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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the 'organic' theory of the state' with reference to Plato, John of Salisbury and Bernard Bosanquet. According to the analysis of this theory, drawn from the analogy with the human organism, the health of the whole depends on the healthy discharge by each part of its own proper function. Thus, the part is not only subordinate to the whole, but cannot exist apart from it. The following problem in particular is examined; is the 'organic theory' a practical one in terms of offering a solution to the problem of political obligation, or is it a mere abstraction ?

For varying reasons the conclusion is reached that the latter is the case in all three writers. Plato's 'Republic' is of course admitted to be an ideal, but in some ways he is not organic enough. Unity is insisted upon to such a degree that the diverse contribution of the parts is neglected, so that a truly common purpose is lacking.

John of Salisbury poses a particular problem, namely that at a time when politics and religion were not separated, it is impossible to talk about the state in the usual secular sense. Moreover, does a Christian owe loyalty first to the state, then to God, and does he fulfill himself only within the state and not the Church ? Where there is no definition of terms the 'organic theory' can mean all things to all men, and can have no practical relevance.

Finally, Bosanquet's idea of the state as a union of different minds in a common purpose fails because he does not distinguish the ideal state from that of the real world of political struggle, economic rivalry, religious differences etc. It too belongs to the world of abstract thought.

P A R T 1

P L A T O

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THE ORGANIC THEORY OF THE STATE WITH REFERENCE TO
PLATO, JOHN OF SALISBURY AND BERNARD BOSANQUET.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The fact that the 'organic theory of the state' has not only survived the change from the Greek city-state, through the medieval 'commonwealth', to its vigorous re-appearance in the albeit opposed theories of Fascism and 'State-Capitalism', (U.S.S.R. China etc.), testifies both to its strength and weakness. Can the same theory of the state be shared by minds conditioned by slavery, serfdom and modern capitalism, without being so vague that it breaks down as soon as the concrete relationship between the various members and the state is examined? What is common, however, to all three epochs, namely economic revolutions bringing new classes into existence, inevitably throw doubt on the values and customs of the old society. But newly-won freedom is often an object of fear, so that anyone proposing guiding rules of conduct, i.e. the suppression of individual initiative and its transference to a seemingly permanent institution capable of uniting its members, will be satisfying a basic human need. Of course, the citizen body is confronted with the paradox that freedom is only discovered, not lost in the state, but the organic theorist does not conceal that the state is something for which man exists and not vice-versa.

This attempt to link indissolubly the state and the individual demands above all the destruction of individual freedom, and by the same token all ideas of an equalitarian theory of justice. The organic theorist's argument does not rest upon the similarity between the state and individual, but upon the identification between the two i.e. that the state is a real and perfect individual.*

* This is certainly true in the case of Plato and John of Salisbury, although in the former, Bosanquet's idea of the state as a mental structure, a union of different minds in a common purpose is foreshadowed. In this instance, the state is not an organism, i.e. a physical entity, but like an organism.

The consequences of such a thorough-going analogy are so disastrous that only a brave few dare give it explicit formulation. Plato, it may be noted, assumes foreknowledge of the analogy on the part of his readers, in an attempt to avoid their ~~en~~ ^{en} ~~ity~~, for what must be concealed above all from liberal-minds is the acceptance of inequality as a just and necessary factor in human society. Everything follows from this. Just as the various members of the body have different functions of varying importance, likewise the state can suffer the amputation of some of its members, although the latter have no existence outside the whole. Their interests are inextricably bound up in the state, by which is meant that an individual's opinion can never come into conflict with that of the state, or if it does, it is the result of an ignorance which is unable to see where its true interests lie. By equating morality with function, justice is merely the forcible maintenance of this initial inequality.

These are the principles of the organic theory of the state. They have not changed in nearly two thousand five hundred years, and will probably only be abandoned when the state itself ceases to be necessary. Of course, there is one school of philosophy which holds that the state has always been authoritarian and repressive, and that the time has long since arrived for its destruction, and replacement by some form of non-governmental cooperation between free individuals, namely philosophic anarchism. This seems to me, to be the true opposite of the organic theory, the former claiming that the state negates all those qualities which distinguish man qua man, the latter postulating itself as the only organ of man's economic, moral and spiritual fulfillment. The democratic theory falls between these two, the essential feature of which is to limit the totalitarian tendencies in the state, by allowing the majority to elect the governing minority.

It is precisely this governing minority which engages the undivided attention of those upholders of an organic analogy.

Although government by the people is inevitably discarded, government for, to wit, in the interest (supposed) of the whole, becomes the 'sine qua non' of the ideal state. A static and arrested state, in which the slightest change in the status quo, assumes the proportions of a disaster, depends above all on the ability of its leader(s). This explains Plato's preoccupation with the educating and training of the Philosopher-Kings, John of Salisbury's grave concern that the King must at all times consult with the priest-hood, and to a lesser extent Bosanquet's desire for a 'purification' of the General Will as exhibited in institutions such as the state, the Church etc. The latter, unlike Plato and John of Salisbury, at times shows an inclination for liberal reform, but the state is alone regarded 'as the supreme community and guardian of moral values'.

We have seen therefore, that in spite of the intervening centuries, all three writers are fascinated by comparison between the body-politic and the body-natural. Superficial similarities are however, easier to find than the corresponding differences. Can we really suggest that an individual is on a level with a hand, i.e that he is not an end in himself 'in initio', and that what forms of association he creates afterwards ^{after what?} is an entirely separate question ?

It nevertheless remains true that a member of a state accepts almost unconsciously an unwritten law of reciprocal rights and duties towards that body. In practice it is impossible for him to contract out of society, but on what terms was membership of the state accepted in the first instance ? The organic theorist regards as heresy any suggestion of a contractualist or utilitarian explanation;* it is for him nothing more or less than the expression of man's innermost being. But here we face an enormous difficulty. Is it an ideal state or that imperfect and often deficient state in the real world ?

* To use another analogy; if a brick is taken from a wall it remains a brick.

If the organic theorist can be faulted with not having distinguished at all times the ideal and the actual, he does exploit man's variety of aptitudes to the full. He asserts that the parts, by reason of their difference, are complementary to each other, and mutually dependent. We may suspect an aesthetic motive here. Heraclitus applied it to the physical world; 'Underlying opposites there is a unity, underlying change a stability'. The 'social scientist' to use a modern term, tries to weave the same unity out of diverse elements into the all-embracing, self-sufficient state.

This all makes very little sense to me!

PART ONE : PLATO:

'No greater evil can affect the state than whatsoever divides it and makes it Many instead of One, and no greater good than whatsoever binds it together and makes it One'. (Republic 462A).

The problems of the One and the Many, of unity in diversity, of permanence in an everchanging world, were inherited by Plato from the rational, evolutionary and hylozoistic Milesian philosophy. Platonism is an attempt to answer those questions raised by the 'natural philosophers', not on their own ground, but in the light of that ethical and moral world discovered by Socrates, and the Parmenidean reaction to the *παντα ῥεῖ καὶ οὐδεν μὲνει* philosophy of Heraclitus. The search for beginnings was transformed into a search for ends of Socrates' 'conversion'*. For Socrates this question took the form of the best life to be led by the individual, but Plato saw it in terms of discovering the 'ideal state', which the individual would not only accept, but recognise as the indispensable focal point of his own existence. However, the search for beginnings and ends is the outward manifestation of a desire to discover some underlying reality and order behind the seeming impermanence of the sensible world. Such was the uncertainty of the times that only a ruling class of genuine philosophers in the Platonic sense could solve the wrangles of fifth-century Athenian politics, and provide the basis of a true *πολιτικὴ τέχνη* which would lead to the rediscovery of the principles of unity (1).

* (Phaedo 95 cff)

How far this is an authentic account is debatable.

The breakdown of the old aristocratic values as a result of the economic revolution during the sixth century B.C, was not accompanied by an immediate and lasting substitute. Apart from the religious sects, notably the Pythagoreans, Godless scientists such as Anaxagoras, and Democritus, the 'sophist movement' represented by Protagoras and Gorgias, and of course Socrates himself added impetus to the constant questioning of ethical standards, of which the most famous examples are Pericle's 'Funeral Speech' and the 'Meliian' dialogue. For example, in the fifth century, 'ἀρετή' has always a political connotation, although it was never devoid of its original Homeric interpretation as 'excellence'. Plato in the 'Republic' by postulating four virtues suggests the influence of the Pythagorean τετραγώνος ^{ἀνὴρ}, an intermediate ethical code which substituted for blue-blood as a qualification to rule, a disciplined life which made a man ^{σωφρων} σπουδαίος, ἀνδραγαθός, and δίκαιος. All these essentially aristocratic virtues are included within the totality of 'ἀρετή'. However, Plato's thought is as always enriched by that other stream of thought represented by Socrates, especially by the latter's confrontation with the Sophists, who made 'σοφία' in the sense of intellectual agility the characteristic of 'ἀρετή'. But in each case, the quality of indicates inevitable superiority in its possessor, and Plato is quick to see its possibilities as a political weapon in establishing the unchallengeable authority of the ruling caste of Guardians.

The early dialogues and in particular, the 'Protagoras', 'Gorgias' and 'Meno' take up the central problem in Plato's thought, to wit that of discovering the true 'πολιτικὴ τέχνη' and its relation to ἀρετή is virtue teachable? ² Protagoras asserts that he professes this art, by which he makes people good citizens. He also claims that the citizens of a given community are capable of educating the young in goodness and that no experts are necessary. Although the

dialogue has no satisfactory conclusion, Socrates thinks that virtue, being knowledge is teachable, but he doubts whether those who claim to teach it, are capable of doing so. It is interesting however, that Plato allows Protagoras to put democracy's case in the myth of Prometheus. In doing so, Protagoras states that every man has a 'share of justice and citizen skill'. Man is therefore a 'πολιτικόν ζῷον' and the state his natural home, although the freedom of the individual to express his opinion is strictly safeguarded. Plato thus owes much to Protagoras' thought, although the debt is hard to recognise through the perversion of the latter's liberal ideas.

In the 'Georgias', Plato is not concerned with πολιτικὴ τέχνη i.e. the art of making man a worthy member of the community, but only with ῥητορικὴ τέχνη, which was called the τέχνη. Socrates claims that it is not a τέχνη at all, but only a manufacturer of conviction, (πείθους δημουργός), and the fact that it cannot be concerned with its ethical implications and consequences, reduces it to the level of a "knack" (τριβή), far removed from the end of the true 'art' which must always be justice. Once again, Plato allows a real argument to develop in 'Callicles' claims to represent the right of the superman, admitting no self control or obligation to others, i.e. the complete opposite of an organic theory. Socrates answers by appealing to Orphic/Pythagorean sanctions, defining 'σοφροσύνη' as obedience to a rule and standard which is beyond this life, i.e. the basis of his argument that it is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it. Equally important is the principle of 'τάξις' and 'κόσμος', an order beyond which nothing in human society or the universe must go. It is the principle which gets things into proportion ('μετροπότης') and this is where happiness lies. The true 'πολιτικὴ τέχνη' will thus impose 'κόσμος' on disordered material i.e. weave a unity out of dissident elements.

In the 'Meno', Socrates argues against the suggestion that there are different types of ἀρετή applicable to men, women and children, because he was always trying to achieve something universally

valid in the ethical sphere. Plato went a stage further and tried to put ethical truth on the same plane of geometric truth. The equality of women put forward in the 'Republic' more from political considerations, e.g. the unity of the state, the importance of intelligent breeders etc, has its basis in this idea of Socrates that the ἀρατή of men and women is the same. In the 'Meno', it is never proved that 'virtue is knowledge', and that there can be teachers of ἀρατή. Nor is the relationship explained between σοφία, ἐπιστήμη and ἀρατή. The arguments of these earlier dialogues are deliberately left hanging, foreshadowing the 'Republic'. One thing is however certain, that ἀρατή is in no way to be identified with the cleverness of the Sophist. The 'Republic' (538 - 40) will make a provision that the young men are kept from being intoxicated with the power of argument, until they are mature adults, who will not abuse it in the manner attributed to Socrates' enemies. But as we shall see, virtue identified with knowledge is the characteristic of the ruling class only, whereas the ἀρατή of the ruled bears most resemblance to an extremely passive form of σοφροσύνη, while out of self-control and knowledge comes a third ἀρατή, justice - the healthy condition of the whole attained by each member's fulfillment of his unequal function.

The importance of the theory of the soul in Plato's political philosophy, demands a brief examination of its historical development. In Homer's time, everybody, even atheists, accepted the existence of the soul, but not its immortality. The normal conception was a wraith, mostly insubstantial, but with the appearance of a person, which came to life as it were, when offered bull's-blood. Among the Ionian scientists however there was complete agreement that the soul is a physical substance, (ἀήρ or πνεύμα), and like the body needs sustenance, which it obtains by the process of breathing. Death is merely the cessation of this process. C.F. (to breathe one's last). Anaximenes testifies to the intimate connection between the soul of man and the soul of the cosmos, conceived as a living organism.* The cosmos too has its own rhythm of life and its

* Any theory which deviated from this tendency to regard the world as a living body εα. The Atomists, did not take firm rest in the ancient world.

laws are basically organic.³ We shall see Plato making use of the same macrocosmic analogy in the 'Timaeus'.

According to Orphic/Pythagorean doctrine, life is a penance by which man atones for the sin of the Titans. The immortal part of him is entombed in the mortal; so that his divinity is constantly exposed to corruption. All life is a rehearsal for death when the virtuous soul, after the necessary number of incarnations, rejoins the company of the immortal gods and heroes. However, this dualism is something new in Greek thought. Nowhere in Milesian philosophy, or in the Homeric poems, is there anything similar to this conception of the soul as generically different from the body, or that it is in the very nature of the former to rule the latter *. According to the *ἐπιμεδέια τῆς ψυχῆς* theory of the Pythagoreans, the soul must reproduce on the microcosmic scale the 'harmonia' of the macrocosm, but gradually, as a result of Socrates' reaching out against science, the 'spiritual' soul replaced the earlier organic conception of the soul as a physical entity.

The question as to whether Socrates believed in a 'spiritual' or 'moral' soul, as opposed to one that might be termed 'metaphysical', i.e. immortal, reflects the more general problem of distinguishing the historical Socrates from that wraith fed on pure Platonism. In the light of Socrates' antipathy to science, and more especially to reasoning based on *à priori* principles, we may interpret his 'doctrine' of the soul as the reflection of his belief in the autonomy of ethics, by which he demonstrates the self-sufficiency of the individual and his right to be treated as an end in himself, precisely because he equated the soul with the faculty of human reason. Plato's philosopher, on the other hand is quite the reverse. Only the state is self-sufficient and an end-in-itself, and the universal application of the theory of 'tending the soul' is the prerogative of the ruling minority.

* I agree with Thomson 'The First Philosophers' p.244, that it was probably in the mines that men first thought of life as a prison and the body as the tomb of the soul.

The new principle of morality which Socrates had discovered, of the perfectible human soul had at last offered a solution to the great ~~debate~~ ^{νόμος/φύσις} debate, and especially to those Sophists, e.g. Callicles, who argued that since the laws of the state exist 'νόμος', by convention, it is the natural right of the stronger to break loose. Plato accepts that the laws of society are conventional, but under the influence of the Socratic doctrine of the soul, i.e. that the spirit matters more than the flesh, argues that the laws are also an expression of the spiritual nature of man, which is at the same time social.* However, this form of naturalism is so vague that it may be used to defend anything. There is nothing that has ever occurred to man which could not be claimed to be natural; for if it were not in his nature, how could it have occurred to him? It is precisely this vagueness in theory which bedevils the organic state in practice. There is however one major difference between the Socratic and Platonic soul. Whereas Socrates regarded the soul as initially a 'tubula rasa', Plato offers a theory of its innate imperfection, which is indicative of its lack of self-sufficiency, and its necessary correction only within the state. Thus, we witness something like a theory of 'original sin', as a result of man's fall from the 'Golden Age of Cronos'.

The organic analogy between the tri-partite soul and state will be discussed in detail below. Here, it is my intention to end this survey of the 'philosophic' soul, with an account of Plato's final version as presented in the 'Timaeus'. The extreme dualism of the 'Phaedo', to wit, the world of the senses and that of the intellect, is amended, by falling back on the micro/macrocosmic analogy, so frequently used by the Pre-Socratics. The problem is to postulate a cause of motion, in sensible objects, and the solution is to replace the soul defined as the 'knowing faculty' (of the 'Phaedo'), with one, the essence and definition of which, (ὄνομα καὶ λόγος) is the power of moving itself (ἄρχη κινήσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ). Moreover, just as the individual has a soul, this:

* The state and its laws exist 'φύσις' for Plato.

presupposes a macrocosmic equivalent. Indeed, the world is described as a living being endowed with soul. (*βίον ἐψυχον ?*). The essential kinship between the two souls is emphasised, the human variety created from an inferior mixture of the same ingredients namely, Being, Some and Other. How far Plato regards the world as an organism can be judged by his statement that although the intellect alone is immortal, being the divine part of the soul, the soul itself is present in the highest to the lowest of living things, and even plants possess the lowest part of it. i.e. nothing is totally inanimate. We must remember of course, that Plato himself emphasises that the myth in the 'Timaeus' is a 'probable story', (*εἰκὼς μύθος*), the subject being in a category of things that cannot be proven although one believes them to be true, but is nevertheless a serious contribution to thought. The immortal part of the soul, the intellect, will return to the great soul of the universe at death, for the aim of the Platonic philosopher, has always been to live on a universal plane and to lose himself more and more in contemplation of the truth. Hence, the soul is individual only in so far as it is imperfect.

If the latter is true, then it is but a short step to the suppression of all individualism to the interests of the collective whole. Plato's philosophy in this sense is a complete reversal of the Socratic doctrine, and is based on the two principles that individualism must not infect the state, and collectivism must permeate the individual.

In another sense Plato owes much to his master.

→ Socrates by abandoning the scientific view of man and nature which had been developed by the thinkers of the Ionian school, substituted for it a development of the religious school of thought, which had come down from Pythagoras and Parmenides. By so doing he paved the way for the first assertion of the primacy of spirit to matter i.e. of philosophical idealism, which in the works of Plato, represents the culmination of the Pythagorean/Parmenidean attacks on materialistic science.

PLATO'S POLITICAL THEORY(1) THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE.

"Change in any society starts with disagreement among the ruling class: as long as the ruling class remains united even if it is quite small, no change is possible" (Republic 545d).

The function of the 'Republic' is to reveal the deficiencies of existing states by comparison with the one perfectly just order. Although his judgement of actual states takes the form of a progressive degeneration from the ideal, from timocracy, oligarchy, democracy to tyranny, Plato does not imagine there ever actually was an ideal state in the beginning and expresses grave doubts as to its future practicability. Moreover, if the ideal state never existed, then the change to timocracy etc is purely theoretical, and if it did exist how could such a perfect body contain the seeds of its own destruction? Racial degeneration thus appears as a 'deus ex machina' and the idea of history as a process of social decay a mere dramatic device, as for example in his frequent references to the statesman being a physician to the ^{sick} ~~state~~ body of society ⁴. It may well be that Plato's theory of historical change was simply that it is inevitable if the state pursues any end other than that of the 'Idea of the Good'.

Plato's ideal state, based upon the examples of the most stable institutions of his time, i.e. the ancient tribal aristocracies of Sparta and Crete may be justly compared to an organism, precisely because of the elimination of any trace of political or class struggle. As Popper points out ⁵, 'the cells and tissues of an organism, which are sometimes said to correspond to the members of a state, may perhaps compete for food, but there is no inherent tendency on the part of the legs to become the brain, or of other members of the body to become the belly'. Thus, if the organic theory of the state is applied to class society, it is based on a false analogy, since the essence of an organism is that each member has a natural, but unequal function to perform.

If one member usurps the function of another, the result is injustice, not suffered by the individual, but only by the collective whole i.e. the state. Although there is no fundamental antithesis between $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$ and $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$ in Greek political thought (except for the Cynics), Plato's philosophy nevertheless represents a departure from the main stream in regarding justice as something transcending 'subjective morality', and identified with 'social morality'. Happiness and justice lie in the attainment of 'My Station and its Duties'.

An important principle of method is involved here, namely that the state is given ^{private} examination as a means of examining the role of the individual⁶. 'We may therefore find that the amount of justice in the larger entity is greater, and so easier to recognise. I accordingly propose that we start our enquiry with the community and then proceed to the individual and see if we can find in a smaller entity anything corresponding to what we have found in the larger'*. Although Socrates is the speaker, the passage in fact represents a complete reversal of everything Socrates believed in. His interest in the state was at all times minimal, only receiving attention in so far as it affected the basic question of the freedom of the individual, and more especially his right to perform that duty incumbent upon him qua individual, namely $\epsilon\pi\iota\rho\acute{\alpha}\delta\alpha\iota\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$.

Not only is the Aristotelian/Platonic question: 'Are the good man and good citizen the same?' not yet formulated, but Socrates' belief in the 'Unwritten Laws' involves the possibility of a duty over and above that owed to the state. But for Plato, the state has its basis in the innate imperfection of the individual, not in his self-sufficiency to decide moral questions for himself. Similarly, Socrates' doctrine that the life which man leads, depends on his soul more than his body, is accepted by Plato in its outward form, but the two 'souls' are totally different. For Socrates, the soul is that 'knowing faculty' or 'reason' which distinguishes man qua man. For Plato, the soul is tri-partite, one part that defined by Socrates, the other two representing that corruption of

* The fact that the state is the 'individual ^vwith large' is the basis of Plato's organic theory.

the soul, which is the premise of his whole political philosophy. The state itself is regarded as a soul, exercising over the whole community the same power as the individual's soul over his body, and the structure of the human soul is analogous to that of a class-divided society.

'Because of its self-sufficiency, the ideal state appears to Plato, as the perfect individual, and the individual citizen, as an imperfect copy of the state. It has been noted however, that Plato's version of the organic theory does not depend on its likeness to another organism, as for example the 'commonwealth' of John of Salisbury, but rather to the human soul. Plato is here dealing with the perennial question of 'unity in diversity'*. The soul is a unity, when its three parts each perform their allotted function, corresponding to the three parts of the state, the guardians (reason), the warriors (energy), the economic class (animal instincts), but Plato goes as far as to oppose these parts to one another as if they were distinct and conflicting persons **. Only the stable whole, the permanent collective, has reality not passing individuals, who are altogether inferior. 'I legislate with a view to what is best for the whole state for I justly place the interests of the individual on an inferior level of value'⁷. Plato thereby reverses the Socratic doctrine of the *ἀπορροκεία* of the individual, with a theory of the interdependence of the latter and society.

As we have seen, change can only occur as a result of dissension among the ruling class, simply because however disgruntled the economic classes become, they have no political or military power.

* i.e. A cosmological problem 'brought down to earth'.

** Whether the average member of the economic class is a complete person is discussed in the conclusion to the discussion of the Guardian class.

The first form into which the perfect state degenerates *, timocracy the rule of ambitious nobleman, (i.e. Sparta) will, by errors in breeding, and by the clash of the old values with the new 'Mammon' of wealth, decay still further into oligarchy. Oligarchy not only recognises wealth as the standard by which fitness to rule is estimated** but brings with it the dreaded division into rich and poor, which the 'Republic' for all its faults, tries to irradiate. The embittered, pauperised majority, eventually overthrow the 'capitalist' class, although if anything, they have even fewer pretensions to knowledge. Plato finds especially repugnant the idea that specialisation is undemocratic, for the principle of the division of function is the cardinal feature of the ideal state. Other offences committed by democracy include the claim of equal rights for all, freedom of speech and action, and especially the freedom of private life from official control. 'Nor should the mind of anybody be habituated to letting him do anything at all on his own initiative. He should teach his soul, never to dream of acting independently, and to become utterly incapable of it' (8)

But extreme liberty leads to extreme sujection. In the 'Statesman' (9) where an analysis of the different states is made on the basis of consent and violence, Plato uses the same word *δημοκρατία*, for what we call democracy and its opposite tyranny, which shows that Plato is not seriously interested in the principles of consent and violence, for each distinguishes a thoroughly inferior *ποδύταια*. The transition between democracy and tyranny is most easily effected by a popular leader, who while championing the cause of the poor, succeeds in building up a private army of his own. Consequently, his absolute power corrupts him absolutely (10). 'A precise definition of a tyrannical man is one who, either by birth or habit or both, combines the characteristics of drunkenness, lust and madness'. Plato's description is no doubt coloured

* This is not, in my opinion, to be regarded as historical ^{series} ~~series~~ (q.v.)

** Only oligarchy of the four types contains the seeds of its own destruction.

by his experience, with Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse, as is that of democracy, by his hatred of Athenian society, but whereas we may agree, with Sinclair ⁽¹¹⁾ that 'whatever one may think of Plato's ideal state, his picture of its opposite is convincing enough, 'to wit a benevolent tyranny' ⁽¹²⁾, which by definition must also suppress the freedom of the individual, receives unqualified praise. 'Give me a state governed by a young tyrant, who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great legislator (Plato, for example ?). What more could a god do for a city which he wants to make happy ?'

To sum up, Plato's whole philosophy is a search for unity amid diversity, for permanence in a world of flux, the fundamental impulse of which must have arisen as a result of the period of wars and political strife through which he had lived. The famous seventh letter corroborates this: 'the result was that I, who had at first been full of eagerness for a public career, as I gazed upon the whirlpool of public life and saw the incessant movement of shifting currents, at last felt dizzy and finally saw clearly in regard to all states now existing that without exception their system of government is bad'. Although Plato decided that what was needed was a re-examination of first principles, this did not entail the removal of the accepted antitheses of the Rulers and the Ruled, or the Few and the Many, and their replacement by a theory of the relative claims of the state and individual. On the contrary, the fault of all the existing constitutions, was precisely that they had failed to provide that unity made necessary by the indissoluble interdependence of the two.

(2) UNITY IN DIVERSITY.

'Our purpose in founding our state was not to promote the happiness of a single class, but so far as possible, of the whole community' (Republic 420b).

Plato's analysis of the imperfect societies led him to postulate as the fundamental cause of their failure to secure unity and harmony between the different classes, the neglect of the natural principle of inequality upon which society itself was founded. Disintegration is the direct result of a breakdown in the division of function i.e. of specialisation when every member performs the function he is naturally most suited for. 'Interference by the three classes with each others jobs, and interchange of jobs between them, does the greatest harm to our state, and we are entirely justified in calling it the worst of evils' (13). Obviously in this society of experts, some will hold far more important positions than others, so to avoid all possibility of disunity, justice is equated with inequality and vice-versa. To impress this principle on a largely antipathetic Athenian audience, Plato concocts a myth for the consumption of both the inferior and superior parties in the state*.

The purpose of this 'noble lie' is twofold; to increase the loyalty of the members to the state and to one another. 'You are all of you in this land, brothers. But when God fashioned you, He added gold in the composition of those of you who are qualified to be Rulers; He put silver in the Auxiliaries, and iron and bronze in the farmers and the rest' (14). This 'rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate' attitude, which all the classes are expected to accept as natural after a few generations, is Plato's solution to the problem of political instability. Rigid class division, reinforced by an educational programme

* See footnote to Cross and Woogley: 'Plato's Republic p.196/7.

devoted entirely to the ruling class, will secure the future purity of the metals, i.e. will confirm the superiority of the rulers and the utter prostration of the ruled. Proposals for promotion from the lower orders are not I think to be taken seriously, especially in view of their later rejection by Plato himself ⁽¹⁵⁾. That philosopher-kings defined as 'lovers of truth' ⁽¹⁶⁾ are not only to administer a great many lies and deceptions for the 'benefit of the ruled' but also to believe them,* shows to what extremities Plato was driven in his classification of the state by function. The virtue of keeping to one's appointed place is also that of the whole i.e. of being properly harmonised. 'And so we are quite justified in regarding discipline as this sort of natural harmony and agreement between higher and lower about which of them is to rule in state and individual' ⁽¹⁷⁾. Justice therefore equals the interest of the state, which in turn means a strict maintainance of the 'status quo'.

Justice, therefore the last of the four cardinal virtues on which the state must be founded, is found to be a property of the whole, and 'consists in minding your own business and not interfering with other people' ⁽¹⁸⁾. Discipline, i.e. an unquestioning belief in the inexorability of the established order is the only redeemable feature of the third class. The Auxiliaries embodying Courage, and the Guardians 'Wisdom', work hand in hand in benevolent despotism.

* The passages referred to are 389b and 414c.

This apparent contradiction receives attention from Cross and Wooley in their book 'Plato's Republic' p.196/7 where they point out that Plato verges on 'double-talk'. For example, when he declares that the philosopher will never tolerate falsehood, but will hate it and love the truth' (485c) falsehood here refers to 'ignorance in the soul' (382b). Adam comments as follows: 'the distinction between veritable and spoken lies enables Plato to call his ideally rulers ideally truthful, even when practically they tell lies'. The medicinal lie (459c) as an instrument of government 'for the good of the city' shows that lies are tolerated in as far as they are transcended by a higher stage of truth and justice.

'So the state founded on natural principles (κατὰ φύσιν) is wise as a whole in virtue of the knowledge inherent in its smallest constituent class, which exercises authority over the rest' (19). This leads to the criticism that Plato's organic theory is not organic enough in that all the virtues other than wisdom are modes of obedience, i.e. that the third class consists of members who are less than full human beings. For the moment however we must be content to note that such a division in the state is 'according to nature', the argument being endorsed by Plato's introduction of the analogy between the structure of the state and that of the human soul. Justice exists when all three elements of mind, like the three classes in the state, perform their proper function. The constituents of the human mind are the ~~facilities~~^{faculties} of reason, desire or appetite and the lower instincts, and the character of the individual as of the state, will depend on which of the three predominates. The second element, often translated 'spirited', allies itself with the rational against the irrational part, and in the nature of things is subordinate to the former, which must be the guiding and controlling principle. Complete virtue consists in the proper ordering and control of the various emotional tendencies by knowledge. 'So the reason ought to rule, having the ability and foresight to act for the whole, and the spirit ought to obey and support it*'. Thus, Plato's social and individual psychology are so linked that order and disorder alike in states are the outward and visible sign of order and disorder in the souls of men. Popper, I am sure is right when he deduces from this analogy some hint of the scale of the mental conflict in Plato's own mind (20)

* Republic 442. Similar doctrines can be found in the 'Phaedrus' where the soul is compared to a charioteer with two horses one good, one bad.

'It must be some kind of internal quarrel between these same three elements, when they interfere with each other and trespass on each others functions, because its natural role was one of subordination to the control of the superior, which produces injustice, undiscipline, cowardice, ignorance and vice of all kinds' (21). Justice is a right order, a healthy condition within the soul of man or state, attained only when each member performs his destined function.

(4) We can detect here the influence of the medical writers who talked about the right condition of the human body (*ἡ κατὰ φύσιν*)
It is but a short step to describe human conduct in the same terms.

(3) THE UNITY OF THE ELITE

'Our citizens are devoted to a common interest, which they call their own; and in consequence entirely share each others feelings of joy and sorrow. And the element in our constitution to which this is due is the community of women and children in the Guardian class' (Republic 464A).

Although Plato follows the Pre-Socratic method of looking for unity amid diversity, his extreme dualism between the sensible and intelligible world the One and the Many, body and soul, universal and particular, rulers and ruled etc, prevents him from deriving this unity from all the elements of the whole. On the contrary, just as the wisdom of the state is that of the part, (q.v.), so does its unity come from the same source. For example, although Plato at one point (462c) regards the ideal state as an organism in which an injury suffered by a member is shared by the whole; 'a community will regard the individual who experiences gain or loss as a part of itself, and be glad or sorry as a whole accordingly', he is later guilty of the most extreme callousness in advancing the principle that sick members i.e. those unable to perform their function should be left to die since they burden the resources of the state (22). Plato himself must have been aware of this contradiction, and the answer must be that the state and its unity is identified with the Guardian class alone, a not unreasonable conclusion in view of the poverty of information offered about the second and third classes. However if the state is organically one then one would expect the stronger to carry the weaker members.

ECONOMICS: Most writers (23) refer to Plato's abhorrence of class conflict, especially the resulting division between rich and poor, as the reason for his passionate insistence on unity in his ideal state.

← The class struggle as such is abolished by the strictest division of function between the military power of the ruling elite, and the economic class who are guaranteed full bellies in exchange for empty heads, by having all political rights withdrawn. An important point is

that, to use Marxist terminology the economic classes do control the 'means of production if not distribution and exchange'. To that extent they have attained their goal. The complete separation of private property from political power wins the approval of Crossman among others, but one must be wary as Baker points out*. Just as important is that the state must be economically self-sufficient ⁽²⁴⁾ otherwise the philosopher-kings will remain at the mercy of the traders and secondly importation of goods involves the danger of innovation in the field of ideas which must be avoided at all costs once the perfect system has been laid down. Plato the sociologist, was only too well aware of the role played by trade in the breakdown of the old myths, and the effect of imperialism on domestic politics.

After private property, family affection presents the greatest danger to the unity of the state **. Wives and children will therefore be held in common, the ideal being that no child should know his parent and vice-versa. The sexual instinct will be catered for at regular festivals devoted to the breeding of the master-race. In this way the ruling class will feel like one big family never doubting its superiority to the 'toiling masses' with whom contact is strictly forbidden, i.e. no mixture of the metals. However, in both classes the claims of individuals yield before the interest of the collective whole, to which end all that is personal must be eradicated. The above measures 'will prevent that dissension that starts when different people call different things their own, and when each has his own wife and children, his own private joys and sorrows; for our citizens, whose interests are identical and whose

* Greek Political theory: Plato and his Predecessors p.147. 'It is difficult to agree with the view that the reform of this state proposed by Plato is meant as an economic reform of an economic evil. Plato may touch upon economic questions; but he always regards them as moral questions affecting the life of man as a member of a moral society. He may speak for instance, in praise of division of labour; but we soon learn that division of labour concerns him, not as a method of economic production, but as a means to the moral well being of the community'.

** This primitive communism is manifestly that of the Spartan military aristocracy.

Efforts are all directed to the same end, feel almost all their joys and sorrows together.⁽²⁵⁾ However, Ademantus lodges the obvious objection that if the rulers are to have none of the perks usually associated with a bureaucracy, how will they be happy? ⁽²⁶⁾ Plato's reply is of course, that the purpose in founding the state is to secure the happiness of the whole, not that of a single class. But there is something more; the idea of vocation which plays such an important part in Plato's political philosophy, and the equation of happiness with duty. 'The Guardians must be persuaded*, as indeed must everyone else, that it is their business to perfect themselves in their own particular job. Their reward is that they and their children are maintained and have all their needs supplied at public cost, that they are held in universal honour while they live, and given a worthy burial when they die' ⁽²⁷⁾. Only those whose personality is completely identified with their role in the state, could tolerate the conditions laid down for the Guardians. However, Plato does use an organic analogy to defend his apparent severity. If we were painting a statue, we would meet the criticism that we had not coloured the eyes red in this way; ⁽²⁸⁾ 'It is absurd to expect us to represent the beauty of the eye in a way which does not make it look like an eye at all, and the same is true of the other parts of the body; you should look rather to see whether we have made the whole beautiful by giving the part its due. So in the present case don't make us give our Guardians the kind of happiness that will make them anything but Guardians.' Whereupon, the reply usually given is that, although the state may be more important than the individual the latter must still have a root i.e. a personality to the full, which entails the existence of the family and private property **.

* Or to put it another way, having once seen the 'Idea of the Good' the philosopher-king is most reluctant to serve humanity by entering the cave again. 'The purpose of our legislation is not to enable everyone to please himself but to make each man a link in the unity of the whole'.
(520)

** This is especially the view of the 'Idealists' notably Bosanquet (q.v.) It is strange that supporters of the organic theory should differ on this basic point.

EDUCATION

As one would expect in an organic state, education is not valued as an end in itself, but as a powerful instrument of class rule, i.e. a political weapon. In contrast to Socrates who saw the problem of reforming the city-state as one of educating all the citizens to self-criticism, i.e. to a position where they recognised their own ignorance, Plato considers the common man utterly unreasonable and incapable of self-government, regards the solution as one of the strict education of an intellectual elite, precisely that kind of professional learning so often decried by Socrates in his attacks on the Sophists. Thus Plato rejects Socrates' fundamental principle that knowledge of truth and reality is present at all times in all souls, but it is the latent unconscious knowledge of Meno's slave. Intellectual freedom in rulers and ruled alike must be suppressed in the interests of stability. 'Those in charge of our state must stick to the system of education and see that no deterioration creeps in; they must maintain it as a first priority and avoid at all costs any innovation in the established literary or physical curriculum ⁽²⁹⁾'. The humble universal spirit of enquiry is distorted by Plato into the omniscience of a totalitarian bureaucracy. Popper criticises Crossman, ⁽³⁰⁾ because the latter agrees with Plato precisely on this point that education should be a major responsibility of the state. The attack is however based on the false premise that the identical solutions are offered to identical problems which is certainly not the case. Whereas Plato looks on state control of education as the prime instrument in securing the irrevocable division of classes, Crossman sees it as the only solution to the problem of 'equality of opportunity' so long associated with mere possession of wealth. Moreover underlying this argument is Crossman's modern conception of the state as 'neutral', and not a means for the oppression of one class by another.

That education is a monopoly of the ruling class follows logically from the identification of the unity and by the same token, the fate of the state with the quality of its leaders. Plato's principle is the simple one of reform from above, namely of putting the right people in charge of the ideal blueprint, together with the suppression of all innovation. What is surprising however, is the complete negation of any freedom of thought in the training of so called 'philosophers'. Although the danger of disintegration may have been a very real one, one cannot but regard the replacement of common sentiment, (ὁμόνοια) by a common set of beliefs (ὁμοδοξία) both in the ruling class and the state as a whole, as a totalitarian step. Drastic censorship of literature, especially of the poets is the inevitable repercussion. The philosophers must be taught that God is the source of good only, and their performance on earth will affect their chances in heaven. They therefore act not from any benevolence inherent in their superior qualities qua Guardians but from fear ! In the theocratic state of the 'Laws' the 'Nocturnal Council' will deal with all those souls whose opinion about the Gods deviates from the 'official line'. Plato may here be remembering the words of his uncle Critias, a thorough-going atheist: 'Since the laws only prevented the commission of deeds of open violence, men continued to commit secret crimes. At this point it is my belief that some far-seeing and resolute man saw the need for a deterrent which would have effect when secret deeds were done or contemplated. So he introduced the idea of divinity, of a god always active and vigorous, hearing and seeing with his mind all that men say and do'. Thus religion joins forces with the state in suppressing all individualism, and without doubt Socrates would have been an early victim.

Plato's problem in the field of education was to irradicate the dualism between its literary and physical aspects, and especially to emphasise the beneficial effect of the latter on the soul, the improvement of which is the chief purpose of all education. The lack of

harmony between the two was the chief cause of degeneration in the two most important states of his time. 'Have you noticed, how a lifelong devotion to physical exercise to the exclusion of anything else, produces a certain type of mind ? Just as the neglect of it produces another type ? One tends to be tough and uncivilised, (Sparta) the other soft and over-sensitive' (Athens) ⁽³¹⁾. This explains why the only characters allowed in the literature read by the Guardians are men of 'courage, self-control, independence and religious principle'. However, although 'effeminacy' must be avoided at all costs, the element of fierceness must be strictly contained if the ruling class are not to oppress their subjects, by virtue of their unchallengeable power'. Indeed it would be simply monstrous if the shepherds should keep dogs, (auxiliaries) who would worry the sheep, behaving like wolves rather than dogs ⁽³²⁾. Thus, self-control in the Guardian class is essential to the stability of the state, which for Plato is always the supreme consideration. 'And so we may venture to assert that anyone who can produce the best blend of the physical and intellectual sides of education and apply them to the training of character, is producing harmony in a far more important sense than any mere musician' ⁽³³⁾.

It is important to note that this early physical and literary education which occupies the potential Guardian until the age of twenty, is the prerogative not of the whole citizen body, but only of the offspring of the existing aristocracy, in whom, as Plato would believe, the qualities of a Philosopher-King are most likely to be found *. For the next thirty years the future Guardian will devote himself to a study of the world of forms culminating in the vision of the 'Idea of the Good', which Plato confesses himself unable to define. The whole purpose of this higher education in mathematical and dialectical studies is to enhance the feeling of unity and elitism and especially the desire to utilise this knowledge in the interests of the almost illiterate demos **. 'So we must

* In our own time supposed innate qualities of leadership in the ranks of the Tory party have only recently been dispelled.

** It is almost certain that Plato did not intend that the third class should learn anything beyond their profession.

choose from among our guardians those who appear to us, when we scrutinise their whole career, to be most completely devoted to the interests of the community, and never prepared to act against them' (34). As the allegory of the Cave reveals those engaged in intellectual pursuits look upon practical affairs as altogether inferior. They would like to remain in the upper world, and refuse ~~to~~ ^{to} return to the prisoners below and share their labours and rewards (35). But reluctance on the part of the rulers to rule is precisely a condition of political stability. 'The state whose rulers come to their duties with least enthusiasm is bound to have the best and most tranquil government, and the state whose rulers are eager to rule the worst'. Plato is obviously thinking of the ambitious politician who uses public office for private gain. Thus the early training from the age of twenty to thirty five is interspersed with periods of practical work in subordinate positions of responsibility. Then, those who have survived all the processes of selection, take up the important administrative posts in the city, and only when they have reached the age of fifty, are they released from their day to day duties, and allowed to satisfy their personal desire to contemplate the eternal truths, although they are still required to exercise a general supervision over the running of the state of which they remain the supreme authority.

That Plato is merely following the organic analogy to its logical conclusion is beyond dispute. No member, not even philosophers, are allowed to engage in any activity that does not have direct relevance to the interest of the state. 'The object of our legislation, I reminded him again' is not the welfare of any particular class, but of the whole community. It was persuasion or force to unite all citizens and make them share together the benefits which each individually can confer on the community: and its purpose in fostering this attitude is not to enable everyone to please himself, but to make each man a link in the unity of the whole (36). Thus, the earlier claim (37) that the object of education is to teach us to love beauty is fulfilled only if we share Plato's view that a benevolent dictatorship is aesthetic.

Moreover, there is some justification for the conclusion that the 'Republic' is a very peculiar state in that the personal happiness of its members counts for so little. It is true that Plato ingeniously pronounces the tyrant 729 times more unhappy than the Philosopher King, but the total unconcern even for the latter's fulfillment beyond his social function, leads one to postulate that Plato's members are not human by his own definition. I refer here to Plato's tripartite division of the soul as constituents of the soul of each member. In reality the Guardian^s seem to have a soul which consists entirely of the element of reason, the warriors the element of courage and the economic classes that of the animal instinct. Unity in the state and unity in the individual we may have, but at the cost of both state and individual becoming a meaningless abstraction. Diversity, namely genuine life and personality is totally lacking.

THE AUXILIARIES.

We have so far been at pains to point out that Plato sees the unity of the state as that of the ruling class only. This suggests that his ultimate ideal as far as the state is concerned, is not unity, but justice, i.e. when each member discharges that function he is most naturally suited for, unity is the automatic result. However, while attributing unity to the 'mystic whole', Plato neglects the more fundamental problem of explaining the relationship between the three classes. This is doubtless because Plato himself is fully aware that in reality the second class is but the 'armed wing' of those philosophic souls who occasionally turn from contemplating the 'Idea of the Good' to issuing an edict which involves the suppression of the economic classes. We are thus presented with two watertight compartments: the armed and educated rulers, and the unarmed and uneducated ruled. The Guardians are merely those Auxiliaries who have acquitted themselves with distinction in their administrative posts, which in turn entitles them to a full period of dialectical studies necessary for their qualifications as 'philosopher-kings'. I therefore suggest that the Auxiliaries as a whole receive the early mathematical education, but only a few pass to that concentrated study of philosophy leading to the idea of Good.

All this however, is mere conjecture because Plato does not carefully distinguish the training of the two groups. He certainly gives the impression that both the Guardians and Auxiliaries are precluded from the twin evils of private property and family life by their status as rulers⁽³⁸⁾. Happiness for both classes is of course equated with performance of duty, on the grounds that the welfare of the whole is all that matters. But as the stability of the state depends above all on the unity of its rulers, the Auxiliaries (a) are not expected to do any thinking for themselves but swallow 'in toto' the opinion of the Guardians; (b) are required to moderate their unlimited power in the interests of the third class. This is supposedly guaranteed by their 'philosophic' disposition. Thus, the confusion and sparsity of information as to the exact role of the Auxiliaries can only be explained by the fact that the division was not a real one in Plato's own mind. To use his frequent analogy between the shepherd, sheep-dog and sheep⁽³⁹⁾, the gulf is between the first two and the third, and it is precisely the function of Plato's educational programme to widen this irrevocably.

THE RULED

The virtue of temperance, of knowing one's place and keeping to it, is common to all three classes. However, while the Guardians possess in addition courage and wisdom, and the Auxiliaries courage, the passive acceptance of the 'status quo' is the only virtue proper to the Workers. Their sole function is to provide for the material needs of the ruling class from whom as we saw above, they are separated not only physically but in their scale of values. Pleasure not knowledge is their ultimate aim, so they alone are permitted to enjoy family life and private property, provided that extremes of wealth and poverty are avoided. However any signs of revolt among these unarmed and uneducated people can be quickly and ruthlessly suppressed so they do not present any danger to the unity of the state. Hence Plato's silence of contempt on the subject, broken only by veiled attacks on the workers' parts. At first sight, this seems hardly consistent with his earlier

doctrine of the expert which was used to deduce natural functions and places for everybody. We may also remind ourselves of the high esteem in which Socrates the stone-mason's son held the various professions of his day. Plato's motive is as always to establish the unchallengeable sovereignty of the ruling elite. Thus, the assertion that the carpenter does not produce the essential form of Bed, the ultimate reality, but a particular bed. (40)

Although this statement seems harmless enough, it in fact means that the power of invention is taken from man who depends on its discovery by God. Furthermore Plato distinguishes three techniques - use, manufacture, and representation (41).

By an ingenious piece of argument, he claims that only the user has true knowledge (επιστημη) while the manufacturer has mere right opinion (ορθη δοξα)*, while the artist's representation is a third remove from reality. The passage runs as follows: 'The player knows about the merits and defects of his instruments, and the manufacturer will rely on the player's judgement. The user of an implement is therefore the man who knows about it; the manufacturer is compelled to take instructions from him and rely on his knowledge, and is so able to form a correct opinion.

We witness here Plato's attempt to reduce all manual labour to the status of slave labour. Although slavery is not explicitly mentioned in the 'Republic', there can be no doubt that the position of the third class corresponds to that of well-treated slaves. Popper (42) claims that Plato omits the word 'slave' for propagandist reasons, citing the description of the timarchic character as evidence (43). 'He will be harsh with his slaves, because his imperfect education has left him uncertain of his superiority to them'. The tacit conclusion must therefore be that the perfectly educated philosopher-kings will treat their slaves with gentlemanly contempt. But Plato always claims that he is looking to the welfare of the whole not that of the part and therefore remains true in word at least to the principles of an organic theory. In reality however, as we have seen there exists not unity

* In accordance with the divided line (Book 7.509).

in difference, but the absolute and undifferentiated unity of the part, the Guardians, who merged with Auxiliaries, seem to become identified with the state, the third class disappearing altogether. The head received a disproportionate amount of attention, whereas the role of the feet is unjustly minimised; John of Salisbury redresses this balance (q.v.), as indeed does Bosanquet (q.v.) whose conception of social charity integrates rich and poor more fully than does Plato's totalitarian bureaucracy.

THE STATESMAN

The first book of the 'Republic' had shown that discussions like what is justice, (Τὴν εἰς τὸ δίκαιον) admit of no satisfactory conclusion. Hence the necessity of describing the elaborate programme of the 'Republic', which Plato himself acknowledged to be an ideal one and never expected to see realised. The 'Politicus' on the other hand, although being a theoretical study of politics, not only makes considerable concessions to the real world, but returns to the question of πολιτικὴ τέχνη, which Socrates himself believed in but never defined beyond an aspect of herdsmanship. This is now rejected altogether on the grounds that it was valid only when the rulers were gods as in the age of Cronos. However Plato no longer believes in investing rulers with absolute authority over their fellows as practical policy. The pre-requisite of the statesman remains a dialectical knowledge of the forms, in particular of that 'πολιτεία' in comparison with which those found on earth can only be a second best ⁽⁴⁴⁾. But Plato cannot resist the temptation of describing a preliminary ideal state, which as in the 'Republic' justifies any measure taken by those in possession of the royal art of ruling as in the interests of the state as a whole, though they put some to death and banish others in order to purge the city for its own good (sic !), or reduce its size by detaching colonies as bees do, (the population problem again), or increase its size by admitting foreign immigrants to citizenship, so long as they by their knowledge and justice maintain it and improve it by every means in their power, then we are bound to say that thus described this is the only right constitution. If we mention others, we must speak of them not as real or genuine, but only as imitations of this one ⁽⁴⁵⁾.

When the government is in the hands of those who really know the truth, the consent of the governed is of no importance.

Since it is but natural for the head to act at all times in the interests of the body, laws are not only superfluous but actually impede the royal art of the statesman. Consequently, Plato places the ideal ruler above the law, but in doing so is he at the same time denying the rights and liberty of individuals? The answer is in the negative, because Plato never regarded law as the guarantee of personal freedom as did the Athenian democracy for example, but only as part of the equipment of ruling. In particular, law provides the necessary unity and solidarity in the state so that in dispensing with it, Plato was convinced of the ability of his ruling class to maintain this unity i.e. he discards the law from a position of strength. To justify this measure, Plato falls back on the familiar comparison between the ruling and healing art, in which the statesman's role is that of a doctor, the patient being the sick body of society. Neither art depends on the observance of laws but essentially on the empirical method. This is in complete accord with the theory of the 'Republic' and the statesman like the philosopher-king is by virtue of his knowledge, regarded 'as it were a god among men' (46).

Unfortunately however, in practice it remains extremely doubtful whether any such statesmen exist. 'As things are, there is no living person in our cities who is as naturally a monarch as a queen-bee in a hive, supreme in body and mind, as you can see at a glance; and so it seems we are obliged to come together and make written terms and then keep running along the track of the truest *'πολιτεία'* (47). Although law consists of general rules which must give a kind of 'rough-edged' justice, this is now preferable to a caste of benevolent dictators with perfect scientific knowledge of right and wrong.

Plato has lost his faith in human nature since the days when he first described the philosopher-kings. The second-best state is characterised as one in which 'none of the inhabitants dare to do anything contrary to the laws and he who does is punished by death or another severe penalty⁽⁴⁸⁾. As far as the individual is concerned, his role is as always to perform his function efficiently, whether in a utopian republic or a police-state. However, since the ruling class has now no claim to the royal art, they are reduced to the status of obeyers of the law, not makers of it. Bitter experience had taught Plato that such virtuous rulers who combine the two functions exist only in the imagination. But the constitution of this second-best state must still be formed by those with supreme knowledge, i.e. a body of philosophers. The problem of social change receives a drastic solution 'All actual constitutions, if they are to copy, effectively that one true policy ruled by one man having knowledge, must never, once their laws have been established, do anything contrary to that which has been written down or to the customs of their fathers'. This is not only a static organism, but a dead one.

After a discussion of the different types of 'Πολιτεία' distinguished by their adherence or non-adherence to law, the classification thereby differing slightly from that of the 'Republic', Plato turns again to the perfect Statesman. It is no accident that the best 'Πολιτεία' is considered to be a law-abiding monarchy, which thus leads naturally to a discussion of the royal art. The first thing is to distinguish the art of the statesman from other kinds of technical knowledge e.g. the art of generalship which will tell you how to win a war, but not whether it ought to be started in the first place. This rather goes back to Plato's answer in the 'Protagora' where the view was put forward that more than ordinary 'Τεχνη' is required from a politician, but anybody with 'Τεχνη' deserves respect. In fact the 'royal art' must be supplemented by specialised assistance in the various fields of military leadership, judicial work, the *θητορικ*

etc. This represents a significant departure from the 'Republic' where the philosopher-kings were also the judiciary and were expected to be thoroughly trained in military affairs etc. But in the 'Politicus' it is

precisely the supervisory control of specialists in executive capacities that is defined as the art of the statesman. His task is to utilise the various forms of specialised skills, which he cannot have himself, although he can understand them, for the benefit of the state as a whole.

Thus, the parallel between the art of ruling and that of herdsmanship and healing is finally rejected in favour of that of weaving (49). Both the weaver and the statesman are artists, employing diverse materials, i.e. men of different abilities, into the finished products of the perfect state. Unity, as always remains of paramount importance, which is achieved by harmonising the unequal roles of the various members. However, just as the authority of the weaver over his material is absolute, so too is that of the statesman. In the case of certain forms if there is to be an analogy between one that describes an everyday occurrence and one less tangible, once you have realised (ὁμοιοτης) ^{likeness} exists, you can use the one to work out the details of the other. The processes of the two arts run along parallel lines i.e. you are discovering something there in nature. City and citizen are by this analysis, linked indissolubly for just as a part of a work of art cannot stand by itself, but only has meaning and existence as part of the whole, so too the life and work of the individual is only meaningful when directed by the Statesman to the needs of the collective whole, who will always have the ideal community before him in his mind's eye.

THE LAWS

By the time Plato came to write the 'Laws' not only was he an old man, but the political situation in the Hellenic world itself must have impressed upon him that those problems to which the 'Republic' had been offered as an ideal, demanded a practical blueprint. As a result of the first, Plato realised that he had now to concede all hopes that he himself might be entrusted with political power. That this had been his secret dream is beyond doubt. The 'Republic' (50) had shown that the natural ruler 'who has tasted the

happiness of philosophy and seen the madness of the many' will retreat from public life and await the invitation to power from the despairing demos. How unlike the ever-inquiring Socrates is the following: 'It is not in accordance with nature that the skilled navigator should beg the unskilled to accept his command likewise should those who need to be ruled besiege the house of him who can rule; and never should a ruler beg them to accept his rule, if he is any good at all ! Alas, the Athenians saw fit to leave their only qualified philosopher king to pursue his vision of the Good. Not withstanding this rebuff, Plato again put forward his claim to power in the 'Statesman'. 'The man who possesses the Royal Science, whether he rules or does not rule, must be proclaimed royal ⁽⁵¹⁾. Since he only imagined himself as the divine ruler of perfect wisdom, when this further hint too fell on deaf ears. Plato was forced back to describe 'the best possible state in the circumstances', the principle of which will be that the laws are divine. Only God is now above the law, a position formerly held by the perfect divine statesman.

Plato's final answer to the economic and political crises that were racking the Greek city-states in the middle of the fourth century B.C. was a return to the stability of the days of the land-owning aristocracy who saw in any form of change, a challenge to their power and accordingly resisted it to the best of their ability i.e. the Spartan type of constitution remained for Plato the ideal. As a practical solution to the problems facing the Greek world, it was as relevant as a call for a return to the principles of feudalism would be nowadays. But behind this manifestly impractical proposal lay Plato's earnest desire to show that the interests of the individual and the state are the same. Unfortunately in spite of Plato's claim that he is at all times acting in the interest of the whole, not the part ⁽⁵²⁾, in truth only the 5,040 citizens could 'enter into a voluntary subjection to the laws' ⁽²⁾, and at the same time identify their interests with the state. For the vast majority of the population, foreigners and slaves,

engaged in manual, professional and agricultural work, thereby supporting the non-productive citizen body, the maze of laws covering every aspect of human behaviour will naturally be seen as the instrument of class oppression. However, for Plato the laws embody the moral standards as defined by the Gods *. Hence an offence against the state is an offence against the Gods; while atheism presents such a spectre of revolution that it is denounced as a capital crime. The theocratic state thus has the overriding advantage of guaranteeing unity, conformity and by the same token unparalleled stability.

Plato is at all times concerned to emphasise that in the 'Laws' we are not dealing with the 'ideal' state, which always remained that of the 'Republic'. However, if communism of property and family relationships are no longer regarded as practicable, strict censorship of art and literature*† the indetification of wisdom and virtue with political conformity and preoccupation with the ruling class, on the principle that change is always the result of internal dissension, again loom large. The imaginary situation of the dialogue, is an opportunity to give practical advice to a lawgiver whose task is to found a colony somewhere in Crete. The most important consideration is to shun all foreign contacts. To this end, production must be large enough to maintain the needs of the population but any surplus which might be exported, must be avoided. Similarly, the most suitable site for the colony is far from the sea, where there would be no temptation to build a fleet. Later, ⁽⁵³⁾ we learn that no man under forty shall obtain permission to go abroad, which is also only granted to

* i.e. God is the measure of all things not man. Cf Protagoras :
'Man is the measure of all things !'

**Field, The Philosophy of Plato; argues 'that only at the end of his life when writing the 'Laws' does Plato come to advocate a very limited degree of suppression' (p.206), but in my opinion, such a view is not substantiated by the facts.

those engaged in public duties not in private capacities. 'And these men after their return, will teach the young that the political institutions of other countries are inferior to their own'. Xenophobia is thus the logical consequence of the cultural censorship on the home-front. Complete Orthodoxy of belief in matters spiritual and temporal so that the state might act and think as one, is the ideal. 'Intercommunication between states results in a mixing of characters and in importing novel customs; and this must cause the greatest harm to people who enjoy the right laws' (54)

In order that the lawgiver may work with a 'tabula rasa', he will need the services of a dictator, a young man with a good memory - intelligent, brave and high-principled' (709e), to get rid of undesirable elements. The quality of 'σωφροσύνη' in a ruler is essential, as is a deep and divinely inspired longing (επιθυμία) for all orderly and righteous conduct. However, the dictator will make way for the rule of law which (a) is identified with the common good (2) embodies the will of the Gods (3) demands a politically conscious citizen body capable of understanding the motives behind the laws. Plato refuses to acknowledge any constitution which does not abide by the principle that the part is created for the whole, and not vice-versa, citing again the examples of the doctor and craftsmen (55). Thus, although a man may only outshine his fellow-citizens by more rigorous obedience to the established laws, this is not mere, blind obsequiousness, but indicates that he is fulfilling himself simultaneously as a moral and political being by conforming to the demands of the state and by the same token the Gods themselves. The State therefore controls the moral life of the citizen in the fullest meaning of the term, and the harmony guaranteed by strict religious orthodoxy, is further fortified by the identification of atheism both with treason and sacrilege. The tactics of dealing with atheism are the usual ones of persuasion and if unsuccessful, force. Stubborn offenders

are sent to a 'reconditioning,' 'mind-bending' centre (συντροφιστήριον), which may be justly compared with the Russian institution Ward 7, where they are regularly visited by members of the Nocturnal Council, who perform the role of secret police*.

Society itself is organised on the basis of slavery, closely imitating the Spartan model. Each of the 5,040 citizens has an inalienable plot of land, receives the same education, shares common meals, is not allowed to engage in any commercial activity and spends his life in one long round of public duties. 'We have now made arrangements to secure ourselves a modest provision of the necessities of life: the business of the arts and crafts has been passed on to others: agriculture has been handed over to slaves on condition of their granting us a sufficient return to live in a fit and seemly fashion (56). However, there is no longer any belief in any theory of 'benevolent despotism' as in the 'Republic'. Here we witness the rule of law not personal absolutism tempered only by σωφροσύνη. Moreover, Plato introduces elements of a 'mixed' constitution since his pseudo-historical survey has convinced him that it is the most conducive to permanence and stability. Hence, elections of officials are permitted in which the whole citizen body takes part; there is a body of Guardians of the Law (νομοφύλακες), thirty seven in number, a Council of 360 members, twelve scrutineers, and of course the Nocturnal Council whose function it is to act as intermediaries between divine law and human, and in particular to stamp out any hostile elements as soon as they appear. Their role may be compared to that of the soul of the state. However, all those bodies are drawn only from the initial 5,040. The rest of the population have no rights and are not expected to visualise the state as the 'sine qua non' of their existence qua humans. Throughout his life, Plato never looked on the producing classes as moral beings, but rather as animals, which as

* Even 'honest and honourable' ran the risk of death for impiety (905b).

slaves they clearly approximated. *

Although it is natural that the state should be concerned with the moral welfare of citizens, the restrictions on the basic liberties of thought and action which follow the seemingly harmless remark: (57) 'there are many things now unrestricted which would be the better of some legal control', indicate that Plato has neglected his own principle of unity amid diversity, the One and the Many, and laid himself open to Aristotle's criticism that 'dead uniformity' is not a true unity. This final attack on the claims of individualism against the collective whole represents Plato's solution to the increasing class war that eventually proved the ^{VIA} ~~end~~ of the city state. In the interests of stability 'all children should play the same games on the same occasions and in the same way, and be fond of the same toys' (58). The ideal state is one in which the 'people have the divine good fortune to live generation after generation under the same laws so that none shall remember or even have heard of any other' (59). Although we are dealing with a theocratic state, in which the claims of the soul override those of the body, the possession of a soul does not guarantee by the same token intellectual freedom as it did for Socrates. Thus, 'even those things which nature herself has made private and individual (i.e. the soul) have somehow become the common property of all. Our very eyes, ears and hands seem to see, hear, and act as if they belonged not to individuals but to the community. All men are moulded to be unanimous in the utmost degree in bestowing praise and blame, and they even rejoice and grieve about the same things at the same time. And all the laws are perfected for unifying the city to the utmost'. (60)

However, Plato still claims that the unity achieved by the laws is inferior to that of the godlike ruler of supreme wisdom (61). This 'leadership mentality' has grave repercussions'. The greatest principle of all is that nobody should be without a leader...for example

* c.f. Heraclitus : 'the mob fills their bellies like beasts'.

he should get up, or move, or wash, or take his meals, only if he has been told to do so. In a word, he should teach his soul by long habit, never to dream of acting independently and to become utterly incapable of it (62). Those who do not devote themselves to the interests of the state will be punished by the Gods (63). How far there is genuine religious feeling in the 'laws' and how far religion is treated as a political weapon is difficult to judge. But certainly subservience to the gods and leaders presupposes a division in the ruling class and therefore a special education from which Plato quite naturally shrinks. On the other hand, if the body only obeys natural laws then on the organic analogy the state should also be bound by this principle of Antiphon. 'Only those laws are valid for our eyes, ears, hands and feet, which the natural capacity of these organs makes it necessary for us to observe unless we want to blind, kill or maim ourselves'. Plato's final state however, which confirms the absolute authority of the state over the individual, strangles its members in a complex web of artificial laws, so that whether in the secular city in heaven (the Republic) or in the religious city on earth (the laws), the principle is relentlessly pursued that the individual is created for the sake of the state, not the state for the individual.

CONCLUSION

Throughout his long life, Plato was preoccupied with the twin problems of politics and dialectics and in his works we witness the successful struggle of each in turn for ascendancy. The early dialogues up to and including the 'Republic', which marks the first serious introduction of dialectics, are concerned with discussing and for the most part refuting the position of the Sophists, which was one of championing individualism. However, this did not involve a rejection of the state as such. For example, Protagoras regarded the state as the source of morality, but by his 'man is the measure of all things' argument, he showed that his attitude to that institution was above all empirical i.e. it must be geared at all times to the interests of the

individual. Plato's answer is not only that the individual cannot identify himself with any order lower than the state, but that he is a mere isolated self *, because only the state is a whole.

The middle dialogues, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist etc, reveal the fundamental dualism in Plato's thought. Here we are concerned with the One as opposed to the Many, the universal not the particular, rational knowledge not belief or opinion and the world of being not of becoming. But Plato is forced to leave this idyllic world of the philosopher for the rough and tumble of everyday politics, because of his belief that the individual's soul is affected by his environment, and that to reform philosophy one has to reform the state first, an idea repugnant to all liberal thinkers. Hence, the 'Statesman' and the 'Laws' although in the latter and the 'Timaeus' we see Plato in his old age reverting not unnaturally to metaphysical problems. In the 'Timaeus' soul is prior to body and more important. In the 'Laws' as we have seen God is the measure of all things ⁽⁶⁴⁾, not individuals.

By giving a metaphysical basis to law, Plato aims at order and measure 'λογος, νομος, ταξις' problems which he himself inherited from Pre-Socratic philosophy - the search for permanence in the world of flux. From the same source, Plato borrowed the analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, but transferred the organic theory of the universe to state, making 'κοσμος' depend not on physical forces, but on the true political 'τεχνη', which is finally agreed to be embodied in the art of weaving a unity out of discordant parts.

The problem is the following :- has Plato unified the state to excess ? i.e. neglected his own principle of unity in diversity. As Aristotle was later to point out there can be no interaction between reciprocal parts if they are all alike. The body has a truer unity than a pile of bricks. Has Plato in fact proposed some members as a means to

* A perfect description of Socrates.

the life of the rest that they do not share i.e. they are denied a full individual existence in accordance with his claim that he is at all times legislating with a view to the whole and not in the interests of any part? This answer to all this is a resounding 'yes'. Plato's organic theory of the state suffers throughout by denying to its members those capacities which make possible a conscious independent contribution for the good of the whole. If any member was suddenly severed from the body politic it would feel no pain or loss because it never participated in the state above the level of an automation. To be sure, such a member could not function outside the state, but only because it shows all the characteristics of a sub-human. In the final analysis, Plato equated unity with stability, diversity with its opposite. Inevitably, dead uniformity was the result.

A more serious confusion arises as a result of a failure to define terms. Such a charge if upheld, will considerably damage Plato's theory of the state as a moral organism. Firstly, by the traditional body/soul analogy, the state at first sight appears as a body. But with whom must the state be identified? The answer must be that only the ruling classes, the Guardians and Auxiliaries in the 'Republic', in the 'Laws' the 5,040 citizens, can possibly identify their interests with those of the state. The 'ruled' in each case do not participate in the life of the city, and Plato is certainly not thinking of them when he says 'if anyone of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole state will make his case their own'. What we are really presented with therefore, is the administrative machinery identified with the state, a very modern conception this, and society, incorporating the producing classes*. But of course, the Greeks did not think of the state as a mere collection of statutes and ruling apparatus, but essentially as a living

* The unity of the 'Republic' is thus the unity of the 'state' i.e. a part not society as a whole.

community, training the minds and characters of its citizens. Thus, Isocrates talks about the constitution as the 'soul of the state'. Plato too regards, as we have seen, the state as a soul exercising over 'the whole community' the same power as the individual's soul over his body. But 'the whole community', the 'state', is itself. The Guardians are therefore both soul and body, an absurd conclusion, but the logical conclusion of Plato's dishonesty in not admitting that the interests of society, the ruled might often be diametrically opposed to those of their rulers.

I contend therefore that a true common purpose is lacking in Plato's 'organic theory of the state'. Plato himself considered the economic classes incapable of participating in the life of the community, but that as long as they are performing the function proper to them i.e. producing for others, the harmony and welfare of the whole is secured. This is obviously why Plato fails completely to explain the relationship between the three classes in the 'Republic', because he never thought of the third class as true members of the whole. The economic class remains an alienated and potentially hostile force, precisely because no effort is made at integration through education. It is hard to resist the conclusion that Plato's organism is really a corpse, due to his paranoic antipathy to change. Antiphon by contrast regarded the organism whether plant or human, as flourishing only when left to itself. If you deny it, its natural condition, it will inevitably become distorted or stunted. Not surprisingly, he rejected the state and its conventions as an impediment to the pleasurable life. He in contrast to Plato made personal happiness his main concern.

But what Plato is really trying to convey by his analogy between the soul of the individual and that of the state is the idea that unity depends upon each member performing his proper function, conscious at all times of the needs and aims of the whole. Such a division of function existed even among the Greek gods, each with their

defined duties. The politician's 'royal art' is a creative one as we have seen to compose a coherent whole of dissident elements, like the artist or musician. But if Plato's organic analogy is unsatisfactory because three-quarters of the population do not acquit themselves as human not to say, political beings, there was a form of society which Plato obviously admired, namely that of the bees ⁽⁶⁵⁾. The bee community does bear very close resemblance to an organic unit e.g. Plutarch's description of Spartan life: 'Lycurgus accustomed his citizens so that they neither would nor could live alone, but were as men incorporated one with another and were always in company together, as the bees about the master bee'. So too Khrushchev speaking to the twenty-second Congress: 'We may well imagine Soviet society as a big Communist beehive. Society has become more united and monolithic than ever before'. Later from the same speech: 'Spontaneity is the deadliest enemy of all'. How Plato would have agreed with him! While no one will deny that unity has been achieved both in Plato's political theory and in the U.S.S.R, we have seen that the equation of justice with the interests of the state does not secure the full existence of the individual within a harmonious whole, but his ultimate enslavement to an impersonal entity which symbolises only his alienation from his fellows. The lesson is clear; an individual must have rights as well as duties.

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P A R T T W O

JOHN OF SALISBURY

JOHN OF SALISBURY AND THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE AS AN ORGANISM.

It has become an axiom in the study of philosophy that the student should beware of imposing the exactness of modern conceptions upon an age when the unconscious and unwritten element of thought was barely differentiated from explicit theory. In considering medieval political thought and that of John of Salisbury in particular such caution is more than justified. To quote John's own maxim: "Words should be gently handled not tortured like captive slaves to make them give up what they never had". (1) One example requiring very gentle treatment is the word 'organic' itself. Indeed, much of the energy of modern scholars has been focussed in this one direction, namely, is medieval theory when truly medieval, organic or individualistic? It will be necessary therefore, after studying John of Salisbury's own theory to consider the merits of the respective cases put forward by Dr. Otto Gierke and more recently by the American scholar Ewart Lewis.

It is generally admitted that the chief contribution of John of Salisbury to political thought lies in his use of the organic analogy in which for the first time a systematic attempt is made to compare the various parts and their functions in the 'commonwealth' to those in the natural organism. John himself claimed that he borrowed this scheme from a work of Plutarch entitled 'Institutio Trajani'. The difficulty is that no such work at present exists or is elsewhere referred to. A further problem arises because scholars are divided as to whether John knew Greek. The origin of John's elaborate organic analogy therefore lies in one of four possible sources: (a) a Latin translation of a compilation of passages from Plutarch's writings. (b) a Latin original masquerading under the name of Plutarch. (c) John knew Greek and had access to a work which has since been lost. (d) there never was any such document and John is merely claiming classical authority for his own idea.

However the idea came to John, its influence on the remainder of the Middle Ages was enormous. Modern scholars have called the 'Policraticus' 'the earliest elaborate medieval treatise on politics' (DICKINSON), 'the first attempt to produce a coherent system which should aspire to the character of a philosophy of politics' (POOLE), 'the first representative known to us from the Middle Ages of the organic theory of the state as a theory of its law' (REMM). What, however, were the unwritten and unconscious assumptions, too obvious and too universally accepted to warrant explicit formulation, but which lay at the heart of John's political thought ?

THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION.

Between the composition of Plato's 'Republic' and John of Salisbury's 'Policraticus' there exists a gap of fifteen hundred years, yet in many ways Plato is the key to medieval political theory in the idea that the first and principle task of the State is to maintain justice. Under the influence of the Stoics, Cicero and St. Augustine, law became the embodiment of justice and the positive law of states drew its authority from the universal and eternal law, the natural law of the Stoic tradition, the revealed law of God by Christian interpretation. However, the classical notion of the state as a supplier of spiritual as well as material needs demanded serious revision as St. Augustine observed : 'the State, even the most perfect state cannot satisfy our desires. God and soul, that is what I desire to know - nothing else ! The problem was to reconcile the freedom, equality and communism of natural law with the actual conditions of society, and its solution by the Christian Fathers underlines the debt owed by Christianity to Stoic philosophy. Stoicism as developed by Cicero in particular is a vital link between the classical and medieval world.

(1) The contribution of the Stoics to political thought.

Stoicism and likewise Epicureanism originated in the failure of the city-state to provide a sufficiently strong social code. Plato's 'Republic' had tried to fill the gap with a new, positive knowledge and morality, but it had been far too abstruse to counter the current mood of scepticism which had its origins in Ionian rationalism and more recently in the 'Sophist' movement. The most urgent question was still an ethical one, what was good for man? The answers the Stoics gave and the problems which arose from them form an intimate link with Christian thinking on the same subject. Firstly, they followed the Sophists in affirming the fundamental equality of men. Secondly, they argued that man alone has the ability to aspire to a higher destiny because of his higher nature. Man's higher nature consisted of the unique quality of reason which was homogeneous to the Supreme Reason in the universe. Salvation lay essentially in acquiescence to the divine plan, and in the final analysis only one principle guided a life according to nature, namely to keep one's reason in perfect activity. Universalism, the note of all medieval thought first found expression in the early Stoic idea of an ethical and religious, but not political world state of which reason was the constitution. This concept of universal brotherhood paved the way for the idea of social service as an integral part of man's rational and moral nature, and when suitably modified was to find ready acceptance in the Roman world, to which the idea of duty was particularly appealing. However, for the early Stoic, man was a part of a world governed by universal meaning and purpose, and as such was subordinate and must conform to the whole. His duty consisted in performing well his part. Such organic tendencies were reiterated in the sphere of physics, where in their 'biological' approach to the cosmos, the Stoics projected the functions of the active elements in the living body into inorganic substances. Thus, the world was conceived as a *ζωον* a living creature permeated by the dynamic principle (*πνευμα*, tension) which causes the entire

cosmos to be a single, orderly and harmonious unit, in exactly the same way as the soul in man is the $\psi\upsilon\lambda\eta$ which gives the natural organism its unity. The cosmos becomes 'a physical field of activities and influences passing from place to place and from substance to substance and transforming the whole mass of entities into a structure which acts and is acted upon through the harmonious interpenetration of its parts' (2) The similarity between the Stoic conception of the cosmos and the organic view of the interdependence of individuals in society, and the harmony that must exist between the various members is one more illustration of the fertility of Stoic thought.*

(2) The adaptation and development of Stoicism under the Romans.

Although the charge of 'barren intellectualism' may be too harsh a judgement on earlier Stoic thought, nevertheless it was essential that philosophy should have a practical content for minds more realistic than contemplative. A philosophy which taught that hitherto only six wise men have existed and that even Chrysippus himself was only 'advancing' towards wisdom, was not likely to command wide support where 'common sense' and 'practical virtue' were ideal qualities. For the earlier Stoics, the world state of wise men remained the only state, whereas existing states are not states at all, being composed of fools. Compared with the distinction between the wise man and the fool, that between a freeman and a slave was unimportant. To counter these difficulties later Stoic thought, especially that of Panaetius who introduced Stoicism to Rome, developed a second conception of relative achievement which the man in the street could live up to. This idea of absolute and relative standards was to provide the Christian Fathers with the key to explaining political authority as we shall see in the next section. Concretely, it led to the doctrine of $\kappa\alpha\theta\eta\kappa\omicron\nu$, 'duty', (officium), an action performed

*We may also cite the argument of Carneades, the so called 'heap' argument. How many grains make a heap i.e. a whole, and if you start why stop ?

by a man not wise, but the kind of action a wise man could perform. The problem of Stoic 'apathy' was dealt with in a similar way. Desire for health, property, honour and reputation, if limited, was sanctioned, because this represented progress towards realising the ideal of a wise man. Natural law too was rescued from the wise man's utopia and made the basis for the positive law of states. In the case of Rome the presence of many foreigners with different local laws had resulted in the necessity of transacting business on the basis of common ideas, and the 'ius gentium' thus became united with reason, equity and justice, the precepts of natural law.

The Stoic ideal of social service and universal brotherhood finds its greatest expression in the work of Cicero, whose aim was to represent political life as the acme of human achievement and a political career, as the most honourable of professions. Justice is the necessary characteristic of Cicero's commonwealth, and law is what unites men in a state to the extent that without law a state cannot exist. John of Salisbury is in entire agreement with Cicero on this point. The law of states is an imitation of eternal and divine law which for Cicero is the universal law (*vera lex*) and for John the law of God. e.g. 'There is in fact a true law namely right reason which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties, by its prohibitions it restrains them from wrong-doing⁽³⁾. Law and justice thus arise from universal reason and reason is the essential attribute of man. 'We are born for justice and men naturally seek to live justly'⁽⁴⁾. The commonwealth is therefore an affair of the people (*res publica est res populi*), which by very definition presupposes justice as its principle thereby rendering the concept of political authority as absolute an impossibility, an unbroken link from Cicero, through St. Augustine to John of Salisbury. From Cicero too the universalism of medieval thought can be traced. The existence of universal law implies that the world is the true state of which the Gods and man are fellow citizens. 'Universus hic mundus una i quitas communis deorum atque hominum existimanda est'. That the social

order is a sacred institution and that the foundation of government rests on divine sanction, are ideas shared by John and Cicero alike.

Two further points need emphasis as illustrating how the classical idea of law permeated medieval thought. The first is that the state is an association of people united by consent to law and community of interests. Thus, liberty is the end for which the law is established and obedience is not based on fear but mutual advantage, for without law one would be subject to arbitrary control. In medieval society this idea had reached its logical conclusion. 'High and Low' alike sought liberty by insisting on enlarging the number of rules under which they lived. The most highly privileged communities were those with most laws. At the bottom of society was the serf, who could least appeal to law against the arbitrariness of his superiors⁽⁵⁾". The idea of function which becomes basic in the organic view of the state was also developed by Cicero, who insists like Plato that the inner strength of government depends on the assignment of appropriate functions 'there is no cause for change when each individual is firmly set in his proper place and there is no inferior position into which he may rapidly decline'⁽⁶⁾. Finally, both for Cicero and John of Salisbury the distinction between a king and a tyrant depends on his relation to law and justice. John was the first to develop the idea of tyrannicide as a legitimate act, but without doubt Cicero provides the premise for his conclusion. 'For once a king has adopted a form of rule which is unjust and arbitrary he becomes forthwith a tyrant, than whom no creature more foul or loathsome or detestable to gods or men can be imagined'⁽⁷⁾.

(3) The Christian Tradition.

St. Augustine represents the transition from the classical world about to pass away to the world of Christendom, a universal society in which Church and State formed an organic unity. However, the state could never be a thing of beauty as it had been for Plato. Both the

Christian Fathers and the Stoics agreed that coercive authority was not natural but necessary to control the unreasonable passions of human nature. An additional case against the state lay in the revolutionary aspect of both Stoicism and Christianity namely that the soul of man has an individual relationship with God which cannot come under the control of the state. To explain the origin of the state, St. Augustine, under the influence of the Stoics distinguished between the absolute and relative law of nature between the ideal order of things and their actual condition as the result of the fall. 'Whatever was the historical origin of a ruler's authority, its fundamental condition was sin, its fundamental cause the will of God, and its fundamental purpose order and justice' (8). John of Salisbury follows this tradition without reservation but emphasises the divine origin of political authority and develops the idea that every office under the sacred laws is really a religious office, thereby claiming that secular authority really belongs to the spiritual power. St. Gregory the Great adopting a more extreme position argued that the state was a relative evil in that it saved the people from anarchy, so that it was irreligious to resist it or even to criticise it.

The principle that order required diversity was basic to all medieval thinking and undoubtedly favoured the development of an organic view of the state. St. Paul had laid emphasis on the diversity of gifts within the church, and the corresponding diversity of offices 'there are many members but one body' (9). The hierarchical structure of the church led to the Christian community being seen as a mutually interdependent fellowship of members with unequal functions and ranks, each rank performing a special function for the common good. Neo-Platonist cosmology seemed to add new justification to this attitude. The whole universe appeared as planned by God in a wonderful hierarchy of ranks and orders in which each member had his appropriate niche. Thus, Augustine's conception of justice lay in a world at peace with itself and with God, in the tranquil maintenance of the divinely-established order of diversity. (10)

This was essentially the role of the prince in John of Salisbury's commonwealth, which will now be discussed in greater detail.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN OF SALISBURY.

The value of the preceding discussion lies in the fact that John's originality consists of the comprehensiveness and systematization of his thought. He is considered to be the greatest classicist of his time and like his model Cicero can be justly charged with being an eclectic. The Classics were not an end in themselves but were studied for the purpose of understanding and guiding the present, to transmit that 'informationem virtutis quae facit virum bonum'. As Helen Waddell has pointed out: 'those who come to John for information on contemporary matters do so warily: he may so easily be thinking of the court of Augustus not of Henry II'⁽¹¹⁾.

The 'Policraticus' was completed in 1159 which makes it a land mark in political theory for three reasons. Firstly, it represents the renewed interest in political questions resulting from the conflict between Papacy and Empire settled at Worms in 1122 leaving practical supremacy with the Popes. Secondly, it represents the purely medieval tradition before western thought had once more become familiar with the 'Politics' of Aristotle. This will become important in considering the organic tendencies in the 'Policraticus'. Thirdly, it comes just before the important turning point in institutional development at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth century when legal precision began to be stamped on previously indefinite relationships and when feudal independence tended to become consolidated into definite organs of political control. Together with the renewal of interest in political questions, there arose the conception of the innate dignity of the secular order largely at the hands of scholars who knew what Cicero and Seneca had said about the office of a ruler e.g. Hildebert, Archbishop of Tours wrote to the Count of Anjou who had laid himself under a vow of pilgrimage as follows: 'If the fruit of government is much greater and more desirable than the pilgrimage - which no one will dare to deny, stay in your palace, help the afflicted, live for all, that all may live for

you: live for the state (rei publicae); work for it day and night. Let equity not acceptance of persons be the rule of your court. Rule yourself by law and your subjects by love' ⁽¹²⁾. (John of Salisbury likewise begins his book with the theme of the dignity of just authority).

The cardinal feature of John of Salisbury's thought is the apparent reconciliation of the Christian conscience within an authoritarian state. An organic theory asserts not only that the part derives its value and character from embodiment in the whole, but like the hand separated from the body it cannot realise itself to the full, if indeed at all, when detached from the unity of the whole. The state therefore, has the highest claim on man's loyalty and obedience, being that organisation in which man completely fulfills himself as a rational and social being. If man realises his end purely in his social function, i.e. qua prince or qua peasant, then his hope of salvation in the next world will depend on the degree to which he faithfully performs that function. But is John saying that the state and not the Church has prior claim to the loyalty of men? This would indeed be a very dangerous position to hold in medieval Catholic Europe, but the very ambiguity of John's treatment of the relation of the Church to the temporal power and of the connection between individual and social life and the transition from one to the other, may suggest that this was his secret doctrine. However, there remains the problem, whether it is man merely in his social function or man as a whole i.e. as a Christian, that John is referring to in his description of the prince, priest, peasant etc. Is it conceivable that John ever regarded the prince in any other light than primarily a Christian holding a secular office and responsible ultimately to God for all his actions? Surely loyalty to God must take precedence over loyalty to earthly authority? If this is so, it would be hard to avoid labelling John's organic theory of the state a pure abstraction.

THE PRINCE - THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH

The survival and use of the term 'republica' in the most confident and creative period of feudalism is indicative of the strength of the ecclesiastical-Roman tradition. It is one of the striking features

of the 'Polycraticus' that there is hardly a trace of contractual feudal theory, but instead of a mere network of private relations, the concept of a true political relationship between the members of a state becomes the sine qua non of the true commonwealth. This consists of a society of ranks and orders ordained by God, the unity of which is secured by the interdependence of the parts. The guardian of this unity is the prince who works continually to keep the pattern from dissolving by maintaining justice and peace, the greatest emphasis being laid upon the coercive aspect of the royal office. John closely follows the ecclesiastical tradition at this point. The king is God's minister and especially God's minister for wrath. e.g. 'The ruler is a minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil be afraid: for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil' (13).

The prince has power over all his subjects 'to the end that the state of the human commonwealth may be ordered in the best possible manner, seeing that each and all are members of one another' (14). Nature has subjected all the members in obedience to it so that they will all function properly so long as they follow the guidance of the head and the head remains sane' (15). The prince is on the one hand the supreme political authority, but he is also a 'kind of likeness on earth of divine majesty', for his power comes from God. These two ideas can be traced from (1) the revival of Roman law in the twelfth century, especially the idea of the 'lex regia' whereby the people had voluntarily handed over their sovereignty to a ruler; (2) that the beginning of kingship marks a falling away from the purity of obedience to the law, and was a token of God's anger. A cruel ruler could thus be justified as representing God's will, but an unjust one is guilty of neglecting the law of God, and is consequently a tyrant, the authority of the prince depending upon the authority of justice and law. The prince is therefore not absolved from the obligations of law, but it is his essential character to practice equity not out of fear of the law but through his love of justice. Indeed the prince has no actual will of his own apart from that which law or equity enjoins or the calculation of the common interest requires. (16)

Although in this sense he 'bears the public person', he is responsible for the commonwealth but not to it, for ultimately the prince is responsible only to God, the legal authority to which he owes his appointment, which in practice means the Church e.g. 'The prince is then as it were a minister of priestly power and one who exercises that side of the sacred offices which seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood' (17). Kingship thus being a sacred office, the prince must set an example to his flock by being chaste and avoiding avarice, and listening to the advice of the priests. e.g. 'the prince is the Lord's servant, and performs his service by serving faithfully his fellow servants, namely his subjects' (18). The principle that 'what thou wouldst should be done unto thee do that unto others', John claims to be one of the precepts of law which have a perpetual necessity, having the force of law among all nations and which absolutely cannot be broken with impunity. There is no conception of 'oderint dum mepiant' but the favour and love of one's subjects is held up as an ideal. A second class of flexible rules can only be altered if a concession is made to the common interest*. However, if the ^{views} ~~view~~ of the prince's subjects are unable to be cured by mild measures sharper punishments must be inflicted. 'But who was ever strong enough to amputate the members of his own body without grief and pain?' asks John. (19) The prince is therefore responsible for all the members and has this incentive to practice justice, namely that his son will succeed him, as John does not accept the absolute hereditary right of kings.

At this point, let us summarise the organic tendencies in relation to the role of the prince using John's own words. (20) "The prince being the public power draws from the strength of all, and in order that his own strength may not fail, he should accordingly take care to preserve the ^{or} ~~s~~andness of all the members. For as many offices and stations of duty as there are in the administration of a prince's government, so many are the members as it were of the prince's body therefore, in preserving each

* John's division of law into two kinds represents the view that the state is above positive but below natural law, universally accepted in medieval thought.

office in unimpaired integrity of strength and purity of reputation, he is preserving as it were the health and reputation of his own members. But when through the negligence or concealment of the prince as regards the members there is loss of strength or good reputation, then diseases and blemishes come down upon his own members. Nor does the well-being of the head long continue when sickness attacks the members. Again, (21), it is common knowledge that the commonwealth enjoys the rights and legal position of a ward, and it advances along the path of good fortune only when its head recognises that he is unprofitable unless he faithfully coheres to the members. Without doubt, John had very firmly grasped the interdependence of individuals in society. The importance of the head lies in uniting the specialised functions of each part in the whole organism. e.g. the function of duty is to bring different acts into harmony by allotting them to the different individuals to whom they are appropriate. (22) What is more he grasped the need for that basis of psychological unity, the bond of common feeling. 'It seems to me that there can be no faithful and firm cohesion where there is not an enduring union of wills and as it were a cementing together of souls'. (23) However the relation between the parts of the organism is a fixed and static one to fit in with the pre-established design which John took to be eternal and immutable. At this point, let us return to John's analogy.

THE CHURCH - THE SOUL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

John introduces Plutarch's letter for the 'Instruction of Trojan' by quoting his definition of a commonwealth. 'A commonwealth according to Plutarch is a certain body which is endowed with life by the benefit of divine favour, which acts at the prompting of the highest equity, and is ruled by what may be called the moderating power of reason'. (24) 'Those things which establish and implant in us the practice of religion, and transmit to us the worship of God fill the place of the soul in the body of the commonwealth'. However, the earlier conception of the priests as advisers to the prince in the interpretation of law (25) now gives way

to the doctrine of spiritual supervision of secular affairs. 'Furthermore since the soul is the prince of the body, and has rulership over the whole, so those whom our author calls the perfects of religion preside over the entire body'.⁽²⁶⁾ The prince is therefore subject to God, and "to those who exercise His office and represent Him on earth, even as in the human body the head is quickened and governed by the soul." Thus the organic unity of Church and State is clearly maintained in the notion that (the organisation of temporal government), like (Church organisation) is but an instrument for applying the 'higher law', the law of God. Following ecclesiastical tradition, the wielder of temporal power is conceived by John as a minister of the priestly power for the purpose of enforcing the divine law by physical sanctions and receives his sword from the Church. John seems to imply that the prince was merely the agent of the Pope, and on the basis of this, some scholars consider that John is the first to make an explicit claim of direct power in temporal things existing in the Pope. There is however a great difference between supervisory and direct control of temporal affairs by the Church and there is no evidence that John is here, suggesting the complete absorption of the State within the Church. John certainly is not so extreme as Gregory VII in saying that 'human arrogance invented the one, and divine piety invented the other'. This is one of those cases where the definiteness of modern constitutional ideas must not be read into John's thought. As Schubert observes ⁽²⁷⁾: 'the theories of the Policraticus are not exclusively of the high ecclesiastical variety but are combined with others which attribute to the state a high and independent significance'. Indeed it is my contention that John considered the state necessary for man's moral development (see below), but whether it is an intermediate, or final stage will be the test as to whether John's theory is ^{truly} ~~only~~ organic.

To summarise, it may be said that the Church has a moral supremacy rather than a strictly legal one. e.g. 'those who minister to Him in the sphere of human law are as much inferior to those who minister in divine law as things human are below things divine'.⁽²⁸⁾ It is my

belief that John grasped the necessity of solving the problem of sovereignty and his solution is essentially of a compromising nature. The soul has its part to play and likewise the head. 'Where there is no ruler, the people will fall',⁽²⁹⁾. Indeed, genuine pluralism is a feature of organic thought recognising the necessity of the intermediary forms of social life, and their freedom and right to perform their particular functions. There is no idea of an inherent struggle between Church and State in John's thought, resulting in a necessary absorption of one in the other but the emphasis is rather upon the closest coordination between the two to realise the common good, each part having a particular function to perform. Two illustrations will be sufficient. John observes that as the priesthood has the power of conferring royalty, they also have the power of deposition⁽³⁰⁾. However, he notes that God does not always work through their power, but frequently employs other agencies to elevate his chosen candidate to office. The prince is in fact chosen by divine, popular and clerical elements, the model being Moses⁽³¹⁾. Secondly, it would appear from the definition of the prince as the minister of the priesthood, that the prince must submit to the supreme adjudication of the priesthood in all questions requiring an interpretation of the divine law. However, the ultimate responsibility for bringing human law into accord with equity rests with the Prince himself. The Prince thus seems to be the servant of the Church only in an ideal sense, that is when the priests are really such as they ought to be, and John's anti-clerical satire shows his contemporaries were far from being paragons of virtue. Finally, there is little doubt that John has initially magnified the sovereign, to show how much greater is the Church from whom his power largely derives.

THE SENATE : THE HEART OF THE COMMONWEALTH

'The place of the heart is filled by the Senate, from which proceeds the initiation of good works and ill'⁽³²⁾. The wisdom of old age consists in properly apportioning all duties and in practising the whole art of life. 'For the art of right living as the Stoics thought, is the art of arts,⁽³³⁾ but for John the necessary basis of this art is the principle that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom⁽³⁴⁾. It

is certain that he who fears God omits nothing and does good works. A man who searches diligently into all things, and knows the things which ought to be done, and does them is verily a wise man and such as ~~it~~ is most fit to be a counsellor of princes⁽³⁴⁾. One thing however remains impossible, namely, to seek justice and money at the same time, so like all the inner parts of the body of the commonwealth, the financial officers, bailiffs etc. the counsellors are to be provided for from the public store lest they become needy and covet the goods of others. This is illustrated by a striking use of the organic analogy. 'And perchance it is for this reason that mother nature has prudently protected the inner parts of the body with the coating of the chest, and the solid structure of the ribs ... to the end that they may be more safe against violence from without, and then proceeds to supply them with their several necessities.'⁽³⁵⁾ 'So in the commonwealth it behoves us to follow the pattern of nature's craftsmanship and from the public store supply these officials with a sufficiency for their needs'. There is a passage in a treatise entitled 'Old Men in Public Affairs in Plutarch's Moralia'⁽³⁶⁾ which likewise emphasises the contribution of the senate to the common good which may be one of the sources of John's view. 'There are many kinds of political activity by which old men may readily benefit the commonwealth by giving reason, judgement frankness etc. For not only do our hands and feet or the strength of our body constitute a possession of the state, but first of all our soul, and the beauties of the soul, justice, moderation, wisdom'.

THE SIDES OF THE COMMONWEALTH : THOSE WHO ATTEND UPON THE PRINCE

The idle parasites of the court are the victims of John's most savage satire. The scandalous venality of the bureaucracy depended upon the lack of effective political organisation which in turn was the outcome of the concept of 'higher law'. This bound individuals directly and was at once international, constitutional and private law. It led to political 'quietism' in the idea that if a government acted illegally God would

punish such violations of his own law. The court officials, negate the basic principle of the state, namely justice. Their very silence is a commodity to be bought. It is the prince who is directly responsible for such a state of affairs, being the head of the commonwealth. 'For the negligence of rulers is most often the source of the wickedness of the subjects'.⁽³⁷⁾ Therefore, to curb the malice of his officials the prince must provide for them out of the public funds to remove all occasion for extortion. John, perhaps remembering with bitterness his own years of court life declares that the only way to preserve virtue is to leave the court, because the latter casts out philosophy utterly and the true philosopher will in no way participate in its follies. The relation of the true philosopher to the problem of political obligation will be discussed later.

THE EYES, EARS AND TONGUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. THE JUDGES AND THE GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES.

The duties of eyes, ears and tongue are claimed by the judges and the governors of provinces, and the idea that every office existing under and concerned with the sacred laws is really a religious office⁽³⁸⁾, has particular force in the case of judges who should be slaves to justice, knowing that ultimately they themselves will be judged by God. Furthermore, John conceives the rule of judges as an ideal in contrast to monarchy, thereby emphasising his idea of the supremacy of law, kingship marking the punishment of the people by God for failing to obey this essentially non-coercive form of law. Judges should therefore be eminently religious men with the means and will to enforce justice, this being their specialised function in the organic whole. But, if a governor or judge knows and wishes to do equity, but has not adequate power, the fault is not so much his own as it is the fault of the prince⁽³⁹⁾. This follows from the essential function of the head to maintain the cohesion of the members. Judges should be bound to the laws by an oath, and neither rank, wealth nor friendship should influence them in the administration of justice. John quotes Cicero: 'he puts off the character of a judge who puts

on that of a friend'⁽⁴⁰⁾, and attacks the venality of the judges ecclesiastical as well as temporal, of his own day. Offices should be performed gratuitously, and those who sell justice, sell their own soul.

Governors, likewise, have the primary duty of ensuring justice in their province which should be 'peaceful and quiet'.⁽⁴¹⁾ To this end, a governor should be 'easy of access', but should not admit provincials to too great familiarity. Ideally, there should be unceasing sacrifice to the Lord in the house of a judge,⁽⁴²⁾ but in practice, John sees 'extortioners rather than judges'. Such is the materialism of his age that from disgust at these 'publicans of justice', John contrasts the real riches of philosophy, closely following the Stoic doctrine. Indeed it is the finest fruit of philosophy to know how to bear both poverty and abundance, so that a man will meet every fate with a happy and even mind, and presenting a front of solid virtue, wholly disarm fortune.⁽⁴³⁾

'Does not the judgement of God itself make riches contemptible because the unjust abound in them while the good are often in poverty ?'
Once again 'the life of the philosopher' seems to be an ideal achieved over and above participation in the state.

THE HANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH - THE SOLDIERS.

'The hand of the commonwealth is either armed or unarmed. The armed hand is that which performs the soldiering of camps and blood; the unarmed is that which administers justice, and keeping holiday from arms, is enlisted in the service of the law'⁽⁴⁴⁾. The hand of each militia, to wit both the armed and unarmed, is the hand of the prince himself; and unless he restrains both, he is not continent'. Here then is yet another example of the cohesion and mutual dependence of the head and members of the commonwealth. There is no doubt that John paints a very lofty picture of the soldier's office, thereby implying that he accepted the necessity of war, but the control exercised over it is the principal test of the wisdom and justice of the prince⁽⁴⁵⁾. The prince must therefore add to his knowledge of law that of military science, a profession instituted by God⁽⁴⁶⁾. The secular soldier has this in common with his spiritual brother

namely, selection and oath, and he serves God loyally when he loves him who reigns by the authority of God i.e. the prince. The soldier's office is essentially a religious one, bound to the sacred service and worship of God: 'To defend the Church, to assail infidelity, to venerate the priesthood, to protect the poor from injuries⁽⁴⁷⁾ in a word, to apply the necessary defence of the commonwealth. However, in certain cases the soldier can disobey the prince if the latter's actions are contrary to the higher law of God, because his first loyalty is to God not man. To guard against rebellion the soldiers are given certain privileges, the most important being that in common with other officials, they are not permitted to be in want. Discipline and training are essential if the soldier is to carry out his duty, and likewise the avoidance of luxury, which John illustrates by countless examples, praising the virtues of the Romans in this field, and deploring the decadence of his own age.

THE FEET OF THE COMMONWEALTH : 'the drawers of water and hewers of stone'.

The feet are the last, but as John himself emphasises, not the least of the members of the commonwealth. Before them John places the stomach, the financial officers, and keepers of the privy chest, which becomes congested through excessive greed, and throws the whole body into disorder. It is in the relation of the feet to the rest of the body, that we find the best illustration of the relationships of feudal society, so sparsely mentioned in the 'Polycraticus' e.g. 'For inferiors owe it to their superiors to provide them with service, just as superiors in their turn owe it to their inferiors to provide them with all things needful for their protection and succourⁿ⁽⁴⁸⁾'. The feet have their specialised function to perform, without which the living unity of the whole could not be realised. 'It is they who raise, sustain and move forward the weight of the entire body. Take away the support of the feet from the strongest body, and it cannot move forward by its own power'⁽⁴⁹⁾. The feet are the rural and urban proletariat 'performing duties which are in the highest degree useful and profitable to the corporate whole of the commonwealth', but they must be shod 'to the end that they may not be wounded by stumbling against a stone or other

obstacles which so many chances put in their way⁽⁵⁰⁾. This protection is illustrated by the institution of magistrates to prevent wrongs being committed against them. Following the ecclesiastical tradition of caring for the widow and the orphan, John concludes that "an afflicted people is a sign and proof of the gentleness of the prince."⁽⁵¹⁾ The body as a whole cannot be healthy, if any of its parts, including the humblest is sick. e.g. "then and only then will the health of the commonwealth be sound and flourishing when the higher members shield the lower, and the lower respond faithfully to the just demands of their superiors, so that each and all are as it were members of one another by a sort of reciprocity and each regards his own interest as best served by that which he knows to be most advantageous for the others."

CONCLUSION.

The 'Policraticus', in dealing with the moral issues arising from man's position as a ruler or subject, is an outstanding example of that type of writing known as the 'mirror of princes'. In the medieval Teutonic world Christianity was imposed upon his subjects by the monarch so that instruction in the claims of religion was essential for a ruler conceived in terms of a pastor and church administrator. John himself was acquainted with the 'De Regia Potestate' of Hugh of Pleury (died 1117), who advocated the same coordination between the temporal and spiritual powers. 'What the priest cannot accomplish by verbal teaching, the royal power does or commands by the terror of its discipline'⁽⁵²⁾. Although as we have seen, John takes great pains to emphasise the importance of the specialised functions of the members, 'the happiness of no body politic will be lasting unless the head is preserved in safety and vigor, and looks out for the whole body.'⁽⁵³⁾ John finds the character and harmonised activities of the state in the bees, with their ideal division of function, their common effort and spirit of self-sacrifice. Justice exists when 'the duties of each individual are performed with an eye to the welfare of the whole'⁽⁵⁴⁾, but this is only possible under a ruler, who although forgiven for human vices, must keep religion inviolate. The organic unity of the

head and members is illustrated by the fact that an injury to the hand is brought home to all members and likewise a wound unjustly inflicted on any member tends to the injury of the head⁽⁵⁵⁾. 'May the excellence of the head ever flourish because therein consists safety of the whole body',⁽⁵⁶⁾. But are we to conclude that John is really putting forward an organic theory of the state? Is man qua man fulfilling himself merely in terms of his social function or is the life of man the philosopher hinted at above, a higher end achieved outside the totalitarian organisation of both state and church? Moreover, has John really solved the problem to whom one's loyalty is owed, and what is the relation between the two?

In her book 'Medieval Political Ideas',⁽⁵⁷⁾ Lewis rightly urges caution in dealing with the term 'organic': 'the term 'organic' is an ambiguous one: the classification of political theories as 'individualistic' or 'organic' leaves the vast majority of systems wandering in the debatable ground between the two categories'. In a previous article entitled 'Organic Tendencies in Medieval Thought',⁽⁵⁸⁾ Lewis had attempted to refute the main contention of Gierke's 'Political theories of the Middle Age', that 'political thought when it is genuinely medieval starts from the whole, but ascribes an intrinsic value to every partial whole down to and including the individual',⁽⁵⁹⁾. Thus medieval thought is for her 'a fairly stable compound of individualistic and organic elements',⁽⁶⁰⁾ the former comprising the purely medieval element, *nihil est praeter individuum* the latter being the ecclesiastical-Roman tradition. The article referred to above is admitted by the author to be an oversimplification of the problem, but is remarkable to the extent that no mention is made of John of Salisbury in dealing with the question of organic tendencies in medieval thought. Lewis' argument that 'there is no need to assume that any medieval writer meant to imply more than a limited resemblance between the body natural and the body politic, is put forward once again in 'Medieval Political Ideas' (p.204): 'In spite of a frequent use of analogies between the organised community and the human body, no medieval writer seriously defined the community as an organism or maintained that its unity was of the same kind as the unity of the human individual'*

* I agree with this view as I try to show in the section: 'Does John's view satisfy an organic theory of the state?'

However, Lewis does agree that medieval theory can be called 'organic' in the following instances: 'because it emphasises the harmony between the individual and organised society; because it sees political organisation not as merely restrictive, but as positively necessary to the fulfillment of human nature; which visualises social bonds as deeply rooted in human need, and not in a mere revocable and deliberate contract, which derives all political rights not from individual rights, but from common purposes, which is led to approve an inequality of political rights, and the existence of spheres of absolute authority'.⁽⁶¹⁾ Such ideas form the backbone of the 'Polycraticus' as we have seen above.

After this concession, Lewis tables those conditions of an organic theory, which in her opinion, medieval thought failed to sustain namely: 'that the whole has a purpose distinct from and superior to the ends of individuals; which construes the whole as a hierarchy of partial groups each with its special end and with a right as a group to realise that end; which posits the unity of each group like the unity of the human individual; which views the officers of the group as organs through which the unity of the whole expresses itself'. Contrast Gierke: 'if medieval theory holds out one hand to Antique thought when it sets the whole before the parts, and the other hand to the modern theories of natural law when it proclaims the intrinsic and aboriginal rights of the individuals, its peculiar characteristic is that it sees the universe as one articulated whole and every being - whether a joint being (community) or a single being - as both a part and a whole : a part determined by the final cause of the universe, and a whole with a final cause of its own'. So far from the whole having a purpose distinct from the ends of individuals as Lewis asserts, it is the essential feature of the organic theory that there is no real conflict between the interest of the whole and the true interests of its constituent members. John cannot be faulted on these, grounds. The common good, the end of the state, consisting of law, peace, security, etc is qualitatively different from the mere sum of the particular goods of individuals, but the raison d'être of the state is its service to individuals.

Lewis' argument that John did not pass beyond the patristic idea to a complete organic conception⁽⁶²⁾, is true to the extent that Christian thought whilst desiring that unity expressed in organic terms could never accept its full implication of the supremacy of the state. In other words, the perfection of one's immortal soul could never be synonymous with mere fulfillment of political obligation. To be sure, John is vague as to what 'commonwealth' he had in mind in his comparison to an organic body, whether a city, a province, a kingdom, the Roman Empire or the Universal Church. However, if John can be faulted for his lack of precise definition his philosophic insight is indeed striking as can be seen from a letter written to Peter abbot of Celle at the time of sending him the 'Polycraticus',⁽⁶³⁾. 'All things derive their strength from mutual aid. It is for this reason alone that all things go on their way because the same indwelling spirit of unanimity nurtures the concord of things dissident, and the dissidence of things concordant, and arranges the diverse parts of the body of the universe as though they were its own members, in order that they may be attuned together for mutual and reciprocal service. Thus, it is in the human body the members serve each other and the offices of each are elected for the benefit of all. There are less of some and more of others, but all of them are united to serve the body's health. They differ in their effects, but if you consider the health of the body they are all working for the same end'. Jacobs concludes as follows :⁽⁶⁶⁾ 'John gave the state a soul - he made it human. To him it was a person fallible but with infinite potentiality for goodness - a creature that breathed, thought, willed, dependent upon all the delicate adjustments of the human body'.

DOES JOHN'S VIEW SATISFY AN ORGANIC THEORY OF THE STATE ?

Many commentators have argued that in John of Salisbury we find one of the earliest definite statements that all authority, ecclesiastical or secular, belongs to the spiritual power. However, on several very critical points, for example, the choice of the prince by the priests, the right of the Church to depose the ruler, the way in which the

Church communicates its commands to the prince and imposes them upon him, he simply evades the issue. Indeed, are we to take his words literally, that the Church is the soul of the state, i.e. that it is merely an organ of the latter, for there is no objection to temporal power such as 'so long as it is exercised in subjection to God and follows His ordinances' (64) i.e. so long as the Church can use the prince as a mouth-piece for its own teaching. Is this John's solution to the problem of the Church and the state, but because of the uproar which would result from the idea that the Church should be absorbed in the state, he has veiled his true intention by emphasising the moral supremacy of the Church. Why should John have proposed such a radical solution to the problem of sovereignty? The reformers of the eleventh century had seen no other way of purifying the Church than to set it wholly free from temporal control. It remained for their successors in the twelfth century to witness that the faults of church organisation were not wholly due to secular causes. John devotes much of the 'Policraticus' to exposing the corruption and ambition within the Church, and ends the book with the observation that the position of the Pope himself is an impossible one in the face of the rivalries between the members. Absorption within the state is indeed a radical reform, but the Church still has as it were, the controlling interest. The Church's loss of sovereignty is rewarded with the acquisition of the prince as its puppet, and the hitherto ^{conflict} of interests is resolved into a single community able to command the loyalty of all citizens.

The question is now to be asked, does John consider that man realises himself as a social and rational being only in so far as he participates in this single harmonious society? Throughout the 'Policraticus' John insists that where men are free from sin they can live by law alone and need no government. His belief that a king should reign not rule finds its ideal in Gideon: 'I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you, but the Lord shall rule over you'. In other words John is saying that in so far as men are virtuous, they make government seen as an instrument of coercion (redundant), and the state loses its absolute authority over the citizens because of the existence of a complete code

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of intelligible laws of divine authority, which every virtuous man can know directly. i.e. without participation in the state. This has very important implications in regard to the question of political obligation. So far from the individual fulfilling himself within an all-embracing state, the state is fulfilled i.e. its coercive aspect withers away, as a result of the moral perfection of individuals. 'For if every man were to labour in the cultivation of himself, and were to regard things external to himself as no proper concern of his, straightway the condition of each and all would become the best possible, virtue would flourish and reason prevail and mutual charity would reign everywhere, so that the flesh would be subdued to the spirit and the spirit would serve God with full devotion'. (65) It would seem therefore that man's final perfection is an inner process and not achieved purely in his social function. Similarly in his discussion of the best life, there is no mention of the impossibility of achieving this without participation in the state. John is here quoting Apuleius (Bk.6 Ch.28): 'I marvel at nothing so much as that while all desire to lead the best life, and while they know that life is not lived otherwise than with the mind, and that it is impossible to live the best life except in cultivation of the mind, still the fact is that men do not cultivate their minds'. So far from the cultivation of the mind in the service of God being the complete realisation of man's potentialities only achieving perfection within the state, John considers this final development to be possible only outside the realm of political obligation. 'No life is more faithful, none more simple, none more blessed than the life of the men who spend their days humbly in the cloisters' (Bk.7 - 21).

But just how far is the state necessary for the fulfillment of human nature and to what degree does the performance of one's social function determine one's rewards in the after life? Perhaps John comes closest to defining the value of the institutions of Church and State in the following passage (Book 7 Ch.20) in a quotation from *Justinian* 'Greatest among all the gifts bestowed by the supreme mercy of God are the priestly power and the power of the Emperor; both proceed from one and the same source to improve the life of men.' In other words neither Church nor state are absolute or ends-in-themselves, but means to a further development which must be the work of man himself. Sometimes the wickedness of the

people causes the coercive aspect of government to take an extreme form, to wit a tyrant. 'For tyrants are demanded, introduced, and raised to power by sin, and are excluded, blotted out, and destroyed by repentance' (Book 8 Ch.20). How can man realise his end in a state ruled over by a tyrant? John's answer is that a tyrant can have no claim whatsoever on the loyalty of men 'being an enemy of the human race'. One's only obligation in this case is to kill him, but here the greatest caution is needed. A tyrant in the first place may be God's agent for punishing a wicked people, but if they are penitent and the tyrant stands in the way of their further progress, than and only then is tyrannicide permissible. However, the best method of destroying tyrants is through prayer, so that in this case the people fulfill themselves in spite of the state.

There is very little evidence that John relates the performance of man's social function with his rewards in the after-life. Two examples however stand out. On the negative side in connection with tyrannicide* 'No blame is attached to any of those by whose valour a penitent and humbled people will set free but their memory is preserved in affection by posterity as servants of the Lord'. Secondly, in the case of princes 'in the life to come they will surpass their subjects in glory, in proportion as they have surpassed them in virtue because of their greater opportunity which they have to sin'. But apart from these isolated examples, John considers salvation to be essentially in keeping one's soul intact by avoiding the material things of life and following nature, the best guide to right living, all this in the pursuit of wisdom. In fact there is strain of anarchism running throughout John's thought (Bk 7 Ch.1) e.g. 'I am not here speaking of men whose hearts are wholly cleansed and who rejoice in continual subjection, declining to be set over any in this life: my task is rather to analyse the life of men in the political state. And whom will you name me among them who does not in point of power desire to be set ahead at least of one other'. In describing qualities of justice, kindness, prudence etc necessary for the various ruling elements of the state, John conceives the abuse of public power in terms of a breach of

* How in fact the head of a body can be removed without detriment to the latter never occurred to John.

personal morality, but this morality is not something man derives from participation in the state but is essentially the outcome of man's rational activity carried on in communion with God and as it were from outside provides the ethics of government.

Finally, there is no suggestion that the Church, the soul of the state is the soul of individual man as is the case in Plato's Republic. Indeed, it is the very possession of a personal immortal soul which characterises the Christian first and foremost as a complete entity in himself. The unity of the state therefore is made up of self-sufficient individual units, as a wall consists of a number of independently existing bricks. If we take away a brick it does not cease to possess the properties of a brick; likewise the Christian retains his qualities qua Christian outside any political structure. The organic analogy with its images of severed heads and heads is quite inapplicable, and as we have seen breaks down as soon as any attempt is made to remove it from its proper place in the realm of ideas to the everyday world of politics. There were two problems which faced John in working out a theory of political obligation. Firstly, where is sovereignty to lie in Church or State². In my opinion, having decided that the power of the Church would have to be compromised within the state, John could then ask himself whether man fulfilled the needs of his immortal soul entirely within that structure. His answer is that the state is a relative not an absolute end. In so far as man is imperfect and needs laws for the protection of property, life justice etc, then the state performs a useful and necessary function.

The problem of tracing an organic theory of the 'state' to any writer in the period before the thirteenth century is precisely because 'politics' was not separated from morals, or religion. The 'Republica Christiana' was indeed one body, an organic unit, but ruled by laws which embodied the purely Christian conception of justice. Theoretically, the 'regnum' and 'sacerdotium' worked together for the same ends within the all-embracing 'res publica'. Before Aquinas, the concept of the state as

an independent self-sufficient and autonomous body was unthinkable, although John himself soaked in Classical studies, prepares us for the explosion accompanying the rediscovery of Aristotle if we are prepared to read between the lines. What we are really presented with is the following: an organic theory of the 'res publica' i.e. of that body composed of both secular and spiritual authority. Within this, the priesthood seems to have control of the prince, but if in fact the latter is prepared to uphold Christian beliefs then loyalty to it, in terms of fulfilling one's allotted function is as indispensable as loyalty to the Church *. The 'state' is therefore is still a religious body, i.e. Christian, otherwise the position of any Christian writer advocating an organic theory is obviously completely contradictory. However, I am also convinced that John reaches back to the Socratic/early Christian idea of man's soul or conscience. This lies behind his hatred of the bureaucratic officialdom he found at Rome, and his insistence that voluntary subjection to the laws was the ideal, which in turn, kept the coercive aspect of sovereignty to the minimum. But in John of Salisbury, there is a glimmer of suggestion that in spite of the hierarchic structure of power designated 'from above', first from the hands of God, through his *vicegerents* on earth, the kings etc, the idea of the right of resistance to a tyrant implies that a ruler must carry out certain obligations i.e. in some way however vague, he is responsible to the people. Although, John in no way advocated a theory of government 'from below', the theory of tyrannicide does raise the question of the rights of an individual. It must be added however, that such a question never occurred either to John or any other writer of the medieval period. What is clear however is that to attribute an organic theory of the state in the secular sense in which the term 'state' is usually applied, to John of Salisbury's 'res publica' ignores the claim of the Christian conscience which must reduce the 'organic state' to the level of an abstraction.

* John's dictum that 'every office under the sacred laws is really a religious office' must always be borne in mind.

THE ORIGIN OF JOHN'S THEORY.

John is considered to be the best read man of his time, a fact which no doubt accounts for the difficulty scholars have found in distinguishing the originality as opposed to the influence of others on his thought. His thirst for knowledge was indeed remarkable. Born C. 1115 he travelled to Paris in 1136 and for the next twelve years studied under the leading teachers both there and at Chartres, the centre of humanistic studies. The list is formidable : Abelard, Alberic, Robert of Melun, William of Canches, Peter Helias, Richard l'Eveque, Adam du Petit Pont, and Gilbert de la Porrée. However, John's essential detachment prevented him from taking sides in the great dispute between nominalism and realism at that time raging through the different schools, but he could not remain aloof from the secondary struggle between dialectics and classics (67) Dialectics became the fashion of the day and consequently attracted those who saw considerable financial rewards in this new 'art'. When twelve years later, John revisited these 'dialecticians' he found that they had not progressed at all, and concluded that dialectics furthers other studies, but by itself is bloodless and barren. 'To waste a life-time in these pursuits is an occupation for a man who has nothing to do or for one who does not mind labouring in vain'. His superb sense of realism, combined with his love of learning, especially his love of the classics, is evident throughout the 'Policraticus', which like the 'Metalogicon' was written entirely in his spare time, a living illustration of his belief that *otium sine litteris mors est.*

In 1146, John left Paris and spent the next twelve years in church administration, eight at the court of Pope Eugenius III. By 1159, he tells us that he had crossed the Alps ten times, engaged in diplomatic missions. Later, he was to become confidential secretary to Theobald and Becket. John was above all a churchman, and there is no doubt that the hierarchical structure of the church had great influence on his political views. However, the role of the ecclesiastical politician was far from being straightforward, and John the scholar too

was finding it necessary to reconcile the study of pagan authors with Christianity, grammar and rhetoric being two subjects which had lately been attacked. In addition, it was during these twelve years that John's love of learning increased in contrast to the vanities of the court, so savagely attacked in the 'Policraticus'. In the 'Metalogican', he talks of himself 'being fettered to the trifling concerns of court',⁽⁶⁸⁾ . Therefore, because of his delicate position and indeed the radical nature of his doctrine some scholars have argued that John is using a classical authority as a vehicle for expressing his own views on contemporary problems. Such is the case argued by Hans Liebeschutz in a paper entitled 'John of Salisbury, and the Pseudo-Plutarch',⁽⁶⁹⁾ .

Liebeschutz begins by saying that there is no new feeling for the character and organic unity of the state in John's writings, but that he is merely expressing the common medieval conception of society as an organism with the two authorities of Church and State working in harmony. The organic view attributed to Plutarch is a pseudo-classical invention of his own which in its combination of clerical and classical features, is characteristic of the author. If this is the case, and certainly we do not know of the existence of a work entitled 'Institutio Trajani', then it is reasonable to conjecture, as Liebeschutz does, that John had a particular purpose in bringing the name of Trajan before his readers. An analysis of John's authorities reveals that he made extensive use of two later Roman historians, Florus and Eutropius, who stressed the harmony of military, political and moral strength exemplified by Trajan. Additionally fascinating for medieval writers was the myth that Pope Gregory had wept for the Emperor and so released him from hell, on hearing how he had delayed going to war to bring justice to a widow whose son had been murdered. Thus, John as an ecclesiastic and a lover of antiquity was naturally attracted to Trajan, and his admiration could be justified on the authority of Gregory himself, as John himself emphasises in the 'Policraticus',⁽⁷⁰⁾ . 'But I do not hesitate to prefer Trajan before all the pagan rulers because he founded the greatness of his reign solely on the practice of virtue'. However there is no evidence

that Plutarch was Trajan's tutor, although he did visit Rome on at least two occasions. Certainly, Trajan and Plutarch were connected in the later Roman period, and this might have come down to the middle ages through the Byzantine tradition.

However, the main objection to the existence of such a work by Plutarch, according to Liebschutz's analysis, falls on the words of John himself⁽⁷¹⁾. 'There is extant a letter of Plutarch written for the instruction of Trajan, which expounds the meaning of one sort of political constitution. It is said to run in this way. Liebschutz argues that this nullifies the evidence of the letter although we must bear in mind John's own statement that he intends 'to insert the 'Institutio Trajani' in part in the present work, but in such a way as to follow rather the general trend of ideas than the actual sequence of words'.⁽⁷²⁾

Liebeschutz then argues, that when we examine the number of times John actually quotes Plutarch's 'Institutio Trajani' by name, we are forced to conclude that this was 'only one among many authorities employed and not his principal textbook'. In dealing with the soul and the heart, Plutarch is cited as the authority, but not in the case of the head, sides, eyes, ears or tongue, although at the end of that chapter John writes⁽⁷³⁾ 'Now let my pen pass on to those who are likened to the hands in the simile of Plutarch'. The same formula is employed in regard to the feet⁽⁷⁴⁾ 'For these are the last words which Plutarch uses in the 'Instruction of Trajan' when he descends from the hands to consider the feet. Let us, therefore, follow him, and as he himself says, make as it were shoes for the feet, to the end that they may not be wounded by stumbling against a stone or other obstacle which so many chances put in their way'. In a later chapter⁽⁷⁵⁾ dealing with the mutual dependence of the head and members John writes: 'Read diligently again the 'Instruction of Trajan' of which mention has been made above, and you will find these things discussed there at large'. However, it must be borne in mind that John had at the very beginning of his introduction to Plutarch's work carefully enumerated the various offices mentioned by him⁽⁷⁶⁾, so that it would seem superfluous to quote his name every time when he came to discuss each office in greater detail. One further example of great interest

remains. In illustrating the difference between a tyrant and a true prince (77), John draws the same organic analogy with regard to 'the commonwealth of the ungodly which strives to correspond as it were to the civil institutions of a legitimate commonwealth'. The tyrant who is its head is the likeness of the devil: its soul consists of the heretical, schismatic, and sacriligious priests, and to use the language of Plutarch, prefects of religion who wage war on the law of God; its heart of unrighteous counsellors is like a senate of iniquity: its eyes, ears and tongue, and unarmed hand are unjust judges, laws and officials: its armed hand consists of soldiers of violence whom Cicero calls brigands: its feet are those who in the humbler walks of life go against the precepts of the Lord and His lawful institutions. The ambiguous phrase, 'to use the language of Plutarch' inserted almost as an afterthought, convinces me that this is one case where the Christian mind is attributing to a pagan authority criticisms of which it was unaware.

But what of Plutarch himself, is it true as Liebschutz contends, that 'the bulk of Plutarch's writings were certainly as little known to John as they were to the Middle Ages generally'. The great difficulty consists in the volume of Plutarch's work, and the corresponding loss in the course of time. In addition to the original catalogue of Lamprias there are 152 quotations from Plutarch which cannot be allocated with certainty under any known title of works by him⁽⁷⁸⁾. Moreover another twenty pieces are preserved, the majority of undoubted authenticity, which are not mentioned in the original catalogue. The greatest loss probably occurred in the centuries immediately following the closing of the schools of philosophy by Justinian in 529 AD. However, abstracts of some of Plutarch's works were made probably in the tenth century, and these usually supplanted the originals. In the case of the 'Moralia' there are over one hundred manuscripts, and there are undoubtedly in existence others which have not yet been discovered. It is quite likely that still others, known to have been in existence may be rediscovered. It is possible that John's evidence falls into one of these categories. In addition to numerous quotations from Plutarch made by early medieval writers, there are seven manuscripts of the 'Moralia' dating back to the eleventh and

twelfth centuries, and in the case of the 'Lives', there is a tenth century parchment containing fifteen lives and an eleventh century parchment consisting of sixteen lives. One ought not therefore, to consider Plutarch as being a writer unknown to the middle ages, and it is possible that John who travelled widely and attended some of the most important schools of the day, did have a knowledge of Plutarch which most scholars dismiss on the grounds on his being an undiscovered writer.

Moreover, there are examples of genuine Plutarch in the 'Policraticus'. These are (1) : the disapproval of the public worship of Fortuna⁽⁷⁹⁾ (2) : young Alexander's envy of his father's deeds⁽⁸⁰⁾ : the fact that palm was chosen as the symbol of victory because of its resistance to pressure⁽⁸¹⁾ : the story of man despising the married state. The last two examples are paralleled by Gellius and Hieronymus, but the first is of great value, as John should have illustrated the sovereign's fear of God, leading up to the place of the priest in the state, but John is obviously fascinated by Plutarch's view on fortune and digresses accordingly. Contrary evidence however, is revealed in John's discussion of the qualities of leadership⁽⁸²⁾. He cites as his authorities the 'Instruction of Trajan' and Frontinus 'Book of Stratagems'. Webb has shown that he does use Frontinus here and has followed his words literally. John has also made use of Eutropius, both authorities being prominent throughout the 'Policraticus'. However the story of Fabricius which follows, John attributes to the sixth book of Julius Ignius. 'life and deeds of illustrious men, but is a mixture of Gellius and Frontinus. John continues : 'What shall I say concerning self-restraint and contempt for possessions, since I have also promised some of the stratagems of Plutarch ?' At the beginning of the next chapter (Bk.5 Ch.8) he writes : 'To conclude these borrowings from Plutarch's 'Stratagems' with the case of Trajan ... ' thereby implying that what came in between these two statements was genuine Plutarch. In fact it is Frontinus again all three stories being called from one chapter of Frontinus with the addition of Suetonius as the authority for Augustus. This is particularly damaging evidence and Liebeschütz concludes that it is proof of John's desire to set out a clerical scheme of the relationship between the church and state in terms of classical precepts and examples, thereby protecting himself

against the charge of vanity in his delicate position as an ecclesiastical politician, on the grounds that he is only handing down another's work.*

Liebeschutz considers there are two general difficulties which one can only surmount by ascribing the 'Policraticus' to the medieval tradition. The first consists in John's claim that the analogy of the priesthood as the soul of the body politic comes from a pagan source in spite of the substitution of the one true God for the earlier pantheon. There is no doubt that John, wary of offending his clerical readers, would have found it necessary to alter the examples given in the original. The second point is that it is difficult to accept that the belief in a hierarchical structure of society as expressed in the 'Policraticus' could have been characteristic of classical thought. Liebeschutz solves the problem by saying that John took the basis of his idea from the work of Robertus Pullus, who we know instructed John in theology. He is mentioned favourably on two occasions in the 'Metalogican' as a man 'whom all good men hold in happy memory⁽⁸³⁾', and commendable alike for his virtue and knowledge⁽⁸⁴⁾. Pullen was archdeacon of Rochester from 1138 to 1143 and was called to Rome in 1144 where he became a cardinal so that the virtue of this theory is that a theologian is asserted as the authority for the idea that the prince should be the servant of the priesthood, the central theme of the 'Policraticus'. In Pullen's 'Book of Sentences' the harmony between the spiritual and temporal powers is expressed in the symbol of the soul and body, but the clerical authority remains pre-eminent. The prince wards off evil from without, the church caring for man's inner welfare. Robert also discusses the features that distinguish a prince from a tyrant, and how a subject should behave under a tyrannical government, and then considers the functions of the various offices appointed by the king and the various classes of society, the judges dispensing justice, the knights defending the country, the peasants and merchants maintaining the whole machinery by their payments. It is Liebeschutz's contention that John's discussion in books five and six of the 'Policraticus' follows the sequence of Robert, but extends it to cover the relationship between all classes of society.

*This seems to me the most plausible solution to the problem.

There are however, objections to what on the surface seems a very plausible theory. The distinction between a prince and a tyrant has its roots in the classical tradition, in particular in the works of Cicero, with which John was very familiar, and although John was the first to state explicitly that to kill a tyrant is a just act, this was already implicit in the works of Isidore of Seville in the seventh century, so that John need not have relied on the work of Pullen alone. Secondly, the organic analogy, although in a considerably less elaborate form, had its origins in the biblical and classical tradition, and in an introduction to the Institutes of Justinian, attributed to date between 850 and 1100, and probably representing the earlier Byzantine edition, the different ranks in the imperial hierarchy are compared to the different parts of the human body⁽⁸⁵⁾ - the prince to the head, the 'illustres' to the eyes, the 'spectabiles' to the hands, the 'clarissimi' to the thorax etc. So that in this instance as well, there were other sources besides that of Pullen. Thirdly, although John is apt to use material without assigning it to its source in the case of classical authors I feel sure that Pullen as his teacher, friend, contemporary and above all a respected theologian, would have been cited as his authority if this really was the source of his idea, especially in view of his delicate position as an ecclesiastical politician, the basis of Liebeschutz's own argument.

CONCLUSION

It has been said⁽⁸⁶⁾ that the three principle contributions to political thought in the 'Policraticus' are (1): that the prince is the servant of the priesthood (2) the detailed examination of the difference between the legitimate ruler and the tyrant (3) the allocation of different functions to the various members. As we have seen, none of these ideas are original in themselves, but John is the first to formulate them explicitly. It must be remembered that John considered that Henry II had challenged the authority of the Church, but while every medieval writer agreed that monarchy was the best form of government in order to provide the necessary unity in the social organism, it was universally accepted

that the state was above positive but below natural law. However John follows the ecclesiastical tradition in keeping alive the classical notion of the state as an institution with special claims on the loyalty and obedience of men, and may be trying to centralise the activities of the state, his model being the highly organised Church. Thus, just as in the case of the relation between the prince and the priesthood, and between the prince and the tyrant, John has merely formulated explicitly what was implicit in medieval thought, so it seems to me but a short step from the organic analogies of classical and ecclesiastical writers to the detailed theory expounded in the 'Policraticus', this being the case, I do not think that one can safely say with Liebeschutz that John took the basis of his theory from Robertus Pullus. He no doubt influenced John but the same tradition of organic analogy played its part in formulating the ideas of both writers, and I have no doubt that John was the more original thinker of the two. My conclusion is then that John has merely followed the organic analogy of biblical and classical writers to its logical end, and its clear formulation for the first time in the 'Policraticus' is the culmination of medieval thought on the subject, before the rediscovery of Aristotle's 'Politics', when the state was to recover an innate dignity unknown to John of Salisbury.

There remains the problem of Plutarch. I agree with Liebeschutz that the discrepancy between the belief in a hierarchical structure of society and classical thought poses great problems, and the linking of Plutarch's name with that of Trajan, historically very doubtful, nevertheless is from a literary point of view very convenient. What of the other possibilities? Wytttenbach argued that John employed a translation, perhaps contemporary, of a Byzantine original which was a compilation of genuine works by Plutarch. Apart from the difficulties of content mentioned above, we still face the problem that only those writers who had been influenced by the 'Policraticus' refer to the 'Institutio Trajani'. Mirtzel and Schaarschmidt claim that John mistook a Latin forgery for a genuine work of Plutarch, a complete reversal of Wytttenbach's view; but in this case too the difficulty remains of explaining the sudden loss of the work in question. A more remote possibility is that

John knew Greek and had access to the original work of Plutarch. Most scholars find in the titles 'Policraticus' and 'Metalogican' the pathetic desire of a man who knew no Greek, to find Greek sounding names for his works, which became a fad in the twelfth century. McGarry however, in his introduction to the 'Metalogican' writes⁽⁸⁷⁾, 'Although John knew some Greek, he apparently used his Greek sources in Latin translations'. In that book⁽⁸⁸⁾, John himself refers to what a Greek interpreter who also knew the Latin language very well, told me when I was staying in Apulia! Certainly in both the 'Policraticus' and 'Metalogican', John quotes the derivations of words from the Greek. Whether John knew enough Greek to understand a work of Plutarch must remain a matter of conjecture, but we do know that, appreciating as he did, that the course of philosophy lay in Greece, he employed John the Saracen to translate the original Greek for him⁽⁸⁹⁾. Indeed in a letter he wrote to John the Saracen, he corrects a translation of the pseudo-Dionysus that John has sent him, so that the possibility of the Greek original of Plutarch's work should be considered along with theories of Latin translations whether forged or genuine.

Scholars therefore, seem to have turned the full circle in accounting for this lost work of Plutarch; the fact that there is hardly anything else in John's writing which is known to be genuine Plutarch makes the survival of this one letter most unlikely. It seems to me that while rightly crediting John to be the most well read man of his time, scholars have overlooked the fact that he had a mind capable of developing the ideas of others. Nurtured in the Platonic-Ciceronian school, the home of philosophic doubt, John's thought is a combination of orthodoxy and humanism. In the inevitable conflict between the two, John falls back on the old literary subterfuge of putting his own views through the work of another. In the relatively unknown Plutarch, he found the perfect agency. Believing that a kingdom was an ordered community in which each social group had by divine appointment a necessary part to play in the welfare of the whole, John took over the traditional organic analogy, and extended it to cover all classes of society, from the prince to the poorest peasant.

*I suggest that 'Policraticus' may be connected with 'Polycrates' of Samos, one of the most enlightened of the Greek 'tyrants'.

In his ideal state, there could be no clash of interests between the two. After John, the organic analogy becomes the dominant feature of medieval thought, culminating in the system of Nicholas of Cusa, before finally losing ground to the mechanistic theories of an increasingly industrialised society, but by then the medieval world of John of Salisbury had long since died.

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P A R T I I I

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

THE ORGANIC THEORY OF THE STATE CONSIDERED IN THE WORK OF
BERNARD BOSANQUET.

The development of a British Neo-Hegelian movement may be accounted for partly as a reaction to utilitarian and Marxian theories of society, partly as a product of that civilisation which might fairly claim to be the bearer of the present stage of development of the 'world-spirit'. Thus, the idealist theory of the state is essentially a philosophy of patriotism, and the state itself is considered a spiritual phenomenon, and citizenship a great spiritual experience, without which human life would not be complete. The purpose of the 'Philosophical theory of the State' is to find an ethical justification for the use of coercion by the state, and a satisfactory explanation of the duty of obedience to the law. 'Philosophy, in treating of society, has to deal with the problems which arise out of the nature of a whole and its parts, the relation of the individual to the universal, and the transformation by which the particular self, is lost, to be found again in a more individual, and yet more universal form'⁽¹⁾. Bosanquet admits that the essence of this theory is to be found not merely in Plato and Aristotle, but in many modern writers, especially, Hegel, Green, Bradley and Wallace⁽²⁾. However, he considers that there is no longer any need for the scrupulous caution which Green displayed in estimating the value of the State to its members, but the state must be recognised as the 'substantive purpose and foundation of our lives'.

THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND.

At the heart of the Idealist system lies the belief that everything, whether natural or intellectual, forms part of a system apart from which it cannot be understood. 'That the world of mind or the world above sense exists as an actual and organised whole is a truth most easily realised in the study of the beautiful. And to grasp this principle as Hegel applies it is nothing less than to acquire a new contact with spiritual

life⁽³⁾. The suggestive force of special experiences such as beauty and religion, leads us to the World of the Absolute, the whole of which the human individual is a mere fragment, and the constitutive feature of the finite self is self-transcendence. The individual is incomplete and imperfect so long as he remains in his own finitude, and his life is a constant struggle between the finite and infinite elements of his nature towards perfection 'in the great world of spiritual membership', as opposed to the essentially false world of claims and counter-claims. However, the individual transcends himself not in a world beyond this one but in his daily life. 'The Absolute is simply the high-water mark of fluctuations in experience of which in general we are daily and normally aware'⁽⁴⁾. c.f. Hegel : 'the subject-matter of philosophy is never anything abstruse and remote but always something concrete and in the highest sense present'. It is because the spiritual world is conceived by Bosanquet to be simply the natural world understood in the fullest light, that he sees the ideal state in the actual state. This has led many commentators* to accuse Bosanquet of confusing the actual with the ideal state i.e. instead of realising the ideal, he idealises the real, but it is precisely this dualism that Bosanquet is anxious to avoid.

In one of his last papers⁽⁵⁾ Bosanquet writes : 'Plato in particular came as a revelation, not as confirming the dualism of 'this' world and the 'other', but in opposition to the current and more or less popular legends of his meaning, it was so plain and obvious that his true passion was for the unity of things'. This unity is illustrated as follows : 'If you ask what reality is, you can in the end say nothing but that it is the whole which thought is always endeavouring to affirm. And if you ask what thought is, you can in the end say nothing but that it is the central function of mind in affirming its partial world to belong to a real universe'. It is as an organic part of this real universe, the concrete,

* Hobhouse particularly.

objective 'world of mind', that the individual derives his value and reality, not as distinguished from other particulars, but as a concrete, universal entity within a richly differentiated and systematic whole i.e. the Absolute. This final form of individuality is anticipated in finite experience by the human personality and the state, but the latter remains the highest embodiment of the social, not absolute, mind, being one of the 'media' by which the individual comes in contact with the Absolute.

It is precisely because participation in the state is conceived by the idealist to be a spiritual experience that the ideal can be claimed to be realised in the actual. Ideal does not mean unrealised, but the universal or essential character of the community considered from a moral point of view. Thus the state is an ideal fact⁽⁶⁾. 'The actual facts of this world do directly arise out of and are causally sustained by conscious intelligence', and these facts, from the world above sense. The unity of a Christian church or congregation is a governing fact of life : so is that of a family or nation. What is this unity ? Is it visible and tangible, like the unity of a human body ? No, the unity is ideal; that is, it exists in the world of thought only. An army, qua army, is not a mere fact of sense; for not only does it need mind to perceive it - a heap of sand does that - but it also needs mind to MAKE it⁽⁷⁾. The idealist therefore casts his political theory in terms of mind, will and purpose. Man's spiritual life is a concrete reality here and now, and there is no divorce of the sensuous and the supersensuous, the natural and the supernatural. The world of sense is seen as an organ and symbol of the world of spirit, and the world of spirit as the 'truth' and full reality of the world of sense. The task of philosophy is to realise the 'ideality of life in its commonest actual phases'.

Two principles therefore emerge from our preliminary discussion of Bosanquet's metaphysics. First, the ultimate reality of the individual is a fiction. The finite self has no being apart from membership of the whole i.e. self-transcendence in the perfection of the Absolute, the

all-inclusive harmonious system of experience in which all our imperfect human values and achievements are consummated and fulfilled. Bosanquet's political philosophy is essentially the application of the theory of the Absolute to the nation-state as imperative on man's nature as rational. Secondly, 'the object of political philosophy is to understand what a State is, and it is not necessary for this purpose that the state which is analysed should be 'ideal', but only that it should be a state'(8). The state is 'ideal' only in the sense that its will is at every stage dissatisfied with its own expression in its effort to satisfy the needs of its members, who in turn acknowledge the common self of society to be more real than the apparent individual. i.e. as representing their higher or ideal self as opposed to the actual self at the ordinary level of consciousness.

THE PROBLEM STATED.

The ultimate root of political obligation lies for Bosanquet in the complete identification of the will of the individual with the will of the state, and in the individual's belief that only within that structure can he fulfill himself as a social being. To this must be added that 'the aim of politics is to realise and find the individual'(9), and that 'nothing short of the state is the actualisation of freedom'(10). The end of the individual and the state is the same, to wit, the realisation of the best life. All theories which accept as ultimate, the absolute and natural independent existence of the physical individual, must regard government as alien, a diminution of the self by others and force as oppression. Self-government is not the government of each by himself, but of each by others. Therefore the theories of Mill, Bentham, Hobbes and Locke, do not solve the problem of political obligation because they accept the natural separateness of the human unit, that the 'people' who exercise the power are the same people over whom it is exercised. But the will of the people practically means the will of the most numerous or active part of the people, and such a tyranny of the majority is one of the evils against which society must be on its guard.(3) Bosanquet therefore, in his radical treatment of the problem of political obligation rightly rejects democracy as a paradox of two alien factors, self and government.

Where then lies the solution ? 'We must take the two factors of the working idea of self-government in their full antagonism, and exhibit, through and because of this, the fundamental unity at their root, and the necessity and conditions of their coherence. We must show, in short, how man demands to be governed; and how government, which puts real force on him, is essential as he is aware, to his becoming what he has it in him to be'⁽¹¹⁾. Theories of self-government, designated as 'theories of the first look', fail precisely because they assume that society and the individual really are as they immediately appear to be. Government by consent involves at any time the retraction of that consent. Liberty is not merely absence of constraint but the maximisation of the self and individuality which first becomes possible and real in and through the state. It is in the doctrine of the general will, first put forward by Rousseau and developed by Hegel, that Bosanquet finds the basis of society which will make morality and self-government intelligible. Freedom lies in the assertion of the higher self, the real will of the individual as opposed to his actual will consisting of his trivial and rebellious moods, and this real will is identified with the 'general will' or 'common self' which is the essence of the state. The general will as opposed to an aggregate of wills, the 'will of all', involves the idea of organic unity, the difference being illustrated by a fortuitous crowd and a well-disciplined army. The former is united merely by association, the latter by a systematic whole which permeates and lives in the members who in turn are determined by it. Thus, the individual through the general will attains genuine individuality that belongs to a self organic to the communal whole⁽¹²⁾.

THE REAL WILL OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The theory of rational activity is the basis of Idealist social philosophy. To the egoistic, particular self, living entirely by natural impulse, the force exercised by the state merely epitomises his alienation. The real self on the other hand is capable of rational and

moral behaviour and freely acquiesces in state compulsion, being the instrument of his fulfillment as a social being. The doctrine of the real will thereby paves the way for a series of restraints upon the individual. Liberty, normally defined as the absence of constraint, now becomes a condition of the mind, but in either case Bosanquet argues the principle remains of only being determined by oneself⁽¹³⁾. In the literal case, what we mean by ourself is the given self, the actual will, which being acknowledged as unsatisfactory, 'we throw the centre of gravity, outside it, and place the true self rather in something which we want to be than in what we actually are; although at the same time it is clear that to some extent we are this something or we should not want to be it',⁽¹⁴⁾. In other words as a member of a state one's liberty consists of the restraint laid upon one's worst propensities which are at war with one's better self. Bosanquet admits that this form of liberty is merely metaphorical⁽¹⁵⁾, and it is precisely this conception of being free wherever one's higher self is being asserted, even by compulsion, that led the 'liberalist' philosopher L.T.Hobhouse to attack the whole idea of a real as opposed to an actual will. The basis of this real will which transcends the individual whose will it is, and the throwing of the centre of gravity of the self outside what is normally considered to constitute individuality, has obvious affinities with Bosanquet's metaphysics.

It has been mentioned however, 'that the real will is but slightly represented in our explicit consciousness at its ordinary level',⁽¹⁶⁾. How therefore, can anything be my will which I am not fully aware of, or which I am even averse to? The answer is indicated by the common experience that 'what people demand is seldom what would satisfy them if they got it'. In order therefore, to obtain a full statement of the real will, 'what we want at any moment must at least be corrected and amended by what we want at all other moments',⁽¹⁷⁾. Secondly, 'this cannot be done without also correcting and amending it so as to harmonise it with what others want.' However, 'when any considerable degree of such correction and amendment has been gone through, our own will would return to us in a shape in which we should not know it again, although

every detail would be a necessary inference from the whole of wishes and resolutions we actually cherish! Moreover, 'if it were to be supplemented and readjusted so as to stand not merely for the life which on the whole we manage to live, but for a life ideally without contradiction, it would appear to us quite remote from anything which we know'. Bosanquet has here distinguished three levels of rational activity⁽¹⁸⁾. The first consisting of our day to day acts of will, embodies rationality at the level of ends and means. In correcting what we want at one moment with what we want at all other moments, we have moved to rationality at the level of private self-satisfaction, the third stage of amending our own wants with those of others, represents the level of morality, or in other words a rational way of living must be a social way of living. 'The State is an imperative necessity of man's nature as rational, while contract is a mere agreement of certain free persons about certain external things',⁽¹⁹⁾.

Thus, the conflict between self and others which destroyed the conception of self-government is removed when we realise that the average individual is not the real self. Self-government is only possible on the basis of an identification of the real will of the individual with the general will as embodied in society. 'There is no other way of explaining how a free man can put up with compulsion and even welcome it',⁽²⁰⁾. 'The imperative claim of the will that wills itself is our inmost nature and we cannot throw it off'. This is the ultimate root of political obligation. But, as we have seen, the real will is something which we do not know, and cannot will because we do not recognise it⁽²¹⁾. Is therefore, Bosanquet's version of the real will a valid conception, in itself, and does it solve the problem of political obligation? 'Are we to treat the average nature as a means to the truer and fuller self - as something that is to say, which is instrumental to the latter and has no rights against it?'⁽²²⁾

A fundamental objection to the conception of the real will rests on the ~~false antithesis~~ between conscious aims and actual desires. 'The man's will is in short just what it is with all its limitations, and not what it might be if these limitations were removed' (23). Regret at doing a thing is no more ground for regarding regret as more essentially myself than regarding my original choice as more real. All such imperfections are part of my 'real' will, but strictly there is no part in me which is more real than any other. The term 'real' must be distinguished between its adjectival^{iv} meaning, connecting a particular phase of myself^w with myself as a whole, and its substantival^v meaning in which 'Reality' is something either to be simply asserted or denied. 'For the contrast between the real and the unreal then should be substituted the contrast between the self as it is permanently constituted and the self as it acts in some transitory excitement' (24). However, even this distinction breaks down, because not merely superficial interests clash with the best life but the deepest passions. The rational, harmonious will is not real in the average man, but rather its recognition depends upon his transformation. Thus, the actual 'will' is real not rational, the 'real' will, rational but not real. It would appear therefore, that Bosanquet's statement of the real will is not satisfactory, but is defined in effect as an ideal will, and it is this ideal will which is the basis of political obligation. The individual's relation to the state, 'as the guardian of our real self, the instrument of our greatest self affirmation' (25), has developed into a relation between two 'ideal' entities that overrule his empirical existence.

THE REAL WILL AS IDENTICAL WITH THE GENERAL WILL

"The reality of the common self, in the action of the political whole, receives the name of the 'general will' (26). It is we might say, the will of the whole society 'as such' or the wills of all individuals 'in so far as they aim at the common good'. By the identification of the particular wills of individuals with the social good, the general will purports to provide a genuine account of

self-government by 'on the one hand, an absolute and determinate adjustment and recognition of rights; on the other hand, embodying in its recognitions all individual claims which represent a true individuality⁽²⁷⁾. The general will is then the spirit of the community as a will for the good and is as much implied in the life of a society as some sort of will for good in the life of an individual. The two, in fact, are not merely analogous, but to a great extent identical⁽²⁸⁾. Bosanquet seems to reduce the general will to the level of philanthropy. e.g. 'The general will in the last resort is the ineradicable impulse of an intelligent being to a good extending beyond itself in as far as that good takes the form of a common good'. However, its real significance is that it binds the individual and society into an inviolable whole, an organic unity, together with the individual's conscious recognition that the realisation of the best life is possible only in and through society. 'It is plain that the unity of myself with others in a common good is the same in principle as the unity of myself with myself which I aim at in aiming at my own good'⁽²⁹⁾. But the general will, as mentioned above, is fundamentally opposed to a mere aggregate of wills, the will of all. Surely however, the will of all, if directed to the common good, would be one with the general will? In fairness to Bosanquet it must be mentioned that he himself raises this point⁽³⁰⁾, but his answer is unsatisfactory, namely that the general will, as a true interest requires some degree of energy or effort, perhaps of self-sacrifice, and that such action will not be forthcoming, without the application of some kind of force or 'authoritative suggestion by the state'. This not only expresses a very pessimistic view of human nature, the rationality of which is elsewhere made the basis of political obligation, but is in effect contrary to Bosanquet's own view that morality cannot be enforced by the state, to consider a man's ideals not as the spontaneous expression of his innermost feelings, but as created in the first place by the state*.

* Compare Bosanquet's later remarks that the state can only enforce obligations not duties.

The question remains as to how the general will finds expression. Rousseau having grasped the distinction between the general will and the will of all, fails in Bosanquet's judgement, to conceive how the general will exercises its sovereignty in the modern nation-state. By reverting to the democracy of the Greek polis, ' he is appealing from the organised life, institutions, and selected capacity of a nation to that nation regarded as an aggregate of isolated individuals⁽³¹⁾'. It is precisely the community of the interest and the nature of the object, not the number of votes which distinguishes the general will. Bosanquet, following Hegel provides the following solution : 'The habits and institutions of any community are, so to speak, the standing interpretation of all the private wills which compose it, and it is thus possible to assign to the general will an actual and concrete meaning as something different at once from every private will and from the vote of any given assembly, and yet as standing, on the whole, for what both the one and the other necessarily aim at sustaining as the framework of their life⁽³²⁾'. The will of the individual is actualised in private property, the family, in institutions such as the Trade Unions and the Church, and finally in the state, which embodies the highest freedom. The fullest condition of liberty is that in which we are ourselves most completely, or in other words 'the free will is the will that wills itself'. 'Any system of institutions which represents to us, on the whole, the conditions essential to affirming such a will, has an imperative claim upon our loyalty and obedience as the embodiment of our liberty⁽³³⁾'. Thus, freedom lies in conformity to the real will, which is identified with the common self, the general will, and which in turn is embodied in the social fabric.

This concept of a common self, a social mind, identified with the general will, strikes at the root of every theory which regards human individuality as something ultimate. It is however, entirely consistent with Bosanquet's belief in the Absolute as the concrete universal, the totality of experience, which asserts itself to the full through identity and difference in the individual. As we have seen, Bosanquet's metaphysics

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 is in many ways the key to his political theory, and it is worthwhile at this point to re-state the Cardinal Tenet of his philosophy. 'Thus, for freedom as for truth and reality, freedom in society in morals, and in all action and expression, once more the condition and criterion was the participation in the whole, by union with which alone the finite spirit could become what it had in it to be'⁽³⁴⁾. Now the principle behind Bosanquet's conception of the common self is that 'the nearer I approach to being myself, the nearer I approach identification with the communal mind'⁽³⁵⁾, so that all the real wills of individuals, defined as that which they ought to be, are in quality and character indistinguishable, and it is this sameness which constitutes the one, common self of society. The crux of the problem lies as always in Bosanquet's interpretation of the term 'individuality'. The true individuality of individuals does not lie in their isolation, but in that distinctive act or service by which they pass into unique contributions to the universal⁽³⁶⁾. In other words, Bosanquet rejects as the basis of individuality 'the pure privacy and incommunicability of feeling' which for him 'is superceded in all possible degrees by the self-transcendence and universality of the contents with which it is unified'⁽³⁷⁾.

The point of view of the 'theorist of the first look' is admirably argued by Hobhouse⁽³⁸⁾. Drawing a distinction between the kind of unity involved in the qualitative identity between real wills, and that unity involved in the self or the state, he continues, 'the self is a continuous identity united by strands of private memory and expectation, comprising elements of feeling, emotion and bodily sensation which are its absolute, exclusive property. No such continuity unites distinct selves however alike, or however united in their objects'. Bosanquet, however, regards the differences within the self as identical in their essential nature with the differences between selves, and therefore seems to imply a numerical identity between individuals. 'If we consider my unity with myself at different times as the limiting case, we shall find it very hard to establish a difference between the unity of what we call one 'mind' and that of all the 'minds' which enter into a single social experience'⁽³⁹⁾.

In reply Hobhouse argues that experience qua experience can never be common, because unity can only belong to the object of experience, while the subject in each case remains a distinct centre of sensation. He acknowledges however, that Bosanquet himself recognises that 'in a sense it is true that no one consciousness can partake of or can actually enter into another,' but as always Bosanquet is not content with prima facie definitions, but takes the problem one stage further into the realm of metaphysics. 'Separateness is not an ultimate character of the individual, but it is a phase of being alien to externality and tending to disappear in as far as true individuality prevails' ⁽⁴⁰⁾. Of course if you reject Bosanquet's metaphysics, as Hobhouse does, then it is perfectly legitimate to repudiate the conception of the common self from the point of view of the uniqueness of the individual. It must be pointed out, however, that Bosanquet's position is quite logical, provided that the fuller and metaphysical sense of individuality is taken as the real, and the sense given to it by Hobhouse rejected as a lower and incomplete version of it. It is merely an extension of the principle involved in a real and actual will.

THE GENERAL WILL IDENTIFIED WITH THE STATE

The identification of the state with the real will of the individual in which he wills his own nature as a rational being is the final stage in Bosanquet's account of political obligation. Our real will is to live and act as citizens, and we realise it by conforming to the rules and conventions of the laws and institutions, as the embodiment of the social spirit. 'The state is to the general life of the individual much as we saw the family to be with regard to certain of his impulses. The idea is that in it, or by its help, we find at once discipline and expansion, the transfiguration of partial impulses and something to do and care for, such as the nature of a human self demands. If you start with a human being and try to devise what will furnish him ^{with} an outlet and

a stable purpose capable of doing justice to his capacities - a satisfying object of life - you will be driven on by the necessity of the facts at least as far as the state, and perhaps further'⁽⁴¹⁾ .

Institutions, 'as the standing interpretation of all the private wills' are 'ethical ideas' because they provide the individual with an opportunity for self-realisation. However, citizenship as a sphere of rational activity is only possible in a politically organised society.

The term 'state' for Bosanquet, accents the political aspect of the whole and is opposed to the notion of an anarchical society', but it also includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, from the family to the trade, and from the trade to the Church and the University.⁽⁴²⁾ This is the source of a most serious confusion between state and society which will be considered later. Bosanquet goes on to define the state as the 'operative criticism of institutions', as that structure which gives 'life and meaning' to the latter. It is a 'working conception of life by the guidance of which every living member of the commonwealth is enabled to perform his function'⁽⁴³⁾ . 'But a complete reflective conception of the end of the state ... would mean a complete idea of the realisation of all human capacity', and Bosanquet considers this an impossibility 'because of the gradual character of the process by which the end of life is determined for man'. The real will, as represented by the State is only a partial embodiment of it. This statement, together with the phrase 'perhaps further' mentioned above, is the first intimation that there may be something higher than the state.

For the moment, however, it is fair to say that it is the totalitarian aspect of the state to which Bosanquet directs his chief attention. 'It seems important to observe that force is inherent in the state, and no true ideal points in the direction of destroying it'⁽⁴⁴⁾ . Nevertheless, as the sovereignty of the state is the sovereignty of the general will, it is not mere possession of force that characterises the state, but its use in furtherance of the general will. Force in this sense is defined as 'instruction and authoratativesuggestion', reminding

us of duties we are too ignorant or indolent to carry out, as opposed to the mere restraint of law-breakers. 'The state is the fly-wheel of our life. We profit at every turn by institutions, rules, traditions, researches, made by minds at their best, which through state action, are now in a form to operate as extensions of our own minds' (45). However, 'the return of this greater self, forming a system adjusted to unity, upon their isolated minds, as an expansion and stimulus to them, necessarily takes the shape of force, in as far as their minds are inert'. But, as the end of the state is the end of the individual, to wit the realisation of the best life, the common good, there can be no question of such force impeding the highest self-assertion of the individual mind. An abrupt transition in the argument now takes place in which the state is promoted from its position 'as a necessary factor in civilised life' to mean 'society as a unit, recognised as rightly exercising control over its members through absolute physical power' (46). Without such power the state could not fulfill that function for which by definition it exists, viz the 'ultimate and effective adjustment of the claims of individuals'. 'The state, as the widest grouping whose members are effectively united by a common experience is necessarily the one community which has absolute power to ensure, by force if need be at least sufficient adjustment of the claims of all other groupings to make life possible' (47). The natural consequence of such a view is that each individual must belong to only one state, which, as will be shown, destroys the possibility of any effective international organisation. By identifying the general will with the state, and giving a new interpretation to the term 'force' Bosanquet solved the paradox of self-government which arose out of a view which equated force with physical compulsion and government with force. 'Our theory insists on the will and personality of the state, and with them on its moral responsibility' (48). However, the question now to be asked is, whether the individual is not in effect sacrificed to the ends of an authoritarian state.

END AND LIMIT OF STATE ACTION.

On the credit side, Bosanquet's first principle is that 'the promotion of morality by force is an absolute self-contradiction' (49).

Although the end of the state is the realisation of the best life, its direct power is limited to the performance of external actions,⁽⁵⁰⁾ i.e. backed ultimately by physical force, it can promote the intention to act in a certain way, and thereby indirectly the actions themselves.

Furthermore, 'an action performed in this sense under compulsion is not a true part of the will'⁽⁵¹⁾. In so far as such physical compulsion is used against recalcitrant individuals, they are not being forced to be free, for they are capable only of the lower levels of freedom and not of the freedom of citizenship. Thus, Bosanquet describes the distinctive province of the state as 'hindrance to hindrances of good life'⁽⁵²⁾. So that state action is negative in its immediate bearing, though positive in its ultimate purpose. How careful Bosanquet in fact is in limiting the use of force by the state is illustrated by the following passage⁽⁵³⁾:

'We ought, as a rule, when we propose action involving compulsion, to be able to show a definite tendency to growth, or a definite reserve of capacity, which is frustrated by a known impediment, the removal of which is a small matter compared with the capacities to be set free. For it should be remarked that every act done by the public power has one aspect of encroachment, however slight on the sphere of character and intelligence. It can therefore only be justified if it liberates resources of character and intelligence greater beyond all question than the encroachment which it involves'. The self-conscious development of the individual is the sine qua non of his membership of society, and Bosanquet restricts automatism to those acts better performed from any motive than not performed at all, thereby following Green. He is also following Bradley in the idea that there must be intense life and self-consciousness in the members, otherwise the whole state is ossified. The criterion for all state action is its effect on the moral character of the citizen e.g. 'thus we may say that every law and institution, every external fact maintained by the public power, must be judged by the degree in which it sets at liberty a growth of mind and spirit'⁽⁵⁴⁾. Bosanquet's position therefore, is that as far as

* the higher levels of rationality are concerned e.g. citizenship, government can only hinder hindrances. The capacity for rational achievement must already be there, and government can do no more than assist in its liberation. It can only act directly with regard to the three lower levels of rational activity, to wit, those of means and ends, private self-satisfaction, and moral rules and customs. In these instances the general will acts in the form of force through automatism, not as social suggestion which we spontaneously rise to accept, but comes to us ex hypothesis as something which claims to be ourself, but which for the moment we more or less fail to recognise. (55). However, 'in so far as by misdirection of the automatic process it encroaches upon the region of living will - the region where the good realises itself directly by its own force as a motive, it is sawing off the branch on which it sits', and superseding the aim by the instrument (56). Our loyalty to the state rests on the fact that its end is moral purpose imperative upon its members.

The subject of rights is an integral part of the province of state action. 'If we ask in general, for a definition and limitation of state action, the answer is in a simple phrase that state action is coincident with the maintenance of rights' (57). The system of rights is described as the 'organic whole of outward conditions necessary to the best life' and the position of the individual in the organism is summarised as follows: (58). The immediate point is that no rights are absolute, or detached from the whole, but all have their warrant in the aim of the whole, which at the same time implies their adjustment and regulation according to general principles'. The ultimate basis of a right is traced to the individual's function in the whole and depends upon that function being recognised as instrumental to the common good. 'A right thus regarded is not anything primary' (59) Rights are claims recognised by the state, but duty is the purpose with a view to which the right is secured and not merely a corresponding obligation equally derived from a common ground. Duty, therefore being considered the basis of rights, it follows that there can be no rights, which are not recognised by the state. However, Bosanquet adds that if rights can only be recognised by the state, they can only be real in the individual, and

cannot be enforced because they involve the relation of an act to an end in a person's will. An obligation on the other hand is the correlative of a right. It is what must be done by others in order to secure the right. In this case 'the state can enforce an act which favours the possibility of acting towards a moral end'⁽⁶⁰⁾. However, 'no person and no society is consistent with itself'⁽⁶¹⁾, so that ^{1c 9a}loyal and customary rights must be continuously overhauled to see whether they are rationally justified and as conditions change new rights will come into existence. 'The state-maintained system of rights, then, in its relation to the normal self and will of ordinary citizens with their varying moods of enthusiasm and indolence, may be compared to the automatic action of a human body⁽⁶²⁾. One such automatic action is the punishment of any violation of that system of rights, the negation of the offender's anti social will. But even in this extremity, the indivisible unity of the individual and the state is insisted upon. 'It must be laid down that in as far as any sane man fails altogether to recognise in any form the assertion of something he normally respects in the law which punishes him, he is outlawed by himself and the essentials of citizenship are not in him'⁽⁶³⁾.

STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN THE REAL WORLD.

It can now be seen that the idealist view of the state as an influence which permeates every nook and cranny of society, and shapes all institutions and persons to its end, is merely the other side of the Marxist coin. But, whereas reality for the materialist can only lie in the objective world, the idealist is finally driven back to the basic Platonic position of asserting the world of mind as the ultimate sphere of reality. However, the idealist allows of no significant demarcation between these two worlds, a central weakness which is illustrated by Bosanquet's ambiguous dualism of a ^freal and an empirical self. This could refer on the one hand to the actual distress of men in their empirical reality, as against a 'real' self which demands release in a better world, ususally identified with the 'world to come', or on the other hand it may signify a deprecation of the empirical life in favour of an

unconditionally 'ideal' life of the state. Hoemle, a disciple of Bosanquet, explains the position as follows:⁽⁶⁴⁾ the idealist has no desire to deny the need for reforms, but is more interested in dwelling on the positive achievement and value of actual institutions. It must certainly be admitted that a great deal of idealist theory does not come to grips with the actual working of present-day institutions at all, and throws the blame of imperfections on the lack of character and public spirit in the citizens than on remediable faults in the established order'. Detrimental as this is to any satisfactory solution of the practical problem of political obligation. Hoemle then points out the fundamental difficulty 'the term 'the State, as used by the idealist, covers two things which the critics insist on distinguishing: it covers both the community or nation and the government - both the ideal values of which the community is bearer and the particular arrangements or machinery by which its life is 'regulated'. It is this sense of the term 'state' therefore to which a possible organic theory is applied, as a solution to the problem of self-government, the true root of political obligation. But first, it is necessary to consider the full implications of Bosanquet's interpretation of the term 'state'.

Taking the case of Bosanquet's definition of the state as 'the widest territorial area compatible with the unity of experience which is demanded by effective self-government'⁽⁶⁵⁾, two criticisms immediately emerge: (a) that Bosanquet's philosophy yields the individual into the clutches of society as such, or to the state generally, whereas in reality the individual always has to carry on his life in some particular historical form of society and state (b) the identity of nation and state is not perfectly realised in any known political community, because society is divided into classes and therefore cannot be reason's embodiment to any subject class. Bosanquet's total neglect of the economic foundations of society and his summary dismissal of class as a political institution⁽⁶⁶⁾, invites the criticism that he is wanting the best of both worlds, by

accepting what is good in 'actual' states and turning a blind eye to those elements which no rational theory could sustain. If states qua states do not maintain bad conditions it surely results that the state is not the actual organised community, but only so much of the organised community as makes for good, and the state is defined by an ideal. The ideal state may dwell solely in the realm of concepts - 'It is not one with actual states but a measuring rod'⁽⁶⁷⁾ - but the fundamental fallacy in the method of definition arises precisely because the idealist sees the rational embodied in the existing order in its essential outlines, but deliberately minimises those aspects in which it falls short of the ideal.

In one of his few certain references to actual states,⁽⁶⁸⁾ Bosanquet feels the need to defend his analysis as opposed to that of Green who contended that the requirements of the state have 'largely arisen out of force directed by selfish motives'. In answer to the fundamental question as to whose conception of the general will the institutions represent, Bosanquet concedes that the idea of a common good has never been the sole influence operative in the formation or maintenance of states, but such imperfections as self-interest and ambition are not accidental, but 'inherent in each particular form of human experience'. Hegel's statement that the 'state is no work of art, it ends in the world' is obviously applicable here, but a deeper principle is also involved summed up by Bosanquet in one of his letters⁽⁶⁹⁾. 'Our life is a striving against evil, but if the evil were gone, finite life would be gone too'. However, it seems as if the existence of evil in no way prejudices the state's essential neutrality in promoting the best life of all the members.

'All that we needed to show was that what makes and maintains states as states is will and not force, the idea of a common good, and not greed or ambition; and that this principle cannot be overthrown by the facts of self-interest in ordinary citizens, or of selfishness in those who mould the destinies of nations'⁽⁷⁰⁾. The English labourer for example may not concern himself with abstract ideas such as the state or the 'common good', but Bosanquet argues that he does recognise that his claims depend on his recognition of the claims of others. Furthermore, as a

member of a trade union, he contributes to the 'common good', and becomes aware of his place in the whole, his true individuality, while the common life he shares with his fellow citizens evokes a recognition of the state 'as absolute in power over the individual',⁽⁷¹⁾.

This complete identification of the nation with the state, as a description of any hitherto existing society is manifestly false. Under modern conditions of capitalism where the relations of production are the key to political relations, because the instruments of production are in private hands, the power of the state is coincident with the power of private property, and cannot therefore be a neutral agent of the total well-being of society. Even in the extreme case of a nation united by war, the position of the religious rebel or political revolutionary remains an anathema to any concept of a general will. Bosanquet however, in an attempt to allow full play to the individual conscience concedes the possibility of rebellion as a duty. This is not consistent with his theory of punishment as the return of the individual's real will, but rebellion is permissible only against a fossilised society, but 'never in a state in which law can be altered by constitutional process',⁽⁷²⁾. Bosanquet's statement that 'the conscientious objector will follow his conscience to the end, and if we believe him to be sincere we all respect him for it',⁽⁷³⁾ allowing the initiative to lie with the individual, is impossible to reconcile with his general theory of obligation. In setting up the free development of the rational will, as the criterion for obedience, it follows that there is no political obligation which is not subordinate to moral obligation and politics are subordinate to ethics. It appears therefore that the whim of subjective reason does constitute in certain circumstances a valid claim against the social institutions, the embodiment of objective reason. Surely, however, it is erroneous to claim that the customs and institutions of society are the product of a unitary general will, of an intelligent purpose alone. 'The actual institutions of society are not the imperfect realisation of a real will, which is essentially good and harmonious, but the result into which the never-ceasing clash of wills has settled down with some degree of permanency, and that result may embody much less of justice, morality and rationality than the explicit

ideas of many an individual mind'⁽⁷⁴⁾. Society therefore, is the outcome not of one real will but of millions of wills through generations. Bosanquet himself does not seem wholly convinced by his own argument. In discussing the ideas and causes advanced by the career of Napoleon he writes⁽⁷⁵⁾: 'they came into existence through the working of innumerable minds towards objective ends by the inherent logic of social growth'. Our conclusion is therefore that the sovereignty of the state is that sovereignty exercised in defence of the private ownership of the means of production and does not 'reside only in the organised whole acting qua organised whole'⁽⁷⁶⁾, but in reality in one element of the whole. It is not denied that there exists a common purpose in particular wills, only that this cannot be equated with the state.

Where does such a general will or common purpose lie according to our analysis? The answer is in the voluntary institutions, those very examples of 'practical logic' which Bosanquet admires e.g. Trade Unions, Local Government, Charity Organisations etc. 'But for concrete logic, the creative spirit of things, what is really the common basis of politics and poetry, I am convinced there is not, and never has been a national mind more highly endowed than the English. I point to the great organised institutions which have sprung unaided from the brain of our wage-earning class'⁽⁷⁷⁾. But as we have seen, it is precisely the idea of a common good involved in the creation of organisations that is made the basis of the state's claim of obedience from the working man. In other words, the state for Bosanquet is the entire social fabric whereas we think of the state as the organisation behind law and government. 'It includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined from the family to the trade, and from the trade to the Church and the University'⁽⁷⁸⁾. However, primitive societies and advanced society as the anarchists conceive show that the state is at present necessary to society but is only one of its conditions. Moreover, if the state, is a 'single independent corporation among other independent corporations'⁽⁷⁹⁾, then society is always something wider than the state. The state is an aspect of society but not society as such and man's obligations are to the latter. There is

considerable evidence that this is Bosanquet's real position, and that a complete identification of the state with society is not seriously pressed. The relative distinction between society and the state is, I think, permanent and inherent⁽⁸⁰⁾. The state in fact is thought of as that office with the power of coercion to carry out the general will, 'the clear and iron will to determinate good and justice, which the legal and political fabric of the state will exist to sustain and to defend'. Another example is when he talks of the family as something necessary to society and the state, but absolutely distinct from both⁽⁸¹⁾. Thus, Bosanquet's idea of the state in effect corresponds to the general view which sees the executive and government aspect predominant. The serious confusion between state and society is, I think caused by Bosanquet's real difficulty in seeing anything 'ideal' in the effects of actual states upon the average individual, to the extent that the 'ideal' exists only in those organisations which have grown up in spite of, or in opposition to the conditions maintained by the state. To maintain a complete identity of interest between these two antagonistic elements, and further to represent the one as demanding absolute physical control by the other, is a fatal weakness in the idealist theory.

A further problem arises as a result of Bosanquet's distinction between state and government whereas it is generally recognised that a decision of the government is a decision of the state. 'The state then, exists to promote good life, and what it does cannot be morally indifferent; but its actions cannot be identified with the deeds of its agents, or morally judged as private volitions are judged⁽⁸²⁾'. This is because 'its acts proper are always public acts, and it cannot as a state, act within the relations of private life in which organised morality exists', a concession to individual freedom not usually recognised by critics. Therefore, because the action of the state is by definition, the action of a general will, the state cannot be guilty of personal immorality and cannot commit murder or theft in the sense in which these are moral offences, war being excluded because it is not the act of a private person.

However, one may raise the objection of a state carrying out an unjust war, or the execution of an innocent man. Again, to claim that the state cannot be bound by the honour and conscience of its agents, ultimately justifies any measures taken by the state. The agent on the other hand is completely free of the ties of private morality when acting on behalf of the interest of the state. The state as such can be criticised on moral grounds only when its agents faithfully carry out the general will which is itself selfish or brutal, to which it must be said in reply that the actions of the state must be judged on the same principle as those of individuals, and are not to be distinguished from those of its agents.

Finally, a theory of the state must also be a theory of international relations. Although Bosanquet modified his views over the years, his basic position is as follows:⁽⁸³⁾ 'the state has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community; the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organised moral world. Moral relations presuppose an organised life; but such a life is only within the state, not in relations between the state and other communities'. By following Hegel's stricture that one state is not subject to the law of any other, Bosanquet's theory precludes any effective international organisation such as the League of Nations or United Nations precisely because such bodies depend upon each member state accepting some diminution of its sovereignty. His apparent enthusiasm for the League in later life (1919):- 'The same principle demands in the same spirit, the World-state. The unifying activity cannot cease with the state, as it could not cease with the group'⁽⁸⁴⁾ - camouflages this inconsistency by calling for support of a thorough communal will throughout the participant countries, according to the principle that a healthy state is non-militant in temper and supports the humanising values of knowledge, art, religion etc. In other words the concept of a supra-national state is subordinated to the need to purify the will of each existing state, thereby implying acquiescence in the status quo. 'States are peaceful or warlike compared with their internal condition being either one of stability and social justice or not'⁽⁸⁵⁾

'Humanity as an ethical idea is a type or problem rather than a fact', (86) because 'no such continuity of identical experience can be presupposed in all mankind as is necessary to effective membership of a common society and exercise of a general will'. The League of nations is a combination of general wills but they are not one will because they have not the same object or views of life in common. Such an organisation, like the idea of a universal language is valuable only as an addition but fatal as a substitution for the particular state.

The statements that 'the state is the supreme community' and guardian of the whole moral world have very important implications for an organic theory, for they suggest that the ultimate moral community is the political community, and that morality is to be equated with citizenship, but citizenship thought of in terms of conformity to the rules and conventions of society is not regarded as a sphere of rational activity. This is the life of self-consistent human achievement which necessitates the human community as the supreme community, and the citizen's loyalty is to the latter over and above the particular state, and would certainly involve some modification of the term 'organic' for such a theory i.e. the good life which the state exists to maintain is something more than merely the life of citizenship. That this is indeed Bosanquet's ultimate position will be shown in the final section. At this stage it must be remarked that one of the vices of the idealist theory is that it does not conceive the possibility of transcending state limits. Moral, religious and commercial relations exist between all human beings irrespective of state boundaries. The cells of a human body are wholly bound up with that body, whereas the citizen of an independent state often has closer relations with individual members of other states than with his own countrymen e.g. the English capitalist with his money invested in South Africa etc. Bosanquet's state may be a moral being with a conscience in internal relations but externally its absolutism indirectly condones the possibility of war, an entirely consistent position for one who accepts evil as a necessary part of the permanent scheme of things.*

* Evil is also necessary to the perfection of the Absolute.

THE INFLUENCE OF HEGEL ON BOSANQUET'S PHILOSOPHY.

We have already had occasion to note various instances in which Bosanquet reveals the debt owed to Hegel as the source and inspiration of his own philosophy, notably in the idea that the state is the spirit of the people in realised rationality and actuality and that the individual has his truth, existence and ethical status only as a member of it. In a letter to Hoemle Bosanquet writes⁽¹⁾:- 'To me Hegel has not, and never had from the first that foreignness or essential difficulty. Not that I can 'explain' him any more than others can, but that when I do seem to understand he speaks to me as the only writer I can understand. What he says seems to come straight out of one's heart and experience; every one else seems distant and artificial beside it'. However, the suggestion that Bosanquet faithfully adheres to the principles of Hegel's political philosophy is severely criticised by Marcuse in his book 'Reason and Revolution':⁽⁸⁷⁾ 'The British idealists seized upon the anti-liberal ideas in Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'. From T.H.Green to Bernard Bosanquet, the crescendo of emphasis fell increasingly upon the independent principle of the state and on the pre-eminence of the universal. The more Hegelian in wording, this idealism became, the further it removed itself from the true spirit of Hegel's thought'. Such criticism is not in fact borne out by the evidence. In two chapters devoted to Hegel in the 'Philosophical theory of the State',⁽⁸⁸⁾ Bosanquet observes⁽⁸⁹⁾: 'it is a simple fact that the whole political philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Fichte is founded on the idea of freedom as the essence of man, first announced - such was Hegel's distinct judgement - by Rousseau.' Of course, both for Hegel, and Bosanquet nothing short of the state is the actualisation of freedom, but Hegel's safeguards are carefully preserved. 'It is just freedom which is the self of thought : one who repudiates thought and talks of freedom knows not what he is saying',⁽⁹⁰⁾ . Again, in treating the modern state as a chapter in the 'Philosophy of Mind', both writers accept the universal as the spirit, the substance of the whole, not as an external negative power⁽⁹¹⁾ . 'We do not deny that mind may be more than social; but in as far as it is social it is still real mind, and that means that it is not something other than what we

know as individual lives. However, the impulses of the 'freemind' cannot be ordered, its purposes cannot be made determinate, except in an actual system of selves. For both philosophers the ultimate reality of the individual is inconceivable. 'The life of the members in the whole is the essence of what we really value.' (92)

So far from 'seizing upon the anti-liberal views in Hegel's philosophy' Bosanquet's concessions to the freedom of the individual inevitably conflict with his theory of obligation. In dealing with Hegel's conception of right 'the realm of realised freedom, the world of mind produced out of itself, as a second nature' of the three points of view involved, (1) the letter of the law, (2) the revolt of conscience, (3) social ethics, the utmost importance is attached to the second. 'There survives the permanent necessity that an intelligent being can acquiesce only in what enters into the object of his will he is absolutely debarred from reposing in anything which does not appeal to his will. The subjective will is the only soil on which freedom can be a reality' (93)

It is difficult to imagine a more liberal statement or one so completely fatal to the spirit expressed in the theory of the general will, although Bosanquet himself hardly seems aware of any ambiguity. Furthermore, it is legitimate to ask why if Bosanquet's theory has features that make the individual a victim of the hypostatized state universal, so characteristic of the later Fascist ideology' (94), does he agree with Hegel against Plato on the principle of individual choice, initiative, and private property, the latter being the means by which the will first becomes a fact in the material world. It will be remembered that critics have generally ignored Bosanquet's dictum that the state cannot act within the relations of private life. All ideas of the state nationalising private property, or of a 'welfare state' are regarded with horror because if the state were to assume the duties in connection with character, it would destroy those moral qualities it is the duty of the state to maintain. Private property, develops character because it enables the individual to organise his life, thrift being an essential quality. For this reason Bosanquet opposed such

measures as the introduction of free school meals, old age pensions, because they would destroy the individual's sense of responsibility. However, it was at least obvious that the state was failing to promote the best life for the poor and needy and if remedial action was not within its province, the initiative must rest with the society's more fortunate members. This was the purpose of the Charity Organisation Society, an organisation full of upper class condescension whose aim was to develop 'industry, forethought and honesty' in the lower orders, of which Bosanquet was a prominent member. The important point here is that on the question of private property and charity, Bosanquet's assignment of absolute value to the state is clearly inconsistent with itself. In both cases private means come to the rescue of public inadequacy.

Perhaps even more damaging to Marcuse's argument is Bosanquet's attitude to the family. Hegel's tripartite division of social ethics, (the latter defined as 'that systematic character that is enabled to connect (95) the individual or particular will with the universal spirit of the community) into the family, bourgeois society and the state is faithfully followed by Bosanquet. Whereas 'the distinctive character of the state is clear intelligence, explicit law and systems, the natural basis of feeling achieves these needs in the family as a special organ and not in the state as such' (96). The family meal has the 'fundamental elements of a sacrament' (97), and 'the family, or a nation is a far more sacred thing than any Church, because these are what prescribe our duty and educate our will' (98). On this account too, Plato's 'Republic' is criticised for being too totalitarian. However, the family and bourgeois society are not separate realities, but factors in a rational whole, representing identity differentiation and final re-integration in the state. It is in the idealist's view of bourgeois society, admitted to be a world of cash-values and self-interest, that the state conceived as a neutral organ of the common good is shown to lie only in the realm of theory. Bosanquet writes (99): 'It is posterior to the state in time. It is only within the state proper and resting on its solid power, that such a world as that of bourgeois society could arise or be conceivable'. This contains the strange idea of the state as something static, whereas in reality the state is the superstructure upon

the economic base, and adapts itself to the latter's changing needs. The justice it administers in the bourgeois world must be bourgeois justice, i.e. it must protect the capitalist relations of production. Again, to describe the trade unions as the second basis of the state after the family⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ shows a striking lack of a sense of political realities. For Bosanquet such institutions are constituent elements of the social mind, but this depends on the groups being thought of as completing whereas they, are manifestly competing. It is true that in such organisations a member's particular interest becomes a common one, but common with his fellow members not with the state, viz, the recent clash of interests over an Income Policy. The great opponent of those theorists^{of} of the first look has now joined their ranks. In accepting the superficial unity of the state as the reality, Bosanquet has departed from the theory he had so faithfully adhered to. For Hegel, the unity of the state was always a dialectical unity; it contained the seeds of its own destruction. The state is subject to thought, the same element to which it owed its existence, because Hegel saw as a general law of history that social and political reality cannot for any length of time conform to the demands of reason, for the state seeks to maintain the interest of that which is and thus fetters the forces which seek a higher historical form. Bosanquet's great vice was the failure to recognise that the free rationality of thought had long since come into conflict with the given order of society. The state in which the freedom of the subject is in conscious union with the whole remains as yet in the world of mind.

AN ORGANIC THEORY ?

In our attempt to eradicate the confusion which surrounds Bosanquet's use of the 'term' 'state', we were led to the conclusion that for any practical theory, for such in essence the 'Philosophical theory of the state' purports to be, the state must denote that organisation as it exists in the real world and in particular that aspect of society to which belongs the legal and executive power to carry out the general will.

Although the state is nothing apart from individuals, if it is organic, it equally true that individuals apart from society are nothing. The state must exist for the benefit of its component parts, and they likewise must also exist for the benefit of the state. Moreover, it is impossible to separate the welfare of the whole from the welfare of the members and vice-versa. All the evidence hitherto presented bears out that a unity of this kind forms the basis of Bosanquet's state. 'The distinction between such a sum of wills, and a will which aims at a truly common interest or good, rests upon the fundamental contrast between a mere aggregate and an organic unity, which is embodied in the opposing views of society which we have been discussing⁽¹⁰¹⁾. 'The state is, as Plato told us, the individual mind writ large, or as we have said, our mind reinforced by capacities which are of its own nature, but which supplement its defects'⁽¹⁰²⁾. 'Punishment is a return of the offenders act upon himself by a connection inevitable in the moral organism'⁽¹⁰³⁾. In the organism of the state i.e. in so far as we feel and think as citizens, feeling becomes affectionate loyalty'⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Our judgement must therefore be that Bosanquet's theory is organic in-so far as he is attracted by the unity of the living organism and the characteristic of the whole as being more than a mere sum of its parts. The 'in so far as' represents the confusion in Bosanquet's use of the organic analogy, because he refuses to accept the necessary corollary summed up in the criticism of Hobhouse 'that all conscious beings that live under the shadow of the Absolute seem to have just as much or as little entitle to independent consideration as the cells of the human body.'⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ This is quite the reverse of Bosanquet's real view which never accepts the totalitarian-organic equation a fact which explains why he never draws any precise analogy between the body natural and the body politic. For him the individual remains to the end a self conscious organ of the common good so that the social organism is an organism of organisms. It is my contention that Bosanquet is fully aware of the inconsistency involved in the first position but must be criticised for not drawing the necessary conclusion.

* Not so Milne 'Social Philosophy of English Idealism' p.261

On what evidence do I base this claim ? 'The social whole is of the nature of a continuous or self-identical being, pervading a system of differences and realised only in them. It differs from a machine or from what is called an 'organism' pure and simple, by the presence of the whole in every part not merely for the inference of the observer, but in some degree for the part itself, through the action of consciousness' (106). In similar vein: (107) 'We conceived society to be a structure of intelligences so related as to co-operate and imply one another. We took the source of obligation to lie in the fact that the logic of the whole is operative in every part, and consequently that every part has a reality which goes beyond its average self, and identifies it with the whole, making demands upon it in doing so'. Fichte is criticised precisely because his use of the organic analogy being complete, the individual becomes a mere receptive organ incapable of any independent activity. 'Just as in the natural product, every part can be what it is only in this combination and out of this combination would not be this, so only in the combination of the state does man attain a definite position in the series of things, a point of rest in nature' (108). Bosanquet's state in contrast is that 'connection of feeling and insight working throughout the consciousnesses of individuals as parts in a connected structure which unite in willing a certain type of life as a common good in which they find their own' (109). The free expression of opinion by individuals is essential to their acquiescence in the real will, that is, their role as organs in the moral organism. But Bosanquet also thinks that the state is an individual achievement of rationality, although by his own arguments as I have shown, it is also made up of individual achievements of rationality, to wit the activities of its members as members. However, it is not rationality which gives a structure to the parts of an organism, but a merely empirical or de facto system, which precludes any self-conscious activity in the members. Bosanquet having as I believe, recognised this, should have then dissociated himself from the traditional organic analogy, by showing quite logically that society is unlike a living body because it is more organic not less so.

An article by Henry Jones entitled the 'Social Organism',⁽¹¹⁰⁾ offers such a solution. 'May it not be proved that society is more concrete as well as more discrete than any physical type of organism; that it is more concrete because it is more discrete; and that its self-integration is more complete because its self-differentiation is more intense?'⁽¹¹¹⁾ The organism of society is only possible because its components are themselves organic i.e. the freedom and self-consciousness of the individual is emphasised as the only basis of an organism which is not only 'sensitive' but self-conscious in every part. Bosanquet's use of the term 'self-conscious purposive organism'⁽¹¹²⁾ is inconsistent in so far he fails to amend this description of society after the individual has been recognised as a complete organism, with meaning in himself. It must be remarked that freedom for both writers consists of 'answering the demands of one's station and to perform duties which one has not chosen but finds imposed by the social environment',⁽¹¹³⁾ Jones however substituted for Bosanquet's self-transcendence of the individual self-realisation, being opposed to the latter's apparent dualism e.g. finite and infinite relative and absolute, appearance and reality. 'The subjective and objective, the self and the not-self, the particular and the universal, the individual and society, interpenetrate and become an organic whole'. 'Society is an organism not because it is like an animal or because the individual components are like joints and links, but because the individual realises himself as an ethical being in society, and society realises itself in the individual. The life of the whole is the life of every part. The individual is free because he is a member of society and society realises its aims in the freedom of individuals. Freedom is the life which forms the unity of the moral organism.'⁽¹¹⁴⁾ This I believe, to be the essence of Bosanquet's organic theory, although the conclusions which such a theory involved, were never so explicitly formulated as in the essay of Jones. It should be noted however that Bosanquet sees the limitations of the comparison of society with an individual organism.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Human society corresponds in many of its features rather to a local variety of a species than to an individual

organism. It is essentially discrete, not individual, and therefore, the analogy of the individual organism gives way to that of a group or species. In contrast to Jones, Bosanquet sees only one aspect of society as more concrete because it is more discrete i.e. the state, whereas in the wider sphere of human society he falls back on the analogy of a whole animal species, because such a Darwinian survival of the fittest, is in complete accordance with his own theory of inevitable conflict between nation-states.

The state right however, is still not the final right, but must answer as with Hegel, to the 'right' of the World Mind which is the unconditional absolute. The prospect of eternal conflict between states cannot remain the last word. Bosanquet's world-wide view is determined chiefly by logical and aesthetic motives; logical in his quest for theoretical satisfaction through the removal of everything contradictory and irrational; aesthetic in the harmonious completion of his system in a symphony of the Absolute in which all discords find their final solution. His theory was severely tested by the First World War, as is revealed by the author himself writing in 1919⁽¹¹⁶⁾. Then all the old things were true. It is then only spiritual good that is real and stable; earthly and material aims are delusive and dangerous and the root of strife. By spiritual goods, we mean such as can be shared by others without our portion being diminished, beauty, truth, religion. He regards as fundamental the idea that social life presupposes a guide and criterion beyond its current activities. 'Aristotle was surely right when he made religion the ultimate aim and quintessence of civic life, and it is only devotion to these supreme values that can guide desire aright, and keep patriotism clean and sweet.'⁽¹¹⁷⁾ The state is neither ultimate nor above criticism but subordinate to what Bosanquet calls 'this ultra-social and also ultra-individual level of life which represents the highest fulfillment at once of society and the individual'⁽¹¹⁸⁾. But if such values are independent of the social medium is it possible for the priest, poet or philosopher to realise their capacities qua human apart from participation in the lower order represented by the state? The answer given by Bosanquet is an emphatic 'no'. The human mind must be

'consolidated and sustained by society before going further on its path in remaining contradictions and shaping its world and itself into unity'. (119) Art, philosophy, religion, though in a sense the very life-blood of society, are not and could not be directly fashioned to meet the needs and uses of the multitude, and their aim is not in that sense social: they should rather be regarded as a continuation, within and founded upon the commonwealth, as fuller utterances of the same, universal self which the general will reveals in more precarious forms. The organic theory, as we have attributed it to Bosanquet, demands even in its highest sphere that the individual has no life except that which is social, and that he cannot realise his own purposes except in realising the larger purposes of society. Society and individuals from a whole apart from which they are both nothing but names. Their unity is indeed inviolable.

Here then the identification of morality with the service of society breaks down. Truth lies not in the phenomenal world, the state, but in those rare experiences which aid us in conceiving the totality of the universe as a being in which reality coincides with value. Although we live principally in the middle region of conflict and division, that rare feeling we denote as the 'real thing' represents a world which is one both with itself and with ourself, of value at its height and unity at its simplest, the Absolute. There are duties of man to man underived from any society or common good 'the duties of religion are the same as the duties of morality'*. On the negative side, Bosanquet's belief in a better future is hampered by the justification of present evil on the grounds that the Absolute is perfection. Although the latter is real, only as differentiated into constituent selves, 'unique focalisations of the same world in each centre of experience', the individual by his self transcendence seems finally engulfed in an undifferentiated totality.** These defects are evident in Bosanquet's political philosophy, which for all its superficial totalitarianism, ultimately regards the state as the embodiment of the 'social' not 'absolute' spirit.

* Of Moenle : There is good reason to think that Absolute Idealism came to Bosanquet as the solution of grave religious complexities'. (p.248).

** Milne argues that the Idealist Social Philosophy has no necessary connection with the Absolute. It may be unsatisfactory but I have tried to show that B's metaphysics guides the political theory did not vice-versa. and

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