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YEMENI RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC AUTHORITIES - (9-233/630-847)

A POLITICAL HISTORY

By

[c]Abd al-Muhsen Medej Muhammad al-Medej

B.A. University of Kuwait

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts in the University of Durham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Society
Durham.

August, 1983

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a political study of the Yemen and its relations with the central Islamic authorities from 9/630 to 233/847. The present study consists of eleven chapters divided into three parts.

The first part of this thesis consists of three chapters (i.e. I, II, III), and deals with the political situation of the Yemen before the migration of the Yemeni tribes into the conquered provinces, i.e. 9-12/630-34. This part also examines Yemeni-Muslim relations. Chapter I describes briefly the political situation of the region before Islam and the beginnings of Yemeni-Muslim relations. The political situation of the Yemen in the last phase of the Prophet's life, i.e. the movement of ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb, and its relations with Medina is covered in Chapter II. The following chapter is devoted to the political situation of the region during the early period of Abū Bakr's reign, i.e. the War of Apostasy, and the Medinan attitude towards it.

The second part is concerned with Yemeni-Muslim relations during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs, 11-40/632-661, and consists five chapters,(IV, V, VI, VII, VIII). The first chapter of this part, i.e. Ch. IV, deals with the migration of the Yemeni tribes to the battle fronts and their participation in the early Islamic conquests. The settlement of these tribes in the conquered provinces is examined in Chapter V. The following Chapter, VI, is devoted to the political situation in the Yemen, after the

migration of some of its tribes, during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs. The role of the Yemeni migrants in the uprising against ᶜUthmān and the first Civil War is discussed in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII treats the political situation of the Yemen at the time of the first Civil War.

The third part of this thesis consists of three Chapters (IX, X, XI) and is devoted to the political situation of the Yemen during the Umayyad and ᶜAbbāsid Caliphate (41-233/661-847). The policy of the Caliphs toward this region and the local uprisings against the Islamic authorities throughout this period are also discussed in this part. The first Chapter of this part, i.e. IX, examines the political situation in the Yemen during the Umayyad Caliphate, 41-132/661-750. The political situation in the region during the early ᶜAbbāsid Caliphs is covered in Chapter X. Chapter XI is devoted to the political situation of the Yemen from the Caliphate of al-Amīn to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's reign 193-233/809-847.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of many people in the course of preparing this work. I am indebted most of all to Dr. G. Rex Smith, my supervisor, for his help and guidance which he generously gave me throughout my research period. His constructive suggestions and sustained interest in the subject had the greatest influence in presenting this study. It is true to say that, without his guidance and support this thesis could not have been carried out.

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor J.R. Harris, Head of the Oriental School, for his continuous encouragement and kind treatment during my research period. Thanks go to Mrs. J. Butterworth, the Islamic assistant Librarian, and the library staff of the School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham, for their courtesy and efficiency in supplying the means for my researches.

I must also take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Aḥmad al-Zaylaᶜī and Dr. Ḥusayn al-ᶜAmrī, my friends and colleagues, for interesting discussions and helpful suggestions in my work. Dr. R.T.O. Wilson kindly answered my geographical queries and Mr. Nicholas Lowick generously supplied me with a list of Yemeni coins issues in the British Museum. I am glad to have this opportunity of thanking them.

Especial thanks to those who are nearest and dearest. My thanks go to my parents for all the sacrifices they made to see me having a good life. My wife Munīrah has given me her constant encouragement and support. She and my three children have endured much throughout the period of gestation of this thesis and all deserve my sincere and affectionate gratitude.

In the Kuwait I received help from many people. My grateful thanks to Professor Shākir Muṣṭafā, ex Head of the History Department, Kuwait University, and Dr. Muḥammad ᶜĪsā Ṣaliḥiyyah for their constant encouragement and help. My thanks also go to Kuwait University for financing this study.

I acknowledge the skilful efforts of Mrs. M. Bell who typed this thesis. Finally, my grateful thanks are paid to my friends and relatives.

PREFACE

At the same time as the Muslims were taking control in the Ḥijāz, the Yemen was undergoing political unrest as a result of tribal struggles in some of its regions. This situation reflected on Yemeni-Islamic relations at that time. Thus the Muslims interfered indirectly in the affairs of these tribes during the last phase of the Prophet's life, and directly in the early period of his successor. By the end of the first year of Abū Bakr's reign, Muslim authority was established in some of the Yemeni regions. The following year Yemeni tribes began their migrations to the conquered provinces, participating in the fighting and settling in these new regions, even forming the majority in some of them.

Two main results have been noticed after the migrations of the Yemeni tribes : first, the considerable participation of these tribes in both the early conquests and the internal events of the Islamic state during the late period of the Orthodox Caliphs; second the effect of these migrations on the political situation in the Yemen throughout the first two centuries of Hijrah, especially during the first/seventh i.e. which were distinguished by a political lull.

The Yemen, its relations with the Islamic authority and its political history, is the scope of the present work. The period chosen for research is 9/630 to 233/847, i.e. from the official correspondences between the Prophet and the Yemeni chiefs, concerning the adoption of Islam, until the first year of al-Mutawakkil's Caliphate.

The purpose of this study is tripartite : first, to show the state of Yemeni relations with the Islamic authority before the migration of the Yemeni tribes to the conquered areas, i.e. between 9/630 to 12/634; the second to illustrate these relations during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-641); the third to cover the political history of the Yemen and the caliphal policy toward it throughout the Umayyad and the ʿAbbāsid caliphates (41-233/661-747).

The importance of this study lies in the fact that it is the first essay so far as I am aware, to deal with the political history of the Yemen and its relations with the Islamic state from 9/630 to 233/747.

For the present study our sources are annals, local histories, geographies, literature and the numismatic evidence. Each part of this thesis is dependent on different sources. For the first and most of the second part the bulk of our information has come down to us from the non-local sources. For the third part, however, the local Yemeni sources are in the majority.

In addition to the fact that most of the local sources are late in respect of the period of the present study, each historian repeating the information provided by his predecessor. Since there is no alternative to quoting these sources, great care has been exercised in building up our research from them.

Relevant books and articles by contemporary authors have also been consulted, reviewed and are referred to in the notes.

In the early years of this period we can see the first step relations of the Yemeni tribes with the Islamic government. Their correspondences, delegations and their attitude towards Islamic authority in the region will be discussed in detail. The period of the Orthodox Caliphs (i.e. 11-40/632-61) is that in which the considerable participation of the Yemeni tribes in the early conquests can be placed. This was followed by their settlement in the conquered provinces and the effect of the Yemeni migrants in the major internal crisis during the last phase of ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān's caliphate and the period of his successor (i.e. the uprising against the former and the Civil War) can then be seen. The effect of the Yemeni migrations on the political situation of their homeland and the escalation of the local resistance to the caliphal regime also can be seen in this work.

The years between 9/630 to 233/847 have been divided into three periods; 9-11/630-2; 11-40/632-61; 41-233/661-847. Each period has been covered by a part of this study. In the case of certain themes, some overlap from one chapter to the next, though in the same part this has been unavoidable. The transliteration adopted in the present study is that of Arabian Studies.

P A R T O N E

CHAPTER I

The Yemen before Islam

A. An Introductory Study

a. The ancient history

The origins and early movements of southern Arabs still constitute a matter of scholarly inquiry and speculation, with little light thrown on the subject by the ancient authors.(1) A detailed study of the early history of the Yemen is beyond the scope of the present work; our aim is to present a brief illustration of the political history and the religion of the area before the advent of Islam.

i. The political history

"From the imposing ruins of several cities, from thousands of inscriptions written in a peculiar alphabet and in the so-called South Arabic language, and from a few passages of Greek and Roman historians and geographers, we know that South Arabia was organized under four main kingdoms - of Sabaeans, Minaeans, Hadramautians and Qatabanians - and some other minor states." (2) However, each state had its own principal dialects.(3)

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(1) Playfair, Arabian Felix, 3; Stookey, Yemen, 10.

(2) Della Vida, "Pre-Islamic", 30. See also Winnett, "The place", 3f; Zaydān, al-ʿArab, 132.

(3) Cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 6-8.

"The supposition formerly held that these two states [Ma^{c}īn and Sabā] succeeded one another chronologically has given way, under rigorous analysis of the available evidence, to the recognition that they existed side by side for several hundred years, and that Ma^{c}īn's historical period was entirely included in that of Sabā ." (4)

The kingdom of Ma^{c}īn was established in the region of al-Jawf. In addition to the capital, Qarnāw, other urban centres, such as Barāqish and Nashq were also built. (5)

The Kingdom of Sabā however was the most important state of the Yemen, its early kings were contemporaneous with the last rulers of Ma^{c}īn. (6) Before the Christian era, the Sabaeans became heirs to the kingdom of their earlier kinsmen and duly established themselves as masters of South Arabia and, as such, were rulers during the most brilliant era of its history. Thus the Sabaean domination extended over several local states, such as Ḥaḍramawt, Awsān, Qatabān and Ma^{c}īn. (7)

Up to about the beginning of the Christian era, the rulers of Sabā bore either the title of mlk/sb "King of

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(4) Winnett, 3f; Stookey.11; See also Ḥittī, History, 53; Della Vida, 31; Little, South Arabia, 2.

(5) Ḥitti, History, 54; Zaydān, al-^{c}Arab, 130; Little, 2. The sites of Qarnāw and Barāqish are a little way north of the Ma$^{\flat}$rib region, cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 7.

(6) Ḥittī, History, 54; Zaydan, al-^{c}Arab, 138, the former gives 950-115 B.C. and the latter suggests 850-115 B.C. for the early period of the Sabaean era. However, the earliest state of South Arabia is still a vexed question, and no final solution has yet been reached. Cf. Beeston, A Descriptive, 2.

(7) Cf. Ḥittī, 54f; Beeston, "Pre-Islamic Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\flat}$ ", 36.

Sabā ", or mkrb/sb 'priest - ruler of Sabā '. (8) In the latter half of the 4th century B.C. the transition between the two Sabaean periods, i.e. mukʾarrib - Kings, took place. It was with the reign of Karibʾil Watar who called himself mukʾarrib in an inaugural speech, but later on referred to himself as king. (9)

In the early centuries A.D., the Sabaean Kingdom depended for its strength on a military caste, something like a professional army, drawn from two rival tribes, namely Ḥimyar and Hamdān. The tribes of the latter were fully incorporated into the political structure, while Ḥimyar occupied the crucially strategic southwest corner of the Peninsula. (10)

During the first three centuries A.D., the south Arabian Monarch adopted a new title "King of Sabā and Dhū Raydān". Between A.D. 280-300, Shammar Yuharʿish appeared as sole monarch, adding the titles of "Ḥaḍramawt and Yamanat" to the earlier ones. Thus, the political unification of all of southern Arabia under one ruler was achieved. (11) From the death of Shammar Yuharʿish until the early sixth century A.D. nine of the Sabaean "Ḥimyari" Kings are known to us from inscriptions; traditionally they are known as tubbaʿ

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(8) Beeston, "Problems", 42; Zaydan, 138f; Ḥittī, 54.

(9) Beeston, "Problems", 42; Stookey, 14.

(10) Little, South Arabia, 4; Beeston, "Pre-Islamic Sanʿā ", 36, 38; Stookey, 15.

(11) Cf. Beeston, "Problems", 41; Ḥittī, History, 60.

(plural - tabābi^{c}ah). (12) By the end of the first quarter of the sixth century A.D., the era of the tabābi^{c}ah, the late Sabaean era, came to an end as a result of the Abyssinian invasion. According to al-Ṭabarī, Dhū Nuwās, the last Ḥimyarī (i.e. Sabaean) tubba^{c} spurring on his steed ,"plunged it into the waves of the sea and was never seen again." (13)

Following the invasion, the Yemen remained under Abyssinian rule for some fifty years (525-75 A.D.) with Ṣan^{c}a$^{-ɔ}$ as the occupiers' headquarters. (14) During the occupation several independent, anti-Abyssinian movements led by various Ḥimyarī chiefs took place, but none with any success.(15) This situation lasted until the unsuccessful campaign of Abrahah, the Abyssinian ruler of the Yemen, against Mecca in A.D. 570-1. (16) By that time, the national movement to free the Yemen from the Abyssinian domination had found its hero. This was Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, a Ḥimyarī chief, who travelled to the Sasanid court in al-Madā$^{-ɔ}$in where he appealed to Chosroes I, the Persian Emperor, for help against the Abyssinians. Sayf's request was accepted and in A.D. 575 the Persian Emperior furnished him with the support of eight hundred men under the command of Wahriz.(17)

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(12) Hittī, History, 60.
For the meaning of the tabābi^{c}ah, see Ibn Manẓūr, lisān, VIII, 31.

(13) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 927 f. See also Ḥittī, History, 62;Zaydān, al-^{c}Arab, 124, 148f; Little, 5; Stookey, 21f.

(14) Anon, Tārīkh, f7b-8a;

(15) Al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 149.

(16) Known as ^{c}ām al-fīl. See al-Ṭabarī, I, 936-45.

(17) Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, I, 162; al-Ṭabarī, I, 946-8; al-Mas^{c}ūdī, Muruj, III, 162-4; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghanī, XVII, 308-10; al-Himyarī, Mulūk, 149-51.

With this force, plus those Yemeni fighters who joined him, Sayf was able to defeat the Abyssinians and kill their leader Masrūq. However, the Ḥimyarī kingdom was not restored and the administration of the country was divided between Ḥimyar and the Persians. (18) After the murder of Sayf, by his Abyssinian slaves, the Persian Emperior despatched an army to secure his rule there. (19) The Persians were able to gain a foothold in the Yemen and subsequently scattered themselves throughout the country, although they remained strongly concentrated in Ṣanʿā and Aden. (20) Other provinces remained in practice under the control of their own local tribes, although Persian rule made its presence felt quite considerably throughout the whole country. The Yemen remained under this regime until the Islamic state was established in Medina and its power extended to other Arabian regions, the Yemen included.

ii. The rise of monotheism

Apart from paganism, the ancient Yemen adhered essentially to a planetary astral system in which the cult of the sun and moon gods prevailed. The large tribal entities coterminous with political units were united in their devotion to one or more deities, most commonly a supreme god related to either the moon or the sun.

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(18) Al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 36b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f32b.

(19) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 957f; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, III,175f. Cf. also al-ʿAsalī, 363; al-Ḥadīthī, 84.

(20) See Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 266, who says that the Abnāʾ controlled the commerce of Aden and Ṣanʿāʾ and levied ʿUshr.

Frequently these tribal entites considered themselves associated with the planet Venus. Other tribal groups also worshipped local gods, often of an animistic or ancestral nature. (21)

It was in such a religious environment that monotheism gained a foothold in the Yemen. Both Judaism and Christianity flourished in the pre-Islamic Yemen, spreading extensively throughout the country during the second Ḥimyarī era (about 300-525).

Following the conquest of Palestine and the destruction of Jerusalem by the Emperor Titus in A.D.70 many Jews fled to Arabia, where they established settlements in the north - the Ḥijāz. It is most likely that some of them migrated southwards, to the Yemen, and stayed there. (22)

In the Yemen, however, Judaism had formed neither tribal groupings nor settled communities, nor even formed settlements of the type that existed in the Ḥijāz. (23) By the early part of the sixth century A.D., Judaism featured strongly in the Yemen as a result of the conversion to it of the Ḥimyarī king Yūsuf As^{c}ar, generally known as Dhū Nuwās, who subsequently declared his new faith the official religion of the state. (24)

Up to the third century A.D., Christianity in the

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(21) Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, I, 162; Hitti, History, 60; Ba Faqih, Tārīkh, 211-7; Stookey, 11.

(22) Ḥittī, History, 61; Stookey, 11.

(23) Trimingham, Christianity, 289.

(24) Ḥittī, History, 61f; Della Vida, 44; Trimingham, 289.

Yemen had been veiled in obscurity, with actual evangelistic work only beginning in the middle of the following century. However, it was during the reign of Constantius II, the Byzantine Emperor,(A.D. 337-61) that the Yemen received the first official Christian mission. This was sent by the Emperor himself under the leadership of Theophilus, nicknamed "the Indian". (25) Theophilus met the Ḥimyarī king, Tha'rān and his son Malkī-karib, at their capital, Ẓafār. The king subsequently adopted Christianity and Theophilus founded a church in the city and planned others in the region. (26) In this way, Christianity gained a foothold in Ḥimyar territory, gradually spreading throughout the Yemeni regions. The religion was most strongly established in Najrān. (27)

In the early part of the sixth century A.D. rivalry between the two newly introduced monotheistic religions - i.e. Judaism and Christianity - led the country to an armed struggle. In A.D. 515 the leadership of the Ḥimyarī Kingdom fell to Dhū Nuwās, who had already adopted Judaism. (28) The new king led the movement against the Abyssinians, who were occupying the Yemen at that time. The movement also took on an anti-Christian flavour, leading

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(25) Ḥittī, History, 61; Stookey, 19; Trimingham, 291.

(26) Ḥittī, History, 61; Stookey, 19f;Trimingham, 292.

(27) See Ḥittī, History, 61; Trimingham, 294 ff.Cf. also 30 below.

(28) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, I, 161; Zaydān, al-ᶜArab, 148; Ḥittī, History, 61f; Stookey, 21; Trimingham, 297f.

to several attacks against the Christians, culminating in the famous massacre of the Christians at Najrān in A.D. 523. (29)

The survivors of the Najrān incident spread the news of the massacre far and wide. Eventually it reached the ears of the Byzantine Emperor, who at that time was regarded as the protector of all Christians. The emperor immediately wrote to the King of Axum urging him to fight Dhū Nuwās. (30) The Axumite army, led by a certain Aryāṭ, duly crossed the straits of Bāb al-Mandab in A.D. 525 overthrew and killed Dhū Nuwās and installed military governors in his place. (31) Garrisons were left by them in the Yemen to protect the Christian communities, and Sumayfa^{c} Ashwa^{c}, a Ḥimyarī chief, was installed as king. Years later, however, the Yemenis, led by the Abyssinian general, Abrahah, staged a successful revolt against their king. (32) In A.D.530 Abrahah became king and consolidated his influence as the sole master of the Yemen. At his capital Ṣan^{c}a$^{-ɔ}$, he built a church, al-Qalīs, (33) and in 570 or 571 he led his troops to the north, to Mecca, in

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(29) Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, I, 161; Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Tījān, 312; Ḥitti, History, 62; Zaydān, al-^{c}Arab, 148. For full information on this massacre, see Shahīd, Martyrs, passim; Trimingham, 295-9.

(30) See Ḥittī, History, 62; Stookey, 21f.

(31) Trimingham, 299.

(32) Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, I, 162; Zaydān, al-^{c}Arab, 150f.

(33) Al-Waysī, al-Yaman, 189; Hittī, History, 62; Zaydan, 151, Trimingham, 304. For a full discussion of al-Qalīs, see Serjeant & Lewcock. "The Church", 41-8.

order to destroy the Ka^{c}bah. However, the Abyssinian army was destroyed by smallpox, the "small pebbles" (sijjīl) cited the Quran . (34) The year of Abrahah's unsuccessful campaign came to be known as the Year of the Elephant (^{c}ām al-fīl); it was also the year in which the Prophet Muḥammad was born in Mecca. Approximately sixty years later 9/630-1 , the Yemeni tribes began to embrace Islam, and their country was more or less absorbed by the caliphal state.

b. The political geography of the Yemen on the eve of Islam

The first step a historian must take is to define his area of interest and describe it in geographical terms. In the following section, the political geography of the Yemen, i.e. its boundaries, main internal divisions, and the geographical distribution of local influential powers - on the eve of the advent of Islam in the area - will be covered.

i. The boundaries of the Yemen

The definition of boundaries of the Yemen on the eve of Islam is, compared to other areas of interest, a task of considerable difficulty. "The ancient Greek and Roman geographers were in the habit of dividing Arabia into three great provinces, Arabia Felix, Arabia Petrea, and Arabia Deserta : the first nearly corresponding to the modern Yemen, but including Mahra and Ḥaḍramawt." (35) The early Arab

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(34) Sūrat al-Fīl, 4. See also Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Tījān, 314; al-Ṭabarī, I, 936-45; al-Mas^{c}ūdī, Murūj, III, 158-62. Cf. also Ḥittī, History, 64; Trimingham, 304f.

(35) Cf. Playfair, Arabia Felix, 1. Cf. also Ḥittī, History, 44.

geographers, however, differ in their definitions of the boundaries of the Yemen; nevertheless, they agree upon a general definition of the country, with some differences in detail.

Al-Aṣma^{c}ī mentions that "its boundaries run from Oman across to Najrān. Then, [the boundary] follows the Arabian Sea as far as Aden and al-Shiḥr, and even extends beyond Oman and terminates at Baynūnah." (36) Al-Muqaddasī records that "al-Yaman was composed of two parts : the lowland, called Tihāmah, which extended as far as the sea and had Zabīd as its centre, plus other towns such as Ma^{c}qar, Kadrah, Mawr, al-Sharjah etc; and the highland, known as Najd, which he described as cold." (37) Al-Hamdānī writes that "the Yemen was bounded by the sea to the east, west and south. A line running between Oman and Yabrīn separated al-Yaman from al-Yamāmah. This line separated the Yemen and Kinānah from Tihāmah inland." (38) Yāqūt maintains that, "The boundaries of the Yemen lie beyond Tathlīth down to Ṣan^{c}a$^{\circ}$ and the areas parallel to it down to Ḥaḍramawat, al-Shiḥr and Oman as far as Aden Abyan, as well as the adjoining areas, including the lowlands and the highlands." (39)

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(36) In Yā ̄qūt, Mu^{c}jam, V, 447; Cf. also Khaḥḥālah, Jughrafiyat, 286f. This description is far from clear. Does al-Aṣma^{c}ī's "Arabian Sea" include the Red Sea? Is he suggesting that the Yemen encompasses Oman?

(37) Al-Muqaddasī ,Aḥsan al-Taqāsīm, 69f.

(38) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 51.

(39) Yāqūt, Mu^{c}jam, V, 447; see also Kaḥḥālah, Jughrafiyat, 287.

In fact it is a difficult task for the writer to demarcate the boundaries of the Yemen during that period for several reasons; firstly, the Yemen is part of the Arabian Peninsula, with no physical boundaries between it and other regions,(40) especially on the northern side; secondly, tribal movement around and across these boundaries and their intermingling with each other; thirdly the absence of a strong state in the Yemen at that time which could have imposed its control on the region and drawn up fixed boundaries. However, the meaning of the Yemen in the present study is the area which was bound on the north-east by the Empty Quarter, (al-Rub^{c} al-Khālī); on the north by the province (sing. mikhlāf) of Jurash, in ^{c}Asīr; on the west by the Red Sea; and on the south by the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.(41)

ii. The divisions of the Yemen

The Yemen was distinguished by the large number of its provinces, of which al-Ya^{c}qūbī (42) says that there were eighty-four in all, most of them named after the various Yemeni tribes that inhabited there. Generally speaking, however, the Yemen is separated into four main divisions as follows:

1. the highlands area (Najd al-Yaman), which extends from the province of Jurash in the north,(43) now ^{c}Asīr,

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(40) Al-Ḥadīthi, Ahl, 37.

(41) Cf. Map 1..

(42) Tārīkh, I, 162. Cf. also Khaḥḥālah, Jughrāfiyat, 292.

(43) For the province of Jurash, see al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 117-9. The town of Jurash is on the western bank of Wadī Bīshah, 15 kms south-east of Khamīs Mushayṭ, and 44 kms from Abhā, Cf. Ibn ^{c}Ayyāsh, "Madīnat Jurash al-Athariyyah", 243.

to the province of al-Maᶜāfir, now al-Ḥujarīyyah, in the south. This division contained many of the Yemeni provinces, most of them occupied by the influential tribes.

2. the coastal plain, known traditionally as Tihāmat al-Yaman. This area extends from Bāb al-Mandab in the south to ᶜAththar, 40 km north of Jāzān, in the north. It runs parallel to the Red Sea on the west and the mountainous area on the east. Two main provinces make up Tihāmah : ᶜAkk in the north and al-Ashāᶜir in the south.

3. Al-Jawf and the Maʾrib area. This extends from Najrān in the north to the boundary of Ḥaḍramawt, Mafāzat Ḥaḍramawt, in the south, and from the Empty Quarter in the east to the mountainous region in the west.

4. Ḥaḍramawt, which includes Mahrah and al-ᶜAbr makes up the fourth division. (44)

iii Distribution of local power

On the eve of Islam there existed no central government in the Yemen which could have spread its political influence over the whole of the country. At that time, the Yemen was distinguished by the existence of many powerful and influential tribal groups, each one dominating its own particular province (mikhlāf). Beside these, the Persian community had also emerged as an influential power in several Yemeni towns. What follows is a brief illustration of the distribution of local power throughout the country, with greater attention focused on the more influential groups.

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(44) For the divisions of the Yemen, see Map 1.

1. The Persians

The Persian community in the Yemen was made up of the descendants of the Persian troops sent by Chosroes I, the Persian Emperor, to the Yemen in A.D. 575 to assist Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, a Ḥimyarī chief, in his struggle against the Abyssinian occupation. (45) These people were traditionally known as the Abnā', "the Sons." (46)

Shortly before the spread of Islam in the Yemen, the Abnā' were scattered throughout the country, figuring strongly in Aden and Ṣanʿā', (47) the latter of which served as the centre for their rule in the country.

Enjoying no tribal solidarity as such, the Abnā' were known by their own family name. These families appeared as aristocratic groups in the Yemen, such as the Bādhān family, who were prominent landowners in Ṣanʿā' and Dhamār. (48) In Ṣanʿā' other families such as B.Sarduwayh, B. Mihruwayh, B. Zanjuwayh, B. Barduwayh, B. Janduwayh and B.Buzurj also enjoyed a certain importance. (49) The B. Khurrah were settled in Najrān, whilst the B. Layf appeared in Ṣanʿā' and Radāʿ. (50) The Abnā' also figured

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(45) Cf. 5 above.

(46) Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar,266; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 298; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XVII, 313; al-Samʿānī, Ansāb,I, 122.

(47) Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 266, says that the Abnā' dominated the commerce of both Aden and Ṣanʿā'.

(48) Bādhān was the Persian governor in Ṣanʿā', and he had properties in both Ṣanʿā' and Dhamār, cf. al-Rāzī, 89f, 133. See also al-Ḥadīthī, 85; Serjeant "Sanʿā' the Protected", 39.

(49) Al-Hamdānī, Jawharatayn, 145f.

(50) For B. Khurrah, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 530; for B.Layf, see Ṣifat, I, 234.

prominently in some of the Yemeni villages, especially in the Bawn.(51) In al-Raḍrāḍ the Abnāʾ were well known as investors in its silver mines. (52)

Apart from the Abnāʾ, several tribal groups dominated the Yemeni provinces, with four of them constituting the main influential tribal powers of the country. These were Ḥimyar, Hamdān, Madhḥij and Kindah.

2. Ḥimyar

It is an historical fact that out of all the Yemeni tribes it was Ḥimyar who enjoyed the most power in the Yemen on the eve of Islam. Their influence spread throughout most of the Yemeni provinces through both their own clans and their allies.(53) The tribe's main stronghold was its own territory, Iqlīm Ḥimyar, which extended from Ṣanʿāʾ in the north to Aden in the south, and from Shabwah in the east to the coastal plain in the west.(54) There, each of the Ḥimyarī tribes inhabited its own province, with their chiefs enjoying independent rule. (55)

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(51) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 111.

(52) Al-Hamdānī, Jawharatayn, 145.

(53) E.g. some of al-Kalāʿ joined the Yursam confederation and settled with them in Ṣaʿdah and al-ʿAwāsuj in Jurash; see al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 114, 117. See also al-Hadīthī, Ahl, 45.

(54) Cf. Map 2.

(55) Such as Dhū ʾl-Kalāʿ, Dhū Ruʿayn and Dhū Yazan, Cf. Map 2.

3. Hamdān

Muslim genealogists define the relationships of the Hamdānī tribes on a genealogical tree which shows Hamdān as the ancestor of these tribal confederations named after him.(56) Al-Hamdānī (57) defines the borders of Hamdān territory as extending from the lowland (al-ghāʾiṭ) of the east to Tihāmah in the west, and from Ṣanʿāʾ in the south to Ṣaʿdah in the north. Within this area, the Hamdānī tribes enjoyed much influence and power. These were composed of both nomad and semi-nomad groupings.(58) Certain elements of Hamdān were also to be found outside Hamdān territory, such as Dhū Murrān, who had settled in al-Maʿāfir alongside Ḥimyar,(59) and al-Maḥāyīl in Ḥaḍramawt. (60)

4. Madhḥij

Although the tribe was suffering from political weakness at that time, the confederation of Madhḥij appeared in al-Jawf area. The elements of this confederation were mainly of Madhḥij tribes and those Yemeni tribes who lived with them in al-Jawf such as al-Azd and Khawlān.(61) The Madhḥij tribes, however, dominated the eastern part of al-Jawf, the lowland country, which extends from Najrān

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(56) Wilson, "Al-Hamdānī ", 95f.

(57) Ṣifat, I, 109. See also Wilson, "Al-Hamdānī", 97.

(58) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 99. See also al-Ḥadīthī, 48, 67f.

(59) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 67, 190.

(60) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 85.

(61) Cf. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 37, who mentions some elements of these tribes in Madhḥij confederation.

in the north to the boundary of Ḥaḍramawt (Mafāzat Ḥaḍramawt) in the south. (62) In Najrān B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^{c}b, a tribe of Madhḥij, figured strongly.

5. Kindah

The tribe appeared as an influential power in Ḥaḍramawt, settling in the upper areas and in the western part of Wadi Ḥaḍramawt. (63) On the eve of Islam they were in political control of most of the Ḥaḍramī provinces, having challenged other tribal groups in the country. (64) Two main Kindah tribes shared this region, the most influential of which was B. Mu^{c}awiyah. (65)

c. The political situation on the eve of the advent of Islam

At that time the Yemen was in the throes of a political split. This split immediately followed the murder of Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, who had almost succeeded in unifying the country under his rule. Subsequently the Yemen was divided amongst the local chiefs, each one having established his political influence in his own province. This situation is described by one of the historians as

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(62) Cf. Maps 1, 2.

(63) Cf. Map 2.

(64) This challenge obviously appears during the meeting of their chiefs with the Prophet in Medina, see 88 below.

(65) The most influential Kindah chiefs were from this branch, such as al-Ash^{c}ath b. Qays and the Kings of B. Wali^{c}ah, al-Hamdāni, Ṣifat, I, 88f; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 425-9; Ibn Khaldūn, ^{c}Ibar, II, 536f. For their nasab, cf. table 3.

one of petty kings (mulūk al-ṭawā'if).(66) Following this political split amongst the local power, the Persian Emperor sent troops to the country in order to protect his authority there. Then they entered the Yemen, consolidating their authority in Ṣan^{c}ā'. (67)

Naturally the emergence of various leaderships in the area inevitably meant a power struggle between them. When the Prophet had founded his administration in Medina and had begun to spread his message, the power struggle amongst some of the Yemeni groups had reached its zenith. It is obvious, however, that the most important event in the Yemen at that time was the tribal struggle and the formation of alliances between various local powers. To illustrate this situation we will give a brief description of the area, mentioning the alliances formed at that time.

The most important tribal group emerged in Ḥimyar territory. In their own provinces, the Ḥimyarī chiefs kept their sovereignty with independent rule. These rulers usually had a title, which began with Dhū ("master of"), such as Dhū ^{ɔ}l-Kalā^{c}, Dhū Ru^{c}ayn and Dhū Yazan. (68) Others had the title qayl ("ruler"), such as Banū ^{c}Abd Kalāl.(69)

Several Himyarī groups succeeded in forming alliances amongst themselves, each group coming under the leadership of one of the Ḥimyarī chiefs. In the territory of al-Kalā^{c}, some Ḥimyarī buṭūn gathered under the leader-

(66) Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Kitāb al-Tījān, 317.

(67) Cf. al-Mas^{c}ūdī, Murūj, III, 176; Anon, Tārīkh, f7 b. Cf. also

(68) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, passim; Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān, XV, 457; al-Mubarrad, Kāmil, II, 373f.

(69) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 362-4; Ibn Manẓūr, XI, 580.

ship of al-Sumayfa^{c} b. Yu^{c}fir b. Nākūr who took the title of Dhū' l-Kalā^{c}. (70) In al-Ma^{c}āfir Banū ^{c}Abd Kalāl figured strongly as rulers (aqyāl) of this region. (71)

The relations between Ḥimyar and other local powers are vague in our sources, yet it is clear that these Ḥimyarī chiefs kept themselves aloof from the power struggle which was taking place amongst some local tribes at that time. Even Ḥimyarī-Persian (Abnā') relations are not clear in our sources. Such lack of information leads one to believe that each Ḥimyarī group was satisfied with its lot and, consequently, abstained from interfering in the affairs of others. Thus when the Abnā' were attacked by Madhḥij in 11/632, the Ḥimyarī chiefs adopted a neutral stance.(72)

Our sources mention two confederations which arose in the central highland area and al-Jawf : the first was represented by the Abnā' and Hamdān; the second consisted of several tribes in the Jawf and Najrān area, especially those of Madhḥij. The sources record that the reason behind the establishment of the Abnā'-Hamdān confederation was to oppose an internal movement by the Madhḥij and their allies against Persian rule in Ṣan^{c}ā'. (73) When the news of Madhḥij intentions reached the court of Bādhān, the Persian governor in Ṣan^{c}ā', he assembled his army and duly moved

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(70) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 265f.

(71) Al -Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 363f.

(72) Cf 59,81f below.

(73) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 37; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f36b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 32b.

northwards to meet his enemy. He went via Hamdān territory. There, the leaders of Hamdān met him and suggested establishing a confederation. Bādhān accepted the offer and both sides signed an agreement.(74)

If the Abnāʾ signed this agreement in order to benefit from the power of Hamdān in their opposition to the Madhḥij attack, our sources do not illustrate the reasons which led all Hamdān to involve themselves in such a confederation. There is no indication except for the fact that Hamdān might have intended to extend its influence over the area which was under the control of Madhḥij in the upper part of al-Jawf. Another reason may have been to demolish the confederation of Madhḥij and their allies which, without any doubt, was threatening its interests in the area. Therefore Hamdān exploited its alliance with the Abnāʾ by attacking Madhḥij in al-Razm in al-Jawf in 2/622; the latter were decisively defeated and some of their chiefs were killed.(75)

In the area of Najrān, the Christian power figured prominently. Najrān, therefore, was the central point of Christianity in south Arabia.(76) The Christians there were led by the three most important men of the community : the ʿĀqib; the Sayyid shared the civil governorship; and the bishop of Najrān. (77)

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(74) Ibid.

(75) Cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 108; Iklīl, II, 46lf; al-Bakrī, Muʿjam, II, 649. See also al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 210; Yāqūt, Muʿjam, III, 42; al-Waysī, al-Yaman, 169, who says it was on the same day as the battle of Badr, 17 Ramaḍān A.H.2.

(76) Cf. 8 above; 30 below.

(77) Watt, 127; Trimingham, 306.

Other Najrānī leaders were to be seen among the leaders of the Madhḥij alliance. These elements were namely the B. ᶜAbd al-Madān,, of B. al-Hārith b. Kaᶜb of Madhḥij. (78) In the battle of al-Razm four chiefs of B. ᶜAbd al-Madān were killed. (79)

On the eve of the advent of Islam in Ḥaḍramawt, the region was also in a state of political disturbance due to the tribal struggles. This political unrest, however, reflected on the security of the area. Ibn Ḥabīb (80) comments upon this by saying "No body can travel in the area unless he has the protection (khafārah), of its people, because it [Ḥaḍramawt] is not controlled by any one ruler."

Although some tribal groups had settled in Ḥaḍramawt, the real domination of the area lay with Kindah (and to a lesser degree with the tribe of Hadramawt), in particular B. Muᶜāwiyah whose foothold in the region went back to A.D. 570. (81) Thus, B. Muᶜāwiyah was prominent in the area, having waged war on the rest of the Ḥaḍramī tribes. Even their own kinsmen of B. Ashras were not on good terms with them. (82)

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(78) See al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 37, who records the name of al-Ḥuṣayn b. Qannān, Shihāb b. al-Ḥuṣayn and Yazid b. ᶜAbd al-Madān.

(79) Namely the four sons of Dhū al-Ghuṣṣah, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 461f; Ṣifat, I, 108; al-Bakrī, Muᶜjam, II,649.

(80) Al-Muḥabbar, 266f.

(81) Al-ᶜAsalī, "South Arabia", 234. Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 85. Kindah migrated from Ghamr Dhī Kindah to Ḥaḍramawt after Ibn al-Jawn, their king, had been killed in the battle of Shiᶜb Jabalah.

(82) Cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f30a, who mentions a battle which took place before Islam between al-Sakūn (of Ashras) and B. Muᶜāwiyah.

In Tihāmat al-Yaman and the northern plateau of the highlands, the situation was different from that of other regions. Neither influential leaders nor strong confederations had appeared in both areas. In Tihāmah the tribes of ᶜAkk and the Ashāᶜir represented the bulk of the population. (83) Khathᶜam, al-Azd and Bajīlah appeared to be the powerful tribes in the northern part of the highlands.(84)

It was in this atmosphere of political unrest that the Prophet sent letters and envoys to the Yemeni tribes calling them to adopt Islam.

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(83) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 53f; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 529. Cf. Map 2.

(84) Cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 118f; al-Bakrī, Muᶜjam, I, 58, 90. At that time Bajīlah was scattered amongst the Arab tribes as a result of their defeat in the Battle of al-Fijār. Cf. 119 below. But some of them were refugees with the Yemeni tribes, cf. al-Bakrī, I, 58-61.

B. The beginnings of Yemeni-Muslim relations

We have seen above how the Yemenis were divided politically, a fact which rendered the Yemen as a whole incapable of dealing with neighbouring powers. The Ḥijāz, on the other hand, enjoyed stability as a result of the spread of Islam and the unification of the main towns (i.e. Mecca, Medina and al-Ṭā'if) in the region. Consequently, the Prophet looked forward to spreading his message (da'wah) into the other parts of Arabia including the Yemen.

The real Prophetical call to the Yemeni tribes had not occurred before the year of the conquest of Mecca, i.e. 8/629. The sources at our disposal do not mention any letter or delegation sent by the Prophet to the Yemeni tribes before this year,(85) the only contact being with certain Yemeni groups or individuals who had frequently travelled to the Ḥijāz where the Prophet asked them to adopt Islam. The sources describe the Prophet meeting with al-Ṭufayl b. 'Amr al-Dawsī, a chief of Azd al-Sarāh, in Mecca, before the hijrah; the latter duly accepted Islam.(86) Al-Hamdānī (87) also records a promise of support made to the Prophet by Qays b. Namaṭ al-Hamdānī just a year before the hijrah. This early contact was, of course, on an individual basis and was not representative of the real

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(85) The only communication was that with Bādhān, the Persian governor in Ṣan'ā', but this communication is not a direct one since it was related to the Prophet's letter to the Persian Emperor; cf. Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 260; al-Mas'ūdī, Tanbīh, 259. For a full discussion of the adoption of Islam by the Persian community in Ṣan'ā', cf.61-3 below.

(86) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, I, 407-10; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Istī'āb, II, 757f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III,287- Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 54f.

(87) Iklīl, X, 220. See also Ibn Sa'd, I, 340f (has Namaṭ b. Qays). Al Nuwayrī, XVIII,8; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 225; Ibn Hajar,V,264, reads Qays b. Mālik.

Yemeni-Muslim contact at that time. The first full-scale contact came when fifty people from the Ashā^{c}ir, a Yemeni tribe in Tihāmah, led by Abū Mūsā al-Ash^{c}arī set sail from the Yemen and arrived in the Medina to meet the Prophet in 7/628-9.(88)

The Prophet communicated with the Yemeni tribes, starting with Ḥimyar. Detail of these communications is beyond the scope of the present study; (89) our main concern is the Prophet's method of corresponding with these leaders and his manner of dealing with them.

a. The correspondence between the Prophet and the Yemeni leaders

The Prophet's correspondence with the leaders of Ḥimyar and other influential Yemeni chiefs was similar to that he entered into with the rulers of the great empires of that time. In his letters the Prophet recognized the political titles and the sovereignty of the various rulers over their own lands. (90) He also chose his delegates from those who held high positions among their own tribes. They included : Jarīr b. ^{c}Abd Allāh al-Bajalī, who was sent to Dhū ^{ɔ}l-Kalā^{c} al-Ḥimyarī;(91) al-Aqra^{c} b. ^{c}Abd

(88) Ibn Sa^{c}d, Ṭabaqāt, I, 348f; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, III, 979; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 83.

(89) For these communications, cf. Ibn Sa^{c}d, 264ff; al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 64-6; See also Hamīdullāh, 160ff; al-Akwa^{c}, Wathā^{ɔ}iq, 83ff.

(90) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1718; Hamīdullāh, Wathā^{ɔ}iq, 145; al-Akwa^{c}, Wathā^{ɔ}iq, 105, 107.

(91) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 318; Ibn S^{c}ad, Ṭabaqāt, I, 265f; al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh. II.62; Ibn Ḥajar, II, 182. According to al-Wāqidī, in al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763, Jarīr adopted Islam in Medina in Ramaḍān 10/November-December, 631, and the Prophet duly sent him to destroy Dhū ^{ɔ}l-Khalasah, an idol in Tabālah. Cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, Aṣnām, 34-6; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 388; Ibn Sa^{c}d, VI, 22; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 279f; Ibn Ḥajar, I, 242. Jarīr took sides with the Muslim authority during the War of Apostasy and played a major role in the conquests, cf. Chapters III, IV, below.

Allāh, despatched to Dhū Murrān; (92) and al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah, sent to al-Ḥārith b. ᶜAbd Kalāl.(93)

The attitude of these leaders towards Islam is unclear, the data available being contradictory. There is, however, general agreement in the sources that the leaders of Ḥimyar sent Mālik b. Marārah al-Ruhāwī to the Prophet in 9/630-1.(94) But these sources do not confirm precisely the islamization of these leaders as a whole. Nevertheless, the Prophet's reply to these chiefs indicates the islamization of some of them. This letter, sent to B. ᶜAbd Kalāl and Zurᶜah b. Dhū Yazan, mentions the adoption of Islam by these chiefs. (95) There is no mention in this letter that these leaders were obliged to take part in spreading Islam or protecting the Muslims in their lands. This is clear from the fact that they did not defend Muᶜādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy, and other Muslims when ᶜAbhalah declared his uprising. (96) Thus it can be seen that some, but not all, the Ḥimyarī chiefs might have accepted Islam in 9/630-1. Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh, for instance, met Dhū ʾl-Kalāᶜ and Dhū ᶜAmr, both Ḥimyarī chiefs, just after the Prophet's death and asked them to adopt Islam. (97)

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(92) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, I, 104.

(93) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 62; al-Suhaylī, al-Rawḍ, II, 358; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 422.

(94) Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 258; Ibn Saᶜd, 264f; al-Ṭabarī, 1718f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 198. Ḥamīdullāh, 144; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāʾiq, 104f.

(95) Ibid.

(96) When ᶜAbhalah moved against Ṣanᶜāʾ, Muᶜādh and the Muslims fled to Ḥaḍramawt, cf. 55 below.

(97) Ibn Ḥabīb, al-Muḥabbar, 75; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, II, 182 (the narrative of Jarīr himself). See also Watt, Medina, 126.

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the Ḥimyarī chiefs, having abstained from taking sides either for or against Islam in the area, did not all adopt Islam in 9/630-1. It is quite possible that they did not question their own attitude towards Islam, preferring instead to remain neutral. A more definite stance, however, appeared in the course of the Muslim-Yemeni dispute in the early part of Abū Bakr's Caliphate.(98) It seems that these Ḥimyarī chiefs did not oppose the spread of Islam amongst their people as long as it did not clash with their interests in the region. The Prophet might have realized their position and avoided annoying them by appointing officials in their provinces, either from their kinsmen or from his own Companions. (99)

The Prophet's letters were also distributed amongst other Yemeni tribes. It is interesting to note that these letters were sent to more than one chief in the same tribe. In Ḥaḍramawt, for example, he wrote to several Kindī and Ḥaḍramī chiefs. These letters also were not delivered by prominent people. (100)

The Prophet despatched many campaigns to several parts of the Arabian Peninsula before the conquest of Mecca in 8/629. However he sent no campaign to the Yemen,(101) until he had captured this holy city. However,

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(98) For their attitude in this dispute, see 81-2 below.

(99) I.e. political representatives.

(100) Cf. Ibn Sa^{c}d, I, 266; Ḥamīdullāh, 168-74. He also wrote to the chiefs of B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^{c}b and Khawlān, cf. Ibn Sa^{c}d 266-9; Ḥamīdullāh, 104-7.

(101) Cf. al-Wāqidī, Maghāzī, passim; Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 280ff; Ibn Sa^{c}d, Tabaqāt, II, passim.

those campaigns sent to the Yemen were not aimed at the influential tribes, such as Ḥimyar or Hamdān, but rather at those who were weak due to a political split, in particular Madhḥij. To the territory inhabited by this tribe, three Muslim expeditions were sent shortly after the unification of the Ḥijāz in 8/629-30. Ibn Sa^{c}d (102) records that as soon as he returned from al-Ju^{c}rānah, the Prophet equipped Qays b. Sa^{c}d b. ^{c}Abādah, from the Anṣār, with four hundred men in order to invade Ṣudā^{ɔ}, a tribe of Madhḥij. However, the expedition never materialized due to the conversion of the tribe in question. The second army consisted of four hundred men and was directed in Rabī^{c} I, 10/June-July 631, against B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^{c}b, also of Madhḥij, in Najrān.(103) The third campaign was also directed against certain Madhḥijis. This was led by ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭālib who left Medina in Ramaḍān/December of the same year at the head of three hundred men. The sole aim of this expedition was to reach Madhḥij territory. (104)

The strategic location of Najrān as a stopping place between the Yemen and the Ḥijāz (105) prompted the Prophet to gain a foothold in the town. In fact, if the Prophet wanted Islam to spread throughout the Yemen, he would have to ensure that there was a secure route to the region via

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(102) Tabaqāt, I, 326. Cf. also Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, II, 351; Watt, Medina, 123.

(103) Led by Khālid b. al-Walīd, cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 262; Ibn Sa^{c}d, I, 339; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1724.

(104) Al-Wāqidī, Maghāzī, III, 1079f; Ibn Sa^{c}d, II, 169. Cf. also Watt, 124.

(105) Bowen "Ancient Trade Routes", 39; Beeston, "Some observations", 7; Trimingham, Christianity, 294.

Najrān. This would safeguard his envoys to the Yemeni tribes. The Najrānīs formed two groups, each of which was dealt with differently by the Prophet. The first was B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb, whom he forced to adopt Islam. (106) The second consisted of the Christians with whom the Prophet signed a peace treaty. (107)

b. The delegations of the Yemeni tribes

The year 9(630-1) is known as the year of delegations (ᶜām al-wufūd). In this year Medina was inundated by waves of tribal delegations which met the Prophet and proclaimed their allegiance to Islam. The Yemeni delegations were included. It is clear that the Yemeni delegations showed no unity in their attitude, even single tribes being divided.

i. The Prophet's policy towards the delegations of the Yemeni tribes

It is noticeable that the Prophet received the Yemeni delegations in different ways, treating some with warmth and others quite differently. Our sources do not explain the reasons behind the Prophet's attitude, although it may have been due to the different attitudes of these delegations towards Islam. It seems that some of them adopted Islam before their arrival in Medina, coming there only to prove their acceptance of Islam. For instance, the delegate of Tujīb, a Yemeni tribe of B. Ashras from Kindah, brought alms (ṣadaqah) to Medina in 9/630-1, and in the following year

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(106) Cf. the expedition of Khālid b. al-Walid against them, 27 above.

(107) See 30 below.

a group of Khawlān met the Prophet, telling him that they had adopted Islam and they would destroy their idols, a fact which delighted the Prophet. (108) The Prophet's reception of those who adopted Islam only after being attacked by the Medinan armies, e.g. the delegates of B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb, Ṣudāʾ and Khathᶜam was different.(109) This also applied to his reception of the Yemeni chiefs or those who represented them. (110)

The above policy of the Prophet led those delegates to take different attitudes toward Islamic authority in their provinces. Those who were warmly received by the Prophet became supporters of Islam during both ᶜAbhalah's movement and the War of Apostasy, whereas the others led the rebels in these events. (111)

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(108) For the delegate of Tujīb, cf. Ibn Saᶜd, I, 323; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII,81 al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 90f. For Khawlān, see Ibn Saᶜd, I, 324; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII,82; al-Ahdalī,87f.

(109) For the reception of the Prophet to these tribes, see Ibn Saᶜd, I, 326f, 339f, 348; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 83ff.

(110) He, for instance, warmly received Mālik b. Marārah al-Ruhawī, the envoy of the Himyarī chiefs, see Ibn Saᶜd, I, 356; Wāʾil b. Ḥujr al-Ḥadramī, see 88 below; and Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, cf. Ibn Saᶜd, I, 347 and note 91 above. Such a reception was not given to some of the Yemeni chiefs, such as the kings of B.Walīᶜah, al-Ashᶜath b. Qays, both of Kindah, and ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī, of Madhḥij. For B. Walīᶜah, cf. Ibn Saᶜd, I, 350; for al-Ashᶜath, see Ibn Hisham, Sirat, IV, 254; for ᶜAmr, see Ibn Hishām, IV, 252.

(111) Those who were warmly received by the Prophet, such as Tujīb, a tribe, Wāʾil b. Ḥujr and Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh took sides with the Muslims during the War of Apostasy, while those who were not received in such a manner became the opponents of the Muslims authority in the Yemen, such as Kings of B. Walīᶜah, al-Ashᶜath b. Qays and ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib. For the attitude of these Yemenis towards Islamic authority in the Yemen, cf. Chapter II, III below.

It is worthwhile mentioning that the delegation of the Christians of Najrān was among the Yemeni delegates assembled in Medina in 10/631-2. There were fourteen of them in all, including the ᶜāqib, the Sayyid and the bishop, their leaders. They refused to adopt Islam, instead requesting peace (sulḥ). The Prophet accepted and entered into a peace treaty with them. It was agreed that the Medinan government would not interfere with the ecclesiastical affairs or property of the Christians of Najrān, in return for which the latter would make an annual payment of two thousand garments of stipulated value, and, in the case of war, would lend the Muslims 30 suits of mail, 30 horses, and 30 camels. The Christians of Najrān were to house the Prophet's messengers for twenty days or less, but for no longer than a month. (112)

It can be seen from the articles of this treaty that it guaranteed to the Medinan government the ability to communicate with the Yemeni tribes and secure routes for the Muslim envoys to use on their way to the Yemeni regions. On the other hand, the treaty enabled the Christians of Najrān to keep their religion and protect their land from any Muslim attack.

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(112) Cf. Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 357f; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 75f; al-Yaᶜqubi, Tārīkh, II, 66f, Ḥamīdullāh, 111f; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāᵓiq, 94f. Cf. also Watt, 127, 359f; Trimingham, 306.

ii. The effect of tribal conflict on relations with Medina

Conflict among the Yemeni tribes became clear when they met the Prophet. However, the spirit of understanding and stability amongst the Ḥimyarī chiefs led them to authorize Mālik b. Marārah al-Ruhāwī to deliver their letter to the Prophet. (113) Hamdān was represented by one delegation for both settled people and bedouins. (114) Other tribes were represented by a number of delegations, which leads us to believe that these tribes were not unified. The Madhḥij, for instance, included the delegations of Murād, Sa^{c}d al-^{c}Ashīrah, Zubayd, Ṣudāʾ Ju^{c}fī and al-Nakh^{c}. (115) B. Mu^{c}āwiyah of Kindah was represented by two delegations : one led by the Kings of B. Walī^{c}ah and the other under the leadership of al-Ash^{c}ath b. Qays. (116)

This situation shows two aspects : firstly the split amongst these tribes and the absence of any central authority in their regions; and secondly, the power rivalry of the local chiefs. This rivalry apparently emerged when they met the Prophet. Al-Ash^{c}ath b. Qays and Wāʾil b. Ḥujr (both influential leaders, the former of Kindah and the latter of the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt) disputed the ownership

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(113) See 25 above.

(114) Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 267-9; Ibn Sa^{c}d,I,340f; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 10f.

(115) For these delegations, cf. Ibn Sa^{c}d, I, 324ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1732ff; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 84ff; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 92ff.

(116) For B. Walī^{c}ah, cf. Ibn Sa^{c}d, 349f; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII, 114; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāʾ, f4a. For al-Ash^{c}ath, see Ibn Hishām, Sirat, IV, 254-6; Ibn Sa^{c}d, I, 328; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 203; al-Nuwayrī, XVIII,87f. For their Nasab, cf Table 3.

of a Wadi in Ḥaḍramawt. The Prophet, after hearing the evidence of witnesses, judged in favour of Wā᾽il. (117)

It is noticeable that some Yemeni chiefs had a keen desire to obtain a guarantee from the Prophet for their estates. The Prophet guaranteed individual ownership for those who requested such whether in person or by letter.(118) Some of those delegates asked the Prophet to grant them certain areas in the Yemen, which he did. (119) The fact that such requests were not forwarded by the Ḥimyarī chiefs suggest that they were strong enough to defend their lands themselves. However, our sources do not specify why these Yemenis sought guarantees from the Prophet. One reason may have been the political unrest in their provinces, for such a guarantee would secure their properties.

c. The Prophet's representatives among the Yemeni tribes

One of the most complex matters in the history of Yemen at the dawn of Yemeni-Muslim relations is the identification of the Prophet's representatives there. Although the names of many representatives are mentioned in the sources, contradiction abounds concerning the posts of

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(117) Cf. al-Akwaᶜ, Wathā᾽iq, 117; Watt, 120.

(118) E.g. Wā᾽il b. Ḥujr al-Ḥaḍramī, Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, IV, 1562f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, 81; Ibn Ḥajar, VI, 312; Ḥamīdullāh, 172; al-Ḥamid, I, 129; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathā᾽iq, 117. For those to whom the Prophet guaranteed the ownership of their estates by letters, cf. Ḥamīdullāh, Wathā᾽iq, passim; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathā᾽iq, passim

(119) E.g. both al-Abyaḍ b. Ḥammāl and Abū Sabrah al-Juᶜfī asked the Prophet to grant certain areas in the Yemen and he did. For al-Abyaḍ request, cf. Ibn Saᶜd, V, 523; Ibn al-Athir, Usd, I, 45f, Ibn Ḥajar, I, 14. Although he was a Ḥimyarī, he was not one of the Adhwā᾽ or Aqyāl and he was settled in Ma᾽rib area. For Abū Sabrah, cf. Ibn Saᶜd, I, 326; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 410.

the representatives and their areas of service.

A brief glance at the names of those appointed by the Prophet as his representatives among the Yemeni tribes reveals two different groups : the first comprising alms-collectors, teachers and qāḍīs; the second consisting of some of the Yemeni chiefs who met the Prophet, who in turn recognised their leadership over their tribes, the Muslim in particular. Thus it may be concluded that the first group specialized in religious affairs and the second in military and political matters. This is corroborated by the following examples : first when the Prophet appointed Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī, a Madhḥij chief, over all Madhḥij, he sent with him Khālid b. Sa^{c}īd b. al-^{c}Ās, one of the Companions, as alms-collector (jāmi^{c} al-ṣadaqah);(120) secondly the Prophet recognized the leadership of Wā^{ɔ}il b. Ḥujr, over all the Ḥaḍramī tribes, but appointed three of his Companions to collect the alms; (121) thirdly, when B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^{c}b adopted Islam, the Prophet designated one of their chiefs, Qays b. al-Ḥuṣayn, and sent him along with ^{c}Amr b. Ḥazm al-Anṣārī, one of his Companions, as qāḍī and teacher. (122)

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(120) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 251; Ibn Sa^{c}d, Ṭabaqāt, I, 327; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1736; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, II, 421; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, XVIII,85.

(121) For the Prophet's recognition of Wā^{ɔ}il's leadership, cf. Ibn Sa^{c}d, I, 350f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, 81; Ibn Ḥajar, VI, 145,312; Ḥamīdullāh, 169; al-Akwa^{c}, Wathā^{ɔ}iq, 115, 117. For the Prophet's representatives there, see Table 1.

(122) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 265; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1727; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, XVIII, 100.

It seems that the Prophet intended, through the appointment of the local leaders as his representatives, to encourage these leaders to work for Islam amongst their own tribes and to win them over to his side. However since these leaders knew nothing about Islamic regulations, the Prophet sent with them individuals with enough knowledge to deal with Islamic affairs. Although these representatives were chosen from among their own tribes, some prominent chiefs, such as ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī (a Madhḥijī), kings of B. Walīᶜah and al-Ashᶜath b. Qays (both Kindī chiefs) were neglected. This policy resulted in these chiefs opposing the Muslim authority and revolting against it after the Prophet's death. (123)

The Prophet's policy in the territory of Ḥimyar was different. He did not interfere in the internal affairs of this tribe. No mention is made in the sources at our disposal of the Prophet appointing any one, whether from the tribe or elsewhere, as political representative. On the other hand, the leaders of Ḥimyar did not oppose the Muslims for the sake of having religious activities in their own provinces. Therefore, the Prophet sent Muᶜādh b. Jabal al-Anṣārī as an Islamic teacher in the Yemen as a whole, and ordered him to base himself in al-Janad. (124)

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(123) For their opposition to Islamic authority, cf. Chapter II, III.

(124) Ibn Saᶜd, III, 584; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1719; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 249, all confirm that he was sent in 9/630-1. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 529; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 376-8; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f9b; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣabah, VI, 106f; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 58f.

Although al-Janad was chosen as a centre of the da^{c}wah, it might have lacked central authority. Some evidence confirms that the leadership in the town was held by B. al-Aswad, (125) However, these indications do not mention whether the people of al-Janad were united. It is quite probable that the inhabitants of the town had different attitudes towards Islam and when Mu^{c}ādh came they divided into two groups : one supported Mu^{c}ādh and the other opposed him. According to ^{c}Ubayd b. Ṣakhr, one of Mu^{c}ādh's Companions in the Yemen, by the time of ^{c}Abhalah's control over Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$, Mu^{c}ādh and his supporters were fighting the other group to control the town.(126)

In conclusion it may be said that it was during the last two years of the Prophet's life (9-10/630-2) that relations between the Muslim authorities and the Yemeni tribes were established. The Yemeni attitude towards Islam differed from one group to another; the Muslims, on the other hand, succeeded in establishing themselves in some regions, but failed to do so in others. Their success or failure became apparent in the events which took place shortly before the Prophet's death and in the early period of his successor.

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(125) Al-Janadī, Sulūk, f9b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f9a.

(126) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1853f.

Table 1. The Prophet's representatives in the Yemen (9-11/630-2)

a. For religious affairs

Muʿādh b. Jabal al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī	teacher of Islamic doctrine and the leader of the Prophet's representatives.(1)
Khālid b.Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ.	an alms-collector with Madhḥij(2)
ʿAmr b.Ḥazm al-Anṣārī,	qādī and teacher with B.al-Ḥārith b. Kaʿb in Najrān. (3)
Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī, a Yemeni,	in Maʾrib. (4)
al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah al-Tamīmī,	an alms-collector with ʿAkk and al-Ashāʿir in Tihāmah (5)
Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī,	an alms-collector with the tribe of Ḥadramawt.(6)

(1) He stayed in al-Janad, cf. 34 above.

(2) Cf. 33 above.

(3) Cf. 33 above.

(4) Al-Ṭabarī, I,1852,(citing Sayf b. ʿUmar);Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228, Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 64; Bughyat, 23 .Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 97; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb,I, 529; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 246; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, all say that he was over Zabīd, Rimaʿ, Aden and the coastal area. It is probable that he was over Maʾrib for two reasons : firstly he was in Maʾrib when ʿAbhalah b. Kaʿb captured Ṣanʿaʾ, Cf. 55 below; secondly the sources which mention the governorship of al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah are agreed that he was over Tihāmah, cf. note 5 below. Cf. also Watt, 122.

(5) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1852 (citing Sayf b. ʿUmar); Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Usd, III, 50f; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Bughyat, 23; Qurrat, I, 64.

(6) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat,IV, 271; Ibn Khayyāṭ, 97; Ibn Saʿd,III, 598; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 245, 529; al-Ṭabarī, I,1852; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, II,534; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228: Usd, II, 217; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f20a; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III 20; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 68f; al-Nuwayrī,XVIII,169.

ᶜUkāshah b. Thawr b.Asghar al-Ghawthī, an alms-collector with al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn, in Ḥaḍramawt.(7)

al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah al-Makhzūmī, an alms-collector with B.Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah and al-Ṣadif in Ḥaḍramawt. (8)

Saᶜīd b. al-Qishb al-Azdī, in Jurash. (9)

b. For military and political affairs

Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī, over all Madhḥij (10)

ᶜĀmir b. Shahr al-Hamdānī over a part of Hamdān(11)

Qays b. Mālik b. Saᶜd al-Arḥabī al-Hamdānī, over Hamdān (12)

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(7) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1852; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, III, 1080; Ibn Mākūlā, Ikmāl, I, 96; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 2; all these sources add B. Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah. We know that al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah was appointed by the Prophet as an alms-collector with B. Muᶜāwiyah and al-Ṣadif, but he did not go there. Cf. 183 below. Since al-Muhājir remained in Medina it is quite possible that the Prophet annexed B.Muᶜāwiyah to ᶜUkāshah who held this post until the Prophet's death. When Abū Bakr became caliph, he replaced ᶜUkāshah of B. Muᶜāwiyah by Ziyād b. Labīd, cf. note 64 in Chapter III.

(8) He remained in Medina until Abū Bakr despatched him at the head of his army to suppress the Yemeni rebels. Cf. 101 below.

(9) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, II, 626; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, II, 315; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 101.

(10) Cf. 33 above.

(11) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, II, 792; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 10 (both citing Sayf b. ᶜUmar) say he is one of the Prophet's representatives in the Yemen.

(12) Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 341; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 224; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 264, all say that the Prophet appointed him over all Hamdān. Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 220, reads Qays b. Namaṭ b. Qays b. Mālik b. Saᶜd al-Hamdānī, and does not mention this authorization. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, has Mālik b. Namaṭ.

Qays b. al-Ḥuṣayn al-Ḥārithī, over B. al-Ḥārith b.Ka^{c}b in Najrān. (13)

Ṣurad b. ^{c}Abd Allāh al-Dawsī al-Azdī, over Jurash. (14)

Mahrī b. al-Abyaḍ, over Mahrah. (15)


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(13) Cf. 33 above.

(14) Ibn Sa^{c}d, Ṭabaqāt, V, 526 (says he settled in Jurash), I,338; Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, 256; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1729f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 17.


(15) Ibn Sa^{c}d, Ṭabaqāt, I, 355. In another account Ibn Sa^{c}d, ibid, says that Zuhayr b. Qirḍim met the Prophet and the latter appointed him over his people, i.e. Mahrah.

MAP I THE MAIN GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS OF THE YEMEN



Note

It must be stressed that the majority of the places on these Maps and the information given have been fixed after references to historical and/or geographical works only. Many must therefore be regarded as approximate.


N
0 Kilometres 100
B. MUTAWIYAH (of Kindah)
Damman
Tarim
Shibam
The Tribe of Hadramawt
AL-SAKASIK WA-L-SAKUN
MAHRA
al-Shihr
AL-ʿABR
Shabwah
HADRAMAWT
MAFAZAT
JAHIL
Maʾrib
HADHRAMAUT
MADHHIJ
Najrān
Ṣaʿdah
ṢANĀʾ
The Abqāʿ
AL-RUBʿ AL-KHĀLĪ
RUʿAYN
Dhū Yazan
al-Kaldʿ
al-Janad
The Abnʾ
Aden
AL ASHĀʿIR
ARABIAN SEA
RED SEA
Map2 DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL POWER

CHAPTER II

The Political Situation in the Yemen during the last phase of the Prophet's life - The movement of ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb (Dhūʾl-Ḥijjah-Rabiᶜ I 10-11/March-June 632)

Towards the end of the Prophet's life, in particular in Dhūʾl-Ḥijjah 10/March 632, a movement arose against the Islamic state in many parts of the Arabian peninsula. These uprisings were led by Arab tribesmen who claimed prophethood among their own tribes, such as Musaylimah b. Ḥabīb of B. Ḥanīfah in al-Yamāmah, Ṭulayḥah b. Khuwaylid of B. Asad in Najd and ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb of ᶜAns, a branch of Madhḥij, in the Yemen. (1) However, ᶜAbhalah's movement was a limited one which arose in one district and ended in another. It was mainly an internal conflict involving land control and as such was merely a continuation of the power struggles before Islam among the local powers themselves. However, this chapter will cover the movement of ᶜAbhalah and the attitude of the locals towards it, showing its aim and its relation with Islam.

A. ᶜAbhalah and the beginning of his movement

The very first movement was that of ᶜAbhalah in the Yemen. According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr, (2) the first apostasy in Islam took place in the Yemen during the life time of the Prophet and was led by Dhūʾl-Khimār

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(1) For these movements, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1793ff. See also Donner, Islamic conquests, 85.

(2) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; see also Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, III, 1266.

ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb who rose up after the Farewell Pilgrimage (Dhū ʾL Ḥijjah, 10/March, 632). His movement began in the north-east of al-Jawf, specifically in Khabbān Cave. (3)

Arab historians consider all the movements which arose in the Arabian Peninsula during the last phase of the Prophet's life, without any exception, to be movements of apostasy. This means that the leaders of these movements and their followers were originally Muslims but later left Islam for another faith, or at least stopped openly practising Islam. According to Islamic teaching, an apostate is one born a Muslim or who adopts Islam and leaves it for another faith, or who stops practising Islam. (4) In fact this term may include most movements in the Arabian Peninsula, since they had originally gone to Medina with their tribes and accepted Islam. (5)

ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb himself had never been a Muslim. There is no information to confirm his adoption of Islam in the sources at our disposal. Furthermore, these sources do not supply us with any historical material about the background of his life before his uprising, with the exception of the fact that he was a soothsayer (kāhin)

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(3) Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1854; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307. Yaqut, Muᶜjam, II, 343, confirms that it's a village near Najran. Cf. also Smith, Ayyūbids, II, 171f; al-Shamāḥī, 79. See also Map 3.

(4) Cf. al-Māwardī, Aḥkām, 51-4; SEI "Murtadd",

(5) Such as Musaylamah of B. Ḥanīfah and Ṭulayhah of B. Asad.

in Khabbān. (6) Therefore his being termed an apostate (murtadd) is, in my opinion, not acceptable.

The Arab historians, however, all agree that he made claims to Prophecy and they thus all call him the liar (kadhdhāb). (7) On the other hand, he was not the only one in the Arabian Peninsula who claimed the prophethood during the last phase of the Prophet's life. Events confirmed that the strong revolts which arose at that time were led by leaders claiming the prophethood for themselves. (8)

ᶜAbhalah's claim to be a prophet might have occurred, but it is relevant to ask why he did so? The modern writer, al-Dūrī, says that "we must not forget the Prophet's success and the spread of his call, in addition to the presence of tribal solidarity which was responsible for the rise of the liars in the Arabian Peninsula." (9) We find this point of view acceptable, especially in the case of ᶜAbhalah's movement.

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(6) Shoufānī, Al-Riddah, 91. For this historical material of his life, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II 228; al-Diyār-bakrī Tārīkh, II, 155f. In al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 113, Dhū ʾl-Ḥimār, Dhū ʾl-Khimār and al-Aswad, see also Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, III, 1266.

(7) E.g. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 271; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1797; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 161; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 76. Watt, M. at Medina, 129 says "He does not seem to have made a serious claim to be a Prophet."

(8) Such as Musaylamah, Ṭulayhah, Sujāḥ and Dhū ʾl-Tāj Laqīṭ b. Mālik al-Azdī.

(9) Muqaddimah, 43. He is therefore suggesting that ᶜAbhalah argued that, since the Prophet himself was successful despite early opposition from many of his own tribe, he could himself succeed with ease, having the united support of his people.

We know that at the same time as ᶜAbhalah's movement was on the ascendant, Islam was spreading actively in the Yemen to the extent that many provinces were dominated by Islam. In Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmah political authority was mostly held by Muslims. In the highlands (Najd al-Yaman), it was absent, except for some alms collectors, and Muslim teachers, while political authority remained completely in the hands of the tribal and provincial chiefs. (10)

B. The political situation of Madhḥij territory

In the north-east of al-Jawf, in particular in the territory of Madhḥij, Islamic activity seems to have been limited as a result of the failure of the Medinan representative, Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī, to keep the area under his control. It can be assumed that he had insufficient active political influence within his tribe, Madhhij, to form a local Islamic force from them. Nor was there strong leadership within Madhḥij, which could play a major role to control the area politically. Ibn al-Ruwayyah, (11) the paramount chief of Madhḥij, played no role in these events and the historical sources at our disposal do not mention him as being among the Yemeni chiefs - those, for example, who met the Prophet in Medina or who had relations with the Islamic government through correspondence. Furthermore he does not appear among the important chiefs in the Yemen itself during

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(10) E.g. Bādhān over Ṣanᶜāᵓ, then his son Shahr, ᶜĀmir b. Shahr al-Hamdānī on Hamdān territory, Chiefs of Ḥimyar over their own provinces and B. ᶜAbd al-Madān in Najrān. See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1737; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ḥamīdullāh, Wathāᵓiq, 100.

(11) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 108; Ibn Rustah, Aᶜlāq, 113.

these events. Some of the Madhḥij chiefs had adopted different attitudes towards Islam, such as Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī and ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī. The former refused to go to Medina to adopt Islam, while the latter went there but did not obtain the leadership of his tribe, while Farwah b. Musayk did. (12)

This feuding among the Madhḥij chiefs appeared a short time before the rise of ᶜAbhalah's movement, (13) and caused the unstable situation in their area. In all probability some of these Madhḥij chiefs disagreed with the Islamic policy concerning the appointment of representatives in the area. These chiefs perhaps rejected this policy by forming an opposition against it. The Prophet therefore, paid attention to this area by sending troops from time to time to put pressure on the people, in particular the Madhḥij. (14) Meanwhile he commanded

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(12) He was appointed on behalf of the Prophet on all Madhḥij, Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 249-54; Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I,327f al-Ṭabarī, Tārikh, I, 1733f; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 40-4. See also Shoufani, 93f; Table 1.

(13) For the Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth and ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib conflict, see Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 252f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, ᶜ227; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 94. For the antagonism of ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib to Farwah b. Musayk, see the poetry of the former, 48 below. Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Muradī, the nisbah after his tribe Murād, of Madhḥij. Ibn Saᶜd, V, 525; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1732ff; al-Masᶜudī, Tanbīh, 277; al-Razī, Tārīkh, 80, 150; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 227; and al-Kalāᶜī, 153 all simply call him Qays b. Makshuḥ (Makhsuh is his laqab for its meaning, cf Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān, II, 573; Ṭabarī, III, 1365. In al-Hamdānī, Iklil, VIII, 21 and Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255, read as Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth b. Makshūḥ. Al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 7ff and al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3ff, call him Qays b. Hubayrah. However, his full name is Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī. We will mention him as Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī.

(14) There are three campaigns directed to Madhḥij during the Prophet's life, the first led by Qays b. Saᶜd b. ᶜAbādah and prepared to Ṣudaʾ, branch of Madhhij; the second led by Khālid b. al-Walīd to B.al-Ḥarith b. Kaᶜb, also of Madhhij; the third led by ᶜAlī, Ibn Abī Ṭālib which directed to Madhḥij territory. For these campaigns, see above. For the buṭūn of Madhḥij, see Table 2.

Farwah b. Musayk, his own representative in Madhḥij territory, to attack those people whenever he found the opportunity right. (15)

Thus the weakness of the Islamic forces in the area, the Madhḥij territory, the feuding among the leaders themselves, and the absence of strong local leadership which created a political vacuum, as well as the spread of the news of the Prophet's illness after the Farewell Pilgrimage - all of these factors perhaps encouraged ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb to announce his movement by claiming the prophethood at that particular time. He succeeded initially in declaring his movement, easily forming a force which consisted mainly of the inhabitants of the area.

C. ᶜAbhalah's followers

Al-Ḥadīthī (16) suggests that " ᶜAbhalah's power rested upon the old pre-Islamic alliance, which mainly consisted of Madhḥij and some Yemeni tribes, particularly those who lived in al-Jawf area." However, the acceptance of the new faith by some members of this alliance certainly encouraged an inclination by some of them towards ᶜAbhalah's movement. Thus some of them followed ᶜAbhalah while others, such as al-Nakhᶜ and Juᶜfī, branches of Madhḥij, remained neutral;(17) the smallest number, led by Farwah b. Musayk, the Prophet's representative in Madhḥij was hostile to him,

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(15) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 210; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 142f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣabah, V, 209.

(16) Ahl, 15. For this alliance, see 19 above.

(17) Al-Kalāᶜī, Tārīkh, 151. See also table 2.

but unable to face up to his power. This latter group, therefore, retreated to al-Aḥsiyah. (18) In fact ᶜAbhalah's power rested mainly upon his tribe ᶜAns, although elements of Zubayd, B. al-Ḥārith, Awd, Musliyah and Ḥakam, all branches of Madhḥij, also supported him. (19)

ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb also got support from other Madhḥij chiefs, particularly those who had lost their high positions within their tribes as a result of the advent of Islam in the Yemen during the period (9-10/630-32). (20) These were after all chiefs within their own tribes, while the Islamic administration appointed others from their tribes, such as Farwah b. Musayk. Therefore some of them, such as Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī, Muᶜawiyah b. Qays al-Janbī and Yazīd b. al-Ḥusayn al-Hārithī, all Madhhij chiefs, joined ᶜAbhalah's troops. (21) The Kings of B. Waliᶜah, of Kindah in Ḥaḍramawt also declared their support for ᶜAbhalah's movement, (22) but could not

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(18) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f. See also Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, I, 112, who says that al-Aḥsiyah a place in the Yemen.

(19) Al-Kalāᶜī, 151; al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156; those all being branches of Madhḥij; Some sources mention Madhḥij only, Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; al-Diyārbakrī, II, 155. For the nasab of these tribes, see Table 2.

(20) Such as ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī and Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, both are Madhḥij chiefs.

(21) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854f. See also al-Ḥadīthi, Ahl, 115.

(22) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2000; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 257. These Kings also lost their high positions during the appearance of Islam in Ḥaḍramawt, especially when the Medinan government appointed Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī as its representative there who succeeded in creating a military force consisting entirely of local tribes.

join him because the Islamic power in their territory was concentrated and strong. (23) Furthermore, they were far from the scene of events.

In fact the chiefs who joined ᶜAbhalah's movement, or those who declared their support, found it convenient for solving their own problems. Immediately after joining ᶜAbhalah's movement, Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth, a strong ᶜAbhalah supporter, removed Farwah b. Musayk, the Prophet's representative of all Madhḥij. (24) The latter, however, succeeded in getting back his high position, which he had lost during the appearance of Islam in the Yemen. (25) ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī also succeeded in winning back his high position when ᶜAbhalah appointed him a governor of all Madhḥij. (26) For this reason ᶜAmr satirized Farwah b. Musayk as follows -

وجدنا ملكَ فروةَ شرَّ مُلْكٍ حِمارًا ساف منخرُهُ بِقَذْرِ
وكُنتَ إذا رأيتَ أبا عُميرٍ ترى الحَوْلاءَ من خُبْثٍ وغَدْرِ

We found that the rule of Farwah at the worst,
(he is just like) a donkey whose face is covered with filth.
Whenever you meet Abā ᶜUmayr (Farwah),
You see the calamities of the malice and treason. (27)

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(23) For a detailed discussion of the Ziyād and his local force challenge chiefs of Kinda, cf. Chapter III, B. below.

(24) Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1796; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Abū'al-Fidā', Tarīkh, I, 163.

(25) Ibid, of course, the existence of Farwah b. Musayk as a governor on behalf of the Prophet had weakened his position within his tribe, therefore, he was appointed by ᶜAbhalah of all the army.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1834. In Ibn Hishām, Sīrat., IV, 254, bithafri instead of biqadhri and in al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, VX, 211, mala ta yadayka instead of al-ḥuwala'.

D. Extension of ᶜAbhalah's movement

In Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah, 10/March, 632, after claiming prophethood, ᶜAbhalah left Khabbān Cave towards Najrān with his followers at the invitation of certain Najranīs.(28) He entered the town without any objection on the part of its inhabitants. (29) It may have been that some people there were making plans to facilitate his coming, especially those from B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb who were concentrated in the town.(30) It is not surprising because elements of B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb had been members of the old pre-Islamic Madhḥij alliance, (31) as well as the fact that they were a branch of Madhḥij. (32) Therefore, they expelled ᶜAmr b. Hazm a qāḍī and teacher of the Medinan government there, from Najrān, (33) and joined ᶜAbhalah's army. (34) Najrān

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(28) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795f; al-Kalāᶜī, Tārīkh, 151; al-Diyārbakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156.

(29) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307.

(30) According to al-Hamdānī, Sifat, I, 135, the population of Najrān comprised B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb and Hamdān. Cf. also al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 320, who says Najrān belong to B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb.

(31) In particular B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb, who were in the same alliance with Madhḥij, furthermore, they are a branch of Madhhij. For the alliance, cf.19 above.

(32) Cf. Table 2.

(33) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1796; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Abū ʾl-Fidāʾ, Tārīkh, I, 163.

(34) ᶜAbhalah left Najrān with six hundred men from B. al-Ḥārith b. Kaᶜb, see al-Kalāᶜī, Tārīkh, 151; al-Diyārbakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156.

had clearly not been ᶜAbhalah's aim, for he left it a few days after his occupation, without any thought of settling down there. (35) It seems that he went to Najrān only to collect his followers, for he left for Ṣanᶜāʾ with six hundred men from the town. (36)

On Muḥarram, 11/April, 632, after he had succeeded in forming his army in Najrān, ᶜAbhalah marched to the south via Hamdan territory to Ṣanᶜāʾ. Historical sources differ concerning the identity of the ruler of Ṣanᶜāʾ at that time. However, the majority of these sources agree that he was Shahr b. Bādhān who succeeded his father, Bādhān, as a ruler of Ṣanᶜāʾ. (37) This view is indeed the most likely since at that time the town was a stronghold of the Abnāʾ, as well as the centre of their rule in the Yemen. (38)

In Shaᶜūb, the northern suburb of Ṣanᶜāʾ, ᶜAbhalah faced the army of the Abnāʾ, led by their chief, Shahr b. Bādhān. In this battle Shahr was killed and his army defeated. (39) ᶜAbhalah then entered Ṣanᶜāʾ and settled down

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(35) Al-Kalāᶜī, Tārīkh, 151; al-Diyārbakrī, Tārīkh, II, 156.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 21-3; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 64.

(38) There is a general agreement in the historical sources that the Abnāʾ ruled Ṣanᶜāʾ at that time : consequently they led the opposition against ᶜAbhalah and Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth. For a detailed discussion of Abnāʾ resistance against ᶜAbhalah and Qays, cf. 60ff below.

(39) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854, (the account of ᶜUbayd b. Ṣakhr); Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

with his followers without further opposition from the other inhabitants or tribal groups. (40)

According to one modern point of view, (41) " ᶜAbhalah moved directly against the Persian rule in Ṣanᶜā', after declaring his movement openly, in order to take over the town to use it for his struggle against Islamic authority in the Yemen." However, the fact is that ᶜAbhalah avoided any quarrel with the local tribes in the Yemen, or with any other Islamic power in the Yemeni provinces. The historical sources at our disposal mention no battle taking place between ᶜAbhalah's troops and the Islamic forces during the time he held sway in Ṣanᶜā'. The only exception was the battle of Kushar, in Hamdān territory, which took place between some of ᶜAbhalah's followers led by ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī and some Muslims led by Khālid b. al-Walīd and Khālid b. Saᶜīd b. al-ᶜĀs. (42) Yet Islamic forces led by al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, the Medinan representative

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(40) Not over Hamdān, who were concentrated in this area and through whose territory ᶜAbhalah passed on his way to Ṣanᶜā'. For ᶜAbhalah's route, see Map 3.

(41) Al-Ḥadīthī, Ahl, 116.

(42) In al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 211 and al-Bakrī, Muᶜjam II, 650f both mention it as a main battle, however, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1984, who regards this as an insignificant battle, considering it as a personal conflict between ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib and Khālid b. Saᶜīd makes no mention of Khālid b. al-Walīd and the place directly. For the location of Khushar, cf. Map 3, and below p 54. According to Sayf b. ᶜUmar, ᶜAbhalah wrote to Muᶜādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy to the Yemen, who was in al-Janad addressing him as an intruding outsider and ordering him, with his companions, to hand over to him whatever he had collected from the Yemen. See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1853f. See also Shoufanī, 92. However, ᶜAbhalah had never attacked, militarily, any Islamic centre in the Yemen.

in Tihāmah, were in the mountains of ᶜAkk and Ṣanᶜā' when ᶜAbhalah was fighting the Abnā'. (43)

Another modern point of view considers ᶜAbhalah's movement to be a national uprising against foreign rule in the Yemen which was represented mainly by the Persians. (44) ᶜAbhalah moved directly from Khabbān Cave via Najrān and Hamdān territory without doing battle with any force except the army of the Abnā'. This means that his aim was, without any doubt, to remove power from the Abnā'. Certainly, ᶜAbhalah worked to remove the authority from the Persian ruler in Ṣanᶜā', but we doubt that he worked against the Persian community itself. There is no mention in the historical sources at our disposal that ᶜAbhalah took action against the Persian community, either those who were spread throughout towns of the Yemen, or those who were in Ṣanᶜā'. (45) Furthermore he accepted them as a division of his army, even appointing some of their chiefs such as Fayrūz al-Daylamī and Dādhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī over them. (46)

ᶜAbhalah's concentration on Ṣanᶜā' was probably because of the weakness of the Persian rule at that time, especially after the death of Bādhān, (47) the governor

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(43) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228. Cf. Map 3.

(44) This point of view has been given by some modern Yemeni writers, e.g. Nuᶜmān, al-Aṭrāf, 86f; Ṭāhir, "ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib", 50f.

(45) We know that the Persins were spread throughout the Yemeni towns, but their centre was Ṣanᶜā', cf. 14 above.

(46) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307f. Cf. also Shoufanī, 93.

(47) Cf. Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 260; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 113; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1571ff; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I, 176.

of the Persian Emperor in the Yemen. On the other hand, the Abnā' had no support after the decline of the Persian Empire as a result of the assassination of Qubādh II in 7/628 by his son Shīrawayh. (48) Furthermore, they had no tribal support in the Yemen. In addition, on the economic side, Ṣan^{c}ā' was the most fertile area and had that advantage over Madhḥij territory, from where, it will be recalled, the majority of ^{c}Abhalah's followers came. Lastly, Ṣan^{c}ā' territory had been the desired object of Madhḥij and their allies before the spread of Islam there. (49)

E. "The political situation in the Yemen during ^{c}Abhalah's control over Ṣan^{c}ā'."

According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr (50) when ^{c}Abhalah took over Ṣan^{c}ā', he ruled all the Yemen. His power extended from Mafāzat Ḥaḍramawt (51) as far as al-Ṭā'if, al-Baḥrayn, al-Aḥsiyah and Aden. However, it is uncertain whether ^{c}Abhalah moved from Ṣan^{c}ā' after his settlement there to extend his political authority throughout these provinces. It can be assumed that the inhabitants of some areas in the Yemen were enthusiastic supporters of his movement, but they had not been under his control and did not join his troops. From some of the historical and the geographical sources we can see that some areas were connected in

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(48) Persian Emperor (590-628), see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1574. For the decline of the Empire, cf. al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 106ff. See also Watt, M. at Medina, 129.

(49) Cf.19 above.

(50) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

(51) This would seem to be the area between Wadi Hadramawt and the Yemen proper, but excluding Wadī itself, see Map 1.

particular with ᶜAbhalah's movement. Some of these places were on the coast of Tihāmah, such as ᶜAththar, (52) al-Sharjah, (53) al-Ḥirdah, (54) Ghalāfiqah, (55) and Aden. (56) Others were in the highlands, such as Manqal, (57) Kushar, (58)

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(52) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855. Al-ᶜAqīlī,, al-Muᶜjam al-Jughrāfī, I, 158, places it 40 kms north of Jāzān. Al-Ghunaym, Jazīrat al-ᶜArab, 126, says that 300 kms south of al-Sirrayn, Cf. also al-Hamdanī, Ṣifat, I,120. Al-Muqaddasī, 86 and al-ᶜUdhrī, Manāzil, f6a, both say that the town is the harbour of Sanᶜāʾ.

(53) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, III, 334. Al-ᶜAqīlī, 124-6, states that its archaeologic town on al-Muwassam coast belongs K.S.A. on its border with Y.A.R. Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 119f, who says that on the coast of Ḥakam territory.

(54) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Yāqūt, II, 240. Both al-Muqaddasī, 86 and al-ᶜUdhrī, f6a, place it on the coast of al-Mahjam and al-Kadrāʾ. Yāqūt, II, 240; Kaḥḥālah, Jughrafiyat, 289; al-Ghunaym, 48f. reads al-Ḥardah. Al-Hamdani, Ṣifat, I, 120; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 319, both have al-Ḥirdah.

(55) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Yāqūt, III, 334. Al-Muqaddasī, 86; al-ᶜUdhri f6a, record that its the harbour of Zabīd. Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 119, the town is the coast of al-Ḥuṣayb.

(56) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855.

(57) Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, V, 216, reads Manqal al-Mustaᶜjilah, and says ten miles from Ṣaᶜdah, without giving the direction, connected with al-ᶜAnsī's, i.e. ᶜAbhalah, movement. Cf also Smith, Ayyūbids, II, 178. Wilson, "Mapping" 467, says that it is a site in al-Ẓāhir to the north of Ẓafār al-Ashrāf (Ẓafār al-Ashrāf a fort close to the north of Dhībīn). Both Smith, Wilson, read al-Manqal. It is perhaps ten kms to the east of the main road about half way between Khamir and Ḥūth, personal communication with Dr. Wilson dated 15 July 1983.

(58) Kushar or Kashar, according to al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 182 is in Hamdān territory. Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, II, 649, says there are two places Kushar near Ṣanᶜāʾ, whereas Kashar mountain near Jurash. Cf. also al-Bakrī, Muᶜjam, II, 1130; Smith, Ayyubids, II, 168. Al-Akwaᶜ, in al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, 335, footnote 1, says that Kushar is a mountain in Liwāʾ Ḥajjah. Wilson "Mapping", maintains that it is the name of the mountain and of a settlement on its northern side to west of Sanᶜāʾ, near Bayt Ḥanbaṣ. In Kuwait map Kushar appears in 140 km N.W. Ṣanᶜā .

Madar,(59) al-Raḥbah, (60) al-Miḍmār (61) and al-Janad.(62) In Ḥaḍramawt B. Walīᶜah, a branch of Kindah, declared their support for ᶜAbhalah's movement. (63) In fact during his period of control over Ṣanᶜāʾ, ᶜAbhalah had no governors to represent him in these places. Furthermore, he did not have a military force in other areas of the Yemen, so his power was concentrated only around Ṣanᶜāʾ. (64)

As soon as ᶜAbhalah occupied Ṣanᶜāʾ, the Muslim leaders left the highlands. Muᶜādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy to the Yemen, went to Abū Mūsā al-Ashᶜarī, the Medinan representative in Maʾrib, then they both went to Ḥadramawt. (65) The former was a refugee with al-Sakāsik, a branch of Kindah, and the latter with al-Sakūn, again a

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(59) Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, V, 76. Madar a place some 15 miles E. of Raydah, on the edges of al-Jawf, it belongs jointly to Yām and Bakīl, cf. Smith, Ayyubids, II, 176; Wilson, "Mapping", 438. See also al-Hamdani, Ṣifat, I, 112.

(60) Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, III, 34. See also Smith, Ayyubids, II, 194, who says that it is a place W. al-Khārid.

(61) Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, V, 146 says it is a Himyarī fort, 1½ miles from Sanᶜāʾ connected with ᶜAbhalah's movement. Al-Akwaᶜ, in al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 45, footnoot 2, suggests that it might be the area between Sanᶜāʾ and Bīr al-ᶜAzab. Wilson, "Mapping", 457 believes that it is a village on the summit of the mountain of Miswar (i.e. Maswar). Maswar is a mountain area about 7 miles S.E. of Ḥajjah, Cf. Smith Ayyubids, II, 180.

(62) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855. For the locations of these places, cf. Map 3.

(63) Cf.47above.

(64) Cf. Map 3.

(65) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307.

branch of Kindah. (66) Khālid b. Sa^{c}īd b. al-^{c}Āṣ, the alms (ṣadaqah) collector of the Medinan government in the territory of Madhḥij went back to Medina. (67) Others retreated to join al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, the Medinan representative in Tihāmah, who was camping with his force in the mountains of ^{c}Akk and Ṣan^{c}ā'. (68) Those who remained within Islam from Madhḥij returned to join Farwah b. Musayk, the Prophet's representative of all Madhḥij, in al-Aḥsiyah.(69)

In all probability the retirement of the Muslim leaders from the highlands to other territories was due to the weakness of Islamic power there to protect them from ^{c}Abhalah. On the other hand, people who took sides with ^{c}Abhalah's movement declared their support for ^{c}Abhalah freely. As we have already mentioned the spread of Islam in the highland provinces had no effect on whom the governors actually were. (70) Furthermore those who were the representatives of the Medinan government, such as Khālid b. Sa^{c}īd b. al-^{c}Āṣ, and ^{c}Amr b. Ḥazm al-Ansārī, were both alms collectors and teachers, the former in the territory of Madhḥij, the latter in Najrān. They did not succeed in forming a military force from the inhabitants of the area. Therefore, these highland provinces were not under the control of the Muslims at the time of Abhalah's control over Ṣan^{c}ā'.

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(66) Ibid. For al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn territory, see Map 2,4.

(67) Ibid.

(68) Ibid.

(69) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1795; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Yāqūt, Mu^{c}jam, I, 122.

(70) Cf. 44 above.

In Ḥaḍramawt, especially in the territory of al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn, the Muslim leaders found security due to the existence of the Islamic force in this area. Islamic power was supported by some of the local inhabitants. In spite of this protection for the Muslim leaders the political situation was confused and the Muslims worried. Al-Ṭabarī (71) tellsus that the Muslims in Ḥaḍramawt were worried that ᶜAbhalah might send troops against them, or that some heretic, such as ᶜAbhalah himself, might appear there.

As for Tihāmah, some people, particularly those from ᶜAkk, a Yemeni tribe, took sides with the Medinan representative, al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, declaring their opposition to ᶜAbhalah's movement. (72) Al-Ṭāhir and some Muslims, therefore, retreated to the mountainous area of their territory.(73) In the coastal areas of Tihāmah, the political situation was different from the highlands of ᶜAkk. People there seem to have been less faithful to the Islamic authority. Some of their towns, therefore, supported ᶜAbhalah's movement. Also we shall later find them among the first rebels against the Islamic authority in their area, immediately after the Prophet's death. (74)

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(71) I, 1796. Cf. also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

(72) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854.

(73) Cf. Map 3.

(74) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1985f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254. For a detailed discussion of the Tihāmah rebellion, see chapter III, C. below.

F. The Prophet's action to put down ᶜAbhalah's regime

The Prophet first received the news of ᶜAbhalah's movement through Farwah b. Musayk, his representative with Madhḥij, when the former was busy equipping Usāmah b. Zayd's campaign, which was sent to the north of the Ḥijāz at an early stage of Abū Bakr's caliphate. Furthermore, he was suffering from the illness of which he finally died. However, the Prophet immediately fully understood the seriousness of this movement against Islam, especially at a time (10/631-2) when the new religion was just beginning to take a hold in the Yemen.

However, this unsettled situation created by ᶜAbhalah's movement in the Yemeni provinces caused the Prophet to exercise prudence in his policy against it. He was especially careful not to send any Islamic troops from Medina, or indeed any external Islamic force to the Yemen to fight ᶜAbhalah there. It seems that the Prophet believed that the movement had to be put down by an internal Yemeni force. He did, of course, utilize his authority there through ambassadors and correspondence. (75) He sent a letter to the Muslim leaders in Ḥaḍramawt ordering them to arrange for the death of ᶜAbhalah in any way possible, (76) but sent no letters to the Ḥaḍramī tribal chiefs. Perhaps the Prophet believed that only the help of the tribal chiefs in the highlands could succeed in crushing ᶜAbhalah's regime. Therefore he directed his letters to those chiefs, urging them to oppose ᶜAbhalah's movement. He wrote to ᶜĀmir b.

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(75) An idea advanced by Brockelmann, Tārīkh al-Shuᶜūb, Arabic trans. Baᶜlabakkī, 89. Cf. also al-Ṭabarī, I, 1856-8; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 288; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 844.

(76) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1855.

Shahr al-Hamdānī, a Hamdān chief, and sent Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, a Yemeni chief of Bajīlah and one of the companions, to Dhūʾl-Kalāᶜ, Dhū Murrān, Dhū Ẓulaym, Ḥimyar chiefs, and the people of Najrān, both Muslims and Christians. (77) However these chiefs were careful to avoid open conflict with ᶜAbhalah's army. They probably thought that ᶜAbhalah's movement and his coming to Ṣanᶜāʾ was only a struggle between Madhḥij and their allies against the Persian authority in the town. Although the Prophet was keen to encourage these chiefs to rise against ᶜAbhalah, they were not enthusiastic about entering into an armed struggle with ᶜAbhalah. ᶜĀmir b. Shahr al-Hamdānī the only one of these chiefs who declared his objection to ᶜAbhalah, (78) nevertheless made no military move against this movement. This attitude shown by the Hamdān chief might have been because of the alliance which existed between Hamdān and the Abnāʾ. (79) To this can be added the bad relations existing between Hamdān and Madhḥij as a result of their armed conflict over territory a short time before the spread of Islam in the Yemen. (80)

In all probability the Prophet's communications with these chiefs were not successful in urging them to enter into an armed struggle with ᶜAbhalah. Some historical sources

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(77) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I , 1857f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 308. Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 844 adds the Christians of Najrān.

(78) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1853; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, II, 792.

(79) For the alliance, see 19-20 above.

(80) Specifically in 2/623-4 at the Battle of al-Razm, cf. 20 above

mention, however, that the Yemeni chiefs to whom the Prophet had written agreed to fight ᶜAbhalah and so they met together to prepare themselves. (81) But as far as we can ascertain from the strength of the above sources or any others at our disposal these chiefs made no military campaign against ᶜAbhalah during the period he held sway in Ṣanᶜaʾ (Muḥarram - Rabīʿ I, 11/April-June, 632). There is also the fact that they did not oppose him when he was passing through their territories on his way to Ṣanᶜaʾ.(82) Furthermore, some of them did not form an attitude towards the adoption of Islam until the time of the Prophet's death. We know that an envoy of the Prophet to some Ḥimyar chiefs to whom the Prophet wrote, Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, was with Dhūʾ L-Kalāᶜ, a Ḥimyarī leader, at the time of the Prophet's death, persuading him to adopt Islam. (83) Consequently, the Prophet concentrated on communicating with the inhabitants of Ṣanᶜaʾ mainly the Abnāʾ.

Ṣanᶜaʾ, during the course of ᶜAbhalah's rule, was indeed ripe for a revolution against him. There was great disaffection in the town on the part of the inhabitants in particular among the Abnāʾ, who had been ruling the town before ᶜAbhalah's arrival. Doubtless the Abnāʾ wished to regain their authority or at least their

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(81) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1857f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 844.

(82) Especially Hamdān and inhabitants of Najrān whom ᶜAbhalah passed over their own land in his way to Ṣanᶜaʾ, as well as some areas in their territory which sympathized with ᶜAbhalah's movement. Cf. Map 3.

(83) Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 265f; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 19f; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, II. 470.

self-respect at the first available opportunity. It is most likely that the Prophet realized their positions. He therefore sent Wabr b. Yuḥannis, one of the Abnā$^{\circ}$ and one of the Companions, to the Abnā$^{\circ}$ urging them to resist ^{c}Abhalah's rule. (84) The Prophet then utilized the situation by trying to put down ^{c}Abhalah's regime through the Abnā$^{\circ}$ whose true belief in Islam was at that time doubtful. The reason this suggestion is being put forward is because of the obscurity about the exact time of their adoption of Islam. In fact there are contradictions in the historical sources regarding this question. In al-Ṭabarī, one account (85) mentions that Bādhān, the chief of al-Abnā$^{\circ}$, and his people in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\circ}$ adopted Islam in 7/628-9. Another account (86) records that it was in 10/631-2. In some biographical sources, e.g. Ibn Sa^{c}d, it is mentioned that some of the Abnā$^{\circ}$ adopted Islam during the Prophet's life-time, (87) but he gives no biographical information about Bādhān. In Ibn Ḥajar's Iṣābah, (88) there are two contradictory accounts. In the first Bādhān became a Muslim after the death of Kisrā, the Persian Emperor, who was killed in 7/628-9. The second mentions that Kisrā ordered him to negotiate with the Prophet to stop his mission (da^{c}wah) and when he was on his way to Medina, he was killed by ^{c}Abhalah. If it can be assumed that the Abnā$^{\circ}$ in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\circ}$ adopted Islam during the Prophet's life-time, it was probably

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(84) Ibn Sa^{c}d, Ṭabaqāt, V, 533, al-Ṭabarī, I,1763, 1798; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 140; Ibn Khaldūn, ^{c}Ibar, II, 844; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 1205f; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Bughyat, 19.

(85) Account of Yazīd b. Abī Ḥabīb, I,1572-5. This account also occurs in Ibn Sa^{c}d, Ṭabaqat, I, 260.

(86) That of al-Wāqidī in al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763.

(87) See the biographies of Wabr b. Yuḥannis, Fayruz al-Daylamī and Dadhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī, in Ṭabaqāt, V, 533-5.

(88) I,176, the first account has been given by Ibn Isḥāq, Ibn Hishām, al-Wāqidī and al-Ṭabarī. The second by al-Sha^{c}bī.

not before Dhū ʾL-Ḥijjah 10/March, 632. It is quite probable that they accepted Islam during the time when ᶜAbhalah held sway over Ṣanᶜāʾ (Muḥarram - Rabīᶜ I, 11/April - June, 632). There is a general agreement in the historial sources that Wabr b. Yuḥannis was the first ambassador from the Prophet to the Abnāʾ in Ṣanᶜāʾ and he was sent to them at the time when ᶜAbhalah occupied Ṣanᶜāʾ. (89) Another general agreement in the historical sources is that the Abnāʾ in Ṣanᶜāʾ were converted to Islam by Wabr. They mention that when he arrived there, Dādhawayh, one of the Abnāʾ chiefs, received him and housed him in the church of Ṣanᶜāʾ, al-Qalīs. (90) Wabr met Dādhawayh's wife, Umm Saᶜīd al-Burzakhiyyah, and recited the Quran to her, so she became a Muslim. She was the first Yemeni to adopt Islam in the Yemen followed by Fayrūz al-Daylamī, Markabūdh and Wahb b. Munabbih. (91) On the other hand. there is no mention in the historical sources at our disposal that the Abnāʾ had sent an official delegation to the Prophet in order to bring Islam to Ṣanᶜāʾ, before the appearance of ᶜAbhalah's

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(89) Cf. Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 533; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763, 1798; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79f; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, IV, 155, Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 884; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 313; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 19.

(90) Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 533; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1763; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, VI, 313; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 19.

(91) Ibid. It is unlikely that she was the first Yemeni who adopted Islam in the Yemen, we know that many of Yemenis were converted to Islam by the Prophet's envoys there. But it is most likely the authors mean the first Yemeni of al-Abnāʾ, where those who followed her, all of them from the Abnāʾ, were considered as the earliest Muslims from this community in Ṣanᶜāʾ.

movement, as other Yemenis had done. (92) Nevertheless, the first official delegation to Medina from the Abnā' to discuss their becoming Muslim took place after the assassination of ʿAbhalah, in the last few days of the Prophet's life. (93)

The Prophet's concentration on the Abnā' in Ṣanʿā' might have been because he believed that their enthusiasm was sufficient to take back control of the town. Therefore, his letters to the Abnā' contained promises that the Muslims there would help them to put ʿAbhalah's uprising down. In al-Ṭabarī (94) we read that the Prophet sent his envoy, Wabr b. Yuḥannis, to the Abnā' to ask for help from the tribes of Tamīm and Qays. At the same time he sent some companions for the purpose of resisting ʿAbhalah. (95) These communications with Ṣanʿā' were, however, taking place in great secrecy.

After these communications, the Muslims in Ṣanʿā'

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(92) For the Yemeni delegations to the Medina, see Chapter I,B,b.

(93) They sent a letter for the Prophet telling him of their adoption of Islam and of the assassination of ʿAbhalah, Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 76.

(94) Tārīkh, I, 1798. Abū'l-Fidā', Tārīkh, I, 163f, says some men from Ḥimyar and Hamdān. We know that the power in Ṣanʿā' lay between al-Abnā' and other Yemeni tribes, particularly B. Shihāb, see al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 124; Iklīl, I, 159. As for Qaysī and Tamimī power. perhaps he means here his companions, who had been sent there to work against ʿAbhalah, such as Yaʿlī b. Umayyah al-Tamīmī who arrived Ṣanʿā' with Wabr, see al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79.

(95) Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 215f.

were able to form a secret front which consisted mainly of people who wished to put down ᶜAbhalah's rule. Therefore, they planned with Shahr b. Bādhān's widow, Āzād, to assassinate ᶜAbhalah and this they did in a secret operation. (96)

There are differences in the historical sources concerning ᶜAbhalah's killers. They all agree, however, that the murder was carried out by a group consisting of some of the Abnāʾ, such as Dādhawayh and Fayrūz and others from ᶜAbhalah's followers themselves, such as Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī. (97) Although the actual assassination is not of major importance here, it is of importance nevertheless to make clear who was interested in assassinating ᶜAbhalah. In fact these people who joined together to destroy ᶜAbhalah had been themselves oppressed by his authority in Ṣanᶜāʾ. They were the Abnāʾ, particularly those who sought to regain their rule and respect in the town. (98) Also there were those from ᶜAbhalah's followers themselves, such as Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, a strong ᶜAbhalah supporter and the commander-in-chief of his army, who had ambitions to keep his high position within his tribe. (99) Also there should be

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(96) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1857-61; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 229.

(97) For Fayrūz al-Daylamī, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 115; Abū ʾl-Fidāʾ, Tārīkh, I, 164. For Fayrūz and Qays b. b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth, cf. Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 525, 534, with the addition of the name of Dadhawayh, cf. also al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 80. For Farwah b. Musayk and Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklil, VIII, 21.

(98) Mainly their leaders, such as Dādhawayh and Fayrūz.

(99) So that when he realised that ᶜAbhalah was treating him with less than respect. For Qays's ambition see 47 above and Chapter III,A below.


added the role of the Muslims who encouraged those people to resist ᶜAbhalah, especially after the spread of Islam among them.


In conclusion, therefore, ᶜAbhalah's movement in simple terms was an internal conflict consisting of some of Madhḥij and their allies led by ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb al-ᶜAnsī to remove power from the Abnāʾ in Ṣanᶜā, to settle there and take over control of the city. He claimed the prophethood so as to gain support for his conflict with the Abnāʾ by introducing a strong religious bias into his movement. ᶜAbhalah's endeavour to control Ṣanᶜāʾ was continued by Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī who declared war against the Abnāʾ immediately after the Prophet's death. (100)

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(100) For his struggle with the Abnāʾ, see Chapter III, A below.

Table 2


Mālik (Madhḥij)
Lamīs
Sa^c d al^cAshirah
Murād
Jald
Zāhir
Nājiyah
^cUllah
Ju^cfī
Sa^cb
Ḥakam
^cAbd Allāh
Radmān
^cAmr
Ḥarb
Ghuṭayf
Ḥarīm
Marrān
Musliyah
Ka^cb
al.Nakh^c
Munabbih
Yazīd
Zubayd al.Akbar
'Munabbih'
Ghanm
Tha^clabah
Awd
Kinānah
Usd
Za^cbal
al.Hārith
Ruhā^
Rabī^cah
al.Hārith
Munabbih
Ka^cb
Umayyah
Rabī^cah
Ḍabyah
^cAbd Allāh
Sulaym
Sa^cd
al.Akbar
^cAynī
Sa^cd
al.Aṣghar
^cAmr
^cĀmir
Mu^cāwiyah
^cAzīz
^cAtīk
Shihāb
Mālik
Yām
Jusham
al.Qirriyyah
Sa^cb
^cAwf
Ka^cb
^cAbhalah
(The leader of the movement)



MAP 3 THE YEMEN DURING ʿABHALAHʾS MOVEMENT

CHAPTER III

The political situation in the Yemen during the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate (11/632-3)

The sudden death of the Prophet in Rabī^{c} I, 11/June 632, was a direct reason for the spread of rebel movements throughout the Arabian Peninsula against Abū Bakr's government. The new government, however, was supported mainly by Medinans, Meccans and the people of al-Ṭā^{ɔ}if, in addition to some Arabian tribes who maintained their loyalty to the caliphate. Therefore they swore allegiance (bay^{c}ah) to the new caliph and supported him against the rebels.(1)

Some of these movements had begun during the last phase of the Prophet's life, with their leaders claiming Prophethood. These were the movements of B. Ḥanīfah in al-Yamāmah, led by the "false Prophet" Musaylimah b. Ḥabīb; of B. Asad in Najd, led by the "false Prophet" Ṭulayḥah b. Khuwaylid and that of Madhḥij in the Yemen led by ^{c}Abhalah b. Ka^{c}b al-^{c}Ansī who also claimed Prophethood. While the Prophet succeeded in putting down the latter, he was unable to suppress the others before his death. Most of the movements, however, arose after the Prophet's death.(2)

During this period the Yemen witnessed comprehensive political disorder which spread over most of its regions. Consequently, the Yemenis were divided into supporters or

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(1) Shoufanī, Al-Riddah, 77f.

(2) Al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 97ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1793ff. See also Donner, Islamic conquests, 85.

opponents of the Islamic authority there. Some of them, however, remained neutral in their attitude towards the Muslim-rebels conflict.

Three main Yemeni movements have been mentioned in our sources during the early period of Abū Bakr's reign, and are worthy of discussion here. The first is that of Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī in Ṣanᶜāᵓ. The second is the rebellion of B. Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah in Ḥaḍramawt. The third is the political disorder stirred up by ᶜAkk and al-Ashāᶜir in Tihāmah.

The following chapter will deal with these movements and their conflict with the Islamic authority there, showing the attitude of the Yemeni tribes in this struggle. In order to illustrate these movements we will study them individually, beginning with the rebellion of Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī.

A. The political situation in Ṣanᶜāᵓ [Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth's rebellion]

a. The appearance of Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth as a new rival to the Abnāᵓ

In Muḥarram, 11/April, 632, the balance of power in Ṣanᶜāᵓ changed as a result of the invasion and settlement of Madhḥij and their allies there for three months. The Abnāᵓ, however, tried under cover to regain their authority, having failed to defend it militarily. Therefore, they planned to assassinate ᶜAbhalah himself. They believed that with his death they would regain power in Ṣanᶜāᵓ, as there was no other strong competitor for the position of

ruler from among the indigenous inhabitants. But, the assassination of ᶜAbhalah and the expulsion of his followers would not in itself be enough to regain control over Ṣanᶜāʾ. This was because Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī had appeared as a new competitor to take power there, thus posing a real threat to the Abnāʾ regime. This event confirmed Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth's real thirst for power. He had joined ᶜAbhalah's revolt only to regain his high position. When he realised that ᶜAbhalah was treating him with less than respect, he immediately joined the Abnāʾ, although they had been his greatest enemies in the area.(3)

This rebellion by Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth is called "Qays's second apostasy" by some of the Arab historians who linked this rebel with the Medinan government.(4) As mentioned above, the area of Ṣanᶜā was not under Medinan control during the Prophet's life time. (5) Furthermore it had no direct relations with Medina until the Abnāʾ officially sent a letter to the Prophet concerning their adoption of Islam and the assassination of ᶜAbhalah.(6) Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth is regarded by some Arab historians as an apostate, (7) though this is not an exact description In spite of the fact that some historians do mention that

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(3) Cf. 64 above.

(4) Cf. Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255; al-Kalaᶜī, Tārīkh, 153f.

(5) Cf. 50 above.

(6) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 76. For a detailed discussion of the Abnāʾ and their adoption of Islam see 61-3 above.

(7) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

Qays went to Medina and adopted Islam [8] and some others say that he was the Medinan representative in Ṣanᶜāʾ during the Prophet's life time,[9] this is far from being true.[10] The first occasion on which it is said he adopted Islam during the Prophet's life time is only mentioned in Ibn Saᶜd.[11] However, if he really had met the Prophet and adopted Islam, he would have been mentioned as one of the Yemeni chiefs, or at least his name would have appeared among those delegates from his tribe of Madhḥij. Ibn al-Athīr [12] believed that Qays's assassination of ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb was a proof of the former's adoption of Islam during the Prophet's life time. Some sources, however, have mentioned that Qays had refused to meet the Prophet. Furthermore he became very angry when ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī requested him to do so. [13] On the other hand, he was the second most important person after ᶜAbhalah, and Commander of his army.[14] Qays's conspiracy with the Abnāʾ against ᶜAbhalah had no religious motive as Ibn al-Athīr says, but he was purely interested in political

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(8) Cf. Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 525.

(9) It is mentioned in al-Qalqashandī, Maʾāthir, I, 80.

(10) Watt, Medina, 130.

(11) Ṭabaqāt, V, 525.

(12) Usd al-Ghābah, IV, 277.

(13) Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 253f; al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1733f, III, 2365. al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 94.

(14) al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1855; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 307f.

control over Ṣanᶜā'. (15) It can be assumed that, if he had really worked against ᶜAbhalah on behalf of Islam, he would not have involved himself in his movement at all and pursued the Abnā', trying to kill some of them and pushing others out of Ṣanᶜā' immediately after the Prophet's death. This is particularly clear if we bear in mind the fact that the Abnā' at that time were Muslims, and he would have been aware of their political weakness. Also in the meantime the Medinan government was more concerned with its own problems after the Prophet's death and was in no position to intervene in the affairs of Ṣanᶜā'. In simple terms, Qays had done all that for the sake of assuming power there, following the same aim as his predecessor, ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb, and co-operating with people who had no relations with Islam (16) against those who had adopted Islam, i.e. the Abnā'.

As for al-Qalqashāndī, (17) he mentions that the Prophet appointed Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaqhūth over Ṣanᶜā'. The historical sources which record the Medinan representatives of Ṣanᶜā' either during the Prophet's or Abū Bakr's time, however, do not refer to Qays's governorship at all. (18) As we mentioned above (19) Ṣanᶜā', until ᶜAbhalah's occupation, was under the control of the Abnā'. When the latter succeeded in the assassination of ᶜAbhalah,

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(15) Cf. 64 above.

(16) He co-operated with the remainder of ᶜAbhalah's followers, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; al-Masᶜūdī, Tanbīh, 277; Ibn Khaldūn, Ibar, II, 861; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(17) Maᵓāthir, I, 86.

(18) See Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 96f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1750, 1983; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 140; al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 227; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 22f; Qurrat, I, 63ff.

(19) Cf. 50 above.

the town remained without leadership. On the other hand, the longest period between the assassination of ᶜAbhalah and the Prophet's death recorded in historical sources is five days. (20) Therefore there could not have been enough time for the ambassador of the Abnāᵓ to reach the Prophet before his death so as to appoint either Qays or anyone else over Ṣanᶜāᵓ.

Qays's adoption of Islam during ᶜAbhalah's occupation over Ṣanᶜāᵓ is also doubtful. His relations with the Muslims who came from Medina, such as Wabr b. Yuḥannis or those who adopted Islam from the Abnāᵓ in Ṣanᶜāᵓ such as Fayrūz al-Daylamī and Dādhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī revolved simply around the question of the planned assassination of ᶜAbhalah. (21) When the Abnāᵓ contacted him and asked him to join them against ᶜAbhalah, he immediately agreed without any hesitation because he was angry with him for the way he had scorned and discredited him. (22) So events proved that, though Qays had met and co-operated with some of the Abnāᵓ to assassinate ᶜAbhalah, it was a temporary sort of understanding, while ᶜAbhalah was in Ṣanᶜāᵓ. However, after they had succeeded in assassinating ᶜAbhalah in Rabīᶜ I, 11/June, 632, political differences started to flare up in Ṣanᶜāᵓ over the question of who was to be in power. Actually that rivalry developed gradually from secret conflict to open and armed struggle which ended in Qays's defeat and the entrance of Muslim troops into Ṣanᶜāᵓ for the first time.

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(20) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 115; in al-Ṭabarī, I, 1798; one day in another account, I,1868, Abū Bakr received the news about ᶜAbhalah's assassination at the end of Rabīᶜ I, 11/June, 632.

(21) Al-Ṭabarī, I,1856; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II,288; Ibn Kathīr, Bidayah, VI,308.

(22) Ibid.

b. The inhabitants of Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-ɔ}$ and their attitude towards the rebellion

The inhabitants of Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-ɔ}$ themselves had nothing to do with Qays's movement. As far as we know, they did not refrain from paying the alms (ṣadaqah) nor did they rebel against Islamic authority, as was the case in Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmah. We know that the area was free from alms collectors, who returned to Medina when ^{c}Abhal̂ah moved in.(23) On the other hand, there was no official Islamic authority in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-ɔ}$ during that period to justify the inhabitants' rebellion. Furthermore the few Muslims there, other than the Abnā$^{-ɔ}$, played no role in these events until caliphal troops entered Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-ɔ}$. It is unlikely that the Abnā$^{-ɔ}$ committed apostasy because the Medinan government was their main supporter in their armed struggle, either against ^{c}Abhalah's or Qays's rebellion. There is no doubt that they were convinced that the help of the Muslims was essential for their existence, especially after ^{c}Abhalah's attack, when the local Yemeni force deserted them. Perhaps they felt that Qays b. ^{c}Abd Yaghūth's intention was to assume power in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-ɔ}$, a thing which made them more strongly linked to Medina. Therefore it was with the utmost regret that they received the news of the Prophet's death.(24)

The relations between the Islamic government and the inhabitants of Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-ɔ}$ other than the Abnā$^{-ɔ}$ were indeed obscure, even as events unfolded themselves. They

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(23) I.e. Khālid b. Sa^{c}īd b. al-^{c}Āṣ, and ^{c}Amr b. Ḥazm, the former with Madhḥij and the latter in Najrān, cf. Table 1.

(24) Al-Diyārb̂akrī, Tārīkh, II, 202. See also al-Akwa^{c}, Wathā$^{-ɔ}$iq, 166.

took no part in Qays's rebellion and historical sources do not mention them as a power who played a major role during it. In fact those who reported the rebellion in the town were ᶜAbhalah's followers themselves; these hailed from al-Jawf and Najrān and were led by Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghuth, the general commander of ᶜAbhalah's troops. (25) However, there are no grounds for linking their rebellion with the inhabitants of Ṣanᶜāᵓ, because ᶜAbhalah's followers were not from the indigenous population of the town. That is in addition to the fact that they had not directed neither of their rebellions against the Islamic authority. (26)

c. <u>The open struggle between Qays and the Abnāᵓ</u>

This struggle was contemporary with the deterioration of the political situation in the Arabian Peninsula after the Prophet's death Rabīᶜ I, 11/June, 632.

Control of Ṣanᶜāᵓ was ostensibly in the hands of the Abnāᵓ after ᶜAbhalah's assassination, for the following reasons: firstly, they had been in control until ᶜAbhalah's entrance into Ṣanᶜāᵓ in Muḥarram 11/April, 632; secondly, they constituted the majority of the inhabitants of Ṣanᶜāᵓ; and thirdly there was no strong rivalry from the indigenous population of Ṣanᶜāᵓ at that time.

The effect of Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaqhuth's presence in Ṣanᶜāᵓ was that the Abnāᵓ could not appoint any one of

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(25) For the followers of ᶜAbhalah, see Chapter II-C. above.

(26) Cf. 51 above; 78 below.

themselves as leader there to succeed Shahr b. Bādhān, their former Chief. (27) In all probability they might have thought it better to have a governor appointed by the Medinan government, especially after they had adopted Islam. (28) Al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī one of the Abnāʾ in Ṣanʿā , says that "We assassinated ʿAbhalah and our affairs in Ṣanʿāʾ were as before, but we sent for Muʿādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's ambassador to the Yemen, and agreed upon him". (29) In the account of al-Kalāʿī, (30) Fayrūz and Dādhawahy, the most powerful chiefs of the Abnāʾ, gave Qays b. Abd Yaghūth power and he therefore was named amir of Ṣanʿāʾ. However, it does not mean that they accepted Qays as a ruler of the town. It seems that he emerged as a chief among the Abnāʾ rivalling their power after ʿAbhalah's assassination. Consequently Qays appeared as a strong rival, challenging the Abnāʾ for the authority there. We do not know exactly when the open struggle for power started between the two sides, Qays and the Abnāʾ, but it seems to have begun as a conflict incited by the political vacuum which existed in the period after ʿAbhalah's assassination. Thus it is most likely that Qays was an important figure among the Abnāʾ as early as that, and that they therefore offered him restricted power over Ṣanʿāʾ,

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(27) Who was killed by ʿAbhalah in Battle of Shaʿūb, Cf.50 above.

(28) Immediately after ʿAbhalah's assassination, cf.63 above.

(29) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739- Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 310.

(30) Tārīkh, 153.

albeit shared with themselves. Meanwhile they sent to Mu^{c}ādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's ambassador, at that time absent in Ḥaḍramawt, requesting him to solve the problem of the political vacuum left in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$ after ^{c}Abhalah's assassination. (31)

The historical sources differ about the time when Qays b. ^{c}Abd Yaghūth declared his rebellion against the Abnā$^{\supset}$. Some of them link the time to when the inhabitants of Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$ learned about the news of the Prophet's death, (32) while others think that his rebellion and enmity towards the Abnā$^{\supset}$ was declared immediately after his assassination of Dādhawayh, one of the Abnā$^{\supset}$'s chiefs. (33) We know that the Abnā$^{\supset}$ at that time believed that their most important supporter was the Medinan government. (34) Therefore, the Prophet's death and the deterioration of the political situation in Medina and the Arabian Peninsula undoubtedly affected the Abnā$^{\supset}$ position in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$. On the other hand this situation had indeed encouraged Qays to declare his rebellion seriously against the Abnā$^{\supset}$.

Qays b. ^{c}Abd Yaghūth secretly send word to the remainder of ^{c}Abhalah's troops, promising them that he would regain authority from the Abnā$^{\supset}$, (35) although meanwhile he was

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(31) Al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz's account, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 310.

(32) Al-Mas^{c}ūdī, Tanbīh, 277; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 225; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VI, 331. See also al-Akwa^{c}, Wathā$^{\supset}$iq, 163.

(33) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989f (citing al-Dathīnī); al-Kalā^{c}ī, Tārīkh, 153; Ibn Khaldūn, ^{c}Ibar, II, 861.

(34) Cf. 76 above; 175 below.

(35) They had retreated to the mountains between San^{c}ā$^{\supset}$ and Najrān, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; al-Mas^{c}ūdī, Tanbīh, 277; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255; Ibn Khaldūn, ^{c}Ibar, II, 861.

planning to assassinate the Abnā' chiefs. He succeeded in assassinating Dādhawayh, but failed to destroy others such as Fayrūz al-Daylamī and Jushaysh who fled to Jabal Khawlān, east of Ṣanᶜā', taking refuge with Fayrūz's uncles from Khawlān. (36)

When the rest of ᶜAbhalah's followers joined him, Qays declared his rebellion in Sanᶜā' and he increased his power. (37) He could only justify his action by a call to get rid of the Abnā' and drive them away from the Yemen. So he sent to the chiefs of Ḥimyar telling them that the Abnā' constituted a threat in their country and were annoying them. "If you leave them", he said, "they will carry on ruling you. So, in my opinion, we have to kill their chiefs and push them out of our country."(38) We are in no doubt that the account mentioned above is true, since it is given in more than one source without having been rejected by others. There is some doubt, however, concerning the actual truth of Qays's message to the Ḥimyar chiefs. The question which must be asked is whether Qays, by sending the letter, really meant to push the Abnā' out of the Yemen as a national leader, or just to justify his rebellion towards the local power. It seems that the second suggestion is more likely. Qays was not originally from Ṣanᶜā', in addition to the fact that he co-operated with them, i.e. the Abnā', to assassinate

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(36) Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 534f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(37) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 861; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(38) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

ᶜAbhalah. Also they had been friends until receiving the news about the Prophet's death. It can be accepted that if Qays had believed the Abnāʾ were not in conflict with him, he would not have killed them. Both al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr. (39) suggest that when Qays declared his rebellion in Ṣanᶜāʾ and failed to assassinate Fayrūz al-Daylamī, he made for the Abnāʾ and separated them into three groups : those who did not oppose him were left in Ṣanᶜāʾ, while he separated those who followed Fayrūz into two groups, the first was sent to Aden to be transported to Persia by sea, the second were sent home to Persia over land.

d. The local attitude towards the rebellion

Those people of Ṣanᶜāʾ other than the Abnāʾ had shown neutrality in their attitude towards the rebellions. The Abnāʾ, therefore found themselves facing the rebels alone in Ṣanᶜāʾ. Thus during either ᶜAbhalah's movement or Qays's rebellion, the security of the town was always dependent upon the power of the Abnāʾ. Therefore neither ᶜAbhalah nor Qays had been able to take over the town until they had eradicated the chief of the Abnāʾ.(40) It is true that it was the duty of the Abnāʾ as a whole to defend Ṣanᶜāʾ from any attack because of their connection with the town. (41) All that, however, did not contradict in any way

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(39) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(40) ᶜAbhalah entered Ṣanᶜāʾ after he killed Shahr b. Bādhān, see 50 above and Qays tried to get rid of the Abnāʾ chiefs, cf. 78 above.

(41) They were in power, in addition to that, the town was the main centre of their rule, Cf6, 19, 50 above.

the fact that the inhabitants, other than the Abnā', should not stand by the latter's side in the struggle against the take-over of their town by Qays, or at least to defend their belongings and homes, which the invaders, Qays and his followers, had shared with them. (42)

The only justification would appear to be that the Ṣanᶜānīs, other than the Abnā' and especially those of Qaḥṭān, were not pleased with the rule of the Abnā'. In spite of this, those historical sources which mention the struggle between Qays and the Abnā' say nothing about the role of these Qaḥṭānīs in this event. Perhaps they were sympathetic towards Qays and his followers against the Abnā' and it is most likely that they took sides with Qays after the assassination of ᶜAbhalah. Therefore Qays was able to challenge the Abnā' at an early stage, before the remnants of ᶜAbhalah's followers arrived in Ṣanᶜā'. Furthermore, there are some sources which indicate that Qays was supported by some members of the tribes, to the chiefs of which Abū Bakr had written urging them to do so. (43)

In fact the struggle was mainly confined to the question of assuming power in Ṣanᶜā'. These events proved that those of the Abnā' in power were the only ones who lost and suffered from these events, while the rest of the inhabitants, i.e. the Arabs, were not in any way affected by the occupation.

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(42)Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1867.

(43)cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1991; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

This explains their non-appearance in the account of the events in the sources. Therefore, the local population of Ṣanʿāʾ, Qaḥṭān, were not obliged during the rebellion to support the Abnāʾ in order to regain power for them. That attitude on the part of Qaḥṭān was undoubtedly the result of the disaffection of their members in Ṣanʿāʾ vis-à-vis the rule of the Abnāʾ. Bad feeling, therefore, developed on the part of the Abnāʾ towards Qaḥṭān and was to produce continual conflict between them. (44)

On the other hand, Fayrūz al-Daylamī, the Abnā's chief at this stage, had had no support from other local forces, except from his uncles Khawlān. (45) Each group, Qays and the Abnāʾ, concentrated mainly on getting Ḥimyar to its side, so the letters sent by Abū Bakr to muster support for the Abnāʾ and by Qays in support of his own cause were sent to their chiefs. Abū Bakr wrote to the chiefs of Ḥimyar urging them to assist the Abnāʾ. (46) When Qays heard about Abū Bakr's letter, he immediately sent to these same chiefs. (47) They, however, had already formed a clear attitude towards Qays's rebellion which was outlined by one of them, Dhūʾl-Kalāʿ, who replied to Qays's previous message saying, (48) "We are not involved here in any

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(44) For the Abnāʾ - Qaḥṭān struggle in Ṣanʿāʾ, see 306-7, 314, 336 below.

(45) Khawlān al-ʿĀliyah, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 1991; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(46) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255. See also al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 163.

(47) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(48) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989.

way, they are your friends i.e. the Abnā' and you are their friends." Such an answer clearly illustrates their attitude which was one of complete non-cooperation. The Ḥimyarī chiefs had definitely looked on the struggle between Qays and the Abnā' as something which would not affect their interests, otherwise they would have had a different attitude. On the other hand, these Ḥimyarī chiefs did not see that struggle as an assault on the rights of the Abnā' who adopted Islam by sending to the Prophet after ʿAbhalah's assassination (49) so that they could be regarded as Muslims. The fact that some of these chiefs had adopted Islam does not mean that they were obliged to support or protect any Muslim group in the area. (50)

Hamdān, the other power in the area, must have played a significant role in these events for the following reasons : firstly, they had been in the same alliance with the Abnā' and the enemies of Madhḥij a very short time earlier, (51) secondly, they were the only tribe in the area who opposed ʿAbhalah's attack against Ṣanʿā' by open declaration. (52)

However, during the time Qays declared his enmity against the Abnā' in Ṣanʿā' we cannot discern any role played by the Hamdānīs in this event. The direct reason for

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(49) See the Abnā''s adoption of Islam, 61-3 above.

(50) The events proved that they had a neutral attitude towards the movement of ʿAbhalah and Qays, cf. 59, 81-2 above.

(51) For their alliance with Hamdān, see 19-20 above. For Madhḥij-Hamdān struggle, see the battle of al-Razm, 20 above.

(52) Cf. 59 above.

their non-involvement is unknown. It is obvious, however, that the Hamdānī chiefs at that time were heavily involved in solving their internal problems. The situation in their region was one verging on Civil War amongst their clans, due to their attitude towards Islam. (53) Furthermore, the spread of the Ṣanᶜā' crisis to their region was as a result of the dispersal of ᶜAbhalah's followers there. (54)

The attitude of the chiefs of Ḥimyar and Hamdān was not to support the Abnā' during the rebellion of Qays. The Abnā' thus sought help from other tribes in other areas. Fayrūz al-Daylamī, a chief of the Abnā' at this stage, sent to B. ᶜUqayl b. Rabīᶜah and ᶜAkk asking for their help. (55) These tribes responded immediately to the call, wiping out Qays's men and freeing those Abnā' families who had been sent by Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth to Persia. (56) Furthermore they went and joined Fayrūz, who was thus strengthened by them. So Fayrūz led them and fought Qays and his followers on the outskirts of Ṣanᶜā'. Qays was defeated and subsequently withdrew to the mountains, where he joined the remaining troops of ᶜAbhalah who were led by ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdīkarib al-Zubaydī. (57)

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(53) In consequence of this situation some of the Hamdānī chiefs declared their support to Abū Bakr, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 33f. Cf. also biography of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Mālik al-Arḥabī, Hamdānī chief of Bakīl, in Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 124.

(54) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 861; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 230.

(55) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1993f; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 861.

(56) Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, I, 1993-4; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 861.

(57) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1993-4.

B. The political situation in Ḥaḍramawt

In the early period of the spread of Islam in Ḥaḍramawt in 9-10/630-2, there had been no external invasion to challenge the structure of the inhabitants of the region, as had happened in Ṣanᶜā'. (58) The inhabitants of the area were a mixture of Kindah, who had settled in the highlands in the northern part and the west, and the Ḥaḍramī tribes, who had concentrated in the central area.(59) The advent of Islam in the area, however, created a new force, exemplified by the Medinan representatives, who succeeded in forming a local army consisting of some of the inhabitants of the area.(60) This force became apparent during the time of ᶜAbhalah's revolt, when the leading Muslims retreated to Ḥaḍramawt. (61)

In spite of the fact that those representatives left Medina without any army to assist them in their task, some of them managed to form a local force, mainly consisting of several local tribes from those areas in the region where they were working. In Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmah the representatives relied upon such armies to suppress those who abstained from paying alms (ṣadaqah) or those who revolted against Islam.

In Rabīᶜ I, 11/June, 632, the nature of events differed

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(58) See Chapter II, D, "extension of ᶜAbhalah's movement", above.

(59) Cf. Map 2.

(60) For "Their role during the struggle between the Muslims and B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah, cf. 94-7 below.

(61) When Muᶜādh and Abū Mūsā retreated to al-Sakūn and al-Sakāsik, cf. 55 above.

from one area to another. The rebellion which took place in Ḥaḍramawt was of a different kind from that in Ṣanᶜāᵓ. In simple terms the former was a result of the refusal of some Muslims to follow Islamic teachings, while in Ṣanᶜāᵓ it was an internal political struggle, as mentioned earlier. (62)

a. The roots of the rebellion

This rebellion among B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah which took place in Ḥaḍramawt during the early period of Abū Bakr's caliphate has its roots in the last phase of the Prophet's life time. It started as a conflict between kings of B. Walīᶜah and the Prophet when the former declared their support for ᶜAbhalah's movement. (63) The open struggle, however, began gradually as a conflict between some elements of B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah and Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī, who represented the Medinan government in Ḥaḍramawt. (64)

Our sources give two reasons for the beginning of this conflict : firstly, B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah and the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt disagreed about how the alms (sadaqah),

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(62) For a detailed discussion of Qays's rebellion, see A above.

(63) Cf. 47 above.

(64) The Prophet sent Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī to Ḥaḍramawt in 10/631-2 as an alms-collector (jāmiᶜ ṣadaqah), with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt. After the Prophet's death in Rabīᶜ I, 11/June, 632, Abū Bakr annexed Kindah, i.e. B. Muᶜawiyah, and al-Ṣadif to Ziyād, see Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 271; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 529; Futūḥ, 109; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 97; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istiᶜāb, II, 533; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, II, 205; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f37a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f112a; Kifāyah, 49; See also Shoufānī, Riddah, 90f.

which the Prophet ordered, should be distributed, with the result that one of the B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah clans, namely B. Walīᶜah, accused Ziyād b.Labīd of collusion with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt against them; (65) secondly, Ziyād refused to return one of B.ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah's she-camel which he stamped as alms, despite the mediation of one of their chiefs, Ḥārithah b. Surāqah. (66) This refusal, however, appears in a line of poetry by this chief:

يَمنعُها شيخٌ بخديهِ الشَّيبُ مُلمَّعٌ كما يُلمَّعُ الثوبُ

An old man [Ziyād] with grey hair on his cheeks
is keeping her [the she-camel] ;
hair shining like a garment.(67)

The above events probably did occur, given the reliability of the sources that mention them. But, we cannot accept them as direct reasons for the rebellion of B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah against the Muslim authority there. In the first account the conflict took place between two local tribal groups, so Ziyad was aloof from this strife. However, he found himself involved in it when B. Walīᶜah accused him of colluding against them with the other party. In the second, the matter mentioned did not constitute a casus belli, if indeed both sides were truly honest in avoiding military action.

On the other hand, we must not forget the relations

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(65) Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim's account, in al-Ṭabarī,I,2000f. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil,II,257; al-Ḥāmid, Tārīkh, I,152.

(66) Kathīr b. al-Ṣalt's narrative, in al-Ṭabarī,I,2001f. See also al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 109f; Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, III,69f; Anon, Tārīkh, f22a-b; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar,II, 533; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil,II,257; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah,V, 96f. See also al-Ḥāmid,I,151f.

(67) See al-Ṭabarī, I,2002; Ibn ᶜAsākir. Tahdhīb,II,70: Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar,II,533. Cf. also al-Ḥamīd,I,152.

of the chiefs of B. Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah with the Prophet when they first met him in Medina. This probably leads us to believe that their dealings with him then have some connection with their role in leading the rebellious movement in Ḥaḍramawt. Although these chiefs were enjoying the strength of their influence in Ḥaḍramawt, the Prophet did not pay them as much attention as he did with other less powerful tribes in the region when he met them in Medina. (68) The Prophet rebuked him for their smart clothes. (69) He also refused the claim of al-Ashᶜath b. Qays, chief of B. al-Ḥārith b. Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah that they were the sons of Ākil al-Murār and that the Prophet was also his son. The Prophet replied that they were Banūʾl Naḍr b. Kinānah on the father's side and that the mother's line was unimportant. (70) Al-Ashᶜath was far from pleased. Perhaps he was not expecting such a reply from the Prophet. He therefore warned his people not to mention the reply to anybody and threatened those who did with eighty lashes. (71) Even the Kings of B.Walīᶜah did not establish good relations with the Prophet when they met him in Medina and they left in total disagreement with him. (72)

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(68) For the tribal delegations to the Medina, see Ibn Saᶜd Tabaqāt, I, 291,ff; Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 221ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1717ff. See also 28 - 32 above.

(69) Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 225; Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 328, al-Ṭabarī, I, 1739; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 97f.

(70) Ibid.

(71) Ibid.

(72) For the B. Walīᶜah delegation, see Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 350.

The Prophet, however, was on good terms with the Chiefs and delegates of other tribes who came from Ḥaḍramawt. He warmly received the delegation of Tujīb and rewarded them more than other delegations. (73) When Wā'il b. Ḥujr, the Chief of the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt, arrived in Medina, the Prophet greeted him by calling for the salāh jāmi'ah, a prayer celebrated on a special occasion, and appointed Mu'āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān as a special companion to him. (74) Furthermore, Wā'il was recognised by the Prophet as paramount chief over all Ḥaḍramawt. (75) A modern scholar (76) has suggested that Islam attracted bit by bit the subordinates among the Arabian tribes. If that was the case, the Prophet probably practised it when dealing with the powerless people in Ḥaḍramawt.

It is evident from some accounts that the Ḥaḍramīs were unable to regain their lands from some of B. Mu'āwiyah of Kindah. They therefore complained to the Prophet when they met him in Medina. Ibn al-Athīr (77) tells us that two persons, a tribesman from Ḥaḍramawt tribe and another from B. Mu'āwiyah of Kindah, appeared before the Prophet seeking his ruling upon a piece of land which each declared to be his. Eventually the Prophet ruled that it belonged to the

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(73) Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 327; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 91. See also 28 above

(74) Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 349; al-Ahdalī Nathr, 108.

(75) Ibn Sa'd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 351; Ḥamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 132.

(76) Arnold, Preaching of Islam, Arabic trans. Ḥasan, 'Ābdīn and Naḥrāwī, 43.

(77) Usd, I, 115, in the biography of I mru' al-Qays b. 'Ābis, Cf. also the biography of Rabī' b. 'Idān, ibid, ii, 170.

Ḥaḍrami. Even Wā'il b. Ḥujr himself was unable to protect his own land from some of the chiefs of Kindah. He therefore asked the Prophet to get it back for him and so the Prophet did, promising him that he would guarantee its protection. (78)

It is obvious from our sources that the Ḥaḍramī delegates left Medina with a guarantee from the Prophet for the protection of their properties, further confirming their acquisition of the lands, while the Kindah returned without any such guarantee. It can be assumed that tribal power in Ḥaḍramawt at that time was centered in Kindah, in particular around B. Muᶜāwiyah. (79) Thus when Islam spread throughout Ḥaḍramawt some inhabitants, mainly those from less powerful tribes, gathered around Ziyād b. Labīd to form an Islamic army in the area. This force appeared at the beginning of the rebellion as a local power beside Ziyād b. Labīd, the Medinan representative in Ḥaḍramawt. (80) Consequently the people of Ḥaḍramawt were mostly divided into two factions : the first represented by B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah and those who followed them from Kindah; the second consisting of Muslim officials and those who supported them from other tribes in the area such as B. Ashras of Kindah and the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt. (81)

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(78) See 32 above.

(79) For their nasab, cf. Table 3.

(80) Cf 90 ff below.

(81) For buṭūn of Kindah, see Table 3.

The rebellion was confined to the territory of B. Mu^{c}āwiyah al-Riyāḍ, Maḥjar al-Zurqān, Tarīm, and al-Nujayr. (82) There were, besides, minor battles which took place in the villages of that territory whose occupants followed the rebels. (83) The fact that these took place is itself a proof of their rebellion, while other areas were not involved in it.

b. Development of the conflict to armed struggle

This conflict between Ziyād b. Labīd and B. ^{c}Amr b. Mu^{c}āwiyah developed gradually. It had begun as a personal conflict and ended in armed struggle. Ziyād displayed in this conflict a rigid attitude which B. ^{c}Amr b. Mu^{c}āwiyah could not accept; the parties therefore, could not settle their differences. According to one account (84) Ziyād had been seen returning a she-camel after it had been changed for another one, something which weakened his position among his people. So B. ^{c}Amr b. Mu^{c}āwiyah explained such rigidity on the part of Ziyād as something unacceptable in their own area. Therefore, the owner of the she-camel declared loudly, "You B. ^{c}Amr in al-Riyād, I have been unjustly treated and humiliated. The humble one is he whose right is denied in his own country. (85)

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(82) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002-10; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258f; Yaqūt, Mu^{c}jam, III, 136f; also cf. Map 4.

(83) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2007, Ḥamīdu ̂llāh. Wathā^{ɔ}iq, 272f.

(84) Kathīr b. al-Salt's account, in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002.

(85) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258.

As far as we can see, Ziyad's inflexibility stems from a reason other than that of the she-camel affair. Changing the she-camel for another would not itself have been serious enough to discredit him. On the contrary it would have attracted others to him, as it is something which does not contradict the Prophet's teaching and administration, (86) especially if it had been given to him by mistake, as the owner declared. (87) It is believed that such rigidity on the part of Ziyād had other causes. One of these causes might be the disgust which he felt, as indeed did all Muslims, towards the Kings of B. Walī^{c}ah, of B. ^{c}Amr b. Mu^{c}āwiyah, as a result of the Prophet's curse on them during the last phase of his life time. (88) Furthermore, Ziyād was feeling strong at the beginning of the conflict, in addition to the fact that he was urged by some of the tribes who encouraged him to fight B. ^{c}Amr b. Mu^{c}āwiyah. So with the encouragement of al-Sakūn, Ziyād invaded B. ^{c}Amr b. Mu^{c}āwiyah immediately after the event of the she-camel. (89) Consequently, the conflict between the two sides further developed into open warfare. As a result, some of B. Mu^{c}awiyah agreed among themselves

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(86) For the Prophet's instruction to Mu^{c}ādh b. Jabal, when he sent him to the Yemen, as a chief of the Medinan representatives there, cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 260; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 83; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 18.

(87) For the discussion between Ziyād and the owner of the she-camel see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2001f.

(88) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2000; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamīl, II, 257.

(89) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamīl, II, 258.

to abstain from paying alms (ṣadaqah). Others, however, such as Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ and Imruʾ al-Qays b. ᶜĀbis(90) joined Ziyād b. Labīd, the Medinan representative, and advised him to invade B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah and their followers who had settled in their own pasture-land (maḥjar). (91) Ziyād duly invaded them by night, directing his attack on B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah, who represented the backbone of the rebels of Kindah. The four Kings, B. Waliᶜah, were killed in the attack, as well as their sister al-ᶜAmardah. (92)

In spite of the victory of Ziyād and his followers over B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah, the pursuing of armed conflict was difficult and terrible for both sides. After this battle al-Ashᶜath b. Qays, Chief of B. al-Hārith b. Muᶜāwiyah, emerged as the leader of a rebellion among B. Muᶜawiyah themselves. It seems that the direct reason he was involved in armed struggle was to defend his relatives from B. ᶜAmr b. Muᶜāwiyah, who had taken refuge after being defeated by Ziyād's troops.(93)

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(90) For Shuaḥbīl's attitude, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258f; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 862. For Imruʾ al-Qays, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2005; Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 69f; Ibn Ḥazm; Jamharat, 428f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 115.

(91) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258; Maḥjar means land owned and protected by powerful chieftains as private pasture for their camels and sheep; see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004; Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, III, 136f. See also Landberg, Daṭînois, I, 360f.

(92) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 109f; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 111; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2005; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 428; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 116; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 862.

(93) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 110; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2005; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 111; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 862. For the blood relation between them, see Table 3. .

Before that al-Ash^{c}ath had led the rebels from his own people, those who abstained from paying the alms (ṣadaqah) to Ziyād. However, al-Ash^{c}ath b. Qays was not directly involved with Ziyād b. Labīd in the fighting. He declared "we will keep our money in our own hands and will not pay it, and will be the last to pay. "(94) He also refused to give his oath of allegiance to Abū Bakr saying "As for you (Ziyād), we have heard your speech and praise for that man (Abū Bakr) and if people agree on him we will give him our oath of allegiance."(95) At this stage al-Ash^{c}ath was speaking as a powerful man by virtue of his being of the Kindah and with strong influence. He shouted out against one of his people who called upon them not to rebel against Ziyād.(96) He also replied to one who threatened him with Ziyād by saying, "Who said that Ziyād is of the same standing as myself? Would it not please Ziyād to give him refuge." (97)

This belief of al-Ash^{c}ath was the same as that of these others in the Arabian Peninsula who abstained from paying alms during the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate. They thought that the Medinan government would not be as powerful as during the lifetime of the Prophet. (98) Perhaps

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(94) Ibn Asākir, Tahdhīb, III, 69f.

(95) Cf. Hamīdullāh, Wathā^{ɔ}iq,272f, quoting of al-Wāqidī.

(96) See the biography of ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Yazīd in Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 96f.

(97) Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Tahdhīb, III, 69.

(98) For these events, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 103-9; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1870ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 231-53; al-Diyārbakrī, II, 201ff. See also Shoufanī, Al-Riddah, 77ff; Donner, 85-9.

the long distance between Ḥaḍramawt and Medina might have encouraged al-Ash^{c}ath to rebel. He proclaimed "All the Arabs have returned to what they had been previously worshipping and we are in an area distant from Abū Bakr, so he cannot send troops against us." (99)

In spite of the fact that al-Ash^{c}ath abstained from paying alms and pledging his own allegiance to Abū Bakr, he did not declare his apostasy openly. (100) On the other hand, Ziyād could not force al-Ash^{c}ath to pay alms or to give his oath of allegiance (bay^{c}ah) to Abū Bakr. It is most likely that Ziyād was avoiding an armed conflict with al-Ash^{c}ath himself. But, Ziyād's invasion of B. ^{c}Amr b. Mu^{c}āwiyah inflamed al-Ash^{c}ath, who duly protested against that action by urging the Kindah tribes to fight Ziyād and his followers. Near Tarīm the armies met; the Muslims were defeated and retreated to the town. (101)

c. Ziyād's supporters:

According to al-Ṭabarī,(102) even in this battle Ziyād depended entirely upon the local force for support. These events took place in Kindah territory, thus explaining why members of this tribe had a different attitude towards them. While B. Mu^{c}āwiyah of Kindah were representing the rebels, the other branch, B. Ashras, were mostly representing the power that supported Ziyād b. Labīd. (103)

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(99) Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Tahdhīb, III,69.

(100) Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Tahdhīb, III,69; al-Kalā^{c}ī, Tārīkh, 165.

(101) Ḥamīdullāh, Wathā^{ɔ}iq, 273; for the location, see Map 4.

(102) I, 2006 (citing Kathīr b. al-Ṣalt)

(103) Cf. Table 3 .

The latter branch protected the Muslim leaders who had left the Yemen highland for Ḥaḍramawt, as mentioned above. (104) At the time of the event of the she-camel B. Ashras, particularly al-Sakūn, had stayed on Ziyād's side. As their poet said:

لَعَمرى وما عَمْرى بِعُوضةِ جانبٍ لَيَجْتَلبَنْ منها المرارَ بنو عمرِو
كَذِبتُمُ وبيتِ اللهِ لا تمنعونَهَا زِياداً وقد جِئْنَا زِياداً على قَدْرِ

Upon my life - and my life is not often upon it;

B. ᶜAmr will indeed bring bitterness upon themselves because of her (the she-camel);

You are liars, by the house of God, you will not keep her from Ziyād;

We have arrived at the right time (to support Ziyād); (105)

ونحنُ نصرنا الدِّينَ إذ ضلَّ قومُنا شَقاءً وشايعنا ابنَ أُمِّ زيادِ
ولم نَبْغِ عن حقِّ البياضِى مَذْحِلاً وكان تُقى الرحمنِ افضلَ زادِى

We supported the Faith, while our people went astray;

In their wretchedness and we have declared our support -for (Ziyād) ;

We have sought no reward for (supporting) the right of al-Bayāḍī (Ziyād)

Piety is my best provision; (106)

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(104) Cf. 55 above.

(105) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2004.

(106) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 109.

According to Abū Marzūq al-Tujībī (107) not even one man from Tujīb, a branch of B. Ashras, abandoned the Faith. Al-Kalāᶜī (108) also mentions that nobody from Qatīrah, also of B. Ashras, had abandoned the Faith either. The latter tribe was on the side of the Islamic army in the course of the armed conflict; therefore they were mentioned in the poetry of Kindah as enemies :

صبـــاحُ ســـوءٍ لبنـى قَتِيـْـرَةَ وللاميـــرِ مـن بنـــى المغِيـرة

What an evil morning for B. Qatīrah;
And for the prince from B. al-Mughīrah (al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah) : (109)

On the other hand, ᶜUkāshah b. Thawr, the Medinan representative among B. Ashras, al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn,(110) did not figure in these events. This leads us to believe that these tribes did not rebel against the Islamic authority in their territory. Nevertheless, that does not mean that these tribes followed Ziyād in his struggle with the rebels completely for the simple reason that there are some references to the fact that some of B. Ashras joined B. Muᶜāwiyah.(111)

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(107) Al-Diyārb-akrī, Tārīkh, II, 202; al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 91.

(108) Tārīkh, 166.

(109) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2007.

(110) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1999, has ᶜUkāshah b. Miḥṣan which is patently wrong, see Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, III, 1080; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228; Usd, IV, 2; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqat, 22; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 49; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 54. **Cf. Table 1 .**

(111) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2006; Hamīdullāh, Wathā'iq, 273.

However, we can confidently say that their areas remained relatively uninvolved in the Kindah rebellion, which makes us believe that the tribe, generally speaking, did not rebel against the Medinan authority.

Ziyād b. Labīd was also given support from some of the Ḥaḍrami elements who had stood by his side at the beginning of the conflict.(112) Their territory was not involved in the rebel movement and as a matter of fact, their chief generously entertained the Muslim leaders when they passed through their land on their way to B. Muʿāwiyah territory. (113)

C. The political situation in Tihāmah

In Dhūʾl-Ḥijjah, 10/March, 632, when ʿAbhalah's troops were approaching Ṣanʿaʾ, al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, the Medinan representative among ʿAkk and al-Ashāʿir, in Tihāmah, was camping in the mountains between Tihāmah and the town. (114) Al-Ṭāhir succeeded in forming an army from among the inhabitants themselves. (115) His force was particularly concentrated in the highland area, while some of the coastal towns sympathised with ʿAbhalah's revolt. (116)

In Rabīʿ I, 11/June, 632, the coastal territory of Tihāmat al-Yaman was one area rebelling against the newly formed government in Medina. This rebellion arose immediately after the spread of the news of the Prophet's death.

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(112) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2002f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 258f.

(113) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2001.

(114) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1854; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 228.

(115) Mainly from ʿAkk, they played a major role during the events either in Tihāmah or in Ṣanʿāʾ, see 83 above; 99 below.

(116) Cf. 54, 57 above. For the location, see Map 3.

According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr, (117) ʿAkk and al-Ashāʿir were the first to rebel in Tihāmah against Islamic authority, the former adding that the people of al-Awzāʿ, a confederacy consisting of some Ḥimyarī tribes settled in the southern part of Tihāmah joined them.

We have no further historical material explaining the aims and requests of the rebels. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the rebellion was not led by famous local leaders, so the biographers pay no particular attention to them.

However, it may be the paucity of material in our hands which leads us to the general impression that this rebellion was not as important as the others in the Yemen, which shook Islamic authority there and threatened to separate the area from the new government of Abū Bakr, such as the rebellion of B.Muʿāwiyah, of Kindah, in Ḥaḍramawt.

The absence of regular leadership of the Tihāmah rebellion and the confusion which it brought about was perhaps a direct reason why it was put down easily by the Medinan representative there, al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah, and his local force. So without having support from Medina, al-Ṭāhir was able to control the area. Thus it can be assumed that the historians' silence regarding this rebellion indicates that it was weak and unimportant.

The Tihāmah rebellion was limited to al-Aʿlāb, the area near Ṣuḥār on the coast. (118) The rebels gathered

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(117) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1985f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254. See also SEI, "ʿAkk".

(118) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1986; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254; See also SEI, "ʿAkk".

and proclaimed their rebellion where they controlled the coastal road, while the highlands remained under the influence of the Islamic authority. (119)

Al-Ṭāhir b. Abī Hālah accompanied by his followers from ᶜAkk under the leadership of Masrūq al-ᶜAkkī, one of ᶜAkk chiefs, advanced towards the west, where they met the rebels in a crucial battle at al-Aᶜlāb. Thus the Muslims took control of the area, having scattered the rebels. (120)

D. The Medinan Army enters the Yemen

a. The local force, their failure and success

In both Ḥaḍramawt and Tihāmat al-Yaman the Muslim forces were obviously supported by some of the local tribes. Through the support of the latter, Medinan representatives were able to oppose the rebels. The same attitude towards the Muslim authority also appeared amongst some of the Yemeni tribes in the northern plateau of the country. There, elements from Bajīlah led by Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī appeared defending the Islamic authority in the region. (121) After suppressing the rebels of Khathᶜam, Jarīr and his troops moved southwards and made camp in Najrān. (122)

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(119) Cf. Map 4.

(120) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 1986; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 254; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 832- SEI "ᶜAkk".

(121) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1988; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

(122) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1988, records that Abū Bakr commanded Jarīr to move to the south and station in Najrān after finishing his task, i.e. suppressing the rebels in the region.

Najrān witnessed no rebellion during the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate, so the political situation in the town was satisfactory. The Christians had their treaty renewed by Abū Bakr (123) and also the Muslims adhered to their Faith. (124) Consequently the town was chosen as a centre for the assembly of the Islamic troops, who arrived in the Yemen to suppress the rebels. (125)

The situation in Ḥaḍramawt was, however, different despite the existence of the local Islamic force there. The Muslims felt that they were not able to face the rebels who were increasing in number by collecting their clans together, particularly in B. Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah's territory. (126)

In Ṣanᶜāʾ Fayrūz al-Daylamī, one of the Abnāʾ chiefs, had become famous and therefore, as some historical evidence indicates, Abū Bakr wrote to him and invested him with the governorship (wilāyah). (127) So the Abnāʾ who were under his leadership in Ṣanᶜāʾ appeared as an ally to the Medinan government. Fayrūz, therefore, sent to Abū Bakr asking him for assistance. (128) Abū Bakr immediately wrote to the Chiefs of Ḥimyar urging them to support the

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(123) Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futuḥ, 77; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1987f. See also Ḥamīdullāh, Wathaʾiq, 128f; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāʾiq, 160f; Trimingham, Christianity, 307.

(124) Al-Ahdalī, Nathr, 97.

(125) There al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah met Farwah b. Musayk al-Murādī and Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, both were local chiefs and allies to the Muslim government, see 101, 102 below.

(126) See 94 above.

(127) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1989, (citing al-Dathīnī); Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 861.

(128) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1990; Ib Khaldun, ᶜIbar, II, 861; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 255.

Abnā'.(129) This, however, did not succeed and so the Abnā' sought aid from B. ʿUqayl and ʿAkk.(130) Fayrūz and his new allies were able to control Sanʿā' after defeating Qays b. ʿAbd Yaqhūth near the town in 11/632-3. So the survivors of the troops of Qays left the town for the area between Ṣanʿā' and Najrān without setting themselves up in any particular place and creating a danger to the Islamic authority in this area.(131)

b. Abū Bakr's decision to send troops to the Yemen

Following the escalation of the threat against the Medinan authority in the Yemen and the failure of the local Islamic forces to completely control the situation there, particularly in Ḥaḍramawt and some areas in the highlands, Abū Bakr realised that he had to send an army there. The force he dispatched was led by al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah who had been ordered to fight the remnants of ʿAbhalah's followers and to support the Abnā', and then to go to B. Muʿāwiyah of Kindah in Ḥaḍramawt.(132)

Al-Muhājir's army was, according to al-Ṭabarī,(133) the last Muslim force sent to fight the apostates (al-Murtaddūn). When al-Muhājir left Medina in 11/632-3, he marched south to the Yemen passing through Najrān where

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(129) See 81 above.
(130) See 83 above.
(131) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1993; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 256.

(132) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1880 (citing Sayf b. ʿUmar); Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 422f; Ḥamīdallāh, Wathā'iq, 260. See also al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 316; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 35; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, IV, 1452f; al-Fāsī, ʿIqd, VII, 292; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f4a.

(133) I, 1998.

Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh and Farwah b. Musayk joined his army.(134) When Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth and ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib, who were camped in the mountains between Ṣanᶜā and Najrān, learned of the arrival of al-Muhājir from the north and ᶜIkrimah b. Abī Jahl, (sent from Medina to Oman) from the south, they were afraid of the consequences and submitted unconditionally. Al-Muhājir arrested them and delivered them to Medina.(135)

In 11/632-3, al-Muhājir afterwards marched southward to Ṣanᶜāᵓ where he met the rest of Qays's followers in ᶜAjīb where the latter were defeated. Their survivors withdrew to Tihāmah. There they were met by ᶜAbd Allāh b. Umayyah, a Muslim general who was sent by al-Muhājir to the area, who put them to flight.(136)

Al-Muhājir entered Ṣanᶜāᵓ in 11/632-3 following the rebels of the Yemeni tribes around the town to get rid of them. (137) In the meantime ᶜIkrimah b. Abī Jahl was near Abyan coming from Oman via Mahrah territory. (138) When al-Muhājir had finished his first task, he marched eastwards to Ḥaḍramawt, in particular to B. Muᶜāwiyah, of Kindah, territory, to support the Muslims there. ᶜIkrimah, however, found the situation stable in Abyan and therefore moved to the north-east following al-Muhājir. They met each

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(134) Al-Ṭabarī, I,1998; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt,35; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar,II, 863f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 52; ᶜAsjad,14; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat,22; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāᵓ, f4a.

(135) Al-Ṭabarī,I,1998; Ibn al-Dayba , Qurrat,I,77.

(136) Al-Ṭabarī,I,1998; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt,35. ᶜAjīb or Ghūlat ᶜAjīb a village between Raydah and Khamir. For the exact location,see Wilson, "Mapping", 358,390. See also Map 4.

(137) Al-Ṭabarī, I,1998; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar,II,864.

(138) Al-Ṭabarī, I,1995f; al-Fāsī, ᶜIqd, VI,121.

other at Ma$^{\circ}$rib. (139)

In Ma$^{\circ}$rib al-Muhājir received a letter from Ziyād b. Labīd, the Medinan representative in Ḥaḍramawt, urging him to give his support. He immediately left the rest of the army under the leadership of ^{c}Ikrimah and went to Ḥaḍramawt. (140) Al-Muhājir met the rebels in Maḥjar al-Zurqān and the latter were defeated and retreated to al-Nujayr fort. (141) B. Mu^{c}āwiyah's rebels failed to free themselves from the siege of the fort. When ^{c}Ikrimah rejoined al-Muhājir to press further with the siege, (142) B. Mu^{c}āwiyah found themselves in an impossible situation and were obliged to surrender. So al-Ash^{c}ath, the leader of the rebels signed an agreement with the Muslim leaders to open the gate of the fort, provided he and his clan were given safe conduct. (143) This agreement indeed put an end to the rebellion and the Muslims gained a foothold in the area. Moreover they ended the strongest and most dangerous rebellion in the Yemen in that era. In the following year, i.e. 12/633-4, Abū Bakr's envoy, Anas b. Mālik, arrived in the country appealing to the Yemeni tribes to join the conquest.

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(139) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2001; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 257.


(140) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2006. For the routes of al-Muhājir and ^{c}Ikrimah, cf. Map 4.


(141) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2006; Yāqūt, Mu^{c}jam, III, 136f; Ibn al-Athīr. Kāmil, II, 259.

(142) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2007, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259.

(143) Cf. Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 111; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2009; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 259f; Hamīdullah, Wathā$^{\circ}$iq, 278.

Table 3


Kindah
Ashras
Muᶜāwiyah
al.Sakūn
al.Sakāsik
Shabīb
ʿUqbah
Murttiᶜ
ʿIyāḍ
Thaᶜlabah
Thawr
Muᶜāwiyah
al.Ḥārith (al.Akbar)
Ashras
Bakr (B. Bakrah)
Muᶜāwiyah (B. Māwiyyah)
Wahb
al.Raʾīsh
Muᶜāwiyah
Zayd
Badāʾ
Tujīb
Saᶜd
ʿAdī
al.Ḥārith (al.Aṣghar)
Dhahl
ʿAmr
Usāmah
al.Ḥārith
Imruʾal.Qays
Muᶜāwiyah (al.Akramūn)
Mālik
al.Ṭumḥ
Jaᶜfar
Muᶜāwiyah
ʿAbd Shams
alᶜAtīk
Rabīᶜah
al-Mithl
ʿAdī
Muᶜāwiyah
al.Ḥārith (al.Wallādah)
Ḥujr (Ākil al.Marār)
Imruʾ al.Qays
Ḥārithah
Jabalah
Ḥujr (al.Qarid)
Qatīrah
Muᶜāwiyah
Muᶜāwiyah
Shurahbīl
Maᶜdī Karib
Walīᶜah
Qays
Maᶜdī Karib
al.Ashᶜath (The leader of the rebellion)
'Kings of B. Walīᶜah'
(Led the first rebels)


N
Dammūn
Tārim
Shibām
HADRAMAWT
From Oman
MAHRAH
AL-SAKĀSIK
WA'L-SAKŪN
MAFĀZAT HADRAMAWT
Ma'rib
AL-RUB' AL-KHĀLĪ
A R A B I A N S E A
Concentration of the Islamic Forces
Areas sympathetic to Muslim authority
Rebellious Areas
Ikrimah's route
Muhājir's route
0
km
100
MAP 4 THE YEMEN DURING THE EARLY PERIOD OF ABŪ BAKR'S CALIPHATE
From The Hijāz
Najrān
Ṣaddah
HAMDĀN
ʿAjīb
Ṣanʿā'
Jurash
Ath thar
ʿAKK
AL-ASHʿĀR
Red Sea
Bāb al-Mandab
ABYAN
al-Janad
YEMEN

P A R T T W O

CHAPTER IV

The Yemenis and the early Islamic conquests during the caliphates of Abū Bakr and ᶜUmar

(13-5/633-6)

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Abū Bakr had fought the rebellious tribes of Arabia, having considered that to be his first task. (1) These wars against the rebels, the Wars of Apostasy, constituted some of the most important events of the early period of the Orthodox Caliphs. The other important event mentioned in the historical sources is the actual movement which triggered off the Islamic conquests in Muḥarram, 12/March-April, 633.

In fact the Wars of Apostasy developed into conquests in which the Medinan government directed its military activity into the neighbouring areas of the Persian and Byzantine Empires. (2)

The first Islamic expeditions in this conflict were focused on the border with the Persian Empire following the Caliph's decision to support B. Shaybān and B. ᶜIjl,

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(1) For the Yemeni rebellions, see Chapter III above. For other Arabian tribes, cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 101ff; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 103ff; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 13ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1851ff. See also Shoufānī, Al-Riddah, 71ff; Donner, Islamic conquests, 85 ff.

(2) See Ibn Khayyāṭ, 117; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 90; al-Dīnawarī, al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl, 111; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2016-21; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 261f. These sources confirm that Muslim troops were transferred to the Iraqi border immediately after the end of the Wars of Apostasy. See also Lewis, Arabs in History, 52; Shaᶜbān, Islamic History, I, 24; Donner, Islamic conquests, 177.

(Arabian tribes, both of Rabī^{c}ah) who were in the neighbouring provinces of Iraq (at that time under the control of the Persian Empire) against the Persian forces.

In Muḥarram, 12/March-April, 633, Abū Bakr ordered Khālid b. al-Walīd, one of the key figures of the Muslim army, to move with his troops from al-Yamāmah to the Iraqi front.(3) At the same time the caliph gave orders to one of the Companions, ^{c}Ayyāḍ b. Ghanm, to advance with his troops towards the Iraqi border. (4)

The first real movement of the conquest on the northern front with Syria (al-Shām) started when Abū Bakr sent a small force led by Khālid b. Sa^{c}īd b. al-^{c}Āṣ, one of the Companions, to stay in Taymā^{ɔ}, on the border of Syria.(5) We have no exact knowledge of when that expedition was sent; What is certain is that its main task was to protect the route of the Muslim troops which moved to this front in early 13/634.(6)

From the historical sources we know that there were two movements that made up the Islamic conquests, both of which took place in the first/seventh century. The first

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(3) Ibid. Khālid was camped in al-Yamāmah, an area in eastern Najd which was inhabited by B. Ḥanīfah, a branch of Rabi^{c}ah, where he had defeated them in the battle of ^{c}Aqrabā^{ɔ}.

(4) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2020; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 261f.

(5) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2079f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 261f. Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Madīnat Dimashq, I, 451. See also Hill, "The Mobility", 169; Donner, 113. For the location of Taymā^{ɔ}, see Yaqūt. Mu^{c}jam al-Buldān, II, 67.

(6) Ibid.

was during the period of the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-61), and the second in the time of the Umayyads (41-132/661-750). The climax of the first series of conquests came in the early years of ᶜUmar's caliphate, while the second reached its zenith during the caliphate of al-Walīd b. ᶜAbd al-Malik, the sixth Umayyad ruler, 86-96/705-15. (7)

The Islamic conquests themselves are beyond the scope of this study; what we are concerned with is the role of the Yemeni tribes and their impact in the early stages of the conquests. In this research we shall be concentrating on the Yemeni tribes which migrated from their homeland, the Yemen, upon the Caliph's request for them to join the conquest movement. The Yemeni tribes which already inhabited the disputed areas, i.e. Ghassān, Quḍāᶜah, Kalb and Judhām are not included in the present study.

However, it is not an easy matter to follow all the Islamic conquests, explaining the role of the Yemeni tribes in each. We shall follow the role of the Yemenis on the battle-fronts, both in Iraq and Syria, in the early stage of the conflict only. That period (13-5/633-6) indeed saw the peak of the first movement of the conquests and also witnessed the greatest participation by Yemeni tribes. These Yemenis indeed played a major role in fighting, commanding and negotiating in these conquests.

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(7) For the Islamic conquests in this period, cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 299ff; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 423-7; al-Yaᶜqūbī Tārīkh, II, 35f. See also al-Munajjid, Muᶜjam B. Umayyah, 189-91; Fayṣal, Ḥarakāt al-Fatḥ al-Islāmī, 116ff.

A. The call of the Medinan government to the Yemeni tribes to join the conquests

After one year of war, Abū Bakr succeeded in putting down all the rebellious tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. By means of that war the caliph re-established the Medinan government's control over these tribes throughout Arabia. Therefore he appointed governors (wulāh) for the important provinces of the area, three of which were in the Yemen in al-Janad, Ṣanᶜā' and Ḥaḍramawt. Consequently the Yemen, and in particular the above mentioned areas, rallied to the Islamic state, placing herself under the authority of the government in Medina. (8)

In spite of the outbreak of fighting on the Iraqi front, Abū Bakr's government did not need reinforcements from all the Arabs. At the early stages of the conflict on that front, the Muslim forces consisted of some of the Arabs of the border area such as B. Shaybān and B. ᶜIjl, who had been invading the Persian territories from time to time. It was sufficient for the Medinan government, however, to send Khālid b. al-Walīd and ᶜAyyāḍ b. Ghanm to support these tribes, thus forming together the Muslim forces on that front in the early stages of the conquests. (9)

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(8) For the full discussion of the establishment of the Islamic authority in these areas, see Chapter VI-A, above.

(9) These tribes had fought the Persian forces in the very early stages of the conflict, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 242f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 88f; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 11; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2018.

During 12/633 war officially broke out between the Islamic government and the Persian Empire. The Muslims were victorious and ultimately captured al-Ḥīrah, capital of that territory on the Euphrates. (10) The Yemeni tribes played no part as such in these battles during that early stage other than the role which was played by some of their chiefs e.g. Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. (11)

Al-Balādhurī (12) mentions that Abū Bakr commanded Jarīr to support Khālid b. al-Walīd's troops, which had received orders from Medina to move from al-Yamāmah to the Iraqi front. Ibn al-Athīr (13) confirms this, adding that Jarīr joined Khālid after the occupation of al-Ḥīrah in Rabīᶜ I, 12/May-June, 633.

The historical sources, unfortunately, do not supply us with details of the composition of Jarīr's army, which joined him on the Iraqi front. Al-Azdī (14) however, records that two hundred warriors from Bajīlah, most of them from Jarīr's clan, Aḥmas, accompanied Khālid b. al-

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(10) For the conflicts of this year, cf. al-Balādhurī, 242ff al-Dīnawarī, 111f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2037ff; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, II, 265f. See also Hill, Termination, 109f; Donner, 177ff.

(11) One of the key Yemeni chiefs who played a major role during the Wars of Apostasy in the Yemen, as well as being one of the Companions. For Jarir's biography, see Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, VI, 22; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istiᶜāb, I, 239f; Ibn al-Athir, Usd al-Ghābah, I, 279f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣabah, I, 242f; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqat, 19-21.

(12) Futūḥ, 243.

(13) Kāmil, II, 268.

(14) Futūḥ, 66.

Walīd from Iraq to the Syrian front when war broke out there in early 13/633. Accordingly, we can assume that Jarīr was leading his own tribe, Bajīlah, when he was sent to the Iraqi front. (15) This information, of course, leads us to believe that some Yemenis joined the Muslim forces in the early stages of the battles on the Iraqi border in 12/633. But that participation was in a limited and unofficial capacity.

In fact there is no mention in the historical sources of a Yemeni presence, either on the Iraqi or Syrian front, before Ṣafar, 13/April-May, 634. The actual participation of the Yemeni tribes in these conquests began when Abū Bakr wrote to their chiefs appealing to them to join the Muslim troops encamped in al-Jarf on the outskirts of Medina. (16)

The idea behind Abū Bakr's call to the Yemeni tribes was his intention to invade Syria, relying on his government's influence over the Arabian tribes in the Peninsula. The caliph realised the value of such influence and worked on the unity of the Arab tribes by saying : "The Arabs belong to the same father and mother, so I intend to appeal to them to fight the Byzantines (al-Rūm) in Syria."(17) Al-Wāqidī (18) records that Abū Bakr was intending to fulfil

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(15) This supposition is safe, since we know that Jarīr led his own tribe in other military operations, e.g. when the Prophet sent him to destroy Dhū ʾl-Khalaṣah, idol of Khathʿam and Bajīlah; in 10/632, and in the following year Abū Bakr ordered him to suppress the rebels in the northern plateau of the Yemen, see Chapter I, note 91.

(16) Al-Azdī, 11; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 116; al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 223.

(17) Al-Azdī, 1.

(18) Futūḥ, I, 2.

the Prophet's wish by conquering Syria. Al-Balādhurī (19) mentions that the caliph's decision to invade Syria came immediately after the Wars of Apostasy. He thus wrote to the people of Mecca, al-Ṭā'if, the Yemen and all the Arabs in Najd and the Ḥijāz urging them to join the conquests. (20)

Both al-Azdī and Ibn ʿAsākir (21) agree that Abū Bakr and his advisers discussed the idea of writing first to the Yemeni tribes. This means that the Muslim leaders had put the Yemenis at the top of their list when they decided to appeal to the Arabian tribes. If this analysis is correct it shows how much importance was attached to the Yemeni tribes' contribution to the Muslim forces. In fact this is not difficult to believe when one compares these with the other Arabian tribes at that time, especially in military matters. It is known, for example that the people of al-Ṭā'if sent some men to Jurash, a Yemeni town, now in ʿAsīr, to be trained in the use of certain weapons, the catapult (manjanīq or ʿarrādah) and some form of armoured vehicle (dabbābah) when they heard that the Muslims had decided to invade their town in 8/628. (22)

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(19) Futūḥ, 155.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Futūḥ, 5; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 128; Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, I, 445.

(22) Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 312, says ʿUrwah b. Masʿūd and Ghaylān b. Salamah, both from people of al-Ṭā'if were training in Jurash in the course of the siege of their town. Cf. also al-Diyār-bakrī, II, 110. The Muslims also used such weapons when they sieged al-Ṭā'if; they brought them from the Yemen through such Yemenis as al-Tufayl al-Dawsī; Cf. Ibn Hishām, Sīrat, IV, 128; al-Diyār-bakrī, II, 110. See also Hill, "The Mobility", 117.

When Abū Bakr and his advisers decided to invade Syria, they sent Anas b. Mālik to the Yemen, urging the Yemeni chiefs to join the Muslim troops with their tribes. (23) This invitation was indeed the first official call from the Medinan government to the Yemenis to join the conquests. However, that call was directed only to those Yemenis in the Yemen who had not rebelled against Islamic authority during the period of Apostasy. (24) We know that during the Wars of Apostasy some Yemeni chiefs, such as ʿAmr b. Maʿdī Karib al-Zubaydī and al-Ashʿath b. Qays al-Kindī, appeared as opponents of Islamic authority in the Yemen. (25) The majority of Arab historians, however, agree that such people did not appear among the Yemeni chiefs who joined the Islamic troops during Abū Bakr's Caliphate. (26)

Anas b. Mālik, Abū Bakr's envoy to the Yemen, tells us that the Yemenis became enthusiastic when he read the caliph's letter to them. (27) The Yemeni tribes, therefore,

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(23) Al-Azdī, 5f ; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 1; Ibn ʿAsākir, Madīnat Dimashq, I, 445f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, II, 187; al-Diyārbakrī, II, 222; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 169.

(24) In keeping with Abū Bakr's policy, apostates were not accepted in the Muslim armies. Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2081; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 262.

(25) Cf. Chapter II and III above. For the former see in particular II C. ; for the latter III B b-c.

(26) Both al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 11f and al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3, do not mention such people among the first Yemeni chiefs who arrived in Medina after Abū Bakr's call; Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2218, 2222 mentions their coming to Medina during ʿUmar's Caliphate, when the latter equipped Saʿd's army.

(27) Cf. al-Azdī, 6f; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2f; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq , 169.

began to leave for the battle-fronts, participating in the early stages of the Islamic conquests. Medina, the centre of Islamic government, was their first stop. Ḥimyar was the first Yemeni tribal group to arrive in Medina, led by Dhū ʾl-Kalāʿ al-Ḥimyarī, one of the leading figures of Ḥimyar. Then followed Madhḥij, led by Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth al-Muradi, and al-Azd under the leadership of Jandab b. ʿAmr al-Dawsī. (28)

Our historical sources do not give a precise time for the arrival of these tribes in Medina; nevertheless they must have arrived before Ṣafar, 13/April-May, 634. According to al-Azdī, (29) Abū ʿUbaydah b. al-Jarrāḥ, one of the Companions and leader of the Islamic armies on the Syrian front during ʿUmar's caliphate, was waiting with his army for the arrival of the tribes, to whose chiefs Abū Bakr had written. Some historians confirm that Abū ʿUbaydah left Medina for the Syrian front in early Ṣafar, 13/April, 634, as soon as the Yemeni tribes arrived in Medina. (30) So Madhḥij, led by Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, accompanied him to that front. (31)

Ḥimyar, the first Yemeni tribe, arrived in Medina and appeared among the Muslim troops in the very early stages of the conflict on the Syrian front. (32) Al-

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(28) Al-Azdī, 11f; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2f; al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 169.

(29) Futūḥ, 11.

(30) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 119; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 116.

(31) Al-Azdī, 21.

(32) Before Ṣafar 13/April 634, Abū Bakr sent Khālid b. Saʿīd, commanding him to stay in Taymāʾ, but the latter attacked the Byzantine forces which were led by Bāhān. Khālid was defeated and then sent to the Caliph asking for help. Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I , 2079; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil II, 276; Cf.also al-Azdī, 8; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3; and Donner, 113.

Tabarī records that Abū Bakr supported Khālid b. Sa^{c}īd b. al-^{c}Āṣ by despatching the first Yemeni reinforcements led by Dhū^{ɔ}l-Kalā^{c} al-Ḥimyarī. Thus, the Yemenis participated with the Islamic forces in their early conflict with the Byzantine forces in Syria.

Thereafter, the Yemeni tribes joined the Muslim forces in Syria, passing through Medina on their way to the battlefront. A few days after the departure of the Muslim armies, more Yemeni tribes arrived in Medina. Ibn Dhī^{ɔ}l-Sahmayn al-Khath^{c}amī, a Khath^{c}amī chief, arrived in Medina with about one thousand men from Khath^{c}am, seeking to join the Muslim forces. (33) Two thousand men from Hamdān led by Ḥumrah b. Mālik al-Hamdānī, one of the chiefs of Hamdān, also arrived in Medina. (34) They were both directed to the Syrian front; the former joined Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān's army while the latter was placed under Abū ^{c}Ubaydah's command.(35)

In fact these Yemeni tribes came to be the most important Yemeni reinforcements to join the Islamic forces in Syria during the last six months of Abū Bakr's caliphate (Muḥarram-Jumādā II, 13/March-September, 634).

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(33) Al-Azdī, 20.

(34) Al-Azdī, 31-3.

(35) For the former, cf. al-Azdī, 20; for the latter see ibid, 33. Abū Bakr equipped four separate armies to invade Syria led by four Muslim leaders: Abū ^{c}Ubaydah Ibn al-Jarrāḥ, Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān, Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasanah and ^{c}Amr b. al-^{c}Āṣ and he directed them to all the Syrian territories; cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 119; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 115f. See also Hill, The Termination, 75f; Donner, 114.

In Jumādā II, 13/September, 634, ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb became the second caliph in Islam after Abū Bakr's death. In the early period of the new caliph, conflicts between the Muslims and their enemies reached a climax. Accordingly the new regime renewed their invitations to the Arab tribes to provide military assistance. ᶜUmar succeeded in assembling a great number of the warriors from the Arabian tribes, among whom were many Yemenis. Al-Wāqidī (36) explains the assembling of Arab tribes by saying that the victories which the Muslims gained on the Syrian front after the battle of Ajnādayn encouraged the Arabs to join the Muslim troops. We should add ᶜUmar's deliberate policy of attracting the Arab tribes into the military and this gave the opportunity to all Muslims including apostates (murtaddūn) to join the Muslim forces. (37)

Al-Wāqidī records that when ᶜUmar was attending the dawn prayer, six hundred Yemenis from Ṣadwān, Sabā and Ḥaḍramawt arrived in Medina, plus another four hundred men from different Yemeni provinces. (38) Both groups asked

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(36) Futūḥ, I, 38.

(37) We know that Abū Bakr did not permit apostates to join the Muslim forces and therefore he ordered his commanders not to recruit them. For Abū Bakr's instructions to his commanders on this point, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2081, 2225; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 276. But ᶜUmar cancelled this instruction as soon as he came in power, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2165.

(38) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 109f, 166. Ṣadwān; there is no mention of this area in the geographical sources at our disposal. The author probably means here Ṣudāʾ, the name of a province (mikhlāf) in the Yemen (cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 159; Yāqūt, Muᶜjam al-Buldān, II, 397; Smith, The Ayyubids, II, 207; or he means Ṣadūr, a wadi in Sarw Madhḥij, cf. also Ṣifat, I, 89.

the caliph if they could join the Muslim troops on the Syrian front. It seems that these groups arrived in Medina during the first six months of ᶜUmar's caliphate, as they were directed to the Syrian front.

After the battle of the Bridge in Shaᶜbān, 13/October, 634, ᶜUmar decided to escalate the fighting on the northern eastern front, Iraq and Persia. (39) Accordingly reinforcements had to be sent to this front. The caliph, therefore, urged Muslims to go there, but many, especially the Yemeni tribes, refused, preferring to join the Muslim forces on the Syrian front. (40) So ᶜUmar wrote to his representatives amongst the Arab tribes ordering them to send him all their able-bodied tribesmen. (41) Immediately a huge number of these tribes converged on Medina seeking to participate in the conquests; among them were many Yemenis.

Thus the Yemeni tribes were now heavily involved at this stage. Yet some of them persisted in their desire to join the Muslim armies in Syria. ᶜUmar eventually succeeded in directing them to the Iraqi front. Some historians (42) record that a group from al-Azd came to Medina asking to join the Muslim armies in Syria, but the caliph ordered them to support the Muslims in the Iraqi border, promising

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(39) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2182; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303. In that battle the Muslims had been defeated and their commander, Abū ᶜUbayd al-Thaqafī, was killed.

(40) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183, 2186. 2187, 2218, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303. Cf. also I27-o belo

(41) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2211

(42) E.g. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2187f the latter(citing Abū Mikhnaf).

them the booty of Chosroos, the Emperor of Persia. Another Yemeni group from Khath^{c}am arrived in Medina and was directed to the Iraqi front. (43)

A large Yemeni group from Bajīlah appeared at that stage of the fighting on the Iraqi border. This tribe had been of importance but had been scattered among other Arabian tribes at that time. (44) One of the important chiefs of this tribe, Jarīr b. ^{c}Abd Allāh, had wanted to re-unite his tribe, the Bajīlah, and had asked Abū Bakr to do so, but the caliph had not paid much attention to Jarīr's wishes. (45) When ^{c}Umar came to power, Jarīr asked him to fulfil this previous request. The caliph agreed and duly wrote to his representatives among the Arabian tribes, ordering them to separate all those who came originally from Bajīlah and send them to Jarīr b. ^{c}Abd Allāh. (46)

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(43) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2188.

(44) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2223; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II,303. Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 390, says that they were scattered after their defeat by B. Kalb b. Wabarah, the Arabian tribe, in the battle of al-Fijār; cf. also al-Nuss, al-^{c}Aṣabiyyah al-Qabaliyyah, 47.

(45) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2223; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303.

(46) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183; Ibn Ḥazm, 387; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303.

On this occasion an Arab Poet said praising Jarīr;

لَولا جَرير هَلَكَتْ بجيلَه نِعْمَ الفَتى وبِئْسَتِ القبيلَه

Were it not for Jarīr, Bajīlah would have perished;

What a fine youth! What an evil tribe*

* Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, I, 238.

This was carried out successfully. In this way ᶜUmar succeeded in creating a great Yemeni force which supported the Muslim army on the Iraqi border at that time.

All those Yemenis who had been sent to the Iraqi front at that stage of the conflict were indeed the first of the official Yemeni reinforcements to join the Muslim forces there. Their arrival was definitely before the battle of al-Buwayb in 14/635, which took place in Iraq between the Muslims and the Persian forces, with the latter being defeated. (47)

In this same year after the battle, a new army began to assemble near Medina in compliance with the caliph's call. ᶜUmar himself, amid popular applause, declared his intention of leading it in person, but allowed himself to be dissuaded by his principal advisers, who recommended Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, cousin of the Prophet and one of the earliest converts to Islam, as commander of the new reinforcements for Iraq. (48) Al-Ṭabarī records that when ᶜUmar wrote to the Arabs urging them to join Saᶜd's army, he said "By God, I will attack the Kings of Persia with the Kings of the Arabs."(49)

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(47) The Yemenis appeared among the Muslim army in that battle led by Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh, cf. al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253-5; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2184ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303-5. See also Kamāl, al-Ṭarīq ilā ʾL-Madāʾin, 424ff; Faysal, Ḥarakāt, 51-3; Donner, 200.

(48) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 172f; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 255; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2212ff; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 309f. Cf. also Glubb, Arab Conquests, 189; Kamāl, al-Qādisiyyah, 12ff.

(49) I, 2223.

Historical sources mention the Yemeni tribes which answered the caliph's call. A group of some two thousand three hundred men from some Yemeni tribes, mostly Madhḥij, came to Medina. (50) They were followed by four hundred Yemeni warriors from al-Sakūn, a branch of Kindah, led by two of their chiefs, al-Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr and Muᶜāwiyah b. Ḥudayj. (51) Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ left Medina with four thousand men, three thousand of whom were from the Yemen.(52) While he was encamped at Sharāf, a collection of wells in Najd, a further one thousand, seven hundred Yemenis joined his army. (53)

These Yemenis who joined the Muslim forces during the caliphate of Abū Bakr and ᶜUmar came from most of the Yemeni tribes. Later, without exception, they settled down permanently in the garrison towns (amṣār) of the conquered provinces.

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(50) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2218f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 310; Ibn Khaldun, ᶜIbar, II, 917.

(51) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2220f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 310.

(52) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 311; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 917; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 36; cf. Also Glubb, 189.

(53) Led by al-Ashᶜath b. Qays al-Kindī; cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 311. For the location of Sharāf, cf. Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, III, 331; see also Glubb, 191, map XXIV ('the campaign of Qādasiya').

B. The Yemeni groups at the battle fronts

Medina, the centre of the caliphate, was the first station from which volunteers were sent to the battle fronts. In 13/634-5, the Medinan government concentrated its military activity on the Syrian front. Accordingly, volunteers were sent there.(54) But, when ʿUmar decided to escalate the conflict on the Iraqi front after the battle of the Bridge, he redirected the reinforcements to that border.(55) In short it can be said that the role of the Yemeni tribes on both fronts cannot be ignored. We shall, therefore, discuss their presence on these fronts in detail.

a. The Yemenis on the northern front - Syria

Al-Azdī (56) says that Rabīʿah, Tamīm and Asad were concentrated on the Iraqi front, since this area was their homeland. The Yemenis, however, formed the bulk of the Muslim troops in Syria and, therefore, adopted this as their homeland. The Yemeni tribes' presence with the Muslim forces in Syria has been extensively documented in the historical sources. (57)

As has already been mentioned, Abū ʿUbaydah's army, the fourth Muslim army to leave Medina for Syria on Ṣafar

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(54) For their arrival during this period, cf. al-Azdi,11ff; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2082ff
cf. also II5 ff above

(55) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183ff; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil,II, 303.

(56) Futūḥ, 12.

(57) Cf. al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 12ff; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, 3ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2078ff; Ibn al-Athir, Kāmil,II,275ff.

13/April-May, 634, was awaiting the arrival of the Arabian tribes, including the Yemenis. (58) Some historians (59) record that Abū Bakr sent all the Yemeni tribes arriving in Medina in answer to his call to the Syrian front under the command of his leaders. In fact on this front it was rare to find Muslim troops without Yemenis among them and consequently many of them were killed at the beginning of the fighting in the early stages of the conquests. (60)

The Yemenis took part in all the decisive battles on this front. In the battle of Ajnādayn, (Jumādā, I, 13/July, 634) between the Muslims and Byzantines in Palestine in which the latter were defeated, the Yemeni tribes took part, some of their chiefs appearing on the battlefield. One of them, ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAmr b. al-Ṭufayl al-Azdī, was killed (61) while Dhū ᵓl-Kalāᶜ al-Ḥimyarī and Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī appeared amongst the Muslim leaders. (62) At the time of the Muslim siege of Damascus, Abū ᶜUbaydah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim forces there, sent one of his armies led by Dhū ᵓl-Kalāᶜ, one of the Yemeni leaders, to stand by between Ḥims

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(58) See 115 above.

(59) See115-6 above. also al-Azdī, 12ff; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ,3ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2079ff.

(60) In Palestine, cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 11, who describes the fighting by saying "The Muslims lost many of their soldiers, most of them from the Yemen."

(61) Cf. al-Azdī, 79; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 147; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, III. 956; Ibn Ḥajar. Iṣābah, IV, 111.

(62) Al-Wāqidī. Futūḥ, I, 32.

Damascus.(63) The rest of the Yemenis took part with the Muslim armies in the siege of the city. (64)

When one reads of the conquest of Ḥimṣ, 15/636, in the primary sources, one has no doubt that the city was conquered by a purely Yemeni army. According to al-Balādhurī, (65) the Muslim army which conquered Ḥimṣ was under the command of al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī, one of the leading chiefs of Kindah. Al-Ṭabarī (66) confirms the participation of B.Muʿāwiyah and al-Sakūn, tribes of Kindah, amongst the warriors. Al-Wāqidī's (67) account of the number of Muslims who were killed in the course of the battles for the town of Ḥimṣ indicates that two hundred and thirty-five men were killed, all from Ḥimyar and Hamdān, except thirty men from Mecca. Dhūʾl-Kalāʿ al-Ḥimyarī and his troops were surrounding Ḥimṣ when the Muslims arrived there. (68) These statements indeed lead us to believe that the Yemenis played a major role in conquering Ḥimṣ. As a consequence of this role, Abū ʿUbaydah authorized some of their chiefs to divide the land belonging to the city amongst the Muslims.(69) Ḥimṣ, therefore, became a predominately Yemeni city. (70)

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(63) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2151.

(64) For the blockade of Damascus, cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 39ff; Ibn ʿAsākir, Madīnat Dimashq, I, 493.

(65) Futūḥ, 137.

(66) I, 2392. For the clans of Kindah, cf. Table 3.

(67) Futūḥ, I, 96.

(68) Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 340.

(69) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 137; Yāghūt, Muʿjam, II, 303.

(70) Cf. al-Yaʿqūbī, Buldān, 324f; al-Maydānī, Majmaʿ, I, 294, Cf. also Kurd, Khiṭaṭ, I, 65.

Concrete evidence of a Yemeni presence on the Syrian front during the course of the battle of al-Yarmūk, a decisive struggle in the area of Jordan which took place in 15/636, is given by al-Azdī, who describes the distribution of the Muslim forces at this battle as follows: "The Muslims were gathered around their flags and the Arab notables appeared with their own people. A third of the army was from al-Azd, but the majority of the people were from Ḥimyar. Also Hamdān, Khawlān, Madhḥij, Khath^{c}am, Ḥaḍramawt and Kindah were there. So the majority of the army was made up of the Yemenis (ahl al-Yaman)." (71) Al-Wāqidī reports the battle too, saying, "The right flank of the army consisted of men from al-Azd, Madhḥij, Ḥaḍramawt and Khawlān." (72) Al-Kūfī records the Yemeni presence in this battle by saying : "Thus the Yemeni tribes were spread amongst all the divisions of the Muslim army."(73) There is probably some exaggeration in this description, but it does illustrate the fact that the Yemeni participation was greater than that of the other Arabian tribes in the conquest of Syria.

After the battle of al-Yarmūk, the Muslims intended to conquer Jerusalem. Abū ^{c}Ubaydah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, sent several independent troops, formed

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(71) Futūḥ, 195; he also mentions Quḍā^{c}ah, Lakhm, Judhām, Ghassān and ^{c}Āmilah amongst the Yemeni tribes, but these tribes fall outside our present topic as already mentioned. See 109 above.

(72) Futūḥ, I, 127.

(73) Futūḥ, I, 255, he also mentions Qūḍā^{c}ah, Lakhm and Judhām.

mostly from the Yemenis to that city. (74) According to al-Wāqidī, (75) when the Muslim armies dispersed after the occupation of Jerusalem, seventeen thousand warriors remained with Abū ᶜUbaydah, most of whom were from the Yemen. Four thousand men, all of them from ᶜAkk, a Yemeni tribe, accompanied ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ, one of the key figures of the conquests and one of the Companions, when he left Syria to conquer Egypt in 19/640. (76)

The accuracy of the actual numbers may be questioned, but it can be demonstrated that the Yemeni tribes were in the majority. This is presumably why the historians mention them more than other Arabian tribes, especially on that front.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that the Yemeni tribes which joined the Muslim forces in Syria played a major role in reinforcing the army on this front, and constituted the majority.

b. The Yemenis on the north-eastern front - Iraq and Persia

The first indication of a declaration of war against the Persian Empire came in Muḥarram, 12/March-April, 633, when Abū Bakr gave orders to Khālid b. al-Walīd and ᶜAyyāḍ b. Ghanm to move with their troops to the Iraqi border.(77) This means that the Muslim forces had moved to the Iraqi

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(74) Cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 144.

(75) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 155.

(76) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 125; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, II, 56. In al-Kindī, al-Wulāh waʾl-Quḍāh, 8, three thousand, five hundred, a third of them from Ghāfiq, a branch of ᶜAkk.

(77) Cf.108 above.

front at least twelve months before Abū Bakr's appeal to the Yemeni tribes. (78) When ᶜUmar stepped up the war on the Iraqi front after the defeat of the Muslim army at the battle of the bridge in Shaᶜbān, 13/October, 634, the official Yemeni reinforcements were directed to this front. (79) Therefore in the following year, 14/635, the Yemenis appeared amongst the Muslim army at the Battle of al-Buwayb, led by Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. (80) This is indeed the first Yemeni involvement mentioned in the historical sources.

These Yemeni tribes had preferred to join the Muslim army in Syria. But because of the critical situation on the Iraqi front after the failure of the Muslim forces at the battle of the Bridge, ᶜUmar used diplomacy and promise of material gain to persuade them to join the Muslim troops on the Iraqi border. Al-Ṭabarī, following the account of al-Shaᶜbī, (81) mentions that ᶜUmar ordered Jarīr b. ᶜAbd

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(78) For the first coming of the official Yemeni reinforcements, cf. 115 above.

(79) See 118 above.

(80) According to al-Ṭabarī, I, 2184, it was on Ramaḍān, 13/November, 634. Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 129; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121 and al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 254, all confirm that it took place in 14/635, with the addition that the latter says, according to Bajilah's allegation, the Muslim army was under the command of Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh.

(81) I, 2186; cf. also Ibn Isḥāq's statement, ibid, 2200. ᶜArfajah was a chief of Bajīlah before it was re-united; although he was not actually from Bajīlah, he was an ally from al-Azd. For his biography, cf. Ibn al-Athīr Usd al-Ghābah, III, 401; Ibn Ḥajar, IV, 235, cf. also al-Ṭabarī, I, 2186f.

Allāh al-Bajalī and ᶜArfajah b. Harthamah to advance on Iraq, promising them that they would be re-united with their tribe. However, when Bajīlah assembled in Medina, they refused to go to the Iraqi front, preferring Syria. Because of their value as fighters ᶜUmar persuaded them by promising them certain privileges if they agreed to join the Muslim forces in Iraq. (82) When al-Azd refused to advance there, ᶜUmar tried to persuade them with the lure of the booty of Kisrā himself.(83) When they rejected to move to the Iraqi front the caliph divided al-Nakhᶜ into two divisions, sending one to Syria, while the second agreed eventually to join the Muslims in Iraq. (84)

One of the Arab commentators (85) puts forward the suggestion that the refusal was a result of the pessimistic outlook of the Arabs on that front, who believed that the Persian forces were superior in strength. In fact there was no difficulty in directing the other Arabian tribes, particularly Rabīᶜah, to the north-eastern front. They were the first contingent of Muslim troops to fight

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(82) In al-Ṭabarī, I, 2183, Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303, one quarter of the fifth (al-khums). In al-Balādhurī, Futuh, 253, one quarter of the total spoils, but al-Shaᶜbī says ᶜUmar promised to give them one third of the spoils after the usual fifth had been taken. cf. Abū ᶜUbayd, Amwāl, 79; al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 254. For the distribution of booty, see Abū Yūsuf, Kitab al-Kharāj, 18, al-Mawardi, ahkam, 126-37.

(83) Cf. 118-119 above.

(84) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2218.

(85) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2159. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 297.

against the Persian forces in the very early stages of the conflict on the Iraqi border. (86) But the refusal to move there came mainly from the Yemeni tribes who preferred the northern front, as is mentioned above. (87) Some Arab historians justify that refusal by saying that they might well have wanted to join their kinsmen in Syria. Al-Ṭabarī tells us that the Yemenis wanted to move to Syria, while the Muḍaris preferred Iraq. Therefore ᶜUmar said, "Your [i.e. the Yemenis'] blood bonds are much stronger. Why do the Muḍarīs not remember their kinsmen in Syria?" (88) This historian's views seem to be an acceptable explanation of the desire of the Yemenis to go to Syria.

In 14/636 ᶜUmar equipped Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and his volunteers from the Arabian tribes, including three thousand Yemenis. (89) When Saᶜd encamped on the Iraq border, the Muslim troops joined him there. This force consisted of

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(86) Cf. al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 88-90; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 111; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 242f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2016ff.

(87) Cf.127 above.

(88) I, 2222. Both Bajīlah and al-Azd declared openly their wishes to join their kinsmen in Syria, when they assembled in Medina, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 253f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2186f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 303. As far as I know the Yemeni tribes, i.e. Qaḥṭānī, the only Abab tribes who settled in Syria before Islam. However, it is most likely that ᶜUmar meant these Muḍrarīs, from Quraysh and other Hijāzī tribes, who joined the early Muslim armies to this front.

(89) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 311; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 917; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 36; cf. also Glubb, Arabs Conquests, 189.

eighty thousand warriors, two thousand of whom were from the Yemen led by Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. (90) In the following year, 15/637, Saᶜd faced the Persian forces at al-Qādisiyyah, where the Persians were decisively defeated by the Muslim army.

In this battle Arab historians differ as to the total size of the Muslim army. Ibn Abī Ḥāzim (of Bajīlah and an eye witness in this battle) in al-Ṭabarī (91) says that six or seven thousand Muslim warriors were at al-Qādisiyyah, while al-Balādhurī (92) states that there were nine or ten thousand. Another account in al-Ṭabarī (93) gives more than thirty thousand. Al-Kūfī reports an even higher number as follows: "The Muslims numbered forty thousand, and twenty thousand came from Syria, making sixty thousand altogether at al-Qādisiyyah." (94) While one of the modern scholars (95) believes that no exact result can be obtained concerning the total size of the Muslim warriors in this battle another suggests between 6,000 to 12,000.(96) As a result of these uncertain accounts, it is difficult to settle for an actual number. (97) However, from the total number of

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(90) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2221. These were the Yemenis who took part with the Muslim army in the battle of al-Buwayb, but most of them were from Bajīlah, cf.127 above.

(91) I, 2356.

(92) Futūḥ, 256 (citing al-Wāqidī).

(93) I, 2222.

(94) Futūḥ, I, 201.

(95) Hill, "The Mobility", 122.

(96) Donner, Islamic conquests, 208, 221.

(97) It should perhaps be made clear that the very large number of troops quoted in the early histories can be taken only with extreme caution. Many are undoubtedly exaggerated and the real point the present writer tries to make is that the Yemenis formed a very high percentage of the whole of the Islamic armies in this front.

the Yemeni reinforcements joining Sa^{c}d's army before al-Qādisiyyah, confirmed above, it can be satisfactorily concluded that the total size of the Yemeni warriors was about seven thousand in this battle.(98) Within two years this number increased to twelve thousand Yemenis in Kufa alone. (99)

C. Yemeni participation in the command of the Muslim troops and in the negotiations at the battle fronts

The Yemeni tribes' involvement was without doubt simultaneous with the movement of the conquests in their early stages and they contributed to the struggle at the battle fronts. Some of their tribal chiefs took part in the command of the Islamic armies and in negotiations with the enemy. A few Yemeni chiefs had had the opportunity of assuming command during Abū Bakr's caliphate. These were mainly Companions such as Jarīr b. ^{c}Abd Allāh al-Bajalī; (100) or those who had supported Islamic authority in the Yemen during the Wars of Apostasy, such as al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī and Imru^{ɔ} al-Qays b. ^{c}Ābis, both from Kindah; (101) or those who were neutral in these wars, such

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(98) We know that Sa^{c}d b. Abī Waqqāṣ left Medina with four thousand men, of whom three thousand were Yemenis; and one thousand, seven hundred, also Yemenis, joined him in Sharaf, cf. 121 above. Add to this two thousand who were already at the front, see130 above; as well as some Yemenis who came from the Syrian front reinforcing the Muslims in Iraq, cf. al-Ṭabarī,I,2367f.

(99) This number appears at the early establishment of Kufa, see 151 below.

(100) For the biography of Jarīr, cf. Chapter I, note 91.

(101) For their role, cf 92 above, Chapter III, B.c. 'The political situation in Ḥadramawt (Ziyad supporters)

as Dhū ʾl-Kalāᶜ al-Ḥimyarī. (102)

When ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb came to power, the Medinan government changed its policy towards apostates. (103) The new caliph gave them the opportunity to join the Muslim armies, as well as his permission for them to lead troops provided that it was not more than one hundred men. (104) Consequently many Yemeni chiefs appeared among the Muslim commanders and the negotiations in the course of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

a. Yemeni participation in the Islamic command

The Yemeni tribes who arrived in Medina are recorded in the historical sources as being separate tribal groups led by their own chiefs. (105) Those chiefs submitted to the general command as soon as their people joined the Muslim troops in Medina. (106) The Yemeni chiefs, therefore, had no chance to lead any of the Muslim armies from Medina to the battle fronts, with the single exception of Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī. His name appears among the Muslim commanders, when Abū Bakr sent him with troops to reinforce the Muslim forces, in Iraq in early Muḥarram, 12/March, 633. (107) In Iraq Jarīr took part in some of the military

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(102) For the Himyarīs' chiefs attitude in these wars, cf. Chapter II F, "The Prophet's action to put down Abhalah's regime". And Chapter III A, d, "The local attitude towards the rebellion", i.e. the rebellion of Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth.

(103) Cf. 117 above.

(104) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2165.

(105) See A. above : "The call of the Medinan government in the Yemeni tribes to join the conquests."

(106) Ibid.

(107) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 243; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 268.

operations and led the Muslim troops which successfully invaded Bāniqyā, a town near Kufa.(108) Nevertheless Jarīr was not mentioned in the historical sources as a Yemeni chief in command of a specific Yemeni group; rather he was leading a general Islamic contingent.

As has already been mentioned, when ᶜUmar came to power many of the Arabs hurried to Medina seeking to participate in the conquests.(109) These tribes were generally led by their local chiefs. This was true of the Yemenis who also appear among these tribes and who were generally under the leadership of one of their own chiefs. These had been authorised to lead their people by the caliph himself, especially ᶜUmar, as soon as they arrived in Medina.

Al-Ṭabarī(110) records that ᶜUmar appointed ᶜArfajah b. Harthamah over al-Azd and Ghālib b. ᶜAbd Allāh over Kināmah before he directed their tribes to the Iraqi front. When Kindah arrived in Medina, Shurahbīl b. al-Simṭ, a Kindī chief, succeeded to the leadership of his tribe, after a power struggle with al-Ashᶜath b. Qays.(111) Jarīr b. ᶜAbd

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(108) Al-Azdī, 57; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ 246. For the location of the town cf. Yaqūt, Muᶜjam al-Buldān, I, 331f.

(109) Especially after he decided to escalate the fighting on the Iraqi front, see 118 above.

(110) Cf. I, 2188, who calls ᶜArfajah al-Bāriqī, nisbah of his clan Bāriq from al-Azd. Also Ghalib was from Kinanah itself.

(111) Al-Shaᶜbī justifies this by pointing to the former's role against the apostates when he took sides with the Muslim troops in Ḥadramawt during the Wars of Apostasy there, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2225; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 200.

Allāh disapproved when ᶜUmar intended to appoint another over Bajīlah. (112) Therefore, most of the Yemeni chiefs who appeared as leaders on the battle fronts were normally in command of their own tribes.

As for the Syrian front, al-Wāqidī (113) tells us that at the siege of Damascus in 13/634-5, Khālid b. al-Walid, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim forces in Syria at that time, appointed Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī over his own tribe, Madhḥij, and commanded him to protect the gate of al-Faraj. After Damascus had been captured, according to al-Ṭabarī, (114) Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān, one of the Muslim commanders in Syria, stayed with the three Yemeni leaders to help protect the town. At the conquest of Ḥimṣ in 15/636, B. Muᶜāwiyah and al-Sakūn, branches of Kindah, were led by some of their own chiefs. (115)

In the Battle of al-Yarmūk in 15/636, Muslim forces were divided into military divisions. (116) Some of the Yemeni chiefs, such as Dhūʾl-Kalāᶜ al-Ḥimyarī, Muᶜāwiyah b. Ḥudayj, Ḥawshab Dhū Ẓulaym and al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad, were in command. (117) These chiefs were the leaders of some of

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(112) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2201.

(113) Futūḥ, I, 39.

(114) I, 2154, those were ᶜAmr b. Shimmar b. Ghaziyyah, Sahm b. al-Musāfir and Mushāfiᶜ b. ᶜAbd Allāh, cf. also Ibn Ḥajar III, V, 116, 171.

(115) Those were al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad over B. Muᶜāwiyah and al-Ashᶜath b. Miʾnās and Imruʾ al-Qays b. ᶜĀbis over al-Sakūn; cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2392; see also al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 137, and Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, II, 303, both confirm that the first Muslim troops to conquer the town were under the command of al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad.

(116) Cf. al-Azdī, 194; al-Waqidī, Futūḥ, I, 125; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2092-5.

(117) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2094. Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 125, mentions Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth as one of the Muslim Commanders.

these military divisions and it is probable that they were in command of their own tribes also. (118) We know that Zubayd, a Yemeni tribe of Madhḥij, elected ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī, one of the chief figures of the tribe, as their leader in this battle. (119) Some of the Yemeni chiefs had lost their leadership within their own tribes at the battle of Yarmūk. Thus they asked Abū ᶜUbaydah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, to re-appoint them over their own tribes. (120) Abū ᶜUbaydah promised them that he would do so after the battle. (121) Consequently one of them, Mālik b. al-Ashtar, appeared leading his own tribe, al-Nakhᶜ, pursuing the survivors of the Byzantine army from al-Yarmūk. (122)

On the Iraqi front, the Yemeni chiefs also appeared in command. As has already been mentioned, some of those had been appointed over their own tribe in Medina by the caliph himself. (123) One of them, Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī refused to come under the command of al-Muthannā b. Ḥārithah, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army in Iraq at that time, when the former arrived on the Iraqi

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(118) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2094.

(119) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 127; al-Kūfī, I, 159.

(120) These are al-Nakhᶜ and Khathᶜam, cf. al-Azdi, 208-10.

(121) Ibid.

(122) Al-Azdī, 214-7.

(123) Cf. 133 above.

border. He declared "You are [i.e. al-Muthannā] a commander and I am a commander too." (124) Accordingly, the Yemeni reinforcements, which had been directed to Iraqi front at that time, appeared in the battle of al-Buwayb in 14/635 as a separate Yemeni force under the command of Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh. (125)

A full record of the Yemeni participation in command of the Muslim armies on the Iraqi front is contained in the accounts of the battle of al-Qādisiyyah in 15/636, when the Persians were decisively defeated. In this battle some of the Yemeni leaders had been appointed by Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic forces there at that time. According to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr, (126) Saᶜd appointed Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī on the left flank of the Muslim army in this battle. Al-Kūfī (127) mentions that ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib and Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh, both Yemenis, led the right flank of the Muslim army, which consisted of ten thousand men, on behalf of Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ. In spite of the contradictions in these statements, what is clear is that the Yemenis did indeed participate in positions of command in this decisive battle.

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(124) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2201 (citing Ibn Isḥāq).

(125) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 254; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2188. Cf. also note 47 above.

(126) I, 2225; al-Kāmil, II, 310. In Ibn Ishāq's account in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2353, Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh on the right flank and Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth on the left, both Yemenis.

(127) Futūḥ, I, 201.

Even those Yemeni chiefs who had no positions of command appeared leading and encouraging their own tribes during the battle. (128)

b. Yemeni participation in negotiations

We have already seen the extent of the Yemeni involvement in the Islamic command; now we shall discuss their role in the negotiations which took place between groups of the Muslims themselves or with their enemies on the battle fronts.

In fact the caliphs paid more attention than usual to the Yemeni chiefs on their arrival in Medina. (129) Their advice was taken seriously by the Muslim leaders, especially during Abū Bakr's Caliphate. (130) It was the latter who gave chiefs the choice of joining whichever Muslim troops they preferred. (131)

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(128) Such as Durayd b. Ka^{c}b al-Nakh^{c}ī and al-Ash^{c}ath b. Qays al-Kindī. The former appeared leading his own tribe, al-Nakh^{c}; while the latter and other Yemeni chiefs were encouraging their own tribes at al-Qādisiyyah; cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2330-6; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 334-7.

(129) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2f; al-Azdī, 7; both record the warm reception of the Yemeni tribes by the Caliph of Abu Bakr as soon as they come to Medina.

(130) Cf. Qays b. ^{c}Abd Yaghūth al-Murādī's suggestion to the caliph, when he advised him to send the troops quickly to the battle front; al-Azdī, 7; in al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 3, a group of the Yemeni chiefs advised Abū Bakr to do so.

(131) Cf. al-Azdī, 20,31-33.

It seems that the caliphs realised the advantage of the Yemeni chiefs' participation in negotiations. So Abū Bakr ordered Abū ᶜUbaydah, while equipping him in Medina, to take seriously the advice and proposals of Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī by saying "A great man will accompany you and the Muslims must listen to his proposals."(132) Ibn al-Athīr (133) records that when ᶜUmar b. al-Khattāb ordered ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib, a Yemeni chief, to move from Syria to the Iraqi front, he wrote to Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the commander-in-chief on that front, instructing him to consult ᶜAmr in all military affairs. Therefore, some of them such as Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth, appeared amongst the foremost of the Muslim planners, when they were discussing the situation before the battle of al-Yarmūk in 15/636 in Syria. (134)

Some of the Yemeni chiefs are also mentioned among the Islamic delegations which met their enemies on the battle fronts. On the Syrian front some of them, e.g. Dhū ʾl-Kalāᶜ al-Ḥimyarī, and Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, joined Khālid b. al-Walīd, the spokesman of the Muslim delegation, when he went to meet the commander-in-chief of the Byzantine armies, Bāhān, before the battle of al-Yarmūk. (135) Also some of them, such as al-Ashᶜath b.

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(132) Al-Azdī, 21.

(133) Usd, IV,133.

(134) He appeared among the Muslim leaders giving his own ideas, cf. al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 99; al-Azdī, 168.

(135) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 113, adds Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī to that delegation. This, however, unlikely because he was on the Iraqi front at that time, cf.119,128 above.

Qays al-Kindī and ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī, appeared among those who were sent to negotiate with the Persian Emperor before the battle of al-Qādisiyyah. (136)

In conclusion, this historical information leads us to believe that the Yemeni reinforcements played a major role in the victory of the Muslim armies in the early period of the Islamic conquests, especially on the Syrian front. Also, through these waves of migration, the Yemenis began direct contact with the Islamic government. They settled down with the Muslim troops in the conquered areas, even forming a majority in some of these towns.(137)

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(136) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 258; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2236; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 315.

(137) Such as Ḥims and Kufa. For the former, cf. al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 324 f; al-Maydānī, Majmaᶜ al-Amthāl, I. 294; Kurd, Khiṭaṭ, 65; al-Ḥadīthī, 150-9, for the latter, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 276; cf. also Massinon, "Explication du Plan de Kufa", 38ff; al-Ḥadīthī, 191-202. For the settlement of the Yemenis in the conquered areas, cf. Chapter V "The Yemeni settlement in the conquered provinces".

CHAPTER V

The Yemeni settlement in the Conquered Provinces

A. The Yemenis and the early settlements

In the previous chapter we saw the spread of the Yemeni tribes on the battle fronts, both in Syria and Iraq. They formed a high percentage of the Muslim warriors on these fronts, especially in Syria. (1) Later on they settled down in these provinces and constituted a large proportion of the Arab inhabitants there.

Some historians describe the movement of the Yemeni tribes to the battle fronts. In these descriptions some of the Yemenis appear with their families and property, leading us to believe that they intended to settle permanently in the disputed provinces. Ḥimyar, the first Yemeni tribe to answer Abū Bakr's call to participate in the conquests, appeared with their wives and children in Medina. Their leader, Dhū ʾl-Kalāʿ al-Ḥimyarī is quoted as saying on meeting the caliph :

أَتتك حميرُ بالاهلِ والولدِ اهلُ السوابقِ والعالونَ بالرتبِ

"Ḥimyar came to you with their wives and their children people of good reputation in the past, and high rank." (2)

Other Yemeni tribes also arrived with their families in Medina and on the battle fronts. (3)

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(1) Cf. Chapter IV, B.

(2) Al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 2.

(3) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2363, says there were one hundred women with Bajīlah and seven hundred with al-Nakhʿ on the Iraqi front. See also al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 20, who records that Khathʿam came to Medina with their families.

As soon as the Muslim armies gained control of the disputed countries, ᶜUmar gave his orders to their commanders to keep these conquered provinces under their sway by establishing the Muslims there. In this way the caliph created a new Islamic community drawn mainly from the Arabian tribes who originally formed the Muslim armies on these fronts and of whom many were from the Yemen.

Generally speaking each Yemeni tribe settled in the area which it had had a hand in conquering, although some of them had participated in fighting on more than one front. These tribes' intention, of course, was to reinforce the Muslim troops on some fronts; however we still find that tribal rivalries were behind some of these movements. It is well known that al-Sakūn, a Yemeni tribe of Kindah, accompanied Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army on the Iraqi front. (4) In Iraq they were relatively unknown, but when they moved to the Egyptian front they became one of the most famous of all the Arabian tribes. One of their leaders, Muᶜawiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Sakūnī, was one of the Yemeni chiefs who divided the land amongst the Muslims at the establishment of al-Fusṭāṭ on behalf of ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim troops there. (5) Tribal relationships were also the motivating force behind the movement of some Yemenis from one front to another: some Madhḥij chiefs moved from Syria to the Iraqi front to join their own tribe there, later

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(4) Cf. 121 above.

(5) Al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 76; Ibn Duqmāq, Intiṣār, I, 3.

on becoming one of the most important groups in Kufa. (6) Al-Simṭ b. al-Aswad al-Kindī, a chief of Kindah, asked ᶜUmar to re-unite him with his son Shuraḥbīl, who was in Kufa, by either permitting him to move to Kufa or sending his son to Ḥimṣ. The latter subsequently moved to Ḥimṣ to join his relatives. (7)

ᶜUmar worked to establish his government's influence over the conquered provinces by ordering his commanders, particularly those in Iraq and Egypt, to build garrison towns to accommodate their troops. In 14/635-6, he sent ᶜUtbah b. Ghazwān, one of the Companions, to reinforce the Muslim troops in the south of Iraq, ordering him to establish a military camp which later developed into what is now Basra. Three years later, in 17/638-9, Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, began the establishment of Kufa on behalf of the caliph. In Egypt ᶜUmar also gave his order to his commander, ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ, to build a garrison town: ᶜAmr established al-Fusṭāṭ in 21/641-2.

In Syria the Muslims did not build such garrison towns; instead they stayed in local Syrian towns and occupied the houses that had been deserted. (8) However, they began to

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(6) Such as ᶜAmr b. Maᶜdī Karib al-Zubaydī, Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī and Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhᶜī. For their presence on Syrian front, see 134-5 above. For ᶜAmr's transfer to Iraq, cf. Ibn al-Athir, Usd, IV, 133; for Qays, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 256, As for Mālik, we have no account of his transfer there, but he appeared on the Syrian front during the early conquests and established himself in Kufa, cf. 135 above 208ff below. For the realisation of Madhhij's power in Kufa, see Chapter VII.

(7) The former was in Hims at that time commanding his own tribe, Kindah, cf. Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, VI, 209; Ibn Hajar, Iṣābah, III, 169.

(8) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 155, who says the Arabs occupied some houses after the departure of its inhabitants in Bals and Qasrīn, two Syrian towns. See also al-Ḥadīthī, 154.

establish new villages on the outskirts of some of these Syrian towns. Villages were built to the north and west of Damascus where each tribal group occupied a village for itself. (9) The Yemeni tribes were among those who assisted in the establishment of these garrison towns in Iraq and Egypt and they were also among the first Arabian tribes to settle in Syrian territories.

In these new settlements the Yemeni tribes had their homes near to one another. Some of their branches (buṭūn), especially those with no real tribal power, joined the more powerful Yemeni groups in these towns; i.e. B. Shaᶜbān b. ᶜAmr, a baṭn of Ḥimyar, joined Hamdān in Kufa and those who were in Basra joined al-Azd, while those who were in al-Fusṭāṭ in Egypt came together with al-Ashāᶜir. (10) Also B. Kurayb, a baṭn of Ḥimyar, joined al-Nakhᶜ in Kufa. (11) So in identifying the tribes in these conquered areas, the Yemenis were collectively regarded as one group. This Yemeni group is traditionally known as the People of the Yemen (ahl al-Yaman).

It is hoped that by mentioning the whereabouts of the Yemenis in the conquered provinces we shall be able to understand their real effect upon the uprising against ᶜUthmān and the first Civil War. Some modern scholars

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(9) Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.

(10) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 234f.

(11) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 150.

have studied in detail the settlement of the Arabian tribes in the conquered areas. One of them concentrated his study on the Yemeni tribes only, while others included them with the other Arabian tribes who settled in these conquered provinces. (12) This has made it unnecessary for us to go into such details to study their settlement. It is necessary only to illustrate briefly their concentration in these provinces. To give a clear picture of the proportion of Yemenis there, it is preferable to study their presence in each region separately, using tables to illustrate their branches.

a. The Yemeni tribes in Syria

Because the Yemeni tribes constituted a high proportion of the Muslim army which conquered Syria, we find that both early and modern historians confirm that the Yemenis formed the basis of the Muslim troops settling in Syria. (13) This agreement indeed corresponds with the geographical indications which mention the spread of the Yemeni tribes throughout the Syrian territories as being so extensive that their names are mentioned in most of the villages and towns there.

The Yemenis indeed comprised the majority of the

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(12) For the Yemeni tribes only, see al-Ḥadīthī, 145ff. For the settlement of the Arab tribes, including the Yemeni, see Kurd, Khiṭaṭ, 63ff; Massignon, Opera minora, III, 35ff; al-Barrī, al-Qabā'il al-ʿArabiyyah fī Miṣr, for Qaḥṭan (i.e. the Yemenis), see 123ff; al-Janabī, Takhṭīṭ, 41-3, Djait, "Yamanites", 148ff.

(13) Cf. al-Azdī, 12; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2222. See also Kurd, Khiṭaṭ, 63-7; al-Nuṣṣ, 234; Dixon, The Umayyad Caliphate, 54.

population. We know that in Ḥimṣ, for example, they were in the majority from one quotation "the weakness of the Qaysī there" (14) i.e. the northern tribes (Qays) were in the minority. According to al-Yaᶜqūbī, (15) the majority of the population in Damascus were Yemenis. On the outskirts of the town the Yemeni tribes began to establish villages, each of which bore the name of its inhabitants. (16)

In fact the nature of the settlement of the Arabian tribes in Syria was different from that in Iraq and Egypt. In Iraq and Egypt they confined themselves to the garrison towns which they had built such as Basra, Kufa and al-Fusṭāṭ, while in Syria they settled in towns and villages throughout various regions (ajnād). (17)

b. The Yemeni tribes in Iraq

As the Muslim armies penetrated deep into Iraqi territories defeating the Persian forces, the Medinan government decided to establish garrison towns from which they could prepare for their attack on Persia. In 14/635-6, ᶜUmar sent ᶜUtbah b. Ghazwān, one of the Companions, to assist the Muslim troops on the southern Iraqi border. He also recommended him to establish a Muslim presence there. (18)

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(14) Al-Maydānī, Majmaᶜ al-Amthāl, I, 294; See also al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 324f.

(15) Buldān, 326.

(16) Cf. Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243, who records some of these Yemeni tribal names, such as al-Awzāᶜ, al-Ṣadif, Muqrī, Shaᶜbān and al-Ashaᶜir (north of the town); Ṣanᶜā', al-Ḥimariyyīn and Ruᶜayn (west of the town); See also al-Ḥadīthī, 154.

(17) See Table a , "The Yemeni tribes in Syria."

(18) Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 127; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 121; al-Dīnawarī, 116f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2377f (citing al-Shaᶜbī); Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 338.

ᶜUtbah's first camp was in al-Khuraybah; after he had taken control of the area, he set off for al-Dahnāʾ where he built the mosque and laid the foundations of Basra. (19)

Within three years, 14-17/635-39, the Muslims fully controlled the rural areas of Iraq (al-Sawād), having defeated the Persian forces in three main battles and crossed over the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris. (20) In the year 17/638-9, the Caliph ordered Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army on the northern Iraqi front, to look for a suitable site for another garrison town for the Muslims in Iraq. (21)

Since the Yemeni tribes had participated in the conquest of Iraq, they were also among the settlers in these new towns. In both Basra and Kufa the Yemeni tribes have been mentioned as being among the other Arab tribes, but they were to be found in Kufa in larger numbers than in Basra. So we shall deal with the Yemeni tribes in both Iraqi towns separately, starting with their presence in Basra.

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(19) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 341f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2377f, 84; see also al-ᶜAlī, al-Tanẓīmāt, 26.

(20) These are al-Qādisiyyah, Jalūlā and al-Madāʾin, cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 255 ff; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, I, 195ff; al-Dīnawarī, 119ff; al-Tabarī, I, 2419ff. See also Donner, 209ff.

(21) For the establishment of Kufa, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, 138; al-Balādhūrī, Futūḥ, 274; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2481-6; cf. also Massignon, Opera minora, III, 38-60; al-janābī, 60-7; al-Ḥadīthī, 192f; Djait, "Yamanites", 152.

i. The Yemenis in Basra

The establishment of Basra, 14/635-6, was contemporary with the assembling of the Muslim army led by Sa^{c}d b. Abī Waqqāṣ, a Companion and one of the most important of the Muslim leaders. These troops were directed towards the northern side of the Arab-Persian borders by ^{c}Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb in the early stages of his caliphate.(22) As has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, most of the Yemeni reinforcements that arrived in Medina at that time joined this army. (23) When Kufa was established in 17/638-9, these Yemeni reinforcements were apparently among the earliest settlers who formed the majority of the population. (24) This matter, however, affected the size of the Yemeni settlers in Basra, where presumably they were less than in other garrison towns. (25)

Five major tribal confederations occupied Basra during its early establishment, one of which was a Qaḥṭānī represented by al-Azd. (26) Our interest here is to investigate the original place of the members of the confederation, in order to ensure that some of them were Yemeni.

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(22) Cf. 118-21 above.

(23) Cf. 118-21 above.

(24) Cf. 151 above, see also Table b,ii "The Yemeni tribes in Kūfa".

(25) Such as Kufa and Fusṭāṭ, see sections on the Yemenis in these garrison towns.

(26) These are Tamīm, B.Bakr, Ahl al-^{c}Āliyah, al-Azd and ^{c}Abd al-Qays, cf. Massignon. Opera minora, III, 66-70; al-^{c}Alī, al-Tanẓīmāt, supplement 237; "Khiṭaṭ" 288ff; Ḥasan, al-Qabā'il, 93ff.

In the primary historical and geographical sources at our disposal, there is no confirmation that the Azd of Basra, came as a whole from one original place at an early stage in its establishment. In modern studies there exist two contradictory points of view. The first was proposed by Wellhausen who suggested : "It must not be thought, however, that all the Azd had come to Basra only in the year 60 A.H. There were already Azdites there before that, and those certainly belonged, just as much as those in Kufa, to the western branch which had its home on Mount Sarât to the Daus mostly." (27) Sixty-two years later a second point of view emerged. This was put forward by al-Nuṣṣ who commented on the above point of view as follows : "Actually we find that the Azd of Oman had come to Basra long before the year 60/679-80. Furthermore, we have no evidence other than from the Azd, that they settled in Basra before this year."(28) Wellhausen tends to confirm that the Azd of Basra before 60/679-80 were from al-Sarāh, i.e. Yemenis, while al-Nuṣṣ tries to establish that they were from Oman. In my opinion, neither Wellhausen nor al-Nuṣṣ has come to a satisfactory conclusion on this question. According to reliable historical evidence, the Azd group in Basra before the year 60/679-80 consisted of all the branches of the Qaḥṭān tribes, who came from both Oman and the Yemen. It is noticeable that long before that date both the Azd groups, Yemeni and Omani, were to be

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(27) The Arab Kingdom, 399.

(28) Al-ᶜaṣabiyyah al-qabaliyyah, 277. He followed by, Ḥasan, al-qabāʾil, 97.

found in Basra. (29) Ibn Isḥāq in al-Ṭabarī (30) tells us that in 13/634 ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb sent ᶜArfajah b. Harthamah al-Bāriqī, one of the chiefs of Azd in al-Sarāh, to Basra to assist the Muslim troops there. This leads us to believe that the Azd of al-Sarāh were amongst the earliest Muslim warriors in Basra and that they might have taken part in its establishment in 14/635-6.

Twenty-two years later, when the first civil war broke out, all the Qaḥṭānī tribes in Basra, coming from either Oman or the Yemen, all declared themselves to be Yemenis. (31) Sayf b. ᶜUmar in al-Ṭabarī (32) records that during the Battle of the Camel (Jumada II 36/December 656), the Azd of Basra were under the leadership of three of their own chiefs, while other Yemenis were led by Dhū'l-Ājarah al-Himyarī. The Azd chiefs were Ṣabrah b. Shaymān, Masᶜūd and Ziyād b. ᶜAmr. Our sources, both primary and modern,

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(29) Massignon, Opera Minora, III, 66, says that the Azd of Basra came from ᶜAsīr and Oman.

(30) Tārīkh, I, 2201 : ᶜUmar sent ᶜArfajah to Basra when the latter disagreed with Bajīlah in Medina. In al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 337; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 401 and Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣabah, IV, 235, the caliph directed him from al-Baḥrayn to assist the Muslims in Basra. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr calls him ᶜArfajah b. Khuzaymah, Istīᶜāb, III, 1062, but this is not correct, his name is ᶜArfajah b. Harthamah al-Bāriqī, a nisbah of his tribe Bāriq of Azd al-Sarāh, see Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 282; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 367; al-Ḥāzimī, 22; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 401.

(31) Cf. Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 47; al-Ṭabarī, 3180-2; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 299; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 125.

(32) I, 3179f. In al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 148f, Madhḥij, a Yemeni tribe, was led by al-Rabīᶜ b. Ziyād al-Ḥārithī, one of the Madhḥijī chiefs in Basra.

differ about the place of origin of the former, Ṣabrah b. Shaymān. Ibn Abī ʾl-Ḥadid (33) says, "During the fitnah, of Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī in Basra in 38/658-9, Ziyād b. Abīhi, ᶜAlī b. Abī Tālib's governor there, was under the protection of Ṣabrah b. Shaymān and his people were from the Azd of Oman". Ibn Durayd(34) confirms that this chief is from al-Sarāh.

In all probability, however, both the Yemeni and Omani tribes gathered in Basra forming a Qaḥṭānī confederation in the same manner as the other Arabian tribes had done in the garrison towns. (35) The reason this confederation

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(33) Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāghah, IV, 43f Cf. also al-Nuss,227, who considers all these Azd chiefs as Omanis; Cf. also al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat,I, 211, and Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat Ansāb al- ᶜArab, 384, the former confirms that al-Ḥuddān, Ṣabrah's clan of Azd, is Omani, while the latter mentions that indirectly when he confirms that al-Ḥuddān were related to al-Julandā, King of Oman.

(34) Ishtiqāq, 299; he also considers him as an Azdī of B. al-Ḥuddān. However, he mentions that his place of origin is al-Sarāh. Cf. also, Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom, 400.

(35) For the Khiṭaṭ of the tribes in Basra, cf. al-ᶜAlī "Khiṭaṭ al-Basrah", 73 who says "One of the difficulties which faces us is that we do not know exactly which clans had settled in Basra and whether the place of their houses corresponded to their genealogical tree". Usually, however, the branches of each tribe gathered in their houses in the garrison towns. For a detailed discussion of the Khiṭaṭ of Basra, see Massignon, Opera Minora, III, 61 ff;al-ᶜAlī, "Khitat", 281ff; Ḥasan, al-Qabāʾil, 93ff. For the Khiṭaṭ of Kufa, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 276; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2489f; Cf. also Massignon, 35ff; al-Janābī, Takhṭīṭ, 60ff. For al-Fusṭaṭ see Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 91ff; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 2-5; al-Maqrizi, Khiṭaṭ, II, 76-80.

has been known as al-Azd may be explained by the preponderance of al-Azd in Basra over other Qahtānī tribes. Other Qahtānī branches, therefore, especially those who had no tribal power in the town, came under al-Azd's protection.(36)

i. The Yemenis in Kufa

We have seen previously that most of the Yemeni tribes who arrived in Medina during the early period of ᶜUmar's caliphate were directed to the Iraqi front and joined the Muslim army led by Saᶜd b. Abī Waqqāṣ. (37) Those warriors represented the first Arab settlers in Kufa. When Saᶜd established Kufa in 17/638-9, however, the Yemenis appeared among the other Arab tribes settled there. Since their numbers in Saᶜd's army were large, they constituted a high proportion of the settlers. On this occasion al-Shaᶜbī said "We [Yemenites] were twelve thousand men; the Nizār were eight thousand; from which you can easily see that we constituted the majority of the settlers of al-Kufa."(38) Thus when the Arab tribes were divided into seven, four of them consisted of Yemeni tribes.(39)

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(36) Such as B. Shaᶜbāh, a baṭn of Himyar, cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklil, II, 235.

(37) Cf. 118-21 above.

(38) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 276; see also English tran., Ḥittī, I, 436.

(39) For the sevenths of Kufa, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235f; al-Dīnawarī, 147f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2495; Cf. also Massignon, Opera Minora, III, 39-44; al-Ḥadīth, 195f; Djait, "Yamanites", 153ff

c. The Yemeni tribes in al-Fusṭāṭ

The proposal to invade Egypt came originally from ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ, who was one of the most important of the Muslim Commanders in Syria, as well as being one of the Companions. He asked the caliph, who was in Syria at that time, for permission to march on Egypt. (40) When the caliph gave his permission in 19/640, ᶜAmr marched west from Syria crossing the Egyptian border with four thousand Yemeni warriors. (41) These Yemenis formed the back-bone of ᶜAmr's army, especially at the beginning of the campaign there.

However, the importance of the Yemeni tribes on this front is indicated by the major role they played. Al-Wāqidī (42) reports that ᶜAmr gave his command to the people of the Yemen (ahl al-Yaman) and those Arabs who accompanied them to lay siege to Qalyūb, an Egyptian town. Further proof of their importance in this army is mention of them in the poetry of ᶜAmr himself, who encouraged his army in the course of the battle of Babylon, near the present site of Cairo, as follows:

يـــوم لهمـدان ويـــوم للصَّـــدِف والمنجنيـــــقُ فـي بلـــيً تختلـــفْ

One day for Hamdān and another for al-Ṣadif [both Yemeni tribes] .

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(40) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 214; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2579; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 125.

(41) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 125. In Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 56, all of them from ᶜAkk, a Yemeni tribe, while in another account three thousand five hundred. In al-Kindī, Wulāh, 8, three thousand five hundred, a third from Ghāfiq, a tribe of ᶜAkk.

(42) Futūḥ, II, 31.

While the catapult (manjanīq) goes around Balī [tribe of Quḍāᶜah].(43)

Thanks to their importance in this army, the Yemenis were no doubt mentioned in these events more than any other of the Arab tribes. This importance, however, led ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ to authorize four Yemeni chiefs to divide the land of al-Fusṭāṭ amongst the Arab tribes in 21/641-2.(44)

Al-Fusṭāṭ was the third of the garrison towns established by the Muslims in the conquered countries. Historical and geographical sources discussing the establishment of this new garrison town give much data about the Arab tribes who settled there, including the Yemeni migrants whose tribes were situated near each other and were in control of most lands (khiṭaṭ) of the town.(45)

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(43) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 62. Ballī is one of the Yemeni tribes which settled in Syria before the conquest, therefore, it is of no concern to us here.

(44) These Yemeni chiefs are Muᶜāwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī (of Kindah), Shurayk b. Summy al-Ghuṭayfī al-Murādī, of Madhḥij, ᶜAmr b. Qaḥzam al-Khawlānī and Ḥaywīl b. Nāshirah al-Maᶜāfirī (of Ḥimyar), see Ibn Duqmāq, Intiṣār, I, 3; Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 76. In Ibn Taghrī-Bardī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah, I, 74, Jibrīl b. Bāshirah al-Maᶜāfirī. Al-Ḥadīthi in his book, ahl al-Yaman fī Ṣadr al-Islām, 168, comments upon ᶜAmr's authorization to those chiefs as follows "ᶜAmr avoided involvement in the affairs of these tribes, or he intended to let them choose their houses according to their desires and these [chiefs] were more understanding in the matters of settlement."

(45) Cf. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 188ff; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 4f; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 77-9. Cf. also Table c "The Yemeni tribes in al-Fusṭāṭ".

B. The branches (buṭūn) of the Yemeni tribes in the conquered provinces*

a. Syria (46)

1. buṭūn Ḥimyar

- Al-Aḥāmis, in Ḥimṣ (47)
- Al-Awzā^{c}, north of Damascus (48)
- Bahīl, baṭn of al-Kalā^{c}, in Ḥimṣ (49)
- Dhī Tarkham, in Ḥimṣ (50)
- Dhī Yazan, in Ḥimṣ (51)
- Ḥannah, baṭn of Āl-Sawādah b. ^{c}Amr, in Ḥimṣ (52)
- Ḥarāz (53)
- Hawzan, baṭn of al-Kalā^{c} (54)

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(46) Since the Arab tribes were scattered throughout Syrian regions, settling in all its towns and villages, the definition of the settlement of each tribe becomes difficult. Although some Muslim genealogists and historians have tried to assign specific towns to some of these tribes, they ignore others and mention only their settlement in Syria. Therefore in this table we shall mention the Yemeni tribal branches (buṭūn) in Syria, giving some of their specific areas according to what we have found in our sources.

(47) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 240.

(48) Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.

(49) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 1f.

(50) Al-Ḥāzimī, ^{c}Ujjālat, 30. Al-Sam^{c}ānī, Ansāb, II, 40, reads al-Tarākhumah.

(51) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 263.

(52) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 244.

(53) Ibn Mākūlā, Ikmāl, II, 447; al-Ḥāzimī, 48; al-Sam^{c}ānī, VI, 92.

(54) Al-Ḥāzimī, 123; See also Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 434.

(*) Names are listed in English alphabetical order.

- Jubā, batṇ of Āl-Sawādah (55)
- Jubayr, batṇ of Āl-Sawādah (56)
- Jublān, in Ḥimṣ (57)
- Al-Kalā^{c}, a large tribe - most of them in Ḥimṣ (58)
- B. al-Khabā^{ɔ}ir, batṇ of al-Kalā^{c} . (59)
- B. Kurayb, in Shahrazawr, Damascus and al-Ramlah (60)
- Muqrī, north of Damascus (61)
- Nu^{c}aymah, batṇ of Āl-Sawādah (62)
- B. Ru^{c}ayn, a large tribe, west Damascus (63)
- Al-Ṣadif, north of Damascus (64)
- Sha^{c}bān, north of Damascus (65)
- Sulaf, batṇ of al-Kalā^{c} (66)
- Wuḥāẓah (67)
- Wuṣāb, in Ḥimṣ (68)

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(55) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 244,281.

(56) Ibid.

(57) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 176; al-Sam^{c}ānī, III, 187.

(58) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, X, 514.

(59) Al-Ḥāzimī, 53.

(60) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 150f, some of the Abrahiyyīn joined them.

(61) Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.

(62) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 244f, 281.

(63) Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Tahdhīb, I, 243.

(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid.

(66) Al-Ḥāzimī, 75.

(67) Al-Ḥāzimī, 120.

(68) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 176; al-Sam^{c}ānī, III, 187. Al-Ḥāzimī, 121 reads Waṣṣāb, which is absolutely wrong, see Caskel, I. Table 274; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 105.

- Yaḥṣub, in al-Lādhiqiyyah (69)
- Zunjaᶜ, batn of al-Kalāᶜ, in Ḥimṣ (70)

2. butūn Kindah (71)

- B. Al-Arqam, in al-Ruhā (72)
- B. Malᶜaqah, batn of Ākil al-Marār (73)
- Al-Sakāsik, a large tribe (74)
- B. Wahb b. al-Ḥārith (75)

3. buṭūn Madhḥij

- ᶜAns, a large tribe (76)
- Ḥawṭ (77)
- Ruhāᵓ (78)
- Zubayd, a large tribe in al-Lādhiqiyyah (79)

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(69) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 324f.

(70) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 1f.

(71) Unfortunately the sources do not give in detail the butūn of Kindah in Syria as they do for Kufa and al-Fusṭāṭ.

(72) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 426.

(73) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f28a.

(74) Al-Samᶜānī, VII, 97, says that they settled in Wadi al-Sakāsik in Jordan, and they were of al-Azd. This tribe is one of the two main sections of B. Ashras of Kindah, See Caskel, I, table 233, 43; Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 221; Ibn Ḥazm, 429, 31f; al-Ḥimyarī, Shams, 50; al-Ḥāzimī, 72; Ibn Rasūl, Turfat, 34; Ibn al-Athīr, Lubāb, I, 519; and see also table 3.

(75) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(76) Ibn Mākūlā, VI, 355; al-Samᶜānī, IX, 79.

(77) Al-Ḥāzimī, 51.

(78) Al-Ḥāzimī, 66.

(79) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 324f giving the place. See also al-Ḥāzimi, 68.

4. buṭūn Hamdān

- Ḥajūr (80)
- B.Madrak b. ᶜUdhar (81)
- B. Mālik b. ᶜUdhar (82)
- Āl-Maᶜyūf, in Damascus (83)

5. Other Yemeni tribes

- Al-Ashāᶜir (84)
- Khawlān (85)

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(80) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f68b.

(81) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 61.

(82) Ibid.

(83) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f68b. See also al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, V, 197, who says that those Hamdānīs who joined Muᶜawiyah's army at Ṣiffīn were still living in a village called Tharmah in Damascus, i.e. on the outskirts of the city. Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 324f, records that some Hamdānīs were living in Ḥims, and the inhabitants of Jabalah, a Syrian town, were from Hamdān.

(84) They first settled in Tiberias then moved, after Ṣiffīn, to al-Thaniyyah and Hawrān, both are Syrian cities, see al-Yaᶜqūbī, Buldān, 324f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, III, 221. Cf. also al-Ḥadīthī, 158.

(85) Al-Hāzimī, 56.

b. - Iraq

i. Basra

- B. An^{c}am, batn of al-Azd (86)
- Al-Baddā$^{\supset}$, batn of B. Mu^{c}āwiyah of Kindah (87)
- B. Buḥayr, batn of Khawlān (88)
- B. Duhn, batn of Bajīlah (89)
- B. Al-Ḥārith, batn of Madhḥij (90)
- B. Khayār, batn of Khawlān (91)
- B. Mālik b. Salamah, batn of Ākil al-Marār of Kindah (92)
- B. Sha^{c}bān b. ^{c}Amr, batn of Ḥimyar (93)
- B. Shibābah, batn of al-Azd (94)
- Al-Tanā^{c}im, batn of Khawlān (95)
- Za^{c}bab, batn of Madhḥij (96)
- Zahrān, a large tribe of al-Azd (97)

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(86) Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 299.

(87) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 29a.

(88) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 445.

(89) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 389.

(90) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 40b.

(91) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 445.

(92) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 28a.

(93) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 234f.

(94) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 380.

(95) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 445.

(96) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 40b.

(97) Al-Ḥāzimī, 69.

ii. Kufa

1. butūn Hamdān

- B. Dālān, baṭn of Bakīl (98)
- Al-Fubbī (99)
- Fā'ish (100)
- Al-Ḥabbāb, baṭn of Bakīl (101)
- Khārif, baṭn of Hāshid (102)
- B.Marhabah, baṭn of Bakīl (103)
- Al-Mujālid, baṭn of Ḥāshid (104)
- B. Nā'iṭ, baṭn of Ḥāshid (105)
- Al-Sabī', baṭn of Ḥāshid (106)
- Shibām, baṭn of Ḥāshid (107)
- Yām, baṭn of Ḥāshid (108)

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(98) Ibn Mākūlā, III, 306; al-Sam'ānī, V, 265f.

(99) Al-Sam'ānī, IX, 237.

(100) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3348.

(101) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 195f.

(102) Ibn Mākūlā, III, 235; al-Sam'ānī, V, 14; al-Ḥāzimī, 53.

(103) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 145.

(104) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 35.

(105) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3348.

(106) Ibn Durayd, 254; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 390; al-Sam'ānī, VII, 35; al-Ḥāzimī, 72. Al-Ḥimyarī, Shams, 29; al-Waysī, 166, both add al-Ḥūthān baṭn of al-Sabī' in Kufa.

(107) Al-Ḥāzimī, 78; Yāqūt, Mu'jam, III, 318.

(108) Al-Ḥāzimī, 124.

2. buṭūn Madhḥij

- B. ᶜAbd Allāh (109)
- B. ᶜĀmir (110)
- Awd (111)
- Al-Ḥaddāᵓ, batn of Saᶜd al-ᶜAshīrah (112)
- B. Ḥārithah (113)
- Al-Jadā, batn of Saᶜd al-ᶜAshīrah (114)
- B. Jadhīmah, batn of al-Nakhᶜ (115)
- Jamal b. Kinānah, batn of Murād (116)
- Juᶜfī, a large tribe (117)
- Musliyah, a batn of ᶜAmr b. ᶜUlah (118)
- Nāshirah (119)
- B. Qays, batn of al-Nakhᶜ (120)
- B. Salmān, batn of Murād (121)

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(109) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(110) Ibid.

(111) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 411.

(112) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 407; al-Ḥāzimī, 47.

(113) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(114) Ibn Ḥabīb, Mukhtalif, 32.

(115) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab f 44a, reads Jadīmah. See Caskel, I, table 264; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 414, who give a correct name.

(116) Al-Hāzimī, 41f.

(117) Ibn Durayd, 244.

(118) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 43b.

(119) Cf. al-Hāzimī, 116, who says Nāshirah is a batn of Hamdān. This assumption is patently wrong, see Caskel, I, table 262, who referred it to Madhhij.

(120) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(121) Al-Hāzimī, 74.

- B. Suhbān, batn of al-Nakh^{c} (122)
- B. Wahbīl, batn of al-Nakh^{c} (123)
- Zubayd, a large tribe (124)

3. buṭūn Kindah

- B. Al-^{c}Adā (125)
- B. Al-Arqam (126)
- B. Baddā (127)
- B. Dhuhd b. Mu^{c}āwiyah (128)
- B. Ḥujr b. Wahb (129)
- B. Imru' al-Qays b. Rabī^{c}ah (130)
- B. Jabalah b. ^{c}Adī (131)
- B. Mālik b. al-Ḥārith (132)
- B. Mālik b. al-Rabī^{c}ah (133)
- B. Masrūq (134)

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(122) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 44a.

(123) Ibid, reads Wahsal. For the correct name, see Caskel, I, Table 264; Ibn Hazm, Jamharat, 414; Ibn al-Athīr, lubāb, II, 281.

(124) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, VI, 248.

(125) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 29b.

(126) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 25a. We know that some of them left Kufa when they disagreed with ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭālib before Siffīn and they moved to Syria where they settled in al-Ruhā , see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 426; cf. also Table a, 2 above.

(127) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, II, 111, who refers this batn to Himyar. It is clear from our sources that this batn is from Kindah not Himyar, see Caskel, I, table 233; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 425, Ibn al-Athīr, lubab, I, 104.

(128) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(129) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 24a.

(130) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(131) Ibid.

(132) Ibid.

(133) Ibid.

(134) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 28a.

- B. Murrah (135)
- B. Nahd (136)
- B. Al-Rā'ish (137)
- B. Salāmah (138)
- B. Al-Shajarah (139)
- B. Zayd b. al-Ḥārith (140)
- B. Zimmān (141)

4. buṭūn Ḥimyar

- Al-Aḥmūs (142)
- Ḥadramawt, a large tribe (143)
- B. Kurayb (144)
- Mahrah (145)
- B. Sha'bān (146)

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(135) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 24a.

(136) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(137) Al-Sam'ānī, VI, 62. Al-Ḥadīthī, 202, says that B. al-Rā'ish was one of branches (buṭun) of Kindah who settled in Kufa, quoting Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Durayd. However, none of these sources confirm this. The former does not record such a statement and the latter says that Shurayḥ al-Qādī was the only one from this baṭn in Kufa, see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 425; Ibn Durayd, 218.

(138) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 26a.

(139) Ibn Durayd, 220.

(140) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 23b.

(141) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 31b.

(142) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 240.

(143) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235; al-Ḥāzimī, 49.

(144) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 150, they joined al-Nakh', of Madhḥij

(145) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235.

(146) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 234, they joined Hamdān.

5. Other Yemeni tribes

- Aḥmas, batn of Bajīlah (147)
- Al-Ashā^{c}ir (148)
- B. al-Ḥārith b. ^{c}Āmir, batn from Zahrān of al-Azd (149)
- Khath^{c}am, a large Yemeni tribe (150)
- B. Māzin, batn of al-Azd (151)
- B. Zārah, batn of al-Azd (152)

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(147) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, I, 146. For Bajīlah, see also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 236; al-Sam^{c}ānī, II, 85.

(148) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235.

(149) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 68b, they were from al-Sarāh.

(150) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 236; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 391.

(151) Ibn Durayd, 289f, they were from al-Sarāh.

(152) Ibn Durayd, 288, says in al-Sarāh. Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 376 mentions that they were from the Ḥijaz.

c. Al-Fusṭāṭ

1. buṭūn Ḥimyar

- B. ᶜAbal, batn of Ruᶜayn (153)
- ᶜAbs b. Zawf (154)
- Al Akhmūr, batn of al-Maᶜāfir (155)
- Al-Aḥjūr, batn of al-Maᶜāfir (156)
- Al-Amlūk, batn of Ruᶜayn (157)
- Aṣbaḥ (158)
- Al-Ashbāʾ, batn of Ḥadramawt (159)
- Dhubḥān, batn of Ruᶜayn (160)
- B. Ḥajr, batn of Ruᶜayn (161)
- Al-Jabzā, batn of al-Maᶜāfir (162)
- Al-Janad, batn of al-Maᶜāfir (163)
- Jayshān, batn of Ruᶜayn (164)

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(153) Al-Ḥāzimī, 90.

(154) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.

(155) Al-Samᶜānī, I, 155. See also al-Akwaᶜ, "Afᶜūl",15.

(156) Al-Samᶜānī, I, 390f. Cf. also al-Akwaᶜ, "Afᶜūl", 26.

(157) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 128; see also al-Akwaᶜ, "Afᶜūl", 25.

(158) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 129.

(159) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 123. They arrived during ᶜUthman's reign.

(160) Al-Ḥāzimī, 62.

(161) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 129; al-Ḥāzimī, 45.

(162) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 177.

(163) Al-Ḥāzimī, 42.

(164) Al-Ḥāzimī, 44.

- Al-Kalā^{c}, a large tribe (165)
- B.Khāḍid, baṭn of Yaḥsub (166)
- Al-Ma^{c}āfir, a large tribe (167)
- Mahrah, a large tribe (168)
- B. Mawhab, baṭn of al-Ma^{c}āfir (169)
- Na^{c}īmah, baṭn of al-Kalā^{c} (170)
- Qarāfah, baṭn of al-Ma^{c}āfir (171)
- Qitabān, baṭn of Ru^{c}ayn (172)
- Radmān, baṭn of Ru^{c}ayn (173)
- Ru^{c}ayn, a large tribe (174)
- Sabā , a large tribe (175)
- Al-Ṣadif, a large tribe (176)

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(165) al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.

(166) Ibn Mākūlā, III, 117.

(167) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 102; al-Ḥāzimī, 114; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.

(168) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 118ff; al-Ḥāzimī, 115; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 77.

(169) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.

(170) Al-Ḥāzimī, 117.

(171) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, X, 86; al-Ḥāzimī, 103.

(172) Al-Ḥāzimī, 102.

(173) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 128; al-Ḥāzimī, 65.

(174) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126; al-Sam^{c}ānī, VI, 139; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, IV, 1455; al-Ḥāzimī, 66; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.

(175) Ibn Mākūlā, IV, 532f; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Hakam, Futūḥ, III, 126; al-Sam^{c}ānī, VII, 23; al-Ḥāzimī, 72; Ibn Duqmāq,I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.

(176) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 122ff; al-Sam^{c}ānī, VIII. 43; al-Ḥāzimī, 80; Ibn Duqmāq, I,5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78.

- Al-Sama^{c} (177)
- Saybān, batn of Mahrah (178)
- B.Sha^{c}bān b. ^{c}Amr (179)
- Al-Sulaf (180)
- Al- ^{c}Utaqā^{ɔ} (181)
- Yāfi^{c}, batn of Ru^{c}ayn (182)
- Yahṣub, a large tribe(183)
- Zawf, a batn of Ḥaḍramawt (184)
- Zayād, a batn of al-Kalā^{c} (185)

2. buṭūn Madhḥij

- B. ^{c}Abs, batn of Murād (186)
- B. Badī^{c}ah (187)
- Ghuṭayf, batn of Murād (188)

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(177) Al-Ḥāzimī, 75.

(178) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 121.

(179) Al-Hamdānī, Iklil, II, 233-5, they joined al-Ashā^{c}ir.

(180) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.

(181) Al-Ḥāzimī, 90

(182) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126; al-Ḥāzimī, 124.

(183) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futuḥ, III, 123; al-Ḥāzimī, 124; Ibn Duqmāq,I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 79.

(184) Al-Ḥāzimī, 69.

(185) Al-Ḥāzimī, 68.

(186) Al-Ḥāzimī, 89.

(187) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.

(188) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Hakam, Futūḥ, 125f; al-Ḥāzimī, 99; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78f.

- Janb, a large tribe (189)
- Nāshirah (190)
- Silhim, batn of Sa^{c}d al-^{c}Ashīrah (191)
- Wi^{c}lān, batn of Murād (192)
- Al-Za^{c}āfir, batn of Sa^{c}d al-^{c}Ashīrah (193)
- Zawf, batn of Murād (194)

3. butūn Kindah

This tribe was mainly represented by butun of Tujīb(195)

- Abdhā (196)
- B. ^{c}Āmir (197)
- Al-Ayda^{c}ān (198)
- ^{c}Ibād (199)
- Al-Khalāwah (200)
- B.Sa^{c}d (201)
- Sawm (202)

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(189) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.

(190) Al-Ḥāzimī, 116.

(191) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f49b; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 123ff. They both consider this batn from Murād, but in Caskel, I, table 266; Ibn Durayd, 242 and Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 408, is a batn from Sa^{c}d al-^{c}Ashīrah.

(192) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam Futūḥ, III, 125f- Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78f.

(193) Al-Ḥāzimī, 68.

(194) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab f50a; al-Ḥāzimī, 69.

(195) See Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 125; al-Sam^{c}ānī, III, 24f; Ibn Duqmāq, I, 4; Ibn Ḥazm, 429; al-Ḥāzimī, 30; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 77.

(196) Al-Ḥāzimī, 9.

(197) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 125.

(198) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 122.

(199) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, VIII, 340; al-Ḥāzimī, 90.

(200) Al-Ḥāzimī, 57.

(201) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Hakam, Futūḥ, III, 122.

(202) Ibn Mākūlā, II, 581; al-Ḥāzimī, 76.

4. buṭūn Khawlān

- Furūdh, baṭn of B. Rabī^{c}ah b. Sa^{c}d (203)
- Al-Judaydah, baṭn of B. Rāziḥ b. Mālik (204)
- Rushayyah (205)

5. buṭūn ^{c}Akk

This tribe was mainly represented by buṭūn of Ghāfiq (206)

- Dihnah (207)
- Al-Ghumr (208)
- Hadhrān (209)
- Hamd (210)
- Al-Qiyān (211)
- Al-Rubbaniyyīn (212)
- Tayam (213)

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(203) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 369.

(204) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, III, 198.

(205) Ibn Mākūlā, IV, 72. For Khawlāh, in general, see Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 125f; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78.

(206) See Al-Kindī, Wulāh, 8; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 119ff; Ibn Duqmāq, I,5; al-Ḥāzimī, 97; al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78. The Muslim genealogists differ about the nasab of ^{c}Akk, some of them refer this tribe to ^{c}Adnān, others claim that it is Qaḥṭānī from al-Azd, see Ibn Durayd, 287; Caskel, I, table 176, 219f; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 328, 375; Ibn al-Athīr, lubāb, II, 147; al-Sam^{c}ānī, IX, 34; al-Ḥāzimī, 93. It is not our aim to define the nasab of the tribe in the present study, as long as the tribe had migrated from the Yemen. For the territory of ^{c}Akk in the Yemen, see Map 1, and also see 22 above.

(207) Al-Ḥāzimī, 59.

(208) Al-Ḥāzimī, 99.

(209) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 121. Caskel, I,Table 220, reads Ḥidrān.

(210) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 121; al-Ḥāzimī, 5C.

(211) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, X, 285. Caskel, I, table 220 reads, Qiyāt.

(212) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 122. In Caskel, I, Table 220 reads Rabbān.

(213) Al-Sam^{c}ānī, III, 116.

6. Other Yemeni tribes

- Al-Abnā^{ɔ}. (214)
- Al-Aknū^{c}, batn of al-Ashā^{c}ir (215)
- Daws, a large tribe of al-Azd in al-Sarāh (216)
- Hamdān (217)
- B. Suray^{c}, batn of al-Ashā^{c}ir (218)

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(214) In Ibn Duqmāq, I, 5 and al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 78: "They [the Abnā^{ɔ}] were the remainder of Bādhān's [the Persian governor in the Yemen] army who adopted Islam in Syria and moved with ^{c}Amr b. al-^{c}Ās to Egypt. However, we know that the Abnā^{ɔ} were descendants of the Persian troops sent to the Yemen in AD 575, adopting Islam during ^{c}Abhalah's sway over San^{c}ā', see 14 above. It is quite possible that some of them migrated to the battle fronts with the Yemeni tribes taking part in the fighting with the Muslim armies and settling with them in the new garrison towns, see Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 129.

(215) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 126.

(216) Ibn Duqmāq, I, 3. Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam Futūḥ III, 120, mentions Shabābah one of its buṭūn, who some of them were from al-Sarāh, see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 380.

(217) Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, III, 128, they settled in al-Jīzah, outskirts of al-Fusṭāṭ.

(218) Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab, f 50b.

In conclusion, however, the settlement of such a high number of the Yemenis in these conquered provinces obviously reflects on the political situation of the Yemen. One of the most important factors was the migration of the Yemeni chiefs, accompanied by their own tribes, who appeared on the scene of the events during the Wars of Apostasy. Their departure on the one hand left the Muslim governors in full control over some of the Yemeni regions, and, on the other, the Yemen was transformed politically from a troublesome to a quiet country. This result, however, will be seen in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

The political situation and Yemeni relations with the Islamic government during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs

(11-35/632-56)

Chapter three indicated the success of the Islamic forces and their Yemeni allies in putting down the rebellious tribes in the Yemen in the first year of Abū Bakr's Caliphate, 11/632-3. (1) Following this victory, Islamic authority apparently emerged in three of the Yemeni towns : Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns. For well over 200 years (11-233/633-847), Muslim governors were appointed by the caliphate over these towns, Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$ and al-Janad in particular. (2) On the other hand, some provinces of the Yemen(makhālīf) remained under the political control of their local chiefs. These provinces belonged to some of the influential tribes of the Yemen, such as Ḥimyar and Hamdān. This chapter, however, will cover the political situation in the Yemen and its relations with the Medinan government from the end of the War of Apostasy until the murder of ^{c}Uthmān b. ^{c}Affān (11-35/632-56).

A. The transfer of authority from the local powers to the Medinan governors in these three towns

Our sources unanimously agree on Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns as being the headquarters of the Islamic governors in the Yemen. From these towns, Arab

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(1) For a detailed discussion of this event, cf. Chapter III above.

(2) Cf. Table of governors.

historians believe that these governors had ruled the Yemen as a whole. This exaggerated assumption, however, is still followed by some modern writers. (3)

This naive assertion by both primary and recent sources, however, is not acceptable. It is likely that politically, Islamic domination over the Yemen was concentrated in some Yemeni regions only. Such domination over all the Yemeni provinces however is indeed suspect, especially considering the actual internal situation of that period. There is no doubt that Islam as a religion became the first faith in the Yemen, (4) while some areas remained under the political control of their local chiefs. This phenomenon clearly appeared in the provinces of influential tribes, such as Ḥimyar and Hamdān. These local powers and their relations with Medina will be discussed later. (5)

The political submission of Ṣanᶜā, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns to the Medinan administration certainly did occur. The succession of Islamic governors in these towns is material proof of this political domination. It is relevant, however to assess the main

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(3) Especially the Yemenis, i.e. see Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 14f; al-Khazrajī, ᶜAsjad, 13f; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 67-71. Cf also Ibn Khurdādhibah, Masālik, 144; al-Muqaddasī, Aḥsan, 105, who both say that the Yemen was divided into three divisions (aᶜmal), al-Janad, Ṣanᶜā and Ḥadramawt. For the modern writers, cf. al-Ḥaddād, Tārīkh, 150; Ṣālih, Tārīkh, 101; al-Ḥadīthī, Ahl al-Yaman, 125.

(4) For full discussion of the spread of Islam in the Yemen, see Chapter I.B above.

(5) See192 Below.

factors that helped the concentration of Islamic political power in these Yemeni towns.

The constant flow of Yemeni migrants into the conquered provinces throughout the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs caused a serious political vacuum in the Yemen. (6) This resulted from the fact that most of the influential tribal chiefs, those who came to power during the Wars of Apostasy, either for or against the Medinan authority, had left the country and settled in the conquered areas. (7) After their departure, the Yemen entered a new phase of her history which was to be distinguished by a political lull. As for the rest of the chiefs remaining in the Yemen, it seems that they contended among themselves for sovereignty over their own regions.(8)

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(6) For a detailed discussion of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered areas during the caliphate of Abū Bakr and the early stages of his successor's reign, see Chapter IV above. Of course, these migrants were not the last Yemenis who travelled to the conquered areas, since the migratory movements continued throughout this period from the Yemen to the conquered provinces, these migrants have been known as rawādif, those who came after the conclusion of the conquest (A.H.17/A.D.638), see Donner, Islamic Conquest, 231ff.

(7) Such as al-ʿAshʿath b. Qays al-Kindī, Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, ʿAmr b. Maʿdī Karib al-Zubaydī and Dhū ʾl-Kalaʿ al-Ḥimyarī. For their role during the Wars of Apostasy, see Chapter II-III, above, and for their role in the conquests, cf Chapter IV above. See also their role in the Civil War in Chapter VII below.

(8) Especially those of Ḥimyar and Hamdān, such as Dhū Ruʿayn, Dhū Yazan B. ʿAbd Kalāl and Dhū Murrān. These chiefs enjoyed full power over their tribes on the eve of Islam in the Yemen and did not migrate to the conquered provinces. However, it cannot be accepted that those chiefs lost their influence over their own tribes by the spread of Islam in the region.

In such a political atmosphere, the Medinan governors in the Yemen were able to rule freely in their headquarters, without any rivalry from such tribal leaders.

However, there is no mention of the direct reasons for the selection of these towns by the Medinan government as centres of its authority in the Yemen. This choice might have been the result of the armed struggle which these areas witnessed during the last phase of the Prophet's life and the early stages of Abū Bakr's Caliphate,(9) since this hostility gave an excuse to the Muslims to interfere politically in these areas.

In order to support the Muslims in these areas, the Medinan government sent re-inforcements there. Following their victories, the Muslims gained a foothold in these regions, filling the political vacuum. This happened particularly during the first year of Abū Bakr's Caliphate, 11/632-3.

As has already been mentioned, the Abnāʾ in Ṣanʿā, either during their hostility against ʿAbhalah b. Kaʿb or against Qays b. ʿAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī, had been looking for help from the Medinan government.(10) In order to lend support to the Abnāʾ during their campaign against the Madhḥij in Ṣanʿāʾ, the Islamic troops entered the town and established their authority. Thereafter, political

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(9) For these hostilities, see Chapter II-III above.

(10) For the communications of the Abnāʾ with the Medinan government during this hostility, cf. Chapter II and III above.

affairs in Ṣanᶜā were transferred from the Persian community, the Abnā, to the Islamic authority.

Thus after the arrival of al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah's army in Ṣanᶜā in 11/632-3, the Abnā were all debarred from any official posts, though their influence as a local power continued in the town. (11) It is noticeable that none of the Abnā was designated over the town throughout the period of the Orthodox caliphs 11-40/632-56; despite this, their hostility against Madhḥij was mainly to stay on an official level. (12)

In fact the sources at our disposal do not record any objections or complaints from the Abnā as a reaction to the Medinan policy. It is probable that as a result of their sufferings during the local hostilities, the Abnā might have averted their eyes from political affairs in Ṣanᶜā, especially as long as it remained under the control of a neutral authority. Their invitation to Muᶜādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy in the Yemen, offering him leadership over Ṣanᶜā, is clear proof of the Abnā's wish for a neutral regime in the town. (13)

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(11) For the arrival of al-Muhājir's army in Ṣanᶜā, cf 102 above. They appeared as the great local power in Ṣanᶜā in 40/656, see 254 below.

(12) However, when Muᶜāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān became caliph they apparently emerged in power when the former appointed some of them to office of Ṣanᶜā and al-Janad. See 271 below and Table 6.

(13) When the Abnā realized that Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth intended to remove authority from them in Ṣanᶜā, after the Prophet's death, they immediately sent to Muᶜādh offering him the office of the leader of the town, see 77 above.

The year long hostilities between the Abnā$^{\text{ɔ}}$ and Madhḥij over the question of control over Ṣan$^{\text{c}}$ā$^{\text{ɔ}}$ must have created a political vacuum in the town. (14) It appears that the Medinan government realized that the leadership of Ṣan$^{\text{c}}$ā$^{\text{ɔ}}$ had to be removed from the hands of these conflicting groups. Consequently Fayrūz al-Daylamī, a leader of the Abnā$^{\text{ɔ}}$ in Ṣan$^{\text{c}}$ā$^{\text{ɔ}}$, was removed from the leadership when al-Muhājir's army entered the town, 11/632-33, though the former had officially been appointed by Abū Bakr. (15) Through such a policy the Medinan government was able to eliminate the local struggle in Ṣan$^{\text{c}}$ā$^{\text{ɔ}}$ and at the same time gain a foothold in the town. Thus throughout the period of the first three Orthodox caliphs, 11-35/633-56 the governors were successively sent from Medina to Ṣan$^{\text{c}}$ā$^{\text{ɔ}}$. None of them was from the inhabitants of the town. (16)

Al-Janad was the second Yemeni town chosen by the Medinan government as a centre for its representatives in the southern area of the highlands and Tihāmah since Abū Bakr confirmed his authority there by appointing a governor over the town in 11/632-3. However, this choice was made long before that date, when the Prophet sent his ambassador, Mu$^{\text{c}}$ādh b. Jabal, to the Yemen in 9/630-1. (17) After

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(14) For a detailed discussion of the hostility of the Abnā$^{\text{ɔ}}$ against Madhḥij, cf. Chapter II, III above.

(15) Cf.100 above.

(16) Cf. Table 4.

(17) Because of al-Janad's suitable geographical location and the acceptance of some of its inhabitants to protect the Muslim envoys, the Prophet directed Mu$^{\text{c}}$ādh to the town to take it as a centre of his mission in the Yemen. See 34 above.

ʾAbhalah's occupation of Ṣanᶜāʾ in Muḥarram 11/April 632, Muᶜādh b. Jabal feared the spread of the rebellion and went to Ḥaḍramawt. (18) When the political situation settled down in the Yemen during the early period of Abū Bakr's reign, Muᶜādh returned to al-Janad, establishing Islamic authority permanently in this Yemeni town. (19)

In fact without the support of some of the local tribes, the Medinan government would not have been able to establish its authority in Ḥaḍramawt. When the rebels had been decisively defeated at al-Nujayr, 11/632-3, the Medinan government gained a strong foothold in Ḥaḍramawt and was able to appoint a series of governors over the area. (20)

Unfortunately, our sources do not indicate the precise headquarters of the Medinan governors in Ḥaḍramawt. Al-Hamdānī himself does not define these headquarters, although Ḥaḍramī towns are described in his geographical work. (21) But, in his description of Shibām, al-Hamdānī says that it is the town of all people, i.e. the Ḥaḍramīs. (22) Quoting the previous statement, Serjeant (23)

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(18) Cf.55 above.

(19) He appeared again in the town after the termination of the Wars of Apostasy in the Yemen during the first year of Abū Bakr's caliphate, cf. Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 36f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah VI, 107; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I,68-71.

(20) For the battle of al-Nujayr, cf.103 above. For the Medinan governors at that time, see Table 4.

(21) Cf. Ṣifat, I, 85-8. This lack of interest, however, is followed by other Arab writers, both geographers and historians.

(22) Ṣifat, I,86.

(23) Saiyids, 9.

suggests that Shibām was probably the capital of the region. During the Umayyad-Ibāḍī struggle in 129-30/746-7, it can be seen how Shibām was important since each group worked to keep the town under their influence.(24) However, despite these indications it can not be stated categorically that the town was the headquarters of the Medinan governors.

In all probability this failure to mention the centre of the Muslim governors in Ḥaḍramawt might be due to the isolation of the area from the scene of events throughout the first three centuries of Islam. (25) This could be the main reason for the neglect of the area in our sources. Therefore, the succession of Muslim governors in Ḥaḍramawt was not recorded regularly in these sources.(26) At any rate it is hoped that more work can be done to pinpoint the centre of the Muslim governors in Ḥaḍramawt.

B. The foundation of the Islamic governorship

It is noticeable that after suppressing the rebellious tribes in 11/632-3, the Islamic government was able to appoint its own governors (wulāt) over three Yemeni towns. Following this policy the position of these officials changed from that of Medinan representatives with some Yemeni tribes, as teachers and alms coll-

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(24) See al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 943f; al-Ḥārithī, ʿUqūd, 227. The latter reads Sanām.

(25) With the exception of the revolution of Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq in Ḥaḍramawt in 129/745-46, which spread throughout the Yemen and the Ḥijāz, cf.284-92below.

(26) In contrast with the governors of Ṣanʿā' who recorded regularly, though the town had also been isolated from the scene of the events of most of this period, see the tables of governors.

ectors, to governors (wulāt). (27) Thereupon their number was reduced to three official governors in the Yemen. (28)

Our sources do not illustrate the movements of these officials; moreover they do not give specific dates for the foundation of the Islamic governorship in the Yemeni towns. However, according to the historical facts the replacement of Muslim officials took place during the period of Abū Bakr's caliphate, to be specific, before the first of the official Yemeni re-inforcements who joined the Islamic armies for the conquests on the Syrian front in the early 13/633. (29)

The first indication of Muslim governorship in Ṣanᶜa comes in the course of the rebellion of Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth al-Murādī during the early stages of Abū Bakr's reign. Fayrūz al-Daylamī, a leader of the Abnā in Ṣanᶜa, was appointed to this office by Abū Bakr. (30) However, this governorship expired with the termination of hostilities in the town. This sudden replacement leads us to believe that some military purpose lay behind the appointment of Fayrūz in Ṣanᶜa during the hostilities. It is known that Abū Bakr appointed Fayrūz and sent a letter

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(27) During the last phase of the Prophet's life and the early period of his successor Medinan officials were known as ᶜummāl or representatives of the Islamic government for particular post. For a full discussion of the Medinan representatives during the last phase of the Prophet's life, see chapter I,B above.

(28) For the representatives of the Prophet amongst the Yemeni tribes, see Table 1.

(29) Cf. 115above.

(30) Cf.100 above.

to some Yemeni chiefs requesting them to support Fayrūz and the Abnā against Qays b. ᶜAbd Yaghūth. (31) Thereupon the local power and the Muslim forces recognized Fayrūz as a leader of the resistance in Ṣanᶜā against Qays and his followers. This recognition, however, was temporary, since Abān b. Saᶜīd b. al-ᶜĀṣ, one of the Companions, appeared in 11/633-4 in Ṣanᶜā as a governor on behalf of Abū Bakr.

Some historians record that Abān b. Saᶜīd was appointed over Ṣanᶜā by the Prophet, (32) while others state that his appointment was made by Abū Bakr. (33) Nevertheless, these historians give neither an exact date for this governorship, nor do they discuss it in detail.

In all probability Abān b. Saᶜīd was appointed over Ṣanᶜā by Abū Bakr during the early stages of his caliphate. Several reasons make this point of view more plausible. The fact is that Abān is not mentioned in the sources at our disposal as being among the Prophet's representatives in the Yemen during the period of ᶜAbhalah's movement.(34) The second reason is that it is well known that he was the Medinan representative in al-Baḥrayn until the death of the Prophet in Rabīᶜ I , 11/June, 632. (35) Thirdly, Abān

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(31) See 81 above.

(32) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 76 (citing al-Walīd b.Yazīd); Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 67f.

(33) Al-Rāzī, 150; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I, 11, both citing al-Nuᶜmān b. Buzurj. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 36f, who says that he was appointed by Abū Bakr somewhere in the Yemen.

(34) For the Prophet's representatives at that time, see Table 1.

(35) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 529; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, I, 62; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 36.

appeared for the first time in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-}$ as a Muslim official after the termination of the rebellion of Qays, since it was he who began to investigate the murder of Dādhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī, (36) one of the leaders of the Abnā$^{-}$ in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-}$ who was murdered by Qays b. ^{c}Abd Yaghūth. That was the apparent start of the Islamic authority in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-}$.

Again our sources do not indicate the period of Abān b. Sa^{c}īd's governorship in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-}$. However, it can be deduced from the fact that Abān had joined the early invasion of the Islamic armies on the Syrian front in 13/634-5. (37) This fact is clear proof that Abān was not in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-}$ at that time. The governorship of the town was transferred to Ya^{c}lī b. Umayyah al-Tamīmī who occupied the post at some time during the period of Abū Bakr's reign.(38) One can confidently assume that Ya^{c}lī came into office as an immediate successor of Abān b. Sa^{c}īd when the latter received permission from Abū Bakr to return to Medina. (39)

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(36) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 150; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I,11, (both citing al-Nu^{c}mān b. Buzurj).

(37) Where he was killed in the battle of Ajnādayn, Jumādā I, 13/July, 634, see al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 76f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, 147; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, I, 63f; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 37. In Ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, 120, it is suggested that he was killed in the battle of Marj al-Ṣuffar, Ṣafar, 13/April, 634. According to al-Ṭabarī, I, 2101, he was killed in al-Yarmūk, in 13/634.

(38) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 160,163; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 15. According to Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 123; and al-Ṭabarī, I, 2136, Ya^{c}lī was Abū Bakr's governor in Khawlān (Khawlān al-^{c}Āliyah). However, it is quite likely in the early stages of Abū Bakr's reign that Ya^{c}lī represented Medina among Khawlān and when Abān resigned from his post as a governor of Ṣan^{c}ā$^{-}$, the former replaced him in this office for the rest of Abū Bakr's Caliphate.

(39) Idrīs, Kanz, f172b.

The replacement of the Islamic officials in al-Janad is indeed clearer than that in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$. There is a general agreement in our sources that Mu^{c}ādh b. Jabal, the Prophet's envoy to the Yemen, occupied that post during the early stages of Abū Bakr's Caliphate. Sayf b. ^{c}Umar in al-Ṭabarī (40) records that he left the Yemen in 11/632-3. His successor in that post was ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^{c}ah al-Makhzūmī, designated by Mu^{c}ādh himself. (41)

Our sources unanimously agree that the Prophet's representatives in Ḥaḍramawt were Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī, ^{c}Ukāshah b. Thawr and al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah. (42) Some of these sources, however, confirm that although he was appointed by the Prophet with some Ḥaḍramī tribes, al-Muhājir remained in Medina until the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate. (43) Al-Rāzī (44) says that the

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(40) I, 2015.

(41) Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 36f; Idrīs, Kanz, f172b. There is contradiction in the sources about the date when ^{c}Abd Allāh held this post. Whilst Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, III, 897, and Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 155, maintain that he was appointed by the Prophet, others confirm that his post authorized by ^{c}Umar, see al-Zubayrī, nasab, 317; al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 139; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 155, different account; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 65. However, there is no mention in the sources at our disposal for Mu^{c}ādh's successor in this post other than ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^{c}ah. On the other hand, there is confirmation in our reliable sources that Mu^{c}ādh had joined the Islamic armies in the Syrian front during the last year of Abū Bakr's caliphate 13/634, cf. al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 76-8; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I, 36. However, by their assumption these historians, who claim that ^{c}Abd Allāh was appointed over al-Janad by ^{c}Umar, are intending to suggest that the office of the town was unoccupied during the last two years of Abū Bakr's reign, which is unlikely.

(42) See Table 1.

(43) At that time he was sent by Abū Bakr to reinforce the Muslims in the Yemen, see 101 above

(44) Tārīkh, 145.

Prophet sent al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah to the territory of Ḥaḍramawt to fight Kindah and the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt, where he remained until the Prophet's death. This narrative is repeated by Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, al-Fāsī and Ibn Ḥajar with few differences. (45) A contradictory statement appears in al-Ṭabarī and is repeated by Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn al-Ḥusayn. (46) They record that al-Muhājir was appointed as an alms collector (ᶜāmil al-ṣadaqah) with the tribes of Kindah and al-Ṣadif both in Ḥaḍramawt, by the Prophet, but that he remained in Medina until Abū Bakr despatched him to fight the rebels in the Yemen.

In fact three reasons lead us to accept the second statement i.e. that al-Muhājir remained in Medina during the last phase of the Prophet's life and was sent to the Yemen by Abū Bakr. The first of these reasons is that al-Muhājir had no role in the first stages of the hostility in Ḥaḍramawt between the Muslims and the rebels during the early period of Abū Bakr. (47) The second reason is that al-Muhājir was one of the Muslim leaders equipped by Abū Bakr and sent from Medina to fight the apostates. (48) The third of these reasons is the role of al-Muhājir in pursuing the survivors of ᶜAbhalah's troops, who were concentrated in the highlands, when he was on his way to

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(45) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, IV, 1452f; al-Fāsī, ᶜIqd, VII, 292; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣabah, VI, 144f.

(46) I, 1880, Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 423; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāʾ, f4a.

(47) See chapter III, B above.

(48) Al-Zubayrī, nasab, 316; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 35; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, II, 863f. See also 101 above.

his post in Ḥaḍramawt.(49) However by the time of al-Muhājir's arrival in Ḥaḍramawt, three official Muslim representatives assumed power in the region, all of whom had been originally appointed by the Prophet. (50)

Our sources are vague about the replacement of the Medinan representatives and the development of those offices to that of governorship in Ḥaḍramawt. The only exception is that al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah returned to Medina, having appointed ᶜIkrimah b. Abī Jahl in his post. (51) This replacement was definity before Muḥarram, 13/March-April 634, as ᶜIkrimah joined the Muslim armies on the Syrian front, designating ᶜUbaydah b. Saᶜd as his successor. (52) This designation, however, was recognized by Abū Bakr. (53)

The other two Muslim representatives in Ḥaḍramawt, Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī and ᶜUkāsh b. Thawr, are completely ignored by the historians. Consequently we have no knowledge of the period of thier holding these posts. This lack of information has indeed brought about total ignorance of the political history of Ḥaḍramawt during the

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(49) Al-Zubayrī, 316; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1998; Ibn Samurah,35; Ibn Khaldun, II,863f.

(50) There are al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah, Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī and ᶜUkāshah b. Thawr, see Table 1.

(51) Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majid, Bahjat, 15.

(52) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, I, 363, who says that he was killed in the battle of Ajnādayn, Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 120, however, in the battle of Marj al-Ṣuffar, though both battles took place in 13/634. See also al-Ṭabarī, I, 2082, 2093, 2098, 2101; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 276; Usd, IV, 6.

(53) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2013; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 210.

last year of Abū Bakr's reign. (54) The first sole governor of the caliphate in Ḥaḍramawt to be mentioned was ᶜAdī b. Nawfal, who suddenly emerged as the Medinan governor during the period of ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb's reign (13-23/634-44). (55) The replacement seems to have been sudden but the historians give no indication of the predecessor of the new governor.

Seemingly, Ziyād b. Labīd, ᶜUkāshah b. Thawr and ᶜUbaydah b. Saᶜd remained as Medinan representatives with the Ḥaḍramī tribes until the arrival of ᶜAdī b. Nawfal. Thereafter, the Medinan government reduced its representatives in Ḥaḍramawt to one governor who had already been appointed in the region. (56)

C. The sphere of the Muslim governors and local tribes of influence in the Yemen

Three Muslim governors had been appointed successively in the Yemen during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs (11-35/632-56). (57) These governors gained a political foothold in three Yemeni towns : Ṣanᶜā, al-Janad and one of the Ḥaḍramī towns, using them as centres of their administration.

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(54) Our sources are unanimously silent about the replacements of these governors, whilst they mention those of Ṣanᶜā and al-Janad.

(55) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XV, 74; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, III, 1061; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 398; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 232. See also al-Ḥāmid, Tārīkh, I, 163.

(56) Thereafter the sources at our disposal do not indicate that there was more than one Muslim governor in Ḥaḍramawt.

(57) See Table 4.

Unfortunately, neither our general nor local sources have preserved much data about the political life of these areas under the authority of the Muslim regime at that time. However, we are more fortunate in having some information concerning the activities of the Muslim governor of Ṣan$^{c}\bar{a}^{\flat}$, particularly for the period of ^{c}Umar's Caliphate. Nevertheless, this small amount of data gives a reasonable picture of the political situation in these towns and their relations with Medina during that period. Some of these indications might suggest the Muslim governors wielded real power in the centres of their rule in the Yemen, whilst other evidence suggests that in other areas such authority was not generally recognized. So an attempt will be made to illustrate the sphere of influence of these Muslim governors and the influential tribes in the Yemen, beginning with the governors themselves.

a. <u>The real Muslim authority in the Yemen</u>

It is noticeable that Arabia in general and the Yemen in particular were not concerned with Medinan policy during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs, except the period of the War of Apostasy. Throughout this period (12-35/633-56) the policy of the caliphate was in the main concentrated on the conquests and the affairs of the conquered provinces. These specific interests on the part of the Medinan administration, however, caused the early Arab historians to pay no further attention to the affairs of Arabia, including the Yemen. On the other hand, the Yemen itself may not have witnessed any important political

events during that period. The few events preserved in the sources about the Yemen are, indeed, less important in comparison with other political events at that time, such as the conquests.

Although specific information about the political authority of the Muslim governors in the Yemen is lacking, the real power of these offices did exist. The non-existence of tribal chiefs in the centres of the Muslim governors in the Yemen made the latter seem influential as rulers. At the same time the inhabitants of these towns set themselves up in business, leaving political affairs to the Medinan governors. In some of these centres these governors succeeded in forming a small army consisting mainly of those who came with them, together with some of the local population. (58) But the political influence of these governors was limited to the centres of their rule. Throughout that period, some of these governors evidently pursued their political activities in their official seats, bearing in mind the instructions of the caliphs.

The political isolation of the Yemen apparently began in the second year of Abū Bakr's reign, 12/633-4.

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(58) In particular in Ṣanᶜā and al-Janad. Yaᶜlī b. Umayyah, the governor of Ṣanᶜā (12-35/634-56), for example, brought some followers with him cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 79; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, III, 1267; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, IV, 185; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V,218, and ᶜAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabīᶜah, the governor of al-Janad (12-35/632-56) who was able to prepare himself with an army to support the caliph ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān in 35/656, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 87; Istīᶜāb. III, 897; Usd, III,155.

The cessation of political unrest in the Yemen and the beginning of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered provinces created a political vacuum in the region. Consequently, the country was transformed, politically speaking, from a troublesome to a quiet area. Therefore our knowledge about the political situation of the Yemen during the second half of Abu Bakr's caliphate is very scanty. Neither the caliph's communications with the Yemeni tribes nor his governors activities are clear in our sources. Yet some important Yemeni events have been ignored in these sources. For example, the renewal of the peace treaty between the Medinan government and the Christians of Najrān is reported in only a few words. (59) Furthermore, Abū Bakr's communications with both the Yemenis and his governors are also mentioned only briefly in these sources. (60)

During the period of ᶜUmar's caliphate (13-23/634-44), the real domination of the Medinan government apparently emerged in the Yemen, particularly in Ṣanᶜāʾ. In the light of some of the events which took place in the town, it can be said that Ṣanᶜāʾ was totally under the control of the Muslim regime. Of course, other centres of the Medinan governors, i.e. al-Janad and Ḥadramawt, were also controlled by such officials, but their activities in these areas have not been described in our sources.

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(59) Cf. Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 77; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1987; al-Nuwayrī, Nahāyat, XVIII, 136. See also Ḥamīdullāh, Wathāʾiq, 128f; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāʾiq, 160f.

(60) For his communication with his governor about the people of Ḥufāsh, see al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 85, who records it in a few words.

However, the events of Ṣanᶜā clearly illustrate the real influence of the Medinan regime in this town. For example, the Ṣanᶜānīs lodged complaints against their governor, Yaᶜlī b. Umayyah. (61) As a result Yaᶜlī was summoned three times by ᶜUmar to Medina for investigation.(62) Another example of the domination of the Muslim authority over Ṣanᶜā comes through ᶜUmar's attitude towards the murder of one of the local population, where the caliph ordered his governor in the strongest terms to execute all the murderers. Ibn Rustah and al-Rāzī tell us that in his letter to his governor in Ṣanᶜā, ᶜUmar insisted on the execution of all the accused, even if the whole of the population of Ṣanᶜā were involved, saying "Kill them all [the murderers]; even if all of the inhabitants of Ṣanᶜā are involved, I will execute them." (63)

Throughout the period of ᶜUthmān's reign (23-35/644-56) the political isolation of the Yemen was at a peak. During that period the Yemen as a whole was isolated from the political life of the Islamic state. The historians are unanimously silent about Yemeni affairs and our sources do not preserve such information which might help to illustrate what was happening in the area or concerning its political relations with the caliphate at that time. When some of these sources mention important events, they are very brief.

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(61) See al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 163-5; Idrīs, Kanz, f172b; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, VI, 353; al-Khazrajī, ᶜAsjad, 17-9; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghayat, I, 83,85.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Ibn Rustah, Aᶜlāq, 110; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 30, 161,452.

Part of the reason for this political isolation was that the caliphate paid no more attention to Yemeni affairs. This policy begins to emerge, it would seem, when ᶜUthman reappointed Yaᶜlī b. Umayyah, the governor of Sanᶜā , in 23/644, ignoring the complaints of the Ṣanᶜānīs against him. (64) As a result of this isolation the inhabitants of the Yemeni provinces were relatively secluded from the social and the political life of the other Muslim communities throughout the Islamic state. This general feeling of disinterest on the part of the Medinese administration and its officials is confirmed by ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffan al-Thaqafi, the caliph's envoy to the Yemen. In a report he expressed his dissatisfaction toward the Yemen, saying "I met a people who gave what they were asked, whether truth or untruth."(65) This description leads us to believe that the isolation of the Yemen was at its greatest during ᶜUthman's reign (23-35/644-56), though political events of great importance were happening elsewhere. Indeed the fact that the caliphate and its armies were so heavily engaged at this time in the conquests must also to some extent have served to increase this isolation. (66)

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(64) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 165; al-Khazrajī, ᶜAsjad, 19; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat, I, 85.

(65) Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 40: Raʾaytu qawman ma suʾilū aᶜṭaw Kāna ḥaqqan aw bāṭilan. The full implications of this statement do not appear clearly from the literal translation. It is evident, however, from the full context that the Yemenis were regarded by the caliph's envoy as being completely isolated, politically weak and ignorant of Islam.

(66) For the conquests during ᶜUthmān's caliphate, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 157-68; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2802 ff al-Kufī, II, 108ff.

It seems that the ability of the Medinan governors to rule the centres of their offices effectively was dependent on the central power of the caliphate. If the caliph was strong and firm in following up the actions of his governors, then these governors were loyal and faithful to Islamic principles. If however the caliph was not, then the governors tended to separate themselves within their areas, exploiting the fact of their being remote from the centre of the caliphate and the absence of strong local leadership in order to feather their own nests. Therefore, as a result of the weakness of the Medinan administration during the period of ᶜUthmān (23-35/644-56) the governor of Ṣanᶜāᵓ, Yaᶜlī b. Umayyah, was able to amass a great fortune for himself. (67) Since Yaᶜlī had never joined the conquests and was not wealthy before he was appointed in Ṣanᶜāᵓ, (68) these reasons lead us to believe that this wealth came to him during the period of ᶜUthmān's caliphate. (69)

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(67) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 221; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3089, 3099; al-Kūfī, II, 279; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, 128.

(68) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal that Yaᶜlī either had joined the conquests or he was wealthy before he was authorized over Ṣanᶜāᵓ.

(69) He tried, however, to exploit his authority in Ṣanᶜāᵓ, as a governor on behalf of Medina, for his own interests during ᶜUmar's reign. The latter, however, immediately opposed him in this, see al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 161; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 303; al-Khazrajī, ᶜAsjad, 18f; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat, I, 85.

b. The influential tribes of the Yemen and their relations with the caliphate

By influential tribes we mean those which figured strongly in their own provinces, such as the tribes of Ḥimyar and Hamdān, during the last phase of the Prophet's life and the period of his successor. According to their strength, both the Prophet and Abū Bakr had recognized the authority of these tribes in their own provinces on several occasions. (70)

Although there is little information in the sources about the actual control of the influential tribes over their own territories, a few indications preserved in some sources may confirm that some Yemeni tribes evidently emerged with independent authority in their provinces. (71) There actual political authority remained in the hands of the tribal chiefs who exercised control over their own people. However, in addition to the fact that these few indications do not illustrate the actual political life of these territories, they also do not make clear the real relationship with the central Muslim authority, either with the governors in the Yemen or the caliphate itself. Nevertheless from these indications it can be assumed that in addition to maintaining control of their own provinces, some influential tribal chiefs had direct

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(70) For the Prophet's communications with the leader of these tribes, see 24 above. For Abū Bakr's communications with them, cf. 193 below.

(71) They come in the main through al-Hamdānī's works, in particular his Iklīl, as well as one or two of the primary sources. Precise references are given below in the appropriate place.

communications with the caliphate, whilst their contact with the Medinan governors in the Yemen was in all probability extremely rare.

i. The caliphate and the major Muslim tribes in the Yemen

We know that when Abū Bakr decided to appeal to the Yemeni tribes to join the Muslim armies at the early stages of the conquest, he sent Anas b. Mālik to the chiefs of their more important representatives. Anas went directly to meet these chiefs. (72) Ibn Samurah (73) alone provides a contradictory account, saying that the caliph authorized Yaʿlī b. Umayyah, the governor of Ṣanʿāʾ, to appeal directly to these tribes. On the one hand, however, all our other primary sources agree that Anas was the only one officially authorised by Abū Bakr to carry out this mission; on the other hand, these sources do not assign any role to Yaʿlī b. Umayyah in this appeal to the tribes. (74) Therefore it can be said with reasonable surety that there existed direct communications between the caliph and the tribal leaders. This fact, however, leads us to believe that the real authority in these influential provinces belonged to the tribal chiefs, their influence over the inhabitants being clearly

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(72) For the journey of Anas to these chiefs, see 114 above.

(73) Ṭabaqāt, 38. This statement, as will be seen, is here considered unacceptable. All our sources contradict it and it should be recalled that Ibn Samurah is relatively late (6th/12th century) and he does not quote his sources for such a statement.

(74) See al-Azdī, Futūḥ, 5f; al-Wāqidī, Futūḥ, I. 1; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tahdhīb, I, 445f. Cf also al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 169.

greater than that of the Medinan governors. Thus, in such political matters, the Muslim governors there were being ignored, both by the tribal chiefs and the caliphate itself. Without any doubt, if these governors had had influence over the powerful tribes, Abū Bakr would have ordered them to exercise their control over these tribes and recruit them to the conquests.

Even during the caliphate of ᶜUmar(13-23/634-44) the full authority of the influential tribes over their own territories was apparent in the Yemen. Although there were a number of internal political crises in the provinces belonging to influential tribes, the Medinan administration was clearly powerless to stop them.

Unfortunately, all our sources are vague and lacking in detail of these crises, yet al-Hamdānī preserves brief indications of them in his works, though it is true they concern only the territory of Hamdān.

Two indications come to us accidentally in al-Hamdānī which might help us to visualize the real authority of the Hamdān chiefs over their provinces during ᶜUmar's Caliphate. In the first of these al-Hamdānī (75) tells us about the conflict which took place between two Hamdān chiefs, each from a different branch, where both claimed possession of al-Bawn, the plain lying to the north of Ṣanᶜāʾ. Consequently, one of them, Saᶜīd b. Qays, travelled to Medina complaining about the aggression of his kinsman. Despite the fact that

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(75) Iklīl, X, 115.

the caliph attempted to exercise his caliphal influence to end this crisis, the other chief, Aẓlam b. al-Nu^{c}mān, paid no attention to the caliph's mediation. Therefore, Sa^{c}id b. Qays stayed in Medina until he had been sent by ^{c}Umar to appeal to his tribe to support the Muslim forces in Nihāwand where a battle took place between the Muslim and the Persian forces in 21/642. (76)

In the second indication, ^{c}Umar clearly tried to avoid involving himself politically in the internal affairs of these influential tribes. Ibn al-Kalbī and al-Hamdānī (77) illustrate ^{c}Umar's attitude towards these matters, showing the caliph's caution when he was compelled to involve himself in the case of revenge which took place within Hamdān, though one of the warring chiefs, Asnad b. Mālik, took refuge with him. To gratify Hamdān and to end the crisis, ^{c}Umar paid the blood-money (diyah) instead of Asnad and appointed him as his official in al-Rabadhah, a place three days distant from Medina, thereby removing

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(76) Ibid. Ṣālih, Tārīkh, 200, who comments upon the fact that through his envoy, Ziyād b. Abīhi, to these quarrelling chiefs, ^{c}Umar succeeded in establishing peace between them. Ṣālih, however, quotes from Ibn Abī ^{ɔ}l-Ḥadīd, Nahj, IV, 226. In fact neither Nahj, nor any of the primary sources at our disposal mentions Ziyād's role in this particular conflict, except Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, II, 525, who hints about ^{c}Umar's authorization to Ziyād to bring an end to the corruption which existed in the Yemen, but what sort of corruption precisely has not been illustrated. For the participation of Hamdān led by Sa^{c}īd b. Qays in Nihawand, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 2619; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III,4. See also Donner, 433.

(77) Nasab, f70a; Iklīl, X, 219. Cf. also Ibn Ḥazm Jamharat, 396. He is known by Abū Salāmah.

him from contact with the opposing branch of Hamdān. (78)

In the other tribal areas of the Yemen, however, there is no clear picture of the political life and the relationship of the tribes with Medina. Despite this vagueness, however, we cannot accept that the descendents of the pre-Islamic Yemeni chiefs, such as those of the Himyar Kings, did not have some influence over their own people. It is true that some of them migrated to the conquered provinces, but others remained in their provinces exercising authority there, such as B. Manākh and B. Hiwāl. (79) It is possible therefore, that the absence of important events within Ḥimyar and the continuation of the tribal migrations into the conquered areas (80) might have led to the political obscurity in this influential territory.

In all probability the first three Orthodox Caliphs were following the Prophet's policy towards the influential tribes in the Yemen. They avoided putting themselves in direct involvement in the internal affairs of these tribes. Moreover, to gain the loyalty of influential chiefs, the caliphs recognized their authority over their own regions by authorising some of them to become the official Medinan

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(78) Ibid. For the location of al-Rabadhah, see Yāqūt, Muᶜjam, III, 24; Khaḥḥālah, 35-9.

(79) The descendents of those who remained in their provinces emerged in the (3rd/9th century) challenging the caliphal regime in the area, such as B.Manākh and B.Ḥiwāl (i.e.B.Yuᶜfir), cf. Chapter XI. F. above.

(80) In the early states of the conquests, Ḥimyar officially participated in one group led by Dhū ʾl-Kalāᶜ, but later their number increased amongst the new settlers of the conquered provinces which leads us to believe that their migrations continued throughout the period of the Orthodox Caliphs. For early participation, see above. For the branches of Ḥimyar in the conquered countries, cf. Chapter V.B.

representative there. It is noticeable that the authorization came from the caliph direct to these chiefs. This leads us to believe that the caliphs were seeking to gratify these influential tribes in the same way as the Prophet had done. Therefore, Ka^{c}b b. Mālik, a Hamdān chief, was appointed by ^{c}Umar as Medinan representative over the district which he and his people inhabited. (81)

ii. ^{c}Umar and the Christians of Najrān

Up to the early period of ^{c}Umar's caliphate, Jumādā II, 13/August, 634, the Christians of Najrān represented one of the important local powers in the Yemen. The majority of their power lay with B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^{c}b, a tribe of Madhḥij.(82) During the last phase of the Prophet's life and the early period of his successor, a peace treaty between them and the Medinan government was in existence. (83)

Through that treaty the Christians of Najrān were, to a certain degree, recognized as an autonomous group in the area. Therefore the unstable situation in the Yemen, after the Prophet's death in Rabī^{c}I, 11/June, 632, induced Abū Bakr to renew the Prophet's treaty with them. (84) Under

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(81) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 220, says he has been appointed over the rab^{c} by ^{c}Umar. The rab^{c} is the homeland or 'group of people', cf. Ibn Manẓūr, lisān, VIII, 120; al-Fayrūz ābadī, Qamūs, III,24.

(82) For the nasab of B. al-Ḥārith b. Ka^{c}b, see Table 2.

(83) For their treaty with the Prophet, see above. For the renewal of this treaty by Abū Bakr, cf. Ibn Sa^{c}d, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 77; al-Ṭabarī, I, 1987f; al-Nuwayrī, Nahāyat, XVIII, 136. See also Hamīdullāh, Watha'iq, 128f; al-Akwa^{c}, Watha'iq, 160.

(84) Ibid.

the terms of the treaty, Najrān became a point of concentration for Muslim troops en route for the Yemen in the first year of Abū Bakr's reign. (85)

In Jumādā II, 13/August, 634, however, the peace treaty between the Medinan government and the Christians of Najrān broke down as a result of ᶜUmar's decision towards them. This termination led to the eviction of the Christians of Najrān from the area. Three different justifications have been preserved in our primary sources for that decision. The first of these justifications comes from Abū ᶜUbayd, al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī, (86) who say that ᶜUmar was intending to fulfil the Prophet's and Abū Bakr's instructions that Islam as a religion must be unique in the Arabian Peninsula, which meant that those of other religions must leave. The second is given by another narrative in al-Balādhurī which reads, "One of the terms stipulated against the people of Najrān [i.e. the Christians] was not to practise usury; but when they did practise it, ᶜUmar decreed that they be expelled." (87) Therefore ᶜUmar expelled them. The third of these justifications is preserved in Abū ᶜUbayd and al-Bakrī who consider them as apostates (murtaddūn). Therefore ᶜUmar wrote to them the

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(85) For the concentration of the Muslim troops in Najrān at that time, see 99,101 above. The treaty allowed for the free passage of Muslim troops through Najrān, also imposed upon the Christians there the supply of weapons and horses to the Muslim armies, see 30 above.

(86) Abu ᶜUbayd, Amwāl, 129; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 77; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2162 (citing Sayf b. ᶜUmar). See also Yaqūt, Muᶜjam, V, 269.

(87) Futūḥ, I, 240, Eng. Tra. See also Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 160.

following statement, "You [the Christians of Najran] asserted that you were Muslims, then you became apostates. So those who stay in Islam and became faithful will not suffer because of their previous apostasy; but as for those who refuse [to return to Islam] and insist on Christianity, my protection (dhimmah) will be withdrawn from time after the twentieth of Ramadān." (88)

However, some of these justifications might have been put forward by the caliph himself, since they came to us through our usually reliable primary sources. Moreover, there is no further information in the sources at our disposal which could illustrate the real intention of ᶜUmar's decision. These justifications, however, cannot be accepted as a direct reason for the eviction of the Christians of Najrān, since they do not correspond with the nature of the relationship of the Medinan government with those Christians throughout the period of ᶜUmar's predecessors.(89) Furthermore these statements are in direct contradiction to some of the historical facts. In the following pages these justifications will be discussed individually beginning with the first one.

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(88) Abū ᶜUbayd, Amwāl, 130; al-Bakrī, Muᶜjam, II, 660. They mention that ᶜUmar directed his order to the people of Ruᶜāsh, one of the villages of Najrān which was fully controlled by the Christians at that time. For its location, cf. al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 199; al-Bakrī, Muᶜjam, II, 660. See also Hamīdullāh, Wathāʾiq, 130; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāʾiq, 173.

(89) There is no indication in the sources at our disposal about violation on the part of the Christians of Najrān of their covenant with the Medinan government during the period of the Prophet and Abū Bakr.

Since the articles of the peace treaty between the Medinan government and the Christians of Najrān was respected by both sides during the period of the Prophet and Abū Bakr, the first justification is not acceptable. According to Sayf b. ᶜUmar, (90) ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb declared three important decisions at a very early stage of his caliphate, one of them being the eviction of the Christians of Najrān. By that sudden decision ᶜUmar meant only the Christians of Najrān, whilst other free non-Muslims (ahl al-dhimmah) who inhabited the Arabian Peninsula were not included. According to historical fact some of those non-Muslims remained for some years of ᶜUmar's caliphate and were evicted for different reasons. (91)

The second of these justifications is also unacceptable. Two reasons makes us doubt that the practising of usury was behind ᶜUmar's decision. The first is the general agreement in the sources about the good relationship between Abū Bakr and the Christians of Najrān which leads us to believe the latter did not breach the treaty during that time. (92) The second of these reasons is the time

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(90) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 2162, 2165, this account is repeated by Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 298.

(91) Such as the Jews of Khaybar, see Abu Yusuf, Kharaj, 50f; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 36, 38, 39, 41. Al-Wāqidī in al-Ṭabarī, I, 2594, confirms their eviction in 20/641.

(92) They respected the treaty, therefore, their town, Najrān, was the central assembly point of the Muslim troops during the Wars of Apostasy, from where they entered the Yemen, see 99, 101 above, as well as they never differed with Abū Bakr.

when ʿUmar declared his action against them, since that does not correspond with the historical facts. (93)

For the third justification, it is enough to say that there is no mention in our sources of the adoption by the Christians of Najrān as a whole of Islam, whilst these sources all agree that they remained Christians and they were evicted and lived in exile as Christians.(94)

Together the appearance of the military power of the Christians of Najrān and the escalation of the Yemeni [i.e. the Muslims] migrations to the conquests might have led ʿUmar to take a decision concerning them, i.e. the Christians of Najrān, quickly. (95) Al-Ḥusayn b. al-Aswad (96) tells us that the people of Najrān [i.e. the Christians] grew to forty thousand during ʿUmar's Caliphate. Abū Yūsuf (97) records also that they collected weapons

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(93) As has already been mentioned ʿUmar declared his decision in the very early stages of his caliphate which means that he could not receive and investigate those who practised usury during these few days.

(94) They made their treaty with the Prophet and Abū Bakr in order to protect their faith and ʿUmar evicted them because they were Christians. In their new home in al-Najrāniyyah, in Iraq, they remained Christians. For their new settlement, see Abū Yūsuf, Kharāj, 73f; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 77-9; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, I,358; Yāqūt, Muʿjam, V, 269f. See also Watt, M. at Medina,128.

(95) Cf, al-Akwaʿ, Wathāiq, 181. In July 1981, Prof.M.al-Ghul presented a paper at the seminar for Arabian Studies in which he discussed in detail the eviction of the Christians of Najrān by ʿUmar. However, I have not yet managed to locate a copy of this paper.

(96) In al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 78. Al-Ṭabarī, I, 1987, gives the same number of Najrānīs at the time when the Prophet died.

(97) Kharāj, 74.

and horses. It is obvious that a political reason was behind the caliph's decision.

Since the location of Najrān represented the northern gateway to the Yemeni highlands (98) (Najd al-Yaman) any opposing power which emerged there could detach the highland provinces from the Ḥijāz. This advantage was clearly understood by the Prophet who guaranteed the passage and supplies of his envoys to the Yemen by the treaty which he made with the Christians of Najran. (99) It can be assumed that continuation of Yemeni migrations, the military strength of these Christians, their tribal solidarity and the strategic location of their town led ᶜUmar to pay more attention to them than to other free non-Muslims in Arabia. Therefore, his eviction of them was one of the important decisions he made during the very early stages of his caliphate. (100)

In all probability, however, ᶜUmar was not worried by the area possessed by these Christians during the early years of his caliphate, since the majority of the Yemeni Muslim tribes were still to be found in their homeland at that time. It is true that officially the Yemenis joined the Muslim armies during Abū Bakr's Caliphate, but the intensive migrations of Yemenis to the battle fronts began during the period of ᶜUmar's reign. (101) This means that

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(98) Cf. 27 above.

(99) See the contents of the treaty in Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, I, 358; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 76. See also Hamīdullah, Wathāʾiq, 111f; Watt, M. at Medina, 359f; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāʾiq, 94f.

(100) Cf. 200 above.

(101) For these migrations, see Chapter IV, A,B, above.

at the early stages of ᶜUmar's Caliphate, the Medinan regime still had supporters in the Yemen, namely the Muslim tribes there, whom he could use to put down any uprising against his authority in the area. From the narrative of Abū Bakr al-Hudhalī (102) it can be seen that the Yemen represented a major source of Muslim combatants on the battle fronts during the period of ᶜUmar's Caliphate.

To conclude, however, it can be said that by his eviction of the Christians of Najrān at the very stages of his caliphate, ᶜUmar was looking carefully ahead to the future of Islam in the Yemen, especially when the area was to become drained of Muslim supporters in consequence of the continuation of the Yemeni migrations to the conquered countries as they expanded.

The twenty-four year period starting with the migration of the first Yemeni group to the conquests in 12/633-4 and ending with the murder of ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān Dhūʾl-Ḥijjah 35/June 656, marks the beginning of a political lull in the Yemeni history. The political life of the Yemenis was obscure and Islamic-Yemeni relations remained vague. The real participation of the Yemenis in the political life of the state emerged outside of the Yemen, their homeland, namely, in the conquered provinces. There they became directly involved in this life playing a major role in the political events, i.e. the murder of ᶜUthman and the first Civil War.

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(102) In al-Ṭabarī, I, 2612. Repeated in al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ 300; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 134f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kamil III,3. They record that when the Persian forces gathered at Nihāwand, in northern Persia, in 21/642, ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān advised ᶜUmar to write to the Syrians to move from Syria and the Yemenis to advance from the Yemen.

CHAPTER VII

The role of the Yemeni migrants in the uprising against ᶜUthmān and the Civil War

(35-40/656-661)

During the last phase of ᶜUthmān's caliphate, some of the Muslims, mainly those garrisoned in the towns (amṣār) of the conquered provinces, rejected his policies, particularly the one regarding the appointment of governors. This rejection developed into an uprising against the caliph which ended in his assassination in Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah 35/June 656.

Immediately after the murder of ᶜUthmān the real first civil war began as a result of some of the Companions revolting against the newly elected caliph, ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. It is true that in the battles of the civil war of that period both sides were led by some of the Companions, yet the major part of their armies consisted of the inhabitants of the conquered provinces, which formed the real military power of the state.

The Muslims, therefore, were divided into three factions: the first supported the new caliph; the second followed his opponents; and some of them, especially those from among the Companions, were neutral. In fact two battles worthy of mention here are the battles of the Camel and of Ṣiffīn. Both of them were between ᶜAlī and his opponents. In the first battle he fought Ṭalḥah b. ᶜUbayd Allāh and al-Zubayr b. al-ᶜAwwām, who had been supported

by the inhabitants of Basra; in the second he faced the people of Syria, who were led by their governor, Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, who had refused to give his oath of allegiance to him. The latter conflict lasted until the renunciation by al-Ḥasan b. Alī of the caliphate in Rabī^{c} II, 41/August, 661.

In fact neither the murder of ^{c}Uthmān nor the civil war is our main topic in this Chapter, the major emphasis of which is the role of the Yemenis (who migrated from the Yemen and were living in the conquered provinces at that time) in that uprising and the civil war.

To illustrate the role of these Yemeni migrants in each event, we will study the events separately, dividing this chapter into two main headings: the first will consider their role in the uprising against ^{c}Uthmān; the second will cover the role and the influence of the Yemeni chiefs during the time of the battles of the civil war, especially Ṣiffīn.

A. The effect of the Yemenis on the uprising against ᶜUthmān

The uprising of the people of the garrison towns (Basra, Kufa and al-Fusṭāṭ) against ᶜUthmān which led to his murder, was one of the most important events in the history of the Islamic caliphate. It has, therefore, become known traditionally as the "Great Civil War" (al-fitnah al-kubrā). This uprising started when some of the inhabitants of the garrison towns expressed openly their opposition to ᶜUthmān's policy in the last few years of his reign. (1)

a. The Yemeni role in inciting hostility against ᶜUthmān

In these garrison towns, where the military and financial power of the caliphate was centered, the inhabitants originated from the Muslim armies of the conquests. There most of the Yemeni tribes were totally opposed to the caliph's policy of making important appointments from the members of his own family. In Iraq the majority of them, especially the Kufans, were against it, while in al-Fusṭāṭ the Yemenis were split into two factions, one for the caliph's policy, one against. In Syria the Arabs, including the Yemenis, all followed Muᶜāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, the governor of Syria and a relative of the caliph; hence they were in agreement with ᶜUthmān's policy.

One modern scholar (2) has suggested that "The

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(1) For a detailed discussion of the uprising against ᶜUthmān, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 168ff; al-Balādhurī, Ansab, IV, 512ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 290ff; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 33ff. Cf. also Muir, The Caliphate, 215ff; Sālim, Tārīkh al-dawlah al-ᶜarabiyyah, II, 267ff; Shaᶜbān, Islamic history, I, 67-71.

(2) Al-Nuṣṣ, al-ᶜAṣabiyyah al-qabaliyyah, 198.

Yemani party had started to exert its influence on political events since the uprising against ᶜUthmān, because the majority of his opponents and the leaders of the revolution were from the Yemen." It can be assumed that there is some truth in the above point of view, since the Yemenis constituted the majority of the rebels. However we should also note that many non-Yemenis were also involved and, of course, some of the Yemenis were against the uprising. (3) It is probable that a large number of Yemenis participated in the revolution, and the appearance of a number of their chiefs in command of it is the reason for the above view, arguing that the Yemeni party had declared its own national solidarity openly at that time. However, there is no evidence in the sources at our disposal to prove that any Yemeni leader did in fact claim the revolt to be specifically a Yemeni uprising.

Although many Yemenis were involved in this uprising, many were against it. In Egypt some of their leaders, such as Muᶜāwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī and al-Ḥuṣayn b.Numayr al-Sakūnī, both Kindah chiefs, took sides with ᶜAbd Allāh b. Saᶜd b. Abī ᵓI-Sarḥ, the governor of ᶜUthmān in Egypt. These chiefs were later to become the leaders of ᶜUthmān's party (al-ᶜUthmāniyyah) in Egypt. (4) The Yemenis in

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(3) There were many non-Yemenis who declared their opposition to the caliph's policy: Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥudhayfah and ᶜAmmār b. Yāsir, all of them Companions.

(4) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 128. For Muᶜāwiyah b. Ḥudayj, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 398; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3392, 98f, 3404; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 188; Ibn Ḥazm, 435; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 209, 221f.

Basra, it seems, did not involve themselves in this event, for none of their leaders joined the Basrans who had gone to Medina to state their case. (5) Therefore, when the rebels tightened up their siege on the caliph's house, one of his relatives advised him to go to Basra to remain under the proection of al-Azd. (6) The Yemenis in Syria played no part in the uprising against ʿUthmān and supported totally his governor there who had indeed sent re-inforcements to the caliph. These re-inforcements were led by Yazīd b. Usayd al-Bajalī, one of the Yemeni leaders in Syria, whom Muʿāwiyah ordered to fight those laying siege to the caliph's house. (7)

There is no doubt that most of the Yemeni rebels were from Kufa and al-Fusṭāṭ. In all probability, however, the degree of influence of the Yemeni tribes in these towns encouraged their chiefs to challenge the caliph's governors and to declare their opposition to his regime. In Kufa when Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ, the caliph's governor there, declared that he considered the rural area of Iraq (al-Sawād), to be the garden of the Qurashīs, some of Kufan chiefs, led by Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhʿī, a Madhḥijī, challenged his claim by attacking the police chief (ṣāḥib al-shurṭah). (8) According to Abū Mikhnaf in al-Balādhurī (9) ʿAmr b. Zurārah and

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(5) For the delegation of Basra in Medina, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 2955; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, al-ʿIqd al-Farīd, XVII, 69; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 173f; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 103.

(6) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 227.

(7) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 72; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 85.

(8) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 40; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 171f.

(9) Ansāb, V, 30; see also Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 414.

Kumayl b. Ziyād, both Yemenis from al-Nakh^{c}, were the first Kufans to make public their wish to depose (khal^{c}) the caliph. Thus the governor was unable to confront these people and he wrote to the caliph asking him to expel them from Kufa. Accordingly, the Caliph ordered his governor there to deport the rebels to Syria to put them under the control of his strong relative, Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān. (10)

Of course, if these Yemenis had not been adequately protected by their tribes, they would not have dared to declare openly their objection to the caliph's policy. Even when they arrived in Syria they challenged Mu^{c}āwiyah there, threatening his position with opposition from their own clans. Al-Kūfī (11) records that when Mu^{c}āwiyah threatened Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^{c}ī by jailing him, one of the Yemenis said to Mu^{c}āwiyah, "Mu^{c}āwiyah, if you jail him, you must know that he belongs to an innumerable clan. It can be very dangerous for those who challenge it."

As soon as Mālik b. al-Ashtar and others came back to Kufa, opposition to ^{c}Uthmān increased. (12) At this stage the rebels of Kufa, led by two Yemeni leaders, Mālik b. al-Ashtar and Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, left the town, thus preventing Sa^{c}īd b. al-^{c}Āṣ, the governor of ^{c}Uthmān, who was unacceptable to the Kufan rebels, from entering the

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(10) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 532; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 173-5; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, III, 70.

(11) Futūḥ, II, 177.

(12) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 44; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 190-3; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2930.

town. Submitting to their pressure, the caliph replaced Sa^{c}īd by Abū Mūsā al-Ash^{c}arī, a Yemeni and a Companion.(13)

Al-Fusṭāṭ was the other town inhabited by many Yemenis who revolted against ^{c}Uthmān. Although the leadership was in the hand of such Companions as Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥudhayfah and Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, the bulk of the support came from the mainly Yemeni tribesmen. In 35/655-6, after he had expelled ^{c}Uthmān's governor, ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Abī $^{'}$l-Sarḥ, Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥudhayfah came to power in Egypt. He formed an Egyptian force, consisting of those tribesmen in al-Fusṭāṭ, and ordered them to move to Medina to put their case. The majority of this force was Yemeni. (14)

In spite of their different attitudes towards the uprising against the caliphate, the Yemenis in al-Fusṭāṭ supported each other on occasions, motivated by considerations of clan solidarity. Al-Kindī (15) mentions that Kinānah b. Bishr defended Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Ḥudayj (both of them from Tujīb, a Yemeni tribe of Kindah, though the former was against ^{c}Uthmān and the latter one of his supporters) when Mu^{c}āwiyah was held prisoner.

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(13) The rebels forced the caliph to appoint Abū Mūsā instead of Sa^{c}īd, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 44-7; al-Ṭabarī I, 2930; Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 62f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, II, 74f. See also Sha^{c}bān, Islamic History, I, 68.

(14) Al-Kindī, Wulāh, 18; Ibn Abī Bakr, 102. See also 211 below.

(15) Wulāh, 18. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 403; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3405, who report the clan solidarity of Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Ḥudayj when he declared openly his attitude towards the murder of Kinānah b. Bishr after the battle of Ṣiffīn.

b. The Yemeni role in the murder of ᶜUthmān

In Shawwāl, 35/April, 656, when the rebels marched from the garrison towns, Basra, Kufa and al-Fusṭāṭ to Medina, most of their leaders were Yemenis. One thousand men came to Medina from Kufa led by Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhᶜī, a Yemeni. (16) At the same time the Egyptian contingent arrived there led by five leaders, four of whom were Yemenis, (17) whereas the leadership of the Basrans contained no Yemenis at all. (18)

The rebels, however, took over Medina and surrounded the caliph's house. Although some of the Companions were amongst them, real control was in the hands of the leading rebels, especially the Yemenis. Ibn Qutaybah (19) confirms the role of Mālik b. al-Ashtar, a Yemeni leader, as leader

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(16) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 31. In al-Ṭabarī, I, 2954 and Ibn Abī Bakr, 103, four leaders, among whom was Mālik b. al-Ashtar. Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 79, gives a different account in which he considers Mālik b. al-Ashtar one of the four Kufan leaders who were all under the leadership of ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Aṣamm/al-ᶜĀmirī.

(17) See al-Ṭabarī, I, 2954; Ibn Abī Bakr, 102; Ibn al-Athīr Kāmil, III, 79; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 173, who all mention Kināanah b. Bishr al-Laythī instead of al-Tujībī. See al-Kindī, Wulāh 17; Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 222; al-Masᶜādī, Murūj, IV, 282; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 98; al-Kūfī, Futūh, II, 236, who all confirm that it was al-Tujībī, not al-Laythī.

(18) For the contingent of Basra, cf. Ibn ᶜAbd Rabbih, ᶜIqd, XVII, 69; al-Ṭabarī, I, 2955; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII, 173f.

(19) Imāmah, I, 29.

of the rebels in Medina; when some Companions asked him to stop the attack on the caliph, he shouted to them, "When we arrived you came crying for him [the caliph]; by God, we shall not leave until we kill him." Other Yemenis stood by, abusing and criticising the caliph as he was making a speech to the rebels in Medina. (20)

In Dhū³l-Ḥijjah 35/June, 656, the caliph was murdered after his house had been broken into by some of the rebels, the majority of whom were Yemenis. In this whole operation the Yemenis had played a major role. Although historical sources differ about the identity of the man who was actually involved in murdering ᶜUthmān, they agree that four Yemenis were the chief culprits. (21) One of them, Kinānah b. Bishr al-Tujībī, was mentioned in an elegy of ᶜUthmān as follows ;

ألا إنَّ خيرَ الناسِ بعد ثلاثةٍ قتيلُ التُجيبى الذى جاء من مصرَ

Oh! the best of people after three [others] (The Prophet, Abū Bakr and ᶜUmar),

was killed by al-Tujībī who came from Egypt. (22)

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(20) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 89, quoting an anonymous member of Tujīb.

(21) These are Kinānah b. Bishr al-Tujībī, Sūdān b. Ḥumrān al-Muradī, al-Ghāfiqī b.Ḥarb al-ᶜAkkī and Qutayrah al-Sakūnī. Although the fifth of those involved is Yemeni, he was not one of those who migrated from the Yemen during the conquests. See Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt,III,73; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb,_IV, 574; al-Kūfī, II, 236; al-Ṭabarī,I, 3017-22; Ibn Kathir,Bidāyah, VII, 188.

(22) This verse was composed by al-Walīd b. ᶜUqbah b. Abī Muᶜīṭ, one of the relatives of ᶜUthmān. Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 98; IV, 591; Ibn Durayd,222; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3064; Ibn Abī Bakr, 209. Al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, IV, 283, says that this verse was composed by ᶜUthman's wife, Nā'ilah bint al-Farāfiṣah.

Thus the Yemenis in the garrison towns exercised a major influence in the uprising against the caliph. There is no doubt that this influence gave sufficient authority to their leaders to attain important positions in the course of the uprising. One of them, al-Ghāfiqī b. Ḥarb al-ᶜAkkī. administered Medinan affairs for five days after the murder of ᶜUthmān. (23) Throughout the days which followed, the rebels tried to persuade some of the Companions to accept the office of caliph. When they met with no success, they turned to ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, putting pressure upon him to accept the post. In the negotiations between the rebels and some of the Companions about their acceptance of the caliphate, certain Yemeni leaders had a major influence. Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhᶜī strongly argued with ᶜAlī that if he refused to shoulder this responsibility, the Muslim state would disintegrate. Consequently ᶜAlī accepted and the first man to pledge his oath of allegiance (bayᶜah) was Mālik b. al-Ashtar. (24) Because of the central role played

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(23) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3073 (citing Sayf b. ᶜUmar); see also al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 142, who says three days only, however, confirming al-Ghāfiqī's role. Ibn Abī Bakr, Tamhīd, 147, records that al-Ghāfiqī was the prayer leader and Kinānah b. Bishr (al-Tujībī) was his deputy.

(24) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3075 (citing al-Shaᶜbī); Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 38. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 215f; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, VII,226, who both confirm this role of Ibn al-Ashtar with slight differences. Of course, such a remarkable suggestion would be totally rejected by the Shīᶜah, for example, al-Yaᶜqūbī, al-Kūfī and al-Iṣfahānī, but there is no objection to, or comment on the above suggestion.

during this uprising by the Yemenis, one of the historians(25) considers them in particular as those who gave oath of allegiance to ᶜAlī. It is known that none of the rebels had actually declared his tribal affinity, but the fact was that the Yemenis were very numerous and had been largely responsible for leading the uprising. This role might have led some of the historians to consider that they alone from among the Arabs gave their oath of allegiance to ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. (26)

B. The role of the Yemenis in the Civil War

The murder of ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān in Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah, 35/June, 656 marked the actual beginning of the first civil war in the Islamic state. (27) At that point large regional groups in conflict with the caliph and led by some of the prominent Companions came into existence. The first stage of this war was concentrated in Iraq, where the inhabitants of the country were divided into two factions. The Kufans took sides with the newly elected caliph, ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Meanwhile the Basrans followed

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(25) Al-Diyārbakrī, Tārīkh, II, 275 (citing Abū ᶜUmar).

(26) Ibid. For the arrival of the Yemeni tribes from the Yemen; in Medina to give their oath of allegiance to ᶜAlī when he was elected caliph, see 236-8 below.

(27) Two civil wars took place during the first/seventh century: The first between ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and his opponents; the second when ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr opposed B. Marwān. For a detailed discussion of these wars see, Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 180ff; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 145ff; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 154ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3087ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 105ff. Cf. also Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom, 75ff; Shaᶜbān, Islamic History, I, 71ff; Surur, al-Hayat al-Siyasiyyah, 68ff; Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, 121ff.

Ṭalḥah b. ᶜUbayd Allāh and al-Zubayr b. al-ᶜAwwām, both prominent Companions (the latter was also the Prophet's cousin), who revolted against the new caliph and were backed by the Prophet's widow, ᶜĀ'ishah. The second stage took place mainly between the new caliph who had been supported by the Iaqis, both the Kufans and Basrans, and Muᶜāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, governor of Syria and a relative of ᶜUthmān, who had been totally supported by the Syrians. Although the Egyptians made no direct contribution to the battles of these two stages, there is evidence that some of them joined the Syrian troops. Their absence from the confrontation can probably be attributed to their remoteness from the central area of conflict.(28)

In spite of the fact that the oath of allegiance had been given to ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib in Medina in the presence of the Anṣār and Muhājirūn and those who came from other regions, the result was not a caliphate which was capable of unifying the people, for the factions were divided in their attitude towards it. In such an atmosphere of conflict, the caliph was faced by a strong rebellion that he could not hope to put down. The rebellion against the new caliph continued to produce military confrontations until the renunciation by al-Ḥasan b. ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib of the caliphate in Rabīᶜ II 41/August, 661 Muᶜāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān succeeded him. This abdication, however, brought the first civil war to an end. (29)

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(28) The centre of the confrontation was in Iraq. The battle of the Camel, the first battle of this war, took place in Basra and the second main battle, Ṣiffīn, took place on the north bank of the Euphrates River, in Iraq.

(29) For this event, cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 203; al-Dīnawarī, 220; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārikh, II, 192; see also Shaᶜbān, Islamic History, I, 77, 78.

Two battles worthy of mention here these are the battle of the Camel and the battle of Ṣiffīn. It is not our aim, however, to provide a detailed study of this civil war, but rather to assess in particular the role of the Yemeni migrants in it.

a. The loyalty of the Yemenis to the leaders of antagonists

In the battle of the Camel in Jūmāda II, 36/December, 656, the Yemeni tribes living in Kufa constituted the majority of ᶜAlī's army. Abū Mikhnaf (30) tells us that ten thousand warriors from the tribes of Kufa joined ᶜAlī, most of whom were Yemenis. On the other hand, the Azd and other Yemenis in Basra supported his opponents, Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr, in this battle. (31) Actually, the most important evidence concerning the role of the Yemeni tribes played comes in relation to the battle of Ṣiffīn (Dhū ᵓl-Ḥijjah, 36-Ṣafar, 37/May-July, 657) between those Iraqis led by the caliph and those Syrians who supported their governor, Muᶜāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān. In this battle the Yemenis formed the bulk of the fighting forces in both the Iraqi and the Syrian armies. (32)

The strong influence of the Yemeni tribes in this war is apparent from a study of the role played by some of their chiefs at the time. These chiefs had the strongest influence on how the battles were conducted. So extensive was this influence that they came on occasions to be

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(30) In al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235f. Cf. Also al-Dīnawarī, 147f. Both confirm that seven tribal groups joined ᶜAlī, of whom four were Yemenis.

(31) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 137f; al-Dīnawarī, 148.

(32) For a detailed discussion of their role in this battle, see Ibn Muzāhim, Ṣiffīn, 131ff; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 298ff; al-Dīnawarī, 156ff; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 488ff.

instrumental in decision-making at the highest level. Again, of course, the strength of the influence of the Yemeni chiefs was obtained from their tribal support. (33) This power wielded by the Yemeni tribes was the main reason why the rebel leaders were always striving to obtain the support of their chiefs. This is clearly illustrated by a message sent by al-Zubayr b. al-ᶜAwwām, one of ᶜAlī's opponents, before the battle of the Camel to Kaᶜb b. Sūr, the Azdī chief in Basra, addressing him as 'Lord of al-Azd' (Sayyid al-Azd), and requesting him to be on his side.(34) When Kaᶜb showed his neutral attitude, ᶜĀ'ishah, the Prophet's widow, realized Kaᶜb's position and had to go personally to persuade him. She was successful in persuading him to join their army. (35) The Azd in Basra, therefore, became the most important supporters of ᶜAlī's opponents in the battle of the Camel in Jumādā II, 36/December, 656.(36)

As has already been mentioned, the Yemeni tribes in Kufa, especially Madhḥij and Hamdān, were keen supporters of ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. According to al-Kūfī (37) ten thousand Madhḥijīs were in ᶜAlī's army at the battle of Ṣiffīn

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(33) Especially in these regions in conflict where they constituted a high proportion of the Arab inhabitants. For their settlement in Syria and Kūfa, see Chapter V, B, Tables a, b.ii.

(34) Ibn Qutaybah, Imamah, I, 47f.

(35) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 238.

(36) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 237f; Al-Dīnawarī, 148.

(37) Futūḥ, III, 295.

(Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah, 36-Ṣafar, 37/May-July, 657). As for Hamdān, because of their importance and their loyalty to the new caliph, they became closely aligned with ʿAlī himself, to such a degree that Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān described them as, "The sword of ʿAlī." (38) As for their role in supporting ʿAlī in the battle of Ṣiffin, Muʿāwiyah expressed his bitterness when, after he had become caliph, he addressed a Hamdānī woman, Sūdah bint ʿUmārah, saying "I have never suffered from any Arab as much as I have suffered from your people. [i.e. Hamdān]". (39) It may be said that Hamdān greatly impressed ʿAlī. This can be seen when he addressed them at Ṣiffīn saying, "You are my shield, my spear, my sword and my protection. By God, if I had a paradise I would allot it to you alone, you people of Hamdān." (40) He even expressed his feeling towards them in his verse; (41)

ولو كنتُ بواباً على بابِ جنةٍ لقلتُ لهمدانَ ادخُلوا بسلامِ

If I were a door keeper of paradise,

I would say to Hamdān, "Enter in peace."

In Syria, however, the Yemeni tribes were also an important part of Muʿāwiyah's force and, as can be witnessed from a study of his troops at Ṣiffīn, they were in the

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(38) Al-Kūfī, II, 488.

(39) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, III, 89-93.

(40) Ibn Muzāḥim, 437; al-Kūfī, III, 43.

(41) Ibn Muzāḥim, 437; al-Himyarī, Shams, 110. See also al-Ḥajrī, Masājid Ṣanʿāʾ, 12.

majority. The most prominent Yemeni tribes with Mu^{c}āwiyah were Ḥimyar, Kindah and ^{c}Akk. (42) Mu^{c}āwiyah, therefore, considered that the fundamental strength of the Syrian forces lay in the Yemeni tribes, and so he declared war against ^{c}Alī relying on their support. This is very clear from his poetry :

إنِ الشـأمُ اعطـت طاعـةً يمنيـّـةً تواصـفَها أشـيـاخُها فى المجالـسِ
فإن يفعلـُـوا اصـدُمْ عليـًا بجبهـةٍ تفُـتُّ عليـــه كـــلَّ رطـبٍ ويابـسِ

If Syria gives [me] Yemeni obedience,
of the sort that is described by their chiefs in their meetings
If they do, I will attack ^{c}Alī with a front,
which will devastate him completely [literally; everything fresh and dry]. (43)

For this reason Mu^{c}āwiyah delayed his reply to ^{c}Alī when the latter asked him to clarify his position. He must either give an oath of allegiance or be prepared to fight, ^{c}Alī said. In fact the reason is that Mu^{c}āwiyah was trying to discover the view of the Syrians and of the senior Yemeni leaders.

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(42) Also some of Khath^{c}am, Hamdān and al-Azd were in his army, but they were in the minority.

(43) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 33; al-Mubarrad, Kāmil, I, 190f. See also al-Shamāhī, al-Yaman, 81. In al-Kufī, Futuḥ, II, 379, Wabi'l-Shāmī ^{c}indī ^{c}usbatun Yamaniyyatun. In al-Baladhurī, Ansāb, II, 289, Wa-qad manahatni' l-Shāmu afḍala tā^{c}atin, instea of Ini'l-Shāmu a^{c}ṭat ṭā^{c}atan Yamaniyyatan.

b. The influence of the Yemeni chiefs in the war

In all probability ᶜAlī, by sending one of the Yemeni leaders who supported his cause, Jarīr b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Bajalī, to Muᶜāwiyah, intended to give this responsibility to a man who had influence among the Syrians, especially those of Yemeni origin. Therefore, when ᶜAlī nominated Jarīr for this mission, he addressed him saying, "as you see, I have many Companions of the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār who are qualified for this mission, but I have chosen you in particular because the Prophet described you as the best of the Yemenis."(44) "And Jarīr, accepting the mission, said to ᶜAlī, "I will ask the Syrians to obey you and recognize you as a caliph; for most of them are my people, my clan and my citizens." (45)

So, when Muᶜāwiyah received Jarīr, he was in a very difficult position because of the influence of Jarīr upon the Syrians, especially those of Yemeni origin. Muᶜāwiyah immediately consulted ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ, one of the Companions and his special military consultant. The latter agreed that it was too dangerous to withhold the oath of allegiance to ᶜAlī as suggested by Jarīr, whom ᶜAmr had described as the best Iraqi envoy. (46) So ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ suggested that the best thing was to convince Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, a Yemeni chief in Syria who played a major role in the war,

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(44) Ibn Muzāḥim, 28; al-Mubarrad, Kāmil, I, 190; al-Kūfī, II, 374.

(45) Ibn Muzāḥim, 27f; al-Kūfī, II, 373.

(46) Ibn Muzāḥim, 44; al-Dīnawarī, 161; al-Kūfī, II, 397.

to support Muᶜāwiyah by persuading a few influential people to say that ᶜAlī had killed ᶜUthmān. Then Muᶜāwiyah could still retain the loyalty of the Syrians when he rejected the request to grant an oath of allegiance to ᶜAlī. (47)

Muᶜāwiyah agreed to ᶜAmr's idea and when Jarīr urged him to give his reply, he answered him saying, "By God I am not waiting for anybody's opinion except that of Shuraḥbīl, for he is an important Syrian chief. I do not want to make a decision without him, so when he comes I will consult him and give you my final decision at our first meeting." (48) When Shuraḥbīl met the Syrian leaders in Damascus he was totally convinced by them that ᶜAlī had killed ᶜUthmān. In this context Shuraḥbīl pressed Muᶜāwiyah not to obey ᶜAlī, saying, "Muᶜāwiyah, it has become clear to me on the basis of just witnesses that ᶜAlī killed ᶜUthmān unjustly, and by God, if you give him your oath of allegiance, we will drive you out of Syria. So send that man [Jarīr, ᶜAlī's envoy] back to the one who sent him. For, by God, the only thing we have for ᶜAlī is the sword." (49) According to Ibn Muzāḥim, (50)

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(47) Ibid. It seems that ᶜAmr intended to nominate Shuraḥbīl in particular to face Jarīr because of the enmity of Shuraḥbīl for Jarīr. Al-Najāshī, the poet of the Iraqi army, says;

شرحبيلُ ماللدين فارقتَ أمرَنا ولكن لبغضِ المالكي جريرِ

Shuraḥbīl, it was not for the faith that you left us,

but because of your hatred for Jarīr al-Mālikī.*

* See Ibn Muzāḥim, 51; al-Kūfī, II, 402.

(48) Al-Kūfī, II, 22.

(49) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 47; al-Dīnawrī, 161; al-Kūfī, II, 401, 404.

(50) Ṣiffīn, 47.

that was the time when Muᶜāwiyah realized that Shuraḥbīl had reached a decision to fight the Iraqis and that all the Syrians would follow him.

In fact the decision of Shuraḥbīl came to be a declaration of war against ᶜAlī. Muᶜāwiyah immediately sent back ᶜAlī's envoy saying to him, "Go back to your leader and tell him what you have heard from the people of Syria." (51) Thereafter, the Yemeni leaders in Syria evidently appeared to be supporting Muᶜāwiyah. Three of them played a major role in recruiting for Muᶜāwiyah's cause. The first was Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, who went throughout Syria, persuading people to follow Muᶜāwiyah and was, as such, extremely successful. (52) The second was Abū Muslim al-Khawlānī, who wandered around the Syrian towns taking ᶜUthmān's blood-stained garment and asking people to join him in retaliation.(53) The third was Mālik b. Hubayrah, of Kindah, who was the first to give his oath of allegiance to Muᶜāwiyah. (54)

It is noticeable that, just as the Yemenis had had a strong role in the declaration of war, they also had the same influence on its termination. So in the battle of Ṣiffīn when Muᶜāwiyah realized the superior strength of the Iraqi army he began negotiations to cease hostilities.

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(51) Al-Kūfī, II, 404; al-Dīnawarī, 162.

(52) Al-Kūfī, II, 406f; al-Dīnawrī, 161f; Ibn Muzāḥim, 50f.

(53) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 291.

(54) Ibn Muzāḥim, 80f.

Again Muʿāwiyah thought of persuading some of the Iraqi tribal chiefs to put pressure on their commander, ʿAlī, to accept peaceful negotiations. He decided to contact al-Ashʿath b. Qays al-Kindī, one of the Yemeni leaders in the Iraqi army, to use his position to enforce his opinion in the decision making. Muʿāwiyah, therefore, selected Muʿāwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī, one of the Kindah chiefs in the Syrian army, to fulfil this mission of persuading al-Ashʿath to stop fighting and to deliver up the murderers of ʿUthmān. (55) When Ibn Ḥudayj failed in his mission, Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān repeated the attempt through his brother, ʿUtbah, saying to him, "Speak softly to al-Ashʿath, because if he is able to bring peace, people will accept it." (56) Although ʿUtbah tried hard to change al-Ashʿath's mind and always described him respectfully as the head of the Iraqis and the Lord of the Yemenis (Sayyid ahl al-Yaman), he failed and thus fighting continued. (57)

The military confrontations during the battle of Ṣiffīn (Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah, 36-Ṣafar, 37/May-July, 657) did not stop until the Syrians finally raised their Qurans on their spears. That, together with the pressure exerted by some of the Yemeni leaders in the Iraqi army, was eventually sufficient. Some of the Yemeni chiefs in the Iraqi army were very influential in exercising pressure upon ʿAlī to accept the arbitration (taḥkīm) threatening the use of

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(55) Al-Kūfī, II, 273f.

(56) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 87; Ibn Muzāḥim, 408.

(57) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 88; Ibn Muzāḥim, 408. Al-Kūfī, III, 277, reads Sayyid qabāʾil Kindah.

their tribal influence if he did not accept. One of those powerful Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side, al-Ash^{c}ath b. Qays al-Kindī, who was accompanied by a number of Yemenis, asked ^{c}Alī to accept the arbitration. When ^{c}Alī hesitated, he threatened him saying "Accept the people's call for consulting the Quran, or otherwise, by God, none of the Yemenis will fight for you with an arrow, sword or spear." (58) So under this pressure ^{c}Alī agreed to stop fighting and accept the arbitration. (59)

Both sides in the conflict, during this war, always had to take account of the positions and opinions of the Yemeni chiefs, especially during the fighting between ^{c}Alī and Mu^{c}āwiyah. The two conflicting groups worked to win over the opposing Yemeni leaders to their own side, using their Yemeni supporters for these missions. In this context Sa^{c}īd b. Qays al-Hamdānī, a chief of Hamdān in the Iraqi army, had been authorized by ^{c}Alī to write to Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, a chief of Kindah on the Syrian side, to warn him not to support Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān. (60)

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(58) Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, I, 95; al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 165; al-Kūfī, III, 307. Cf. also Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 483f who records the verses of the Syrians which confirm that the decision makers on the Iraqi side are three, all of them are Yemenis.

(59) However, we do not intend to confirm here that the Yemenis alone exercised pressure on ^{c}Alī to accept arbitration. On one hand, we agree with these sources, both the primary and the modern research, which confirm the role of al-qurrā', on the Iraqi side, to stop fighting, such as Abī Mikhnaf in al-Ṭabarī, I, 3330; Ibn Muzāḥim, 489f. Cf. also Surūr, al-Ḥayāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 77; Lewis, Arabs in History, 63; Sha^{c}bān, Islamic History, I, 75, the latter confirms the role of al-Ash^{c}ath in addition to the role of al-qurrā' by saying "Most of the qurrā' accepted arbitration, but the decisive factor in ^{c}Alī's acceptance was the action of al-Ash^{c}ath b. Qays. "On the other hand, we again confirm the role of the Yemenis represented by some of their chiefs who exercised pressure on ^{c}Alī to stop fighting.

(60) Cf. Kūfī, II, 109-11.

Mu^{c}āwiyah was so concerned about the doubts of Dhū^{ʾ}l-Kalā^{c} al-Ḥimyarī, a chief of Ḥimyar in the Syrian army, about fighting ^{c}Alī and was never at rest until Dhū^{ʾ}l-Kalā^{c} was killed. Mu^{c}āwiyah, therefore, expressed his concern saying "If Dhū^{ʾ}l-Kalā^{c} were alive he would have gone over to ^{c}Alī with half of our people."(61)

After the battle of Siffīn, Mu^{c}āwiyah's followers controlled Egypt and, of course, it was only natural that his party flourished there, having gained its support from influential Yemeni chiefs such as Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Ḥudayj al-Tujībī and al-Ḥuṣayn b..Numayr, both of Kindah. (62) ^{c}Alī soon realised the weakness of his representative in Egypt, Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr. The latter failed to control the country and to confront such Yemeni leaders as those. By endeavouring to retake Egypt, ^{c}Alī replaced Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr with a strong Yemeni leader, Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakh^{c}ī.(63) Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān, therefore, was very disturbed when he learnt of the appointment of this Yemeni chief who was capable of influencing the other Yemenis in Egypt. As it happened, when the new governor reached al-Qulzum he was given poisoned honey to drink and died instantly. (64) On this occasion Mu^{c}āwiyah was

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(61) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 341; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, II, 143.

(62) Cf. Ibn Muzāḥim, 128. For the role of Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Ḥudayj, see Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 435; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V, 111.

(63) Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 170; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 398; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3392.

(64) Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, II, 170; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 298f; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3393; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 178; all confirm that Mu^{c}āwiyah was involved in this operation. Al-Kindī, Wulāh, 23-6; and al-Maqrīzī, Khiṭaṭ, II, 82, both do not mention this involvement.

delighted and said, "ᶜAlī had two right supporting arms, one of them was cut off at Ṣiffīn and the other was cut off today [meaning the death of Mālik b. al-Ashtar]"(65)

c. The appearance of Yemeni solidarity during the conflict

It is noticeable that during the first civil war the Yemeni tribes were not unified on any one side, but even within one tribe there was a division of loyalties. So in the battle of Camel in Jumādā II, 36/December, 656, the Yemenis of Basra were fighting the Yemenis of Kufa.(66) Furthermore, at the battle of Ṣiffīn (Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah, 36-Ṣafar 37/May-July 657), ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib directed every Yemeni tribe in his army to confront its relatives on the Syrian side.(67) From this it became clear that the Yemenis appeared to be the central force in all the conflicting armies in that period.

It is very curious that these Yemeni tribes never forgot their tribal solidarity, though they had differing attitudes towards that conflict. This was displayed by one of their chiefs in the Syrian army, Shuraḥbīl b. al-Simṭ al-Kindī, replying to Saᶜīd b. Qays al-Hamdānī, chief of Hamdān on the Iraqi side, when the latter urged him not to support Muᶜāwiyah, saying, "By God, I am affiliated neither to Iraq nor to Syria, I am simply a man from the Yemen."(68)

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(65) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 399; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3394; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 178.

(66) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 2182; al-Kūfī, II,141.

(67) Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 257; al-Kūfī, II, 299.

(68) Al-Kūfī, II,411.

Another example is when Ṣubrah b. Shaymān al-Ḥaddānī, chief of al-Azd in Basra, decided to take the side of ᶜAlī's opponents in the battle of Camel. Kaᶜb b. Sūr, another Azdī chief there, advised him against it saying, "listen to me and depart with your people and leave these who are descended from Muḍar and Rabīᶜah, for they are brothers; if they are reconciled to each other, all will be well; but if they fight each other, we will be their ruler tomorrow." (69) A third example of Yemeni tribal solidarity is when the Azd of Iraq were directed to fight their relatives in the Syrian army at the battle of Ṣiffīn. On this occasion Mikhnaf b. Sulaymān al-Azdī, their leader in the Iraqi army said, "It is ironic that we are directed to fight our people and they are urged to fight us. By God these are surely our own arms, which we shall cut with our own arms and our wings; we shall eliminate them by means of our swords."(70)

Yemeni solidarity appeared also through the rivalry in the leadership of the troops in both the Iraqi and the Syrian army. It is well known that all through these battles of the first civil war, the tribes were led by their own chiefs, with ultimate leadership resting with the two original opponents themselves. It sometimes happened that more than one tribe was grouped under one man's leadership, and these were mostly the tribes which were related to each other. This fact is exemplified by the

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(69) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 237; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3178.

(70) Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 262; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3303.

grouping of Ḥimyar and Hamdān in the Iraqi army under the leadership of the latter's tribal chief. (71) But, sometimes such a grouping occurred between non-related tribes, i.e. a Qaḥṭānī and an ᶜAdnānī tribe under a leader selected for his personal leadership qualities or military experience. It is noticeable here that none of the Yemeni tribes from either side that joined the war, especially during the battle of Ṣiffīn, agreed easily to fight under non-Yemeni leaders. On this occasion we shall give two examples on both sides, the Iraqi and Syrian, showing the rejection of those Yemenis who objected to the leadership of a non-Yemeni. The first is briefly as follows. When an Iraqi army left Kufa for Ṣiffīn, the leadership of Kindah and Rabīᶜah (the former a Yemeni tribe, the latter ᶜAdnānī) was given to al-Ashᶜath b. Qays al-Kindī. As ᶜAlī was dissatisfied with this arrangement, he replaced al-Ashᶜath with Ḥassān b. Makhdūj al-Ḥanafī, a chief of Rabīᶜah. (72) This action of ᶜAlī angered the Yemenis in his army to such an extent that fighting was about to break out between the Yemenis and Rabīᶜah. The crisis was not defused until Ḥassān went to al-Ashᶜath and offered him the leadership of Kindah, (73) moreover, ᶜAlī appointed al-Ashᶜath as a general leader of the right wing of the Iraqi armies in order to satisfy the Yemeni tribes. (74) The second example was on the side of the Syrian army. During the

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(71) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 235f.

(72) Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 137; al-Kūfī, III,105.

(73) Ibn Muzāḥim, 138f; al-Kūfī, III,105.

(74) Ibn Muzāḥim, 140.

battle of Ṣiffīn, Mu^{c}āwiyah divided the leadership of his troops between some of the Muḍarīs, ignoring the Yemenis. Consequently, the latter appeared most reluctant to be led by a man from other than their own tribes, especially since they felt that they were the majority of this army. Duly they protested to Mu^{c}āwiyah and one of their chiefs, ^{c}Abd Allāh b. al-Ḥārith al-Sakūnī, expressed their objection in verses;

معاوَ احييت فينا الأحَنْ وأحدثتَ في الشأمِ ما لمْ يكنْ
عقدتْ لبسرٍ واصحابِه وما الناسُ حولكَ الا اليَمنْ

Mu^{c}āwiyah, you envoked our old hatred,
you invented in Syria what was not known.
You promoted Busr and his friends [Muḍaris] ,
while the only people around you are Yemenis. (75)

Yet again the Yemenis in the Syrian army were not satisfied until Mu^{c}āwiyah brought them closer to himself. (76)

In Ṣafar, 37/July 657, when the Iraqi and Syrian armies stopped fighting at Ṣiffīn on the basis of accepting arbitration, each side nominated its representative. Mu^{c}āwiyah nominted ^{c}Amr b. al-^{c}Āṣ. But, when ^{c}Alī wanted to select his representative, he was compelled to satisfy the ambition of the Yemeni chiefs. The latter totally refused to accept a situation in which the two sides' representatives were both to be Muḍarīs. Being motivated

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(75) Ibn Muzāḥim, 424f; al-Kūfī, III, 145f.

(76) Ibn Muzāḥim, 425; al-Kūfī, III, 147.

by tribal solidarity the Yemenis compelled ᶜAlī to appoint one of them, Abū Mūsā al-Ashᶜarī. Although ᶜAlī did not trust Abū Mūsā, he found no way of refusing their demand.(77) Shaᶜbān in his book (78) tends to confirm that it was the qurrāʾ alone who imposed on ᶜAlī the choice of Abū Mūsā, ignoring the pressure of the Yemenis. Two historical facts lead us to believe that tribal solidarity was a main factor of this choice. The first is that ᶜAlī had already chosen one of the qurrāʾ when he nominated ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbbās to this mission. (79) The second is the strong rejection by the Yemenis in the Iraqi army to ᶜAlī's initial nomination of ᶜAbdAllāh b. ᶜAbbās. This rejection was expressed by al-Ashᶜath b. Qays al-Kindī who protested, saying "No, by God, two Muḍarīs will never make the decision, but select a man from the Yemeni people, if your opponents select a Muḍarī." (80) Moreover, the Yemenis ignored the

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(77) See, al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 165; Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 500 (citing Abī Jaᶜfar Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī); Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, IV, 1764 (quoting al-Wāqidī). In al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 333; al-Dīnawarī, 195; Abī Mikhnaf in al-Ṭabarī, I, 3333; al-Kūfī, IV, 3, ᶜAlī imposed by both al-Ashᶜath b. Qays and the qurrāʾ. In al-Jāḥiḍ, al-Bayān waʾl-Tabʿyīn, I, 183, by the Iraqis.

(78) Islamic History, I, 75. Al-qurrāʾ, Reciters of the Quran, see Ibn Manẓūr, lisan al-ᶜArab, I, 130; al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-ᶜArūs, I, 364.

(79) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3333; Ibn Muzāḥim, 499; Ibn al-Jazarī, Ṭabaqat al-qurrāʾ, I, 425f.

(80) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 165; Ibn Muzāḥim, 500, al-Kūfī, IV, 3. See also al-Dūrī, Muqaddimah, 59.

fact that ᶜAlī had told them that their man - Abū Mūsā might be deceived by ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ. Al- Ashᶜāth b. Qays replied to ᶜAlī saying, "By God, if they [The arbitrators] decide what we dislike and one of them is a Yemeni, that will be better for us than if two Muḍarīs decide what we like." (81)

Thus, to conclude, the Yemeni migrants played a major role in the uprising against ᶜUthmān and the Civil War. In the first event they formed the majority of the rebels, while the Yemeni chiefs apparently emerged in inciting hostility against ᶜUthmān and his murder. The strong influence of these Yemeni tribes also appeared in the course of the Civil War, since their chiefs became decision-makers in both the declaration of war and its termination. However, the role of these Yemeni chiefs in these events extended to their homeland, the Yemen, where their support to the antagonistic leaders reflected on the political situation of the country throughout this period. Consequently the Yemen was politically affected by the war, which spread throughout its provinces, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

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(81) Ibn Muzāḥim, 500- al-Kūfī, IV, 3,4; See also al-Dūr ī.59; al-Nuṣṣ, al-ᶜAṣabiyyah, 199.

CHAPTER VIII

The Political situation in the Yemen at the time of the Civil War (35-40/656-61)

After the murder of ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān, the third Orthodox Caliph, in Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah 35/May 656, both the inhabitants of Medina and those responsible for his death agreed upon ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib as Caliph. The main request of the former was that the governors of ᶜUthmān be changed; the new Caliph also had the same thought in mind. Thus he immediately ordered the governors of ᶜUthmān to leave their offices. (1) In the Yemen, ᶜAlī appointed two governors : ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās in Ṣanᶜāʾ and Saᶜīd b. Saᶜd b. ᶜAbādah in al-Janad. (2) However, there is no mention in the sources at our disposal of ᶜAlī's governor in Ḥaḍramawt.

With the assumption of the Caliphate by ᶜAlī and the resulting Civil War between his followers and those of ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān (al-ᶜUthmāniyyah), the repercussions of this struggle were felt in the Yemen. (3) This situation

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(1) Cf. Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, 37 ff; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 154 ff; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3066ff.

(2) Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 42f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 61; ᶜAsjad, 19; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 82-4; Bughyat, 23; Abū Makhramah, Tārīkh, II, 91. For ᶜUbayd Allāh only, see al-Ṭabarī, I, 3089, al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 155; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 172; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istiᶜāb, III, 1009; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 340. For Saᶜid, see Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 97, who says over the Yemen.

(3) Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜāʾ", 52.

led the historians to pay more attention to the political situation in the Yemen, especially after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn in Rabī^{c}I 38/August 658. This chapter will cover the effect of the civil war on the political situation in the Yemen during the period of the fourth Orthodox Caliph, ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭalib (35-40/656-61).

In fact throughout the first two years of ^{c}Alī's Caliphate, Dhū ʾl- Ḥijjah, 35-Rabī^{c}I, 38/May 656 - August 658, the Yemen passed through a quiet and stable political period, as it had during the period of his predecessors. Our sources are all silent on the question of the political situation in the Yemen during these two years. This silence is a result of their concentration on the stage on which the events of the Civil war were being played out. This stage included both Iraq and Syria, and at times, Egypt. (4) Consequently, the rest of the Islamic provinces, including the Yemen, were mentioned only incidentally during these two years.

However, when the diplomatic conflict began between ^{c}Alī and Mu^{c}āwiyah after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn in Rabī^{c}I, 38/August 658, there emerged in the Yemen sudden activities both on the part of the supporters of ^{c}Alī and also those of Mu^{c}āwiyah. Each of these two groups took

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(4) Whereas the battles which took place during the civil war were concentrated on these territories, such as the battle of the Camel and Ṣiffīn, cf. Chapter VII. B

sides with one of the opposing leaders. By those actions the Yemenis became divided into three factions. Two of them involved themselves with hostilities, whilst the third faction remained neutral. Thereupon, two parties were established in the area. The first comprised the supporters of ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib who were traditionally known as "the party of ᶜAlī" (Shīᶜat ᶜAlī). The second was made up of those who sympathised with Muᶜāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān who later became known as the supporters of the Umayyads (Anṣār Banū Umayyah).

The members of the latter were originally the followers of ᶜUthmān (al-ᶜUthmāniyyah) (5) who had been angered by his murder and who now gathered under the leadership of Muᶜāwiyah, the governor of Syria at that time and a relative of ᶜUthmān. Muᶜāwiyah accused ᶜAlī of being a part of the conspiracy to murder ᶜUthmān and of protecting the murderers. (6) By that claim, Muᶜāwiyah succeeded in gaining the supporters of ᶜUthmān on his side in his conflict with ᶜAlī, bringing the Umayyad party into existence. Subsequently, Muᶜāwiyah was able to oppose the fourth Orthodox Caliph both politically and militarily and his followers spread throughout the Islamic provinces, including the Yemen.

To illustrate the political situation in the Yemen during the period of the fourth Orthodox Caliph,

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(5) For a detailed discussion of al-ᶜUthmāniyyah, cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, al-ᶜUthmāniyyah, passim.

(6) For the murder of ᶜUthmān, cf. 212 above.

(35-40/656-661) we shall divide this chapter into two sections. In the first we will study the political situation in the Yemen during the first two years of ᶜAlī's caliphate, Dhū ʾI-Ḥijjah, 35-Rabīᶜ I 38/May, 656-August 658. The second section will cover the political scene in the Yemen after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn and the appearance of political parties, showing relations of the Yemenis with the Alids' and the Umayyads' two leaders in the struggle, ᶜAlī in Kufa and Muᶜāwiyah in Damascus, through to the murder of the former in Ramaḍān 40/May 661.

A. The political situation in the Yemen before the arbitration of Ṣiffīn

The sudden upsurge of activity in the political conflict between the supporters of ᶜAlī and those of Muᶜāwiyah in the Yemen after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn, Rabīᶜ I, 38/August, 658, was a continuation of the previous squabbles between members of the two parties in the area which had taken place during the first two years of ᶜAlī's reign. The presence of ᶜAlī's governors in the Yemen, as well as his military success in the battles of the Camel and Ṣiffīn might well have led the supporters of Muᶜāwiyah in the area to practise their activities secretly during these two years. They were particularly careful in what they did in the centres of ᶜAlī's governors in the Yemen, namely in Ṣanᶜaʾ and al-Janad. Yet certain influential Yemeni tribes participated openly in the civil war on both sides, since they had been sent as re-inforcements to both armies in the conflict during the first two years of ᶜAlī's caliphate.(7)

(7) For the Yemeni role during this period, cf. Chapter VII,B. above.

Of course, the establishment of both the Alid and Umayyad parties in the Yemen must have been backed by experienced people in the area with a great deal of knowledge of local tribes. It is quite logical that Yemeni tribal chiefs, who had settled in the conquered areas and joined one of the two opposing leaders, together with some Medinan officials who had occupied posts in the Yemen during the period of ᶜUthmān's reign, had taken part in forming these two parties. So, in order to illustrate how these parties were established, let us study each party individually.

a. The establishment of the Alid party

As has already been seen, some of those Yemeni chiefs who had settled in the conquered provinces played a major role in leading the uprising against ᶜUthmān and in supporting ᶜAlī's caliphate. (8) That role, however, has led some of our historians to confirm that the oath of allegiance given to ᶜAlī came mainly from the Yemenis. (9) Their part in events did not stop at this stage, but they extended their activities throughout the regions of their homeland appealing to the Yemeni tribes to support ᶜAlī's caliphate.

As a result of the activities of these Yemeni chiefs delegations of their tribes, who had been in the Yemen at that time, came to Medina to give the oath of allegiance to the new Caliph on behalf of their people. (10)

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(8) For the role of these chiefs, cf. Chapter VII, B.b.above.

(9) The account of Abū ᶜAmr in al-Diyār-bakrī, Tārīkh, II, 276.

(10) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal that such Yemeni delegations gave their oath of allegiance to either ᶜUmar or ᶜUthmān.

Al-Kūfī (11) describes the arrival of these Yemeni delegates in Medina and explains their coming by saying, "When the Yemenis were informed that ᶜAlī became Caliph, they voluntarily gave their oath of allegiance, then they came to congratulate him in Medina." One of these delegates was Rifāᶜah b. Wāʾil al-Hamdānī who expressed the loyalty of the other delegates to ᶜAlī, by saying :

نسيرُ إلى عَلِيٍّ ذِي المَعَالِ بِخَيْرِ عصابةٍ يُمْنٍ كِرَامِ

We march to join ᶜAlī, the supreme; in a best group of noblemen and generous. (12)

Al-Kūfī (13) intends to confirm that the Yemeni tribes were the only ones who sent delegations to ᶜAlī, omitting the other Arab tribes. Of course other non-Yemeni tribes must have sent delegates to give their oath of allegiance to ᶜAlī, since tribal leaders other than the Yemenis had been involved in the murder of ᶜUthmān and had supported ᶜAlī's caliphate. (14) However, two facts lead us to realize why al-Kūfī recorded only the Yemeni delegations to Medina. The first is the dominant role of the Yemenis in the uprising against ᶜUthmān and in the Medinan affairs after the murder of the Caliph. (15) The

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(11) Futuḥ, II, 252.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Futūḥ, II, 252-6.

(14) Cf. 212-14 above.

(15) Cf. 213-4. above.

second is the enthusiasm of those Yemeni chiefs, who were amongst the rebels in Medina in choosing ᶜAlī for the Caliphate. (16) That great enthusiasm might have led these chiefs to intensify their activities in urging their relatives in the Yemen to give the oath of allegiance to ᶜAlī. Therefore, Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhᶜī, one of the Yemeni chiefs who led the rebels against ᶜUthmān and supported ᶜAlī, happily appeared in Medina with the arrival of the Yemeni delegations. That willingness on the part of Mālik b. al-Ashtar leads us to believe that ᶜAlī might have received a promise from some of these Yemenis, who were on his side, to keep their own tribes loyal to him. Therefore, when the Yemeni delegations reached Medina, Mālik b. al-Ashtar accompanied them and approached ᶜAlī, saying loudly:

أَتَتْكَ عِصابَةٌ مِن خيرِ قومٍ يمانيُّونَ مِن حَضْرٍ وبادِ

A group of the best people have come to you, Yemenis, both settled peoples and bedouins. (17)

Because Hamdān was one of the most loyal of the Arab tribes which supported ᶜAlī against his opponents, their relationship with the new Caliph was not restricted to those Hamdānīs who were settled in Iraq, but extended also to their territory in the Yemen. (18) It can be assumed that the Hamdān chiefs in Iraq were responsible for the increased loyalty among their fellow tribesmen

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(16) Cf. 213-4. above

(17) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, II, 254.

(18) Cf. 248ff below.

in their homeland towards ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. An indication of that support was the correspondence between their chiefs in Kufa, encouraging their people in the Yemen to hold a similar position towards ᶜAlī. An example of that was the role of Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, a Hamdān chief in Kufa, who appealed to his people to support ᶜAlī's authority in the Yemen. (19) Resulting from the role of such Hamdān chiefs, the tribe became distinguished in the Yemen as the supporters of ᶜAli (Shiᶜah Li-ᶜAlī). Al-Hamdānī (20) comments upon this fact, saying, "The predecessors of the [present day] Abnāᵓ were Shīᶜah because of their intimate relationship with Hamdān who supported ᶜAlī." The Alids also existed in other Yemeni provinces, such as Najrān, Ṣanᶜāᵓ, Jayshān and Ḥadramawt, (21) but their activities seem to have been on a lower level than those of Hamdān.

b. The establishment of the Umayyad party

One of the main reasons for the uprising against ᶜUthmān was the failure of his governors in their various territories to gain the confidence and loyalty of the rebels. However, those other governors who did succeed in this respect, led their people in a respectful relationship with ᶜUthmān's Caliphate. Consequently those regions,

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(19) Cf. 248 below

(20) Iklil, VIII, 102f.

(21) Cf. Map 5.

such as Syria and the Yemen, did not get involved in the uprising against ᶜUthmān. Hence the Syrians became the majority of the ᶜUthmaniyyah, whilst some Yemenis, especially the inhabitants of the centres of the Islamic governors, also emerged on ᶜUthmān's side.

In all probability the roots of the ᶜUthmāniyyah in the Yemen go back to the presence of the Medinan governors during the period of ᶜUthmān's own Caliphate, especially those in Ṣanᶜā and al-Janad. In Ṣanᶜā it is possible that Yaᶜlī b. Umayyah, who occupied this office for approximately twenty-four years (12-35/633-656), had participated in establishing this party. In addition to the fact that he was one of ᶜUthmān's governors who had been dismissed by ᶜAlī, he was also one of those companions who strongly accused ᶜAlī of sharing in the conspiracy to muder the Caliph. (22)

Moreover, because of the long period of his governorship in Ṣanᶜā and his relationship through marriage with the leader of the Abnā, (23) Yaᶜlī was able to gain the confidence and loyalty of the leaders of the locals who were, in the main, Abnā. Several reasons lead us to believe that Yaᶜlī b. Umayyah successfully gained the loyalty of the Ṣanᶜānīs in favour of ᶜUthman's administration. The first

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(22) He gave financial support to Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr, the opponents of ᶜAlī, and offered to equip anybody who joined them. Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 222; al-Kūfī, II, 279; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3100, 3102, 3104; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, 128; Idrīs, Kanz, f 172b. For the period of his governorship in Ṣanᶜā, see Table 4.

(23) He was married to Umm al-Kirām, daughter of Fayrūz al-Daylamī; Cf. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 159.

of these is that the inhabitants of Ṣan^{c}ā did not take part in the uprising against ^{c}Uthmān. (24) The second is that Ya^{c}lī left Ṣan^{c}ā peacefully in the early 36/May - June 656 with a great fortune, most of it collected from alms-tax. (25) The third is the refusal by the Ṣan^{c}ānīs to support ^{c}Ubayd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās, ^{c}Ali's governor there, against the Umayyad troops in 40/660. (26)

One of the most effective forces in establishing the ^{c}Uthmāniyyah in the Yemen was ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^{c}ah al-Makhzūmī the governor of al-Janad during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs (12-35/633-656). In addition to experience gained through such long service in the area, ^{c}Abd Allāh had also become thoroughly acquainted on a personal level with al-Janad and its people. (27) Therefore, these two factors made ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Abī Rabī^{c}ah the strongest Islamic governor in the Yemen. This fact attracted the attention of ^{c}Umar b. al-Khāṭṭāb who expressed his feelings in the following words, "Do not differ [addressing the members of the council (Shūrā) who were responsible for choosing his successor] ; if you do, Mu^{c}āwiyah will come to

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(24) Either, in fact, for or against him.

(25) Al-Ṭabarī, I, 3089.

(26) Cf. 254 below.

(27) He occupied the office of al-Janad for approximately twenty four years from 12-35/633-656, cf. Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Barr, Istī^{c}āb, III, 897; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III,155; Ibn Samurah, Tabaqat, 37, 40. For his experience, see al-Iṣfānī, Aghānī, I, 64-6. Cf. also table 4.

you from Syria and ᶜAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabīᶜah from the Yemen to take control ". (28) Of course, the strength of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabīᶜah was a result of the confidence and the loyalty of the local population towards him. Through the support of those loyal people, he was able to equip himself with a local force with which to defend the Caliph from the rebels. (29) Doubtless, without the obedience of the inhabitants of al-Janad, he would not have convinced them to support ᶜUthmān. The sympathy of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabīᶜah and his followers for the Caliph, therefore, led to the creation of the ᶜUthmāniyyah in al-Janad. This faction evidently emerged after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn in Rabīᶜ I 38/August 658, revolting against Alid's authority in al-Janad and paving the way for the Umayyad seizure of the town. (30)

Although sympathy towards both antagonists existed amongst those Yemenis who were actually in the Yemen during the first two years of ᶜAlī's caliphate, it apparently did not flourish. While the governors of ᶜAlī were in a position of dominance over the centres of their rule in the Yemen, the ᶜUthmāniyyah might have frozen their activities in these towns. But these governors could not stop the activities of certain influential

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(28) Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 155; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 65.

(29) When the Caliph was sieged by the rebels in his house. Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 87; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, al-Istīᶜāb, III, 897; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, IV, 65; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, III, 155.

(30) Cf. 249 below.

tribes who sent as re-inforcements their tribal relatives to join the Syrian side. It is noticeable that during these first two years of ᶜAlī's reign, both the Alids and the ᶜUthmāniyyah in the Yemen ceased their activities within the country. However, during this period both political and military activity increased on both sides on the battle fields, especially at Ṣiffīn. Some evidence is included in our sources which indicates the involvement of the Yemeni tribes in reinforcing their tribal relatives in both conflicting armies at Ṣiffīn.

As a result of the special loyalty of the Hamdān and Madhḥij chiefs towards ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib,(31) the involvement of their tribal supporters, who were still in the Yemen, was remarkable during the battle of Ṣiffīn. Although the sources at our disposal do not indicate the arrival of Madhḥij reinforcements in support of ᶜAlī in the course of that battle, the high number of Madhḥij guides leads us to believe that some of them came from the Yemen to support their own tribe.(32) As for the reinforcements of Hamdān to ᶜAlī, this is clearly confirmed in our sources, Al-Masᶜūdī,

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(31) Those who were on his side during the civil war, such as Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, Saᶜīd b. Qays, both are Hamdānī and Mālik b. al-Ashtar al-Nakhᶜī, of Madhḥij.

(32) According to al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, III, 295, more than ten thousand Madhḥij joined ᶜAlī's army at Ṣiffīn.

al-Kūfī and Ibn ᶜAsākir (33) tell us indirectly about these reinforcements when they mention that Busr b. Abī Arṭāh, sent by Muᶜāwiyah to the Yemen, fought in 40/660-1 those Hamdānīs who had participated on ᶜAlī's side at Ṣiffīn and who had returned to the Yemen.

Yemeni reinforcements were forthcoming for the Syrian side also. Because Ḥimyar and Kindah represented the majority of the Yemeni tribes in the Syrian army,(34) Yemeni reinforcements to Muᶜāwiyah came in the main from the provinces inhabited by these tribes in the Yemen. This indication comes to us through a Yemeni who indicates in verse the direction of these reinforcements as follows:

أَتتكَ الرِّجالُ من إمدادِنا تَجُودُ إليكَ الفَلاَ من عَدَن
ومن سَرْو حميرَ قد أَقبلُوا ومن حضرموتَ ومن ذِي يَزَنْ
فدبُّوا اليكَ دَبيبَ الجَرادِ على صَعْبِها والذَّلولَ المُحِنّ

Our reinforcements came to you, pouring
across the open land from Aden.

They came to you from,
Sarw Ḥimyar, Ḥadramawt and Dhī Yazan.

They swarmed to you like locusts,
On the backs of untamed and tamed camels.(35)

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(33) Al-Musᶜūdī, Murūj, V, 57; al-Kūfī, III, 90, 91; Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222.

(34) Cf. Chapter V,B,a, above.

(35) Cf. al-Kūfī, III, 146. These provinces belonged to Ḥimyar and Kindah in the Yemen. See Map 2 .

B. The political situation in the Yemen after the arbitration of Ṣiffīn

When the arbitrators declared their judgement in the conflict between ᶜAlī and Muᶜāwiyah in Rabīᶜ I, 38/August 658, the struggle between the two antagonists became political rather than military. Consequently, the supporters of both leaders emerged throughout the Islamic provinces, diplomatically active in support of their cause. In the Yemen both parties were also involved in such activities.

Because ᶜAlī was engaged militarily in fighting the Khārijīs,(36) Muᶜāwiyah increased his political activities throughout the Islamic provinces by sending his envoys to these countries.(37) In doing so, he was able to oppose ᶜAlī politically. These areas included the Yemen. There the supporters of Muᶜāwiyah were able to declare openly their sympathy for the first time during ᶜAlī's Caliphate.

In the early stages of the political conflict, Muᶜāwiyah took advantage of the Yemeni tribal chiefs who sympathized with him to increase his political activities in the Yemen. He also benefitted from the support of certain Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side who had already actively sympathized with ᶜUthmān. Two examples are preserved in our sources which help to illustrate how Muᶜāwiyah benefitted

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(36) For a detailed discussion of the war between ᶜAlī and the Khārijīs, Cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 192, 197 f; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 362ff; al-Kūfī, IV 97ff; al-Ṭabarī, II 3360ff; al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 204-15. See also, Surūr, 79-86; Shaᶜbān, History, I, 77.

(37) For the political activities of Muᶜāwiyah after Ṣiffīn, in particular when he sent his envoy to Basra., Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī, Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3414; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd. Nahj, IV, 34f; Ibn Khayyāṭ, 196f; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I, 228; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, I, 263.

from the loyalty of such Yemeni chiefs who increased his influence in the Yemen. The first of these examples is given by al-Hamdānī, (38) who tells us how Muʿāwiyah benefitted from the loyalty of Abū Maʿbad, a chief of Hamdān, who supported his force in the Yemen. The second example comes through the narrative of Ibn Masʿūd in al-Balādhurī (39) who tells us of the role of Wāʾil Ibn Ḥujr, a Ḥaḍramī chief in supporting Muʿāwiyah's troops in Ḥaḍramawt, though Wāʾil was in fact settled in Kufa. (40) As a consequence of the activities of Muʿāwiyah's followers in the Yemen, the Umayyad party appeared strongly to challenge the authority of ʿAlī there.

The sudden appearance of the Umayyad party in the Yemen has led some historians to accuse ʿAlī's governors there of disloyalty and sympathy with Muʿāwiyah. (41) It is true that these governors did not seriously oppose the supporters of Muʿāwiyah, however, it cannot be asserted that they sympathised with Muʿāwiyah. In fact the energy of Muʿāwiyah's supporters and the disappointment of those of ʿAli at the sudden emergence of a strong Umayyad party promoted advancement of that party in the Yemen at this stage in the conflict.

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(38) Iklīl, X, 66f; VIII, 102. Cf. also Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāʾ who gives a different name saying Ḥumrah b. Saʿid al-Yamānī, whilst in Ghāyat, I, 96 Ḥamzah b. Maʿbad al-Yamānī.

(39) Ansāb, II, 458.

(40) See al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 250-4; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, VI, 26; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd, V, 81; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, VI, 312.

(41) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453.

With the increase in the political conflict between the supporters of both antagonists, the Yemen became politically unstable. In Ṣanᶜaᵓ and al-Janad the supporters of Muᶜāwiyah revolted strongly against the governors of ᶜAlī. Two different points of view comment upon this uprising. The first is given by al-Balādhurī (42) who justified the uprising by the harsh treatment of ᶜAlī's governors of the local population, in particular the ᶜUthmāniyyah. The second comes through al-Kūfī (43) who simply accuses ᶜUthman's supporters of revolting against the authority of the Caliphate. Despite the contradiction of these two historians in their accounts of the specific reasons for the uprising against ᶜAli's authority in these Yemeni towns, the whole episode serves to confirm the real role of the supporters of Muᶜāwiyah in opposing their opponents there.

As a result of the development of the political struggle between the supporters of Muᶜāwiyah and the governors of ᶜAlī in the Yemen, armed conflict flared up in the area. Thereupon, each group asked for reinforcements from their headquarters, the Alids in Kufa and the ᶜUthmāniyyah in Damascus.

ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās thus wrote to ᶜAlī informing him of the uprising of the Umayyad party and asking for reinforcements.(44) Consulting some influential

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(42) Ansāb, II, 453.

(43) Futūḥ, IV, 53f. When ᶜUbayd Allāh imprisoned some of them, the ᶜUthmaniyyah wrote to him threatening a revolt against ᶜAlī's Caliphate; "Free our brothers whom you imprisoned, or we shall not obey you and the Caliph."

(44) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 54; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453.

Yemeni chiefs on the Iraqi side, ᶜAlī met Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, a Hamdanī, to discuss with him the letter of ᶜUbayd Allāh. (45) Al-Kūfī (46) records the dialogue of ᶜAlī and Yazīd about the Yemeni uprising against the former regime, in which ᶜAlī says, "Have you [Yazīd] seen what your people have done in the Yemen and their revolt against me and my governors". Yazīd replies "By God, I believe that my people are still loyal to you, but if you wish me to prepare myself and go there, or write to them and see what their answer is, so that they return to your loyalty, all well and good; otherwise, I will move to the Yemen and protect you from them." Yazīd b. Qays prepared a letter to his people in the Yemen urging them to support ᶜAlī's authority there. He also authorised al-Ḥurr b. Nawf, one of his own followers, to deliver his letter personally to his people in the Yemen. (47)

The mediation of Yazīd b. Qays with the Yemeni rebels leads us to belive that some of the Hamdān might have been involved in the uprising. However, it is quite logical that some Hamdān chiefs on Muᶜāwiyah's side, such as Abū Maᶜbad and Ḥumrah b. Mālik, had formed an opposition group from among their own people to counter Alī's authority in the Yemen.(48)

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(45) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 54.

(46) Ibid.

(47) Al-Kūfī, IV, 55. See also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453, who records that ᶜAlī authorised Jabr b. Nawf to this mission, but he made no mention to Yazīd's letter.

(48) Both of them were of Hāshid. The role of the former in the Yemen has already been discussed, cf. 246 above. However, the latter's role in the Yemen is not clear in our sources. Nevertheless, he played a major role in supporting Muᶜawiyah during the civil war, since he was one of the important tribal chiefs on Muᶜawiyah's side; see Ibn Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 44, 196, 207, 279, 507, who uses the name Ḥamzah, not Ḥumrah; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 61; VIII, 102; Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, II, 65.

One reason for ᶜAli's attempt to engage the services of Yazīd to mediate amongst his people [i.e. Hamdān] in Ṣanᶜāᵓ area, was the neutrality of the Abnāᵓ there in the ᶜAlī - Muᶜāwiyah conflict. This would mean that Yazīd would be able to take advantage and rally support for ᶜAlī. (49) Al-Kūfī's account (50) is far from clear when he describes the route of al-Ḥurr b. Nawf to the Yemen. He confirms, however, that Yazīd's envoy met the people of two Yemeni towns and presented the letters of his chief to the people. The first of these towns has not been specified by al-Kūfī, whilst the second has been confirmed, as al-Janad.(51) The sources at our disposal, however, do not mention the first stopping place of al-Ḥurr b. Nawf. In all probability it was Ṣanᶜāᵓ since the majority of the rebels and the appeal of ᶜAlī's governors had come mainly from this town. (52)

The arrival of al-Ḥurr b. Nawf in the Yemen without any reinforcements affected the position of ᶜAli's governors and promoted increasing support for Muᶜāwiyah's followers in the area. Therefore, the Umayyad supporters sent an immediate letter to Damascus urging Muᶜāwiyah to send a representative to take their oath of allegiance (bayᶜah) (53)

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(49) Especially those in Ṣanᶜāᵓ who had good relations with Hamdān, Cf. I9-20 above

(50) Futūḥ, IV, 55.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453; al-Kūfī, IV, 53.

(53) al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453; al-Kūfī, IV, 55.

In order to push Muʿāwiyah into sending reinforcements quickly, his followers included in their letter some verses threatening him that they would give their pledge of allegiance to his opponents :

مُعاوِيَ أَلاَّ تُسْرِعِ السَّيْرَ نحْوَنا نُبايِعْ عَلِيّاً أَوْ يَزِيدَ اليَمانِيا
وإِنْ كانَ فيما عِنْدَنا لَكَ حاجَةٌ فأَرْسِلْ أَمِيراً لا يَكُنْ مُتَوانِيا

Muʿāwiyah, unless you move to us quickly,
we will give the oath of allegiance to
ʿAli or Yazid, the Yemeni

If you have need of us,
then send a governor who will not be
remiss in his work. (54)

When Muʿāwiyah received the letter, he realized that his supporters had succeeded in facilitating his invasion of the Yemen. Thus he equipped and despatched Busr b. Abī Arṭāh al-ʿĀmirī, one of his commanders, with three thousand cavalry with the words, "O Busr, Egypt has already been conquered, so our followers have become dominant and our enemies humiliated. Carry on in the name of God, pass Medina frightening and terrorizing its inhabitants till they think that you are going to kill them; then leave them alone and move on to Mecca, but do not harm anybody there. Then advance to Ṣanʿā' where we have supporters from whom I have received a letter. Strengthen them and recruit them for your attacks on ʿAlī's governors and followers. Kill anybody following ʿAlī if he refuses to give the oath of allegiance to us, and confiscate all his properties." (55)

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(54) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453. See also Ibn al-Kalbī Nasab, f 70a; al-Hamdanī, Iklīl, X, 173, Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, VI, 360.

(55) al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 453f. Cf. also al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 55f; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 173.

In Muḥarram, 40/May 660, Busr left Syria with his army, stopping in the Ḥijāzi towns of Medina, Mecca and al-Ṭā'if. (56) From there Busr marched on south, seeking the seizure of certain Yemeni towns. By following the route of Busr's expedition to the Yemen we are able to give an approximate location of the centres of the followers of ʿAlī and those of Muʿāwiyah. (57)

Our sources are unanimously silent about the route of this expedition in the northern part of the Yemen. The attitudes of the locals there towards the two parties, therefore, remains obscure. The position of the Najrānīs is, however, illustrated in the sources. This town was the first to be invaded by the Umayyad force. Although the town was controlled by ʿAlī's followers, there were Umayyad supporters there also. (58) However, long before the arrival of Busr there, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Madān al-Hārithī represented ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-ʿAbbās,

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(56) Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 198; al-Ṭabarī, I, 3450 and al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, V, 56 confirm that he was sent in 40/660. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istiʿāb, I, 159, al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f.93a and Abū Makhramah, Tārīkh, II, 26 say that he was sent after Ṣiffīn. In Ibn ʿAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222, 39/659 is given. Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, I, 153, says that Muʿāwiyah sent Busr to the Yemen and the Hijāz early in 40/660.

(57) Cf. Map 5.

(58) For the pursuit of Jāriyah b. Qudāmah by the ʿUthmāniyyah In Najrān, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3452.

ᶜAlī's governor in Ṣanᶜaᵓ, in Najrān.(59) As soon as he entered Najrān, Busr arrested ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbd al-Madān and his son, Mālik. Having killed them, he hunted down the rest of ᶜAlī's followers in the town. (60) When he had seized Najrān, Busr called for a general meeting and gave a tough speech, warning the Najrānīs against supporting ᶜAlī : "You people of Najrān, brothers of the Jews and the Christians, by God, if I ever hear of anything resembling support for ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, I will return to the attack against you with both cavalry and infantry, killing as many as I like; so think about this matter and be warned." (61)

From Najrān, Busr and his army marched on towards the south-west to the north-western part of Hamdān territory (Balad al-Ahnūm waᵓl-Maghrib). When he arrived, Abū Maᶜbad, a Hamdān chief, joined him. (62) Al-Hamdānī (63) tells us that Abū Maᶜbad was the most loyal supporter of

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(59) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 62f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15. Cf. also al-Ṭabarī, I, 3452; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 175; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 455; Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 223; al-Masᶜudī, Murūj, V, 58; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, 162f, who suggest that al-Ḥārithī was appointed over all the Yemen after ᶜUbayd Allāh's departure.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 175; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15.

(62) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, VIII, 102; X, 66. See also Ibn al-Husayn, Anbāᵓ ,f 10b; Ghāyat, I, 96. Al-Ahnūm is a large mountain formation between Wadi Mawr and its principal tributary, Akhraf. Cf. Wilson, "Mapping", 184. See also al-Waysī, 107f; al-Ḥajrī, Buldān, I, 119-27. Cf. also Map 5.

(63) Iklīl, X, 66.

Busr, since he guided the Umayyad forces through Hamdān territory. In that area, Busr pursued with resolution the followers of ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Abū ᶜAmr al-Shaybānī in Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr (64) says that Busr invaded Hamdān, killing and capturing their women. Both al-Masᶜūdī and Ibn ᶜAsākir (65) confirm that in al-Jawf Busr killed more than two hundred men from those Hamdānīs who had joined ᶜAlī's army in Ṣiffīn. Then he advanced into Arḥab, the area where Yazīd b. Qays' tribe lived. He attacked their bedouins (bādiyah) and killed their chief, Abā Karib who had declared his sympathy for ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. (66) Continuing with his march in Hamdān territory, Busr advanced on Ṣanᶜaᵓ, passing the southern part of the territory of Bakīl who had retreated to Shibām (Kawkabān). (67)

The concentration of Busr's operations on Hamdān, particularly those of Bakīl who inhabited al-Jawf, lead us to believe that the majority of ᶜAlī's supporters were from Bakīl. The members of the other branch of Hamdān, Hāshid, in particular those who were settled in the north-western part of Hamdān territory, might have sympathised with Muᶜāwiyah since they were not attacked by the Umayyad forces. (68) The evidence is not sufficiently strong to

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(64) al-Istīᶜāb, I, 161.

(65) Al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, V, 58; Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222.

(66) Al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15.

(67) Idris, Kanz, f 173a; al-Kazrajī, Kifāyah, 62; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 87.

(68) For the location of Hamdān territory, see Map 2.

confirm this as truth, but if the Ḥāshid chiefs were enthusiastic in supporting Muᶜāwiyah they must have played a major role in appealing to their own tribes to follow him. (69)

In Ṣanᶜāᵓ at that time the overall political feeling was one of support for Muᶜāwiyah. Therefore Busr entered the town in 40/660-1 without any resistance on the part of ᶜAlī's governor. (70) Both the activities of Muᶜāwiyah's supporters and also the refusal of the Ṣanᶜānis to support ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās, the governor of ᶜAlī in Ṣanᶜāᵓ, facilitated the entry of the Umayyad forces into the town. Of course, without the sympathy of the Ṣanᶜānis for Muᶜāwiyah, Busr would not have easily entered the town.

An example of support for Muᶜāwiyah was the refusal by the Abnāᵓ to take sides with ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās, when the latter asked them to help against Busr's invitation. (71) Therefore, the refusal of Fayrūz al-Daylamī, the chief of

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(69) Such as Abū Maᶜbad and Ḥumrah b. Mālik.

(70) For the entry of Busr to Ṣanᶜāᵓ, Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 456f; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāᵓ, f 11a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 62f; Abū Makhramah, II, 26; Ibn al-Dybaᶜ, Bughyat, 24.

(71) The refusal came from their leader (Fayrūz) who replied to ᶜUbayd Allāh, "Protect yourself, we are not going to fight". Cf. Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 48f; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 40b; al-Khazraji, Kifāyah, 62; Tirāz, f 93a; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāᵓ f 11a; Abū Makhramah, II, 26.

the Abnā' in Ṣan'ā', was enough to break the resistance of ʿAlī's governor, ʿUbayd Allāh, who fled from the town, designating ʿAmr b. Abī Arākah al-Thaqafī in his post.(72) Although most Sanʿānīs sympathized with Muʿāwiyah, others did emerge on ʿAlī's side, albeit in a minority and without influence. Thus Busr entered Ṣanʿā' with ease, rounding up ʿAlī's followers. There he killed ʿAmr b. Abī Arākah and seventy-two from the Abnā' who had declared their sympathy with ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.(73)

Continuing his march into the rest of the Yemeni Provinces, Busr left Ṣanʿā' moving with his army southwards and attacked Jayshān. In this town he clashed with some of ʿAlī's followers who were decisively defeated. (74) Pursuing the rest of ʿAlī's supporters in the Yemen, Busr led his troops right down into the south, imposing Umayyad authority on Aden, (75) during the year, 40/660-1. From there he continued with his march eastwards where he attacked the supporters of ʿAlī in Ḥaḍramawt.(76)

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(72) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 62; Ibn al-Ḥusayn Anbā', f11a; Abū Makhramah, II, 26; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 456; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 15.

(73) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, VIII, 103; X,66; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 50; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 63; Ṭirāz, f93a; Ibn al-Dayba'. Bughyat, 24; Abū Makhramah, II, 26. Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 11a; Ghāyat, I, 97, estimates seventy. al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, V, 58; Ibn ʿAsakir, Tahdhīb, III, 222 give no specific number.

(74) Cf. al-Yaʿqūbī Tārīkh, II,175; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 63; Ibn Abī al-Hadīd, Nahj,II,16. According to al-Ḥajrī, Buldān, I, 296, Jayshān is a town near Qaʿṭabah; and al-Akwaʿ, in al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, 219, note 1, adds that it is in ʿUzlat al-Aʿshūr, north of Qaʿtabah. See also Map 5.

(75) Al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f130a; Kifāyah,63; Abū Makhramah,26.

(76) Cf.al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, IV, 64f who does not illustrate the route of Busr to Ḥaḍramawt. But al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 170, confirms that Busr reached al-Shiḥr, yet he gives neither the route nor the achievements of his campaign in this Ḥaḍramī port. It is quite probable that Busr moved from Aden to Ḥaḍramawt via the coastal area, since it is easier for him, and when he finished his task in al-Shiḥr he advanced to the north where he attacked the Alids. See Map 5.

Thanks to Busr's expedition into the Yemeni provinces, Muᶜāwiyah was able to gain a foothold in the country removing the Alid authority there. Therefore, the Umayyad victory in the Yemen had the greatest effect on ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, who commented upon it to his followers in Kufa, saying : "Busr b. Abī Arṭāh has already conquered the Yemen, By God, these people are going to dominate what you are now holding. They would not have done so except through their obedience to Muᶜāwiyah and your disobedience to me." (77)

Despite the fact that the Arab historians agree that ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib despatched an army led by Jāriyah b. Qudāmah al-Saᶜdī, a Tamīmī chief and one of ᶜAlī's supporters, to pursue the Umayyad troops in the Yemen, they differ about both the route the expedition took and its achievements whilst there. Moreover, they do not all give the exact date for the arrival of this Iraqi army in the Yemen.

The first of these statements comes mainly from some of the Yemeni historians who confirm the entry of Jāriyah into the Yemen. Nevertheless, they do not give a clear picture of his expedition's route.(78) In the second statement some historians assert the achievements of Jāriyah's force

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(77) Al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, V, 327. Cf. also al-Kūfī, Futūḥ IV, 65-67; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 455.

(78) Cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 63; ᶜAsjad, 20; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 11a; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 87f; Bughyat, 24. See also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, II, 458.

in pursuing the Umayyad supporters throughout the Yemen.(79) The third group of our historians confirm that Najrān was the only Yemeni town invaded by the Iraqi troops.(80) However, according to al-Rāzī,(81) Busr b. Abī Arṭāh occupied the office of Umayyad governor of the Yemen for one year. This statement is confirmed by al-Kūfī. (82) If these statements are correct, it would support the third group above which considers the achievement of the Iraqi troops to be the invasion of Najrān only. (83)

It may be said, therefore, that the role of the Alids in the Yemen was destroyed once and for all by Busr's army. On this occasion Ibn Khayyāṭ (84) gives a contradictory statement when he records that ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās re-occupied the office of governor of the Yemen after Busr had fled from there, and ruled the country until the murder of ᶜAlī in

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(79) Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, II, 16, says he pursued Busr throughout the Yemen until the latter fled from the area which had belonged to ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.

(80) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, 3452; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 175; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat, I, 97-98.

(81) Tārīkh, 170.

(82) Futūḥ, III, 91, who mentions the existence of Busr in the Yemen as the military leader of Muᶜāwiyah after the latter had become Caliph.

(83) As for Busr and his army, they might have remained in the Yemen until the office of the Caliphate fell to Muᶜāwiyah.

(84) Tārīkh, 198. Repeated by Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜāb, III, 1009. Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 42f, says both ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās and Saᶜīd b. Saᶜd b. Abādah remained in office until the murder of ᶜAlī.

Ramaḍān 40/January 661. According to reliable sources, however, ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās did not return to his office in the Yemen since he had fled to Kufa. Moreover these sources do not mention any successor for him representing ᶜAlī in this post. (85)

To conclude, in the armed struggle in the Yemen during the year 40/660-61, neither ᶜAli's nor Muᶜāwiyah's troops had complete success in controlling the Yemen. Thus, the centres of Islamic authority there - i.e. Ṣanᶜāᵓ, al-Janad and Ḥadramawt - experienced a political vacuum which lasted until the office of the Caliphate fell to Muᶜāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān in Rabīᶜ II, 41/August 661. The latter thereupon sent his governors to the Yemen, which came officially under Umayyad sovereignty.

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
(85) al-Ṭabarī, I, 3474 says he occupied the office of governor of the Yemen until Busr's invasion.

Table 4 The governors of the Yemen in the time of the Orthodox Caliphs (11-40/632-61)

In Ṣanᶜā		
Abān b. Saᶜīd b. al-ᶜĀṣ (1)		11-12/632-3
Yaᶜlī b. Umayyah al-Tamīmī		12-35/633-56
ᶜUbayd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās		36-40/656-60
In al-Janad		
Muᶜādh b. Jabal al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī		11/632-3
ᶜAbd Allāh b. Abī Rabīᶜah al-Makhzūmī		12-35/633-56
Saᶜīd b. Saᶜd b. ᶜAbādah al-Khazrajī		36-40/656-60
In Ḥaḍramawt		
Ziyād b. Labīd al-Anṣārī		with the tribe of Ḥaḍramawt
ᶜUkāshah b. Thawr b. Aṣghar al-Ghawthī		amongst al-Sakāsik and al-Sakūn
al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayyah al-Makhzūmī		amongst B.Muᶜāwiyah of Kindah and al-Ṣadif
ᶜIkrimah b. Abī Jahl		successor of above
ᶜUbayd Allah b. Thawr b. Aṣghar al-Ghawthī		
ᶜAdī b. Nawfal al-Qurashī (2)		

(1) Zambaur, Manuel, 113, omits.

(2) He replaced all the Medinan representatives amongst the Ḥaḍrami tribes and became the sole Muslim governor in the region, i.e. Hadramawt, throughout the period of ᶜUmar and ᶜUthmān. For full information of the Muslim governors in the Yemen during the period of the first three Orthodox Caliphs, see Chapter VI, B. For those of ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, see 232 above.


Map 5 BUSR'S ROUTE IN THE YEMEN
AL-RUBᶜ AL-KHĀLĪ
N
HADRAMAWT
Tarīm
Shibām
al-Shiḥr
Areas sympathetic to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib
Areas sympathetic to Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān
Areas sympathetic to both ʿAlī and Muʿāwiyah
The route of Busr's Campaign
0 Kilometres 100
ARABIAN SEA
Jāyshān
Aden
al Janad
Arḥab
Ṣanʿā(-)
HAMDAN
Ṣaʿdah
al-Ahnūmxx
From the Ḥijāz
Najrān
RED SEA

PART THREE

CHAPTER IX

The Yemen during the period of the Umayyad Caliphate

(41-132/661-750)

During the period of the Umayyad Caliphate the Yemen was isolated from the political life of the Islamic State, with the exception thatthe rising of Ibāḍiyyah.(1) As a result, relations between the Umayyads and the Yemen were not close, especially during the first/seventh century. Even during the political disorder which the State witnessed in the course of Ibn al-Zubayr's revolution (64-73/683-692), the Yemen remained uninvolved.(2) So the policy of the Umayyads towards Yemeni affairs was obscure.

Throughout the period of the Umayyad Caliphate, only three political events are mentioned in our sources. The first is the separation of the Yemen from Umayyad authority during the period of Ibn al-Zubayr's uprising. The second and third events are the two internal uprisings which took place against the Umayyads during the second/eighth century.(3)

However, throughout the period of Umayyad rule, the area witnessed two different forms of both political life and caliphal policy concerning the appointment of governors. The first began with the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate in 41/661 and lasted until the death of

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(1) Which arose in 129/746 in Ḥaḍramawt and was led by ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī. Cf. 284 below.

(2) For a detailed discussion of the Yemen during this revolution, see 273-5 below.

(3) Cf. [illegible] 281-92 below.

Yazīd b. Mu^{c}awiyah, the second Umayyad caliph, 64/683. The second form of Yemeni political development began when ^{c}Abd al-Malik b. Marwān, the fifth Umayyad caliph, became sole caliph in 73/692 until the end of Umayyad rule in 132/750.

In order to illustrate politically the Yemen and its relations with the central Islamic authority during the period of the Umayyad caliphate, the following chapter will be divided into two sections: the first deals with the policy of the caliphs in appointing their governors and the political situation in the Yemen during the period of the first three Umayyad caliphs, and Ibn al-Zubayr, 41-73/661-663, and the second covers the rest of the period of Umayyad rule, 73-132/683-750.

A. The Yemen during the caliphate of B. Sufyān and Ibn al-Zubayr

a. The appointment of governors

As has already been mentioned, both Mu^{c}āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān and ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭālib had despatched troops to the Yemen in 40/660-1, in order to take control of the territory. However, neither enjoyed complete success in controlling the area.(4) Unfortunately, our knowledge of the political situation in the Yemen from the time of the murder of ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Ramaḍān 40/January 661, until the renunciation of the caliphate by al-Ḥasan b. ^{c}Alī in Rabī^{c} II 41/August, 661, is extremely slight due to lack of material. However, it is unlikely that the hostilities between the Alids and the Umayyads during that period went unnoticed in the Yemen.(5)

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(4) For a detailed discussion of the despatch of these troops to the area, see Chapter VIII, B. above.

(5) The hostilities between both parties did not stop immediately after the murder of ^{c}Alī and they continued for at least six months during al-Ḥasan's caliphate. For this conflict, see al-Kūfī, IV, 148 ff; al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh. II, 191 f; al-Dīnawarī, 218 ff; al-Ṭabarī, II, 1ff.

The military activities of the Umayyads in the area shortly before this time lead us to believe that Mu^{c}āwiyah exercised military control over the Yemen

Despite the fact that ^{c}Uthmān b. ^{c}Affān al-Thaqafī was designated by Mu^{c}āwiyah as the first governor of the Yemen, when the latter became sole caliph in Rabī^{c} II 41/August 661, there is evidence that another Umayyad governor was in the area at that time, and was responsible to Mu^{c}āwiyah for waging war on his opponents. Both al-Kūfī and al-Rāzī (6) confirm that Busr b. Abī Arṭāh occupied the office of Umayyad governor of the Yemen in the early stages of Mu^{c}āwiyah's reign. But, on the one hand, these two sources do not illustrate the period and the nature of Busr's governorship, and the rest of our sources omit his name from the list of Mu^{c}āwiyah's governors in the Yemen. (7)

It is probable that during the sixteen month political vacuum which the Yemen experienced, Busr b. Abī Arṭāh remained there as leader of the Umayyad troops. He is also likely to have stayed in the area during the early stages of Mu^{c}āwiyah's caliphate, attacking the Alids. (8) If this assumption is correct, Mu^{c}āwiyah would have intended to leave the troops led by Busr in the Yemen. Thus, Busr's presence in the area continued until the first year of Mu^{c}āwiyah's reign, 41/661.

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(6) Futūḥ, III, 91-3; Tārīkh, 170. The former says that Busr attacked those of Hamdān who had supported ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭālib in the course of the civil war, and those Hamdānīs, therefore, went to Mu^{c}āwiyah in Damascus and asked him to stop Busr's invasions.

(7) See table 6 , the governors of the Yemen appointed by Mu^{c}āwiyah.

(8) Cf. al-Kūfī, III,91-3. Al-Zuhrī in Ibn ^{c}Asākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222, tells us that Busr attacked the Alids after the murder of ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.

But the former's task was a purely military one, for it can be assumed that the Yemen might have witnessed political unrest in the form of Alid objection to Muʿāwiyah on the eve of his Caliphate. As a result of the ʿAlid uprisings against the Umayyad rule, Busr appeared in the area and attacked the ʿAlids, especially those of Hamdān. (9) It is this role of Busr that may have led al-Rāzī (10) to consider him as Muʿāwiyah's official governor in the Yemen for one year.

In Rabīʿ II, 41/August, 661, when the office of the caliphate fell to Muʿāwiyah, the latter appointed ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān al-Thaqafī over the Yemen. Accordingly, ʿUthmān became the first official governor of the Umayyads in the area.(11) Our sources differ on the question of the successor of ʿUthmān in this post. Some Yemeni historians mention that ʿUtbah b. Abī Sufyān, the brother of Muʿāwiyah, replaced ʿUthmān in this office.(12) But, ʿUtbah's name does not appear in the list of governors of the Yemen in the non-local sources at our disposal, though some of them do confirm his governorship over al-Ṭāʾif.(13) It may be assumed that ʿUtbah was holding the office of the governor of the Yemen and al-Ṭāʾif during the early period of Muʿāwiyah's reign. It is possible,

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(9) Al-Kūfī, III, 91-3; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tahdhīb, III, 222.

(10) Tārīkh, 170.

(11) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; ʿAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 91; Abu Makhramah, II, 130; Idrīs, Kanz, f 173a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16.

(12) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; ʿAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 91; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 17; Idrīs, f 173a.

(13) Cf. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, Istīʿāb, III, 1025f; al-Fāsī, ʿiqd, VI, 10.

therefore, that ᶜUtbah had resided in al-Ṭāʾif and designated a representative in the Yemen. His governorship lasted until the death of ᶜAmr b. al-ᶜĀṣ, the governor of Egypt, in 42/662, where ᶜUtbah succeeded him in this post.(14)

By the replacement of ᶜUtbah in the Yemeni post and as a result of the occupation by three of the Abnāʾ, the Persian community there, in the governorship of both Sanᶜāʾ and al-Janad during the rest of Muᶜāwiyah's Caliphate, they regained power in the Yemen. The first of these Abnāʾ is Fayrūz al-Daylamī who replaced ᶜUtbah as a governor of the Yemen.(15) However, this governorship was limited to Ṣanᶜāʾ and al-Janad.(16) Both Idrīs and al-Khazrajī(17) say that Fayrūz occupied this post for eight years, while an anonymous writer (18) records that in fact he continued until his death in 53/673. Some historians mention that al-Nuᶜmān b. Bashīr al-Anṣārī replaced Fayrūz in this office, and, when the former was dismissed, Bashīr b. Saᶜd al-Aᶜraj held the post.(19)

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(14) Cf. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, Istīᶜab, III, 1025f; al-Fāsī, ᶜiqd, VI, 10.

(15) Idrīs, f 173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; ᶜAsjad; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 91; Abū Makhramah, II, 130.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Kanz, f 173a; Kifāyah, 64; ᶜAsjad, 21.

(18) Anon. Tārīkh, f 26a See also Kay, Yaman, text 104, trans 140. Ibn Saᶜd, Ṭabaqāt, V, 534; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Barr, III, 1265, both say that Fayrūz died during ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān's Caliphate. Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, V 214, mentioned that Fayrūz died during the Caliphate of ᶜUthmān or Muᶜāwiyah However, we cannot accept that Fayrūz died during ᶜUthmān's reign for two reasons; the first is that Fayrūz was still alive in 40/660-1, when he himself rejected the appeal of ᶜUbayd Allāh b. ᶜAbbās, ᶜAli's governor in Ṣanᶜāʾ at that time, after the latter had asked the Ṣanᶜānis for help against Umayyad troups, see 254 above the second of these reasons is that Fayrūz also made a journey to Syria to meet Muᶜāwiyah during the latter's reign, cf. 267 below.

(19) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 64; ᶜAsjad. 21; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I 91-3; Abū Makhrama, II, 131.

There seems to be some confusion in our sources concerning the governors of the Yemeni provinces. According to al-Balādhurī,(20) al-Nuᶜmān b. Bashīr al-Anṣārī held the office of Ḥaḍramawt and resided there. Since Bashīr b. Saᶜd replaced al-Nuᶜmān in this post, it is possible, therefore, that both of them occupied, one after the other, the governorship of Ḥaḍramawt, whilst Ṣanᶜā' and al-Janad were governed by the Abnā'.

In fact relations between the Abnā' and Muᶜāwiyah were cordial. This was reflected in Muᶜāwiyah's policy of appointing governors to the Yemen. The nature of the relationship can also be seen through descriptions of journeys made by the Abnā' leaders to Muᶜāwiyah in order to gain the governorship of the Yemen.(21) Thus, the Abnā' monopolised the offices of Ṣanᶜā' and al-Janad during Muᶜāwiyah's caliphate. It is most likely that Saᶜīd b. Dādhawayh succeeded Fayrūz al-Daylamī in the governorships of Ṣanᶜā' and al-Janad in 53/673, occupying the posts for seven months. After Saᶜīd's death, al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī occupied the post until the death of Muᶜāwiyah in 60/680.(22) In fact the advantages accruing to the Abnā' were a result of their negative attitude towards ᶜAlī's governor in Ṣanᶜā' in the course of the invasion

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(20) Ansāb, IV, 161.

(21) According to Anon, Tārīkh, f 26a, Fayruz al-Daylamī went to Muᶜāwiyah who warmly received him and appointed him governor of the Yemen. Al-Kashwarī tells us that al-Nuᶜmān b. Buzurj, one of the Abnā' leaders in the Yemen, went to Muᶜāwiyah and asked him to appoint al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayruz al-Daylamī over the Yemen; see Ibn Ḥajar, Iṣābah, III, 1206.

(22) Cf. Anon, f 26a-b; Idrīs, f 173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 65; ᶜAsjad, 21; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 93; Abū Makhramah, II, 131.

of Umayyad forces to the town in 40/660-1, and also of their positive endorsement of the latter.(23)

During the caliphate of Yazīd b.Muᶜāwiyah, 60-4/680-4 Baḥīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī replaced the Abnāᵓ in the governorships of Ṣanᶜāᵓ and al-Janad.(24) Our sources do not mention anyone other than Baḥīr as having governed the territory during Yazīd's reign. Although our sources confine the governorship of Baḥīr to Ṣanᶜāᵓ and al-Janad, they do not mention the presence of any Muslim officials in Ḥaḍramawt.

In actual fact, Yazīd's policy concerning the appointment of governors to the Yemen was quite different from that of his father, Muᶜāwiyah. Even those who came to power after him did not practice such a policy in this territory. All that Yazīd did was simply to appoint Baḥīr over Ṣanᶜāᵓ and al-Janad on the condition that the latter provided a certain amount of money and slaves each year for the caliphate.(25)

Unfortunately, neither the specific amount to be paid, nor Yazīd's aims behind this policy have been illustrated in our sources. What can be assumed, however, is that it was Yazīd's friendship with Baḥīr that led him to offer the latter such advantages. There are three reasons for this assumption : firstly, Baḥīr occupied the governorship of the

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(23) Cf.254 above.

(24) Idrīs, f 173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 65; ᶜAsjad, 21; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 16; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 94-7. In al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 92b; al-Aḥdal, Tuḥfat, f 36b, he was appointed over the whole of the Yemen.

(25) Ibid. Idrīs, and al-Khazrajī (in both of his books) Kifayah and al-ᶜAsjad state that Baḥīr had to send ninety slaves to Yazīd every year.

Yemen as sole Umayyad representative throughout Yazīd's reign;[26] secondly Baḥīr apparently emerged as an independent ruler, since various poets are mentioned as having travelled to him seeking money;[27] and finally, Yazīd decided to visit the Yemen - rather than other more important territories in the last year of his caliphate.[28]

Following the death of Yazīd b. Muᶜāwiyah in 64/683, ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr proclaimed himself caliph. At the height of his power, he controlled the Ḥijāz and Iraq.[29] As for the Yemen, Ibn al-Zubayr's authority was clearly manifest in Ṣanᶜā'. Here, nine governors were appointed in succession by Ibn al-Zubayr throughout his caliphate 64-73/683-92.[30] In al-Janad, the governorship fell to Baḥīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī on behalf of Ibn al-Zubayr himself,[31] though the former had been one of the most prominent Yemeni followers of the Umayyads.[32] The historians mention neither the period of this governorship, nor do they discuss it in detail. But, when the Khārijīs entered the Yemen in 68/687-8, Baḥīr was governor of al-Janad.[33] The sources at our disposal remain unanimously silent about the governorship of Ḥadramawt during the

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(26) Cf. Table 6.

(27) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; al-ᶜAsjad, 21.

(28) Ansāb, IV, 287.

(29) Cf Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, 13f; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 2; al-Fāsī, ᶜIqd, V, 145, See also Dixon, 121.

(30) See Table 6. The governors of the Yemen during Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate.

(31) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 353; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 53.

(32) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 109.

(33) Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 53.

period of the Civil War. The absence of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority in this territory can also be seen in the course of the Khārijī invasion in 68/687-8.(34)

In fact we have no clear picture of the policy of Ibn al-Zubayr concerning the governorship of Ṣanʿā', due again to lack of material. But the short duration of the governorships appointed by him in Ṣanʿā' has led one recent writer to comment upon this policy. In his book Tārīkh al-Yaman, Ḥasan Sulaymān (35) writes : "The reason for the short period of each Yemeni governor in office is related to the fact that the country was not fully controlled by Ibn al-Zubayr. Added to that is the ambitions of his followers, those of high status aiming to obtain more power and Ibn al-Zubayr being interested in having their consent, besides his fears that one of his governors, if he maintained more power by his being long in office might think of achieving independent rule over the Yemen". Although this assumption is not supported by clear historical evidence, it may be accepted. Thus it seems that Ṣanʿā' was the only Yemeni town under the sway of Ibn al-Zubayr, with al-Janad and Ḥaḍramawt remaining completely untouched by his political activity.

b. The political situation

Following the Alid-Umayyad conflict in the Yemen during the last year of the first Civil War, 40/660-1, the area seemingly enjoyed a political lull, which was to last until the early part of the second/eighth century. But,

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(34) Cf. 274-5 below.

(35) 95.

both external and local sources give little information concerning the political situation in the Yemen and its relations with the Islamic government during the caliphates of B. Sufyān and Ibn al-Zubayr, 41-73/661-92. Thus it may be assumed that the area was completely isolated from the political life of the Islamic state throughout this period, and specially during the reign of B. Sufyān (41-64/661-84).

The political history of the Yemen during the caliphate of Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān (41-60/661-68) is obscure, with little light thrown on it by our sources. Consequently, our knowledge of the Yemen and its relations with the caliphate during this period is slight.

In Ṣanʿāʾ and al-Janad, Muʿāwiyah consolidated his authority through the leaders of the Abnāʾ, who had successively occupied the governorships of these two towns during his reign. (36) Thus, he was able to maintain political domination there, although the political life of these areas remains vague.

As for the other Yemeni provinces, neither the state of their relations with the caliphate, nor their political situation is clearly illustrated in our sources. There exist no indications as to whether the Umayyads had military forces in the area during the caliphate of Muʿāwiyah; indeed the sources confirm an absence of Umayyad authority in some of these provinces. In the area of Maʾrib, for example, despite the expulsion of Khawlān by other local tribes there, the

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(36) These officials are Fayrūz al-Daylamī, Saʿīd b. Dādhawayh and al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī, see 267 above and Table 6.

Umayyad authorities in the Yemen were unable to take any action to put an end to such inter-tribal feuds.(37) In Ḥaḍramawt the isolation of the area from the Islamic state and the weakness of Umayyad authority vis-à-vis the local tribes became apparent and was expressed in verse by al-Nuʿmān b. Bashīr al-Anṣārī, the governor of Muʿāwiyah in Ḥaḍramawt, as follows:

أبا خالـــدٍ لا تتركَنّي ببلـدةِ القـرودِ ونيـــرانُ الحـــوادثِ تلمَـــعُ
أبـوكَ خليلـــي واصْطفيتُـــكَ بعـــدهُ علـــى الناسِ ما كانـــوا معًا وتصدَّعوا

Abā Khālid [Yazīd], do not leave me in the land of the monkeys, at the time when the fires of events are blazing.
Your father is my friend and I choose you as a friend after him of all people, whether they are united or divided. (38)

The height of the Yemen's political isolation came during the caliphate of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiyah, 60-4/680-4. Abū Mikhnaf(39) illustrates this isolation in his narration of ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās's advice to al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, when the latter had decided to reject openly the caliphate of Yazīd saying, "If you decide definitely to revolt [against Yazīd], go to the Yemen where there are forts and mountain paths, where the land is extensive, where you will have supporters and be isolated from the people."

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(37) For this event, see Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab Maʿadd wa-ʾl-Yaman al-Kabīr, f 34a; al-Ḥimyarī, Shams al-ʿUlūm, 9f.

(38) Al-Nuʿmān sent this verse to Yazīd b. Muʿāwiyah seeking his mediation with his father in order to change his post and move to another area; see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 161.

(39) Cf. al-Ṭabarī, II, 275; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 109; ; al-Dīnawarī, 244; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, V, 129; al-Kūfī, Futūḥ, V, 113; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 276.

Despite a Alid presence there, the Yemen had not experienced political disorder as a consequence of the murder of al-Ḥusayn b. ᶜAlī in Muḥarram 61/October, 680.(40) Thus, this state of political isolation can be seen to have extended to the time of Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate 64-73/684-92, to all regions of the Yemen, except Ṣanᶜā', cut off from the caliph's administration in Mecca.(41)

Yet it has been mentioned (42) that the Yemen fell into the sphere of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority following his inauguration as caliph in 64/684, with some historians (43) claiming that the majority of the Yemenis pledged the customary oath of allegiance to him. This indication also confirms the fact that some Yemenis were opposed to Ibn al-Zubayr. But the sources identify neither the supporters nor the opponents of Ibn al-Zubayr in the Yemen, except for Baḥīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī, who played a major role in encouraging the Yemenis to grant their allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr, when the latter proclaimed himself caliph.(44) With regard

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(40) The consequence of this event was felt throughout the Islamic provinces where political disorder arose in many, even those in the neighbourhood of the Yemen such as the Ḥijāz. The Yemeni regions, however, did not undergo such political disruptions. For these events, see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 304 ff; Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, al-Fakhrī, 115-7; al-Kūfī, V, 252 ff; Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, II, 6; al-Ṭabarī, II, 395 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, III, 305 ff. Cf. also Jafrī, The Origins and Early Development of Shiᶜa Islam, 222 ff.

(41) Cf 274-5 below.

(42) Cf. al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayn ʾl-Firaq, 31; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; ᶜAsjad, 21; in al-Dinawarī, 260, the people of the Ḥijāz and Tihāmah gave their oath of allegiance to him.

(43) Cf. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16; Idrīs, Kanz, f 173a.

(44) Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, IV, 353; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 53.

to the succession of governors he appointed to Ṣan'ā', it may be said that Ibn al-Zubayr wielded authority over this town, even though he had no military force there. Yet, although the extent of his influence in other Yemeni provinces is not clear, it is fair to say that his hold over the area as a whole was not a particularly strong one. In fact Ibn al-Zubayr's actual lack of authority there became clear in 68/688, when the Khārijīs were able to invade the country, directing their attack in particular on Ṣan'ā' and Ḥaḍramawt and levying alms (ṣadaqah) from the Yemenis. (45) Some historians do not identify the Khārijī group which invaded the Yemen, simply referring to them as the Ḥarūriyyah. (46) In fact, these Khārijīs who overran the Yemeni provinces were the Najdāt, a group of Khārijīs led by Najdah b. 'Āmir al-Ḥanafī, and which was concentrated in al-Yamāmah at that time. (47)

There is no evidence in our sources to confirm any control by the Najdāt over the Yemen. True enough, the area did witness some kind of political disruption in the years following the invasion, (48) but again the sources to hand

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(45) Dixon, 171. See also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, XI, 136f; Ibn Khaldūn, al-'Ibar, III, 314; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, IV, 353.

(46) Especially the Yemeni historians, see Ibn Samurrah, Ṭabaqāt, 53; Anon, Tārīkh, f 26a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 67f; 'Asjad, 22; Idris, f 173; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 13a; Ghāyat, I 107; Abū Makhramah, II, 100.

(47) Cf. al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayn'l-Firaq, 66 ff; al-Mubarrad, Kamil, II, 209 f; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa 'l-Niḥal, I, 187 ff; al-Ḥimyarī, al-Ḥūr al-'īn, 170; Ibn al-Athir, Lubāb, II, 215.

(48) Al-Khazraji, Kifayah, 68; Asjad, 22; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 13a; Ghāyat, I, 107 (where in the latter the name of Najdah b. 'Āmir erroneously appears "Ḥaddah, Ibn 'Āmir," where Ḥaddah is taken as a place name); Abū Makhramah, II, 100.

mention neither the scope of the disorder nor the specific regions affected. Thus, it can be assumed that the Najdāt had invaded the Yemen for the purpose of collecting money rather than to exercise political domination over the area. Therefore, upon entering Ṣanᶜā they had to resort to force in order to make the people pay some hundred thousand dinars.(49) Also Abū Fudayk, one of their leaders, was sent to Ḥadramawt for the same purpose.(50)

Together the weakness of Ibn al-Zubayr's authority in the Yemen and the sudden invasions by the Najdāt might have brought about the political vacuum in the area during the last five years of Ibn al-Zubayr's reign. Naturally, had Ibn al-Zubayr ruled with a stronger hand over the Yemen, the Najdāt would not have been able to enter the country and extort such large amounts of money from the populace.

The thirty-three year period beginning with the caliphate of Muᶜāwiyah in Rabīᶜ II, 41/August 661, and ending with the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr in Jumādā II, 73/September 692, represents one of the most obscure periods of Yemeni history. Relations between the Yemen and the central Islamic authority during this period were virtually non-existent.

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(49) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 68; ᶜAsjad, 22; Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat, I, 107.

(50) Cf. 274 above.

B. The Yemen during the caliphate of B.Marwān (73-132/692-750)

From the time of the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr in Jumādā II, 73/September, 692, until the end of Umayyad rule in Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah, 132/July 750, ten caliphs - all of them from the B. Marwān branch of the Umayyads - enjoyed successive occupation of the caliphate. During their rule the area witnessed the second great spate of conquests, which led to the domination by the Islamic state over a number of freshly captured provinces. (51) As usual, these caliphs, in turn, paid more attention to the newly acquired regions than their existing domains, especially the Yemen, which appears to have played an extremely unimportant role in caliphal policy at that time. (52)

a. The appointment of governors

When ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān became sole caliph after the murder of Ibn al-Zubayr, he appointed al-Ḥajjāj b.Yūsuf al-Thaqafī over the Ḥijāz, al-Yamāmah and the Yemen.(53) Al-Ḥajjāj himself resided in the Ḥijāz and sent representatives to the other two regions. To the Yemen he sent three of his relatives from the Āl Abī ʿAqīl of Thaqīf.(54) Since that time, this family has been known throughout Yemeni history as governors of the B. Marwān there. Throughout

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(51) The high-water mark of these conquests came during the caliphate of al-Walid b. ʿAbd al-Malik, the third Marwānī caliph. Therefore, some historians regard this movement as the second great wave of conquests. For the references to these conquests, see Chapter IV, note 7 above.

(52) Cf. 280-1 below.

(53) Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, V, 266; al-Ṭabarī, II, 854; Ibn Khaldūn, ʿIbar, III, 293; Idrīs, Kanz, f173b.

(54) These were Muhammad b.Yūsuf over Ṣanʿā, Wāqid b.Maslamah over al-Janad and al-Hakam b.Ayyūb over Hadramawt, cf. Table 6 .For the nasab of Āl Abī ʿAqīl, see Ibn Durayd, Ishtiqāq, 186; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 267 f.

almost all of the period of B. Marwān's authority in the Yemen (Jumādā II, 73-Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah 132/September 692 - July 750) members of this family were successively designated to the post in the area.(55)

It appears that during al-Ḥajjāj's governorship of the eastern part of the state, the replacement of governors of the Yemen was a prerogative enjoyed by al-Ḥajjāj himself, having been fully authorised to do so by the caliph.(56) Thus he dismissed the governor of al-Janad and handed the region over to his brother, who was already occupying the office of Ṣanᶜaʾ.(57) After the latter's death in 91/709-10, al-Ḥajjāj gave the post to his cousin, Ayyūb b. Yaḥyā al-Thaqafī.(58)

In fact B. Marwān's policy concerning the appointment of governors to the Yemen was interconnected with the nature of their relations with the governors of the eastern part of the state. For example, when Sulaymān b. ᶜAbd al-Malik, the seventh Umayyad caliph, became angry with al-Ḥajjāj's

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(55) Cf. Table 6.

(56) Al-Ḥajjāj clearly appears in our sources to control these posts for twenty years (75-95/694-714); see al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 18 ff; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 271 ff; al-Kūfī, VII 1ff; al-Ṭabarī, II, 863 ff; al-Dīnawarī, 274 ff; Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah, II, 22 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, III, 323 ff.

(57) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 69; ᶜAsjad, 22.

(58) Al-Khazrajī Kifāyah, 69. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 311, says that the caliph, al-Walīd b. ᶜAbd al-Malik, himself appointed Ayyūb in this post.

representatives in that part of the empire, he dismissed them all, including the governor of the Yemen.(59) Since ᶜUmar b. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz, the eighth Umayyad caliph, opposed his predecessor's policy of harsh treatment towards his subjects, he refrained from appointing the likes of the Āl Abī ᶜAqīl over the Yemen. (60) However, this did not herald the end of their governorship in this territory; what it signified was that the policy of the state at that time was to flush out al-Ḥajjāj's followers from the high positions they occupied throughout the Islamic provinces. However, the removal of Āl Abī ᶜAqīl from the office of governor of the Yemen was temporary, with Yūsuf b. ᶜUmar, one of this family, being designated by Hishām b. ᶜAbd al-Malik, the tenth Umayyad Caliph, to govern the three Yemeni provinces.(61) When Yūsuf was transferred to Iraq in 120/738, his son, al-Ṣalt, occupied his post for the rest of Hishām b. ᶜAbd al-Malik's caliphate.(62) Two other Thaqafis, from Āl Abī ᶜAqīl, were appointed over the Yemen by the Umayyads, Marwān b. Muhammad b. Yūsuf and al-Qāsim b. ᶜUmar. (63) The latter was the last of Āl Abī ᶜAqīl to occupy the office of the governor of the Yemen, his governorship lasting until his

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(59) For the governor of the Yemen, see Table 6 . For the other provinces, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 318; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 38ff; al-Ṭabarī, II, 1281 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 138 ff.

(60) Cf. Table 6.

(61) Idrīs, Kanz, f 173b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 17; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 70; ᶜAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, 107, all of them say over all the Yemeni provinces . See also Ibn Khayyāṭ, 357; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 63.

(62) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 357; Idrīs, f173b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 17; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 71; ᶜAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, 108.

(63) Cf Table 6.

deafeat by the Ibāḍiyyah in 129/764-5.(64)

Given that the main distinguishing mark of this family was its harsh treatment towards its subjects, one may assume that unjust methods were employed by these Thaqafīs who held the post of governor of the Yemen. In fact, such treatment was only usually resorted to in order to suppress revolt. However, given the weakness of the local forces and the general negligence of the area by the caliphate, the Thaqafis found themselves with a free hand to be as oppressive as they wished. (65)

b. The political situation

By the end of Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate in Jumādā II, 73/September 692, ᶜAbd al-Malik b. Marwān had been able to dominate all the Islamic provinces, including the Yemen. Much is known about the Umayyad occupation of all of Ibn al-Zubayr's territories, except for the Yemen;(66) however; the absence of a force loyal to Ibn al-Zubayr in the Yemen must surely account for the easy take-over of the area by the Umayyads. Their entry was accomplished without an armed struggle. Subsequently, Sanᶜā' was taken without any great difficulty and Ibn al-Zubayr's governor there arrested. (67)

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(64) See 288 below.

(65) Cf. 280-1 below.

(66) In fact the Umayyad occupation of Iraq, the Hijāz, Syria and Khurāsān is illustrated in our sources, while their struggle with Ibn al-Zubayr's supporters in the Yemen is not mentioned in these sources, for the Umayyad occupation of these regions, Cf, al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 14 ff; al-Kūfī IV, 260ff; al-Ṭabarī, II, 783ff; Ibn Qutaybah, Imāmah II, 19-22; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 9ff. See also Dixon, 121ff.

(67) Ibn Samurah, 57f. The governor was Hanash b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Sanᶜānī. Cf. Table 6.

i. A political lull

There is no indication in our sources as to whether or not there occurred an uprising against B. Marwān in the Yemen during the first/seventh century. However, there is evidence to confirm that the Yemeni populace suffered considerably from the harsh treatment of the governors from the Āl Abī ᶜAqīl of Thaqīf. Al-Balādhurī (68) mentions "When Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī occupied the office of the governor of the Yemen from 73-91 /692-708 , he oppressed the subjects by confiscating their lands." He also forced the Yemenis to pay land tax (kharāj), despite the fact that the Yemen was regarded as ᶜushr land. (69) The Yemeni historians also record that he intended to kill all the lepers in the Yemen. (70)

Despite such injustices, the area did not witness any objections to Āl Abī ᶜAqīl's governorship. This situation lasted until the office of caliph fell to ᶜUmar b. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz in 99/717-8, who immediately ordered his governor in the Yemen to abolish the kharāj, regarding the area as ᶜushr land.(71) He also wrote to his governor there warning him of the harsh treatment previously suffered by the Yemenis and

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(68) Futūḥ, 84.

(69) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 84. For a detailed discussion of Kharāj and ᶜUshr, see Yaḥyā b. Ādam, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 22 ff; Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, English translation, Ben Shemesh, 78-83; Abū ᶜUbayd, Amwāl, 203-6; SEI, 'Kharāj'. 'ᶜUshr'.

(70) This indication is only mentioned in the Yemeni sources, i.e. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 69; ᶜAsjad, 22; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd. 17; Idrīs, f 173b.

(71) Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 84.

demanding that he return the confiscated lands to their rightful owners.(72) Unfortunately, these communications between ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and his governor in the Yemen are not clear in our sources, having only been mentioned in passing. Their immediate consequences are also vague, as is, indeed, this whole period of Yemeni history. This leads us to believe that the country was in a state of political isolation, although the caliphate paid attention to it from time to time. The obscure nature of Yemeni history lasted until the year 107/725, 26, when the first Yemeni uprising against the Islamic government since the accession of Muʿawiyah (41/661) occurred.

In fact in the last twenty-five years of Umayyad rule (107-132/725-750), the Yemen underwent a political change. During this period two revolutions, both of them led by Yemenis occurred in the area.

ii. The uprising of ʿAbbād al- Ruʿaynī

The first uprising was that of ʿAbbād al-Ruʿaynī, who headed some three hundred Yemenis in a revolt against Umayyad authority in 107/725-6.(73) Unfortunately, the source material at our disposal throws little light on this event, clarifying neither the scene of the revolt, nor its duration. What is disputed in the sources, however, is the lineage (nasab) and the sect of ʿAbbād al-Ruʿaynī. Al-Ṭabarī, al-Hamdānī and Ibn Kathīr (74) claim that he was a

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(72) Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Sīrat, 65, 126; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III,49; Ibn al-Jawzī, Sīrat, 97. Cf also Ṣafwat, Jamharat, II, 333.

(73) Al-Ṭabarī, II, 1487; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX, 244; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 70; ʿAsjad, 23; Idrīs, f 173b; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāʾ, f15a-b; Ghāyat, I, 119; al-Shamāhī, 85 says that the revolt took place in 110/728-9; and Ṣāliḥ, 109, claims that it was in 109/727-8.

(74) Al-Ṭabarī, II, 1487; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 386; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX, 244.

Khārijī. Al-Hamdānī[75] adds that ᶜAbbād was one of the Juḥāfiyyīn who have no kinship with any of the Yemeni tribes. Ibn al-Ḥusayn [76] records that ᶜAbbād proclaimed himself al-Manṣūr, who according to the old narratives,, was supposed to appear under the title "al-Ruᶜaynī" at the end of time, (ākhir al-zamān).

Comments concerning ᶜAbbād and his uprising also appear in more recent works. Al- Shamāḥī,[77] for example, regards ᶜAbbad as one of the Ḥimyarī chiefs (qayl) and states that his revolution extended to several other provinces. Another modern point of view is put forward by Ṣālih, [78] who comments upon ᶜAbbād's supposedly Khārijī origins, saying, "we can say that ᶜAbbād was not a Khārijī and had no relations with any of their known groups".

It is difficult to judge ᶜAbbād and his revolution due to lack of information. However, several reasons indicate that ᶜAbbād was in fact most probably an Ibāḍī. The first reason is the assertion by our primary sources that he was a Khārijī.[79] Secondly, the Ibāḍiyyah had existed in the Yemen long before the revolution of ᶜAbbad ' 107/725-6. [80] The third reason is the activities of the

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(75) Iklīl, II, 386.

(76) Anbāʾ, f 15a.b.; Ghāyat, I,119.

(77) Al-Yaman,85.

(78) Tārīkh al-Yaman al-Islāmī,109.

(79) Such as al-Ṭabarī,II,1487; al-Hamdānī,Iklīl,II,386; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX,244.These historians do not distinguish between Khariji and Ibāḍī.

(80) Al-Baghdādī,al-Farq bayn ʾl-Firaq,61, tells us "When the Khārijīs were defeated at al-Nahrawān in 38 [659]two of them fled to the Yemen and established the Ibāḍiyyah in the area. "Ibn Hawqal, 37, says that ᶜAbd Allāh b.Ibāḍ and ᶜAbd Allāh b.Wahb, the former of whom was the founder of Ibādiyyah, died in al-Mudhaykhirah, a Yemeni province. See also E.I.² "Ibāḍiyya".

Ibāḍiyyah against the Umayyad caliphate in many places within the state at that time. (81)

It is unlikely that ᶜAbbād was one of the Ḥimyarī chiefs, for apart from the fact that he enjoyed no kinship with any Yemeni tribe, the uprising put paid to his social position. Naturally, if he had been a Ḥimyarī chief, he would have had the support of thousands of Yemenis. In addition, the forts and mountain paths (82) in the area could have protected him from the Umayyad forces for at least several years.(83) However, according to historical fact, ᶜAbbād was not a distinguished person and his uprising was not a strong one. Therefore, he was supported by no more than three hundred men and his movement was easily suppressed by Yūsuf b. ᶜUmar, the Umayyad governor of the Yemen at that time.(84)

In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that the uprising of ᶜAbbād al-Ruᶜaynī was quite simple one of the more unimportant revolts against the Umayyad caliphate; it consisted of various local Khārijīs who aimed to put an end to Umayyad rule. Its prestigious place in Yemeni history is due merely to the fact that it was the very first revolt of its kind to be directed against the authority of the caliphate in the Yemen.

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(81) After the death of ᶜUmar b. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz (101/720) Abū ᶜUbaydah, the leader of Ibāḍiyyah in Basra at that time, planned revolts in different provinces, in order to build upon the ruins of the Umayyad caliphate a universal imamate of the Ibāḍiyyah. Cf. E.I.² "Ibāḍiyya" S.E.I. "Ibāḍiyya".

(82) The province, (mikhlāf) Ruᶜayn distinguished by geographical complexity which could protect him. For the location of this province, see Map 2.

(83) E.G. al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Ṣamad who revolted against the ᶜAbbāsid for seven years, retreating to Jibāl Maswar; see 317-20 below.

(84) Cf al-Ṭabarī, II, 1487; Ibn Kathīr, Bidāyah, IX, 244; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 70; ᶜAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā', f 15a.b.; Ghāyat, I, 119. See also al-Shamāḥī, 85; Ṣāliḥ, 109.

iii. The revolt of the Ibāḍiyyah

The most serious of the Yemeni insurrections against Umayyad authority occurred during the reign of the dynasty's last caliph, Marwān b. Muḥammad (125-132/743-750). The Ibāḍiyyah, based in Ḥaḍramawt, staged a revolt which, within a year, enable them to extend their authority over the Yemeni provinces and the Ḥijāz and enjoy supremacy there for more than a year.

It is not within the scope of this work to study the origins, doctrine or history of the Ibāḍiyyah;(85) our sole concern is with the political implications of the revolt and subsequent events. The significance of the uprising lies in the suddenness with which it appeared,and the fact that it did so in an area hitherto politically isolated from other Islamic territories.

In 129/745-6, the Ibāḍiyyah of both Basra and Ḥaḍramawt swore an oath of allegiance (bay^{c}ah) to ^{c}Abd Allāh b.Yaḥyā al-Kindī, otherwise known as Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq.(86) From Ḥaḍramawt, the latter proclaimed himself caliph, thus rejecting Umayyad rule.

The name of ^{c}Abd Allāh b.Yahyā appears for the first time in 128/745-6, thus allowing us no insight into his political activities. Al-Iṣfahānī (87) reports that he was a

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(85) For a detailed discussion of the Ibāḍiyyah, Cf. al-Shahrastānī, Milal,I,212-4; al-Baghdādī, Farq,82-9 E.I.^{2} 'Ibāḍiyya"; ENNAMI, 'Studies in Ibāḍism',passim.

(86) He was from the most powerful tribe in Ḥaḍramawt, namely B. al-Ḥārith al-Wallādah of Kindah. For his nasab, see Table **5**

(87) Aghānī, XXVII, 9393. Repeated by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj, V, 105.

a diligent (mujtahid) and a pious (ᶜābid). He also appears as a Qāḍī of Ḥaḍramawt on behalf of its governor, Ibrāhīm b.Jabalah al-Kindī.(88)

The revolt cannot be convincingly connected with any political event in the Yemen for the following reasons; the political history of Ḥaḍramawt before the uprising is obscure; and the nature of relations between the Ibāḍiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt and those in Basra unclear.

The historians agree that the Ibāḍiyyah of Basra played a major role in effectuating the success of the revolt, yet differ concerning the initial connection with ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā. Mūsā b. Kathīr in al-Ṭabarī(89) mentions that at the end of 128/746, during the pilgrimage season, Abū Ḥamzah, al-Mukhtār b. ᶜAwf al-Azdī, an Ibāḍī leader in Basra, met with ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā in Mecca and persuaded him to rise up against the Umayyad caliphate. Al-Iṣfahānī(90) confirms that it was ᶜAbd Allān b. Yaḥyā himself who opened communications with the Ibāḍiyyah of Basra, consulting them about the uprising due to his disaffection from Umayyad rule in the Yemen, where the latter wrote to him urging him to revolt.

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(88) Al-Ḥārithī, ᶜUqud,187. Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah al-Kindī was designated by al-Qāsim b. ᶜUmar al-Thaqafī, the Umayyad governor in the Yemen during the caliphate of Marwān b. Muhammad, to be his representative in Ḥadramawt. See Table 6.

(89) II, 942 f. See also Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 297; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar,III, 356 f; al-Ḥārithī, ᶜUqūd,189.

(90) Aghānī, XXVII,9393f. Repeated in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj, V, 105-7 ; al-Ḥārithī, ᶜUqud, 188. However, they give no specific date for these communications.

Incidentally, the uprising could not have come at a worse time for the caliph Marwān b. Muḥammad, who was already threatened on several fronts.(91) The opportunity was indeed ripe for those who desired to revolt against Umayyad rule, especially the Yemenis, who had lived under the yoke of harsh governors for more than half a century.(92)

ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's followers consisted of men mainly from Basra and Ḥaḍramawt. Ibn Khayyāṭ (93) records that Basrans formed the bulk of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's supporters. Undoubtedly there were some Ḥaḍramīs involved in the early insurrections, since records show that ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā was totally dependent upon them on the eve of his revolution. Addressing Abū Ḥamzah in Mecca, he proclaimed his Ḥaḍramī support by saying "You there, I have heard the fine speech from you; I see you calling to what is right, come with me [to Ḥaḍramawt], where I enjoy the obedience of my people."(94) As a result of Basran and Ḥaḍramī support for ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā, high posts in the armies and administration of the revolution were occupied by members of these groups.(95)

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(91) For the political situation in the Islamic provinces during this time, see al-Ṭabarī, II, 1890ff; al-Dīnawarī, 334 ff; Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imāmah, II, 94 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 282ff, al-Kūfī VIII, 142 ff; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tarīkh, III, 76-85.

(92) During the governorship of Āl Abī ᶜAqīl (Thaqīf), 73-129/ 692-746-7 save a short period where others occupied this office, Cf. Table 6.

(93) Tārīkh, 384.

(94) Al-Ṭabarī, II, 1942f; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9398; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, III, 357; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 297.

(95) Those of Basra are Abū Ḥamzah and Balj b. ᶜUqbah, as for the Ḥaḍramīs these are ᶜAbd Allāh b. Saᶜid al-Ḥaḍramī and Abrahah b. Shuraḥbīl b. al-Ṣabbāḥ al-Sadī fī of Himyar. See Ibn Khayyaṭ, 385, 391 f; al- Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9394, 96-8; al-Ḥārithī, 189ff. For nasab of Abrahah, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, 21f.

Our sourcesestimate the number of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's troops at the time of his revolt at some two thousand.(96) However, a year after his occupation of Ṣanᶜā', the number increased by some thirty thousand.(97) Such a rapid build up leads us to believe that many Yemenis had joined ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's army, and that even the inhabitants of the centres of Umayyad administration in the Yemen were enthusiastic to take up arms against the caliphate. Al-Iṣfahānī,(98) tells us "Before moving from Ḥaḍramawt, ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā wrote to his followers in Ṣanᶜā' informing them of his coming." He also mentions(99) that when ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā occupied Ṣanᶜā', many Khārijīs from outside joined him.

Unfortunately, the source material does not indicate in which Ḥaḍramī town ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā announced his revolt. What is known, however, is that his first course of action was to proceed to the area's seat of governorship (dār al-imārah), where he arrested the Umayyad governor, Ibrāhim b. Jabalah al-Kindī.(100) In his place he appointed one of his own followers, ᶜAbd Allāh b. Saᶜīd al-Ḥaḍrami over Ḥaḍramawt and then marched on westwards to Ṣanᶜā' with two thousand of his troops.(101)

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(96) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 384; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9395; Ibn Abī Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 189.

(97) See 289 below

(98) Aghānī, XXVII, 9394. See also Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj, V, 107.

(99) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9397; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, ᶜUqūd, 194.

(100) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9394; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 188.

(101) Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 384; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9391f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāᵓ, f16a; al-Ḥarīthī, 189. See also al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāᵓiq, 205.

When al-Qāsim b. ᶜUmar al-Thaqafī, the Umayyad governor of the Yemen, heard of the Ibāḍiyyah march out of the Ḥaḍramawt, he left al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Zumal in charge while he himself advanced to the south to oppose the Ibāḍiyyah.(102) The two armies met in al-Jālih, a village of Abyan, the Umayyad force was defeated and retreated to Ṣanᶜā'.(103) Following their victory the Ibāḍiyyah advanced to Ṣanᶜā', where they easily defeated the remainder of the Umayyad troops and entered the town.(104) Consequently, Ṣanᶜā' fell totally under the control of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā who seized the treasure house (bayt al-māl) and gave an aggressive speech.(105)

In Ṣanᶜā', ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā was able to build a strong army consisting of those Khārijīs who joined him there, as well as some of the Yemenis. Following their occupation there, the Ibāḍiyyah focussed their attention on challenging Umayyad authority in the Ḥijāz and Syria. Accordingly, ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā despatched Abū Ḥamzah there

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(102) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 384; al-Isfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9395; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 189; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 18; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 73; ᶜAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 113; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā' f 16a.

(103) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 384, giving the place. See also al-Iṣfahānī Aghānī, XXVII, 9395; al-Ḥārithī, 190, followed by al-Ḥāmid, I, 207, all say this battle took place in Laḥj, a village of Abyan.

(104) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 385; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9396; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107; al-Ḥārithī, 190; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 73; ᶜAsjad, 23; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā' f 16a.

(105) For this speech, see al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9396 ff; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 107f; al-Ḥārithī, 192-4. See also al-Ḥāmid, I, 208; al-Akwaᶜ, Wathā'iq. 205.

with one thousand troops, during the pilgrimage season, 129/746.(106) Through this expedition, the Ibāḍiyyah were able to spread their influence over the Ḥijāzī towns for a couple of months and thus threaten Syria. (107)

Alarmed by the worsening situation, Marwān b. Muḥammad decided to send troops, under the command of ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAṭiyyah al-Saᶜdī, in order to drive out the Ibāḍiyyah rebels from both the Ḥijāz and the Yemen.(108) After his success in re-occupying the Ḥijāz, ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAṭiyyah continued southwards to Tabālah, in ᶜAsīr, where he made camp. (109) When ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā heard of the defeat of his armies in the Ḥijāz and the subsequent advance of the Umayyad forces into the Yemen, he left Ṣanᶜā' with thirty thousand troops and marched northwards where he encamped at Ṣaᶜdah.(110) In 130/747, ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā

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(106) Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9397 f; says that 900 or 1000 men. Repeated in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 108; al-Hārithī, 194; E.I.² "Ibāḍiyya". In al-Ṭabarī, II,1981; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, III,37; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV,307, they were 700 troops. Ibn Khayyāṭ,285, gives unacceptable number when he records that there were 10,000 men.

(107) It is not within the scope of our topic to deal with their spread in the Ḥijāz; our sole concern here is their uprising in the Yemen. For their spread in the Ḥijāz, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, 388 ff; al-Ṭabarī, II,1981 ff; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9399 ff; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 108 ff; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, III, 357 f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, IV, 307 ff; al-Ḥarithī, 194 ff. See also E.I.² "Ibāḍiyya".

(108) Ibn Khayyāṭ,393; al-Ṭabarī, II, 2012 f; al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, VI, 66; al-Isfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9423; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 120; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 18.

(109) Ibn Khayyat, 394.

(110) Ibid.

endeavoured to stave off the Umayyad advance near Jurash, a town in northern Yemen; however, he was killed and his army routed.(111)

The defeat of the Ibāḍiyyah in the Yemen was not yet a total one, for some of them rose up in the south upon the arrival of the Umayyad army in Ṣanᶜā'. Our main source of information here are Ibn Khayyāṭ and al-Iṣfahānī; other historians, both local and external, unanimously neglect the continuation of hostilities in the area between the supporters of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā and the Umayyad forces.

At this time, two movements appeared in the Yemen, both led by Ḥimyarī chiefs, each of which arose in the territory occupied by their own particular tribe. The first of these uprisings was headed by Yaḥyā b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Sabbāq, who succeeded in taking al-Janad.(112) Consequently, ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAṭiyyah sent a force to the area. The Ibāḍiyyah were defeated and their leader fled to Aden. Undeterred by this defeat, Yaḥyā b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Sabbāq raised an army of two thousand men. Again this army was defeated and its leader killed by the Umayyad forces, who were led by ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAṭiyyah himself.(113)

The second uprising was led by Yaḥyā b. Ḥarb, also of Ḥimyar,

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(111) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 394; al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, VI, 67, give the place. In al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9430, Kashshah (probably means Kashar a mountain near Jurash). In al-Ḥārithī, 223, Kast. See also al-Ṭabarī, II, 2014; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 124.

(112) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 394. Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9436 (quoting of al-Madā'inī), says from Āl Dhū'l-Kalāᶜ. See also al-Ḥārithī, 226.

(113) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 394.

who revolted in the coastal area. Without delay, ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAtiyyah dispatched an army, this time led by a man of Kindah nicknamed Abū Umayyah; in due course, the rebellion was suppressed and its leader slain.(114)

Nevertheless, the suppression of the Ibāḍiyyah in the Yemen was not yet complete, for they were still active in Ḥaḍramawt under the leadership of ᶜAbd Allāh b. Saᶜīd al-Ḥaḍramī, ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā's deputy in the region. Again, ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAṭiyyah lost no time in advancing to Ḥaḍramawt to put down the rebels.

Our sources agree that ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAṭiyyah's suppression of the Ibāḍiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt was not total. These sources tell us that while Ibn ᶜAṭiyyah was besieging the Ibāḍiyyah he received a letter from the caliph designating him as his representative at the pilgrimage; accordingly, the former called for peace. The Ibāḍiyyah accepted the offer on condition that they choose their governor. Duly, Ibn ᶜAṭiyyah accepted this condition leaving Ḥaḍramawt under the mercy of the Ibāḍiyyah.(115) The latter, thus, remained a threat to caliphal authority in the region until the reign of the second ᶜAbbāsid caliph, Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr. (116)

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(114) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 394. In al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9436 and al-Ḥārithī, 226 read Yaḥyā b. Karib al-Ḥimyarī.

(115) See Ibn Khayyāṭ, 394; al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, XXVII, 9436f; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, V, 128; al-Ḥārithī, 227. See also al-Masᶜudī, Murūj, VI, 67. Lewicki, EI², "Ibāḍiyya", says that "He [Ibn ᶜAṭiyyah] even agreed to recognize their independence."

(116) For the Ibāḍī-ᶜAbbāsid struggle in Ḥaḍramawt, see 311-3 below.

Although our sources offer reasonably adequate descriptions of the Ibāḍiyyah uprising in the Yemen, they do not throw any light on the political situation of the country during the course of these events. The question worth considering here is to what extent did the rebellion affect the security of the Yemen, and how, if at all, did it change the feelings of the caliph concerning his influence in the area?

It is certain that the Yemen underwent much unrest during the course of this uprising, given the absence of security in general and of strong local rulers in particular. Abū ʾl-Zubayr b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān in al-Ṭabarī (117) tellsus that ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAṭiyyah's death at the hands of local people occurred as a result of their not being able to distinguish the governor of the area from a highwayman! As far as the caliph was concerned, his intentions toward the area are clearfrom the letter he wrote to the Yemenis, urging them to remain loyal to the caliphate and not to join the rebellion. Such a letter could only have been sent out of serious concern about the revolution which by this time had spread throughout the Yemeni provinces.(118)

To conclude, then, the Yemen spent the first/seventh century politically isolated from the rest of the Islamic world, its relations with the Umayyad administration at no time clear.

At the beginning .of the second/eighth century, local powers

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(117) II, 2015 (Abū ʾl-Zubayr himself was one of Ibn ᶜAṭiyyah's Companions on this journey) Cf. also Ibn al-Athīr, Kamil, IV, 316; Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, III, 358.

(118) See this letter, Anon, Tārīkh, f. 139a, Cf. also al-Akwaᶜ Wathaʾiq, 201-3.

began to dispute caliphal authority; thus at the end of Umayyad rule, the Yemenis were able to lift the heavy veil of caliphal authority from their own country for the first time. Although this expulsion was temporary, it represented real opposition to the caliphal regime in the Yemen by the locals who gradually escalated their conflict with the ᶜAbbāsid authority.

Table 5* The nasab of Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq

Kindah
|
Muʿawiyah
|
ʿAmr (Murʿatti)
|
Thawr
|
Muʿawiyah
|
al-Ḥārith al-Akbar
|
Muʿawiyah
|
ʿAmr
|
al-Ḥārith (al-Wallādah)
|
al-Shaytān (ʿAbd Allāh)
|
al-Aswad
|
ʿAmr
|
Shurahbīl
|
ʿAmr
|
Yaḥyā
|
ʿAbd Allāh (Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq)

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* After Caskel table 239; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 428.

Table 6 The governors of the Yemen in the time of the Umayyad Caliphate* (41-132/661-750)

B. Sufyān	41-64/661-84	appointed by Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān
Busr b. Abī Arṭāh al-ʿĀmirī (1)		as a military governor
ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān al-Thaqafī	41/660-1	overall the Yemen
ʿUtbah b. Abī Sufyān	41-2/660-2	(brother of Muʿāwiyah)(2) over all the Yemen
Fayrūz al-Daylamī	42-53/662-73	Ṣanʿāʾ and al-Janad(3)
Saʿīd b. Dādhawayh al-Iṣṭakhrī (4)	53/673	"
al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Ḍaylamī	54-60/674-80	"
al-Nuʿmān b. Bashīr al-Anṣārī		Ḥadramawt
Bashīr b. Saʿd al-ʿAraj(5)		"
Baḥīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī (6)		Ṣanʿāʾ and al-Janad, appointed by Yazīd, I.

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* Including Ibn al-Zubayr's caliphate

(1) See 264 above.

(2) Resided in al-Ṭaʾif .cf 266 above.

(3) Omitted by Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 16.

(4) Omitted by Zambaur, 114. In Smith, "History of Ṣanʿāʾ," 53, reads Saʿīd b. Dāwūd instead of Dadhawayh. He remained only seven months, cf. 267 above

(5) For al-Nuʿmān's and Bashīr's governorships, cf.267 above.

(6) In Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 16, reads erroneously Bujayr b. Zayyān al-Ḥimyarī . Omitted by Zambaur, 114. See Smith, "History of Ṣanʿāʾ", 53. Cf.268 above.

During the Caliphate of ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr (64-73/683-92)

Baḥīr b. Raysān al-Ḥimyarī, in al-Janad

al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī. (7) Ṣanᶜā᾽

ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Walīd b. ᶜAbd Shams b. al-Mughīrah al-Makhzūmī. (8) Ṣanᶜā᾽

ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Muttalib b. Abī Wadāᶜah al-Sahmī (9) Sanᶜā᾽

ᶜUbaydah b. al-Zubayr (brother of ᶜAbd Allāh) (10)

Qays b. Yazīd al-Saᶜdī al-Tamīmī. (11) Ṣanᶜā᾽

Abū ᾽l-Nujūd (mawla of ᶜUthmān b. ᶜAffān) (12) Ṣanᶜā᾽

al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Fayrūz al-Daylamī (the second governorship during Ibn al-Zubayr's reign) Ṣanᶜā᾽

al-Sā᾽ib b. Khallād b. Suwayd al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī. (13) Ṣanᶜā᾽

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(7) See Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 16; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66; ᶜAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 95; Bughyat, 25.

(8) In Idrīs, Kanz, f173a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 16; al-Khazrajī, Kifayah, 66; ᶜAsjad, 21; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 95f; Bughyat, 25; Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜā᾽, 53, all of them read ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān b. Khalid b. al-Walīd. According to al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 330-2; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 148 and Ibn Ḥabīb, Muhabbar, 152, ᶜAbd Allāh is a descendant of another branch of B. Makhzūm and was appointed over the Yemen by Ibn al-Zubayr.

(9) See Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 16f; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 25; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 66f; ᶜAsjad, 22; Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜā᾽", 53. In Idrīs, f 173a; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 96f, read Ibn Abī Wādīᶜah.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Idrīs, f173a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 67; ᶜAsjad, 22; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 97f. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 17. See also Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜā᾽, 53. In Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 25, reads erroneously ᶜIsā b. Yazīd.

(12) Cf. al-Khazrajī, ᶜAsjad, 22; Kifāyah, 67. See also Smith History of Ṣanᶜā᾽", 53.

(13) In al-Khazrajī, ᶜAsjad, 22, has Khallād b. al-Sā᾽ib al-Anṣārī. In Kifāyah, 67, reads as Najlā᾽ instead of Khallād. Smith "History of Ṣanᶜā᾽, " 53 has omitted al-Anṣārī. However, it seems to me these historians place Khallād before al-Sā᾽ib. According to al-Baladhūrī, Ansāb I, 244f; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 363, Khallād b. Suwayd al Khazrajī al-Anṣārī was killed in Medina (on the day of B. Qurayzah) in 5/627, and his son al-Sā᾽ib was appointed over the Yemen by Muᶜawiyah. It is quite possible that the above historians erroneously mention Muᶜawiyah instead of Ibn al-Zubayr. If this assumption is correct, al-Khazrajī, then, places Khallad before al-Sā᾽ib.

Ḥanash b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Ṣanᶜānī (14)		in Ṣanᶜā'.
B. Marwān	73-129/692-746	appointed by ᶜAbd al-Malik
Muḥammad b.Yūsuf al-Thaqafī	73-91/692-710	brother of al-Ḥajjaj, in Ṣanᶜā'
Waqid b.Maslamah al-Thaqafī	73-4/692-3	in al-Janad
al-Ḥakam b.Ayyūb al-Thaqafī		in Ḥaḍramawt
Ayyūb b.Yahyā al-Thaqafī	91-6/709-15(15)	appointed by al-Walīd I.
ᶜUrwah b. Muḥammad al-Saᶜdī	96-101/715-20	appointed by Sulayman and reappointed by ᶜUmar b ᶜAbdal-ᶜAzīz (16)
Masᶜūd b. ᶜAwf al-Kalbī	101-6/720-5 (17)	appointed by Yazīd II
Yusūf b. ᶜUmar al-Thaqafī	106-20/725-38	appointed by Hishām
al-Ṣalt b. Yūsuf	120-5/738-43	Son of above
Marwan b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī	125-6/743-4	appointed by al-Walid II
al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Wāṣil al-Ṣaksakī	126/744 (18)	appointed by Yazīd III

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(14) Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 97. In al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 67; ᶜAsjad, 22; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 25, all have Hasan instead of Ḥanash. Smith. "History of Ṣanᶜā'," 53, has Muᶜtab/Muhsin, and places him after ᶜUbaydah b. al-Zubayr. Ḥanash b. ᶜAbd Allāh is a famous Yemeni Faqīh, see al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 300; Ibn ᶜAsākir, Tahdhīb, V, 7-9. He was the last of Ibn al-Zubayr's governors and was therefore arrested by ᶜAbd al-Malik's troops and sent to Damascus, see 279 above.

(15) For the appointment of these governors, see 276 above.

(16) Cf. Idrīs, f173b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 69; ᶜAsjad, 22; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 17; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 103; Bughyat 26. See also Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜā'".53. Omitted by Zambaur, 113. He reappointed by ᶜUmar b. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Cf.Idrīs, f 173b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd,17; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 72; ᶜAsjad,23. In Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I,111; Bughyat,27, has Wāᵓil instead of Wāṣil. Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜā'", 53, has Fāḍil.

	appointed by Marwān b. Muḥammad	
al-Qāsim b. ᶜUmar al-Thaqafī	127-9/744-6	he was expelled by the Ibāḍiyyah
Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah b. Mukhramah al-Kindī,		the governor of Ḥadramawt on behalf of al-Qāsim b. ᶜUmar. (19)
ᶜAbd al-Malik b. Muḥammad b. ᶜAtiyyah al-Saᶜdī (20)	130/747-8	
Yūsuf b. ᶜUrwah (21)	131-2/748-50	

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(19) See 287 above.

(20) Sent at the head of the Umayyad force to suppress the Ibāḍiyyah in the Ḥijāz and the Yemen and to govern the latter. However, by the end of 130/748 he received a letter from the caliph in which he was ordered to lead the ḥajj ceremony. He duly left the Yemen to assume his new task, but did not reach the Ḥijāz, but was murdered in the Yemen, cf. **292** above.

(21) He resided in the Ḥijāz and sent his brother al-Walīd to the Yemen. Cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ,407.

CHAPTER X

The Yemen during the early ᶜAbbāsid caliphs (132-93/750-809)

With the advent of the ᶜAbbāsid caliphate in 132/750, Yemeni relations with the central Islamic authorities took on a greater clarity compared with those under previous administrations.(1) During this period political events in the Yemen were such that on several occasions governors in the area deemed it necessary to ask the caliphate for military reinforcements in order to suppress disorder and revolt. Regardless of the existence of political activity in the Yemen, the country could not exist separately from the central Islamic authority, which always succeeded in suppressing local revolts there. Nevertheless, despite the concern shown for Yemeni affairs by some of these five ᶜAbbāsid caliphs, the area remained mostly in a state of political isolation.

The following chapter will deal with the political situation in the Yemen and the area's relations with the central Islamic authority during the period of the first five ᶜAbbāsid caliphs (132-93/750-809). Firstly, we will discuss the caliphal policy towards the appointment of governors to the Yemen and, secondly, the various Yemeni uprisings against ᶜAbbāsid authority and the relations of the latter towards them.

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(1) In particular, the Orthodox and Umayyad administrations.

A. The appointment of governors

Initially the ᶜAbbāsids had no specially formed policy on appointment of governors to the Yemen; the officials there were appointed by the governor of the Ḥijāz, the area as a whole seeming to have been a relatively unimportant one. When Abū ʾl-ᶜAbbās al-Saffāḥ, the first ᶜAbbāsid (132-6/750-4), became caliph, he appointed his uncle Dāwūd b. ᶜAlī over the Ḥijāz and the Yemen. The latter took up residence in Mecca, sending his representative, ᶜUmar b. ᶜAbd al-Ḥamīd al-ᶜUmarī, to the Yemen.(2) This situation lasted until the murder of Dāwūd b. ᶜAlī in the following year 133/751, whereupon Abū ʾl-ᶜAbbās al-Saffāḥ personally appointed his own uncle, Muḥammad b.Yazīd b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbd al-Madān, governor of the Yemen.(3) This blood relationship between Abū ʾl-ᶜAbbās and B.ᶜAbd al-Madān enabled various members of the latter to occupy the governorship of the Yemen for some ten years.(4)

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(2) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 421; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 413; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 18. See also al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 76; ᶜAsjad,24, who says Dawūd Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd. Ibn al-Dayba ᶜ, Qurrat, 119, mentions ᶜUmar b. ᶜAbd al-Madjīd.

(3) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 413, has ᶜUbayd Allāh. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 19, reads Muḥammad b. Zayd. In al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah,76 Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Zayd, but in ᶜAsjad, 24, writes Muḥammad b. Zayd b. ᶜAbd Allāh. Ibn al-Dayba ᶜ, Qu rrat, İ, 119 f, gives Muḥammad b. Yazīd al-Hārithī. Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜaʾ, 53, has Muḥammad b. Zayd. For the blood relationship, cf al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 30; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 416 f.

(4) See Table 8.

However, a change in ᶜAbbāsid policy vis-à-vis the appointment of governors to the Yemen became apparent in 142/760, when the caliph Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr (136-58/ 753-75) appointed Maᶜn b. Zāʾidah al-Shaybānī over the area, apparently in order to quell political unrest there.(5) From this time, then, it can be said that the ᶜAbbāsids began to pay greater attention to political affairs in the Yemen.

It is quite probable that political disorder in the Yemen was the sole factor behind the change in caliphal policy towards the country. Indeed, from that time onwards the caliphs selected governors to the area with greater discretion. As a corollary those governors who failed to check the various insurrections were quickly replaced by others more capable to do so.(6) Thus, the number of governors to the Yemen in the early ᶜAbbāsid caliphate and the duration of their governorships may serve as a general indicator of the success or failure of the authority in question in suppressing local uprisings. A governor's long stay in office in the Yemen was undoubtedly the result of the caliph's satisfaction with the former's ability to uphold political order; news of the Yemeni governors' suppression of local rebellions was warmly received by the caliphs, while the fact that they also perpetrated vicious massacres in some Yemeni provinces probably went overlooked.(7)

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(5) Cf. 308 below.

(6) Cf. 316 below.

(7) For the reply of Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr to those who blamed him for the massacre in Ḥadramawt carried out by his troops, Cf. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 19f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80f; ᶜAsjad, 26. For the massacre, see 312 below. For the failure of the Yemenis to convince Hārūn al-Rashīd to dismiss his governor, Ḥammād al-Barbary, from the Yemen; see al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 143f; al-Janadi, Sulūk, f45b; al-Khazraji, Ṭirāz, f111a; Abu Makhramah, II, 64 f.

However, ᶜAbbāsid policy concerning the choice of governors to the Yemen did not always centre on the appointment of a military man to the post. On some occasions, the governors appointed were not distinguished by their military experience. One example is Muḥammad b. Barmak in(183/799), renowned for his generosity - he was known as khayyir (beneficent) - he was chosen at a time when the political situation there was particularly unsettled.(8) Yet despite his attempts to win over the Yemenis by implementing useful social projects and helping the poor, he too was eventually unable to control the country and was replaced, after a year, by a military man.(9)

As a result of their general failure to find a governor capable enough of maintaining order in the Yemen, the caliphs occasionally resorted to dividing the governorship of the area between two officials. In 177/793-4, Hārūn al-Rashīd, the fifth ᶜAbbāsid caliph (170-193/786-809), appointed both al-Rabīᶜ b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbd al-Madān and al-ᶜAbbās b. Saᶜd over the Yemen, the former to head the military and lead the prayers (ᶜalā ʾl-ḥarb wa ʾl-ṣalāt), and the latter to supervise the levy of the alms-tax (ᶜalā ʾl-jibāyah). (10) One modern scholar (11) comments upon this policy : "By this

(8) See al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 106f,109; Ibn al-Mujāwir, II,178f (different account); al-Janadī,f 45b; al-Khazrajī,Kifāyah, 89f; ᶜAsjad, 28f; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 129-31; al-Ahdal , Tuhfat, f40a; Abū Makhramah,II, 214.

(9) Cf. al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 109; al-Janadī,Sūlūk, f 45b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 22; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 89f; ᶜAsjad,29; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 129-31; al-Ahdal,Tuḥfat, f 40a; Abū Makhramah, II, 214.

(10) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 128f.

(11) Daghfūs, see note 53 in al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87.

action, Hārūn al-Rashīd intended to facilitate the duty of his governors in the Yemen due to the increase of political disorder in the area." Naturally this division of duties, plus his later attempt to double the salary of his governor there, ᶜAbd Allāh b. Muṣᶜab al-Zubayrī, offers clear proof of Hārūn al-Rashīd's endeavour to step up the activities of his officials in the Yemen. (12)

It is interesting to note that the ᶜAbbāsid governors in the Yemen were supported by an army stationed in Sanᶜā',(13) a fact which has not been mentioned in the sources of the period of the Orthodox caliphate and Umayyad rule.(14) Thus it may be deduced that this army was formed during the ᶜAbbāsid caliphate. However, since the sources do not throw any light on the make-up of the army we cannot be sure whether the soldiers were sent by the caliphs in Baghdād or whether they were recruited from among the Yemenis.

It is likely that the army was made up of both associates of the governors and local Yemenis.(15) What is clear

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(12) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 88; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 22.

(13) This indication appears for the first time during the governorship of Rajā' b. Rawḥ al-Judhāmī, 159/776. Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ᶜAsjad, 27. See also Ibn Khayyat, 440; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20. In al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 132, Rajā' b. Sallām b. Rawḥ. See also table 8.

(14) The sources at our disposal do not mention such an army in the Yemen throughout the period of both the Orthodox caliphs and the Umayyads.

(15) Some governors, especially those who were appointed with the express purpose of suppressing ᶜrebels,' were accompanied by their own followers. Maᶜn b. Zā'idah, for example, says that he lost many of his own followers in the course of his governorship in the Yemen; cf. al-Tabarī, III, 395.

is that the force did not officially contain any of the inhabitants of Ṣanᶜāʾ itself; the conflict between the populace there and government troops during the caliphate of al-Mahdī, the third ᶜAbbāsid caliph (158-69/775-86), may attest to this.(16) However, when this army failed to put down an insurrection, reinforcements were sent from Baghdād. Likewise, Hārūn al-Rashīd sent troops to Ḥammād al-Barbarī, the governor of the Yemen (184-94/800-10), when the latter failed to suppress the revolt of al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Ṣamad.(17)

In actual fact the ᶜAbbāsid force in the Yemen was a weak one, its main task being to uphold the security of the Islamic authorities in the area. Its general failure to do so led to the despatch of auxiliaries from Baghdād, a policy which began during the reign of Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr and developed into a formal structure under Hārūn al-Rashīd. From then onwards the sending of reinforcements to quell uprisings in the Yemen remained a salient feature of ᶜAbbāsid policy towards the area.(18)

Thus, contrary to the practices of previous administrations, the ᶜAbbāsids began to pay more and more attention to the appointment of governors to the Yemen. The reason for this, no doubt, was the increase in anti-authority uprisings in the area. Despite the success of the ᶜAbbāsid administration in suppressing the revolts there during the period

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(16) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ᶜAsjad, 27.

(17) See 319 below.

(18) Cf Chapter XI below.

of the first five caliphs, their successors totally failed to maintain control over the area as a whole during the third/ninth century. (19)

B. The political situation

During the period of the first five ᶜAbbāsid caliphs (132-93/750-809), the Yemen was witness to various uprisings which resulted in political disorder in the area. Most of the Yemeni tribes, along with certain ᶜAbbāsid governors, took part in these revolts. Whilst the former rose up against ᶜAbbāsid authority there, the latter were seeking independence from the central ᶜAbbāsid administration. It was considerations such as these that mostly coloured caliphal policy towards the Yemen. At this point, we shall discuss the nature of these local revolts and the reaction of the ᶜAbbāsid government to them.

a. From Abū ʾl-ᶜAbbās's caliphate to the death of al-Hādī

During the caliphate of Abū ʾl-ᶜAbbās al-Saffāḥ (132-36/750-4) the Yemen remained quiet, with no anti-caliphate revolt occurring. It is interesting to note that during the reign of Abū ʾl-ᶜAbbās, the caliphate affirmed its influence over Aden instead of al-Janad, by appointing a governor over the former. (20) This attention paid to the coastal areas of the Yemen for the first time since the establishment of the Islamic authorities there, leads us to believe that the ᶜAbbāsid caliphate intended to achieve a

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(19) Cf. Chapter XI below.

(20) Cf. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 19; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 76; ᶜAsjad, 24; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 120.

stronghold over the Yemeni ports, which formed a chain of connection between the ports of Iraq and those of East Africa. (21)

However, the accession of Qaḥṭān to the office of governor of Ṣanᶜā᾽ during the reign of Abū ᾽l-ᶜAbbās (132-136/750-4) heralded a renewal of local conflicts between the Abnā᾽ and their opponents, Qaḥṭān who inhabited Ṣanᶜā᾽.(22) We know that the conflict was determined by the arrival of Abū Bakr's general, al-Muhājir, and his army to the town in 11/632, whereupon the conflict came to an end and remained dormant until the governorship of ᶜAlī b. al-Rabīᶜ b. ᶜAbd al-Madān in 133/751.(23) A modern writer(24) connects the renewal of hostilities to the occupation by the Qaḥṭānī element of the Ṣanᶜā᾽ and justifies this claim by pointing to the presence of Muḍarī elements in this post during the previous period, 11-133/632-751. (25) Consequently, the writer intends to accuse ᶜAlī b. al-Rabīᶜ b. ᶜAbd al-Madān of encouraging hostilities. It may well be that the preponderance of certain Qaḥṭānī elements over the authority of Ṣanᶜā᾽, like that of the ᶜAbbāsid officials during the period of Abū ᾽l-ᶜAbbās al-Saffāḥ, encouraged their relatives

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(21) The ᶜAbbāsids paid more attention to the coastal area than the other Yemeni provinces and, therefore, established the B. Ziyād dynasty in Tihāmat al-Yaman to retain their interests in the ports of this region. See Chapter XI,D. below.

(22) In particular B. Shihāb, a tribe of Himyar, for their nasab, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 529.

(23) See Table 8.

(24) Ṣālih, Tārīkh, 117.

(25) However some Qaḥṭānī elements had occupied this post in this period, such as Baḥīr b. Raysān al-Himyarī and al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Wāṣil al-Saksakī, see Table 6.

in the town to reaffirm their enmity towards the Abnā$^{\circ}$ there.(26) What it does not signify, however, is that ^{c}Alī b. al-Rabī^{c} was behind this, especially since his judgement in the affair came down very clearly on the side of the Abnā$^{\circ}$.(27)

In actual fact the occurrence of such hostilities in Sanʿā$^{\circ}$ was dependent mainly on the attitude of the governors themselves. Had the governor remained indifferent and unwilling to take sides, such conflict would never have taken place.(28) Since the Abnā$^{\circ}$ lacked tribal solidarity in the area, they avoided involvement in such hostilities. This too accounts for their warm acceptance of Islamic rule in 11/632.(29) On the other hand, the Qaḥṭānī position in the town was different since they enjoyed the support of other Yemeni tribes. Thus, these Qaḥṭānīs needed only the slightest encouragement to provoke the Abnā$^{\circ}$. It is most likely, then, that the early Qaḥṭānī governors in the Yemen during the caliphate of Abū $^{\circ}$l-^{c}Abbās gave the necessary encouragement to their clans; by the time that the third Qaḥṭānī governor, ^{c}Alī b. al-Rabī^{c} had come to power, the enmity of Qaḥṭān

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(26) Three Qaḥṭānī governors successively appointed over the Yemen during the caliphate of Abū $^{\circ}$l-^{c}Abbās al-Saffāḥ, see Table 8.

(27) Al- Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 77 f; ^{c}Asjad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 120 f.

(28) For the aggression of Yazīd b. Jarīr al-Qasrī, Yemeni from Bajīlah holding the governorship of the Yemen during the caliphate of al-Ma$^{\circ}$mūn, against the Abnā$^{\circ}$, see 336-7 below.

(29) Cf.175 above.

towards the Abnā' became clear.(30) However, ᶜAlī b. al-Rabīᶜ was able to suppress the crisis. (31) In any case, the disorder had not been aimed against the ᶜAbbāsid authority in the area; it was simply a local conflict to which the caliph paid much less attention than did his successors to the later Yemeni crises.(32)

During the caliphate of Abū Jaᶜfar al-Mansūr (136-58/753-75) the Yemen again entered a period of political turmoil. This time, however, the crisis was not the result of any systematic local rebellion against ᶜAbbāsid rule, since there is no mention in our sources of such a revolt. The actual disorder began some six years into the reign of Abū Jaᶜfar (142/760), the early period of his caliphate having been free of political unrest.

Thus, our knowledge of the political situation of the Yemen during the first six years of Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr's regime is little, since the sources at our disposal throw no light on the circumstances in which the governors of the Yemen were being appointed. Things become clear, however, with the appointment of Maᶜn b. Zā'idah al-Shaybānī to the Yemen in 142/760. Although the Yemeni sources remain silent

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(30) Particularly since at that time Qaḥṭān in Ṣanᶜā' demanded the ownership of al-Rahabah, northern part of Ṣanᶜā' plain, cf. Wilson, "Mapping", 281. For the Qaḥṭanī claim to the area, see al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 77f; ᶜAsjad. 25; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 120f.

(31) Ibid.

(32) For the attitude of Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr, Hārūn al-Rashīd, al-Ma'mūn and al-Muᶜtaṣim towards the Yemeni crises, cf the following pages.

on the circumstances surrounding his governorship, external records offer two different statements concerning it. The first account of Ma^{c}n b. Zā^{ɔ}idah's appointment to the office of governor of the Yemen has been preserved by al-Ya^{c}qūbī.(33) who tells us that, "In 142 [760], when Abū Ja^{c}far al-Manṣūr set out for the pilgrimage and arrived in Basra, he received the news that the Yemenis were in a state of revolt, and that his governor there, ^{c}Abd Allāh b. al-Rabī^{c}, had fled. Thus, he sent Ma^{c}n b. Zā^{ɔ}idah to the Yemen." The second statement comes to us from al-Ṭabarī, (34) who records that, "In 142 [760] the governor of the Yemen rebelled and declared his disobedience, which led the caliph Abū Ja^{c}far al-Manṣūr to despatch Ma^{c}n b. Zā^{ɔ}idah to the Yemen in order to arrest the governor and confiscate his property."

The second statement is probably the most accurate. Our sources confirm that ^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Abd al-Madān, the governor of the Yemen replaced by Ma^{c}n b. Zā^{ɔ}idah, went to Abū Ja^{c}far al-Manṣūr designating his son to the office of governor of the Yemen before the appointment of Ma^{c}n in 142/760.(35) Also ^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Abd al-Madān fled from the Yemen because he had failed to suppress the rebellion.(36) Since his son succeeded him in his post, it is possible, therefore, that the former took part in this rebellion. This assumption is supported by al-Tabarī,(37) who records that, "When

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(33) Tārīkh, III, 108.

(34) III, 393-5, the account of Ma^{c}n b. Zā^{ɔ}idah himself. See also Ṣāliḥ, Tārīkh, 112.

(35) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 78; ^{c}Asjad, 25; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 122; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 19.

(36) Al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 108.

(37) III, 395.

Ma^{c}n b. Zā^{ɔ}idah came out from al-Manṣūr's meeting (majlis) to discuss the agreement of the governorship (^{c}ahd al-wilāyah), he met ^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Abd al-Madān, who used him to take care of his son who had rebelled in the Yemen." If this assumption is correct, it may uncover two significant facts concerning the political history of the Yemen and its relations with the caliphate. The first is the realization by the caliphs of the necessity of preserving their influence in the Yemen. The second is the birth of various separatist movements freeing themselves from central Islamic authority, but, paradoxically,led by the officials of this authority themselves.(38)

Although the sources confirm that the Yemen was undergoing political disorder on the eve of the governorship of Ma^{c}n b. Zā^{ɔ}idah, they do not define the rebellious areas, except Ṣan^{c}ā^{ɔ}, whence Ma^{c}n was sent directly. Once there, he arrested the rebellious governor and occupied his post.(39)

Without giving any date, our sources throw light on insurrections which occurred in the Yemen which led Ma^{c}n b. Za^{ɔ}idah to use military force. Al-Hamdānī (40) mentions briefly a skirmish in the province of Ṣa^{c}dah between Ma^{c}n b.

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(38) According to our sources it was the first rebellion which arose in the Yemen led by the governors of the caliphate itself, since the latter confirmed its influence in the area in 11/632.

(39) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 395.

(40) Iklīl, II, 129, records that, "Muḥammad b. Abān, a Khawlanī chief, opposed Ma^{c}n b. Za^{ɔ}idah in Ṣa^{c}dah and fought against him where he took revenge for the murder of ^{c}Umar b. Zayd al-Ghālibī, whom Ma^{c}n had killed in al-Mandaj, an area north of Ṣa^{c}dah.

Zā'idah and the leaders of Khawlān. The fact that the struggle took place between government officials and extremely influential chiefs indicates a political motive behind the incident. However, conditions in the southern part of the Yemeni highlands and Ḥaḍramawt were quite different, these areas undergoing unrest during the governorship of Ma'n b. Zā'idah (142-151/760-769). Again our knowledge of the causes and consequences of these events is slight due to the paucity of source information.

The revolt of the southern part of the Yemeni highlands took place in the province of al-Janad, and has been recorded by Yemeni historians.(41) They all agree that the cause of the uprising was the harsh treatment meted out to the inhabitants of the area by the representative of Ma'n there. When they had murdered him, Ma'n attacked the area, avenging the death of his agent by slaughtering two thousand.(42) Information concerning the event in Ḥaḍramawt during Ma'n governorship comes only briefly in our sources. Furthermore, the causes and consequences are again obscure. What is obvious is that this event was of a graver nature than the first, chiefly due to the fact that the Ibāḍiyyah themselves, along with other influential chiefs in the area, espoused

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(41) Cf. al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 44b; Ibn 'Abd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 19f; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat f39a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 79; 'Asjad, 25. See also Ibn al-Mujawir, al-Mustabṣir, II, 163 with a little differences.

(42) Ibid.

this rebellion. (43)

Thus Yemeni historians, without attempting thorough analysis, indicate that the Ḥaḍramīs in general revolted against the ᶜAbbāsid regime.(44) This assertion, however, is a naive one, and clearly not acceptable. It is likely that, numerically speaking the Ḥaḍramīs were inclined towards the rebellion, but not enough actually to join it. On the other hand, some Ḥaḍramīs did openly take sides with the ᶜAbbāsid caliphate, agreeing to act as the latter's officials in the area. (45)

The significance of this rebellion lies in the profound effect that the massacre, which Maᶜn and his troops perpetrated in Ḥaḍramawt under the pretext of suppressing the rebels, had upon Muslims throughout the State. (46) Two

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(43) There is no mention in the sources at our disposal of the specific role of the Ibāḍiyyah in this rebellion, but according to these sources they were attacked by Maᶜn b. Zāᵓidah and a large number of their people were killed, an event which made the caliph, Abū Jaᶜfar, happy; see al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80f; ᶜAsjad, 26; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 19f. According to al-Hamdanī, Iklīl, II, 373; al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk Ḥimyar, 183, ᶜAmr b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Zayd, an influential Ḥaḍramī chief in the area, was killed by Maᶜn b. Zāᵓidah.

(44) See, Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 19f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80; ᶜAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 123.

(45) See Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab Maᶜadd waᵓl-Yaman, f.28b, who says that Ibrāhīm b. Jabalah was appointed by Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr over Ḥaḍramawt, the governor who was dismissed by ᶜAbd Allāh b. Yaḥyā, Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq, from the governorship of Ḥaḍramawt when the latter announced his revolt, see 287 above.

(46) See al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80; ᶜAsjad, 26; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 123, who all confirm that fifteen thousand Ḥaḍramis were killed by the ᶜAbbāsid troops.

motives for this massacre are reported in our sources : firstly, tribal feuding (al-ᶜaṣabiyyah al-qabaliyyah) between Qaḥṭān and Nizār; (47) and secondly, retaliation against the Ibāḍiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt.(48) What may be assumed is that both of these motives led the ᶜAbbāsid troops to massacre the Ḥaḍramīs. As a result, Maᶜn b. Zāʾidah succeeded in suppressing the rebels in Hadramawt, thus bringing about a political lull in the area which was to last at least until the second part of the third/ninth century.(49)

Generally, speaking, Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr's harsh treatment of the Yemenis led to his securing a foothold in the area. One result of this domination was that he succeeded in pursuing those opponents of his who had previously sought refuge in the Yemen. Thus, when al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad Dhūʾl-Nafs al-Zakiyyah took refuge there following his father's revolt against Abū Jaᶜfar in 145/762, he was easily arrested by the ᶜAbbāsid authorities. (50)

Our knowledge of the Yemen's political situation during the caliphate of al-Mahdī and al-Hādī, the third and the fourth Abbāsid caliphs (158-170/775-787), is vague due to lack of material. However, the pattern of appointment, dismissal and replacement of governors to the Yemen for that

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(47) It comes mainly through the non-local sources, see al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 119; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 380; al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, VI, 45f.

(48) Cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 80f; ᶜAsjad, 26; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20.

(49) Until Muḥammad b. Yuᶜfir conquered it in 258/871-2. see 372 below.

(50) Al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, VI, 193.

period leads us to believe that the area was most likely going through a phase of political unrest.(51)

The only information we do have concerning the political situation in the Yemen at that time comes to us via several Yemeni historians. Mention of the state of affairs in Ṣanʿāʾ, however, is both limited and unclear. All that is related, quite simply, is that a conflict took place in the town between the locals and the ʿAbbāsid army,(52) with neither its cause nor consequence explained. It is unlikely that the event was a result of the anti-caliphate uprising; more tenable is the suggestion that a clash occurred between two factions of the locals themselves, and that the army took sides. Such a struggle may possibly have taken place between the Abnāʾ and their Qaḥṭānī opponents in Ṣanʿāʾ, the latter enjoying the support of government troops.(53) It appears that this disruption had repercussions in other Yemeni provinces which led the caliph al-Mahdī to connect the Yemen with the Ḥijāz by establishing postal services between the two territories in 166/782-3.(54)

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(51) Ten successive governors occupied the governorship of the Yemen within twelve years, see Table 8.

(52) Cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ʿAsjad, 27; Idrīs, Khanz al-Akhyār, f 174b.

(53) For the struggle between these two groups in Ṣanʿāʾ, see 306 above. We assumed that Qaḥṭān might have enjoyed the support of the troops because this conflict took place during the governorship of ʿAbd al-Khāliq al-Shihābī, cf. table 8, note I2 , who clan B. Shihāb, represented the head of the enemies of the Abnāʾ in Ṣanʿāʾ; see 336 no. I8 below

(54) Al-Tabarī, III, 517. See also Kremer, Orient, 233. English trans, Bukhsh.

This measure, however, did not put an end to civil disorder, which worsened during the caliphate of al-Hādī (169-70/785-6). (55)

b. <u>During the caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd</u>.

The overall picture of the history of the Yemen and its relations with the central Islamic authority became relatively clear with the reign of Harun al-Rashid (170-93/785-808). Reasonable information on the Yemeni situation during this period is preserved in the sources, with particular attention focused on the uprising of al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Samad against ᶜAbbāsid authority there in 184/800. (56)

The first fourteen years of Hārūn al-Rashīd's reign saw the Yemen in continuous political disorder - a result of unabated local agitation and a legacy from the caliphate of al-Mansūr. Thus Hārūn al-Rashīd's constant pre-occupation throughout this period was his search for an able governor to control the area. His efforts, not unexpectedly, were in vain. (57)

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(55) See al-Yaᶜqūbī, <u>Tārīkh</u>, III, 137, who says that the Yemen witnessed political unrest throughout the caliphate of al-Hādī.

(56) In al-Rāzī, <u>Tārīkh</u>, 108; al-Jahshiyārī, <u>al-Wuzarāʾ wa'l-Kuttāb</u>, 118; Idrīs, <u>Kanz</u>, f.175a, al-Haydam b. ᶜAbd al-Hamīd. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 733, reads al-Haysam al-Yamānī. Ibn Ḥabīb, <u>al-Muḥabbar</u>, 488, al-Haysam al-Hamdānī. However, the correction is given by al-Hamdānī, <u>Iklīl</u>, II, 322; X, 39, has al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Samad, of Ḥimyar. See also Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 131 and note 4. For his <u>nasab</u>, see Table 7.

(57) Cf. 302-4 above

Yet, although the area witnessed political disorder throughout this period, our sources fail to pin down the root causes of the disruption. Such unrest may have been triggered off by the fact that on the eve of Hārūn al-Rashīd's accession, the Ḥijāz represented the focal point of the Alid's anti-ʿAbbāsid regime; (58) indeed although there is no clear evidence of open Alid activity in the Yemen at that time, the possibility of underground Alid opposition cannot be ruled out. Hārūn al-Rashīd knew only too well that an Alid presence in the Yemen would pose a threat to ʿAbbāsid authority there. Thus, when he heard of al-Shāfiʿī's intention to incite one of the Alids to revolt against the ʿAbbāsids, he immediately ordered his governor there to arrest al-Shāfiʿī and send him to al-Raqqah, (59) a town on the Euphrates, where he had camped.

It seems that the disruption in the Yemen was becoming increasingly clear during the first fourteen years of Hārūn al-Rashīd's reign (170-83/786-99). In the following year, the caliph received a report from his governor there, Muḥammad b. Barmak, informing him about the insurrection of the Yemenis. (60) Thus Hārūn al-Rashīd replaced the latter with one of his military commanders, Ḥammād al-Barbarī. (61)

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(58) For the ʿAlid events in the Ḥijāz during the caliphate of al-Hādī, 169-70/784-5, in particular the revolt of al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan, who was killed in Fakhkh near Mecca in 169/785-6, cf al-Ṭabarī, III,550 ff; al-Dīnawarī, 365; al-Iṣfahānī, Maqātil, 442 ff; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 137; Ibn al-Athir, Kāmil, V, 74 f. See also EI2 "al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAli, Ṣaḥib al-Fakhkh"; Lassner, Shaping. 265 f, note 65.

(59) Cf. al-Kūfī VIII, 248; Ibn Samurah, 138 f; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f45b. al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 111a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 28b.

(60) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 109; al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 111a; Kifāyah, 90; ʿAsjad, 29; Abū Makhramah, II, 61f, 214; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f 40a.

(61) Ibid.

With Ḥammād's tenure of the governorship (184-94/800-10), the political situation in the area became even clearer than during the early part of Hārūn al-Rashīd's reign. This new period is marked by two internal uprisings against caliphal authority in the area : the first is the revolt of al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Ṣamad, and the second is the insurrection of the people of Tihāmah. Our sources contain information about the first revolt, but unfortunately have preserved nothing concerning the second. (62)

The revolt of al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Ṣamad was in actual fact, the most serious of all the uprisings that took place in the Yemen during the ᶜAbbāsid caliphate in second/eighth century, shaking the very foundations of ᶜAbbāsid administration in Baghdād. He arose in Jibāl Maswar extending his rebellion throughout the neighbouring areas. (63)

Naturally, the imperial historical tradition does not usually concern itself with minor events in outlying provinces, and this uprising is dealt with only summarily by the non-local sources. Of these sources only al-Yaᶜqūbī mentions it, albeit briefly. Again, it is the local historians we must look to for more information. (64)

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(62) See al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 111a; Kifāyah, 90; ᶜAsjad, 29; al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Ahdal, f 40a; Abū Makhramah, II, 64, all say that the people of Tihāmah revolted against Muḥammad b. Barmak, the governor of the Yemen (183-4/799-800).

(63) Cf. al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 144, who says in Ḥarāz ᶜUmar b. Abī Khālid al-Ḥimyarī declared his support to al-Haysam. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108, mentions that al-Haysam retreated to Jibāl al-ᶜAḍd (al-Akwaᶜ, in al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, 123, foot notes, says that al-ᶜAḍd from aᶜmāl Shibām Aqyān). Al-Hamdānī Iklīl, II, 322, records that al-Haysam was in Jabal Tays at the eve of his revolt. For the location of Jabal Tays, see al-Waysī, 64; Wilson, "Mapping", 200,371.

(64) Cf. al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III,144. This rebellion is preserved in several Yemeni sources, such as al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108-10; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 132-5; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91-3; ᶜAsjad, 28f.

There are two different accounts of the uprising. One gives the year (179/774-75) as the beginning of the revolt. (65) The other mentions no specific date, merely confirming that it began when, following the arrival of Ḥammad al-Barbarī in the Yemen in 184/800 al-Haysam made a stand against the injustices perpetrated by the new governor.(66) This second account is probably the more valid one, for two reasons. Firstly, there is no mention of the incident in our sources before the governorship of Ḥammād. Secondly, Hārūn al-Rashīd sent Ḥammad with the express purpose of suppressing the Yemeni insurrection, whereas neither al-Haysam's name, nor his revolt were mentioned in the caliph's instructions. (67)

Again our sources, especially local ones, differ as to the cause of this uprising.(68) What is clear is that

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(65) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 144.

(66) This statement is recorded mainly by the Yemeni historians, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91; ᶜAsjad, 29; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 132, who confirm that al-Haysam opposed the injustices of Ḥammād by revolting against him. Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a, both record that this rebellion took place during the governorship of Ḥammād without giving any specific date, except Idrīs, f 175a, who gives 181/797-8, as a beginning of the rebellion, which is unacceptable. Al-Khazrajī, ᶜAsjad, 28, records that during the governorship of Aḥmad b. Ismaᶜīl al-Hāshimī, though he gives no specific date.

(67) For the instructions, see al-Rāzī, 109; al-Janadi, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 90; Ṭirāz, f 111a; ᶜAsjad, 29; al-Ahdah, Tuḥfat, f 40a; Abū Makhramah, II, 64.

(68) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322, for example, confirms that al-Haysam rebelled against Ḥammad due to personal conflict. Other Yemeni historians record that he stood against the harsh treatment of Ḥammād towards the Yemenis, see al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91; ᶜAsjad, 29; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 132.

these sources portray Ḥammād al-Barbarī as the oppressor and al-Haysam as the one who attempted to stop him. Since that is all the information we have it is difficult to offer any other judgement. Thus al-Haysam's revolt was either the result of personal enmity towards Ḥammād or of his sympathy with the Yemenis and his opposition to the harsh treatment that Hammād meted out to them.

Unfortunately, our sources give no details of the battles that took place between the ᶜAbbāsid troops and the rebels. However, they do confirm that Ḥammād al-Barbarī's initial attempt to suppress the revolt was a failure and that the governor had to write to the caliph for reinforcements. (69) The strength of the revolt lay in the rebels' geographical advantage and the existence of influential leadership among the insurgents; consequently, Ḥammād was unable to put down the revolt until he had succeeded in arresting al-Haysam by means of trickery.(70)

As for the Ṭihāmah insurrection, we know that as a result of the Yemeni rebellion against ᶜAbbāsid authority, Ḥammād al-Barbarī was despatched to the area.(71) Since

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(69) Al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 108; Ibn al-Dayba ᶜ, Qurrat, I, 132. Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 91 f; ᶜAsjad, 29; all say that the caliph reinforced him by ten commanders [ten armed divisions].

(70) Al- Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 322. Cf also, al-Razi, 108; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 92f; ᶜAsjad, 29; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a, who mention that "Al-Haysam fled from Ḥammād to Baysh, a village in Tihāmah, where he was arrested." Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 144, says that Ḥammād despatched an army led by Ḥarād who succeeded in arresting al-Haysam. According to al-Ṭabarī, III, 712, al-Haysam was arrested in 191/806-7.

(71) Cf. 316 above.

the insurgents were mainly from Tihamāh, ᶜAbbāsid troops must have been directed there. Yet, there is no mention in the sources at our disposal of a direct confrontation between the Ṭihamāh rebels and the caliphal army, nor any indication as to the political situation of the region during Ḥammād's governorship (184-94/800-10).(72)

On the other hand, our sources confirm that Ḥammād suppressed the rebels and forced them to pay land tax (kharāj). (73) Once again our sources give neither the identity of the rebels, nor the names of their provinces. There is, indeed, a possibility that the revolt of al-Haysam and the Ṭihāmah insurrection were interrelated. Although lack of material does not allow judgements of absolute certainty, two reasons exist for this assumption : firstly, the geographical proximity of the troubled areas, i.e. the territory of ᶜAkk; in Ṭihāmah, and Jibāl Maswar; and, secondly, the failure of the sources to provide information about the Ṭihāmah rebellion and its emphasis on al-Haysam's revolt makes us believe the latter rebellion had included the former under its leadership. (74) Thus, while Ḥammād al-Barbarī succeeded in suppressing the uprising of al-Haysam after the latter's arrest in 191/806-7 he failed to put a stop to rebellion in Tihāmah. There, insurrectionist activity

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(72) Except this vague indication which throws a little light on the ᶜAbbāsid invasions to this region. This attack comes to us through messages made by the Yemenis to the caliph al-Amīn and his minister. see 332-3 below.

(73) Al-Janadī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 90f; ᶜAsjad, 29; Ibn al-Dayba ᶜ, Qurrat, I, 132; Abū Makhramah, II, 65.

(74) Especially as the latter enjoyed strong leadership.

resurfaced within less than ten years.(75)

All in all, Ḥammād's more successful achievements were concentrated in the Yemeni highlands (Najd al-Yaman) and especially the area to the north of Ṣanᶜā, where he controlled the trade routes which connected Ṣanᶜā with al-Yamāmah and Mecca. (76) Undoubtedly, the amount of attention paid by our sources to his success there leads us to believe that the area was insecure long before Ḥammād's governorship. If this assertion is correct, the nomads of the area may themselves have been the cause of the unrest. Al-Rāzī (77) records that Ḥammād kept the nomads (al-aᶜrāb) in check, preserving the security of the routes. The Yemeni historians (78) tell us that as a result of Ḥammād's military activity, the Yemen entered a period of economic ease such as it had never witnessed before.

Thus, it may be said that had Ḥammād not taken such a serious stand against the rebels, this part of the Yemen would never have become secure. However, such interest

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(75) The insurrection flared up in the area at the beginning of the caliphate of al-Maᵓmūn 198/813-4, see 347-8 below.

(76) The sources mention only the security of these routes which lead us to believe that the ᶜAbbāsids succeeded in controlling the area. See al-Rāzī, 110; al-Janādī, f 45b; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 111a; Kifāyah, 91; ᶜAsjad, 29; Abū Makhramah, II, 65; al-Ahdal, f 40a.

(77) Tārīkh, 110.

(78) See, al-Rāzī, 109; Idrīs, f 175a; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 132; al-Janadī, f 45a; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 111a; Kifāyah, 91; ᶜAsjad, 29; Abū Makhramah, II, 65; al-Ahdal, f 40a.

on the part of the ᶜAbbāsid caliph in Yemeni affairs offers clear proof of the growth and widespread nature of local insurrections against his authority there. On the other hand, this emphasis illustrates the fact that the Baghdād administration at that time paid more attention towards its interests in the area. By and large, such successful expeditions were not to be repeated by the ᶜAbbāsid regime during the period of Hārūn al-Rashīd's successors. (79)

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(79) See Chapter XI below.

Table 7.[1] The nasab of al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Samad

Sabā (al-Aṣghar)
|
Zurᶜah (Ḥimyar al-Aṣghar)
|
Sadad
|
Zayd
|
Malik
|
al-Ḥārith
|
Shurahbīl
|
Murrah (Dhū Khalīl) [2]
|
ᶜArīb
|
Nawf
|
Karib
|
Zayd
|
ᶜAmr
|
Buhr
|
ᶜAbd al-Ṣamad
|
al-Haysam [3]

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(1) After al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 321; al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 158.

(2) One of the eight most influential chiefs (al-Mathāminah) who ruled the Yemen after Sayf b. Dhī Yazan. Cf. al-Rasulī, Ṭurfat, 55; in al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 294, who ruled the Yemen after Dhū Nuwās. Cf. also al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 156f.

(3) The leader of the rebellion against the ᶜAbbāsid regime in Jibāl Maswar during the caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd

Table 8 — The governors of the Yemen in the time of the early ʿAbbāsid Caliphs (132-93/750-809)

appointed by Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās, al-Saffāḥ (132-6/750-4)

Dāwūd b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al-ʿAbbās (1)

ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Zayd b. al-Khaṭṭab al-ʿAdawī (2)

Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Madān al-Ḥārithī (3)

ʿAbd Allāh b. Mālik al-Ḥārithī (4)

ʿAlī b. al-Rabīʿ b. ʿAbd al-Madān al-Ḥārithī (5)

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(1) Over the Ḥijāz and the Yemen, he resided in Mecca. Cf. 300 above.

(2) Deputy of above. See 300 above.

(3) His governorship lasted for five months only, see Ibn ʿAbd al-Madjīd, 19.

(4) Idrīs, f 174a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 19; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 77; ʿAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 120; Bughyat, 28. His governorship lasted for four months. Omitted by Zambaur, Manuel, 113; Bikhazi, "Coins", 15.

(5) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 413, says he was appointed by his uncle Ziyād b. ʿUbayd Allāh. Idrīs, f174a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 19; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 77; ʿAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 120; Bughyat, 28, all of them give four years and some months for the period of his governorship, which is not acceptable, because this period does not correspond with the period of Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās's reign, i.e. four years nine months, if we discount the period of ʿAlī b. al-Rabīʿ's predecessors in this post during Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās Caliphate. Cf. Serjeant, Lewcock , Smith and Costa, "Great Mosque", 324, 348, which tells us that in 136/754 the ʿAbbāsid Caliph al-Mahdī (most likely Abū ʾl-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ who died by the end of this year whose first name was ʿAbd Allāh) gave his order to his governor in the Yemen, ʿAlī b. al-Rabīʿ to repair the mosques of Ṣanʿāʾ.

appointed by Abū Jaᶜfar al-Manṣūr (136-59/754-75)

ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Rabīᶜ b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbd al-Madān al-Ḥārīthī (6)	136-42/753-9
Maᶜn b. Zāʾidah b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Maṭar b. Sharīk b. al-Ṣulb b. Murrah b. Hammām b. Murrah b. Dhuhl al-Shaybānī (7)	142-51/759-68
Zāʾidah b. Maᶜn (8)	151-3/768-70
al-Ḥajjāj b. Manṣūr (9)	
al-Furāt b. Sālim (10)	153-4/770-1

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(6) Cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431; Idrīs, f174a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd,19; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 78; ᶜAsjad, 25; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 121f; Bughyat, 28. He travelled to Baghdād leaving his son in charge. Omitted by Smith, "History of Sanᶜāʾ",53. The latter and Bikhāzī, "Coins",15, instead they insert ᶜAlī b. al-Rabīᶜ. See also 309 above.

(7) For a detailed discussion of the Maᶜn's governorship, cf.308,13 above.

(8) He replaced his father "Maᶜn", who left to go to Sijistān, in 151/768, cf. al-Ṭabarī, III,368 (citing of al-Wāqīdī); al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 118. See also Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20. Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 81; ᶜAsjad,26f; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, I, 123; Bughyat,28, all of them say that Zāʾidah ruled the Yemen three years after his father, which is not acceptable, see Bikhazī, 16. We have already mentioned that Maᶜn was appointed over the Yemen in 142/759-60, Cf. 308 above, and al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 108, says he remained there for nine years. It is quite probable he left the Yemen in 151/768 , the year in which his son replaced him.

(9) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 82; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat,I, 123; Bughyat, 28. Idrīs, Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd omit.

(10) He was in office in 153/770, see al-Hamdani, Ṣifat, I, 59. See also Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 82; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 123. Bughyat omits. They all give three years for the period of his governorship. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431, does not give a specific date. See also Bikhazi, 16; Smith, "History of Sanᶜāʾ," 53.

Yazīd b. Manṣūr al-Ḥimyarī[11] (154-8/770-5)
appointed by al-Mahdī (158-69/775-85)

Yazīd b. Manṣūr al-Ḥimyarī (12)	159/775-6
Rajā' b. Rawḥ al-Judhāmī (13)	159-60/776-7
ᶜAlī b. Sulaymān b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās (14)	161-2/777-8

(11) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 59, confirms that he arrived in the Yemen early in 154/771. See also Idrīs, f174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 82f; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 123f; Bughyat, 28f, who confirm that he came in 154/771, except Qurrat which records he replaced al-Furāt b. Sālim. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431, mentions that he occupied this post in the latter part of al-Manṣūr's caliphate and gives no specific date. Al-Ṭabarī, III, gives two contradictory accounts; in the first quoting al-Wāqidī, 372, he says that in 153/770, Yazīd was the governor of al-Yaman; in the second, 371 he says in this year Yazīd was governor of Basra.

(12) He was re-appointed by al-Mahdī for the whole year and left designating ᶜAbd al-Khāliq b. Muḥammad al-Shihāhī in charge for some two months, Cf. Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 124; Bughyat, 29. See also Ibn Khayyāṭ, 431 who says al-Mahdī reappointed him for a while. See also Bikhazī, 19. Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜā' omits, instead he inserts al-Shihābī.

(13) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 466. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20, says that he arrived in the Yemen in Dhū 'l-Ḥijjah. Idrīs, f 174b, confirms that his governorship lasted for thirteen months. See also al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 132, who mentions that he succeeded Yazīd b. Manṣūr in this post.

(14) Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20; al-Khazraji, Kifāyah, 83; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, all of them confirm that he arrived in Ṣanᶜā' in Muḥarram 161/October, 777. In the following year he left appointing Wasiᶜ b. ᶜIṣmah in his place, ibid. Bikhazī, 19, follows al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat I,64, and gives 162 for his arrival in the Yemen. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 493, states that he was dismissed in this year.

ᶜAbd Allāh b.Sulaymān(15)	163-4/779-81	brother of above.
Manṣūr b. Yazīd b. Manṣūr al-Ḥimyarī (16)	165/781-2	
ᶜAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān al-Rabᶜī (17)	166/782-3	
Sulaymān b. Yazīd b. ᶜAbd Madān al-Ḥārithī (18)	167-9/783-5	

(15) Idrīs, f174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 20f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 83f; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29, all of them say he arrived at Ṣanᶜā in Rabiᶜ II, and stayed some seventeen months. In al-Ṭabarī, III, 502, he was dismissed in 164. See also Ibn Khayyāṭ, 440; Bikhazi, 19f; Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜā", 53.

(16) He came in 165/781-2 and stayed about one year, cf. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 84; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29. Al-Ṭabarī III, 502, gives 164/780-1 for his appointment, and followed by Bikhazi, 20. Zambaur, 113, has al-Manṣūr b. Yazīd b. al-Manṣūr.

(17) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 521. Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ᶜAbd Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifayah, 84; ᶜAsjad, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29, all of them say he stayed one year; in Qurrat, I, 126, he remained until the death of al-Mahdī (169/785), and these sources have al-Nawfalī instead of al-Rabᶜī.

(18) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 521, says he was in the Yemen in 167/783-4. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 440, places him after ᶜAlī b. Sulaymān b. ᶜAlī b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās. In Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 85; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29, all of them confirm that he stayed throughout al-Mahdī's reign. Qurrat omits.

appointed by al-Hādī (169-70/785-6)

ᶜAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī
Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī
b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās (19)

Ibrāhīm b. Salm b. Qutaybah
b. Muslim al-Bāhilī (20)

appointed by al-Rashīd (170-93/786-809)

al-Ghiṭrīf b. ᶜAṭāʾ (21) 170-3/786-90

al-Rabīᶜ b. ᶜAbd Allāh b.
ᶜAbd al-Madān al-Hārithī (22) 174-5/790-1

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(19) Idrīs, f,174b; Ibn Abd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 85; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29, all of them say that he remained one year. In al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 132, Abd Allāh b. Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Zaynabī. Omitted by Ibn Khayyāṭ; Zambaur; Bikhazī. See also Smith, "History of Sanᶜā," 54.

(20) In Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 85; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29; Qurrat, I, 127, read Sulaymān instead of Salm; and all say he stayed for four months until death of al-Hādī in Rabīᶜ I, 170/September 786. See Ibn Khayyāṭ, 446. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 568, says that Ibrāhīm governed the Yemen in 169/785-6.

(21) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 590f; he was appointed in 170/786-7. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 86; Asjad, 28; all of them say he stayed in al-Janad, while the former gives three years nine months for the period of al-Ghitrif's governorship, the latter gives three years seven months. This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf. Bikhazī, 20; Muḥarram "Danānīr Islāmiyyah", 24; Lowick, "Mint", 303. In 173/790, he left the Yemen appointing ᶜAbbād b. Muḥammad al-Shihābī in his place, the latter remained in office until the end of the following year.

(22) Idrīs, f 174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21; ᶜal-Khazraji, Kifayah, 86f; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 128, all of them say that he arrived in the Yemen in the later part of 174/791. Ibn Khayyat omits.

ᶜĀṣim b. ᶜUtbah al-Ghassānī (23)	175/791-2	
Ayyūb b. Jaᶜfar b. Sulaymān b. ᶜAlī b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās (24)	176/792-3	
al-Rabīᶜ b. ᶜAbd Allāh b.ᶜAbd al-Madān al-Ḥārithī (24)	177-8/793-5	joint authority
al-ᶜAbbās b. Saᶜīd (mawlā of B.Hāshim) (25)		
Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Hāshimī (26)	178-9/795-6	

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(23) Idrīs, f174b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29, all of them record that he stayed only one year, though they give no date for his arrival in Ṣanᶜāᵓ; in the latter ᶜ Utaybah and in Qurrat, I, 128, ᶜUyaynah. Ibn Khayyāṭ omits. Bikhazī, 21, suggests that he arrived early in 175/791.

(24) Idrīs, f 174b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29, all of them mention that he remained in Ṣanᶜāᵓ for a whole year; Qurrat omits.

(25) Both al-Rabīᶜ and al-ᶜAbbās were appointed as joint authority, the former to head the military and lead the prayer and the latter to supervise the levy of the alms-tax. Cf 302 above. Idrīs, f175a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 29, all of them mention that they remained in the Yemen for some two years. It is most likely that al-ᶜAbbās stayed in Ṣanᶜāᵓ, since al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 137 says that al-Rashīd sent back al-Rabīᶜ to the Yemen except Ṣanᶜāᵓ, and in page 143 he (i.e. al-Yaᶜqūbī) records that al-Rashīd appointed his mawla i.e. al-ᶜAbbās over the Yemen. Both governors are omitted by Bikhazi. Al-ᶜAbbas omitted by Smith "History of Ṣanᶜāᵓ".

(26) He was appointed over the Hijāz and the Yemen, stayed in the Hijāz and sent his son al-ᶜAbbas to the Yemen. Cf. Idrīs, f 175a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 21f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 87f; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 129; Bughyat, 29f (the latter records that al-ᶜAbbās was dismissed after six months) Ibn Khayyāṭ, 461, say that first he sent his son Ibrāhīm, then, he dismissed him and appointed al-ᶜAbbās. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 637, confirms that Muḥammad was the governor of Mecca in 178/794-5

ᶜAbd Allāh b. Musᶜab b.Thābit b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr (27)	180/796-7
Aḥmad b. Ismāᶜīl b. ᶜAlī al-Hāshimī (28)	181/797-8
Ibrāhīm b. ᶜAbd Allāh b.Ṭalḥah al-Ḥajabī (of B. ᶜAbd al-Dār) (29)	182-3/798-9
Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Barmak (30)	183-4/799-800
Ḥammād al-Barbarī (mawlā of al-Rashīd (31)	184-93/800-9

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(27) Idrīs, f175a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 22; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 88; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 30, all of them say that he remained only one year, though they give no indication of his arrival in Ṣanᶜā. Bikhazi, 22, gives 180/796-7, for his governorship; Lowick, "Mint", 303, has 180-1/796-8.

(28) Idrīs, f175a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd 22, both give 181/797-8 for his governorship. Smith, "History" 54; Bikhazī, 22, both read Aḥmad b. Ismāᶜīl b. ᶜAlī b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Ṭalḥah b. Abi Ṭalḥah. For the correct name, cf. al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 88; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 129; Bughyat, 30.

(29) Al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 58, say that he came in 182/798-9 followed by Bikhazī, 22. Idrīs, f175a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 22; al-Khazraji, Kifāyah, 89; ᶜAsjad, 28; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 30, all of them say that he remained only one year. Qurrat omits.

(30) He arrived in Shawwāl 183/November, 799. For the reference, cf note 8 in Chapter X.

(31) He reached Ṣanᶜāᵓ in Shawwal 184/November 800. For the reference, cf note 61 in Chapter x. This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf. Bikhazī, 23; Lowick "Mint", 303.

CHAPTER XI

The Yemen from the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's reign

(193-233/809-47)

When Harūn al-Rashīd died in 193/809, the ᶜAbbāsid Empire was divided between two of his sons, al-Amīn and al-Maᵓmūn, with the stipulation that the former assume the office of caliph and the latter be his heir apparent. In the following year the power struggle between the two brothers flared up, which led the Muslim world into the Civil War. This war continued until the murder of al-Amīn in Baghdād in 198/813, and the office of the caliphate fell to al-Maᵓmūn.(1) It is noticeable that this Civil War is considered the watershed of ᶜAbbāsid rule; it clearly hastened many changes in the fabric of Muslim society.(2) Apparently, ᶜAbbāsid domination over the regions, including the Yemen, became weak. In this region, while local power appeared in strength disputing the caliphal regime in the area, the ᶜAbbāsids failed to suppress them. In some parts of the country the caliphs worked to safeguard the loyalty of the area, in other regions their regime was opposed and the governors were expelled. However, the following chapter will cover the political situation in the Yemen and its relations with the ᶜAbbāsid administration from the death of al-Rashīd to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's rule (193-233/809-47), showing the escalation of local uprisings and caliphal policy towards it.

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(1) See, al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 146 ff; al-Ṭabarī, III, 651 ff Ibn Khaldūn, ᶜIbar, III, 471 ff. Cf. also Shaᶜban, Islamic History, II, 39 ff.

(2) Lassner, The Shaping of ᶜAbbāsid Rule, 48.

A. The Yemen during the Civil War

By the end of al-Rashīd's reign 193/809, the ᶜAbbāsid influence was clearly manifest in the central and northern parts of the Yemeni highlands (Najd al-Yaman) and could be felt, albeit less strongly in the other Yemeni regions.(3) Throughout the period of the Civil War (193-8/809-14) the eastern part of the empire represented the focal point of events. Consequently, our sources pay considerably less attention to the other provinces under caliphal rule. Thus reports of affairs in the Yemen are limited to the appointment and replacement of governors there, with few references to their activities.

During the first year of al-Amīn's caliphate, 193/809, the Yemenis themselves were working for the dismissal of Ḥammād al-Barbarī from the governorship of the Yemen, a post which he held during the period 184-94/800-10.(4) Although the sources at our disposal do not directly illuminate the political situation of the area during this period, messages and complaints made by the inhabitants of Ṣanᶜāᵓ to the caliph and his minister, al-Faḍl b. al-Rabīᶜ, do throw some light on the aggressive attacks of Ḥammād al-Barbarī against certain Yemeni tribes, especially those in Tihāmah and the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. The Ṣanᶜānīs alluded to the areas under attack from Ḥammād's troops in

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(3) As has already been mentioned Ḥammād al-Barbarī, the governor of the Yemen (184-94/800-10), succeeded in controlling the central and the northern parts of the highlands, see 321 above.

(4) See Table 8, 11.

the following verses sent to al-Faḍl b. al-Rabīᶜ

فَأْمُنْ على قومٍ رجوكَ ودارُهُم ... صنعاءُ والبلدان عنسٌ ويحصُبُ

وأرحمْ يتامى ضائعينَ وصبيةٍ ... نحو السكاسكِ دمعُهُم يتسكَّبُ

وأرحم أراملَ بالحصيبِ عيونُهَا ... بالدمعِ ذائبةٌ تسيلُ وتسكبُ

"So grant favours to those who have put their hope in you - and whose Lands Sanᶜāʾ and the countries, ᶜAns and Yaḥṣub.
And be merciful to our wretched orphans and children - whose tears flow continuously towards al-Sakāsik.
And be merciful to the widows of al-Ḥusayb whose eyes - are full of tears, flowing constantly. (5)

Although our information concerning Ḥammād's incursions against the Yemenis is scant, it is clear from these verses that he attempted to control the regions of Ṭihāmah and the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. Ibn al-Mujāwir(6) writes that the territory of al-Ashāᶜir, in the southern part of Ṭihāmah, was the scene of tribal conflict which resulted in the leaders of the hostile factions going to Baghdād to seek the mediation of the caliph, al-Amīn, and to ask him to designate one of them as ruler of the area concerned. Yet, despite the fact that an overall leader was agreed upon, political disorder in the territory did not abate. Thus a political vacuum was created in the Ashāᶜir area which existed until the governor of the Yemen presented a report to al-Maʾmūn on the disturbances in 202/817-8.(7)

Apparently, Ḥammād al-Barbarī had managed to recruit various loyal Yemenis with the aim of attacking Tihāmah and the southern part of the Yemeni highlands. This was confirmed by the Ṣanᶜānīs in their message to the caliph, al-Amīn, which

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(5) Anon, Tārīkh, f 160b. See also al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāʾiq, 223.

(6) Tārīkh al-Mustabṣir, 65f. For the territory of al-Ashāᶜir see Map 2 .

(7) For this disturbance, see 347-8 below.

reads as follows: "His [i.e. Ḥammād] first act of injustice towards the Muslims and treachery towards the caliph was that he used - in ruling the country - some Yemenis and his own followers who are arrogant, tyrannical, treacherous, immoral, ignorant and straying from what is right who know no kindness and do not oppose any forbidden."(8) Yet despite this, our knowledge of the political situation in Ṣanʿā during this year remains vague. From the above complaint, however, it is clear that the Ṣanʿānīs were suffering to a considerable extent from the aggression of Ḥammād and his followers.

In 194/810, Ḥammād was replaced by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Malīk al-Khuzāʿī.(9) The new governor's main achievement was his pursuit of Ḥammād's representatives in the different regions of the Yemen and the subsequent confiscation of their properties. These steps satisfied the Yemenis.(10) Such an initiative on the part of the new governor leads us to believe that the Ṣanʿānīs' petition to al-Amīn and his minister, al-Faḍl b. al-Rabīʿ, had been both welcomed and accepted. Within a year Muḥammad al-Khuzāʿī was able to restore law and order in the area. However, in Shaʿbān 195/May-June 811, he was replaced by Muḥammad b. Saʿīd b. al-Sarḥ al-Kināni.(11) Our sources are silent on both the achievements of the new ruler and the overall political situation in the area during his governorship.

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(8) Al-Akwaʿ, Wathāʾiq, 220.

(9) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 93; ʿAsjad, 30; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 136.

(10) Al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 93; al-ʿAsjad, 30.

(11) Ibid.

although al-Ya^{c}qūbī(12) confirms that the governor left the Yemen for Palestine, having amassed great wealth.

Such are the only references to Muḥammad al-Khuzā^{c}ī and Muḥammad al-Kinānī in our sources. The paucity of information about them may indicate the lack of any significant achievement on their part in their services to the central government. If the first governor managed to eliminate Ḥammād's representatives there, then the sole claim to fame his successor had was the fortune he accumulated while in office. Politically, it appears that the situation in the area was not unlike that during the caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd.

However, in 196/811-2, the power struggle between al-Amīn and al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn changed considerably in favour of the latter. From Khurāsān al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn sent his army to capture Baghdād and to declare his caliphate. Once in Baghdād his general, Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, despatched al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn's governors to various regions, including the Yemen. There Yazīd b. Jarīr al-Qaṣrī was appointed governor, arriving in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$ in Dhū $^{\supset}$l-Ḥijjah 196/August-September 812.(13) Although the local historians make no mention of the political situation in the Yemen at the time of Yazīd's appointment, they

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(12) Tārīkh, III, 165.

(13) Al-Tabarī, III, 857, 64; al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 165, both giving the name Yazīd b. Jarīr al-Bajalī. Al-Janadī, Sulūk, f. 45b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; ^{c}Asjad, 30; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 138; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 40b; Idrīs, Kanz, f 175a, the latter giving the date. It seems to be that Yazīd was appointed over the Yemen, except ^{c}Akk territory which belonged to the governor of Mecca at that time, see al-Ṭabarī, III, 863.

readily accept that he abused his power by bolstering Qaḥṭānī solidarity and treating the Abnāʾ in Ṣanʿāʾ badly with considerable hostility. (14) In discussing the main reasons behind Yazid's appointment to the Yemen, al-Ṭabarī (15) records that the former was despatched there by Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn with a large army and swore that he would persuade his people and also his kinsmen of the Yemeni "kings" and nobles to recognise the caliphate of al-Maʾmūn. Thus the main purpose behind the appointment was a political one. Yazīd, according to al-Ṭabarī, (16) succeeded in his mission, duly convincing the Yemenis to depose (khalʿ) al-Amīn and recognize al-Maʾmūn. According to many sources, (17) Yazīd concentrated his efforts against the Abnāʾ through the ploy of fostering Qaḥṭānī solidarity. No other explanation offers any real credibility. Naturally, Yazīd's good relationship with the Qaḥṭānī chiefs, especially the Ṣanʿānīs, meant the certain enmity of the Abnāʾ in that town. (18) It is thus apparent that his aggression towards the Abnāʾ was aimed at satisfying the Qaḥṭānīs in Ṣanʿāʾ. If al-Ṭabarī's statement is correct, two things became obvious ; firstly the intention

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(14) Al-Janadī, f 46a; Idrīs, f175a,b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 40b; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 139.

(15) III, 864.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Especially the local ones, such as Idrīs, Kanz, f 175 a-b; al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f40b; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 139.

(18) Such as B. al-Hārith and B. Shihāb, the former a clan of Madhḥij. See, Table 2 . And the latter is a clan of Himyar, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 155ff.

by the caliphate to win over the Yemeni chiefs in the Yemen and secondly, the fact that the territory as a whole became involved in the political life of the Islamic Empire.

Unfortunately, our sources throw little light on the political situation of the Yemen during the governorship of Yazīd b. Jarīr, 196-8/811-4, with the exception of his aggression against the Abnā$^{\supset}$ in San^{c}ā$^{\supset}$. Yet the historians do recount how this governor was dismissed, although they differ on the direct cause of his dismissal. Al-Janadī, al-Khazrajī and al-Ahdal (19) confirm that he lost his position after al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn heard of his harsh aggression against the Abnā$^{\supset}$. Idrīs, Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd and another account in al-Khazrajī(20) mention that, since Yazīd failed to show generosity towards Abū $^{\supset}$l-Ṣalt, the Iraqi delegate, the latter encouraged the caliph to strip him of the governorship. The second account seems somewhat exaggerated and is, therefore, unacceptable. To the credibility of the first account may be added the fact that it was Abū $^{\supset}$l-Ṣalt himself who delivered the news to al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn of Yazīd's aggression against the Abnā$^{\supset}$. Then when he received the news, al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn replaced Yazīd by ^{c}Umar b.Ibrāhīm b. Wāqīd al-^{c}Umarī, one of the few non-Qaḥṭānī chiefs in the Yemen, and ordered him to arrest Yazīd and punish him for his misdeeds.(21) Al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn's directive was issued upon the

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(19) Al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94; al-Ahdal, f 40b.

(20) Idrīs, f 175b; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 23; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 94f; ^{c}Asjad, 30.

(21) Idrīs, Kanz, f 175b; al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 95; ^{c}Asjad, 30; al-Ahdal, Tuhfat, f40b. ^{c}Umar b. Ibrahīm b. Wāqid b. Muḥammad b. Zayd b. ^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, see al-Zubayrī, Nasab. 360.

murder of al-Amīn in Muḥarram 198/September 813, when the office of caliphate officially fell to him. So, in the following month al-ᶜUmarī entered Ṣanᶜāᵓ where he arrested Yazīd b. Jarīr and imprisoned him. (22) Al-ᶜUmarī's governorship lasted until Dhūᵓl-Qaᶜdah of the same year, when he was replaced by Isḥāq b. Mūsā b. ᶜIsā al- ᶜAbbāsī.(23) The latter ruled the Yemen until he was forced to leave in early 200/815 due to the spread of the Alid revolt throughout Iraq and the Ḥijāz.

B. The expansion of the Alid revolts to the Yemen

This revolt was led by Abūᵓl-Sarāyā, an adventurer and soldier of fortune who had fought with al-Maᵓmūn against al-Amīn and, in Jumādā II, 199/January-February 815, he joined forces with the Alid pretender Ibn Ṭabāṭabā at Kufa. Following their capture of Kufa, Abūᵓl-Sarāyā, in the name of Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, sent a detachment to take over the important cities of the empire and thus widen the extent of the revolt.(24) Besides those delegated to Basra, Wāsiṭ, Fars and al-Ahwāz, Abūᵓl-Sarāyā sent troops under the leadership of al-Ḥusayn b. al-Afṭas and Muḥammad b. Dāwūd, both descendants of ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, to capture the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, while despatching Ibrāhīm b.Mūsā b.Jaᶜfar

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(22) Ibid

(23) Idrīs, f 175 b.; al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 83a, gives 201 A.H.; Kifāyah, 95; ᶜAsjad, 30; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ Qurrat,I,141; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f40b.

(24) For this revolt, see Ibn Khayyāṭ, 168-70; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 173-6; al-Ṭabarī, III,976.

al-Ṣādiq to seize control of the Yemen. (25) Meanwhile, the governor of the Yemen Isḥāq b. Mūsā al-ᶜAbbāsī had received orders from al-Maᵓmūn to march on Mecca with his army in order to protect the pilgrims (ḥujjāj). (26) Designating his cousin, al-Qāsim b. Ismāᶜīl, as governor in his absence, Isḥāq duly moved south towards Mecca. Somewhere in the Yemen he was attacked by bedouins and forced to retreat as far as Ṣanᶜāᵓ. (27) When Isḥāq received news that Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā was on his way to Ṣanᶜāᵓ, he and his troops left for the Ḥijāz via the Yemeni highlands, (Najd al-Yaman). The departure of the ᶜAbbāsid forces left the country completely at the mercy of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, who easily entered Ṣanᶜāᵓ in Ṣafar 200/September 815. (28)

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(25) Geddes, "Al Maᵓmūn's Šiᶜite Policy", 99. Al-Ṭabarī, III, 987, records that Ibrahim had previously come to Mecca with his family for the ḥajj, and from there he moved to the Yemen, but he does not mention by whom he was appointed for this post. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 24, says that he was designated by al-Ḥusayn b. al-Afṭas. Al-Iṣfahānī, Maqātil, 533; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 97; ᶜAsjad, 31; and Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 142, all confirm that he was directly appointed by Abū ᵓl-Sarāyā. Al-Masᶜūdī, Murūj, VII, 56, states that he appeared in the Yemen in 199/814-5.

(26) For the letter sent by al-Maᵓmūn to Isḥāq on this matter, cf. Anon, Tārīkh, f 167a. Cf. also al-Akwaᶜ, Wathāᵓiq, 224f.

(27) Idris, f175b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 96; al-ᶜAsjad, 31. See also Geddes, "Al-Maᵓmūn", 100.

(28) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 987, gives A.H. 201. Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 131; Idris, Kanz, f175b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 96f; ᶜAsjad, 30f. See also al-Ṭabarī, III, 995, who says that at the end of this year (i.e. A.H.200) Ibrāhīm despatched an army led by an un-named descendent of ᶜAqīl b. Abī Ṭālib to Mecca as the leader of the ḥajj, cf also 341 below.

Hardly anything is known of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's journey from Mecca to Ṣanᶜā'. Al-Hamdānī(29) records that Ibrāhīm made a stop in Ṣaᶜdah where B. Saᶜd b. Saᶜd of Khawlān, immediately declared their support for him. Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā then moved southwards with a large force, his aim being the capture of Ṣanᶜā'. Al-Iṣfahānī (30) mentions that Ibrāhīm was able to take the Yemen with comparative ease, although he identifies neither Ibrāhīm's opposition, nor the place where any clash might have taken place.

However, upon the arrival of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā in the Yemen, the rivalry and conflict between the local tribes began to manifest itself. Ibrāhīm was able to capitalize on the situation and enjoyed the support of some of these tribes. Al-Hamdānī(31) confirms that support was given to him from B. Futaymah, a batn of B. Saᶜd b. Saᶜd from Khawlān.

Although little is known of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's administration over the Yemen, his harsh treatment of the populace and the confiscation of private property, often resulting in the death of his victims, earned for him the title of al-Jazzār, "The Butcher."(32) The existence of tribal conflict had a profound effect upon his administration in the Yemen. In order to satisfy B. Futaymah, his allies, Ibrāhīm arrested the chiefs of Ukayl (a batn of Khawlān who were the

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(29) Iklīl, II, 131f.

(30) Maqātil, 534.

(31) Ikīil, II, 131f; I, 425, 530.

(32) Geddes, "Al-Maᵓmūn", 101. See also al-Ṭabarī, III, 988; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, V, 177; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 24; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 97; ᶜAsjad, 31; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 144.

enemy of B. Fuṭaymah), along with their Ḥimyarī allies, and subsequently slaughtered them.(33) And on the request of his Yemeni allies, Ibrāhīm expelled B. Shihāb, a baṭn of Himyar, from Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$.(34)

Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā was able to rule the Yemen throughout 200/815-6, and dinars were struck in the mint of Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$, bearing his name.(35) By the end of this year, he despatched an army, led by an unnamed descendant of ^{c}Aqīl b. Abī Ṭālib, to Mecca as the leader of the pilgrimage (ḥajj) in the name of the Shī^{c}ī imām.(36) At the same time al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn appointed his brother, Isḥāq, as ḥajj leader, and the latter arrived in Mecca with a large body of troops. When the Alid leader heard of the size of the ^{c}Abbāsid army, he chose to stay with his own men on the outskirts of Mecca. From there he attacked the pilgrim caravan, capturing the new kiswah destined for the Ka^{c}bah and robbing the merchants of their goods. Informed of the raid, the ^{c}Abbāsid leader despatched an army led by ^{c}Īsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī, one of al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn's generals; the Alid troops were soundly defeated and the stolen goods were recovered.(37)

Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān, one of al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn's generals, had accompanied the pilgrim caravan on his way to the Yemen, over which he had been appointed governor by the minister,

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(33) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 131f.

(34) Al-Hamdānī, Iklil, I, 530f, confirms that both al-^{c}Umarī and the Abnā$^{\supset}$ were behind Ibrāhīm's action against B. Shihāb.

(35) Personal communication with Mr. N.Lowick dated 10.12.1982.

(36) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 995.

(37) Ibid.

al-Ḥasan b. Sahl.(38) After completing the hajj ceremonies, he continued southwards to take up his new post and expel Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā from the province. At the beginning of 201/815, he met the Alid forces on the outskirts of Ṣan(ʿ)ā, and in the resulting battle the Alid troops were defeated and their leader, Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, was forced to leave the region.(39)

Our sources differ on the route taken by Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā following his defeat. Al- Yaʿqūbī (40) states that he fled directly to Mecca. Local sources, (41) on the other hand, insist that he remained in the Yemen until his appointment by al-Maʾmūn to the governorship of the province in the latter part of 202/818. In all probability Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā remained in the Yemen during the early part of 201/817, venting his wrath against the ʿAbbāsid allies in the northern area of the highlands. In Ṣaʿdah, therefore, he made an attack upon B. Ukayl, a baṭn of B. Saʿd b. al-Rabīʿah from Khawlān and representative of the ʿAbbāsid allies in the region, destroying their old dam, al-Khāniq, in the process.(42) Meanwhile his ally, Muḥammad al-ʿUmarī, murdered one of the Dhū Laʿwah chiefs, a baṭn of Bakīl.(43) These aggressions by Ibrāhīm and his Yemeni allies in the country undoubtedly

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(38) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 995.

(39) Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III,176; Idrīs,Kanz, f 175b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 25; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat,I,146.

(40) Tārīkh, III, 176.

(41) See Idrīs, f 175b; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 25; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 98; ʿAsjad, 31; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat,I,146.

(42) Al-Hamdānī,Iklīl,VIII,115; al-Rāzī, Tārīkh, 235 f. See also Geddes, "Al-Maʾmūn", 102.

(43) Iklīl, X, 117. For the friendship of al-ʿUmarī with Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, see Iklīl, II, 131; I. 530.

took place during the early months of that year, thus al-Ṭabarī (44) regards it as the first year of the former's uprising. From Ṣa^{c}dah Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā continued northwards to capture the Holy City of Mecca. Informed of the Alid troops imminent arrival in Mecca, the ^{c}Abbāsid commander there, Yazīd al-Makhzūmī, took the offensive against them; however his men were routed and he was killed. Consequently, the Alids had little difficulty in obtaining control over Mecca and its surrounding areas.(45)

C. The rebellion of Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān.

In Dhu ^{ɔ}l-Ḥijjah 201/June-July 817, the house of ^{c}Alī received an unexpected boost when ^{c}Alī al-Riḍā, a son of Imam Mūsā b. Ja^{c}far al-Ṣādiq, was appointed heir to the throne (waliyyan li-^{ɔ}l^{c}ahd) by al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn.(46) Taking advantage of his brother's new position, Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā took illegal control of Mecca, calling upon its citizens to support al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn and his brother, ^{c}Alī al-Riḍā. In the latter part of 202/818, however, Ibrāhīm was officially appointed by the caliph as governor of Mecca and the leader of the ḥajj.(47)

Upon the completion of the ḥajj ceremonies, Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā advanced towards the Yemen, where he had been appointed

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(44) III, 987.

(45) Geddes, "Al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn", 103. See also al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 176; al-Fāsī, ^{c}Iqd, III, 264.

(46) Cf. al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 176, who says in Ramaḍān; al-Ṭabarī, III, 1012; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 61. See also Geddes, "Al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn" 103.

(47) Ibn Habīb, Muḥabbar, 40; al-Ṭabarī, III, 1029; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Tārīkh, 471; al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 58b; al-Fāsī, ^{c}Iqd, III, 264.

a governor.(48) Gaining control over the area, however, was not an easy matter for him, given the resistance of Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān, whom he was to replace. During his two years as governor of the Yemen, (201-2/816-8), Ḥamdawayh had succeeded in strengthening his own army, among which were certain Yemenis. With the approach of Ibrāhīm and his army towards Ṣanᶜā' early in 203/818, Ḥamdawayh rode out to meet them at Jadir. In the battle which ensued, Ibrāhīm's forces were routed and he was forced to flee back to Mecca. (49)

Following his victory over Ibrāhīm, Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān revolted against the caliph, proclaiming independence from the central government.(50) When the news of the rebellion reached al-Maʾmūn, who was on his way to Baghdād from Marw, he immediately appointed ᶜIsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī over the Yemen with orders to send Ḥamdawayh as a prisoner to Baghdād. (51)

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(48) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 177. Idris ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 25; and Ibn al-Dayba ᶜ, Kanz, f175b; Ibn ᶜ, Qurrat, I, 146, mention that he received the ᶜahd al-wilāyah while he was in the vicinity of Ṣanᶜā'.

(49) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 177, states that Ibrāhīm at first defeated Ḥamdawayh's son and pushed on towards Ṣanᶜā' . When he reached that city Ḥamdawayh himself went out to meet him and it was then that Ibrāhīm fled to Mecca; see Geddes, "Al-Maʾmūn." 104, note 29. Cf. also Idris, Kanz, f 175b; Ibn al-Dayba ᶜ, Qurrat, I, 146, who mention the place of the battle; Ibn ᶜAbd-al-Majīd, 25. Jadir are two villages Jadir al-ᶜUlyā and Jadir al-Suflā; see Iklil, I, 526. Al- Akwaᶜ in, Iklīl, I, 526, note 1561; Ibn al-Dayba ᶜ, Qurrat, I, 146, note 4, says the Jadirs are in al-Raḥabah, north of Ṣanᶜā' . The village of Jadir is about 13 kms north Ṣanᶜā', personal communication with Dr. R. Wilson dated 15 July 1983.

(50) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 182. See also Geddes, "the Yuᶜfirid", 41.

(51) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, III, 182.

While our sources agree that Ḥamdawayh did revolt in the Yemen, no specific reasons for the rebellion are given. Yet if we connect this revolt with other uprisings against the pro-Shi^{c}ite policy of al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn at that time we may conclude that Ḥamdawayd may have been one of those opposed to the caliphal policy.(52) Geddes(53) suggests this when he writes that Ibn Māhān was "probably in revolt against the pro-Shī^{c}ite policy of the caliph".

However, on this occasion we should not ignore the role played in this revolt by some Yemenis, especially those who had suffered a year of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's domination over the Yemen in 200-1/815-6, such as B.Ukayl of Khawlān in Ṣa^{c}dah and their allies among the different Yemeni tribes.(54) Thus we may assume that these Yemenis may have encouraged Ḥamdawayh to reject Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's governorship, offering, by way of compensation, their support for him against the Iraqi army. The reasons for this assumption are threefold : the first is the high number of Ḥamdawayh's army;(55) the second is the appointment of certain Yemenis who were hostile towards the rule of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, such as Muḥammad b. ^{c}Abbād al-Ukaylī, as representatives of

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(52) When al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn appointed ^{c}Alī al-Riḍā as a heir to the throne, many of his followers opposed his and revolted against him, thus they elected Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī as a caliph in Baghdād, see al-Ṭabarī, III, 1015f; al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 178; Ibn Khayyāṭ, 470; al-Mas^{c}ūdī, Murūj, VII, 615; Tanbīh, 349 f; Ibn Khaldūn, al-^{c}Ibar, III, 526f.

(53) "The Yu^{c}firid ", 41;

(54) See 340-1 above. And see al-Ya^{c}qūbī, Tārīkh, III, 177, who says that Hamdawayh convinced a group of the Yemeni and then he dismissed the caliph.

(55) Hamdawayh was able to recruit ten thousand men and used them to stop al-Jalūdī's advance to Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$. See 346 below.

Ḥamdawayh in some Yemeni provinces; (56) and the third is the inflammatory propaganda spread by some of these opposing Ibrāhīm's rule in the Yemen, such as Aḥmad b. Yazīd al-Qushaybī of Ḥimyar. (57)

Once informed of his appointment as governor of the Yemen, ʿĪsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī left Iraq with the ḥajj caravan in 204/820. The ḥajj ceremonies over, al-Jalūdī continued south to take up his new position and arrest Ḥamdawayh. (58) Informed of the approach of al-Jalūdī's army, Ḥamdawayh added to his own troops a number of men recruited from the local tribes. He then sent his son, ʿAbd Allāh, in the van of his troops to make the first attack upon the imperial army. The two armies clashed on the 5th of Jumada I, 205/23rd of October 820; Ḥamdawayh's men were routed and his son fled to Mecca. With his army defeated and his son gone, Ḥamdawayh found himself in this impasse. He thus fled to Ṣanʿāʾ to hide from al-Jalūdī, but in vain. There he was easily arrested, put in chains and sent to Baghdād. (59)

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(56) Iklīl, I, 317f.

(57) Iklīl, II, 131 f.

(58) Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 182.

(59) Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 182; Idrīs, Kanz, f175b; (gives the Ibn ʿAbd al-Mājīd, 25; al-Khazraji, Kifāyah, 98; ʿAsjad, number 31; Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Qurrat, I, 147. See also Geddes, "Al-Maʾmūn," 104f.

In actual fact these political disorders which had plagued the Yemen for approximately five years, 200-5/815-20, were centred on the highland area. The influence of the unrest on the other Yemeni regions, except Tihāmah, is not clear in our sources. This influence is however seen in the uprising of the ᶜAkk and the Ashāᶜir, the two major tribal powers in the region, in 202/817-8. But this trouble was swiftly checked by al-Maᵓmūn, who appointed Muḥammad b. Ziyād over the area and allowed him to establish his own dynasty there. Now we must turn our attention to this region and discover the main reasons for the establishment of the new rule in Tihāmat al-Yaman. Naturally, a history of this dynasty is beyond the scope of the present study; the aim at this point is to illustrate the reasons behind the caliph's decision to set up such a state in this particular area.

D. The establishment of the B. Ziyād dynasty

The new dynasty was named after its founder, Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Ziyād, a descendent of ᶜUbayd Allāh b. Ziyād, who was at that time settled in Yemen.(60) The idea for the establishment of the state having been conceived immediately after the political disturbances in the region during 202/817.

In Muḥarram 202/July-August 817, whilst Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī, the caliph's uncle, was being declared caliph in Baghdād by the inhabitants of the city, a letter arrived

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(60) Kay, Yaman, its Early Mediaeval History, text, 104, trans 141.

in al-Maʾmūn's capital at that time, Marw, carrying the news that the two major tribes of Tihāmah, the ʿAkk and al-Ashāʿir, had risen in revolt against the ʿAbbāsid authorities in the Yemen. As soon as the news reached the court of al-Maʾmūn his minister, al-Faḍl b. Sahl, suggested that the caliph appoint Muḥammad b. Ziyād as amir there in order to quell the insurrection. Duly accepting his minister's suggestion, al-Maʾmūn appointed Ibn Ziyād as amir and designated two of the latter's own companions to assist him.(61)

The following year, Ibn Ziyād and his assistants accompanied an army sent to oppose the anti-caliph Ibrāhīm b. al-Madhī in Baghdād. From there they travelled to Mecca with the pilgrimage caravan and, upon completion of the ḥajj ceremonies, they continued southwards to Tihāmat al-Yaman. After waging war with the inhabitants there Ibn Ziyād succeeded in securing a foothold in the area. In Shaʿbān 204/January-February 820, he laid the foundations of Zabīd, the city which was to be the capital of his dynasty for another two hundred and five years.(62)

Certain historians link the establishment of this dynasty with Alid activities in Tihāmah, even though there is no concrete evidence in our sources which might confirm the existence of such activities in the region at that time. Ibn Khaldūn makes an unacceptable statement regarding this matter,

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(61) Cf. Kay, text, 2f -trans, 3 f; Ibn al-Mujāwir, al-Mustabṣir, I, 66 f; Idrīs, Kanz, f 176a; Ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd, 25; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 99 f; Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, I, 320f; Bughyat, 39; Abū Makhramah, II, 216. See also Geddes, "Al-Maʾmūn", 105f.

(62) See Kay, trans, 4-text 3. Ibn al-Dayba, Qurrat, I, 321f, confirms that the descendants of Ibn Ziyād remained in the city until the last of them was dismissed in 409/1018-9.

saying, "Among the leading men of Yaman sent up to al-Maʾmūn there was one, Muhammad son of Ziyād, a descendant of ʿObayd Allah son of Ziyād son of Abū Sufyān. He propitiated the Khalifah, and having engaged to protect Yaman against the ʿAlids, he won his favour and was appointed to the government of the province [Tihāmah] , where he arrived in A.H.203."(63) Besides this statement two modern scholars suggest that the reason behind the appointment of Ibn Ziyād over the area was the Shiʿite activities there; the first is Geddes (64) who insists that the rebellion of the ʿAkk and the Ashāʿir in Tihāmah was a result of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā's year long domination of the Yemen, and thus assumes that the rebels were Shīʿite; the second scholar (65) believes that, since the Shīʿites were dominant in the Tihāmah area, al-Maʾmūn realized that a Sunnī principality there could never be anything but an ally of the caliphate. Both Ibn Khaldūn and the two modern scholars, apparently, have based their suggestions on the assumption that the revolt of the ʿAkk and the Ashāʿir in Tihāma in 202/817 was a Shīʿī uprising against the ʿAbbāsid regime which Ibn Ziyād sent to suppress and thus to protect the region from further Alid activities. However, nothing is mentioned in the source material concerning the political leaning of these rebels. On the other hand, the various revolts which took place in Tihāmah during the twenty year period before the arrival of Ibn Ziyād there, do not appear to have been Shīʿite in motivation.(66)

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(63) Kay, trans,141 - text, 104f.

(64) "Yuʿfirid ", 42f; "Al-Maʾmūn", 105,

(65) Bikhazī, "Coins", 27.

(66) For the political disorder in the area during the caliphate of al-Rashīd, cf. 315-22 above.

Concerning Ibrāhām b. Mūsā's year-long rule over the Yemen in 200-1/815-6, there exists nothing in the sources which might point to any spread of his power to Tihāmah. The main gathering of the Alid followers in the Yemen was Ṣa^{c}dah, from where Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā extended his authority over a large part of the highlands between there and Ṣan^{c}ā'.(67) As for the revolt of the inhabitants of Tihāmah in 202/817-8, apart from the fact that the sources do not specifically consider it to have been an Alid uprising, it is clear that the Alids themselves were enjoying harmonious relations with al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn at that time.(68) Given, then, that ill intention towards al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn by the Alids, and vice versa, was unlikely, it is difficult to believe that Ibn Ziyād was sent with the express purpose of suppressing Alid activities in the region. Further confirmation of this can be seen in the attitude of Ibn Ziyād himself towards the Alid uprising led by ^{c}Abd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad in the region of ^{c}Akk in 207/822-3;(69) apparently, Ibn Ziyād took no part in its suppression. Subsequently, al-Ma$^{\supset}$mūn sent an army, under the leadership of Dīnār b. ^{c}Abd Allāh, to put down the revolt.(70) Thus, if Ibn Ziyād had been appointed specifically to protect the area from the Alids, one must assume that he would also have participated in the suppression of a revolt which did, after all, take place within the borders of his state. However, Ibn Ziyad's role in the affair - be it direct or otherwise -

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(67) Cf. 340 above.

(68) See 343 above.

(69) ^{c}Abd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad b. ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ^{c}Umar b. ^{c}Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. See al-Ṭabarī, III, 1062f; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, V, 204.

(70) Ibid.

has received no mention in the sources at our disposal. The non-appearance of Ibn Ziyād - supposedly sent to protect Tihāmah from the Alids - on the scene of ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad's uprising corroborate the more tenable conclusion that the purpose of his presence in Tihāmah was solely to fill the political vacuum from which the area had been suffering for so long. (71)

It was obvious from the escalation of events in the Yemen from the reign of al-Manṣūr until the spread of Alid influence during the caliphate of al-Maᵓmūn that the latter could not afford to ignore this region and, therefore, should pay more attention to it in his foreign policy. In the Yemeni highlands, for example, although al-Maᵓmūn's governor, Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān had succeeded in retaking Ṣanᶜāᵓ following the expulsion of Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā, he was unable to effect entire control over the rest of the Yemen. Furthermore, local tribes had emerged as participants in the political arena in the area, which was by now closely related to the scene of political unrest in the Ḥijāz. (72) Without a doubt it was this situation which forced al-Maᵓmūn to pay special attention to his policy vis-à-vis the Yemen, in order to preserve its loyalty to the caliphate.

Apart from its several seaports, Tihāmah's over-riding importance lay in the fact that it was the commercial

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(71) For the struggle for power in the region amongst its inhabitants during the caliphate of al-Amīn, cf. 333 above.

(72) Political opposition had escalated in the Ḥijāz since the early period of the ᶜAbbāsid caliphate due to Alid attempts to take over the two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina. See al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 111ff; al-Ṭabarī, II, 189ff. See also Lassner, Shaping, 69-79.

cross-roads between Oman and Mecca. It was also of crucial significance as an area of transit for the pilgrims (ḥujjāj) coming from the Omani coast via the coastal lands of Ḥaḍramawt. (73) Leaving Tihāmah vulnerable to the attacks of uncontrollable tribal rebels, then, would be contrary to caliphal interests for two main reasons : firstly it would jeopardize the economic interests of the ᶜAbbāsid government in the coastal ports; and, secondly, were an anti-caliphal state to emerge there, an extremely undesirable example would be set which would no doubt endanger considerably the political security of the Ḥijāz.(74)

The question of how to control Tihāmah came up during the most critical period of al-Maᵓmūn's reign. In 202/817-8, the year of the Tihāmah troubles, most regions of his empire broke away from the caliphal administration. (75) The following year, his governor in the Yemen, Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān, rebelled and proclaimed independence in the highlands.(76) At this point al-Maᵓmūn had no alternative but to establish an independent state under a ruler who would always remain loyal to his government and observe its interests in the area. Brockelmann (77) comments on Ibn Ziyād's appointment to Tihāmah, saying "The ᶜAbbāsid

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(73) Ibn Jaᶜfar, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 192-3;

(74) When ᶜAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ṣulayḥī succeeded in unifying the Yemen in 455/1063, he set out for Mecca to take it over, see Ḥasan S., Tarikh al-Yaman al-Siyāsī, 181-3. Cf. also Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 246-7; Kay, text, 18-trans, 24-5; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 52.

(75) See al-Ṭabarī, III, 1016 ff; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 178 ff.

(76) See 343 above.

(77) Tārīkh al-Shuᶜūb al-Islāmiyyah, Arabic trans, Baᶜlabakkī, 226.

government saw, for some time, that it would be better to encourage the development of local power to go along with the official governors. An evidence for this is that when al-Maʾmūn's Alid policy in the southern Arab Land [i.e. the Yemen] failed, he sent a Khurāsanī force led by an experienced soldier called Muḥammad [i.e. Ibn Ziyād] who proclaimed himself as a descendant of Ziyād b. Abīh - a half-brother of Muʿāwiyah, both having the same father, the amir of Iraq. Muḥammad succeeded in controlling the coastal lands down to al-Shiḥr in Ḥaḍramawt as well as the areas facing them, while the mountainous country remained under the control of the rulers of Ṣanʿāʾ." Geddes (78) says, "the appointment of Ibn Ziyād split the administration of the province [i.e. the Yemen as a whole] into two equal units; the size and geographical complexity of Yemen did not allow for a single administrative whole."

On this basis al-Maʾmūn appointed Ibn Ziyād over Tihāmah, advising him to construct a city as his capital, from where he would be able to control the region. (79) Ibn Ziyād chose a site at Zabīd which is situated half way between the sea and the mountains on the northern bank of the Wadi Zabīd, and between the two provinces (sing-mikhlāf) of ʿAkk and the Ashāʿir. (80) The structural style of the new city was military. (81)

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(78) "Yuʿfirid ," 44; "Al-Maʾmūn", 106. See also Ṣāliḥ, 126, who says, The caliphate had followed a new policy in the Yemen by establishing a strong rule in the lowlands to control the mountainous area from the west and the south".

(79) Ibn al-Daybaʿ, Bughyat, 39.

(80) For its location see, al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, I, 110; Kay, trans, 11 - text 8-9.Cf. also Geddes, "Al-Maʾmūn," 106; and map

(81) Al-ʿAmīd, "Binaʾ madīnat Zabīd". 343.

Our sources differ concerning the boundaries of Ibn Ziyād's territory. Although it is agreed that he controlled the coastal area extending from Ḥaly, 65 km south of al-Qunfudah, in the north to al-Shiḥr in the south, there is no consensus on the extent of his domination over the other Yemeni provinces. ᶜUmārah, Ibn al-Mujāwir, Ibn al-Daybaᶜ and Abū Makhramah (82) all mention that he ruled the Yemen in its entirety, both coastal and mountainous areas alike. Both Idrīs and Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd (83) maintain that Ibn Ziyād ruled Ḥaḍramawt and the coastal areas as far as Ḥaly, but of the mountainous areas controlled only al-Maᶜāfir, al-Janad and Mikhlāf Jaᶜfar. In Bughyat al-Mustafīd, Ibn al-Daybaᶜ (84) disregards his previous assertion that Ibn Ziyād ruled the mountainous areas, insisting now that the rulers of these areas used to mention Ibn Ziyād's name in the Friday khuṭbah. The view of the latter writer seems to carry the most weight. There are several reasons which lead us to believe that Ibn Ziyād enjoyed comprehensive influence over Tihāmah and the coastal ports, from al-Shiḥr in the south to Ḥaly in the north. Firstly, when al-Maᵓmūn sent Ibn Ziyād to the Yemen, he defined the borders of the latter's state as Tihāmah and whatever land he was able to acquire from the mountainous areas.(85) Secondly, some of the local

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(82) Kay, text, 4-trans,5; Ibn al-Mujāwir, Mustabṣir, I,67; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 322f; Abū Makhramah, II, 216.

(83) Idrīs, Kanz, f176a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 26f.

(84) 39f.

(85) See Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 25; Idrīs, f176a.

chiefs in the mountainous provinces appeared to be independent rulers of their regions. (86) Thirdly, the caliphate had regularly been sending its own governors to Ṣanᶜāʾ in order to keep its influence in the region. (87) The fourth reason is that there is no mention in the source material of Ibn Ziyād's full domination over the mountainous areas. Nevertheless these sources do assert that the rulers of these provinces mentioned Ibn Ziyād's name in the Friday khuṭbah. (88) This, however, does not mean that these provinces were under the political control of Ibn Ziyād; what it does point to, quite simply, is the recognition by these rulers of the power of the Ziyādī regime in the country.

Thus with the establishment of Ziyādī rule in Tihāmah, al-Maʾmūn forestalled the appearance of an anti-ᶜAbbāsid power in the region, safeguarding the loyalty of the area in the process. Initially, this policy was focused on Tihāmah alone, with different strategies employed by al-Maʾmūn and his successors vis-à-vis the highland regions. It was with the ᶜAbbāsid re-capture of the highlands in Jumādā I, 205/October-November 820, that they focused this policy on that area in order to safeguard their existence there.

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(86) Such as B. Manākh and B. Yuᶜfir, cf.F. below.

(87) Cf. Table 11 and below.

(88) Ibn Ḥawqal, 23f; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 27; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Bughyat, 40.

E. The Yemeni highlands following the rebellion of Ibn Māhān

After ᶜIsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī's subjugation of Ṣanᶜāʾ his representatives were sent to the provinces, whilst he returned to Baghdād appointing Ḥiṣn b. al-Minhāl in his post. (89) In due course Ibrāhīm al-Ifrīqī came to the Yemen as governor, remaining there until he was replaced by Nuᶜaym b. al-Waḍḍaḥ al-Azdī and al-Muẓaffar b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī, who entered Ṣanᶜāʾ in Ṣafar 206/July-August 821. These two shared the joint administration of the Yemeni highlands, with al-Azdī in Ṣanᶜāʾ and al-Kindī in al-Janad. (90) In 208/822-3, Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Muḥriz, the mawlā of al-Maʾmūn, arrived in the Yemen as the caliph's governor there. He himself stayed in Ṣanᶜāʾ and sent his son to al-Janad. (91) However, shortly afterwards the people of al-Janad rebelled against his son. Realising the weakness of his own administration, Muḥammad b. Muḥriz appointed ᶜAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī, a Yemeni chief, in Ṣanᶜāʾ and left for the Ḥijāz. (92) Al-Shihābī was replaced by Isḥāq b. al-ᶜAbbās b. Muḥammad al-ᶜAbbāsī, who arrived in Ṣanᶜāʾ

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(89) Idrīs, Kanz, f 176b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 25,31; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 99; ᶜAsjad, 31f; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 147; Bughyat, 31; al-ᶜArshī, Bulūgh, 12.

(90) Idrīs, f 176b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 31f; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 100; ᶜAsjad, 32; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 147.

(91) Idrīs, f 176b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 32; al-Khazrajī Kifāyah, 101; al-ᶜAsjad, 32;

(92) Idrīs, f 176f; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 32; al-Khazrajī ᶜAsjad;32; Kifāyah, 101; and followed by Geddes, "Yuᶜfirid:" Appendix A, ᶜAbbād b. ᶜUmar al-Shihābī. However, according to al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 471,5; II, 152; and Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 148 ᶜAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī. Cf. also table 11.

at the end of Rajab 209/December 824. (93)

Unfortunately, the information offered by our sources does not lend itself to a proper evaluation of the political situation of the region, or of its relations with Baghdād during the approximately four year period (205-9/820-4) following the suppression of Ibn Māhān's rebellion in the Yemeni highlands. That the ᶜAbbāsids were in control of Ṣanᶜāᵓ and al-Janad during this period is not doubted; what is needed is a more precise view of the actual political situation in the Yemeni highlands. Despite this lack of data, the frequency with which governors to the area were changed over such a short period,(94) plus the rebellion by the inhabitants of al-Janad against Ibn Muḥriz's son and the emphasis made by the sources on the weakness of Ibn Muḥriz's administration in Ṣanᶜāᵓ, all lead us to believe that the highland country had been in the throes of political unrest. This was especially reflected in the governorship of Isḥāq b. al-ᶜAbbās, who expressed his anger towards the inhabitants of the region by insulting and humiliating them, the Ḥimyarīs in particular.(95) Our sources do not disclose the reasons behind such behaviour towards the Yemenis. However, whether the reasons were personal or merely designed to ensure control over the area, Isḥāq's aggressive stance cast no

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(93) Idrīs, f 176b; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 101; ᶜAsjad, 32. Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 32; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 148, Isḥāq b. al-ᶜAbbās b. Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbbās.

(94) Cf. Table 11.

(95) Idrīs, f 176 b, f 177a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 32; al-Khazrajī. Kifāyah, 101f; al-ᶜAsjad, 32; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ. Qurrat, I, 148; al-ᶜArshī, Bulūgh, 12.

uncertain discredit on the ᶜAbbāsid presence in general throughout the highland provinces. Al- Maᵓmūn subsequently endeavoured to avoid Yemeni hostility by replacing Isḥāq with Muḥammad b. Nāfiᶜ in Ṣanᶜāᵓ and Mālik b. Luqmān al-Arḥabī, a Hamdānī chief, in al-Jawf, (96) but in vain. In due course the area became witness to various Ḥimyarī-led uprisings against the ᶜAbbāsid regime. (97) Before discussing these revolts in more detail we must first turn to the political upheaval which occurred in the central part of the highlands, instigated by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-ᶜUmarī, a descendant of ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, nicknamed Aḥmar al-ᶜAyn. (98)

This particular disturbance suggests that the area was politically unstable, and that a power struggle was taking place between some of the influential chiefs in the region. This conflict apparently emerged when Isḥāq b. al-ᶜAbbās left the Yemen, leaving a weak governor behind him. (99) In 212/827-8, according to al-Ṭabarī, (100)

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(96) For the appointment of Ibn Nāfiᶜ, see al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188. For Ibn Luqmān, Cf al-Hamdānī, Iklil, X, 212f.

'97) These uprisingsrepresented by the B. Manākh and B. Yuᶜfir emergence in the area, see 360-71 below.

(98) Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ᶜUmar b. Ibrāhīm b. Wāqid b.Zayd b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭab. See al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 360; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 154. For his nickname, cf. al-Ṭabarī, III, 1099; al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 177; X, 117.

(99) Means Muḥammad b. Nāfiᶜ in Ṣanᶜāᵓ.

(100) III, 1099. See also al-Yaᶜqubī, Tarīkh, III, 188, who confirms this event, but does not give the date.

Aḥmar al-ᶜAyn rebelled against ᶜAbbāsid authority. The aim of the uprising was the deposition (khalᶜ) of al-Maᵓmūn, and he began by attacking caliphal authority in Ṣanᶜāᵓ. (101) In response, al-Maᵓmūn despatched an army to the Yemen under the leadership of Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd al-Hamīd, Abū ᵓl-Rāzī. (102) When Abū ᵓl-Rāzī arrived in Ṣanᶜāᵓ Aḥmar al-ᶜAyn requested amnesty (amān) which he had initially been granted. Abū ᵓl-Rāzī, however, subsequently arrested him and sent him to Baghdād where he was imprisoned. (103) Although the revolt was ineffective, it was indicative of the appearance of independent uprisings against the ᶜAbbāsids in this region. Such political upheaval was reflected, especially in two revolts, led by the influential Ḥimyarī chiefs, Ibrāhīm b. Dhī al-Muthlah al-Manākhī and Yuᶜfir b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥiwālī. (104) A twenty-one-year struggle (212-33/827-47) against the ᶜAbbāsid forces by these Ḥimyarī chiefs eventually came to fruition with the expulsion of caliphal authority from the highland regions.

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(101) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III,. 188, says he expelled the caliphal governor, Ibn Nafiᶜ, from there.

(102) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 1099; al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188. In al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 83b, he was appointed in (213/828-9).

(103) Al-Yaᶜqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188. Cf. also al-Zubayrī, Nasab, 360.

(104) For the nasab of these leaders, see Table 9,10. In Idrīs, f 177a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 105; Ṭirāz, f 96b; al-ᶜAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbāᵓ. f 22b; and al-ᶜArshī, Bulūgh, 18, one reads Yuᶜfir b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥīm. But, the correct version is Ibn ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān, see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 230; II, 66 and passim; VIII, 85; al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 165. Cf. also Zambaur, Manuel, 116; Geddes "Yuᶜfirid", 54; Smith, "History of Ṣanᶜāᵓ,", 55.

F. The emergence of Ḥimyarī power in the highlands

a. B.Manākh in the southern part of the highlands

In the same year as Abū ʾl-Rāzī's arrival in Ṣanʿāʾ 212/827-8, the southern area of the highlands also became the scene of political opposition to caliphal authority. The focal point was the province of al-Kalāʿ, where Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Manākhī rose up against the ʿAbbāsid regime.(105) Within two years his power had spread to the mountainous areas of Jabal Thūmān and Raymat al-Manākh. (106) In 214/829, Abū ʾl-Rāzī and his forces went to the province of al-Kalāʿ in an attempt to suppress the rebels arriving there in Shaʿbān/ October-November. Abū ʾl-Rāzī took the offensive, but he was killed and his troops were routed. (107) The defeat of the caliphal army left the southern part of the highlands at the mercy of Ibrahim al-Manakhi. In the following month, he attacked al-Janad, looting and destroying most of the town. (108) Following this victory, Ibrāhīm al-Manākhī continued to rule over his mountain domain for another thirty years, apparently without any further action taken against

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(105) Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 40b. For the location of the province of al-Kalaʿ, see Map 2,

(106) Al-Janadī, f46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal, f 40b. InGeddes, "Yuʿfirid", 50, reads Thawmān; al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat, 213 (al-Akwaʿ) Thūmān. For the location of Thūmān, cf. Ṣifat, Ibid, note 1. And for Raymat al-Manākh, see al-Ḥajrī, Buldān, II, 112, who says its from Mikhlāf Jaʿfar [al-Mudhaykhirah] in al-ʿAdīn.

(107) Al-Janadī, f 46a; al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal, f 40b. Al-Yaʿqubi, Tārīkh, III, 188, mentions that this occurred in 212/827-8 which is absolutely wrong, see al-Ṭabarī, III, 1101, who states that in 214/829-30 Abū ʾl-Rāzī was killed in the Yemen. See also Geddes, "Yuʿfirid ", 49, note 59.

(108) Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, III, 188, al-Razī, Tārīkh, 211; al-Janadī, f46a; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 57b; al-Ahdal, f 41a.

him on the part of the caliphate.(109)

Al-Mānākhi's challenge to ᶜAbbāsid authority in the Yemen confirmed two important points : firstly, the inability of the ᶜAbbāsid authorities to suppress local uprisings in the area; and secondly, the emergence of influential local chiefs with power enough to be able to rule their own regions with relatively little opposition. Al-Maᵓmūn was simply unable to take any serious action against these mushrooming forces which threatened and defied his authority in the region. Instead he merely reappointed Isḥāq b. al-ᶜAbbās to succeed his murdered governor, Abū ᵓl-Rāzī. Isḥāq arrived in Ṣanᶜaᵓ in early 215/830.(110) However, neither Isḥāq nor

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(109) "He was followed by his son Jaᶜfar who built the town and the fortress of al-Mudhaykhirah on the slopes of Jabal Thawmān (Thūwān), which he continued to rule with an iron hand for nearly fifty years until he was killed by the Faṭimid daᶜīᶜAlī Ibn al-Fadl in 292. Geddes, "Yuᶜfirid," 49. See also al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 93-4; Ṣifat, I,100. Al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 167, states that they ruled the area for some one hundred and fifty years, which is patently wrong, because they were dismissed by the Ismaᶜīlī daᶜīᶜAlī b. al-Fadl in 292/904-5, see al-ᶜAlawī, Sīrat, 389; al-Ḥammādī, Kashf, 30; Ibn Samurah, Ṭabaqāt, 76; al-Janadī, Sulūk; f 50a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 44a. Cf also Geddes, "Yuᶜfirid," 50.

(110) Al-Janadī, f 46b; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f58a, f 83a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat,f 41a; they all confirm that he arrived in the Yemen in 215/830-1, after Abū ᵓl-Rāzī's murder, however, they record his name as follows, Ishāq b. Mūsā b. ᶜIsā al-ᶜAbbāsī. In Idrīs, f 176b, f 177a; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 101f; al-ᶜAsjad 32; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 148f, there is no mention of the Abū ᵓl-Rāzī's governorship. They all consider the existence of Isḥāq as a continuation of his first governorship since 209/824, moreover they give an incorrect name (i.e. Ishāq b.Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī b. al-ᶜAbbās). Although Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat 32 agrees with the above idea, he gives a correct name (i.e. Isḥāq b. al-ᶜAbbās b. Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī al-ᶜAbbāsī). It is most likely. Isḥāq himself who had occupied the governorship of Ṣanᶜaᵓ in 209/824 and stayed until he was replaced by Muḥammad b. Nāfiᶜ in 212/827-8. But when Abū ᵓl-Razī, Ibn Nāfiᶜ successor, was killed in 214/829-30, al-Maᵓmūn reappointed him to put pressure upon the Ḥimyarī chiefs, i.e. B. Manākh and B. Yuᶜfirid

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his successor dared to invade the territory of al-Kalā^{c}, and thus it may be said that the year 214/829 marked the foundation of the B. al-Manākh dynasty in the southern part of the highlands.

The situation in the northern part of the highlands, however, was quite a different one. In this area, there were no ambitious local chiefs ready to come forward and dispute the caliphate in the region, quite simply because the area was in the grip of a tribal struggle between the various branches of Khawlān. But these Khawlānī factions were indirectly involved in the conflict between the Yu^{c}firids and the ^{c}Abbāsid authorities in the central highland area. (111)

b. <u>B. Yu^{c}fir in the central highland area</u>.

The most prominent example of a local political power which helped to put an end to ^{c}Abbāsid authority in the Yemen is that of the Yu^{c}firids. They strongly opposed the caliphal authority in the area for some nineteen years (214-33/829-47). The head of the family at this time was Yu^{c}fir b. ^{c}Abd al-Raḥmān al-Hiwālī, who was anxious to establish independent rule from his fortress in Jabal Dhukhār. (112)

(Cont) who began revolting against his authority there. Therefore, Isḥāq led the <u>ḥajj</u> ceremony in 214/830, on behalf of al-Ma'mūn, and from there he continued southwards to assume his post, where he entered Ṣan^{c}ā' at the early part of the following year, and died in the same year. Cf. Ibn Khayyāṭ, 474 f.

(111) Cf. 368 below.

(112) Jabal Dhukhār is the ancient name of the mountain which is now known as J. al-Ḍula^{c} (west of Shibām Kawkabān), see Wilson, "Mapping" 272. Cf. also al-Hamdānī, <u>Ṣifat</u>, I, 107; Al-Waysī, 168. In al-^{c}Alawī, <u>Sīrat</u>, 19 and <u>passim</u>, it is called Jabal Bayt Dhukhār. Cf. also Map 6.

It is not certain exactly when the Yu^{c}firids first appeared as a direct threat to ^{c}Abbāsid rule in the Yemen. However, most of the sources agree that the family was able to force the legitimization of its claims onto the caliphate, as a letter written by the caliph al-Mutawakkil in 257/870-1, recognizing Muḥammad b. Yu^{c}fir as the ruler of the region clearly confirms. (113) It is obvious that such recognition marked the end of the ^{c}Abbāsid-Yu^{c}firid struggle in the area, although the origins of the conflict are unclear. Al-Hamdānī (114) maintains that the Yu^{c}firids began their rule of the Yemen - i.e. the central and the northern highlands - in Ramaḍān 214/November-December, 829, an assumption which is confirmed by none of the other sources. Moreover, it also contradicts the actual political situation in the region at that time, for between 214/829 and 233/847, the first year of al-Mutawakkil's caliphate, Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\circ}$ had been ruled by ^{c}Abbāsid governors.(115) It was during this period that the Yu^{c}firids rose in the area in opposition to the caliphate, although the actual struggle for power in the area between them and the ^{c}Abbāsids only became truly manifest during the governorship of ^{c}Abd al-Raḥīm b. Ja^{c}far al-Hāshimī (221-5/835-9).(116) This clearly makes al-Hamdānī's assumption untenable, although

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(113) Al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 165f; Idrīs, f 177b; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 109; ^{c}Asjad, 34; Ṭirāz, f 58 b; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 48a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 42b; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 161f.

(114) Iklīl, II, 71f.

(115) See Table 11.

(116) Cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, 181; Ṣifat, I, 107, the latter says that Yu^{c}fir fought the governors of al-Mu^{c}taṣim, al-Wāthiq and al-Mutawakkil.

the year 214 may have marked the emergence of Yu^{c}fir b. ^{c}Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥiwālī on the scene in the area, which was at that time in a political vacuum following the murder of the ^{c}Abbāsid governor, Abū ^{ɔ}l-Rāzī.(117) It is quite possible that Yu^{c}fir's attempt to establish independent rule in the area (since 214/829) was inspired by both his military expertise and high social status.(118) But, the political vacuum in the region was filled by Isḥāq b. al-^{c}Abbās, who arrived to govern Ṣan^{c}ā^{ɔ} on behalf of al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn in early 215/830, remaining there until he was replaced by ^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Ubayd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās two years later.(119) Al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn was also able to enjoy the support of some of the tribal chiefs in al-Jawf by appointing them as his representatives in the region.(120) Such a policy prohibited Yu^{c}fir b. ^{c}Abd al-Raḥmān from expanding his activities throughout the rest of al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn's reign.

On the death of al-Ma^{ɔ}mūn in Rajab 218/August 833,

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(117) Who was killed (Sha^{c}bān 214), and his successor entered Ṣan^{c}ā^{ɔ} at the early following year, see 360 above.

(118) See al-Khazrajī, Tirāz, f 96b, who states that he was a soldier early in his career.

(119) For the former, see note 108 above. For the latter, Cf. al-Ṭabarī, III, 1106; Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 33. In al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 103; ^{c}Asjad, 32f; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 149, ^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Alī b. ^{c}Ubayd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās. The correct name is ^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Ubayd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās b. Muḥammad b. ^{c}Alī b. ^{c}Abd Allāh b.^{c}Abbās, see al-Azraqī, Akhbār, II, 162; al-Ṭabarī, III, 1106. Cf. also al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, III, 281f for his father's nasab.

(120) He appointed Mālik b. Luqmān al-Arḥabī, a Hamdānī chief, see 358 above.

ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜUbayd Allāh left Ṣanᶜā for Iraq, appointing ᶜAbbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī in his place.(121) This designation was authorized by al-Muᶜtaṣim and ᶜAbbād continued to rule Ṣanᶜā until he was replaced by ᶜAbd al-Raḥīm b. Jaᶜfar b. Sulaymān al-Hāshimī, who entered the town in Muḥarram 221/December 835-January 836. (122) Knowledge of the political situation in the Ṣanᶜā region during the governorship of ᶜAbbād is virtually non-existent; al-Hamdānī (123) merely alludes to a clash which took place between ᶜAbbād and Yuᶜfir, explaining neither the reasons for the conflict nor its outcome. It is obvious, however, that the confrontation was related to the Yuᶜfirid expansion in the region. It appears that throughout the whole of ᶜAbbād's governorship, Yuᶜfir was endeavouring to extend his influence in the area. ᶜAbbād, as a governor of the ᶜAbbāsid caliphate in the region, was obliged to take steps to curtail the spread of Yuᶜfirid power; such a situation may have provoked the confrontation between them. Thus when ᶜAbd al-Raḥīm b. Jaᶜfar was appointed over Ṣanᶜā, he too found himself compelled to fight the Yuᶜfirids, who had begun to become a real threat to the ᶜAbbāsid presence in the region. The new governor's campaign against the Yuᶜfirids was unsuccessful, and his son was taken hostage.(124)

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(121) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 471f; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 103; ᶜAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 149.

(122) Idrīs, Kanz, f 177a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Ṭirāz, f 132b; Kifāyah, 104; ᶜAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 149; Abū Makhramah, II, 104f.

(123) Iklīl, I, 475; II, 181.

(124) Ibid. al-Shamāḥī, al-Yaman, 94; and al-Shāmī, B. "Yuᶜfir", 337, both say that ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-Hiwālī and his son Yuᶜfir were representatives of this governor in al-Janad. This statement, however, is not confirmed in our sources.

ᶜAbd al-Raḥīm b. Jaᶜfar's governorship continued until 225/839, when he was replaced by Jaᶜfar b. Dīnār. The latter, remaining in Baghdād, sent Manṣūr b. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-Tanūkhī to represent him in the region. Manṣūr entered Ṣanᶜāᵓ in Ṣafar/December of the same year. Later, ᶜAbd Allāh b. Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān joined him as joint-governor. (125) It is intersting to note that the change of governor in Baghdād - Jaᶜfar b. Dīnār being replaced by Ītākh al-Turkī - did not result in a change of deputy governors in Sanᶜāᵓ. This was because they were reappointed by Ītākh. (126)

Our sources confirm that these deputy governors were able to control the country, (127) their success apparent from their campaigns against the rebels. Al-Hamdānī, (128) for example, mentions al-Tanūkhī's pursuit of Muḥammad b. Abī al-ᶜAyzār, a rebel from Āl Muqrī of Ḥimyar, in the Dhamār region. Despite the emphasis placed by our source material on the success of these deputy governors in controlling the area, they fail to describe or analyse their relations with the Yuᶜfirids during the last two years of al-Muᶜtaṣim's reign (225-7/839-42). One must assume, therefore, that the Yuᶜfirids remained in control of Jabal Dhukhār throughout this period. Thus on the death of

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(125) Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 104f; ᶜ Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 151f.

(126) Ibid.

(127) Ibid.

(128) Iklīl, II, 252f.

al-Mu^{c}taṣim in Rabī^{c} I, 227/December 841-January 842, Yu^{c}firid power had emerged as a strong opponent of the ^{c}Abbāsid regime in Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$.

Following his accession to the caliphate, al-Wāthiq reappointed Ītākh over Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$. The latter remained in Samarra sending Abū $^{\supset}$l-^{c}Alā$^{\supset}$ as his deputy to the region. On hearing that Abū $^{\supset}$l-^{c}Alā$^{\supset}$ had reached Ṣa^{c}dah, Yu^{c}fir sent an army under the leadership of Ṭarīf b. Mālik, a Hamdānī, to occupy Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$ before the arrival of the new governor. This time, however, the ^{c}Abbāsid forces, supported by the Ṣan^{c}ānīs, were able to defeat the Yu^{c}firid troops and drive them from the town. (129) Although the Yu^{c}firids failed to occupy Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\supset}$, the attack heralded the escalation of the ^{c}Abbāsid-Yu^{c}firid conflict in the region. Thus from Jabal Dhukhār, Yu^{c}fir was subsequently able to survive all the ^{c}Abbāsid campaigns sent throughout al-Wāthiq's reign and the first year of that of his successor.

During the caliphate of al-Wāthiq (227-232/842-7) the local tribes in the central and northern parts of the highlands began to emerge and participate in the ^{c}Abbāsid-Yu^{c}firid conflict. In these regions the Yemenis were divided into two factions : one supporting the Yu^{c}firids, the other aligned with the ^{c}Abbāsids. Among the Hamdānī chiefs, for example, could be found members of both factions. This is illustrated by the fact that while some of Ḥāshidī

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(129) Idrīs, Kanz, f 177a; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 105; ^{c}Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 153-5; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā$^{\supset}$, f 22b.

joined the Yu^{c}firids in their uprising against the ^{c}Abbāsid regime,(130) some of Bakīl preserved their good relations with the caliphate.(131) The conflicts between the Khawlānī tribes in Ṣa^{c}dah were also reflected in the ^{c}Abbāsid-Yu^{c}firid struggle. Al-Hamdānī, (132) for instance, mentions that during the conflict between B. Sa^{c}d b. Sa^{c}d and B. al-Rabī^{c}ah b. Sa^{c}d - both tribes of Khawlān in Sa^{c}dah - Yu^{c}firids supported the former. The reason for their partisanship was obviously a political one, since B. al-Rabī^{c}ah were acknowledged as supporters of the caliphate. The leader of the B. al-Rabī^{c}ah, ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ^{c}Abbād, travelled to Samarra to inform al-Wāthiq of the increasing power of the Yu^{c}firids and to ask for re-inforcements. (133)

Al-Wāthiq responded immediately to Ibn ^{c}Abbād's appeal, sending with him an army led by one of his generals, Sharbāmiyān, who reached the Yemen in Rabī^{c} II, 229/January 844. (134) It seems that this army was initially directed

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(130) Such as B. Ṭarīf b. Thābit al-Kibārī, Cf. al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 51; Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; al-^{c}Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 154.

(131) Such as Mālik b. Luqmān al-Arḥabī who represented al-Ma'mūn in al-Jawf, see 358 above, and Yazīd b. Abī ^{c}Uyaynah al-Aṣqar, leader of Arḥab see al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, X, 212. For the support of B. ^{c}Uyaynah granted to the ^{c}Abbāsid general, Sharbāmiyān during his invasion against B. Yu^{c}fir, Cf.369 below

(132) Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 322f.

(133) Ibid.

(134) Al-Ṭabarī, III, 1335, reads Sharbāmiyān. Al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, I, 323 gives the same name, but says it is arabized (^{c}urriba) and has become al-Bashir. He also gives the year 230/844 for his arrival. In Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 33; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; ^{c}Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 155; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā^{c}, f 22b, we had Harthamah b. al-Bashir.

to Ṣa^{c}dah to suppress B. Sa^{c}d b. Sa^{c}d, the Yu^{c}firid allies. This assumption is confirmed by al-Hamdānī,(135) who records that Ibn ^{c}Abbād and Shārbāmiyān moved from Ṣa^{c}dah on their way to Jabal Dhukhār via al-Jawf. In al-Jawf they were joined by B. ^{c}Uyaynah, a branch of Arḥab of Bakīl.(136) From there, according to al-Hamdānī,(137) the ^{c}Abbāsid forces moved directly to Jabal Dhukhār, where they camped and later besieged the Yu^{c}firids. Some historians(138) mention that Shārbāmiyān and his troops went first to Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\flat}$ and from there marched on Shibām, Jabal Dhukhār, camping below the town in lower Wadi Ḍula^{c}. Shārbāmiyān and his army continued to try to breach the Yu^{c}firid fortress but in vain. Without inflicting any appreciable damage on the enemy position, they retired to Ṣan^{c}ā$^{\flat}$.(139)

The news of Shārbāmiyān's failure was brought to Samarra by Ibn ^{c}Abbād, who went there to complain about the former's refusal to consider his suggestion regarding the invasion of the Yu^{c}firid fortress. Al-Hamdānī(140) who

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(135) Iklīl, I, 323-4.

(136) Iklīl, I, 324. In Iklīl, X, 212 B.^{c}Utaybah, Cf. also Ṣālih, Tarīkh, 141.

(137) Iklīl, I, 323f.

(138) Cf. the account of Aḥmad al-Mu^{c}īdī, in Iklīl, I, 323. See also Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; ^{c}Asjad, 33; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 155; Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Anbā$^{\flat}$, f 22b.

(139) Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 106; ^{c}Asjad, 33; Anbā$^{\flat}$, f 22b; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 155. See also Geddes, "Yu^{c}firid", 56.

(140) Iklīl, I, 325-7, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad's account.

records this statement, gives no exact date for Ibn ᶜAbbād's petition, although he confirms that it came after the death of al-Wāthiq in Dhū ᵓl-Ḥijjah 232/ July-August 847; it was the latter's successor, al-Mutawakkil who responded to the complaint by sending an army led by Jaᶜfar b. Dīnār to the Yemen. According to al-Ṭabarī, (141) Jaᶜfar b. Dīnār was appointed by al-Wāthiq in Shaᶜbān 231/April, 846, and left Samarra for the Ḥijāz, but did not reach Ṣanᶜāᵓ until he had completed the ḥajj ceremonies. This statement is more credible since it is confirmed by al-Hamdānī himself and some local historians, who state that in the following year (i.e. 232/846-7) the ᶜAbbāsid governor in the Yemen (i.e. Ṣanᶜāᵓ) at that time was Jaᶜfar b. Dīnār. (142) It can be assumed, therefore that Ibn ᶜAbbād arrived in Samarra in 231/845-6, and petitioned al-Wāthiq and not al-Mutawakkil. Thus it was al-Wāthiq who responded by sending Ibn Dīnār's army to Ṣanᶜāᵓ, which they entered at the beginning of the following year.

Soon after his arrival in Ṣanᶜāᵓ, Ibn Dīnār went out to Jabal Dhukhār in an attempt to suppress the Yuᶜfirids, (143) who were relying on their defensive position, rather than risking open conflict. Seeing that it was impossible in such a situation to dislodge the rebels, Ibn Dīnār retired to Ṣanᶜāᵓ, leaving the Yuᶜfirids in

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(141) III, 1350.

(142) Al-Hamdānī, Jawharatayn, 263; Idris, f 177a; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 46b. Cf also table 11.

(143) Idrīs, f 177a; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, Bahjat, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 107, ᶜAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 155.

full control of Jabal Dhukhār.(144) Before long, however, he returned to Jabal Dhukhār to put down the Yuᶜfirid rebellion, besieging his enemy until the news of al-Wāthiq's death at the end of Dhū ʾl-Ḥijjah 232/ August 847 reached him. Without delay Ibn Dīnār lifted the siege, concluded a truce with the Yuᶜfirids, and rode off at the head of his troops to Ṣanᶜāʾ. Shortly after receiving the news of his reappointment as governor of the Yemen by the new caliph, al-Mutawakkil, Ibn Dīnār left his son Muḥammad in charge of Ṣanᶜāʾ and made back to Samarra. (145)

Upon Jaᶜfar b. Dīnār's arrival in Samarra, al-Mutawakkil, replaced him as governor of the Yemen by Ḥimyar b. al-Ḥārith. Following his arrival in Ṣanᶜāʾ in the early 233/847, the new governor immediately took the offensive against the Yuᶜfirids in Jabal Dhukhār. In the open battle that ensured, Ḥimyar was forced to flee and his troops were defeated. Following this, the ᶜAbbāsid governor left the Yemen, leaving the highlands, except the province of the al-Kalāᶜ, completely under the control of the Yuᶜfirids. In this way Yuᶜfir was able to establish control of the capital, Ṣanᶜāʾ, and to overrun a large part of the country between Ṣaᶜdah and al-Janad. (146)

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(144) This idea was first advanced by Geddes, "Yuᶜfirid", 57.

(145) Al-Hamdani, Iklīl, 327; Idrīs, Kanz, f 177a; al-Janadī, f 46b; Ibn ᶜAbd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 107; ᶜAsjad, 33; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, Qurrat, I, 155. Cf. also Geddes, "Yuᶜfirid" 57.

(146) Al-Janadī, f 46b. Cf. also Geddes, "Yuᶜfirid", 58, who states that, "Following this battle Yuᶜfir established himself in control of the capital i.e. Ṣanᶜāʾ and over-run a large part of the country between Ṣaᶜda and al-Janad."

Thus during the year after al-Wāthiq's death (i.e. 233/847), the Yu^{c}firids succeeded, by and large, in erasing the caliphate's political authority from the central and the northern areas of the highlands. Henceforward the sole vestige of the caliphate in the Yemen was the customary mention of the caliph's name in the Friday Khuṭbah. Politically, the Yemen was now split into three independent states : the Ziyadids held Tihāmat al-Yaman as far as al-Shiḥr; B. Manākh took over a part of the southern Yemeni highlands; and the Yu^{c}firids also occupied a large part of the highlands, their power extending from al-Janad in the south to Ṣa^{c}dah in the north. (147) Ḥaḍramawt remained unoccupied until Muḥammad b. Yu^{c}fir conquered it in 258/871-2. (148)

(147) For the distribution of these states, see Map 6.

(148) Cf. al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 165-6; Idrīs, f 177b; Ibn ^{c}Abd al-Majīd, 34; al-Khazrajī, Kifāyah, 109, who call him Muḥammad b. Ja^{c}far; al-^{c}Asjad, 34; Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 161-2. It seems that B. Manākh had been trying to extend their authority as far as al-Janad whenever they found an opportunity, see al-Ḥammādī, Kashf, 24; al-Janadī, Sulūk, f 49a; al-Ahdal, Tuḥfat, f 43b, who mention that al-Janad was under the control of B. Manākh who had removed it from B. Yu^{c}fir during the seventh decade of the third century of the Hijrah. Cf also Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, Qurrat, I, 163.

Table 9 The nasab of Ibrāhīm al-Manākhī

Ḥimyar (al-Akbar)
al-Hamaysaʿ
Ayman
Zuhayr
ʿArīb
Qaṭan
Jaydān
al-Ghawth
Waʾil
ʿAbd Shams
Zurʿah (Dhū Manākh) (1)
Shufʿah (2)
Zayd
Shuraḥbīl (3)
Shurāḥīl (4)
Zayd
Khamr (5)
Lahīʿah
Murrah
Ḥassān
Suwayd
Aksūm
Salamah
ʿAbd Allāh
Muḥammad (Dhū ʾl-Muthlah)
Ibrāhīm (6)

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(1) One of the eight most influential chiefs (al-Mathāminah) who ruled the Yemen after the murder of Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, see al-Rasūlī, Turfat, 55. In al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 294, they ruled the Yemen after Dhū Nuwās.

(2) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, reads Subqah, while al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, has Sufʿah.

(3) Omitted by Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, instead he records Sharāḥīl b. Sharāḥīl.

(4) Omitted by al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 167.

(5) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, has Ḥimyar.

(6) The leader of the rebellion against the ʿAbbāsid regime in the southern part of the Yemeni highlands.

Table 10 — The nasab of Yuᶜfir al-Ḥiwālī

Zurᶜah (Ḥimyar al-Aṣghar)
|
Sadad
|
Zayd
|
Mālik
|
Dhū Maqār (1)
|
Yarīm
|
al-Sharmaḥ (Dhū Ḥiwāl Al-Akbar)
|
Ilā Zād
|
ᶜAwsajah
|
ᶜĀmir (Dhū Ḥiwāl al-Aṣghar)
|
Yadras (2)
|
ᶜAwn
|
Māti ᶜ
|
Ibrahim
|
al-Waddāḥ
|
Kurayb (3)
|
ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān
|
Yuᶜfir (4)

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(1) One of al-Mathāminah, the eight most influential chiefs, who ruled the Yemen after Sayf b. Dhī Yazan, Cf al-Rasūlī, 55; in al-Hamdānī, Iklīl, II, 294 after Dhū Nuwās. See also al-Ḥimyarī, Mulūk, 157,165. Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437 reads Maghār.

(2) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, has Tadras.

(3) Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat, 437, has Kurayb b. ᶜUthmān b. al-Waddāḥ.

(4) The leader of the rebellion against the ᶜAbbāsid regime in the central area of the Yemeni highlands.

Table 11 The governors of the Yemen from the time of al-Amīn to the first year of al-Mutawakkil's reign. (193-233/809-47)

appointed by al-Amīn (193-6/809-11)		
Hammād al-Barbarī (1)	193-4/809-10	
Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Mālik al-Khuzāᶜī(2)	194-5/810-11	
Muḥammad b. Ṣaᶜid b. al-Sarḥ al-Kinānī	195/811	
appointed by al-Maᵓmūn(196-218/811-33)		
Yazīd b. Jarīr b.Yazīd b. Khālid b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Qasrī al-Bajalī	196-8/811-4	
ᶜUmar b. Ibrāhīm b. Wāqid b. Muḥammad b. Zayd b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb	198/814	
Isḥāq b. Mūsā b. ᶜĪsā b. Mūsā b. Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-ᶜAbbās	198-200/814-5	
Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā b. Jaᶜfar b. Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib	200/815-6	Alid rebel(3)
Ḥamdawayh b. ᶜAlī b. ᶜIsā b. ᵓMāhān (4)	201-5/816-20	
ᶜĪsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī (5)	205/820	

(1) Remained only one year attacking certain Yemeni tribes, see 332-4 above.

(2) This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf Bikhazī, 24.

(3) He occupied the Yemen for a whole year in the name of Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, the Shīᶜite imam. See 341 above.

(4) Omitted by Smith, "History of Sanᶜāᵓ", 54, instead he inserts ᶜIsā b. Yazīd al-Jalūdī.

(5) Smith, ibid, places him after Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā.

Ḥiṣn b. al-Minhāl (6)	205/820	
Ibrāhīm al-Ifrīqī	205-6/820-1	
Nu^{c}aym b. Waḍḍāh al-Azdī	206-8/821-3	joint authority
al-Muẓaffar b. Yaḥyā al-Kindī		
Muḥammad b. ^{c}Abd Allāh b. Muḥriz (7)	208-9/823-4	mawlā of al-Mu^{ɔ}mūn
Isḥāq b. al-^{c}Abbās b. Muḥammad b. ^{c}Alī b. ^{c}Abd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās	209-212/824-7	
Muḥammad b. Nā fi^{c} (8)	212/827-8	
Muḥammad b. ^{c}Abd al-Ḥamīd(9)	212-4/828-9	known as Abū ɔl-Rāzī
Isḥāq b. al-^{c}Abbās b. Muḥammad b. ^{c}Alī b. ^{c}Abd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās (10)	215-7/830-32	
^{c}Abd Allāh b. ^{c}Ubayd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās b. Muhammad b. ^{c}Alī b. ^{c}Abd Allāh b. al-^{c}Abbās (11)	217-8/832-3	

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(6) Deputy of above. Smith, ibid, places him after Aḥmad (Muḥammad) b. ^{c}Abd al-Ḥamīd.

(7) Geddes, "Yu^{c}firid", Appendix A-7, reads Maḥriz.

(8) Omitted by Geddes, ibid; Smith, "History of Ṣan^{c}ā^{ɔ}, 54.

(9) Smith, ibid, has Aḥmad instead of Muḥammad, and places him before Ḥiṣn b. al-Minhāl

(10) The second governorship, see Chapter XI, note 110.

(11) He left Ṣan^{c}ā^{ɔ} appointing ^{c}Abbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī in his place. Smith, "History of Ṣan^{c}ā^{ɔ}" omits.

appointed by al-Mu^{c}tasim (218-27/833-42)

^{c}Abbād b. al-Ghamr al-Shihābī (12)	218-20/833-5	
^{c}Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ja^{c}far b. Sulayman b. ^{c}Alī b. al-^{c}Abbās al-Hāshimī	221-5/835-9	
Manṣūr b. ^{c}Abd al-Raḥmān al-Tanūkhī	225-7/839-42	joint authority
^{c}Abd Allāh b. Ḥamdawayh b. Māhān (13)		
Abū ʾl-^{c}Alā (14)	227-9/842-4	
Shārbāmiyān (15)	229-31/843-5	
Ja^{c}far b. Dīnār al-Khayyāṭ (16)	232-846-7	

appointed by al-Mutawakkil

Ḥimyar b. al-Ḥārith (17)	early in 233/847	

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(12) Geddes, "Yu^{c}firid", Appendix, A.12; Smith, "History of San^{c}āʾ, 54 reads ^{c}Abbād b. ^{c}Umar al-Shihābī. However, his second name, according to al-Hamdani and Ibn al-Dayba^{c}, is al-Ghamr, see Chapter XI, note 92.


(13) Both are deputies of Ja^{c}far b. Dīnār and later they were both reappointed by Ītākh al-Turkī. Both Geddes "Yu^{c}firid", Appendix A,15 and Smith, "History of San^{c}āʾ", 54 insert Muḥammad instead of Ḥamdawayh.

(14) He was sent by Ītākh as his deputy in the Yemen.

(15) Geddes, "Yu^{c}firid", Appendix A 17, reads Seri-Bamikan; Smith, "History of San^{c}āʾ", 54, has Harthamah Shār Bamiyan. He might have been sent as deputy of Ītākh, since coins bear the latter's name. Cf. Bikhazi,30.

(16) This governor struck coins in his own name. Cf.Bikhazi, 31. He left San^{c}āʾ leaving his son in charge.

(17) He was defeated by the Yu^{c}firids who expelled him and his army from the Yemen, see 371 above.


Map 6 DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL DYNASTIES
AL-RUBʿ AL-KHĀLĪ
ḤADRAMAWT
N
Shibām
al-Shiḥr
Maʾrib
Ṣaʿdah
Shibām
Jabal Dhukhār
Ṣanʿā (-)
Zabīd
Raymat al-Manākh
Jabal Thūmān
al-Janad
Aden
Laḥij
DYNASTY
B. Ziyād
B. Manākh
B. Yuʿfir
0 Kilometres 100
ARABIAN SEA
RED SEA

CONCLUSION

During this two hundred and twenty-four year period the political history of the Yemen with its relations to the Islamic administrations had passed through various phases.

In the time of the Prophet and in the first year of Abū Bakr's reign (9-11/630-2) the area was distinguished for its political activities on the whole and particularly for the interest of the Medinan government to spread Islam and consolidate its grip on some of the Yemeni provinces. The Prophet practised two styles in his dealings with the Yemeni tribes; at one time we find him using military pressure and negotiations with some of the Yemeni powers; in the second he uses diplomacy and sends envoys to the others. It was clear that the Prophet always avoided direct military interference in local disputes in the Yemen, even though some of these disputes could have threatened the interests of the Muslims in the region. And for this reason he quelled the movement of ᶜAbhalah b. Kaᶜb by sending envoys to some of the groups distressed as a result of the movement.

The Yemenis who converted to Islam played a great part in suppressing those who opposed the Islamic authority in the Yemen and also they helped to consolidate the Muslim regime in the area during the early period of Abū Bakr's Caliphate.

The Muslims managed to bring to an end local political dispute in some of the Yemeni regions and to maintain their

authority. In other regions the Muslim political domination was not evident because these regions were under the control of the local tribes.

The contribution of the Yemeni tribes to the conquests was considerable. The caliph Abū Bakr and his successor, ᶜUmar, encouraged these tribes to join the Medinese armies. The Yemeni tribes played a great military role in the decisive battles at the beginning of the conquests; moreover they formed the majority amongst the Muslim warriors. Because of their military experience their leaders became distinguished amongst the other Muslim commanders. These Yemeni leaders took part in leading the troops and negotiations on both the Byzantine and Persian fronts.

The Yemeni warriors were accompanied by their families and carried with them their belongings to the battle fronts. When the Muslims conquered Syria, Iraq and Egypt and built villages and cities there, the Yemenis were the first amongst the Muslims to inhabit them. They spread all over the conquered provinces and their numbers were greater, in some of these regions, than the other Arab tribes which conquered these countries with them.

At the end of the caliphate of ᶜUthmān and during the period of ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib the Yemeni migrants played an important part in the internal events of the Islamic Empire; for some of them were the driving force behind the uprising against the caliph ᶜUthmān in Kufa and al-Fusṭāṭ and so they constituted a direct challenge to the caliphal authorities there. This driving force was seen distinctly in the various

stages of the uprising. These Yemeni migrants were also engaged in the first civil war and played a great part in it. During the course of the battles of the civil war, they were also recognized as a military and political force. Because of this recognition their leaders had the upper hand in making important and decisive decisions, as was clear in the battle of Ṣiffīn.

The political stagnation began in the Yemen when its tribes joined the Islamic expeditions elsewhere though their contacts with their motherland continued. This relationship with their homeland, the Yemen, appeared distinctly during the first civil war. This war had spread to the Yemen after the battle of Ṣiffīn. The Yemenis in the Yemen were split into two different camps in this war and we find one camp backing ᶜAlī and the other Muᶜawiyah.

The migration of the Yemeni tribes to the conquered provinces and the continuation of the conquests during the caliphate of the Umayyads had a great impact in the political isolation of the Yemen and its neglect by the Islamic authority during the first/seventh century. The assassination of al-Ḥusayn b. ᶜAlī and Ibn al-Zubayr's revolution were two of the most serious events which occurred during the same period, though neither had any effect on the Yemen. When Ibn al-Zubayr took over Mecca and established himself there, the Yemen received no attention from his administration and as a result of this, the region suffered from the lack of political leadership and fell an easy prey to Khārijī invaders. After the fall of Ibn al-Zubayr his

successor ᶜAbd al-Malik b. Marwān saw no importance in sending a military expedition to the Yemen in order to consolidate his authority there.

The sudden appearance of the Ibāḍiyyah in Ḥaḍramawt and the extent of their influence to Ṣanᶜaᵓ was the consequence of the disinterest of the Umayyads in the Yemen. The Umayyads only stood against the Ibāḍiyyah when they, the Ibāḍiyyah, extended their influence to the Ḥijāz and had the control of the holy cities.

The relationship between the Islamic authority and the Yemen was cold in the first decade of the ᶜAbbāsid Caliphate. In the following decade the relationship of this region with the Islamic authority improved gradually as was very obvious in the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd when the Caliphate tried to keep its influence there. The ᶜAbbāsid administration had witnessed the emergence of the local opposition to its authority in the Yemen which was embodied in the uprising of al-Haysam b. ᶜAbd al-Ṣamad al-Ḥimyarī. One of the features of the policies of the caliphate at that time was its attempts to find competent administrators to rule this region. By following this policy the first five ᶜAbbāsid caliphs managed to keep their control of centres of administration in the Yemen, but not for long, for the weakness of the caliphate began to appear from the end of the second/eighth century.

The importance of the Yemen became clear in that period when Ibn Ṭabāṭabā started his revolution in Kufa. This revolution spread to the Ḥijāz. The Yemen was one of the main

targets for the revolutionaries in which they extended their influence by appointing one of them as its governor. Several local powers were found supporting or opposing the Alids. The ᶜAbbāsids, when they tried to take the Yemen, sent a regular army to expel the Alid governor.

The emergence of the local power in the course of the events in the Yemen and the increasing interest of the caliphate in it came at the time when the ᶜAbbāsids were nearer the decline of their influence over their administration, particularly after the civil war. The disturbance in Tihāmat al-Yaman at the beginning of the third/ninth century forced the ᶜAbbāsid administration to send Ibn Ziyād as a ruler of the region in order that he might protect its interests there and ensure the allegiance of that area.

This policy of the ᶜAbbāsids was successful except in the highland area which underwent a succession of uprisings against the caliphal authority. These uprisings were led by some influential and ambitious chiefs. As a result the central Islamic authority lost its political control over this region.

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