ from our own self, because we through reason and prohairesis actually willed it, and from God, because the cosmic logos had planned it. Each step in reason is a free acceptance (through prohairesis), but leads to a necessary result. And through reason, man has means to develop his prohairesis to the point that it desires and wills the cosmic plan for his life.

The constant freely willing state of the prohairesis as moral character makes such freedom possible. The freedom then displays the positive characteristics of αἰδώς , εὐσθένεια and εὐθυμία , as well as the negative ones already mentioned.⁸² It requires us to develop positive moral qualities of courage and high-mindedness.

A further positive characteristic is the preservation of self, the essential 'I'. There is in this third concept of freedom, the freedom of the self identity. We are what we are, and our intentions are what they are because of ourselves and nothing outside ourselves. The function of prohairesis as moral character, contributes to the freedom of the whole personality of the ego as a willing, rational being.

I remarked earlier that self-responsibility was inadequate to cover fully this third type of freedom. This is because in Epictetus, self-responsibility becomes the responsibility to share in the freedom of the universe, that is, the freedom of reason. By being free, we discover that we are existing in a sphere bigger than that of self, and in a sense, released from self. Thus through the purification of the prohairesis, man can enjoy a freedom for existence wider than his own experience; such an existence is something to be desired, even yearned for, not because it brings freedom from anxiety, but for its own sake.⁸³

Again the point is raised, whether κάθαρσις and ὁμογνωμόμαί τοῦ θεοῦ etc., are used purely figuratively in Epictetus. If the interpretation given in this section is correct, the idea of a mystical union with the One, is very nearly approached. There is a religious enthusiasm in Epictetus' exposition of this freedom, even if the direct evidence for a religious experience is lacking.

Epictetus is significant not for noting this third type of freedom or for experiencing it. The idea must have been present in the freedom of the perfect Sapiens and the Stoic εὐροία.⁸⁴ Even in Aristotle, the final end, θεωρία ,

would almost certainly have been accompanied by these characteristics. For θεσις is expounded with a poetic enthusiasm, more characteristic of Plato than Aristotle.⁸⁵ Epictetus is important for co-ordinating this type of freedom with the practical life of the individual, by showing it is a development of his freedom of choice, and that by proper training and understanding of the Stoic principles, this freedom is within reach of everyone; and also for making more explicit, through his concept of prohairesis as moral character, the full positive activity and experience that results from what was the commonly accepted Stoic freedom from fear.

5. Social Responsibility.

In the foregoing sections we have seen that in Epictetus, man's moral commitment is to perfect his freedom through prohairesis. He is to be free, noble and self-respecting.⁸⁶ If this end were achieved by every person, then everyone would act to God's will, and the whole of humanity, through individual prohairesis, would perfectly accord with divine reason, as the rest of nature does of necessity. This is the kind of Utopia to which his teaching on freedom would

finally lead. In such a world, the virtues would not be social virtues of love and justice, since outer virtues would have no effect either on the design of the cosmos, or on other people's prohairesis; rather, inner virtues alone would be necessary, for on these depends prohairesis. These virtues were discussed in Chapter Six. Essentially then in Epictetus responsibility is to oneself, to perfect your own area of freedom, that is, prohairesis.

This view is open to two charges: first it displays selfishness, or Aristotelian $\phi\lambda\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$. Secondly, it may be objected that the world in reality is not an Utopia, and we necessarily impinge on other human beings whose prohairesis is far from perfect, so should there not be a responsibility here to correct others?

Epictetus replies to the charge of self-love in I 19, 11 - 15: if man concentrates first on his own character and essential virtues, it will follow naturally that he will achieve the social virtues, since inter-dependence is a mark of human oikeiosis. The prohairesis is free; if this is rightly directed through its judgements, it will be the source of love and affection, civil concord and peace.⁸⁷

So although love of self is the prime consideration,⁸⁸ Epictetus recognises that one entire field, out of the three

τόπος, where prohairesis operates, is devoted to having a right attitude to our obligations towards other people, in fulfilling the social aspect of oikeiosis. This is the field of study in ὁρμή and ἀφορμή. Thus significantly it is under the heading of prohairesis that Epictetus gives any guidance at all on the attitude towards duty and what constitutes duties. These duties were the καθήκοντα or officia, which were considered ἀδιάφορα (indifferent) by the early Stoics, but received prominent treatment from Panaetius.⁸⁹ Epictetus, whilst not elaborating on the, is clearly aware of their teaching, as his classification of duties in III 7, 24 indicates.⁹⁰

Epictetus gives no systematic teaching on duties, or analysis in the manner of the De Officiis, but considers they have their origin from prohairesis in the field of ὁρμή, though it may be noted that he allows this sphere to be more externally committed than desire.⁹¹ A duty, or social responsibility occurs as a phantasia, an inclination to sympathy, help and so on, and as a phantasia, must be referred to reason and prohairesis.⁹² Accordingly, in the matter of duties, the decision on how far we undertake it and in what attitude of mind, is under our control, and so far we can exercise ὁρμή. But we must not be carried

too far with a duty, so that it affects our self-respect and destroys the freedom of the prohairesis. The exercise of ἔρμη will lead to actions, but only in meeting the potentials of relationships, (αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν σχέσεων), which are not regarded as essentially ours (τὸ αὐτοῦ), but as something given to us.⁹³ This is illustrated in sympathy, not to try to remove another's grief at all costs, but only so far as is under your control, and also in natural affection, (φιλοστοργία): don't let affection for another lead you to misery.⁹⁴

Accordingly, duties involve man in the world and externals, but do not commit him to these, and all worldly undertakings, events and circumstances are characteristically described with levity by Epictetus as a game (παιδία), or a festival (ἑορτή). If the crowd of civic life gets on top of you, treat it as a festival. Bear relationships with your wife and children, as children playing five-stones, for as long as those stones are there. Simply devote yourself to the game as long as it lasts, or as long as you can maintain self-respect.⁹⁵ Thus Socrates only so far obeyed the Thirty: when they commanded him to bring Leon to trial, he refused, even though he would face death; he would no longer 'play the game'.⁹⁶

The concern of prohairesis in duties is not to harm oneself, rather than to benefit others. Often there are misjudgements as regards duties, and the prohairesis suffers.⁹⁷ We should know by rationally considering each change of circumstance, when to retire from a duty.

Involvement in duties requires choice of actions, or a series of sensible choices in fulfilling them - a process of deliberation in the Aristotelian sense. All the possible means within our power to accomplish an action, must be considered, and the best one chosen, or selected; when we can no longer make a selection without becoming affected by the exteriors, then we must withdraw.

A significant point is, that in discussing this process of deliberation, Epictetus uses the term ἀκλογίη not 'prohairesis', which is reserved for things in our power, that is, it will finally tell us when to withdraw from a duty. This again emphasises the inward-directed nature of prohairesis and its independence: with τὰ ἕξω (externals) we must not act thoughtlessly (ἀλογίστως); if my brother treats me badly, I can do nothing but use my relationship with him as I ought, (ὡς δεῖ).⁹⁸ That is, I must take thought for the best, but being aware that the outcome is not under my control. Although the process of selection in fulfilling a

duty is similar to Aristotle (Ethics III), when he discusses deliberation and voluntary actions, Epictetus does not employ the Aristotelian term prohairesis for this choice of externals. The following are instances of Epictetus' use of ἐκλογή :

II, 5r, 10ff. Epictetus is discussing the correct attitude to ἀδιάφορα. Things indifferent are compared with the fall of dice; the fall is ἀδιάφορα, but the use we make of it is ours, (προαιρετικά). Similarly, on a voyage it is ours to choose (ἐκλέξασθαι) the helmsman, sailors and time for sailing. After this we are in the helmsman's hands.

II, 6r, 8. Discussing to what lengths one should go to fulfil a duty, Epictetus quotes Chrysippus: "As long as the consequences (τὰ ἐξῆς) are not clear, I cling to what is more in accordance with nature, (τῶν εὐφυστέρων ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν). For God created me with the power of choosing: μὲν ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν τούτων ἐκλεκτικόν.

II, 10r, 6. Again in a discourse on Duties, Epictetus states that since we do not know the future, it is our duty to cling to what is more naturally fit to be chosen: τῶν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν εὐφυστέρων ἔχεισθαι .

I, 1, 27. An anecdote about Thrasea: Thrasea said he would rather be killed today than banished tomorrow; to which Rufus replied, "If you choose (death) as the heavier of

two misfortunes, what folly of choice". εἰ μὲν ὡς βαρύτερον ἐκλέγῃ, τίς ἢ μωρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς; The wise choice is towards the most natural, whichever that is.

These passages illustrate an important change in the development of the application of the term prohairesis from Aristotle to Epictetus: the former adopts it in the choices of a process of deliberation, the latter reserves it for the inward reaction to externals. The function of making choices in carrying out a duty cannot really be separated from prohairesis, but the avoidance of the term in the above examples, probably shows his uneasiness to include duties at all in the perfection of his system. He is obliged to say something about them, because he recognises them as part of human nature in the social oikeiosis. Yet even in this teaching, Epictetus is not wholly consistent, since he equally regards the oikeiosis as παρακολούθησις,⁹⁹ implying that man can fulfil himself by contemplation and perfecting inner freedom. The feeling that duties are somehow 'dragged in' by Epictetus cannot be avoided.

The second charge against regarding self-responsibility as the only responsibility shown by an individual, is not so easily met by Epictetus, namely the responsibility of correcting others who are manifestly in error. If Epictetus believed

in the social oikeiosis, then we would expect to find a duty towards justice in society. But on this aspect Epictetus reverts to his thorough-going inwardness of freedom and responsibility, which if followed absolutely, would not require him to hold a doctrine on duties at all. For a man may show kindness and sympathy towards someone in need or suffering; but if he realises that the need or suffering is something towards which that man has adjusted his prohairesis, then he knows that the man is free and happy and needs no help. For this reason, duties in the form of a purely altruistic act to anyone, does not appear in Epictetus. But he does recognise duties demanded of natural relations and friends, and allows ὀργή in respect to these; but in the more distant aspects of social inter-dependence, especially in correction of the criminal, he holds to his self-responsibility doctrine.¹⁰⁰ So whilst it is remarkable that Epictetus himself sets forth a rigid education to progress to moral perfection, yet never advises that one should take pains to correct another, this is the logical conclusion of his doctrine of freedom, where pursuance of duties is ultimately superfluous.

His teaching on criminals is that however wicked they might be, they can never harm another's prohairesis or freedom, so let them be. The punishment, not correction, that awaits

criminals is in having a bad prohairesis. For whilst the wicked man may appear better off, he fails inwardly in τὸ κρείττον and αἰδώς; and the person who does wrong, always receives the punishment.¹⁰¹

Further, criticism of others is out of place since one must first determine what kind of a judgement produced the misdeed. Until one learns the judgement from which a man does each act, one cannot apportion praise or blame; and the judgement is never clear to the observer.¹⁰²

Although Epictetus adopts this attitude when he is on his guard against a criminal having power over another's belongings, even over his life, and is seeking refuge in his own prohairesis, yet in his role as an educator, he shows that he can, as an observer, distinguish a wrong judgement, and before the person concerned can be expected to act otherwise, he must first be shown how his reason and desire have lead him astray into doing a wrong which, he argues, no one can do willingly.¹⁰³ But these passages display an educative responsibility not a social responsibility, and occur in the context of discussion on choice and right will, not on duties.

Epictetus' ~~trial~~-scene example, which occurs twice,¹⁰⁴ well summarises his attitude to other's mistakes. In court

the defendant's responsibility is to make a good speech; he cannot be responsible for his acquittal or condemnation; he can be innocent and make a good speech to prove it, but still be sentenced. The judge has responsibility of passing sentence, and he might err. If the judge errs, he destroys his prohairesis: the defendant has maintained his. The judge runs a risk more painful than the defendant.

Whatever anyone else does is not my responsibility, whether his actions are right, (in accordance with nature) or not. This is his concern, my concern is to treat his decision and his act as an ἀδύφορα, an occurrence given by Zeus, and to adjust my will, through prohairesis, accordingly. A contradiction remains here: that one person can make a wrong decision, that is, act contrary to nature, whilst the same act or circumstance must be regarded by another as nature's course, and submit to it. The contradiction reveals a difficulty in any system involving free will and determinism. Namely that the wickedness of another person has to be regarded as a determined circumstance relative to one's own moral progress, whereas relative to the other person that wickedness can be avoided by his act of choice.¹⁰⁵ These examples also reveal Epictetus at his weakest, in interpreting life as making the most of a bad job:

because of the universe, the body and fellow men, it is impossible for catastrophes and injustices not to happen.¹⁰⁶

All each person can do is to submit to them willingly, and enjoy the freedom of the prohairesis, seeing that it is not bound by externals, and devote all his attention to this.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Very rarely was the word used of casual choice. One of the earliest occurrences of προαίρεσις is in Plato, Parmenides 143C, where it is combined with the verb, to give considerable emphasis to the act of choosing: ἐν ἑκάστη τῇ προαίρεσει προαιρούμεθα. Similarly, it is frequently used by Demosthenes to denote 'set intention', e.g. with βουλεύομαι in 44, 57. Demosthenes commonly couples it with πολιτεία to denote the policy of the state, e.g. De Corona 93:(cf. 192), ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ αὐτῆς καὶ ἡ πολιτεία.
2. The use of the verb προαιρούμαι particularly illustrates this. Its single occurrence in the New Testament (II Cor. 9, 7.) indicates the purpose or will of the heart, that is not swayed by any compulsion or feeling of sorrow: ἕκαστος καθὼς προήρηται τῇ καρδίᾳ, μὴ ἐκ λύπης ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. These qualifications are strikingly similar to Epictetus' use of prohairesis. The noun προαίρεσις occurs several times in Polybius, always denoting 'set will', (e.g. 39, 29 = expressed opinion or will),

but even sometimes extending the connotation of will to include the whole of a person's type of conduct or character, e.g. in 18, 3, 3, where **διὰ τῆς προαίρεσως** means 'because he displayed such conduct or character', and could well pick up the **πρόσωπον** which occurs a few lines earlier.

Colson's remarks on the varied meanings of pro-
hairesis in Philo's works are illuminating:

"The uses (of prohairesis) in Philo, all springing from the sense of choice of purpose, may be divided into those which describe the purpose or motive of some particular action, and those which regulate a lifetime or a career."

(De Vita Contemplativa, Appendix (2), p. 518.).

The singular occurrence of **προαίρεσις** in the Septuagint (Ecclasiastes 1; 14.), translating the Hebrew, **וַיִּטְוֶה רוּחַוּ**, **προαίρεσις πνεύματος**, English translations vary, "waywardness of spirit", "vexation of spirit", "chasing the wind" (N.E.B.), which appear to imply something contrary to set purpose. The literal meaning of the Hebrew, from the stem **וַיִּטְוֶה**, to pasture a flock, is a feeding upon the wind, therefore 'a desire for', for which **ὄρεξις** would have been a nearer Greek equivalent. It may be that **προαίρεσις** was erroneously adopted by confusion with the Chaldee, **וַיִּטְוֶה**, used in Ezra 5, 17. and 7, 18, meaning deliberated will, but from the same stem.

3. There is one occurrence of προᾶρις in the Stoic fragments, (SVF III 173). The fragment describes the stages in the thought process leading to an action, reminiscent of Aristotle's analysis in N.E. III, but embroidered with an impressive string of Stoic terms, which probably bore indistinct shades of meanings even to its author, as for example, between ᾶρις , προᾶρις and βούηις . This is far nearer to Aristotle's use than to the application of the term in Epictetus, of which it gives no suggestion. The occurrence is interesting in that it shows that the term was still in philosophic usage, though this was a very specialised use. Whether the originator of the Fragment was Chrysippus or Panaetius, it is difficult to regard him, (as Hjmans does, Askesis p. 24n.) as a 'mediator' between Aristotle and Epictetus, since the usage is far too close to the Aristotelian analysis.
4. I do not think the prefix προ- in the word has any semantic significance in Epictetus, since the word had already been in existence from fourth century

Greek, meaning 'choice'. Admittedly the fragment mentioned above (Note 3), makes some narrow distinction between ἀίρεσις and προαίρεσις, but this illustrates the Stoic inclination of devising terminologies, and of creating distinctions of meaning between two words which in colloquial Greek meant the same, except that the form of the word with the prefix was generally more emphatic. No use of the word in Epictetus can mean 'choosing beforehand', as opposed to any other kind of choosing, in spite of Hjmans warning (Askesis p. 24). Neither do I believe, as Peters suggests, (Greek Philosophical Terms p. 163) that Epictetus consciously connects προαίρεσις with διαίρεσις. The latter occurs in II 6, 24, as the distinction between what is in our power and what is not. Its occurrence is rare, and if Epictetus chose the word to denote that προαίρεσις should precede διαίρεσις, then we should expect some mention of προαίρεσις in the context.

5. Cf. I 12, 9.

6. II 1, 10; II 22, 28.

7. II 10, 25.
8. II 1, 9.
9. Cf. also the juxtaposition of προίρεσις (noun) and ἀπροκίρετα (adj.) in this section, (II 23, 19).
10. I 8, 16. Cf. I 29, 1 - 2.
11. I 18, 8. Cf. I 30, 4. and IV 5, 32.)
12. Cf. also, II 13 and IV 4.
13. Souilhé, Introduction p. L, note 3.
14. Ch. 3, 5. Ch. 4, 1.
15. 13 - 21; see also, 22 - 25 and 58 - 77. For other examples of the essential 'I' meaning, see section 3, below.
16. It is not always easy to decide which of the meanings προίρεσις bears in each instance, (see

App. I), and frequently both meanings are combined in a single occurrence of the term, e.g. II 22, 19. See additional note (18) below.

17. IV 7, 32; II 23, 22.

18. The division of Epictetus' uses of προαίρεσις is only for analytical purposes, and not an actual division in Epictetus' thought. Cf. note 16, above.

19. This has already been shown in Ch. 5. Cf. I 1, 7; II 19, 32; Fragment 169 (Schweighauser), etc.

20. Epictetus frequently introduces the notion of a game as a metaphor in describing our attitude to the circumstances we meet in life. See section 5, below.

21. παντὶ τῷ ἀποβάντι χρησθῆναι κατὰ φύσιν, IV 10, 8.

22. Cf. I 17, 21 - 5; I 4, 11; IV 4, 15 - 22; IV 10, 1 - 3, etc.

23. Schenkl has adopted προσθέσει in place of προθέσει

in I 21, 2. This firmly fixes it in the terminology of logic, (cf. πρόσθεσις with ἐποχή in I 4, 11, where both terms are part of συγκατάθεσις). It is likely that both πρόσθεσις and πρόθεσις were part of the vocabulary of the logicians, and only minutely distinguishable. Cf. note 4, above.

24. Oldfather, Vol. II, p. 20, note 4. More, Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 107.
25. E. g. I 4, 14; IV 4, 16.
26. III 3, 10; I 1, 23.
27. IV 7, 16 - 17; cf. Ench. 7, 35.
28. I 17, 26.
29. IV 4, 23; IV 6, 24; I 19, 7 and I 20, 5.
30. II 6, 25.

31. διὰ τοῦτο κακία μόνη αὕτη (προαίρεσις) γίνεταί ἢ ἀρετή μόνη.
cf. II 10, 29; III 10, 18.
32. οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά, τοῦ κακοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά.
I 29, 1; cf. I 8, 16.
33. II 1, 39.
34. III 5, 2 - 3.
35. Aristotle, N.E. VI. See Ch. 2, 3.
36. I 18, 8.
37. IV 12. 12. For the obvious lacuna, the Bodleian MS (Codex Saibantinus) suggests <τοῖς> μετ' ἐκείνον .
Diels' emmendation, μετ' ἐκείνον <ἐμοί> , seems more appropriate (and meaningful) in the light of what immediately follows. Other suggestions are cited by Schenkl, Editio Maior, p. 448.
38. I 17, 14; II 23, 42; cf. III 4, 9; I 12 9; III 5, 7 - 10.

39. I 12, 12. Compare the thought of Wordsworth's sonnet, 'Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room', where he expresses the 'Weight of too much liberty'.
40. III 24, 98. Compare the Book of Common Prayer, p. 49, "(God.....) whose service is perfect freedom".
41. I 12, 15; IV 7, 20; III 10, 18 (cf. 'I want the victor to win', III 4, 11.); Fragment 130 (Schweighauser):
 ἑαυτὸν ἑκόντα βέχσθαι τὰ ἀνάγκαια.
42. These are listed in IV 3, 7.
43. I 27, 10 - 13. The passions as a special branch of desire, were treated in Ch. 5.
44. I 4, 1; III 9, 22.
45. More, Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 102 - 3. More's resolution of the 'wheel' (p. 161), that the things that are one's own have a different quality of reality in a world of ideals, comparable to the Platonic forms, is interesting, and will be referred to in the Conclusion.

46. See Ch. 2, 3.
47. I 4, 1 and 11.
48. I 27, 10 - 13; III 9, 22; particularly the latter, which emphasises that desires are not disallowed altogether, but are to be restricted to what can be satisfied.
49. Cf. I 24, 6.
50. III 10, 13 - 16.
51. III 20, 15.
52. II 13, 4; I 29, 1 - 8.
53. Lucretius makes a similar remark though for slightly different reasons, De Rerum Natura III 955 f; also 79 - 84.
54. Cf. III 1, 40.
55. IV 1, 57.

56. Ibsen, Peer Gynt, Act V.
57. IV 3, 7.
58. II 22, 20.
59. II 23, 36 - 47.
60. III 22, 103 - 5; cf. IV 6, 25 - 7, and IV 4, 26.
61. II 28, 1 and 6 - 8.
62. Askesis, p. 64, correctly notes that Epictetus' use of ἐπιθυμία has the 'connotation of a potentiality, an inclination to certain actions, brought about by habituation'
63. III 5, 7 - 11. See Ch. 6, note 87.
64. II 18, 19.
65. Ch. 5, 3.
66. Ch. 6, 4.

67. Ch. 6. 5.
68. Section 2, above.
69. St. Paul, I Corinthians 10,23, sees a similar limitation to the Christian's liberty. All things are permitted, (πάντα ἔξεσιν), but not all things are expedient (οὐ πάντα συμφέρει). The Christian should feel free only to build up (οἰκοδομῆι) the work of the Church. C. K. Barrett, Commentary, p. 239, comments, 'A man who acts on the principle that he is free to do anything he likes is in danger of losing his freedom through becoming enslaved to the practices for which he feels himself to be free'.
70. Chs. 3 - 4.
71. IV 3, 8; cf. IV 4, 36.
72. Philo's essay, Omnis Probus Liber Sit (Every good man is free), provides a very close parallel to this discourse. Two points particularly emerge:
1. that freedom is primarily freedom from the

passions through asceticism, and one should desire what virtue demands. 2. Freedom implies service in obedience to God. (cf. Epictetus' προαίρεσις οἷα δεῖ .

73. Cf. Ench. 5 - 9.
74. IV 1, 176.
75. III 24, 64 ff, and particularly III 22, passim.
76. There is a useful discussion on the limitations of freedom in Reid, Philosophy and Education, p. 112 - 3.
77. This self-discipline is admirably expressed in Wordsworth's Ode to Duty. The best illustration in Epictetus is Fragment 169 (Schweighauser): the right use of freedom involves law and self-control, (νόμος καὶ σωφροσύνη).
78. On this, see section 2, above.
79. I 26, 15.

80. IV 4, 42.

81. IV 4, 47.

82. IV 3, 8.

83. In St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, **ἐλευθερία** again is used in the sense of a freedom that is a positive goal, where we share the freedom of the heavenly order (**ἐλευθερία τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ θεοῦ, Rom. 8:21**) at the end of the world. The sons of God enjoy a 'glorious liberty'. In Epictetus the freedom is definitely fixed in this life, in having a free mind or will (**προαιρεσις**) which is immune from the groanings of our bodily hurts. The parallel of the free Stoic avoiding groaning within (**μὴ στενάξῃς ἑσῶθεν** I 18, 19) with the groaning of creation in Paul's Epistle (Rom. 8, 23) **αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς στενάζομεν** is again striking.

84. See especially Fragment 169 (Schweighauser), which could well represent Stoic thought anterior to Epictetus.

85. See Ch. 2, 6, where the Platonic characteristics of the θεωρία doctrine were noticed.
86. III 7, 27.
87. IV 5, 35; cf. III 3, 5 - 8; I 22, 16.
88. Cf. Aristotle's φιλαυτία, N. E. IX.
89. See Ch. 3, 4.
90. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus III 16 - 20; though Bonhoffer, Die Ethik, p. 205 - 6, prefers to regard the triple division as a gloss, but the longer treatment of duties in II 10 does appear to owe something to such a classification.
91. See section 2, above.
92. I 28, 4 - 5; IV 5, 28 - 32.
93. IV 12, 16 - 18; III 7, 28.

94. III 24, 20 - 24; 58 - 60.
95. IV 4, 24f; IV 7, 5; II 5, 15.
96. οὐκέτι πάϊνω , IV 7, 30.
97. IV 6, 35; II 10 II - 15, esp. 13 - 14.
98. III 10, 17 - 20.
99. Ch. 6, 1.
100. Christ, in the New Testament, affords a contrast here, since His teaching demands both an outer love, 'love thy neighbour' (-for love's sake), and an inner purity, in the Sermon on the Mount. The combination of the two, is a characteristic mark of the Christian, but rarely for the Stoic, who at the best, loves his neighbour for his own sake. In Seneca, however, there was found a strong suggestion of this self-giving, or Christian love, (See Ch. 4, 4.). What place self-giving love had in the ancient world, and how far our ideas about this kind

- of love are shaped by Christianity, is a question of considerable interest; were the Stoic duties always undertaken either for self interest (towards friends), or from some long association of (in civic duties)? The responsibility of correcting others, however, is firmly stated throughout Plato's Republic, particularly in the Cave Allegory, and at 519 D 7.
101. I. 17, 11 - 14; Fragment 13 (Oldfather); II 17, 2 - 6; II 13, 18.
102. IV 8, 1 - 4; cf. IV 4, 44.
103. II 26, 1 - 7; cf. I 18, 13; IV 5, 10.
104. II 5, 29; II 6, 21.
105. Compare the ending of Socrates' Apology (31D). Socrates wishes at the same time both to accept that his death, and therefore the miscarriage of justice, was fated, and yet to rebuke, gently, (οὐ πάλιν) the judges who were responsible for such a miscarriage.
106. II 5, 2 and 7 - 8.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS AND AN EPILOGUE

It was seen in the last chapter that Epictetus' importance in Stoic thought lies in his introduction and use of the term 'prohairesis'. My thesis has devolved upon an interpretation of this term. The very adoption of the term indicates an intrusion of an element of uncertainty or choice into the determinist account of ethics given by the Stoics. This element of choice is at the centre of Epictetus' doctrine, in contrast to other Stoics, who felt the need to give an account of freedom and choice, but allowed nothing to turn them from their rational determinism, and so found the normal vocabulary adequate.

My chapters on the Stoics and Seneca afforded a chance to trace certain trends in Stoicism leading to a fuller appreciation of man in all his aspects, including will and personality. These two aspects were seen to be a late development in Stoicism, and prepare for Epictetus' fuller consideration of them by examining the concept of prohairesis. The chapter on Plato and Aristotle had a twofold importance: first it indicated the approach of these philosophers to the irrational aspects of man's character, showing how, in each

activity, there is a desiring function as well as a reasoning function. This was clearly seen in Aristotle's account of knowledge, and the practical syllogism. The problems encountered there have direct bearing on the concepts of will and freedom in Epictetus. Second, we examined Aristotle's use of 'prohairesis', and found some useful points of comparison with Epictetus, particularly in choice exercised in making moral decisions. The fuller account of man's personality in the later Stoics has much in common with the complex psychic elements appreciated by Aristotle and Plato, in the co-ordinating of reason and desire.

With the wider appreciation of man's nature, two concepts rapidly developed in Stoicism, will and the individual's freedom. The Stoic position, particularly that of Epictetus, is interesting because these concepts have to be framed within the Stoic rational monism. The impact of theories of mixed psychic functions (rational and non-rational) on the strict rational system coerced the development of concepts of will and freedom, and much of Epictetus' doctrine appears to be the result of certain Platonic and Aristotelian convictions super-imposed on the Stoic rationalism.

It has not been the purpose of this thesis to fix an exact point or exponent of Stoicism where these modifications

took place. I do not hold that Epictetus was solely responsible for the change. As early as Posidonius new influences were apparent in Stoicism, and a keen interest in personality and will was seen in the writings of Seneca. Epictetus rather stands at the end of this development, and is the fullest exponent on the concepts of will and freedom. In Marcus Aurelius, writing later than Epictetus, there is a regression to the earlier Roman Stoicism of the period of Panaetius and Cicero, with an emphasis on the brotherhood of mankind; there are instances also of the free-will versus determinist arguments, and of freedom from the passions, but the central theme of the individual's will and freedom is missing¹.

By Epictetus' time, the Stoic rationalism was not impregnable. Only with difficulty had Chrysippus absorbed the irrational motions in his basically rational hegemonikon; weaknesses in the rational bastions of the system were mentioned earlier in the thesis, notably in the concepts of prolepseis and conscientia. These imperfections in the Stoic account of causation, - on the causation of knowledge and of moral conduct respectively, - afforded greater consideration to be given to the concept of will. In the history of philosophy, the time was now ripe for this concept to be developed, and along with it, a fuller account of the individual's

freedom. This development was possible in Epictetus because he adopted a single term (prohairesis) for the ruling part, the former hegemonikon, and the choosing element, and set this firmly in reason. Seneca's use of 'voluntas' did not necessarily combine will and reason. In Epictetus, prohairesis shares the attributes of reason and of choice, as the controlled desiring function evident in Aristotle and Plato.

Since will is a specific aspect of individual freedom. I shall consider Epictetus' important contributions on this subject presently. First we must examine his concept of freedom in its broader aspect. In the previous chapter, we saw how Epictetus arrived at three 'levels' of freedom: freedom of choice, freedom from anxiety, and freedom for existence. The operation of prohairesis is important at each level. The perfect state of the will (or prohairesis) is to be fully rational. This can be achieved by education and habitual training (askesis). When our choosing function is fully rational, it is guided by reason to make identical choice with what actually occurs by natural determinism. In the final level of freedom, reason will be so perfected that the prohairesis chooses in advance of the course of nature. This is the exercise of positive freedom.

The will finds its freedom in reason; this reason is in

substance identical with the reason that governs nature, - it is an apospasma of cosmic logos. Consequently, if operating perfectly, it will reach the same rational conclusions, allowing a choice to be made in accordance with nature, - not following nature, but arriving at the same conclusions of its own accord. But reason itself is free, (this is one of its essential attributes in Epictetus), and so there is no coercion from outside in reaching the conclusions; the conclusion is dependent on reason alone, that is on a process of logic where each stage is a contingent truth. Provided at each stage the premises are correct, reason will operate freely towards necessary conclusions. Each stage in reason is approved of by our own choice (prohairesis), whereby we become responsible for that reasoning. Accumulated choices of this kind, building up the entire choosing personality (prohairesis in the wider sense), result in our whole life being directed willingly towards the circumstances and ends ordained by natural reason.

This liberation by reason has much in common with Spinoza, who regards activity as continuous thought, with each idea following its predecessor, and found freedom in self-evident truths.² The theory is criticised by Berlin, together with the view that virtue is knowledge (which is the ethical application of the former). For pure reason can only operate

when knowledge is perfect. Knowledge and certainty offer a limiting restraint to freedom, which true freedom should not feel³. Epictetus might be allowed, or at least excused his position, more than the later exponents of liberation by reason, since he was still in the tradition of the materialist concept of reason: logos was a substance pervading the universe, and man's reason was a part of this substance. The apospasma and the hegemonikon were thought of as parts of an individual, as substantial as we regard heart and mind, and frequently Epictetus even makes prohairesis similarly a materialistic concept⁴. This consideration makes the theory less idealistic and more acceptable, but since it depends on a tradition which can be traced back to the earliest Greek philosophers being used by Epictetus, but not re-examined, and which is today seen to be invalid, it cannot ultimately acquit Epictetus of the impossible idealism contained in this particular theory.

The materialistic concept also prevents freedom in Epictetus from assuming an emptiness which often accompanies the philosophical examination of the term, as for instance in Karl Jaspers' theory. In many points the two concepts of freedom are identical⁵, but Jaspers tended to see freedom as an empty goal. He was seeking some nature, or original essence 'which has some positive content, and is not empty

liberty.⁶ He finds no complete solution to this emptiness. Epictetus can at once fill the vacuum by the apospasma, or prime reason. This is the objective original self, which is realised in freedom. It is the self given by Zeus. The difficulty expressed by Jaspers' "I come to myself as a gift", is solved by Epictetus' doctrine, where we are given reason as an apospasma, and our freedom consists in perfecting this.

We may note a further consequence of Epictetus' use of the materialist concept of reason in his doctrine of freedom; this is the restriction of freedom to a necessity. This is a basic idea in many views of freedom, and was discussed in the previous chapter. Freedom is best when it is limited by certain laws. This applies particularly to freedom in behaviour, and is found in many moralists. One of the earliest instances is in Psalm 119, "I shall walk at liberty, for I seek Thy commandments." We have noticed the same teaching in St. Paul and Wordsworth. But the limitation of freedom by necessity, also applies in the philosophical aspects of freedom. The views of Spinoza, Locke, ("Where there is no law, there is no freedom."), Montesquieu, Kant and Burke are cited by Berlin.⁷ All have in common the idea that freedom, as a philosophic concept, involves necessary restraint.

Epictetus' " προαίρεσις οἷα δέη " (choosing

as one ought), is an early instance of this philosophic paradox, and is more easily resolved than similar positions occurring in later philosophers. The 'proper choice' is the course of nature, - the events ordained by the natural logos; part of the logos (as apospasma), exists in each individual, and 'free choice' consists in recognising the natural and necessary conclusions of this reason. How far this solution, (depending on rational materialism), is valid is less important than the fact that Epictetus did recognise that perfect freedom was free submission to some necessary rule of being governed.

There is one other important consequence of rational materialism in Epictetus' doctrine, namely that reason (the apospasma) affords a link between the general (nature) and the particular (the individual). Reason is co-extensive with the Absolute and the individual. If the Stoic rational monism - that reason is the absolute cause and substance - were valid, the criticism put by Berlin against freedom as an absolute goal, would have to be rejected. But Berlin's criticism⁸ is based on a transcendent not a co-extensive view of the Absolute. The Absolute in Epictetus is not found in an ideal realm whose characteristics we in our finite state cannot conceive. The Absolute, reason, pervades the world, causes

and is the world we encounter in ordinary experience. Epictetus' freedom lies in the perfection of this substance, not in attaining a unity with a transcendent concept.

The rational monism also helps the problem of knowledge inherent in any absolute system: namely, how can anything less than the Absolute have knowledge of it. This was a problem in Plato, and in the many aspects of mysticism. We noted that rational mysticism was a fair interpretation of Epictetus' religious convictions. Epictetus' concept of reason at least contributes to an easing of the dilemma of the one and the many.

We have therefore in Epictetus a theory of freedom embraced in the Stoic rational monism. The reason in the individual is the cause of his thought and activity: if the reason is perfect, his activity will accord with nature. Each stage in reasoning is accompanied by choice, or prohairesis. It is this choice which is responsible for the perfecting of reason. An individual strives to identify his prohairesis with reason; it does not, however, thereby lose its function of approving reason, or of willing reason: it becomes the desire ever to will what reason demands, yet remains the essence of individuality. As this individuality identifies itself

with reason, it partakes of a generality, namely reason. Then any action resulting from this individuality-reason identification, can be said to be caused, since cause can only be explained by reference to generalities. So far is the person's activity determined. But in so far as action results from individuality (the prohairesis), the activity is free, since there is ultimately no generality of the individual essence, therefore no causation. Though not definitely stated, this appears to be Epictetus' position in the free-will versus determinist debate, and like Aristotle, he clearly accepts free-will. Thus far the Stoic monism might allow him progress on principles that may satisfy in part, both determinists and free-will adherents. But for reasons we have noted in the chapter devoted to their doctrines, the Stoic position cannot stand.

The study of Aristotle's theory of knowledge has shown a specific weakness in the rationalist view, which is relevant to the question of will. It was seen that the same type of reason cannot operate in the practical syllogism as in theoretical reasoning. An additional desiring function was present in the former. This important conclusion from Aristotle has been repeated by modern authors on the subject of will, notably Hampshire, who draws a distinction between

two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of intention and knowledge of fact. The latter is obtained from deductive reasoning, both from the natural course of events and from objective self knowledge. Such knowledge can be proved wrong. Intentions can never be proved wrong since they depend on beliefs and desires, and on a degree of probability, not certainty. Our intentions are in the end responsible for making our decisions.⁹ This knowledge of intentions is very close to the knowledge with desire that was necessary for the specific or particular premisses in Aristotle's practical syllogism. They both indicate a breakdown of general reasoning (and no other type of reasoning is really valid) or of objective knowledge, when an individual makes a decision in a particular circumstance. Epictetus' failure to observe this shortcoming in reason and knowledge is the chief criticism of his doctrine of freedom.

However, whilst Epictetus is not explicitly aware of this shortcoming - he could not openly criticise reason on these grounds and at the same time maintain his position as a Stoic - the introduction of the term 'prohairesis' indicates Epictetus' dissatisfaction with a fully rational system, and his use of the term shares many aspects of the uncertainty principle in the

knowledge of intentions. His adoption of a single term is the nearest approach to a concept of will that exists in ancient philosophy, and we must see how far the concept developed under this term.

In Seneca, will was closely attached to decision (voluntate ac iudicio). This was a development of the free adoption, by συγκατάθεσις, of the phantasiai in the earlier Stoic account. In using prohairesis, Epictetus makes the decision and the will one and the same. That is, no decision in behaviour can be made without the intervention of will. The prohairesis was seen in the previous chapter to be an orektic function, neither essentially rational or irrational, but desiring to function with reason. It was the factor which individualised each person's activity, making it their own. Thus it is not true to say, as Souilhe comments,¹⁰ that in Epictetus the rational is always superior to the irrational. The factor that is basic in Epictetus' psychology is prohairesis, which is the free individual personality which may seek the rational or irrational, and which is ultimately responsible for each decision. Epictetus here progresses beyond his predecessors by allowing uncertainty, something not subject to the laws of reason, in his principle which causes

behaviour (prohairesis).

Epictetus also gives a useful account of what constitutes this uncertainty principle of will. As seen in the previous chapter, the prohairesis is the entire willing and desiring personality of the individual. Epictetus stresses that everything that is individual (τὸ ἑμὸν) is in, or depends upon, prohairesis. We have noticed this in the individual dynamis and character (πρόσωπον), in the degree of knowledge each person attains, and in displaying certain inner virtues of τὸ πιστόν and aidos. All these individualising aspects contribute to prohairesis.

The teaching on dynamis was particularly important in respect to will: these qualities or capacities remain dormant until activated into actuality by prohairesis. The individual, through prohairesis can determine whether to realise his powers or not, and to what extent. Modern accounts of will have given much attention to the comparison of will and power, or capacity, in human actions.¹¹

Another aspect of will in Epictetus, again repeated in modern accounts, is its organic constitution: each choice contributes to some change in a person's total personality. His individual identity is changed in some way, however small, by any single act of will. This was seen clearly in the two

uses of prohairesis in Epictetus, - as choice, and as the total willing personality. The latter is an accumulation of the former. "What I do or will, is caused by the whole of my complex personality at that moment, but the decision I make, what I do, subtly alters this personality." This treatment by E. R. Emmett reflects the position of Epictetus: "prohairesis compels prohairesis". The will - the 'I' - is organic and dynamic, not a static substance as reason is. This is the will, or the orektic element, that functions in attaining the knowledge that leads to decisions, as opposed to objective reasoned knowledge (see above). According to Jaspers, the personal self-determination of the free personality is manifest in "fugitive sensations, perceptions, feelings, intuitions and intimations of the private consciousness."¹² These are precisely the areas controlled by prohairesis in Epictetus' teaching.

There is no adequate account of the part of desire in willing in Epictetus. The reasons for this omission are connected with the thoroughly inner concept of Epictetus' idealism, and were examined in the previous chapter. The omission however must detract from a useful account of the will. We are left with the impression that while prohairesis is orektic and represents a tendency towards rational or

irrational, it is only valuable to the individual when it is fully identified with reason. In actual practice, will is a blend of desire and reason, and a proper account of it should attempt some analysis of the blend, as was done by Aristotle, especially in his discussion on akrasia.

The essence of will is that it is something outside the process of caused events. It is free. Philosophers often have to place the will quite arbitrarily in the string of caused events. This was evident in Aristotle's account of deliberation, and even more so in modern approaches to the philosophy of action.¹³ In Epictetus this elusive quality is displayed in having to regard prohairesis from two different points of view: as the individual choice, and as the total willing personality. They are not different concepts, but two ways of looking at the same thing; but at what point can they both be regarded as the same? Where do they meet? This difficulty in pinning down the will to a particular function is common to both ancient and modern accounts. The reason is probably because the will by definition is uncaused, and any notion that is by nature uncaused, ultimately escapes analysis.

Why then do we use these terms of freedom and will at all? Here we fall back on the final argument of the free-will adherents, - that because the terms will and individual freedom

are meaningful concepts in the language, even to the extent that notions of good, bad, praise and blame, in fact the whole of ethics depend upon them, they must represent some basic freedom in the willing and activity of the individual.¹⁴ We may say that the concepts of will and freedom are part of our 'experiential reality'. In this 'experiential reality' events may occur which are not predictable, and therefore are not experienced as caused events; such are events of the will, and free-will is meaningful. Opposed to this is what we might call 'actual reality', the reality of the world of causation. It may be that all events are caused, including those of will. Those who hold a determinist position, particularly amongst psychologists, believe that events occurring in the mind obey the laws of the mechanistic universe, and can all be reduced to cause and result. It is difficult to prove this position of thorough determinism wrong: it has not yet been demonstrated to be right. But if it were right, and all psychic events were caused, we would still not be in a position to predict results, so long as the processes of causation remain unanalysed. So allowing that it is right, we can hold that there is an 'actual reality' in which all events are caused; the analysis of this causation could well be an impossibility: amongst modern thinkers it is so regarded by Jaspers and Emmett.¹⁵ But so long as there is causation

without prediction, ideas of will and freedom are valid in terms of 'experiential reality'. The Stoic rationalism represents a view of 'actual reality', and prohairesis in Epictetus a view of 'experiential reality', and for this reason, the Discourses present a notable position in discussions on freedom.

In a sense, the above account only takes the free-will/determinist problem a stage further back, to ask which of the two realities is truth. 'Actual reality' may be regarded as truth because it is reducible to laws and reason. But in support of 'experiential reality' is the consideration that it provides a strong enough basis of all ethics and the entire human applications of philosophy. Science and metaphysics are concerned with 'actual reality'; and most of the problems of metaphysics on the one hand, and ethics on the other, have their origin in this divorce of 'experiential' and 'actual' reality.

We must now consider the question of ethics and the individual's responsibility. The conclusions on this were reached in the previous chapter, that the individual's responsibility was primarily to himself alone, in perfecting his own prohairesis. From this initial responsibility, social responsibility would result. Essentially, Epictetus follows the

earlier Stoics in placing the point of responsibility in συγκατάθεσις , - the choice of approval of rational suggestions. His account of prohairesis as the willing personality necessarily extends the notion of responsibility to all a person is at any moment.

This teaching is consistent with the oikeiosis doctrine of the Stoics, that man's proper function is the free contemplation of the rational universe; from this, social oikeiosis will follow. This is theoretical, and consistent with Stoic ideals. But a concept of freedom can be criticised on two levels: first on the philosophic understanding and approach to the concept and terms involved; this we have examined in relation to freedom and will; second, on the value of freedom as a moral virtue: is it sound ethical sense? The term 'freedom' lends itself to limitless philosophical debate and analysis, but in Epictetus it is put as the highest goal of moral conduct, and its value as such must be examined.

Here Epictetus is disappointing, but at least consistent. The aim of his freedom is the perfection of the individual. His ultimate aim is a world peopled with perfect individuals, - a Utopia of perfect wills. Epictetus meets the objection that perfect individuals can never form a

perfect society, by the rule of natural reason, which is responsible for the making of perfect individuals in a perfect society. This is the social oikeiosis. The real flaw in the argument again turns on the shortcomings of the Stoic concept of reason, which were discussed earlier.

Each act of an individual towards society has to be individually willed. In terms of the practical syllogism, it is an event of behaviour, and the will must be involved. Epictetus' concept of will is always internally directed, whereas the notion of willing, as desiring, is naturally externally directed. Compromising though it may be, the position of Aristotle is at least more practical, and the same practical attitude is adopted in modern times by Berlin¹⁶, who criticises the Stoic 'retreat to the inner citadel'. While reason may demand a single virtue, such as truth or freedom, perfect human life and life in society requires a blend of virtues, and freedom must take its place with justice, generosity, and so on. Epictetus could recognise, through the oikeiosis doctrine, that self-identity (perfection of prohairesis) and total harmony with others were compatible, but this was possible only through his idealism. The more common-sense view adopted by Aristotle and Berlin recognises that for society and the individual to attain towards

perfection, self-identity cannot be completely meaningful in the sense that the individual exists freely in himself alone, nor can social harmony ever be perfect, each must sacrifice a little in mutual compromise.

There was a glimpse of such a compromise in the middle period of Stoicism, especially amongst its Roman exponents; but Epictetus returns to the full Stoic tradition and concentrates his whole teaching on the freedom of the inner person, hoping thereby that externals and society will look after themselves. But let us not dismiss this uncompromising freedom without noting its importance, both philosophically and practically. We are dealing here with the third and final 'level' of freedom discussed in the previous chapter, freedom for existence.

The attainment of this freedom brings each individual to his self-identity, that is, to a state where his inner will is directed towards goals of which he is the only cause and source of responsibility. In its simplest terms, this goal is the maintenance of the perfect freedom in order that all virtues and attributes of the individual may be fully his own, caused only by his willing personality, and the self finds itself through freedom. The emphasis on self and prohairesis as the essential 'I', is very marked in

Epictetus' teaching.

In some recent thinkers, this freedom of existence of the self-identity has been a characteristic of the existentialists. Parallels between Epictetus and these thinkers are numerous, both in spirit and detail, though less in the French School. I have taken Karl Jaspers as representative, though equally one could find parallels in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard:

"At the bottom is my liberty, the source of my possibilities, of what I will to be. Existence for me is this active choice of myself in liberty. If I do not come to myself and exercise my liberty in the realm of being-oneself, I remain in the realm of being-there, objectively determined, a thing. When I do come to myself, accompanied by the anguish and the thrill of knowing that all I think, decide, and do, separates me from the solid ground of being, there I launch myself in flight."¹⁷

The three levels of being in Jaspers, - being-there, being-oneself, and being-itself, are paralleled in Epictetus to the external world (τὰ ἔξω), the willing personality (prohairesis) and the cosmic reason (logos). From this it is seen that Epictetus' freedom does not entail the despair of Jaspers, "My essence is freedom, I have no essence." The three

modes in Epictetus are unified by reason. Reason is responsible for the external world; the willing personality is only free when it is reason-tending; and the logos is pure reason. Jaspers remarks that to fail to attain the freedom of the willing personality, or 'being-oneself', is more to be feared than death. The loss of oneself (one's freedom) which comes from attachment to objective substitutes, (for example, a party or state), or by falling back into being-there, causes one to die without having lived. This was exactly Epictetus' position. Absolute inner freedom is necessary to maintain a personal identity of existence.

This then is the purest aspect of freedom as a goal, to attain freedom for the sake of freedom, that is, in order to be wholly oneself. There are however two aspects of inner freedom where its importance is rather in application. Both of these have to some extent been represented in Epictetus' idea of freedom. They are the freedom of the individual for intellectual speculation, and freedom for religious mysticism.

Aristotle stressed the importance of self and *φιλαυτία* in his excursus on *θεωρία* (contemplation). In Epictetus, the individual oikeiosis was *παρακολούθησις*, the understanding of the use of phantasiai. Satisfaction is

is gained from speculation and contemplation of the universe, only if it is done in a free spirit. And it is possibly the only activity to which we can devote ourselves in a free spirit. Russell's remarkable essay in praise of Stoic freedom for twentieth century man, makes this point: "In thought, in aspiration, we are free. Let us learn then that faith which enables us to live continually in the vision of the good."¹⁸ Intellectual contemplation of man's ideals is the last reserve of freedom we have.

From the intellectualist application of freedom, we pass to the mystical: here freedom is found in communion with an Absolute. Before such communion is possible, there has to be purification to dissociate the mind and personality from anything in the external world, to become his true self alone; then the mystic's freedom is perfected in communion. "Strain every nerve in every possible way to know and experience yourself as you really are", says the author of the Cloud of Unknowing. The mystical tendency in Epictetus was examined in chapter six, and we concluded that whilst he shared many aspects of mysticism in the purifying of the prohairesis, the communion he seeks is with pure reason, which is the immanent source of creation, and regeneration, and all activity, including his own willing personality, rather than a

transcendent Absolute being. Here again the rational monism of the Stoic system preserves Epictetus from true spiritual mysticism, just as it preserved him from thorough idealism in his theory of παρακολούθησις. The same consideration, incidentally, preserves him from insisting on a transcendental will of the individual (Kant), or on a transcendental self (Jaspers).

These are the philosophic considerations surrounding the concept of the individual's freedom. But what is this freedom in practical terms? Here we must be content with defining it as 'feeling free', or labelling it spiritual, or perhaps, 'poetic' freedom. It cannot be defined in more precise terms for exactly the same reason as 'will' could not be so defined. Freedom (like will) is part of our 'experiential reality', which ultimately is not reducible to definition in terms of cause and analysis, but only in terms of experience, of 'feeling free'.¹⁹

But we must not allow such a definition to detract from the importance of 'poetic' freedom, as Berlin tends to in preferring a compromise approach to freedom. 'Feeling free' is a positive value, relative to the importance one attaches to being an individual person, or to the worth of one's individuality. If one is convinced that this is

everything, and whatever happens outside an individual ultimately concerns his innermost self in no way whatsoever, than this freedom must be guarded at all costs. This was Epictetus' position, and is present in some degree in most individuals - a yearning to be free - particularly in those who look forward to a perfection of individuality either in this world, as Epictetus does, or in a spiritual world, which is the concern of those who believe in the immortality of the soul. Unamuno states that, "there is nothing more universal than the individual, for what is the property of each, is the property of all. Each man is worth more than the whole of humanity, nor will it do to sacrifice each to all, save in so far as all sacrifice themselves to each."²⁰

If ultimate ends are regarded as individual ends, not social, then the 'poetic' freedom is valid. Again, through the Stoic monism of reason, the individual end perfects the social end, and consequently Epictetus does not feel the same tension in holding a philosophy of 'poetic' freedom as modern thinkers do. This tension is marked in Jaspers from the existentialist point of view, and in Berlin, from the socialist angle. Further examples abound in the plays of Ibsen, notably, 'Hedder Gabbler'.

Epictetus' teaching should hold a place in philosophy

for the account he gives of will, and of the 'poetic' freedom. Both aspects have in common a certain elusive quality, since they are both in the realm of 'experiential reality'. Therefore, our philosophy of them may be enriched by studying different approaches by philosophers schooled in different philosophical traditions. The tradition of Epictetus combines one of the most thorough-going systems of rationalism known in the history of philosophy with an emerging awareness of human experiences outside this rational fabric, - the awareness of will, personality and individuality, and the desires and aspirations which accompany these. In Epictetus, these aspects are constantly breaking in upon the bulwarks of reason, but our conclusions have shown that the rational monism stands firm against the ideas of will and freedom, to give a unique interpretation of these concepts which arise from experience.

An Epilogue: Epictetus and Christianity.

I have deferred discussing similarities between Epictetus and Christianity since it is difficult to compare usefully until both objects of comparison are carefully understood in themselves. In this postscript, I turn to survey this question not because I think that literature on this

subject needs augmenting, but because some of the conclusions of this thesis may help to assess the tradition emerging from the Renaissance and adhered to in the majority of studies and commentaries on Epictetus, of concentrating on Christian parallels and the religious aspects of Epictetus.

Published in 1911, Bonhoffer's "Epictet und das Neue Testament" was a scholarly examination of the similarities, and has become the definitive work on the relation between Epictetus and Christianity. His inquiry was a reply to current thinking in Germany led by Theodor Zahn and others who advanced the theory that the Stoicism of Epictetus was influenced by the New Testament documents.

Bonhoffer opposes this case for "Abhängigkeitsverhältnis" (dependence through direct influence) by showing that the Discourses are the expression of a man who places his entire faith in the Stoic materialism and who preaches these doctrines so unfalteringly and with such complete conviction and satisfaction that he had no need to turn to a different quarter for new thoughts to supplement his beliefs.²¹ This mainspring of Bonhoffer's refutation is borne out by a close examination of words which are common to Epictetus and the New Testament, and of significant words which are peculiar to either, and also of specific parallel passages. He examines

in addition the influence of Stoicism on the New Testament writers,²² and shows that the parallels which exist arise from the two faiths emerging amongst the same intellectual tendencies. In the systematic comparison of Epictetus and the New Testament, which forms the last part of Bonhoffer's work, he admits a far-reaching common spirit shared by both 'faiths'.²³ But when we meet these remarkable parallels of thought between the two, we must be satisfied that there is no causal connection between them. Consequently, if discussions are going to be useful, they must be directed elsewhere than attempting to show direct influence of Stoicism on Christianity, or vice versa, in any essential dogma, however tempting the parallels at first appear.

There has however been an equally misleading trend in the discussions, which has not been so authoritatively countered. It was especially prevalent at the beginning of this century, and may have been influenced by Bonhoffer's final rejection of an actual connection between the New Testament and Epictetus. This is the sentimental view expressed by P. E. More, S. Dill and others,²⁴ that Epictetus was typical of an age groping in darkness before the enlightenment of Christianity, and we are to discern in the late Stoics a deficiency to be filled by the revelation of

Christ. Such thinking engenders a desire to read into Epictetus much that is unwarranted, and to overstate the case for Epictetus' religious personality, as though he would be an immediate convert to Christianity once in possession of the Gospel. To speak as Dill does,²⁵ gives a false impression of Epictetus: "By love and emotion he solved the dualism of the world. God is within the human soul as the voice of conscience, spiritual monitor and comforter, - Holy Spirit, still small voice." Such love, if it has any place in ancient philosophy is Platonic or even pre-Socratic, not Stoic, and nowhere is the Stoic divinity regarded as "cherishing in mercy".

P. E. More also admits that he wishes to come to Epictetus as a Platonist not as a Stoic, and to regard him as "almost a Christian".²⁶ Nor is there any evidence in the Discourses that Later Stoics feel an "inadequacy of man's will alone and long for divine aid".²⁷ On the contrary, as Bonhoffer had demonstrated, Epictetus regards the will as sufficient in itself for virtue and the attainment of freedom, and its perfection is through human endeavour. Epictetus' religious zeal, which cannot be denied, does not detract from his rational convictions; as I have shown already in Chapter Six, his religion, a kind of mysticism, is rational and,

paradoxical though it may seem today, there is little indication that he wanted a more spiritual religion.

We may then dissociate our discussion from this sentimental thinking that Epictetus just missed Christianity, and putting aside for the moment any correspondence in religious fervour, we can consider common aspects of the intellectual or rational content of the two beliefs. First there is the existential aspect, that both beliefs concentrate primarily on the inner well-being and existence of the individual. In Epictetus the life of the individual is unconcerned in the first place with the external world, being totally concerned with having his own will directed in the way of reason. This is most clearly expressed in Discourse IV, 11, on 'Cleanliness'. Man exists to perfect his will, and thereby his life, for by this means he attains freedom.

Christ's aim was to give life more abundantly, (St. John 10, 10), and this more abundant life was the spiritual, inner life of the individual, preparing for salvation after life. This way of salvation for the individual was by a personal and continual commitment to follow Christ. Epictetus demands a commitment constantly renewed of the individual's will to follow reason: both require a continual adjustment of the will towards a life-giving ideal. This

focus of attention on the individual's will, common to both faiths, could account for the many similarities which occur in their moral teaching. The differences emerge from the end on which the will is fixed, rather than on the means.

Stoicism is traditionally offered as comprising a large part of the intellectual background to the New Testament and the Apostolic age, but in such treatments this later development of Stoicism - the individual's responsibility for his inner perfection which is his true life, receives little attention. Whether or not there were common social and political factors causing this concentration on inner perfection to emerge at approximately the same time in Judea and the Graeco-Roman cities,²⁸ this parallel in thinking is important and basic in comparing the two beliefs.

The second common intellectual factor is metaphysical and logical rather than moral. Epictetus' doctrine of the individual's freedom has to be reconciled with the Stoic determinism. Similarly the message of personal commitment of the Gospels has to be accommodated to a doctrine of historical destiny in Judaism, and this led to many complications in the Gospels, and to the problem of predestination in St. Paul's epistles.²⁹ In this way Epictetus and St. Paul are faced with a similar philosophic problem, and compromises

led to the same kind of logical difficulties.

In the writings of St. Paul, as well as in the Gospels, these two aspects account for much of the parallel thought. The concern for the inner man accounts in addition for a similarity in their spirit of preaching. For both Paul and Epictetus are committed to turning man away from the licentious worldliness of the age and the temptations of the flesh. The First Epistle to Corinthians is a notable example. But the mistake must not be made of thinking that because Paul was pressing the same cause, he used Stoic dogma in any form to present this aspect of his teaching to the Gentiles. The introduction to I Corinthians, clearly shows how Paul rejected the wisdom of the Greeks, in preference to the wisdom of God in a mystery; God is not in logos but in power.³⁰ Whilst there are incidental and important similarities of expression, Stoicism is not a vehicle which Paul can use to make the Christian faith intelligible to the Gentiles.³¹ Nor, since Stoicism was based entirely on the material concept of reason, could he even adjust the theories to the extent that the Christian Fathers were able to accommodate Plato and Aristotle in their theology.

In the Patristic period, philosophy made definite incursions upon theological thought, and we may inquire whether

the writings of Epictetus had any influence on this thinking, and particularly whether his philosophy of the will had any effect on the debates that were to take place in the Church in the following centuries, and on the Church's concept of freedom.

After Plotinus the chief philosophic trends from 300 AD were set by the Church, and until Augustine, developed mainly from Neo-platonism, and the concept of the will dominated many discussions and treatises. It was prominent in Gnosticism, particularly Origen, whose psychology is Neo-platonic rather than Stoic. He believed that it was man's duty to overcome sin by his own will, aided by God's grace; through the will man can attain freedom from sin and fellowship with God. Right desire was emphasised by Macarius and Clement of Alexandria. The latter held that the will was the instrument of the stronger desire. It may be that this emphasis on will was influenced by the later Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius, perhaps transmitted through the Neo-platonists,³² but no compelling argument can be found to support the view firstly because the part of the will was a natural postulate in the Church's doctrine of redemption, and not necessarily allied to any previous philosophy, and secondly because the concepts and the psychology were

insufficiently worked out by these Fathers to make any doctrine recognisably similar to that of Epictetus.³³ Accordingly, in the absence of any references by the Fathers to the Stoic philosophers on the concept of will, we can say no more than that the predominance of will in Epictetus and other Stoic philosophers might have provided a sufficient tradition for the concept of will to be such a widely acceptable topic for theological discussion.

In the theology of St. Augustine and those following him, there is a much stronger admixture of Aristotelean thought with Neo-platonism. His teaching on will and freedom is complex, since he sets out to retain an insistence on will whilst defending the doctrines of salvation by grace and predestination, against the 'salvation by will alone' heresy of Pelagius. Augustine's compromise position required the aid of a doctrine of Original Sin. In his arguments he has a strong tendency to regard the will as a faculty of the mind following the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, rather than as a function of the whole personality which is making the choice. This latter was Epictetus' concept of prohairesis. This characteristic feature of Augustine's arguments on will is a regression from the stage reached by Epictetus.

It is rather St. Augustine's concept of soul as a

whole which in certain aspects resembles Epictetus' 'prohairesis'. Soul is described as, "a certain substance participating in reason and suited to directing the body; on it depends all sensual perception and memory, will and intelligence, which have no existence apart from the soul, but are identical with it; they are three relatively, but one substantially."³⁴ Also he states in De Trinitate, "Omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt."³⁵ This is closely parallel to Epictetus' "You are prohairesis". For as with Epictetus, will is the controlling influence in the acquisition of knowledge, and on it depend the mental operations of judging and reasoning, and it determines the result of both sensations and feelings. Thus when Augustine is using a concept of will incidentally, as he is in the above passage which illustrates the doctrine of the Trinity by analogy to human faculties, there are similarities to Epictetus. But in works more specifically related to 'will', especially when countering heresies, there is far less resemblance.

Augustine provides a further parallel in an idea of a perfect freedom, that is, "the free decision of the self-determination of the will towards the good and holy,

exercised in the next life by the righteous: the freedom only to do good because one only wills the good"³⁶ Again it is chiefly the doctrine of original sin, demanding an inherently evil will, which prevents this freedom being attained in this life, the freedom preached by Epictetus for whom the good was reason, and also by later Christian mystics, was for this life.

From these instances it will be seen that the germs of the philosophic problems of will and freedom which were evident in the Gospels developed rapidly during the period of the Church Fathers, and it was natural that many of the observations made by Epictetus were to be repeatedly voiced by theologians. But there is no evidence that the Fathers based any part of their doctrines on Epictetus;³⁷ thus as with Paul, so with the Fathers, we must conclude that any similarities that exist are the result of parallel development of basic philosophic questions, not of direct contact. In the absence then of any association between Epictetus and Christianity during the early history of the Church, what justification is there for the established and fervent connection between the two?

The attraction of Epictetus' works has always been for their moral content rather than literary worth, and not for moral content alone, but for the sincerity with which this is

taught, thus distinguishing Epictetus from Cicero or Seneca.³⁸ In the resurgence of Stoicism during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Epictetus was considered to be outstanding as a teacher of morals. This at least was the opinion of Justus Lipsius of the Low Countries, "Non est qui bonam mentem magis aut trahat aut formet".³⁹ Primarily, the popular book was the Encheiridion, and we may assume that this was frequently translated and read without reference to the Discourses; it is ~~given priority~~ by Lipsius, and the Discourses are dismissed as other works.⁴⁰

The first translation, and this was of the Encheiridion alone, appeared in an age and country where it was less enthusiastically received than its successors, - fifteenth century Italy. This was a translation into Latin by Perotti in Rome for Pope Nicolas V in 1450.⁴¹ The elaborate rhetoric and self importance of the age found little to admire in Epictetus' unembellished style and meekness. But towards the end of the century another translation, apparently independent of Perotti's, was made by Politian,⁴² and was far more favourably accepted, perhaps because of some propaganda on the part of the translator defending Epictetus against the prevailing tendencies of Renaissance thought.

In 1604, a translation of the Encheiridion, together

with the commentary to each chapter by Simplicius, appeared in English from the hand of Geoffrey Stanhope. In the introduction it is definitely stated that the work should be used as a Christian handbook.⁴³

During the eighteenth century it is probable that the impact of the Age of Reason was leading Christian preachers to adopt Epictetus' teaching more carelessly, without the reservations specified by Stanhope. For it would be to counter such a tendency that Elizabeth Carter wrote her Introduction to her translation of Epictetus of 1758, which claims to be the first modern translation (except in French) of the entire extant works.⁴⁴ Writing in an age "Fond of preferring the guesses of human sagacity before the unerring declarations of God", throughout her exposition of the Stoic philosophy, she condemns the basis of Stoic doctrine as being obscure and contradictory, and favours the revelation of God in the Bible. She is worried by the corporeal nature of God, by the lack of an after-life and its accompanying rewards, and by the belief that virtue alone is sufficient to produce happiness, a belief "repugnant to sense and reason".

We may infer from her invective that certain Christian preachers had been confusing aspects of the Stoic rationalism and materialism with the Christian religion. She finally admits

however, that, "the Stoics may be read with advantage, especially in roles of self-government, social behaviour, of the noble reliance on the aid and protection of heaven, and of a perfect resignation and submission to divine will, - but in subordination to Christian reflections". Allowing this, she states, "The Stoics everywhere testify the noblest zeal for virtue and the honour of God, but they tended to establish them on principles inconsistent with the nature of man."⁴⁵

The observation is both accurate and important, anticipating the conclusions of the enquirers of this century. For she admires Epictetus for sharing to a great extent the spirit of Christianity, but rebukes those using him as a substitute for the Bible; and, as Bonhoffer notes, Christians' appreciation of Epictetus had oscillated between these two views.⁴⁶ Subsequent translations⁴⁷ followed Miss Carter's cautions, but they had the advantage of increasing knowledge about the development of Stoic thought. For it was notable that Miss Carter was referring to the spirit of Stoicism in general, without realising Epictetus' distinctive free use of religious expression. Unfortunately, the nineteenth century commentators used their extra knowledge, that the religious element in Epictetus was a distinct development from

the earlier Stoics, against the background of the established association of Epictetus and Christianity. Consequently, they immediately tried to show that the two had some special relationship historically. This was the view which Bonhoffer set out to correct, and the general conclusions of his work compare well with Miss Carter's Introduction.

But even the more recent commentators are still enthusiastic to indicate the Christian parallels in Epictetus. Souilhé⁴⁸ finds the religious attitude more fervent in Epictetus than in either Seneca or the Marcus Aurelius. Lagrange,⁴⁹ writing close upon Bonhoffer's study, suggests that there does exist a parallel of spirit between Epictetus and the New Testament.

This religious "esprit" of Epictetus has already been examined in Chapter Six, and certain aspects of this, set out below, can readily be related to Christianity:

1. The urgency of the preaching.

The repetitive and unembellished style of Epictetus, and his dependence upon illustrations and anecdotes, unparalleled by any other Stoic writer is similar to the urgency of the Gospels and the evangelistic spirit of the Church in the Apostolic Age. They are pressing, without recourse to unnecessary rhetoric.

2. The Mystic Spirit.

This has already been discussed in Chapter Six. Christianity has had many mystic followers. The Church has condemned fanatical mystic movements as heresy, such as the "Pantheist Heresy" of the thirteenth century, but more moderate experiences of Mysticism are entertained within the Church, and indeed are almost inseparable from its theology.⁵⁰

The most dominant mystical aspect which is shared by Epictetus and Christians, is the unity of God and man, and the spiritual freedom resulting therefrom. The Christian mystic, in becoming like Christ, shares His will, becoming detached from self; he wills what Christ wills, and so gains a perfect freedom. The parallel with Epictetus is clear, (though the differences are immense): Epictetus perfects himself in reason which is his universal, or God. The Christian perfects himself in Christ-likeness, that is, following the example of perfect humanity particularly in humility and love; of love, at least, there is no hint in Epictetus. But the result of the mystic tendency, the harmony of wills and perfect freedom has made Epictetus greatly admired by the Christians.⁵¹

3. The claim upon the inner man:

"Both in Epictetus and Christianity, goodness, or, for

the Christian, salvation is dependent on the state of the inner man. In both beliefs, the purification of the internal dispositions are towards an ideal, in Epictetus the ideal of reason, in Christianity the ideal of Christ-likeness. Similarly, the attainment of this ideal results in a perfect freedom. Because of this common orientation of their moral thinking, the personal conduct of the Stoic and Christian has much in common.

First, their moral conduct requires a certain detachment from material goods, from wealth and extravagance and positions of honour. These are not to be held in esteem, for such externals are unable to benefit the inner man. The Stoic extends this detachment to human relationships, since the rational spirit can be sullied even by ties of affection. For the Christian seeking Christ-likeness, the perfection of love is an essential aspect of the Christian character.⁵²

On the attachment to life itself, there is a distinct difference between Stoic and Christian. Martyrdom, that is, to be killed while defending one's belief against persecution, is admired by both. But suicide is contrary to the Christian belief in the sanctity of life.⁵³ For the Stoic, it is permissible and laudable if in any act he has no alternative but to transgress his principles and soil his personal inner

virtue. The Christian only faces voluntary death if the alternative is to deny in public his professed faith, and to betray Christ or the Church. If he is merely forced to act in an un-Christian way, he may pray for God's grace and forgiveness.

Second, this attitude of detachment is inclined to create a tension in the individual between the natural man of worldly desires, and the inner or spiritual man seeking detachment from these. Both Stoic and Christian experience this tension between an inner will or conscience that desires the good and passing desires stimulated by some external object which tempt the inner will to yield. Although the exact terms of this tension vary considerably, - and significantly - the problem is basically the same as that encountered in Aristotle's position of akrasia.

The third common characteristic in moral conduct arises from this need to conquer the natural man. It is the method of self-discipline or askesis. In formal discipline the brotherhoods and sisterhoods of the Church have much in common with Epictetus' training programme. In order for the inner will to attain perfection, it must be fortified against temptation through thorough schooling and habitual exercises. This repetition of moral principles, the self-examination of conduct, and the examples of Stoic 'saints', are important

aspects of Epictetus' askesis. The moral discipline extends from the formal discipline of the school to the self-imposed discipline of daily life. Thus the asceticism of the Stoic was far from mere denial, but rather a striving after virtue, which is the perfecting of the will, just as St. Paul speaks of exercising himself (ἀσκεῖν) to have a clear conscience.⁵⁴

Today, amid the restlessness in theological thinking and the indecisiveness in the principles of Christian morality, appeal is again being made to the discipline of orthodoxy, and for Christians to strengthen their practical profession of the Faith through the traditional ascetic of regular prayer, office and sacrament. And equally important is the habitual recollection privately, to keep the tenets of faith in constant rehearsal.⁵⁵

Finally, in pursuing moral progress, Christians and the Stoic practise self-effacement, the virtue of becoming ταπεινός, - an adjective common to Epictetus and the New Testament. Epictetus admired the Cynic's way of life, and is eager not to make a show of philosophy, but rather to undertake everything for the improvement of one's own inner life. This virtue is not conspicuous in other Stoic writers of the period. Self-effacement however does not preclude holding

one's own life as an example to others. Epictetus and St. Paul did this unashamedly,⁵⁶ but the sincere believer, Stoic or Christian, expects no praise nor material reward.

These are aspects where there is a general similarity of spirit between Epictetus and Christianity, which we can now define further as a similarity in moral commitment and method of moral progress. These are immediately recognisable in reading the Encheiridion, or any selection of the Discourses. If thoroughly examined, they will always testify Miss Carter's observation that Epictetus' ethics are based on a different concept of man's destiny from the Christian view. But we are not here making a systematic comparison between the two beliefs, but enquiring with what justification Epictetus has been a popular author amongst Christians.

The majority of Christian people through the ages, have not involved themselves primarily with thoughts on the destiny of man and the nature of God, or the relation between man and God. Their faith has simplified these important theological questions to an expectation of life after death, to a conviction that God is love, and to the observance of the sacraments of the Church, approached in holiness and purity of life. Accepting this faith, the

everyday thoughts of the ordinary Christian are concerned with purity and moral progress. This pilgrim's progress is not an intellectual grasp of theological questions, but a progress towards a moral perfection through the imitation of Christ. It is precisely this purity of life that is emphasised in Epictetus' ethics, and for this reason his writings are immediately attractive to the ordinary Christian, irrespective of the principles on which the homilies towards moral progress are based.⁵⁷ To exercise the means for reaching the end is possible for every Christian, but to understand fully the end, requires much learning.

Thus the common spirit shared by Epictetus and Christians is a common method or approach to the perfect life; and a Christian reading the Discourses will be struck by this common esprit, will be uplifted by it, and will want to re-read. He will not base his beliefs on the parallels, for he is likely to know as little about the philosophic basis of Epictetus' morals as he does of the principles of Christian theology, but he will feel inspiration finding that a Greek pagan could share even to this extent the moral spirit of Christianity.

Just as, in examining the 'common spirit', the parallels were seen to be in practical conduct and the moral

outlook of one's life, so now, in turning to specific similarities in the theories on which conduct is based we find considerable correspondence between the ethics of Epictetus and the moral theology of the Church, but not extending to the metaphysical or religious basis of the ethics. And in this sphere of ethical concepts and theory, the following parallels may be noted.⁵⁸ Commentaries have given comparatively little attention to these parallels in theory, concentrating more upon the incidental parallels in the practical outlook of the 'common spirit'.

1. The end of man.

For the Christian, the end of man is God: to share in His goodness. For Epictetus, the end is reason, and perfection consists in sharing this all-pervading reason. Further, the Christian believes that there is a special sharing for man, which the rest of creation does not enjoy, because man, although a creature, reaches nearer to perfection since he is made in the image of God.⁵⁹ The distinction in Epictetus was that man possesses the faculty of understanding (*παρὰ κολούθησις*), and is therefore equipped to reason ideally, on the level of universal reason; his reasoning faculty is an apospasma, or 'off-cut', of that reason.

2. The will.

Neither Epictetus nor the Church arrived at a clear concept of will. In Epictetus' view some elusive or incalculable factor was involved, yet this did not deter him from placing prohairesis at the centre of our whole moral being. Belief in will also had its problems for the Church, as we have noted, but its importance in human nature and conduct is always stressed. "It is by will that we both sin and live righteously." says St. Augustine.⁶⁰ External acts add nothing to the moral character of the individual. Every deed must be the result of an inner will and commitment to the good. This is the teaching in the Sermon on the Mount. The will likewise is essential in sin.⁶¹ Sin is a "voluntary aversion from the immutable and universal good, and the turning to one's own good and to external and inferior goods."⁶² An evil desire arises from perverse will. This aspect of the Christian doctrine of sin closely resembles Epictetus' teaching on the $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$.

The Church teaches that man has conscience, as the power of knowing what conduct is right, and he also has free will to determine his own self to adopt this conduct. The will may be feeble and lead him to act against conscience, as St. Paul's, "The good that I would I do not" (Romans 8, 19).

On the question of conscientia, we saw that Seneca was nearer to the Church's teaching than Epictetus, and the omission of conscience in Epictetus' doctrine requires explanation.

The term 'conscience' involves not only knowledge of what is good, but also an accompanying desire to do this good. This desire would be the general βούλησις which Aristotle adopts. Any tempting immediate desire can then pull against this knowledge, and even overmaster this general will. In Epictetus, as was seen in the discussion on akrasia in Chapter five, man potentially has the knowledge of the good in his reasoning faculty. But in order to adopt the correct conclusions of reason, the choice of the prohairesis is required in the judgement, or κρίσις. This control by a rational will then becomes our 'conscience', in the sense that it is knowledge of the good, accompanied by an orektic factor. But if the will judges against reason, the 'conscience' (reason with will) is destroyed.

In reaching this position on 'conscience', Epictetus was following the traditional unity of the hegemonikon in Stoic thought, which disallows opposing desires. The contrary drives in deliberating conduct occur in the phantasiai, which are of varying strength, and are regarded

as external to us. But it was noted in Chapter Five that the phantasiai were not really external, but since they contained a subjective element, were only external to the prohairesis. For this reason, whilst the idea of 'conscience' is foreign to the Stoic psychology which Epictetus was following, his writings often suggest that to be tempted against reason was to act against conscience. Moreover, it is natural that Seneca, being more eclectic, abandoned the strict Stoic teaching on this point in favour of a concept, conscientia, which accords better with our experience.

3. Natural and supernatural virtues.

The Church has distinguished between natural and supernatural virtues.⁶³ The natural virtues can be acquired by habituation, such as by maintaining a right attitude towards externals. The supernatural virtues are attained only through a supernatural principle, God's grace. Moreover, natural virtues unless assisted by supernatural virtues, will not remain virtues, but will degenerate into habits. In accordance with these two classes of virtues, there can be naturally good actions and supernaturally good actions.

There is a resemblance here in the virtues frequently listed by Epictetus, - self-respect, faith and magnanimity, and his over-riding virtue, the perfection of the prohairesis.

The separate virtues which the good man displays are only properly acquired if they are the result of a good prohairesis, and this prime (cf. supernatural) virtue is acquired through a universal principle, namely reason.

A naturally good action in Epictetus, may be described as one in which the agent accepts the will of nature as he sees it expressed. This offers freedom at the second stage, the stage of resignation, in the analysis given in Chapter Seven. By consistently willing each event as it happens, a person is doing the right thing. A supernaturally good action would be one in which the prohairesis perfectly reflects universal reason, so that prohairesis of its own natural accord, chooses the course of nature; this is freedom in the third stage. In this two-tier concept of moral actions there is resemblance to the Church's teaching, for attainment of virtue at the higher level depends on the perfection of the universal principle in us.

Knowing how readily a comparative study may degenerate into a game of intellectual 'snap', I have tried in this epilogue to account for ~~and~~, in a sense, to justify the association between Epictetus and Christianity, not by indicating every

incidental parallel, but by finding grounds for the existence of a common spirit, and further, by showing some common approaches in ethical theory. The 'common spirit' has appealed to Christians of different periods, because it serves a number of intellectualising aspects of Christianity, such as mysticism and rationalism. Today, the existential thought of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries has influenced some theological discussions, and this spirit also is reflected in Epictetus, as was noted in the Conclusions. Less intellectual aspects, especially the strong sense of moral discipline, have also held their appeal.

In ethical guidance, we have seen that parallels between Epictetus and Christian, occur on a level deeper than mere practical moral conduct, and exist in some of their basic ethical concepts. And I believe this does more than explain the association of the two beliefs: it justifies the usefulness of Epictetus' doctrines for the Christian, provided he realises that these parallels are confined to the moral beliefs. For as Elizabeth Carter remarked, the concepts of man and God, and the relationship between man and God are basically different. Interest in comparing the moral aspect of the two beliefs is enriched by understanding those essential differences: Epictetus

shows a religious aspiration to reason, which in his psychology is 'super-man', - the perfection of each individual's personal life, and in his metaphysics is 'super-men', - the common universal material of all mankind and creation; he has no God apart from this rational material.

Even though the association of Epictetus' teaching with Christianity is valid to a point, this ought not to influence commentators to regard this association as the major importance of Epictetus' works. If it was likely that Epictetus had influenced the Church in any essential aspect, or if the New Testament had influenced Epictetus, which theory Bonhoffer has rejected, then this association would warrant the most diligent investigation. But since this evidence is lacking, a full comparative study, although being interesting, would little advance our knowledge either of Epictetus or of the Christian faith.⁶⁴ For the Christian certainly there is justification to approach Epictetus sympathetically, for they share a common spirit; but those approaching Epictetus critically should view him in his rightful place in the history of philosophy, as representative of the final trend in Stoicism, not as the precursor of Christianity. This has been the object of this thesis, and approached in

this way, there will occur to the student many parallels with philosophers and beliefs other than Christian, particularly of the modern era.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. The social oikeiosis is stressed throughout the Meditations, (II 4f; IX 22 - 3; XI 21, etc.): the individual is important as part of the entire plan of the cosmos, and attention should be given to the inner man, that his 'will' always accords with nature. Consequently there are references to the self-examination, (III 5 - 6), and the inner virtues of τὸ πιστόν and aidos, which are reminiscent of Epictetus.

But the Meditations contain no positive function of will, and no mention of prohairesis. Man comprises hegemonikon, σάρκιον and τὸ πνευμάτιον. After Epictetus, prohairesis again lapses into the hegemonikon, from which he had developed the concept, of will, (see Chapter Five).

The nearest approach to will in Marcus Aurelius is τὸ προαιρετικόν, a single occurrence, (VIII 56). The context is to be noted: will is introduced as a solution to the problem of evil. If each individual is designed to function in harmony

with nature, how can evil arise? - through will (τῷ προαιρετικῷ), that is, an inclination to turn from reason. The function is the same as Epictetus' 'prohairesis', - a controlling factor of will outside reason, prompting choice. But will is not generally used in Marcus Aurelius in this sense, and we may interpret this single instance as the author being forced to introduce a term, almost a 'dirty word' into his pure Stoicism, in order to ease a real problem. Epictetus had pushed the non-rational too far in adopting prohairesis, that a reaction set in. τὸ προαιρετικόν (= prohairesis) was still current, but not for Stoics. Marcus Aurelius well illustrates the negative kind of freedom ('freedom from') typical of the Stoics, the 'retreat to the inner citadel' (VIII 48); Epictetus' prohairesis preserves him from a purely negative position.

2. Hampshire, Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom, p. 197.
3. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 141 - 154.
4. Epictetus, II 22, 19, etc.

5. For further parallels, see below.
6. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 48 - 9.
7. Berlin, Op. cit. p. 147.
8. Berlin, Op. cit. p. 146f.
9. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 85 - 90.
10. Souilhé, Épictète, Vol. IV, p. 12 - 13 (note):
 "Épictète, comme toute la morale Stoicienne
 d'ailleurs se caractérise beaucoup plus par une
 exaltation du jugement que par une exagération de la
 volonté."

Souilhé fails to recognise that in Epictetus, prohairesis is anterior to judgement. Judgement is certainly the all-important factor in living according to nature, but prohairesis is responsible for judgement, and must include desiring as well as calculating faculties.

Epictetus is distinctive amongst Stoics for stressing will (prohairesis) in favour of rational

judgement, as the controlling factor in decisions. Souilhé's interpretation disregards this important development, "Le jugement entraînant fatalement la tendance, le désir et l'aversion."

11. Hampshire, Freedom and the Individual, p. 24 - 7.
12. Blackham, Op. cit. p. 46.
13. For instance, Melden, in The Philosophy of Action (Ed. White), p. 70. A selection of modern studies which afford useful comparison with Epictetus' position, appears in the Bibliography.
14. Berlin has recently put this argument, Op. cit. Introduction, xxvii - xxxvii.
15. Blackham, Op. cit. p. 46. Emmett, Learning to Philosophise, p. 208.
16. Berlin, Op. cit. p. 167f.
17. Paraphrased by Blackham, Op. cit. p. 48 - 9

18. Russell, A Free Man's Worship, contained in, Mysticism and Logic, p. 43.
19. A general point may be made here: when persons are involved in discussions on their personal or political liberty, it is a feeling of liberty they wish to preserve. In colloquial use the word is rarely meant to extend to absolute freedom; if at this moment I was not 'free' to speak to the person I am with in the room, I should feel a restriction of my liberty. But if I was not 'free' now to walk to Lands End, I should perhaps intellectually accept that this was a restriction on my freedom, but I should feel no such restriction. A recognition of this feeling of freedom, or relativism, is important to our understanding of the concept, 'freedom'.
20. Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, p. 61.

EPILOGUE

21. Bonhoeffer, Epictet und das Neue Testament, 1911, p. 75.

22. Op. cit. Book one, Second part.
23. In parts of his comparative study, especially p. 382 - 90, Bonhoffer presses this common spirit almost to the point of contradicting his main refutation.
24. P. E. More, Hellenistic Philosophies (1923); S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius (1904); J. Baldwin Brown, Stoics and Saints, 1893; F. W. Ferrer, Seekers after God (1902) p. 186f.
25. Op. cit. p. 389.
26. Op. cit. p. 63.
27. C. H. Moore, Ancient Beliefs in the Immortality of the Soul, (1931) p. 51 - 2.
28. E. R. Dodds has traced a similarity in the stresses faced by individuals in the 1st. and 2nd centuries in Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety. He notes, for instance, the idea of confession of sin in Epictetus, (III 10, 2.) A similar view is held

by Gilbert Murray, Stoic, Christian and Humanist,
p. 74.

29. The difficulty is not only noticable in St. Paul, but also in Philo, who adopts intermediaries to explain the transcendence and immanence of God, which is a related problem. See especially, Quod deus sit immutabilis, 10, 47 - 8.
30. II Corinthians 2, 5.
31. On Paul's attitude to the Stoic tradition, see Bonhoffer, Op. cit. p 98 - 101.
32. For instance, Simplicius of Cilicia, the last of the Neo-platonists, was sufficiently interested in Epictetus to write a full commentary on the Encheiridion, in the early sixth century.
33. In reflecting generally on the development of Ancient and Medieval philosophy, it is surprising to find so little advance in the concept of will. From Socrates onwards, philosophers are increasingly

aware of its importance in moral discussion. Yet if it was sometimes central to the philosophers' thought, it was never central to the tradition or system which they were following. The question was rarely asked: "What constitutes will?" The most objective analyses, by Aristotle and the Middle Stoa, were incomplete and lacked a clear definition of terms. It is only in modern times that we can speak of a Philosophy of the Will, when the development of linguistic philosophy and psychology affords a clearer terminology for description than was possible before. Against this general background of will in the history of philosophy, the idea of prohairesis in Epictetus, cannot be regarded as meagre.

34. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, ix.
35. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, xi.
36. J. Morgan, The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine, p. 156. cf. St. Augustine, Encheiridion, cv.

37. Bonhoffer gives evidence of certain Christian paraphrases of the Encheiridion, such as the Encheiridion of Nilus, but these were confined to the Eastern Church; op. cit. p. 383 - 5.
38. W. S. Landor, in his Imaginary Conversations, (1821 - 1863) composes an interesting dialogue between Epictetus and Seneca, in which the latter is severely censured for his parade of philosophy and rhetoric: "Are philosophers only philosophers for the people, and instead of instructing them, must they play tricks before them?" Perhaps in his admiration for Epictetus, Landor was influenced by Robert Southey, who in a letter to Landor writes: "Christian Stoicism is wholesome for all minds: were I your Confessor, I should enjoin you throw aside Rousseau and make Epictetus your manual" (1808) - from R. H. Super, Walter Savage Landor: a Biography.
39. Justus Lipsius, Manductionis ad Stoicam Philosophiam Libritres. (Antwerp, 1604), Dissertatio XIX on Epictetus.

40. On Epictetus' works, Lipsius says: "Encheiridion sane egregium et Stoicae moralis philosophiae velut anima; item Dissertationes quas obiter in via domo schola habuit."
41. Now edited by R. P. Oliver, Niccolo Perotti's Version of the Encheiridion of Epictetus, (Illinois, 1954).
42. R. P. Oliver, op. cit., p. 28.
43. "The instructions are so wise, the allusions so lively, the exhortations so moving and the arguments so strong that they may well be allowed to excite our greatest admiration. The application is so easy, by a little change of philosophy into religion, and the plurality of Divine Beings into the one True God, that any considering Christian may here find a scheme of what he himself ought to be." (Introduction to Stanhope's translation, 1604)
44. Elizabeth Carter, Epictetus' Discourses and Encheiridion, 1758, now re-published in the Everyman edition. In 1702, a further rendering of the Encheiridion alone

had been undertaken by Ellis Walker: Epictetus made English in a Poetical Paraphrase.

45. Op. cit. Introduction p. xix.
46. Bonhoffer, Op. cit. p. 2: "..... teils als Geistesverwandler der Christlichen Lehre, teilsals Ersatz für sie."
47. G. Long, 1877. P. E. Matheson, 1916. W. A. Oldfather, 1946.
48. Souilhé, Introduction to his translation, p. viii.
49. Fr. M. J. Lagrange, La Philosophie religieuse d'Epictete. Revue Biblique, 1912, p. 192 ff:
"Le parallèle vient à l'esprit de chacun, (Epictetus and N. T.)."
50. For evidence of the mystic spirit within the Church, see S. Spencer, Mysticism in World Religion, Ch. 7, especially p. 231 - 56.
51. The similarities and contrasts between Epictetus and

Christianity on the mystic freedom are well expressed by C. F. d'Arcy, God and Freedom in Human Experience, (1915), p. 217: "The principle of love harmonises wills without destroying their freedom. There is a relationship amongst spiritual beings, and a relationship which can be characterised as goodness or harmony of wills. The all-inclusive aim of the universe is a realisation of love; this definition includes all goodness, all freedoms, and is as far as possible from regarding the spiritual world as a great mechanical system working out inevitably a pre-determined end."

52. φιλοστοργία , natural brotherly affection, is mentioned as a virtue by Epictetus, but only secondary to the prohairesis. It is not the 'love' which is at the centre of the Christian character. See Bonhoffer, op. cit. p. 134.
53. Ephesians 5, 29.
54. Acts 24, 16.

55. Martin Thornton, The Rock and the River, (1965, London).
56. Epictetus, IV 10, 14 - 15; and St. Paul, II Corinthians 4, 8ff. On ταπεινός see Ch.2 note 133.
57. P. E. Matheson, in his introduction to the translation, p. 38, sums up the spirit of the Discourses thus: "His overmastering conviction of the supremacy of reason, his impatience of unmanliness and loose-living, his belief in the unity of nature and the kinship of the rational world, in which all men are related as children of one father, - all these doctrines are enforced by a dramatic method which arrests and convicts, a sarcasm which strips affectation bare, and a fiery earnestness which robs his crude strokes of their cruelty."
58. For a basic Christian moral theology I have used the work of the Roman Catholic theologian, Hormann, An Introduction to Moral Theology, (trans. Quinn, London, 1961).
59. Philippians 3, 10 - 15.

60. St. Augustine, Retr. 1 c.9, n.4.
61. St. Matthew 15, 19.
62. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. 2 c.19, n. 53.
63. Hormann, Op. cit, p. 126. cf. R. C. Mortimer, The Elements of Moral Theology, p. 103 - 8.
64. In the German Language a thorough comparison has been made in Bonhoffer's work (op. cit, p. 195 ff.) in which all the comparative material has been collected. Interest lies in the conclusions to be drawn from this material, and these he leaves for each individual reader to decide for himself (p. 389). The comparative material is a basis for speculation only.

APPENDIX I

PROHAIRESIS IN EPICTETUS' WORKS

The different categories of reference of the term prohairesis in Epictetus, are set out below. Note has been taken of each distinctive occurrence of the term. These occurrences are:

<u>Discourse</u> I.	1 23	17 26	29 3
	2 33	18 8	29 1, 2
	4 18	18 17	29 12
	8 16	19 8	29 47
	12 9	22 10	30 4
	17 21	25 1	
<u>Discourses</u> II.	1 12	10 27, 29	22 29
	5 4, 6	16 1	23 17 - 19
	6 25	22 19	23 22
	10 1	22 21, 26	23 40
<u>Discourses</u> III.	1 40, 42	5 7, 2	22 103
	2 13	10 18	22 105
	3 8	18 <i>passim</i>	23 5
	4 9	19 2	26 24
<u>Discourses</u> IV.	4 23	5 32	13 14
	5 11, 23	12 12	13 21
<u>Encheiridion</u>	4	9	13 30

Of these instances I have chosen seven classifications; where two references are put beside each other, their contexts are closely similar:

A. The prohairesis is free, i.e. independent of externals.

I 1, 23	I 29, 47	II 16, 1
I 4, 18	II 5, 4 6; 6 25	III 18 passim
I 12, 9	II 10, 1	III 21 (105) ?
I 17, 21	II 10, 27	IV 12 12
I 18, 17; 19 8		

B. Prohairesis as the choosing function in making a judgement or decision.

I 22, 10	II 22, 29; III 22 103
II 1, 12	III 2, 13

C. Good and bad is only meaningful in terms of a good or bad prohairesis. Prohairesis is the source of moral responsibility.

I 8, 16: 29 1 - 2	II 10, 25
I 29, 3	IV 12, 7

D. Prohairesis implies right, or necessary, choice, in accordance with nature and reason.

I 18, 8

III 3, 8; 5 7

I 30, 4

IV 5, 32

III 4, 9

Ench. 4; 13; 30.

E. Prohairesis as choice, affecting prohairesis as moral character. Moral character in turn is responsible for choice.

I 17, 26

II 10, 27 29

III 18, passim

I 18, 8

II 23, 17 19

III 19, 2

I 29, 12

II 23, 40; III 14 2 Diss. IV 4, 23.

F. Prohairesis as a man's moral character.

I 2, 33; IV 13, 14

II 5, 2

II 22, 19

III 10, 18

II 22, 26

III 23, 5

G. Prohairesis as a man's character in terms of a willing personality, directing his free existence. It is the essential self.

I 18, 17; 19 8

III 1, 40

II 22, 21

IV 5, 11 23

II 23, 22

Ench. 9

APPENDIX II

SOCRATIC REFERENCES IN EPICTETUS' WORKS

The resurgence of Socratic elements in later Stoicism was noted in chapters two and three. I believe the interest in the Socratic Dialogues of Plato, and Xenophon's account of Socrates' life, accompanied a general tendency found in writers of 1st centuries B. C. and A. D. towards certain Pythagorean precepts and doctrines. There is at any rate, material here for study, and its importance in the later development of philosophy, particularly Neo-Platonism, could be considerable.

Below I have listed and classified the references to Socrates in Epictetus' works. I have included direct references only. The study could be extended to include parallel terminology, particularly with the 'Apology', for instance, the use of δαίμων (I 14, 14), αἰδώς (passim) and οἶοντα εἰδέναι (II 11, 2).

A. Socrates, an example of the Stoic sage.

I 2, 33	III 7 34	III 26 23
I 19 6	III 16 5	IV 8 22
II 4 8	III 22 26	IV 9 6
II 13 24	III 24 38	<u>Ench.</u> 33

B. His methods of philosophy, dialectic etc.

I 17 12	II 12 14
*II 2 32	II 26 6
II 12 5	III 14 9
	IV 1 41

*A remarkable reference to writings by Socrates.

C. The importance of self-examination.

I 25 31	III 5 14
I 26 18	III 12 15
II 2 32	

D.¹ He was unaffected by externals and 'duties'. His own life was self-sufficient, and his attention was on inner will.

II 16 35	IV 5 3 - 4	IV 9 19
II 18 22	IV 5 33	<u>Ench.</u> 46
III 24, 60	IV 7 28	Frag. 11(Schweighauser)

D.² By willing resignation, he was unaffected even by his imprisonment and death. This was God's role for him, and they therefore cannot affect the inner man.

I 4 24	II 2 8	IV 1 123
I 12 23	II 5 18	IV 1 159 - 169
I 29 17	II 6 26	IV 4 21 - 2
I 29 65	III 18 4	<u>Ench.</u> 5
II 1 15		

E. God stations each person at his post, (military metaphor).

I 9 22

III 21 19

I 29 29

III 24 99

III 1 19

F. His belief in a personal God

I 9 1

I 12 3

G. An attitude to divination.

Ench. 32.

A recent study of some Pythagorean sources has been made by C.de Vogel, Philosophia I (1970), pp.27-107. These chapters are of value in making an estimate of Socrates and the later Socratic influences upon Stoicism, particularly on the 'spiritualising' tendency, discussed at the end of chapter three of this thesis. Her second volume of Philosophia, on aspects of Christian and Patristic thought, will, I hope, contribute considerably to some of the problems of development of later Stoicism referred to in this thesis.

INDEX OF PRINCIPAL PASSAGES CITED

Aetius	<u>page</u>	Diocles Magnes	<u>page</u>
(see <u>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</u>)		(see S.V.F.)	
Aristotle		Epictetus	
<u>Nic. Ethics,</u>		<u>Discourses</u>	
1109 b - 1115 a	35-41	I 1, 1-12	232-3
1139 a - 1144 b	45-50	1, 4	192
1147 a - 1151 a	49-50	1, 7-9	194
1168 b - 1169 a	68	1, 27	356-7
1177 a, 12 et seqq.	76	2, passim.	273-4
		2, 30	299n.3
Aurelius, Marcus		3,3	233
<u>Meditations</u>		3, 4	230
VII 56	433n.1	4, 1	332
		6, 1-7	268
Chrysippus		6, 8	234
(see S.V.F.)		6, 10	197
		6, 18-22	207-8
		6, 30	270-1
Cicero			301n.40
<u>Academica post.</u>		9, 5-17	264
I 11, 40	113-4		311n.87
<u>De Finibus,</u>		11, 27-40	240
V 24-6	149	12, 12	328
V 47-59	149		311n.87
<u>De Natura Deorum,</u>		14, 7-8	119, 197
I 43-4	119	14, 2-14	278
<u>Paradoxa</u>			283-4
V	156	16, 1-5	260
		17, 1-3	194
Cleanthes		17, 11-14	358-9
(see S.V.F.)			

<u>Epictetus</u>	<u>page</u>
<u>Discourses</u> (contd.)	
I 17, 23	315
17, 26	324
17, 27	185n.51
18, 1-2	231
18, 8	327
18, 17-19	336
19, 11-15	352
20, 1-6	195
22, 1-9	198-200 368n.23
22, 9	202
25, 1-6	201
26, 15	237-8
27, 1-2	210
27, 15 et seqq.	209
27, 10	225
28, 1-6	209, 216
28, 7-9	227-8
28, 12 et seqq.	212-4
29, 1-8	333
II 4, 2-4	293
5, 1-17	321-2
5, 10	356
5, 24 et seqq.	262
5, 29	359-60
6, 9	356
6, 12	296n.7
8, 1-14	194, 206
8, 4 et seqq.	208
8, 11-14	235

<u>Epictetus</u>	<u>page</u>
<u>Discourses</u> (contd.)	
II 10, 6	356
10, 27	320
11, 1-20	200-1 247n. 14
13, 8-9	322-3
13, 13	292
14, 6-12	235 257n.85
14, 15-16	207-8
16, 1 et seqq.	314
16, 16	333
16, 41	268-70
17, 12-13	261
17, 19	227-8 254n.64
18, 8-9	221-2
18, 15-25	224
18, 19	231
18, 29-32	225-6
19, 26	277
20, 11	210
22, 6	220
22, 19	239
23, 3	250n.33
23, 5-29	320
23, 19-27	315
23, 43	316
26, 1-7	287, 259
26, 2	228-9
28, 6-8	338
28, 19-28	294

<u>Epictetus</u>	<u>page</u>	<u>Epictetus</u>	<u>page</u>
<u>Discourses (contd.)</u>		<u>Discourses (contd.)</u>	
III 1, 25-6	193	IV 3, 8	343,349
2, 1-2	322	4, 24 et seqq.	354
3, 2-3	217,230	5, 14	271
3, 4	231	6, 6-8	289
5, 7-11	311a,n.87	7, 7	192,246 n.3
7, 7	230	7, 31	339
7, 24	353	7, 40-41	237,239
7, 27-8	291,331	8, 1-4	359
8, passim	288	10, 8	322
10, 17-20	355	11, 5-6	238
12, 7	224	12, 12	369n. 37
13, 7	288	12, 16-18	354
20, 1-2	21215-6	<u>Encheiridion</u>	
21, 14-16	278	2	332
22, 5-8	267-8	17	301n.46
22, 33-41	238	<u>Fragments</u>	
23, 4 et seqq.	267	(Schweighauser, ed.)	
24, passim	317,319	52	22231
24, 9-11	261	174	267
24, 20-24	354	180	221-2
24, 34	287	Gellius, Aulus <u>N. A. VII</u> 2 130	
24, 58-60	354	Plato	
24, 88	224	<u>Laws</u>	
24, 91 et seqq.	26	644 D	73
	297n.11	653 A-C	63-5
108	220-225	709 A-B	73
24, 110-11	284	715 E - 716 D	71
25, 6	221	896 D - 897 D	74
IV 1, passim	317,343	903 B-C	71
2, 4	338	904 B-C	72

Plato (contd.)	<u>page</u>	Seneca	<u>page</u>
<u>Philebus</u>		<u>De Beneficiis</u>	
21 D - 36 B	61-3	IV 6-8	174
50 B - 52 B	62-3	<u>De Ira</u>	
<u>Republic</u>		I 8	166-7
436 A - 444 B	59-60	II 1-4	165-6
516 C - 517 C	77-78	<u>Epistles</u>	
617 E	72,75	XVI	145
<u>Symposium</u>		XLI	174-5
210 A - 212 A	77		
Plutarch		<u>Stoicorum veterum</u>	
<u>De Stoicorum</u>		<u>fragmenta (ed. Arnim)</u>	
<u>Repugnantis</u>		I 537 (Cleans) 172	
1045 E-F	125-6	II 75	115
1055 F et seqq.	117,130	II 83 (Aetius)	118
1057 A et seqq.	117	II 87 (Diocles)	118-9
		III 173	364n.3
		III 377 (Chrysippus)	125

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note The only volumes underlined are those such as journals or collections of works and papers, of which the bibliographical item is only a part.

A. Sources

Note This is a select list of the principal authors; other ancient authors and works appear in the general index. Other editions of works here listed and commentaries which I have used, will be found in the General Bibliography, under the editor's name.

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. I Bywater, Oxford Classical Texts), Oxford, 1890.

Aurelius, Antoninus Marcus, The Meditations (Trans. C.R.Haines, Loeb Classical Library, -L.C.L.-), London, 1916

Cicero, De Finibus (Trans. H.Rackham, L.C.L.), London, 1913.

De Officiis (Trans. W.Miller, L.C.L.), London, 1913.

Paradoxa Stoicorum (ed. A.G.Lee), Macmillan Classical Series, London 1953.

Epictetus, Editio Maior (ed. Schenkl, H. Editio Minor, 1898, 2nd.ed.1916; Teubner Texts), Leipzig, 1894.

- Gellius; Aulus, *Noctes Atticae* (Trans. J.C.Rolfe, L.C.L.), London, 1927.
- Greek New Testament, The (Ed. Atland, Black, Metzger and Wikgren), London, 1966.
- Philo *Quod omnis probus liber sit* (Trans. F.H.Colson and C.H.Whitaker, in Philo, vol.IX, L.C.L.), London, 1941.
- Plato *Laws* (Ed. J.Burnet, Plato, vol.IV, O.C.T.), Oxford, 1906.
- Philebus* (Ed. J.Burnet, Plato, vol.IV, O.C.T.), Oxford, 1904.
- Republic*, (Ed. J.Burnet, Plato, vol.II, O.C.T.), Oxford, 1901.
- Plutarch *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*, from Moralia Vol.VI, fasc.2, ed.M.Pohlenz, Leipzig 1952.
- Seneca *De Beata Vita*
De Beneficiis
De Ira
 (Trans. J.W.Basore, in Moral Essays, 3 vols. L.C.L.), London, 1928-35.
- Epistulae Morales* (Trans. R.M.Gummere, 3 vols. L.C.L.), London, 1917-21.
- Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Collected by J.von Arnim, 4 vols.), Leipzig, 1905-24.

B. General Bibliography

- Adkins A.W.H. Friendship and Self-sufficiency in Homer and Aristotle. Classical Quarterly (N.S.), Vol.13,(1962), pp.30-45.
- Merit and Responsibility, Oxford, 1960.
- Allen R.E. (ed.) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London, 1965.
- Ando T. Aristotle's Theory of Practical Cognition, The Hague, 1965.
- Anscombe G.E.M. Intention, in The Philosophy of Action, pp.14--152, (See White A.R.); 1957.
- Thought and Action in Aristotle's Ethics, in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle; pp.143-158 (see Bamburgh), 1965.
- d'Arcy C.F. God and Freedom in Human Experience, London, 1965.
- Barrett C.K. A Commentary on the Epistle to Romans, London, 1957.
- A Commentary on the First Epistle to Corinthians, London, 1968.
- Barrett W. Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy,(1958) London, 1964.
- Berlin I. Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, 1969.
- Berofsky B. Determinism and the Concept of a Person, Journal of Philosophy, Vol.61, (1964),p.461.
- Bevan E. Stoics and Sceptics, Oxford 1913.

- Blackham H.J. *Six Existential Thinkers*, London 1952.
- Bonhoffer A. *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet*,
Stuttgart, 1894.
- Epiktet und die Neue Testament*, Giessen, 1911.
- Epiktet und die Stoa*, Stuttgart 1890.
- Bodson A. *La morale social des derniers Stoiciens: Seneque, Épictète et Marc Aurèle*, Paris 1967.
(Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fasc. 176.)
- Bréhier E. *The Hellenistic and Roman Age*, Chicago 1965.
- Chrysippe et l'ancien Stoicisme*, Paris 1951.
- Broad C.D. *Conscience and Conscientious Actions*, (1940);
in Moral Concepts (see Feinberg), pp.74-9.
- Burnet J. *The Ethics of Aristotle*, London 1900.
- Bonzonis G.A. *Ὁ Προσδιορισμὸς τοῦ Ἀληθοῦς ἐν τῷ Φιλίβῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος*, Athens 1968.
- Carter E. *The Moral Discourses of Epictetus (1758)*,
Everyman Edition, London 1910.
- Clark G.H. *Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy*,
New York 1940.
- Clarke M.L. *The Roman Mind*, London 1956.
- Cloud of Unknowing, The.* (Trans. Wolters), London 1961.
- Colardeau T. *Étude sur Épictète*, Paris 1903.
- Crombie L.M. *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, I*,
London 1962.
- Daveney T.F. *Choosing*, Mind Vol.73 (1964), pp.515-26.

- Davidson D. How is Weakness of Will Possible?(1969), in Moral Concepts (see Feinberg), pp.92-113.
- Dill S. Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, London 1904.
- Dobson J.F. The Posidonius Myth, Classical Quarterly, Vol.12 (1918), pp.179ff.
- Dodds E.R. The Greeks and the Irrational, (Sather Classical Lectures, Vol.25.), California 1951.
Pagan and Christian in an age of Anxiety, Cambridge 1965.
Plato and the Irrational, Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol.65, (1945), p.16.
- Douglas A.E. Cicero the Philosopher; ch.6 of Cicero, ed. T.A.Dorey, London 1965.
- Emmett E.R. Learning to Philosophise, London 1964.
- Farquharson A.S.L. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Oxford 1944.
- Farrar F.W. Seekers after God, London 1863.
- Feinberg J. (ed.) Moral Concepts, Oxford, 1969.
- Festugiere A. Epicurus and his Gods, (tr.C.Chilton), Oxford 1955.
- Friedlaender P. Plato, Vol.I, (Trans.H.Mayerhoff), London 1958.
- Gaite H. Cicero's attitude to the Greeks, Greece and Rome Vol.9 (2nd.series) 1962, pp.142-59.
- Garnett A.C. Conscience and Conscientiousness, (1965) in Moral Concepts (see Feinberg), pp.80-92.
- Gould J.P.A. The Development of Plato's Ethics, Cambridge 1955.

- Gould T. Platonic Love, London 1963.
- Greenwood L.H.G. Aristotle: Ethics Book Six, Cambridge 1909.
- Hackforth R. Plato's Examination of Pleasure: A Translation of the Philebus with Introduction and Commentary, Cambridge 1958.
- Hampshire S.N. Freedom of the Individual, London 1965.
Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom,
Proceedings of the British Academy,
1960, pp. 195-215.
- Thought and Action, London 1959.
- Hardie W.F.R. Aristotle's Ethical Theory, Oxford 1968.
- de Hir J. Fondements Psychologiques et Religieux de la Moral d'Épictète. Bulletin de l'Assoc. J. Budé,
Suppl. Lettres d'Humanité, XIII ser. 4, no. 4, 1954.
- Hjmans B.L. jr. Askesis: Notes on Epictetus'
Educational System, Assen 1959.
- Hörmann K. An Introduction to Moral Theology,
(Trans. Quinn), London 1961.
- Hunt H.A.K. The Humanism of Cicero, Melbourne 1954.
- Joachim H.H. The Nicomachean Ethics: A Commentary,
Oxford 1951.
- Jones A.H.M. The Greek City from Alexander to
Justinian, Oxford 1940.
- Jones R.M. Chalcidius and Neo-Platonism, Classical
Philology Vol.13 (1918), pp.205-6.
- Kemp J. Reason, Action and Morality, London 1964.
- Kenny A. Action, Emotion and Will, London 1963.
- Lagrange M.J. La Philosophie Religieuse d'Épictète,
Revue Biblique, 1912, pp.192ff.

- Landor W.S. *Imaginary Conversations*, (1853); World Classics Edition, Oxford 1914.
- Lipsius J. *Manductionis ad Stoicam Philosophiam Libri Tres*, Antwerp 1604.
- Melden A.I. *Free Action*, London 1961.
 Willing, (1960) in The Philosophy of Action (see A.R.White), pp.70-8.
- Milo R.D. *Aristotle on Practical Knowledge and Weakness of Will*, The Hague 1966.
- Moore C.H. *Ancient Beliefs in the Immortality of the Soul*, London 1931.
- More P.E. *Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol.III of The Greek Tradition, Princeton 1923.
- Morgan J. *The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine*, London 1939.
- Morrow G.R. *Plato's Cretan City*, Princeton 1960.
- Mortimer R.E. *The Elements of Moral Theology*, London 1947.
- Murray G.Gilbert A. *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, Oxford, 1912.
Stoic, Christian and Humanist, London 1940.
The Stoic Philosophy, London 1915.
- Nock A.D. *Posidonius*, Journal of Roman Studies, Vol 49 (1959), pl.
- Oldfather W.A. *Epictetus: the Discourses, Manual and Fragments* (with notes and translation, L.C.L.), London 1946.
- Oliver R.P. *Niccolo Perotti's Version of the Encheiridion of Epictetus*, Illinois 1954.

- Pears D.F. (ed.) *Freedom and the Will*, London 1963.
- Pease A.S. *Cicero: de Natura Deorum, A Commentary*, Cambridge, Mass. 1955.
- Pierce C.A. *Conscience in the New Testament*, London 1955.
- Pohlenz M.H. *Die Stoa* (2 vols.), Gottingen 1949.
Philosophie und Erlebnis in Seneca's Dialogen; No.6 in Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Philosophischhistorische Klasse Jahre, 1941.
Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, (1954) English translation, Dordrecht 1966.
- Pritchard H.A. *Acting, Willing, Desiring*, (1949), in *The Philosophy of Action* (see A.R.White), pp.59-69.
- Rees D.A. *Introduction to, Marcus Aurelius* (trans. A.S.L.Farquharson), Everyman Edition, London 1961.
- Reesor M.E. *Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy*, *Phoenix* Vol.19 (1965), p.285.
- Ried L.A. *Philosophy and Education*, London 1962.
Ways of Knowledge and Experience, London 1961.
- Riddell *The Apology of Plato (Text and Notes)*, Oxford 1878.
- Rist J.M. *The Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969.
- Ritter A.H. and L.Preßler *Historiae Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae*, Gotha 1869.

- Ross W.D. Aristotle, London 1937 (3rd ed.)
- Russell, Bertrand. A Free Man's Worship, (1903),
reprinted in Mysticism and Logic,
London 1963; pp.40-47.
- Sandbach F.H. Ἐννοια and Prolepsis in Stoic Theory,
Classical Quarterly, Vol 24 (1930), p.447.
- Santas G. The Stoic Paradoxes, Philosophical
Review, Vol 73 (1964), p.447.
- Souilhé J. Épictète: Entretiens, (with introduction,
notes and translation), 4 vols. Paris 1943.
- Spencer S. Mysticism in World Religion, London 1963.
- Stanhope G. A Translation of Epictetus' Encheiridion
with Simplicius' Commentary, London 1604.
- Sterrett J.R.S. An Inscription from Pisidia, Papers of the
American School of Classical Studies at Athens,
Vol.III (1884-5), p.215; and Hermes 23(1888)p.542.
- Super R.H. Walter Savage Landor: A Biography,
New York 1951.
- Schweighäuser J. Epictetae Philosophiae Monumenta,
Leipzig 1799.
- Thalberg I. False Pleasures, Journal of Philosophy,
Vol.59 (1962), p.65.
- Thornton M. The Rock and the River, London 1965.
- Tod M.N. Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol.II,
Oxford 1946.
- Unamuno M.de The Tragic Sense of Life; translation
for Macmillan Publishers, London 1921.

Ueberweg F. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie,
I. Alterthum, Berlin 1867.

Vogel C.J.de Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts,
Vol.III, The Hellenistic - Roman Period,
Leiden 1964.

Wolfson H.A. Philo (2 vols.), Harvard 1947.

Walsh J.J. Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness,
New York 1963.

Watson G. The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, Belfast 1966.

Zeller E. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, (trans.
O.J.Reichel), London 1880.

White A.R.(ed.) The Philosophy of Action, Oxford 1968.

Addenda

Long A.A. Problems in Stoicism, London 1971.

Lucas J.B. Freedom of the Will, Oxford 1970.

Pease A.S. Cicero: De Divinatione, A Commentary,
Harvard, 1924.

Peters F.E. Greek Philosophical Terms, New York 1967

Vogel C.J.de Philosophia I, Studies in Greek Philosophy,
Assen 1970.

Colardeau Th. Étude sur Épictète. Paris 1902.

Hartmann K. Arrian und Epiktet, Neue Jahrb. 15 (1905),
pp.248-75.

INDICES

A. General Index, including Names of Persons.

- | | | | |
|------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Academy | 209 | Aristotle (contd.) | |
| Fourth Ac. | 134,266 | <u>Metaphysics</u> | 48 |
| Action, | | <u>Nic. Ethics</u> | Ch.2, passim |
| freedom of | 2,331,332 | Arrian | 17 |
| and freedom | 334-5, 347 | Aurelius, Marcus | 2,9,169 |
| in Iliad | 212-3 | | 381,411 |
| Aetius | 118 | Meditations | 433n1 |
| Animals | 46,49,122,151, | <u>Beneficium</u> | 171,174 |
| | 206-7, 260 | Berlin I. | 6,383,386,397,403 |
| <u>Animus,</u> | | Bonhöffer | 2 30n36, 251n36, |
| <u>Habitus animis</u> | 157 | | 405-6, 417, |
| <u>Motus animi</u> | 165 | | 438n23, 446n64 |
| Anscombe | 46-7,48, 80 | Bréhier | 123 |
| Antiochus of Ascalon | 134 | Burnet J. | 56-7 |
| Aristotle | Ch.2, passim | Carneades | 117,131 |
| deliberation | 12, 312-3, | Carter E. | 416-7,423,430 |
| | 316,319,333,356, | Cause, | |
| | 357,393,379 | in Chrysippus | 125-6,130 |
| Ar. and Epictetus | 334 | and reason | 120-1,240 |
| <u>impetus</u> | 167 | and responsibility | |
| soul | 123 | in Stoic ethics | 129 |
| ἀκρασία | 229,421 | in <u>Timaeus</u> | 73 |
| θεωρία | 4,350,400-1 | and will | 130 |
| προαίρεσις | 327,331,380 | from <u>phantasia</u> | 206 |
| φιλαυτία | 400 | Chalcidius | 141n47 |
| φρόνησις | 289 | Choice, | |
| φυσική ἀρετή | 293 | in Aristotle | 36 |
| <u>Eudemian Ethics</u> | 83n17 | and personality | 318-9 |
| <u>Hist. Animalium</u> | 86n43 | in Chrysippus | 125 |

- choice (contd.)
 as decision 315
 in deliberating
 on duty 335ff.
 and character 342,344
 in Plato 63
 Christ 408
 Ch.-likeness 419
 Christian love 77n100,171
 Ch.mystics 414
 Ch.theology 111
 Christianity and
 Epictetus 280,281
 304n73
 404f.(epilogue),passim.
 Chrysippus,
hegemonikon 381
 free-will 130
 passions 125,132,164
 166,226-7
prohairesis 364n3
phantasia 116f. 123,124
 Cicero 119,130,132,135,
 Ch.4,passim,381,415
 de Amicitia 171
 de Dixibus 135,161
 de Nat.Deorum 303n62
 de Officiis 152,156,161,
 168,353
Paradoxa 150,152,156
 Circumstances,
 see Nature.
- Cleanthes,
 Hymn to Zeus 172-4
 Cloud of Unknowing 306n88,
 401
Conscientia 161-64, 184n47,
 (συνείδησις) 291,381, 426-8
 Contemplation 400-1
 see θεωρία
 Conviction 90n71,203,289
 Criminal,
 and bad conscience 163
 punishment of 358-9
 Cynics 108,164,291,338
 Death,
 and freedom 311n87,339-40
 life after d. 416
 and suicide 274-5
 and Stoic φύσις 261-2
 see Martyrdom,Suicide.
 Deliberation,
 see βούλευσις
 Desire,
 conditioning of 64, 288-9,
 332
 conflict of 55,421
 eradication of 243
 and false phantasia 214,
 221,242
 of good 230,253n52,284,331
 of knowledge 68
 and prohairesis 41f. 325
 326,330,340,392-3

- desire (contd.)
 plus reason 32,41f.49f
 52f.59f.242-3
 of reason 234
 restriction of 330-1,341
 unfulfilled d. 227
 and δαίμων 283
 in ὄρμη 329
 in πάθη 226
 Desiring function 229-230,
 326
 Delphic Oracle 135,287,336
 Determinism (and will) 7,
 110,129-30,145n69,
 232,235,298n17,
 342,260,388
 in the Church 426
 in experience 394
 in Plato 71-2
 and phantasiai 205,218
 Diocles Magnes 118
 Diogenes Laertius 134,172
 Discipline 164,343,421-2
 see ἀσκησις and habituation
 Discourses (of Epictetus),
 and Arrian 17
 character of 11,17-19
 lost dd. 18
 moral content of 414
 Divine,
 contemplation of 76,282
 - providence 69-71
 divine (contd.)
 - reason 69,173
 - will 173,277,284-5
 Duties (καθήκοντα) 112,
 128-9,132,152, 153,
 156,160,168-9,176,179n5,
 274,329,338,353-8
 Education,
 Epictetus' ed. system
 18-9,278,285-90,314
 323,337-8
 in Laws 64,65
 see ἀσκησις
 Empiricus, Sextus 114,115
Encheiridion 17-18,415
 Epictetus,
 conscience 163,184n47
 duties 169-176
 externals 170
 freedom in 6,110,111
 lectures and school,
 18-9,314,323
 life of 14
 missionary zeal 15
 originality in 10,13,135,
 314f.320-1,323
 and Plato & Arist. 78f.
 and Posidonius 133
 rational emphasis 168,
 176-7
 reason 191

Epictetus (contd.)

- religious character
 - 28n27, 177, 275f. 406-7
- and Roman Stoics 177-8
- self-knowledge 135, 160
- and Seneca 158, 159, 176-8
- sincerity 16, 20, 281
- social background 20
- and Stoic system 111,
 - 208-9, 217-9
- Epicurus 79, 108, 119,
 - 136n5, 137n10, 191
- Externals (τὰ ἔξω) 170-1,
 - 264, 324, 354-5, 420
- Fancies (as phantasia) 212f.
 - 217, 219, 221f.
- Fear,
 - of freedom 106
 - emotional f. 222-3
 - and caution 231
 - eradication of 333
- Feeling,
 - correct feelings 230-1
 - and education 64
 - of freedom 402-3, 437n19
- Freedom,
 - act and state of 344-5
 - of action 2
 - and character 295
 - in death 311n87, 339
 - emptiness in 384

freedom (contd.)

- in Epictetus 110, 178, 340-51
- fear of 106-7
- from fear 108, 316, 329, 342
- inner f. 3-5, 291, 330-1,
 - 341f. 408-9
- and knowledge 285-6
- in judgements 203-4, 342
- in Laws 65
- as moral goal 1, 263
 - 396f. 400
- in mysticism 283-5, 401
- necessary restriction of,
 - 236, 326, 327-8, 344-5, 385
- in New Test. 375n83
- 'poetic' f. 402-3, 437n19
- political & social f. 1-4,
 - 23n6, 24n8.
- from passions 3, 161, 342-3
- and responsibility 31
- in reason 193-6, 232-3
 - 240-4, 326
- for rational existence 346
- in St. Augustine 413
- and self-identity 335-6,
 - 349, 398
- three stages of 341f. 382
- from tradition 136 n3,
 - 105, 106.
- in universe 260, 269, 350
- of will 270-1, see will,
 - determinism.

- freedom (contd.)
- in apospasma 232f
 - in daimon 75
 - in dynamois 159
 - of hegemonikon 238f.243
 - of prohairesis 324-5
340-51
 - in συγκατάθεσις 114,117
- Free will 270-1, 334,
344-5,393-5
- see Determinism
- Friendship 80,171,292,293
- Galen 134
- Gellius, Aulus 130,221
- Gnosticism 411
- God 66,171-6,193,410,425,430
- in Epictetus 276-7f.
281-2,350
 - and freedom 285,324
 - and reason 122-3, 194,
233-5
- Good, the 67,70
- attracts the soul 77-8,
230
 - as cosmic purpose 109,
190,208,235,277
 - and duties 169f.
 - knowledge of 198-202
 - of Socrates 63,70
 - is prohairesis 316,325
- Goodness,
- and conscience 162-3
 - and duties 156,168-71
 - individual g.152,192,208
 - moral progress 424
 - of Sapientia 150,168
 - in Stoa 127-9
 - see Virtues
- Greenwood 44,45
- Habituation ἠθροπάθη 226
- Habituation 63-5,70-71,73,
288-9,332,338,422,428
- Happiness 67,76f.
108,109,285
- Hardy, Thomas 72
- Henley, William 22n2,23n4
- Heracleitus 261
- Hjms B.L. 27n19,289
- Horace 24n6,22n2
- Human relationships 170-1,
354,358,420
- Humanity 151,155
- Ibsen 337,403
- Images 224-5
- Impulse 166-7
- see ὁρμή
- Irrational, the 9,26n14,
108,132,176
- as cosmic cause 74
 - and reason 64

irrational (contd.)

- in prohairesis 81
 and phantasia 215, 221f
 see Desire, Passions.
- Irrational soul 58-9
- Iudicium 156, 158, 165-6, 178
- Jaspers, Karl 384-5, 392,
 399-400, 402, 403
- Joachim H. 38, 39, 48-9, 55
- Judgement (δύμνα) in
 cognition 115, 192, 196,
 202, 210, 223f. 327, 341
- Knowledge, theory of 54,
 112-20, 133, 196-8, 200-4,
 208-12, 283-4, 287f, 388-9
 of 'can', 'ought' etc. 218
 of correct conduct 215f.
 of future 217-9, 283, 287
 of God 282
 of good 67
 and freedom 286, 241,
 383-4
 self-kn. 66, 133, 135, 160
 218, 284, 286f.
 of Stoic principles 286
 and will 286-9
- Lagrange M. 418
- Landor W.S. 441n38
- Language,
 religious 275f.
 rhetoric & myth. 280
- Lipsius J. 415

Logic,

- in practical syllogisms,
 198-9, 202-3, 216-7, 241
 of the Stoa 245n1, 323
- Love,
 of knowledge 68
 Christian l. 171, 419
 Platonic l. 78, 102n160
 of truth 77-8
 of self 68, 400
 see Desire, ἐπιθυμία.
- Lucretius 8, 372n53
- Martyrdom 420
- Mixed Life (Plato) 61-2, 64
- More P.E. 323, 330, 407
- Musonius Rufus 14, 20, 27n19
- Mysticism 74, 175-6, 279,
 281-2, 283-4, 350
 401, 419, 430
- Nature,
 as circumstances 268-9
 endowments of 159
 live acc. to n. 121, 135,
 154, 160, 235
 of man 110, 111, 135, 151
 as physical theory 259,
 260-2, 298n17
 in Stoic theory 120-7
 will acc. to n. 65, 109, 192
 237, 262-4, 269, 290,
 317, 348, 429

- Natural,
 inclinations 153
 knowledge 200-1, 247n16
 relationships 354
 virtues 293, 428-9
 Neo-Platonism 6-7, 411, 412
 New Testament 362n2, 373n69,
 375n83, 377n100,
 405-6, 409-10, 418, 431
Notitias, see πρόληψις.
Numen 175
Officium, see duties.
 Oldfather W. 17, 254n65, 323
 Panaetius 132, 168-9, 353,
 364n3, 381
 Pantheism 172, 173, 175, 281
 Pantheist Heresy 419
 Paradoxos, Stoic 150-1, 169
 Passions,
 in Arist. 33, 36, 37, 52-3
 in Epicurus 119
 in Epictetus 220-32, 225,
 330, 426
 freedom from pp. 3, 342-3
 in Plato 59
 in Posidonius 132-3
 in Seneca 164-7
 in Stoa 112, 124-7, 164, 226
 see εὐπάθεια.
 Perotti 415
Persona 159
 see πρόσωπον.
 Personality 158-61, 266,
 271-2, 295, 318, 319
 Philo 363n2, 373n72, 439n29
 Philosophy,
 in Patristic period 410-11
 purpose of in Hell. era 106-7
 of synthesis 134, 154
 of will 439n33
 Plato Ch. 2, passim
 Dualism 4
 desire for good & reason 8,
 9, 57f. 223
 ethics 58, 70
 goodness 291
 the irrational 379
 and Posidonius 134, 137n7
 and soul 291
Apology 79, 378n105
Laws 58, 63f. 70f. 343
Phaedo 58, 79, 279, 302n53
Philebus 58, 60-4, 75, 79, 225
Republic 58f. 61, 72, 233
Symposium 58, 77
Timaeus 58, 73
 Pleasures 61-4, 79, 230
 Plotinus 111, 172, 191
 Plutarch 117, 123
 Pohlenz M. 7, 134, 161, 177
 Politian 415
 Polybius 362n2
 Posidonius 33, 95n102, 111, 125,
 131-4, 164, 226, 229, 257n87, 381

- Practical syllogism 49f.55
 143n60,199,203,212f.
 216,228,241-2,388,397
 Prayer 422
Proprium 151,160
 Psychology,
 of Epictetus Ch.5,passim
 of Origen 411
 in Stoa 112
 Psychological conflict,
 59-60,63,421
 - Monism 116f.126,166-7,
 253n53
 Punishment 358-9
 Purification 279,281-2,284,
 320,350
 Pythagoreanism 79,163,
 164,281
 Rational Monism 6,7,198-9,202,
 216,226,229,380,384,404
 Reality, actual and
 experiential 394-5,402
 Reason,
 Age of R. 416
 cosmic r. 70-1,109-20,133,
 172,191,193-6,232f.259
 countering $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ 223f.
 and desire 44f.242,331,340
 in emotion 166,220-32
 faith in r. 9
 and freedom 178,191,232-3
 240-4,348-9
 reason (contd.)
 as God 281f.284
 as goodness 120,127,130
 241,277
 human r. (judgement) 123,
 151,173,191-6,233-4
 in knowledge 210
 and personality 159-60,348
 and pleasure 62
 and right conduct 216
 self-analysis of 194-5
 in Seneca 160
 in Stoa 108-9,120-4,
 190-6,245n1
 and will 335,383,387
 as apospasma 173
 232-6,384-5
 as prohairesis 326
 as prolepsis 197
 as phantasiai 205f
 Religion,
 in Athens 8
 in Epictetus 16,275-285,
 350,407,418
 of Stoicism 111,154,171f.177
 Religious meaning in
 conscientia 162-3
 - awareness in Sen. 173-6
 - response to reason 233
 Renaissance 405,415
 Resignation 328-9,343,
 345-6,348,360-1

- soul (cond.)
 and hegemonikon 236-7
 as pneuma 122-3
species 221
 see phantasia
 Stanhope, Geoffrey 416
 Stoic doctrine Ch.3, passim
 on conditioning 65
 physical theory 71, 259,
 260-2, 298n17
 on soul 57
 on εὐπάθεια 230
 on prohairesis 313-4
 on phantasia 89n62
 Stoic freedom 317-8
 - paradoxes 150f24
 - terminology in E. 12
 - 'wheel' 330, 370n45
 Stoicism Ch.3, passim
 and Arist. 80
 and Christianity 406
 development of 9, 10,
 150, 379
 in New Testament 409
 Suffering (& injustice),
 140n40, 262, 360-1
 Suicide 274-5, 420
 Temttation,
 in New Testament 410
phantasia as t. 220-1
 see πίθάνοτης
 Thucydides 2
 Tragedy, Greek 8, 44
 Unamuno M. 25n13, 403
 Vaughan, Henry 305n86
 Vergil 175, 176
 Virtues,
 in Aristotle 34
 blend of 397
 in Epictetus 179n4, 292
 innervv. 129, 155, 170,
 290-5, 332-5, 352, 433n1
 intellectual v. 42
 natural v. 46, 428-29
 as a potential 159
 Roman v. 153
 Social v. 294, 352
aidos principal v. 230, 290
 v. as dynamis 270-1, 290
prolepsis of v. 198
 Virtuous acts 128f
 Voluntary actions 69, 114, 222
Voluntas 156, 158, 163, 166, 178
 Whitman, Walt 268
 Will,
 as an activity 348
 and causation 393
 and character 72
 in Christian thought,
 408-9, 411-4, 426
 development of w. in Stoa,
 7, 110, 112, 131, 157, 320-21
 disciplining of w.,
 202-3, 288-9

will (contd.)

divine w.	173,277,284-5 348,419
general & particular	157
irrational w.	165-7
& moral end	263f.269,332
philosophy of w.	439n33
in Plato	65
rational w.	203,218,326 327,427

will (contd.)

and reason	243
as self	339
in Seneca	390
& <u>logos</u> in w.	127
and	114,342
see Nature, Choice,	
Wordsworth	370n39,374n77,385
Zeno	79,109,113f.126,226
Zeus	172,201-2,276

B. Index of Greek Terms

ἀδιάφορα	112,128f.132,135 (<u>adiaphora</u>)155,170,321,353	ἀσκησις (<u>askesis</u>)	14,202-3, 218,220,222,224, 287-90,295,382,421-2
αἰδώς (<u>aidos</u>), τὸ αἰδήμον,	14,230,290-1, 337,349,391,428	ἀταξία	107,110,343
αἰσθησις	42-3,50,89n59,119	αὐτάρκεια	66,75-6
ἀκολασία	53	βούλευσις	144n65,228
ἀκρασία (<u>akrasia</u>),		in ἀκρατής	56
in Arist.	51f.68,70, 90n71,144n68,393,421	in Arist.	36,46-7
in Epictetus	228-9,242	βούλησις	231,313,316
in Plato	78	in Arist.	36-9,51,56,427
ἀκρατής	47,133,143n60	in Plato & Arist.	63,77
ἀποσπασμα (<u>apospasma</u>)	69, 194-5,232-6,240,243,276 288,383,384	δαίμων (<u>daimon</u>)	74-5, 100n148,134,172,184n47, 235,278,282-3,305n83
ἀπραιρετά see προαιρετικά		δεινότης	46-7,92n81,144n66
ἀσθένεια	56	διάθεσις	155
		διαθρώσις	201
		διάίρεσις	365n4

- διάνοια 37
 δόγμα 192, 224, 225, 240
 see κρίσις, judgement.
 δόξα 36, 55
 δύναμις (dynamis) 152,
 159-60, 267-72, 274,
 290, 293, 295, 341, 391
 - λογική 192-3
 - προαιρετική 320
 δυνάμεις,
 Aristotle 48
 - φυσικά 271
 ἔγκρατεια 68, 133
 ἔκλογή 355-7
 ἑκστατικοί, οἱ 57
 ἐλευθερία 1f. 22n1
 see Freedom
 ἐνάργεια 115, 231
 εὐνοια, ἐννόημα 116,
 118-20, 196-7
 ἐμφυτος ε. 200-1, 247n16
 -αι κίοναι 119
 ἔξω τὰ see externals.
 ἔξις 34, 41, 42, 48
 - ἠθική 85n35
 - προαιρετική 65, 80, 158
 ἐπιβολή 322
 ἐπιθυμία 36, 39, 55, 57, 231
 see Desire.
 ἐποχή 114
 ἑτεροίωσις 116
 εὐθυμία 349
 εὐπάθεια 230-1
 εὐροια 31, 109, 263, 327, 350
 εὐστάθεια 349
 ἡγεμονικόν τὸ (hegemonikon)?
 69, 81, 125, 164, 178, 221,
 227, 236-40, 243, 264, 279,
 293, 325-6, 348, 384, 427
 in M. Aurelius 433n1
 in Chrysippus 116
 as reason 122-3
 θεωρία,
 as contemplation 69-70,
 76, 350-1, 400-1
 as knowledge 54
 θυμός 36-7, 39, 83n12
 θυμοειδές τὸ 59
 κάθαρσις 279
 καθήκοντα τὰ see Duties.
 κανῶν 201
 κατάληψις 113, 115, 117
 κατόρθωμα 155
 κρίσις 81, 83n18, 318
 κυριεύον τὸ 239, 258n92
 λόγος (logos) 45, 26n14,
 212, 234, 336, 339
 as craftsman 127, 172
 personification of 276
 in practical syll. 50
 in Stoa 120f
 ὀρθὸς λ. 42, 44, 53, 133, 194
 and πάθος 127
 -οι σπερματικοί 127, 172, 232

νόησις	39
νομοί, οἱ	5
νοῦς	69, 76, 98n129, 194
οἰκείωσις (<u>oikeiosis</u>),	
	122, 127, 160, 352,
	357, 358, 396-7, 433n1
in individual	266-75
in man	262 - 66
in universe	259-62
ὄρεξις	322, 330-1
in Arist.	36, 42, 167
in φρόνησις	45f. 48, 50, 53
in Stoa	124
ὄρμη	124, 167, 237, 317
	322, 329, 353-4, 358
πάθειν τὸ	209, 231
πάθη see Passions.	
παρακαλούθησις	122, 192, 207-8
	213, 263-5, 324, 357, 402, 425
παράσκευη	300n33
πιθανότης	220
πιστόν, τὸ	14, 271, 291, 337
πνεῦμα	121, 122, 172
προαίρεσις (<u>prohairesis</u>),	
	Ch. 7, passim
Arist.	36-50
Arist. & Epict.	80
bad π. as punishment	366
central in Epict. 11, 13, 178	
as character	40, 43, 48-9,
	267, 272, 294-5,
	319-20, 335-40, 391

προαίρεσις (contd.)	
characteristics listed,	324-6
as choice	212, 217, 220
choosing personality,	
	226-7, 243-4, 318-9, 383, 391
conditioning of	65,
	185n51, 289-90
and conscience	163-4, 428
as decision	229-30
and desire	390-92
in deliberation	36-40
desire + reason	231-2
double aspect of	321,
	338-9, 383, 390
elusiveness of	48, 80-81,
	87n52, 393
freedom of	324-5, 429
as goodness	12, 31, 207, 316
in Jaspers	398
and knowledge	286
and mysticism	401
perfection of	337
Plato and Epict.	80
& Platonic love	78
purification of	76
rational nature of	103,
	194, 325.
and rational will	158, 178,
	203, 218, 219-20
and St Augustine	413
in Souilhé	435n10

προαίρεσις (contd.)

and virtue	40
in ἀκρατής	56
and <u>dynamis</u>	212
and ἐκλογή	357
and <u>hegemonikon</u>	238f.
- οἷα δεῖ	158, 236
and πάθη	53
and πρόσωπον	223-4
and συγκατάθεσις	113
in φρόνησις	42f.
προαιρετικά, ἀπροαιρέτα	313, 314-5, 317
in M. Aurelius	453n1
δύναμις προαιρετική	265
προαιρούμαι	316, 362n2
πρόθεσις	322
προθυμία	221
πρόληψις (<u>prolepsis</u>),	118, 120, 123, 195-204, 218, 228, 241-3, 247n16, 381
πρόνοια	193
προπέτεια	56, 82n11
πρόσωπον	152, 160, 267, 272-4, 291, 295
συγκατάθεσις	113, 116, 117, 123, 129, 158, 165, 192, 216, 237, 316, 317, 322, 327, 329, 342
συμπάθεια	134, 278, 282, 283
συμφωνία	134
συνάισθησις	300n33

συνείδησις	see <u>Conscientia</u>
σωφροσύνη	59, 60, 68, 133, 291
τάπεινός	98n133, 422
τεχνίτης	127, 234
τόποι, οἱ	85n32, 222, 283, 322f.
τρόποι	117
τύπωσις	113
ὑλή	339
ὑπηρεσία	260
φαντασία (<u>phantasia</u>),	
in Arist.	50-1, 56, 89n62
in Epict.	204-232
in Stoa	63, 79, 90n71, 113f. 125, 133, 205
in animals	122
categories of	210-11
and duties	353
false φ.	203, 210-12, 219
forming ἔννοιαι	197
and <u>hegemonikon</u>	237
judgement of	202, 315
material of reason	195
and πάθη	165, 167-8, 220-30, 251n36
subjectivity of	221f. 240, 242, 251n36
true and false	208-11, 215
φ. ἀγαθοῦ	231
φ. καταληπτική	115-6, 117, 118
φιλαυτία	68, 352, 400
φιλοστοργία	354, 444n52
φρόνησις	33, 35, 42-5, 60-1, 84n44, 289
φύσις	109, 121. φυσικὰ ἄρετα 293