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THE URBAN GEOGRAPHY OF BENGHAZI

By

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. of the University
of Durham

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Preface

The selection of the subject resulted from the desire to acquire detailed knowledge of the various problems of the urban geography of a town of my country. Detailed urban geographical studies in Libya do not exist despite their vital importance for future economic and social development, especially with the new prospects created by the discovery of oil.

My grateful acknowledgments are rendered to Professors J.I. Clarke, who supervised my research for three years with a great degree of patience, and to Professor W.B. Fisher who kindly accepted me in his department.

It would be ungracious of me not to recognize my debt to the officials of the Libyan University and to the Ministry of Education of Libya. Lastly, to the great number of individuals and institutions who helped in the provision of statistics, reports and maps I also offer my grateful thanks.

H.M.R. Bulugma.

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INTRODUCTION

Although the site of Benghazi has been occupied since ancient times the development of the centre remained slow and erratic until the early decades of this century. The centre was almost certainly founded by Greek settlers from the Jebel at some time before 515 B.C. However, no certain reasons are yet known for the establishment of what was then known as Eusperides. Berenice replaced Eusperides. In the third century B.C. the city was re-named in honour of the wife of the Egyptian King Ptolomy III.

Eusperides had direct sea communications and perhaps its effective defensive site developed serious defects because of the gradual silting up of the lagoon on which it was founded. The transfer from the old site was, therefore, inevitable.

The recorded history of both the old and new centres is very scanty whilst the remains of the latter site, on which present Benghazi has developed, have been almost entirely consumed by the Islamic city which since the 15th century A.D. has occupied the site. However, both centres have failed to compete with the other Greek and later Roman centres on the Jebel as neither of them achieved the honour of being the capital of the Pentapolis.

After the Roman occupation, and with the Arab conquest there came a new mode of life. Agriculture on the plateau and fortified military posts on the fringe zone of the desert



were no longer necessities. Within the city the walls were reconstructed by the Byzantines in the sixth century, but city life does not seem to have lasted for more than two to three centuries after this, when the centre became one of the numerous ruined sites and so remained until the middle of the 15th century. This time the revival was initiated by Tripolitanian merchants trading between Tripoli city and the eastern parts of Cyrenaica.

The name Bernik used by some Arab geographers to refer to Berenice began to give way to that of Marsa Ibn Chazi as early as the second half of the 16th century. The new name is no doubt that of a Moslem Saint of whom nothing is known except that his tomb is thought to be somewhere in the main cemetery.

During the long Turkish domination, Marsa Ibn Chazi although it developed a new function as the seat of the Turkish provincial governors, in fact benefited very little and consequently remained in no way distinguished by the new development. Trade activities by Misuratans from Tripolitania were far more important for the survival of the provincial capital.

When the Italians took over the Cyrenaican littoral in 1911, Benghazi although characterized by its castle, great mosque, municipality and prison was still a small unplanned town mostly of mud buildings with a population ^{of} under seventeen thousand. Suburbs were limited to a shanty town in the

north and a few scattered agglomerations around the marabouts tombs in the south-east. There were no modern roads or railways and in fact land communication between the town proper and the south-east extensions of the later Berka and Fuehat quarters had only been built late last century.

In reality Benghazi was merely a small isolated centre with no profound urban characteristics. The surrounding harsh landscape with a belt of almost continuous salt marshes immediately followed by a large semi-arid infertile plain did not revive the classical European outlook in choosing the capital for Cyrenaica. The Italians, surprisingly enough, were enthusiastic for the continuance of the political status of Turkish Benghazi. To this end, the face of African Benghazi had to be replaced by a characteristic face of the motherland.

Thus, soon after their arrival, the Italians began to work out their ideas towards achieving this aim. Military and political circumstances, on the other hand, soon showed that the Italians had indeed underestimated the native resistance. The inevitable outcome was a delay of all intended development schemes. The new European Benghazi was therefore not built as quickly or as easily as the Italians had envisaged and in fact for the first time since the Byzantine period Benghazi had to be given a defensive wall. It is true that some changes were taking place, but

essentially the old town remained unchanged for almost two decades. The emergence of Italian Benghazi was therefore bound to be slow and limited in scale. The fact that development in the early years was fundamentally for military purposes, combined with the disadvantages of the available sites for conspicuous planned urban development may account for this. However, this does not mean that the Italians have not succeeded in creating a new Benghazi. On the contrary Benghazi of today owes much to Italian planning and initiative. It is true that the old remained alongside the new: a feature which, no doubt, has been a handicap for comprehensive development. The Italian phase of development was unquestionably the most important event in the long history of the city.

By the end of World War II Benghazi had been utterly devastated.

Independence may fulfil lost and long fought for aspirations, but reconstruction and development require basic resources which unfortunately did not exist. It is true that Benghazi had become the first national capital in less than ten years after the end of the war, but it is also true that the face of the city had to remain almost as ruined as it was when the last German vehicle drove off for the last time.

The Italian plans to create a modern Benghazi were tremendous efforts which not only showed generous even


perhaps extravagant expenditure, but more important, introduced a new civic conception, and illustrated great determination to defeat the harsh landscape. To achieve this the Italians had no option, but to reduce the areas of the surrounding salt marshes and the harbour. Radical transformations of some of the adjacent parts of the Arab quarter were also essential. But even so, there was not enough space to give the Italian "Piazza" its place in the new town. The Municipality Square, the centre of former Benghazi was redeveloped, but only to give it a transitional area between the core of the Arab town and new Benghazi. The square is closed to traffic from all, but the southern direction.

The success of the Italian scheme made Benghazi the most important town in Cyrenaica and only second to that of Tripoli in the whole of Libya.

Had it not been for the discovery of the oil fields in the Syrtic area a decade after independence, the destiny of Benghazi would certainly have been different. It was the location of the city which gave Benghazi a considerable share in the expenditure by the oil companies during the hunt for oil in the early years, and this initiated a second phase of expansion in the city (see Figure 1)

It was unfortunate that the Italians failed to see the African side of Benghazi and so allowed two adjacent, but divergent cities to develop. The Libyans, surprisingly

Figure 1



Location map with the municipal boundaries

enough, did not seem to bother about the artificiality of this physical structure and in fact have intensified the earlier contrast. The fact that oil had brought sudden wealth and prosperity where economic difficulties were certain to prevail combined with the lack of capable administration may provide an explanation for the hazards which were a feature of Benghazi's expansion after oil had been discovered in Syrte. The recent growth of the city has been a combination of sophisticated westernized villas and multiple storey buildings next to if not interspersed with Arab buildings and shanty towns. The harbour and the airport are both being extravagantly reconstructed, yet only a small part of the city is efficiently drained. No fundamental town planning was considered. Zoning has not been heard of. It is a city in which no detailed surveys of any kind have taken place. Even a road map of the city is not available and many streets have no official names.

Benghazi is neither Libyan nor European. To Europe it owes its turning point to Italian development and of course to its recent fortune and wealth because of oil. To Libyans Benghazi was the focus of the movement for independence, yet they do not seem to worry about her future. It is true that the city is still growing, but this has been achieved by private interest at the time when government money was wasted on Beida the proposed new capital.

The city is a complex of extreme wealth for some and

the hardest core of misery and poverty for the majority. In this respect Benghazi resembles most if not all towns and cities in the Arab world, like Khartoum, Baghdad and Marrakesh. Along the Arab Mediterranean coast, Benghazi stands unique, at least for its unfavourable site and its poor hinterland. Alexandria with Lake Mariut to the south is the only city where similarity of site occurs. The latter for many reasons developed into the second largest Mediterranean harbour after Marseille, yet Benghazi still remains an unimportant port especially in comparison with port-capitals like Beirut, Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. The only thing which Benghazi now possesses is the wealth from oil which none of the former cities have, yet its population is only one-tenth that of Alexandria, one-eighth that of Algiers, one-sixth that of Tunis, one-fifth that of Beirut and one-third that of Tripoli.

Benghazi has no defined city boundary. According to the Municipalities Laws of 1953, the municipal boundaries of the city were laid down. From the north-east the boundary follows a line one hundred metres north of the track road between the fort of el-Munastir and that of fort el-Nakhil on the main road to Barce. A straight line from this point to the south to the fort of Fuehat is the eastern boundary. One hundred metres south of the ring road between Fuehat and the sea is the southern boundary while the Mediterranean shoreline forms the western boundary. The

approximate municipality area, therefore, is about 30 square kilometres. The city covers about half of the municipal area while the areas of salt marshes account for over one-tenth. The area of the city proper is very small; two square kilometres in all. The suburbs of Sabri, Sidi Husein, Berka and Fuehat account for the rest of the developed area, the subject of this thesis.

My personal knowledge of the city (in which I am attached to the university staff) has greatly stimulated and facilitated this research project. Nevertheless numerous difficulties and problems have been encountered. The most important of these were the prevailing lack of precise data and government refusal to permit organized surveys. Accurate maps at suitable scales do not exist and to complicate matters still further no coverage of air photographs could be obtained. The lack of specialized bodies associated with development has been a further serious handicap. The destruction of the Italian records and most literature together with the suspicious and unhelpful attitude of most people and government officials have also posed problems.

However, determination to stimulate geographical studies among young Libyans and the search for knowledge have encouraged me to complete this thesis.

CHAPTER I
POSITION AND SITE

The city of Benghazi is located on the Mediterranean coast almost half way between Tripoli in the west and Alexandria in the east. The exact position of the city is $32^{\circ} 11' N$ and $20^{\circ} 3' E$. The hinterland of Benghazi is a semi-arid flat plain known as the Plain of Benghazi, varying in width from north to south according to the divergence of the interior escarpment and the coast line.

The position of Benghazi throughout the history of the province, especially from the economic point of view, has undoubtedly been unfavourable. This is the main reason why until the early decades of this century the city has been insignificant. The nearby Jebel area has always played a more effective and decisive role in Cyrenaican history. The first capital of Cyrenaica was at Cyrene; in A.D. 287 the Romans transferred it to Tolmeita. Later, in the 6th century A.D. Susa (Appollonia) became the capital. Subsequently, the Arabs made Barca-el-Marj their capital, but under the Fatimid rulers it was rivalled by Agedabia which lay more conveniently on the inland caravan route from Egypt to the Maghreb. The Turks resided in Benghazi simply because it was their first place of arrival, and the Italians followed this line for political and military purposes. However, the

Libyans are now engaged in transferring the political status of the city once more to the Jebel at Beida.

The story of Benghazi from the earliest days is, therefore, no more than a series of political factors working without any economic support until very recently, but even now the oil-fields lie too far away from the city. In other words, the location of Benghazi, although now supporting nearly one third of the total provincial population, is rather unfortunate for many reasons, of which the poverty of her hinterland is the chief, whilst the lack of a natural harbour is another serious disadvantage. Contact with the rest of the province, especially in the Jebel area where most of the towns developed, was not easy until the late 1930's when both the railway and the bitumenised road were finished.

PLAIN OF BENGHAZI

The Benghazi Plain, which is roughly triangular in shape, widens towards the south as the coastline and the escarpment diverge. The escarpment represent a post-miocene shoreline and the elevated area behind the scarp is known as the Jebel Akhdar. The southern limit of the plain is arbitrary as it intermingles north of Agedabia with what is known to the Arabs as Barca el-Beida. A line from Antellat to Zwetina on the coast may be considered the southern boundary of Benghazi plain. The width of the plain, therefore, ranges

from about four kms. in Tocrá area to about 25 kms. in Benghazi area. South of Benghazi the width increases rapidly until the plain becomes part of the Syrtic area.

The area consists of a flat plain rising from the Mediterranean coast inland to the foot of the escarpment which approximately parallels the present coastline. The plain rises from sea level to an elevation of 400 to 500 feet at the piedmont. A beach and a wide dune area border the sea and give way to a succession of sea level salt flats along most of the inland side of the dunes. The plain has been to some extent dissected by erosion and dry wadis are present throughout its extent. During the rainy season the wadis flow, but little of their run-off reaches the sea. Wadi Gattara and Ngar are the two main wadis of the plain; the first, which is also known as Wadi Hauari, drains a large area in the Jebel; and after heavy rains discharges water on to the flat lands round Benghazi. The plain is best developed north of Benghazi city, but as a whole it is infertile partly because of the insufficient amount of rainfall and partly because of the poor quality of subterranean water, except perhaps in the surroundings of the city of Benghazi itself.

The soils of the plain are variable in depth and character. Agriculture is confined to the scattered tiny cases where both water and a reasonable depth of soil are

found. In most cases such as Benina, Feuhat, Soluk and Sidi Khalifa the dominant soil colour is reddish. Other colours vary between pink and reddish yellow. The physical composition of these soils is, in most cases, dominated by sand which ranges from 25 to 80 per cent. Organic matter represents no more than 5 per cent. The reddish colour of the most important soils is due to the fact that most of these soils were transported to the oases either by water run-off from the Jebel or by winds. The high iron content of the Jebel formations together with the domination of the Mediterranean climate are the factors which produced the typical red soil better known as terra rossa. This soil is very rich as far as chemical composition is concerned, but on the other hand, and especially on the plain of Benghazi, it lacks two elements of great importance to cultivation: organic matter and moisture. The soils of the oases of the Plain of Benghazi, and in particular north of the city, are similar in origin though less valuable than the famous terra rossas dominating the flat areas of the Jebel and in particular the Barce Plain. Alluvial soils in the drained areas of the wadis are similar. The absence of humus combined with inadequate moisture are the only two major differences between the reddish soils of the plain and the terra rossa of the Jebel.

Apart from the soils, the plain is mostly covered with a thin compact sandy layer derived from fine wind-blown sand.


Three other types of soil - using the term in its largest sense - are widespread: first the Sebkhah soils, which are very saline and therefore support no vegetation; secondly, widespread patches of crôte (calcrete) caused by capillary action and precipitation of calcium carbonate after the moisture evaporates and thirdly pure sands which form the dunes whether on the shoreline or inland.

The Plain of Benghazi as a whole is part of the semi-arid climate zone which is characterized by a rainfall of 100-200 mm. (4-10 inches) a year. The total rainfall varies considerably from year to year from one location to another, and furthermore it is unevenly distributed throughout the year. Severe droughts covering almost the whole country are reputed to have occurred in cycles of roughly ten years. The rainfall is seasonal, occurring mostly in the winter months when it is not much needed, leaving the summer months dry and hot. Most of the rainfall either evaporates or soaks into the soil; very little reaches the sea in the form of run-off.

The semi-arid zone of Benghazi plain can be subdivided into three distinct rainfall areas, with Benghazi city forming a fourth area with the highest rainfall (see fig.2).

Prevailing winds are from the north-west through north. Hot south winds (ghibli) are infrequent and sometimes are accompanied by wind-blown sand and dust. Average monthly temperatures for January and August are as follows:

Figure 2



Climatic zones of Northern Cyrenaica

Average temperatures (°C.)

	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Aug.</u>	<u>Range</u>
Tocra	13.9	25.5	11.6
Benghazi	13.0	25.6	12.6
Benina	12.1	26.7	14.6
Agedabia	12.6	26.7	14.1

From this brief description we realize that the plain is of little economic value because of its natural poverty. Settlements are limited to a few scattered oases where both underground water and soil are available to support sufficient population. The plain has some significance for grazing and for shifting cultivation especially of barley and wheat. The success or failure of the crop is a matter of extreme uncertainty. If rainfall is distributed in the most favourable manner throughout the season a crop can be harvested even when the total rainfall would not normally be considered sufficient to ensure its survival.

Prior to the discovery of oil the Cyrenaican economy was a combination of livestock raising and cultivation. The latter because of the natural obstacles and tribal traditions is mostly shifting. Static agriculture is negligible and practised only where either suitable soils have enough precipitation or where such soils are supported by the presence

of underground water. The total irrigated area in the whole province is only 2,000 hectares, and the Plain of Benghazi has almost half of the irrigated areas. The oases of Koefia, Benina, Sidi Khalifa, Dariana, Tocra, Guarsha and Ghemines are the main static farming areas of the plain, these oases being divided into small holdings, called sania in Arabic, in which in most cases a separate well is found. The method of utilizing subterranean water is still primitive and depends on animal power such as donkeys, camels and cows, whilst the water container is merely a skin bag with a small water capacity. The depth of the wells varies from one place to another, but they are usually from 6 to 12 metres, and the water is sometimes collected in a stone built tank or lifted straight from the well to the irrigated unit (gedula). The following two tables show the production of garden crops as well as the number and production of fruit trees in the Plain of Benghazi and in the province as a whole. (1)

(a) Garden crops.

Crop	<u>Production (in quintals)</u>		Plain production
	Cyrenaica	Plain of Benghazi	% of total
Maize	5,428	531	10
Potatoes	260	2	2.8
Onions	10,564	4,074	40
Beans	3,562	950	30
Dry Peas	147	15	10
Chick Peas	2,893	6	-
Tomatoes	36,527	11,723	33
Water melons	22,028	8,761	36
Pepper	5,953	1,904	35
Cucumber	1,690	1,395	93
Lentils	102	96	97
Carrots	641	-	-

(b) Fruit Trees (2)

Tree	<u>No. of Trees</u>		<u>Production (in quintals)</u>	
	Cyrenaica	Plain of Benghazi	Cyrenaica	Plain of Benghazi
Orange	28,000*	736	2,859	2,706
Lemon	1,334	288	516	360
Apple	6,612	941	961	183
Pear	2,836	340	353	130
Apricot	7,889	1,964	1,989	238
Vines	924,488	13,993	41,241	9,051
Fig	72,791	32,470	15,048	3,406
Almond	21,507	7,833	1,947	1,200
Banana	87,457	1,357	3,553	540
Date Palm	117,586	26,534	14,453	4,224
Olive	114,871	33,555	8,893	7,426
Pear	7,806	1,095	1,042	502
Plum	4,960	270	2,608	180

* The number of trees and production are highly exaggerated. The official yearly figures show a big contrast every census. 350 quintals a year for the whole province seems a more reasonable estimate.

These two tables illustrate the types of farm production of garden crops and fruit trees, the production figures for the whole province indicating the insignificant role of static farming in the provincial economy. The average area of garden crop is about 2,400 hectares and that of trees is about 3,000 hectares. The striking phenomenon about static farming in Cyrenaica is that most of the small production is meant to fulfil the farmer's own requirements. The result is a great shortage of production in the local market, except in the Jebel crops such as tomatoes, water-melons, grapes and bananas. The city of Benghazi hardly knows the marketing of local vegetables and fruits, and is at present almost entirely dependent on Tripolitania for her needs in these respects, though some fruits are imported in certain seasons from overseas. This situation has led to a great rise in prices, especially after the search for oil, which has trebled the number of foreign residents in the city over the last six years.

Cyrenaica is more noteworthy for shifting cultivation. Barley and wheat form the main elements in the diet of the Libyan people although recent oil discoveries have introduced new food items such as rice, macaroni and to some extent a mixed modern diet with meat and vegetables.

The total output of barley and wheat, as mentioned before, is subject to climatic variability. Taking into consideration the prevailing natural conditions such as the dominant winds

and the high evaporation, high outputs are unlikely to be possible. Crop failure is caused by many factors, of which the lack and ill distribution of rain are of great importance, as well as the ghibli if it occurs at certain times and lasts too long. If no rain falls in November the earth will be too hard for sowing and if it does not rain in March, when the crops are ripening, they will be in danger of being burnt up. Because of these facts the production varies from year to year, as the following statistics show. (3)

Year	Cyrenaica Production (in tons)		Plain of Benghazi (in tons)			
	Wheat	Barley	Wheat	%	Barley	%
1954	9,470	42,610	2,000	c. 21%	9,700	c. 44%
1955	10,000	25,000	5,900	c. 51%	12,100	c. 50%
1956	8,400	18,200	2,000	c. 23%	8,900	c. 44%
1957	21,343	24,913	3,267	c. 14%	4,630	c. 16%
1958	13,592	23,113	4,019	c. 30%	10,239	c. 49%
1959	9,064	8,543	142	c. 1.7%	175	c. 2%

The above figures clearly indicate general fluctuations of yearly productions in both crops. The fluctuations of wheat production are less sharp than those of barley, the reason being that most of the wheat is cultivated on the Barce plain, an

area less liable to climatic fluctuation. Barley, on the other hand, is cultivated mainly on the semi-arid areas, and the production percentage of the former two crops explains the role played by the Plain of Benghazi, as far as shifting cultivation is concerned.

Livestock raised on the Plain of Benghazi as well as the whole province is as shown below.⁽⁴⁾

(a) Cyrenaica. (figures in thousands)

Year	Sheep	Goats	Cows	Camels	Horses	Donkeys	Poultry
1954	904	709	85	73	-	-	-
1955	1,032	691	86	76	-	-	-
1956	815	586	60	76	-	-	-
1957	545	524	34	76	-	-	-
1958	795	669	60	81	24	55	-
1959	510	394	34	74	21	45	152

(b) Plain of Benghazi.

1954	428	125	32	14	-	-	-
1955	468	129	34	15	-	-	-
1956	400	115	27	15	-	-	-
1957	235	105	10	15	-	-	-
1958	303	100	16	16	8	12	-
1959	190	83	15	16	6	8	46

Animal numbers fluctuate enormously from year to year, largely due to drought and famine. Sheep and goats are most important in respect of numbers. Although livestock is the major source of income, two factors reduce its value in Cyrenaica - the unfortunate communal system of land tenure and the ownership of most of the livestock by a few landlords who enjoy a great part of the provincial income. Animal husbandry on the Plain of Benghazi falls into two well-defined categories. Firstly, there is the animal husbandry carried out by the Bedouin on the open ranges. Secondly, there is a more limited animal husbandry practised in the oases by farmers possessing a few sheep and goats, a cow, perhaps, and a few poultry. The scale and value of the latter type are far less than the first type.

In an underdeveloped country like Libya, and Cyrenaica in particular where statistics are regarded as a luxury service, one faces a different task in determining the real values and issues of things under consideration. The exact influence of Benghazi plain on the city of Benghazi itself is, therefore, a matter of extreme doubt. In view of the low agricultural productivity of the plain no agricultural revolution can be expected, and as far as the food supply in the city is concerned, the city benefits very little because the majority of the city dwellers depend on wheat and not, as in the case of the Bedouins, on barley. Wheat production on the plain

is very limited compared with the city's requirements, and indeed, the wheat production of the whole province is less than these needs. The steady increase of imports of flour in recent years illustrates that wheat production is certainly below consumption and there seems to be a general change in the form of diet. Barley consumption in the city is confined to the poor inhabitants of the surrounding slum areas or for feeding animals. Industries using barley as a raw material, like breweries, do not exist.

The marketing of vegetables and fruits produced in the different oases of the plain scarcely allows sale on the city markets. Separate statistics of livestock raised on the plain and sold at the city market are not available. The supply of different kinds of meat from the plain to the city is believed to be the highest among the regions of Cyrenaica.

Besides these influences of the plain on the city, three other important roles are played by the plain. The first is that Benghazi city depends entirely on the plain for her water requirements. The water quality is, unfortunately, not very good for drinking purposes, but it is now sure that the city's future is not in danger because of lack of water supplies as was thought before. Secondly, it was on part of this plain that the city airport was founded. The area between Benina village and the escarpment was first chosen by the Italians, to construct what is now known as Benina Airport, and although

the traffic now using the airport is limited by the unsuitability of its runways for modern aircraft, the future plan for the airport aims to convert it to an international base fully equipped to undertake such a function. Thirdly, since the early days of the city, a few centuries before Christ, the plain has provided enough building materials. The revolutionary growth of the city under the Italians and again in recent years after oil discoveries, were both met by local quarries. The present huge reconstruction programme of the city harbour is also met by local materials. The biggest quarry is to be found east of the town and north of the Benghazi-Benina road. The rocks of the plain do not only supply stones for building purposes, but they also provide whitewash, a useful material for building requirements, produced by burning a certain type of it, mainly calcrete. A mixture of cement and whitewash helps enormously to give cement a solid texture preventing it from cracking soon after it has been laid down. Whitewash is also important for painting walls, a universal practice in Libya. The plain also influences the city and the province by being the only source for salt production. The salt-pans scattered along almost the whole shoreline can give an adequate salt supply not only for home consumption but also for export. At the moment no efforts are being devoted to developing this source of income. Salt is collected by individuals, in most cases, and the quality is

therefore poor. It is not surprising to know that Benghazi, which once exported over 3,000 tons of salt a year, is now almost dependent on foreign salt.

The plain also influences the communications of Benghazi; roads link the city with the Jebel and consequently with Egypt via Tobra and via Benina el-abiar. South of Benghazi roads link the city with Agedabia via Ghemines and consequently with Tripolitania and Fezzan. Railways link Benghazi with the Jebel via el-Marj and the south via Soluk. Finally, the plain acts as a permanent reservoir of manual workers. In recent years the flow of Bedouin and other agricultural workers from the plain and other parts of Libya has become a heavy burden on the city suburbs, which have become dotted with shanty towns.

SITE

The site of present Benghazi was chosen by Greek settlers in the third century B.C. and a full account of Benghazi's evolution is given in the following chapter. The surface geology of the coastal belt on which Benghazi was sited is an area mainly composed of limestone of the Helvetian group of middle miocene, overlaid in places by a thin layer of quaternary clay. A narrow strip of recent sediments is present along the coast. South of Benghazi a strip of quaternary sediments separates the outcrop of upper miocene rocks. Looking at the geological map of Northern Cyrenaica

(fig. 3) we notice immediately a littoral bar of sand dunes, either simple or consolidated, replaced north of Dariana by a thin alluvial clay. The rest of the plain is simply formed by middle miocene Helvetian deposits. The plain is therefore geologically a homogeneous region. This fact provoked the initial suggestion that the geology of the plain was simple. Further studies, especially by Desio, Marchetti and those of recent years have reversed the previous picture of simplicity. (5) In 1938 Marchetti discovered three faults near the city of Benghazi, at Feuhat, Ain Zaiana and the river Lethe. Details of these geological complications do not concern us here, but we must consider briefly the surface deposits in the Benghazi area.


(a) Miocene deposits.

These deposits are the main materials forming the plain around Benghazi, with a maximum elevation of 10 metres above sea level. These marine sediments mainly consist of cemented littoral fossiliferous sands.

(b) Lagoonal deposits.

These deposits are a common feature along the western coast of Cyrenaica; the lagoons of el-Kuz and Giarrar north of Benghazi are the biggest lagoons in the area, whilst Benghazi itself lies between the sea and the Salmani sebka. South of the city there is the Punta lagoon, beyond which is situated the sebka with the salt-pans where salt was produced. About 12 kms. northeast of the city lies the lagoon of el-kOefia or Zaiana.

Figure 3



Geological map of Northern Cyrenaica

The latter communicates with the sea, but is also fed by a spring of fresh water, Ain Zaiana, which considerably reduces the salinity of the water in the lagoon.

(c) Sebkha.

The Arabic word sebkha denotes the salty surface deposits of the desert, whether formed in lagoons or in closed interior depressions. The sebkha of the Benghazi plain are all lagoons except a few of which the Salmani sebkha is the most important. The difference between lagoons and sebkha lies in the way of their salt formation. Lagoons are formed either by the lowering of land or the rising of the sea, or by sand bar dunes. The salt of sebkha can be formed in many ways, of which sea infiltration is one; another is the solution of salt in soil found in rock fissures when in contact with the underground water.

(d) Terra Rossa.

The distribution of this type of soil, is restricted to a very few oases on the plain. The formation of Terra Rossa is often found, as here, to be associated with the erosion of limestone under a Mediterranean climate. In the Benghazi area Terra Rossa is restricted to the Fuethat suburb and its southern surroundings.

(e) Sand dunes.


The shoreline immediately south and north of Benghazi city is formed by a low belt of sand. These dunes are of marine

origin and are distinguished by their grey-white colour.

The dunes of Munastir or el-Thama, north of the city, are of great importance because they were until a few years ago one of the main sources for fresh water in spite of the fact that they support no vegetation, and at present these dunes are the most important source of sea sand, widely used as a building material. The sandy shore south of Benghazi provides a first-class beach for the city. Cemented sand dunes on the Benghazi coast are not widespread; the shore on which the prison was built is, perhaps, the only important place where these consolidated dunes appear. (see plate 1).

The site of Benghazi is formed by a thick layer of limestone of miocene age overlain in places by lagoons, sebka, sand dunes and in some places by a transported layer of red soil. The city shore is mostly sandy except in a few places such as the front of the old promenade, where the rocks are still traceable.

The physical character of Benghazi's site was, therefore, since the early days, the decisive factor which determined the shape, size and direction of Benghazi's growth. The surrounding sebka from north-east, east and south prevented any expansion in these directions, and the sandy nature of the coast also prevented the city from possessing a natural harbour, whilst the water supply of the city has been affected



Consolidated dunes near the prison

by the salinity of the sebkha. The result was that Benghazi has been kept confined to a small area surrounded by sebkha to the east and south, by the sea to the west and by sand dunes to the north. The city's growth under the Italans were a challenge to the former landscape, both Salmani and the inner harbour being reduced in size, but the construction of the present causeway between Benghazi and Berka by the Turks in the late 19th century was the first large-scale change in the prevailing urban landscape. Since World War II the sebkha has remained unchanged in size and the sand dunes have remained unfixed. The present reconstruction of the harbour caused the company in charge to build a road across the Salmani sebkha. This new development, together with the expansion of Sabri suburb, will help to reduce the size of this sebkha.

The striking feature about the site of Benghazi, with all the salt marshes around, is that although the ground seems always wet and affects the local type of building it has proved solid enough to support modern multiple-storey buildings and modern roads with heavy traffic. Likewise the coastal sea beds have been found sufficiently solid to embark on the construction of the outer basin of the city harbour.

CLIMATE.

Classification of climate is extremely difficult, not only due to the lack of abrupt regional changes, but also

to the numerous climatic elements to be considered. Thus, the climate of the western coastal zone of Cyrenaica has been classified differently by prominent authors; Koppen and Fantoli differed from all other writers (De Martonne, Trewartha and Thornthwaite) by including the coastal belt within the Mediterranean climate. The maritime region, in this particular part, is between 4 to 8 kms. wide and this is because it is a transitional area between the lessening influence of the sea and the governing influence of the Sahara. Rainfall and temperatures in the Benghazi area therefore depend mainly on distance from the sea. The rainfall increases near the coast and decreases inland. Temperatures follow an opposite direction. Apart from rainfall and temperatures at Benghazi, winds and other climatic features will be considered.

Rainfall.

The amount of rainfall in the city of Benghazi has undoubtedly less effect on the population than elsewhere in the plain where rainfall brings hope, happiness, wealth and food to all the people. The majority of the city dwellers have no direct concern with shifting cultivation on the plain or elsewhere. A limited number of the city's prosperous landlords - most of them still belong to one particular tribe - are the only people who are actually still indirectly engaged

in shifting cultivation. They either supply seed and animals or give their lands to certain Bedouin providing they receive a certain proportion of the production. Rain in the city, on the other hand, has always been a source of inconvenience. The description of Benghazi after rain by the Beechey brothers 135 years ago is still more or less true. The main streets together with the non-bitumenised streets of the old Arab town are impassable. The shanty town of Sabri turns into a heap of mud and dirt. The Arab mud-built houses often collapse. The winter rainfall also accumulates in the Salmani and Punta sebkha, which attract summer flies in large numbers.

The annual average rainfall in Benghazi is about 265 mm. This average is based on the monthly rainfall in the city since 1879, when the first regular readings of rainfall were recorded. The average monthly rainfall in Benghazi is as follows:-

J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	Year
67	40	19	5	2	-	-	-	3	17	46	66	265 mm.

These figures show that rainfall has a simple unimodal distribution with a winter maximum; half the total annual rainfall falls in the two most rainy months of December and January. November and February rainfall are also practically the same with the former month leading by a few millimetres. The months of March and October also have

a similar total rainfall. The rainfall of April, May and September is negligible if compared with the total rainfall, and as the summer months of June, July and August are absolutely dry, these six months usually receive only 10 mms. in all.

Around Benghazi there is no important static farming, as compared with Tripoli, for instance. The city surroundings even lack vegetable cultivation which is usually associated with cities and towns for quick consumption. The few gardens of Feuhat, with the Experimental Farm of the Nazirate of Agriculture as the most developed, all depend on underground water for irrigation. The De Martonne aridity index for Benghazi and Tripoli is estimated as follows. (6)

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	Year
Benghazi	3.3	1.8	0.8	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.5	1.6	1.7	9.2
Tripoli	3.7	1.9	1.0	0.4	0.2	-	-	-	0.3	1.1	2.5	4.5	13.3

The former figures for Benghazi, at least, explain how little benefit can be obtained from the total rainfall. On the plain of Benghazi, where rainfall is lower than that of the city, one must realize how difficult it is for the inhabitants to depend on shifting cultivation and raising livestock, where sufficient subterranean water is also lacking even for domestic purposes.

Rainfall in itself has little effect on the city of

Benghazi and its inhabitants, except perhaps into two direct ways: first, rainfall, is the main source of underground water on which the city depends for full requirements, and secondly, during drought years thousands of Bedouin from nearby areas come into Benghazi seeking work. In prosperous years, however, the city thrives economically.

Temperatures.

Range is not a trait restricted only to rainfall, but is also a characteristic of temperatures. August has the highest recorded maximum temperature of 30.1° C. January, on the other hand, is the coolest month, with a minimum temperature of 8.8° C.

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J
Mean monthly temperatures	13.0	13.7	15.4	18.5	21.6	23.9	25.0
	A	S	O	N	D	Year	
	25.6	24.4	22.6	19.3	15.0	19.8	
Mean monthly maximum temperatures	13.7	18.2	20.6	23.9	27.3	29.1	29.5
	30.1	29.6	27.9	24.3	14.3	24.8	
Mean monthly minimum temperatures	8.8	9.2	10.2	13.0	15.9	18.7	
	20.6	21.0	19.3	17.2	14.3	10.7	14.9

The figures for the mean monthly temperatures indicate

that the temperatures after January, the coolest month, begin to increase gradually for both February and March, after which the rise is sharp until they reach their maximum in August. The subsequent decline of temperature is gradual and slow in October, after which the decline becomes more obvious. The difference in temperatures between the mean annual maximum and minimum is 9.9° C. compared with 7.7° C. in the case of Alexandria.

The mean monthly temperatures of Benghazi are compared with those of Alexandria, Cairo and Tripoli in the following table. (7)

City	Months						Yearly Average
	J	F	M	A	M	J	
Benghazi	13.0	13.7	15.4	18.5	21.6	23.9	19.8
	J	A	S	O	N	D	
Alexandria	25.0	25.6	24.4	22.6	19.3	15.0	20.2
	13.7	14.1	15.8	18.1	21.0	23.6	
Cairo	25.4	26.2	25.3	23.3	19.9	15.7	19.1
	12.3	13.5	16.3	20.2	24.2	26.8	
Tripoli	27.7	27.6	25.3	22.7	18.7	14.0	19.1
	11.8	13.3	15.2	18.1	20.6	23.7	
	25.6	26.2	25.5	22.4	18.2	13.6	

The former statistics show clearly the maritime influence on temperatures of the three ports in contrast to Cairo. Although the three ports lie farther north in latitude, the winter

months are comparatively warmer than Cairo except in the case of Tripoli. The explanation of high winter temperatures in these three harbours lies in the fact that the temperatures of surface Mediterranean water increases as it advances eastward. The phenomenon is also demonstrated by the moderate temperatures of the summer months and by the fact that August is the warmest month along the coast, whereas inland the warmest month is July.

Generally speaking, Benghazi enjoys a favourable climate; it has a moderate amount of rainfall if compared with Tripoli, which gets an annual average of 370 mm. or with Alexandria with only an annual average of 184 mm. Benghazi also has a lower distribution pattern of temperatures if compared with Alexandria and a slightly higher one than that of Tripoli. In other words, Benghazi is warmer than Tripoli in winter and cooler than Alexandria in summer. Another factor of Benghazi's climate is that it has lower humidity than the two other ports; the annual average of relative humidity in Benghazi is about 58% compared with about 72% in Alexandria and 65% in Tripoli. The following table showing the mean temperatures and relative humidity in the months of July and August in the three ports gives illustration to these points. (8)

City	Temperatures (%)		Relative humidity (%)	
	July	August	July	August
Benghazi	25.0	25.6	67	66
Alexandria	25.4	26.2	77	75
Tripoli	25.6	26.2	69	69

In addition, Benghazi suffers less frequent hot southern winds, locally known as ghibli, which cause tremendous increase in temperature and decline in relative humidity; however, the combination of high temperatures and high humidity in summer has a serious effect upon the activities of the city dwellers. The closure of shops and markets at midday, the emptiness of the city streets and cafes, the early office hours, and the fainting of many students during examinations are all common features of summer in Benghazi. Other effects are profuse perspiration and reduction in appetite for food, and furthermore, people seem to turn bad tempered.

Winds.

During summer the area of Benghazi lies within the zone of north-easterly winds, which are rainless. In winter their hold is disputed by the rain-bearing north-westerly winds, which characterize the winter climate of the Mediterranean.

The following statistics show the approximate percentages of monthly distribution of wind in Benghazi for a period of 50 years.

Month	Direction of Wind								
	N.	N.E.	E.	S.E.	S.	S.W.	W.	N.W.	Calm.
J	8.5	7.5	3	21.5	10	13.5	9.5	20.5	6
F	7	4	4	19.5	11	10.3	13	26.5	4
M	11	9	5	16	10	12	10	22	-
A	16	16	2.5	13	6	8.5	8.5	23.5	6.5
M	18.5	14.5	1	9	5.5	6.5	7.5	29	3.5
J	27.5	25.5	1	6.5	2.5	3	13.5	21.5	4
J	51.5	13	2.5	1	-	2	2	24	6
A	45	18.5	-	0.5	1	1	5	24.5	4.5
S	37.5	16	3.5	2.5	2.5	5	6.5	17	4.5
O	15.5	9	3	13.5	12.5	8	11	20	7
N	10	11	5.5	19.5	9.5	8	8	15.5	6.5
D	5	7	3	22	14.5	12	14	18	4.5
Average	21.0	12.5	2.9	12.4	7.0	7.5	9.4	21.8	4.8

These statistics show that north-west and north winds are the most common types of winds blowing on Benghazi; the first are especially important in the winter months when they are responsible for precipitation. These winds have

a serious effect on the harbour conditions in winter time and waves caused by them are estimated to reach a height of 30 feet, having an average period of 12 seconds. The destruction of the Italian-built outer mole was a combination of air bombardment and these high waves, which, of course, delay ships getting in and out of the present harbour. The north winds blow mostly in the summer when they reduce the excessive heat prevailing in this season. North-east winds also occur mostly in the summer and have a similar effect on temperatures to the north winds. South and south-east winds prevail mostly in wintertime. South winds - ghibli - corresponding to the Khamsin of Egypt - reach their peak effect in the summer when their occurrence, in most cases, causes a tremendous increase of temperature and reduction in humidity. These southern winds, with an average frequency of about three weeks a year, also carry dust and fine sand, resulting in a lot of eye trouble, and make the weather very depressing by a rapid increase in temperature, so reducing man's power and ability to work.

Other climatic features such as dew, fog, thunderstorms and hail occur very rarely indeed, and therefore have very little effect on life and activities in the city.

In conclusion, the effects of Benghazi's climate upon man are less noticeable if compared with most centres along the Tripolitanian coast where people are mainly engaged in

agriculture. The major climatic elements influencing man's activities in Benghazi are rainfall and winds.

Rainfall, although temporarily reducing the dust in the city, causes mire in the old quarters of the town and the shanty towns nearby. The summer harvest of flies is indirectly caused by winter rainfall. Winds, moreover, handicap port activities in winter and cut man's ability to work in the summer.

Apart from these disadvantages Benghazi's climate, in general, is more favourable to Europeans than that of Tripoli, where summer humidity is higher. Improvements to drainage systems and street conditions and the filling up of Salmani sebka will certainly make Benghazi a more acceptable town for Libyans and for Europeans. In 1915 U. Tegani wrote "In generale come d'estate sù vive sotto i trente. L'inverno si passa i dieci. Ne troppo caldo, dunque, ne troppo freddo."(9)

References.

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2. Ibid., p. 79.
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6. Bulletin of The Faculty of Arts and Education, Vol. 1, Benghazi, 1958, p. 307.
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CHAPTER II.

THE EVOLUTION OF BENGHAZI.

The study of the evolution of Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica and the second town in size and in population in the whole of Libya, necessitates a systematic study of the early nucleus around which the present city has grown and expanded through the centuries.

Knowledge of the two early phases of Benghazi's growth, Eusperides and Berenice, is mostly derived from archaeological evidence.

EUSPERIDES (HESPERIDES)

So far there is no concrete evidence of the actual date of the first foundations of the city of Eusperides. Not only this, but we also lack the correct and most ancient form of its name despite the fact that most historians seem to agree that the name is no doubt of Greek origin.

The first mention of Eusperides did not occur until the year 515 B.C. In that year a Persian satrap was sent from Egypt with a military expedition to put down a revolt in Cyrenaica against its King Archesilaus. "The Persian expeditionary force completed the subjection of the country without opposition, penetrating as far West as Eusperides. This is the first mention of the city which was the westward Greek city in Libya". (1)

The ancient site of Eusperides, at present part of a

Moslem cemetery called Sidi Abeid, lies on the southern side of the main road to Barce at the junction with the by-pass road to Benina and Fuehat.

The following factors have hindered a detailed excavation survey of the old city:-

(a) Of foremost importance is the existence of the Moslem cemetery which covers part of the old site. Moslems, as is well known, are very careful about the continuous existence of their cemeteries.

(b) Eusperides was an easy prey for the Libyan nomadic tribes who seemed to be a continuous threat to the city. An example of this was in the year 414 B.C., when the city was besieged by these nomadic tribes. "It was only saved by the chance arrival of a Greek fleet, blown into port by the unfavourable winds on its way to Syracuse".⁽²⁾ Many archaeologists believe that a considerable part of the actual site of Eusperides has been quarried away, "despite the fact that many superimposed walls of stone and mud-brick and floors of mud containing Greek pottery of the 6th-4th centuries are still to be found".⁽³⁾ It is now absolutely certain that the Turks have used the old site as one of their main quarries for the construction of their administrative and military buildings.

(c) Unfortunately, there is also the attitude of the native people towards antiquities, which from a religious

point of view they believe are traces of Kuffar or Heathen people and therefore not worth preserving.

(d) This has also been the attitude of the Libyan Government, which was lax, to the preservation of antiquities.

Taking all these disadvantages into consideration, together with the fact that almost nothing of the old site is visible to the human eye, we may come to the conclusion that Eusperides is no more than a "ghost city" which has no special interest from a tourist point of view.

On the other hand, it recently became obvious that no traces of Ptolemaic or Roman buildings are to be found, and that the site of Eusperides is in actual fact an entirely Greek one. In other words, the original town-plan was that of a Greek city of the 6th-4th centuries B.C.

The foundation of Eusperides at this special place makes us consider carefully the landscape and topography which existed at the time of its foundation. It is now clear that there was no opening to the sea except south-west of the present entry through what is now called the inner harbour. On the other hand, according to information gained from aerial photographs taken by the R.A.F. in the early fifties, the city wall of Eusperides almost ran along the northern edge of the present salt marsh known locally as Sebkhah el-Salmani. This basic fact leads us to consider the possibility of a deeper salt marsh than the present one, which is now no more than two metres

in depth at its deepest point. "To understand why the earliest city was sited here, rather than where modern Benghazi stands, one must take into consideration the changes that have been brought about by the gradual drying up into salt flats of the former lagoons around Benghazi".⁽⁴⁾ In actual fact, Eusperides was founded on the shoreline of a deep lagoon which served as a channel to connect the city with the sea through the inner harbour, which is now also out of use because of silting. The contact between this harbour and the Salmani salt marsh upon which Eusperides stood was continuous until it was blocked up by the Turks in the late 19th century as the result of the construction of a causeway which now links Benghazi with the Berka suburb.

The reason behind the establishment of Eusperides far away from the other four Greek cities in Cyrenaica (Apollonia, Tocra, Tolmeita and Cyrene) still has to be found. Some archaeologists believe that the reason was to create some sort of a refuge for the Cyrene King who feared the loss of his throne by the people of his city. "His aim was to create a safe refuge against the day when the people of Cyrene itself revolted against his rule."⁽⁵⁾ On the other hand it might be that Eusperides' foundation was due to the fertility of its surrounding area. Herodotus praises the territory of Eusperides as being exceptionally fertile.⁽⁶⁾ In my

opinion this suggestion has to be excluded from our consideration because of the fact that no other records praising the fertility of Benghazi's surroundings are to be found. This leaves us with the opinion that the foundation of Eusperides in this special location was simply to act as a fortified frontier for the Cyrene domain and at the same time to act as a shelter or a refuge for its King during revolts against his regime. Besides this function, Eusperides acted as a minor sea port, with few exports apart from limited quantities of cereals and perhaps the exportation of the so-called sylphium plant. These facts about Eusperides might be illustrated by its insignificant population. Mr. R.C. Goodchild, the present Director of Antiquities in Cyrenaica, believes that the peak population was of the order of two thousand only.

The life of Eusperides continued to function normally until about the second half of the third century B.C., when Egyptian interference - through former contacts and military co-operation between the two ruling families of Cyrenaica and Egypt - became obvious. An Egyptian military expedition came to Cyrenaica to subject the people of Cyrene, who were opposed to a close union with Egypt through a proposed marriage between the heiress of the Cyrene throne and the King of Egypt. In the year 249 B.C. the Egyptian King Ptolemy III succeeded in overrunning the whole of Cyrenaica and subsequently married the Cyrene heiress. It was on this important occasion that

Eusperides was refounded in a nearby location and renamed after the bride, Berenice.

BERENICE.


In fig. 4. it will be seen that the new site chosen to establish Berenic was not very suitable because of the lack of natural shelter; its predecessor was better situated in a comparatively sheltered area long the coasts of both the Salmani and Zreifiain lagoons.

The site of Berenice stands about two kms. to the southwest of Sidi Abeid on a rather well marked promontory which was known as Pseudopenias at that time.

There are no recorded documents of the ways and means by which the transfer of the daily routine life and population of Eusperides took place to the newly founded centre. What was the reason behind the transfer of the old site? Here again we are confronted by a mystery which cannot be solved unless we reverse the suggestion upon which we accepted the possibility of the foundation of Eusperides. The theory then relies on the gradual silting up of the Salmani lagoon. In other words, Eusperides ceased to possess sea communications without which she could not function any more. No other logical reason seems available.

At present there is no lack of evidence about the long life that Berenice enjoyed. But on the other hand there is

Figure 4



Benghazi: ancient and modern

very little known about this life, because of later superimposition of buildings. The old site was used as the nucleus for further urban growth.

Judging by the limited archaeological data the plan of Berenice extended as follows. From the present port the city extended north-eastwards to the Fonduk (Suk) and from the old lighthouse south-eastwards to the old Italian Stadium. This means that the actual area of Berenice was very limited indeed.

The area mentioned above is today entirely in a built-up area. Other parts which were proved to contain remains of Berenice and at the same time lie away from the above-mentioned town plan are found at Sidi Husein in the south-east, in the extreme north at the Sabri area and in a few other scattered places, all of which are of minor importance if compared with the area of Sidi Husein, which is believed to be one of the main cemeteries of Berenice. It is also understood that the dead from Berenice were ferried to this region because of the sea inlet to the Salmani lagoon.

Generally speaking, we are in no better situation to gain any significant information about the complete town-plan, form, function, population and sphere of influence of Berenice than we were with its predecessor Eusperides because of the superimposition of later Roman, Arab, Turkish and then Italian cities. "There is nothing left in sight for the visitor to see, but the records of discoveries indicate that the Greco-Roman city

had much the same character as the other and better preserved centres of ancient Cyrenaica". (7)

The main archaeological objects of Berenice to be found are: an Aphrodite statue now in the Louvre, 100 bronze coins, a marble head of a Roman Emperor, a few mosaic floors one of which is now in the Cyrene Museum, 1500 silver coins of the Roman era at present in Cyrene, many tombs and walls, especially at Sidi Husein, and two famous inscriptions also taken to France. These two inscriptions are one of the very few sources of our knowledge about Berenice. "They both refer to an amphitheatre in the city and one of them records the dedication of special honour by the Jewish community of Berenice to the proconsul Marcus Titus Sextus for his just and beneficial administration. At the date 24-25 A.D. the Jewish community was presided over by nine archons or elders and seem to have been separated from the main body of Berenice citizens. Unfortunately we do not know where the inscriptions were found, so the emplacement of Berenice's amphitheatre remains to be solved." (8)

Other information known about Berenice includes the fact that it was the chair of a Christian bishop and had a population estimated at about 4-5 thousand.

There is no evidence to show what the Romans actually did as far as the expansion of the original Greek town-plan is concerned. On the other hand, it is well known that the Byzantine Emperor Justinian had to rebuild the city walls

which were severely damaged by the Vandal invaders.

North Africa was eventually integrated with the new Moslem Empire when Omar Ibn el-Ass's army overran Cyrenaica in the year 643 A.D. After this event the history of Cyrenaica as a whole, and especially of the city of Berenice, became obscure. The reasons for this may be attributed to the fact that the Arab invaders were not, in reality, interested in this part of North Africa, perhaps because of its limited natural resources as compared with the Maghreb region. But the city life of Berenice may well have continued to function, even on a smaller scale, for a hundred years later. "The city may have lingered on for another century or so, with a "Coptic" population under Arab suzerainty. All that we can be reasonably sure about is that settled life within its walls had come to an end before A.D. 1000".⁽⁹⁾

Eusperides, and later on Berenice, which formed the extreme westward cities of the Greek civilization in Cyrenica, were, in my opinion, established in the first place to create a defence line against the Libyan nomadic tribes who were the traditional enemy of the Greeks. This opinion is based on the fact that both cities seemed to be enormously dependent on Cyrne. Furthermore, the surrounding areas of the Plain of Benghazi could not provide plentiful agricultural products as a main source of wealth to these cities. Finally, neither of these cities became a capital of the Pentapolis, or the

Five Cities. But despite this, it is certain that both cities played an important role in providing peace and tranquillity for the rest of the Greek and later Roman domains in this part of North Africa.

The contact between both cities and the other prosperous part of Cyrenaica seems to have been largely dependent on sea communications. There are no traces of Greek or Roman roads as is the case in many parts of the Jebel, Cyrene-Susa for example. The sea contact between Old Benghazi and other Mediterranean harbours was probably limited to a few ports like Syracuse and those of Greece itself.

BENGHAZI BETWEEN THE ARAB CONQUEST AND KARAMANLI RULE
(643-1711 A.D.)

For most of this long period the history of Cyrenaica remains very obscure. "The fact that the newcomers were nomadic and warlike people meant that sedentary life lost ground and nomadic life developed once more. Commerce also declined in favour of political, religious and military aspirations". (10)

The gradual decline of Berenice after the Arab conquest lasted in all probability no more than one century, after which no further mention of the name was to be recorded until the first half of the 12th century when the Arab geographer el-Edrisi mentions the name of Bernik as a locality name stretching from Barca (el-Marj) to Agedabia.

To emphasize the lack of importance of the name Berenice,

we find that the famous Arab geographer el-Bakri, writing only one century before el-Edrisi, does not mention this particular name, despite the fact he mentioned other places which are now of minor importance to Benghazi. "According to tradition, it was not until about 1450 A.D. that the site of the old city began to be rebuilt, by Tripolitanian merchants trading with Derna and other coastal centres. The first new inhabitants are said to have been men from Tajiura, Zliten and the Msellata region; but these immigrants were later ousted by settlers from Misurata, under whom the new town was divided into two quarters named FAKRUN and DGHEM, between which there was continued rivalry and strife. The old place-name "Bernik" (still used by the Berbers of the southern oases) gradually gave way to that of Marsa Ibn Ghazi which appeared for the first time in 1579 on a world map compiled by Ali Ibn Ahmed Esh-Sherafi of Sfax. Of Ibn Ghazi nothing is known except that his tomb lies in the old cemetery of Sidi Khrebish. We may suppose that the harbour (Marsa) was named after the adjacent tomb of a holy man".⁽¹¹⁾

It is well known that the Turks were militarily able to take over Egypt in the year 1517. This fact made the Turks willing to spread their domain to other parts of North Africa. Tripoli was consequently taken about 35 years after Egypt. The new Turkish strategy brought Cyrenaica within the orbit of Ottoman control. Even so, Cyrenaica was largely left

to its nomadic tribes, fighting each other and fighting together against the few settled areas along the coast.

In 1638, the Pasha of Tripoli began to move towards Cyrenaica. The first military mission consisted of a few ships and on board there were also a few hundred Christian galley slaves. The mission, which did not, in all probability, plan on Benghazi as its final destination, was carried by the winds and the sea current to the present location of Benghazi. Here the construction of a new castle was carried out - for the governor's office and home and at the same time to accommodate his big garrison which he needed for defence and the exaction of taxes, which was the main interest of the governor. As far as the nomadic people of Cyrenaica were concerned. Benghazi at this period seemed to be no more than a place of fear from which the tax collectors were expected to appear at any time. To its small merchant community it was a rest house between the Jebel and Derna in the east and Tripoli in the West.

BENGHAZI UNDER THE KARAMANLIS

The Ottoman regime in Libya, with Tripoli as its headquarters, was disturbed by the Karamanli takeover in the year 1711. The Karamanli rulers continued to be as little interested in Cyrenaica as were their predecessors. The changes brought to life in Cyrenaica as a whole and in

Benghazi in particular were of no major importance apart from the Karamanlis' tremendous appetite in collecting as much tax, from both the Badawi (Bedouin) and the town-dwellers, as they could.

The Karamanli regime in Cyrenaica, with Benghazi the main administrative centre, was marked, from the social and political points of view, by many fascinating accounts recorded by European travellers.

The Scotsman, James Bruce, in the year 1767 when he visited Benghazi, talks bitterly about the serious lack of grain, milk and meat in the town, which was temporarily over-populated. The reason for this situation was the war which broke out between two of the local tribes, of which the defeated one fled into Benghazi. (12)

The Italian, Paolo de Sella (1817) indirectly mentions the political upset of the city and the country as a whole by writing in detail about the Juazi (a local tribe), slaughtered by the governor himself. Other information given by de Sella included the fact that Benghazi had a population of about 5000 inhabitants, of whom at least half were Jews. He also describes Benghazi as a fly-infested city and the region of Benghazi in the following words "Alcune palme e qualche tratto seminato col orzo". (13) The final description of De Sella means that the region of Benghazi was of no economic value apart from a few scattered palm trees and a few dispersed patches of badly cultivated areas. This description,

as we will see later on, does not correspond with the last and best account of Benghazi under the Karamanlis given by the famous Beechey brothers after their visit to Benghazi in the early winter of 1828. Their description of Benghazi at that time is as follows: "The state of the town during this period may truly be said to have been miserable; the houses being chiefly put together with mud and were continually giving way and falling down and we were frequently apprized of occurrences of this nature in our immediate neighbourhood, by the shrieks and cries of women whose families had been sufferers on some of these occasions. The streets during part of the time were literally converted into rivers, the market was without supplies owing to the impossibility of driving cattle into the town". (14)

The buildings of that time were mostly constructed with stones from the ancient city broken up and cemented with mud. The houses of Benghazi as described by the Beecheys were simple structures of the present Arab Hoosh (house) type. Their roofs were mainly made from seaweed laid down on mats with other vegetable rubbish and a thick layer of mud.

They considered that Benghazi's inhabitants numbered two thousand. They therefore regarded the figure of 5000 given by De Sella as exaggerated, but apart from the two thousand Libyans the city also had a substantial number of Jews and Negro slaves. "The population of Benghazi is continually changing, owing to circumstances of many persons removing to the country whenever the weather permits, where they establish

in tents or in huts made of palm-trees".⁽¹⁵⁾ The region of Benghazi which was described by De Sella as a barren land with no agricultural value, was described by the Beecheys as follows: "There are a great many palm-trees in the neighbourhood of Benghazi, on both sides of the harbour and a great proportion of cultivated land".⁽¹⁶⁾

Most important of all the Beecheys' recordings of Benghazi is the remarkable plan of the town and its site. This plan, which is probably the first reasonably accurate one to exist, can be seen in fig. 5. It corresponds to a great degree with that of Berenice.


They finally stressed the fact that the hygiene conditions of Benghazi were very unsatisfactory and furthermore that Benghazi was notorious for its flies.

THE SECOND OTTOMAN OCCUPATION OF BENGHAZI

A few years after the Beecheys' visit to Benghazi, the Karamanli family lost its struggle against the Ottomans. This event brought the Turkish rulers to Benghazi and to the whole of Libya. The new regime, which began in 1835, continued to function normally until it was finally swept away by the Italian army in 1911.

During what is now called the Second Ottoman Occupation, Benghazi seemed to be in a rather better situation than it was before. The main source of information about life and conditions in Benghazi at this period also comes to us from a

Figure 5



Published as the Act. No. 26, April 1827, by J. Murray, Ordnance St. London.

Benghazi: after the Beecheys

prominent Scots traveller named James Hamilton, who visited the town in the year 1850.⁽¹⁷⁾ The recordings of Hamilton include an assessment of a total population of about ten thousand and an approximate figure of about 1500 houses. These houses were more or less similar to those described by the Beecheys, apart from the fact that some of these houses had upper storeys and a few had paved courtyards. The rebuilding of the governor's castle took place in 1842. Hamilton also mentions that the city had a German doctor who was responsible for every aspect of the health of the city, including street cleaning. The main disease mentioned by Hamilton is the plague, which later on swept the town in 1858 and in 1874. Finally he noted the fact that although there was no great wealth in Benghazi, there was no absolute poverty either, and he never saw a beggar in the town, which he considered as one of the most healthy towns in all of North Africa.

From James Hamilton's visit until the Turks were expelled from the country, many changes have been recorded in Benghazi. The first and perhaps most important of all is the expansion of the town, especially the construction of the Berka suburb, the first suburb of Benghazi. The change which brought this form of expansion became possible only after the construction of the previously mentioned causeway through the inlet between the inner harbour and the Salmani salt-marsh. The new suburb

contained a new palace for the governor, a garden, military hospital and a large army barracks. Other modifications took the form of administrative developments such as dividing the city into twelve quarters, the foundation of a new Baladya (town hall), the establishment of the first Senusi Zawya, and the linking of the harbour, which had a small mole and a lighthouse, with the quarries of Sidi Daud by the first railway to exist in the country.

These modification, together with the fact that the Ottoman governors were then more able to provide peace and tranquility than ever before, resulted in a considerable increase of the town population to about 20 thousand in the decade 1880-90. Moreover, new villages began to appear, especially around the tombs of Sidi Husein and Sidi Daud.

Most of these enlargements and modifications which occurred in Benghazi at this period were due, in a way, to changes in the general administration of Ottoman Libya.

Cyrenaica after the Turkish takeover was regarded as a Kaimmakamia, or a subordinate district to the Pasha of Tripoli. The result of this form of administration gave Cyrenaica, as a whole, a minor value and consequently less development opportunities during the first three centuries of Turkish rule.

In 1863 Cyrenaica became a Mutasarrifia, ruled by a Mutasarrif (commissioner) or by a Wali (governor) directly

responsible to Constantinople. The change of administrative pattern gave Cyrenaican rulers more power, which helped enormously the development of the city.

Before the drastic and costly Italian occupation of Benghazi, the town was said to have 25 mosques, 4 synagogues, a Catholic and a Greek Orthodox Church.⁽¹⁸⁾ The number of Jewish synagogues seems to be highly exaggerated. R.C. Goodchild mentions only one. The old city mosques are of simple architecture and very few of them have minarets. The most famous of these mosques, though less dignified and elaborate than those of Tripoli, is the Baladya Square mosque, known as Giama el Kebir (the great and ancient mosque). It was first constructed in the early years of the 16th century and rebuilt at the end of the 19th century. The bombardment of Benghazi by the Italians in 1911 damaged the mosque, which they rebuilt soon after their takeover. The other mosques are scattered all over the Arab town.

At this time there were a few European minorities, of whom the largest was the Italian one with a total number of just over one hundred. Other minorities included a smaller number of British subjects (mainly Maltese), 43 Greeks, about 100 French (mostly Tunisians), 50 Spanish and 9 Austrian families. The quarter in which most of these minorities lived occupied the western margin of the town along the sea front (now Shara el-Bahar). In this part there were

many modern houses to accommodate the foreign Consuls, namely the Italian, French, British, Spanish, Greek and Tunisian. The Catholic Church and a convent were also located in this area.

BENGHAZI UNDER ITALIAN OCCUPATION

The capitulation of Benghazi to the Italian Navy, composed of seven cruisers and twenty transports and commanded by Admiral Aurby, was the only possible solution to save the destruction of the city. The Turkish garrison, which was available in Benghazi on the 18th October 1911 when the Italian fleet appeared off the shore of the city, was negligible in number and fire-power: 200 infantrymen, 80 cavalrymen and 18 guns in all.

The Italian ultimatum to surrender the city was deeply felt as a military insult by the Turkish force, who in order to defend their military dignity decided to reject the idea and concentrated their limited weapons on the Sabri beach, which they thought as the only possible place for the enemy landing. The end of the ultimatum at 8 p.m. on October 19th brought a strong and persistent bombardment. The Great Mosque of the Baladya Square lost its minaret and was partly damaged, the British and Italian Consulates were also partly destroyed and numerous native houses were wrecked and a great number of people lost their lives. The Italian landing plan

took a different direction from that expected by the Turks - at Juliana beach, on the southern side of the city. The new development made it very difficult if not impracticable to defend the city, especially after the withdrawal of the rest of the Turkish garrison from the Berka barracks to the Sabri area in the north.

The fighting, although only for a short period, made it clear that the Turkish force supported by the local tribesmen were definitely losing the battle. A complete destruction of the city was then avoided by the mayor of the city, who wisely accepted the capitulation of his town. The Catholic Father Cristoforo of the Franciscan Mission was the mayor's envoy to Admiral Aurbly. The bombardment ceased soon afterwards and while the Italians took over the whole city the Turco-Arab forces managed to withdraw eastwards to Benina, where they remained until April of the next year.

However, although Benghazi became fully an Italian base with the rest of the other coastal centres along the Cyrenaican coast, the fact is that Italy was far from being able to control the whole province until 20 years later.

The continuous war between the Italians and the Arabs of Cyrenaica, under the leadership of the Senusi Order, has played an important role in the history of Cyrenaica and Libya as a whole. On the other hand, this war, which was religious in concept at least as far as the Arabs and the

other Moslems were concerned, impeded in some ways the growth of Benghazi. It was essentially confined to merely military functions. This fact, together with the heavy financial resources needed to cope with vigorous and extensive fighting in many scattered places over a large desert area, was a real obstacle to the effectiveness of the agricultural settlement schemes which were the indirect key to the city's growth. In contrast, the Italian town-planning and the rapid expansion of Tripoli was essentially due to the prevailing peaceful conditions in the hinterland of that city.

The early changes and modifications by the Italians to Turkish Benghazi were almost of a military character. Defence requirements immediately necessitated the construction of a strong city wall. A full account of this defensive installation is given by U. Tigani: "Questo che fu costruito in settanta giorni dal genio militare, ha lo spessore di ottanta centimetri, l'altezza di quattro metri e mezzo e lo sviluppo di 3600 metri, con tredici casermette defensive, due capponiere per matragliatrici (una alla Giuliana e l'altra ai Sabri) e cinque porte"⁽¹⁹⁾. This wall, which is stone built, is 15 feet high, about 3 feet thick and about 4 km. long, enough to run around the outskirts of the town, especially those facing the enemy in the east and north.

The wall was pierced by five gates which controlled the passage of the civilian population in and out of the city and furthermore it contained 13 openings for the use of machine-guns. In additions to this the Italians went on to build more military forts and blockhouses in different locations beyond this wall.

The oriental architecture of the governor's castle apparently did not attract the Italians, who decided to pull it down. The present provincial government headquarters is the replacement of the old castle.

However, as far as Old Benghazi was concerned few changes took place. The Baladya Square and Sharia (street) Omar el-Mukhtar (formerly Via Roma) were the only objects which were radically changed. In other words, the Italian town-planning, which is widely regarded as one of the best, did not touch the Arab town of Benghazi, which resulted in a distinct contrast between the Arab quarter and the Italian style of architecture dominating elsewhere outside the Arab quarter.


On Juliana beach the Italians started in 1912 to erect a high memorial to commemorate those who died for the new colony. The completion of the memorial took two years. Its height was 25 metres and it lay a short distance from the Italian war cemetery. The memorial does not exist any more; it was destroyed by

Libyans after independence. X

The area of Juliana, apart from being the main beach for Benghazi, was and still is famous for its large salt-pan which was one of the best salt producing areas under the Turks. The Italians, after surveying all the existing salt-pans in the surroundings of Benghazi, decided to choose both Juliana and Ghar Junes to the south-west of Juliana as the main producing areas. The estimated output of both was in the range of 30,000 tons a year. In 1911 the Italians found an estimated 3,000 tons of salt collected and gathered at the so-called Piazza del Sale, now the main city garden opposite the Berenice Picture-house, the former city theatre (see plate II). In later years the Italians managed to export salt on a large scale.

Before the war was finally over the Italians also made the following main developments: the foundation of the Palazzo Nobile (now the Green Mountain Building, constructed after the demolition of the former palace in

X The name Juliana, after which the present beach is called, is believed to be the name of a daughter of an English consul who died and was buried there after an epidemic. The actual date of the event is not known. In the early 1920s U. Tigani wrote "Una Leggenda gentile, racconta d'un console Inglese che visse un tempo a Benghazi con una giovane figliuola, Miss Giuliana, il suo nome resto legato, dolce tributo di ricordanza".




Piazza del Sale, photograph Benghazi Municipality

1952); the establishment of the city's general post office, now being pulled down for the erection of a bigger and more suitable one ; and the building of both civilian and military hospitals, the railway station and the closed markets for fish and vegetables.

The first Italian town-plan of Benghazi is the map which accompanied De Agostini's work on the population of Cyrenaica, published in 1922 (fig. 6). Because of the limited changes put forward by the Italians at the time, it really shows the Benghazi town-plan of the late Turkish rule. The real town-plan of the city under the Italian regime did not take its final shape until the late 1930s.

According to estimates carried out in 1914 Benghazi's area was approximately 700,000 square metres with road development areas of 18,000 square metres. The quarters of Sabri, Sidi Husein and Sidi Daud were excluded from these estimates. Other estimates were those of the door numbers and road developed areas by each quarter: (20)

Figure 6



Benghazi: after De Agostini

Quarters	No. of Doors	Road area (sq.metres)
Ghrebil	1461	4981
El-Drawi	779	2745
El-Shabbi	337	848
Belkheir	283	589
Loheshi	515	1959
Ben Isa	477	1742
El-Sherif	510	2058
Sidi Salem	303	507
Sidi Khrebish	725	3092
Sidi Husein	200	-
Sidi Daud	500	-
Sabri	-	-
Grand Total	6090	18522

Another fact about Benghazi in the same period is that there were 100 streets and 45 lanes. These streets were lighted by 42 big gasoline lamps and 450 small paraffin lamps. The majority of these streets were those now minor streets which link the present local shopping centres of Suk el-Dlam and Suk el-Gerid. Besides these streets, the city had five Squares: Piazza del Re (King's Square), at present a Municipality garden, Piazza Municipio (Municipality Square)


Piazza Ferrari (now 9th of August Square), Piazza del Erba (now Maidan Suk el-Hashish) and the Fonduk Square. At the time, most of the street and square names were of Italian origin. A few names of Libyan origin were those of some towns such as Tripoli, Misurata, Zuara, Homs, etc.

The slow progressive Italian takeover of the interior part of the province made Benghazi act as the main base for the war operations; in other words Benghazi continued to exercise an essential military function which, of course, did not give her a real chance of planned growth.

The capture of the patriotic leader Omar el-Mukhtar in 1931, and the method of his trial and sentence to death, brought an end to 20 years of Bloodshed. The agricultural colonization scheme put forward in 1923 for the development of the Jebel Akhdar was accelerated as soon as the Italians obtained a strong foothold in the Jebel. The success of this scheme meant the assurance of the Italian policy aiming for a "quarta sponda" or fourth shore for mother Italy. To achieve this purpose the Italian financial aid to Cyrenaica and Libya in general increased enormously as soon as the war was over. The Italian rulers were absolutely sure that Libya must be an integral part of Italy, and that therefore the revival of what was called the granary of Rome must take place. The immediate aims of their agricultural programme was a mass re-distribution of

population, widespread land confiscation, followed by extensive surveys, road and railway construction and research for underground waters. To fulfil these aims the Italian authorities, operating from their headquarters in Benghazi, began to work on a large scale. The improvement of the harbour of Benghazi, the main port in the whole planned development area through which almost every single item needed for the development must come, was properly tackled in 1929, when a sum of 200 million lire was provided to give the city a new outer basin of large extent.

The city wall, which was erected for defensive purposes, was then pulled down to allow further expansion: "The old perimeter-wall was demolished where it obstructed new town-planning projects, which were for the most part confined to the marginal areas of the town where the ground had not previously been built on (see plate III). Old Benghazi still remains very little changed from Turkish days^(19a)". The idea of building only on unbuilt-up areas gave priority to those empty lands laying along the seashore from the customs house as far as Juliana Bridge, the area between Sharia Omar Ibn el-Ass in the west and the cemetery of Sidi Husein in the east, the inner harbour in the south and the Sebka in the north, the area along the northern half of Sharia Omar Ibn el-Ass and the Sebka which included the stadium, the Fonduk and the houses of government personnel. On the other



Sabri: part of the Italian defensive wall

side of the same street, opposite the houses of the government personnel, the general hospital was constructed. On the same northern edge of the town and alongside the sea the Torelli Barracks were founded, and the main slaughterhouse was built to the north of these barracks. Along the seashore west of the Arab town and not far from the old prison the Italians built the Navy headquarters, at present the Faculty of Law of the Libyan University. The last major developed area, although for military purposes, was the barracks between Sharia Saint Lot (the name of the head delegate of Haiti in the U.N. whose vote gave Libya her independence, and Sharia el-Saghesli in the Berka suburb, which is now known as REME Barracks. Other military installations included D'Aosta Barracks and the barracks of Ras Abeida.

The analysis of the growth of the different parts of Benghazi under the Italians is considered in more details in the following chapter.

The most striking phenomenon of Benghazi's growth under the Italians was a growth in population from about 16,500 in 1911 to about 50,000 in 1937, of whom one third were civilian Italians. The distribution of the city's population by quarters, at the time, may be classified into two distinct quarters: the Italians occupying the new premises of modern Benghazi with a few wealthy Jews, and the rest of the town dominated by the natives, with the exception of a high Jewish

concentration at and near the Baladya Square, near which their synagogue is located in a back street. The construction of entirely new and impressive quarters along the promenade of the old harbour was to show to local people and the world that the city was no longer part of Africa but an integral part of Italy.

The Italians succeeded in making the new Benghazi a city resembling many Italian coastal towns. The facilities which brought this sudden change included a twin-domed cathedral, described by G.R. Goodchild as the town's most prominent landmark (see Plate IV); a public theatre, now used only as a picture-house; and two first-class hotels, of which one, named "The Berenice", is still the city's first hotel, but the other, "Albergo Italia", was damaged in World War II. The site of this hotel together with what was called the Palazzo Nobile is now occupied by the Green Mountain Building. Other prominent buildings were the elegant governor's residence, now occupied by the Faculties of Commerce and Arts of the Libyan University; a Moorish type parliament building, later used as the Fascist headquarters and now occupied by the Senate and House of Representatives, and a huge general hospital. The Italians also provided modern communications by the construction of an efficient harbour, a first-class highway linking the city with Egypt and Tunisia in 1937, and the railways to Soluk and El-Marj in 1926 and 1927 respectively. Apart from these facilities, which existed for the first time in the history




Benghazi's twin-domed Cathedral

of the town, the Italians also provided Benghazi with electricity and piped water systems, although these were mostly confined to the modern part of the city. In other words, Benghazi became a place in which modern city life began to function properly.

Modern Benghazi was undoubtedly a mirror which reflected Italian architecture, planning and administration. On the other hand, the Italians failed to change and hide the local town featured by narrow and tortuous streets, single-storey buildings constructed of cheap materials, absence of open spaces and gardens, high population density and widespread poverty (see Plate V). The Italians were in a better position to eliminate the Turkish landmarks left in the city. The radical transformation of the Baladya Square and Sharia Omar-el-Mukhtar leading to it from the port, which included the demolition of the governor's palace, played a leading role in diminishing the Turkish form and style of architecture. The prison of Benghazi, the customs office and the present headquarters of the Berka Libyan army barracks, known as Gasr Turkia, are the only remnants of Turkish buildings to be found in the city (see Plate VI).

Despite the extensive enlargements which occurred in Benghazi under the Italian domination, the city's civil growth was somewhat delayed by the lack of security and stability during the first twenty years after the Italians' arrival. The city had an important military status and



A typical street in the Arab town



The Customs Office

little planned expansion took place apart from the defensive installations. The general Italian policy during the 1930's and the dreams of a Roman Mediterranean Empire greatly influenced development in the whole of Libya, the result of which was that the country became dotted with military installations. Benghazi alone had five huge military barracks of which two are still in the hands of the British forces.

The gradual disappearance of African Benghazi and the turn to Europe gave the city a new but temporary visual appearance. At the same time, large-scale agricultural and military operations launched by the Italian government in Cyrenaica gave Benghazi four fundamental functions, the last three of which were new phenomena:

- (a) The status of being the official capital for Cyrenaics gave Benghazi the benefits usually enjoyed by main administrative centres elsewhere in the world.
- (b) A first-class military base with modern facilities to accommodate at least 30,000 troops. The opening of Benina airport strengthened this function.
- (c) A first-class harbour meant that Benghazi became the provincial doorway to the rest of the world, and communications with the rest of the province as well as with Tripolitania were maintained by regular steamers until 1937, when the bitumenised road across the whole country was finally opened.

(d) The completion of this highway made Benghazi the key of land communications as well as other means of transport.

Accordingly, the influence of the city on the rest of Cyrenaica increased year after year until its name came to mean the whole of the province. The reasons behind this phenomenon were, in my opinion, the new status of the city and to a certain extent the rigid method of Italian administration. The Kufra desert with its nomadic tribes who were never subject to any authority became affected by any issue from Benghazi. Trade and commerce were constantly influenced by Benghazi's markets. In other words, the influence of the city was not only felt in towns along the coastal areas but also very deep in the heart of the Libyan desert.

BENGHAZI UNDER THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

Benghazi in the late 1930's was sharply divided into two distinct large quarters: the Arab town with the Baladya Square at its centre and the other quarter composed of (a) the new areas built for civil purposes, which in fact forms the modern part of the city, or what is occasionally called the European quarter, and (b) the peripheral military installations scattered all over the outskirts of the city of the 1930's.

Italy's unfortunate entry into World War II on the side of Germany against the Allies on the 10th June 1940

proved to be Italy's undoing. As far as Benghazi was concerned the British air raids against the port and the other military targets began in September of the same year and continued night after night until the Australian mechanized units under the command of Brigadier Robertson entered the city on the 16th February 1941. The British takeover of Benghazi, which became possible only after almost six months of non-stop air bombardment, did not last for more than two months, after which the British forces had to withdraw because of the pressure brought by the German forces from the south via Agedabia. The British evacuation of Benghazi brought further destruction at least from the point of view of the military installations. The Axis forces' occupation of the city lasted from April until December 1941, a period during which further R.A.F. air raids continued intense and persistent. The Christmas of 1941 brought a temporary British return to Benghazi, after which Rommel's forces were in a position to regain a foothold in the city. The Germans managed, this time, to maintain the city under their control for nearly a year, after which they were forced to withdraw, for the last time, in face of General Montgomery's Eighth Army, who finally liberated Benghazi on the 20th November 1942.

Of all cities in North Africa, Benghazi suffered most during the Second World War. The severe devastation of the city is perhaps the first of its kind in the whole of North

Africa in modern times. The ruin of Berlin, although more extensive, is perhaps the only comparable degree of destruction in recent decades, apart from the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

To understand how far Benghazi was damaged during those 30 months of severe fighting in which the city changed hands five times, we may consider the following account given by Alan Moorhead, a war correspondent of the Times and an eye-witness of the war operations which took place in Benghazi.

"Benghazi was no longer a city any more. The plague of high explosive had burst on the place and left it empty, apathetic and cold. The shops were shuttered, the markets closed and ruin succeeded ruin as we drove along".⁽²¹⁾ This description of Benghazi was written one year before the final liberation of the city took place; twelve months of constant bombardment have still to come. Later, R.G. Goodchild wrote "Benghazi had suffered every violence and humiliation that modern warfare can provide. It had been shelled from the sea, pounded incessantly from the air and had changed hands five times, each change involving demolitions of installations which whilst of military importance were no less vital to the civil life of the town. During the peak of air bombardment large numbers of the citizens had moved out to the surrounding countryside, leaving an empty desolate city with its doors walled up and its municipal services at a standstill".⁽²²⁾

A year later, John Gunther wrote "Benghazi suffered no fewer than 1680 air raids". The description of the city by the same author reads: "Benghazi is a miserable city. I think the most miserable we saw in Africa ... It was half destroyed by bombing ... here we are in Africa, not Europe and a slatternly Africa at that". (23)

The devastation of Benghazi was a real problem facing the new British Military Administration, and the lack of capital and the limited resources available were basic disadvantages for coping with any significant reconstruction programme. The urgent need for many public utilities was satisfied from the start, but the uncertain future of the former Italian properties handicapped any major undertaking of repairs by those who occupied these properties until the question of legal ownership was settled. The British authorities were also unwilling to undertake any major reconstruction programmes because of the uncertain future of the country as a whole. The prosperous city merchants and other wealthy people hesitated to buy these private properties until after 1957 when a Libyan-Italian treaty was signed in this respect. The picture of Benghazi, therefore, changed little during the period (1942-49) of the British Administration. On the other hand, the seven years of British rule played a vital role towards the later phase of Benghazi's growth. The participation of the Libyan army, headed by then el-Amir el-Said Idris el-Senusi, with the

Allied forces in the last war gave the Senusi family of Cyrenaica a definite promise by the British Government that they, the Senusi, would not come again under Italian domination. Together with the way in which the question of the future status of the whole of Libya was conducted, this has resulted in acknowledgment of the special status of Benghazi by its recognition as co-capital, with Tripoli, of the United Kingdom of Libya. Benghazi became the focus for political affairs in regard to the settlement of the whole Libyan question. This fact has played a major role in the delay of reconstruction and expansion of the city, as the people of Benghazi were more interested in the political future of their country than anything else.

The defeat of the Axis forces in World War II, although fulfilling the national aspirations of the Libyan people, meant the disappearance of factors which had caused the pre-war prosperity of the city. The paralytic city lost its economic position because of the end of the mass agricultural schemes and the repatriation of the whole Italian population. The introduction of ration cards soon after the British occupation was indicative of the economic stagnation of the city and illustrates the miserable living conditions of the town, which is believed to have had only one-quarter of its former native population.

The announcement of the first Cyrenaican government resident in Benghazi in 1949 and the later recognition of the city as the eastern capital of Libya gave the city a

special status and consequently a limited reconstruction programme was introduced. The idea was to provide enough administrative offices and headquarters for both provincial and federal requirements. The transfer of hundreds of federal government employees from Tripoli meant that enough houses had to be provided. The Provincial Government, which occupied most if not all the residential areas of the city, was in no position to offer any official accommodation to the federal personnel. A private reconstruction scheme was then initiated to fulfil the demand for more houses either by the government employees or by public individuals who began to reside in the city as traders, merchants, craftsmen and manual workers. The introduction of many schemes under foreign aid agencies also helped to some extent to provide better accommodation for those in charge.

However, the evolution of Benghazi since independence in 1951 can be sharply classified into two main phases of growth. The first (1951-56) is a phase characterized by very limited new expansion. The features of this phase are mainly reconstruction of damaged houses and government departments for residential and administrative requirements, or to a very limited extent the reconstruction of a few public buildings such as schools, dispensaries and the present power station in 1952.

The second phase (1956 onwards) is the one which is

associated with the exploitation of oil in the Syrtic area. The search for oil and the early hopes of oil findings gave Libya an international interest in this field. Tripoli and Benghazi were the only two places where facilities required by oil companies could be provided. The result of this need gave Benghazi, in particular, a favourable place for oil companies because of her location as far as the first oil discovery in the Syrtic area was concerned.

Discussing the city's growth from 1951 onwards, four factors must be carefully examined in order to follow the stages which finally gave Benghazi its present stage of evolution. First, immediately after independence Benghazi became a city of two administrative functions; the first was as local capital for the provincial authorities, and the second was the transfer of the Federal Government from Tripoli. Nevertheless, the city grew little from these functions. The economic difficulties facing the Federal Government at the time were an obstacle to any construction schemes needed to fulfil the administrative requirements. The reconstruction of some of the former Italian government buildings was the only solution. A compact use of the ready premises was another idea to justify Benghazi's new administrative difficulties.

In my opinion, the early transfer of the Federal Government from Tripoli, where enough and suitable administrative quarters were already in existence, was a major

mistake, especially if we take into consideration the cost in money, time and effort of such an operation. Yet the transfer was vitally important from a Cyrenaican point of view, where economic revival was an urgent necessity to the ruined city.

The second factor assisting growth was the arrival of many exiled Senusi families to stay in Benghazi. The first growth of Feuhat suburb was undoubtedly due to the establishment of some of these royal families in the area in the early 1950's. Because of their special status these families are now indispensable to the economy of the city. The growth of Benghazi, especially after the oil discoveries, was carried out on a big scale by their financial investments.

The third and most important of all factors in recent growth is the presence of many foreign oil companies in Cyrenaica and the discovery of quantities of commercial oil in the Syrtic area, as early as 1959, and subsequent successes in the area have helped to create a new era for Benghazi. The impact of oil operations upon the life of the city developed enormously until it became the backbone of its economy. In contrast, Tripoli's growth, although more intensive, was characterized by more diverse factors, and there oil is less instrumental in growth than in the case of Benghazi, where both agricultural productivity and traditional industry are of no major importance. Without the oil discoveries Benghazi's growth would have been very slow indeed,

especially after the decision of the Federal Government to create Beida as the main administrative centre for the whole of Libya.

The flood of foreigners employed by oil companies revived the need for better accommodations to satisfy the daily increase in demand for modern houses and villas by these foreigners, who can afford to offer very high rents. The limited accommodation vacancies in the town were very soon taken over. Expansion outside the former residential areas soon became a necessity.

The Fuehat area is one of the best in the surroundings of Benghazi from a residential point of view, as it is comparatively higher in altitude, far away from the Sebka and from the city noise. The result was that a new modern suburb emerged in less than six years.

Expansion inside the city was progressing too, but vertically because of the limited ground space. New buildings, some of them seven storeys high, are now common features of most of the city's main streets. The vertical expansion has taken place either on those limited empty spaces especially on the way to Berka or as superimposition on old buildings in the previously built areas.

The following statistics, obtained from the Architecture Department of Benghazi's Municipality, illustrate the increase of building licences from 1954 until 1962.

Issue of Building Licenses: Benghazi Municipality (1954-62).

Year	Months												Total
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	
1954	28	35	37	28	12	35	29	27	25	13	15	13	297
1955	22	28	25	21	6	35	33	23	37	35	33	12	310
1956	23	18	50	50	43	39	34	49	38	15	19	13	391
1957	27	49	31	16	27	36	75	44	24	44	31	25	429
1958	49	36	18	11	30	27	32	50	54	45	46	61	459
1959	46	46	41	34	58	51	81	101	180	80	53	116	887
1960	54	71	42	93	104	39	91	133	113	114	106	113	1073
1961	104	61	71	183	237	135	209	195	197	105	141	130	1768
1962	158	63	91	194	171	181	?	?	?	?	?	?	858
Grand Total												6472	

Although statistical reliability in unde^{de}veloped countries is often dubious, errors in the former figures are probably few. On the other hand, numbers of reconstruction licences issued are lacking for recent years, as we can see from the following table:

Issue of Reconstruction Licences: Benghazi Municipality(1955-58).

Year	Reconstruction Licences	
1955	16	
1956	16	
1957	43	
1958	48	
Grand Total		123

Distributions by localities and type of buildings are also lacking for some years, especially those before 1958. The following classifications for the month of March in the years 1959, 1960 and 1961 may give some indication of the type of buildings:

Analysis of Building Licences: Benghazi Municipality (March 1959-61)

Month	Year	1 to 5 rooms	5 to 10 rooms	10 to 15 rooms	15 to 20 rooms	20 to 25 rooms	25 to 30 rooms	30 to 35 rooms	35 to 40 rooms	40 to 45 rooms	45 to 50 rooms	50 to 55 rooms	55 to 60 rooms	60 to 65 rooms	65 to 70 rooms	70 to 75 rooms	75 to 80 rooms	80 to 85 rooms	85 to 90 rooms	90 to 95 rooms	95 to 100 rooms	Total	
March	1959	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	41
March	1960	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43
March	1961	35	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	71
Grand Total		71	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	155

Other statistics in this field are shown in the table below:

Total number of certain building constructions: Benghazi Municipality (1959-62).

Year	No. of Villas	No. of Factories	No. of Petrol Stations	No. of Garages
1959	1	2	1	3
1960	50	2	8	5
1961	13	1	6	11
1962 (till July)	7	3	8	9
Grand Total	71	8	23	28

In the case of the growth of Tripoli information is more available, accurate and detailed, as the following table shows:-


Year	Multiple storey buildings		Villas		Arab Houses		Garages, shops, stores and schools.
	Nos.	Aptments.	Nos.	Aptments.	Nos.	Aptments.	
1952	15	44	12	29	1	1	9
1953	56	185	33	88	16	26	6
1954	28	134	22	45	18	21	21
1955	40	189	67	156	22	26	20
1956	41	120	123	350	45	51	13
1957	39	195	115	298	63	82	28
1958	26	102	158	402	80	96	36
1959	31	185	64	163	98	127	26
1960	23	65	125	315	120	156	37
1961	33	51	78	216	165	210	65
	322	1446	797	2062	628	809	261

It will be noticed that the increase in buildings has been less brusque than in Benghazi and that it started earlier.

The final factor assisting Benghazi's growth was the establishment of some important federal projects, such as the foundation of the Libyan University (Arts, Commerce and Law faculties), the Royal Military Academy, the Health Centre, the Libyan Army Headquarters and the reconstruction schemes for the Harbour and Benina Airport.

Nevertheless, it is essential to realise that Benghazi's growth over the last five years would not have been so fast or effective if it had not been left to governmental expansion. Oil reserves for the government budget are still very limited, and it is therefore unwise to embark on expansion schemes. Moreover, the Federal Government decided to create what is now officially known as the Federal Administrative Centre of Beida. The idea aimed at eliminating the unhappy feelings between the two largest provinces, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, who according to the constitution should each have a capital for the Federal Authorities in Tripoli and Benghazi respectively. Another influence upon the creation of Beida was His Majesty's desire to commemorate his father's birthplace at Beida. The Beida project, undoubtedly disapproved of by the majority of Libyans, began early after independence and it is estimated that the project's expenditure has exceeded thirty million pounds (see fig.7). The completion of Beida, now highly accelerated, will almost certainly have a serious effect upon Benghazi's present prosperity which will inevitably decrease to some extent when oil explorations cease. Another serious factor affecting the future of the city is the present tendency to abolish Provincial Authorities, which means that Benghazi would lose not only her status as a Federal Capital but also that as a Provincial Capital for Cyrenaica.

Figure 7



Beida

Benghazi has doubled in size since independence and has expanded to the south-east, north and east. Its economic influence is now greater than ever before owing to the concentration of the major oil companies, and to some extent to the reconstruction scheme aiming at giving the city its pre-war size of harbour, including the outer basin which was specially designed for military purposes.

The city's Libyan population increased enormously from about 30,000 in 1942 to over 81,000 in 1962. The number of foreigners also increased from about 1,800 in 1954 to about 6,000 in 1962. Health services, although greatly increased and modified, are still unfortunately inadequate. Schools on the other hand are probably the only service which seem to be expanding fast enough to fulfil the demand. Houses, transport, entertainment, water and electrical facilities are in short supply. Some of these are serious problems facing the present phase of Benghazi's prosperity, and the shift to Beida may delay a proper solution to them. The present trend in the distribution of oil revenues has already produced a prominent capitalist class which unfortunately may be the only class to receive substantial benefits. The benefits gained by the majority of the local population from oil revenues are still far from producing a sharp increase in standards of living. The people gaining most from oil operations so far are contractors, merchants who were able

to satisfy the requirements of oil companies, the landowners and the owners of entertainment facilities such as restaurants, hotels and cabarets. The total number of these people is really insignificant.

The impact of oil in Banghazi and the rapid growth of the city which followed has produced a distinct segregation of the different income groups. The Americans, British and other Europeans occupy most of the new area of Fuehat and elsewhere in the city where new buildings are to be found. The rich capitalists are also to be found in this area. High government personnel occupy the houses of Adrian Pelt Street; the other high officials are almost all concentrated in the Scabli area. The middle class is scattered all over the Arab town and most parts of Berka while the lower income class is mainly in Sabri, Ras Abeida, Dar el-Kish and in the new developed area in the eastern part of the city; Ard bin Junes.

In conclusion, although Benghazi is still growing, it is true to say that there has been no proper planning. This has resulted in an obvious lack of harmony between the pre-war and the present types of architecture. The city also still lacks fundamental services. Because of this Benghazi will remain a city which neither belongs to Europe nor to Africa, a city in which at least one quarter of its total population still lives in the shanty town of Sabri alone, a city still famous indeed for its flies, first mentioned a century and a half ago.

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CHAPTER III

BENHAZI TODAY

NATURE AND DIRECTION OF GROWTH,

Since the initiation of oil exploitation in the City of Benghazi has come to face the second revolutionary phase in its growth. The Italians were the pioneers of the first phase of the development of Benghazi. Italian expansion introduced a European style of planning and architecture; a feature entirely new to this part of Africa in modern times at least. (See plate VII) On the other hand, especially after the rise of the Fascists, Italian political aspirations were, unfortunately, not confined purely to colonization. The results were of great value at least in creating a separate modern section of the City. The contrast between Italian Benghazi and the Arab quarter - Madine - was a matter which the Italians seemed to ignore and which in the end happened to reflect the superficiality of the Italian scheme for developing the City. "Mussolini, however, was busy making of Benghazi an Italian town, with its native quarter a mere appendage". (1)

The devastation during the World War II and the economic difficulties facing the newly born Libyan State presented great problems for urban renewal despite the administrative functions which the city began to enjoy soon after independence.

The backbone of Benghazi's modern expansion is undoubtedly



19th Century Municipality Square, photograph Benghazi Municipality

of Italian origin. The long-term Italian schemes for Benghazi's development, although now completely missing, involved a complete survey of the old town including a new road plan. The main proposed road, according to reliable sources, was to start from the 9th of August Square opposite the Libyan University and cross the Arab town to the general hospital. Other roads were to cross the Arab quarter from east to west in order to facilitate traffic and give proper opportunities for new and better planning. However, whether the Italians really meant to implement such a scheme or not, they are hardly to blame for not doing so because they were not sure of the permanency of their sojourn. The blame should be placed instead on the Libyan government and in particular on the Provincial Authorities with the Municipality as the proper authority. The expansion following oil exploitation and discoveries was left to private interest, although according to the Italian planning regulations of 1936 which are still in force, the Municipality must agree, in theory, beforehand to any repair or construction project. Corruption, blackmail and nepotism are, unfortunately, common feature in many departments, in which private interest can be easily satisfied. The total of 6472 building licenses approved during the last eight years could hardly have been technically examined by the Municipality's one engineer.

The present phase of Benghazi's modern growth, as

mentioned before, followed two patterns. The first was of a vertical nature in the modern Italian part of the city. The Arab town began to join the new development only in the last three years when superimposition of new buildings became a necessity due to the increased demand for more houses, offices and shops inside the city. The second pattern has a general horizontal nature and may be residential, as in Fuehat, or comprise large offices and bases for the oil companies. The ring road between Fuehat and the main road to Tripoli provides a good example of such expansion.

The architecture of recent Benghazi has a general similarity to the Italian types of buildings, with perhaps three major differences:-

- (a) Under the Italians separate garden Villas were very rare, but now they are the dominant feature of the European extensions of the city.
- (b) The appearance of commercial buildings is new. A recently built multiple-storey building and one of Italian origin differ in thickness of walls and in the raw materials. The Italian construction has perhaps a double foundation and thickness of walls if compared with recent buildings, which often require maintenance two years after their completion. The Italians, taking into consideration the warm summer conditions, always preferred high ceilinged rooms, whereas in recent buildings

the height is sometimes only half of the old ones.

Balconies are also reduced in size, and in most cases it is hard for two persons to pass on them. The tallest Italian building in the town is the so-called Silos or the cereal store. Other buildings have from two to four storeys and because of this lifts did not come into use until very recently, when they became indispensable parts of most of the modern buildings.

- (c) The third difference lies in the disappearance of the arch system first introduced by the Italians. In recent years when much superimposition of new buildings has taken place along the main city streets, owners in one way or another seem to have ignored the general pattern of previous architecture, and the result is that the arch system has disappeared in different places, leaving the general pattern unbalanced, despite the great value of such a system. Arches protect the public from the excessive heat of summer, provide a good shelter from the torrential winter rains and are also used as extension space for cafes.


If brief, Benghazi is still a growing city which has neither any fixed future plans nor seems to worry about the way in which the present expansion is conducted. It is a growth brought about by oil and is carried out by individuals whose only concern seems to be high and quick profits. It is a growth which for many years will be restricted to serving only

a small section of the city's inhabitants, either foreign oil employees or a few wealthy native families.

North and east of the city another type of growth has been going on for the last few years. The general increase in the living standards of the lower and middle classes after oil discoveries is the indirect reason for this northerly expansion. The Arab quarter with its high population concentration cannot be expanded vertically due to general poverty of most residents. Horizontal expansion is also impracticable because of the unsuitable sites nearby. The shanty-town of Sabri to the north of the Arab town was one of the new sites for such expansion. The Municipality land along the main road to Barce and immediately beyond the city entrance was the developed area in this part. (see figure 8). The Buildings of the area, although high in number, are still far from providing suitable dwellings for even 5% of the total population, who still live in a shocking and miserable condition, with no modern facilities of any kind. Such conditions, though less intensive, also apply to the other local developed areas in Ard bin Junes, the Berka and the south-eastern edges of the Salmai Sebka and in Ras Abeida. Architecture in these areas is of local Arab pattern with the exception of more use of stones and cement. In these areas there is no proper road system, no electricity or piped water systems and no public transport.

The recent unplanned growth of Benghazi has further

Figure 8



Plan of the municipality land in Sabri

illustrated the diversity and contrast between the oriental parts of the city and those so-called European or modern parts. It is a contrast between poor mud-built houses, wooden huts or tents and American designed villas, fascinating multiple storey buildings and in some cases Gasur-Castles of the Arabian Nights.

In conclusion, Benghazi's evolution necessitated by oil discoveries has a similar character to that expansion introduced by the Italians in the way that both were imposed from outside and consequently both failed to provide any local significant response except perhaps in the way that both have succeeded to attract thousands of daily manual workers.

The landscape surrounding old Benghazi had conditioned the way in which the Italians expanded the city. Modern growth has to some extent failed to challenge the Sebkhah simply because it has no basic planning. The result has been that the city has expanded toward the south-east for modern residential areas and to the south beyond the Punta Sebkhah for oil offices and bases. North of the old town and east of Berka were the main areas for native pattern of expansion.

THE GROWTH OF BENGHAZI IN REGARD TO WATER SUPPLY.

Because of the complete absence of surface water, the city's water supply has always been dependent on underground resources. Specific information about how the city water requirements were fulfilled in the old times are unfortunately

lacking. The Greek system of digging wells in public places and houses in the old Eusperides has been in all probability the method later developed in Berenice and in Marsa Ibn Ghazi. Prior to the Italian occupation there were two major ways for providing water for domestic requirements. The first was that most houses had their own well which ranged in depth between three to six metres. The water quality was so poor for drinking purposes that many people, especially those of comparatively high social standards, constructed cisterns in their houses where rain water was collected in the winter and used for drinking and washing clothes in the rest of the year. The second method was the use of the few public wells such as those of the Sabri sand dunes and those of the present site of Fuehat Water Works. These public wells were widely utilized by el-Warradin - water sellers who sell their water either to those people who have no private wells or to those who look for better water quality especially that of Fuehat. Such a system is still in common use in the Arab town and the outskirts of the town, with the difference of using metal barrels fitted upon carts pulled by donkeys and that the water is collected from the public fountains and not from wells. At present the city needs great efforts to expand on the original Italian water pipe system. The old Arab quarter and the new Arab areas are still lacking a piped water system. The Warradin are still indispensable to the Sabri and Ras Abeida areas as well as in the centre of

the Arab town (see plate VIII).

It is not surprising, therefore, that water supply limited the evolution of the city before the Italians. They laid the foundation for the city's expansion simply because they located enough water resources beyond the Turkish city walls without which the destiny of Benghazi might well have been different.

The Italian attempts to locate a city water supply began a few years after their takeover. The results of their numerous test borings were tabulated by Romano (1933) and were commented on by Marchetti (1938). They indicated that a zone of saturation, whose water table was slightly above sea level, was present and that wells could be developed which would produce moderate amounts of usable water.⁽²⁾ The former studies provided the city with major water supply areas outside the Turkish limits of the city. The first source was a system of galleries and wells at Fuehat. The Italian Fuehat Waterworks consisted mainly of five deep wells ranging in depth from 130 to 330 feet, a series of shallow collection galleries, a pumping station and an elevated storage tank. All were destroyed or damaged during the Second World War. The second source was a collecting gallery at Munastir, on the coast five kilometres north of the city. The Munastir Water Works consisted only of two infiltration galleries in the sand-dunes with a total daily




A water seller in the Arab town

yield of 75,000 gallons of water containing 1,800 parts per million of sodium chloride. The total yield derived from both sources was just less than one million gallons a day and the water, in general contained approximately 1,000 parts per million of sodium chloride.

The Italian hydrologic surveys and the construction of the water works which followed gave Benghazi the first proper chance of expansion not only because they were able to supply a permanent yield of approximately one million gallons per day, but also because they gave hope for further exploitation and consequently more yield for future expansion development.

The defeat of the Axis forces and the arrival of the British Military Administration brought the second phase of large-scale water exploitation. To start with, some of the collecting galleries at Fuehat were cleared and four extra wells were drilled. The yield of this particular water works averaged 925,000 gallons a day of water with 900 parts per million of sodium chloride. "The water from all sources is pumped into a ground-storage tank reservoir of one million gallons capacity. In addition, an elevated concrete water storage tank has been constructed and put into service." (3) (see plate IX).

The war damage to Munastir Water Works on one hand and the high sodium chloride content on the other hand brought this water supply to an end, but Italian preliminary surveys




Fuehat water storage tank


of the Benina area encouraged the British Military Administration to employ a British firm to undertake further geophysical studies of the area. The final results were promising and work soon took place after 1949. The Public Works Department with the help of the British firm began a series of 23 test drilling wells in a north-south line near the 100 metre contour. The location of these wells as well as other works in the region are shown in Figure 9. The wells ranged in depth below the surface from 260 feet in well G.3 (plate IX) to 370 feet in well G.16. Water levels on the other hand ranged from 3.4 feet above sea level in well G.2 and 16 feet in well G.16. The sodium chloride content is less than that of Fuehat. Three of the wells gave outputs of 20,000 gallons per hour, eleven wells yielded an output ranging from a few hundred to about 10,000 gallons per hour. The other nine most southerly wells gave so little water that they are listed as dry holes. The wells G. 3, G.1 and G.8 have been used since 1958 to provide some of Benghazi's water supply. A reservoir of one million gallons capacity was built in the area and a 12 inch main was connected with Fuehat Water Works.

The present phase of urban expansion has meant demands in excess of the limited supply of two million gallons per day. In 1962, water consumption rose to 4.5 million gallons a day during the summer months compared with only 2.5 millions

Figure 9



Water resources of Benghazi



Well (G3) near Benina Village

in the summer of 1960. The system followed to cope with such a tremendous increase was to increase the total yield of Benina by drilling extra wells and to construct a supplementary pumping station nearby.

Further improvements to the water supply of Benghazi are in need of urgent consideration in order to fulfil the necessary obligations towards the city's increasing population. The following suggestions, after personal consultation with the water authorities, may help to improve the present situation.

(a) The construction of a higher elevated storage tank.

The height of the present Fuehat tank (120 feet) is not enough to give sufficient pressure to the Sidi Khrebish reservoir, which in return fails to supply sufficient water quantities to the medium height multiple storey buildings.

(b) The construction of a second distributing water reservoir in the city in order to reduce the pressure on the single reservoir of Sidi Khrebish.

(c) The provision of more permanent water yields. Regular water shortages, which in some cases last several days, are faced in the summer months in particular.

(d) The replacement of old pipes. Most of the present pipes system dates back to the early years of the Italian occupation.

(e) The extension of the piped water system to the newly

developed areas especially north and south-west of the city where the majority of the population lives at present.

- (f) Adequate governmental aid to and proper supervision of the department in charge which at present is short of qualified staff and proper means of transport.
- (g) The abolition of the scheme for providing the city with better quality water from Ains Dabbusia on the Jebel. The terrific cost of the project together with the fact that this scheme would provide a maximum of only three million gallons a day would not justify its construction under the present economic situation. Alternatively, the drilling of more wells in the Benina area would, according to reliable official resources, certainly produce enough water for future urban expansion without any great costs. An estimate of one quarter of the proposed project would be sufficient to modernize the whole city water works.

The future water supply of Benghazi is now assured.

Political and economic factors are certainly the two creative factors behind the city's recent evolution. The question of the future status of Benghazi would therefore depend on how these two factors behave in the coming years.

MORPHOLOGY AND GROWTH

Examining the morphology of the City of Benghazi in detail is almost impracticable for many reason, First,

there is a lack of contemporary maps showing the different stages of the city's growth. In all there are only four reliable maps covering a period of the last 135 years. The first map of Benghazi is the drawing left by the Beechey brothers in 1828. The Italians produced two major maps in 1922 and 1938. In 1958 the Libyan authorities published the first map, which was largely based on the latest Italian work. The British Petroleum Company published in 1961 a general map of the city with the intention of showing the location of their offices, bases and petrol stations. Air photographs are also very rare and they are not allowed publication for military reasons.


A second difficulty is that, apart from the Italian quarter, the military installations and the recently developed areas, the ages of buildings are not apparent, especially in the Arab town where building systems have changed little over the ages.

A third difficulty is the poverty of historical records of Benghazi, in comparison, for example, with Tripoli.

Because of these unfortunate difficulties no precise growth map can be constructed. On the other hand, Figure 10 is derived from the four above mentioned maps, and therefore presents the following four general different stages of growth:-

- (a) Prior to 1828.
- (b) Between 1828 to 1922.
- (c) Between 1922 to 1958.
- (d) After 1958.

Figure 10



Evolution of Benghazi

(a) No traces of Benghazi before 1828 remain. The buildings of the early city are either included in the Italian area of radical transformation or were built of mud and other simple raw materials and not of durable materials and stone like ancient Berenice. In other words the map of Benghazi of 1828 presents the built-up area and not the age of buildings of that time. The present buildings found on the former site can be classified into two groups: Italian Buildings ranging in age from immediately after 1911 to 1940, and, less dominant, those of Arab character. The exact age of the different buildings in this particular area is impossible to forecast. The simple raw materials of these buildings and their response to the dampness of the ground indicates that their construction could not have been earlier than the end of the last century. In other words, they present a probable superimposition on those buildings described by the Beechey brothers.

(b) Between 1828-1922 no maps of the city are available, but the size of the city could hardly have extended beyond the limits of 1828, because of the lack of stability and security. Limited expansion may have begun to take place in the late Turkish period when economic and political conditions were reasonably well under control. At this time more few features were added to Benghazi's topography. Of these the most important was the creation of

the Berka Suburb. Before 1881 villages began to spring up around the tombs of Sidi Husein and Sidi Dawud to house the increasing population, and the Turkish governor had a garden in the Berka. In the extreme north not far from the old site of Eusperides, a nucleus of a few shops and houses was developing. The site was and is still called Dakakin Hamid.

The shanty-town of Sabri was also not only existing but also considered as one of the city's quarters. Besides these enlargements Benghazi proper expanded to the north, to a point north of the present limit of the cemetery of Sidi Krebish, which according to the Beechey brothers formed the extreme northern part of the city. To the east expansion was confined to the present Omar Ibn el-Ass street. Apart from the later Italian modifications, either by new establishments on empty lands or by fundamental changes to the previous morphology of the city, the map of 1922 may be considered as the actual map of Benghazi when it was taken over by the Italians in 1911. Buildings of local design which are now found on the map of 1922 were difficult to classify whether they have been built before or after the Italian occupation because of their regular repair. Sidi Husein and Sidi Dawud were at the time included as two quarters of the city.

(c) The Italian stage undoubtedly was the most important phase of the city's evolution. During the thirty years which cover this stage Benghazi was almost completely changed in size, in layout and in architectural style. The

Italians, accelerating their agricultural schemes for granaries after gaining absolute security, were able to devote more efforts for the development of the city. The creation of modern Benghazi was an Italian initiative. On the other hand, World War II ruined most of the city - expansion was arrested for almost fifteen years until oil discoveries initiated a new phase of growth after 1958. Because of this we may regard the map of 1958 as the map of Italian Benghazi.

(d) Benghazi after 1958 began to respond quickly to the sudden wealth which followed the discovery of oil in 1959. The lack of proper planning for Benghazi's recent growth has made it impossible to draw an accurate map showing the extent of this growth. A large proportion of it has taken place on the old sites.

QUARTERS

The idea of dividing the city of Benghazi into twelve separate administrative quarters was put forward by the Turkish governor Khalil Pasha who reigned between 1863 and 1868. The new development was a great advantage not only because it organized city administration, but also and more important because it decreased the tribal influence, which had been the base for administration for many centuries. "It is perhaps the demolition of the tribe as the social and racial unit in the late 1860s which will be remembered as

the best thing the Turks did".⁽⁴⁾ the Italians, although keeping the system of quarters (Mahalla) functioning on the Turkish basis, were for military and political purposes tempted to revive the tribal influence for many years after their occupation. In the 1930s the Italians were able to control the whole province, an event which brought heavy restrictions to any sort of tribalism not only in Benghazi but all over the country. The revival of tribalism in Benghazi is now believed to be an action of the British, who during their administration were considered to support the few Kologlis families against the rest of the city dwellers. After independence tribalism has developed enormously. The practice of political rights in a country where illiteracy dominates and where no political parties are well organised helps the electors to turn to the original tribe as their chief supporter. This is a phenomenon which has long ago disappeared from the city of Tripoli. The political and social implications of tribalism in Benghazi will be considered in detail in the chapter on population.


The number of quarters remained unchanged until a few years ago when they increased from twelve to seventeen. The first additional change occurred when the Italians considered the Feuhat suburb as a separate quarter. The second change followed the division of both Sabri and Sidi Dawud into three sub-quarters each. The boundaries of the quarters are well defined except in the cases of the sub-quarters of Sidi Dawud

and Sabri where no reliable official boundaries could be fixed and consequently these sub-quarters will be regarded as if no changes have occurred. (see figure 26) Each quarter has its Mukhtar corresponding to the Sheikh of the tribe and also its Imam. The Mukhtar is a paid government official who in fact has less authority over the Mahella than a Sheikh. The Imam who is also a government paid official is the Mukhtar's assistant whose responsibility concerns the religious affairs including marriage and divorce. The Mukhtar's main functions concern registration of births and deaths, recommendations for commercial and driving licences, distribution of government aid to the poor families and official consultation in respect of the needs of his quarter development.

1. Sabri is the extreme northern quarter of the city. The name Sabri is believed to be the name of one of the oldest families to reside in the city. During the Turkish rule the area was more known as Zreria or Dakakim Hamid. Today the name Sabri generally means the area of the shanty-town, but in fact the Sabri quarter is the whole region beyond Sharia el-Mustashfa. According to local sources, the Italians in their early years deliberately set fire to the shanty town which was mainly inhabited by Sudanese Negroes. The total disappearance of the domed straw huts which were common types

of dwellings before the Italians, is believed to be the result of this destructive action which, in all probability, aimed to create a better and cleaner suburb.

The construction of the general hospital in 1933 was the first real effort for modern development in the Sabri area. The increased demand for local manual workers during the Italian regime made the area a focus of attraction for those workers who came to reside in the city. The devastation of Benghazi during the World War II also encouraged the local inhabitants who lost their houses to live in the area where they could build a cheap hut or pitch a tent. After 1958 the area became one of the most populated parts in the city, because of the continuous flood of migrants to the city. Between 1922 and 1962 the quarter's official population estimate has sharply risen from 899 persons in 1922, to 17,000 in 1962, an increase which officially gives the area about 24 per cent of the whole city population. Sabri with its high population concentration has been entirely neglected in official development plans. Unofficially the estimates of the Sabri population exceed 25 thousands, of which only an estimated 10 to 15% live in Arab-built houses. The rest live in wooden or metal huts, zariba or in tents. (see plate XI). The shanty town of Sabri which covers most of the quarter gives a clear picture of a primitive and miserable society living on the lowest margins of human




View of Sabri shanty town

subsistence. In winter the people suffer from dirt, mud and rain. Summer conditions are better than those of winter but millions of flies live on the dirt and sewage found all over the place. (see plate XII). In brief, it is undoubtedly the poorest living area in the whole of Libya. Neither modern dwellings nor medical, health, sanitation, hygiene, piped water and electricity services are yet known despite the fact that the eastern part of the area lies along the main northern entrance to the city. The Municipality's decision to sell its lands lying between the main road and the shanty town was regarded by many people of the area as a decision which aimed in the first place to hide the shanty town from the eyes of foreigners and tourists. In my view, the decision was also intended to cope with the increased demand for more premises either for the use of commerce and trade which explains the design of most of the new buildings in the area.

The Sabri quarter, which now extends as far north as the Jewish cemetery, still lacks public transport. There is no bus service to link the quarter with the town. Public buildings in the quarter besides the general hospital include the former Torelli barracks, the slaughterhouse, a sporting club and three mosques one of which is still under construction by the Municipality.

Since the war, the shanty town, because of its extreme poverty and high population density, has developed into




A cafe in the shanty town

a moral problem especially after the official prohibition of alcoholic drinks and licenced brothels immediately after independence.

2. Sidi Sherif. This quarter is called after the marabout Sidi Sherif who is believed to have come from el-Maghreb about three and a half centuries ago. The marabout is buried in the cemetery which bears his name, but which has long been out of use. This fact together with its central position necessitates its removal and replacement by a public garden or children's playing ground. This suggestion is based on the fact that the cemetery is located almost in the centre of the populous Arab quarter which lacks space for children's playgrounds. The quarter is practically divided into two different sections east and west of Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass. The eastern part is an Italian creation. It includes the old city stadium and the new Fonduk. East of the hospital and north of the Fonduk the quarter includes the houses of government personnel and the new extension of the hospital including the sisters' living quarters. In the south-east of this Italian part of the quarter there are the premises of the Nazirate of Education. The new memorial tomb of the patriot Omar el-Mukhtar is one of the most elaborate buildings in this section.

The western part, on the other hand, is a typical part of the Arab town except for the girls' intermediate school



and the nearby petrol station. The area west of the former school with Sharia Bin Isa as its centre is an area of traditional blacksmiths which is often sarcastically called the Manchester of Benghazi. The extreme western end of this quarter enjoys a share of the busiest local trade and shopping centre of Suk el-Gerid and Sharia Bughula which is a northern extension of the former Suk. Generally speaking, most of the quarter, especially its Arab part, is a residential area, with the exception of the shops along the western side of Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass north of the girls' school, where, since the Second World War, these shops have specialized in selling motor spares. Between the stadium and the Fonduk lies the only textile factory in the whole of Benghazi. Besides these functions the quarter, because of the Fonduk, represents the most important wholesale market in the city. (see plate XIII). The quarter's population has risen from 1670 persons in 1922 to 3,499 in 1962 which is an insignificant increase if compared with the previous quarter.

3. Sidi Khrebish is the largest quarter inside the Arab town. The quarter's name was derived from the marabout who is buried in the cemetery which still bears the name Khrebish. According to Agostini, Sidi Khrebish left two sons - Sidi Said, whose tomb is still found in Belkheir quarter, and Sidi Junes whose tomb is found in the Sabri Area. There are seven



The main entrance of the Fonduk

mosques in the quarter, five of which are believed to be founded by Tripolitarians from Misurata. The other two are known to be erected by people from the Maqreh. The tomb of Sidi Ibn Ghazi, the saint after whom the city of Benghazi was named, is laid somewhere on the former cemetery. Sidi ibn Ghazi was a marabout who most Arab historians agree was a son of one of the Prophet's followers, despite the fact that nothing definite is yet known about his life.


The quarter is largely an Arab residential area except in the extreme west where the Italians built their (marine headquarters); now the Faculty of Law in the Libyan University, and reconstructed the Turkish City prison. The south-west part of the quarter is occupied by the huge old Khrebish cemetery. The transfer of this cemetery will benefit the city's future expansion, where its site can be successfully used as a council house area due to its central location or as the main public garden, a feature which the city lacks and needs badly. This is beside the fact that the cemetery as it is now spoils the scenery of the old promenade and affects the whole morphology of this part of the Arab town. The quarter's population has practically doubled itself over the last forty years; it increased from 4,214 persons in 1922 to 7,993 persons in 1962. The impossibility of horizontal expansion and of vertical modern growth kept the population.

from a rapid increase as in the case of Sabri.

4. Belkheir. This is a small quarter which is also named after a local marabout whose tomb is still found at Suk el-Gerid. The quarter's eastern part is one of the most important shopping centres of Suk el-Dalam and the southern part of Suk el-Gerid (see plate XIV). The rest of the quarter is a typical Arab residential area. The quarter's population rose from 571 persons in 1922 to 1,710 persons in 1962.

5. Sidi Salem is the smallest quarter in the city, with a population of only 789 persons in 1962 compared with less than two hundred in 1922. The name of Sidi Salem was derived from a local marabout. Despite its small size, the quarter has five mosques, the most important of which is the Great Mosque of the city located in the Municipality Square. This mosque was founded by Abdul Samiah el-Ghadi 400 years ago. Apart from these mosques, the Municipality building and square, the quarter is mainly a residential area.

6. El-Shabbi. This quarter is one of the few which have lost their pre-Italian character because of the radical changes introduced by the Italian development scheme for Benghazi. The quarter is therefore one of the most important areas in the city because of its almost complete modernization. It includes the Provincial and Federal government headquarters, the Federal High Court, the National Bank, the



Suk el-Gerid

Moreover there are two second class hotels, the Fiat garage and showrooms, and the Clinic of Benghazi. Between the railway gauge and Sharia el-Isliklal - Independence Street - lies another Italian-developed area. The main features of this second Italian area include the Parliament, the Federal police headquarters, the Libyan University and the Squares of the 9th of August and Omar Tosoun. Other public buildings include the fruit and fish markets. (see plate XV).

The Arab section of this quarter has been greatly modified especially in the last few years when new buildings have been constructed on old sites.

The Victory (Nassar) Street from the harbour main gate to the sailing club built on the so-called cathedral mole provides the largest single road in the city, besides being the city's promenade. Independence Street, on the other hand, is one of the few streets in the Italian part of the city where superimposition of huge multiple storey buildings has taken place after oil discoveries. In 1961 there were seven of these buildings under construction. The street is one of the best shopping centres with a high concentration of many company offices besides being the busiest road for traffic. Generally speaking Ghrebil quarter is one of the most important quarters in the town especially when the Juliana zone is brought into consideration as the extreme southern extension of the quarter.*

* some of the municipality officials deny this and consider Juliana as part of Berka.

This area is famous for its first class beaches, clubs, the installation of many petroleum storage tanks and the formerly productive salt pans. The quarter's population is rather small if compared with the actual size of the quarter; the figure for 1962 was 6,188 persons compared with 2,000 in 1922.

8. El-Drawi. This is a comparatively small quarter, the name of which was derived from the founder of the mosque of el-Drawi. The quarter west of Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass has still preserved its Arab character. In Suk el-Khaddara in the extreme west lies the area which specializes in the retail trade of vegetables and fruits and where a concentration of butchers' shops are also found. The Jewish Synagogue was built near this western end. The rest of the Arab quarter is primarily residential. East of Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass the buildings are mostly of Italian origin, whose foundations are based on the filling up of the southern edge of the sebkha. Most are residential, but over the last few years quite a number have turned into showrooms and offices. In Agostini's time the quarter, which was mainly of Arab character, was the second most important quarter after Sidi Khrebish from the trade and commercial point of view. At present the importance of the area is small compared with most of the previous quarters. Its population increased from 2,300 persons in 1922 to 5,269 persons in 1962.

9. Loheshi. A small quarter known after a local marabout whose grave is believed to be found at el-Drawi mosque, the quarter is also divided into two parts west and east of Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass. West of the former street the section is a typical part of the Arab town. This part besides being a residential area is famous for its two Arusia zawya and two other mosques. East of Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass the quarter was founded by the Italians, like the southern and northern quarters of el-Drawi and Bin Isa, The 1962 population was 2,491 persons compared with only 600 persons in 1922.

10. Bin Isa. The name Bin Isa was derived from its Isawia zawya. Its population rose from 140 persons in 1922 to 2,810 persons in 1962. The western part of the quarter contains part of Suk el-Gerid. The eastern end, on the other hand, is one of the main administrative areas of the city; it includes the Nazirates of Social affairs, Health and Public Transport.

The Arab part of the quarter was well as the similar parts of the former two quarters are among the poorest areas in the Arab town where buildings damaged during the last war are still widespread. Before the Italians, the quarter was famous because it included the Old Fonduk and the Municipal Hotel.


11. Sidi Husein. The creation of the quarter of Sidi

Husein which is again called after a local marabout buried in the cemetery which also bears the same name, dates back to the late decades of the last century. The area is now believed to be one of the main cemeteries for Berenice. The construction of the Turkish causeway between Benghazi and Berka through the Salmani Sebkhah was undoubtedly the first seed for the area's later development. The growth of the quarter before the Italians was insignificant and was merely confined to the eastern and southern edges of the cemetery. The Italian efforts to reduce the size of the Sebkhah gave the quarter a real chance of enlargement, and so the quarter is largely an Italian creation especially in the west and northwest in the Scabli residential areas. Other important Italian achievements in the quarter included the railway station and the present Royal Diwan. In 1952 the Libyan authorities constructed the power station. After the discovery of oil, the eastern side of the main street of St. Lot, which is an extension of Istilkal Street, became one of the most modern parts of Benghazi, due to the construction of the most up-to-date multiple storey buildings. The population of the quarter increased from 513 persons in 1922 to about 2,500 in 1962.

12. Sidi Dawud. The quarter of Sidi Dawud which is now known more as Berka, is called after the marabout Sidi Dawud

whose tomb is still found in the area. According to Agostini, this marabout is a relative of the famous Sidi Chazi. The quarter at present has the biggest population; 24,635 thousands in 1962 which gives it about 29% of the official population of the whole city. The quarter is now divided into three sub-quarters, each with a Mukhtar and Imam who, unfortunately, are not all aware of their administrative boundaries. Before the Turks established their military barracks - Gasar Turkia - almost 110 years ago, Berka was an area of no significance, apart from a few scattered Arab gardens most of which have now disappeared because of the tremendous growth especially after the Italians had made it their first military zone. The population figure of only 1,317 persons in 1922 may illustrate that Berka - pool-in Arabic - was at the time far less important than most other quarters of the Arab town. Berka is also important for its many military camps, which are all in use either by the Libyan or the British army. It is also important as a local shopping area having many new industries such as sweet and shoe factories. In addition, Berka has the city stadium and other sporting facilities, but it is mainly a residential area for lower and middle classes and was the first area where council houses were built.

13. Feuhat. This suburb was first included as a quarter of the city by the Italians towards the end of the 1920s. Before 1950, it was like Berka before the Italians, an area of scattered gardens around a small nucleus of Arab houses called hiash bin Ismail. Feuhat is still growing rapidly around the main nucleus of Garden City on the eastern side of the ring road and Bin Aun Farm south of the former road. During Italian times Feuhat was important for its huge military camp, called, since the end of the last war, D'Aosta barracks, which is still the main British base and the British army headquarters for the whole province. Also important is the installation of the main city water works which were located on the site of what was known previously as the garden of el-Usta Mhemid. Moreover, Feuhat was also chosen for the establishment of both the main Agricultural Experimental Farm and the Zoo in 1936. Besides these functions the area was also used as one of the main quarries, and quarrying is still one of the main occupations for local people and for those who live nearby in Berka. The old centre of Feuhat contrasts with the modern parts of the quarter. South and west of bin Ismail houses, near the newly built Senusi mosque and market, most of the local people still live in a typical small shanty town. Water is collected from a public well (plate XVI) and electricity is rarely used.



A well in Fuehat

NATURE OF HOUSING

A detailed study of house types in the city of Benghazi can be more easily achieved if housing is classified into two main forms of dwellings, (a) the traditional Arab dwelling and (b) the modern form of dwelling. Each of these groups is subdivided into a few different categories.

(a) Traditional Arab Dwellings.


Before the Italian takeover and the introduction of their scheme for city development, Benghazi was a typical Arab centre, which, due to the superficiality of the Turkish regime, remained almost unaffected by Turkish architecture and design. This phenomenon differentiates Benghazi completely from the old city of Tripoli which still reflects Turkish design in many different aspects. The Turks in Benghazi were few in number and they lived either in military camps or in the castle itself. The rest of the inhabitants had three house types: the typical Arab house or hoosh, the straw hut or the Zariba, and the tent. The hoosh was and still is the most common dwelling for both Arabs and Jews. The zariba was confined to the northern edges of the city. Tents must have been well known at least in the outskirts, where Bedouin camped. After World War II a fourth type of Arab dwelling became dominant in the outskirts; the scrap metal or wooden huts.

(1) Hoosh. The traditional Arab house is a square uncovered courtyard surrounded by rooms. There is a well in the court, except in a few cases where the well is located in a separate section near the kitchen. In houses of the comparatively high income groups there is usually a cistern for collecting the rain water used for drinking and washing purposes. A few decades ago most Arab houses inside the city changed to the use of the piped water system; it is now estimated that only 8 to 15 per cent of the Arab houses are still dependent on water from wells and cisterns. The hoosh has normally a flat roof of wood, dried palm trunks or of stones and concrete. The social position of the owners decides the materials used in this respect. The number of rooms varies from two to six according to family size and social standard. The room nearest to the entrance is usually used as the sitting room. Most Moslem women are not allowed to meet strangers and so an extra inside door separates the sitting room from the main courtyard. The design of the hoosh has the advantage of providing enough air and sunshine for women, some of whom scarcely leave their houses. During winter time, especially where the courtyards are not paved or where there is no proper drainage system, the courtyards turn into

heaps of dirt and slush, causing many diseases. Other disadvantages of the hoosh design remove it from future consideration as the dominant dwelling type in any growing city or town. The size is, in most cases, no less than 10 x 15 metres which means that every house requires a space of about 150 square metres. This would result in too much land waste, especially in a city like Benghazi where the site suitable for expansion is still limited by natural obstacles. Furthermore these houses are only one storey high. The above description of the hoosh applies mainly to the Arab houses in the old town, but new houses built in Sabri and Berka are practically the same in their main features, except that they are often smaller in size with paved courtyards and are built of more resistant building materials such as stones and cement (see Figure 11).

- (2) Zariba and huts. Straw huts (zariba) are less common in the poor suburbs of the city than in similar areas around the city of Tripoli. The scarcity of the usual building materials of palm leaves (jerid) in the Benghazi area may be the reason behind this fact. However, it is quite certain that the zariba was more common before the Italians left particularly in the Sabri area. It can still be found in Sabri and

Figure 11



Plan of a modern Arab house

Berka surroundings, but is much less common than the scrap metal or wooden huts. The Sabri shanty-town is the main area for this sort of habitation. East of Berka and Dar el-Kish huts are also frequent. The zariba or the hut are, in most cases, built to provide one single room for the whole family. A straw fence, to hide the inside and to shelter the women, is often found surrounding these types of poor dwellings.

(3) Tents. The tent is socially and economically associated with the Bedouin on the open ranges, but in recent years it has become a common dwelling around the city, especially east of Berka and north of the railway line and on the southern and eastern edges of Fuehat. The constant influx of Bedouin seeking manual work is responsible for the appearance of this unusual form of habitation in an urban settlement.

According to the general census of 1954, the former four types of housing represented almost 98% of the total dwellings in the city of Benghazi, or 14,067 dwelling units out of the grand total of 14,879. The classification of these types as well as the other types included in the second category, the modern dwellings, is as shown below:-

<u>All</u> <u>Forms of</u> <u>dwellings.</u>	<u>Hoosh</u>	<u>Zariba</u> <u>or huts</u>	<u>Villa</u> <u>or</u> <u>apart-</u> <u>ment</u>	<u>Tent</u>	<u>Hotels</u>	<u>Camps</u> <u>and</u> <u>Prisons</u>	<u>Trodoe-</u> <u>lyte.</u>	<u>Others</u>
14,879	11,400	2,336	329	311	31	5	4	443

These statistics show that the hoosh type alone accounts for about 79% of the grand total; Zariba and huts only 17%. Numbers of tents nearly equalled villas and apartments together. Trodoglyte housing is very insignificant indeed and is totally confined to the old quarrying areas in eastern Berka and Fuehat. Families residing in hotels were mostly foreigners who could not find suitable housing and did not intend a long stay. The 443 units which were classified under the term 'others' were mostly local families who were resident temporarily. Their dwellings were mostly of the Arab traditional type except in three cases only where the habitation was on boats.

(b) Modern types of dwellings

In 1954, at the time of the last official census, Benghazi hardly provided any modern housing, as only 329 housing units could be described as modern. The reason was the extensive damage to the Italian quarter. In recent years modern dwellings have increased enormously and can be classified into three main categories.

(1) Villas. The Villa was regarded as a luxury form of housing during the Italian regime, when only high officials could enjoy such a privilege. From 1956 onwards the economic wheel of the city of Benghazi began to accelerate due to the indirect incomes of

oil exploitation. The result was 70 villas in a period of two and a half years. The new villas have, in most cases, a typically, elaborate American design. Some of these villas are two storeys high, all have separate gardens, and practically all have walled surrounds. The construction of this sort of housing has taken place mainly in Fuehat.

- (2) Apartments. Before the Italian occupation, the Arab town had very few buildings with two or more storeys. The construction of Italian public buildings and residential buildings, either governmental or private, was the turning point in the evolution of the general pattern of urban development. However, although the Italians were able to produce a complete modern quarter, the old town remained practically unchanged in this respect. Apartments before the war were mostly occupied by Italians and the wealthy Jews.


Oil discoveries, as previously mentioned have accelerated the repair of most of the ruined parts of the city and in particular those of Italian origin. The demand for modern housing was higher than could be fulfilled with such a reconstruction programme, and so some wealthy Libyan people quickly started building

multi-storey buildings either for living purposes or for offices and showrooms. Exact statistics of apartments - flats - and villas and other types of housing are not available, but it is believed that they have more than trebled during the last eight years.

Villas are almost completely restricted to foreign oil employees, foreign diplomats and a few prosperous Libyans. Apartments, on the other hand, are shared among high officials of the Provincial Government who largely occupy the Italian residential areas, oil company staff, Libyan university staff, British military families, Jewish families, Greek traders, and other professionals such as doctors and engineers.

(3) Council houses. The recent introduction of the council house scheme by the Provincial Government was forced on them by the constant pressure for better housing for the lower class. The scheme is not yet a success by any means simply because it has provided only 350 housing units since it was introduced four years ago. The main area chosen for this scheme was at Ras Abeida where 250 units were completed and where work is going on for another 150 units. (see figure 12). At Dar el-Kish work is proceeding on about 30 units. Near to the Royal Military Academy a compound of 40 houses was also

Figure 12



Plan of a block of council houses

finished to accommodate the junior married staff of the academy. According to official announcements, Sabri is another area for such houses, which are rented according to the income of the occupier. Most of these houses have two rooms, a court yard with separate kitchen and toilet, and all are provided with a piped water system and electricity. The extension of the scheme especially in an area like Sabri is an urgent necessity in order to eliminate the present unbearable living conditions.

ROAD PLAN

The term modern road plan can hardly be applied to the present road system in Benghazi even if we use the term in its widest scope. Several reasons contribute to this phenomenon. The gradual growth of the Arab quarter in an isolated site necessitated the consideration of the value of the proper expansion areas. This fact, together with other cultural, social and security reasons, has amplified the impact of the existing land use. The result, therefore, was a dense use of the available land without any plans for future evolution. Roads and streets were, as a consequence, regarded as amenities which have no significance to daily life. Therefore all streets in this section of the city, especially where the Italian planning schemes have failed to penetrate, are still

unsuitable for modern traffic. Most are too narrow to accommodate modern vehicles or even cabs and are also unpaved, while many are cul-de-sacs. (see Figure 13)

The Italian scheme for city development also created disadvantages to the evolution of a road plan.

First, the Italians ignored the fact that the Arab town is an indispensable part of modern Benghazi. The new developments created two separate quarters each with distinct road systems.

The Italians also greatly underestimated the future of Benghazi. The differences in the pattern and nature of their development schemes for both Benghazi and Tripoli underline this fact. The result is that the Italian section of Benghazi has itself begun to face the impact of the present traffic. The reasons which explain this contrast between Benghazi and Tripoli are:-

- (i) The width of the main streets is not enough to cope with the continuous increase in vehicles.
- (ii) The lack of permanent parking places.
- (iii) The failure to provide suitable roads anywhere around the city except where military purposes have necessitated them.

Another factor affecting the present road system in the city is the ignorance of the problem by the local authorities. Most of the roads and streets were greatly damaged during the Second World War, a feature which,

unfortunately, still characterizes every single road in the city. Moreover the Libyan authorities have paid little attention to developing new roads. Consequently, the tremendous increase of vehicles has posed a serious traffic problem.

Instrumental in the growing road and traffic problem is the fact that the harbour is the only outlet for exports and imports. Owing to oil discoveries, the latter needs heavy equipment, which has to be transported by heavy trucks through the main streets causing damage to the streets and delays to traffic. The construction of the outer harbour and the use of similar heavy trucks from the quarry site near the Royal Military Academy has almost completely ruined part of the route between the city and the Airport.

Moreover, the fact that the city has only two bus routes has made numerous dwellers, especially those of Sabri and eastern Berka, depend on the use of horse drawn carriages as their main means of transport. The use of these carriages delays traffic and increases dirt in the city. The same applies to the use of the smaller carriages drawn by donkeys, which are advantageous in the narrow streets of the Arab quarter. Licences for these carriages totalled 1351 in 1962. These carriages are classified into two main categories:-

- (a) 773 horse drawn carriages which are in turn subdivided into two groups: the Carro is mainly used for transporting goods from the harbour to the town and vice-versa, or as means for public transport especially between the Fonduk and Berka, and the Arabia or cab is used only for public transport. The total number of these cabs is 110, of which only 99 were in use in 1962.
- (b) 448 Carrusa have a similar character to the Carros, but are smaller in most cases and drawn by a donkey.

Carriages account for almost 10 per cent of the vehicle licences in the city.

Other difficulties arise from the present system of road repairs where public contractors proceed without any real governmental supervision and fail to conform to the official plans. Moreover, conflicts between different departments - for example the Water Works who dig up a road without the co-operation of the Public Transport Department which is the responsible body for road fitness - mean that many streets are out of use for days or weeks. Considerable changes in attitude are required if Benghazi is to cope with its present rate of growth.

There are three main entrances to Benghazi: to the north the city is linked with the Jebel via Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass; to the east the city is linked through the ring road with Benina Village; to the south the link is between the city and Tripolitania via Agedabia. As far as the city road plan

itself is concerned the former entrances all lead to the square of Omar Tosoun - the Christmas tree square - known to the Italians as Piazza Cane. The main square is not by any means the city centre, as in Tripoli and Alexandria.

The Road system north of the former square is served by four main streets. The first and most important of these streets is Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass. The street is comparatively wide (4 ms.) especially in the part north of the memorial tomb of Omar el-Mukhtar. Sharia el-Giazair, also known as Via Fume, links Sharia St. Lot with Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass after following the edge of the Salmani Shebkha where they meet immediately beyond the old town entrance. On the other side of the old quarter two streets link Sharia el-Istiklal with Sharia el-Mustashfa, the widest street in the northern edge of the Arab town which joins Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass at the cross road near the hospital. These are Sharia Omar el-Mukhtar and Sharia el-Mehdawi. Because of its junction with Suk el-Dalam and Suk el-Geriâ the former is closed for traffic. The other, although partly of Italian origin, is also practically unused because of its poor condition, especially north of Sidi Khrebish cemetery. This street should be immediately repaired and widened

in its northern part in order to alleviate the traffic problem, within and outside the Arab quarter and to divert heavy trucks from the main streets. Other minor streets in this part include Sharia Gasr Hamed, Sharia el Aguib, Sharia Omar ibn el-Khattab which all link Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass with Sharia Omar el-Mukhtar.

During the Italian domination private motor vehicles were very rare indeed and were mostly restricted to Italian citizens. The Second World War brought thousands of abandoned military vehicles into public use in all parts of Cyrenaica. These vehicles have done a useful job as one of the main means for public and private transport all over the province. In Benghazi these khaki painted vehicles were widely used until very few years ago. The oil industry accelerated their disappearance. Precise statistics of the number of vehicles, garages and mechanical shops - repair shops - in Benghazi are lacking for the last decade, but the following figures obtained from reliable public sources may well throw some light in this aspect. In 1947 the city had 8 car repair shops and the vehicles numbered about 4,000, mostly of military character and origin. In July 1956 the official number of vehicles was 7,080. In 1962 the number of repair shops rose to 40, the number of garages to 12 (cf. 2 in 1956) and the number of private vehicles to 13,800.

Moreover another 1,000 vehicles were believed to be in use by the government, oil companies and as taxis. These figures indicate an increase of over one thousand vehicles every year, or about three vehicles every day for the last six years. This figure, although high for the city road system to cope with, is small compared with that of Tripoli where the daily increase in cars is believed to be about 13 vehicles a day.

The simple methods by which driving licences are issued, and other factors account for the higher car insurance fees charged in Benghazi than in Tripoli; they are always higher by an average of 60% to 70% than in Tripoli where accidents are far ~~less~~ frequent.

Benghazi's road system and traffic problems need close examination based upon the following suggestions:-

- (i) Work should immediately start to find a solution to the complex traffic problems in the Arab town. This can be done in three ways: by finding means for an east to west modern road through this part of the city, by cutting a similar road through this part of the city from north to south, and finally by using parts of the two cemeteries as car parks.
- (ii) Two new roads should be constructed to link the city with the ring road in the east. One of these roads should cross the Salmani Sebkhah opposite

the northern end of Via Fume. The other road should join the ring road Via Ras Abeida near the Silos.

- (iii) Road maintenance should be carried out by the Road Department itself and not by individual contractors.
- (iv) A modern driving licence board should be created as a branch of the Traffic Police Department. Some individuals can get their driving licence by paying the required fees without attending any driving test. It is not surprising to know that an estimate of 15 to 25 per cent of the people who at present own cars are not yet in possession of a driving licence.
- (v) A traffic census within and around the city should take place as soon as possible in order to ascertain the main congested areas.
- (vi) Further installation of traffic lights should take place in areas where they are badly needed; there are only three sets of traffic lights in the whole city.
- (vii) Permanent parking places should be provided.
- (viii) Main roads should be divided into two well defined lanes.
- (ix) More trained traffic policemen are required.
- (x) One or two permanent emergency traffic police cars are needed not only to help survivors of accidents

but also to clear the accident spots for the rest of the traffic.

DRAINAGE.

Another aspect of Benghazi's recent unplanned development is its drainage system. Despite the last phase of expansion, the city authorities have not provided an appropriate drainage system, and thus there is grave risk to public health.

The existing drainage area in Benghazi is only a very small proportion of the total area. The area of the Arab town with the nearby Italian quarter from the Harbour to the western limit of Sidi Husein is the only zone which enjoys such a vital service. The existing drainage facilities which are mainly for sewage do not function properly. The main disadvantages of the sewage network in this area are:-


- (a) The three pumping diesel stations operating in this part date from the early years of the Italian rule and are still manually controlled.
- (b) The sewers themselves still suffer from the effects of the War.
- (c) The use of short sea outfalls opposite one of the crowded areas of the city is a danger to health.
- (d) The existing pipelines are only of 4 to 6 inches in diameter and are therefore of limited capacity.

Drainage for surface water suffers from similar disadvantages, with perhaps more noticeable effect on most roads of the city. Outlays for water rainfall and other surface water are limited in number and more important most of them are out of action. The flooding of most streets, including even those of the Italian quarter, during torrential periods of rain indicates the deficiency of this kind of drainage.

In 1961 a British engineering firm produced a preliminary report on sewerage and sewage purification in Benghazi. The report is considered by many officials as a first-class piece of work. According to this new plan, which unfortunately has not yet been put into practice despite the grave situation, the city has been divided into 14 different sewage areas including those four areas which now have sewage drainage. (Figure 14). In the old drained area alone, one of the present pumping stations is to be abandoned, and a new station is to be constructed in a more suitable place while the other remaining two stations are to be reconstructed. The city, according to this project, will have in all fourteen pumping stations of which 12 are entirely new. The case for dividing the city into this high number of drained areas is due to the topography and the soil character of the different areas.

The new project aims not only to serve the whole city of Benghazi, from this point of view, but also to purify

Figure 14



Benghazi: sewerage and sewage purification

the total sewage discharge by constructing a purification works at el-Guarsha Village 10 kilometres south of the city. At present the sewage of the drained area is discharged to the sea from four outfalls all of which lie between Torelli school and the northern wall of the outer basin of the city harbour, an area where sea water pollution is proved to be considerably high. " The present discharge of crude sewage to the sea via short sea outfalls is unsatisfactory and the resulting pollution of the coastal waters must be dealt with if the health of the inhabitants is to be preserved and the coastal amenities are to be maintained."(5)

The report classifies the areas from one to nine as the main development areas in the city and therefore work should start in these areas, as an urgent matter, whereafter work can be devoted to the remaining zones as the second step of this vital scheme. The main pumping station will take place north of the ring road at the point where it meets the Benghazi Soluk railway. The purification works is sited at Guarsha in order to avoid interference with the future development of the city and to provide water for agricultural development in the area. The report stresses the fact that although the effluent, estimated at 3,000,000 gallons per day, will be chemically pure, it will be still unwise to use it for irrigation for any crops which are

likely to be eaten raw because of the fact that the flow will still contain a considerable number of potential bacteria.

The implementation of the new scheme, despite its comparatively high cost of about 3,000,000 pounds, is the only solution to deal with this vital service. "It is hardly necessary for us to stress the highly unsatisfactory conditions and the urgent need to remedy the present situation. Coupled with the insanitary conditions in some parts of the city there must be inevitably great risk to the health of the inhabitants."⁽⁶⁾ The scheme, besides its remedy to the public health, will also help enormously to maintain the coastal amenities and more important it will provide a sewage system for the first time, for places like Sabri and Berka, where not less than 60% of the whole city population is found. It will also provide about 2,000 to 3,000 tons of dried sewage sludge, which could be utilized as fertilizers. Above all, the scheme will certainly help any further expansion in the city.

ADMINISTRATIVE QUARTERS

During the long Turkish domination, Benghazi was never regarded as an important administrative, commercial or trade post. The Turkish governors resided in the city castle surrounded by their guards to protect them and to accompany their envoys to the interior for tax collections. Things remained much the same even during the second Ottoman

occupation when the province became directly governed from Constantinople after the fall of the Karamanli family. It was during this period when a few administrative improvements were introduced for the first time. One of these improvements was the recognition of the Municipality as the main administrative body. The division of the city into its twelve quarters was the first step in this direction. However, although these changes seem to reduce the centralization of the Wali's power, they were never practically applied; in other words, the Wali remained the only authority who ran everything according to his own wishes. After the Italian takeover administrative measures were in the hands of the military commander for many years. The progressive restoration of peaceful conditions brought the introduction of separate administrative bodies to control the city and the province. The defeat of the Axis forces in the Western Desert radically changed the destiny of the whole of Libya by the arrival of the British Military Administration which, because of the prevailing standard of education and the tremendous lack of trained Libyan personnel, ran the country in a similar centralized way. There was only one major difference: the introduction of training schemes for Libyan future staff, especially in Cyrenaica, where all Italian citizens left with the last German withdrawal from Benghazi.

Independence was undoubtedly the first step towards

bringing national administration to Benghazi. Cyrenaica being one of the three federal states or provinces which form the United Kingdom of Libya, gave Benghazi the status of being the Provincial Capital. Two important difficulties were soon faced with the new development apart from the urgent need for administrative personnel which to some extent has been justified by the British efforts in this field during their transitional period of rule. The first of these difficulties was the shortage of premises to accommodate the different Nazirates - provincial ministries. The second major difficulty was the widespread damage to the Italian-designed premises suitable as administrative quarters. Further difficulties were encountered when the Federal Government moved to Benghazi. The impact of the new expanding administrative functions in Benghazi after independence was met by the use of every single suitable building in the different parts of the city. The gradual transfer of the Federal Government to Tripoli for the second time and eventually to Beida has alleviated the accommodation problem in Benghazi, and has given room for expansion to the Provincial Government.

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CHAPTER IV.

LAND USE

Disadvantages of position and site have for too long determined the shape and the size of Benghazi. The Italians with their modern techniques were the first to modify the surrounding landscape and consequently allowed for controlled expansion. Under the Turks the town was confined to what is now called the Arab quarter. Within these limits planning was totally unknown except perhaps around the Great Mosque and the Governor's Palace which resulted in a spontaneous growth.

The areas available for development around the Arab town were limited and the fact that in the north there were sand dunes along the shore and wide salt marshes inland, made the Italians attempt their expansion scheme at the expense of reducing the size of the Salmani Sekha particularly in the east and the south-east of the Arab town.


Taking advantage of all directions of possible expansion and leaving the Arab quarter almost untouched, produced heterogeneous, but new and completely contrasting surroundings to old Benghazi. The impact of the recent discovery of oil has not only proved strong enough to modify a great deal of the existing morphology, but also to add new parts as well. It is within these successive, but divergent phases of growth, that the valuation of the present land use has to be

investigated. A full assessment is impossible, however, owing to the lack of early records and maps and in addition plans for future development.

Generally speaking, land use within the city boundaries can be classified into two distinct groups; developed areas, and waste land or salt marshes and sand dunes. The degree and purpose of development in the first areas vary according to their location and their phase of growth.

In the Arab quarter, land use has been much influenced by the traditional commercial activities of its main suks. Areas adjacent to the Great Mosque were, no doubt, the first to attract the establishment of commercial surroundings. Sharia Suk el-Dalam through Suk el-Gerid and its extension in Sharia Bughula are typical of a compact oriental city shopping area. Along this north-easterly direction of the main suks, the Arab quarter has developed mainly as a residential area. South of the Municipality Square the Italian planning has radically transformed the southern extension of the Arab town. The new plan as well as extending the former commercial areas through Sharia Omar el-Mukhtar has, which is more important, produced new conceptions of land use. One of these conceptions is the introduction of multiple-storey buildings with shops occupying the first floors. Buildings in the Arab town are mostly one storey high (see Fig. 15). The design of the arch

Figure 15



Distribution of upper storey buildings

system on both sides of the main streets is another new feature. The fact that Italian Benghazi, as a whole, has developed new functions is perhaps the most significant factor which accordingly stimulated, or more precisely imposed, new forms of land use to suit the new functions. The military installations, the administrative and residential sites, the railway and the harbour are illustrative examples. In the case of the recent phase of expansion, land use has been determined either by pure residential purposes or by commercial activities in the form of oil company sites.

Benghazi's leading functions are no doubt commerce and administration. The military status has become insignificant since the defeat of the Axis forces in the last war. Industry is limited and inefficient and handicrafts are very rare.

Shops

The main city streets, with considerable concentration of shops as well as the suks of the old town, are Sharia Omar el-Mukhtar - a joint extension to the old suks through the Municipality Square, Sharia Omar ibn el-Khattab and Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass. Sharia el-Istiklal and Sharia el-Aguib are also important, but with less density of shops. The spread of shops along Sharia St. Lot and Sharia Adrian Pelt is a recent feature. In Berka to the south-east and in Sabri to the north, shops are only found along the main streets like those leading to Berka Square or those of Dakakin Hadmid along

the main road to Barce. The plotting of the distribution of shops, especially of those in the old quarter, is handicapped by the absence of suitable scale maps. Nevertheless, the distribution of those along the main streets of modern Benghazi indicates that no specialization of any great extent can be found anywhere. Basically speaking, specialization in specific items is not a common practice even along the main and most modern shopping streets: Omar el-Mukhtar and Sharia el-Isliklal for instance, where shoes, shirts, ties, perfumes and perhaps jewellery can all be found in one shop. Even so, it is evident that the former two streets form a single shopping area not only more modern and semi-specialized, but also unique in the sense that shops here resemble proper commercial establishments in view of their moderate sizes and efficiency. Along the remaining streets of Omar ibn el-Ass, Omar ibn el-Khattab and el-Aguib, shops are generally smaller in size and less efficient as most of them keep no regular accounts, except perhaps in the case of general stores and grocers run by Greeks. Other features characterizing the distribution of these shops is the fact that there is a tendency towards specialization in food-stuffs, especially those of Sharia el-Aguib. Otherwise the lack of homogeneous distribution is more obvious than in the former shopping area. This is in spite of the fact that the density of shops increases to the west in the cases of Sharia Osmar el-Khattab and el-Aguib and to the south

towards Maidan Omar Tosoun in the case of Sharia Omar ibn el-Ass (see Fig.16).

Expansion in trade and commerce with a growing need for luxury goods, has established the need for further commercial sites and in particular modern shops and showrooms. Because of this most first floors of newly built buildings, even in areas as far as those of the Municipality development land in Sabri, are being devoted to such activities. Furthermore, the conversion of many residential premises into commercial sites is now taking place in many parts of the city outside the Arab quarter (see Plate XVII). In brief, although there is no distinct and clear specialization in the distribution of shops in modern Benghazi, it is noticeable, on the other hand, that the degree of divergence tends to decrease with the importance of the street. Land values and high rents and perhaps education too, are the factors responsible.

The general distribution of shops in the Arab quarter, in spite of its wider range, is more symmetrical in the sense that it can be roughly classified into rather distinct specialized areas. Suk el-Dalam, the most southerly part of the quarter's shopping area, is perhaps the only street devoted solely to shops in all of Benghazi. The uniformity of its modern oriental architecture has certainly linked it to modern Benghazi. Shops here, although varying in size,



Conversion of residential premises into commercial ones

nearly all deal with textiles. Jewellery, household equipment and shoe shops are also found. In the adjacent suk el-Gerid, although specialization is less extensive, the general tendency is towards foodstuff and household equipment. There are hardly any differences between this suk and that of Sharia Bughula, except that shops in the suk area are bigger in size and that a considerable number of them act as wholesalers as well. Other suks in the quarter include the suk of el-Khaddarin (greengrocers) and suk el-Saiagha (craftsmen) which are both parallel to suk el-Dalam from the east. The first so-called market is a narrow street with almost complete specialization in vegetables and fruits. The second, which is a northern extension of the previous suk, has, surprisingly enough, denser concentration of butcher shops than of crafts, which gives it its name. Elsewhere shops are few and scattered except along the extreme north of Sharia Abdalla Bala and its conjunction with Sharia el-Mustashfa and the western side of the Fonduk.

Government offices.

Distribution of government offices and public buildings during the Italian reign has been of great importance in terms of their concept of land use. The present status of both Omar el-Mukhtar and Istiklal streets has no doubt been achieved through their earlier importance as the nucleus of the leading government departments. Since independence and

because of the new administrative methods, administrative expansion, which coincided with economic difficulties, had to be fulfilled at the expense of other forms of land use: residential premises, for instance, or the conversion of minor public buildings into ministries. It is true that the Provincial Government may be over elaborate, but the fact that many of its main departments suffer inconvenience as well as being widely distributed explain the fact that no direct relationship between the present distribution of administrative quarters and their function can be established. Gasar el-Wilaia, the Provincial Government Headquarters, is the most important administrative quarter in the city. Within this so-called castle, which the Italians rebuilt on the former site of the Turkish castle, there are the Governor's Office, the Headquarters of the Executive Council, the Nazirates of the Interior, Finance and Economics and that of Justice, the National Bank of Libya (Cyrenaica Branch), the Provincial Police Headquarters and the Federal High Court. In other words, this castle accommodates only three out of nine provincial nazirates. The distribution of the other nazirates is divided among the quarters of el-Sherif, Bin Isa and that of Sidi Husein where the Nazirates of Public Works and Agriculture are found. The premises of the Public Works Nazirate is the western extension of the railway station. The Nazirate of Agriculture, on the other hand, has newly constructed premises built with the assistance

of the Libyan-American Joint Services. At the south-east end of el-Sherif quarter lie the premises of the Nazirate of Education. South of this nazirate in the quarter of Bin Isa and along the eastern side of Sharia Omar Ibn el-Ass lie the Nazirate of Communcation and Transport and the Nazirate of Health. On the western side of the same road and opposite the latter two nazirates, which are also of Italian construction, lies a new three-storey building designed for dwelling purposes, but now rented to the Provincial Government for the Nazirate of Labour and Social Affairs.

Other important provincial administrative quarters include the Municipality which was also rebuilt by the Italians on the site of the old Municipality, and the newly constructed building for the Legislative Council, the Tourist Department, the central police and traffic stations and the Mutasarrifia of Benghazi. Buildings of federal status include the Parliament, the Federal Government Headquarters, the Development Council, the Libyan University, the Post Office, the Federal Court, the National Insurance Institute, the Immigration Department, the Customs Department and the Army Headquarters.

Administrative quarters which are not located in Italian built premises are very few indeed. They are limited to the Nazirate of Labour and Social Affairs, the Legislative Council, the Mutasarrifia of Benghazi and those still under construction such as the courts compound and the new post office.

Residential

There is no question that most of the recent physical growth of the city is due to the residential expansion whereas military installations were among the main reasons under the Italian rule. Among the basic differences between the two phases of growth is the fact that planning, in general, was more of a reality under the Italians than it is today. It is true that the area developed by the Italians is not very big in comparison with the size of present Benghazi, but even so, it is clear that the Italians have indeed done their best to differentiate between the different land use requirements. The well defined residential areas of Scabli and that of Sharia Adrian Pelt are illustrative examples. In the remaining parts land use was carefully selected to suit the needs of their community.

Inside the Arab quarter and apart from the earlier defined commercial streets and essential amenities like cemeteries and mosques, the whole place is still devoted to residential purposes. Suburbs like Sabri and Berka too have similar residential characteristics.

The estimated increase of the population of the city during the last eight years is well over 50,000 inhabitants. Land values and the physical limitations are two of the main factors which have greatly influenced the nature, extent and direction of the new residential expansion aiming to fulfill the needs of this sudden population increase. The

northern slum area of Sabri is unquestionably one of the poorest and most densely populated areas not only in Benghazi, but in the whole of Libya. It is true that Sabri sand dunes have been for a long time a nucleus of a poor residential area and in recent years it has become the focus for thousands of new immigrants. The real attraction of Sabri besides its location is its unique atmosphere as well as the fact that land, though it has more or less the same value as in eastern Berka and most areas surrounding the Salmani Sebkhah in the east, can be either temporarily obtained free of charge or cheaply rented instead of being purchased. Because of this, expansion not only extended the limits of the shanty town, but also intensified the density of land use except along the main road to Barce where land prices have increased five-fold in the last three years due to the modern development.

Within the limits of Benghazi proper land prices are very high especially along Omar el-Mukhtar and Istiklal streets where the value of the square metre is estimated at £165 compared with only £1 per metre in the shanty town of Sabri. Elsewhere it varies according to location, but generally speaking, it hardly falls below £10 except in some remote parts of the Arab town. This means that new expansion, which is mainly a consequence of superimposition, besides being limited is also devoted to serving an entirely different class and purpose from that responsible for the expansion of the northern area of Sabri. Commercial purposes as well as the

provision of living accommodation for foreigners are the main reasons. South-east of Benghazi proper, Berka has been growing mainly as a second-class residential area especially around Berka square where land prices range between £3 to £5. East of Berka and in Dar el-Kish the residential character changes, giving way to scattered shanty sites. Further to the south-east Fuehat has emerged as the most modern residential suburb. High rents combined with dominant garden villas, dwelling units different and unfamiliar to most local people and the absolute lack of public transport have reserved most of the area to foreign residents and in particular those engaged in the oil industry. It is true that Fuehat is a new and distinct growing residential area - different from anywhere in Benghazi, but disadvantages like the absence of effective planning and official supervision are among the features reflecting the way in which the suburb is growing, that is, it was left to the individuals to decide upon the sites and styles of their properties. The fact that Fuehat is the property of a few landlords means that each owns separate groups of villas with perhaps a different architecture in every case. One of the serious disadvantages of Fuehat's growth is the rapid decrease in the best agricultural lands famous for their terra rossa.

Trade

The trading and commercial activities of Benghazi are

fundamentally those associated with the small shop unit rather than with specialized, distinct and large commercial enterprises. The wholesale trade in products other than agricultural ones is almost indistinguishable from the retail trade and consequently no specialization of this kind can be found. In other words, it is within the limits of the previously mentioned streets, especially those in the Arab quarter, that most commercial activities are carried out. The main factors underlining this organization of trading activities are tradition and the nature of most marketed commodities such as sugar, tea, olive oil, flour and textiles and their need for extensive storage space. It is easier to find houses in the vicinity or even attached to the shops for the purpose of storing these commodities in the old sector of the city. It is because of this function that the Arab quarter has retained its importance in spite of the difficulties of transportation.

The only wholesale market is the so-called Fonduk, though retailing is also important there. The fact that the marketing of agricultural commodities requires a large space made the Italians construct this market, which since then has become the focus of all important agricultural trade activities. The site of the Fonduk is at the eastern end of the areas developed by the Italians and in all probability was meant not only to serve the bulk of the inhabitants, but also to provide an easy link with the Jebel agricultural areas.

Industry

The role of industry in the life of the city is very small, not simply because of the limited number of industries, and their dispersed distribution, but also because of their inefficiency and consequently low productivity. Because of this there is little relationship between the distribution of industries and their function on one hand and the growth of the city as a whole on the other.

Crafts too are limited and cannot be called established as in the case of most other pre-industrial cities. Local shoe-making is an exception, but cannot survive long because of strong competition from manufactured imported shoes. The same is true of local jewellery making which suffers also from its poor quality.

Apart from these two crafts which are associated with specific sections of the commercial area of the Arab quarter, no further specialization can be found anywhere else. In view of such limitations in the case of both industries and crafts it is obvious that the present general pattern of land use cannot be seriously affected by the actual distribution of these two functions.

Entertainment


Generally speaking, entertainment facilities are confined to cinemas and cafes. The cinemas, with other but more sophisticated facilities like night clubs, are

practically all located in the modern part of the town as essential amenities to meet the demand of the foreign community. As regards the distribution of cafes, the few first and second class categories are similarly distributed. The remainder tend on the whole to follow the density of shops in the Arab quarter where cafes are often very small in size and mainly depend on the custom of a handful of local shop-keepers who often buy drinks for their friends and customers.

Future Plans

The inefficiency of the civil service, the influence of tribalism on political life, and above all the strong impact of the discovery of oil all resulted in a complete lack of planning anywhere in the province. As far as Benghazi is concerned the following disadvantages from a general land use point of view are clear examples:

- (1) The decision to allow the establishment of a huge petroleum tank reservoirs north of Juliána Beach, probably the best possible site for new hotels and casinos (see plate XVIII)
- (2) Despite the great shortage of land suitable for residential or recreational purposes, the Salmani Sebkhā and those south of the inner harbour, in spite of their unhealthy conditions, remain as they were left by the Italians, while uncontrolled expansion is being allowed on the best and only agricultural land of Fuehat.



Juliana petroleum tank resevoirs

- (3) The preservation of most military installations in spite of the urgent need for suitable schools, and the preservation of the huge and central site of the railway station, despite its negligible role in the present economy.
- (4) The location of the Libyan University in the centre of the town where premises do not meet the space requirements of half the present students enrolled.

No plans are as yet in existence. It is true, however, that the local authorities have already undertaken the reconstruction of both the harbour and the city airport, but it is essential to remember that both schemes are financed by the Federal Government and, more important, that both projects were functioning normally and that their construction will not be of great significance at least in the near future. The badly-needed drainage scheme however, which was considered four years ago, is still forgotten. The decision to transfer the old site of the Municipality to the abandoned stadium south of the Fonduk, prior to any road survey, and the filling of the sebkha nearby is bound to create traffic problems and may well affect the commercial importance of the nearby surroundings.

CHAPTER V

FUNCTIONS

PAST AND PRESENT FUNCTIONS

The exact factors behind the Greeks' shift from the well watered and fertile Jebel to the barren and futile plain called now after the city of Benghazi, are not yet well known. Among the chief suggestions is the assumption of military protection. The reasons supporting such an idea are: (1) the fact that the Greek concentrations of population were all the time mainly associated with the Jebel areas means that Eusperides could not serve as any important administrative centre; (2) the agricultural productivity of Eusperides Plain was, in all probability, at the time of its foundation much the same as it is now. This suggestion is based on the fact that climatic conditions, at least since the second century B.C., were very much the same as they are now. This implies that the early centre of Benghazi could not survive independently from the productive Jebel areas. In other words, the construction of Eusperides and later Berenice cannot be justified except in their defensive character. On the other hand, two eminent disadvantages stand against the military importance of such an isolated post; (a) the lack of evidence of any land roads between this centre and the principal centres on the Jebel. R.G. Goodchild in his article "Mapping Roman Libya" points out the uncertainty of only one track between Berenice and the

centre of the Jebel. (10) (b) The fact that the centre was taken over by the nomads who were once defeated and forced to withdraw by a foreign fleet from Syracuse and not by the Greeks from the nearby Jebel. The gradual silting up of Eusperides' harbour resulting in the transfer of its site to Berenice also indicates the military insignificance of the centre.

Under the Romans, who also followed the Greek concentration on the Jebel, Berenice was known to have had its walls rebuilt by the Emperor Justinian. This fact, besides suggesting that the place was still menaced by the nomadic tribes, also implies that Berenice could not function objectively except as a fortified military post to reduce the westerly menace of the war-like Berber tribes. Even before the arrival of the Arabs, agricultural achievements began to decline. In other words, the Jebel area gradually ceased to function as part of the granary of Rome. This unfortunate situation had caused the inevitable decline of the earlier cities especially when the newcomers decided to make of Barca - Barce - their own capital.

The military function of old Benghazi carried out by both Greeks and Romans was no longer a necessity under the Arab domain mainly because the Arabs shared the same nomadic way of life as the Berbers. Therefore, they were able to fight the Berbers in the desert itself and so managed to control them.

As far as Benghazi is concerned, it is evident that settled life was brought to its end in all probability before A.D. 1000.

"The History of Islamic Benghazi before the rule of the Karamanlis is very meagrely documented. We do not know for how long after the first Arab invasion (A.D.643) the old city of Berenice remained inhabited; but it is reasonably certain that by the 11th century it was a heap of ruins without fixed occupants".⁽²⁾

According to some writers the revival of Benghazi began as early as 1250 A.D. when the place-name was recorded on what was called "Composso da Navigare". Nevertheless, information is entirely lacking until about 1450 when the rebuilding of the former site began to take place. The new development was not of any military character; on the contrary, it was necessitated by trade and the decline of the former Fatimid Capital of Agedabia.

In 1638 the decision to bring Cyrenaica under the Ottoman rule was finally fulfilled. The new event gave Benghazi the status of being the provincial administrative capital, a feature which lasted throughout the 273 years of Turkish rule. Political and military requirements facing the new Italian occupation favoured the continuity of the administrative functions of Turkish Benghazi. The Italian intentions behind the occupation of Libya as a whole were a combination of political, military and social factors. Politically, Italy had to do so in order to rival the British and French governments. Militarily, the Italian dream of remaking the Mediterranean a Roman lake was no longer secret, and socially the impact of rapid population increase was a heavy burden and therefore new colonies must be found.

As far as Benghazi was concerned, the Italian authorities, although strongly opposed by local resistance especially in the Jebel and the interior, had decided to go ahead with their development schemes. Benghazi had to become a strong point with a town wall in order to cope with the new and unexpected conditions. From 1911 until 1931 although primarily an administrative centre, Benghazi remained at the same time a military base. Because of this Benghazi became the most important city in the whole province. "Political centres geared to administrative or military functions are unquestionably the dominant cities in the society".⁽³⁾

Other functions, such as industrial, health, entertainment, religious and cultural, were also found in Italian Benghazi, but were less important. Industry for instance was rare, and included only two factories of soft drinks, two for alcoholic drinks, one ice factory, one electric flour mill and 30 mechanical shops. Salt and sponge production was the most important of all industries. In other words, the city requirements, excluding the limited agricultural products, were completely dependent on importation. Consequently, the city harbour was of great importance and that is why the Italians had undertaken a formidable task of providing a huge and modern harbour though the outside part of it was totally for strategic and military purposes. Unfortunately these industries were all destroyed during the North African campaign. The Italians built the present general hospital, the present clinic as well as many

other dispensaries and chemist shops, but unfortunately, they were meant to serve the Italian citizens in the first place. The same applies to entertainment as natives were not allowed access to any first-class hotels, restaurants, picture houses or beaches. The religious function of Benghazi was also insignificant if compared with the small and isolated oasis of Giaraboub, the headquarters of the Senusi family; and before the opening of the Libyan University in 1956 Benghazi had few cultural or educational facilities mainly because both Turks and Italians had kept natives' education at its lowest level.

Under the British military administration (1942-49) the city remained almost unchanged from its disastrous fate during the war, but it became the focus of Libyan politics especially after the foundation of the political organization of Omar el-Mukhtar. Administrative improvements by the British authorities included:

(1) Dividing the province into three administrative areas with headquarters in Benghazi, Barce and Derna. Each of these areas was controlled by a British administrator until 1949 when they were replaced by natives.

(2) The foundation of the Senusi defence force, now known as Cyrenaica Defence Force or C.D.F.

(3) The establishment of what was called the Public Courts.

(4) The foundation of a new Customs and Excise Department.

(5) The foundation of the Public Works department together with the reorganization of educational and telecommunication departments.

The declaration of independence of the province announced, by His Excellency the Prince of Cyrenaica on the first of June 1949 initiated a new phase not only as far as life and conditions in the city were concerned, but also from a national point of view. The new development gave Benghazi the status of being the official national capital. On the 9th of November of the same year, the United Nations agreed to give Libya, the former Italian colony, its independence. The new event which was finally fulfilled in 1951 gave Benghazi another and more important administrative function when constitutionally it was proclaimed as a federal co-capital with Tripoli.

The strike of oil in the Syrtic area in 1959 began the second major phase in the modern Libya. The location of Benghazi is more favourable than that of Tripoli in regard to the location of the main oilfields. The oil operations after the first oil strike of 1959 were accelerated and extended to other areas. The direct result of which was a continuous flow of capital especially after it became certain that large and commercial quantities of oil are found in more than one area. As a result Benghazi developed quickly in size, population and trade activities despite the decision of the federal Government to create a new capital at Beida.

According to Toni, Benghazi now falls functionally into four clear and defined zones; (4)

- (a) the urban nucleus with mixed commercial, administrative and residential development.

- (b) Shanty town of Sabri and other scattered places.
- (c) Modern residential areas of Benghazi, Berka and Fuehat.
- (d) The railway and harbour areas of Benghazi proper.

This classification, although useful from a general point of view, does not provide enough grounds to study the different functions of the town and their relative importance because the city lacks a defined and proper planning and consequently there is no single function which can be associated with a certain location. Because of this, each function, except education and health which were dealt with in the chapter on the growth of social services, is discussed separately. (See Figure 17).

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Prior to the Italian constructed means of communications, especially roads and railways, Benghazi lacked the facilities to achieve a real and objective position as the chief administrative centre mainly because it lies far away from the productive and most populated part of the province.

Under the Turks, the limited provincial administration was conducted according to the Governor's wishes and desires. Modern administration dates from Italian times. They managed to develop the necessary specialized departments even with the war still going on. The limited basic education made available to the natives meant that the country's affairs were practically all in Italian hands. Because of such policy the British Military Administration was faced by a serious shortage of Libyans

qualified to fill the gap caused by the repatriation of all the Italian personnel. To overcome this problem it was decided to make full use of the limited number of Libyans available, recruiting expatriates, especially those who had had experience in other Arab countries and finally exercising centralization of power in the hands of the top British personnel.

The independence of Cyrenaica in 1949 did not last long mainly because a few months later the fate of the other two provinces was also decided by the United Nations. The implementation of the U.N. decision granting independence to all Libya in 1951 did not bring real changes to the former provincial structure type of government except perhaps the change of names and titles like for instance the title governor instead of prime minister and nazir instead of minister.

The new elaborate political frame of Cyrenaica and Libya in general, although maybe justifiable from a patriotic point of view, was on the other hand, a heavy burden and indeed beyond the province's capacity, for the following reasons:

- (1) The lack of enough trained personnel, a feature which still exists.
- (2) The lack of suitable premises to accommodate the large number of government departments.
- (3) The acute financial difficulties.

However, these difficulties were eventually overcome by different means, especially continuous help from different

organizations of the U.N., Britain, the United States as well as many other nations.

Excluding the federal Government employees from Cyrenaica, the province alone has a total of about 15 thousands as local government staff. This figure which corresponds to about 5% of the whole population is exceptionally high in an agricultural community like that of Cyrenaica, and over 65% are concentrated in Benghazi. Among the main reasons to account for this phenomenon are: the centralization of provincial affairs in the hands of local ministers residing in the capital; the interference through nepotism and power to appoint followers and supporters without regard to their need; and finally the growing desire for government jobs not only because of the security of the offer, but also because of the limited work involved. A clear example of such a situation is illustrated by the 40 office attendants at the Libyan University. A similar situation is found in every single department not only in regard to the number of office attendants (Bawabeen), but also from the actual number of redundant staff. In this respect the United Nations Report on the Economic Development of Libya states "the mission is in no doubt that the total number of staff employed by the provincial government could and should be reduced." (5)

The present government system in Cyrenaica is no doubt elaborate if judged by the national income and the population.

There are 9 local ministers, the King's deputy or the Governor, the head of the Executive Council and a legislative council of 20 members. The striking feature in spite of the existence of this top machinery and other numerous departments is the fact that little economic and social benefits have been achieved. Not only this, but the influence of tribal and political attitudes have shown that senior officials are often shifted around the different departments without regard to their special experience and qualifications. This is not calculated to promote efficiency or morale, and if the practice continues it will become increasingly difficult to retain good men in the public service. Furthermore, the multiplication of different government departments besides resulting in confusion of responsibilities, which in turn slows the process of administration, often makes it impossible to take decisions at all. The interpretation of the provincial responsibilities too often causes direct conflict between the local government and the federal authorities.

The question now is what will happen when the present federal system is finally abolished? To assess the impact of such a step - undoubtedly favoured by most Libyans - at the present time is rather premature mainly because it is not known which city would be chosen as the national capital. From recent official speeches one concludes that they are in favour of Tripoli City as the future capital of Libya. If so, it would mean

that the proposed capital of Beida under construction is going to be abandoned despite the formidable cost of over 35 million pounds. To justify this wasted expenditure, Beida looks as if it is going to be a university city. Public opinion has been against the Beida scheme from the start, and I have no doubt that when the proposal of transferring the university becomes known, it will be strongly opposed. However, the certain thing is that Benghazi's future will be greatly challenged especially if Tripoli becomes the future capital. The reasons for this are not only that Benghazi's present status of being the provincial capital would no longer be in existence, but also it will cease to be a co-capital of the whole country. What would happen to the thousands of its provincial employees? It is true that some of them will retain their jobs, but surely the majority will lose their jobs or accept a transfer to Tripoli. The response to the latter solution is difficult to judge, although experience with the Federal Government has shown that such a solution is greatly appreciated by the young and high-class personnel. Other disadvantages would include the loss of prestige as well as the loss of economic and financial gains now enjoyed by the presence of the federal authorities in Beida and in Benghazi itself.

All these events, especially if combined with the transfer of the Libyan University and the cessation of the activities performed by 12 foreign embassies now found in

Benghazi because of lack of accommodation in Beida, will have a sound influence on the city's growth, especially when oil exploitations come to their final stage.

THE PORT

The earliest records describing the port of Benghazi are those given by the Beechey brothers in 1928 and James Hamilton in 1856. According to the first the description reads "The Harbour of Benghazi appears to have been formerly capable of containing good-sized vessels, and even in the recollection of some of the present inhabitants, the Bashaw's ships were accustomed to lay, where now only boats can be accommodated. At present it can only be entered by small vessels, drawing seven to eight feet of water, and that merely in moderate weather."⁽⁶⁾ The disadvantage of the Beechey's account is that they did not locate the landing²-post or the dockyard on their plan of the port and the neighbourhood of Benghazi. This disadvantage which also was made by J. Hamilton makes us wonder which part of the present three harbours was used most. According to some, people, the Turks were first to use the south-eastern edge of the present inner harbour. This assumption which has no material proof to support it, is doubtful not mainly because this part lies far from the main inhabited area of the town, but also because it lacked land communication as well. It is more probable that the Turks' first port installations were built at the present site of the central harbour. This part besides being well protected by the north-westerly reefs, and where the water was, in all probability, deep enough to accommodate vessels drawing seven to eight feet of water,

is also the nearest possible site for such purposes.

28 years after the Beecheys, J. Hamilton described the port as follows: "the depth of water in the small part of the ancient harbour, which is not yet sanded up, admits no vessel which draws more than ten feet of water; after September the passage is so insecure that all direct intercourse ceases and letters then can only be conveyed from Malta by Tripoli, whence there is a weekly courier who comes in thirteen days."⁽⁷⁾ In the late 19th century, conditions of the former harbour were improved by the building of what was called the mole of Turkey.

Under the early years of Italian domination consideration was given to promote and develop the status of the port in order to give Benghazi the intended leading role as the main administrative, commercial and military centre for this part of the new Colony." "Benghazi senti fino dai primi tempi della nostra occupazione la imperiosa necessita di un Sicuro refugio che fosse degno della funzione che l'economia generale della colonia le assegnava come principale centro abitato della costa Cirenaica."⁽⁸⁾ Because of this many commissions were appointed to study the project and to provide the plans for the new harbour. In 1920 the final plan was accepted by the authorities. According to this plan (fig.18) it was decided on the following three operations:

- (a) The construction of the principal mole (1929-39), the erection of which was meant to provide the naval base, or what is now called the outer harbour.
- (b) The construction of the central mole by 1937.
- (c) The construction of Juliana mole by 1939.

The new plan therefore provides Benghazi with two main harbours, the naval base and the central harbour which was already under improvement of which the construction of the mole of Italy - replacing the old Turkish mole - was the most important.

During the second world war the harbour was severely damaged by persistent R.A.F. bombardment. Defects in the original design and the effect of storms were two major factors reducing its efficiency (see plate XIX).

The British Military Administration spent considerable sums in an attempt to save, at least, part of the principal mole in order to keep the middle harbour functioning normally, but unfortunately, their efforts were unavailing. The provincial authorities soon after independence began to feel the need for improving the deteriorating conditions of the port. Economic difficulties, on the other hand, have delayed a positive action until 1955 when a British firm of consulting engineers was appointed to advise on the reconstruction of the harbour. After one year of work a



Extensive damage to most moles


scheme aiming to reconstruct the middle harbour with a minimum cost of five and a half million pounds was submitted to the authorities who immediately rejected the plan and asked for a revised scheme which would not reduce the size of the former Italian port. A year later the new survey was completed and the cost went up to over seven million pounds. It is true that the port had been greatly destroyed during the war, a process accelerated by defects in the original design and marine erosion, but such destruction was mainly limited to those areas of military purposes. In other words, the middle harbour, the main commercial section was practically unchanged. Because of this many people believe that it is not justifiable, at least from an economic point of view, to embark on such a costly project especially when it is realized that this harbour handles less than one fifth of Libya foreign trade. The middle harbour also has two main drawbacks: it is sometimes inaccessible to shipping in stormy weather, and it is limited, at times, to vessels with a draft of $14\frac{1}{2}$ feet or less. In 1960, the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development devoted great efforts to find a justifiable answer to the controversy over the reconstruction of the harbour. "The mission has been aware of the keenness of the Cyrenaican government to develop the facilities of the port and render it accessible to large ships in all weather. The fact that Benghazi

is one of the capitals of Libya and also the capital of Cyrenaica, invests this project with a special importance: and there are other political and psychological considerations that were brought to the mission's attentions in this connection. We have borne all this in mind in studying the project and while our own examination has properly been confined to the economic, financial and technical aspects, we recognize that these are not the only criteria that have to be applied in a case of this kind. (9)

Thus it is obvious that the embarkation on a scheme aiming to revive the city's harbour to its original pre-war size and design is a matter based upon provincialism rather than future requirements. Because of this the former mission produced an outline plan, the aim of which was to abandon the reconstruction of the naval base and concentrate directly on the dredging and reconstruction of the middle harbour which, according to the mission's views, will be able to treble its present capacity. However, the new scheme was again rejected despite its low cost of only one and a half million pounds (see Fig. 19). The rejection of any project not giving Benghazi its dignified and huge pre-war port was based on the following facts:

- (1) The present status of the harbour often necessitates that some cargoes are still transhipped en route especially from Tripoli and Malta, an operation which undoubtedly increases the prices.

Figure 19



Benghazi harbour: after the International Bank

- (2) In bad weather many ships deliberately avoid calling, a phenomenon which gives Benghazi a bad reputation.
- (3) The fact that many cruise ships are bigger than can be accommodated or have to cancel landing because of rough seas, a situation which not only gives the place a bad name, but also cuts additional income.
- (4) A similar situation often occurs when embarking Libyan pilgrims to and from Mecca.
- (5) The discovery of oil necessitates the provision of a large and suitable harbour to handle the heavy equipment required for the oil operations.

But the question is, do these factors justify the spending of about 8 million pounds in a scantily populated area which has not yet any sound economic set-up? To answer this it is vital to point out at the beginning that many so-called development schemes in Libya are carried out because of political competition between the provinces rather than on the actual requirements. Cyrenaica always feels that it lacks many advantages which Tripolitania enjoys. Because of this Cyrenaicans feel that Benghazi ought to have nothing but a first-class port, a feature which will reduce the gap between the two rivals. The fact that the capital needed is derived from the federal budget means that Cyrenaica would not be affected by the high cost, on the contrary the project is a source of employment for hundreds

of local workers.

During the period 1954-58 the amount of commercial cargo passing through the harbour never exceeded 105,000 tons in any single year. Together with this the following criteria argue against a complete reconstruction programme.

- (a) In 1957 and 1958 it is found that the total amounts of transshipped cargo forwarded from Tripoli did not exceed 4,437 tons out of 88,000 tons in 1957 and 2,365 tons out of 81,000 in 1958. This means that the amount of cargo exposed to priced increase is insignificant indeed.
- (b) There are enough regular services provided by five shipping lines. These services which ensure an average of ten calls per month, appear to be adequate to handle the offered cargo. Not only this, but some of these ships, as well as the irregular tramps, are often faced with difficulties of finding cargoes, especially in the outward direction, and because of this there has been no serious congestion in the port since independence.
- (c) From the tourist point of view, Benghazi in any case lies far from the main archaeological sites and therefore it would be better if landing places are provided near these sites, where in many places such landings can be easily found.
- (d) As regards pilgrimage activities, it is unreasonable to

think of a serious problem not only because such events are limited to two occasions a year, but also because of the small number of pilgrims.

- (e) As far as the oil companies are concerned, it is true that such a scheme would help by reducing the time and cost, but these companies are financially able to use the better facilities of Tripoli harbour or to build their own oil harbours.

However, although it is clearly premature and economically unjustifiable, the provincial authorities in 1961 finally approved the full reconstruction programme and it is hoped that the work which is undertaken by an Anglo-Greek company will be finished by next year.

One finds great difficulty in getting enough information to assess the evolution of its function during the last decade or so. The following statistics show the trend of imports and exports either for commercial or military purposes for selected years. (10)

YEAR	IMPORTS		EXPORTS		
	Commercial	Military	Commercial	Military	Petrol
1954	48,517	46,639	20,578	27,359	19,907
1956	87,343	37,606	16,287	20,808	18,062
1958	71,447	3,133	244	17,176	28,930
1960	186,184	4,046	7,389	10,886	71,003

These statistics indicate that there has been a drastic increase in the commercial imports while those of military character have decreased considerably because of the reduction of the British forces in the city and the change in British strategy. Exports of both kinds have shown a continuous decrease. The facts behind the decline of commercial exports lie in the fact that there has been a drastic shift from the rural areas to the urban centres. The traditional agricultural products of cereals and live-stock have suffered a considerable decline. The continuous increase in oil imports is mainly due to the persistent increase in the number of motor vehicles.

The former figures also show that the port has handled a total cargo of 163,000 tons in 1954 against 270,508 tons in 1960. Of these figures the imports percentage was about 72% in 1954 against about 93% in 1960. These percentages explain that Benghazi and the province as a whole are extremely dependent on foreign imports.


Port statistics are not only scarce, but also unreliable in most cases. Nevertheless, the following tables show its position in relation to the other ports from the number of ships and their net cargoes. (11)

Year	BENGHAZI		TOBROUK		DERNA	
	No. of ships.	Net ^l cargo in tons.	No. of ships.	Net cargo in tons.	No. of ships.	Net ^l cargo in tons.
1959	366	259,728	112	108,259	18	2,314
1958	374	310,810	142	183,013	37	9,162
1959	435	337,991	160	146,567	35	15,290
1960	568	413,642	197	265,759	25	11,493
1961	617	437,408	-	-	-	-

The above statistics clearly show that Benghazi's position is not challenged by the other two ports, especially when it is realized that ships calling at Benghazi's harbour are mostly cargo ships and petroleum tankers, while at Tobrouk, ships are mainly those supplying the military base and the nearby British air base at el-Adam. Ships calling at Derna are often small Greek fishing vessels or occasional small tramps (see plate XX).

To explain the situation in more detail it is better to examine the following comparative table of 1960⁽¹²⁾.

Harbour	IMPORTS				EXPORTS		
	Commer- cial in tons	Mili- tary in tons	Petrol in tons	Fresh water	Commer- cial in tons	Mili- tary in tons	Cows in numbers
Benghazi	186,184	4,046	71,003	-	7,389	10,886	1,648
Tobrouk	21,357	40,026	43,325	9,890	2,094	25,427	-
Derna	7,043	-	-	-	109	1	-
Total	214,584	44,072	114,328	9,890	9,592	36,315	1,648



Part of the dock-yards

It is obvious that the port of Derna has no special importance either from the commercial or the military points of view. The relative importance of Tobrouk, on the other hand, is associated with the presence of the British forces without which the port's status will certainly decline and in all probability would not be in a better position than that of Derna in view of its poor hinterland and the limited population. The exportation of last war's scrap metal is the sole factor which counts for its commercial exports. The importation of fresh water into Tobrouk, which continued until 1962 when a fresh water pipe line linked the centre with Derna 160 kilometres to the west was finally finished, was because of the very poor quality of its water resources.

As far as Benghazi is concerned, it is worthwhile recalling that between 1958 and 1960 the imported commercial cargoes alone have risen by 108,737 tons, the increase of imported military cargoes, on the other hand, was less than 1,000 tons, while the importation of oil rose by 42,000 tons giving a total net increase of over 152,000 tons. In the same period the total exports declined from 26,520 tons in 1958 to 18,295 tons in 1960. Of these figures the commercial totals decreased by about 2,000 tons besides a drop of 3,569 head of cattle and about 2,000 sheep.

The sharp increase of all imports, especially,

commercial ones, and that decrease of exports is related to the sudden impact of oil not only in the city itself, but in most parts of the province as well.

The future prospects of changing the pattern of the present trend of foreign trade is rather remote, and it is almost certain that the future handlings of the harbour will continue in much the same manner.

The balance of trade will probably not continue against the province as it was in the past. On the contrary the oil royalties have already reversed the picture. But even so, prospects of Benghazi's harbour being an important exporting port are too far remote unless some real efforts are devoted to improve the present agricultural economy.

Benghazi's political, administrative and military functions all seem to become less important with the new national political changes. Because of this one wonders whether it would be better to consider what might be done if the money were spent in other ways such as improving rural conditions in the province, providing more schools and hospitals or initiating a housing scheme for the poor people in the towns. "It would suffice for instance to build houses for one-quarter of the population of Cyrenaica." (13).


THE AIR PORT

The present city airport is called after the village of Benina about 24 kilometres east of Benghazi. This

airport which was of Italian construction was the main Italian airport. Prior to its transformation into a civilian airport in the late 1930's the Italians had built four airfields in the surroundings of Benghazi, three of which were named after the suburb of Berka. They were called Berka I, Berka II and Berka III. These airfields which were used for civil purposes were greatly damaged during World War II. The only air strip still in use by the oil companies is Berka II, or as it is better known Ghar Yunes airport (See plate XXI). The fourth was built near the so-called river Lethe and it is too being abandoned. Besides these airfields there were two landing grounds one at Guarsha and the other immediately north of the present Benina airport.

Under the British rule many improvements were introduced for the development of Benina airport for the accommodation of the British airlines to East Africa. In recent years it was felt necessary to develop the airport not only to cope with the increasing traffic because of oil, but also to provide modern passenger accommodation as well as suitable landings and runways for the huge and fast jet aircraft.

The following comparative statistics showing the number of planes, passengers and the amount of goods of both Benina and Tripoli airports, are the key to assessing the relative importance of each airport. (14).



Ghar Yunes Airport

BENINA

TRIPOLI (Idris)

Year	Airplanes			Passengers			Goods (in tons)			Airplanes			Passengers			Goods (in tons)		
	Arriving	Take-off	Take-off	Arriving	Take-off	Take-off	Arriving	Take-off	Take-off	Arriving	Take-off	Take-off	Arriving	Take-off	Take-off	Arriving	Take-off	Take-off
1956	2117	2102	4603	4427	18	43	4087	4087	19824	15782	79	415						
1957	4164	4169	5287	5119	31	41	4956	4971	26741	22711	208	547						
1958	3652	3653	5566	5324	36	51	5499	5492	29671	31444	101	624						
1959	2704	2696	3643	3550	68	139	6145	6162	32267	36120	151	757						
1960	4396	4366	6249	5396	33	219	7204	7199	44585	42840	278	872						
1961	5588	5372	9312	8549	42	370	7276	7272	48954	45137	322	1078						
1962	6596	6566	12081	12767	27	84	6711	6620	52574	48220	403	1240						
Total	29124	29124	46741	45132	255	947	41878	41801	269616	252151	1542	5533						

In comparing these figures we notice that the number of airplanes landed at Benina in 1956 was only just over half the number in Tripoli. By 1962, the picture was completely changed with both airports having practically the same number of arriving planes. In other words, there has been an increase of 4,479 planes landing at Benina compared with only 2,624 planes at Tripoli for the period 1956-1962. This is partly accounted for by the number of oil company planes using this airport. The wide gap in the number of passengers between both cities in the same year supports the former explanation. The difference in the total of passengers as well as those of goods may be attributed to the differences in the population and the extent of political, commercial and tourist activities between the two cities. Comparison between the two airports for the period 1956, 1962 shows; Tripoli airport was used by 25,338 planes and 420,000 passengers more than that of Benina, and also handled about 6,000 tons more of goods.

Nevertheless, it is true to note that Benina airport has played a very important role not only from the point of view of providing an essential link either between Europe and East and Central Africa or with the Arab world, but also in the progress of the desert oil operations. As regards local transportation, the role of the whole of the Libyan airports is still limited indeed because of the high cost of

inland air travel and the limited economic contacts between the provinces.

INDUSTRIES

It is vitally important to bring to mind once again that the term industry used here is rather an arbitrary term due to the primitive nature of most industries. The main reasons for this are: (1) the importation of not only the machines and skilled labour, but also of most raw materials; (2) the low standards of technology as well as of productivity.

Generally speaking, industries can be classified into three main categories:

- (a) Factories
- (b) Mechanical shops (car repair' shops)
- (c) Handicrafts


A. Factories

According to the Municipality figures in 1962 there were 8 factories of soft drinks, 9 of macaroni, one of sweets, one of textiles, one of shoes, a small oxygen plant and one carpet factory (see Fig. 20). Once again it is essential to note that although the former factories are modern in the sense of comparing them with handicrafts, they are still lacking sufficient power, labour and managerial skills. None are able to fulfil local demand.

1. The textile factory.

The textile factory of Benghazi, founded in 1913, was the first modern factory to be opened in the whole of Cyrenaica in spite of the fact that its production was rather

Figure 20



Distribution of main industries

premises. Because of this the majority are located in small Arab-designed houses. "The majority of the existing factories in Libya are located in unsatisfactory premises and few are housed in buildings specially designed for the purpose."⁽¹⁵⁾ Accordingly most of them lack the fundamentals of hygiene and security for labourers.

The capacity of macaroni production varies considerably from one factory to another, but generally speaking, it falls between 40 quintals to 5 quintals a day while the number of workers ranges between 25 and 4 workers per establishment. The following facts about the largest of the city factories may give a further and clearer picture of this industry. This factory which was opened in 1952, is known after its owner I. Kanun. The production at the time was limited to 8 quintals per day as there was one machine only. Today there are three machines, the first of which produces 3 quintals per hour, the second 2 quintals per hour and the third 1 quintal per hour. In 1956 the factory operated for the first time in the province a fourth machine for the production of the well-known dish of kuskusi. The present production of kuskusi varies between 6 and 8 quintals per day. The total average production is therefore about 40 quintals per day. Outside Benghazi/^{the} production is sold in all parts of Cyrenaica in spite of the fact that the factory has just one dealer in the town of Barce. In the case of other towns and villages it is the merchants who

come to the factory and buy their needs.

Until two years ago the factory ~~produced~~ was all marketed locally. Recent contacts with merchants from the Republic of Chad have developed a regular yearly export of about 400 quintals. Exports to Tripoli are limited to an average of 50 quintals of kuskusi.

The factory employs 25 workers of whom 6 are from Fezzan and 2 from the oasis of Augila. The rest are all from Benghazi itself. Flour consumed by the factory is all imported from Italy.

3. The Shoe Factory. The official opening of this factory took place in 1956 despite the fact that the formation of its company was one year earlier. The initial capital of the enterprise was £117,000 and by 1962 it rose by another £19,000. The enterprise, despite the increase of its capital, began to show signs of weakness, the main cause of which was the limited sale as can be seen from the following table given by the management in 1962:

Year	No. of workers	Production (in pairs)	Sales (in pairs)
December 1956	32	15,300	13,800
" 1957	55	15,630	7,900
" 1958	57	34,000	26,150
" 1959	69	33,570	34,242
" 1960	39	22,000	27,700
" 1961	25	20,092	17,000
Total	-	140,592	126,792

The factory has not yet reached 50% of its total production capacity, because its high costs mean that it faces an acute problem of foreign competition. Despite the good quality of its products its future is doubtful unless some official measures are incorporated. The current problems of the industry include:

- (1) the continuous increase in wages;
- (2) the loss of most trained personnel;
- (3) the difficulties of recruiting foreign experts and skilled workers.

By 1962 the factory was employing 34 workers of whom 10 were Egyptians including the two experts. The local workers included 16 men and 8 youths. The marketing of products is similar to that of macaroni, as the factory has one dealer in the town of Tobrouk.

4. Factories of Soft Drinks. There are eight of these factories in the city. Examples of this industry are given in two cases:

(a) Hilal factory. This factory which is located in a small Arab house was opened in 1945. It has three old machines producing a monthly average of about 110,000 bottles. The average number of workers is ten.

(b) Zamzam factory. This factory which is found at Fuehat was opened in 1952. It employs 8 workers and produces an average of 100,000 bottles per month.

The striking feature about this industry as a whole is

its poor quality. The reason for this is attributed to the high salinity of Benghazi's water. Because of this a considerable proportion of the consumption is being imported from Derna. Importation of Tripoli's soft drinks is also commonly practised especially in cases of Cola Cola and Pepsi Cola and mineral waters.

5. The Carpet factory. The idea behind the foundation of the factory was to teach girls the art of sewing and knitting, and so it was run by the Ministry of Education until 1961 when it was not only converted into a modern carpet factory, but also transferred to the Nazirate of Finance and Economics. The new conversion of the old carpet factory is estimated to cost over £35,000. It has 26 machines and employs 18 full-time women. The yearly consumption of local raw wool is about 45 tons. By March 1962, the total products were estimated at 2,592 square metres or about 510 carpets. Sales are very limited indeed in spite of the fact that the monthly average production is about 200 square metres.


6. The sweet factory. This factory when completely finished will undoubtedly be the biggest in the province. The factory, besides its five different sections producing different types of sweets including some oriental categories, employs 70 local workers and five foreign experts of whom four are Egyptians and one British. The maximum production capacity

is considered secret although the owner confirmed that besides meeting the whole Libyan market, there are hopes for exports as soon as the factory is fully operational.

7. The oxygen plant was founded in 1962. Production is still limited and the factory will not be fully equipped for a number of years.

8. Brick factories. The use of bricks for building purposes is mostly confined to the modern parts of the city. A feature which is responsible for the increase in the number of these factories to a total of 48 instead of only 12 in 1950. The striking feature about this industry is the fact that the majority of these so-called factories provides work for no more than 2 to 4 people. Many are also owned by the building contractors themselves who work these factories only when required (see Plate XXII).

9. Printing works. Although the official figures show that there are 8 printing works it is important to note that most occupy premises no bigger than the size of ordinary shops, employ a maximum of 6 workers, and all, except the state printing press, suffer from lack of work. There is not one single newspaper being printed in any of the seven privately owned printing works. Because of this, it is very doubtful that most of them will survive much longer unless the government changes its policy. At present most of the government requirements are still printed in foreign



Brick manufacturing

countries especially Egypt and Lebanon.

10. Flour mills. The surprising thing about this industry is that the number of flour mills has increased considerably in the last few years in spite of the change in the form of diet. By 1962 there were 46 of these flour mills with an average daily production - wheat and barley - of 2 to 6 quintals. It is learnt that over 80% of the people using these mills are Bedouin from the Benghazi Plain. Because of this it is found that almost one-third of the total mills is concentrated in the surroundings of the Fonduk where most rural Cyrenaicans gather either to sell their agricultural products or buy their needs.


11. Quarries. Building materials, apart from cement, are all provided locally. Mud and clay, the main materials for the construction of Arab houses, are now substituted by a combination of limestone, sea sand and white wash. Cement and bricks, although now widely used even in the construction of poor Arab houses, were limited indeed especially in the case of bricks. The old site of Eusperides, Berka and many other surrounding areas were all used at one time or another for the quarrying of limestone. The large-scale development started by the Italians and still going on has, on the other hand, made of Fuehat not only a new and vast quarrying area, but also developed it to be the sole miocene limestone quarrying area. There are two main quarries east and west of the ring road. The eastern quarry (see Plate

XXIII) lies north of the Garden City and south of the road to Benina airport, while the western quarry is almost adjacent to the nucleus of Hias bin Ismail. Neither production nor the number of workers can be fairly estimated not only because there are no previous records, but also because of the fact that most people engaged in this industry are self-employed which results in wide fluctuations, in their numbers and production, from one year to another and from one day to another.

12. Bakeries. Although there are 33 bakehouses in Benghazi it is not surprising to know that out of this total there is only one mechanized bakery. The rest, which are mostly owned and run by Tripolitarians, are still operated by burning wood.

B. Mechanical shops.

Prior to the end of the last world war all mechanical shops were run by Italians. The complete repatriation of the Italian community, together with the availability of thousands of abandoned vehicles, have encouraged native enthusiasts to take over in spite of the fact that most Libyans, especially Cyrenaicans, hate to work with their hands. However, the need for such costly service, the presence of many hundreds of technicians among German war prisoners seemed to attract the interest of many youths. The indirect result of this is that all the present forty



A quarry in Fuehat

mechanical shops are run by natives. This is completely different from the situation in Tripoli where the Italians are still dominating this profitable public service. The impact of oil, represented by a drastic increase in the number of vehicles, forced modernization of the majority of these mechanical shops. The large ones are employing foreign engineers. The biggest of these mechanical workshops is the so-called Sasco workshop, located at Dar el-Kish where it has been recently transferred. This workshop, which employs 65 technicians of whom 12 are Greeks, 10 Italians and 4 Egyptians, occupies an area of 15,000 square metres and has a capital of over £150,000. This mechanical workshop besides being equipped to repair all different makes of cars also has a variety of machines for the production of spare parts. Steel and copper raw materials are mainly imported from Belgium and Germany while most machines in use are imported from Italy or America.

In addition to the 40 mechanical shops, Benghazi has 12 garages some of which provide repair services as well.

C. Handicrafts.

Benghazi has no real traditional handicrafts like the old city of Tripoli, for example, where leather and silver handmade products are well known. "Late in the 19th century, the Turkish domination established in Tripoli the Moslem Arts and Crafts School, which is still doing excellent work to

train young boys in a variety of crafts".⁽¹⁶⁾ In Benghazi the lack of established crafts caused the disappearance of specialized quarters like the different suks of Tripoli or better still those of Cairo. The only kinds of handicrafts which have a provincial character are the shoe and oriental jewellery making. Otherwise most handicrafts are similar to those usually found in any Libyan urban centre.

1. Coppersmiths. Although there are 465 of these coppersmiths, no specialization can be found. The main jobs carried out by these craftsmen are the plating of the traditional cooking pans or their repainting by using mercury.

2. Blacksmiths, Carpenters and Plumbers. The license figures of these groups are 33, 129 and 62 respectively.

3. Tailors. There are two kinds of tailors in Benghazi: the first are those engaged in the making of traditional or national dresses, while the second are similar to those known in the western world. There are 66 tailors in the first group while the total for the second group is still limited to 19 tailors including 3 women dressmakers. The striking feature about the latter section is the fact that most employees are foreigners mainly Palestinians, Tunisians, Greeks and Egyptians. Craftsmen from Cyrenaica are very few even in the first category where Tripolitanians are dominant.

4. Barbers. Although there are 45 barber shops, less than half of them can be regarded as modern saloons. The

remainder are small barber shops which are engaged in the traditional way of hair-cut. A great number of the native people, especially the old generation, still practise a complete hair-cut. Women hairdressers are still few; 3 saloons in all. The reason for this is the fact that the majority of native women are still veiled.

Laundry work too is still carried out in the traditional way and because of this there are only 3 mechanized laundries out of the total of 31. Besides these groups there are 8 licences classified as glass fitters, 14 licences of jewellery makers and 6 licences of painters and decorators.

It is clear from this brief description that Benghazi presents a typical example of most cities outside the industrial parts of the world. "Most non-industrial cities today are those where the population continues its pre-industrial mode of existence quite unaffected by industrial forms".⁽¹⁷⁾ Illustrations of Benghazi's position may be further explained by the following table:⁽¹⁸⁾

No. of industrial licences excluding quarrying	No. of licences of mechanical shops & garages.	No. of licences of all crafts categories.	No. of Grand commercial licences.	Total
147	52	878	3,870	4,947

The figures of the category of industrial licences are misleading on the ground that there are no more than 22

modern factories. This means that the actual industrial licenses comprise, in fact, less than 0.5% of the total issued licences. The percentage of all industrial licences as well as those of mechanical shops and garages amounts to about 4% of the total. The percentage of all industrial licences as well as those classified as handicrafts still remains below one quarter of the grand total.

There are no statistics of industrial workers anywhere in Libya. However, excluding handicraft licences which are usually limited to one or two people, one may calculate a rough estimate on the grounds that each of these licences employs an average of 5 people; "the average unit size of Libyan industry, as measured in terms of employment is only 5 workers per establishment". If so, it means that the number of industrial workers will be about one thousand. Assuming that each of these industrial workers supports a family of five people, the total population affected by industry is about 5,000 or about 6% of the city's official population.

Future industrial expansion in Benghazi is rather remote in spite of the discovery of oil due to the fact that the city not only lacks enough agricultural products, which are the basis for industrialization in the whole of Libya, but also because of other serious handicaps like the shortage of skilled workers, the limited market, and its unfavourable location.

TRADE AND COMMERCE

There is no doubt that trade and commerce are the two main activities of the city of Benghazi. In rural Cyrenaica their position is disputed by agriculture, especially livestock raising. The creation and development of this vital function was necessitated by many factors such as the absence of any important agricultural undertakings in the surrounding areas or any significant industrial growth. It also resulted from the administrative and political functions and the fact that it is the most thickly populated centre in the whole province. The disadvantage of its non-central location is compensated for by the availability of fairly good land communications.

Economically speaking, Cyrenaica and Benghazi in particular have very few products to offer for trade, so that commercial activities depend upon foreign goods. The extent to which Tripolitania shares in the import trade of Cyrenaica is not yet known. However, although Tripolitania is still predominantly an agricultural province we find that many of its industrial products are among the chief imports of Cyrenaica. Such products include tinned tomatoes, macaroni, cigarettes, beer and other alcoholic and soft drinks, paper and shoes. In addition, Benghazi market is practically dependent on Tripolitanian agricultural products such as fruit and vegetables, olive oil and ground nuts.

Excluding trade with Tripolitania, which might be considered as internal trade, five countries alone have supplied over 78% of the Cyrenaican imports in 1960, as can be seen from the following table:⁽¹⁹⁾

Country	Percentage
United Kingdom	29.61
U.S.A.	16.86
Italy	13.76
Holland	9.99
Germany	8.30
France	5.70
Egypt	2.50
Other Countries	13.28

As far as exports are concerned Egypt receives most with 49%, Italy takes 24% and Greece 22%. This means that none of the main importing countries take any significant share of provincial exports.

In view of the limited economic resources the trade balance is increasingly unfavourable. Moreover, the value of exports is quickly decreasing. The main factor behind this is the oil impact which resulted in a drastic shift from the countryside to the urban centres as in the case of the capital Benghazi. On the other hand, oil

royalties may well reverse the picture in the future. But the question is how the general economic system will be reorganized if conditions continue in their present trend. Answering this question is beyond our scope, but one cannot deny the fact that if no immediate planning occurs the situation will further deteriorate. To illustrate this situation in more detail the following two tables deal with the provincial foreign trade as no separate statistics are available for Benghazi alone. (20)

Trade Balance of Cyrenaica

Year	Value of imports (in pounds)	Value of exports (in pounds)	Deficits (in pounds)
1958	6,139,000	1,631,000	4,508,000
1959	7,466,000	1,702,000	5,764,000
1960	16,987,000	868,000	16,119,000

The deficits for 1961 and 1962 are believed to exceed 20 million pounds. The main factors behind the persistent increase of the deficit is the trade expansion in oil equipment, the demand for more luxury services especially cars and other electrical equipment, the importation of all equipment for the building industry and of course the absolute lack of government supervision. Another important factor is the prevalent desire for making quick profits even if such profits are detrimental to the national economy.

Classification of the main imported and exported items by their value and percentage in 1960. (21).

IMPORTS			EXPORTS		
Commodity	Value (Pounds)	%	Commodity	Value (Pounds)	%
Foodstuffs	2,073,000	12.20	Cows	64,000	c. 7.37
Cigarettes and alcoholic drinks	58,000	0.34	Sheep	72,000	c. 8.29
Raw materials other than foodstuffs	346,000	2.04	Hides	87,000	c. 10.02
Petrol and associated fabrics	1,331,000	7.83	Wool	63,000	c. 7.25
Olive Oil and butter	364	2.14	Scrap Metal	98,000	c. 10.14
Different fabrics	6,449,000	37.97	Sponge	250,000	c. 28.80
Cars and Transport equipment	5,320,000	31.32	Camels	345,000	c. 26.94
Medicines and other chemical fabrics	1,043,000	6.16	TOTAL	868,000	c. 100%
TOTAL	16,987,000	100%			

Surprisingly enough, the above statistics give about 15% of the total imports as commodities of agricultural character, which could be locally provided if a little

attention was given to the development of local resources which in return would help to increase exports. Nevertheless, the high percentages of other imported commodities, excluding oil equipment, are due to the increase of living standards brought by the impact of oil discoveries. As far as exports are concerned, prospects are very poor indeed unless something creative is quickly done. At present, unfortunately, there are no signs that any objective plans are forthcoming. Oil royalties, although not yet precisely estimated, may stand alone as the sole national income. In my view, this is very dangerous and surely its consequences will prove to be disastrous especially in a community which already has begun to accustom itself to a better living but which certainly hates to work.

The commercial status of Benghazi, which is unique and unchallenged if compared with the rest of Cyrenaican centres, is undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the acceleration in urban growth. And one of the major features characterizing and giving Benghazi the biggest share of the national trade is the fact that the overwhelming majority of either foreign or internal trade is being concentrated in the hands of a very few prosperous Cyrenaicans whose usual residence is in Benghazi.

Prior to independence, wealth and prosperity among the natives were not only limited in scale, but, in most cases

were confined to the powerful tribal chiefs. Independence and later the impact of oil operations have brought new and formidable changes to the traditional native economy. The present ruling financial class in Benghazi had, in most cases, no connection with the economic life before World War II. In other words, the post-war political and economic circumstances have added a new social and financial class to the pre-war population structure. The new class is composed of wealthy merchants as well as professional politicians. The members of the first group, who are usually partners and supporters of the politicians, still enjoy full control of trade due to the limited competition indirectly granted to them by those in power. Most politicians are perhaps tempted to make as much money as possible for two main reasons: the sense of governmental instability and the ignorance of the public concerning the nature of government affairs. This is how the small new class has formed, with a semi-monopoly of the main trade activities such as cars, electrical equipment, building requirements, sugar, tea, flour and textiles.

From the statistical point of view, this analysis seems to be contradicted by the fact that in the city today there are a total of 437 importing and exporting licences plus 77 commercial agencies. However, although this total is high if compared with the grand total of 3870

commercial licences, most of these licences belong to a few groups, and the effectiveness of those remaining or non-associated is very limited, because of their limited capital and the fact that the big groups are exercising their influence on the city's six banks as regards security and overseas guarantees of those outside their associations. It is therefore very common that the holders of these licences are no more than small retailers.

One of the main features of trade and commerce in Benghazi is the lack of specialized quarters either for the wholesaler or retailers. Generally speaking, Benghazi apart from the Fonduk, has three active commercial centres: Sharia Omar el-Mukhtar, Suk el-Dalam and Suk el-Gerid. Differences among these centres are mainly limited to the qualities of their commodities rather than to anything else apart from their locations, except perhaps in the case of Suk el-Gerid and its northern extension of Sharia Bughula. The commercial activities of Sharia Omar el-Mukhtar as well as that of Sharia el Istiklal are featured by their financial activities in the first place due to the concentration of banks and insurance companies. Other activities are those associated with modern commercial areas with the emphasis on the small or average shop units rather than big stores. Textiles, electrical equipment, shoes, tailoring, jewellery and modern grocery form the main merchandize in

this commercial part of Benghazi.

The second commercial centre is the Italian constructed market of Suk el-Dalam or the Suk of Darkness in English. This Suk, although modern in design, is remarkably different from the previously mentioned nearby commercial quarters because of the nature of its atmosphere, its closer association with local types of commodities and because it has a sudden transition to the third Suk in the heart of the old Arab town. In this Suk activities are primarily concerned with textiles for both traditional and modern cloths, carpets, oriental jewellery, house equipment, shoes, toys and local shoe making (see Plate XXIV).

The third commercial centre of Suk el-Gerid is undoubtedly the most representative part of commercial Benghazi because of its dominant African orientation. Here the Suk is a mixture of grocers, butchers, wholesale traders of flour, sugar, tea and spices, textile shops, shoe repairers, restaurants, traditional tailors and of course hundreds of mobile carts selling almost everything.

Other commercial areas which are of some importance include Sharia el-Aguib where there are noticeable concentrations of carpenters, plumbers, electrical technicians, laundries and grocers. Sharia Omar ibn el-Khattab is of a similar character to the previous street. In other areas except the Berka Square where a considerable concentration



Suk el-Dalam

of mixed shops is found, the general pattern is characterized by the mixed or non-specialized shops being scattered throughout the area. In other words, it is very common that a few shops are to be found in every street even in those residential areas either in the old town or in the suburbs. In all, Benghazi has 1113 grocers, 327 textile shops, 68 jewellers and 34 brokers, found mainly in the Fonduk. Other main commercial activities are represented by 45 licences for selling house equipment, 41 licences for electrical tools, 17 furniture shops, 17 stationery shops and 137 licences for selling second-hand materials.

The recent growth of trade and commerce, due not only to the continuous increase of the population but also to the increasing foreign community, has brought new features to the retail trade in the city, notably the emergence of modern grocery shops and in some cases even big provincial stores and supermarkets. The close contact with Europeans is the main reason for the steady increase in these types of modern shopping units, most of which are run by Greeks who came from Egypt after the Suez Crisis. The strange feature about the Greek community in Benghazi is the fact that this minority is growing so rapidly despite the strict immigration regulations. The explanation for this is that most of these immigrants are trade partners of some prominent citizens who by different means are able to arrange for their stay, especially in the case of those selling alcoholic

drinks. The provincial law prohibits not only the sale of such drinks by natives but also prevents their consumption by all Moslems. The prohibition of this trade has made it one of the most profitable businesses in the whole province. Those engaged in this trade are considered as one of the wealthiest groups in the town, despite the fact that no Cyrenaican Moslem is directly engaged in this business. In Tripolitania, although trading in spirits and alcoholic drinks by natives was also prohibited by law, the local authorities, realizing its increasing profits, began to allow Moslems to participate in this trade which until recently was carried out entirely by Italians and Jews. In Benghazi and elsewhere in the province, the general opinion is in favour of similar legislation or approval on the grounds that although such trade is completely in the hands of non-Libyans it is at the same time flourishing on the demand of those whom the law prevents from sharing in the profits. Other new trade features include the introduction of marketing beauty and toilet preparations for women as well as modern fashion shops and finally the general tendency towards better methods of marketing as a whole.

From this brief and general description of the trading activities of the city, one notices the lack of precise distinction between the different commercial activities. The reasons for this ~~are~~ vary, including the lack of

specific physical distribution of the different commercial quarters, or absence of specialized trading centres. Because of this no accurate analysis is possible as far as any special trade is concerned, especially as no separate records or accounts are officially available. Difficulties are also caused by the impossibility of distinguishing between wholesale and retailing activities. In most cases a wholesale merchant is also a retailer, and the majority of the wholesalers use shops similar in size to those occupied by their neighbouring small retailers. Thus it is very difficult to judge the difference, especially as the majority of wholesale premises and stores have no back doors and therefore stocking has to be undertaken somewhere else. In fact the wholesale market does not exist in the fully separate sense.

Other traits of present commercial activities are those common to most Libyan urban centres. The most important is the fact that most merchants do not know their exact financial status. The majority keep no full and regular accounts and bankruptcy is frequent. There is a rapid increase in the use of promissory notes, especially among the small retailers who predominate. Thirdly, there is a slow change from the traditional mixed variety shops to the modern and specialized ones, except perhaps in the modern sector of the city and in particular where superimposition of new buildings has taken place. Finally, the majority

of the so-called merchants and traders are the small and poor retailers who according to most reliable sources earn much less than any manual worker. In consequence, although about 20 thousand people, almost one quarter of the city's inhabitants, depend on commercial activities for their living (on the assumption that each of the present 3890 licence holders supports five persons), only a small minority benefit substantially.



THE MARKET

In a centre like Benghazi where there is no efficient public control over the market activities and the movements of goods it is difficult if not impossible, in some cases, to obtain exact information, especially where commodities are exposed to tax duties. As regards past statistics, the situation is even worse mainly because according to the regulations most records are destroyed after four years of their collection. The city of Benghazi, like any other Libyan town and most oriental cities, depends commercially on the marketing of many varieties of commodities, especially those of agricultural character, in special types of daily or weekly markets - Suks in Arabic. The Arabic term, therefore, excludes the activities of the modern commercial quarters or streets and refers only to those specific markets such as the vegetable market, the cattle market, the fish market and so on. Traditionally the Arabic term in Benghazi is used only in connection with the main suk, which is also referred to as the Fonduk.

The present Fonduk, which is of Italian construction, is located in the northern section of the quarter of Sidi el-Sherif in order to serve the bulk of the native population of the old town. Prior to the Italian occupation, Benghazi had a similar suk of which the first mention had been by the Beecheys in the early 19th century. The main function

of the Fonduk is wholesale marketing of agricultural products. There are several main groups of merchants and traders in the Suk. Wholesale fruit and vegetable merchants. Of forty merchants only four have no permanent shops or stores inside the Suk. These four merchants are, more or less, acting as agents between the retail merchants and the producers. Of the rest, only four merchants possess import licences and control the supply of overseas fruits, which constitutes a considerable amount throughout the year. There are also 20 retail merchants who have no licences, but who pay a certain amount to the authorities for using certain sites where they keep their small and mobile carts. Among the licence holders there are only four Tripolitarians, but at least three-quarters of the actual merchants are Tripolitarians. The idea is that a partnership is usually formed between Tripolitarians who do the work and some locals who possess licences or easily manage to obtain them.


Cereal merchants. The majority of the thirty cereal licence holders are acting as agents rather than proper wholesale merchants. The Tripolitarians are less dominant here if compared with the first category, because all cereal producers are really Bedouin and therefore it is much more difficult for non-Cyrenaicans to get along with them.

Charcoal merchants. Thirty-five charcoal merchants occupy

one-third of the total area of the Suk (see Plate XXV)). Each licence holder for charcoal trading has an area of about 100 sq. metres. All of the merchants except one are from Tripolitania and the surprising thing is that over 60% of them come from the small town of Agelat in Western Tripolitania.

Raw wool merchandise. There are five wholesale merchants, of whom two are local Jews. Besides these main groups of traders the Fonduk is also famous for its huge area reserved for the sale of firewood. Other daily activities associated with the Fonduk are those of livestock and hay. The livestock market is held inside the Suk in the morning and in the nearby open court in the afternoon and evenings. In addition, the Fonduk is provided with a number of shops on its front side opposite to the general hospital. On the northern side of the Fonduk there are four flour mills, fourteen shops mainly engaged in selling tea, sugar, olive oil and tinned tomatoes and two coffee bars. On the southern side there are three flour mills, fourteen shops similar to those on the other side and four coffee bars. On the Fonduk's eastern side facing the Sebkhah the area is, practically, reserved for transport agencies.

The Fonduk of Benghazi, which is a daily market, is the main commercial area as far as the previous commodities are concerned. Because of the negligible agricultural productivity of the Benghazi Plain we find that the source



Charcoal in the Fonduk

of supply of these commodities is variable. Most of the supply of vegetables and fruits is imported from Tripoli especially in the case of vegetables. Local requirements of some varieties, tomatoes for instance, are partially supplied either from the Barce Plain or from the oasis of Jalo, from which all tomatoes are imported at the end of Autumn and the beginning of Winter. However, it is estimated that at least three-quarters of the supply are imported from Tripolitania. Because of this the prices of vegetables and fruits are not only high but always differ from day to day.

The supply of charcoal, firewood and cereals is entirely from the province. Cereals, hay and live-stock are mainly imported from the Benghazi Plain which also produces wool, although most of it is brought from the Jebel area. Firewood and charcoal are also exclusively from the Jebel. On the other hand, one can hardly find one single item of Cyrenaican origin in the neighbouring shops as most commodities are imported either from Tripoli or from overseas.

Statistics of the activities of the Suk are not only scarce but also unreliable in most cases, perhaps partly because the Municipality's personnel are underpaid, often ignore their duties and falsify returns for financial rewards.

Generally speaking, the Fonduk's activities are highly affected by the prevailing economic conditions in the

province as shown in the following table:-(22)

Year	Cereals(in quintals)		Sheep	Goats	Cows	Cam-els	Hor-ses	Don-keys	Hides
	Barley	Wheat							
Dec. 1954	1,906,000	374,000	4731	1872	389	132	14	34	7509
Dec. 1959	417,000	166,000	6150	1566	559	233	37	120	10396

Despite the increase of the city population the differences in the figures of the two months are related to the fact that the first year had a rather good harvest, while 1959 was almost a drought year. The increase of livestock sold in the last year is due to the fact that owners try to sell their livestock in order to avoid their natural destruction through famine.

The Suk's activities (excluding livestock) are illustrated in Appendix 1) which shows these activities on the first day of each month for the years 1955, 1957, and 1961.

Although these statistics cannot be taken as basic criteria to indicate the evolution of the Suk's functions, we may draw the following conclusions:

- (a) There has been a decrease in commodities such as hides, wheat, barley, charcoal, firewood and wool mainly because of the population shift from rural Cyrenaica to the urban centres.
- (b) There has been an increase in the variety of commodities marketed in the Fonduk especially those of fruits


and vegetables due to the increase in living standards as well as the increase of the foreign community.

- (c) There has been a considerable decrease in the tax duties especially between 1955 and 1957.

More specific analyses of the Fonduk's activities are difficult under present circumstances. However, further information regarding the fruit and vegetable market may be illustrated by the statistics obtained by visiting the Suk on various occasions and working with the people in charge (see Appendix 2).

Although commercial activities of the Fonduk have increased enormously, at least in varieties, in the last few years, they still fluctuate from one season to another. Livestock and cereals flourish in spring and summer respectively. Wool sales also increase in the late summer and early autumn. Vegetables and fruits fluctuate according to the ripening seasons (see Plate XXVI). The only commodities which seem to be stable all the year round are charcoal and firewood. The reason is that the majority of Cyrenaicans are still dependent on these items for cooking and making tea. The monthly average sale of these two items is about 6,500 quintals of charcoal and 4,800 quintals of firewood.

The striking feature about the Fonduk's activities is the fact that although this market has the official status of being the only wholesale market of agricultural products,



Fruit and vegetables in the Fonduk

we find that these activities do not apply and correspond to the actual facts simply because many retail traders arrange for outside transactions in order to avoid tax duties. Consequently, even if statistics were available they would not really indicate the exact trends of the market's different functions.

Other markets

Besides the Fonduk, Benghazi has three other smaller daily markets. Two of these markets, which are all retail markets of Italian construction, are for fruit and vegetables while the third is a fish market. Two of these markets are situated in the modern part of the city at the square of Suk el-Hut, or the fish market. The third Suk is the fruit and vegetable market of Berka. About 20 licences of proper greengrocers are found in both fruit markets. The main feature of these markets is that both include other categories of shops, especially butchers. In all, Benghazi has a total of 188 greengrocers divided among the former markets, the so-called Suk el-Khaddarin, and in shops in different parts of the city.

Although the fish market has 20 licences or merchants is hardly deserves the term as it is very rare to find or see any fish in it. According to C.D. Serebetis's report on the Fisheries of Libya, the Cyrenaican coasts are one of the best fishing areas along the whole North African coast. In spite of this Benghazi faces a drastic lack of fish all

the year round mainly because the people are not attracted to the sea, and because the provincial law stands as an obstacle not only for foreigners but even for Tripolitanian fishermen to fish in the territorial waters. Therefore, fish prices are often higher than those of meat and often it is also regarded as a black-market commodity. Prices are according to the traders' wishes especially in the month of Ramadan.

MILITARY BASES

The military function of Benghazi has been greatly reduced in the last decade. The reasons for this decline are twofold: the change in British strategy and the fact that Benghazi's military installations are larger than can be fully utilized by the limited Libyan forces. During the post-war decade economic life was to a great extent reliant on the presence of the British forces, a feature which attracted many Tripolitanians who are still found in the city today. The reduction of the British Army in Benghazi and the new policy of promoting the R.A.F. station near Tobrouk, did not result in further economical difficulties, as was feared, simply because it was a long-term policy and secondly and more important, it occurred after the start of oil exploitation.

Prior to the end of 1956, the British plan was a complete withdrawal from Benghazi and suburbs. The Suez Crisis, on the other hand, led to a revision, and a new camp was to be built to accommodate the armoured garrison, as most other camps were already handed over to the Libyan army. The new development has, at the same time, necessitated the continuation of other military sites such as D'Aosta Barracks, the officers' mess and the British forces' club. The new camp, which is the only military landmark added to Benghazi's topography since the Italians left, is named in memory of General Wavell, the second British officer to enter the city. In an interview with the

British Chief District Commander, I was informed that there are no plans for future expansion except in the case of enlarging the new camp in order to provide full living facilities for all the military families and personnel. This means that in the near future living accommodation will be available for the remaining 50 out of three hundred families now comprising the bulk of the British forces in the city. Future plans seem to concentrate on developing the new site as an efficient training unit which has no great military significance but which will be able to prepare and meet unexpected circumstances with the help of the air base near Tobrouk.

The economic effect of the British forces on the present day life in Benghazi is rather small for the following reasons:-

(a) the limited size of the forces, (b) the fact that over three-quarters of the total families are living inside the camp, which also provides all requirements of those who live outside and (c) the availability of entertainment facilities combined with the regular bus services reaching the camp.

The influence of the Libyan armed forces is similar. Although these forces occupy most of the city's military installations and the city is the seat of the Libyan Army Headquarters and the Royal Military Academy, little economic values are gained in return. The main reasons are the fluctuations in the city's garrison, the limited numbers of these forces, the fact that the bulk of the Libyan army is composed of non-married soldiers and the relatively small incomes of all Libyan army personnel.

In consequence, the effects of this major concentration of the Libyan army are small. This contrasts sharply with conditions in other centres such as Barce, Derna and Marsa Bardya where the presence of the army is regarded as of great importance because of local economic stagnation. The present military installations can hardly be justified at a time when land and more particularly ready premises are desperately needed to provide suitable schools, hospitals, clubs and oil company sites. The transformation of Torelli barracks into a public school was a suitable solution which might be applied to many other military sites especially in the cases of Ras Ablida and D'Aosta and the camp now occupied by the Cyrenaican Defence Force. According to official reports it is believed that D'Aosta barracks alone can provide adequate accommodation for the theoretical section of the Libyan University which is now badly sited and suffers from overcrowding in the heart of the city. Consequently there is a need to re-survey those military sites in order to ameliorate the present acute shortage of land for building, and more important to facilitate the present trend of the city's expansion as most of these sites interfere with harmonious and healthy continuation of the present southern urban growth.

OIL COMPANY SITES

Prior to the publication of the Libyan Mineral law in the early 1950's, little was known of Libya's subterranean wealth, despite early Italian efforts and investigations. The oil discoveries in Southern Algeria and in particular those adjacent to the border between the two countries, have raised great hopes for similar discoveries in Libya. The failures to strike oil in western Egypt as well as in Tunisia, were on the other hand, enough to diminish prospects of rich oil findings. Because of this the Libyan authorities, aiming to assess the extent of the country's petroleum wealth, have made favourable concessions in order to attract as many international oil companies as possible.

The motives behind this encouraging attitude were basically the acute economic difficulties of the country and the resentment of the Libyan people in depending on foreign aid especially when military bases were to be offered in return. All these circumstances have accelerated the completion of the Petroleum Law which was, officially, enacted in 1955. During the period (1953-55) 9 international oil companies had taken part in the preliminary geological reconnaissance, as only scattered surface mapping and literature of some littoral areas were available beforehand. Other deficiencies in pre-independence geological studies may account for their very limited reference to oil

potentiality and the absence of any detailed regional studies. In view of such a situation all possible facilities were granted to the oil companies in order to encourage a rapid search for oil. The oil policy was conducted in very close co-operation with the oil companies who, undoubtedly, were attracted by the country's political stability.

After the first major oil strike in mid-1959 the search for oil was intensified and the country's potentiality became almost certain. Since 1959 oil strikes have occurred frequently and widely, but especially in the Syrte lowlands, where most of the area has now been developed into full capacity producing fields. Elsewhere scattered findings have also steadily increased and at present there are more than twenty international companies engaged in oil exploitations which cover an area of over one million square kilometres including most of Libya's territorial waters.

The finding of commercial quantities of oil, the comparatively stimulating terms of the petroleum law and finally the growing confidence in the country's political status have encouraged further competition among all oil companies concerned. The direct result was a progressive increase in expenditure on oil operations. Between 1955 and 1961 such expenditure was estimated to exceed 220 million pounds, of which over 80 millions were spent in 1961 alone. The total expenditure during 1963 amounted to £113 millions. On the other hand, oil royalties are only beginning to be

received. Therefore it is still premature to assess their potential, at least as far as regional or provincial development schemes are concerned.

Nevertheless, expenditure on oil operations has brought the first seeds of change in the Libyan economy even before the final confirmation of commercial findings.

The cities of Benghazi and Tripoli were the only two suitable places where the requirements of the oil companies for the whole series of operations could be provided. In the case of Benghazi, obstacles such as the lack of suitable headquarters, living accommodation and enough local office staff as well as the distance from the major exploited areas, were eventually solved by the considerable expenditures of the companies.

In Tripoli, difficulties were less acute, especially in accommodation facilities and the availability of employees and semi-skilled workers, and perhaps most important of all, Tripoli had good port facilities. These advantages gave Tripoli the lead in the hunt for oil and consequently it was in Tripoli that most oil companies decided to make their headquarters and other facilities, of which the most important is the oil company site or camp (offices, storage and warehouse units). In most cases such oil bases are meant to provide the whole needs of the field operations, providing the link between the desert field operations and the company management. Consequently, the size and the financial status

of any urban oil company site is largely dependent on the size and the units of the field team.

Before, 1957, oil research had no extensive regional concentration as in the case of the Syrtic area in later years. Such a method of exploration, inevitable in the early stages, gave Benghazi an advantage as far as oil exploration in Cyrenaica was concerned, but not a comparable importance to that of Tripoli. The impact of oil research was financially less influential in Benghazi prior to 1957. Supplementary administrative quarters and minor oil camps appeared in Benghazi as early as 1954, but no real expansion was to take place until the extensive field operations of Syrte and central Cyrenaica began in 1957. The striking feature about Benghazi's status prior to Syrte's oil strikes is the fact that private enterprise was very keen to make efforts not only to co-operate with the new companies but also to provide their full needs and perhaps, plan for city companies' future growth.

The increasing certainty of commercial oil productivity of the Syrtic area together with the continuous growth of local capital invested in oil operations have stimulated further and rapid interests in Benghazi's future oil services. Benghazi gradually took over Tripoli's role after 1957, except in the case of central administration, as most major headquarters are still in Tripoli.

Benghazi's changing character owes much to the oil

bases of the former companies, especially that of Esso and British Petroleum. Other oil companies which helped in Benghazi's transformation are Mobil Oil, Shell, Nelson Bunker Hunt, Libyan American and the Italian Company of Cori. The railway line from Benghazi to Benina marks the northern extent of the main oil company bases, except Cori headquarters at Sharia Omar el-Mukhtar and a few other residential or catering premises. All are in Fuehat, Dar el-Kish or along the ring road between the cross road to Tripoli and that to Benina airport.

The oil impact of the last decade or so on Benghazi's expansion is undoubtedly the most significant feature as far as the whole evolution of this urban centre, but detailed and regional statistical analysis of oil expenditure are lacking. Therefore it is extremely difficult to assess the public benefits gained for hiring manual workers, office staff, rents and other similar services. In this respect, five oil companies are at present employing an average of 30 office staff and 120 workers. The monthly average incomes of these groups are 60 and 20 pounds respectively. The former figures are very high if compared with pre-oil circumstances, but such gains would by no means account for the actual financial benefits which Benghazi has enjoyed. The post-independence economic conditions in the city were extremely difficult, and worse still the provincial economy was facing

complete stagnation as a result of the cessation of the Italian colonization schemes. Thus when oil operations began to emerge there were very few landowners and businessmen who were either financially strong enough or were officially recommended to undertake the provision of the oil companies. The result was that the bulk of oil expenditure in Benghazi has gone to a few contractors, merchants and landowners. Early hopes for a rapid transformation in the general standard of living are still remote expectations, which may never be fulfilled unless some sort of effective social security scheme is developed.

Nevertheless, Benghazi's present status could never have been achieved without oil. The following phenomena, in addition to those criteria often stressed such as the extent of the city's physical growth, the expansion in trade and commerce, the general improvements in living standards, will give further illustrations of the miracle brought by oil:-

- (1) An increase of over 30 thousands in the city population;
- (2) The formation of a new foreign community of over 6 thousands,
- (3) Before 1952, the city had one bank, and by 1958 the number had increased to seven banks of which two are Libyan.
- (4) Until the end of 1958 there was one insurance company and 4 years later the figure jumped to 9 companies,

- (5) The number of motor cars has increased from 7 thousands to over 15 thousands in five years.

One cannot but hope that the future oil royalties would be wisely invested not only to promote the traditional economy but also to minimise the former disadvantages already created. In other words without wider social security, it is doubtful whether the present political stability can survive, and if not it may be difficult to protect the present achievements.

TOURISM

Awareness of the value of tourism is low, both among government officials and among the public at large. Because of this Cyrenaica spends much more on foreign travel than it has been earning from it. The reasons for this phenomenon in spite of the natural advantages of the province are the drastic lack of hotels, entertainment facilities and inland transport, the high costs, as well as the complications of entry and exit formalities. These major disadvantages together with insufficient publicity have made the province and to some extent the rest of Libya unknown and neglected in the tourist trade area of the Mediterranean. Tourist attractions including the sunny climate, mild winters, long and sandy beaches, the variety of landscape, the legacy and variety of historical sites, and the usual way of life, have unfortunately failed to capture any significant share of the tourist trade of North Africa.

The outside contacts of Cyrenaica, and Benghazi in particular, have reflected the pattern of the oil operations as can be seen from the following table. (23)

YEAR	Libya			Cyrenaica		
	Arrivals	Departures	Tourists	Arrivals	Departures	Tourists
1957	38,231	36,517	25,026	-	-	-
1958	39,603	39,750	31,217	13,172	13,271	-
1959	42,898	40,960	27,339	14,551	13,098	197
1960	56,227	53,240	29,452	16,338	14,710	7,907
1961	53,955	58,338	61,550	15,983	15,501	33,613
1962 (till Sept.)	44,357	40,137	49,550	15,199	13,871	26,192

The former statistics, although higher than those of Tunisia for the same period, are misleading because the bulk are associated with the movements of oil company personnel, foreign traders, business men, diplomats, visiting relatives of foreign residents, air crew and so on. Holiday-makers or genuine tourists are believed to account for only one third of the total Libyan non-resident visitors. In the case of Cyrenaica the proportion in the tourist category has been limited indeed until recent years.

As far as Benghazi itself is concerned, tourist activities are few. Provincial legislation requires every client or foreigner who stays for over one night to be officially registered. The overwhelming majority of the police records, therefore, include resident foreigners who have for example moved from Tripoli or the desert to Benghazi or even from Benghazi to any of the Jebel hotels. In two years of residence in Benghazi, I cannot remember seeing one group or bus load of tourists.

Benghazi, even after what has been achieved in increased hotel accommodation still has very little to offer to tourists.

Essential requirements to cope with the present needs are not only behind demand but are mediocre in quality.

Hotels

There are eleven hotels in Benghazi of which 4 are classified as first-class, 4 as second-class and 3 as third-

class. All except two of the first-class and one of the second-class category are of pre-war construction. Prior to 1960 the sole suitable hotel was the Italian constructed hotel named after the old site of Berenice. Persistent demand for sufficient and better accommodation by both foreign personnel and government officials led to the private construction of four first-class hotels, (two completed by 1963) and one second-class hotel during the last three years. Hotel capacity in 1962 was 725 beds of which 332 were in first-class hotels, 254 in second-class and 170 in third-class hotels. This shows that almost 46 per cent of the hotel bed capacity is of the first-class. The Berenice hotel alone provides 200 beds or about 28 per cent of the total percentage. The second-class category is less affected by recent economic developments. The remaining hotels of the third group are in a terrible condition and can be hardly termed hotels. Further illustrations of Benghazi's present hotel facilities are indicated by the following table obtained from the tourist department in 1962.

Name	Cate- gory.	Rooms	Beds	Baths	Room with one bed	Room with one bed & bath	Room with two beds	Room with two beds and bath
Berenice	I	150	200	85	40	75	25	10
Continental	I	53	72	36	15	12	5	21
Lux	I	32	60	32	-	4	-	28
National	I	33	59	14	9	2	22	-
Grand	II	72	105	36	36	-	36	-
Vienna	II	27	35	7	9	-	18	-
Palace	II	22	32	8	12	-	10	-
Tourist	II	64	92	12	24	-	40	-
Nagmi	III	34	64	8	4	-	30	-
Libya	III	17	40	4	-	-	17	-
Tunis	III	33	66	6	-	-	33	-
Totals	II	537	725	248	149	93	236	59

Suitable accommodation is therefore still limited and needs to be trebled in order to fulfil the persistent demand for modern hotel facilities. To complicate things further, it should be noted that almost 30 per cent of the rooms at the Berenice hotel are continually reserved for government officials and guests. The air-lines too reserve a similar percentage of most first-class hotels. In other words, although the hotel trade has made some progress it is still behind the present demand created by oil.

Entertainment Facilities.

While hotel facilities are poor, such difficulties are combined with lack of entertainment. The situation is most unsatisfactory especially with the present increasing contact with Europe. The social, political and religious background of post-war Benghazi have determined the present rigidity of the city's social life in general, and it is perhaps the natives who suffer most from the lack of entertainment. This is well reflected in the way of life of the majority of the population especially the younger generation. Religions, beliefs and relationships between the two sexes, the high percentage of veiled women, the prohibition of prostitution and alcoholic drinking, and the absence of cultural clubs and public libraries are all factors which helped to create a deep vacuum in the lives of the young. The direct result of this social atmosphere is unfortunately the growing irresponsibility and the tendency towards laziness. To the natives of Benghazi the word entertainment, although differing slightly among the different social groups inevitably implies sitting in a coffee bar, a visit to a picture house, secret rendezvous for drinking purposes, a weekly visit to the single football ground, a ride around the outskirts of the city either to take the family out, to discuss politics or more frequently for the sake of drinking. As far as foreigners are

concerned conditions are rather different but they are by no means able to enjoy what their original environments had to offer. To the majority social indoor gatherings have become a prominent way to overcome these difficulties.

Cinemas.

There are 8 picture houses in Benghazi, but only one is first-class and one second-class. The latter was built by the Italians in 1932 as the city theatre and it was also named after the old site of Berenice. The conversion of the theatre into a picture house meant that Benghazi remains without a theatre, apart from two-third-class stages now part of the Girls' Secondary School and that of the old Torelli barracks. The premises of the former British forces' cinema at Berka, now occupied by the provincial Olympic Committee, together with the old Berenice stage are the only two possible places for theatre work, which is often restricted to national celebrations.

Cinemas attract huge crowds of Libyans and foreigners. To the first group Arab films are preferred although one cannot really draw a definite decision on this matter except, perhaps, with the old generation where language difficulties cannot be ignored. Foreign films are required by the law to have Arabic translation. Because of this all foreign films come after being shown in Egypt or Lebanon. The Rex Cinema is the only picture house showing only foreign films and because of this its audience is

largely foreigners with educated Libyans. The Berenice Cinema is the largest of all picture houses, showing a mixture of foreign and Arabic films. Besides Berenice, el-Horryia is the only other picture house where the audience is a mixture of natives and foreigners. Other cinemas often show foreign films, but with an entirely Libyan audience as these cinemas are all of a third-class category. Air conditioning and comfortable seats are limited to the Rex Cinema while other cinemas including the Berenice lack all essentials for any standard picture house. Because of tradition and religious beliefs Libyan women do not go to cinemas unless accompanied by their male companions with the exception of the Berenice cinema which has presented a weekly special show for women for some years.

The distribution of Benghazi's cinemas does not correspond with either population density of the different parts of the city, nor has it responded to the post-oil discoveries and the changes in land use values in modern Benghazi. The location and site of cinemas in the city - along the main street between Berka and the Municipality Square, where 6 out of 8 cinemas are found has remained practically unchanged despite the recent radical changes brought by oil. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that all but two of these cinemas are among the lowest class group although this area comprises what we have called modern Benghazi. The remaining two cinemas are found in

the northern part of the Arab town, south of the general hospital and opposite the Fonduk.

Night Clubs

Until a few years ago the Berenice hotel was the only place in Benghazi where a night club and a casino were found. The increased number of foreign male bachelors with immense incomes quickly led to the provision of more night clubs. Today Benghazi has four, though gambling is still confined to the Berenice casino. All these clubs are owned by Libyans, but in most cases are run by Greek managers. Customers of the clubs are mainly people engaged in petroleum affairs, especially Americans and Libyans; gambling, on the other hand, is only for foreigners. Prices charged in these clubs are considered higher than anywhere else in the Middle East and in most European countries, but there is always a complaint of overcrowding. This feature in itself reflects the seclusion of native women. There are now half as many night clubs as cinemas; a feature which probably does not exist in many other oriental cities.

Restaurants

Catering services and restaurants in particular are still deficient. According to Municipality figures of 1962, Benghazi had 23 restaurants, including 5 first-class restaurants of which three are attached to main hotels. One of the remaining two first-class restaurants is part of a night club and is only open at night. Moreover, there

are only 5 second-class restaurants, one of which is a private restaurant at the Sailing Club. The striking feature about the former two categories is that they are rather expensive for most people, especially Libyans. The remaining number comprise typically small and poor oriental restaurants, mostly located in narrow and sometimes barely accessible lanes of the Arab town. For the foreign community restaurant facilities seem to fulfil the present demand. As far as middle-class Libyans are concerned, conditions are rather difficult because current prices are high.

Sports Clubs

Basically all clubs in Benghazi are sports clubs, and there are no cultural or other kind of clubs. Only three clubs undertake some social activities mainly because the majority of their members are foreigners: the Sailing Club, the Golf Club and the Beach Club. Only in these clubs is family membership found, though Libyan members are largely males. Drinking facilities are the main reason for most Libyan members, as the majority never take part in the sports available.

As far as the other 8 clubs are concerned, the situation is different as all of them are more or less youth clubs with a football team as the main attraction. Other sports are still in their first stages. Of these 8 clubs there is only one club registered as a Tennis Club and another one as a

Cycling Club, although in fact the latter club is mainly known for its football team, while the former has not even premises yet. Benghazi has only two usable tennis courts, one of which is a private part of the Petroleum Committee premises. The remaining clubs are comparatively small and their membership varies from 400 to 800 persons, compared with about 1,050 members in the Sailing Club. These clubs face real financial difficulties and manage to survive largely because of public interest in sports, and in particular football. In recent years the Provincial Government, after establishing the Olympic Committee for sports in 1958, has begun to provide financial aid and suitable lands for future premises, and to arrange for recruiting qualified trainers.


Benghazi has one single untidy football ground, and furthermore most clubs are situated in departments inside the city. To complicate things further, none of these clubs owns any private sports ground. The government is said to be studying the construction of a compound sports stadium along the southern part of Sebkhah't el Punra. Public criticism of government promises and its limited financial support of developing sports is often sharp.

Constructive development measures as far as sports are concerned do not exist in Benghazi or elsewhere in Cyrenaica, and one cannot hesitate to wish for a new official outlook for reorganizing sports in general.

Benghazi's sandy shoreline at Juliana and further south at Ghar Junes are not yet fully developed as modern beaches despite their first-class natural conditions. The need for better beach accommodation was ignored by the Municipality until two years ago, when a plan for what is now called the Chalet of Benghazi was put into operation (see Fig.21). The scheme will provide 136 medium-sized cabins with other essential services and is sited near the old Juliana beach. Until now Juliana beach, the only public beach served by seasonal public transport, is, in view of the majority, a complete failure if compared with similar beaches at Tripoli and Alexandria. The main reasons are the lack of accommodation, irregular public transport, noise and litter.

Dance halls, separate licenced bars, and proper snack bars do not exist in Benghazi. Cafes, on the other hand, are perhaps more numerous than the city inhabitants need especially in the case of the typical oriental cafes. Of the 150 cafes in Benghazi less than 10 are of standard status except those three cafes attached to the Rex Cinema, the Vienna Restaurant and that in the Berenice Hotel. Otherwise, the remainder are distinguished by their small size or their independence on non-mechanical systems, except those found along the main streets of modern Benghazi. Concentrations of Arab or oriental cafes are in the Arab town, especially near the shopping centres of Suk el-Dalam, Suk el-Gerid and the Fonduk. The majority

Figure 21



Juliana chalet

of these cafes depend on certain groups of traders, shopkeepers and so forth. Payments are, therefore often made weekly or monthly.

In sum Benghazi does not yet possess enough standard entertainment facilities to assist in attracting tourists, and those available do not even fulfil the requirements of the city's own residents.

RESIDENTIAL FUNCTIONS

No specific rules can be laid down to determine the pattern of the distribution of residential quarters in the city of Benghazi. At the centre of the Arab quarter, residential functions are influenced by tradition. North, East and to some extent to the South Dar el-Kish, shanty towns developed long ago and are still growing in areas usually associated with the middle classes. In modern Benghazi, apart from the state properties, demand for extra commercial sites is reducing accommodation facilities. The high rents and the nature of housing have kept the area almost preserved for foreigners. New buildings are not fulfilling the growing demand.

State popular houses at Ras Abeida and Dar el-Kish are still limited to lower-class residential sites. Although both Berka and Sidi Husein have a nucleus of a mixture of lower and middle classes, they have begun to face a strong challenge of modern superimposition and consequently the transformation to modern planning. This will eventually

mean the evacuation of their present occupants unless government policies become more effective and more state houses are made available. In the case of Fuehat and other modern residential areas, it will take some time for most Cyrenaicans to adapt themselves to these new forms of dwelling.

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CHAPTER VI

SPHERE OF INFLUENCE


The influence of Benghazi upon surrounding regions and indeed upon the whole of Cyrenaica undoubtedly exceeds that of any other city (see Fig. 22). Political status and the high concentration of population are largely responsible, but have been intensified by work opportunities created by oil findings. But to define a limit to this influence or to assess its intensity is another matter. Shortage and unreliability of statistics are among the chief handicaps. Various criteria may be considered.

1. Newspapers

Benghazi and the whole of Cyrenaica is still without one single daily newspaper. The high rate of illiteracy, the lack of private, cheap and efficient printing facilities and the government censorship of independent newspapers are the chief reasons. Special emphasis must be laid on the fact that no newspapers are published in Cyrenaica outside the city of Benghazi. The Benghazi papers number three.

The Barca el-Giaddida or New Cyrenaica is the official government newspaper which is published three times a week. Circulation is free to government departments all over the province, but public circulation, on the other hand, is limited to very few people, mainly those interested in government bids and contracts. 800 copies per publication

Figure 22



Cyrenaica

is considered a large production. Outside Benghazi the distribution, which is often the following day, is estimated at less than 200 copies per issue. Average sales of 50 copies in Derna is second to that of Benghazi city itself. Beida, Tobrouk, el-Marj and Agedabia are the other chief distribution centres.

There are two independent weekly newspapers, el-Amal and el-Rakib. The first is fully independent, while the second is often regarded as a semi-government newspaper. Circulation of the first is over 2,000 copies per week; the latter is less appreciated because of its pro-government views, and maximum distribution, as a result, falls to 800 copies. Circulation of both newspapers outside Benghazi is confined to the other urban centres, especially Derna. Sales of these two newspapers, in particular el-Amal, reach as far as Tripoli City. In all no more than 800 copies of both papers are sold outside of Benghazi.

Finally, Benghazi has a weekly English newspaper called Cyrenaica News. Circulation is limited to the English speaking community and to educated Libyans. No sales of the paper are found out of the city. Local periodicals and magazines do not exist at all. The political role played by Benghazi's newspapers and periodicals after World War II has come to a standstill since independence. To most people the government attitude of conditioned publications - still in practice - is the only reason, and this is confirmed by

recent government interference.

In view of such conditions one wonders whether there is any press conscience at all. To answer this question one ought to reverse the basic issue and examine the external influences, or in other words the influence of Arab newspapers on Benghazi and the whole of Cyrenaica.

No regular distribution of Tripoli's newspapers is undertaken in Benghazi, except the Sunday Ghibli, a weekly English paper published in Tripoli. Some periodicals are often on sale. Otherwise little effect is visible, simply because conditions in Tripoli are not much better.

The following statistics obtained from the Provincial Press and Publication Department in 1962 summarize the situation for the imported newspapers and magazines:-

Year	Place of publication	No. of Newspapers	No. of Magazines	Paperback books	Total
	Egypt	32,500	114,650	845	147,995
	Lebanon	4,600	-	-	4,600
1957	Syria	1,670	1,150	-	2,820
	Iraq	170	1,440	-	1,610
	Tunisia	120	-	-	120
	Totals	39,060	117,240	845	157,145
	Egypt	70,500	208,900	4,080	283,480
	Lebanon	9,550	11,500	-	21,050
1961	Syria	750	-	-	750
	Kuwait	120	-	-	120
	Morocco	360	-	-	360
	Totals	81,280	220,400	4,080	305,760

Two striking points are well exposed. First, the grand total of all categories nearly doubled between 1957 and 1961, and second, Egyptian publications are greatly dominant, not only by comparison with other Arab countries, but also by comparison with the total yearly publications of all local newspapers. In 1961, for example, Benghazi's newspapers, including the English editions, did not exceed 270,000 copies compared with 283,000 copies of Egyptian publications. Not only this, but in 1961 there were only two weekly flights between Benghazi and Cairo, a fact which has limited regular circulation especially in the case of daily newspapers. The present higher rate of flights and the intention of operating new lines will certainly bring more of these publications.

Generally speaking, and without involving political implications, the Egyptian press has done a great deal to fill the vacuum created by the limited and poor Libyan publications. To find a substitute for such an impact is difficult at least in the near future. Thus it is desirable to provide an official formula in which prices of these publications are cut down in order to enable and stimulate further interest in reading.

Outside Benghazi also, sales of these publications are above those of local newspapers. The stationery and bookshops at Derna, Tobrouk and that of Beida are mostly dependent on

sales of these publications. In other words, Benghazi with the accepted fact of very low circulation of all printed matter, is more or less serving as a rallying point for foreign publications than as a centre of local production. As far as the non-Arab community is concerned, the sale of British, American, Italian, Greek, German and (since the Algerian cease-fire) French newspapers and magazines, is considered fairly regular and fulfills the present requirements. No public sale of non-Arab publications is found anywhere else in Cyrenaica.

2. Public Transport

An effective road network, supplemented by two railway lines to Barce and Soluk, was the base of the Italian colonization scheme in Cyrenaica. Oil exploitation south of Syrte and the increasing awareness of Jiarabub as a religious centre were the only two factors which brought further extensions to the former Italian road network. Otherwise no major expansion or even effective maintenance has been carried out since the Italian domination.

The completion of both networks by the middle of 1930s has stimulated Benghazi's evolution and growth and furthermore has made the city an effective capital.

On the whole the existing networks seem to serve the needs of the province adequately and it is felt that there

is no necessity for further expansion, especially now with the traditional economy facing a serious setback if not complete stagnation.

(a) Railways

Cyrenaican railways consist of two small single-track narrow-gauge railways. In all there are 164 kilometres of track with 20 kilometres of sidings and branches.

Railway contact between Benghazi and other railway terminals is limited to five journeys per week: three one-day return journeys to Barce and two to Soluk. The trains are very old and take half a day to get to Barce (80 kms.) Travelling by railway when there is a market day in Barce is something which reflects the way of life in rural Cyrenaica. The train is often a mobile market not only for manufactured goods, but also for sheep and goats. The drinking of tea by train officials in the traditional way is customary. Direct movement of passengers or goods between the termini (Benghazi and Barce or Benghazi and Soluk and vice versa) is very little, as the trains are mainly meant to help inhabitants to reach the nearby weekly market. So most trains leave and arrive at Benghazi with few on board. The result is that since 1954 Cyrenaican railways are estimated to have lost over 25 thousand pounds per year. The average yearly goods traffic, though differing from year to year, is less than 10 thousand tons.

(b) Buses

The present network of buses between Benghazi and the other urban centres is totally influenced by the direction of the coastal highway between Cyrenaica and Egypt in the east and Tripolitania in the west. There are no bus services to link up the other off-route towns like el-Abiar and Soluk or even some of the coastal centres like Susa and Tolmeita. The small volume of passenger traffic is proclaimed as the reason. Tobrouk in the east and Agedabia in the south are termini for bus services. Two journeys per day link Benghazi with Agedabia via Ghemines. To the east buses run once a day to Tobrouk and twice to Derna, including the former journey to Tobrouk. East of Tobrouk no buses are available. Until a few years ago there was a weekly bus link between Benghazi and Salloum. The competition of mini-buses running as taxis between Egypt and Benghazi has brought the end of bus services between Benghazi and the Egyptian border.

The development of Beida as a national administrative centre has not brought additional bus services with either Benghazi or Derna.

Apart from the former route Benghazi is linked with Tripoli by four bus journeys per week. Two of these journeys are undertaken by the Cyrenaican Bus Company while the other two are arranged by the similar company in Tripoli. No bus service is yet available between Benghazi and Sebka,

the capital of Fezzan. Generally speaking, the present bus network is less than the demand even on the sparsely populated route west of Benghazi.

(c) Taxis

Benghazi has two distinct types of taxis. First the usual type of taxis found in any town and secondly the mini-bus taxis. The long distances between the urban centres and consequently the high fares together with insufficient bus services were the reasons for the introduction of this sort of taxi. These taxis, which are normally licensed for eight passengers, are the real means of public transport between Benghazi and the other centres, Tripoli or as far as Alexandria and Cairo. The actual number of these taxis is not known as many are registered in other towns. An estimate of 150-200 seems reasonable. The eastern side of the Fondak where 17 land travel agencies are found is their main terminal. Journeys are more often conditioned by a full seating capacity than the given timetables, even in cases of long journeys, like those to Tripoli or Egypt. Inside Cyrenaica these taxis, which charge roughly similar fares as buses, travel as far as Tobrouk and Agedabia. Barce, Soluk, Beida and Derna are reached a score of times a day. To Egypt journeys are carried out once or twice a day except in summer, when these journeys are believed to equal if not exceed local journeys. Libyan tourists, the return of Egyptian teachers with their families, and Libyan

students returning on their summer holidays from Egyptian institutes form the bulk of the travellers. To Tripoli an average of four journeys per day occur. So mini-bus taxis are a vital factor in extending Benghazi's sphere of influence.

In Benghazi itself the number of taxis has increased enormously as a result of the recent prosperity. De Luxe cars are dominant among the city's 140 taxis. Charges, on the other hand, are terribly high and because of this they hardly travel outside the city boundary.

Traffic of goods is also undertaken by private vehicles for which no records are available or even roughly known to officials.

3. Medical Facilities

Treatment in Benghazi general hospital for non-residents is limited to cases where treatment is not available at the administrative hospital, and therefore it has to be officially arranged between the hospitals concerned. Cases of such nature are always included in the totals of both hospitals without any special distinction, and therefore no specific interrelation can be determined. According to many officials the figure is very small indeed and ought to be disregarded as an influential medical service. Patients in private hospitals are too rarely listed as non-city residents. Patients coming specially to attend private surgeries or consulting specialists are also believed to be

limited to a few cases a year. Distances and the high costs are the two main reasons. On the other hand, patients from Benghazi compose over 75% of all patients treated in either Barce mental hospital or Cyrene chest hospital. No exchange of doctors between the city general hospital and elsewhere is practised. This means that in actual fact Benghazi has no direct influence upon medical services prevailing outside its administrative boundary, except in cases of distribution of doctors, the supply of medicines and finally the supervision of policies and administration.

4. Schools

Elementary and to some extent intermediate education are available in most urban centres. Secondary level is limited to Benghazi, Derna and Agedabia. Female secondary education, on the other hand, is only available in Benghazi and Derna. Benghazi's influence on secondary education is in theory supposed to cover the whole Mutasarrifia of Benghazi for male education plus the Mustasarrifia of Barce and Agedabia for females. But in practice this influence is negligible as very few pupils indeed outside the big urban centres obtain secondary education, particularly in the case of girls, where traditions are against female education, not to mention the matter of allowing girls to travel and stay away from their homes. Recorded cases are

consequently very few and only permitted where residence with family relations is possible.

Vocational education including teacher training is available only in Benghazi, where admittance is conditioned by the required qualifications. Half of the total students of all vocational schools in Benghazi are estimated to come from the other parts of Cyrenaica, especially from centres with intermediate school facilities. The Libyan University is a national institute with students from Cyrenaica coming mainly from Benghazi itself or Derna which is often regarded as the supply centre of most educated Cyrenaicans including those now in the key posts of Benghazi's Civil Service.

5. Prisons

Apart from Benghazi city no other centre is to have a proper prison. Towns like Derna, Tobrouk, Barce and Agedabia have small detention centres usually part of the town police station. Detainees are either those waiting for trial or those spending less than three months imprisonment. Convicts exceeding this limit of punishment are forwarded to Benghazi's prison. The following example explains how the system works. An accused from Bardya - near the Egyptian border - is the responsibility of Tobrouk's police, who with the district public prosecutor investigate the matter. The accused is then transferred to Derna public prosecutor, who, in most cases, arranges for a trial in Derna itself. If the

accused, detained at Derna police station, is found guilty, then he must serve his sentence in Benghazi's prison unless the punishment is less than three months. In such cases convicts are often sent back to be detained at the area police station and if this is not possible to the main police station of the region which is in this case Tobrouk's police station.

As far as courts are concerned each major administrative centre has its own primary Shariah courts. Civil primary courts are only found in Benghazi and Derna. Guziah civil courts are, on the other hand, found in every Mutasarrifia headquarters. Courts of appeal and those dealing with capital crimes are also limited to Derna and Benghazi, because of the rank and status of their public prosecutors. This means that all criminal cases except for the Mutassarrifia of Derna and Beida and Tobrouk are dealt with in Benghazi. The approval of a criminal investigation by the Derna prosecutor is by law subject to the approval of the Benghazi headquarters which in actual fact means that the influence of Benghazi is absolute, especially as advisors presiding over criminal cases are always recruited from Benghazi's Court of Appeal. Therefore the influence of Benghazi's judicial jurisdiction is overwhelming, although it does not affect cases within the Jurisdiction of Guziah civil courts or of those of Derna primary and court of appeal, the situation in practice

more complex, as according to regulations no verdict is final unless registered and approved by Benghazi's Chief Public Prosecutor.

6. Banks

Eight banks and five branches are the entire banking facilities encountered in Cyrenaica. Outside Benghazi the number of branches includes Barclays D.C.O. at Tobrouk and Derna, the Libyan Agricultural Bank in Derna and Barce, and the Bank of Libya at Beida. These banks are all found in Benghazi, where other banks include the Bank of Rome, the Bank of Egypt, the Arab Bank and the British Bank of the Middle East.

According to some officials the total amount of business undertaken by all branches outside the city is still very small and perhaps does not exceed 8% of the total business. Awareness of banking even in Benghazi itself is still at its lowest level. Cyrenaican individuals, apart from prosperous traders and merchants and some government employees, do not have banking accounts either because of their limited incomes which do not allow for savings or more often because of their ignorance of banking facilities. Officials of the Bank of Libya confirm that 90% of all Cyrenaican cash in circulation is found in Benghazi alone; a feature which well reflects the present attitude of the public towards banking in general.

In theory the city banks, or at least those which have

branches in other parts of the province, are distributed in order to offer a wider service in places where it is supposed to be most needed. The Barclay's branches with their commercial facilities in Derna and Tobrouk, and the agricultural branches in Barce and Derna, are located in the most developed agricultural areas, and the branch of the Bank of Libya at Beida, the administrative centre. In practice, however, services offered by these banks, owing to insignificant demand, are limited indeed.

7. Marketing of agricultural produce

Static agriculture in Cyrenaica has always been in direct conflict with nomadism. The defeat of the Axis powers in the Western Desert has brought further obstacles to the agricultural redevelopment of the province. The Italian colonization scheme in the Jebel was basically to recreate what once was called the granary of Rome. All fundamental work was accomplished and the trial was set up for a new agricultural project. War damage, the fever of independence, and the complete failure of local authorities in laying effective policies all retarded the revival of the costly Italian scheme. High maintenance costs are often cynically considered by the public as long term profits. Excluding areas of the still paralysed Italian scheme, static agriculture does not exist apart from scattered and in most cases, limited and non-commercial patches of dry or irrigated

farms. Therefore, no agricultural specialization is to be found. Derna's bananas, for example, have fame but no real commercial value. Production of bananas here has been possible because of the availability of enough water and the suitable climate. Intensive family work and the high prices are also important factors. The physical limitations of sites have limited production, which can hardly fulfil local consumption. The main reason for the renown of Derna bananas is that most Cyrenaicans have no respect for farming in general. Because of this the word Muz - bananas - in Arabic is often used to denote with disgust people from Derna. Similar examples of small regional specialization include Barce for wheat, Messa (near Beida) for grapes, and Ghemines for green mint, widely used with the traditional tea.

The following selective statistics showing areas and production of some field crops and fruits give further illustration of regional agricultural differences for the year 1960.⁽¹⁾

(1) Field Crops

Crop	Area & Production	Cyrenaica	MUTASARRIFIA					
			Age- dabia	Bengh- azi	Barce	Beida	Derna	Tob- rouk
Maize	Area(ha)	545	4	53	19	-	450	19
	Prod(Qtls)	5,428	37	531	187	-	4,485	188
Broad Beans	Area(ha)	357	6	95	-	76	158	22
	Prod(Qtls)	3,562	61	9	-	755	1,575	225
Chick Peas	Area(ha)	1,011	-	3	8	700	250	50
	Prod(Qtls)	2,893	-	6	16	2,048	714	109
Tomatoes	Area(ha)	123	30	39	30	3	19	2
	Prod(Qtls)	36,527	8,828	11,723	8,910	758	5,710	548
Melons	Area(ha)	71	12	31	15	1	10	2
	Prod(Qtls)	21,369	3,679	9,408	4,367	149	3,126	640
Water Melons	Area(ha)	43	4	18	18	-	-	3
	Prod(Qtls)	22,028	2,010	8,761	9,240	181	99	1,737
Onions	Area(ha)	35	5	15	5	1	8	1
	Prod(Qtls)	10,564	1,553	4,576	1,364	224	2,427	420
Pepper	Area(ha)	41	4	13	10	1	13	-
	Prod(Qtls)	9,953	547	1,904	1,441	140	1,905	16

(2) Fruits

Fruit	Area & Production	Cyrenaica	MUTASARRIFIA					
			Age-dabia	Benghazi	Barce	Beida	Derna	Tobrouk
Oranges	Area(ha)	11	-	3	1	4	4	-
	Prod(Qtls)	2,859	-	2,706	-	86	67	-
Apples	Area	43	-	6	3	26	7	1
	Prod	962	1	183	1	553	225	1
Peaches	Area	38	1	5	7	22	4	1
	Prod	1,042	1	502	-	294	246	-
Grapes	Area	916	62	104	39	556	155	-
	Prod	41,241	5,025	9,051	2,634	21,579	2,228	724
Bananas	Area	7	1	1	-	-	6	1
	Prod	1,947	-	540	-	253	1,154	-
Dates	Area	1,176	880	265	9	1	8	14
	Prod	10,453	4,567	4,224	963	1	395	304

Marketing of these products and many others is often encountered in Benghazi, though it is not done on a proper and regular marketing basis. The limited output, the purpose of home consumption and the long distances from Benghazi are all factors limiting the actual amounts reaching the city market. Exceptions are the vegetables of the nearby coastal cases, tomatoes from Jalo and Barce, grapes from Beida, Derna and

Agedabia, melons and water melons from Barce, Derna and Tobrouk and dates from Agedabia and the southern oases.

The city's needs of vegetables and fruits are largely met by imports from Tripolitania. Overseas imports are usually limited to some varieties of fruits such as apples, peaches, bananas and grapefruit.

Wheat and barley, as well as animals for the meat supply, are brought from areas as far as the Egyptian border, Syrte and the southern oases. The supply of poultry is also largely on a provincial scale, especially from areas like el Abiar, Barce and Soluk. Some poultry is brought from as far as Tripoli. Firewood and charcoal are exclusively from the Jebel.

Generally speaking, agriculture, including shifting cultivation, is facing a strong challenge from new and more profitable work opportunities, developed as a consequence of oil discoveries. If the present shift from rural Cyrenaica continues it will not be long before agriculture strongly declines, bringing further complications to the local supply of agricultural products, including those at present in fairly adequate supply, like cereals and meat.

8. Immigrants to Benghazi

Two events in the last few decades have left Benghazi with a legacy of a comparatively large scale population migration : (1) the Italian phase of constructing modern

Benghazi: (2) the recent impact of oil discoveries.

The first migration was on a provincial scale, and mainly included people from confiscated lands and properties. The latter, on the other hand, was of a national character.

Better payments and persistent shortages of labour are among the fundamental factors. The occasional economic difficulties in Tripolitania, usually in times of severe droughts, also account for the city's population growth.

Immigrants to Benghazi are mostly Tripolitanians.

Misurata, the eastern parts of Jebel Nefusa and the coastal zone west of Tripoli City are the main areas from which Tripolitanians come to Benghazi. Localities like Tagiura, Garian and Tripoli City are also important. The Berbers of the Western Jebel (e.g. Nalut, Jefren) are the only Tripolitanians who did not contribute to the eastward immigration. Preservation of ethnic origin combined with their nature as sedentary people are the reasons.

Migration to Benghazi from Fezzan is a recent phenomenon. Independence in the 1950s has stimulated the conception of one nation. Differences in dialects, the colour of the skin and more important the consideration of all Fezzanese as primitive and backward people have caused some segregation and have consequently acted as barriers to family migration. Because of this most Fezzanese are youths who often come in groups and work together mainly as hotel attendants and waiters.

Immigrants from Cyrenaica are a mixture of all tribes especially those of Awagir, Abedat and Baraasa. The drift to Benghazi is basically from the urban centres and areas of farming experience like the coastal oases and most parts of the Jebel. Permanent migration from pure and semi-nomadic zones is less significant. Temporary or seasonal migration is more frequent. In conclusion, the present composition of the city population is undoubtedly the most complex of urban centres in Libya.

In summary, it is difficult to define the precise sphere of influence of Benghazi. Its tentacles reach out to many parts of Libya from which it attracts migrants. In Cyrenaica, its influence extends more to other smaller towns than to agricultural and nomadic communities; its contacts are with places like Barce, Derna and Agedabia rather than with the desert south. Nevertheless, to all it is the main town, the centre of wealth and prosperity, the essence of new Cyrenaica. Its cosmopolitan air is only typical of many Middle Eastern cities.

References

- (1) Agricultural Statistics for Cyrenaica, Benghazi, 1962, pp. 77 & 78.

CHAPTER VII.

POPULATION

To assess the influence of the different ethnic element of the population of Benghazi upon present day life, one must try to unravel the evolution of these different racial groups; a task which cannot be justified unless consideration is devoted to the analysis of the whole provincial population or even the whole population of Libya. The reason is that the present composition of the different ethnic elements of the Libyan population is no more than a reflection of the racial mixture of the successive waves of invaders with the original ethnic background represented by the Berbers. In brief, the Berbers are a Hamitic race who are also known as Mazigh after their language. Many historians agree that the word Berber was probably first used by the Arabs in order to distinguish those people living in North Africa whose language was not understood by the Arabs. The same writers also agree that the Berbers in North Africa come from two main confederations, the Branes and Madghis. E. Carette in his work "Recherches sur l'origine et les migrations des principales tribus de l'Afrique Septentrionale" (Paris, 1835) supposed that the word Berber was given by the Arab historians as a common name to all people of North Africa and that it is derived from the word Barbari which means to the ancient geographers the people of Mauritania.

There were few major migrations of peoples whose ethnic

influences are still to be traced in the composition of the provincial population. According to some writers, the first is the Phoenician influence. "Thus in the period preceding the final Semitisation of Cyrenaica by the Arabs, an early Semitic Phoenician influence has to be taken into consideration".⁽¹⁾ This suggestion is rather doubtful because Cyrenaica was never in the direct orbit of Phoenician rule or influence, and because the Phoenicians, being traders in the first place, were mainly concerned with the exaction of tribute, the control of trade and the employment of mercenaries. Their racial influence is dubious even in Tunisia and Tripolitania where the Phoenicians have ruled for many centuries.

About the middle of the 7th century B.C., Cyrenaica became the focus for the Greek interests. The new development was necessitated by the strain of the economic difficulties in Crete and Greece and it was facilitated by the geographical position of the two countries especially in the case of Crete. "Between Northern Cyrenaica and Southern Crete there are many points of contact - from time immemorial the coast and parts of the Jebel have been the scene of highly developed Cretan and Greek settlements".⁽²⁾ However, it is again difficult to determine the extent of the Greek racial impact on the native population who were considered as an inferior race. Nevertheless, intermarriage

should be expected and the foreign racial element must have contributed to the ethnic composition of the Berbers of Cyrenaica. Another similar situation ought to be considered during those long centuries before the Greek arrival when the Berbers of Cyrenaica, forced by the severe climatic conditions, often sought prosperity in the Nile Valley. "The sharp contrast between the pastoral environment of Cyrenaica and that of agricultural Egypt must have stimulated racial and cultural contact." (3)

The Greek domination in Cyrenaica was followed by rather a short rule by the Romans who failed too, for economic, security and social reasons, to intermingle on a large scale with the native inhabitants. The Roman domination was brought to its end when the province was subjugated by ^{the} Arab commander Omar ibn el-Ass in 643 A.D. The Arab conquest of Cyrenaica is without doubt the first major event in the racial history of the province.

The persistent revolts of the Berbers throughout their history showed their hatred of early intruders, a phenomenon which in itself reflects the impossibility of large scale intermarriage. The Berbers also struggled long and hard against the Arabs even after their adoption of the Islamic faith which was completed in 753 A.D. when the Berbers were excused the payment of tribute to the Moslem ruler. "Nel anno 753 il governo dell'Africhia

informava il Califfo che tutto il paese era Islamizzata e che percio non poteva mandare il consueto tributo, che doveva pagato soltanto dai sudditi non musulmani".(4)

At the time of the Arab takeover, the Berber tribe of Luata was the dominant and most powerful Berber tribe whose territory included the whole Mediterranean littoral of Egypt, Cyrenaica and Syrte. O. Bates states "It is the Luata who must be regarded as the dominant branch of the Berber stock in eastern Libya of the 7th century A.D."(5) The former tribe is racially linked with the confederation of the Madghis. The Berbers of Cyrenaica who were subdued by the Arabs maintained their full racial structure from the 7th century until over four hundred years later when the large Arab nomadic tribes of Beni Hilal and Beni Suleim arrived from Arabia via Upper Egypt. Most of the Arabs, because of the necessity of safeguarding their rule, were obliged to remain in the urban centres. Between the Arab takeover and the arrival of the warlike Bedouin tribes in the 11th century the province of Cyrenaica faced gradual changes which in the end brought the Hamitic race of the Berbers and the Semitic race of the Arabs together. These changes were the complete conversion of the Berbers to the Mohammedan faith, the adoption of the Arabic language, and their gradual accordance of the Arab citizens. In other words, the attitude towards the Arabs underwent a basic change. Most writers conclude that the Semitic influence

would never have reached its present level if the conditions which prevailed before the appearance of the two Bedouin tribes had persisted. These tribes, who were tempted by the Fatimid Caliph el-Mustanser to migrate westward, were said to number between 200 to 300 thousands.

The agricultural prosperity of the province achieved by the Greeks and to some extent by the Romans began to fade gradually under Arab rule, not only because the Arabs were never accustomed to such a mode of life, but also because the province was far less economically attractive than the Maghreb. Besides, there were successions of severe battles for a long time. From the 13th century onward, changes in the Berber's racial composition became obvious. The fundamental fact behind this phenomenon is attributed to the decision of both tribes of Beni Labid and Beni Heib of the Beni Suleim branch to reside permanently in Cyrenaica.

It is difficult to judge how far the Arabs have ethnically influenced the provincial population because of the lack of detailed anthropological studies, and also the fact that every inhabitant strongly declares that he is an Arab even if he is a Kologli, Cretan or even Negro. The reason is that every Libyan, apart from the Jews, is a Moslem and speaks Arabic, and so all consider themselves racially as Arabs. However, according to the figures given

by De Agostini in his work "Le Popolazione della Cirenaica" published in 1922, the Arab-Berber stock amounted to 96 thousands or more or less half the population of the province. The remaining half was divided among the Italians, Kologlis, Negroes, Cretans and Jews. This means that the Berber element, although in a mixed form, was the largest racial group. Figures for the second Italian official census made the Arab-Berber element 95% of the total population. On the other hand, Massignon as cited by Evans-Pritchard, made the Berbers of Cyrenaica to be one fifth of the population, and the Arabs and other minor groups three quarters, a higher fraction than any Arabic-speaking country outside the Arabian peninsula itself. Evans-Pritchard in his work "Handbook on Cyrenaica" writes "Cyrenaica is much more Arab, in the ethnic sense than its neighbours Egypt, the Sudan and Tripolitania".(6)

The second most important ethnic change encountered by the Libyan population, in general, was the gradual racial modification following the Turkish domination, which began at the end of the 16th century and was maintained until the early years of this century. These changes account for the Kologlis, who are the descendants of Janissaries from different provinces of the Ottoman Empire and native Arab, Berber or even Christian women captured by the Berber pirates. In 1936 the Kologlis represented 4.7% of the

whole Libyan population, but there were only 1053 Kologlis in Cyrenaica compared with their total of 35,062. But according to Agostini's figures the Kologlis in Cyrenaica in 1922 totalled 4,250 persons. However, in spite of this comparatively small number, the Kologlis were of great importance during the Turkish regime as they provided nearly all the government employees and they enjoyed generally a higher standard of living than the rest of the population.

Other minor groups are to be found. Prior to the Arab takeover Jews occurred all over North Africa including Cyrenaica. It is believed that their first occurrence took place in the third century B.C. In 174-194 B.C. a second wave of them is believed to have arrived from Palestine. The Jewish community was a large one, especially in Cyrene when in 110 B.C. they were able to arrange their first rebellion, which caused much damage to the prosperity of the country as a whole. Today no traces of this ancient Jewish element can be found. According to Agostini they mixed with the Berbers and lost their identity after the Arab invasion. On the other hand, Bates states that some Jewish families in Benghazi claim to have been settled in the country since the romans.⁽⁷⁾ After 1391 A.D., when Granada was captured by the Christians, resulting in the expulsion of both Moslems and Jews from Spain, the number of Jews increased. Moreover, they avoided mixing with other

racers in spite of the fact that they spoke the Arabic language. Since 1948, emigration to Israel once more has reduced the Jewish community in the province.

There is also the negriod element which mainly consists of descendants of former Sudanese slaves brought to the country by the trans-Saharan commerce. Their number is small; 4% of the whole Libyan population in 1936. Negroes speak Arabic and Islam is their religion. The word 'Abid' - slave - is still widely used to indicate these people. Descendants of Arab men and negresses are called shawashna, a different group from 'Abid', full blooded Negroes.

A third minor racial group are the Cretans, who may be divided into two groups according to the time of their arrival. Prior to 1897 it was estimated that a total of about 150 families of small merchants and artisans had emigrated from Crete to the main coastal cities. After 1897, as a result of the Turco-Greek war which resulted in the island's takeover by the Greeks, one thousand Moslem refugees came to seek protection under the Turkish rule in Susa (Appolonia) and Derna. Cretans were expelled after the Italian occupation, towards which they were hostile, but after the Second World War many of them came back. At present, Cretans have lost some of their identity for many reasons such as their adoption of the Islamic faith and the Arabic language. Furthermore they have intermingled

freely with the local people through intermarriage, though it is true, in some cases, that such marriages would not have taken place if a marriage inside the community could have been arranged. Cretans still speak their own language not only in their homes but also whenever they gather together. According to De Agostini, the Cretans in Cyrenaica numbered 700 persons of whom 300 were in Susa alone, 250 in Benghazi and the remaining 150 divided between Derna and Tobrouk.

Besides these ethnic groups, which one may call the native or indigenous population, Cyrenaica prior to World War II had a total Italian population of about 40,000. Apart from Italian settlers in the province, the Italian occupation which began in 1911 and lasted for thirty-three years did not bring any sort of changes to the dominant racial composition. By the decree of 31st of October 1919 "Legge Fondamentale per Cirenaica" it was intended to treat the natives on an equal footing with the Italian settlers, but the policy of equal partnership and democratic rule was reversed by the rise of Fascism. The decree of June the 26th, 1927, cancelled the earlier decree and made the natives second-class citizens. Another significant result of the Italian occupation was that many thousands were killed or exiled or migrated to neighbouring countries especially Egypt, where they still form Libyan minorities in Alexandria and Fayoum. "Until today there is not a

Cyrenaican tribe or even large section which has not some of its numbers in Egypt".⁽⁸⁾ As far as native losses in Cyrenaica during the Senusi-Italian Wars is concerned, C.L. Pan describes this phenomenon: "During the intervals many natives fled to neighbouring countries particularly from Cyrenaica. Of the natives who remained one-third to one-half were removed to guarded quarters in desert areas. The hardship involved in this mass removal caused many deaths."⁽⁹⁾ The defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa was accompanied by a complete repatriation of the whole Italian community of Cyrenaica. In 1960 Cyrenaica had a total population of 336,488, including 5,176 foreigners of whom only 507 persons were Italians. The foreigners in Cyrenaica, although very few in number if compared with Tripolitania, where the Italian minority alone is over 30 thousands, are divided among 51 nationalities plus 18 persons regarded as stateless. Apart from the foreigners and the Jews, who form rather distinct groups in the economic and social life, the rest of the former ethnic elements mix together in more than one way to give the population of Benghazi its special characteristics which to some extent distinguish it from the rural pattern prevailing outside the urban centres.

With present knowledge we cannot escape the fact that the Berber element is the basic racial background among the Cyrenaican people, as it is in Tripolitania where such a base is estimated at a minimum of 50% of the provincial population.

The fact that some writers put Cyrenaica among the most Arab of territories is based on cultural evidence rather than racial stocks. In this respect the Berbers' early linguistic transformation together with their complete conversion to the Mohammedan faith and Arab customs and traditions have rendered the two groups virtually indistinguishable from a cultural point of view. Besides there are no real physical differences between Arab and Berber. However, what is important to us is to find the effect of this Arab-Berber group as well as the influence of the other ethnic elements on the present life inside the city of Benghazi.

Tribal influence

A tribe may be defined as a politically or socially coherent and autonomous group occupying or claiming a particular territory.⁽¹⁰⁾ The use of the term tribe in Cyrenaica is always to some extent arbitrary, for the political structure is highly segmentary. Cabila is the word generally used to denote a tribe or primary tribal division. The tribes of Cyrenaica are divided into two main groups; the Saada (named after a Berber woman from Zenata who married a notable sheikh from Beni Suleim⁽¹¹⁾) and the Marabout tribes. Details of these tribes are given in De Agostini's monograph on the population of Cyrenaica.

Tribal influence in Benghazi are less prominent than in rural Cyrenaica where they are among the strongest

in the Arab world. The reason for this phenomenon is the early stage in which the quarter or Hai system was implemented to replace the tribe, and the high percentage of Tripolitani-ans, who are estimated to be at least three quarters of the city's native population. "Risulta che ^{piu} piu di tre quarti degli abitanti della Citta sono di origine Tripolitana".⁽¹²⁾ In recent years, despite the wider range of education than at any time before, tribal influence has increased enormously in the city of Benghazi as well as elsewhere because of the new political rights granted by the constitution and which were wrongly conducted by the sheikhs, who did not see any way of achieving their aims except by strengthening the tribal concept. The new situation was further encouraged by the government bodies who too must rely on this concept for their survival. Conflicts among top provincial personnel often show real and open misunderstanding among the three biggest tribes of Abedat, Baraasa and Awagir. Armed collisions were often feared as a result of these conflicts. The direct effects of such a strong tribal system upon Benghazi's life can be seen in many fields. Top personnel often become wealthy and prosperous even if they stay in power for a short time, and also take full advantage of employing their relatives and supporters in key posts without any regard to their qualifications. Most Cyrenaicans emphasize the name of the tribe they belong to especially

if it is a strong tribe and enough of its people are in power. This situation does not apply to intellectuals, who are still few. But tribal influence does not stop there. For instance marriages between the different tribes or groups of tribes are very infrequent and only through vital necessity. Some tribes do not allow exogamous marriage even with other tribes of their division. Partnerships in commerce and trade or even on a smaller scale, for shopping for instance, are mostly preferred on a tribal basis. The climax of tribal influence is in political spheres, where under no circumstances will a vote be given to a candidate of another tribe except in a few cases where intellectual candidates stand in opposition to the government. The outcome of this situation has begun to show itself in the tribal social groups which have begun to appear.

In Benghazi Cyrenaicans are far fewer than Tripolitarians, or Magharba or Westerners, as they are called by the local Cyrenaicans. The two groups do not like each other, Economic factors are regarded by the Cyrenaicans as the real objects for the continuous arrival of Tripolitarians who are looked upon as intruders or parasites. The Tripolitarians, on the other hand, regard the Cyrenaicans as Bedouin, backward and primitive. They proudly consider the present standard in commerce and trade, as well as in other important fields, their own creation, and therefore they should be

thanked. The feeling between the two groups is also well marked in Derna town where practically every single aspect of daily life is in the hands of the so-called Westerners. In Benghazi, Tripolitanian business-men informants stated that the local authorities do not give Tripolitani-ans opportunities for any worthwhile transactions. In political activities the Magharba, who have two main confederations of the Kologlis and Werfella, are always capable of getting their own way and in so doing they often stand against other groups. Socially, as well, they tend to form their own groups. The Kologlis, for instance, all stand together in a feud or in any case in which el-Diah (compensation) is required by local traditions. The diah in the case of murder is traditionally estimated at six hundred pounds, apart from the expenses needed to provide food for the maghis - council - to settle the case. The Kologlis in Benghazi or any other tribal group are required to pay this sum of money on the basis of the number of family members. The surprising thing about this system is that every person is willingly prepared to pay his share without any compulsion. Cases of such a nature are very rarely dealt with by the law and most of these cases involve those who have no tribal support.

Political conditions prevailing in Cyrenaica, supported by tribal influence, expressed themselves publicly when the Provincial Legislative Council in recent months failed three times to support the idea of uniting the country

instead of the present federal system. This event shows the reaction of fourteen of the twenty council members who have voted against such unification simply because these tribal members feared to lose their prestige, interests, privileges and economic benefits when future plans are conducted on the basis of total population and not on provincial status.

Population Records

The first available record of the population of the city of Benghazi is the estimate of five thousand given by Paolo De Cella in 1817-1818. The Jewish element according to the former writer constituted half the total population. Three years later the figure, according to the Beechey brothers in 1828, was estimated at only two thousands including substantial numbers of Jews and Negro slaves from the south. By the end of the 19th century the city's population was believed to be in the order of 20 thousands. The factors behind this increase are attributed to stability and security rather than to economic development. In 1911 the Turks carried out their first and last general census, according to which the city's population was 16,500, of whom 3,000 were Jews, 2,000 Kologlis and about 3,600 Europeans, almost all Italians. According to De Agostini's semi-official census or statistical summary published in 1922, the population was 19,110 persons of whom 3,020 were Jews. The distribution of the local population by origin and quarter was given

as below:-(13)

Quarter	Kolo glis	Misu rata	Zli ten	Shwe khat	Tri poli	Cyre naica	Arabs	Tuni sians	Tur ks	Cret ans	Negr oes
Sabri	273	246	12	13	28	130	3	2	-	-	-
Khre- bish	818	1400	248	60	427	796	102	150	4	45	103
Sherif	235	586	70	25	250	396	53	50	10	5	40
Belk- heir	42	289	30	9	46	45	-	42	-	50	18
Benisa	-	422	74	-	303	332	105	90	27	10	42
el-Drawi	195	1150	36	215	133	250	52	16	26	30	154
Sidi Salem	71	73	9	-	-	17	-	-	-	10	5
Shabbi	30	305	-	5	18	25	5	9	-	15	6
Loheshi	34	129	-	245	4	71	6	42	9	13	23
Ghrebil	435	1105	25	52	112	150	39	114	34	37	50
Sidi Husein	47	180	16	100	59	60	-	7	-	-	4
Dawud- Berka	190	528	150	30	190	188	15	8	-	5	13
Total	2370	6470	670	760	1570	2460	280	430	110	220	655

The Kologlis in Benghazi as De Agostini stated were immigrants from Misurata, Homs and Tripoli. Peoples from Misurata and Zliten are immigrants of mixed origin. The Shwekhat are also a mixture of different tribes from Misurata, Orfella, Tajura and Homs in Tripolitania and Waddan in Fezzan. De Agostini wrote the following statement about these last

people: "Constituiti in Cabila per vicinanza di domora all'epoca in cui non era stato ancora introdotta la divisione di quartieri".⁽¹⁴⁾ The non-Libyan element numbered over 700. The figures clearly explain that the dominant majority of the city's population is of Tripolitanian background and that the Cyrenaicans, if these figures were accurate, were no more than 13% of the total population. The 1931 first Italian official census is, unfortunately, not available for the city of Benghazi. The figures for only 5 years later gave the city a total population of about 40,000 of whom 3,464 were Jews. In 1954 when the first National Libyan Census was taken the city population reached a figure of 69,718 persons and in 1962 the official population for the natives alone was just over 80,000.

The figures for both 1954 and 1962 give the city a gross percentage of over 23% of the whole provincial population, a phenomenon which creates certain disadvantages in a huge territory like Cyrenaica where the general pattern of population density is no more than one person per square mile, one of the most scantily populated areas of its size on earth.

Population records of Cyrenaica in general as well as the population of the city of Benghazi itself are very scanty, and, more important still, unreliable in most cases. Nevertheless the following estimates show the provincial

population during the last and this century:

1.	Pachs.. .. .	1827:	40,000	(15)
2.	Rohlf's. . . .	1869:	100,000	
3.	Camperio	1882:	246,000	
4.	British Consul	1894:	260,000	
5.	French Consul	1896:	302,000	
6.	Arya	1896:	100-150,000	
7.	Padetti	1901:	200,000	
8.	Jilderbrant.	1904:	250,000	
9.	Jewish Report	1909:	100-200,000	(16)
10.	Turkish Census	1911:	198,000	(17)
11.	De Agostini.	1922:	181,700	
12.	General Census of 1931	1931:	136,212	
13.	" " " 1936	1936:	137,582	
14.	British Administration:			
	(a)	1943:	240,000	
	(b)	1950:	298,000	
15.	National Census.. . . .	1954:	278,007	
16.	Municipality figures.. . . .	1962:	331,000	

The variability of these estimates, especially among those of a few years difference in timing, is partly due to the time of the year in which these estimates were taken, and to the impossibility of judging the total population by those people living in the urban centres where most of these estimates were taken. This is especially true for the estimates given by European travellers who, in most cases, never penetrated far from the coast. W. Blundell in 1895 wrote "I do not think that with the exception of a little village called el-Marj and this place (i.e. Cyrne - H.B.) I have seen fifty inhabitants in the whole journey from Benghazi." (18)

Under the long Arab and Turkish dominations, most historians are inclined to believe that the provincial population shrank considerably. Peace, economic development

and social welfare were all lacking in the province until Italy subdued the country. The Italian occupation, associated with twenty years of bloodshed, was a great menace to the native population, who in Cyrenaica alone lost about 50 thousands between 1911 and 1931. The outbreak of World War II again caused a great loss, particularly the repatriation of the Italian community. During and after the British Military Administration which was followed by independence many medical, health and social improvements have taken place. Thus the population has more than doubled itself between 1936 and 1954. Oil exploitation since 1954 has also helped to increase the population by 53 thousands during the last eight years; the total increase from 1936 to 1962 has amounted to about 194 thousands. As far as Benghazi city is concerned, the population increase between 1936 and 1954 amounted to 29,000. It is evident that the reasons for such rapid growth since 1936 are not to be sought in the reproductive power of the Cyrenaican people, but rather in immigration, in some technical fault in the process of enumeration, or in both factors.

Evolution of Censuses

Under the Turkish rule which lasted for about three centuries no censuses were carried out. Taxation and government affairs depended on estimates given by the Sheikhs. In 1843 what was probably the first estimate was made, giving the province a total of 230 thousand inhabitants. (19)

Another estimate was made in 1911; returns for Cyrenaica were only 198,345 persons. The reason behind the decrease may be attributed to the greater attention given by the Sheikhs to enumeration. According to this last Turkish estimate the city of Benghazi had a total population of 16,500, or just over 8% of the total population.

1922 Statistical Summary

E. Agostini's work is a tremendous document from the point of view of tribal structure, but gives very little demographic data. Like the Turkish estimates, these returns are not reliable enough to be used as a basis for determining the trend of population, simply because of the state of continuous war and lack of co-operation between the natives and the Italian administration.

1931 Census

In this first official Italian Census, which was based on the de facto (present population) method, and carried out by the Italian "Istituto Centrale di Statistica", three different schedules were used:-

- (a) Complete listing of data for each Italian individual;
- (b) Separate listing of information for each member of each native family, in less detailed manner than the Italian ones;
- (c) Collective information for native families without any individual identification.

The Cyrenaican people according to the data of this census were classified into three distinct types according to their way of life.

- (1) Settled people, defined as families having their residence in a definite area with provision of water and other needs and a periodical sowing and pasturing even at a distance.
- (2) Semi-Nomads are those family members who move more frequently and cover greater distances within or outside their territories.
- (3) Nomads are those families who, although they may have lands of their own, migrate for long periods and are entirely engaged in animal husbandry.

These three different definitions were also applied in the 1936 Census. Returns of the 1931 Census also cannot be taken as a basis for showing population trends, owing to two major defects: lack of familiarity of the people with such practices, and the conditions of anxiety and unrest.

1936 Census

The method followed in carrying out this Census was based on the de jure (resident population) method and it was again carried out by the same institute. Three major modifications distinguish this census from the previous one:

- (1) a statement of name, father's name and surname for natives, to establish their identities as they only have first names in most cases;
- (2) listing of information by

native individuals, and (3) dividing the towns into sectors and the rest of the territory into districts corresponding to localities inhabited by various tribes. Only two schedules were used and both called for a listing of information by individuals, (a) for natives (b) for Italians and foreigners. The only disadvantage of this census was the time chosen. The month of April in which the census took place was hardly suitable because nomads and semi-nomads are on the move during winter and spring simply because their herds of sheep and goats can easily find drinking water; whereas from May till the end of summer they are obliged to live near the wells. On the other hand this essential rule was wisely followed when the month of August was chosen for the 1954 census.

1954 Census

This was the first general census that the Libyan authorities have undertaken. It followed the strong recommendation put forward by the United Nations when granting Libya her independence. Because of this the census was supervised by the organization experts. But does the fact that it is a national census and highly organized mean accurate data especially in an underdeveloped country like Libya and in Cyrenaica in particular? To assess this fact one must try to understand how population registration occurred prior to this census. After the war between the Cyrenaicans and Italy came to its end in 1931, legal

registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces and migration became fairly regular even among the non-settled categories of population. The start of the Second World War, unfortunately, brought this vital service to an end, when co-operation between the natives and the Italian authority reached a standstill. The immediate consequence was that registration of all kinds became irregular once more. Moreover, in Cyrenaica in particular, all registration documents were destroyed during and after the campaign in North Africa. The British authorities, feeling the need for reviving this important service, made real efforts to reorganize and develop the former Italian registration centres or municipalities. On the 17th of November, 1945, the British Military Administration issued Order Number 116 in which clerks for births and deaths were appointed for 19 towns and villages. However, in spite of the hard work devoted to this purpose registration conditions promised far less accurate results during the whole of the 1940's. Two major disadvantages may account for such a situation; firstly a false increase in population occurred because of rationing, and secondly many errors were committed when Arabizing the Italian registration forms. In such conditions, census reliability is very doubtful, especially when consideration is given to the high percentage of illiteracy and to the

apathy and suspicion of censuses caused by long periods of foreign administration.

According to the figures of 1950 the city of Benghazi had a total population of 56,692 persons while the provincial total was 298,000 (cf. only 240,000 in 1943). However, no tabulation of the data collected has ever been made, and since this survey was made for rationing purposes it is believed that both figures are highly exaggerated. Figures for those classified as non-Libyans were only 193 persons in the 1943 estimate. Here is a case in which we see how much the population figure can be exaggerated. On the 31st of August, 1949 according to the Municipality figures the population of the town of Barce was 11,104 persons of whom there were 177 Jews and 37 foreigners. 17 days later when an official census was carried out the population figure had dropped to only 7,459 persons of whom there were only 8 Jews and 43 foreigners. (20)

The results of the 1954 census are certainly more satisfactory than any other previous attempts in this field for the following reasons:-

- (A) The wider propoganda made before the census;
- (B) The use of fairly well educated and capable enumerators;
- (C) Better methods of enumeration and tabulating;
- (D) The stable economic conditions which, together with a wider spread of education, made co-operation between the people and the authorities more effective than it was

before independence.

By the 1954 census the population of Benghazi amounting to 69,718 persons was divided among 14,879 families. These figures imply what the average family size is 4.6 persons. In early 1962 the city's population, according to the Municipality, was 82,782 persons divided among 21,447 families. This means that the average family size is only 3.8 persons. The decrease in the family size in the city between 1954 and 1962 is attributed to the increase of one-person households, either Libyans or foreigners, since the first oil discovery of 1959. The 1954 census classified the Libyan families according to their size into four groups: small size families of less than 3 persons, medium size families of 4 to 6 perons; large families of 7 to 9 people, and finally the very large families of 10 persons and over. Details of the city's families according to these definitions are not available. On the other hand the percentage of these groups of the whole Libyan population, which may help to illustrate the situation in the city, are as follows:- (21)

1. Small families - 38%
2. Medium " - 44%
3. Large " - 15%
4. Very large" - 3%

These percentages show that the dominant family size is the medium group followed by the fist category or the


small family. The former two groups (families from one to six persons) comprise 82% of the whole family distribution pattern. The other two groups comprise 18%, and are in all probability more common in rural areas than in urban centres. Thus it might be that the first two groups constitute more than 82% in the case of Benghazi. Further details on this matter are shown in Fig. 23.

The distribution of Benghazi's families by type of settlement takes the following pattern in comparison with Tripoli City and the Libyan population in general. (22)

City	Total Number		Settled		Semi-nomads		Nomads	
	fami- lies	of pop- ulation	No. of fami- lies	Popula- tion	No. of fami- lies	Popula- tion	No. of fami- lies	Popu- lation
Benghazi	14879	69718	14632	68627	117	797	70	294
Tripoli	30319	129720	30245	129447	26	114	48	159
Libya	240349	1088884	179092	801541	43173	196571	18324	90773

The first striking feature about this distribution is the fact that we find that the two largest cities in the country do not merely comprise settled peoples. The reason for this phenomenon lies in the fact that work opportunities have long been attracting many families from the interior. The total of 187 families of nomads and semi-nomads found in Benghazi contrasts with only 74 families in Tripoli. The reason for this is explained by the natural difference in the hinterland of both cities. Benghazi Plain, as has been

Figure 23



Libyan population by size of family

mentioned, is more or less a barren plain of no economic value if compared with the fertile Jefara Plain of Tripoli. The result of such natural differences on both plains has meant that Benghazi is a more suitable environment for nomads. Nevertheless the percentage of those people classified as non-settled is negligible in the case of Benghazi or Tripoli if the population of either cities is compared with these figures for Libya as a whole.⁽²³⁾


Province	Settled%	Semi-nomads%	Nomads%
Cyrenaica	56	32	12
Tripolitania	80	14	6
Fezzan	92	6	2
Libya	74	18	8

These percentages clearly indicate higher proportions of semi-nomads and nomads in Cyrenaica not only if compared with Tripolitania but also with the country as a whole (see Fig. 24). This phenomenon in itself implies that local migration to Benghazi is bound to be affected by the 44% of those classified as non-settled.

Population Growth

In view of all the difficulties discussed and with great reserve we notice that the population of the city of Benghazi since 1911 has increased in the following manner:-

Figure 24



Distribution and size of population 1954 Census

Year	Population	Increase or decrease in numbers	Approximate % of total population of Cyrenaica
1911	16,500	-	7%
1914	25,884(excluding Europeans)	+ 9,388	-
1922	19,110(" ")	- 6,779	10%
1936	40,000(including Europeans)	+ 20,890	29%
1950	56,672(" ")	+ 16,672	18.5%
1954	69,718(" ")	+ 13,046	23.2%
1960(July)	76,616(" ")	+ 6,616	22.3%
1962(June)	83,239(" ")	+ 6,233	25%

These figures, although very doubtful before 1934, show that the city's population has risen by nearly 67,000 during the last 51 years, which implies a yearly increase of over 1,313 persons. The seemingly rapid increase in the city's population between 1911 and 1914 is because the 1911 figure was underestimated and because there was a deliberate exaggeration by the Italians of the 1914 figure to show that their occupation has attracted more people to come and live in the town. The 1922 figure shows rather a sharp decrease if compared with the 1914 figure. Two explanations can also be given here: that the 1914 figure has been deliberately raised for political reasons or that the natives of

Benghazi were not satisfied with the new regime and consequently emigrated to other areas. The increase of 20,890 thousands in the period between 1922 and 1936, despite a total loss of at least 56 thousands of the native population of the province during the Senusi-Italian wars, is also difficult to substantiate. Three major factors may have contributed to this increase:

- (1) the return of many city dwellers who had left during those twenty years of continuous bloodshed;
- (2) the possibility of a large number of Italian citizens having been included in this figure;
- (3) the attraction of manual work for many natives, especially those whose lands were confiscated by the Italians for their agricultural scheme. In addition, the general amnesty of 1933 had attracted many exiles as well as the so-called rebels to return to their original home or otherwise to come and seek work opportunities.

Between 1911 and 1936 the population of Benghazi showed a different rate of growth if compared with the total population:

Year	CYRENAICA			BENGHAZI		
	Population	Rate of increase or decrease	Remarks	Population	Rate of increase or decrease	Remarks
1911	198,345	-	-	16,500	-	-
1922	181,750	- 0.8)	Outward migration and War deaths	19,110	1.2	-
1931	136,215	- 2.8)		-	-	-
1936	137,582	0.2)	Return of emigrants	c.40,000	7.8	Return of rebels plus Italian migration
1954	278,007	5.7)		69,718	1.7)	
1962	331,000	3.0)		83,239	1.7)	

The former figures for Benghazi imply a growth rate of 3.7% per annum during the period 1936-1962. The growth rate for the province was 2.9% per annum, and for the whole Libyan population in the same period it was less than one per cent per annum. This means that the rates for Benghazi in particular and Cyrenaica in general are bound to be greatly affected by migration from the other two provinces.

The fivefold increase in Benghazi's population during the last 51 years and the doubling of its population (if not more)

during the last two and a half decades is undoubtedly due to the great migration to the city. Nevertheless it must be noticed that migration was not only of a local character; there were also a large number of Italian settlers especially after 1936 as a result of accelerating their efforts for the agricultural development of the province as a whole.

Comparing the population growth of Benghazi with that of Tripoli City we find the picture as follows:-

City	Year	Population	Increase in numbers
Tripoli	1911	30,000	-
	1936	59,296	17,988
	1954	129,722	70,426
Benghazi	1911	19,500	-
	1936	c. 40,000	20,500
	1954	69,718	29,718

These statistics show that between 1911 and 1936 the gross growth was higher in Benghazi than in Tripoli, despite the tremendous difference in the total population of the two provinces. Two explanations are possible:-

- (a) deliberate inflation of Benghazi's total population figures in order to clear the doubts about the high number of native deaths during the Senusi-Italian wars;
- (b) greater opportunities for employment in Benghazi than in

Tripoli.

Between 1936-54 the picture was reversed. The increase in Benghazi was much less than in Tripoli, in spite of the severe drought of 1947 in Tripolitania, "Emigration to Cyrenaica and to Benghazi in particular has begun on a comparatively large scale only since 1947, when the family and not the individual became the unit of this semi-internal migration".⁽²⁴⁾ The main reasons lie in the fact that Benghazi was largely destroyed during World War II and consequently work opportunities were less attractive than those of Tripoli which continued to function normally, due not only to the high number of Italians who stayed but also to the large numbers of the British forces, which helped enormously to provide work for many thousands. A third factor may well be taken into consideration. It is probable that there has been a higher false increase in registration because of rationing purposes in Tripoli than in Benghazi, where economic conditions were preferable in the late 1940's. The false increase in population between 1937 and 1947 was proved to have taken place not only in the Libyan cities but also in Egypt in Cairo and Alexandria.⁽²⁵⁾ The reasons behind the population increase of Benghazi City between 1936 and 1954 can be attributed to the following factors:-

- (a) emigration by both natives and Italians;
- (b) work opportunities before 1941 were the real reasons for native migration;

(c) after 1942, the date of the British occupation, despite the mass repatriation of all Italian citizens, the growth of the city population has accelerated due to the employment facilities provided by the British forces and the policy of equal partnership which aimed to give the Libyans their rights which they had not enjoyed during the Italian occupation.

Soon after independence, Benghazi became not only the provincial capital for Cyrenaica but also enjoyed being a federal co-capital with Tripoli. This status gave the city a better economic position and consequently it began to attract more people from the other parts of the province as well as from Tripolitania and Fezzan. After 1954 the city's population grew up as follows:-

Year	Month	Population	Increase or decrease in numbers
1955	July	70,457	-
1956	July	70,063	388
1957	July	71,229	1,166
1958	July	71,931	702
1959	July	73,925	1,994
1960	July	76,808	2,883
1961	July	79,346	2,538
1962	June	83,239	3,538

These statistics show that the population has had an average yearly increase of 1,824 persons. The only decrease in July 1956 is related to internal migration as well as a higher death rate. The total increase of 12.772 thousands

during the seven years is mostly confined to the native population. Of this total the city has had a natural increase of 5,356 persons. Oil discoveries had a great impact on internal migration to Benghazi where in seven years the total immigrants amounted to 7,416 persons plus about 3,000 foreigners who came to the city after 1954. This meant a total increase of over 10 thousand immigrants, or approximately two thirds of the gross increase. These are the official statistics for Benghazi's population. But the question is how far do these official figures present reality? To answer this question, it is better to check on some fundamental facts in the first place. There are no official obligations for any Libyan living in the city to be locally registered, except in the case of a person needing a commercial licence. This regulation has helped to ensure the registration of a considerable number of Tripolitani-ans as well as some Cyrenaicans. But again how far is this method working? To be officially registered means the transfer of one's registration from one's previous place of residence. Although this method sounds easy and logical, in view of the fact that the immigrant is always looked upon as a failure in life, as well as the decision of the Tripolitanian local authorities to stop official transfer of registration forms (as I was informed by Zavia Municipality), I believe that in 1962 Benghazi had at least twenty thousand non-

registered Tripolitanians. The majority came to find manual jobs which do not need a licence or came to join some of their relatives or friends who are already in possession of their commercial or trade licences. Most Cyrenaicans, on the other hand, are still strongly attached to their original tribes and therefore very few of them shown any willingness for migration. After oil discoveries the city of Benghazi, as the main base for oil operations, was able to provide more jobs than the local demand. People from all over the province could easily find jobs. In most cases these people remain integral members of their tribes, some of the males return to their lands for ploughing and harvesting their crops. To judge how much the Cyrenaicans have contributed to the 1954-62 increase of Benghazi's official population we examine the following statistics obtained by special permission from the Nazirate of Interior:

Municipality	Total people moved to Benghazi	Total people moved from Benghazi	Net movement
Tobrouk	165	166	- 1
Derna	532	199	+ 333
Agedebia	224	446	- 222
Beida and Barce	1062	392	+ 670
Total gain for Benghazi			780

Cyrenaicans represent no more than 10% of the new arrivals during the last seven years. The former figure seems to be

more or less limited to the transfer of government employees rather than immigration and emigration. The reasons behind the shift from Benghazi are the concentration of the British Forces in Cyrenaica at el-Adem, the main air base near Tobrouk and the increased importance of Agedebia as a provincial base for many nearby oil fields.

However, an accurate estimation of the city's population under the present poor system of registration is impossible. Unofficial estimates vary considerably, some giving the city a population figure as high as 140,000. Consultations with the city's chief water engineer showed that the city's population in mid-1962 was no less than 120 thousand. The former estimate was also accepted by the head of the Cyrenaica Executive Council. If this figure is nearer to the actual fact, it implies that the city's official population ~~represents~~ only two-thirds of the actual figure. It also implies that population growth since the 1954 Census amounts to about 50 thousand (cf. the official figure of only 12 thousand). In other words, the population would appear to have practically doubled itself in only 7 years, and now supports no less than 35% of the whole provincial population.

No real steps have been taken to face the problem of growth. On the contrary, the situation has been ignored up to now. Shortage of water, electricity, public transport, hospitals, schools and houses are great disadvantages if the

city's present rate of growth continues for a few years.

Distribution of Population

The official distribution of native population of Benghazi by quarter shows itself in the following pattern:

Quarters	Year		Increase in numbers
	1922	1962	
Ghrebil	473	6,188	5,715
El-Drawi	2,257	5,269	3,012
El-Shabbi	418	1,101	683
Belkeir	571	1,710	1,139
Loheshi	626	2,491	1,865
El-Sherif	1,670	3,499	1,829
Sidi Salem	187	789	602
Ben Isa	1,405	2,810	1,405
Sidi Khrebish	4,214	7,993	3,779
Sidi Husein	473	c. 2,500	2,027
Berka	1,317	24,635	23,318
Sabri	899	17,000	16,101
Fuehat	-	2,399	-
Total	16,090 (plus 3,000 Jews)	79,214 (excluding foreigners)	60,725 (excluding Fuehat)

These statistics show that the most populated quarters are Berka and Sabri which together contain just over 50% of the official population for 1962. In 1922 the former two quarters had a total population of only 2,216 persons, only 13.5% of the native population. Other important quarters include Sidi Khrebish, Ghrebil, El-Drawi, El-Sherif and Fuehat. The smallest quarters, on the other hand, include Sidi Salem, El-Shabbi and Belkheir. The high population increase of both Berka and Sabri results from their great

size and the cheapness of land. The lower class were able to reside in these quarters, constructing cheap dwellings and erecting zariba and tents. In 1954 these two types of dwellings amounted to just over 18% of the total types of dwelling. Population increase in the other quarters is much less significant, because most are already built-up areas and vertical expansion is extremely difficult: most inhabitants cannot afford to build upwards. The foreigners concentrate in Fuehat, Sidi Husein, Ghrebil and generally speaking they occupy most of the newly constructed premises in the city. Exact distribution of the foreigners by quarters is difficult simply because over 3,000 are not yet registered in the Municipality.

Composition of Population

Analysis of the composition of Benghazi's population is extremely difficult mainly because of insufficient information. The term Libyan, which cannot be applied as a racial term, means the native population including the Kologlis, the Cretans, the Negroes and of course the Arabs and the so-called Arab-Berber element. Of these groups the Cretans, the Negroes and to some extent the Kologlis represent the non-original Libyans. Exact figures of these groups are not available and, more important, are not reliable. My own estimate of these elements after consulting reliable sources is roughly as follows:

(a) Cretans: between 300 to 500 persons.

(b) Negroes: between 2,000 to 2,500 persons.

(c) Kologlis: no less than one-sixth of the total population.

The rest or original Libyans are a mixture of different tribes and localities. The group which forms the bulk of the city's inhabitants is also largely non-original in the sense that Tripolitanians are considered foreigners. Cyrenaicans proper in Benghazi therefore count only for a small fraction of the total population.

A full analysis of these groups from the point of view of occupation, wealth, social characteristics as well as locating their dwelling areas is impossible for many reasons, the most important of which is the quick spread of education which gave most people a new attitude towards a national character rather than a provincial or tribal approach. This fact, together with new economic and social images, has already begun to reduce group differences, except political ones.

Many differences exist between the Magharba and the proper Cyrenaicans. There is no mutual feeling of friendship between the two groups and consequently intermarriage is very limited. Marriage even inside the group is always preferred on the basis of the original locality or tribe. For example, among Tripolitanians marriages mostly occur between those of the same original place. But as a rule there are no fundamental objections to marriage being extended outside the province. Among Cyrenaicans the usual family consultation is still very common; the marriage of a

daughter of a Cyrenaican father, even those of the higher social class, generally never takes place unless every adult in the family group has been consulted and has agreed.

Otherwise difficulties always occur. This is because most Cyrenaicans of Benghazi are still in close contact with their original tribes and because of the inferior position of the women.

There is also a difference in attitude between the two groups to manual work. Cyrenaicans seem to despise manual work because of their previous Bedouin background. Most of these jobs are therefore done by Tripolitarians; a case which also applies to commerce and trade, as well as other skilled work, not to mention prostitution which is largely carried out by Tripolitanian women.

Although Negroes freely mix with the rest of the population they are still looked upon as second-class citizens. Intermarriage between them and the rest is very rare. According to V. Tegani's figures for 1914, the Negro element was composed of 273 families or 925 persons. These families, of which 17 were not identified, were classified according to their original native place as follows:-

34	families	from	Barai
49	"	"	Uadai
3	"	"	Nadal
66	"	"	Faurani
121	"	"	Salamatti

The situation with the Cretans is rather different. This group, as previously mentioned, have no real cultural differences which distinguish them from the rest except perhaps their language and the reputation of their women for beauty. The Cretans try hard to limit intermarriage with others and that is why they have not lost their full identity.

The Kologlis have lost much of their social standards achieved under the Turkish domination, but are probably the most broad-minded racial group in the city's population. The reason is probably that they were one of the very few groups to take full advantage of education. In consequence, many of them held leading posts, especially after independence. On the other hand, some of them were and still are strongly criticized for their pro-British attitude as regards awakening tribal influence. However, the Kologlis in Benghazi are the least prejudiced towards other groups and intermarry with them more freely. They are mostly from Misurata in Tripolitania, and specialise in commerce and trade. In this respect they resemble the majority of Misurata people who are quite often described, inside Libya, as the Lebanese of the Arab world. Relations between the Tripolitaniⁿians of Benghazi and their original families are in most cases well maintained, even among those who have been in the city for many decades, largely by irregular visits and remittances. The latter feature is more common but, unfortunately, no official figures can be obtained in this

respect.

Apart from these racial groups the 700 Jews form part of the Libyan population. The Jewish community in Benghazi, as in most other places in Libya, has suffered many incidents which have reduced their numbers considerably. The number of Jews in Benghazi after the Palestine crisis of 1948 dwindled from 3768 in 1947 to only 537 persons in 1951. By 1962 there were only 357 persons. Describing the relationship between Jews and the natives long before 1948 we can do no better than quote Jane Soames' words in her article "Libya: Italy's North African Colony, 1936". "They are greatly despised by the sons of the Prophet and the majority of them live in extreme poverty - by far the dirtiest inhabitants of the country".⁽²⁶⁾ However, even before 1948, the Jews of Benghazi seem to have had less influence than those of Tripoli who controlled a great part of the city's economic life and where they have their own quarter - Hara. No real Jewish quarter existed in Benghazi and today the majority of Jews are merchants and craftsmen with better economic standards than most of the local people. The attitude towards the Jews is still dominated by the unsettled issue of Palestine. The Jews have their synagogue and freely practise their religious beliefs but have no social contacts with the rest of the native people.

Benghazi has always had a foreign community. In 1913

Tegani classified the foreign community as follows: 1850 Italians, 200 French subjects, 100 British subjects, 100 German subjects, 98 Greeks, 28 Armenians, 20 Albanians, and 60 Turks. These figures amounted to about 2,500 persons or about 10% of the city's total population. The foreign community in the city remained more or less the same except for the Italians who increased to 16 thousand in the late 1930's. The defeat of the Axis forces in the last world war, as well as the strong anti-Italian feeling among the natives, have caused a total repatriation of all Italians in the province. The 1954 census figures show that there were only 3,498 foreigners in Cyrenaica against 43,647 thousand in Tripolitania. In both cases Benghazi and Tripoli had the main concentrations of foreigners. The foreigners in Cyrenaica were classified in the following pattern:

Continent	Number of Nationalities	Total numbers	Approximate percentage
Africa	6	842	24.8%
Americas	2 (U.S.A. and Brazil)	44	1.2%
Asia	12	282	8.2%
Europe	14	1,990	57.7%
Australasia	1	3	
Unclassified persons	35	238	8.1%
Grand Total	35	3,399	100%

Between 1954 and 1960 the foreign community practically doubled itself and the number of nationalities grew from 35 in 1954 to 51 in 1960. According to 1960 figures the foreigners were classified as follows: 1436 African persons divided among eleven nationalities of whom the Egyptians alone constitute 1194 persons, Tunisians and Sudanese following the totals of 149 and 38 respectively; 654 Asians belonged to 13 nationalities, Jordanians and Palestinians numbering 469 persons; the North Americans had a total of 784 persons of whom 731 were United States citizens, the remaining 43 persons were Canadians; South Americans totalled only 6 persons; the Europeans, as in 1954, led the bill with a total of 2264 persons divided among 20 nationalities, the British topping the list with a total of 758 persons, followed by 568 Greeks, 507 Italians, 105 Germans, 81 Dutch and 74 French; Australians numbered 14 persons instead of only 3 in 1954.

The oil discoveries of 1959 onward are the only reason for the growth of the foreign community, except those from the Arab world, who are mostly government employees, mainly teachers, judges and doctors.

The striking feature about almost all foreigners is that for one reason or another they seem to avoid mixing socially with Libyans. In most cases the difference in economic and social standards is the key to this segregation.

Some Americans and Europeans also tend to emphasize racial difference as well. The only community which seems to adapt itself well to the environment is the Greek one. The fact that most of this group have moved to Benghazi from Alexandria where they already knew the language and many Arab customs and traditions may explain this fact. But as far as intermarriage is concerned the Greeks too stand apart. The last two marriages between local youths and Greek girls were both regarded as elopements, and the police had to intervene to protect the two couples. The other foreigners, excluding Arabs, tend to emphasize the fact that as long as native women are not allowed to meet strangers there would be no social intermingling. This is true to some extent, but on the other hand it seems that the case for doing so is based on the fear of future sexual relationships with local youths rather than anything else. The limited local members in the first-class clubs and the very few newly accepted members if compared with other foreigners underline such fears. Furthermore, social relations even inside these clubs are always kept to a minimum. Among the foreigners themselves there is still a point of contrast especially among those speaking English and others. Because of this and in spite of the fact that practically all foreigners speak English, social relations tend to fall into two rather distinct groups: (a) Americans and British, (b) Greeks, Italians and the rest.

Population Structure

Studying the population of Benghazi, in detail, by sex, age and marital status is not possible before 1954 mainly because details concerning these subjects are not available for the last Italian censuses and also because of the great gap between the official figures and the actual total of the city's inhabitants. However, some light may be thrown on the matter by examining these subjects for the province of Cyrenaica and the whole Libyan population (see Fig. 25).

A. Sex ratio


The following statistics show the present native population of Libya by sex in 1931, 1936 and 1954 censuses. (27)

Date of Census	Males	Females	Deficiency of females	Males per 1000 females
1931	341,984	312,732	29,252	1,092
1936	377,416	355,557	21,959	1,062
1954	540,364	501,235	39,129	1,081

The above statistics seem to indicate under-enumeration of women compared with men in 1936 census. The cease fire in 1931 and the general amnesty of 1933 and consequently the return of the so-called rebels as a result do not explain this phenomenon simply because the majority of them must be males.

Generally speaking, the Libyan population shows a preponderance of males, as does the population of Cyrenaica:

Figure 25



Libyan Native population by Sex and Age

Date of Census	Males	Females	Deficiency of Females	Males per 1000 females
1931	72,370	63,839	8,531	1,013
1936	75,079	62,503	12,576	1,041
1954	152,454	137,782	14,772	1,093

The reason behind this fact, especially in the case of 1954 where figures for Tripolitania were 1,073 men to every 1000 females lies in the continuous emigration of men to Cyrenaica, either from Tripolitania or from the Fezzan.

Official figures of males and females for the city of Benghazi from July 1955 until June 1962 are as follows for the month of July of each year. (28)

Month	Year	Total population	Males	Females	Deficit of females
July	1955	72,533	38,855	31,678	6,977
"	1956	72,074	38,612	31,462	7,150
"	1957	71,215	39,328	31,887	7,441
"	1958	71,870	39,665	32,205	7,460
"	1959	73,690	40,615	33,035	7,540
"	1960	76,616	42,205	34,411	7,794
"	1961	79,175	43,572	35,603	8,169
June	1962	82,900	45,610	37,290	8,320

The corresponding deficit of females in the city in the census of 1954 was 6,764 females. This deficit is

explained by the higher percentage of male immigrants, as females because of religion and traditions are not allowed

even to leave their homes let alone migrate. The actual deficit of females in Benghazi is probably much higher than the above figures, because immigrants who bring their families with them are usually those who get themselves registered. Single male immigrants are largely responsible for the large difference between the official figures and those estimates recorded earlier. The social implications of this phenomenon are growing enormously. In all probability there is a shortage of no less than 20 thousand females, if not more. This means that the official figure of 1211 males over 1,000 females should be raised to about 1,400 males for the 120,000 population estimate. Despite the measure prohibiting both prostitution and alcoholic drinks immediately after independence, prostitution has become a profitable business for many hundreds of women and it is practised on a large scale not only in those areas - mainly between the general hospital and the Kura police station - where the Italians have chosen to concentrate them, but in many other parts of the city as well. The city of Benghazi with its dramatic female deficit and legal prohibition of prostitution suffers the following results:

- (1) Widespread venereal diseases, as there is no medical supervision;
- (2) Temptation of many illiterate and poor women to join the profession;



(3) The terrible increase in homosexuality.

It is not surprising in this respect to notice the change of the crime pattern before 1956 and now. Prior to this date most crimes and offences were related to theft. After the impact of oil on the city the crime pattern changed to sexual offences either with the opposite sex or among males themselves.

(4) There has been a steady increase in the dowry. This fact, together with many other reasons including the lack of houses for those who intend marriage and the increase of living standards has to some extent reduced the annual total of marriages. A quite considerable number of youths have to marry foreign girls, especially Egyptians. Some people believe it is economically cheaper to do so, while others regard the educational standard of the native girls as still too low.

The situation for the foreign community in Benghazi does not differ much from that of the natives. According to 1954 census the foreign community of 3,348 persons was divided between the two sexes as follows:

<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Deficit of females</u>
2,143	1,255	888

Figures for 1960 show that the ratio was 16:12 while the Jewish minority was composed of 182 males against 175 females. The difference in the foreign ratio between men and women is

related to the fact that males are there for temporary periods or were forced to leave their families because of lack of suitable accommodation. Together with the wealthy local youths' foreigners overcome their difficulties either by going abroad on holidays or by generous payments to foreign cabaret girls.

B. Age Composition.

Knowledge of the distribution of the population of the City of Benghazi by age group is entirely lacking before 1954. However, some light may be thrown on the subject if consideration is given to the following table dealing with the percentages of the resident native population of Libya in 1936 census. (29)

Age (year)	Both sexes %	Males %	Females %	Males per 1000 females
0-4	14.9	14.5	15.3	1,016
5-9	14.6	15.0	14.1	1,143
10-14	10.5	11.6	9.3	1,343
15-19	5.9	6.0	5.8	1,111
20-24	5.5	4.9	6.0	883
25-29	7.0	6.7	7.4	968
30-39	14.1	13.7	14.7	1,001
40-49	10.9	10.5	11.4	995
50-59	7.8	8.1	7.4	1,173
60-69	4.9	5.1	4.7	1,152
70-79	2.7	2.7	2.7	1,092
80 and over	1.2	1.2	1.2	1,083

The outstanding conclusion to be drawn from the above table is

that the Libyan population is demographically young. The percentage of the people under 30 years of age is as high as 58.4% while those under 50 years of age amount to 83.4%.

According to 1954 census the age distribution of the city's population was as given below. (30)

Age (in years)	Both sexes	Percentage	Males	Females
All ages	69,718	100%	38,240	31,478
1-4	9,910	14.2	5,205	4,795
5-9	8,289	11.8	4,060	3,340
10-14	6,174	8.8	3,316	2,858
15-19	6,104	8.7	3,133	2,971
20-24	7,872	11.2	4,792	3,080
25-29	7,387	10.5	4,580	2,857
30-34	4,841	6.9	2,809	2,032
35-39	3,348	4.8	1,850	1,498
40-49	6,465	8.9	2,555	2,491
50-59	4,448	6.6	2,652	1,796
60-69	2,630	3.8	1,410	1,220
70 and over	2,779	3.8	1,070	1,199
Not identified	0.0026	-	0.0011	0.0015

The age group under 30 years of age is as high as 65.2%. The similar figure for the province of Tripolitania was 63.7%. The age group under 50 years comprised 85.8% compared with 83.8% for Tripolitania in 1954.

The large number of young people creates complications in providing enough suitable educational facilities. In the scholastic year 1954/55 the total number of students in the whole of Cyrenaica was 20,438. The figure for those who were under 20 years of age in the city of Benghazi alone was 17,714. This means that at the time, all the schools in the province could hardly provide education even for the city's inhabitants alone. Although the situation has been greatly improved since 1954, Benghazi still suffers especially in the case of female education.

The absence of any major and permanent industries in the city has made the utility of youths not only limited but also very marginal. One result is the increase of juvenile delinquency. Unless quick and effective solutions are found, the present limited medical, health, hygiene, housing and dietary conditions will become even less satisfactory.

C. Marital Status.

The following table shows the distribution of the city's population by marital status, age and sex in 1954. (31)

Marital Status and sex	Age in years						
	All ages	15 & over	under 15	15-29	30-39	40-49	50 and over
1. <u>Males</u>	38,162	25,821	12,341	12,455	4,659	3,555	5,132
Single	28,842	9,481	19,361	8,474	501	329	277
Married	13,687	13,678	9	3,183	2,433	2,925	4,137
Married with one wife	13,383	13,374	9	3,164	3,367	2,826	4,017
Married with two wives	300	290	1	28	63	86	122
Married with three wives	14	14	-	1	3	2	8
Married with four wives	1	1	-	-	-	1	-
Widowed	613	605	8	127	74	116	288
Divorced	1,066	1,065	1	-	-	-	-
Unknown	416	392	24	-	-	-	-
2. <u>Females</u>	31,445	19,563	11,882	8,908	3,530	2,914	4,211
Single	13,976	2,125	11,851	1,870	84	71	100
Married	12,722	12,694	28	-	-	-	-
Widowed	3,109	3,106	3	125	177	514	2,290
Divorced	1,271	1,266	5	-	-	-	-
Unknown	325	312	13	-	-	-	-

Of these statistics we find that marriage among males

and females under the age of 15 is insignificant; in all, there are only 23 cases of whom 14 were females. The civil law prohibits a woman being married before the age of 15. It is not surprising to know that in such cases parents overcome such prohibition by getting a medical certificate in which the doctor states that the girl's age is over 15 years and he sees no objection to her being married.

Divorce is more common among women especially those between 15-29 than those over 30 years of age.

The percentage in all ages of single males is about 57.8% compared with 41.6% for females. The corresponding figures for Tripolitania are 58% and 45% respectively. Moreover of the single males about 40.3% are over the age of 15 years while the corresponding figure for females is only 15.3%.

The percentage of males who are married to one wife is 97.8%. This means that the percentage of polygamous husbands does not exceed 2.2%. Polygamy therefore has only a minor effect on population growth. The complications of city life may be a factor in keeping the percentage so low. In Tripolitania the corresponding proportion is 4.5%.

In the city of Benghazi the extent of marriages and divorces is not directly controlled by the general economic situation; a feature which influences these social events to great extent in rural Cyrenaica. The official statisticians

of marriages and divorces in Benghazi and the whole province (32)
is as shown below for the period from July 1955 until June 1962.

Year	<u>Marriages</u>			
	Benghazi		Cyrenaica	
	No. of marriages	Av. per month	No. of marriages	Av. per month
1955 (from July onwards)	591	98.5	1,560	260.0
1956	897	74.7	2,330	194.1
1957	1,208	100.6	2,755	229.5
1958	1,291	107.5	3,407	283.9
1959	1,140	95.0	2,918	243.1
1960	1,358	113.1	3,621	301.7
1961	1,797	141.4	3,720	310.0
Till June 1962	800	133.3	1,898	316.3

	<u>Divorces</u>			
	Benghazi		Cyrenaica	
	No. of marriages	Av. per month.	No. of marriages	Av. per month
1955 (from July onwards)	430	71.7	909	151.5
1956	609	50.7	1,321	110.8
1957	480	40.0	1,246	103.8
1958	369	30.7	1,255	104.5
1959	253	21.0	889	74.0
1960	530	44.1	1,187	98.9
1961	565	47.0	1,439	119.9
Till June 1962	263	43.4	610	101.3

All marriage figures show a gradual increase since 1956.

The temporary decrease in 1959 cannot be explained except by the possibility of an error or by the temporary emigration of youths to the oil fields in the Syrtic area. The lowest monthly average of 1956 in the case of Benghazi city is, in all probability, related to the Suez Crisis. The months of November and December of that year recorded the lowest marriage figures for any similar months during the last seven years. The average of both months was 45 cases against that of 237.7 cases for the corresponding months of the last seven years. The monthly average marriages in Benghazi over the last seven years is 105.5 cases compared with that of only 142.3 cases for the whole province. These averages indicate that the marriage proportions are higher in the city than in the rest of the country, where three-quarters of the population are found. The reason lies in the economic standards of the city dwellers who, unquestionably, have benefited more from the oil operations. In rural Cyrenaica the bulk of marriages follows the end of harvesting the wheat and barley crops in the summer. In Benghazi the pattern of marriages, although it differs from one year to another, shows a tendency to a later period. The month of September often marks the beginning of the marriage period which extends in most cases to the end of March when the figures begin to decline. During the last seven years the month of August 1959 was the month for the lowest recorded

marriages and divorces, with one single marriage and no divorce at all. On the other hand, the month of September 1960 showed the highest marriage figure of 228 cases. 80 divorce cases were also recorded in the month of September 1955. Divorces decreased during the first few years, after which the average rose again and was maintained for the last three years. The average divorce cases in the city for the same period was 43.0 cases compared with 107.9 cases for the province. This means that Benghazi not only enjoys a higher marriage rate but also a higher divorce rate if compared with the total population. This unusual phenomenon can only be explained by the fact that many people who gained financially after the oil impact have become divorced in order to re-marry.

The monthly figures of 125.5 marriages against 43.0 divorces are very alarming from the point of view of family unity. Legislation regulating divorce should be implemented as soon as possible. Divorce should not be allowed except where enough grounds are submitted before the court. This means abandoning the present Moslem law - as has happened in Tunisia in recent years - in which divorce can take place outside the court, and in most cases for no sound reasons.

Religion and language differentials in Benghazi are of no great importance due to the fact that over 95.7% of the population are Moslems and speak Arabic. According to 1960 figures the city inhabitants were 75,647 Moslems, 1,620

Christians and 366 Jews. The former total figure is underestimated by at least 2,000, of whom over 50% were Christians. The reason for not including this substantial number of foreigners is because they are not registered in the city Municipality.

The Level of Fertility, Mortality and Natural Increase.

Under the present conditions of vital registration in Benghazi as well as the whole of Libya, no precise and accurate measurements can be given to determine the fertility of Libyan women. However, a rough measure can be furnished by the ratio of children under the age of 5 years to women between 15-49 years old. According to this method the ratio for the last two censuses is as follows:

Census	No. of children under 5 yrs. to every 1000 women
1936	683
1954	672

These figures clearly suggest that Libyan women are rather fertile and consequently they imply a very high birth rate, estimated at 40 per thousand of the population at the time of the 1936 census. In all probability the former birth rate is under-estimated because of the possibility that many children under the age of five were under-estimated. The crude birth rate for 1954 is no less than 41 per 1,000. In the

province of Tripolitania where health, medical and maternity services are better than anywhere else in the country the crude birth rate was 39 per thousand.

It is more difficult to suggest reasonable estimates as regards death rate, mainly because data on mortality of natives is totally lacking. Nevertheless, 35 per thousand was estimated by Pan as a minimum death rate for Libya in 1936. There are some estimates carried out by individuals before and after 1954. In 1951 Dr. Shenwani, a United Nations official, gave from official records a crude birth rate of 19.2 per thousand, a crude death rate of 5.9 per thousand of population and an infant mortality rate of only 43.5 per thousand. These results were quite different from the former official's personal findings which were 53.2 per thousand for the birth rate and 42.2 per thousand for the death rate. (33)

Returns from the official records of the Municipality of Benghazi for the following six years showed the following:-(34)

Year	Total population (in December)	Total births	Birth rate per 1,000	Total deaths	death rate per 1,000
1956	70,154	1,211	17.2	1,799	24.2
1957	71,359	1,691	23.6	1,472	20.4
1958	72,639	2,217	30.7	1,128	15.5
1959	75,426	2,624	34.7	1,705	22.6
1960	77,624	2,753	35.4	1,812	23.5
1961	80,975	3,431	42.3	1,791	22.1

The above statistics show that the rates for births or deaths

vary considerably from one year to another. In all the former years the birth rate exceeded that of deaths except in 1956 when the natural decrease in that year was 7.0 per thousand. The decrease of the death rate of 1957 and 1958 is misleading because many people do not bother to record deaths in the family, especially those of children under 5. The natural increase of the city population since 1956 was therefore as follows:-

<u>Year</u>	<u>Natural increase/decrease per thousand</u>
1956	- 7.0
1957	3.2
1958	15.2
1959	12.1
1960	11.9
1961	20.2

If comparisons are made with Alexandria and neighbouring countries it is doubtful if the birth rate for Benghazi can be lower than 45 per thousand and the death rate must be about 25 to 30 per thousand.

The reasons supporting such high birth and death rates in Benghazi and in Libya, in general, are those features we expect to encounter in any underdeveloped country especially Moslem ones: (1) early marriage and the very low proportion of women who remain spinsters; (2) religious beliefs which encourage marriage; (3) shortage of entertainment, if not the complete absence of it for the majority; (4) the domination of the 'joint family' in which fathers are responsible for

their sons' marriages; and (5) the high percentage of illiteracy especially among women. On the other hand, the limited maternity and medical services, insufficient food (a daily average of less than 2,000 calories per head), bad health, hygiene and housing conditions all contribute to a high death rate which is expected to remain, at least for one decade, as high as it is now.

Density of Population


Drawing a complete and accurate map showing the density of population by quarter and street is impracticable for three reasons: (1) there are no previous records of the exact population by different quarters or streets; (2) there are no censuses of the number of houses; and (3) precise official limits of different quarters are not known even at the present time. However, the quarters were mapped on the city map at a scale of 1:5,000, and planimetered accordingly.

Quarter	Area in sq. kms.	Population	Density per sq. km.
Belkheir	.0625	1,710	27,361
Sidi Salem	.0271	789	29,110
El-Shabbi	.1925	1,101	5,771
El-Drawi	.1700	5,269	30,994
Loheshi	.0975	2,491	25,558
Ben Isa	.1175	2,810	23,924
El-Sherif	.3430	3,499	10,201
Sidi Khrebish	.4000	7,993	19,981
Ghrebil	.3925	6,188	15,766
Sidi Husein	.4050	2,500	6,017
Berka	1.8925	24,635	13,130
Sabri	.1675	16,999	101,480
Fuehat	-	2,399	-

These statistics give an average of about 19,500 persons per square kilometre. The highest density (that given for Sabri) is misleading, as the population of the quarter is actually scattered over a greater area than that shown by the official boundary. The density in Berka, the most populous quarter, is reduced by the comparatively huge area of the quarter. Inside the town we find that the Drawi quarter enjoys the highest density while sparser populations are found in el-Shabbi and Sidi Husein. However, the population density within the whole municipal boundary is lower- 2,766 persons per sq. kilometre. Benghazi's position is rather alarming simply because it lacks the facilities which can in the long run support such a high density as compared with the Egyptian cities (Fig. 26). Three major factors provoke this suggestion: (1) the lack of any major industries; (2) the insignificant agricultural productivity of the hinterland, and (3) the political issues which in the early months of 1963 have terminated the city's provincial political activities. The city's present prosperity is bound to decrease as soon as oil operations reach their final stage.

Analysis of the population by the number of houses is also impossible before 1954, although in 1914 Tegani stated that the population (including European and Jews) was 33,400 and the number of houses was about 5,000.⁽³⁵⁾ These figures mean that there were 6.6 persons for every house. According

Figure 26



Population density of Benghazi

to the 1954 census, the city had a total of 14,879 dwelling units. This implies that every dwelling type accommodated 4.7 persons. This figure is misleading, because out of the total units the city has only 11,333 houses, the rest being mainly zariba and tents.

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CHAPTER VIII

GROWTH OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Analysis of social services has no direct relation with geography unless it is felt that the structure of at least some of these services has some effect upon future development.

Because of this, two of these services, education and health, are dealt with here. A brief assessment of crimes is also considered vital. Other social factors are considered elsewhere in the general theme of this thesis.

A. EDUCATION

Awareness of the rights and obligations by citizens of an advanced society indicates that education, among other factors, has developed and has played its role in achieving that kind of community. In unde^{de}veloped societies, like that of Benghazi, education is a recent phenomenon, and is an important factor in future development. The emphasis here is as much on the absolute quality as on its indirect influence on the degree to which the present form of life is advancing.

Under the long Turkish regime and to some extent during the Italian domination, no proper efforts were ever introduced to give Libyans a basic education. Proper

elementary education only started with the British Military Administration after World War II. Further expansion was also the theme of independent Libya. Examples of these efforts in the case of elementary education are as shown below for the whole of Cyrenaica. (1)

<u>School Year</u>	<u>No. of Schools</u>	<u>Pupils</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>No. of Teachers</u>
		<u>Boys</u>	<u>Girls</u>		
1943/44	17	1,470	30	1,500	50
1950/51	59	8,201	700	8,901	330
1960/61	241	31,430	10,587	42,017	1,811

Along with these efforts secondary and vocational education began to grow. In 1947/48 there were two classes of first year of secondary education, one at Benghazi and the second at Derna. Thirteen years later there were eight secondary and sixteen intermediate schools with 3,892 students of whom 347 were girls. Vocational education, on the other hand, did not start until the school year 1950/51 when a technical-clerical school was opened in Benghazi and an agricultural school at Awelia on the Jebel.

By the school year 1960/61 there were 46,556 students enrolled in the state schools of Cyrenaica. The former figure is classified by types of schools and their numbers as follows:-(2)

Type of School	Cyrenaica				Benghazi	
	No. of Schools	No. of Students	No. of Schools	%	No. of Students	%
Infant	111	727	10	90.9	600	82
Elementary	132	41,290	37	15	14,176	34
Intermediate	16	3,225	4	25	1,200	37.5
Secondary	8	667	3	37.5	550	89
Teachers' Training Colleges	2	225	2	100	225	100
Agricultural School	1	122	-	-	-	-
Technical School	1	88	1	100	88	100
Trade School	1	138	1	100	138	100
Fundamental Education	1	74	1	100	74	100
TOTAL	273	46,556	59	21.6	17,051	36.6

University education prior to 1956, when the Libyan University was opened, was limited to a few students studying abroad. At present, the Faculties of Arts, Commerce and Law enrol about 800 students, of whom about 15% are Cyrenaicans. The rest come mostly from Tripolitania. In addition, Benghazi has three cultural centres: British, Egyptian and American. The value of

these centres is not yet fully appreciated, simply because most people are reluctant to enter and have their doubts about the intentions of these centres, especially those of America and Britain. Schools for the foreign community are limited to four, two of which are Catholic missionary schools.

These improvements have, undoubtedly, changed the earlier picture described in 1952 by "The Overseas Economic Survey" as follows: "Illiteracy which was in the region of 90 per cent is decreasing. At present about 20 per cent of the children are receiving education in schools, but of girls between 5 years and 15 years old only one in thirty goes to school."⁽³⁾

Ten years after, the "Report on the Economic Development of Libya" states: "So far as the mission can judge from available statistics, between 60 and 70 per cent of all Libyan children in the primary school age (6-12) are now in schools, a proportion which stands up to comparison with other underdeveloped countries."⁽⁴⁾

The provincial authorities have therefore succeeded in providing a considerable foundation of basic education despite the short time involved. The kind and qualities of the present educational system are subject to severe criticism. To illustrate the grounds for such criticisms one ought to examine the following table, for literate

people in Cyrenaica. (5)

Types of literate people	1959		1960	
	Total number	%	Total number	%
Students other than university level	43,972	13.52	46,556	13.92
University graduates and students	576	0.20	1,128	0.33
Government employees	7,289	2.35	7,320	2.14
Citizens other than the former categories	10,077	3.09	13,710	4.10
Total of literate people	61,924	19.06	68,814	20.47

The striking features about the former figures are firstly that the majority of literate Cyrenaicans are those still at school, secondly that over one-third of the remaining percentage are government employees, and finally, and most significant of all, the fact that illiteracy is still the prominent feature of the productive section of the society, apart from the civil service where semi-literacy presents a real obstacle for large-scale improvements in this vital service.

As far as Benghazi itself is concerned, the situation is less grim for three reasons:

- (1) It was in Benghazi that both Turkish and Italian regimes opened their single secondary schools.

- (2) There are large numbers of schools, staff and other means of learning such as bookshops, libraries, newspapers and magazines and adult classes.
- (3) Work opportunities exist for literate and skilled workers from all over the province and from Tripolitania as well.

The impact of city life and the need for better education is another reason together with the fact that Benghazi up to now has been the only place for technical, vocational and university education.

Available educational and general statistics of Benghazi are often not complete and are unfortunately usually taken for the whole city. This method has little significance when assessments of the social services in relation to the various parts of the city becomes the main object. However, to illustrate this particular point conclusions are drawn from the following table: (6)

TYPES OF SCHOOLS

Quarter	Elementary	Intermediate	Secondary	Teachers' Colleges and Vocational Institutes	No. of Schools
Fuehat	1	-	-	-	1
Berka	14	1	-	3	18
Sidi Husein	5	1 (in one compound)	1	-	7
El-Sherif	5	-	-	2	7
Sidi Salem	2	-	-	-	2
Sidi Khrebish	5	1	-	-	6
Ghrebil	-	1	1	1	3 (1 compound)
	1	-	-	-	1
Sabri	4	-	-	-	4
	37	4	2	6	49

This distribution (which excludes infant schools, four elementary schools for foreigners as well as the faculties of the Libyan University), although partly influenced by the distribution of population especially in the case of elementary level, is more influenced by the availability of suitable premises than the proper requirements of a certain area. The differences in school numbers between Berka and Sabri is a clear example, as both quarters have almost equal populations. The fact that over 20 per cent of all elementary schools are situated in typical

Arab houses is also indicative. The sites for teachers' training colleges, secondary schools and the faculties of the Libyan University have nothing to do with the present pattern of elementary school distribution. However, it would be wrong to stress a real inequality and to show how this distribution affects the flow of civil servants into the city, and distribution of teachers and trained workers.

According to the 1954 national census, the pattern of literacy of the native population by sex and age was as follows:-(7)

Age group	MALES					FEMALES				
	Total	Illit- erate	Read only	Read & write	Un- known	Total	Illit- erate	Read only	Read and Write	Un- known
All ages over										
5 yrs.	31750	15433	94	13913	2310	25889	20150	22	1845	3872
5-9	3955	1674	33	1458	790	4133	2480	17	577	1059
10-14	3268	779	5	2246	238	2789	1827	2	522	438
14-19	3092	1071	3	1857	161	2927	2244	2	310	371
20-29	8814	4100	37	4245	442	4738	4750	-	267	721
30-44	6043	3150	17	2581	285	5043	4364	-	130	559
45-59	4118	2808	7	1081	212	2861	2438	1	31	390
60 & over	2404	1832	2	425	165	2371	2038	-	4	320
Unknown	36	9	-	10	17	27	9	-	4	14

These statistics, although greatly modified in the last decade, are still representative and have changed little in the age groups of 20 years old and over. The total illiteracy of males and females in all ages over 5 years old amounts to over 61 per cent. Among women alone the percentage is 80 per cent, while of males only it is just less than 50 per cent. At present, girl students compose about 30 per cent of those at Benghazi's elementary school level, while this percentage decreases to about 10 per cent at the secondary level and to lower than 3 per cent at university level. Furthermore, no vocational education is yet available for women, a feature which reflects an acute problem in women's contribution to some social activities such as nursing and teaching.

Because of religion and traditions women in Benghazi are excluded from economic life and have no direct economic or social influence on future development. If their conditions, especially those of the young generation, do not quickly respond to modern learning, the status of women will then certainly delay the degree of future development and modernization in the country as a whole.

Male education, besides being limited, is unfortunately devoted to theoretical learning. Vocational education is still neglected and often looked upon with scorn. The impact of oil and the need for skilled workers has not yet

influenced those responsible for a fresh look at necessary educational requirements to cope with the changing society. Office work is the ultimate desire of most youths, so much so that almost one third of the Cyrenaican population live on government payments. Consequently radical changes cannot be expected in the near future especially when government planning and supervision is affected by political and personal interests more than anything else.

The low level of literacy is reflected in every activity. The acute lack of technicians, professional people and administrators is obvious. The low level of industrialization, the absence of famous and traditional handicrafts, and the low standards of local products, including agricultural ones, are also symptomatic. Skilled workers required by oil exploitation were obtained through foreign recruitments. Over 90 per cent of those engaged in commerce keep no regular accounts. The corruption of the civil service is another prominent feature reflecting the problems of semi-literacy and nepotism.

To the educated minority, the strong challenge of the older generation now presiding over most important government departments and lacking either experience or education is another difficulty in development. It is not surprising that most graduates leave the civil service and work for independent companies. Finally, the population growth of Benghazi and the lack of systematic plans to cope

with it, has brought further difficulties and consequently will delay educational improvements.

As far as the needs of the near future are concerned, five objects are regarded essential: (1) doubling the number of elementary schools especially in the shanty towns; (2) promoting female education and raising its quality to at least the present boys' level; (3) expanding intermediate and secondary schools with special stress on vocational education; (4) increasing adult education; and (5) raising standards of all educational levels.

B. HEALTH

Cyrenaica is naturally a healthy region and its population is not exposed to the major debilitating diseases which cause so much illness in many sub-tropical countries. In Benghazi, however, health conditions are very unsatisfactory in most parts, but have not yet given rise to any serious alarm in spite of the persistent population growth. No major epidemics have been recorded since the early decades of last century. Naturally, there is sickness, but the main disease problems spring from poverty and lack of adequate food particularly in the case of children. Diseases like enteritis, trachoma and tuberculosis are all a consequence of poverty and low standards of living, especially in the shanty towns and similar residential areas. The meagre data available

enable only a very uncertain picture to be drawn of health conditions. However, the infant mortality rate in Benghazi and Libya in general, though it showed some decline in recent years, is believed to be above 350 per thousand. Gastro-enteritis and tetanus are very important causes of death among infants.⁽⁸⁾ The ubiquity of these diseases is a reflection of the prevailing socio-economic conditions, of which the most significant are: the high percentage of illiteracy among women and consequently their ignorance of many essentials of hygiene: the common practice of giving children adult food before they are able to digest it: the contamination of food by flies and dust and finally, and perhaps most significant of all, the limited incomes of the majority which prevent them from properly looking after their children's food and clothing.

Estimates of inflammatory eye disease or trachoma show that one person out of three has signs of active or post-eye infection. To understand the importance of this disease, it must be noted that out of 2,534 operations carried out in 1962, eye operations totalled 1292 or over half of the total. According to figures taken in Tripolitanian, 3 per cent of the total population are blind, while the percentage for those who have only one good eye is about 5 per cent. Another 3 per cent have impaired vision.⁽⁹⁾ In other words, about 11 per cent of the total

population of that province suffer from this disease which is largely caused by dirt and blown dust as well as by malnutrition.

Overcrowding, poor nutrition, bad housing and the low standard of education are the main causes of the incidence of tuberculosis. In Benghazi, where the majority live at a minimum level, tuberculosis admissions to hospitals have increased. In 1958, statistics for Cyrenaica showed that there were 1192 cases (about 0.4 per cent of the population). Two years later the figure rose by another hundred. Deaths caused by tuberculosis in 1958 amounted to over 4 per cent of all death causes in the province and obviously many deaths from T.B. go unrecorded.

The total cases of diseases recorded in Cyrenaica in 1958 were 30,995 and in 1960 35,732.

A rough classification for 1960 cases stands as below: (11)


(1) Nervous system - skin disease and blood disease	25.7%
(2) Diseases of digestive system	17%
(3) Deliveries, complications of pregnancy and child puerperium	15%
(4) Diseases of respiratory system	13.6%
(5) Infectious and parasitic diseases	13%
(6) Symptoms of senility and ill-defined conditions	12.7%
(7) Diseases of circulatory system	3%

Basic health facilities in Benghazi have changed little. New hospital facilities since the war were limited to a small missionary hospital and a few extra wings added to the city general hospital (See Fig. 27). Otherwise the Italian health facilities, especially in cases of preventive medicine and general health education, have even diminished owing to war damage, and the lack of doctors and nurses. Generally speaking, Benghazi's health services, though very limited, greatly exceed those in rural Cyrenaica. The following table gives further illustration. (12)

Year	CYRENAICA				BENGHAZI			
	No. of hospitals Gener- al	Chest	Men- tal	No. of beds	Doc- tors	No. of hospitals	No. of beds	Doc- tors
1958	8	1	1	1,368	36	3	677	14
1962	8	1	1	1,410	60	3	677	35

These statistics, especially the numbers of doctors and hospital bed capacity, give Benghazi almost half of these facilities. Chest and mental hospitals with a bed capacity of 120 and 140 beds respectively, although located on the Jebel, serve the whole province. Benghazi has also ten private surgeries run by government doctors in the evenings as well as 8 chemists' shops. Specialists are very

Figure 27



Benghazi General Hospital

few and all of them are attached to Benghazi General Hospital. According to 1962 official population figures the former statistics give Benghazi's population one hospital bed for every 120 persons, a doctor for every 2,200 people and 8,000 inhabitants for every chemist's shop. These ratios have, on the other hand, little significance from the public health facilities point of view for the following reasons: (a) although medical treatment in general hospitals is free, very few people indeed benefit from it as it seems that those who are not government officials and in particular the lower classes are hardly ever admitted or even treated unless recommended: (b) limited hospital capacities combined with the lack of essential modern equipment: (c) language difficulties, as most doctors are foreigners, which leads to mis-understanding and wrong treatment in many cases. The high costs of private surgeries together with expensive medicines eliminates equal opportunities for the majority. In other words medical treatment is still beyond the reach of most of the people.

The Benghazi General Hospital, the only state hospital in the city, has accommodation for 453 patients. Facilities for treatment apart from its main wards for medical, surgical and obstetrical patients, include treatment of eye, venereal and children's diseases as well

as a small ward for tuberculosis. Expansion and modernization of the hospital, despite the increasing demand, is insufficient and was limited to the rehabilitation of the surgical department, the kitchen and the X-ray unit. "The whole hospital is in urgent need of repairs, improvements and some special equipment and hospital furniture."⁽¹³⁾ The Benghazi Clinic is run by the Municipality and was the private hospital of a famous Italian doctor, who still supervises the clinic. Treatment is limited to general medicine, mainly because of lack of equipment. A dentist, an eye doctor and a female doctor compose half of the clinic's medical staff. Five Italian nuns undertake most of the nursing requirements as local female nursing staff is very limited indeed. The clinic, which has about 150 beds, carried out an average of 800 operations a year against a maximum of 300 operations before 1958. The clinic is overworked, which makes it more like a public dispensary on a market day in a small market town.

The third, but private hospital, in Benghazi is the Adventist Hospital. This hospital, though small, is well equipped and has 2 doctors, 6 female nurses and 2 technicians. Despite its limited bed capacity of 50 beds the hospital serves most if not all the foreign community and the high income group of Libyans. Free

medical treatment for poor people takes place once a week. Otherwise, the hospital charges are very high indeed, in spite of its charitable nature.

Health services are generally directed to curing disease while few efforts are being made towards preventive medicine. Prevention of diseases is often argued to require three essential means: providing a good mixed diet, without which immunity to diseases is impossible; educating women to look after their children and finally increasing food inspection.

The deficiency of the caloric intake per head among the city's inhabitants is considered to exceed 1,000 calories if compared with that of western countries. Proper education among adult Libyan females, in general, is insufficient to influence the way in which the present children are brought up. Inspection of food and other essentials of hygiene are not yet commonly practised especially in the old town and the crowded suburbs.

Further social developments cannot be expected to materialize with such health facilities. It is true that local doctors are few but this does not justify limiting the recruitment of foreign doctors and the provision of more hospitals, when public money is wasted on other less useful projects. Consultation with medical personnel has shown that effective plans for improving

health services in the city require the following measures:-

Preventive medicine:

- (1) The public should be aware that economic development and better health conditions are interrelated. Health education must not only increase but be carried out in homes, schools and in public places.
- (2) The development of a good school health service should be considered a basic item in the long-term health programme.
- (3) A better policy should be adopted for the provision of improved housing, sanitation and slum clearance.
- (4) The nutrition of the public in general, and in particular of pregnant women, must be improved.
- (5) The breeding of flies must be eliminated by making the public aware of their harmfulness.

Hospital services:

- (6) Two new hospitals should be constructed at Berka and Sabri with extra bed capacity of 600 beds.
- (7) Maternity services are in urgent need of expansion and therefore a hospital for this purpose should be built.
- (8) Increased and more effective dispensary services should be developed.

- (9) The present number of doctors should be trebled and a modern female nursing school established.
- (10) The State hospitals should be reorganized with emphasis on equal treatment.
- (11) Medicines and private surgeries should be required to be cheaper.

C. CRIME

No studies or statistics of crime have ever been published in Benghazi. The changing rate of economic and social life in recent years has, according to some officials, changed the pattern of crime, but to what extent no reliable and definite answer can be obtained. Close friendship with officials has enabled me to get some of the recent crime statistics. Comparison of the available data may throw further light on the subject, but certainly not to illustrate the whole picture, as no complete records of earlier years are to be found.

Brief analysis of the judicial system may also add some explanations. Basically, courts are divided into two distinct groups, the Shariah and Civil Courts. The jurisdiction of the first category is confined to pure Islamic affairs. Records and statistics of these courts are not even known to those who work inside them. Benghazi has two of these courts: the first is a primary court, while the second is a court of appeal. Both are badly

situated and suffer from neglect and inadequate equipment. Work to provide a new compound to accommodate all types of courts is now going on.

Civil courts are also divided into three groups:

(1) District or Juziah Courts, with jurisdiction to deal with offences punishable by not more than one month's imprisonment or a fine of 100 pounds: (2) Primary Courts, with jurisdiction to deal with crimes as well as with appeals from the Juziah courts. Offences exceeding one month in prison or a fine of over 100 pounds are also within their jurisdiction:

(3) The Court of Appeal, which has to consist of three advisors. Judges in the civil courts are mostly from neighbouring Arab countries. The primary court of Benghazi for example has three Tunisians, one Egyptian and one British judge. Advisors of the Court of Appeal, on the other hand, are all Libyans. Besides these courts, Libya as a federal state has a Supreme Federal Court which mainly deals with matters involving the provinces and the federal state.

The Public Prosecutor's Department is also divided into two sections: the general headquarters and the district division. The latter is divided into two major subdivisions at Benghazi and Derna. Jurisdiction of the Benghazi division includes those for Barce, Benghazi city itself and Agedabia. Investigation of any crime or major offence is undertaken by the district prosecutor

Final approval of Benghazi's headquarters is essential for the presentation of any criminal case to the proper court. Investigation of minor offences is usually undertaken by the police, though it is subject to the approval of the district prosecutor. The number of lawyers is limited to 9, of whom 8 are Libyans. Only 5 of the lawyers have proper qualifications.

According to figures obtained from the public prosecutor's records, classification of cases from 1959 until 1961 together with figures for 1955 stands as follows:-

Year	TYPES OF CASES			TOTALS
	Minor offences	Major offences	Crimes	
1955	-	-	155	8,940
1959	4512	4109	108	8,729
1960	4035	3262	126	7,423
1961	4488	2737	82	7,307

Two outstanding points of these statistics draw the attention: the gradual yearly decrease of the total number of all types of cases and secondly that major offences are the only type of cases to follow the general trend. The decrease in the total of crimes between 1955 and 1961 is perhaps the most significant of all. The increase in 1960 interrupting the general decline in crime has no specific explanation except that it might be due to re-examination of earlier

cases. The decrease of other cases and in particular that of major offences in that year may further support the suggestion. The increase of minor offences in 1961 may continue in the future owing to car and traffic offences.

These conclusions, despite the increase of population, are normal features and do not contradict the fact that Benghazi's community is responding to what we may call a general social and economic change. In other words, the recent economic prosperity combined with expansion in education have begun to show their influence on one of Benghazi's major problems.

The nature of the category of crimes alone, though showing persistent decline, reflects the fact that the recent economic prosperity has indeed developed a different pattern of crimes as the following table shows:

Year	TYPES OF CRIME									
	Rape & Fraud sexual crimes	Bribery	Theft	Murder	Attempted murder	Arson	Fighting	Drunkenness	Totals	
1955	14	8	-	120	6	4	2	10	3	155
1959	19	12	2	42	4	6	5	8	1	108
1960	44	18	3	26	5	9	9	11	3	126
1961	36	11	1	16	4	5	4	4	1	82

Theft and rape are the most common of Benghazi's crimes.

Both categories have responded differently to the changing

economy. The first has been very much reduced while the second has considerably increased. Work opportunities are the reasons counting for the dwindling of thefts; the people are no longer desperate for food. The increase of income, at least for a certain number, has developed the search for leisure. The strict social life, the shortage of women, high dowries and the prohibition of prostitution among other factors, are the criteria for the increase of sexual crimes. It is not surprising to know that in 1960, 9 out of 44 cases were cases of homosexuality. Fraud and bribery are largely due to the inefficiency of the civil service and the growing attitude of irresponsibility towards state property. Attempted murder and murder itself are too often associated with sexual crimes or linked with tribal feuds. The future tendency of both categories is expected to continue in its present range if not augmented due to further complications caused by relations between the sexes. The arson type of crime is rather unusual in urban societies and the increase since 1957 can only be explained by the extent of tribalism and its indirect influence on the city life. Crimes caused by fighting are practically all cases which have no justifiable causes and could be avoided. Drunkenness is prohibited by the provincial law; recorded cases are only those where disorder or harm is involved. Minor cases are often dealt with by the police,

where punishment is usually one night in custody.

To summarize, it is true that the impact of oil has introduced a new pattern of crime, but happily a general decline has also occurred and may well persist. However, it may be some time before there is a real decline in the present approximate ratio of 1:11 of the city population who are charged by the courts.

References

- (1) General Statistics of Cyrenaica, Benghazi, 1960, pp. 189-195
- (2) Ibid., pp. 189-206.
- (3) Overseas Economic Survey, London, June 1952, p. 16.
- (4) The Economic Development of Libya. New York, 1960, p. 252.
- (5) General Statistics of Cyrenaica, op. cit., p. 194.
- (6) Nazirate of Education, Statistical Dept., 1962.
- (7) 1954 National Census, p. 178.
- (8) The Economic Development of Libya, op. cit., p. 276.
- (9) Bulugma, H. Mr., M. Litt. Thesis, Durham, 1960, p. 120.
- (10) General Statistics of Cyrenaica, op. cit., p. 175.
- (11) Ibid., p. 178.
- (12) Ibid., pp. 175-188.
- (13) Economic Development of Libya, op. cit., p. 503.

CHAPTER IX

STANDARDS OF LIVING

There is no question that the majority of Benghazi's native population live near the minimum level of subsistence. Recent economic changes brought by oil together with a new political structure since independence have greatly benefited only a minor section of the population. The consequence was the creation of a new distinct wealthy group. Persistent population growth, on the other hand, has undoubtedly intensified the misery of the majority especially in the shanty towns where conditions of hygiene, sanitation and housing in particular were already at their lowest level. Between these two extremes lies a third category, the middle income group, including government officials, professional people, most traders, oil company personnel and skilled workers. The impact of oil on the growth of this group is obvious as most elements, apart from government employees, are in one way or another affected by services depending on oil.

Manual workers and labourers, small retailers, government employees of lower grades like ghaffirs and office attendants and finally those who have no permanent incomes are elements who constitute the bulk of the bottom or lower income group.

Prior to independence the structure of the traditional Libyan economy characterized by its limited resources was one of the main factors which reduced clear and sharp economic differences among Libyans in general. The upper income group is a new economic feature and small in comparison to other groups. It is composed of prosperous merchants and landlords, politicians and high government personnel. The recent growth and expansion of Benghazi initiated by oil was largely due to economic activities undertaken by this category.

According to officials from the Nazirate of Finance and those of Labour and Social Affairs, the approximate percentages of the former groups are 70% for the lower group, 27% for the middle and 3% for the upper income group. These classifications are arbitrary as there are no definite or even reliable data to support such distinctions. They, therefore, can only be regarded as broad lines of a general classification of the present different living standards in Benghazi.

Information on incomes, taxes and price indexes are lacking, and even a rough estimate of the total labour force in the city is not available. To complicate matters further the officials refuse to give figures of the total number of government employees. The oil companies, banks and insurance companies have shared the same attitude.

Government permission to undertake a comprehensive survey was also emphatically rejected. With all these difficulties in hand one wonders what the economic structure of the city inhabitants is really like.

Regardless of the authorities' refusal a small-scale survey has been undertaken. Incomes and expenditures on food, clothing and rents were among the main objects of the survey. Information on the kind of jobs, the size of the family, housing conditions and the means of cooking and transport was also included. But, before analysing the findings of this so-called survey a few facts must be stressed.

- (1) From 1959 onwards Benghazi's high rate of unemployment began to disappear, and there developed a continuous shortage of all kinds of workers. The present lists of unemployed at the city labour office are mainly cases of people looking for specified or more profitable jobs.
- (2) The minimum daily wage limit has doubled in the last few years. Salaries and wages paid by the oil companies are often double those paid by the government.
- (3) Inflation of recent years has at least trebled the price index which existed before 1956.
- (4) Government salaries are still based on conditions which prevailed in the early years of independence.

(5) The growth of the foreign community has been faster than the actual growth of services and facilities required to cope with such growth.

The distribution of the survey questionnaires was based on the population proportions of the city's three major quarters of Benghazi proper, Berka and Sabri. An attempt to cover a wider range of the inhabitants was also in mind, and reliable sources helped in choosing the samples, undertaking the distribution and collection of questionnaires. Returned questionnaires numbered only 129 (of which 7 were excluded for improper information) and were less than 25% of the actual distributed number. The reason for this is that no proper contact could be arranged in view of the authorities' disapproval.

Disadvantages like the small representation of the survey (750 people, or less than one per cent of the city's official population), the failure of most sources to provide the required information on expenditure, ^{the} difficulty of drawing exact lines among the different income groups, and the argument that the survey in spite of its low representation is heavily biased on the ground that it lacked verbal or personal contact in a community where illiteracy is a dominant feature, are major handicaps facing a true assessment of native standards of living in the different parts of the city. So no

reliable conclusions can be drawn. The intention is mainly to illustrate, with the data available, some of the actual living conditions, rather than drawing major principles with the intention of applying them to the present economic structure of the inhabitants. On the other hand, we can make some fair assessments using our personal experience and comparison with some studied aspects of living conditions in Tripoli. (see Fig. 28).

	QUARTERS					
	Benghazi proper		Berka		Sabri	
	Numbers	%	Numbers	%	Numbers	%
Population	37,200	46.0	26,800	33.5	16,000	20.5
Sample	63	51.6	41	33.6	18	14.8

The sample is fairly representative of population distribution in the three quarters. Taking into consideration the economic changes brought by oil in the past few years as well as the high prices of essential goods, the lower income group is often regarded as those households (defined as people sharing the same cooking facilities) with incomes of up to £170 per month. The middle income group includes those who earn between £130 to £170 per month. People earning over £170 per month are within the upper income group.

According to these definitions, the classification of incomes, after excluding 2 cases in which households stated that they had no incomes at all, and 5 cases where no fixed incomes were stated, stands as follows:

Income group	Income £.p.mon.	Cases	Total in each group	% in each group
Lower	Below £20	29	74	60.6
	20-30	45		
Middle	30-40	24	43	35.3
	40-50	12		
	50-60	7		
	60-70	0		
Upper	70 and over		5	4.1
			122	100.0

Only about 1.5% of the total households have no permanent incomes, a feature which explains the extent of work opportunities in the city. The fact that the daily minimum wage is 48 piastres or about 14 pounds per month explains the absence of cases lower than 10 pounds per month. Over one-third of the total cases have incomes between £20 and £30 while the monthly average income per household is £32. The corresponding figure for Tripoli city is about £28. The differences in wages for non-government employees between the two cities may be responsible.

It will be noted that the percentage in the 3 groups differ from the official estimates. The differences become even wider when classification is done according to the specified jobs for each income group. Examples of the upper income group give further illustration.

Jobs	Cases	Average monthly income
High government officials	2	£93.5
Oil Company employees	2	£102
Business	1	£80

According to tradition independent company employees are included in the middle income group. The reason for this lies in the fact that until recently top government officials were the only group with high incomes. If so, and this is certainly wrong, the proportion of the upper group falls to only 2.4%, nearer to the official estimate.

Two reasons may account for the differences between the calculated and the early suggested percentages of the remaining two income groups. Firstly, the smallness of the sample, and secondly the misrepresentation of the manual workers, the lowest paid category of all as can be seen from the following table.

Income group	Types of jobs							Total
	Government employees	Company employees	Professionals	Business	Semi-skilled workers	Traders	Manual workers	
Lower	33	4	6	-	7	10	14	74
Middle	23	7	4	4	2	3	-	43
Upper	2	2	-	1	-	-	-	5
Grand Total	58	13	10	5	9	13	14	122

The high proportion of government employees is inevitable due to the fact that there are over 15,000 of them in Cyrenaica, 65% of whom are in Benghazi alone. On the assumption that every government employee supports a family of five persons, this means about 48,000 persons. In other words, one half of the city's registered inhabitants live on government payments.

The monthly income per person of the three income groups is as follows:

Income group	Total income	Total population	Average size of household	Average income per person in pounds per month
Lower	1,706	433	5.9	3.9
Middle	1,779	266	6.1	6.6
Upper	449	16	3.2	28.0
Total	3,934	715	5.2	5.3

The monthly income per person is similar to that found by the family budget survey of Tripoli city in 1962 and reflects some formidable facts about the actual purchasing power of most inhabitants. The most significant is the wide gap between the poor majority and the well-off minority. The monthly income per person of the first two groups, almost 98% of the survey people, enables the purchase of a packet of cigarettes and a box of matches per day per person. The monthly income per person of the wealthy minority certainly exceeds the income per household in the lower income group.

However, the average monthly income per household, although very limited in value, seems very high when compared with the national yearly average income of only about £17 per capita. However, this does not concede the fact that the bulk of the city inhabitants have a very low standard of living.

Information on the monthly consumption expenditure is based on the conclusions of the Tripoli budget survey for the whole of Libya. Comparison with some selected countries is also given. (1)

Country	Date	Consumption expenditure per year	% distribution of consumption expenditure						
			Food	Housing			Clothing	Miscellaneous	
			Rent	Fuel and light	Furniture & equipment	Total			
Libya	1962	£266	45.0	15.2	5.1	1.9	22.2	13.0	19.8
Egypt	1959	£261	50.3	11.8	3.5	1.2	16.5	8.2	25.0
Iraq	1961	-	48.7	8.3	2.8	8.1	19.2	8.4	23.7
Italy	1954	785,544 lira	52.4	6.0	6.5	3.2	15.7	12.7	19.2
U.K.	1959	£807	35.6	9.3	6.1	7.0	22.4	10.5	31.5

In the case of Benghazi the percentages of consumption expenditure on food and rent ought to be modified to something like 50% and 19% respectively. The fact that most foodstuffs and vegetables are imported into Benghazi is the reason for the first item. As far as rent is concerned Benghazi stands alone in this respect, largely because of the demand by the foreign community. The former modifications are fulfilled at the expense of other items, mainly clothing and miscellaneous expenditure.

The classification of each income group by major residential quarters and the type and ownership of housing is as follows:-

(1) Low income group

	No. of cases	Types of housing				Ownership of housing	
		Arab houses	Apart-ments	Huts	Villas	Private property	Rented
Benghazi proper	32	30	2	-	-	8	24
Berka	29	26	-	3	-	9	20
Sabri	13	5	-	8	-	2	11
Total	74	61	2	11	-	19	55

(2) Middle income group

Benghazi proper	28	21	7	-	-	5	23
Berka	10	10	-	-	-	4	6
Sabri	5	5	-	-	-	2	3
Total	43	36	7	-	-	11	32

(3) Upper income group

Benghazi proper	3	2	1	-	-	2	1
Berka	2	1	-	-	1	2	-
Total	5	3	1	-	1	4	1
Grand total	122	100	10	11	1	34	88

These statistics indicate that the majority live in Arab houses; modern dwellings like apartments and villas

are much less frequent because their high rents (sometimes over one-third of the total income) largely limit them to foreigners. Although the percentage of people living in brarik (huts) is small, it means that nearly 7,500 people live in the poorest form of dwelling. If the proportion is worked out according to the estimate of the city's actual population (120,000), the number of those who live in huts alone would amount to over 11,000, or more than the total inhabitants of Derna, the second largest urban centre in the whole province. The percentage of rented dwellings is just over 72%. The percentage of dwellings occupied by their own owners is therefore about 28%; the corresponding percentage in Tripoli is 25%.⁽²⁾ Of the total sample 23% live in dwellings with more than one household. As far as the density of people per room is concerned, no attempt was made to ascertain figures. Averages of 2.7 persons per room in Tripoli; 2.6 in Amman and 1.9 in Alexandria may illustrate the matter. However, it should be noted that in the poor quarters more than 5 persons to a room is quite common. Severe overcrowding is noticeable in cases (23%) of shared dwellings where in most cases the family occupies no more than one room. "High rents as well as the custom of living together force too many people to live in too small a space for optimum health."⁽³⁾

The classification of the sample according to the availability of piped water, electricity and the means of

cooking adds further illustrative information about the present living conditions.

Income group	No. of samples	No. of houses with piped water and electricity	No. of houses with electricity alone	Means of Cooking			
				Fire-wood and charcoal	Kero-sene	But-agas	Elec-tricity
Lower	74	37	1	58	17	4	-
Middle	43	40	1	18	13	10	2
Upper	5	5	-	-	2	2	1
Total	122	82	2	71	32	16	3

These statistics leave 40 cases of almost one third of the total dwellings with no piped water and 38 with no electricity. In such cases water is obtained either by buying it from el-Warradin (people selling water) or by women carrying it from public fountains or from a nearby well. The following description is true for Benghazi as well as Amman: "A daily procession of women carrying 4-gallon petrol cans on their heads is seen almost everywhere in Amman and loud altercations are heard when the fortunate owner of a garden tap or hose refuses water to the waterless."⁽⁴⁾ Lighting is mostly provided by kerosene or paraffin lamps. In over 58% of the sample cooking is still done in the traditional rural way with firewood or charcoal. As a result, overcutting of trees has become a serious

problem in many parts of the Jebel. The widespread burning of firewood and charcoal is illustrated by the large quantities marketed at the Fonduk where the monthly averages exceed 4 and 5 thousand tons respectively. Modern cooking facilities, on the other hand, are still limited to about 16%. The use of kerosene stoves amounted to about 26%. The high prices of kerosene are often regarded as the sole reason for its limited use if compared with firewood. To some conservatives the argument that food is better cooked in the traditional way is another reason which accounts for the difference. Electricity is very expensive and consequently prohibitive for cooking, unless it is illegally obtained, which is a common practice in Benghazi.

As far as means of transport are concerned, 56 cases reported walking to their jobs, 19 use bicycles, 23 use buses, 11 use private cars, while the remaining three use hantur (horse drawn carts). The comparatively high percentage of about 9% with private cars does not signify any economic privileges; in 3 out of 11 cases cars are owned by households with incomes of less than £L30 per month. The high percentage (46%) of people walking to their jobs plus those using bicycles or carts is due either to the insufficient and infrequent bus services or the fact that people do not need to travel long distances like most

government employees or traders living in Benghazi proper. Cases where people cannot afford bus fares amounted to about 12% of the survey.

Modern home equipment, although still limited because of the limited incomes of the majority or because of their recent widespread marketing, are more indicative of the actual living conditions than say the high proportion of cars in use.

Income group	Total number of cases	Radio sets	Tape-recorders	Refrigerators	Washing machines
Lower	74	47	-	-	-
Middle	43	63	7	19	2
Upper	5	5	1	5	3
Total	122	115	8	24	5

These figures clearly indicate that nearly 36% of the lower income group have no wireless and therefore almost certainly cannot afford to buy one. The lack of other equipment is understandable. The limited amount of equipment other than radios in the case of the middle income group illustrates the fact that modern house facilities are still beyond the reach of most people.

To some people especially among the middle and upper income groups, modernization or better living in general,

although it may be financially possible, is still something which does not fit with their social traditions. However, this does not mean that it is only the social structure that produced the earlier picture of living conditions of the Libyan community. The widespread poverty continued, with enormous lack of proper housing, the shortage of health, hygiene and sanitation facilities and the high percentage of illiteracy being indeed the main causes.

The average monthly income per household may be high in comparison with rural Libyan society or most neighbouring Arab countries, but the real values of this income are certainly misleading because of inflation and high prices as well as the wide gap between the wealthy minority, and the majority who hardly earn enough to eke out a living.

Generally speaking, the Libyans of Benghazi can be classified in terms of income according to their residential areas as follows: the upper income group is located in the Italian section of Benghazi and the new residential areas like Fuehat, the middle class dominates the Medine and Berka while the lower income group concentrates in Sabri and all the extended areas of shanty towns.

As for the foreign community, excluding Jews where the living standards of the majority are above those of the natives, information on incomes is hard to obtain especially in cases of oil company employees. Here the estimate of

£200 as an average monthly income seems reasonable, and over 70% of all foreigners are employed in jobs associated with oil. For the remaining 30% an estimate of £100 seems rather below the actual fact. This means that the average monthly income per working foreigners is about £170 or nearly six times the average income per Libyan household. Considerations such as most foreigners being bachelors, or supporting smaller family units, or having more than one working member, explain the immense differences between the actual income per person. Although this sharp division of incomes initiated new work and commercial activities and accelerated the physical growth of the city, it was accompanied by a formidable increase in prices which, in fact, was far more than the incomes of the majority could afford. In other words only the foreign community and the Libyan upper class enjoy what modern Benghazi has to offer.

It is true that oil is bringing more wealth to the city, but if conditions remain unchanged it seems doubtful that the wealth of the few - in terms of public interest - will reduce the misery of the many; they may increase it. Political stability cannot easily thrive in such a divergent community. The introduction of some effective social scheme seems highly desirable not only for the sake of political security but also to provide a base for future development.

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- (1) Family Budget Survey in Tripoli Town, Tripoli, 1963,
pp. 24, 25.
- (2) Ibid., p. 66.
- (3) Hacker, J.M. Modern Amman, Durham, 1960, p. 88.
- (4) Ibid., p. 89.

Conclusion

Benghazi is an oriental pre-industrial city. Five decades ago the Italians, for the first time, tried their best to give the town a European outlook. Their task was difficult, courageous and expensive. World War II on the other hand, soon left Benghazi with overall destruction. A complete reconstruction, even of the city's main amenities, was something beyond the economic capacity until oil was discovered.

The disadvantages of the city site are enormous, but they did not stop the Italians creating a new Benghazi. With the new resources the filling up of the surrounding sebkhah would not be a difficult task, thus eliminating a formidable physical challenge to harmonious growth and so giving the town a new chance of more controlled development.

Benghazi's past has been achieved by a combination of Italian settlement, national political gains and of course the discovery of oil. Chances of future growth are certain at least for the near future. The question of whether better use of planning and development schemes in general can be fulfilled is another matter. So far politics and tribal influences have exercised a great deal of influence on all so-called development plans. But the time has come when development can no longer be subjected to politics. Development plans for future Benghazi are matters of great

urgency. Benghazi's position may not be ideal in regard to Cyrenaica and its main productive areas, but it supports over one-third of the total provincial population. The low standards of living, the high death rate and bad housing, high illiteracy and health conditions of most inhabitants are enough criteria for a revision of earlier attitudes towards development. To this end Benghazi badly needs more effective municipal authorities with enough powers and finance not only to draw up a plan of forthcoming physical development, but also to undertake the formidable task of redeveloping the shanty sites and similar poor areas. In Tripoli such authorities do exist and planning is going ahead.

The lack of qualified personnel needed for future development plans is no longer an excuse. The cry for capital is over. Different detailed surveys are immediately required if there is to be any sound comprehensive development.

The assessment of the loss of the political functions on Benghazi's future is difficult to forecast as no final decision on the future Libyan capital has yet been taken. The inevitable end of large-scale oil operations, the proposed transfer of the Libyan University to Beida and the fact that Benghazi has not yet any established industries are among the chief handicaps which may well affect the future of the city's recent achievements. The redevelopment of salt, sponge and tuna industries are vital, especially when Benghazi possesses a first-class port.

Finally, it should be stressed that much of the prosperity of the city will no doubt depend on the rate of success of the national development. The renewal of the Jebel agricultural schemes and the development of rural Cyrenaica in general, are the key to the future of Benghazi.

qu. = quintals, no. = number
kgs. = kilograms.

Appendix 1

Fonduk Activities

Year	Month	Higes (no.)	Barley qu.	Wheat qu.	Charcoal qu.	Firewood qu.	Wool kgs.	Butter kgs.	Olive Oil kgs.	Ground nuts qu.	Dates qu.	Corn qu.	Oranges qu.	Tomatoes qu.	Onions qu.	Green Pepper qu.	Lemons qu.	Potatoes qu.	Chick Peas qu.	Water melon qu.	Scrap metal tons	Income tax
1955	J.	221	47	100	252	90	130	-	1	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	12	-	-	61,470
	F.	306	504	174	68	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	62,640
	M.	423	277	142	114	350	1	14	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	121,180
	A.	330	163	71	1	1	356	330	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14	-	-	75,980
	M.	724	196	58	207	1	3780	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	72,800
	J.	456	141	166	118	210	2250	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	56,400
	J.	710	472	131	89	1	250	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	73,700
	A.	647	217	138	-	1	12	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	46,780
	S.	588	415	104	105	1	800	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	66,465
	O.	450	577	118	720	10	110	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	67,710
	N.	970	260	94	162	270	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	53,980
	D.	236	180	140	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	53,920
1957	J.	1197	112	16	343	74	120	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	43,290
	F.	699	62	15	26	193	387	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	148	46,500
	M.	554	8	10	268	100	36	283	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	89	54,000
	A.	143	38	9	253	53	81	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11	38,775
	M.	177	127	13	244	109	105	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	44	25,500
	J.	120	76	14	147	1	2603	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	53,440
	J.	688	121	85	95	100	193	1	360	1	1	1	1	10	72	1	1	1	10	1	1	40,545
	A.	302	233	31	50	150	138	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	85	75	1	76,465
	S.	220	146	113	245	100	177	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	100	1	185	44,840
	O.	444	204	73	41	453	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	42,325
	N.	184	20	116	282	100	3000	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	61,960
	D.	81	196	98	53	1	96	1	2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	51,800
1961	J.	125	40	26	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	16	32,930
	F.	129	30	30	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	77	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	1	10	34,480
	M.	306	34	9	295	51	1	1	90	1	68	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	150	1	20	62,700
	A.	244	76	1	48	273	1	200	1	15	60	1	38	1	1	6.5	1	1	-	1	1	44,851
	M.	40	3150	25	104	310	5236	1	1	1	1	25	28	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	37	62,820
	J.	491	8250	200	169	1	4000	1	1	1	300	1	14	21	1	1	1	1	-	1	1150	76,470
	J.	161	135	87	290	41	1200	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	1	1	-	100	55	54,700
	A.	706	116	40	1	1	120	1	200	14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	82	5	58,300
	S.	344	183	109	108	111	316	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	1	-	1	1	63,300
	O.	367	144	41	282	26	230	1	71	1	8	1	1	1	1	6	1	1	-	1	1	84,235
	N.	246	98	41	234	45	1	1	300	66	24	1	30	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	49,900
	D.	169	94	22	235	494	650	1	430	22	50	1	75	1	1	2	1	1	-	1	23	55,740

Appendix 2

Fonduk Activities

Date	COMMODITIES (in kilogrammes)																	
	Toma- toes	Green Pepper	Onion	Broad beans	Carrot	Rad- dish	Grapes	Dates	Bana- nas	Cab- bage	Apri- cots	App- les	Dried beans	Alm- onds	Water melon	Mixed vege- tables	Let- tuce	Cucum- ber
19.3.62	825	1	55	235	32	55	1	140	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	220	35	-
2.4.62	258	1	128	350	1	1	1	1	217	130	1	1	1	-	-	1	120	-
22.4.62	452	5	1	341	1	1	1	18	425	115	1	1	1	-	-	92	95	-
28.4.62	221	1	95	342	1	15	1	1	215	77	1	1	1	-	-	200	72	-
14.5.62	356	20	210	225	1	-	-	-	353	110	85	1	1	-	-	240	94	89
7.6.62	975	127	135	1	1	-	-	-	1	145	250	272	25	125	-	350	65	237
2.8.62	2500	315	1	1	1	-	545	62	1	62	1	1	1	-	1150	650	40	-
13.8.62	985	320	1	1	1	1	615	220	1	1	1	1	1	-	1700	350	145	-

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Summary of ThesisThe Urban Geography of Benghazi

Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica and the second largest city in Libya, grew little before the Italians established themselves in the province. The reasons for slow growth were the isolation of the city, its poor site and hinterland, the lack of security and the unwillingness of the Turks to develop the country. Unfortunately, the city developed by the Italians suffered severe destruction during World War II, and only Benghazi's status as co-capital of independent Libya and the oil discoveries in the Syrtic region have revived her fortunes and induced expansion. This expansion, both of modern and traditional quarters, has lacked official supervision and planning. Modern European-type quarters now contrast vividly with the old city and the newer native quarters, some of which are merely shanty-town growths. Urban redevelopment has not reduced the marked social segregation.

Benghazi lacks important industries and well-established crafts, and efforts should be made to develop them, especially as the federal political system terminates, the traditional economy declines and the wave of oil operations is only short-lived. Other necessities are slum clearance, improved standards of health and education, reduced tribal influence, and above all, more efficient municipal authority. At the moment, Benghazi is too dependent upon the revenues of oil.

