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LEONARD J. CARTER.

"THE IMAGE OF GOD IN MAN"

(An enquiry into the doctrine of human nature)

Thesis submitted for degree of

Doctor of Divinity.

25th September, 1943.

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39(a); 67(a); 109(a), (b), (c); 119(a) and (b);
139(a); i.e. 22 in all.)

Part I
CRITICAL HISTORICAL SURVEY

Chapter 1
From Plato to the Christian Fathers

The doctrine of man's nature is of outstanding importance in the present world situation. The 'ideologies' of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy involve a view of man which is fundamentally different from that of the Jewish and Christian outlooks. State Totalitarianism, in whatever form, presupposes a conception of human nature essentially incompatible with the tradition of Judaism and Christianity. Was man made for the State, or the State for man?

Secular democracy has indeed recognised a universal ethic, until the growing tendency of recent years to challenge long accepted moral standards; but it has been unwilling to make practical acknowledgment of the relationship of man to God. In this latter fact christians see the root of the failures of our democratic civilisation.

In christian thought itself, as the following pages will show, 'catholicism' tends to regard what is specifically christian as supernatural, in distinction from what is natural in human life; liberal christianity has looked upon human nature as rational, or even divine, in character, but as hampered by instincts which are a relic of the animal, the work of christianity being to perfect man's evolution from the brute; the extreme wing of modern 'non-rational' protestant theology, as represented by the Barthian school, holds that the nature of man is so utterly fallen that in christianity it is superseded. If christians are to play a leading part in shaping
the

reconstruction of society after the war, what doctrine of man will inspire their efforts?

Having briefly indicated the practical importance of our subject, we may proceed with our historical survey, and we must start with the great philosophers of ancient Greece, because they have so much influenced the thought of our western civilisation.

First for our purpose among the Greek philosophers stands Plato. To understand something of Plato's views of the human soul and body, and of the manner of life proper to man's true nature, it is necessary briefly to consider his conception of the Universal Soul, his doctrine of matter, and his theory of Forms. *

His philosophy begins with his famous theory of Forms. According to this, the ~~the~~ objects perceived by our senses are not truly real, being transitory, changeable, and imperfect, and they are objects of opinion and not of knowledge. Each genus or kind into which a number of particular sensible (i.e. able to be perceived by our senses) objects may be classified is represented by a real, unchangeable, perfect, Form or Ideal or Type, which cannot be known through the senses but only through reason, and of which the particular sensible objects are imperfect copies, reflections, shadows, or imitations.

His conception of the Universal Soul is reached through the reflection that the orderly motion and change in the universe is a proof that a rational Soul or Mind is at work, animating the body of the universe with a purposeful activity, directed to bringing everything to be as good as possible, i.e. in accordance with the eternal Forms. This Universal Soul is thus the Soul which animates the whole

* For ^{much of} the following account of Plato's teaching the writer is greatly indebted to two papers by Professor G.C. Field, of Bristol University. See also Moore's History of Religions pp. 497-506.

of physical reality. In descriptions of Platonic thought the term 'World Soul' is frequently used, as expressing the Soul which animates the world, i.e. this planet the earth. In the Philebus (30 A), however, Plato speaks of *To Tou Pantos sōma ἑμφυον ὅν* ("the body of the All being animate"), and the whole of that context is in keeping with the contention that Plato believed in a Soul of the whole physical Universe, and not merely of this world. The general argument of Book X of the Laws ^{*} supports this view, and is a guide to the interpretation of the symbolism of the Timaeus. There was not, for Plato, any soul or god outside of or beyond this Universal Soul. Because, however, the whole physical universe was differentiated into parts, especially the heavenly bodies, including this earth, he speaks sometimes of *Θεός* or the Divine, and sometimes of *οἱ Θεοί*, using singular or plural indiscriminately - it is simply a matter of emphasis. The Universal Soul was probably not to Plato a personal God in the Biblical sense, to be known in direct personal fellowship, but rather an idea of God, a philosophical concept. ?

Plato's doctrine of matter, conceived in its elementary state as space, regards it as an uncreated, eternal, principle out of which the physical universe is fashioned after the pattern of the Forms. Though the best that lies to hand, it is an inadequate medium for the purpose, and necessarily places a limit on the action of the Divine will.

We may now turn directly to the Platonic thought of man. The rational souls of men include love of the good and of the beautiful as well as the intellectual powers. Though disputed by some scholars, a good case can be made for the view that Plato in his later thought apparently conceived individual human souls as fragments, in effect,

* Especially 897 ^{B & C} ~~C & D~~, and 898 C & D.

of the Universal Soul, and as getting their separate individuality by association with a particular body, presumably going back at long last into the Universal Soul. The bodies of men are fashioned out of matter.

But it is in his view of the kind of life proper to man that Plato's thought is of particular importance for the doctrine of human nature. In the Republic, a comparatively early work, he maintains that the highest activity of man is the philosophic contemplation of eternal reality, and depicts in the life of the philosopher-kings a sharp tension between contemplative philosophy and the practical duties of ruling. In his later works, however, he increasingly stressed and emphasised the importance of conduct, particularly in Book X of the Laws.*

His view of the right human conduct is closely connected with his theory of Forms. By the conduct of their lives men are taking part in a great enterprise, in which the Soul throughout the whole Universe is engaged, to wit, the bringing everything to be as good as possible, in accordance with the eternal Forms. For men this must mean the bringing of mankind to be as good as possible, in accordance with the relative ~~the~~ Form. This involves above all right conduct, the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice, in our daily lives. Right conduct finds its highest expression in the activity of the true statesman, for the highest practical good of which man is capable is co-operation in the realisation of the ideal community. It seems legitimate to infer that Plato would have approved the conception of an ideal, archetypal, Form of Man, after the image or in the pattern of which

* See especially 899 D & E, & 900 A, B, & C.

individual men are fashioned. If, moreover, the Biblical idea of 'The Kingdom of God' be thought of as an eternal pattern to be realised as far as possible in the kingdoms of the earth, we have a conception also agreeable to Platonic thought.

Grand as is the true enterprise of mankind, the sense of our own insignificance and of the unimportance of our own private and personal needs and desires is very strong with Plato. He does indeed speak of our own souls as a divine element in us, but the difference between them and the Universal Soul is evidently thought of as so great that he can appropriately adopt an attitude of worship.

One other philosophy of ancient Greece is important for our historical survey, and that is Stoicism. We need not here enter into the intricate details of the Stoic explanation of the origin of the world, but it is sufficient to say that the primal force of the world is a vital principle, or spirit, or breath, ($\piνευμα$), conceived of as a very fine, pervasive, form of matter. From it all things have been evolved. It penetrates into all parts of the world, but in different degrees of purity and fineness, and imparts to all things their distinctive qualities, holding them together, setting them in motion. It is a rational, purposeful, directing principle (Logos).*

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* For much of his account of Stoicism the writer is indebted to Moore's History of Religions, pp. 511-512, & the chapter on Stoicism in an English translation of the French author Robin's "Greek Thought".

The rational soul of man is a particle of the Logos. It is man's 'ruling principle' ($\eta\gamma\epsilon\mu\omicron\nu\kappa\acute{o}\nu$), and exerts its power by seven special functions - the five senses, speech, and generation. Man's well-being consists in living in obedience to the Logos, i.e. in accordance with Nature. He has freedom of choice, but only in obedience to the Logos does he attain to the true freedom of his nature. One of the great contributions of Stoicism to the doctrine of man is its teaching that the Divine Logos is very near all men, within them, their Ruler and Guide, and that their true nature can be fulfilled only in conscious dependence upon the Logos. This involves the pursuit of virtue for its own sake as the supreme good. One of the most honourable characteristics of Stoicism was its strong emphasis upon ethics. This is ascribed by Lightfoot in his Commentary on Philippians to the eastern ^{affinities} ~~origin~~ of Stoicism (p.273). In man's dealings with his fellows in society, justice and beneficence are two fundamental principles. The good man is gentle, not easily provoked to anger, scorning revenge, prompt to forgive, and to help even his enemies, magnanimous, liberal - though not with indiscriminate charity.

It is in the moral teaching of Stoicism that the word 'conscience' ($\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) and the idea of conscience rose into philosophic importance.* The word signifies co-knowledge, the knowledge or reflective judgment which a man has by the side of

* See Sanday & Headlam's Commentary on Romans, pp.60-61.

or in conjunction with the original consciousness of an act. It is a natural faculty which belongs to all men alike, and pronounces upon the character of actions, both their own and those of others. The idea is more restricted than that of modern times, referring to the passing judgment upon actions after they have been done (conscientia consequens moralis) rather than upon actions before they are done (antecedent or precedent conscience). This does not, of course, mean that the consciousness of wrongdoing originated with the Stoics, but only that the technical term and idea of 'conscience' became current coin|through their influence.

This use of the word *συμμετρησις* is an excellent instance of the way in which Stoic philosophy had leavened the moral vocabulary of the civilised world at the time of the christian era. The first teachers of christianity naturally often made use of words made popular by the Stoics, but gave them a specifically christian application. This is especially true in the case of S. Paul, whose birth place, Tarsus, was in his day an important centre of Stoic philosophy, and who, there is reason to think, was particularly well acquainted with Stoicism. His speech at Athens, for instance, recorded in Acts 17, shows a clear appreciation of the elements of truth contained in their philosophy, and an adaptation to their forms of expression.*

What hinders man from obedience to the Logos is his passions,

* Note also the quotation in verse 28 referred to on the following page - perhaps the noblest expression of heathen devotion preserved in Greek literature.

which are regarded as exaggerations, or perversions, or false judgments, not subject to the control of the informed reason. The passions therefore must be extirpated. The wise man strives to maintain his independence of things, sufficient unto himself, apathetic.

Since all men are subject to the same Logos and are meant to obey the same law of reason, they are brethren. Compare S. Paul's words in Acts 17,28 ("for we are also His offspring") - a quotation from the 'Phaenomena' of the Stoic writer Aratus, and also from the famous Stoic hymn to Zeus by Cleanthes. Man is not a part (μερος) of an aggregate, but a member (μελος) of an organism, and the members exist for one another. We are all members of one body.

The Stoic conception of the Law of Nature had considerable influence upon subsequent views about man. "The oldest Greek philosophers had been accustomed to explain the fabric of creation as the manifestation of some single principle which they variously asserted to be movement, force, fire, moisture, or generation. In its simplest and most ancient sense, Nature is precisely the physical universe looked upon in this way as the manifestation of a principle. Afterwards, the later Greek sects, returning to a path from which the greatest intellects of Greece had meanwhile strayed, added the moral to the physical world in the conception

of Nature It was not solely the moral phenomena of human society which they understood by Nature, but these phenomena considered as resolvable into some general and simple laws To live according to Nature came to be considered as the end for which man was created, and which the best men were bound to compass. To live according to Nature was to rise above the disorderly habits and gross indulgences of the vulgar to higher laws of action which nothing but self-denial and self-command would enable the aspirant to observe. It is notorious that this proposition - live according to nature - was the sum of the tenets of the famous Stoic philosophy.* This Stoic principle of living according to nature appealed greatly to the more stalwart Romans after the Roman conquest of Greece, and not least to the Roman lawyers. "The alliance of the lawyers with the Stoic philosophers lasted through many centuries The long diffusion of these doctrines among the members of a particular profession was sure to affect the art which they practised and influenced It has often been observed that the strength of Stoicism resided not in its canons of conduct, which were often repulsive or ridiculous, but in the great though vague principle which it inculcated of resistance to passion. Just in the same way the influence on jurisprudence of the

* Maine's *Ancient Law*, pp. 53-54.

Greek theories, which had their most distinct expression in Stoicism, consisted not in the number of specific positions which they contributed to Roman law, but in the single fundamental assumption which they lent to it." * That assumption was that Nature provided a basic principle or Law according to which all man-made law should be framed. The Roman lawyers were not clear as to the Law of Nature. In the Institutes of Justinian 1.2.p. & 1. two contrary definitions appear. In 1.2.p. there is a three-fold division of Law into Jus Naturale, Jus Gentium, and Jus Civile. "Jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit, nam jus istud non solum humani generis proprium est ... hinc descendit maris atque feminae conjunctio^o, quam nos matrimonium appellamus". Then follows a second treatment in which Jus Naturale is treated as equivalent to Jus Gentium: "quod vere naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos per^eque^u custoditur vocaturque jus gentium". The first three-fold classification is that of Ulpian, the second two-fold one is that of ^{Gaius} Gaius. Maine follows the latter classification. "After Nature had become a household word in the mouths of the Romans, the belief gradually prevailed among the Roman lawyers that the old Jus Gentium was in fact the lost code of Nature, and that the Praetor in framing an edictal jurisprudence on the principle of the Jus Gentium was gradually restoring a type from which law had only departed to deteriorate". † It may be said that the Jus

* Maine's Ancient Law, p. 56

† ~~A~~ Ancient Law, p. 56

Gentium was the sum of the common ingredients in the customs of the old Italian tribes, who were all the nations whom the Romans had the means of observing. Whenever a particular usage was seen to be practised by a large number of separate races in common it was set down as part of the Law common to all nations, or Jus Gentium. In this thesis Natural Law is taken to be the Law of Nature which pertains to the human race, and includes such common customs or usages as may be said to be universal, as, for instance, the existence of the family and of the state or nation. The subject will receive further attention in the next chapter.

Lightfoot, however, comparing Stoicism with Platonism, says "It is in the doctrines of the Platonist ... that the truer resemblances to the teaching of the Bible are to be sought. It was not the Porch but the Academy that so many famous teachers, like Justin Martyr and Augustine, found to be the vestibule to the Church of Christ".* He urges that Stoicism is the most incongruous and self-contradictory of all philosophic systems. "With a gross and material pantheism it unites the most vivid expressions of the fatherly love and providence of God; with the sheerest fatalism it combines the most exaggerated statements of the independence and self-sufficiency of the human soul; with the hardest and most uncompromising isolation of the individual it proclaims the

* Commentary on Philippians, p. 294

most expansive view of his relations to all around".* Even so, it may be thought that this very inconsistency brings into clearer relief the witness which Stoicism bears to truths agreeable to christianity.

We may now pass to a brief consideration of the Biblical doctrine of man's creation. It is explicitly stated in Genesis I. 26-27: "And God said, Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." (Other explicit references are Gen. 5,1; 9,6; and in the Apocrypha, Wisd. 2,23; Eccles. 17,3.)

It is obvious that the Platonic theory of Forms can be applied in a way which is agreeable to the doctrine of Scripture. But, as has been stated, the latter differs from Plato's philosophy in its presentation of an intensely personal God, the Creator both of the spiritual part of man's nature and of his body.

At this point it will be well to refer to the doctrine of Philo, the Jewish philosopher of Alexandria (born about 20 B.C.). Philo presents Judaism in terms of Greek philosophy. The 'Word' of God was a Hebrew concept (e.g. Gen. I,1; Ps.33,6; Wisd.16,12;18,15)-

* Lightfoot's Commentary on Philippians, p. 298

Logos in the Greek Bible, - and Philo applied to it conceptions of the Logos of Greek philosophy. Stoic, Platonic, and Hebraic currents of thought are united in his doctrine. He is, however, a philosopher rather than a theologian, and his thought is of the Divine Reason (Logos) of the Greeks rather than of the Divine Word (Logos), or Reason spoken forth, of the Hebrews. His references to the Logos as 'the archetypal man' (ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἀνθρώπου - I.427), 'the archetypal idea',^{*} and 'the image of God' (εἰκὼν Θεοῦ - I.6), are Platonic. More commonly he uses the Stoic conception of the Logos as the principle of Reason, which quickens and informs matter. He also speaks of the Divine Logos as 'Son of God', 'firstborn Son' (πρωτόγονος - I.414), 'high-priest' (ἀρχιερεὺς - I.653), 'man of God' (ἀνθρώπος Θεοῦ - I.411), 'the Head of the body' (I.640), 'through whom the world was created' (II.225). Philo's doctrine of the Logos, however, is far removed from the idea of an incarnation.

There is an obvious resemblance between this language of Philo and the language of the New Testament. The ideas of the New Testament are nevertheless grounded in the Old Testament. The doctrine of the image of God in the New Testament has its roots in the first chapter of Genesis; the Johannine doctrine of the Logos is fundamentally based upon the Old Testament conception of the Word of God as the revelation of the Mind of God;

* de spec. leg. 36.11

the thought of the Logos as 'the Light that lighteth every man' (Jn.I,9), however consonant with Stoicism, is foreshadowed in the Jewish Wisdom literature; the designation of Christ as the Son of God is found with Jesus Himself in Matt.II, 25-27, with the strongest and deepest meaning, and the foundation of the term is laid in Old Testament language. It was the genius of Philo which brought the philosophy of Greece to bear upon these Old Testament ideas, and his teaching was probably widely current in the apostolic age, especially among Hellenistic Jews. Whatever the extent to which S. Paul and the authors of the Johannine writings and the epistle to the Hebrews consciously or unconsciously used terms made popular by Philo, terms which would carry a meaning not only to Jews but also to Greeks, the Gospel of the Word made flesh is neither Greek nor Platonic but is due only to the revelation of Jesus Christ Himself.

In the profound theology of the prologue of the fourth gospel, therefore, though it is fundamentally Hebraic in thought, we may find Platonic and Stoic conceptions united in a higher synthesis. The Divine Logos was in the beginning with God, the only-begotten Son is in the bosom of the Father; and He is also the true Light which lighteth every man. That is to say that the uncreated Image of God, Who is therefore the ideal, archetypal Form of the beings created in God's image, viz. men, is also the indwelling Logos of the Stoics. This Logos,

moreover, Himself 'became flesh', and is known to us as a historical Person, Jesus of Nazareth.

The Bible recognises more than one aspect of the doctrine of man's creation in the image of God. First, the doctrine refers to man's inherent constitution, his potentialities, faculties, capacities. It also views man on the way to the fulfilment of his true nature, man in process of the realisation of his potentialities, and then again man in the attainment of the fullness of his stature, the man of God's whole purpose. Aquinas designates these three aspects respectively as those of analogy, conformity of grace, and conformity of glory,^{*} while Brunner designates the first as the formal image, and the other two together, as merely stages in one process of character, as the material image.[†] In the realisation of the material image the whole problem of sin, redemption, and sanctification is of course involved.

It is perhaps correct to say that in the Old Testament the thought of the formal image is predominant, since the natural institutions of the family and the nation figure so largely in the record, and the redemption of man through the sacrifice of Christ still lies in the future. But it is a mistake to say that the idea of the material image is not strongly recognised there. The problem of sin, the existence of moral evil, the idea of the 'saint' (T'DQ) of God, the coming redemption of the people of God, are ideas belonging intrinsically to the record as a whole. The Divine exhortation "Be ye holy, for I am holy" (Lev. II, 44, 19.2, 20.7 & 26, cf. Ex. 19.6) is a typical expression of the recognition of the thought of the material image. ?

In the New Testament the formal image is directly alluded to in

* *Summa Theologica* I. Q. xciii, art. 4.

† See Cairns' translation of Brunner's 'God & Man'; Introduction, p. 21.

I Cor. II.7, Jas. 3.9, cf. Ac. 17.28, but the thought of the material image is specially in evidence, e.g. Rom. 8.29, 2 Cor. 3.18, Eph. 4.24, Col. 3.10, and other passages where sonship to God is spoken of as manifested in likeness of character to God.

Some of the early christian fathers distinguish between the image (εἰκών, Lat. imago) and the likeness (ὁμοιωσις, Lat. similitudo) in Gen. 1.26. This distinction was probably suggested by the septuagint translation, which inserted καὶ (ποίησμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμῶν καὶ καθ' ὁμοιωσιν). Irenaeus makes εἰκών refer to reason and freedom in man, and explains ὁμοιωσις as mediated through the Divine Spirit, lost in the Fall, and originally present only in germ; he conceives primitive man as a big child, and ὁμοιωσις is rather a goal of development than a primitive state. The Hebrew words for image and likeness are respectively בְּצֶלֶם and דְּמוּת. The former Hebrew word perhaps suggests the general form (cf. Num. 33.52, I Sam. 6.5, 2 K. II.18, Ezek. 7.20), the latter the resemblance of the parts (cf. Ezek. 1.5 & 10 & 13 & 16): but the distinction cannot be pressed, for in Gen. 1.27 and 9.6 'image' alone, and in 5.1 'likeness' alone, occur. There seems therefore no clear etymological justification for the distinction which Irenaeus makes the two words to carry. It seems most likely that 'likeness' serves to fix and strengthen the meaning of image. Brunner, in 'Man in revolt', criticizes Irenaeus for thus introducing a division into the christian ^{doctrine} theology of human nature.* Irenaeus' explanation of the 'image', however, does virtually correspond to the conception of the formal image, or to a part of the formal image, while it is that spiritual fellowship with God, designated by him by the term 'likeness', which alone can give the material content to the formal image. A matter more deserving of serious crit-

* "Man in Revolt" - pp. 93-4, 265 (n.), 504-6

-icism is his representation of the 'likeness' as lost in the Fall - language which opens the door to artificial conceptions of two separate elements in human nature, and to the logical inference that unregenerate man as we know him is not really man at all. There would be no objection to saying that man has lost his primitive innocence, and it is indeed true to say that man has erred and strayed from God's ways like a lost sheep: but when speaking of the effect of this upon man's integral, essential, nature many pitfalls are avoided by using such a term as 'perverted'.

The Alexandrine fathers proposed to understand εἰκὼν as denoting the rational basis of man's nature, and ὁμοιωσις as expressing its free development to τελειωσις (perfection). This, still more clearly than Irenaeus, identifies the term 'image' with the formal, and 'likeness' with the material, image.

The rise of Neo-Platonism in the third century, represented by the philosophy of Plotinus, deserves mention because of its influence upon Augustine, and, through him, the christian theology of the west generally. The great lesson which christianity had to learn from Neo-Platonism ^e was, to quote Dean Inge, the meaning of 'God is Spirit'. * Plotinus maintains reality to be spiritual, knowable, and single - in opposition to material conceptions of the Godhead, and to scepticism and dualism. The thought of the transcendence of God is pushed to its furthest extreme. From Him emanates the Nous (which Dean Inge maintains is in this connection better translated by Spirit than by Mind), and from that the World-Soul, and thence primal matter and the corporeal universe in graded procession. To Plotinus ~~the~~ matter is really a mere

* Article on Neo-Platonism by Dean Inge in Hastings's Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics, p. 318. This art. is the source of much of the short description of Neo-Platonism on this & the following page.

abstraction, the bare receptacle of forms, the subject of energy, viewed as subsisting apart from the energy which alone gives it meaning and existence: but the language in which he speaks of the body as a tomb, the sensible world as a cavern or slough, our earthly existence as a fall of the soul, and his ascetic prescriptions for daily living, opened a door among his followers to the view of matter as in itself evil. Human souls constitute a system of souls in the World-Soul, and the object of philosophy is not the rational finite, but a soaring beyond reason to the infinite. The end of man is a mystic salvation, a state of ecstatic union with the infinite, attained by the rising of the soul through the stages of sense and reason and beyond them to a trance-like state in which the soul loses itself in God. "The one defect in a grand constructive effort seems to be that on which Augustine laid his finger. 'The Word made flesh - that found I not among them' " (Inge).

The Pelagian heresy, so ably controverted by S. Augustine, is of such importance as representing a permanent tendency in much christian thought, especially in Britain, that a short description of its tenets must be given at this point. It asserted man's own inherent power to live a moral and holy life, without sin. "As often as I have to speak of the principles of virtue and a holy life, I am accustomed first of all to call attention to the capacity and character of human nature and to show what it is able to accomplish; then from this to arouse the feelings of the hearer, that he may strive after different kinds of virtue." * The doctrine of original sin was denied; the sin of Adam injured himself alone, and not the human race; Adam was made mortal, and would have died whether he had sinned or not; neither by the sin and

* Ager: *A Source Book for Ancient Church History*, pp. 458, 459.

† Article on Neo-Platonism by Inge in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics*, p. 319.

death of Adam does the whole race die, nor by the resurrection of Christ does the whole race rise; new-born children are in that state in which Adam was before his fall. Universal, or almost universal, sinfulness is due only to the following of Adam's bad example; to Pelagius grace is merely justification by faith through baptism and general Divine teaching. Our Lord was only a great example to man. Pelagianism, however, never got really down to the root of the question. As Bicknell says in his book on the Thirty-nine Articles (p.250), the difficulty is not simply "I want to be good and I can't: it is rather "I know that I ought to do this; I feel that I could do it if I wanted to do it: but then unfortunately I don't want to do it, or at least a large part of me does not want to do it."

We come now to the teaching of that great father of western Christendom, Augustine of Hippo, whose writings, especially in view of the fact that he was a man of action as well as a man of thought, are so amazingly prolific. We may well begin with a reference to a particularly illuminating passage about the true nature of man in the *De Civitate*, Book XIV. The passage in question is the fourth chapter, "Quid sit secundum hominem, quidve secundum Deum vivere." The theme of the preceding chapter is that sin is caused not by the flesh, but by the soul, and that the corruption contracted from sin is not sin, but sin's punishment. "For it is not by having flesh, which the devil has not, but by living according to himself that man became like the devil. For the devil too wished to live according to himself when he did not abide in the truth." Then in chapter four Augustine shows that man's true nature, as created by God, is grounded and centred in God. When he acknowledges

the true ground and centre of his being, he stands in his right position: all his disorders come through his refusal to acknowledge that ground and centre, and affirming a false ground and centre in himself. "When, therefore, man lives according to man, not according to God, he is like the devil. Because not even an angel might live according to an angel, but only according to God, if he was to abide in the truth, and speak God's truth and not his own lie..... When, then, a man lives according to the truth, he lives not according to himself, but according to God..... when, ^{therefore} then, a man lives according to himself assuredly he lives according to a lie; not that man himself is a lie, for God is his author and creator but because man was made upright, that he might not live according to himself, but according to Him that made him - in other words, that he might do His will, and not his own." In S. Paul's usage, to live 'according to man' and to live 'according to the flesh' are the same, as I Cor. 3.3 makes clear. The famous passage in I Cor. 2. 11-14 refers to the *ψυχικος* man, as verse 14 shows. And the *ψυχικος* or animal man is what S. Paul elsewhere calls the carnal man. "For both the soul and the flesh, the component parts of man, can be used to signify the whole man; and so the animal man and the carnal man are not two different things, but one and the same thing, viz. man living according to man."

Augustine held that it is in man's soul that the image of God in him is recognisable, and throughout his *De Trinitate* he argues that the mind, as one of the 'parts' (by which he means 'acts') of the soul, is better than the other 'parts' of the soul, since it is the understanding mind, governed by the rule of faith, which is capable of discerning

in some way that highest, ineffable, immaterial, and unchangeable nature of God Himself. God is more knowable than anything else, because more present, more within man, more certain. In spite of the gap between finite and infinite, there is no natural incompatibility between the mind and God. "The divine substance is not so outside the range of the created intellect as to be absolutely beyond its reach, as sound is to ^{the} sight, or an immaterial substance to the senses; because the divine substance is the primal intelligible, and the principle of all intellectual knowledge: yet it is outside the range of the created intellect, as exceeding its power, just as the highest things are outside the range of the senses" (Summa contra Gentiles III.liv).

In De Trinitate he finds three principles ^{al} examples and evidences of an image and likeness to the Trinity in the intellectual nature of man:

(1) The existence of Mind, Knowledge, and Love (Books I-VII). "Love is of someone that loves, and with love something is loved". Hence myself the lover, myself as loved, and my love for myself. Hence the mind itself the mind's knowledge of itself, and its love of itself.

(2) Memory, Understanding, and Will (Book X). Memory is the mind seen as the storehouse of knowledge; understanding is the mind consciously attentive to the knowledge of itself as present in memory - the act of remembering; will the movement of the mind toward that recollection of its knowledge of itself.

What in the former trinity is seen as an abiding state (i.e. innate, 'habitual', potential, principles of operation), in this second trinity is shown as active, realised, achieved in operation, and is for that reason a more manifest image of God.

In Book XI Augustine turns to the body and external senses, to enquire whether the three acts of the second trinity in the soul may be seen and set forth more clearly in the present temporal order. As an example which will serve for all the bodily senses, he chooses the sight of the eye. Three things are noted: (i) the object seen, and existing before it is seen, and yet the image of which remains in the memory of him who sees it, even if it is taken away; (ii) the act of seeing, which did not exist before the particular object was seen; (iii) the attention of the mind upon the object seen with the eye. When the object is taken away, we are left with the trinity of memory, understanding, and will.

(3) The Remembrance of God, the Understanding of God, and the Love of God. (Book XIV). Thus it is that man is *capax Dei*. The doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul is stated (XIV.IV.6), and the abiding existence of the *imago*, though defaced (XIV.VII.II). Whatever may be the present, actual state of that image in any man, it is the image of God, still 'capable of Him and can be partaker of Him'.

Augustine took over Irenaeus' distinction between the *imago* and the *similitudo*. The *imago* includes the physical, psychical, and spiritual endowments with which man's nature is constituted, though it is in the soul that the image is most recognisable. The *similitudo* is man's original righteousness. Unlike Irenaeus, however, Augustine conceives the primitive state as perfection. By the fall man lost his original righteousness, i.e., the *similitudo*, and by this loss an impairment was brought about among his natural endowments also (*vulneratio in naturalibus*).

The idea of the 'loss' of original righteousness has already, with reference to the doctrine of Irenaeus, been marked out for criticism.

The question will be fully discussed in the next chapter. We may, however, here consider the emphasis of Augustine upon the mind as the centre and ground of the Divine image in man. "Love is of someone that loves, and with love something is loved". Hence myself the lover, myself as loved, and my love for myself. Hence the mind itself, the mind's knowledge of itself, and its love of itself. So runs Augustine's argument (as given on page 15), rightly, for his purpose, confining his attention to man's self-love. But is the inference from 'myself the lover' necessarily 'the mind itself'? Why am not I, qua lover, the primary factor in the situation? Why is not my capacity for loving the elemental factor in my psychological constitution? As a matter of fact, modern psychology does maintain that the fundamental stratum of human nature is in the realm of instinct, and that the instinctive forces are all-powerful, shaping, and moulding. The law of reversed effort, for instance, declares that "when the imagination and will are at variance, imagination always wins". All this, in the light of the doctrine of man's creation in God's image, is in accord with the christian revelation that God is Love. Because God is perfect love, therefore He is all-wise and all-powerful, and not vice versa. In human life as we know it, however, it would seem as if one of the great results of man's sin is the corruption of his feelings. Our instincts need to be controlled by the reason, lest they run amok. Men must have knowledge of God before they can love Him. From this point of view, there is much to be said for Augustine's concentration upon the mind of man as that in which the imago is most easily recognisable. On the other hand, Augustine infers from this that Mind is the fundamental stratum of the Divine Being, from which it would surely follow that because God is

Wisdom, therefore He is Love, whereas the christian ~~would~~ revelation would invert that statement.

Augustine, however, did not regard the human intellect as having escaped corruption, in spite of his emphasis upon the mind as the centre of the imago. As a result of his doctrine of vulneratio in naturalibus he held that a special illumination was added to the intellect by God to enable it to perceive even truths of the natural order, and the Augustinian school consequently came to depreciate the natural power of the intellect, and to make it altogether dependent on faith. This interpretation of Augustine's teaching was later to be strongly refused by Thomas Aquinas.

Augustine's view of the relation between Church and State is important for our survey, as showing his thought of man as a social being. His great treatise on this subject is the De Civitate, written in the dark days after the capture of Rome by Alaric the Goth. Its teaching contains much of the philosophic basis of the theory of the mediaeval papacy. Since the first rebellion against God "two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self" (XIV.28). Of the City of God, all have been members who have confessed themselves strangers and pilgrims on the earth. The Earthly City has as its highest representatives heathen Babylon and Rome, but all other civil states are its embodiment. It is a relative good. To it peace and civil order are due. In a world of sin, though having love of self as its principle, it represses disorder and secures to each his own. But it must pass away as the City of God grows. Those who make up the City of God are the elect. These are now in the visible Church, though

not all in that Church are elect (XX.9). It is the visible, hierarchically organised Church that in the City of God must more and more rule the world.

According to this doctrine, the Earthly City rests upon a false principle, and yet is a relative good. The thought, moreover, of the Earthly City as passing away before the growing visible Church cannot but lead to the usurpation by the Church of the proper functions of the State. Against this teaching we may set the idea that the Earthly City or State exists to be the representative, image, or sacrament, of the Heavenly City, and that it is the task of the church in the state to bring about ^{therein} the realisation of this function. The view of the State, and of other natural institutions, as a relative good will receive consideration in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE SCHOLASTICS TO THE REFORMATION

In passing from S. Augustine to the mediaeval scholastics it becomes necessary to explain the technical term 'Natural Law'. The recognition of Natural Law implies the view that human life on earth is ordered upon rational, universal, principles or laws which control the welfare of the individual and of the community and underlie common universal institutions such as the family and the state. The term Natural Law denotes these rational, universal principles. The acknowledgment of Natural Law must obviously greatly affect the conception of the nature of man, and also the actual welfare of man. A government, for example, which proceeds ~~as~~ upon the conviction that economic conditions are determined by political principles, and that politics themselves ultimately depend upon moral laws, will differ greatly in its conception of human nature, and will achieve very different results, in comparison with a government which believes that economic conditions can for any great length of time be fashioned by the arbitrary schemes of individuals to control politics, and that habitual opportunism in politics, independently of ethical considerations, can in the end bring prosperity; or a theology which, in its views of God's dealings with men, depreciates Natural Law or fails to give it adequate recognition, must differ widely, both in its idea of God and of human nature, from a theology which attempts a full appreciation of Natural Law.

Now, in view of the corrupt and unsettled age in which the christian

fathers lived, during the period of the dissolution of the Roman Empire, their teaching on the subject of Natural Law has much less right to be called the classical teaching on that subject than has that of the scholastics of the middle ages. The fathers distinguished between absolute and relative Natural Law, i.e. between what is natural to human nature in itself as God's creation, and what belongs to fallen human nature as a result of, and remedy for, sin and is only evident in the form of a law of order and compulsion.[†] Augustine, for instance, held a relative view of marriage as being little more than licensed concubinage; and Ambrose considered that the institution of private property was made necessary on account of robbery.[§]

The scholastics held that Natural Law is of Divine institution and essentially in[†] accordance with the creative purpose of God. We may note that their recognition of Natural Law explains their use of what Nygren would call their eros-philosophy, i.e. philosophy in terms of man's search for God rather than of God's search for man (represented by the term agape in Nygren's book *Agape and Eros*).^{*} A christian theology which takes full account of the fact of creation must inevitably to a considerable extent use the language of eros (the love which comes from desire), for God is the Creator of eros, and eros in itself must be good: it is the perversion of eros which is sin, and the work of grace is to re-direct eros. The ~~see~~ scholastics, however, as Nygren shows in his second volume of *Agape and Eros*, neglected the idea of agape, and the influence of pseudo-Dionysius, whose work was accepted as from a disciple of S. Paul, was largely responsible for this. Along with

this neglect of the idea of agape we may note the significant fact of

[†] See Troeltsch *"Social Teaching of the Christian Churches"*, Vol. I, pp. 142-64.

^{*} In *Agape and Eros* Nygren pronounces the two ideas represented respectively by agape (the Divine love) and eros (natural human love) to be directly antithetic to each other.

[§] See *"Marriage in Church & State"*, pp. 12 & 19. Hanson *"Vox Clamantis"*.

the mediaeval neglect of communion, a supreme witness to the doctrine of agape.

The mediaeval doctrine of Caritas held the two motifs of agape and eros in an uneasy synthesis. Ritschl has pointed out that in the scholastic thought of the incarnation the humanity of Christ is in effect a mere mask for His Divinity, but that with regard to the atonement the thought of His manhood is in the foreground.* Though Natural Law is recognised as of Divine institution and essentially in accordance with God's creative purpose, yet the rigid scholastic view of the Divine impassibility rendered difficult the conception of a real entry of God into human nature, and there was a consequent tendency to regard the christian life as supernatural (not in the sense of 'taking the manhood into God', but in the sense of an addition to human nature).

Mediaeval Scholasticism attained its noblest development in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Aquinas held that the aim of theology is to give the knowledge of God and of man's origin and destiny. The goal of every human life is the vision and enjoyment of God, according to the utmost, but varying, capacity of each. The ground of the image of God in man is to be found in the soul. To appreciate his doctrine of the soul it is necessary to refer to the three mediaeval schools of thought concerning 'universals'. The realists, who followed Plato, asserted that universals exist apart from and antecedent to individual objects (*ante rem*). The moderate realists, like Aquinas, who were Aristotelians rather than Platonists, contended that universals exist only in connection with individual objects (*in re*). The nominalists, like Duns Scotus, whose philosophy was more akin to that of the Stoics, taught that universals were only abstract names for the resem-

* Ritschl: 'The Christian Doctrine of Justification & Reconciliation', pp. 389-91.

blances of individuals, and had no other existence than in thought ~~of~~
 (post rem). According to Aquinas, "the soul is the first principle of
 life nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For
 it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing,
 does not belong to a body as such; since if that were the case, every-
 thing corporeal would be a living thing, or a principle of life"
 (Summa Theologica ~~III.Q. VII~~ I.Q. 75, art. I). Therefore man's soul is
 that by which his body has life and movement, and the body derives its
 substantiality from the soul, which is the formal cause of its ~~existen~~
 existence as a body. The human soul, while being the first principle of
 life and movement, is also a self-subsistent, immaterial, intellectual,
 incorruptible, substance which, whether united to or separated from the
 body, has a life and activity of its own. It is by the possession of
 an intellectual soul capable of activities which far surpass those of
 the rest of the animal world, and are beyond the power of any material
 organ, that man bears a unique likeness to God. We should notice that
 in the thought of Aquinas man's soul is independent of the physical
 brain, and also that it is of course not exclusively concerned with
 specifically religious activities. The mind is the characteristic
 faculty or power of the soul - the characteristic operation of the
 soul. "The intellect is not to be distinguished from the soul accord-
 ing to its essence, but as a power from the other parts of the soul"
 (Summa Theologica III.Q. VI, art. 2, ad. I). Reason is an imperfection of
 the intellect, due to the necessity, under its present union with the
 body, of obtaining its knowledge through the senses. It is an activity
 of the mind by which it arrives at truth by a process of movement from
 one thing or principle to another. But mind itself grasps a truth

directly and immediately, in a single, intuitive, glance. That the mind is an immaterial, spiritual substance may be gathered from its capacity to perform acts which are impossible to a physical substance, such as body or brain, e.g. its ability to form judgments and universal ideas, its freedom from the limitations which impose themselves upon the bodily senses, and its capacity to reflect upon and know itself.

If, however, these instances show that the ^{human} mind is an immaterial, spiritual, substance, they do not prove that it is essentially independent of a body or brain or that it can exist without any kind of body, and it would be rash to use them as providing sufficient evidence for the doctrine that the departed exist in the intermediate state as 'disembodied' souls or spirits.

Aquinas' view of the soul as the ground of the Divine image in man, and of the mind as the characteristic faculty or power of the soul, follows the thought of S. Augustine, and is open to the same criticism as that made in the foregoing chapter on page 17. Though Aquinas regards the soul as constituting the ground of the image of God in man; and the mind as the characteristic power of the soul, he explains that just as the intellectual soul confers the substantial unity of man, and is present throughout the whole of his nature, so the image of God impressed upon the unifying principle of his being extends to the whole nature of man.

In the mind or intellect Aquinas discerns two powers: ^{or 'actual'} the 'active' ^{'potential'} and the 'passive' or ^{'possible'}, intellect. By the operation of the former we are able to disengage the immaterial form, which makes each thing to be what it is, from the particular material in which it exists

and is apparent to the senses. But the knowledge of the mind is gained from objects outside itself and perceivable by the senses, and as related to such objects the mind is passive ~~or patient~~, being not in act, but in potentiality, a ~~possible~~ capacity not merely to perceive but to receive the object. Thus for the mind to pass from potentiality to act an object is necessary by which the mind is set in motion. This implies a certain likeness or proportion of the mind to that object. In the case of material objects, this likeness or proportion is due to the fact that both the 'form' of such objects, and the mind, are of the immaterial order, and the 'active' intellect abstracts what is material and particular in the object, thus reaching the immaterial 'form' which causes it to be that specific object. If the object is of the spiritual order, no such act is necessary since the mind, being spiritual in essence, has an affinity with the spiritual and immaterial. In order, moreover, to gain knowledge of any object the mind has to submit itself to that object, and by doing so is enriched by it and changed, not in its nature but in its condition.

Hence, if God be thought of as the external object, the human mind has a passive capacity to know God, but cannot itself turn that potentiality for knowledge into an act of knowledge, any more than it can turn its capacity to know into knowledge of any truth by itself. It must have an object which, as the mind turns to and submits itself to that object, enables it to realise its innate, but in itself helpless, capacity. God must reveal Himself, and man must submit himself. But by that surrender of itself the mind does not lose its liberty, but on the contrary gains an accession of life and freedom. Its acts in no way cease to be its own acts, but rather are more its own, since they are more in accordance

with its highest nature.

As to the important question of the relation between reason and faith, Aquinas taught that for the knowledge of truths of the natural order the human reason is sufficient in itself, and that certain theological truths also, concerning the being and perfection of God, the validity of the moral law, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul, are to be known by reason or natural theology. Truths of revelation, however, such as the doctrines of the Trinity, the incarnation and atonement, the Church and the sacraments, though not contrary to reason, are beyond its natural reach and comprehension, and must be accepted by faith, solely on God's Word as mediated through the Catholic Church. It should be noted that to the scholastics faith is not a blind adventure or step in the dark, nor an emotion, but an intellectual act, a new power and reach of vision given to the mind, by which it sees as true and existent that which it is incapable of seeing or knowing through the natural reason. Human reason leads us to faith by enabling us to arrive at the rational conclusion that God has revealed Himself to man, and that the Church is a trustworthy witness to, and teacher of, the truths so revealed; then, following the mind's acceptance of these truths, the reason, now illumined by faith, seeks to know what is believed so far as that is possible in this life. This doctrine will be further discussed in connection with Luther's teaching later in this chapter, but meanwhile we may emphasise the point that the scholastic distinction between reason and faith is not a distinction between the rational and non-rational, much less the irrational, but between the natural and supernatural.

By Aquinas the distinction between the ~~image~~ and the similitudo in

man was further developed. The imago represents the properties of the natural man (*pura naturalia*), especially the rational soul (*anima rationalis*). The *similitudo* is a supernatural gift superadded (*donum superadditum supernaturale*), enabling man to attain fellowship with God, and this has been lost in the fall. Originally the natural endowments which constituted the imago were combined in a harmonious integrity, disposed to the attainment of an ever higher perfection: man possessed knowledge of all that was necessary to him as lord of creation, a capacity to control the lower passions of his nature, and the immortality of the body as an essential part of his nature. The loss of the *similitudo* has weakened and divided the whole of his nature: ignorance replaces knowledge, the lower part of the soul is but hardly controlled by the higher, the passions dominate the mind and will and the body no longer so shares in the immortality of the soul as to be free from the accidents of sickness and death.

Aquinas' explanation, however, of the manner in which the human mind attains the knowledge of God, as already described on page 25, does not need the doctrine of a lost *similitudo*. If we view the fall in the light of that explanation it would follow that man has turned his mind from God to creatures; the lord of creation has submitted to the creature instead of to the Creator. The image is not lost or destroyed, but forgotten, clouded over, defaced, as a great picture relegated to some dark corner of a dealer's shop, to be covered in dust, begrimed, and stained. But God is still there - man's need is to be turned back by God to Himself, or 'reconciled to God'.

The scholastic doctrine of man has been inherited by the Roman Catholic Church, notably the conception of the *donum superadditum*

supernaturale. It is therefore, convenient to discuss the Roman Catholic position at this point. The following description of Roman doctrine is taken from an approved manual of Roman Catholic theology, widely used in seminaries at the present day, 'Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae' by Tanqueray, Vol.II. ed. 1933 (Desclée) - Tractatus de homine, Art. II. 'De hominis elevatione ad statum supernaturale', I. Praeviae notiones de supernaturale.

Man was created natural, with a supernatural gift, or gifts, of grace, by which he had fellowship with God, i.e., was a partaker of the Divine nature. This supernatural gift was lost through sin, but is restored through grace, in Christ, and perfected in heaven.

The 'natural' is defined as what is 'owed' to a creature: that is, whatever is required for constituting something in its own essential species (constitutive), e.g. in man his body and rational soul; or, the (natural) powers necessary to enable it to exercise its own proper activity, e.g. in man his faculties, intellect, will, etc., and the operations for which they are ordained (consecutive); or, all helps necessary for the exercise of its natural faculty (exigitive), e.g. Divine co-operation, without which its faculties cannot be exercised; or, whatever it can obtain by way of moral sanction, (meritorie); such as the acquisition of moral virtues. It should be noted that man's natural gifts are regarded as including the capacity for fellowship with God, called by Thomas Aquinas *potentia obediencialis*.*

* *Summa*, Part 3, Qn.1, A3, ad 3.

For the above short account of the 'natural' it is perhaps well to quote in full the Latin text in Tanqueray.

* "Ad has confusiones vitandas, prae mente habeatur hic 'naturale' et 'supernaturale' definiri quoad ea quae alicui creaturae debentur vel non. Naturale proprie dictum est id quod, posita creatione, debetur alicui naturae aut personae constitutive, consecutive, exigitive vel meritorie.

Dicitur: (a) Constitutive seu secundum essentiam, i.e. quidquid requiritur ad constituendum aliquod ens in sua specie; v.g. in homine corpus et anima rationalis sunt quid naturale, quia constituunt ipsam essentiam hominis.

(b) Consecutive, i.e. secundum vires seu facultates, quidquid ^enampe ab ipsa natura dimanat, aut requiritur ut ens aliquod possit suam activitatem exercere, v.g. in homine facultates, intellectus, voluntas, etc., et operationes ad quas ordinantur.

(c) Exigitive, seu secundum exigentias, videlicet omnia auxilia necessaria ad naturale facultatem exercitium, v.g. concursus divinus, sine quo facultates exerceri non possent.

Haec tria vocantur debitum naturae, quia Deus, posito quod velit aliquod ens creare ... debet ei dare quidquid eidem essenziale est eiusdem naturam constituit, aut requiritur ad operandum.

(d) Meritorie, secundum meritum, id est, quidquid aliquod ens, per modum sanctionis moralis, adipisci potest, v.g. virtutum moralium acquisitio...."

The 'supernatural' [†]is something which is 'not owed' to a
 * §845(b) 'Notio naturalis'. [†]"Hic agimus de Supernaturale per participationem, quale est in angelis et homine inventum. Supernaturale per essentiam dicitur Deus ut in se est, in sua vita intima, quatenus est unus et trinus" (footnote on 'supernaturale' - Tanqueray §845(c)).

creature. It is above all natural essence, and powers, and needs of Divine co-operation for the ^{natural} exercise of the ~~natural~~ faculty, and merit. It is, however, not opposed to nature, but perfects nature. Supernatural grace is classified as (i) habitual grace, a 'state' of grace, through which we are made partakers of the Divine nature, and at last attain the Beatific Vision, and (ii) actual or transient grace, illuminating the intellect and helping the will, and serving to preserve and increase habitual grace.

*

The Latin text is as follows:- "Supernaturale vocatur, quidquid est supra naturam seu indebitum. Proprie definitur id quod, etiam supposita eius creatione, est prorsus indebitum sive naturae sive personae, ideoque non debetur nec constitutive, nec consecutive, nec exigitive, nec meritorie; sed superat essentiam, vires, exigentias, et meritum alicuius naturae. Dicitur (a) quod superat, non autem quod opponitur, quia supernaturale non est contra naturam, sed solum supra, eamque perficit; (b) essentiam, vires.. etc., ut supra explicitum est; proinde supernaturale in genere est illud quod enti conceditur praeter et supra debitum naturae et meritum personae."

†...."(a) Supernaturale relativum illud est quod alicuius duntaxat, non totius naturae vires et exigentias superat Ad supernaturale relativum refertur praeternaturale, id nempe quod, etsi indebitum, non excedit tamen limites perfectibilitatis naturalis, sed aliquod ens ^{perficit} ~~perfectit~~ in sua specie; (e.g.) donum immortalitatis corporeae, Adamo collatum, erat in se quid naturale sed ratione subjecti cui conferebatur, erat supernaturale,

quia immortalitas enti de se corruptibili minime debetur.

(b) Supernaturale absolutum est illud quod superat exigentias et vires totius naturae creatae et creabilis visio beatifica est clara et intuitiva Dei cognitio prout in se est; haec est donum absolute et in se supernaturale, quia nulli creaturae debetur. Gratia ^ahabitualis, seu status gratiae, est qualitas supernaturalis, permanenter et intrinsece animae inherens, per quam efficimur divinae participes naturae, et exinde mediate apti ad actum divinum visionis beatificae. Gratia actualis est auxilium quoddam supernaturale et transiens, quo Deus illuminat intellectum et voluntatem adjuvat ad eliciendos actus supernaturales. Gratia habitualis, utpote participatio divinae naturae, est absolute et in se supernaturalis; idem dic de gratia actuali quae ordinatur ad gratiam habitualement servandam et augendam."

As the above quotation shows, there is recognised, as it were between man's natural constitution and his original supernatural gifts, what are termed 'praeternatural' gifts, which are within man's natural capability but ^aindebitum and therefore relatively supernatural, viz. freedom from concupiscence, ignorance, sickness and death. These praeternatural gifts were lost through sin, and are not restored on earth by grace, but will be perfectly restored in heaven.

It is well to note the recognition by some Roman Catholic theologians, of the admirable conformity of grace with nature, and of the importance of keeping the balance between the recognition of this conformity and the recognition of the absolute gratuity of

grace. Thus Legrange writes: ^{*}"Trop souvent, lorsque nous

^{*}"*Perfection chrétienne et contemplation*", p. 60ff.

considérons la conformité du Christianism avec nos aspirations naturelles, nous cessons de voir l'absolue gratuité du don divin, nous inclinons ainsi vers la naturalisme pratique: au contraire si l'on néglige de voir cette admirable conformité, on est porté à concevoir un surnaturel rigide, contre nature, sans simplicité; ce qui conduirait à l'exaltation et aux folies du faux mysticism. S. Thomas * maintient admirablement l'élévation infinie de la grâce au-dessus de notre nature, et aussi leur harmonie. Mais il ajoute que cette harmonie n'apparaît vraiment qu'après une profonde purification de la nature par la mortification et par la croix, comme le montre la vie des saints."

But is the distinction between the natural and supernatural as respectively quod debetur and quod non debetur satisfactory? God's decision to make man is of the Divine sovereign will, and man's life is a gift to him from God, a stewardship for which he is answerable. Everything necessary for the constitution of man's nature and for enabling it to perform its proper function is a gift of God and from this point of view indebitum. Moreover, the phenomena of nature, its creation and preservation, at every point require the supernatural for their ultimate adequate explanation.

It will be convenient, therefore, and will be expressing an important truth, to speak of man's natural life as dependent

* References are given to Part I. 2 of the Summa, Q. 110. arts. 3 & 4; Q. 112 art. 1.

upon God's grace in creation, provided that we are aware that the orthodox use of the term 'grace' is restricted to the grace which comes through the christian revelation alone.

In the New Testament the word 'grace' (*χάρις*) is never used directly of unearned natural blessings received by man from God in creation ~~and~~ and the preservation and development of natural life. § The technical meaning of the term, as defined by the scholastics, is that of a supernatural gift freely bestowed by God on rational creatures with a view to their attainment of eternal life.* If, for reasons which will be stated a little further on †, the phrase 'supernatural gift' be avoided, we may say that the technical meaning of grace in christian theology is that of unearned blessing bestowed by God on man with a view to his salvation (as a process not completed in this life) through Christ. According to the argument of the preceding paragraph, the creation and preservation of man's natural life is an unearned blessing bestowed by God, and to that extent is due to the grace of God. God's grace in creation, moreover, as well as His grace in revelation, is through His only-begotten Son. Both aspects of grace proceed from the one Divine Author through the same LORD, and though there is for us a real distinction between them, there

§ In Rom. 4 ⁴ 11⁶, however, that which is given by God's 'grace' is ^{contrasted} ~~compared~~ with a debt earned by our own efforts. This description of grace may fairly be extended to the sphere of natural life.

* See 'Catholic Dictionary' on 'grace'.

† pp. 30(b) & 30(c).

cannot be between them an absolute distinction in kind.

The Roman Catholic doctrine outlined above argues that, God having once decided to create man, human nature must receive from Him all that is necessary for its constitution and proper activity, as a matter of debt, if it is to exist and carry out the activities which He willed for it, and that from this point of view the natural is quod debetur.

If for a moment this argument be granted, another objection may be raised. Roman theology admits that man's natural 'make-up' includes the capacity for fellowship with God. It is presumably in the rational and immaterial soul, and particularly in the intellect as the characteristic organ of the soul, that, in accordance with the teaching of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, this capacity for Divine fellowship is to be recognised. It is man's peculiar glory to have fellowship with his Creator. Without that fellowship he is wretched and frustrated. In fellowship with God alone does he attain to the true purpose of his being. Now, if God has made man with such a wonderful capacity, is it not just as legitimate to say that He owes it to man to enable him to satisfy that capacity, as to say that He owes it to him to enable his other faculties to function properly? From this point of view, supernatural grace, as well as what is natural, is debitum.

The truth is that man's nature is supernatural, in the sense that not only does his life depend upon God, as the lives of all other creatures depend upon God, but that his essential nature is

to have knowledge of and fellowship with his Creator. Apart from the above Roman use, the words 'nature' and 'natural', as regards man, may be used ambiguously - either as referring only to his endowments as a denizen of this world, which are normal objects of observation by secular science; or as referring to his true, essential, integral, constitution as created, in which case it includes his capacity for fellowship with God, about which there is surely something which may fairly be regarded as supernatural in itself. It is precisely because man is created in the image of God that there is necessarily something of a paradox in applying the term natural to his essential constitution.

Though Roman theology says that the supernatural perfects ^{*}nature, and Roman theologians may insist on the admirable conformity of grace with nature, their official doctrine of the natural and supernatural does obscure the view, for which this thesis stands, that christianity is man's truly natural condition, and that grace restores nature. It suggests that man's natural life is one thing, and that christianity is something else to be added to it. The doctrine of the donum superadditum supernaturale to replace a lost original supernatural gift of grace does not treat man's nature as a unity, especially since the original supernatural gift is the similitudo or 'likeness' of Thomist theology, inherited through Augustine from Irenaeus. Even if it is explained that what is lost through ^{Sin}~~sin~~ is fellowship with God, the objection is not entirely disposed of. It is true that the result of sin is the loss of fellowship with God, but to speak of that

* v. Latin text quoted on p. 29

fellowship as an original gift of grace conferred on man, then lost through sin, and to be replaced by the donum superadditum supernaturale, suggests something which does not belong to man's essential being by creation, but something external to him (though capable of admirable assimilation by him), which God originally gave to him, then took away because of his sin, but replaces by infused grace. The standpoint of this thesis is that human nature, after as well as before the entrance of sin, is a unity, and that this unity not only includes the capacity for fellowship with God, but implies the realisation of that capacity as the primary purpose of man's creation, and as the most characteristic law which governs his nature. Man's loss of fellowship with God through sin is due to his having turned away his allegiance from his Creator, and that is per se loss of fellowship. Man's need, as the Thomist doctrine of the passive or potential intellect makes so clear,[†] is to be turned back by God to Himself. This, after many centuries of preparation until man was able to 'bear it', He has done, in the fullness of the time, through Christ.

The Roman Catholic definition of the natural as debitum and of the supernatural as indebitum is in accordance with a characteristic tendency of the Latin mind, a tendency never more marked than in the scholastic period. "The Latin mind has always been inclined to view sin and righteousness in terms of definite acts rather than as states, and therefore to look upon man's relations to God under the aspects of debt and credit - though holding that the only basis of credit is the effect of God's grace."^{*} The same tendency is at the root of the mediaeval doctrine of merit. "To-day, in spite of the balanced statements of her theologians, the Church of Rome in her ordinary teaching and practice never seems able to get away from the idea of accumulating merit by good works."[§]

† p.25 * Williston Walker - *A History of the Christian Church*, pp.274-5.
 § Bicknell, *Thirty-Nine Articles*, p.275.

The Roman Catholic doctrine of human nature is well illustrated in the case of baptism. The grace conveyed in baptism is regeneration. The Romanist regards regeneration as conferring a supernatural gift of grace. In popular practice there is a tendency to regard this supernatural gift as a sort of deposit or germ left in our souls, a something existing by its own inherent power apart from ^{God} Himself, a something which at last becomes 'infused virtues', notably faith, hope, and charity, possessing a vitality in themselves. The result is an inclination to view the purpose of the post-baptismal life as primarily one long effort to preserve ^{the} baptismal gift from defilement, or to recover a lost good, and it is implied that the baptismal gift was one of independent holiness and purity.

But this error is avoided if baptismal regeneration be interpreted as meaning that in baptism man is placed in a new state, or condition, of restoration; that he is brought into a new, right, relationship with God. As in physical birth the life which has been in existence for some time is brought forth and placed into new conditions, so in baptismal regeneration man is placed into a new state of things, into God's Family and Kingdom. He is created anew in Christ Jesus, in that he is grafted into Him, and becomes the inheritor of Christ's life and not of his own; he receives the Holy Spirit, but the operation of this Spirit is to effect the actual restoration of his nature by teaching him to know the Father and the Son, drawing him continually out of himself, and teaching him to disclaim all independent virtue.

Luther breaks down the distinction between *imago* and *similitudo*, but follows Augustine's view of the original perfection of Adam.

"*Similitudo et imago Dei est vera et perfecta Dei notitia, summa Dei dilectio, aeterna vita, aeterna leticia, aeterna securitas.*"* Both

* This & the following quotations are both given by Brunner in 'Man in Revolt', p. 507.

imago and similitudo are to him the material image, and were lost in the Fall. "If the imago consists in that power of the soul (anima rationalis), then it would follow that Satan too would be formed according to the image of God, since in him these natural qualities are far stronger." To this latter argument we may answer, "Yes, admitted as a fact. Satan is the perversion of the Divine image."

Luther has then reluctantly to explain the 'humanitas' of fallen man to be 'relics of the imago', and these 'relics' have to include what man still has of freedom, civic righteousness, and natural knowledge of God. Actually, therefore, though he gets rid of the distinction between the terms imago and similitudo, and tries to limit them to man's perfect state only, he cannot get rid of the distinction between the ideas of the formal and material image, nor can he reconcile these ideas, however much he wishes to depreciate the formal image. There still remains an unresolved dualism, because he thinks of the Fall as involving the loss of man's 'original righteousness'. We have already seen how the conception of the similitudo as lost in the Fall leads to an artificial division of human nature, and Luther cannot get out of this difficulty.

For what exactly is meant by 'original righteousness'? Whether, with Augustine and Luther, it be regarded as a state of perfection, or whether, as modern science would suggest, we regard it as a state of primitive, childlike, innocence, it consisted, presumably, not in mere ignorance of the nature of sin, but in actual absence of sin. But whatever its content, it stood then, as it always will stand, in Christ alone, and could be maintained only by the grace of God through faith. In the case of unfallen man, it stood in Christ the Light that lighteth every man; in the case of fallen man, it stands in Christ the Redeemer,

as well as the Light, of every man. Absolute faith in God is man's only right and truly natural attitude as creature, whether fallen or unfallen, toward his Creator. 'Original righteousness' is not a kind of objective, external, gift received by man from God and then held by him as a quasi-inherent possession. It rests upon faith, conscious or unconscious, the only condition in which man's natural capacities, under God's grace, can be rightly exercised. The distinctively human capacities, therefore, functioning by grace through faith, are the only means by which righteousness, whether original or restored, may exist in man. To speak of the divine image in man, or of 'original righteousness', as materially lost by sin suggests that some essential quality of human nature was lost by the fall; whereas the truth is that the capacity for righteousness existed in man then and exists in man now, but then that capacity was realised through faith by God's 'creative' grace,[†] and now it has become perverted, so that its tendency or direction is away from God instead of toward Him, and can be restored only through faith by God's 'redemptive' grace.

It is further misleading to speak of man's material righteousness as wholly lost or effaced by the fall, as do Augustine and Luther and others, because though since the fall every human being 'comes short of the glory of God',^{*} in that the full possibilities of his nature are not realised,

* Rom. 3²³

† See pp. 29 (6) & 30

yet there does remain, even in unregenerate man, much actual or material, though imperfect, good, due to the grace of God in creation.*

Luther rendered magnificent service in so effectively recalling men to the scriptural doctrine of justification by faith, but his desire to exalt this doctrine led him to depreciate the natural reason, in contrast with faith and the illumination given to the christian by the Holy Spirit. Thus it is stated in the Formula of ^{Concord} ~~Concord~~, which was an agreement arrived at among Lutheran theologians in 1577 (published in 1580) some years after Luther's death in 1546: "When even the most able and learned men upon earth read or hear the Gospel of the Son of God, and the promise of eternal salvation, they cannot, from their own powers, perceive, apprehend, understand, or believe and regard it true, but the more diligence and earnestness they employ to comprehend with their reason these spiritual things, the less they understand or believe, and before they become enlightened, or taught of the Holy Ghost, they regard this only as foolishness or fictions, I Cor. 2,14" (Part II, Chapter II, section 9). This trend of thought led Luther to make a distinct cleavage between State and Church - not in the sense that, while the functions of State and Church are different, the Church must nevertheless be deeply concerned with the matters of the State and ought to set before it the principles and ends by which its conduct should be guided, leaving to the State its own proper business of devising the means to the accomplishment, upon those principles, of those ends; but in the radical sense

* See pp. 29 (b) & 30

that the business of the State is no concern of the Church at all. The following quotation well illustrates this point:

"I advise that ministers interfere not in matrimonial questions. First, because we have enough to do in our own office; secondly, because these affairs concern not the Church, but are temporal things, pertaining to temporal magistrates; thirdly, because such cases are in a manner innumerable; they are very high, broad, and deep, and produce many great offences, which may tend to the shame and dishonour of the Gospel. Therefore we will leave them to the lawyers and magistrates. Ministers ought only to advise and counsel consciences, out of God's Word, when need requires" (Luther's Table Talk, Hazlitt, No.748 b).

On the other hand, one of Luther's most important contributions to Protestant thought, as well as one of his most significant departures from mediaeval christian conceptions, was his vindication of the ordinary life of the individual as the best field for the service of God, rather than the unnatural limitations of monasticism and asceticism. He denounced those who "limit good works so narrowly that they must consist in praying in Church, fasting, or giving alms". At the same time, his radical separation of Church and State opened the door to a dual morality, christian and secular, and suggests the thought that the modern doctrines of Nazi Germany may well have received their initial direction by this error of Lutheranism four centuries earlier.

As to the passage in I Cor. 2,14 in the quotation from

the Formula of Concord given above ("The natural - φυσικος - man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged"), Augustine's explanation given in Chapter I, page 14, is surely the right one. S. Paul does not here intend a contrast between human reason as such and the teaching received from the Spirit, but between man's reason in so far as it is self-centred, i.e. carnal or 'animal' and 'secundum hominem', and therefore taking its stand upon a false position, contrary to its true constitution by creation; and man's reason in so far as it is used in accordance with its true nature, agreeably to God's will, even though with very imperfect conscious realisation by the user of his Creator.

It is instructive to contrast scholasticism with Luther in respect of the view of the relation between faith and reason. The scholastic doctrine has been described on page 26. Truths of revelation are the sphere of faith, and are separated from natural theology as within the province of reason. In actual experience, however, revelation undoubtedly demands from men the exercise of reason, nor can a certain exercise of faith be kept out of the field of reason and natural theology. Nevertheless the scholastics, because of the recognition which they gave to reason, found a place for the State and Natural Law in their theology. Yet, because, at least in theory, they separated the sphere of faith from that of reason, and the sphere of grace from that of nature, the specifically christian character

was regarded as something supernatural, manifested largely in an unnatural asceticism. Luther, regarding human nature and the natural reason as wholly corrupt and properly outside the sphere of christian theology, so that the work of grace is virtually to supersede nature, laid a foundation for another twofold system of ethics. That of the scholastics was the natural and the supernatural (i.e. ascetic and monastic and allegedly specifically christian): Luther's was the secular and the christian.

Calvin, like Luther, did not draw a distinction between the terms *imago* and *similitudo*. He did, however, recognise the two Biblical aspects of the formal and material image.[†] Yet, because of his doctrine of the loss of original righteousness and of the total corruption of human nature, his recognition of the formal image is, as such, of little practical value. He has a place in his theology for Natural Law, derived from the Old Testament. But it is Natural Law, not arrived at through the human reason, as with Aquinas, but grounded upon the sovereign will of God revealed in the infallible Word of God in Scripture.* Calvin, in his anxiety to assert the tremendous truth of the Sovereignty of God, fell into the error of depicting Him as outside the range of the moral law. Whatever God does is right because God does it (though similar action on the part of men might be contrary to the accepted codes of human morality): not, God is righteous, therefore He does what is right. Man's reason belongs to the formal *imago*, but it is defaced, and the higher the reason aspires, the more it errs (here Luther is in agreement). Civil government is of Divine institution, and has the Divinely appointed task of fostering the Church, protecting it from false doctrine, and punishing offenders for whose crimes excommunication is insufficient.

* See Troeltsch: 'Social Teaching of the Christian Churches', Vol. II, pp. 603 ff., 612-616, 652-653

† See Brunner, 'Man in Revolt', p. 509

As regards the specific standpoint of the Church of England, so far as it is officially set forth in the formularies of the Thirty-Nine Articles of 1571, there is scarcely need to do more at present than refer to the ninth article, on Original Sin. A large part of article I will be dealt with in Part II, in the chapter on the Biblical doctrine of man's creation; arts. X and XIII will be discussed in the ^{criticism} ~~chapter~~ *of Brunner's theology*; * ~~on Sin and Free will~~; and art. XXXVII referred to in the consideration ^{of the Family and Nation} ~~of the Family and Nation~~. The ninth article condemns Pelagianism and affirms the doctrine of original sin, but it is noteworthy that the latter is described as involving, not the loss of original righteousness, but a going widely astray from it. The actual words in question are: "whereby man is very far gone (*quam longissime distet*) from original righteousness". This language seems unobjectionable, and to be thoroughly in keeping with the confession that "we have erred and strayed from Thy ways like lost sheep". But the further statement of the article that "therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation" is open to serious criticism. Yet it is the original sin in each person, not the person himself, which is thus condemned. Dean Church (*Life and Letters*, pp. 294-295) justifies the statement thus: "It is of this inherited sin, looked upon in the abstract and without reference to concrete cases, that I suppose the article speaks. How can we suppose that such a nature looks in God's eyes according to the standard of perfect righteousness which we also suppose to be God's standard and law? Does it satisfy that standard? Can He look with neutrality on its divergence from His perfect standard? What He may do to cure it, to pardon it, to make allowances for it in known or unknown ways, is another matter about which His known

* See p. 109

† See pp. 357-358.

at tributes of mercy alone may assure us; but the question is, How does He look upon this fact of our nature in itself, that without exception it has this strong efficacious germ of evil within it, of which He sees all the possibilities and all the consequences? Can He look on it, even in germ, with complacency or indifference? Must He not judge it and condemn it as in itself, because evil, deserving condemnation?"

The great Anglican divines Hooker, Andrewes, and Jeremy Taylor, may be said to represent the classical period of Anglican theology. In his 'Laws of the Ecclesiastical Polity' Hooker laid down principles which have ever since been characteristic of Anglican divinity at its best. The Ecclesiastical Polity follows the order of Aquinas in Summa Theologica in treating of (i) the Eternal Law, i.e. the Divine reason; (ii) Natural Law, i.e. the rational order of creation as cognisable by human reason; (iii) Human Law, i.e. law made by man; and (iv) Divine Law, i.e. the Law of the Old Testament and the New Testament. The law of the universe is nothing less than the product of the reason of God, and in the laws which regulate the physical and moral world man is able to discern the Divine character. The reason of man exercises its highest function in justifying and explaining the laws of God, both natural and supernatural, to the moral nature and intellect of man. Human reason, thus sifted and tested by experience, and applied to the facts of life, becomes the true basis of authority, because it approaches most nearly to the reason of God. The revelation of Scripture is the complement, not the substitute, of Natural Law; it presupposes that men are gifted with reason, and is not intended to reveal that which men by the exercise of their own reason can find out for themselves. Hooker's great work, called forth by the aggressive Calvinism of his time, laid

down principles which showed where the intellectual basis of Calvinism was wrong and why it was wrong. A universe constituted upon rational and moral laws presupposes that the nature of the Creator must be rational and moral, and the human reason, in so far as it is able to apprehend the Divine nature as manifested in creation, is not defaced.

There is a difference between the view held by the Anglican tradition, as represented by Hooker, concerning the relation between reason and faith, and the view of the scholastics. With the latter, human reason leads to faith by enabling men to arrive at the rational conclusion that God has revealed Himself to man, and that the Church is a trustworthy witness to, and teacher of, the truths so revealed: but at this point faith, as a higher power of the intellect than the natural reason, steps in and, as it were, takes command, and henceforth it is for reason to function under the direction, and by the illumination, of faith. With Hooker, however, the reason should function independently, not only before the acceptance of revelation, but in the act of acceptance and afterwards, at every step freely criticising the alleged truths of revelation, and rejecting them if convinced that they are contrary to reason, conscience, and experience. In other words, the right of private judgment is not exercised in one supreme act of submission to the Church, to be followed by unquestioned acceptance of all that the Church may at any time teach, but every individual member of the Church has at all times the right of independent enquiry and private judgment, though the wise man will exercise it with the greatest care and humility.

Consequently, because this Anglican attitude regards the relation between reason and faith rather from the standpoint of actual experience than theory, it is not so apt as the Roman Catholic to separate, as

supernatural, the specifically christian from the natural, nor to divide ethics into natural and supernatural. Anglicanism finds it easier to see what is christian in what is natural, and it requires the same moral code of the christian as it requires of the man of the world, though in a higher degree of perfection.

The scholastic contention that faith is a higher act of the intellect is in fact open to criticism. The psychology of Thomas Aquinas recognises only the two faculties of cognition and appetite. "Feeling", or emotion, or instinct, is subsumed under the latter faculty. Cognition has two levels - the sense level of perception, and the rational level of abstract or conceptual knowledge. Appetite also has two levels - the sense level, i.e. what we today call 'instinct', and the rational level, i.e. what we today call 'will'. Faith is a supernatural 'habit' or 'virtue' of the intellect, by which, through grace, Divine truth is received on the authority of revelation, the will also being moved, by charity, to assent. Hence faith is 'cogitatio cum assensu', and is said to be 'caritate formata'.[¶] This charity, however, operates essentially in the will, rather than in the affections or passions. It is the desire for God. It seems clear that faith is regarded as an act of the intellect, in the sense that the term 'intellect' denotes a distinction from the element of feeling or instinct, or at any rate suggests depreciation of that element. ^{however,} Granted, that there is in faith a rational element, for we cannot have faith in that about which we know nothing, and even the infant's blind faith in its mother is apparently based on an instinct confirmed by an elementary rational experience: yet to an

[¶] *Summa* II. 2, Q. 2, art. 2; Q. 4, art. 3.

unbiased view it is clear that the instinctive, emotional element also plays an important part in the working of faith. It is begging the question to define faith as distinct from both natural human reason and instinct, and yet at the same time to claim it as an intellectual act, unless it can be to some extent tested by natural human reason. There would seem at least as much justification for saying that faith is essentially the instinctive longing of the creature for his Creator.

Chapter III

The 17th to the 19th Century

The age of the Reformation was followed, as seems to be always the case after periods of great originality of thought in human history, by a period when the new contributions were, so to speak, classified and systematised. Thus the post-reformation period may be described as one of Protestant Scholasticism. This period occupied the greater part of the 17th and 18th centuries. The theology of this time was influenced chiefly by two movements, hostile to ^{the} prevailing scholastic temper and leading eventually to its downfall.

Pietism in Germany was a reaction against the one-sided emphasis laid by orthodox 'scholastic' Lutheranism on pure doctrine and the sacraments as constituting the sufficient elements of the christian life. As regards the doctrine of man, pietism depreciated the reason, and insisted on the primary importance of the experience of the individual, his consciousness of definite conversion and 'new birth'. If 'the heart' is right, differences of intellectual interpretation are relatively unimportant. The leading of a good life by the individual, the cultivation of personal holiness, are all-important, and to this end Bible-reading, prayer, and discussion-groups (collegia pietatis) were formed, which increasingly tended to usurp the place of ordinary church-going. The attitude to the world was one of strict asceticism - in food, drink, dress, rejection of the theatre, dancing, cards, etc. The Church's independence of the State was strongly advocated.

The other movement, the Aufklärung or Enlightenment, arose some time

after the appearance of Pietism, and was largely its nemesis. It became increasingly rationalistic in character, emptying the christian Faith of its mystery and reducing christianity to little more than a doctrine of morals with a religious flavour. Yet it produced the pioneers of that method of scientific historical criticism of the Bible which has led to such clearer knowledge in our own day. In Germany Pietism preceded the Enlightenment (though the latter did not extinguish it): in England the parallel movements of Methodism and Deism occurred in the reverse order - Methodism brought life to the dead bones which were the effect of Deism.

The above short account of pietism and the aufklärung has been included to make the link between the reformation period and the 19th. century as clear as possible, but it has not been thought necessary to enter into a separate discussion of these two movements, since the issues which they raise are abundantly covered by the consideration elsewhere of the relation between faith and reason, man as a social being, Natural Law, etc..

The doctrine of Natural Law was virtually abandoned by the protestantism of the 17th., 18th., 19th., and early 20th., centuries - with a few notable exceptions, such as that of F.D. Maurice in the 19th. century. Its sphere was consequently taken over increasingly by secular humanism. The rising tide of secular humanism showed itself in the teaching of the great jurists of the 17th. and 18th. centuries, Rousseau's doctrine of the 'Rights of Man' (Natural Rights) which inspired the French Revolution, the romanticism of the early 19th. century, the great influence on popular conceptions of human progress produced by Darwin's 'Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection', and 19th. century

liberalism, such as the belief that the evil in man is the consequence only of his having been enslaved by exterior forces and conditions, so that if these were removed nothing would hinder his natural goodness revealing itself, or the dream popularised by Mr. H.G. Wells, that education is the one panacea for all human ills. All these movements of thought seek the centre of human life in man himself, or even in one of the elements of man's life, and tend to give to these false absolutes a religious force. Perhaps the most far-reaching of such influences was that occasioned by Darwin's work. The biologists, of course, are altogether right in investigating the development of bodily forms. But it is bad logic, to say the least, when their popularisers assume that because it is proved that man is physically an animal, therefore his nature is essentially animal. The conceptions of secular humanism, of course, profoundly affected contemporary theology.

Having noted the increasing secularisation of the doctrine of Natural Law, we may now consider the philosophic and religious thought of last century. The passage from the 18th. to the 19th. century was marked by a philosophical renaissance. Of the great names concerned it will perhaps suffice to make a brief mention of Kant. His importance for our subject lies in the fact that, though he denied that a knowledge of God is attainable by pure reason, and though to him religion was but the handmaid of morality, he nevertheless maintained strongly that man's imperative sense of duty demands religion and the existence of God as its ultimate ground, and that the reality of the eternal is actually entered upon by moral action. It is also most significant that so independent a thinker who stands for the autonomy of the moral conscious

ness should feel impelled to the grave admission that there is in man "a natural propensity to evil, and since man must nevertheless always bear the blame of it, it may actually be styled a radical badness in human nature, innate, but none the less drawn upon us by ourselves". Brunner (in the Mediator, chapter VI) points out that in spite of Kant's profound insight into the doctrine of the radical evil in man, he implicitly abandons it in the end, to save our moral autonomy. Kant's recognition of the radical evil in human nature, however, has made it more difficult than ever for subsequent theology to construct a shallow doctrine of sin.

With the dawn of the 19th. century we enter upon a succession of great thinkers who have exercised important influence upon the formation of 20th. century doctrines of man.[†] For this reason their views will be given at some length. The first is Schleiermacher. He is both philosopher and christian theologian, and there is in him frequently a curious ambiguity of doctrine according as whether Schleiermacher the philosopher or Schleiermacher the theologian is speaking. His views are a reaction against the lifeless rationalism associated with the Enlightenment, and against the cold, stern, morality of Kant, and were strongly influenced by the new Romanticism, which was an impassioned return to natural instincts, life, freedom, individual predilection, spontaneity, creativeness. Schleiermacher taught that "each man is meant to represent humanity in his own way, combining its elements uniquely".* The free man is not under command to submit himself to a transcendent moral law: he is to live out his life untrammelled and uncontrolled by any authority higher than his own soul - like the plants and blossoms of nature. But we are called to do this, not as isolated individuals, but

* Eng. translation of Schleiermacher's Soliloquies, by H.N. Friess, p. 317

† For much of the material in the following accounts of Schleiermacher, Hegel, Ritschl, Troeltsch, Kierkegaard & Barth, the writer is greatly indebted to Mackintosh's 'Types of Modern Theology'.

in society as the appointed form of human life. Schleiermacher's passion for humanity led him to a much needed emphasis on the essential importance of the corporate nature of christianity. His stress on individual freedom and spontaneity, however, a doctrine which, if controlled by a proper regard for law, may be productive of much wholesomeness and powerful drive, is fraught with obvious dangers when, as in his teaching, it is not balanced by ^{regard to} due legal control. It has already been suggested (page 33) that the impulse to the dual morality of secular as distinct from christian ethics occasioned by Luther's radical separation of Church and State started that direction of thought which later made possible the rise of modern Nazi doctrines in Germany. Here, in the over-emphasis of Schleiermacher's unbalanced romanticism upon individual spontaneity, we may discern that tendency in German thought which, appearing in another form in the Dane Kierkegaard, as we shall see, has influenced, via the philosophy of Heidegger, modern German thought, both in the popular idea that the decision of the individual is above any objective or universal ethical standard, and also in the non-rationalism of the Barthian school of theology.

Schleiermacher's fundamental theological tenet is that the proper home of the idea of God within our consciousness lies in that which precedes and underlies will and knowledge equally, viz. feeling. The basic religious element in man is pious feeling, and the particular quality of this feeling is that of absolute dependence. This feeling of absolute dependence ranges in our experience not only over our consciousness of being determined to a considerable extent by things around us, but also over our spontaneous activity or freedom as depending upon a source beyond ourselves. In spite of ambiguous language,

Schleiermacher, it would seem, does not mean that this feeling of absolute dependence is a mere inward emotion, from which we infer by reason a cause beyond ourselves. It is itself actually the apprehension of the Divine. It is that faculty in man by which he has immediate awareness of or communion with the Divine. Its sphere is properly distinct from the spheres of reason and ethics. Religious doctrines are but the intellectual definition and interpretation of fundamental religious experience. They have changed and may change. Morality asks insistently the question, 'What ought to be?', in the light of religious consciousness, and is the result of the proper understanding of that of which man is a part - the family, the community, the State, the world.

Schleiermacher's doctrine of pious feeling as the basic religious element in man suggests three points for reflection. First, this feeling of absolute dependence is to a certain extent a corrective to his doctrine of individual spontaneity: but it is a very vague corrective, and liable to self-deception, unless the Divinity which is thought to be thus apprehended has given some expression of itself in an external, absolute, standard or law. Secondly, his doctrine of feeling to some extent endorses the foregoing criticism (page 17) of Augustine's, and after him the scholastics', concentration upon the mind as the centre and ground of the Divine image in man. Thirdly, when we come to consider Otto's 'Idea of the Holy' in a later chapter, we shall inevitably be recalled to this doctrine of Schleiermacher as having obviously much influenced Otto, though the latter differs widely from him.

Schleiermacher's idea of God begins by being very vague and pantheistic in its suggestions. It gradually becomes more definite, but never wholly succeeds in throwing off semi-pantheistic conceptions. The

fault is largely due to his weak sense of revelation, and to an inadequate understanding of the Old Testament, which was his weak subject. It is not surprising that for him prayer has no place for supplication and intercession, but comprises only gratitude, resignation, and meditation. Yet for all this he was a great lover of Jesus, but it is the perfect humanity of Jesus rather than the personal incarnation of God which stands in the centre of his Christology. Nevertheless, he can define christianity as "a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological ^{*} type of religion, and (it is) essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything has relation to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth".

His view of sin is 'evolutionary'. He practically regards it as a very grave imperfection, a relic of the brute in man, to be overcome. But he lays much needed stress on the significance of sin in its corporate or social character. It is "in each the work of all, and in all the work of each". This idea is taken up later by Ritschl.

The next 19th. century thinker for our consideration is Hegel. Hegel makes a brilliant analysis of the process by which the human mind advances in the apprehension of truth, an analysis of which practical use has been made in more recent years by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, for Communism, and thus introduced into modern thought as invaluable. The process consists in a succession of three stages. An absolute truth is first apprehended by the mind partially, under one aspect. This preliminary aspect is the first stage (thesis), and is developed until it encounters opposition or limitation. This opposition to the preliminary idea is the second stage (antithesis), but it retains some element in common with the stage of thesis, because the same absolute

^{*} by which he practically means ethical.

truth is parent of both stages. The clash of the two opposed stages of thesis and antithesis eventually produces the third stage (synthesis), in which the opposites are brought together in a higher union. Man's apprehension of truth thus pursues a zig-zag path or spiral, by the three repeated stages of affirmation, negation, and higher affirmation, which may be denoted by the three words 'Yes, No, Nevertheless'.

It is important to notice the contrast between this method of approach to the problems of human nature and sociology and that of conceptions grounded on the recognition of Natural Law. In Hegelian thought human progress is dynamic, being brought about by violent, often disruptive, forces rather than by orderly obedience to static principles. It is organic - it is the force and life inherent in the social organisms produced in the course of human history which give rise to further progress, and progress is due to social forces rather than to men living in individual obedience to external principles. It is empirical - man advances by new experiments which may lead him to an unknown goal unlike the ideals of past generations, whereas a conception of Natural Law inspires man to work for the attainment of ideals preconceived by rational methods and as such unchallengeable. It is relative - the question of progress is considered in relation to a particular nation or people in a particular age, with reference to particular circumstances, and not, as in the case of Natural Law, in the light of universal and absolute principles. It is concrete - dealing in a spirit of opportunism with hard facts as they are and not asking sacrifices for the sake of abstract and what might seem to be impractical principles and ideas.

Though it is particularly the philosophy of Russian communism which has made use of this thought, it nevertheless is of German source, and is

in accord with a characteristic of German mentality. It is in the dynamic explosiveness of this approach to human problems that a typically German trait may be discerned. It may be remarked that though Hegel scorned the subjective emotionalism of Schleiermacher, both actually represent a view of the world and of human life, viz. humanistic and aesthetic, characteristic of the romantic movement ^{of} to their day. What Schleiermacher was trying to express in terms of feeling, Hegel tried to express in terms of ~~pure~~ thought, and Schleiermacher's rejection of a transcendent moral law as binding upon the individual is in keeping with the fact, ^{that} Hegel's thought, as such, is in contrast with that approach to human problems which stands only upon Natural Law and does not make due allowance for the spontaneity of human freedom.

Hegel, however, was not content only to regard his analysis as a description of the way in which the human mind advances in the apprehension of truth, or even as a valuable contribution to the understanding of the sequence of great movements of thought, and their corresponding social changes, in human history. He made the claim, the extravagance of which has since been abundantly demonstrated, that it is the solution to the entire universal process, and applied it even to the Being of God Himself. God is always striving to reveal Himself, and this revelation must always be through the three necessary stages of development. As Father, we have the stage of thesis; as Son, antithesis; as Holy Spirit, synthesis. So with the incarnation. God represents the stage of thesis, finite humanity that of antithesis, Christ that of synthesis. Hegel was sincerely under the impression that his scheme of thought must effect the reconciliation of philosophy and religion.

Such presumptuous speculative-rationalism as that of Hegel, which

which seeks to press the christian Faith into its own preconceived system, and theological subjectivism like that of Schleiermacher, were alike opposed strongly by Ritschl. Subjectivism in theology is often accompanied by mysticism, and Ritschl was particularly hostile to that type of mysticism which is not vitally centred in, and kept steadfast by, the revelation of God in Christ. The strength of his theological method is that it is always grounded, at least in intention, upon this revelation. Thus he insists on the central fact of this revelation in attacking speculative rationalism, subjectivism, and mysticism, and also as against natural theology, and he urges the study of New Testament history, and also of the Old Testament, as affording solid standing-ground in contrast to the vagaries of subjectivism and rationalism. His interpretation of the scriptures is in the light of the Reformation, and especially Luther, for whom he had a great reverence. But though he depreciates philosophy, and bases his position upon Biblical revelation in contrast to it, he does not seem fully aware of the problem of the relation between the history of revelation and history in general, or, as Brunner puts it, particular or singular revelation and general revelation. He treats Biblical revelation as of a piece with history in general, to be adequately understood by the method of normal historical investigation - and yet he disparages reason and exalts faith in contrast to it.

Ritschl's emphasis on historical fact is in his case an expression of a pragmatic temperament, which viewed religion from a utilitarian standpoint. Much influenced by the teaching of Kant, his conception of christianity was strongly ethical. For him the Kingdom of God is virtually "the moral unification of the human race, through action prompted

by universal love to our neighbour". Morality is not represented by him as the fruit of faith, but is, strictly speaking, independent of it. This same confidence in human morality led him to deny the doctrine of original sin, explaining our sinful tendency as due to corporate influences and to environment. It was also closely connected with his refusal to recognise as an actual fact 'the wrath of God'. Two favourite doctrines of his are those of 'vocation' and religious lordship over the world. Each of us is called to serve God in his station and its duties, in a unique way, as forming for us "an integral part of the Kingdom of God". "The lordship over the world possessed by believers is the aim of reconciliation with God in the christian sense". The present liberty of a christian man is the very purpose of all that God has done for man in Christ.

The pragmatic utilitarianism of Ritschl shows itself again in his estimate of christian theological doctrine. Here again he was influenced by Kant, in the latter's assertion of the moral sense as a basis of practical certainty and in the denial of absolute intellectual knowledge. "We know God only in His effects upon us". We may have economic knowledge of the Blessed Trinity, but knowledge of the Eternal Being and relationships in the Godhead is impossible. Ritschl makes use of the teaching of Lotze. What a brick pavement is in itself I have no means of knowing. Yet it is truly known to me as a sidewalk, and to ants with mounds between the bricks as their home. If such knowledge affects my conduct, it is a 'value judgment'. This principle Ritschl applies to the christian revelation. Thus Christ has for us the value of God, and as such is truly known: but to ask whether He was pre-existent, and of two natures, and one Person of an Eternal Trinity,

is to ask what the experience of the early Church could not answer. But this is begging the question. The question is not merely whether God has made a revelation to men concerning their moral conduct, in which case the exercise of the moral judgment would be proper for the estimation of that revelation: but whether God has, as the experience of the Church asserts, expressly and uniquely revealed to men His own eternal nature, in the resurrection of Jesus and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The criteria by which Ritschl tests christian doctrine are merely the independent moral ideas which he brings with him to the task.

A strong feature of Ritschl's theology is his doctrine of the Church. Here again we have an instance of an appeal to historical fact. Ritschl emphasises the Reformers' doctrine that it is only through the Church, as the living body of believers, that the Gospel comes to the individual, and that it is only through the historical fellowship of the Church that the torch of revelation has been handed down through successive generations. He insists that the christian life, both in its origin and continuance, is not accidentally but essentially corporate.

The tendencies of Ritschl's teaching were developed by the left wing of his followers, who became the representatives of Liberal Protestant theology in its fully conscious form. In particular, the dualism which Ritschl had tried to maintain between faith and reason, between christianity and philosophy, was felt to be no longer possible. The Bible was increasingly taken down from its pedestal and subjected to scientific criticism, especially in the light of the new knowledge of the history of the great world religions. In reaction against Ritschl's

attempt to put faith upon the basis of history, it was held that this view had been rendered impossible by the latest knowledge of the history of religions. But, in the attempt to save religious faith from being altogether discredited by new knowledge, a fresh dualism was made between faith and reason, religion and science. The realm of fact and truth is the department of science. Christianity is the concern of the individual, and is confined to the sphere of values, moral ideals, and uplift. The doctrine of original sin becomes inadequately recognised. Grace merely perfects man's natural evolution. Hence the idea of some to-day that man is by nature a beast, and that christianity raises him and educates him with a view to the evolution of the 'super-man'.

One of the greatest leaders of Liberal Protestantism was Troeltsch (1865-1923). His great interest lies in the relation between specifically christian thought on the one hand, and the culture of civilisation on the other. The different types of christian thought and experience, e.g. those of the early Church, Mediaeval Catholicism, and Protestantism, are accompanied by different types of culture and social order. Does religion determine culture or does culture determine the form of religion? He lays down three canons to govern his enquiry: (i) the law of criticism, according to which no historical judgment can assert ~~no~~ more than a probability or rise higher than a moral certitude; (ii) the law of relativity, according to which the explanation of any particular human historical event or period is relative to the whole sequence of human history, which moves onward in conformity with a rational principle and presents an integral continuity; (iii) the law of analogy, according to which religious thought in history has every-

where been at work on similar lines, so that virtually all the cardinal doctrines of christianity have a counterpart in other faiths. These canons make it clear that for him christianity is not the revelation of the nature of the eternal Godhead by means of a unique historical event, and it is not surprising that he draws the obvious inference that neither christianity nor any other religion can be absolute and final, and that christian¹ foreign missions ought not to aim at converting heathen, but at uplifting them by education.

On the other hand, the Lutheran heritage of Troeltsch makes him assume that the purest form of christianity is separate from Natural Law, and to esteem the attempt of mediaeval catholicism to give ^{adequ}adequate recognition to Natural Law in its theology as to that extent a departure from pure christianity, while at the same time as philosopher and historian he appreciated the value of that attempt. In his great work on "The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches" he finally, after a magnificent study of the data, gives up² the idea that there can ever be a satisfactory combination of religion and society.

Troeltsch, like Ritschl, is in religious sym⁴pathy and outlook Lutheran, assuming that pure christianity is properly distinct from the field of reason, philosophy, and Natural Law. At the same time, both are interested in historical facts. Ritschl assumes that christianity and history are not in contrast to each other, but does not see that the Lutheran interpretation of christianity makes this assumption impossible: Troeltsch, in his great book, is led to realise that christianity as he understands it cannot be reconciled with the history of human culture and sociology. The work of both raises acutely the question of the relation between pure christianity and history. If christianity be

founded upon a unique historical revelation, what is the relation, if any, between that historical revelation and history in general? We shall find occasion to return to this important question again in future pages.

The teaching of Kierkegaard (1813-1855) has been kept till this point because until thirty years ago he was scarcely known outside Denmark, but since then his writings have leapt into importance in the wider world. He has, for instance, much influenced the philosophy of Heidegger, which, until at any rate quite recently, was the fashionable and dominant one in circles in Germany which were by no means national-socialist -- such as the universities, and among Confessional churchpeople. He has also strongly influenced the theology of Barth. The greatest original thinker Denmark has produced, his teaching cannot be appreciated apart from the background of the morbid and tragic experiences of his life. Three such experiences stand out as landmarks in the progress of his thought: (i) the occasion when he first learnt from his father of the supposed curse which the latter imagined he had incurred through having in his youth, under great physical distress, himself solemnly cursed God, as it were, to His face; (ii) the renunciation by him, at the age of thirty, of his engagement to be married; and (iii) the satire meted out to him by a weekly Journal in Copenhagen, which strongly affected the outlook of the last years of his short life.

His theology, like so much other continental theology, started from the doctrine of sin, rather than from the essential idea of the Gospel as good news about God. Original sin is a hideous fact and is bound up with a mysterious dread, which is common to all mankind. In a few

passages he actually identifies sin with the state of finite being as such, a view which, if developed, would deny the essential goodness of God's creation and become sheer Manichaeism. He regards human nature in its present condition as having no point of contact for the action of God's grace. The christian is a new man in the sense of an absolute break, absolute discontinuity, with the past and the calling into existence of a wholly new personality. We shall find opportunity, when we consider the teaching of Barth and Brunner, for comment on this idea of fallen human nature as presenting no point of contact for the action of God's grace. To Kierkegaard, there is between God and man a dualism so absolute that he can speak of God as 'the absolutely Unknown', the mere 'Limit', the 'sheerly unqualified Being' - conceptions which surely make nonsense of the incarnation.

There are three successive levels of human life: (i) the 'aesthetic', (ii) the ethical, (iii) the religious. The 'aesthetic' level is not necessarily artistic, nor sensuous, but what St. Paul would call *ψυχικός*, and the authorised and revised versions of our English Bible translate as 'the natural man'. Its keynote is irresponsibility, unwillingness to make important, life-influencing, decisions. This state eventually leads to despair. Progress from one level to another is emphatically not by natural evolution, but only through decision, impassioned decision. The secret of life lies not in a compromising and comfortable 'both ... and', but in the absolute challenge 'either ... or'. The facing by the individual, without shrinking, of any crisis in his life, and the making of a decision, constitute 'existence', in distinction from mere 'life', and 'existential' thinking is the kind of thinking which accompanies the making of such decisions.

In the ethical stage of life a man is living as a responsible moral individual, making important decisions. There are wholesome concrete interests, and a real, if only partial, development of personality. Yet man's failings in the sphere of morality point the way to remorse, and to penitence, and to the conviction of the ultimate incompetence of morality considered as a final sphere in itself, and so lead to the highest stage, that of religion.

In the religious sphere decision is faith. Faith is the personal appropriation of Divinely presented truth with or through passion. "Faith is a suffering ... a shaking of the whole existence which can be compared only to what we call passion" (Brunner on Kierkegaard, in 'The Word and The World', pp. 71-72). Truth is inward, it is subjectivity, not in the sense of the denial of outward reality, but in the sense that "only the truth that edifies is truth for thee". In religion we are face to face with the Divine will which perpetually demands our decision.

Kierkegaard insists that the individual, in his relation to God, is above mere universal laws and codes, and that the personal decision of the individual is essentially different from choice made merely in accordance with ethical principles, in obedience to some moral law, and that the latter must, if necessary, give way before the former. He makes much of the story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. Abraham's faith led him to obey the Divine command to do a morally wrong act. Thus the sphere of ethics was temporarily set aside in the interest of the higher purpose of faith, by what Kierkegaard calls 'a teleological suspension of the ethical'. And the real triumph of Abraham's faith lay in his courage in accepting the inspiration at the crucial moment

that he ought not to sacrifice Isaac.

In refutation, however, of this interpretation of the story of Abraham's sacrifice, we may point to the view of the Divine character plainly stated in the famous words ascribed to Abraham in Genesis 18.25, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Abraham was convinced that God is righteous, and if he had been certain that it was a morally wrong act to sacrifice his son to prove his devotion to God, he would never have thought of doing so. The point is that he was not certain. We ought not to put into the story the moral standard of a later time. It was the custom among neighbouring heathen nations for men to sacrifice their sons to prove their devotion to their gods, and it was not unnatural that Abraham should be faced by the terribly insistent thought, "Am I ready to give up as much for my God as they are for their gods?" It may be answered that, according to the story, the idea of sacrificing his son was not the mistaken ~~idea~~ notion of Abraham's own heart, but actually God's command. Precisely. Given the state of conflict of Abraham's mind, there was only one way in which the question could be finally settled - the way in which God settled it for him, by putting the question to the awful test. Thus God taught not only Abraham, but mankind for all time, that such sacrifice is not the sacrifice which He requires of men. In any case, God did not allow Abraham to do the morally wrong act, so that the story affords no justification for the actual commission, in the name of faith, of acts contrary to ethical standards.

In Kierkegaard's view of individual decision we have a doctrinal seed which has been misdeveloped^p into the distorted notion which, consciously or unconsciously, influences Nazis and Confessional church-

men alike in Germany, that the decision of the individual, made in a concrete moment, is above any objective or universal standard of ethics or of reason by which it can be either justified or criticised. Kierkegaard's view of ethics, and that of the modern Barthian school after him, is inadequate through failure to recognise that universal moral law is itself the voice of God, and that the moral judgment of the conscience of the individual and his sense of duty are, for him, absolute and not relative. The attempt to decide what is morally the right thing to do in a particular situation is often a most perplexing and baffling problem, and there would seem to be a real element of faith in the decision which we make at last, but it is a decision made in the effort to order our conduct in accordance with ethical standards, and not a decision justified in its own right.

Kierkegaard had a rooted antipathy to the philosophy of Hegel, which had exerted strong influence on christian thought. He was at pains to maintain that between speculative rationalism and faith there is an absolute contrast. He accordingly delighted in bringing out the paradox, a method which he called 'qualitative dialectic', between such ideas as the Divine holiness and love, God's grace and man's responsibility, eternity and time. The cross is to men an irrational offence, though it is the wisdom and power of God, and it is for man simply to submit to the paradox of the cross. The sacrifice of the intellect is imperative. The gulf between the infinite God and finite man is so absolute that the notion of God becoming man is 'absurd' and unthinkable. Yet the 'absurd' has happened. The Infinite has impinged upon the finite in the 'moment' of the historic life of Christ, and in the 'moment' of faith, which has to be continually renewed, the gulf between

the finite and the infinite is bridged for the believer. So Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac was in defiance of all considerations of reason. "In the power of the absurd Abraham clung to the certitude that he would receive Isaac back again, and he thereby gained anew the whole sphere of time".

But was Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac in defiance of all considerations of reason? If God is righteous, and if He had made to Abraham a promise which involved his posterity through Isaac, and if it was not morally wrong to sacrifice Isaac, and if it was God's will that Abraham should do so, was it unreasonable to believe that the Creator had power over His creation and would keep His promise, and would somehow or other bring back Isaac from death? ^{*}No doubt it was a stupendous act of faith, but it was reasonable. It is our ~~faith~~ failures through lack of faith that are really unreasonable. So Paul, standing before Agrippa to be judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto the fathers of Israel, asked "Why is it judged incredible with you, if God doth raise the dead?" [†]To the heirs of the promise, possessing such a revelation of God as they had received, it was both cre^dible and reasonable to believe that the holy, anointed One of God, Who had lived a life of perfect fellowship with Him, should not see corruption and that it was not possible for Him to be holden of death. [§]

Kierkegaard's life work had been to answer the question 'What it is to be a christian', and in his reaction against the easy and compromising notions of christianity around him he had deliberately tried in his answer, to make christianity as difficult as possible. Perhaps the most damning thing that could be said against his presentation of christianity as a whole was his own admission that his view of the

* Heb. 11¹⁷⁻¹⁹

† Acts 26⁶⁻⁸

§ Acts 2²⁴⁻²⁸ 13³⁴⁻³⁷

Gospel had little to offer to the child. Yet he was convinced that his interpretation of the christian religion is the right one, and was confident that it would prevail. He became increasingly embittered toward the end of his life, and launched a fierce attack upon the Church as an institution. Christianity was to him an isolated business which essentially concerned only the individual and God. The world became for him more sharply distinct from the believer. There is, of course, for him no such thing as a general revelation of God in human history.

Kierkegaard's teaching was a powerful corrective against easy-going conceptions of God and failure to recognise His essential holiness, and against complacent ideas of human nature, and he did good service in recalling men to the fact that the Gospel presents an absolute, inescapable, challenge. In particular, the meaning which he gave to faith as decision is, in itself, of great value for our ~~present~~ ^{his absolute} purpose. But his views of God, and the incarnation, and ~~the~~ contrast between human reason and faith, and his idea of the christian life as essentially individual, are a travesty of New Testament doctrine. In his book on Kierkegaard (p.22), E.L.Allen writes: "Few men have offered to God such a sacrifice as he did, yet surely that he gave was that one sacrifice which God does not ask of His children, for it was the quenching of the Inner Light." When one contemplates the costly sacrifice of this gifted man on the one hand, and his fearful errors on the other, one feels driven to suspect strongly that such errors, in so far as they were not due to morbid sickness of mind, must have been due to culpable faults of his character - some pride, or wilfulness,

his unwillingness to acknowledge good in the members of the visible church who differed from ~~himself~~ him, perhaps above all his failure to hallow God's Name as perfect righteousness and love, a Name in which sinful men may gladly ~~at~~ put their trust.

CHAPTER IV

FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE

It is a great relief to turn from nineteenth century continental theology to the work of an English theologian of that century - Frederick Denison Maurice. Archdeacon Hare described him as "the greatest intellect since Plato." Whether this eulogy be exaggerated or not, it certainly stamps Maurice as a man of unusual intellectual insight, and there is no doubt that he was also a man of most saintly character. Some have complained that his writings are obscure, but surely such obscurity as they may sometimes contain is not to be compared with the difficulty of reading such modern theologians as Barth and Berdyaev. The writer of this thesis has read Maurice's Kingdom of Christ, his Theological Essays, his life compiled by his son, and many of his sermons on the Prayer Book and the Lord's Prayer, Patriarchs and Lawgivers, Prophets and Kings, Sacrifice, St. Luke's Gospel, St. John's Gospel and Epistles, and the Apocalypse, going to them again and again for comfort and inspiration, and has almost invariably obtained through them release from unworthy conceptions of God, the quickening of a lively faith in God and His Christ, and an interpretation of human nature and human society which has filled life with meaning and grandeur. It is for this reason, and because of the conviction that the present generation stands in sore need of the teaching of Maurice, that a separate chapter is being devoted to the consideration of his theology.

Though it would be difficult to find anyone insisting more strongly upon the fundamental unity in which the whole human race is constituted, and the universality of the Gospel, yet he never tries to be other than thoroughly English and a clergyman of the Church of England in his theological approach, holding firmly that the best contribution to the Church Catholic is made by faithfulness to the particular vocation assigned by God, as indicated by such natural institutions as a person's nation and family, and by the education which he has received and the experiences which have come to him in the ordinary course of life. He has a hatred of systems, parties, and societies formed to propagate particular tenets of opinion, on the ground that all such are of merely human invention, artificial, and quite inadequate to meet the many-sided problems of actual life, and that God has Himself provided what men need, in the natural institutions of society, the gospel, and the Catholic Church. His own home experiences and upbringing as a child played an important part in shaping this outlook.

A comparison of his theological method with that of the great continental theologians of his century presents a striking illustration of the difference between English and German (and in the case of Kierkegaard, Danish) thought. The German, in his investigation of truth, is wont to lay strong emphasis upon one aspect of it in such a way that other aspects are virtually excluded. He is thus apt to be very one-sided, though very forceful. German thought thus progresses by, as it were, a zig-zag path, the extravagances of each great thinker being followed by a reaction in an opposite direction. English thought, on the other hand, strives to keep on the highroad, maintaining a sense of proportion, holding fast the truth it has already received, fearful of

becoming unbalanced, testing doctrines by their ability to stand up to the facts of life rather than by their logical consistency. It is not that English thought is actuated only by motives of obedience to static principles of Natural Law and that the progressiveness of the Hegelian type of thought finds no place therein. On the contrary, accepted thought and policy in England is gradually, and as it were naturally, formed as a result of the test of actual experience, and does as a matter of fact represent a stage of synthesis, holding in balanced and practical tension the previous stages of thesis and antithesis.

Maurice's theology typically exemplifies these English characteristics. In his many controversies, he makes an earnest attempt first to do justice to the position of his opponents, searching for and acknowledging the truth on which it rests, however perverted and overlaid with accretions and errors. He contends that reconciliation of party divisions is to be effected, not by that misrepresented doctrine of the *via media* which implies compromise of principle, but by drawing out, much more completely than the partisans themselves do, the full implications of each aspect of truth for which the respective parties stand, and then finding some higher point of view which unites these different aspects in all their fullness; it is not the truth for which a party stands, but the failure to follow it boldly and honestly, which breeds the factious spirit. The following sketch of his theology is based, though not exclusively, upon his *Theological Essays*, which he himself regarded as the most important and representative of all his works.*

True theology must correspond to the deepest feelings and thoughts of human beings. Even the most ignorant men should be able to

* See *Life of F.D. Maurice*, Vol. II, p. 164

appreciate the issues of the most important questions of theology, if they are presented simply; in fact, they could not fail to be deeply interested in them. This does not imply that theology must rest upon man's inner consciousness and his experience: it must rest upon a surer rock than that. But it must evoke a response, an echo, from man's deepest thoughts and feelings. The basis of theology is the revelation of God in Christ as Charity, or Love, or Agape. "Charity is the ground and centre of the Universe, God is Charity".* "Take away the Love of God, and you take away everything."† The Bible sets forth the Revelation of that Love, or it is good for nothing. The Church is the living Witness and Revelation of that Love, or it is good for nothing.‡ Human love (as manifested in the unregenerate as well as the regenerate) is the image and counterpart of the Divine; even imperfect natural conceptions of human charity witness to the Divine reality.§ To start from this belief is the best way to reconcile philosophy and christian theology, and also at the same time to maintain the distinctness of christian theology.

The profound craving, whether conscious or unconscious, of the human heart for the love of God is, however, thwarted at every turn by sin. Sin seems intricately, inseparably, interwoven with the very fibres of our being. The sense of sin is essentially a sense of solitude, isolation, distinct individual responsibility. Yet man instinctively disclaims it, explaining it as due to circumstances, or to some essential error in his constitution. The ultimate explanation is that of the New Testament, that it is due to the tyranny of an Evil Spirit, who has withdrawn men from their true Lord. This Evil Spirit has established his thralldom over the will, and its effect is a corruption which is

* Theological Essays p. 9
 † - do. - pp. 12-13
 ‡ - do. - pp. 6-7

felt through man's whole nature. But this thralldom, this corruption, is not the true law of man's being; it is due to a usurper. There is in every man, whether he realises it distinctly or indistinctly, the sense of a righteousness, more closely intertwined with his being than sin, and proper to his nature. The experience of suffering, and the contradiction of sin, do not destroy that belief, but their intrusion is permitted in order that man may be led to cry out for a Redeemer and may attain to the knowledge of the fact that this Redeemer lives. This Redeemer is the only-begotten Son of God. The mythology of every great ancient people attests man's universal longing for such a Redeemer, and demands that He should be also in some way related to man. He, the Christ, is man's true LORD, a belief which implies, in accordance with New Testament doctrine, that He is in every man, the source of all light that ever visits him, the root of all the righteous thoughts and acts that he is ever able to conceive or do. Thus in the creeds He is exhibited as man's Lord before any affirmation is made of His incarnation, etc..

In the fullness of the time He took our flesh, entering into all the infirmities of man, tempted like as we are, bearing the sins of man, so showing forth the purity, compassion, love, of His Father. He made atonement for our sins, reconciling us with the Father. The atonement originated with the Father. The will of the Son is one with that of the Father; He did not change that will which He took flesh and died to fulfil - His whole earthly life is an exhibition of that will and an entire submission to it. As man's true Lord He did not take upon Himself the sins of men by some artificial substitution, but is man's actual Representative; as Head of mankind, He shared man's sufferings,

overcame death, delivered men from the power of the Devil, the great Accuser and Slanderer of men to God and of men to one another. He the Lamb of God, has taken away the sin (not the penalty of the sin) of the world. The sacrifice of God's beloved Son, in Whom God is well pleased, is the satisfaction to the Divine love of the Father. Compare John 10.17-18, "Therefore doth the Father love Me, because I lay down My life, that I may take it again; no one taketh it away from Me, but I lay it down of Myself; I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again; this commandment have I received from My Father".

Christ's death is the type or pattern for everyman's death. It is the universal death. It involved the death of the soul (defined roughly by Maurice as 'that with which we think')* as well as the death of the body, for Christ poured out His soul, as well as His body, to death,[†] and body and soul in man are both intimately attached to his personality, whatever distinction we may make, for convenience, in thinking of body and soul. "Christ gave up all that was His own - He gave Himself to His Father. He disclaimed any life which did not belong to Him in virtue of His union with the eternal God. It is our privilege to disclaim any life which does not belong to us in virtue of our union with Him. This would be an obvious truth, if we were indeed created and constituted in Him, - if He was the root of our humanity. We should not then have any occasion to ask how much perishes or survives in the hour of death. We should assume that all must

* Theological Essays p. 165

† 2s. 53¹² Mk 10⁴⁵ John 10^{11.15.17} cf. Ac. 2²⁷⁻³¹

perish, to the end that all may survive".^{*} and Christ's burial, and the doctrine of His descent into hell, affirm that there is no corner of God's universe over which the Son of God and the Son of man has not asserted His dominion.

The strongest evidence for the doctrine of His bodily resurrection is that it is the inevitable issue of all the previous revelation. If there is a Son of God, a Lord of man, and if He became incarnate and died, He must rise. It was not possible that God's Holy One should see corruption. Maurice much disliked the doctrine of the existence of 'disembodied spirits' in the intermediate state. It would seem that he believed in the immediate resurrection of the eternal (not earthly) bodily substance of men:† men's earthly bodies, defiled by sin, must see corruption - unlike the body of their sinless Lord, which only needed to be glorified.

God's justification, by the resurrection, of the perfect faith of Christ implies the justification of everyman, who may therefore believe in Christ and acquire His righteousness, which is the only condition of doing any good acts. Baptism is the Divinely ordained witness to this justification, as the true and proper state of all mankind.

But this faith in justification implies further the acknowledgment of a

* *Theological Essays* pp. 167-8

† " " pp. 168-188

regeneration, claimed in baptism, in the sense of being born "into the light of ~~God's~~ God's countenance, as the child is born out of the womb into the light of the sun" - a regeneration "effected, not for individual men merely, but for human society in the true Lord and Head of it." And the ascension of our Lord, in our nature, in a glorified body, vindicates the true order and constitution of human existence, proclaiming that, in spite of the limitation and corruption inherent in the earthly bodies of sinful men, we do not belong to earth, but are spiritual beings, able to hold converse with God Who is Spirit, because the body and blood of our glorified Lord is our food and nourishment. Christ is King and Judge now, continually present with men and nations, and they are daily exposed to His cognisance, ^{for} approval, or censure; He is manifested, for the putting down of evil and the establishment of righteousness, in all the crises of history, which are anticipations of the final Day of the Lord.

Maurice considered that he was, by temperament and disposition, of a cold and unemotional nature, and he did not enjoy those helps to faith which it is the lot of some people to experience, viz. frequent warm and passionate feelings of the nearness and the love of God. Consequently his doctrine of faith characteristically emphasises that "God does not depend upon our feelings, but our feelings upon God, ... we must claim a certain spiritual position as our right before we can realise it in our apprehensions, .. (and) be assured that we have the Spirit of God within us, and that He is distinct from all the emotions, energies, affections, sympathies in our minds, the only source and inspirer of them all" To learn that there is a substance for faith to lay hold of, and that faith does not create this substance;

that there is a deepground and source of faith - deeper of course than all the acts which proceed from it, this is our task."* To the objection that it is a vain subtlety to insist so strongly on the importance of the fact of our redemption, assured to us in our baptism, as distinct from the knowledge of the fact, when it is only the knowledge of the fact which distinguishes the believer from the unbeliever, he replies, "Yes, but the distinction is a most vital and practical one; for it makes all the difference to the possibility of my knowing and believing whether there is something to be known and believed, or nothing".†

As to his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, there has been in human history, Maurice taught, a universal recognition of an Inspirer of the minds of men. The explanation of this Inspirer is found in the christian revelation recorded in the Bible both in the Old and New Testaments through the prophetic inspiration of its writers, unparalleled in the history of man. The understanding of the Scriptures by their readers, the minds of christian believers, the gifts of the Greek poets invoking their Muse, and all the general inspiration of men - all are inspired by the same Holy Spirit. The normal condition for man is that all his thoughts should be inspired by that Spirit, so that they may be right, good, true, thoughts. The Holy Spirit has come to the ages following Christ's ascension in a way in which He did not come to those which preceded it. Since our Lord's ascension there has been such a sense of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment in the world as cannot be traced in preceding ages, and which can be adequately explained only as proceeding from the teaching of a Person.

* Life - Vol. I. p. 246

† - do. - p. 189

But the Holy Spirit is also the establisher of a One, Holy, Catholic, Church. The divisions and sins of all the churches contradict the Scriptural idea: yet these very contradictions bear witness that Scripture has revealed the true law of human society, for they have not arisen because the different christian bodies have maintained too strongly the reconciliation effected by Christ, and the descent of the Spirit, but because they have acted as if that reconciliation had not been effected and we had still to effect it for ourselves, as if there were no Spirit to unite us with the Father and the Son and with each other. "The world contains the elements of which the Church is composed. In the Church, these elements are penetrated by a uniting, reconciling, power. The Church is, therefore, human society in its normal state: the world, that same society irregular and abnormal. The world is the Church without God: the Church is the world restored to its relation with God ... Deprive the Church of its Centre, and you make it into a world. If you give it a false centre ... there necessarily comes out ... a world assuming all the dignity and authority of a Church, - a Church practising all the worst fictions of a world; the world assuming to be heavenly, - a Church confessing itself to be of the earth, earthy." (*Theological Inquiry*, pp. 403-4).

The acknowledgment of the Name of the Trinity in its fullness and unity is eternal life. Each portion of that Name answers to some apprehension and anticipation of men. The setting up of one part of that Name against another has been the cause of strife, unrighteousness, superstition. The logical difficulties to prayer caused by the ideas of God's perfect goodness and His omnipotence disappear when prayer is offered to the Father, in acknowledgment of the perfect sacrifice, and of a Spirit helping our infirmities and making intercession for us.

CHAPTER V.

MODERN CONTINENTAL DOCTRINES (OTTO & NYGREN)

A characteristic feature of modern theology is the non-rational school which has arisen in reaction against liberal protestant theology. Since it is of comparatively recent development and is exerting considerable influence today, it is necessary that its doctrines should be criticised in some detail. Kierkegaard may be regarded as in many respects a precursor of the movement.

1. RUDOLF OTTO.

It will be best to begin with Rudolf Otto, who died a few years ago, although Otto himself is by no means an opponent of liberal theology as such.

Of all the non-rational theologians, the views of Otto are perhaps the most subtle and formidable in relation to a clear and practical recognition of the formal image in man, for he recognises the rational aspect of Divine revelation and regards it as necessary and important, and at the same time cuts the ground from under our feet with his doctrine that it is after all but an interpretation in human terms of that which is 'Wholly Other', and that its necessity and importance is relative to human need only.

According to him God is essentially the *Mysterium tremendum*

et fascinans, of Whom man becomes directly aware only in a non-rational, though progressive, manner different in kind from all other human experience. This non-rational awareness of God, called by him the sense of the 'numinous', which is designated by the original implications of the word 'holy', is progressively rationalised for man through ordinary human experience. Such rationalisations, however, though of vital necessity, are nevertheless, being temporal and in terms of human experience, essentially different in kind from the eternal truths which they illustrate about the nature of the Godhead. Man's sense of the numinous relates to that which is 'Wholly Other', as compared with ordinary human experience capable of being rationally known and expressed. Like 'the good' and 'the beautiful', 'the holy' belongs to a distinct category of experience, sui generis.

Otto illustrates his contention from the sphere of music. A song set to music expresses feelings that are 'natural', "homesickness perhaps, or confidence in the time of danger, hope for a future good, or joy in a present possession - all concrete elements in our 'natural' human lot, and capable of being described in conceptual terms. But it is otherwise with the music, purely as music".* The emotions which it releases are, he argues, properly quite distinct from the human feelings expressed in the words of the song. Consequently he holds that programme-music "misinterprets and perverts the idea of music by its implication

* *Idea of the Holy*, p. 49

that the inner content of music is not - as in fact it is - something unique and mysterious, but just the incidental experiences - joy and grief, expansion and repression - familiar to the human heart", and he extends this criticism to the 'music-drama' of Wagner.

But may not a particular piece of good music make the appeal which it does because the 'natural' human feelings and experiences - homesickness perhaps, or confidence in the time of danger, etc. - expressed in words which become closely associated with that piece of music themselves contain, as such, profound and mysterious depths of emotion which are substantially one in quality with the emotion produced by the music alone? May not the music of programme-music and music-drama be inspired as the true expression, in the sphere of music, of profound and mysterious depths which underlie natural human feelings and experiences? May not natural human feelings and experiences themselves be expressions of profound and mysterious depths of the human personality?

Again, Otto instances the sex-instinct. This, he says, is non-rational like the numinous and the aesthetic, but, while they infuse the rational from above, the sexual "presses up from beneath, quite wholesomely and normally out of the nature which the human-being shares with the general animal world, into the higher realm of the specifically 'humane'",^{*} becoming interwoven with the latter, yet remaining essentially distinct. He thus contends that the

^{*} Idea of the Holy p. 47

love between man and maid is essentially different from the love between friend and friend or between child and parent, though the first kind of love becomes interwoven with thoughts and feelings owed to the influence of the two latter.

But may not the 'specifically humane', the 'higher humane life of mind and feeling', have as lowly origins as the sexual? Animal life affords many instances of the exhibition, for example, by parents of wonderful devotion to their young, and of loyal friendships. All these different manifestations of love are found in an immeasurably higher form in man than in the animals. Why treat sexual love as necessarily lower in essence and origin than the others?

Otto goes on to assert that the fear felt by man towards God is essentially different in quality from the fear felt by a child towards its father, "though retaining the essence of the most genuine reverence"* felt by the child for its father - presumably as a rational, human, natural feeling interwoven with the non-rational numinous feeling.

Assent to the doctrine of man's creation in God's image, however, would warrant us in asserting that all feeling and experience which is 'natural' to man contain profound and mysterious depths which have something in common with, something of the same quality as, man's sense of the numinous; in other words, man's numinous sense differs from other categories of human experience,

* Idea of the Holy, p. 48

not in kind, but as one species differs from another in the same genus, or one sense from another in the same body; common to the different categories of human experience is an essential, underlying, unifying, principle. Man's numinous sense of the *Mysterium tremendum et fascinans*, in which at first the attribute of *tremendum* tends to predominate, has within it an essence which is also recognisable, under other species, in ordinary 'natural' human experience. Otto's *Mysterium tremendum et fascinans* must be Love, for Love is the supreme revelation of the character of God. Love, proceeding from the Divine Creator, is the common essential principle in natural human experience; the reciprocal love between God and man, distinct in its species, is in essence the same as the basis of the love which is to be found in its various species in the natural relationships of human life, e.g. between husband and wife, parent and child, brother and brother, friend and friend.

The writer will not easily forget, on finishing the reading of Otto's 'Idea of the Holy', standing on the top of the tower of his parish church one night in the late autumn. To the east lay the great city of Bristol with its sparkling lights, and a tongue of suburbs extending north-west from the city along the north bank of the river to the port of Avonmouth; to the south an expanse of quiet country with here and there a village or hamlet; to the west the waters of the Bristol Channel, and, beyond,

the lights of some Welsh townships with the hills behind them; and above - the starry sky. He thought of the great, mysterious Power behind all this; he thought of the *Mysterium tremendum et fascinans*; and Otto's book seemed to offer cold comfort and to leave a weary and dread gap in the heart, with its doctrine that man's soul is indeed capable of intuitive, direct, and growing, awareness or apprehension of its Creator through its inherent sense of the numinous, but that all that is really 'natural' and most human about ^Hhim is to be thought of as belonging to a quite distinct category, able to interpret numinous experience to some extent in human terms which humanity can understand, but quite unable as such to enter into any direct relation with the Deity. Then there came to mind the lines of Browning:

"Think.....

What if the all-great were the all-loving, too,

Saying, 'O heart I made, a heart beats here!

Face My hands fashioned, see it in Myself.

Thou hast no power nor may'st conceive of Mine,

But love I gave thee, with Myself to love,

And thou must love Me Who have died for thee'."

If, as Otto asserts, it is the element of *tremendum* in the Deity rather than that of *fascinans* which is felt by primitive man, nevertheless that after which he is groping is He Whose Name

is Love. From this point of view, the ultimate origin of religion, instead of being ascribed to the shuddering awe felt by primitive man in the presence of the numinous, may be more accurately ascribed, with Jevons, to an inherent longing in man for a personality to worship, as that *quo nihil majus*, or to the smile bestowed by a baby on its mother or the cry of the infant for its mother, as genetic psychology suggests.

There can at any rate be no reasonable doubt that the only kind of conception of God which can really satisfy the longing of the human heart is that suggested in Browning's lines quoted above, i.e. the doctrine of a God Who has created man in His own image. The admission of this, however, does not in itself prove the doctrine to be true, though such admission is surely a most significant fact.

In Appendix IX. of 'The Idea of the Holy', Otto quotes as descriptive of numinous experience a passage from Ruskin, in which the latter recounts repeated experiences of his youth. The following is an extract from the passage in question:

"Although there was no definite religious sentiment mingled with it, there was a continual perception of Sanctity in the whole of nature from the slightest thing to the vastest; an instinctive awe, mixed with delight; an indefinable thrill..... I could only feel this perfectly when I was alone; and then it would often make me shiver from head to foot with the joy and fear of it, when after

being some time away from hills I first got to the shore of a mountain river, where the brown water circled among the pebbles, or when I first saw the swell of distant land against the sunset, or the first low broken wall, covered with mountain moss. I cannot in the least describe the feeling; but I do not think this is my fault, nor that of the English language, for I am afraid no feeling is describable and the joy in nature seemed to me to come of a sort of heart-hunger, satisfied with the presence of a Great and Holy Spirit....." *

The writer, like no doubt many other persons, has had, perhaps to a lesser degree, similar experience, his emotion being roused by desolate mountain, hill, or sea scenery. Perhaps worth special mention is the fact that a violent, howling wind or gale on hill or sea-shore attracted, and still attracts, him almost irresistibly, producing a mood of great exhilaration, carefreeness, and robustness tending to wildness: a mood, he is persuaded, closely allied to the quieter mood of silent awe felt on other occasions. Rather, however, than describe the 'instinctive awe, mixed with delight' as something which made him 'shiver from head to foot with the joy and fear of it', he would prefer to say that sometimes it well-nigh brought a lump into his throat and tears into his eyes, and would hesitate to say that there was no definite religious sentiment mingled with it. In his experience, moreover, this inherent love of nature includes inseparably both the intuitive sense of the numinous, and a rational, 'natural', ordinary human understanding

* *Idea of the Holy*, p. 221

of nature, and it is in fact through the former that he has been led to the latter. It is through the idea of the holy that he has learned to appreciate the natural and common, especially in human life, and to contend for the vital importance of the doctrine of man's creation in God's image. He is convinced that it is impossible to make an essential distinction between the numinous, spiritual side of man's being and the 'natural', rational, side.

It may be urged that the reconciliation between the holy and the natural or common has been due to rational christian teaching. But granted, for the sake of argument, that man's primitive sense of the numinous would inspire him primarily, if not altogether, with a shuddering awe, and with a dualistic outlook as regards the holy and the common or natural: it is nevertheless a unifying and reconciling explanation of that dualism which christianity provides, and not an intensifying explanation of it, like the teaching of Otto and certain other continental theologians, however much Otto may value rationalism as a necessity. In so far as a reconciliation between the conceptions of the holy and the natural is due to christian rationalism, this ^{thesis} ~~book~~ claims that that rational teaching is an explanation of the actual relation between those two conceptions. In Appendix IV. of 'The Idea of the Holy' Otto quotes Gregory of Nyssa:-

"Since one of the signs of the Divine Nature is its essential incomprehensibility, in this also must the copy be like the original. For were the nature of the copy comprehended when the original was above comprehension, the copy would be a mistaken one. But

inasmuch as the nature of our spirit is above our understanding, it has here an exact resemblance to the all-sublime, representing by its own unfathomableness the incomprehensible Being of God."

Upon this quotation Otto remarks: "Here, too, we need to break up anew our hardened and crusted feelings and to withstand the intellectualising tendency to which we are so prone in our doctrine of the soul and its creation in God's image. For this divine image in man does not merely consist in the fact that he is reasonable, moral, intelligent, and a person, but primarily in the fact that in its profoundest depths his being is indeed for religious self-consciousness something numinous - that the soul is mystery and marvel." *

The logic of Gregory of Nyssa is obviously correct, but the writer of this book would amend Otto's statement by saying that human personality itself, while reasonable, moral, intelligent, and to a certain extent capable of being understood, is in its profoundest depths beyond our understanding, mysterious, marvellous. As the seashore deepens to the ocean-bed, so that a man may walk out into the sea for a certain distance but then finds himself out of his depth, so man's reason may carry him a certain distance in his understanding both of his own nature and of the Divine nature, but beyond that distance he has passed the limit to which his reason will take him; yet the bottom of the sea, from shore to ocean-bed, remains continuous and unbroken, whether within or

beyond man's depth - and so that which man is able to understand about his own nature or about the Divine nature is continuous with those depths which are beyond his reason's limit, it is true so far as it goes, it is on the right lines, it is pointing him in the right direction. The foundations of human personality, which lie deeper than our understanding can penetrate, contain roots which spring up into the domain of man's rational understanding as that which is 'reasonable, moral, intelligent'. Otto, on the other hand, though admitting that the Divine image in man partly consists in his rational nature, nevertheless separates this rational nature from the profoundest, intuitive depths of man's nature as being, in human experience, something different in kind, making the soul something 'wholly other'. If, however, you take away the 'natural' from the essential being of man, he remains no longer truly human.

Instead, therefore, of using the term 'non-rational' to denote the basic raw material of man's faculties of appreciation of holiness, beauty and moral goodness, it is preferable to use the term 'intuitive' or 'instinctive', as implying that, though the raw material of these faculties may not be consciously rational in man's experience, yet in their own inherent principle by creation they are rational in the sense that in their own proper nature and function they are part of a rational system and subject to rational laws, so that their right func-

tion is their rational function.

A doctrine which recognises the rational aspect of Divine revelation as necessary, and yet at the same time regards the whole content of that rational revelation, occupying centuries of time and involving incalculable human suffering and effort, as merely a Divine accommodation to human intelligence of something wholly other, may well be felt to be intolerable and one which at any rate cannot be accepted so long as the facts adduced in support of the doctrine are capable of another explanation which does not separate the being of God and the soul from the rational content of revelation as something wholly other. But it is hardly true to say that such an explanation on the one hand and the doctrine of Otto on the other are both equally possible interpretations of the facts adduced by Otto. The doctrines of the incarnation and the ascension, if they are not to be emptied of all real meaning, tell heavily against his theory.

Otto, like other continental theologians, fails through attempting to give an 'absolute' interpretation of a single word or idea which he is examining. What Otto says about the distinctive category of the 'holy' is indeed relatively true to a certain extent. It is true, for example, upon the merely human plane, that for practical purposes sexual love, parental and filial love, and love toward God can be placed

in distinct categories: but to pursue this relatively superficial distinction to such an extent as to make it provide a perfectly concise, absolute, objective account of such emotions, is not to recognise other relevant factors in this complex universe, and to turn the facts to suit a theory. The more ultimate our comparison of such emotions, the more we are precluded by our limitations from making that comparison perfectly concise and absolute; the more must we find that the roots from which these emotions spring have a mysterious common connection.

Otto's great contribution is to have shown so clearly that man's religious sense of the holy is as distinct a category of human experience as reason, conscience, and the aesthetic sense, and that man does possess an instinctive, intuitive faculty for entering into direct relation and fellowship with his Creator.

2. NYGREN.

In his book 'Agape and Eros' Dr. Nygren pronounces the two ideas represented respectively by agape and eros to be directly antithetic to one another.

Agape is the Divine love, and, according to him can be found, as far as man is concerned, only in the christian life of grace. It is spontaneous and uncaused, being indifferent

to human merit or worthiness, and man has value because God loves him, not vice versa; hence the idea of 'the infinite value of the human soul' is not christian.

Eros represents human love, and is the love of desire, seeking good for the self, and is utterly distinct from agape. It is characteristic of Greek religion and philosophy and fundamentally opposed to christianity.

Nygren holds that there is no room in agape for any sense of desire or longing. But agape must contain an element of unselfish desire - for communion with the beloved. That is an integral, essential characteristic of love. Though the Divine Agape laid down its life for man, yet it was in the faith of ultimate victory. Though Agape renounces itself for the good of its beloved, it is in the faith that that renunciation is the road to ultimate closer communion between them. Such communion is a source of rejoicing to God. "There is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth". Many scriptural parables must involve this if they are not to be emptied of real meaning. The very conception of God as Father implies that, unselfish though His Fatherly love is, He does desire fellowship with the men whom He has created through His Son, and that such fellowship gives Him joy. The Divine Agape knows that man's true good is ultimate fellowship with itself, man's Creator - for apart from Agape is no true good.

Nygren pours scorn on the notion that God is Eros.* To Aristotle the idea of Eros is wholly inapplicable to God, since it implies an unsatisfied need. But Aquinas (Summa Theologica Part I, Quaes. XIX, Arts. 1 and 2) applies the idea of Eros to God. We cannot think of God's love as stimulated or evoked by created things, and so dependent on them. But we may think of God as eternally desiring, loving and effecting all Good, which is His own nature, and as reproducing in creation some of that Good.

So there is a place for self-love by the side of the demand for self-denial. "If any man would come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow Me. For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for My sake and the gospel's shall save it." (Mark, 8,34-35). A priest must desire to be a good priest. "His grace which was given me was not in vain, but I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I ..." (I Cor. 15,10), and Paul presses on toward the goal unto the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus (Phil. 3.14). Non propter praemium, sed non sine praemio. To say that 'self-love' in its widest sense is not christian (Agape and Eros, p.170) is almost Manichaeism.

The best christian mysticism cannot truly be described, as Nygren describes it, (Agape and Eros, p.p.163, 172, 175. 179) as wholly egocentric and so in itself essentially non-christian.

* Agape & Eros pp. 156-7

The classical mystical texts in the New Testament are explained by him as eschatological and not mystical.[†] May they not be both?

Even when the idea of self-love is somewhat narrowed, we can still say that a right and proper self-love is not inconsistent with Agape. It is right to love as good anything that God has made, so long as that love is kept in its right place; everything that God has made is good and everything that has being, is, so far, good (Aquinas, Q.V. 1 and 2). Nygren's interpretation of the commandment 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' as meaning that "when love gains its new direction, when it is turned away from self and directed to one's neighbour, then the natural perversion of the will is overcome" (Agape and Eros, p.72) is entirely arbitrary and contrary to the obvious explanation. Even St. Paul says, 'he that loveth his own wife loveth himself, for no man ever hated his own flesh ...' (Eph.5, 28-29), and agapáo is the verb used for love.

Again, to say, as Nygren does, that the idea of the infinite value of the human soul is not christian^{*} is to ignore consideration of the creation of man by God. The Divine Agape manifests in creation its character as spontaneous and uncaused. So God's mercy is over all His works. He loves sinners and the ungodly because in His love He created them. Man indeed has value because

† Matt 5⁸, 1 Co 13¹², 2 Co 5⁷, 1 John 3² Rev 22^{3f}

* Agape & Eros p.55

God loves him, and God loves him because of his intrinsic unmerited value as being the creation of God's love. Nygren speaks as if agape were independent of the nature of its object: in fact, however, it can only be poured out on a person who can respond.

If, moreover, we accept the doctrine of man's creation in God's image (which Nygren apparently denies altogether - Agape and Eros, pp.180-181), the reasoning of the preceding paragraph acquires still greater cogency. Man has value because God loves him, and God loves him because of his intrinsic unmerited value as being the creation of God in His own image.

If man is created in God's image, there exists in man the germ of created agape, and the true love which is to be found, in its various forms, in the ordinary relationships of human life manifests agape. In whatever form true love is to be found in ordinary human experience, its existence is due to the working of the Divine Spirit, and at its core it bears close relation to the Divine Agape its Creator. To say this is not to ignore the fact of sin. But we could not form any notion of agape if it were 'wholly other'. We say agape is self-sacrificing love, and we do know what that is from seeing it in men. This is the obvious implication of the words of Jesus recorded in the fourth gospel, 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends'.* Some men of the "world" have ^dlain down their lives for their friends.

* John 15¹³

The parables of Jesus bear out this contention. Nygren argues that the parables do not say 'God must so be rationally conceived' but 'so God actually is, in spite of all your rational calculations'. "The parables are not intended to deduce truths about God from admitted premises. If the parable of the Prodigal Son were an argument from the actual behaviour of an earthly father to the dealings of God with men, this would be to measure God's love after a human standard, to make God after the image and likeness of man. In reality, the parable takes the opposite direction; it is the attitude of God that is primary, and the human father is sketched after his likeness. Of course, it is not every earthly father that would act as is here described; but, anyhow, it is so that God acts." *

Allowing, however, that the parables are not intended to deduce truths about God from admitted premises, and that it is the attitude of God that is primary, the human picture being sketched after God's likeness, and not the human standard set up as the measure of God's love, making God after the image and likeness of man; the point is that God's likeness is capable of being sketched in terms of a human picture. In the parable of the Prodigal Son, for example, if it is true that "it is not every earthly father that would act as is here described; but, anyhow, it is so that God acts", it is also true that some

fathers would act so, and that all fathers ought to act so. The parable is generally a picture of what human nature, perverted by sin, is like when restored by grace; and sometimes the character of God is sketched even from some good persisting in unregenerate human nature. In general, the parables do use earthly things in order to represent heavenly things. "It is not a question of two wholly separate spheres, an earthly and a heavenly, but of one and the same Law working on two different levels". They imply that the Author of grace is the Author also of nature. Otherwise the earthly analogy would be quite misleading.

Human eros is the creation of God, and in itself good. God "made of one every nation of men that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though He is not far from each one of us; for in Him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts.17. 26-28). That side of St. Paul's theology is neglected by Nygren and his school. Eros can never of itself find God, but in so far as it lays aside pride and exclusiveness, and is merely lowly desire of creature for Creator, it is ready to receive and understand the revelation of the Creator.

It has already been argued that the Divine Agape must contain an element of unselfish desire- for communion with the beloved. It is also true that the human eros contains an element of agape, which may, however, never be brought to much realisation. The man who desires fellowship or union with his beloved, whether

sweetheart, or friend or child, may be ready to lay down his life for his beloved's good, by virtue of his love of desire. We say rightly that God has given that man a noble love of desire which is ready to sacrifice itself for the good of the beloved. Ought we not also to say that all the natural human loves of desire toward other human beings, whether man to maid, friend to friend, mother to child or father to child, are noble gifts of God and that they contain a capacity for self-sacrifice for the good of the beloved?

The Divine Agape contains an element of unselfish desire. But God's agape and God's eros are ultimately one. In natural human life we find both agape and eros, as we should expect if man is the creature of God's image. Human eros, however, is largely perverted, and it is the work of christian grace to restore and re-direct eros in man.

Nygren criticises adversely the Johannine stress on the agape between the Father and the Son, on the ground that agape properly refers to the Divine love for worthless sinners, and that the Johannine language sometimes suggests that the agape of the Father is caused by the Son. *

But the agape between the Father and the Son is as definitely implicit in the Pauline epistles. What difference is there between the meaning of such statements on the one hand as 'Therefore doth the Father love Me, because I lay down My life, that I

* Agape & Eros pp. 111-113

may take it again', (John, 10,17) or 'For Thou lovedst Me before the foundation of the world, (John, 17,24), and on the other hand as, 'Wherefore also God hath highly exalted Him, and hath given unto Him the Name which is above every name, (Philippians, 2,9), or the original love of the Father for the Son implied in, 'He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all,' (Romans, 8,32)?

Nygren likewise criticises the implication of the Johannine use of agape in other passages that the agape of the Father towards christians is caused by their agape towards Him, e.g. 'The Father Himself loveth you, ^{be}cause ye have loved Me, and have believed ...' (John, 16,27).^{*} The agape which is the condition of the reception of the Spirit, however, is the right and natural response to the Lord's manifestation of Himself. It is inseparably connected with obedience to the Lord's call to follow Him, and with faith. The Father loves all men whom He has created, but in so far as they respond to His love, it is obvious that He will be able more fully to manifest His love to them, to take them into fellowship with Him (John, 14. 21-23). His creative and redeeming love² will be achieving its object. St. John can say in his first epistle, 'We love, because He first loved us'.

Nygren mentions on page 117 of Agape and Eros, terms which frequently occur in the Johannine writings, such as 'light', 'life', 'to know', 'spirit', 'glory' as creating "points of

* Agape & Eros p.113

attachment of which ideas coming from the alien sphere of Eros-religion might be able to take hold". He might have done the same with regard to certain words used by St. Paul.

A view of Agape which is constrained to condemn the Johannine doctrine on a question of such fundamental importance to christianity may seem to many on that account alone justifiably suspect. Not only so, but Nygren's doctrine does neglect, both in the Synoptic gospels and in St. Paul, important points of evidence against it, as has been pointed out.

Nygren, like Otto, has failed through attempting to give an absolute, perfectly concise objective account of the words he is examining, instead of being content to give a relative account of them. The great contribution made by him is to have shown so strongly the characteristically Godlike nature of agape, as involving essentially the principle of self-sacrifice. Wherever the natural man exhibits agape, it has this characteristically Godlike stamp, but in man it is always mingled to a greater or less degree with perverted Eros.

Our criticism of Nygren's teaching may well be closed by quoting the conclusion at which Sanday and Headlam arrive from their review of the history of the word agape in their Commentary on the epistle to the Romans, pp. 374-376 (on Rom.13,8+10):

"....Christianity does not shrink from declaring that in all forms of human passion and affection which are not purely

animal, there is present that same love which in its highest and most pure development forms the essence and sum of the Christian religion. This affection, however perverted it may be, Christianity does not condemn, but so far as may be, elevates and purifies."

CHAPTER VI

MODERN CONTINENTAL DOCTRINES (BARTH AND BRUNNER)

I. Barth.

The outstanding figure of the non-rational school of theology is that of Karl Barth. His style is forceful and dynamic, and he is wont in one context to give, in an explosive manner, one side of a truth an absolute emphasis, and in another context we may find the other side of that truth recognised. It is not therefore surprising to find that he loves paradox and dialectic. He also uses a special terminology, some of which is his own and some borrowed from Kierkegaard. For all these reasons he is difficult to read, but in more recent years, as his thought has developed, his terminology has been somewhat simplified and his use of dialectic rather more sparing.

As against the easy, vague, theology of humanism, Barth answers that God Himself has spoken. His theology is the theology of the Word of God. It is essentially eschatological, thought out as in the light of eternity. Formerly Barth apparently regarded eternity only as a timeless, overshadowing, present, impinging on this ^{life} here and now: but latterly he also finds room for the hope of a fuller manifestation of the eternal in the future.

With Barth God is the 'Wholly Other', unknowable by man, from whom He is removed by a wholly impassable difference, except as He Himself chooses, in His sovereign power, to bridge the gulf and reveal Himself. But though indiscreet language in Barth's book on Romans gave reason for the charge that the utter dualism between God and man is due to the fact that man is finite, other utterances of his make it clear that

he really regards this dualism as due to man's sin. He contends that the image of God in man, both materially and formally, is totally lost. There is no 'point of contact' in man's fallen nature to which the redemptive Word of God can appeal.

The criticism already advanced of the doctrines of Otto and Nygren make unnecessary further criticism of Barth's conception of God as 'Wholly Other'. We have also, in considering the teaching of Luther in chapter II, discussed the view that the imago in man has been totally lost, formally and materially. If, moreover, the imago in man has not been wholly lost, it follows that there must be some point of contact in man to which the Word of God can appeal. The views of the total loss of the imago and of there being no point of contact in man for the Word of God are both opposed by Brunner, as we shall see.

Barth has been accused of so emphasising the transcendence of God as to reject the doctrine of the Divine immanence, but what he really rejects is that semi-pantheistic doctrine of immanence characteristic of a certain type of philosophy. He has a doctrine of immanence. God's free and almighty presence and rule are within the world He has made. God is "not distant only, but also near, not only free as He confronts it but bound to it by His sovereign choice, not transcendent only but also immanent". "If we knew nothing of the once-for-all and sheerly special immanence of the Divine Word in flesh, how would or could we dare - in face of sin, evil, death, and devil - to believe and live by any general immanence of God in the world? Far, then, from our being compelled or bound to deny the first on account of the second, we must acknowledge the first in order rightly to believe and teach the second" (Credo, p. 37).

In spite of much earlier obscurity, it is now clear that in his theology the Word of God is Jesus Christ. God speaks to men in Jesus Christ through three channels: (i) Revelation, in a unique act of history; (ii) Holy Scripture, through the witness of the prophets, which looks forward to the revelation, and that of the apostles, which looks backward to it; (iii) the preaching of the Church. The Word of God "is one and the same whether we regard it as revelation, as the Bible, or as proclamation. For so far as proclamation really rests upon recollection of the revelation attested in the Bible and is therefore the obedient repetition of the Biblical witness, it is no less the Word of God than the Bible. And so far as the Bible really attests revelation, it is no less the Word of God than revelation itself. By becoming the Word of God in virtue of the actuality of revelation, the Bible and proclamation are also the Word, the one Word of God within which there can be neither a more nor a less" (Church Dogmatic I.p.136).

Barth recognises no general revelation in nature, history, human experience, conscience, and reason. "Such a man (the believer) will acknowledge to himself that the same eternal Word that became flesh is audible in creation as God's primary work, audible therefore in Nature, in History, in his own heart, conscience, and understanding. But he will go on and to his own shame acknowledge that as a matter of fact he has never heard the Word there, and neither can or will hear it. Not on the ground of some theory of cognition will he make this acknowledgment to himself, but because he knows that Jesus Christ is the Word made flesh, that it has pleased God for the revelation of His Word to adopt this wholly other way, and that he personally has received

grace, and therefore needs it. In the light of this knowledge he certainly will not claim for himself the ability to apprehend God's Word in creation. As one whom grace has brought into judgment, he will rather confess that always what he has heard there, what he will hear in the future, is only the voice of the gods - i.e. the created elements of this world - the voice of the earth and animal life, the voice of the seemingly infinite heavens, and, embraced therein, the voice of his own seemingly inescapable destiny, the voice of the blood in his own veins derived from parents and ancestry, the voice of the genius and hero in his own breast - all these invested with a false divine value and authority, all these, but just not the eternal Word of God. Knowledge of grace in point of fact destroys the idea of an indirect revelation in Nature, in History, or in the consciousness of our own existence".

With Barth's refusal to recognise any general revelation in nature, history, human experience, conscience, and reason, this thesis is emphatically at variance. It is indeed one of the chief grounds of disagreement between Barth and Brunner, and will be discussed in our consideration of Brunner's doctrine concerning revelation and history, reason and faith, law and faith, and the whole question will repeatedly be in view in the Biblical survey in Part II. Here it shall only be said that while Barth insists on the revelation of the Word made flesh, he seems to rob of all real meaning that other doctrine of the prologue to the fourth gospel, viz. that of the Light that lighteth every man.

It is interesting at this point to notice Barth's position as regards the State and the Church. The following account describes the view maintained in his Gifford Lectures (The Knowledge of God and the

Service of God) given in Aberdeen shortly before the war.

The true question is not what the Church has to say about politics to statesmen or the general public, but to men of faith. Any other kind of speech is quite outside the limits of its commission. The Church teaches believers that the political order has a place in God's design for men, and a service to render to God, distinct from the place and service of the Church. The purpose of political order is to secure that the will of God is done in the life of mankind as a whole - outside, as well as within, the sphere of faith; that is to say, to establish outward peace, freedom, and justice. The State is as truly 'ordained of God' as the Church. And since God is revealed in Christ, Christ is Lord not only of the Church but also of the world. There is no other law derived from some other source than the Christian revelation, which provides principles for the conduct of the State. It is none the less true that the political sphere is one which is not yet the sphere of the Church. Any attempt to ignore this fact and to set up the Kingdom of saints in a world which is not yet subject to the obedience of faith is contrary to the truth of things and must lead to frustration and disillusionment. While this must be freely recognised, political authorities and systems are at the same time subject to criticism in the light of christian standards and to criticism in and by the Church. It must not, however, be supposed that the first and last thing that christians have to demand of the State is that those who direct it should themselves be christians. God has given the State a particular task - the maintenance of outward freedom, justice, and peace, and the only relevant question is whether the State is carrying out rightly the secular task entrusted to it. A government of profess-

ing christians may be a bad government and a government of non-christians a very good government. The concrete advice which the Church gives to its members must depend on how the State is doing its job. If the government is a real government, honestly trying to carry out its tasks, believing men must give it their active support. To refuse to do our duty as citizens is to deny God just as much as to disavow our faith. Members of the Church who evade or resist legislation that makes for justice deserve the rebuke and discipline of the Church. There may be governments, however, which are so untrue to their God-given task that christians cannot actively co-operate with them, but only endure them. There may even be a point at which there is a right and duty to rebel. Such rebellion is in the name, not of the Church against the State, but of a true political order against a usurping tyranny. If to resist becomes our duty, we must not shrink from active resistance through fear that it may lead to forcible resistance. We must not try to evade the consequences of fulfilling our duty. "The world needs men, and it would be sad if it were just the christians who did not wish to be men". ~~When Barth says that because the State's~~

When Barth says that because the State's function to administer justice ^{*} is ordained of the God Who is revealed in Christ, therefore "there ~~is~~ no other law derived from some other source than the christian revelation which provides principles for the conduct of the State", he presumably means that the same Logos Who became flesh has always been, both before and after the incarnation, the ^{Lord} ~~Source~~ of order and law, so that, for instance, the Ten Commandments are shown by the christian revelation to be His law. Otherwise, if he meant that the christian revelation has introduced new law and principles for the

* The definition of justice is discussed in Chapter VII of Part II of this Thesis, pp. 336 - 337.

conduct of the State, that would seem to be at variance with his point that any attempt to set up the Kingdom of saints in this present world is contrary to the truth of things. It is not easy, moreover, to reconcile his contention that any other speech on the part of the Church regarding politics, except as ^daddressed to believers, is quite outside the limits of its Commission, with the ~~expressed~~ view that political authorities and systems are subject to criticism in the light of christian standards and to criticism in and by the Church. The great majority of christians would agree that political authorities and systems are subject to criticism by the Church: but the expression 'in the light of christian standards' needs careful explanation. No section of the community is better able to appreciate principles of justice than the enlightened christian conscience, so long as it does not presume to dictate methods of administration beyond its competence. Christians should be the best citizens of a good State, both because their criticism is particularly valuable, and also because the life of grace provides them with the spiritual power to fulfil in their own lives the requirements of the law: and on the other hand, the good State is the Church's great friend, for one of the primary results of its administration of justice is to enable true religion and virtue to be maintained within its borders. But the criticism which the Church brings to bear upon the State is, properly speaking, not exclusive to Christianity as a distinctive faith, but within the sphere of natural and universal justice. There is much talk to-day about building up after the war a christian society (in which presumably the State is included). What exactly does this mean? In so far as it implies the Church's evangelisation of as many individual

members of the State as possible, and the securing of conditions which will enable the Church to perform her proper task without let or hindrance, and which will also enable persons to obtain a sound christian education for themselves or their children without incurring any unfair discrimination in their treatment by the State, it is easily comprehensible. But in so far as it refers to the Church's task of keeping ever before the State the ideal of justice, and of criticising the State's administration of justice, and to the active work of the Church in connection with such matters as slum clearance, housing, unemployment, and extreme poverty, it ^{may be} is a misleading form of expression. For these questions are questions which, strictly speaking, lie within the sphere of natural justice.

It would, however, be reasonable to take the expression 'building up a christian society' as including the view that, since the State's function to administer justice is the ordinance of God, therefore that State which recognises its function as Divinely ordained is far more likely to perform it faithfully than a State which does not give clear recognition of the Divine ground of its stewardship. As long as the King is anointed and crowned by the Church, and a national Church is recognised by law as 'established', christians may have some ground for assurance that the State will on the whole strive to perform its functions faithfully.

This consideration is very relevant to Barth's statement that a government of professing christians may be a bad government and a government of non-christians a very good government. This is surely true, and the reason would appear to be that the christians may not possess the special knowledge for ruling appropriate to the statesman,

the royal or political art, βασιλική τέχνη, as Plato calls it in his *Politicius*, while the members of the non-christian government may possess it. But Barth's statement that it must not be supposed that the first and last thing that christians have to demand of the State is that those who direct it should themselves be christians seems to need some modification. Where it is estimated that two candidates for government possess approximately an equal capacity for statesmanship, would it not be right for the christian elector to choose the christian candidate on the assumption that his administration would be more likely to be marked by integrity and justice than that of the non-christian,† and that the observance of such religious duties as that of public worship would, in the private life of a person of high position in the State, be an example of great value?

What Barth says as to the concrete advice which the Church ought to give to its members concerning the support, or otherwise, which they owe to the State seems to be eminently sensible and right.

We may now return to Barth's doctrine of revelation. Revelation is an event which has taken place in Jesus Christ, and, which still takes place in Him. Jesus Christ is the point where the unknown world of the Infinite breaks into the known world of the finite. The point at which this unknown world touches ours has no extension upon the plane known to us. It touches it as a tangent touches a circle, 'without touching it'. In his book on Romans Barth can acknowledge that "the years A.D. 1 to 30 are the era of revelation and disclosure".* He can acknowledge the Jesus of history, but it is the eternal content revealed in this unique event which matters, and that is apprehensible only to faith.

The actual historical finite manifestations of this event, even if they

* p. 29.

† This is not to say, however, that "it may not be possible to live in a christian way under a pagan or other non-christian government."

are called 'the life of Jesus', are not themselves the eternal world. So far as this world is touched by the other world, it ceases to be finite, visible, temporal, material, historical. The point at which, through Christ, the Infinite breaks into the finite is the Resurrection. Revelation is thus something new, unique, final, and yet it is eternally present. Barth contends that, contemplated merely historically, Jesus as the Christ can only be understood as a problem or myth. If we have known Christ after the flesh, now know we Him no more. The cross pronounces the Divine condemnation of all lights which shine in humanity and which shone even in the life of Jesus in the days of His flesh. It is an absolute stumblingblock, and it proclaims the absolute radicalism of redemption in Christ. The creation of the new man in Christ is in no sense the perfection of man's fallen nature, but it comes into being through the annihilation of the old fallen nature. This last contention, like the denial of a 'point of contact' in man's fallen nature, is opposed by Brunner, and will be referred to again later.

The passage in 2Cor. 5.16 of which Barth makes use ("though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know Him so no more") has another obvious interpretation. S. Paul is contrasting the christian's knowledge of Christ, as illuminated by the Spirit, not with knowledge of the facts of the historical manifestation of Christ in the days of His flesh, but with a perverted, 'fleshly', interpretation of the facts. The human life of Jesus is in no way depreciated: what is depreciated is 'carnal' notions of humanity. The term 'after the flesh' is here, as often (but not always), used by S. Paul in an ethical sense, as suggesting man's sinful tendency due to the thralldom of Sin

in the flesh. Elsewhere, S. Paul can say that the life of Jesus is to be manifested in our mortal flesh,¹ that the body is for the Lord,² a temple of the Holy Spirit,³ and that the christian is to present his ~~W~~ body and its members as an offering to God for His service.⁴ To say, moreover, that the cross pronounces the Divine condemnation of all lights which shine in humanity (to say nothing of those which shone in the life of Jesus) is to ignore the obvious fact that much natural good does actually persist in ordinary human life and is due to the grace of God in creation. What the cross condemns is sin, shown in the perversion of human nature; and by means of the power of the cross what is perverted is restored.

Barth regards revelation in Jesus Christ as attested by certain rational signs or tokens: (i) the earthly humanity of Jesus, His words and deeds recorded in the Gospels (but why should these be distinguished as 'signs' from the cross and resurrection, which are recognised as constituting the revelation itself?); (ii) the Virgin Birth and the Empty Tomb; (iii) Holy Scripture; (iv) the preaching and sacraments of the Church; (v) the congregation of believers and the ministry; (vi) the christian's experience, both in its own inward aspect, and in that of the effect of his life upon others. All these signs are summed up in (a) the manhood of Jesus Christ, (b) the Church, which is His Body. *Extra ecclesiam nulla revelatio*.

The Word is unveiled in rational, human, worldly, form, which is itself itself a veil except to faith, but which to faith is the unveiling of a Divine content. "The worldly form without the Divine content is not the Word of God, and the Divine content without the worldly form is not the Word of God". Thus Jesus' lowliness, the cross, grace, law, are res-

¹. 2 Co 4 "

². 1 Co 6 ¹³

³. 1 Co 6 ¹⁹

⁴. Ro 6 ¹⁹ ¹²

pectively the forms corresponding to the Divine contents of God's glory, power, wrath, and the Gospel. Deus revelatus and Deus absconditus are conceptions which involve each other - even, nay precisely, to believers, Deus revelatus is for that very reason unfathomable, with depths the human mind cannot sound, and such that the different aspects of His action towards and upon us cannot be adjusted in a logical unity. But it would seem that to Barth the worldly form or veil through which God is revealed to the believer reveals Him in spite of itself, rather than because of its essential fitness to be a medium of the Divine communication. God dwells in Christ incognito as far as unbelievers are concerned: but this is so, not only because their sin and unbelief hides Him from their perception, but because (according to Barth) the veil of humanity would not naturally suggest the Godhead, for such a suggestion is regarded as totally incompatible with natural assumptions - a view which is open to much question, and which does not accord with the history of world religions, nor with the Johannine doctrine, which surely is that it was the very perfection of human flesh as seen in Jesus which attested His Godhead. ~~There is~~

The Word of God, however, in the thought of Barth, is only recognised by us as we perceive it to be addressed to us, to tell us what we could not tell our selves, and revelation essentially includes the gift of the Holy Spirit to create faith in us that we may be able to apprehend the Word. Faith is not a quality of the Soul, or a subjective state, or anything human; it is the negation of human activity; it is not even the negative work of self-annihilation. It is the simple acknowledgment of the absolute sovereignty of God. It must not be

thought that it has any value in itself: its only value is that it is a necessary prelude to the Divine affirmation. Our acceptance of the timeless redemption of Christ translates us from time to eternity. God in Christ manifests Himself for the sake of man, and man by faith accepts the Divine hand stretched out to him and is drawn out of his finitude into the eternal world of spirit. There are early passages in which Barth comes near to saying that when we believe savingly, it is not we who believe at all, but the Spirit in us. But in Church Dogmatics I.p.250 he writes: "In faith men have an actual experience of the Word of God; and no 'finitum non capax infiniti', nor any 'peccator non capax verbi divini' ought now to prevent us from taking this affirmation seriously, with all its consequences". It is not, however, easy to see how revelation can be both once-for-all and also inclusive of the operation of the Spirit upon individual believers. We shall return to the subject of faith and its relation to reason in our discussion of the doctrine of Brunner.

As to Barth's view of ethics, he takes his point of departure in justification by faith - righteousness, i.e. being right with God, is the beginning of everything, not the hard-won goal of effort. The really good man is the man whose conscience has been comforted and his will fortified by submitting to have his sins forgiven for Christ's sake. What matters is not ethical autonomy, ethical programmes, etc., but obedience to the Word of God, speaking in a man's heart to disclose to him his duty for the actual or existential (i.e. in ultimate Divine reality) moment through which he is living. We may refer to the criticism of Kierkegaard on page 58 as relevant here.

Barth sharply distinguishes between the 'invisible Church' and the visible Church, which belongs to the present age and is regarded by him as under condemnation. "In the Church the hostility of men against God is brought to a head; for there human indifference, misunderstanding, and opposition attain their most sublime and also their most naive form" (Romans, p.418). It was the Church, not the world, which crucified Christ. Yet "it would never enter our heads to think of leaving the Church. For in describing the Church we are describing ourselves" (p.418).

The general impression made upon the writer by Barth's theology is that of a revelation, the primary ground and source of which is the sovereign will of a Despot rather than the good news of an Almighty Father Whose essential nature is Love.

(2) Brunner

Of all the theologians of the modern non-rational school, the most reasonable and liberal presentation of the case for non-rationalism is made by Emil Brunner. Brunner was formerly closely associated with Barth in the dialectical theology which both represent, but eventually there arose a controversy between them on the subject of general revelation and special revelation, a subject in which the question of man's creation in the Divine image is necessarily involved. The controversy came about, not owing to any essential change in the views formerly held by Brunner, but rather as the opinion of Barth on the subject at issue became manifest with increasing clearness.

Brunner, seeing from certain statements and writings of Barth that this gulf had grown between them, set forth six theses which he believed Barth would maintain, to which he appended six antitheses of his own. The most important of these theses are summarised by Cairns, in his introduction to his translation of Brunner's 'God and Man', as follows:*

- (I) Sin has absolutely effaced the Divine image in man.
- (II) There is no general revelation of God in history, nature, or conscience.
- (III) There is no 'point of contact' in man's fallen nature, to which the redemptive Word of God can appeal.
- (IV) The new creation is in no sense the perfection of man's fallen nature, but it comes into being through the annihilation of the old fallen nature.

Barth's reply to Brunner's antitheses is adequately criticised by Cairns† and in view of the general argument of this thesis scarcely needs further treatment here.

Brunner agrees that the material image, regarded by him as original righteousness, has been wholly effaced by sin, so that man is not able to do any wholly good act; but contends that the formal image persists in man.

The conception of 'original righteousness' and the view that it has been wholly effaced by sin have already been examined on pages 31 and 32 in connection with the teaching of Luther.

Brunner's statement, however, that "man is not able to do any

* v. p. 21 of *that Cairns*.

† *Ibid.* pp. 23-32.

wholly good act" is defensible as regards unregenerate man, in the sense that though he may perform acts which from the human ethical point of view are good and as such pleasing, to that extent, to God, yet so long as they are not performed in conscious faith toward God cannot be wholly pleasing to Him - they lack the 'one thing needful' which the Father's heart desires.

Brunner, however, would hardly accept this interpretation of his words without modification. In his 'Divine Imperative' (p.188) he writes on the subject of 'Service' as follows:-

"God does not desire 'something' from us - He desires us, ourselves; not our works, but our personality, our will, our heart ... God does not desire to have us for Himself so that we may lose ourselves in Him in mystical contemplation, but He desires to possess us for His service. The service of God constitutes the sum-total of all good conduct. It is due to the grace of God that He declares us fit for His service, and that He appoints us to His service. And this is the true obedience of faith; that we are at His disposal, that in all that we do we do His will, in order to please Him, and are wholly there for Him, to 'lend Him a hand', desiring to glorify Him. 'Whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God'. Only then is our action hallowed; for to 'hallow' means to 'dedicate to God'. Without this dedication an action may be useful, creative, heroic; but it is in no way holy or good" (the underlining is not Brunner's).

According to this statement, Brunner would evidently restrict the use of the term 'good', as applied to human conduct, to those actions performed with a view to pleasing and serving God. In the

common use of the term, however, actions which are 'useful', 'creative', 'heroic' would also be recognised as good, and with this common usage this thesis is in agreement. Take heroism as an example. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends". As pointed out on page 87 in the discussion on Nygren, we know what Divine self-sacrificing love is from seeing it in man, often in men who are not christians. Why? Because even in the case of non-christians self-sacrificing love proceeds from the working of the Divine Spirit through God's grace in creation (see pages 29(b) & 30) - though the person exhibiting such heroism may be ignorant of the fact. The essence of agape is common to both and is good. "God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen. I, 31). Similarly, useful and creative human actions are good as proceeding from Divine 'creative' grace. "Why callest thou Me good?" said Jesus to the rich young man; "None is good save One, even God".* The words are a warning against shallow and false conceptions of goodness. All goodness proceeds ultimately from the one source of goodness, the perfect and absolutely good God;† it is never to be credited to men as if it originated from themselves. If Jesus were the Messiah, and the Son of God, the attribute could be ascribed to Him as, together with His Father, the Source of goodness. To other men the application of the term can only be justified in relation to their stewardship of the goodness of their Lord or their reflection of the goodness of their Creator. There are many instances of our Lord's description of men as good in a relative sense.‡ In Luke 6, 33 sinners are said to do good to their friends (cf. verse 9). We are to imitate our

* Mk. 10¹⁶ † Cf. Mk. 2nd. Collect at Wansley in B.C.P.

‡ Mt. 5⁴⁵ 12³⁵ 22¹⁰ 25^{21.23} Lk 8¹⁵

heavenly Father (Mt.5.48). Again, S.Paul's reference to 'every man that worketh good' in Rom. 2,¹⁰~~11~~ would seem, especially in the light of verse 14, to include the possibility of the performance of 'good works' by the heathen. And in Rom. 13,4 the State is declared to exist, by the Divine ordinance, for a good end, and in the preceding verse it is stated that rulers are not a terror to good works, which in such a context are surely to be understood as possible of performance by heathen as well as christian citizens (cf. I Pet. 2,14).

Our Anglican Articles X and XIII are relevant to this discussion. The former states that "we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ^{*}", and the latter that "works done before the grace of Christ^{*}, and the inspiration of His Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ". In the latter case the title "Of works before justification" must give way before the text of the article. Since 'faith in Jesus Christ' is not primarily an assent to an intellectual proposition but an attitude of heart and mind, it must be present in a rudimentary stage in the relatively good non-christian in his attitude to life, though unconsciously, and hence to the eternal Word in Whom is that life. Professed atheists who order their lives by belief in goodness, truth, and beauty, rather than in moral evil, falsehood, and ugliness, manifest to that extent unconscious belief in Christ the Word.

The popular use of the term 'good', then, to cover useful, creative, or heroic actions properly implies that their ultimate source is God, and it would be well if the fact were more often

** For the grace of God 'in creation' see pp. 29 (b) & 30.*

pointed out to people. The same argument is of course applicable to the attribution of such qualities as wisdom and righteousness to men.* Brunner's restriction of the word 'good' to actions consciously directed to God's glory is more than a mere question of the use of terms; it is in effect a denial of the Divine inspiration of the usefulness, creativeness, and heroism manifested by non-Christians.

When he says that useful, creative, or heroic human actions not consciously wrought for God's glory are in no way holy, he seems on surer ground. Otto's examination of the idea 'holy' justifies the view that if actions are 'holy' they must have involved in some form the exercise of man's numinous sense, i.e. his instinctive, intuitive faculty for entering into direct relation and fellowship with his Creator (see page 83). To say this is in no way inconsistent with the view maintained in the criticism of Otto, that man's sense of the holy is no more, and no less, distinct a category of human experience than reason, conscience, and the aesthetic sense, and that the essential nature of man, which is an image of the Divine Agape and may be recognised in the natural relationships of human life (p.75), is served by all the different categories of human experience. Actions wrought consciously to God's glory may rightly be called 'holy', and it is precisely through this quality of holiness that the partial and adulterated goodness of useful, creative, and heroic actions not dedicated to God may be perfected and cleansed.

Returning now to our consideration of Brunner's antitheses, in "God and Man", against Barth, Brunner maintains that the formal image of God in man is the point of contact for the Word of God in the Gospel,[†] and includes three elements therein:[‡] (a) reason, the capacity to speak and receive rational discourse; (b) the sense of creatureliness; and (c) conscience. To these elements

enumerated by Brunner

* See, e.g., 1 John 3⁷: "My little children, let no man lead you astray; he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as He is righteous."
 † "Theologie und Ontologie", Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1931, p. 112.
 ‡ Zwischen den Zeiten, 1932, 6.

we would add man's aesthetic sense; his instincts and emotions - above all, human love; his social instincts, expressed in social institutions; and man's body. ~~See pp. 90-91~~

Brunner argues that because there is a point of contact in man for the Gospel, therefore the new life is not simply the annihilation of the old.† He explains scriptural statements about the dying of the old man as referring to the material and not the formal side of personality. This would not be correct, however, if he means that the whole of the material side of personality must be mortified, for there already persists much imperfect material good through God's grace in creation. That which must be mortified is the material side of personality in so far as it is perverted from its true nature. Since such restoration of personality involves vital redirection of attitude and motive, St. Paul's radical language is indeed an admirable description of the process. It is, psychologically, as Dodd shows in his book on Romans, the harmonising of the various sentiments, formerly disintegrated and conflicting, under a dominant sentiment.*

Brunner holds that the Bible itself admits that there is a knowledge of God revealed generally in history, nature and conscience, but that it is different in kind from the knowledge of God which comes from faith, through the special revelation in Jesus Christ. This question - of general and

* pp. 90-91

† Cairns' translation of 'God & Man', Introduction, p. 22

special revelation - merits most careful discussion.

In his book 'God and Man', translated by Cairns, in the first chapter, contrasting the philosophers' idea of God with the Creator God of faith, he states that the Biblical doctrine 'God reveals Himself in history' does not mean 'History reveals God'.[†] The philosophers' interpretation of history depends upon what the philosopher knew, at least in principle, apart from history. It is the projection of his own thoughts upon the stage of history. The philosophy of Nazism[‡], for example, regards the history of the German race as revealing God. What, however, the Nazi interpretation of German history actually reveals, is Nazi philosophy, which is contrary to the special revelation which God has already given of Himself in Biblical history.

Brunner goes on to contend that God reveals Himself only in 'singular', special, events in history, and that precisely by this means the Godlessness of history, its failure to reveal Him, its darkness, becomes thoroughly apparent; God's particular revelation does not teach His revelation in all history. With that contention the writer of this thesis is emphatically at variance, maintaining that God's revelation of Himself in definite, 'singular', special events teaches those who receive this revelation that He reveals Himself constantly in all nature

‡ This is not Brunner's example.

† Cairns' translation of 'God & Man', pp. 54-55.

and in all history. Through the grace of God's revelation in Christ, and through that revelation alone, man is enabled, ~~not~~ not only to have fellowship with God, but also to understand the meaning in the Divine purpose of the principles which under-~~lie~~ the order of man's life on earth.

The special event in which God reveals Himself is not, indeed, a symbol in the sense in which Brunner defines 'symbol',* i.e. something which says nothing to me, but suggests to me what I ought of myself to think when I perceive it. But it may be a symbol in the sense of the word $\sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu\mu$ in the fourth gospel, as something through which God speaks to me. It may be in the sacramental sense a symbol, if by sacrament is meant an outward and visible sign ordained by God Himself as a means of His revelation to man. God, in revealing Himself to man through the 'singular' event or Divinely appointed sign, teaches those who receive His revelation that He reveals Himself constantly in the universal event. Hitherto their eyes were holden, but now He has specifically spoken and their eyes are opened. They are able to say, "Thy name also is ^{so} high, and that do Thy wondrous works declare!"

That foundation-stone of Hebrew religion, God's deliverance of the Hebrews from slavery in Egypt, was truly a special Divine revelation in a singular event of history, but it taught God's people increasingly that He is in His essential character a

* Cairns' translation of Brunner's 'God & Man', p. 55

Deliverer of the oppressed and an Avenger upon the tyrant, and that wherever and whenever upon earth we meet with real deliverance from oppression and judgment of tyranny, God is working His purpose out. The help that is done upon earth, He doeth it Himself. He putteth down the mighty from their seat, and exalteth the humble and meek.

God's special revelation of Himself in the Old Testament, first to one chosen family and then to one chosen nation is intended to teach men that in that family, and in that nation springing from it, all families and all nations of the earth shall be blessed; His special education of one chosen family is to be a lesson-book to guide all human families, and His special education of one chosen nation is to teach all nations that only faithfulness to Him and obedience to His laws can bring blessing, and unfaithfulness and disobedience an inevitable curse.

One of Israel's greatest and most common temptations was that in the wilderness at Massah - no doubt, when in adversity, God's presence in the ordinary and to cry, 'Is the LORD among us, or not?' (Exodus, 17,7.) This temptation was echoed in our Lord's experience, in the suggestion to cast Himself down from the pinnacle of the temple, thus providing a miraculous 'sign' to compel belief.

Christ's resurrection was a singular event of Divine revelation, and so were His post-resurrection appearances during the

40 days between the resurrection and ascension. But by these events He taught His disciples that when He is invisible to human sight He is with us always, even unto the end of the world. The parables of Jesus are meaningless unless they teach that in all the course of nature and the ordinary events of human life God is speaking to those whose ears are open to hear.

Likewise the Divinely appointed sacrament of Baptism is a continual witness to man of his rightful status, which may be his in Christ; and the special Presence promised in the Eucharist is a witness to the Lord's continual presence with us.

If, however, God's special revelation in singular events in history teaches those who receive this revelation that He reveals Himself constantly in all nature and all history, what is the special quality of the special revelation which distinguishes it from general revelation? Why should certain special events more than other events reveal universal truth? Is it because the events themselves are different in kind from all other events? Is it, for instance, because of the presence of the miraculous element?

In the Old Testament prophet and psalmist again and again recount the noble works which God has wrought for the nation of Israel in the past, and thereon ground their faith in Him for the present and future. "Ask now of the days

that are past..... whether there hath been any such thing as this great thing is, or hath been heard like it? Did ever people hear the voice of God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard, and live? Or hath God assayed to go and take Him a nation from the midst of another nation, by temptations, by signs, and by wonders, and by war, and by a mighty hand, and by a stretched out arm, and by great terrors, according to all that Yahweh your God did for you in Egypt before your eyes? Unto thee it was shewed, that thou mightest know that Yahweh He is God; there is none else beside Him." (Dt.4.32-35). "O give thanks unto the Lord, and call upon His Name; tell the people what things He hath done. Let your songs be of Him and praise Him, and let your talking be of all His wondrous works... Remember the marvellous works that He hath done: His wonders, and the judgments of His mouth, O ye seed of Abraham His servant, ye children of Jacob His chosen" (ps. 105,1-6 etc.). Similar examples are found in the New Testament, e.g., the speech of Stephen in Acts 7 and of Paul in Acts 13 at Antioch in Pisidia.

A full recital of the acts of God for Israel would include such events as the following: the choice and call of Abraham; the birth of his son Isaac out of due season, in Sarah's old age; the gradual education of patriarchal families and tribes which sprang from Abraham; the turning of the evil plotted against Joseph by his brethren into good, as

bringing about the preserving of their lives and as subserving God's purpose for the future through the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt; the Exodus in Egypt (whether explained as due to miracle or 'natural causes'); the period of discipline in the wilderness; the gradual welding of the Jacob tribes into a united nation; the period of the monarchy, when the people learned, through the pressure of political events, the lesson that national well-being depends upon loyalty to God and obedience to His commandments; the great influence which the reign of David had upon posterity in forming the conception of the ideal Davidic King; the cessation of the northern kingdom; the experiences of the exile and the subsequent restoration; the Maccabaeen revolt against the persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes.

No fair survey of the Old Testament record could neglect the presence here and there of the miraculous element in the narrative as recorded, however possible and legitimate it might be to explain away this element. Our Lord's conduct and teaching, however, as recorded in the New Testament, has made it clear that miracles are not expected to produce faith where faith did not already to some extent exist,* though they may greatly strengthen and enlighten faith of the right sort which is already in being.† Even after the miracle of the resurrection, our Lord showed Himself to Divinely chosen witnesses who had been His disciples before His death. The

* e.g. Mk. 8^{11, 12} Lk. 16²¹

† e.g. John 4^{50, 53}

only exception is the case of S. Paul, and good reason can be adduced for the view that a state of acute inward conflict had rendered him psychologically disposed to acceptance of Christ before the appearance on the road to Damascus. In our own case, separated by some 1900 years from the events described in the gospels, faith in our Lord's Divinity must rest ultimately upon our conviction of the unique perfection and sinlessness of His Manhood, revealed in His self-sacrificing love.■

We may therefore judge the miraculous element in the Old Testament, where it is to be found, though as of considerable importance, yet as not being of primary importance in the Divine revelation, and we may form the opinion that the 'singularity' of the events of Divine revelation in Old Testament history consists essentially in the wonderful way in which the course and conjunction of events therein recorded (usually ordinary enough events if considered merely in isolation) may be shown to be the working out of a consistent Divine purpose for all mankind.

This involves the vocation and inspiration of the prophet for the right interpretation of the events in question. The Roman Empire spread its highways throughout the then civilised world, and established law and order where it went. Greece

■ Thus believing, our faith in the resurrection is confirmed by experience and by the sign of the Empty Tomb. ~~Chapter~~

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provided a beautiful tongue, which became the common language of civilisation. But it needs prophetic insight, (and that in the Hebrew tradition) to discern that the tongue of Greece and the roads of Rome were Divinely ordered to be a means for the spreading of the Gospel in the early years of christianity. The translation and popularising of the English Bible synchronised with the beginning of the period of Britain's expansion. Prophetic insight may declare, in the light of the lessons of former history, that the roads of the British Empire and the English language are once again a remarkable instance of the Divine ordering of history as a means to the spreading of the Gospel.

And so, for the right interpretation of God's wonderful ordering and controlling of events for the special revelation of Himself recorded in the Old Testament, there were needed rare spirits such as Abraham, and Moses, and Elijah, and the great line of Hebrew prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., and of the exile and the restoration.

Then why should the interpretation of contemporary events given by these Hebrews be recognised as 'special' revelation, and as such to be distinguished from all interpretations declared by other men of other nations and other times of their contemporary events? If the philosopher's interpretation of history depends primarily upon his philosophy as subject, and not upon the objective historical facts, must we not say

the same of the Hebrew prophets' interpretation of history?

It is a fact that the Hebrew prophetic interpretation of history is unique. It alone has given to men faith in one God only, and Him a personal God and all-righteous; and it is from the Hebrew race, in fulfilment of the prophetic teaching and expectation, which were concerned with a Divine purpose for all mankind, that Jesus Christ came, and He Himself is an altogether unique Personality in the world's history. These are the reasons which justify the recognition of the Hebrew interpretation of history, and its fulfilment in the New Testament, as God's special revelation.

The statement in the preceding paragraph that Hebrew prophecy "alone has given to men faith in one God only, and Him a personal God and all-righteous" perhaps requires a few words of explanation. The writer is persuaded that a vague belief in a supreme righteous Being has been latent in the heart of all great peoples, but in the case of heathen, so overlaid with polytheistic and demonistic beliefs as to render it of little account. The revolutionary attempt of Amenhotep IV ("Ikhnaton") of Egypt in the 14th century B.C. to establish Solar monotheism is well known. "What is really strange is not the monotheism, but the exclusive turn Amenophis (Amenhotep) gave it and his determination to make it the sole religion in his dominions". (Moore - History of Religions, p.185). No sooner, however, had he died than his reforms were engulfed in a flood-tide of reaction. The 8th to the 5th centuries before Christ produced a

remarkable rise of great prophets and teachers in the world. It was the age of the long line of great Hebrew prophets; and in the 6th century Confucius appeared in China, and Buddha in India; in Persia, Zoroaster prophesied in the 7th century, or possibly in the 8th; and in the 5th, the philosophers Socrates and Plato in Greece. Confucius was conservative in his attitude to the old Chinese religion, emphasising above all things an ethical system of life. In so far as he acknowledged a supreme Being (as well as minor deities), he could not be said to recognise that Being as personal in the sense of aspiring to close fellowship with Him. What Buddha founded was not properly a religion, but a philosophical way of life. The religious features of later Buddhism are borrowed elsewhere. Zoroaster did teach belief in a supreme righteous Being, Ahura Mazda, but set over against Him an Evil Power in a practical, though presumably not absolute, dualism; and however exalted Zoroaster's own beliefs may have been, in the religion which he founded worship was offered not only to Ahura Mazda as the Supreme Being, but also to many minor divinities. "They receive individually and collectively the same kind of worship as the Supreme God, and from the practical side the religion may be described as a monarchical polytheism with a somewhat numerous and varied pantheon". (Moore - History of Religions, p.374). "When modern Parsees claim that their religion is monotheistic they are perhaps right, but if so, they have derived it from some other source than their sacred books" (Booklet on Zoroastrianism by Rev. H. McNeile, formerly

missionary in Bombay, published by the Missionary Literature Supply, Church House, Westminster, in 1923 - page 25). As for the great Greek philosophers, the heights to which their philosophy soared was for the few only and not the common people, nor did their philosophy give them personal knowledge of God. There are only three great world religions which may properly be said to teach pure ethical monotheism - Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, and the two latter have their roots in the former. Christianity may be said to represent the flower and fruit of Judaism, and Mohammedanism to be a degeneration from it.

To return to the consideration of Hebrew prophecy. The ultimate criterion of the inspiration of each successive prophetic utterance was whether or not that utterance was in continuity with the true Hebrew tradition of the past. The saying "I will not believe that I see Christ transfigured, unless Moses and Elias are with Him" well illustrates this conception.* Thus, during the relapse into idolatry in the long reign of Manasseh in the 7th century B.C., it was possible for certain false prophets to teach that the troubles following Sennacherib's invasion of 705, when, though the capital was saved, the rest of the land was overrun and devastated by the Assyrian armies, were due to the teaching of Isaiah and the reforms of Hezekiah, to which they had been opposed, and that these troubles indicated the advisability of a return to the former condition of things in the reign of Uzziah, when

* See *Essays Catholic and Critical*: "Tests & Types of Mystical Experience", p. 299.

they had been more prosperous. The proof, however, that Isaiah was a true prophet and that the prophets who denounced his views were false, lay in Isaiah's insistence that Yahweh is a righteous God and that therefore if Israel fall into unrighteousness His protection would not be extended to her, but even the heathen would be used as instruments of punishment upon His own unfaithful people - teaching which was wholly in accord with, and a logical development of, the teaching of earlier prophets. The Divine revelation to Abraham, therefore, was the starting-point and germ of all future Hebrew prophecy; it was a veritable parting of the ways for mankind.

A further criterion of prophetic inspiration lay in subsequent experience. The obvious test as to whether or not the prophecy was fulfilled was necessarily subject to certain qualifications; a surer test was whether obedience to it made for true morality and inward peace.

The resurrection was the fulfilment and vindication of all previous revelation. It was the fulfilment of the hope of the promise made of God unto the fathers (Acts 26.6). All former prophecy pointed forward to Christ, and, to those whose minds were opened to understand, to his suffering and resurrection (Luke 24, 45-46). It was not possible that God's Holy One should be holden of death or that He should see corruption (Acts 2, 24 & 31; 13, 34-35, see p.59 of this thesis).

After the ascension of Jesus the Holy Spirit was given to the Church. The 'special' revelation coming through that gift

consists chiefly in the interpretation of Christ's Person, and of the meaning of His death and resurrection, and of the continuance of His work through His Body the Church, set forth in the New Testament in the Acts and Epistles and Apocalypse. It remained for later christians to formulate explicitly the doctrine which is implicit in the New Testament, and for each generation to explain in terms of the life of its own day and to apply to the particular problems of its own age 'the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints'.

Brunner's absolute contrast between philosophy and christianity, between reason and the 'religion of faith', seems to be another illustration of the tendency of Continental theologians to clearness of logic and conciseness of definition at the expense of recognition of other relative factors in real life. An absolute contrast may indeed be drawn between non-christian philosophy and christianity, such as Brunner draws, on the ground of the failure of the former to present God effectively as a real Person, and to deal adequately with the fact of sin and hence to be unable to give fellowship with God: but, on the other hand, christianity needs philosophy, which it converts into christian philosophy. The 'religion of faith' stands in essential need of reason. The essence of reason, according to Brunner, consists in the 'power to say it oneself'; in reason and philosophy what can take place is

the recognition of that which already is, but not a decision. 'I cannot make a decision that God and I are one'.[†] Faith, on the contrary, recognises the necessity of 'having the Word said to one'; in the religion of faith God speaks to me, and I acknowledge Him to be my LORD; this knowledge of God as my LORD comes through my decision. §

But when God speaks to me, and by my act of decision I acknowledge Him to be my LORD, the exercise of my reason is inseparably involved. If God speaks, manifesting Himself, through special revelation, as Creator, there is bound to pass through the mind of the man who acknowledges His Lordship, 'ere he makes his decision, some such reasoning as the following, even though it be unexpressed: "If it is in truth my Creator Who speaks to me, if I am in truth His creature, sinner though I be, then He must be all-sufficient to meet my every need, and I will trust Him implicitly." That is the only reasonable and truly natural attitude that such a man could adopt. There are etymological reasons for supposing that God's revelation of Himself to Abraham as 'El-shaddai', as recorded in Gen.17.1, means God the Sufficient.* If this be the right meaning, added force is given to the famous statement of Gen.15.6, 'He believed in the LORD, and He counted it to him for righteousness. (17.1).'

God's further special revelations of Himself as the Righteous One, and as Father, involve to a still greater extent

* See Dodd: 'Romans', p.15

† Cairns' translation of 'God & Man', p.65

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pp.55-69

the inevitable exercise of man's reason as a prelude to the acknowledgment of Him as LORD, for they are revelations in terms of rational human life and experience and are, as such, Divine appeals to man's reason and natural human feelings. The principle that 'we love, because He first loved us' involves a sound reason why we should love God. When Brunner says (p.62 of 'God and Man') that God "is only to be known in His revelation in the Word He addresses to us, and that means that He is only to be known as the Lord, and by being thus known He is known also as incomprehensible mystery", he is, as was argued in the criticism of Otto, doing less than justice to the revelation of God in Christ as Father and as Love.

If reason be the power only to recognise what already is, then the decision of faith presupposes the recognition of what already is, in the deepest sense of the phrase, not in my own mind, but by the facts of creation and redemption. The faithful recipients of God's special revelation decide to live by the recognition of the fact that God is man's Creator and Redeemer, and of their rightful status, solely by His grace, as men created in His own image (truths which they did not know before He revealed them). 'I cannot make a decision that God and I are one', says Brunner, referring to the failure of natural philosophy to represent God as a personal Creator, and man as a sinful creature. No! But when God has revealed Himself as a personal God, and when He has revealed that, in Christ, men

may enter upon and abide in their rightful status towards Him, then I can make a decision to live by the recognition of the truths which He has revealed.

Brunner's criticism, therefore, of the Catholic 'system' as resting on an illusion, on an almost imperceptible coalescence of nature and grace, of Divine and human action,^{*} is not justified. True catholicism does not treat perverted nature, but essential nature, and restored nature, as coalescing with grace; not that non-christian philosophy and christianity coalesce, but a christianised or sanctified or restored philosophy.

Brunner's doctrine of the Church, well-known to the Reformer Reformers and rediscovered chiefly through Gogarten, - that it is only through the historical fellowship of the Church that the special revelation of God was brought hither from that place in space and time where the fire was kindled on earth, viz. the cross of Jesus Christ[†] - is of great value for making clear the relation between God's special revelation, as recorded in the Bible, and the function performed by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in the present day. The Church, whose existence is itself a 'singular' event of revelation, and who is the author of the Scriptural record, is the means which God has chosen to ensure that the message of salvation should be handed on to all places and all times. It is only in hearing the witness of the Church in faith that a man is

* Cairns' translation of 'God & Man', p. 40

† *Ibid.* pp. 122-130

united to God, and thus becomes in the proper sense of the word a 'person'.

Brunner's strong distinction, however, like Barth's, of the 'invisible' from the visible Church, is not scriptural. Both in the Old Testament and in the New the Church on earth is, as such, necessarily a mixture of good and evil. It is a school of holiness for sinners, in which perverted human nature is being restored. To say, as Brunner does, that "there is no historical or sociological knowledge about the Church"[§] is to use the term 'Church' in an entirely unscriptural sense. Brunner says again, in a footnote, "one enters the national Church by birth, but one only enters the fellowship of believers by faith, or, in other words by being born again".[†] According to the teaching of the New Testament, however, a Church is only justified in being regarded as 'national' in so far as she is, as such, a true branch of the Church universal, and the Church and the 'fellowship of believers' are one and the same thing, and one certainly does not enter it by physical birth, nor by faith only, but by faith through baptism, in which one is born again.

In so far, therefore, as the Papal Church is a mixture of faith and worldly power, of good and evil, it is obvious that these elements are "present in the thought of Ignatius of Antioch, so early as the beginning of the second century after Christ"^{*} - in fact, in the Church of the New Testament itself,

[§] Cairns' translation of 'Kod & Han', pp. 105-106.
p. 113

[†] *ibid.* p. 109

^{*} *ibid.* pp. 105-106

as in every branch of the Church universal ever since, for in the Church of Christ on earth they must ever be found mingled, as our Lord's parable of the Tares clearly teaches.* Brunner and Barth, in their insistence upon the 'invisible' Church on earth, miss the real sacramental significance of the Church as the Body of the ascended Christ, and hence the outward and visible expression of His mind and character and the instrument of His activity in the world.

In his chapter on 'Faith in justification and the problem of ethics' in 'God and Man', Brunner points out that from the christian point of view both idealistic legalism and realist eudaemonism have the weakness that, as regards their goal they trust man himself to achieve the good, and as regards their motive they are self-centred. They are also legalistic, impersonal, self-righteous. Only christian faith releases us from ourselves, brings us into true 'encounter' (begegnung) with our neighbour as our neighbour and not as a mere case to be subsumed under a law. Only christian faith makes us realistic in our actions instead of leaving us the slaves of elaborate and unpractical programmes. Only christian faith makes us really free agents and not the slaves of a law.

Brunner recognises that there is no christian man who is identical with faith, and that every believer is ever and again an unbeliever, and that to this extent the law of God is still valid for him. In so far as the christian falls into sin, he

* Augustine uses the parable of the Tares as an argument against the Donatists. Yet it is not that certain people in the Church are holy, & some unholy, as he assumed: but that each individual member is imperfect. The true ground of the Church's holiness is not in her members, but in Christ.

still needs law to condemn him.

S. Paul apparently held that God's purpose in creating man was that he should live in a condition of such filial fellowship with Him that law would not be necessary. He would know God's will and through faith would be enabled to do it. Law was thus secondary to the original purpose of creation.* It was 'added, because of transgressions', a tutor to bring us unto Christ.†

The Mosaic Law, however, was an expression of the character of God as essentially righteous. In the very process of creation the righteous God must so have constituted the universe upon principles of law that, if they should be broken, these principles would assert themselves. Thus, though it is God's original purpose for man that he should live by faith, yet it is also His original purpose that the universe should be constituted upon unchanging principles of law. Consequently, law can be secondary to God's original creative purpose only in the sense of its declaration, or revelation, to man. God's laws existed from the beginning, before they were declared to man.

Even in an ideal primitive state, however, in which man knew God's will and performed it through faith, God would have to make known to him His will. That which distinguishes such a making known of God's will from the declaration of God's law in the sense in which S. Paul is thinking of law, consists rather in the way in which the latter is declared - amid

* See page 265

† Gal 3^{19.24}

lightings and thunderings and a voice of exceeding awe, and in the way in which it is received and held - in the spirit of slaves who groan under bondage. It is law in this sense which is abolished for the christian. He still needs the terrors of law to condemn him when he falls into sin. But not only this: even in so far as he is free, he still needs the principles of law, as the revelation of God's good will, to guide him in a world where sin is always possible. The difference between laws and principles may be illustrated by the difference respectively between a notice set up in a park by an urban district council to 'keep off the grass', and a notice that 'the public are requested to co-operate with the council in keeping the lawns in good condition'. The christian needs the principles of the Sermon on the Mount for his instruction. In spite of all his teaching about justification by faith, S. Paul repeatedly gives his christian readers ethical teaching, and recognises a 'law of Christ' * and a 'Law of the Spirit'. † Thus the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews quotes Jeremiah's prophecy of the new covenant as being fulfilled in christianity (Heb. 8. 8-13). "This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will put My laws into their mind, and on their heart also will I write them..." It is in this sense that the Decalogue is used in the Anglican Liturgy and taught to the children in the Catechism.

Law in the Bible, though it bears strong witness to the

* Gal 6²

† Rom 8²

essentially ethical character of God, is nevertheless connected, in its original declaration, with an emphasis upon the Divine transcendence and incomprehensibility, the dread of which is enhanced for man by sin: whereas Brunner recognises only its connection with the human reason, and is silent about its connection with the Divine transcendence. Faith, in the Bible, though it ~~fully~~ fully and necessarily recognises the Divine transcendence and ~~in~~ incomprehensibility, nevertheless suggests that it is accompanied by a filial attitude toward God and some rational apprehension of Him, and reaches its highest expression through the rational conception of God revealed by Jesus Christ: whereas Brunner recognises only its connection with Divine transcendence and incomprehensibility, and excludes its connection with rational apprehension of God.

Brunner is right in his insistence that law alone is powerless to give freedom and realisation of personality. But what he does not bring out is that faith itself makes use of principles of law. Law needs to be sanctified and used by faith. In the very exercise and development of faith, the existence and operation of ethical principles are recognised.

The fundamental idea of a more recent book of Brunner's, 'Man in Revolt', is that even the unbeliever is still related to God, and therefore that he is responsible, and that this responsibility is not put out of action even by the fullest emphasis upon the generous grace of God, but, on the contrary, that God requires it. *

* This is explicitly stated in Brunner's Preface, p. 11.

Against the Catholic doctrine, that man's nature needs a *donum superadditum supernaturale*, Brunner contends that the nature of man is to be understood as a unity, from the point of view of man's relation to God. This unified theological nature is perverted, but still always reveals the traces of the image of God in the human structure. The present *humanitas* is not the truly original human nature, but, precisely in its merely formal character, it is that which man has retained of his original relation with God. *

Against the Lutherans, man's being as a sinner is man's being in a corrupt form, but for that very reason even the *humanitas* which still exists must be understood in the light of the original image of God, or of man's relation with God. It is not a *profanum*, nor a trifle. *

Against Barth, the present *humanitas* is not a secular matter which is of no interest for theology. *

Though, however, Brunner claims to present man's nature as a unity, and recognises the *humanitas*, i.e. the formal image perverted, as preserving a relationship of man with God, * we have seen that he speaks of the material image as an original righteousness which has been lost, and what he means by this is shown by the exclusive distinction which he draws between philosophy and faith, and between law and faith, and also by his radical separation between general and particular revelation. Such

* For Brunner's view contrasted with ^{that of} Catholics, Lutherans, & Barth, see pp. 513-14 of "Man in Revolt".

natural law as he admits is relative to human sin, and there is a very distinct line of cleavage between it and christianity in his doctrine.

CHAPTER VII.

MODERN CONTINENTAL DOCTRINES (concluded)1. Berdyaev.

This survey would hardly be complete without a reference to Nicolas Berdyaev among the modern theologians. Berdyaev does not belong to the non-rational school, but, whilst taking account of both non-rational, negative, theology and rational, positive theology, he attempts to transcend both in his doctrine of the origin of good and evil.

Berdyaev is an orthodox Russian who was for many years a disciple of Karl Marx, was imprisoned under the Tsarist régime and subsequently under the Soviets, and his sufferings have greatly influenced his theological thought. The following brief sketch is based upon material from his 'Destiny of Man'.

As a means to accounting for the origin of evil, which he rightly insists to be inseparable from the problem of freedom, he postulates, as eternally anterior to the Godhead, a 'Divine Nothing', the Absolute, Non-being, the Abyss, To ^{More} ~~More~~, the Uncreated, the Primal Void. In this uncreated Primal Void is rooted Freedom from all eternity. Out of Freedom springs evil as well as every kind of good. Out of the Divine Nothing God the Creator, the Holy Trinity, is eternally born. The meonic Freedom consented to God's act of creation; non-being accepted being. *

God is all-powerful over being, but has no power over

* See 'The Destiny of Man' pp. 33-34

non-being or freedom, which is independent of Him.

God longs for His 'other', His friend, His creature man; He wants him to answer the call to enter the fulness of the Divine life and participate in His creative work of conquering non-being. God does not answer His own call, which would virtually be the case if His own creation answered it: the answer must come from freedom which is independent of Him, i.e. from man's freedom which is not of His creation. To attempt a forcible conquest of the potency of evil contained in freedom would have meant the destruction of freedom itself; freedom must respond voluntarily.*

In opposition to Aristotelian conceptions of Divine impassibility, Berdyaev stresses the inner life of God.[†] The God of the Bible, the God of revelation, is by no means an actus purus - He has affective and emotional states, dramatic developments in His inward life, inward movement - but all this is revealed exoterically. Self-satisfaction, self-sufficiency, stony immobility, pride, the demand for continual submission, are qualities which the christian religion considers vicious and sinful, though it calmly ascribes them to God. It becomes impossible to follow the Gospel injunction, 'Be ye perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect'. The Christian God is first and foremost the God of sacrificial love, and sacrifice always indicates tragedy.

Man's nature is derived from two different sources. His

* 'Destiny of Man', p. 34

† 'Destiny of Man', p. 37

He is the child of God and the child of freedom or non-being. His freedom is not created, but springs from the Primal Void; the rest of his nature is created by God. Man is not a fragmentary part of the world, but contains the whole riddle of the universe and the solution of it; he is the centre of the world.

God created man in His own image and likeness, i.e., made him a creator too, calling him to free spontaneous activity and not to formal obedience to His power. Free creativeness is the creature's answer to the great call of its Creator. Man is therefore primarily a creative being.[†]

There can be no question of the work of a great artist being low, poor, insignificant simply because it is created. But the Creator of the world is the greatest of artists, and there is no reason why it should be denied that He can create something Divine and lofty - whereas the common theological use of the term 'creature' as applied to man is depreciative of human dignity.*

As to man's creativeness, what he creates is more expressive of him than what he begets. As contrasted with Divine eternal generation, birth in the world means pain and suffering as a consequence of the evil disruption of the world: man's creations, on the contrary, mean conformity to the idea of man and to the vocation bestowed on him by God. Unlike God, man needs matter for his creations and he cannot create a living being: man's creativity itself, however, does not proceed from matter, but from his Creator.

[†] 'Destiny of Man', p. 43

* 'Destiny of Man', pp. 35-6

Sin and the Fall is the return from being to non-being - a free act of resistance to God's creation and to God's conception of man. Neither the created nature nor the uncreated freedom of the human creature belittle him: what belittles him is the evil which springs from freedom.

In his view of the State, Baedyaev asserts that it is actuated by a lust of power in which there is something daemonic (p.248).

Berdyaev writes in the prophetic rather than the scientific-theological manner, and this, together with his general style, makes his meaning as difficult to grasp as Barth's.

In criticism of the doctrine outlined above, we assert that freedom, which, on Berdyaev's own showing can accept or reject the Divine proposal, and is a source of good or evil, seems inseparable from the conception of personality and being. Thus, Berdyaev's Primal Void implies a principle of being, a Personality, anterior to God. So a doctrine of dualism is involved. God the Creator is not the ultimate source of all good.

It is impossible to think of that which we know as freedom having its origin in nothing. It must proceed from something which is capable of causing it. Berdyaev's Primal Void becomes ultimately a First Cause of Freedom, which is a power to be reckoned with in the world.

Even though Berdyaev attributes non-being to the Primal Void, yet from it, according to him, is eternally generated God the Creator. If the Void could give birth to a good God, why not also to a bad God in opposition to Him?

Berdyaev's postulate of Freedom as proceeding un-created from the Primal Void is entirely arbitrary and, to say the least, highly speculative. He would argue that only this assumption can give an adequate explanation of the problem of evil. But it may be replied that his assumption raises more problems than it solves.

His conception of God as sacrificial love involving tragedy, and of an inner life of God characterised by affective and emotional states and dramatic developments, together with his conception of God as longing for His 'other', His friend, His creature man, is in agreement with the contention put forward on pages 64-85 of this thesis, that there is an element of eros in agape. But Berdyaev's strong portrait of the dramatic character of the inward life of God needs to be balanced by the thought of God as working out His eternal purpose to a goal of sure achievement and final victory, or God becomes merely, as it were, 'democratic' and anxious lest evil should

prevail - an error against which the idea of Divine impassibility is a strong safeguard.

9 Again, his thought of human creativity and human freedom as each springing from distinct sources hardly seems true to life. Is there not justification for holding that the exercise of creativity involves the exercise of freewill? Must not God's freedom, as well as His creativity, according to Berdyaev's doctrine, be ultimately grounded in one source, viz. the Primal Void?

Berdyaev's view of man as being, not a fragmentary part of the world, but the centre of the world, containing the whole riddle of the universe and the solution of it, and as primarily a creative being, is logically justified by the doctrine of man's creation in the image of God; that doctrine also justifies his contention that man's creaturehood is not belittling, but a position of dignity and honour, as the work of the supreme Artist. Nevertheless, as the first two chapters of Part II. of this thesis will maintain, all human power, wisdom, and goodness is utterly dependent upon God, man's Creator; and though sin, which is that which belittles man, is the result of the abuse of freedom, yet the abuse of man's freedom consists, not in the return from being to non-being and the Primal Void, but in man's attempt to be himself as God and to deny his creaturehood.

2. State Totalitarianism.

In our time the failures of the secular liberal humanism which has characterised democracy have led to violent reaction in the form of State totalitarianism. This rests upon an 'ideology' which owes much to Hegelian philosophy* (pp.46-47) - dynamic, organic, empirical, relative, and concrete in its conceptions - rather than upon the absolute and universal ethical principles recognised by a doctrine of Natural Law. It is, however, at one with secular liberalism in being ultimately materialistic, having regard to things temporal rather than to things eternal. A precise statement of the respective 'ideologies' of the totalitarian States is a very difficult and controversial matter, but a brief description must be attempted. In Nazism it would appear that the Blood and Race of the German people are regarded as an incarnation of the Mind of the Creator, and the Führer, as the living embodiment and representative of the German people, becomes virtually an object of worship. The State is the organic manifestation of the German 'Folk'. In the Nazi doctrine that the decision of the State, or of the individual German in his proper sphere, is above any objective or universal standard of ethics or reason, it is easy to trace a legacy of the philosophy of Heidegger, who in turn was much influenced by the writings of Kierkegaard. The influence of the philosophy of Nietzsche has also, of course, been great. Nietzsche faced with uncompromising candour and relentless courage the full implications of atheism. If "God is dead", the basis of absolute truth and morals disappears. Nothing

* Probably, as far as Germany is concerned, a good deal depends also on the influence of Fichte, who has done much to shape German thought.

remains except that man himself by a titanic effort and infinite heroism should impose on the world a meaning and value and make life something to which he can with his whole being say "Yes". For that reason the goal of all endeavour must be the coming into existence of the superman. Humanity must learn to give itself a purpose. We must 'create beyond ourselves'.

Russian Communism, which appeared before Italian Fascism and German Nazism, has a clear conception of Natural Law in its teleological aims, i.e. its socialist ideas, postulating the laws of man's economic development and laying down the lines along which social evolution must take place; from capitalism to the class-war, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the ultimate fading-out of the national State in a universal class-less society. At first Russian Communism was for the industrial worker, and ^{was} anti-peasant. Then Lenin brought in the peasant as well; but peasant and industrial worker form two classes and their interests are not identical. Nazi theory, on the other hand, exalts the "soldierly peasant". It is in its dialectic thought that Russian Communism manifests those principles characteristic of the Hegelian type of philosophy. The heroic resistance of Russia to the German onslaught and the amazing success of her counter-offensive against the German invaders, is forcing many of us to revise our opinions about the Soviet régime. If we may help Russia to the revival of a lively national christian faith, there are also many things that she may teach us. There are, moreover, indications that a large number

of individual Russians have never abandoned their christian faith,* and of a growing tolerance in her international outlook, and of a lessening desire to extend her political creed beyond her own borders.

* The above was written before the ^{recent} institution of an orthodox patriarch of all Russia and his formal recognition by Premier Stalin.

CHAPTER VIII
CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH THEOLOGY

In England in more recent times two significant movements in theological thought may be discerned. One of these finds its adherents among some of the younger Anglican clergy as represented by the authors of the series of popular theological books known as 'Signposts'. The various authors are responsible only for their own books, yet there is a fundamental unity of attitude and approach among them. The movement is a reaction against the easy optimism of liberal humanism, and its outlook, broadly speaking, is Anglo-catholic. Though as a whole looking upon Barth, however significant as a figure, as one of the great dangers to a rational theology, at least one of the writers (A. Mackinnon) has been much influenced by Sir E. Hoskyns, who in turn was influenced by Barth (though with reservations). They would presumably agree with Maurice that the Church is human society in its normal state, but emphasise, as necessary to enable the Church to carry out the task of evangelising the modern world, a sharp distinction between the Church and, the world, advocating, for instance, the tightening of regulations concerning baptism. It is a case of 'reculer pour mieux sauter'. The doctrine of original sin is strongly stressed, and man is regarded as more seriously wounded in naturalibus than the Anglican tradition represented by Hooker has held, though the adherents of the movement are certainly not Calvinists.

One of its representatives, the Rev. E. Mascall, writing in 'Theology' in February and March, 1941, on the Nature and Task of Theology, argues

that the scholastic distinction between reason and faith, philosophy (which includes natural theology) and theology (i.e. revealed theology), is right, precisely because the two are distinguishable in thought, even though in practice they are interwoven as warp and woof, and that the Report of the Archbishops' Doctrinal Commission (page 44) is wrong in rejecting this distinction.* He maintains that "the instrument which the theologian should use in performing his task is not just his rational faculty, as the post-Thomist scholastics and the Liberals have assumed, but his whole self in its sacramental union with Christ in His Mystical Body; in this, his rational powers, strengthened and illuminated by grace, will, of course, play an organic and controlling part. He is not concerned simply to make deductions from principles or to pass judgment upon the dogmas of the Faith, but to allow Himself to be used by the Divine Head of the Mystical Body as an organ through which, in accordance with the will of God for him and for his time, some tiny fraction of the truth which is in Christ may be ~~express~~ expressed more clearly the task of theology is to display in its fullness and bring to its blossoming the revelation which God has committed to His Church".† Theology has the secondary task "to illuminate and fertilize the workings of the natural reason and so to bring the sciences of the natural reason to their fructification. The precise bearing of theology upon each science will vary from case to case, as will also the contribution that the science concerned will have to offer to theology".§ Thus a true philosophy can only be developed in the light of the christian revelation. This view put forward by Mascall helps to explain the criterion, otherwise by no means clear, which the 'Signpost' writers, in their emphasis upon the revealed Word

* *Theology*, Feb. 1941, pp. 79-80.

† *Theology*, March 1941, p. 135

§ *Theology*, March 1941, p. 139

of God recorded in Scripture and upon the inerrancy of Scripture, would recognise for the interpretation of Scripture in accordance with the Creeds and tradition of the Catholic Church.

We can hardly remind ourselves too often, if we would appreciate the scholastic position fairly, that Aquinas did not distinguish faith from reason as meaning that faith is 'non-rational'. To him faith is a 'habit' or 'virtue' of the mind which is capable of apprehending revealed mysteries of the Divine Reason which are beyond the reach of the natural human reason. It is an 'intellectual' act. What, however, the Report of the Doctrinal Commission points out is that nothing can "be effectively revealed by God to man apart from an activity of human reason in apprehending it".² The real point at issue is whether the Divine revelation is addressed to the natural man, so that, by acting in accordance with the best that he knows, he is capable of apprehending it through the light of reason and conscience, and deserves blame for not apprehending it when it is presented to him, or whether the natural man is incapable of apprehending it without the gift of a superadded supernatural grace. The doctrine approved by Mascall tends in practice to suggest to non-christian men that the specifically christian creed is outside the sphere of their apprehension until they have made up their mind (through the use of reason) that the Church is a trustworthy witness to, and teacher of, that creed (see p. 26 of this thesis).

Our Lord's words to Peter on the occasion of his great confession of faith are pertinent in this connection. "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar Jona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father Who is in heaven" (Mt.16.17). There is no need to interpret this

² *Doctrinal Commission Report, p.44*

as meaning that the common people who were about our Lord could not be expected to arrive at the conclusion at which Peter had arrived, and that Peter himself would never have arrived at it had it not been for a special gift of grace vouchsafed unto him which was not vouchsafed unto the others. It was indeed a conclusion at which flesh and blood could not arrive without a revelation from the Father, but that revelation had been given, offered to them all, through the life of Jesus, and Peter had received it, and was the first to confess it. Hence the Lord's statement of his blessedness, and would that many others with a like opportunity might shortly be brought to a like faith!

Let us recall the valuable teaching about the true nature of man quoted from Augustine on pages 13 and 14. Man's true nature is to live 'according to' God, i.e. with the acknowledgment that God is the centre and ground of his being. Instead of this he abides in a lie, living 'according to' himself, i.e. according to flesh and blood, affirming a false ground and centre in himself. If we apply the thought of Aquinas, his mind has a passive capacity to know God, but needs an object to enable it to realise its innate, but in itself helpless, capacity (page 25). God must reveal Himself, and man must submit himself. The revelation is made to man in his fallen condition, to enable him, if he responds, to recover his true condition.

Who will not agree with Mascall that the instrument which the christian theologian should use is not just his rational faculty, but his whole self in sacramental union with Christ in His Mystical Body? It is indeed true that sin in the life of the theologian is a great stumblingblock to His apprehension of spiritual truth. The common

christian practice of prayer, individual or collective, before setting about an important duty, bears ample witness to this truth. The acknowledgment of this, however, is not inconsistent with the view that the theologian, while he should regard the Church's pronouncements with deep respect, must nevertheless regard his own reason and conscience as for him ultimately decisive.

With the view expressed by Mascall as to the relations between theology and the sciences of the natural reason the writer is in hearty agreement. To say, however, that a true philosophy can only be developed in the light of the christian revelation suggests that non-christian philosophy possesses no truth at all. This could be avoided by saying that philosophy can only be purged of all its errors and be brought to its full development in the light of the christian revelation.

The other recent movement (though its roots are many decades old) in British theology is in the direction of christian sociology. Much quickened by the state of society revealed by the present war, it is perhaps the most significant trend in the christian thought of our country at this time, and is becoming increasingly concerned with the reconstruction of society after the war. The question is being approached from different quarters, represented, for instance, by the statement on "Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction" published by the Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility, and by the pamphlet "The Christian Realm" issued by the Church Union, and by the publication of the Industrial Christian Fellowship on "Malvern and After". There is a

considerable measure of agreement between these documents, but in each case the presentation is somewhat different. The situation is too large and complex to allow more than a brief summary, but the following five standards published in 'The Times' of 21st. Dec., 1940, in a letter bearing the signatures of the Anglican Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, and the Moderator of the Evangelical Free Church Council, and associated with the 'Five Peace Points' of Pope Pius XII, may be said to express a widely accepted basis of agreement. The five standards are derived from the Report of the Economic Section of the Oxford Conference on Church, Community, and State, 1937.

(i) Extreme inequality in wealth and possessions should be abolished;

(ii) Every child, regardless of race or class, should have equal opportunities of education, suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities;

(iii) The family as a social unit must be safeguarded;

(iv) The sense of a Divine vocation must be restored to man's daily work;

(v) The resources of the earth should be used as God's gifts to the whole human race, and used with due consideration for the needs of the present and future generations.

These ^{standards} ~~proposals~~ indicate ~~that a~~ the conviction that a fruitful cause of our present troubles has been the virtual confinement of the Christian Faith to the spheres of religion (as distinct from the 'secular') and morality only, and the acknowledgment of the theological doctrine that Christ is 'the Lord of all life', and that therefore

christianity is vitally concerned with all departments of human interest and activity. The matters with which the five standards are concerned all fall within the region of Natural Law and of the oversight of the modern State. The fourth and fifth, however, make it clear that man's 'natural' life, and those departments of human life with which the State is directly concerned, are of God's ordering, and that the practical recognition of this Divine ordering must have most important results for human welfare.

Then there is the contribution being made by the Christian News Letter, edited by Dr. J. H. Oldham. Supplements 86 and 88 deserve special mention as dealing in a summary manner with some of the most fundamental aspects of the situation. An attempt is made, with the substantial agreement of many critics of different types of experience and outlook, to state the predicament of society in a form which is more than a merely individual interpretation and which may be expected to command wide assent. At the beginning of the modern period of history men, setting out to subdue nature to their purposes and thereby to enlarge their freedom, have met in many directions with success beyond their dreams and still larger possibilities are within the reach of mankind: yet at the same time there have been called into operation vast, mechanical, impersonal forces which deprive the majority of men of real existence as persons. The apparently irresistible drift towards rational planning increases the danger threatening human freedom and makes the necessity of consciously planning for ~~his~~ freedom desperately urgent. The large-scale organisation of modern life has to a large extent broken up the small communities in which men in association with their neighbours take decisions directly affecting their own lives,

are bound to one another in a system of acknowledged obligations and responsibilities, and are consciously dependent on one another for mutual help. In place of persons living as members of a real community we have the modern phenomenon of the 'mass-man'. Accompanying these developments, both facilitating them and fomented by them, is a widespread sense that life has no meaning. Large numbers are becoming sceptical and disillusioned. Lacking any definite aim in life they become irresponsible. The weakening of the sense of responsibility is seen in the breakdown of conventions regarding the relations of the sexes, and confronts us in the many in all classes who cannot be trusted to do an honest job of work, in the indifference to waste or the destruction of property, so long as the government or someone else pays. Though there are still in this country powerful centres of resistance to the establishment of a totalitarian State, the mechanisation of life and the breakdown of community lead inevitably to the loss of belief in God, and prepare the way for the dictatorship and tyranny of ambitious men using modern techniques for raising themselves to power by exploiting the weaknesses of the dehumanised masses. The older tyrannies exercised an absolute power over men's bodies; the modern authoritarian State by the control of education and all sources of information and by the power of suggestion and psychological pressure is able to invade their souls and bring them into subjection to its purposes. To conquer these dangers, something must come into existence which the historian of the future will recognise as having a comparable importance in history to the rise of the Communist and Nazi movements - not a new political party, not another new organisation, not primarily a programme of action, but the definition

of "a common faith and purpose sufficiently simple and clear, sufficiently relevant to the present predicament, and involving sufficiently definite obligations in regard to action, to unite those who accept it in a conscious common devotion to a common cause." The ultimate realities which constitute and condition the life of man, and which form the substance of such a common faith as the writer of the Supplements is seeking, are then described under the following five headings:

(1) God. In spite of current atheism and agnosticism, where else can one begin? Because God is, there is an absolute truth and absolute right, in surrender to which man can rise to undreamed of heights. Though God must indeed be apprehended in personal experience, it is not subjective experience, it is not 'personal religion', which is here advocated. It is the acknowledgment of the sheer fact of the living God, to believe in Him, not only as the Ruler and Helper of our individual lives, but as the Lord of history, at work in the world as well as in the Church.

(2) Nature. Men stand in a false attitude to this world, which God has created, which they think they know and understand, and are estranged from God accordingly. Instead of looking on the earth and the world of natural objects as gifts to man for the good of mankind, men have regarded them as just so much raw material for the satisfaction of their unlimited wants. Science, which is the child of humility and reverence, has been made the tool of man's pride and ambition. It is vital to establish the right relation between our machine civilisation and the primary products of the earth on which man depends for his existence. In responding reverently to the truth of material things men may discover that without having known it they are in touch

with God Who made them.

(3) Persons. The fundamental meaning of human life is found in the communion of persons. M. Maritain goes to the root of things when he urges that what is needed to save civilisation is to substitute for a democracy based on the isolated individual a democracy which draws its strength from persons living in community. In so far as society is conceived of as a community of persons, power will be exercised for men, and exercised over them only because it is exercised on their behalf. Faith in what man is, and was made to be, gives us the assurance that at whatever price of suffering and struggle the truth of his inalienable being will in the end triumph over the strongest concentrations of dictatorial power.

(4) Society. We are related to persons and things not only directly but through the medium of a host of activities and a network of institutions, in which we are associated with others in an endless variety of ways. The organisation of these manifold social activities has become in our day, in contrast with earlier societies, so vast and intricate as to bring about an unprecedented crisis in the life of mankind. What has been built into history by the labours of past generations is not something to be lightly thrown away, but by the very fact of its existence has a claim on our loyalty: on the other hand, into whatever is built by sinful men there enters an element of injustice, and consequently much that exists has got to be changed. Notwithstanding all this, these common activities belong to the texture of human life created by God. A reawakened sense of the common life as the sphere in which God's will must be done, the opening of our eyes to the spiritual significance of the British tradition of

public service, local initiative, and voluntary effort, evoking the resolve to build new social structures on foundations already given, would infuse fresh energies into the body politic and crown our resistance to tyranny with positive meaning and achievement from which the whole world would benefit.

(5) Christ. To those who believe in Him, Christ is the centre of history, the inaugura^tor of a new order, and their relation to Him is the ultimate reality of their existence. He is also the attestation and final sanction of the elemental realities of human existence described above, and since these are the environment of the life of every man, many who do not call themselves christians have an ~~underst~~ understanding of them - often a deeper understanding than that of many professing christians.

It is incumbent on christians to unite their forces to ensure that the issue is decided in the sense that their faith demands.

(a) They must set themselves to discover the point or points at which the issue may be, in fact, decided, and attack the enemy at these points - e.g. the evil of unemployment, the shameful neglect of our adolescent population. But this demands adequate knowledge of the problems involved, adequate equipment and personnel. (b) Christians should make fuller use of the organisations and institutions which already exist, and permeate them, infusing into them more vigorous and definite christian spirit. (c) There is crying need for more evangelisation.

But besides the distinctively christian contribution to the national life, the nation needs the general education that is based on a doctrine of the true nature of man, and, as far as possible, on a christian understanding of the true ends of life.

Supplements II2 and II4 are also of radical importance. In the former, the crucial factor for the right understanding of human nature and society is seen in the view that human life is essentially one of relationship, not to things, but to other persons. The presentation of this view is based upon a recent broadcast talk by Professor John Macmurray on 'Persons and Functions', and upon a book 'I and Thou' by a German writer, Martin Buber (now in exile from Germany) published in 1923. The latter appeared in an English translation in 1937. Man strives to obtain mastery over things for his own ends, but he has to meet other persons in unknown encounter, and his personality has to adjust itself to the demands of their personalities. All real human life is the daily meeting with other persons. Human relationships are of much greater importance than the material technicalities of industry. This view reaches its consummation in belief in the living God, Who, as the eternal 'Thou', addresses us and calls us to a responsible decision. In the latter Supplement this attitude to life is contrasted with the philosophy of Nietzsche as the only other ultimate alternative for modern society. The imperishable service rendered by Nietzsche is that he has explored to the furthest limits what it means for man to be alone in the universe ~~7~~ - a universe which has no value or meaning except what by superhuman heroism and suffering he puts into it. When, however, man goes forth thus to conquer the world, he finds that it meets him in the end as inexorable and relentless fate. His dreams of freedom end in terrible slavery. But for the man who understands life as relationship the world is seen in the light of a Divine purpose and the goal of man as a God-appointed destiny, towards which he may move in the spiritual freedom of sonship.

This historical survey may well be concluded with a short summary of the views maintained in this thesis, as they have been brought out in the examination of the various doctrines which have been described, and in so far as they are relevant to modern thought and conditions.

Man is created in the image of God's only-begotten, beloved, Son, Who is also the Light that lighteth every man, and Who, in the supreme manifestation of God's essential nature as Love, was made flesh, and redeemed all mankind.

Augustine's doctrine of what it is to live according to man, and what according to God, is strongly affirmed. Man's true nature is to live according to God. Instead of this he abides in a lie, according to man, i.e. according to the flesh, asserting a false ground and centre in himself instead of in his Creator. His mind, as Aquinas teaches, has a passive capacity to know God, but needs an object to enable it to realise its innate, but in itself helpless, capacity. God must reveal Himself, and man must submit himself.

All explanations of human sin which do not treat man's nature as a unity, are rejected, e.g. the explanation of Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Otto, Barthianism, and (in spite of his claim to the contrary) virtually Brunner.

Maurice's view of sin is accepted, that sin is due to the tyranny of an Evil Spirit, who has withdrawn men from their true LORD, establishing his thralldom over the will, effecting a corruption which is

felt through man's whole nature: but that the true law of man's nature is not thereby destroyed; the image of God still persists in him; there is in every man the sense of a righteousness, more closely intertwined with his being than sin, and proper to his nature, and bearing witness to the presence of man's true LORD and Redeemer, the Light that lighteth every man.

The mind is not necessarily the centre and ground of the Divine image in man, as Augustine and Aquinas assumed. The tendency of modern psychology is to support the view that the imago is to be sought rather in the realm of instinct and emotion - a view which accords with the christian doctrine that God is Love, provided that it is recognised that man's sin has wrought a considerable measure of corruption in his feelings, which need to be controlled by the reason.

Against the scholastic and Roman Catholic teaching, revelation is addressed to the natural reason in man, so that, by acting according to the best he knows, he is capable of apprehending it through the light of natural reason and conscience, and does not need superadded supernatural grace for the purpose. It is begging the question to define faith as distinct from the natural reason and emotion, and yet at the same time to claim it as an intellectual act, unless it can be to some extent tested by natural human reason.

As against the Lutherans, Calvinists, Barthians, and Brunner, the natural reason is neither wholly corrupt nor properly outside the sphere of christian theology. On the contrary, as Hooker taught, if sifted and tested by experience and applied to the facts of life, it is the true basis of authority. The scholastic view of reason and faith leads to a separation of christian ethics from natural ethics

as between supernatural and natural; the Lutheran view to a separation as between christian and secular. Both tendencies are alike to be avoided. Faith must at all stages build upon reason; and philosophy needs the christian revelation to correct and complete it. It is not that the sphere with which faith is concerned, which is beyond the limit of human reason, is itself either irrational or non-rational. It belongs essentially to rational order, and is continuous with the scope of human reason, though beyond its reach.

The Lutheran tendency to exalt the personal decisions of faith at the expense of ethical standards, as exemplified in the doctrines of ~~Substantiation~~, Kierkegaard, Barth, and Brunner, is strongly opposed. Faith itself makes use of law, and law needs to be sanctified and used by faith. The recognition of Natural Law needs to be balanced by a dynamic faith, and vice versa.

Faith is the natural and right attitude of man, fallen or unfallen, towards his Creator. His righteousness stands in Christ alone, by grace through faith, whether he be fallen or unfallen. Our redemption in Christ is a fact for faith to lay hold on, and does not depend on our feelings, nor is it created by our faith.

Man has a special instinctive, intuitive, faculty - inherently (though, as far as man himself is concerned, not consciously) rational - for apprehending his Creator, viz. his sense of the holy. This 'category' of human experience is co-ordinate with the other categories of experience proper respectively to the reason, conscience, and aesthetic sense, none of them as a rule functioning in entire independence of the others, but each calling the others to its aid. The essential nature of man, being an image of God Who is Love, may be

recognised in the natural relationships of human life and is served by all the different 'categories' alike. The good, however, which persists in man's fallen nature and natural relationships and good actions, is imperfect, and becomes perfected only through fellowship with God and conscious direction of the life to the glory of God, i.e. goodness to become perfect must become also holy.

As to the relation between particular and general revelation in history, the former is held to be sacramental, teaching those who receive this revelation how God reveals Himself constantly in all nature and history. Special revelation enables man not only to have fellowship with God, but also to understand the meaning in the Divine purpose of the principles which underlie the order of man's life on earth. The singularity of events of revelation in the Old Testament consists essentially in the wonderful way in which the course and conjunction of events therein recorded may be shown to be the working out of a consistent Divine purpose for all mankind. This involves the vocation and inspiration of the prophet in the tradition of ethical monotheism and, since Christ, of the Christian Faith. The resurrection is the fulfilment and vindication of all previous revelation.

With regard to the problem of the relation between State and Church, the earthly City or nation or State exists to be an image or sacrament of the Heavenly City or Kingdom. Christians should be the best citizens of a good State, because their criticism is particularly valuable, and grace provides them with the power to fulfil in their own lives the requirements of the law: and the good State is the

Church's great friend, for the administration of justice makes for the maintenance of true religion and virtue. But the Church's duty of criticising the State is within the sphere of natural and universal justice. The 'building up of a christian society' implies primarily evangelisation (especially of high State officials), and the securing of conditions to enable the Church to perform its proper task, and the obtaining of a ~~sound christian~~ sound christian education wherever desired, without unfair discrimination. The more successfully the Church performs her primary functions of evangelisation and teaching and worship, the more likely is society to fulfil its natural functions properly, if, as has been argued (page 28), the purpose of grace is to enable human nature to perform properly the functions for which it was created. The Church's task of keeping before the State the ideal of justice, and criticising its administration of justice, and her active work with regard to such matters as slum clearance, etc., lie strictly within the sphere of natural justice. Since the function of the State is ordained by God, therefore a State which recognises this, as, for instance, in the anointing and coronation of a king by the Church and in the establishment of a national Church, is more likely to perform its function faithfully than a State which makes no official acknowledgment of its Divine stewardship.

The above remarks concerning State and Church represent for the most part a summary of the discussion which arose from a consideration of Barth's doctrine on pp. 97-102. As regards the question of "the building up of a christian society," they are directed against loose talk upon the subject, especially the popular suggestion that active social work undertaken by the Church (or, more correctly, its individual members or communities), or the Church's criticism of the State's politics, are, in themselves, something distinctively christian, rather than the Church's Faith and worship. The latter belong to the distinctive life of christians: the former are its fruits, & they are manifested in the common natural sphere.

As a matter of fact the writer, as he shows in the last chapter of Part II, attaches the utmost importance to the formal acknowledgment, by the State as such, of the Supreme Lordship of God and His Christ, and of its responsibility to Him, as the basis of a christian State. That should be a primary aim of evangelisation in a heathen State, and, in a State formally christian, like ours, it is a basis for the further evangelisation of the citizens.

PART II

BIBLICAL SURVEY

CHAPTER I

THE CREATION OF MAN

How does Holy Scripture support and amplify the conclusions to which the foregoing historical survey led us? Such a consideration, respecting questions which concern the essential nature of man, must ever be a vital issue to christians who are persuaded that "the holy scriptures contain sufficiently all Doctrine required of necessity for eternal salvation through faith in Jesus Christ".*

The historical survey itself necessarily involved, from time to time, some examination of certain particular passages and doctrines of Scripture, but such examination was only incidental, and far from anything that could be called a complete Biblical survey of our subject. Since our investigation covers a wide field, it will help us to concentrate our attention upon one point at a time, and save us from becoming lost in an attempt to deal with several considerations at once, if, instead of examining the doctrine of man as a whole in one survey, we deal separately, in a series of Biblical essays, with some of the most important aspects of human nature which our historical survey has shown to be relevant to modern thought. It is not that these Biblical essays will seek to interpret Scripture in the light of the views expressed in the foregoing historical survey, but that

* Service for Ordination of priests in Book of Common Prayer.

years of Bible reading and study from his youth up have been a most potent influence in forming, in the writer, that general outlook which he took with him to the historical survey. The latter has enriched ^{his} ~~the~~ that preliminary general outlook, and reacted upon ~~the writer's~~ understanding of the Bible. The contentions of these Biblical essays are claimed as the straightforward way of interpreting the Bible with regard to the subjects under consideration, whereas, on the contrary, it is those who hold the views of non-rational theology who tend to regard themselves as champions of the Bible against slaves of tradition.

We begin, then, with the doctrine of man's creation stated in the first chapter of Genesis, which has already received some discussion in pages 7 to 10, although indeed the doctrine is in its widest sense the text of this entire thesis.

Does Biblical criticism disprove the importance of the doctrine of the creation of man in Genesis I? Nygren in *Agape and Eros* quotes with approval a statement of Lehmann that the strongest argument against the doctrine is the complete silence of the rest of the Old Testament (prophets, psalms, and job, even Deuteronomy). "It can be no accident that this doctrine of man's creation in God's image appears in a document contemporary with the beginnings of Greek influence on the Old Testament Scriptures". *

It matters little whether or not the explicit statement of the doctrine is comparatively late in appearance and due to the influence of Greek thought. What matters is whether the doctrine is true, and whether it is, or is not, the corner-stone of all sound theology and

* *Agape and Eros* p. 181, footnote.

philosophy. The doctrine is explicitly referred to in Gen.5.1 and
 — in the Apocrypha,
 9.6 (also, Wisdom 2.23, Eccles.17.3), and is in any case implicit ~~th~~
 throughout the Old Testament, as the following pages will show, and it
 is even more strongly implicit in the New Testament, where at least
 two explicit statements are also found (I Cor.11.7, Jas.3.9, cf. Ac.17.
 28)*. The priestly writers who placed the Creation Account in question
 at the beginning of the Pentateuch acted by a sound and true judg-
 ment. It forms a fitting introduction to the whole of the Old Testa-
 ment and the New Testament. With its climax of creation in the
 creation of man as man the note of universalism is sounded at the
 outset. God's eternal purpose is concerned with the whole human race,
 not merely an elect section of it. The first chapter of Genesis is not
 incongruous with the unfolding of God's purpose in the rest of Scrip-
 ture, but forms a consistent whole with it. Neither should it be for-
 gotten that one of the characteristics of the priestly writings is
 an emphasis of the Divine transcendence: yet it is to this source
 that the classic expression of the doctrine of man's creation in God's
 image is due.

The argument from silence might be applied to the doctrine of
 'original sin'. We have the account of the Fall in Genesis 3, but
 there is no explicit statement there that Adam's sin is transmitted
 to his posterity. There is a semi-explicit statement in Psalm 51.5,
 but it is not necessarily connected with Adam. It is the authority of
 S. Paul which is usually invoked in support of the doctrine. Those to
 whom the doctrine of man's creation in God's image is distasteful do
 not find it convenient to use, respecting the doctrine of 'original

* The 'material' image is alluded to in Rom. 8²⁹, 2 Co. 3¹⁸, Eph. 4²⁴, Col. 3¹⁰.

sin', the same argument which some of them use with respect to the doctrine which offends them.

It is objected by some that the doctrine is actually a theological attempt to explain the fact that the religious development ~~recorded~~ recorded in the Bible represents a process of man's interpretation of God in terms of human experience. The gulf between Creator and creature is so vast that it is absurd to suppose that human natural experience can have anything in common with the Divine nature. The doctrine of man's creation in the image of God is a projection of the human mind. The God of the Bible is in reality God conceived in man's image.

The doctrine of the Bible, on the contrary, is that man's creation in the Divine image is a truth which rests, not on human fancy, but on God's own revelation of Himself to man. The broad justification for the claim that the Bible contains the record of God's special revelation is the fact that the process of revelation in the Old Testament, ^{alone} eventually gave to the world faith in one personal, righteous, God, and culminated, in the New Testament, in the revelation of Jesus Christ.* The Old Testament revelation was mediated through the prophetic interpretation of the facts of history. One of the fundamental principles of that interpretation is the a posteriori and the a ^tforiori argument from human nature to the Divine Creator, and it is thoroughly rational. A typical instance is Isaiah 28.23-29, where the prophet argues from the agricultural method of the farmer to the Divine method of moral government of the world. Another good example is Psalm 94.8-10 ("Take heed, ye brutish among the people, and ye fools, when will ye

* See page 119

understand? He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? He that made the eye, shall He not see? He that instructeth the nations, shall not He correct^{even}? He that teacheth man knowledge?" Our Lord Himself often used the same mode of argument, e.g. "If ye, theⁿ, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father Which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him"? (Matt. 7. II). The Hebrew prophets' interpretation of life, however, was not the result of mere intellectualism, but was drawn forth by the pressure of actual experience - not that the interpretation which the Hebrews gave of their experience was necessarily the only one which could suggest itself, but that it was grounded on faith in a personal, righteous, God and has been substantially vindicated at the bar of history and of further experience. The claim for the Divine inspiration of the prophets is strengthened by their own remarkable conviction of Divine inspiration. Where else can we find such amazing certainty that the Word of God is uttering itself through the human voice as in the absolute confidence which rings through the oft-repeated assertion, "Thus saith the Lord"?

If the Hebrew argument, that the proper nature and functions of the creature must have some counterpart in the nature of the Creator, be anthropomorphism (which may be defined as conceiving of God in terms of human nature), then it is anthropomorphism of the right sort. Anthropomorphism betokens a less advanced stage of religious development only when it attributes to God qualities of human nature as perverted by sin, as, for example, unworthy passions; ^{or} when its thoughts of God are obviously crudely materialistic; ~~is~~ or if it regards man's knowledge of God as attainable through his own unaided effort,

and not as due to God's initiative in revelation. The Hebrew argument does not equate the Divine nature with human nature, but is always the a posteriori and a fortiori 'how much more?'.¹⁴

In view of the reasons above outlined for the claim that the Bible contains the record of God's special revelation, we may feel disposed to trust the inspiration of the Hebrew genius which has proclaimed the doctrine of man's creation in the Divine image, and to take the doctrine seriously in our interpretation of it. If so, we may infer that man's natural tendency to anthropomorphic ideas of God springs from the inherent necessity of his own essential nature as created in the image of God. So Ovid writes of Prometheus: "Finxit (hominem) in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum"[†], and Cicero "Qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, ingeniumque in se suum, sicut simulachrum aliquod, dedicatum putabit."[§] Man conceives of God in terms of human experience not merely because he can understand God in no other way, but because God has created him in the Divine image. It is, for instance, because God's nature possesses the characteristic quality of Fatherhood that He made men ~~✱~~ fathers and that men are able to think of Him as Father.^{*} The term 'theomorphism' has been proposed for the expression of this doctrine that human nature is rightly to be interpreted in the light of the Divine nature as God has revealed Himself to us.

Those to whom it seems that the doctrine of man's creation in God's image asserts too high a dignity for mere man should remember that the allegation of the divine image in man is counterbalanced by the fact of man's creaturehood. In the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, it is the second Person of the Blessed Trinity alone who is the only-begotten Image of the Father. Men are created in the image of God. Man is different in kind from God in being God's creature. The recognition of this fact is of the utmost importance.

It may be well to illustrate this by a brief and necessarily somewhat technical examination of some of the well-known characteristics and attributes of the Divine Being. Natural theology can inform us about these, through the method of reason. It cannot, however, solve the

* See, e.g., Eph. 3¹⁴⁻¹⁵

† Metam. lib. 1, lin. 83.

§ De leg. lib. 1 cap. 22

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problem of sin nor give us fellowship with God - that is the province of revelation. Let us consider the "definition" of God given in the first of the Anglican XXXIX articles. God is "aeternus, incorporeus, impartibilis, impassibilis, immensae potentiae, sapientiae, ac bonitatis".

(a) Aeternus. "Eternal" does not mean "everlasting", but is beyond time. Time implies change and movement. God is changeless: but His changelessness is consistent with ceaseless activity of love, purpose, will. "Eternity is the possession, simultaneous and complete, of unending life" (Aquinas). Though man may have eternal life even in this world, yet the limitations of the temporal still remain for him as long as he is in the flesh.

(b) Incorporeus. God is without body, for He is "Spirit". He cannot be thought of as material. He is not restricted by limitations of the flesh, needing food or sleep, etc.. He is above the limitations of space; He is omnipresent. His omnipresence is in no way local or material, but is according to His purpose, and is His operation.

(c) Impartibilis. God's feeling, intellection, and purpose never conflict. What we regard as separate Divine attributes (e.g. His love, wrath, joy, sorrow, etc..) are really aspects of one consistent and unchanging Being.

(d) Impassibilis. This attribute properly refers to what is termed "internal" impassibility. God is not subject to unruly emotions and instincts[†] which move Him contrary to reason. God is not, however, "externally" impassible, i.e. incapable of being acted upon by something from without, in relation to His own act of creation, though He is so absolutely. Similarly, He is not "sensationally" impassible, i.e. incapable of experiencing pleasure or pain caused from without, in relation to His own creatures, though He is so absolutely.

[†] Latin 'passio'; Gk. 'παθος'.

These conclusions respecting external and sensational impassibility are virtually modifications wrung by the pressure of Hebrew, Biblical, thought from the Greek thought which is the basic influence behind the conception of these philosophical attributes of Deity. Neither is subscription to God's internal impassibility inconsistent with the attribution of emotions like wrath, love, etc. to Him so long as we remember the truth safeguarded by the statement that the Divine nature is impartibilis.

(e) Immensae potentiae. God's power is the operation of His will (Gk. eros). His eros is the will of One Who is also absolutely good and wise. It is not unfulfilled desire as with us: but the desiring, possessing, and enjoying the eternal good, which is His own nature. As every individual first grows to its proper maturity, then seeks to reproduce itself after its kind, so God wills and desires first the ultimately real and good, and secondly, the reproduction of that good in created things.

When God's will is put into operation by the exercise of His power, it is impossible and absurd to think of Him as doing anything contrary to His own nature, which is absolutely good and wise, and to the laws which of His own sovereign will He has established in accordance with that nature.

In the exercise of His power He is not limited by creation in the sense that He has exhausted His resources in it. He has inexhaustible power in reserve. His power is to a certain extent thwarted by evil, in that His antecedent will is not always done: but His actual or consequent will is always done. For instance, it is not God's will that a man should be a criminal, but if He becomes one, it is God's will that he should be punished. If God is not glorified by a man living a right-

eous life, His glory will be manifested otherwise when His righteousness is vindicated in that man's inevitable punishment.

God is, however, all-mighty to achieve His purpose, and even evil itself is, not merely conquered, but actually turned by the power of the cross and resurrection into an instrument for achieving greater good. This truth, however, belongs to revelation: redemption is beyond the province of natural religion.

(f) Immensae sapientiae. The difficulty of the relation of Divine foreknowledge to human freewill receives great illumination from Prof. James's illustration of the chessboard. "Suppose two men before a chessboard, the one a novice, the other an expert player of the game. The expert intends to beat. But He cannot foresee exactly what any one move of his adversary may be. He knows, however, all the possible moves of the latter; and he knows in advance how to meet each of them by a move of his own which leads in the direction of victory. And the victory infallibly arrives, after no matter how devious a course, in the one predestined form of checkmate to the novice's king. Let now the novice stand for us finite free agents, and the expert for the infinite mind in which the universe lies. Suppose the latter to be thinking out his universe before he actually creates it. Suppose him to say, I will lead things to a certain end, but I will not now decide on all possibilities thereto. At various points, ambiguous possibilities shall be left open, either of which, at a given instant, may become actual. But whichever branch of these bifurcations becomes real, I know what I shall do at the next bifurcation to keep things from drifting away from the final result I intend." * We need to remember, of course, that God as the expert Chess-Player is working for our good, not in order to beat us, and

* "The Will to Believe", pp. 181 et seq.

that it is only when we set up our wills against His that He plays against us and that still for our good and for the good of others.

Again, while human knowledge is discursive, i.e. obliged to attend to things one at a time, and to reason from premises to conclusions, the Divine knowledge must be simultaneous, knowing the whole meaning of things, all at once, e.g. the true nature of man. Our experience of human knowledge, moreover, suggests that the highest, and therefore the divinest, kind of knowledge consists in knowledge of universal laws rather than of mere particular facts, and of universal laws of value or goodness rather than of those which directly govern physical and material facts.

The Divine knowledge must also be in some sort creative, i.e. the cause of events in the universe, and not dependent upon their happening. If something like the above view of the relation between Divine foreknowledge and human freewill be accepted, however, (and it seems to the writer that any contrary theory reduces life as we know it to a mere puppet-show) then the statement that the Divine knowledge is creative must be modified to the extent that Divine knowledge is partly dependent upon particular choices of human individuals, but the Divine knowledge causes the consequences which ensue upon such choices, until the next bifurcation of human choice appears, and so on; and the very exercise of the power of choice is due to the Divine wisdom which voluntarily gave this power to man; and the Divine wisdom is the cause of the inevitable ultimate fulfilment of the Divine purpose.

(g) Immense bonitatis. According to Aquinas, Good is really (secundum rem) identical with Being, though from the two standpoints of Being and Value they differ (secundum rationem). All that has being is,

so far, good. God possesses in Himself the fullness of Being, and therefore is the true and eternal Good, and, as such, to be supremely desired and loved.

Man's goodness consists in the being which God creates. Man is good in so far as he conforms to the laws of his nature or being, according to which God created him. ^{*} His righteousness, therefore, is not inherent in himself.

As we contrast human attributes with these Divine attributes, we may conceive of man perfected and glorified, beyond the limitations of time and space, with a will which has achieved the perfect freedom of harmony with his own true nature, and with a wisdom become much more heavenly than in his present state. Yet his wisdom will not be omniscient; and he will not be all-mighty to achieve his purpose; all his power, wisdom, and goodness, then as now, must be utterly dependent upon his Creator. Here is indeed the essential, ultimate, and infinite distinction between God and man, viz. that God is Creator and man His creature.

In speaking of man's creation in the Divine image another point should be noted. The doctrine properly implies that the whole of the Divine nature is imaged in the human creature. [†] If man's nature were a reflected likeness of only a part or aspect of the Godhead, then it could hardly be said rightly that man is created in the image of God. Such language would be misleading. The correct statement of the doctrine would be that man is created in the partial image of God, a doctrine which would involve very different consequences.

Such instinctive self-sacrifice and care as are to be found in the case of certain higher animals for their young may surely be described

^{*} See pp. 108-109. [†] When man's physical body, as well as the rest of his nature — not, of course, as suggesting pantheistic or material notions about God, but in the sense that, if it is the best instrument of expression & operation of the human personality, it would also be the best instrument of the economic expression & operation of the Divine Personality.

as to a limited degree a reflected likeness of the Creator, but we should not think of saying that such animals are created in the image of God. It might indeed be more correct to say that such qualities are not instances of direct reflection of Divine qualities, but only of indirect reflection through man, the Lord of created beings. Thus the Old Testament psalmists and prophets, and Christ Himself, saw in the relations between shepherd and sheep a reflection of the relations between God and men. *

Man's creation in God's image implies that all our highest ~~concep-~~ conceptions of what is integral and essential human nature reflect correspondences in the Divine nature; and conversely, that all that has been revealed to us of the Divine nature is mirrored in the human creature, and that even the transcendence of the Divine has its counterpart in man. Gregory of Nyssa well says: "Since one of the signs of the Divine nature is its essential incomprehensibility, in this also must the copy be like the original. For were the nature of the copy comprehended, when the original was above comprehension, the copy would be a mistaken one. But, inasmuch as the nature of our spirit is above our understanding, it has here an exact resemblance to the all-sublime, representing by its own unfathomableness the incomprehensible Being of God". †

We proceed to consider how far the doctrine of Genesis I is substantiated in the rest of the Bible, not in its wider ^{outlook} aspects involving various aspects or elements of human nature - for that will be done in the following chapters, but in its bare statement that the essential principle of man's nature is the fact of his creation in

* See, e.g., Psalm 23, Ezek. 34, Lk. 15³⁻⁷, John 10¹⁻³⁰

† See pp. 79-81

the Divine image.

The narrative of creation in Genesis 2 is from the earlier, prophetic, source and depicts man as of more lowly origin. But then the idea of God too is more crudely anthropomorphic. In any case, moreover, man is portrayed as having simple fellowship with God. There is, in short, nothing inconsistent with the doctrine of Man's creation in God's image. The description of man as formed of the dust of the ground is a fine depiction of the lower side of human nature, and the truth of it is acknowledged by all. But to recognise this in no way rules out recognition of man's creation in the Divine image; we may find the latter truth in the portrait of Adam's simple fellowship with God. It is evident that the priestly editors, who prefaced this earlier account of the creation by the account in Genesis I, felt no inconsistency between the two accounts.

In the eighth psalm there is an obvious reference to the doctrine of human creation in Genesis I. "What is frail man, that Thou art mindful of him? And the son of man, that Thou visitest him? For Thou hast made him little less than divine ('elohim'); and crownest him with glory and honour" (vv.4-5). On this psalm Davison comments: "The subject of this psalm is not, as is often represented, the glory of God in nature, nor the glory of man nor the glory of the Messiah as such, but the glory of God reflected in the fact that He has made a creature in many respects so insignificant and puny as man, lord of creation around, because he is viceroy of God upon the earth".*

The fourth verse is quoted again in psalm 144.4. It is bitterly parodied in Job 7.17-18, with reference to man's suffering and humiliation.

* In the Century Bible - p.68.

tion on earth. In Hebrews 2.6 it is applied to "Him Who hath been made a little lower than the angels (following LXX), even Jesus, because of the suffering of death crowned with glory and honour". Man's true dignity is not yet realised nor his consequent lordship over nature attained, but in and through the incarnation, passion, and exaltation of the Son of Man we see the pledge and earnest of the fulfilment of all the high promise of this psalm, and much more besides. Of this psalm, and its echoes in Job and Hebrews, Wheeler Robinson says, "Around the explanation of these three passages, so closely linked, might be gathered no small part of the Biblical doctrine of man". *

The vision of Ezekiel in chapter I of that book, a vision which came to him again several times during the course of his ministry, is worthy of note. The teaching of the prophets is a continuous protest against idolatrous worship, against supposing God to be the likeness of anything in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water under the earth. But the construction of Solomon's temple, its furniture and its services, and even more so the temple of Zerubbabel after the exile, must have given considerable distinctness to the thoughts of the Jew respecting Him Who was dwelling in the midst of His people. The vision of Isaiah was of One Who is holy, holy, holy; but it was of a King whose train filled the temple.[†] And this vision of Ezekiel, so emphatic of the holiness and transcendence of God, leads to a climax in the following words: "And upon the likeness of the throne was a likeness as the appearance of a man upon it above".[§] Here, in the very heart of Divine transcendence and holiness, we have the suggestion of the God in Whose image man is created.

* Religious ideas of the Old Testament, p. 101.

[†] Is. 6, 1.3.5

[§] Ezek. 1²⁶

The Old Testament doctrine of man's creation in God's image is greatly strengthened when in the New Testament we meet the doctrine of the incarnation. If the only-begotten Son be, as the latter doctrine affirms, the uncreated Image of God,* and if man is the created image of God, there is manifestly something most fitting about the mystery of the incarnation. The uncreated Image assumes the limitations of the created image. Ezekiel's vision of the likeness as the appearance of a man upon the likeness of the heavenly throne receives in the incarnation a wonderful vindication.

S. Paul states in I Cor. 10.4 that the Israelites in the wilderness "drank of a spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ." And in I Peter 1.11 the teaching of the Old Testament prophets, which later received its fulfilment in the sufferings and resurrection of Christ, is ascribed to "the Spirit of Christ Which was in them". The pre-existent Christ is regarded as present with the Israelites of old, their protector and spiritual refreshment, the light and inspiration of prophecy. The New Testament ^{writers} repeatedly refer unhesitatingly to Christ passages which in the Old Testament are referred to Yahweh: e.g. in Heb. 1.10 f. the quotation from Psalm 102²⁵, "Thou, LORD, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of Thy hands", or the quotation from Joel ¹⁷⁻²¹ in Ac. 2.21, cf. Rom. 10.13. It would be rash, as Hort comments, to conclude that Christ is identified with Yahweh in such passages: it is rather that Old Testament language is spontaneously applied to the Son to describe His Divine character. All this is logically involved in the doctrine of the incarnation, but often neglected in modern christian teaching.

* 2 Co 4⁴ Col. 1¹⁵; † Heb. 1³ - when the Gk. word is Χαρακτῆρ.

† Joel 2²⁸⁻³²

In the thought of S. Paul there are three conceptions, grounded upon conviction of the Divinity of Christ and His consequent part as God's Agent in creation^{*}, which, though in themselves referring to redeemed humanity in process of sanctification, imply an original relation between Christ and men.

(a) The idea of the 'second Adam'. To speak of 'the old (or first) Adam' is to use language which expresses mankind's universal experience of sin. Our sins, however, are disruptive forces, contradicting the true nature of man. In contrast with the first Adam, the idea of the second Adam expresses the true nature of man and the deep underlying unity of human nature. For example, terms such as John Bull and Uncle Sam and Jerry do express a certain common national character of Englishmen, Americans, and Germans, respectively, though single members of these nations retain their individuality. The second Adam idea expresses the universal essence of the human race. Prior to the sinful 'first Adam' is an original, fundamental bond of unity, consisting in our creation in, through, and unto, the Christ. It is the truth of this fundamental bond of unity which underlies the doctrine of the second Adam. That doctrine conceives of Christ our Redeemer as the Head of a new humanity united in Him. But the conception of a new humanity united in Christ as Redeemer involves the conception of the solidarity of humanity in Christ as Creator.

Col. 3.9-10[†] suggests that the work of christianity is the renewal of sinful humanity after^r the image of its Creator, Who, it is implied, created man in His image. In the light of this statement, the conception of the 'second Adam' or the man 'from heaven' (apart from any

* See, e.g., Col. 1¹⁵⁻¹⁷

† "Seeing that we have put off the old man with his doings, I have put on the new man, which is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him."

question of the influence of the book of Enoch upon the latter term) seems to presume the doctrine of the pre-existent Christ as the original Archetype of which human nature is the image and reflection.

(b) The mystical union between christians and their Lord expressed by the phrase 'in Christ'. The important passage in Romans 6.I-II shows that it is the baptised person who is regarded by S. Paul as 'in Christ'. Verse 3 (baptised into Christ Jesus) expresses incorporation into Christ. Συμφύτοι in verse 5 expresses the process by which a graft becomes united with the life of a tree.

The ~~incomparably~~ intimate ~~personal~~ union suggested by incorporation and grafting involves what is sometimes called the doctrine of the 'nekrosis'.* It is usually said (as by Sanday and Headlam in their Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, pp.162-163) that one of the basic components of this doctrine is the conception of the death and resurrection of Christ as cardinal facts of the christian life. This can be true only because of a prior and equally cardinal truth of the christian faith, viz. belief in Christ as the One in Whom and through Whom and unto Whom all things are created, in Whom we live and move and have our being. The faith by which we experience incomparably intimate friendship and union with Christ does not create the fact of our being 'in Him'. It would indeed be a thought of despair if the bond between Christ and us depended upon the continuous energy of our faith to maintain it, but it is always there for us to recur to. And the bond between the baptised and Christ their Redeemer is always there for them to recur to because that bond is founded upon an original bond in Christ their Creator.

* i.e. dying to sin & rising again to righteousness through faith in Christ.

(c) The idea of the Church as the Body of Christ. Professor Dodd thinks that S. Paul developed this doctrine under the influence of the sacramental idea.* The Bread in the Eucharist, as the Body of Christ, was for him "the organic instrument of Christ's Personality."† But in a similar sense the Church itself could be thought of as His 'Body'. The doctrine of the second Adam naturally implied a new, redeemed, humanity, a Fellowship, in which men take their place through union with Christ. It may well have been the sacramental idea which led S. Paul to think of this Fellowship as Christ's Body. Thus in a double sense the sacrament is a participation in the Body of Christ (I Cor. 10. 17).

Dodd says that S. Paul probably took so seriously the idea of the Church as embodying the 'corporate personality' of Christ, that in the death of Christ on the cross he always saw the death of the whole people of God to sin, law, and the flesh.‡ All Christians, as participating in the mystical Body of Christ, have been crucified with Christ (2 Cor. 5. 14).

But is not the serious view which S. Paul held of the Church as embodying the corporate personality of Christ grounded in his conviction of the original relation in which men stand to Christ by their creation in Him? For He is the Head and Lord, not only of His Body the Church, but of everyman.† In Him divisions due to religion, language, race, social class, even sex, are done away.‡

These three Pauline conceptions, therefore, teach the possibility of a unique union between men and Christ, and between man and man through Christ, grounded in the fundamental fact of man's creation in Christ.

* Commentary on Romans, pp. 194-5.

§ 'Romans', p. 102.

‡ Rom. 10¹², 1 Cor. 11³.

‡ Gal. 3²⁸ Col. 3¹¹

† But if the Body of Christ be itself regarded as the inward & spiritual grace of the sacrament then the bread in the Eucharist is strictly the outward & visible sign of the Body of Christ given in the sacrament — see Report of Doctrinal Commission p. 228.

As to Johannine doctrine, brief reference has already been made on page 8 to the prologue of the fourth gospel. It will be sufficient in this chapter to notice two other passages in that gospel.

(a) The fact that the feeding of the five thousand recorded in John 6 is the only miracle recorded in all four gospels is in itself significant of the importance attached to it by the author, who does not usually repeat accounts of miracles already given by the synoptists. The impression upon the people who had been fed by Christ is described as such that they said "This is of a truth the prophet that cometh into the world", and would have taken Him by force to make Him King. The evangelist interpreted the miracle as a 'sign' leading to the deepest truths about the relation between Christ and men, as set forth in the subsequent discourse.

The discourse itself falls into three sections, (i) verses 26-40, (ii) verses 41-51, (iii) verses 52-58, with an illuminating conclusion, verses 60-65. The first section and part of the conclusion are all that are strictly relevant here.

The burden of the first section, as shown by the evangelists' summary in verse 41, is the claim of Jesus to be the bread which cometh down from heaven. The reason why bread is able to feed our bodies is that it contains just those elements out of which our bodies are made up, and therefore the claim of Jesus implies, not merely that He is the sustainer of man's true life, but that there is a close ^{original} correspondence between His heavenly nature and true human nature, and that man's proper life actually depends upon feeding on Him. Such language involves a uniqueness of intimacy which goes far beyond that suggested by such expressions as 'fellowship'.

It has been suggested* that our Lord, in the institution of the Eucharist, did not make use of the natural physical process of eating and drinking because it merely offered a convenient illustration of the peculiar relationship between Him and His faithful followers, but because it is the Divinely created image or reflection of the true relationship between Him and mankind. In other words, in the Divine purpose the relationship between Christ and men preceded the creation of the physical process of eating and drinking, and the latter was created in correspondence with the former.

The conclusion of the discourse contains, in verse 62, a reference to the ascension. "What then if ye should behold the Son of Man ascending where He was before?" The question plainly implies that the Person Who, as the Son of Man, walked this earth of ours and after His passion ascended into heaven, taking His victorious Manhood with Him, is the same Person Who before the incarnation was with God from the beginning. We have already remarked that the doctrine of the incarnation is most agreeable to the doctrine of man's creation in God's image. The doctrine of the ascension greatly strengthens this impression. Those tendencies of some theological thought to belittle our humanity receive their death-blow in the ascension, for the ascension is a permanent guarantee that humanity sits enthroned at the right hand of God.

(b) In the parable of the Vine and the branches in chapter 15, the followers of Christ are exhorted to abide in Him, for apart from Him they can do nothing. If this latter statement be understood to mean what it says, it must be because in Him they live and move and

* A. J. Mason: "The Faith of the Gospel", pp. 304-5.

have their being: otherwise they would certainly be able to do some things apart from Him. Christ is the root of humanity. The analogy implies both that the source of humanity is Christ, and also that in creation humanity is Christ's own proper plant and fruit.

The idea expressed in the parable of the Vine is fundamentally the same as that underlying S. Paul's phrase 'in Christ'.

Given the doctrines of the incarnation and ascension, and given the modes of expression typified by the phrases 'the second Adam', 'in Christ', 'the Body of Christ', 'the Bread of life', 'the Vine and the branches', is there any other theory which will explain the basic assumption of all this language as well as the doctrine stated in the opening chapter of the Bible, that man is created in the image of God? We find a hint of the same idea as that expressed in the Pauline and Johannine language which we have examined, in the Synoptic Gospels themselves, in such sayings as those ascribed to our Lord in Mark 9.37, "Whosoever shall receive one of such little children in My Name receiveth Me, and whosoever receiveth Me, receiveth not Me, but Him that sent Me" (cf. Mt. 18.5, Lk. 9.48), and in Matt. 25.40, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these My brethren, even these least, ye have done it unto Me".

The common fault of all explanations of human nature other than that of the first chapter of Genesis is that they do not take nearly high enough a view of man, and, paradoxically, the consequence is an unworthy conception of the nature and character of God. The fact is that God is glorified most when the highest view of human nature is taken. The final measure of true human nature is not our own imperfect

natures,perverted through sin - but the perfect,blessed,Manhood of Jesus. It is the belief that man is made in the image of his Creator, and that that image still persists in spite of sin,which enables us to feel a trustful,loving,reverence for Him such as no other view of human nature can give. Nor is this doctrine an arrogant and dangerous one for man,because man can only rise to the true heights of his nature through entire dependence upon his Creator and Redeemer.

Chapter II.

SIN AND FREEWILL

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Before attempting an estimate of Biblical teaching respecting sin and freewill, it will be well to review briefly the information upon this subject yielded by our historical survey and, if necessary, to amplify it, so that we may see as clearly as possible those aspects of the problem which are most relevant to modern thought. There are three outstanding theological attitudes to the problem of human sin: the Roman Catholic, which inherits the mediaeval doctrine; the Lutheran, in which we may include the views of the schools of Barth and Brunner, which are based upon a Lutheran outlook; and the Liberal Protestant.

The Liberal Protestant approach, in days when inhuman atrocities are being daily committed in dictator-ridden countries in a world at war, tends increasingly to be regarded as an old-fashioned relic of easy-going Victorian times. It is grounded on an inadequate estimate of sin^{*} which is belied by the facts of experience and which it is easy to show is at variance with the grave view which the Bible everywhere takes of sin. The facts signified by the doctrine of 'original sin' are therefore fully recognised at the outset in this essay on sin and freewill. The term 'original sin' is open to objection as implying original guilt, and suggesting the idea that all human-beings, including unconscious infants, have committed actual sin: it does not, however, properly include either of these ideas, but simply ex-

* See pp. 51-52

presses the truth that all human-beings have an inborn tendency to evil. It is a term possessing valuable associations of long tradition, and no better one has been found. A broad survey of human society as a whole reveals the fact of perversion in all its institutions. This chapter, therefore, will take no further account of the Liberal Protestant attitude to sin.

Roman Catholic doctrine[†] regards the effect of sin as involving the loss of an original superadded supernatural gift by which man had fellowship with God, and thus necessitating a *donum superadditum supernaturale* for the restoration of that fellowship. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural as respectively debt and freegift strengthens the impression, which the doctrine of the superadded supernatural gift in itself suggests, that grace (in spite of its essential connection with God and the fact that it involves fellowship with Him) is something which can be infused from the Divine Personality into the human. The doctrine certainly obscures the view that human nature not only includes the capacity for fellowship with God, but implies the realisation of that capacity as the primary purpose of man's creation, and as the most characteristic law which governs his nature.

Romanist teaching recognises that although the effect of human sin is a *vulneratio in naturalibus*, yet man's nature and institutions are not wholly corrupt. To any unbiased view, there is much that is good, and that often in non-christian quarters,

[†] See pp. 28 ff.

though all this natural goodness is not altogether unmarred nor altogether free from derangement: The life of the non-christian individual may present an appreciable amount of this relative imperfect goodness. This is due to what was called on page 29(b) "God's grace in creation", in distinction from the grace which comes only from the christian revelation and to which alone the orthodox use of the term 'grace' is restricted. We should, of course, also remember, when we think of the amount of good discernible in western civilisation among people who do not confess the Name of Christ, that much of it is attributable to God's 'creative' grace working through the influence of centuries of christian tradition and environment. Apart, however, from any question of the influence of christian tradition, God's grace in creation must itself always be through Christ, the eternal Word, by Whom all things were made.*

The relative and imperfect nature of non-christian natural human goodness is also demonstrable from the point of view that though, so far as it goes, it is pleasing to God, it cannot be fully pleasing to Him because, not being inspired and directed by the conscious faith of the creature in his Creator, the Father's pleasure must be clouded by the sadness of the creature's separation of heart from Him. This point was carefully considered in the discussion on Brunner. (pp.107-109).

What of the righteousness or relative goodness of the Old Testament saints? What of the grace to which that was due? Since such knowledge of God as that to which they attained was due to

* It is thus that the Anglican articles X & XIII should be interpreted - see p. 109 (b). The Book of Common Prayer fully recognises natural human goodness as coming from God alone: e.g. the 2nd. Collect at Evensong, "O God, from whom all holy desires, all good counsels, & all just works do proceed."

the special revelation of the Word which culminated in the New Testament in the revelation of the Word made flesh, we must say that their goodness was due to God's 'redemptive' grace, but that the latter was not operative in all the fullness with which it operated when the Holy Spirit had descended upon the Church after the ascension.

S. Augustine maintained, on the one hand, man's power of freedom of choice and, on the other, the sovereignty of the will of God over man's will. He reconciled these apparent contradictions by his doctrine of motive.* Man has in all cases the power of freedom of choice. It is not that he cannot decide rightly, but that he will not. He has not the desire. The will never decides without a motive, without the attraction of some good which it perceives in the object. Now, although the will may be free in presence of every motive, still as a matter of fact it takes different resolutions according to the different motives presented to it. To present before the will the right motives is one of the chief aims of human education. But to God belong the wisdom and power to do this perfectly. In His over-ruling providence He presents to each individual in each case just those motives which will incline the particular individual to make the decision which He wills. "Cujus autem miseretur, sic eum vocat, quomodo scit ei congruere ut vocantem non respuat."†

Augustine, however, maintains man's power of freedom of choice and God's sovereign will at what any unprejudiced view

* This doctrine is stated particularly clearly in his 'De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum'. It is not an article of faith in the Roman Church, but a matter for individual opinion.

† op. cit. I. q. II. n. 2, 12, 13.

must regard as the cost of the Divine goodness, for in his system God wills the salvation of some and the rejection of others. Augustine would answer that in the latter case man himself does not desire salvation. But the fact still remains, according to his theory, that God could, if He willed it, present such motives to the wills of the individuals in question that they would desire salvation. It is submitted in this essay that the Divine sovereignty is adequately safeguarded by Dr.

James's illustration from the chessboard, quoted on page 165, and that then Augustine's doctrine of motive becomes most illuminating. It is the writer's own experience, in the case of certain strong undesirable natural inclinations, that, when temptation has been strong, victory has come at those times when his desire of God has proved stronger, and he has therefore been led in this connection to attach the greatest importance to such prayers as "O God, Who has prepared for them that love Thee such good things as pass man's understanding, pour into our hearts such love toward Thee that we, loving Thee above all things, may obtain Thy promises, which exceed all that we can desire".* God, Who wills that all men should be saved, in His providence causes to be presented to men's wills such motives as, in the circumstances, are best calculated to move them to decide rightly, having regard, not merely to the case in question, but to the conforming of their whole characters to that of Christ. Prayer by the subject whose will is in conflict enables God to do more

** Collect for 6th §. after Trinity - cf. that for 4th §. after Easter, & the one before the Commendments in the Communion Service.*

for him than He could otherwise do in the way of presenting helpful motives. We must also believe that intercession for others brings about a like result on their behalf. But the motives thus presented to the will are not in themselves decisive. God may do all that He can, in the circumstances, do; but the person whose will is in conflict retains real power to say Yes or No to the motives presented to it, and the decision which he will make is not objectively determined, but rests with him alone.

As regards Lutheran doctrine, we shall take the teaching of Brunner as our chief example, not because it is the most representative of Lutheran doctrine as such, but because it is probably the most liberal and reasoned presentation of that modern school of thought which is based upon Lutheran outlook, so that inasmuch as it seems that Brunner's doctrine of sin is at variance with Scripture, the argument 'How much more?' will apply to the more extreme doctrines of Barth and of orthodox Lutheranism. We have seen * that Brunner claims to present man's nature as a unity and recognises the *humanitas*, though perverted, as preserving a relationship of man with God, but that he nevertheless draws an exclusive distinction between philosophy and faith, and between law and faith, and makes a radical separation between general and particular revelation, regarding natural law as relative to sin. One of his charges against Catholicism is that the latter rests on an illusion, on an almost imperceptible coalescence of nature and grace, of Divine and human action.†

* p. 130

† p. 124

To Brunner human nature preserves the formal imago, but, owing to the loss of an 'original righteousness', it is so corrupt that there can never be any union between it and grace; it can indeed serve as a point of contact for the revelation of the Divine Word, but it is so corrupt a point of contact that it is not envisaged as becoming restored by grace.

This thesis maintains the view that the image of God persists in true, essential human nature, that no original constituent or capacity of human nature has been lost, but that Sin is due to the tyranny of an Evil Spirit, who has withdrawn men from their true LORD, establishing his thralldom over the will, so that man is inclined to evil rather than to good, though the original inclination to his true LORD, albeit now weaker than that toward evil, has certainly not been destroyed. The corruption of his will has affected his whole nature, yet the true law of his nature is not thereby destroyed. The solution of sin lies in his turning from the usurping tyrant power and putting his whole trust in his Creator and Redeemer. This necessitates a prior Divine revelation; but man has by nature the power to say Yes or No to that revelation. It is always God's will that he should say Yes, and he is to be blamed if he says No.

If this view of the problem of sin and freewill, which is based on the teaching of F. D. Maurice, be contrasted with those of Roman Catholicism and Brunner respectively, we may say that Roman theology thinks of it in terms of debt and gift, natural

and supernatural. To Brunner, human nature as we know it, though a point of contact for God's revelation, is so corrupt that there can be no union between it on the one hand, and faith and grace on the other. This thesis seeks to explain the problem in terms of the state, or condition, of the whole being of man - according to the relationship in which it stands to God. Grace is not something to be "infused" into man, nor is it the sovereign word of One Who is 'Wholly-Other' or almost Wholly-Other. It is essentially rather the attractive, magnetic, influence of the Divine Personality upon the human personality created in its image. It is the inward glory of the Divine character manifested through outward means, in the Man Christ Jesus.

If, however, the seat of sin is in the will, and yet we still hold firmly to the reality of man's freedom of choice, it is necessary to discuss the extent to which men can be said to be in bondage to sin.

The power of sinful habit in the life of the individual is an experience only too well realised. Repeated indulgence in a particular sin weakens the power of resistance to that sin. Thus we speak of a man becoming, for example, a slave to drink. We must be very careful how we speak of slavery to sin. Slavery implies strictly the absence of freedom. We are indeed slaves to sin in the sense that we are unable to free ourselves from the sinful taint in our nature and thus in general from the fell

consequences which result from that taint; the redemption and renewal of society are of Christ alone.

The non-christian individual is, strictly speaking, a slave to sin in the sense that the axe has not yet been laid to the root of the tree in the treatment of the spiritual disease which mars his nature, but this use of the term 'slavery to sin' must not be understood as being incompatible with his freedom of choice. Human life in general in its ordinary proceedings takes it for granted that man has freedom of choice and is personally responsible for his actions. We must cling firmly to this belief, or life would be reduced to a mere puppet-show.

S. Augustine and the Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of human freedom: (1) *libertas minor*, i.e. man's power of freedom of choice in particular instances; and (2) *libertas major*, i.e. man's freedom to fulfil the laws of his true nature, his power to live in harmony with the laws of his true being. Men have the former in order that they may attain unto the latter; it is in proportion as a man attains to the latter state that he knows God's service, which is perfect freedom.

The non-christian is a slave to sin in the sense that he has not the power to attain *libertas major*, he has not the power to live in complete harmony with the laws of his true nature. It is true that most practising christians have not attained unto this complete harmony of nature, but they are to reckon themselves indeed dead unto sin, free from sin, for the power of the second

Adam is theirs; they are members of the body of the new humanity; the radical cure has been begun; victory is assured for them if they will stir up the gift which is in them. The essential difference in this respect between the christian and the non-christian is that for the latter the radical cure has not yet begun and there is no possibility of complete victory in his non-christian state. He has not yet the power which will ensure perfect freedom.

We have then the paradox that unregenerate man has on the one hand the power of freedom of choice in particular instances, as to whether he will yield himself to the laws which make for the fulfilment of his nature or to a course of conduct which contradicts it and which will bring into play laws of inevitable retribution; and that on the other hand he has not the power to attain unto libertas major, and is therefore in this respect a slave. His power of freedom of choice must be vitiated somewhere.

As a matter of common experience, we all know some men who make no christian profession, who manifest libertas minor by making the right moral choice on many occasions; yet there are always in their lives some weak spots, some peculiar sinful tendencies or habits, perhaps comparatively harmless and unobjectionable, which they seem powerless to conquer. These weak spots may perhaps be due to the individual's particular taint of original sin, for it is important to remember that original sin is not of course a fixed quantity, but different individuals are born into the world with different kinds and degrees of

propensities to sin; or the weak spots may rather be due to habit. Normally they are of such a kind and are kept to such an extent controlled, that they do no violence to the law of the land, and simply pass among those little universal weaknesses of the human race which we refer to lightly as the old Adam in us. But if they assume such proportions as to violate the law of society or seriously jeopardise the health or well-being of the individual the case becomes acute. Such men are then seen to be slaves indeed to their besetting sin. Most of us know such cases where nought but the grace of Christ can effect a cure.

The 'redemptive' grace of God through Christ, is in such cases seen to be indispensable. But the obvious slavery which we see in such acute individual cases and in the ills which afflict human society as a whole is, writ large, the same slavery which is present, less obviously, in the lives of all unregenerate men and non-professing and non-practising christians. A non-christian man, in certain aspects of his life, will manifest rightly his power of freedom of choice, and will thereby develop it in those parts of his life. But there will be the weak spots, where his slavery to sin manifests itself in his lack of power to attain *libertas major*. It is not that at any particular instance, where his weak points are concerned, he need necessarily be impotent as regards his power of choice; we cannot form any such definite conclusions. In extreme cases, such as that of the habitual drunkard, it does often seem as if this is so. But in

more normal cases, habit may simply have weakened the power of resistance, so that there is partial, but not absolute, slavery. The man might in certain cases by great effort assert his power of freedom of choice and break the habit; but if so, sin will get him somewhere else, at some other point. Man cannot of himself, by means only of God's grace 'in creation', free himself at all points from the power of sin.

And now let us consider what the Bible has to say regarding the above points raised by Roman and Augustinian and Lutheran doctrine, and by the view maintained in this thesis. We will keep before us the two following questions:

(1) What impression would an unprejudiced reader of the whole Bible be likely to derive as to the difference which sin has made to the life of unregenerate man?

Is it - (a) the loss of an original supernatural gift? (b) So grievous a corruption of the whole nature that there can be no union between nature and grace? or (c) a change of personal relationship affecting the whole nature, especially the will?

(2) To what extent does the Bible represent fallen man as possessing real freedom of choice?

(1)* The story of the Fall in Genesis 3 manifests a penetrating insight into the depths of human nature. It is legitimate to infer that, though the knowledge of good and evil was forbidden man as a gift, so to speak objective and external, to be immediately

* For the discussion of (2) see p.205

acquired without the effort of self-discipline, yet obedience to the Divine command would have resulted in his gradually attaining unto a wholesome and sinless moral knowledge, like that of Jesus. Temptation came to the woman from an objective, non-human, source, and though we must not read into the story the later identification of the serpent with the Satan of more fully developed Jewish theology, the non-human source of the temptation strongly supports the view that sin is due to the usurping tyranny of an Evil Power. The essence of the temptation consisted in the suggestion that man's freedom and independence were being unwarrantably curtailed, and, once that suggestion was admitted, there was admitted also a misrepresented view of the character of God as jealous (in a bad sense) of His creature. The Divine prohibition had been accompanied by the Divine warning that death would be the consequence of disobedience; man's temptation, on the contrary, had suggested that to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil would result in his becoming as God (אֱלֹהִים). God, in exiling man from paradise, acknowledged that man had become "as one of us, to know good and evil";* but his knowledge, wrongly acquired, was tainted with the dire consequences of guilt. Death was the consequence of disobedience - eternal death, i.e. the death which consists in not knowing God or having fellowship with Him.

This story, then, represents sin as a change in man's relationship, the withdrawal^a of his allegiance to his Creator, at the

* Gen. 3²²

instigation of a non-human, evil, Power, in order that man may be himself "as God". This sin is its own result, viz. - loss of fellowship with God, i.e. eternal death (the opposite to eternal life, which is the knowledge - in personal fellowship - of the only true God in Christ^{*}). This loss of fellowship is not an independent result of sin, a result as it were external to the sin itself. It is the sin.

There is no need to argue whether there is in the Old Testament any definite trace of the idea of an inheritance of sinfulness from Adam.[†] All the rest of the Bible after the story of the Fall is in keeping with the teaching of that story in the portrait everywhere depicted of man. The story can with profit be meditated upon by every man in all ages as descriptive of his own experience.[‡]

In the Genesis narrative, God still converses with man after the Fall. When Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God, God called Adam and conversed with him even in his sin.^(Gen. 3⁸⁻¹²) Abel's sacrifice was accepted, and it was Cain's own fault that his own sacrifice was rejected.^(Gen. 4⁷) It is recorded of both Enoch and Noah that they 'walked with God'.^(Gen. 5²²⁻²⁴) Romanists would presumably have to say that Adam was given a special supernatural gift for converse with God after the Fall, and that Abel, Enoch and Noah, were each given a special supernatural gift of grace. Such a suggestion seems artificial, and necessary rather to support a doctrine than to explain the narra-

* John 17³ † Ps. 51⁵ is often appealed to. Rom. 5¹² seems to state that human sinfulness has been transmitted from Adam. This need imply no more than what Science might to-day concede with regard to heredity. St. Augustine pointed out how moral qualities may be observed to run in families.
‡ There seems a clear allusion to the story of the Fall in St. Paul's description, in Rom. 7⁷⁻¹⁴, of the inward conflict.

tive. All that this essay is concerned to maintain is that, in all cases of such converse, it was God, as Creator, Who took the initiative, and man who responded, and that the latter had real freedom of choice in the matter, and that there is no need for a doctrine of a superadded supernatural gift. One is reminded of the case, recorded in the Acts, of the centurion Cornelius, who "feared God with all his house ... and prayed to God alway",* before his conversion, reception of the Holy Spirit, and consequent baptism. The Romanist must account for this by a supposed gift of, presumably, 'actual' grace prior to the reception of the Holy Spirit. So converts under instruction for baptism into the Roman Church must apparently be credited with the gift of a supernatural preparatory faith by 'baptism of desire', or perhaps of an 'actual' grace, to explain pre-baptismal faith and prayer during the period of instruction.

One can hardly read the narratives of Abraham and his posterity in Genesis without feeling that the background set for the whole picture is that, so to speak, of "the land", and that human nature is being very faithfully, one might almost say affectionately, portrayed. The natural life of man is under the control and direction of God. The unprejudiced reader would certainly not get from the story the impression that there can be no union between nature and grace.

Again and again in the Bible sin is represented as consisting

* Acts 10²

essentially in idolatry. We may instance the sin of the golden calf in the wilderness (a), the golden calves set up by King Jeroboam at Bethel and Dan (b), the repeated denunciation by the prophets of the vanity of idolatry (c), the closing words of the first epistle of S. John "Little children, keep yourselves from idols", words which acquire all the more force as immediately following the statement "This is the true God and eternal life", with which it is contrasted. This is entirely in agreement with S. Augustine's doctrine that man's true life consists in his living according to God, and that to live according to himself (i.e. by the principle of self-centredness) is to live like the devil and according to a lie,* and it is also entirely in agreement with the teaching of Genesis 3. Similarly S. Paul states that men, who have a knowledge of God in creation, suppressing the truth and refusing to acknowledge God, inevitably fall into the unreasonable follies of some form or other of idolatry, changing the truth of God into a lie, and worshipping and serving the creature rather than the Creator, and that the natural fruit of their idolatry is immoral and unsocial conduct.†

Psalm 139 is an excellent example of the practical recognition of the fact and implications of man's creation which underlies the general outlook of the Bible. "There is not a word in my tongue, but Thou, O Lord, knowest it altogether ... Whither shall I go then from Thy Spirit? ... If I climb up into heaven, Thou art there; if I go down to hell, Thou art there also. If

(a) Ex. 22 (b) 1 K. 12²⁶⁻³³ (c) E.g. Is. 44⁷⁻²⁰ * pp. 13-14 † Rom. 1¹⁸⁻³²

I take the wings of the morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me. If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me, then shall the night be turned to day" etc...

In the personal experience of the writer of this Thesis, this psalm has been of inestimable value in helping him to realise the presence of a righteous and good God, and thus to appropriate the blessings of redemption. The theology of the schools of Barth and Brunner is not sympathetic to the view that the road to salvation may well be reached through the doctrine of creation; or at least, in so far as it might assent to such a view, it would be with the assumption that the doctrine of creation should declare essentially and predominantly God's condemnation of human nature as we know it, whereas to the present writer the psalm in question has always declared the presence of the good God, the essential goodness of human nature as created by Him, and His condemnation only of sin.

In the synoptic gospels, our Lord is represented, to any unbiased view, as regarding the life of every individual human being as of priceless value.* The unreasonableness of Nygren's denial of this has been shown on pages 86-87. Christ plainly sees much natural good persisting in man. We may adduce His attitude to children - "For of such is the kingdom of heaven" (a); His saying, "The harvest truly is plenteous" (b); His parables, in which events of common human life illustrate heavenly truths (c);

(*) * e.g. Mk 2²⁷ Mt 12¹² Lk 12⁸ 31-33¹⁵, Mt 16²⁶ 18⁸.
 (a) Mt 19¹⁴ (b) Mt 9³⁷ (c) that of the Good Samaritan, especially, teaches that good may appear in the most unexpected & despised cases (Lk 10³⁰⁻³⁷).

His method of teaching by eliciting the truth from His hearers, as instanced in His question, "Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" ^{*}~~etc.~~

On the other hand, He fully recognises the fact of human sin. "If ye, then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him?" (Mt.7,11). "That which proceedeth out of the man, that defileth the man; for from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed, fornication, thefts," etc. (Mk.7,20-23). "Except ye turn, and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of heaven" (Mt. 18,3). "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish" - like the victims of certain notable calamities (Lk. 13,1-5). "The Son of Man came ... to give His life a ransom for many" (Mk.10,45). We may note that 'good' and 'evil', as applied by Jesus to men, are relative terms. Though in one connection He can speak of men as evil, yet He can say of little children "Of such is the Kingdom of heaven", and He can speak of good men, who bring forth out of the good treasure of their hearts good things, as well as of evil men who do the opposite (Mt.12,35).[†] In the New Testament writings there is plainly ascribed to our Lord, as to S. Paul and other New Testament authors, belief in a personal Power of Evil. Christ in His temptation encountered this Power, and His recorded teaching assumes the reality of the Evil One. The doctrine of the story of the Fall in Genesis,

* Lk 12⁵⁷

† See p. 109 a.

that man's temptation originates from a non-human power distinguishable from himself, is confirmed. In fact, we may say that in the Biblical revelation it is not until the coming of Christ in the flesh that we find a full recognition of the power of the Evil One. If the Devil be a reality, this is only what we should expect.

The healing of the Gadarene demoniac is instructive as showing our Lord's attitude to a man possessed with a legionary power of evil. To him, before the completion of his cure, Christ addresses the question, so misapprehended, it would seem, by the poor lunatic, "What is thy name?"* Surely the point of the question was to call the man to a recognition of his true personality. "These demons which hold thee in thrall are usurping powers. Thou art not in thy rightful state. They do not belong to thy true self. Thy true condition is to own Me as thy Lord, and thou shalt shortly proclaim to thy friends what great things the Lord hath done for thee." What the Evil One does is to seek to enslave man and to withdraw him from allegiance to his true Lord.

It is above all on certain aspects of Pauline teaching, as interpreted by them, that non-rational theologians rely for the Biblical foundation of their views. Some special aspects of Pauline doctrine will receive consideration in the next four chapters. In this present chapter we shall deal with that part of S. Paul's teaching respecting sin which does not specifically belong to the subjects of the following chapters.

* Mk 5⁹ Lk 8³⁰

It will be well to begin, as S. Paul begins the doctrinal part of his epistle to the Romans, with his recognition of the sinfulness of human nature as we know it.* In Romans I,[†] he states that the first stage of sin consists in culpable refusal to acknowledge God, in spite of the knowledge of Him manifested in creation. All mankind, even the heathen, have a knowledge of the invisible nature of God, i.e. His everlasting power and Divinity, manifested in nature, but they have been untrue to the light and have therefore become darkened. To the school of Barth and Brunner, all that 'natural religion' can teach about the knowledge of God is His condemnation of human nature and man's utter need of salvation. Barth, commenting on this passage in his book on Romans, says that that which may be known of God and is manifest is that we are a hopeless contradiction and utterly need Him, the all-powerful and unknowable. S. Paul, on the contrary, says in his speech at Lystra as recorded in the Acts, that God "left not Himself without witness, in that He did good, and gave you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling your hearts with food and gladness".[§] According to this, God's witness to Himself in nature includes the bestowal of blessings which man recognises as good. This side of God's manifestation of Himself in nature certainly does not receive due recognition from the non-rational school.

S. Paul's view of the flesh is particularly relevant to his doctrine of sin. The flesh is what we have in common with the

* See footnotes to p. 192

† vv. 18-20, also referred to on p. 194

§ Acts 14¹⁷

animals. It therefore naturally has animal desires(a). Thus the term is often used to designate earthly and outward relationships, e.g. of descent and kinship (b). It suggests the corruptible part of man's nature (c), as subject to sickness and suffering (d); it is weak (e), but it is never by S. Paul identified with sin or described as inherently and necessarily sinful.

Because of its weakness, we are easily led into sin by the flesh; if it is not controlled by the spiritual part of man's nature. This tendency of the flesh to lead us into sin is emphasised by S. Paul until it becomes an ethical principle. The tendency is intensified by the fact that sin has made its seat in the flesh and thence exercises thralldom over human nature. The process is described in the psychological passage recorded in Romans 7,7-25, in which sin is personified as making use of the prohibitions of law to further its own ends.* Hence the Pauline ethical use of the term 'flesh'. The flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.(f) So S. Paul can speak of 'sinful flesh',(g) and say that the mind of the flesh is death (h), and enmity against God (i), and that those 'in' the flesh cannot please God (j), and that the christian has put off 'the body of the flesh'(k). Man is therefore naturally *σαρκικός*, as suggesting his sinful tendency.

(a) Ro.13¹⁴ (b) Ro.1³ 4¹ 9^{3-5.8} 11¹⁴ (c) 1 Co.15⁵⁰ (d) Gal 4¹³, 2 Co 7⁵ 12⁷

(e) Ro.6¹⁹ 8³ - cf. Mt 26⁴¹ (f) Gal 5¹⁷ (g) Ro.8³. "The flesh of Christ is 'like' ours inasmuch as it is flesh; 'like' & only 'like', because it is not sinful" (Sanday & Headlam, p.193)

(h) Ro.8^{6.13} (i) Ro.8⁷ (j) Ro.8⁸ (k) Col 2¹¹.

* The allusion to the Fall in verses 7 to 14 of this passage has already been noted.

The origin of sin, however, is recognised by S. Paul as subsequent to the creation of Man's flesh (a). His firm belief in the incarnation decisively negatives the view that he regarded the flesh, as such, as evil. The Son of God was born of the seed of David according to the flesh (b). Though the flesh needs to be mortified (c), S. Paul condemns mere asceticism (d), and the life of Jesus is to be manifested in the mortal flesh (e). The view that 'flesh' with S. Paul is essentially evil was held by Baur, Holsten, Lüdemann, and ^{at one time} ~~formerly~~ Pfleiderer, but this controversy "may now be regarded as practically closed".*

The view of this thesis, that sin is due to the usurping tyranny of an Evil Spirit who holds in thrall the will of man, the effect of this thralldom being a corruption which is felt throughout the whole nature, is thoroughly in agreement with the Pauline doctrine that Sin, personified, has made its seat in the flesh and thence holds man's nature in thrall. It is through the appeal of carnal motives that the will is inclined to evil.

From what has just been said about S. Paul's view of the flesh, it is obvious that he regarded the natural, earthly, body, which is composed of fleshly material, as the seat of sin and prone to sin, and as such to be 'mortified' (f). In itself, however, it is good, as proved by the incarnation, and by the fact that the bodies of christians are temples of the Holy Spirit(g)

(a) Ro. 5¹² (b) Ro. 1³ (c) Col. 3⁵ (d) Col. 2¹⁶⁻²³ (e) 2 Co. 4¹¹
 (f) Ro. 6⁶ 8¹³, 1 Co. 9²⁷, 2 Co. 4¹⁰ Gal. 6¹⁷ (g) 1 Co. 6^{13.19-20} (h) ~~Ro. 6¹³~~

* Sanday & Headlam, p. 181

and 'members' of Christ, to be presented to God and used in His service (a).

It may be well in this connection to notice S. Paul's use of the term 'soul' ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) as referring to man as a living being - that part or aspect of his nature which belongs to him as a 'natural' man. Since the 'natural' man, as we know him, has renounced his dependence upon God and fallen from his proper status, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$, like $\sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\xi}$ and $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, in Pauline use often acquire an ethical sense, in contrast with pneuma (b). When the soul is thought of as the principle of animal, natural, life, whether in a neutral or an ethical sense, the term can be clearly distinguished from the 'spirit' (c).

As we turn from Pauline to Johannine theology, we can hardly do better than begin by considering the Johannine use of the term 'the world'. Augustine's doctrine of what it is to live according to man, and what according to God, which is itself based upon Pauline language (d), here receives strong confirmation. The world, or kosmos, which originally means 'order', is God's creation constituted upon rational principles, and the summit of creation is God's creature, man. The world was created through Christ (e). Christ is essentially the light of the world (f), and in a special sense the light of men (g). The world is therefore, as God's creation, i.e. as long as God is

(a) Ro 6¹³ 12¹ (b) e.g. 1 Co 2¹⁴ 15⁴⁵ (c) 1 Thess. 5²³ (d) See pp. 13-14
(e) John 1³ (f) John 8¹² (g) John 1⁴⁻⁹

acknowledged as its Creator, very good. Thus God can be said to love the world (a), and where such language is used the thought of mankind is obviously in the foreground. Unregenerate man, however, does not acknowledge God as Creator, but instead deifies the kosmos itself, or some part of the kōsmos (b). Johannine language identifies the kosmos with the idolatrous tendency of the human creature who is its crown and lord. Thus the Light that lighteth every man was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not (c). The world hates His disciples (d), and is in bondage to the Devil as its prince (e). The Devil "was a murderer from the beginning, and stood not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for he is a liar, and the father thereof" (f). The thought of Genesis 3 leaps to the mind, for there the serpent is depicted as bringing death upon the human race by his lie. This is altogether in agreement with the Augustinian doctrine that for man to live 'according to a man' is to live according to a lie, and with the view taken in this thesis that sin is due to a usurping Evil Tyrant who has withdrawn man from allegiance to his true Lord. To know God in His Son Jesus Christ by faith is man's true, eternal, life (g). The way of the world, which is the way of idolatry, is the way of death. "He that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God (i.e. the wrath of love manifested in the inevitable retribution which follows the breaking of God's laws of righteousness(h))

(a) John 3¹⁶ (b) cf. Rom. 1¹⁸⁻²¹, v. p. 194

(c) John 1¹⁰

(d) John 17¹⁴

(e) John 12³¹, 14³⁰, cf. 8³⁴

(f) John 8⁴⁴

(g) John 17³ 20³¹

(h) This point will be more fully discussed in Chapter IV on 'Faith & Law'.

abideth on him" (a). "He that loveth not abideth in death (b)". The contrast between life and death is more explicitly stated in I John 5,12: "He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not the life". If we believe that Christ is the Light that lighteth every man, we shall surely not be untrue to Johannine thought if we infer that in so far as a man sees and obeys truth and righteousness, even though he has not conscious faith in God through Christ, he sees and obeys, and lives according to, what is God's and therefore what is in accordance with the true principle and law of his being (c); but since it is man's highest and peculiar blessedness to know God in Christ by faith, he cannot without that knowledge have eternal life in the fullest, and specifically christian, sense of the term.

As to the Johannine view of the flesh, it is generally agreed that in the great statement of John I,14 ("And the Word became flesh, and tabernacled among us, and we beheld His glory, glory as of an only-begotten from a father, full of grace and truth") the term must be understood as including the rational soul of man, and that the Person Who became flesh is the same Person as He Who pre-existed as the Word eternal. It is implied that it was through or by means of the flesh that the Word manifested the glory as of an only-begotten from a Father. That is to say, the doctrine of the flesh is sacramental. The Manhood of Jesus is the perfect sacrament for the manifestation of the Divine nature. This sacramental doctrine of the flesh is borne out by further

(a) John 3³⁶

(b) I John 3¹⁴

(c) See, e.g., I John 3⁷

teaching in the fourth gospel - e.g. by the presentation of our Lord's miracles as signs attesting His glory (a). A contrast can therefore be drawn elsewhere between the spirit and the flesh where the latter is not the vehicle of the former (b). And in the famous conversation with Nicodemus that which is born of the flesh is contrasted with that which is born of the Spirit, and the necessity for man of a new birth of water and the Spirit is declared (c). As in natural human birth the child, already alive before it is born, is now brought forth into the light of this world, to breathe the free air and to feel the sun shining on him, so in spiritual birth the human person, whose wonderful spiritual capacity for fellowship with his Creator is already existent, is brought forth into a new state, into the light of God's countenance through Christ, hereafter to be brought up with the Holy Spirit as his Teacher and Guide (d). In the new life of the regenerate man, the flesh is to be the sacramental vehicle of his spirit, in constant dependence upon the Divine Spirit.

A few words should be said about the view of the flesh in the epistle to the Hebrews. The humanity of Jesus is depicted as so real that He "hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin"^(e) and that in the days of His flesh He "offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him from death, and was heard for His godly fear"^(f). "Though He was a Son, yet He learned obedience by the things which He suffered"^(g).

(a) L.f. 2"

(b) 6⁶³, cf. 8¹⁵

(c) 3³⁻⁸, cf. 1¹³

(d) See pp. p. 30 d.

(e) Heb 4¹⁵

(f) Heb 5⁷

(g) Heb 5⁸

The crucial passage, however, for determining the precise angle from which the author regarded the flesh is 10,19-20; "Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holy place in the blood of Jesus, by the way which He dedicated for us, a way fresh-slain yet living, through the veil, i.e. His flesh". The Greek liturgies and the vast majority of interpreters understand the veil to be the flesh of Jesus, and this is certainly the most natural way of rendering the construction of the sentence. Westcott, however, with Tyndale, Coverdale, the Great Bible and the Geneva Bible, takes the 'flesh' in apposition to the 'way' which Jesus dedicated for us. Westcott considers that it is surprising that 'the flesh' of Christ should be treated in any way as a veil, an obstacle, to the vision of God in a place where stress is laid on His humanity ('in the blood of Jesus'). In this case the veil will apparently be the sin of mankind. According to the other view, the flesh is a veil between man and God, not merely because of the sin of man, but also because of the very fact of its earthly and corruptible nature, and for this reason even in the case of Jesus Himself it had to be penetrated by death before He could enter into the very presence of God - a distinctive idea in New Testament Christology, and one which fits the author's sacrificial thought of the death as necessary for the setting free of the life-blood.

(2) We must now consider our other* question, viz. To what

* For (1) see page 190.

extent does the Bible represent fallen man as possessing real freedom of choice?

It seems obvious that for practical purposes the Bible treats man as a responsible being, and therefore this essay will take account only of certain points or passages which may be considered to have a special bearing upon the problem of human freewill in its relation to Divine grace.

Since some well known difficulties in connection with the election of the patriarchs in Genesis and with the hardening of Pharaoh's heart in Exodus will be discussed later, we may well begin with a comparison of the respective attitudes of the prophets and the priesthood in the Old Testament, pointing out their relevance to the subject.

The teaching of the prophets plainly appeals to man's freedom of choice (a), nor does it suggest a virtual nullifying of this freedom by bringing in an Augustinian doctrine ~~(b)~~ of irresistible motive or irresistible grace. Sometimes, when the disobedience of the people has been so persistent as to make their rejection, as a corporate community, of a further appeal, certain, a prophet is nevertheless Divinely commanded to make that further appeal (c). It surely involves a terrible view of the Divine character to conceive of God issuing a command which can only increase the condemnation of His people, if He has it in His power to present them with an appeal which would result of

(a) See esp. Jer. 1², 2², 5⁹⁻¹⁰, 4²⁻¹¹. (f. such passages as Is. 44⁵⁻⁶, 45³⁻⁷)

(b) (a) e.g. Is. 1¹⁶⁻²⁰ (b) Jer. 2² (c) Ezek. 3⁷

necessity in their conversion. The natural view of the purpose of such an appeal is that there is always the chance that a few individuals may hearken to the message, and that the eyes of the disobedient majority may be thoroughly opened, so that they may have no excuse for rejecting an offer which they ought to have accepted as much as the minority who did accept it (a). The prophetic appeal, moreover, is not only made to the chosen people, who, it might be argued, were already 'under grace'. It was also made to heathen. The appeal to the Ninevites in the book of Jonah is a good example (b).

The developed sacrificial system of the Old Testament, however crude and unspiritual it may seem to us, is based on some appreciation of certain truths of which the characteristic prophetic teaching, with all its splendid ethical witness, gives little recognition. These truths are (1) those facts of human nature which are explained by the doctrine of original sin - video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor; (2) that God Himself takes the initiative in the work of man's salvation, Himself providing the means, and not waiting first for man to reform himself, as the prophetic teaching might appear to suggest; (3) that man's universal instinct (as witnessed by the perverted sacrifices of heathen religions, and justified by the sacrifice of Christ Himself) is that perfect communion with the Creator can be achieved.

(a) Ezek. 2⁵⁻⁷ 33⁷⁻¹⁹

(b) See esp. Jonah 1² 3² 5. 9. 10 4²⁻¹¹. Cf. such passages as
Is. 49⁶ 56³⁻⁷

only through the offering of life in death.

It is not necessary, however, in explaining the facts of the Old Testament concerning prophecy and sacrifice, to postulate that the prophets intended to condemn all sacrifice as such.

"The religious progress of Israel was not from a ritualistic to a 'spiritual' worship, but from a ritualistic worship which was magical and idolatrous in intention and mixed with practices that were heartless and immoral, to a ritualistic worship not so very different in its outward form, which nevertheless was in intention the service of the one God, Whose Name and Law denoted to the Jew everything that was holy and just and good" (Burkitt (a)). What the prophets denounce is the abuse of the sacrificial idea, that namely of considering the sacrifice in itself as all important, quite apart from the spirit in which it is offered and the moral character of the offerer. When they had learned the lesson that the sacrifice of God is a contrite heart, God would accept their outward sacrifices. "Then shalt Thou be pleased with the sacrifice of righteousness, with the burnt-offerings and oblations; then shall they offer young bullocks upon Thine altar" (Ps.51,16-19).

What in fact the prophets emphasise is man's *libertas minor*, though of course the doctrines of *libertas minor* and *major* had not been formulated in Old Testament times. The sacrificial system, on the other hand, will not let us forget that man is

(a) *New Anglican Commentary: Article on the Prophets*, p. 429 (b).

unable to attain libertas major without gratia gratum faciens. We have seen that the recognition of these two forms of libertas in actual life is not inconsistent. It may be added that the prophets themselves, strong as was their appeal to man's freedom of choice, from the time of Jeremiah recognised also man's need of special Divine grace (a).

With regard to S. Paul's view of the effect of sin upon human freedom, an important point is his words to King Agrippa in his description of his conversion recorded in Acts 26. "Wherefore, O King Agrippa, I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision".(b) The words clearly imply that S. Paul might have been disobedient. This is not inconsistent with his conviction, expressed in Galatians 1,15, that God had separated him from his mother's womb for the apostleship. God's purpose was that Saul of Tarsus should be the great apostle to the Gentiles; but it lay with Saul whether to respond, or not to respond, to that purpose.

In Acts 13,46, Paul and Barnabas are reported to have condemned the Jews at Antioch in the following words: "It was necessary that the word of God should first be spoken to you. Seeing ye thrust it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles". By God's command the message had been addressed to them as worthy of eternal life. Such worthiness could consist only in their allegiance to the true Lord of human life. Their estimate of themselves, however,

(a) Jer. 31³¹⁻³⁴ Ezek. 11^{19,20} 36²⁶⁻²⁷

(b) Acts 26¹⁹

was actually infinitely lower than the Divine estimate had been. God's offered recognition of them was to them too good to be true, and they thrust it from them, thus judging themselves to be unworthy of eternal life.

One feature of Johannine theology is particularly relevant to the discussion of this problem, and that is the doctrine of *krisis* which pervades the fourth gospel. The purpose of the gospel, stated in 20, 30-31, is that the readers may believe that Jesus is (i) the Christ, and (ii) the Son of God, and that in this faith they may have life in His Name. To this end the author selects, from the mass of material at his disposal, a few actions and discourses of Jesus, covering only some 20 days in the Lord's life, which either have not been previously reported by the synoptists or, if they have, to which he can add some notable facts or sayings or make some correction, and which, rightly interpreted, are exemplary 'signs' pointing to the Messiahship and Divine Sonship of Jesus. These significant actions and discourses of Jesus are narrated along with the '*krisis*' or judgment produced by them in the lives of those who saw or heard them with ever heightening effect, in the hope that the *krisis* thus induced in the reader may lead to faith and not to unbelief with its inevitable disastrous consequences. This idea is strongly foreshadowed in the prologue.* It is stated with particular clearness in 3, 18-19: "he that believeth not hath been judged already,

* 5. 10-12

because he hath not believed on the Name of the only-begotten Son of God. And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light."

The principle receives direct illustration in the sign wrought upon the man born blind. "For judgment came I into this world, that they which see not may see, and that they which see may become blind".* Whenever the Light is manifested, men judge themselves by their response to it. It is the same truth as that set forth by Paul and Barnabas at Antioch, noted above.[†] It is also one of the main principles underlying our Lord's use of parables, viz. to sort out his hearers according to whether or not they took the trouble to think out what He had said and to try to pierce to the spiritual lesson taught by the parable.

We have left until last a consideration of those passages of Scripture which might seem to be inconsistent with man's freedom of choice. First, however, let us give strong affirmation to the truth so clearly stated in I Tim. 2,4: God "willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth". Let this be acknowledged as God's primary purpose, for it is entirely in accord with the christian doctrine of God as essentially Love, and with the purpose of revelation stated at the call of Abraham, the father of the faithful, "In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed".[§]

It is well known that the Hebrews, with their strong sense

* q³⁹

† Acts 13⁴⁶, v. pp. 209-210

§ Gen 12³

that nothing can happen in this world apart from the governance or permission of the Divine Ruler of heaven and earth, did not hesitate to ascribe to God events which in themselves are morally evil. Thus, Hosea 1. 2, does not imply that the prophet, before he was married, was told by Divine revelation that a certain woman was a harlot and bidden to marry her with his eyes open to the fact; but the prophet, after years of marriage, is describing the past in the light of his actual married experience. Similarly, the Divine charge to Isaiah recorded in Isaiah 6,10 must not be understood as meaning that it was God's primary purpose that the prophet's message should harden the hearts of the chosen people: the explanation is that the prophet is describing his call some time after it had actually occurred, looking back in the light of bitter experience.* Faithful witness to the truth must always have one of two effects on those to whom it is borne - either it will soften, or else it will harden, their hearts, according as they accept or reject the witness. They cannot, in the nature of things, remain the same as they were before. The result of Isaiah's prophecy had been to harden the people's hearts.

Neither is any difficulty presented by the plain fact that God elects nations and individuals to play particular parts in the working out of His purpose, as long as this is not taken to imply predestination to moral evil, or the denial of man's freedom to abuse the Divine election or to reject the Divine call. So
 * This is fully explained in G. Adam Smith's Commentary on Isaiah, pp. 78-88.

S. Paul in Romans 9, quoting Genesis 21. 12^z, says "In Isaac shall thy seed be called"^{*}, pointing out that the inheritance of the promise by Isaac and not by Ishmael was due to Divine election. But this did not involve the rejection of Ishmael from God's loving care and guidance.[†] In verse 13 the quotation "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated", is from the prophet Malachi,[§] and is another instance of the interpretation of past history in the light of subsequent experience.

There are, however, a few passages in the New Testament which might be interpreted as implying the predestination ~~to salvation~~ of individual christians, as individuals, to salvation, in the sense that their salvation is fixed in advance by God as a matter of certainty. The most famous of these is Romans 8, 28-30. Another explanation, however, is possible. God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth. His primary will, therefore, is that all men should be "conformed to the image of His Son".[‡] He works out this purpose by the method of election into the Church, the Body of Christ, through which God's purpose for all mankind proceeds. Members of the Church therefore, are able to ground their calling[‡] and justification in the foreknowledge[‡] and foreordaining[‡] of God. Their glorification, which is also thus grounded[‡], may be interpreted,

* verse 7 † See Gen. 21¹⁷⁻²⁰

§ Mal. 1²⁻³. Esau of course stands for the nation of Edom.

‡ ~~verse 29~~ Rom 8²⁹

‡ Verse 30

‡ verse 29.

‡ verse 30

in the light of passages like Ephesians 2,6, as also fulfilled by their present position as members of the Church in this world; or, if it be interpreted as applying only to the future life, it will be complete and certain in the Divine counsels if there is perseverance in grace through the right exercise of freedom of choice. Members of the Church, whensoever they claim by faith their rightful position 'in Christ', which is their rightful position as members of the Church, can in truth encourage themselves with the thought that their position is that for which God created them, and the fact that they are in it is proof that He has called them to it and they have not been disobedient to that call. Whenever that call comes, through the Church, to any unregenerate men, they too, if they will, may claim that state which truly belongs to them as created and redeemed in Christ.

There are two or three places where the rendering in our English Bibles suggests predestination of some to condemnation, but where this suggestion is corrected by a study of the Greek text. In Acts 13, 48 both A.V. and R.V. render "as many as were ordained to eternal life believed", a translation which implies that the unbelieving did not accept the preaching of Paul and Barnabas because it was ordained beforehand by God that they should not do so. The Greek word is

Τεταγμένοι. The translation 'ordained' should be understood in the old etymological sense of 'set in order'. A better modern rendering would be 'marshalled' or 'ranged'. The Greek word may be either middle, "as many as had marshalled themselves", or passive, "as many as had been marshalled", in either case those who "by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honour and incorruption",* as S. Paul expresses it in Romans 2.7, where he has in mind Gentiles as well as Jews. The passage does not necessarily suggest that those who believed did so because they had been irresistibly predestinated to eternal life. It is quite consistent with the ascription of real freedom of choice both to those who believed and to those who did not believe.

It may be as well to mention Acts 2.47, where the A.V. renders, "the Lord added to the Church daily such as should be saved". The R.V. rightly translates *οὐλομένους*, "those that were being saved".

Finally there are certain well known passages which in the original suggest predestination of some to condemnation. One ^{of} the most important of these is the famous passage Romans 9.14-23. S. Paul's primary purpose therein is to show that the Divine election does not depend on human merit but on God's sovereign will, and that the rejection of the majority of the Jews is in no way inconsistent with the principles of His covenant as originally declared. He is arguing with Jews from the Old Testament scriptures, and in his desire to make good his main ~~point~~ point he leaves unqualified certain statements which could be interpreted as teaching a doctrine of irresistible predestination of some to good and some to evil living, if his assumption of God's righteousness and mercy, and of human responsibil-

*and to whom God will therefore render eternal life, according to the text of Rom. 2⁶⁻⁷

ity, is not understood and firmly kept in mind, - assumptions which he makes clear later in his argument, in chapters IO and II, and in the last four verses of chapter 9, and abundantly clear elsewhere in his epistles. Let us, with these assumptions of ~~X~~ his in mind, briefly examine the passage in question.

In verse I4 S. Paul assumes God's righteousness, and ^{His} that righteousness implies faithfulness to the covenant, a covenant based on the revelation of the ethical character of God in the deliverance from Egypt and the giving of the Law. God's declaration to Moses, therefore, after the redemption from Egypt and the giving of the Law, that He will have mercy on whomsoever He has mercy, ^{*} must mean that that mercy, howsoever shown, though especially in election, is exercised in accordance with the Divine character as revealed in Israel's deliverance and in the Law. So then election is not due to human desire or effort, but only to the sovereign will of the righteous and merciful God. So far there is no very great difficulty. But in the next verse (I7) S. Paul instances the case of Pharaoh. God had raised him up [†] on the stage of history, in order that He might show in him His power, and that His Name might be published abroad in all the earth. S. Paul does not say that God created Pharaoh for this purpose, and the phrase in itself need not mean more than that God called this particular Pharaoh to the Egyptian throne for this purpose. In doing so God must have acted righteously, and therefore presumably in accordance with the moral trend already taken by Pharaoh himself as a responsible being. The direction of Pharaoh's life is already evil, and God makes use of him accordingly, but for the good of mankind as a whole. The inference from

* Ex. 33¹⁹

† The Greek word (ἐξηγέρσατο) is rendered by some 'raised up (from sickness)', & this follows the original Hebrew text of Ex. 9¹⁶, & the LXX translation: but this is almost certainly not S. Paul's meaning here.

God's raising of Pharaoh upon the stage of history is (verse 18) that He hath mercy upon whom He will, and when He will He hardeneth. The hardening of men's hearts comes about in accordance with God's righteous laws, which proceed from His sovereign will. Man's rejection of righteousness always effects a hardening of the heart, just as acceptance of it does the opposite. S. Paul's Jewish readers, however, may not interpret his words with these assumptions, and hence would bring forward the obvious objection (19) that God could not blame evil men for their unrighteousness, for they could not help themselves, but were only ~~in~~ fulfilling His will. For man to question the righteousness of God is to S. Paul a most ^{serious} ~~serious~~ matter (20). He meets the objection with the old illustration of the clay and the potter.* If it is unthinkable that the thing formed by the potter should say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?, how much more should it be unthinkable that mere man, who in his daily life thinks, feels, wills, and acts as a responsible being, should say to his all-righteous and all-wise Creator, Why hast Thou made me thus? However little he may be able to understand, he should be assured that God's election of men is in accordance with righteousness and wisdom, and that God's treatment of evil men is also in accordance with righteousness and wisdom. In the next verse (21), the vessels made ~~of clay~~ ^{of clay}, if God is righteous, are men created to fulfil vocations which, though menial, are, comparatively speaking, without honour, as in I Cor. 12.23 S. Paul refers to the uncleanly, though most necessary and in themselves good, parts of the body. But (verse 22) not only ~~if~~ does God in His righteousness and wisdom create men for high or low vocations in the community. In

the illustration of the potter and the clay as used by Jeremiah^{*}, the potter's work was marred, and so he made of it another vessel, as seemed good to him. The lesson was that if a nation, against which for its evil-doing God had pronounced imminent overthrow, should repent, God would not carry out its overthrow: but that if a nation blessed of God should disobey Him and do evil, its blessings would be taken away. If therefore human vessels are unfaithful to their vocation, they become 'vessels of wrath' fitted to destruction', and the retribution which overtakes them is an example to all men. Nevertheless, the righteous and merciful God has actually endured with much long-suffering the unfaithfulness of the Jews, using their unfaithfulness as a means for the manifestation of the riches of His glory (23) upon vessels of mercy (i.e. Gentiles), which He afore prepared unto glory.[†]

There remain three other ^{Cases} passages for consideration. The first of these is the case of Judas Iscariot, and the most important statements about him for our purpose are John 6.64 and 13.18. The case of Judas is the concrete instance in which the problem of Divine foreknowledge and human freewill is illustrated. We are here treading on such infinitely delicate and dangerous ground that the least said the better. We would, however, stand fast by our conviction of the reality of man's freedom of choice and of the righteousness of God - a righteousness which does not contradict our highest human conceptions of righteousness. The statement in 6.64 that Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not and who should betray Him refers almost certainly to the beginning of His public ministry. On this the Archbishop of Temple comments: "Did He then choose Judas so as to equip the Twelve with a traitor? That is incompatible with His

* See Jer. 18²⁻¹⁰

† For the interpretation of this see pp. 213-14, on Rom. 8²⁵⁻³⁰

§ Cf. 16⁴ 15²⁷ & verse 70 of this chapter of S. John

whole method. No doubt He knew that the nature of Judas supplied very intractable material; but He chose him "that he might be with Him", and at the last made a final appeal to his loyalty and shame. But all through He had known the difficulty. If His victory and kingdom were to be all-embracing they must include such as Judas; the world must be welcomed into the Church if the Church is to convert and direct the world." *

Apart from any question of the knowledge of our Lord, however, we may perhaps feel constrained, in view of the statement that the treachery of Judas was a fulfilment of Scripture, to suggest that, given the fact of the sin of the world, the betrayal of Jesus was necessary for the carrying out of world redemption, and that God, knowing the evil which is in the world, purposed to use as a human instrument a man who had made himself suitable for the purpose. This is the same explanation in principle as that of the raising of Pharaoh upon the stage of history, given three pages previously.

There are two more passages to be examined, I Peter 2.8 and Jude 4. The former passage states that "for such as disbelieve (the gospel) 'the stone which the builders rejected, the same was made the head of the corner',[§] and 'a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence',[†] for they stumble at the word, being disobedient (or, they stumble, being disobedient to the word)[‡]; where- whereunto also they were appointed.[‡]" A careful reading of the whole verse makes clear that their stumbling is the result of their disbelief and disobedience. But is the clause 'whereunto they were appointed' to be taken as referring only to their stumbling, or does it refer to their disobedience as well? If

* Readings in S. John's Gospel, First Series, p. 100.
† John 13¹⁸ cf Ps. 41⁹.

§ Ps. 118²² ‡ ἡτίθονται.
‡ Is. 8¹⁴

~~If~~ the former, there is no difficulty - their fate is retribution for their own disobedience. But if the meaning is that their disobedience was also appointed, the explanation we suggest is on the same lines as that already given in the cases of Pharaoh and Judas - the sin of the world makes ^{much} disbelief of and disobedience to the Gospel inevitable, and the men in question have qualified for their part by the particular trend which their pre-Christian life has taken. Jude 4 may be explained as meaning that a sentence of condemnation has been of old set forth for ungodly men, and that the men to whom the verse refers, having chosen to be ungodly, can be spoken of as 'of old set forth unto this condemnation'.

It may perhaps seem that the interpretation of some of these passages has been somewhat strained in the interests of the writer's own views. Perhaps so. But it is at least equally true that the passages in question can be interpreted as teaching a doctrine of predestination of individuals to good and evil only at the cost of the destruction of the truth that the Gospel is good news from God to all mankind, and of the distortion of Biblical passages which quite plainly teach God's love for mankind and His will for their salvation, and of the violation of the assumption implicit throughout the Bible and the daily life of man that men are responsible beings with a real gift of freedom of choice.

This long essay will be ~~concl~~ concluded with the discussion of a problem not hitherto raised in it, but which has lately received a good deal of attention, viz. the question of the corruption of non-human nature. What are we to say of nature "red in tooth and claw"? It is a matter relevant to the subject of this chapter in so far as it

it affects man's relation to non-human nature, and in so far as our answer to the problem affects the general impression which non-human nature makes on us and the lessons which it may teach us about our own lives, and thus may influence our conceptions of God as the Author of nature.

S. Paul speaks of the hope that "even the very creation shall be delivered from its bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God" (Rom. 8, 21). Modern science has shown that death and presumably pain existed among the ~~animals~~ animals millions of years before the appearance of man. Even S. Augustine and St. Athanasius, however, taught that sin did not introduce physical death into the world, but that what it introduced was the 'sting' of death, that which gives death its peculiar horror and misery for man. It is not unreasonable to hope believe that whatever the origin of the physical death and corruption under which creation labours, deliverance is to come at the 'revealing' of the sons of God,† and that perhaps, if man had never sinned, it would have been delivered long ago. The exile of man from paradise, lest he should "take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever" may be interpreted as teaching that, if man was created mortal, by obedience and self-discipline he would have attained early unto a wholesome and sinless moral knowledge and unto immortality: but that through disobedience he forfeited this immortality, until life and incorruption should be brought to light for him by the second Adam through the pathway of submission to the direst consequences of man's disobedience. This suggestion is not of course in accordance with the Roman doctrine of man's original 'praeternatural' gift of immortality.

It has lately been argued that there was a fall which is pre-organic, i.e. prior in time to the whole evolutionary process, so that
~~the fall was pre-organic~~ † Rom. 8¹⁹

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the nature which man inherited from his animal ancestry was fallen even before he inherited it. Such a fall would presumably be bound up in some way or other with the sin of angelic beings. Such theories are highly speculative, however. Moreover, the general impression given in the Bible is that the corruption of non-human nature is rather dependent upon the sin of man than its pre-disposing influence.

As far as the corruption, death, and decay of nature are concerned, may this not be a part of God's purpose in creation, prior to any fall, to teach man the truth that the essence of love is self-sacrifice? "Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone: but if it die, it beareth much fruit" (John 12, 24). The necessity of this principle is of course vastly enhanced by a 'fall'.

Dr. Bicknell, in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (p. 221), says, "It is impossible to suppose that a perfectly good and wise God would have created, say, the cobra or the cholera germ". The impossibility of such a supposition is by no means so manifest to the writer of this thesis.

Leaving for a moment the question of the cobra and other animals of prey, may not disease-producing germs be reasonably considered as instruments of God's judgment against man's disobedience to His laws of physical health? It is at any rate a vital part of the message of the great Hebrew prophets that the forces of nature - tempest and flood, famine and pestilence, the locust and the cankerworm - are agents under the control of an all-righteous God.

It is indeed an essential part of the practice and teaching of Christ to fight against disease and like forces producing premature death and unnecessary suffering in man, and to recognise them as evil. But they are evil as being 'poena', i.e. the evil of suffering and temporal loss, a kind of evil distinguished by S. Thomas Aquinas from the evil of sin, which alone is in the full sense evil.* Disease is

* Summa I. Q. XLVIII. Art. 6

due, not to God's primary or antecedent will, but to ^{His} secondary, consequent, or actual will, ^{*}owing to the breaking, consciously or unconsciously, of God's laws. The successful fight against disease consists in obeying the laws of God's primary will.

The Divine Love in the creation of the universe, whilst ready to pour itself out even unto death for the sake of the creatures made in its own image, has at the same time, by the machinery of the laws of nature, restrained the power of sin in the universe, so that it cannot go beyond certain limits.

The question of disease-producing germs arises only in connection with God's secondary or consequent will. Similarly, it is not difficult to see the value of worms and other devourers of refuse.

The case of the cobra and other cruel beasts of prey presents greater difficulty. What are we to say when we are confronted by an obviously cardinal principle of nature as we know it, viz. that higher forms of life support their existence by preying upon lower forms of life?

It is usually possible for the naturalist to point out some useful functions in nature which each of these kinds of preying animals fulfil, often by the very fact of preying upon other animals, e.g. the value of the fact that birds devour caterpillars and other grubs is obvious to the gardener. In any case, unless a man is a strict ~~vegetarian~~ vegetarian, he has no right to complain of the fact that in nature one kind of animal life devours another. The question is not the devouring of animal life, but the cruelty of the means by which the prey is in many cases secured.

It has recently been helpfully pointed out by G.S. Lewis in his

book 'The problem of pain', that one of the worst features of pain is the suffering of anticipation, and that, owing to the lack of imagination amongst the animals, they are almost exempt from this.

Perhaps the best thing we can say at present is that from the Divine standpoint, in view of the glorious fulfilment towards which the course of life is being ordered, the end justifies the means. The war is teaching the present generation that suffering and death are less evil than dishonour. In evolution the successive tiers of nature which rise one beyond the other, and the fact that one kind of life lives upon another, together with nature's lavish waste, suggests that each tier is incomplete in itself, and is unconsciously groping towards something higher, and the lesson is thus driven home that the principle of sacrifice lies at the very heart of life. The very entry of a human being into this world is accompanied by great danger to the mother. This war is driving home the realisation of the real price of man's freedom, which we had learned to rate cheaply in the old days before the war. It may be that when man has learned his lesson, "the wolf will dwell with the lamb and the leopard lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them." *

Meanwhile, the lions "roaring after their prey, do seek their meat from God"†. The crocodile, of whom it is said that "none is so fierce that he dare stir him up"§, is nevertheless, as the book of Job leaves us in no doubt, God's creation. And though Jonah learned that God cares for the cattle of Nineveh†, and Jesus has assured us that not a sparrow falls to the ground without the Father's knowledge^a, yet Jesus Himself aids the craft of the fisherman^b, and teaches that the physical

* Is. 11⁶ † Ps. 104²¹ § Job 41¹⁰ ‡ Jonah 4["] ^a Mt. 10²⁹ ^b Lk. 5⁴⁻⁶

life of two thousand swine is of less value than one poor demoniac.*

It seems possible, then, to explain the facts of the corruption and frustration of nature and of one form of life preying upon another as due partly to God's intention to teach man the lesson of sacrifice, not necessarily as the result of sin, and partly to His secondary or consequent will due to man's sin. We must not admit the creation of life as due to any other source but God, and therefore all creatures, including the cobra and the cholera germ, are His creation. The Power of darkness may pervert nature, but cannot create it.

All that we know for certain, however, is that the nature of man, a rational creature with the power of freedom of choice, has been perverted. Can the nature of non-rational[†] creatures, without the power of freedom of choice, be perverted? It may be so, but the writer feels great difficulty about admitting it.

* Mk 5¹³⁻¹⁵

† i.e. without the power of reason.

Chapter III

Faith and Reason

Reasons have been given for the view that it is a defect both of Roman doctrine, following Thomas Aquinas, and of that of Brunner, as representing the most liberal presentation of that outlook which has its roots in Lutheranism, to separate the spheres of faith and reason. With both, man's life toward God is the proper sphere of faith, to be distinguished from his natural life, which is the sphere of the reason. In the case of Romanism, the distinction is not one in kind, but in degree, between the higher and lower, the supernatural and natural. Reason, which is an imperfection of man's intellect due to his present condition here in the earthly body, should lead to faith, which is a supernatural 'habit' or 'virtue' of the intellect by which Divine revelation is received on the authority of God Himself, and which then steps in, so to speak, and takes command, and enlists the natural reason in its service. With Brunner, the distinction is one in kind, faith being contrasted with reason, and the reason is depreciated. Romanism teaches that the proper sphere of faith is entered only by means of a superadded supernatural gift of grace: Brunner, that it is entered only when the word of God is addressed to man as a responsible person.

The view put forth in this thesis is developed out of the Anglican tradition and temper. In actual life, and therefore in the purpose of God, the spheres of faith and reason are not to be clearly distinguished. It is not a question of two separate spheres, an earthly and a

heavenly, but of faith and reason both working on two different levels. On the higher level, both faith and reason play their respective parts, and, on the lower level, both faith and reason play their respective parts. In man's natural life, faith as well as reason has its functions to fulfil; and in man's higher, 'supernatural', life, reason as well as faith has its functions to fulfil. Faith as well as reason is an innate faculty of human nature by creation, and both operate throughout the whole of human life, though we obviously expect faith to play a greater and more characteristic part in man's life toward God. If any example of the exercise, in natural life, of faith be needed, we will only instance at present the trust of a child in its parents.

This thesis has throughout maintained that, for fellowship with God and victory over sin, God's special redemptive grace through Christ^{us} is necessary. This need not, however, imply acceptance of the Roman doctrine of the *donum superadditum supernaturale*. The latter doctrine not only leads to the popular conception of grace as an infused virtue, but also suggests that, when the Gospel is preached to a number of non-Christian men, those who do not become Christians do not do so because they have never been offered the necessary supernatural gift. This danger is avoided if we think of God's grace as primarily the direct influence of Divine Personality upon the human. Those who beheld Jesus in the days of His flesh beheld the grace, or the glory of the inward character of God, whatever might be their reaction to it. Similarly, when we associate grace with the gift of the Spirit, it is the direct influence or voice of the third Person of the Holy Trinity speaking to, or

teaching, or otherwise influencing, the human person.* When therefore the Gospel is faithfully preached, according to God's will, to a number of non-christian men, the Holy Spirit speaks through the preacher, and the refusal of those who do not respond is due, not to their not having been offered the gift of the Spirit, but to their rejection of His call. They "grieve the Holy Spirit of God",†

What has just been said becomes clearer if we consider the relation between revelation and inspiration. Revelation, or unveiling (ἀποκάλυψις), or manifestation, is given in facts: inspiration is needed for the right interpretation of the facts. Christ is the Revealer, the Holy Spirit the Inspirer. The higher the form of revelation given, the higher is the inspiration required to grasp it. The revelation in Christ is given in the facts of His human personality, His life, His teaching, His experience. It is addressed to the natural reason of men (and to their conscience and other inherent faculties of human nature). It is the Spirit Who explains their meaning, so that we see the Gospel contained in them. The Spirit's work in the Church to-day has been likened to that of an expert explaining to the inheritor of a historic mansion the value of the objects of art which it contains. It is the expert who shows them to the owner rather than the owner to the expert. But the owner can turn a deaf ear to the expert if he wants to.

This distinction between revelation and inspiration suggests an answer to a widespread difficulty of the present generation in the way of the acceptance of christianity, and at the same time well illust-

* The use of the phrase "direct influence of Divine Personality" is meant to exclude the conception of a secondary influence, e.g. an infused virtue, emanating from the Divine Personality, but not the direct action or influence of Divine Personality by sacramental means, for one human personality influences another almost always, if not invariably, by sacramental means.

† Eph. 4. 30.

illustrates the relation between faith and reason and the part which they play throughout the whole of human life. Many people to-day have been from early years so imbued with the scientific attitude to life, that they regard religion as alien to that outlook. Except they see in the hands of the risen Christ the print of the nails, and put their finger into the print of the nails, and put their hand into His side, they will not believe.* It seems to them that the idea of Divine revelation as recorded in the Bible, and the discoveries and inventions of modern science, are two entirely different things.

It is the business of the scientist to investigate the facts of nature which are perceptible by means of the senses. These facts of nature are, however, in very truth revelations of God. God has indeed revealed Himself, to a limited extent, in nature. What is the usual process by which some great scientific discovery is made? (i) The scientist observes certain facts of nature and reflects upon them. He brings his reason to bear upon them. (ii) Then an inspiration strikes him. It may be that his attention is arrested by certain phenomena. He begins to suspect some truth hitherto unknown by men. His mind forms a tentative, preliminary faith. Or it may be that it is while he is, perhaps idly, observing the facts of nature that the inspiration comes to him, and that it is the inspiration which sets him reasoning along certain lines rather than that his reasoning leads to the inspiration. But in any case the exercise of reason will be involved, and will normally precede the tentative faith. (iii) The preliminary faith is thoroughly tested by careful experiment. (iv) If that faith is confirmed by experiment, a general law can be formulated, expressing the newly discovered truth, and by the application of that

* John 20⁵

law inventions can be made for the service of human needs. Though, however, it was the scientist who formulated the expression of the particular law, the fact that the law is true is not due to him at all. The law itself was operative in nature ages before he discovered it, and will continue to operate in nature after he has discovered it. Those who apply the law to make inventions for human needs work by faith in the universal truth of the law discovered and made known by the scientist.

Besides this limited revelation of Himself in nature, however, God has revealed His inmost, essential character in a special revelation, in the historic facts recorded in Scripture and culminating in the life of Jesus. Our analogy will most easily be made clear if we trace the way in which the cardinal doctrines of the Catholic Church became formulated. (i) The facts of the life, death, resurrection of Jesus and the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost were observed and reflected upon by the early Church as represented by the apostles, who had been with Jesus from the beginning of His ministry.* (ii) They became inspired with the conviction that Jesus is the Son of God incarnate, and that the Holy Spirit must be a Divine Person. (iii) This faith of the early Church was tested by more than four hundred years of experience, in the face of heresies. As compared with the experiments of natural science, experiments in the far higher realm of special revelation must necessarily be much more difficult and prolonged, since they involve nothing less than the whole of human life. (iv) The doctrines of the incarnation and the Trinity, which had always been implicit in the Church's early faith, were at last explicitly formulated - the former at Chalcedon in 451, and the latter in the

* and by S. Paul & the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

creed now known as the Athanasian. But the facts of the eternal relationship within the Godhead, which the Church's doctrine of the Holy Trinity expresses and safeguards, were true before the creation of the world. And those whose life-work is wrought by faith in their redemption by Christ, and in the indwelling, sanctifying, Spirit, do not create these truths by their faith or feelings, but simply stake their lives upon their conviction of them as solid, factual, truth.

It is not, moreover, that the riches revealed in Christ have all yet been discovered. There still remain great treasures for mankind to be found out as the Spirit increasingly throws light upon the facts connected with the appearance of our Lord in flesh on earth.

It is important to notice, in the above analogy between natural and special revelation, that not only is the latter through the Word, made flesh, but the former is also through the Word, in His eternal nature, in Whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden.* Likewise it is the Holy Spirit Who gives inspiration, not only in the field of special revelation, but also in that of natural revelation. He can illuminate only that which is there, in men's minds, for Him to illuminate, and thus there is a distinction between the His inspiration of the knowledge acquired by men from the facts of natural revelation, and the knowledge acquired by men from the facts of special revelation, - a distinction corresponding to the distinction between natural and special revelation.

The rational nature of Old Testament revelation as mediated through the prophetic interpretation of the facts of nature and history has already been pointed out.† To the examples there given

* Col. 2³

† pp. 160-161

we would here add that of the first chapter of Isaiah, of which one of the basic assumptions is the reasonableness of God in His dealings with men. God's children, the nation of Israel, show less sense than the ox and the ass.* In verse 18 we come to the exhortation, "Come now, and let us bring our reasoning to an end,† saith the Lord". Again, in chapter 31, rebuking the folly of Israel's trust in Egypt and her political opportunism instead of putting her trust in the Holy One of Israel, the prophet sarcastically remarks, "Yet He also is wise".§

A characteristic conception of the second Isaiah is that of the Divine righteousness and its manifestation. This conception of righteousness, however, includes not only moral righteousness, but also the idea of rational consistency, in accordance with a reasonable purpose. The Hebrew verb itself, *ṣāḡ*, from which the relative nouns and adjectives are derived, means 'to be right', and refers not only to conduct but also to truth, to rightness of judgment or belief or utterance. This intellectual sense of righteousness is illustrated in such a passage as 45.19-25: "I said not unto the seed of Jacob, In Chaos seek ye Me. I Yahweh speak rightness, I declare straight things. (Righteousness is here clearness, straightforwardness, truth.) Assemble yourselves and come, draw near together, ye that are escaped of the nations. They have no knowledge that carry the wood of their graven image, and pray unto a god that cannot save. Declare ye, and bring it forth, yea, let them take counsel together. Who hath shewed this from ancient time? Who hath declared it of old? Have not I, Yahweh? And there is no god else beside Me; a right God and a Saviour, there is none beside Me. (Righteousness is here God's purposefulness and foresight.) Look unto

* vv. 2-3

† This is the translation of Cheyne, and G. Adam Smith (Commentary on Isaiah 1-xxxix, p. 13).

§ vv. 1-2

Me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth, for I am God, and there is none else. By Myself have I sworn, the word is gone forth from My mouth in rightness and shall not return, that unto Me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear". (Here righteousness involves the thought of effectiveness and power.)

The Wisdom literature of the Hebrews reflects the contact of Judaism with Hellenistic culture. The wisdom which is its central theme is, in accordance with the Hebrew emphasis upon morality, wise-practical wisdom, the wisdom of the art of living, morality regarded, as it were, from the standpoint of reason, or reason regarded from the standpoint of morality.* The contact of Greek humanism and philosophy, however, only brought influence to bear upon a way of thought which already existed among the Hebrews. In I Kings 3.5-15 we have the story of Solomon's dream and his prayer for wisdom. The γ wisdom for which he asked was the kingly wisdom which would be able to judge God's people, that he might discern between good and evil. So in Isaiah II.1-5 the gifts with which the Spirit of the Lord ~~and~~ would endow the Messianic King are wisdom gifts, to enable him to judge his people with righteousness. The Christian Church, with an instinct more sure in her worship than sometimes appears in her theology, has for centuries made use of this ~~so-called~~ description of the so-called sevenfold gifts of the Spirit, not only at the consecration of kings, but also at the confirmation of her humblest sons and daughters. The royal wisdom required for the work of kingship, though greater in degree, is the same in principle as that necessary to every common man. So in the book of Proverbs we have a most varied collection of practical maxims for daily conduct. Some of them may have been composed by Solomon, whose

* and both, of course, as dependent upon God. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Prov. 1⁷ 9¹⁰ Ps. 111¹⁰ Job 28²⁸).

name has been associated by tradition with large sections of the book; many of them are doubtless of early, pre-exilic date; but the first nine and the last two chapters are generally agreed to be of post-exilic date. A noteworthy feature of the Wisdom literature is the personification of Wisdom in certain passages, as, e.g., in Proverbs I.20ff., 8.1ff., 9.1-6. She was with God from the beginning, before the creation.* She offers herself freely unto man, and they are to be blamed if they reject her.† Such a conception of wisdom is essentially universal in its scope. It belongs to all men for all time. All this is certainly not in agreement with any separation of man's reason from his Godward life, nor with any tendencies to ethical dualism, natural and supernatural, secular and christian.

Barth, commenting upon Romans II.33-36 in his book on that epistle, finds the book of Job, from which S. Paul obviously quotes freely in that passage,§ agreeable to non-rational thought, and to the conception of God as 'Wholly Other'. Yet actually the main argument of the book of Job is a rational one. The prologue makes it clear that God's reason for allowing Job to suffer was to test the extent to which Job's faith, and affection for Him, were disinterested. Did Job fear God for nought?‡ Was-h Were his faith and affection capable of standing up to the heaviest storms which the voyage of life might encounter? This reason was hidden from Job, but it has been recorded for us, and we are capable of understanding it, to our great profit. Again, when at last toward the end of the book God challenges Job out of the whirlwind,‡ the point is not that He overwhelms Job's questioning and reasoning by a sheer display, in which the rational has no place, of the majesty of the Creator: on the contrary, the Divine discourse is based on a rational

* Prov. 8²²⁻³⁰ † Prov. 1²⁰⁻³³ 8¹⁻⁶ 9¹⁻⁶ § Job 11⁷ 15⁸ 35⁷ 36²² 41¹ ‡ Job 1⁹⁻¹² 2³⁻⁶
‡ Job 38, 39, 40^{1-2, 6-24}, 41.

argument. "You are racked with doubt as to whether I am really a righteous Being. Do you not see how the wonders of creation manifest beyond doubt My infinite power and wisdom? Then can you not be sure that I am best able to manage My own universe, and that the evil and suffering of the world are under My control and are being ordered in accordance with the wisest purposes? Therefore, though you do not know the reason, is it not reasonable for you to believe hold fast to your faith, and to believe that, if you knew the reason, you would understand that it is in accordance with the purpose of a righteous Being? Can you not therefore trust in My righteousness in spite of your experience of evil and suffering?" Some modern thinkers ^p would have more to say about the suffering and cruelty in nature, apart from man, but the infinite wisdom which orders natural phenomena is nevertheless apparent. God's power and wisdom in nature had previously been a subject which had formed no small part of the discourses between Job and his friends, ^{*} and Job had not found ~~them~~ it to afford a convincing argument: but it was altogether different when God Himself spoke to him through nature, out of the whirlwind. Once he was convinced that the Divine Personality was thus addressing him, he knew that he need have no misgivings about the God's care for him as a human being.

The rational nature of our Lord's a fortiori argument from truths of man's natural life to the relationship between man and God has already been noted. [†] It is a fundamental principle underlying His use of parables. It was His method to teach men by appealing to the judgment of their own reason and conscience. [§] The corner-stone of the Church's Faith is the answer which she gives to the simple question, 'What think ye of Christ?' [‡] She answers that He is verily and indeed

* e.g. Job 12⁷⁻¹⁰

† p. 161

§ e.g. Lk. 12⁵⁷ ‡ Mt. 22⁴²

the Divine Son of God, and that He is Jesus. In John 5.30-47 Jesus is said to adduce a fivefold witness as reasons why men should believe on Him:

(i) His own witness concerning Himself. This is acknowledged by Jesus as in itself inconclusive, for it might be merely self-prompted (verse 31). Actually, however, His witness to Himself was made only in complete dependence upon the Father, and therefore it was true. Such witness is illustrated by claims like 'I am the light of the world'. See 8.12-18, which is an important passage in this connection. The great reason for accepting the witness of Jesus to Himself lay in the unique fact of His sinlessness. "Which of you convicteth Me of sin? If I say truth, why do ye not believe Me?" (8.46).

(ii) The imperfect witness of John the baptist, who in God's mercy was sent for men's sakes. (Verses 32-35.) John's prophetic power was acknowledged by all. He declared the advent of the long-expected Kingdom of God. His baptism of repentance was an appeal to the consciences of men. He bore witness to One Who should be the anointed King of that Kingdom which he had come to proclaim, One Who would baptise men with Holy Spirit and with fire.* To his own disciples, at least, he definitely pointed, in due course, to Jesus as that King.† But any who heeded John's call to repentance would thereby have qualified themselves for the recognition of Jesus as the One to Whom John's witness pointed.‡

(iii) The works of Jesus. These include acts both supernatural and natural, both alike being wrought in fulfilment of one purpose, viz. His Father's will.† These works, if reflected upon honestly, bear rational

* Mk 1^{7,8} Mt 3¹¹ Lk 3¹⁶

† John 1^{29,36} 3²⁶ Mt 11^{2,3} Lk 7¹⁹

§ Mt 21²³⁻²⁷

‡ John 4^{34,17}

witness to the Divine mission of Jesus. This had been so in the case of Nicodemus,^{*} and also in the case of the blind man whose sight Jesus had restored.[†] To reject this witness is culpable sin. It is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit.[§]

(iv) The witness of the Father (verses 37, 38). This witness was given unmistakably at the Lord's baptism^a and transfiguration.^b This special witness borne by the Father, however, should teach us that He is continually bearing witness to men concerning His Son. The witness of the Father is to the hearts of men, but it is conditional upon their having the His word ~~abiding in them~~ abiding in them.^c This presupposes moral obedience. "If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from Myself" (7. 17). Like attracts like and recognises like, and to hear God's voice we must desire God and His will. But to those who hear God's voice it comes with supreme authority.[†]

(v) The Scriptures (verse 39). They do not in themselves contain eternal life, but if we read them rightly they lead to eternal life because they bear witness of Christ, in Whom is eternal life.^d If the Jews believed Moses, they would believe Jesus.^e The Pentateuch, which they attributed to the authorship of Moses, pointed throughout to Him - in the promise to Abraham and his seed, in the experiences of the chosen people, in the sojourn in Egypt, in the great deliverance from bondage and the sacrifice of the Passover, in the temptations of the wilderness and the manner of their Divine education there, in the giving of the Law, in the services of the tabernacle.

To this fivefold witness we can now add a sixth:

* John 3² † John 9³⁰⁻³³ § Mk 3²²⁻³⁰ ^a Mt 3¹⁷ ^b Mt 17⁵ ^c John 5³⁸ ^d John 5³⁹⁻⁴⁰
^e John 5⁴⁵⁻⁴⁷ - cf. the teaching of the parable of the rich man & Lazarus, Lk. 16²⁹⁻³¹.
 † 1 John 5⁹

(vi) The resurrection. This had been foretold by Jesus as the sign of the prophet Jonah (Mt. 12, 39-40). This was the witness which had convinced Saul of Tarsus, a conviction which is the starting point of all his Christology.*

Now all these witnesses (~~at~~ unless we ought to exclude the fourth) are the material of the Holy Spirit's witness, which He interprets to us as pointing to Jesus as the Christ and Son of God. Thus He convicts the world in respect of sin.[†] In our Lord's last discourses to His disciples recorded in John 14 to 16 the Holy Spirit is called the Parakletos and the Spirit of truth. He is the Parakletos as the Agent or Interpreter of Christ, explaining to the disciples the true meaning of the Lord's personality, life, teaching, and experience. The distinction drawn in the early part of this essay between Christ as the Revealer in facts, and the Spirit as the Inspirer Who interprets those facts[§] was based upon the doctrine of the Spirit as given in John 14 to 16. In the narrative of the early chapters of the Acts, the Spirit through S. Peter convicted the Jews of sin, not by appeal to the moral standards of the Law, or of Christ Himself, but by pointing to the fact that they had rejected the Lord in spite of God's witness to Him.[‡] So also He convicted them 'in respect of righteousness'. The Jews, priests and people alike, had declared the Lord to be a malefactor, but the Father quashed their sentence and declared the Lord to be righteous by taking Him to Himself through the resurrection and ascension. S. Peter insists on this contrast repeatedly. So once more the Spirit convicted the Jews ~~in~~ⁱⁿ 'in respect of judgment'. They had looked for judgment to fall upon their enemies, not upon themselves. But the true conflict had been

* Ac. 9⁵⁻⁶ Rom. 4

† John 16⁸⁻¹¹

§ p. 228

‡ Ac. 2²²⁻²³

between Satan and the Lord, and the victory of the Lord involved the judgment of Satan and all who had followed him in his attack upon the Lord. Thus, Jerusalem would pass away and only believers would be saved from the coming destruction (Ac. 2.40).

The radical cause of unbelief was the idolatrous seeking of human glory instead of the glory that cometh from the only God,^{*} an attitude which necessarily involves in such persons a lack of the love of, or desire for, God.[†] In spite of the universal sin of man, the grace which is given to every man through nature by man's Creator and Preserver and Governor should move men to this preliminary seeking of God, "if haply they might feel after Him, and find Him, though He is not far from each one of us, for in Him we live, and move, and have our being" (Ac. 17. 24-28).

The evidence, therefore, on which faith in Christ depends is almost entirely rational in character, in the sense in which the word rational is commonly understood. For that evidence involves the weighing of Christ's own claims as supported by the unique facts of His single and the testimony borne by ministers of the Gospel (of whom John the Baptist was the type), the works of Jesus, supernatural and natural, in fulfilment of the Father's will, and the Scriptures. The weighing of all this evidence is rational in character, and can be undertaken by the unregenerate man, and, if undertaken, should lead to faith if he is true to those inborn inclinations which move him to seek God, if haply he feel after Him and find Him. If a man conscientiously considers the evidence, the Holy Spirit is at hand to be his Teacher if he will let Him, and to give him a right judgment.

* John 5⁴⁴ † John 5⁴²; cf. John 14^{15,16} — here the love which is the condition of the gift of the Spirit is a preliminary quality, involving mentally obedience.

In the preceding paragraph the evidence on which faith in Christ depends was said to be almost entirely rational in character, because the witness of the Father and of the resurrection were not included in the evidence there summarised. The witness of the Father does not seem obviously rational in the common sense of that word. Perhaps the suggestion may be hazarded that its peculiar sphere lies rather in that of true human feeling, in distinction from the witness of the Spirit as illuminating the mind. If so, however, such feeling must, whether consciously or unconsciously, rest upon a solid rational basis, or it would be merely shallow sentiment. As regards the witness of the resurrection, we have not irrefutable proof like S. Paul experienced. In so far as the fact of the empty tomb is to us an argument of practical cogency, that argument is of course rational. But for most of us belief in the resurrection rests ultimately on the conclusion to which the other ~~the~~ lines of witness have led us. It is because we have been convinced that Jesus is the Christ and Son of God that we believe in the resurrection, and not that we are first convinced of the truth of the resurrection and on that ground conclude that He is God's Son and Messiah. Believing in Him on grounds other than the resurrection, to us it is simply not possible, it is inconceivable, that He should be holden of death.*

This examination of the way in which the core of the christian Faith comes to be believed, then, makes it clear, against the school of Barth and Brunner, that faith is not to be contrasted with reason to the disparagement of the latter. It also shows that God's revelation in Christ is presented to men's natural reason and conscience and freedom of choice, and that they are to be blamed, when it is presented

* And this conclusion is itself rational - see page 59.

to them, if they do not draw the right conclusion. The Holy Spirit is at hand to be their Teacher, and to give them a right judgment upon the evidence. Examination of the Scriptural passages in question does not produce the impression that those who believe do so because they are infused with the gift of some commodity or quality or virtue, nor suggest that those who do not believe have not been offered that virtue. Where the facts of the Gospel are presented for evidence to men, the Holy Spirit is at hand to interpret to them the evidence, as He is also at hand, whether with or without acknowledgment, to inspire the natural scientist with a right judgment concerning facts of God's revelation in nature - a judgment which can be tested by experiment much more easily and quickly than can judgment upon facts the interpretation of which lies in the eternal sphere.

S. Paul's deep manifold doctrine of the Spirit will not be discussed here, but various aspects of it will be better considered in the context of the following chapters. The important passage in I Cor. 2. 11-14 has already been discussed on pages 14 and 34. For his views on reason it will suffice in this chapter to record his use, influenced probably by Greek philosophy, of the word 'nous' for 'mind', as man's intellectual activity. Though in itself a neutral term, it can be reprobate, ^avain, ^bfleshly, ^ccorrupt, ^ddefiled. But its proper and characteristic exercise is the pursuit of the law and will of God. ^fChristians need to be constantly renewed in their mind, ^gthat they may have the mind of Christ. ^hHe prays that the eyes of the understanding ($\kappa\rho\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$) of the Ephesian christians should be enlightened, ⁱwith a view to clearer knowledge of their christian heritage and of God's will. He

^g Ro. 12²⁸ ^h Eph 4¹⁷ ^c Col 2¹⁸ ⁱ 1 Tim 6⁵, 2 Tim 3⁸ ^e Tit 1¹⁵ ^f Ro. 7^{23, 25}
^g Ro 12² Eph 4²³ ^h Phil 2⁵ (τοῦτο φρονεῖτε). ⁱ Eph 1¹⁸

even contrasts the use of the mind in worship with the ecstatic state.^a To him all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden in Christ,^b and wisdom and knowledge are among the gifts of the Spirit in Christ's Body the Church.^c The non-rational school of theology of course tends in varying degree to understand this wisdom and knowledge and specifically christian activity of the 'nous' as a matter of direct revelation only, non-rational in character and different in principle from the wisdom and knowledge which are determined by the rational laws of human experience as such. But this is certainly not the plain and obvious interpretation of the passages in question. Barth's explanation of Romans I.18-20 has already been discussed on page 198: having in mind the Biblical view of the function of reason as set out in this essay, it would certainly seem that the passage was meant by S. Paul to include some rational knowledge of God from nature.

We have been examining the Scriptural doctrine of reason: but, since this essay is entitled ~~the~~ 'Faith and Reason', we must now make some examination also of the Scriptural doctrine of faith.

Toward a God Who has revealed Himself as the Bible records - a personal Creator, almighty to achieve His purpose, infinite in wisdom, essentially righteous, faith is man's only natural, rightful, universal attitude. The truth of this statement is fundamentally implicit in the doctrine of justification by faith.^{*} Faith involves the lowliest humility, the acknowledgment that man is utterly dependent upon God, in Whom he lives and moves and has his being,[†] that the very freedom of choice, which is the thing he can most call his own, is a gift from God.[‡]

^a 1 Co 14¹⁴⁻¹⁹ ^b Col 2³ ^c 1 Co 12⁸ * or see, e.g., Rom. 16¹¹⁻¹³ † Ac 17²⁶

‡ Ac 3¹⁶ cf. Heb. 12² Eph. In Eph. 2⁸ "τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ὑμῶν τοῦ σωθῆναι" probably refers to the preceding clause as a whole rather than specifically to δια τῶν ἔργων.

entrusted to him by God as a stewardship for which he will have to render an account. Faith is man's response to the Divine initiative.^a Man must give up that dream of being 'as God'.^b His attitude must be "We are not sufficient of ourselves to account anything as from ourselves".^c Faith absolutely rules out boasting and pride, self-satisfied stagnation which is resentful of new light, slavery to convention, and hypocrisy.^d "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" Man's universal capacity for faith is one of the strongest grounds for monotheism; it is on this capacity for responding to God's grace that St. Paul justifies his mission to the Gentiles.^e In our Lord's teaching "Ask, and ye shall receive; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you", illustrated by the readiness of earthly fathers to give good gifts unto their children,^f and in such parables as those of the Importunate Friend^g and the Prodigal Son,^h we may rightly discern the implicit truth that that faith, which exists and is exercised in man's natural relationships, is a reflection of the faith which is the rightful attitude of man towards his Creator - the same in essence, but exercised in two spheres, the earthly and the heavenly.

As regards the Old Testament, it is well known that there is no Hebrew word for faith as such. The word אֱמוּנָה has the passive sense of 'faithfulness' or 'trustworthiness' rather than the active sense of 'faith'. There are only two Old Testament passages of outstanding importance for the Biblical doctrine of faith: Gen. 15.6, "He (Abraham) believed in Yahweh, and He counted it to him for righteousness"; and Hab. 2.4, "The just shall live by his faith" - here the word is אֱמוּנָה, and it is the one place in the Old Testament where it is used in a

^a Ro 9³² 10¹⁷ 11²²⁻²³ ^b Gen 3⁵ ^c 2 Co 3⁴⁻⁵ ^d 12⁹ Ro 3²⁷ ^e 1 Co 4⁷ ^f Ro 3²⁸⁻³⁰
^f Mt. 7⁷⁻¹¹ Lk 11⁹⁻¹³ ^g Lk 11⁵⁻⁸ ^h Lk 15¹¹⁻³²

sense suggesting the translation faith rather than faithfulness, or at any rate a transitional stage towards the former. In his Commentary on the epistle to the Galatians, Lightfoot adduces evidence for the view that Genesis 15.6 had at the time of the Christian era become a standard text for discussion in the Jewish schools. * "By faith he (Abraham) left home and kindred, and settled in a strange land; by faith he acted upon God's promise of a race and an inheritance, though it seemed at variance with all human experience; by faith he offered up his only son, in whom alone that promise could be fulfilled. Thus this one word 'faith' sums up the lesson of his whole life".† Genesis 15.6 is commented upon by S. Paul in two of his epistles, and by S. James in his epistle, and the faith of Abraham is cited twice as an example by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, in the eleventh chapter of that epistle. Reference is made to Hab. 2.4 by S. Paul in the same two of his epistles, and by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews.

We see S. Paul's characteristic conception of faith in his quotation of Hab. 2.4 in Rom. I. 17 ("The righteous shall live as a result of faith"). In quoting the same passage in Gal. 3. 11, he illustrates the quality of this faith from the case of Abraham, and Abraham's faith is also discussed at length in Romans 4, the core of the conclusion being in verses 17 to 21. The latter passage shows that S. Paul took the passage from Habakkuk to mean that, though it is impossible to attain life through the way of works, it is possible to do so through the faith that God is able and willing to quicken the dead and to issue His commands down through the ages to things that are non-existent as though they were, and to perform what He has promised.

It is possible, and there are etymological reasons for the view,

* op. cit. pp. 159-163 † op. cit. p. 159 ^a Ro 4³¹ Gal 3⁶ ^b Jas 2²³ ^c Heb 11⁸⁻¹²⁻¹⁷⁻¹⁹ ^d Ac 7²⁻⁵
^e Ro 1⁷ Gal 3³ ^f Heb 10³⁸ § This seems the best rendering of $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\alpha\ \mu\eta\ \delta\omicron\upsilon\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \delta\omicron\upsilon\tau\alpha$ in verse 17.

that S. Paul and his contemporaries understood God's revelation of Himself as 'YH^ו ^וא' to Abraham in Gen. 17.1, translated in A.V. and R.V. 'God Almighty', as meaning God the Sufficient. The passages in 2 Cor. 2.16 ('Who is sufficient for these things?') and 3.4-5 ('not that we are sufficient of ourselves to account anything as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God', etc.) and perhaps 12.9 (though here the Greek word is ἀρκεί, not ἰκανός as in the two former passages) probably contain allusions to the Divine Name 'YH^ו ^וא'. If so, S. Paul regarded Abraham's faith as the response to the revelation of God as the All-Sufficient. This revelation is rational in principle, for it involves the essential, if latent, truth that, if God ^וא can be trusted as sufficient to meet Abraham's every need, he must be all-mighty and all-wise to achieve His purpose, and all-good and righteous.

In the Synoptic Gospels faith is usually belief in the power and willingness of Christ, or of God through Christ, to work miracles ^{*} for men's well-being. We meet this faith there in various degrees. We may, however, say that even in its crudest form [†] Christ recognises in it a germ capable of development, under His education, into a larger faith in Him as Messiah and revealer of the unconquerable goodness and power and wisdom of God and of God's ability to satisfy, through Christ, the deepest needs of men.

S. Paul argues that the faith of Christians is the same in principle as that of Abraham. [§] Abraham believed in hope that God would give him a son of promise in his old age. The Christian's effort of faith is easier and assured; he looks back to the resurrection of Christ as the ground of his faith. [†] He believes on Him Who raised Jesus

* Sanday & Headlam, p. 32

† Ro. 4. ^{23.24}

† e.g. Mk. 5 ²⁵⁻³⁴

§ Gal 3 ⁶⁻⁹ Rom. 4

our Lord from the dead. One purpose of the resurrection of Christ was that His death for our sins might be shown to be justified or vindicated by God.^a Another purpose was that we too might be justified through faith in God Who quickeneth the dead and therefore can quicken those who are dead in sin.^b This is essentially the faith of the convert to christianity coming forward for baptism.^c

Belief in the resurrection of Jesus implies acknowledgment of His Divinity and vice versa. It was the appearance of the risen Jesus to Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus which convinced him that Jesus is the Son of God,^d and gave him the faith which is the rock on which his distinctively christian theology rests. Conversely, it is the conviction that Jesus is the Son of God which is the real ground of most christians' belief to-day in His resurrection.^e The essential characteristic of faith in God, as distinct from the faith exercised by men in their natural relationships, is the belief that God can create out of nothing and that He can quicken the dead. So in the Acts we often meet the expression 'the faith',^f i.e. the faith distinctive of christians, belief that Jesus is the Son of God. In the Johannine writings belief that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, is the condition of eternal life.^g The faith that Jesus is the Son of God is the 'victory that overcometh the world'.^h In the fourth Gospel the great witness to this faith is the resurrection of Jesusⁱ and His own power to raise the dead.^j In the epistle of S. Jude faith has got the concrete sense of 'a body of belief',^k and since the particular point against which the saints are to contend is the denial of Christ, so the faith for which they are to contend would be the confession of Christ.

^a Ro 3²⁶ ^b Ro 4²⁵ ^c Ro 6¹¹ ^d Ro 1⁴ ^e See p. 67 (a) & cf. Ac 2²⁷ etc.

^f Ac 6⁷ 13⁸ 14²² 16⁵ 24²⁴, see Sanday & Headlam p. 32 ^g John 20³¹ ^h 1 John 5⁴⁻⁵

ⁱ John 20²⁸ ^j John 11, cf 5²⁶ ^k Jude 3, 20.

Faith in the power and righteousness of God, based on belief in the resurrection of Christ, is, like that of Abraham, reckoned by God for 'righteousness'.² The corresponding Hebrew word, *צדקה*, however, means properly 'rightness', and may refer not only to conduct, but also to truth, to rightness of belief or judgment or utterance. There is no need for the explanation that the believer is accounted righteous, though he is not actually righteous, - an explanation which either makes S. Paul's conception a fictitious, academic, and unreal one, or an immoral one. Faith is reckoned by God for 'rightness' because it is man's only right attitude to God.

S. Paul's statement that in the Gospel "a righteousness of God is being revealed by faith unto faith"¹ recalls the Old Testament idea of God's manifestation of His righteousness or salvation in being the Deliverer and Avenger of the oppressed, and involves the thought for christians that God, Who has vindicated His righteousness by raising Jesus from the dead, is also revealing His righteousness in delivering from the power of sin those who groan under its bondage and in the inevitable judgment brought upon themselves by those who reject His mercy.

Faith, as conceived by S. Paul, of necessity involves love.² "Faith in Jesus Christ ... (is) ... the crowning and characteristic sense with S. Paul it is not merely assent or adhesion but enthusiastic adhesion; the highest and most effective motive power of which human character is capable".^{*} The Johannine emphasis on faith also obviously involves love, both to men and to Jesus.[†]

According to S. Paul, any custom or action or assertion of the

² Ro. 4³ ¹ Ro. 1⁷ ² Gal 5⁶ Eph 3¹⁷, 1 Th. 1³

* Sanday & Headlam, p. 33-4. † e.g. 1 John 3²³, John 13³⁴ 15¹², cf. 14¹⁵. q. also the attribution of faith to individuals in the Acts: to Stephen (6⁵), & to Barnabas (11²⁴).

individual which goes beyond what his faith enables him to be convinced of is for him sin.^a Faith is concerned not merely with the beginning of the christian life but is constantly needed and growing.^b It should enable a man to perceive rightly the vocation for which he is best fitted, by natural endowment and environment and opportunity, in the Body of Christ, and will keep him from thinking of himself 'more highly than he ought to think', from seeking his own aggrandisement instead of the service of the community and thus disturbing its peace.^c

It was said above^{*} that the faith of Abraham is commented upon, not only by S. Paul, but also by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews and by S. James. We have still to consider the views of the two latter writers.

In the eleventh chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews ~~the~~ the faith of Abraham is twice cited^d as an example of the author's conception of faith as "the assurance of things hoped for, the testing of things not seen"^e, i.e. the conviction of the solid certainty of the unrealised future of God's promises, and the testing of the unseen present in the eternal sphere. Abraham, having received God's promise, acted upon it in faith, staking his all upon its truth, even to the uttermost point of practical belief in God's power to raise the dead, although during his sojourn on earth he himself did not receive the complete fulfilment of the promise. This is essentially the same as S. Paul's view of Abraham's faith in Romans 4.16-21. The difference between their views of christian faith lies in this. With S. Paul, the principle of Abraham's faith, that God will perform His promises even to the extreme point of

^a Ro. 14²³

^b Ro. 1¹⁷ 4²⁰

^c Ro. 12³⁻⁸

^d vv. 8-12, 17-19.

^e Heb. 11¹

raising from the dead, has been fulfilled in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the baptised christian looks back upon ^fthat fulfilment as the rock whereon he grounds his conviction that he himself is dead unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ, ^arisen with Him, ^band reigning with Him in the heavenly and eternal sphere. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews also recognises the principle of Abraham's faith as fulfilled in the death and resurrection of Jesus, but thinks of the christian as looking to that fulfilment as the pledge of his own future perfection through sufferings; ^dthe christian, as he runs his earthly race, looks forward to the risen Jesus, the author and perfecter of his faith, ^ehis great High-Priest within the veil. ^fIn each case the principle of faith is the same: the christian is to live his life by his trust in his conviction of a fact. But the point of view from which the christian life is regarded is different in the two cases. S. Paul is thinking of the christian as already in this present life risen and reigning with Christ. The epistle to the Hebrews looks forward to the future life for the christian's realisation of these blessings, for which our mortal pilgrimage is ~~A~~ but preparatory. S. Paul too recognises that our redemption will not be completed until the redemption or resurrection of the body is accomplished, but in connection with this expectation he prefers to use the term 'hope' rather than 'faith'. ^g

In S. James's epistle it is maintained that the faith of Abraham was perfected through works, in the offering up of Isaac upon the altar. It is insisted that faith, unless it is dead, must manifest itself in works ⁱ- the demand of the 'plain', practical, man, which is very

wholesome and, alas, often very necessary. S. James, however, regards faith

^a Ro 6¹¹ ^b Col 3¹ ^c Eph 2⁶ ^d Heb 2¹⁰ ^e Heb 12^{1,2} ^f Heb 6^{19,20}
^g See especially Rom. 8¹⁸⁻²⁵ ^h Jas. 2²¹⁻²³ ⁱ Jas 2^{17,18}

as in itself little more than intellectual belief. The deeper meaning given to faith by S. Paul and the authors of the Johannine writings and of the epistle to the Hebrews necessarily includes moral obedience to God's will as its inevitable accompaniment.* And when S. James insists on the necessity for the manifestation in actual deed of professed faith, the example which he gives is Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac as a practical manifestation of faith in God's power and readiness to perform His promises even to the point of resurrection from the dead.† The content of S. James's meaning is the same as that of the others: it is his terminology which is different.

* Rom 5¹⁻¹⁸ 6^{3.4} 10⁴ 12^{1.2} 16²⁶ Gal 5²²⁻²⁶ etc.; 1 John 5¹⁻³, John 14¹⁵; Heb 8⁷⁻¹³ 10^{16.17} 13^{1-7.16.17.21}

† Jas 2²¹⁻²³

CHAPTER IV

FAITH AND LAW.

What is the relation between religion and morality? This question, ages old, has been revived in our day with particular force. It has been the English tradition to emphasise the importance of an upright moral standard, and the Englishman's love of truth, as exhibited in the facts of life, has compelled him to acknowledge the existence of righteousness wherever he has seen it, and to modify his religious views in accordance with ethical facts, rather than to seek to press ethical facts into the narrow mould of preconceived religious opinion. It has been the glory of British law to seek to administer justice without partiality, whether religious or political or commercial or otherwise. Along with this, the sturdy independence of the national character has led to a typical inclination to regard moral rectitude as within man's own unaided grasp and as due almost entirely to his own efforts. The Pelagian heresy was born on British soil and easily flourishes in its native land.

To-day, however, following upon the years of unrest since the war of 1914-18, there are discernible certain disquieting features pointing to a decline, in some quarters, of national morality - notably the rise in the incidence of a venereal disease and lowered standards of honesty and honour. This has gone hand in hand with the loss of conviction in the christian faith of our fathers.* In Germany, as the true nature of Nazi doctrine and practice ^{has} been more clearly revealed, * The increase in venereal disease is of course due to the present war, whereas the decline in honesty & the loss of christian faith were already operative before this war.

it has also become increasingly clear that they are fundamentally ~~the~~ incompatible with christianity.

What has just been said has shown the importance of the subject of this essay in modern thought, and has briefly indicated the chief facts relevant in the present situation. There is, however, compelling evidence that morality may exist in human life independently of religious faith. The ethical teaching and practice of the great Greek philosophers demonstrates this conclusively. Man's moral sense is a natural endowment capable of natural development like reason. Nations and communities have ~~and~~ found themselves compelled, by the pressure of events, to the constitution of governments and legal authority for the regulation of the family, the protection of life and property and character.

It was by an argument from natural human morality that Plato was able to prove, in his Euthyphro, that popular contemporary polytheism was illogical. Polytheism inevitably involves notions of antagonism between various gods. But if the gods quarrel and fight about points on which they disagree, this is proof of their inferior wisdom. But a god of inferior wisdom is no true god. Hence polytheism is irrational. Somewhat as man's spiritual progress during the centuries since the Reformation has lagged behind his rapid progress in humanism and material improvement, so in the ancient world his spiritual progress, in the form of polytheism, was outstripped, in the great civilised nations, by material advance, and an accompanying relative 'humanism' in ethical conceptions.

Nevertheless, though morality may exist independently of religion, morality leads toward religion, and enlightened religion. Kant, who

certainly did not approach the problem with a bias in favour of religion, saw that man's imperative sense of duty demands religion and the existence of God as its ultimate ground. The sense of righteousness points to a supreme righteous Lawgiver and Judge. Kant, moreover, contended that the reality of the eternal sphere is actually entered by moral action.

But though reason may lead the moralist to the acknowledgment of a supreme righteous Being, that acknowledgment need be little more than an intellectual belief for a philosophic few. It was the Hebrew genius which brought together practical monotheism, as the religion of faith in a living and personal God, and morality. "The unique feature in Hebrew religion is not so much the outstanding superiority of its ethics, but the essential connection between morality and religion." It is this unique fact, that the Hebrews gave the world a practical faith in one personal righteous God, which is a strong argument for the claim that such a faith was nothing less than a special or singular or particular revelation from God Himself. This faith is a convincing revelation of the true basis of morality, and explains and justifies the conclusion of the moral philosopher, that morality demands the existence of a supreme Lawgiver and Judge as its ultimate ground.

Christianity has completed the revelation. First, it has illuminated, simplified, and deepened the moral law itself. It has illuminated it with the teaching, already foreshadowed in the Old Testament, that the moral law is summed up in the twofold duty of love to a heavenly Father and to our fellow-men, a love which proceeds from the prior love of that Father toward us. And this teaching is at the same time a great

simplification of the moral law. It has also deepened the moral law by insisting on its application, not only to outward acts, but also to a man's thoughts and the inmost state of his heart.

Secondly, Christianity gives a practical answer to the problems of evil and suffering. Almighty God, of His tender love toward mankind, has sent His only-begotten Son to take upon Him our flesh, and to be assailed by the worst forms of evil and suffering even unto the death of the cross. By His endurance Christ has given us an example, that we should follow in His steps. By His resurrection He has triumphed over man's greatest enemies. But He has been more than Conqueror. Men's sin, and the suffering which their sin brought upon Him, as symbolised by the cross, have actually been turned into instruments for man's salvation. The passion of Christ is the most potent means of effecting repentance within human hearts that has ever been presented. Faith in His sacrifice of perfect obedience unto death enables men, in union with Him, to follow in His footsteps and to share His victory. Innocent suffering is seen to have a purpose, and becomes a means to purification, sanctification, and the salvation of others. The sure hope of resurrection beyond the grave gives confidence that the good must always prevail ultimately over evil.

Thirdly, through the christian Faith man receives the power to fulfil the moral law as otherwise he cannot do. Faith in God revealed in Christ is faith in One Who is absolute Love, absolute Charity, as the ground of the universe. The moral law is the law ordained by One Who is absolute Love. In as far as this moral law which governs human nature can be rightly described as natural law, it must be cognisable by man's natural reason and conscience. Such natural moral law will

therefore in its higher development include such acknowledgment of God as that made by Plato or Kant. That God should be recognised and glorified by the natural man to a limited extent is the teaching of S. Paul in Romans I. 19-21.* But for man to have deliverance from sin and personal fellowship with God, His special revelation is necessary. Hence the revealed Law of the Old and New Testaments, which Thomas Aquinas and Hooker call Divine Law in distinction from Natural Law,† gives enlightened teaching as to man's duty toward God as well as toward his neighbour. The Divine moral Law, however, is not in any respect a revelation of a different moral standard from that of natural law, but it is the full revelation of that universal moral law which governs, and always has governed and always will govern, human life on this earth as constituted by God in creation. It confirms, fulfils, and explains all the true ideas of morality cognisable in natural law. The Divine moral Law of the Old Testament, however, as represented in the Ten Commandments, gives only a partial indication of the mind of its Divine Author, consisting ~~an~~ almost entirely of prohibitions of certain outward acts.‡ It is the revelation of God in Christ, recorded in the New Testament, and, in the moral sphere, the Divine Law of love to God and to our neighbour, set in the New Testament against the background of that revelation, which fully manifests the mind and character of God. By faith in God through Christ man is delivered from bondage to sin in his own life, and the door is opened for the operation of the power of the Spirit, giving him understanding in the knowledge of the riches of the christian heritage, and thus shedding the love of God abroad in his heart, and enabling him to the fulfilment of the moral law. "For what the Law could not do, in that it was weak through

* Cf. Rom 2nd 14-15

† See p. 37

‡ The 5th Commandment, however, is positive, & the 4th.

partly so, & the 10th concerns man's inward state.

‡ Eph 1st 17-20 3rd 16-20

‡ Rom 5th

the flesh, God, by sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned our sin in the flesh, in order that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the spirit" (Rom. 8.3-4). Even when the immediate motive of good moral conduct is that of duty rather than the that of the constraining emotion of love, it is still true that the ultimate motive power proceeds from the Divine Charity, for love concerns not only the emotions but also the desire and the will, and man's desire and will to act in accordance with the highest dictates of his reason and conscience are grounded, whether he recognises it or not, in that Divine Charity which ordained the natural moral law and endowed man with the faculties of reason and conscience.

Once, however, the natural reason and conscience have been led to the acknowledgment of the supreme Lawgiver, or the special revelation of Divine Law has been received, it is to the peril of morality that the knowledge of God is neglected or rejected: for to do so is to cut away the known source and foundation of morality, and the inevitable result, if the process is not stayed, must be the decline and collapse of morality within two or three generations.

The division in the being of man effected by Roman Catholic theology in the distinction between the natural *as debitum*, and the supernatural superadded gift of grace *indebitum*^{*}, has an inescapable influence on Roman Catholic ethical conceptions. The Divine Law revealed in the Old Testament, in as far as it transcends the highest reaches of natural law, and in particular the Divine Law revealed in the New Testament, tends to be regarded as an addition superimposed upon the natural law rather than as that which is necessary for the

* See pp. 28-30(c).

completion and fulfilment of the natural law in order that God's creative purpose for the development of human nature may be carried out. In other words, there is a tendency to a practical ethical dualism between the natural on the one hand and the specifically christian or supernatural on the other hand.

Within the sphere of christianity itself, moreover, the distinction between 'precepts', as commands binding on all christians, and 'counsels', as obligations voluntarily undertaken by individual christians, although it may be so stated as to be justifiable in itself, leads, through the influence of the *donum supernaturale superadditum et iniebitum* conception, to the characteristic Roman ideas of accumulation of merit and works of supererogation^{*}, and to an ethical dualism of secular and religious within the christian society. It seems less dangerous that the obligations of 'counsels' voluntarily undertaken should be regarded from the standpoint of 'vocation', and that it should be emphasised that every man has a particular vocation, however lowly, in the Divine purpose, which might be described as the best way in which he is able to render service to God and his fellow men - the natural endowments and inclinations of the individual, education, environment, opportunities, 'chance' meetings with others which exercise enormous influence, etc., being usually potent factors in the discernment of a man's calling. Thus for all christians the problem of conduct consists in the application of the universal norm of the Divine Law to the complex circumstances of their respective callings. It is "to learn and labour truly to do my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me"[†]. There is no room here at all for any questions of merit nor for any tendencies to dual ethical

* See Anglican Article *xiv.*

† Catechism in Book of Common Prayer.

standards. Perhaps it is worth remarking, in connection with this subject of 'vocation', that if a special vocation has been missed or disobeyed, that does not close the door upon the Divine education of the individual in question, nor upon God's use of him through future 'second-best' vocations.

The Barthian school has no theology of natural law. Brunner does indeed recognise it as relative to human sin, but regards it as superseded for the christian, in so far as he is truly a man of faith. The true christian does all to the glory of God; he always does the will of God; he obeys the Word of God speaking in the heart to disclose to a man his duty for the actual moment through which he is living. The obedience of faith is not obedience to ethical programmes. This view of christian conduct draws a radical contrast between law, as existing for non-christians to govern human conduct in the world, and faith, through which christians are enabled to live in accordance with God's will. It underlies the radical separation made by Lutheranism between Church and State, and leads to a practical ethical dualism of secular and christian. What it fails to recognise is that the christian, in seeking to ascertain the will of God in any given situation, needs a universal moral standard as a criterion to which, in making his decision, he may refer contemplated courses of conduct, and that this universal moral standard is itself the voice of God. This thesis, moreover, upholds the view that the State exists for man by the creative purpose of God, and that it is fundamentally wrong to regard it as relative only to human sin.

Biblical teaching concerning the subject of this essay has already been necessarily involved in much of the above discussion -

especially in the references to the unique nature of Hebrew ethical monotheism, and to the Divine Law of the Old and New Testaments, and to certain points of Pauline doctrine. The story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, from the point of view of its important ethical bearing, was discussed in connection with the teaching of Kierkegaard on pages 56 and 57. Biblical doctrine as to the relation between faith and law was also considered in a criticism of Brunner on pages 126 to 129. A few more points will be made here.

Some critics of the Old Testament do not seem to give nearly enough weight to the fact that the great deliverance of the children of Israel from bondage in Egypt, as recorded in Exodus, however capable of natural explanation, nevertheless remains a foundation-stone of Hebrew religion. The Divine choice of Abraham and the deliverance from Egypt are again and again recounted as the basic historical examples of the Divine initiative in God's dealings with Israel, and they provided an inspiration to obedience and a pledge of future mercies. The deliverance from Egypt was a signal revelation of the Divine character. God had shown Himself to be a great Deliverer, a Deliverer from outward oppression and affliction, a Champion of human freedom. He had seen the affliction of His people and had come down to deliver them. On this revealed character of God rests the whole Mosaic Law.*

"It is strange indeed", says Robertson, "that critical historians should postulate the putting forth of legislative programmes at various points of the history (of the Hebrews), and should be so unwilling to admit the same for the time of Moses."

As to the exact content of a legislation promulgated by Moses

* The significance of the facts that the deliverance from Egypt is regarded in the New Testament (1 Co. 10^{1,2}) as an antitype of Christian baptism, & the Passover as an antitype of the Eucharist, is often insufficiently recognised.

himself, it is not yet possible to form any certain opinion. Prominent, however, in the so-called Mosaic code is the Book of the Covenant (Ex. 20.23-23.33⁴), and the 'Little Book of the Covenant' (34.11-27). Since these are assigned to JE, the substance of the laws recorded in them would presumably have been current at least some time previous to JE, in the time of the judges or very early monarchy. There is, however, the well known fact of the striking resemblance between the social legislation of the Book of the Covenant and that of the Code of Hammurabi of Babylon, which is perhaps ^{six} ~~five~~ or ^{eight} ~~six~~ hundred years older than the time of Moses. One of the chief differences between the two codes is that in the code of Hammurabi a distinction is made between the rich and the poor. The theory of a common primitive Semitic source seems precluded by the fact that part of the common material is of definitely Sumerian character.

It is possible that this Babylonian influence affected the Hebrews through the inhabitants ^{an} of Canaan. But in view of certain clear traces, pointed out by Sir Leonard Woolley in his book 'Abraham', ^{*} of the influence of the Code of Hammurabi upon the conduct recorded of Abraham in the JE narratives, notably in his treatment of Hagar and Ishmael, which was anti-Semitic, it seems more likely that the influence of the Code of Hammurabi came to the Hebrews through Abraham and was traditional among them.

With regard to the Decalogue, it seems likely that this existed originally in a simpler form. The explanatory matter shows signs of E, D, and P, in the Exodus record, and of D in the Deuteronomic record. The fourth and tenth commandments are usually held to presuppose the settlement in Palestine. The great stumblingblock to a date before the

period of the later monarchy is the prohibition of idolatry in the second commandment.

The legislation of the Mosaic period, then, or, more certainly, of the period of settlement in Canaan and of the early monarchy, as represented in the Book of the Covenant, though partly dealing with religious observances, was primarily ethical. Some of these ethics may have been due originally to Sumerian influence in the Code of Hammurabi, but, if so, the Hebrew religion modified them in a more humane direction. The Decalogue stands a lasting monument of what these earlier ethics, under the Divine revelation, developed into. Other nations, notably the Chinese, have evolved other lofty systems of ethics. The peculiarity of Hebrew religion, as regards morality, is the essential connection between morality and religion. Holiness implies moral goodness as a *sine qua non*. The all-holy One is the ~~all-righteous~~ all-righteous One. The teaching of the full truth of this was of course the work of the prophets.

An unbiased reading of the ethical teaching of the Old Testament, if allowance is made, as regards certain particular moral prescriptions for the age to which they refer, must surely create the impression of how natural it all is, how it confirms natural moral law, how in its higher development, as represented in the Decalogue and teaching of the prophets, it is a revelation of the principles of eternal law on which the universe was constituted. The conscience of Christendom has so accepted it throughout the centuries. The Decalogue has been the foundation on which the human law of christian states has rested from generation to generation.

To those who have grown to love the Old Testament as containing

the revelation of Divine Law and Promise, the raptured songs of such writers as the composer of the 119 th. psalm are dear and occasion no surprise. "Lord, what love have I unto Thy law; all the day long is my study in it" (verse 97). Dr. Oesterley, in his book on the Psalms, has given good reasons for the view that in psalm 119^{*} verse 1 to 6 are an earlier composition, adapted from Babylonian mythological elements, and that verses 7 to 10 are a post exilic addition, in the form of a hymn in praise of the law of Yahweh, verses 11 to 14 being an application by the later writer to himself of what he has said about the Law in verses 7 to 10. Be this as it may, the ^{complete} whole psalm, as compiled by the later writer, forms an admirably connected whole. The glory of God manifested in the heavens, and in the laws of nature on which depend the ordered succession of day and night, is also manifested in the moral law. Both proceed from the same Lawgiver. The passage of Kant is anticipated: "There are two things that fill my soul with holy reverence and ever-growing wonder - the spectacle of the starry sky that virtually annihilates us as physical beings, and the moral law which raises us to infinite dignity as intelligent agents."

In the Old Testament the moral commandments of the Law are not regarded as a grievous burden, for the reason that faith in God is presupposed as a condition of obedience. "The scripture, foreseeing that God justifieth the Gentiles by faith, preached the gospel beforehand unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all the nations be blessed" (Gal. 3.8). "And now, Israel, what doth the LORD thy God require of thee but to fear the LORD thy God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the LORD thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, to keep the commandments of the LORD, and His statutes, which I

* Vol. I, pp. 167-171 (published 1939)

command thee this day for thy good?" (Deut. 10. 12-13). Compare the famous passage in Micah 6. 8: "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the LORD require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" Or again, what a high synthesis of faith and law is attained in such a passage as this of Jeremiah!: "Thus saith the LORD, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches: but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth Me, that I am the LORD Which exercise lovingkindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth; for in these things I delight, saith the LORD " (9. 23-24). Passages like this are understood and appreciated by simple people, and it does not occur to them to draw a radical contrast between law and gospel, ^{in the sense} ~~as~~ that law is superseded by faith.

In Deut. 30. 11-13 the commandment of the law is declared to be not too hard for God's people nor far off from them. Then in the next verse (14) follows the great declaration "But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it." "The word" here evidently refers to the commandment of the law, and the meaning would seem to be that the law declared by Moses is affirmed by the voice of God speaking to man in his converse with his fellows and in his reason and conscience in the moral law. The tenor of the whole book of Deuteronomy suggests that obedience to this voice of God, or 'word', speaking in man's heart in the moral law, must be through walking humbly with God in holy fear and love - in other words, through faith.

This passage from Deuteronomy is quoted by S. Paul in Romans 10. 6-8 as a description of the righteousness which is of faith, in

contrast with the righteousness which is of law (verse 5). By the latter he means such high self-centred righteousness as that of the Pharisees, who have perverted the purpose and spirit of the Old Testament Law. Sanday and Headlam, commenting on S. Paul's quotation, say "St. Paul uses the same words (as in the original passage in Deuteronomy) to express exactly the same idea, but with a completely different application. 'The Gospel as opposed to the Law is not difficult or hard to attain to.'"

But S. Paul's quotation is not made with a completely different application. The point is not that the Gospel as opposed to the Law is difficult or hard to attain to. The moral standard required by the Gospel is the same as the moral standard required by the Law: or rather, it is a deepening of the moral standard required by the Law, and in itself is harder to attain to. The true point of contrast lies in the method of attaining to the requisite moral standard. In the case of 'the righteousness which is of law' the method is self-centred: in the case of the righteousness which is of faith the method is God-centred. S. Paul's instinct, in quoting for his purpose the passage from Deuteronomy, is perfectly sound and correct.

The teaching of the prophets brings out the relation between law and that aspect of the Divine character which is termed in Scripture 'the wrath of God'. The prophets teach clearly, and their teaching is assumed and often repeated in the New Testament, that there is such a thing as the wrath of God and retributive Divine justice. Their teaching suggests that the wrath of God operates on the principle of the law of cause and effect. If we play with fire, it burns; if we break the moral laws of God's universe, which He has set

before us for our good and not that they may be traps^s to ensnare us, we suffer the inevitable consequence of our actions. Thus the wrath of God in effect has the character of an impersonal force. But ever there, behind and above the law, stands the good God, grieved and pained at our folly, longing for our repentance, doing His utmost, in discipline and punishment and mercy, to bring us to ourselves and draw us back to Him.

To christians God has been revealed as Love. Yet while the Divine Love has shown itself ready to pour itself out even unto death for the sake of men, it has at the same time, in the creation of the universe, by the machinery of the laws of nature, restrained the power of sin in the universe, so that it cannot go beyond certain limits. Men must learn to love God of their own free choice, but if they choose evil they will learn that the power of evil is limited by the operation of the laws of nature and that these laws must eventually assert themselves. "The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small." The Old Testament prophets teach that national disaster is deserved and inevitable disaster, and that at the same time God is good and merciful and desirous of His people's repentance and of saving them from disaster; the mighty forces of nature and great upheavals of human society are in the control of a righteous God, wielded by Him for moral purposes.

The above consideration throws further light on S. Paul's view of law as secondary in God's purpose in creation.* The primary directing purpose in creation is the purpose of love, which is the essential, primary, character of God as revealed in Christ. But the Divine Love constituted the universe upon principles of law, which has just been

* See page 127

shown to be manifested in an impersonal, secondary, manner. We may say that metaphysically or absolutely, Love is primary and Law secondary, but that chronologically, Law comes before the full revelation of Love.

It has been pointed out on pages 262 and 263 that the moral law represented in the Pentateuch as revealed through Moses is not there regarded as a grievous burden incapable of fulfillment, because faith in God is presupposed. The value of faith, however, must obviously depend upon the knowledge of God already revealed or attained. Even in the narrative of J God is revealed in Exodus 34, 6-7 as "full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger and plenteous in mercy and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation." The high level to which such a conception of God may raise is shown in many of the psalms and other passages of the Old Testament. It seems, however, to have been grasped only by a few, and the idolatry and unfaithfulness of the great majority of the Hebrew people perverted their view of the law and rendered even a moderate obedience to its moral requirements far beyond them. Moreover, when we have done all the justice we can to the Old Testament revelation (and it is very important to try to do this at a time when for years past the Old Testament has been persistently belittled in many quarters), we must remember that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to divest ourselves entirely of our christian outlook in a historical appreciation of the Old Testament. The difference between the topmost heights of Divine revelation through sinful men, however great, who

after all were but servants in the House of God, and the revelation of the Son Himself, is tremendous.* It was the experience of the saints of the Old Testament that the more earnestly and faithfully a man strove, the deeper his humility and penitence and sense of utter dependence upon God. Such men, became apt pupils in that school of Hebrew piety which, like Simeon at a later date, was "looking for the consolation of Israel".†

It was the prophet Jeremiah who made the great contribution to Hebrew religion of the doctrine of the New Covenant. The experience of the reformation by King Josiah seems to have burnt into the his soul the worthlessness of everything without the law written on the heart; and during the calamities of his last days, as the earthly Zion sinks, the image of God's true City rises on his soul.

"Behold, the days come, saith Yahweh, that I will make a new covenant . . . ; not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, which My covenant they break, although I was an husband unto them, saith Yahweh. But this is the covenant that I will make I will put My law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be My people for they shall all know Me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them . . . , for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more" (Jer. 31.31-34).

This teaching was explicitly affirmed by Christ Himself at the institution of the Eucharist and it is twice quoted in the Epistle to the Hebrews as fulfilled in christianity (8.8-12, 10.15-17). It is of

* Heb. 3¹⁻⁶

† Luke 2²⁵

course in this light that the Decalogue is used in the Anglican Liturgy. God does not cease to require obedience to the moral law, but He promises a new power for obedience. The law in the heart will be a sign of intimate fellowship between God and His people individually. This prophecy is supplemented by Ezekiel with his doctrine of a new heart and a new spirit, and the gift of the Divine Spirit (Ezek. II. 19-20, 36. 26-27).

The recognition by the Old Testament sacrificial system of those facts of human nature which are expressed by the later doctrine of original sin, and of man's inability to attain *libertas major* without God's special grace, has already been discussed in connection with the question of man's freedom of choice, in chapter II, pages 207-209. The question is obviously relative to the subject of ethics and is therefore alluded to here.

As we pass to the Synoptic Gospels to consider our Lord's teaching with regard to the Law, the Sermon on the Mount is of crucial importance. His attitude to the Law is there clearly defined. "Think not that I am come to destroy the Law or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil ($\piληρῶσαι$). For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the Law, till all things be accomplished" ($\gammaένηται$ - the A.V. translation 'be fulfilled' here has unfortunately helped to give quite a wrong impression). The first part of this statement seems clear, viz., that our Lord is come to reveal the substance or kernel of the Law, that which fills up the husk of the outward Law. The Mosaic Law may be divided into three parts: (i) Its moral teaching, summed up in the Ten Commandments; (ii) its sacrificial system; (iii) certain

particular enactments which have reference to the social conditions of the time. The purpose of these latter was fulfilled as the particular social conditions for which they were designed passed away. The sacrificial system has been fulfilled by the sacrifice of Christ, as the author of the epistle to the Hebrews shows. It is the moral law which our Lord appears from the following verses to have had especially in mind, and which is the subject of our discussion. Our Lord is come to reveal the substance or kernel of the moral law; He is come to reveal that which fills up the husk of the outward commandments.

Verse 18 is more difficult. The phrase 'Till heaven and earth & pass away' may be interpreted as referring to the passing away of the age in which our Lord's contemporaries were living, due to the new age which His coming was bringing to the birth. Or it may be understood as being fulfilled only at the end of the world. Most modern commentators, influenced by recent thought on the subject of New Testament eschatology, give the former interpretation. In any case, the last words of the verse help greatly to a clarification of the meaning. 'One jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished'. The plain meaning of this would seem to be that until the whole purpose of law the moral law is accomplished, as long as any need for it exists, the moral law will, in God's providence, remain. Inasfar as men apprehend Christ's revelation of the inward substance of the outward moral law, the purpose of the latter is for them accomplished; not indeed that they are henceforth under no obligation to obey the moral law, for they now perceive its real, inward, meaning to be more exacting than they ever realised before:

but they see in its inward, substantial, meaning the will of a heavenly Father, and they obey it as sons in the strength of His Spirit, applying it with understanding to the complex circumstances of their state of life. Inasfar as men do not apprehend Christ's revelation of the inward substance of the outward moral law, the purpose of the latter is not for them accomplished, and for them it stands as sternly authoritative as ever, challenging an obedience which they must seek to render as the servants of God who do not yet understand its inward secrets. The next verse (19) shows that "no Christian man ~~what~~ whatsoever is free from the obedience of the Commandments which are called Moral"*, and verse 20 emphasises the high requirement of christian righteousness, through the way of faith, as contrasted with Pharisaic righteousness, which is not through the way of faith.

The Lord then gives five instances[†] of the way in which He reveals the inward substance or meaning of the moral law. The five instances concern respectively the laws regarding murder, adultery, swearing, ~~retri~~ retribution, and hatred of enemies. The last three are closely connected with the christian's relation to the State, and will be better discussed in the last chapter. In the case of the laws against murder and adultery, Jesus shows that the inward substance of these laws, which is addressed, not to the outward, but to the inward, ear, applies to the inward state of a man's mind and heart. The law provides as it were signposts on the road of righteousness. It can take cognisance only of outward acts. The Gospel affects the inward springs of human character, and thus provides the State with its most law-abiding and public-spirited citizens. The purpose of the law is therefore fulfilled by the Gospel.

Our Lord's teaching about the Law throws light upon the language
 * The 7th of the 39 articles. † Mt 5²¹⁻⁴⁸

used about it by S. Paul. S. Paul says that the Law has been abolished by Christ,^a and also that the christian has died to law generally.^b Christ is the termination of law.^c The Law has been blotted out, taken out of the way, nailed up in triumph.^d Christians have been made dead to the Law through the body of Christ.^e They have been discharged from it, having died to that wherein they were holden.^f "I through law died to law, that I might live to God"^g - is an excellent brief summary of this contention and also of S. Paul's 'psychological' argument in Romans 7.7-25.

Before his conversion Saul of Tarsus, as a zealous Pharisee, had revered the Law as the peculiar treasure of his nation, looking down upon other nations for not possessing it. He had believed that he had kept these commandments from his youth up.^h But had he kept them as treasures committed to him by a friend? Had he learned the nature and character of that friend by means of them? Had he learned from the very first of them that he was to worship a Deliverer, and none else? No, he had read the commandments as letters in stone, laid up in the temple, as the arbitrary decrees of a Being Who was determined that they should be obeyed, and Who would have His satisfaction in punishing to the death those who did not obey them. And the discovery came to him, with dreadful power, that he himself, the strict Pharisee, was at war with the Being Who made these laws. That Being said 'Thou shalt not covet'. "And I do covet, and even more so since I have been told not to do it".ⁱ He found deliverance in Christ. "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord".^j Therefore S. Paul, having had this terrible experience

^a Eph 2¹⁵, 1 Co 3⁹⁻¹¹ ^b Gal 2¹⁹ ^c Termination' or 'end' seems to be the normal meaning of $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ in Rom. 10⁴, though some would render it fulfilment, which is the normal meaning of $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega\varsigma$.
^d Col 2¹⁴ ^e Rom 7⁴ ^f Rom 7⁶
^g Gal 2¹⁹ ^h cf. Phil 3⁶ ⁱ Rom 7⁷⁻¹⁴ ^j Rom 7²⁵

himself, could say, that the law shows us our sins; that it is not something to boast of, for if we look at it as separate, independent creatures, whether we be Jews or not, it simply curses us and drives us to despair: but if it is our schoolmaster^a to teach us of one true Lord, in Whom we are created, in Whom we have a new and true life, then indeed it is a blessing to us; for then we give up altogether boasting of ourselves, and can submit ourselves freely and heartily to God as our Friend and Deliverer.

The christian is said by S. Paul to have died to sin^b, in the sense that he has been delivered^d from its tyranny. He is no longer a slave groaning under its bondage, but a son^c. However much he may have attained by mystical union^e with Christ to the 'sublimation' of all disorderly impulses and become a new creature^d, yet he still has, to a greater or less extent, to fight against sin^e, but in the power of the Spirit, and it is a winning battle with the assurance of forgiveness^f, in progressive sanctification. In the same way and to the same extent he has been delivered from the tyranny of law; he is no longer a slave groaning under its bondage, but a son: yet in so far as he has still to fight against sin, he is in need of law to press the standard upon him and to condemn him when he falls short - but to condemn him, not as a slave in hopeless bondage, but as a son assured of forgiveness and of being enabled to rise on stepping-stones of his dead self to higher things. In this sense the christian may be said to have died to the law of moral commandments.

Again, death is said by S. Paul to have been abolished for the christian^g, in the sense that the sting and horror and misery of it are

a Gal 3²⁴ b Ro 6¹⁻¹¹ c Ro 8¹⁵ d Gal 6¹⁴ &c. e 1 Co 9²⁷ Phil 2^{12,13}

f 1 Co 10¹³ Phil 4¹³ g 2 Tim 1¹⁰

gone,^a and the hope of fuller life and the resurrection is ever present, though physical death still remains a fact. In the same way, law still remains a necessary fact, but the sense of hopeless bondage caused by it is gone.

Thus S. Paul can also say that law is not annulled but established through faith in Christ,^b and that though he is not 'under law',^c he is nevertheless not 'without law' to God, but 'within law', i.e. within the law of Christ.^d There is a law of Christ to be fulfilled by the christian,^e and it is the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus which frees the christian from the law of sin and death.^f S. Paul urges his converts to good christian conduct,^g and makes much of the principle of 'noblesse oblige'.^h I Cor. 7.10-11 is an instance of christian legislation. And S. Paul can appeal to the Law in support of what he says.ⁱ

Johannine doctrine respecting the moral law begins with the revelation of God to men in His Son,^j and makes this the ground of all ethical teaching.^k Consequently the moral law is to be kept as the commandments of a God Who, in His Son, is at one with believers, and the more they keep His commandments the more they will know of Him.^l

a / Co 15⁵⁵ b / Ro 3³¹ c / Ro 6¹⁵, 1 Co 9²⁰ d / 1 Co 9^{20, 21} e / Gal 6²

f / Ro 8² g / Ro 6¹⁻⁴, 1 Co 6¹³⁻²⁰ 7¹⁹ Eph 4¹⁷⁻³² 5²²⁻²⁴

h / Ro 12¹⁻² Eph 4¹ Phil 1²⁷ Col 1¹⁰, 1 Th 2¹² i / 1 Co 9^{8, 9, 14} 21, 34

j / John 1¹⁻¹⁸; 1 John 1¹⁻¹⁰

k / John 14¹⁵; 1 John 3²⁴⁻⁵⁻³

l / John 13¹⁰; 1 John 2³⁻⁵

CHAPTER V

FAITH AND FEELING

For the purposes of this essay feeling is defined as natural human emotion, impulse, instinct, or passion. For the sake of clearness the term 'passion' should be carefully examined. Feelings are called passions from the point of view that the individual endures, or is acted upon by, them apart from the reason with which his true self is (from this point of view) identified. S. Augustine even defines the term 'passio' (Greek *πάθος*) as a movement of the mind contrary to reason, though he goes on to say that passions like anger and sadness can be turned to purposes of righteousness.* The term denotes liability to feelings of pleasure and pain, and includes, for example, fear, joy, sorrow, wrath, etc.. In this essay love will be regarded as the chief representative of the feelings, for 'God is love'. In speaking of love as an emotion, it is of course recognised that in the higher manifestations of love the reason is very much involved. Nevertheless, even in those cases of self-sacrifice[†] where the actuating motive would seem to be that of duty alone and the emotion of love would seem to be virtually absent, it is at least true that the desire to do one's duty must be strongly in evidence, for reason alone could never provide the motive power to great self-sacrifice without the interplay of very strong emotional forces and imagination.

* See J. K. Mozley: "Impassibility", p. 104

† Cf. John 15¹³

*

It was stated in Part I, Chapter II, that the recognition by the scholastics of Natural Law necessarily resulted in their finding much place in their theology for the idea of human eros. Eros is natural human love, and in its highest manifestation, as recognised by Nygren in 'Agape and Eros', is man's natural desire and search for God, which is the subject of Natural Theology. To Aristotle the idea of Eros is wholly inapplicable to God, since it would imply an unsatisfied need. S. Thomas Aquinas, however, argues that there must be Eros in God, in the sense that He eternally desires, loves, and effects all Good, which is His own nature, and in creation reproduces some of that Good.† This Scholastic conception of the Divine Eros is nevertheless of a quality characteristically intellectual and emotionless. The idea of Divine impassibility rigidly held by the Scholastics, due to the influence of Greek philosophy, led them to neglect, to a considerable extent, the idea of the Divine Agape. Agape, as Nygren has shown, is characteristic of the self-sacrificing love of God seeking man in the Gospel.‡

To Nygren, however, agape is fundamentally opposed to human eros, and of course he does not recognise any eros in God, and it is only in the life of faith that human-beings can manifest agape. To Otto,‡ again, God is the Wholly Other, and while natural human love, along with other natural human experience, is the rational medium through which man learns to understand and interpret God to himself, yet that human love and experience is radically different in kind from the ~~cherished~~ actual character and life of the eternal Godhead.

The view of this thesis is that both agape and eros meet in the

* pp. 21-22

† Summa, Part I, Q. XIX, Arts. 1 & 2

‡ pp. 63-90

‡ pp. 71-75

Divine love; that even the natural man can manifest agape; and that natural human love, in whatever form it occurs, is, in so far as it is not perverted by sin, a mirror of the Divine love, and has its source in the Divine love. It follows from this view that the more man has fellowship with God through Christ by faith, the greater the purification, and the more abundant the increase, of his natural human love. The standpoint of this thesis is also in agreement with Berdyaev^{*} in regarding God as emphatically not impassible in reference to His own creation, but as a passionate, dynamic, Being, with dramatic developments both in the inward, eternal life of the Godhead as well as in His dealings with His creation; but it is the dynamic passion of perfect Love, which is always perfectly wise and righteous, and supremely able to achieve the purposes of perfectly wise and righteous Love. The line of thought which finds expression in the statement of Jesus that "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work"[†] is, as the life of Jesus bears witness, in no way inconsistent with the statement that "there remaineth therefore a sabbath rest for the people of God"[§], viz. in entering into God's rest.

It was argued on page 17 that the christian revelation of God as Love suggests that the centre and ground of the Divine image in man is to be sought in the realm of human feeling rather than, as assumed by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, in the mind, and that the trend of modern psychology supports this view; always provided that it be remembered that the Divine Love is one with perfect wisdom and righteousness, whereas in man, owing to sin, his feelings are frequently in conflict with reason and conscience.

* p. 133. This is not, however, to agree with Berdyaev's metaphysics respecting freedom & evil (v. pp. 132-137).

† John 5¹⁷ (This refers to God's work relative to His creation).

§ Heb 4⁹

We may at this point recall the doctrine of Schleiermacher, that the proper home of the idea of God within our consciousness lies in feeling, the particular quality of this feeling being that of absolute dependence, and that this basic religious element of feeling is itself actually the faculty by which man apprehends the Divine.* Schleiermacher's doctrine, however, exalted religious emotional experience in depreciation of reason and ethics, and may rightly be called a doctrine of emotional subjectivism. The view that emotional consciousness or emotional experience of God is of vital importance in the life of the christian, and that its presence or absence are necessarily reliable indications of the quality of the spiritual life, is a very different thing from saying, as this essay does, that the natural human feelings, in so far as they are not perverted by sin, reflect the Divine nature, and that they constitute the centre and ground of the Divine image in man.

This essay reaffirms the teaching of Maurice,[†] that God does not depend upon our feelings, but our feelings upon God, and that, apart from our feelings, we must claim by faith our position as sons of God in Christ as a fact, before we can realise it in our emotional apprehensions. The latter may, in the case of some sincere christians, be for many years, perhaps as long as this life lasts, cold and ~~unreliable~~ unreliable.

Otto has shown that man does possess an instinctive, intuitive, faculty for [‡] the apprehension of his Creator, and he finds it in the sense of the holy, which he shows to be as distinct a category of human experience as reason, conscience, and the aesthetic sense.[§] But this need not mean that ~~we~~ the ground of the Divine image in man must

lie in his sense of the holy. We can conceive of feeling as the ground or centre of the Divine image in man, that which is most closely to be identified with his inner self or personality; his reason, conscience, aesthetic sense, and sense of the holy being faculties by which that basic element of feeling should apprehend respectively truth, righteousness, beauty, and Divinity, not as implying that the operation of each respective faculty is exclusive in its own field, but that, the higher the exercise of the faculty, the more the co-operation of other faculties is necessarily involved* according to the analogy of the operation of the Divine Charity, which is that of infinite wisdom and righteousness, and, in its accomplishment, of perfect beauty. If this is so, it is easy to understand how the shuddering awe felt by primitive man in the presence of the 'numinous' in which Otto sees the ultimate origin of man's religious consciousness, may be inextricably interwoven with a dim, inarticulate, longing for the Father of spirits† - perhaps this explains the element of 'fascinans' in what Otto calls the 'Mysterium'.

The last paragraph has suggested an explanation of the general relationship between human feeling and the faculties of reason, conscience, appreciation of beauty, and sense of the holy. But what part does faith play in this relationship?

According to Otto, man's sense of the holy is a sense of the 'numinous' by which he apprehends the presence of a 'Mysterium tremendum et fascinans' to be worshipped. In the case of primitive man the idea of the holy is crude and gross. An element of faith, however, is necessarily involved, even though only in the form of a trembling belief in the unseen: not, however, that faith is peculiar to

* v. pp. 74-75

† v. pp. 76-77

man's supernatural life - it has already been pointed out that even in the natural life of man faith has its function to fulfil.*

Primitive man's crude idea of the holy needs education through the light of reason and conscience, and may thus attain to some recognition of a rational and righteous God. But we have seen that, if man is to attain to personal knowledge of and fellowship with God through deliverance from sin, God's special revelation is necessary, and that revelation, it has been argued, is addressed to man's natural feelings and faculties. It is for man, satisfied by the use of his reason and conscience, and of his feelings attested by reason and conscience and experience, that the revelation is the revelation of infinite Truth, Righteousness, and Love, to submit himself in faith to that which infinitely transcends, but will make increasing claims upon, his own finite reason, conscience, and love.

The characteristic exercise of the sense of the holy is worship, and it is in worship that faith, enlightened by reason and conscience and submitting to the revelation of God, apprehends and knows Him.

Before we pass to consideration of Biblical doctrine, it is worth noting that the psychological tripartite division of intellect, feeling, and will, which is claimed in endorsement of the writer's view that the ground of the Divine image in man is to be found in 'feeling', is quite modern. It was first brought into general use by Kant at the end of the 18th. century; it may date a little earlier, but not much.† The tradition which prevailed from Aristotle, and was followed by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, distinguished only two aspects of mind -

* pp. 226-227.

† In 18th. century England the writings of John Wesley, the social work of Howard, the poetry of Cowper, & the writings of Shaftesbury (which apparently attracted special interest in Germany), seem to have anticipated the modern recognition of and emphasis upon feeling.

the cognitive or intellectual, and the ~~actual~~ active or conative. Croce, the Italian philosopher, still refuses to distinguish more than these two aspects of mind, and protests strongly against recognising ~~feeling~~ feeling as a third division.

We may conveniently begin our survey of the Biblical attitude to feeling with a reference to a book, 'Abraham',^{*} by the archaeologist Sir Leonard Woolley. In it he gives good reasons for the fearless acceptance of the tradition of Abraham's birth at Ur, and for receiving the substance of the Abraham narrative in Genesis as historical.

He makes a fascinating and illuminating suggestion as to the nature of Abraham's conversion. The religion of Ur was a polytheism of the grossest type. The Moon god Nannar was the special patron of Ur. The only other important Mesopotamian town to have the Moon god for its patron was Haran. Recently discovered tablets show that in North Syria the Moon god was called Terah. Terah, Abraham's father, who was of Aramaean blood, moved with his family from Ur to Haran. Hence there is good evidence that Abraham's father was named after the Moon god, and that the worship of the Moon god was the faith in which Abraham was brought up.

The difference between this religion and Abraham's religion as recorded in the prophetic narratives of Genesis is tremendous, and yet there is no record of any dramatic conversion. The Biblical narrative is unsensational and matter of fact. How can this be accounted for?

For the last five hundred years the Sumerian race had been declining, and had been intermittently under the yoke of foreign over-

* The argument on this & the next 3 pages is taken from Chapter 6 of Woolley's book - pp. 208-240.

lords, and about this time the Semitic king Hammurabi was extending his conquest from Babylon over the whole land by "peaceful penetration."

Great upheavals and disappointments in public and national life usually affect religion. If men lost faith in Nannar, where could they find another outlet for their religious instincts? The minor deities were strictly limited each to his own department, and none of them could deal with the whole life of a man.

There had recently arisen in Ur a new custom of burying the dead, instead of in cemeteries as formerly, underneath the floor of a private or domestic chapel common to every house but the very poorest. In these chapels was practised ancestor worship and worship of the family god. This new practice was not inspired by any sentimental interest in the dead for their own sakes: the object was to keep the family intact and to preserve its continuity. So we have the cult of the patron god of the family.

At once the door is open for something far more personal and intimate than was possible to the ordinary man in the State worship. The family god, moreover, is not a god of fear, but the luck-bringer and the averter of the anger of the high gods.

The migration from Ur to Haran involved no transfer of religious allegiance. Terah and his family would still find the moon god worshipped, and they would take with them the teraphim or household gods. The Old Testament associates Abraham's 'conversion' with the migration from Haran. Abraham would now cut himself adrift from his country's god. The most prudent course for an emigrant was to enquire who were the gods who exercised dominion over the new country and to transfer his worship to them. This is precisely what Abraham did ^{not} ~~not~~

do. Instead, he adopted, or acknowledged, a god of his own, and he seems to have done it in a perfectly natural way. Who was this god?

At the beginning He is simply 'the God of Abraham', and later He becomes known as 'the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob'.

"Of all the multitudinous deities which the forefathers of the Hebrews had known in the old days 'beyond the River' there is only one whom we can possibly link with the nameless, landless, God Who ~~followed~~ followed the clan's shifting tents, was solely responsible for their welfare, had no worshipper other than the clan and no priest other than the clan's leader, and that is the family god of Abraham's tribe.

"Then is the God of Abraham to be resolved into the little family god, the luck-bringer, to whom offerings of bread and beer and incense were made on the brick altar in the family chapel behind Terah's house at Ur? The world's debt to Abraham consists in the fact that his was the only mind which realised the potentialities of that cult, and in the fact of the contrast between that little domestic luck-bringer and Jahweh. To a certain extent Abraham was reacting to exterior forces, and the 'accident' of new surroundings brought him face to face with a dilemma and required of him a choice: but he had the good fortune, or the inspiration, to choose that way out of it which was the way of truth and life.

"Any other man of Abraham's contemporaries would have started forth light-heartedly enough, taking indeed his teraphim with him, but quite prepared to accept in each place to which he came the sovereignty of the god of that place; his wanderings so far from moderating his polytheism would only have increased his experience in it. But there was deeply impressed upon Abraham's mind the lesson he had learned in the

chapel at Ur beneath whose floor his ancestors lay buried. If in the complex and highly organised civilisation of Ur the family had been the ultimate social unit, it was now for Abraham something infinitely more important - the whole of society itself. The god who was the symbol and essence of the natural link binding the clan together, who had protected Abraham from a child, as he had protected his father before him, was the one god not tied down to any one locality but able to be with him in the highlands of Palestine as well as in Haram or at Ur. This god now became the only God that mattered, and Abraham resolved in self-protection to stand aloof from the strange gods and to confine his worship to the one God he knew. He became, not indeed a monotheist, but monolatrous. Moreover, his God was not the God of a mere individual as an isolated unit, but of the family, of a man as son and as father. There are wondrous possibilities of progress in such a conception. As social morality widens and deepens this god of human relationship will become more spiritual. The gods of the forces of nature cannot progress; they are limited by their functions; but the province of Abraham's God was the hearts and minds of men. The fact that the patron god was the God of the family and that his duty towards it could be regarded as covering all his contacts with the outer world enabled him to break through that departmentalism which fettered the other Sumerian gods. Consequently the choice which Abraham made rendered possible that advance to a conception of God as not only moral in Himself but universal in His authority."

The suggestion therefore is that the decisive link in the transition from polytheism to monolatry and thence to monotheism lay actually in whole-hearted faith in the god of the family. How very

much in keeping is this suggested mode of revelation with the doctrine of man's creation in God's image ; How it accords with the view that the ground of the imago lies in the realm of natural human instinct and passion ; It would have been possible for God to choose some other mode of revelation which would have made it clear to men that their most natural human feelings had little, if anything, in common with the essential character of the Deity. But the God of the family ! - Here is a Divine revelation to man in the very heart of his most natural relationship, and one which is the unit of all his social development.

The Divine promise to Abraham, recorded by J, was that "I will make of thee a great nation and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed"*. This promise is implicit in all the further Scriptural record of Divine revelation, and forms a consistent whole with it. However narrow and imperialistic may have been the interpretation placed upon this passage by J, it is natural for us, looking back upon it in the light of subsequent events, to understand that the Divine purpose was not only that the revelation to Abraham and his family was to be extended to a nation of which he was to be the human founder, but also that the revelation of the God of Abraham and his family was to ~~be extended to a nation~~ become a revelation of the God of all human families and of the various nations of which they are the component units.

The plain reader of the patriarchal narratives of J and E throughout the book of Genesis can hardly fail to be struck by the intensely human interest which lives in them. God is indeed set forth as closely concerned with the very human life of the family and of the tribe.

* Gen. 12²⁻³

And this is the manner in which revelation has in point of fact come to the Hebrews - a revelation for which the whole world is their debtor.

Before we pass from consideration of the book of Genesis it is relevant to what has been said above to note that in both accounts of the creation^{*} the institution of marriage is represented as the original Divine intention, i.e., as of absolute Natural Law, and not as consequent upon the Fall, i.e., as of relative Natural Law. Compare our Lord's words, combining both narratives, in Mark 10.6-8. Marriage and the family are thus set forth as, by God's creative purpose, the unit of man's social development.

It was emphasised in the chapter on Faith and Law[†] that the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt is regarded in the Bible as a cornerstone of the religion of the Hebrews. God revealed Himself therein as a great Deliverer Who sees and cares for the affliction of His people.[#] How could this be if He were 'Wholly Other'? But it is what we should expect if the natural human instincts and affections be the ground of the Divine image in man. This would also explain the impression left upon later generations that during the period of wandering in the wilderness God bore His people "as a man doth bear his son"[§], or "as a nursing-father"[†]. "He humbled thee, and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna that He might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only, but by every thing which proceedeth out of the mouth of Yahweh And thou shalt consider in thine heart that, as a man chasteneth his son, so Yahweh thy God chasteneth thee".[‡]

* Gen. 1²⁷⁻²⁸ 2^{15. 21-25}

† p. 259

§ Deut. 1³¹

‡ Acts 13¹⁶

‡ Deut. 8³⁻⁵

Exod. 3⁷⁻⁸

The book of Judges - recording a rough period when the Hebrews were as yet but lightly settled in the land of promise, and law and order but little established, and when "every man did that which was right in his own eyes"^(Judges 21.5) - is followed by the book of Ruth, which gives a delightful picture of simple, Godfearing home life against the darker background of those barbarous times, reminding us once more of the primary importance of the ~~life of the~~ family in the life of the community. One of the main objects of the book seems to have been to give the ancestry of David. It is plainly stated that Ruth was a Moabitess, so that the national hero of the Hebrews was partly descended from a foreign people who were often their foes. The duty of Levirate marriage is also strongly recognised in the book. Nevertheless that which commends the book to the heart of the ordinary reader, and leads him to the perception of the further aims of the its writer, is the human interest of the sweet story of homelife and courtship therein narrated.

The teaching of the prophet Hosea is an outstanding example for the theme of this chapter. In him we breathe an atmosphere of tenderness and a love of his native soil and of simple, homely, human things, which are surpassed only in the parables of Jesus. The shadow of the cross, too, looms amid all this tenderness, and leads onward to love triumphant. Divine revelation came to Hosea through his domestic experience. The wife of his youth proved unfaithful. He calls her first child his own, and names him Jezreel ('God scatters' - ominous of the nation's fate). Her second child he will not own, calling her 'Unpitied'; likewise her third, a boy whom he calls 'Not my people'. Once at least Hosea had forgiven her, but eventually he put her from him or she left him. Robertson Smith, followed by George Adam Smith, gives excellent reasons for the

view that Hosea's domestic affliction preceded his Divine revelation rather than followed it. "The struggle of Hosea's shame and grief when he found his wife unfaithful is altogether inconceivable unless his first love had been pure and full of trust in the purity of its object." *

Hosea's trouble, instead of embittering him, kindled within him a great sympathy, and quickened a sense of mission. He remembered that there were many unhappy homes in Israel like his own. Further reflection told him that widespread marital unhappiness in Israel was due to the nation's sin in disloyalty to Yahweh and the worship of strange gods. "He tells the fathers of Israel, for instance, that they need not be surprised at the corruption of their wives and daughters when they themselves bring home from the heathen rites the infection of light views of love" (G.A. Smith[†]). See Hos. 4.13-14.

Thus he was led to see in his own domestic anguish a reflection of Yahweh's grief at the unfaithfulness of His people. Yahweh was Israel's husband, the husband of her youth. He had betrothed her to Him. She had played the harlot and gone after the Baalim, the local heathen gods of the soil, for the gifts she might get out of them in the shape of good harvests and fertile flocks. And the children which Israel bore were not her husband's. The new generation in Israel grew up in ignorance of Yahweh, with lives and characters which He could not own. They were 'Lo-Ruhamah', and 'Lo-Ammi'. The very title, 'Baalim', meant originally a possessor, a husband. The heathen gods were the possessors or husbands or lords of their soil, which was fertilised by them. Thus the gross, perverted, heathen notion of the god of the land as the husband of the land, and of the land as his bride, is taken and consecrated in the idea of Yahweh as the Husband of His

* Robertson Smith, "The Prophets of Israel."

† "The Book of the Twelve Prophets", p. 241.

people, and of His people as His bride.

But it is just here - in the parallel between Hosea's grief and Yahweh's - that Divine revelation broke through. Because Yahweh is God, and not fallen man, He will not give Israel up (II.8-9). He will seek her, and woo her again, to restore her.

The revelation of the persistent, unquenchable nature of the Divine love taught Hosea a lesson, not only for the nation at large, but for himself as an individual: that his own love for his unfaithful wife should follow the Divine example; and he seeks out his wife again and redeems her from the slavery into which she had sold herself and restores her. Surely this latter order of events is the correct interpretation of the book. Chapter 3 is not a parallel account to the opening verses of chapter 1, nor an interpolation which ought to come before the last part of chapter 2. Hosea's human sorrow had taught him to realise the Divine sorrow; but it was the Divine redeeming love which taught him the lesson of forgiveness and restoration. It is not, as Nygren would have it if we were to apply his teaching, that the parable of God's love as the Husband of Israel teaches that He behaves in a way utterly different from any human husband, thereby proving the absolute antithesis between agape and eros: the point is that the lesson of God's love as the Husband of His people teaches human husbands how they ought to act, what is implicit and potential in that husbandly love which is, alas, so widely perverted on earth, and it supplies the inspiration whereby the human husband imitates the Divine, and thus is enabled to fulfil the deepest implications of the relationship of 'husband'. This, of course, is in entire accord with the view that the ground of the Divine image in man is to be found in his natural instincts and affections.

This parallel between the love of an earthly husband and the love of God as the Husband of His people is also strongly suggested by the book of the Song of Songs. There is no doubt that in its primary and literal meaning the subject of this book is that of the love between man and maid. Some see in this book merely a collection of Hebrew love poems. Others discern a unity of structure which gives the book as a whole a dramatic quality, and recognise either two chief characters in the dialogue, viz. King Solomon and a Shulamite maiden, or, like Driver, following Ewald, three chief characters, viz. Solomon, the Shulamite maid, and her shepherd lover. According to the latter view, the Shulamite maid remains loyal to her shepherd lover in spite of all the inducements of the king. At last she is allowed to return home, and at the end of the poem "the lovers appear hand in hand, and express, in warm and glowing words, the superiority of genuine, spontaneous affection over that which may be purchased by wealth or rank".*

After much hesitating approval, the Song of Songs was, under what we must surely recognise as God's over-ruling providence, given final canonicity among the Old Testament scriptures at the Synod of Jamnia in A.D. 90. In the record of God's special revelation of Himself in the spiritual history of the chosen and typical race, the space of a whole book has been found for the hallowing of that passion which plays so vital a part in the life of man, and which is the underlying theme of so much poetry and romance, nor is the passion emasculated of its outward and physical forms of expression, for in the poem these aspects are prominent.

Thus read, the book may be to a Christian man or woman in a special sense God's own abiding lesson of the whole-hearted loyalty which should characterise the love between man and maid, husband and wife. So

* Driver: "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament", p. 411.

far from its language rousing unlawful and uncontrolled sexual passion, it should serve to concentrate sexual passion upon its lawful object and to render it self-controlled and wholesome, because it is taken up unto God and hallowed, that it may be the sacrament of a true, pure, and lasting love that is worthy of the name.

Such an understanding of the book makes most fitting the secondary interpretation that the book is an allegory of the love between God and His people or between Christ and His Church. When we think of the Bible's opening doctrine of human nature, that it is created in God's image, and when we recall the lesson which Hosea learned through his domestic experience about the character of God and about the true nature of husbandly love, and when we remember S. Paul's teaching in Ephesians 5, 22-33 that marriage signifies the mystical union betwixt Christ and His Church, are we to say that the allegorical interpretation just mentioned is a merely fanciful and arbitrary one, however spiritually profitable, and not rather that it is justified by the fact that the love between man and maid is a reflection of a corresponding love in the Divine nature, manifested in God's love for His people and in Christ's love for His Church?

In the latter chapters of Isaiah the people of God is often personified under the aspect of a mother, individual Israelites being her sons, and in 49, 14-16 the love of God is measured by the love of a mother. "But Zion said, Yahweh hath forsaken me. Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb? Yea, these may forget, yet will not I forget thee. Behold, I have graven thee upon the palms of My hands, thy walls are continually before Me" (the walls of Jerusalem are, as it were, tattooed upon the

Divine hands). Here again, the point is not that there is no likeness whatever between human motherhood and Divine 'Motherhood': rather human motherhood is a reflection of the perfect Divine pattern. We may compare our Lord's words, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not". *

It may not be beside the point, in an essay supporting by Biblical doctrine the view that, because God is love, the ground of the Divine image in man lies in the sphere of human feeling, and that the contention that God is 'Wholly Other' is erring and mischievous, to adduce in the chain of scriptural evidence the fact that the feasts of the passover, pentecost, and tabernacles, which were originally feasts connected with the harvest, became eventually instruments respectively for the commemoration of the Exodus, the giving of the Law, and the wandering in the wilderness. The significance of this is that the God of revelation is thus shown to be also the God of nature. The holy and transcendent One is also the God Who is closely concerned with the interests of every-day human life, such as farming and other fields of human labour, man's food, and hospitals and other institutions for the sick and needy. It is this truth which underlies the popular appeal which Christian Harvest Festivals make to-day to the heart of men.

In a similar connection we may instance also the general nature of the Psalter. Perhaps its two most striking features are its humanity and its tone of spiritual devotion. It is the intensity of these two features which constitutes the catholicity of the Psalter. As it is the intense, sheer, and varied humanity of the plays of Shakespeare which has given them their universal appeal in successive

ages in the sphere of the drama, so it is the sheer, stark, versatile humanity in its Godward aspect which we find in the psalms that gives the latter a universal and unrivalled place in the language of religious devotion of all time.

The devotional element in the Psalter is too manifest to need much description. Here we find the soul in converse with God: outbursts of praise and worship, liturgical invocations, expressions of faith, penitence, resignation, joy in God's presence, meditations on God's providence, etc..

The point which we need particularly to notice, however, is that the devotional element is inseparably connected with matters of the most human and natural interest: God's glory in the material heavens^a; His majesty in the storm^b; His glory in nature^c; the harvest^d; petitions for help in sickness^e, persecution^f, or other earthly trouble; complaints of national oppression or disaster^g; God's wondrous works in the national history^h; psalms relating to the kingⁱ; God's active moral judgment of the world^j; Thanksgiving for deliverance from outward evils in personal and national life^k. The God of the Psalter is anything but Wholly Other.

We may say that in the psalms man appears in his distinctively human character, i.e. as holding converse with his Creator, exercising that crown of human faculties the neglect of which is fundamentally responsible for the evils which oppress the world to-day.

We are brought into contact with another strand in the Biblical doctrine of feeling, in the development of thought in connection with the problem of suffering. The earliest solution, containing a truth

a/ e.g. Ps. 19¹⁻⁶ b/ e.g. Ps. 29 c/ e.g. Ps. 104 d/ e.g. Ps. 65⁹⁻¹⁴ e/ e.g. Ps. 38
f/ e.g. Ps. 10 g/ e.g. Ps. 77 h/ e.g. Pss. 105 & 106 i/ e.g. Pss. 20 & 21 j/ e.g. Ps. 50
k/ e.g. Ps. 9

the great importance of which has been sadly neglected in the years between the present war and the last, is that suffering is retribution for sin.^a This truth finds an extension in the idea of suffering as discipline.^b The fact of the suffering of the innocent, however, led to other lines of solution. One of the most obvious of these was that the inequalities of this life may be put right in a life after death.^c The pessimism of the author of Ecclesiastes gives up the problem as inexplicable.^d In the great book of Job it is revealed that the suffering of the innocent does fulfil a Divine purpose, even though that purpose be not fully understood; it can be at any rate a Divine test of the disinterestedness of human piety.^e But it is in the wonderful conception of the suffering servant of Yahweh in the teaching of deutero-Isaiah that we behold the height of Old Testament revelation respecting this subject, and are given a deeper glimpse of the Divine purpose lying behind human & innocent suffering.

There are various interpretations as to the identity of the servant. It seems likely that each contains some truth, and that, as George Adam Smith thinks,^f the earlier portraits of the servant refer to the nation at large, then in later portraits the reference was narrowed down to connote the faithful remnant of the nation, and last of all the conception was concentrated upon one ideal individual, possibly suggested by the example of Jeremiah.

The doctrine^g is that, in the working out of the Divine purpose, suffering may be a vocation, which can exercise a redemptive effect upon others; and it holds out the promise of the final exaltation or vindication of the sufferer.

^a e.g. Amos 4.⁶⁻¹² Hos. 4.⁹ Is. 1.⁵ Mic 3.^{10, 12} Deut. 28.²⁵ Hag. 1.^{5 f.} Other passages look forward in faith to the vindication of the righteous & judgment of the wicked in this life, e.g. Hab. 1.^{13, 2, 4} Ps. 37. The blessedness of the knowledge of God in this life is also held up as more than compensation for this world's sufferings & injustices, e.g. Ps. 73. ^b e.g. Job 5.¹⁷⁻¹⁸, 32-37. ^c e.g. Job 14.¹³⁻¹⁵ ^d Eccl. 9.² ^e N.B. Job 1.⁸⁻¹², 2.³⁻⁶ ^f Commentary on Is. 40-66, Chap. XVI, pp. 252-277. ^g Is. 52.¹³⁻⁵³ and 54.¹ The servant's exaltation is through death.

The conception of the suffering servant is obviously fulfilled in the passion, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. In Him the doctrine of vicarious and redemptive suffering is fully manifested. Moreover, the suffering which He endured sounds the depth of the common suffering of all mankind, and supplies an inspiration to all innocent sufferers. "For it became Him, for Whom are all things and through Whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings".* The epistle to the Hebrews brings out clearly the truth that the law of the cross as the way to the crown, of attainment by means of sacrifice, of life by means of death, is a fundamental law of human life in this world.†

The Johannine doctrine of Jesus as the Way‡ likewise implies that the passion and final triumph of Jesus are principles or laws which must be reproduced, through union with Christ, in the experience of every sincere christian. It is faith in Jesus as the Divine, creative, Word made flesh‡ which gives this doctrine a rational and logical basis.

The same view is implicit in S. Paul's doctrine of baptism in Romans 6.I-II, according to which those who are united with Christ by faith, through baptism, should reckon themselves dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus - "continually mortifying our evil and corrupt affections, and daily proceeding in all virtue and godliness of living", in the words of the Anglican Baptismal Office.

The same conception underlies S. Paul's philosophy of history in Romans 9-II. Peoples or social movements or influential individuals are elect vessels, in which some peculiar gift is to be developed and

* Heb 2¹⁰ † cf. Heb 12¹⁻¹² § John 14⁶. v. Hort, Hulsean Lectures, 1871, on 'The Way, the Truth, & the Life'.

‡ John 1¹⁴

then poured out, through the breaking of the vessel, for the benefit of mankind as a whole; in so far as the vessel is unfaithful to its vocation, it inevitably declines and falls, but in the very process God's merciful providence brings about, usually in a faithful remnant, a fresh concentration of the special gift in even greater richness for the benefit of mankind. S. Paul, of course, is dealing specifically with the problem of Israel's unfaithfulness in the rejection of the Gospel, but his argument may be applied generally in the way just stated.

We thus see how the principle of the cross, or sacrifice, lies at the heart of human life. The suffering of the cross is the exhibition of that love which lays down its life for its friends. Does not all that has been said make it clear that, however much the reason and the will be involved, even if the latter be explained as ^{movement toward a} ~~the rational de-~~ ^{desired end,} ~~sire for God,~~ man's deepest instincts and emotions are also so greatly involved ~~that~~ as to justify the view that feeling is the ground of the Divine image in man?

This contention may be strengthened by the reflection that the sacrifice of Christ is, as the epistle to the Hebrews shows, the fulfilment of the Old Testament sacrificial system. Sacrifices involving the shedding of blood seem to be prompted by ~~one~~ as a deep and universal instinct of primitive man, and that instinct is vindicated and enlightened by the christian teaching that every follower of the Son of Man must take up his own cross daily. The Old Testament sacrifices were designed to teach men, among other things, that God Himself is desirous of communion with His human creatures.

* This statement is in no way meant to ignore the "instrumental" aspect of the statement, viz. the truth that Christ has effected a change in man's relation to God which we could never have done for ourselves.

+ Such element of feeling as might be thought to be included in this scholastic view of the will was regarded, when God was the object of the desire, from an intellectual & rational standpoint, and emotion as such was not seriously accounted for in such a connection.

§ 16.9 23.24

and that He Himself takes the initiative in providing the means whereby it may be brought about. "And thou shalt put the mercy-seat above upon the ark . . . , and there I will meet with thee, and I will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the two cherubim which are upon the ark of the testimony" (Ex. 25, 21-22). Man's instinct for sacrifice is the answer to something in the nature of the God Who "so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son".

It was noted above (page 293) that one of the most obvious lines of solution of the problem of innocent suffering in the Old Testament lay in the hope of a life after death. Now, Hebrew thought did not conceive of human nature as a dualism of soul plus body, like the Greeks, but as a unity. If there was to be any restoration from death worthy of the name, it must be the restoration of the whole man, body and soul. In earlier Hebrew thought the dead were vaguely supposed to exist, not as 'souls', but as 'shades' (שֵׁדִים),^{*} in Sheol. The characteristic feature of this existence was its unattractive weakness.[†] But as the idea of a future life developed, the doctrine of a bodily resurrection at last became explicit.[‡] Another line of thought was strongly active in the growing hope of a future life, viz. the increasingly monotheistic conception of God and the idea of fellowship with Him. If God be what He is believed to be, then death cannot possibly put an end to a fellowship to which God is partner. This conviction should probably be connected with the idea of the Divine covenant. If God has made a covenant with Israel which, rightly understood, is eventually to bring blessing to all the nations of the earth in the establishment of a universal Kingdom of God, and if the people of God die having

* 'Remains' or 'relics' would probably be a nearer translation.

† Is. 14 9-11

‡ Is. 26 19 Dan 12 2

received at best only part of the promise, then God can be trusted to fulfil it to them in His own good time beyond the grave. This is the argument of Hebrews II.39-40. The same argument ~~app~~ underlies the passage in Romans 8.23. Christians have received the gift (or 'first-fruit' or 'instalment' or 'foretaste') of the Holy Spirit, but they have yet to look for 'the redemption' of the body. We may compare our Lord's argument about the Bush passage. God said "I am the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob"; He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.* We may also notice the repeated refrain in the sixth chapter of the fourth Gospel, in the Bread of Life discourse, "I will raise him up at the last day",† and the Lord's words to Martha, "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in Me shall never die".‡

The relevance of the last paragraph lies in the connection between the doctrine of the resurrection and the problem of the suffering, and also in the fact of the Hebrew conception of man's constitution as an inseparable unity. The resurrection of Christ vindicates the hope of innocent sufferers and corroborates the Hebrew view of man. In the light of these considerations are we not justified in the conclusion that feeling, which is so closely connected with man's body in this life, is a most important, essential, and permanent element in man's constitution, though in the future life it will be mediated, not through a physical, but a 'resurrection' body?

Our examination of the Biblical doctrine of feeling began with the suggestion, based on archaeological discovery, that the decisive

* Mk 12²⁶ Mt 22³² Lk 20³⁷

† vv. 40, 44, 54 - cf. v. 39

‡ John 11^{25, 26}

link in the transition from polytheism to monolatry and thence to monotheism lay in faith in the god of the family. Whether this was so or not, it is certainly true that Divine revelation as recorded in the patriarchal stories of Genesis is very much concerned with the life of the family. This essay will close with a consideration of the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God.

The doctrine is foreshadowed in the Old Testament. In a fragment of very ancient mythology preserved in Gen. 6.1-4 the angels are referred to as 'sons of God'; and much later, in Job 1.6 and 2.1, they are again described by this title.

In the Book of the Covenant (Ex. 20.23-23.33) the priests who consulted the oracles are called 'elohim'. *

In 2 Sam. 7.14 God's anointed King is referred to as in a special sense His son (cf. Ps. 2.7 and 89.27).

In Psalm 82.6 magistrates are reproved for unjust judgment. "I said, Ye are elohim, and all of you sons of the most High." This passage is recorded in John 10.34-36 as referred to by our Lord. "Is it not written in your Law, I said, ye are gods? If He called them gods, unto whom the word of God came . . . , say ye of Him, Whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am God's Son?" It is argued by some that elohim is never used in the Old Testament with reference to men or angels. The use made of this psalm in the fourth gospel, however, is evidence that at that time the word elohim in this particular passage, at any rate, was understood as referring to men in high position. The argument is, If earthly authorities had some share in the Divine nature, how much more the incarnate Logos?

* Ex. 21.6, 22.8, 28. In each of these places, however, R.V. renders 'God', with 'judges' as the marginal reading.

The nation of Israel as a whole is also sometimes spoken of as God's son: e.g. Ex. 4.22, "Thus saith Yahweh, Israel is My son, My first-born"; in the song of Moses (Dt. 32.6-10); and in Hos. II.1, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called My son out of Egypt". This use is extended to individual Israelites: "Ye are sons unto Yahweh your God" (Dt. 14.1). Cf. also Hos. I.10.

We may therefore say that the Old Testament idea of sonship to God is that of special nearness to Him through the status conferred by the calling to positions of special privilege and responsibility: men in high position, the nation as a whole, individual Israelites, and above all the ideal theocratic king, who may thus appropriately be regarded as the son of God par excellence.

In the Old Testament, however, the conception of the Fatherhood of God is occasional; in the New Testament it is habitual and characteristic. God is in a unique way the Father of Jesus. This thesis takes the doctrine of the incarnation for granted as the only adequate interpretation of the facts connected with the problem of Christ's Person, and assumes the catholic doctrine of the eternal generation of the only-begotten Son. It is the Divine Sonship of Jesus which is the key to the understanding of the New Testament doctrine of the Fatherhood of God respecting the human race, and of the Old Testament conception of God's Fatherhood, while it also throws light upon the emphasis which the record of Divine revelation lays on the importance of the family and would explain the suggestion that ~~Abrah~~ Abraham's conversion was due to his faith in the God of the family.

In the synoptic gospels the disciples of Jesus are taught by Him to regard God as their Father. But His teaching implies more than

this. Jesus is represented as teaching His disciples to love all men, even their enemies. Sonship to God involves moral likeness. "That ye may be sons of your Father Which is in heaven; for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good ...".* There is universalism here. It is as the Father that God loves and blesses all. Similarly, Jesus teaches His disciples that it is their Father, not the Father of the birds, who feeds the birds.[†] The implication is not a contrast between believers and unbelievers, but between men as men, who have God as their Father, and birds, who, though God cares for them, cannot, as men can, call Him their Father. The parable of the Prodigal son,[§] again, though of special significance for the baptised, is of universal significance. The younger son may be any man. Though he was not worthy to be called God's son, yet God still remained his Father.

The Pauline use is even clearer. St. Paul bows his knees unto the Father, from Whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named (Eph. 4.14,15). All earthly fatherhoods are here declared to derive their essential nature from the Divine pattern.

"All fathers learn their craft from Thee;

All loves are shadows cast

By the beautiful eternal hills

Of Thine unbeginning past."

Even the fatherhood of the animals, so manifestly inferior to human fatherhood, may be included, so far as it goes, within the range of St. Paul's statement. Their fatherhood, as such, is a reflection of the Fatherhood of the Divine Creator: but we could never speak of them as created in the image of God, for they lack such human qualities as reason, conscience, freedom of choice, sense of beauty, capacity for

* Mt. 5⁴⁵ † Mt. 6⁴⁶ § Nygren's interpretation is refuted on pp. 88-89.

fellowship with their Creator. Human fatherhood needs to be interpreted in the light of the other marks of essential human nature.

S. Paul also writes in the same epistle of one God and Father of all, Who is over all, and through all, and in all.^a

In the Johannine writings God is referred to as 'the Father' without qualification.^b God so loved the world, i.e. as represented by mankind especially, the kosmos which has lost its centre, which knew not the Word through Whom it was made, though He was in the world.^c God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son.^d God's love and Fatherhood are universal.

On the other hand, the synoptic gospels teach that sonship to God involves moral obedience, conformation in moral character to the likeness of God.^e

Likewise S. Paul writes of receiving the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father, and declares that as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God - and this in a passage in which he shows that the power of the Spirit alone can enable us to fulfil the requirement of the moral law.^f It is, he teaches, in baptism that we receive the adoption of sons.^g

Again, the fourth gospel states that "as many as received Him, to them gave He the right to become children to God, even to them that believe on His Name".^h And we have already seen, in our discussion of Nygren's theology, that it is characteristic of the Johannine teaching to emphasise the agape which exists between the Father and those who believe on His Son.ⁱ

This apparent dualism, which is of course the same as that which

a/ Eph 4⁶ b/ John 4²³ 15¹⁶ 16²³, 1 John 2¹ c/ John 1¹⁰ d/ John 3¹⁶ e/ Mt. 5⁴⁴⁻⁴⁶
 f/ Rom 6¹⁻¹⁵ g/ Gal 3²⁷ cf. 4⁴⁻⁷ & 1 Co 12¹²⁻¹³ h/ John 1¹² i/ p. 91.

Brunner

Nygren distinguishes by the terms 'formal' and 'material' image^{*}, is reconciled by the fact of the Divine Sonship of Christ. The only-begotten Son is the uncreated image of God. Man is the created image. The only-begotten Son is therefore, in Platonic language, the ideal, archetypal, Form of Man, after the image or in the pattern of which men are fashioned. It is only by virtue of their relationship to Christ that men are sons of God. Man is created in Christ, but his tragedy is that he has turned away from the true Root of his being. But we have also the tremendous fact that the only-begotten Son has Himself become Man, and has redeemed all mankind, and it is still possible for men, in spite of their sin, to take up their rightful position in Christ as sons of God, and to be the men of God's creative purpose.

It is this truth of man's relationship to God in Christ which throws light on the Old Testament conception of sonship to God and brings it into line with New Testament doctrine. We saw that the Old Testament conception is that of special nearness to God through the status conferred by vocation. It is, whether they know it or not, in Christ that men are called to their various positions in the structure of human society, for the service of the community, and every individual human-being, however humble, has a vocation to fulfil. This principle is summed up and concentrated for us in the office of kingship. It is in each man's particular vocation in the common body, to which he is called by Christ the Lord of mankind, that he is to realise and manifest his sonship.

Furthermore, the Divine Sonship of Christ explains the important

place given to the family in the record of Divine revelation. If the eternal relationship between the first two Persons of the Blessed Trinity is best revealed in the conceptions of 'father' and 'son', the honour accorded to family life in the Bible is only what we should expect. And if the doctrine of man's creation in God's image be indeed true, which is what this thesis has been labouring to show, then the terms 'Father' and 'Son' as applied to the first two Persons of the Trinity are not mere projections of our human experience upon our ideas of God, but the human relationship of father and son exists because ~~it~~ a corresponding relationship existed beforehand within the eternal life of the Deity. In this light the suggestion that Abraham's conversion was due to his faith in the God of the family would also obviously be fitting.

The subject of Divine and human fatherhood and sonship bears closely upon the discussion of faith and feeling, for the relationships of family life are inseparably connected with feeling. ~~Indeed~~ Indeed, in human life fatherhood seems to be so rooted in the natural instinct, however much reason and conscience may also be brought into play, that feeling may be justly regarded as its most characteristic element. In the light of these considerations the revelation of the Father and the Son within the Godhead, together with the revelation that God is Love, strongly supports the view that the ground of the Divine image in man lies within the sphere of feeling.

CHAPTER VI

THE HOLY

It is the merit of Rudolf Otto to have shown that in the idea of the holy man possesses an instinctive, intuitive, faculty for entering into direct relation and fellowship with his Creator, and that this religious sense is as distinct a category of human experience as reason, conscience, and the aesthetic sense. His contention, however, that the proper sphere of operation of the religious or 'numinous' sense of the holy is ^{essentially non-rational and} wholly different in kind from all other human experience has been challenged in the foregoing pages.*

In his book 'The Idea of the Holy' Otto devotes two chapters to an examination of numinous ideas and passages in the Old and New Testament respectively. The rationale of his argument is as follows. Having shown by examples of ideas common in the earlier stages of the religion of Israel that the idea of the 'numinous' was prominent, and having shown that the idea of the holy can also be discerned in the more rational ideas of later stages of Israel's religious development and in the New Testament, he infers that the specific object of the sense of the holy is itself necessarily non-rational and wholly other, and that the rational ideas of more advanced stages of religious development are, as it were, translations of the essentially non-rational and wholly other into terms of natural human experience.

* v. esp. pp. 71-83

But it does not follow that, because the first cries and gropings of a human babe for its mother are due to instinct, the mother's love and care for it are essentially non-rational and non-moral, or that the cries and gropings of the infant, though not consciously rational, are in principle non-rational. In the last chapter evidence was adduced from the patriarchal narratives in Genesis in support of the view that the transition from natural to revealed religion depended on the fact that the latter, however much the operation of the sense of the holy was involved, was addressed primarily to the common natural experience of man. It would be possible to bring forward instances from the Bible, many of them the very instances brought forward by Otto himself, in which it could be shown that rational and moral ideas exist in closest proximity to the idea of the holy, and we should have as much reason on our side as Otto has on his, if we used these facts as an argument in support of our view that the Holy One is essentially a rational and ethical Being and not 'Wholly Other'. The evidence provided by such a course would indeed be a weighty answer to a theory which denied that rational ideas have any place at all in true religion, but it would not be a decisive refutation of a view which, like Otto's, makes willing recognition of the development of rational ideas, but as rationalisations, in terms of human experience, of that which in itself is essentially non-rational and wholly other. There would be little point, therefore, in this essay, in labouring to compile a careful chain of Biblical evidence showing the close connection of rational and moral ideas with the idea of the holy, but the scriptural evidence adduced by Otto will be briefly reviewed, certain parts of it, where it seems necessary, receiving

fuller treatment.

Otto analysed the holy as 'Mysterium tremendum et fascinans'. We need not hesitate to assent, provided that the term 'mysterium' be not pressed to mean the 'wholly other'. This aspect of the holy represents the proper attitude of the creature, qua creature, in the presence of its Creator. There is, however, another aspect of the holy which we desire to emphasise, and that is the thought of holiness as separation from moral evil. It is in the higher developments of revealed religion that this aspect of the idea of the holy becomes clear. We are concerned to maintain, against Otto, that this is not a mere human rationalisation of something which is itself wholly other, but that, on the contrary, it is an essential and vital ~~element~~ element in the holy. Man may begin, in the primitive stages of religion, with recognition only of that aspect of the holy which the very fact of his creaturehood calls forth in the presence of his Creator and of the unseen, and this recognition is enhanced, especially the 'tremendum' element in it, by the fact of human sin; but this is an incomplete recognition of all that the holy really is, and it is not until he learns that the holy also essentially includes the idea of separation from moral evil that he apprehends the full meaning of holiness. It is not the supernatural in distinction from the natural,^{*} nor faith in contrast with reason,[†] but the mark of separation from sin as moral evil which characterises the true life of faith.

There is a further thought suggested by the idea of the holy, a thought upon which christian doctrine has valuable light to throw, and which will be considered after the scriptural evidence adduced by Otto in support of his opinions has been reviewed, viz. that if the
 * as emphasised by medieval Scholasticism & by Roman Catholicism.
 † as emphasised by Lutherans & the Bartheian school.

Biblical doctrine that ^mMan is created in God's image be true, then, though we can apprehend or grasp that which God has revealed to us of Himself in general and special revelation, ^{yet} because He is incompre-hensible (i.e. cannot be wholly mastered or grasped or understood or measured by human reason), ^{*}man must be incomprehensible too. The idea of the holy, in as far as it is concerned with the specific relations of the human creature, as creature, and the Creator, is concerned with those depths of Divine and human being which the reason of man is not able to plumb.

We may now proceed to our review of the Biblical numinous ideas and passages cited by Otto.

His references to Gen. 18.27 (Abraham's intercession - "Behold now, I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes") and Gen. 32.24-32 (Jacob's wrestling at Peniel) need no comment in view of what has been said above, for this essay admits the 'numinous' element, and sees in them a rational element also.

He instances [†]Ex. 4.24 § (the passage in which it is said that Yahweh met Moses on his way at the lodging place, and sought to kill him because of the uncircumcision of the son whom Zipporah had borne to him), and draws an analogy from the case of music. He argues that, if primitive music be compared with good developed music, it will be found that the former contains the same essence as the latter, and that on the same principle the numinous tone of the Old Testament passage in question is the essence also of advanced religion. But surely primitive music may contain some features which more developed taste recognises as erroneous, and the numinous ideas of primitive

* The word 'incomprehensible' in verse 9 of the Athanasian Creed is a translation of the Latin 'immensus', though it may have come in to the English version through a Greek translation, & κατὰ ληπτος.

† The Idea of the Holy, pp. 75-76.

religion may contain some erroneous features which are ^{largely} due to man's sinful condition.

Otto adduces the Biblical term 'the living God',^{*} and states: "It is by His 'life' that this God is differentiated from all mere 'World Reason', and becomes this ultimately non-rational essence, that eludes all philosophic treatment."[†] We should amend: "It is by the fact that He is God, a living God in contrast to all other gods, that He is differentiated from mere man, as ~~Greater~~ Creator from creature, not as non-rational from rational, for He is a rational Creator, though His Divine reason infinitely transcends that of His creature man."

Isaiah is recognised by Otto as "the capital instance of the intimate mutual interpenetration of the numinous with the rational and moral",[‡] and Isaiah 6 is given as the grand example. The same, he says, is true of Deutero-Isaiah, where the transcendent holiness of God is combined with the thought of His rational care for His people. Both the first and second Isaiah, however, can just as well be used in support of the view maintained in this essay, and in the second Isaiah especially it is notable that the very majestic transcendence of God is used as an argument for His control of human history, His immanence, His great tenderness. The magnificent passage 40.12-31, for example, brings out clearly the point that, because the Creator is of such transcendent majesty, therefore He has the most intimate knowledge of, and tender care for, His people. Or again, in 41.1-5, in the description of the alarm of the nations at the triumphant progress of Cyrus, God's ordering and control of human history are plainly shown as the fitting actions of the transcendent Divine holiness.

* e.g. Dt. 5²⁶ Jer 10¹⁰ Heb 10³¹
 † The Idea of the Holy, pp. 78-79
 ‡ *ibid.* p. 78

Otto thinks less highly of Ezekiel. He describes Ezekiel's dreams as "an example by anticipation of the later more spurious sort of excitement of the religious impulse to the mysterious, leading . . . to the merely strange, the extraordinary, the marvellous, and the fantastic."^{*} This does not do justice to the very rational features which are nevertheless characteristic of Ezekiel. It would be ~~difficult~~ difficult to find more definitely ethical teaching than his doctrine of the responsibility of the individual in chapter 18. His emphasis on holiness was not divorced from daily life nor 'wholly other': it was ethical. Again, with regard to Ezekiel's visions, it has already been pointed out[†] how, in the very midst of a revelation of Divine transcendence and holiness, we reach the climax in the following words: "And upon the likeness of the throne was a likeness as the appearance of a man upon it above."[§]

The body of laws contained in Leviticus 17-26, known as the Holiness Code, bears a close resemblance, both in teaching and literary style, to Ezekiel, and suggests that it is the product of a school of thought which that prophet represented. The later priestly legislation is a developed and completed codification of the laws for the restored exiles summarised in Ezekiel 40-48. A significant point may be discerned respecting the laws of clean and unclean meats, of the purification of women, of the diagnosis and cleansing of leprosy, and of personal cleanliness, in Leviticus 11-15, which belong to the Priestly Code. Here is a description of many regulations inspired by the idea of the holy. No doubt many of them, regarded from the standpoint of the securing of public welfare, have since been proved erroneous.

* The Idea of the Holy, p. 79

† p. 170

§ Ezek. 1²⁶

Nevertheless these regulations do contain substantial anticipations of the discoveries of later medical science and hygiene. Is not this a solid piece of evidence in support of our contention, against Otto, that the idea of the holy, even in its more primitive forms, though it may not be consciously rational, is not essentially non-rational in principle?

Otto makes much, for his purpose, of the book of Job, especially chapter 38. Respecting the argument of that chapter he states: "In the last resort it relies on something quite different from anything that can be exhaustively rendered in rational concepts, namely, on the sheer absolute wondrousness that transcends thought, on the mysterium, presented in its pure, non-rational form.*" The book of Job has already been used in this thesis,† in the chapter on Faith and Reason, in support of an argument for the rational nature of Old Testament revelation. Otto contends that the animals mentioned in chapters 39, and especially 40 and 41, are carefully chosen instances which suggest, not the Divine wisdom, but the sheer power of God, and that the appeal to Divine wisdom is absent from Yahweh's discourse. It does not seem to the writer of this essay that Otto's contention is evident: to him the descriptions recorded in chapters 39, 40, and 41 cannot exclude the thought of the Divine wisdom, even though the purpose of that wisdom be not always apparent. In any case, we have in chapter 38 a brilliant description of the subject matter of the modern sciences of geology, physiography, meteorology, and astronomy - of course from the ancient point of view, and with the ancient limitations of knowledge. Surely all this includes an appeal to God's wisdom, and it is not noticed by Otto.

* The Idea of the Holy, p. 81.

† pp. 234-235

Three other Old Testament passages are mentioned by Otto. One is Daniel's vision, in Dan. 10.5-8, of a man described in symbolic language which, with that of Ezekiel's vision, is echoed in the vision of St. John the divine recorded in Rev. I. This passage would be equally useful as evidence for the intimate connection of the rational with the idea of the holy. The other two passages, Psalm 104.32 and 114.3, certainly need not be interpreted as suggestive of the 'Wholly Other', but of the Creator Whose attributes are manifested in His works.

The first of the evidence enumerated by Otto from the New Testament is the conception of 'The Kingdom of God' in the synoptic gospels. "As against all ~~attempts~~ rationalizing attempts to tone it down into something less startling, the most recent research shows quite decisively that the 'Kingdom' is just greatness and marvel absolute, the 'wholly other' 'heavenly' thing, set in contrast to the world of here and now, the 'mysterious' itself in its dual character as awe-compelling yet all-attracting, glimmering in an atmosphere of genuine 'religious awe'." We beg to disagree fundamentally with such an assertion. How can the Kingdom of God be 'wholly other' when we are repeatedly taught by our Lord in parable after parable that the "the Kingdom of heaven is like unto" something with which we are familiar on earth? Enough has already been said on this point in our discussion of Nygren's theology[†] to make it unnecessary to say any more. Of course there is a contrast between the Divine Kingdom and 'the world of here and now' - the contrast between the eternal and the temporal: but to call it a contrast of the wholly other is to evacuate the parables of Jesus of all real meaning.

We pass over Otto's references to the petition 'hallowed be Thy

* *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 85.

† pp. 88-89.

Name' in the Lord's Prayer, and to Matt. 10.28 and 21.41, as being obviously otherwise[†] explicable on lines already put forward in this essay, though, incidentally, the writer feels by no means sure that Matt. 10.28 does not refer to the devil rather than to God.

When, however, Otto explains the Agony of Jesus in Gethsemane as due to His encounter with the sheer mystery of the Wholly Other, he seems to be deserting the field of reasonable exegesis and to be advancing a purely arbitrary view in the interest of his theory. Christians have always felt incompetent to enter into the depths of our Lord's experience on this occasion, but it has been almost universally agreed that His agony was due to the overwhelming weight of the sin of the world which the Lamb of God was taking upon Himself in order to remove.

We come to Otto's examination of Pauline theology. Verses 18, 24, 26, 28, and 29 of the first chapter of Romans are easily susceptible of a rational and moral interpretation. So is his doctrine of the flesh, which has already been discussed^{*}, and was regarded by him from a strongly ethical standpoint.

The Pauline doctrine of predestination is claimed by Otto[†] as rooted in a non-rational idea of the holy and wholly other. He holds that it is "not explicable by the 'scientific' notion of universal causal connexion", and that it springs from two distinct aspects of thought, (a) that of election unto salvation, which belongs to a distinct religious experience, and (b) that of predestination proper (e.g. Rom. 9.18), a non-rational idea which is held in spite of the rational idea of freewill, which is maintained along with it.

We agree that the doctrine does not proceed from any rational^{Consciously}

* pp. 193-200.

† The Idea of the Holy, pp. 90-94.

desire on the human side, and that its origin lies in the sphere of religious experience, in the perfectly proper attempt of the earnest christian to refer the facts of his present state of salvation to the goodness of God and not to any merits of his own. But there is nothing essentially non-rational in principle about this. The christian is right in ascribing his present state of salvation to God's predestination, so long as he does not go on to postulate a doctrine of individual predestination by irresistible grace to final salvation. He is right in ascribing his present salvation to the eternal counsel of God. Another Divine attribute besides the goodness of God is unavoidably emphasised in the fully justifiable and rational desire not to ascribe salvation to the christian's own merits, and that is the sovereign will of God. But it is the sovereign will of a God Who has revealed Himself as perfectly good and perfectly wise, and it is therefore a moral and rational sovereign will, and though the christian's doctrine of predestination has its origin in practical experience rather than in the intellect, not only is it inevitable that theologians should seek a rational explanation of the doctrine, but the doctrine is, in its essential principle, rational. God has revealed His primary will that all men should be saved, and Christ has redeemed all mankind. It is in keeping with this truth to believe that every individual man is created by God in Christ for a good particular purpose, to be realised in Christ. All proceeds from God, including man's gift of freedom of choice, but by the very nature of that gift man may accept or reject the gracious motions of the Spirit of God. When he accepts, his present state of salvation is in truth to be ascribed to the good and sovereign ^{predestinating} will of God.

The doctrine of what Otto calls predestination proper, i.e., predestination to moral evil, presents much greater difficulty. It would seem to arise as an extension of the doctrine of predestination to election, through the desire, characteristic of Hebrew thought, to ascribe all final causes to God, - in itself a rational desire, though it is admittedly not always easy to give a rational explanation of some passages in which the doctrine appears in the Bible. It is possible to do so, however, on the lines that a righteous and wise God has so ordered the universe that evil-doing, if flagrant or persistent, produces a ~~bias to further~~ 'hardening' of the heart which inclines to ~~partake~~ further evil-doing. The whole subject has been discussed at length on pages 211 to 220.

Otto simply mentions as numinous evidence S. Paul's "spiritual terminology of the 'pneuma' "^{*}, without going into any details about it, but the subject is important enough to justify fuller treatment of it here. The important passage I Cor. 2.11-14 was discussed on pages 14 and 34.

Recognition of the work of the Spirit as directly intellectual, i.e. as enlightening the reason, is not an outstanding feature of S. Paul's thought. He thinks of the manifestation of the Spirit as being rather in power and deed. Nevertheless, his emphasis upon the fruits of the Spirit is entirely ethical and social. The righteous ordinance of the Law is to be fulfilled in Christians, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit.[†] The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control.[‡] Faith, hope, and love, are three abiding gifts of

* The Idea of the Holy, p. 89.

† Rom 8⁴ { Even if it were referred to the human spirit, it is still true that in S. Paul's thought the ethical victory of Christians is only possible through the dependence of the human spirit upon the Divine Spirit. } Gal. 5^{22, 23}

the Spirit, but the greatest of these is Love.*

S. Paul's examination of the subject of spiritual gifts in I Cor. 12 to 14 makes clear that whereas many early christians were tempted to regard the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit as His most wonderful and desirable gifts and the test of His presence, to him the most marvellous gift of the Spirit and the most decisive evidence of His presence was the manifestation of christian character, above all, of love. In his doctrine of the Spirit it is upon love that his emphasis falls. "When the religious ideas of the apostolic age are considered, this correlation of the Spirit with man's ethical and practical life seems to be Paul's greatest contribution to the doctrine under consideration" (George Barker Stevens)[†]. Gunkel: "The community regards as pneumatic the extraordinary in the life of the christian, Paul the ordinary; they that which is peculiar to individuals, Paul that which is common to all; they that which occurs abruptly, Paul that which is constant; they the special in the christian life, Paul the christian life itself. Hence the value which the primitive Church attaches to miracles, Paul attaches to the christian state. No more is that which is individual and sporadic held to be the divine in man; the christian is the spiritual man."[‡]

In distinction, moreover, from the Roman catholic view of the christian life as supernatural, and from that of Lutheranism and of the schools of Nygren and Barth, which regard it as contrasted with nature, it is noteworthy that according to S. Paul agape is manifested in such natural virtues as kindness, beneficence, and self-control,[†] and it is the fulfilling of the moral law.[‡] The sphere of the

operation of agape is in man's natural social life, for it is the one
 * 1 Co 13¹³. † The Theology of the New Testament, p. 439. ‡ Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes, p. 81.
 † Gal 5^{22, 23}. Χρηστοτης, ἀγαθοσύνη, and ἐκκερσία may surely be classed among the natural virtues,
 when ὁ μακροθυμία and ἡπιότης are reckoned as characteristically christian. ‡ Ro. 8⁴

power which can enable men rightly to fulfil their vocation in the body of Christ's redeemed humanity; and it is significant to observe how often S. Paul, especially in his epistles to the Romans, Colossians, and Ephesians, after lifting his readers to the loftiest heights of christian doctrine in matters of belief, descends, as it were, suddenly to the lowlands of practical ethical instruction, using his lofty doctrinal teaching as the natural ground and inspiration of his ethical exhortation. In the two latter epistles, ^{*}particularly, the drift of his argument is as follows: "Because your christian Faith is of such abundant richness, therefore be good wives, good husbands, good children, good fathers, good servants, good masters"; and the ethical instruction of Romans 12 is followed in the first seven verses of the next chapter by instruction in the duties of earthly citizenship.

A point of central importance in S. Paul's doctrine of the Spirit is his great phrase $\eta\ \kappa\omicron\iota\kappa\omega\nu\iota\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \text{'}\text{Αγίου Πνεύματος}\text{'}$.[†] Dr. Quick has pointed out [§]the paradox inherent in the combination of the two opposite terms $\kappa\omicron\iota\kappa\omega\nu\iota\alpha$ and $\text{'}\text{Αγιος}\text{'}$. The former suggests something which is $\kappa\omicron\iota\upsilon\varsigma$ or common to all christians, while the latter term suggests separation and exclusiveness. The fact is that the true idea meaning of the idea of the holy has now, since the christian Pentecost, at last been made clear. Before the christian Pentecost God's people were called to be holy unto Him by sharply separating themselves from the heathen world, and in earlier times their separation involved to a considerable extent materialistic notions of taboo. But since the coming of the Holy Spirit the full meaning of their former education is revealed. Devotion of the creature unto the Creator is in any case an awe-ful thing for the creature, but for a sinful creature it is

* Col 3¹⁷-4¹, Eph. 5²⁰-6⁹.

† 2 Co 13¹⁴

§ Doctrines of the Creed, pp. 284-286.

still more awe-ful. The essential thing from which the people of God must separate themselves is sin, i.e. moral evil. Christians are called into a common fellowship of separation from moral evil, in devotion to God. They manifest this freedom from moral evil by the sterling quality of their natural life and its relationships. Thus they become, as the Body of Christ, a sacrament to the rest of mankind, being both a witness as to what man, according to the purpose for which he was created, ought to be, and also an instrument by means of which God carries out that purpose, by bringing others within that common Divine fellowship of separation from moral evil, which represents human society fulfilling those proper functions for which God created it.

In his examination of Johannine doctrine Otto selects the two terms $\phi\omega\varsigma$ and $\xi\omega\eta$, and says that as used by S. John "they are a sheer abounding overplus of the non-rational element in religion." * To the present writer it has always seemed that S. John uses these terms because the natural, rational, ideas associated with them are excellent parables of heavenly truth.

Of S. John's doctrine of the Spirit Otto says: "S. John when he speaks of $\piνευμα$ is not thinking of 'absolute reason' but of that which is in absolute contrast to everything of 'the world' and 'the flesh', the utterly mysterious and miraculous heavenly Being who surpasses all the understanding and reason of the 'natural' man." † The Johannine doctrine of the world and of the flesh, and of the contrast between the flesh and the spirit, has been discussed above, § and the Johannine doctrine of the Holy Spirit has been discussed on pages 238-239. To S. John the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Truth, the Paraclete, Who

* The Idea of the Holy, p. 96.

† Ibid. p. 96.

§ pp. 201-203, 203-204, & 204

respectively.

interprets to the disciples the true meaning of the birth, life, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus, and this ~~illumina~~ interpretation involves the illumination or inspiration of the intellect.

This essay will be concluded with a brief consideration of the thought that the doctrine of man's creation in God's image implies that the incomprehensibility of the Divine nature is reflected in the human creature.

The doctrines of the incarnation and ascension give strong support to this inference. S. John's statement that the Word became flesh involves the statement of S. Paul that in Christ dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead ($\Theta\epsilon\omicron\tau\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$) $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omega\varsigma$ - i.e. 'in bodily wise', 'with a bodily manifestation', (Col. 2.9). Even if $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omega\varsigma$ be understood in the colloquial sense of 'utterly' (so Westcott) or 'really', emphasis is laid on the fact that all the fulness of the Godhead dwelleth in Christ.

The orthodox catholic doctrine, as defined at Chalcedon, is that in the one Person of Christ the Divine nature is united with the human nature inconfusedly ($\alpha\sigma\upsilon\chi\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$), unchangeably ($\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\lambda\alpha\tau\omega\varsigma$), indivisibly ($\alpha\delta\iota\alpha\mu\epsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$), inseparably ($\alpha\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omega\varsigma$).

Some theologians tend to explain ^{certain} difficulties about our Lord's words and deeds as recorded in the gospels by distinguishing between what ~~our~~ He said and did as God, and what He said and did as man. Such a method seems to the writer artificial and to detract from the reality of our Lord's manhood. S. John depicts Jesus as manifesting His Divine glory through His flesh, in such acts as the turning of the water into wine, the miraculous feeding of the five thousand, and the

raising of Lazarus - which are illustrations of His Divine power over the natural creation. The manhood of Jesus is thus the sacrament of His Divinity.

The ascended Christ still unites in His Person the two natures. To say that the process of creation is now being sustained through Him in His Divine nature, and that His human nature has nothing to do with it, would seem to the writer artificial and unreal. But neither must the two natures be confused so as to suggest the attribution of Divine power to the ascended Manhood; rather, as Jesus while on earth manifested His Divine glory through His 'flesh', so the ascended Christ may be conceived as exercising Divine power through His glorified Manhood. The thought of the cosmic functions of the Son of God has indeed given rise to the theory that during the days of His flesh on earth He must have exercised them either unconsciously, or with a separate consciousness. Such guess-theories may be necessary for the period of our Lord's earthly life, but it seems intolerable to think of the cosmic functions of the ascended Christ being carried on now either unconsciously or with a consciousness distinct from His consciousness as Son of Man.

In any case the mystery of the incarnation and the enthronement of Manhood at the right hand of God lead us into a region which passes our understanding, but the mysteries and amazing potentialities of human nature are enhanced still further, when we think of human nature as the sacrament of our Lord's Divinity, both during His earthly life, and also as glorified and ascended.

CHAPTER VII

STATE AND CHURCH

For any enquiry into the true constitution of man's nature the doctrine regarding the State must obviously be of first-class importance. For an enquiry which takes a christian view of man the doctrine concerning the State necessarily becomes a question of the right relationship between State and Church. If, moreover, the doctrine of the creation of man in the image of God is accepted, it is reasonable to see a correspondence between the eternal relationship of Father and Son within the Godhead on the one hand, and the human family on the other, and a further correspondence between the Biblical idea of the Kingdom of God and the natural human kingdom.

In the Republic Plato shows that the first requisite of political thinking is to get our ideals clear and to have a definite conception of the state of things at which we are aiming. There is a passage in the Gorgias in which we are warned that the final test of the work of a statesman is not the public works he built, or the successful wars he waged, but whether he left the citizens better men than he found them.

The Bible, it has often been observed, begins with a picture of man in a garden and ends with a description of the heavenly City, into

which the kings and nations of the earth bring their glory and honour*. If, in our estimate of Biblical doctrine concerning the ideal State, we apply the Platonic advice mentioned in the preceding paragraph, we may say that God's purpose is to form men into a common fellowship with Him, and, through Him, with one another, their individual personalities thus attaining full development.

In the Bible record a particular people was selected to this end, to be, as we should say, a sacrament to the rest of mankind. They were to be both the witnesses of the Divine Kingdom, and the means through which it should be extended. The basis was the family - the family selected from the seed of Abraham. This note of the Kingdom - as resting upon the family principle - constantly recurs throughout the scriptural narrative. In the providence of God the selected family, and the tribes springing from it, are carefully educated for their future role. The very geographical character of the promised land - as a highway between the great empires of the ancient world - is admirably suited to its purpose.

In course of time the Hebrew tribes begin to be formed into a nation. The ground of their national unity and existence is their experience of God as a Deliverer - from bondage in Egypt, and their consequent faith in and loyalty to Him. God is their Ruler and Judge, manifesting Himself through the human leader whom He has chosen. They are given Divine laws for the ordering of their society. These laws are at first, as contained in the Book of the Covenant (Ex. 20.23 - 23.19), of a primitive character, but they contain a germ capable of development later into the Ten Commandments. The laws are largely

ethical, but they include also regulations for worship as a vital part of the life of the community, for this community is essentially a worshipping community. The chiefs of the principal families are naturally regarded as 'elders', being men of position and influence (Ex. 3.16 & 18, 17.5, 18.12 etc.). The 'elders' of Ex. 24.1 are the 'nobles' of verse 11 of that chapter. Josephus makes Moses declare: "Aristocracy is the best constitution" (Ant. VI. viii. 17). This is correct only if it is recognised that the power of government was regarded as coming from God, and the aristocracy as responsible to Him. It seems that it was usually from the elders that judges were appointed (Ex. 18. 21-26, Dt. 16. 18, 21. 2). Then there were the priests. It may be that the word 'elohim' refers to these in Ex. 21. 6, 22. 8 & 28, though in Psalm 82. 6 it refers to judges, and in I Sam. 2. 25 may well refer to the judge. In those early days the priest often performed duties which would later be regarded as specifically within the separate province of the judge. Eli, for instance, was both priest and judge (I S. 1. 9, 4, 18). A colony of priests is mentioned at Nob in I S. 21 & 22. After the time of Moses and Joshua, a series of leaders was raised up who became known as 'judges'. Their ability and military prowess marked them out as pre-eminent among lesser leaders. Moses, Joshua, and the other judge-rulers, seem, as exercising their rule in God's Name, to have combined in their own person the offices civil and ecclesiastical. In any case the civil and ecclesiastical offices were apparently not very clearly distinguished at first, but their functions became gradually definitely separated.

The land was to be divided among the people as their Divinely-

appointed inheritance. Each tribe was to have its portion, 'according to its families'.^{*} There were to be no inequalities, but everyone was to have his appointed share. When the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh asked for more than had been given them, because they were 'a great people', they were given a piece of difficult forest land to reclaim. The method of division by lot may be a primitive method, but its purpose was good - in order that the division might be a fair one, and in accordance with the will of God.

At length the people of Israel ask for a king. Modern Biblical criticism has discovered two distinct narratives in I Sam. 8-12, and regards one as hostile to the monarchy and the other as favourable to it. The present writer must confess that he has always suspected that, in order to explain the apparent discrepancies, it is not really necessary to regard the two narratives as proceeding from conflicting traditions.[†] What is condemned in the people's request in chapter 8 is their motive in desiring a king and their idea of kingship. They desired a king to judge them like all the nations,[§] and to go out before them and fight their battles.[‡] Their idea of a king was the worldly, heathen, idea of a conqueror lording it over others. And yet there was something in their desire for a king which proceeded from a deeper and truer impulse, little though they realised it. For God Himself had an ideal of kingship, an ideal very different from theirs, and one which they could learn only to their great blessing. Therefore their request is to be gratified. They are to be warned as to the manner of king for which they are asking. Bitter experience would drive home the lesson. Their first king would be one who would prove to be of this worldly type. But in due season it was God's purpose to provide them a king

* Josh. 13¹⁵ etc.

† Josh. 17¹⁴⁻¹⁸

§ v. 5

‡ v. 20

See Dt. 17¹⁴⁻²⁰

after His own heart, who should do His will, and through whom it would be possible to reveal the Divine ideal of Kingship. The king after God's heart must be a father to his people, ruling them with the loving care with which a shepherd rules his sheep.

The king of God's people is essentially the Lord's anointed. He possesses greater dignity and authority than the former judge-rulers. His office, moreover, is hereditary. This latter principle is a strong check against the scheming and fighting of ambitious men to obtain the supreme power. It is also a continual witness to the truth that the power of government proceeds from God and not from the people: the ^{modern} democratic election of presidents obscures this truth, though it does indeed prevent ambitious men from rising to supreme power by force or other unconstitutional methods. The hereditary nature of kingship also bears witness, as nothing else could, to the family principle as an essential characteristic of true government - the true ruler must be a father of his people.

Civil and ecclesiastical functions and offices now become increasingly distinct. To begin with, the king himself sometimes performed ecclesiastical functions, but as time went on these were jealously guarded as the peculiar prerogative of the priesthood. When David brought the Ark into Jerusalem, he offered sacrifices himself and blessed the people in the Name of the LORD of hosts. * So did Solomon on the occasion of the dedication of the temple. † But about 150 years later king Uzziah is stoutly resisted by the priest Azariah, according to 2 Chron. 26, for attempting to burn incense upon the altar of incense in the temple.

* 2 S. 6¹⁷⁻¹⁸ & W. 16-23 † 1 K. 8¹⁴ cf. 2 Ch. 6³; 1 K. 8⁶²⁻⁶⁴ cf. 2 Ch. 7⁴⁻⁷ — possibly all the sacrifices were offered through the priests.

Our present purpose scarcely requires us to go with any detail into the complexities involved in a study of the priesthood before the time of Ezekiel. Suffice it to say that probably long before the time when Deuteronomy was written, the priesthood in the southern kingdom had become a hereditary guild, every priest being the son of a priest, and his sons becoming priests. Here again, as in the case of the kingship, we find the family principle. The people of God must never be allowed to forget that they are brothers and sisters of a common family. The later enactments of the priestly code of course rigidly emphasise this hereditary principle.

The king's civil government was not wholly confined to such matters as the punishment of evil-doers, the judgment of disputes, and the general maintenance of order and peace. It also had regard to certain aspects of positive public welfare. We may instance the laws concerning the sabbatical year, and, after the exile and not under the monarchy, the year of jubilee. Some other duties affecting the public welfare were performed by the priesthood, which in our own day have been undertaken by a benevolent government. For example, the oversight of the public health seems to a considerable extent to have devolved upon the priests. The diagnosis of the disease of leprosy and the certifying of its cure was a priestly duty.

In the importance which they attached to the education of the young, it may fairly be claimed that the Hebrews were easily first among the nations of antiquity. Indeed, if the ultimate aim of education be the formation of character, the Hebrew ideals and methods will bear comparison with the best even of modern times. In character Hebrew education was predominantly and almost exclusively religious and

ethical. Its fundamental principle may be expressed in the familiar words: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge" (Prov.I.7). Conduct was recognised as the true test of character. In pre-exilic days the Hebrew child received his education in the home, with his parents as his only instructors. He was instructed in the truths of his ancestral religion (see Dt.6.20-25 and elsewhere), and in the ritual of the recurring festivals there was provided for him object-lessons in history and religion (Ex.I2.26f., I3.8 & I4). In the traditions of his family and race he had a unique storehouse of the highest ideals of faith and conduct.

A phenomenon which had a most profound bearing upon the life of the nation was the remarkable rise of the long line of Hebrew prophets. The great lesson which they sought to drive home to the community was that national well-being depends upon loyalty to the one living and true God, and upon moral righteousness, the two being inseparably connected. From this point of view they interpreted ^{and current politics} history, not only that of their own nation or sister-nation, but also of the surrounding nations and great empires. The prophetic philosophy of history finds a characteristic expression in the work of the writers of the Deuteronomic school, which shows obvious traces of the influence of the eighth century prophets, and is responsible for much of the work of compilation and editing in the books of Joshua, Judges, I and 2 Samuel, and I and 2 Kings. These books are significantly regarded by the Hebrews as among the prophetic literature of the Old Testament, being known as the Former, or Earlier, Prophets - showing that the Hebrews valued history as being God's revelation of Himself through His actual dealings with men. The Deuteronomic selection of

material frequently gave much space to events which, regarded from an isolated scientifically historic point of view, would seem comparatively unimportant, and as frequently omitted events which, regarded from the same point of view, would seem important.

Whatever views may be held to-day as to the 'interference' of the Church in politics, there is no question as to the influence of the prophets upon the politics of their time. Their intervention, however, was not in support of any special political party as such, but was in the Name of Yahweh, in defence of the Faith revealed unto their nation, and as directly championing the cause of righteousness. So Samuel played the part of 'kingmaker' in the anointing of Saul and establishment of the monarchy, and again in the transference of the power from Saul's house to that of David. During the last days of David, the prophet Nathan established the claims of Solomon in opposition to those of his older brother Adonijah. Ahijah foretold the division of the kingdom, and Shemaiah prevented Rehoboam from attempting to change it when once it was an accomplished fact. The house of Jehu owed its establishment to the efforts of Elijah and Elisha. In the eighth century B.C., great material prosperity had brought about a sudden increase in the wealth of the few and corresponding poverty among the lower classes; wealthy nobles had increased their own possessions and enriched themselves to the detriment of the poor, who had even in some cases been reduced to a state of slavery; luxury had increased owing to the spread of commerce, and drunkenness and gluttony followed in its train; the judges who should have remedied these things showed themselves corrupt, and favoured the rich for the sake of their bribes; dishonesty and inhumanity everywhere prevailed;

the women were as bad as the men. Against all these social evils the eighth century prophets raised their voices in no uncertain way. And when the northern kingdom had been swept into captivity by Assyria, and Judah was trembling before that mighty empire, amid the mad game of politics which ensued, in which the leaders of Judah sought by any unscrupulous means to ally with Egypt or some other foreign power and to play it off against Assyria, it was the prophet Isaiah who stood firm and proclaimed his famous message, "In quietness and in confidence shall be your strength, in returning and rest shall ye be saved."^a

We have already discussed, on pages 264-265, the prophetic doctrine of retributive Divine justice as operating on the principle of the law of cause and effect. The Divine wrath is a secondary aspect of the Divine character. We say "God is love" - that is His essential character: but we do not say "God is wrath". God would rather that we did not give Him occasion to show His wrath. His wrath is consequent upon sin.

Another important doctrine of the prophets, the doctrine of the remnant, began to take ever clearer shape as the mass of the people continued to show themselves unresponsive to the prophetic message. We find it as early as the time of Elijah, in the Divine assurance to the despairing prophet of a remnant of seven thousand faithful men in Israel.^b The doctrine takes definite shape with Isaiah,^c and takes a characteristic form in the second Isaiah's idea of the Servant of Yahweh.^d As, in the case of those whom God has appointed to a special vocation in the carrying out of His purpose, the unfaithfulness of the many hinders the accomplishment of that purpose, He continues to carry on His work in fresh forms by means of the faithful few.

^a Is. 30¹⁵

^b 1 K 19¹⁸

^c Is. 10²⁰⁻²³

^d Is. 49⁵

There is for our purpose a feature of the utmost importance in the polity of the Hebrew nation which we must notice before we pass on. The Biblical record represents it as the duty of the State to put down idolatry and to enforce the worship of Yahweh with the power of the civil sword.* Not only are the distinctively moral commandments of the Decalogue to be enforced as the laws of the land, but also those which concern man's duty toward God. The Deuteronomist had no place for the idea of freedom of worship among God's chosen people.

The time comes, however, when first the northern kingdom, and then the southern, are swept to their doom. Samaria fell in 722, Jerusalem in 586. The teaching of the prophets is substantially justified at the bar of history. God's chosen people have proved unfaithful, and His retributive justice has been vindicated. Yet through the national life of the Hebrews God had revealed truths which, in a later age, the countries of Christendom have recognised as of lasting value in the life of nations.

God has not, however, finally taken away from His chosen people their peculiar calling. Before the end of the sixth century He has wonderfully brought back the Jews, through ^{the decree of} Cyrus, into Judaea and Jerusalem from exile. A remnant has been restored. But this remnant has not now an earthly kingdom of its own. It is ruled by a foreign empire. It is now a Church, but the civil government is ordered by a heathen power.

One of the most powerful movements of thought affecting the reconstruction of the returned society was due to the genius and vision of Ezekiel. In him the streams of both prophecy and priestly tradition meet, for he was both priest and prophet. It is, he says in

* See, e.g., Dt. 13; and 2 K 23.

effect, in, and through, and from, the worship of the living God that there flow those springs of vitalising creative energy which can make a new Divine community. Ezekiel's emphasis upon worship, however, was in no way divorced from daily life. His moral teaching is as strong as that of any of the prophets. It would, for instance, be difficult to find more definitely ethical doctrine than his assertion of individual responsibility in chapter 18.

The theme is taken up by the prophets Haggai and Zechariah in their message to the returned exiles. "Make the glory and worship of God the foundation and inspiration of the new order", says Haggai. "And carry the spirit of worship into everyday life", adds the message of Zechariah.

It was the reconstructive programme of Ezekiel which largely inspired the writers of the famous priestly code. These writers re-wrote the history of the Hebrew people, making it their special aim to bring out what was believed to be its real significance, from the point of view of worship. So they are careful to preface the account of the settlement in Canaan with directions for worship, in the last chapters of Exodus and in the book of Leviticus, - directions which are represented as given to the Israelites for the ordering of their life in the wilderness and when they enter the promised land. Again, in the books of Chronicles they re-write, from the point of view of the sanctuary, the history of the monarchy which has already been told in the books of Kings. Once more, the arrangement of the material in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah would suggest that Ezra came before Nehemiah in chronological order, whereas it seems, from other considerations, that the reverse is true. To the compilers the work of Ezra

was first in order of importance, because to them the question of worship is of primary importance in the life of the new community. This essay stands for the view that the priestly compilers were right, not chronologically, but in their estimate of the primary importance of worship, and it maintains that in this they were Divinely guided toward a correct appreciation of the true significance of the history of their race.* Their view, seeing that it has determined the form in which the Biblical record has come down to us, is entitled to be called the 'Biblical' view, and it is endorsed in the New Testament, as, for example, the epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse bear witness.

This lesson of the supreme importance of worship was, however, driven home at the price of the growth of a spirit of exclusive nationalism. We have a good instance of this in the reform carried out by Ezra, putting away the foreign wives whom the Jews had married. Yet in the providence of God the spark of a more liberal and enlightened outlook was kept alight, as the universalism of the book of Jonah and the Wisdom literature testify.^{as}

Another feature of Hebrew prophecy must claim our attention here. During the chequered experiences of the later monarchy, there arose the great hope that God would eventually set up a Kingdom of righteousness which should embrace all mankind. This bright hope was centred about the figure of an ideal Davidic King. Even in David's own reign a suggestion of this was made by the prophet Nathan (in 2 Sam. 7, IIff.). But it is Isaiah^a who first gives the idea definite expression. Micah^b, Jeremiah^c, and Ezekiel^d repeat but do not add much to * The Psalter, of course, as the Hymn Book of the Temple service, is an outstanding example of the spirit of Hebrew worship.

† v. Ezra 10.

^a e.g. Is. 7⁹⁻¹¹

^b Mic. 5²

^c Jer. 23⁵⁻⁶ 30⁹

^d Ezek. 34^{23ff.}

Isaiah's ideas.

During the exile the expectation of a coming Davidic king died out for a while, though the general hope of a bright future is present. The sure mercies of David are now transferred to a people.^a One of the most arresting new conceptions was that of the Servant of the LORD.^b This title was, at least in one of its meanings, a generalisation of the position of Israel in the religious life of mankind. The two chief ideas expressed by the phrase are that the Servant is the missionary of the LORD to the nations, and that by his sufferings he atones for the sins of his people. The conception of the Servant of the LORD contributes more elements to the Christological ideal realised in our Lord than all other figures together. These two figures - the Davidic King during the monarchy and the Divine Servant during the exile - supply the chief contents of the christian idea of the Messiah. Never during the Old Testament period, however, was the suffering servant identified with the Davidic king. Nor did the idea of atonement enter much into the thoughts of the people. The main point of Deutero-Isaiah which influenced those who came after was the thought that Israel is Yahweh's missionary to all mankind, that all the world may be embraced in His salvation.

Immediately after the exile, the general eschatological hope of Haggai and Zechariah was that as soon as the temple was finished, Yahweh would return to it in glory and 'shake' all nations, who would turn to Him and His universal Kingdom would come. Along with this hope was found another - that of a ruler to arise in David's house. Somewhat later the idea of priesthood became more prominent. The royal and the priestly appear united in the description of the final

ruler (e.g. Zech. 6.9-13).

One further aspect of Hebrew religious thought bearing upon the doctrine of the Kingdom of God is notable before we reach the New Testament period, and that is the Apocalyptic Literature. This appears first during the Hellenistic period, and is chiefly connected with the years between the Old Testament and the New. There are, however, examples of apocalyptic literature in the Old Testament itself, the chief being the whole of the latter part of the book of Daniel. Other passages of a similar kind are Isaiah 24-27, Zechariah 9-14, and Joel 3.9-17. One of the chief characteristics of apocalyptic writings, especially the later, is a pessimistic view of present conditions. The world is too evil to last ~~any~~ much longer and the last things are at hand. The end of the age is near and God is about to set up His Kingdom miraculously. An obvious feature of this literature is the use of allegorical use of an elaborate machinery of symbol. ^{It is} They are also pseudonymous, written in the names of great men of old, and they ^{it} interpret scripture rather than claim direct inspiration.

In the fullness of the time God satisfies the hopes which He has kindled in the hearts and minds of men, giving, as He is wont, more than either they desire or deserve. He has revealed Himself by divers portions and in divers manners, through the family, and through the nation and law, and through forms of worship which pointed forward to their true heavenly pattern.* Now He reveals Himself in One Who is a Son† - His beloved, only-begotten Son. He manifests His very heart to men in the revelation of A Man - The Man, Christ Jesus. The Kingdom of Heaven is opened, the true King of the human race has appeared.

The Divine institution of the family is recognised and blessed by

* Heb. 8⁵

† Heb. 1¹⁻³

Jesus.* It can, however, stand only upon a prior loyalty to God and not upon the principle of self-centredness.†

The ethical teaching of the prophets is vindicated. The righteousness of the Kingdom and its social implications are strongly emphasised. The axe is laid to the root of the trees. The beatitudes outline the qualities of moral character required of members of the Kingdom. In contrast to the formal legalism of the Pharisees, the immoral and anti-social impulses and thoughts which hold sway within, in the heart of man, are to be vanquished. The King is revealed to be King even of men's thoughts and hearts. He is King also of men's bodies. Their bodily health is a matter of grave concern to Him. He went about healing the sick and casting out demons. His parables affirm that all facts in nature and human social life are testifying of the Kingdom of God. He freely draws from the ordinary institutions of national life lessons respecting His Kingdom.

Our Lord's attitude to national life is of course closely connected with His attitude to the Law, particularly the Moral Law. The present writer holds strongly that it is most reasonable to seek to understand our Lord's mind upon this matter with the expectation that He will take for granted the revelation which has already been made in the Old Testament concerning national life, and that an explanation, in accordance with this principle, of difficult passages in the gospels, provided of course that it is not manifestly unreasonable, is more likely to be right than an explanation which must lead ultimately to Manichaean notions of the Old Testament. Christ's attitude to the Law as defined in the Sermon on the Mount was to some extent discussed on pages 268-270. His instances respecting swearing, retribution, and

* Mk 10²⁻¹⁶ John 2¹⁻¹¹

† Lk 14²⁵⁻²⁷, v. Mt. 10³⁷, cf. Mt. 13⁶ Rev 12¹¹

hatred of enemies were left for consideration in this chapter.

(1) Respecting oaths (Mt. 5. 33-37). This passage is surely the best commentary on the third commandment. God said to them of old time, "Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain", and He also said, "Thou shalt not forswear thyself", etc.. Both commands agree together and both proceed from the same God and Father of Jesus Christ. The Jews understood both these commands not to forbid oaths in a court of law or on other solemn lawful occasions. Their rulers were only doing their duty as rulers in putting them in mind on such occasions that they stood in the presence of the living God, Who is a God of truth and Who will be avenged on those who speak lies, - for that is the essence of the meaning of an oath. Jesus did not need to re-state this old lesson: but He had higher, more blessed truths for the subjects of His Kingdom. The habit had grown up among them of thinking that, as long as they avoided the Name of God Himself, it did not matter if they swore in private conversation by heaven, or by the earth, or by Jerusalem, or by their own head. Though they did not realise it, this custom sprang from a profane habit of mind. They thought these things were not sacred. Everything is sacred. Heaven and earth bear daily witness to the God Who made them. So does the city with its places of worship. So do our own heads. All belong to God and are therefore sacred. The speech for the members of His kingdom is the speech of simple directness. Those who remembered and practised this lesson in their daily lives would be the ones who in a court of law would treat an oath with peculiar reverence and sincerity, while those who were most careless about their daily manner of speech would be the very ones who would be most likely to perjure

themselves in a court of law. Thus the teaching of Jesus fulfils the law respecting oaths.

(11) Respecting retribution (Mt. 5. 38-42). This passage concerns the internal jurisdiction of a State and must not be confused with the following passage, which concerns its external relationships. The lex talionis is often spoken of as a primitive expression of justice, which marked indeed an advance upon barbaric lawlessness, but should be outgrown by more civilised forms of law. Is this really true? In what does the principle of Divine retribution, expressed in the statement 'Vengeance is Mine, I will repay, saith the Lord' ^{*} differ from the principle of lex talionis? Is not the latter principle, if applied to God's judgments, only a way of saying that whatsoever a man sows, that shall he also reap? [†] Does not the principle of lex talionis after all lie at the foundation of the conception of the State's administration of justice, whether in the Old Testament or elsewhere? It has already been argued that the Divine retribution operates in accordance with the law of cause and effect. [§] In the case of the more gross sins of the flesh, this often becomes apparent in individual cases. In the case of the less carnal sins, the effect may be only upon the character of the sinner, and thus may indirectly affect his relationship with others. In the case of communities and nations, the principle still holds good. "The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small." We All these facts are of course not in the least inconsistent with the blessed truth of God's readiness to forgive the penitent. Forgiveness is not the letting off punishment, but the removal of the barrier created by sin; forgiveness sets free the conscience. The inevitable penalties which a man's

* Rom 12¹⁹ Heb 10³⁰ Dt. 32³⁵

† Gal 6⁷

§ pp. 264-265

sins may bring upon him may through the experience of God's forgiveness actually become a blessed discipline. The very act of sincere repentance itself sets in operation a chain of effects which exercise a most potent healing effect upon the character.

If man is indeed created in the image of God, we should expect to find the principle of Divine judgment, as well as that of the Divine mercy, represented in human society. We are not fitted to be judges in our own cause, or in causes in which we have a personal interest. The State is therefore charged by God to administer justice in His Name.⁵ But the State's administration of justice⁴ is at best, by the very nature of the circumstances, but a rough and ready approximation ~~of~~ to the ideal.

We have been considering justice as an expression of the lex talionis principle. This is what Dr. Quick, in his book "Christianity and Justice", calls 'Commutative justice'.^{*} He distinguishes this, not completely, but relatively and for convenience, from what Bergson calls 'absolute justice', i.e. the conception of justice defined by Plato in the Republic as consisting in 'giving every man his due'.[†] These two conceptions of justice are not mutually exclusive. The just retribution of a transgressor may be regarded as that which is due to him.

We should say, then, that the lex talionis principle lies at the root of the State's administration of justice, and that our Lord, in the passage under discussion, does not intend to set it aside. The law of the State thus bears its appointed witness to a God Who punishes

wrong-doing, and nothing but the law can bear such a witness. But the
 & This function does not exhaust the duties of the State. * Christian News-Letter Book Series; p.3.
 † Dr. Quick points out (p.4, *ibid.*) that Plato, in discussing this definition, subordinates the individual to the community, & disagrees with him for so doing. (pt. 1) It is very much due to be a member of a society, & to perform therein his proper function; & the society, as representing the interests of its other members, has its dues as well as the individual considered as an end in himself.

¶ law can do nothing toward taking the principle and desire of personal revenge out of a man. Only He can do that Who has bidden us in our personal relationships to turn the other cheek to those who do us wrong. The law cannot do it, but He Who gave the law can.

The christian acts as a good, law-abiding citizen in not seeking revenge or redress for personal injuries. The law would not thank him for seeking legal redress. But there are occasions when it is his duty to do so, and an enlightened conscience will direct him rightly. Hampden, in resisting ship-money, complied far better with our Lord's precept than if he had paid the tax, for he was sacrificing his own interest for the sake of the dignity of law, not using the law for the promotion of his own interest. Our Lord Himself clearly recognises the distinction in the instruction He gives for the treatment of an offending fellow-christian in Mt. 18.15-20.

Bishop Gore points out^{*} the proverbial character of our Lord's illustrations in this passage concerning retribution, and in some other cases. We are all familiar with contradictory proverbs, e.g. "Penny wise, pound foolish", and "Take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves". Both proverbs are true, but take opposite view-points, and enlightened common-sense recognises which of them is applicable to particular circumstances.

We maintain, therefore, that in the passage in question our Lord's teaching does not destroy the outward law, but fills up its husk by revealing the substance or kernel of it.

(iii) Respecting hatred of enemies (Mt. 5.43-48). Our Lord is giving examples to show how He has come, not to destroy, but to fulfil, the law. The last example concerned the internal judgments of the

* The Sermon on the Mount, pp. 92-93

State, and the present passage must not be confused with it.

The precept "Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy" is not directly recorded anywhere in the Old Testament. Nevertheless it is a true summary of the attitude of the law towards the enemies of Israel. As God's chosen people, Israel was regarded as doing right in making war, only when she made it in obedience to the Divine will, against the wickedness or unbridled aggression of some neighbouring heathen nation.*

The psalms, of course, provide notable instances of the hatred rather of personal than of national enemies. However far it may or may not be reasonable to read these psalms as referring to the retribution due to the enemies of God, it seems correct to say that our Lord's words 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy' are intended to describe the attitude of the law to the enemies of the nation, and not to refer to personal enmities. Is it in accordance with the purpose of the law of any country ~~to~~ for that law to say to its own subjects 'Thou shalt hate thy ~~personal~~ fellow-subjects if they happen to be thy personal enemies'? Obedience to such a prescription must soon lead to acts of lawlessness and violence.

When a country is at war, does not the precept 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy' truly express its national attitude? All christians are agreed that no country is right to go to war unless that war is morally justifiable. Some think that it is never justifiable. Most of us think that there are cases where it is both justifiable, and also a clear duty.

Our Lord's teaching in the passage in question condemns personal

* In view of our habit of emphasising the crudeness of outlook & practice of the Hebrews in the period of the monarchy, it is worth while calling attention to the laws to be observed in war, as recorded in Dt. 20¹⁰⁻²⁰. How far do some modern practices in war bear comparison?

hatred of enemies, whether our own or our country's. It has often been remarked how, as a matter of fact, the soldier is more merciful to his enemies, once they have surrendered, than many civilians would be, if one were to judge some of them by their utterances. If our Lord's injunction to love our enemies were but more faithfully carried out by His followers in their private lives, what a difference it would make to the happiness of our parishes, and of society generally! Such citizens merit the praise of the law as well-doers.

The above interpretation of the passage in question is supported by our Lord's exhortation, to His in verses 45 and 48, to His followers to imitate the example of their heavenly Father. "He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust." He sends also plagues and pestilence, storm, tempest, and earthquake, all of which are regarded by the prophets as wielded by Him for purposes of moral judgment. The love of God is manifested not only in mercy but also in wrath, and if man is created in the image of God, so that it is his true nature to reflect his Creator, then there must be some provision in human society for the representation of the Divine wrath and judgment.

Once again, therefore, we contend that our Lord's teaching in the passage in question does not destroy the law, but fulfil it.

We must now return to the argument on pages 333 and 334. We have sought to show that the Kingdom of God, inaugurated by Jesus, does not conflict with national life as such, but that on the contrary it fulfils it. It takes up national life into the universal Divine Kingdom and enables it to fulfil its proper function in the purpose of God. So with family life. That too is taken into the Kingdom of

God, that it may be what God meant it to be.

An essential note of the Kingdom of God is that it is worshipful. All the highest ideals of worship in the Old Testament are realised in it. The best Old Testament forms of worship, as the epistle to the Hebrews teaches, are anticipatory shadows, or copies, of the true heavenly Pattern revealed in and through Jesus Christ. The unique contribution of the author of that epistle is the idea of the Kingdom as the Heavenly Sanctuary, the High Priest being the ascended Jesus.

The choice and training of the twelve apostles was one of the primary objects of the work of Jesus, and it laid the foundations of the christian ministry. The Kingdom has two great rites of common worship: the initiatory sacrament of Baptism, and the sacrament of the Eucharist, essentially sacrificial in character, commemorating the sacrifice of the King and fulfilling the ideals of the Old Testament sacrificial system, the regular food and nourishment of the christian's spirit.

It is indeed this note of worship, founded on the christian Faith, which marks the essential difference between the christian nation and the secular nation. It is by christian worship, based upon the christian Creed, that the natural institutions of the family and the nation are taken into the universal Divine Kingdom and maintain their life therein.

In the Acts of the Apostles we see the wonderful creative power of the Holy Spirit manifesting itself in the spreading of the Gospel - first in Jerusalem, then throughout Judaea, Samaria, Syria, then to Asia Minor, across to Europe to the land of Greece, and eventually to Rome itself. The New Order has indeed begun. The revelation of the

Lord and Elder Brother of mankind has brought into being a power which the ancient world had never known. By the pressure of events God constrains the infant church to admit into its flock Gentiles as well as Jews. The Kingdom is universal, transcending the bounds of race, nationality, and social distinction.

But consider the manner in which the universal nature of the Kingdom unfolds itself. Take the apostolic speeches in the Acts as specimens. How does S. Peter address the Jews on the Day of Pentecost? Does he tell them that now that the new age of the Spirit has dawned, they must forget the lessons which their forefathers had learned? On the contrary, he claims that the outpouring of the Spirit is the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy. He addresses them as 'men of Israel'. He says that the resurrection of God's Christ was foreseen as inevitable by the psalmist, and that Jesus is that Christ spoken of in the Old Testament. He called on them to repent of their indifference to the promises which had been made to their nation, and of their unfaithfulness to their stewardship. S. Stephen in his defence,† S. Paul in his speech at Antioch,‡ both adopt the same principle. The Jews are exhorted as Jews. They are not to cease to be Jews. It is only by accepting Jesus as the Christ that they can be true Jews, and in doing this they will at the same time be acknowledging themselves, whether or not they realise the full implications of their confession, as of one common flesh and blood with all mankind. Membership in Christ's universal Kingdom enables those who belong to it to live out the full meaning of their peculiar national vocation. "Let each man abide in that calling wherein he was called."‡

The society of the infant Church at first assumed the form of a

* Ac. 2¹⁴⁻⁴⁰

† Ac. 7²⁻⁵³

‡ Ac. 13¹⁶⁻⁴¹

‡ 1 Co. 7²⁰

voluntary communism. All christians would presumably agree that it is highly desirable that they should at all times and in all places be of one heart and soul^a in matters pertaining to the unity of all mankind in Christ. This early voluntary christian communism, however, included communism of property^b, and the narrative passes no judgment upon the question whether such a form of society is everywhere and always desirable as an ideal. At any rate the Ananias and Sapphira incident^c soon showed what dreadful temptations and dangers attend such a form of society, and rendered it, in the circumstances which had arisen, no longer practicable.

The apostles taught the christians to whom they wrote to regard themselves as belonging to the Family and Household of God^d. The conception as worked out later in the thought of the diocese as ideally a family and the bishop as the father in God. Here is another clear indication of the care with which the family principle is preserved in the Divine universal society.

^{New Testament}
The apostolic doctrine regarded the Government of a State as of Divine ordinance, and its officials as God's ministers, answerable to him for their use of their stewardship. The civil sword is to be exercised as a Divine ministry^e. The things that are Caesar's are nevertheless ultimately God's, and are given to Caesar from above^f. It is the Devil's own lie to tempt men to believe that the kingdoms of the world belong to him, instead of to God^g. There are mighty, unseen forces of lawlessness at work in human society, but they are kept in ~~restrained~~ restraint, or should be kept in restraint, by the government of the State^h.

Nevertheless the governments exercising authority in the regions

a/Ac. 4³² b/Ac. 2⁴⁴⁻⁴⁵ c/Ac. 5¹⁻⁴ d/1st John 2¹⁹, 3¹ John 4¹ e/Rom. 13¹⁻⁴
f/Mt. 22²¹ cf. John 19¹¹ g/Lk. 4⁶ h/2nd Thess. 2^{6,7}

in which the primitive church made its way were heathen governments. No doubt their best men had a vague feeling that they were responsible to some higher unseen power for the way in which they used their office. But even they could not have the clear knowledge which a christian would have of One God Who is both the supreme Father and the King of all nations. No longer could the people of God expect, even if any of them desired it, that the State should use the power of the civil sword, as in the days of the Hebrew monarchy, for the enforcement of the first, second, and fourth commandments of the Decalogue. Moreover, the power of Rome had a tradition for justice and shrewd political sense, which made it (except for the later days of persecution) tolerant of the principle of freedom of worship among its subject-peoples, and the new Israel of God had now in His ~~provid~~ providence to learn, if indeed they had not learned it already, that since the Lord of all mankind had appeared in human flesh the Faith which they proclaimed had far greater power over idolatry than the sword could ever wield.

No survey of the Biblical doctrine of Church and State could be complete without some consideration of the Apocalypse. It may justly be claimed that the 'Futurist'* and 'Continuous-Historical'† modes of interpretation of this great book have been definitely ousted by the 'Preterist' method, which seeks to interpret it in the light of the actual circumstances of the period in which it was written and of other Jewish apocalyptic literature. This latter method, in thus discovering the original purpose and meaning of the author, is able

also to reveal the fundamental principles on which he based his

* i.e. the events described in the book refer to the future & mainly concern Christ's second Advent.
† i.e. the book describes the actual history of the Church in the world from the 1st century A.D. to the end of time.

presentation of the Divine government of the world in his day, and to apply them to the changing circumstances of each succeeding age. In this way the Apocalypse becomes particularly relevant to the upheavals and unrest of the present time.

This essay obviously could not find space to attempt anything like a detailed explanation of all the complicated symbolism of the Apocalypse. All that can be done here is to suggest certain broad lines of interpretation of this most interesting and valuable book. The writer of this chapter has derived much help from the late Dr. Goudge's little book 'The Apocalypse and the present age', but he is most of all indebted to F.D. Maurice's 'Lectures on the Apocalypse.'

The background against which the whole book should be viewed and to which everything in it is primarily relevant is the state of the Roman world during the three and a half years preceding the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.. This period represents approximately the duration of the siege of Jerusalem, and is referred to in the book as $3\frac{1}{2}$ years, or 42 months, or 1260 days. The author regards this period as of first-class historical importance, more significant for mankind than the downfall of the empires of Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, or Rome. The New Testament christians believed that the Kingdom of God was at hand, and they were not mistaken. The end of the old order was approaching. They were witnessing the birth-throes of a new age. The pre-christian dispensation was at length outwardly and visibly declared, by a radical judgment upon the unfaithfulness of the chosen nation of Israel ~~in the~~ in the fall of the city of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple, to pass away, and to be succeeded by a universal society, based on faith in a common Head and Lord of the

whole human race, to which the Old Testament revelation had always pointed.

S. John the divine in an inspired vision beholds Jesus Christ, the ruler of the kings of the earth, exalted in glory and standing as the great High-Priest in the midst of the churches. To each local church the Lord addresses the solemn, searching, words, "I know thy works", and, according to the circumstances of each, gives praise or warning, or both, and advice, and a promise. In the world drama which is to be unfolded, it is the churches which are the first matter for consideration.

After this vision of the churches on earth, with their imperfect life and worship, there follows a vision of the true, eternal, heavenly, worship. This is the real thing. It is the worship offered by God's creation to its Creator. And an essential theme of this worship is that that part of the creation which was made in God's own image, viz. man, has been redeemed. For S. John sees in the right hand of Him that sat on the throne a book written within and on the back, sealed with seven seals. And only the Lamb Which was slain, Who is also the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, was found able to open the seals. And when He had taken the book, a chorus of worship from the four 'living creatures' and the four and twenty elders and all the rest of creation ^{arose} to Him and unto God.

Against this background of heavenly worship the seven seals are successively opened. The opening of the first four reveals respectively, one after another, the famous 'four horses' of the apocalypse: the white horse of conquest, the red horse of revolution and civil war, the black horse of famine, and the pale horse of pestilence. This

is what happens when man abuses the power with which God entrusts him. Brute conquest breeds revolution and civil war, and hard at heel follow famine and pestilence. When the fifth seal is opened, we are shown those faithful ones who for the sake of truth have been hounded out of this world. Their prayer certainly does not teach that it is unchristian to desire that evil-doing should meet with just retribution. For they cry, "How long, O Lord, dost Thou not judge and ~~and~~ avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?"

The description of what is seen when the sixth seal is opened suggests some great shaking of the nations, more dreadful than that which the four horses of the first four seals suggested. With our experience of to-day in our minds, we may well describe this as perhaps the climax of a terrible clash of 'ideologies'. Worldly persons are everywhere fearfully expecting 'the wrath of the Lamb'. The paradox of this phrase splendidly witnesses that the character and will of Christ are not in any way different from the character and will of God, but they are altogether one.

What the opening of the seventh seal will reveal cannot happen until the servants of God have been sealed on their foreheads, so that no hurt can come to them. They may pass through great tribulation, but the enemy can do no more than destroy their earthly bodies.

At this point it is of the greatest importance for our purpose to notice how emphatically the author states the inclusion of the remnant of the Hebrew nation as first among the sealed servants of God. Each tribe is distinctly and carefully named. Both here and by his repeated Old Testament allusions throughout the book he shows himself a Jew who

has drunk deeply and lovingly of the revelation vouchsafed to his forefathers. His countrymen are not to abjure their nationality on becoming christians. There is an important place yet for his nation in God's universal Kingdom. On this principle all other "nations, and tribes, and peoples, and tongues" next mentioned as contributing to the servants of God have their own peculiar places in the Kingdom of God. We should bear this continually in mind when we consider the judgments which are afterwards to be set before us in the following chapters.

And when the Lamb opened the seventh seal, there followed a silence in heaven about the space of half an hour. The prayer of the martyrs is about to be answered. A terrible and wonderful thing is to be revealed. Seven angels prepare to sound seven trumpets announcing judgments. ~~The~~ Seven trumpets had announced the doom of Jericho in the time of Joshua.* Now they are to announce the doom of the Holy City itself, which had been set apart to bear witness against the idolatries of the earth, and, in spite of many warnings and much long-suffering, had been unfaithful to its trust.

The first four trumpets announce physical judgments, in the form of natural plagues. The laws which govern the crops, the commerce of the seas, inland supplies of fresh water, and the catastrophic forces of nature, are under the control of God, and are wielded by Him to further His larger purposes. The last three trumpets announce more dreadful judgments than those which are merely physical. These judgments are called 'Woes'. They cry of spiritual wickedness in high places, of 'hell let loose'. There is to be no more delay[†] in the accomplishment of judgment upon Jerusalem itself. There prophesy two witnesses, who there is good reason to understand as denoting the true representative

* Josh. 6¹⁻²⁰

† Rev. 10⁶

of the powers civil and ecclesiastical respectively.*

At last the seventh trumpet sounds the third Woe. Its sounding proclaims that the mystery of God's judgment upon Jerusalem is finished. There followed great voices in heaven, saying, The kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of His Christ; and He shall reign for ever and ever.† And there was opened the temple of God in heaven. Why? Surely because the temple in Jerusalem has fallen. The old pre-christian order is passed away. The new age is born. The millenium, according to S. John the divine, has begun.‡

In the four following chapters (12 to 15) the dragon would appear to be emphatically a spiritual, self-willed, destructive power, the personification of the spirit of anti-God and anti-Christ. The beast is evidently his earthly counterpart or 'image'. The beast coming up out of the sea appears to represent brute force,§ such as was characteristic of the rule of the empire of Rome in those years. The beast coming up out of the earth seems to stand for the State religion or 'ideology' which sustained the imperial tyranny of Rome.

Chapter 16 contains the account of the pouring out of the seven bowls. The seven trumpets announced the imminent doom of Jerusalem, the spiritual centre of the old world. The seven bowls would seem to concern the material centre of the old world, i.e. they point to Rome. In chapter 18 it is declared that Babylon the great is fallen. Babylon has been thought to represent Rome, and some have thought it to refer to Jerusalem. If, however, we understand it to represent the system or polity of which Babylon in scripture was the type, it will be obvious that the Babylon principle was working in Rome, and that it had

* Cf. Zeck. 4 † Rev. 11¹⁵ ‡ See Rev. 20⁷⁻⁶ § and, of course, unbridled passions.

been working in Jerusalem too, as it has been working in all countries for generations, and which was to hear its sentence in that generation.

In the last two chapters we have the vision of the heavenly City, coming down from God. We do not need to think of some future miraculous event to happen ages hence. The vision is eternally true. It is true as a present fact for each generation of the christian era. The holy City is coming down out of heaven from God. Our material temples or church buildings are indeed essential to us; but we need to remind ourselves that the true centre of the universal, Divine, society is the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb.* They are the true temple. "And the nations shall walk amidst the light thereof; and the kings of the earth do bring their glory into it, &.... And they shall bring the glory and the honour of the nations into it, And there shall in no wise enter into it anything unclean, or he that maketh an abomination and a lie; but only they which are written in the Lamb's book of life."†

From the figure of the City the seer immediately passes to the symbols of the garden of Eden.‡ But now we have come to the realities which were denoted by those early symbols. We know that the Spirit Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son is the River of Life, and that what He nourishes is the minds and hearts of human beings. Then we are immediately recalled to the City, by the words 'in the midst of the street thereof'.† "And on this side of the river and on that was the tree of life, bearing twelve manner of fruits, yielding its fruit every month; and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations."

* Rev. 21²²

† *ibid.* 24-27

‡ *ibid.* 22¹⁻³

† *ibid.* -2

The above fragmentary sketch of the teaching of the Apocalypse has been included, both because the writer of this essay regards the book of the Revelation as of the utmost importance to the question of the relationship between the Church and the State, and also in order that the very partial outline attempted above may supply some ground for the following general application to our own day of some of the chief underlying principles of the doctrine of the Apocalypse.

The stage of the world drama shows "nations and tribes and peoples and tongues" as well defined constituents of the human race. Vital elements in the life of each nation or people are State and Church. Two opposing principles are continually at work upon the human characters composing the different nations or communities, and upon the nations or communities which they compose. One is the life-giving principle of the Spirit proceeding from God and His Christ. The other is the evil, destructive principle proceeding from the dragon, "the old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan".* The seed sown by each of these two principles bears its own inevitable harvest,† which becomes increasingly manifest at the great crises of world history. The two principles operate continually both in State and Church in every nation. The dragon principle is manifested as the worship of 'the beast'⁶ (obvious symbol). The beast-worshipping State must have a religion or 'ideology' of some sort, based on the dragon, anti-Christ, principle.† Beast worship in the State leads to brute conquest and aggression, which inevitably brings in its train sooner or later revolution and civil war, famine, pestilence, and great international convulsions. Other modes of judgment are natural plagues, and 'hell let loose'.

* Rev. 20² † 14¹⁴⁻²⁰ 6 cf. 13¹⁻¹¹ 15² ‡ 13¹¹⁻¹³

The life-giving principle of the Spirit rests upon truth and ultimate fact. The kingdom of the world has been redeemed. It is become the Kingdom of our LORD and of His Christ. The followers of the beast may persecute and the martyrs cry for judgment, but the prayer of the latter is heard. The judgment of the former is certain. The power of the beast can do no more than destroy the earthly bodies of the true followers of the Lamb. The holy City is coming down out of heaven from God. In every generation it is gathering within its walls out of every nation those who, whilst still in their earthly lifetime, come into it 'victorious from the beast', and, as they come, they help to bring into it the peculiar glory of their nation or race, whether they be king, warrior, statesman, priest, sage, merchant, craftsman, or husbandman.

The above general application of some of the outstanding features of the teaching of the Apocalypse may recall Augustine's basic conception of the 'two cities' in *De Civitate**. "Two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self" (XIV.28). It differs from Augustine's doctrine, however, in that he identified the Earthly City with all the civil States of the world, which would thus stand upon a false principle, and yet according to him were nevertheless a relative temporary good. The view set forth in the two preceding paragraphs, on the other hand, regards national States as existing in accordance with God's purpose in creation and therefore in themselves absolutely good, but subject, along with the Church herself, to the operation of the two conflicting principles represented respectively by the dragon (i.e. the principle

* v. pp. 18-19.

of Augustine's 'earthly city') and the Holy Spirit (i.e. the principle animating the heavenly City).

By the beginning of the fourth century the power of the Holy Spirit had triumphed over the hostility of the Roman empire, which had been manifested in repeated persecutions of christianity under various emperors. By the edict of Milan in 312 the emperor Constantine granted christianity equal rights with other religions of the empire. Then he soon began to show it special favours, until it became in effect the religion of the empire. Private heathen sacrifices were prohibited. The State began to use the civil sword to put down heathenism, and christianity came under some measure of State control, its ecclesiastical officers acquiring a civil position. A superannuated despotism, based on the acknowledgment of brute force, was entering into union with a body based on the acknowledgment of a King ruling in righteousness. The Church had not sought the union. She might be thankful for it, though it brought with it great dangers for her. It was not, however, lasting. New wine had to be put into new bottles. The decadent empire at length fell before the northern barbarian tribes. Charlemagne re-established it as a christian empire. In the next generation it was again broken up.

Meanwhile christianity was at work upon the barbarian tribes. No doubt the bishops, if they could have ordered things in accordance with their own notions, would have formed Europe into one christian society without any national boundaries. But it would seem that, the more the tribes became christianised, the more they developed a strong national consciousness. May we not see in this the higher power of God asserting His will in spite of the mistaken notions of the leader

of the Church? The barbarian kings, as they became christian, began to take a higher view of their office than before, and to regard their kingship as a trust committed to them by God.

Christendom's doctrine of the relations between Church and State, as that doctrine developed from the time of Constantine to the middle ages, was that of a Divine ^{Community*} society, in which church and state are co-terminous and component elements. The christian State was one with the Church. All the citizens of the State were also, at any rate in theory, all churchmen. Church and State each had its own proper function to perform in the one christian community.

In the papal form of this theory the Church of course was the dominant partner. This dominance, moreover, was asserted by a foreign bishop, viz. the Roman pontiff. The frequent interference of the Pope in the affairs of other nations was thus an anti-national influence, rather than an influence which would tend to bring out the peculiar genius of each particular nation as a contribution to international life.

The modern Roman Catholic theory, as described in the 'Catholic Encyclopaedia',[†] is that Church and State are both 'perfect' societies, i.e. "each essentially aiming at a common good commensurate with the need of mankind at large and ultimate in a generic kind of life, and each juridically competent to provide all the necessary and sufficient means thereto." Man has one ultimate purpose of existence, eternal happiness in a future life, but a twofold proximate purpose, one to earn his title to eternal happiness, the other to attain to a measure of temporal happiness consistent with the prior proximate purpose. The aim of the State is man's temporal happiness, and its

* The technical term was 'universitas', as applied to the whole community of Christendom.

† Article on 'State'.

~~and~~ proximate purpose twofold, viz. the preservation of external juridical order, and the provision of a reasonable prosperity of its citizens. With regard to man's prior proximate purpose of earning his title to eternal happiness, the State has a natural right to order the worship of its citizens, but God, through the christian revelation, has by positive law vacated the natural right of the State regarding public worship and given it to the Church. The aim of the Church is man's future eternal happiness, and its proximate purpose is to safeguard the ^{nat}interior moral order of right and wrong, and its external manifestation, to care for Divine worship and minister to man the supernatural means of grace.

From the above description we see that the characteristic Roman doctrine of man, distinguishing between the natural, which includes his natural capacity for fellowship with God, and the supernatural, as an original gift of fellowship with Him which has been lost but is restored in the Church by a *donum superadditum supernaturale*, is logically followed out in the doctrine of State and Church. However much there may be a union between them in the 'catholic' State, the Church, which is concerned with man's supernatural needs, is in ultimate principle independent of the State, which is concerned with man's natural and temporary needs. Since, moreover, supernatural and spiritual considerations are sometimes involved in temporal and natural questions which are obviously part of the State's interest, it is always the Church, as representing man's higher and eternal interests, which has a Divine right to the prior voice. But in reverse circumstances, such matters directly concerning the Church as obviously involve temporal considerations do not entitle the State, as the lower society, to have

the prior voice over the higher society.

Against the Roman doctrine of man's nature, distinguishing between the natural and supernatural, we have maintained the view of a man's nature as a unity, explaining his sin and his restoration, not by means of a distinction between natural and supernatural, but in terms of his relationship to God.* His sin consists primarily in the turning away of the whole man from God; his restoration in the turning back of the whole man to God as revealed in Christ. This idea may also be worked out in the conception of the relation between State and Church. Heathen States or nations represent human society turned away from God. The Church represents those nations turned to God. It is a Divine, universal Society which gathers within its world-wide family the faithful out of every nation, who bring the peculiar treasures of their nationality with them, and this, of course, is much more strongly the case when the faithful include the leaders of the nation and the nation formally bases its constitution on the acknowledgment of Christ as supreme Lord of mankind.

As regards England - and it is with England that we are particularly concerned, - "The distinguishing mark of the Church of England has always been its close connection with the territorial State." † In the Middle Ages, "while political thinkers might identify sacerdotium (the State ecclesiastical and spiritual) with the Church universal, personified by the Roman Pontiff, and regnum (the State civil) with the Holy Roman Empire, Englishmen tended to regard them as the local branch of the Church and the local nation. 'the nationalist flavour which thus permeated the identification of Church and realm in England was accentuated by the interest felt by all

members of the commonwealth in resisting papal exactions and intrusions
* pp. 30 (b) & (c), 190, 186. † Report of Archbishops' Committee on the relations between Church & State, 1935 - p. 9

intrusions.' The respective spheres of the two authorities, while reasonably clear in practice, were not precisely defined, and friction occurred periodically: but there was no attempt at unitary control." *

This close interpenetration of State and Church in England had not come about in obedience to a theory or programme or system. It was a matter of natural and gradual growth, moulded by the pressure of circumstances and events. No doubt big mistakes of policy were sometimes made. Yet through it all we trace the guiding hand of God, wiser and stronger than human intellect and logic.

At the English Reformation both Church and State repudiated the authority of the Pope. In 1534 Convocation declared that "the Pope of Rome hath no greater jurisdiction conferred on him by God in Holy Scripture in this realm of England than any other foreign bishop". The declaration was then legally enforced by the authority of the Crown, with the hearty support of the body of the nation. Henry was acknowledged by Convocation as "Supreme Head of the English Church and Clergy, 'so far as the law of Christ allows' ". Under Elizabeth the title 'Supreme Head' was altered to 'Supreme Governor'. Our thirty-seventh article interprets the meaning of these titles "We give not to our princes the ministering either of God's Word, or of Sacraments, the which thing the Injunctions also lately set forth by Elizabeth our Queen do most plainly testify: But that only prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy Scriptures by God Himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the

* Report of Archbishops' Commission on the relations between Church & State, 1935 - pp. 94-10.

stubborn and evildoers."

It is important to notice that the fundamental assumption of the Christian Society continued under the Reformation settlement. Church and State were still regarded as complementary elements of one whole christian nation. "There is not any man of the Church of England but the same man is also a member of the Commonwealth, nor any man a member of the Commonwealth who is not also of the Church of England" (Hooker, Eccl. Pol. viii). The nation and the Church are still as yet practically co-extensive.

This attitude provides the background against which should be set the Acts of Uniformity^{*}, with the penalties prescribed therein. The civil power was used to enforce religious observance. England had indeed absorbed truths of incalculable value from the teaching of both the Old and the New Testament concerning the nation, but it had yet to learn that, for the advancement of the Christian Religion, the power of the civil sword is far weaker and more ineffective than the power of the Faith proclaimed by the Church.

Since the days of the Reformation period a change of the utmost importance has come about in the English nation. The people of England and the Church of England are to-day very far from being co-extensive. The population includes many adherents of various christian non-conformist bodies, and a considerable number of Roman catholics, while a large element of the nation does not belong to any organised christian body at all. This fact has two results. The Church of England is no longer as truly representative of the nation as it used to be. Secondly, On the other hand, since any measures

** especially the 2nd, 3rd, & 4th, which were directed, not only against non-conforming clergy, but also lay recusants and separatists.*

touching, not only administrative, but doctrinal and liturgical questions which have been passed by the Church must also pass through Parliament, as the body to which the power of the crown has been delegated, before they can receive the Royal assent, the Church is largely dependent, even in spiritual legislation, upon the judgment of non-churchmen and non-christians. Nevertheless, however much the character of the Church of England as a representative national Church may have declined, the nation shows no desire to disestablish her. The Government is friendly to her; the people outside her are not, with a few exceptions, hostile. On great national occasions the people flock to her services. On the other hand, there are many in the Church, especially among the clergy, who chafe at her dependence upon Parliament. The question was raised in an acute form through the rejection by the House of Commons of the 1927 and 1928 Prayer Book Measures. The Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the relations between Church and State, issued in 1935, recommends (p.99 of the Report) that the Archbishops should make every effort to secure an agreement within the Church upon the two matters which formed the ground of the Commons' objection, viz. (a) the permissible deviations from the 1662 Prayer Book Order of Holy Communion, and (b) the use and limits of Reservation; and that as soon as a sufficient measure of agreement has been obtained, Parliament should be asked to pass an Act giving the Church new powers to legislate with regard to doctrine and worship.

Unless it were almost certain that Parliament would grant these powers to the Church - and our leading authorities in the Church should be the best judges, - it would, in the writer's opinion, be far better not to put forward the request. Establishment is to him so strongly desirable, both in the interests of the nation, and also of the Church as the Body of Christ for the advancement of His Kingdom, that only the most obvious voice of duty could persuade him that grievous necessity had made it right to seek for disestablishment. It is not as if the Church had asked for sanction in some reform of doctrine. It has been expressly declared officially that no question of any change of doctrine was involved in the most controversial points of the proposed new Prayer Book. If the Church of England has no desire to make any change in her doctrine, does she stand in any great need, after all, of any new legislation which might enable her to do so?

A more weighty point is that the Church of England should be free to make her own legislation in matters concerning changes in the form of worship. This consideration is strengthened in the case under discussion, when it is remembered that the primary reason for Prayer Book revision was to check the growth of lawlessness in the conduct of the services. Nevertheless, the 1662 Prayer Book is, by common consent, admirable - except for a few modifications which are generally agreed to be obviously necessary in the altered circumstances of our own time. If the proposed revision had been presented

to Parliament minus the two most controversial issues, would she not have agreed to it? The writer himself is one of those to whom the proposed new book, including the revised Communion Office, would have been personally most acceptable. Yet he cannot help feeling a little doubtful of the entire rightness of the argument that, on such a question as revision of the Church of England Prayer Book, the leaders of the Church are necessarily always bound to arrive at a more correct judgment than the House of Commons even as at present constituted. However much some of us may think that those members of Parliament who voted against the new Book were mistaken, is it not true that they exercised their judgment with a solemn sense of responsibility? The conscientious, common-sense judgment of a body of responsible Englishmen, many of whom were personally disinterested in the matter at issue, may possibly, upon such a point, be wiser, from the point of view of the ultimate good of the nation, than the judgment of elected Church representatives.

Another important point arises out of consideration of the decline in the representative character of the Church of England as a national Church, viz. the great desirability of re-union with other English christian bodies. The Roman Catholics will have none of it. But there is great practical urgency, in the face of widespread paganism, for re-union between anglicans and those English non-conformist bodies which acknowledge the faith of the incarnation and practise baptism into the Name of the Blessed Trinity. The

greatest obstacle is the question of the Ministry. It is clear that the historic episcopate is the bond of unity and continuity between the different parts and ages of the Church Catholic, and that the Church of England must at any cost, loyally adhere to it without compromising her position, if she is to fulfil her vocation as a "bridge" Church in the wider field of international unity, and not shrink into the isolation of a mere State-Church.

We would emphasise two other aspects connected with the episcopate, which are not usually stressed in this respect. One is the anointing of the sovereign at the Coronation Service. It is the episcopal anointing which confers upon our sovereign, and the State which he rules, christian vocation and commission in the universal Kingdom of Christ. This fact has very profound consequences in the life of the nation, even today.

Then, again, it is the confirmation of the laity, by the episcopate, which "ordains" churchmen to their daily vocation in the service of the community in the Kingdom of Christ. For these reasons, the truly representative Church of the English Nation, as a part of the Church Catholic, should at all costs stand by episcopacy and confirmation.

We would further draw attention to the important witness which the practice of infant baptism bears to the fact that the family, as a natural institution, is, through baptism, taken into the Kingdom of God. The Church of the English people must insist

on infant baptism (administered in accordance with the safeguards prescribed in the Prayer Book).

On the one hand we recognise the urgency of re-union. On the other we are convinced that, to be faithful to our calling in the Church of England, we must make no compromise about infant baptism, confirmation, and episcopacy. We can but pray earnestly for re-union, and work for it by such co-operation as may in no wise compromise our principles, letting it be plainly known to our non-conformist friends what our principles are, and not giving them the impression that we do not strongly value and stand by these principles.

As sons of the Church of England, we believe that we have been called to be members of a branch of the Catholic Church which has been blessed with a particularly glorious tradition and vocation. We believe, not only that we have a peculiar contribution to make to the Church Universal, but that we hold in trust for our own countrymen a treasure which would meet their deepest needs, that we have something to offer them which is capable of satisfying their heartfelt desires. There is a growing feeling in our land that Christianity should be applied in a practical way to all departments of human life; we for our part believe that all the natural institutions and occupations of human life have been redeemed by Christ Jesus and may be taken into His Kingdom. Our countrymen look for a better and happier nation in a world where the nations live in firmer fellowship; the British Commonwealth of nations is a hint of a still wider family

of nations held together by a similar principle; - we can tell them that that international fellowship which they so greatly desire does actually exist, that it is a far higher and better one than they desire or imagine, that the outward signs of its existence may be seen in almost every country of the world, and that it is waiting to gather increasingly into its fold all the glory and honour of the families and nations of the earth. We are in a better position than any other christian body in England to put them in the way of participation in the rich heritage of this Universal, Divine, Kingdom. The outward signs of that Kingdom are conveniently summarised in the famous Lambeth Quadrilateral: the Scriptures and the Creeds, the two great sacraments, and the historic episcopate. The sacrament of baptism testifies to the admission of the family (as well as the individual) into that Kingdom; through the episcopate, the historic bond of unity and continuity between otherwise sundered branches of the Kingdom, the Crown and rule of our realm are formally and effectually appointed to their task among the nations, and individual citizens are ordained to their service for the common weal; in the Eucharist, our daily bread (and all that that phrase implies) becomes the means through which we enter, through sacrifice, into union with our Lord, and, through Him, with one another.