

## Durham E-Theses

---

### *The divine sympathy: an essay on kenotic Christology*

S. H. Evens

#### How to cite:

---

Evens, S. H. (1944) *The divine sympathy: an essay on kenotic Christology*. Masters thesis, Durham University.

#### Use policy

---

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a <https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/9580/> is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

THE DIVINE SYMPATHY.

An Essay

on

Kenotic Christology.

"Or what was it which He took on  
That He might bring salvation?  
A body subject to be tempted,  
From neither pain nor grief exempted;  
Or such a body as might not feel  
The passions that with sinners deal?"

William Blake.

Submitted for the Degree of Bachelor of  
Divinity in the University of Durham.

August 1944.

Chapter 1.

Chapter 2.

Chapter 3.

Chapter 4.

Theologians in Revolt. *good; not 3/5*

Orthodoxy re-examined. *(of free)*

Orthodoxy re-stated. *[See below] ✓*

Towards Orthodoxy. *Fu/R. ✓*

Appendix A. Note on Philipians 2.

Appendix B. Note on the Doctrine of the Cosmic Christ.

Bibliography.

*Chap III*

1. *critical notes. second hand ✓*

2. *gore*

*has made ✓*

*B.L. Dec ✓*

*H of (1/2) [should be fuller]*

*See Appendix ✓*

*gore critical:*

1. *terminology: [See Hill]*

2. *cosmic ✓*

*restr. prefer ✓*

3. *ability ✓ [See journal etc.]*

4. *Filters [should be fuller]*

*next for methodology*

*at 3. towards*

CHAPTER ITHEOLOGIANS IN REVOLT.

The nineteenth century witnessed a revolt against traditional orthodoxy in theology. For this, as for all revolutions, there were causes both remote and proximate: nor were all the rebels actuated by the same motives. But if there was one conviction which the Liberal Theologians of the last century held in common, it was that the ecclesiastical dogma had been superseded for all who were not fettered by bands of tradition and prejudice. This conviction was forced upon them by the new autonomy of the sciences, natural and historical. Philosophy and theology were relegated to a departmental status, and from the time of Kant the story of both has been a tale of struggle for emancipation and reinstatement. Dr. J.M. Creed (The Divinity of Jesus Christ) has convincingly shown that the study of Christology, far from being an isolated backwater, is in the midstream of theological thought and much affected by the currents of contemporary philosophy. The conscious reaction of such modern theologians as Barth and Brunner against the dominant theological tendencies of the nineteenth century has its counterpart in the revolt of recent philosophy from that idealism, Kantian or Hegelian, which in its time had considerably influenced the trends of contemporary theology. Yet whatever may be the future developments in either theology or philosophy, they will all be affected by that break with tradition which occurred at the beginning of the last century when the old idea of Revelation was destroyed.

Protestant orthodoxy, confusing the fact of revelation with the witness to the fact, had placed the Bible itself, as a book, in the place which should have been reserved for the fact of revelation. Hence the destruction of the dogma of Verbal Inspiration, with its emphasis upon an Infallible Book, by the modern process of research in natural and historical science, inevitably carried away with it the whole Christian faith in revelation, in God's reconciling action in history in Jesus Christ. Catholicism was able to weather the storm because dogma and Bible are part of the Church, and the destruction of the old authority of the Bible did not involve the destruction of the Church. But within orthodox Protestantism everything was staked upon the legal authority of the actual letter of scripture. Scientific research and intellectual honesty exploded the doctrine of verbal inspiration once for all. While we today, looking back and benefiting from the labours of those who have wrestled with the issues of revelation and science, can see that the destruction of that doctrine did not at all involve the destruction of the Christian Faith, yet it did not seem so to the theologians of the period. "For the first time the Bible was drawn within the whole story of man's history which hitherto it had been supposed to encircle.... The idea of Revelation was thrown into the melting-pot. And therewith it was inevitable that the interpretation of Him Who is the centre of Revelation, Jesus Christ, should enter upon a new stage." (Creed. Ibid. p. 19).

The crux of the matter lies in a choice between two ways of looking at Jesus Christ. Either the theologian regards as primary

the testimony of the Church to Jesus Christ, or, ignoring that as an irrelevant and misleading distortion, he concerns himself wholly with the merely human picture of the Jesus of history. Liberal theology of the last century and the beginning of the present concerned itself with the "Jesus of history," the picture of the man Jesus extracted from the supposedly biased ecclesiastical documents which form the New Testament. We find Ritschl anxious to drive a wedge between the scriptures and ecclesiastical doctrine; and his pupil Harnack pleads that "the Gospel is simpler than the Churches want to make us believe."

This attempt to distil a "Jesus of history" from the New Testament is an illicit procedure, and for this simple reason. The revelation of Christ is not completed with the last word spoken by Jesus Himself. The most important and revealing events of all had not yet taken place. It was precisely the Death and the Resurrection which made all the difference. The significance of the revelation could only be seen when those who had experienced the Resurrection looked back on the Life and Death and read their meaning anew. Once this fundamental truth is grasped, why should it any longer be considered impossible and incompatible with the revealed character of the message of Christ that the full truth of Christ should only be gradually revealed and become defined on all sides? As Brunner says: "It was the God-given task appointed to the Apostles of God, as witnesses of the Resurrection and the foundation of the Church, to explain in an authoritative manner to the Church what had really taken place in Christ, just as it was the God-given task of the prophets to predict it." (The

Mediator, p. 182). Within the literature of the New Testament there is no evidence at all for a purely human conception of Jesus. The very circumstances which led to the writing of the Epistles and Gospels rule out that possibility. It is precisely the witness of the Church to Jesus Christ the Son of God and the heavenly Redeemer of the world which matters for Christianity.

This criticism of the traditional Christological dogma in the nineteenth and the present century is not the full extent of the theological revolt: it is only the occasion which is utilized in order to discredit, with some show of justification, the Christian view of Revelation as a whole. As we shall see, the Chalcedonian Doctrine of the Two Natures, in which the controversies of centuries were crystalized, is not, and cannot be made, a satisfactory description of the Incarnate. The doctrine was a defensive measure; but, however suspect the outer covering may be, it did at least preserve the essence of the matter, namely the fact of the Divine descent. The revelation was a revelation from outside the sequence of historical events; from the mystery of God. In the revolt of the nineteenth century this essence of the matter itself was discarded simply because its outer covering was unacceptable. The philosophy of progress, the materialistic optimism of nineteenth century thought, could not stomach the humiliating claim that Revelation must be given from beyond. Revelation for Hegel means the self-manifestation of the divine in the depths of the human spirit: history is the idea made concrete: there is nothing decisive about it. In his overweening confidence

in his own reason and in the unbroken character of his own existence, modern man cannot tolerate the idea that divine energies of redemption are not latent in the deepest foundations of his own being. The "cogito ergo sum" of Descartes, and Kant's "I ought, therefore I can", are faithful expressions of the pride of modern man, as well as strong influences making for its continuation. In spite of his emphasis on experienced redemption in his approach to the doctrine of Christ's Person, Schleiermacher and Paul are poles apart. For Paul, the sinless human being means the miracle of an absolutely new creation: for Schleiermacher it means only the attainment of the final end of human development by a speeding-up process. Paul took sin seriously: Schleiermacher and his successors did not. In the end it comes to this - that all that modern man expects from Jesus is assistance.

The battle between modern thought and the faith of the Church turns upon the fact of evil. Modern thought on the whole is Pelagian: it thinks of sins, not of sin: of evil as isolated acts of will, but not as corruption of human will. The Bible sees evil as sin, as a personal relationship: we can sin only against God: it is insubordination, "the non-recognition of the limitations of my own will by the divine will in the existence of my fellow men...The Doctrine of the Fall is the idea in which the inexplicable character of evil finds its clearest expression." (Brunner, The Mediator, p.144). Recognizing the power of evil in his own experience, Paul is supremely conscious of his need of a redemptive power from outside himself. He has found that power in

Jesus Christ. He knows that Jesus is not just a man, nor even the best man who ever lived. The author of Hebrews sees the Person and the work of Christ as a living whole, vitally related; the Christology of Irenaeus is always soteriological and his soteriology is always Christological; simply because they, like Paul, took sin seriously. The whole presupposition of the Biblical revelation of the self-movement of God, and of the patristic interpretation of that revelation, is the gulf between God and man, the abyss between the Holy God and the sinful creature which the sinful creature cannot cross. "The good that I would, I do not." We cannot understand the descent of God unless we see first that man in his own strength cannot move towards God. It is his very certitude of self-sufficiency which blinds modern man to the truth of the Christian claim. Sin as personal alienation, the solidarity of original sin, of which we have no historical knowledge, which, however, lies at the basis of historical experience - this receives no serious attention from the theologians whom we are considering. For them Christ is the highest expression that can be imagined of a moral and religious human being, no less, but also no more. As Brunner assesses it: "the modern conception of Christ is essentially that of Paul of Samosata; we might describe this theologian as the first Ritschlian, or as the first modern theologian....Christ was merely the possessor of a specially great, but impersonal, divine power and divine spirit....In principle what took place in Christ could happen again and again; the unique character of revelation is

denied." (Mediator, p.276.). But the heresy goes deeper. At the root it is Sabellianism: modern theologians have freed us not only from the difficulty of the two-nature doctrine, but also from that of the Holy Trinity. It is crystal clear and simple, but it is not the Gospel, and there is no redemption. We are still in our sin.

The emphasis placed by Liberal Protestant theologians upon Jesus as a man like other men, save for His supreme goodness which shows Him to be divine, is the not unnatural outcome of the Christology of Luther. For while Luther himself is in no doubt about the reality of God's victorious act through Jesus (which involves the truth that Jesus Himself is God), yet in Luther's Christology there was a quite new emphasis upon the real manhood of the Master. Brunner remarks that no one after Irenaeus had taken the vere homo so seriously as Luther. "Like any other holy man He did not always think, speak, will everything like an almighty being, which some would fain make Him out to be, thus mingling unwisely two natures and their work: for indeed He did not always see all clearly, but was led and aided by God." (Quoted Brunner, Mediator, p. 329). Modern theologians have this in common that they start from the reality of the Saviour's manhood and seek from this standpoint to determine more clearly the meaning of His divinity. It might almost be claimed that Luther laid down the principle by which future Christologies were to develop. "The Scriptures begin very gently and lead us on to Christ as to a man, and then to One Who is Lord over all creatures, and after that to One Who is God. So did I enter delightfully, and learn to know God. But the

philosophers and doctors have insisted on beginning from above; and so they have become fools. We must begin below and after that come upwards". (Quoted Mackintosh. The Person of Christ, p.232).

That is true enough, and that needed to be said. That certainly was the experience of the Apostles. But there is a world of difference between the conclusions of the Apostles about Jesus Christ and the conclusions of the Liberal Protestant theologians of the nineteenth century. And the causes of the difference we have already tried to indicate. The disciples who knew the man Jesus better than we with all our historical research, yet worshipped Him as the Exalted Lord. However much Brunner may be in error by his exaggeration of the antithesis between faith and reason, \* yet he is surely right in pointing to the absence of faith as the difference between the historical interpretation of Jesus and the witness of the New Testament. For the Apostles the man Jesus had an authority which He did not have for the Liberals of the last century. Even the most perfect ethical and religious personality can never be an authority for us. As Quick has pointed out, the Liberal protestants were so preoccupied with the conception of God revealing Himself that they missed the other truth which is essential to the biblical Gospel - namely the belief that God in Christ has decisively and finally acted. All that Brunner means by the einmaligkeit (the once-for-allness) of the Christian revelation is ignored. "If, therefore, Christ has really conquered death and sin, made atonement for man and opened the way to God, then the same situation which existed before his coming

can never be repeated, and neither can his victorious act. The fundamental defect of Liberal Protestantism is that it thinks of Christ only as revealer. Therefore it misses the point of the Gospel of the new age." (Quick. Doctrines of the Creed, p. 132).

\* N.B. The relation of Faith and Reason is probably neither that of the scholastics on the one hand nor that of Barth and Brunner on the other. It is not true that everything which is of permanent value in man's knowledge of God is derived from Jesus, or from biblical documents alone. Nor is it satisfactory to superimpose a superstructure of specifically Christian revelation on a foundation which is essentially non-Christian and is never reinterpreted in the light of Christian revelation. How can a man ever legitimately embrace the Christian Faith if he is not able to assess its claims, at least in some degree, by the light of his conscience and reason? Again, how can a man hope to reach a unity in living if he divides his view of life into that which he discovers by reason and that which he receives by faith? The purpose of reason is to consider facts and interpret them so as to make them intelligible. Thus in the sphere of the Christian Faith it is the task of reason to expound the main beliefs of Christianity in such a way as to show that those beliefs, when accepted as true, do illuminate the order of the universe as nothing else can. Reason and Faith are not concerned each with a distinct sphere of cognition. "The true business of philosophy seems to be to bring the belief to a consciousness of itself". (J. Cook Wilson. Quoted by Baillie, Our Knowledge of God. p.240).

ORTHODOXY RE-EXAMINED.

The criticism of the Christological dogma of the Church was, we have seen, only the occasion which the Liberal theologians of the nineteenth century utilized as part of their effort to discredit the Christian view of revelation as a whole. In its place, it is true, they put forward a Christ of such sort that, had this been the actual Christ, it is extremely unlikely that the New Testament would ever have been written. Nevertheless the fact of their revolt is important. We must try to find what it was in the patristic definitions which proved unpalatable, and we must attempt to assess the true value of the patristic conclusions about the Person of Christ.

1. Patristic Terminology.

A chief reason for the Liberal revolt was dissatisfaction with the terms in which the Fathers sought to give expression to their beliefs. Superficially this line of attack offered easy victory. Too often Christological discussion has turned upon a violent controversy about words, each side arguing from its own interpretation of the words it uses, and neither side trying to discover what the other side really meant. The bitter controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries were largely of this sort; while fundamentally both the leading Christological schools of Alexandria and Antioch were contending for the same principles, differences of expression were interpreted as differences of doctrine. A controversy which might have ended in an enriched Christology, had it been carried on in charity, led to the triumph of one school and the dissolution of the

other to the lasting impoverishment of the Church. (Sellers, Two Ancient Christologies. pp.202 ff.).

The New Testament is the history of the coming of salvation through Jesus Christ, and of Jesus as Saviour. The problem which faith creates is the problem how Jesus Christ can be God: He does without arrogance or incongruity what only God can fitly do. Thus the task of the theologians is to find terms to express the Church's belief that in the one Person Jesus Christ are united the two elements of Godhead and manhood. For this purpose the Fathers of the Church adapted for a new use a variety of terms which were already more or less current coin in the philosophical systems of the contemporary Gentile world.

οὐσία Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary ousia. The word in its primary sense was used by Origen to describe a particular existence, an individual: and the use of ousia in the sense of prosopon was never completely abandoned. More generally the word came to be used in the secondary sense, as a result largely of the setting up of homousios. In this sense ousia is that in virtue of which a thing has the nature which it shares with other things of the same class: as the equivalent, that is, of the Latin substantia. In common usage this philosophical term ousia became identified with the empirical term φύσις which, technically, means the sum of the attributes which belong to a thing. Once nature came to be used as the equivalent of ousia, it came to bear the same two meanings as ousia, the one particular, the other general.

ὑπόστασις

The Greeks used this term in both an active and passive sense. It could mean both "that which gives support" and "that which underlies." (Prestige. God and Patristic Thought, pp. 162 ff.). In the former case hypostasis could be used to signify "particular objects or individuals": in the latter the emphasis is on "the raw material, stuff or matter, out of which an object is constructed," and so the term could be used to signify "reality and genuineness." The equivalent of hypostasis in Latin, i.e. substantia, was used by the Latin theologians to express ousia. But while the Fathers do sometimes use hypostasis in the sense of ousia, i.e. that which underlies, more commonly hypostasis is used in the former individualizing sense, "that which gives support" and its equivalent is prosopon - the particular centre of being which has the nature in virtue of the ousia, i.e. that which makes horse to be a or this horse.

πρόσωπον

Prestige (Op.Cit.p.157) explains this as signifying "the external being or individual self as presented to the onlooker." It is probable that the term is first found in connection with doctrine as a translation of the Latin term persona. Persona designates that which appears on the surface; it conveys the notion much more of the subject in a certain environment than of the subject alone: i.e. rank or status; also a "party" in the legal sense, whether an individual or a corporation treated as an individual for a law-suit, cp. personam gerere rei-publicae. Thus prosopon seems to be the equivalent of persona which represents individuality from the external point of view, and

also of hypostasis which represents individuality from the internal point of view.

The Hebraic and Christian ideas which the Fathers were attempting to express in these Hellenic terms were in many respects antithetical to the metaphysical presuppositions of the Hellenic thought which lay behind the terms. To the Jew, Yahweh was essentially the living God who acted in history and controlled the issue of events. To the Platonist all things are more or less adequate symbols which partly reveal and partly veil an unchanging divine reality which, to the seeing eye, shines through them. In the former religion God is conceived as the doer of mighty works who fulfils His promise or purpose against all opposition: in the latter, God is the eternal and changeless perfection, imperfectly imaged in phenomena and revealed to those who know how to look behind them. To the Platonist, knowledge of God was essentially a clearer vision of the eternal reality behind phenomena: to the Jew, the knowledge of God was a practical and obedient response to the will of the living God.

The supreme attribute of the God of the Greeks was immutability, with impassibility as its correlative - an ontological immutability, that is, which is contradicted if God from His side ever enters into a fresh relation with created beings. God and man are distinct: they are essentially different ousiai. "Salvation" consists in the inward union of the individual soul with the eternal reality in virtue of the link provided by men's possession of Logos. Salvation is an individual achievement: there is no possibility of God Himself acting in

order to accomplish men's salvation.

The fundamental presupposition of the New Testament on the contrary, is that God has acted in Christ in order to reconcile men to Himself. There is nothing in the Christian Creed to suggest the impassible God of the philosophers. Omnipotence does not involve impassibility; omnipotence in fact has no meaning except as the power of love to achieve its purpose. To conceive of love apart from sacrifice is to conceive of something entirely different from what God in Christ has shown the divine love to be. Hellenic ideas, however, so dominated the Christian intellect up to the Reformation that theology was never able to take quite seriously the notion of any act of God in history, and if the Christology of the Fathers is inadequate it is because it does not do justice to that revelation of God with which Christianity both completes and corrects the imperfect ideas of Godhead derived from God's universal witness to Himself. The metaphysical dogma of divine immutability prevented the Fathers from ever doing full justice to the cardinal truth of the Gospel, although no doubt, they felt that it was only by using the familiar terms of Greek philosophy that they could get a hearing at all in the Gentile world for their unfamiliar doctrine of an ethical God. (Prestige has shown that the notion of the divine οἰκονομία is the result of an effort to combine a belief in God's providential action with a Hellenic theology which did not think of God as personally active in mundane affairs.)

It is in no way a disparagement of the excellence of the doctrinal structure which the Fathers erected with such

inadequate materials to say that it was these very materials which prevented them from achieving ultimate success. Sellers (Op.Cit. pp.1-17) has been at pains to show that the Fathers themselves were never taken captive by the doctrine of God which they were attempting to overcome; Athanasius, for instance, was teaching a view of man's salvation which was moral and scriptural; but the very fact that he was using terms which were not in keeping with such a view frustrated him in the accomplishment of his real intention. No satisfactory theory of the Person of Christ could be reached so long as God and man were spoken of as antithetical ousiai. Just as pre-Christian conceptions of Messiahship had to undergo changes once it was accepted that the Messiah was Jesus; so the pre-Christian ideas of God, both Hebraic and Hellenic, had to be modified in face of this revelation.

While it is not difficult to see the value of the Chalcedonian definition when it is set alongside the interpretation which it is designed to exclude or correct, it cannot be said to provide a coherent theory of Christ's Person. "If it is lifted out of the mental and spiritual environment in which it was shaped, and treated as a constructive statement of the doctrine of the Lord's Person, it must answer formidable objections. The parallelism of the two natures and the two wills, united by their common relation to one divine hypostasis, is a theory hard to reconcile with an intelligible conception of personality. And the theory has no warrant in the Gospels." (Creed, Mysterium Christi. p ). Ultimately the truest Christology is that which does

most justice to the life of Jesus recorded in the New Testament, and that is the final standard by which the patristic Christologies must be judged. Leo typifies the bankruptcy of Hellenic terminology as a vehicle for Christian revelation. All he does is to state the paradox with which the Fathers started: the Saviour must really have been both God and man, he says, and points to the miracles as obvious evidence of his Godhead, and to the sufferings as obvious evidence of his manhood. "The truth is that Hellenic theology cannot without contradiction go further towards a doctrine of the Incarnation than to say that the historical life of Jesus symbolizes the perfect goodness of the Godhead more truly than any other human and passible life." (Quirk. Op.cit. p. 125).

The Liberal theologians of the nineteenth century, however, did not object to the ecclesiastical definitions of Christ as the inherence in one Person of two natures, Godhead and manhood, for exactly the reasons outlined above. Their quarrel was due rather to their failure to appreciate what the Fathers meant when they spoke of the "Divine Nature". In their thinking the contrast between Creator and creature had been replaced by the relative antithesis of nature versus cultural achievement (Brunner, The Mediator, Ch. viii). Whereas the Fathers by the "Divine Nature" meant something like the quality of His being, the moderns thought of nature in the sense of what is merely physical, natural and material. Accordingly they supposed the early ecclesiastical formulas to be far more material and naturalistic than they were ever intended to be. In the line of argument developed by Ritschl

and Harnack, the fundamental objection is that the dogma of the early Church is dominated by a "physical" (naturalistic, mechanical) conception of salvation: salvation is caused by a physical act - the incarnation. While it is possible to see the truth which the description is intended to convey, a truer criticism is that the patristic categories were "intellectualist" and "static" rather than "moral" and "dynamic". The Fathers generally thought of the divine Being in terms of  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  rather than of  $\pi\tau\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\mu\alpha$  and Will

Even so, had Cyril and Nestorius each tried to understand what the other said that he meant, it is probable, as Sellers suggests (Op.cit. p.234), that the result would have been a view of Christ's Person altogether more satisfactory than that which actually emanated from the victorious Alexandrian school alone. For even if we try to avoid the terms nature and ousia, the Christological problem remains, and it cannot be said that either Ritschl or Harnack have made any conspicuous contribution to its solution: in fact it is by no means certain that they ever appreciated where the problem really lay. On this point the Fathers were absolutely decided. Their clear perception of man's fall and need of redemption meant that they always viewed Christology from the standpoint of Soteriology, and the Person of Christ can only be understood when the purpose of His coming is firmly grasped.

(Jan)

### ii. The Manhood of Christ.

The disciples who knew the Man Christ better than we with all our historical research, yet worshipped Him as the exalted Lord. The theologians, however, starting from the Pauline principle that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, have on the whole failed to do justice to the truth that as a historical personality, as a subject of history, Jesus is completely human. It was inevitable that on this issue also the ecclesiastical dogma should be severely criticised by the Liberals with their renewed interest in the humanity of Christ.

Once it has been asserted that in Christ there are two natures, each with its properties, there is involved the question of the relation between them in the one Person. Here we encounter difficulty, for in the coming of Jesus Christ we have something unique, and because of its uniqueness we are bound to acknowledge that the psychology of the God-Man lies beyond human comprehension. Is it then possible to go further than the plain statement of the paradox that Jesus Christ, Himself one Person, is yet both God and Man? Both Alexandrians and Antiochenes attempted to go beyond the plain statement, and we must briefly consider how far their Christological adventure is justified by results.

Cyril, for example, (Sellers, Op.cit. pp 84 ff.) insists that Jesus Christ is one Person, but that in that one Person are the two elements of Godhead and Manhood. The Logos is the same person both before and after the incarnation. He who existed <sup>3/</sup>  $\kappa\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$  is now (though without any change in respect of His divine being)

συνδικωμενος. The union of Godhead and manhood is hypostatic; it is a "personal" union which has its centre in the Logos Himself. The Logos made man is one prosopon. Cyril lays down that it must be said that "God" suffered; otherwise, if it was not the Logos, as He had become man through making His own a passible flesh, who suffered, then a man - another beside the Logos - must have suffered; and no mere man can be the Saviour of the world. He flatly rejects the notion that some of the actions and sayings in the Gospels should be attributed to the Logos, and others to a manhood regarded as having a prosopon alongside that of the Logos. All are the actions and sayings of the God who has become man.

Jesus Christ is "One", but He is "One out of two." Using ousia in the sense of substantia, Cyril holds that the incarnate Logos is "the one and sole Christ out of two and different natures;" using hypostasis in the same generic sense, he says, that there has been "a coming together of things or hypostases." These two elements, Cyril insists, remain without confusion in the union, and are to be "recognized" as distinct: Christ is a theandric person, whose activity is also theandric. But it has to be confessed that Cyril does not work out the relation between Godhead and manhood in their union in one Person. He says that the Logos has added to His eternal being this - that He has undergone "a voluntary self-emptying", through becoming man for man's salvation.

Cyril was not the first theologian to toy with the Pauline concept of a divine self-emptying. Origen had said; "We are lost in deepest amazement that such a pre-eminent nature should have divested itself of its condition of majesty and become man". Such

self-emptying was necessary if God was to be seen by man, and he first makes use of the theory in order to explain how the Logos could become a speechless and ignorant child. But as Raven (Apollinarianism pp.28 ff.) points out, "the self-limitation is not a permanent condition of the incarnate life", but "an act so transient as to last only until the end of Christ's adolescence". When Athanasius says of our Lord's expression of ignorance that He said this "that ignorance might be the Son's when He was born of man", his meaning seems to be that since "ignorance is proper to man", and the Logos has become man, the Logos as incarnate was ignorant. Again he says, "when the Logos came in His own body He was conformed to our conditions", and one may surely see the germ of the conception that the Logos - to use Hilary's word - "tempered" His powers that there might be a real incarnation. Much more explicit is Apollinarius who states as a principle that incarnation is self-emptying,  $\sigma\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$   $\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ . He declares that the suffering of Christ "only appears in proportion to the restraint and withdrawal of the divine will" (cp. the "quiescence" of the Word in Irenaeus); for example, in the matter of our Lord's fasting, "when the Godhead with its capacity for superiority to want acted in combination, the hunger was appeased: when it did not employ its capacity to resist the feeling of want, His hunger increased". (Raven, Op.cit. pp.203 ff.) Apollinarius had the conception of a continuous process of voluntary self-emptying, and "the self-emptying revealed Him Who emptied Himself to be not man but the Son of man, by way of limitation, not of change". In the one Christ there are two separate spheres of

action, the one limited, the other limitless. But neither Apollinarius nor Athanasius carried out to the full the implications of the concept.

Cyril, however, takes the theory a stage further. The self-emptying of the Logos, who in His divine being cannot suffer any change, is to do and to say what is human through the economic union with the flesh. He asserts that the Logos "went through the laws of human nature" and "allowed" the humanity to fulfil its own measures. "He permitted the measures of the manhood to prevail over Himself". ἡφίει δὲ οὖν οἰκονομικῶς τοῖς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος μέτροις ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν τὸ κρατεῖν. But, as Bruce (The Humiliation of Christ, pp 54 & 366 ff.) has proved, Cyril "restricts the reign of law to the material sphere, excluding it from the intellectual and moral". While he does not hesitate to speak of a physical, he will not go so far as to posit a moral and intellectual growth: the growth in wisdom is not real, but apparent, "a holding back, or concealment, of wisdom existing in perfection from the first, out of respect to the physical law". Seemingly Cyril is intent upon making the redemption sure, believing that this could only be if the Logos had supreme control over the manhood. But in his desire to preserve the reality of redemption, Cyril, like Athanasius, and in a different way Apollinarius, sacrifices the reality of the manhood. He allows no real inward conflict. The Representative Man, Christ certainly is; but hardly one whose manhood can be said to be individual (i.e. "real" in the only sense that we understand real humanity), if as soon as temptation arises the Logos steps in and

uses His power to quash the human impulse. In common with his predecessors in the school of Alexandria, Cyril upheld the principle of the totus homo in accordance with the conviction that "that which was not taken was not redeemed". In common with them also, and in virtue of the Platonic tradition in which they had been brought up, Cyril is inclined to emphasize the abstract rather than the concrete. Had he developed the doctrine of the Lord's full individual manhood he would have been compelled to posit the complete self-emptying of the Logos. That he was prepared to admit a measure of self-limitation by the Logos in respect of the powers which are His by nature if He was indeed to become man, we have already seen. But the metaphysical dogma of the immutability of the Logos, and the habit of abstract thought, was too strong an influence; in spite of himself Cyril could not conceive it possible for the Logos really to permit the measures of manhood to prevail over Himself without His thereby ceasing to be essentially and identically the Logos. The Cyrilline school, by requiring as subject of manhood the Logos conceived as unlimited, must end by deifying the humanity at the cost of what is proper to man, or by teaching a semi-docetic conception of it as a mere veil or instrument of Godhead. Manhood is a veil between God and man rather than the very proper nature of the Incarnate in His mediatorial action Godward and manward. The manhood of Christ cannot be an efficient medium of the manifestation of the unlimited Godhead, and, at the same time, an adequate representation before God of our weak and limited manhood.

It was this otherwise admirable doctrinal structure which was accepted by the Church as the orthodox expression of its belief; when Nestorius was condemned at Rome and at Ephesus, judgement was in both cases based on Cyril's view of the incarnation, and, what is more significant, on Cyril's view of what Nestorius meant by his teaching. In recent years, however, new interest has been shown by scholars in the writings of Nestorius, and Sellers has done a great service to the cause of Christology by his re-examination of the whole Antiochene position. He claims that fundamentally the school of Antioch was concerned to establish the same two Christological principles which were emphasized by the school of Alexandria, but that, being Aristotelian rather than Platonic in outlook, they were particularly interested in man as a free agent, and were at greater pains to preserve the reality of Christ's manhood.

The Logos, states Nestorius, takes man's fallen nature upon Him to renew in man the divine image which was His at the first. Emphasizing the fact that the Logos "took" (  $\lambda\epsilon\beta\omega\nu$  Phil.2.v.7.) human nature, he asserts that the incarnation brought about no change in the Godhead which is immutable and invariable. The union of Godhead and manhood in Jesus Christ is voluntary and personal because the Logos Himself has been willing to take the body and the rational soul. The two natures" have been combined in one prosopon"; the Logos has so assumed His manhood that there is constituted one Prosopon, one Person of Him who assumed and of that which was assumed: again and again Nestorius insists that his is not the doctrine of two sons.

On the other hand the Antiochene teaches that Christ was tried to the uttermost throughout His life, but by being implicitly obedient to the will of the Logos, brought about man's salvation which was dependent upon such perfect obedience. "Although He had all these things which appertain to our nature, anger, concupiscence and thoughts, and although they increased with the progress and increase of every age, He stood firm in thoughts of obedience". Bazaar of Heracleides, p. 63. (quoted Sellers, Op.cit.p. 139.)

How then does Nestorius conceive of the relations of the manhood and the Godhead in the one Christ so that the moral struggle of Christ thus asserted is shown to be real?

While affirming that Jesus Christ is one prosopon as a result of the union - one person in whom the two ousiai of manhood and Godhead are brought together - he also expressly asserts that each ousia has its own prosopon. Hence the accusation of Cyril that Nestorius was teaching two sons. But whereas the Alexandrians use prosopon only in the technical sense of 'person', the Antiochenes say that every real thing has its prosopon. For them, ousia signifies "that which exists". The prosopon of an ousia can mean either its 'appearance', or 'the individual peculiarities of a being', or 'the personage' which has the appearance and the individual peculiarity. Hypostasis they use almost exclusively in its root meaning of 'underlying existence'. Thus when they speak of there being in Jesus Christ two hypostases, and that each of the two ousiai has its prosopon, they are simply seeking to underline the reality of the two natures. Nestorius is firm on the point

that the union has been set up through the action of the Logos in uniting manhood to Himself: the incarnation consists in the "giving and taking" of the prosopa - the individual peculiarities - of divinity and humanity. The Logos "takes" the prosopon of the manhood, or "the Man", as His prosopon, and "gives" His divine prosopon to the manhood. The Logos Himself performs both actions. "The Antiochenes may reject Cyril's hypostatic and natural union - because taking hypostasis and nature in this connection in the sense of substantia, they are convinced that such expressions must mean that, as a result of the union, the human nature has been transformed into the divine substantia of Jesus Christ - but it seems clear that they would uphold the very same truth which their opponents were upholding, namely, that in Jesus Christ the Logos has 'personally' united manhood to Himself". (Sellers, Op.cit. p. 153.) Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Sellers has entirely vindicated Nestorius' Christology as an intelligible doctrine of one Person. For when in other passages he gives his own paraphrase of Antiochene doctrine it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he seems to be commending a belief that the Son of God did not unite to Himself a humanity personal only in Himself, but chose a Man to be His instrument. e.g. "It is fundamental to their doctrine that this Man is the Chosen One of God, foreordained as the instrument of the Logos as He comes down to restore the human race, and that in Him, as the Chosen One, the Logos dwells from the first." (Op.cit. p.130. op: pp.154, 255.)

Like the Alexandrians, the Antiochenes also uphold the

reality of Christ's divine nature because they are moved (though less explicitly) by the thought that if man is to be redeemed there is need of the divine nature to fulfil its part in effecting the redemption. For the same reason they oppose the Apollinarian doctrine that the Logos took the place of the human soul in Christ, since that doctrine robs the manhood of its reality, and if this is not real there is not that conquest over sin which must be seen if man's redemption is to be brought about. Nestorius insists that the will and the intelligence, which are part of the nature of humanity, were active in Jesus Christ. Thus the manhood has its *prosopon*, its individuality: the manhood is utterly real, possessing the faculty of self-determination. If man is to be redeemed, 'the Man' assumed, as he passes from trial to trial, must be ever at one with the divine Logos in purpose and will.

No doubt this greater emphasis on the reality of the manhood is partly due to the efforts of the Antiochenes to reject Eutychianism, just as the Alexandrians emphasize the unity of Christ's Person in their determination to defend the faith against what they dub the 'Nestorian' error. But fundamentally, allowing for difference of emphasis, both are eager to maintain, in principle at least, the individuality of the human element in Jesus: what is explicit in Nestorius is certainly implicit in Cyril's whole position. The tragedy is that neither carried this principle to its logical conclusion in respect of the relation between the Logos and His real humanity. The Antiochenes affirm clearly that in the union the manhood of Jesus Christ possesses the individual characteristics and

functions of a free agent - though always in accordance with the Will of the Logos - but they do not explain what is involved for the Logos in thus giving His prosopon to the humanity and taking to Himself the prosopon of the humanity. While, with Cyril, Nestorius seems to perceive that a real incarnation necessitates that the Logos shall restrain Himself in the exercise of His divine powers and functions so as to be able to conform to human conditions, he does not examine the implications of such a principle. By speaking as he does of the transference of prosopa it would seem that he means that the Logos, while remaining God in all things, becomes 'that which the Man is', and does nothing 'apart from the human humiliation'. He uses the analogy of the king who wishes to condescend and to become one of the soldiers, laying aside the purple of royalty and putting on the equipment of soldiers, thus concealing himself and talking to them on equal terms. But Nestorius no more than Cyril made any real attempt to follow through this line of thought. Had he done so he would no doubt have avoided the accusation of teaching two sons, only to be accused of making God mutable. Nestorius, like Cyril, thought of God too much after the manner of the Greek philosophers. They could not conceive of a divine act of self-sacrifice and self-limitation which did not make God less than God. Neither school succeeded in speaking of God in terms of love, and neither school gave real place in its Christology to the fact of the divine condescension.

Nevertheless Cyril and Nestorius do throw out suggestions for a new line of approach to the problem of the

Person of Christ. Cyril's insistence that in Christ there is a single personal life is supremely important: important also is Nestorius' teaching of the individuality of Christ as man, His power of self-determination and the real moral struggle and obedience. By taking the human rather than the divine in Christ as starting point, and asking what are "the measures of His manhood" and what is involved in the "human humiliation", it may be possible to safeguard the complete reality of Christ's human historical life together with the truth that nevertheless it was God who was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. In the next chapter we shall examine how far the attempt to reach a doctrine of Christ's Person along these lines has been successful.

*Second-hand  
under the paper*

CHAPTER IIIORTHODOXY RE-STATED.

The need for a restatement of what the Church believes about the person of Jesus Christ is first seen most clearly by Martin Luther. In the vivid phrase of Mackintosh, "new thoughts of Christ are struggling in Luther with old forms". His great contribution to the development of Christology was that he virtually rediscovered the historic Saviour, who redeems sinful men by drawing them into union with His own wondrous Person as disclosed in the New Testament. For him, as for St. Paul, there is an indissoluble bond between the Person of the Redeemer and His redeeming work. The Person and the office are an organic unity, and to understand Christ we must begin by getting to know His human life. In the days of earth He was no almighty man. "He ate, drank, slept, and waked; was weary, sad, joyous; wept, laughed; was hungry, thirsty, cold; sweated, talked, worked, prayed." Luther could not make Him too human: yet, nevertheless, he saw also that it was fatal to make Him merely human. "If Deity be wanting in Christ", he writes, "there is no help or deliverance for us against God's anger and judgment"; and again, "if it could not be held that God died for us but only a man, then we are lost". The keystone of Luther's Christology was that none other than God could avail to atone for human sin. Yet he never ceased to insist that to talk of the mere juxtaposition of Godhead and manhood was valueless: for him, as for Hermann, the experience of the man who finds in Christ the saving presence of very God is "not so much expressed as concealed by the formula that combines a Divine nature with the human nature of Jesus".

(Quoted Mackintosh "The Person of Jesus Christ," p.236.)

To the present day the Church is occupied with the problem in all essentials as it was stated by Luther. He offered no solution himself, but it is significant of his importance that not only the kenotic theorists, but also such widely differing Christologians as the Liberal Protestants and Brunner are all deeply influenced by his teaching. What he preached passionately, was the unity of Christ and God; we must not, he said, make "a Christ apart by Himself and a God apart by Himself"; the two natures are so united that they cannot really be looked at separately. By placing emphasis upon the unity of Christ as seen in the Gospels, Luther changed the direction of Christological enquiry. No longer was the question, "How can two natures so different as divinity and humanity be combined in one Person?" but rather; "What is the relation in the one Person Jesus Christ between the Divine content of His being and the specific form it assumed in Him of a perfectly revealing human consciousness?" That is the emphasis in Brunner every bit as much as in the Kenotists.

It is with these last mentioned theologians that this essay is concerned. They can almost be said to carry on where Luther left off. Their's is the attempt to find a solution to Luther's dilemma by means of a restatement of orthodoxy, in distinction, that is to say, from the revolt against orthodoxy which characterized their Liberal contemporaries. The fact that their theories came to be styled "kenotic", from the passage in Philipians which figured prominently in the discussion, must not

be taken as implying that the truth in this matter rests on a particular exegesis of this single passage. Like most nicknames this one only expresses a half-truth. For while undoubtedly the theory did seek "to do justice to the truth that the Incarnation of the Son involved a real self-limitation of His Divine mode of existence", and also in effect did throw "into strong relief the exceeding greatness of the step downward taken by the Son of God when for our sakes, though rich, He became poor", so that Mackintosh can say that this was "the profoundest motive operating in the kenotic theories"; yet the chief motive was the more general one of seeking to restate the central dogma of the Christian faith in a manner more in keeping with the New Testament and less obnoxious to modern minds than the Chalcedonian formula.

The germs of what was later to blossom forth as a kenotic theory are to be found among both Lutheran and Reformed divines. The former, drawing a sharp distinction between incarnation and humiliation, held that the subject of humiliation or self-emptying is not the Logos, for in becoming man the Logos surrendered nothing of His Divine Majesty. "The subject of humiliation is the God-man in respect of His human nature; and for Him humiliation consisted solely in this, that while retaining possession of the Divine qualities conveyed to His humanity by its union with the Logos, He yet made no habitual use of them. He usually dispensed with them, and only at times did His real power flash through the veil". (Mackintosh, Ibid. p.242). The Reformed divines held that the subject of humiliation in Phil.2.

is not the incarnate God-man, but the pre-incarnate Son; and for the apostle's mind humiliation is simply the incarnation.

A more explicit forecast of the modern idea of kenosis was made by Zinzendorf, (1710-1760), the founder of the Moravian brotherhood. It was the religious rather than the scientific interest which appealed to him, and probably no other writer has shown such eloquence and extravagance in proclaiming a thoroughgoing kenosis as the glorification of divine love. For him the greatest thing in the Saviour was not His Godhead, or His Majesty, or His miracles, but His becoming freely so little. While never ceasing to be God, Jesus was in all matters to be considered as a simple man: all our comfort is to be derived from His humanity, viewed not only as like us in its weakness, but as characterized by a maximum of weakness, so that the most miserable creature can think of Christ as weaker than himself. In carrying His self-emptying so far, He but glorified His love. As Dörner recognized, this religious trait has always been a dominant characteristic of the theory of which Zinzendorf may be regarded as the immediate forerunner. This desire to conceive the divine Love as having become as like to, as intimately united with, man as possible, undoubtedly represents a truth fundamental to the revelation of God in Christ: the writer of Hebrews had recognized it, and St. Francis of Assisi gave concrete expression to it.

It was nearly a hundred years later that this thought of Zinzendorf's first received scientific treatment as a Christological axiom, and it remains to this day probably the most important single contribution to the development of Christology in modern times.

The considerable literature which was written round this subject in Germany in the last century, while influenced by contemporary philosophical and scientific thought, received an additional impetus from a projected reunion of the two great branches of the German Protestant Church. The desire to thrash out theological differences in the hope of attaining to a measure of agreement not unexpectedly led to very considerable discussion regarding the Person of Christ, and the Christology of kenosis was offered to the world as a union Christology.

It is neither necessary nor useful in this essay to do more than summarize the main characteristics of the continental Kenotists. The laborious task of classifying and examining the multitude of forms in which the theory has been put forward has been performed with care and exactitude by Dr. A.D. Bruce in his compendious volume, "The Humiliation of Christ". It is to this writer more than to any other that the majority of English theologians have turned for a knowledge of this Christological development. Bruce observes that the forms which the new theory assumes in the hands of its exponents are scarcely less numerous than the exponents themselves. It is in consequence a tribute to his patient study that he has been able to classify them under four main types.

#### A. Modern Continental Theories of Kenosis.

1. Thomasius of Erlangen (Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie 1845, Christi Person und Werk 1853-61).

This may be taken as the classic form of the kenotic theory.

We find in Thomasius principles which are fundamental to the

kenotic standpoint, and remain, with individual variations of interpretation, characteristic of all forms of the theory. One and all proceed upon orthodox assumptions as to the Trinity and the two natures present in the One Person of our Lord. They seek to secure a conviction that the subject of the experience of the central Figure of the Gospels is, as in the traditional scheme, identically the Eternal Word, the Second Person in the Trinity; and, at the same time, to do justice to the reality of the human experience of Jesus in its local and temporal setting, while yet avoiding the seeming unreality of the traditional formula. One and all agree that this Second Person of the Trinity, by a suspension or restriction of His divine activities, reduced Himself within the limits and conditions of a truly human experience, thereby revealing the amazing love of God.

Thomasius contends that incarnation is for the Son of God, necessarily, self-limitation, self-emptying, not indeed of that which is essential to Deity in order to be God, but of the divine manner of existence, and of the divine glory which He had from the beginning with the Father, and which He manifested or exercised in governing the world. The Son of God continues to be Himself, yet, having undergone kenosis, He is at the same time the subject of a human experience: Christ is the man who is God. God is not destroyed by self-limitation, for self-limitation is an act of will; not negation, but rather affirmation of existence. Love was the motive of the incarnation, and love is the sole measure of its depth. But, moreover, the humanity of Christ remains intact also. Christ made Himself the Ego of a human individual, and is conscious

of being limited in nature, possessing both a soul and a body having the same contents and the same conditions as ours.

The crucial question as to the relation of the Logos incarnate and the Logos as sustainer of creation Thomasius answers by drawing a distinction between the divine attributes. Some are regarded as essential, some as relative. Omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence are conceived as relative attributes of God, expressive of His relation to the world which He has made; attributes with which God can part and yet be God. During His earthly state the Redeemer is neither almighty, nor omniscient, nor omnipresent. But all the essential attributes of Deity are retained by the incarnate Logos; absolute power, absolute truth, absolute holiness and love. Far from losing these, the Son of God entered into a state in which He had an opportunity of revealing them. The humiliation of Christ was revelation as well as kenosis.

2. Gess. (Die Lehre von der Person Christi. Basel, 1856.)

Gess differs from Thomasius in the more radical kenosis which he assumes to have taken place. He does not hesitate to claim that the incarnation affected the internal relations of the Trinity. For the Son, the incarnation involved a suspension of the influx of the eternal life of the Father into the Son. He suffered the extinction of His eternal self-consciousness, to regain it again only after many months as a human, gradually developing, variable consciousness. For incarnation involved the loss of the essential, immanent attributes of Deity in addition to those which Thomasius distinguished as purely relative to the divine economy. The flesh

became a determining power for the Logos as it is for the ordinary human soul. Thus the self-depotentiation is absolute: the Logos "reduces Himself to the germ of a human soul". The only difference between the Logos and a human soul is that He became human by voluntary kenosis, while an ordinary human soul derives its existence from a creative act. Meanwhile the cosmic functions of the Son are performed by the Father who now enters into direct relation to the world, and Himself exercises the functions of Creator and Preserver, which He commonly exercises through the mediation of the Word.

3. Ebrard. (Christliche Dogmatik. Königsberg, 1851).

This writer agrees with Gess that the Logos in undergoing incarnation became a human life-centre, a human soul. But in opposition to Gess he denies that His self-reduction involved a depotentiation of the Logos. The Son of God in becoming man underwent not a loss, but a disguise of His divinity in the sense that the divine properties, while retained, were possessed by the God-man only in the time-form appropriate to a human mode of existence. While accepting the Chalcedonian formula, Ebrard contends that the two natures are not to be considered as two "things". The human nature is a manner, or form, of being. Christ is the Eternal Son of God entered into a time-form of existence, possessing the ethical and metaphysical attributes of God (i.e. God's essence) in a finite form of appearance. The divine nature and the human nature stand related to each other as essence and form. The divine attributes remain in an applied form, and in that form they are truly human.

Applied omnipotence is simply the dominion of the spirit over nature, which belongs to the idea of man. Applied omniscience is the dominion of the Spirit over the objects of knowledge, to which man was originally destined. Applied omnipresence, the power to be where one wills, is simply the dominion of the Spirit over the natural body which man was designed to attain; the body in its ultimate idea being not a foreign burden subject to elementary influences, but a free projection of the soul in space, released from all subjection to the elements, to death, to the laws of gravity.

For Ebrard the incarnation seems to consist in the exchange of the eternal for the time-form of existence. But he does not grapple with the question whether the conscious personal identity of the Logos can survive the change from the eternal to the time-form of existence. And beyond this Bruce finds him extremely difficult to understand; for, in much that he says, he seems to suggest that the eternity form did not cease to exist; rather the time-form of existence was added to the eternity form.

4. Martensen. (Die Christliche Dogmatik, Deutsche Aufgabe, Berlin, 1856.)

The distinguishing feature of the doctrine as put forward by this Danish theologian is the belief in a real, yet only relative, kenosis of the Eternal Logos. The Logos is not wholly involved within the incarnation. The Word became flesh, but did not cease to exist in His general world-revelation. Qua incarnate the Logos possesses His Godhead in the limited forms of human consciousness; but as the omnipresent Logos, the Son of God continues to shine

through the whole creation. Martensen clearly teaches that the Logos leads a double life. How this duality in the life of the Logos is to be reconciled with the unity of His Personality, Martensen does not explain. He seems to have preferred to regard the problem as a mystery, convinced on the one hand that the kenosis was an indubitable Scripture doctrine and historical fact; concluding on the other hand that the continued activity of the world-sustaining Logos was an obvious corollary from His distinctive function as the Mediator and Revealer in relation to the universe. These two truths he holds in tension, not considering himself bound, or able, to reconcile them.

Broadly speaking, subsequent theologians of the kenotic persuasion can be classified under these four headings, though of course there is a wide variety of interpretation of disputable points. Delitzsch (System der biblischen Psychologie pp. 326-33, 1861.) and Kahnis (Die lehre heiligen Geiste) follow Thomasius: Gaupp (Die Union, 1847), Godet (Commentaire sur l'Evangile de Saint Jean) 1864) and (but with some hesitation) Liebner, 1849, and Hoffman (Der Schriftbeweis), belong to the Gessian type: Ebrard seems to have no follower: Martensen can count Schöbelein, 1851, on his side, and more important than him, Dr. Charles Gore whose Christology has marked affinities with that of the Dutchman.

Almost as wide a variety of objections have been raised both to the theory in general as to particular expositions of it. Some of these criticisms must be noticed at this point.

The study of these early exponents of the theory is frankly disappointing. On the whole they lose sight of their main intentions

in a welter of involved speculations about matters in the supramundane sphere about which there is no evidence whatsoever. The attempt of Thomasius to discriminate exactly and academically between those attributes of the Godhead which the Son gave up in His incarnation and those which He retained, could not hope to survive criticism. Gess on the other hand, would seem convicted of tritheism. They try to prove too much.

An obvious weakness in those who teach an absolute kenosis after the manner of Thomasius is that the Logos is reduced to a state of helpless passivity or impotence. Thomasius endeavours to meet the objection by remarking that "Potenz" signifies fulness concentrated in itself. But if this means that the "Potenz" has power at will to radiate forth, then there is no real depotentiation, as Ebrard consistently holds. With Gess, however, there is no doubt that "Potenz" is practically equivalent to impotence. Thomasius virtually admits this by representing the development of Christ as taking place under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. In consequence the Thomasian association of the depotentiated Logos with a human soul seems superfluous; according to Gess, the depotentiated Logos became a human soul, but so bereft of His antecedents that His sinlessness and consciousness of personal identity are all but unaccountable.

A more serious objection to this metaphysical interpretation of the kenosis is that there is a breach of continuity in the mind which gave rise to the Incarnation. The love which moved the Son of God to become man would seem to have consumed itself

at one stroke, for it is well-nigh impossible to recognize the Second Person in the Trinity in the depotentiated Logos as conceived by Thomasius and Gess. The moral truth of the divine descent is obliterated by metaphysical necessity, and not only is nothing gained, but the most essential truth of all is lost. Dörner rightly seized on this "unethical sacrifice of Himself" as proof that the Kenotists had overreached themselves. "For if the Logos has given up His eternal self-conscious Being, where is His love during that time? Love without self-consciousness is an impossibility". (Doctrine of the Person of Christ, div.ii, vol.iii, p.253).

Again, one object of the kenotic theory being to resolve the dualism of Chalcedon, it is difficult to see what has been gained by the Thomasian teaching that there are in Christ two life centres the depotentiated Logos and the human soul. Even if the two life-centres are sufficiently homogeneous to secure a unity of self-consciousness, it is apposite to ask: Why two human souls to do the work of One? Gess certainly avoids this dualism, but only to fall into more grievous error.

Incarnation as conceived by Gess virtually involves the annihilation of the Logos: not only does it involve loss of self-consciousness, but also of the very characteristics of God in virtue of which alone He can be said to be God. It was the death which finally released the Logos from the bondage of the flesh, and somehow, from somewhere, the Logos recovered all that He had given up. The most serious consequence of such a theory is that it imperils the end of the incarnation, that redemption of sinners

for which it is indispensable that the Redeemer Himself should be free from sin. Gess quite consistently treats sin as a real possibility for Jesus, and while claiming that the possibility never became an actuality, he gives no good reason for that fact.

Thomasius and Gess have erred by treating the doctrine of the Person of Christ primarily as a matter of being rather than of doing: Their's is a metaphysical, rather than an ethical Christology. That it should be so is all the more astonishing in view of the predominantly ethical emphasis both of 2 Philippians, and of their own conception of the limitation of the Son being the supreme demonstration of the love of God in action. But once they have become involved in a process of metaphysical speculation their theses grow more and more artificial, and in many respects more remote from the New Testament than the Fathers at Chalcedon. Evidently an ethical reality cannot be expressed in metaphysical categories, and the theory of an absolute kenosis of the divine Logos, as expounded by Thomasius and Gess, is manifestly unacceptable.

Ebrard on the other hand is suggestive. It is probably true to say that in fact his Christ is a tertium quid - neither God nor man, but more the former than the latter. But by his idea of the Logos incarnate retaining His divine attributes in an applied form, (i.e. in a form compatible with a truly human life), he seeks to safeguard the identity of the Second Person in the Trinity with the Christ of the Gospels, and he also hints at the idea that it is only in Christ that we see what human nature is destined to be, and is capable of becoming. We must not make our manhood the standard by which to measure that of our Lord: we must attempt to measure

our approximation to the standard of true manhood by reference to Him. It is probably this truth which Ebrard was meaning to express when he wrote that "applied omniscience is the dominion of the spirit over the objects of knowledge to which man was originally destined". But, at most, it can only be taken as suggestive of a truth which is relevant to kenotic Christology. Beyond that it is difficult to take Ebrard's as a serious contribution, for, on examination, he seems to be playing with words in a way which renders them meaningless. If our Lord possessed "applied omniscience", the power of knowing this or that secret at will, how is that attribute to be reconciled with His profession of ignorance? Did Christ as a child possess omnipotence and omniscience applicable at will? Perhaps the child possessed them unconsciously. But surely unconscious, unavilable power and knowledge can only mean impotence and ignorance. Bruce finds the attempt of this writer to reconcile Patristic and Reformed Christologies nothing more than "a characteristic display of perverse ingenuity".

When we come to Martensen we find a presentation of the theory which avoids most of the objections to which, under the forms already considered, it is liable. The incarnation consists in a voluntary act by which the Logos becomes a human life-centre, without His power becoming exhausted in the act: moreover, to whatever extent the laws of physical nature have power over the Logos, in that state they have it by His own consent. But not only does Martensen escape those difficulties which beset the

theory of an absolute metaphysical kenosis; his doctrine seems also to satisfy the demand of the ethical kenosis as suggested by the New Testament. As we shall see more clearly when we come to consider the Christology of Dr. Geera, it may well be that the Logos has a double life; one in the man Christ Jesus, one as the world-governing, world-illuminating Logos. At least it is a possible working hypothesis intended to cover and account for all the facts of our Lord's history, without creating more or greater difficulties than it solves. Whatever may be the difficulties of conceiving this double life of the Second Person in the Trinity, it must be remembered that it is a problem which presents itself in one form or another, to all who believe in a real incarnation at all. Certainly the kenotic theory as put forward by Martensen goes much further than any of the other types that have been reviewed to provide an ethical and scriptural doctrine of the Person of Christ.

In summary conclusion at this point it may be said that the Kenotists have served the cause of Christology well in calling in question the traditional axiom of the immutability of Godhead. By asking whether that which is commonly said to be inconceivable is so in fact, they have challenged the traditional orthodoxy at its weakest point: they have demanded that our conception of God be Christianized before we proceed to consider what is involved in the incarnation of the Son of God. Secondly, they have brought into new relief the great ethical truth that the incarnation, which proceeds from the love of God, demonstrates

that love most chiefly in the divine humiliation which incarnation involved. Thirdly, they have insisted that no theory which does violence to the New Testament conception of Christ can be acceptable. The New Testament speaks of divinity revealed through humanity, not of divinity and humanity side by side. The doctrine of the self-limitation of the Son is put forward as a theory which is in line with the historical evidence, and makes the manhood of Christ a reality and not a pretence. Nor is the value of these three contributions lessened by the fact that none of the theologians we have so far considered has been able to put forward a theory of self-limitation which is theologically satisfactory. As has already been said, their chief fault was their attempt to express an ethical truth in metaphysical categories. The identity and unity of the Incarnate Christ was made a matter of considerable doubt by the very theologians who set out to establish that unity and identity beyond all doubt.

But whatever their failure in the realm of scientific exposition, all honour is due to them for insisting that Christology must do justice both to the love of God and to the real manhood of Jesus Christ.

We turn now to consider how these high themes have been treated by theologians of the kenotic school in this country.

*unsuccessful: not original ✓*

## B. The Christology of Charles Gore.

### Lux Mundi.

Several British theologians have made the attempt to explain by a theory of kenosis how the Son of God could become truly man. We cannot do better than select Dr. Gore as a typical exponent of those views: by an examination of his Christological position we shall be able to see the main issues clearly; to compare and contrast his theses with those of other prominent theologians of the same school; and to reach a general conclusion about the whole theory.

The circumstances which initiated Gore's formulation of a Christology were not auspicious. Had Gore set out to formulate a doctrine of the Person of Christ in relation to the whole divine purpose of redemption, he would no doubt have started from sounder premises, and would have reached more satisfactory conclusions. As it was, he found himself forced to make a Christological statement to bolster up certain contentions on a somewhat subordinate issue. One cannot avoid the criticism that the whole development of his Christological reasoning is to a large extent crippled by the inadequacy of his starting-off point.

The key to Gore's Christological position is to be found in the edition of Essays published in 1889 under the title "Lux Mundi". In these essays the aim of the writers was to demonstrate the Church's "power of witnessing under changed conditions to the catholic capacity of her faith and life". (Preface 1889). Rapid advances in scientific method had led many to believe that the

foundations of the Christian faith were shaken beyond repair, but Gore and his companions set out to "succour a distressed faith by endeavouring to bring the Christian creed into its right relation to the modern growth of knowledge, scientific, historical, critical". (Preface 1890).

Higher criticism of the Old Testament books asked for a changed view both of the circumstances of their composition and of the method by which they had reached their present form. The Pentateuch could no longer be ascribed to the hand of Moses, nor the Psalms to the authorship of David. That was the position of the critics. On the other side were those who claimed that our Lord's own use of the Old Testament books foreclosed such enquiry into origins. It was in his attempt, in the essay on "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration", to reconcile the two positions and to show that the authority of our Lord was not at all imperilled by the conclusions of the higher critics, that Gore "changed Lux Mundi from a declaration of High Church doctrine into an ecclesiastical typhoon". (Prestige. Life of Charles Gore. p.98). In that essay (parts of which were re-expressed in the fourth edition in order to make it clear that he was not to be misunderstood as suggesting our Lord's fallibility as a teacher), Gore definitely asserted that the Incarnation of the Son of God involved a limitation of His divine omniscience. In making his claim Gore directly opposed the teaching of Liddon who, in his Bampton Lectures of 1869, had as definitely and vigorously repudiated the supposition that Jesus of Nazareth could ever

have made a statement involving limitation of knowledge. With reference to our Lord's apparent ignorance of the date of the day of judgment, Liddon says, "That Jesus was ever completely ignorant of aught else, or that He was ignorant on this point at any other time, are inferences for which we have no warrant, and which we make at our peril". (Liddon. The Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, 4th ed: 1869. p.467).

It is not surprising that Gore's statement raised a storm. He pleads with his opponents (Lux Mundi: Pref. to 10th ed. 1890) to grant him leave to "defer to another occasion the fuller discussion of this important subject in connection with the doctrine of the Person of Christ".

What is curious about this gauntlet that Gore seems almost unwittingly to have thrown down in Lux Mundi is that he need never have done it at that particular moment. He already had a satisfactory answer to the immediate question of the apparent discrepancy between our Lord's use of the Old Testament and the conclusions of the higher critics. He says, "as we scan carefully our Lord's use of the Old Testament books we are surely struck with the fact that nothing in His use of them depends on questions of authorship or date". (Preface 10th ed: 1890). Both in that Preface and later in the Bampton Lectures 1891, he makes good his thesis in respect of our Lord's references to Moses, to the Flood, to Jonah and to Psalm CX. Our Lord refers to the inspired books under the only name by which His reference would have been intelligible to His hearers. "Unless He had violated the whole

principle of the Incarnation by anticipating the slow advance of natural knowledge, He must have spoken of the Deuteronomist as Moses as naturally as he spoke of the sun 'rising'. (St. John: 5. 46-7.) His use of the narrative in Genesis is to be compared with His own parable of Dives and Lazarus: it is a vehicle for spiritual teaching, a typical narrative of what is again and again happening, a representative narrative, an archetype. Rather more difficult to reconcile is our Lord's use of Psalm CX. But here again Gore claims that our Lord is not giving positive instruction which depends on Davidic authorship. He is asking a question as part of His method of leading men to examine their own principles, without at the time suggesting any positive conclusion at all. To argue that our Lord intended to teach anything about the authorship of the Psalm is to make this a unique phenomenon in the record of His revelation, because nowhere else does He bring to bear the unveiled omniscience of the Godhead to anticipate or foreclose a development of natural knowledge. What He rather does is "to bring to bear upon men's intellectual equipment the moral claim that it should be used rightly, honestly, and impartially". (Bampton Lectures. 1891. p.200).

While, no doubt, on other grounds a strong case can be made out for a theory of our Lord's limitation of knowledge, it is difficult to see why Gore thought such a theory necessary to meet the critical attack. He adequately defends the authority of our Lord by arguments which in themselves are in line with more traditional interpretations of the incarnate Person such as Leo's or Liddon's. But those few sentences had raised the hue and cry.

Gore could not withdraw, and it is unquestionably true that his subsequent Bampton Lectures were considerably influenced by the need to explain more fully all that he had implied in the Lux Mundi essay. What he says in that essay suggests that he was throwing out an idea which he had not yet very carefully worked out. On the one hand, he says that "the Incarnation was a self-emptying of God to reveal Himself under conditions of human nature and from the human point of view". A little later he says: "He used human nature, its relation to God, its condition of experience, its growth in knowledge, its limitation in knowledge". The former statement implies a self-emptying of God, a real change in the Godhead; in the latter statement a self-emptying of God is not necessarily implied at all. The limitation in this second statement seems not a limitation of Godhead but of manhood, and that presumably is a position which Liddon could accept. Gore then safeguards himself by adding the note (Lux Mundi p.265): "This limitation of knowledge must not be confused with fallibility or liability to human delusion because it was doubtless guarded by the Divine purpose which led Jesus to take it upon Himself". What is not clear from the context is whether Gore means by "this limitation" a limitation of Christ's knowledge as God, or a limitation of His knowledge as man.

#### Bampton Lectures and Dissertations.

Gore elaborated his thesis for the "general reader" in the Bampton Lectures 1891 and for "a more strictly theological public"

in Dissertations 1895. These works leave no shadow of doubt as to Gore's position: the incarnation in his view involved a definite self-emptying of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity.

As a result of the Lux Mundi controversy there is a tendency for Gore to be a theologian on the defensive. He dwells on the question of our Lord's human consciousness and never really succeeds in working out a Christology on the broad basis of the whole divine plan of redemption. He says (p.59) that Christ's incarnation was "a voluntary act of self-beggary, an act by which the Divine Son for our sakes became poor, depriving Himself of the riches of His previous state in order for our redemption to become true man". But it is precisely this relation of the Person of Christ to the purpose for which He came down from heaven, this interaction and interdependence of atonement and incarnation, which Gore never expounds. Gore's Christology is Hellenic rather than Hebraic, Johannine rather than Pauline. Paul reaches belief in the Incarnation through belief in the Atonement. For him the earthly life of Jesus is valued primarily for what it has effected. St. John, on the other hand, values the earthly life of Jesus primarily for the revelation which it conveys in itself of the eternal communion of love between the Father and the Son. Gore's Bampton Lectures treat the incarnation almost as something separate from the atonement, and it is a debatable point whether a satisfactory Christology can be formulated which does not base itself in soteriology. Gore's description of the purpose of the incarnation cannot be held adequate (p.155.) He says "a divine

motive caused the Incarnation... a deliberate act of God:..it was a means devised for our recovery and for our consummation, a means, therefore, directed and adapted in the divine wisdom, to serve its purpose. That purpose included on the one side a clearer revelation of God's mind and being to man in terms intelligible to him, and on the other hand the exhibition of the true ideal of human nature". But if Christ's work were only a revelation and an example, the sin-diseased souls of men would still be in need of a physician. Gore, of course, realized this, but it cannot be denied that in his Bampton Lectures he did not (perhaps deliberately, but in that case inexcusably) consider the problem of the Person of Christ against the background of His redemptive work. If the primary purpose of the incarnation was to effect the reconciliation of man with God, to heal the whole wound of man, then it is far from irrelevant to ask what sort of Person Christ must have been in order to effect that reconciliation. As Creed warns us: (The Divinity of Jesus Christ p.119) "Incarnation is no self-explanatory idea...disaster dogs the attempt to define the incarnate Person in Himself". For Athanasius, the incarnation of the Word is firmly viewed as God's redeeming action for the race; Christology in the stricter sense holds a subordinate place in his thought. "Later controversies, when the mode of the Incarnation was in the centre of interest, came to no decisive issue comparable with Nicaea, and the explanation may be that in trying to define the Incarnate Person, men had largely lost the wider horizon of God's purpose for mankind". (Creed. Ibid. p. 118). It was their desire to safeguard

the reality of their redemption won by Christ that led the Fathers to safeguard the doctrine of His Person from all tendencies which would so deny either His humanity or His divinity that redemption, in the objective sense of opus operatum, would be an act without meaning, not mystery but nonsense.

Thus we cannot but regret that Gore did not treat the kenotic theory in relation to the larger issues of redemption as well as to the more particular subject of the Person of Christ. Powerful as his arguments are, they would undoubtedly have been much more powerful and his thesis probably more satisfactorily formulated, had he set out to prove that the reality of our Lord's experience of life in human conditions was a necessary ingredient of a truly moral atonement.

What is at once most striking in Gore's approach to the problem is the complete absence of anything doctrinaire. There is no dogmatism about the divine attributes, no a priori picture of what an incarnation may be thought to have involved. When reading Gore you feel that you are once again breathing the same air that pervades the Gospel narratives themselves. Canon Hodgson's is a salutary warning: "We must always be testing ourselves by asking whether we can recognize the Christ of our thought in the Christ of history". So often Christological speculations seem grotesquely remote from the Christ of the Gospels, but not so with Gore. It is with the historical Jesus that he is concerned, and he seeks an interpretation of the Person of the Incarnate in which this Jesus of the Gospels is recognizable. Gore's principle is that "all

right theory emerges out of experience and is the analysis of experience", and "the religion of the Incarnation is pre-eminently a religion of experience and fact". (Preface to Bampton Lectures).

Examining the undisputed letters of St. Paul, Gore points out that whereas they are Epistles of controversy with the Judaistic party, we are able to perceive that the doctrine of Christ's Person was not one of the points of dispute. This is a most important fact. The letters contain an unmistakable doctrine of the incarnation and Person of Christ: an account of the method of Christ's manifestation, divinity through humanity, which corresponds with the evangelic record: an appeal back behind Paul's present teaching to primary instruction in the events of Christ's Person and resurrection which presupposes an evangelic narrative already existing in the memory of the Church. Gore claims that the Chalcedonian formula, 300 years later, represents simply and faithfully, in language supplied by Greek philosophical schools, this same original apostolic creed in Christ, the incarnate Son of God. No doubt that was the intention of the Fathers at that Council. Nor can it be denied that the great achievement of these Fathers was that they preserved the truth of the incarnate Person from heretical perversion. But to attempt to turn this traditional doctrine of the incarnation into a theory of how the incarnation happened is to court disaster. Chalcedon does not represent "simply and faithfully" the belief of St. Paul about Christ. It reveals the bankruptcy of patristic theology, its inherent inadequacy to form a satisfactory theory of the

incarnation. All it affirms are certain negative limits within which a theory must keep. Our Christological troubles have largely resulted from attempts to make the Chalcedonian formula into a theory. It is precisely when we look for the Divine side by side with the human, instead of discerning the Divine within the human as did the Apostles, that we miss the significance of them both.

Gore, of course, recognizes this truth: in fact its recognition is fundamental to his thesis. "We need", he says, "to go back again and again to the consideration of the historical Jesus. The dogmatic decrees of the Church afford us guidance and warning in the undertaking: they are notice-boards to warn us off false lines of approach to Him, but they are not meant to be anything more". (B.L. p.143). The negations of the conciliar decrees were adopted to guard the old faith without adding to it, by simply blocking off false avenues of development or explanation on this side or that. The decrees are but the hedge, the New Testament is still, and must always be, the pasture ground. For dogmatic language, like any form of human language, can never finally give expression to divine realities.

#### The Christ of the Gospels.

The Gospels present a picture of Christ in which two features are especially prominent: a really human development of life, and a consciousness of divine Sonship. In this Weston agrees with Gore. He says that the Evangelists "do not allow for any conception of Him which does not include these two main facts.

But if we ask how and in what sense the two opposite facts are to be reconciled, we shall find no answer in the Gospels. The Evangelists do not betray any consciousness of a difficulty, much less do they exhibit any tendency to evolve a rationalized explanation of the unity of the Incarnate. They had come to adore Him as God, they had lived with Him as man, yet they always speak of Him as possessing one single centre of consciousness. But how these things came to be they neither ask nor explain". (Weston. The One Christ. pp.39-40).

No one who accepts even generally the historical character of the Gospels can doubt that the divine Sonship, hinted at in the Temple episode and asserted at the Baptism, was ever present to His consciousness throughout His earthly life. When He does instruct it is in the tone of one who speaks "that He doth know and testifies that He hath seen". The people recognized an authority in His teaching wholly different from that of the accredited exponents of the law. What He teaches, He teaches so that we can depend upon it to the uttermost. Yet for all that, says Gore in his analysis, while He knows the Father and is known of Him and reveals Him to whom He will, He does not appear to teach out of absolute divine omniscience, but rather as one conditioned by human nature. He frequently exhibits a supernatural knowledge, insight, and foresight, but all such supernatural illumination, if of higher quality, is yet analagous to that granted to prophets and apostles. He gave prophetic indication of the moral conditions of the coming judgment, but He did not reveal "times" and "seasons"; He declared that it was not in the scope of His mission to do so (Mk.13<sup>32</sup> Mtt.24<sup>36</sup>).

Nor can His declaration be held in isolation (as by Liddon) from the other indications which are given us of a limited human consciousness. He never enlarges our stock of natural knowledge, physical or historical, out of divine omniscience. His eschatological utterances "cannot rightly be described as history written beforehand by the hand of omniscience". (Dissertations . p.84). On several occasions our Lord expresses surprise: at His Mother's misunderstanding of His presence in the Temple, at the unbelief of men, at the slowness of the disciples' faith. (The episode of the barren fig tree (Mk.11<sup>13</sup>) is probably best interpreted as a parable as in Luke 13<sup>6-9</sup> which had come to be thought of in some Church circles as an actual occurrence). "We must surely believe", exclaims Gore, "that He really felt the surprise He exhibited". Again, He asks for and receives such information as any man would ask; the place of Lazarus' grave, the number of loaves available for feeding the crowd. In agreement with this He lived in constant exercise of prayer to God - the characteristic expression of human faith and trust, of which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews sees in Jesus the supreme example (Heb. 2<sup>13</sup> 12<sup>2</sup>). The reality of His human faith becomes more and more obvious as the anxieties and terrors of the Passion close in on Him. It was only because the future was not clear that He could pray "Father, if it be possible..." Nor would the cry of desolation from the Cross have had real meaning unless He had entered into the experience which originally prompted that cry of the Psalmist.

Gore concludes from his analysis of the evidence: "One

impression is given by the Gospels, taken together, of a real entrance of the eternal Son of God into our manhood and into the limited conditions of consciousness necessary to a really human state. This view alone can interpret and hold together all the phenomena, and His view does hold them all together and does enable us to read the Gospels without doing violence to any element in the many-sided but consistent picture which they represent".

(Dissertations p.88). This is certainly more satisfactorily expressed than the conclusion in the Bampton Lectures where he says, rather inconsistently: "as we look at the history in the Gospels we see side by side in Jesus, a life of one who dwells in the Father and manifests the Father, and a truly human life of joy and sorrow, sympathy and antagonism, trial and victory, faith and prayer". But this is to fall into the Chalcedonian impasse - this idea of Godhead and manhood side by side and yet somehow inhering in one Person.

What Gore really concludes is that in Christ we see One Who at the same time and consistently throughout the Incarnate life was both Ἰσὸν ἑαυτὸν πατρὶν τῷ Θεῷ (John 5:18) and yet also ὠχ ὑπομῶν ἡγήσατο τὰ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἰσὺ Θεῷ. (Phil. 2:6).

The Person of Christ.

His analysis of the apostolic evidence has led to a conclusion concerning the Person of Christ which needs to be elucidated and ratified. While there is "no single certain passage of the New Testament against" this idea of the self-limitation of the Logos Incarnate, Gore finds reinforcement for it in Hebrews 5:7-8 and in Phil. 2:9 and II Cor. 8:9 and draws a provisional conclusion: "The

Son of God without ceasing to be God, the Son of the Father, and without ceasing to be conscious of His divine relation as Son to the Father, yet in assuming human nature, so truly entered into it as really to grow and live as Son of Man under properly human conditions that is to say also under properly human limitations.....Within the sphere and period of His incarnate and mortal life He did, and as it would appear He did habitually (doubtless by the voluntary action of His own self-limiting and self-restraining love) cease from the exercise of those divine functions and powers, including the divine omniscience, which would have been incompatible with a truly human experience". (Dissertations p. 94).

In so conceiving of our Lord, Gore claims that we do not do violence to the New Testament and that "we are well within the limits of those prescribed dogmas which were intended as restraints on error, rather than as sources of information".

#### Gore's Position Appreciated.

We cannot too greatly admire Gore's insistence on the necessity of a correspondence between dogma and revelation, nor is practical religion ever forgotten in the discussion of theological dogmas. The conviction that doctrinal truth reaches its proper issue only in religious life is shown in passage after passage. He seeks an interpretation of the Person of Christ which is built not on a priori metaphysical considerations of divine impassibility, but upon the recorded facts of the historic revelation. He holds that neither the <sup>a</sup>priori dogmatical and unhistorical view that Christ's human mind was from the first moment of the incarnation and

continuously flooded with complete knowledge; nor the <sup>a</sup> priori humanitarian and also unhistorical view that the Son in becoming man ceased to be conscious of His own Eternal Sonship, can be admitted. Neither is true to the known facts: the New Testament shows that the truth of Christ's Person must lie between, "yet we cannot be contented with a view which simply puts in juxtaposition during our Lord's earthly life the divine and human consciousness: attributing simultaneously omniscience as God and limitation as Man". Gore rescues Christology from the realms of philosophical speculation and restores it to the realms of historical revelation. All that he says about the nature of the conciliar decrees has further helped to liberate Christology from bondage. He has taught us a new approach to the study of the Person of Christ, which is faithful to the biblical and primitive Gospel in a way that the Christology of Liberal Protestantism is not. Even if his own formulation of the theory of kenosis is open to criticism on many counts, yet in that theory he has, with other members of the same school, placed emphasis that was needed on that clause of the Creed which speaks of the divine condescension - "Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven". Dr. Mackintosh rightly sees in this prominence given to the exceeding greatness of the step downwards taken by the Son of God for men's sake, the profoundest motive operating in the kenotic conception: herein lies the immense religious significance of the theory. Somehow, to describe the method exactly may well be beyond human power, somehow God in Christ has brought His greatness down to the narrow measures of our life:

in the light of Christ's renunciation we gain a new glimpse of the lengths to which the divine Love will go for man's redemption. No Christology in the future can afford to gloss over this fundamental truth: in so doing it would render our one trustworthy source of information, the Gospel narrative, dubious or unintelligible. It is almost inconceivable that traditional Christology on the whole has found it too much to believe in that truth of divine condescension which has been a converting power in the lives of countless men and women down the ages of Christendom. Moreover, if we deny that Christ's coming to dwell among us did not involve a great act of self-abnegation voluntarily accepted out of sheer love, we are faced with the choice of three views, none of which is compatible with an unbiassed reading of the New Testament: either we must deny the Godhead altogether, or we must believe that as man He acquired Godhead, or we must hold that He carried eternal deity unharnessed and unmodified into the sphere of time. On this third view it is impossible to assign reality to His manhood at all. Far from being a sign of weakness, the self-limitation of God is proof positive of the omnipotence of Love - not a failure of power, but its manifestation.

#### Gore's Position Criticised.

We must, however, single out for more detailed discussion four issues on which Gore either has been or may be attacked.

First, his explanation of what he understood the kenosis to have involved is neither clear nor consistent; second, the depotentiation of the Logos incarnate raises several problems in

connection with the cosmic functions of the Logos; third, it has been questioned whether there is, in fact, identity between the Second Person in the Trinity and that Person as depotentiated in Christ according to the theory; fourth, it has been alleged that the theory is inconsistent with the orthodoxy of the Early Church.

### 1. Terminology.

What is confusing in Gore's exposition of the theory is that he uses, as apparently synonymous, terms which imply very widely different conceptions. A selection of passages may be quoted to prove this contention.

(a) "The self-sacrifice of the Incarnation appears to have lain in great measure, so far as human words can express it, in His refraining from the divine mode of consciousness within the sphere of His human life that He might really enter into human experience". (Dissertations p.97).

(b) "Thus remaining in unchanged personality He abandoned certain prerogatives of the divine mode of existence in order to assume the human". (Bampton Lectures p. 158).

(c) "By an act of deliberate self-abnegation He so emptied Himself as to assume the permanent characteristics of the human or servile life". (Bampton Lectures p. 158).

The first expression "refraining from" might be held not incompatible with the Augustinian theory that when our Lord said "He did not know", He meant that He knew, but would not tell. He refrained from using "the divine mode of consciousness", though presumably He might all the time of His sojourn among us have

been aware of a divine mode of consciousness which He was all the while refraining from using.

The second expression suggests that Gore is really on the side of the German Kenotists, and conceives of a distinction in the divine attributes; some of them are abandoned, some of them are retained by the Logos incarnate. The objections to this theory have already been noticed. It is his use of the word "abandon" which suggests "leaving for ever", which gives rise to the third of the above-mentioned criticisms of Gore's position, namely that the abandonment of certain prerogatives of the divine mode of existence casts doubts on the essential identity of the Logos <sup>2</sup>ΛΟΓΟΣ with the Logos <sup>2</sup>ΕΥΛΟΓΟΣ.

The third quotation, with its use of the Pauline phrase, is a further modification, for "self-emptying" is not necessarily the same as "abandoning", and may only be a rather strong expression for what in fact was no more than a self-limitation. Gore does not sufficiently clarify the issue, and one is never quite sure as to what he really considers the kenosis to have involved.

#### 11. The Cosmic Functions of the Logos.

A more serious objection to the kenotic theory is that, while apparently avoiding the seeming unreality of the traditional doctrine of One Person living simultaneously in two realms of consciousness, it either leaves unaccounted for the cosmic functions of the Logos during the incarnation, or else "introduces a perilous dualism within the Second Person of the Trinity", and to that extent may be considered to weaken the seeming gain in maintaining the Logos to be the centre of our Lord's consciousness. (Creed. Ibid. pp. 76 - 77).

Gore realizes that an absolute kenosis is not affirmed by the New Testament, and that his theory leaves a great deal unexplained, especially the relation of the incarnation to the eternal and cosmic functions of the Word. The New Testament represents the Father as sending the Word, and, in a sense, 'giving up' the Word, for our salvation: and the Word in incarnation is conceived of as 'coming down'. The Word was made Flesh, not part of the Word, or one aspect of the Word, but the Personal Word Himself. (John 11.4, 3<sup>16</sup>, 20<sup>20</sup>. 1 John 4<sup>9</sup>. Rom. 8<sup>32</sup>). Yet while no text directly suggests that the Incarnate Person during the period of His humiliation was still none the less in the fulfilment of His divine functions, nevertheless St. John, St. Paul and the writer of Hebrews lead us to believe that the Word belongs to the eternal life of God and is the sustaining principle of all creation. (Col. 1<sup>12</sup>. Heb. 13. See Appendix B). As Lightfoot expresses it; "He is the principle of cohesion in the universe. He impresses upon creation that unity and solidarity which make it a cosmos instead of a chaos". Both St. Paul and the author of Hebrews seem to have believed the self-emptying in the one sphere to have been compatible with the cosmic function in another sphere. Christian consciousness generally from the early Fathers onward has found it an inconceivable supposition that the cosmic functions of the Son should be interrupted by the incarnation; "The heavenly word proceeding forth, Yet leaving not the Father's side". Gore concludes "with the theologians of the Church from Irenaeus to Westcott," "that it is inconceivable to suppose any suspension of the functions of the Son in the Godhead and in the universe: "we must

conceive, therefore, that in some manner the humiliation and the self-limitation in the incarnate state was compatible with the continued exercise of divine and cosmic functions in another sphere". (cp. Martensen).

It has been wisely observed that we must all be agnostics if only we put our agnosticism in the right place. Sooner or later when seeking with human minds to comprehend the majesty of God we must with bowed heads and folded hands say simply and trustingly, "This great mystery". Some would forbid us to enquire into the manner of the incarnation at all: others, with Gore, would place the dividing line between the knowable and the unknowable behind the incarnate state and in the Eternal Trinity in whose love the descent of God originated.

In defence of his position Gore makes a strong point: he says that the language of the New Testament is much more full and clear on the fact of the human limitations than on the permanence of the cosmic functions: and our capacities for speculation about God, beyond what is disclosed in experience and revelation, are exceedingly limited. We 'know in part' admittedly, "but if Scripture represents the divine intention, we should meditate on the reality of the self-limitation which is revealed to us and pressed upon our notice". (Dissertations p.93). (One cannot refrain from expressing the wish that Gore had seen his way to working out a Christology couched in terms of "self-limitation" rather than of self-abandonment" and "self-emptying").

What has to be decided is whether a view of the self-limitation of the Godhead in the incarnation can legitimately be held and taught

in face of the difficulties which this leaves unresolved in the Being of God Himself. Is it conceivable that the Second Person in the Trinity can at the same time be the subject of the limited consciousness of Jesus Christ and also the sustainer of the universe? Or is it satisfactory from the point of view of theology to leave this as a mystery unresolved, humbly acknowledging that God, whose purposes demanded the incarnation, is able, nevertheless, to order His divine economy in spite of all that incarnation involved of self-limitation for His Son?

Weston puts forward a modified form of the theory that the Logos lives a double life. He considers that the extreme kenotic view leaves too much for the manhood to accomplish in its own power, while it does not save us from the dual centre of activity. His is the theory of the one divine Logos active in two states. The eternal Logos, who lives in universal creative relationships with the whole of His creation in virtue of His own eternal relation to the Father, adds to this a fresh set of relationships. He also lives on earth in special, redemptive relationships with a few chosen souls, such relations being based on a new, limited, human relationship to His Father. Only as man could He meet men on a common level, and only as communing with the Father through a human soul could He adequately serve mankind as priest. These new relations are additional to those that are universal, but the Person who constitutes each set of relationships is the same, the eternal Son of God.

The Incarnate is the eternal Son under conditions of manhood.

He had come to exhibit manhood to God; therefore He was content to accept the limitations which are proper to, and normal in, man. Weston rightly criticises the Kenotists when he argues that in considering the self-emptying of the eternal Son we have not to discuss how much of His power He retained, but how far at any stage of His life the manhood He had assumed was able to mediate His power. We are far too ignorant of the nature of God to be able to measure the effect upon Him of the assumption of manhood; nor can we determine a priori the possibilities and capacity of manhood; the Gospels only record for us the truly wondrous power of manhood when constituted in God.

How can the one Logos continue simultaneously in a dual relationship to the Father and to mankind? This problem is common to all theories of the incarnation. There is no clear answer, but Weston, by several convincing analogies, shows that the idea is by no means inconceivable. (Ibid. pp 166, 171-2, 182). Of the consciousness of the Logos in this dual relationship, Weston says that in the original relationship He is fully conscious of Himself as the eternal Son; in the incarnate relationship He knows Himself as God at every moment just in the measure that such self-knowledge can be mediated by the soul as it passes from perfect infancy to perfect childhood, from perfect childhood to perfect youth, and from perfect youth to perfect manhood. That this could be so was the result of His self-sacrificing love whereby He willed so to relate Himself to the Father and to men that within these relationships He could not know Himself as unlimited Son of God. As eternal Logos He made an act of will in virtue of which He added to Himself the

experience of entering upon and living in manhood; and as incarnate, He accepts at every moment, personally, through His divine will, all the foreseen, inevitable consequences of His act. The continuous act of obedience is the expression in terms of humanity of the primary act of self-sacrifice, and is based upon His limited self-consciousness as Logos in manhood.

Weston does much to ease the difficulty by thus emphasizing the possibility of dual relations, but admits that even analogies cannot take us very far towards seeing the possibility of the co-existence of the two states of the Logos. Ultimately this is a subject on which we have to admit that we see through a glass darkly. He agrees with Gore that our chief task is to emphasize the reality of the conditions of manhood under which the Logos chose to dwell. The Holy Spirit has not given us a revelation concerning the conception of a single person as the centre of two sets of relationships at the same moment; He has, however, revealed to us the actual relationships themselves.

#### Dr. Temple's Criticism.

Dr. Temple levels his criticism at Dr. Mackintosh rather than at Dr. Gore, but the point at issue is precisely that with which we are at present concerned, namely the relation of the cosmic Logos to the Logos incarnate. Of the kenotic position generally he says "we shall be wrong if we infer that during those years the Second Person of the Trinity was denuded of those divine attributes for which there is no room in a human life. We have no data enabling us to draw inferences of that kind. What we may justly

say is that from that moment there is in God, not only a sympathetic understanding of our state and of death itself, but a real experience. He Himself hath suffered, being tempted". (Christus Veritas p. 122). However much Dr. Temple may object to the theory of kenosis as stated by its various exponents, it is extremely difficult to understand how the Second Person of the Trinity could have a real experience "of our state and of death itself" without a voluntary self-limitation of Godhead, a limitation, that is, of divine consciousness, rather than of divine being as some of the German Kenotists seem to imply.

Mackintosh had said: "we are faced by a Divine self-reduction which entailed obedience, temptation and death. So that religion has a vast stake in the kenosis as a fact, whatever the difficulties as to its method may be". (Person of Jesus Christ. p. 469). Dr. Temple finds these difficulties "intolerable", though why he should it is hard to understand, because the difficulties which he finds intolerable belong to that supramundane sphere about which he has already claimed that we have "no data". "What was happening to the rest of the universe during the period of our Lord's earthly life? To say that the Infant Jesus was from the cradle exercising providential care over it all is certainly monstrous; But to deny this, and yet to say that the Creative Word was so self-emptied as to have no being except in the Infant Jesus is to assert that for a certain period the history of the world was let loose from the control of the Creative Word, and 'apart from Him' very nearly everything happened that happened at all during thirty odd years, both on this planet and throughout the

immensities of space". (Christus Veritas, p. 142-3).

All that can really be said in answer to Dr. Temple's questions is the answer which Gore gives - we do not know. (Belief in Christ, p.226). We are necessarily ignorant of the direct conditions or results of an act of the Deity within the supramundane sphere. On any theory of the incarnation that is true: and Gore has every right to claim that his doctrine is not invalidated by the necessity of remaining agnostic on this issue. Nothing whatever is gained by following Gess' and Godet's suggestion that during the period of our Lord's earthly life the Father Himself exercised directly the functions which He normally exercises through the mediation of the Logos. In fact such a suggestion savours of Tritheism.

As Quick has pointed out (Doctrines of the Creed, p.136) it is difficult to understand Dr. Temple's objection to the kenotic theory on the ground that it is "mythological". That surely is inevitable. "Myth is the only language we can use about supramundane realities, in so far as we think or speak of them in the category of action". "The myth is a true myth if it serves to express a reality which we cannot express better in other ways. And the kenotist contends that the theologian, if he would express the truth about the incarnation as fully as he can, is bound to tell a myth in order to account for that element or moment in the incarnation which belongs definitely to the sphere of historical fact".

When Dr. Temple comes to state his own theory of the incarnation it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that his position

is virtually the same as Gore's; he does not state that a kenosis took place, but it is impossible to see any meaning in his theory except on that assumption. He claims that the difficulties of Mackintosh's theory are avoided "if we suppose that God the Son did indeed most truly live the life recorded in the Gospel, but added this to the other work of God". This is what Gore means also, and the idea holds a prominent place in the writings of Cyril and Nestorius. But what cannot be understood is how Temple is able from this statement to draw the conclusion "We are able to see how Jesus Christ may be truly human, subject to all the conditions of His human life, 'a Jew of the first century', and yet be very God, without any such self-emptying of God as has a mythological appearance and involves stupendous difficulties in general philosophy and theology". All that Temple has done is to insist on the personal identity of Jesus Christ with the Second Person of the Trinity, and the continuing activity of the Logos during the incarnation. But precisely how can Jesus Christ be "truly human" if the subject of His manhood is the unlimited Logos? Dr. Temple has explained nothing. It seems almost as if, with Calvin, he is separating the divine Nature from the divine Person: the divine Nature remains in heaven, external to the incarnation all the time, the divine Person becomes incarnate. Jesus is, in fact, the Person of the divine Nature in heaven and of the human Nature on earth at the same time. Brunner, likewise, suggests that the divine Nature cannot enter the sphere of history at all, thus teaching a more extreme kenosis than Thomasius; the Person on earth has none of the attributes of the

divine Nature. But it is quite erroneous to imagine that things logically separable in thought are separable in reality, (e.g. the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation). The divine Person is not separable from the divine Nature. And except by conceiving a self-limitation of the Logos in becoming incarnate, we cannot attach any intelligible meaning to Temple's words "at each stage Jesus was the perfection of that stage of human life. The temptations that came to Him were perfectly real and so was His resistance. He overcame them exactly as every man who does so overcomes a temptation - by the constancy of the will, which is the whole being of a man organized for conduct". It is precisely to give reality to such a statement as that that Gore states his kenotic theory. As Creed argues, Temple's belief in the personal identity of Jesus Christ with the Second Person of the Trinity can only be reconciled "on the kenotic theory, but so far as I can see on no other theory".

Dr. Temple foresees the criticism which Dr. Quick makes of his theory. "If God the Son, the Word of God, is at once the Sustainer of the universe and the Babe in the Manger, does not this involve duality of Person in Him on precisely the same grounds on which it was said that there must be more than one Person in the One God?" (Christus Veritas, p.277). For Dr. Temple had already argued: "To attribute to a Person at once the eternal comprehension of the universe and the disappointment of Jesus Christ over Jerusalem or His cry of desolation on the Cross, is to talk nonsense. It is one God; but it is two Persons - so far as human terms have any applicability at all". Then in answer to his own question, as given

above, he replies: "between the experience of the Son subject to human limitations in Jesus of Nazareth and the Son as progressively ordering the world according to the Eternal Purpose of the Father, there is not the same distinction as between the eternal and temporal modes of the divine". But we are still obliged to assume a kenosis even if we agree to think of Him Who is at the same time both the creative Word and the Infant in the cradle, as being at the same time the subject of two distinct consciousnesses and experiences at once. "Granted that the Word without ceasing His creative and sustaining work, added something to it, what He added is precisely that experience in which His divine consciousness was limited and His divine state surrendered". (Quick, *ibid.* p.138.)

Dr. Temple, in spite of himself, gives weight to the contentions of three contemporary, but by no means like-minded, theologians. Dr. Bethune Baker (The Way of Modernism, p.88) has said "if we are to work with the orthodox theory of the incarnation I am sure we can only do so by making use of the conception of kenosis to the full extent". Dr. Creed says substantially the same thing: "If we take seriously both the human conditions of the life of Jesus and the theory of His personal identity and continuity with the Eternal Word, then a kenotic Christology appears to be indispensable". (Mysterium Christi p. 136). Dr. Quick, in a note on Gore's statement of the kenotic principle, holds that "the Chalcedonian Definition, as interpreted by Leo's Tome, seems to commit orthodoxy to accepting a kenosis, in so far as it affirms that the Son of God in His human nature subjected Himself to human limitations".

No doubt what Dr. Temple really objects to is the idea of "self-abandonment" and the artificial distinction between divine attributes which is characteristic of the "classic form" of the theory, and, to a lesser extent, of Gore's presentation of the theory. Is it possible for the truth for which the Kenotists have contended to be expressed in terms less open to objection? To this question we must return. For the moment we must continue to deal with criticisms that have been brought against the theory, and more particularly with those that have been brought against Gore's statement of the theory.

#### iii. The Problem of Identity.

The strongest blow aimed at the Kenotic principle, and by far the most damaging to its integrity, comes from Ritschl. He claimed that if the Word divested Himself of essential qualities of deity in order to be incarnate, then we are to that extent prohibited from recognizing essential qualities of deity in the earthly life, and that life itself is emptied of its meaning. We cannot in that case see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. God is not in fact in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.

As we have already said, the main motive of the kenotic doctrine is to secure belief in a Divine centre of consciousness for Jesus Christ. But is this belief secured by postulating so vast a change in the Word at the incarnation as did Thomasius, and, to a lesser extent, Gore? We have previously shown that in the case of Thomasius the personal identity of the incarnate Son with the second Person of the Holy Trinity is virtually denied by

his theory of the Self-depotentiation of the Logos. Once the world is created the divine relations of omnipotence, omniscience and the like are as really essential as righteousness or grace. We cannot think away the relative attributes of God without at the same time thinking away the relation. "Dispersion into the colours of the spectrum is not essential to sunlight as such, but so soon as we use a prism this relative attribute of light cannot but appear". Gore too speaks of the Son as "abandoning" certain characteristics of deity, and to that extent he falls with Thomasius. It must be God, and nothing less than God, who is revealed in Jesus Christ, and it is impossible to say that such a depotentiation is consistent with the Word being unchanged. Any theory of the Kenosis which involves a depotentiation of the Logos must be held to have failed to secure the one thing which the kenotists are so eager to secure - that the Divine nature was present in its integrity in Jesus Christ.

Thomasius and Gore both in effect posit a change in the permanent characteristics of the Word such as St. Cyril of Alexandria

expressly disclaimed in the Dogmatic Epistle to Nestorius: οὐ γὰρ φάμεν ὅτι ἡ τοῦ λόγου φύσις μεταποιήθεισα γέγονε σάρξ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅτι εἰς ἄνθρωπον μετεβλήθη τὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.

But when we have demanded that the subject of the incarnate Person must be not less than God, we have also to realize, what Ritschl did not realize, namely, that wherever God reveals Himself the veiling is as real as the revelation. Certainly incarnation cannot involve change in the sense of God becoming anything other

than He is. Otherwise how could we know God in the revelation?

"Yet a God Who even in revealing Himself is not at the same time the hidden God, the Mysterious, the Lord, the One Who cannot be possessed, would not be the God Who as perfect Love is also Holy and Unapproachable.....the indirectness of the divine self-communication means that God does not force Himself upon us, or overwhelm us with His creative power, but He summons us to make our own personal decision....A complete disclosure would leave no room for faith; it would be sight". (Brunner, The Mediator.p. 337.)

Or, to look at the same truth from another angle, just as God does not put more of Himself into chemistry than chemistry will hold, we may expect that He will not put more of Himself into humanity than humanity will hold. The Kenotists are right in maintaining that only by contracting His divine fulness within earthly limits could the redeeming God draw nigh to man and win that response which is the condition of salvation. It is in their theories regarding the manner in which this divine veiling took place that Thomasius, and, even if less decisively, Gore, have virtually denied the truth they sought to place beyond doubt.

Gore, for instance, seems to mean that the incarnate knows Himself as Son of God in manhood, through the medium of His human soul. Thus, argues Weston, the dual conception of the Logos as unlimited and as self-limited suggests that "the Word as self-abandoned has a different self-consciousness that is different from both. In the first case, we have the divine self-consciousness; in the second, one that is so far from being fully divine

that we can only term it impoverished divine: and in the third case we have what the Bishop calls human consciousness, meaning in fact divine consciousness impoverished and then conditioned in manhood".

It would seem that Gore has avoided the traditional dilemma of two natures inhering in one Person only to postulate two centres of consciousness in the Incarnate, not to mention the difficulty of the relation of the Logos unlimited to the Logos limited. Certainly if one can make this logical distinction of the one consciousness in which the Logos knows Himself as less than Himself, and the other in which He knows Himself as self-impoverished divine conditioned by manhood, then Weston is right in saying: "We have robbed the theory of its practical advantage and, therefore, of its only appeal". He rightly pleads for "some such conception of the manner of the incarnation as will unify the act of limitation and the act of accepting the conditions of manhood, so that the only knowledge He shall have of Himself as less than Himself is that which comes to Him through His recognition of human conditions". But evidently such a conception would rule out all theories of self-abandonment of attributes, as opposed, that is to say, to self-limitation in the exercise of divine powers. The problem of the relation of the consciousness of the Logos as unlimited and as limited would still remain unresolved, but from what has already been argued it would seem that we must be content to remain agnostic on this issue, while maintaining the personal identity of the Second Person of

the Trinity with Jesus Christ.

Mackintosh (The Person of Jesus Christ p.477 ff) seeks to explain the kenosis in a way that does not involve a break in personal continuity. He suggests that the incarnate Son possessed "all the qualities of Godhead in the form of concentrated potency rather than of full actuality,  $\deltaυνάμει$  rather than  $\ἐνεργείᾳ$ ". The doctrine of divine immutability which has clung to the Christian conception of God down the centuries involves, as Mackintosh recognizes, the "gravest ethical caprice; in varying moral situations God would act with mere mechanical self-consistency". But what Christ reveals in God is rather the infinite willingness to do and bear whatever is compatible with moral nature for the redemption of the lost. What is immutable is God's holy love. We must therefore conceive of the attributes of God as existing and operating only in a moral universe and under moral conditions. Thus, while omnipotence is in one sense limited or conditioned by holy love, yet in virtue of that same love its range of possibility broadens out endlessly. Self-limitation is not a failure of power, but its clear demonstration.

The kenosis, then, for Mackintosh is not to be thought of as the abandonment of this or that attribute of deity. God ceases to be God, even if such qualities as omnipotence are parted with. The attributes may, however, be considered to have been transposed; they may be thought of as functioning in new ways, assuming new forms of activity, readjusted to the new conditions of the Subject. Knowledge for the incarnate Son takes on a discursive and progressive character. Christ, who in virtue of His relation to

the Father had divine knowledge within reach, took only what was essential to His vocation. Just as there is no such thing, even in God, as omnipotence which is not morally conditioned so, says Mackintosh, we may think of God as willing to limit His almightiness, translating it into a form compatible with our experience. Taking omnipresence to mean that God is absolutely superior to and independent of the limitations of space and distance, he holds that as the Eternal may enter time, so He may have positive relations to space and the spacial life we live. From beginning to end there is no break of personal continuity; what God is actually for ever, that Christ is by potency, with a potentiality based in His own personal uniqueness.

The Gospel facts reveal a life wholly restrained within the bonds of manhood. To conceive of the incarnate One as confining Himself from moment to moment by explicit volition within the frontiers of manhood is to resurrect the old, unsatisfactory doctrine of a krypsis, and leads to that theoretic duality of mental life in our Lord against which all modern Christology has been a protest. Mackintosh is surely right in saying that it would seem "that the self-imposition of limits by divine love must be conceived of as a great supra-temporal act by which, in the almightiness of grace, the Son chose to pass into human life".

In this conception of the kenosis as involving the compression of the divine characteristics to a state of potentiality compatible with manhood, Mackintosh follows Dr. P.T. Forayth.

In "The Person and Place of Jesus Christ", Forsyth works out the implications of this idea with convincing analogies, and while it is difficult to understand what potentiality in this usage really means except by analogy, yet the idea is suggestive; it avoids that break in personal continuity to which Thomasiaus and Gore seem committed, and furthermore allows for a development of personality culminating after the Resurrection in the re-entrance of Christ into that glory which was His before the incarnation; an aspect of the Christian faith not sufficiently recognized in most works of Christology. Of this we shall speak at greater length later.

Weston also is clear on this issue, and his statements of what may be thought to have been involved in the incarnation do much to restore confidence in the kenotic approach. "Whatever of self-limitation is required, He always remains in possession of His powers, recognizing a law of restraint where restraint is necessary. His continuous respect for this law of restraint constitutes His act of self-sacrifice and obedience..... The measure of the self-restraint is the capacity of the perfect manhood to receive, assimilate, and manifest divine power.....We must conceive of Him as so respecting the law of self-restraint as to be unable to pass the limit of manhood's capacity.....It is not for us to determine a priori the possibilities and capacity of that manhood; we know them only from the Gospel story, wonderful in their extent, but none the less marked by their very real limitations and hindrances.....The act of self-sacrifice lies in

this determination to possess Himself and His powers within the conditions of manhood and to allow the needs and the capacity of His manhood to determine at every moment the limits of His freedom. Thus the incarnate state is one of progress at every moment; beginning with the life of the unborn child, and looking for its consummation to the day when He shall mediate to His Mystical body the beatific vision of the Godhead". (The One Christ pp. 149 ff).

In this restrained statement Weston allows for a true human development such as the Gospels recount by conceiving of the degree and measure of the self-restraint as changing proportionately with developing human life and experience. This is not arbitrarily to subject Godhead to human control, for it was precisely the loving act of God at the beginning which willingly subjected Himself to all the limitations appropriate to a naturally developing human life. Such a modified form of the kenotic idea preserves the true humanity of the Incarnate in its fullness, without in any way detracting from His true deity and personal identity, avoiding all the time the pitfalls of psychological and metaphysical speculation.

#### iv. The Kenotic Theory and the Fathers.

The objection that the kenotic theory has no sanction in the Fathers need neither surprise us nor detain us. As we have already argued, the patristic theologians were influenced by a Hellenic conception of the divine nature which effectively prevented them from working out the suggestions of a kenotic Christology to be found in St. Paul's Epistles, although

certain of them point the way to a theory of kenosis. F.J.Hall, however, in "The Kenotic Theory" 1898 is a champion of the old orthodoxy of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo as against this "modern novelty"; he is frankly opposed to any attempt to interpret in a less paradoxical manner the conciliar decrees, or to go beyond what they state. He maintains that the very limitation in what the Fathers undertook to do constitutes the merit of their position. While refuting "any and every theory which suggests that the Son of God ceased to possess or exercise in His Own Person certain of His eternal prerogatives and attributes when He became Incarnate", he yet does not wish "to minimise the truth that our Lord assumed a real manhood, and personally submitted 'as touching His manhood' to human conditions and limitations".

But what in plain sense does this mean? Is it possible to conceive a personal submission to human conditions without at the same time conceiving of a degree of limitation self-adopted by the Person submitting? Does not the very act of submission involve an act of self-limitation? Even if Hall does not agree with the kenotic theory as stated by its various exponents, is not his own statement meaningless unless there is some degree of self-limitation involved in the taking of human nature by the Son of God?

While he bitterly attacks Gore, Hall never appreciates what Gore is trying to do. He attacks Gore as an enemy of Chalcedon, rather than the kenotic theory as an attempt to resolve the conciliar dilemma. Most of his criticisms miss the mark for this reason. He brings a great deal of learning and an

abundance of patristic quotations to bolster up the contention that the kenotic theory, because modern, is therefore to be repudiated. He fails to see that the aim of the Kenotists is to attempt in the present century what the Fathers attempted in the fifth century, to interpret the incarnation in contemporary terms. What the Fathers achieved in their day was magnificent: but that is no reason for insisting that the theologians of the nineteenth and twentieth century must be bound by the thought-forms of the fifth. It may well be emphasized at this point that it is precisely due to the influence of Christian thought that there is today a desire to interpret the incarnation in terms that are moral and personal, rather than metaphysical. It may indeed be true, as Creed says, that the kenotic "conception of the Incarnate Life is a wide departure from that which prevailed in the Ancient Church". And Dr. Loofs <sup>may exist</sup> has shown that no real precedent for this type of thought can be adduced from the patristic writers. But to assume with Hall that therefore the whole theory is unworthy of serious consideration by orthodox theologians is to argue on the basis of a false assumption. Moreover Sellers has shown good reason for modifying the view that the idea of incarnation involving some measure of self restraint for the Logos is alien to the thought of the Fathers. A more just conclusion on this issue is that of Creed who says "However questionable may be the parentage of the idea, it is beyond question that it falls in with the thought and feeling of some great texts of the New Testament, and in the hands of teachers such as Dr. Gore and Professor Mackintosh it lends itself to a powerful interpretation of the doctrine of the

Incarnation". (Creed, Mysterium Christi. p.133).

In the foregoing survey of the kenotic theory it has been necessary to be adversely critical of many of the forms in which that theory has hitherto been presented. But it would be a serious error to assume that because the forms in which a principle has been applied, when weighed in the balance, have been found wanting, therefore and thereby the principle itself is wholly discredited. So stern a critic as Dr. Creed, while unable to accept the scientific exposition of the theory by the Kenotists, nevertheless recognizes that the principle of kenosis must be acknowledged as a constituent element in any Christology which aims at preserving the traditional scheme.

The chief glory of the Christian religion, and the source of its evangelical appeal, is in its characteristic conception of the Divine Love. God's Love in Christ is triumphantly set forth as something infinite and measureless, and revealed to us most chiefly in this that though He was rich, yet for our sakes He became poor. But one may justly feel that the revelation of God's Love is not at all enhanced by this doctrine of His sympathetic condescension, but rather diminished, if, with orthodox tradition generally, we have to add that, nevertheless, He all the time remained rich. On the other hand, if, with the Liberal Protestant school, we hold that in Christ we have something less than God's presence and His very self, it is clear that the scale on which the Love of the

Eternal has been made manifest is now gravely altered. A Christ who is eternal, and a Christ of whom we cannot be sure whether He is eternal or not, are positively and profoundly different, and the types of faith they respectively call forth will differ correspondingly. If Christ be not very God, it becomes hard to persuade men that God loves them better than He loves Himself. However inadequate the idea of pre-existence may be as a means of representing eternity in forms of time, yet the reality of redemption demands that the Christ who saves must in eternity, both before and after, be one with God; for only the eternal God can save. And it is precisely the belief that "Somehow - to describe the method exactly may of course be beyond us - somehow God has brought His greatness down to the narrow measures of our life, becoming poor for our sake" - it is this belief which in all ages has been powerful in winning the love and loyalty of mankind. The quality of the never-failing sympathy of God is proved when it takes shape in action, entering into conditions that are foreign to it. No one can doubt that this is an essential truth of the Christian Gospel, but one which in the Christian dogmatic has received inadequate recognition. Whatever the difficulties on the side of scientific theology in any exposition of the kenotic principle, it remains, as Mackintosh emphasizes, a conception of immense religious significance. There must be something wrong in any system of theology in which so essential a feature of the Gospel appeal is missing. Despite their faults, the modern kenotic theorists have shown a quickened sense of the real issues at stake, and it is not unnatural if, in spite of its difficulties, many Christians prefer to hold a view of the

incarnate Person which both conserves the vital religious interest inherent in the self-abnegating descent of God, and clings steadfastly to the concrete details of the historic record, maintaining the real manhood of the Master. Creed goes so far as to say, "I should think it probable that a majority today of those among us who have a Christology which they are prepared to state and to defend are still Kenoticists". (The Divinity of Jesus Christ". p.75).

Once it has been conceded that Christ is God - since redemption is as typically a Divine work as creation - the possible alternatives are few. It may be said that He acquired Godhead - which is pagan. Or that He carried eternal deity unmodified into the sphere of time - which is unhistoric. "Exclude these options and it only remains to say that in Christ we are face to face with God who in one of the distinguishable constituents of His being came amongst us by a great act of self-abnegation". This much can be claimed even if we are unable to form a precise scientific conception of what took place when the Word became Flesh. But in so far as we do attempt to elucidate the mystery of the divine condescension, it is essential for us to moralize genuinely and thoroughly the categories we employ. Kenotic Christology cannot be stated except in terms of the Divine Love and the whole redemptive act of Divine Love in history. Neither psychological nor metaphysical categories can contain the meaning of this "ethically appealing act of God".

CHAPTER IV  
TOWARDS ORTHODOXY.

Probably the most significant and hopeful trend in modern philosophy is that which gives new attention to the nature of our knowledge of one another. The doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that we infer the existence of other minds from an awareness of our own minds and a sensible perception of other bodies, is a cheerless philosophy where friendship is concerned, and its solipsistic starting-point is at once ruled out by the fact that self-consciousness is so obviously a socially conditioned thing. The new philosophy holds that there is a primacy and a directness in our knowledge of other selves. Under the influence mainly of Søren Kierkegaard, such moderns as Martin Buber speak of the 'I - Thou' relationship as fundamental. Our knowledge of other minds is not merely a derivative from our knowledge of other bodies, or of our own minds, or of both together, but is itself a primary and original mode of consciousness, of equal right with these others, and having like them a character sui generis. An inferential element is involved: but the primary element in our knowledge of one another is an element of immediacy. The old theory of knowledge as a subject - object relationship is being shown inadequate. There is in knowledge a subject-subject relationship as well. As Buber expresses it: "I come into being as over against the Thou; all real life is of the nature of encounter".

The importance for theology of this new emphasis is patent. Too often theology has objectivized God in thinking about Him; God is conceived as an object over against the self as the

knowing subject. In actual fact what is of supreme importance is the subjecthood of God - a truth so easily obscured in the process of thinking about God. It is God Who comes to meet us, not as an object that may be spoken about, but as a Subject Who must be spoken to. He is not one among the many objects of our knowledge, but is a Knower by whom both they and we are known; He is Someone we find speaking to us, and Whom we then, in our turn, find ourselves speaking to. "Properly speaking", writes Dr. Buber, "God cannot be expressed, but only addressed".

That such ideas about our relationship with God mark a return to the Hebraic, as over against the Hellenic, conception is obvious, and must commend themselves to the attention of Christian theologians for that reason. Brunner's theology, for instance, is dominated by the idea of the I-Thou relationship, and no one can fairly deny that Brunner's contribution to the development of theological thought is as considerable as it is arresting. "To be determined by this event, this fact of the Word, this Word incarnate, is faith.....Nothing save a real relation to a real Thou can dispel the solitude of the soul: only a real conversation in which we are actually addressed by another person, can make us responsible". (Mediator pp. 205, 209). No doubt in reaction against rationalism he overstates his case; but it may well be argued that the case needed to be violently overstated in order to call attention to the forgotten truth. Subsequent scholars will modify Brunner's statement (as, for example, Dr. J. Baillie in Our Knowledge of God), but that does not in any way diminish the value of the jolt which has been given to contemporary theology by the transcendentalists.

In virtue of his conviction that the cardinal truth for Christology is that in Christ God comes to speak to us, and by the very fact that He speaks to us demands from us a personal decision, Brunner rejects what he calls the study of Jesus Christ from the point of view of the cult of personality and of scientific research into His life and self-consciousness. His reiterated complaint is that Liberal Protestants and Kenotists are so concerned with Christ 'after the flesh' that they fail to see the significance of Christ 'in the flesh'. The real question that should be asked of Christ is, 'Who is He?' which means 'What has God to say to us in Him?' But this question 'Who?' has been replaced by 'How does He come to be what He is?' He makes the acute criticism that the Kenotists went astray through their pre-occupation with the psychological approach to the Person of the incarnate Lord. A necessity for decision is turned into a need for explanation. In the attempt to make it metaphysically clear, the deity of Christ is discussed in the same way that a physical phenomenon could be discussed. But the decisive point is not what He felt about His significance, but what His significance actually was. (The Mediator. Chap. XIII).

That such observations are just criticism of a great deal of kenotic Christology has already been made clear in preceding parts of this essay. Herein lies both the failure to create a satisfactory theory on the basis of the kenotic principle, and also the measure of the difference between the Christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries and the Christological speculation of the last century. The one was actuated by a desire to preserve the truth revealed from misconceptions: the other,

attempting to re-state the results of the former in terms less illogical and paradoxical, came under the sway of speculative curiosity to know how it all happened. But if the Kenotists stand condemned of an unhealthy interest in matters beyond human ken, many of their opponents fall more heavily under the same condemnation. A critic of kenoticism, writing in the Church Quarterly Review of July 1897, produced the following explanation of our Lord's self-consciousness, on the basis of an extravagant assumption that omniscience is analogous to human memory. "In forming our picture of His incarnate Being we must suppose that behind His waking consciousness He had, as all men have, this vast sphere of human memory. But his incarnate Being did not end there. In Him there was another depth of even vaster dimensions - a depth stretching far away into infinity - the whole volume of His divine omniscience.....Just as we extract particulars from our memory, so could He: but He also could extract from His divine omniscience: and, what is noteworthy, in the very act of extracting He would translate or give to these particulars a human form.....In the case of us men the vast store of acquired knowledge lying in the memory, even when not extracted, exercises an all-powerful influence in shaping our thoughts and determining our judgements about things...Our Lord had continually present, as being inseparable from His Person, the whole volume of divine omniscience...Clearly it must have influenced - silently influenced - every judgment which He formed as man....in common with His memory it lay behind His consciousness". Now even if this were the method by

which the self-consciousness of the Divine-humanity was determined, and we have absolutely no criterion for judging, it is apposite to ask 'What have we gained by such information?' Does it in any way increase one's faith in Christ as mediator and redeemer to know the process of His thinking? Does it not rather blind the mind to the real issues for faith, so that faith suffers the same fate from curiosity as the proverbial cat?

The true function of Christology is to play the rôle of interpreter of the revealed fact, not to speculate about the effect of incarnation on the inner life of God, or on the consciousness of the God-man. "In this consists the knowledge of the divine mystery, that thou shouldst know as God Him of Whom thou knowest that He is man, and Him as man of whom thou knowest that He is God". (Hilary. De Trinitate X.60). Christology, primarily, must make clear to every age the truth of the apostolic testimony that in Jesus of Nazareth we are confronted by God: the divine, personal authority is present in a human, personal life. How that could be, how a man could at the same time be God, are questions which we probably ought never to ask, and certainly can never hope to answer.

All this, however, does not mean that there is no place for reason in connection with revelation. We have already quoted the dictum that 'the true business of philosophy is to bring the belief to a consciousness of itself'. The task of interpretation, as distinct from the attempt at metaphysical speculation, must go on in each succeeding generation. Christologists can never cease in their attempts to understand the act of God in Jesus Christ.

The all important point is to find the right category. Brunner attempts to circumvent the psychological impasse of a doctrine of Christ stated in terms of one divine Person in two natures, by a distinction between 'Person' and 'personality'. The 'personality' of Jesus is the element accessible to everybody, the human aspect of our Lord's Person which can be known by every good historian. The secret of Jesus which can only be known by those to whom it is 'given', lies beyond the human personality in the divine 'Person'. Critics and historians may elucidate and interpret the 'personality' but the 'Person' is revealed to faith alone. It is the mystery of the Person of Jesus that at the point at which we have the sinful 'person', He has, or rather is, the divine 'Person' of the Logos. 'Person' means that which we cannot have, but must be. He entered wholly into human life: He allowed the powers of the abyss to work their will on Him, but instead of the human mystery of personality - sin, He possesses the divine mystery of personality - divine authority: hence He could bridge the abyss. This union of the Son of God with human nature is indeed intended for humanity as a whole, but only profits those who believe. It is, however, not only the individual's decision which is important, but that which made the decision possible - the coming of God to humanity.

It is not possible to read Brunner without being profoundly stirred; his theological teaching searches the very depths of one's being. There is no doubt that he and others of the same school have recovered a vital element in Christian thinking that was in grave danger of being obscured. But the conception of a transcendent revelation from on high has not been,

and is not now, the only operative factor in Christian faith. The Biblical faith in God as Creator, and in Christ as agent in creation, springs from experiences and events in the order of history, and these historical experiences must not be left out of account.

Brunner's emphasis on the divine incognito must answer the same objections as Luther's emphasis on the deus absconditus. If God is only known to us in His humiliation, then how do we know, apart from that humiliation, that His attributes are those of blinding glory and majesty? Brunner's Christology has to be assessed in relation to his entire theological position. But, even when viewed dispassionately in itself, it is extremely hard to be sure what he does mean by 'Person'. As has been already remarked, it looks rather as if he is committing the logical fallacy of separating the divine Person from the divine Nature, and that really his theory is a play upon words to which one cannot attach any intelligible meaning.

x            x            x

From all the attempts which have been considered in this essay to answer the question, "Who is this Jesus of Nazareth?" there emerges one major truth which must direct future exploration in this field. Dogma must be moralized. Only moral and personal categories will suffice for the interpretation of the doctrine of Christ. Starting with the historic reality and unity of Christ's Person, students must seek an interpretation in terms of person, will, history, society. If the end of our salvation is a moral glory, then the origin of it must have issued from moral glory rising in Eternity: a moral end can only be reached by moral means. St. Paul

and the writer to the Hebrews are surely to be understood as teaching that it was not the rank and power of the Redeemer that made His death precious for redemption, but His worth. Herein lies the importance of the kenotic principle: it makes the whole Christ on earth the result of a grand moral act in the heavens. Soteriology is the way of access to Christology. The Fathers knew that, but the Kenotists for the most part forgot it: by their tendency to treat the Person of Christ by Himself and in abstraction from His atoning work, they missed the essential value of the very principle they set out to establish. It is the doctrine of the atonement which requires the doctrine of the kenosis as security for the reality of the moral struggle and victory of Christ.

Dr. Temple has observed: "It is characteristic of the growth of Christian theology that religious experience should precede dogmatic formula". We are driven to believe in the divinity and therefore the pre-existence, of Christ, and we are at the same time driven to believe in the self-limitation of the divine element in Christ, by our belief in the redemption won by Christ. In the early Church the more closely the association of Jesus with God in the salvation of men was realized, the more certain became the ascription to Him of true divinity. Whenever the soteriological motive appeared, Jesus could be thought of only as coming to the world from the side of God. Nothing lower than the Holy God could re-hallow the guilty human soul. Yet it is the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, who witnessed particularly powerfully to the deity of Christ, who was nevertheless not afraid to state in

concrete, uncompromising terms the real individual humanity of Christ. There is undoubted affinity between the Christology of this epistle and the kenotic theory; yet on the whole the Kenotists have failed to appeal to the epistle for support. The essence of the Christological belief which we find in Hebrews is that through the real veil between God and man, made impassable by sin, Jesus has opened and dedicated for man the one true way unto the fulness of God's presence and eternal life. This finished work of Jesus presupposes two conditions. First, Jesus is Himself God's Son who came forth from beyond the veil: second, although Jesus came forth from God, it is equally true that He really did come forth to the human side of the veil which separated men from God. The way to God is one which men have to follow; it must therefore be one which men are capable of following in spite of the limitations of their new mortal nature. Jesus in being born as man accepted all the restrictions which belong of necessity to natural, fleshly and mortal manhood. The way was found in the complete surrender of the human will of Jesus to the will of God; the surrender of obedience consummated in the self-sacrifice of the perfect High-priest on the Cross; thus He showed that the veil of mortal flesh which hides God from men, may be made the opportunity for an obedience which brings human nature through humiliation nearest God's throne at last. (Heb. 2. 5-9, 17, 18. 5. 7-8. 9.13-14, 10. 19.).

This doctrine is closely parallel to what we have supposed to be a correct interpretation of Phil: 2. 5-11. (v. Appendix A), and it is difficult to understand either writer

unless we suppose that the Logos, in taking manhood, voluntarily submitted to a self-retraction, a self-restraint, a self-limitation. Forsyth is surely right in saying: "it is what He did in becoming man, more than what He did as man, that makes the glory of His achievement so divine that nothing short of absolute worship from a whole redeemed humanity can meet it". (The Person and Place of Jesus Christ, p.273).

Dr. P.T. Forsyth, more than any other theologian, has placed the kenotic principle in its proper context and shown its real importance for Christology. J.K. Mozley has said of him that he is "one of the few great theologians who have refused to think about Christ in terms of the two natures' formula, and yet have preserved the full value of orthodox Christology". His conviction is that "the ethical notion of the true unity as the interpenetration of persons by moral action must take the place of the old metaphysic of the union of natures by a tour de force". He adds "the Church has worked long on the old lines which were laid down by pagan thought rather than by a final revelation in a person; perhaps, when we have worked in this new and living way as long, then we may expect results for which we are not yet prepared, but which we can already foretell along the line of the true method". (Op.cit. p.231) His own is a conspicuous contribution towards a new orthodoxy.

Like Brunner, Forsyth sees the psychological impossibility of going very far in reconstituting the self-consciousness of Christ; but he realizes that the kenotic principle, more than any other, demonstrates the amazing love of God, and makes man's

redemption spring from an act of supreme moral worth. This principle alone safeguards the reality of Christ's moral struggle. One of the effects of the kenosis was that, while Christ, being Who He was, could never sin, He was Himself not aware of that impossibility. He knew He came sinless out of every crisis, but He did not know that He never could be anything else. The limitation of His knowledge about Himself is indubitable. He was not perfectly sure that the Cross was His Father's will until the very last. "If it be possible let this cup pass". Forsyth rightly points out that what is truly human is not sin: sin is a factor only of empirical humanity and fatal to the true. What is truly human is the power to be tempted to sin, and Christ was so tempted. He could be tempted because He loved; He could not sin because He loved so deeply - because it was God He loved - God more than man. The potuit non peccare rested on the non potuit peccare: He was the Holy One of God who had condescended to human state: but to His own experience as incarnate the moral conflict was entirely real because His self-emptying included an oblivion of that impossibility to sin.

But Forsyth is not content with a merely kenotic Christ. (And when he uses the term he means not self-emptying in the sense of self-depotentiation, but in the sense of self-retraction, in which attributes of Godhead are not destroyed but reduced to a potentiality - concentrated). A Christ merely kenotic is inadequate. "A self-divestment only leads to the spectacle of a humbled God, and not to the experience of a redeeming and royal God.... We must keep in view and keep uppermost, the positive

process, the effective, ascending, and mastering process which was interwoven with the renunciation in Christ". (Op. cit. p.309). Christ's growth is a history of 'moral redintegration', the history of a recovery by gradual reconquest of the mode of being from which by a tremendous moral act He came. He won by duty what was His by right. So Forsyth is led to describe the union of God and man in Christ as the "mutual involution of two personal movements raised to the whole scale of the human soul and the divine". (p.333) God and man meet in humanity, not as two entities or natures which co-exist, but as two movements in interplay, mutual struggle and reciprocal communion. God and man meet in action rather than being". "We have within this single increate person the mutual involution of two personal acts or movements supreme in spiritual being, the one distinctive of man, the other distinctive of God; the one being the pointing, in a corporeal person, of God's long action in entering history, the other the pointing of man's moral growth in the growing appropriation by Jesus of His divine content as He becomes a fuller organ for God's full action on man. The two supreme movements of spiritual being, redemption and religion, are revealed as being so personal that they can take harmonious, complete, and final effect within one historic person, increate but corporeal". (p.344).

What is so excellent about an interpretation of Christ along the lines suggested by Forsyth is that it comes nearer to our experience; it has more religious value for us; than if we speak about a conjunction of natures. The old orthodoxy was too

much ruled by intellectualist preconceptions. The ideas for which kenosis and plerosis stand, fire the imagination; and the part played by the imagination in the soul's dealings with God, though it has always been understood by those skilled in the practice of the Church's cure of souls, has never been given proper place in Christian theology. The Church's experience of salvation has been that of a moral salvation, spiritually and personally realized. But frequently in her history the workings of grace have been described in mechanical, rather than in moral and personal, terms. The object of redemption in the creed-making age was less to forgive man, than to immortalize him, less to convert than to deify. Grace was not the restoration of unclouded personal relationships, but the deification of corruptible human nature by the transfusion of an incorruptible, divine antiseptic. But sin, as Brunner never ceases to impress on us, is a personal relation; it cannot be cured by magical infusion, but only by moral action on the part of God wherein person deals with person, and soul with soul, in a mutual act of grace and faith. "Repentance and faith, mortificatio and vivificatio, are one, an indivisible act of revelation. Both imply the one decisive act, and this act is the meeting with the divine person in Christ through the self-revelation of God, in which we also - in a two-fold sense - are revealed as we really are". (The Mediator p. 347).

The recreation of our souls, in which lies our salvation, was epitomized and accomplished once for all in the Person of Christ. His humanity was real; it only "passed from a destiny into a perfection through a career". He presents God with a perfectly holy

humanity made possible by His initial self-renunciation wherein He identified Himself with mankind. The Christian Gospel proclaims that by a supreme act of love God in Christ has put Himself at man's side to suffer with him and for him in his sinful condition, and so win from him the free response of penitence which is the first condition of salvation through forgiveness. "In all their affliction He was afflicted.....in His love and in His pity He redeemed them". (Isai: 63.9., op.Hebs. 5.9.) In Christ, first, the purpose of the original creation has been accomplished, and the life of the world to come has been made not only a future hope, but also a present reality. Whereas man has sinned by self-assertion, self-exaltation, 'snatching at equality with God', God in Christ redeems man by 'self-emptying', self-humiliation, putting Himself on an equality with man.

The manner and aim of the divine coming was 'nostra assumpsit ut conferret nobis sua'. A real, historical, human life is the place in which God wills to meet man. In that life, in that Christ, the two movements of God to man and man to God are perfectly harmonized. "The soul's redeemer was the soul's creator, divested of everything but the holy love in which He created, and raised by the deep and long renunciation to a power in which lies the salvation for ever and ever of the whole created race and world". (Forsyth. Op.cit. p.353).

We are thus led to conceive of there being in the Person of Christ His growing exaltation to holy power alongside His humiliation to the conditions of an evil world. In this interaction His Person was constituted. It is by holding on to this

notion of the moral redintegration of Jesus, the gradual plerosis, that we can perhaps dimly understand how He, Who not only felt and thought and spoke, but actually prayed, as a man, could yet speak with a certain absolute authority which impressed His hearers whenever He dealt with the things of God. It cannot fairly be doubted that our Lord was conscious of some unique relation in Himself to God the Father, and He considered Himself to be, as Messiah and Son of Man, God's representative in establishing the Kingdom of which He spoke. His human sense of sonship towards God was rooted in the reality of a Sonship which belonged to Him alone as the Eternal Son. Somehow the consciousness of a human sonship towards God, as expressed in prayer, merged in, while it limited, the consciousness of the divine Sonship which alone can account for the divine authority with which He spoke. "We might venture to say that Jesus is divine, not because His divine Person of Nature is divorced from the human, but because His human person and nature are dominated and organized in the divine. Because in Him the divine is self-limited by the human, in Him also the penetration of the human by the divine is complete". (Brabant. Time and Eternity in Christian Thought. p. 181 n. quoted by Quick p. 180 n.).

Christ's Godhead means that in Him was the complete and final action of the holy and gracious love of God our Saviour. Christ's manhood consists in the moral reality of His experiences, His conflict and His growth: it means His true ethical personality growing in an actual historic situation. "At the moment of the incarnation, then, we suppose that by a quite unimaginable act of divine sympathy the Son of God took upon Himself both the human

fulness and the human limitations of a created personality, which, through His self-identification with it, became the personal expression of Himself as man". (Quick. Op.cit. p.179). For the redemption of mankind He identified Himself with men, and became one from whom the Father required, as from all men, the response of loving obedience. He 'permitted the measures of the manhood to prevail over Himself'. In the very same circumstances, in the very same difficulties, in the very same temptations in which we are disobedient, He was obedient unto death, tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin. The Cross was the final depth of humiliation consequent upon the original act of will by which He became incarnate: the Cross was also the completion of a victorious human life, the sealing of His objective achievement which is the perfecting at once of His own soul and of our salvation. This truth which was obscured from the disciples on Good Friday was revealed to them on Easter Day. The risen, ascended, glorified Christ is the Christ rewarded with that glory which was eternally His, but won anew by Him in the moral victory achieved after He had assumed man's condition of personality and renounced God's. What Christ Himself did with common manhood, He enables believers in Him to do also. So we, recognizing in Christ the amazing condescension of the divine, redemptive sympathy, knowing and partly knowing, can but kneel and humbly offer our litany, "By the mystery of Thy holy incarnation; Good Lord, deliver us".

Appendix A. Philippians 2. (1-11).

The various ways in which this passage has been interpreted in ancient and more recent times have been collected and classified by Lightfoot in his commentary on the Epistle, by Bruce in The Humiliation of Jesus Christ, and by Gifford in his study of The passage in an essay entitled The Incarnation, A Study of Philippians 2. These writers show that the theological presuppositions of the commentator have in many instances seriously prejudiced the interpretation, but in no case so disastrously as in the controversy of recent years centring round the kenotic theory. All too frequently has it been thought by supporters and opponents alike, that the theory stands or falls by the interpretation of this one text. Nevertheless, it is important to decide to what extent Christologies of the kenotic type may legitimately look to this passage for support.

Dr. Thornton, in his exhaustive study of Pauline theology, The Common Life in the Body of Christ, pp.122, 132, 168, 309 etc. has indirectly shown that this key passage cannot be understood apart from the whole trend of St. Paul's dogmatic. It is too facile to say simply with Gifford that in the passage "the Incarnation and the human life of our Lord are set before us as the perfect example of the principle enjoined in v.4". St. Paul's thought goes far beyond that of Christ as an example. His use of the phrase  $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\nu\iota\alpha \ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$  in 2 (I) shows that he is thinking of the Philippians as already members of the Body of Christ, and therefore as partakers of that humiliation and death and exaltation which are set forth in vv.5-11. Far from being a statement exclusively concerned with the manner of Christ's incarnation, it may well be claimed that it is the atonement and the sacrificial living of the Church which St. Paul has chiefly in mind, and the incarnation only in so far as it prepares for, and gives expression to, the reality of redemption.

St. Paul reminds his readers that in Christ they have God's love because they share the Spirit ( $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\nu\iota\alpha \ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$  Phil.2. 1-2). He exhorts them to banish strife and vainglory, and seek that unity of mind and spirit (cp.Phil.1.27). which is their true heritage. They are bidden to become in their daily living what they already are potentially in virtue of their baptism into Christ's death. (All this, it would seem from Dr. Thornton's study, is involved in St. Paul's use here of the word  $\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\nu\iota\alpha$ ). It is probable that v.6. should be translated, "Have this attitude of mind in you which you also have in Christ Jesus", meaning by that, not simply that they are to consider Christ as their exemplar in this matter - but that they already have, potentially, this Christ-attitude in virtue of their baptism. They are to stop thinking of themselves as individuals and think of themselves as members of the one Body of Christ. Their attitude of mind individually among themselves is henceforth to be the same as that which they have in Christ. He exhibited once for all the life to which they are committed as His members, for by baptism "they belong to a

sacrificial organism, the One Man". They are, in a word, to let Christ do in them what He once for all did for them, not just on the Cross, but in all that preceded and followed the Cross. By thus adding to their faith in Christ the crowning graces of humility and self-denying love (2.2-3) they will complete the Apostle's joy. The principle enjoined in v.4. "not looking each to his own things, but each to the things of others" is now explained by St. Paul as being the practical outcome, the visible fruits, of life in Christ - the mystical re-enactment of Christ's historical life in the believer, - the cultivation of that attitude of mind displayed by one who  $\epsilon\nu\ \mu\omicron\sigma\phi\eta\ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\ \upsilon\kappa\alpha\epsilon\chi\omega\nu\ \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$

What has never been noticed in the kenotic controversies is the similarity of this passage with others, e.g. I Cor: 15.3-4, Rom: 4.25, (cp. Rom: 5.19, 8. 32-36), in which the language of St. Paul is in word or thought reminiscent of the Suffering Servant. The thought of Isaiah 53. 12,  $\text{יְשׁוּעָה\ לְמַעַן\ מוֹתוֹ\ וְלֹא\ יִרְצֶה\ עִצְמוֹ}$  would seem to be reproduced in Phil: 2. 7-8, as  $\text{ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν... μέχρι θανάτου}$ . The pattern of righteousness prefigured in the Suffering Servant of the Lord, and brought to actual realization by the incarnate Son, involves that complete giving of ourselves to God which is described in Rom: 12.1-2, and implied in Phil: 2. 1-4. The old righteousness was embodied in a legal code; the new righteousness has been revealed once for all in the human life-story of God's Son who submitted Himself obediently to the conditions of His incarnate life. St. Paul sees the purpose of the incarnation in the atonement. God sent His Son into the World that we might become sons instead of slaves. Therefore "God sent forth His Son born of woman, made subject to law" (Gal. 4.4.). For our liberation it was necessary that the divine Son should share not only our nature but also our state of bondage to law. He became a slave that we might become sons. (Rom: 6 cp. Phil: 2.7., the significant word is δούλος ). The sacrificial outpouring of Christ's self-giving had its source in heaven, was enacted in the "form of a slave" on earth, and was consummated in a slave's death upon the Cross. The death consummated the obedience, and the whole act of self-humiliation was vindicated by the Father when He raised His Son from the dead and exalted Him. (Phil.2. 9-11, cp. Rom. 1.4, I Peter 3.18, Luke 14.11.). So to Jesus as "Lord" all creation shall render divine honours because "He poured out His soul unto death". (Is. 53.12).

Now if this comparison of Phil.2.1-11, with Isaiah 53 is correct, it would seem that St. Paul is more concerned with the motive and inner meaning of the incarnation than with its manner and method. The emphasis is on the self-sacrifice of Christ in becoming man, and in being obedient as man to death. It is precisely this quality which St. Paul wishes to see reproduced in the Philippians. Nevertheless, bearing all this in mind, it is necessary to consider vv.5-11 in greater detail to see whether they throw any light on what St. Paul may have imagined incarnation to have involved for the Son of God.

St. Paul unfolds the attitude of mind  $\delta$  καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ in three distinct stages.

- A. vv 6-7. The original act of self-humiliation.  
 B. v 8. The life of obedience consequent upon the original act.  
 C. vv 9-11. God's vindication of the self-humiliation and obedience unto death by the exaltation of Jesus.

A. The central idea in this stage is the antithetical statement  $\text{οὐχ ὑπαγμὸν ἠγάσαστο τὸ εἶναι ἰσὸν θεῷ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν.}$  Corresponding to this main antithesis is the subordinate and explanatory antithesis  $\text{ὅτι ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ συνεκένωσεν... μορφῆν δούλου λαβών...}$

1.  $\text{ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν.}$  A.V. "but made himself of no reputation".  
 R.V. "but emptied himself".

What does St. Paul mean by  $\text{ἐκένωσεν}$ ? There is no parallel instance of this reflexive use of the verb in the N.T. In Rom. 4.14, I Cor. 1.17, 2 Cor. 9.3, the verb is used in the passive with the following subjects:  $\text{ἡ πίστις, ὁ σταυρὸς, τὸ κεύθημα.}$  In I Cor. 9.15, it is used actively with object  $\text{τὸ κεύθημα.}$  The R.V. translation in these instances "to make void" is non-committal, and probably a fair rendering in each case is "to empty of meaning". But while these uses throw no light on Phil.2.6, neither do they support the contention that the word implies the abandonment of anything. We can therefore only attach a meaning to  $\text{ἐκένωσεν}$  in so far as the present context reveals it.

Of what does St. Paul say that Christ  $\text{ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν}$ ? The only possible answer which the construction of the sentence permits is that  $\text{ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν}$  of that which He did not regard as an  $\text{ὑπαγμὸν}$ . Westcott on John 1.14 (Speaker's Commentary) writes "St. Paul describes it as an emptying of Himself by the Son of God, a laying aside of the mode of divine existence ( $\text{τὸ εἶναι ἰσὸν θεῷ}$ ) and his declaration carries us as far as we can go in defining the mystery". What then is meant by  $\text{τὸ εἶναι ἰσὸν θεῷ}$ ? Lightfoot shows that  $\text{ἰσὸν}$  is adverbial, and holds that while  $\text{εἶναι ἰσὸς}$  would denote equality of nature,  $\text{εἶναι ἰσὸν}$  points to the mode of existence, the state and circumstances, the insignia of majesty, rights and prerogatives which it was an act of condescension to waive. cp. 2 Cor. 8.9. It is noticeable that where Christ is accused, in John 5.18, of claiming equality of nature with God the phrase used is  $\text{ἰσὸν ἑαυτὸν ποιῶν τῷ θεῷ.}$

11.

ἡπαρμον

The R.V. rendering of the word as if it were the passive ἡπαρμῶν has been established by Lightfoot beyond

doubt. The fact that the Greek Fathers generally had no scruple in rendering the word as if it had been ἡπαρμῶν may be taken as indication that no hard and fast line separates the active from the passive as to sense. The disposition of love, says St. Paul, does not even regard its own lawful property as a robber regards his unlawful rapina, but freely gives it away. He did not deem being on an equality with God a thing to be clutched at all hazards as a robber regards his booty, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν of τὸ εἶναι ἵνα ᾧ

St. Paul is here drawing as complete a contrast as he can between the action of Christ, the second Adam who redeeming mankind, and that of the first Adam, who caused its fall. Adam, being originally in the form of man, counted it as booty "to be as God, knowing good and evil", and, in snatching at the prize, he fell, and dragged mankind down with him. Christ, on the contrary, being originally in the form of God, did the exact opposite: He humbled Himself to the uttermost, and being therefore exalted, He raised mankind to life with God.

111.

We come now to consider the subordinate antithesis, ὅς ἐστι μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων... μορφῇ δούλου λαβὼν... ὑπάρχων.

R.V. marg. "being originally". This, in Lightfoot's opinion, is the correct rendering; he contends that

ὑπάρχων must be referred to a point of time prior to the Incarnation and quotes authorities to support the contention. But while undoubtedly this is an essential part of the meaning, there is strong evidence from New Testament usage to support the view that the Imperfect ὑπάρχων contrasted with the following Aorist implies indefinite continuance of being. Luke, 23.50, Acts. 2.30., confirm this view, but 2. Cor. 8.17, 12.16, Rom. 4.19, put it beyond any doubt. "So far as principles of grammatical construction and the writer's usage are concerned it is unreasonable to assume that Christ ceased to be in the form of God when He emptied Himself". (Gifford, P.11, who also shows that the use of the Greek Fathers includes this idea of continuance).

Gore therefore is plainly wrong when he says that Christ emptied Himself of the divine μορφῇ. (Dissertations. p.89).

iv.

μορφῆ θεοῦ

Lightfoot has shown that μορφῆ in philosophical usage refers to the nature or essence of a thing, not in the abstract, but as actually subsisting in the individual and retained as long as the individual itself exists. It is to be carefully distinguished from σχημα which refers to changeable and separable accidents. He shows by quotations that the contemporaries of St. Paul would not be unfamiliar with this use, and concludes that μορφῆ θεοῦ is the divine Nature actually and inseparably subsisting in the Person of Christ, something of which Christ could not divest Himself without ceasing to be God. In face of Lightfoot's argument, the contention of Bruce that μορφῆ refers to separable accidents cannot be sustained any more than Gore's variable translation of μορφῆ by such widely differing conceptions as "the divine mode of existence", "the permanent characteristics of a thing", "the prerogatives of equality with God". Thomasius also wrongly speaks of μορφῆ as the glory-form answering to the essence of God.

So far, then, the passage may be considered to mean that Christ Jesus, pre-existing and continually subsisting in the form of God, thought His prerogatives as God ( τὸ εἶναι ἰσὺ θεῶ ) not a prize to be clutched at all costs, but emptied Himself, i.e. continuing to be what He always was - God - He divested Himself of what Lightfoot calls the insignia of God - the fitting condition of glory and majesty which was the adequate manifestation of His divine Nature.

v.

μορφῆ δούλου  
λαβῶν

The coincidence in time between this participle and the verb ἐκένωσεν, strictly fixes the action of ἐκένωσεν at the first moment of the Incarnation and excludes all attempts, such as those of Luther and his companions, to assign it to any later period of Christ's life on earth. A further refutation of the Lutheran position is the participle γενομένος in the next phrase which more clearly defines μορφῆ δούλου. The word occurs in Gal. 4.4, John. 1.14, Rom. 1.2-4, and in each case it marks the entry of the pre-existent Son into human nature. With this and the meaning of ὑπαχῶν to support it, there can be no doubt that the subject of is the pre-existent Son. It has already been suggested that St. Paul uses the strong word δούλος of the Incarnate (explaining it further by the phrase ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀπορώτων γενομένος) partly because he has in mind the ideas associated with the suffering Servant of Isaiah 53. Moreover this word sums up our Lord's own teaching on the meaning of His own life and the essence of true discipleship. "I am among you as

one who serves". v.Matt.20. 27-28, Mk. 10.44-45, John.13. 16. No view of our Lord's Person and work can be satisfactory which does not do justice to this truth.

$\muωϕη$  here must have the same meaning as in the phrase  $\muωϕη$   $\Thetaεου$ . Christ identified Himself with humanity; in comparison with God every creature has the form of a servant who is bound to give obedience to God; but while we have all been disobedient servants, Christ shows the perfect servant-attitude to God. The taking of the form of a servant consisted for Him in the entire submission of His will and affections to the will of God. Bishop Bull (The Primitive Tradition VI.21) expresses the connection of thought in these phrases "If you ask how Christ emptied Himself, the Apostle answers, by taking the form of a servant. If you ask again, how Christ took the form of a servant, the answer follows immediately, by being made in the likeness of men, that is, being made man, like unto us men, sin only excepted". Christ lived out the life of one who serves, accomplishing a life of perfect obedience to God unto death by first putting Himself on a par with us - by taking upon Himself, although still God's Son, the permanent characteristics - the very nature - of a servant, becoming voluntarily Himself one from whom God requires, as from us, the response of obedience.

B. The second stage,  $\piτρεινωσις$ , records the way of life upon which Christ entered as a result of the  $κενωσις$  and the taking of the form of a servant. He showed His humility by persevering in and carrying out the purpose for which He became man. The humiliation being a perseverance in the mind which led to the  $κενωσις$  implies not only identity of subject, but continuity of self-consciousness in the subject.

1.  $\epsilonταπεινωσεν$   $\epsilonαυτον$ .  $\epsilonαυτον$  in each case (cp.2.7) emphasises the voluntary nature of the acts, and the agent must obviously be He,  $\deltaς$   $\epsilonν$   $\muωϕη$   $\Thetaεου$

$\epsilonταπεινωσεν$   $\epsilonαυτον$   $\epsilonκενωσεν$ . The second act was the inevitable outcome of the first. Having entered on a way of life which demanded obedience, He was obedient unto death, a death which He could only have avoided by compromise which would have rendered His obedience a farce. It was precisely because He was obedient to God that He incurred the hatred of the Jewish authorities. The extent and final depth of Christ's self-humiliation and condescension, which began when  $\epsilonαυτον$   $\epsilonκενωσεν$ , was seen in this submission to a shameful death.

11.  $\kappaαι$   $οχηματι$   $εισεθις$  This phrase declares what Christ appeared to be in the eyes of His  
 $ωσ$   $ωθιωσας$ ...

contemporaries, and prepares for the statement of that further humiliation to which He submitted at their hands. In His entire way of life He made Himself known and was recognised (ἐπεδείχθη) as a man. There is no real support for the charge of Marcion and Baur that this is a docetic description. St. Paul is really recording the experience of the Twelve. By every sensible proof Christ was recognised and known and found as man.

- C. The final stage is the reward (as in Isaiah 53) by an exaltation proportionately great of Him who had poured out His soul unto death. The exaltation applies to Christ as God in manhood. As God in manhood He received again the glory that was His before as God. (John. 17.5). But there is a very real sense in which the glory Christ now received was an added glory, at least in relation to us. He had by His life of humiliation and obedience won a new title - that of Saviour and Redeemer. His risen Body we are told, still bears the marks of the Passion. John. 20. 20, 27. Therefore God gives to Him τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπερ πάντων ὄνομα. The ineffable name of God has been changed by God Himself into a name utterable by man and desirable by all the world, ἵνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πάντες γένηται κένηται... καὶ πάντα γένηται ἐφομολογήσονται ὅτι Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός..... "The tetragrammaton or adorable mystery of the patriarchs is made fit for pronounciation and expression when it becometh the name of the Lord's Christ". Jeremy Taylor.

In this passage St. Paul is preaching an ethical sermon with the help of a more or less pictorial contrast between Adam and Christ. He is not writing in the precise and carefully chosen phrases of scientific or metaphysical theology, but even if he does not "use his terms with the exactness of a professional logician or scholastic" (Gore, Dissertations. p.89 n.) we are not thereby justified in putting on those terms whatever interpretation suits our particular fancy. There is no support in the passage for a metaphysical theory of a depotentiated Logos, either in the extreme form proposed by Thomasius or in the more moderate form favoured by Gore. St. Paul is not concerned to answer the question how the divine Son became man in the precise sense in which the Kenotists are interested in the question. His object is rather to show how Christ redeemed fallen man, and his answer is that Christ redeemed fallen man by putting Himself on man's level. It is because St. Paul sees the life of Jesus as the act of the living God working for the deliverance of His creation from bondage to sin and death, that he is driven to a doctrine of the incarnation (2 Cor. 5.19. Rom. 5.8.) If a dividing line is drawn between the Creator and the creation, Christ must appear on the divine side of the dividing line (Col. 1.13. c.p.Heb. 3.3). By the fact of his own experienced redemption "through Jesus Christ" (Rom. 7.24, 25.) Paul is forced to rank Jesus with God, and to identify what Jesus did with what God did to redeem mankind.

Thus the earthly life of Jesus is seen to be the earthly life of one who came forth from the bosom of the Father (c.p. John 1. 18.) to raise men up to the Father by an identification of Himself with men in all things save in sin. The real significance of the historical life of Jesus of Nazareth (of which Paul had heard from Peter and the other Apostles) was seen by him to be nothing less than a divine act of redemption. In Jesus God's Son put Himself on an equality with man and became one from whom God henceforth required, as from all men, the response of loving obedience. It was precisely in living obediently in the very same conditions, under the very same limitations, and amid the very same temptations in which we have always been disobedient that He won the victory which gained for Him the Name which is above every name. (Phil. 2.9.) Christ proves that the very conditions of mortal life, which, when made the instruments of sin, cause man's downfall (Rom. 7.8,11, 15-23), may nevertheless be made the opportunity for an obedience which brings human nature through humiliation nearest to God's throne at the last. As one who has lived obediently in human conditions He is able, by drawing men to Himself, to give them new life and power that they themselves may respond obediently to the will of God. (Rom.6.) In Christ a new life, a new hope for humanity has dawned.

It is evident that St. Paul's doctrine of the atonement requires the real manhood of the Redeemer every bit as much as does the doctrine of the writer to the Hebrews. Christ's self-identification with sinful humanity in everything except sin is the key-stone of the teaching of both writers. Equally essential for both is the personal identity of Him who was obedient unto death with Him who, being in the form of God, took the form of a servant. How this could be so, how one who was personally God could be at the same time one from whom God required, as from men, the response of loving obedience, St. Paul does not profess to explain. But what is at least suggested by Phil. 2. 5-11, is that the identification of Himself with men was a voluntary act of the Son of God, an act of sympathy, involving for Him a measure of self-sacrifice and humiliation. The nature of the self-sacrifice was such that it did not in any sense involve a break in personal identity (that would have defeated the divine purpose); nevertheless the humiliation was real; it was costly to the Son; and we can legitimately claim that the measure of the self-sacrifice was such as was necessary to enable Christ - really and truly, and not only superficially and apparently - to be man. We have no means of measuring how far it was necessary for Christ to restrain His divine powers in becoming the subject of life under human conditions, because we do not know to how great an extent human nature is capable of mediating the divine life. Human nature as we know it is warped and weakened by disobedience. Christ alone shows us what human nature is capable of becoming when perfectly united in will with God; the only standard by which we can measure the capacities of human nature being Christ Himself, we have no criterion to help us in under-

standing His person. This then is the point beyond which St. Paul does not (perhaps could not) take us. What we can, however, claim with confidence is that St. Paul's argument cannot be understood except on the basis of a real self-restraint undertaken in the pre-incarnate state by the Son of God whereby He was able really to identify Himself with us.

Appendix B.

The Doctrine of the Cosmic Christ.

The ascription of divinity and of cosmic functions to Jesus Christ was made by men who had been brought up to believe in the strictest monotheism that the world has ever known. Only when the effects of the doctrine of divine transcendence on later Jewish theology are taken into account can it be understood how St. John, St. Paul and the writer to the Hebrews could speak of Jesus Christ as Him without Whom "was not anything made that hath been made".

Such information as the document J gives us of the primitive Israelite conception of God in the pre-prophetic period indicates that God was thought of as a man. Anthropomorphic ideas are dominant. Yahweh walks in the garden in the cool of the day, Gen. 3.8; He Himself shuts the door of the ark when Noah had entered, Genesis 7.16; He meets Abram by the oaks of Mamre appearing in human form and accepting the Patriarch's hospitality, Gen. 18. 1 ff; He wrestles with Jacob at Peniel, Gen. 32. 24. God is spoken of as if He were a man, and in J anthropomorphism is frank and naive. It retains the notion that Yahweh is a Being who is pleased with a gift, and that notion is responsible for the predominantly confident and joyous tone which marked the peace-offerings of pre-exilic religion.

Against such a conception of God as this the prophets protested. Hosea 11.9, illustrates the trend of their teaching: "I am God and not man: the Holy One in the midst of thee". The mark of the prophetic attitude is strongly impressed on the Pentateuchal document, which, although it probably comes before Hosea, yet owes its composition to the impetus of early prophetic activity in the North. Here the notion of God has greatly developed; it is a theocratic writing standing for a purer Yahwism. God does not now appear for Himself: Gen. 22. 11, speaks of the angel of the Lord appearing and speaking for Him. So gradually in the course of years and changing circumstances, the early anthropomorphic conception gave way to a more transcendent view of Deity. As thoughts of the majesty and the power of Yahweh become prominent, so a gap separating God from man appeared, and men began to speak of the holiness - the separateness - of Yahweh. The prophets loudly proclaimed Yahweh as the Righteous Ruler and Judge, and so stage by stage the warrior-God of the tribe was conceived of as the Sovereign Lord of Israel, and eventually, with the passing of monolatry into monotheism, as the God of all the nations. The final impetus to the developing view of Yahweh as transcendent was given by the Exile. Ezekiel's writings are filled with his sense of the grandeur of the divine majesty, Ez: 1. 26-28; his repeated use of the phrase "Son of man" seems to lay stress on the distance between the Godhead exalted in holiness and the prophet as a mere man. In his proclamation, 2.3, of the universal sovereignty of Yahweh, monotheism is indeed implicit, but even so there is not the express statement such as is found repeatedly in Deutero-Isaiah.

His mind is so filled with the glory of Yahweh that he seems not to reflect whether the gods of the heathen have any reality. But with D. - Isaiah the doctrine of the transcendence of Yahweh is stated in no uncertain terms. The experience of the Exile had made a deep impression; the prophet determined to preserve a spiritual conception of God as against the crude anthropomorphism of idolatry. Yahweh's glory is set over against the futility of idols. For it is after references to such man-made statues of deity that the writer declares "I am God and there is none else; I am God and there is none like Me". Is. 46. 1-13. Perhaps the most striking picture of the transcendent God is 40.22-26, 43.15; in 40.6-7, 44.24, the all-mightiness of Yahweh is emphasized.

Zechariah follows in the wake of Isaiah's conception of Yahweh's transcendence. For him Yahweh is almost beyond contact with this earth and its inhabitants. For although Zechariah is a prophet, his access to Yahweh is trebly mediated. Yahweh communicates His will to His Angel, and then another angel interprets to Zechariah the divine command given to the Angel of Yahweh and commissions him to prophesy to the people; the divine message, therefore, reaches Israel through three intermediaries, Zech; 2.3.

Again, post-exilic legalism by its interposition of a written law between God and man tended to carry on this emphasis on the divine transcendence: for although the law as the revelation of Yahweh's will enters intimately into the details of life, yet it intervenes as an external mediator between man and God. It is not a law in the heart. In the later apocalyptic literature generally, e.g. Enoch 1-36, the Creator is depicted as distant from all mankind, reigning from heaven and governing the world by angelic viceroys. It has been said that in the apocalyptic literature "God is thought of as occupying an inaccessible throne", much in the manner of an Eastern potentate. In I. Maccabees even the name of Yahweh has become too sacred to use, and there is no direct mention of His name at all except for obscure allusions to Him as "Heaven", 3.18, 4.10-24.

The inevitable corollary of the doctrine of divine transcendence is the attempt to preserve the doctrine of divine immanence by conceptions of God working through agents - projections, as it were, of Yahweh into the sphere of the world, - conceived as acting and speaking for Him. No longer was it possible to say that the Lord God formed man or planted a garden. The will of Yahweh was made known through intermediaries. Of this tendency, which was the outcome of transcendentalism, there are two outstanding modes of illustration. The first is the personification of the attributes of God, His Spirit, His Wisdom, and His Word: the second is the doctrine of angels. An examination of the former will suffice for present purposes.

#### The Spirit of God.

The physical meaning of [117] spirit, is breath,  
 πνεῦμα : it is the characteristic of life: where breath

is present, there is life and power; where it is absent, there is only flesh, weakness and decay. It was probably in quite primitive times that ideas of life and power became attached to <sup>ה-י</sup> as a result of observation. Man has his breath within him, so if God is like man then God too must have a Spirit: for in the Old Testament Yahweh has a Spirit, but is not in His essence considered as a Spirit. The Spirit being that in which resides vitality, power, energy in general, the usage became extended: the prevailing direction of the mind - what we should call mood or temper - was called a spirit of such and such a kind, Is. 19.14. When this frame of mind was permanent then the general disposition of a man was called "Spirit". In like manner the term Spirit of Yahweh comprehends all activities of vital energy, emotional, intellectual or moral. Is.40. 13, 14, Ps. 143, 10. Thus it comes about that the relations of God to man become spoken of as activities of the Spirit of God. The Spirit of God is God exerting power: God actually exerting efficiency in any sphere.

In creation the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the watery chaos, Gen. 1.2. (The Hebrew word means "hover like a bird over" cp. imagery of the dove. Luke 3.22, Mk. 1.10, Mtt. 3. 16, John 1, 32.). In Job 26.13, it is said: "by His Spirit the heavens are garnished". A bold, though not unnatural figure identifying the wind which carries off the clouds through God's efficiency with the Spirit of God. In the sphere of vitality God is the source of life. While in the J document God breathes into Adam the breath of life, in Job 33.4 it is "the Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty giveth me life". cp. Job 27.3. Behind it all is the thought of God as continually communicating His life; but God in operation is the Spirit of God, and God's operation in giving the creature life is the entrance of His Spirit into the creature. Again, great feats of strength and daring are referred to the Spirit of God. Judg: 3.10, 6.34, I.Sam.2.6. The heroes are acted upon by the Spirit of God, and to this category no doubt belongs the ascription of prophecy at first to the Spirit of God. The ecstasy of the early prophets was thought of as the symptom of inspiration by the Spirit of God: in later times prophecy became an ethical intercourse with God, but the prophet is still called in Hosea the man "of the Spirit", and Micah says, 3.8: "But I truly am full of power by the Spirit of the Lord". Again, in the sphere of intellectual gifts the Spirit is the cause of Joseph's wisdom, and Elihu says "There is a spirit in man and the breath of the Almighty giveth him understanding". Job. 32.8. (cp.Is.42.1. 11.1-2.). Further, all the religious emotions of men are due to the Spirit of God and the Psalmist prays 51.11: "Take not Thy Holy Spirit from me". cp.Is.63.10. (These are the only two places in the Old Testament where the epithet "Holy" is applied to the Spirit. <sup>י-ה</sup> <sup>י-ה</sup> "Spirit of His Holiness". cp.Rom: 1.4.). The Spirit of God, then, is God actively present and in operation, but its sphere of action is

chiefly referred to God's inspiration of prophecy: and while in the Old Testament generally there is no real division, yet we may say that there are the beginnings of a distinction between the Lord and His Spirit in such phrases as Hag: 2.5. "My Spirit is in the midst of you" and Is.48.16 "Yahweh hath sent me and His Spirit"

### The Wisdom of God.

The two main problems which were constantly before men's minds were those of creation and revelation: the questions "How did God make the world?" "How can and does God communicate with man?" One attempt was to explain them by the activity of the Spirit of God, but with the decay of prophecy the place of the Spirit was taken by a personification of Wisdom. This is a mere philosophic attempt to convey the same sense of God's immanence in creation while holding fast to the cardinal doctrine of His transcendence.

The Hebrew conception of חכמה was essentially practical - skill in ordering the affairs of daily life. The wise man is he who directs his life worthily and well, and Ps. 111.10 shows that the root of wisdom lies in religion. Is.29.14, Jer.18.18, seem to suggest the wise as a guild of spiritual advisers distinguished from both priest and prophet, who after the Exile gradually took the place of the prophets as moral guides and teachers, Ecclus. 39.1, 51.23. To these wise men is due not only the gnomic wisdom of the "Sayings of the Fathers", but also the wisdom speculations in the later Proverbs and Apocryphal literature. Proverbs 8.22 represents wisdom as the first-born before creation, who was with the Lord as a master-workman as He wrought His mighty works of creation. Wisdom is indeed the impersonation of a moral quality endowed with life by Yahweh, whose place in Creation, however, she nowhere usurps. Ecclus: 24.3, describes her ethical character and her birth from the mouth of the most High; in Baruch 4, wisdom is connected with the Law. Enoch. 42.1 - 49. 1, pictures her as descending from heaven to earth, being rejected by men, returning to heaven and there awaiting the Messianic age when she will be poured out in her fulness.

So as men came more and more to realize the activity of a supreme intelligence in the universe, and to speak of "Him that by wisdom made the heavens", the Wisdom of God became almost an object of adoration. In post-exilic years, when the prophetic source of knowledge failed, the divine intelligence made its appeal and men recognized in all human thinking the impact of the divine Mind. Prov. 8 reveals the personified Wisdom as the vehicle of the divine message to men. But in Wisdom 7.22 - 8, the personification has risen beyond a practical metaphor to be a philosophical doctrine. Wisdom is identified with the prophetic Spirit of old time: "In all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God and prophets". In relation to God Himself, "she is the breath of the power of God and a pure

effluence flowing from the glory of the Almighty..... the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of His goodness". 7.25-26. Wisdom is at once a quality of God and almost a Person within the Divine Personality. (cp: Hebs. 1.3.).

### The Word of God.

The transition from the Wisdom of God to the third great personification, that of the Word, is a natural development. In Philo, the Hebraic Wisdom mingles with the Hellenic and Stoic Reason, and leads to a confluence of the best and truest in the thought of the two cultures. But the contribution of Hebraism to the idea of the  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  in Philo was not entirely in the conception of Wisdom, for the Scriptures have much about the divine Voice in creation - the creative Word. Applied to man, word is speech or utterance, but under the influence of transcendentalism it attains the sense of creative force through which God acts. The Word of Yahweh is gradually substituted for the appearances of Yahweh Himself. Gen. 15.1 "the Word of the Lord came unto Abram in a vision". It becomes in Ps.107.20 the medium through which God does anything: "He sendeth His Word and healeth them and delivereth them from their destructions". Later still it becomes almost a personal agency which can act almost independently apart from God. Is:55.11 "So shall my Word be that goeth forth out of My Mouth, it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereunto I sent it". In the P account of creation the Word is the instrument. "And God said". Ps.33.6. "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made". In the Targums the action of Yahweh is constantly described as His "Word" - the term Memra being sometimes used as of a person. The Targum of Onkelos on Gen.28.21 says that Jacob's covenant was that "the Word of Yahweh should be his God". Wisdom 18.15 "Thine all-powerful Word leaped down from heaven out of the royal throne as a fierce man of war into the midst of a land of destruction, and brought thine unfeigned commandment as a sharp sword".

Finally in Alexandria the divine  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  of "Wisdom" literature, and the creative Wisdom of the teaching of the Son of Sirach, are identified, and to them in Philo's writings is added the further Stoic use of the  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  idea to express the all-pervading world reason. The doctrine of the personality of the Word which is plainly implied in the Fourth Gospel, in Paul (I.Cor: 8.6, Col.1.16,) and in Heb: 1.2-3, is but vaguely foreshadowed in Philo when he speaks of the association of the  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  with Creation. When God was fashioning the world, He used the Word as a tool; Philo speaks of the creative power according to which the Creator made the world with the Word: in other passages the  $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  is  $\epsilon\iota\kappa\omega\nu$   $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ . Thus in so far as they ascribe divine personality to this mediating Agent, Paul, Hebrews and John do not borrow directly from Philo's speculations; they and Philo represent two different streams of thought, the common origin of which was the Jewish doctrine of the Memra of

Yahweh. It is not, then, too much to say that in the growth of the doctrine of transcendence, and in its corollary, the personification of the Divine attributes finally culminating in the <sup>Λογος</sup> concept, is to be found the key to the beginnings of Christian doctrine and the background against which it is to be studied.

Although these three personified attributes of God have been treated separately in this appendix, they are not in fact used exclusively. Ideas associated with one are often predicated of another: the terms are virtually interchangeable. Wisdom 7 vv.22 ff. is a striking instance of this interchangeability; Word = Wisdom = Spirit. Similarly in the New Testament the Johannine "Logos" and the Pauline "Son of God" have the same reference.

An examination of the evidence of the New Testament indicates that at the end of the first century the doctrine of the cosmic functions of Christ was by no means universal: yet there is no sign of abrupt transition in the development by which St. Paul and others reached these stupendous affirmations concerning Jesus and His relation to the world. We find the doctrine emerging quite naturally, and references to Christ as agent in creation and the principle of cohesion in the world are not found to conflict with references to God as creator and sustainer.

In Rom: 11.v.36 it is of God that St. Paul says: "for of him and through him and unto him are all things" (c.p. Eph.3. v. 9). In I Cor: 8.v.6, a further idea is introduced: "yet to us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things and we unto him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him". Col: 1.v.16 is still more explicit in the way it speaks of Christ as the Son "who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation: for in him were all things created in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible.....all things have been created through him, and unto him: and he is before all things and in him all things consist". (N.B. <sup>συνέστηκε</sup> R.V.Marg. "hold together"). c.p. Eph. 1.v.10, 2.v.10, Jn. 8.v.56, Ps. 89.v.27, Eccles.43.v.26, Prov. 8.v.22.

Similarly the writer to the Hebrews, in 2.v.10, speaks of God: "for it became him for whom are all things, and through whom are all things.... to make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings". But in 1.v.2-3, of Christ he says: "whom he appointed heir of all things, through whom also he made the worlds: who being the effulgence of his glory and the very image of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had made purification for sins, sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high". (c.p. Hebs. 3.v.3. "For he hath been counted worthy of more glory than Moses, by so much as he that built the house hath more glory than the house"). (N.B. Hebs. 1.v.3. <sup>ἀκτίνα</sup> c.p. Wisdom. 7.25-26).

The development culminates in the precise claim of Jn. 1. 1-4. "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that hath been made".

That the infant Christian Church was able to make such claims for Jesus Christ in face of the monotheistic belief of the parent Jewish Church can only be accounted for by reference to the development of the doctrine of divine agents which characterized later Jewish theology. Indeed it is not surprising that the disciples after the vivid experience of the Resurrection, and faced with a unique Person and a unique series of facts calling for interpretation, should turn back to that conception of God, and of God's action in history, in which they had been brought up. The necessities of missionary apologetic in a Jewish environment drove them to think out their new faith in relation to the presuppositions and inherited beliefs of Judaism, just as in later years the Church was to seek in the Hellenic world the help of Hellenic philosophy to give expression to its faith. St. Paul, St. John and the writer to the Hebrews all presuppose the validity of Judaism; they take it for granted that there really were promises and purposes of God. Christianity is organically continuous with its own past; what was new was its claim that all the redemptive promises of God were fulfilled in one Person. The eventual formulation of an explicit doctrine of our Lord's deity as the incarnate Son of God was necessitated by the fact that it provided the only ultimate intellectual justification, compatible with monotheism, of such a cultus as Christianity. A study of the earliest Christological titles suggests that this is, in fact, what did happen; ideas which were vague in the Old Testament, e.g. son of man, servant, etc. received definite and concrete application in reference to the risen Christ.

Consequently the doctrine of the cosmic functions of the Christ was an inevitable development once Christ had been identified in men's minds with the Divine Word.

Dr. J.M. Creed (The Divinity of Jesus Christ, p.137 ff) has a valuable comment on this issue. "No doubt the Church was helped towards its belief in a cosmic Christ by the concepts of a Divine Word and Wisdom, more or less personified, which were already current in Hellenistic Judaism, but these concepts do not themselves explain how Christians came to associate cosmic functions with an historical Man. We must look for some inner logic which carried the Church onward to the faith of St. Paul and St. John".

He rightly says that there is no evidence that Jesus said of Himself that He was God's agent or co-agent in creation, and no valid reason for claiming that such an idea was present to His mind. (There is, however, one passage which is not without significance in this connection. Mtt. 8.v.23-27, Mk. 4.v.36-41, Luke 8.22-25, contain accounts of the stilling of the storm. It is noticeable

that Christ did not pray to the Father or invoke the divine Name; He spoke as if He were Lord of the elements, and we recall the bewilderment of the disciples at His doing so. "Who then is this that even the wind and the sea obey him?"). But it is true, as Creed says, that the terms of thought in the Gospel are predominantly soteriological, not ontological, even as in the Old Testament the doctrine of creation is only clearly articulated at a late date (Deutero-Isaiah chaps. 40-55). Yet there is a difference between the Old Testament and the New. Whereas an Isaiah stands Himself a penitent with the sinful nation over against the holiness of the Lord of Hosts, Jesus Christ is found to stand on both sides of the chasm at once, "the friend of publicans and sinners" yet also "the holy one of God". "That kind of impression must go back to the very beginning, and it must have been very nearly, but not quite, at the beginning that the disciples found here - in the chasm which separated them, yet did not separate them from their Master - the true explanation of the crucifixion". Creed suggests that we can perhaps see in the eighth chapter of the epistle to the Romans the nature of the movement from this early conviction towards faith in a cosmic Christ. "When St. Paul has proclaimed his persuasion that the love of God which is in Christ Jesus is the sovereign power to which all things created must yield place, the way has been opened for the belief that through Christ all things created came to be.... The affirmation that all things were made by Jesus Christ is certainly not a conclusion which can be established by philosophical reflexion, still less by observation and experiment, independently of a relationship to Christ: but with relationship to Christ as a starting point, faith may and must advance to include the wide world in its embrace".

To this may be added the argument of Quick, Doctrines of the Creed, p.p.79 - 80. "St. Paul's whole Christology rests upon the fundamental conviction that in the earthly life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, God had accomplished a supreme act of grace for the deliverance of men from the otherwise inevitable consequences of their transgressions of the law.....The Christ by whom we are forgiven and justified is the same person who will appear in glory to exercise God's final judgment. Therein lies the assurance of perfect salvation.....And, if by Christ's work Christians are created anew through forgiveness, and made inheritors of the new world, the original creation also must have been formed through the agency of the same person in whom now its final purpose is revealed and is being fulfilled: for, as Irenaeus says "It is the same hand through which God creates and completes". (Vide Thornton. The Common Life in the Body of Christ. p.p.289, 297).

