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THE SUEZ CRISIS

A Study in Press Performance

by Harold Evans

B.A. Hons. (Dunelm, 1952)

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Degree of Master of Arts

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THE SUEZ CRISIS
A Study in Press Performance

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Photo-copies of a few Suez front pages
are included for interest

CHECK LISTS AND MASTER SHEET

In a separately bound folder there are included:

1. Master Sheet giving the daily total factual scores
for each publication and the total non-factual score,
divided by categories.
2. A sample check list used in the study.
3. A sample theme list used in the study.

P R E F A C E

Britain's intervention in Israel's war with Egypt in October, 1956, was a time of grave strain for Anglo-American relations. Britain acted independently of the United States and the British Government had to explain and defend its actions to the world. Britain - and her Suez ally, France - faced considerable criticisms. The intervention itself was criticised. Its motives were suspected. Its results were derided.

The subject of this study is how a number of American newspapers and magazines reported the crisis to the American people. The concentration throughout in the assessment is on the reporting of the British-French case; other subsidiary findings are included, however, since it was necessary to study and analyse all the reporting on the Suez crisis.

SECTION I

AIMS AND METHODS

CHAPTER 1

Aims of the Study

There were suggestions during the Suez crisis that the British case had not been properly put to the world. On the other hand, a report for the International Press Institute by the United States correspondent of an English newspaper* said, after the crisis, that the British case for intervention had been well reported:

"The biggest story of the recent past, however, remains the invasion of the Suez Canal. Like no other story in the last 15 years, it seriously shook the Anglo-American alliance and confronted the American press with a great dilemma: a popular President who had the support of most American newspapers decided to oppose America's closest ally who had decided to part ways with the United States on this crucial occasion. Initially the importance of the British-French ultimatum was underestimated by most American newspapers, but from then on the crisis was handled with great skill and objectivity. And though it had to compete with the American elections and the revolt in Hungary, it was given ample space and in its factual treatment showed the American reporting at its best. In spite of unfriendly to hostile guidance from Administration quarters the American press, though critical, remained surprisingly sympathetic to Britain. It showed itself a sturdier supporter of the Anglo-American alliance than either the British press or the Eisenhower Administration; it therefore deserves great credit for having helped in averting a more serious alienation between the American and British people."

*Britain in the American Press, by Henry Brandon of the Sunday Times, May 1957, I.P.I., Zurich.

The questions posed in this study were:

1. Did the publications studied report the official British objectives for intervening in Egypt?
2. Were the stated British arguments for intervention reported?
3. Were the newspapers and magazines ready to print rumours of collusion between Britain (France) and Israel?
4. Did they print such suspicions as fact, or did they print them as allegation?
5. Did they report for the American reader the international debate on the Suez intervention?
6. Were there any significant differences between individual papers in their coverage? Between newspapers and magazines? Between newspapers of different syndicates?
7. Does the study suggest any conclusions about how the performance of the Press can be effectively tested?

This is a study of Press performance. Whether the performance of the Press had any effects on public attitudes is a further and separate question. It could, of course, be argued that the attainment of good foreign relations is not merely a matter of sound foreign policy. Effective co-operation, it might reasonably be argued, requires wide mutual understanding of policies and their assumptions and such understanding requires a full flow of news and opinion.

CHAPTER 2

The Suez Debate

A brief recapitulation of the Suez crisis will assist the reader. Titles of books on the crisis are included in the bibliography.

The root of the crisis goes back to July 26, 1956, when President Nasser of Egypt announced the nationalisation of the Suez canal in a speech at Alexandria. The two principal Suez canal shareholders, the British and French Governments, at once strongly protested. There was a long summer of diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement.

The Suez crisis itself, with which this study is concerned, opened on October 29 when Israeli troops crossed the frontier into Egypt and headed towards the Suez canal. The Israeli invasion and the British-French ultimatum occurred during two other important international events.

In the last week in October 1956 revolution had broken out in Hungary against the Communist rulers; and in the United States Adlai Stevenson, for the Democrats, was challenging the retiring Republican President Eisenhower. With Eisenhower critical of the British-French action, the intervention became a subject for debate in the U.S. elections. In Hungary it seemed at first that the Soviet Union was prepared to acquiesce in a victory for the rebels,

but a few days after the British-French intervention an apparent retreat by Soviet military forces was dramatically reversed and the Hungarian rebellion was swiftly crushed. Britain and France were blamed by some commentators for this apparent change of policy; it was argued that the resort to force in the Middle East had encouraged the Russians to do the same in Eastern Europe.

Throughout this period there was considerable international debate - on the objectives of the Anglo-French action, on the justifications for it, if any. There were charges, which were denied, that Britain and France had plotted with Israel to attack Egypt in the hope of regaining control of the Suez canal.

Egypt was accused of provoking the crisis by the nationalisation and its hostility to Israel. The House of Commons was a vital part of this international debate since here British policy was defined by the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and attacked by the official Opposition. From Egypt there were fewer international messages, partly perhaps because of the nature of the political system and another factor which has since become known: President Nasser was suffering from a bad attack of laryngitis for which his doctor had prescribed little talking.

SUEZ: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

- October 29, 1956 Israel's Army crossed the Egyptian frontier "to destroy Egyptian commando bases", according to the Israel Foreign Ministry.
- October 30
(afternoon) The British Government handed an ultimatum to the Egyptian ambassador in London and the Israeli charge d'affaires. This ultimatum said Britain and France would occupy key positions in the Suez canal zone unless Israel and Egypt stopped fighting and withdrew 10 miles from the canal.
- 4.30 - 5.40 p.m.
(GMT) Sir Anthony Eden defended the ultimatum in the Commons. He said that unless fighting was stopped the free passage of the Suez canal would be jeopardised. The British Government had, therefore, asked Egypt to agree to Anglo-French forces temporarily occupying key positions to guarantee freedom of transit for ships and separate the belligerents.
- 4.00 p.m. United Nations: The Security Council assembled to consider the situation. After debate Britain and France vetoed first a United States

then a Soviet resolution calling on Israel to withdraw and all participants to cease fire.

October 31, a.m. The Security Council decided to summon a special meeting of the General Assembly.

October 31 Israel accepted the British-French ultimatum, Egypt rejected it. British-French planes bombed military targets in Egypt.

November 1 Eden called for United Nations police force for Suez once position 'stabilised'.

November 2 The United Nations General Assembly urged an immediate cease fire and a halt to all military movements.

November 3 Britain and France replied to the United Nations resolution. Sir Anthony Eden said "Police action must be carried through urgently to stop hostilities threatening the canal". But he said Britain and France would stop if both Egypt and Israel accepted a United Nations force to keep the peace and, until its arrival, limited detachments of Anglo-French troops.

November 3-4 United Nations Assembly instructed the
Secretary General to prepare plans for a
United Nations police force.

November 3-4 Soviet tanks returned to Budapest to suppress
Hungarian rebels.

November 5 British and French troops landed at Suez.

November 5 Russia warned Britain and France that they
might face attack if they did not stop fight-
ing in Egypt.

November 5 Egypt and Israel accepted a United Nations
police force and announced they were ready to
cease fire - the conditions laid down by Eden
on November 3 for a cease fire.

November 6
6.00 p.m. Britain said she would end military operations
from midnight. Eden rebuffed Soviet warning
of November 5.

November 8 Israel agreed to withdraw and co-operate with
a United Nations Expeditionary Force.

November 9 Britain said British troops would withdraw when
the United Nations Expeditionary Force was in
position.

November 10 Russia suggested volunteers should be allowed
 into Egypt to eject Britain and France.

November 15 Egypt said she did not now want volunteers.

November 15 First United Nations Expeditionary Force
 advance unit arrived in Suez canal zone.

November 18 United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld ended two days of talks in Cairo with
 President Nasser on clearing the Suez canal,
 blocked by sunken ships.

SOME PERSONALITIES IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

Britain

Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary

Lord Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor

Mr. Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War

Sir Pierson Dixon, British delegate at the
United Nations

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Opposition

General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander-in-
Chief, joint British-French forces.

France

M. Guy Mollet, Prime Minister

M. Christian Pineau, Foreign Minister

Louis de Guiringaud, United Nations delegate

Egypt

President Gamel Nasser

Mr. Omar Loufti, delegate at the United
Nations

Dr. M. Fawzi, Foreign Minister

Israel

Mr. Ben Gurion, Prime Minister

General Moshe Dayan, Commander Israeli
armed forces

Mrs. Golda Meir, Foreign Minister

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador to U.S.

United States

President Eisenhower

Adlai Stevenson, Democratic candidate for
Presidency

Henry Cabot Lodge jr., U.S. representative at
the United Nations

John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State

United Nations

Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General

General E. Burns, Commander United Nations
Expeditionary Force.

U.S.S.R.

N. Bulganin, Prime Minister

A. Sobolev, United Nations representative

D. Shepilov, Foreign Minister

N. Khrushchev, Communist Party Secretary

Canada

Lester B. Pearson, Minister for External

Affairs and advocate of a United Nations
Expeditionary Force.

CHAPTER 3

Handling the News

This chapter is a sketch of various factors within newspaper production affecting the handling of foreign news. It is included to give some idea of the working side of the press and conditions affecting the performance of the newspapers in this study at the time of the Suez crisis.

The vast majority of American daily newspapers depend for their foreign news on the services of news agencies. These, for a fee, supply news ("copy") directly into the offices of subscribing newspapers by means of teleprinter machines. This copy is called "telegraph" or "wire" copy in the United States to distinguish it from reports written by the newspaper's own staff in its own publication area. Only a few of the American daily newspapers maintain their own full time correspondents abroad - at the time of this study the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Daily News, the Christian Science Monitor, the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Daily News. A study by the International Press Institute in 1953* showed that the news agencies supplied almost three quarters of the foreign news examined in 105 American newspapers.

* Flow of News, I.P.I., Zurich 1953.

In the larger foreign cities the news agencies employ their own staff reporters; other journalists in outlying areas ("stringers") are paid for contributions to the bureau head office in the capital. In addition, most of the agencies have agreements with foreign news agencies to enable them to pick and use the news gathered by the foreign agency. The Associated Press has access to the messages of the Press Association, the British domestic agency, and from these it had an extensive service of Parliamentary reports during the Suez crisis.

The Associated Press is the most important U.S. news agency. Almost two thirds of all U.S. dailies are members of the Associated Press (AP). It is co-operatively owned by them. At the time of this study a little less than half of the American press also subscribed to the United Press Association (UP), a privately owned news agency. Slightly less than one fifth of American dailies subscribed to the International News Service (INS), another privately owned agency. At the time of the IPI study the figures were:

245 U.S. dailies received both AP and UP

54 received both AP and INS

27 received both UP and INS

174 received the service of all three U.S. agencies

(AP, UP, INS).

In addition to the American agencies supplying foreign news, there is Reuters, the agency co-operatively owned by the British Press.

In 1956 Reuters was supplying news to 53 U.S. newspapers. The service west of the Mississippi was distributed through the Chicago Tribune.

There is one final source of foreign news in U.S. newspapers - the syndicated services. At a fee, U.S. newspapers can buy the syndicated foreign news service of the New York Times; the New York Herald Tribune; the Chicago Tribune; New York Daily News; or the Chicago Daily News (as it was in 1956). The Scripps Howard Newspaper Alliance operates a news service exclusively for the Scripps Howard newspapers.

All the news agencies and syndicated news services are represented in one way or another in this study. It includes a newspaper solely dependent on AP; and one solely dependent on the UP. The others combine agencies and syndicated services in different ways. What the agencies supply and what the newspapers use are, however, two different things,

The news agencies have to serve clients with different interests, different news judgments, and different newspaper sizes. The same Associated Press service of foreign news goes to the small town daily newspaper with perhaps only a quarter of the editorial space of the big city newspaper. All the newspapers are on the same teletype channels, and the agency supplies the news in bulk, leaving it to individual newspapers to cut, reshape, and headline according to their interests and space requirements. This is an

important point in the study of foreign news reporting. The adequacy of the American press coverage of the Suez crisis could not be gleaned by examining the dispatches wired, say, by the Associated Press. What happened to those dispatches in widely different newspaper offices is vital.

What happens to a news agency dispatch depends within the receiving newspaper on a number of variable factors. To appreciate these it is necessary to know a little of the mechanics of newspaper production. The methods vary slightly from office to office but the general practice is for all the foreign news to be channelled through one man. On a large paper with its own foreign staff, like the New York Times, he is the cable desk editor; the telegraph editor is responsible for the national news on the telegraph (i.e. teleprinters). In newspapers without their own foreign staff, it is more general for the one telegraph editor to handle all the telegraph copy, national and international. He decides how much space, if any, each report is worth, a decision that is subject to review by the night managing editor or his assistants and by the arrival of later news which may compete successfully for space. Once the assessment is made, the telegraph copy goes to a copy reader who carries out the instructions about the length of the story and the headline. There may be anything from one or two to a score of copy readers depending on the size of the newspaper. Practical considerations make it impossible to see that the same

copy-holder handles the same subject as it develops over a period.

The adequacy with which a Suez crisis statement is reported depends therefore on these factors:

(a) Space

The number of columns in the newspaper open that day to receive editorial matter. This varies. The economic page sizing of a newspaper varies in direct relationship with the volume of advertising.

(b) Time

To be distributed efficiently over wide areas, newspapers produce various editions at different times. Editorial material must meet strict fixed deadlines and reports received after that deadline will ordinarily not appear in that edition. When very important reports miss all the editions of a newspaper one day, they will often be summarised in the next day's issue.

(c) Judgment

The judgment of the telegraph editor or other news executive on the merit of the news agency report and the amount of space it should therefore occupy in relation to other news.

(d) Skill

The copy-holder, while working within the fixed space limit for a report, can cover the ground of the dispatch in fewer words than the original reporter did if he is skilled in his craft of condensation.

These four factors suggest that hypothetically the best coverage of a foreign affairs crisis like Suez would be expected to come from a big city newspaper with its own foreign reporters supplementing the agencies; with a consistently large number of pages, and hence news space, each day; with a large capacity for setting type quickly to be able to deal more effectively with later news; with several editions a day to catch up on late news developing; with a high degree of editorial skill in the processing of the news; and with an objective editorial policy.

Even for the largest newspaper, it has to be realised that selection and condensation of agency reports is the norm. Newspapers try to cover a range of subjects and not even the largest could print the full flow of news agency reports. The IPI study* suggested that an average was a newspaper which in one ordinary week printed 29 columns of foreign dateline news out of material for 200 columns supplied by afternoon cycles of two agencies, or about 14 per cent of the supply. A Middle Western afternoon paper had available to it in one week from the afternoon cycles of four agencies enough to fill 447 columns. Much of this duplicated the same event; the newspaper used 15 columns.

The editorial skill in judging and condensing agency reports is just as important as the factors of space and time. A high degree of skill can to some extent offset the limitations of both space and time, especially of space. By careful editing more facts

* Op. cit. p.11.

can be squeezed into limited space; and this is very relevant to this study since newspapers are to be judged on their reporting of the facts.

A news agency report can be shortened in two ways:

- (a) The first few paragraphs of the report can be used and the rest discarded ("spiked").
- (b) An attempt can be made to precis the dispatch so that all the main points considered important are reported either more crisply or in summary style without subsidiary supporting detail.

This is the art of sub-editing, as it is called in the United Kingdom. In the United States the work is "copy-reading" and the different terms reveal a fundamental difference in approach to the work. The copy-reader on the American daily newspaper is indeed more of a copy reader and less of an editor. He does not attempt to precis and paraphrase a dispatch in the same way as an experienced British sub-editor does. The British sub-editor is trained to edit "tightly" - to cross out verbose phrases used by the reporter; to use one word where it will do the work of two; to summarise in briefer, crisper English, preferring the more lively active voice, partly because it consumes fewer words and less space than the passive voice. Wartime newsprint rationing in Britain brought this skill to a fine pitch and a good sub-editor takes pride in being able to convert into half a column a report that would take a column if printed as received - without losing a single

relevant fact or straining a meaning. Of course this is skilful work and it has its dangers of distortion when done too hurriedly or unintelligently. Failing to do it, however, means that fewer facts of a crisis can be reported, and this failure would be all the more important in the United States because the news agency reports are written very much more wordily than the average reporter's copy. It might help to give an illustration of a general nature not related to Suez. First, an AP dispatch as it appeared:

The toll of traffic deaths among Americans celebrating the nation's freedom rose steadily yesterday. The count climbed to 110 for the Independence Day holiday period that began at 6 p.m. Wednesday and will end at midnight Sunday. The National Safety Council commented that, while the number was pushing up, it was not keeping pace with the total or the corresponding time of the four-day Fourth of July Observance in 1961 when it reached a record 509.

The worst single accident cost the lives of six members of a family from Butler, Pa., who had set out for a pleasure ride in their new car.

Dry, pleasant weather in most sections of the country encouraged heavy travel. The council has estimated that motor vehicle accidents may kill 550 to 650 persons during the four day Independence observance. That would be a record far exceeding the old mark for a July 4th period of 509 set in 1961. The record for a holiday period of any kind was established during a four day observance of Christmas in 1956. It is 706.

To draw comparisons the Associated Press made a survey of traffic fatalities during the four day non holiday period running from 6 p.m. Wednesday June 19 to midnight Sunday June 23. The tally was 458. Traffic deaths holding at record levels have averaged 100 a day through the first five months of this year.

July 4 boating accidents cost 12 lives and drownings 40.

Here is the same report as it would be after quick editing
by a trained sub-editor:

The toll of traffic deaths among Americans celebrating the nation's freedom rose steadily as dry pleasant weather encouraged heavy travel in most parts. By last night 110 had died since 6 p.m. on Wednesday.

Six members of a family from Butler, Pa., out for a pleasure ride in their new car died yesterday in the worst accident of the Independence Day holidays.

The National Safety Council said, however, deaths were not keeping pace with last year. It had previously estimated that 550 or 650 might die between Wednesday and the end of the holiday on Sunday, which would top the Independence record of 509 deaths in 1961. The all-time record for a holiday was Christmas 1956 when 706 died over four days.

How does a non-holiday period compare? For the four days from 6 p.m. Wednesday, June 19, to midnight Sunday, June 23, 458 died. This year traffic deaths, at record levels, have averaged 100 a day in the first five months.

July 4 boating accidents cost 12 lives and drownings 40.

The second version saves 85 words or $3\frac{3}{4}$ inches of a $9\frac{1}{2}$ inch news report. That space saved could be used for more holiday news or for other news. Over many columns, savings like this would be very large.

Sub-editing in this way is hardly attempted on American newspapers. The difference will be seen to have some relevance to this study. Since the author completed the newspaper reading and marking for this study, he has been on another visit to the United States to study the editorial production of American daily newspapers. This suggested that the differences in editing were more

fundamental than generally appreciated. A common practice is for editing to be done by length. The telegraph editor faced with a news agency report of four long telegraph "takes" (somewhat longer than a foolscap sheet) and space available for only a quarter of it, commonly spikes the last three sheets with no more than a cursory glance and passes only the one sheet to the copy-reader. The copy-reader then has no opportunity to condense the whole report - and has no incentive to do so anyway since he will need to use all the copy he has been given to fill the allocated space. (Frequently a newspaper supplied by two or three agencies will print the one version and not attempt to combine or relate the two; this means an opportunity is missed to check the particular news judgments made by one agency reporter with the other.)

In not attempting to precis a full agency dispatch, two assumptions are made by the telegraph editor and news executives: That the introductory portion selected by length for publication is incapable of being significantly shortened; and that the news agency reporter will have assembled the most important facts at the beginning of his report so that a newspaper printing only the beginning of the report will none the less have the most important facts. These assumptions are not conscious assumptions; they are rarely verified; they are frequently not justified.

The trained reporter will know that he should include the most important facts at the beginning of his dispatch and his report will have had the benefit of some editing at the agency's headquarters.

However, it has to be remembered again that the news agency has the task of supplying news to a myriad assortment of newspapers with varying needs and space.

The ideal development of a narrative for instance may be to give three key facts at the beginning plus supporting detail and then go on to what the reporter judges subsidiary facts and give their supporting detail. However, the newspaper with little space would be better served by having the six bare points all together at the beginning, dispensing with subsidiary detail and description. If the dispatch is supplied to suit the larger paper - and dispatches tend to be written this way - the smaller paper news executives will have to read the full report and bring the six points into the available space. This is a point about longer dispatches, of which there were many in the Suez crisis, but it can be illustrated by the previous agency example. A paper short of space would not be making the best factual use of it if it merely printed, say, the first three paragraphs of that report which was intended for full publication. Phrases like "celebrating the nation's freedom" are dispensable for a tighter factual report.

Finally, a few words about the time factor. Urgent news is transmitted very quickly indeed. A significant statement made in the House of Commons would be on cable desks in the United States within minutes. Reuters in particular is adept at this. It has its own reporters in the House of Commons to supplement the Press

Association (the British domestic agency). The PA keeps a running report going into the London office of Reuters so that a speaker's remarks would reach the Reuters editors within minutes of being made, and would be given abbreviated priority transmission. Less urgent but none the less pertinent statements from the Commons could safely be said to move from the Commons to the agency and on to editorial desks in the United States within an hour. Another hour would be an ample allowance for the handling of the statement in the American newspaper, covering its editing and conversion into type. Reasonably important statements made in Britain during Suez should therefore have easily been able to meet deadlines two hours later in American newspaper offices.

The time factor is complicated of course by the time differences between Britain and the United States. When Eden made a statement in the Commons at 3 p.m. in London, it was five hours earlier in New York - 10 a.m. It was eight hours earlier in San Francisco - 7 a.m. This means an afternoon statement in England was readily available by teleprinter to evening newspapers publishing in the United States. A Pacific Time newspaper with a main edition going to press at 2 p.m. from the composing room could, if it wished, easily print, say, a 400 word report based on a statement made in London the same day at 8 p.m. London time (noon Pacific time).

A time-change table is added for easy reference:

Time in London, Paris	Time for			
	Phila- delphia Inquirer, Wall St. Journal (EASTERN TIME)	Chicago Tribune, Quincy Herald Whig (CENTRAL TIME)	Denver Post (MOUNTAIN TIME)	San Francisco newspapers (PACIFIC TIME)
Noon	7 a.m.	6 a.m.	5 a.m.	4 a.m.
3 p.m.	10 a.m.	9 a.m.	8 a.m.	7 a.m.
4 p.m.	11 a.m.	10 a.m.	9 a.m.	8 a.m.
5 p.m.	Noon	11 a.m.	10 a.m.	9 a.m.
6 p.m.	1 p.m.	Noon	11 a.m.	10 a.m.
8 p.m.	3 p.m.	2 p.m.	1 p.m.	Noon
10 p.m.	5 p.m.	4 p.m.	3 p.m.	2 p.m.

CHAPTER 4

Method of the Study

How can the performance of the Press be judged with fairness? Anyone can read a selection of newspapers and write a personal judgment. The trouble is three different readers may produce three totally different impressions; and no one can say any one impression is more valid than another.

This is the basic weakness of most comment on Press performance. It is arbitrary and subjective. It criticises selectivity and bias in a biased and selective way. A new method for the analysis of the news item, which it is hoped may gain some general acceptance, has been devised for this study. The case for it will be discussed here after an examination of traditional methods of studying press performance. Notes on the objectivity and reliability of the method devised have been separated from this main development of the method and will be found in Appendix II (p. 268).

Traditional Methods of judging Press performance

(i) Impressionism. This is the most common. The assessor reads the newspaper(s), then writes a considered judgment, quoting extracts to prove his judgment. This assessment is highly subjective. It depends on perceptions and intuitions and judgments throughout may be affected by preconceived notions. With impressionistic studies we are frequently not told whether the study has

been confined to the verbal elements of the text; the verbal elements of the headline; or the display elements of report and headline (i.e. the degree of prominence for the report).

A good example of impressionism is As Others See Us, published in 1954 by the International Press Institute (Zurich). It was an attempt to gauge how well various countries were reported in the Press of other countries. For instance Mr. Alex Faulkner, U.S. correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph, wrote for the International Press Institute a most readable view of American Press coverage of Britain. He was supplied by the I.P.I. with a file of U.S. newspaper cuttings and he selected quotations from these to illustrate his thesis that much of the U.S. Press reporting degenerates into stereotypes of John Bull as a "panhandler", a bully, a deadbeat.

But Mr. Faulkner did not tell us just how widespread the distortion was. He did not tell us whether he was quoting every instance of distortion or a minute proportion. His report was strictly a personal impression. He may have been unconsciously selective. Conceivably, it might have been possible to select different quotations, even from the same sample, to support an entirely different judgment. We do not know - the I.P.I. did not publish the selected cuttings.

Inevitably, any debate on reports like this goes round in a circle. We cannot judge the fairness of the method because there is no method. Hence the conclusions are considerably reduced in

value. The same criticisms apply to the Suez assessment quoted on page 1 of this study.

This may be one of the reasons why many working editors are suspicious of auditors of the Press. In the United States the proposal of the Commission on Freedom of the Press (1948) that a new agency should be established to appraise and report annually on Press performance has come to nothing. So has the survey of alleged bias proposed in 1956 by the Editor and Publisher, the professional and trade review of newspapers in the United States.

(ii) Column Inches. The recoil from impressionism has produced many studies of press content based on the defining and measuring of content. The International Press Institute; Schools of Journalism in the United States; Political and Economic Planning* in this country; and the 1948 Royal Commission on the Press* have all used this approach.

The newspaper is divided into categories such as sport/crime/politics/foreign news, and the amount of space given to each is measured, different newspapers being compared with each other. This method tells us something of the newspapers' interests, but little of how fairly they treat what they select. Even large differences in the amount of space given to one political party

* Report on the British Press, 1946, by P.E.P. (Appendix C)
What's in the papers (P.E.P. Vol. XXII No. 393, 1956)
1948 Royal Commission on the Press Appendix, Part I.

compared with another are not conclusive evidence of bias. The measurement of column inches tells us nothing about the qualitative content of the column inches. It tells us nothing about the accuracy or fairness of that content. Conceivably the longest reports could be the worst, the most cleverly distorted, the most devoted to irrelevancies. A measurement of column inches tells us nothing for certain about omissions of fact: but the power of the press is the power to suppress.

(iii) Thematic Content Analysis. Though neglected in this country, this method has been widely used in the United States in analysing the content of newspapers and history text books*. Basically it is an attempt first to detect then to quantify the ideas being purveyed. The initial analysis of the ideas into themes does justice to the qualitative content in the way the measurement of column inches does not; counting the frequency of the themes as they occur meets the objections to impressionism. A thematic content analysis of various newspapers was considered for this study. The method would have been this:

From a reading of selected newspapers and magazines over the period various recurrent themes would have been noted and divided into categories. (One theme, for instance, would have been: "That Britain is committing aggression". This might have been put into a category "Unfavourable to Britain".)

* Several examples are given in the Bibliography on methods of media analysis.

Once the themes had been discovered, the material would have been carefully scanned and the frequency by sentence of the various themes would have been counted so that we would, in the end, have a picture of the actual content of the papers and magazines.

We could have answered such questions as: Were many themes unfavourable to Britain present in the United States press at the time? Which newspaper carried the largest amount of themes hostile to Britain? And so on.

However, there are serious difficulties about relying on thematic analysis as a test of press performance. It gives a picture of content, but it does not seem a good method by itself for the detection of bias. For instance, in the Suez crisis a newspaper with a prevalence of themes unfavourable to Britain might not be guilty of bias at all. It might merely be that more statements unfavourable to Britain were available for reporting and the newspaper was faithfully recording them.

Conversely, a newspaper with a predominance of themes favourable to Britain might, in this situation, be guilty of suppression.

What is missing in the conventional content analysis is any account of the material available for reporting. Yet unless that is given we have no standard against which to relate the reports. We need to know not only the themes in the newspapers and magazines. We need also to have a picture of the material from which these themes came - the speeches and incidents of the Suez crisis. Only then can we start to judge whether the reporting of the crisis was

fair and adequate.

It was a consideration of these difficulties that led to the formulation of the method of this study.

The Check List

The question then is how we can measure the content of a newspaper's Suez reporting against the information content of the crisis. A check list has value. All the important facts of the event are listed first, then the newspaper is scanned to see how many of these facts it has reported. This in a simple but effective way was the method used by Mr. R. Silverman in his research for the first Royal Commission on the Press (1948) in Part II "Reporting of Selected News Items 1946-7".

Mr. Silverman's method was to compare certain news reports in the newspapers with the absolute standard of an independent printed report. For instance, he listed the most important facts available to newspapers at a press conference of the National Coal Board, then gave the newspaper a mark of 1 for every fact it reported. The same technique was used by obtaining official housing figures: "It was then possible to relate the (newspaper) report to the information on which it was or ought to have been based and consider whether it was a fair summary of that information."

There is, however, a fundamental weakness in the check list method and the Royal Commission report did not attempt to overcome it. Hypothetically it would be possible for a newspaper to score

100 per cent on the facts but still not be reporting the news fairly. For in addition to giving the facts on the check list it could:

- (a) Interpolate prejudicial or favourable colour words
- (b) Interpolate prejudicial or favourable opinions
- (c) Juxtapose facts in an unfavourable way
- (d) Fail to give background fully or fairly.

The Royal Commission conclusions recognised that there was more to a news item than facts. Of one newspaper the main report said: "Reports of fact are coloured by the use of pejorative adjectives, the imputation of motives, and the admixture of comment and the correspondent's inferences are represented as facts." The research, however, did not attempt to justify this insightful comment or analyse the material which provoked it in either a systematic or objective manner. It quite failed to take account in a defined manner of what we shall call the non-factual elements of the news item.

The check list cannot be relied on by itself because by definition it excludes the non-factual elements of the news item. The Royal Commission research gives us no idea of the frequency or intensity in the news columns of material other than the plain statement of fact. Mr. Silverman implicitly recognises this weakness in remarks such as: "The newspaper treated the housing return in a very unsatisfactory manner, introducing much comment" (p.316)

but his report does not tell us how much is "much" and what it was - whether the comment followed a consistent theme, for instance, nor, indeed, whether it was clearly distinguishable as comment. "Reports in this newspaper had a rather critical tone", says the report vaguely without any further definition or example.

For a fair test of press performance, therefore, we need a method which not only can relate the information available to the information relayed by the newspaper; but which, at the same time, can also indicate the frequency and intensity of other matter obtruding on this information in the same news report. A check list can meet the first requirement; a thematic content analysis can meet the second requirement. Essentially it is a combination of these two methods which is the method devised for this study.

Basis of the Method for this Study

A newspaper's content can be divided into:

A. Verbal elements

- (i) Wording of the headline
- (ii) The text of the news item

B. Display elements

- (i) The news item's position in the paper
- (ii) The typographical devices such as the size of heading and type used for the content of the report.

This study is basically concerned with the reporting of the Suez crisis - the flow of primarily international messages. These

are the information content of the crisis; they fall under definition A above, essentially A (ii).

The display elements one might call the "attention content" of the crisis, rather than the information content: The way in which information is brought to the reader's immediate attention or withheld from the reader's immediate attention. A close study of the display elements of a newspaper can be interesting for a study of press performance, especially between newspapers of different political beliefs reporting the same political event, and especially in the multipage United States newspapers. For Suez, however, the crisis was automatically the predominant news and a preliminary reading confirmed the view that display elements were marginal to the purpose of the study and did not merit a systematic analysis. Where occasionally a display element did in any way suggest a modification of the conclusions being drawn from a study of the information content, this was noted separately, and is mentioned where relevant in the discussion of each publication.

Analysing the Verbal Content

The fundamental verbal content of a newspaper is of course the text of the news item (since the news item text also determines the possibilities of the verbal content of the headlines). The problem of method is objectively to do justice to the richness and complexity

of the news item. This is where traditional methods, including the Royal Commission research, have stopped short. A study of press performance just cannot begin by regarding the news item as made up of homogeneous parts all amenable to the same method of analysis or assessment.

It is essential to analyse the very different constituents of a news item. The view advanced here is that the news item may be made up of some or all of the following:

- (a) Attributed statements
- (b) Partially attributed statements
- (c) Privately attributed statements
- (d) Non-attributed statements and non-attributable colour.

(a) Attributed statements:

What is the information content of the crisis? Basically it consists of attributed statements.

In the Suez crisis there was a great flow of messages. In a sense these were the crisis. In London Eden announced the Anglo-French ultimatum, and he outlined the reasons for it. In Cyprus and London the British military authorities issued communiques about the military action. In Washington President Eisenhower gave the American view of British/French intervention. In New York at the United Nations and in capitals all over the world, official spokesmen gave their national view and said what action they would take. President Nasser and Radio Cairo spoke for Egypt, arguing their case, reporting bombing raids and other military moves.

Now these are statements freely available to all the newspapers, statements attributable to specific spokesmen and verifiable independently. We shall call these statements the facts of the crisis.

The Facts, in this sense, might be statements on a specific day giving news of physical action, such as bombing or protest demonstration. Or they may be speeches, presenting an opinion or arguing a case.

The truth or falsity of the opinion or news is irrelevant so long as it does come from a specific named source external to the newspaper publishing it. This is a parallel with court reporting. A newspaper must publish both sides of the case. It is not for it to decide that one witness is telling lies and suppress his evidence. A balanced report of all the evidence must be given.

Thus a British statement denying collusion with Israel is to the newspaper as much a "fact" as the Egyptian statement alleging collusion. An Egyptian high command statement alleging the bombing of Cairo is to the newspaper as much a fact as the British statement denying the bombing of Cairo. Both statements were made. Both were freely available. Both are facts.

This is the basic information content of the crisis, the normal raw material of a check list. This is the basic measuring rod. It is clearly factual, and equally available to all the newspapers studied. But newspaper columns legitimately contain other information than specifically attributable statements, as we have insisted. They contain those (b) partially attributed statements; (c) privately

attributed statements; and (d) unattributed statements.

We shall categorise these together as "Non-Factual" content.

(b) Partially attributed:

Often newspapers carry stories in the news columns for which the authority quoted is "official sources", "reliable circles" or "informed opinion". The information or opinion conveyed with this vague attribution may have come from a Government official or Cabinet Minister, who wished to remain anonymous. He may have merely given a questioning reporter hints which the reporter has had to construe in his own way. Or he may have given specific information. He may merely have wished to "fly a kite" - to test public reaction to one of several opinions or courses of action being considered.

Again, the information may have come from an official but private Press briefing where the spokesman wanted to be anonymous. Quite possibly it may have come entirely from the imagination of an informed reporter who feels he is sufficiently in touch with official feelings to express his view of them independently. We do not know. Is this factual matter? We must treat this kind of content as quite different from a verifiable public statement which is specifically attributable to a named individual or organisation.

With the latter there can, in the end, be no disagreement about what is said, what has to be reported. With the "source" stories two reporters may legitimately produce two different viewpoints, quoting the same vague source. And even if the viewpoints are

similar, the tone of such a report must depend a good deal more than in an ordinary news report on the reporter who puts hints and generalisations into sentences.

This is certainly not to doubt the virtue of un-named lobby reporting. It is merely to make a distinction that is important in any attempt to measure Press performance. Here are two examples of the partially attributed statement which we shall classify as Non-Factual material:

"Most of Washington plainly was convinced that the British and French had put Israel up to the attack to provide them with a pretext for forcible capture of the canal from Nasser".

"Moslem embassies in Washington hint Nasser's days may be numbered even though their countries are ostensibly behind him".

In the same category we must put:

"Average Indians are much more concerned with the attacks on Egypt than with the attack on Hungary".

Or:

"Canadians have been shocked by the French/British attack on Egypt".

(c) Privately attributed:

In this general group of Non-Factual statements we must also include the reporter's own by-lined stories where personal assessments for their newspapers are given. For instance:

"I can positively state than the prime idea was to give Egypt a sudden sharp slap".

This is part of a military reporter's piece and the "I" is the military reporter himself. Another military reporter might write the opposite.

Or again:

"When I visited the hospital it had no light, no water, no food, and no medical supplies".

Or the news analysts who make comments in news columns:

"I think the time had come to slap down Nasser and Tony Eden knew it and was willing to bet his life on it".

These are all personal statements made for the newspaper. There is no external verifiable source. They are not generally available as Facts are. Again, this is not decrying such reporting. It has its part. The point is that for the analysis it can be separately analysed and studied in relationship to the reporting of the independently verifiable Facts.

(d) Completely non-attributed statements:

A number of statements in news columns appear without any attribution at all. For instance:

"British and French military forces plan to occupy strategic positions in the canal zone until Nasser's influence in the Middle East has been destroyed".

This is not a statement from any communique, or allegation in a speech. It is really no more than the opinion of the newspaper or news agency, but it appears with the categorical flavour of a "fact" in the news column.

True enough, the idea may have started life as the allegation in a speech, specifically attributed, and therefore a fact. But its repetition, without any attribution, puts it in quite a different category.

This also must be classified as Non-Factual matter. It is supplementary to the basic information content of the crisis, as represented by the factual matter generally available and independently verifiable.

Colour: Finally, there is non-attributable Colour. By this we mean derogatory adjectives or phrases or loaded words. Such devices may legitimately occur in a specifically attributed statement. The spokesman himself may use loaded words. But they also appear without any attribution whatsoever: They are written in by the reporter, or copyholder, and so they, too, are surplus to the basic information content of the crisis.

For instance:

"The British spokesman scoffed at Russian charges that the Anglo-French manoeuvre - taken outside U.N. jurisdiction - invaded the sovereignty of Egypt".

The words "scoffed", "manoeuvre", are no part of the spokesman's statement. They are extras, and extras clearly loaded against the British spokesman by the reporter, news agency, or newspaper. So is the piece in dashes.

A neutral statement of the same information would be:

"The British spokesman denied that the Anglo-French ulti-

matum invaded the sovereignty of Egypt".

Or a statement could be coloured favourably to the British spokesman:

"The British spokesman staunchly rebutted the Communist smear that the Anglo-French intervention to keep the peace invaded the sovereignty of Egypt".

Here are further instances that would be classified as having an element of colour:

"Britain and France's calculated experiments in destruction against Egypt".

Or:

"The ambitious Egyptian dictator".

Or:

"Eden obstinately refused to declare the reaction of the Government....."

Design of the Study

Having identified these various constituents of a news item, it is clear that the study must be designed to distinguish between them and take account of them all. We must note a newspaper's reporting of the FACTS of the crisis (the specifically attributable statements). And we must consider the reporting of these facts in relation to the NON-FACTUAL material (the statements not specifically attributable and independently verifiable).

THE FACTS

This material is ideal for study by the check-list method. This

provides an absolute standard against which the information content of the newspaper can be measured. In the Suez crisis there were a number of specific facts available for reporting. They were freely available to all newspapers. The importance of these facts varied of course. Initiating the whole debate on British intervention was the fact of Sir Anthony Eden's announcement in the House of Commons of an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel. The details of this announcement and Eden's justification of it are, of course, basic to an understanding of the British-French case for intervention. This is where the objects of this study define what is an "important" fact. Bearing in mind the questions posed at the beginning of the study, a list was prepared of the main facts for each day from October 29, 1956, to November 17, 1956*. This period of three weeks begins with the Israeli invasion of Egypt and takes us nearly two weeks beyond the cease fire of November 7 and two days after the arrival of the first officials of the United Nations Expeditionary Force on November 15. This easily covers the crucial period of the crisis; and three weeks (eighteen daily issues) was considered a more than reasonable test of the efficiency of a newspaper publishing every day.

The facts on the check list were divided each day into the following categories.

1. Objectives

Official British-French statements of their objectives

* See appendix p.268 for more discussion on the objectivity and mechanics of this procedure.

for intervention plus other specifically attributable statements supporting the British-French statements of objectives.

2. Counter Objectives

Hostile statements suggesting objectives other than those officially put forward by Britain and France.

3. Conspiracy

Statements alleging Britain, France and Israel were partners in a conspiracy against Egypt.

4. Counter Conspiracy

Mainly official British-French-Israeli statements denying collusion with each other.

5. Favourable to Britain, France, Israel

Statements supporting Britain, France and Israel in a more general way, i.e. not specific enough to be classified under any other headings. This category includes statements critical of Egypt's resistance to British-French intervention.

6. Unfavourable to Britain, France, Israel

The reverse of 5 above, including statements supporting Egypt in the stand against British-French intervention.

7. Military Humanity

Statements suggesting the British-French military intervention was being carried out as humanely as possible: Mainly official British-French communiques.

8. Military Inhumanity

Statements suggesting British-French military intervention

was being carried out inhumanely without regard for Egyptian civilian lives and property: Mainly Egyptian communiques.

9. United States Policy Approval

Statements supporting America's official critical reaction to intervention: Mainly statements by Republican candidates during the presidential election currently proceeding.

10. United States Policy Disapproval

Statements criticising America's official reaction: Mainly statements by Democratic candidates during the presidential election.

11. Canal Blockage: Britain Culpable

At an early stage in the intervention, one of whose official objects was to protect the Suez canal, the canal was blocked. In this category are statements blaming British-French military action for the damage to the canal and the interruption of free passage (another of the official British-French objectives).

12. Canal: Egypt Culpable

The reverse of 11. Mainly statements saying Egypt had deliberately blocked the canal and British-French not to blame.

13. Neutral Military Statements

A category for statements of military action which do not fall into any of these categories and are politically neutral between Britain and France on the one hand and Egypt on the

other. This category was included to gain some idea of the adequacy of coverage of the actual military operations; it is of course very subsidiary to the main purposes of the study.

14. Other Neutral General Statements

These were official political statements which did not fit any category (i.e. the Swiss appeal for Big Five talks and Eisenhower's preference to continue working through the United Nations). The sources of these statements in the newspapers were distinguished between statements originating from Britain and France; from sources by definition hostile to Britain and France; from the United Nations; from the United States.

NON-FACTUAL

So much for the facts of the crisis. We have argued that it is also essential to make an objective analysis and record of all the non-factual material in the newspapers and magazines.

This cannot be done with a normal check list because the material is by definition not verifiable in the same way. But this difficulty does not mean we can safely ignore the non-factual material, or make do with general impressions. Non-factual material forms a significant part of the content of the news item.

What we can do is analyse and count this non-factual matter. We can bring to it the method of objective thematic content analysis (p. 27 above). We can categorise the common themes, broadly and in refinement, and count the frequency of these themes. With this

content analysis plus the fact check list, every element in a news item will be accounted for.

After a thorough reading of all the material of the Suez crisis, various themes or propositions in the non-factual material became evident. They were noted. A sensitive classification was made of these themes, dividing them into the same broad categories as the fact list.

Under OBJECTIVES, for instance, were listed themes suggesting that the objectives of British intervention were parallel with the world's best interests - i.e. these themes accepted the British-French objectives as officially stated and recorded on the factual check list.

For the non-factual material a further category ("Alliance") was added consisting of themes reflecting on the durability or otherwise of the Atlantic Alliance.

Counting

The identification and classification of themes is by itself a great help in discussing what is in the material. But for a really objective assessment it is then necessary to count the frequency of the various themes in different newspapers.

It is traditional to express horror at the idea of counting qualitative themes. This is surely a mistake. Provided the initial classification is rich and sensitive we do not "lose" any of the quality of the material by counting the themes. We do no violence to qualities of the human mind. At the end of a thematic count we

are simply in a better position to summarise the relative importance of various qualitative themes.

Without counting their frequency there is a very early limit on the amount of material that can be digested and recalled in balance and detail. Without counting it is certainly impossible to compare different papers fairly and when many themes are present, as in this study, the task would be unmanageable. Of course much general qualitative judgment is, in fact, quasi-quantitative*, using phrases like "more or less", "on the whole". This impressionism is simply less explicit and less reliable and provides no proper basis of judgment or comparison.

Counting Mechanics

Every time a categorised theme was given expression by word, phrase or by entire paragraph, a count of one was recorded on an exhaustive list of themes divided into categories: Each publication was marked separately. It is possible for one sentence or paragraph to contain two different themes. In that case two figure 1's were marked on the theme list, one against each of the separate themes. The general pattern however was that one non-factual paragraph was the conveyor of one theme: in American newspapers that is roughly the same as saying one sentence because the large body type set on a narrow column makes frequent paragraphing a necessity to avoid a slabby appearance. In this study the reference will be to non-factual paragraph units.

* See again Royal Commission on the Press, p. 30, 31.

Here are examples of scoring:

"The reaction of most Egyptians is that the whole affair, including the Israeli attack, was a scheme by Britain and France to provide a pretext for their occupying Suez canal key points."

This scores ONE in the Conspiracy category for the theme that Britain, France and Israel planned Suez together.

Here is a more complex sentence yielding two non-factual units in one paragraph:

"In high official circles suspicions were voiced privately that Britain and France had encouraged Israel to invade Egypt so that Britain and France would have an excuse to occupy the canal zone in the hope of pushing President Nasser from power."

The thematic break-down of this is:

Conspiracy category

Britain and France had possibly encouraged Israel to invade 1

Objective category

British-French objective is to weaken or destroy Nasser 1

Where the theme contained a colour word like "excuse", a cross reference was made to a notebook and the details entered there.

Headlines

Arrangements have now been made to record and assess every constituent of every news item about the Suez crisis, which is the main purpose of this study. There is however another verbal element, that in headlines, and it was felt this could not be ignored if it might in any way modify the conclusions suggested by a study of the news item. The content of the headline is of course to some extent already covered by the check list: what is omitted from the actual check list will not appear as a headline, though the reverse is not

correct. Many of the facts on the check list are reported with others and are not necessarily the point(s) chosen for the headline. There is also the possibility of distortion where the headline changes the meaning of the facts it is supposed to summarise.

The headline wordings (and display element) were therefore noted independently throughout. For each report the varying headlines from different newspapers were collated and transcribed. They could then be readily compared with each other and with the content of the news item they were summarising. No attempt was made to score the check list differently where a headline emphasised one point rather than another. In the event the lists of headlines were not very significant for this study since the major headlines were found to be devoted to the neutral military facts.

The separate recording of headlines did however throw up a few instances where the verbal element of the headline emphasised or moderated the conclusions from a study of the text. Observations will be made in the individual studies of each publication where relevant. (Four front page photographs are included in this study as illustration.)

SECTION II

CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER 5

Introduction to Case Studies

The Publications

The United States is too large to have a centrally printed national press in the English pattern. The American reader is dependent on the quality of his state or city newspaper. It was obviously impossible for one worker within one lifetime to analyse all the American daily press, or even a portion acceptable statistically as a valid sample of the United States press. A selection was made therefore which might cast light on some incidental questions:

- (a) What were the readers of a city told where there was competition between home-town papers? San Francisco was chosen and the two morning daily newspapers and an evening paper examined. The Examiner and San Francisco News were included for another purpose as well: see (c) below.
- (b) What were the readers of a small town told by a small-town newspaper in a monopoly situation? Quincy, Illinois, was chosen.
- (c) What were the readers of three chain newspapers told of?
 - (i) A Hearst paper - the San Francisco Examiner was chosen.
 - (ii) A Scripps Howard paper - the San Francisco News was chosen.
 - (iii) A McCormick paper - the Chicago Tribune was chosen.

But also see (d) below.

- (d) Did the Chicago Tribune live up to its famous anti-British stereotype in a situation ideal for exercising it?
- (e) What were the readers of an independent big city paper with a big city circulation told? The Philadelphia Inquirer was chosen. The Denver Post is added for a medium-sized city and circulation.
- (f) What did the business man learn if he read only his financial paper, the Wall Street Journal?
- (g) What were readers of the three big national news magazines told?

The publications studied then are:

San Francisco Chronicle

San Francisco Examiner

San Francisco News

Quincy Herald Whig

Chicago Tribune

Denver Post

Philadelphia Inquirer

Wall Street Journal

Time Magazine

Newsweek Magazine

United States News and World Report

Circulation details, etc., are included about each publication in the individual studies*.

* See also appendix, p. 277 on editions.

The Method - In Brief

It may be as well to recapitulate the method of this study. It is based on the argument that there are two main contents in a newspaper's news items:

- A. Statements specifically attributed to some named person or agency. These will be called facts in news column.
- B. Content only partially attributed - i.e. accredited to "official circles" or "government circles", and content not attributed to any source.

These latter two kinds of content are strictly non-factual on our definition. They cannot be independently verified.

The method for this study was as follows:

- (i) Daily check lists were prepared for the factual content of the Suez crisis. They incorporated the most important public statements during the crisis. Each publication was checked daily to see how many of these available facts it reported.
- (ii) The non-factual content of the news columns was analysed. The persistent themes were detected and each time the theme occurred in a sentence it was counted.

Thus for each publication under study we emerged with a score for the number of check-list facts reported and also with a content analysis of the themes occupying the remaining space in the news columns. In this way the whole content of an item was exhaustively analysed by an objective standard.

Each study begins with a brief summary of the figures on how the paper fared in reporting the British case for intervention. It is followed with a detailed day-to-day study of the reporting of the British (and French-Israeli) case divided for convenience into three periods:

The first period from the Israeli invasion of October 29 and the British ultimatum to November 3 (i.e. November 4th's morning newspapers).

The second period from November 4 to 7, including the actual land invasion by Britain and France and the cease fire; and

The third period from November 8 to November 17 (morning newspapers of the 18th) with the arguments about intervention; the threats of intervention by Communist volunteers; and the creation of the United Nations Expeditionary Force.

Following this discussion of the reporting of the British case, the period as a whole is summarised reviewing the reporting of the case against Britain and France (called counter-case), and the emphasis given by the non-factual material.

More specific findings are then discussed using the categories previously defined (p.40 et seq.)

Conspiracy (How did the publication report the allegations of British-French-Israeli collusion?)

Military Humanity (Was the British-French military intervention humanely carried out?)

United States Policy Judgments

Canal Blockage

Alliance

Each individual study ends with Remarks summarising the author's judgment of the findings for that particular publication, based on the material presented. An attempt to be more precise about words like "adequate" is included in the conclusions (p.247).

The master score sheet for all the publications is included in the separately bound appendix (along with examples of both a check list and theme list as marked for the crisis). Unless otherwise stated, the dates given in the individual studies are the dates the facts were recorded on the check list, which was compiled a day after the events recorded to coincide with the dates the facts would appear in morning papers.

WEATHER FORECAST

Bay Area: Clearing today, fair and cooler tonight. Northwest winds to 20 m.p.h. Low temperature Wednesday, 42 to 46; high, near 60.

Full Report, Page 32

San Francisco Chronicle **FINAL**

THE VOICE OF THE WEST

92nd YEAR No. 305

CCCCAAA-CP

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1956

10 CENTS

GATEWAY 1-1112

BRITISH, FRENCH SEIZING SUEZ

Hungarian Rebels Free Mindszenty



After nearly eight years as a prisoner of the Hungarian Communist Government, Mindszenty, 47, was released today. He had been

Russ Hint Withdrawal In Satellites

MOSCOW (Wednesday), Oct. 31—The Soviet Union offered last night to negotiate for the removal of its troops from rebellious Hungary and from Communist Poland and Rumania.

The government, in an official declaration, also said it will withdraw its troops from shattered Europe as soon as the Hungarian Government so requests.

Soviet leaders said it is prepared to meet negotiations with all other nations at the

Landing of Troops at Port Said Is Reported

First Photo of Desert War



Rejected Ultimatum

Joint Expedition To Protect Canal

CHAPTER 6

THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE

Morning: 1956 circulation: 179,343 (Sunday 245,276)

Called itself politically: Republican

Chain affiliation: None

Wire Services: Associated Press, United Press, New York
Herald Tribune, New York Times, Reuter
via Chicago Tribune Press Service (CTPS
distributes Reuter west of the Mississippi)

Competition: San Francisco News (circulation 102,282)
San Francisco Examiner (circulation 241,108)
San Francisco Call Bulletin
(circulation 139,013)

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	24.7	8
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	7	33
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	20	69
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	32	77

The San Francisco Chronicle score was low because, just as with its reporting of objectives, it gave only a bare summary of news from London, Paris and the United Nations, or ignored it altogether. The non-factual content aggravated this imbalance.

Details of Coverage of the British/French Case

First Period

The San Francisco Chronicle started well enough in its issue of October 30 by reporting six of Israel's ten stated reasons for invading Egypt. It did not keep this standard of coverage. Eden's important statement in the afternoon (GMT) of October 30 announcing the British/French ultimatum fell somewhat early for morning newspapers publishing at Pacific time. It was ideal for evening newspapers on the Pacific coast (8 a.m.). Availability and use, however, are two different things (see report on the San Francisco News).

The San Francisco Chronicle editors would have seen how little of the early Commons reports the evening competitors chose to publish; and the Commons debate on the night of October 30 was falling more conveniently for morning newspapers on the Pacific coast (fully available around 3 p.m.). These considerations, plus the importance of the news itself, make it hard to understand why on October 31 the Chronicle published only:

- a) The terms of the ultimatum
- b) The voting figures in the Commons

This compares badly with the other San Francisco morning newspaper (see Examiner). The Chronicle did not, for instance, report any of Eden's argument justifying the ultimatum. For readers of the San Francisco Chronicle the ultimatum was an ultimatum in a vacuum, without reasons.

The Chronicle could have made up for failing with the Eden speech by reporting other important pronouncements. It did not.

It failed to report anything of the British Foreign Secretary's speech (arguing, among other things, that the presence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council frustrated the Council's ability to act in time of crisis). It failed to report M. Mollet's speech in Paris. It failed to report any of the British, French or Israeli delegates' speeches at the United Nations.

The first day of the crisis proper, then, it had only three of the 24 facts favourable to Britain and France and only five of 13 facts about British/French objectives.

However, the San Francisco Chronicle did not ignore the United Nations altogether. It reported four unfavourable points from the speech of the United States delegate, and the unfavourable views of the Russian delegate (3 points).

There was also a piece of misreporting. The San Francisco Chronicle suggested that the ultimatum was issued after the Security Council vote. This was not so. ("The joint British/French move took place after the two governments had vetoed a United States resolution to halt hostilities.....")

The San Francisco Chronicle did not make it plain in its reporting at this stage that the military intervention was claimed to be temporary. (In its editorial comment column it did put in the word temporary - in quotation marks.) When the temporary nature of the intervention was stressed again on November 1 by both Eden and Lloyd in Parliament, the San Francisco Chronicle did not have this because again it did not report their speeches.

It did, on November 1, give three facts about British objectives, from the statements by the British delegate, Dixon, at the United Nations. But it did not report Britain's pledge, given by Dixon, that it was Britain and France's firm intention that Israel should be made to withdraw. Nor did it report the statement that Britain and France did not condone the Israeli action.

On November 1, Eden made a major defence of intervention, and the San Francisco Chronicle on November 2 had three points from his speech. However, it omitted to report any of Eden's replies to

specific criticisms of the intervention. It did not report his declaration that Britain and France were not seeking to impose by force a solution to the Egyptian/Israeli long term dispute over the Suez canal.

Supporting statements by the Australian and New Zealand Premiers were also not reported in the San Francisco Chronicle.

Again, on November 3, the San Francisco Chronicle did not report Eden's reactions to the Assembly ruling other than the fact that he refused to answer immediately; it did not give Eden's reasons for postponing a reply. What it did say, adding prejudicial colour, was: Eden refused obstinately to declare at once the reaction of the Government to the Assembly's ruling (AP).

The first period, then, is one of meagre reporting of facts on objectives favourable to Britain. At the same time the San Francisco Chronicle had 13 non-factual units conveying the idea that the British objectives were disreputable (against five non-factual units which were favourable).

It was reported four times, as if it were a fact, and once as a probability, that the British/French official objective was to destroy Nasser. Thus: "Informants said Britain and France hoped by Tuesday Nasser would be overthrown and replaced by someone willing to negotiate."

Second Period: November 4, 5, 6, 7.

For the first time, on November 4, the San Francisco Chronicle (Sunday edition) began to report Eden's views, reporting eight out

of 16 of the objectives he gave and reporting his considered reply (November 3) to the United Nations fairly fully under the page one banner "Allies Tell Peace Terms". However, there was poor reporting of other available facts favourable to Britain, France and Israel - a score of three out of a possible 32, largely because the San Francisco Chronicle did not report the British Foreign Secretary or War Minister, a supporting statement from Holland, and Mrs. Roosevelt's supporting speech.

On November 6 there was no report of Britain's suggestion for a Security Council meeting at high level to work out a Middle East plan. Support from Australia was not reported, nor Lloyd's reply to the criticism that Suez had sacrificed Hungary.

More important perhaps was the limited reporting in November 7 issues of Eden's reasons for ordering a cease fire; his defence of the whole action; and his reply to Bulganin's note threatening Britain and France. This major speech was admittedly somewhat early for morning newspapers - it was fully available before noon in San Francisco - but again the rather perfunctory evening papers left it to the mornings, and again the mornings did not repair the omission. The United States election results being published this day are some extenuation, but there was space enough for doing far better justice to the Suez developments. Only three points altogether were reported in the Chronicle from this major speech.

The San Francisco Chronicle did not report Eden's announcement that the cease fire followed the acceptance by both Egypt and Israel

of an unconditional cease fire - "a new element" - that his aim of stopping fighting and separating the combatants was now achieved. Neither did it report his argument that the action had been essential for the attempted creation of a United Nations police force - that Britain was the first to suggest the United Nations force which had now been accepted. All these reasons for a cease fire on the 6th did not appear in the San Francisco Chronicle.

On the intervention, Eden claimed that only the British/French forces had stopped the Arabs joining in and spreading the war. He answered the critics of landing in Egypt rather than Israel by maintaining that the canal was the only line where force could be interposed. He denied having broken friendship with the Commonwealth and the United States. All these points, and others, did not appear in the San Francisco Chronicle.

Eden's whole defence received very short shrift (two of nine objectives and three of 21 favourable facts). M. Mollet fared worse. He did not get a mention, nor did other British Ministers who spoke later in the week on this theme.

In this second period, however, the San Francisco Chronicle gave space to ten non-factual assertions of disreputable objectives, and 14 other unfavourable non-factual assertions (against nine favourable). For instance, while the San Francisco Chronicle did not report the reply to criticisms that Britain's action at Suez had sacrificed Hungary, it did, non-factually, carry the criticisms: "The sharp reprisals by the Soviet against Hungary over the week-end have

embittered some officials here (Washington) all the more against Britain and France. For these officials feel that the Anglo/French decision... provided Moscow with an excuse to abandon the more liberal satellite policy of recent months."

Also, there is in this period a case of misreporting tending to make Britain and France appear more isolated than they were: "On Thursday at the first emergency session in the United Nations General Assembly's eleven-year history they cast the only negative votes against considering a cease fire in the Middle East. And their planes kept up a day long pounding of Egyptian targets". In fact, the first General Assembly vote was on November 2 (Friday) and Australia and New Zealand voted with Britain, France and Israel in 64-5 vote on a United States motion and six abstained. Of course, the votes were not simply against "considering a cease fire in the Middle East".

Third Period: 8 November - 18 November

Case:

This period saw the development of the British view that intervention had thwarted a Soviet plot to dominate the Middle East by using President Nasser as a tool and Egypt as an arms dump. The San Francisco Chronicle got a slow start by failing to report Mr. Peter Thorneycroft's first allegations (November 9), M. Pineau's support and Ben Gurion's report that "astonishing quantities of Soviet arms" had been captured by the Israelis. Ben Gurion's defence of Israel's action was omitted; so was the New Zealand Prime Minister saying there was now a prospect of peace thanks to Britain and France;

so was the British delegate at the United Nations replying to the charge that the Suez action had persuaded the Russians to put down the Hungarian revolt.

More serious, on the 10th Eden said that Britain had no intention of delaying in Port Said and would be pleased to hand over to the United Nations force. He declared that British/French forces would be withdrawn as soon as a United Nations force was ready.

This was an important speech because only "lobby" stories to this effect had been reported. But the San Francisco Chronicle did not record this statement, nor the Foreign Secretary's follow-up on the 12th, advocating a United Nations Expeditionary Force. It did not report Eden's offer of airfields to the United Nations in Cyprus and his plea for the United Nations Expeditionary Force to be set up urgently.

Again, a defence of the results of the intervention was ignored by the San Francisco Chronicle. Not one of the four objectives, argued as attained, was reported. These omissions and the scant report of Eden's reply to Bulganin's threat (November 6) were aggravated by a dispatch from Harold Callender of the New York Times baldly headlined: "Soviet, U.S. pressure forced the Anglo-French cease fire".

The San Francisco Chronicle did rather better on the 12th, with the plot story. It gave good coverage to Mr. Thorneycroft's claims that so many Russian arms had been found in the Middle East they were obviously intended to equip a Soviet invasion force. It did not maintain this coverage. M. Mollet's speech available for the 13th

was not reported - again it contained a reply to the contention that the Suez intervention sacrificed Hungary.

The India 'Times' on this subject this day said that freedom was more seriously threatened in Hungary than in Egypt. That was not reported. Nor was the Gallup Poll from Australia and Canada with the man in the street in support of intervention, (nor the official British denial of reports in the United States that the British/French urged postponement of United Nations Security Council after Israeli mobilisation), nor British Government spokesmen on the economic effects of the crisis. Only one of 26 available favourable facts on the check list was reported on the 13th.

So it was on the 14th, Mr. Butler's reply to the criticism that force in Suez had encouraged Russia to use force in Hungary was omitted, arguing that the return of the Russians was premeditated.

Eden on the same day came out with a pledge that it remained British policy to build up the United Nations as a force for peace. Mr. Butler said Britain wanted to maintain a common front in the Atlantic Alliance. The San Francisco Chronicle did not report. On the 15th a public opinion poll showed support for Eden and Lord Hailsham made a speech addressed, in the main, to the United States. The Chronicle did not report (in fact, it cut out these points in a Drew Middleton dispatch, syndicated to it by the New York Times).

This same day Allen Dulles of the United States intelligence service gave his view that the Russians probably moved against Hungary because they saw their control of Eastern Europe was at stake. The

San Francisco Chronicle, again, ignored this reference to Suez vis a vis Hungary. British speakers did badly no matter whether they spoke in Britain, the United Nations, or even in the United States. Thus the British ambassador was not reported at all in a speech in Washington defending British action (both the evening San Francisco News and morning San Francisco Examiner did better). Finally, for Eden's major speech on the 18th, the San Francisco Chronicle scored four out of 15 points.

In the third period as in the other two, there is this scanty reporting of the British case. Again, too, the Chronicle had a preponderance of hostile non-factual assertions on the actual British/French objectives. Six times it was reported as a fact by the Chronicle that the objective was to reoccupy the canal zone by force and impose an international settlement on the canal; twice it was reported that the objective was to weaken or destroy Nasser. (A total of ten non-factual units against three favourable.)

On the general case for and against intervention, the balance of non-factual material was better. The Chronicle carried 43 units favourable to Britain, France and Israel and 42 against.

The Period as a Whole, Case and Counter-case

It is clear that readers of the San Francisco Chronicle were barely given the bones of the British position. What of the case against Britain and France?

Coverage of the counter case was not ample but generally it was better. The Chronicle hardly reported the hostile statements of

objectives (seven per cent against 24 per cent of the favourable statements), but in the broader, bigger category of facts unfavourable/favourable, the balance was hostile to Britain and France. The Chronicle reported 32 per cent of the unfavourable facts, 12 per cent more than the 20 per cent of the favourable facts. This was the second highest score of unfavourable facts in all the newspapers analysed, and the biggest hostile/favourable proportion in the whole sample.

Most of these unfavourable messages carried in the San Francisco Chronicle were due to reporting critical opinions or actions (like the severance of oil pipelines) from Arab countries (36), then hostile opinions and actions (such as the volunteer stories) from Communist sources (33). President Nasser and his delegate in the United Nations were almost completely ignored.

It is interesting that the criticism within Britain and France received as little attention as the official opinions in these countries - a total of 15 facts only being reported in this category for all the Labour speeches, resignations from the Government, demonstrations, etc. This compares with the reporting of 27 facts of American criticisms.

However, there is, in the factual reporting, this 12 per cent imbalance as well as general sparseness. Does the imbalance represent a significant bias in this section of the study?

This is where the thematic list and colour count becomes very relevant for it enables us to see whether the whole content

of the news item was directed one way. We find that in the broad favourable/unfavourable category the San Francisco Chronicle carried 69 non-factual units favourable to the British/French case, and 77 hostile. One unfavourable theme given credence was that Suez was to blame for Russia's return to Hungary, which makes the factual omissions on this issue more unfortunate. However, 69:77 is not markedly unbalanced.

It is when we examine the category of objectives that the San Francisco Chronicle coverage is suspect. There is a considerably higher non-factual hostile score - 33 hostile against eight favourable. In view of the neglect of official British stated objectives (23 per cent reported), this high non-factual score suggests San Francisco Chronicle reporting here was unbalanced.

There was no significant colour, but the Chronicle seven times stated as a fact, as if it were official, that the British/French objective was to weaken or destroy Nasser (plus three times a possibility); twice it reported, as if it were a fact, that the objective was to denationalise the canal and make it Anglo-French again; and nine times, as a fact, that it was to impose an international settlement. The San Francisco Chronicle was noticeably low on colour or loaded words (four favourable and six unfavourable).

Conspiracy

Throughout the Suez crisis it was widely alleged that Britain, France and Israel had plotted together. The San Francisco Chronicle reported 20 per cent of these factual allegations, and 17 per cent of

the facts denying the allegation. The margin is small, though one may note that the weakness again was in reporting statements available from British spokesmen.

We must have a look at the non-factual content of the San Francisco Chronicle for a full picture of its reporting on the conspiracy charge.

We find that there is emphasis on conspiracy themes. Nine times the San Francisco Chronicle stated as a fact that the United States was being deliberately deceived by Britain and France. Twice it was stated as a fact that the British and French knew of and encouraged the Israeli invasion as a pretext, and three times this theme occurred as a probability.

Altogether there were 28 units conveying ideas of conspiracy and only seven suggesting there had been no conspiracy. For instance, in the Sunday summary:

"According to several reports there was a widespread feeling in Washington that Britain, France and Israel were in cahoots on the whole show. An Israeli attack would give Britain and France an excuse to reoccupy the canal - and possibly overthrow Nasser while the Anglo-French action would ensure the success of Israeli arms....."

It is in the light of non-factual content such as this that the observer regrets the San Francisco Chronicle's factual omissions - such as, for instance, Britain's pledge on November 6 that it intended to make Israel withdraw.

Was the Intervention Humanely/Inhumanely Carried Out?

Was the intervention carried out as humanely as possible? Here again, the San Francisco Chronicle balance was hostile. It reported 16 per cent of the facts suggesting it was done as humanely as possible against 29 per cent of facts suggesting inhumanity. Moreover, there were 25 thematic units conveying the idea of the inhumanity of the intervention, against six humane non-factual units.

The Chronicle reported bombs "raining down on Egypt"; "day long pounding of Egyptian targets"; but the repeated British emphasis on warnings to civilians and civilian targets was not reflected in the Chronicle reporting. Suggestions of indiscriminate bombing were one of the hostile non-factual themes. The other dominant themes were the lack of services and order in Port Said; the heavy casualties; and the suffering of the people. For instance:

"British troops used clubs and blackjacks to restore order. Hundreds of bodies of people killed in the Anglo-French attack lie unburied in the fly infested streets and there is serious danger of an epidemic. Every available vehicle has been pressed into service as an emergency hearse but the vast task of clearing the streets and burying the dead has barely begun" - November 12, United Press.

November 18

"Over 1,000 bodies lay rotting in the streets."

The San Francisco Chronicle carried pictures of Port Said.
"These Port Said children were killed by the Anglo-French bombardment."

United States Policy

The Chronicle had 27 per cent of the facts approving American policy, 34 per cent of the critical. Non-factually it had one unit approving American policy, none critical. It scored here mainly by reporting in verbatim Stevenson's November 2 speech, which neither of the other San Francisco papers did, and by giving other Stevenson criticisms during the election campaign.

Canal: Who was Culpable?

The San Francisco Chronicle reported 20 per cent of the facts alleging that Britain was to blame; and 21 per cent of the facts that it was Egypt. Non-factually the score was seven hostile, and two favourable. (It must be borne in mind throughout that the canal category is small - 20 per cent is a score of 2 of 10 available facts.)

Alliance

The San Francisco Chronicle did not carry any significant material on the Anglo-United States Alliance.

Other News

Did the San Francisco Chronicle report the general, neutral news fully? It had 34 out of 78 military facts - the general score was high in all newspapers. It had 15 of 32 possible other statements

from London; 13 out of 30 from hostile sources; 16 out of 27 from the United States; 12 out of 25 from the United Nations; and 9 out of 17 from other sources. These figures, somewhat better than the other factual categories, do not suggest any partiality in source selection.

Background

The San Francisco Chronicle had scanty background information on Suez and the Middle East and the importance of the area for Britain.

Conclusion

The San Francisco Chronicle failed to give the British-French case for intervention.

Its reporting from the House of Commons, Paris, Tel Aviv and the United Nations did not do justice to the main news sources. Its factual coverage was inadequate. It did not make use of its very wide range of wire services - giving less than the San Francisco Examiner which used only AP and INS. It was also in its balance consistently hostile to Britain and France, though sometimes marginally so.

The thematic material slightly increased this hostility. However there is no apparent correlation between the selection of other unfavourable facts and the erratically balanced non-thematic material and there was very little colour.

During the Suez crisis the San Francisco Chronicle was therefore not a newspaper intent on deliberately distorting the news but its coverage of the issues was considerably less than adequate for a fair understanding of the situation.

Mark County — SA. 3-4914

San Francisco

Examiner
THE DAILIES

PLATE 16. *Strophomena* sp.

CHAPTER 7

THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER

Morning: 1956 circulation: 241,108 (Sunday 510,325)

Called itself politically: Independent

Chain affiliation: Hearst Publishing Co., Inc.

Wire Services: Associated Press, International News
Service

Competition: San Francisco Chronicle (circulation 179,343)
San Francisco Call Bulletin
(circulation 139,013)
San Francisco News (circulation 102,282)

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	31.6	5
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	10	12
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	24	42
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	30	58

The San Francisco Examiner coverage of the British and French objectives for intervening was the best of the San Francisco papers and easily the second best in all the magazines and newspapers studied. There was no colour in the San Francisco Examiner reporting of these objectives.

Coverage of British and French statements arguing the case for intervention, and other favourable facts, was also better in the San Francisco Examiner than in either the San Francisco Chronicle or the San Francisco News - and again second best of all the rest of the newspapers and magazines, a position shared this time with the Philadelphia Inquirer.

Whether 24 per cent coverage of favourable facts, though good by comparison, is adequate is, of course, another question.

Details of the San Francisco Examiner coverage of the British/French Case

First Period

The San Francisco Examiner began better than its San Francisco rivals in its reporting of the British and French case for intervention by the simple policy of reporting some of what Sir Anthony Eden actually said in the Commons and the British delegate said in the United Nations.

The objectives were fairly well covered on the first day with eight out of 13 reported. The case for intervention was also fairly well covered this first day, the San Francisco Examiner scoring nine out of 24 (compared with three by the San Francisco Chronicle).

However, the San Francisco Examiner had nothing at all on M. Mollet's speech, and eleven of the points listed from Eden's speech were not reported - for instance, his assurance that Britain would not wish to keep troops there for a moment longer than necessary to deal with the situation, or his criticisms of Egyptian provocation of Israel.

The San Francisco Examiner readers thus started off with a fair idea of the official objectives of the intervention and a less adequate idea of the arguments in support of Britain's policy.

The standard was not maintained. The next day the San Francisco Examiner ignored Eden's speech in the Commons. In this Eden replied to United States criticisms of Britain's policy, explained why Britain had not supported the United States resolution in the United Nations, and why the Suez canal had been chosen as the line of intervention,

rather than a point in Sinai nearer the Israeli Army.

These reasons of Eden's may be considered feeble, of course; they may have been considered feeble by the San Francisco Examiner readers, as well as the San Francisco copy reader; but is that a good reason for depriving the reader of such facts? They are part of the crisis, part of the flow of news. They had some mention in the evening San Francisco News, but does that justify total silence in a morning newspaper with its own readers and its own obligation to present coherent coverage? Whatever, by this omission and thin United Nations reporting, the San Francisco Examiner this day scored only two of the 16 objectives, and four of 23 favourable facts. Moreover, these points of Eden's were again omitted in the November 2 editions when Eden once more explained why he had vetoed the Security Council's censure of Israel. The San Francisco Examiner did not report, either, Eden's declaration that Britain was not seeking to impose by force a solution to the Egyptian-Israeli dispute or to the canal dispute.

Several important points by the British delegate at the United Nations were similarly not covered. Sir Pierson Dixon stated that Britain would be pleased to hand over the physical task of keeping peace to the United Nations. He suggested a conference on the Middle East. He argued that the United States had acted in Korea before the United Nations had met, and there was now the threat of a Soviet veto preventing effective action in the Middle East, even if a fresh Security Council injunction would have had any effect in a situation rapidly getting out of hand.

None of this was reported in the San Francisco Examiner.

It did not, in its November 3 issue, give Eden's reply to the criticisms that he was flouting the United Nations. Nor in this issue did it report Dutch and Belgian statements in support of the British attitude to the United States United Nations solution. Having surveyed the missing facts, let us look now at the extent and nature of the non-factual matter interpolated in the news columns. In the Objectives category there was little - three paragraphs of hostile non-factual matter, three favourable. But in the broader category, the balance was lop-sided - 22 unfavourable to three favourable - and there was colour.

There were no particularly insistent themes but one may note that the factual omissions where Britain denied she was anti-United Nations were aggravated by non-factual material suggesting that Britain was, in fact, hostile to the United Nations.

For instance, while failing to give space to Eden's statement of his attitude to the United Nations, the San Francisco Examiner found space for: "Another source said Britain and France would defy the United Nations call for an immediate cease fire." (AP). And also: "Eden refused obstinately to^{make}/clear at once the reaction of the Government to the Assembly ruling. His voice rising and his arms waving, Eden declared it appeared Eden hoped to be able to confront Parliament, Britain and the United States with the accomplished fact of a successful British landing."

Second Period

The Sunday edition of the Examiner scored better, as did the Sunday edition of the San Francisco Chronicle, by giving the details of Eden's official reply to the United Nations. There was no report of the British Foreign Secretary's promise that Britain would hand over to the United Nations as soon as the United Nations Expeditionary Force had been constituted, or Eden's and Churchill's criticisms of Egypt.

The Examiner gave very full coverage of the letters available for reporting on the 6th - Bulganin's letter to Eden and to President Eisenhower. The Bulganin letters contained, of course, a good deal of material unfavourable to Britain and France and critical of the intervention.

The texts of these letters were given, plus very full reportage of them. However, when it came to reporting Eden's reply the San Francisco Examiner was not liberal with its space. It had only three points of a possible 18 when covering Eden's reply in the issue of November 7.

Here is at least an inconsistent use of space, for if the Bulganin text was worth giving twice over, Eden's reply was surely deserving of being reported once.

The very same day that the Bulganin letter was given twice over, no room was found for a British letter to the United Nations on how Britain was trying to carry out the intervention humanely - but at the same time the Examiner carried Bulganin's allegations of "inhuman

bombardment".

To its credit the Examiner did report (unlike the San Francisco Chronicle) the United Nations Secretary-General's announcement that Egypt and Israel had accepted an unconditional cease fire, and also points of M. Mollet's reply to Bulganin.

Why did Britain and France cease fire? Whether they were given morning, afternoon or evening, the Examiner failed to report Britain's publicly stated reasons (the point that the unconditional cease fire by Egypt and Israel was a "new element"; that action by air had now made it virtually certain Egypt and Israel would not re-engage in fighting; that the United Nations was aroused to action). Neither did the Examiner report Britain's welcome in the United Nations for the United Nations Expeditionary Force on the 8th, or the first British suggestion of a Soviet plot in the Middle East.

And in its report on November 5 on United Nations voting authorising the United Nations Expeditionary Force, the San Francisco Examiner had also neglected to give the voting details showing that Britain had not opposed the motion.

In this second period there was very little non-factual matter in the Examiner; the balance was hostile (15 paragraphs to six).

The Examiner did not report Britain's stated reasons for a cease fire or what Eden thought had been achieved - but on this it did publish hostile non-factual matter.

From Associated Press it carried a story suggesting that the

conditions for a cease fire included a Suez canal settlement and participation of Britain and France in the United Nations Expeditionary Force, and that therefore the cease fire decision "represented a withdrawal from earlier policies". This is not accurate. Britain's wish to be in the United Nations Expeditionary Force was not "a condition". Eden said Britain would agree to a cease fire if the United Nations procured and maintained a United Nations Expeditionary Force to remain until the Arab-Israeli dispute had been settled and satisfactory canal arrangements had been guaranteed. It was the procurement of a United Nations Expeditionary Force that was a condition.

There were five non-factual paragraphs to suggest that Britain stopped because of the Russian threat. (It must be recalled that Eden's rebuttal of Bulganin's letter was not reported.)

Third Period: November 8 to 18

The Examiner reported the new British claim, voiced first by Mr. Thorneycroft in London, that the British success in stopping war had frustrated a Soviet plan to dominate the Middle East via President Nasser. It did not report Mr. Lennox Boyd on the same theme and M. Pineau's statement that Israel had captured arms more formidable than expected. It did not report support for Britain from Mr. Menzies in Australia.

Therefore it is fair to say the gaps in the coverage of the Examiner were maintained: but they remained less noticeable than the gaps in the coverage of the San Francisco Chronicle. On

November 10 the Examiner gave good coverage to Eden's speech with its specific pledge to withdraw British and French troops without delay as soon as the United Nations Expeditionary Force was competent to discharge its tasks. The San Francisco Chronicle did not report this.

The Examiner, however, missed the chance to make up for a previous inadequacy in reporting, for it did not publish Eden's offer of air-fields to help the United Nations Expeditionary Force and his emphasis that Britain had supported the Argentine resolution of November 7 approving the Secretary General's report on the United Nations Expeditionary Force and endorsing the motion of November 2.

In other words readers confined to the Examiner would be in some doubt if not ignorance about Britain's attitude to the United Nations Expeditionary Force: Again on November 14 a Foreign Office statement on this point was not reported.

Britain's reply in the United Nations to the criticisms that the intervention had sacrificed Hungary was not reported; nor M. Mollet's reply to this charge on November 13. But in further items in this period the Examiner continues to score over its fellow morning competitor the Chronicle. The degree of superiority can be properly reflected only by the figures; and these also reveal the degree of deficiency in the Examiner's relatively better coverage. Several inaccuracies were introduced into what was reported. For these the Associated Press must bear responsibility; they are hardly significant but they are hardly encouraging.

During the crisis Dr. Hewlett Johnson, the Dean of Canterbury, so galled the Red Dean because of his Communist sympathies, made a statement. He said he welcomed "cessation of fratricidal strife in Hungary... morally I am no more able to condone these events than our own attack on Egypt". The view gets twisted considerably, presumably by an error in reporting or transmission. In the Examiner, for instance, the headline is "Red Dean excuses Russia". Why? He does no such thing. The reason is that the Associated Press story (datelined Canterbury November 12) as published begins: "Dr. Hewlett Johnson, the Red Dean of Canterbury, said tonight that he was more able to condone Russia's actions than his own country's interventions." The headline is just one step further from the truth. The vital "no" is missing from the text on which the copy-reader based his headline.

Again, on October 31, one is not happy with the Associated Press rendering of what Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge said in the United Nations. He actually said the British ultimatum was not needed if Israel stopped advancing - though he was not implying, he said, that the Israeli ultimatum was consistent with the United Nations principles and purposes. In the San Francisco Examiner (and the Philadelphia Inquirer) that became, via Associated Press: "Lodge denounced the ultimatum as not consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations".

In the San Francisco Examiner this particular report said:
"Lodge sat stiff and silent as the British and French delegations ...

broke the long standing Western unity of action". (Author's underlining)

Non-factually in this third period the balance is about even, 29 units hostile to 33 favourable in the general category, with five hostile units in the objectives category. The favourable themes were that Britain was being supported by other countries - which perhaps offsets the failure to report the actual statements (4); evidence of Egypt's provocations, which perhaps offsets the failure to report fully from Israel; and the theme that intervention did weaken Nasser (8).

There were three anti-Nasser paragraphs, five pro-Nasser.

On Britain's attitude to the United Nations there were 3 units suggesting hostility to one favourable. The intensity of the anti-United Nations theme is slight, but here the gap in reporting on this point is aggravated.

Again, the failure to report the British view of objectives achieved is aggravated by this inaccurate Associated Press statement: "The British and French announced last week that their attack in the canal zone had achieved their prime objective - the return of the 103-mile waterway to international control."

The Period as a Whole: Case and Counter-case

There are gaps in the San Francisco Examiner coverage of the British/French case for the whole period, but do they suggest bias? No - and partly because the reporting of the Egyptian case had many gaps.

The weight for reporting of actual statements on objectives is

favourable to Britain and France. Only 10 per cent of the hostile objectives were reported (against 31 per cent of the favourable). But, as with the San Francisco Chronicle, the coverage of the bigger category of generally unfavourable facts was better than that of the favourable category: 30 per cent of unfavourable reported against 24 per cent of the favourable.

Similarly with the Chronicle, a relatively better score here came from reporting statements from hostile Communist bloc and general Arab bloc sources rather than criticism in Britain or from Cairo itself. Only 17 critical statements from Britain were given throughout - against 38 for the Communist bloc. The specific criticisms by the Labour Opposition in Britain were hardly reported at all. The Egyptian case, as advanced by Egyptian spokesmen, was also little reported. Indeed the Egyptian delegate in the United Nations might never have made all the points he did for all the report they got in the San Francisco Examiner, and President Nasser's speeches of November 1 and 9 were not mentioned.

Was the slightly hostile balance of facts reported further increased by non-factual thematic material?

Yes, but not significantly. Indeed, the Examiner carried comparatively little thematic non-attributed material. In the category of objectives, it had five favourable units and 12 unfavourable, in which the dominant theme was that Britain was going to impose an international canal settlement.

In the general category, the Examiner had 42 favourable units and 58 unfavourable. Only one other newspaper (the Wall Street Journal) carried so few unfavourable thematic units.

What did the non-factual thematic material convey?

The dominant favourable themes were evidences of Egypt's provocations; the dominant unfavourable theme that Britain was anti-United Nations. There was colour in some of the unfavourable unattributed paragraphs:

"Appeals from the United Nations for a softer course were brushed aside and the die was cast for force". (Associated Press, London).

But such coloured reporting was confined to six paragraphs throughout.

Conspiracy

The Examiner did not print to any extent the unattributed allegations of conspiracy between Britain, France and Israel. And in its reporting of the attributed allegations and attributed denials the balance was equal: roughly a fifth of each.

There were only eight unattributed paragraphs in the Examiner alleging conspiracy - contrasted with 28 for the San Francisco Chronicle and 55 for the Denver Post, 25 for the San Francisco News.

Was the Intervention Humanely/Inhumanely Carried Out?

In this category there was a considerable hostile balance in the reporting of the actual landings and raids. The Examiner reported

16 per cent of the statements that the intervention was carried out as humanely as possible; and 40 per cent of the allegations of brutality and suffering. Moreover, while the Examiner did not report the British point of view, as stated, it carried 35 non-factual paragraphs conveying the idea of brutality. All the non-factual material in this category was hostile. There was not one favourable paragraph:

The themes were:

That the bombing was indiscriminate (18 paragraph units)

That Britain was impeding true story of Port Said and playing it down (5 paragraphs).

In reporting the facts, the Examiner carried, for instance, the allegation that incendiary bombs had been dropped - but not either day the British statement that this was not so and that probably target flares had been confused for incendiaries.

The emphasis on the inhumanity of the intervention came mainly, however, from captions to photographs from Port Said (International News Service and Life Magazine photographs); for instance, International News Service and Life Magazine caption:

"Uncensored. This photograph, which was smuggled past British censorship, shows an Egyptian girl standing amid ruins in Port Said, obviously not near any airfield, where Britain reported they concentrated bombing."

That was used on November 10. The San Francisco Examiner did

not report the official British and French communique the same day that at no time was Port Said bombed, rockets and canon fire being used at strictly military targets. There were statements on November 8 and 9 from Eden and Head in London that there had been no preliminary bombardment at all before the landing. The Examiner did not publish these denials but it did carry this picture caption: "War Victim: Body of Egyptian motorist is lifted from remains of his car, smashed during bombing raid on drainage canal during British and French attacks that preceded the invasion of the Suez canal zone."

United States Policy

The Examiner carried 39 per cent of the statements approving American policy; 23 per cent of the criticisms.

It gave the full text of Eisenhower's television speech on November 1, with an introductory story. It did not do anything like the same for Adlai Stevenson, his opponent in the Presidential election then being fought. It gave only two points of his speech. Yet the same day it gave the text, again, of a speech by Eisenhower at Philadelphia (4 columns), a whole page, in fact, with a full column and five inches of interpretation in addition.

Stevenson had barely a column and the reporting was ambiguous. "This was Stevenson's answer to the President's address last night, an address in which the President said 'in the circumstances I have described there will be no United States involvement in the present hostilities'". This reporting wrongly inferred Stevenson favoured United States involvement.

In addition the Examiner carried 13 non-factual unattributed paragraphs approving American policy - against only four critical. (United States policy doing everything for peace: 7; winning friends; 4). The Examiner's electoral sympathies with Eisenhower seem to have affected its coverage here.

Canal

The Examiner carried fifty per cent of the hostile allegations; 24 per cent of the favourable ones. Non-factually there were eight paragraphs on Egypt's culpability, five on Britain's.

Other News

The Examiner followed the trend with a high score on the military facts: 51 per cent. No partiality in source selection is shown by the other figures.

Background

The Examiner had scanty background information on Suez and the Middle East, and its importance for Britain.

Summary

The Examiner is noticeably superior to the San Francisco Chronicle and News. It reports more of the facts of the British and French case and the official reasons for intervention. Except for the "humanity" category there is a reasonable balance in its proportion of coverage for hostile and favourable statements. There are

fewer unattributed thematic interpolations and little colour. In other words, the Examiner served its readers by devoting its space to the available facts and letting readers form their own opinions. It did this in a balanced, if incomplete, manner - important statements both from Britain, on the one hand, and Egypt on the other, were ignored so that the Examiner cannot be said to give a continuously coherent account of the crisis and its issues. The rough balance maintained between Britain and Egypt was not maintained between the United States Presidential candidates speaking on the Suez crisis.

CHAPTER 8

THE SAN FRANCISCO NEWS

Evening: 1956 circulation: 102,282

(ex Sunday). Has now ceased publication.

Called itself politically: Independent

Chain affiliation: Scripps Howard Newspaper Alliance

Wire Services: United Press

Competition: San Francisco Chronicle (circulation 179,343)

San Francisco Examiner (circulation 241,108)

San Francisco Call Bulletin
(circulation 139,013)

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	8.5	4
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	4	24
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	15	37
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	17	72

The News had one of the lowest scores. The score of objectives was the lowest of any newspaper or magazine, except the Wall Street Journal.

The comparison is not quite exact because the San Francisco News does not publish a Sunday edition, and the other newspapers in the sample have a Sunday score included - except the Wall Street Journal which publishes only five days. However, even increasing the San Francisco News score by an extra three days of its average daily score, it is still low: 11 per cent of the objectives would then be reported and 17.9 per cent of the favourable facts.

Details of the San Francisco News coverage of the British/French Case

First Period - to November 3

Readers confined to the San Francisco News began by knowing

there was an ultimatum. The reasons for it remained obscure. There was nothing in the News of the first British statement to the United Nations justifying the ultimatum. There was only one point from Eden's first major speech (that free passage at Suez was in danger). The page one banner headline suggested simply a military grab: "London, Paris Alert Troops to Seize Suez".

Instead of a report of the British/French statements in the United Nations on either October 30 or October 31, the October 31 News carried a long sketch by Scripps Howard staffwriters. They did not attempt to give any of the news, any of the attributable statements made in public for the public knowledge.

We had instead - in the news columns - "Britain and France only two days previously had vigorously denounced the use of foreign (Soviet) force in Hungary. Now they insisted on the necessity of foreign troops - this time British and French - entering Egypt and seizing and holding for a temporary period a part of that nation's territory."

The San Francisco News did not report a single one of the reasons given by Britain and France in the United Nations for this action - what made Britain and France consider it necessary. Indeed, throughout this first period only critical statements from the United Nations were reported at all. Further statements in the United Nations of British and French objectives and supporting arguments on November 1, November 2 and November 3 check lists were not reported by the San Francisco News. No press time or editionising can account for this.

San Francisco newspapers, on Pacific Time, had three hours in hand on New York (Eastern Time) - the first Security Council meeting, for instance, began at 1 p.m. Pacific Time on October 30 (4 p.m. in New York).

The coverage from London was hardly better. The San Francisco News did report, on October 31, Eden's reasons for not supporting the American resolution in the United Nations (under the page one headline "Eden Talks - 'Peace'".) It did report on November 2 his offer to hand over to the United Nations if the United Nations would keep peace.

But Eden's statements of his aims on November 1 and 2 were not reported. His defence of the action was not mentioned. His rebuttal of various charges, including colonialism, was not mentioned. Yet on November 1 the San Francisco News found space in its news columns for a 6-7 paragraph United Press follow up story from the United Nations, at the top of page 3, saying the United Nations delegates praised the United Nations stand which had "focussed the broader issue into a last ditch fight for the survival of colonialism."

Also we had (November 1): "Britain and France stood almost alone. Newspapers and Governments in the Commonwealth nations decried the attack.....as a move to gain control of the nationalised Suez canal". (The San Francisco News did not report the supporting speeches by Mr. Menzies or the New Zealand Prime Minister).

And also in the news columns: "Now Britain, France and Israel

stand convicted of transgression.."

The issue of November 3 reported Eden's reply to the United Nations that day - it was made at noon GMT, 4 a.m. San Francisco time. But again Eden's simultaneous statement of objectives was omitted and so was his justification of the British action, including a criticism of United Nations action over the Middle East in the last few years.

Second Period - issues of November 4, 5, 6, 7

The poor coverage from Britain and France continued. Eden's broadcast to Britain was not reported. The Foreign Secretary's speech was not reported. However, there was an improvement in United Nations reporting. For the first time since the crisis began a definite statement by Britain was reported from the United Nations: Dixon's welcome for the United Nations Expeditionary Force, and his assurance that Britain would cease fire as soon as Egypt and Israel endorsed the plan for United Nations Expeditionary Force which would carry out specific functions.

The weakness of reporting from Britain was seen again following the Soviet Union warning by Bulganin. This was reported but when Eden replied at 10 a.m. San Francisco time nothing at all appeared. Nor was Eden reported when he replied to Opposition criticisms in the censure debate. There was simply a general failure to report British stated objectives at whatever time or place they were made, and this was aggravated by non-factual hostile insertions. For instance, November 6, a ScrippsHoward writer from Cyprus writes:

"The purpose of the British/French/Israeli bombing and invasion of Egypt has failed utterly. I can state positively that the primary idea was to give Egypt a sudden sharp slap in the belief that her soldiers - considered by the British to be as courageous as Ubangis confronted with a green ghost - would drop their guns and quit the field. This it was assumed would lead to the night of the long knives along the Nile; Nasser - ultimate target of the assault - would be replaced, perhaps deceased, and a new government would come to power to deal in friendly fashion with Paris and London."

Again, though the San Francisco News did not find space to report what spokesmen actually said in the Commons, it gave space, on November 6 in the news columns, to a long dispatch from Tom A. Cullen, NEA staff man in London. His themes were: That disagreement with United States is such the alliance is wrecked; that Britain is against Eden (3) and that Britain is a weak, sick country. Thus:

"Unable to face up to the reality of Britain's eclipse as a world power she has taken refuge in irrational actions. In this sense the war is welcomed in some quarters as a diversion from the grave economic crisis of creeping inflation and falling exports.....She needs a good psychiatrist.....Britain is a sick nation. All the old humiliations under which Britain has smarted since World War II - her hat in hand status at the end of America's breadline for example - have come bubbling to the surface."

And though the San Francisco News did not report Eden's reply to Bulganin or even that he had replied, it did have: "The Soviet offer to jump into the Near East war has had the immediate effect of forcing all combatants to think about suing for peace."

Third Period

A large part of the official statements from Britain in this period were defending the British attitude to the United Nations Expeditionary Force, to British and French withdrawal; and to arguments about the success of the intervention.

The News did report the important Eden pledge that the British force would be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations Expeditionary Force was ready; also his offer to go anywhere to meet anybody; and the physical withdrawal of British assault troops.

But the News did not report his or the Foreign Secretary's assessment of the results of intervention. Nor, from the United Nations, did it report the British reply to criticisms that the Suez intervention had sacrificed Hungary. The San Francisco News carried on the 8th the result of the voting for the 7-power motion to rush in the United Nations Expeditionary Force, but it did not report that Britain supported this motion.

There was good coverage on November 12 of Thorneycroft's speech suggesting a Russian plot had existed, and when Lennox Boyd followed up this he was reported in November 13 issue. But that was the last of the reports of official British statements from London. In the following four days' issues nothing at all appeared.

This means there were no reports of R.A. Butler (14th); M. Mollet (13th); Harold Macmillan(13th); Lord Hailsham (15th); M. Pineau (14th); Lt. Gen. Glubb Pasha (15th); Eden (14th); though again times were not unfavourable for a Pacific coast evening newspaper. Mainly these messages continued the defence of the intervention. Butler replied to criticisms that the attack had ruined the Commonwealth or sacrificed Hungary. Macmillan claimed the intervention had prevented a third world war. Butler also said Britain was not insisting on being part of the United Nations Expeditionary Force. Mr. Menzies (13th) said but for the intervention the United Nations would never have taken positive steps - nothing had been done about Hungary. Support from India for Britain and France was not reported.

However, the San Francisco News reported the speech of the new British ambassador in as much detail as the San Francisco Examiner - the San Francisco Chronicle ignored it - repeating the pledge of withdrawal. And alone of the San Francisco papers the San Francisco News reported the public opinion poll which showed majority support in England for Eden's action (16th).

There was not a good deal of non-factual matter in these categories in this period. There were three non-factual references to British "aggression" and four paragraphs blaming British action for Russia's return to Budapest.

Period as a Whole and Counter Case

No unbalance is apparent in the San Francisco News selection of

facts for publication. The favourable facts and objectives were sparsely reported: so were the unfavourable facts and objectives. Only four per cent of the statements of hostile objectives were reported (compared with 8.5 per cent of the favourable objectives). In the much bigger category of generally unfavourable facts, 17 per cent were reported, compared with 15 per cent of the favourable facts.

The sources for the San Francisco News unfavourable reports were rather more widely spread than the other two San Francisco papers. The Arab reports (19) predominated, followed by Russia and other Communist bloc reports (16) but United States and British hostile statements were close behind, which means that in proportion, rather more was given to criticisms from Britain.

But, of course, the coverage was low altogether. Little attention was paid to the speeches by Opposition spokesmen in Britain. The accusation in England that the Opposition spokesmen provided critical material for enemies of the British and French action abroad looks absurd in this context. And though there were 19 Arab statements, they by no means gave the Egyptian case. They were mainly announcements of severance of the diplomatic relations and boycott threats from Arab countries. President Nasser's major pronouncements were at least as little reported as Eden's, and the early Egyptian statements in the United Nations were not covered. However, when we look at the non-factual content of the news columns we discover not merely an all-round inadequacy, but imbalance. The British and French case, ill reported, is distorted.

There were 34 coloured words - 24 unfavourable, 8 favourable. There was also a predominance of unfavourable matter in the unattributed insertions into news stories: 24 times hostile objectives were suggested and only four favourable ones, so that, in frequency, the official statements of objectives were submerged.

While the San Francisco News was weak factually it carried twice as many non-factual hostile statements of objectives, many with prejudicial colour. The significance of this can be seen in the fact that in the three weeks the News only once reported the official British position that an important objective was to protect free passage at the Suez, only twice that an objective was to stop fighting. This can be contrasted with the unattributed suggestions that the British/French objective was to weaken or destroy Nasser (suggested 14 times); or that the official objective was to denationalise the Suez canal (suggested 6 times).

In the generally unfavourable category there were 72 hostile insertions compared with only 37 favourable.

The most frequent unfavourable theme was that intervention was opposed by the world. For instance: "Britain and France stood almost alone... Newspapers and governments even in the Commonwealth nations decried the attack....as a move to gain control of the Suez canal".

The next most frequent was that intervention sacrificed the Hungarians: "United States officials in Washington blamed British/French intervention for the suppression of the Hungarian revolt".

The most frequent favourable non-factual theme was that Nasser was a dictator (but this only five times).

Most of the colour writing occurred in the next category: the allegation of conspiracy between British, French and Israelis.

Conspiracy

The News printed 14 per cent of the allegations of collusion between Britain, France and Israel and only 8 per cent of the rebuttals of the charge. Moreover, it printed non-factual unattributed collusion suggestions 25 times, many of them with colour (compared with only four non-factual counter conspiracy insertions).

The sources for these insertions varied from "U.S. officials in Washington"; British and French officers", or none at all. The dominant theme was that Britain and France knew of and encouraged the Israeli assault as a pretext for intervention. This was stated nine times as hard fact, three times as a probability.

November 5: The Scripps Howard writer from Cyprus: "There is little evidence here to support Anthony Eden's insistence that he ordered British forces into action strictly as part of a plan to separate the warring Egypt and Israel. That at least is my conclusion after talking here - off the record of course - to a number of British and French officers. It seems obvious that long before the Israelis announced their armour had crossed the border, the British and French assault was planned and ready to ^{the} last rocket and almost to the exact hour". Later he refers to the British/French "calculated experiment in destruction against Egypt" (November 14).

Was the Intervention Humanely/Inhumanely Carried Out?

The News reported 16 per cent of the British/French statements that intervention was being carried out as humanely as possible. It carried only 9 per cent of the critical statements, which was among the most generous coverage of the British/French view. However, it did have 18 non-factual insertions supporting the inhumane theme, with colour.

The Scripps Howard man in Cyprus, on November 3, builds up a picture of a smug bully: "An RAF officer in crisp starched tropical shorts briefs BFA correspondents on the terrible punishments now being inflicted on Egyptians. The briefing officer, proud, lists Egyptian properties seared and torn, Egyptian ships sunk and adds that the allies have yet to lose a man. It is more of an exercise, with live targets."

Much of the thematic count was in captions (the actual photographs were not, of course, considered in this verbal survey): "Bodies of the dead are placed outside the temporary P.S. hospital following air sea bombardment which accompanied the Anglo-French invasion". (The British and French several times denied any preliminary bombardment; the News did report one of these.)

United States Policy

The News reported criticism of the United States policy more fully than approval. Stevenson and Kefauver and Truman got rather better coverage than Nixon and Eisenhower. In fact, not one of

Nixon's defences of United States policy was reported. But here there is question of proportion. The San Francisco News did not print all Stevenson's speech in reply to Eisenhower, though it gave the President verbatim plus a summary.

Alliance

The News suggested the disagreements were such that the alliance was seriously damaged, perhaps wrecked. November 6 in the news columns: "Peering into the black hole where the . . . alliance once stood one wonders that it lasted so long....Whatever the immediate cause the partnership is now in ruins." This was in the second period, and the suggestion was also present in the first. It was not continued in the third.

Other News

The San Francisco News followed the pattern: Its score for the military facts was better than for any other category - 26 per cent.

Background

The San Francisco News had little background on the importance of Suez and the Middle East for Britain; but it did make an attempt to inform the readers on the existing Middle East political situation.

Remarks

The San Francisco News coverage is the weakest of the three San Francisco papers studied. It is similar to the San Francisco Chronicle

and distinct from the San Francisco Examiner, in a tendency to carry frequent non-factual insertions hostile to Britain and France. But the News has more colour reporting than the San Francisco Chronicle.

The San Francisco News may be a deliberately angled newspaper, but the basic weakness is a failure to report the facts. There was space enough on Suez. It is just that it was not used to report the attributed hard news.

CHAPTER 9

THE DENVER POST

Evening: (ex. Sunday): 1956 circulation: 254,120

Sunday morning: 350,439

Called itself politically: Independent

Chain affiliation: None

Wire Services: Associated Press, International News Service,
Chicago Tribune-New York News, North American
Newspaper Alliance, New York Herald Tribune,
United Press.

Competition: Denver Chief (morning) (circulation confidential)

Rocky Mountain News (circulation 162,133)

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	19.6	14
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	3	43
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	16.4	78
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	24.6	240

These figures place the Denver Post fifth in adequacy of coverage in these categories.

What is particularly interesting about the Denver Post is its very high content of non-factual matter, second only to Time Magazine. The weight of this matter was overwhelmingly hostile to Britain and France.

Details of the Denver Post coverage of the British/French Case

First Period - to November 3

On the first day the Denver Post had the British ultimatum in full - the other evening papers, the San Francisco News and the Quincy Herald Whig, did not, and neither did the morning Philadelphia Inquirer or the Wall Street Journal, or the magazines Time and Newsweek. The Post carried partial details of the United States motion in the United Nations and the fact that Britain had vetoed

this. It did not give any of the supporting British argument from the United Nations. On October 30 or 31, for instance, it did not give the British delegate's statement that it was Britain's firm intention that Israeli forces should be made to withdraw.

There was some coverage of Eden's October 31 speech in the Commons (little of the speech on the 30th), but the Denver Post remained weak on objectives - seven facts in this category out of a 54 possible in the first four days, though Denver, being on Mountain Time, gave the Post a two-hour better chance than Eastern papers of catching late London News (8 p.m. in London being 1 p.m. in Denver).

There is nothing remarkable about this weakness, compared with the publications in the study, but the Denver Post aggravated its thin coverage with substantial non-factual insertions and colour. For instance, though the Post ignored the British statements in the United Nations it did on October 31 have a 10-paragraph International News Service wire story reporting that Egypt wanted a General Assembly session and saying: "United States prestige meanwhile soared to an all time high in the United Nations following American opposition to the Anglo-French manoeuvre to regain control of the Suez canal... Asian, African, Arab and Latin American diplomats hailed the United States.....At the same time they expressed shock and dismay at Britain and France twice violating resolutions demanding a cease fire in the area....."

Again, on November 1, when the British statement in the United Nations was ignored, there was an interpolation: "Britain and France are reported ready to walk out and boycott the United Nations assembly Thursday unless the forum keeps hands off the Anglo-French military blow at Egypt."

And, on the general question of objectives, there was this in the news columns from James Marlow, Associated Press: "Britain and France wanted to wreck Nasser and get back the Suez Canal". Nobody would question the right of analysts like Mr. Marlow to assess intervention in this or any other way, but there is a case at least for saying the reader should also have the facts in the news columns so that he can also make his own assessments.

The Denver Post's Associated Press report in its issue of November 1 was headed: "Labour Leaders Blast Eden in Bitter Commons Debate". But out of 16 paragraphs there was only one of Eden in it, though Eden spoke at 10 a.m. Denver time. The next day it reported Labour criticism that Eden was flouting the United Nations - but it did not report Eden's rejection of the charge, nor any of the Foreign Secretary's closing speech in the debate which was on the wires from around 5 a.m. Denver time - too late for the mornings to carry that day.

The Post continued virtually to ignore the United Nations British delegate. It did not report his statement that Britain would be pleased to hand over the physical task of keeping the peace to the United Nations. (The two issues, November 2 and November 3, carried only three of the many points made by the British delegate.)

The Post did not report that the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand spoke in support of Britain. On November 3, we were told via Associated Press in the news columns that a successful intervention, from the British/French point of view, "Presumably means the toppling or fatal weakening of Nasser's Government".

Second Period, November 4, 5, 6 and 7

The Post started quite well factually. Like all the newspapers, it reported Eden's reply to the United Nations recommendation, scoring eight out of 13 in the objectives category on the November 4 check list. It reported Eden's broadcast promise to make sure Israel left Egypt, and headlined another report: "Acted to Prevent Big War, says Eden".

However, this good standard of coverage was not typical for the period. The Post did not report: Support for Britain from Mrs. Roosevelt, and from Holland in the United Nations: the British announcement on November 6 that all British bombing would cease forthwith through Egypt (carried by the other evening papers) and, like so many others, it did not report Eden's reply to Bulganin's threatening letter. Eisenhower's reply to Bulganin's Suez alliance proposal was reported, and so was the United Nations Security Council refusal to sanction Russia's intervention. But from Britain all that was reported was that Britain and France had ordered a cease fire. Eden's reasons for it were not reported, nor his defence then of the entire intervention.

Once again this was a question of news selection rather than

space or time. There was space for 11 paragraphs for a speech from Ben Gurion, nine further paragraphs from Moscow with Marshal Zhukov following up President Bulganin's intervention offer, and a seven paragraph report of Indonesians stoning British and French embassies which could have been reported in a sentence.

The most serious criticism of Denver Post treatment in this period, however, is, again, that while the facts were very sparsely reported there was in the news columns, with the facts, considerable non-factual matter of a tendentious nature.

Mr. Lawrence Martin, Associate Editor, writing from Washington contributes much of this. On November 4, for instance, we have: "Eden and Dulles are taking the 'calculated risk' that the authority and existence of the United Nations will, in the long run, be so strongly supported by public opinion that the political gamblers in London and Paris will - after a face saving interval - acknowledge the fact that's so apparent here, namely that unless they are prepared to plunge the world into much greater trouble they must quickly end their imperialistic adventures in the Suez area.....Painted in the blunt and realistic words of officials here, the picture is this: So far as the Suez area is concerned the British realised they had come to the end of their imperial road if they even allowed Nasser of Egypt to stay in power to keep them in the position of beggars....

"The alternative, as Eden and his advisers see it, is to destroy Nasser, put some still un-named personage in his place, frighten the Arab coalition into passivity by a display of brutal force, and keep

John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, so completely out of the picture that this idealistic effort to keep the situation in balance between Israeli and Arab would never get a chance to complicate their nationalistic policies with more compromise proposals delaying the showdown....."

Though we did not have Eden's reply to the Bulganin note we had, November 6, Associated Press quoting an "authoritative British source" that the Russian note was "not regarded in London as a propaganda stunt" and there was this barb: "The announced purpose of the British-French invasion is to safeguard the canal - now closed to shipping."

Third Period

Reporting the United Nations continued weak in the issue of November 8. Britain told the General Assembly it could not withdraw at once because the separation of combatants achieved would break down, but Britain welcomed the United Nations Expeditionary Force. The Post did not report this or state Britain's support for the motion to rush in the United Nations Expeditionary Force. Eden in the Commons was not reported, offering to clear the canal under United Nations, and announcing that Britain would not attempt reinforcements.

Ben Gurion's claim that Israeli army had found "astonishing quantities" of Soviet arms was not reported, nor his reasons for Israeli action, nor Pineau's statement on November 8 that the Israeli army had captured formidable quantities of Soviet equipment.

On November 9 Eden made a major speech in the Commons. He said he would be willing to go anywhere, talk to anyone, for peace; he

offered British facilities for United Nations observers; he urged that the United Nations force be set up with great urgency; he replied to the charges that Suez had sacrificed Hungary; and he reviewed the results of the intervention. None of these points was in the Denver Post sparse report.

However, in the brief reference to Eden's policy statement there was one of the rare favourable non-factual interpolations: "The British leader's statement really was intended to contribute toward a relaxation of tension in the Middle East and to show co-operation with the United Nations....Eden repeated with emphasis Britain's readiness to withdraw...."

From France, M. Mollet's speeches were not reported, but the New York Times man in Paris, Mr. Harold Callender, had a dispatch in the Post which, like the rest of his dispatches, was heavily coloured against Britain and France.

In the issue of the 10th: "Mollet's soothing speeches to the Assembly have failed to counteract the growing belief that the British and French military adventure was an egregious and tragic error that isolated the two powers and risked a disaster." He refers to the "ignominious outcome" of the policy.

The comment may be fair or useful, even in a news column, but at least those "soothing speeches" should be reported for the reader to judge.

The Post reported the wounding of the United States Vice Consul in Port Said by Egyptians, and was one of two papers to report United

States Air Force Secretary Quarles saying there had been a case for use of force by Britain and France.

Union

The British allegation that the Soviet/had been plotting in the Middle East and had laid on an arms supply was meagrely reported. Most newspapers gave the full statements here, but the Post carried only three of six points from Thorneycroft in London on the 12th. It gave limited coverage of Lennox Boyd's development of the charge on the 14th (a single column headline on page 7: "Invasion Hailed as Red Block"), and it found a prominent space for a long report from Mr. Jack Smith, London, Associated Press, to the effect that the allegation of a Russian plot was an excuse thought up to white-wash the intervention.

"The old explanation was not holding up....To bring it (the new excuse) off, Britain warmed over some facts just about every informed person has known for months....The gimmick: You can't quote us. It was topped off in typical British style. A man in a pin striped suit sat in a government office methodically telephoning key reporters in London." (Unrelated in the same issue there was a much shorter piece from Lt. Gen. Glubb Pasha elaborating the idea of a Russian plot.)

This was a period when the intervention's success was keenly debated. The Post found more space for non-factual interpolations than for the views of the British/French spokesmen. James Marlow was given space from Washington to refer to the "almost incredible stupidity of the British and French statesmen", but what those

statesmen had to say themselves was on the whole still not being reported.

For instance, Mr. Macmillan on the 13th, not a line; M. Mollet on the 13th, nothing; nothing of Butler or Eden in the 14th check list; nothing of Hailsham on the 15th; nothing of the British Ambassador's speech on the 16th; only one point from Pineau (14th), and very little of Eden's summing up for the 18th. Yet there continued to be considerable non-factual matter putting the case for the British and French critics. The Denver Post reprinted a Reston dispatch referring to the intervention as a "debacle" (13th); John M. Hightower (16th) that the intervention had been "little short of disastrous"; and Joseph E. Dynan, Paris: "The two chief allies failed to achieve their chief objective: To damage the prestige of the Egyptian leader enough to topple him from power at home".

(There was also in an opinion column a reference by Dorothy Thompson to the "officially expressed declaration of intention in London and France to bring down his (Nasser's) government". - Author's underlining)

Counter Case and Period as a Whole

The reporting of the British/French case was scanty. But this does not by itself demonstrate any conscious bias, as distinct from inadequacy. The Post reported only three per cent of the hostile objectives and the Post's coverage in the category of hostile statements and events was not much more than its coverage of the favourable statements and events - 24 per cent of the unfavourable to Britain and

France were reported against 16 per cent of statements favourable to the British and French.

The Post tended to go more for the event than the statement or opinion. It reported, for instance, in the November 2 list the fact of an Opposition censure motion, but not the terms of it; it had none of Bevan's criticisms; it had Antony Nutting's resignation as a British Minister and protest demonstrations on the 4th, but nothing of the leader of the Opposition in the Commons or on television; it had on the 17th list Saudi Arabia cutting off British and French oil and the Indonesia troubles on the 8th - but none of the United Nations debate, none of the condemnation by Asian leaders (15th), and little of Egypt's case: The Post was one of three papers that did not report Egypt's November 3 acceptance of a cease fire.

But while the margin of emphasis in the factual selection was not particularly significant, though slightly hostile, there is the Post's considerable non-factual content in the news columns to consider. The Post carried 240 hostile non-factual paragraphs in the general category - but only 78 favourable. It carried 43 hostile non-factual indications of objectives - but only 14 favourable. For instance, the theme that the British objective was to destroy Nasser as an enemy of Britain occurred:

12 times as a fact

twice as a probability.

The generally unfavourable theme that intervention had helped Russia in the Middle East occurred:

14 times as a fact

once as a probability.

Considering the low factual score, the very high non-factual content, barely distinguishable from the facts in the news columns, plus the very high colour content, suggest unbalance in the Post treatment. Further categories analysed support this judgment.

Conspiracy

The Post reported 13 per cent of the allegations of conspiracy and 6 per cent of the statements answering the charge. This is a margin that should not be overstated. The total allegations available for publication numbered 56 and the Post had only 7 of them, which is one every third day on average.

It is when the non-factual matter in the news columns is also brought in for consideration that the weight of the Post's emphasis on the conspiracy charge is seen. For there were 55 non-factual paragraphs in the Post news columns alleging conspiracy between Britain, France and Israel, the highest count for any publication in the sample. And there were only five paragraphs putting the other view.

The Post was more ready than any other newspaper or magazine to print non-attributable allegations of conspiracy, and it was in this category that much of the colour writing came in.

The conspiracy charges fell into these main theme groups: That the United States is being deliberately deceived by Britain and France:

Seven times stated as a fact, five times as a probability, five times as a possibility.

Britain and France planned the assault with Israel as pretext for intervention: Four times as a fact, four as a probability, once as a possibility.

Britain and France welcomed Israel action: Stated 11 times as a fact.

What was the evidence advanced for these assertions?

That Britain and France had all along wanted to use force against Nasser (13 times).

That there was no communication London-Washington just before the intervention.

That United States envoys were given misleading information.

The Colour

For instance, on November 2, under the headline, "U.S. Aides Bare British Play to Hide Suez Plan", we had this, United Press report: "Additional details have come to light on how British diplomats kept American diplomats in the dark about plans for military action against Egypt". There was a picture of Lloyd and the caption: "He fooled Dulles".

By Lawrence Martin, associate editor, there was this: "There is no doubt here (Washington) whatever that there was collusion among Israel, Britain and France which timed the Israel invasion of Sinai to accord with Russian troubles in Poland....and with the American political campaign....Neither is there much doubt that, to

an even more serious degree, the British are now - as has been unofficially reported - making overtures to the Soviet Union designed to dislodge the United States from its position of world leadership by recognising the Kremlin's ascendancy in Europe in exchange for British ascendancy in the Middle East...."Mr. Martin then refers to Britain's "obvious, deliberate and arrogant repudiation of pledged words under the United Nations Charter."

It is with this as background that the Post's factual omissions are important. In all the three weeks of this kind of allegation only one direct denial of collusion of the many made was reported.

American Policy

The Post carried 31 per cent of the facts critical of American policy; 27 per cent of the approving statements. (Non-factually the balance was even: 11 critical, 10 favourable.)

Was the Intervention Humanely Carried Out?

The imbalance of the Post reporting continued in the category where the humanity of the operation for intervention was underlined - or denied. It had only three of 85 British, French and other reports in the humane category (3.5 per cent) which was the lowest for any of the newspapers in the sample, even including the Wall Street Journal. It reported 18 per cent of hostile facts that intervention was inhumanely carried out.

Moreover, the non-factual content once again was hostile. There were 22 paragraphs suggesting inhumanity, compared with only three favourable.

The British communiques and the statements in the Commons and by the Commander-in-Chief about military precautions to save life in the intervention were virtually ignored. The fact that there were radio warnings before raids was not reported at all - though it was officially stated many times and at different hours of the day. The claim that only military targets were being bombed, mostly airfields, was not reported. (The tone of the Post reporting comes right at the beginning. On October 31, the page one streamer was: "Jet Bombers Attack Cairo".)

Consider November 1: Cairo radio then said incendiaries and high explosives had been dropped on Cairo twice, killing even more the second time. The Post reports this most carelessly. The Post's main story begins:

"British jet bombers attacked Cairo at 10 a.m. according to United Press and International News Service. The planes dropped high explosives and incendiaries, according to an official communique."

It would seem important to make clear this is an Egyptian communique, but it is not until much lower down that the Denver Post says in an unconnected way: "The Egyptian communique which said..."

In fact, the British Air Ministry made a categorical denial that incendiaries had been used and said flares had probably been mistaken for them. The Post does not carry the denial. It follows the incendiary report with this: "The British planes also dropped a dozen parachute flares."

The Post did not report a single official British communique through the entire three weeks. But it did report several Egyptian communiques and Russian allegations of atrocities. Indeed, even the three points the Post is credited with in this category are generous.

Consider another instance. The British communique of November 2 said military airfields had been bombed and it went on to say how much care had been taken to avoid civilian casualties, including the use of delayed action bombs. The Post reported that Britain had said it would continue to bomb airfields "relentlessly" until Nasser's air force was destroyed.

On November 8, an Egyptian patrol broke the cease fire. In the Commons it was told how a British company spared the infiltrating patrol and the Associated Press reporter on the 11th told how after nine bursts of fire by the Egyptians the British had eventually replied. The Post reported this ambiguously: "British and French soldiers beat off Arab snipers in Port Said despite the cease fire."

Thus there is clear distortion in the factual reporting, plus a weighted non-factual content.

Repeated British statements that Port Said was not bombed or bombarded before invasion did not get published in the Post. But statements such as this did: "The British and French took over the city after a devastating bombardment which hit the poor section hardest."

Canal

Who was to blame for the blocking of the Suez canal during the

crisis? The culpability theme is not important by itself in this analysis because few statements were generally available and the frequencies are therefore not great. However, here again the Post seems at pains to present Britain and France in the worst possible light. In the coverage of such facts as there are, there is a higher proportion of those suggesting British and French culpability. It is worth detailing a sample of early coverage.

On November 1 the Post carried on page one: "An Egyptian government communique said Britain and France sent bombers which sank an Egyptian warship, the Akka, near Lake Timsah, blocking the Suez canal to all traffic."

The British denial was not carried - that the Egyptian ships were being towed into sinking position and the ship was sunk by British planes clear of the channel.

The same day the Post gave further credence to the idea that Britain was blocking the canal. "The Admiralty announced Wednesday night a British cruiser sank an Egyptian frigate in the Gulf of Suez at the southern end of the canal." (In fact, the British Minister in the Commons said the ship was sunk 80 miles south of the canal entrance.)

Now on November 2 the Post had this again on page one: "The communique said the Anglo-French bombing blocked the southern entrance to the canal by sinking an Egyptian fishing vessel across the channel. Egypt claimed Thursday that Anglo-French bombers blocked the canal by sinking a warship in the north segment of the canal."

Time should surely have been found now for the British reply. But more distortion is to come, for on page 6 the Post rams the point home with an Associated Press Cairo November 2 story headlined: "Suez blocked by Sunken Ship".

The story says: "Egyptian army headquarters announced Friday a fishing vessel sunk by British and French air bombardment has blocked the south entrance to the Suez canal."

"It was the second vessel sunk in the 103 mile waterway. Thursday the Egyptian warship Akka was sunk near Lake Timsah, midway in the canal, by British and French planes."

Nothing still of the British statement. No shadow of denial is admitted. But the Post (Associated Press) story goes on: "The Egyptian announcement was confirmed in London by Aubrey Jones, Minister of Fuel and Power. We know that no ships are at the moment passing through the canal", said Jones.

In fact, Aubrey Jones did not confirm the Egyptian Government announcement at all. According to the London Times (November 3, page 4) Jones had said the Government had taken precautionary moves against the canal closure - if the action caused temporary closing of the canal it was a small price to pay for objectives." But he certainly did not say Britain was responsible for blocking the canal by bombing, which is what the Post conveys.

Why Intervention Stopped

Only two favourable reasons were in this non-factual category for the British-French cease fire. The stress in the Post was that

Britain and France had stopped because they were frightened by the Russian rocket threat (12 paragraphs).

Other Military

The Post reported 44 per cent of the main military facts.

Background

The Post gave reasonable background information on the Suez and the Middle East importance for Britain (17 paragraphs). It had good background information on the Middle East situation neutrally explaining its politics.

Remarks

From the British and French point of view, the Post's reporting of the facts is inadequate. In this respect it occupies a position about half way among the sample newspapers studied. But the Post's whole coverage of the crisis is not only inadequate. It is also seriously distorted by the high non-factual score, repeated colour, and errors. A paper that set out to present a deliberately anti-British view of Suez could have perhaps chosen more factual hostile statements. However, there is a distinct anti-British bias in the Post coverage over the three weeks; whether it arrived there by editorial direction, by the attitude of one or two of the key staff, or by chance, we cannot say. But in such a complete study the latter explanation is the least likely.

CHAPTER 10

THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

Morning: 1956 circulation: 623,024. Sunday: 1,140,409.

Called itself politically: Independent.

Chain affiliation: None

Wire Services: Associated Press, Chicago Tribune-New York News, International News Service, New York Herald Tribune, United Press.

Competition: Philadelphia Bulletin (evening)
(circulation 709,441)

Philadelphia News (evening)
(circulation 175,905)

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	23	10
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	8	31
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	25	49
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	33	127

In Detail: First Period to November 3 inclusive

The Philadelphia Inquirer did justice to Israel's official reasons for invading Egypt. The reasons for the British intervention were not so clear. Eden in London, and Britain's representative in the United Nations in New York were not reported in defending the need for action outside the United Nations - they argued that the United Nations had failed in the past and could not act in time in a situation rapidly getting out of control. Only two points out of seven on the check list were reported from the speech by the British delegate at the United Nations. The United Nations meeting began in evening paper time (11 a.m.) but evening paper coverage does not explain the gaps in the Inquirer coverage, for the United Nations business continued into the afternoon and the full Commons debate did not finish until 5 p.m. Eastern Time and was thus out of evening

newspaper time altogether.

There was also much better coverage for hostile statements in the United Nations - the Philadelphia Inquirer reported the American motion, Russia's motion, America's appeal to members not to exploit the situation for any selfish interest, the attack on Britain and France by the Egyptian delegate and the criticisms of the Yugoslav delegate.

Striking omissions occurred in the Philadelphia Inquirer issue of November 1. The Philadelphia Inquirer ceased even the barest reporting of the British and French statements in the United Nations. It omitted Britain's declaration in the United Nations that she did not condone any Israeli action aimed at occupying positions in Egypt, and that it was Britain's intention to see Israeli forces withdraw. It omitted Britain's promise that intervention was not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt.

The Inquirer did not report, also, anything at all on Eden and Lloyd speaking in the Commons debate on October 31, again ending outside evening newspaper time. This meant the British reasons for not supporting the United States motion in the United Nations were not published. Nor, again, were the British reasons for acting outside the United Nations.

Yet the Philadelphia Inquirer did find space for hostile non-factual material. For instance: "Officials made no secret of their suspicion that Israel's stab into Egypt was part of a scheme to pave the way for British/French occupation....and bring down Egyptian

President G.A. Nasser." (Wire Services from Washington, November 1).

And again, this time from the United Nations: "Lodge sat stiff and silent as the British and French delegates broke the long standing Western Unity of action....Lodge denounced the ultimatum...."

"The administration's displeasure and alarm is such that there is a strong possibility that the United States will haul its allies before the United Nations as aggressors" (Higgins, October 31).

There was much better coverage from London in the Philadelphia Inquirer of November 2. Eden's offer to let the United Nations take over when positions were established was reported, and so was his theme that the small war might prevent a larger one. But again Britain's reason for not supporting the United Nations and United States was not reported, and the reporting from the United Nations continued weak.

Only one point was reported from the major speech by the British representative. The Philadelphia Inquirer did not report his proposal of a conference to settle the Middle East problems, or his review of the United Nations difficulties, or his detailed rebuttal of charges of aggression. Support for Britain from the Prime Minister of Australia was not published - one of his points was that the United Nations had never even been able to guarantee free passage for Israeli ships. Nor was the statement by the New Zealand Premier expressing "full confidence" in Britain's intentions. Some of this was available in evening paper time, but still the Philadelphia Inquirer continued to give space to more non-factual matter hostile to the British/French case.

On November 2, for instance, it printed a report from London, under the heading: "Why Britain and France launched their attack on Egypt": "British and French military forces plan to occupy strategic positions in the Suez canal zone until Colonel Nasser's influence in the Middle East has been destroyed. Eden is convinced Nasser is a menace who must be halted by force." (by-lined: Ernie Hill).

And again: "Privately the British discuss freely their intentions to impose solutions on the Middle East by use of force. But they will continue to deny before the United Nations that they are guilty of aggression. They will claim that they 'requested' Nasser to allow them to put troops in Suez for police purposes to maintain peace and they took action only after he rejected their request."

Similarly on November 3, Belgium's and Holland's criticisms of America's United Nations motion, and, more important, Eden's Commons statement, were not reported.

Instead of the news we had: "Eden in the face of angry Labour demands refused obstinately to declare at once the reaction of the Government to the Assembly ruling. It appeared Eden hoped to confront Parliament, Britain and the United Nations with the accomplished fact of a successful British landing."

There was nearly a column of this kind of lightly coloured writing - but nothing of what Eden had actually said.

Second Period, November 4, 5, 6, 7

In common with most other newspapers, the Philadelphia Inquirer scored much better on November 4 when Eden's reply to the United Nations recommendation was available, and he had broadcast to the nation. It reported Eden's conditions for a cease fire; it did not report the Foreign Secretary or Eden's detailed criticisms of Egypt and the United Nations in the past, or the full Churchill statement of support, or support from the Prime Ministers of Australia and Canada.

There was better coverage of the United Nations in the Inquirer of the 6th. The Inquirer was the only newspaper in the study to report the British suggestion that the Security Council should meet at the highest level to work out a permanent solution; the only paper to report the Foreign Secretary's arguments in reply to the criticism that Suez had sacrificed Hungary.

But the Inquirer did not report the important November 5 announcement that Egypt and Israel had both accepted a cease fire unconditionally and that Egypt had accepted the United Nations proposal for a United Nations force to go there.

This was the "new element" in the situation, according to Eden, for Britain ordering a cease fire on November 6. But, again on the 6th, the Philadelphia Inquirer did not report this prior agreement by Egypt and Israel.

The Inquirer was somewhat better than most other papers on November 7 in reporting at least that Eden had replied to the threats in the Bulganin letter, though the coverage of the reply was thin,

and, incidentally, played down. The Bulganin threat was page one banner material ("Bulganin threatens Mid East war action; Bulganin insists Britain, France, halt Egypt push"), but Eden's reply was on page 22 (a lame 3-column head: "Asks Reds to use 'Reason'".)

Eden maintained that the action had made it virtually certain Israel and Egypt would not re-engage in fighting; that it had limited the area of conflict because only the presence of British and French forces had stopped other Arab countries from joining in at once; that it had been the essential condition for the attempted creation of the United Nations Expeditionary Force to get into the area. After years of flickering war, he said, the stage "can now be set.... for negotiations and for a real settlement of the problems of the Middle East." None of this was reported in the Inquirer.

There was, in the second period, little non-factual matter, but on the 6th the Inquirer was still carrying hostile allegations of objectives in its news columns: "The British feel that their lifeline of Empire is at stake - and more. If Nasser is not knocked down while there is still time, they fear he may threaten her oil supplies in the Middle East and perhaps become a new 'little Hitler'." (William McGaffin, Washington, by-lined "a Knight newspaperman").

Third Period, 8 - 18 inclusive

The public policy questions in this period were mainly: What was achieved by the intervention? What was Britain's attitude to the United Nations Expeditionary Force and withdrawal?

The Inquirer did not report Britain's support of the United

Expeditionary Force on the 8th or much of the British arguments that the intervention had been a success. The Foreign Secretary, Lloyd, was not reported on November 8 when he explained that the cease fire had been called because the objectives had been achieved. The New Zealand Prime Minister's view that intervention had now brought prospects of a permanent Middle East peace, and the Australian view that the intervention had galvanised the United Nations into action was not reported. Mr. Ben Gurion's claim that Israel had captured "astonishing" quantities of Soviet arms was not reported, nor the French announcement to this effect.

On November 9, the Inquirer reported Britain's decision to withdraw troops - but not Britain's offer of facilities to the United Nations, or, again, the review of what the intervention had achieved. The Inquirer concentrated on the news of troop withdrawals and Eden's offer to go to a summit.

These omissions have relevance when, non-factually, arguments are published decrying the intervention. On the 12th, for instance, there was an Associated Press dispatch to the effect that intervention had been a "disaster". (In this third period there were 69 non-factual paragraphs unfavourable to Britain, mainly adverse judgments on the intervention).

The Philadelphia Inquirer had excellent coverage of the new British allegations that there had been a Russian plot to take over Egypt. It reported Mr. Peter Thorneycroft's story in full on the 12th, published some of the development of the charge by Mr. Lennox Boyd on

the 14th, and repeated the arms facts as stated by the new British Ambassador on the 16th. It published a Washington non-factual piece saying Russia had been plotting to take over Middle East oil.

However, the Inquirer continued not to print British and French general defences of their action - no Mollet and Macmillan on the 13th; no Butler on the 14th, no Pineau; no Hailsham on the 15th. In doing this the Inquirer omitted to publish the British and French spokesmen's reply to the current criticism that their action at Suez had sacrificed the Hungarian anti-Soviet rebels (an idea that did earlier receive a little currency non-factually in the Philadelphia Inquirer: 10 paragraphs based on Washington "diplomats'" views.)

Even Eden's final summing up of intervention, in the issues of November 18, was sparsely reported, again omitting the point that Britain and France could not continue intervention because Egypt and Israel had meanwhile accepted a cease fire.

Counter Case and Period as a Whole

The Inquirer had very low reportage of the hostile news items about British and French objectives (8 per cent). It did have 31 paragraphs of hostile non-factual material, but it also had 10 favourable non-factual paragraphs, and altogether the reporting of objectives balances. The dominant non-factual objectives suggested that the British aim was to weaken or destroy Nasser (this was stated 10 times as a hard fact, twice as a probability).

The Inquirer follows the pattern in that it reported a greater proportion of the facts generally unfavourable to Britain than of the

facts favourable - 33 per cent of the hostile against 25 per cent favourable. And the non-factual matter was mainly hostile (127 paragraphs with 49 favourable).

In the early stages the Opposition in Britain received a smaller press than the Government; there was no report of the Trafalgar Square speeches or Mr. Gaitskell's on television. After the first two days United Nations coverage was not good, either way. Broadly the resolutions were reported but not the content of the debate. President Nasser was reported only once or twice briefly: he did not, of course, make anything like as many speeches as Eden facing a hostile Commons.

There were no personal anti-Eden themes in the non-factual matter. The main unfavourable themes in the non-factual matter were that Britain was not co-operating with the United Nations (14 paragraphs); that intervention had lost friendship in Middle East (9 paragraphs) and had weakened Britain. From November 8 there was a steady picture of Britain as a tottering economy (26 paragraphs). Peter Lisager of the Chicago Daily News Service writes from London, under the heading: "Britain's adventure in Egypt". Intervention, he said, was an adventure, now there was the hangover, and Uncle Sam might have to "bail out" Britain.

There were 45 hostile colour words, three favourable, featuring strongly in the allegations of collusion.

Conspiracy

The Inquirer reported 16 per cent of the allegations of conspiracy between Britain, France and Israel - and 30 per cent of the facts denying this. This margin of 14 per cent was the highest for any publication in the study. On the facts available for reporting, the Inquirer was clearly fair to the British and French. What of the non-factual content of the news columns? Here the balance was the other way - 21 non-factual units alleging conspiracy (against four for counter conspiracy). The non-factual matter had loaded colour words.

Marguerite Higgins reports from Washington, November 3, that Mr. Dulles confronted the British and French envoys that their governments had co-operated with Israel to play "a giant international trick on the United States". Later in the report what had begun as a probability continued as a fact: "The British and French took the position in their talks with Dulles today that they have at last gotten an opportunity to 'get rid of Nasser'. They turned deaf ears to Dulles' insistence that even temporary victory in Egypt would not prevent the terrible chain of events which he foresees."

Then we have this false attribution of official policy from Ernie Hill from London (November 2): "The British deny they worked in collaboration with Israel. The British claim instead that Israel was aware they wanted an excuse to take action and Israel went ahead on its own initiative. The British were aware that Israel planned to attack Egypt so they got ready to execute their part in the pro-

ceedings." This suggests Mr. Hill is reporting British official policy, but the public stand was certainly not this one.

And in this category Associated Press is guilty of misreporting. The Inquirer text is: "Gaitskell quoted reports that United States officials believed Britain and France approved of the Israel invasion of Egypt as an excuse to re-occupy the canal zone. Neither Eden nor other Government spokesmen answered that." In fact that same day Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd devoted part of his speech to answering the charge of collusion and it came in ample time for morning newspapers.

The Alliance

Up to November 4 the non-factual interpretative reporting of the Inquirer tended to stress the strains on the alliance, and the United States anger. In the final period, the dominant theme was that United States and Britain wished to see the alliance preserved.

United States Policy

The Inquirer had the highest score of facts approving United States policy - 58 per cent - and this was 28 per cent better than its reporting of criticisms of United States policy. Noticeably, it barely reported the Stevenson radio and television speech of November 2 in reply to Eisenhower (whom it had reported fully, though not verbatim).

The Inquirer merely had the fact that Stevenson thought the Administration policies "ill considered", and none of the details of his criticism. Both Eisenhower and Nixon fared noticeably better

than Democratic critics but there was no significant non-factual content (2 approving United States policy; 4 critical).

Was the Intervention Humanely/Inhumanely Carried Out?

The Inquirer reported 19 per cent of the facts supporting the contention that the intervention was humanely carried out - a better score than most other newspapers except the Chicago Tribune. It reported 32 per cent of the facts in the category that the military intervention was inhumanely carried out.

Unlike most other newspapers, the Inquirer carried almost no non-factual matter in this category (three hostile paragraphs, one favourable).

The weakness in its factual reporting was a slowness to report the British statements that civilians were being warned before air raids (first reported November 5, though statements had been made first on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th also). And the Inquirer did not report the British communiques and spokesmen that there had been no preliminary bombardment of Port Said before the invasion, though it did report the Egyptian director of information alleging this bombardment by sea and air and the deliberate mass killing of civilians.

Canal Blockage

The Philadelphia Inquirer reported 40 per cent of the allegations of British culpability for the blocking of the Suez canal, and only 21 per cent of the charges alleging Egyptian guilt (non-factually the scores were equal at five units each).

The Inquirer for some reason did not cover this aspect in a balanced manner. On November 2, for instance, paragraph two of the lead story on page one says this: "France disclosed that two carrier-led Anglo-French fleets were approaching both ends of the Suez canal blocked by the sinking of an Egyptian vessel by an aircraft". This suggests the French stated that a bombed vessel blocked the canal; in fact that part of the text came from an Egyptian communique whose contents were denied by the British and French. But the Inquirer does not carry the denial until lower down page on page four; the British and French communique actually said the Akka was being towed into sinking position half way down the canal but was sunk by the planes clear of the channel.

Again on November 3, the Egyptian communique that British and French bombers sank a big fishing ship in the canal was in a "Box" on page one without the British denial. On page nine there was a headline and story to the same effect and no denial here either. And on page four there was a repetition of the already denied story about the sinking of the Akka, the denial appearing at last, but in brackets.

On November 5 the Philadelphia Inquirer carried the Egyptian communique saying Britain and France had demolished the Firdan bridge over the canal; but not the available British communique that the Egyptians themselves had blocked the canal with seven ships.

Other Military

The Philadelphia Inquirer reported 52 per cent of the main

military neutral facts.

Background

The Philadelphia Inquirer was weak on background on the Middle Eastern political situation and also on the importance of the canal area for Britain.

Remarks

Despite its extensive wire services, the Inquirer reporting from London, Paris and the United Nations in New York was inadequate to cover the crisis. It conveyed a clearer idea of official British and French objectives than the San Francisco Chronicle, the San Francisco News and the Denver Post, but it failed to present a balanced account of the British case for intervention. Is there evidence of bias in this? There is a high count of coloured writing, overwhelmingly hostile, which could lead a casual observer to concluding that the Inquirer was deliberately biassed against Britain and France. On the other hand, the hostility was erratic, and the non-factual content not overwhelming in quantity.

CHAPTER 11

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Morning, except Saturday and Sunday: 134,218 (Mid-West
Edition)

Combined circulation all over, four editions: 420,761

Chain affiliation: Dow, Jones and Co., Inc.

Main Wire Services: Associated Press, International News
Service, United Press, Dow Jones.

The Wall Street Journal is primarily a business and financial newspaper. But it does attempt to report the main news of the day in abbreviated form, and it was included in the survey to see what picture of the intervention would be available to a businessman reading only the Wall Street Journal.

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	4.2	3
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	0	15
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	7	13
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	9	47

The Journal is a five-day paper, so it loses a total of six days' scoring in the three weeks. Adjusted to a seven-day score the figures would be six per cent for objectives and 8 per cent favourable facts, the lowest score for any of the newspapers examined. The adjusted score of 8 per cent for reporting the supporting facts would be the same as the magazine Newsweek, the lowest in all the publications examined.

The noticeable point about the Journal is that, though obviously limited on space, it did also include a not insubstantial amount of non-factual matter.

British-French Case, First Period to November 3

The Journal began the crisis with a fair report of the Israel statement on October 30, giving the reasons for Israel's action. On October 31 it reported one point of the British ultimatum - that Britain and France had called on both sides to withdraw ten miles from the canal and stop fighting. It reported Eden saying that the objectives were to assure free passage through the canal and to end hostilities. That was all. Nothing further was reported from Britain, from France or from the British, French or Israeli spokesmen in the United Nations.

On the other side there was: The United States motion in the Security Council; the voting on this; some of the United States delegate's argument; President Eisenhower's appeal to Britain and France not to intervene; and Egypt's rejection of the ultimatum as a violation of the United Nations charter and "aggression against a victim of aggression".

Thus the temporary nature of the British intervention was not reported at all, nor was the British/French argument that Israel was justified by the provocations of Egypt and the British and French by the inability of the United Nations to act decisively and promptly. The votes supporting Eden in London and Prime Minister Mollet in Paris were not reported.

The coverage of the British/French case remained sparse on November 1. Though the Russian delegate to the United Nations was reported in calling for the United Nations to condemn British/French

aggression, and the Secretary General's call for "true principles" to be honoured, there was no report at all of what the British delegate said, or the French delegate. There was thus omitted Sir Pierson Dixon's promise that Britain would see to it that Israel withdrew and his assurance that the British/French action was not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt. The British delegate also gave a full statement of objectives of the intervention which was not reported.

Again, though President Eisenhower was reported on Suez, Eden and the British Foreign Secretary were not reported at all from London. Eden explained why Britain had not been able to support the United States resolution in the United Nations; he stressed that the intervention was temporary; and he, too, outlined the objectives of the intervention.

A British statement of objectives was again available on November 2, but it was not reported by the Wall Street Journal. This included Eden's point that he was not seeking to impose by force a solution to the Egyptian-Israeli or canal disputes, but merely to prevent a wider conflagration. However, the Wall Street Journal did have Eden's important point that he would welcome the United Nations after the position had been stabilised and the combatants separated.

Though the Journal failed to report the stated British/French objectives at whatever time made available, it did find space for non-factual matter about these objectives. It reported as a fact that

one of the British objectives was to weaken or destroy Nasser, and twice in this period it referred ambiguously to the British objective as to "seize" the Suez canal. For instance, on November 1:

"The attack gives the British and French not only an opportunity to seize the canal but also a possible chance to topple the regime of Egypt's President Nasser."

Readers were also told that Washington officials "boil with ire" at Britain and France.

Second Period, up to 7 November

There was no Journal on the 3rd or 4th. Eden's point-by-point reply to the United Nations on November 3 was not picked up in the Journal on the 5th. His broadcast was not covered. This is understandable since the speeches had been well covered by the Sunday newspapers. Less understandable is the omission of the important announcement by the United Nations Secretary General on the 5th that both Egypt and Israel had now accepted an unconditional cease fire. The Journal did report Eden's acceptance of a cease fire from midnight - but not his reasons which came in around 2 p.m., certainly not too early to be left to the evenings. The omission of Eden's reasons, including his contention that the Egyptian and Israeli acceptances were a "new element" in the situation - a new element which led the British Government to order a cease fire - left a strong inference that Britain and France had stopped because of the Soviet threat in the letter from President Bulganin. This threat was reported, but there was nothing at all of Eden's or Mollet's reply

to it or defence of it. Instead there was this non-factual insertion:
"The Anglo/French cease fire decision was made after the Russians threatened to intervene. Diplomats in London and Paris reportedly did not consider that a bluff and decided the best way to head off a Soviet move was to call a hasty cease fire."

Third Period

On November 8 the Wall Street Journal again stated, as a fact, that intervention had ended because of Russian threats, and on November 9 it gave eight paragraphs to this effect in a dispatch from Paris ("Anthony Eden was scared stiff, declares one Government official"). All this was under the headline: "French-British Wrangle over Mid-East Mess: Agree United States is Villain".

Yet, though readers of the Wall Street Journal had this coloured non-factual material, space continued to be denied the facts. The dispatch from Paris did not tell them what the French Government was saying. M. Mollet claimed the intervention had revealed the ambitions in the Mid-East of the Soviet Union. M. Pineau said the Israeli army had captured Soviet arms more formidable than had been suspected. They were not reported. And while the Wall Street Journal was publishing non-factual criticisms of intervention and suggesting that fear of Russian intervention caused it to end, it did not print the British appraisal of intervention or the British answer to the latter charge.

This is the pattern for the Journal. Four times after November 8 it reported, as if it were a fact, that the British/French objective was to denationalise the Suez canal and make it Anglo-French again.

Three times it reported, as if it were a fact, that the objective was to impose an international settlement on the Canal dispute. And it repeated, as if it were a fact, that the objective was to get rid of Nasser.

Yet in this period after November 8 not one official British or French statement of objective (out of 33 available) was reported by the Wall Street Journal. (It reported on the 12th that Soviet arms had been found in Egypt; but nothing of the elaboration of the charge that there was a Russian plot.)

Counter Case and Period as a Whole

The Journal did not report any of the actual assertions of British/French objectives by sources hostile to Britain and France. It did, however, carry 15 unattributed paragraphs conveying the hostile assertions.

In its coverage of the facts it reported slightly more of the anti-British/French case than of the British/French case: 9 per cent of the hostile statements against 7 per cent of the favourable - the 9 per cent coverage was, of course, too little to do justice either to anything said officially by President Nasser or the Egyptian delegate in the United Nations. Its non-factual matter, however, was also predominantly hostile to Britain and France - 47 paragraphs hostile against 13 favourable. The strongest theme was the shakiness of the British economy after the Suez intervention.

The opposition to intervention in Britain was conveyed more non-

factually than by reporting what the Opposition said. No official opposition to intervention was mentioned until it was reported on November 5 that there had been a demonstration in Trafalgar Square. There was nothing further, factually, beyond one mention of Labour's censure motion on the economic effects of Suez (13th) and newspaper quotes on the 14th when there were 12 paragraphs suggesting Britain was more against Eden than for him. This opinion piece was based on the Chester by-election. The Journal did not the next day report the result of the by-election itself.

Conspiracy

The Journal did not publish any of the factual allegations of collusion between Britain, France and Israel. But it did give them brief currency non-factually. It reported from Washington on November 2: "Administration men push their story of French/British/Israeli collusion. They say Eden and Mollet lured Israel into invading Egypt as a pretext for intervening to save Suez. The reported bait: Opening Suez to Israeli ships, more territory to Israel."

The two other non-factual paragraphs were to the effect that Britain and France deceived the United States.

The count is small, but the Journal did not give its readers any of the factual denials of the specific charge of collusion or suggest, non-factually, that it was denied.

On Britain's relations with Israel, the Journal did not report any of the British statements that Britain would ensure Israel with-

drew - promises given both by the Prime Minister (November 3) and Foreign Secretary (November 5). But the Journal did carry this on November 8 from Paris: "A Britisher here blithely leaves to the United Nations the job of getting the Israelis to pull back. There's not a chance the British and French would use force to get them to do so", he exclaims." The same day there was available a Foreign Office statement saying it was Britain's intention that Israel should withdraw speedily. That, too, was not reported.

United States Policy

The Journal was evenly balanced. It had 12 per cent of the approving facts, 13 per cent of the critical: and no non-factual material.

Was the Intervention Humanely Carried Out?

Coverage was slight here also, but balanced. There was 5.8 per cent coverage of the humane facts, and 7 per cent of the inhumane facts: again, no non-factual matter.

Canal Blockage

The frequencies are again small. The Journal had two out of 34 (5.9 per cent) of the facts alleging Egyptian culpability and one in 10 (10 per cent) alleging British culpability. Non-factually the balance was moved infinitesimally the same way with two theme units alleging British culpability and one alleging Egyptian culpability.

One piece of mis-statement should be mentioned. On November 2 the Journal reported "British bombers also sank an Egyptian ship in

the Suez canal. Cairo claimed the action had blocked the waterway. Britain confirmed the sinking but denied the bombing was aimed to clog the canal. It said the vessel was hit while being towed by Egyptians to a position to block the waterway." This leaves the impression that the ship is still actually blocking the waterway, whereas in fact the British statement was at pains to point out that Britain had succeeded in sinking the ship clear of the canal. Britain did not confirm a sinking which blocked the canal, which is what the Journal reports. The Journal's sub-editing here changed the sense of the official British statement.

Other Categories

In the other categories the Wall Street Journal coverage proved too small to merit analysis.

Background

The Journal did not give background to the political situation, but it gave reasonable background on the importance of Suez and the Middle East for Britain.

Summary

The Wall Street Journal coverage of the facts of the Suez crisis is too fragmentary to give any idea of the British objectives or the reasons for the intervention. The Journal obviously does not set out to cover the news. However, the summaries it gives are very bare and space is given up to non-factual material of doubtful value, some of it masquerading as fact.

Thus, though the Journal does not report the British official objectives it nonetheless gives space to 15 paragraphs of unfavourable objectives, and 47 other hostile paragraphs, including 14 coloured words. Brief summaries should be more scrupulously distilled. The Journal was not only inadequate in its coverage of Suez. It may also have been misleading.

CHAPTER 12

THE QUINCY HERALD WHIG
(Illinois)

Evening, ex. Sunday: Circulation: 32,407

Sunday: Circulation 32,786

Called itself politically: Independent

Chain affiliation: None

Wire Services: Associated Press

Competition: None

How well did a small town newspaper report the crisis? Were its readers substantially less informed than the readers of the city newspapers examined? The Quincy Herald Whig was studied as the small town newspaper.

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	17.9	5
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	3	30
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	12	28
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	21	65

The Quincy Herald Whig reporting of the statements of British objectives was higher than the San Francisco News, the Wall Street Journal and any of the magazines. Its reporting of the case in support of the British/French action was the smallest for any newspaper except for the Wall Street Journal.

The British Case: In Detail: First Period

The Whig started better than the Denver Post, the San Francisco News and the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Wall Street Journal, by giving the text of the ultimatum, a little of Eden's speech and three points from the speeches of the British delegate at the United

Nations on October 30 and 31. (It also reported the unfavourable United States, Russian and Egyptian views from the United Nations, rather more fully.)

The reason for Britain's refusal to vote for the United States and then for the Russian resolution was not reported on October 31, nor was this justification reported on November 1 when Eden explained in detail, supported by the Foreign Secretary. There was little, in fact, of Eden's second day speech, and less from the United Nations, though both were ideal for evening paper publication Central Time. The British pledge in the United Nations that it was Britain's "firm intention" to make Israeli forces withdraw was not reported. The British reasons for not supporting the United States continued to remain unknown to readers of the Quincy Herald Whig. In the United Nations on November 1 (November 2 check list), the British delegate dealt with this at some length. He explained that the United States resolution would have left the Middle East situation in its dangerous pre-crisis position, that it would not have achieved the twin British objectives of separating the combatants at once and safeguarding the Suez passage.

Again he was not reported. His suggestion of a Middle East Conference was not published either.

Eden's November 1 defence of intervention was not reported - though readers were told of "angry" Commons demands for Eden's resignation and of the Labour Opposition's agreement with the "United Nations condemnation". Support for Britain from the Prime Ministers

of Australia and New Zealand was not published.

The November 2 issue of the Quincy Herald Whig did report the important reply by Eden to Labour demands that he comply with the United Nations resolution and it gave his reasons (which was more than the big city Philadelphia Inquirer and the San Francisco Chronicle did). On the other hand, it carried the full details of the United States motion in the United Nations - but again omitted criticism of it, this time by Belgium, Holland and France.

The Whig reporting is clearly thin in this first period. The weakness is aggravated by non-factual matter in the news columns. Including four non-factual paragraphs, official objectives were stated 11 times in all. There were 17 non-factual paragraphs conveying objectives inimical to Britain and France. In other words, rumour and suspicion were reported more fully than official statements.

The objective given most currency by the Quincy Herald Whig was that Britain aimed to weaken or destroy Nasser. This was reported seven times in this period as if it were the official factual objective (and once as a possibility). The reporting was also coloured: "What Britain and France wanted was to wreck Nasser and get back the Suez canal." And (in an Associated Press story from London): "The two western powers were evidently trying to topple Nasser's government in addition to taking over control of the Suez canal alone."

In this first period, the Whig reported 17 of the facts supporting the British case (out of 108). It had reported 41 (out of 141) unfavourable facts, and, again, the non-factual matter further unbalances the picture: 37 paragraphs were hostile compared with eight

favourable.

These non-factual insertions were various: That the intervention needlessly risks war; that it helps Russia; that Britain is anti-United Nations; that colonialism is involved. For instance: "The United States underestimated the colonialism within its allies.... No Arab can ever be expected to forget the attack on Egypt this week by the French and British who acted like colonial powers which they were and are" (Marlow). When there is non-factual matter like this, the omission of Eden's views and his rebutting of the charge of colonialism, is noticeable.

Second Period: November 4, 5, 6

Eden's November 3 reply to the United Nations was carried the same day, the five-hour Atlantic time lag making it easy for evening newspapers. His pledge to ensure an Israeli withdrawal and his welcome for the United Nations police force were included, but his supporting speech justifying his action was not covered; the Foreign Secretary was not reported; and Churchill's supporting statement was reduced to the one point that America would come to agree Suez was for the best.

Bulganin's threat to Britain of November 6 was carried, and there was a page one headline: "Red Threat Stirs British War Fears", but the Whig is yet another newspaper which did not print Eden's reply. Mollet's reply to Bulganin was also not carried. Yet, while the Whig did not report Eden, it did give space to unattributed reporting in its news columns: "An authoritative source said on

November 6 that Prime Minister Eden takes 'very seriously' the Russian warning to Britain....it is not regarded here as a propaganda stunt." On November 8 also the Whig published a partisan view as news: "Premier Bulganin didn't in so many words threaten to get into the Middle East war if Britain and France didn't quit. The British and French seemed to think he might mean that. The British began to sound softer" (Marlow, Associated Press).

In this second period, there was little non-factual matter, and it was evenly balanced.

Third Period (November 7 onwards)

The fact that Britain voted for the seven-power motion to rush in the United Nations European Forces was not reported in the Whig. The reporting of the United Nations proceedings was scanty, only one point of the actual debate, favourable or otherwise, reaching print. Britain's argument that she could not withdraw at once because the separation of combatants achieved would then break down was not reported. Eden's offer to clear the canal outside the British area was not reported - nor was Lloyd's reply to the charge that the cease fire was because of Moscow pressure.

Ben Gurion's claim to have found astonishing quantities of Soviet arms was not published. The Whig did carry his view that the old armistice was dead - but not his simultaneous statement that he was ready for new peace talks.

Eden was given no chance to justify the intervention. On the 10th, the Whig, like most papers (with the exception of the San Francisco Examiner), concentrated on his announcement of military changes

in the area - but not his offer of facilities to the United Nations including Cyprus airfields; not his defence of intervention; not his reply to the view that intervention had sacrificed the Hungarian patriots.

The Whig was the only newspaper in the study not to give straight coverage to the Thorneycroft allegations in London on the 12th that the discovery of large quantities of Russian arms found in Egypt suggested a Russian plot. Instead, on the 16th, the Whig printed a long dispatch from Jack Smith, Associated Press, devoted to saying that the (unreported) arms plot was an excuse Britain had thought up for the intervention. The headline was: "Massive Switch in British Policy Explained".

Part of the text said: "The original explanation was not holding up. Eden and his colleagues decided to shoot all their political ammunition to justify their action....Thorneycroft's statement in the Commons (the only reference to it in the Whig) implied that British and French forces in Egypt had just uncovered this information. But other officials said privately the facts had been reported many weeks before." There was also available for publication on November 15 a statement by the British ambassador in Washington about the alleged Russian plot. He, too, was not reported by the Whig, though the Whig, on Central Time, gained an hour which made same-day publication more feasible.

For the rest of the period little attempt was made to report the statements from London. There was no report on: Lloyd on the

12th; Lennox Boyd on the 14th on the plot; Butler on the 14th; Pineau on the 14th; Hailsham on the 15th. There was also no report on: Israeli allegations of new raids (12th, 14th and 10th); support for Britain from Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister (13th); further Israeli offers of peace talks (9th, 14th, 15th).

While there was the noticeable reluctance by the Whig to report the official British/French justification for intervention, on its results, space was given to non-factual interpretative matter. Thus, John M. Hightower, on November 16 (Associated Press, Washington): "The British/French invasion of Egypt is considered in United States official quarters to have produced results little short of disastrous". Also on November 16 Marlow (Associated Press) refers to the "almost incredible stupidity of British/French statesmen who made a career of foreign affairs". In his judgment intervention hurt the alliance, damaged the United Nations, hurt western influence among the Arabs, made Nasser stronger, risked world war..... "It is understandable that Britain and France could have thought of all these risks and still believed it worth it to get what they wanted: Get Suez control away from Egypt's President Nasser and wreck him. But if they did this it is not understandable why once they had considered the risks and started their adventure they suddenly backed down."

Five times, in the third period, it was stated as a fact that the British/French objective was to destroy Nasser. Three times it was stated as a fact that the objective was to impose an international

settlement of the canal dispute. Thirteen inimical objectives were given non-factually - against six mentions of official British/French statements.

The Period as a Whole, and Counter Case

The Whig followed the pattern in that it reported more of the case against Britain and France than the case for British/French intervention: 21 per cent of the facts against Britain and France were reported compared with 12 per cent for. In common with the other newspapers the Whig barely reported the factual allegations from hostile sources about British/French objectives (only 3 per cent), but the non-factual matter it published was preponderantly hostile.

Thirty times inimical objectives were attributed to Britain and France by the Whig (against only five favourable mentions in the news columns). There were 65 hostile paragraphs against 28 favourable. The hostile themes were that colonialism was involved; that intervention had failed; that Russia had been helped in the Middle East; that Britain was anti-United Nations. But this latter was not a strong theme - and was offset by non-factual matter conveying the idea that Britain was in favour of the United Nations Expeditionary Force. Largely because of the heavy reliance on James Marlow (Associated Press), there was a certain amount of colour in the Whig's news columns: 30 hostile counts (one favourable).

Conspiracy

Did Britain and France conspire with Israel? The Whig reported 7 per cent of the facts making this allegation, and 6 per cent of the counter facts. This would seem a good balance - but one must also look at the unattributed, non-factual themes in the news columns, the interpretative, background, lobby and "write-in" material. In this way the Whig 22 times alleged there was conspiracy - and there was colour in the allegations. It was stated four times, as a fact, that Britain and France planned the assault with Israel, twice more as a probability. Five times it was reported as a possibility that Britain knew of and encouraged the Israeli attack as a pretext for intervention, and once this was reported as if it were a fact. Three times it was suggested that Britain and France deliberately deceived the United States.

For instance, James Marlow (November 2) says that after the nationalisation of the canal Britain and France "reacted in typical colonial fashion. They reacted immediately by wanting to crush the militarily weak Nasser. Dulles tried to cool them down by stalling tactics. They got fed up and ignoring the United States attacked Egypt using as a handy excuse the attack begun on Egypt by the Israelis."

Again, Associated Press, November 15: "Dulles is understood to have been particularly upset that Ambassadors Winthrop Aldrich and D. Dillon in Paris were unable to break through what is regarded as a deliberate blackout of news by the British and French Foreign Office

in the week before the invasion."

It is in this context that the reporting failures are significant. The Whig did not report Eden's explanation for a delay in informing the United States (November 1). It did not have the Israeli ambassador's denial of collusion, the shooting down of Israeli planes by a British frigate (5th), and other replies to the charge (November 2, 8, 16).

These denials, and rejoinder replies, may well not be considered conclusive but if they are not reported a one-sided picture is being presented.

Alliance

What impression did the non-factual, interpretative reporting convey on the state of the Anglo-American alliance? The Whig did not write off the alliance. The emphasis of its early reporting (up to the 4th) was that the disagreement was confined to the intervention and the alliance would stand firm as the three allies all wished ("officials believe....the wounds of disagreement....can be healed with reasonable success because in so many fields the western powers have common interest"). Thus the Whig's initial reporting was more restrained, here, than the San Francisco News and the Philadelphia Inquirer who tended to stress, in the non-factual matter, that the alliance itself was, in this first period, in danger.

Was the Intervention Humanely Carried Out?

Was the British-French intervention carried out with any effort

to minimise civilian casualties and suffering? The British and French case is that it was. The Whig has little coverage of this issue - but what it has is not in balance.

The Whig reported 4.7 per cent of the statements and reports in support of the idea that the intervention was humanely carried out. It reported 18 per cent of the facts suggesting inhumanity.

In the detail, this meant it reported the air raids - but it did not carry any of the many British claims to be warning civilians in advance of the raids by radio. It did not report the official stated objective of the raids (to neutralise the Egyptian air force). It reported that heavy naval and air bombardment accompanied the invasion (in a picture caption), but it did not publish Sir Anthony Eden's denial of this or Mr. Head's (8th and 9th), nor the denial in the British communique of the 10th.

There were only four non-factual paragraphs (three hostile, one favourable).

Canal: Who to Blame?

There was little material, but some looseness in the reporting, via Associated Press on November 1. Two early paragraphs reported the Egyptian claim that the Akka had been sunk by the British blocking the canal, then the Whig went on: "The reported sinking of the Egyptian warship in the canal followed the British announcement that another Egyptian warship had been sunk in the Red Sea off Suez". It was, in fact, many miles from the canal entrance. On November 2 the Whig reported the British Minister of Supply saying the canal

was closed - but it omitted his allegations of Egypt planning this.

United States Policy

The Whig reported 16 per cent of the facts critical of the United States stand, 15 per cent of those approving. This reflects, in part, low coverage of the foreign affairs speeches of Stevenson, Kefauver, Nixon and Truman. Eisenhower was fairly fully reported on the 1st (his major delivery), Stevenson somewhat less fully but not dramatically so.

Non-factually, the Whig had little material: Five paragraphs suggesting that United States policy had been at fault in part; one suggesting that America had done everything possible.

Other Military

The Whig covered the neutral military facts fairly well - 42 per cent of the facts were reported, which put the Whig No. 5, ahead of the San Francisco News and the Wall Street Journal in this category. Of the other facts, neutral, from London it had 19 per cent (a bottom position, shared with the Wall Street Journal), compared with 33 per cent from hostile sources (which placed it fourth above the Examiner, the News, Post and Journal). From the United Nations, of the main neutral sources, 11 out of 27, slightly below average.

Background

The Whig gave good background on the Middle East political situation (38 paragraphs), the history up to 1949 from the end of

World War II, the development of Israel and Arab hostility. On the importance of Suez and the Middle East for Britain it had a brief mention.

Remarks

The small town paper is at the mercy of the agencies - in this case the one source, Associated Press - and generally its sizes are smaller so space is shorter. A low score was therefore anticipated for the Whig - and it does have a low score of reporting the facts. However, the discrepancy is not all that startling. The score is consistently better in all categories than the Wall Street Journal, occasionally better than the San Francisco News, and generally as high as the factual scores of all the magazines. But the British case was sketchily reported and space was given to considerable non-factual material, with colour, which an observer might think better to have been devoted to coverage of the hard news, especially for a paper like the Whig in a monopoly situation.



Chicago Daily Tribune

60 PAGES
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FINAL

THE AMERICAN PAPER FOR AMERICANS

THE WORLD'S GREATEST NEWSPAPER

Founded June 10, 1847

VOLUME CXV—NO. 20

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1956

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4 P

PRICE—FIVE CENTS

DRIVE ON SUEZ BY SEA, AIR

Britain, France Veto U. S. Peace Plea

Israelis Capture Egyptian Warship; Cairo Firm

Nasser Says Army
to Defend Honor

EXPEDITION
SET TO LAND
ALONG CANAL

Mid-East Summary

U. N. COUNCIL Blasts, New Street
STYMIED BY Fights in Budapest

LONDON, PARIS

Poland Ousts 2 Hungarian Air
Russians from
Army Posts
Force Warns
Russians

Appeals to Ike, Nehru, Tito, Bulgarian

CAIRO, Oct. 20 (AP)—Nasser announced today that he would lead a force of 10,000 men to defend the Suez Canal.

TEL AVIV, Israel, Oct. 20 (AP)—The Israeli government announced today that it would send a force of 10,000 men to defend the Suez Canal.

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APPEAL BY DE
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LONDON, Oct. 20 (AP)—Gen. Yusef Turkiel, Russian commander of Poland's 1st army, has been dismissed in a new struggle of Polish military leaders.

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SUEZ BLUNDER: INSIDE STORY

TRIBUNE MAN REVEALS ERRORS; \$70,000 Estate Mystery!
REDS DEMAND PAYMENT TO EGYPT

Status of Israel as a State Is Questioned

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 (AP)—Status of Palestine refugees tonight is a key question that may determine United Nations efforts to solve the Middle East crisis.

In action in the prime committee of Britain, France, and United States, the United Nations Security Council will be asked to make a decision on the status of the refugees.

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50,000 HUNGARY REFUGEES JAM AUSTRIA CAMPS

VIENNA, Nov. 25—A steady stream today which is the daily appearance of hundreds of Hungarian refugees arriving in Austria, jamming the camps.

The refugees are arriving in Austria, jamming the camps.

Hesitation Fatal: U. S. and Soviets Misjudged

(This dispatch is from Arthur Fery, Tribune correspondent, who has been reporting the Suez situation since the late 1950s.)

Washington, Nov. 25 (AP)—The United States and the Soviet Union have misjudged the situation in the Middle East.



East Coast Tied Up in Dock Strike

(Continued from page 1)
New York, Nov. 25 (AP)—The powerful International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) dock strike today has tied up the East Coast.

The strike has tied up the East Coast.

FLECK'S FILES CAST DOUBTS ON HEIRSHIP

Question Awaits 'Daughter'

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 (AP)—The files of the late J. Edgar Hoover, cast doubt on the heirship of his daughter.

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CHAPTER 13

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

Morning: 1956 Circulation: 935,943 (Sunday: 1,303,615)

Chain affiliation: McCormick

Wire Services: Associated Press, Reuters, Chicago Tribune-
New York News, New York Times

Competition: Chicago American (evening)
(circulation 519,372)

Chicago Calumet (evening)
(circulation 10,702)

Defender Negro (morning)
(circulation 25,672)

Sun Times (all day daily)
(circulation 586,137)

Daily News (evening) except Sunday
(circulation 588,576)

There is a notorious stereotype of the Chicago Tribune. It is seen as a rabidly anti-British paper, with all sorts of techniques for making the facts support this prejudice. Does the Suez analysis support the stereotype? And if the coverage proves to be balanced, could it also be said to be adequate?

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	34.1	14
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	10	17
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	28	53
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	32	164

The Chicago Tribune gave the fullest coverage of the crisis for any newspaper or magazine in the sample. It gave the biggest preponderance of favourable objectives of any publication in the study. In the broader category of favourable/unfavourable facts, it reported 28 per cent of the generally favourable facts and 32 per cent of the hostile facts. One might call this a hostile imbalance of 4 per cent. By comparison, here are the "hostile imbalances" of the other papers on the check list:

San Francisco Chronicle	12 per cent
San Francisco Examiner	6 per cent
San Francisco News	2 per cent
Denver Post	7 per cent
Philadelphia Inquirer	5 per cent
Wall Street Journal	2 per cent
Quincy Herald Whig	9 per cent

There is also, of course, the non-factual content. How this affects the picture is best seen in the detailed study of the three periods.

Details of the Tribune Coverage of the British/French Case

First Period to November 3

The Tribune started well on October 30 and 31 with the full text of the Israeli statement giving Israel's reasons for the invasion of Sinai, and then full details of the British-French ultimatum to Egypt. It reported the British and French delegates in the United Nations in some detail. It reported Eden's justification of the ultimatum to the House of Commons.

The Tribune even had one point from the speech by M. Mollet in France (though it followed the general trend in reporting France less fully than Britain).

It is true that the Tribune also reported the hostile attitudes in the United Nations and Labour criticisms in Britain, but this was well-balanced coverage of the events of the first two days of the crisis.

The Tribune coverage was not so good in its issue of November 1. The Security Council debate had continued, but the Tribune had only one point and not the statement of the British delegate (Sir Pierson Dixon) that it was Britain's firm intention to make Israel withdraw. However, the Tribune did give Eden's reasons, as stated in the Commons, for not supporting the United States resolution in the Security Council, and his belief that the British and French action would bring permanent peace to the Middle East (it was the only paper in the study to report this). It did not report the British Foreign Secretary whose speech was too late for Chicago evening papers (fully available around 5 p.m. Central Time). The Foreign Secretary said that under the United Nations Charter Britain was entitled to use force in self defence and go to the aid of British citizens in the war zone. There was, he maintained, imminent danger to British nationals and British shipping. He replied in detail to charges of collusion with Israel and emphasised that occupation would be temporary.

On November 2, the coverage was again weak by comparison with the first two days - but still superior, in these categories, to coverage by the other publications in the sample. The Tribune was the only paper in the study to report (briefly) the support for Britain and France from the Premiers of Australia and New Zealand, though the page one headline was tendentious: "Even Empire Heads Blast British Policy". It was the only paper to report from the United Nations Sir Pierson Dixon's reminder to the United States

that over Korea it had acted before the United Nations meeting and always called it a police action, and again the only paper to report Eden's claim that the war would have spread by now but for the British and French intervention. Like the rest of the papers studied, it did not, among other things, report:

The British delegate's proposal to the United Nations of a conference on Middle East problems.

The delegate's pledge that Britain would hand over to the United Nations the physical task of keeping the peace (only in the Philadelphia Inquirer).

Eden's reply to the charge that the intervention was a colonialist policy.

Eden's reminder of the massacre in Cairo at the time of Abadan.

Eden's claim that Britain had complied with the Hague convention by sending an ultimatum before attack.

Governor Averil Harriman's criticism of United States policy lining up America with Russia "against our allies".

The Lord Chancellor's argument that the United States should not think the action a reversion to colonialism but a strengthening of the line against Communist influence - the first suggestion, this, of an explanation to come later.

The Tribune on November 3 gave Eden's reasons for not replying at once to the United Nations recommendation, which the Chronicle and Philadelphia Inquirer did not. (It had also the day before

reported Mr. Dulles's affirmation that the United Nations Assembly could only recommend.) In common with all newspapers, it did not report Belgium's criticism of the United States motion in the United Nations, nor Holland's; nor support for Britain from the Prime Minister of Rhodesia. It did report the Economist newspaper's criticisms under the headline on page four: "British move on Egypt hit as a gamble. Reputation of country at stake: Economist".

What of the non-factual matter in the news reports in this first period? A propaganda paper would surely have a distinctly hostile balance here. In the category of facts about British-French objectives for intervention the Tribune is far better balanced than any other newspaper. It gave six mentions of official objectives and gave currency to inimical objectives seven times: Compare this 6:7 with a hostile/favourable ratio in this period of 33:8 in the San Francisco Chronicle; 43:14 in the Denver Post; 31:10 in the Philadelphia Inquirer; 30:5 in the Quincy Herald Whig; 12:5 in the San Francisco Examiner; 32:0 in Time Magazine.

The unofficial objective most frequently reported was that the aim is to weaken or destroy Nasser. But this was only once reported as if it were a fact (and three times as a possibility).

The balance was not so well held in the bigger categories of assertions broadly favourable or unfavourable to the British/French case. In this first period there were five favourable paragraphs and 57 unfavourable. This imbalance is only equalled by the San Francisco Examiner which also had a good score on facts for the

British case. This is a heavy imbalance. On its own it suggests some degree of bias, for this is the major category. But, of course, this is only one period and one category. It will have to be seen in perspective.

It is interesting to note the origin and content of this hostile non-factual matter mixed up in the news reports in this first period.

The Themes: The generally unfavourable themes are:

	<u>Stated</u>
That intervention is aggression	6 times
That it is opposed by the world	9 times
That Britain is opposed to the United Nations	8 times
That Britain is ungrateful to the United States	7 times
That Britain and France are not impartial vis a vis Egypt	6 times
That intervention is an example of colonialism	4 times

The Sources: The biggest proportion of the unfavourable non-factual matter came from the Chicago Tribune staffman in Washington, who was reporting unofficial comment. This was a third as high an amount as the next source of unfavourable non-factual material - the Associated Press - and twice as much as the third source - Reuters. In other words, while the Washington man was the main source, unfavourable non-factual matter in news reports was not the monopoly

of the staffman on the Tribune. The agencies played a part. The figures are:

	<u>Favourable non-factual paragraphs</u>	<u>Unfavourable non-factual paragraphs</u>
Washington Chicago Tribune staffman	8	37
Associated Press	7	22
Reuters	4	15
Chicago Tribune New York	3	8
Chicago Tribune staffmen, other	4	11
Unattributed	1	5

There is a high count of 'colour' words: 2 favourable and 33 units unfavourable, shared in similar proportions to the non-factual unfavourable matter from which it derives.

For instance:

"In high official circles suspicions were voiced privately that Britain and France had encouraged Israel to invade Egypt so that Britain and France would have an excuse to occupy the canal zone in the hope of pushing President Nasser from power". (Chicago Tribune, Washington).

Bearing an Associated Press, London (November 2) credit, it reported James Griffiths, the Labour leader:

"It has become increasingly clear that the government is destroying the empire. The present Prime Minister has dealt such a moral blow at the Commonwealth that he may be responsible for the liquidation of it."

Mr. Griffiths did not in fact ever use the word "empire". But then, the next paragraph says: "The empire consists of the Commonwealth countries and Britain's many colonies and dependencies."

Second Period, November 4, 5, 6, 7

Eden's reply to the United Nations recommendations for a cease fire (available for morning papers on Sunday, November 4) was fully reported as far as it affected Britain's statement of objectives. His supporting arguments in a broadcast justifying his stand were not reported. (They were mainly criticisms of United Nations ineptness in the past, and of Egypt's provocations.) This was too late for the day's evening newspapers. However, only the San Francisco Examiner did better than the Chicago Tribune here.

Support for Britain from Mrs. Roosevelt and Holland in the United Nations was not reported, nor a speech by the British Foreign Secretary emphasising Britain's willingness to hand over to a United Nations police force as soon as one was ready. This, however, had been available in time for evening papers.

The Tribune reported on November 6 the Secretary General's announcement that Egypt and Israel had agreed to a cease fire (but it did not report the further point that Britain and France had said they would follow Egypt and Israel). It missed the Foreign Secretary's reply to the charges that Suez had sacrificed the Hungarian patriots, and the British United Nations delegate's suggestion at the United Nations for a high level meeting of the Security Council to work out a permanent peace for the Middle East.

The Russian rocket threat to Britain and France was reported (but not with the Soviet Foreign Ministry qualification that Russia would only act through the United Nations). The report was on page 7, headlined "Russia warns of 'force' for peace in Egypt." In common with most newspapers, morning and evening, and all the magazines, the Chicago Tribune had the surprising omission of Eden's reply to Bulganin's threatening note (beyond one point saying that Eden thought Bulganin should not compare Suez with Hungary).

The cease fire was the main Suez news of this day, of course. The Chicago Tribune hardly reported Eden's justification, in the Commons, of the results attained before the cease fire. And it did carry the further threat to Britain from Marshal Zhukov that Russia was prepared to liquidate the British/French invasion; the United Nations Asian motion asking for a British/French withdrawal; and an Egyptian appeal for aid against "brutal, dishonourable aggression".

Non-factual

The non-factual reporting was slight in this period and the balance is better than the badly unbalanced first period. There were two favourable references to British/French objectives, only one hostile. In the broader category there were 11 favourable references to the British/French intervention (mainly about the provocations of Egypt), and 21 unfavourable: a proportion of two to one compared with five to one in the first period.

Moreover, though there were five unfavourably slanted 'colour' passages, there were four favourably slanted. The favourable references were mainly negatively favourable in the sense of attributing

guilt to Egypt.

The main unfavourable themes in this period were:

- (i) That intervention is aggression
- (ii) That Britain is opposed to Eden
- (iii) That intervention had strained Britain's economy
- (iv) That colonialism possibly involved (A Reuter paragraph: "The landing is the second landing to be made by British soldiers at Suez in 75 years....Gladstone explained then that 'England is not at war'".)

Third Period, November 8 - 18

The most noticeable omission was the failure, in the November 8 issue, to report the United Nations proceedings. This meant the Chicago Tribune did not have the 65.1 vote for immediate withdrawal, or Britain's support of the seven-power motion to rush in the United Nations Expeditionary Force. It did not have the British representative's point that Israeli withdrawal should be one of the United Nations Expeditionary Force's objectives. Evening paper coverage hardly justified these omissions.

The Tribune reported Ben Gurion's claims to have found large quantities of Soviet arms in Egypt more fully than other papers in the sample. It had a rather better report of Eden's speech in the Commons, being the only paper to report his assurance Britain would not attempt major reinforcements for a further move forward.

However, the Foreign Secretary's review of the intervention was

not reported. This meant the Tribune did not have his first allegation of a Russian plot, nor his explanation for the cease fire. At the same time, the Chicago Tribune did carry hostile non-factual material on this: once, on November 8, it suggested the cease fire was due to domestic pressure in Britain, and in another item that it was due to United States pressure.

On November 9 the Tribune missed Mr. Menzies' vigorous defence of intervention, and followed up the non-factual matter of November 8 with more non-factual material, which suggested intervention had stopped because of pressure in Britain - the British official position, of course, was that intervention had stopped because its objectives had been achieved. There was a long Associated Press dispatch from Moscow quoting unnamed Western diplomats to the effect that intervention had helped Russia gain political victories "ranking among its greatest since the Bolshevik Revolution".

The facts were not reported at this length. But the Tribune was the only paper in the study to report several favourable points: M. Pineau's statement on Soviet arms to Egypt; the expulsion from Libya of the Egyptian military attache; and Mr. Lennox Boyd's claim in Britain that the Middle-East had been saved from a nuclear war.

On the 10th, Eden made a full scale defence of intervention, in which he urged the formation of a permanent United Nations police force. This defence was not reported by the Chicago Tribune and again space was given for a long hostile non-factual piece from the Chicago Tribune in Paris, suggesting that intervention had failed

and that Eden was to blame. However, the Tribune was again alone in reporting one fact - Eden's promise of all help for United Nations military observers.

There was no coverage on November 12 of a statement by the British Foreign Secretary. He advocated the establishment of a permanent United Nations force to make United Nations effective. He claimed Britain had been misunderstood and misrepresented and insisted that Britain was very ready to hand over to a United Nations force. None of this was reported by the Chicago Tribune or any paper (except the last assurance which was carried by the San Francisco News).

Mr. Peter Thorneycroft's allegations of a Russian plot were fairly reported.

Coverage on November 13 was sparse in all papers. The Tribune did not have Menzies' supporting statement, the defence of intervention by the Prime Minister of France, M. Mollet, or the Commons defence by Mr. Macmillan, or the World Gallup Poll. However, it was the only newspaper to report Mr. Maudling (saying that if Britain had not acted in time there would have been great and lasting damage to the British economy).

The Tribune reported more fully than any of the papers the allegations of a Russian plot in Egypt contained in Mr. Lennox Boyd's speech available for morning papers of the 13th. The Tribune did not report other support and argument from Mr. Shinwell, Mr. Butler and Mr. Macmillan, though again it was alone in reporting Sir Anthony

Eden's pronouncement that Britain's policy was to build up the United Nations as a force for peace. At last, on November 16, we have an issue of the Tribune more nearly conforming to the anti-British image. The day's news was swept to one side for a big page one attacking article. The banner headline was "Suez Blunder : Inside Story". (See photograph.)

It was a long, heavily opinionated dispatch from the Chicago Tribune man in Rome, and was introduced as an "uncensored dispatch on the inside story of the British/French/Israeli blunders which caused the failure of their Suez coup". It is also relevant to the conspiracy section below that in featuring this, a hostile statement from the Arab league and a note to Eden from Bulganin demanding damages for Egypt, the Tribune did not find space for a speech by the British Foreign Secretary in part rebutting the theme of the page one article, and making proposals for settling Middle East conflicts peaceably. This speech came in morning paper time in Chicago. On November 18, however, the Tribune re-established its margin of better factual coverage: It had 9 of 15 points from Eden's speech. It was the only paper to report Eden's claim that intervention had achieved the two main objectives of limiting the conflict and extinguishing it. There was some colour distortion in this report. The cross heading in the middle said, "Eden jibes at UN". There were also non-factual interpolations in a news report from the Chicago Tribune man in Washington, who referred to the British/French "aggression" and the possibilities this raised of a third world war "which

drowned out the dying shrieks of betrayed patriots in Hungary".

Non-Factual: (In the third period as a whole)

There was again a high count of non-factual material in the news columns, 86 hostile paragraphs in this third period; 37 favourable. There were six interpolations to suggest objectives favourable to Britain/France/Israel (five that the aim was to thwart a Russian plot) and four suggesting the objectives were unworthy ones.

This is a very high score for generally hostile non-factual material. It is exceeded in this third period only by the Denver Post and, again, just by the Philadelphia Inquirer. There were, moreover, 28 hostile coloured references and only five instances of favourable colour writing.

Sixteen paragraphs of this non-factual matter was to suggest unfavourable reasons for the British/French cease fire (mainly that the cease fire had been forced by domestic pressure in Britain and France). These 16 reasons advanced for a cease fire were all, of course, opposed to the official British position that the cease fire was called because the objectives of intervention had been achieved and Egypt and Israel had agreed to a cease fire and to a United Nations Expeditionary Force. The official reasons for a cease fire were not reported with anything like this frequency.

The other dominant unfavourable themes in the non-factual material were:

That intervention had failed	(8 times)
That Russia had been helped in the Middle-East	(10 times)
That Britain and France were not impartial to Egypt	(16 times)
That the United States left to clean up, pay up	(7 times)
The dominant favourable themes were:	
Egypt not co-operating with the United Nations	(12 times)
Intervention did expose Russian penetration	(6 times)
Simple anti-Nasser themes	(4 times)

Counter Case and Period as a Whole

We have seen that the Chicago Tribune coverage of the facts was nearly in balance: 32 per cent of the hostile facts available were reported; 28 per cent of the favourable. This is more in balance than all except two other papers (Wall Street Journal and San Francisco News).

Obviously much factual hostile material was omitted. Criticisms by Mr. Nehru, points from the Labour Party's attack and details of President Nasser's big speech of November 9 were not reported; there was also by no means full coverage of the hostile comment in the United Nations. Most coverage was given to official Russian notes.

This, however, is only part of the picture. There is considerable

non-factual material mixed up in the news columns of the Tribune. How does it affect the balance?

For the British objectives, it hardly affects the situation. The Tribune had reported 34 per cent of the British statements of objectives and only 10 per cent of the hostile statements. Non-factually it gave currency to favourable objectives 14 times - a high score - and only 17 times did it convey unworthy objectives. The favourable score here is as high as anything else in the sample, except for the Denver Post which is also 14. But whereas the Denver Post gave currency 43 times to hostile objectives, the Tribune was low on the hostile non-factual matter in this category: only 17 paragraphs conveying unworthy objectives, which is surpassed by five other papers and two of the magazines. There is clearly no hostile bias in this category in the Chicago Tribune.

What of the bigger category with news broadly favourable or unfavourable to the British case? Here the balance obtaining in the factual reports is not present: There are 146 hostile non-factual paragraphs in the news columns against 53 favourable paragraphs.

This is a 3:1 hostile ratio and is equal to the Denver Post's. It is very slightly more hostile than the Philadelphia Inquirer, is well exceeded by the magazine Time, Newsweek, and by the Wall Street Journal. But it is important to remember that the Chicago Tribune factual reporting was balanced; and anti-British bias, pure and simple, is not detectable as such in the non-factual material.

There are, in fact, favourable non-factual references which one would hardly expect to find in the Chicago Tribune of the stereotype (for instance, the Chicago Tribune man in Washington: "Mr. Eisenhower has made clear his determination to solidify and strengthen if possible the historic American/British/French alliance....").

Again, there is no special anti-colonialism theme. Suggestions that Britain's "colonialism" was involved in the dispute were made four times in the first period, once in the second, nine times in the third. This is a total of 14.

There is one instance, however, where a theme almost peculiar to the Chicago Tribune is detected. The Chicago Tribune's antipathy editorially to foreign aid is well known. The only connection observable is between this antipathy and the prevalence of non-factual material suggesting foreign aid is a failure. This is only on a small scale but it is quite distinct. For convenience, I call this the Rescue Theme - the theme being that the United States is continually being expected to rescue ailing nations with dollars.

The Associated Press supplied the first material for this in a Washington dispatch on November 1. The Chicago Tribune carried more of this Associated Press dispatch than any other newspaper in the study, and it carried it on page one prominently with the headline: "Combatants got 13 billion American aid". The dispatch began:

"The United States has extended more than 12 billion dollars worth of economic aid grants to the four countries

involved in the Middle East fighting. Britain has been given the biggest slice of the economic aid funds...."

The Chicago Tribune did not introduce any colour into this dispatch. Moreover, it did print the sentence making it clear that economic aid to Britain and France "has been terminated". (This point was not carried by the Denver Post, which did not give the story any prominence. A Chicago Tribune ruthlessly edited for anti-British propaganda effect would surely have left out this fact.)

In the second period the Rescue Theme was not there at all in the Chicago Tribune. (The San Francisco News gave it currency with four paragraphs from an NEA agency staffman in London: "All the old humiliations under which Britain has smarted since World War II - her hat in hand stature at the end of America's headline for example - have come bubbling to the surface.")

The Rescue Theme returned to the Chicago Tribune in the third period. The Chicago Tribune man in Paris devoted 14 paragraphs to it: "It thus appears that the French people, Parliament and Press have entirely forgotten the 12 billion dollars which the United States collected from the American taxpayer and handed over to the French as a gift in addition to the 2 billion dollars in long term loans." He goes on to refer to the "fragility of alliances....the White House and State department they were forging so solidly."

This is an echo of the traditional view of the Chicago Tribune as the voice of isolationism, but though the Rescue Theme is distinct in the Chicago Tribune news columns it is hard to say if it is a

persistently calculated one. It was given currency 28 times, on four different days out of the 18 days of the study.

Conspiracy

The Tribune had the highest percentage reporting of the factual allegations that the British/French/Israelis were conspiratorial allies. Twenty-five per cent of all the facts were reported, while only 14 per cent of the countervailing facts were reported.

A 25 per cent score may not be considered significant in itself, since low totals are involved - 25 per cent means 14 facts out of 56 available, which is less than one a day. However, the conspiracy case was given substantial currency in the Chicago Tribune by being mentioned in the news columns 41 times non-factually (only two denials were mentioned non-factually).

This also is a high score. The Denver Post (55) and United States News and World Report (45) were the only ones to surpass it.

This is not quite as damaging to Britain and France as it might have been. When we analyse the non-factual reporting in the Conspiracy category we find the stress in the Chicago Tribune on the less collusive allegations. In all three periods the dominant theme is merely that the British/French and Israelis are allies, at the present, rather than the more startling allegation that intervention had been premeditated by all three. This allegation did not receive the currency in the Chicago Tribune that it received in, say, Time Magazine, the Denver Post and the Philadelphia Inquirer.

Of course, the less collusive allegations are not at all favourable to Britain and France. They were rebutted by British spokesmen - and the Chicago Tribune failed here. For instance, on October 31 the Chicago Tribune man in Cairo said the Egyptians thought intervention was a plot to seize the canal. On November 1 the Chicago Tribune man in Washington reported "suspicions" that Britain and France had encouraged Israel to invade. And, factually, there were several reported allegations of conspiracy. Yet the Chicago Tribune did not report factual denials. Eden referred on the 31st to his warnings to Israel and the British representative in the United Nations, Sir Pierson Dixon, denied that Britain had prompted Israel to invade. The Chicago Tribune did not report these.

On November 1 Dixon in the United States, Lloyd and Eden in the Commons, the Israeli envoy in London, and a former Israeli premier all replied to the allegations that Britain and France were allies. Not one of them was reported.

Again, on November 2, Dixon made a categorical denial of collusion and the Foreign Office issued a statement. Nothing was reported.

On November 3, the British ambassador in Lebanon said Britain intended forcing Israel to withdraw. The Israeli envoy in London again denied outside arrangements. Neither was reported.

On November 4, the Tribune did report the Eden pledge to make Israel withdraw (without a headline on this point). But it failed to report a further denial of collusion by the United Nations Israeli

mission, and on November 6 it did not publish Mr. Ben Gurion's declaration in Israel: "We have not acted, nor shall we act, as agents for any foreign power".

The insistence by the British Foreign Secretary on November 8 that Israel should be made to withdraw was not reported, nor was Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia's further denial of foreknowledge of the Israeli attack, available for morning newspapers of November 16.

Yet on the 16th the Chicago Tribune printed a report from the Chicago Tribune man in Rome where he asserted as a fact that Britain, France and Israel planned the assault. This was given prominence on page one and page four as the "inside story" of the "British, French and Israeli blunders which caused the failure of their Suez coup". On November 18 there was a further coloured allegation: "Many believe Britain and France egged Israel into making an attack for their own considerations".

In this conspiracy category, the Chicago Tribune reporting was inadequate and its content unbalanced. It rather coincides with the editorial view of the deceitful nature of 'perfidious Albion'.

Was the Intervention Humanely Carried Out?

The Tribune reported 27 per cent of the favourable facts - more than any other newspaper or magazine. It also reported the highest number of unfavourable facts in this category (41 per cent of them), but the hostile balance throughout was not as great as it was with the San Francisco Examiner, and was similar to the Inquirer, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Denver Post and the Quincy Herald Whig.

The emphasis in the Chicago Tribune was undoubtedly on the inhumanity of the intervention, for in addition to the emphasis in the reporting of fact there were 25 non-factual paragraphs suggesting inhumanity. But, unlike the conspiracy themes, this was not one of the highest scores - it was exceeded by the San Francisco Examiner, Time Magazine, and Newsweek. There were nine paragraphs suggesting the intervention was carried out as humanely as possible. This was the highest score for this theme.

Alliance

On its stereotype one would expect the fragility of alliances to receive emphasis in the Chicago Tribune. We have already seen that the Chicago Tribune editorial antipathy to foreign aid is reflected somewhat in the news columns, and its coverage in the conspiracy category is unbalanced. The treatment, however, of the specific Anglo-American alliance does not suggest any bias.

In the first period it is six times suggested that the alliance is severely shaken and in danger. But three times it is suggested that the disagreement is confined to the Suez intervention and the alliance will stay afterwards as the United States wishes. This favourable latter theme is mentioned once again in the second period - when it is the only material in this category. And in the third period the dominant theme (11 counts) is that the allies are keen to see the alliance stands.

United States Policy

The Chicago Tribune reported 48 per cent of the statements approving American policy in the crisis - and 47 per cent of the statements of disapproval. This was the fullest and fairest coverage of the election debate on the crisis.

Canal

This category is rather small for firm conclusions. Anti-British bias could be indicated in a readiness to blame the British for the blocked canal. The Tribune published 60 per cent of the statements suggesting Britain was to blame and 26 per cent of those blaming Egypt. However, the caution about the size of this category should be remembered - 60 per cent is actually a score of six out of only 10 factual allegations of British culpability.

Rest of the News

The comparative fullness of the Chicago Tribune coverage is reflected in the rest of the Suez material. Of the other military facts the Tribune is top with 58 per cent. In the news from other sources, the Chicago Tribune might be expected, on its stereotype, to report more from hostile sources and less from Britain. There is hardly any difference. The Tribune gave space to outlining the importance of the Suez canal for Britain - most other papers gave hardly anything at all.

Colour

In the first period there were 33 unfavourable units; 2 favourable. In the other two periods: 37 unfavourable units; 11 favourable. This was a high colour count which mars somewhat the Chicago Tribune

fuller coverage.

Remarks

The Chicago Tribune, on its stereotype, should have the worst record so far as reporting the British case over Suez is concerned. In fact, it has the fullest coverage of favourable factual statements and this gives a better idea of the British case than any other newspaper or magazine.

From the British view, this is marred by the quantity of non-factual hostile material in the news columns and in particular by the inadequate and unbalanced coverage in the Collusion category, and generally throughout by the high colour count in non-factual material. However, no simple anti-British bias is demonstrated by this; and the Chicago Tribune does generally make an attempt to give the facts as well.

This means that the reader is at least given some genuinely factual material for making his own judgment. This should be contrasted, to the Tribune's benefit, with the methods of Time Magazine et seq. (p.187/) where slanted writing is accompanied by a dearth of straight facts.

CHAPTER 14

TIME MAGAZINE

1956 Circulation: 1,920,852

Competition: Newsweek

United States News and World Report

There are three issues of Time, the weekly news magazine, in the period. These were examined for facts and non-factual material in the same way as the newspapers. But there is a qualification to be entered about the factual scores of all the magazines: Since they publish weekly, they have time to discard facts that have been overtaken by events in the week. When developments of facts have led to a conclusive statement or definite outcome it is only necessary for the conclusive statement to be reported in most instances. In short, the magazine coverage may be judged adequate on a lower factual score than the newspapers publishing daily.

By the same token, the magazines have a better chance to present a balanced picture.

How far do they succeed?

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	12.8	0
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	7	32
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	12	35
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	16	249

Time magazine reports very few indeed of the facts of the Suez crisis. It is questionable whether the qualification of weekly publication compensates for this low factual score of Time.

Statements about Britain's objectives were made 105 times. Time reported only 15 of these: and five of these 15 facts were not presented "straight". The low factual score is accompanied by a high non-factual score and colour, and this is the significant feature of Time coverage of Suez.

Details of Coverage of the British/French Case

The first issue of Time in the period is dated November 12, but apparently containing facts up to November 7. In this the objectives of the intervention reported were that the aim was to stop the fighting and separate the combatants. Time did not report, in this issue, that one of the stated objectives was to protect the free passage at Suez for all nations, nor that Britain felt there was danger of a wider war unless there was immediate intervention - which could not, according to Britain, be supplied by the United Nations.

Nothing was reported of Eden's speech of October 30 giving the reasons for the British ultimatum. Nor of his speech on October 31 replying to criticisms and explaining why Britain had voted against the United States resolution in the Security Council, and why Britain had not consulted the United States before issuing the ultimatum. His offer to hand over to the United Nations was also not reported in Time. The offer was not reported either as made in the Security

Council by the British delegate: Time coverage of the United Nations debates was also almost non-existent.

There was slightly better coverage of the hostile facts. Mr. Gaitskell for instance was more fully and better reported than Eden; he was even quoted direct.

Time's omissions may or may not be considered important in themselves. But to recount omissions is to tell only part of the story. Time magazine was also:

1. Distorting some of the facts it gave
2. Presenting non-factual matter as fact.

Distortion

For instance, when Eden replied to the United Nations recommendation on November 3, Time did not give the facts of Eden's reply impartially. It reported:

"....The Anglo-French were unwilling to halt action until they had achieved their goal of grabbing the canal zone from Egypt. They might be willing to accept a United Nations police force in the canal zone if everyone else agreed but their conditions were in fact a refusal."

Time readers are not given the benefit of the facts so that they may judge for themselves whether Eden's conditions "were in fact a refusal". In truth, there was no question of doubt in Eden's statements that Britain was saying she would be willing to accept a United Nations Expeditionary Force.

The point had been made on November 1 and not reported by Time. One of Eden's very points in his reply of November 3 was that the United Nations should raise and maintain an expeditionary force. He urged the United Nations to do this. Yet Time's report here suggests that Britain is refusing to co-operate with a United Nations Expeditionary Force.

This is typical of the distortion found in Time in this study. What Time calls a "fact" is almost always a Time opinion. This can be misleading. For instance, in this first issue of the crisis, Time magazine did not report what the British Ministers themselves were saying about the intervention and what they hoped to achieve by it. But Time still gave readers the impression it was reporting the official statements; and thereby it presented a good deal of supposition as fact:

"Britain's case went thus. You must judge our methods by our results. We hope to crush Nasser without much bloodshed. If we do this we will be rid of an ambitious dictator who not only threatens our oil interests and our Suez canal status and stings our pride, but with his ambitious Arab nationalism threatens the whole security of European civilisation. Once we show our strength....you will hear less nonsense from the oil country Arabs and have less trouble from the Arabs in North Africa. Israel will expand. But if it grows big enough, its Arab neighbours will be unable to challenge it and there will be peace at last in the Middle East."

With the phrasing here, "Britain's case ~~went~~ thus....", Time suggests that this was an official view. But this was never stated by a British spokesman. It is a travesty of the official case Time was failing to present.

Time did not report the official objectives - but 19 times in this issue it suggested unworthy objectives. Eight times Time stated it - as a fact - that the British/French objective was to weaken or destroy Colonel Nasser. There was plenty of colour in the writing:

"Great Britain and France, aggression bound, moved in, determined to overthrow Gamel Abdul Nasser and recover the Suez canal."

Also:

"As the questions tumbled out Anthony Eden lounged at the front bench....Occasionally he swung to his feet to give a curt, evasive answer."

But Time does not tell us what constitutes "a curt, evasive answer". It did not tell its readers what Eden's answers were, not in the smallest summary.

Second Issue: November 19

Time reported Russia's threat of rocket warfare. But it did not report a word of Eden's reply to the Soviet threat. It suggested, in this issue, that it was the threat that had made Britain and France cease fire. Later, Time said the cease fire had come because of a Cabinet split over United States and world pressure. The

official British and French reasons for the cease fire were never reported or discussed, nor the factual denials, on November 7, 8 and 9, that pressure from Moscow had anything to do with the cease fire decision.

Intervention was now being reviewed, by British, French statesmen and others. In this period Mr. Thorneycroft, for Britain, suggested the intervention had thwarted a Russian plot. Time did not report this fact straight. It reported and derided it at the same time:

"At week's end Eden's Government was propounding a new line: Britain and France had intervened to foil a Russian plot to take over the Middle East....Eden's Foreign Office had apparently not had the political word. The Foreign Office told inquiring reporters that stories of massive Russian moves came from Russian propaganda."

Later, Time did report that large quantities of arms had been discovered; but not in the context of a Russian plot in which they were made.

Eden's offer to help the United Nations take over was reported, but the British and French were given short shrift in their defences of intervention. What Time did was itself to review the intervention, give a few of Eden's justifications (after a fashion) and demolish them at the same time.

Time began by referring to the "palpably hypocritical version of history Eden has disingenuously tried to foster on the world..."

It went on: "Eden pleaded that faced with Israel's sudden

action the British and French had to act too swiftly for the inevitably cumbrous processes of the United Nations. But the British had known of the Israelis' intentions earlier with France doing most of the dirty work on linking the three nations in conspiracy.

"Eden pleaded that Britain wanted to keep the canal open....The day of Israel's invasion a record northbound convoy of 36 ships moved through the canal. By the time British/French troops landed the canal was blocked and will be for several months."

Eden was all the time reviewing intervention by measuring its results against the original objectives postulated. The original objectives, we saw, were not reported. Here objectives and results are mentioned only to be derided. But Time also ignored Eden's claim that intervention had succeeded in the objectives of stopping the fighting and preventing a resumption, because it had separated the combatants and limited the area of conflict in the Middle East.

Time gave its own version of history for the occasion of the cease fire. The Foreign Secretary had said Britain would cease fire if the United Nations Expeditionary Force was accepted by Egypt and Israel. Eden told the Commons, in announcing the cease fire, that during the night of 5-6 November the Secretary General of the United Nations told Britain that both Israel and Egypt now accepted an unconditional cease fire and Egypt accepted a United Nations Expeditionary Force. This, said Eden, was the "new element in the situation" leading to British and French agreeing to a cease fire. Later Eden said that the aims had been virtually achieved of stopping the

fighting and separating the combatants.

Instead of Eden's public statement, Time "reported" on two British Cabinet meetings. At best, these reports of secret meetings were pieces of speculation. Time reported them as fact.

"The grave men gathered in the Cabinet room at 10 Downing Street were confronted with a problem unique in the proud history of Britain: they were afraid that Egypt and Israel would stop fighting and peace break out in the Middle East. All Monday afternoon, as British paratroops ground down on Port Said and a British/French fleet hovered off the canal's mouth, Britain's Cabinet debated tensely. One member pointed out that the man who stepped in to referee a fight would hardly be justified in attacking the boxers if they stopped fighting.

"There was a murmur of uncomfortable assent. But Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden had gone too far to stop now. Only a matter of a few hours, he argued, separated them from full control of the Suez canal and perhaps the downfall of Egypt's Nasser. It was a curious position for the man....who only 17 months ago had won a triumphal election on a platform of 'working for peace'."

Time reports a further Cabinet meeting the following day:

"By 1 p.m. Eden yielded. He advised Mollet: 'We've practically won. Nasser cannot last long now, anyway'."

Perhaps there were readers of Time who really believed this was the voice of Eden. They certainly had no way of guessing otherwise

in Time.

Further reviews of intervention by British spokesmen (Macmillan on the 13th, Lennox Boyd on the 14th) were not reported or considered. On the relationship of Suez and the Russian action in Hungary, Time said that on November 5 "Laborites charged bitterly Russia would not have dared to take this action in Hungary but for the action of this government in Egypt. Eden stood his ground, unyielding, uncommunicative."

In fact, on that day it was the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd who was the Government spokesman. He replied to these criticisms about Hungary alleging that the Russians would have returned in any case. Further rebuttals of this charge were made on November 9 (Lord Reading); in the United Nations; by R.A. Butler on the 14th. Time did not report, summarise or discuss them.

Third Issue

Further reviews of intervention by British/French spokesmen were not even briefly reported. Time ignored:

Selwyn Lloyd's advocacy of a permanent United Nations force (12th)

M. Mollet on the alleged Soviet plot (13th)

M. Pineau's review of intervention (14th)

Mr. Lennox Boyd on the alleged Soviet plot and on the
intervention (14th)

Eden (14th)

Mr. Macmillan (13th - beyond the one remark that Britain would
suffer temporary material loss as a result of Suez).

Eisenhower's message to Mollet expressing sympathy and
friendship

Eden's major speech on November 17 was reported in only the
one point that Britain would feel well rewarded if the
result of the action was to equip the United Nations
with the effective means to enforce its resolutions.

This was reported as follows: "And Great Britain, which had
so lately ignored the United Nations by its invasion of Egypt, was
now trying to say it had done so only for the United Nations' own
good....Privately some of the United Nations' presumed best friends
were saying that unless it becomes really effective it should quit;
Britons, Frenchmen and Belgians were throwing rocks at precisely
the time when the United Nations was trying to grow."

And again: "The United Nations Expeditionary Force must somehow
ensure that two of the greatest nations in Europe abandon with
grievous loss of face a last-ditch attempt to dominate a region of
the world vital to their survival as major powers."

As for the alliance, Butler, on November 14, said Britain wanted
to maintain a common front in Atlantic Alliance; Caccia appealed for
united Middle East policy versus Soviet intrigue. This, and other
unreported statements, came out in Time as:

"Britain and France to manoeuvre themselves out of a jam...
(were) talking elliptically about how the alliance was coming
back together again....Well mannered and well indoctrinated
young embassy spear carriers were ever ready to convince their
United States opposite numbers that they had really invaded

Egypt to stop the Russians."

Counter Case and Period as a Whole

Time reported rather more of the unfavourable facts than the favourable - 12 per cent of the favourable against 16 per cent of the unfavourable. In the smaller category of objectives, Time reported 7 per cent of the hostile statements and 12 per cent of the favourable, though, as we have seen, one-third of these were not reported straight.

These represent low scores, both for the case and the counter case. But the point about Time Magazine is the high frequency of non-factual matter.

There were, in all, 32 unfavourable allegations in the objectives category (none favourable). There were in addition 249 paragraph units of hostile material in the broad Unfavourable category - and only 35 favourable units.

The main <u>Favourable</u> themes were:	<u>Number of times occurring</u>
Evidence of Egypt's provocations	5
Anti-Nasser themes	6
More people are behind Eden than against him	5
Pro-Eden themes, personal	3
Russia has been, is plotting	3
The main <u>Unfavourable</u> themes were:	
Intervention is opposed by world	10
Britain is against Eden (with colour)	9
Personal anti-Eden	12

Eden not impartial	10
Intervention has failed	4
Britain guilty of aggression	6
Britain anti-United Nations	7

Conspiracy

Time magazine told its readers the Anglo-French intervention followed a conspiracy with Israel. This is not evident in any selection of the facts by Time. The magazine continued, in this category, to report few of the factual allegations or of the counter allegations. Only 9 per cent of the allegations of conspiracy made at the time were reported; only 5 per cent of the replies were reported.

Again, it is Time's non-factual score which is important (and where a simple check list analysis would fail). Twenty-nine times Time magazine itself, in its news columns, stated there was a conspiracy. It did not qualify this as a rumour or a Time belief; it reported it as a hard fact.

The main massive allegation of collusion was made in the first issue of November 12 where conspiracy was suggested 22 times. Thereafter the assertions were only occasionally repeated. This is by no means the highest score for suggesting the intervention was collusive, but Time has easily the highest score for colour: 28 of the 29 assertions of conspiracy were couched in emotive terms hostile to Britain and France. Moreover, the conspiracy allegation in the first issue was prominently displayed in a big panel.

The panel was headlined:

"THE CONSPIRACY

How Britain and France and Israel got together"

The main theme was that the United States was deliberately deceived by Britain and France. The secondary theme was that Britain and France knew of and encouraged the Israeli attack.

To cope with denials of conspiracy by Britain and France, Time does this: "Israel's Foreign Minister talked of the unexpected intervention. Britain's Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, protested 'There was no prior agreement between us'. Despite their words there was plenty of evidence to show that the two attacks were planned in collusion ('orchestration' was the French word for it). In this conspiracy France was the instigator, Britain a belated partner and Israel the willing trigger."

What is this evidence? Mostly, it is Time assertions of what went on at meetings between the British and French following the seizure of the Suez canal in July. For instance, Time says that on October 16 Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris to meet with Mollet and Pineau and conferred in "deepest secrecy" for five hours. Then it goes on: "This presumably was the moment when Britain made the fateful decision - at France's urging - to back Israel....The evidence indicates that it was at the October 16 Paris meeting - 12 days before Israel's invasion of Egypt - that Eden and Mollet agreed to reoccupy the Suez canal zone jointly on the pretext of protecting it from Israel's planned attack."

continued on 5th, 6th and 7th). Time did not report the British shooting down an Israeli plane.

Was the Intervention Humanely Carried Out?

Time reported 19 per cent of the facts in support of the idea that the intervention was carried out as humanely as possible. This compares well with any of the newspapers. Out of 56 allegations of inhumanity in the intervention itself, Time did not report a single one.

However, we must again look at the non-factual score. Here Time had 29 paragraphs suggesting that the intervention was inhumanely carried out, and this is one of the highest non-factual scores in this category.

Again, there is the juxtaposition of fact and comment:

"....from the beginning the Anglo-French high command emphasised the careful concentration on purely military targets, the deliberate effort to spare Egyptian lives and property. Seen face to face it was not that kind of war at all."

A suggestion of callousness is given by: "By the time the fighting ended much of Port Said lay in rubble, some of it ten to fifteen feet deep. It was like a bloody good exercise, said a British paratroop colonel - 'a lot of fun and very interesting'."

More legitimate than this opinion by juxtaposition of news items was a Time man's personal report: "When I visited the hospital it had no light, no water, no food, and no medical supplies. According to the chief surgeon, Dr. Ezzeldine Hoseny, more than 500

Egyptians had died in his hospital during the two days of fighting in Port Said. At one point corpses were piled nearly as high as a man's head in three sheds...." Here the reader is given clear attribution.

United States Policy

Time did not report straight a single statement criticising United States policy (out of 83 on the check list). It reported two of the 33 approving American policy - and 18 units of non-factual approval. The only criticism of United States policy Time reported was that of various political columnists, and here it reported them merely to deride them. Time claimed that the political columnists had been given "briefings" by British Embassy officials to the effect that Dulles had been a failure. Many of these columnists were "still wallowing in the ash of the sunken Adlai Stevenson", said Time. (It was supporting Eisenhower for the election.)

Time said Joseph and Stewart Alsop "ranted" and it prefaced another extract from the Alsop column with this: "Two days later the Alsops swung even more wildly." James Reston's paragraph was accompanied by the credit - "James Reston reported nonsensically".

Time said: "Angry United States officials were convinced that 'friendly embassies' tipped key correspondents that President Eisenhower intended to deliver a 'strong' statement against Russian intervention in the Middle East at his Press conference. When the President stuck by his policy of talking softly and backing the United Nations, a new spate of punditry and radio-TV commentary

bewailed his disappointing stand."

So much for the reporting of the Press and public debate on United States policy. Time reinforced this statement with positive applause for the United States policy, in its manner of reporting. The theme here was that the United States was doing everything possible for world peace:

"The United States gained credit throughout the world for separating itself last week from the conduct of its oldest allies."

"Eisenhower kept a close watch and a cool head. Meanwhile he worked patiently to repair the physical and moral basis of the Western alliance."

It refers to a series of "crisp and rippling decisions".

"In classic diplomatic fashion Dwight Eisenhower moved surefootedly on these fundamentals of security to dampen the false points of potential outbreak."

The President "was handling things Normandy-style, coolly, with a sure and knowing touch."

The remaining categories are briefly reported; no significance attaches to them.

The Canal

Time reported 24 per cent of the facts attributing blame to Egypt; ten per cent of those blaming Britain: That is to say there were eight mentions of Egypt's culpability; one suggesting the

British were to blame. Three non-factual units blamed Egypt; two blamed Britain.

Alliance

What non-factual material occurred on the alliance? Time did not emphasise danger to the Western alliance. It reported, in the first period, that disagreement was extreme, but also suggested that the alliance would survive. This was the view in the other two periods as well: there is too strong a word for the few references to the stability or otherwise of the alliance.

Why Stopped

This is another non-factual category. Time put forward no consistent view in its news columns. In both periods Time suggested Britain and France had ended the intervention because of pressure from inside or outside the country. In the second period Time suggested Britain had been frightened by the Russian rocket threat; later it suggested this was not the reason. In the third period it suggested at one point that the intervention stopped because of United States pressure - Eisenhower's work. At another point it suggested it was because of domestic pressure inside Britain and France.

Other Military

Time reported 31 per cent of the facts, lower than any other publication in the study except the Wall Street Journal. However, this is not considered significant since many of the military facts

were of the kind soon overtaken by events.

Of the other neutral facts it reported 16 per cent were from British and French sources, and 40 per cent from sources hostile to Britain and France.

Background Information

Time carried three paragraphs on the importance of Suez and the Middle East for Britain; seven on the Middle East situation before the intervention; one on Britain's withdrawal position.

Remarks

Time magazine not merely failed to report the Suez crisis. It reported few of the facts, but what it did report was so mixed with colour and opinion that the ordinary reader would be unable to distinguish fact from opinion. This is a serious criticism of Time. Fact and opinion may both have a legitimate part to play, even in what is ostensibly news material, but it is essential that the reader should be able to tell what is fact and what is interpretation and opinion. This confusion in Time is too frequent, and too contrived, to be an accident. Time was deliberately biassed against Britain and France in its reporting of the Suez crisis.

Certain regular distortion devices were detected in the study of Time and the other magazines. An analysis of these is included in appendix I (p. 256).

CHAPTER 15

NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE

1956 Circulation: 1,642,337

Competition weekly: Time

United States News and World Report

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

		Number of non-factual units in this category
Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	11.9	4
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	0	10
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	8	18
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	16	78

Newsweek had a lower score even than Time in reporting the hard facts of the Suez crisis. Again, one must say that it is not fair to judge the magazines only on the basis of their factual scores. A much lower score than for newspapers published daily would be creditable. But reporting only 8 per cent of the generally favourable facts really is a slim diet - in terms of incidents and statements available it means that Newsweek had only 35 out of 462 facts available in this category.

Newsweek did twice as well reporting facts in the generally unfavourable category. And, just as with Time, there was a heavy non-factual score in hostile categories.

The British Case in Detail: First Period

Newsweek did not give us any details at all of:

1. Israel's communique (October 30) stating reasons for invasion.
2. Britain's statement in the United Nations explaining the ultimatum.
3. The British Government's views and policies as stated in the House of Commons on October 31, November 1, November 2 and November 3, beyond this legitimate summary of one of the points: "Again and again through five consecutive days the Prime Minister hammered home his key point: Armed intervention was the only way to stop 'warfare spreading through the whole area'."

On the ultimatum, for instance, Newsweek reported: "Sir Anthony Eden rose in the Commons and without betraying the slightest emotion spoke the ultimatum that shook the world. As dazed men everywhere tried to sift the meaning of Eden's words...."

Those words themselves were not reported to be sifted. But there is an interesting sidelight in the way Newsweek and Time reported the Commons. Time said the House was chill with silence after the speech. Newsweek said: "His fellow Conservatives, including an enthusiastic Sir Winston Churchill, responded with a three minute ovation, probably the loudest of Eden's career." (In truth, there were cheers.)

Eden's full statement of British objectives on November 3 was not reported at all, nor was there any mention of his detailed defence of British intervention. When it came to Britain's offer to help the United Nations Expeditionary Force and support for the United

Nations Expeditionary Force , Newsweek did not report what Eden himself said.

It reported it this way: "Britain and France, realizing now the precariousness of their venture, saw a chance to extricate themselves and to remove the onus of aggression from their assault on Egypt. They readily accepted the plan (for a United Nations Expeditionary Force) hoping that by the time the police force was ready the Anglo-French action would have disposed of the main source of trouble - Gamel Abdul Nasser."

Though it did not give more than a passing reference to Eden's view of his objectives, Newsweek readily gave its own: "Whether by collusion or coincidence, Britain, France and Israel had one aim in common: Getting rid of Gamel Abdul Nasser."

The only time Newsweek reported Britain in the United Nations it got it wrong, whether by coincidence or design. It said: "Even Canada deserted Britain's stand that the 'temporary police action' against Nasser was justified."

Of course, this suggests Britain defended the intervention in the United Nations as police action against Nasser. In fact, the intervention was defended as necessary to separate the combatants, safeguard the canal, restore peace and protect British and French civilians.

Second Period

Newsweek reported Russia's rocket threat and Bulganin's suggestion of joining forces with the United States and Shepilov's offer

of aid to end the fighting. It did not report Eden's reply in the Commons. As for Eden's statement on the cease fire, Newsweek merely said:

"First Moscow threatened direct intervention in the Middle East. Britain, France and Israel then stopped short of their objectives and accepted a United Nations cease fire order."

Readers confined to Newsweek did not know what those original objectives were, as stated by the British and French. Eden's full statement of objectives and his review of intervention on November 6 was not reported, summarised or discussed, nor was the Foreign Secretary's review on November 7, or Eden himself again on the 9th. Rather than report and comment on the principal parties, Newsweek commented as if it were reporting: "Britain, France and Israel had gambled all on a quick knockout of Nasser. They had failed. The threat of Soviet intervention and the moral indignation of the majority of the free world had forced all three powers to pull back short of their objectives."

And earlier Newsweek had added an objective all its own: "It was to avert French naval and air control of the canal that Britain agreed to the joint police action"

Newsweek occasionally reported a fact in a wrong and possibly misleading context. In the issue of November 19, Newsweek advanced it as a fact that the British began to falter following the Bulganin threat, though France wanted to fight on. It says: "President Eisenhower's tough reply (to Bulganin) bolstered French courage

momentarily. But then the British began to falter, and with the war scare mounting Mollet had no choice but to join his London colleagues in accepting the United Nations cease fire. The final blow was Prime Minister Eden's demand for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula."

Prime Minister Eden certainly did demand Israel's withdrawal - but not after the Bulganin threat of November 5. Eden said on November 3 that Britain and France would ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and as early as October 31 in the United Nations this had been stated as a definite objective.

Though Newsweek did not allow Eden to review intervention (on 7th and 9th) it did give its own verdict. It said: "By moving into Egypt he had obscured the ruthless Russian repression in Hungary." It developed this point and concluded: Eden's acts "have clouded Britain's name and Britain's word." But Newsweek did not report or discuss any of the British replies to this charge of sacrificing Hungary (made on November 5, 8, 9 and 13).

The British contention that intervention had foiled a Russian plot began to be made in this period. Newsweek did not report the official statements. It put it this way: "The promising way out for the beleaguered Eden would be the production of incontrovertible new evidence that the Soviets had, through Nasser, penetrated the Middle East to a hitherto unrealized degree and that the day was not far off when they would be in a position to suck the entire oil-rich region into their own orbit. Such evidence was reputedly unearthed during the landing."

Third Period

Newsweek did not follow the development of the theory that there was a Soviet plot. It did not report the details given by Mr. Peter Thorneycroft in London on the 11th alleging that Russia could have formed its own units in the Middle East quickly in the event of wider war, nor did it report Mr. Lennox Boyd on the 13th. There was, indeed, almost no more coverage of the Suez crisis in terms of the facts. Newsweek did, however, carry some material vaguely parallel to the Soviet-plot theme. It said there was an allegation that a hundred Russians had been captured in Sinai; and, although it had not reported Eden's detailed defence of intervention and had itself been critical, it did say: "Many top Pentagon men feel that Washington should have backed up the British and French action in Egypt....the British and French might have achieved a success that would have wiped out the Soviet footholds in the Arab world."

Counter Case and Period as a Whole

Newsweek did not report any of the hostile objectives, and four times carried unattributed non-factual support for Britain and France's official objectives. However, there were ten times when Newsweek itself attributed unfavourable objectives to Britain and France. The most frequent objective attributed was that the aim of intervention was to weaken or destroy Nasser as an enemy of Britain.

The objectives category, however, is in some rough balance in terms of frequency. It is in the broadly unfavourable category that

there is a big discrepancy in Newsweek. The magazine reported twice as many of the unfavourable facts (70 against 35, which is 16 per cent compared with 8 per cent). Moreover, while there were 18 paragraphs of favourable non-factual material, there were no fewer than 78 unfavourable non-factual paragraphs. Thus the content of Newsweek was heavily hostile.

Half of the material classified as favourable to Britain and France consisted of material hostile to Nasser. Though Newsweek's selection and editing was so critical of Britain and France, there is no question of it being "soft" on the Egyptian President. Newsweek portrays him as an arrogant dictator with dreams of empire.

The main non-factual references unfavourable to Britain and France were:

	<u>Frequency</u>
Intervention helps Russia in Hungary, Poland	3 units
Russia helped in Middle East or elsewhere	3 units
Intervention strained British economy	19 units
Intervention failed	6 units
Intervention risked World War	4 units
Britain anti-United Nations	4 units
Britain has reverted to colonialism	3 units

Conspiracy

Did Britain, France and Israel conspire together to invade Egypt?

Fifty-six factual allegations of conspiracy were entered on the check lists and 63 factual rebuttals. Newsweek did not report any of the allegations of conspiracy and only one denial. However, the

Newsweek distorted the chronology of the Suez affair to give the impression that the French National Assembly voted for a secret conspiracy plan. "Operation Hamilcar for all its gamble brought Mollet a resounding vote of confidence in the National Assembly", says Newsweek immediately after it has said there was an October 27 meeting of Israeli staff officers and the French in Paris to plan joint invasion in "Operation Hamilcar". Newsweek does not say the Assembly vote of confidence was, in fact, for the intervention with Britain following Israel's invasion and was a vote of confidence on October 31.

This section begins in Newsweek with a quotation from Mollet: "We know that by taking action (against Egypt) we might make a mistake but the mistake would be even greater if we remained inactive." The bracketed words "against Egypt" were not Mollet's. They were written in by Newsweek. The magazine does not report what Mollet said in context. For instance, he said that France could not condemn or condone Israel's action.

Not once did Newsweek even suggest that Britain, Israel and France had formally denied conspiracy.

Was the Intervention Humanely/Inhumanely Carried Out?

Newsweek suggested that the intervention was carried out inhumanely. There were 85 facts on the check list in the category suggesting the intervention was carried out as humanely as possible. Newsweek reported eight of these - and these were not reported straight. Six of these facts were reported only to be ridiculed immediately. For instance:

"An Anglo-French communique announced that civilian facilities in Port Said are being quickly normalised. Two days later there was still no electricity, no water and no police."

There were 56 facts on the check list in the category suggesting the intervention had been inhumanely carried out. Newsweek reported only one of these. Once more it is in the non-factual content that it is decisive (illustrating how misleading it would be merely to rely on a check list). Twenty-eight times non-factually Newsweek suggested that the intervention was inhumane (and only seven times that it was humane).

Most of this was the result of a dispatch from Benjamin Bradley in Port Said, who said there had been heavy casualties and considerable destruction, and a lack of order in Port Said.*

For instance: "Lt. Gen Sir Hugh Charles Stockwell, Commander of the Anglo-French army task force, told correspondents just in from Cyprus that only 100 civilians were killed in Port Said. As he said this, we who had been there for two days followed a yellow Coca Cola truckful of corpses to one of the three cemeteries. Twenty-seven bodies were unloaded. Those strong enough to have the odour counted another 100 awaiting burial under the bright purple bougain-

* For comparison: Damage and Casualty in Port Said, a report by Sir Edwin Herbert (published HMSO December 1956) said Egyptian casualties in Port Said were 650 dead, 900 wounded and detained in hospital, with a further 1,200 slightly wounded. This official estimate of Egyptian casualties has been criticised as too low - see Suez by A.J. Barker (Faber & Faber 1964).

villea bushes inside. There are at least 2,000 dead - one of every twenty Port Said residents."

Nobody should take exception to Mr. Bradley's descriptive reporting. It is attributed to him. It is first hand reporting, offered as such, and not disguised as an official or uncontested fact. Newsweek's coverage in this category, however, is open to criticism because:

1. It gave only one official British communique straight.
2. Other statements from the British and French sides were given only to be ridiculed.

United States Policy

Newsweek gave little space to the debate on United States policy. What little it did give was rather more balanced than Time magazine. Time did not report any of the fact-list criticisms of United States policy. Newsweek reported one of these (made by Mr. Adlai Stevenson). Newsweek did not report any of the statements approving American policy - but it did suggest five times non-factually that the United States was doing everything possible for world peace. It three times conveyed non-factual criticism of United States policy.

Canal

Newsweek reported 38 per cent of the facts that Egypt was to blame, and only 10 per cent of the facts blaming Britain. The non-factual score was negligible (none against Britain, three units against Egypt).

Why Stopped

Why did Britain and France cease the intervention? This is a category for non-factual material. Newsweek, we saw, did not report the British and French factual reasons for stopping. Its non-factual coverage was all hostile. The intervention had stopped, it suggested, because of United Nations pressure, because of danger from Russian volunteers, and because of Russia's rocket threat.

Alliance

What non-factual material occurred on the alliance? Newsweek made it clear that the disagreement was confined to the intervention and the alliance would survive, as the three allies wished.

Background Information

Newsweek was good on background on the Suez and Middle East's importance for Britain (27 paragraphs) but gave no information on the political history before the intervention.

Remarks

Newsweek, like Time, is a confusing mixture of fact, supposition, colour and consistently angled writing. Like Time, it must be judged deliberately biased against the British and French. Similar patterns of distortion appear and are analysed in appendix I, page 256.

CHAPTER 16

UNITED STATES NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

Circulation: 737,242

Competition weekly: Time

Newsweek

Reporting of the British-French Case: Summary

Number of
non-factual
units in this
category

Percentage score of facts giving official British-French objectives	14.5	8
Percentage score of facts giving hostile statements of objectives	1	42
Percentage of facts reported in category Favourable to Britain, France, Israel	11	116
Percentage of facts reported in category Unfavourable	11	102

United States News scored more than any other magazine in reporting British objectives - and more than two of the newspapers publishing daily (San Francisco News and Wall Street Journal). However, it will be seen that in this category of objectives it did have a high hostile score non-factually.

The percentages in the broad category balance, and it will be seen the non-factual score was favourable to Britain and France - 116 to 102. United States News is the only magazine or newspaper in the sample in which a favourable balance emerges from these non-factual categories (i.e. Generally Favourable and Unfavourable).

First Period: Details of United States News Coverage

The first issue of the United States News is November 9. This scores heavily on the early check lists of the first period because in it the United States News reported, quite straight, a good deal

their Oil". Accompanying this was a big map ringed in red with objectives saying, "What Britain and France are trying to do".

These objectives included: "Crush Nasser Who Seized Suez and Built a pro-Soviet Arab Alliance"; "Take the Suez Canal Back under International Control"; "Put an End to Years of Arab Attacks on Israel, Israeli Reprisals"; "Drive Russia's Arms Salesmen, Political Agents out of Arab World".

Here, in the text of its magazine story, rather than the separate official excerpts from speeches, United States News slanted its reporting: "Ousting Nasser's Government is the real aim of military action. British and French intelligence agents in Egypt have long been in contact with anti-Nasser groups in Egypt."

"An Armistice, as the Europeans see it, can be signed quickly with any government which may take over from Nasser. Then, with the leverage provided by the occupation of the Suez canal, the British and French expect a quick deal for international operation of Suez, a slower moving negotiation aimed at real Arab-Israeli peace."

And: " 'Don't think we like to go to war', British officials tell you. 'Don't think we believe it will be easy. But we have no alternative - we must upset this dictator to remove his stranglehold on the economies of Western Europe.' "

And: "The ultimatum, in effect, was an announcement that Britain and France intended to occupy the Suez canal zone by force and in strength if necessary."

Here in the magazine recounting of the Suez crisis, there was no reference to the British policy of "separating the combatants". Here we have instead the plain unqualified assertion that the objective was to destroy Nasser. Moreover, the clear implication is that this was officially stated as British policy.

Second Period. November 4, 5, 6 and 7

The second issue of United States News and World Report during the crisis, dated November 16, was thin for news of Suez, concentrating on the United States Presidential election.

In the four days, United States News had only eight facts in the four categories of Objectives Favourable (Hostile) and Facts Favourable (Unfavourable). Though United States News did not report further statements of British and French objectives in this issue, it did say once: "Colonel Gamel Abdul Nasser, Egypt's dictator, has not been driven from his position of power, although this was a main objective of the British/French action".

Eden's major speech, replying to the United Nations recommendations and giving reasons for not ordering an immediate cease fire, was not reported, nor was his broadcast. There was thus no mention or discussion of the fact that Eden had promised to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The United Nations was again not reported, and with it the British suggestion that the Security Council should meet at high level to work out a Middle East solution. The Foreign Secretary was not reported, defending the intervention and rebutting

the charge that intervention in Suez had sacrificed the Hungarian rebels by encouraging Russia also to use force.

United States News did report the threat to Britain and France from Premier Bulganin - it did not report anything of Eden's reply. And later it said of the threat ".....a threat which preceded the Anglo-French decision to agree to a cease fire in Egypt."

Equally, unfavourable statements were not reported. Mr. Gaitskell's broadcast was not mentioned, nor was the Trafalgar Square protest meeting, nor President Nasser's second big broadcast on November 10.

There was more unattributed non-factual material than factual. There were fourteen non-factual paragraphs favourable to Britain and France and 22 unfavourable.

The favourable non-factual matter was of a negative character - it was favourable in the sense that it was hostile to Egypt and "local dictators such as Gamel Abdul Nasser ready to accept Communist arms on the Kremlin terms".

The unfavourable non-factual matter was critical of the intervention. The magazine also began to include a theme that, having got into deep water, Britain and France once again expected America to rescue them. This is similar to the Rescue Theme detected in the Chicago Tribune (p. 179). It was suggested four times in this United States News issue: "You don't hear people in Western Europe shouting 'Yankee go home' right now."

There was also the assertion, three times, that Britain was

opposed to Eden. In a mixture of factual reporting and supposition, the magazine suggested that Mr. Butler had come out clearly against Eden's policy, which of course he did not do.

"Eden's Cabinet, it is now known, split over the move into Egypt. Eden's Deputy Prime Minister, R.A. Butler, led the revolt. Junior Ministers have since resigned; Eden's press officer has found he can no longer go along with Eden."

Third Period

United States News, like the newspapers, reported the details of the cease fire announcement scrappily. It did not, for instance, have Eden's explanation for the timing of the cease fire - that during the night the Government had been told by the United Nations Secretary General that Egypt and Israel had now accepted both an unconditional cease fire and the United Nations Expeditionary Force.

United States News merely reported: "Sir Anthony suddenly announced the war had stopped". Early in the magazine, it reported: "Britain and France, striking at Egypt, were forced to call a halt in their effort to seize the Suez canal just after a Soviet note reached London and Paris threatening to use force." Later it says Eden yielded to "diplomatic pressure" from United States, Communists, United Nations and at home.

Eden's November 6 defence of intervention was not reported at all, neither was the Foreign Secretary's when next day in the Commons and on radio he insisted that Britain's short term objectives

had been achieved - the separation of the combatants and the ending of the war.

This was the period for debate on the results of the British and French action - and United States News, like the other magazines, preferred to interpolate its own judgments rather than report British/French views.

Eden's full scale review of intervention on November 9 was not reported, nor was Lennox Boyd's, nor was the support from Premier Menzies in Australia, nor was Mr. Macmillan on the 13th, nor was Eden's pledge that Britain and France would withdraw their troops as soon as the United Nations Expeditionary Force was competent and ready to discharge its tasks.

Instead, the United States News summed up itself: "A war on the verge of being won is ending up as lost by Britain, France and Israel. The winner: Egypt's dictator, Gamel Abdul Nasser." The themes given currency were:

Intervention helped Russia (four paragraph units)

Britain and France lost friendship of the Arabs (four paragraphs)

Intervention strained British economy (twelve paragraphs)

Ten times United States News suggested that intervention had revealed Britain as a weak, second class power. There was also a continuation of the theme that the United States was once again expected to rescue Europe.

"Next question in London is this: Who will bail Britain out now?"

"Whether the United States will now help out Britain remains to be seen."

"Britain can't go it alone. The Suez fiasco indicates that".

United States News emphasised all this with maps and a diagram. Black lettering on a red background with an arrow to the Middle East read: "British-French prestige was to be restored, now is lowered." And again: "Nasser was to be destroyed, is stronger than ever."

However, United States News did give emphasis to one point of the British/French justification for the intervention. This was the British allegation that a Soviet plot had been uncovered. United States News gave ample coverage to this as part of a strong "exposure" of how Russia aimed to dominate the world.

"On one point, however, the Israeli-British-French tactic may have paid off. The invasion disclosed that a large-scale military build-up by Soviet Russia had been going on in Egypt and Syria.... Thus the Egyptian invasion may have choked off this Soviet plot."

On this one point, perhaps because the United States News agreed, the factual statements from Britain were fully reported. The details of the Soviet arms build-up in Egypt given by Mr. Thorneycroft in London on the 11th were reported, and so was Mr. Lennox Boyd's development of the case. There were straight excerpts from the debate of November 13 when Mr. Lennox Boyd said British/French

action had disturbed carefully-laid Soviet plans.

This was full reporting. But it was only for this one debate where the Russian plot was discussed. Anything other than Soviet plotting continued to be ignored by United States News.

United States News did not report anything of the British Ambassador's speech on the 15th defending intervention, nor of the Foreign Secretary's on American television, nor the major speech by Eden on the 17th arguing that the reluctance of the democracies to use force helps the dictatorships, and the Suez intervention has had good results. He also repeated the British reason for ordering a cease fire, which was again not reported: it was not reported by any publication in the sample.

There was similar failure to report unfavourable facts. The November 15 Arab League statement in support of Egypt was not reported, nor was the criticism of Britain and France by Asian Prime Ministers, nor was a new note from Bulganin demanding British and French compensation for victims in Egypt. There were ten unfavourable non-factual references to President Nasser. He was described as "a willing tool" of the Soviet.

Conspiracy

United States News left its readers in no doubt that there was a conspiracy between Britain, France and Israel to deceive the United States and invade Egypt. It did not do this by publishing

the allegations of conspiracy by various nations and speakers. It reported only seven of these (and as many denials). United States News itself simply said there was a conspiracy. It did not attribute this allegation to anybody. It reported it as if it were an established fact, with only one or two doubts in forty paragraphs of assertion.

"To understand why the United States was left in the dark about British and French plans for war in the Middle East, you must go back to the seizure of the Suez canal by Egypt's Nasser."

United States News was not consistent in the degree of conspiracy it asserted had existed between Britain, France and Israel. The themes varied in emphasis:

Britain and France planned the assault with Israel (two paragraph units)

Britain knew of the impending attack and was ready to act (five paragraph units)

France planned the assault but Britain knew nothing of this (five paragraph units)

In addition there were the following themes:

The United States is being deliberately deceived by Britain and France (nine)

Britain, France and Israel are Allies (fifteen).

The different emphasis is illustrated in these extracts: "For Eden the Israeli attack seemed to be what one British observer

called a 'Heaven sent excuse' to revive his military plan and to send into action the forces he had ready."

Again: "It was at this time that Israel's leaders, their forces strengthened by French arms launched the 'reprisal attack' which gave Britain and France the opening they awaited."

These suggest Britain and France merely took advantage of the Israeli attack but did not plan it.

Yet we also have: "British, French and Israeli forces, attacking Egypt, have aimed for a quick knockout of that country's military power. The immediate military objectives were three, in the order that follows: Objective No. 1. Encircle and destroy Egypt's military forces stationed in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Gaza strip bordering Israel. This task was assigned to the Israeli Army."

Assigned by whom?

And again: "Eden and Prime Minister Ben Gurion are reported to be in agreement that Israel should occupy and eventually annex the Sinai desert now held by Egypt."

The three factual statements by Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, and the British delegate to the United Nations that it was Britain's firm intention to make Israeli forces withdraw were not reported by United States News.

There were further inconsistencies in the United States News and World Report. The magazine recounts various British and French meetings before the Israeli attack and adds: "During all these doings

the Americans in London and in Paris as well were left in the dark." Then it also says, "....most of the answers lie in Paris where French officials talk more freely."

Again, the magazine says American officials "are deeply disappointed that they have been kept completely in the dark," and that Britain and France so wellmasked their decision that President Eisenhower first learned of the British/French action through press dispatches. Yet in its Washington Whispers section, United States News also says this: "President Eisenhower on October 29 (day before the ultimatum) called Sir Winston Churchill by transatlantic telephone to ask that he intervene to keep Sir Anthony, British Prime Minister, from going ahead with operations aimed at Nasser. Churchill is understood to have refused flatly."

How could President Eisenhower know of these "operations" if America had been kept completely in the dark? Yet, again, in the next paragraph it says: "The vast and very costly intelligence service of the United States Government once again was caught off guard when Britain and Israel moved against Egypt. On this occasion intelligence officials were fooled by America's own allies."

Yet also: "Sir Anthony at no time concealed his view that it would require armed force to cut Nasser down to size."

There was not much colour in United States News and World Report charges. It was much calmer than the other magazines.

Other categories were not significant in United States News, and are dealt with briefly.

Was the Military Action Humane/Inhumane?

United States News gave very little attention to the details of the military intervention's humanity or inhumanity. It had two of the opposition's allegations that the bombing was inhumane, two of the Government's replies that only military targets were being attacked. There was no non-factual matter.

Canal

Again there was no significant reporting of the facts, and no non-factual matter. (The magazine reported only the allegation that Britain was to blame, and two blaming Egypt.)

United States Policy

Unlike Time, United States News did not go out of its way to say that United States policy had done everything possible for world peace. It reported six per cent of the statements approving American policy and 11 per cent of those disapproving. The emphasis is this way round because it gave the full text of the speech by Stevenson replying to Eisenhower under the headline "United States Policy Makers Appeased and Provoked Egypt". It gave the full text of the President's speech as well, but Stevenson concentrated more on the Middle East in his speech.

Non-factually, United States News had five paragraphs saying that United States policy failures made Britain and France go it alone.

Why did Britain and France Stop?

Early in the third issue, United States News suggested that Britain and France stopped because of the Russian rocket threat. Later, with a side-heading, "Why Drive Halted", it says. "Behind this sudden starting and stopping of war were diplomatic pressures that proved more powerful than arms." Then it lists pressure from the United Nations, from the Commonwealth and United States and Parliament, saying also: "India, Pakistan and Ceylon threatened to withdraw from Commonwealth" - something which was never officially stated.

Other Military

United States News reported 26 per cent of the main military facts, which is more than Newsweek but less than Time. For the rest of the news, neutral in colour, it had six per cent of the statements from London, seven per cent from hostile sources - rather less in both cases than either of the other magazines.

Background

United States News gave full background on the importance of the Suez canal and Middle East for Britain (46 paragraphs), and gave the background to the political situation in the Middle East more fully than Newsweek, but the same as Time.

Summary

For a reader who had not time or inclination to read the newspapers during the Suez crisis, United States News and World Report

was the erratic best of the magazines for gaining some unbiased appreciation of the British and French case and the crisis as a whole. However, it could hardly be said to give a full account of the crisis and the debate that went with it, and the reader would be confused between fact and opinion in the main columns of the magazine.

S E C T I O N I I I

C O N C L U S I O N S

A P P E N D I C E S

CHAPTER 17

Conclusions

The conclusions fall into two parts - conclusions about press performance and conclusions about the method of study.

Press Performance

In the separately bound folder, there is included a Master Sheet setting out the daily check list scores that emerged for all the publications in their appropriate categories, together with the totals of non-factual units, again in the appropriate categories.

For ease of reference in this chapter, a table has been prepared setting out the total scores for each newspaper of all facts in the favourable and unfavourable categories (i.e. favourable and unfavourable to Britain, France and Israel). The total number of non-factual units is given alongside. This table gives a good overall idea of the use of space and the general balance of the coverage for each publication. The total must not, of course, be confused with the specific categories Favourable/Unfavourable used in the study for the arguments about intervention. The total of favourable facts here is arrived at by adding the scores for each publication in all the categories that can conceivably be favourable or unfavourable:

Objectives (Statements giving British-French objectives for intervention)

Counter Conspiracy (Statements rebutting the charge of conspiracy)

Favourable (Statements and arguments supporting intervention)

Critical United States Policy (Statements generally criticising the United States Government's failure to support Britain, France and Israel)

Military: Humane (Statements on the care of the British-French military operation to save lives)

Canal: Egypt Culpable (Statements placing the blame on Egypt for blocking the canal)

The unfavourable facts total is arrived at by adding together the scores of each publication in the unfavourable categories corresponding to the favourable categories outlined above. In the table below the total check list scores are expressed as a percentage of the full check list score possible (i.e. 832 favourable facts; 670 unfavourable).

The actual score is given in brackets below. The non-factual units are simply expressed as a total because they cannot, of course, be compared to any possible total score.

SUMMARY OF FAVOURABLE/UNFAVOURABLE FACTS
AND WEIGHT OF NON-FACTUAL MATERIAL

	<u>FACTUAL MATERIAL</u>		<u>NON-FACTUAL</u>	
	<u>Favour- able</u>	<u>Unfavour- able</u>	<u>Favour- able</u>	<u>Unfavour- able</u>
	(As percentages of total score possible)			
San Francisco Chronicle (Actual total):	21.5 (182)	27.5 (184)	92	171
San Francisco Examiner	24.1 (204)	28.5 (191)	53	122
San Francisco News	15.2 (129)	14.9 (100)	50	139
Denver Post	16.5 (140)	20.7 (139)	115	370
Philadelphia Inquirer	24.7 (209)	30.2 (203)	69	189
Wall Street Journal	6.2 (53)	7.5 (50)	17	68
Quincy Herald Whig	12.5 (106)	17.7 (119)	39	122
Chicago Tribune	29.8 (252)	31.5 (208)	99	253
Time	11.1 (94)	12.2 (82)	43	344
Newsweek	8.6 (73)	10.7 (72)	35	154
United States News	10.5 (89)	9.4 (63)	124	189

Two things are noticeable at once in this general table - the very low percentage scores for reporting any of the facts, favourable or unfavourable; and the great weight of unfavourable non-factual material in publications like the Denver Post and Time magazine which also have very low factual scores. This will be discussed later in an attempt to define press bias.

The individual studies (from which this table is drawn) provide individual conclusions to the questions 1-5 posed at the beginning of this study:

1. The official British-French objectives were scantily reported.
2. The arguments for intervention were even less fully reported.
(It seems that once military operations had started the theoretical justifications for it were given only subsidiary consideration).
- 3-4. The newspapers and magazines were all ready to print rumours of collusion between Britain and France and Israel and in differing degrees to print them as fact rather than allegation.
5. The international debate on the Suez intervention was sketchily reported for the American reader of the publications studied.

These conclusions are, of course, directly contradictory to the impressionistic conclusions of Mr. Henry Brandon*, but we cannot

* Page 1, this study.

compare the grounds of disagreement because we do not know what newspapers Mr. Brandon studied, for how long, or with what method, if any.

6. The differences between individual publications were significant and have been indicated. Newspapers with more than one news agency or syndicate supplying it did not score consistently better than newspapers relying on fewer suppliers.

The monopoly small town evening newspaper in the Middle West did have the thinnest coverage of the newspapers, but it was not markedly worse in its factual coverage than the evening newspaper in a competitive situation in San Francisco, or the large evening paper in Denver. The Chicago Tribune did not live up to its anti-British stereotype.

All the newspapers would have given a much more adequate coverage of the crisis if the available news space had been used more effectively by careful editing of the needlessly verbose agency reports (see p..17 above et seq.)

It was clear many times that the agency reports had been used fully for a few paragraphs, then ended abruptly. All would have had considerably higher factual scores if the available news space had been used more for facts and less for unattributed non-factual material, inferences and opinions. The weight of this non-factual content in the news columns was considerable in every publication studied. There was no significant distortion in headlining.

The magazines did not merely report the facts scantily. They

consistently distorted the facts.

Flow of News: In some international crises the newspapers are short of facts (i.e. attributed statements). This was not so at Suez. The crisis was openly debated between capitals and in Britain the House of Commons questions, debates and statements were freely available. In addition, at the time of Suez the British Government maintained offices for the British Information Services in New York, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco and Los Angeles which supplied to newspapers official texts of the major speeches and Commons replies made by British Ministers. These reached the newspaper offices after the same speeches had been carried on the news agency wires. They were supplied because of previous experience of Anglo-United States misunderstandings arising from incomplete reports being received and published. There is no sign that any of these releases was used in news columns; they may have been helpful to editorial writers and columnists.

The Method

The method devised for this study is applicable to any other study of press performance. Its main disadvantage is that it is laborious work. It is not totally objective but given the preliminary judgments it proceeds under fairly rigorous controls. Once the check list has been compiled, for instance, the newspapers can be marked by an auxiliary worker.

The method is to be preferred to the subjective judgments that pass for studies of press performance because:

- a) the method is set out and therefore open to criticism
- b) the grounds for preliminary judgments are given
- c) there is a verifiable quantitative basis once those judgments have been accepted. This gives a more solid foundation for the quasi-quantitative conclusions that always have to be made in studies of press performance (i.e. with the figures here, if one said, "more or less", it would be possible for the reader to see just how much more and how much less).
- d) the whole content of a news item is considered, not merely the attributed statements.

The method of this study can be used for two parallel but distinct purposes:

- i) systematically determining the adequacy of a newspaper coverage
- ii) detecting and demonstrating the presence of bias in the news columns.

The first purpose is more easily demonstrated in the detailed studies. What is an "adequate" report of the facts of a situation is open to debate, but at least in a study of this kind the bounds of the debate are set out by the check list. Bias is a more difficult question. By bias, one would mean that the sum total of content is likely to inspire prejudice in the reader. This need not have been the intention; motives strictly are irrelevant in a study

of press performance. What follows is an attempt to relate the findings of this particular study to the possibilities of a more general hypothesis for the general study of communication content.

Can bias be measured? asked A.E. Rowse in his study, "Slanted News"^{*}, deciding that "there is no precise and generally accepted way to judge fairness in the press", an echo of the conclusion in 1953 by Professor David M. White of Boston University: "No completely adequate methodology for determining newspaper bias has yet been developed". It is indeed difficult ground. It is however worth exploring because the existence of a method generally acceptable to research workers and pressmen could have an important bearing on press performance. Two approaches are possible. We can try to lay down a priori criteria for fairness such as:

- a) full reporting of the facts impartially between two sides
- b) comment and other non-factual material in the news to be distinguishable as such and not to overwhelm the factual content
- c) the absence of loaded words.

Alternatively, we can work backwards from findings in this study.

If it is accepted that bias has clearly been demonstrated in the detailed examination of Time magazine, some leads emerge.

Accepting for a moment the absence of precision in the comparative terms here, we can say that in Time magazine we had:

- a) Inadequate factual coverage

* p. 284, entry No. 17 Bibliography

- b) Balanced factual coverage
- c) Heavy amount of non-factual material
- d) Marked imbalance in this non-factual material
- e) Considerable colour
- f) Non-factual material barely distinguishable from factual material - a confusion of fact and Time opinion.*

All characteristics (a) to (f) were again present in similar degrees in Newsweek, which again is biased on the evidence of this study.

Is it possible to have bias when the factual coverage is nearly in balance? The evidence of the individual studies is that it is - because:

- i) Time balance is balance at an extremely low level. The great weight of material is in non-factual categories and here the unfavourable non-factual score is more than seven times greater than the favourable non-factual score. In addition there is perjorative colour.
- ii) the facts reported are vitiated by (f) above: they are rarely reported straight.

If the factual coverage had been unbalanced in the same direction as the non-factual coverage, the degree of bias in Time magazine would have been greater. If the balance of factual coverage had been favourably inclined, this might have offset the non-factual count - depending on the weight of ^{favourable} factual reporting.

* P. 187 et. seq. and also Appendix I p. 256.

The relationship between the factual and non-factual is surely very important. If the facts are fully reported, they can "carry" a greater weight of non-factual material provided it is made clear to the reader that it is non-factual material. A newspaper cannot reasonably be accused of bias if it reports the facts fully and fairly and its non-factual material, however prevalent, is clearly identifiable. The reader is being given the means to judge.

Following this approach, we can now perhaps attempt to be a little more precise about the comparative terms and see if, in the light of the studies, we can reduce and refine the constituent characteristics of bias.

Factual Adequacy: An adequate coverage is one which gives a sufficient number of facts to enable a reader to form a clear idea of the issues (in this case of the objectives for intervention and the arguments for and against, etc.)

How many facts are needed to achieve "adequacy"? This is a matter for judgment - but the counting of facts against a check list gives a quantitative guide, and ensures consistency.

Is 25% adequate or inadequate? We are working at the frontier between qualitative judgment and quantitative factors. The nature of the check list is basic.* If the check list is liberally compiled, it gives a newspaper the best chance of scoring since every fact it

* Appendix II, p.268, discusses the objectivity and mechanics of the check list.

has is likely to be included on the list. On the other hand, a liberal check list sets a higher standard. In this study the detailed reports on each publication give an indication of the relative importance of the facts omitted. None of the publications has been judged to give an "adequate" report of the crisis within the terms of this study. The best is the Chicago Tribune, with 30 per cent overall (and a 34 per cent score in reporting the category 'objectives'). This would be bordering on adequacy.

Factual Balance: This is self explanatory - the coverage would be unbalanced when the proportion of favourable or unfavourable facts reported was significantly at variance with the proportion of unfavourable/favourable facts.

Non-Factual Weight: We have said that Time's non-factual material was "heavy". It is certainly heavy in relation to what other publications score. But the real significance is surely in the relationship of the "heavy" non-factual content to the total space for Suez. How can we compare the space given for factual coverage with the space given for non-factual? And how can we assess the intensity of the non-factual coverage where a single word like "dictator" or "plot" can conceivably carry as much force as a paragraph of unemotive argument? These are real difficulties.

First, space. It might be possible to measure the column-inches occupied by non-factual material and then by factual material.

This has not been the method of this study. Column inches have not been measured for the reasons given at the beginning. However, the measure in this study can give some comparability between factual and non-factual content. The amount of space needed to convey a fact in the check list is a sentence or more. A non-factual unit can be conveyed in a single word*, but the general average is more like a sentence (which in American newspapers with large body type and narrow columns is often the equivalent of a paragraph). There may thus be some space comparability between a score of one on the factual check list and a non-factual score of one. The correspondence is not precise in spatial terms because there can be a non-factual score of one for a single word in a paragraph and in some rich passages one sentence-paragraph may yield two or even three non-factual units. Thus a column of non-factual material will, on average, yield a higher score than a column of factual matter. Against this slight discrepancy, one might consider the relative effect on the reader of a paragraph of factual material and a paragraph of non-factual material. It could be argued that the non-factual, with its common perjorative content, justifies the slightly higher count since it can be assumed to have that slightly higher intensity. Further study would be needed to test this suggestion. However, acceptance of the argument that there is some genuine comparability between the non-factual scores and the factual scores would enable us to assess the non-factual weight in a publication. We could proceed to a definition that the unfavourable non-factual content is "heavy" when the total non-factual units significantly exceed the total number of favourable facts reported (and vice versa).

* See p.45 above.

In Time there were 344 unfavourable non-factual units: the number of favourable facts reported was 94. In Newsweek there were 154 unfavourable non-factual units: and 73 facts.

On intensity, we can only note the existence of pejorative material - see Colour below.

Non-Factual Balance: We have said that in Time there was a "marked imbalance" in the non-factual material. There were 344 units unfavourable to 43 favourable - more than seven times as great. Would unfavourable non-factual material which was double the amount of favourable be "marked imbalance"? It would certainly be imbalance - but it would be hard to say it was "marked". Here again we are at the frontiers of quantitative factors and qualitative assessment. The San Francisco Examiner was not in the study considered biassed (except in one distinct category of military inhumanity). Throughout there were 122 non-factual unfavourable units and 53 favourable. However, the conclusion that the Examiner was not biassed was influenced by the remaining two characteristics noted in Time: Colour, and Confusion of Fact and Opinion. There was little colour - emotive words, etc. - in the Examiner. The non-factual material was distinguishable from the factual.

Let us now take the characteristics of bias in Time and Newsweek and see how they apply in the other publications on the comparative definitions discussed above.

Denver Post. This was considered biassed in the individual study.

The characteristics are:

- (a) Inadequate factual coverage
- (b) Unbalanced factual coverage
- (c) Heavy amount of non-factual material
- (d) Marked imbalance in this non-factual material
- (e) Considerable colour
- (f) Non-factual material barely distinguishable from factual material

These are the same characteristics as Time and Newsweek.

The San Francisco Chronicle was not considered biassed. Its characteristics are:

- (a) Inadequate factual coverage
- (b) Unbalanced factual coverage
- (c) Amount of non-factual material not "heavy"
(i.e. on our definition in relation to facts reported)
- (d) Not a "marked" imbalance
- (e) Little colour
- (f) Much non-factual material indistinguishable from factual

On items (c), (d) and (e), the Chronicle would escape the charge of bias on the Time characteristics, despite the imbalance in its factual coverage.

The San Francisco Examiner

- (a) Inadequate factual coverage
- (b) Unbalanced factual coverage
- (c) Amount of non-factual material not "heavy"
- (d) Imbalance in non-factual score bordering on the "marked"
- (e) Little colour
- (f) Non-factual material easily distinguishable from factual

On items (c), (e) and (f), the Examiner would escape the charge of bias on Time characteristics, again despite imbalance in its factual coverage and the borderline "marked" imbalance in its non-factual coverage. (d)

San Francisco News

- (a) Inadequate factual coverage
- (b) Balanced factual coverage
- (c) Heavy non-factual content
- (d) Imbalance in non-factual content bordering on
"marked" imbalance
- (e) Considerable colour
- (f) Non-factual material barely distinguishable from factual
material.

These are, again, the characteristics of Time magazine; they would support the judgment of the individual study that the San Francisco News was biased.

Philadelphia Inquirer

- (a) Inadequate factual coverage
- (b) Unbalanced factual coverage
- (c) Non-factual content not "heavy"
- (d) Imbalance in non-factual content bordering on "marked"
imbalance
- (e) Considerable colour
- (f) Non-facts indistinguishable from facts.

The Philadelphia Inquirer, differing from Time on item (c) and (d), would escape being judged biased.

Wall Street Journal

- (a) Inadequate factual coverage
- (b) Balanced factual coverage

- (c) Heavy amount of non-factual material
- (d) Marked imbalance in non-factual material
- (e) Relatively considerable colour
- (f) Non-factual material barely distinguishable from factual.

The Wall Street Journal meets the Time characteristics of bias.

Quincy Herald Whig

- (a) Inadequate factual coverage
- (b) Unbalanced factual coverage
- (c) Heavy amount of non-factual material
- (d) Marked imbalance in non-factual material
- (e) Comparatively considerable colour
- (f) Non-factual material barely distinguishable from factual material.

The Whig meets the Time characteristics of bias.

Chicago Tribune

- (a) Factual coverage bordering on adequate
- (b) Balanced factual coverage
- (c) Non-factual content not "heavy" in relation to factual
- (d) Imbalance in the non-factual bordering on "marked"
- (e) Considerable colour
- (f) Non-factual material not distinguishable from factual.

The Chicago Tribune escapes the Time characteristics of bias on (c), possibly also on (a) and (d).

United States News and World Report

- (a) Inadequate factual content
- (b) Balanced factual content
- (c) Heavy amount of non-factual material
- (d) Non-factual material not significantly unbalanced
- (e) Colour
- (f) Non-factual material indistinguishable from factual.

United States News would escape the judgment of bias on account of (d).

On the characteristics set out, then, these publications would be declared observably biased in coverage of the Suez canal crisis:

Time
Newsweek
Denver Post
San Francisco News
Wall Street Journal
Quincy Herald Whig

The publications ruled unbiased would be:

San Francisco Examiner
San Francisco Chronicle
Philadelphia Inquirer
United States News
Chicago Tribune

These assessments might be compared with the judgments of the individual studies.

On the basis of this study, therefore, one would suggest the following guides to a study of press performance.

1. Bias should be suspected where the factual reporting (favourable or unfavourable) is clearly inadequate (say a score of less

than 30 per cent being recorded against the check list) and where this inadequacy is accompanied by a heavy non-factual content which is markedly unbalanced.

2. Bias would be demonstrated where these characteristics are accompanied by considerable colour and where non-factual material is presented in a way likely to make it indistinguishable from factual material to the casual reader.

Whether this bias is deliberate or accidental is really beyond a study of press performance. It is enough that it is there. Some leads to this question could, however, be gained by seeing if the bias is consistent over a period; if it is present in all categories of the study; and if in any consistent manner statements from favourable sources are turned against the source. Given these characteristics, bias must be presumed to be deliberate. But this is a refinement. If the general suggestions above are sound, it would be possible to detect and demonstrate press bias simply by making a check list and a theme list on the lines of this study, without needing to go to the trouble of preparing detailed descriptions of content. On our argument, the figures alone would be sufficient to indicate whether the coverage had been adequate and unbiassed. This would considerably reduce the labour of a press study - and it would give some standard of measurement.

The need now is for the method of this study to be given an independent trial and for the rough hypotheses on bias to be tested and perhaps refined.

A P P E N D I X I

Distortion Techniques in the News Magazines

The three news magazines do not merely give the facts and their editorial opinions and interpretations. They so mix the facts and opinions that the casual reader cannot tell which is which. What is presented as a fact is often an opinion. When a fact is reported it is rarely presented straight. This is not a random affair. The emphasis is consistent in all three magazines. It is clear that in all three an editorial attitude is first adopted to the crisis, then the facts to be reported and omitted are selected and presented accordingly to confirm the editorial attitude. For the facts of the Suez crisis, this meant that many relevant facts were omitted and others from a source favourable to the British and French were presented only in a pejorative context.

The three news magazines are therefore more vehicles of propaganda than of information and comment. Time magazine is the most thorough propagandist, United States News and World Report the least. However, the verbal techniques all three magazines used are so similar that the main ones have been identified and labelled by the author of this study. (It falls outside the field of this study, but it is worth remarking that the techniques are not peculiar to the Suez crisis issues of the news magazines. The same approach has

been evident in other issues to other topics. It would be interesting if an independent research worker could both check the identification of the techniques in another controversy and plot their use.)

The labels given by the author to the propaganda techniques are as follows:

Significant omission

False attribution

Misplaced chronology

The "Aunt Sally"

Supposition as fact

Simple colour

Enough instances of Significant Omission have been given in the detailed studies of the magazines. Illustrations of the remainder follow. Two techniques detected separately in Time and United States News and World Report are mentioned at the end.

FALSE ATTRIBUTION

In the Suez crisis the technique was to attribute as British official views opinions that were never officially given. The omission of what British and French spokesmen were saying is one thing; with the false attribution technique the magazines put words into their mouths - damning words.

(a) "Britain's case went thus. You must judge our methods by our results. We hope to crush Nasser without much bloodshed." [Time]

This paragraph suggests that it is the gist of the formal British case, and of course nothing like this was ever said.

(b) "Even Canada deserted Britain's stand that the 'temporary police action' against Nasser was justified." [Newsweek]

Britain, of course, did not take an official stand that the action was "against Nasser".

(c) "The political hope in London and Paris was that the air strikes alone combined with the Israeli sweep across Sinai would persuade Egypt to surrender or to overthrow Nasser."

[Time]

(d) "As for Britain its justification for aggression against Egypt had to be that a quick war could bring the kind of Middle East solution that diplomacy had failed to achieve."

[Time]

What is happening is that Time's own view of the British and French motives is being presented as if it were the official British and French view.

MISPLACED CHRONOLOGY

Here facts are reported but in a jumbled time order which changes their emphasis and sometimes their meaning completely.

(a) "Operation Hamilcar for all its gamble brought Mollet a resounding 368 to 182 vote of confidence in the National Assembly." [Newsweek]

Newsweek says earlier that Operation Hamilcar was the code name for the French conspiracy with the Israelis to strike at Egypt.

This sentence above, therefore, suggests the French Assembly openly voted for the plan, and presumably thus strengthens the reader's belief there was a clear conspiracy. In fact, the vote count referred to was the vote for French intervention with Britain in the "police action" to separate the combatants.

(b) As part of its alleged factual report of a Cabinet meeting on Monday afternoon, November 5, Time said that Butler argued: "How could he go back to the House and say now that Britain refused the cease fire even though the other combatants had stopped. If Britain kept fighting after Egypt and Israel stopped, he added, the rupture with the United States might become irreparable."

In fact Egypt and Israel had not stopped fighting by November 5. Time itself later says in the same report that later that night Eden was roused with a message "announcing that both Egypt and Israel had agreed to a cease fire".

(c) "Within 23 hours after Israel invaded Egypt, Britain and France joined in an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel and then began to bomb Cairo." [Time]

The Time chronology of this is that Egypt rejected that ultimatum and Israel accepted it. Leapfrogging this fact changes the sense of the facts. Indeed, Time does not say that Israel accepted the ultimatum. And in two other places it does not mention that the ultimatum was given to Israel: "The Egyptians were fighting with more skill and courage than in the '48 fiasco. Then came the ulti-

matum from Britain and France set to expire at 4.30 the next morning. So Egypt had three enemies to contend with instead of one."

(d) "In fact Britain's 12 hour ultimatum demanded that the Egyptians but not the Israelis retreated. British forces neither engaged the attacking Israelis nor drove them back."

[Time]

Again, Time omits to say that the Israelis accepted the ultimatum and stopped at the ultimatum point ten miles from the canal.

(e) "After midnight Tuesday, little more than a week after the operation began, Israeli Army General Headquarters announced:

'The campaign in Sinai had ended....and there is no more fighting'. At that moment, the British-French invasion of the canal zone was already under way." [Time]

Tuesday was November 6. After midnight would be a.m. November 7. At that moment Britain and France had already agreed to cease fire. The British-French invasion began on November 5, Monday. Time's treatment of the chronology here suggests Britain and France were not interested in stopping the Egyptian/Israeli fighting.

"THE AUNT SALLY"

This is a label for the practice of all the magazines of putting up a fact only for the purpose of knocking it down. To follow an attributed statement with a clearly identifiable comment is legitimate journalism. To follow nearly every attributed statement from one source with consistently pejorative comment is another

matter. Moreover, in the magazines the selected factual statements from British and French spokesmen are not simply followed by a comment but are almost always derided by a mere assertion unsupported by evidence to justify the derision. The argument here is that the frequency and uniform hostility of this practice in the magazines moves it over the border from journalism into propaganda.

(a) "Eden pleaded that faced with Israel's sudden action the British and French had to act swiftly. In fact the British had known of Israel's intentions earlier with France doing most of the dirty work in linking the three nations in conspiracy."

[Time]

(b) "An Anglo-French communique announced: 'The civil facilities of Port Said are being quickly normalised'. Two days later there was still no electricity, no water and no police." [News-week]

(c) This, from United States News and World Report, follows an account of "French plotting" with Israel: "In London all you get is a denial that Britain conspired with the French and Israelis to go to war - or at least to attack Egypt in a 'reprisal raid' of unusual size. There is no official evidence of such collusion available in London and Paris. But the Paris Government has seldom made any move in the Middle East without consulting Britain or at least informing Britain."

(d) "They might be willing to accept a United Nations police force in the canal zone if everyone else agreed, but their

conditions were in fact a refusal." [Time]

(The conditions were not reported.)

A close relative of the Aunt Sally device appears in Time - JUXTAPOSITION, false or sinister: Two true facts put together to seem related can change their meaning.

(a) "At week's end Eden's Government was propounding a new line: Britain had intervened to foil a Russian plot to take over the Middle East....Eden's Foreign Office had apparently not had the political word. The Foreign Office told inquiring reporters that stories of massive Russian moves came from Russian propaganda."

(Fact): Foreign Office statement referred to Russian military moves during the crisis. That denial had no bearing on the alleged plot, which was about previous arms moves.)

(b) "While diplomats attended London conferences and took appeals to the United Nations, the British and French forces gathered on Cyprus."

SUPPOSITION AS FACT

(a) Eden advised Mollet: "We've practically won. Nasser cannot last long now, anyway."

Time supposes Eden advised Mollet this. It has no evidence to present it as a fact in quotes.

(b) Time also reports a secret Cabinet meeting with "quotes" from Eden: "Only a matter of a few hours", he argued, "separated

them from full control of the Suez canal and perhaps the downfall of Egypt's Nasser."

(c) Occasionally Time half concedes it has not the facts. It introduces the useful word "apparently".

"That afternoon Dulles summoned British and French diplomats to get their co-operation in calling an early emergency meeting of the Security Council. They stalled. Apparently, they had orders to delay until the ultimatum could be delivered next day."

Then after the ultimatum had been delivered:

"Apparently everything had been all arranged, long before."

(d) "Each of the nations involved had many scores to settle with Egypt's young dictator. Together, they decided that these scores could not be settled by indecisive talks." [United States News and World Report]

"For months the French secretly have been urging Israel to attack Nasser's Egypt." [United States News and World Report]

(e) "Suez was no improvised action. Plans were begun last August, when the Israelis confided to France that the Arabs had succeeded in choking them economically." [Newsweek]

There then follows an account of how Britain, France and Israel planned to attack Egypt - all stated as hard fact without any qualifications.

"But Britain dragged its feet on joining in direct action

until October 1 when Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden and Foreign Secretary Lloyd talked with Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in Paris. The precise date for the Israeli attack was determined by the Hungarian revolt - not by the United States election. On October 27 Israeli staff officers held a lengthy meeting with their French counterparts in Paris. The scheme was named Operation Hamilcar."

In a later edition, November 19, Newsweek gives more supposition as hard fact which contradicts the earlier fact, apparently unnoticed:

"This is the untold story behind Prime Minister Eden's cease fire ultimatum to Israel and Egypt. The French had just warned London that unless the British were prepared to go ahead with the reoccupation of the Suez canal, the French would move into the Sinai Peninsula and occupy the canal zone themselves as fully fledged allies of the Israelis. It was to avert French naval and air control of the canal that the British agreed to the joint police action."

However, Newsweek is less ready than Time to state supposition as fact. It has occasional qualifications in its reporting, and thus occasionally and inconsistently admits the possibility of doubt in its report of British, French and Israeli collusion.

Moreover, Newsweek occasionally reports statements without deriding them: "Again and again through five consecutive days the Prime Minister hammered home his key point: Armed intervention was the only way to stop warfare spreading through the whole area."

SIMPLE COLOUR

This is the use of emotive words and phrases which are inclined to prejudice the reader against the subject. This is one technique which was also used against the Egyptian President Nasser.

(Underlining throughout is the author's)

(a) "President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles considered the undercover British, French, Israeli collaboration in the Middle East almost a personal betrayal..."

(b) "With Egyptian President Nasser now completely Moscow's tool, the West must move fast for a permanent Middle East settlement if it is to block further Soviet inroads." [Newsweek]

(c) "A shocked murmur ran through the Council chamber. Suavely British delegate Sir Pierson Dixon rose to announce that he trusted that 'the great majority of my colleagues will agree that the action taken is in....the interest of security and peace'." [Time]

(d) "When he (Eden) had finished, the House was chill with silence." [Time]

(In fact this is also an error - see p. 209)

(e) "As the questions tumbled out Anthony Eden lounged at the Front Bench. Occasionally he swung to his feet to give a curt, evasive answer." [Time]

(f) Time referred to the "palpably hypocritical versions of history Eden has disingenuously tried to foist on the world."

(g) "Well mannered and well indoctrinated young British embassy

spear carriers were ever ready to convince their United States opposite numbers that they had really invaded Egypt to stop the Russians." [Time]

(h) A picture of callousness is suggested: "In the first flash of conflict casualties were considerable among British, French and Egyptians. Back in Cyprus beaming well-starched invasion chief, Sir Charles Keightley....." [Time]

(j) "The Eisenhower Administration has little use for Egypt's dictatorial President, Gamel Abdul Nasser. He is regarded as a wild eyed, ambitious nationalist who aims at leadership over the entire Arab world - and the American feeling is that the world would be better off without Nasser in his present position." [United States News and World Report]

(k) "United States intelligence officials were fooled by America's own allies." [United States News]

(l) "Eden is determined to preserve the British Empire as a major power in the world." [United States News]

TWO FURTHER TECHNIQUES

False Precis

United States News and World Report used the words "in effect" to summarise an allegation into a fact.

"In effect the ultimatum was an announcement that Britain and France intended to occupy Suez by force."
and another "in effect":

"Eden and Ben Gurion, former enemies, are now, in effect,

new allies."

SIMPLE AMBIGUITY

"Israel, France and Great Britain joined in an attack on Egypt."

[Time]

This suggests the collusion theme.

Also: "The French-British-Israeli invasion of Egypt." [Time]

This suggests the invasion was concerted.

A P P E N D I X I I

Mechanics of the Method

Preparing the Check List

The statement in the chapter on Method that "a list was prepared of the main facts for each day" invites the question, Who picks the important facts of the crisis for the check list? How are they picked? Indeed, what are the important facts?

The mechanics were this. First the basic facts available for reporting were culled from the New York Times factual reports. These were checked against the London Times, and corroborated by Hansard, the Journal of Parliament. These facts for each day of the crisis were then allocated to the categories previously described.* The advance reading of the material had suggested these were the main possibilities of categorisation.

Of course, in the selection of facts for the check list there can be no mechanical substitute for judgment - but the selection is fairly rigorously governed by the objects of the study. The important facts (i.e. attributed statements) are those with a direct bearing, favourable or otherwise, on the official British-French case for intervention. This means official British and French state-

* p. 40 above.

ments of objectives or defences of their policy; other public statements supporting the British and French; and statements which are critical but which are directly relevant to judging the British-French case.

The compiler has to make this basic judgment of the statements which would affect a reader's judgment of the British-French intervention. Statements closely impinging on this judgment were analysed into a series of points, each point having a separate entry on the check. Since coverage of British policy was the main question fairly full entries were made on the check list when British spokesmen defined British policy.

It was necessary to do this to do justice to the richness and complexity of the material and the wide possible range of newspaper performance. For instance, merely to have a one-line entry on the check list for Eden's ultimatum would have enabled a newspaper to score full marks by simply reporting in one sentence that Eden had issued an ultimatum. An adequate report of course would mean reporting what the terms of the ultimatum actually were and how Eden justified them. Since it was conceived likely (and proved so) that some newspapers would report some bits of the ultimatum statement and not others, and not all newspapers would report the same bits, it was necessary to divide the statement into this series of key points. On the other hand, there was no need to do this when the fact for the check list, though relevant, was not so important to

the purpose of the study. When Mr. Nehru criticised the intervention a one-line entry on the check list was sufficient for recording that Mr. Nehru was against the Suez intervention. Similarly, support for the intervention from Mr. Menzies of Australia was recorded in a one-line entry on the check list.

It might be helpful to give an actual example of the preparation of the check list. Here is the text of the statement by Eden in the Commons in the afternoon of October 30, 1956; and below is the way this statement was recorded on the check list.

As the House will know for some time past the tension on the frontiers of Israel has been increasing. The growing military strength of Egypt has given rise to renewed apprehension, which the statements and actions of the Egyptian Government have further aggravated. The establishment of a joint military command between Egypt, Jordan and Syria, the renewed raids by guerillas, culminating in the incursion of Egyptian commandos on Sunday night had all produced a very dangerous situation.

Five days ago news was received that the Israel Government were taking certain measures of mobilization. Her Majesty's Government at once instructed H.M. Ambassador at Tel Aviv to make enquiries of the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs and to urge restraint.

Meanwhile, President Eisenhower called for an immediate tripartite discussion between representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the United States. A meeting was held on October 28 in Washington and a second meeting took place on October 29.

While these discussions were proceeding, news was received last night that Israel forces had crossed the frontier and had penetrated deep into Egyptian territory. Later, further reports were received indicating that paratroops had been dropped. It appeared that the Israel spearhead was not far from the banks of the Suez Canal. From recent reports it also appears that air forces are in action in the neighborhood of the canal.

During the last few weeks Her Majesty's Government have thought it their duty, having regard to their obligations under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, to give assurances both public and private of their intention to honor these obligations. H.M. Ambassador in Tel Aviv late last night received an assurance that Israel would not attack Jordan.

My Right Honorable and Learned Friend the Foreign Secretary discussed the situation with the U.S. Ambassador early this morning. The French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have come over to London at short notice at the invitation of Her Majesty's Government to deliberate with us on these events.

I must tell the House that very grave issues are at stake, and unless hostilities can quickly be stopped, free passage through the canal will be jeopardized. Moreover, any fighting on the banks of the canal would endanger the ships actually on passage. The number of crews and passengers involved totals many hundreds, and the value of the ships which are likely to be on passage is about £50 million, excluding the value of the cargoes. Her Majesty's Government and the French Government have accordingly agreed that everything possible should be done to bring hostilities to an end as soon as possible. Their representatives in New York have therefore been instructed to join the U.S. representative in seeking an immediate meeting of the Security Council. This began at 4.00 p.m. [G.M.T.]

In the meantime, as a result of the consultations held in London today, the United Kingdom and French Governments have now addressed urgent communications to the Governments of Egypt and Israel. In these we have called upon both sides to stop all warlike action by land, sea and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the canal. Further, in order to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the canal by the ships of all nations we have asked the Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily - I repeat temporarily - into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. The Governments of Egypt and Israel have been asked to answer this communication within 12 hours. It has been made clear to them that, if at the expiration of that time one or both have not undertaken to comply with these requirements, British and French forces will intervene in whatever strength may be necessary to secure compliance.

I will continue to keep the House informed of the situation.

Check List for Statements, October 30, available morning newspapers of October 31:

OBJECTIVES

- a) Eden in Commons: Free passage in danger of being jeopardised
- b) Eden: Any fighting at canal would endanger ships and crews
(ships on passage that day worth £50 million excluding cargo)
- c) Eden: Aim of Britain and France: To end hostilities
- d) Eden: Ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to stop fighting and
withdraw 10 miles from either side of canal
- e) Eden: Aim: To separate the belligerents and guarantee free
passage
- f) Eden: Have asked Egypt to let Anglo-French forces move
temporarily into key positions
- g) Eden: Egypt and Israel given 12 hours to agree; otherwise
British and French forces intervene.

COUNTER CONSPIRACY

- a) Eden, Commons: Our ambassador urged restraint on Israel after
news of Israeli mobilisation
- b) Eden: Tripartite talks held in Washington, October 28, 29.
- c) Eden: British had warned Israel of Anglo-Jordan treaty and
received assurance Israel would not attack Jordan, October 29
- d) Eden: Foreign Secretary "discussed situation" early on
October 30 with United States envoy.

FAVOURABLE BRITAIN/FRANCE

- a) Eden: Egypt has been militarily provocative
- b) Eden: Israel invasion spearhead and air action not far from canal
- c) Eden: Britain and France's United Nations representatives had now joined with United States representative to get immediate meeting of Security Council

There are 14 points here, 14 entries on the check list. A newspaper which reported this speech in full would score all 14 points. However, a newspaper which selected all these 14 points without necessarily reporting the statement verbatim would score just as well.

The statements categorised under Objectives fall very neatly there. The statements categorised under Counter Conspiracy were placed there because they are all statements about actions before Israel's invasion that are inconsistent with the conspiracy theory that Britain, France and Israel had planned together in secret to attack Egypt and kept things secret from the United States. They could alternatively of course have been classed in the general category "Favourable to Britain, France and Israel", as could all the statements of objectives. The purpose, however, was to classify statements separately where at all feasible to help in the analysis.

The Eden statement of October 30 provided a particularly detailed set of points for the check list, since it was perhaps the most important statement of the crisis. At the other extreme would be

the day-to-day Israeli-Egypt military actions which were not all entered on the check list unless an item had relevance to the British-French ultimatum. For instance the Israeli communique that the troops had penetrated to within 10 miles of the canal was entered because it was relevant to Eden's argument that fighting might take place along the canal. But an Egyptian communique issued on October 31 claiming that its planes attacked 20 vehicles loaded with Israeli soldiers was not entered on the grounds that it was politically a neutral statement, not meaningful for the whole crisis or relevant to a judgment of British/French policy.

It will be evident that, given the basic messages of the crisis, there is room for limiting or extending the check list. The compiler of the check list must be guided by the purpose of the study. Within that outer limit it is possible to adopt either a liberal or a rigorous approach to what should be included in the list. The objection to a rigorous, highly selective approach is that a newspaper might score a good many fairly relevant facts excluded from the list by the rigorous compiler. The check list compiled liberally on the other hand invites the danger of irrelevances being included on the list; and it certainly increases the work.

A liberal standard was adopted for this study. If there was doubt about including a message or point it was included. It should be remembered of course that this is "liberal" within the scope of this study. The hypothetically complete check list, drawn up without

a frame of reference, would be the verbatim text of every message of the crisis. In this study there is first the strict frame of reference, and secondly the limitation that the basic fact list was culled from the New York Times, as corroborated.

The adoption of a liberal standard for this study meant that it was only very occasionally that a newspaper was found to carry a relevant statement which was not on the existing check list. Almost entirely these were speeches in the United States, local to the paper under examination. Since this study is an exhaustive account of everything within every news item, it was necessary to cope with this situation. Two categories were added to the check list:

Other favourable facts

Other unfavourable facts.

Thus, when the San Francisco News reported the view of a San Francisco rabbi, there was a credit mark in the Other favourable facts category. This was footnoted, and an entry of the content was made in a notebook for reference when the use of space was being assessed.

Working to this pattern, an extensive check list was drawn up for each day of the crisis: 20 check lists. No arbitrary limit was set to the number of facts for the daily check list. On a day like November 1 when many long and important statements were being made, there were 131 entries on the check list. On November 17, only 64 entries were made. In other words, when there was a comparatively

low flow of messages there were comparatively fewer entries. Each fact list was dated for the convenience of marking morning newspapers, i.e. the facts of October 30 were entered on the list dated October 31 (the day they were reported in the basic source paper, the New York Times).

An evening newspaper's score tended to be split between two check lists because frequently evening newspapers reported events and speeches the same day they occurred.

Each fact was entered only once. New statements were given new entries even if they touched old ground.

Scoring: For one fact on a check list it was possible to score only once. It was irrelevant whether one inch or two inches were taken to report the fact, so long as the fact was covered.

The test for a credit tick on the check list was not literal accuracy. A missing comma, or word, or phrase, did not lose a newspaper the point, provided the sense remained the same as in the original text. In marginal cases, the newspaper was given the benefit of the doubt. (In the study for the Royal Commission on the Press, the check list was marked "1" for a complete coverage of the check list item and " $\frac{1}{2}$ " for incomplete coverage. The check list entries for this Suez study were rather more refined to a single point of fact so that the chances of incomplete coverage were reduced, and it was possible to simplify the marking.)

The possibilities of differences of judgment in (a) the selection of facts for the check list and (b) the categorisation of those facts has already been discussed (p. 268 above). Two workers independently

agreed on the categorisation of one day's selected facts in a trial run, though the possibilities of different categorisation at the margin remains. In addition, two independent workers marked the same two issues of a newspaper against the fact list with identical results.

However, allowance must none the less be made for human error, in marking scores of issues of newspapers of considerable page-size. When the preliminary check list score was complete, therefore, 100 facts marked as omitted from various newspapers and magazines were checked by an independent reader going back through every newspaper and magazine. It was found that six facts marked as omitted were actually included (on a liberal assessment) but had not been credited by the author.

These six credits were added to the scores of the publications concerned, but it is perhaps a fair precaution to assume that a mechanical error of similar magnitude may be present in the remaining list of facts marked as omitted.

No attempt was made to assess differences in different editions on any one day of the same newspaper. Different editions of the same newspaper might marginally improve or marginally weaken the newspaper's score recorded in the study.

To attain some rough consistency between newspapers, the idea put forward in "Slanted News"* was adopted, that newspapers would be judged by the edition chosen to preserve for the permanent record in library files.

* Bibliography p.284, No. 17.

Where relevant, the timing of international messages has been discussed in the individual studies. See also the time scale on p.23 above.

NON-FACT LIST

Checking the fact list was relatively simple and automatic, though laborious. Checking the theme list was more difficult. Every sentence had to be scrutinised to see what themes, if any, were being given expression, even by a word, and whether colour words or phrases were used. Colour or theme words might be found interpolated in the middle of a specifically attributable statement previously marked on the fact list. For instance:

"Eden in the face of angry Labour demands refused obstinately to declare at once the reaction of the government to the assembly ruling."

Here is an anti-Eden theme in the use of the colour word "obstinately".

The responsibility for defining the non-factual themes is the author's. These themes became evident after a close reading of the material. When these judgments had been made, the analysis was conducted under controls that made it systematic and objective in comparison with the conventional review of communication content.

However, there remains room for error. When the marking of the theme list was complete, the author repeated one check, at a later

period, to gain some idea of the consistency of the method. The non-factual content of five days of a newspaper was therefore recorded again five months after the first recording so that memory was no guide.

The difference between the two checks was:

- (i) The total unit count for the period on the second count was 137. On the first it was 133. Six more units were ascribed on the second count and two omitted in the later check had been included in the earlier check.
- (ii) A less noteworthy difference was that 7 of the 137 units on the second count had been ascribed to slightly different themes on the earlier count. But the difference was marginal; they were still in the same broad category, and of the seven differently ascribed, five were due re-allocating one unit from the theme: Disagreement in United States such that alliance itself in danger" to the less rigorous theme: "Disagreement in the United States strong, indeed."

A Refinement of Thematic Counting

A study of the theme list will show that it was made quite sensitive to record the varying degrees of emphasis. However, a further refinement was introduced to deal with the themes on the allegation of British-French-Israeli collusion. Here a theme of collusion might be stated as if it was

- (a) an incontrovertible fact, or
- (b) a probability, or
- (c) a possibility.

If a theme was stated as undoubted fact, it was marked in black in the appropriate column for the newspaper under study. If it was stated as a probability, the mark was in red; and green for a possibility. This did more justice to the material and helped the author in reading thematic list marking.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Initial reading was on the role of mass media in forming opinions and particularly in forming ideas about foreign countries and their policies. Having come to the conclusion that newspapers play a significant, if indeterminate, role, considerable reading was then done to discover the best method for analysing newspaper and magazine content. Reasons are given in Chapter 4 why the most generally favoured method (thematic content analysis) was rejected for this study, and an original method devised.

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THE SUEZ CRISIS:

A study in press performance

by Harold Evans

WORK SHEETS

Seven work sheets are included to illustrate the method and present the most important final figures of the study.

Master Sheet 1 and 2

These assemble the results of the daily check lists in the most important categories. For each day, each paper, and each category, there is a possible score of facts - and the result the individual newspaper achieved. These scores are totalled at the end and set alongside are the total number of non-factual units in that category for that newspaper. This enables the newspaper's daily and total reporting of the facts to be compared at a glance with the space given to non-factual material in the news columns.

November 2nd Check List

These three sheets are the factual check list prepared and marked for November 2nd. There were similar check lists for the twenty days of the study. The facts are set out on the left and the newspapers which reported them are credited with a tick. (See Chapter 4 and Appendix II)

Theme List

These two sheets are the theme list prepared and marked for the third period of the study, November 8th and beyond. The themes generally prevalent throughout the crisis are on the left. The figures in the columns represent the occasions the newspapers conveyed this theme, without attribution, in the news columns (i.e. non-factually). (See Chapter 4 and Appendix II)

MASTER SHEET 1

Total scores for each paper in the major categories, compared with possible scores and total of non-factual units.

OCTOBER		NOVEMBER					NOVEMBER										POSSIBLE TOTAL SCORE (FATS)	SCORE OF NON-FACTUAL UNITS	NOTES			
30	31	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th			
NIL	13	16	11	4	13	4	6	9	9	2	6	NIL	3	5	7	2	2	NIL	5	117		
1	5																			ACTUAL SCORE		
1	5	3	2	1	9	/	1	2	2	/	/	/	/	/	3	1	/	/	/	29	8	+1 ... The small footnotes figure refers to other facts reported but not on the check lists - local speeches, etc. See page 275 of the study, Appendix II.
1	8	2	2	/	9	/	2	2	2	/	4	/	/	/	4	/	/	/	2	37	5	
	3	/	/	/	3	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3	/	/	/	/	10	4	
	4	/	2	1	8	/	1	/	2	/	/	/	/	/	3	/	/	/	2	23	14	
	4	/	3	1	9	/	2	2	1	/	/	/	/	/	3	/	/	/	2	27	10	
	3	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	5	3	
	6	1	/	/	7	/	1	/	1	/	/	/	/	1	1	/	/	/	3	21	5	
	10	2	4	1	8	/	3	2	1	/	/	/	/	1	4	/	/	/	4	40	14	
	5	3	/	/	3	/	/	/	2	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	1	/	/	15	0	
	1	/	2	/	4	/	1	1	1	/	/	/	/	/	2	1	1	/	/	14	4	
	8	2	2	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	4	/	/	/	/	17	8	
NIL	3	4	5	NIL	3	6	7	5	2	3	3	2	NIL	5	2	1	1	NIL	1	POSSIBLE 72		
	/	/	/	/	/	/	2	1	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	5	33	
	1	/	/	/	/	/	2	/	1	/	/	/	2	/	/	/	/	/	1	7	12	
	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	1	3	24	
	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	2	43	
	/	2	/	/	/	/	2	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	6	31	
	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	15	
	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	2	30	
	2	/	/	/	1	1	1	/	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	1	7	17	
	/	/	1	/	/	1	2	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	5	32	
	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	0	10	
	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	42		
NIL	4	9	13	7	5	2	3	NIL	2	1	3	NIL	NIL	2	2	NIL	NIL	2	1	56		
1	2	5	1	/	1	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	11	28	
	2	5	/	/	/	/	1	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	10	8	
	1	3	2	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	8	25	
	1	3	1	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	7	55	
	1	5	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	1	/	/	9	21	
	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	0	4	
	1	2	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	4	22	
	2	4	5	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	1	14	41	
	/	1	1	1	1	1	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	5	29	
	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	0	37	
	/	3	4	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	7	45	

Quincy Herald Whig			5	4	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	3							1	24	9	
Chic go Tribune			2	5	1	2	1		1	2										14	2	
Time magazine			1			2			3	1	1									8	7	
Newsweek			1	1																2	NIL	
U.S. News & World Report																						
10 MILITARY ACTION INHUMANE	Possible:	NIL	NIL	4	8	6	6	5	4	4	3	1	1	8	NIL	NIL	2	NIL	NIL	1	3	56
San Francisco Chronicle			2	1	4		1	2	1	2			1							2	16	25
San Francisco Examiner			2	2	1	5		1		2			6							3	22	35
San Francisco News			2	1				1												1	5	18
Denver Post			1	2	2								4			1					10	22
Philadelp ia Inquirer	NIL		1	4	2	1	2	2	1	1			1							3	18	3
Wall street Journal			2	1						1											4	NIL
Quincy Herald Whig			1	3	1					1			3			1					10	3
Chicago Tribune			3	2	2	2	4	2	1	2			3							2	23	25
Time magazine													NIL								0	29
Newsweek													1								1	28
U.S. News and World Report				2																	2	NIL
11. CANAL:BLOCKAGE:BRITAIN TO BLAME	Possible:	NIL	NIL	NIL	4	1	NIL	2	NIL	NIL	1	NIL	NIL	NIL	1	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	1	NIL	10
San Francisco Chronicle				1	1																2	7
San Francisco Examiner				2	1		1													1	5	1
San Francisco News				2	1															1	4	NIL
Denver Post				1	1																2	7
Philadelphia Inquirer				1	1		1													1	4	5
Wall street Journal				1																	1	2
Quincy Herald Whig				2			1													1	4	1
Chicago Tribune				3	1		2														6	3
Time magazine							1														1	2
Newsweek				1										NIL							1	NIL
U.S. News & World Report				1										NIL							1	NIL
12. CANAL BLOCKAGE: EGYPT TO BLAME	Possible:	NIL	NIL	NIL	2	4	3	1	2	1	2	NIL	3	2	3	1	4	3	1	2	NIL	34
San Francisco Chronicle				1	1	1			1				1		1					2	8	2
San Francisco Examiner				1	2	1	1							2						1	8	1
San Francisco News					1	1			1	2				1						2	8	1
Denver Post													1			1					2	4
Philadelphia Inquirer				2	1			1					1				1			1	7	5
Wall street Journal				2																	2	1
Quincy Herald Whig					1	1	1		1							1				2	7	5
Chicago Tribune				2	2		1						2	2							9	20
Time magazine						1			1	1			1	2	1	1					8	3
Newsweek				1	2			1	1	2			1	2		2	1				13	3
U.S. News and World Report				1	1																2	NIL
203h 21h 22h 23h 24h 25h 26h 27h 28h 29h 30h 31h 32h 33h 34h 35h 36h 37h 38h 39h 40h																						
OCTOBER NOVEMBER																						

Cont. d) Eden, Commons: B.F. would welcome UN take over after E-I separated		✓	✓ ²	✓✓ ²	✓	✓	✓	✓		
e) Eden, Commons: Would welcome participation other nations in settlement	✓	✓			✓					
f) Foreign Office spokesman: Suggestions concerning mil. action with I. false					✓					
g) Foreign Office spokesman: Mil. aims B. and F. entirely distinct from Israel's		✓			✓					
5. FAVOURABLE TO BRITAIN, FRANCE (or ISRAEL)										
(F) Eden, Commons: Do not intend to stay one moment longer than necessary	✓	✓			✓					
a) War Minister, Commons: Original offer to Egypt remains open at any time										
b) UN, British delegate: US motion would leave Mid-East in dangerous pre-crisis situation	✓	✓				✓				
c) UN, "": Situation nearly out of control - what use a Security Council injunction?										
d) UN, Britain: Suggested conference to solve Middle-East problems										
e) UN, Britain: Willing hand over physical tasks of keeping peace to U.N.										
f) UN, Britain: U.S. would have fought in Korea in 1950 even if blocked by veto						✓				
g) UN, Britain: Soviet veto would have prevented UN from agreement - hence police action								✓		
h) UN, Britain: This is not aggression, but purely temporary police action	✓	✓		✓						✓ ¹¹
i) Eden, Commons: Not at war with Egypt - "state of armed conflict". Compare Korea				✓ ⁴		✓		✓		
j) Eden: Complied with Hague convention of 1907 by ultimatum before attack										
k) Eden: World should remember fate of Britons in Cairo massacre at time of Abadan										
l) Eden: Britain vetoed UN censure of Israel because unjustified. Egypt provocative.										
m) Eden: Colonialism? Charge fails in light of Suez-Sudan evacuations										
n) Eden: UN not equal to legal system - B. and F. had the forces available	✓					✓				✓ ²⁴
o) Eden: Need for economic aid for Middle East										
p) Britain: Government won majorities 69, 68, 67 for policy; 82:30 in Lords	✓ ¹⁴	✓		✓ ⁵	✓ ¹	✓	✓		✓	✓
q) R.A. Butler, Commons: Once US fully understands motives, will take more benignant view										
r) Menzies, Australia: Nasser has been hostile to Israel's existence										
s) Menzies: U.S. should try and understand the pressures on Britain and France									✓ ¹	
t) Menzies: UN failed secure Suez passage for Israeli ships: show UN can be useless										
u) New Zealand Premier: Situation "disturbing" but full confidence in B's intentions									✓ ¹	✓
v) Nehru: Recalled liberal gestures of Britain in past (which made sorrow more now)										
w) Eisenhower: Despite differences, alliance would grow to new and greater strength	✓ ⁷	✓				✓	✓	✓ ⁶	✓	
x) UN, Israeli delegate: Aggression for 8 years - against Israel by Egypt	✓									
y) UN, Israel: Would not do to go back to outdated crumbling armistice	✓									
(z) Lord Chancellor: Disagreed with US at moment but keen on co-operation										
A) Dulles: UN Assembly can only recommend action		✓							✓	
B) Eden: In our responsibility and with full information, intervention "only action"										
C) Foreign Office: Denied that before fighting any progress on Suez canal dispute										
D) British delegate, UN: US acted before UN taking in Korea and always called it police action									✓	
E) British delegate: Procedure to recall Assembly improperly invoked				✓					✓	
6. UNFAVOURABLE TO BRITAIN, FRANCE, ISRAEL										
a) Nehru sent sympathy message to Nasser:										
b) Nehru: Letter to Eisenhower: B. and F. actions worse than Israel's										✓ ¹⁷
c) Nehru: B. gone back to predatory methods. Clear and naked aggression									✓	✓ ²³
d) Capetown (Reuter, AP): All newspapers, English & Afrikaans, critical of Britain										✓ ¹⁷
e) Syria Government announced support of Egypt						✓			✓	
f) Moscow: Need for new Bandung conference to discuss British aggression	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
g) Commons, Britain: Opposition censure motion said intervention affronted UN, US alliance, Commonwealth and many British people.....	✓	✓	✓	✓ ¹	✓			✓ ²	✓	

6. UNFAVOURABLE TO BRITAIN, FRANCE, ISRAEL (Continued)

	SAN FRANCISCO Chronicle	SAN FRANCISCO Examiner	SAN FRANCISCO News	DENVER Post	PHILADELPHIA Inquirer	WALL STREET Journal	QUINCY Whig	CHICAGO Tribune	TIME	NEWSWEEK	US NEWS & World Report
h) Bevan, Commons: No semblance legal justification: For God's sake, get out.							✓ 5/4		✓		
i) Bevan: Argument of lynchers to say because UN weak we take law into our own hands											
j) Bevan: Intervention has stained Britain's reputation					✓				✓ 18	✓ 13	✓
k) Australian Opposition in Parliament: B. F. violating United Nations											
l) Australian Opposition: Will oppose any Australian aid in Suez fighting											
m) Egypt breaks off diplomatic relations with Britain - London & Nasser announcement	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓			
n) Adlai Stevenson, U.S.: Would not condone use of force even by our friends	✓			✓				✓			✓
o) Eisenhower: Cannot condone armed aggression no matter who the attacker or victim	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ 3	✓		✓
p) Archbishop of Canterbury: Christian opinion uneasy. Should ask Israel withdraw	✓ 5								✓ 2 1/2		
q) National Council of Labour said British people shocked by intervention	✓ 6			✓ 6			✓	✓		✓	
r) Liberal Party: Intervention wrong even if succeeds: Blow to UN & Commonwealth											
s) Jordan announces cutting relations with France	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
t) Jordan announces: Relations with Britain 'being considered'	✓	✓									
u) Jordan: Use of bases barred by Govt. for attacks against Arabs	✓	✓			✓		✓			✓	
v) UN decided that crisis should be discussed in Assembly: 62-2,7 abstentions			✓		✓						
w) Egypt in UN: 1888 Convention gives Egypt alone right to defend the canal								✓			
x) Egypt, UN: If Britain wants peace, why veto mere cease fire resolution?											
y) Egypt, UN: Temporary action? Britain said 1882 occupation was temporary				✓				✓			
z) Egypt, UN: Public opinion in UK far from approves Eden policy											
A) US, in UN: Policy appraised in highest quarters but despite ties with Britain, France and Israel U.S. could not accept the use of force	✓	✓			✓						
B) US, in UN: US motion proposes cease fire for all parties; Israeli withdrawal; prohibition on military goods; end of raids; free navigation of Suez canal	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓			✓ 4
C) Dulles: "violent" armed attack by BFI "grave error" inconsistent with UN principle	✓	✓						✓			
D) Dulles (UN): Provocations serious but force not justified	✓	✓			✓			✓			
E) Nasser, Cairo: Israel accepted cease fire - it left her, the aggressor, within ten miles of the canal											✓
F) France: Pro-regime newspaper questioned the policy of intervention (Reuter, AP):										✓	
G) Labour Opposition in Britain angry - Speaker suspends Commons sitting	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓ 4	✓	✓		✓
H) Senator George, U.S.: Britain & F. virtually withdrawn from NATO: "mean"			✓ 8 1/2	✓			✓				✓
I) Canada, Premier: No decision yet whether to support Britain and France											
J) Shepilov for Russia: War should end first, then troops withdrawn. Britain & France "gangsterism".	✓				✓						
K) Dulles: Unless stop what started in Mid-east might spread - other nations using as a pretext	✓	✓						✓			
L) Dulles: Before fighting progress British-French-Egypt agreement on Suez canal											
M) Ceylon, Premier: Britain & France no justification. Ceylon bases barred								✓ 2		✓ 17	✓ 12
N) Pakistan, Premier: Depreciated use of force in solving differences								✓			
Other hostile attributed statements or events:	✓ 4 1/6	✓ 6 1/7	✓ 7			✓ 3	✓ 1	✓ 9 1/5 1/7			✓ 14

7. APPROVAL U.S. POLICY

- a) Menzies, Australian Premier: Profound respect for Eisenhower and Dulles' attempts to keep the peace in Suez crisis

7. APPROVAL U.S. POLICY

a) Menzies, Australian Premier: Profound respect for Eisenhower and Dulles' attempts to keep the peace in Suez crisis

b) Eisenhower: Despite strident voices of those seeking to turn world events to political profit, proud of his stand in middle east

c) Dewey: Situation shows need of Eisenhower "foremost leader in world for peace and justice"

d) Nixon: Eisenhower's stand on Suez represents U.S. at its best: No double standard

e) Eisenhower (Philadelphia): "U.S. policy receiving proud, spirited, bipartisan support in the crisis."

f) Nixon: Shocking of Adlai Stevenson to criticise US policy without being constructive

g) Yugoslav envoy, Brileg: U.S. prestige will soar..action "unforgettable" for peace

7. CRITICISM U.S. POLICY

a) Kefauver (Rhode Island): Eisenhower policy to blame for split with B & F.

b) Adlai Stevenson: Crisis direct outcome of Eisenhower policy provoking and appeasing Egypt. Policy at a dead end.

c) Stevenson: Should have helped Israel with arms and territorial guarantees, and put in UN force.

d) Stevenson: Blunders climax finds U.S. with Russia and a dictator, against the democracies of Britain, France and Israel

e) Stevenson: U.S. built up Nasser and pressured Britain to leave Suez base

f) Stevenson: Dulles behind Baghdad pact which caused trouble & offended Nasser

g) Stevenson: When at last became clear Nasser was enemy of peace, Dulles withdrew aid for Aswan Dam

h): Kefauver: Admin. had contributed directly to rise of Nasser

i) Admin. allowed Russia to gain foothold in middle east & divide US from allies

j) Kefauver: Administration thought oil more important than middle east people

k) Canada in UN: US motion inadequate to achieve purpose - needed UN peace force

l) Lord Astor: U.S. ambassador in Cairo anti-British

m) Evans, MP. Britain: U.S. oil rivalry is reason for not getting fair play from US

n) Governor Harriman, New York: "lack of confidence" shown in U.S. by allies

o) Adlai Stevenson (new speech): Mistake after mistake in U.S. policy

p) Stevenson: Have given Soviet 2 victories in Mideast, broken Western alliance

q) 4 : No we going back to pre-crisis situation when every threatened strangulation of all life in Israel

8. MILITARY ACTION HUMANE

a) British communique: Military airfields bombed

b) British com unique: Much care taken to avoid civilian casualties in bombing

c) British communique: Delayed action bombs used to help personnel escape

d) C in C, Cyprus: Aim to achieve only military objectives with minimum of casualties, to save life and property, both civilian and military

CANAL BLOCKAGE: EGYPT CULPABLE

a) British & French communique: Denied Egyptian claim that had attempted to block canal

b) B. and British com unique: Egyptian ship being towed into sinking posit on half way down the canal was sunk by B. planes clear of channel

3 cont

OTHER MILITARY

a) C in C (for BF): "capable of dealing great blows... hope Egypt will agree to temporary intervention control to save lives

b) Egyptian statement: B&F raided Egyptian troops crossing canal at several points, esp El Firdan

c) Admiralty: Egyptian frigate sunk in gulf carrying mines - 67 picked up as survivors

GENERAL

a) Spaak in Moscow: Crisis showed need to solve Suez permanently

b) Egypt: Proclamation ordered take over of BF property

OTHER FAVOURABLE
OTHER UNFAVOURABLE
(see above in "categories")

✓ means fact appeared in newspaper issue of preceding day (usually evening newspaper)

✓² Small letter is footnote

cross reference to notebook where details of some entries kept - i.e. to preserve the original passage or qualify the credit mark in some way relevant for writing up the figures.

Nov 8th and beyond (after cease fire)

	SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE	SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER	SAN FRANCISCO NEWS	DENVER POST	PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER	WALL ST JOURNAL	QUINCY HERALD WHIG	CHICAGO TRIBUNE	TIME MAGAZINE	NEWSWEEK	U.S.-NE WORLD REPORT
NON-FACTUAL THEME LIST (V)											
Nov 8H and beyond (after cease fire)											
1. OBJECTIVES (Accepting official British view)					1 ³						1"
a) Taking of Port Said, Suez, Ismailia, to protect waterway while fighting				1				/			
b) Separating combatants and ending the Egypt-Israeli war											
c) Protect British nationals and property											
d) To stop the fighting from spreading further in the Middle East	3 ¹³					1					
e) Prepare way for durable peace equally between Arabs and Israel			1 ⁵	7 ^{2.}				5 ^b		1.1	1
f) Uncover, forestall Russian plot to take over Middle East											
g) To save West's position in Middle East											
h) "occupy the Suez canal zone"											
2. OBJECTIVES (Hostile assertions)											
a) To prevent Nasser uniting Arabs			1.					2		1.1	
b) Weaken or destroy Nasser as enemy of Britain and France	2.		1.	2.1.1.1.1. ²⁵	1 ²	2.1.1	1 ^{2.1}				15.1"
d) Reoccupy Canal Zone by force and impose international Canal settlement	29.2.2.13	19.2 ¹⁸	16.	1	1.2 ^s .	1.1.1?	2.1 ⁷			1	1
d) Denationalise the canal once occupied and make it Anglo-French		1 ¹⁰		1 ²⁵	1.	4	2	1			
e) Restore British colonial rule over Egypt											
f) Re-establish an Egyptian government dependent on Britain and France									1 ⁷		
g) Preserve Israel as an independent state											1!"
h) Preserve Iraq, Jordan, as independent vis-a-vis Egypt											1
i) Restore Britain's position as a big power, independent of U.S.											1
j) Impose peace at expense of Arabs											1
k) Preserve British-French own interests, unspecified (oil/prestige, etc.)	1.							1 ² .1.			1
l) "Seize the Suez canal"	1	1.			1	1	1	1.3			1
m) "temporary" occupation of Canal, i.e. repeat of official statement of objective but using quotes on temporary as sign of doubt}				114.1.1			1 ¹ .1				
3. CONSPIRACY CHARGES											
a) U.S. was/is being deliberately deceived by B.& France	2 ² .1 ⁷			1 ²⁰		1.1 ⁵	1 ⁶		15.3 ⁵		
b) U.S. Deliberately deceived by Britain, France & Israel jointly											
d) Britain/France planned the assault with I.as pretext for action							1	4 ^o		12	
d) Britain & France knew of and encouraged I.assault as pretext			1.1 ¹⁸				1.				
e) BF hknw of the impending Israeli attack& were ready to act		1 ¹⁰						1 ^d			1 ²
f). BF hoped for Israeli attack and planned in anticipation											
g) France planned the assault, bur Britain knew nothing of this											
h) France knew of and encouraged Israeli assault,but B. did not											
i) France knew of I.plan and was ready with assault plan for Britain											
j) Suggestions that Britain,France,Israeli were allies		1.	1 ⁵	1.		1 ⁵		1.1.1.1.2.3.1 ¹	1.1	1' 2.1	1.2
k) Britain and France welcomed the Israeli invasion											
l) Britain and France deliberately defied the U.S.	2.			1.							
m) Plain/statement that B/F did not consult or inform the U.S.	2.	1.		1.1.1.1.1				1.1.2.1			1.
4. ALLIANCE (Anglo-U.S.)											
a) Disagreement confined to crisis, alliance will stay & U.S.	1.2.2		1.1	8.	8 ² .1.1.1	1.1		3 ² .1			

1) Britain and France deliberately defied the U.S.

m) Plain statement that B/F did not consult or inform the U.S.

NON-FACTUAL THEME LIST (T) CONT.

4. ALLIANCE (Anglo-U.S.)

a) Disagreement confined to crisis, alliance will stay & U.S.

Administration wishes it to stay

b) France keen to see alliance preserved

c) Britain keen to see alliance preserved

d) Disagreement such that alliance in doubt in U.S.

e) " g " in doubt in France, Britain

f) Disagreement such that alliance is wrecked in U.S. eyes

g) " " alliance wrecked (for good) in BF eyes

h) Plain statement: Disagreement anger extreme in U.S.

I) Disgreement was violent but subsiding

j) U.S. not really very angry at any time

5. WHY DID BRITAIN & FRANCE ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE? UNFAVOURABLE THEMES.

a) Because B. had said it would do when E/I accepted cease fire

b) Because objectives achieved, combatants separated

d) NOT because of Russian threat of rocket attack on England

d) NOT because of pressure at home or from U.S.

e) NOT because of threat of Russian volunteers

6. WHY STOPPED:UNFAVOURABLE REASONS (i.e. not given by Britain/France)

a) Because of U.S. pressure

b) Because of UN pressure, in whole or part

c) Commonwealth pressure

d) Domestic pressure in Britain and France

e) Because BF suffered military setback from Egyptian forces

f) Frightened by Russian rocket threat in whole or part

g) Frightened by Russian volunteer thr t, chance of World war

h) British economy could not stand the cost any longer

7. JUDGMENTS ON INTERVENTION: FAVOURABLE

a) IS a genuine police action

b) Canal is in danger from Egyptian/Israeli fighting.

c) Could lead to peace in Middle East now

d) Russian has been plotting in the Middle East

e) Anti-Nasser themes (i.e. Nasser a "dictator", etc)

f) Did not risk a major war

g) Britain and France genuinely impartial


1) More people support Eden than oppose. Also Mollet

j) vEgypt friendly with Russia & other themes hostile to Egypt

N-FACTUAL THEME LIST (2)

Nov. 8TH and beyond, continued

	SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE	SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER	SAN FRANCISCO NEWS	DENVER POST	PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER	WALL ST. JOURNAL	QUINCY HERALD WHIG	CHICAGO TRIBUNE	NEW YORK TIMES	NEW YORK NEWSWEEK	US NEWS & WORLD REPORT
7. JUDGMENTS (FAVOURABLE)											
k) Britain a reliable strong ally still			1.								
l) Intervention has not ruined Commonwealth											
m) U.S. policy failures forced Britain/France to go-it-alone											
n) US came to see intervention for common good											
o) Support for Britain from other countries suggested (i.e. no attribution)		4 ¹²		1 ⁷ 3	1.						
p) Egypt not co-operating with the United Nations	1.3.2.3.1	1.1.1	1.1.1.1	1.	1.2.2.1		3	1.2.1.2.2.3	1.1		
q) Britain co-operating with the UN and the UN Expeditionary Force	1.4 ¹³	1.	1.	1.			1.	1.			
r) " " " " UN Expeditionary Force	1.1.1.1	1.	1.	1.1.2.1.1.1	1.1	1.	1.1	2.1.1.			4
s) Evidence of Egyptian provocations of Britain/France	2.	2.8 ¹³	1	1.1 ¹⁸ 1	1		1.	1.1			13.2
t) Russian return to Hungary was due to Hungarian causes, not Suez		1.11		1.2 ²	1 ⁷			2.3 ¹ 1	1 ¹⁰		23 1 ¹⁰ 1 ⁰
u) Intervention did expose Russian penetration of Middle East											
v) Intervention did stop war from spreading & separated combatants		8 ³		1.2 ³			7 ³				
w) Did weaken Nasser as a dangerous force in Middle East				1							
x) Did bring a settlement of the Canal dispute nearer											
y) Laid groundwork for permanent Middle East peace				8.2 ⁴							
2) US. shared help Britain since became an ally											
8. UNFAVOURABLE JUDGMENTS <i>Israel provocations caused trouble</i>											
A) Intervention failed (unspecified)	1.			7 ¹⁰ 1.4.2	3.4	1 ⁷	3.1.1 ⁷	4.8 ¹ 3	1 ³	1.1.1.2 ¹²	1.1
b) Is aggression, war (i.e. not police action)	1.		1.1.1	1.1	1.7			1.2	1		
c) Is to blame for Russia being freed from world censure over Hungary				1.		1.		1.	1	2.	
d) Is to blame for Russian suppression of the revolt in Hungary	5.2 ⁹		4 ²								
e) Britain not co-operating with the United Nations	1.1 ¹⁶ 2.1 ³	1.2	1.3	1.1.1	1.2	1.1 ⁶		1.5	1.8.1.1	1	
f) Has shown Britain to be weak, 2nd class power who cannot be trusted	8.1 ¹⁷				1.1 ³	9.4			1.9 1 ¹⁰		2.9 1.1 ¹³
g) Has made Nasser stronger & disadvantage Middle East stability				2.1.1	2.	2.	1.1.1	2.		2.	1.2 ¹¹
h) Has helped Russian in the Middle East		1.1		3.2.2.1.1.1 ¹	3.6	2.	2.	9.1.	1.2	1.1	1.1.2 ¹¹
i) Anti-Eden themes				1.1 ¹³ 1 ²³				4		1.7	
j) Pro-Nasser or pro Egypt themes		4.3 ¹⁷		1.1 ⁸			1.	2.	2.	1 ¹³	
k) Britain and France lost prestige in the world & among Arabs	1.1.2 ¹⁶	2.16.3		1.1.1.1.1	5.2		1.1	2	1.6	1	1.1 ¹¹ 1.1
l) "Arms plot by Russia" was an excuse devised later	1.1 ⁴			2.6 ¹⁹ 1	1.1 ²		1		1.4		
m) Intervention hurt the British Commonwealth				1.1		1.5	1.				1.
n) US not keen to associate with B/F yet which makes them weaker		1.9 ⁵		3.		1.		2.		1.	1 ¹¹
o) World condemned intervention	2.1		1.	1.	1		1	1.		1.	
p) Needlessly risked world war		1.		1.6.1						4.	
q) Helped isolationists in U.S. and enemies of UN	3 ⁷						1.				
r) U.S. rescue theme (i.e. US had to "bail out" Britain and France)	2.3 ⁷			1.1 ⁵ 1.2 ⁶	2.6 ¹ 1.1 ¹⁰		1.2	3.3 ¹ 1.14	1.4 ¹⁷	1.1.1.2 ¹ 1.1 ³	
s) British public opinion against intervention	2.		2.			12.					
t) Intervention not impartial vis a vis Egypt	1.1		2.1	1.1.1	1.	1.	1	1.1.3.2.1.8.1	1.		
u) Simple themes that intervention hurt NATO and the Western alliance				1.1					1.1 ¹⁰		
v) Hurt the United Nations											
w) To blame for the blockage of the canal & postponement of settlement				1.1.1	2.		1.7		1.		2.2 ¹¹
x) Peace in Middle East put in peril											2 ¹¹
y) Strained British economy				5.2 ⁴ 1.3	4.4.5.2.6.3	12.	3	1.7.1	1.1	3.2 ¹² 1.4	2.1.1.8.1



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