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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with beliefs in and about education. It attempts to develop ways in which such beliefs can be studied in relation to the context of which they are an essential part.

Part I explores the nature of belief. The concept of "value-knowledge" is used to emphasize the commitment that underlying beliefs entail. A "tree-root" metaphor is also employed to explore the ways in which beliefs are structured, both internally and in relation to their social context. It is argued that commitment and structure are two aspects of the same thing. A methodology is developed which relates creative thought to belief.

Part II considers various treatments of educational ideologies. It is suggested that insufficient attention has generally been given to the commitment and structuring of beliefs. Certain dimensions are elaborated on which educational beliefs and ideologies might usefully be considered.

Parts III and IV develop this analysis by examining various meanings and implications of "open education" and by exploring the notion of "closure". Finally, Part V illustrates the methodology by reference to the educational beliefs of early nineteenth-century British Radicals, early twentieth-century American Progressives and contemporary British Child-centred educationists.

Though the thesis is intended primarily as a contribution to the sociology of education, it is suggested that it has important implications for the sociology of knowledge.

THE STRUCTURING OF IDEOLOGY AND BELIEF IN "OPEN EDUCATION" : A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

MICHAEL ALAN SYER

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Ph.D. thesis, submitted to the University of Durham, May 1977

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research leading to this thesis was part-funded by the Social Science Research Council and was done whilst I was a postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology and Social Administration, Durham University. I am most grateful for the accommodation and other study facilities that this entailed. I also benefitted greatly from having the opportunity to teach on undergraduate courses. I am indebted to many people for their general stimulation - including staff, postgraduates and undergraduates, and members of the Durham Political Economy Group. In particular, I should like to thank Bill Williamson for his encouragement and helpful comments on my work. I should also like to express my gratitude to many people in Teesside for the help and hospitality they accorded me in the course of research which did not, in the event, come to be reported here. Above all, my thanks are due to my family, for their forbearance and support throughout.

INTRODUCTION

This essay is intended to be a contribution to the sociology of education and to the study of ideology. When Young introduced Knowledge and Control, he saw the papers collected there as a "radical and widely differing set of departures from what might be included under a 'textbook definition' of the sociology of education" (Young, 1971, ed., p.3). Since then such papers have become part of an orthodoxy in Britain, which is itself already under challenge (cf. Syer and Corrigan, 1976). This essay is within that debate. Few writers, still, have attempted to bridge the gap between societal ideologies and what individuals actually believe - and what they learn to believe in school. How ideology works remains a question that is largely untackled precisely where it should be a central concern - in the sociology of education. One man who has devoted attention to this is Professor Basil Bernstein. I am critical of much that he has written. Yet he has at least tackled this central question. Many of the ideas developed in this essay are the fruit of close reading and criticism of Bernstein's approach.

Some will dismiss any bridge between ideology and belief as unattainable, and impossible to discuss as a sociological issue. Such a retreat is unacceptable. Certainly, there are major epistemological problems involved, which have preoccupied philosophers for centuries. It is not, and cannot be, my object in this essay to write a history of such preoccupations. In editing the initial draft, I have already omitted, footnoted or drastically reduced treatment of what would certainly be central arguments, were that my intention. I am often reduced to straight

assertions where this may seem incautious and where I would prefer to be more tentative. I can only excuse this on the grounds that what else I have to say is, I hope, worth saying.

Part I of this essay is concerned with the structuring of belief. Not only are subjectively held beliefs structured, but they are only beliefs, as opposed to noncommittal understandings, insofar as their structures are somehow rigidified and closed. The problem is to conceive of that structuration. For this I suggest a "tree-root" metaphor. I then suggest that ideological master patterns share many of the properties of individual subjective beliefs and that the same metaphor is useful in seeking to understand them. From this discussion emerges a methodological approach for the consideration of ideology and belief, in empirical contexts. I argue that such contexts are inseparable from such ideology and belief, and that no part of the totality can be properly understood without consideration of both.

In Part II, I look at educational ideologies. After reviewing certain other treatments of these, I consider some examples of ideological anomaly, which give clues as to how a more general methodology might be developed. I then suggest that two dimensions are universally relevant in considering educational issues and that accordingly beliefs on these dimensions must always be considered.

Whilst Part I is concerned with belief and ideology in general, and how to consider actual instances of them, Part II is concerned with these issues in specifically educational contexts. Parts III, IV and V narrow the attention still further, to "Open Education". This was chosen because it is peculiarly

appropriate to questions of ideological closure. It is also relevant to some of the central concerns of sociology. I would maintain that my approach is relevant to far more than the issue of "Open Education". This is chosen as an example of how the approach might be pursued.

In Part III, I examine possible meanings of the expression "Open Education" and develop ideas already introduced for application to particular historical instances of educational ideology. In Part IV, I consider whether truly "Open Education" could in practice be possible, and if so, in what senses. In Part V, I look at some historical examples of what, in some respects, might be regarded as beliefs in "Open Education". These are the educational beliefs of early 19th century British Radicals, of early 20th century American Progressives and of contemporary British Child-centred educationists.

Despite these examples, this essay is not intended as an historical study of education, any more than it is a history of epistemological debates. Nor is it an essay about the consequences of particular educational ideologies - although these are obviously relevant and Chapter 12 is devoted to the matter of "penetration". The theoretical concern of this essay is ideology and belief (in education) and how to consider actual instances of it. The substantive subject of the last three parts is the ideology and beliefs of teachers, administrators and politicians, rather than the implications of these for children at school. Finally, this essay is not an account of societal structures. Fundamental to an understanding of any societal totality, must be the appreciation that ideologies and beliefs must be treated as real, as having describable structures, and as being an essential

part of that totality. An emphasis on this should not be taken to imply that more orthodox study of societal structures and processes is unimportant, only that they do not and cannot give a full picture. This is especially the case in a study of education, which is, after all, the production and reproduction of beliefs and understandings.

PART I - THE STRUCTURING OF BELIEF

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I assume in this essay that we can validly distinguish between the real world-out-there and people's beliefs and understandings about it. The first of these I call Reality. The second I call 'realities'.(1) There is a Reality, independently of how people understand it. Yet people's 'realities' are themselves real. They do themselves constitute a part (but not the totality) of overall Reality. I shall be using the terms 'realities', beliefs and 'knowledge' interchangeably, for to me they are the same thing. What people believe about the world-out-there, they assume implicitly or explicitly they know. That is, they 'know' it. They take the object of that 'knowledge' to be real. That is, it is their 'reality'. I shall also be introducing the term Value-Knowledge. This again refers to beliefs, rather than objectively-valid knowledge. My reason for using four terms, rather than the single term "beliefs", is to emphasise, in particular passages, certain denotations which all these terms have, in my usage, but which may be of particular relevance in those passages. All are "stronger" words, for instance, than mere "understandings", which do not entail the same level of non-rational commitment. I hope these distinctions will become clear as I proceed.

A further distinction which I shall make is between subjective 'realities'(2), held by individuals, and objectivated 'realities' which are external to them. The latter may include the 'realities' of other people, but more importantly they are

those 'realities' which are institutionalised in social relations, or otherwise objectivated in "what everyone knows", or in what "experts" or other 'reality'-definers take to be valid and valuable. Both kinds of 'realities' are also real in themselves. Subjective 'realities' exist in the mind-brain of individuals. Both the nature of their origins, and that of their consequences need to be understood. Objectivated 'realities' also exist, as part of the real world with which any individual, any learner, has to cope.

Necessarily, it is my 'reality' which is presented in this essay. I shall not, however, feel obliged constantly to qualify my assertions with such phrases as "in my opinion" or whatever. I shall say a few words about the problem of relativism in Chapter 2. Meanwhile it must be assumed that appropriate qualifications are implied, and that it is meaningful for me to write as an "objective observer".

For an adequate sociological understanding of ideologies - what they are and how they operate - it is essential to distinguish between the Reality that is the world-out-there, in any given historical context, and the 'realities' that people believe in, in that context. At the same time, those 'realities' are themselves Real. They are a part of the total reality of the situation. They are in whole or in part determined by the history of that situation, and they play an important determinative role in how that situation develops.

Both external Realities and internal 'realities' are structured. What may in particular contexts be regarded as contents or elements of the physical and social world, and of subjective notions of this, are never isolated. They are always

and necessarily - and, sociologically, crucially - related to each other non-randomly. In the case of 'realities', I will suggest that it is convenient and useful to consider them as hierarchically structured. This helps us both to identify the ideological beliefs with which we are concerned and to assess their adequacy.

The term Value-Knowledge will be used to denote belief structures which, for reasons to be understood in each context, have become rigidified. As such, they are closed belief structures which are unquestioned and/or "unquestionable" to their adherents. The rigidification occurs as a result of experience firstly of material and social Reality and secondly of the personal behaviour (including thinking) and inherent properties (including belief structuration) of the person or persons in question. This rigidification constitutes the creation of Value-Knowledge, which is determinative of individual behaviour. Value-Knowledge is thus the bridge between experience and behaviour. It is hoped that the concept might help us to understand how ideology works. It is, after all, individuals who hold beliefs. And ideologies are belief systems.

The term 'realities' can be used both of individually-held subjective (structures of) belief and of objectivated bodies of 'knowledge' which are external to - and an important part of the experiential environment of - those individuals. This distinction between Subjective 'Knowledge' and Objectivated 'Knowledge' allows us to examine relationships between the two, in any empirical context, and to discuss the transmission of societal "truths" and Master Patterns, as well as the subjective creation of novel accounts.

There is commonly an isomorphism between intersocietal, societal, institutional and interactional 'realities', which "corresponds" to actual social relationships at those different levels. These 'realities' are interacting, and frequently mutually reinforcing. The Reality to which they "correspond" is to an important extent reproduced by virtue of this isomorphism.

A view of belief systems as hierarchically structured enables us to search for unifying Basic Beliefs, which underlie both subjective 'realities' and objectivated bodies of 'knowledge'.

An awareness of the implicit structuring of belief systems enables individuals to reflect upon that structuring, to identify closures/rigidifications, and therefore to "open out" belief systems through making them explicit and questioning their adequacy.

Reality and 'Realities'

Things exist in the physical world, independently of people's awareness of them. Equally independently, they are related to one another in time, space and determination. The natural world, in short, is non-random. Discussion of these relationships, of this non-randomness, must always be, in a sense, metaphorical. For that reality must always be ontologically distinct from the language with which we attempt to describe it. Yet that does not mean those relationships are but a product of our language or our understandings. Determinative relationships, for example, are real, independently of Man's ability to conceive of them, and independently, for instance, of any specific societally-contexted notions of "causality".(3) Our notions of "things", also, is generally inadequate. Whilst physicists still

long to identify elementary particles, for most purposes it should suffice to realise that no thing is distinct and isolated. All things are externally related in time, space and determination to other things. Furthermore, all things are internally structured. They are themselves composed of "smaller" elements, in turn related to one another.

In human society, people are things in the same sense. They are externally related to other human and non-human things in the world. And they are internally structured. The possibly unique feature of humanity, its ability to reflect upon itself-in-relation-to-the-world and thereby its creative potential, does not detract from this thing-ness of people. The internal relationships between brain and behaviour, and the external relationships with other people and environment, are equally real. People's 'realities' are as structured and as non-random as the Reality external to them. The relationship between the internal structuration of subjective 'realities' and the structuration of the Real world-out-there is of fundamental importance, if we are to seek any understanding of belief and ideology. The problem here is not merely one of whether 'realities' "correspond" in some way to Reality, but one of what reasons there might be for any such "correspondence", and what consequences for behaviour such more-or-less adequate "correspondence" might have.

As an example of a real object and a notion of it, consider a bus. A particular bus cannot but be constructed (internally) in a certain way, and situated in time and space in relation to other human and non-human things. Similarly, our notion of "bus" - however much we are tempted to think of it explicitly as something distinct - cannot but be a "bus-as-an-example-of-redness",

a "bus-filling-with-people", a "bus-running-over-my-foot", and countless other "things" as well. Moreover, we can only have 'knowledge' of things in the world-out-there insofar as their internal and external relatedness is in some way represented in our structured notions - however inadequate those notions may in fact be. Otherwise, they would be quite literally inconceivable.

The structuration of people's beliefs is both causally and functionally related to the structuration of the Reality "portrayed". However, those beliefs are not merely a passive response to the world-out-there. That external reality is not the sole determinative source of our beliefs. What determines beliefs is experience. But we also experience ourselves. We experience not just our external situations, but also our internal selves - the internal structuring of our own always-already beliefs, and of our own always-ongoing behaviour and action.

Moreover, Man has the ability to fantasy, to think creatively and to act on the basis not solely of mechanically-determinative beliefs, but also on the basis of hypothesised understandings. Consequently, we are in some ways able to create the very experiences from which beliefs are derived. People can act upon the world (including other people), thereby creating objectivated 'realities' for themselves and others.(4) An important example of such objectivated 'realities' is that which is presented as Educational 'Knowledge' in schools. Such objectivated 'knowledge' is real, structured and "significant" for people in schools.

Finally, we can distinguish between "objectivated 'Knowledge'" (or "Objectivated 'Reality'") and <u>an objectivistic view of knowledge</u>.

The latter view, according to Esland,

> "assumes that zones of knowledge are objects which can be considered to have meaning other than in the minds of the individuals in which they are constituted, irrespective of their human realisation", and
> "has been firmly embedded in the norms and rituals of academic culture and its transmission." Esland (1971) p.75.

It is, in a sense, a prescriptive view, in that it holds that there are bodies of knowledge, which should be transmitted to the uninitiated. According to this view, these bodies are taken as relatively unproblematic: neither their validity (as accounts of Reality) nor their value (to the educans) is generally open to question.

Objectivated 'Knowledge', however, arises from the existence of such views as this. The pupil is commonly confronted with objectivated bodies of 'knowledge' because, also external to him, educationists with an objectivistic view of knowledge take those bodies of 'knowledge' to be valid and valuable. In everyday life, also, individuals are confronted with the institutionalised or otherwise objectivated 'realities' of others. However problematic (invalid or non-valuable) they may appear to that individual, or to us the observers, they are there as part of that individual's objective environment. They are a part of the Reality which he experiences.

Notes

(1) In the first draft of this paper, I employed a number of different bracketing devices, in the hope of clarifying distinctions that are seriously glossed over in more conventional punctuation. Being advised that these may confuse rather than clarify, I have abandoned this attempt here. Where, for instance, Ford (1975) would use interrogative brackets, I have used ordinary double inverted commas, undistinguished from conventional use.

Originally, I used single inverted commas to indicate that what was enclosed was believed to be real by the people in question. I retain this usage only in the case of 'knowledge' and 'reality', which indicate what such-and-such people take to be knowledge and reality. On occasion, I use capital letters and/or underlining as a substitute for double inverted commas, where a term is being used for the first time or in a specialised sense.

(2) i.e. subjective 'knowledge' or beliefs.

(3) I disagree, therefore, with Ford when she says:

> "For many commentators seem to believe that ¿causal? links are things which exist in the real world. Of course they are not ... They are notions which people invent in their attempts to grasp, order, and explain reality. Questions about the frequency and utility of ¿causal? ideas are not questions about relationships in the real world, but questions about linkages in the world of theory." (Ford, (1975) pp. 119-120.

(4) Not that the resulting symbols, artefacts and behaviours need have the same meaning subsequently to others, nor even to the creators themselves. I do not, in this essay, use the notion of "culture". However, it seems relevant to note here that much ambiguity arises in certain sociological literature from a failure to see that "culture" must always be at least a second-order concept. It cannot refer to the artefacts, behaviours and symbols of a particular cultural group themselves, but to understandings and beliefs about those external objects. The same object may exist over time, or even contemporaneously, but have quite different cultural significance for different parties.

CHAPTER 2

THE LOGIC AND CONTEXT OF BELIEFS

Relativism

The question of relativism affects this essay at two levels. Firstly, the subject of the essay is people's beliefs. Consequently, the relationships which they believe to hold between their beliefs and the reality to which these "correspond" must itself be a matter for consideration. Secondly, my own understanding of that relationship is an essential part of my account. Specifically, I wish to talk about the ways in which a certain kind of notion - those I call "beliefs" or "Value-Knowledge"(1) - become consequential. And I wish to discuss dimensions along which we might consider the structuration and adequacy of people's beliefs.(2) In the latter case, I shall suggest that though in fact we can have no direct access to other people's beliefs, even where these have formed the basis of written or spoken accounts, nevertheless is it meaningful to talk about them. Certainly, we may in the event be analysing what we take to be their beliefs - that is, our own subjective understandings of them. Nevertheless this is more than mere introspection, if we assume that those beliefs do have reality external to, and independently of, ourselves.

My own position is one of Relativist Realism. I take it as given that even were we to have beliefs that did, somehow, "correspond" to Reality, or were, in some other sense, "true", yet we could never unquestionably know this. We can never know that we know. No beliefs can ever be either context-free or value-free.(3) This much any relativist would accept. I would

differ, however, from certain other forms of relativism[4] in that I am in no way distressed at the prospect of dismissing the search for cut-and-dried "truth" and "falsity". On the contrary, fundamental to my account of belief structures is a notion of Adequacy, which entirely replaces the need for such a misleading dichotomy. Moreover, I am prepared unquestioningly to accept that there is a world-out-there, that it is real whether I reflect upon it or not, and that it contains other people and their beliefs.

'Realistic' Beliefs

I am primarily concerned in this essay with beliefs about the world as it "really is". These beliefs are descriptive in the sense that, if verbalised, they would constitute descriptive assertions or propositions about Reality. However, the very adherence to such descriptive beliefs can itself constitute prescription - however implicit and unrecognised such prescription may be. To emphasise this, I shall use the term "Value-Knowledge". I wish, therefore, to distinguish my notion of beliefs from that of "values" as it is most frequently used. I suggest, even, that such "values" have no distinct reality and consequently no direct sociological importance.

I shall distinguish later between beliefs that are strongly held and those which are held only for-the-time-being. The former constitute Value-Knowledge proper. They are distinguished from fantasy or mild conviction only as a matter of degree, not of kind. Such differences in degree are, however, both explicable and consequential. I shall also distinguish between beliefs that

have been made explicit by their adherents and those which have not. For the moment, however, I shall be discussing beliefs. It may be assumed for the moment that these are strong beliefs (i.e. Value-Knowledge) about the world-out-there.

The notion of "values" as a specific kind of prescriptive belief is not sociologically useful. It tends misleadingly to imply that behind such statements there are beliefs which have a privileged status over "merely" descriptive beliefs. They are commonly taken in some way to influence or determine behaviour in a way that "merely" descriptive beliefs do not. They are assumed to be separate and distinct from the latter. It is sometimes supposed, furthermore, that such "values" are relatively immutable, when compared with descriptive beliefs. I maintain that from a subjective point of view they "describe" reality every bit as much as "ordinary" descriptive beliefs. They need be no more strongly-held. And in practice "ordinary" beliefs are just as prescriptive.

A distinction commonly made is that between cognitive and affective behaviour. Yet the two are inseparable. As Holly says, in discussing Bloom et al.'s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (Bloom et al. 1956),

> "Their ideological commitment to cognition as pure mental operation uncontaminated by feeling ... means that their categories remain external and formalistic. How, for instance, does one achieve 'comprehension' without, as a prior condition, having a feeling of involvement? How, having achieved comprehension, can one remain unaffected by it?" Holly (1973/74) p.138.(5)

In practice, cognition and affect are inseparable (although the degree to which the two aspects of the same beliefs are made explicit may vary considerably).

Distinctions are also found between "attitudes" and "beliefs".

Allport (1954), for instance, would see the two statements,

1. "I dislike Negroes" and

2. "Negroes are stupid",

as indicating an attitude and a belief, respectively. Firstly, however, such statements have no sociological significance as distinct expressions of underlying notions. If made by the same person, then they express aspects of the same belief structure. Secondly, both might easily indicate beliefs. There is no evidence in the verbal formulations alone as to the strength of commitment of the speaker. Strength of belief necessarily exists only in context - in particular people, in particular situations, at particular times. Thirdly, as Tajfel puts it,

> "'Bad' or 'good', even 'liked' or 'disliked', become incontrovertible statements of fact not different in their mode of assimilation from, for example, 'large' or 'small'." Tajfel (1973) pp. 75-6.

Furthermore, beliefs are inseparable, in practice, not only from the ways in which they are learned, but from their consequences upon behaviour.

Another common distinction is similar to the last. It is made on the basis of the permanence of notions, rather than of what they are "about", or of how they are learned. "Opinion", "attitude" and "character trait" are believed by Brown (1963) to be progressively harder to change by "techniques of persuasion" (though they are <u>defined</u> in terms of how they are acquired). Again, I insist that the differences are only a matter of degree. They are not qualitatively different.

My major objection is to distinctions between "knowledge" (or sometimes "belief") and "<u>values</u>". There are no such <u>things</u> as values. They do not have objective reality. They cannot,

therefore, offer a sociologically useful category. They do not exist independently of people's (contexted) minds. Insofar as it is possible to talk of them at all, they are inseparable from those people's 'realistic' beliefs. It is possible to abstract, for the purposes of analysis, people's beliefs, because all descriptive beliefs, refer to some aspect of the believer's 'reality'. But "values" in isolation do not refer. There are only states of valuing. Certainly, we can talk about - and thereby abstract - such psychological states. But we cannot then reunite such abstractions with the referential beliefs from which they were in the first place divorced. We cannot talk about "The Values", that "God is good", or that "Murder is wrong", or that "Pedestrians should not jay-walk". To accord distinct ontological status to such "values" would be idealism.

In practice (i.e. in the real world), those beliefs which are so commonly separated off as "values" are no different from descriptive beliefs. To show this, let me borrow Russell's much-used proposition that "The (present) King of France is bald". Now whatever the referential status of mere propositions, when they appear as assertions they necessarily refer to what is taken to be 'Reality'.

When someone says, "The King of France is bald", he means, not only that "There is a (man who is, or is called, the) King of France, and that man is bald",

but, more than that: "I believe that there is a (man who is or is called, the) King of France, and I believe that that man is bald".

(To repeat, I am assuming for the moment that the beliefs I am discussing are "sincere", and that they are really believed.

Strength of belief is, for the moment, another matter).

This set of stated beliefs is no different in kind from the equivalent elaboration of "Murder is wrong":

When someone ways, "Murder is wrong", he means, not only that "There is a real or possible class of actions which we call 'murder', and it is wrong to commit any such action",

but "I <u>believe</u> that there is (such a class of actions) and I <u>believe</u> that it is wrong (to commit them)".

In this example, the definition of "wrong" may of course be debatable. It may not be consensual. But the debate would be with others, not by the believer with himself, <u>as believer</u>. Insofar as he believes the second statement (insofar that is, as it is an accurate portrayal of his beliefs), then it is no different in kind from his beliefs about the King of France's hairstyle.(6)

In short, it is delusory to isolate a certain kind of belief called "values", characterisable by what it supposedly refers to (God, murder, jay-walkers). Sociologically, the only useful way to talk about "values" is in specific contexts, where they are inseparable from the referential (descriptive) beliefs of particular people. Whilst we may meaningfully be able to talk about the possible meaning of such <u>beliefs</u> in the abstract (beliefs about God, about murder, etc.), <u>valuation</u> is necessarily contexted. Moreover, it is an essential part of <u>any</u> beliefs, in practice.

Mannheim appears to make a similar point when he talks about the peculiarly modern phenomenon of talking about "values". This arose, he suggests, from the diffusion of economic theory. However, his complaint is linked with an argument about rationality which I would want to qualify. He says that,

> "The view which holds that all cultural life is an orientation towards objective values is just one more illustration of a typically modern rationalistic disregard for the basic irrational mechanisms which govern man's relation to his world. Far from being permanently valid the interpretation of culture in terms of objective values is really a peculiar characteristic of the thought of our own time ..." Mannheim (1936/60) p.73.

I would maintain, however, that men do behave "rationally", according to a rather restricted use of that term. Insofar as men's belief structures become rigified (a notion that I shall explain in Chapter 3) then their behaviour is in principle predictable according to those structures. This essay is directed at the problem of how we might consider certain common structures of belief, relevant to education. I would not say that man tends to act "rationally" in the sense of action directed to certain (invariant) objectives. The non-randomness of behaviour must be seen in the light of belief structures. (These may be conveniently characterised - and analysed - in terms of certain Basic Beliefs, along certain Dimensions, which I discuss below).

Meanwhile, Mannheim is right when he continues the above passage,

> "... But even granting for the moment that this conception [of orientation towards objective values] had some merit, the existence of certain formal realms of values and their specific structure would be intelligible only with reference to the concrete situations to which they have relevance and in which they are valid. There is, then, no norm which can lay claim to formal validity and which can be abstracted as a constant universal formal element from its historically changing content." Mannheim, loc.cit.

In talking of the unifying Basic Beliefs[7] of belief structure, I may appear to be resorting to something akin to the "higher values" which I have been attacking. The principal differences are as follows. Firstly, Basic Beliefs are no more (nor less) prescriptive beliefs than any others. Secondly, the notion of "value" - in Value-Knowledge - applies to beliefs at

any level of inclusiveness[8], not merely to those at a "high level". Such valuation inheres in the state of believing, not in the overt referential content of the beliefs in question.

A notion to which I was at first sight attracted is that of "value-orientations".[9] Certain formulations of this notion are similar to what I call Dimensions. The suggestion behind "value-orientations" is that although particular people's contextual experience may not be concretely the same, yet it may be possible to examine their Basic Beliefs in terms of certain supposedly universal criteria, and along certain dimensions which supposedly are universally relevant. I have two main objections to the "value-orientations" formulation, however. Firstly they refer almost exclusively to dimensions "at the top" of beliefs, isolated from the structures of belief of which they (or their equivalents) are really integral parts. Secondly they are remarkably context-free. They tend to be presented as though learned in one context (usually infancy) and then magically transferred to another (in adolescence or adulthood). Yet this "transfer" does not fit a great deal of empirical evidence. People may be "achievement-oriented" or "individualistic", for instance, in one context, but not in another. Where such continuities are found, then it is precisely this continuity that is in need of explanation. It should not be taken as an independent, explanatory variable. Stability (and change) in people's beliefs need to be explained in terms of past and ongoing experience. It is most misleading to assume that the "natural" state of man is consistency, and to use this to explain social order.[10]

In using the concept of "Basic Beliefs", therefore, especially of Objectivated Belief Systems, and of rigidified individuals' structures of 'reality', I wish to dissociate it from any notion of "higher-order values". They are integral parts of more comprehensive belief structures. They are themselves non-random products of past and ongoing experience. To this extent, my usage of "Basic Beliefs" has slightly perverted Ford's use of the expression. She describes them as "metatheoretical judgments", which are untestable and a priori and which "in a most profound sense ... we believe because we believe" (Ford, 1975, p.88, her emphasis). I differ in stressing that there are much lower level beliefs which are just as consequential - though their verbalised form may be discreditable on contextual or logical criteria - and that the experiential basis of such strong belief (Value-Knowledge) is crucial in our understanding of how Basic Beliefs are produced and reproduced.

An illustration may help to emphasize that what are commonly conceived of as "high level values" are not what I mean by either "Value-Knowledge" or "Basic Beliefs". Take the supposed "value" that "Thou shalt not kill". This could well be a high-level notion, in the terms described below. But this in no way means that it must be valued as 'knowledge'. In most cases, such a formula is not learned from direct experience at all, either through experience of world-out-there reality, or through subjective elaboration. It is most probably learnt "off the peg". If it were nonetheless strongly-believed (i.e. Value-Known), then this would be through its incorporation in a quite different structure of beliefs - not about "life" or "killing" at all but about

(for instance) the truth of God's word, or the danger of oneself being hurt. Were the 'knowledge' that "Though shalt not kill" put to the test (for instance in War-time), it would to a major extent be 'knowledge' structures about God or about one's own danger (for instance) that would be being challenged, rather than those about life and death. Compare this, for instance, with drinking and driving. I 'know' that I should not drink-and-drive. But it is questionable whether that 'knowledge' is truly Value-Knowledge, to me. Two kinds of experience might really impress the importance of such a belief on me. Firstly, I might witness or be part of a drink-and-drive accident. Secondly, I might be breathalysed-and-convicted by the "due processes of law." If the former occurred, my Value-Knowledge Structure concerning drinking-and-driving would be predominantly related to beliefs about "drink", about "driving", about "life-and-death" and "motor accidents". In the second case, however, my drink-and-driving belief structure would probably be quite different. It would be composed of such elements as "police", "being-caught" and "being-fined-and-losing-my-licence". The occasions on which such Value-Knowledge would significantly affect my subsequent behaviour and the ways in which it would do so would therefore be likely to be very different. Yet the social-scientist-on-the-doorstep might evince from me the (as it happens) totally ambiguous "value" that "Drinking-and-Driving is bad" - Strongly Agree. Where "off-the-peg" notions are neither Value-Known as a result of direct experience relevant to their immediate referents, nor as a result of the "significant" experience of being fined, or preached to etc., then, however high-level those beliefs in terms of referential content, this has nothing to do with values. Finally, there is

plenty of evidence in political and industrial sociology to demonstrate that off-the-peg, so-called "values" may be quite inoperative in actual behaviour.(11) They frequently mean quite different things in different social milieu, anyway.(12)

I am leaving till later the question of explicit and implicit beliefs. Meanwhile, my distinction between apparently high-level "values" and (not necessarily high-level) beliefs is closely related to the distinction between understanding and belief. For I may be able to understand what is meant by the verbalised high-level belief of another person. But that in no way means that I believe it, or internalise it as Value-Knowledge of my own. Similarly, Value-Knowledge may be quite unverbalised. Another related distinction is that between rhetoric and ideology.(13) The former may be quite different to what we really believe. And we may be quite unaware of the latter.(14)

I have not said that prescriptive beliefs cannot be Value-Knowledge. They can, and this can be very important. But such "should-ness" does not significantly distinguish beliefs of a particular kind, from a sociological point of view. "Should"-statements and "Is"-statements are, after all, only verbal formulations. It is not the verbal formulation that constitutes what is sociologically significant. It is the strength-of-belief. This is clear when we consider that "Thou shalt not kill" can not-inadequately be reformulated as "Life is sacred", and vice-versa. What, in social behaviour, determines the prescriptive content of beliefs is not their apparent (verbal) reference to "should-ness" rather than "is-ness", but the strength of Value-Belief that accompanies their assertion. Indeed, Value-Knowledge

which is not asserted, because it is implicit/unverbalised, is generally the most significant, sociologically.

It is the structure of beliefs and their inherent Value-Knowledge content, then, that actually have determinative effects upon behaviour. But "Should"-beliefs can still be important. In Chapter 7, I shall make such a distinction. No privileged status, however, should be accorded to beliefs explicitly formulated in prescriptive terms. If we consider beliefs that refer to a particular state of affairs - a political system, say, or an institutional relationship - the following questions might be asked:

a. Does that state of affairs exist?

b. Could it exist?

c. Does it (inevitably) have to exist?

d. Should it exist?

Such questions have particular relevance to the dimensions of Change.(15)

Notions and Models

Beliefs are 'realistic'. They refer to what is taken to be real in the world-out-there. Or, since one's own beliefs also have reality, at any given point in time, they may refer to these too. Beliefs may refer, then, to what are taken to be properties, things or relationships out-there. Or they may refer to one's own notions and models and the relationships within and between them.

The term Notion refers to any particular belief or understanding. Notions may or may not be verbalised and they may or may not be adequate in any of the senses suggested below.

(Explicitness and adequacy are closely related, as we shall see.) Verbalised notions I call Concepts. In using a name (which may be a single word, a phrase, or even a lengthy treatise) to indicate a notion, one is thereby employing a concept. The name itself refers not to the concept, nor to the previously unverbalised notion, but to the aspect of 'Reality' to which the notion itself refers. All three,then, refer to 'real' objects. To use or develop concepts is to attempt to bridge the gap between belief and language. Conceptualisation may itself improve understanding, and this itself may make belief more adequate. Frequently, however, we fail to say what we implicitly mean.

In diagrammatic form:



(All notions are contexted and all notions refer.)

Verbalisation should be distinguished from verbalisability. We may use simple names to refer to complex Realities and yet be well aware of that complexity. Often we can elaborate further, if the need arises. In such cases, simple names, or simple statements, are short-hands for more complex 'knowledge'.(16)

On the other hand, such simple names may not be a short-hand at all, but mere clichés. When I say "nuclear physics", and when a nuclear physicist employs the same expression, we may

objectively be referring to the same object[17] in the world-out-there. Subjectively, however, these verbalisations indicate quite different notions/concepts. If asked to elaborate on what I meant by "nuclear physics", I might not know where to start, for reasons of ignorance. The specialist, however, might not know where to start for quite different reasons.

It is difficult even to conceive of "elemental" notions - just as it is difficult to conceive of "elemental" things, in the real world-out-there. Notions are inherently related and either casually or invariably associated with other notions in our belief structures. They are necessarily structures in themselves. And they are always, and at the same time, elements of other notional structures.

It is tempting to say that such "elemental" notions are either typifications, or constructs of them. However, the term "typifications" generally denotes explicit reference to what are taken to be "properties" in Reality - "properties" such as "redness", or "roundness", or "dog-ness", or "car-ness". To refer explicitly to such supposed "properties", one needs to have well-developed (and far from elemental) notions of them. One also needs to be able to abstract: for one is referring, in typifications, not just to the known, but to hypothetical instances of those "properties" in other, unknown, situations.

Prior to this development of abstraction and explicitness, we have implicit and ill-formed notions of the "properties" in question, which are initially undivorced from concrete experience. So "dog-ness" as an implicit pre-typification for an infant may have a notional structure that includes "hairiness", "waggliness", etc., and "our-Sheba-ness" - rather than "all-known-and-

unknown-dogness".

Language itself is a prerequisite of abstraction. But, once even elementary language is acquired, abstraction necessarily, and by the same token, occurs. It occurs in respect of the objects referred to by particular names, and by the concepts -in-formation that these names indicate. It is a fiction that abstraction is something that occurs only in "high-level"thinking.

> "All ideas without exception are abstract, since the very process of forming ideas is a process of abstraction. When, therefore, we apply the term 'abstract' to distinguish certain ideas from others, we use this term only in a relative sense, meaning that one idea is more abstract than another, or rather, represents a higher level of abstraction." Cornforth (1954) p.72.

(The account that follows is in part an attempt to give meaning to such expressions as "higher level of abstraction".)

In view of what I have just said about "typifications" and "abstraction", I prefer not to use Berger's notion of "pre-theoretical" thought (or beliefs). I would speak, rather, of "pre-linguistic" beliefs. Much - and possibly most - of our 'knowledge' remains "pre-linguistic", long after infancy. For it refers to relationships in Reality which we have either not attempted, or not been able, to name and thereby conceptualize. This does not mean, however, that we have no notions of it. Nor - importantly - does it mean that those notions may not be very real Value-Knowledge, and therefore consequential.

Value-Knowledge consists of rigidified (or closed) belief structures. Such rigidification can occur even in the case of apparently "simple" notions - where they are assumed to be unproblematic.(18)

Such apparently "simple" notions, then, are also structured. All notions are at the same time models. They are models of what is taken to be Reality, or some aspect of it. At least implicitly, they refer to structured relationships in the world-out-there, and they are themselves structured. The relationship between these two kinds of structure - on the one hand of Reality and on the other hand of 'realities' - is discussed below. Theories are also models. What distinguishes theories from other kinds of notion is that, however inadequately, they refer to determinative relationships in the world-out-there. Believed theories are determinisms.

Theories are not necessarily explicit explanatory models. Even models which overtly are 'non-explanatory' frequently contain a covert, perhaps unrecognised, reference to determinative relationships. Especially when it comes, not to "scientific" models, but to "everyday" ones, it frequently happens that our understandings of determination are unvoiced. They are there in our implicit beliefs, for all that. Because of the fact of determination out-there, we almost inevitably have some implicit theories about it. These implicit theories may not be particularly adequate. Clearly we do not implicitly know whatever happens in the world about us, as if it were merely a question of introspection and verbalisation. On the contrary, our implicit 'knowledge' is generally non-adequate in a number of ways. But neither are we totally ignorant of determinative (and other) relationships in Reality. We tend to have implicit 'knowledge' of Reality, insofar as we experience it. Our very failure to make our models explicit in itself tends to prevent them from becoming more adequate. To give a brief example: I shall argue

later that "progressive" teachers are not ignorant of political structures and economic relationships, in their pedagogical ideals - as some would argue. Rather, they do have 'knowledge' of the functions of education, of the industrial labour market, of state apparatuses. But this 'knowledge' is frequently low-level, implicit, and inadequate.

Beliefs as Structures

The rest of this chapter outlines one way in which we may conceive of beliefs as structures. I suggest that there are certain logical and contextual criteria or dimensions, according to which we can form an image of the shape of these structures, as well as their adequacy. I use in particular a "tree-root" metaphor to clarify certain central features.

Whilst this view of belief structures is above all hierarchical, it must be distinguished immediately from any social prestige or power that may in practice be associated with different "levels of abstraction", or different 'knowledge'-areas. Much of Young (1971. ed.) is concerned with this social stratification of 'knowledge'.(19) Some writers have claimed that certain curricular developments promoted by the Schools Council perpetuate or recreate social differentiation within British schools, despite an apparent shift towards equality, in comprehensivisation.(20) Clearly, certain branches of 'knowledge' and forms of thought are regarded as superior, more worthy and entitling the master of such thought and 'knowledge' to higher remuneration and responsibility.(21)

The sorts of distinction that I am making in this section

are obviously related to this social stratification of 'knowledge', in our society. However, they are analytically quite distinct. To hold that they were inevitably related in practice, one would have to assume that either innate individual differences, or societally necessary experiential differences, made it impossible for more than a few to become "abstract thinkers". I would challenge both assumptions, but that is not here the issue. I am concerned here with the structuring of beliefs <u>whatever</u> evaluations are accorded to "high level" understandings and belief, and whatever constraints actually or supposedly restrict their acquisition.

Not being concerned here with the social stratification of 'knowledge', I can approvingly refer to the work of Hirst.(22) His logic areas are suspiciously similar to those institutionalised in a particular society's historically-situated academic tradition, and his account may be taken as a legitimation of that tradition and the inequalities it helps to reproduce. Nonetheless, it is not inappropriate to conceive of 'knowledge' <u>in this society</u> as structured along the lines he suggests. Compare a distinction made earlier, between Objectivated 'Knowledge' and an objectivistic view of knowledge. The latter may produce a descriptive analysis of 'knowledge' as it really is objectivated in a particular societal context. But it also tends to add a prescriptive element. It legitimates that 'Knowledge' by saying "And this is how it most probably must be". This is only a <u>further</u> belief, and one I would reject.(23)

At the same time, in any given historical society, societal inequalities may clearly produce differential opportunities and needs to theorise and to render implicit beliefs explicit. In

a class society, members of different classes by definition have different experiences, in important respects. Were there no experience but that of the world-out-there and its relational properties, different "levels" of theory about that Reality would inevitably result. However, one experiences also the Reality of one's own subjective belief structures. These are themselves a source of reflection and elaboration. There is no necessary inevitability that "high level" 'knowledge' be the prerogative of one section of society.

The idea that 'knowledge' may be structured is not, of course, new. However, it is not commonly elaborated in such a way as I attempt in this chapter. Such expressions as "high levels of abstraction" and the "deep structures of knowledge" are often taken to be self-evidently meaningful. And the distinction between - but relationships between - objectivated and subjective 'Knowledge' structures are largely neglected.

Since Kuhn (1960) adopted the term "paradigm" to refer to the dominant structures of belief in particular historical scientific communities, many writers(24) have extended this notion to cover whole societies or cultures. This is in the tradition of employing such notions as "ideologies", "legitimations", "collective consciences", "master symbols" and "master patterns", found in most of the main schools of sociology.(25) Specifically in the field of education, the structuring of curricular knowledge - which in my terms is objectivated for any given learner - is at least hinted at by Durkheim(26) and elaborated further by, for instance, Hirst and Peters (1970) and by Bruner (e.g. 1974).

The distinction between these objectivated structures and the developing structures of belief within the learner, however, is not

always very clear.[27] Even when the distinction is made clearly, it is generally the learner's introduction to the (objectivated) curricular structure that is seen as problematic, and rarely that curricular 'knowledge' itself. This is the case with Bruner, for instance, in his famous dictum that

> "With respect to making accessible the deep structure of any given discipline, ... any subject can be taught to any child at any age in some form that is both honest and powerful." Bruner (1969/74) p.138.[28]

When more detailed analyses of the structuring of subjective beliefs have been made, these have often been divorced from a parallel analysis of the structuring of objectivated belief systems, which learners in particular societies are generally expected to assimilate. This is so, for instance, of much Gestalt theory in psychology, and of Kelly's theory of personal constructs.[29]

I shall be using a "tree-root" metaphor as an aid to describing my version of how 'knowledge' - both subjective and objectivated - is structured. Metaphors are a common and, arguably, an essential part of scientific theorising[30], though their use is not always recognised - with unfortunate consequences. In sociology, there have been many dominant metaphors, as well as more specialised ones for particular analyses. Amongst the most common are those taken from ecology[31], from biology and technology (the organism and the machine, respectively[32]), from construction (whence "base" and "superstructure"[33]), from the theatre (whence "roles" and "actors"[34]), from linguistics (whence some versions of "structure", and "competence"[35]).

The use of metaphors is necessarily selective - or should be. Only certain aspects can be relevant to what is to be described

or explained. Thus Elkins complains that his critics have tried to read too much into his analogy between slavery and concentration camps:

> "Metaphor and analogy do have ... a serious point of vulnerability. Their very vividness and particularity are coercive: they are almost too concrete. One's impulse is thus to reach for extremes. The thing is either taken the whole hog ... or it is rejected out of hand on the ground that not all the parts fit." Criticisms of his metaphor therefore seemed to him to be based "on an unwillingness to let analogy be used for limited and controlled purposes even when the purposes are made explicit and the limits defined with great care ..." Elkins (1959) p.104.

Horton (1967/71) gives similar warnings. He also points out that since there is never exact isomorphism between analogy and object there is frequently a hybridisation of different metaphors. Perman (1973), on the other hand, warns of the dangers of metaphors becoming clichés, and their metaphorical character being forgotten.

My use of the term "tree-root" should therefore be explained. It arose in the first place as a description of diagramatic "shapes" that I had already developed. The principal point of these shapes was to emphasise the notion of Inclusiveness, and thereby of Levels of belief. However, the reference to tree roots is also useful in certain other respects. It emphasises the structuredness of belief systems generally, and in particular the necessary inter-relatedness between lower level and higher level beliefs. A (healthy) tree cannot have a trunk without roots, nor vice-versa. Similarly, high level notions are necessarily related all the time to lower level notions, in the belief structures of which they are both always parts. The major objection to the analogy may at first sight be that tree-

roots are solid, whilst notions may be transitory, fleeting, changing. On the contrary, however, this is a major advantage of the analogy. For whilst many notions are indeed fluid, it is those very beliefs - both subjective and objectivated - which are not fluid, but are rigidified as beliefs about what the world is 'really' like, that are sociologically the most important. Thus an emphasis on the rigidity of some belief structures helps us to understand the nature of Value-Knowledge. It suggests the need to explain why some structures are rigid, whilst others may be fluid. Furthermore, it leads us to consider the possibilities and potentials of de-rigidifying - of opening up closed beliefs - in particular social contexts.

Adequacy

The foregoing comments were concerned with the senses in which beliefs can be seen as structured; the following have to do with the idea of "Adequacy". The same dimensions by which we might think in terms of "tree-root" structures, may also be used in considering the adequacy - or otherwise - of our own and others' accounts of the world. In a sense, therefore, the dimensions I recommend are also criteria. This word is used very tentatively, however, lest it be thought that quantifiable and universally applicable measurements of adequacy are at hand. They are not. I prefer, therefore, the word "dimensions", which denotes ways in which we might look at the object in question, rather than precise criteria to be applied.

A brief consideration of other criteria sometimes suggested for the assessment of accounts is in order. Simplicity is often

advocated. Horton, for instance, states that the "over-riding aim of explanation" is "to disclose order and regularity underlying apparent chaos ..." (Horton, 1967/71, p.223). He also says that

> "The quest for explanatory theory is basically the quest for unity underlying apparent diversity; for simplicity underlying apparent complexity; for order underlying apparent disorder; for regularity underlying apparent anomaly." ibid,p.209 (my emphasis).

Sometimes this need for simplicity is justified in terms of man's mental capacities. Andreski, for instance, says,

> "The limited nature of our mental powers constitutes a sufficient justification for striving to make our formulations as simple as possible in order not to get lost in the maze." Andreski (1964) p.13.

And this is also Bruner's argument:

> The "most common blight of human thinking /is/ clutter ... It is not harmless. It is lethal. For it can be said about our knowledge of knowledge that very little of it can be dealt with by the human mind at one time. The range of human attention is highly limited, we know by comparing men and machines. But this is both its strength and its weakness. It imposes a need for economy in man as to what he bears in mind. It is this that makes theory a necessity rather than a luxury. A concept or the connected body of concepts that is a theory is man's only means of getting a lot into the narrow compass of his attention all at a time. Without some such aid, there is clutter." Bruner (1969/74) p.139.

Harré, on the other hand, finds the Principle of Simplicity "highly dubious". Firstly, he says, it is by no means clear how one might choose between a variety of simplifications. And secondly,

> "There can be no doubt that the history of science shows that the laws of nature are always more complex than we originally thought." Harré (1972) p.45.

In fact, of course, Simplicity is not a criterion of conceptual adequacy, but one of style. It has to do not with the adequacy of the belief or theory itself, but with its communication. (One of the advantages - but also dangers - of using metaphors is that it enables certain connotations to be "carried over", without recourse to their non-simple elaboration in meticulous detail. Similarly, the short-hand involved in being able to refer "simply" to "Einstein's theory of relativity" or to "Marx's theory of surplus value" is stylistically useful. It saves having to spell out the details in Ent-fashion(36), every time we wish to talk about such issues. But the conceptual complexity actually involved in such theories cannot be avoided if they themselves are to be understood).

Another criterion sometimes put forward is Plausibility. If a theory is not plausible, it is said, then it is not a "good" theory. In some ways this is related to the principle of Simplicity, and they are both dismissed by Chomsky:

> "The real problem for tomorrow is that of discovering an assumption regarding innate structure that is sufficiently rich, not that of finding one that is simple or elementary enough to be 'plausible'. There is, as far as I can see, no reasonable notion of 'plausibility', no a priori insight into what innate structures are permissible, that can guide the search for a 'sufficiently elementary assumption' ..." Chomsky (1968) p.69.

On the other hand, Plausibility may not merely be a question of simplicity and communicability. If it were, it would be the listener's/observer's understanding whose adequacy was in question, rather than the believer's/theorist's account. Rather, the extent to which a theory accords with the perceived "facts" must clearly be a criterion of adequacy. This appears, therefore,

in my dimension Pragmatic Adequacy (see below).

Finally, we could consider Merton's suggestion that Parsimony, Continuity, Scope and Cumulation[37] are criteria by which theories might be judged. At first glance, these too may seem to concern communicability - i.e. stylistic criteria - more than conceptual adequacy. This is especially true, for instance of Continuity. However, although Merton's criteria are for theories set within particular bodies of 'knowledge', there is a sense in which these are what I call Logical criteria. They refer at least in part to the amount of "data" that might be co-ordinated within particular theories. Parsimony, for instance, may not just refer to Simplicity, but also to Inclusiveness. (Inclusiveness is one of my Logical dimensions, which I explain below).

Initially, I propose that my dimensions of adequacy may be used introspectively. That is, they are useful for an examination of one's own belief systems, acting as "observer" on oneself. But they may also be used for the consideration of other people's accounts. Ultimately, this cannot strictly be done, because even in considering someone else's account, one actually only assesses what one takes it to be. That is, one assesses one's own understanding of it. Even the consideration of a written account is not a consideration of the actual beliefs that such an account is an attempt to verbalise. (And whilst one's own understandings prompted by a written account may themselves not "correspond" to the writer's intentions, nor might that account itself "correspond" very adequately with these intentions).

However, insofar as one's experiences are shared with or similar to the experiences of the person whose account one is trying to analyse, then we may expect some similarity of belief.

Where one's experience is not so much similar as complementary, then notions of the other's position are also likely to have developed. Furthermore, insofar as one belongs to the same linguistic community (a relative rather than an absolute criterion), one will also be likely to have conceptualisations - verbalised notions - similar to those of the other person. Whilst an ideal correspondence is therefore obviously not possible - and could not be known, even if it were to occur - it is reasonable to suppose that others' beliefs can be meaningfully considered. If this were not so, human social existence would be odd, if not inconceivable.

The account which I develop here, then, is initially directed to subjective beliefs. It is initially concerned with what are essentially introspective criteria. But I shall argue that it is appropriate also for the consideration of other people's belief systems, and of bodies of 'knowledge' objectivated in given societal contexts.

A further word of warning should be given about the tree-root model. This is, of necessity, my account of how people's beliefs might be structured, and of how we might usefully consider them. I cannot say that this is how people actually and invariably do theorise. Nor am I saying that this is how they should do so. What is presented here is an explicitly metaphorical account of how we might conceive of structures of belief. I find it heuristically useful as a model to aid understanding, and it does, I suggest, enable us to make certain empirical hypotheses - about Value-Knowledge in general and about educational ideologies in particular.

A word is also necessary about Fluidity. Man is essentially creative. In their thinking (as opposed to their believing)[38], individuals are creative. They can and do create new and different notion structures, whether deliberately, or in response to changing contextual situations.[39] Whilst, for instance, I may not carry around a ready-made belief construct that regularly relates "clouds", "pets" and "beer", it is not difficult for me to devise one, temporarily, in my mind. (They may all, for instance, be things that "spill" liquid on the floor if wrongly handled - if rooves are not mended, pets are not walked or let out, and beer is taken to excess). But such a passing fantasy is exactly that. It is passing - not a belief structure basic to my 'knowledge' about what the world is 'really' like. And it is a fantasy - it is not a strongly believed (Value-Known) piece of 'knowledge', but something constructed for the moment. Such passing fantasies, and also non-deliberate notions that occur and then recede in our ordinary interaction with Reality, are fluid notions. They are not Value-Knowledge. Yet they too are structured, and structured according to the same dimensions. We cannot choose to really-believe/Value-Know them[40], though we can choose to construct them. Such temporary or non-"valued" notions may drift from one point of reference to another. They overlap and intertwine. But at any point in time it is possible to conceive of them as being "photographed", as it were. And at that point in time their structures would be, I suggest, describable in the same terms as those of Value-Known beliefs. This structuration of fluid (non-belief) notions can have important methodological implications, as we shall see.

The essential characteristic of Value-Knowledge is that it

lacks this fluidity. Through our experience of Reality, we come to 'know' what is 'real' and what is not. We cannot fleetingly decide not to believe, for instance, that we are sitting on a chair, or that we have a family, or that Sunderland were promoted to the First Division at the end of the 1975/76 football season. We can "doubt" the truth of such beliefs, in that we could fantasy their non-veracity. But we could not actually choose not to believe them. That is not in our power. Our experience determines this strength of belief for us. (At the same time, however, we may create the conditions whereby experience is created, such that belief follows. Such experience includes experience of our own (real) thinking and believing, as we shall see).

Since experience (however complex) is non-random, it is an empirical likelihood that people of similar societal position have similar beliefs in certain important respects. One person's Value-Knowledge - his rigidified belief structures - may therefore be directly analogous to the 'knowledge' of others. Similarly, where other people's concepts are recorded for instance in writing - where they are "frozen" as if rigidified beliefs - they too are available as non-temporary, non-fluid structures for analysis. Moreover, insofar as social institutions can be seen as objectivated 'knowledge' systems, these too might be examined in the same way.

Finally, it should be remembered that in talking of belief structures I am not just referring to complex and all-embracing bodies of belief, I refer also to the notions which are still complex, but which are the elements of those wider systems. Even notions are structured. Indeed all notions are models of

'reality' - whether they are Value-Known or fanciful or believed-for-the-time-being. Relationships between "lower-level" notions are themselves a part of "higher-level" notions. The structuring of mind is not separate from its notions, but intrinsic to them.

However, these internal relationships, though themselves notional, may be less explicitly recognised than the "elements" themselves. We do tend to perceive "distinct objects" in the world-out-there. Accordingly we do, on reflection, tend to conceive of our notions of those "objects" as distinct. This is part of the necessary short-hand I have already mentioned. It is part of the Simplicity to which Bruner referred as a necessary device for communicating, not just with others, but with ourselves also. But it should be possible to reflect upon those internal relationships - that internal structuring - of beliefs. It should be possible to verbalise them - i.e. to develop concepts of them. The tree-root metaphor is intended in part as an aid to this explicit attention to the structuredness of beliefs. For this attention itself may thereby become a means to the development of higher level understandings - and to the conscious exercise of control over our beliefs. This kind of experience - that of reflection - can itself produce Value-Knowledge of a more "adequate" kind.

Dimensions of Adequacy: The Structure of Beliefs

Belief structures can be viewed on two kinds of dimensions, the first logical and the second contextual. The first apply to internal properties of belief structures themselves, whilst the second apply to the relationships between those belief structures

and the Reality to which they are "intended" to refer.

1. At first sight, the logical criteria - Inclusiveness and Consistency - might in some sense seem to be absolute. Many have claimed that Logic is universal and not culturally specific. Cornforth, for instance, declares that:

> "No discussion, no controversy or argument, no development of thought would ever be possible, if the laws of thought changed and were different for different people. Anyone who thinks that the laws of thought change, that different epochs have a different logic, thereby denies the very possibility of thought as a reflection of objective reality. Logic arises from the universal requirements of the reflection of reality in thought, and not from the particular interests which particular processes of thought may serve from time to time." Cornforth (1954) p.64.

Similarly, Labov suggests a universal logic, in denying that Negro Non-standard English is either less logical, or more likely to impede the development of logical thought, than Standard English.(43)

2. Despite the attraction of this suggestion, however, I prefer to see the logical "criteria" suggested here as Dimensions, rather than criteria. For context is so undivorcible from beliefs that it inevitably affects what might otherwise be claimed to be "neutral" or "context-free". The criterion of Consistency, for instance, might appear to be absolute. Rules of identity and negation might seem quite independent of the subject-matter of people's beliefs. Yet particular applications of the Consistency "criterion" must always depend ultimately on definitions, and insofar as definitions are believed to be Pragmatically Adequate (see below) they can be neither context-free (in their determination) nor value-free (in their potential or actual consequences).

Nonetheless, Cornforth is right in suggesting that there may be some universal moments of experience such that beliefs will tend to be consistent in some sense. The emphasis, however, is on universals of experience rather than universals of, for instance, brain structure.(44) The reality and non-randomness of Reality - a Reality experienced, in different respects, by all men - adequately accounts for non-random belief structuration. It is not necessary to posit a universal predisposition, or a universal psychological need, in order to explain Man's essential rationality. At the same time, people's apparent irrationality, in many contexts, needs to be explained in terms of widely differing and contradictory experiences, and the consequently wide diversity of belief structuration. What seems "illogical" or "irrational" to an observer may be so only by his own criteria, and by his own understanding of the context in question.

Inconsistencies do, of course, exist in people's belief systems, and probably universally (!) Indeed, one purpose of this section is to suggest ways of unearthing such inconsistencies - whether as observer, or as subjective thinker. To talk of inconsistencies in a given account is not merely to talk of cases where the believer/writer suggests "P" at one point and then "not-P" at another. Of course such cases are important. But far more important are inconsistencies which in essence are like this, but which in appearance are not. Thus some one might not say first "P" and then "not-P", but merely "P" and then "Q". The use of a single word, where two (or more) logically distinct terms (and therefore concepts) would be more Realistic, may conceal from the believer himself the ambiguity of his beliefs. It may equally deceive the observer. It is of the nature of language that it can classify concepts without

explicit attention being paid to them. When a given term is used, the user does not every time have to ask, "What do I really mean by that? What are all the connotations and denotations intended - and unintended - by me?". As we shall see, one object in seeking higher level notions is to resolve inconsistencies.

In considering other people's accounts - and, indeed, one's own - we need often to be aware of the function of lip-service statements. It is practically impossible to make everything explicit, to cover all sides of a problem, when presenting an account to others (or to oneself). It would be time-consuming and boring to attempt to do so. Either explicitly or implicitly, therefore, one leaves out what does not seem relevant. Often a footnote will point out that such-and-such a topic is relevant, but "cannot be gone into here". This effectively restricts the writer/believer himself, and also potentially the observer/reader, to a particular way of looking at the issue at hand. Sometimes what is thereby left out is of central importance. Moreover, it may not fit into the main body of the account because that account would have to be re-written drastically for it to do so.(45) This restriction is a rigidification. It can conceal ambiguities or inconsistencies that in fact characterise the total belief structure of the writer/believer, in respect of the issue at hand. Though what is written may seem entirely consistent, what is left out renders it - or rather should render it - most problematic. I return to this question below, in seeing how "looking at the matter from a different angle" may permit a higher-level resolution of lower level inconsistencies.

3. The "tree-root" metaphor refers primarily to the dimension of Inclusiveness (though, as I have said, it has other useful implications too). This view of Inclusiveness applies to all

belief structures, whether it is implicit or explicit beliefs that are being considered. However, since it is not easy to see how we might easily give examples of implicit belief structures, the following account uses verbalised notions (concepts).

Beliefs can be seen as hierarchically structured in such a way that higher order notions (verbalised in the examples given here) are more inclusive than those below them. One can often look at aspects of reality in different ways, according to the context, such that what is in one case a higher (more inclusive) notion is in others lower. In the first place, however, certain structures take on a rigidified structure that is not in <u>belief</u> - as opposed to fantasy - so amenable to re-ordering. (This I shall develop later). In the second place, there are certain "rules" which govern the ordering of notions - even fantasied ones.

The notion of Inclusiveness is in principle quite straightforward. "Furniture" is a higher-order concept than either "chair" or "table", in that it includes both. "Chair", on the other hand, does not include "furniture" - except by clever fantasising. Nor does it include "table". Similarly, "Science" is higher than "biology" or "astronomy", and so on. Viewed this way, one could construct, from one's own subjective 'knowledge', highly complex structures, and present them diagrammatically in tree-root fashion. To pursue the "furniture" example:-



etc.

Obviously, where such a diagramatically presented structure is a deliberate construct (open to fantasying), rather than actual belief, it is not the only version possible. In the above example, for instance, I might have included:-

B.



Or I might have started off differently:-

C.



Or:-

D.



There appears to be an arbitrary element in what I see at any given moment to be the 'real' hierarchy. Yet there are very real constraints on how I can, in fact, present my beliefs. I could not, for instance, present the following, as in any way a genuine belief structure:-

E.



etc.

Or:-

F.



etc.

.... or any number of illegitimate models of what my 'knowledge', in particular areas, is.

Nor could I even present:-

G.



etc.

Although I may be able to choose a seemingly endless number of alternative structures to demonstrate the inclusiveness of my notion of "furniture", there are quite obviously "rules" of inclusiveness which would make illegitimate an even vaster number

* Illegitimate

of alternatives. Some of my notions are not included in certain others because, in my beliefs, Reality "is just not like that". That is, the empirical referents of my beliefs are not themselves "related" in the required manner.(46) Furthermore, as example (G) demonstrates, certain notions that are quite clearly related in a given area of my 'knowledge' may not be interchangeable, from the point of view of levels of Inclusiveness.

The above examples may seem somewhat laborious and obvious, since "furniture" is not a sociologically momentous notion. However, the same sorts of structures and the same sorts of Inclusiveness rules obtain in the case of more abstract notions. They are relevant to notions that refer to realities very differently understood by different people, even within the same societal context. As I have said, my notion of "nuclear physics" is very low level, when compared to that of a nuclear physicist. But it is not merely a matter of specialised experience producing different level notions of the "same" thing. Such words as "democracy" and "freedom" may mean very different things to different people. This does not mean that they refer to different aspects of Reality, but that their equivalent notions have very different structures. To use an earlier example, "drinking-and-driving" beliefs may have different structures, for different people. The same is true of such notions as "Open Education", or "traditional pedagogy".

The idea of hierarchically ordered notions is not new. Examples could be chosen from semantics and from anthropology. Frake (1961/73), for instance, adopts Kelly's view of dichotomous concepts in discussing the disease names of Subanun (in the Philipines). He insists that it is concepts, not terms, that are

hierarchically ordered. He points out, for instance, that in English the word "man" can mean a number of things and be used at a number of levels, according to context.

Olver and Hornsby (1966) have suggested that children, as they grow older, increasingly group pictures according to a rule of subordinate grouping - that is according to what are taken to be common attributes. However, they contrast this with an earlier (i.e. younger) pattern, wherein things are grouped not because of common attributes, but because of common membership in, for example, a story. According to my usage of "tree-root belief structures" I would still see this as hierarchical. For instance:



Similarly, I would say that Wittgenstein's "family resemblances" can also be seen in hierarchical terms. That we do not just order our notions in terms of strictly consistent, semantically "obvious" distinctions is important. (See below.) At the same time, the nature of the including relationship in each case is clearly an important variable.

One way of defining the level of a particular notion is sometimes to refer to the extent of abstraction from empirical referents. Horton's version of this in effect defines the level of a theory in terms of the number of such referents included or accounted for.(47) I would dispute this in two respects. Firstly, he seems to imply that all levels are as easily available to explicit elaboration, it being merely a question of context, which level one finds appropriate. Secondly, the "area of

experience" he refers to seems to imply that it is only the number of empirical referents (or "things") that matters. I would stress, rather, the relatedness of "things" in Reality. It is attention to those relationships that is important in high-level understandings. This is especially true of theories, which I define in terms of notions of determinative relationships.

This attention to relatedness (or structure) is particularly important in deliberate attempts to achieve more inclusive accounts. Achieving greater inclusiveness is an important way of resolving the ambiguities and inconsistencies of lower level versions. I shall return to this in a moment, after considering the two contextual dimensions of Adequacy. Meanwhile a suggestion of Bernstein's, about a development in his work, illustrates the point:

> "In .. 'On the classification and framing of educational knowledge', the lower order concepts of stratified/differentiated(48), open/closed(49) finally disappeared as they could be derived from the concepts classification and frame." Bernstein (1973) p.261.

I have argued elsewhere(50) both that Bernstein does not pay sufficient attention to the relationships between (what I call) Inclusiveness and Consistency and that his conceptual framework in "Classification and framing ..." is still in some ways inadequate. However, the point I am making here is well illustrated in this quotation.

4. Although I return to it later, we might stress here the inter-relatedness of the two logical dimensions. The "furniture" examples of tree-root structures demonstrated among other things that even in fantasy - let alone in genuine belief- we are not free to construct literally any kind of inter-relation between

notions. Certain suggested forms were illegitimate.(51) The illegitimacy of such formations clearly demonstrates the relatedness of Consistency and Inclusiveness.(52)

At the same time, I do not wish to restrict the "tree-root" metaphor to strictly logically adequate belief structures. On the contrary, these two logical dimensions can be devices for considering, and in some cases assessing, the adequacy of beliefs. Many or most belief systems are <u>not</u> so logically coherent, and attention to these dimensions is in part intended as a device for "improving" accounts. Actual belief structures do <u>not</u> all take the form of precisely defined hierarchies. Lower levels may be related to those above in a manner which, to the observer, may seem somewhat arbitrary. Consider examples A and E, above. These were:-

A.



etc.

and E.



Firstly, notice the dots in example A. These indicate that other notions have been left out, apparently for brevity. They might be translated as "etc.". Although the superordinate notion in

each case is more inclusive than those beneath it, the classification of subordinate notions is not exhaustive. One could, for instance, have added "shop furniture", "vehicle furniture", or even some illegitimate category such as "*flower furniture". Without anything other than imaginatively flicking through one's experience of, and beliefs about, furniture, it is not clear how one would decide when the list of lower level categories was complete.

In example E, however, though two out of the three classes are illegitimate (as accounts of my furniture-beliefs), the categorisation is nonetheless exhaustive. What has been used is a rule of Consistency. All possible categories, according to the Relevance-theme of size, are included.(53) In order to make the first example (A) as exhaustive, rules of Consistency would similarly have to be invoked. This could be done crudely (e.g. "furniture found in people's homes" versus "furniture not found in people's homes") or some more sophisticated version might be produced (in terms, for instance, of the furniture's functions). The point to note is that the search for exhaustiveness is generally an explicit exercise, whereas every-day beliefs are frequently not wholly adequate, by strict Consistency criteria. They may be ambiguous, overlapping, and non-exhaustive. At the same time, of course, explicitly sought exhaustive (and thoroughly consistent) classifications may be quite inadequate from the point of view of revealing truths about the world-out-there. Thus the inter-relatedness of Consistency and Inclusiveness is itself problematic. It becomes clear only upon explicit elaboration, and it becomes itself a supra-dimension of logical coherence. But it still does not

in itself constitute the only criterion of belief Adequacy - as example (E) demonstrates. There remain contextual criteria/dimensions, to which we must now turn. I return to this issue later, for it concerns not just the description of belief systems (as they are observed), but the development of more adequate notions and theories. That is, it becomes a methodological question. I discuss my methodology in respect of "tree-root" structures below.

5. By logical criteria alone, a given belief structure may be beautifully coherent. Yet it may just not fit the facts of external Reality. In practice, we "test" our beliefs every day. Not just their internal coherence but, as it were, their external coherence will determine the extent to which they are genuinely held as 'knowledge'. Much of our 'knowledge', of course, is not concerned with our immediate experience. It is not, therefore, tested in the same way. By the same token, it may be less strongly believed - less "valued" as 'knowledge'. However, it may be integral not to a structure of belief about the referred-to object itself, so much as to one referring to the experience through which the 'knowledge' was mediated.(54) I may "Value-Know" something about an Italian earthquake - for instance that it occurred - without having immediate experience of that phenomenon.(55) The contextual experience of acquiring and reinforcing our beliefs is, then, a crucial issue. At the same time, it is not just contexts externally determined for us that become more or less relevant.(56) It is also our own active -and in many cases fanciful - "choice" of relevance zones. Both in "day-dreaming" and in deliberate reflection, we may "choose" what aspect of Reality it is that our ongoing thoughts

are directed to, and therefore which sets of beliefs are relevant. Accordingly, I suggest two dimensions by which Contextual Adequacy might be considered: Pragmatic Adequacy and Relevance.

6. Pragmatic Adequacy refers to the problematic notion of "correspondence". Brain is as physically real as external Reality, and in principle thoughts and beliefs might be describable in the same terms as the physical world. Nonetheless subjective beliefs in the mind are ontologically different from the Reality "portrayed" in them. The ideas of "yellowness", or of "A^b", for example, are not reducible to lightwaves and soundwaves, although the reality of yellowness and A^b-ness might well be. Similarly, the structuration of beliefs can only be metaphorical, just as any pictorial or verbal account of mind (such as my "tree-root" analogy) can itself only be metaphorical. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which our ("metaphorical") beliefs must "work" as accounts of Reality, for them to be adhered to as Value-Knowledge. (I am stating this on the basis of empirical experience. We do, as a matter of fact, really-believe/value-know things. I am not, that is, relying on some functionalist "explanation" in terms of the needs of human sanity, or of societal stability).

The idea of "reality testing" is not in itself novel. Esland (1971) uses this expression. Berger & Luckmann (1966/71) talk of "validation". Kelly says,

> "The constructs which are hierarchically organised into systems are variously subject to test in terms of their usefulness in helping the person anticipate the course of events which make up the universe. The results of the testing of constructs determine the desirability of their temporary retention, their revision, or their immediate replacement." Kelly (1963) pp. 43-44.

Though the term "reinforcement" has Behaviourist connotations,(57) the notion is attractive.(58) It is experience which determines what is (strongly) believed. Lack of particular experiences will fail to produce appropriate Value-Knowledge. Furthermore, new experience, not just early or initial experience, may be the source of new beliefs. Changed circumstances may produce quite drastic changes in our understandings of the world. Just as Reality is non-randomly - though complexly - structured, so also are 'realities' (beliefs about that Reality). It is experience of real-world structures - of the relationships between "elements" in Reality - which determines the structuration of beliefs, and determines also their rigidity (strength of Value-Knowledge). Furthermore, the structuration of subjective belief systems (and also that of objectivated bodies of 'knowledge') is itself Real. It can itself, therefore, be a source of experience - and therefore of 'knowledge'. These points will be developed in Chapter 3.

When it is a case of "testing" our beliefs against aspects of reality which are apparently "simple" and unproblematic, the usual version of "reality testing" seems fairly straightforward. For if we have a certain idea about how cars work, or how solid buses are, or how poisonous certain toadstools are, then we can take a car to bits, step in front of a bus or eat toadstools - or (with a view to controlled experiments) persuade some one else to do these things. However, we also have beliefs about far less "concrete" "things" in the world-out-there. We have notions of "love" and "democracy" and "class structure" which may be Value-Known, but which cannot be straightforwardly "tested" against the empirical Reality to which they are supposed to

refer. In this case (but also, one would hope, in the case of buses and toadstools) we do not really test our beliefs against concrete "things", so much as against other notions that we have about related aspects of Reality. That is, the apparently hard-headed and unambiguous dimension of Pragmatic Adequacy is at least as relativistic, in the end, as the other dimensions. Ultimately, it becomes a matter of Consistency. For it is in the context of our other beliefs, and the extent to which any given notion is consistent with them, that particular beliefs are "tested". Having said this, I should re-emphasise my Relativist-Realist position. I assume that there is a world-out-there. Accordingly, those other beliefs must themselves somehow "correspond" to that Reality. Beliefs by definition refer to that Reality. Where notions are hopelessly inadequate, by the criterion of Pragmatic Adequacy, they just will not be believed. (This is not, however, to deny the possibility of people "living in a dream world" - for I have stressed that belief structuration itself is Real, and therefore a possible source of "reinforcement". It is not, after all, unknown for people to "live in ivory towers".)

Finally, in discussing Pragmatic Adequacy, it should be remembered that whilst all these remarks initially concern the introspective examination of one's own belief systems, they should also be taken to apply to considering (understandings of) other people's accounts, and bodies of 'knowledge' that have been objectivated. Where this is the case, of course, the problem of relativism is intensified: the Reality against which the observer is "testing" some one else's account is his own 'Reality'. I shall argue in Part II that an analysis of the

overt policies, statements and behaviours of teachers, politicians and administrators may, in revealing their educational ideologies, reveal something of the social Reality to which those ideologies refer. But ultimately the observer cannot enter the field with no pre-definitions. He cannot divorce his interpretations from the ways in which he already and ongoingly sees that same referred-to Reality. Thus the observer will inevitably attempt to "see through" the accounts of others, and assess their adequacy - especially their Pragmatic Adequacy - in terms of his own perspectives. To give an example from industrial relations, Fox refers to managerial pluralist ideology, which

> "represents, in the context of modern business, a high point in sophisticated 'managerialism', in the sense that it serves managerial interests and goals whether pluralists themselves identify with those interests and goals or not." Fox (1974) p.280.

Such reference to prior - or at least "independent" - perspectives is inevitable. But that in no way means that it is to be regretted. On the contrary.

7. The other contextual dimension on which belief structures can be considered is that of Relevance. In an important sense our 'knowledge' is "stored" in the brain. Obviously, not all is "called into play" at any given moment. What appears to be relevant may, deliberately or otherwise, be brought to the fore in particular contexts. However, what is considered to be relevant at any one moment, in any one context, is not randomly decided. As Schutz says,

> "A system of relevances and typifications as it exists at any historical moment, is itself a part of the social heritage and as such is handed down in the educational process to the members of the in-group." Schutz (1957) p.43.

The culturally-established nature of what is "relevant" is certainly important, as I shall observe in discussing Master Patterns, in Chapter 3. That is, insofar as one has assimilated (aspects of) the objectivated 'knowledge' of a particular cultural group, Relevance will be pre-determined. However, the context of beliefs does not follow simply in regular, same-as-before patterns. Novel situations may require novel responses and "call into play" new associations of ideas. Where one deliberately attends to one's notions and deliberately considers what might or might not be relevant - "how we might tackle this situation" - the creative imagination of man is at work.

A good example of this can be found in any piece of written work. Books, chapters and even paragraphs can generally be re-written as "tree-roots", though it is rare that the classification at each level is exhaustive. Beneath the chapter headings we might have section-headings and beneath them (though not necessarily written-in) sub-section headings, etc.. In each case, the heading is likely to "summarise" the included contents, being a short-hand for it.(59) But each set of equivalent section-headings (and therefore the elaborations contained in the sections) may not constitute an exhaustive classification. More frequently, there are <u>related</u> issues dealt with, which do not fit into a perfectly <u>logical</u> (consistent) pattern.

The present section, for instance, has the following shape:-



But it will be observed that there is also a § 1, a § 4 and a § 5. These also belong under the higher level inclusive "Dimensions of Adequacy : Structure of Beliefs". But § 1 and § 5 are by way of introductions, and § 4 makes some general points about the context of both § 2 and § 3.

We might re-write the structure of this section as follows, then:



But even here, the apparent "neatness" may be deceiving. For by what criteria have only two kinds of dimension been chosen (logical and contextual) ? Answer: internal versus external, or within-'realities' versus 'realities'-in-relation-to-Reality. (But, as we have seen with Pragmatic Adequacy, the distinction

is already by no means clear).

Then, why are there only two kinds of logical dimension? Answer: Vertical versus horizontal dimensions of the "tree-root" metaphor. (But, even given the adequacy of that metaphor, are there only two dimensions to it? No, not in fact: by one way of thinking, the contextual criteria are a third dimension themselves). And so we might go on, looking at all or any of the chapters (of this essay[60], or any other book). If we were to examine the sub-sub-sectioning, there is likely to be even less obvious a rationale behind the ordering, and certainly less exhaustive coverage than might have been worked out.

Exhaustiveness is not the only criterion of merit. In a perfectly developed system, it might well be very valuable. When it comes down to the smaller riders to an argument, however, it may not seem to be worth the trouble (<u>just</u> for the sake of "neatness"). More importantly, the search for exhaustive classifications generally comes <u>after</u> the initial <u>intuited</u> selection of what is likely to be relevant. Buzan (1974) is in effect advocating an imaginative free-run of what <u>might</u> be relevant when he recommends his form of note-taking.[61] His idea of "working from the centre" and jotting down whatever appears to be relevant - in no special temporal order, but ordered spatially as it is jotted down - is extremely useful: in preparing lectures, lessons, papers ... and theses. (Though I had been doing it a long time before reading Buzan's book, I had not seen it in the same light, nor done it so systematically). What it amounts to, in fact, is working <u>down</u> a number of tree-root structures - initially, at any rate - but not by explicit logical criteria at all, rather by imaginative association of

ideas and selection of relevance.

I shall say more about Association of ideas as a methodological procedure below. Meanwhile, let us explore the imaginative side of the exercise. In any given context, one's explicit attention may be restricted to certain aspects of that context, in default of imagination. Imagination is learned and contexted. One learns to be imaginative (or not) about particular aspects of Reality. Freire (1972) distinguishes between "structural perception" and "focal perception". The latter, for reasons perhaps of restrictive education, involves attending only to the obvious and immediate problems of life. The former involves putting these in the "context" of the totality - of societal structure, for example. There need be no difference in the nature of those problems that externally prompt the imaginative wider view. Rather one needs to have developed an explicit understanding of one's ability to think "structurally". The "things" attended to may be the same, but one switches relevances, considers the possible inter-relatedness of those "things" in different ways - seeking a more adequate structural notion of the total reality.(62) There may in principle be an infinite number of ways of considering given aspects of the world-out-there. Some may be no "better" than others. But the object, clearly, would be to improve upon previous notions with explicit accounts that were superior(in the sense of being more adequate - according to the criterion of pragmatic adequacy, as well as the logical criteria).

Ford puts it in her own inimitable way:

> "When one looks at a real world through the eyes of a normal rabbity sociologist, one sees things that would not be apparent to a normal rabbity psychologist".
> She adds, in a footnote:
> "The reverse may also be the case. One paradigm transcends the other with respect to a particular problem."
> Ford (1975) pp.131, 207 n 35.

Similarly, Goldmann considers Marxism to be superior to "objective" sociology:

> "Some value-judgments permit a better understanding of reality than others. When it is a question of determining which of two conflicting sociologies has the greater scientific value, the first step is to ask which of them permits the understanding of the other as a social and human phenomenon, reveals its infrastructure, and clarifies, by means of an immanent critical principle, its inconsistencies and its limitations." Goldmann (1969) p.52.

Whilst, of course, one's newly acquired perspective may become just as rigid as the previous account, the aim of imaginative relevance-shift is to find a way of looking at the phenomena in question which transcends, in some way, the earlier notions.

This transcendence will attempt to overcome any inconsistencies that may have been identified in the earlier account. It may involve not just seeking higher, more inclusive notions to those that previously stood "at the top", but restructuring the account altogether. Let me give an example. In Syer (1974a), I suggested that Bernstein's notions of three message systems, Curriculum, Pedagogy and Evaluation, though useful from certain points of view, could not help us to tackle what he called the "power and control component" in education - something which Bernstein had explicitly set out to do. I suggested that these were everyday notions, which contained considerable ambiguity and inconsistency. Instead, I suggested we dichotomise between superordination and subordination in determinative relationships, and between people

in the real world and the ideas that they have (including ideas which are objectivated in curricula). I did not, therefore, start with Bernstein's suggestion, which might be portrayed as



and seek a new set of concepts to be included beneath "Educational Knowledge Codes". Rather I suggested:



which were, by the criteria I suggested, exhaustive - and, I felt, more useful. This involved looking at the problem from a different "angle" - or shifting the relevance.

In conclusion to this discussion on Adequacy dimensions, then, my notion of Relevance is not just a question of what is determined by <u>context</u> to be relevant. It concerns both what the believer takes for granted to be relevant - rigidifications that would need explaining in context - <u>and</u> what he deliberately and creatively <u>thinks</u> might be relevant. The shifting of relevance can be a creative, imaginative exercise - though by no means always fruitful! I shall return to it below in discussing my own methodology.

In practice, the deliberate shifting of relevances is unlikely to be divorced from a search for more adequate accounts

by other criteria. In the next section I discuss Intuition. This may arise in the search for more Inclusive understandings, in order to resolve lower level Inconsistencies.

Intuition and Elaboration

> "People living at the seashore grow so accustomed to the murmur of the waves that they never hear it. By the same token .... we look at each other, but we do not see each other any more. Our perception of the world has withered away; what has remained is mere recognition." Shklovskij, quoted by Chomsky (1967/68), p.21.

Our beliefs are predominantly implicit, unverbalised. This by no means applies only to beliefs that are not strongly-held. It applies to most of our Value-Knowledge, also. Our linguistic competence, for instance, is not a subject of constant reflection, yet we 'know' what is linguistically "correct", and what is not.(63) The same is true of our social competence.(64)

Nor is it merely "low-level" beliefs that are unverbalised. Complex and inclusive models of 'reality', including theories, may also be implicit. Gladwin's Trukese navigators, for example(65), demonstrate how complex navigational theory can be wholly unverbalised - and even unverbalisable to the 'knower'.

The implicit 'knowledge' discussed in this section may be either pre-verbal or post-verbal. It includes both 'knowledge' which has been acquired but never put into words and 'knowledge' which has been learned through detailed elaboration, but which has then taken on a taken-for-grantedness and no longer "requires" constant re-examination. An example of post-linguistic implicit 'knowledge' is the 'knowledge' of how to drive. Not just supposedly "motor" skills - like the handling

of steering, braking, and changing gear - but those of "road sense" - "reading" hazards and anticipating other road-users' behaviours - can be learned with great concentration on verbalisation. The experienced driver rarely says to himself all that he is "thinking" about all these things, though he may still be implicitly "concentrating" on driving.(64)

However, this section above all concerns pre-verbal beliefs. It concerns the circumstances in which people attempt to make verbal what they already implicitly 'know', and the intentions and implications that are involved. Shklovskij, whom I quoted above, thought that the function of poetic art was to "make strange" the object depicted and thus to transfer that object to the "sphere of new perception". This can apply not just to "thing-objects" (as we have said, all things are structured internally and externally), but to the relations between them - both in the world-out-there, and in our structured beliefs about them.

The experience of "groping for a word" that may be "on the tip of one's tongue" is often used to demonstrate that thought is not identical with "inner speech".(67) This has mainly to do with post-verbal 'knowledge', in that the word, or name, is "known-but-temporarily-forgotten". But such "hunches" also occur in the case of pre-verbal 'knowledge', when an idea occurs before it can be put into words - and, by the same token, is not yet fully grasped and understood. For verbalisation may order what we already feel we 'know' and enable us to understand our own beliefs. That ordering may then, in turn, give us grounds for being further sure of what we believe - or for rejecting "false hunches". Verbalisation enables us to reason,

and

> "Reason is not a source of theories, it is an arbiter of mistakes." Ford (1975) p.70.(68)

We have intuitions which we feel the need to verbalise. Implicit theories can become the basis of explicit ones.

The circumstances which arouse a "need" to verbalise intuitions must be understood. On the one hand, they may be "problems" of context or of logic. Our prior beliefs may no longer be adequate on either contextual grounds - in "fitting the facts" - or on logical grounds - in being logically coherent. In practice, these are not sharply distinct, for "fitting the facts" - though based on experience of a Real world-out-there and ultimately inseparable from that Reality - itself involves logical consistency with (real) beliefs already and ongoingly held.(69) On the other hand, two things have to be learned, before such elaborated "solutions" are sought. Firstly, one must learn that particular kinds of "problem" are ones that require, and are amenable to, "solutions". Secondly, one must learn a self-concept such that one believes oneself able and entitled to seek such "solutions". Both things are learned in particular contexts, as a result of experiences which are in principle identifiable by the observer. One has to learn the relevance, value and possibility of intuition, and

> "Intuition is an invitation to go further - whether intuitively or analytically." Bruner (1965/74) p.104.

Curiosity is the learned ability, the "need" and possibly duty to seek out problems of the sort suggested above and to

make sense of them.[70] It is related to what Durkheim called "reflexive thought", Mannheim, "awareness", and Mill, "(sociological) imagination".[71] Ford calls it, as I do, "curiosity".[72] It is also very closely related to the question of "openness", in respect of Objectivated 'Knowledge' and of Learning Theory, as we shall see later.

Many people regard Curiosity as a natural quality of Man, which may be "killed" by restrictive education.[73] This notion is sometimes indicated by the term "intrinsic motivation"[72], which Huberman (1974) considers ideological, in that it serves to legitimate - and to promote - the academic success of children from already advantaged families. This "natural curiosity" view sees the loss of curiosity as what is commonly learned. It is generally accompanied by assertions that this is wrong. But a lack of any clear elaboration of what this curiosity is most often makes this rather shallow as a prescriptive comment. It is most commonly seen as an entirely individual quality, neutral and divorced from the bodies of 'knowledge' which in my view are inevitably involved.

Bruner (1965/74) talks of the self-rewarding nature of learning and curiosity[75], implying that it is "natural" or "innate". Yet he is also concerned with "training" (his word) curiosity. He comes close to my own concern with this concept - the emphasis on the learned nature of self-concept involved in relation to particular areas of 'knowledge'[76] - in this passage:

> "Children, like adults, need reassurance that it is all right to entertain and express subjective ideas, to treat a task as a problem, where you invent an answer, rather than finding one out there in the book, or on the blackboard." Bruner (1965/74) p.78.

Many have talked of the social and societal contexting of particular attitudes to, and uses made of, 'knowledge'. Znaniecki (1969) for instance, distinguished between priests, sages, scholars, technologists, scientists and explorers - the last of these being the small number of discoverers and innovators who create new 'knowledge'. It is commonly maintained that "modern" society is both characterised by an "open" view of 'knowledge' and produces "intellectuals" accordingly.(77) Yet the location in society of such "intellectuals" is also usually taken to be delimited.(78) Furthermore, continued closures - and their non-random character - are extremely important, as we shall see.

Insofar as Curiosity is a self-concept, it is related to the Parsonian notion of a value-orientation. It is related to the "Active orientation" of Kluckhohn (1962), the "functional autonomy" of Gouldner (1959) and of Ford et al.(1967/71) and indeed the "voluntarism" of Berger (1963/66). But, as I have said, such ideas as these too easily become abstracted from contextual situations. They are given reified, determinative status as individuals' characteristics. We should not talk about "curiosity" on its own, so much as "curiosity-about-x" or "curiosity-about-y", in particular contexts.

I do not deny that Curiosity is an individual self-concept. On the contrary, it is this that distinguishes it from mere scepticism or accommodation.(79) But I would emphasise that self-concepts themselves are relational concepts. They are not about the self-in-abstraction, but about the self-in-specific-kinds-of-context, and in relation to specific kinds of 'knowledge'. These are learned in experience of one's own success or failure

in being curious in the past, and in experience (and anticipation) of other people's reactions to those attempts.(80)

Being essentially a matter of self-concept (but stressing again that self-concept is necessarily concept of self-in-relation-to-x-and-y) the importance of "labelling" in the development (or otherwise) of Curiosity is obvious.(81)

Curiosity involves firstly an awareness of the distinction between Reality and one's own 'reality', secondly an awareness that one can observe, talk and think about one's own 'reality', and thirdly the Value-Knowledge that such attention, reflection and creative elaboration of one's 'reality' is worthwhile. Curiosity is a learning concept, as opposed to Legitimation, which is a being-taught concept (Syer 1975a).

According to the context/logic distinction made above, one may be curious about one's external context, seeking perhaps to develop more adequate accounts of it and thereby to achieve some autonomy in relation to it. Or one may be curious about the logical structure of one's beliefs (or the objectivated 'knowledge' with which one is confronted), seeking to develop more internally consistent understandings.(82) One may, of course, be both.

To be "curious" in this sense requires the use of language. To resolve intuited problems also requires language. It is verbal elaboration which is involved in rendering implicit 'knowledge' - including intuited inconsistencies - explicit, and resolving them at a higher level. Like Curiosity itself, this use of language needs to be learned. And it needs to be learned in relation to specific 'knowledge' areas (in specific relevance zones).

The idea of verbal elaboration as a release from implicit closures is common.(83) So also is the idea that it is no easy, nor automatically undertaken, task, to render implicit belief explicit.(84) At the same time, the constraining aspects of language should not be overlooked. Linguistic determination occurs through the absence of Curiosity about the role of language itself.(85) The role of language here is not merely one of rendering implicit beliefs explicit - producing verbalised versions of the same thing. Nor is language just a tool whereby rigidified beliefs may be rendered fluid and problematic, though of course this is important.(86) Language is also a means to higher level, or otherwise more adequate, understandings of Reality. Fluid beliefs need not just be replaced by beliefs no more adequate than the originals, but by more adequate versions. (This suggestion is, of course, coupled with a descriptive belief that, to some extent at least, "knowledge is power"(87), and a prescriptive belief that it is "human" to want to control one's circumstances, rather than be unknowingly determined by them.(88))

Some would argue that the very act of rendering explicit the inconsistencies in one's beliefs should be sufficient to provoke a search for resolution. It might even be argued that inconsistencies per se - even at the implicit level - will tend to provoke an automatic solution-solving disposition. Milgram, for instance, uses a cybernetic analogy to talk of "overload"(89), and cognitive dissonance theory relies on a similar assumption of "natural" need.(90)

I would not be so optimistic. Such all-encompassing views tend to divorce human dispositions from their contexts. They fail

to recognise that any desire, let alone "need", to resolve inconsistencies has to be learned. It has to be learned in specific contexts. And it has to be "relevant" to the areas of Reality in question. Accordingly they tend to forget that, as Holt (1974/75, p.188) has pointed out, impotence also corrupts, (and absolute impotence corrupts absolutely). Curiosity can be "killed", or never even born, in relation to certain contexts. This can produce, if not a tolerance of ambiguity, at least a felt inability to resolve it. Frequently, after all, such logical resolution cannot be separated from resolved contradictions in Reality - and powerlessness to achieve that may create as "insufferable" an inconsistency with beliefs (on grounds of Pragmatic Adequacy) as a "merely" logical inadequacy. Furthermore, the pervading influence of self-interest - which is not, of course, always vindictive, nor even "selfish" - can prevent any desire to resolve inconsistencies that exist only at the level of understanding, not that of belief. In direct opposition to the notion of cognitive dissonance, Yinger and Simpson suggest that

> "The human mind has an enormous capacity for holding mutually contradictory ideas without any feeling of discomfort." Yinger & Simpson (1973) p.102.

This facility exists precisely because understanding is not belief. The fundamentally Value-Known may not be explicit. What one is explicitly aware of may not be strongly believed. Explicit inconsistencies may not therefore be stressful. Moreover, our 'realities' are "parcelled up" into belief structures of differing relevances - referring to different aspects of reality. The learned "dissociation" of one from another is a most significant

sociological (i.e. societally contexted and socially significant) variable.

This is not to deny the value of verbal elaboration. On the contrary. For it is this "parcelling up" - this structuration of beliefs such that we have not one single view of the world but a variety of them, co-ordinated only imperfectly and implicity - which requires verbalisation. This is the deep structure of our cosmologies, which is necessarily implicit - and therefore unamenable to deliberate change - in default of explicit attention.

Basic Beliefs

The "tree-root" metaphor is intended to be applicable to structures not only of subjectively held beliefs, but also of objectivated 'knowledge'. The latter includes both the accounts of individual others, ("frozen", as it were, in print, or reconstructed according to the observer's interpretation of behaviour etc.) and bodies of 'knowledge' such as those institutionalised in curricula, in cultures and in social institutions themselves. The logical and contextual dimensions were considered above primarily in terms of subjective belief structures. The emphasis in the last section was consequently on the elaboration of implicit 'knowledge' and the possible resolution of inconsistencies through the development of Curiosity. In this section, I suggest how this same view of structured beliefs might be used to consider objectivated 'knowledge'.

I mentioned above a "metatheoretical judgment", that it was "human" to be autonomous rather than determined. That judgment

was my own. "Metatheoretical judgments" is how Ford (1975) defines what she calls "Basic Beliefs". One problem with such Basic Beliefs is that it is not always obvious where they are. That is, on challenging a belief ("Why do you - or does he - believe that?") one might be led to a "meta-belief". But then it is legitimate to ask, "Why ... that belief?". One is then led to a "meta-meta-belief". And so on. Put like this, it might seem that one will ultimately come to the "ultimate" meta-belief which is unjustifiable (to the believer) or inexplicable (to the observer). But it does not always work like that. Instead of a finite regression, one can find oneself "looping back".(91)

I suggest that this difficulty in pinning down Basic Beliefs arises from our ability to switch Relevances (without, perhaps, realising it). The "same" notions may be re-ordered in such a way that they are not really the same at all. They are related ones, differently structured. To pin down Basic Beliefs, therefore, we must nominate the Relevance with which we are concerned, and look for the appropriate "tree-root" structure.

The "tree-root" metaphor was initially developed to illustrate the dimension of Inclusiveness. In portraying beliefs as hierarchically structured, it naturally suggests that there are fewer beliefs "at the top" than at lower levels of inclusiveness. With apologies for the mixing of metaphors, these can be seen as "underlying assumptions" or "unifying notions"(92) - or as Basic Beliefs. Were we concerned only with fantasized notions, the difficulty of pinning down a valid

relevance angle might be insurmountable. But beliefs are real and actually structured. However figurative might be the "tree-root" model as a device for conceptualising their structuration, they are structured. Whilst the observer's choice of relevance angle may confront problems of relativism, therefore, this does not mean that his choice need be merely arbitrary. Nonetheless, the complexity of belief structuration and the metaphorical nature of the "tree-root" model do mean that the observer's relevance angle must be made quite explicit, and as far as possible justified. Having seen people's beliefs as structured and non-random, one can avoid trying to describe the total structure (or structures) in terms of all the notions, at various levels, that can be gathered together. One can simplify, by using high-level Basic Beliefs as short-hands - just as "The Theory of Relativity" or "The Gospel" are short-hands for complex theory and description. The "tree-root" analogy is not just a descriptive metaphor for the consideration of belief structures in general, but a heuristic device for talking about specific belief structures, in specific contexts.

Furthermore the same device may be used of objectivated bodies of 'Knowledge'. What Bourdieu calls "Master Patterns"(93) might also be considered as hierarchical "tree-root" structures. They might also be characterisable in terms of their highest level Basic Beliefs. I am not, here, talking of the beliefs of individual people holding particular Basic Beliefs as identifiable notions. I am talking of objectivated systems of belief. Their unification is likely to lie not in the high level notions of any one individual, but in the social or societal context itself. Yet the accumulated beliefs of divers people may make up an

identifiable body of 'knowledge', experienced by each individual.

In the Division of Labour, Durkheim appears at first to deny the possibility of any such unifying Basic Belief. He notes the lack of unity in science - especially "the moral and social sciences". He sees this as analogous to certain anomic features of the contemporary division of labour. But he then says:

> "The unity of science will thus form of itself, not through the abstract unity of a formula, far too scanty for the multitude of things that it must embrace, but through the living unity of an organic whole. For science to be unitary, it is not necessary for it to be contained within the field of one and the same conscience - an impossible feat anyhow - but it is sufficient that all those who cultivate it feel that they are collaborating in the same work." Durkheim (1893/1964) p.371.

Such "collaboration", of course, need not be seen as active and willing co-operation (though that may be what Durkheim would have prescribed). It may entail, essentially, common experience. Insofar, then, as a society or section of society may be said to have any kind of homogeneity in respect of its culture - or Master Patterns - these may be pieced together from the beliefs of various members, rather than assumed to be extricable from those of any one individual. Nonetheless, it should in principle be possible to conceive of them as structured in the same "tree-root" fashion as individual belief systems.(94)

The question still remains, however, how we are to identify the Basic Beliefs. For, if in the case of individual belief systems it seems that these cannot be located unless the precise Relevance is first nominated by the observer, is this not even more the case of belief systems which are the subjective 'knowledge' of no single individual, but rather characterise a

social group, or even institution, as a whole?

I suggest that there may be certain universal moments (or dimensions) in respect of particular kinds of experience and activity. According to the subject to be discussed, these might be named, and thereafter used as dimensions of experience "along" which people concerned with that kind of experience or activity are "bound" to have some kind of notion. By suggesting such universals, those notions can then be seen as Basic Beliefs, which adequately or inadequately unify other notions in that Relevance area.

I will suggest in Part II, for example, a way of considering educational ideologies. I will claim that it is legitimate and useful to start by asserting the relevance of two universal dimensions. The first of these is the social contexting of learning, and hence the social relations of learning situations. The second is the physical separateness of individual people, and therefore of their physical brains, and therefore of their subjective beliefs and understandings. These are separate from the 'knowledge' of others and from objectivated bodies of 'knowledge', established "truths" and master patterns. This leads me, in turn, to talk about the "Power" and the "Knowledge" dimensions of educational ideologies, some versions of which can be expected in any individual or societal 'knowledge' about education.

In the next section, I shall say some more about my methodology, as it relates to the initial "tree-root" metaphor.

"Tree-roots" and Methodology

The "tree-root" metaphor is not only a way of looking at structures of Value-Knowledge and systems of belief. It is also a device for the consideration of notion structures, whether those notions be strongly-believed or not. It can also be used, therefore, as a methodological device. This was suggested earlier, in connection with the search for higher-level subjective understandings and more adequate accounts of Reality.

In illustrating the "tree-root" metaphor, it was convenient to use single-word, or short-phrase, examples ("furniture", etc.). This does not mean, however, that the structuration of these "tree-roots" is just a matter of semantics. Where actual 'realistic' beliefs are concerned, single words or phrases are short-hands for descriptive, or even "assertive", beliefs about what the world is really like out-there. To illustrate this, consider the notion of "father". Some such "tree-root" as the following might be presented:

A.



Within a given culture, the three lower order notions may be implied by the higher (more inclusive) notion of "fatherhood". Such a structure might also be a fair short-hand for the beliefs of any one individual member of that culture. But insofar as they were unquestioned and Value-Known elements of the "fatherhood" belief structure, an elaboration of this short-hand might take

the form of:

B. (I believe that) there are fathers

who

have (biologically) fathered children → and therefore had past relations with the mothers - and "should" maintain some relationship → and therefore have certain responsibilities to the children

Or:

C. I am a father

which means that

I have fathered children → i.e. that I have had relations... and I "should" maintain some relationship ... → and I have certain responsibilities

This itself is also abbreviated for convenience's sake. It should be clear, though, that when it is beliefs that are in question, the supposedly "semantic" simplicity of "tree-root"structures is actually very complex. They refer to actual or potential instances of the "things" (e.g. fathers) in question. They are structured according to certain relational properties (such as "should", or "implies", or "means") which, in a fully elaborated version, need to be spelled out. And they are context-specific: clearly this view of fatherhood is by no means universal. Some societies do not necessarily conjoin biological fatherhood with responsibilities of subsistence and inheritance.

The initial purpose of presenting the "furniture" example, then, was to enable a simplified illustration of "tree-rooting".

There is a further purpose, too. This metaphor can apply not just to 'realistic' beliefs, but to structures of notions which are not strongly-believed (Value-Known) in specific contexts. This same device then has methodological implications. The dimensions along which we can see the structuring of beliefs can also serve as "criteria" by which to assess belief systems. Moreover, they can be used as a device for the development of more adequate subjective understandings. Even without such an intention to "improve" notional structures, I suggest now that the same metaphor can be employed as a means of analysing the belief systems of others, and objectivated 'knowledge' systems in general.

I suggested above that books or articles present an excellent example of how "tree-roots" can be observed in practice. Chapter, section and sub-section headings - even if these are not verbalised by the writer - are short-hands for the included contents. This, however, is the finished article. Before such a book or article comes to be written, that ordering has to take place. (Often, of course, the ordering is by no means as coherent as it might have been, even in the finished product). At an early stage of research(95), notes or index cards may be arranged under provisional short-hand headings, the relationships between which may be largely unrecognised. Even at the implicit, intuited level, they may be incoherent. At a later stage, when such notes or cards are re-ordered/re-classified, they are likely to take on a more explicitly reasoned arrangement. Old categories give way to new ones, as sub-division and amalgamation take place, and a hierarchical arrangement establishes itself, as classes of a higher level of inclusiveness become apparent. This may seem

almost a question of the cards or notes "ordering themselves". The model according to which this ordering takes place may still be largely implicit. As, however, the intuited model becomes explicit, it becomes potentially more coherent, and the classification of particular items of data, references, novel ideas, etc. becomes that much easier. When the model is fully worked out, the article or book is perhaps ready for writing. In my experience, this is an effective research strategy. What is important to note here, however, is that it is according to a model or theory - initially implicit, but eventually explicit - that the classifications take place. That is, from a certain stage of the research, the Relevance according to which data, etc., are ordered is decided.(96) Other data, etc., may meanwhile become "irrelevant" to the project at hand and be filed elsewhere.

The exercise of classification necessarily entails the use of some model - however implicit that model may be in its early stages. Furthermore, theories are merely a form of model. This counters a common suggestion that classifications and theories are quite different. Morris (1968), for instance, says that theories are the organisation of concepts into testable propositions, whilst classifications do not contain propositions.(97) I maintain that theories may in any case be implicit - intuited, perhaps, but not verbally elaborated. And I maintain that classifications do contain propositions - about the nature of the "things" classified. Beliefs necessarily refer to what is taken to be Reality. But tentative notions also "refer". That is, they tentatively imply that "perhaps reality is like this". Any classification, when proposed as a way of ordering the "facts", contains the (at least) tentative proposition that

"this is how it might be". Furthermore, the very "shape" of the classification may contain hidden propositions, for instance that "Reality is or might be ordered dichotomously" or that "Reality is or might be ordered hierarchically". I touch briefly on the question of dichotomies below.

The "tree-root" metaphor, then, offers both a plausible account of how people's beliefs are structured and also of how explicit accounts - whether tentative or as attempted elaborations of Value-Knowledge - might be ordered. One can see such "tree-roots" in books and articles. One can see them in taxonomies of fauna and flora, in kinship diagrams, in syllogistic arguments, in Roget's Thesaurus(98), as well as in most coherently written accounts about 'Reality'. Are there any major differences, though, between the ways in which they are (implicitly) used? Are there different types of "tree-root" structure?

One way to consider different "tree-root" structures might be in terms of the following distinctions: (a) whether the primary emphasis of the writer is upon the "elemental" notions and the intrinsic properties of their supposed referents, or upon the relationships that supposedly connect those elements, and (b) whether the structures are supposed to derive their structuration from a Real structuration out-there, to which the account is supposed in some way to "correspond", or are intended essentially as heuristically useful - but ultimately arbitrary - devices, for other purposes.

According to these two distinctions, one could arrive at four "types"of "tree-root" structure.

Type A. Semantic Taxonomies[99]

These include, for instance, taxonomies of plant or animal life, in terms of genera and species. They attend primarily to the elements or contents of the structures, and it is the real properties believed to characterise the referred-to objects (plants, animals) which distinguish between classes and between hierarchical levels.

Type B. Logical Structures

These include academic syllabuses, based, for instance, upon faculties and departments, or upon areas of 'Knowledge'. Though it is the intrinsic subject matters that may be the overt defining characteristics, there is at least implicitly a strong reference to inter-disciplinary combinations or distinctions. (For instance, "the Arts" versus "the Sciences".) Though some may recognise an arbitrary, or at least relativist, character in these distinctions and orderings, there is frequently the assumption that the methodologies and logics of the various areas of 'knowledge' are real and distinct.[100]

Type C. Logical Arguments

These include, most obviously, logical deductions, where lower order conclusions can be drawn from higher order premises. Explanatory arguments can also be viewed in this way.[101] The emphasis is primarily on the structure of the arguments (and in formal logic, symbols may stand for elements). Yet these structures are not necessarily taken to have value by virtue of any correspondence to Natural Laws, or whatever.[102]

Type D. Associational Arguments

These include the exploitation of shifting Relevances and the creative association of ideas. The emphasis is primarily on contents, though there may be a strong element of fantasying and no rigid intention, therefore, of reflecting the world-out-there as it 'really' is. The approach is, rather, deliberately to seek alternative ways of looking at it.

Diagrammatically, these four "types of "tree-root" structuring may be summarised as follows:

	"Correspondent"	"Heuristic"
Emphasis on Structure	B. Logical Structures	C. Logical Arguments
Emphasis on Contents	A. Semantic Taxonomies	D. Associational Arguments

This is one way of considering possible "types" of "tree-root" structures. I would not claim that it is the only, nor possibly the best, way of differentiating between them. There are two reasons for this. First, these "types" are not so distinct as such a typology might seem to suggest. In all cases, there is structuring, even though primary attention in "types" A and D may not be on such structuration. (Being less explicit, the structuration may well be less coherent, however). Similarly, all "types" are presumably supposed to be "useful". To say that "types" A and B are supposed to relate more directly to 'Reality' does not mean that they are not held to be helpful (in, for instance, an understanding of that 'Reality'). Thus if

taxonomists prefer to classify according to genera and species, this may be because that is more heuristically useful to them than classifying, for instance, according to size, or dietary habits, or geographical habitat, or hostility-to-man. These other Relevances may, however, be more useful to others, classifying the same 'real' life-forms.

The second reason why this typology should be regarded as only one way of differentiating between "types" of "tree-roots" is that I can (for the moment, at any rate) see no universally valid reason why the two dimensions chosen are the best ones possible. As a matter of biographical detail, I at first intuited five, not four, "types". Four roughly corresponded to those outlined above, and the fifth was a kind of amalgam. It was by attention to the fifth "type" that I was able to clarify the four-part typology, and see that the fifth "type" was qualitatively different from the other four. I was typologising.

Typologising involves first a search for possible relevances, that is, for possible ways of viewing the phenomena under consideration. If we remember the distinction between beliefs and notions which are not strongly-believed, then it is clear that typologising applies only to the latter. It is a thinking device, not a characteristic of beliefs. The second step is to select the Relevances which are most useful, for the case in hand. There may be various criteria by which such "usefulness" might be assessed, but one important one is Exhaustiveness. There are, I think, two ways in which exhaustiveness might be attained. The first of these is through dichotomisation and the second (which I return to more fully in Part II) is the possible universality of chosen dimensions. Such universality

would need to be argued, in each case.

Dichotomisation is sometimes taken to be a natural and inevitable human exercise.(103) But we do not always dichotomise, though we always can. As my examples of "furniture" constructs showed, our immediate attempts to render implicit notions verbally-elaborate do not automatically "come out as" dichotomies. It is only with a very special attention to making (lower level) classifications exhaustive, that dichotomies - or bi-polar continua - emerge. In everyday life such exhaustiveness is not always (or even usually) required or sought. There is no particular problem, for instance, in thinking of furniture as being either household or office furniture without concern for the rest. For most purposes, any furnishings thereby left out do not matter. In certain contexts, however, there is a perceived need for exhaustiveness that is very real. One of these is in theorising, or the building of models, for instance for academic purposes. With that "need" comes a tendency to dichotomise.(104)

Not infrequently the dichotomous distinctions then produced are unhelpful, if not deceptive. Firstly, an overtly plausible distinction may in fact rely on covert distinctions, which, through remaining implicit, carry connotations that lead to illicit conclusions. It is not legitimate to posit

> "A (but also, covertly, P) or B (but also, covertly, Q), but not both"

and then to "discover" that, empirically,

> "When A then not-Q".(105)

Secondly, "false dichotomies" can also arise when positive categories are contrasted with residual or negative categories.

Such distinctions may be logically legitimate, but theoretically not very devastating, and practically misleading.(106)

Returning to the question of typologising, as a methodological device, care must be taken with the (usually dichotomous) dimensions employed. In the first place, it needs to be argued that the Relevance of the dimensions is the most appropriate. In the second place, one must be aware that particular dichotomies may be misleading and may well be better replaced by others. However, this is in no way an argument for avoiding such a methodological approach. In Part II, I shall suggest that two dimensions are likely to be universally relevant to educational issues. However, in dichotomising these dimensions (or aspects of them) there may certainly be better ways of considering particular data. ("Better", in this case, will mean "more productive of hypotheses concerning educational ideologies" - in particular, how empirically found examples can be understood; how they might be related to Master Patterns at the societal level, why they might occur as they do in specific societal contexts, and what consequences their occurrence might have).

In this section, I have suggested that four "types" of "tree-root" structure might be distinguished. Such structures may characterize either Value-Known or merely temporarily-held notions. When, however, it is a question of thinking, rather than mere believing, the deliberate search for more adequate structures may involve not just a search for higher levels (as described in the last section. It may involve a shifting of relevances and a precision of explicit definitions and classifications. Such classifications are not necessarily "atheoretical".

They contain implied relationships which may in fact be explanatory. Great care should, however, be taken in the selection of dimensions believed to be relevant, especially when these lead to dichotomisations. For these can frequently be deceptive, rather than illuminating.

Notes

(1) or "'realities'" or "'knowledge'".

(2) I shall explain what I mean by "dimensions" below. Meanwhile it suffices to say that whilst it may be illegitimate to expect particular beliefs or particular social relationships to exist a-historically or universally, nonetheless it is meaningful to talk of universal dimensions (or moments) on which some beliefs or social arrangement might be anticipated.

(3) By "context-freedom" I mean the idea that beliefs might be unrelated to their societal context in the sense of not being determined by it. By "value-freedom" I mean the idea that beliefs may be unrelated to their context in the sense of not having any determinative consequences upon it. The first, then, refers to a supposed lack of cause, the second to a supposed lack of consequentiality. Both views I reject.

(4) Three other forms of relativism are worth mentioning. Pluralistic Relativism sees all 'knowledges' as different. Since we cannot therefore know which is "true", this view holds, then all are equally valuable. I cannot accept this view, since some accounts are patently better than others. Metaphysical Idealism (a term I borrow from Flew, 1976) is an extreme version of Pluralistic Relativism. Having a strong footing in some contemporary sociology, its main characteristic is an implicit denial that there is any order in the world-out-there. It insists that order exists only "in the mind". Blum, for example, says

> "It is easy to see that the methodical character of marriage, war and suicide is only seen, recognised and made possible through the organised practices of sociology. These regularities do not exist 'out there' in pristine form to which sociologists functionally respond, but rather, they acquire their character as regularities and their features as

> describable objects only through the grace of sociological imputation..."
> Blum (1970/71) p.131 (my emphasis).

I would agree, of course, that Reality is complex. But its non-randomness is not merely a function of sociological benificence.
Whilst both these forms of pluralistic relativism take as their starting point the context-freedom problem (see note 7), Conflict Relativism looks rather to that of value-freedom. This view sees "truth" as relative not to the origins of beliefs and understandings, but to their consequences. The problem is one of "Whose side are you on?". Whilst having more sympathy with this view, I still reject the implication that truth/falsity is ultimately meaningful.

(5) Nonetheless, Holly does make some such distinction himself, when he says that

> "On the whole ... the central task of primary schools is to promote the learning of formal skills alongside the emotional development of the child."
> Holly (1973/74) p.175.

(6) Incidentally, of course, "baldness" may also be debatable. Do two hairs constitute hairiness? Does a microscopic fuzz....? The average believer in K. of F. hairlessness may not be impressed by such nit-picking (!), but rendering our implicit definitions problematic, by making them explicit, can be an important way of "forcing" us to examine our own beliefs - an important point that I shall return to in Chapter 2.

(7) I gratefully borrow this term from Ford (1975) - including capital letters - to replace what I have variously called, in the past, "underlying" or "fundamental beliefs", "supra-content concepts" (an expression adopted and adapted from Bernstein, 1971) and "unifiers" or "unifying notions" (Syer, 1974b, 1975b). What I mean by "Basic Beliefs" and by "unifying", will, I hope, become clear as this section proceeds. It is not, I am afraid, wholly identical with Ford's usage - see below.

(8) "Inclusiveness", also, is explained below.

(9) This Weberian-Parsonian notion has been developed, for instance, by Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961). In Syer (1972) I looked at a number of such developments and usages - and used it myself - though, to my mind now, rather uncritically.

(10) At times, very rapid - and drastic - changes of "personality" take place, even on a collective basis. Not just "opinions", but fundamental dimensions of belief akin to what "value orientations" attempt to describe, are involved. See, for instance, Bettelheim (1960/70) pp.22-6, et passim; Elkins (1959) p.115 ff.
It is the failure, on the whole, of Bowles and Gintis to make problematic the transfer of school-learned beliefs to the economic and political sectors - and not just their emphasis on primary socialisation - that makes their "Correspondence Principle" suspiciously functionalist.
(I say "on the whole", because there is clearly a disjuncture between their earlier work, as represented in Chapter 5 of their latest book (1976), and the later chapters of that book, which concern the relative autonomy and revolutionary potential of schools).

(11) Compare the commonly reported striking of workers who are supposedly opposed to strikes (e.g. Cousins & Brown, 1971). The most notorious example of this was the events at Vauxhalls of Luton, after the completion of Goldthorpe et al.'s research (1968-9). (cf. Blackburn, 1969).

(12) cf. Mann (1970).

(13) cf. Bell (1960).

(14) Also related are such distinctions as those made by Keddie (1971) in talking of Teacher and Educationist Contexts. (See below). Wittgenstein (1966) notes that religious beliefs are only distinctive in the degree of commitment involved, not in their content. I agree, but would point out further that it is only in a society where there was a high proportion of beliefs that are "open" - not Value-Known - that such religious beliefs are so distinctive. Any closed, rigidified, Value-Known beliefs are "religious", in this sense.
Finally, the distinction between "tradition" and "traditionalism" is instructive. Tradition, to Weber, was that which has always existed, whilst traditional authority was that which was based upon the everyday belief in the sacredness of prevalent traditions. If someone was said to Value-Know something "because it was traditional", then, it could mean one of two quite different things: either an objective or a subjective explanation might be intended. In the former, everyday experience had produced the Value-Knowledge. In the latter, a ("conscious") belief in the importance of traditions was responsible. Friedrich (1972) would call the former "tradition", and the latter "ideology", but I do not find his usage useful.

(15)Since each of these dimensions is dichotomously presented (the answer in each case may be Yes or No), the following "truth table" might be constructed:-

	Is	Could be	Has to be	Should be
1.	Yes	(Y)	Y	Y
2.	Y	(Y)	Y	No
3.	Y	(Y)	N	Y
4.	Y	(Y)	N	N
	Y	N	Y	Y*
	Y	N	Y	N*
	Y	N	N	Y*
	Y	N	N	N*
	N	Y	¥	Y**
	N	Y	¥	N**
4.	N	Y	(N)	Y
3.	N	Y	(N)	N
	N	N	¥	Y**
	N	N	¥	N**
2.	N	N	(N)	Y
1.	N	N	(N)	N

In this table, brackets indicate that this value is superfluous (either the state of affairs Is, and therefore to say that it Could-be is superfluous, or it Isn't, and therefore to say that it Doesn't-have-to-be is superfluous).

* indicates a void category, because a state of affairs cannot both be (Is) and not be possible (Couldn't-be).

** indicates a void category, because a state of affairs cannot both not-be (Isn't) and yet necessarily exist (Has to be).

The remaining categories I have grouped in pairs:

1. Ideal
2. Fatalistic
3. Conservative (or retrenchment/consolidation)
4. Radical or Reactionary.

These four types of belief about given state of affairs may be shown in tabular form, as follows:-

	Is, and should be or Isn't and shouldn't be	Is, but shouldn't be or Isn't, but should be
(Could be) and has to be or Couldn't be and (doesn't have to be)	1. Ideal (YYYY or NNNN)	2. Fatalistic (YYYN or NNNY)
Could be, but doesn't have to be	3. Conservative (YYNY or NYNN)	4. Radical/ Reactionary (YYNN or NYNY)

The names I have applied to each type should be self-explanatory. (No further significance will be attached to them in this essay). In each case the belief in question may firstly be explicit or implicit, and secondly it may be more or less adequately elaborated. Thirdly, it may also be Value-Known or merely believed-for-the-time-being, though this is not, of course, a dichotomous choice but a continuum.
These distinctions will be useful in Chapter 7. They are not immediately germane to the arguments of this chapter, and are included here only because they arise from discussion of the notion of "values" and prescriptive statements. It should be noted that the additional dimensions just mentioned (the extent of explicit elaboration however (in-)adequate, and the strength of belief) are not separate. For example: if a given political system or pedagogical relationship, say, is assumed implicitly to be inevitable (Has to be), then functionally such an assumption will have prescriptive effects (Should, therefore, be). Ideologies commonly rationalise what it is supposed "should" be - in the interests, for instance, of the believer - into what inevitably and naturally "has to be". And vice-versa.

(16) Lichtheim (1971/74) notes that, "Theorists employ concepts as a kind of intellectual short-hand ... They use words to designate more or less complex intellectual models..." He goes on, however, "... which have no precise equivalent in empirical reality." (p.9). This is a different point.

(17) By "object", I do not, of course, mean a concrete thing, but "that which is referred to".

(18) To use an earlier example, I do not commonly question my notion of "baldness". Furthermore, I may assume it to be

quite easily verbalisable. When I stop to consider it, however, I find it less clear than I had assumed. How much more true this is of notions which I have never verbalised.

(19) Particularly the papers by Young, Bernstein, Bourdieu (two papers, but especially pp.174-180) and Keddie. Keddie puts it succinctly:

> "Like the pupils who are categorised in terms of levels of ability, knowledge in school is categorised in terms of its supposed hierarchical nature with reference to criteria of age and ability." (p.144)

(20) For instance, White (1969); Shipman (1969/71).

(21) As an example:

> "The academic value of a subject seems to me to depend largely on the ratio of ideas to facts in it ... It could be argued that an accurate account of the rise and fall of export figures for Danish cheeses during a given decade of the 19th century ... might well be more socially useful than an elaborate topological fantasy. Nevertheless our respect for the specialist on cheeses is not high; we value his work but not him; and the sole reason for this is the low content of ideas - hypotheses, powers of reasoning, capacity for general ideas, awareness of the relationship of elements in a total pattern , etc. - in such painstaking, but intellectually undemanding, work..." Berlin (1969b) p.19.

(22) e.g. Hirst (1969/71).

(23) Actually, Hirst explicitly says of his "cognitive structures" that "these would seem to me to be the logically distinct areas, though this division might well be disputed ..." Hirst, (1969/71) p.243.

This does not, however, alter my argument. It is a "lip service statement" which is clearly not intended to invite radically different interpretations, and if anything reinforces the view that the 'knowledge' structures are objectivatable - <u>independently of context</u> - a view that I find most suspect.

(24) For instance Horton (1967/71).

(25) cf. Gerth & Mills (1954/61) pp.276-7.

(26) In Durkheim (1925/56).

(27) This lack of distinction in Bernstein (1967,1971) I criticised and explored in Syer (1975b). I shall draw on this in Chapter 10.

(28) I shall mention this idea, that Objectivated 'Knowledge' is often <u>not</u> taken as problematic, although subjective introduction to it is, in greater detail in Parts II and III. Bruner, in the terms developed there, is a "Participationist".

(29) Kelly (1963) e.g. p.43.

(30) See Hesse (1966)

(31) e.g. Park et al. (1925)

(32) cf. Perman (1973)

(33) cf. Marx (1859/1969); Thompson (1973) pp. 27-30.

(34) For instance, Goffman (1969).

(35) For instance, Levi-Strauss (1963/72).

(36) The reference is to Tolkein (1954). Tolkein's Ents consider "hasty" any language that does not fully verbalise all connotations and denotations. In contrast, also from fiction, one might cite Delaney's (1967) Ciribian's language.

(37) Merton (1957/68) pp.313-4

(38) cf. Wittgenstein (1953/67) p.152.

(39) Compare Schutz' "zones" or "realms of relevance". (See part 7 of the next section of this chapter.)

(40) This is so even if what we want to believe is objectively true. ("If only I could believe what you say ...") Similarly, expectations cannot be chosen, whereas aspirations perhaps can.

(43) Labov (1969/73)

(44) I am suspicious of Chomsky's notion that human brains are (in normal circumstances) universally predisposed to construct language in certain ways. I am suspicious also of theories that reduce consistency to psychological "needs" - as in cognitive dissonance theory.

(45) As an example of "lip-service statements", consider Bernstein's insistences that what he calls the "Restricted Code" is blessed with various merits. Such comments are always "tacked on", never integrated with the rest of the theories developed. (For instance, Bernstein, 1969/73, p.211). Another example is pointed out by Bruner (1966/74, p.38):

> "Although Piaget has given us our richest picture of cognitive development, it is one that is based almost entirely on experiments in which age alone is varied. While he admits that environmental influences play a role, the admission is pro forma, and inventive experiments remain confined to Western European children, usually middle class at that."

(46) This does not mean that I am unable to fantasize alternative structures:



But in that case I am deliberately changing - and quite drastically - the way in which I am conceiving of, for instance, "guns" and "steeples". In terms that I shall elaborate upon in a moment, I am changing my angle of relevance. Accordingly, different structures come into operation.

(47) "A low-level theory /is/ ... one that covers a relatively limited area of experience ... A higher-level theory /is/ ... one that covers a larger area of experience." Horton (1967/71) p.220.

(48) The reference here is to Bernstein et al. (1966/71)

(49) The reference here is to Bernstein (1967/71)

(50) See Syer (1974a, 1975b), and also Chapter 10 below.

(51) Bever and Rosenbaum (1964/71), who use a hierarchical notion of semantic lexical structures, include a similar argument.

(52) In Syer (1974a, 1975b) I have argued this interrelationship in discussing some of Bernstein's work on curriculum .

(53) That is, first the dimension for classification is made explicit ("size") and second it is - in this case - exhaustively trichotomised. In example (A), however, the implicit dimension ("building function") has not been exhaustively categorized.

(54) cf drinking-and-driving example, above.

(55) Compare the anger that is roused by the false "news" occasionally broadcast on April Fool's Day.

(56) cf the four (or five) regions of decreasing relevance in Schutz (1946)

(57) It therefore has possible implications of an identity between thought and language, and of over-determinism (neglecting the human facility to create in the first place new notions and in the second place the experience whereby those notions may become Value-Known.)

(58) I used the term extensively in Syer (1974b).

(59) The author's actual headings may, however, be misleading: they may not "summarise" the included arguments, so much as mention memorable expressions related to them.

(60) The reader might like to compare an early preliminary plan of Part I of this essay with the "contents page" of the first type-written draft. (See next page.)



I

Belief Structures

1.

1.1. Reality of 'Realities': Introduction

1.2. Reality & 'Reality'

2.

2.1. Relativism

2.2.

2.2.1. 'Realistic' Beliefs

2.2.2. Notions & Models

2.3.

2.3.1. Beliefs as Structures

2.3.2. Adequacy Dimensions

2.3.3. Dimensions of Adequacy :

2.3.4. Intuition & Curiosity

2.3.5. Basic Beliefs

2.3.6. "Tree-roots" & Methodology

3.

3.1. Mind-brain & Language

3.2. Determinative Experience

3.3.

3.3.1. Value-Knowledge & Hidden Curriculum

3.3.2. Hidden Patterns

(61) Compare Buzan's "patterned summary" of his chapter on memory (Buzan, 1974, p.8c) :



(62) I hasten to add that I am here translating Freire's ideas into my own terminology.

(63) That this is not just so of elaborated Standard dialects, but also of non-standard dialects, is well demonstrated by Labov (1969/73).

(64) The obtrusive tactics of ethnomethodologists have done much to demonstrate this.

(65) Gladwin (1964/73).

(66) It is significant in this respect that Advanced Driving techniques involve an attempt to stress-again verbalisation.

(67) e.g. James (1892) pp.163-4, quoted by Slobin (1971) pp. 100-1.

(68) Ford talks a lot of "intuition", "hunches" and "implicit models", and refers to others, including Kuhn and Popper, who have made similar observations, see also Syer (1974b).

(69) See, for instance, Simon (1970/71) p.251 et passim, on the blinkering effects of psychometry, but the problematic effects of teachers' actual experience of supposedly dull children.

(70) Syer (1974b, 1975a).

(71) cf Mills:-

> "That imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another - from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self - and to see the relations between the two. Back of these there is always the urge to know the social and historical meaning of the individual in the society and in the period in which he has his quality and his being."
> Mills (1959/70) pp.13-14.

(72) "It is curiosity which is the starting-point for theorising and theorising which ... is the first stage of scientific investigation ...." Ford (1975) p.221.

(73) Plowden, for instance, talks of "children among whom some seem to have learned only how not to learn" (§ 134)

"The thrust to learn seems to be latent in every child, at least within a very wide range of normality. But however good the opportunities, some children may not be able to take advantage of them. Failure may have taken away from them the urge to learn."
Plowden Report (1967) §136.

Holt talks in similar terms:

"To a very great degree, school is a place where children learn to be stupid ... Children come to school curious; within a few years most of that curiosity is dead, or at least silent ..." Holt (1969) p.156.

(74) For instance, Morrison & McIntyre (1969/73) pp.151-4.

(75) Bruner (1965/74) p.28.

(76) See Syer (1975a and 1974b) respectively.

(77) "A society which must carry out more complicated processes based upon thinking and acting with a purpose in view will, in certain situations, necessarily tend (sic) to produce the reflective type of person." Mannheim (1936/60) p.57.

"Intellectual self-awareness ... is the characteristic obligation of our time" Bramson (1961) p.7.

(78) cf Mannheim (1936/60) ; Arblaster (1973). This is related to the assumption that a scarcity of skills in society is inevitable and that it is responsible for differential rewards for occupational performance. As Bowles and Gintis (1976, Ch.4) point out, this technical-functionalist assumption (cf Davis and Moore, 1945/64; Kerr et al.,1960/73) remains unchallenged by most environmentalist critics of "IQ-ism".

(79) I elaborate upon this in Syer (1975a). Compare the following passage in Keddie (1971):

"The questions from the /"A"/ pupils take the framework the teacher presents for granted, and the pupils show a willingness to accept the terminology (the 'correct term') as part of that framework. The <u>scepticism</u> of many 'C' pupils, which leads them to question the teachers' mode of organising their material, means that <u>they do not learn what may be taken for granted</u> within a subject, which is part of the process of learning what questions may be asked within a particular subject perspective." Keddie (1971) p.151 (my emphasis).

The scepticism here is not curiosity so much as a lack of legitimation of teacher-defined relationships. It involves neither the development of higher-level understandings, nor the possibility or duty of seeking them. One might

also compare the dashed hopes of some early "transactional" deviance writers, that truancy (for instance) was incipient revolution. It lacked, of course, the political consciousness that might have made it radical, rather than accommodative. (See, again, Syer 1975a for a development of these distinctions).

(80) One might compare the learned reluctance of adults to take up new pursuits, or to acquire new skills of certain sorts. Adults might feel they will "look silly" if they are seen to be novices at exercises that "even children can do". On the other hand there are some activities which adults are positively encouraged to "take up", where it is not remotely "odd" for them to be novices. A major part of the B.B.C. "On the Move" programmes, in connection with the recent adult literacy campaign, has been to point out that illiteracy amongst adults is (a) common, not so exceptional as might have been believed, and (b) remediable; i.e. one need not look "silly", and one can do it.

(81) Compare Hargreaves (1972) p.40:-

"What could be more devastating for a lazy pupil to find that, when he does respond to the teacher's appeal for change, his efforts are greeted with suspicion and disbelief? Would it not be reasonable for the pupil to conclude that the effort is not worth making since this is a game he can never win?"

(82) In terms explored in Syer (1974a), the former (contextual curiosity) refers to the Autonomy and Power relationships, whilst the latter (logical curiosity) refers to Logic and Socialisation. In Syer (1975a) I was primarily concerned with the latter only, in considering curiosity, because the contextual considerations involve the re-application of beliefs as determinative of changes in contextual Reality. See § 25 of that paper.

(83) To choose three diverse examples:

"We must force the frozen circumstances to dance by singing to them their own melody." Marx, qtd. Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.270.

"The cosmological scheme connects up to bits of experience and invests the whole with meaning; the people who accept it will only be able to justify their treatment of one another in terms of these ultimate categories. Unless we make the process visible, we are the victims." Douglas (1970/73) p.10.

"Whatever may be the major direction of influence at any time, the explicit identification of the structure and components of one's conceptual system release one from bondage to it." Harré (1972) p.17.

(84) For instance:

"To have an idea is not difficult, but to attempt to clarify it, to rescue it from a local intuition, to make it explicit, yet always to be aware of the ambiguity upon which its growth depends, is quite another matter." Bernstein (1973) p.263.

"It is not possible for one to express the whole of his construction system. Many of one's constructs have no symbols to be used as convenient words or handles. They are therefore difficult, not only for others to grasp and subsume within their own systems, but also difficult for the person himself to manipulate or to subsume within the verbally labelled parts of his system." Kelly (1963) p.110.

(85) Postman & Weingartner draw on McLuhan in talking about "label-libel". McLuhan suggests that the medium of print-alphabet has produced a predominance of noun-metaphors.

"The structure of our language is relentless in forcing upon us 'thing' conceptions. In English, we can transform any process or relationship into a thing by the simple expedient of naming it into a noun. We have done this with 'rain' and 'explosions', with 'waves' and 'clouds', with 'thought' and 'life'."

"'What is its name?' can become a substitute for 'How does it work?'" Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) pp.88,36.

(86) Compare psychoanalysis, one of whose objects I take to be to reveal the implicit taken-for-granted "unconscious", thereby enabling the subject to resolve logical inconsistencies - and thereby, in turn, emotional disturbances.

(87) See also Part II. A major ethic of Western science has been, at least since Roger Bacon, that "knowledge is power". The Poor Man's Guardian and then the L.S.E. took up Bacon's dictum as their motto.

(88) This is a metatheoretical judgment, common in much humanist and existentialist thinking, which <u>may</u> be inconsistent with another, namely egalitarianism. See again Part II.

(89) Milgram (1970). cf also Drekmeier (1971).

(90) cf Festinger (1957); Frenkel-Brunswick (1949).

(91) For example: "Why is murder wrong?" "Because life is sacred." "Why is it sacred ?" "Because murder is wrong." Or, "Because Man must survive." "Why?" "Because life is sacred." etc..

(92) These are expressions I have used before, for instance in Syer (1976a). cf also the "domain assumptions" of Gouldner (1970, Ch.2).

(93) Bourdieu (1967/71).

(94) Davies (1970/71) offers another example. In discussing Henry's "Rome High School", Davies notes that it "has two orientations /which at first sight seem incompatible or at least inexplicable in terms of a single framework/: fun and scholarship, but both are subsumed in the common-value-system which demands integration into the adult society .." Davies (1970/71) p.127.

(95) It is, of course, my own research strategy that I am describing. However, I am tempted to think that it is frequently that of others - even if they do not see it explicitly in the way I suggest. cf Mills (1959/70), p.199.ff.

(96) The more certain one becomes that the model or theory being developed is adequate, the more that now-explicit structuring may take on the rigidified character of Value-Knowledge. That is, however, another matter, for the moment.

(97) cf Morris (1968) pp.25-26.

(98) I am grateful to Professor Baldamus for this last example. Baldamus (1976) employs a "weeping willow" metaphor, similar in very many ways to my own "tree-roots" (but independently arrived at) to demonstrate surprising similarities between many major sociological and philosophical writings - and consequently the belief structures behind them.

(99) The names given to these "types" of "tree-root" structures are little more than labels. They do not affect my argument, though, of course, they are intended in some way to "short-hand" the defining characteristics of each "type".

(100) cf Hirst (1969/71); Hirst and Peters (1970)

(101) cf Ford (1975)'s portrayal of Deductive Nomological Explanations, e.g. p.45.

(102) Indeed, Ford, it will be remembered, denies the reality of causality.

(103) There might be two reasons for such an assertion, the first that there is something intrinsic to the human brain that "needs" dichotomies, and the second that nature is in Reality full of symmetries and asymmetries which "impose" themselves upon our minds. The first of these, for instance, is tentatively proposed by Baldamus (1976), and there is considerable evidence (for instance of the differential functions of the two hemispheres of the brain) to back it up. Insofar as alternative explanations can be found, however, I am inclined to distrust this view. Any detailed

attempt to refute it would, however, be outside the scope of this essay. The second tends to be tautological. For any belief about the world-out-there entails reference to aspects of it. This in turn implies identity - as a reality, and as a "correspondent" 'reality'. Identity, in turn, can be taken to imply a dichotomous distinction between any given P and not-P. The supposed dichotomous nature of Reality is thus derived from understandings of it as much as from irrefutable "facts" of nature itself. The conclusion is thus in part the premise.

(104) Compare the following:

"What we propose to do is to assume that all constructs follow this basic dichotomous form. Inside its particular range of convenience a construct denotes an aspect of all the elements lying therein. Outside this range of convenience, the aspect is not recognisable. Moreover, the aspect, once noted, is meaningful only because it forms the basis of similarity and contrast between the elements in which it is noted ... In a minimum context, a construct is a way in which at least two elements are similar and contrast with a third." Kelly (1963) pp.60-61.

I suggest that Kelly's assumption is based upon a "need" to conceive of personal constructs for psychotherapeutic purposes, rather than it "springing" either from the reality of people's dichotomous natures, or even from Kelly's own "natural" dichotomising tendencies.

(105) In Syer (1975b), for instance, I suggested that Esland's Epistemological (or Phenomenological)/Psychometric dichotomy was basically a contrast between thesis and synthesis, rather than between thesis and antithesis (Esland, 1971).

Baldamus (1976), on the other hand, has developed an intriguing methodological approach based precisely on the asymmetricality of dichotomies. This involves, however, making explicit what the "hidden" connotations are.

(106) Pring (1975) has suggested that Bernstein's Collection/Integration dichotomy is of this kind. He suggests that "they rest on the interesting logical device of dividing things into two types which, though mutually exclusive, are together exhaustive or comprehensive of the universe of discourse or what is being talked about. Such a logical procedure must assume that the differences within the types are less important than the differences between the two types. But this is an initial assumption that cannot go undefended ..."

He likens the dichotomy to others commonly made in "theoretical work in the sociology of the curriculum", which he sees as equally faulty.

"The theoretical models thus generated gain plausibility from the valid logical move of dividing all things into a particular category (it matters not which) and its negative, but are misconceived in that they then seek to attribute positive content to the negative category. Unless this can be backed up by empirical work, as opposed to purely logical manoeuvring, the models cannot be seen as theoretical models of practical reality." Pring (1975) pp.70-71.

CHAPTER 3

VALUE-KNOWLEDGE

Mind-Brain and Language

In a sense, my distinction between subjective 'reality' and objective Reality is valid only for the person in question. For each person, everything out-there is not of his 'reality', though of course he may have notions of it. The world-out-there includes the 'realities' of other people. For though these are subjective for them they are external and objectively real to the first person considered. Talking generally, 'realities' are a part of Reality.

The Reality of 'realities' is not asserted here only on the basis of externality, however. I see no reason to suppose that there is anything non-physical about mind.(1) Brain is mind, and vice-versa. The observer needs to distinguish between the two because of the (no doubt insuperable) methodological problem of accessing subjective mind. No amount of objective observation of brain properties and processes could reveal the subjective (mind) side of 'realities', just as no amount of precise and accurate description of light or sound waves could produce a correspondent account of subjectively perceived "redness", or "A^b". (Whether technology or telepathy could develop the means to access subjective mind is, however, another matter).

Not having such access, we must resort on the one hand to introspection, and on the other to metaphor, as a way of communicating how mind might "work". The "tree-root" metaphor

is an attempt to do this. It cannot be supposed that mind in reality "contains" structures of this shape. Indeed no pictorial or verbal account could be anything but metaphorical. The principal emphasis of the "tree-root" metaphor is, as we have seen, the structured nature of mind, and especially of rigidified beliefs. I would expect this mind-structuration to "correspond" to some real structuration of physical brain. (And this might in principle be accessed through objective observation). However fleeting fantasy notions may be, they are, I suggest, structured (really - not metaphorically) in time and space. I shall turn to determinative relations in a moment. Meanwhile non-fleeting, rigidified structures of belief constitute Value-Knowledge.

The role of language should be mentioned briefly. I have already discussed the part that language may play in processes of thinking. Firstly, I spoke of Curiosity-inspired verbal elaboration of (hopefully) more adequate accounts. Secondly, I discussed the creative thinking processes involved in shifting Relevance, and the part that language plays in ordering and expanding such alternative relevances, for instance in the creation of typologies.

Language is also involved in beliefs. In putting beliefs and thoughts into words, there is a tendency to concretise them - even if this is subsequently rejected. Insofar as verbalisation may not itself be an activity of which the believer/thinker is explicitly aware, such concretisation may rigidify our beliefs too. Language does not just elaborate and expand. It also names and classifies.

Yet the distinctness - in principle - between language and belief needs to be remembered in any account of adequate accounts.

For just as pictorial or verbal accounts of belief (and of thought) are necessarily metaphorical, so, it can be argued, are one's own verbal elaborations of one's own beliefs. Our intention should indeed be to conceptualise the structuration of mind - that is to develop verbalised notions of the real relational properties. But those concepts of "mind structure" are not identical to mind structure itself. Consequently the inherent properties of those concepts cannot truly correspond to the referred-to structural properties of mind. It follows that our own explicit awareness of our own - let alone others' - belief structures can only be more or less adequate. Frequently, indeed, they are thoroughly inadequate. It is from this divide that there arise all manner of apparent "irrationalities", wherein people say one thing but do another.(2) For people's behaviour is determined (insofar as it is self-determined) by their beliefs, rather than by what they say they believe - or even believe they believe.

Determinative Experience

In the sense that subjective experience is distinct from objective experience, and that access to other people's subjective thoughts and beliefs is (for methodological reasons) impossible, mind and brain are distinct. However, mind is brain and 'realities' are real. They are as much part of the real physical world as are light and sound. They are therefore subject to the same natural relationships of space, time and determination. Beliefs are obviously located in time and space, in people's

minds.(3) They are determined, also.

In a non-controversial sense, such physical constraints on the physical brain as injury or malnutrition can and do affect belief and thought processes. The argument here is not concerned with that. My suggestion is that beliefs are a product of experience and that experience needs to be thought of in terms of the structuration of Reality. Reality out-there is structured. Mind-brain beliefs are also structured. We must now consider what relationships obtain between the two.

I have discussed Pragmatic Adequacy as a contextual dimension, to be considered when looking at belief structures. On the one hand it can be seen as a criterion, which may be explicitly considered when the adequacy of beliefs - one's own, or other people's - is to be understood. On the other hand, it can be seen as a dimension according to which beliefs are implicitly tested, and by which not understanding but strength of belief is (in part) determined. The "reality testing" to which our beliefs are constantly subjected are not, on the whole, deliberately "set up" by the believer. Nor is he aware of the "testing" that goes on. Other dimensions of adequacy are also the domains of "testing", though the believer may be unaware of this. Only insofar as a given structure of beliefs is "adequate" in these various ways do notions (i.e. structures of notions) become strongly-believed - i.e. Value-Known.

It is through one's own implicit adequacy testing that beliefs become Value-Knowledge. This is the same thing as beliefs becoming rigidly structured. A fluid notion is not

Value-Known, whereas a rigidified one is. Particular belief structures may be sadly inadequate in the view of an objective observer. (Adequacy criteria are in any case relative, not absolute). Yet they must "correspond" in some sense to the Reality referred to, for their rigidification to be reinforced by experience.

The possibility of alternative Relevances can be a major source of disagreement with the observer. As I pointed out with the drink-and-drive example earlier, much of our belief may not be integral to Value-Knowledge structures about the "thing" overtly referred to. It may be so at the level of understanding, and possibly rationalisation, but the actual strong-belief (Value-Knowledge) may be structured according to quite different Relevances. This is so of much of our "off-the-peg" 'knowledge' - 'knowledge' which we have acquired in contexts quite separate from the referred-to Reality, whether in school, or in church, or in the public bar. We may fully believe such "off-the-peg" "facts", but it is our 'knowledge' of the medium in question that contains those beliefs. We do not have isolated belief structures merely about the referred-to objects. It is experience that determines belief. Though you don't have to have 'known' Caesar to believe in him, you do have to have 'known' the mediating context of print, or verbal language, for instance in school or on the B.B.C.

Though it is Reality that we experience, it should not be supposed that only external Reality is open to such experience. It is not just the contextual Reality of the world-out-there from which we learn our beliefs. It is also the logical structures of

our own 'realities'. These too are real, and these too can be and are experienced. Our belief structures and our thought processes are a source, in turn, of learned beliefs.(4)

It is because of this reality of 'realities' that external experience alone will not necessarily produce predictable beliefs. Particular situations can produce different understandings and beliefs in different people. Certainly, similar notions may be developed in similar contexts. This may be especially true, the more oppressive and unyielding to personal autonomous action that context is.(5) Moreover the less available are other contextual experiences to prompt alternative relevances - and possibly, thereby, alternative systems of belief - then the more the context in question is likely to produce in its members similar (or complementary) beliefs. But there is no logically necessary determination of any one structure of beliefs by any given context, in relation to any one referred-to aspect of Reality.

In the discussion of Curiosity, above, it was seen that an explicit awareness of the non-identity of reality and 'reality', and of one's own creative ability to construct alternative notional structures, is itself a liberating awareness. For it may liberate one's beliefs about what might be or should be - and even allow more adequate understanding of what is. Vygotsky stresses the importance of such "consciousness":

> "We use 'consciousness' to denote awareness of the activity of the mind - the consciousness of being conscious. A pre-school child who, in response to the question 'Do you know your name?', tells his name lacks this self-reflective awareness: he knows his name but is not conscious of knowing it."
>
> "Becoming conscious of our operations and viewing each as a process of a certain kind - such as remembering and

> imagining - lead to their mastery. School instruction induces the generalising kind of perception and thus plays a decisive role in making the child conscious of his own mental processes." Vygotsky (1934/62) pp.91, 92.

(Whether in practice schooling achieves what it ought to do in this respect is, of course, another question. A school child who answered 'Yes' to the question 'Do you know your name?' - or, e.g., 'Do you know the date of the Spanish Armada?' - would probably be considered cheeky).

Such self-consciousness may, then, be a spur to creative thinking and to freedom from the constraints of imposed experience. In itself, however, it can create beliefs only about itself. As Vygotsky said, it has to be learned. The experience of Curiosity being successfully exercised can teach the possibilities of that Curiosity/reflective self-awareness. The notions thus created, however, do not thereby become beliefs unless they create, or lead to action designed to create, experience by which new beliefs may be "tested". Again, then, we distinguish between thought and belief. And again it is experience that determines belief. We cannot choose to Value-Know whatever notions we choose.(6)

I have strongly emphasised the structuring of notions and of the Reality to which they refer. This might seem to imply an equally strong distinction between those structures and their contents or elements. But this is not so. Such a distinction is an analytical one only. Both material and social "things" in the world-out-there, and our subjective notions of them, are firstly structured in themselves and secondly "elements" of more inclusive structures. From particular points of view (particular Relevances)

it is often convenient to conceive of distinct "things" and notions. But this is only a matter of convenience. To ignore that is to ignore a crucial fact of Reality.

> "The knowledge that social facts are not objects but relations between men is intensified to the point where facts are wholly dissolved into processes."
> Lukacs (1971) p.181.

The same applies to non-social reality, and to 'realities' also. The case is similar to the distinction between words and lexicon, in semantics. The distinction is a useful one for some purposes, but it only isolates words from the lexical structures in which they necessarily inhere, <u>for</u> those purposes.

So far from emphasising structured relationships in order to distinguish these from "isolated" contents or elements, I wish to stress that even when we do conceive of "things" and notions as ontologically distinct - and we frequently do - then we are ignoring what for the purposes of understanding <u>belief</u> is most important.

Compare this piece of 'knowledge':-

> "I can play 'God Save the Queen' on any ordinary piano on request ... If, however, you asked me to play the chords that accompany, say, 'Send her victorious', I should not be able to do so without actually playing, or rehearsing in mind and muscle, the phrases of the tune that lead up to it. I <u>have</u> the representation - the fact that I succeed in doing as you ask me would prove that; but it is a 'representation' largely in terms of my movements (in relation to my perception of the piano-keys) and only minimally in terms of the appearance of the notation on the page ..." Britton (1970) p.9.

This example illustrates the implicitness - and frequently unreflected- upon nature - of our notional structures, as well

as the non-discreteness of those notions.

I have already distinguished between individuals' subjective 'knowledge', and objectivated bodies of 'knowledge' which the individual confronts. Both are structured. In both it is the relationships that need stressing more than the "contents". In the case of language, for instance, native speakers acquire what is, in the first place, a system of 'knowledge' that is objective to them. In learning that system, they acquire 'knowledge' of the deep structures of the language, often without any explicit awareness of it.

> "No special training or instruction is necessary to enable the native speaker to understand these examples (just given), to know which are 'wrong' and which 'right', although they may all be quite new to him. They are interpreted by the native speaker instantaneously, and uniformly, in accordance with structural principles that are known tacitly, intuitively and unconsciously." Chomsky (1969/72) p.131.

Bruner draws a close comparison between this view of language and his own view of school curricula[7]:-

> "Learning to be skillful with a body of knowledge is much like learning a language, its rules for forming and transforming sentences, its vocabulary, its semantic markers, etc.. As with language, there is also the interesting feature in all such learning that what is learned is initially 'outside' the learner - as a discipline of learning, as a subject matter, as a notational system ..." Bruner (1969/74) p.127.

One can become competent in the deep structure of a language, or of a curricular/academic subject, or of a social institution with its patterns of "rules" and expectations. But this competence may not be explicit. In becoming explicitly aware of the structuration, one becomes "conscious", in the sense used by

Vygotsky. That consciousness, in turn, offers the possibility of autonomous action, at least in respect of one's own understandings.

> "To us it seems obvious that a concept can become subject to consciousness and deliberate control only when it is a part of a system. If consciousness means generalisation, generalisation in turn means the formation of a superordinate concept that includes the given concept as a particular case. A superordinate concept implies the existence of a series of subordinate concepts and it also presupposes a hierarchy of concepts of different levels of generality." Vygotsky (1934/62) p.92. (8)

Both objectivated systems and subjective ones, then, can be seen as structured in the same sort of way. However metaphorical and however inadequate a particular account of that structuration may be, that structuration is real. What then of the external Reality, to which those systems themselves refer? Is that also structured "on similar lines"? Certainly 'reality' should not be confused with Reality. The two are distinct in that the former refers to (aspects of) the latter. Reality itself is structured. That is, it is composed of complex relationships (of space, time and determination), rather than composed of distinct "things", linked only in men's interpretations.

> "The weakness of phenomenology seems to us to lie precisely in the fact that it limits itself to a comprehensive description of the facts of consciousness (or, to be more exact, of their 'essence'). The real structure of historical facts permits, however, beyond the <u>conscious</u> meaning of those facts in the thoughts and intentions of the actors, the postulation of an <u>objective</u> meaning which often differs from the conscious meaning in an important way." Goldmann (1969) pp. 33-34.

Reality out-there is not structured only insofar as we impose structural definitions upon it. Even in the case of social systems, there is, at any point in time, an objectively real structuration that is not merely the sum of people's definitions, beliefs and understandings. Of course social institutions would not be as they are (at any given point in time) unless the people concerned had particular beliefs (implicit and explicit) about them. But that does not mean that those institutions consist only in those beliefs. Such would seem to me to be the implication of passages like the following, which I would accordingly challenge:

> "Great care is required in any statements one makes about the 'logic' of institutions. The logic does not reside in the institutions and their external functionalities, but in the way these are treated in reflection about them. Put differently, reflective consciousness superimposes the quality of logic on the institutional order."
> Berger & Luckmann (1967/71) p.82.

As much as the "natural" world, social institutions have a Reality. This may well be fleeting and transitory (but frequently it is not). Yet it is real for all that. As such, it is a major source of experience, and thereby of beliefs.

In sum, there are three analytically distinct sources of experience: (a) concrete reality, (b) objectivated 'knowledge' - in social institutions as well as bodies of 'knowledge' that are located within those institutions, and (c) subjective mind. All have reality (and all are ultimately contained within the material world). All are structured (though our understandings of the structurations are necessarily metaphorical and always more or less inadequate). All can be the contexts of belief-producing experience. That context is crucial to us if we are to understand

the nature of particular belief structures. (a) We may learn "directly" from and about the world-out-there: our beliefs may refer to the context in which they are acquired. (b) We may learn "indirectly", through the medium of print, or conversation etc., without "direct" experience of the referred-to "objects". (c) We may already hold beliefs, and reflect upon them. In this case the reality of those beliefs or of that thinking itself provides experience - which in turn can be belief-producing. In practice, of course, all three forms of experience are commonly combined.

It is not open to us to have just any kind of experience. It is not, therefore, open to us to acquire just any kind of belief. (a) I could not ever have subjective experience associated with being black, or giving birth. I could not, therefore, ever have direct Value-Knowledge of those experiences - what it is like to be or do those things. (b) I can, however, 'know' <u>about</u> them. I can learn "indirectly" in certain learning contexts, whether that be the printed word, or conversation, or even observation. The Value-Knowledge that I already and ongoingly have about those learning contexts will influence the strength with which my new 'knowledge' is held. It will also affect what structures of belief the new 'knowledge' is integrated into. (c) Thirdly, I can reflect upon the understandings and beliefs acquired in either of the above two manners ("direct" or "indirect"). Such reflection itself constitutes experience, and can produce Value-Knowledge. (How else could anyone have passionate convictions about, say, the nature of "the State" - even if they are directly subjected to such manifestations as

its legal apparatuses?).

The strength of Value-Knowledge is a function of two things. First, it is a function of the integratedness of (new) 'knowledge' into other belief structures. Second, it is a function of the reinforcement of other experiences ("direct" or "indirect" - e.g. similar experiences (a) of <u>being</u> such-and-such, or (b) of obtaining "news" from such-and-such a source, or (c) of subjective reflection). The first is a matter of logical adequacy: the coherence of belief integration. The second is a matter of contextual adequacy: reinforcement through direct and indirect "reality tests".

Accordingly, Value-Knowledge is two things. On the one hand it is rigid belief structures - structures of beliefs that are rigidly held as "correctly" formed and non-fluid. In this sense, Value-Knowledge is a <u>state of mind</u>.

> "The uncertainty of an assertion can be expressed impersonally: 'He might come home today'. (But) 'I believe ..., and it isn't so' would be a contradiction."
>
> "'I believe ...' throws light on my state. Conclusions about my conduct can be drawn from this expression. So there is a <u>similarity</u> here to expressions of emotion, of mood, etc." Wittgenstein (1953/67) p.191.

But on the other hand, Value-Knowledge is not <u>just</u> a state of mind. Beliefs necessarily <u>refer</u> to what is taken to be Reality. Value-Knowledge is, therefore, a <u>relational</u> property, linking Reality and 'reality'. It is created in the interaction of the two, that is, by experience.

If Value-Knowledge is in part a state of mind, <u>emotions</u> can be seen as (learned) responses to situations where that Value-

Knowledge is challenged. What is Value-Known is, in a sense, "sacred". But how we react to the "profane" (a residual category, anyway) will depend on our other related 'knowledge' in context. Fear, outrage, delight or mirth, for instance, may result from something not being "quite right".(9) So also might Curiosity.(10) For the rigidification of belief structures is equivalent to their closure. And, as Horton says,

> "Absence of any awareness of alternatives makes for an absolute acceptance of the established tenets, and removes any possibility of questioning them. In these circumstances, the established tenets invest the believer with a compelling force. It is this force which we refer to when we talk of such tenets as sacred.
> .... Where the established tenets have an absolute and exclusive validity for those who hold them, any challenge to them is a threat to chaos, of the cosmic abyss, and therefore evokes intense anxiety."
> Horton (1967/71) p.231.

I return at length to the notions of closed and open views of knowledge, below.

Value-Knowledge and the Hidden Curriculum

Understanding is not belief. One can "learn" theories without their being integrated into one's Value-Knowledge. Consequently they do not, to that extent, determine behaviour. Students who write stirring essays about the need to de-school, or to drastically re-structure society before any effective radicalisation of education can occur, can still go off to teach with relatively unaffected assumptions about pedagogical practice. Their understood theories have not been integrated into their Value-Knowledge. They are exam-room theorists.

In part, this can be seen as a result of contextual situations imposing themselves. A certain set of belief structures may "switch on" in one context, whilst a quite different Relevance is turned to in a different context. This is the suggestion of Keddie's distinction between the educationist and teacher contexts. But in part also, there is a sense in which one Relevance is "more 'real'" than the other. One is more fundamentally Value-Known, and thereby more determinative of actual pedagogical practice. It has, as Keddie says, more to do with commitment than doctrine.(11) When these two aspects are combined, the immediate contextual situation plays a major part in determining the Value-Known Relevance for that situation. But it is not the sole determinant, for the structure of the "relevant" beliefs is a product of other forms of experience also.

"Direct" experience of the context explicitly referred-to may seem more determinative of Value-Knowledge. In a sense this is so. But it is more complex than that. 'Knowledge' about teaching-learning acquired in classroom practice may be different from that acquired "indirectly" in a college of education, and different again from that acquired in subjective reflection. In these three cases it is the experience of, respectively, teaching, being-taught and reflecting that is productive of Value-Knowledge. Consequently that Value-Knowledge will be "about" those different kinds of experience, even though the understanding - the explicit referent - may in each case concern "classroom teaching-learning". Three alternative Relevance structures may therefore be established. Each could be Value-Known. But though all three are explicitly concerned with "classroom teaching and learning", only one of

them is implicitly "about" this. It is not simply the difference of concrete context, then, that determines which 'knowledge' Relevance "comes into operation". It is the role being played by the believer - whether as classroom-teacher, student, or reflective thinker.

Three further issues arise from this. Firstly, these roles are not themselves confined to specific contexts. They are generalisable. Thus the "class-room teacher" may be found holding the rostrum in the public bar, in committees, or at the breakfast table. The "student" may be found in front of the television, and on the shop-floor. The "reflective thinker" may in principle be found anywhere. The extent of actual generalisation is an important empirical question. Decisive in this respect are not just equivalent or similar patterns of social relations, but relationships also with bodies of objectivated 'knowledge'. Ultimately what matters is the learned (and Value-Known) self-concept with regard to this relationship. Secondly, the separation of the three kinds of context-relevance just mentioned is likely to be a matter of default. That is, it will be largely through a lack of explicit awareness of these distinctions that people's behaviour-determining Value-Knowledge is context-bound. Though an understanding of the distinctions need not in itself be Value-Knowledge, it can be the basis of action. Such action can itself create new Value-Known consciousness. Thirdly, all three role-types just discussed are (in the case of educational processes) inter-related. In the case of teachers, their experiences in all three respects are relevant to their pedagogical practice - and, at a deeper level, their educational ideologies. It is likely,

then, that at a higher (more inclusive) level, all three kinds of Value-Knowledge may be integrated - however inadequately. This is a "happy coincidence" so far as the study of educational ideologies is concerned. For it suggests that it may be possible to search for overall Basic Reliefs, rather than for a series of distinct (context-relevant and lower-level) "Basic Reliefs". I return to this issue in Part II.

The idea that contextual experience teaches - at least as much as explicitly "educational" material - has lately become popular in educationist writing. One of the more sophisticated accounts is that of Bourdieu:

> "An individual's contact with his culture depends basically on the circumstances in which he has acquired it, among other things because the act whereby culture is communicated is, as such, the exemplary expression of a certain type of relation to the culture. The formal lecture, for instance, communicates something other, and something more, than its literal content: it furnishes an example of intellectual prowess and thereby indissoluably defines the 'right' culture and the 'right' relation to that culture ... All teaching practices implicitly furnish a model of the 'right' mode of intellectual activity ..."
> Bourdieu (1967/71) p.199.

The expression "hidden curriculum" has been popularised by Illich.

> "I am using the term <u>hidden-curriculum</u> to refer to the structure of schooling as opposed to what happens in school, in the same way that linguists distinguish between the structure of a language and the use the speaker makes of it." Illich (1971), quoted by Lister (1974), p.93.

Others have embraced the concept as an explanation of all education's ills. Kvaraceus talks of the "hidden curriculum", the "covert curriculum" and even the "subliminal curriculum". He says,

> "Like the lower part of the iceberg, the covert curriculum can be the more important one, a hidden and formidable determiner of educational behaviour." Kvaraceus (1970) p.193.

These are not by any manner of means the first to notice that formal schooling systems may not be an unmixed blessing. The distinction between education and indoctrination, for instance, is an old one.(12) Whilst Tories and Whigs argued over whether it was desirable or dangerous to promote popular education, there were many who favoured working class conscientization but opposed state intervention altogether. Marx may have been being deeply ironic when he wrote that,

> "It is better that working men and working women should not be able to read and write or do sums than that they should receive education from a teacher in a School run by the State. It is far better that ignorance should debase the working classes than that eternal principles should be violated." Marx (1873), quoted by Frith and Corrigan (1976).

But he was referring to the same problem as Hodgskin and Robertson, who wrote in 1823 that if the Mechanics' Institute

> "was to be of real service to the workers, it must be under their control."
>
> "Men had better be without education, than be educated by their rulers: for then education is but the mere breaking in of the steer to the yoke; the mere discipline of a hunting dog, which, by dint of severity, is made to forego the strongest impulse of his nature, and instead of devouring his prey, to hasten with it to the feet of his master." quoted by Simon (1960) p.215.

More recently, the writing of McLuhan has pointed influentially to the fact that

> "The content of the medium blinds us to the character of the medium." McLuhan (1964) p.16.

The "hidden curriculum", then, has been taken to refer to the character of the medium - the form, or the structure - of schooling, as distinct from its content. Gintis has gone so far as to declare[13] that the content of education is irrelevant; only the form matters.[14]

There are some important truths in this sort of assertion - as my discussion of context-relevance has, I hope, suggested. But it is often not at all clear what exactly is meant by "content" and "form" (or "structure"). Consequently, there is not infrequently some confusion. Holly, in an otherwise excellent book, manages to say, on the same page, that,

> "Whether I study the career of Napoleon or the General Strike is really less an issue than <u>how</u> and <u>why</u> I study them",

and that,

> because "the post-adolescent generation in secondary schools, colleges and universities ... are still only half emancipated their criticism has been directed against the organisation rather than the content of education." Holly (1973/74) p.22.

Holly resolves this apparent contradiction by defining "the content of learning" as "a question of aims and intentions" (ibid). It seems that here, as elsewhere, the structure/content distinction, in relation to the "hidden curriculum", is intuitively correct, but lacks sophisticated elaboration.

A distinction between structure and contents is tenable only at defined levels of analysis - that is, only when one has stated clearly what Relevance one is employing. All contents are also structures. (Notions, for instance, are

models in themselves, although for particular purposes it may be legitimate to consider them as "elements" in certain other structures. This is a necessary short-hand, which enables us to concentrate on specific issues). In the case of "hidden curriculum", a distinction is presumably being made from the "overt curriculum": that is, the defined and explicitly recognised syllabuses of particular educational institutions. But this makes "hidden curriculum" a residual category. It conceals more problems than it solves. Is the "hidden curriculum" other kinds of '<u>knowledge</u>' which are also <u>actually imparted</u> - such as the differential worth of certain kinds of 'knowledge', or behaviours, or people? Or is it the structure of real material and social <u>relations</u> which may in part <u>help to produce</u> that 'knowledge'? Often it is not clear whether the "hidden curriculum" is what is in the event learned, or what is objectively there to be learned. Metaphorically, it may be proclaimed that the medium <u>is</u> the message. But for an adequate <u>theory</u> to be produced this is not enough. At what level, and according to what relevance, can the "hidden curriculum" be seen as "structure" (as opposed to "content")? And what, in that case, would "content" be?

If we considered the structure of social relations in education, we might be directed to any of a number of levels - classroom interaction, school organisation, the overall schooling system of a society, or the society as a whole. Accordingly, we might look, for instance, at pedagogical styles and peer relations, at the organisation of learning groups, at differentiations between school-types, or at the societal functions of formal

schooling. Writers concerned with political socialisation have often attended to such features as these.(15)

Bowles and Gintis have looked explicitly to the social relations of schooling, in outlining their "correspondence principle".

> "The 'hidden' content of schooling - the values, expectations, and patterns of behaviour which schools encourage - is primarily conveyed not by the formal curriculum, but by the social relations of the schooling process itself."
>
> "The social relations of production are replicated in the schools." Bowles (1971) pp.477, 478.

There appears to be a clear distinction between structures of social relations and the content of what is learned/conveyed (or encouraged!). And the first is "determinative" of the latter. When they try to elaborate on this further, however, they encounter difficulties.(16) The correspondence which they actually discuss most is not between different kinds of social relationships, but between attributes valued by both teachers and employers. This is coupled with a determinist - even behaviourist - suggestion that these attributes are produced and/or reinforced by positive and negative sanctions administered by teachers. Evidence is offered that these attributes - which are not unlike value-orientations - are correlated with school grades, when IQ is held constant. There is little that is different here from the 1950s functionalist positivism of, for instance, Strodtbeck, or Rosen.(17) Indeed their results are similar. Even the family is invoked to explain initial socialisation into these orientations.

In a chapter specifically dealing with the "correspondence principle", Bowles and Gintis (1976) make very little mention of either conflict, in the schooling context, or of the subjective creation of 'knowledge' and identity. On the whole, pupils appear to be more or less passive determinees of a coherent school system, which functions as a selecter and socialiser. The account is not unlike that outlined by Parsons (1959/61) - except that it is corporate capital which is the beneficiary.

There is, however, an acknowledgement in this chapter that correspondence may fail, due to the "internal dynamic of the educational system, and ... popular opposition" (p.129). This is taken up forcefully later in the book. Instead of Carnoy's timid afterthought, suggesting that free schools might turn the tide of cultural imperialism (Carnoy, 1974), Bowles and Gintis devote a longish section to the needs of humanity and the possibilities of social revolution:

> "Central to our optimism that social revolution is indeed possible in the United States is the ever-widening gulf between human needs - what people want - and the imperatives of further capitalist expansion and production. This position may seem out of place in a book which has laid such stress on the reproduction of consciousness and skills consistent with capitalist expansion ...
>
> /However/ The work process produces people as well as commodities. But people, unlike commodities, can never be produced exactly to capitalist specifications. The product - including the experienced needs of people - depends both upon the raw material with which the production process begins, and the 'treatment' it receives. Neither is by any means under the full control of the capitalist class ..." Bowles and Gintis (1976) p.277.

As they say, this position may seem out of place ...

The intuited arguments of Bowles and Gintis may not be

inconsistent. But their notions of the "correspondence principle"- like that of the "hidden curriculum" - are too vague and ambiguous to reveal how their intuitions might be adequately integrated into a single theoretical framework. It is not just structures of social relations that teach (are 'knowledge'-producing experience). The organisation of 'knowledge' is inseparable - except analytically - from social relations as such. And the structuration of objectivated 'knowledge' has "messages" of its own. Furthermore, we should not assume - like Bowles and Gintis (and Parsons) - that what is learned in school is likely to transfer to what "needs" to be 'known' in adult life. This transfer must be taken as problematic. We need also to consider the structuration of subjective beliefs - of pupils, and also of teachers - to see what is supposedly transferred. We need to ask why it might be transferred - and when it might not.

Turning to 'knowledge' objectivated in school, we should see this - like any notions, at whatever level - as both internally and externally structured. It has its own intrinsic "logic", and an "extrinsic logic" too.(18) The intrinsic logic of school knowledge - in any given context(19) - is the structure of the overt curriculum. It is the explicitly intended syllabuses, etc. (though the actual structuration may be quite implicit). The extrinsic logic, on the other hand, is the structured relationship between such educational 'knowledge' and the social and societal context. Such matters as the status of particular bodies of 'knowledge'(20) and the various rituals of schooling(21) would here be included. Bruner hints at this distinction in the following:-

> "Young children in school expend extra-ordinary time and effort working out what it is that the teacher wants - and usually coming to the conclusion that she or he wants tidiness or remembering or doing things at a certain time in a certain way. This I refer to as extrinsic problem solving. There is a great deal of it in school." Bruner (1965/74) p.78.(22)

The "intrinsic logic" of objectivated 'knowledge' in schools has to do with its own structure and its relationship to its explicitly referred-to objects (i.e. historical or biological or mathematical "facts"). Its "extrinsic logic" has to do with its non-explicit referents (i.e. questions of discipline, status, etc.). These are the context of 'Knowledge'-transmission, and an integral part of resultant belief structures.

Bodies of 'knowledge' cannot, then, be divorced from their context. This includes the social relations (of education). Notions refer, and so do bodies of 'knowledge'. Put differently, any attempt to separate out, other than for analytical purposes, social structure from notional "contents" - or base from superstructure - is untenable. It cannot be said that the relations of education alone determine consciousness. That consciousness (those 'realities') itself refers to those relations.

To give one example:

> "A principle educational aim should be to enable people to make use of their knowledge within a particular social situation. Now if they are studying outside that situation, whether as individuals or within Open University study groups, there is perhaps a greater danger that their learnings will be divorced from the social realities of their life. In other words, we may be producing an ivory tower kind of education, even through the non-traditional techniques of the Open University." Perraton (1974) pp.58-59.

If Perraton is right (and I see no reason to disagree with him), it is not just the status of academic 'knowledge', or elitist selection processes, that may produce "ivory-tower" education. It is the actual relationships contained in the "extrinsic logic" of educational 'knowledge' - in the relationships between social relations and objectivated 'knowledge'.

This brings us back to subjective 'knowledge'. It is individuals who learn. It is on individuals' understandings and beliefs that the "hidden curriculum" must have its effects. We should regard as problematic the transfer of beliefs acquired through schooling to contexts in which they might be judged "appropriate" after school. If it occurs, then this needs explaining. There is no merely logical reason why it should occur.

I suggest that any such transfer that does occur does so in default of an explicit awareness that it might have been otherwise. The structuring of what it is "relevant" to question and reflect upon is an essential feature of most education systems. Douglas puts it this way:

> "The child is ... indoctrinated into the assumptions of his society. His curiosity is checked or roused, his expectations for himself are set in the most hidden way - not by the overt doctrines handed out, but by what is left implicit." Douglas (1970/73) p.81.

It is a point made by many "de-schoolers" and liberal educators. For instance:

> "The most important and intellectual ability man has yet developed - the art and science of asking questions - is not taught in school! Moreover, it is <u>not</u> 'taught' in

> the most devastating way possible: by arranging the environment so that significant question asking is not valued." Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) p.34.

Such statements are a blanket dismissal of schooling as the deadeners of (or, in some cases, the non-inspirers of) Curiosity. Any transfer of disciplined work-habits, etc., would therefore be seen as a trained lack of radical questioning. It is a learned "focal perception".

It needs stressing that in many cases children are not merely "deadened". They are often considerably more lively and curious than many critics maintain. But their Curiosity is channelled. They are not "open-minded" about all and everything, but only in structurally ordered areas. What they learn by default is that certain kinds of questions are not asked. Questions which are "relevant" are largely non-subversive. Exceptions are suppressed, whether these be individual pupils who are sanctioned or separated off (in so-called "sin-bins", for instance)[23], or teachers who are dismissed or subjected to pressure, or whole schools which are closed, "reorganised", or just "inspected".[24] Precisely because the structuration of relevance-channelling is on the whole implicit, reflective awareness is not roused in those areas, by default. Children's subjective beliefs - including, of course, their self-concepts - are allowed to develop within certain paradigmatic closures. Relevances appropriate to questioning are determined (in default of reflection) by both the social relations, and the objectivated 'knowledge' structures, and the relationships between these, in formal educational institutions.[25]

In default of relevance-openness, it becomes "just obvious" what one may or may not "sensibly" dispute.(26) The Relevances are rigidified. It becomes Value-Known what is disputable, what is questionable - and what is not - even if no explicit formulation of this is made. Such Value-Known beliefs determine behaviour.

Master Patterns

> "The most important thing ... that we can know about a man is what he takes for granted, and the most elemental and important facts about a society are those that are seldom debated and generally regarded as settled."
> Wirth, quoted by Bowles and Gintis (1976) p.116.

The central thesis of Part I has been that Value-Knowledge can be thought of as rigidified belief structures, which acquire their rigidity through experience of structured reality, and which are determinative of human behaviour. A belief is a state of mind, which refers to what is taken to be reality. However transitory a belief, it can at any point in time be considered to have a describable structure. Thought, on the other hand, is a process. Rigidification, in turn, can be seen as a cessation of thought, or an absence of thought. Value-Knowledge is either post-thought or pre-thought: either "worked-out" beliefs that have taken on a relatively persistent structure, or "unworked-out" beliefs, which are rigid precisely through lack of considered reflection.

Insofar as people in a given societal or social context share similar or complementary experiences, they are likely to acquire similar or complementary beliefs. The non-randomness of

their experience should be expected to produce not just non-random beliefs in each individual, but belief systems that have a structuredness in social terms. In default of considered reflection, we should expect describable systems of belief to be shared by members of given societal situations.(27)

When we talk of collective systems of belief, it is, of course, questionable in what sense we can attribute objective reality to them. Beliefs only exist in people's minds, and people are individuals. They are temporally and spatially separate from one another. One cannot attribute a "state of mind" to a group or category, except metaphorically. Nonetheless, the suggestion that those individually held beliefs are non-randomly decided implies that there is a structuration of time, space and determination which is real. The relationships between individuals' beliefs are in principle a real referent for further elaboration. In effect, the structures are real, whilst the "elements" of those structures are only "there" from a particular point of view (for a particular Relevance). It is perhaps no more arbitrary to talk of a society's particular beliefs "x" and "y", than it is to isolate the notions of an individual. Insofar as one does do this, it is a device only. It is not necessary to attribute any actual, reified and distinct existence to those beliefs.(28)

Furthermore, when we talk of complementary beliefs - as opposed to similar or shared beliefs - we necessarily refer explicitly to the social structuration of beliefs. (To talk of similar or shared beliefs should also be seen as a reference to such social structuration). We need a way of talking about

that structuration - some heuristically useful metaphor. I suggest that the "tree-root" idea is again appropriate.

The reason for any similarity or complementarity of beliefs should not be pre-supposed. It must always be an empirical question, why, in any given context, beliefs appear to be shared or complementary. On the whole, an explanation is likely to rest ultimately in the relative power of particular sections of society to determine the "conditioning situation" of others - for instance, through military or state power. However, the "logic" of particular institutional arrangements do seem to have their own determinative effects on what people come to believe - not least in legitimating more fundamental societal power structures.

Since societal relations can also be supposed to be structured in time, space and determination, it may be appropriate to employ some hierarchical metaphor (similar to "tree-roots" of belief) for social reality itself. If this is the case (and I do not intend to argue it here), then it would be meaningful to talk of "levels" of social reality, comparable to levels of belief. Groups, for instance, may be seen as lower-level than institutions, which may in turn be lower than classes, or societies. If so, it would be an empirical question, which "level" of social reality one was concerned with, and what reasons were sought for the holding of similar or complementary beliefs. In considering belief systems or ideologies, levels of social reality must not be seen as distinct. Indeed, any suggestion of societal patterns of belief (see below) must also be coupled with an understanding of how such patterns are created. That must include both ideational and social

structurations which are integrally related to one another.

Insofar as a given society is ordered and/or controlled, we can expect two important features. First, there are likely to be communalities of certain kinds of experience. Large sections will be likely to have similar experience of, for instance, such institutions as the family, of religious institutions, of productive relations, of state apparatuses. One such communally experienced apparatus is the education system.(29) Since different people experience different sectors of a country's education system, and experience it differently in each sector, then complementary understandings and beliefs (frequently in conflict with each other) about the educational apparatus are produced. Yet those differences are non-random. There is common experience of the fact of a state education system, and of differential access to it, and even of differential experiences within it. Though not necessarily explicit in any one person's mind, there is a structured overall pattern of beliefs about education. I borrow Bourdieu's expression, "Master Patterns", to discuss that overall patterning.

The idea of "Master Patterns" is in many ways not unlike other versions of ideologies, collective consciences, legitimations, master symbols etc. What, to my mind, it emphasises is the structuredness of these belief systems. As such it is akin to the "templates" of Ardener, the "codes" of Bernstein, the "deep structures" of Chomsky. It also has much in common with Kuhn's notion of "paradigms".(30) Kuhn sees paradigms as shared examples, which are determinative of behaviour through being what I call "Value-Known". Philosophers of science often say

that "Scientific knowledge is embedded in theory and rules", but

> "This localisation of the cognitive content of science is wrong. After the student has done many problems, he may gain only added facility by solving more. But at the start and for some time after, doing problems is learning consequential things about nature. In the absence of such exemplars, the laws and theories he has previously learned would have very little empirical content."
> Kuhn (1969) pp.187-8.

Kuhn distinguishes between persuasion and conversion. This wholly accords with what I have said about understanding and belief. He gives this example:

> "Like many of those who first encountered, say, relativity or quantum mechanics in their middle years, [the scientist may find] himself fully persuaded of the new view but nevertheless unable to internalise it and be at home in the world it helps to shape. Intellectually such a man has made his choice, but the conversion required if it is to be effective eludes him. ... His work [remains] parasitic on ['others'], for he lacks the constellation of mental sets which future members of the community will acquire through education.
>
> The conversion experience I have likened to a gestalt switch remains, therefore, at the heart of the revolutionary process." ibid, p.204.

Thus Kuhn stresses both the experiential basis of Value-Knowledge, and its effects on individual behaviour. He also stresses the paradigmatic nature of scientific 'knowledge'. I wish to make similar points about belief systems in general, and educational ideologies in particular.

The second important feature to be expected in an ordered and/or controlled societal context is an isomorphism between various contextual situations, in important respects.(31) This is not to claim, with Bowles and Gintis, a direct (unexplained) correspondence between the social relations of production and

the social relations of education. But there is an element of "transfer", in default of considered reflections, of certain patterns of belief from school to the work/adult context. It is not so much that the "hidden curriculum" mirrors productive relationships, as that certain assumptions may - in controlled/ordered societal contexts - underlie behaviour in both. Consequently, those assumptions-in-practice (their objectification in institutional and behavioural terms) are experienced in school. They may become Value-Knowledge to pupils-becoming-adults, (a) insofar as they are not explicitly reflected upon, and (b) insofar as adult experience (for instance at work) is also structured on similar lines - and therefore becomes a continuing reinforcer of patterns of belief already acquired.(32)

The idea of schools producing Master Patterns which transfer to adult experience can be read into a number of arguments for and against different kinds of (popular) education. Whether it was a fear of the "wrong" ideas about society's structure, or a desire to promote a "disciplined" frame of mind, much in the 19th century educational debates can be interpreted in these terms.(33) As we shall see in Part II certain educational ideologies can themselves be seen as Master Patterns. The point here is that such ideologies frequently refer to the transmission of such Patterns. Their attention is to how schools (if any) should be structured, in order that the "correct" world view is transmitted. Nonetheless, there is not always explicit awareness that it is at various levels that the encoding of messages takes place. In classroom interaction, in the organisation of teaching groups, in the differentiation

between types of schools and in the various functions that are intentionally or unintentionally served by these differentiations, messages are contained which are intimately related to each other. These make up patterns of belief in those who experience schooling.(34)

What is thus patterned is Value-Knowledge. That is, the Master Patterns of a society, or section of society, are patterns of people's strongly believed 'knowledge' about what is "unquestionably" true. Fox has said that,

> "It is probable that for much of the time most men do not perceive the conventional and arbitrary nature of many of the social arrangements under which they live, and suppose them to be the only possible ones given 'the nature of things' - a notion which usually includes belief in an unchangeable 'human nature'. This unawareness itself helps to make possible the continuance of the existing order ..." Fox (1974) p.284.

As we shall see in Part II, beliefs about "human nature", and about what constitutes "valid knowledge" are of paramount importance in educational ideologies.

It must also be remembered that there are no context-less beliefs in the abstract. Beliefs necessarily refer. And the contexts in which particular Relevances (ways of looking at things) become operative are intrinsically characteristic of such beliefs. We do not confront every situation anew, finding it problematic how our beliefs apply in each case. Relevance shift is a deliberate or fantasying process that in many or most cases does not occur. We largely take for granted, not just what we believe, but what we believe about such-and-such a circumstance, in such-and-such a context. Similarly, in the

case of Master Patterns, it is the context-specificity of beliefs, and the Relevances that are taken to be appropriate, which are patterned. There are, as it were, paradigmatic Relevances. Members of a particular social group or category, subject to those Patterns, will see particular objects in a certain way, rather than any other - in default of reflection. In short, Master Patterning applies to both logical and contextual dimensions of belief.

If not only individual belief systems, but those of whole social groups, are structured in non-random and societally contexted ways, there remains the question of how to conceive of these structures. The "tree-root" metaphor is again useful. If we wish to characterise a particular body of beliefs, it is not very valuable merely to list ideas. Even if such ideas were not thereby divorced from the referred-to 'reality', they would be divorced from other beliefs which in reality are integrally related. Some ordering is necessary, and the "tree-root" metaphor is useful in this respect. This metaphor also suggests that we may look for Basic Beliefs - for notions which, in terms of inclusiveness, are "at the top" of particular belief systems.

There are obviously problems in this approach. One of these is that to describe Master Patterns we must abstract from what is actually believed by particular individuals in the groups or categories with which we are concerned.

> "In describing an ideology there is always the difficulty presented by the existence of many individual variants. Some adherents accept while others may reject each given item of the syndrome. Only a generalised picture can therefore be offered ..." Fox (1974) p.260.

Another problem is the selection of Relevances. The observer may view a particular set of referred-to objects in such-and-such a way, and mistakenly assume that the people he is considering must also view them in that way. His most inclusive category may, to them, be fairly low level - and vice-versa. This problem is unsolvable. It must inevitably be so. The observer is himself societally contexted. He has certain assumptions which he imports to his investigation. What can be done, however, is to question the choice of basic dimensions chosen, and to attempt to justify them on grounds that are reasoned and explicit. I deliberately use the term "dimensions" here. For if one object of the analysis is to compare different Master Patterns, and if the approach involves a search for Basic Beliefs, then clearly it cannot be assumed that all those compared will have the same Basic Beliefs. (It is the object of comparison to find similarities and differences in this respect). But it might be suggested that certain dimensions are appropriate in all cases. That is, one Relevance angle may produce significant suggestions in each case considered. I suggest in Part II that it is reasonable to claim that certain dimensions may be universally relevant - whether or not explicitly recognised as such - to questions of education. According to a certain view of learning - which I have elaborated in Part I -certain questions may become necessarily relevant, no matter whose assumptions/Basic Beliefs about education are being considered. I shall not be concerned only with societally dominant Master Patterns, but with the Basic Beliefs of particular individuals or groups. In some cases, such Basic Beliefs may be regarded as short-hands for paradigmatic belief systems. Where this is so, then we must return

to the underlying societal reality, in which this patterning occurs, for an explanation of it. The initial elaboration of ideologies may itself offer clues about the nature of that underlying Reality.

Notes

(1) Nothing seems to me more unnatural than the following suggestion:

> "No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes... It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to them... Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concept of causality then it is high time it was upset." Wittgenstein (Zettel) p.608-610. quoted by Kenny (1973) p.145.

I would disagree also, if the same were said about beliefs .

(2) Compare the rhetorical Educationist's Context and the actual (committed-belief) Teacher's Context of teachers in Keddie's study (1971). Kaplan's distinction between "logic-in-use" and "reconstructed logic" is also pertinent here (1964). As we shall see in this chapter, an essential feature of the"hidden curriculum" is that pupils are <u>implicitly</u> "told" by teachers to "Do what I do, not what I say" - contrary to the usual formulation.

(3) Though beliefs may also be objectivated.

(4) Bettelheim hints at this in saying,

> "Despite its greater propensity for resolving inner conflicts, and its great value as a tool for penetrating surface behaviour and understanding some of the innermost recesses of the mind, the practice of psychoanalytic therapy ... is basically no more than a powerful conditioning social situation ....
> Psychoanalytic therapy ... is essentially a very special environment with its unique consequences ... "
> Bettelheim (1960/70) p.29.

(5) Hence the importance of compulsory schooling. Plato may have been right when he said that "Knowledge which is

acquired under compulsion obtains no hold in the mind ... Do not use compulsion but let early education be a sort of amusement." Plato, quoted by Sharp and Green (1976), p.42.

But this concerns only that 'knowledge' which the would-be teacher wishes to "get over". The experience of being compelled to learn particular "facts" will produce belief structures (concerning that medium of learning) that may undermine the teacher's very intentions. Compare Goodman, who sees the main components of contemporary U.S. schooling as:

"(a) a uniform world-view, (b) the absence of any viable alternative, (c) confusion about the relevance of one's own experience and feelings, and (d) a chronic anxiety, so that one clings to the one world-view as the only security. This <u>is</u> brainwashing." Goodman (1962/71) p.61.

(6) At the same time <u>perfect</u> consciousness is inconceivable. We could never be totally aware of being totally aware of what we are being aware of. There must always remain the unperceived experience of what we are doing in our conscious reflective action. (cf also Williams, 1961/67, p.319).

(7) However, I would argue that despite the sentiments of this quotation, Bruner pays insufficient attention to the distinction between objectivated and subjective 'knowledge' - above all in underestimating the problematic nature of objectivated 'knowledge' (e.g. in curricula).

(8) Similar points are made by Luria. Luria (1956/71), for instance, discusses the differences between two twins, one who had been trained to be aware of his own speech and the other in whom speech arose only as a result of practical activity. e.g. p.100.

(9) Slobin (1971) comments on the humour of anomalies:

"Linguistic meaning allows us to evaluate the truth value of sentences, to make paraphrases, to interpret and laugh at anomalies, to understand ambiguities, and to agree on the appropriateness of figurative usage." Slobin (1971) p.68.

Of Poetry, he says:

"Much of the understanding of certain kinds of poetry is based on ability to find interpretations for grammatically unusual constructions - an activity which can be especially pleasurable." ibid, p.5.

I have already referred to Shklovskij, who saw the function of poetic art to "make strange" the object depicted. Some have commented on the significance of <u>slight</u> deviations from what I call Value-Known "truths". See, for instance, Cohen (1972/73) on "Mods" being fearsome through being so "normal"-looking, rather than stereotypical "yobs"; or

Bettelheim (1960/70) on the preference for brutal guards over those who merely slapped or swore (p.120). Similarly, a B.B.C. commentator observed after the Turkish earthquake in September 1975:

"For the children at any rate the tragedy is too great for comprehension. It is only tragedy on a miniature scale that triggers tears." B.B.C.1. 17/9/75.

(10) The relationship between humour and curiosity is noted in the following:

C.I.D.O.C. is "a place where people go who want help in refining their questioning, rather than completing the answers they have gotten ... What we should be concerned with here at C.I.D.O.C. is to be humourists. That is, people who are constantly aware of the constraints and limitations of the categories with which we think, ..." Illich, in Wayne H. Cowan (1969).

(11) Keddie (1971) p.135 et passim. The reference to doctrine and commitment is to Selznick (1949).

(12) See, for example, Mannheim and Stewart (1962).

(13) At Open University conference on "Political Economy and Schooling", Hertford, 22nd-25th April 1976.

(14) There seem to be parallels in this with the writing of Carnoy, a colleague of Gintis, who - despite rather careless use of such terms as "intention" and "motive" - tries to rule out the importance of intentionality, in cultural imperialist policies in the 19th century (Carnoy, 1974).

(15) e.g. Dreeben (1968).

(16) Bowles and Gintis (1976) chapter 5.

(17) e.g. Strodtbeck (1958/61); Rosen (1956, 1959).

(18) See Syer (1974a).

(19) I would stress that the context is most important. Hirst's suggestions, therefore, apply to a particular academic culture (1969/71).

(20) cf Bernstein (1971); Syer (1974a).

(21) cf Bernstein et al. (1966/71)

(22) cf also Holt's "strategies" (1964/69).

(23) i.e. "withdrawal centres". cf. Mack (1976).

(24) cf the William Tyndale School case (Gretton and Jackson, 1976).

(25) Compare Keddie's description of "Teacher K", who presented his own version of economics as the only one: prescribing his, and proscribing any other, through taking for granted the correctness of his own. (He further restricted this for low-stream pupils).

Compare also, in a non-educational (?) context:

The Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, in considering Police/Immigrant Relations (1971/72), "applied a narrow interpretive framework which served to neutralise or define as illegitimate statements or analyses which did not fit with its own pre-conceived definition of 'what the problem was'. This view shaped the way its members approached the memoranda submitted to them, the conduct in the verbal exchanges, and the conclusions they eventually reached." Clarke et al. (1974) p.4.

Language also plays a major classificatory role in this:

"Not only does the child learn what to do, what not to do, but he is given standardised motives which promote prescribed actions, and dissuade those proscribed. Along with rules and norms of actions for various situations we learn vocabularies of motives appropriate to them ... They are part of our language and components of our behaviour." Mills (1940/71) p.115.

(26) "The obvious is literally that which stands in one's way ... someone whose mind is imprison ed in the metaphor cannot see it as a metaphor. It is just obvious." Laing (1968).

"'Yes, that's how it is, that's really true!'" Althusser (1971/72), p.250.

(27) Thus Dos Santos talks of a "conditioning situation":-

"A conditioning situation determines the limits and possibilities of action and behaviour of men. Faced by it, they may either choose among the various alternatives internal to that situation, or they may seek to change the conditioning situation itself. The first choice is never completely free, for a concrete situation includes further factors placing added limits on action and choice. The second choice opens the way to new possibilities, seeking to bring about a qualititative change which itself must be considered in terms of its concrete possibilities." Dos Santos (1969/73) pp.77-78.

Baldamus makes a similar point in the following:-

"What appears to be common knowledge or common sense is an important component of ... the 'protective cultural fabric', which, in a given period, makes society immune to the relevant intra-systemic pressures. For example, the consumption imperative can only be effective in the present situation as long as it remains invisible. The true purpose of social research as I see it consists in making

concealed institutional underpinnings explicit and thereby enabling the researcher to participate in the process of aggregate social change." Baldamus (1971) p.15.

(28) Compare Ossowski, who says that he uses "social consciousness" not as a reification, but as "an abbreviation to refer to the ideas that characterise certain milieu, for the concepts, images, beliefs and evaluations that are more or less common to people of a certain social environment and which are reinforced in the consciousness of particular individuals by mutual suggestion and by the conviction that they are shared by other people in the same group." Ossowski (1963) p.6.

(29) Or, in some societies, the lack of an education system, or limited access to it. To speak of such an absence as an "apparatus" may seem a little "stretched". However, every society necessarily includes some mode or modes of education. The degree of formality, and of state control or oversight, may vary considerably. In Britain, "non-intervention" by the state in certain areas of private education is every bit as important as overt intervention. It is state action itself. cf T.E.S. 7/1/77.

(30) Ardener (1971); Bernstein (1971/73); Chomsky (1965); Kuhn (1962/70).

(31) cf Dumont:

"The more one stresses the ideological aspect, the more difficult it is to isolate a special domain within the caste society in its entirety. For example, the idea of hierarchy, so important as far as caste is concerned, is not confined to it but penetrates the domain of kinship ..." Dumont (1970/72) p.75.

(32) Insofar as relatively autonomous schools are <u>not</u> correspondent to the work-situations of adults, then the beliefs initially acquired will be <u>lost as Value-Knowledge</u>, <u>unless</u> they have been reflected upon - thereby being based upon logical, as opposed to contextual, experience. (That logical experience can be continued apart from immediate context, through continued reflection).

(33) For instance: "[James Mill's] primary concern at this period [c. 1820] was to lead the non-conformist middle class in an assault on the clerical domination of education. In his eyes, the inculcation of religious opinions, from an early age, was the worst of intellectual crimes; as a result of such teaching, people were led habitually to disregard evidence and became, in effect, intellectual slaves ..." Simon (1960) p.90. This might be contrasted with Tocqueville's "dogma":

"In order that society should exist and, <u>a fortiori</u>, that a society should prosper, it is necessary that the minds of

all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas, and this cannot be done unless each of them sometimes draws his opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of belief already formed."

Nisbet points out that this is similar to Burke's defence of prejudice, on the grounds that reason alone could not possibly be the sole basis of human social existence. (Nisbet, 1966/70, p.233.)

(34) Ford (1975, p.102) refers to the anthropologist Nadel's experiment in which evidence suggested that children's cognitive functioning was related to their cultural background. (Children of Yaruba and Nape tribes were told a story and asked to repeat it. The structure of the repetition was, it seems, related to the tribal beliefs about gods).

PART II - EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGIES

CHAPTER 4

INTRODUCTION

In Part II, I outline what I take to be the defining characteristics of Ideology and also some essential characteristics of Education. I then consider some other treatments of educational ideologies, suggesting advantages and disadvantages in the various approaches. Next I look at a small selection of ideological anomalies, in the context of education, hoping to show their practical and theoretical significance. Finally, I suggest one way of considering educational ideologies, in their context, by reference to two Dimensions - "Knowledge" and "Power".

Throughout Part II it must be remembered that ideologies, like any belief system, are structured. The methodological problem is to devise ways in which we may conceive of these structures. I will suggest that the "tree-root" metaphor and the notion of Basic Beliefs are useful for this purpose.

Beliefs - including ideologies - are both based upon experience and consequential in the determination of human social behaviour. This is generalisable to whole categories and groups of people. Attention to structures of social systems, without reference to people's beliefs and understanding, is bound to be inadequate as an account of the totality. This does not, however, imply a rejection of generalising methods, and the adoption of individualising ones instead. The patterning or structuring of both subjective and objectivated belief systems is a central feature of my account.

"Ideology"

I use the term "ideology" to indicate three central characteristics. It is not my purpose here to discuss the relative merits and demerits of other peoples' definitions(1), but to present my own definition, for the sake of this essay. Ideologies, in my usage, are societally contexted systems of Value-Knowledge, which actually or potentially serve specific interests or functions.

Firstly, ideologies are societally contexted. They arise in identifiable sections of historically situated societies, as a result of the experience of their adherents in those societies.

> "An ideology is always the ideology of definite people, living in definite conditions, depending for their life on a definite mode of production, with definite social relations, doing definite things with definite desires and aims. And their ideology is not found independently of the process of their material life."
> Cornforth (1954) p.82.

Secondly, ideologies are the Value-Knowledge of their adherents. They are the unquestioned or "unquestionable" beliefs about what is "obvious" or "natural". They are belief, rather than understanding, and in no way depend upon explicit verbalisation for their societal significance. (On the contrary).

> "It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes ... obviousnesses as obviousnesses which we cannot fail to recognize and before which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out ... 'That's obvious! That's right! That's true!'" Althusser (1971/72) p.271.

Value-Knowledge is structured belief, which derives its strength from experience. Ideologies, then, are relatively coherent and "adequate" accounts of Reality. Were they quite inadequate,

no more than a few individuals with idiosyncratic experience would adhere to them as so "obviously true". Furthermore, Value-Knowledge is consequential. Behaviour is at least partly determined by Value-Knowledge.

Thirdly, ideologies are consequential in a more general sense, too. They are actually or potentially interest- or function-specific. They are actually consequential when their adherents have the power to impose their definitions on society.(2) But we may also talk hypothetically of the consequences of a given ideology, were it to become dominant: hence potential rather than actual consequentiality defines ideology. Insofar as they are actual, ideologies serve the interests of identifiable sections of society. Or, if members of a particular society are taken to have common interests in certain respects, then ideology may be said to be function-specific. This is the case, regardless of the contextually-specific referents of the ideologies in question. For instance,

> "If the term 'ideology' is taken to mean all systems of belief and opinion functionally defined, that is, defined from the point of view of their role in intellectually justifying and organising mass action, then the ideological element is clearly an essential part of the social sciences." Wiatr (1969) p.29.

Insofar as a given society is stable (ordered or controlled), at a particular time, dominant ideologies are likely to be those of the powerful in that society.

> "An essential function of the ideology of the ruling class is to present to itself and to those it rules a coherent world view that is sufficiently flexible, comprehensive, and mediatory to convince the subordinate classes of the

> justice of its hegemony. If this ideology were no more than a reflection of immediate economic interests, it would be worse than useless, for the hypocrisy of the class, as well as its greed, would quickly become apparent to the most abject of its subjects." Genovese (1968/72) p.33.

Consequentiality, or interest-specificity, is the distinctive feature referred to by the term "ideology". The contexted and Value-Known features are inevitable features of any system of beliefs (as opposed to understandings). But to speak of "ideologies" is to point to interests or functions served - or, where these are unidentified, to suggest the possibility of some such consequentiality. (I suggest below that all educational beliefs be regarded as ideological, in order to preserve the possibility of such consequentiality. Assume any educational beliefs to be interest-specific, until it is proved otherwise. So also with all belief systems).

I will not here attempt to discuss other definitions of "ideology". However, a few points may clarify my own usage. By "ideologies", I do not mean belief systems that are necessarily programmatic. I see as mistaken (or at least less useful) Friedrich's view that it is

> "a mistaken conception of ideology ... which is excessively broadened to comprehend any set of ideas men may cherish, regardless of whether they are programmatic or not." Friedrich (1972) p.95.

On the contrary, one of the most important features of ideology is that its prescriptions are implicitly believed, "obvious" and "unquestionable". The term should not be restricted to explicitly elaborated programmes.

Neither would I insist that ideologies are delusory. In considering the functions of ideology, any discrepancy between ideology and reality[3] may indeed be significant. Firstly, however, we can expect no belief system to be totally adequate. And secondly it is precisely because of their relative adequacy (as opposed to their inadequacies) that ideologies are so strongly adhered-to, and therefore so consequential. In short, ideologies are generally "good" models of Reality, rather than "bad" ones. At the same time, of course, it is not just ruling classes which adhere to ruling ideologies. Ideologies do not necessarily serve the interests of their adherents. Assuming that in specific societies sectional interests are not identical or convergent, then any stability may rest upon ideological rather than immediately physical control. Such ideological control entails adherence by some, at least, to beliefs that are against their objective interests.

> "The concept 'ideology' reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others, and thereby stabilises it."
> Mannheim (1936/60) p.40.

Neither do I find it important to insist that ideologies are collective belief systems. I see no special usefulness in distinguishing between ideologies and, say, perspectives, if the latter is taken to be more individual and idiosyncratic.[4] Two important features of ideology are their determination and

their consequentiality. Experience that is similar, common, or complementary to large groups or categories of people will tend to produce widely held beliefs. Depending on other contextual factors - for instance the degree of direct repression - the significance of those beliefs may rest on the sheer number of people holding them in common. But the ideological beliefs of a small group are not different in nature from those of an entire population. They are similarly structured and share the qualities of Value-Knowledge.

A lot depends, in stressing one rather than another definitional characteristic, upon what it is that is to be investigated. One reason why I prefer not to define "ideologies" in terms of the number of believers involved is that I prefer to regard the extensiveness of particular ideological commitments as problematic. The extent to which such-and-such beliefs are adhered to in given populations is something worthy of investigation. (For the same reason, I allowed hypothetical ideologies - with potential consequences, rather than actual ones - to be included as "ideologies", although that term will mostly be used of belief systems actually adhered-to in specific contexts).

Finally, we might note other terms which are related to my notion of "ideology": "master symbols", "culture", "(dominant) paradigms", "(group) perspectives", for instance. Again it is not my intention to discuss these here. Most of them attend primarily to the first of the three characteristics listed above, namely the societally contexted nature of (collective) belief systems. I would wish to stress at least as much the implicit

Value-Knowledge element[5] and the consequentiality[6] of ideologies.

"Education"

My use of the term "education" is deliberately broad, and, by intention at least, non-evaluative. It applies to all that happens in learning situations. Beliefs about education are beliefs about all learning processes, contents and contexts. I do not restrict "education" to what happens in formally institutionalised learning situations. A better term for that is "schooling". Nor am I concerned for the moment with such distinctions as those between "education" and "indoctrination", or "education" and "instruction". Such distinctions in many cases rely on an evaluation of the content of what is learned. They then depend on societally specific criteria, which it is better to keep problematic. What is in some contexts regarded as "indoctrination" is seen in another as "education". This should be a matter for investigation and explanation. In other cases, these distinctions rely not on the content of learned beliefs and understandings, but on the nature of the social relationships and learning processes involved. Where this is so, they may be derivable from the distinctions which I make, between "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions. In talking about education, I am concerned on the one hand with the subjective processes involved in learning - including characteristics of the individual learner - and on the other hand with the social contexting of such processes. This distinction is only analytical, however. Firstly, those contexts are themselves "educative". They are experienced in such a way

that beliefs and understandings are produced. Secondly, they are in turn partly (re-)produced as a result of what participants have previously learned about the "nature" of such contexts.

In looking at beliefs <u>about</u> education, I discuss the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions. These are best thought of in terms of distinctions made earlier, between objective Reality (including social relations), Objectivated 'Knowledge', and Subjective 'Knowledge'. I shall elaborate on these two dimensions in Chapter 7, below. I shall also say more about the three "realms" in Chapter 9. Both notions will be explored further in Part III and illustrated in Part V. Meanwhile, a brief account is in order here.



Beliefs on the "Knowledge" dimension concern the nature of both Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'. More importantly they refer to relationships between these two, and between each of them and the real world-out-there. Questions of epistemology and learning theory are here involved. Beliefs on the "Power" dimensions concern above all the nature of Social Relations as an aspect of Reality. The nature, desirability, possibility and inevitability[7] of particular structures of social and societal relations are here at issue. Two things should

be noted, however. First, these questions cannot in practice be divorced from beliefs about Objectivated and Subjective 'Knowledge', where education is at issue. Questions of framing arise[8] in the Social Relations-Objectivated 'Knowledge' relationships: who are the "teachers", or "parents", or "elders", who define valid and valuable 'knowledge' for the educans? Similarly, "Power" questions arise in considering any differential distribution of access to resources. This may relate to assumptions about a differential distribution of individual potential. That is, Social Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' relationships concern more than the "Knowledge" question of learning theory. The second thing to note is that this overlap of "Knowledge" and "Power" issues is unavoidable. It is, indeed, to be welcomed. Such an analytical distinction cannot correspond to ontologically distinct features of reality, except from a limited Relevance angle. The most immediate reason for this is that what any one person takes to be Reality (i.e. that person's 'reality') is <u>also</u> what that person will take to be objectivatable as the 'knowledge' of others. Although, therefore, we may distinguish analytically between the three "realms", in discussing the beliefs of others, they inevitably overlap. Accordingly, the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions are in practice inseparable. However, this is easily neglected, not least by participants/believers themselves. "Educational" assertions are often made with the assumption that only "Knowledge" issues are involved - especially those of epistemology and learning theory. In practice, however, important "Power" assumptions may underlie those assertions.

"Educational Ideologies"

"Educational ideologies" are societally-contexted, interest-specific Value-Knowledge about learning and its context. What are commonly considered to be "philosophies", or "aims", or "theories" of education are all included. I include them partly because of the duty-of-doubt suggested earlier. (It is methodologically sound to assume that there may be identifiable interests (or functions) served by adherence to particular systems of belief, at least until convincing evidence is presented to the contrary.) They are also included because, beyond what is explicitly considered and identified in them, there is invariably some further implicit reference. A writer may appear to address himself only to the "Knowledge" dimension, in discussing learning theory, or epistemology, for instance. But he must at least implicitly have some notions on the "Power" dimension, also. These are inseparable from his overall structure of beliefs. Writers who talk of "pure education", or "child-centredness", or "valid educational knowledge" must always also be assuming something about the social contexting of learning.

"Educational ideologies" does not refer merely to the theoretical writings of educationists. Included also are the beliefs and assumptions of practicing teachers, administrators, politicians and others, whenever they are involved in educational matters. If the three-fold Reality distinction is valid, then it is a part of the belief-producing experience of all engaged in education. The more we find certain aspects ignored in explicit statements, the more significant (and consequential) may such

beliefs be. A major empirical object of this essay is to discuss some such implicit beliefs and to attempt to make them explicit.

Notes:

(1) See, for instance, Mannheim (1936/60), Bottomore (1956), Plamenatz (1971), Lichtheim (1965), Geertz (1964).

(2) That power may itself be legitimated by common adherence to ideological beliefs. Conversely, potential (physical) power may not need to be exercised, by virtue of ideological concurrence with an established power structure.

(3) This phrase is used, for instance, by Bowles (1971/75) p.54.

(4) Sharp and Green distinguish between teachers' ideologies and teachers' perspectives (1975, p.69), seeing the former as more general and less dependent on specific context. Whilst such an operational distinction may be useful, it should not be inferred from this that the two are distinct. On the contrary, Value-Known ideology is fundamental to behaviour in concrete situations.

(5) Thus I would reject the suggestion seemingly implied by Becker & Geer (1960/71) that cultural (or ideological) beliefs result from explicit awareness of common problems in need of common solutions. (Their article is, however, somewhat inconsistent. It is not certain that this interpretation is fully intended by the writers).

(6) I would regard Matza's use of "ideology" (1964, e.g. p.52) as lacking in this respect. He uses it as virtually synonymous with "(sub-)culture", stressing coherence, but not consequentiality.

(7) i.e. Questions of "Is", "Should be", "Could be" and "Must be"; cf.Ch.2, note 15.

(8) cf. Bernstein (1971).

CHAPTER 5

OTHER TREATMENTS OF EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGIES

According to my three-fold definition of "ideologies" - that they are (a) societally contexted, (b) Value-Knowledge and (c) function- or interest-specific - I shall briefly review some other discussions of educational ideologies. I shall take them in the order: (c), then (a), then (b). The allocation of particular accounts to one or other of these sections is somewhat arbitrary. I am clearly not suggesting that a given writer is exclusively concerned with one or other of these characteristics of (educational) ideologies. But there does tend to be an emphasis in one direction or another. This is inevitable. The particular definitional characteristics with which one starts tend to dictate the kinds of question one may subsequently ask. My own starting point, of course, is the Value-Knowledge characteristic - the nature of the educational ideologies in question.

Functions and Interests

Attention to educational ideologies as such is a comparatively recent development in the sociology of education. But there has for a long time been attention to the functions of education systems. Beliefs about how such systems do, or might, or should, or must, function are themselves important data. There is remarkable agreement amongst sociologists of education about what the main functions of schooling are. A seemingly large number of diverse functions[1] generally reduces to, or is derivable from,

those of Selection and Socialisation. These are terms used by Parsons.(2) They tend therefore to carry connotations of structural-functionalism and progressivist Freudianism. Yet essentially the same functions are referred-to, for instance, by Althusser. He discusses the reproduction firstly of skills and submission to the established order (socialisation) and secondly of the social relations of production (selection).(3) Other writers make similar distinctions.(4)

This agreement derives from a far deeper agreement. Though very variable in emphasis, and therefore in actual definition, all rely on a fundamental distinction between structure and content, between society (or social structure) and culture, between position and role, etc.. Similarly, they all encounter the same sorts of problem. Firstly, content itself is structured. It can only be seen as elemental to a "larger" structure from a particular Relevance angle. Secondly the two aspects are always interdependent, in practice. In the case of selection and socialisation, for instance, selection procedures themselves "socialise". They are part of the hidden curriculum. Experience of them teaches beliefs that are fundamental to how people subsequently behave.

My own variant of this basic distinction(5), between the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions of education, meets the same difficulties. In spelling out the bases of the distinction, in terms of a tri-partite distinction between Reality, Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge', I hope to do two things. First, this initial elaboration demonstrates why the distinction does not correspond to distinct processes in real contexts.

Objectivated 'Knowledge' "bridges" the reality of physical and social relations, in any given historical context, and subjective (behaviour-inducing) beliefs and understandings about them. Second, the emphasis on this interdependence makes crucial the question, how does ideology work? Our aim need not be to find neat correspondent distinctions. We may make analytical distinctions which direct us to those relationships which are the most problematic, the most societally specific and the most consequential in belief structuration.

Some writings that discuss the two major functions of education systems, but with some emphasis on the ideological aspects involved, are in Hopper (1971, ed.). Hopper's own first article demonstrates some of the problems. Although his concern is explicitly with structural features - the selection function - he pays considerable attention to what he calls ideologies of legitimation and of implementation. He attempts to classify societies, on the basis not so much of the actual functions of their education systems as of ideologies about these functions.

Briefly, Hopper defines ideologies of legitimation in terms of two questions: who it is thought should be selected for particular kinds of education and why they "should" be. These two questions alone give him a four-part typology of education systems (or societies) according to which type of ideology of legitimation is "dominant".(6) He tries to keep these issues distinct from ideologies of implementation. These concern the questions, when people "should" be selected and how. In the first of these, he introduces the notions of "egalitarian" and "élitist", on the grounds that early selection (and therefore differentiation)

is élitist, and late selection is egalitarian. The passage is worth quoting at length:-

> "An élitist ideology specifies for example: [a] that the maximum amount of education for each citizen should depend on his future ability to contribute to economic productivity; [b] that 'intelligence' and 'educability' are determined primarily by hereditary factors, so that some people could not possibly benefit from education above a given minimum; and [c] that those who appear to be bound for élite positions should be separated at an early age from those who appear to be bound for lower positions so that the former gain in their confidence to lead and the latter in their willingness to follow."

Against this, he poses the "egalitarian" position:-

> "An egalitarian ideology specifies, for example: [a] that the maximum amount of education is the right of every citizen regardless of his future ability to contribute to economic productivity; [b] that 'intelligence' and 'educability' are determined primarily by environmental factors so that with proper instruction all people could benefit from a maximum of education and [c] that those who appear to be bound for élite positions should work and play as long as possible with those who appear to be bound for lower positions so that the former will not lose touch with the 'common man' and the latter will not become overly subordinate and lacking in initiative. This ideology supports the view that selection should occur as late as possible, and that a relatively small number of routes should exist."
> Hopper (1968/71) p.97 (lettering added).

Now it is not clear whether the three perspectives in each case (which I have lettered a, b and c) are causes, or descriptive characteristics, or resultant symptoms, of élitism and egalitarianism. Nor is it clear why these questions should relate only - or even primarily - to the question, <u>when</u> selection occurs. The three perspectives concern (a) the economic relevance of formal education, (b) the heritability or otherwise of educability, and (c) the need for special socialisation of élites. Hopper assumes

(a) that education is unproblematically related to an unproblematic economic (but not political) goal of productivity or development; (b) that however it may be determined, educability (despite the inverted commas) is a real variable, which is relevant to the unproblematic economic goal; and (c) that advanced or developed societies are necessarily unequal, whatever "humanitarian" concern there may be for those destined for non-élite positions. I would take all of these assumptions to be open to question. Hopper's own view, therefore, of what are "obvious" or "natural" functions of education systems would be a suitable object of analysis, as educational ideology. However, this is not, for the moment, my point. The point is, simply, that Hopper's distinction between "élitist" and "egalitarian" is trivially divorced from political-economic contexts, in that these are assumed to be unproblematic. By treating the question of eventual selection on certain "natural" grounds as unproblematic, Hopper evades a central problem: that socialisation is an integral part of selection. The interdependence of the two is what is most in need of examination (in each empirical context).

Davies (1970/71) criticises Hopper's article on similar lines. In particular, he finds it "most striking" that Hopper assumes the primary function of education systems to be that of selection. He also suggests that Hopper is misguided in supposing that entire education systems - and thereby societies - can be characterised in terms of single "dominant" ideologies. Davies notes that historical residue, regional variation and

functional variation all contribute to a diversity of educational ideologies, within single societies. From both these criticisms arises the point that I wish here to emphasise. A failure to consider the problematic nature of the selection-socialisation distinction can blind us to the problems of why, and with what consequences, diverse ideologies exist, how they are inter-related, and how they might change over time. Though I appreciate Davies' emphasis on socialisation, it is possible that he goes too far "in the other direction". Consequently the relationships between selection and socialisation again appear to be neglected.

Smith (1971) is clearly in the same tradition as Hopper and Davies. He too emphasises the selection-socialisation distinction. He is nearest to achieving a balanced understanding of the two.(7) His account can be summarized in the following:-

> "It is useful to distinguish among ideologies concerned with the following: [a] the content which is to be transmitted through the education system, [b] the pattern of its distribution among different groups, [c] the consequences of the education process for mobility within existing social structure, and [d] the consequences of the education process for various aspects of the social structure itself." Smith (1971) p.252 (lettering added).

This might be portrayed as follows:-

	Content	Structure/ Distribution
Knowledge	a. (culture)	b. (distribution of knowledge)
Society/power/ use of knowledge	c. (social mobility)	d. (development/ reconstruction)

This is potentially useful, as a starting point for examining educational ideologies. However, Smith's concern is not, primarily, to examine such ideologies, so much as the education systems in which they might be found. I suggest that by approaching ideologies from the point of view of their nature - what ideological (Value-Known) beliefs are, in terms of their adherence and their reference - we should not presuppose that they have particular functions, but rather take those as problematic. It is worth assuming that they serve some functions or interests, in their given context. But which ones they serve is a matter for investigation. Whilst approving, therefore, of the sorts of question that the above typology might raise about particular (ideological) accounts, I am wary of Smith's intention to analyse education systems in these terms. The actual relationship between particular ideologies and their societal context is best examined after an initial examination of those ideologies.

Accounts like that of Hopper, which suggest a "one-to-one" relationship between beliefs held and their functions, are over-deterministic. So also are those like Smith's, which suggest a similar relationship between beliefs and their referents. There is a tendency to play down the creative role of people in making history. Certainly beliefs are determined, but men can and do create circumstances which become belief-producing experience. Ideology tends to function by default, rather than through simple direction of activity. It is through not reflecting on the problematic nature of our beliefs that we are controlled by them.

Despite (perhaps even because of) the interdependence of

socialisation and selection, deliberate attention to that relationship can be fruitful. It is central to the question of how ideology works. If we can describe ideologies as such, rather than in terms of the functions they are supposed to serve, or are supposed to correspond with, it becomes a question of how, and under what conditions, there is mutual determination between the reality of social relations and people's 'realities'.

It is useful to distinguish between ideologies which in part determine particular social formations and ideologies which are themselves produced (determined) within those systems. Attention to socialisation has traditionally been only to the latter. It has been to people being schooled into particular beliefs and value systems through their experience as pupils/students. The work of Hopper, Davies and Smith has pointed to the other level of ideology in schools: ideologies of legitimation, for instance, which (are supposed to) shape the structural relationships within education systems.



It is the relationship between the higher level educational ideologies and the lower level beliefs produced through schooling that is so interesting. When, and why, and in what sense, might the beliefs inculcated in pupils "correspond" with the dominant

ideas behind educational arrangements? When, and why, are master patterns transmitted through schools? Moreover, when and why does such reproduction not occur so straightforwardly?

From this brief look at Hopper et al., it is clear that a distinction should be made between the actual functions of a given education system and what are believed to be the functions of that system. These beliefs are an important part of educational ideology. Smith's distinctions can be useful - as a way of accessing the content of given ideological belief systems. I have tackled the question of function- or interest-specificity of (educational) ideologies, then, in a rather round-about way. Hopper et al. may not be talking directly about such functions. But their importance and the attendant difficulties are evident in their work.

I look in the next section at a group of writers who have considered educational ideologies from a Marxian viewpoint. Perhaps rather arbitrarily, I group them as writers concerned with who hold such-and-such ideological beliefs, in specific contexts. But of course they are also concerned with the functions of ideological belief. It is important to them, too, whose interests are served by the dominance of particular ideologies. Indeed, one of these writers, Hoare, writes:

> "It must be understood that in the following sections there is an assimilation of very different thinkers which is at times brutal, for the purposes of the analysis."
> Hoare (1965) p.45n.

This brutality results from classifying ideologies on the grounds that particular ideologies serve particular interests or functions.

But such a classification cannot explain how it comes about that people of quite different and otherwise unrelated opinions and objective interests find themselves in alliance.(8) They may share some implicit assumptions about the functions of their viewpoints, but that cannot explain the various viewpoints. For example, to group Burt and Bantock together may be valid if one's concern is with the functions of ideologies. But it does not help us to understand how they come to be in alliance.

Operational definitions must depend on what questions one wants subsequently to ask. In my case, I shall consider educational ideologies initially in terms of what they are, rather than who holds them, or why, or with what consequences. It is my objective subsequently to ask such questions, without presupposing the answers.

Societal Context

The term "ideology" itself is most associated with the Marxian tradition, as is a specific emphasis on the interests served by ideological commitment. Writers in this tradition who have written about educational ideologies have obviously had in mind such interest-specificity. However, this has often been implicit. Perhaps it has been too "obvious" to need spelling out. In the case of some writers mentioned below, the very labels chosen to classify holders of particular ideological beliefs indicate what are presumably assumed to be the "obvious" consequences of such alignment. Perhaps through fear of idealism, there has been some concern to stress that it is people who are grouped together,

rather than ideas, emphasising the definite location in particular sections of societies of the ideas discussed. I therefore discuss these treatments under the general heading of "societal context" - that is, who holds the beliefs in question, where, when, and why.

The predominantly Marxian approach in this respect offers a convenient basis for classification: class position, within a particular mode of production. In some versions, this is quite explicit. In others, whether because of the practical difficulties of locating individuals (especially intellectuals?) in clear class positions, or because of the obvious anomalies that occur (false consciousness?), this emphasis is less clear. Indeed, classifications in this tradition have tended to become less "concrete", and made more in terms of ideational dimensions.

Among the clearest exponents of class as the basis for grouping adherents to particular educational ideologies are Simon and Williams.

Simon (1960) provides numerous historical examples of class interest and alignment as the basis of stands taken on educational issues. In the Leeds Grammar School case, for example, (Simon, 1960, p.105 ff) he sees a clear distinction between (a) the high Tory position (represented on the one hand by the schoolmaster under attack by local business interests and on the other by the Lord Chancellor who in 1805 adjudicated in his favour), (b) the manufacturing and commercial class interests (of Leeds) and (c) the "poor" of the city. Simon describes the struggle - initially unsuccessful - by business interests to oust the schoolmaster, because of the "irrelevance" of his classical,

Grammar School, teaching to their needs for literate and numerate clerical staff. The poor of Leeds, for whom grammar school places might be supposed to have been traditionally provided, were, says Simon, not powerful enough to intervene in this two-sided dispute.

Williams (1961/65) does not go into the question of educational ideology in depth. But he explicitly classifies it in terms of class position and class interest. Declaring that they can still be distinguished in the 20th century, Williams identifies three groups: the "public educators", the "industrial trainers" and the "old humanists". Thus Williams sets the fashion for identifying holders of particular ideologies in terms of their class position, but apparently defining them in terms of the content of their beliefs, or of the "intended" functions of their adherence. Immediately, however, a problem arises, which Simon avoided by not explicitly classifying ideologies as such. For Williams also talks of the "new working class", who are presumably distinct from the "public educators". They believed in "the students' choice of subject, the relation of disciplines to actual contemporary living, and the parity of general discussion with expert instruction." (p.165). One might have expected Williams' "public educators" to be of or for the proleteriat. It seems they are not. Presumably they are similar to Simon's "Radicals". They are of the same class as, but distinct from, the "industrial trainers". Young (1971, p.29) is more confident than I, that Williams indeed intended a four-part classification. But he is right in saying that "one is left in doubt as to how the 'democratic' /i.e. 'public educators'/ and the 'bourgeois' /i.e. 'industrial trainers'/ ideologies arise from what appear

to be the same social group " (ibid). What does seem clear is that attempts to classify ideologies according to one criterion (e.g. societal-context or class position) do not produce groupings that are neat and convenient when one turns to other characteristics (e.g. reference of belief or indeed interest-specificity).

At least three writers have drawn on Williams' distinctions - though they have not always acknowledged the debt. Perhaps sensing the problems just mentioned, Hoare, Davies and Cosin have defined their "types" of educational ideology more directly in terms of ideational content. Except in the case of Davies (and even here only loosely) there is no explicit reference to the relationships between the sets of ideas classified. Their dimensions are not spelled out - though I suggest they are there, implicitly. Nor, on the other hand, do they relate the "types" of ideologies in terms of their adherents' inter-relationships - as Simon and Williams did, by reference to class structure. But clearly their "types" do, in fact, owe their origin to Williams' distinctions.

Hoare (1965) distinguishes between (a) "conservatives", (b) "rationalisers of the system", (c) "romantics" and (d) "democrats". All these, he says, are prominent in contemporary Britain. He also adds a fifth group, (e) "revolutionaries", whose absence he regrets. The classifications of Davies (1969) and Cosin (1972) are similar [9], though they omit the fifth, hypothetical, "type". In all cases, the labels given to each group clearly refer to the interests supposedly

served by adherence to particular "types" of educational ideology. Yet the grouping is derived from Williams. Williams based his classification on the societally-contexted, or class-situated, nature of ideologies. Yet neither of these features is spelled out by Hoare, Davies or Cosin. Moreover, the relationship between the ideas themselves is largely intuitive. Only Davies makes any attempt to elaborate on this.

The labels themselves reflect an implicit use of dimensions. I cannot impose dimensions on other people's classifications without dangers of distortion. Precisely because their dimensions are intuitive, they are imprecise. However, Davies himself points out that "types" (a) and (b) are in some sense opposed to "types" (c) and (d), in that they are politically "right-wing", rather than "left-wing".(10) He also suggests a second dimension: (a) and (d), who "see education as part of a cultural whole", are opposed to (b) and (c), who "take a utilitarian view of education". Whether or not Davies explicitly intended these two dimensions to apply to all educational ideologies, I suggest that some such intuitive distinctions are being made by all three writers:-

	"Left"	"Right"
Cultural Whole	(d) "Democrats"	(a) "Conservatives"
Utilitarian	(c) "Romantics"	(b) "Rationalisers"

Four things should be noticed about this classification. Firstly, it is concerned with people and their beliefs, rather

than with supposedly dominant ideologies (as in the case of Hopper). There may be a "brutal" assimilation of thinkers, as Hoare notes. But the basic approach is, by intention at least, inductive generalisation from what are taken to be the ideas of actual people. The debt to Williams' account, and thereby to a theory of class structure, makes this clear.

Secondly, despite this, the labelling of categories and the intuitive dimensions suggested are not based merely on the fact that ideologies are societally-contexted. Attention to this is mixed with attention firstly to interest-specificity (how else would "romantics" be seen as "utilitarian"?) and secondly to the actual content of the beliefs - hence the dimensions.

Thirdly, because of this mixture, there is something lacking from the classification. An awareness of how different "types" are inter-related, and how change might occur in ideological affiliation, over time, has been lost. Yet it existed in the Williams account, which was more explicitly tied to societal-context.

Fourthly, there is in the event more emphasis - albeit unrecognised - on the content of the beliefs than there is on their contextual origin (or on their interest-specificity). The classification, indeed, is remarkably similar to that produced by Hoyle - from a different standpoint - as we shall see below.

In Simon and Williams, there was a clear awareness of the inter-relationships between their "types" of ideology. These

were securely grounded in the societal position of their adherents. (As we saw, though, there were problems in this. For people frequently do not adhere to beliefs that have a one-to-one relationship with their class position). In Cosin, Davies and Hoare, this societal-contexting basis of classification is less clear. Attention is more to the content of the beliefs considered. One means of understanding the inter-relationships between the "types" - namely, in terms of the relations of production - has therefore been lost. This has not been replaced by any explicit development of other inter-relationships, in terms of belief-content.

Value-Knowledge

Ideological beliefs - indeed any beliefs - are both states of mind and references to Reality. Taking this relational property first, it should be possible to discuss people's beliefs in terms of their content - that is, in terms of their referents. The danger in doing so lies in the possibility of generalising from particular instances of belief, seeking similarities and abstract relationships between these instances, and then attributing reality to those relationships. Since beliefs refer (however inadequately) to Reality, then any real relationship between different people's beliefs can exist only in and through specific contexts. If we group beliefs together on the basis of supposed similarities or dissimilarities, then this is a heuristic exercise only, the better to understand people's ideologies. We cannot and should not attribute reality

to those classifications and dimensions [11], except insofar as the believers are themselves aware of them.[12]

Nisbet (1966/70) notes three common ways of dealing with the history of thought. One is to attend to the thinkers themselves. This approach has similarities with the approach discussed in the last section: that of identifying ideologies in terms of their adherents. A second way is to look at "the system, the school, or the ism". And the third - Nisbet's own - is to begin with "unit-ideas", "which are the elements of systems". I mention the notion of unit-ideas below. Meanwhile, the "schools of thought" approach might be said to characterise something of the Hoare-Davies-Cosin approach already discussed. It is certainly related to that of Hoyle.

Hoyle (1970) classifies what he calls "social theories of education" on the basis of two dichotomous dimensions: Nomothetic/Idiographic and Conservative/Radical. Hoyle is explicitly deductive, where Davies et al. are implicitly so. He first posits his two dimensions, and then considers various British educational thinkers, practitioners, administrators and politicians in terms of the resultant four-part typology. Briefly, his "nomothetic conservatives" are meritocratic or laissez-faire administrators, who are concerned with selection rather than socialisation, with structure rather than culture. The "nomothetic radicals", on the other hand, have a similar view of what needs attention (selection), but aim to expand educational provision and to promote equality of opportunity. The objectives of "idiographic radicals" are to promote a common

culture and mutual betterment and to remove élite privilege. The "idiographic conservatives" are concerned to preserve and develop the creative powers of the élite and to raise the cultural standards of the masses through enlightened leadership.

There is a strange similarity between this account and that of Davies. The conservative/radical dimension is related to Davies' "right-wing"/"left-wing" dimension. The nomothetic/idiographic dimension is akin to Davies' utilitarian/cultural-whole dimension. Yet there are also significant differences, not least in the thinkers and theories which find themselves slotted into particular "types". Halsey and Floud are regarded as nomothetic-radicals by Hoyle, but ("right-wing") revisionists by Davies. "Romantics", on the other hand, are absent from Hoyle's typology. These differences cannot be attributed simply to the less elaborated nature of Davies' typology. It arises from different assumptions being made about what is Relevant. Davies and Hoyle clearly see the (actual or potential) function of Halsey and Floud's work rather differently. They have a different view of the possibilities and desirabilities of societal change. It is tempting to say that we are told more about the writers' own (educational) ideologies than about their subjects'. Hoyle does not attempt to justify his two dimensions. This is a pity, because the society/culture dichotomy can only be metaphorical. It would be misleading, therefore, to suppose that there really were four types of theorist, based on such a distinction. Hoyle does, it is true, stress that his typology is intended only for heuristic purposes. His classification is overtly of theories.

Yet there does seem to be an implicit suggestion - in, for instance, his lengthy discussion of debates between different "types" of theorist - that there really are four types of theorist. Such a suggestion must be avoided, unless societally-contexted reasons can be offered for their real distinction and inter-relationship.

A further problem arises in the accounts of both Hoyle and Davies. Both concentrate on the explicit, theoretical viewpoints of the people they discuss. Yet even sincere expressions may not adequately represent what is believed, and it is beliefs which are responsible for behaviour. Perhaps Hoyle is safe here in talking about "social theories of education", rather than "ideologies". But what is sociologically significant is not artificially abstracted ideas. It is what is believed and understood in context. It is beliefs, not "mere" ideas, that have social and societal impact. The relationships, between thinkers/believers and the (education) systems in which they are involved, are crucial.

I have suggested that belief systems can be usefully considered in terms of a "tree-root" metaphor and that a search for high-level (inclusive) Basic Beliefs may be possible as a means of "short-handing" particular belief systems. In principle, we can only take this approach in the case of individual belief systems. To seek the Basic Beliefs of a group or category of people may be to assume an ideational logic that does not exist. However, insofar as groups or categories of people have similar or complementary experiences, then it is

likely that their beliefs are <u>really</u> related to one another, in a way that is in principle describable. The danger is in supposing that it is in the ideas themselves that that relationship exists. In fact it must lie in the belief-producing experience of contextual reality. The relationship between contextual experience and beliefs must always be regarded as problematic. It is not possible to assume that experience of contexts X or Y will always produce beliefs "X" or "Y". This problem is not adequately covered by Nisbet, in his exploration of "unit-ideas".(13) It is illegitimate to suggest that such-and-such a Basic Belief must necessarily exist in a given context, because of the nature of that context.

Not ideas, but social relations, experience of which may generate ideas, can have a "life of their own". When there appears to be a continuity or similarity of belief over time and between different people, this must be explained not in terms of an autonomy of ideas, or of the evolution of ideas, but of identifiable social institutions.(14)

However, certain kinds of relationship or institutional arrangement may be universal - not in their nature, nor in their precise content, but in the fact of their existence, <u>in some form or another</u>. It may then be possible to ask questions about the <u>particular</u> form which that relationship takes in particular instances. In turn, we may examine the <u>beliefs</u> about that relationship, which are held by the people concerned. That is, it may be possible to consider certain "dimensions" which are universally relevant to particular kinds of social arrangement.

In the case of education, social contexting of some kind is always relevant; so also is some relationship between learner's beliefs and objectivated bodies of 'knowledge'. What questions one asks about these has still to be decided. Certain commonly presented ideas may be appropriate - such as the "model of (the well-educated) man"[15], or the functions of education supposed to exist, to be desirable etc.. The sorts of question asked will depend on what it is that most concerns the observer - what his Relevance angle is. It will not be some universal characteristic of (in this case) educational processes which "prompts" the questions. Furthermore, it seems desirable to order the questions asked in some coherent manner, rather than to list them in an apparently random collection.[16] What approach, then, is to be taken in the case of the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions of educational ideologies? A useful way to tackle this is to consider first the question of ideological anomalies. This both illustrates some of the problems and suggests some clues to a viable approach. In Chapter 6, I consider some such anomalies, before returning to the two educational dimensions in greater detail in Chapter 7.

So far in this section, we have considered beliefs in terms of their referred-to objects. But beliefs are not just referential abstractions. They are states of mind. To strongly-believe something is to Value-Know it and this dimension is analytically distinct from the referential belief content. The state-of-mind property of beliefs is sociologically very important. It is what (in part) determines behaviour. Beliefs have to do with motives.

By "motives" I do not mean merely what is explicitly recognised, subjectively, as intention. On the contrary, verbalisations of our beliefs are frequently most inadequate. Even after-the-event rationalisations or explanations may be very poor representations of why we behaved in such-and-such a manner in particular contexts. We behave according to what we implicitly believe to be the nature of Reality. How we verbalise these beliefs is not always very significant. It is a commonplace that explicit declarations of policy and intent are not always a reliable guide to what is actually done, nor to why it is done.(17)

It is an interesting question, whether continuity of function must entail some continuity of ideological assumption. If two apparently different sets of beliefs serve the same interests in practice, are we entitled to say that this must be appreciated in some sense by the people concerned, and therefore incorporated in their underlying beliefs? For instance, 19th century educational policy in this country was clearly motivated predominantly by desires for social control. This has long since been rationalized in other terms in most (though not all) educational literature. Yet the institutions created for formal schooling are still commonly experienced as situations where discipline is the first concern and "education" is only secondary. This does not arise from the nature of learning as such, but from particular contexts of, and particular understandings and beliefs about, teaching and learning.(18) I am inclined to suggest that where it regularly occurs, what is explicitly an unintended

consequence (or latent function) cannot be dismissed as a "fluke", in terms of people's relevant beliefs. It is likely that they have some implicit beliefs which refer to these "unintended" consequences and which are often in part instrumental in their determination. (It is only through the verbal elaboration of such implicit beliefs that the disjuncture between explicit intention and actual function can prompt deliberate action designed to promote change. Much of sociology is the study of unintended consequences).

In the context of schools' hidden curricula, Bowles and Gintis tend to over-emphasise the effects of structure, without sufficient consideration of content. This is comparable with Carnoy's cavalier dismissal of people's intentions in examining 19th century colonialism (Carnoy, 1974). As McGinn puts it,

> "Carnoy tailors his standards of evidence to fit his purpose. If statements of intent support his thesis, Carnoy takes them at face value. If not, well, one cannot rely on statements of intent anyway."
> McGinn (1975) p.248.

Actually, this is not my main criticism of Carnoy's treatment of motives. He is just far too loose in his accounts of why given policies were adopted. He is quite indiscriminate in his use of "intent", "purpose", "use", "attempt" and "function", using them, it seems, interchangeably.(19) This looseness is also found in Bowles and Gintis.(20) Their materialist determinism may be intuitively sound. But they fail to demonstrate how it is mediated through people's actual beliefs, and therefore their actual "motives". Motives do matter.

Just as motives (or intentions) are frequently implicit, so also are they "genuine". They are not always, or even usually, conspiratorial or manipulative.(21) Value-Knowledge is a powerful motivator precisely in that it prompts people to behave in given ways because that is the "natural" or "obvious" way to behave. Even where deliberate action is involved, it is frequently action conceived of as "for the best". When Kay-Shuttleworth, for instance, spoke of guarding the poor against pernicious opinions(22), or when Amis decried the dilution of standards through numbers(23), or the proverbial teacher assures the pupil that "This is going to hurt me more than it'll hurt you", there is no reason immediately to sneer at the supposed hypocrisy of self-interest. Such statements can be occasioned by sincere, and even altruistic, belief. It is of the nature of ideology that it consists of Value-Knowledge - beliefs which do not just refer to what is taken to be reality, but which are in themselves "values" with emotional state-of-mind qualities. This is not, of course, to deny that conspiratorial intent is common. It is, however, to deny that that sort of explicit intent is the substance of ideology. Ideology is belief. It is not statement or thought. It is to the Basic Beliefs of educational ideologies that we must now turn, by considering certain anomalies in practice.

Notes

(1) Consider this list, compiled by Huberman:-

> "Given their industrial mode of functioning, schools are relatively cheap, rational enterprises which process large numbers of units with the help of few executives or administrators at a very low per capita cost. They hire trained professionals at low wages; they are centrally

located; they serve a custodial or baby-sitting function which enables parents to work. In addition, schools teach the basic rules of conduct and basic social behaviours, rehabilitate social deviants, wean children from their parents and widen parochial horizons. They teach basic skills of literacy and numeracy and provide instruction in health and hygiene, human relations, cooking and sewing, local and national history and legislation. They identify and cream off the élite for senior professional posts and control the numbers of applicants entering the labour market at different levels. They provide an environment in which a child's effort counts for something and where most tasks are adjusted to his level of mental and physical functioning. And they are in operation ..."
Huberman (1974) p.57.

(2) Parsons (1959/61) esp. pp.434-7.

(3) Althusser (1971/2) esp. pp.244-6.

(4) For instance, Carnoy (1974) p.344; Goodman (1962/71) p.21; Dahrendorf (1957/68/73).

(5) I only saw it as a variant after adopting it.

(6) His four types of ideology of legitimation - and thence of societies -are Communistic, Meritocratic, Paternalistic and Aristocratic.

(7) He maintains this balance in Smith (1976), though again he does not spell it out in these terms.

(8) See Chapter 6 below.

(9) Davies (1969) suggests (a) "conservative", (b) "revisionist", (c) "romantic" or "psychologistic" and (d) "democratic" or "socialist". Cosin (1972) suggests (a) "élitist", (b) "technocratic" or "vocational" or "rationalisers", (c) "romantic" and (d) "egalitarian".

(10) I would not myself be happy about such a distinction. Immediately, for instance, connotations of egalitarian/inegalitarian and stability/change would need to be distinguished. But, with respect, that is not my problem, but Davies'.

(11) "The whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history ... is thus confined to the following three efforts.
No.1. One must separate the ideas of those ruling ... from these actual rulers ...
No.2. One must bring an order into this rule of ideas ...
No.3. To remove the mystical appearance of this 'self-determining concept', it is changed ... into the 'thinkers', the 'philosophers', the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history ..."
Marx & Engels (1845-6/1969) p.50.

(12) Such awareness might, however, be implicit. Nonetheless, it would need to be explained.

(13) Nisbet's failure to explore the relationships between "actualities" and "themes" - which, confusingly, he seems to treat as interchangeable - leads to considerable ambiguity in his treatment of "unit-ideas" (Nisbet, 1966/70, e.g. pp.23 ff, 36 ff, 109-110, 166, 174 ff). The implicit assumption of the book, especially Chapter 2, is that certain unit-ideas or themes derive from the real experience of the French and Industrial Revolutions. But he fails either to spell this out, or to consider the problems involved.

(14) Compare Bourdieu (1966/71) on the relative autonomy of intellectual fields (institutions). cf. also Shepherd (1974). On the apparent autonomy of racialist ideas, see Rex (1970). Also relevant are the "institutionalised values" (commodity fetishism) of Illich (1971/73), and the relative autonomy of educational institutions, especially universities - see Althusser (1971/72); Gouldner (1975); Bowles & Gintis (1976) Chapter 8.

(15) e.g. Mannheim & Stewart (1962); Postman (1970/73) p.86; Weber (1925/48) p.243.

(16) e.g. Seaman (1972) p.42.

(17) Simon (1960, p.365) for instance, notes that originally educational policies in this country were quite explicitly based upon class interest. These policies remained in many ways unchanged, despite being disguised by educational phraseology. Holly (1971/72, Chapter 1) makes a similar observation concerning the use of the word "secondary", since the 1944 Education Act. Hoare (1965, p.49) points to the manipulative use of "egalitarian" formulations, being apparently democratic in intention, but very undemocratic in function.

(18) A teacher once wrote to me -

> "Although many theories of education do exist, many teachers prefer to concentrate on discipline and control of their class at first, the idea being that, without these, the actual learning process [sic] cannot take place, and many theories tend to be discarded by teachers once they are faced with a real class situation."

(19) Carnoy (1974) e.g. pp.13,24,159,272,343,357,82.

(20) Bowles & Gintis (1976) e.g. p.37.

(21) To be fair, Carnoy does say as much (page 24). He is inconsistent and ambiguous in his reference to motive, however.

(22) cf. Hurt (1971/72) p.23.

(23) Amis (1969) p.10.

CHAPTER 6

IDEOLOGICAL ANOMALIES

In many, if not all, major educational debates, strange anomalies are to be found in the descriptions and prescriptions of those concerned. People with apparently little in common can be found saying very similar things. But what in one context, on one person's lips, appears "progressive" or "enlightened", can look cynical or reactionary when voiced by another. One has constantly to remind oneself who is speaking, what the context of his assertion is, and what he is leaving unsaid about the referred-to situation.(1)

It would be naive, however, to suppose that it is always simply a matter of one party concealing its real intentions, whilst the other is being "honest". Ideology is sincere. What is more, motives do matter. However inadequate people's notions are about the world in which they live, it is beliefs that guide behaviour. When, therefore, we find people of apparently quite different interests making similar prescriptions, these should be taken seriously as something in need of explanation.

We need to ask why, in particular contexts, people are in strange agreement (or disagreement). And we need to look for possible consequences of these (non-)alliances. Before such questions can be adequately answered, however, one needs to be clear about what the nature of these (dis-)agreements is: how are the respective belief structures made up? The "tree-root" metaphor is useful for this purpose.

Though it is the implicitly held Value-Knowledge that one

must attempt to understand, we cannot, of course, have direct access to this. People's explicit statements may in some ways be inadequate, as accounts of their real beliefs (let alone of the reality they attempt to portray). But they are nonetheless an important source of data. To discover anomalies or inadequacies internal to someone's explicit account is to find clues to what might underlie those assertions. Clearly, they cannot be the only evidence, if one hopes to construe as accurate a picture as possible of the subjects' beliefs. The observer's own understanding of the context will play a major part in the final analysis. But sociologists cannot be exclusively concerned with the "objective" reality of such contexts. They must also pay close attention to what people (appear to) believe about them. I am not, therefore, suggesting a displacement of "objective" analysis of social relations in favour of "interpretive" accounts of actors' beliefs, but merely an appropriate concern for those beliefs. (In the last instance, given the materiality of mind-brain, the two are in any case of the same world).

In order to have some feeling of "anomaly", the observer must be referring to more than the statements of the observed. He must rely on some understanding of the societal context in which the statements are made, in order to feel that there is an anomaly to be explained. One approach might be firstly to distinguish dichotomously between the observer's and the observed's understanding of the context in question, and secondly to assume that in some cases, at least, people's objective interests are non-identical. If we simply dichotomise such conflict in terms of "same" or "different" interests, we have a possibly crude, but

heuristically useful typology of ideological anomalies:-

People's societal position/interests

		Same	Same	Different	Different	(According to the subjective perceptions of the people themselves)
		Same	Different	Same	Different	(According to the observer's assessment of their interests)
People's explicit prescriptions	Same	a.e.	F.C.	a.e.	S.B.	
	Different	H.C.	a.e.	D.D.	a.e.	

where a.e. - as expected (by the observer)
F.C. - False Consciousness
S.B. - Strange Bedfellows
H.C. - Happy Coincidences
D.D. - Deceptive Disagreements

Where the observer believes two parties to have the same interests, he will expect them to have similar beliefs and to make similar prescriptions, on relevant issues. Where he sees them as opposed in some way, he will expect different beliefs and accounts. Where these rudimentary expectations are not fulfilled, there is an anomaly to be explained. Before that, there is an anomaly in need of elucidation. (In this schema, the four types of anomaly are, of course, as perceived by the observer.)

False Consciousness, here, is akin to Strange Bedfellowship. In both cases the people in question say (and apparently believe) similar things, whilst the observer believes them to have divergent interests, on the matter in question. The difference between False Consciousness and Strange Bedfellowship depends on the subjective interpretation of interests by the parties concerned. Similarly, Deceptive Disagreements are akin to Happy Coincidences.

The difference depends again on the subjective interpretations of the people observed. A number of examples of these anomalies, in various spheres of educational thought and policy, are given in Syer (1976a). I outline a few below.

In making these distinctions I am referring directly to neither the contextual origin of the beliefs or statements made, nor the actual or potential interests served by behaviour or policies based upon them. The only "external" is the observer's own understandings and beliefs - though these will, of course, make reference to both these other aspects. The observer may first feel that an ideological anomaly exists, then elaborate its nature and structure, and then subsequently seek to explore its contextual origin and consequentiality. This dependence upon the observer's own interpretations need not be so closed as it may at first sight appear. It is enough to observe agreement or disagreement over particular issues and to maintain a "duty of doubt" as to whether the real interests of those concerned are convergent or divergent. In the last resort, though, considerations of adequacy of the observed's accounts must depend on what the observer takes to be logically and contextually valid criteria.

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS AND HAPPY COINCIDENCES: SOME EXAMPLES

I outline below some anomalies revealed in discussions of three educational issues: (1) cultural deprivation and educability, (2) Controversy and the Schools Council Humanities Project and (3) parent and pupil participation. The first of these seems to be a case of Strange Bedfellowship and the last one of Happy Coincidence. The middle case bridges the two, as we shall see. In discussing these, clues will be found to what questions may relevantly be asked on the two Basic Belief dimensions, "Knowledge" and "Power". I take up these clues later, in suggesting one way of operationalising these dimensions.

(1) Cultural Deprivation and Educability

The notion of "educability" (and "ineducability") rests on assumptions (a) that individuals are naturally unequal in personal attributes relevant to the acquisition of educational 'knowledge' and skills; (b) that these attributes are established and on the whole immutable by certain critical periods of a child's development (in some cases at conception), and (c) that there is a fundamental validity in objectivated bodies of 'knowledge' which are presented in educational institutions and according to which children's levels of attainment and potential may be judged. There are various manifestations of the "educability" notion, including "intelligence", "motivation", "linguistic development" and "(achievement) values".

"Cultural Deprivation" is a variant of the "(in-)educability" notion. It attributes the cause of ineducability to the cultural

background of children.[2] Some typical statements convey the idea.

> "In attempting to examine the achievement problem in very, very poor Negro children, I suggest that they lack both hope of achievement and fear of not achieving and that they come from a culture lacking characteristics of order fundamental to the achieving middle class structure. Specifically, their homes are physically and personally disorganised; life does not run on a time schedule and so on. Thus, emotionally and cognitively they lack the structure on which a conventional educational system can build ... Because of the disorganisation of the environment the basic perceptual frames of these children do not seem to have been properly constituted ..."
> Henry (1971) pp.48-9.

> The culturally deprived child "is essentially the child who has been isolated from those rich experiences that should be his. This isolation may be brought about by poverty, by meagerness of intellectual resources in his home and surroundings, by the incapacity, illiteracy, or indifference of his elders or of the entire community. He may have come to school without ever having had his mother sing him the traditional lullabies, and with no knowledge of nursery rhymes, fairy stories, or the folklore of his country. He may have taken few trips - perhaps his only one the cramped, uncomfortable trip from the lonely shack on the tenant farm to the teeming, filthy slum dwelling - and he probably knows nothing of poetry, music, painting, or even indoor plumbing."
> Brooks (1966) pp.516-7, quoted by Friedmann (1967/73) p.257.

> "Educational deprivation is <u>not</u> mainly the effect of poverty; parental attitude and maternal care are more important that the level of material needs."
> Wiseman (1967) p.369.

A fuller statement of the "cultural deprivation" viewpoint can be found, for instance, in Schools Council (1970).

At the same time, much of the popularity of the notion of "cultural deprivation" can be attributed to the hope that frequently accompanies it: that such deprivation may not be totally irremediable. Unlike geneticist accounts of (in-)educability, environmentalist arguments may offer the possibility of

social manipulation. Hand in hand, therefore, with the cultural deprivation model go policies of compensatory education, from the massive Headstart Programmes in the U.S. to the puny E.P.A. provisions in this country. Such policies include such diverse features as "positive discrimination" in the allocation of resources to schools, voluntary playschemes, language machines (Bereiter and Engelman, 1966) and "home visitors" - aimed at "planned intervention in the child's language development".(3)

The main point to note here is the overwhelming acceptance of the cultural deprivation model, especially, but not only, in the U.S.. Friedmann sums it up - albeit a little clumsily - as follows:

> "The idea, particularly as a popular image, eventually attracted widespread public interest and support in connection with the issues of poverty and civil rights. It turned out to be one of those rare societally important ideas that, for various reasons, possessed an image appeal to a broad spectrum of persons and publics of various ideological persuasions - conservative, moderate and liberal ..."
> Friedmann (1967/73) p.267.

The predominance of the "educability" notion is no recent matter in this country. It evolved in relation to a school system that was consciously established on bipartite lines.

> "Victorian England knew that elementary education was for working-class children, and that the grammar schools were for middle-class children. This was as salient a fact of nineteenth century England and Wales ... as the fact of class consciousness itself."
> Silver (1973) pp. xviii-xix.

The development of psychometry both built upon and further institutionalised a particular view of "intelligence" - one

of many from within psychology - that embodied all the underlying assumptions of the educability model. Pidgeon points out that

> "teachers are being constantly assured through their classroom experiences that the potential ability theory ... is apparently sound and that streaming and a selective system of education works ... Every teacher, of course, experiences anomalies - from the obviously incorrectly assessed child arriving from another school, to the 'late developer' - but these are the exceptions that prove the rule. For the most part, teachers can see that the system is working."
> Pidgeon (1970) pp.37-9.

Partly in reaction to the eugenecist theories (not to mention genocidal policies) of Nazi Germany, uneasily linked to their own Dilemma, partly evolving from a growing psychoanalytic tradition, as well as for other reasons, the search for environmentalist explanations of "ineducability" gained enormous momentum in mid-20th century America. Studies of n Achievement[4], value orientations[5] and finally linguistic codes[6] dominate U.S. educational research in the 1950s and '60s. The linguistic formula came, in part, from Britain. By that time (circa 1960), there was growing attention in this country, too, to non-geneticist explanations of under-achievement.

Rosen has commented that

> "the way in which Bernstein's theories have permeated contemporary educational thinking and have been used to justify educational practices is a rare phenomenon in English education, and calls for some explanation. Educational academics can weave theories and publish researches to their heart's content, and these can accumulate over decades, without affecting practice one iota or causing a ripple in staffroom discussion. But there are notable and significant exceptions ..."

One of these is Bernstein's theory of linguistic codes. Rosen's

explanation is forthright:

> "It was just when /the prevailing theory of intelligence and the concept of the Intelligence Quotient/ was looking sadly tattered ... that the theories of Bernstein began to be available ... Whereas in the fifties children had their IQs branded on their foreheads, in the sixties more and more of them had the brand changed to 'restricted' or 'elaborated'. The ideology vacuum had been filled."
> Rosen (1972) p.3.(7)

Rosen also remarks on the strange bedfellowship of support for Bernstein's theories.

> "Both right and left in education politics have seen in these ideas support for their views. Thus Bantock (1965) on the right justifies separate education for working-class children and cites Bernstein in support, and Brian Jackson (1968) on the left accepts the main thesis. Jensen (1968) cites Bernstein in the very same paragraph in which he makes the outrageous statement that 'much of working-class language consists of a kind of 'emotional' accompaniment to action here and now.'"
> Rosen (1972) p.2.

To give just one example of this, Bantock, in an article on "popular education", says:

> "My initial evidence drawn over a long historical period and the particular analysis which Professor Bernstein has given us, make it reasonable to assert that many levels of abstraction are likely to be beyond the capacity of numbers of people and that among those numbers are likely to be included the particular group of children with whom I am specifically concerned in this article."
> Bantock (1971) p.259.

At the same time, Hoare can assert that

> "A theory of education is central to socialist theory, and has been considerably under-estimated by the marxist tradition. There exists in Britain today one body of work in the field of education which brings this home very forcibly; it is genuinely revolutionary and any

> educational theory must integrate its achievements. This is the work of Basil Bernstein ..."
> Hoare (1965) p.52.

The popularity, in this country, not just of Bernstein's version of socio-linguistic-psychology[8], but of the cultural deprivation model generally, is demonstrated in the Schools Council's Cross'd with Adversity. Their working party asked headteachers from thirty inner-city areas about deprivation. They wanted to know where the "problem" seemed most acute, how deprivation was identified and what measures were taken to counteract it. Chapter 3 of the working paper summarises the replies to the first of these questions. Family pathology swamps all other explanations. Whilst criteria of "deprivation" by a number of accounts (e.g. brutality, inattention, etc.) are lumped together, the one thing that all have in common is offence against mainstream criteria of what constitutes "a good family" (Schools Council, 1970, pp.22-30). The chapter concludes:

> "The picture emerging from the heads' reports leaves no doubt of the seriousness of the problem. In the circumstances, it is quite remarkable that the reports are so free from bitterness and resignation, and so full of candour and compassion."
> Schools Council (1970) p.30.

This last quotation indicates that it is by no means a simply reactionary intention that underlies support for the cultural deprivation model. Nor, on the other hand, is support for compensatory programmes simply liberal. As Friedmann points out, in the United States,

> "To political and social conservatives, nationally supported educational programmes held out the hope of 'straightening out' and 'keeping straight' lower class children, of helping them to make and keep them good, respectable, solid citizens, and of preventing the 'social dynamite' in the slums from exploding or re-exploding."
> Friedmann (1967/73) p.260.

Any student of 19th century popular education policies in this country will find this theme very familiar. It is brought up to date in reactions to urban riots in the U.S. in the mid-1960s. The McCone Commission reported, for instance, on the Los Angeles riots in 1965:

> "Children in disadvantaged areas are often deprived in their pre-school years of the necessary foundations for learning. They have not had the full range of experience so necessary to the development of language in the pre-school years, and hence they are poorly prepared to learn when they enter school. Their behaviour, their vocabulary, their verbal abilities, their experience with ideas, their views of adults, of society, of books, of learning, of schools, and of teachers are such as to have a negative impact on their school experience. Thus, the disadvantaged child enters school with a serious educational handicap, and because he gets a poor start in school, he drops further behind as he continues through the grades. His course towards academic failure is already set before he enters school, it is rooted in his earliest childhood experiences. The Commission concludes that this is the basic reason for low achievement in the disadvantaged areas."
> McCone Commission (1965), quoted by Friedmann (1967/73) pp.260-1.

Friedmann finds some significance in the fact that the cultural deprivation model first developed in the mid-fifties, and particularly in New York City, whose school system at that time employed more than a hundred psychologists but no sociologists.

> "Consequently, when a sociologist has been called in to participate in interdisciplinary research on the 'sociological aspects' of cultural deprivation, he often has found the central core of the topic so permeated with psychological suppositions that his own efforts have of necessity been at the periphery of the problem as defined."
> Friedmann (1967/73) p.266.

This may be true, and important, but there is nothing new about sociologists "taking" rather than "making" problems. C.Wright Mills complained about the professional ideology of social pathologists in 1943, and referred to a wide range of existing text-books to prove his point. Perhaps unfairly(9), Young has made similar allegations against sociologists of education in this country (Young, 1971, p.1).

In any case, attention to the family has deep roots in sociology as well as in psychology. Comte believed that society could not be reduced to a sum of individuals, but did suggest that social groups and communities - of which the family was the archetype - were the elements of society. Le Play also felt that

> "Populations consist not of individuals but of families. The task of observation would be vague, indefinite and inconclusive if in every locality it were required to extend it to individuals differing in age and sex. It becomes precise, definite and conclusive when its subject is the family."
> Le Play, quoted by Nisbet (1966/67) p.62.

Furthermore, the pluralist ethic, on which American functionalist sociology is arguably based, reduces to an emphasis on groups, of which the family remains the "communal" archetype. Here, then, is a further trend to reinforce the environmentalist and psychoanalytic ones already noted. "Ineducability" as the

fault of family experience "makes sense" in this light. It thus fulfils one of the basic definitional criteria of ideologies.

The sub-title of Friedmann's article is "a commentary in the sociology of knowledge". His discussion of various challenges to the cultural deprivation model is particularly useful, for it indicates not just the grounds on which it has been criticized, but also by whom. Whilst there are theoretical and conceptual challenges to it, it is the political challenge that is most interesting, in a study of the sociology of knowledge: and thus of the societal-contextuality of ideologies.

Friedmann notes five major criticisms. The first three are theoretical. Firstly, the notion of "cultural deprivation" has been criticised as conceptually inaccurate. It rests upon a confusion between the anthropological notion of "culture" - of which one cannot be deprived - and an aesthetic "high culture" idea. The compensatory policy of "cultural enrichment" is a result of this confusion. (At the same time, this criticism could be largely answered if "cultural deprivation" were taken to imply "deprived by ..." rather than "deprived of culture". This possibility is not considered by Friedmann, presumably because he accepts the pluralistic-relativist view that cultures are inevitably coherent and adequate: that there is no deficit, only difference. cf Valentine, 1968).

Secondly, the notion has been criticised, says Friedmann, as being theoretically inadequate, in that it fails to explain widespread anomalies to its universalist assertions. It is over-deterministic and/or simplistic. Mackler and Giddings say that

> "an adequate theory of deprivation must eventually explain why certain pupils succeed and others do not, given the same social background."
>
> quoted by Friedmann (1967/73) p.261.

(Again, this is a less serious criticism than might be implied. Awareness of such exceptions is itself what prompts research, within the same paradigm, into the minutiae of differential (family) experience. There may be no felt need to search for wider societal explanations of the criteria of success and of deprivation that prevail).

Thirdly, the model has been criticised on the grounds that it is an incorrect explanation of massive scholastic retardation. This is by implication considerably more radical. For if "cultural deprivation" seems adequate (witness its popularity) at the phenomenal level, then a more adequate explanation must explain this apparent adequacy, as well as provide a better model. The model itself has to be explained in terms of its societal context. More immediately, this criticism can point to research, for instance, into the school, rather than the family. It is on such grounds as these that Bernstein has claimed that "education cannot compensate for society" (1970/71).

The other two sources of opposition to the cultural deprivation model are political rather than strictly theoretical - although, of course, political demands are often rationalised in theoretical terms. The first of these is that the model has operated as an obstacle to civil rights progress. It is arguable that racist stereotypes not only helped make the cultural deprivation model acceptable in the first place, but were reinforced by its application in practice.

> "The new ideology, accepted now even by some liberals, would make it seem that unemployment, poor education and slum conditions result from family breakdown, 'cultural deprivation' and lack of 'acculturation' of Southern rural migrants."
> Ryan (1965), quoted by Friedmann (1967/73) p.262.

This is especially true where compensatory education programmes are seen to have failed in their objectives. It was (overtly) the failure of Headstart schemes to "boost IQ" that prompted Jensen to publish his monograph on black inferiority in 1969. (cf Labov, 1969/73, p.56).

The other political challenge to the cultural deprivation idea that Friedmann notes is that it is

> "a device to force a questionable middle-class culture on lower-class students".

Indeed, it is not just black and "lower class" Americans who have reacted against the "Establishment" in the age of Watergate, I.T.T. and Vietnam. (See, for instance, Wills (1970), especially part III .)

Despite these challenges to the notion of cultural deprivation, it has remained, to use Friedmann's limp word, "popular". It has had all the hallmarks of a Kuhnian paradigm, both in and out of "scientific" research. What is more, it now has an almost unchallenged predominance in this country, though it may only have ousted the "potential ability theory" (as Pidgeon calls it) more recently here than in the U.S. Perhaps because of a more ingrained - because more firmly institutionalised - "classism" in this country, blame for educational failure carries more legitimacy when directed at the "undeserving

poor" and the "culturally deprived". There is a strong tradition of classifying the British working class in this way, whose counterpart in educational terms may consequently be that much harder to challenge.

The question remains, however, what underlying assumptions make this acceptance so common? Historically, this acceptance can be explained in terms of the functions it has served. The consequences of behaviour based on particular policy definitions then become the reinforcers of those definitions. But to grasp fully how it is that such a model operates, one must seek the underlying assumptions on which they are based.

Friedmann fails really to elucidate the strange bedfellowship to which he admirably points. On the one hand, he points to the "broad spectrum ... of ideological persuasions" (admittedly only extending from conservative to liberal) that has been attracted to the cultural deprivation idea. He shows, briefly, what sort of appeal this idea - with its corollary, compensatory education - has to various political positions. The implication would seem to be that some of them have "got it wrong": that some have been deluded into pursuing policies which do not, in fact, further the interests they support. Either the model serves conservative interests, or it serves liberal interests, and one of them must have adopted the model in error. This interpretation is suggested by Friedmann's (thoroughly worthwhile) attention to political challenges, just outlined. Yet he does make some attempt to locate underlying assumptions at a rather higher level of inclusiveness than "the cultural deprivation idea". He does not fully succeed, in that at least two of his three suggestions seem to be low-level parts <u>of</u> that idea, rather than higher level notions.

Friedmann's three suggestions are that

> "(a) our formal educational system, particularly in its success with middle class students, and in its practices since Sputnik, is essentially sound; (b) the educational improvement of culturally deprived children in the large cities is a worthwhile effort that can succeed even within the existing situation of de facto segregation; and (c) much progress can come about by giving head starts and special attention to individual children and categories of children, so that they will be helped to overcome some of the adverse conditions of their daily lives."
> Friedmann (1967/73) p.268.

The last two of these are not really assumptions on which the cultural deprivation model rests, but a part of that model. On the other hand, one could adhere to assumption (a) without accepting "cultural deprivation" and compensatory solutions. Taken with other underlying assumptions, the model follows from it.

Three suggestions made by Keddie?(1972)[10] go rather deeper than Friedmann's. She suggests that underlying much of the writing on "cultural deprivation" are three central assumptions:

(a) that what constitutes a "good home" is unproblematic;

(b) that child-centred education is intrinsically worthwhile, and

(c) that 'knowledge' corresponds to the external world to the extent that a child's maturational development can be assessed by reference to an already-known "normal" pattern of development for all children.

It is worth quoting at greater length from this third point.

> "The child's maturational ceiling is lowered so that 'normal development' is inhibited and he has poor concentration and memory. His perceptions are inadequate partly because of the lack of organisation of both time and space in the home and partly because this lack of organisation leads to a poorly structured environment in which the possibilities of learning to discriminate are few. This point ... invokes a correspondence theory which naïvely assumes that the ability to 'discriminate' matches the way things 'really are' and that what is 'out there' to be known can be known independently of the way any knower comes to know about it. The conclusion then emerges that 'culturally deprived' children fail to discriminate because they do not appear to discriminate in ways the standardised tests are designed to measure".
> Keddie ? (1972) p.119.

Now as with Friedmann's suggestions, Keddie's first ("good home") is clearly part of the cultural deprivation model, rather than underlying it. The second ("child-centred education") is less clear. The notion itself is ambiguous. One conclusion I would like drawn from this essay is that "child-centredness", whilst overtly unconcerned with the societal functions of formal education, cannot in fact be so isolated. As Hirst and Peters say,

> "This way of conceiving of education represents an escape from moral responsibility under the cover of a biological metaphor [of 'growth' or development]."
> Hirst and Peters (1970) p.31.

I would add that it is a political, as much as a "moral" issue. And it is not a question of abdication of responsibility, so much as a failure to acknowledge what responsibility is inevitably taken. Any failure explicitly to act on this is a political "decision", albeit one that is taken only implicitly. To access the underlying assumptions of educational ideologies, we must consider what is left unsaid, as much as what is

overtly considered.

Keddie's third point is an important suggestion. It is not, as the quotation shows, a single point, but rather a series of points. It encompasses two of the assumptions - namely those concerning an objectivated body of 'knowledge' and critical stages of development - which I have already suggested underlie all notions of educability, including "cultural deprivation". Both belong to the "Knowledge" dimension in educational ideologies. The first of Friedmann's suggestions, on the other hand,(the fundamental soundness of the education system) refers to the "Power" dimension, which concerns actual and desired social structures, and possible modes of change.

In spelling out in greater detail some of the arguments relating to "cultural deprivation", I have attempted not just to illustrate the Strange Bedfellowship phenomenon, but also to point in the direction required for a deeper understanding of this. It is not enough merely to list a series of apparently unconnected propositions that are either implicitly or explicitly assumed. Such lists/collections are inadequate in that they fragment the ideological 'realities' we are trying to grasp. It is essential to grasp the structural coherence of ideologies if we are to see how they relate to the Reality they supposedly reflect. The next example of Strange Bedfellows merges into the Happy Coincidence type of anomaly.

(2) Controversy and the Schools Council Humanities Project

I use the term "Controversy" to cover not just the argument or debate usually denoted, but also the positive evaluation placed

upon such argument. Parkinson and MacDonald, in discussing the Schools Council/Nuffield Foundation Humanities Project, define as "controversial"

> "problems about which people in our society advocate different courses of action."
> Parkinson & MacDonald (1972) p.299.

The basic rationale of the Humanities Project is that such problems and advocacies not only exist, but should do so: that tolerance of divergent opinions is a blessing. In this case, this is an educational blueprint. But it is also an important master pattern of advanced capitalism - or of the pluralism as which this is often presented:

> "Out of all of this history, one simple fact emerges for the radical intelligentsia, the old ideologies have lost their 'truth' and their power to persuade. ... In the Western world, ... there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralised power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended."
> Bell (1960/72) p.304.

> Mass society is a consensual society in the sense that there are "consensually legitimate institutions within which much of this conflict takes place and which impose limits on this conflict ... This consensus grows in part from an attachment to the centre, to the central institutional system and value order of the society. It is also a product of a newly emergent ... feeling of unity with one's fellow men ..."
> Shils (1962/70) p.304.

Others have pointed to, or been a party to, similar sentiments. Compare the"politics of non-decision making"of Bachrach and Baratz (1962); the "consensus within dissensus" of Bourdieu (1967/71); the "institutionalised conflict" of Coser (1956)

(nicely mocked by Mészáros, 1972); the "shared, stable system of beliefs and values" which, according to Anderson (1969) is the crucial precondition of Leavis' "interrogative form". This contributes to the de-politicisation of formal education[11] and flowers in the Controversy ideal of the Humanities Project. It is the cult of Strange Bedfellows - a sort of intellectual promiscuity - which officially sees no danger in this permissiveness. Yet behind this overt tolerance, there remains an acceptance of societal inequalities which only permit certain "autonomous" actions to be performed.

As Wolff et al. (1969) demonstrate,

> "Pluralism, both as a theory and as practice, simply does not acknowledge the possibility of wholesale reorganisation of the society ... [it] is fatally blind to the evils which afflict the entire body politic."
> Wolff (1965/69) pp. 59-60,

or, more damagingly,

> "What is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is, in many of its most effective manifestations, serving the cause of oppression."
> Marcuse (1965/69) p.95.

Many of the contributors to Sanford et al. (1971) make similar points. For example,

> "The capstone in the [advanced capitalist/U.S.] ideology is the concept of toleration. Tolerance has come to be a value more important than any particular social goal. Toleration was born as the grudging acceptance of facts of life - more specifically as acceptance of the fact that political loyalty need not require religious uniformity. Its subsequent history owes much to the competitive model of the market, but what is less appreciated is the reliance of the market on a situation relatively devoid of strong political commitment. Tolerance protects the realities of power from critical examination insofar as it justifies the avoidance of commitment and of the kind of confrontation which seems to be the only available device for

> revealing the power base of certain social institutions. Tolerance operates best where the issue is a matter of indifference to most people, or the major interest groups, or where procedural considerations are primary. Where the market principle itself is at stake, there is little toleration ... All is tolerated because little can be taken seriously. Values reduce to one denomination, diluting the moral quality of life ..."
> Drekmeier (1971) p.232.

Lest one be tempted to think that this refers only to the U.S., not to this country, one has only to consider similar cults of Controversy, from the B.B.C's Sunday Debate upwards.(12)

A further example can be seen in the reports of the Select Committee on Immigration and Race Relations. As Clarke et al. point out, the 1971 Report on Police/Immigrant Relations

> defined "the problem as one which is the result of faults on both sides, and solutions must therefore involve a degree of 'give and take' by both parties. It is an appeal which serves to prevent the possibility of deeper analysis ..." Clarke et al.(1974) p.6.

The Select Committee declared that

> "We have come to see communications as crucial. In the widest sense, they are at the root of the problem and the starting point of solutions of police/immigrant relations."
> Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (1971) Vol.I, § 307.

As Clarke et al. observe,

> "With that 'we have come to see', the illusion is complete."
> op cit. p.8.

It seems that tolerance is likely only where it is not believed to matter very much. Either the issues are seen as relatively inconsequential or, though important, they do not

directly impinge on the person who expresses tolerance. As Aimé Césare put it,

> "People are astonished, they are angry. They say: 'How strange that is. But then it's only Nazism; it won't last.' And they wait and they hope; and they hide the truth from themselves ... Yes, it is Nazism, but before they became its victims, they were its accomplices; that Nazism they tolerated before they succumbed to it they exonerated, they closed their eyes to it, they legitimated it, because until then it had been employed only against non-European peoples."
> quoted in Race Today, March 1970, p.ii.

Strangely, it was the perceived urgency of the situation that prompted some people to call for a deliberate and constructive introduction of "race" relations into school curricula.(13)

The Association of Teachers of English to Pupils from Overseas, for instance, in an editorial to its English for Immigrants, insisted that the explosiveness of the topic and its importance meant investigation was not needed as to whether, but when and how, there should be teaching about "race" relations. (ATEPO, 1971). Bhatnagar made a similar point. Noting that many teachers feared to "stir things up", he emphasised that

> "Children live in a social milieu where these controversial issues are very much part of their lives ... To say nothing about it in the school would simply reinforce the belief many children hold that what goes on in schools is irrelevant to the world outside."

He called for "frank discussion across the racial lines." (Bhatnagar, 1970, p.172). There is quite a literature on Education for "Racial" Tolerance(14), but one of the foremost textbooks for teachers is still Bibby (1959). He sets the scene for the Humanities Project Race Pack:

> "It is important that the teacher should provoke genuine discussion - not formal debate, which often tends to confirm speakers in their views and makes their abandonment a matter of loss of prestige - encouraging the pupils to express all points of view quite openly and freely. Any too obvious or premature disapproval of undesirable opinions may lead to their repression, but will not secure their eradication... Moreover, it must be remembered that the child who exhibits prejudice is as much in need of help as the child who is subjected to it, [and] should be treated by the teacher with the same sympathy and understanding ..."
> Bibby (1959) pp. 74-5.

The latter sophistry is clear witness that the unaffected can best afford to be tolerant.

The Schools Council/Nuffield Humanities Project adopted this tolerance-and-protection ethic:

> "Teaching must permit and protect divergence and maintain respect for individual opinions." Stenhouse (1969) p.128.

(Stenhouse was Director of the Humanities Project). But it also added a conscious attempt to change the teacher-pupil relationship in the use of its kits. The aim behind this was expressed thus:

> "If we are to move from [an] attitude of custodial containment to the desire to help pupils to cope with life after they have left school, we must at some time wean them from dependence on our authority."
> ibid, p.126.

The two objectives happily coincide in the Neutral Chairman role for teachers:

> "Neutral chairmanship is ... not only a professional ethic in controversial matters, but also the means to put responsibility on the pupils in the task of gaining understanding." ibid, p.126

In the same article, Stenhouse summed up the rationale

behind the Humanities Project as follows:

> "By definition, a controversial issue divides society, and hence divides pupils, parents, and teachers. This was our starting point. A democracy values a dialogue between informed views, rather than a consensus. Teachers whose views range over the whole spectrum of opinion will have pupils whose views and whose parents' views similarly diverge, so teaching should be based on open, but disciplined, discussion rather than on formal instruction. The Project is therefore committed to responsibility (the acceptance of one's own accountability) rather than to authority (depending for justification on others)."
> ibid, p.126-7.

Elsewhere, Verma and MacDonald (1971) have stated the following five premises on which they saw the Project to be based:

(a) controversial issues should be handled in classrooms with adolescents;

(b) the teacher should be neutral at this stage of education;

(c) the mode of enquiry in these controversial areas should be discussion, not instruction;

(d) divergences of views should be protected; consensus should not be enforced, and

(e) the teacher, as chairman, is responsible for the quality and standards of learning.

The difficulties encountered by both teachers and pupils in attempts to introduce Humanities Project materials and techniques generally are not what I want to discuss here. My concern is specifically with the "Race" kit.

The "Race" kit (Hipkin, 1971) was piloted by fifteen teachers. There was considerable opposition to its use. Despite defence by the Project team, the Schools Council

Programme Committee finally refused to sponsor publication, on the grounds that

> "some of the material in the pack is too disturbing or shocking - in terms of being 'disturbing' rather than 'sensational' - to be suitable material for teachers to give 14- to 16-year olds."
> Guardian, 20/1/72, quoted by Taylor (1974) pp.168-9.

Taylor comments that

> "this statement is rather extraordinary when the evidence of disturbing racial, religious and other political conflict situations are readily available, when and as they occur on TV screens, radio broadcasts and in the newspapers." Taylor (1974) p.169.

Her view is akin to that of A.T.E.P.O. and Bhatnagar, quoted earlier - that "race" relations issues have to be

> "discussed openly in a sympathetic atmosphere, rather than suppressed or channelled into violence."
> ibid, p.169.

She feels that there is a great need for materials from the Schools Council, since make-shift teacher-made materials may be more dangerous, and "time is running out" (p.169).

This was certainly the view of the Project team - including the final note of urgency. For despite the profession of professional indifference as to which divergent opinions were voiced in the Controversy situation, the team was very sensitive to charges that their "Race Pack" provoked "racial" antipathies, rather than assuaged them. Verma and MacDonald were keen to stress that despite the limitations of their evaluative techniques, they had found no marked deterioration in

attitudinal or personality characteristics among the pupils at pilot schools. (At the same time they insisted that no teachers had abandoned any of the five principals of the Project listed above.) In further self-defence, Stenhouse and Hipkin (1972) again showed their concern for attitude change (towards toleration), by pointing out that these had only been small because the kit had been in use for so short a time. But still the neutrality ethic prevailed. Parkinson (one of the fifteen teachers involved in the pilot experiment) wrote an article in conjunction with the Project evaluator, MacDonald (1972), in which he confessed that he got angry with white pupils for their insensitive and intolerant statements in the presence of Asian fellow-pupils. But he tried hard to suppress this anger, as his aim was to encourage the broadening of minds at the children's own hands. He feared that to express his own views would be to label himself and what he said as stereotypical "white liberal". This may well be true, but one cannot help wondering what label the pupils in the event found more appropriate.

Criticisms of the "Race" kit are predictable. On the whole critics saw it as qualitatively different from the Humanity Project's other kits. They attacked it on the grounds that the ("laudable") techniques and materials of the Project were inappropriate to the treatment of "race" relations. As Bolton and Laishley put it,

> "Race is not merely another controversial area, to be introduced as the subject of a debate or an odd general studies lesson. The deficiency of the much discussed Schools Council Race Kit lies in its treatment of race

> as one of a general package of controversial areas and in its presentation to schoolchildren of complex race relations material in a situation where there is virtually no back up from conventional school subjects. The educational response to race attitudes in children, to the demands of a multi-coloured Britain is not a peripheral matter; it lies in the mainstream of development of educational aims and objectives."
> Bolton & Laishley (1972) p.6.

Anne Dummett's criticisms were similar. She complained that the Project appeared to treat "race" in a vacuum, not realising that there are tensions, prejudices and injustices in schools already. The kit seemed to provide materials with no means of identifying the real problems at issue. The very selection of wide-ranging and "bitty" material (Chinese, German Jews, Eskimos, South Africa, U.S. ... and U.K.) nowhere put "race" into its societal context.

> "Everywhere it is isolated from other historical, social and political information. The effect of this selection is to emphasise that racial difference is itself a cause of problems: that is, to accept an essential assumption of racism itself." Dummett (1972) p.360.

Dummett's solution (for she too felt the need for a realistic - but non-neutral - introduction of "race" into the school curriculum) was to avoid teaching "race" as a subject, whilst refuting lies about "race" wherever they are commonly disseminated: in biology, history, geography, literature, religious instruction, etc..

Fewer critics, on the other hand, have tackled the Controversy assumption as such - which underlies all the Project materials. One who has is Holly. He has complained that

> "The Humanities Project eagerly embraced the Newsom doctrine of one learning for the able and another for the not-so-able."
> Holly (1973/74) p.54.

(Others have made the same point. See, for instance, White, 1969 ; Young, 1972/73). What is less commonplace in Holly's brief treatment is that he links this with the objectives and assumptions of the Project team.

> "What is at issue in the minds of the Humanities team ... is not the criteria and techniques of using and evaluating evidence, but the techniques of rational, urbane, liberal, middle class discussion." ibid, p.53.

This, according to Holly, is directly connected with Stenhouse's subject-specialism - English. Just as History for the "less able" becomes Social Studies, Geography becomes Environmental Studies and RK becomes Moral Education, so English is transformed into Humanities. Meanwhile the "literary culture" principles of Arnold, Leavis, Eliot and Lawrence live on.

What lives on, in other words, is a Basic Belief in Controversy - in tolerated Bedfellows, so long as the confines of disagreement are not breached. Interestingly, Stenhouse has not avoided spelling out what he sees those confines to be.

> "It is taken as axiomatic that certain values are inseparable from education and are not controversial." Stenhouse (1972), quoted Bolton & Laishley (1972) p.17.

These "values" are presumably the following:

> "Respect for persons, a preference for rationality rather than irrationality, sensitivity rather than insensitivity, imaginitiveness rather than unimaginitiveness, a readiness to listen thoughtfully to the views of others." Schools Council/Nuffield Foundation (1970) p.9.

The Humanities Project team stress the desirability of Controversy, assuming - and in some cases asserting - an

underlying convergence in certain obvious "truths" such as rationality, sensitivity etc.. This assumption allows them to devalue the arguments of critics, dismissing them as opposed to such values. Yet at the same time they feel obliged to find evidence of increased tolerance (Verma & MacDonald) - or at least of no increase in intolerance - resulting from the "Race" kit. Critics of the Project either deny the obviousness of this convergence and/or the inevitability that the Controversy/ Neutral Chairman technique will produce the kind of tolerance expected. The expectation of such tolerance pre-supposes convergent interests, for in the long run Strange Bedfellows can only be expected to agree to disagree if that agreement is not harmful to them.(15)

> "Individuals owe to their schooling, first and foremost, a whole collection of commonplaces, covering not only common speech and language but also areas of encounter and agreement, common problems and common methods of approaching those common problems: educated people of a given period may disagree on the questions they discuss but are at any rate in agreement about discussing certain questions ... Disagreement presupposes agreement on the areas of disagreement, and the manifest conflicts between trends and doctrines conceal from the people concerned in those conflicts the implied basic concurrence which strikes the observer alien to the system. The consensus in dissensus ... is rooted in the academic tradition..." Bourdieu (1967/71) p.191.

By the same token, schooling into this culture of tolerance is likely to be unsuccessful insofar as pupils fail to accept (tolerate/legitimate) their disagreements. One obvious reason why such failure might occur is that the attempt may be to induce tolerance of conflicts which arise in real-life antagonisms experienced directly by pupils - which "matter"

to them - even if they are of merely academic interest to Project teams and others.

In replying to critics, Controversialists are obliged to make more explicit the convergence of interests that they believe to exist in reality, and the lesson of tolerance they expect to be learned from this convergence. In doing so, they are proclaiming the Participation thesis, which is a Happy Coincidence rather than a Strange Bedfellow phenomenon.

(3) Parent and Pupil Participation

Controversy consists in a perceived dissensus beneath an umbrella of assumed consensus. This assumed consensus is largely implicit. It is a consensus of belief based upon an assumed convergence of (or non-antagonism of) interests. Beneath this umbrella, it is possible - even desirable, as in the work of Coser (1956), or Coleman (1957), or the Humanities Project team - to stress dissensus/disagreement. The consensus is so taken for granted, so "obvious", that it seems not to be under threat. Participation, on the other hand, has the same underlying model - consensus in dissensus - but the emphasis this time is explicitly on the consensus. Disagreements or conflicts are played down as relatively trivial, often delusory, or "extremist-inspired". The basic consensus is stressed to "prove" the triviality of these alleged conflicts.(16)

Belief Structures of Controversy and Participation



Thus actual or anticipated criticism of the Controversy thesis can convert it into the Participation thesis: as happened in the case of the Humanities Project "Race" kit.

Participation is a theme of our times, though it is not, of course, new. In the case of industry, Ramsay (1976) has suggested a cyclical pattern over the past century during which employers have seen it (sometimes more, sometimes less) in their interests to promote worker participation. Similarly, we often hear calls today for public participation in structure-planning, or motorway-planning, or school reorganisation planning. Antecedents to these calls can no doubt be traced to social imperialism and to the "Dunkirk Spirit" which more obviously informs such Participations as "Backing Britain". Devolutionary politics and the lengthy debates about Incorporation are clearly related issues.(17)

The subject of participation in education could be treated from a number of angles. The whole question of the autonomy of teachers and of schools is involved. In the U.S., the "who controls our schools?" debate has a much stronger (though not longer) tradition than it has in this country. Counts (1932)

sparked off the debate in the Progressive Education Association. Again, in the '50s, there was a spate of writing, following Hulburd's This happened in Pasadena.[18] Indeed, the debate has sometimes expanded to "Who rules America?"[19]

In this country there have been few comparably wide-read and influential publications. Indeed,the majority of writings on the subject have been in the decision-making/politics-of-education tradition, rather than that of radical politics.[20] The dominant idea is still one of schools being relatively autonomous institutions.

> "There can be few educational structures more flexible than the English state system. This has disadvantages (such as the difficulty of altering 'bad' schools) but lack of opportunity for innovation is not one of these. A colourful and variegated pattern of innovation is being attempted across the nation at all times and in everyday situations." Midwinter (1974) p.94.

However, the experiences of Duane at Risinghill, Mackenzie in Aberdeen, German at Mold, and the recent case of William Tyndale[21] suggest strongly that this "flexibility" is only limited autonomy.[21] Similarly, the supposed autonomy of the class teacher is complex, but on the whole exaggerated. The influence that teachers have even in the "teacher-dominated" Schools Council is remarkably limited (Young, 1972/73). What I want to consider here, however, is the Participation by parents and by pupils in the running of schools.

When the Advisory Centre for Education published a Where report advising parents on what methods were most effective in influencing L.E.A. policy, the Chief Education Officer for Bristol appeared on the B.B.C's "Nationwide" programme to

welcome the report (much to the interviewer's surprise).[23] What everyone wanted, he said, was that the best ideas be institutionalised, and this was only possible if these views were expressed and heard. He made, that is, a Controversy-based assumption that ideas expressed would be neutral and to the potential benefit of all. However, when parents in fact attempt to influence the policy or running of their children's schools, they are not always so welcome. To quote a transatlantic - but thoroughly relevant - experience,

> "The parents come up with a just and proper reason to place blame, and they get it instead. Up they come angry and with proper outrage. Off they go, humbled, sad, and weakly, having as it were apologised for the stupid thing they've tried to obtain. The look of embarrassed humility. The terrible parental horror that they may have made a bad mistake. Will their child now get punished? Will some kind of silent retaliation now take place? What right had they to complain? Wasn't it stupid? Wasn't it unwise of them when they were being received with so much politeness by one of the most respected old-time teachers in the city?"
> Kozol (1967/68) p.97.

Newell (1972) makes similar observations about parents who complain at the use of corporal punishment - and the fear of victimisation (e.g. pp.120-1). Parents are vulnerable because their children are vulnerable.[24]

This is not to say that parents are never listened to, of course. Kozol himself was dismissed following a complaint from a (white) parent, about the use in class of a poem by Langston Hughes. However, the experience of other (black) parents of children at Kozol's school suggests that it was not merely the fact that a parent had complained that prompted

this action. Rather it was the nature of the complaint. It accorded very much with the School Committee's own understanding of the fit role of a Boston schoolteacher.(25)

Though one must, of course, be cautious of too-easy generalisations, it seems that most issues where parents are involved tend to be of minor importance. Where more momentous decisions are to be made, parental participation is less welcome. According to Berg (1968), there was strong parental support for Duane at Risinghill. She describes the despair they felt at their inability to influence the decision as to whether the school should close (pp. 197-8, 211, 214). The much publicised pressure of parents of children at William Tyndale School, however, would seem to have been more in line with the inclinations of those already in power within the I.L.E.A.. An experiment in community control of schools in Brooklyn revealed similar weaknesses on the part of parents, when members of the Board of Education and its bureaucracy worked together with members of the teachers' union to destroy and discredit the community school board. This resulted in the withdrawal of funds by the Ford Foundation and the collapse of the venture (Berube & Gittell, 1969). Ribbich (1972/75) has also pointed to the fiction of community control in inner city U.S. schools.

It seems that the issues on which parents do become effectively involved tend either to be of minor importance, or are in accordance with the intentions of existing officials. Within less than three weeks of autumn 1974, for instance, there appeared in the Middlesbrough Evening Gazette no less than six

incidents of parental protest and action in Teesside - including the lobby of an M.P. and the with-holding of children from school. The issues were as follows: the provision of more school buses, the promptness of school buses, the placement of particular children in one school rather than another (two cases), the breakdown of heating in a school, and the provision of a safe street crossing. Six different schools were involved.[26] In at least one of these cases, the covert but active support of the headteacher played a significant part in the achievement of the parents' objectives.[27] The one genuinely controversial issue, however - the placement of children, a dispute which arose from the Education Committee's policy of trying to achieve a "social mix" - was doomed to failure. The same fate met an extremely vocal and hard-working action group that for some years lobbied and campaigned to obtain a secondary school in the town centre - after the Committee had adopted a policy (probably, but not officially, for "mix" reasons) of campuses in the suburbs.[28]

The promotion of community schools as a motivational inducement is by no means an unpopular idea.

> "In order to reduce poverty-related psychological and social problems in the U.S., the major community will have to change its relationship to neighbourhoods of poverty in such a fashion that families in the neighbourhoods have a greater stake in the broader society and can more successfully participate in the decision-making process."
> Haggstrom (1964), quoted by Bruner (1971/74) p.175.

But it is not clear that motivation to participate will produce any more genuine autonomy on the part of parents or "community". Indeed, such autonomy may be a prerequisite of such motivation.

Nor is it always at all obvious under what circumstances any realistic objective of radical change would manifest itself.

> "Although some minority subgroups have stressed total independence or, conversely, alliances with radical whites to change the entire economic structure, the overwhelming majority in the black and brown communities want to take over the schools so that their children can succeed in the present economic system ... Nevertheless, no amount of school control by blacks, browns, or women will create equality of opportunity in a racist and sexist economic and social structure. No amount of local control will attack the suburban preserves of the élite public schools."
> Carnoy (1972/75), Introduction, p.7.

Similarly, charges are sometimes levelled against the "relevant" education of community schooling (prompted, for instance, by Midwinter in Liverpool[29]) - that this will change nothing. If anything it may merely impede children's escape from their slum environment.

Yet the issue is not so clear-cut as this. Both Midwinter and Carnoy hope for some sort of communal entrepreneurship, whereby the experience of participation in schooling may not satisfy as an end in itself, but form the basis of radical political action.

> "/Local/ control may provide the type of leadership that, if it is not co-opted, may in turn create economic counter-institutions to employ and serve the community. This 'community mercantilism' is a real potential threat to the established structure." Carnoy, ibid,p.7.

In his book (1974), Carnoy rather lamely - and strangely, in view of the stark determinism of the previous 350-plus pages - proclaims that free schools are potentially

> "the strongest element in decolonizing people in the society and breaking down its hierarchical structures."
> Carnoy (1974) pp. 367-8.

Against this, one should consider Neave's judgment that

> "The paradox of the 'free school' movement is that, preoccupied with the reforms that might be necessary for the day after tomorrow, it is less interested in those taking place today ... Unless 'free schoolers' are prepared to battle for [the introduction of freedom of access and freedom to learn in one's own time] into state education, then theirs is a movement that cannot be regarded with any seriousness. If it remains on the fringes of state education, opposed to its extension to all children in a single type of school, or unprepared to face up to the major issues on current reform, the 'free school' must be seen as the break-up of radicalism in education, not the breakthrough."
> Neave (1974) p.250.

Neave sees free schools as merely participating in an overall schooling system, in which they can have no real potential for reconstructionist change. Indeed, in some areas, such as Liverpool, financial assistance is given by the L.E.A. to such schools

> "as a useful instrument for coping with the drop out problem ... The 'free schools' are being asked to take over the childminding aspects of education, keeping young people off the streets and, to some extent, off the labour market ..." ibid, p.247.

The conclusion must be that there is an empirical probability that "community" and parental participation in education may serve to incorporate rather than radicalise, to blinker and limit horizons rather than to promote politically effective action. At the same time this is not a logically necessary outcome, and the exercise of limited autonomy could provide the experience by which radical awareness could be created.(30)

Similar questions arise in the case of pupil participation in schools. Various rituals(31) have no doubt always been used

(whether or not deliberately) to promote commitment to schools' "official" values - and to legitimate their power structures. The "involvement" of children, be it as milk monitor or prefect, is an important aspect of this. Apparent autonomy (i.e. subjectively felt "autonomy") in the actual learning of "school knowledge" can be a mere extention of this.

School councils, aimed partly at providing "experience of democracy", but also (and by no means incidentally) at "involving" pupils, have been almost proverbial for their lack of real legislative power. Consider just two examples. First, Whitley Bay High School's council voted in favour of establishing a smoking room for senior pupils. The headmaster rationalised his veto as follows:

> "This is an educational establishment and we also have a responsibility towards health education. Smoking is known to be potentially extremely dangerous." The Journal, 1/3/75.

Second, in the case of Risinghill, the L.C.C. Inspectorate reported that

> "There is moreover some suggestion that some members of staff feel that the [school] council discusses matters which properly are the affair of the staff. It is clear that the fledgeling democracy of the school is in need of firm and discreet guidance by responsible adults." L.C.C. Inspectorate Report on Risinghill (1962), quoted by Berg (1968) p.131.

Autonomy, it seems - and indeed "democracy", even - has its limits, though one should be "discreet" about this.

Interestingly, neither of these examples concerns the overt function of the school, namely the transmission of educational knowledge - though the Whitley Bay headteacher rationalised as

if it did. It is in the selection and organisation of this[32] that the most complex questions arise. This is not to say, of course, that "non-academic" issues of control are any less tricky in practice. Indeed, the very definition of such areas is problematic. But, if "educational" includes all that teachers are both implicitly and explicitly expected to convey to their pupils, the essential dilemmas of the teacher-pupil relationship are highlighted.

Geer (1968/71) has suggested that there is necessarily conflict in any teacher-learner relationship.

> "In every teaching situation, the teacher is, at least temporarily, the superior and his pupil the subordinate." Teaching is "an assault on the self", so that "the absence, rather than the presence, of resistance requires explanation when one person seeks so much control over another." Geer (1968/71) p.3.

The fact of this inherent conflict[33] is an important observation, but it is equally important to realise that it is true only as an analytical statement. It is a long way from this to Holt's assertion that

> "Teachers feel, as I once did, that their interests and their students' are fundamentally the same ... [But] children in school are like children at the doctor's. He can talk himself blue in the face about how much good his medicine is going to do them: all they think of is how much will it hurt or how bad will it taste. Given their own way they would have none of it."
> Holt (1965/69) p.37.

Many of Geer's own assertions apparently assume that because (analytically) there is inherent conflict, then in practice this will always produce (at least latent) hostility.

Both Holt and Geer are talking about a particular society where this potential hostility is undoubtedly likely. But it is likely not merely because, psychologically, learners "naturally" resent "assaults on the self", but because the social relations of teaching are in most cases more fundamentally antagonistic. The teacher represents (is paid by and generally believes in) the ruling interests of the society, and these are not - in most cases - those of his pupils. Thus Geer is no doubt right when she says that

> "In so-called democratic teaching methods, interaction may seem to originate with the pupil, but all except the youngest sense the teacher's guiding hand and frequently resent the pretence." Geer (1968/71) p.4.

But she is talking about the U.S. state education system, not teacher-pupil relations per se (although her analytical statement quoted from page 3 was about them). In the context she is discussing those "so-called democratic teaching methods" are an exercise in Participatory "involvement". But teaching-learning is not necessarily antagonistic at the sociological level. Teachers' and learners' interests could in some contexts converge. The inherent inter-personal conflict to which Geer initially pointed is still analytically valid, but the societal context of the relationship over-rides this. Moreover, that societal context is necessarily there: teacher and pupil can only exist within a societal context. Certainly, the respective interests of teacher and pupil are extremely complex: short-term and personal, individual interests may not accord with long-term and objective class interests - quite apart from

subjective interpretations of these. It is the subjective interpretations and/or implicit beliefs that will determine how the inherent conflict manifests itself. The subordination of the learner may be wholly legitimated, even when to the observer his interests diverge from those of his teacher - and contrariwise. Disciples may willingly sit at the feet of their "master".

In this light,"so-called democratic teaching methods" have an added significance. If they are employed in a situation where the learners' interests do not correspond with those represented by the teacher, then their use is Participatory. It would be a Happy Coincidence if the learner acquired the 'knowledge' that promoted his own objective interests by such methods. That Happy Coincidence underlies much "progressive" educational thought. For example:

> "We cannot have real learning in school if we think it is our duty and our right to tell children what they must learn... The most we can do is try to help, by letting him know roughly what is available and where he can look for it. Choosing what he wants to learn and what he does not is something he must do for himself."
> Holt (1965/69) p.175.

"Real learning" here appears to be little more than that which is psychologically satisfying. It is autonomy to the child for its own sake. In practice, where the child learns little or nothing to advance his objective interests, then he has merely participated, not controlled. And however unintentially, this Participation may be promoted by the progressive teacher every bit as effectively as by some one who sees pseudo-autonomy merely

as a motivational device for the transmission of "colonizing" knowledge.

Apart from illustrating one kind of ideological anomaly, the foregoing offers clues as to how we might tease out some fundamental assumptions underlying such anomalies. Briefly, the motivational aspects of learning theory - such as a stress on "involvement" or Participation - need to be distinguished from the intended, expected and actual consequences of pedagogical styles, in terms of what 'knowledge' is (to be) acquired. Such 'knowledge' cannot just include overt curricular 'knowledge'. Also, and more importantly, it includes structures of belief about what constitutes -and what validates - reliable and worthwhile 'knowledge', about what constitutes "natural" authority and power relations, and about what are "realistic" modes of change in the case of these two.

One further aspect of pupil/student participation should be noted. The status of 'knowledge' acquired is intimately related to the objective relations between teacher and learner. The "Knowledge" dimension is inseparable from the "Power" dimension. One example will illustrate this in the context of student participation.

It has been said that "dialogue" is the "in-word" in the Open University. Dialogue can be fundamental to an autonomously created learning situation, and the term is clearly intended to accord with Freire's usage (1972, esp.Ch.3). But on the other hand it can merely mean "feedback", for participationist purposes.

> "Student feedback, of course, is essential. Nevertheless, it has severe limitations as a sole source of feedback. The main problem is that students - particularly if their own subjective judgments are asked for - are generally weak at suggesting how improvements might be made. This weakness is due to two reasons: the students do not know enough about the subject matter or teaching methods to know how else the subject matter might be taught; and if they are in difficulty, it may be impossible for them to be able to identify and explain the cause of their difficulty." Bates (1974) p.36.

It is not my purpose to challenge this assertion. But it is worth spelling out an important assumption that lies behind it. This is that there is a valid body of 'knowledge', which is already "there", which has already been mastered by teachers (and course team, in this case), and which has merits beyond and despite the appreciation of students. The problem, to Bates, is "merely" pedagogical. This assumption underlies any educational policy which employs teachers as experts - whatever the "democratic" or "dialogising" teaching methods employed. Whenever genuine control over the contents of educational 'knowledge' lies not with the learner, but with the teacher - when, in fact, the teacher is not indifferent to what is learned - then participatory aspects of that education will be primarily motivational. The objectives will be largely pre-determined.

This motivational aspect of participation is advocated by Bruner:

> "Share the process of education with the learner. There are few things so exciting as sensing where one is trying to go, what one is trying to get hold of and then making progress towards it ... There must be a system of counselling that assures better than now that the learner knows what he is up to and that he has some hand in choosing the goal. This may be raising the spectre problem of

> totally individualised instruction. But learning is individual, no matter how many pupils there are per teacher. I am only urging that, in the organisation of curricula, units, and lessons, there be option provided as to how a student sets his goals for learning."
> Bruner (1969/74) pp.132-3.

Clearly there are implicit limits to these options. The Happy Coincidence lies in two assumptions: first, that given efficient teaching what the learner opts for will (more or less) correspond to what the teacher wants and is able to make available; second, that what will thereby be learned will similarly correspond to what the teacher defines as educationally valid 'knowledge'. Both assumptions rely on a view that 'knowledge' and (expert) educators are pre-ordained. This is a doctrine which

> "necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, of which one is superior to society".
> Marx (and Engels[34]) (1845/88/1969) p.13.

The Structure of Ideological Anomalies

Strange Bedfellow anomalies are cases where different parties are expected by the observer to disagree, but found in the event to express agreement on certain issues. The expectation is based on an observation of different experiences and an understanding of differential interests. Assuming that observation and understanding to be valid, then the overt agreement cannot indicate identical belief structures.[35] Nonetheless, the agreement may be far from insignificant. A failure by the parties themselves to analyse the overall structure

of relevant beliefs may deceive them into believing that there is genuine agreement - and genuinely shared interest - with their bedfellows.

The agreement may, of course, be relatively trivial. The issue itself may be unimportant. Or agreement may only exist in certain superficial respects. But the agreement may be quite basic. Even though incorporated into different overall structures of belief, certain apparently distinct Basic Beliefs may be "shared". This could result from some universally experienced feature of the world-out-there. Or it could be a consequence of common experience of some historically situated occurrence, assumed by the parties concerned to be "universal", "natural" and "inevitable". For example, this might be the case of certain views of intelligence or family pathology, mentioned above. A particular theoretical account of "educability" may rationalise, and subsequently serve to legitimate, institutional arrangements which themselves continue to provide "evidence" of the theory's validity - though those arrangements only persist by virtue of that legitimation.(36)

Whilst Strange Bedfellows are, to the observer, unlikely combinations of people, united in a common adherence to certain beliefs, Happy Coincidences are the strange cohabitation of ideas - in the same person, or same section of society. The observer may see no reason why two contextually related beliefs should in practice be adhered to by the same person or section. They may appear to diverge, or even to contradict one another. One object in elaborating the structures of belief is to help the observer decide whether this intuited anomaly is indeed an inadequacy of belief. If it is so, he may then go on to consider its explanation and consequences.

On reflection and further examination, the observer may come to the conclusion that there is, after all, no logical inconsistency in the observed's beliefs. Two (or more) beliefs initially seen to be quite separate and inconsistent with each other may come to be understood as related at a higher level - though this may remain unrecognised by the believer/observed. (It will still remain to the observer, however, to decide whether he finds this overall structure adequate. He may yet find it either contextually or logically lacking).

On the other hand, the observer may see no logical reason why the two beliefs should coexist. They may belong to two quite distinct belief structures, which are not necessarily compatible with each other. If the two statements of belief are contained within a single account, then that account is inadequate. It may be delusory (contextually inadequate). There is also the possibility, however, that a contradiction in reality - in the real structure of social relations referred to - is itself responsible for divergent beliefs. In this case, a coherent account encompassing both beliefs must refer to this contradiction. (Presumably the observer's own understandings would attempt to do this.)

In the case of the Participationism illustrated in the last section, the same headteacher may apparently believe in the desirability of pupil autonomy in school councils, yet seem to belie this in vetoing decisions made by such a body. This does not necessarily mean that the first belief was insincere or half-hearted. Rather, that "autonomy" may have a particular

meaning which is considerably delimited by higher level beliefs in the right and duty of expert educationists to define what is educationally worthwhile. In this light, the pupil "autonomy" is not an absolute end in itself, but a motivational end to some greater educational purpose. Alternatively, that headteacher may genuinely desire pupil autonomy, but feel constrained by what he takes to be more powerful pressures to reject certain school council decisions. (He might well be right.) Clearly, we cannot be clear what a particular belief structure might be, without considerably more evidence of the empirical situation. (But the beliefs in question are an important part of that situation.)

In the cases of both Strange Bedfellows and Happy Coincidences, one can seek the high-level notions - frequently implicit - that make ideological anomalies possible. This is not to assume that people's accounts are always so coherent as to have some such unifying notion. On the contrary, I have pointed to possibilities of this not being so. In particular, the possibility of different relevance structures for different contextual situations is most important. But sometimes accounts are not shifting. They are not felt to be problematic, but are applied consistently and persistently to educational issues. This is so of the most significant educational ideologies.

In some instances, overt anomalies may be uninteresting or unsurprising. The "unifier" may be easily found and of no special consequence. Happy Coincidences are common but often explicable in straightforward terms. If I said that I intended to roast a

joint and bake a pie in the same oven, there would be nothing startling about this (were it not for my culinary limitations). My belief structure in this respect could be portrayed as:



Harré (1972) dismisses operationalism (the attempt to find objectivity by describing only in terms of laboratory operations, rather than in terms of phenomena observed) with this example:

> "The length of a field can be measured by the use of a tape or by the use of a theodolite, plane table and base line. The coincidence of the results of the two different operations of measurement is explained by the fact that both are different ways of measuring the same characteristic of the field, namely its length." Harré (1972) p.162.

Identity in reality is reflected in a convergence in 'reality'. A "coincidence" is explained.

To give another example, Mr. Taylor, Chief Education Officer for Leeds, comments on a "bonus":

> "I tried successfully to secure uniformity of holidays within the city for the convenience of parents with children at different schools and particularly of working mothers (including teachers). There was a bonus of economy here in having schools on holiday at the same time in that all central kitchens could be shut down and no transport to schools was required."
> quoted by Kogan & Van der Eyken (1973) p.174.

Now what Mr. Taylor delights in as a "bonus", or Happy Coincidence, is in no way mysterious. If we spell out an understanding of this occurrence it can be shown thus:



There was nothing "flukey" about this "bonus".(37)

In Happy Coincidences the unifying notions are frequently left implicit. Yet, to any but those who are constantly surprised by life's benificence, they must be implicitly assumed. If we attempt to spell the "unifiers" out, we can hope to obtain a better picture of the subjects' understandings of reality.

One final example should bring out the sorts of underlying assumption that are most important in educational ideologies. I quote from Hirst (1969/71).

> "Can there in fact be genuinely universal (educational) objectives? Irrespective of the kinds of institutions that we have, does it make sense to set about trying to achieve the same ends with pupils whose IQs are about 120, and those whose IQs are, say, well below 100? Is it that we need different means for different pupils, or must we formulate different, but equally justifiable, ends? ... In fact, how far does it really make sense to talk of educational objectives as alternatives?" (p.236).

Hirst seeks

> "to know how these objectives are related to each other ... What, in other words, are the structural or logical features of the objectives we are interested in, features we cannot ignore if our curricula are to be coherent?" (p.237).

He goes on to distinguish between seven or eight "cognitive structures",

> "each of which involves the making of a distinctive form of reasoned judgment and is, therefore, a unique expression of man's rationality." (p.242).

They are as follows:



"These would seem to me to me the logically distinct areas, though this division might well be disputed..." (p.243)

Hirst goes on to say that

> "Education ... [is] the prime function of the school." (p.245).
> "If once the central objectives of rationality are submerged, or are given up so that these other pursuits [e.g. vocational skills; 'interest'] take over, then I suggest the school has betrayed its educational trust, no matter how successful it may be in these other respects, and no matter how laudible these other ends may be in themselves." (p.245)
>
> "We can have no adequate grounds for forsaking a child's progressive initiation into all the distinctive forms of rationality, until we have done everything in our power to achieve this." (p.245).

> "It is imperative that we find courses involving these central elements that all pupils can take successfully. I see no adequate grounds for saying this is impossible when we have in fact spent so little of our effort trying to achieve this. Such courses need not be identical for all pupils in spite of their common objectives and a likely high degree of common content." (p.246).

My object here is not to disagree with what Hirst has to say. It is to spell out the implicit structure of what he says and to identify the fundamental assumptions. On the basis of these short passages, the following might not be over-simplified:



Underlying Hirst's prescriptions are certain basic assumptions. Amongst them are these: firstly, children are markedly different in their intellectual potential; this inequality is inevitable. Secondly, there is a definable and universally valid body of 'knowledge', which, though Hirst may not yet have completely mastered it (" ... this division might well be disputed ..."), is also given. Thirdly, the fact that the children's inequalities are based upon their actual or potential grasp of this

"rationality" is regrettable, perhaps, but inevitable. Schooling should not involve itself in objectives which in any way devalue the status of this sort of "rationality".

Contained here, then, are assumptions about objectivated bodies of 'knowledge', about children's potential and about the relationship between these two. Assumptions are also implicitly contained about the (rightful) role of valid 'knowledge' - the interactional and the societal relations that presuppose and follow from adherence to this version of "rationality". These inter-related "Knowledge" abd "Power" dimensions are what now need to be elaborated.

Notes

(1) Related to this is the "Greek colonel effect" in referencing: where a writer quotes a statement seemingly in support of his arguments, but which was made by someone who would not, in fact, offer such support, if asked. Pluckrose (1975) opens his book on open education with a quotation from Gerassimos Frangatos, Greek Education Minister, in 1971. The Greek government at that time was not noted for its promotion of curiosity and "open" thinking.

(2) The literature on "cultural deprivation" is vast, it being the popular paradigm of educational underachievement over the past 20 years. Extensive bibliographies can be found, for instance, in Bloom et al. (1965) and in Frost and Hawkes (1966). An overview with particular reference to Britain is Kelsall and Kelsall (1971).

(3) e.g. Bullock Report, 1975. A review of strategies of compensation can be found in Little and Smith (1971). The Schools Council Compensatory Education Project has produced a number of publications. Chazan and Williams (1968) contains a bibliography of these. For a wide variety of U.S. compensatory programmes and techniques see Bereiter and Engelman (1966); Deutsch et al.(1967); Deutsch and Goldstein (1965/68); Passow et al. (1967);

Witty (1971).
For the EPA project schemes, see Halsey (1972, ed.). For work by the NFER see also Quigley (1972).

(4) cf McClelland (1955, ed.).

(5) cf Strodtbeck (1958/61); Rosen (1956). For a fuller treatment of some of these issues, with many more references, but a somewhat inadequate analysis, see Syer (1972).

(6) cf Bernstein (1971/73), especially chapter 7 (first published in 1965).

(7) See also Davies (1970/71) p.111.

(8) See Coulthard (1969/72) for criticism of this cross-disciplinary (integration !?) nature of Bernstein's theories of linguistic codes.

(9) The allegation is perhaps unfair, in that lipservice was undoubtedly paid by those whom he accuses, to precisely these problems. See Floud and Halsey (1958).

(10) I take Keddie to be the anonymous writer of this OU unit. See also her introduction to Keddie (1973,ed.).

(11) cf Althusser's educational ISA which works only because it is "covered up and concealed by a universally reigning ideology of the school, universally reigning because it is one of the essential forms of the ruling bourgeois ideology: an ideology which represents the school as a neutral environment purged of ideology ... where teachers /are/ respectful of the 'conscience' and'freedom' of the children who are entrusted to them ... by their parents ..." Althusser (1971/72) p.261.

(12) Amongst the "lively discussions" engaged in by opposing teams during 1974 and 1975 were those on the Aim of Ever-increasing Growth, the Disciplining of Children, the Power of Trade Unions, Independent schools, and "Are we getting equality at the expense of quality in education?" (which took Equality as given and only Quality as problematic).

(13) I say 'strangely', because one fruit of this call was the Humanities Project "Race" kit, with all its accompanying tolerance of disagreement - tolerance of intolerance - the blessing of Controversy.

(14) See Domnitz (1965, ed.); Bolton & Laishley (1972), and New Community (2), 1973. Simpson & Yinger (1972) and Bibby (1959) are standard "textbooks". For further references, see Taylor (1974) p.138 ff; Milner (1975), and Bhatnagar (1970).

(15) That is, one would expect in the long run to find a congruence between objective/functional interests and subjective perception of interests. At the same time of course, that perception may be - and frequently is - inadequate. All I am suggesting here is that a non-exploitative/manipulative insistence on tolerance implies a belief in its justice, and that this belief may be delusory.

(16) In case the point is not clear, perhaps I should re-emphasise that I am not primarily talking about real (objective) interests here. I am talking about people's perceptions of (or assumptions about) those interests. Thus a convergence of perceived or assumed 'interests' - i.e. consensus - may or may not correspond to a real convergence - non-antagonism. Of course, as I warned above, I am naturally choosing examples where in my opinion such a convergence in reality is far from certain.

(17) I would not, of course, wish to over-simplify the relationship between these various themes - but fortunately it is not the place to elaborate upon them here. In the meantime, it can be noted in passing that colonial administration was in many cases consciously developed on Participationist lines - a theme that is, I think, relevant to education policies in underdeveloped countries today. The lesson was not lost in the U.S. either:

> "It is only after months or years of administration, and sometimes not even then, that a Military Government officer or colonial administrator learns the virtues of 'opposition face'. By this is meant that the native leader or appointed official must be allowed some leeway to oppose the occupying administration for the purposes of his public, in order that he may the more successfully carry through the main and essential necessities of government for the maintainance of law and order. This is simply good political horse sense. One good reason for giving native leaders some sense of responsibility (not necessarily for policies, but rather for methods and procedures for carrying them out) is to avoid too much paternalism. This latter is stultifying and may lead to complete lack of co-operation on the part of the people. A reasonably alert and satisfied population is amenable in terms of labour procurement and any other problems of administration requiring the co-operation of the people."
> Embree (1949), quoted Anderson (1969) p.266.

(18) See Cremin (1962) passim, but especially p.259 ff and p.341 ff.

(19) This is the title of Demhoff (1967). He quotes the chairman of the Board of Rochester University (also President of Xerox):

> "To put it as crassly as possible, it's a matter of sheer self-interest - dollars and cents. Xerox will live or die by technology." (quoted, Ohliger & McCarthy, 1971, p.60).

(20) The academic-administrator still dominates - see for instance, Fowler et al. (1973, eds.); Kogan (1975). Contrast Locke (1974); Male (1974); Thompson (1970, ed.)

(21) See Berg (1968); TES 11/4/74 p.4, 14/2/75 p.2, 24/10/75 p.6; Gretton & Jackson (1976).

(22) cf Blau & Schoenherr (1971) who talk of "new forms of power ... emerging in a contemporary society", which point to indirect and long-range forms of control in other (non-school) organisations.

(23) 19/5/75.

(24) See Henry (1966/71) for a discussion of Vulnerability in Education.

(25) The report by a Boston School Committee member on Kozol's dismissal is an interesting example of Autonomy Allowed, and also of the cultural deprivation model.

> "Mr.Kozol was advised and counselled by his Principal ... and his Supervisor ... to restrict his reading and reference materials to the list of approved publications ... It has been established as a fact that Mr. Kozol taught the poem 'Ballad of the Landlord' to his class and later distributed mimeographed copies of it to his pupils for home memorisation. It is also true that a parent of one of the pupils registered a strong objection to the poem to the school principal ...
> It has been stated quite adequately that the curriculum of this particular school, which is saturated with compensatory programmes in an effort to specially assist disadvantaged pupils, does allow for innovation and creative teaching. However, this flexibility does not and should not allow for a teacher to implant in the minds of young children any and all ideas. Obviously, a measure of control over the course of study is essential to protect the 94,000 Boston school children from ideologies and concepts not

acceptable to our way of life. Without any restrictions, what guarantees would parents have that their children were not being taught that Adolf Hitler and Nazism were right for Germany and beneficial to mankind? Mr. Kozol, or anyone else who lacks the personal discipline to abide by rules and regulations, as we all must in our civilised society, is obviously unsuited for the highly responsible profession of teaching. In conclusion, I must add that Mr. Kozol did bring to his pupils an enthusiastic spirit, a high degree of initiative, and other fine qualities found in the best teachers..." Kozol (1967/68) pp. 211-213 (my emphasis).

(26) Middlesbrough Evening Gazette, 24/9/74, 26/9/74, 1/10/74, 4/10/74, 10/10/74 (two incidents).

(27) Information from fieldnotes.

(28) See Secondary Education for the Town Area (1973).

(29) cf Midwinter (1972).

(30) For reasons of space as well as limited empirical research on the subject, I have consciously omitted any discussion of Parent-Teachers Associations, of the Confederation for the Advancement of State Education and of the National Association of Governors and Managers. Although I have not conducted any specific research, my own experience as committee member of two P.T.As - once as teacher and once as parent - as a committee member also of a local CASE group, and as a research-observer in a number of schools does not lead me in any way to revise my estimate of parental power. Bacon (1976) suggests that in the relatively "progressive" Sheffield L.E.A., election of parent-governors has served to promote the legitimacy of government by "professionals", rather than opening up greater opportunities of parental control.

(31) cf Bernstein et al. (1966/71).

(32) cf Bernstein (1971); Syer (1974a).

(33) The distinction, here, between functionally objective (sectional or class) interests and subjectively perceived (individual) interests presents four possible conditions, according to whether those of teacher and pupil correspond or not:

		Objective Interests: Same	Objective Interests: Different
subjectively perceived 'interests':	Same	A	B
	Different	C	D

Geer's analysis appears to put any teacher-learner relationship into box D, justifying this largely on psychological grounds. See also note 15 above.

(34) cf Draper (1971) p.96.

(35) cf Corrigan & Frith (1975/76), who challenge the "incorporation" thesis on the grounds that in a class society working class experience can never be identical to middle class experience, and that therefore dominant beliefs must always have different meanings to different people.

(36) cf Pidgeon (1970), referred to above. In an earlier draft of Syer (1976a), I outlined some of the underlying assumptions in President Nyerere's "Education for Self-Reliance". Most significant were his assumptions about learning theory and the need for expertise which had direct parallels in the prescriptions of colonialist administrations. These are directly related, I suggest, to continuities in the global situation of post-independence Tanzania. (See, e.g., Hirji, 1974?)

(37) This holiday example is also interesting in that it is the "convenience"/benificence motive that is given as the "real" reason for synchronising holidays, whilst the economy involved comes (overtly) as a "bonus". One wonders with much such "ideological pragmatism" (cf. Williamson, 1975) which objective in reality has priority.

CHAPTER 7

DIMENSIONS OF EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGIES

Universals and Relevances

Before seeking the determinants or consequences of particular belief structures, we must have some understanding of what they are, of how they are constituted. This is firstly a question of conceiving of those structures of belief. For this I have proposed the "tree-root" metaphor and two logical dimensions (of adequacy). Secondly, it is a question of contextuality. Pragmatic adequacy, according to the observer's understanding of other people's beliefs and of their context, is one side of this. The other side is Relevance. If we are to compare the beliefs and understandings of different people or different sections, then either the various beliefs must be structured according to the same Relevances, or differences in Relevance angle must themselves be an object of inquiry.

Strong beliefs (Value-Knowledge) are rigidified belief structures. They are strongly believed insofar as they are not fluid, variable and arbitrary fantasies. This rigidity applies not just to the logical structure of the beliefs, but to the Relevance angle according to which notions are held about the world-out-there. Through experience, people tend to acquire beliefs which are fixed, as it were, into certain channels. Given such-and-such a context, appropriate beliefs consistently operate.

A particular Relevance could not invariably be the only, or most appropriate, way of viewing particular kinds of context unless that Relevance were universal. Yet if there were, universally, some moment of experience - whatever the societal context - then it might be possible to talk of The Relevance Angle for considering that experience.

Some writers have asserted that there are cultural or societal universals. Homans (1961) sought the elementary forms of human existence in psychological terms. Durkheim (1912/15) examined elementary forms of religious life. Marx and Engels (1845-6/1969) proposed the existence of five "moments", universal to historical human existence: the production of the means of subsistence, the production of new needs, the reproduction of people (through family), social communication, and consciousness. Levi-Strauss (1955/63) proposes three cultural universals in semiotic, kinship and economic-technological systems. I suggest that in considering education, two dimensions are universally relevant, namely "Power" and "Knowledge". Basically these concern relations firstly between the learner and his Real context, and secondly between the learner's beliefs and understandings and the 'realities' of others in his society or social group.

It is only possible to talk of the universality of dimensions. I suggest that in educational beliefs, the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions are universally relevant. But even then, we are unlikely to find universal manifestations, on these dimensions. We can expect, in considering educational issues, to find (universally) some beliefs about "Knowledge" and "Power".

But we cannot expect to find the same sorts of beliefs on these dimensions, regardless of context.

In trying to operationalise these dimensions for empirical investigation, the observer must be aware of what it is that he is imposing on the data. He may suggest (on each universal dimension) certain lower level Relevances, as one way of considering those data. Having made that suggestion, he may seek exhaustive categories at that level, saying that from this point of view (Relevance angle) we might expect such-and-such types of belief. But he must recognise that they are his categories which he is then employing, according to the way he has decided to consider the data. He cannot legitimately proceed to declare that there really are these types of belief in the world-out-there (unless some further justification exists for such an assertion, in terms of further (lower level) universal dimensions).

In the rest of this chapter I assert the basic Relevance with which I am concerned - namely, learning/education - and suggest that in this case there are two universal dimensions. Any learner is subject to two kinds of relationship: with societal context and with other (objectivated) 'knowledge'. Accordingly, any one involved in education - whether as teacher, administrator, theorist, student, etc. - must have some beliefs (however implicit and however inadequate) about these sorts of relationship, along these dimensions. But the particular manifestations will depend on non-universal circumstances. So, when I suggest that we might consider educational ideologies in terms of this or that sub-category on the "Knowledge" and

"Power" dimensions, this is a suggestion only. It is one that I believe to be heuristically useful.

"Knowledge" and "Power" Dimensions

In this section, I elaborate one way of considering the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions, in educational belief and practice. A major theme will be not just the relationships, respectively, between subjective and objectivated 'knowledge' and between learner and others in society, but these relationships over time. This dimension concerns (notions of) change. Educational beliefs are always contexted in time. Implicitly or explicitly, they always refer to the fact, desirability, possibility and inevitability of change (or lack of it) in the relationships concerned.

The main operationalising concepts to be elaborated in Part III are Openness and Closure. Closure is quite central to the notions of Value-Knowledge and ideology, for the strong beliefs (Value-Knowledge) that "motivate" behaviour are strong by virtue of the rigidification of their structures. That rigidification constitutes closure. To be unable to see particular phenomena except in restricted and rigidly pre-determined ways is to lack notional openness. It is to lack Curiosity. Belief is closure, whilst the creative acts of thought and reflection are openness. At the same time, the possibility of openness - in certain areas, or certain respects - can come to be believed in.(1) By"closure" I do not mean "constraint", although

closures may constitute constraints. Constraints are real impediments to change, or to alternative courses of action. Closures are beliefs, generally implicit, in the facticity of such constraints. Someone who believes, for instance, that children of a certain age are incapable of acquiring certain skills or understandings, has belief closures in this respect. Were such a belief an adequate representation of reality, then the equivalent incapacity of children would be a constraint.(2) To talk of closures of belief does not necessarily reflect on the validity of those closures. It does, however, suggest that the issue might be open to question. Subjectively (introspectively) it makes such questioning possible.

In approaching both the issue of change and that of openness, I shall employ a four-part distinction made briefly in Chapter 2, between beliefs about what Is, what Could Be, what Has To Be, and what Should Be. This is only one approach, out of many that might be taken. It is important to note that a belief that a certain state of affairs must inevitably exist ("is natural") functions prescriptively. It is not just descriptive. One may explicitly believe that something should not be, yet fatalistically believe it to be inevitable. In such a case an implicit prescription may be functionally the same as if the situation were believed to be ideal. (The possibility or probability of beliefs being made open may, however, vary).

I am here talking about ideology and belief - what are taken to be, rather than what actually are, real constraints.

In discussing the "Power" dimension, therefore, I am not dealing with actual social relations so much as understandings and beliefs about them. Beliefs in part determine behaviour. Insofar as certain ideological closures are widespread, they may be institutionalised as Objectivated 'Knowledge'. As we have seen, the interdependence of Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Social Reality - and therefore of the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions of educational ideologies - is inevitable. Because of this interdependence, some of the distinctions made below may appear a little untidy. Hopefully, however, the very nature of this interdependence is rendered that much more problematic and thereby the object of reflection, in practice.

The basic distinction made in identifying the "Knowledge" dimension is between Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'. Each of these, however, is differently related to the referred-to Reality. By considering whether people see these relationships as actual, desirable, inevitable and possible (viz. the Is, Should, Has-to-be and Could-be dimensions) we may arrive at a four-part typology of perspectives, with regard to the "Knowledge" dimension. This may be further simplified to a single dichotomy. The argument is summarised in the following table and diagram:



Typology of perspectives on "Knowledge" dimension

Objectivated 'Knowledge')(Reality
/What is and what is learnable/
'knowable': epistemology/

Subjective 'Knowledge')(Reality /What could be learned, by whom: learning theory/

	Closed	Open
Closed	"Determinist"	("Relativist")
Open	("Liberal")	"Voluntarist"

* "X)(Y" denotes "the relationship between X and Y".

The question of Is, Should-be, Has-to-be and Could-be might be posed in a number of ways, about both the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions. I am suggesting that this way is heuristically useful. Briefly, we have epistemological questions about the nature and possibility of knowledge. What, in short, is valid Objectivated 'Knowledge'? Within a given societal context, beliefs about such issues will in practice be inseparable from evaluative ones - about what 'knowledge' is valuable, as well as what is valid. This latter concern, however, relates more directly to the "Power" dimension. We also have learning theory questions. What is it possible for specific individuals or categories of individuals to learn, under certain conditions? These will most probably be enmeshed with assumptions about necessary limitations (or lack of them) in respect of leadership or pedagogy. The latter is again more directly a matter of "Power", or social relations. The two questions most specifically to do with "Knowledge" remain. These may be seen in terms of openness or closure, firstly about the supposed constraints of Reality - what may or may not be learned, by virtue of being valid or otherwise; and secondly about the supposed constraints of individual (or category) capacity to learn - who may or may not learn such-and-such skills and understandings, by virtue of their genetically or environmentally determined capacities.

According to these predominantly "Knowledge" questions, we might conceive of four possible perspectives on "Knowledge". A "Deterministic" view would entail closure in respect of both

'knowable' reality and individual learning capacity. Bodies of 'knowledge' would be already "fixed" - at least potentially.(3) Personal limitations would also be "determined" by prior circumstance.(4)

The "Voluntarist" point of view would be the opposite in both respects. No predefined bodies of 'knowledge' would be assumed to have any necessary basis in Reality. In principle, people create their own beliefs, which are all equally valid. Similarly no person is determinatively fixed in potential. All have a virtually infinite capacity to learn or create. The other two positions, according to this schema, differ either in terms of epistemological or learning theory issues. The "Relativist" may hold that no 'knowledge' is (or can be) certain truth, but nonetheless hold deterministic views about individual learning, such that circumstance determines belief. The "Liberal", on the other hand, may stress an open view of learning theory, with much importance attached to subjective creativity and discovery. Yet he may assume that what is learned is ultimately determined by the nature of Reality - which is probably more or less what "experts" already 'know' or suspect.

Turning to the "Power" dimension, we see how closely this is related to the questions raised above. All the questions already asked relate also to the "Power" dimensions. They might be reduced to two aspects concerning on the one hand the Learner and on the other the Teacher. The following diagram and table summarise the argument:



Teaching
(Who is competent and entitled to frame 'knowledge'):

Learning (Who is able and entitled to learn):	Closed	Open
Closed	"Inegalitarian"	("Relativist"?)
Open	("Liberal"?)	"Egalitarian"

Again the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions are inextricably linked. For beliefs necessarily refer to (a supposed) Reality and they are also necessarily a part of the contextual Reality. Beliefs

about what 'knowledge' is valid and valuable and about how it is to be transmitted (or discovered) must always have implications for social relations also. These implications will be at least implicitly incorporated with all educational belief structures. Assumptions about the need for experts and about the nature of their expertise bridge both dimensions, in the case of teaching. In the case of learning, the perception of inequalities of capacity and a prescription of unequal resource provision similarly bridge the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions. They are predominantly questions of "Power", in that they concern the social relations of learning, rather than the creation or determination of 'knowledge'.

Four types of perspective on "Power" in education can be distinguished as follows. The "Inegalitarian" viewpoint holds that only a minority of people are able and entitled to decide what is valid 'knowledge' and how it should best be taught. Only a minority - or at least a limited number - can or should be initiated into this 'knowledge'. The "Egalitarian" position holds that everyone is both able and competent to decide what is worthwhile 'knowledge'. All should be equally enabled to acquire or create it. The other two positions foresee actual or desired limitations in one respect or the other. The "Relativist" may believe that everyone is in principle able and entitled to decide what 'knowledge' is valid and valuable. Yet (perhaps because of temporary, historically situated, constraints) not everyone may have the opportunity to pursue this 'knowledge'. The "Liberal", on the other hand, may feel

that in principle anyone can compete for (or have access to) bodies of 'knowledge'. But these are valid and valuable only insofar as they are defined as such by a limited number of "experts".

The above is only one way of considering the two universal dimensions of "Power" and "Knowledge" in educational ideologies. It is exploratory rather than conclusive. In Parts III, IV and V, I look more closely at certain notions of "Open Education". I shall stress that opennesses on the "Knowledge" dimension are frequently accompanied by continued closures on the "Power" dimension. In much "progressive" educational thought, the "Power" element is either ignored or supposed to be distinct and irrelevant. It is not. It is inherent in all learning contexts and processes and therefore in all education. Before turning to "Open Education", I wish to develop what has just been said a little further. For it is also relevant to a consideration of Master Patterns transmitted through schooling and of assumptions that underlie "hidden curricula".

Educational Ideologies and Master Patterns

Ideology in education can be considered at two levels. On the one hand, Educational Ideologies provide the implicit and explicit "motives" of the educational administrators, politicians and practitioners who attempt to organise education systems in accordance with what they see as "natural" and situated constraints. On the other hand, education <u>is</u>, in an

important sense, the transmission of ideology - at least as much as it is the creation of new 'knowledge'. Much has been written about this ideological function of schooling, though the term "socialisation" may have been used and the interest-specificity of ideology may have been played down.(5) Those who have seen "socialisation" as the reproduction of ideology(6) have generally failed to demonstrate how it is that what is learned at school becomes relevant in adult society. It is not immediately obvious why the patterns of social relations that are the hidden curriculum of school teach beliefs that are unquestioningly determinative of subsequent political and economic behaviour. Further, there is no clear account of how educational ideologies are themselves reproduced:



Schooling may well reproduce ideology. The problem I am addressing is how this may happen - rather than why it does. We must understand what ideological beliefs (Value-Knowledge) are, in terms of their adherence and of their structuration. I have suggested that these are two sides of the same coin: that beliefs are "valued" (adhered to) insofar as they are rigidly structured. I have also stressed that beliefs are necessarily contexted. In this section I look at this

contextuality of ideological beliefs. How do beliefs learned in one context apparently "transfer" to other contexts? This is the question of Master Patterns.

In discussing the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions, it became clear that though these dimensions may be analytically distinct, they are in practice complexly interdependent. The reason for this is that Objectivated 'Knowledge' includes 'knowledge' about social relations, which are the content of the "Power" dimension. It was convenient, in the last section, to allow "Objectivated 'Knowledge'" to include such social (and societal) relations as well as other aspects of what, in any given societal context, is taken to be "true". From one Relevance angle, they are, after all, not qualitatively different. In this section I shall concentrate on social relations as a function of objectivated belief, in order to throw light on the Master Patterning of ideologies transmitted through schools. This involves some simplification of distinctions made in the last section. In particular empirical instances one would have to look again, to ensure that such simplification was not excessively distortive.

If the <u>only</u> aspect of Objectivated 'Knowledge' with which we were concerned were that of social relations, then the "Power" dimension might be simplified to a dichotomous Inegalitarian/Egalitarian dimension. This could be related to a similarly dichotomous "Knowledge" dimension, which would now largely be a matter of learning theory. The result bears obvious similarities with the two four-part typologies already suggested.

In a way it is an amalgam of the two.

Typology of educational ideologies

"Power" \ "Knowledge"	"Determinist"	"Voluntarist"
"Inegalitarian"	"Productionism"	"Participationism"
"Egalitarian"	"Vanguardism"	"Redistributionism"

A typology such as this is not, and cannot be, a classification of Real ideologies. It is an abstraction, a device, which I find useful for organising certain thoughts about the "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions. We can universally expect some beliefs along these two dimensions, amongst people concerned with education. It is not legitimate, however, to expect those beliefs to be of a particular kind, or one of a particular set of types. Nonetheless, according to the Relevance here chosen, the above four "types" have a fairly wide application. I shall illustrate this with a few examples and then discuss their usefulness as clues to Master Patterns in education (and in society).

The Productionist point of view is characterised primarily by its view of 'knowledge' as closed and pre-determined and of the need, consequently, for experts to lead the unknowing.

> "Because this educational process of cultural transmission is very largely imitative, it is always deeply conservative." Leach (1969/73) p.43.

What Popper calls the "élite theory of manifest truth" fits neatly into this "type".

> "There may be certainty, but there cannot be certainty for all. In historical fact at least some are called upon to discover and communicate such certainty; thus some acquire an especially intimate relation to truth."
> Dahrendorf (1967) p.160.

Such views are frequently institutionalised in formal education. It is in that institutionalisation, of course, that ideologies themselves become objectivated. They thus become the source of experience and hence of beliefs. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education[7] justified the maintenance of élite universities in the United States, with the following quotation:

> "All civilised countries ... depend upon a thin clear stream of excellence to provide new ideas, new techniques, and the statesmanlike treatment of complex social and political problems."
> Sir Eric Ashby, quoted by Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973).

The English education system has many Productionist assumptions institutionalised in it, whether these be seen as rationalisations of class power, or as notions that have developed in a relatively autonomous manner.[8] On the question of learning theory, many accounts of educability[9] converge with these societal views of leadership and limited expertise.

> "Whatever stage might have been reached by a particular pupil, the majority of secondary school pupils up to the mental age of sixteen years seem to be at the concrete operational level of thought. The syllabuses <u>should therefore be organised</u> to take account of the limitations in pupil's reasoning."
> Hallam (1969), quoted by Bantock (1971) p.256 (my emphasis).

It is not at all uncommon to find Piaget's stages of development taken as determinative, rather than descriptive, as in this passage. This is frequently used, moreover, to justify qualitatively (and quantitively) differential educational provision.

The "Determinist" elements that Productionism shares with Vanguardism are indicated in the following complaint by Freire:

> "Revolutionary leadership falls into internal contradictions which compromise its purpose, when [i.e. if ?], victim of a fatalist concept of history, it tries to domesticate the people mechanically to a future which the leadership knows a priori, but which it thinks the people are incapable of knowing. In this case, revolutionary leadership ceases to be utopian and ends up identified with the Right ...." Freire (1970/72) p.72.

Where Vanguardism differs is in the assumption that social inequalities - and inequalities of learning capacity, too - are temporary, historically situated and remediable. There is a long-term vision of equality or classlessness, toward which leadership is directed.

> "Consciousness is ideological because it is powerless. When it becomes the determining factor, it sheds its blinkers along with its dependence on material circumstances. A rational order is one in which thinking determines being. Men will be free when they are able to produce their own circumstances. Historical materialism is valid only until it has brought about its own dialectical negation. When this stage has been reached, it will no longer be possible to speak of historical 'laws', for history is subject to 'laws' only insofar as it is unconscious, that is, insofar as it is not, properly speaking, human history at all ..."
> Lichtheim (1965/67) p.21 (emphasis in original).

The Vanguardist position differs from the Redistributionist one, however, in seeing any need for leadership at all. Lichtheim

himself says:

> "The train called 'history' is never going to deposit its passengers at the destination of their choice unless they themselves take over the controls."
> Lichtheim (1971/74) pp. 17-18.

The dilemma of Redistributionism lies in the empirical use of leadership, and even force, to remove previous inequalities. The villagisation programmes in Tanzania, for instance, go against such redistributionist themes as self-reliance, propounded by Nyerere. He has said himself that

> "Five who come in [to a Ujamaa village] unwillingly can destroy the efforts of fifteen who want to work out a new pattern for themselves."
> Nyerere (1968), quoted Coulson (1975) p.53.

This dilemma is not just one of "ethics". It concerns learning theory, too. It may be a most important question, whether experts' policies are the best ones in terms, for instance, of material productivity. Yet will people directed by "experts" learn as effectively what best to do, or how best to control and determine their own futures? This is ultimately a far greater problem. In education, subordination to expertise may be a more significant "lesson" than immediate skills or understandings. According to Lentin (1966), Algerians found that expatriate advisers ("les pieds rouges") brought new kinds of problem, because they failed to understand the traditional values of Muslim society.(10) Raikes (1975) reports that in Tanzania the wrong 'knowledge' - in terms of local agricultural conditions - was in many cases advanced by extension

officers. In both these cases, the "experts" might not have been so "ignorant", yet still have taught messages about expertise and leadership that would have countered redistributionist principles.

> "When the International was formed we expressly formulated the battle cry: the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself. We cannot, therefore, co-operate with people who openly state that the workers are too uneducated to emancipate themselves and must be freed from above by philanthropic big bourgeois and petty bourgeois." Marx (1879/1969) p.94.

> "Techniques as such lend themselves equally well to good or bad purposes. Therefore, it is often felt that control for desirable ends (the rule of the philosopher kings) is good, or at least not bad. But this is a dangerous belief. It neglects the complex and often serious effects of any external control of man; also the fact that when the area for free decisions grows too restricted, it reduces the scope of man's personal responsibility and thus his autonomy ..." Bettleheim (1960/70) p.66.

The Redistributionist perspective differs from the Vanguardist primarily on questions of learning (though there are likely to be other questions of Objectivated 'Knowledge' as well - as is suggested by the extension officer and "pieds rouges" examples above). Its distinction from Participationism, on the other hand, depends on assumptions made about what kinds of social inequality are "natural". "Power" rather than "Knowledge", is involved. There is a fairly thin line between the (Redistributionist?) principles of aid given by China to other underdeveloped countries[11], and notions of "help" and "service" in much (Participationist?) liberal thought. The distinction seems to lie in assumptions about what inequalities are "natural" and

about what courses of action follow from those assumptions.

Holt puts the point like this:

> "The Good Samaritan ... did not make himself a permanent protector of the traveller. He did not make a business or career or vocation out of protecting all travellers. He helped because, before his eyes, he could see someone who at that moment needed help... The trouble with one person defining himself as a helper of others is that unless he is very careful he is almost certain to define them as people who cannot get along without his help."
> Holt (1974/75) p.61 (emphasis in original).

Similar points are made by Williams (1961/65) and the Balls (1973).

Aimé Césaire says that

> "In all parties, in all spheres, from the extreme right to the extreme left [is rooted] the habit of doing for us, the habit of thinking for us, in short the habit of contesting the right to initiative which is in essence the right to personality."
> Césaire (1972).

The "motive" for such "helping" or "service" lies in assumptions of superiority. Therein lies

> "a familiar liberal dilemma - that of wanting to make what are seen as the good things of a society available to all, while wanting to retain the right to define what those 'good' things are."
> Keddie ? (1972) p.132.

Ideology is sincere, but altruistic service may function in much the same way as more conscious Participationism - that which explicitly incorporates subordinates, as a means of preserving existing inequalities. Obvious examples of Participationism can be found in industry. Jukes the Director-General of Engineering Employers, has said that

> "Among employers 'there is now acceptance of responsibility to shareholders, to the enterprise itself, to the employees, to the customers of the enterprise and to the public and the State'. Within this complex of responsibilities and constraints it 'is the duty and responsibility of the employer to manage'. In managing his employees, he must remember that 'important though a man's right to a job may be, it is perhaps of even greater importance that he should work as a reasonably contented member of a team ... High on the list of those things which are essential to the smooth running and efficiency of an enterprise is good communication with workers on the shop floor.' Besides promoting team consciousness, good communication is necessary in securing employee acceptance of change ..."
> Fox (1974) p.259.

"Scientific management" has often been overtly manipulative.

Taylor himself said,

> "I can say, without the slightest hesitation, that ... the man who is physically able to handle pig-iron and is sufficiently phlegmatic and stupid to choose this for his occupation is rarely able to comprehend the science of handling pig-iron ... The man who is fit to work at any particular trade is unable to understand the science of that trade without the kindly help and co-operation of men of a totally different kind of education".
> Taylor (1912), quoted by Bowles and Gintis (1976) p.182 (my emphasis).

Karier (1972/73a) has looked at what he calls "conservative liberalism" in United States education (and beyond education). He pays some attention to Participationist emphasis on expertise.

> "The liberal role in American society was essentially that of the knowledgeable expert dedicated to the survival of the system through growth."
> "Despite equalitarian rhetoric, educational liberals most often, in practice, supported an education directed from the top. They repeatedly supported the professionalisation of the expert-teacher and the use of improved technique to enlighten the ignorant masses. 'Enlightenment', for most, implied education for social control."
> Karier (1972/73a) pp.95, 106.

I have already discussed Participation in education, in Chapter 6. Two things need to be pointed out here. Firstly, the distinctiveness of Participationism lies mainly in assumptions about learning theory. It might be called "motivational participationism", for an appearance of learner autonomy is believed necessary to promote the will and confidence to learn. This need by no means be consciously manipulative. Indeed, the most important instances arise from Value-Known closure. There are assumed to be only limited possibilities for genuinely autonomous, learner-initiated education. It is taken for granted that there are inevitably pre-determined limits or evaluative criteria on what is to be learned. Secondly, in this example of Participationism (as well as in examples of the other broad "types" of educational ideology) I have not confined myself to narrowly "educational" examples. This is a clue to Master Patterning.

Ideologies must not be seen as lists of assorted beliefs. Such a view fails to capture the essential structuredness of beliefs, by virtue of which they <u>are</u> beliefs (Value-Knowledge).(12) Perhaps we should see Master Patterns as "Gestalts" of societal structure. If we could see schools as microcosms of society, or as replicas of employment situations, then the transfer of notions established in school to other contexts would be plausible. But schools are <u>not</u> mere miniatures. They do not merely equip children to fit smoothly into their work roles, with understandings and expectations similar to those they entertained whilst at school.(13)

Beliefs learned and acted-upon in one context may functionally correspond to beliefs learned and acted-upon in another - though the two sets of beliefs may be overtly quite different. In such a case, it would be the structure of the different contextual situations that corresponded, rather than the overt content of participants' beliefs. Accordingly, it may be that the same dimensions are relevant, whereby we might consider, compare and relate beliefs found in various contexts and apparently referring to quite different matters. The dimensions I have considered so far ("Power" and "Knowledge") are specifically relevant to learning situations, including schooling. We may now briefly consider two extensions of these that could "bridge" the gap between school and "adult" society. The first concerns the nature of 'knowledge' and of those who 'know'. The second concerns change.

In discussing the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions in education, I illustrated their appropriateness in contexts other than formal schooling. Though I fear over-simplification, it may be possible to see Productionism as basically opposed to Redistributionism, in that the first is characterisable above all by the Basic Belief that "Knowledge is Power", and the second by "Men are equal". There are many ways in which this could be disputed. Fortunately, it is not the purpose of this essay to argue for such an assertion, so much as to demonstrate that such assertions are worth investigating - that a search for Basic Beliefs is a viable exercise, and methodologically worthwhile. "Knowledge is Power" was a slogan of the "left"

rather than the "right" in 19th century Britain, and much of the argument of this essay has to do with the radicalising potential of explicit verbalisation and Curiosity. However, if we restrict our interpretation of "knowledge" considerably to indicate belief, rather than "true knowledge", it may be legitimate to claim that 'knowledge', as belief (as Value-Knowledge, as certainty, as closure) is conservative rather than radical, functional to pre-determined ends rather than ever-new ones. Bacon was first responsible, I believe, for the slogan that "Knowledge is Power" and it is most associated with scientific 'knowledge', or 'knowledge' about the natural world. As such it tends to prescribe mastery of the environment as an end in itself. This in turn tends to imply a "value" of efficiency and efficiency in turn reinforces the need for "correct" 'knowledge' - non-flexible criteria by which efficiency might be judged. Without a parallel Basic Belief that "Men are equal", this need or desire for efficiency can justify inequality. For it may be believed that the "expert" is more able to master the environment, and to help others to do so, than one who is "less qualified". This in turn may imply a need for some form of social control, whereby the expert is enabled to pursue the desired mastery, without obstruction. Opposed to this is a Basic Belief that "Men are equal". For such a belief, being prescriptive at least as much as descriptive, would make illegitimate any rule of experts. It would thereby qualify the supreme importance of efficiency and in turn mastery of the environment.

Compare this first statement with those that follow it:

> "What is meant by doing a good job of production? This in no way refers to increased output. Rather it depends on whether or not we have developed production according to socialist principles ... whether or not we have aroused the revolutionary activity of the masses."
> Mao Tse-Tung (1965), quoted by Ramsay (1974) p. 5.

> "The process of rationalisation heightens ... the significance of the specialised expert who is highly trained with a limited sphere. Therewith, social knowledge, and the power of making decisions become more and more concentrated for purely practical reasons in a limited number of politicians, economic leaders, administrators, and jurists ..."
> Mannheim (1940) p.47.

> "The fundamental standards and values of language are expressed in its uses in "the discerning appreciation of art and literature" by "the few (in any society) who are capable of unprompted first-hand judgment ..."
> Leavis (1932) quoted by Filmer (1976) p.10.

There is a discernible Master Pattern common to the last two statements. Though this may derive from a common productive base in a given society, it is not learned in relationship with that productive base, nor even implicitly associated with it, at the level of belief. Other factors, such as the objectifiability of 'knowledge' through literacy, can also be looked to as (partial) explanations of such inegalitarianism.(14) The Basic Belief, which may be transmitted by a variety of means in a given society - including, of course, schooling - is something akin to "Knowledge is Power", without any counter-belief that "Men are equal". Empirically, these seem to be dialectically opposed to each other, rather than complementary. They characterise quite different Master Patterns.

The other dimension which seems to have a Master Pattern-like importance is that of Change. This has been implicit throughout

the above discussion of Productionism, Vanguardism, Redistributionism and Participationism. For in societies in which inequalities of various sorts already exist, beliefs in the possibility, desirability and legitimacy of either altering or preserving such relationships of inequality necessarily involve a perspective on Change. Various writers have pointed to the liberalist assumption that anything but "orderly change" is either impossible (in that it would not achieve its objectives) or literally, as well as metaphorically, "unthinkable".(15)

I suggest that these Master Patterns are "masters" precisely in that they are Relevant at a number of different levels and contexts. Individually, in personal interaction, at the societal and indeed at the intersocietal level, the same Basic Beliefs may operate - because on the same dimension. To give just one example, consider some Productionist notions that are congruent at all these levels. The term "Productionism" (and indeed that of "Redistributionism") is borrowed from underdevelopment literature.(16) It is sometimes called, in that context, "Incrementalism".(17) It has been explicitly stated in terms of educational policy by Foster (1969). Elsewhere, Foster states that

> "I must ... confess my personal adherence to the idea of 'piecemeal reform' and limited 'social engineering' as the only way of effecting useful change in educational institutions which, in my opinion, are not easily susceptible to rapid and massive transformation ..."
> Foster (1970), quoted by Ohliger & McCarthy (1971) p.25.

At the interactional level, the "incrementalist" or "productionist"

stance can be seen in the following:-

> "The teacher's "own time and energies are not shared out equally among all her pupils. This is quite explicitly recognised by the teacher herself. There are, in the class, too many difficult children for her to spend as much time and energy as they need ... Those whom the teacher considers most able to benefit, the brightest, receive the extra attention, not those most in need, for them there would be little pay off and the results would be few compared with the energy expended. Even were she to spend a lot of time with them, the pay off would probably be minimal. Given that the pupils generally have such a poor prognosis, the teacher believes that her extra attention and efforts should go to the brightest, those who may be able to make something of themselves, or those she might be able to make as good as 'normal' children with a little attention. This differential allocation of the teacher's time and energies is justified in terms of the economic results..." Sharp and Green (1975) p.97.

Furthermore, the deterministic understanding of Piagetian stages of child development has obvious parallels in notions of development at the societal level, according to a preconceived, unilinear model of societal change.

Finally, the common use at various levels of the term "paternalism" is more than coincidental. To talk of "state paternalism" is, of course, metaphorical. But it is a metaphor which is immediately comprehensible because the patterns of authority, leadership, protection etc. that (in a given society) are learned in relationships with fathers/parents are also symbolically appropriate in other contexts - not least at school. What happens, then, when Master Patterns operate, is not a transfer of a single "Gestalt" from one context to another. There is a continuity of certain kinds of Basic Belief on fundamentally the same dimensions (for instance "knowledge", "leadership" and "change"). These are assumed to operate at various levels,

because they are institutionalised at those various levels. To some extent, they remain institutionalised insofar as those assumptions remain closed. Functional continuity between levels operates in default of any explicit understanding and questioning. There is no necessary reason why particular beliefs, developed in novel contexts, should have the same basic structure as those "relevant" in prior contexts. But the development of some beliefs may be necessary on the same dimensions. Insofar as a society is ordered/controlled, and as beliefs remain implicit, then congruent beliefs are likely to develop. Master Patterning exists not in a simple one-to-one correspondence between (e.g.) school and political-economic context, but between a variety of societal contexts. The same dimensions are then relevant for the observer. And the same kinds of belief may be taken by the participant to be "relevant", in default of open elaboration. It is not a question of "transfer" from one context to the other of particular beliefs that again become relevant. Rather there is already within any relatively controlled or ordered society, institutional congruence such that Master Patterns are relevant (for all or most people) in various contexts. One might have suspected, had this not been pointed out, that an encouragement of Curiosity in one context might therefore "transfer" from one context to another.(18) But this is by no means necessarily true, nor even empirically common. Curiosity tends to be confined within paradigmatic boundaries. People may learn to be Curious about particular contexts, without any necessary "transfer" to others. Brilliantly inventive people within their own special field of

academic study are not necessarily radical in their social and political lives. As we shall see, openness in respect of certain "Knowledge" issues has not in practice always entailed openness on matters of "Power". It is to the question of "Open Education" that we now turn.

Notes

(1) Hence a possibility exists of determined indeterminacy, of institutionalised openness, of permanent revolution.

(2) The distinction is analogous to that made earlier, between determinism (cf. closure) and determination (cf. constraint).

(3) Even if certain "truths" are not yet 'known', it may be assumed that they are nonetheless "there" awaiting discovery.

(4) "You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear."

(5) See Chapter 5.

(6) For instance, Althusser (1971); Bowles and Gintis (1976).

(7) Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973), p.30, quoted by Bowles and Gintis (1976), p.208.

(8) For example, in Stevens' (1960) study of grammar schools, teachers believed that such schools should train for leadership and service.

(9) See Chapter 6, above.

(10) Reported by Cruise O'Brien (1971/73) p.335.

(11) Chou En-Lai's "Eight Principles of Chinese Aid" (1964), reprinted in Bailey (1975) p.588.

(12) A list such as the following may not be inaccurate, but it misses out the most important characteristic of ideologies - its structuration.

> "The major reason ... why the powerful rarely need to make their power visible and obvious is that all the social institutions, mechanisms, and principles which

> it is crucially important for them to have accepted and legitimised are accepted and legitimised already and come under no serious threat ... Crucial for them, too, is the virtually universal acceptance of class and status stratification, and of the hierarchical organisation of work with its massive inequalities of authority, reward, status, and job autonomy. Essential, in turn, for the acceptance of these inequalities are such cultural beliefs as, for example, that those in authority ought to enjoy higher rewards than those they command, and that the alleged (and probably engineered) scarcity of a particular skill, talent or ability justifies its holder in demanding a larger allocation of life chances than those of more common or modest attainments." Fox (1974) p.277.

I would not fundamentally disagree with any of the points Fox makes. But the coherent structure of such ideology is missing.

(13) If this were so, how easy it would be to produce radicals and revolutionaries, merely by changing relatively superficial aspects of school structures. And how easy it would be to demonstrate the hypocrisy of educational administrators and others.

(14) cf. Goody & Watt (1962).

(15) e.g. Karier (1972/73);Morton & Watson (1971/73).

(16) cf. Petras & Laporte (1970/73).

(17) cf. Organski (1965).

(18) As I optimistically suggested in Syer (1974b).

PART III - TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF "OPEN EDUCATION"

CHAPTER 8

THE NOTION OF "OPEN EDUCATION"

In Part III, I apply the perspectives developed in the first two parts of this essay to a consideration of "Open Education". In this chapter I point briefly to some problems commonly encountered in the use and definition of this expression. Often it seems to be a vague slogan which disguises more than it reveals.

Slogans

Hill (1975) suggests that the expression "Open Education" is self-contradictory and therefore lacks intrinsic meaning. It implies, he says, both unrestricted option for students and specific goals for teachers. The two are incompatible. Dismissing it as a mere slogan, he suggests that we can only look at what upholders of "Open Education" in fact advocate, if we are to know what the slogan signifies.(1)

I agree, of course, that insofar as people believe in something they call "Open Education", then those actual beliefs are inevitably contexted and referential. They cannot be understood except in relation to that context. I agree also that beliefs - all beliefs - are value-laden, insofar as they are really believed. As such, to call "Open Education" a slogan - a "yum" expression, as Hill chooses to call it - does not distinguish it significantly from most other verbalised beliefs. But I cannot agree that the

verbal formulation is in effect irrelevant. Hill's approach is to ignore whatever he would see to be denoted or connoted by the words, "open" and "education", except insofar as they "happen" to be relevant to what is actually advocated. This begs some important questions. For in practice those denotations and connotations are relevant to any emotive appeal that the expression might have.(2) They are part of the logical structure of those beliefs. Moreover, it is heuristically useful to consider what "Open Education" could mean - not as an all-or-nothing category, but in any important senses whatever - before seeing how particular empirical instances of supposedly "Open Education" actually measure up to such hypothetical definitions. Such empirical instances are likely to differ from one another in ways that might not otherwise be so evident.

Vagueness

The notion of "Open Education" is often extraordinarily vague. It contains numerous inconsistencies. It is rarely clear what exactly is supposed to be "open". One writer to comment on this is Pring. In strongly criticising Bernstein (1971), as well as other "theoretical work in the sociology of the curriculum"(3), he has suggested that such dichotomies as "Collection"/"Integration" and "Traditional"/"Progressive" are inadequate in that they fail to do justice to the complexity of practice. Above all they tend to adopt the logically valid but theoretically dubious practice of "dividing all things into a particular category (it matters not which) and its negative",

thus producing a residual category of questionable theoretical value.(4) Elsewhere, Pring has attempted to clarify what he thinks might be understood by the term "integration".

> "'Integration' as such is an empty word. There must be integration of something and one cannot understand or appreciate what is meant by curriculum integration until one has clarified what it is that is being integrated ... Any particular recommendation for curriculum integration implies some underlying theory of knowledge or of value or of learning ... To explain what one means by integration necessarily involves one in such theoretical considerations. Because of the failure of so many educationists to understand this, the word integration is bandied about as though its meaning were clear, and recommendations for curriculum integration are made as though its value were self-evident." Pring (1970/71) p.266.

I agree with Pring's complaint and discuss this article further in Chapter 9.

Tunnell (1975) has also remarked on the vagueness of "Open Education" and its susceptibility to overlapping or partial definitions. Like Hill, he dismisses the possibility of truly open education. He attempts to define it in terms of what he takes it to refer to empirically, namely "elementary school practices that the British refer to as 'informal education'".(5) (Nonetheless his definition of "education" is laid down a priori. It is not derived from practice, in educational institutions.)

In contrast, I take "education" to refer to anything related to learning contexts, contents and processes. These may be looked at in terms of two universally relevant dimensions, "Power" and "Knowledge". More specifically, these dimensions themselves relate to a view of Reality as consisting of three "realms" - (a) the objective world-out-there, including Social

Relations (and societal structures); (b) Objectivated "Knowledge", which is external to any individual learner and inseparable from the social context of which he is a part; and (c) Subjective 'Knowledge', which is the understandings and beliefs of any given individuals. I shall explore some possible meanings of "Open Education" in terms of these three "realms" and of the relationships between them.

My aim is not to produce a single definition of "Open Education". It is to identify ways in which education might really be open and therefore ways in which it might, in particular contexts, be considered actually or potentially "open". We can then consider empirical instances, to see what is indeed open - and, more importantly, what remains closed. The search will be for actual constraints and ideological closures in substantive contexts. Only then, if an adequate picture of particular educational ideologies is to be achieved, will it be possible to ask why such beliefs may have arisen and what might be their functional or interest-specific consequences.

Disguised Distinctions: State and Process

"False dichotomies" often involve the suppression of distinctions that should really be made explicit.(6) In choosing the Relevance angle according to which one wishes to examine particular phenomena, it is inevitable that other possible angles may be overlooked. Nonetheless, covert allusion may still be made to such other Relevances. To recognise this, and to seek to make them explicit, can be methodologically very useful. But where

it is unnoticed, it can be most misleading.

A distinction that is often not made explicit in treatments of such notions as "Open Education" is that between state and process. It is common to find "Open Education" (or "integration", or "informal education") confused with "innovation", or the processes involved in institutionalising new forms of pedagogical practice. (Such new forms may often be of the "integrated" or "open" type, whence the confusion.) Consequently, many have commented on the anxiety, or identity crisis, that may be experienced in the course of institutional change. This is frequently attributed to the new type of practice, rather than to the processes of change. Caton (1972), for instance, talks of teachers in a "collaborative learning" context as experiencing

> "a threat to their security both as a person and a specialist. The comfort of the classroom has gone. Gone also is the security of the subject-material. Faced with the loss of many of the supports that prop up the teacher's image, the reaction is often fear, rationalised into educational argument. It is galling to find your subject deemed irrelevant by pupils because you have failed to use it well ..."
> Caton (1972) p.58.

Bernstein (1967/71) discusses such phenomena in terms of mixed and pure categories.(7) I do not deny that "Open Education" may lack the possibilities of emotional security. But this should be kept quite distinct from issues of change.(8)

"Open Education" can be a vague and ambiguous slogan. Yet this does not make it a meaningless expression. Insofar as people have beliefs about the actuality, possibility, desirability or inevitability of something they call "Open Education", then

those beliefs need to be described, if the observer wishes to produce an adequate account of the relevant educational contexts. Such a description is, I suggest, possible, if we consider the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions of educational beliefs. In the next chapter, I consider ways in which openesses might exist in any of the three "realms" - Objective Reality (including especially social relations), Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'. I illustrate my arguments by re-examining Pring's article on "Integration". In Chapter 10, I extend this by looking at Bernstein's approach to "Open Education". It will be seen that the issues raised relate to some central concerns of sociological theory.

Notes

(1) On this basis, Hill suggests three meanings: (a) procedural openness, which he suggests is common in much informal education and unobjectionable; (b) normative openness, which stresses pupil/student autonomy, but which he still regards as "educational" in that it contains a non-neutral objective of personal autonomy, and (c) revolutionary openness, which he does not view with such tolerance. Though it clearly is equally non-neutral - and according to his criteria would be equally "educational", therefore - he views this as a cloak for indoctrination (undefined) and condemns the tendency for teachers to slide from normative to revolutionary openness. He feels they would not do so if they were aware of the significance of what they were doing.

(2) To appreciate the positive evaluation denoted by "openness" in our society, one has only to consider such expressions as "open-minded", "open house", "openly", "open-hearted". Compare the appeal of the term "community" in our society. "Race" relations organisations and approved schools are not called, respectively, "Community relations councils" and "Community schools" for reasons that are irrelevant to the meaning of the word "community". Not any "yum" word will do.

(3) Pring (1975) especially pp. 71-72.

(4) Ibid. See also Chapter 2 above.
It is ironic that a recent attempt to grasp the complexity of such practice, and to operationalise it for empirical research, still reduces to a single continuum of "Formal-(Mixed) - Informal" teaching styles. See Bennett (1976).
Meanwhile, despite my agreement with most of Pring's criticisms of Bernstein (1971), he seems basically to have missed the point, which concerns not boundaries, but codes. See Syer (1976b).

(5) Tunnell (1975) p.16.

(6) cf. Chapter 2.

(7) cf. Douglas (1966/70).

(8) I return to this in discussing the notion of "penetration" in Chapter 12. cf. also Syer (1974a), where I elaborate on the process/state distinction in relation to Bernstein (1971). I suggest there that the Collection and Integration types of educational knowledge code should be carefully distinguished from processes of "collecting" and "integrating" - a distinction which Bernstein fails to make.

CHAPTER 9

DIMENSIONS OF OPENNESS IN "OPEN EDUCATION"

Openness is simply lack of closure. Such a definition may appear to court the dangers of dichotomising between one selected characteristic and everything else.(1) "Openness" could merely become a residual category. However, my aim is not to produce two exclusive categories. Least of all is it to apply the notions of "openness" and "closure" in the expectation of finding a correspondingly dichotomised Reality. It is, rather, to identify dimensions on which notions of openness and closure seem relevant and to give sociologically relevant meaning to those notions.

Broadly, closure is any rigidity of belief structure. Any beliefs (whether implicit or explicit) in the "obviousness" or "naturalness" of something can be determinative of behaviour. All are potentially consequential. Most important, however, are deterministic beliefs, i.e., closed, rigidified beliefs about determinative relationships. The "causality" involved may be quite implicit.(2)

Beliefs necessarily refer. They are about (what is taken to be) the real world. So far as educational beliefs are concerned, the most relevant structures and relationships referred to are as follows: first, social relations and societal structures; second, the structuring of (what is taken to be) "valid and valuable knowledge" (i.e. Objectivated 'Knowledge'); third, structures of subjective beliefs and the properties of

physical mind-brain. Not only is each of these structured, but they are non-randomly related to each other. These inter-relationships are themselves the objects of educational beliefs. The most relevant are those indicated by arrows in the diagram below. Fourth, then, Social Relations-Objectivated 'Knowledge' relationships include epistemological issues on the one hand and the framing of (educational) 'knowledge' on the other. Fifth and sixth, the Social Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' and the Objectivated 'Knowledge'-Subjective 'Knowledge' relationships both involve learning theory. The former refers particularly to environmental and physiological relationships - which concern both "Knowledge" and "Power" dimensions. The latter refers to logical relationships, on the "Knowledge" dimension, internal to belief systems themselves.



Since beliefs refer, any analysis of actual educational beliefs must consider the context of those beliefs and thereby what is implicitly, as well as explicitly, referred-to. In Part III, I am dealing primarily with logical or definitional distinctions, though I shall illustrate with selected examples.

In context, however, one must consider whose education is being considered, in what societal context. In Part IV, I say more on this. In Part V, I look at a few specific historical instances. Meanwhile, a brief illustration should clarify my point. "Openness" may refer in some cases to the matter of access to educational institutions. In a specific context, one would want to know what institutions, for which people, at what age, under what conditions, etc., access was being considered. It is unlikely that one could talk simply of a particular education system being "open" in respect of access. The range of types of school and resources made differentially available to different people at different ages and from different social classes is often quite broad.(3) Nonetheless, it is possible to consider the matter of "access" and to discuss its possible implications in general terms, before looking at specific societal contexts.

In the following three sections, I consider some possible meanings of "openness" in respect of the three "realms" and relationships between them.

Social Relations: Access

Notions of social relations are most obviously relevant to education in the case of pedagogical relationships and the organisational structure of schools. Bernstein (1967/71) characterises "open schools" primarily in these terms. He talks of achievement (rather than ascription) of teacher- and pupil-roles, of co-operation between teachers, of flexibility of teaching

groups, and of contacts between school and the outside society. The notion of "participation" in education, which I discussed in Chapter 6, is closely related to this aspect of open or closed social relations in schools.

Access to institutions is another area in which openness might exist, or be believed to exist, in educational social relations. "Open" in everyday language reflects this in such expressions as "open forum" and "open door". The Open University is taken to be open principally in this sense. Weber discussed the openness and closedness of relationships solely in terms of access.(4) "Access" in such a context normally means access to membership of particular groups or institutions. However, we can also talk of access to meanings, or to cultural understandings.(5) Egan (1975) defines "open" in terms of access in this sense and talks of removing obstacles to learning (p.24). There is clearly an overlap between social relations and Objectivated 'Knowledge', where the notion of "access" is involved.

The Open University presents an interesting illustration of how the "access" aspect of openness may in fact be constraining. Harris and Holmes (1976) note the similarities between the Open University's objective of open access and the contest mobility ethic outlined by Turner (1960/61). Trow has called the Open University

> "a characteristically ingenious way of increasing access to an élite institution by substituting motivation for formal qualifications, and by allowing people to combine university work with full-time employment. Some of the characteristics of the élite university have been discarded, but the university maintains the high standards of élite British universities and their clear boundaries."
> Trow (1974) p.66. (6)

The major feature of Turner's contest mobility is its emphasis on achievement, rather than ascription. It has been common to see social mobility as a major feature of "open societies".(7) From this, in turn, derives the most common understanding of the slogan "Equality of Opportunity". This is generally seen as a matter of equity, rather than equality - at least until very recently.(8)

It is possible to regard Meritocracy as a master pattern in most western societies. In prescribing the right of the "able" to lead/rule - as much as describing the need for them to do so - it legitimates inequalities that might be less tolerable, were ascriptive criteria alone employed. Even opponents of Meritocracy have commonly opposed the criteria of selection, rather than its fact - just as opponents of "bureaucracy" have rarely advocated irrationality. Often, no doubt, they regard themselves as meriting leadership, though not on grounds of quantified assessment. Bowles and Gintis (1976) attack the legitimating role of the meritocratic ideal.(9) In a very different context, Douglas (1970/73) refers indirectly to the same sort of phenomenon.(10)

The access view of openness is clearly located within a societal context of inequality and indeed within an ideological context where certain forms of inequality are considered legitimate, often "natural". Achievement is not a mode of equality, but a particular view of equity. Equality, like freedom, is more than a state of mind. It is a condition of social relations. Total openness would have no limitations of

access. There would not be an open door, but no wall. Consequently, where beliefs about "Open Education" refer to the access available to certain social positions, it is necessary to examine the context in question, to find who has access (and who does not). What limitations are there and what specialisation of roles is involved? Clearly, I am not pointing to two dichotomous types - "openness" and "constraint" - and seeking to classify all societal structures accordingly. We must observe actual contexts and seek to understand what closures exist (if any, of course) in the beliefs of people advocating, or believing in the existence of "Open Education" in these terms.

Objectivated 'Knowledge'

Postman and Weingartner list certain notions which, in their view, are taught in U.S. schools. These clearly indicate what a closed view of Objectivated 'Knowledge' might be like:

"1. The concept [i.e. notion] of absolute, fixed, unchanging 'truth', particularly from a polarising good-bad perspective.
2. The concept of certainty. There is always one and only one 'right' answer, and it is absolutely 'right'.
3. The concept of isolated identity, that 'A is A' period, simply, once and for all.
4. The concept of fixed states and 'things', with the implicit concept that if you know the name you understand the 'thing'.
5. The concept of simple, single, mechanical causality; the idea that every effect is the result of a single, easily identifiable cause.
6. The concept that differences exist only in parallel and opposing forms: good-bad, right-wrong, yes-no, short-long, up-down, etc..
7. The concept that knowledge is 'given', that it emanates from a higher authority, and that it is to be accepted without question."

Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) p.203.

Young attempts a definition of "openness" which attends primarily to the structure of 'Knowledge'. It also refers somewhat loosely to the social relations involved (including access). He defines it as

> "the question of [a] the relation between knowledge areas and [b] between those with access to them",
> "[a] how related are the knowledge areas?" and
> "[a] the idea of curricula consisting of knowledge areas in 'open' or closed relation to each other".
> Young (1971) pp.33,35 (lettering added).

Thus he is referring to (a) the internal structure of bodies of 'knowledge' and (b) the structure of social relations in which those bodies of knowledge are located. He possibly implies also, in the first definition, that the relationship between (a) and (b) is itself important. However, in devising a typology of Dimensions of the Social Organisation of Knowledge in Curricula, Young considers openness and closedness only in sense (a). The question of access (an aspect of social relations of education) is considered separately by Young, in terms of Specialisation or "Scope".

Questionability of Objectivated 'Knowledge' is an important kind of openness. Where no alternative is conceivable, then the view of Objectivated 'Knowledge' is closed, in this respect. Horton (1967/71) points to a number of ways in which African traditional thought is <u>not</u> unlike Western scientific thought. But what he does consider to be a major distinguishing feature is an openness to alternatives.

> "The key difference ... is that in traditional cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical tenets, whereas in scientifically oriented cultures such an awareness is highly developed. It is this difference we refer to when we say that traditional cultures are 'closed' and scientifically oriented cultures 'open'."
> Horton (1967/71) p.230.

Openness or closure, here, concern more than the content and structure of particular beliefs. Whether explicitly or implicitly, epistemological issues are also involved: beliefs about the relationship between the world-out-there (including social relations) and objectivated 'Knowledge'.

Closures in this case are assumptions of "naturalness". If a constraint is believed to be inevitable, then that belief is closed. This is fairly obvious with beliefs about the nature of the physical world. It applies also to beliefs more central to formal education. Take the question of "standards". When educational standards (or cultural standards of any sort) are upheld as unquestionable, it is assumed that some absolute or "natural" truth is being propounded.(11) Fears of falling standards - and measures taken to counteract them - involve closures of belief which are of considerable significance in education.(12)

Yet standards, too, are not just intrinsic to bodies of belief. Standards are inseparable from framing(13) - as are beliefs about them. When Amis complains that

> "the universities today are full of students who do not understand what study is about, and who are painfully bewildered by the whole business and purpose of university life; more has meant worse"
> Amis (1969) p.10,

he is assuming not just that there are definable standards. He is also assuming that there are some people (the students he refers to amongst them) who are not competent to know what these standards are, whilst others (including, presumably, himself) who are. He is not making assumptions solely about the nature of'knowledge', but also about the societal relations in which that 'knowledge' is contexted. Standards, in short, imply framing, which in turn implies expertise (or the right to frame on some other basis). Closures of belief in one respect imply closures in the other.

However, it is still possible to consider the structuring of bodies of Objectivated 'Knowledge' in its own right - so long as it is realised that that is not the whole story. The "tree-root" metaphor was designed partly for this purpose. In Syer (1975b) I discussed how one might understand Bernstein's use of such expressions as the "deep structure" of knowledge and "education in depth".(14) I suggested that the "tree-root" metaphor was useful as a device for conceptualising <u>both</u> objectivated bodies of 'Knowledge' <u>and</u> subjective beliefs and understandings, but that Bernstein (amongst others) confuses the two. Bernstein says that

> "integrated codes will make available from the beginning of the pupil's career, clearly in a way appropriate to a given age level, the deep structure of the knowledge: i.e. the principles for the generating of new knowledge." Bernstein (1971) p.61.(15)

This view assumes that the structure of Objectivated 'Knowledge' into which the learner is being initiated is relatively fixed.

As such it is a closed view. It is a particularly significant form of closure, being common to much "open" educational thinking. This is not necessarily a criticism of such "Open Education", but an insistence that where there are closures, they need to be identified.

Bernstein's failure to distinguish between the structuring of learners' subjective 'knowledge' and that of objectivated Curricular 'Knowledge' again suggests the practical inseparability of the three "realms": (Social) Reality, Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'. The question arises, whether the latter two may not in fact be co-dependent, as well as interdependent. Is there a necessary, logical relationship between them, or does this just "happen" to occur in practice? Esland (1971), for instance, tends to confuse epistemological and psychological issues. Such a confusion is entirely understandable if the two are necessarily related by "correspondent" structures of Objectivated and Subjective 'Knowledge'. The plausibility of Bernstein's distinction between Collection and Integration - and of other dichotomies complained about by Pring[16] - rests in part on the close association of particular epistemological with particular learning theories. I have suggested that the same "tree-root" metaphor may be used in consideration of both objectivated bodies of 'Knowledge' and subjective 'knowledge'. This itself is indicative of a close relationship. In particular, a "collection" view of 'knowledge' - where items of 'knowledge' are not seen to be structurally related, but only listed or collected together - accords well with what Popper called "bucket theories of the mind".[17]

Theories of objectivated and of subjective 'knowledge' are, I suggest, co-dependent. Yet it must be emphasized that some aspects of learning theory are clearly distinct. In the case of programmed learning[18], for instance, particular philosophical and psychological assumptions may need to operate for this to be advocated:

> "Programmed learning ..., particularly of the linear type, is compatible with a set of philosophical assumptions about knowledge: namely that it has an intrinsic form. It also incorporates some behaviourist assumptions about learning and conditioning." Seaman (1972) p.41.

But it is possible to hold similar philosophical assumptions, but a quite different view of learning. Consider the following passage.

> "Teaching is primarily ... listening to the pupil and responding ... with further questions ... Jacques Maritain's book on education is one of the best statements I've heard about what a teacher does in this respect. He thinks of the teacher as knowing more than the pupil does yet in some sense not conveying it but seeing that it is made available to the pupil. The great use of superior knowledge is to understand what the pupil is learning as it is learned. It takes great wisdom to be able to follow a learning pupil sensitively enough to know what the next step is for him, and you don't press the next step. You watch it happen. If it sticks, you help it a bit, but it's not a transmission or an imposition or a filling of a vessel or any of those things..."
> Scott Buchanan (1970), quoted by Ohliger and McCarthy (1971) p.95.

Here the speaker has similar closures in respect of Objectivated 'Knowledge'. A good teacher, to him, knows what is valid and worthwhile. The end product, the pupil's subjective 'knowledge', is similarly viewed as something that will be assessable by

by objective (and therefore closed) criteria. Yet the ironic pedagogical approach advocated suggests a learning theory that is open, in the sense of non-determinative. There is no fixed expectation that the pupil will inevitably learn according to preconceived and inevitable processes.

Learning theory involves two kinds of relationship. That between Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge' has primarily to do with logical structures of 'Knowledge'. Particular people's beliefs about one are co-dependent with their beliefs about the other. But the relationship between (Social) Reality and Subjective 'Knowledge' concerns the contextuality of learning and the physical properties of the brain. These I discuss in the next section.

Subjective 'Knowledge' and Mind-Brain

We have seen that closure or openness in respect of Objectivated 'Knowledge' is logically related to closure or openness in respect of subjective 'knowledge'. Total openness in the former case would imply adherence to no culture - whether traditional or radical - and no criteria of validity and value, whereby subjective 'knowledge' could be judged. Nonetheless, the two "realms" must be distinguished. They are ontologically distinct. Postman and Weingartner make the distinction in this passage:

> "In our questions curriculum, subjects frequently lose their clear and arbitrary limiting dimensions. We will need to start talking more about the 'structure of the

> learner and his learning' and less about the 'structure of the subject'."
> Postman & Weingartner (1969/71) p.83.

The distinction is important, because closure about the logical structure of 'Knowledge' does not necessarily imply total closure in respect of learning theory. There is also the contextual dimension of learning theory. To consider this we may examine what are taken to be "natural constraints" in and upon mind-brain. It is possible to hold closed beliefs about what 'knowledge' should be created - that is, to have pre-established criteria of valid and valuable (objectivated) 'knowledge' - yet at the same time to be "open" about what subjective structures may, in practice, be produced. No deterministic assumptions about what learners will in fact learn are entailed necessarily by closures in respect of what it would be "desirable" for them to learn. This is so in the case of the "Participationist" perspective. The preferred end-product is already 'known'. Yet it may be considered that, to achieve that product, some sense of autonomy needs to be felt by the learner. Hence the so-called "discovery method", mocked here by Goodman.

> "It is impossible to do creative work of any kind when the goals are predetermined by outsiders and cannot be criticised and altered by the kinds that have to do the work, even if they are youngsters ...
> The compromise of the National Science Foundation on this point is rather comical. 'Physical laws are not asserted; they are, it is hoped, discovered by the student'; 'there is a desire to allow each student to experience some of the excitement that scientific pursuits afford' - I am quoting from the NSF'S Science Course Improvement Projects. That is, the student is to

> make a leap of discovery to - what is already known ... The excitement of discovery is reduced to the animation of puzzle-solving. I doubt that puzzle-solving is what creative thought is about, though it is certainly what many Ph.Ds. are about." Goodman (1962/64/71) p.42.

On the other hand, the position is defended by Bruner:

> "As so frequently happens, the concept of discovery, originally formulated to highlight the importance of self-direction and intentionality, had become detached from its context and made an end in itself. Discovery was being treated by some educators as if it were valuable in and of itself, no matter what it was a discovery of, or in whose service." Bruner (1972/74) p.15.

Many less sophisticated educationists than Bruner have assumed that the objective was unproblematic and that only the means (i.e. the mode of learning) needed consideration. This is a common form of closure in most "Open Education" in practice.(19)

Humanist approaches have been most critical of closures concerning individual capacity, rather than structures of thought and belief. The notions of educability and cultural deprivation were discussed in Chapter 6. I emphasised the critical stages hypothesis: that whether at birth, or subsequently, there are stages in individual development, after which major changes in intellectual (and other) development are unlikely or impossible. Intelligence, or motivation, or linguistic skills, for instance, are believed to be fixed by a certain age.

Deterministic interpretations are commonly made of Piaget's theory of child maturation, of Bloom's statistical collections about stability and change in human characteristics(20) and of Bernstein's linguistic codes. Bruner, on the other hand, claims

that,

> "There seems to be little evidence ... for anything like critical periods in human growth - such that, for example, if a skill is not learnt during a particular period in the life cycle, it cannot be learnt later. The only exception may be in the sphere of language ... But what does seem evident, even if there are not dramatic all-or-nothing watershed points in human development, is that certain skills not learnt early come much harder later on." Bruner (1969/74) p.145.

Holt (1974/75) is particularly indignant about the limited accomplishments of most children. He sees this as a consequence of closed beliefs about what they are "normally" capable of. He refers, for instance, to Japanese Suzuki-trained violinists and says,

> "By contrast, I think of a school ... in which four- and five-year old children are formed into what is called a rhythm band. Using small drums, bells and cymbals, they beat out, more or less, the rhythm of some piece that the teacher plays for them. The children, like their teacher, believe that what they are doing is very close to the limit of what they can do, and invite us to marvel at it. All the while children of no greater natural ability, in Japan, are playing on their real violins music by Vivaldi, Handel and Bach."
> Holt (1974/75) p.73.

Perhaps the following is a totally open view of individual potential:

> "In denying that people are naturally competent or naturally good, I am not affirming that they are naturally incompetent or naturally evil. I am affirming that they are naturally nothing."
> Strike (1975) p.188.

Whilst educationists have concentrated on notions of intelligence, or intellectual potential of some kind, such closures are just instances of more general closures concerning

individual characteristics. The journalist Alistair Cooke expressed a common closure when (in discussing Governor Rockefeller's declaration that he would cease a life-time habit of giving big presents, if he became vice-president) he said

> "We all know that character never changes, except in the movies." Cooke, B.B.C. Radio 4, 24/11/74.

This is not exclusively a geneticist assumption, as Adorno et al. indicate:

> "Although personality is a product of the social environment of the past, it is not, once it has developed, a mere object of the contemporary environment. What has developed is a structure within the individual, something which is capable of self-initiated action upon the social environment and of selection with respect to impinging stimuli, something which although modifiable is frequently very resistant to fundamental change." Adorno et al. (1950)

Total closure on this issue would deny any such modifiability (after critical stages). Total openness would presumably deny any necessary human consistency. In examining empirical instances of educational belief, we need to know to what extent such consistency is assumed to be necessary (not just frequent) and "natural", what kinds of people are the objects of such beliefs, in what contexts, and in what respects. Again we see that whilst "Open Education" as a type may not be a valuable concept, the notions of closure and openness in certain specified respects can be very useful.(21)

Significant closures about supposed human characteristics

often concern particular categories of people. Examples are deterministic beliefs about "race" and sex.(22) Both were found in the psychometric emphasis of much U.S. Progressive education, earlier this century.(23) I return to this in Chapter 15 below. As for the contemporary (British) versions of "Open Education", closures in this respect are rather different, but still important. (See Chapter 16.)

Deterministic beliefs often appear as categorisations (of types of people, for instance), within implicit causal models. For no categorisation can exist except within a broader notional structure. Such beliefs may have significant consequences. Real constraints can arise when notional closures affect policy and are thereby institutionalised. That is, beliefs about the Social Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' relationship can bring about real constraints in Social Relations. Frankly racist assumptions, for instance, can have clear policy implications.(24) Less overt deterministic-beliefs may be similarly consequential - perhaps more insidiously so, through referring to what is "obvious" and "unquestionable". Constraints may be reproduced, from which closures themselves are in turn derived. Those closures, indeed, may legitimate continued constraints and inequalities.

We are here clearly dealing with the "Power" dimension. Assumptions about categories of people, about their place within the societal structure and about the preferred role of education in their case are not matters only of subjective 'knowledge'. They concern relationships between this subjective 'Knowledge' and societal relations. Educational objectives are involved here:

who is supposed to benefit from formal education? In much " Open Education", there is an emphasis on the individual learner - not just on psychological (learning theory) grounds, but on moral grounds too. Often it is assumed that what is good for the individual is thereby good for society.(25) But humanist educationists often avoid dealing with this explicitly. They attend only to the question of learner autonomy. Petrie (1975) suggests that the two fundamental principles of "Open Education" are firstly a personal construct view of 'knowledge' and secondly a respect for student integrity. He argues cogently that strong views of these are untenable. (He himself advocates a mild view and the promotion of "judgment"). Respect for student integrity can logically involve a totally open view of how pedagogical relations - and ultimately societal relations - should be structured. For that could be left to student choice. This might be implied, for instance, in the following:

> "We cannot have real learning in school if we think it is our duty and our right to tell children what they must learn. We cannot know, at any moment, what particular bit of knowledge or understanding a child needs most, will most strengthen and best fits his model of reality. Only he can do this. He may not do it very well, but he can do it a hundred times better than we can."
> Holt (1964/69) p.175.

However, in its strong sense, this kind of openness if self-defeating. As Petrie points out, its truth is inconsistent with its assertion. In practice, any advocate of such student integrity and personal construct theory must have limits to what he intends - however implicit those limits may be - because his

beliefs are both in and about the real world. Accordingly, in examining any particular version of "open" educational thinking and belief, we must ask what closures, in this respect, are taken for granted. What limits are assumed to be necessary on the right of individual learners to frame their own 'knowledge'?

Pring's "Integration"

Pring (1970/71) fears that the popular appeal of calls to "integrate" curricula may be detrimental to education, because teachers and others have not spelled out precisely what is intended. He suggests four (or perhaps five - see below) "lines of argument" that might be taken by integrationists. This attempt to spell out what in practice may be largely implicit and logically inadequate is most worthwhile. I applaud the assertion that

> "any particular recommendation for curriculum integration implies some underlying theory of knowledge or of value or of learning." (p.266) (26)

Indeed, I would argue that all of these are always involved. In this section I attempt to spell out in the case of Pring's four (or five) "lines of argument" what these underlying theories are. This is something Pring does not do. (Perhaps, as a professional philosopher, he is more cautious than I about the possibility of simplifying definitions of "knowledge", "value" and "learning" in order to operationalise them in this context.) To do this, I employ distinctions made already in this essay. It is my intention to demonstrate the applicability and usefulness

of these distinctions in clarifying a theoretical analysis of "integration".

It is convenient to quote at length the lines of argument offered by Pring. They are as follows:- (27)

1. (a) "No proposition or argument of any enquiry is, admittedly, without a logical structure which can be identified as such and which determines to some extent the role it can play in the enquiry ... Nonetheless many problems including those of considerable personal importance cannot be raised, let alone answered, within any one cognitive structure. Different sorts of enquiry have to be brought to bear upon a particular problem. Sex education ... is an obvious example." (p.268).

   (b) "There is a further educative task of integrating the disciplines insofar as these are brought to bear upon a problem which cannot be fitted into the limits of any one discipline." (p.270).
   "The putting together of the distinctive enquiries represented by the disciplines is itself an educational task that should have a place within the curriculum..."(p.268).

2. (a) "The disciplines represent the <u>worked out</u> structures of knowledge, the systematic organisations of experience, the particular conceptual schemes which determine how one classifies, individuates, and proceeds with yet further enquiry ... They do not, however, reflect the pupil's level and mode of understanding, nor do they indicate the process whereby the pupil might attain these structures of knowledge." (pp. 268-9 , original emphasis).

   (b) "The 'natural' curiosity of the pupil, his 'spontaneous' enquiry, would lead to the gradual differentiation of a conceptual structure that typified the worked out modes of understanding. Although the end product might be the different forms of knowledge, the educational process towards this goal would be an integrated activity, focussed upon or united in the current interest or enquiry of the pupil." (p.269).
   "The curiosity and free enquiry of the pupil might be seen as the integrating factor and the final systematisation of knowledge, manifest in the different disciplines, would be said to develop from such an enquiry." (p.270-1).

3. (a) "There are no distinct disciplines of thought, characterised by different modes of enquiry. Rather is all enquiry a matter of solving problems ... There is always the same pattern to any enquiry and the resulting knowledge is essentially that of tentative hypothesis, constantly

tested and reformulated. The differentiation of knowledge into distinct modes characterised by different processes of enquiry and verification is dismissed. Enquiry is basically of the same pattern, though the resulting structures of understanding might be distinguished by their respective organising concepts." (p.269).
"The method of enquiry itself is unitary and ... there is no theoretical justification for the proliferation of modes of understanding upon which the fragmentation of the syllabus is based." (p.271).

(b) "Sometimes of course the pupil does not appear to be 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' curious. In such cases the pupil needs to be 'stimulated'. Interdisciplinary enquiry sometimes begins with a key lesson in which the pupil is given a battery of 'stimuli' ..." (p.269).

4. (c) "Whatever its nature, knowledge is said to be of value insofar as it meets the needs of the pupil or is of social utility. The 'needs' of the pupils are listed ... and these become the unifying factors in determining the balance of the curriculum." (p.270).
"The value of knowledge depends on the degree to which it satisfies the 'needs' of the individual or of society ; 'needs' give direction and purpose, and thereby an integrating thread to the educational process." (p.271).

(b) "Themes like 'Man and his environment' are subdivided into smaller themes such as 'Family', 'Home', 'Leisure', 'Work'. To study material within the ambit of such themes will, it is claimed, enlighten the pupil in matters relevant to his immediate needs." (p.270).
"Certain concepts such as 'power' and 'communications' are complex in meaning, are central to our thinking in the different disciplines of thought, need close scrutiny in themselves, and thereby offer fresh ways of entering into different areas of knowledge" (p.271).[28]

These are the four lines of integrationist argument which Pring either observes in practice, or thinks might be put forward. (It is not clear which.) Though Pring does not express it in such terms, it seems to me that the first three hinge on epistemological and learning theory assumptions, whilst the fourth depends on assumptions about "ethics" and learning theory.[29] (Pring does not initially number these lines of argument. It is where he

does - on pages 270-1 - that the "fifth" line of argument is distinguished from the fourth. Since nothing preceding it seems to me to lead up to this separate "argument", I think it justifiable to treat it as a rather anomalous footnote to number 4.)

I have presented each line of argument in two parts ('a' or 'c' and 'b'). In each case, the second part seems to refer to questions of learning theory, whilst the first refers to either epistemological or ethical ones - but not, explicitly at least, to both. These lines of argument, then, are of the following form:

1. (a) epistemological argument
   (b) learning theory argument
2. (a) epistemological argument
   (b) learning theory argument
3. (a) epistemological argument
   (b) learning theory argument
4. (c) ethical argument
   (b) learning theory argument

It will be remembered that Pring stated that

> "any particular recommendation for curriculum integration implies some underlying theory of knowledge or of value or of learning." (p.266, my emphasis).

But in all education beliefs, both "Knowledge' (including epistemological and learning theory) and "Power" dimensions are inevitably involved. Beliefs are always contexted. They always, therefore, have a political - or "ethical" - component. Advocates of any of Pring's four lines of argument would, in practice, be making assumptions of both kinds. In some cases these are apparent even in Pring's formulation. Elsewhere they might be inferred. But in all cases one would have to look at actual empirical instances of such beliefs to understand them properly.

For example, in argument 1 (a), it is suggested that

> "many problems including those of considerable importance cannot be raised, let alone answered, within any one cognitive structure. Different sorts of enquiry have to be brought to bear upon a particular problem." (p.268).

But clearly the choice of what "problems" are to be tacked at school, which ones are of "considerable personal importance", why they are and whether these are the appropriate concern of formal education are all <u>ethical</u> (or political) questions, not epistemological ones. The "needs" of the child or of society (or of any other social grouping) are just as much at issue here as they are in the fourth line of argument.

Similarly, in the fourth line of argument, there is certainly an implicit epistemological assumption being made. This is despite Pring's assurance that an answer to the question, "What is the aim of education", given in terms of child or societal "needs",

> "does not raise the epistemological issues that I have been considering." (p.270).

They may not raise them explicitly, but there is clearly a relativist stance implied in the way Pring has formulated this line of argument. One would expect some such stance to be taken by any advocate of this view, in practice. Again, in lines of argument 2 and 3, there is no explicitly ethical perspective referred to. But this could just be a feature of the way Pring has presented them, divorced as they are from any specific context. Even as they stand, one could argue that implicit prescriptive assumptions are indicated, concerning the desirability

of maximum individual performance, or of maintaining established curricular boundaries as an ethical issue. As in the case of educational standards, questions of classification and subject boundaries are inseparable from questions of framing, and therefore of "power".(30)

Distinctions between the four lines of argument are made clearer if they are reinterpreted in terms of the three "realms" suggested in this essay. If we consider epistemological, learning theory and ethical/political dimensions in terms of (a) Objective Reality (including social and societal relations), (b) Objectivated 'Knowledge' and (c) Subjective 'Knowledge', then variations between the four forms of integrationism become clearer. Epistemology has to do with relationships between Reality and Objectivated 'Knowledge'. Learning Theory has to do with those between Subjective 'Knowledge' and both Reality and Objectivated 'Knowledge'. Ethics (or "Power") have to do with relationships between Reality (including societal relations) and both Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'.



With these distinctions made, Pring's four lines of argument might be seen in these terms:

1. (a) The epistemological assumptions are that established disciplines (OK) do not correspond to the objective Reality (R). Nonetheless, there are inherent structures and logics in these objectivated disciplines. These may not always be appropriate, however, to the kinds of enquiry that <u>should</u> be undertaken in schools.

   (b) As for learning theory, the inherent structures of established disciplines (OK) inevitably play a part in individuals' learning processes (SK). But since they do not correspond adequately with the real world (R), the search for integrative principles is both necessary and also a viable "educative task".

   (c) Although ethical criteria may not be explicitly mentioned, questions of value arise in deciding what kinds of enquiry <u>should</u> be undertaken in schools (see a), and what constitutes an "educative task" (see b). The choice of problems to be tackled and especially those of "considerable importance" are ethical/political questions.

2. (a) Epistemologically it is assumed that objectivated disciplines (OK) more or less "correspond" with the objective Reality (R).

   (b) Learning theory concerns the most effective way of introducing these disciplines (OK) to the child (SK). That is, the object is to make SK correspond with OK. The assumed natural curiosity of the child (which has to do with mind-brain in a societal context - in other words the relationship between SK and R) is a great help in this.

(c) No explicit mention is made of ethical issues. However, unless explicitly questioned, a belief in the correctness of objectivated disciplines (OK) as an adequate interpretation of the real world (R) tends to entail two things. It entails firstly an acceptance of its own ethical standing - this is especially so where the Reality in question involves societal relations - and secondly a legitimation of the current framers of knowledge. Therefore, not only would "natural curiosity" (b) and integration (a) lead to the child subjectivating established forms of 'knowledge', but they should do this.

3. (a) Epistemologically, established disciplines (OK) do not adequately represent Reality (R). Discipline boundaries are arbitrary and there is essentially only one mode of enquiry.

(b) In learning theory, therefore, only one broad approach is necessary. This is one of problem-solving. It is backed by stimulus-response theory, concerning what induces children to learn. In both these respects there is an emphasis on the R-SK relationship - in terms firstly of the nature of mind-brain and secondly of what are to be examined as "problems".

(c) Ethically, there are again no prescriptions explicitly stated. However, there is the implicit assumption that educators have the right and the duty to stimulate those lacking in "spontaneous" curiosity. As in all of these first three arguments, there is also probably (but not necessarily) some further assumption about the desirability of developing subjective understandings of all children to their optimum

level, however this may be defined.

4. (a) The epistemological assumption is a relativist one. There are various realities (Rs) and various possible accounts that may adequately or inadequately "correspond" with them (OKs).

(b) Learning theory is rather ambiguously treated by Pring here. It seems, though, that what is regarded as "relevant to /the child's/ immediate needs" is supposed to be more easily learned than that which is not (R-SK rather than OK-SK).

(c) Ethically, subjective accounts (SK) - and indeed the objectivated curriculum (OK) - should be developed so as to be relevant to societal and/or individual needs (R). The aim is again to educate children to become able to deal with problems - which of course are unspecified.

I have dealt with Pring's arguments at some length, not because I wished to challenge his line of argument, but because this treatment seemed to illustrate well some of the points I have been making, in considering how we might approach cases of allegedly "Open Education". I have stressed that in <u>all</u> educational beliefs and thinking there are epistemological, learning theory and ethical/politidal assumptions involved, whether or not they are made explicit. Certainly, as Pring suggests, one or other aspect may be emphasised in any line of argument put forward. Pring complained that such lines of argument are too frequently unelaborated. It seems to me that <u>all</u> features need elaboration, in each case. Moreover, it is assumptions, rather than lines of

argument, which are in practice most important. It is beliefs, rather than understandings, which are most consequential. This being the case, all three "realms" - and in turn both the "Knowledge" and the "Power" dimensions - are always involved, in practice. All three must be examined in empirical instances.

Notes

(1) cf Pring's criticism, referred to in Chapter 8 above.

(2) i.e. the closures with which I am most concerned are theories, however implicit. They are "causal" models, referring to assumed determinative relationships in the world-out-there. cf Chapter 2 above.

(3) In Syer (1974a) I criticised Bernstein (1971) for failing to distinguish adequately between levels within education systems and trying to generalise on that basis. Briefly, and in his terms, weak classification and framing for teachers or students, and in primary schools, sixth forms, or remedial streams are very different social phenomena. They need other (more basic) concepts for their distinctive elaboration.

(4) Weber (1919/48) pp. 139-143.

(5) cf. Schutz (1944/71).

(6) cf. also Clark (1960) on American open-door colleges.

(7) e.g. Davis, Gardner & Gardner (1944/65).

(8) For changing definitions of "equality of opportunity" in this country, see Silver (1973, ed.); Halsey (1972,ed.) chapter 1. For the U.S., see Coleman (1968/71). On the relationship between social mobility and "equality of opportunity", see, e.g. Huberman (1974). Ribbich (1975) is critical of the way the slogan legitimises economic (and "racial") inequality, as are Bowles and Gintis (1976).

(9) For instance:

> "The robustness of this perspective (even those who reject it have nagging doubts) is due, in no small part, to its incorporation in major social institutions - factories, offices, government bureaus, and schools. For the

technocratic justification of the hierarchical division of labour leads smoothly to a meritocratic view of the process whereby individuals are matched to jobs..." Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.105.

Particularly relevant to this is the assumption held by most prominent psychometricians at one time that "intelligent" was more or less equatable with "moral". See Karier (1972/73b) especially pp. 122-3. I shall return to the American Progressive movement in Chapter 15.

(10) Douglas (1970/73, pp.53-4) praises Bernstein's distinction between positional and personal families on the grounds that it is a higher level abstraction than the more conventional achievement/ascription. For in some families (and I would say in our society) roles may be achieved, but <u>then</u> acquire quasi-ascriptive characteristics.

(11) To repeat, I am not wishing to imply that closures - in this or in any other respect - may not "correspond" with some real constraints. The relativist-realist position I outlined in Chapter 2 insists that beliefs, though relative, are not arbitrary or random. Closures may indeed "correspond" with real constraints, and standards - however ideologically held (and therefore interest-specific) - may be justifiable on quite different grounds.

(12) This can be seen a hundred years apart in the statements of Robert Lowe and of Amis and Conquest. Lowe, who a year later was resigned to an extended suffrage and stressing the need to "compel our future masters to learn their letters", opposed this extension in 1866 because a "conspiracy of the 'unfit' would swamp and obliterate not only property, but intelligence, culture, toleration, patriotism." (Simon, 1960, p.355). Amis and Conquest (1969) have more recently affirmed that, "Our dispute is not of course about élites at all, but about what should constitute an education ..." (p.158).

(13) I suggested in Syer (1974a) that Bernstein's notion of "framing" (1971) is too ambiguous to be used in analysis of what he calls the "power and control component" in education. The term is nonetheless useful, to denote "control over the organisation of what is taken to be valid and valuable 'knowledge' - e.g. curriculum".

(14) See also Chapter 10 below.

(15) Although Bernstein acknowledges reading Chomsky (Bernstein, 1973, p.267), he appears to lean more heavily on Bruner in this passage - and, I suspect, throughout. Consider the following:

> "We begin with the hypothesis that any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development."
> Bruner (1960) p.33.

Later Bruner, too, was influenced by Chomsky's writings:

> "With respect to making accessible the deep structure of any given discipline ... any subject can be taught to any child at any age in some form that is both honest and powerful."
> Bruner (1969/74) p.138.

In this latter passage, Bruner, too, assumed a clearly reified curriculum.

(16) See Chapter 2, note 106.

(17) Popper (1963). Compare also Freire's criticisms of a "nutritionist" view of knowledge (Freire, 1970/72, p.22 ff). As for advocates of "bucket" theories of the mind, compare the following:

> "Intelligence, as psychologists use the word, is almost synonymous with what the Board of Education, somewhat uneuphoniously, has called 'educable capacity'. Capacity must obviously limit content. It is impossible for a pint jug to hold more than a pint of milk; and it is equally impossible for a child's educational attainments to rise higher than his educable capacity permits."
> Burt (1937) p.447.

In the 19th century, the Rev.Robinson, principal of a teachers training college at York, gave evidence to the Newcastle Commission (1861):

> "The present course tends <u>to impart information</u> rather than to <u>develop the faculties and to discipline the mind</u>. The principle in short ... is to pour into the students' minds a large supply of knowledge which they in turn may discharge into the minds of their scholars ... The great feature of the course ... is cram. The master has been <u>crammed</u> himself and so he <u>crams</u> his pupils."
> quoted by Hurt (1971/72) p.140 (original emphasis).

I am not sure, but I think Robinson approved of this perspective. He was certainly unsympathetic to teachers who tried to raise themselves above their "natural" station. Again we see the "power"/consequentiality aspects of educational beliefs, inseparable in practice from the "Knowledge" component.

(18) cf. Goodman (1962/64/71) Chapter 6, for a strong attack on programmed learning.

(19) See Syer (1974b) and Part V below.

(20) e.g. Bantock (1971). Bloom (1964) reported a number of empirical findings, for instance that by the age of 9, at least 50% of general achievement pattern at the age of 18 has been developed. But Bloom himself (1968) claims that children differ in the rate at which they learn, not in their basic capacity to learn - which his findings are generally taken to indicate. On the reification of research findings see Ford (1975) Chapter 20.

(21) Again it should be pointed out that the nature of actual, real constraints is not here at issue. Rather, I am considering what are taken to be constraints - that is closures of belief. Meanwhile, evidence that the common assumption of immutable human characteristics may be a function only of societal circumstance, rather than of innate determination is not lacking. Bettleheim describes the drastic changes that he witnessed (and experienced) in Dachau and Büchenwald, and which caused him to revise much of his previous thinking on psychoanalysis and societal change:

> "I also saw fast changes taking place, and not only in behaviour but personality too: incredibly faster and often much more radical changes than any that were possible by psychoanalytic treatment. Given the conditions of the camp, these changes were more often for the worse, but sometimes definitely for the better. So one and the same environment could bring about radical changes both for better and worse. I could no longer doubt that environment can and does account for important aspects of man's behaviour and personality ....
> My experience in the camps taught me, almost within days, that I had gone much too far in believing that only changes in man could create change in society."
> "Neither is society as irrelevant to understanding personality dynamics as psychoanalysis suggests, nor is personality development as rooted in biology and early life experiences, or as independent of the current environment, as was assumed ..."
> Bettleheim (1960/70) pp.22-24, 42-43.

Becker has commented on the way that many social scientists assume that either personality or value orientations are basically stable and then seek to explain away anomalies:

> "Both these approaches err by taking for granted that the only way we can arrive at generalised explanations of human behaviour is by finding some unchanging components in the self or personality. They err as well in making the prior assumption that human beings are essentially unchanging ..."
> Becker (1964/71) p.129.

Closely connected with some awareness of this possibility of drastic personal change have been certain education policies motivated by desires for social control or order. Eager (1953) says of late 19th century Britain that

> "The discipline and order secured by the elementary schools was almost miraculous, but within two or three years the well-trained schoolboy degenerated to the larrikin of the streets, ignorant, foul-mouthed and predatory."
> quoted by Simon (1965) p.61.

Simon also quotes a contemporary advocate of Boys Clubs, to the same effect. Such evidence as this reminds us again of the problematic nature of the transfer of Master Patterns from one context (the school) to others, in adult life, and the need therefore to view with caution too simplistic a notion of the "Correspondence Principle".

(22) See Rex (1970) who argues that whilst strictly speaking racism may refer to genetic determination, deterministic beliefs that refer to some other (e.g. "cultural") "causation" are of the same basic character. I fully agree with this argument.

(23) Thorndike (1914) had this to say about sexual differentiation:

> "The most striking differences in instinctive equipment consists in the strength of the fighting instinct in the male and of the nursing instinct in the female ... And probably no serious student of human nature will doubt that these are matters of original nature. The out-and-out physical fighting for the sake of combat is pre-eminently a male instinct, and the resentment at mastery, the zeal to surpass and the general joy at activity in mental as well as physical matters seem to be closely correlated with it. It has been common (to) talk of woman's 'dependence'. This is, I am sure, only an awkward name for less resentment at mastery. The actual nursing of the young seems likewise to involve equally unreasoning tenderness to pet, coddle, and 'do for' others." quoted by Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.198.

For an account of sexism in schooling, see Frazier & Sadker (1973).

As for "racial" differentiation in psychometry, Terman (1916) wrote the following:

> "Their dullness seems to be racial, or at least inherent in the family stocks from which they come. The fact that one meets this type with such extraordinary frequency among Indians, Mexicans and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew ... There will be

> discovered enormously significant racial differences ... which cannot be wiped out by any schemes of mental culture.
>
> Children of this group should be segregated in special classes ... They cannot master abstractions, but they can often be made efficient workers." quoted by Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.123.

Jensen (1969) came to not dissimilar conclusions. On challenges to this viewpoint, see Bagley (1925) for an attack on the "fatalistic assumptions" that accompanied the use of intelligence tests and Montague (1975, ed.) and Simon (1971) for consideration of racist mythology in intelligence theory.

(24) See the quotation from Terman (1916) in note 7, for instance.

(25) See Syer (1976a) for some discussion of this "Happy Coincidence".

(26) Page references in this section refer to Pring (1970/71).

(27) The lettering is mine, and is made on the basis of my own distinctions.

(28) This final quotation is listed by Pring separately from the one above, and is his only hint at a "fifth" line of argument. It seems to me to belong with those others quoted, under (4), though somewhat anomalously.

(29) I use the term "ethical" since it is the term used by Pring. However, as I say below, it seems to me that <u>in this context</u> "ethical" (or "moral") is roughly synonymous with "political". It has to do with the "Power" dimension of educational beliefs.

(30) See previous section of this Chapter. cf also Syer (1974a) on the interdependence - which Bernstein explicitly denies - of classification and framing.

CHAPTER 10

OPEN SCHOOLS, ORGANIC SOLIDARITY?

The distinction between "openness" and "closure" in educational beliefs is a matter of dimensions, not of types. It is in many ways related to other distinctions made in everyday language and in sociological theory. Most obvious are such dichotomies as "traditional"/"progressive"(1), "formal"/"informal"(2), "Collection"/"Integration"(3) and "psychometric"/"epistemological"(4). All these have specifically to do with education. In turn they can be located within a broader tradition of sociological distinctions, such as Tönnies' "Gemeinschaft"/"Gesellschaft", Weber's "traditional"/"rational", Durkheim's "mechanical"/"organic" and many others. One writer who has deliberately set out to relate this wider tradition to educational contexts is Bernstein (1967/71; 1971). In this Chapter, I hope firstly to demonstrate how notions elaborated so far in this essay - principally those of structured belief, Basic Beliefs and the three "realms" - may resolve certain important ambiguities in Bernstein's account. Secondly, I hope to refine further our understanding of what "Open Education" might consist of - and what it might not - in specific contexts.

As unfortunately is the case in much of Bernstein's writing, it is not always clear in "Open Schools, Open Society?" when he is hypothesizing and when he is asserting what he takes to be empirical fact.(5) Related to this problem is a rather more serious one: what is the status of his use of Durkheim's concepts

of "mechanical" and "organic solidarity"? Basically, does Bernstein intend to demonstrate the validity of Durkheim's theory, through looking at schools in contemporary Britain? Or is he merely suggesting that one way of looking at this contextual situation might be to employ these concepts? If the latter were the case, one might have hoped for some discussion of ways in which this application might not be useful, or might be improved upon. But there is a tendency to impose what may be an inappropriate framework on the "facts". This seems to accept Durkheim's concepts as unproblematic. I suggest that certain ambiguities in Durkheim's own analysis are based on closures that he himself held about education. These are reflected in Bernstein's application.

There are two major difficulties, which I shall mention but not elaborate upon, since they are not so immediately relevant to the discussion of "Open Education". These are, firstly, the lack of clarity in Durkheim's notion of "society", and, secondly, the rather linear notion that he had of development from a mechanical to an organic mode of solidarity.(6) Accordingly, it is not clear in Bernstein's article(7) whether the changes he observes in contemporary British schools are supposed to derive from prior shifts in societal structure, or from relatively autonomous developments within the school system itself. Whilst a few passages suggest the first interpretation(8), he writes on the whole as though changes in school organisation were themselves responsible for changes in the mode of solidarity. Similarly, there is the impression that these changes are somehow

spontaneous - along a "natural" line of development. I would argue, however, that the motives[9] of innovators (and others) are of fundamental importance, if we are to understand the actual and likely consequences of Integration - about which Bernstein is so pessimistic in his later paper.[10] These motives, of course, are contexted in society, not just within schools.

The two notions I discuss here are those of "boundaries" and "supra-content concept". Boundaries appear to define, for Bernstein, the distinction between mechanical and organic modes of solidarity.[11] He sees the former as identifiable with

> "symbolic orders /which/ point up or celebrate the idea of purity of categories",

and the latter as

> "symbolic orders /which/ point up or celebrate the idea of mixture or diversity of categories"
> Bernstein (1967/71) p.168.

He takes greater flexibility of subject boundaries, of teaching roles, of teaching groups, etc., to be evidence of a shift from mechanical to organic solidarity in schools. The second notion, "supra-content concept", figures more in Bernstein (1971). But even there it is not adequately related to that of "boundaries". It tends to be accorded less importance than it merits. It needs to be seen how these two notions are related to those of "education in depth" and "education in breadth". These apparently underlie what Bernstein regards as a "fundamental paradox", namely the

production of "the covert deep closure of mechanical solidarity" in education systems characterised by an "overt structure of organic solidarity" (Bernstein, 1971, p.66).[12] I suggest that this paradox arises principally in the use of a deficient or inappropriate theoretical analysis - that of mechanical and organic solidarity.

Taking the notion of boundaries first, the purity or mixture of categories seems, for Bernstein, to define the distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. There is ample justification for this in Durkheim's Division of Labour. For instance:

> "It is now manifest how it happens that mechanical solidarity is linked to the existence of the segmental type ... It is because this special structure allows society to enclose the individual more tightly, holding him strongly attached to his domestic environment and, consequently, to traditions, and finally contributing to the limitation of his social horizon; it also contributes to make it concrete and defined." Durkheim (1893/1964) pp.301-2.

And,

> "There is a decreasing number of collective beliefs and sentiments which are both collective enough and strong enough to take on a religious character. That is to say, the average intensity of the common conscience progressively becomes enfeebled ... The decrease in the number of proverbs, adages, dicta, etc. as societies develop, is another proof that the collective representations move towards indetermination." ibid, p.170.[13]

Problems arise, however, when Bernstein seeks to interpret the purity of categories (i.e. closure, mechanical solidarity) in terms of "education in depth", and the mixing of categories (i.e. openness, organic solidarity) in terms of "education in breadth".

This is clearly intended as an original contribution on Bernstein's part, adding to Durkheim's analysis. But it is doubtful whether Durkheim's notions of "mechanical" and "organic" are appropriate, when this development takes place.

There is a certain ambiguity in Durkheim's notions which is not resolved by Bernstein. Certainly mechanical solidarity seems interpretable in terms of closure. But what exactly is open, in the case of organic solidarity? In issues specifically educational, there are some crucial closures that Bernstein fails to appreciate. This can be seen if we look at the questions of specialisation and flexibility.

On the one hand, Durkheim makes a great deal of the flexibility of "organised" societies. A whole chapter is devoted to Heredity. The message might be summarised as,

> "Race and individuality are two contradictory forces which vary inversely with each other." Durkheim (1893/1964) p.304,

and,

> "The more specialised the forms of activity, the more they escape the action of heredity." ibid, p.312.

For Durkheim, "organised" society is characterised by geographical and social mobility. This is undoubtedly a form of flexibility - or openness.

On the other hand, another characteristic of such societies is specialisation:

> "In higher societies, our duty is not to spread our activity over a large surface, but to concentrate and specialise it. We must contract our horizon, choose a

> definite task and immerse ourselves in it completely, instead of trying to make ourself a sort of creative masterpiece, quite complete, which contains its worth in itself and not in the services that it renders." ibid, p.401.

Durkheim has some very contemptuous things to say about dilettantes (ibid, pp.311-2, 402) in this light, which I shall mention in a moment. An organismic metaphor inevitably carries with it connotations of specialisation. The dismissal of any idea of multi-purpose, adaptable and non-specialist organs (in a body) is one of the main points of using that metaphor. In other words, a certain kind of flexibility is quite clearly ruled out. At first sight, flexibility and specialisation are incompatible.

For Durkheim, this is resolved by a reliance upon certain closures which are assumed to be unproblematic. That is, it is misleading to see "higher" societies or organic solidarity in terms of complete openness. They may be characterised in terms of <u>certain kinds</u> of openness. But it is important to identify what closures remain.

In Durkheim's view of "organised" societies there are clearly closures in respect of Societal Relations. A specialised division of labour is, in fact, a defining characteristic. Associated with this are certain assumptions about Subjective 'Knowledge' and mind-brain which, despite the flexibility noted above, are not totally open. His attack on hereditarianism is limited to the notion that specialist occupational aptitudes are heritable. Among the "very general faculties" that he allows to be heritable

are some which are rather dubious. He approvingly quotes De Candolle on the non-heritability of specialist aptitudes, but also on the general faculties that De Candolle's father is alleged to have inherited.

> "Here is the list: will, orderliness, sane judgment, a certain power of attention, aversion for metaphysical abstractions, independence of opinion." ibid, p.315.

Furthermore, Durkheim has some distinct closures in respect of learning theory (apart, that is from those implied in the above), which may best be considered after we have looked at Bernstein's "supra-content concept".

As far as "boundaries" are concerned, it is clear that Durkheim's organic solidarity was not conceived of as total openness, or total lack of boundaries. However, one way in which Bernstein distinguishes between "education in depth" and "education in breadth" is precisely in these terms. Whereas for Durkheim it was specialisation, with in-depth knowledge of specific areas of 'knowledge', rather than a dilettante superficial acquaintance, that characterised "organised" society, for Bernstein education in depth is apparently associated with segmental societies. For Bernstein, it is a move away from such specialist subject 'knowledge' that characterises the shift in education (and in society?) which he is discussing. Yet he describes this shift in terms of the same lineal development described (and possibly prescribed) by Durkheim. It will help to look at the supra-content idea, to understand this better.

Bernstein uses the notion of "supra-subject idea" (1967/71) and

"supra-content concept" (1971) only in respect of curriculum integration, or the more general shift to openness (or organic solidarity or the Integrated Code). He does allow (in one place only) that the Collection Code may also have an implicit relational notion.(14) But his attention is almost exclusively to explicit rationales for integrating:

> "Integration ... refers minimally to the subordination of previously insulated subjects or courses to some relational idea, which blurs the boundaries between subjects." Bernstein (1971) p.53 (original emphasis).

I maintain that all beliefs are structured. In any structure of beliefs, including those about curriculum organisation, there are high-level Basic Beliefs that attempt to unify those beliefs - however inadequate, and however implicit, the structuration and unification may be. By the very fact of being a "code", a Collection Code will have such structure and unification, just as much as an Integrated Code. Similarly, a code that is already institutionalised will have them just as much as one that is potential or innovatory. Bernstein might argue that in the case of Integration or innovation (he does not really distinguish between the two) the Basic Beliefs, or high-level "supra-content concepts", will be more explicit. This may of course be true. Yet what is made explicit may not adequately portray what is really believed (Value-Known). The explicit formulations may be a poor reflection of what actually motivates particular forms of change. In Chapter 9, I approved of Pring's insistance that poorly elaborated notions of integration should be spelled out -

and improved upon. Elsewhere, Pring has said that

> the "relationships between contents can be properly characterised only if there is some reference to the logical structure of their different subject-matters and thus of the logical structure of their possible inter-connection."
> Pring (1975) p.69.

In using my "tree-root" metaphor to consider Objectivated 'Knowledge'- including school curricula - it is possible to picture this inter-relationship. We might illustrate it as follows:



(At the same time, such integration would almost certainly not leave the formerly "discrete" subject structures intact. Since there will already have been an <u>implicit</u> high-level relational idea, the elaboration of a new supra-concept idea is likely to <u>change the Relevance</u> by which the objectivated curriculum is understood). In short, we may view objectivated curricula in terms of the "tree-root" metaphor. The Basic Beliefs on my dimension of Inclusiveness can then be seen as an elaboration of Bernstein's "supra-content concept".

Bernstein does not explicitly distinguish between Objectivated

'Knowledge' (including curricula) and Subjective 'Knowledge'. The explicit concern of his "supra-content concept" is only with the former. However, he does talk of "deep and surface structures" in ways that could be taken to refer to both "realms" of 'knowledge'. Where he talks about curricula, it is reasonable to suppose that the "supra-content concept" has something to do with "deep structures". I suggest that the structuring of subjective belief and understanding can be considered in the same terms. How all these inter-relate is not clear in Bernstein's writing. The following passage shows this. It also suggests that Bernstein is nonetheless concerned with precisely these issues.

> "In order to accomplish any form of integration ... there must be some relational idea, a supra-content concept, which focuses upon general principles at a high level of abstraction. For example, if the relationships between sociology and biology are to be opened, then the relational idea (amongst many) might be the issue of problems of order and change examined through the concepts of genetic and natural codes. Whatever the relational concepts are, they will act selectively upon the knowledge within each subject which is to be transmitted. The particulars of each subject are likely to have reduced significance. This will focus attention upon the deep structure of each subject, rather than upon its surface structure. I suggest this will lead to an emphasis upon, and the exploration of, general principles and the concepts through which these principles are obtained. In turn, this is likely to affect the orientation of the pedagogy, which will be less concerned to emphasise the need to acquire states of knowledge, but will be more concerned to emphasise how knowledge is created. In other words, the pedagogy of integrated codes is likely to emphasise various ways of knowing in the pedagogical relationships. With the collection code, the pedagogy tends to proceed from the surface structure of the knowledge to the deep structure ... With integrated codes, the pedagogy is likely to proceed from the deep structure to the surface structure ... Thus, I suggest that integrated codes will make available from the beginning of the pupils' educational career, clearly in a way appropriate to a given age level, the deep structure of the knowledge, i.e. the principles for the generating of new knowledge." Bernstein (1971) pp.60-1.

If we consider Subjective 'Knowledge' as structured on the same dimensions as Objectivated 'Knowledge', then any individual learner's beliefs and understandings can in principle be compared with the curriculum.(16) Where there are closures concerning what is educationally valid and valuable, to introduce learners to the "deep structures" of the curriculum is to attempt to achieve a correspondence between those objectivated structures on the one hand and the structures of the learner's subjective 'knowledge' on the other. Even where some such correspondence were achieved, however, the two "realms" should be kept quite distinct, in analysis of what is happening.

Turning again to Durkheim, we find that he too implies a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension to the structuring of 'knowledge'. He too writes as if there are not just horizontal boundaries, but also vertical levels of inclusiveness or supra-content relation.(17) Generalist 'knowledge' is for him clearly what I call "low level" and cliché'd. It is low-level - "shallow" even - in that it involves neither deep insights nor thorough understanding. It is cliché'd in that without high-level elaboration it lacks the availability of alternative relevance angles. It lacks other ways of viewing the same phenomena creatively, in different lights.

Two things must be noted about Durkheim's view of such generalism. Firstly, it may or may not be "functional" to "societal needs". Secondly, it results from particular kinds of experience. In the first place, low-level generalisms may be

functional to society.

> "The division of labour presumes that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to them. He is, then, not a machine who repeats his movements without knowing their meaning, but he knows that they tend,in some way, towards an end that he conceives more or less distinctly. He feels that he is serving something. For that, he need not embrace vast portions of the social horizon: it is sufficient that he perceives enough of it to understand that his actions have an aim beyond themselves ..."
> Durkheim (1893/1964) p.372-3.

However, Durkheim has nothing but contempt for the dilettante whose low-level 'knowledge' serves no societal purpose:

> "The complexity of /the dilettante's/ nature is only apparent. As he assigns himself the task of being interested in everything, it seems that he has a multitude of diverse tastes and aptitudes. A pure illusion! Look to the bottom of things, and you will see that it all reduces to a small number of general, simple faculties ... The surface upon which so many skilfully shaded colours shine covers a base of deplorable monotony ... He has reared nothing personal and durable on the ground which nature has bequeathed him."
> ibid, pp.311-2.

> "It is not without reason that public sentiment reproves an ever more pronounced tendency on the part of dilettantes and even others to be taken up with an exclusively general culture and refuse to take any part in occupational organisation. That is because they are not sufficiently attached to society, or, if one wishes, society is not sufficiently attached to them and they escape it." ibid, p.402.

In the second place, low-level generalism, for Durkheim, is a product of general experience, just as specialist 'knowledge' is a product of specialised experience. Specialisation produces specialist knowledge, as well as requiring it. The "education in depth" to which Bernstein refers would be, for Durkheim, the development of specialist high-level 'knowledge' through specialized experience. In short, Subjective 'Knowledge' derives

primarily, for Durkheim, from direct experience of Reality (including societal relations). Far less important is creative reflection on the structuring of one's own ideas or on that of objectivated bodies of 'Knowledge'. Nor does direct determination by that objectivated culture or curriculum figure in Durkheim's account.

In considering the question of belief structuration and the notion of "supra-content concepts", then, we are directed to further closures in Durkheim's conception of "organised" society and organic solidarity. The notion of a "natural" division of labour and specialisation is evident, together with a (Value-Known) belief in its desirability. "Function", indeed, connotes (desirable) purpose,as well as consequence, in Durkheim's account. Moreover, his notions of learning theory are largely deterministic: he sees Subjective 'Knowledge' as a product of genetically produced aptitudes of a general nature and of specialised experience within an "organised" society.

Many of Durkheim's closures are common to much contemporary educational thinking. He believed in the naturalness of individual and societal inequalities. He believed in critical stages of intellectual development, both genetically and environmentally determined. He believed in flexibility as morally right and societally useful in childhood education - until such critical stages were reached and "natural" aptitudes were revealed. But he believed in differentiation (specialisation) at a subsequent stage. He adhered, in short, to the "Equity of opportunity" ideal - as opposed to "Equality of opportunity".

> "We always reason, in educational affairs, as if the moral basis of man was made up of generalities ... Such is not the case at all. Man is destined to fill a special function in the social organisation, and, consequently, he must learn, in advance, how to play his role. For that an education is necessary, quite as much as that he should learn his role as a man. We do not, however, wish to imply that it is necessary to rear a child prematurely for some certain profession, but that it is necessary to get him to like the idea of circumscribed tasks and limited horizons. But this task is quite different from that for general things, and cannot be aroused by the same means." Durkheim (1893/1964) p.402n.

Some of the closures noted here may be ones which I find disputable. But it has not been my purpose to criticise Durkheim. Even in supposedly "Open Education" there are inevitably closures. It is important that these be recognised. To do this, we must appreciate how they are structured. We must seek to explain them in terms of societal context. And we must explore their possible and actual consequences in practice. Durkheim, like anyone else, lived in a particular historical society. It would be strange indeed if he was not a party to beliefs that, to him and others, made sense of the conditions of that society. (In the passage just quoted, there is much that is similar to the beliefs of Progressive educationists in the U.S., as we shall see in Chapter 14.)

I have tried to locate the closures in Durkheim's notions of mechanical and organic solidarity because these are inevitably imported into Bernstein's account, insofar as he applies these notions to contemporary British education without criticism or comment. Bernstein too easily assumes that "mechanical" and "organic" are respectively "closed" and "open".[18] Yet, as we have seen, there are important closures in Durkheim's notion of "organic".

(Indeed, so we should expect.) These produce difficulties that are insurmountable, without considerable refinement of how we conceive of "openness" and "closure".

In this Chapter I have explored the theme that the vertical and horizontal dimensions of Inclusiveness and Consistency - by which we may consider both Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge' - are interdependent, in practice. Bernstein's equivalents of these - "supra-content concept" and "boundaries" - are not sufficiently elaborated to make this clear. We have seen that it is important, in considering educational beliefs, to distinguish between Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'. And we have seen that "openness" and "closure" are misleading if treated as ideal types of educational ideology, but useful if seen as dimensions on which such ideologies can be analyzed.

Notes

(1) e.g. Ashton et al. (1975); Parsons (1959/61).

(2) e.g. Bennett (1976).

(3) Bernstein (1971).

(4) Esland (1971).

(5) Indicative of this is his predeliction for such expressions as "is likely to ..." and "may be ...", which sometimes tend to be treated as if synonymous with "is". These are especially common in Bernstein (1971), e.g. pp.63-5.

(6) My comments on Durkheim are restricted largely to his Division of Labour (1893/1964).

(7) In this Chapter, I refer to Bernstein (1967/71), unless otherwise stated.

(8) These are very few, in fact. For example:-

> "The [newer] secondary schools celebrate diversity, not purity. This may be symptomatic of basic changes in the culture of society, particularly changes in the principles of social control."
> Bernstein (1967/71) p.169.

(9) By "motives", of course, I do not just mean explicit policy formulations. See Chapter 5, above.

(10) i.e. Bernstein (1971). cf. Syer (1974a) and Chapter 12, below.

(11) Nonetheless, as I have suggested in Syer (1976b), Pring (1975) is wrong to see "boundaries" as the central notion in Bernstein's analysis. For the sake of defining distinctions between mechanical and organic (in Bernstein, 1967/71) and between Collection and Integration (in Bernstein, 1971), boundaries may overtly be most important. But more central to all of his work is nonetheless the notion of "codes". (Similarly, it is my intention to hold the notion of "Value-Knowledge" as central to this thesis - including this chapter, where the discussion is presented in terms of openness and closure. I acknowledge my debt to Bernstein in this).

(12) Bernstein already touches on this in the earlier article:

> "Is it possible that, as the open school moves further towards organic solidarity as its major principle of social integration, so the pupils may move further towards the 'closed' society of the age group? Are the educational dropouts of the 50s to be replaced by the moral dropouts of the 70s?" Bernstein (1967/71) p.169.

(13) In this and in other cases, more quotational evidence is presented in the fuller account developed in Syer (1975b).

(14) "There may of course be some underlying concept to a collection: the gentleman, the educated man, the skilled man, the non-vocational man." Bernstein (1971) p.49.

(15) cf Chapter 2, above. In practice, of course, so-called integration is often a change only in name. That is, the basic structures of curriculum remain relatively unscathed. Midwinter is referring to something of this sort when he says:

> "Integration is not itself the answer. Take a topic like Northumbria and give it the interdisciplinary treatment. You finish with early monastic life (history), the north-east coast (geography), a day in the life of a monk (r.e.), a model of a monastery (art), and an acting out of the life of a monk (drama). This is integration from the outside,

> with subjects advancing a few seemly steps in the stately interdisciplinary quadrille. ..."
> Midwinter (1972) p.22.

(16) In practice, the comparison would largely be with what his teacher takes to be the curriculum. In schools, what teachers, text-book writers, examiners, etc. believe to be "a subject" is the curriculum, so far as the pupil is concerned. It is objectivated 'knowledge', external to him.

(17) Durkheim (1925/56) talks of the "cardinal notions" and the "latent philosophy" of the "fundamental disciplines", and urges pedagogues to pay explicit attention to what these might be, and to their consequently more effective transmission to pupils. This is remarkably similar to Bruner's prescriptions, and to Bernstein's account of Integration.

(18) Thus he can say with no further explanation,

> "It might now be helpful to drop the terms mechanical and organic solidarity and refer instead to 'closed' and 'open' schools." Bernstein (1967/71) p.169.

PART IV - CONTEXTUAL CONSTRAINTS AND CLOSURES IN "OPEN EDUCATION"

CHAPTER 11

CONSTRAINTS AND CLOSURES

The Contextuality of Educational Beliefs

Total openness in educational belief would entail a complete lack of preconceptions - no assumption of constraints, no expectations and no objectives. In Reality, such complete openness is inconceivable.(1) In no matter what societal context, there are constraints. We should therefore assume that some belief closures will always be found. They may concern things that are "obviously" not open or negotiable. But this in no way means that they are sociologically uninteresting. On the contrary, it is of the nature of ideological beliefs that they refer to what their adherents take to be "obvious". They are no less consequential for that. Nor are they any less determined - in a way which we should seek to elaborate.

In the case of professedly "Open Education", what is frequently taken to be most open is the end result, the product of education. It is claimed, perhaps, that there are no objectives, that education is desirable in itself. Only the processes matter, not the consequences. That, it may be said, is for the learners themselves to decide. But as many writers have pointed out(2), such professions of openness are likely to conceal very real objectives, nonetheless. A commitment to learner autonomy, or to learner satisfaction, or to "rationality", are all forms of closure. They are prescribed

objectives which are not to be violated. Furthermore, there are always limited resources. There is always an inclusive society. And these are never irrelevant to educational beliefs.

Part III was concerned with definitional questions. In it, I looked primarily at "logical", rather than "contextual", aspects of the notion of "Open Education". It must always be recognised however, that beliefs are contexted. They exist within given historical societies, in the minds of identifiable people, and they need explaining in terms of that context. Their consequentiality depends on where and by whom they are held. And they refer to the real world-out-there. Often, such reference is largely implicit in the statements of those we observe. But this makes attention to the societal context all the more important. Not just the general historical era, but the specific societal context, need to be considered. In the case of educational belief, for instance, opennesses may refer to some sections of society, but not others. Which children are being considered? Which educational institutions are in question? How are these differentiated?

For example, education is often thought of as liberating. Yet schooling for some is anything but liberating. What then is meant by "liberating" when this is forwarded as an objective by educationists or politicians? Does it mean the same thing, in the case of all children? What is it supposed that children should be "liberated" from? (And what should they not escape?) Bernstein (1971) refers to the "ultimate mystery" of 'knowledge', accessible only to the (lucky?) few who reach the pinnacle of our formal education system.(3) Harman et al. (1968) seek in part to explain

the student unrest of the late sixties in terms of the disillusion experienced by an enlarged student body: they failed to find that "ultimate mystery". Is education the introduction to some such mystery? Clearly it depends not just on what one means by "education". It depends also on whose education one is talking about. So far as behaviour-determining beliefs are concerned, such contextual considerations are crucial. This essay is about ideology and belief. It is not directly about societal structure. Yet particular beliefs cannot be validly considered except in relation to social and societal context. Part IV, therefore, considers some contextual features relevant to "Open Education."

Constraints and Closures

Constraints are determinative features of the Real world-out-there. Closures, on the other hand, are features of Objectivated or Subjective 'Knowledge'. They are taken to refer to real constraints. Since such 'Knowledge' is itself a part of Reality, closures themselves may operate as constraints. They are less necessary, or less inevitable, than external physical constraints, however, in that they are subject to internal logical experience, as well as that of external context. Moreover, they can be the object of creative reflection (which itself can be belief-producing experience).

Truly open education would involve a total lack both of constraints and of closures in the minds of people involved. Prescriptive or descriptive beliefs in "Open Education" would

involve merely a lack of closures. Since some kinds of constraint are inevitable, unqualified beliefs in "Open Education" must be delusory, or at least inadequate - whether they refer to actual or potential educational arrangements.

Closures are non-random. They are neither arbitrary nor wholly open to negotiation or change. They tend to "correspond", however inadequately, with constraints in the world-out-there.(4) But the nature of the non-randomness - the nature of the structuration both of the real constraints and of the notional closures - is not often explicitly understood. Closures tend to take the form of reified categories - categories of what are taken to be "natural" or "inevitable". For example, there is clearly a reality to which notions of "intelligence" somehow refer. Differences between people in this respect are not merely illusion.(5) But the categorisation that occurs in identifying - even implicitly - variations in "intelligence" frequently lacks an adequate appreciation of the nature of "intelligence(6), or of its causation, or of its ideological consequentiality. The structured properties, both of the Reality in which real variations (in what we call "intelligence") exist and of the beliefs and understandings within which such categories occur, remain inadequately understood and/or implicit. Making explicit more adequate accounts of the nature of constraints and closures is a necessary - though not a sufficient - condition of deliberate and autonomous action, whether to change or to maintain those constraints.(7)

Inevitable Constraints in Education

In looking for actual constraints in given educational contexts, similar concepts may be used to those already developed for the consideration of closures. Just as we may look for closures about such-and-such areas, so we may look for constraints in those areas.

An obvious kind of constraint is that of limited resources. Differential resourcing is in turn inseparable from the power structure of the society and institutions involved and from participants' educational objectives. Differentiations occur between regions in a given society(8), between schools in each area(9), and within schools themselves (e.g. between departments and between teaching groups). Resources include not just buildings and equipment, but things like teachers' time and energy.(10) (These may be "costed", for instance in terms of teacher-pupil ratios - i.e. staff bills). Inseparable from such resource differentiations are questions of national and local politics, and staff hierarchies and career structures within schools.(11) All these are a complexly related part of the wider questions of "Power" in education, discussed in Part II. They are the subject of assumptions about societal and institutional inequalities and power structures and about the functions and objectives of education.

In educational objectives we see most clearly the importance of context. Though some may seek to define "education" abstractly, without reference to specific objectives(12), education is in practice institutionalised and financed, in most societies. Teachers are employed to pursue very definite objectives - however implicit

these may remain. Whilst it could be argued that "education" may not imply the pursuit of objectives, "teaching" inevitably does. And formal (and financed) education seem always to be concerned with teaching. A question which then arises is, is formal education (or schooling) necessarily conservative?

Education and Schooling: Inevitable Closures?

Bourdieu has suggested that schools are necessarily conservative:

> "A number of the characteristic traits of the teaching and the teacher which the most critical commentators mention only as grounds for condemnation, properly belong to the very definition of the function of education. So, for instance, it would be easy to demonstrate that the routine and routine-engendering activity of the school and the teachers, as frequently attacked by the great cultural prophecies as by small heresies (often consisting simply of this denunciation alone) are without doubt unavoidably implicit in the logic of an institution which is fundamentally entrusted with a function of cultural conservation."
> Bourdieu (1966/71) p.178.

But what may appear to be an analytical statement about the nature of schooling should not be regarded as such. What "entrusted" means in this quotation is distinctly problematic. For it clearly implies the operation of specific policies, by identifiable people. Elsewhere, Bourdieu (1966/74) again talks of the school as a conservative force. He talks of the "cultural capital" that the least privileged social classes lack, but which is the basis of success in formal education. He discusses the legitimation of societal rigidity, within an overt egalitarianism, that arises from the "ideology of giftedness". But in this article Bourdieu is specifically talking about the French

pessimism".[14] My distinction between constraint and closure should make this clearer, when we consider educational institutions. Any institutional arrangement constitutes a real structure of relationships - however temporary or negotiable - which is likely to contain constraints on people participating. However, the existence of real constraints does not necessarily produce notional closures. The latter exist insofar as constraints are only implicitly notionalised. They have the force of Value-Known "inevitability" or "obviousness" in default of explicit consideration. But whether or not those real constraints are a bar to alternative action, they are not a necessary bar to understanding. That is, an understanding of constraints need not in itself constitute closure.

Bernstein has asked:

> "If educational institutions (following Bourdieu) can be considered as repeating agencies, we can ask the following question. What is the social basis of a repeating agency which attempts to produce unrepeatable or unlikely outcomes?" Bernstein (1971) p.66n.

In a way, he is asking the wrong question. For this still assumes an over-deterministic view of how beliefs and understandings are produced. Beliefs are not produced merely by experience of external reality. Subjective creativity can lead to novel understandings. And it can itself constitute belief-producing experience. Otherwise there would be massive consensus and conformity on all manner of issues - where it does not, in fact, exist. In default of explicit consideration, real constraints may produce, determinatively, similar beliefs in all concerned. But through explicit elaboration, people are able to create their own

understandings and their own notional openesses.

To draw a very pertinent analogy, both language and literacy can be determinative. The classificatory schemes that we acquire from our common language - and even from our own development of conceptual schemes - can have a determinative effect on our subsequent beliefs and understandings. The linguistic determination associated with Whorf and Sapir clearly operates, in certain circumstances. Similarly literacy can and does, in some circumstances, operate as a medium of social control. (Postman, 1970/73). But neither of these is a necessary occurrence. Language can also be a vehicle for creative and even revolutionary thinking. Literacy, too, does not necessarily entail subordination. An awareness and self-concept that recognises this is Curiosity. Similarly, in the case of such institutional relationships as teaching-learning, constraints may be real and unavoidable in specific contexts. But they do not by the same token have to be determinative of notional closures. Just as people can learn individually to be Curious, so, within objectively constraining relationships, can there exist what Friedrich has called a "self-transforming tradition".(15)

In the case of schools, it is misleading to suggest that the content of what is taught and learned is unimportant, whilst only the structure of institutional relationships - encoding the "hidden curriculum" - matter.(16) The distinction between structure and content is an analytical one, useful for some purposes (from some Relevance angles), but untenable as reified "fact". Non-conservative teaching (and therefore non-conservative schooling) could indeed exist, where what was involved was a deliberate and active attempt

to make the institutional relationships of teacher-learner - and indeed wider societal relationships in general - the focus of explicit elaboration. This may not in itself remove the constraints of institutional arrangements and societal structure. (Indeed, a failure to recognise the actuality of such constraints would itself be inadequate closure). But it could challenge the determination of closure that might otherwise occur by default. This is similar to what Freire calls "conscientisation". He defines this as follows:

> "Conscientisation refers to the process in which men, not as recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the socio-cultural reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that reality."

He says further,

> "Consciousness is never a mere reflection of, but a reflection upon, material reality."
> "For mechanistic objectivism, consciousness is merely a 'copy' of objective reality. For solipsism, the world is reduced to a capricious creation of consciousness. In the first case, consciousness would be unable to transcend its conditioning by reality; in the second, insofar as it 'creates' reality, it is a priori to reality. ..... In both conceptions of consciousness, there can be no true praxis. Praxis is only possible where the objective-subjective dialectic is maintained."
> Freire (1970/72) pp. 51 n 2, 53.

Totally open education - let alone open schooling - is quite impossible. But in Freire's concept of "conscientisation", there is the suggestion that the very constraints of Reality can become the object of reflection and action. An awareness of the dialectics of learning and of the non-necessary relationship between constraint and closure, would be the objective of a non-conservative education

system. The openness would be conceptual, rather than out-there (though in Freire's case, the one is dialectically related to the other).

To return to Bernstein, we can see again how the distinction between Reality on the one hand and both Objectivated and Subjective 'Knowledge' on the other, can resolve certain problems in his work. Surprisingly, perhaps[17], Mary Douglas, who is both an admirer and an inspirer of Bernstein's work, has hinted at something not unlike the "conscientisation" just discussed. She says of her book Natural Symbols that

> "In the long run, the argument of this book is that the elaborated code challenges its users to turn round on themselves and inspect their values, to reject some of them, and to resolve to cherish positional forms of control and communication wherever these are available. This would seem to be the only way to use our knowledge to free ourselves from the power of our own cosmology. No one would deliberately choose the elaborated code and the personal control system who is aware of the seeds of alienation it contains..." Douglas (1970/73) p.190.

Many who experience other forms of alienation might prefer just that option. It is to them that Freire addresses his remarks. But it is interesting that Douglas, following Bernstein (and indeed Durkheim), believes elaboration to be possible only through experience of a particular kind of societal and family structure. Like them too, she also sees it as somewhat regrettable. Bernstein has referred to the "penetration" of the Integrated code in education, which is closely associated with this pessimism. This merits a chapter of its own, before we turn in Part V to some examples of "Open Education" ideology in practice.

Notes

(1) Or, if anyone were found with such openness, his beliefs about the world would be extraordinarily inadequate .

(2) In the collection edited by Nyberg (1975, ed.), for instance, Hill feels that "education" necessarily implies objectives (p.5). Egan points to the dangers of avoiding explicit educational aims, since what he calls "ideological" ones may take their place, as it were, uninvited (p.31). Strike also notes that attention to educational means, or procedures, may conceal closure as to objectives (p.179). Morgan restates Bernstein's position, pointing to the hidden curriculum of supposedly "open" educational processes.

(3) Holly makes a similar point:

> "Under the standard educational dispensation, only the lucky few will have broken through to a really personal relationship with the intellectual world through which they have passed, and these will have been enabled to do so to the measure in which they are professionally involved with extending and comprehending knowledge. It is only these who are to any degree emancipated in Marx's terms..." Holly (1971/72) p.96.

(4) cf. Chapter 2, note 4, on relativism. Popper (1945/66) similarly points out that "convention" does not imply total arbitrariness (pp. 64-5).

(5) Compare Geras (1972) on the reality (not mere illusion) of value (p.295).

(6) The inability of psychologists to define "intelligence" - other than as "that which intelligence tests measure" (Boring, quoted by Jensen, 1969, p.8) - is notorious. See, for instance, J.Educ.Psychol. (12) pp. 123-147, 195-216.

(7) Berger and Pullberg come close to this point in the following passage:

> "A priori, a social structure is an open horizon of possibility for all its members .... /But/ we would emphasise the a priori character of /this proposition/... Very different propositions emerge as we look at man's de facto situation in the world. On the level of pure possibility, social structure provides an open horizon for man's ongoing world - and self-realisation. On the level of actual historical experience, social structure functions pretty much as the opposite of this, namely, as a narrowing of the horizons within which life is allowed to make sense. Social structure is encountered by the individual as an external facticity." Berger & Pullberg (1965), p.202.

However, vigorous denials of solipsism do not prevent Berger from tending to see all constraints as man-made and therefore explicit awareness as a sufficient condition of their removal. Even social structure is not merely a human creation, but a creation of man in relation to physical (natural) reality. Strauss' view - that there are no rocks, but only ocean - is, simply, wrong. ("The realm of rules could ... be usefully pictured as a tiny island of structured stability around which swirled and beat a vast ocean of negotiation. But ... there is only vast ocean. The rules themselves are negotiable." Strauss et al., 1964, p.313).

(8) For instance, Taylor & Ayres (1969); Boaden (1971); Byrne, Williamson & Fletcher (1975).

(9) Pahl's development of the notion of a "socio-ecological system" (Pahl, 1968; 1969/75) has interesting implications for education, that Byrne, Williamson & Fletcher (1975) have explored further.

(10) cf Shipman (1972); Sharp & Green (1975).

(11) cf Bernstein (1971); Hoyle (1969/71) p.391; Shipman (1971).

(12) McCloskey, for instance, distinguishes between "education" and "indoctrination" in these terms:

> "Indoctrination has been explained [sic] in terms of its aims, its methods, and its results. Its aim is said to be to bring about a belief which is held in an unquestioned way. The methods it uses are non- or even anti-critical, non-reflective kinds. The result at which it aims is the unquestioned acceptance of a belief or attitudes. Education, by contrast, is claimed to instil beliefs or attitudes by means which leave it open to the child later to come critically to examine what he has been taught." McCloskey (1974) p.27.

(13) Bourdieu (1966/74) p.40.

(14) "It is only in the light of such a pessimistic pathos that the defeat of democratic values can be assumed to be probable, while their victory is seen as a slender thing, delicately constituted and precariously balanced." Gouldner (1955/61) p.80.

(15) Friedrich uses this expression in this context:

> "By being an ideology of progress towards an unattainable goal [the political tradition of the U.S.] was subject to a particular dialectic, as is that of the Soviet Union, for it was a self-transforming tradition: what the tradition required was that men acted differently from the way they had traditionally acted." Friedrich (1972) p.35.

Whilst approving of the concept "self-transforming tradition", I do not necessarily agree with its application in this instance. As Friedrich says himself, in discussing what he calls "Fourth-of-July oratory",

> "What was once the unchallengeable truth of 'self-evident' propositions has become the empty rhetoric of vulgar speeches." ibid, p.24.

(16) As Gintis has said - see Chapter 3, above.

(17) I find it somewhat surprising in that part of Douglas' message appears to concern the impossibility of revolutions. (See Douglas 1970/73 , p.187).

CHAPTER 12

PENETRATION

The problem of "penetration" is presented by Bernstein as follows:

> "It is likely that integrated codes will give rise to multiple criteria of assessment compared with collection codes ... The weak frames enable a greater range of the student's behaviour to be made public and they make possible considerable diversity (at least in principle) between students. It is possible that this might lead to a situation where assessment takes more into account 'inner' attributes of the student. Thus if he has the 'right' attitudes then this will result later in the attainment of various specific competencies. The 'right' attitude may be assessed in terms of the fit between the pupil's attitudes and the current ideology. It is possible, then, that the evaluative criteria of integrated codes with weak frames may be weak as these refer to specific cognitive attributes, but strong as these refer to dispositional attributes. If this is so, then a new range of pupil attributes become candidates for labels. It is also likely that the weakened classification and framing will encourage more of the pupil/student to be made public - more of his thoughts, feelings, and values. In this way more of the pupil is available for control."
> Bernstein (1971) pp. 65-6.

Just as the open/closed dichotomy, and others closely related to it, are specifically educational versions of more general dichotomies (like Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft), so the notion of "penetration" is related to the broader notions of "anomie", "alienation" and "massification". Various aspects of penetration are common in educational literature.(1) But they are not often the subject of coherent elaboration.

The prescriptions of certain "Open Educationists" are considered in Part V. Meanwhile, a few examples will demonstrate what the notion of penetration refers to.

"Mrs. Buchanan" in Sharp & Green (1975) comments on an aspect of the "progressiveness" of her colleagues and the school ethos when she says:

> "A lot of emphasis is put on relationships, you know, whether a child can make good social relationships, whereas in a formal school all the emphasis is put on attainment."
> Sharp & Green (1975) p.104.

She feels somewhat out of tune with her colleagues in this respect:

> "Perhaps I'm just a traditionalist and put a lot on attainment, you know, rather than social training."
> ibid, p.103.

Not only does this form of educational concern refer to training the "whole child" - including "social" as well as "attainment" objectives - but understanding and knowledge about the "whole child's" background is felt to be necessary, in order that the job be done adequately and humanely. James and Tenen (1953) say of Michael Duane, when he was at Howe Dell school, near Hatfield:

> "The headmaster and his staff ... interpreted learning in this widest sense, so the emotional needs of the children as individuals were considered to be as important as the more conventional academic requirements ... The headmaster and his staff made it their business to know as much as possible about the home life of each child, and to help each to understand and solve its personal problems. In his spare time, the headmaster visited the villages from which his children were drawn, and talked to the parents in their homes and at village meetings, explaining to them his aims in the school ..."
> James & Tenen (1953)

The same desire to help each child to maximise individual performance rationalises close attention to individual "progress"

and attempts to keep close track of what "work" is done.

> "Co-operative teaching can bring the advantage of tapping the special skills and interests of the teachers; it also brings the need for more discussion about what is to be done and the sharing of information about how individual children have responded to what is offered...
> The keeping of records and, just as important, the use of them to decide on teaching strategies, is time consuming. There is no point in doing more than can be of use, but it is neglectful to do less than is necessary."
> Education and Science, Department of, (1972) pp.10-11.

> "Work as varied and as open-ended as this ... necessitates the keeping of careful records and the evolving of evaluation procedures. It becomes necessary to assess such things as initiative, imagination, the ability to plan, to work unsupervised, etc. The convenient captive class all doing the same thing and being assessed on a comparative basis has been lost; flexibility and the unpredictable have taken its place. In consequence, the role of the teacher as tutor with a detailed knowledge of his group becomes vital.
> We, therefore, instituted a system of recording slips, whereby we jotted down comments about the pupils while the points were still fresh in our minds. These slips were sorted and fed back to the tutors so that background information was built up about a pupil based upon the viewpoints of different teachers and the pupil as seen in different situations. It was hoped that information of this kind, used as part of the tutorials which were held at the beginning and the end of each session, would help identify a pupil's weaknesses and strengths as well as his needs." Caton (1972) p.57.

Even Postman, after a radical polemic against the controlling functions of literacy and after suggesting that other media should therefore be used in education, comments that

> "This means, among other things, that teachers would have to stop acting like teachers and find something to do, like, for instance, helping young people to resolve some of their more wrenching emotional problems."
> Postman (1970/73) p.94.

Comment has not been lacking on this emphasis on social, emotional and other "non-academic" aspects of children's backgrounds

and learning. Parsons distinguished between cognition and affectivity[2] and applied this to formal education:

> "In elementary school, the purely intellectual tasks are relatively easy for the pupil of high intellectual ability. In many such cases, it can be presumed that the primary challenge of the pupil is not to his intellectual, but to his 'moral', capacities. On the whole, the progressive movement seems to have leaned in the direction of giving enhanced emphasis to this component, suggesting that of the two, it has tended to become the more problematical."
> Parsons (1959/61) p.440.

Nash employed Kelly's personal construct theory to examine how teachers perceive pupils. Of one school, he says,

> "The junior school teachers in this school perceived their pupils primarily in terms of their work habits, their maturity, and their classroom behaviour. All the constructs related to aspects of the child's personality. It is very interesting to note that none deal specifically with the child's abilities. The Hardworking-Lazy construct describes the effort the child puts into his work, not his ability to do it. From these teachers I only occasionally elicited constructs such as Bright-Dull, Does good work-does poor work, and High IQ-Low IQ which I later found from other primary school teachers.
>
> This school has a local reputation for being 'progressive' and 'child-centred' ..."
> Nash (1973) p.23.

This "Child-centredness" has meant different things to different people. Holt has worried about the intrusion into the private and emotional lives of children:

> "Is it possible that our modern way of teaching, all gentleness, persuasiveness, and human contact, tends to make children get themselves and their work all mixed up? ... Maybe it was easier for children to grow up in a world in which, when they impinged on the world of adults, they were treated firmly, impersonally, and unceremoniously, but were otherwise left alone ...
>
> Note the danger of using a child's concept of himself to get him to do good work. We say, 'You are the kind

> of sensible, smart, good, etc., etc., boy or girl who can easily do this problem, if you try.' But if the work fails, so does the concept. If he can't do the problem, no matter how hard he tries, then, clearly, he is not sensible, smart, or good.
>
> ... If, when Johnny does good work, we make him feel 'good', may we not, without intending it, be making him feel 'bad' when he does bad work?
>
> Do children really need so much praise?"
>
> Holt (1965/69) pp. 54-5.(3)

In a later book, he says further:

> "It is possible to fail as completely at a free or alternative school ... as at the most rigid and conventional school. In a school whose main work is having everyone get good marks in exams, whoever cannot do this is a failure. But in a school whose main work is helping everyone to be happy, to love and be loved, anyone who cannot do <u>this</u> is just as much a failure. And the shame and pain of such failure may be even greater, because the student really shares the aims of the school, really wants to be a success at love and happiness, and knows that everyone is really trying to help him and that when he fails he has only himself to blame."
>
> Holt (1974/75) p.105.

This loss of a "private" self, which might escape the critical eye and evaluative attention of teachers, is criticised by Illich:

> "Under the authoritative eye of the teacher, several orders of value collapse into one. The distinctions between morality, legality and personal worth are blurred and eventually eliminated ...
>
> School teachers and ministers [of the Church] are the only professionals who feel entitled to pry into the private affairs of their clients at the same time as they preach to a captive audience."
>
> Illich (1971/73) p.38.

The impossibility of escape from so diffuse an array of "educational evaluations is also commented on by Martin (1971). He considers

the "Sesame Street" television series, devised in the U.S. by Lesser and his colleagues, turned down by the B.B.C. on the grounds that it was too "authoritarian", but screened by I.T.A. since research had shown it to be "very popular" with children. Martin says:

> "The street and the home represent the only retreat for ghetto kids. Invading this, ultimately, may result in no escape areas for 'disadvantaged' children - which simply means that television may have succeeded at last in hounding the off-spring of those who object to the cultural and social direction of middle class society." Martin (1971) pp. 399-400.

Many of the above criticisms are based on beliefs scarcely more intuitive than those that they attack. Fearing an over-determination of children in total institution-like schools, they rely above all on some notion of individual integrity and the right to privacy from teachers' interference. The consequences for individual self-concept and self-respect are uppermost in their minds, rather than any wider societal consequences. Yet, as I have repeatedly pointed out, wider issues are inescapable. They are the context of both the ideologies that "motivate" particular educational practices and of the effects of such practices. Ultimately, it is one's conception of societal structure that will determine how one seeks to explain and elaborate upon these practices.

Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963) have a view of an increasingly bureaucratised society. Their "Lakeshore" High School is to them a prototype of the future. They see a trend towards the increasing professionalisation of counselling and clinical work in schools. Consequently, they foresee more labelling of children with, for

example, "deep-seated" problems, where they would previously have had situational problems only - or none at all.

In contrast to this basically Weberian outlook, certain neo-Marxian writers (especially in the U.S.) have emphasised the rise of the corporate state and the increased subordination of individual rights and autonomy to the interests of corporate efficiency. Spring (1972), for instance, criticizes what I have called the "Participationist" standpoint, which defines "democracy" as the freedom to serve society, rather than the freedom to exercise choice or power. He adds,

> "Another magical word in education, one more widely used than freedom, has been individualism. Throughout the writings of the social educators appears the golden term, individualisation. Meeting individual needs and providing for individual differences were the phrases that were sorely overworked. It was believed that as long as education individualised instruction, it maintained some contact with democracy. /But/ at times individualisation meant using individual methods to assure that every student achieved the same goal..." Spring (1972) pp.163-4.

Though perhaps arising for different historical reasons, the appeal to certain American writers[4] of the notion of "corporate capitalism" is reminiscent of French (Marxian) structuralism. The ideas of the "hidden curriculum" and the "correspondence principle" are clearly related to that of "master patterns". In Bourdieu's notion of "cultural capital", again, a societal perspective is applied to the specific problem of academic criteria, which are derived from the ruling class and used to judge - or more frequently to nihilate[5] - the culture of children from the working and "lower-middle" classes. Bourdieu notes that

> "As opposed to a rational and really universal pedagogy ... our own pedagogical tradition is in fact, despite external appearances of irreproachable equality and universality, only there for the benefit of pupils who are in the particular position of possessing a cultural heritage conforming to that demanded by the school. Not only does it exclude any questions as to the most effective methods of transmitting to all the knowledge and the know-how which it demands of all and which different social classes transmit very unequally; it also tends to disparage as 'elementary' (with undertones of 'vulgar') and paradoxically, as 'pedantic', pedagogical methods with such aims. ... The disparagement of examination techniques is merely the corollary of the exaltation of intellectual prowess which is structurally akin to the values of culturally privileged groups..."
> Bourdieu (1966/74) p.38.

And so, via Bourdieu, we come back again to Bernstein, and his Durkheimian concern with codes and boundaries. To Bernstein, basically, the penetration of the Integrated Code is a consequence of spontaneous shifts in societal (and school) structure. These shifts do not result from bureaucratisation and rationalition, nor the acted-upon interests of corporate capitalism. They are a result of the "growing differentiation of knowledge at the higher levels of thought", of "changes in the division of labour [which] are creating a different concept of skill" and of the general deregulation of society as a whole (Bernstein, 1971, pp. 66-7).

Basic Beliefs and Penetration

Certain theorists, then, have attempted to describe or explain aspects of what, following Bernstein, I have called "penetration". In so doing, they have relied on basic patterns

of belief and understanding about the overall structure of society and about the functions of education systems. Importantly, so also have people actually involved in educational processes and practices.

"Penetration" is essentially a social psychological notion. Not surprisingly, ideas of this sort have been common amongst such writers as Fromm (1942/60) or Bettelheim (1960/70), who have written about mass society from a largely social psychological viewpoint.(6) This viewpoint is entirely legitimate, but it does not - and cannot - tell the whole story. Individual participants in educational processes and practices likewise tend to be inclined to consider individual and psychological issues rather than wider societal ones.(7) They adopt a "focal", rather than a "structural" perception, as Freire (1972) puts it. Nonetheless, the very fact of their necessary existence in society is likely to produce <u>some</u> notional understanding of the structuring of society. Teachers are not totally ignorant of the societal significance of qualifications, job opportunities, etc. They themselves are products of education systems. They have inevitably acquired beliefs through their own experience. However much they lack detailed knowledge of local occupational structures and the likely futures of their pupils, they do <u>not</u> lack notions about society and the role of schools within it. Those beliefs are frequently quite implicit. Explicit understandings may be quite lacking, yet this does not detract in any way from the point I am making. Not only do teachers - as well as administrators and legislators involved in educational decision-making - have beliefs about society, but these are

consequential. They are the "motives" on which behaviour is based. Changes in curriculum and in school organisation do not occur spontaneously. They happen through behaviour based on (more or less adequate) beliefs and understandings about educational issues. In turn, the phenomenon of "penetration", however much it may be conceived in social psychological terms, must be seen to be contexted with the beliefs and understandings of those involved.

I suggest that penetration can usefully be considered in terms of closures of belief and understanding. All educational contexts in Reality contain constraints. These are determinative of belief insofar as they are poorly conceptualised - insofar, that is, as they are the object of notional closures. Pupils in schools may be subject to penetration by more diffuse evaluative techniques and criteria. But this is only the case, firstly insofar as they - and their teachers - are unaware of the structuration of the schooling and of the society that supposedly "require" such evaluation, and secondly - and consequently - insofar as they themselves lack the conceptual tools to nihilate procedures which detract from their individual and class autonomy. The kinds of teachers' practices criticized by some of the writers quoted above can only be properly understood if we examine the ideological beliefs that underlie them. These can usefully be explored if we appreciate the structured nature of those beliefs and seek the Basic Beliefs, or Master Patterns, that make such behaviour meaningful, "right" and "natural".

Sanctions in schools might be seen as a clue to these Basic Beliefs. I have no intention here of expanding on Durkheim's

ingenious suggestion that sanctions are indicative of forms of social solidarity. Yet it is worth noting that, in our society, there are at least two distinctly different views about punishment in schools.(8) In recent debates over the use of corporal punishment in schools, these two viewpoints come over clearly. To give one brief example, the headmaster of a school in North Shields has defended the caning of two girls on the grounds that violence (i.e. by pupils) was not to be tolerated, that the girls in question knew this and that swift, prompt action was necessary and effective (B.B.C. T.V. 13/1/76). The headmistress of Starcross School in London disagreed. She felt that protracted punishments gave pupils an opportunity to reflect upon what they had done and on the justice of the punishment. They could also serve the community - in tidying up the school, for instance. The North Shields headmaster thought that such work should be done by volunteers. Moreover, the girls knew what they had done was wrong and did not need to reflect on this.

This example illustrates a distinction between punishment that is retributive (and possibly deterrent) and punishment that is rehabilitating (and possibly restitutive). Neither party considered the possibility of no punishment. Neither, clearly, doubted the right and the duty of the teachers in question to punish. Both had clearly inegalitarian assumptions about the teacher-pupil relationship, though the one, I should say, was deterministically inclined, vis-à-vis learning theory, and the other voluntaristic. Though more evidence would of course be necessary to prove the point either way, the Shields teacher appears to be "Productionist"

in his assumptions about teaching-learning and the London teacher "Participationist". A closer study of sanctioning policies might provide a useful clue to the assumptions that teachers in particular schools (or more widely) hold to be basic to formal education.

We can see clues to master patterning if we turn directly from consideration of apparently local and institutional issues to notions of society as a whole. Consider notions of Mass Society, as described by Kornhauser (1959). He suggests that prior to his own contribution, there were two main kinds of criticism of Mass Society: one aristocratic and the other democratic. The former feared the debasement of cultural values, through the participation of the masses in the making of critical decisions. The latter feared the manipulation of the masses by the élite.(9) In neither case, however, is the inevitable existence of an "élite" questioned. A congruence might also be seen between this dichotomy and that of ascription/achievement (discussed in Chapter 9). The congruence between these three issues might be shown as follows:



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

In all three cases, "X" represents a quite different Relevance angle - perhaps that which in Chapter 7 I called "Egalitarianism". (Unlike the choices offered in each case on the left-hand side, "X" might be represented, or unified, by the Basic Belief, "All Men are Equal".)

So we return to Master Patterns and Basic Beliefs. But we must remain aware of the importance of context. It is quite possible to hold that all adults are equal, but that children (however these are defined) are not the equals of adults. It is also possible, in a particular context, to adhere to a (rigidified) Relevance structure wherein all members of a certain category - say those who have acquired a certain certificational level - are each other's "equals", but the "superiors" of others. Where such distinctions are made, then the Basic Belief is clearly not (for example) that "All Men are equal". That is a lower-level notion (possibly explicit, even sloganised) beneath a higher-level inegalitarianism. In this case, simplified "tree-roots" such as those shown in examples A, B and C, above, may represent not just an analytical representation of my own, but actual Master Patterns. The notion of openness/closure is important in understanding the

contextualisation of such high -and/or not-so-high - level notions. It is one thing to recognise the existence of certain inequalities in a particular societal context. It is quite another to assume them to be "inevitable" and "natural". An awareness of constraints that actually exist is not in itself notional closure. An egalitarian perspective, in this case, would seek to understand (and to teach an understanding of) the contexted structure of constraints - no doubt with a view to their removal.

Finally, these points are clarified if we return to the notion of penetration. The societal context of penetration involves both its determination and its consequences. Not just observers, such as those discussed earlier in this chapter, but participants, are likely to have some notion of the determinative aspects of context. The same is true of the consequentiality - and therefore the nature - of penetration.

One's understanding of the origin of increased diffusion of educational evaluation is not the same thing as one's understanding of the nature of penetration and its consequences. (Although a fully coherent theory would encompass both aspects, most participants and observers do not have such a coherent theory.) Akin to the aristocratic and democratic criticisms of mass society noted by Kornhauser, are two common responses to penetration. On the one hand are fears that "Open Education" allows the insidious entry of undesirable and socially disruptive "ideology". Such, for instance is the argument of Egan (1975) when he says,

> "While open education is dominated by well-meaning people, this opening up of educational concepts may seem useful

> for the expanded activity it permits in educational institutions. But it is well to be aware that it is based on a theory of education that lacks any significant defense against the techniques of religious conversion, the manipulation of immature emotions, ideologizing, and so on. If we open up concepts, it is good to be aware of the full range of what they are opened up to."
> Egan (1975) p.31.

On the other hand, Bernstein - despite the spontaneity with which he sees Integration originating - is not solely concerned with the effects of declassification per se, but also with the opportunities that this presents for ideological control within current power structures. This is clear in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

My own view is that the "opening" of certain aspects of formal education cannot be explained except by reference to the "motives" of people concerned, to the closures that they maintain and to the constraints that remain intact. Nor can the consequences of such "opening" be understood without reference to those same closures. Penetration is a result not so much of declassification as of persistent constraints and closures. Those consequences are inevitable only insofar as those involved - including teachers and pupils - lack adequate explicit understanding of the total structured context.

Notes

(1) Consider such diverse - but related - concepts as size, bureaucratisation, remoteness from decision-making, (loss of) personal autonomy; normlessness, declassification, change of conceptual, evaluative and social categories, (loss of) vertical and/or horizontal differentiation; diffuseness, moral evaluation, psychological (in-)security, conformity...

(2) I was critical of the reification promoted by this distinction, in Chapter 2.

(3) Interestingly, McClelland would answer Yes to both of these last two questions, if one's aim were to promote a need for Achievement. See McClelland (1961); McClelland et al. (1953).

(4) For instance, Braverman (1974). Specifically on Education, see Carnoy (1972/75,ed.); Bowles & Gintis (1976); Spring (1973).

(5) Berger & Luckmann (1966/67), pp.132-3.

(6) Compare these statements:

> "Only if man masters society and subordinates the economic machine to the purposes of human happiness, and only if he actively participates in the social process, can he overcome what now drives him to despair - his aloneness and his feeling of powerlessness." Fromm (1942/60), p.238.
>
> "An age that offers so many chances for escaping personal identity because it offers so many comforts and distractions requires equal strengthening of the sense of identity." Bettelheim (1960/70) p.95.

(7) cf Becker: "College faculty typically see their interaction with students as an individual matter. The teacher presents material and attempts to interest students in it so that they will devote their effort to learning what he wants them to know. If they do not learn, it is because they do not have the ability to do so, or because the teacher has insufficiently interested them."
Becker et al. (1968) p.130.

(8) For more on punishment in schools, see, e.g. Highfield & Pinsent (1952); Newell (1972).

(9) Kornhauser associates himself with the "democratic" critique, but believes that a middle way lies in a social democracy with a pluralism of intermediate institutions.

PART V - "OPEN EDUCATION" IN PRACTICE

The final three chapters of this essay are about three historical instances of "Open Education" ideology. I look at the beliefs of early-19th century British Radicals, early-20th century American Progressives and mid-20th century British Child-centred educationists. Each would merit much lengthier treatment than is possible here. Simplifications and generalisations are inevitable. My objective, however, is not to cover any of these three comprehensively. Much of my exposition relies on secondary sources and I have not tried to unearth material that is not fairly easily available. It is in no way my intention to "test" any substantive hypotheses about any of the three groups considered. My aim is to illustrate the analyses developed in the first four parts of this essay. A fundamental argument has been that beliefs are contexted. This final part is designed to show that my earlier analyses are applicable to real, historical situations, for the better understanding of real, contexted ideologies. All examples are chosen because they have some claim to openness in respect of the educational beliefs concerned. As we shall see, the underlying closures are in practice at least as important. The three differ from each other in important respects - as indeed one should expect, given their different societal contexts. All share, however, an attention to formal education as something of major importance. All were also, in some respects, self-consciously "radical" or "progressive". As such, there were in many cases genuine opennesses, if by that

we mean a rejection of prior closures. Valuable insights are to be encouraged by such comparison of different historical examples of "similar" phenomena. Nonetheless, it must be stressed again that such a comparison is only introduced in these final chapters. What follows is intended to be illustrative of what appears above. It could be no more than preparatory to a more extensive study. However, the feasibility of such a study is, I hope, demonstrated in these pages.

CHAPTER 13

EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH RADICALS

Early Utilitarians

Two dilemmas underlie contemporary liberalism. First is the distinction (frequently unappreciated) between society as it is and society as it should be. Second is the potential clash between a belief that people should choose their own destiny and the prior 'knowledge' of what they "should" choose. Both dilemmas were already central to British Radicalism in the early 19th century. They already had decisive implications and consequences in educational theory and policy.

The sophistication of the philosophical Radicals led many of them to be more explicitly aware of any inconsistencies in their thinking than is often the case. But they too had their Basic Beliefs and it is with these that I am concerned. Just as the 18th century cult of the "noble savage" foundered when put into educational practice by middle-class dissenters, in the domestic tuition of their children[1], so a theoretical adherence to individuals' intrinsic rationality gave way to state intervention and education for social control in the 19th century. How this was rationalised, and what Basic Beliefs were dominant in any inconsistencies of understanding, are important historical antecedents of contemporary English education - as well as interesting phenomena in their own right.

Vaughan and Archer (1971) make a clear analytical distinction between middle class and working class "assertive" ideologies in early 19th century education.(2) They base this, in turn, upon a distinction between classical political economy and (French) social philosophy:

> "Since property was the factor which characterised the middle class, the theories they accepted uniformly accentuated the legitimacy of ownership and therefore were predominantly economic. These were the pre-revolutionary theories emphasising the social role of property and claiming that political rights should be inseparable from it... Educational reform became restrictive rather than universal and political radicalism was tempered into liberalism rather than socialism. Conversely, the working class, insofar as it differed from the bourgeoisie in the formulation of its aims and in their justification, drew on revolutionary principles relating political claims to human rights rather than economic services. Freedom and equality were interpreted as pertaining to the individual, regardless of economic considerations. The generality of the rights postulated logically led to the universality of the reforms advocated. This applied to schooling as much as to the franchise."
>
> "The philosophers of late eighteenth-century France shared with economists a common concern for rationality and a similar commitment to the maximisation of human happiness. However, while the Physiocrats equated rationality with submission to immutable economic laws and happiness with the acceptance of the natural order, the pre-revolutionary moralists - following Rousseau - saw rationality as a natural attribute of man and its operation as perverted by artificial institutions. ...
> Although considerable oscillation between the two outlooks occurred, even within the works of one author (for example, Diderot), eighteenth-century enlightenment thought can be polarised into these two extremes - an emphasis on natural order and the rationality of institutions embodying it on the one hand, and concentration on natural rights and individual rationality on the other."
> Vaughan and Archer (1971) pp. 60-1, 79-80.

In this chapter I look primarily at the "middle class" version of Radicalism: Benthamite Utilitarianism. I then examine briefly its relationships with Owenite rationalism on the one hand

and with the views of Kay-Shuttleworth - as a major figure in the development of state schooling - on the other.

As Vaughan and Archer suggest, the rationality of institutions was fundamental to the beliefs of the Utilitarian Radicals. Man, it was true, was essentially rational. But some men were more rational than others. By contrast, the rationality of the "natural order" was indisputable. This latter notion was inherited, via Adam Smith, from the French Physiocrats. Smith's interpretation involved positing a "spontaneous order". The Physiocrats' paradoxical proclamation of the perfectability of the already-perfect was avoided by blaming imperfections on deficient legislation and institutions. But the further paradox of state intervention in a laissez-faire economy was not avoided. This intervention was a crucial element in most Radical thinking, when it came to education.(3)

For the early Utilitarians, the essential rationality of the "spontaneous order" was operative whether or not appreciated by men themselves. It operated like any other laws of nature. But through science men could become enlightened. That is, they could discover the self-evident truth of these laws. Thereafter, they could act so as to remove any institutional imperfections, just as natural science makes manipulation of the physical world possible. The basic "law" was that the mutual benefit of all was fulfilled through the pursuit of individual self-interest. It was primarily as an attack on aristocratically controlled (and Church-controlled) educational institutions that utility in this sense was advocated in Bentham's Chrestomathia(4) and promoted as the

Hills' schools at Hazlewood in Birmingham and Bruce Hill in London.(5) In these there was a strong emphasis on utility and efficiency. Only "useful" knowledge was to be imparted. This did not include, for instance, the grammar of dead languages. "Useful" meant vocational, in a broad preparatory sense. There was a strong emphasis on science and technology, whilst the body of 'knowledge' to be acquired was (by Bentham) rigidly systematised in a developmental order. Efficiency was further promoted by competition. Motivation was developed through the use of rewards which (at Hazlewood) were banked and carefully accounted. Although much emphasis was laid on punctuality and the efficiency of time-keeping (at Hazlewood, the bell rang over 250 times a week, to signal a different action to be taken), there was also much emphasis on self-discipline and on self-government by the pupils. Bentham advocated this as a way of avoiding any union in opposition to teachers. This, in conjunction with the strongly imposed and constantly tested curriculum, suggests the Participationism of later progressives. However, it must be remembered that these schools (actual or proposed) were designed solely for the middle class, as the sub-title of Chrestomathia makes clear: "... for the extension of the new system of instruction to the higher branches of learning, for the use of the middling and higher ranks in life."(6) The logic of later Participation in schools may partly have derived from the Radicals' societal policies. However, proposals for popular education at that time were very different, in this respect.

It was James Mill who first spelled out a Radical societal theory and policy for education.(7) He shared with other early Utilitarians the associationist psychology of Hartley and the belief that utility was conducive to the general happiness. He also shared their environmental (or educational) determinism. That is, he accepted the natural rationality, and innate equality, of all men. Theoretically, all classes should have "an equal degree of intelligence" (Simon, 1966, p.147). In this, indeed, the "middle class" Radicals agreed with their working class and socialist counterparts. But Mill and his associates also assumed both a natural division of labour between the middle and working classes and the inevitable need for leadership by the former. Given his environmental determinism, this provided a "preventive cause", whereby only the minority were able to acquire superior qualities of intelligence (within the "natural order"):

> "As we strive for an equal degree of justice, an equal degree of temperance, an equal degree of veracity, in the poor as in the rich, so ought we to strive for an equal degree of intelligence, if there were not a preventive cause. It is absolutely necessary for the existence of the human race, that labour should be performed, that food should be produced and other things provided, which human welfare requires. A large proportion of mankind is required for this labour. Now, then, in regard to all this portion of mankind, that labours, only such a portion of time can by them be given to the acquisition of intelligence as can be abstracted from labour."
> Mill (1818) quoted by Vaughan & Archer (1971) p.74.

Mill adds,

> "There are degrees, therefore, of intelligence, which must be reserved to those who are not obliged to labour."
> ibid.

He no doubt intended "must", here, in a descriptive sense, referring to what he took to be inevitable. But such Value-Known description functions prescriptively.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Radical Edinburgh Review, in 1819, strongly praised von Fellenberg's schools at Hofwyl, in Switzerland.(8) The two schools at that time were the Scientific Educational Institution (or Institute) for the Higher Social Classes and the Poor School. The former, drawing pupils from all over Europe and even America, had thirty highly qualified teachers for its maximum of 100 pupils. Compulsory lessons were minimal and much initiative was allowed to pupils. Equipment and facilities were unparalleled in Europe at that time. The Poor School, on the other hand, was for vagrant children, trained by one teacher (Jacob Wehrli) to agricultural labour. Eleven hours a day (nine in winter) were spent in agricultural and craft labour. Only one or two hours were devoted to the three R's, history, geography, drawing and music. It was this second school whose practices attracted the attention of educators in England and which the Edinburgh Review praised as follows:

> "The boys never see a newspaper, and scarcely a book (and) are taught, viva voce, a few matters of fact, and rules of common application. The rest of their education consists in inculcating habits of industry, frugality, veracity, docility and mutual kindness."
> quoted by Simon (1960) p.135.

Of the Institute's pupils, the same writer said,

> "They have evidently more to learn ... It is for them to understand the true tenure of power, and especially of hereditary power, legitimate because of its public

> utility; and feel the justice and necessity of securing the end so well, and making it so evident and plain that no one may be tempted to question the means." (9)
> ibid.

Mill's "pessimism" about the actual possibilities, within a given societal structure, of acquiring elaborated "intelligence" may follow from his environmentalist determinism - that is, a part of his learning theory. However, the prescription of this form of societal structure derives from a quite different source.

> "So Mill, while denying that the human race should be divided in two classes, in fact acquiesces in existing class relations and proposes to perpetuate them ... As Halévy points out, Mill neither enquires how this division came into being, questions its justice, nor envisages its future disappearance."
> Simon (1960) p.147.

The Benthamite Radicals were curiously inconsistent about the kind of education that should be imposed upon the working class. Mill was confident both in the rationality of all men and in the natural order of capitalist relations.

> "I should have little fear of the propagation among the common people of any doctrines hostile to property, because I have seldom met with a labouring man (and I have tried the experiment upon many of them) whom I could not make to see that the existence of property was not only good for the labouring man, but of infinitely more importance to the labourers as a class, than to any others."
> Mill, Letter to Brougham, 1832, quoted by Vaughan & Archer (1971) p.75.

Yet Mill himself supported censorship. Moreover,

> "the government of which Brougham was Lord Chancellor persecuted the working-class press more viciously than had the Dry administration of 1819".
> Simon (1960) p.223.

In short, the Radicals' view of "enlightenment" was totally closed in respect of property relations - and therefore of class relations. Not only were working men unlikely or unable to acquire elaborated understandings of political economy, but they should be prevented from doing so. Or rather, they should be prevented from acquiring a "wrong" understanding - although there was only one valid elaboration "possible". Certainly the most vocal call, early in the century, for popular education came from middle class Radicals. They rejected the Tory strategy of suppression and indoctrination. They advocated the enlightenment of the working class, so that they too could see their natural communality of interest with employer and government.

> "Education, in their view, was the most powerful instrument for changing men's minds and outlook; it was through education alone that the working class could be brought within the orbit of civilisation and led to assist, rather than obstruct, the establishment of a new order. This was the Radical perspective at this stage [i.e. immediately post-Napoleonic Wars]. It led directly to the promotion of various forms of popular education."
> Simon (1960) p.136.

Yet for all this confidence, there could only be one basic structure to this enlightenment. Alternative ways of conceiving of political economy were dangerous "nonsense".(10) "Enlightenment" implied control.

As the 19th century proceeded, erstwhile Radicals increasingly(11) adopted education for explicit reasons of control and moralisation - as opposed to liberation and "enlightenment". By 1847, the Edinburgh Review was claiming that education was "the only effectual preventive of crime". "The great, the paramount duty of the people

of England" was to reclaim the masses from "gross ignorance" and "temptations of vice" and to "bring them under the influence of a wholesome intellectual and moral training."(12) By then, there was little disagreement on this, between Tory, Whig and Radical. Demands were increasingly made for some universal system of educational provision for the working class, and these were commonly based on the dangers to property and to the societal structure underlying it.

As early as 1833, the House of Commons heard a motion to appoint a Select Committee to inquire into the means of establishing a system of national education. J.A. Roebuck, M.P., explained that

> "his desire was, by affording education to the people, not so much to raise them from their proper situation as to make them happy and contented in it."

Another Radical member, William Molesworth, thought that

> "it was the bounden duty of the government to provide for every child born within the realm such an education as was fitting and suitable for the station which Providence had allotted it."
> (from Hansard) both quoted by Hurt (1971/72) p.114.

Kay-Shuttleworth, secretary of the Committee of the Privy Council on Education from 1839 till 1849, and of enormous influence beyond those years as well, advocated popular education for similar ends. He was very explicit in his advocacy of "education-as-insurance"(13) as a means to protect property. In 1839 he warned of labourers who

> "sought to extort by fear what they could no longer procure by virtuous exertion. Property seemed [to be] their enemy,

> therefore they wrapped in one indiscriminating flame the stacks and homesteads of the southern counties, seeking the improvement of their lot by the destruction of capital."

The remedy for these evils was to provide

> "a good secular education to enable them to understand the true causes which determine their physical condition and regulate the distribution of wealth among the several classes of society."
> quoted by Hurt (1971/72) p.23.

Kay-Shuttleworth opposed Lowe's Revised Code of 1862, which reduced elementary education to the 3 R's. He held to Mill's view, that the people should be "enlightened" as to their "true" interests. But in his attack on the Code, he returned as often before to the need to protect property:

> "Only "by experience and education can the workmen be induced to leave undisturbed the control of commercial enterprises in the hands of the capitalists."
> quoted by Simon (1960) p.357.

The defence of property was always at least implicit in the "enlightenment" which the Benthamite Radicals wanted transmitted to the working class. In his strong insistence on religion, Kay-Shuttleworth was far removed from the secular rationalists of the early 19th century. But in his essential Basic Beliefs about society, there was little difference. Johnson (1970) notes an ambivalence in Kay-Shuttleworth. On the one hand he was an environmentalist: he attacked those "prejudiced men" who blamed the poor for all their sufferings. Yet he was also a moralist: he denounced purely environmental reform, since

"many of the evils suffered by the poor flow from their own ignorance and moral errors" (hence the need for popular education). Even this ambivalence had its origins in the Radicals' own position. For this position declared the possibility (and, in some cases even the right) of all men to pursue their own rationally assessed interests. And yet it decreed in advance what those interests must be. "Enlightenment", an apparently open notion of objectivated knowledge-to-be-learned, was in fact a closed system of beliefs, founded on the assumed "naturalness" of an existing social order.

This brief sketch of the early Radical position on education has of course glossed over a number of differences between particular people and between various points in time. Insofar as such generalisations are legitimate, however, I suggest that the foregoing has shown it to be possible and useful to talk about this position in terms developed earlier in the essay. Societal Reality, for the Benthamite Radicals, was a "natural" or "spontaneous" order, subject to immutable natural laws. Whilst the elaboration of these laws was desirable in order to increase the perfection of already rational institutions (i.e. by refuting aristocratic claims of legitimacy), they were not themselves open to refutation, or even adaptation. Valid and valuable 'knowledge' was pre-established, and therefore closed. The societal order "necessarily" entailed a division of labour between classes, but the mutual interests of everyone lay in the harmonious acceptance of this order. Consequently, both Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge' also involved closure. The evident truth

of Utilitarian principles provided its own criteria of adequacy - and also, given a (perhaps half-hearted) belief in Man's natural rationality, provided its own means of reinforcement. Nonetheless, despite this logical connection between Objectivated "truth" and subjective understandings, the Radicals' learning theory also included a strong environmental determinism (relating Reality to Subjective 'Knowledge'). This created a "preventive cause" whereby the labouring classes were unlikely or unable to acquire an elaborated understanding of that Objectivated 'Knowledge' which was so clear to the intellectuals. It also demonstrates a basic inconsistency in such Radical ideology. As Simon points out, this had immediate origins in Smith's Wealth of Nations:

> "Adam Smith's argument for education violates his main principle, that of the natural identity of interests of all sections of society. In general he treats the division of labour as an expression of the unity of interest of all individuals in society: since each contributes in his own field to provide the sum of goods and services the community needs, all are dependent on each other and have a community of interest in the society of which they are an essential part. Yet considering the effect of the factory worker he is bound to advocate a system of popular education specifically in order to counter the adverse effect of the division of labour."
> Simon (1960) p.139.

In his much-cited example of pin-manufacture, concentration on a few simple operations makes the labourer "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become" (quoted, ibid, p.138). Thus the rationality of the societal order may not be self-evident to working men. Contextual, rather than logical, factors may play a more important part in

the determination of subjective notions. Hence the need for state intervention (within a "laissez-faire" economy) in the case of popular education. Hence the need for educational leadership (as well as industrial and political government) - for the framing of valid and valuable 'knowledge', for censorship of the working class press, for the diffusion of 'Useful Knowledge', for control over the Mechanics Institutes, for limited suffrage and, in short, for social control. Many of the educational principles evolved for the children of the bourgeoisie may have been drawn from 18th century social philosophy. But this was quite different from the education envisaged - and in the event institutionalised - for working class children. The "preventive cause", in fact, was a preventive prescription. Nevertheless, the Radicals' view of mind-brain and subjective 'knowledge' was in many respects similar to that of the socialist rationalists of the 19th century. They did, after all, hold that it was a child's class position, rather than his innate abilities, that necessitated differential educational provision. Their beliefs were "open", then, so far as genetic determination was concerned. Indeed, this is their main claim to be considered within the same tradition as contemporary "progressive" or "Open" educationists. Yet this "openness" was coupled with closure insofar as it posited environmental determinism every bit a strong as the genetic determinism rejected. Some of these closures in Benthamite ideology were lacking in working-class radicalism in the early 19th century. To illustrate this, let us briefly consider Robert Owen and the Owenite position.

Robert Owen

Important features of the socialist tradition of educational belief had their roots in 18th century French social philosophy. The writing of Godwin and Paine helped to inject into that tradition a belief in the naturalness of human equality, rather than in the naturalness of particular societal institutions. Godwin, acknowledged by many as the father of anarchism(14), proclaimed that

> "the actions and dispositions of mankind are the offspring of circumstances and events, and not of any original determination that they bring into the world."
> Godwin (1793/1972) p.25.

Furthermore,

> "There is no particular mould for the construction of lords and they are born neither better nor worse than the poorest of their dependents."
> Godwin, quoted by Vaughan and Archer (1971) pp.81-2.

Not only were men equal in their innate abilities and potentials, but also in a natural "curiosity" which was potentially the motivating force for universally rational education. As Paine put it:

> "The human mind has a natural disposition to scientific knowledge, and to the things connected with it. The first and favourite amusement of a child, even before it begins to play, is that of imitating the works of man. ... and it interests itself in the fate of its works with a care that resembles affection. It afterwards goes to school, where its genius is killed by the barren study of a dead language, and the philosopher is lost in the linguist."
> Paine (1794/1972) pp. 46-7.

It was social institutions that corrupted this natural ability. For Godwin, education and government were necessarily in opposition to each other.

> "'The great triumph of man is in the power of education to improve his intellect, to sharpen his perceptions, and to regulate and modify his moral qualities.' Godwin ... sees education and government as competing for influence on human development. While tuition stimulates reason, the state perpetuates error. While education restores natural equality, government supports artificial distinctions...."
> Vaughan & Archer (1971) p.83, quoting Godwin.

Godwin's insistence on the importance of the means by which society is changed - for the result cannot be separated from those means - was but one feature found later in the beliefs of Robert Owen.

Owen, according to Silver (1965, p.94) "was a product of the Godwinian radical rationalism of the 1790s, not the utilitarianism of the 1810s." Silver attaches great importance to Owen, for a number of reasons. Partly, Owen was a practitioner. The central theme of Silver (1965), is that it was Owen who put educational theory into practice, in the context of mass education.

> "Owen, for the first time, in a critical stage of British social development, made what had been a by-product of radical philosophy ... a central feature of the analysis of social problems."
> Silver (1965) p.98.

But beyond this, was Owen's influence on others.

> "His concept of educability and the influence of environment brought sharply into focus a generous approach to the role of education in preparing men for the fullest possible rights in and contribution to society. 18th century 'popular' education practice aimed to produce a specific kind of man for a specific social role. The more enlightened continental educational thinkers aimed to liberate the human spirit, but it was a self-contained act of liberation, since the underlying assumption even of a Pestalozzi was that poverty was inevitable, or that it was, at least, no concern of the educator ... Owen went beyond these to place social responsibility for education in the context of opposition to the status quo. The result was the establishment of traditions bridging across from education to justice, collective action and responsibility, common decency, tolerance and humanity."
> Silver (1965) p.236.

Owen was an egalitarian.

> "No man has the right to require another man to do for him what he will not do for that man; or, in other words, all men, by nature, have equal rights."
> Owen (1837/1969) p.203.

He was a humanist.

> "What was new in Owen's contribution, in the strictly educational field, was the humanism with which he applied this theory [that 'circumstances make man']. He was not concerned to use education to inculcate particular beliefs or theories, nor with happiness conceived of in an abstract way, but sought rather to educate children as human beings capable of applying their reason to nature and society and of enjoying all aspects of life. In the New Lanark schools these ideas were translated into practice."
> Simon (1960) p.195.

He was opposed to "unnatural" class divisions and sought a more rational form of the division of labour. According to his eventual solution the only natural differentiation was one based on age.

> "The natural and rational classification of the human race is ... the classification of age - each division of age having the occupations to perform for which each age is the best adapted by nature."
> Owen (1837/69) p.204.

He proposed eight "classes" on this basis. He and his followers, though believing in the discoverability of the most rational societal structure, did not hold to the rationality of the current "order". Education was not, therefore, the mere transmission of an established political economy.

> "All the Owenite educators stressed the importance of learning about society and, too, the extent to which society forms man. .." Simon (1960) p.265.

For a part of his life, at least, Owen also believed in the importance of alternative education. His activities in the 1830s, especially, were centred round the labour movement as a fountain-head of educational enlightenment.

However, though these characteristics may have distinguished him from the early utilitarian Radicals, Owen also had much in common with them. He was a rationalist, identifying what I have called the logical and contextual dimensions of adequacy:

> "The only certain criterion of truth is, that it is ever <u>consistent with itself</u>; it remains one and the same, under every view and comparison of it which can be made; while error will not stand the test of this investigation and comparison, because it ever leads to absurd conclusion.
> Had any one of the various opposing systems which have governed the world, and disunited man from man, been true, without any mixture of error, that system, very speedily after its public promulgation, would have pervaded society, and compelled all men to have acknowledged its truth.
> The criterion however which has been stated shows that they are all, without exception, in part <u>inconsistent with the facts which exist around us</u>."
> Owen (1812-13/1969) p.115 (my emphasis).

Though his beliefs were "open" in respect of the ideal societal structure for much of his life - in that he was for long uncertain what that society would be like - they were "closed" in respect of certain "fundamental principles". These were the "rational" principles that would have to be embodied in such a society. Moreover,

> "these principles require only to be known in order to establish themselves." Owen (1812-13/1969) p.76.

Owen was also an environmental determinist. Indeed this central principle strongly appealed to his followers:

> "Relieved from religious prejudices and their obstructive influences to the attainment of common sense, my mind became simple in its new arrangement of ideas, and gradually came to the conclusion that man could not make his own organisation, or any one of its qualities, and that these qualities were, according to their nature, more or less influenced by the circumstances which occurred in the life of each, over which the individual had no other control than these combined circumstances gave him, but over which society had an overwhelming influence..."
>
> "Character is formed <u>for</u> and not <u>by</u> the individual."
> Owen (1857/1969) pp.47,51.

This principle he returns to time and again. Yet because of the lack of any distinction between Reality and Objectivated 'Knowledge', and consequently between the logical and contextual origins of Subjective 'Knowledge', there is an inconsistency here. On the one hand "truth" is so self-evident that it has "only to be known in order to establish" itself. Yet,

> "The fundamental principle ... is, that 'Children collectively may be taught any sentiments and habits', or, in other words, 'trained to acquire any character'."
> Owen (1812-13/1969) p.130.

Inevitably, this includes "false" beliefs and "irrational" notions.

> "The basis of this Religion of Truth, the only one which ever can conduct man to the practice of pure charity and real virtue, and to the enjoyment of unalloyed happiness, is the knowledge that the laws of nature have given the power to adult man, so to control the mental faculties and physical powers of his infant, as to force it to receive error, however absurd and inconsistent, or to imbibe truth only ..." Owen (1833/1969) p.193.

In short, both "truth" and "falsity" can be instilled as Value-Knowledge. Yet "truth", once promulgated, will always be self-evident. This inconsistency may be resolved for Owen in his distinction between adulthood and infancy. That is, whilst infants may not be able to appreciate the difference between the two, adult men can. Having once seen the "truth", it must always hold sway. However, this fails to accord either with his approach to the "untutored" working class, or with that to middle class and aristocratic leadership.

His environmental determinism tended to weigh heavier than his faith in rationality, when he considered the working class. Vaughan and Archer suggest that

> "The success attributed to his endeavours [at New Lanark] can be largely accounted for by the low level of expectations concerning the ability of working-class children at the time." Vaughan & Archer (1971) p.87.

This depression of expectations applied not just to admiring visitors, but to Owen himself. In the school itself, he clearly had a very low - albeit patronising - opinion of the first teacher there, James Buchanan. He was

> "a willing servant, to attend to the instruction given to him, as far as his good-natured limited powers would admit..." Owen (1857/1969) p.66.

Owen regarded Buchanan's teaching ability as almost wholly the product of Owen's own "drilling" and "instruction". It was to Owen's absence, when Buchanan moved to London, that Owen attributed the latter's failure there. His replacement was superior in Owen's eyes, but he too was a credit largely to Owen himself:

> He "was eager to be taught the means to carry the improvements which I wished into practice. He was full of faculty for the employment, and at 16 years of age was the best instructor of infants I have ever seen in any part of the world." ibid.

More generally, too, Owen had the same pessimistic and paternalistic beliefs about the actual abilities of working class people. Miliband says,

> "Even in later years, when organisation in trade unions, co-operative societies and political associations began to replace the blind and purposeless manifestations of the anger of the working poor ... Owen did not cease to feel that the poor must be carefully shepherded into the good life, lest their independent actions lead to disastrous consequences. All his addresses to the working classes are couched in language suggesting that he was speaking to untutored and mischievous children, who must be constantly guarded against their ignorance, prejudice and passion." Miliband (1954) p.239.

In 1833, Owen warned workers that they

> "were still gravely deficient in knowledge, though signs were multiplying that they were making great progress in the acquisition of the right principles."
> quoted, ibid, p.242.

Miliband finds it

> "remarkable ... that, deeply convinced though he was of the potentialities of ordinary men, he should have held so consistently pessimistic a view of their present capabilities." ibid, p.245.

In other words, though Owen may have had very different beliefs about the "natural order" of society, he differed little from Mill in assuming that the current one was a major "preventive cause". The "light of reason" was not necessarily bright enough, even for adult men.

It was only late in his life that Owen turned to the labour movement as a specific educational policy. Even then he regarded government as the proper source of educational provision. He did not, for instance, promote the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union <u>against</u> employers, so much as for the mutual benefit of all. His aim was (new) harmony, not class struggle. In earlier days, his appeals were almost exclusively addressed to government and the employing class.

> "I at this time [in 1813] published a pamphlet for private circulation, stating the preparation which I had made to conduct the establishment at New Lanark on principles to ensure the improvement of the condition of the people as well as to obtain a reasonable remuneration for capital and for its management. These were circulated among the best circles of the wealthy benevolent, and of those who desired with sincerity to commence active measures for the improvement of the condition of the poor and working classes..." Owen (1857/1969) p.58.

He appreciated that vested interests might prevent "the Dignitaries of the Church and their adherents" from embracing the rationalism that "must inevitably destroy" the inconsistency of their position. (Owen, 1812-13/1969, pp.138-9). Yet he

maintained a trusting faith in the power of reason to sway the minds of the wealthy benevolent. It was for their benefit, as much as for that of the poor, that he proposed his indeed revolutionary changes.

> "It will ... be the essence of wisdom in the privileged classes to co-operate sincerely and cordially with those who desire not to touch one iota of the supposed advantages which they now possess; and whose first and last wish is to increase the particular happiness of those classes as well as the general happiness of society."
> Owen (1812-13/1969) pp.75-6.

Miliband (1954, p.235) sees this faith in "the potential enlightenment of government, of whatever hue" as peculiarly the child of 18th century rationalism. Voltaire and Diderot before him, and Beatrice Webb after him, had the same faith in enlightened despotism.

The main reason that Owen gave for this approach to government was his fear of the irreparable hostility that would be aroused by any other, more violent, means to societal change. (Another reason was the pessimistic assessment of the abilities of working class men to govern.) Like Godwin before him, Owen stressed the importance of the means by which society must be transformed. What he did not, it seems, consider, was the "hidden curriculum" of paternalist reform - quite apart from its feasibility on other grounds.

It was in his notions of societal change that Owen's perspective was perhaps most inadequate. He was opposed to the extension of suffrage, because of the incapacities of working class people. He opposed any violent form of revolution. He pinned his faith in the power of reason, example and enlightened leadership. Whilst at

the explicit level Owen's central principle may have been that Man can create the perfect society[15], implicitly this did not mean all men, nor did it mean any men whatever. In his personal dealings he was paternalistic - something that was certainly encouraged by many of his followers.[16] And in his conceptions of societal change the same pattern operated.

> "Owen's inability to analyse the mechanics of social change or to understand the nature of power ... [and his] belief that change might be the result of all but miraculous events made consideration of any form of political action unnecessary." Miliband (1954) p.240.

As Vaughan and Archer point out (1971. p.91), the 18th century French political philosophical tradition did not provide a blueprint for action. It had no theory of change. In turn, Owen's rendering of it relied on often implicit Basic Beliefs about harmony and leadership which were not significantly different from those of the Utilitarian Radicals. Indeed, it is worth noting that the family metaphor - with a particular role assigned, of course, to the father - was recurrent in the speeches and writings of that enemy of socialism, Kay-Shuttleworth.[17] Paternalism was in many ways a Master Pattern of societal change notions which Owen shared with his far less humanitarian and certainly non-socialist, contemporaries. It was this that the "political" Chartists rejected.[18] But it marks Owen as a significant member of the 19th century radical movement, of greater significance for later educational progressivism than the utilitarians. Whereas their prescriptive notions of society were complex and explicit, Owen's were less so. But they were clearly different in important respects. Nonetheless,

his notion of change (through leadership) - like his environmental-determinist learning theory, and his belief in an objectivated (or at least objectivatable) rationality - was very much within the same paradigmatic frame.

Notes

(1) See Musgrove (1959/70) on middle-class domestic tuition. Edgeworth was a good example of one who abandoned Rousseau's system of tuition. Though his son developed considerable abilities and some admirable qualities, he also became too self-willed by Edgeworth's standards. He was subsequently sent to boarding school. See Simon (1960) pp.39-40.

(2) Vaughan & Archer distinguish between "assertive" and "defensive" ideologies, depending on whether they challenge or attempt to maintain the status quo.

(3) I say "most", because it was not only the anarchistic tradition (or social philosophy tradition) of the working class which saw dangers in state intervention. There was also a fear of Church domination and a self-help ethic amongst many middle class Radicals. Voluntary-ism was also espoused, of course, by many within the religious societies. See Silver (1965) pp.102-4.

(4) Published 1816-17, the title means "conducive to useful knowledge" - Simon(1960) p.79.

(5) The Hill brothers (or M.D.Hill) published their book, Public Education... in 1812, partly to publicise Hazlewood. My information on this comes from Simon (1960) pp.79-84 and Stewart (1971) pp.54-67.

(6) Vaughan & Archer (1971) p.76.

(7) Mill's "On Education" appeared as a Supplement to Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1818. It is republished in Cavenagh (1931).

(8) Simon (1960) p.135. My description of the two schools, however, is obtained from Stewart (1971) pp.77-81.

(9) Robert Owen sent his son to the Institute, a point which should be remembered below, where I discuss Owen's beliefs.

(10) "Nonsense" is here meant quite literally. For the "obvious"

and "natural" sense of their own view of political economy was assuredly Value-Known.

(11) I do not, of course, wish to imply a steady development of such a policy. It developed in close relationship with other events and processes. Not least of these was working class politicization. Cf. Johnson (1976).

(12) Quoted by Silver (1965) p.208.

(13) "Education-as-insurance" is an expression used by Silver (1965) e.g. pp.208-9.

(14) Kropotkin (1949) p.874.

(15) "A principle regarding Man, which scarcely requires more than to be fairly stated to make it self-evident ... is that, 'Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the application of proper means; which means are to a great extent at the command and under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men.'"
Owen (1812-13/1969) p.70.

This is a good example of a single basic belief structure framing both individual learning theory and notions of societal change.

(16) For instance, James Morrison, described by Postgate as "one of the most level-headed leaders of this time", wrote to Owen in 1833, saying:

> "Your doctrines have made me a <u>better</u> and a <u>happier</u> being ... Since my personal intercourse with <u>you</u> I have become better. Be, then, my Physician ... Your practice inspires my perfect confidence ... I shall look upon you as a Father and try to become a faithful Son..."

Lloyd Jones, secretary to the committee of a Co-operative School at Salford wrote, in 1836,

> "Respected Father,
> Strongly impressed with the truth of the doctrines propounded and advanced by you, and having an interest <u>in</u> and consequently a desire <u>for</u> their promulgation, we have exerted ourselves to make them manifest to those by whom we are surrounded ..."

Quoted by Silver (1965) pp.199, 243 (original emphasis).

(17) See Johnson (1968) pp. 72-5 and (1970) p.112.

(18) For an account of Harney's opposition to Lovett's "Knowledge Chartism", see Simon (1960) pp.267-9.

CHAPTER 14

TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN PROGRESSIVES

To generalise about American Progressive educationists in the first half of the 20th century is perhaps even more difficult than to make similar attempts in the case of the British Radicals a century before. As Swift (1971) points out,

> "It is probable, in spite of the popularity which progressive education eventually attained, that few truly progressive schools ever existed." Swift (1971) p.8.

Yet this in no way detracts from the importance of the progressive education "movement" - any more than the importance of institutionalised religions depend on adherence to the principles of their founders. Cremin, introducing his classic history of the "movement", warns that,

> "The [progressive education] movement was marked from the beginning by a pluralistic, frequently contradictory, character. The reader will search these pages in vain for any capsule definition of progressive education. None exists, and none ever will; for throughout its history progressive education meant different things to different people, and these differences were only compounded by the remarkable diversity of American education". Cremin (1962) p.x.

Nevertheless, a "movement" of some sort clearly did exist and its impact on schools was of tremendous consequence. In 1928, the founder of the Children's School, Margaret Naumberg, could already claim - with some justice - that

> "Anything less than 'progressive education' is now quite out of date in America. No one wishes any longer to be called conservative. Every shade, therefore, of radical,

> progressive, and mildly conservative educator, from public as well as private schools, was to be found at the 8th Conference on Progressive Education ..." quoted by Cremin (1962) p.249.

Time magazine claimed in 1938 that

> "no United States school has completely escaped its influence" quoted ibid, p.324.

The "movement" is important because of its involvement with a mass education system. It was dealing not merely with a set of theories or principles, but with schooling in practice. Though it may be true, as Carnoy suggests, that John Dewey's ideas had their greatest following in middle-class private schools, he is wrong in suggesting that they had little impact on public education until the 1950s and '60s.(1) What happened in the public schools - especially the high schools - in mid-20th century America is not separate from Dewey-an philosophy, but based upon many of the Basic Beliefs to which he also adhered.(2) Though the "movement" was indeed very diversified, and though much that went under the name of "progressive education" was not in accordance with the main body of Dewey's explicit writings, nonetheless there was a certain logic which unified a wide body of practice.

Bowles and Gintis (1976) point out that different sections of American society sought different things through the "movement". Elites sought both to control and to motivate the labour force - by Americanisation, discipline, fragmentation and stratification. Educationists and reformers sought an antidote to urban poverty and many of the humanely conceived "social problems" of massive

urban expansion. Labour leaders sought mobility, security and social respectibility for themselves and their members (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p.186). The dangers of generalisation are obvious. It must be remembered that my aim is not to reveal new historical data, nor to test specific hypotheses about American Progressivism. It is to demonstrate the usefulness of a particular approach. A more detailed study could proceed on the lines here suggested. I shall look principally at some writings of John Dewey and at how these were related to actual practices. I shall again concentrate on closures and Basic Beliefs in the areas of (Social) Reality, Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge', and the relationships between these. I shall look for underlying themes in the ideologies of educational theorists, corporate foundations, politicians, administrators and practicing teachers.

Cremin says of Marietta Pierce Johnson, the guiding spirit behind the Progressive Education Association after World War I, that

> "Her outlook retained the essential vigour and equalitarianism of Rousseau's ... but it presented all the difficulties as well. For to talk of control for the child's good, of conformity merging into obedience, and of wills acting in harmony, is to beg all the very same questions Rousseau begged in the laissez-faire pedagogy of Émile. The school is supposed to honour spontaneity while it moulds good habits, and to follow nature assuming that reason will emerge in its own good time; all children must constantly succeed, and yet realistic discipline and intelligence are among the goals...." Cremin (1962) p.153.

Cremin is not particularly concerned to spell out or clarify these "difficulties". Yet their elaboration is crucial for an understanding of Progressive ideology. Insofar as it is possible to generalise about the Progressive education "movement" in early

20th century America, what were its Basic Beliefs?

American Progressives and British Radicals

The American Progressives had much in common with the British Radicals of the 19th century. Both were strongly influenced by developments in psychology. The Radicals drew heavily on the associationist doctrines of Hartley, which was strongly related to their environmental determinism. The Progressives, on the other hand, were much influenced by the Herbartian notion of measurable psychological data. Furthermore, the animal psychology of Thorndike was taken to have major implications concerning the ineffective drilling methods of "traditional" pedagogy. (Cremin, 1962, pp.110-2). Despite important differences in principle, both the Progressives and the Radicals had a strong faith in scientific enlightenment. The rationalism of Dewey, for instance, was more akin to that of Owen than to that of Mill - at least explicitly. But a faith in the discoverable "natural" order underlay even his pragmatism. Both set great store by the ultimate, if not immediate, harmony of interests of all, in a complex division of labour. Both stressed efficiency and therefore - given other assumptions about "natural" differentiation - the need for enlightened leadership. Both feared the disruption of the "unenlightened" and saw education as a major tool of social policy to preserve or create the perfect society. Finally, both were attracted to the "family" metaphor - wherein the school, the business organisation or even society as a whole were seen ideally as systems of paternalistic control.(3)

British Radical theories of education developed within a bourgeois ideology that legitimated industrial capitalist, as opposed to land-owning, interests. Though they arose at a time of massive societal change, they were not the immediate source of concrete policy in mass schooling. (By the later 19th century, significant changes had taken place in their explicit formulations.) American Progressive theories, on the other hand, were a response to an immediate problem of social control in a period of massive urbanisation. They were widely institutionalised from an early stage. Education was central to Progressivist ideology. The urban population in the United States increased sevenfold between 1860 and 1910. Only a fifth of this was a result of natural increase. 41% were from abroad and 30% from rural areas (Spring, 1972, p.3). The size and scope of business corporations multiplied apace, so that both industrial and civic administration operated on an unprecedented scale (Butts and Cremin, 1953, p.293). Public education expanded correspondingly. By 1912, elementary education was compulsory throughout the United States. The public high school was also becoming a mass institution. Between 1890 and 1930, the percentage of 14- to 17-year olds attending public high school rose from 4% to 47% (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p.181). Already such reformers as Horace Mann, Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education from 1837[4], and Ward, the father of the "American concept of society" (Karier, 1975, p.139) had seen universal education as the basis of all social reform. The ideas of Pestalozzi and of Froebel had made their appearance in the works of Neef (1808) and Maclure (1826). By the 1870s, they had to some

extent been institutionalised, for instance in the public schools of Quincy, Massachusetts (Swift, 1971, pp.19-20). When Dewey came to Chicago in 1894, there were already "progressive" schools which he contrasted - not always favourably - with "traditional" ones (Dewey, 1900/15). According to Swift,

> "Perhaps Dewey's most important contribution to progressive education was the synthesis of his pedagogical ideas with his concern for democracy and social reform."
> Swift (1971) p.19.

Whether a "synthesis" was indeed achieved will be a point for discussion below.

A further major influence upon American Progressives that distinguishes them from the English Radicals was the evolutionism of the 19th century, especially in the biological sciences. For the individual child, for corporate industry and for society as a whole, "growth" was a keyword. Survival was the ultimate criterion of pragmatic efficiency. Waldo (1956) has suggested that the concept of social efficiency was a product of a mechanical metaphor.(5). But I suggest that both the machine and the body/organism - pace Durkheim - coincided as naturalistic metaphors. American Progressivism was overwhelmingly naturalistic. The "biological machine", as it were, was something of a Master Pattern. This accorded well with that frontier philosophy which is distinctively American.(6) As Karier suggests, education

> "in the 20th century ... in effect became a new frontier for many Americans... As this educational frontier emerged, a young man would more often be advised to go to college rather than to go West."
> Karier (1975) p.2.

Also distinctive was a "new liberalism" which saw no pre-established harmony in a society based on self-interest. Such self-interest could be irresponsible. The bulk of Progressive thought was opposed to the evil uses of large corporations, rather than totally anti-trust. The spirit was Hamiltonian and federalist, rather than Jeffersonian and individualist. It insisted that co-operation was necessary for societal harmony. It saw freedom as a positive power to act, rather than as a negative lack of constraints.(7) Nevertheless, such generalisations are somewhat sweeping. Many Progressives did adhere to the old individualism. There were also major ambiguities in American Progressivism. The overt philosophy of the dominant protagonists may have been on the lines I have just outlined. But there is often a covert adherence to some notion of a "natural order".(8) With respect to individualism - as against conformity, for instance - generalisations are made more difficult in that the context needs always to be considered. One set of beliefs may hold for one section of society, whilst a quite different set applies to another. Characteristics that seem desirable in one's own children may not be so considered in those of another (class).

A similar ambiguity exists in respect of Objectivated 'Knowledge'. Implied in the philosophical pragmatism propounded by James and Peirce, and developed by Dewey, is an "open" view of such 'Knowledge'. Dewey's notorious substitution of "warrantability" for (objective) truth would seem to set him aside from the rationalism of the earlier English Radicals. However, despite his warnings about the dangers of pre-judgment(9), and

despite his advocacy of the open-minded ("scientific") proposition of hypotheses rather than rigidified beliefs[10], Dewey's adherence to science could itself constitute a form of closure. In less philosophically inclined Progressives it undoubtedly did. Not just the scientific method, but "findings" made by that method, could be and were reified.[11] Psychological data, for instance, became a particularly significant closure in Progressive ideology.

Progressive Education

A brief list of some of the practices and principles in the Progressive education "movement" in 20th century America will indicate broadly the subject of this chapter.

Bowles and Gintis summarise some of the practices as follows:

> "The educational practice of Progressivism brought us the comprehensive high school, tracking, educational testing, home economics, the junior high school, the student council, the daily flag pledge, high-school athletics, the school assembly, vocational education and guidance, clubs, school newspapers and monopolisation of executive authority by superintendents and other professionals."
> Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.181.

Some of the principles behind these may also be briefly listed. They are elaborated further, below. Society was seen as organically composed, in evolution. Its growth and survival were fundamental. The child individually re-enacted racial evolution and school must provide for the growth of the whole child. Each individual was worthy of attention; each individual was different. His attributes needed close attention from teachers for effective education. (Consequently both "success" and

"failure" were individualised.) Such attention required professional expertise - which was of more importance than "mere" academic specialism. Science - including, potentially at least, pedagogical science - was objective and neutral. The teacher and the administrator were experts in the science of management. Yet, though objective and value-free, education was not purpose-free. The aim of communal or societal harmony was above ideology. Education was a tool of social policy, constrained only by technological and natural (human) limitations. The school as a community in itself, and in its inter-relationship with the wider community, inspired co-operation. It motivated young adults to participate in a democratic society. At the same time individuals were selected by neutral and universal criteria for their respective roles within that society. Democracy was a condition of living, wherein people felt able and willing to contribute to the welfare of all, according to their own unique and individual qualities.

Such, very broadly, was the Progressive viewpoint. I turn now to the writings of John Dewey and related Progressive practice - in part to evaluate this viewpoint. My intention is not to attribute to Dewey any responsibility for those practices. Doubtless his influence was strong, but that is not to say that he in some sense "caused" the "movement" to take the form it did. Nor, indeed, did that "movement" arise from misunderstandings of Dewey's teaching. Such a "great men" view of history is at best partial, at worst fallacious. It is important to look at such influential individuals, but both societal and institutional changes must be considered as well.[12] The approach that I have adopted - of examining

ideologies and Master Patterns - is itself also partial. But it necessarily directs us to the societal and institutional context, in which ideologies are created and reproduced, and have their determinative effects upon behaviour.(13) My object in looking at Dewey is primarily to illustrate some of the themes in Progressive ideology. It is not possible to go further and to look for causal links - though such a pursuit would be a logical development from the approach here adopted.

The Individual and the Collectivity

Dewey was a prolific writer.(14) It is striking how many of the titles of his works consist of dichotomous distinctions: The School and Society, The Child and the Curriculum, Democracy and Education, Experience and Education and many others.(15) The same can be found in his chapter headings. In Democracy and Education (1916) for instance, we find: "Education as Conservative and Progressive", "Natural Development and Social Efficiency as Aims", "Interest and Discipline", "Experience and Thinking", "Play and Work in the Curriculum", "Labour and Leisure", "The Individual and the World", and others besides. The nature of these distinctions is by no means uniform, but "dualities" do seem to be central to Dewey's thought.(16) Perhaps the most fundamental, so far as Dewey's educational writing is concerned, is the distinction between the individual (or the child) and the collectivity (whether it be the school, the community, or the society). In this case as in others, Dewey emphasised the interconnectedness of the "elements"

distinguished. He did not see them as opposed to each other, as separate or in conflict. He saw - or sought - the harmony which he assumed basically to be there. He insisted that such unity should not exist in the dominance of one over the other, but in mutual adjustment. Thus, in condemning both excessive child-centredness and excessive subject-centredness in education, he proclaimed that

> "The child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process." Dewey (1902/66) p.129.

In discussing the school's relationships with the home, with the environment, with business and with the university, he said that

> "The school must ... get out of its isolation and secure /an/ organic connection with social life."
> "All waste is due to isolation."
> Dewey (1900/15) pp. 71, 60.

His pedagogical writings are often believed to be predominantly child-centred. But he repeatedly attacked excesses in this direction. He attacked those who saw freedom as a lack of restriction and who left children without teacher guidance.

> "Since freedom resides in the operations of intelligent observation and judgment by which a purpose is developed, guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupils' intelligence is an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it. Sometimes teachers seem to be afraid even to make suggestions to the members of a group as to what they should do. I have heard cases in which children are surrounded with objects and materials and then left entirely to themselves, the teacher being loath to suggest even what might be done with the materials lest freedom be infringed upon. Why, then, even supply materials, since they are a source of some suggestion or other?"
> Dewey (1938) p.84.

He had always argued on these lines.[17] Yet many of Dewey's followers believed that he preached the openness of curriculum and the centrality of individual child development.[18] Kilpatrick, an important populariser of Dewey's work, certainly laid this emphasis.[19] Dewey himself did indeed emphasise the importance of the individual, in two respects. Firstly, he stressed the importance of self-direction. What was distinctively human[20] was the mental activity involved in adjustment to physical stimuli, rather than mere passive mechanical adjustment (Dewey, 1916, p.35). Freedom, he said,

> "means essentially the part played by thinking ... It means intellectual initiative, independence in observation, judicious invention, foresight of consequences, and ingenuity of adaptation to them." Dewey (1916) p.352.

This was central to his notion of "democracy" and to his notion of education for democracy. He talked of "the vice of externally imposed ends" and of "the democratic criterion of the intrinsic significance of every growing experience" (Dewey, 1916, p.127). Secondly, Dewey stressed the uniqueness of each individual. Teachers must 'know' the individual characteristics of their pupils.

> "Interest represents the moving force of objects ... in any experience having a purpose. In concrete terms, the value of recognising the dynamic place of interest in an educative development is that it leads to considering individual children in their specific capabilities, needs, and preferences." Dewey (1916) p.153.

> "... the teacher [should] be intelligently aware of the capacities, needs, and past experience of those under instruction ..." Dewey (1938) p.85.

Dewey clearly placed much importance on the individual - on his interests, his capacities and his integrity as a citizen.

However, though child-centred educators may have interpreted Dewey as giving greater weight to the individual than to the collectivity, Dewey himself denied this. More importantly, whatever Dewey's own prescriptions were, the dominant trend in mass public education was to emphasise the "social". More, it was to emphasise the corporate[21] interest. Dewey certainly stressed the importance of self-direction and opposed passive conformity. He warned that

> "If we think of a habit simply as a change wrought in the organism, ignoring the fact that this change consists in ability to effect subsequent changes in the environment, we shall be led to think of 'adjustment' as a conformity to environment as wax conforms to the seal which impresses it." Dewey (1916) p.55.

His very definition of education tended to imply an openness of objectives that would make such conformity impossible:

> "The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and ... the educational process is one of continual reorganising, reconstructing, transforming."
> "Education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which ensure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age." Dewey (1916) pp. 59,61.

Yet Dewey fundamentally believed in the actual or potential harmony of society. Despite his rejection of passive adjustment or conformity, the active and reflective participation that he sought was in a particular societal context. Indicative of this is his use of the term "social". To him this was no mere descriptive term. It was prescriptive, in two senses. Social action meant, firstly, the pursuit of societal interest and, secondly, rational, intentional (i.e. non-passive) action.

> "The moral and the social quality of conduct are, in the last analysis, identical with each other."
> "Discipline, natural development, culture, social efficiency, are moral traits - marks of a person who is a worthy member of that society which it is the business of education to further."
> Dewey (1916) pp.415, 417.

> "Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity ... Individuals do not even compose a social group because they all work for a common end ... If, however, they were all cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a community."
> ibid, p.5. (22)

For Dewey, such expressions as "social control" and "social efficiency" had clear prescriptive connotations.

This prescriptive element in Dewey's use of the term "social" and in his discussion of the collective aspects of education might not in itself mean that he attached greater weight to this than to his equally prescriptive notions of individualism and reflection. But these are not ideas in the abstract. They are indicative of beliefs contexted in a particular society - as Dewey would be the first to insist.(23) It may seem surprising that Dewey, the pragmatist, should be prey to the classic liberal confusion between society as it is and society as it should ideally be. Yet he was. It is true that he complained often of an "absence of a social atmosphere" (Dewey, 1916, p.352)(24), especially of "those who are entrenched in command of the industrial machinery" (ibid, pp.372-3). He complained that

> "Efficiency in production often demands division of labour. But it is reduced to a mechanical routine unless workers see the technical, intellectual, and social relationships involved in what they do, and engage in their work because

> of the motivation furnished by such perceptions. The tendency to reduce such things as efficiency of activity and scientific management to purely technical externals is evidence of the one-sided stimulation of thought given to those in control of industry - those who supply its aims..." Dewey (1916) p.98.

Yet shortly after this was written, Dewey was himself engaged in The Polish Study, whose aim was explicitly to "orchestrate" the Polish community in America, to "liberate" them from the leadership of priests and such "corrupt" and "dangerous" individuals as Paderewski. Its purpose was to "Americanise" them. It sought their adherence to an "industrial democracy", which to Dewey was not merely an ideal. It was a practical possibility.(25) Dewey was more than a little committed to a particular societal structure, even if we allow that his was a pragmatic view: that he expected "industrial democracy" to evolve dynamically from American society as it then was. Similarly, some 20 years later, Dewey joined Counts, Hook and other prominent liberals, in organising the "Committee for Cultural Freedom". This anticipated McCarthy by over a decade both in its target (members of the Communist Party and "fellow travellers") and in its tactics (for instance in the witch-hunting of those guilty by association) (Karier, 1975, p.92 ff). In addition, Dewey was heavily involved in stock market speculation (Karier, 1976). His prescriptive emphases on "the social" must be read in the context of such activities and alignments.

Even without such evidence about Dewey's own contexted Value-Knowledge, what is far more important is what in the event happened (in respect of this individual-collective dualism) in America's public schools. Karier suggests that

> "The collective side of that philosophy [of enlightened progress], with its scientifically organised technology and computer-managed bureaucracy, has become reality; on the other side, however, individual freedom, dignity, and well-being have not fared so well."
> Karier (1972/73a) pp.85-6.

More specifically about education, Gumpert & Spring say

> "The concept of a child-centred education based on a doctrine of individual differences provided a rationale for 'differentiated education'. Differences in capacities, aptitudes, and interests, it was claimed, were great enough to warrant organising instruction around them ... Despite disclaimers and statements of objectives to the contrary, there was an obvious discrepancy between talk about individualised instruction and education for civic and industrial objectives. Frequently, the needs of the individual were equated with the needs, not of society, but of economic and political interests. The machinery of efficiency took over."
> Gumpert & Spring (1974) p.78.

In 1918, a special committee of the National Education Association issued what Spring (1972, p.109) calls: "the classic statement for the comprehensive high school". This report, on "The Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education", expressed a view of democracy that is obviously related to Dewey's own - though with less explicit emphasis on individual reflective action.

> "The purpose of democracy is so to organise society that each member may develop his personality primarily through activities designed for the well-being of his fellow members of society as a whole."
> quoted by Spring (1972) p.110.

In bold type, the report stated that

> "education in a democracy ... should develop in each individual the knowledge, interests, ideals, habits, and powers whereby he will find his place and use that place to shape both himself and society toward ever nobler ends."
> quoted, ibid.

Within these comprehensive high schools, tracking became commonplace. It was justified by Terman, for instance, as ensuring "educational democracy" (Carney, 1974, p.249). Ryan and Crecelius (1927) argued that tracking

> "is not social segregation. It is not a caste stratification. It is not an attempt to point out those who are worthwhile and those who are not. It is not a move to separate the leaders from the followers."
> quoted by Carney (1974) p.249.

Nonetheless, the authors of the tests which were used to select entrants to particular tracks saw them in precisely this role. Thorndike, for instance, said in 1939:

> "It is a great good fortune of mankind that there is a substantial positive correlation between intelligence and morality, including good will towards one's fellows. Consequently our superiors in ability are on average our benefactors, and it is often safer to trust our interests to them than to ourselves. No group of men can be expected to act 100% in the interest of mankind, but this group of the ablest men will come nearest to the ideal."
> Thorndike (1939), quoted by Karier (1972/73b) pp.122-3.

Terman, who in 1917 was one of the authors of the first batch intelligence tests, the army Alpha and Beta tests[26], was also author of the Stanford adaptation of Binet's individual tests. In 1923 he wrote that

> "Intelligence tests can tell us whether a child's native brightness corresponds more nearly to the median of (1) the professional classes, (2) those in the semi-professional pursuits, (3) ordinary skilled workers, (4) semi-skilled workers, or (5) unskilled workers. This information will be of great value in planning the education of a particular child and also in planning the differentiated curriculum here recommended."
> Terman (1923) quoted by Karier (1972/73b) p.121.

Of course, not all Progressive educationists adhered to such views as these. Bagley (1925), for instance, vehemently attacked the "fatalistic assumptions" that accompanied the use of intelligence tests. (On the other hand, even he by no means considered such tests to be irrelevant. On the contrary,

> "mental tests have made very important contributions to educational progress ... [as] instruments for detecting individual differences in learning capacity."
> Bagley (1925) pp.45-6.)

However aspects of belief are essential to the testing and tracking phenomenon. These are (a) a belief in the importance of individual attention to children's attributes, (b) a faith in the neutrality of science and its "warrantable assertabilities" and (c) a fundamental belief in the inevitability and/or desirability of a stratified society. These concern, respectively, (a) Subjective 'Knowledge' or mind-brain, (b) Objectivated 'Knowledge' and (c) Societal Reality. All can be traced in Dewey's own work. To repeat, my object is not to suggest a direct causal link between Dewey's theory and Progressive practice. The point is that Progressive educational beliefs were widely applied in mass education. They were not confined to a libertarian middle class movement, relevant to a few private schools only. They were part of an ideology which served to legitimate fundamental societal inequalities. This ideological function persists today.(27)

Scientific Selection and Socialisation

Tracking in the comprehensive high schools was not a coercive system. On the contrary, a strong element of "voluntary-ism" was

intended and achieved. Not only were "objective" tests employed for selection - themselves legitimating that selection - but vocational guidance and counselling were used, whereby students (or their families) apparently chose the tracks in which they should enrol. Such guidance involved expert (professional) management, which I shall discuss below. First, though, it should be remembered that the single comprehensive school was arrived at against some opposition from those who sought separate, more distinctly vocational schools. The views of Dewey on vocational education and on common schooling, and the relationship between these views and eventual practice, are therefore worth considering.

Dewey expressed opposition to narrow vocationalism.(28)

> "Nothing could be more absurd than to try to educate individuals with an eye to only one line of activity. In the first place, each individual has of necessity a variety of callings, in each of which he should be intelligently effective; and, in the second place, any one occupation loses its meaning and becomes a routine keeping busy at something in the degree in which it is isolated from other interests." Dewey (1916) p.359.

He warned that

> "There is a standing danger that education will perpetuate the older traditions for a select few, ... that vocational education will be interpreted in theory and practice as trade education: as a means of securing technical efficiency in specialised future pursuits.
>
> Education would then become an instrument of perpetuating unchallenged the existing industrial order of society, instead of operating as a means of its transformation." Dewey (1916) p.369.

However, Dewey's notion of what such a transformed society would be like was extremely vague.(29) Moreover, his views of individual uniqueness significantly quality this openness. We have already

seen how his view of individual uniqueness could be used to justify testing procedures that relied on and reproduced deterministic assumptions. It could also be the basis of directive "guidance".

> "To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness. Nothing is more tragic than failure to discover one's true business in life, or to find that one has drifted or been forced by circumstances into an uncongenial calling. A right occupation means simply that the aptitudes of a person are in adequate play, working with the minimum of friction and the maximum of satisfaction." Dewey (1916) p.360.

Although he often warned against imposing curricula on children, guidance was not, to him, restrictive. It was the legitimate (i.e. pragmatically effective) employment of expertise.

> "Guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupils' intelligence is an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it." Dewey (1938) p.84.

Such principles were institutionalised in classroom practice and in school organisation.

Frank Parsons, "often called the father of vocational guidance" (Spring, 1972, p.92), opened the first vocational bureau, in Boston, in 1908. His dream was a "Paradise" of "mutualism" (ibid, p.93), which it was in the power of social reformers to achieve.

> "Life can be moulded into any conceivable form. Draw up your specifications for a dog, or man ... and if you will give me control of the environment, and time enough, I will clothe your dreams in flesh and blood."
> Parsons (1894) quoted by Spring (1972) p.95.

Guidance, for him, was a matter of directing and shaping the raw material (people) in the most efficient manner possible.

> A "sensible industrial system will ... seek ... to put men, as well as timber, stone, and iron, in the places for which their natures fit them, and to polish and prepare them for efficient service with at least as much care as is bestowed upon clocks, electric dynamos or locomotives."
> Parsons (1894) quoted by Spring (1972) p.92.

The latter concern was shared by the industrial psychologist, Hugo Münsterberg, who believed that in the past - but not the present -

> America "could afford the limitless waste of human energy just as it felt justified in wasting the timber resources of the forest."
> Münsterberg (1913) quoted by Spring (1972) p.92.

Münsterberg pioneered the use of vocational aptitude tests. His explicit intention was to unite scientific management and vocational guidance.

These techniques and assumptions were applied in schools, especially the mushrooming sector of junior high schools. Here they relied on a particular view of adolescence. Ages twelve to fifteen were seen as a natural stage in a child's development[30] in which subsequently stable social orientations were acquired.

> "Those who know the nature of children are aware that the junior high school period coincides with the time when the social instincts begin to assert themselves with great force."
> Gosling (1919) quoted by Spring (1972) p.105.

Educational guidance involved helping students to select educational programmes to match their interests, abilities and future occupations (Spring, 1972, p.98). It was in the junior high school period that these were supposed to become stabilised. As Bloomfield, who took over Parsons' Vocation Bureau after his death,

put it,

> "Adolescence is the period of decisive battles, the time when the history of many an individual is almost finally written." quoted by Spring (1972) p.100.

The comprehensive junior high school made possible differentiated curricula according to such supposedly stable aptitudes and in line also with the meritocratic principle of equity. Moreover, it provided a location for controlled socialisation into "democratic" principles - for adolescence was also the "gang stage".(31)

That selection and socialisation became, in Talcot Parsons' writing, the major societal functions of schooling(32) is itself witness to the one-sidedness of the individual-collectivity "duality" in Progressive practice. The importance of individual uniqueness was re-interpreted in terms of selection to differentiated curricula and teaching groups (and thence to Societal positions). Not surprisingly, the importance of "social" purpose, "social" control and "social" efficiency(33) was not neglected. Dewey, as we have seen, stressed the importance of collective harmony. Though he overtly rejected passive conformity, this was only because he assumed that unity was the inevitable - or at least most probable - outcome of rational individuality. Nonetheless, his view of the teacher as an expert led him to advocate the conscious manipulation of children's environment in order to promote this end. Socialisation was for him a process whereby individuals internalised particular kinds of "social" orientation.

> "The fundamental means of control is not personal but intellectual ... It consists in the habits of understanding which are set up in using objects in correspondence with

> others ... A socialised mind is the power to understand [things] in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint or shared situations. And mind in this sense is the method of social control."
> Dewey (1916) pp. 39-40 (emphasis in original).

Dewey's perspective was Participationist.

> "A man can be prevented from breaking into other persons' houses by shutting him up, but shutting him up may not alter his disposition to commit burglary. When we confuse a physical with an educative result, we always lose the chance of enlisting the person's own participating disposition in getting the result desired, and thereby of developing within him an intrinsic and persisting direction in the right way."
> Dewey (1916) p.32 (my emphasis).

In discussing the role of objectivated curriculum (or "the value of the formulated wealth of knowledge that makes up the course of study"), Dewey suggested that

> "It may enable the educator to determine the environment of the child, and thus by indirection to direct. Its primary value, its primary indication, is for the teacher, not for the child. It says to the teacher: Such and such are the capacities, the fulfilments, in truth and beauty and behaviour, open to these children. Now see to it that day by day the conditions are such that their own activities move inevitably in this direction, towards such culmination of themselves..."
> Dewey (1902/66) p.146 (emphasis in original).

In short, "socialisation" carried the same prescriptive connotations, for Dewey, as did the term "social". It was a process which the teacher should influence, if not control. The reference to direction "by indirection" in the last quotation suggests that Dewey had a clear notion of what is now called the "hidden curriculum"(34), and that he advocated its manipulation by the teacher.

This manipulation of the "hidden curriculum" was a major element in high school practice. The overt aim, in the words of one junior high school motto, was "Do in Co-operation" (Spring,1972, p.107). Again there are clear parallels in Dewey's writing. For instance, having condemned the "traditional school" because it

> "was not a group or community held together by participation in common activities",

Dewey went on to support the "new schools" because

> "the primary source of social control resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility."

Such social enterprise, though grounded on children's "natural sociability",

> "does not organise itself in an enduring way purely spontaneously."

Instead,

> "It requires thought and planning ahead. The educator is responsible for a knowledge of individuals and for a knowledge of subject-matter that will enable activities to be selected which lend themselves to social organisation..." Dewey (1938) pp.60-1 (my emphasis).

I emphasise "have an opportunity" because it is just this overtly voluntarist ethic which at the societal level underlies the "equality of opportunity" principle. When coupled with children's feeling of responsibility and the educator's actual responsibility, it characterises the Participationist position outlined in Chapter 7.(35) For Dewey, this co-operation in school was not an end in itself - although it was for some other Progressive educationists.(36) Rather, it was a means to societal unity.

> "When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within [the school as an embryonic community life], saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious."
> Dewey (1900/15) pp. 27-8.

Furthermore, the union between school and community was to be encouraged and explored even whilst children were still at school. For isolation was waste (Dewey, 1900/15, p.60) and

> "Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighbouring community"
> Dewey (1927) quoted by Curtis & Boultwood (1953/65) p.492.

> "The school must ... get out of its isolation and secure [an] organic connection with social life."
> Dewey (1900/15).

In seeing how actual school practices "corresponded" with these Dewey-an principles, it is convenient to distinguish between intra-school activities and those which related the school to the external community. Within the school, as we have seen, "Do in Co-operation" was a common theme. The "home room", the school assembly, clubs and non-academic activities, and student governments (what in this country would be called "school councils") were common devices.(37) In the first place, they brought together students differentiated in other activities through tracking.(38) In the second place, they offered a "feeling" of responsibility as well. Spring is contemptuous of the Progressive notion of "democracy".

> "Democracy did not involve choice but rather doing that which you were best able to do. This definition of democracy became very inflexible and limiting when it was assumed that there was a permanency of interests during adolescence [i.e. that interests, like abilities and aptitudes, were stabilised]."
> Spring (1972) p.107.

But

> "Democracy as it pertains to personal choice becomes an illusion if freedom is reduced to acting in terms of social needs. Children are taught to feel free even though their lives are being directed by institutional forces. A well-functioning democracy becomes more possible in a society of aware selves." ibid, p.163.

It is ironic that in the writings - if not, possibly, the Value-Knowledge - of Dewey, democracy would only be possible in such conditions.

As for the community-school relationship, in the event this was developed primarily as the professional leadership of experts, rather than as "grass-roots community control". School boards decreased in size in the early years of the century and "increased" in terms of the social status of their members. Drawing on evidence collected by Hays (1964), Issel (1970) and Tyack (1972), Bowles and Gintis (1976) suggest that this was a general pattern, in urban areas.(39) This concentration was relevant not just in terms of control over administrative policies and educational practice within schools, but in terms of community-oriented activities also. In the provision of educational facilities for adults of urban communities (Spring, 1972, Ch.4) and of "out-of-school" activities for youth (Gumpert and Spring, 1974, Ch.4), the dominant pattern appears to have been one of expert and enlightened leadership - over those who were not themselves adequately "socialised". Indeed, the "leadership" pattern was central to Progressive ideology.

Pragmatism and Leadership

For Dewey, as a pragmatist, there was no universal absolute of human rationality. Mind and intelligence have evolved historically

through the need to deal with problematic situations. With the development of science, progress has continued so far that the ideal society is at hand.

In the pragmatism (or experimentalism, or instrumentalism) of John Dewey, truth itself was relative. "Warranted assertability", as he called it, depended upon consequences.

> "The pragmatic rule [is]... in order to discover the meaning of the idea, ask for its consequences."
>
> "The hypothesis that works is the true one."
>
> Dewey (1920/48): extract in Garforth (1966,ed.) pp.317,327 (emphasis in original).

Moreover, not only were ideas warrantable insofar as they "worked", but so also were actions. This followed from Dewey's desire to unite (as with other dualities) idea and action, theory and practice. It also led logically to a position in which what was realistically possible could be conceived as that which was desirable: what would work should be done. Ethics, like truth, was relative to contexted purposes.

> "Ethical theory ever since [the Greeks] has been singularly hypnotised by the notion that its business is to discover some final end or good or some ultimate and supreme law. This is the common element among the diversity of theories. Some have held that the end is loyalty or obedience to a higher power or authority [e.g. God, ruler, institutions or rational conscience]. Others have asserted that ... morality is sought in ends that are goods. [e.g. in self-realisation, holiness, happiness or aggregate pleasure]. And yet these schools have agreed in the assumption that there is a single, fixed and final good. They have been able to dispute with one another only because of their common premise.
>
> The question arises whether the way out of the confusion and conflict is not to go to the root of the matter by questioning this common element...
>
> Let us ... follow the pragmatic rule and ... transfer the weight and burden of morality to intelligence."
>
> Dewey (1920/48): extract in Garforth (1966,ed.) pp.316-7.

The subordination of morality to intelligence accounts for Dewey's promotion of the scientific method. It does not, however, avoid the problem he noted about the "single, fixed and final good". What it raised to the level of the "natural" and "inevitable" was science. However relative it may have recognised the findings of science to be, the methods themselves had a prescriptive "naturalness" that was justified in terms of evolutionary theory and, teleologically (or pragmatically), in terms of its supposed ability to produce the ideal society. It was viewed as efficient. And efficiency was a further "natural" value, or "single good". Furthermore, intimately connected with a Basic Belief in scientific efficiency was the "natural" position of scientific experts: those who were masters of the scientific method. This pattern applied at all levels.

At the level of the individual, the scientific method involved intelligent and active experience. It evolved observation of, hypothesising about, and experimenting with the environment, for the discovery of warrantable "truths". In school, the individual child should engage in such a method, not to discover such "truths" for the advancement of collective knowledge, but, rather, for the growth of his own abilities and interests.

> "No one expects the young to make original discoveries of just the same facts and principles as are embodied in the sciences of nature and man. But it is not unreasonable to expect that learning may take place under such conditions that from the standpoint of the learner there is genuine discovery..." Dewey (1916) p.354.

Dewey was a Voluntarist, in this respect. Yet at the same time, the ideal of rational scientific method applied to the teacher, too.

For the individual (including the child) this method involved active involvement with the environment. In the teacher's case, that environment included his charges. The teacher had to observe children's individual capacities and interests, and also the stock of established 'knowledge'. He had to plan rationally what pedagogical approach to take (for each child, ideally). And he had to experiment - i.e. to teach. Dewey stated that

> "The problem of teaching is to keep the experience of the student in the direction of what the expert already knows." Dewey (1916) p.216.

He then went on to explain that science represented "the perfect outcome of learning" and "the safeguard of the race against [the] natural propensities" of credulity and pre-judgment (Dewey, 1916, pp. 221,223). The teacher was both teaching the scientific method, and teaching by it. He was the expert. The children were (a part of) his environment to be mastered. His objective was the growth of the child's interests and abilities - for education was growth. But his objective was also societal (or community) growth, through the development of intelligence.

Moreover, the teacher was not, of course, the only "scientist" - any more than the individual child was. At the societal level, growth was again the (vague) objective - progress for its own sake, to be efficiently pursued. The view, that what was realistically possible was by the same token desirable, could thereby legitimate any enlightened leadership, so long as this aim of growth or progress was held realistically, and so long as the "led" had a feeling of freedom in the process. (The need for such a feeling was no doubt

a pragmatic necessity, rather than a moral - by some other "single good" - requirement.) Accordingly teachers were themselves a part of some higher experts' environment - the professional administrator, perhaps.(40) Ultimately there is a pragmatic/moral prescription of expert leadership and (mere) public participation.

To attribute such explicit sequence to Dewey himself may well be unjustified, in view of his many assertions of the importance of individual mental reflection. What I have tried to demonstrate is the compatibility between his philosophical pragmatism and the actual practices of expert leadership, and therefore of the latter's legitimation within a master pattern of Progressivism. To summarise, I shall now review the Basic Beliefs of Progressivism as they have emerged in this analysis. Such broad generalisations as these should not, of course, be taken too literally. A more detailed consideration is not, however, possible, in this essay. Again, my aim is to demonstrate the usefulness of particular kinds of question, for the examination of historically situated ideologies, rather than to produce a definitive statement on American Progressivism.

The Basic Beliefs of Progressivism

A concise version of the major master pattern of American Progressivism is contained in Karier's phrase:

> "the knowledgeable expert dedicated to the survival of the system through growth." Karier (1972/73a) p.95.

Expertise may have resided principally in method. But "warrantable" 'knowledge' from which to work - including, for instance, scientific

"findings" relating to intelligence and scientific management - was in the event as great a qualification. Dedication certainly existed and it would be naïve to dismiss the Progressive "movement" as self-interested conspiracy. Belief in what was taken to be a realisable ideal society characterised many of the most influential Progressives. Society, like the individual, was a "biological machine", growing as the fruit of centuries of evolution, but ultimately having one basic need - survival. For this latter reason, Karier feels that

> "the liberal educational reformer, like the liberal political reformer, was in effect a flexible conservative."
> ibid (41).

For the American Progressives, Reality - including societal relations - was scientifically 'knowable' and controllable. Society was subject to natural evolution anyway. But the progressive acquisition of knowledge (and through it the possibility of control) was a part of that very evolution. It was what ultimately promised the fulfilment of man in a perfect society. Though genuine mass reflective awareness would be a nice ideal, in practice this was not a realistic possibility. The enlightened expert - as teacher, as business manager and as politician - was indispensible to the collective benefit. Through them efficiency could produce the growth that ensured an end to all the social problems that cursed the over-expanded American cities.

For the Progressives, Objectivated 'Knowledge' was in principle never static. As society evolved, so contexts changed. Accordingly, the pragmatic warrantability of particular 'knowledge' changed also.

However, a faith in scientific method led to an assumption that science itself was value-free, that it was beyond ideology and that truth could be pursued scientifically with no consequences other than beneficial progress.(42) Even for Dewey himself, there were in practice ascertainable truths - though it was recognised in principle that such closure was potentially misleading. Furthermore, it was assumed that there was a basic, attainable (and for some, inevitable) harmony in society. This was consistent with the naturalistic metaphors so often used about society and about the individual. Consequently, an overt belief in the merits of "openness"(43) was also subordinate to the collective purpose. This purpose was in turn discernible to the moral/intelligent experts of society.

As for Subjective 'Knowledge', there was no automatic correspondence between either the Real world, or scientific 'Knowledge' of it, and what people learn. Experience alone determined what was learned, subject to predetermined limitations. So the shaping of the environment was the duty of enlightened experts. Nonetheless, that shaping had to take into account subjective feelings of autonomy. Democracy was, as Dewey said, a way of living (Dewey, 1916, p.101), not a form of government. People had to be socialised into a Participationist willingness to contribute, according to their own capacities, to the collective harmony. To this end, various devices - from the organisation of teaching groups and club activities to eugenicist policies(44) were variously open to the experts. As for original dispositions in the individual, accounts varied. Some Progressives were heirs to the Galtonian tradition, often leading to

outright racist statements and policies. Others adhered to environmentalist assumptions, producing a social pathological view of deprivation and its consequences.(45) In all cases, however, actual capacities were determined, whether by environment or heredity. Furthermore, the nature-nurture debate was always underwritten by assumptions of natural inequality and an inevitable need for expert leadership. It was not the fact of differentiation, but its justification, that was at issue. However, what was certainly a matter for environmental experience for most (though even here extreme eugenicists attributed all manner of physical and social handicap to defective germ plasm) was the "social" spirit. Comprehensive high schools, especially, devised various organisational patterns and activities in order to promote a "democratic" ethic. "Democracy", here, meant "all for each and each for all", as one school principal put it (Spring, 1972, p.120). This was very different, of course, from the Jeffersonian individuality of the pre-corporate era, and different also from the self-interest utilitarianism of the British Radicals.

Finally, the Progressives on the whole had a particular view of societal change. As so often appears to happen, this was congruant with their view of individual (child) development. Growth was the underlying notion in both cases, coupled with an assumption that growth was always progress. In some respects, such growth was inevitable. (Like the child, society inevitably gets older). To Dewey, certainly, the evolution of an organically mature society was more or less inevitable.(46) But the nature of the growth was still seen to be largely in the hands of enlightened leaders. Education was an important - indeed the most important - tool of social

policy to this end.

Notes

(1) Carnoy (1974) p.254. Karier (1972/73a, p.97) points out that the high fees at Dewey's "laboratory school" in Chicago would have made it a middle and upper-middle class establishment. The reactions of such liberal educators as Silberman (1971) might seem to indicate that "progressive education" had not touched the public schools. But this implies too narrow a definition of "progressive education", isolated from the overall ideological structure. Different prescriptions may be made for the education of the children of different classes. But the various prescriptions nonetheless relate to one another within a single ("progressive") belief system.

(2) I am not suggesting that Dewey was responsible for the massive changes that took place - though some anti-progressives, like Lund (1950) have done so.

(3) As we have seen, the family metaphor was used especially, in England, by latter-day neo-Radicals like Kay-Shuttleworth. These opening remarks are extremely generalised and must be read in the light of the qualifications that follow.

(4) cf Katz (1971); Bowles & Gintis (1976) p.165 ff.

(5) cf Gumport & Spring (1974) p.67.

(6) Williams (1966)'s development of Turner (1950)'s frontier thesis is referred to by Karier (1975) pp. 1-2.

(7) The distinction between positive and negative freedom is made by Berlin (1969a). For discussions of the new and old liberalism amongst American Progressives see Spring (1972), Chapter 1; Karier (1972/73a) esp. pp.86-90.

(8) Bowles & Gintis (1976) distinguish between two "schools of thought" - the Dewey-an "democratic" school and the "meritocratic-technocratic" one. The former, according to them, saw integrative, egalitarian and developmental functions of education as necessarily associated in the evolving democratic society, whilst the latter saw them as associated only through the intervention of enlightened leadership (pp20-26). I would suggest, however, that both themes were ambiguously co-existent in the beliefs of the same people.

(9) i.e. the dangers, in my terms, of Value-Known closures.

(10) "We are made, so to speak, for belief; credulity is natural. The undisciplined mind is averse to suspense and intellectual hesitation; it is prone to assertion. It likes things undisturbed, settled, and treats them as such without due warrant." Dewey (1916) p.222.

Whereas

"Science represents the safeguard of the race against these natural propensities and the evils which flow from them." ibid p.223.

(11) "The kind of assurance attending science ... is rational assurance - logical warranty. The ideal of scientific organisation is, therefore, that every conception and statement shall be of such a kind as to follow from others and to lead to others ..." Dewey (1916) p.224 (original emphasis).

"The university function is the truth-function ... The one thing that is inherent and essential is the idea of truth." Dewey (1902/75) p.54.

Whilst mathematics, astronomy, physics or chemistry "have worked out such a definite body of truth and such definite instrumentalities of inquiry and verification as to give them a position secure from attack" (ibid), the social sciences had still to reach that point - but were clearly expected to do so.

(12) Swift (1971)'s approach is a novel and well-conceived one. Differing importantly from more usual organisational approaches (see, for instance, Bidwell, 1965; Davies, 1975), Swift looks to conditions in public schools themselves for explanations of Progressive practice and ideology. As he admits, this is itself partial (p.8), but it is most important. In Chapter 15, I shall discuss a British study that also looks at processes of ideological reproduction in schools - although again by a very different approach (Sharp & Green, 1975).

(13) "In many respects, the educational state came to be the mirror image of the social and political philosophy practiced by the controlling classes of American society. This assumes that the ideas and values that men hold dear often make a difference in terms of social action." Karier (1975) p.5.

(14) In preparing this chapter, I have relied principally on Dewey (1900/15, 1916 and 1938), together with certain articles by him, as well as secondary sources which I acknowledge where appropriate.

(15) For instance: Human Nature & Conduct; Experience and Nature; Characters and Events; Art and Education; Individualism, Old and New; Philosophy and Civilisation; Liberalism and Social Action; Education and the New Liberalism; The Public and its Problems ...

(16) They are often dualities whose correspondent reality he denies.

(17) See especially Dewey (1902/66).

(18) e.g. Rugg and Shumaker's The Child-centred School, quoted by Cremin (1962) p.207.

(19) Cremin (1962) p.220. See also Perry (1967).

(20) "Human" is my interpretation. Dewey's word was "social", whose ambiguities I discuss below.

(21) "Corporate" is a biological metaphor of no small significance.

(22) The lack of distinction between "society" and "community" here does not, of course, detract from my argument. On the contrary.

(23) It is central to scientific pragmatism that current (contextual) circumstances and constraints be observed and made the basis of action. On morals, Dewey said:

> "Morals concern nothing less than the whole character, and the whole character is identical with the man in all his concrete make-up and manifestations."
> Dewey (1916) p.415.

"Concrete make-up and manifestations" place man in his contextual reality.

(24) Of course, "social" carries the prescriptive connotations discussed above.

(25) Karier (1976). It was on these grounds that Dewey advocated American involvement in World War I.

(26) For an account of these tests - devised and sent to the publishers within 6½ weeks (including a fortnight's recess) - and their subsequent application on a wide scale in schools, see Gumpert & Spring (1974) p.91 ff.

(27) Jensen, for instance, has used substantially the same arguments as those used by Terman nearly half a centry earlier:

> "What we now mean by intelligence is something like the probability of acceptable performance (given the opportunity) in occupations varying in social status. So we see that the prestige hierarchy of occupations is a reliable objective reality in our society..."
> Jensen (1969) p.14.

Most published criticism of Jensen's arguments (e.g. Harvard Educational Review, Spring and Summer 1969), has concentrated on methodological issues. The basic assumptions of inevitable inequality and the ideological basis of "prestige" and "societal rewards" have received less

attention. See Chomsky's criticism of Herrnstein's article entitled "IQ" (Chomsky, 1972/75). On the legitimation of societal inequality, see Bowles & Gintis (1976), esp. Chapter 4. Simon (1970/71) discusses intelligence, race and class in Britain.
For the involvement of many early psychometricians in eugenics and immigration restriction, see Karrier (1972/73b; 1975); Gumpert & Spring (1974) Ch.3. On the backing of large foundations, Bowles & Gintis (1976) pp. 195-8 draw on Marks (1972, u/p). Marks (1975) is also instructive in suggesting why such foundation backing subsequently supported the environmentalist position.

(28) "The desired transformation ... signifies a society in which every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more perceptible... It denotes a state of affairs in which the interest of each in his work is uncoerced and intelligent..." (Note again the social and individual components) The change to such a society "is essentially a change in the quality of mental disposition..." Dewey (1916) pp.370-1.

(29) See also Wirth (1972) for an excellent pro-Dewey account.

(30) This view of childhood development was often formulated in terms of a re-enactment of human social evolution - a theory that was influentially written in biological terms by G. Stanley Hall. (See Spring, 1972, pp. 100-104.) Dewey himself was influenced by Hall (under whom he studied), according to Curtis & Boultwood (1953/56) p.477. cf Dewey (1900/15) pp.45-6. He was certainly much influenced by the biological/theological debates that greeted Darwin's theories in late 19th century America.

(31) Puffer, author of The Boy and his Gang, was also a student of Hall's (Spring, 1972, p.103).

(32) Parsons (1959/61). See also Chapter 5, above.

(33) "Social" is placed in inverted commas here, because it is Dewey's sense of the term that is intended.

(34) Compare also: "The educative process ... goes on willy-nilly... We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment." Dewey (1916) p.22.

(35) A similar "voluntary-ism" characterised the views of some members of the British H.M. Inspectorate, even in the mid-19th century (Johnson, 1968, esp. pp.389-400).

(36) For instance Colin Scott. See Spring (1972) pp. 50-61.

(37) cf Spring (1972) pp. 106-7 (home rooms), 123 (assemblies), 106 (clubs, etc.) and 118-120 (student governments).

(38) Hence a major part of the Progressive rationale for the common school.

(39) Bowles & Gintis (1976) pp. 186-191. The discussion is reminiscent of the struggle in this country for School Board autonomy, prior to the 1902 Education Act. (See Simon, 1965, Ch.6.) Though conditions and histories were, of course, extremely different, there would appear to be a common element in the ideology of professional expertise and efficiency. Bacon (1976) suggests similar tendencies in Britain today. As this essay is written (Summer, 1976), the Taylor Report on School Management is still awaited.

(40) Such contemporary critics as Upton Sinclair and Scott Nearing attributed great significance to the influence of corporate business in school boards and university management. See, for instance, Spring (1972) Chapter 7. Karier (1975) includes some interesting documentary evidence on certain "academic freedom" cases. I have already mentioned Marks' work on the role of large foundations in the backing of geneticist research in the 1920s, as well as environmentalist research (such as the Myrdal study) in the 1940s. (See note 27).

(41) Many others, of course, have said similar things of liberalism. Specifically on education, see, for instance, Morton & Watson (1971/73).

(42) Thus Bell's End of Ideology epitomised an older Progressivist assumption.

(43) In academic freedom, for instance. See Karier (1975) Chapters 1-3.

(44) See Karier (1972/73b & 1975 Chapters 5-10); Gumpart & Spring (1974), Chapter 3.

(45) Dewey's vision of the "ideal school" being like the "ideal home" - which he outlined - presaged many of the later assumptions of cultural deprivation-ism. See Dewey (1900/15) pp.35-7.

(46) I say "more or less", because in none of the writings that I have considered does Dewey make anything but very vague reference to what the eventual ideal society would look like. Consequently his notion of change to that society is imprecise. That he does see some kind of inevitable transformation, however, is indicated, for instance, in Dewey (1916) p.373 et passim.

CHAPTER 15

TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITISH CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION

The Established Orthodoxy of "Child-centredness"

Van der Eyken (1973, p.94) suggests that Robert Morant's 1904 Code of Regulations for Public Elementary Schools "set the scene for an imaginative new concept of primary education, and embodies a philosophy of teaching which still influences schools today". Certainly it talked of "development" and "individual children" and "natural activities".(1) It was applauded at the time by Katherine Bathurst - an H.M.I. and outspoken advocate of "advanced" thinking and action in respect of Infant Schools.(2) A similar philosophy was contained in the first Handbook of Suggestions for the Consideration of Teachers, published in 1905. This marked a decisive break from the imposed "Payment by Results" system, which was abolished only a decade earlier.(3)

Edmond Holmes published his influential What Is And What Might Be in 1911, having recently retired from the post of Chief Inspector to the Board of Education.(4) Ever since, the dichotomisation between "old" and "new" pedagogies has been a prominent feature of "progressive" writing on education.(5) As Selleck has pointed out, this view of history, wherein the evils of "traditionalists" could be listed to prove the "self-evident" merit of "progressive" methods, served a cohesive function amongst the early (post-World War I) "progressives" in this country (Selleck, 1972, pp.69-70). There was remarkable agreement about what was wrong and broadly what kinds of approach should be adopted, though consensus on conceptual

definitions was quite lacking.(6) It was a missionary zeal with which such reformers as Russell, Neill, Ensor, Caldwell Cook, MacMunn and many others found some sort of unity in their "movement". Theirs, says Sellick, was a messianic enthusiasm. They were setting out to convert an entire education system (Selleck, 1972, p.63 ff). Even Nunn, the reputable theorist, resorted to the old/new dichotomy - as indeed had Dewey, in America (e.g. Dewey, 1902/66, p.128).

> "Expressed in broad terms, the principles of the movement are that the old authoritarian attitude of parents and teachers should be modified, that more responsibility for their conduct and progress in school studies should be entrusted to the children themselves, that methods of instruction should be made more flexible so as to meet better the widely differing needs of individuals, and that more account should be taken of varying tastes and abilities. In a word, it is a movement to exploit more fully than heretofore that spontaneity of the individual which we have described as the essence of play."
> Nunn (1920/45) pp.104-5.

This passage demonstrates not just the "movement's" prevalent dichotomisation, but also some of its principal catchwords - "flexible", "needs of individuals", "spontaneity" and "play". Nunn's book rapidly became the "progressives'" textbook. Its first edition went through thirteen reprints. The second edition (1930) was reprinted eight times. A third edition was published in 1945.(7) F.A. Cavenagh called it "the outstanding book of the period".

> "The studies of a generation of teachers in training have been based on it, and it has profoundly affected their outlook and their subsequent practice."
> Cavenagh (1936) quoted by Selleck (1972) p.47.

Selleck (1972) describes how the largely intuited, vague, missionary enthusiasm of certain "outsiders" in the years immediately after World War I became the established orthodoxy of educational thought

in this country. The 1927 edition of the Board of Education's Handbook of Suggestions was full of advice clearly compatible with - where not derived from - "progressive" pronouncements. The Hadow Reports, especially that of 1931, on The Primary School, also adopted the new outlook. As Selleck puts it,

> Progressive ideas were sufficiently prominent in educational debate to be adopted by men who did not have time to forge their own educational vocabularies but who were not satisfied with the conventional pieties..."
>
> "By 1939, a substantial majority of opinion leaders worked within the progressives' intellectual orbit. Most of those who wrote books on education, spoke at conferences, produced official reports, or sat on important committees, trained teachers, or contributed to the educational journals came to accept progressive views as a basis for their own thinking... As the 20s and 30s progressed, it became clear that the progressives were dictating the terms of the debate..." Selleck (1972) pp. 123,120.

It was not until after World War II, however, that orthodox theory became anything like orthodox practice. Most of the "radical" private schools were already registered as efficient by the Ministry of Education by 1944.(8) The conversion of state schools(9) to "progressive" principles was another matter. I cannot deal here with the history of this conversion. Suffice it to say that by 1967 the Plowden Report could boast that a third of the primary schools in England and Wales were what it called "good"(10) - that is of the kind described and recommended in the Report. Moreover, the British Primary School is commonly taken to be the model for "Open Education" in practice today.(11) The emphasis in this chapter is on the primary school, rather than on other sectors of the education system. The Froebelian and Pestalozzian - not to mention the Owenite - traditions gained some hold in infant education before they "spread" up the

age-range in this century. The removal, in most areas, of the "11-plus" examination was often accompanied by a "liberalising" of primary school education. This lends credence to a common, but somewhat shallow, explanation of educational change, which hinges on the "influence" of infant educational ideas, finally"released" from the constraints of external examinations.(12) Many child-centred ideas have looked to infancy for an understanding of the "nature" of childhood. But such theoretical understanding is not the same as committed belief, nor institutionalised practices based upon such understandings. Two features suggest an ideological patterning that is deeper than simplistic "influence" theories would imply. First, there is a congruence between Child-centred tenets and beliefs about teacher autonomy. Second, Child-centred practices have been applied differentially in secondary schools, depending on the "type" of secondary school child involved. Meanwhile, my concern here is with the theory and practice of Child-centred education. Undoubtedly this was institutionalised in an important proportion of British primary schools during the 1950s and '60s.

The last edition of the Board of Education's Handbook of Suggestions was published in 1937. Twenty-two years later, the Ministry of Education's Primary Education declared that "Handbook of Suggestions" would no longer be an appropriate title, given the changing status of the teaching profession.(13) Primary Education already described and praised the practices of the "new" primary schools in this country. But the veritable Bible of Child-centred education was the Plowden Report (1967). For Peters (1969) it

contained a "little vade mecum of educational theory" (p.2). For Bernstein and Davies (1969) it came "very close to the semi-official ideology of primary education in this country" (p.56). Ex-Chief Inspector Blackie's book-for-parents followed shortly afterwards. It tells a very different tale to the one told by that other ex-Chief Inspector, half a century earlier. Holmes had allowed that there was

> "at least a breath of healthy discontent stirring in the field of elementary education, a breath which sometimes blows the mist away and gives sudden gleams of sunshine"
> Holmes (1911) pp.v-vi.

Yet he had felt that in most elementary schools the aim of teachers was

> "to leave nothing to /the child's/ nature, nothing to his spontaneous life, nothing to his free activity; to repress all his natural impulses; to drill his energies into complete acquiescence; to keep his whole being in a state of sustained and painful tension" Holmes (1911) p.48.

Blackie, on the other hand, wrote his book in the hope of conveying

> "the excitement of the English primary school at its best"
> Blackie (1967/71) p.x.

Like Plowden, he 'knew' that these "best" schools were to be typical of all primary schools in the near future. By the 1960s, Child-centred education had undoubtedly arrived as orthodox practice, as well as theory.

A brief comparison might be made between this Child-centred "movement" and those of the 19th century Radicals and the American Progressives. It is immediately apparent that the two British "movements" are importantly opposed to each other. Indeed, the

contemporary Child-centred "movement" is in many ways a conscious reaction to the pedagogical practices arising out of early 19th century Radicalism. It is the 19th century practices that are held up as the "traditional" and "authoritarian" side of the notorious dichotomy.(14) On the other hand, the contrast with American Progressivism may not at first sight be so obvious.

Much of the theory of English progressivism before World War II was close to, and even imitative of, American educational Progressivism. Yet it may well be that direct American influence was small. Evidence of Dewey's influence, for instance, is sparse. Godfrey Thomson said in 1929 that

> "In Great Britain, except in Scotland... I have been repeatedly struck by the absence of references to Dewey's ideas and sometimes by evidence of complete ignorance of them, although the same views in other dress are often mentioned in their practical aspect."
> Thomson (1929) p.78, quoted by Selleck (1972) p.114.

Nunn (1920/45) recommended that "students should read How We Think" (p.246) and also "know" Dewey's work, especially The School and Society and Schools for Tomorrow (p.276). Yet these are recommended in footnotes. Only once does he refer to Dewey in his text (pp.238-9), even in his third edition. Nonetheless, the between-war progressives in this country, such as those of the New Education Fellowship (N.E.F.), consciously took the term "progressive" from their American counterparts (Selleck 1972, p.113). Some of them, at least, thought explicitly in terms of "Progress". They conceived of education as that extra spur to natural evolution which might bring about the millenial society. Beatrice Ensor, herself an ex-H.M.I. and a leading light in the N.E.F., declared that

> "It is this seeming inevitability of certain fundamental ideas which helps us to believe that we are on the track of something real, something that is in line with the progress of evolution."
> Ensor (1927) quoted by Selleck (1972) p.71.

These early progressives were often disgusted by a society that had erupted in war in 1914. There was a common feeling that, as MacMunn put it,

> "Reform can only come through the children themselves."
> MacMunn, quoted by Selleck (1972) p.95.

Disgust and disillusion with their society was an important characteristic of early English progressivism. There was clearly greater uncertainty as to the future than there was amongst most American Progressives. In its clearest and most extreme form(15), Neill put it as follows:

> "We must not say: 'That is right', because we don't know what is right. We must not say: 'This is wrong', because we don't know what is wrong. The most we should do is to tell a child our experience."
> Neill (1918) p.19, quoted by Selleck (1972) p.98.

Even Nunn could assert that

> "There can be no universal aim of education if that aim is to include the assertion of any particular ideal of life; for there are as many ideals as there are persons. Educational efforts must ... be limited to securing for everyone the conditions under which individuality is most completely developed ... To enquire ... whether this view is supported by the facts of human development - that is, whether it is based upon the solid ground of nature or only upon an amiable illusion ... will be our task in the following chapters." Nunn (1920/45) p.13.

Dewey, also, explicitly rejected all dogma. He did not want merely to replace the narrowness of the religion from which he

felt himself extricated with similar closure. Yet Dewey's own practice suggests closures about the possible ordering of society, and these coloured his writings also. In this respect, Nunn's assertions about the individual-society dichotomy are decidedly ambiguous in places. There are clear signs of a corporatism similar to that which characterised American Progressivism. Yet his emphasis on individuality was more prominent than was Dewey's.(16) More importantly, it was a stress on individuality that was overtly to predominate in post-World War II British Child-centred educational practice. Again I would not press an "influence" theory in this respect. But Nunn's writing was an important rationaliser and reinforcer of subsequent practice, just as it was for the "missionary" progressives in the 1920s. Thus Nunn speaks out against licence (p.100), declares that teachers have a societal mandate (p.111), seeks a harmony of interests in society through a differentiated secondary school system (p.275) and proclaims the importance of deliberately fostered rituals (e.g. Empire Day, p.78). Yet he insists that "Individuality is the ideal of life" (p.18). He "admits" that in the last resort it is the individual pupil who should decide on his own education:

> "The reader may ... press the case of a pupil who withstands the social forces tending to drive him to naturally distasteful studies. Is he to be allowed to leave school ignorant of an essential subject simply because he chances never to have felt its attraction? ... Let us face the issue and admit that in our ideal school the ultimate veto lies with the pupil - though it is never to be exercised lightly or without genuine trial of the repellent subject ... Moreover, though it may seem to a teacher deplorable that a pupil should leave school with wisdom at one of her main entrances quite shut out, this feeling expresses a professional prejudice rather than the judgment of the greater world." Nunn (1920/45) pp.273-4.

This may seem a relatively mild form of open individuality, especially when related to closures elsewhere in Nunn's book - concerning the organisational differentiation of schoolchildren, for instance. These indicate important assumptions on the "Power" dimension of education belief, as we shall see. My point here is that though there was indeed emphasis, in the orthodox progressive theory of the 1930s, on the importance of corporatism, as against individuality, yet there were important signs already of the Child-centredness that became the orthodoxy of the 1960s.

The most distinctive feature of the Child-centred "movement" in mid-20th century Britain is its neglect of the societal functions and purposes of education. Attention has been predominantly to the "needs" and "nature" of the individual child. This tendency was clear from the early days of British educational progressivism. Selleck sums up some of the principal slogans of those earlier days as follows. There were

> "different individuals with some differences in what they recommended, but the same ideas recur: growth, nature, instinct, freedom, play, activity, self-activity, innate goodness, development, individuality, spontaneity, interest. These words had specific (and sometimes different) connotations for each speaker ... Yet all the progressives used these ideas so that they bound together diverse and individualistic people who shared a dissatisfaction with the existing order."
> Selleck (1972) p.81.

This list is outstanding in that, in all cases, reference is primarily to the "Knowledge" dimension of educational ideology. They refer to the child, to learning and occasionally to curriculum. They are far less explicitly about society, or even about teaching. This emphasis is at least as strong in the 1967 Plowden Report. Its title, even, was "Children and Their Primary Schools". The

very first chapter (excepting the Introduction) is devoted to "The Children: Their Growth and Development". This emphasis is maintained throughout. As Bernstein and Davies (1969, p.74) point out, "there is no systematic exposition of the role of either the head or assistant teacher." Furthermore, despite some positive recommendations on Educational Priority Areas, there is a systematic playing-down of the importance of social class (ibid, p.63). In a chapter on "The Aims of Primary Education", the Report declares that

> "One obvious purpose is to fit children for the society into which they will grow up. To do this successfully it is necessary to predict what that society will be like." Plowden Report (1967) § 494.

It then proceeds to devote precisely ten lines to this subject.(17)

This neglect of the "Power" dimension is common to the explicit educational thinking of practicing teachers, also. However, such explicit neglect cannot remove its importance in practice. Beliefs are inevitably contexted and inevitably refer - however implicitly - to the real world-out-there. In the remainder of this chapter, we must consider the nature and significance of <u>implicit</u> beliefs actually held in this respect.

<u>The "Knowledge" Dimension</u>

In the post-World War I period, the thinking of educational progressives was marked by a vagueness and ambiguity which was itself important to the missionary zeal of its adherents.

> "Progressive education was not produced by cool, poised, detached philosophers intent on sifting ideas until they found the few grains of truth. Its theories did not result from the careful piecing together of an intricate argument. They came white-hot, forged on the reformers' anvil, they aimed at conversion, at changing attitudes and behaviour and did not allow for doubts and qualifications; they were not attempts to arrive at the truth, they were proclamations of the truth; they did not define, they demonstrated." Selleck (1972).

When we turn to the Plowden Report, this vagueness and ambiguity is still not resolved. What the report itself calls its "recognisable philosophy of education and ... view of society" (Plowden Report, 1967, § 504) is summarised in paragraph 505.(18) Peters (1969,p.3) rightly points out that this summary - and hence "the little vade-mecum of educational theory" of the Report as a whole - "proliferates in important half-truths that are paraded as educational panaceas." Ambiguities and inconsistencies are even more apparent in the accounts of practicing teachers of the Child-centred "movement".(19)

Such ambiguities - even within single accounts, let alone between those of different writers - mean that generalisations about the Child-centred "movement" should be treated with caution. However, as with the English Radicals in Chapter 13 and the American Progressives in Chapter 14, a general pattern does seem to be discernable. I outline below the salient features of this pattern. It must be remembered, however, that my aim is more to illustrate a methodological approach, than to "prove a point" about the Child-centred "movement". The latter would require much more detailed analysis of specific historical contexts. However, the appropriate research could fruitfully be conducted along the lines here suggested.

The same ambiguities which distress such philosophers as Peters, Hirst, Dearden or Pring(20), are of considerable importance to the

sociologist. As Sharp and Green point out,

> "Many of these ambivalences have been revealed elsewhere in various commentaries, usually by philosophers, on some of the internal philosophical and theoretical contradictions within that body of thought that we could loosely call the 'child centred progressive' approach to education. Nevertheless, the implication of some of these commentaries seems to be that such contradictions and logical inconsistencies are merely the result of woolly thinking and with a little more logical clarity and philosophical expertise, the confusions and ambiguities could be ironed out.... From their perspective as sociologists, [however, the authors] would suggest that such inconsistencies may well be indicators of diverse and conflicting constraints on the position of the educator which pose interesting questions regarding their explanation on the macro level, and have important implications for actors in the way they function at the micro level."
> Sharp and Green (1975) p.66.

Some such significance was indicated by Selleck, when he pointed to the cohesiveness that ambiguities made possible, or even encouraged, after World War I.

Moreover, the very lack of explicit elaboration was regarded as a virtue by some of the early missionary progressives. This too is an important aspect of contemporary Child-centredness. Caldwell Cook said,

> "To have one's feet thus planted on a rock of certainty ... does not come of having accepted a doctrine after logical consideration, but it comes of innate belief; for the springs of human action lie not in the reasoned intention of the individual, but in the intuition of man's mind, in the gathered energy of inherited tendency and communicated desire. And so this expression of an educational ideal will ultimately appeal only to those who already feel an answer to it within themselves."
> Caldwell Cook (1917) p.53, quoted by Selleck (1972) p.69.

Just as it was right for the educators themselves to rely on "intuition", so it was "natural" - and therefore "right" - for children to develop their emotions at least as much as their intellect.

Neill typically took an extreme position on this:

> "Some of you may be doubtful about the importance of emotion. Believe me, and I speak from a long experience, if you educate the emotions the intellect will look after itself. When a boy loses his guilty conscience about masturbation he always learns his lessons more easily and willingly. I use this illustration because, strictly speaking, one cannot educate the emotions: the most one can do is to try to destroy the bonds that have tied up emotion and changed it into guilt and hate. All you can do is to furnish outlets for emotion..."
> Neill (1939) p.159, extract in Perry (1967, ed.) p.128.

From here, it is a short step to talk of educating the "whole child".

This is strongly advocated today. For instance:

> "It is most important to emphasise that the curriculum, stated merely in terms of subjects or activities, omits what schools would regard as fundamental in the education they offer. From the nursery school upwards, education in school is concerned primarily with the development of children as persons... The ultimate criterion of the quality of /each child's/ education is the quality and balance of the personality which results - the child's competence and confidence in using and enjoying the knowledge and skills he has acquired, and, above all, the nature of his attitudes and his behaviour towards those with whom he works and plays..." Education, Ministry of,(1959) p.115.

> "I think this is where we would probably part company with more traditional, more formal schools, in such schools perhaps the head teacher would think it was no part of the function of the school to meet the emotional needs ... that the school was here to hand on a certain culture, a certain way of life, along with a lot of skills, information, knowledge and that sort of thing... and that the emotional needs of children /have/ nothing to do with the school... We don't take that view; we try to see children as whole people with emotional needs, intellectual needs, physical needs and so on. It's become almost platitudinous now but we try to treat the education of the whole child."
> "Mr. McIntosh", headteacher of "Mapledene" Primary School, in Sharp & Green (1975) p.61.

In short, ambiguities in the explicit accounts of Child-centred educationists indicate the need to look at the empirical context of related practice, for an understanding of the <u>beliefs</u> involved. Besides this, they are congruent with a major aspect of the ideology,

namely the supposed importance of encouraging the implicit, intuited, emotional, non-cognitive aspects of the "whole child".

Neill's association of emotions with masturbation reveals the influence of psychoanalysis. His writing often shows a similar preoccupation.(21) Another early progressive, Homer Lane, was an ardent devotee of Freud (cf Lane, 1918/64). He had some influence on Neill himself.(22) Susan Isaacs(23) was also well-versed in Freudianism. On the whole, though, such work supported or reinforced progressives' beliefs rather than formed them (Selleck, 1972, p.107). Moreover, knowledge of it was in most cases superficial. Superficial knowledge can of course be extremely important. Such interpretations as Oscar Wilde's summary of Freud ("Never resist temptation"(24)) may have outraged more knowledgeable Freudians like Ernest Jones, but that does not reduce their significance. New Era, the journal of the New Education Fellowship, could declare in 1921 that "Suppression of any kind is dangerous." (Selleck, 1972, p.108). Psychoanalysis provided "scientific" support for intuited libertarianism, and was important for this reason. Nunn's declared objective in Education: Its Data and First Principles was to seek what scientific support there was for his faith in individuality as the aim of education. He drew heavily on the evidence of psychoanalysis (1920/45, p.55 ff).

> "It is, in fact, unquestionable that the records of psychoanalysis greatly strengthen the argument for making the autonomous development of the individual the central aim of education. They reveal in what depths the foundations of individuality are laid, how endlessly varied are its natural forms, and how disastrous it may sometimes be to force upon the growing character a form discordant with its principle of unity." Nunn (1920/45) p.65.

What was good enough for Nunn must certainly have been good enough for many who had dug less deeply into Freud's work.

Psychoanalysis was clearly important to these early progressives. Harvey's associationism underlay the learning theory of the 19th century Radicals. Small's recapitulation theory, Herbart's measurability of psychological phenomena and Thorndike's animal psychology underlay that of the American Progressives. A similar role was played by Freud's psychoanalysis in British educational progressivism between the wars. Even today, the emphasis placed upon home background and "deprivation" in infancy derive partly from similar origins. As we shall see, however, this is today combined rather uneasily with a more explicit reliance on Piaget's developmental psychology. This dual tradition - of Freudian psychoanalysis and Piagetian psychology - is perhaps responsible for serious ambiguities in the matter of teachers' "expertise".

Meanwhile, an admiration for the findings of science, and of psychology in particular, was as characteristic of the English progressives as it was of their American counterparts. Nunn's entire book is ample demonstration of this. Perry sums it up when he says, of both Britain and the U.S., that

> "It was widely felt at the time these reformers first were active that the only redemption from ignorance, superstition or a mere commonsense level of action was systematic scientific research; and to show that something was scientifically arrived at was equivalent to showing that it was reputable."
> Perry (1967) p.20.

Even Russell, whose support for psychoanalytic theories was somewhat luke-warm, declared that,

> "Scientific psychology shows that flogging on week-days and sermons on Sundays do not constitute the ideal technique for the production of virtue."
> Russell (1926/60) p.25.

However, the function of such scientific revelations was to reinforce, rather than to produce, beliefs already held about the "nature of the child" and about what was educationally worthwhile. This is still the case today.

A word should be said about psychometrics. The testing of mental characteristics played a major part in American Progressivism, and it is clear that the search for scientific "data and principles" allied many of the early British progressives with this "movement". Nunn went to some lengths to summarise statistical techniques and psychometric findings.(25) Burt played a prominent role in many N.E.F. conferences and most of the major educational reports between the wars were influenced by his view of intelligence. In his early days, as the first educational psychologist employed by the London County Council, Burt was rather tentative about his work. The Educational Officer of the L.C.C. (Blair) acknowledged this in his introduction to Burt (1917). Significantly, however, Blair insisted on re-interpreting Burt's tentativeness for more popular consumption:

> "Several times Mr.Burt has insisted that his suggestions and conclusions are tentative and provisional. Even so, many of them are of immediate practical value for those engaged in educational administration and particularly for the teachers in the schools, for example, in testing the value of their own classification. After much hesitation I have endeavoured to re-state some of his conclusions in a different order. I am fully conscious that in removing such conclusions from their context I have inevitably given them much baldness; and that in using as far as possible the less technical language to be found frequently in the body of the memoranda, I have lost much of the precision. I hope, however, that in gathering the main conclusions together from the body of the text I have done something to assist those who will be unable to find time for an exhaustive study of memoranda which occasionally demand severe efforts on the part of their readers."
> Blair (1917/73) p.197.

Blair then proceeded to summarise Burt's "findings" on educational abilities and on normal, backward and mentally deficient children. In time, Burt himself became far less tentative, about the relationships between social class and "innate" intelligence, for instance.(26) Those who sought substantive "findings" to justify a tripartite reorganisation of secondary education found in Burt an abundant source.(27)

A tendency to think in terms of innate ability, or at least fixed potential, persists today. Blackie (1967/71) - unlike the Plowden Report - even employs Burt's definition of intelligence, though he is somewhat apologetic about it.(28) On the whole, however, the contemporary Child-centred "movement" has been opposed to intelligence testing. A common practical feature has been opposition to the "11 plus" exam. Emphasis is made on the irrelevance of chronological age and the importance of individually different courses of development. Plowden reports that

> "the notion of the constancy of the I.Q. is biologically self-exploding as well as educationally explosive... The nearer the approach to the ideal state in which each person's environment became perfect for him throughout his whole growth, the nearer, it is true, would be the approach to constancy. But, even then, the long term gains and losses due to the different rates of intellectual development would remain....
> There are also short term variations in I.Q. test results attributable to transient effects in environment..."
> Plowden Report (1967) § 60,61.

Plowden even comes down on the side of unstreaming, at least in primary schools.

> "We welcome unstreaming in the infant or first school and hope that it will continue to spread through the age groups of the junior or middle schools..." "It is essential to ensure that the staff realise that any classification is bound to be faulty, that there certainly will be big differences between individuals in each class and that those differences can be expected to increase as children grow older...."
> Plowden Report (1967) § 819,820.

The last passage also demonstrates an emphasis on individual differences. Blackie illustrates the same point:

> "We have seen that individual children grow at different speeds, that, though the stages of growth are the same for all, the age at which they are reached varies widely, and that the differences between them are the product of a very complex interaction, which begins at conception, between heredity and environment. It follows from this that we need the most flexible educational system that we can manage. All neat and tidy classifications are wrong. Age of entry, age of transfer, age of leaving, all expectations based on chronological age, classification by I.Q. or by examination, basic curricula, agreed syllabuses and all the rest are uneducational because they are based on an entirely obsolete view of growth..." Blackie (1967/71) pp.23-4.

This emphasis on the individual child, on individual differences and uniqueness, has obvious links with the differentiation associated with psychometry. But there is a deliberate attempt not to classify children, in the explicit theory of Child-centredness. Whilst the American Progressive tradition tended to emphasise differences as a basis for organisational differentiation, and whilst the psychometric wing of progressive educational thinking in this country was similarly preoccupied with a meritocratic justification of class differentiations, contemporary Child-centredness stresses individual uniqueness for its own sake. Overtly, it is all that matters.

This emphasis on the "nature of the child" and individual uniqueness is not new. Nunn declared that

> "The education that aims at fostering individuality is the only education 'according to nature'." Nunn (1920/45) p.26.

The (Hadow) Consultative Committee Report on the Primary School felt that

> "The primary school should not ... be regarded merely as a preparatory department for the subsequent stage, and the courses should be planned and conditioned, not mainly by the supposed requirements of the secondary stage, nor by the exigencies of an examination at the age of eleven, but by the needs of the child at that particular phase in his physical and mental development." Hadow Report (1931) § 59.

The 1937 edition of the Board of Education's Handbook of Suggestions said that

> "The child's enjoyment is in itself worthwhile, for childhood - a stage in itself - is more than a preparation for maturity, and there is no doubt that children learn a great deal naturally through spontaneous and undirected play."
> Education, Board of, (1937), quoted by Education, Ministry of, (1959) p.53.

These earlier pronouncements sit rather uncomfortably beside assertions about the dangers of licence and the needs of the community - just as in American Progressivism. However, in more recent years the tendency has been to play down any specific reference to such "Power" factors. Not that that dimension is now less important. On the contrary, it remains fundamental. But reference to it is far less explicit. It seems, almost, a source of embarrassment. In contemporary Child-centred orthodoxy, the child/learner is at the centre of educational theory, as this is explicitly elaborated.

The explicit basis of contemporary Child-centredness is no longer Freudianism. Though this psychoanalytic basis still has considerable importance in fact, it is developmental psychology, in particular that of Piaget, which now reigns.

> "According to Piaget, all learning calls for organisation of material or of behaviour on the part of the learner, and the learner has to adapt himself and is altered in the process. Learning takes place through a continuous process of interaction between the learner and his environment, which results in the

> building up of consistent and stable patterns of behaviour, physical and mental. Each new experience reorganises, however slightly, the structure of the mind and contributes to the child's world picture.
> Piaget's thought, which influenced the 1931 Report and our own, is not easy to understand... Piaget's explanations appear to most educationalists in this country to fit the observed facts of children's learning more satisfactorily than any other. It is in accord with previous research by genetic psychologists and with what is generally regarded as the most effective primary school practice, as it has been worked out empirically."
> Plowden Report (1967) § 521, 522.

Central to Piaget's theories is a notion of maturation. Plowden embraces it wholeheartedly.

> "There is plenty of evidence that, up to two years of age, brain functions appear when particular structures mature and not before. We know practically nothing, however, about the development of the brain beyond that age, but there is no particular reason to suppose that this generalisation suddenly ceases to be true at 2 or 3 or 13. On the contrary, it is more probable that the higher intellectual abilities also appear only as maturation of certain structures occurs... Piaget and Inhelder have described the emergence of mental structures in a manner strongly reminiscent of developing brain or body structures; the mental stages follow in sequence, for example, which may be advanced or delayed, but not altered. There seems good reason to suppose that Piaget's successive stages depend on progressive maturation or at least progressive organisation of the cerebral cortex."
> Plowden Report (1967) § 23.

This version of "development" - in the Report's first main chapter, entitled "The Children: Their Growth and Development" - largely supersedes the evolutionary notions that inspired pre-war progressives. Small's recapitulation theory, so influential in Progressivism proper - in the United States[29] - was still drawn on by Nunn (1920/45, pp.80-2, 46-7). But it has now largely given way to the emphasis on "readiness". Sharp and Green (1976) rightly pounce upon this notion. I return to it below. Meanwhile, it will suffice to agree with Hirst and Peters when they say that

> "A teacher of progressive persuasion ... who demands that the content and manner of teaching must be closely related to facts of human development cannot proceed purely on the basis of empirical facts. For his selection can only be made in the light of some ethical view about what qualities of mind are constitutive of human development. His biological approach to his task, therefore, only provides stimulating analogies. In the end he, like any other teacher, has to make up his mind about valuative issues." Hirst and Peters (1970) p.58.

As Peters puts it, in discussing Plowden's "recognisable educational philosophy", the Report assumes

> "that the child has a 'nature' which will 'develop' if the appropriate environment is provided. /But/ what will he develop into? Presumably a 'mature adult' ...
> The notions of 'growth' and 'development' immediately begin to collect valuative overtones when we pass out of the realm of the purely physical. For is there not lurking even in the fairly colourless notion of 'mental development' some concept of what a man ought to be? ..." Peters (1969) pp.3-5.

"Play" is another important notion in Child-centredness. Its appeal is again in its "naturalness". Caldwell Cook, in his influential book, The Play Way, argued,

> "What could be more serious than child's play? I know of nothing so wholehearted, so thorough, so natural, so free from stain, so earnest, as the spontaneous playing of a child...
> A child following his natural bent will play. His whole power is in play. Beware of trying to make rivers run up hills instead of flowing round them."
> Caldwell Cook (1917), extract in Van der Eyken (1973,ed.) p.173.

Plowden also emphasises the importance of play (Plowden Report,1967, § 523-8) - without even such qualifications as Nunn felt obliged to make, about "play" not meaning licence.(30) The absence of any such explicit qualification does not, or course, mean that none is assumed. But again the "Power" dimension receives less overt attention.

Finally, in this brief consideration of the "spontaneous" nature of "natural" learning, it is worth observing that recourse is

frequently made to the example of pre-school learning and to the learning of supposedly non-intellectual capacities. The Ministry of Education's "handbook" in 1959 makes several such allusions. It states that nursery school children

> "are not strangers to the concepts of size, number, money, weight and other measures, and they may well have contributed their scribble to a family letter. This they have learnt mainly through play and incidental experience, <u>without much deliberate teaching</u>, though often with parental encouragement." Education, Ministry of, (1959) p.37 (my emphasis).

And

> "Most children from three or four onwards <u>provoke the teaching they need</u>, demanding repetition of words, of rhymes, or stories... They can be heard practising - speaking, singing, repeating words, rhymes and rhythms, finding pleasure in the making of noises and increasing satisfaction in what the growing powers of speech can command..." ibid, p.19 (my emphasis).

The effect of stressing this "natural" learning at the pre-school age is to reinforce a faith in the "naturalness" of self-directed learning when at school.

> "If all this is true of children before they reach school does it continue to be true afterwards, or does a quite new phase begin? ... It is perfectly true that school <u>is</u> a new phase of life and that most children expect to learn new things there... But ... the process of learning develops gradually and play continues to be of the greatest importance as a means of understanding and learning." Blackie (1967/71) p.33.

Amongst Child-centred teachers, such assertions about what is "natural" before school are likely to reinforce assumptions about what is "natural" in school: the reaching of stages of "readiness" in the course of "development".[31] A faith in such "naturalness" will further imply that one pedagogy is appropriate for all children and that those who fail to "develop" optimally are Nature's failures rather than Society's or the school's.

In discussing the "Knowledge" dimension of Child-centred accounts, I have so far dealt predominantly with matters of Subjective 'Knowledge' and the individual learner. This follows from the explicit emphases of those accounts. It is a major characteristic of Child-centredness that the learner, rather than what is learned, is pre-eminent - at least explicitly. Two aspects concerning Objectivated 'Knowledge' should, however, be mentioned here, before we turn to the more significant "Power" dimension (which of course includes 'knowledge' about societal structure and about pedagogical relations).

I have already commented upon the faith in scientific 'knowledge'. I suggested that beliefs are unlikely to have been determined by scientific discoveries. The reverse is more probably the case. The role of particular scientific theories and "findings" seems to have been to reinforce beliefs, and perhaps rationalise practice, rather than to promote them. It is likely that beliefs about education have led to selective consideration of theories available, or at least selective adherence to them. Nonetheless, to say that "science" is a rationaliser is not to dismiss it as unimportant. A more general faith in the facticity of the world-out-there and its discoverable order clearly precedes adherence to particular aspects of scientific theory. In this respect, the naturalism of both the Radical and the Progressive "movements" is to be found again in contemporary Child-centredness. In particular, psychoanalysis and developmental psychology have played prominent parts. As for curricular subjects, the position is somewhat more ambiguous.

Plowden pays surprisingly little attention to the "integration" of curricula. Nonetheless, a rejection of conventional subject

boundaries seems to be an inherent part of Child-centredness. Importantly, it is justified in terms of the child's own nature, rather than on grounds of relativism or epistemological uncertainty. As Blackie puts it, the subdivision of curricula into subjects may be convenient for the adult mind, but

> "Young children simply do not think in this way and only begin to use classification towards the end of the junior school. A rigidly classified timetable ... may be harmful to learning and may disguise the nature of knowledge."
> Blackie (1967/71) pp. 51-2.

Clearly the 'knowledge' to which Blackie is referring in this passage is subjective, not objectivated. Individual understanding rather than epistemological "truth" is endangered. On the whole, established 'knowledge' boundaries are taken as given. Children, if unhampered by the imposition of such boundaries at too early a stage, will no doubt "discover" them, of their own accord. Indeed, continued adherence to certain standards - of what is "usual" or "normal"(32) and, indeed, "desirable" - indicates that no epistemological revolution is envisaged.(33) Meanwhile, what is sociologically most important is 'knowledge' about social and societal relationships. It is to the "Power" dimension that we now turn.

The "Power" Dimension

If Robert Morant's 1904 Elementary Code set the scene, as Van der Eyken suggests, for a new concept of primary education, it was in its references to "development" and "individual children's" capacities and needs. It referred also, however, to children "fit[ting] themselves, practically as well as intellectually, for the work of life". It talked of a "sense of discipline", of

"habits of industry, self-control and courageous perseverance in the face of difficulties", and of "upright and useful members of the community".[34] The spirit of this language was by no means new. It was only gradually that orthodox educational theory contained fewer explicit references of this kind. Holmes, Morant's Chief Inspector, condemned the Western notion of sin and the externality of reward and punishment. Yet even he fulminated against anarchy.

> "What I call the Utopian[35] scheme of education, far from making for antinomianism and anarchy, is the sworn enemy of individualism and therefore, a fortiori, of everything that savours of licence..." Holmes (1911) p.206.

He declared that

> "The children of the 'upper classes' have such an advantage over the children of Utopia in the matter of environment, - to say nothing of inherited capacity - that one would expect the path to do much more for their mental development than it has done for the mental development of the Utopians, especially as they could afford to remain much longer in the first and most important of its stages, the stage of self-education... The gain to the whole nation if the mental development of the highest social stratum could be raised as much above its normal level as the mental development of youthful Utopia has been raised above the normal level of an English rural village, would be incalculably greater." Holmes (1911) pp.271-2.

In short, the precursors of Child-centredness explicitly held on to strong "Power" closures. They advocated not libertarian individualism but a morality in which societal roles were not particularly open to question.

Some of the post-World War I "missionaries" did indeed adopt positions more in line with the anarchistic tradition - notably A.S. Neill. But more common throughout has been an adherence to "values" whose justification was taken to be self-evident. For instance:

> "Duty will for ever be duty ... To love one's neighbour as oneself will for ever be the highest social imperative ... These are among the fruits of insight and wisdom whose permanent validity and supreme worth can hardly be doubted."
> Nunn (1920/45) p.196.

> "It is ... during his early life at home that the roots of the most fundamental moral principles are established in a child ... By three years of age, many children have some idea of 'mine' and 'thine' and in some degree control the actions to which unrestrained curiosity or greed would lead them...."
> Education, Ministry of, (1959) p.80.

> "The older virtues, as they are usually called, of neatness, accuracy, care and perseverance, ... are genuine virtues and an education which does not foster them is faulty."
> Plowden Report (1967) § 506.

As Peters is at pains to point out, "education" necessarily implies "valuation".(36) Moreover, the practice of education must entail objectives. Such practice is inevitably consequential and beliefs must exist about at least some actual or hypothetical consequences. Those beliefs must always be evaluative. Even the somewhat sparse and ambiguous treatment that Plowden gives to "The Aims of Primary Education" (Chapter 15) explicitly or implicitly indicates a morality - an evaluative view of what social and societal relations are or should be. It could not be otherwise.

Objectives and morality concern the relationship between Soci(et)al Reality and Objectivated 'Knowledge'. They concern accepted or prescribed views of what the social world should be like. Leadership and professionalism are a further aspect of this relationship. But this will most easily be discussed after looking at the relationship between Soci(et)al Reality and Subjective 'Knowledge' in Child-centred ideology. Here we find beliefs about differential learning potential and need.

The Ministry of Education (1959) distinguished between the "handicapped" child - including those handicapped by absence from school through illness, by physical handicap, by a narrow environment or an adverse influence, and "(an unfortunately large group) those with little capacity" (pp.70-1) - and, "at the other end of the scale" (p.73), those with exceptional ability. Quite apart from the extraordinary comprehensiveness of the residual category, "handicapped children", this distinction unquestioningly reifies the differentiation described. The same passage refers to the different needs of the "dull" and the "bright". Blackie (1967/71) makes the same broad distinction (pp. 144-5). The Plowden Report itself refers to the research of Terman et al. - the sole reference given on this matter - to substantiate its comments on "The Education of Gifted Children".(37) The Report suggests that "dislike of privilege, doubts about intelligence tests and defensiveness about comprehensive schools" is "an irrational obstacle" encountered by "giftedness" (§ 862). Although, it agrees, mental tests are unreliable, it is quite certain that "giftedness" exists, and has distinct needs. Plowden is non-committal on how best to fulfil these needs.(38)

Beliefs in intellectual differentiation naturally "motivate" policies which concern organisational differentiation. Secondary selection has been a major issue throughout this century. Nunn (1920/45), who made several references to mental testing(39) and accepted Burt's "findings" concerning the relationship between social class and intelligence (p.134), was strongly opposed to comprehensive schooling (pp. 357-8, 274-5). He had no doubts about the need to differentiate between the "gifted" and the "dull" in schools, and in society at large. He stated plainly that

> "In the general interest a community must seek out high intelligence wherever it can be found and see that it is provided liberally with all it needs for full development; but, if it is wise, it will also see that the abilities of the less intelligent are fostered with equal care, - if only because 'without these cannot a city be inhabited' and it is they who 'will maintain the state of the world'. Here, then, as always, the claims of individuality and of social need are found to be convergent if not indistinguishable."
> Nunn (1920/45) p.127.

In other words, society needs it hewers of wood and drawers of water, and adequate (or appropriate) educational provision should also be made for them, if society is to "survive". Blackie (1967/71) escapes the reluctance of the Child-centred "movement" to speak out on societal (or "Bower") functions of education. He condemns as "muddle-heads" those who cannot see the "obvious" need to differentiate organisationally between the "gifted" and the "dull". The needs of the gifted

> "seem to include contact with others, adults, and children, who have the same kind of intelligence as their own and there are schools in which this would not happen. Only 5% of the total population have IQs of 125 or over and 0.5 of 140 or over. There are schools and whole areas in which the gifted child might never meet another like him of his own age. Besides, there are some teachers who not only cannot provide the gifted with what they need but think it wrong to do so. They talk about 'equal treatment for all' and confuse it with 'fair treatment for all'. The two would only be the same if we were all identical,and since we are all different 'fair treatment' would ideally mean 'different treatment for all'. The modern primary school does try to give that, to meet, as far as it can, the needs of every individual child and it would be a tragedy if this were ever interfered with by muddle-headed egalitarians."
> Blackie (1967/71) pp. 144-5.

(The Plowden Report noted cautiously that it had become the government's policy to promote comprehensive secondary schooling, and confined its comments on secondary selection to the effects of selection procedures on the primary school itself (Chapter 11).)

There is an implicit (and in some cases explicit) assumption that "giftedness" and "dullness" are determined and consistent individual qualities, and that they are furthermore attributable largely to innate factors. Yet there is also a strong emphasis on environment, especially in contemporary Child-centredness. Beliefs about innately determined maturational development sit uneasily beside social pathological explanations of intellectual differentiation. Yet the combination is common.(40) Blackie, for instance, returns time and again to the importance of the home as determinant of children's educational performance. For instance:

> "The single most important factor in success at school is parental interest." Blackie (1967/71) p.11.

> "It is time to think a little about 'good' homes and 'bad' homes, and what home can do to help children to grow fully or to hinder them from doing so... The home is the place where development begins and at all stages of education it remains the most important influence in a child's life..." ibid, p.22.

> "The foundation is laid by the parents whether they do it well or badly and by the time the child gets to school the good or the damage is done. The school can build on the good, but it cannot repair the damage, or only to a limited extent. The essential job is the parent's and not the teacher's." ibid, p.94.

I return to this line of argument below, in considering assumptions about teachers' professional expertise. Meanwhile, it may be noted that the Plowden Committee paid considerable attention to the survey commissioned from Wiseman.(41) It praised the survey for taking into account "all" the environmental influences involved in a child's development (§ 90). It accepted the argument that parental attitudes are a more significant cause (sic) of educational performance than any other factor. As Bernstein and Davies (1969, p.63) have pointed

out, the Report systematically plays down the importance of social class. Nonetheless, much publicised recommendations were made concerning positive discrimination in favour of "educational priority areas". These were not, in fact, defined in terms of parental attitudes.(42)

I have picked out three aspects of belief about the relationship between Societal Relations and Subjective 'Knowledge': intellectual differentiation, secondary selection and social pathology. These are not discrete beliefs. They are sub-dimensions, as it were, on which beliefs are held. More important, beliefs held on these sub-dimensions are contained within broader belief structures. Not only do beliefs not exist in discrete isolation, but their "value" element itself - i.e. the extent to which they are really (or strongly) believed, rather than merely entertained as understandings or fancies - depends upon their inclusion within broader structures. These in turn arise from, and refer to, structured experience.

Beliefs about the Social Relations-Subjective 'Knowledge' relationship must be seen in the context of beliefs about societal relations themselves. The lack of explicit reference to such matters by the Child-centred "movement" makes it difficult to decypher these. We cannot rely merely on explicit statements. After looking briefly at three more clues to the societal perspective in contemporary Child-centredness, I shall therefore look at an example of Child-centredness in practice. This will offer further insights into practitioners' belief structures on the "Power" dimension.

There is an anarchistic tradition in British education(43), which has had its place in the Child-centred "movement". A study of Neill's writings reveals certain closures that his often intuitive approach

overlooks. Yet his hostility to direction and control is clearly of this tradition. Consider, for example, his comments on moral education, and in particular his hostility to Montessorian pedagogy:

> "There is no case whatever for the moral instruction of children..." Neill (1926) p.18; extract in Perry (1967 ed.) p.58.

> "Another reason why I am not wholly on the side of Montessori is, I fancy, that her religious attitude repels me. She is a church woman; she has a definite idea of right and wrong. Thus, although she allows children freedom to choose their own occupations, she allows them no freedom to challenge adult morality. But for a child to accept a ready-made code of morals is dangerous; education in morality is a thousand times more important than intellectual education with a didactic apparatus."
> Neill (1920) p.148; extract in Perry (ed.) p.46.

Neill was not alone in this suspicion of Montessori. Susan Isaacs found her experimental role at the Malting House School compromised by the need to act as guardian and leader, in some cases.(44) She clearly regretted this - and not solely on the grounds of experimental objectivity. Many years later, her husband wrote a disparaging review of Montessori's writings.

> "The outstanding fact is the flat incompatibility of /Montessori's/ proclaimed gospel of freedom and spontaneity with her intensely directive doctrine of actual training."
> Isaacs (1966/73) p.301.

It is worth quoting from this review at some length, because it clearly indicates the opposition of libertarian strains in British progressivism to Montessorianism.

> "Montessori's books show that she ... started from a number of ... firm beliefs which carried her in a totally different direction from that of most English progressive educationists, and indeed, as it seems to us, a long way back towards the very yokes from which we have been so anxious to free children ... Thus Montessori arrived at the conviction that everything which we wanted children to learn - reading, writing, arithmetic and all we normally mean by education - could be put into forms which

> truly responded to the child's own needs and strivings, and were thus inherently able to lead to joyous, yet disciplined, progress...
> But what must here be noted is that however sharply the foregoing differs in method from conventional education, it fully accepts the latter's assumptions and aims. In fact it seeks to apply these from an even earlier age. Its most novel contribution lies in the preliminary early sense-training phase; but what is gained from this, as Montessori emphasizes over and over again, is not merely senses trained in all the above ways, but also the invaluable habits of discipline and obedience. These are indeed just what the conventional objectives of ordinary education need and normally rest upon. But whilst in the regular course they have to be vigorously enforced, Montessori claims that by her method and her early start she turns them into the natural pattern of the child's own life. It seems indeed as if these results of her method are those which she personally values most.
> And so we come to the clear parting of the ways. All the above stands in diametrical contrast to both the aims and the methods of most progressive educationists in this country." Isaacs (1966/73) pp. 196-7.

This passage clearly indicates the hostility that some people (such as Isaacs) felt to Montessorian methods. But it is not, I think, an accurate reading of the bulk of British educational progressivism. It is certainly not representative of orthodox Child-centredness today.

Even Lane, considered an extremist in his attempts to overthrow authoritarian pedagogic relationships, believed some expertise in Freudian analysis to be an indispensible qualification for teaching. At the very least, he felt that

> "no one should teach who has not been himself analysed and through the process gained that true psychological insight which produces the 'Art of Teaching'." Lane (1918/64) p.265.

Russell had clear words of approval for Montessori:

> "The modern educationist does not simply eschew discipline; he secures it by new methods. On this subject, those who have not studied the new methods are apt to have mistaken ideas. I had always understood that Madame Montessori dispensed with discipline, and I had wondered how she managed a roomful of children. On reading her account of her methods, I found that

> discipline still held an important place, and that there was no attempt to dispense with it. On sending my little boy of three to spend his mornings in a Montessori school, I found that he quickly became a more disciplined human being, and that he cheerfully acquiesced in the rules of the school. But he had no feeling whatever of external compulsion: the rules were like the rules of a game, and were obeyed as a means of enjoyment... The fundamental idea is simple: that the right discipline consists, not in external compulsion, but in habits of mind which lead spontaneously to desirable rather than undesirable activities. What is astonishing is the great success in finding technical methods of embodying this idea in education. For this, Madame Montessori deserves the highest praise."
> Russell (1926/60) pp.22-3.

This sentiment, rather than that of Isaacs, has predominated. Holmes was enthusiastic about Montessori's work. Then, on her first visit to England in 1919, it was Fisher, the President of the Board of Education, who took the chair at a banquet held in her honour. When she ran a training course in her methods in that year, there were a thousand enquiries - three times the number she could accommodate. Thereafter she returned every other year until World War II to run further courses (Selleck, 1972, pp.28-30). One reason for this popularity was that whilst

> "some of the leading reformers explicitly acknowledged her influence, ... teachers less committed to reform saw in her work an attainable goal." Selleck (1972) p.30.

This comment could also apply to the popular Dalton Plan. Developed by Helen Parkhurst in Massachussets, under direct Montessorian influence, the Dalton Plan was publicised in this country by Belle Rennie. Nunn recognised that it did

> "not challenge the conventional curriculum but, wherever possible, would replace class-teaching by free individual study unregulated by a time-table."
> Nunn (1920/45) pp. 102-3.

He apparently approved of it for this reason, regarding it as "an important innovation" (p.102). The "Plan" gained adherents all over the country. Two thousand schools were said to have adopted it by 1929 (Selleck, 1972, p.41). Such popularity was importantly related to its continued closures, rather than to any unbridled openness.

> "To a teacher who was worried that the progressives were calling into question the procedures which once had guaranteed him security, the Dalton Plan had a particular attraction. It offered a methodology - a set of procedures, ways of organising a classroom and conducting discussion. To adopt it, or even to go through the motions of adopting it, meant a certain immunity from criticism, for one could be mistaken for a reformer. Yet it was not too far removed from what had gone before and the old habits, the old expectations ... did not need to be fully discarded. It offered security at a time when the educational culture of the English primary school was uncertain and unstable." Selleck (1972) p.153.

This continuity in beliefs about the teacher-pupil relationship was evident in the bulk of "progressive" educational writing and practice even between the Wars. It remains in Child-centredness today. There is also, today, more emphasis on teachers' relationships with pupils' parents. In this respect, the promotion of teachers' professional status has been significant. In the sphere of elementary education it increased after the 1890s, when the practice of Payment by Results was formally abandoned, and was reinforced by a growing preoccupation with "scientific" 'knowledge' about education and pedagogy. Nunn was at pains to point out that his emphasis on the "natural" development of children did not make the teacher redundant.

> "However 'natural' the conditions of school life may be made, it remains a life lived in a selected environment, an artificial microcosm within the macrocosm, and ...the teachers do the selecting. They set the stage and furnish the properties for the play. It follows that even though they claim no share in the composition of the drama, but merely watch its development

> with friendly interest, they have already settled within certain limits what form the action shall take. Thus, though it is true that in a Montessori school a child may do what he pleases, yet what he may please to do is rigidly and even narrowly limited." Nunn (1920/45) p.107.

What this meant in terms of the teacher's expertise was hinted at in a Board of Education report on the Training of Teachers for Public Elementary Schools.

> "It is not enough ... that the teacher should know just a little more than his pupils. The teacher in an elementary school must know much more of his subjects than he will have to teach, but he will also have a general sense of the relations which the subjects bear to each other, of their place and extent in the world of knowledge, so that he may convey or suggest to his pupils the main features of that world."
> Education, Board of, (1925): extract in Van der Eyken (1973 ed.) p.302.

There is a striking contrast between this pronouncement - and in its conclusion that elementary school teachers be educated "in the way in which all other members of the professional classes are educated" (ibid) - and the sentiments of Kay and Tufnell, when they established their Normal School at Battersea some 70 years earlier.(45) But it was in strong accord with the sort of scientism that Nunn's book, for instance, was designed to foster, in the field of pedagogy.(46)

This is apparent when we consider the role of the parent in relation to the professional teacher.(47) In Chapter 4 of the Plowden Report, it is clear that the parent is expected to bow to the teacher's professional expertise, whilst at the same time acting as "partner" in the educational enterprise. Blackie (1967/71), in a book aimed above all at parents, repeatedly expresses the same message. For instance:

> "Most teachers are anxious to do their best for their children, and to improve their knowledge and their techniques with that purpose in view. If they adopt a new method, they do it because it seems to them a good one and because they feel able to cope with it. A parent who finds that his child is being educated in a way that startles him ought to begin by assuming that the teachers know what they are doing and only complain when he has some clear evidence that they don't."
> Blackie (1967/71) p.51.(48)

Similarly, a Department of Education and Science booklet on "Open Plan Primary Schools" refers to "wise leadership by the head and friendly understanding by parents".

> "A few of the schools produce attractive and helpful booklets for parents telling them about the school and what the parents might do to help their children make a good start in it."
> Education and Science, Department of, (1972) p.14.

In all cases, teachers supposedly have a virtual monopoly of wisdom. For they are the professional experts.

Finally, having looked briefly at beliefs about teacher-pupil and teacher-parent relationships, a few words can be said about notions of the overall society. Clearly apparent in the foregoing is a Master Pattern of expertise: a necessary and inevitable mode of organising 'knowledge' and people. This is quite consistent with assumptions about the need to select children for different types of secondary school, overtly on grounds of intellectual differences. However, in the writings considered in this chapter, there is also a rhetorical allegiance to "democracy". This resembles the corporate ideal of many American Progressives. In their case, "democracy" seemed to imply a feeling, rather than an actuality, of choice and autonomy. A similar interpretation can be put on such statements as the following:

> "The task of education is two-fold. It has to enable children to grow up as good members of the societies in which they live and this entails their developing a sufficient degree of conformity to the ways of those societies. At the same time, it is expected to develop in them a proper sense of independence in thought and action, which implies a power to choose and to make judgments on their own account. These two aims are complementary..." Education, Ministry of,(1959) p.78. (my emphasis).

This clearly relates to the Participationism discussed in Chapter 6. Children at school are taught to "participate" and adults also are invited (or allowed) to do so. As the Schools Council working paper on "Raising the School Leaving Age" puts it,

> "The possibility of true secondary education begins when the pupil realises that he is no longer a child, and becomes aware of himself - of his needs, satisfactions and expectations - and of his relationships with other people and with his environment outside the narrow circle of family, neighbourhood, peer group or school. It is part of the nature of this awareness that it involves him in taking decisions which are adult, or near adult, in character... There is no sharp break between childhood and an adult awareness; there is a period of transition of varying length. Indeed, for a few the transition to a fully adult state over a large field of activities is never realised." Schools Council (1965),extract in Van der Eyken (1973), ed.) p.505.

Such an assertion does not in itself "prove" participationism or corporatism. If we are to appreciate underlying assumptions then explicit statements must be examined in the context of social and societal circumstances, and of other explicit or implied beliefs. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that for the Schools Council, both adulthood and childhood appear to be defined in terms of "awareness" - not of biological age, or of positions within the societal structure. We must, however, look to other evidence, including that already quoted, to understand what this "awareness" is in fact taken to mean.

A final quotation again points to the importance attached to children's feelings, rather than to any objectively defined position of autonomy.

> "The children feel free and relaxed and at the same time, in the care of some one whom they respect and to whose authority they can trust themselves." Blackie (1967/71) p.37.

Such "feelings" are to be learned at school. They are expected to be transferred to adult experience, too, in the face of expert and selective social control.(49)

Having said this, it should again be stressed that the main distinguishing feature of Child-centredness is its lack of explicit treatment of the "Power" dimension. We cannot look solely to the explicit accounts of this "movement's" proponents and theoreticians to appreciate the underlying beliefs. We must look to the practice of Child-centred educationists for a fuller understanding. It is to the context of school, then, that we now turn.

"Child-centred" Practice

The Child-centred "movement" is in some respects heir to an anarchistic tradition, with roots in 18th century social philosophy rather than classical political economy. This was seen in the opposition of Nathan Isaacs to Montessori and in the overtly more extreme position of A.S.Neill. It is in part to this that the "movement" owes its emphasis on the "whole child" and its explicit attention to the child and learning, rather than to society and teaching. The still prevalent tendency to dichotomise (inadequately) between the "old" and the "new", or between "traditional" and

"progressive" teaching styles, suggests a conscious anti-conservatism and a rhetoric of "openness". But it is wrong to suppose that the Child-centredness practised in schools is so divorced from notional closures as this heritage might imply. At the same time, it would be wrong to regard Child-centred teachers as merely ignorant of societal circumstances, blithely pursuing practices that are either irrelevant to, or opposed to, cultural conservatism. Such teachers work within a complexly structured education system. This contains patterned constraints - and tends accordingly to produce patterned closures in teachers' educational ideology.

In the first place, even Child-centred teachers have standards as to what is educationally worthwhile. They have goals which are regarded as valid. Pluckrose, for example, headteacher of an "open plan" primary school and writer of many books and articles on the subject, says,

> "A teacher to succeed as a teacher needs goals which are understood both by her and by the children for whom she is responsible. In the past these goals might be learning the multiplication tables up to 12 or lists of words from a spelling book, the capital cities of Europe or the principal rivers of the world. We might deplore that such shallow objectives passed for education, we might dismiss the gold stars and house points given for successful memorisation as a worthless exercise. Yet who can deny that, played well, the game gave a feeling of security to both participants.
>
> Replacing the formal curriculum - the chunks of English, mathematics, history, religious instruction and nature study - with an all-embracing learning programme has merit. But if 'things fall apart, the centre cannot hold and pure anarchy is loosed upon their world.'" Pluckrose (1975) p.57.

As Peters says, education implies valuation.

In the second place, teachers belong to specific educational institutions. Through their own education and career experience, they also belong to professional communities. They have career and

subject identities which are the product of past, ongoing and anticipated experience (Barnes, 1969/71; Esland, 1971). In the immediate experience of school, buildings, resources, teaching-group sizes and other constraints are decided within a societal framework which is not, by and large, of the teachers' own making. The possible appeal of "progressive" methods before World War II was not strong enough in its own right to override the constraints of limited resources and career opportunities (Selleck, 1971, Ch.5). Similarly, the acclaimed need for nursery school or nursery class provision took second place to the expansion of secondary and tertiary education even in the relatively affluent 1960s.(50) In the current mood of financial stringency, with high teacher-unemployment, large cut-backs in teacher education and renewed calls for accountability and the industrial "relevance" of education, the Child-centredness of the Plowden Report - less than a decade old - already seems curiously outdated. Not just the immediate material constraints occasioned by financial restrictions, but closures in the Objectivated 'Knowledge' of administrative and legislative thinking and belief, constitute constraints on actual teaching practice. This was so in the 19th century when State intervention entailed the suppression of alternative educational institutions.(51) It was so in the 1920s, when the Hadow Committee found its terms of reference carefully pre-defined to exclude an overall examination of post-eleven education - i.e. it could not include "secondary" education as well as upper-elementary.(52) There is an important sense in which other people's closures become one's own constraints, as they are institutionalised in the immediate context of one's own experience and behaviour.

In the third place, determinative relationships in reality tend inevitably to produce determinative (or "causal") models in people's 'realities'. Teachers, like other people, have theories to account for events and processes in their experience. This is the more likely, the more regular and/or imposing such events and processes are, even though the resultant theories may be implicit and inadequate. In contemporary British schools some of the most imposing and constraining facts of life for teachers include variations in the apparent ability of pupils to achieve the marks of "success" and "failure". To a large extent, these too are patterned - as a result of the essential structuredness of societal reality. It is not surprising, therefore, that teachers develop theories of some sort to account for these variations. The predominant model today, which co-exists with and belongs to the same overall belief structures as Child-centredness in practice, is one of social pathology.(53) Adherence to this theoretical model can be illustrated by reference to Sharp and Green (1975), whose research I draw on in this section.(54)

The headmaster of "Mapledene Lane", the school they observed, says that

> "By not having this rigid set up, kids who are in acute distress, and, let's face it, we have got a great number who are really in distress; there's no other phrase for it... and their distress is caused by their home conditions... this kind of setting enables them to withdraw, opt out..."
> "Mr. McIntosh", in Sharp & Green (1975) p.60 (my emphasis).

Though they varied in certain respects, the other three teachers observed and interviewed by Sharp & Green (and Lewis) made similar references to the deprivation of most of their pupils and to the origins of their "disturbances" in parental mistreatment and

incompetence. They regarded the Child-centredness of their school as particularly appropriate for "these children".(54)

The Child-centredness of practising teachers is not anarchistic, but framed by implicit and explicit models (including theories) about Reality. It might be asked whether they are as attached to the model of scientific method as some of the more theoretically inclined writers previously considered. On the whole, I suggest that they are not, though this needs qualification, as we shall see. Theory tends most often to follow from experience, rather than to precede it. Of course, belief structures and thought processes themselves constitute experience for the individual subject. The creativity of Man lies precisely in this self-divorcibility from concrete circumstance. This is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of autonomous action upon the environment. Nonetheless, there is a difference between an individual's creation of original theory and the more general popularisation and institutionalisation of theories. In the event, many of the societally most momentous theories are at least as much theoreticisations of pre-existent experience as they are novel spurs to changed circumstance. This seems to have been so, for instance, of psychometric theory, which tended to rationalise social class differentiation between types of schooling, rather than to create novel ("meritocratic") arrangements. In any case, where it comes to practitioners in schools, as opposed to educational theorists, those theories which appear to be most influential take on very different forms. Freudianism for many amounted to "Never resist temptation". Bernstein's analysis of linguistic codes has commonly been reduced to "Working class children don't talk properly". In such cases as these, it is not the structure

and content of the theories themselves which has such widespread practical impact. It is the fact that there are theories at all which are regarded as intellectually respectable. Into the master pattern of legitimate expertise fits a rhetorical obeisance to approved theory. This almost precludes any direct relationship between the substance of that theory and practical commitment. Keddie (1971), Sharp and Green (1975) and others tend to see this as paradoxical or contradictory.(56) But the very meaning of theories to teachers (and others) is dependent upon the context in which they are learned and reinforced. That context is firstly social or external - compare my example of drinking and driving in Chapter 2. And secondly it is logical - that is, it includes the other beliefs and understandings of the subject: new theories have to be integrated into subjective 'knowledge'. Looked at in this way, it becomes even clearer that theory-as-it-is-interpreted-or-understood follows experience, rather than preceding it. It tends to rationalise or theoreticise practice, rather than to inspire novel forms of behaviour.

Nonetheless, the master-patterned legitimacy of expert-derived theory is important as a legitimation of (teacher) professionalism. A significant aspect of this in Child-centred education is the notion of "readiness", to which Sharp and Green rightly pay some attention. "Mrs. Lyons", the deputy headteacher,

> "frequently maintains that she cannot teach until her pupils are ready. Nevertheless, it is she who decides when the child is 'ready' and what criteria she will use to justify 'moving the child' to the next stage when he has reached the appropriate level. For example, with respect to 'readiness for reading', she argued 'medical evidence has shown that their eyes cannot focus properly much before five', and would use such things as his ability to complete patterns symmetrically... [etc] ... as indicators of the child's readiness...

> ... It was noticed by the observer that the teacher did not closely specify what the stages were and their operational indicators beyond reference to such generalities referred to when giving examples of her notion of 'readiness for reading'... She seemed to 'know' where they were at, and what they needed, and appeared very rapidly to arrive at judgments regarding their cognitive and emotional qualities and their requirements. This self-confidence may be a reflection of her being more highly qualified than the other staff. She has an advanced diploma in psychology, regards herself as an expert and is so regarded by others." Sharp & Green (1975) p.94.

The same teacher,

> "has very clear notions about what the parents should and shouldn't do at home in their attempts to 'help' the children educationally ... They shouldn't encroach on the teacher's role or 'make a convenience' of school. Above all, 'you've got to trust us, leave everything to us', and allow the teacher to be the best judge of what is in the child's interests... She informs the parents that she knows 'what stage each child is at, what he most needs', and that teachers have good reasons for doing things that they do and if subsequently there should be any changes there will be valid reasons for that too."
> Sharp & Green (1975) p.87.

The writers comment:

> "This public projection of infallibility is interesting when appraised alongside the concession to the observer and to other teacher colleagues of the difficulty of knowing what and how and when the child is learning, presumably with consequent ambiguity for the role of the teacher vis-à-vis the taught. Again, teacher infallibility is ironic when seen in the context of the almost universal tendency to blame the home for the child's failings but not necessarily his successes." ibid.

The notion of "readiness" is an important indicator of, and legitimator of, teachers' professional aloofness. At the start of Sharp and Green's research period at least, the probationer "Mrs. Buchanan" felt herself to be on good personal terms with the parents.(57) Yet even she wanted to be seen as a professional, with appropriate social distance and autonomy from parental interference (pp.101-2). The headmaster's viewpoint is taken to reflect the overall school "ethos".

> "We will bring parents into the school ... I'm certain that to get the parents involved with the non-academic aspects of the school ... is the way to do it... If you can get fathers or mothers to come into school and work with a small group of children they see that the place is not a blackboard jungle at all, and that although there appear to be a number of children milling about, it's in a kind of framework of a secure kind of order ... it's reasonably orderly."
> "Mr.McIntosh", Sharp & Green (1975) p.58.

Sharp and Green continue, again quoting the headmaster,

> "He wants to limit parents' involvement, nevertheless, to non-academic activities:
> 'At the moment I prefer to preserve that area for the teachers... we've got a lot of evidence to show that parents and non-professional people can do the children a lot of harm and unintentional harm.'" ibid.

It is in teachers' beliefs about parents and about pupils' home backgrounds that we find some of the clearest indications of their beliefs about societal relations.(58) This is forcefully illustrated in Sharp and Green's book. The teachers at "Mapledene Lane" School saw Child-centred pedagogy as particularly appropriate for "deprived" children. This is not something that would easily be predicted from most theoretical writing in the "progressive" tradition. Stewart's book on Progressives and Radicals in English Education, 1750-1970 is a compendium of unorthodox ventures in private - and therefore predominantly middle class - education. These were clearly minority ventures and their significance for popular education is not self-evident. As Selleck says,

> "However excellent these schools /such as Abbotsholme, Bedales, Summerhill, Rendcomb, Dartington Hall, Bryanston or Wennington/ were, they are relatively few and, though they may last, they are clearly not rapidly increasing. Progressive education, if limited to them, would be an interesting but peripheral feature of the English educational scene." Selleck (1972) p.32.

(It is Selleck's argument that they were of central importance,

however, because "the modern primary school ... has been made in the progressive image." (ibid).) It is not an uncommon assumption that "Open Education" is just not suitable for "ordinary children". It is sometimes argued, for instance, that Child-centredness relies on the "hidden curriculum" of the middle class home (e.g. Strodtbeck, 1958/61). Neill confessed that

> "I should like to be able to say that, since freedom touches the emotions primarily, all children, intelligent and dull, react equally to it. I cannot say it..."
> Neill (1953), extract in Perry (1967, ed.) p.67.(59)

Keddie (1971) also suggests that the innovatory "enquiry-based" course in the school she observed

> "in fact caters for a pupil who already exists: the A stream academic and usually middle-class pupil." Keddie (1971) p.137.

Early on in Sharp and Green's research, "Mrs. Buchanan", the probationer, felt that the school's Child-centred methods were not suitable for the type of children attending "Mapledene Lane".(60)

Nonetheless, the "official" view in that school was that Child-centredness was <u>particularly</u> appropriate for "problem children". The other two class-teachers observed ("Mrs.Lyons" and "Mrs.Carpenter") believed the overwhelming majority of the school's children to be "thick and those who aren't thick are disturbed" (Sharp & Green, 1975, p.70). This was put down to the instability and incompetence of the pupils' parents (e.g. pp. 71-3, 83). It was the very "disturbance" of these "deprived" children that made "Open Education" suitable. "Mrs. Carpenter"

> "shares the headmaster's belief that the nature of the childrens' needs and the aims of the school dictate an informal and 'open' approach to pedagogy and classroom organisation. There should be

> no rigidity of structure but rather an open environment where children can choose what they want to do in accordance with their needs. The instability and deprivation of the children presents problems to the teacher in this approach to the teaching situation but at the same time provides its own justification. The children can play out their problems in a secure and therapeutic environment without feeling threatened." Sharp & Green (1975) p.76.

Similarly, "Mrs.Lyons"

> "agreed with the general approach of the school both as a therapeutic institution which would enable the children to resolve their needs engendered by their unsatisfactory and unstable home backgrounds, and on the ground of practicality since 'these children' were considered not capable of fitting in to a formal context, not 'bright enough to conform' and not stable enough to cope." ibid, p.90.

Sharp and Green's book is an important attempt to bridge the gaps between social and physical constraints, teachers' ideologies and what children actually come to learn. Children in "Mapledene Lane's" "open classrooms" were differentially treated. The authors describe a stratification of successful élite, "bedrock of business", and "peculiar" deviants. What the children themselves learn from this categorisation and social stratification is extremely important. But my concern in this essay has not primarily been with childrens' learning; it has been with teachers' ideologies and belief structures. Sharp and Green's contribution in this respect is to elaborate on how teachers' perspectives

> "are in themselves reflections of the structuring of material and social constraints, external to the classroom, which impinge upon the teacher and structure her activities. The understanding of stratification in the classroom, whilst it may be related to and affected by the teachers' consciousness, cannot be solely explained by it.... The teachers are encapsulated within a context which produced the necessity for some hierarchical differentiation of the pupils in order that the teacher may solve the problems she is confronted with and provide some legitimation for the allocation of her time and energies."
> Sharp & Green (1975) p.116.

Whilst I might quibble at the deterministic strength of the term, "necessity", in this passage, their book on the whole adds both empirical observations and theoretical elaboration to many of the points I have tried to spell out in this essay. While the experience of one's own thinking and beliefs may offer the possibility of autonomously developed conceptual understandings, even these must inevitably be in the context of external circumstances. The very pressures of time and other resources, which tend to make such autonomous, creative theorising less likely (less possible, even, and less "relevant" to the people concerned), tend also to enforce and reinforce structures of belief that are rigidified and therefore "closed". To the extent that these pressures are pre-institutionalised or ongoingly decided by others within society, Child-centred education in contemporary Britain would seem likely to reproduce, rather than undermine, existing societal relations. In short, the "Power" dimension in Child-centred ideology seems to contain over-riding closures. It must be predominantly conservative, in default of any explicit elaboration of these closures by practising teachers.

Notes

(1) The introduction to the 1904 Code is reprinted in Van der Eyken (1973, ed.) pp. 95-6.

(2) Bathurst (1905/73) p.123.

(3) According to Holmes (1911) p.116, Payment by Results was abolished in 1895. Simon (1965) p.118 puts the date at 1897. To the Plowden Report (1967, § 508) it was 1898.

(4) It had been the publication of Holmes' circular on the quality of elementary school teachers that had occasioned the downfall of Morant.

(5) This is still true today. See, for instance, Blackie (1967/71) pp.39-41. Also an ex-Chief Inspector, Blackie contrasts the "old fashioned" and the "new type" of teacher. Pring has criticised what he takes to be the tendency of contemporary sociology of the curriculum to dichotomise on similar lines. See Chapter 8, above and, of course, Part III, passim, on the need to specify the dimensions on which "Open Education" might be considered.

(6) Perry (1967) p.17 makes the same point.

(7) It is from this 3rd edition that I shall be quoting in this chapter.

(8) Stewart (1972) p.436. The word "radical", here, is Stewart's. His book is a compendium of the origins and fates of private experimental schools. It almost entirely ignores mass (or state) education.

(9) Legally, of course, there are no "state schools" in this country - they are maintained by local education authorities, not by the D.E.S. The term nonetheless seems to me appropriate.

(10) Plowden Report (1967) § 270. The H.M.I's survey to which the report refers was conducted in 1964 (Blackie, 1967/71), p.12).

(11) e.g. Nyberg (1975, ed.) pp.5, 16 and 61: in articles by Hill, Tunnell and Petrie respectively. In recent years, a "backlash" has developed, which was finally given official recognition in the D.E.S. "Yellow Paper" (Times Educational Supplement 15/10/76, pp. 2-3). I do not deal with this reaction in this essay. I suggest, however, that it should be understood, not just in terms of "financial crisis", but of Happy Coincidences (Chapter 6) whose conceptual inadequacies are revealed when certain societal (i.e. real) contradictions become manifest. See also Syer (1976a).

(12) See, for instance, Education, Ministry of (1959) p.37; Blackie (1967/71) p.6. One indication of the oversimplicity of this kind of "influence" explanation can be found in Lunn's (1970) finding that younger primary schoolchildren tend to be taught under less "informal" conditions than do older ones. See also Nash (1973).

(13) Education, Ministry of (1959) p.iii. Nonetheless, the sub-title of Primary Education was "Some suggestions for the consideration of teachers and others concerned with the work of Primary Schools".

(14) This point is generally overlooked. To read, e.g. Bernstein's account of "Open Schools, Open Society?" (1967/71), one might suppose that it is the capitalist (or industrial) and the feudal (or pre-industrial) societal types - and their education systems - that are being contrasted. This is simply not the case. Though dichotomous Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft views of modern history may have had some relevance in the 19th century, they are no longer adequate today.

(15) Neill stood outside the main "movement" in the interwar years. Overtly, his philosophy was undoubtedly more anarchistic than most. His significance - and possibly influence - in post-war Britain should not, however, be underestimated.

(16) I have not considered any research on Nunn's own life, comparable, for instance, to Wirth's or Karier's work on Dewey. I must confine myself, therefore, to the evidence of his writing.

(17) It is expected that Society will be marked by rapid economic and social change, richer, with more leisure and more frequent changes of occupation, and with "tastes dominated by majorities". The writers hope that minorities (the old and young, handicapped and gifted, deviant and conformer) will be "cared for" and that the environment will be "stimulating, honest and tolerant". They fear that there may be excessive pursuit of material wealth, hostility to minorities, domination by mass opinion and uncertainty of values. And that is all.

(18) "A school is not merely a teaching shop, it must transmit values and attitudes. It is a community in which children learn to live first and foremost as children and not as future adults. In family life children learn to live with people of all ages. The school sets out deliberately to devise the right environment for children, to allow them to be themselves and to develop in the way and at the pace appropriate to them. It tries to equalise opportunities and to compensate for handicaps. It lays special stress on individual discovery, on first hand experience and on opportunities for creative work. It insists that knowledge does not fall into neatly separate compartments and that work and play are not opposite but complementary. A child brought up in such an atmosphere at all stages of his education has some hope of becoming a balanced and mature adult and of being able to live in, to contribute to, and to look critically at the society of which he forms a part. Not all primary schools correspond to this picture, but it does represent a general and quickening trend." Plowden Report (1967) § 505.

(19) See Sharp and Green (1975), especially pp. 63-6. I return to their work below.

(20) For instance, Peters (1969); Hirst and Peters (1970); Dearden (1969); Pring (1971).

(21) e.g. Perry (1967, ed.) pp.49-50, 134-9. See also Waks (1975).

(22) Neill visited the Little Commonwealth during World War I. Had the Home Office not closed it in 1918, it is likely that Neill would have gone to work there after the War (Stewart, 1972,p.230). Instead. he went, first to King Alfred School in Hampstead, and then to join Beatrice Ensor as co-editor of <u>New Era</u>.

(23) See Van der Eyken and Turner (1969); Gardner (1969).

(24) Selleck (1972) p.107.

(25) Nunn (1920/45), especially Chapters 9 and 10.

(26) e.g. Burt (1923, 1943a). Both of these are drawn on by Nunn - uncritically.

(27) Even so, Burt himself challenged the Norwood Committee's (1943) classification of three types of adolescent. See Burt (1943b). On the other hand, allegations have recently been made that Burt deliberately concocted important "evidence", later in his career, (T.E.S. 29/5/76).

(28) Blackie (1967/71) p.20: Intelligence "is not even exactly definable, or at any rate not everyone will agree with any particular definition that we may adopt. However, we all know pretty well what we mean by it and would perhaps assent to a definition by Sir Cyril Burt. He calls it 'innate, general, cognitive efficiency'."

(29) By "Progressivism proper", I mean belief in the power and worth of progress per se. This is central to American Progressivism, whereas in this country "progressive" has come to mean, rather, "advanced" or "following the latest ideas", whether or not these are themselves concerned with "progress".

(30) Nunn (1920/45) Chapter 7. On p.100, he points out that "play" is to "work" as "freedom" is to "discipline". In both cases the extremes are between ugly, unchecked licence and dangerous and corrupting repressive discipline. "The higher values of freedom [and therefore of play also] emerge only when it chooses worthy ends and in pursuing them submits itself to the control of well-inspired forms or methods." It is worth contrasting Russell, too, on the power of concentration and the need for self-discipline in seeking accuracy (Russell, 1926/60, p.134 ff) - a passage that is reminiscent of Gramsci's account of mental work (1926/65) - with Neill's totally libertarian standpoint in this respect.

(31) Related to this is also the importance attached to the supposed spreading of pedagogical ideas up the age range - something I have already commented on. cf. Education, Ministry of, (1959) p.37; Blackie (1967/71) p.6. Also relevant is that other source of supposed influence: Art and the other expressive areas. cf. Plowden Report (1967) g.677.

(32) What is "natural" or "normal" or "usual" for children to do or 'know' at particular ages or stages is a constant pre-occupation in the Ministry of Education's "handbook" of 1959. Despite the feeling that every child's development is different, this is a natural issue of concern for teachers - and those advising them - where there is a perceived need to evaluate children's progress, and thereby, of course, teachers' practice. "Perhaps one of the hardest things a young teacher has to learn is the standard of work that is to be expected from a class of any particular age, and from each child in it." Education, Ministry

of, (1959) p.50. This is hardly surprising when it is also claimed that the teacher should not be expecting reified standards, anyway. The Plowden Report also contradicts many of the main tenets of individuality when it says that "What goes on in primary schools cannot greatly differ from one school to another, since there is only a limited range of material within the capacity of primary school children..." (§ 289).

(33) cf. Syer (1974b).

(34) Education, Board of, (1904): extract in Van der Eyken (1973,ed.) pp. 95-6.

(35) "Utopia" was the village of Sompting in Sussex, to whose school Holmes looked as "what might be".

(36) See, for instance, Peters (1969); Hirst and Peters (1970). These writers, in seeking a source of authority that is beyond the individual teacher, try to establish "objective" values in the structuring of curriculum. Peters even exclaims that "It took acute thinkers such as Hume and Kant a considerable time to establish that mathematics is different from empirical science in important respects and that morals is not really much like either of them. Are we suggesting that philosophers since the 17th century have been wrong about such matters?" Peters (1969) pp.13-14.
That such distinctions have distinct sociological functions means that an evaluative stance must inevitably be taken on those functions, in practice. This seems to escape Peters. Warwick (1974) points out that such philosophers as Bantock and Pring, in criticising a sociological concern with the status of curricular divisions, have largely missed the point. The sociologist's concern is not (merely) whether subject divisions are in some sense wrong, but whether they are explicable, or have consequence, within particular societal formations.

(37) Plowden Report (1967) Chapter 22. For further comments on Terman, see Chapter 14, above.

(38) Plowden Report (1967) § 863 and Chapter 22, passim.

(39) See especially Nunn (1920/45) Chapter 10.

(40) See also Chapter 6 above on "Cultural deprivation".

(41) Reported in the Plowden Report (1967) Vol.1, Chapter 3.

(42) Plowden Report (1967) Chapter 5. On the definition of E.P.As., see Halsey (1972, ed.) Chapter 5.

(43) On contemporary libertarianism, see Arblaster (1971). Standard works on anarchism remain Woodcock (1963) and Joll (1964).

(44) See Van der Eyken & Turner (1969); Gardner (1969). It may be noted also that Susan Isaacs collaborated with Burt, in providing evidence to the Hadow Committee on Infant and Nursery Schools (1933) - see Van der Eyken (1973, ed.). pp.354-363.

(45) See Hurt (1971/72) p.118.

(46) A further congruence might be noted between pleas for teacher "autonomy" and the individualist ethic of children's learning. It is clearly the ideal of autonomy (cf Entwhistle, 1970, pp.205-8) rather than psychological assumptions that are here involved - the "Power", rather than the "Knowledge", dimension.

(47) See also Chapter 6, above, on Parental Participation.

(48) For similar passages in Blackie (1967/71), see pp. 45, 55,89,110.

(49) Non-fulfillment of such expectations in part explains the force of the recent reaction against Child-centredness and "informality". cf. the publicity that attended the publication of Bennett (1976). This non-fulfillment should itself be understood in terms of structural contradictions in society and of the creative potential of people to resist being merely "patterned" by institutional arrangements. In turn, the "reaction" is an expression of previously implicit beliefs on the "Power" dimension, rather than of new or different societal assumptions.

(50) cf D.E.S. Circulars 8/60 - which banned the provision of any more nursery schooling - and 2/73 - which lifted the ban.

(51) Johnson (1970); Frith (1974); Vaughan & Archer (1971).

(52) Simon (1974) p.76 ff; Selleck (1972) p.133 ff.

(53) See Chapter 6, above, on "Cultural deprivation".

(54) At the risk of being excessively repetitive, I should again point out that this chapter is essentially illustrative. I am not attempting here to validate any empirical hypotheses - about Child-centred education, for instance. Rather, my intention is to illustrate how the methodological suggestions made in earlier chapters might be applied in certain substantive areas. Clearly it would be illegitimate to generalise from Sharp and Green's research on a single infants' school to British primary education as a whole. Nonetheless, it is convenient to use their research to illustrate my points, rather than using my own field notes. The latter, however, do not significantly conflict with Sharp and Green's observations.

(55) Sharp and Green selected the school because of its reputation for Child-centredness.

(56) cf Keddie (1971) p.136; Sharp & Green (1975) pp.63-6. Sharp and Green qualify this, however. See the passage quoted above in the second section of this chapter.

(57) "Mrs. Buchanan" subsequently became more committed to the social pathological theories of the other staff. See Sharp & Green (1975) p.101.

(58) There are, of course, other areas of teachers' beliefs that would also be informative in this respect, for instance on the question of vocational relevance of schooling and pupils' career-potentials. See, for instance, Musgrove & Taylor (1965); Schools Council (1968). As far as primary school Child-centredness is concerned, however, the largely implicit beliefs on the "Power" dimension seem potentially most accessible through consideration of teachers' views about pupils and their home backgrounds. See also Nash (1973); Goodacre (1968) and, for a different interpretation, Murphy (1974).

(59) Neill would himself argue that it was precisely the "hidden curriculum of the home" that Summerhill's freedom was designed to overcome. "Brightness" and "dullness" for him, presumably, must be the product of genetic endowment. There is an intriguing parallel here with a section in Sharp and Green's book, where they describe the ideal parent - not in terms of how the teacher sees them, but in terms of how the teachers perceive their products: the children. The successful parent, say Sharp and Green, is one who provides compensatory education for the child, to make up for the lack of efficient teaching at school. Yet this intrusion must not be known to the teacher, who would resent the "interference". See Sharp and Green, p.208 ff.

(60) This was, however, qualified by Mrs. Buchanan's lack of confidence in her own ability to use the methods efficiently. Sharp & Green (1975) p.103.

Conclusion

The most fundamental point that this essay has tried to make is that beliefs matter. To produce an adequate sociological account, they must and they can be the object of elaborated understandings. I have attempted to devise conceptual tools whereby this may be done and to illustrate these by reference to certain educational contexts, in particular three broad historical "movements" devoted to versions of "Open Education".

What I have called "Value-Knowledge" is the motive force of individual behaviour. It is a property of individuals' mind-brain and it is real. Not societies or institutions, nor even groups or categories of people, believe and behave on the basis of beliefs. Beliefs exist only in physically unique and distinct individuals. Yet Man is necessarily a social animal. He could neither produce nor reproduce in isolation. Individuals can only exist in and be understood in relation to, their social and material context. So also with their beliefs. This is my first central premiss.

My second central premiss is that Reality is non-random. However complex the relationships which we wish to explore, apparently discrete individuals, "things" and beliefs only exist - as well as only being conceivable - insofar as they are related non-randomly to each other. This is true of beliefs as much as it is true of the social and the material world. Moreover the essential quality of belief - of committed and committing Value-Knowledge - is its structuration. It is only belief insofar as it is structured and rigid. Rigidity is commitment. Accordingly, it is crucial that some way be devised whereby that rigidity and that structuration

may be explored theoretically and empirically. I have suggested a "tree-root" metaphor for this purpose. Any account of the subjective side of mind-brain must necessarily be metaphorical. A more useful metaphor than "tree-rooting" may well be possible. In the meantime, however, this does assist our understanding of a number of the most important aspects of belief. It enables us, in the same terms, to talk about the "internal" or logical dimensions of adequacy as well as the "external" or contextual dimensions. It directs us to the experiential basis of Value-Knowledge - determinants of reinforced rigidity - which are both internal and external to individual believers. Furthermore, it presents a way whereby creative or autonomous reflection can be described, understood and indeed intentionally pursued. Conversely, a lack of such reflection can be seen as the behaviour-producing facet of Value-Knowledge. In short, the "tree-root" metaphor assists our understanding of the nature, origins and consequences of beliefs, by specific reference to the essentially structured property of that belief. It does this, moreover, in a way that allows us simultaneously to consider the social, contextual structuring of individual beliefs. For the same metaphor is applicable to 'knowledge' that is objectivated in the school curricula, in the cultures and ideologies, and in the written or otherwise "frozen" accounts with which the individual learner is confronted. The relationships between subjective and objectivated 'knowledge' may thereby be examined. I have had rather less to say, in this essay, about the structuring of societal and institutional Reality. My emphasis on belief should not be interpreted as an attempt to play down the importance of that Reality or of theoretical

accounts of it. On the contrary. Rather have I tried to redress the balance, or perhaps to bridge a gulf between "merely" objective and "merely" subjective accounts of social phenomena. It is to this end that I have stressed the materiality and structuredness of beliefs, and stressed belief as the primary basis of behaviour.

My third central premiss in this essay has been that sociological analysis - any more than so-called "everyday" understandings - can have no recourse to simple blue-prints of what the world-out-there is really like. It is not possible to produce a once-and-for-all classification of "types" of social phenomena, which can then be applied to or imposed upon Reality to produce adequate understanding. What may, however, be possible is the adoption of certain dimensions which, according to the aspect of the totality with which the analyst is specifically concerned, are universally relevant, whatever the societal context. Thus production and (biological) reproduction are necessarily universal conditions of human existence. In the case of education (or learning) there are also, I have suggested, certain universally relevant dimensions. Learning always involves contexts, contents and processes, which I have labelled the "Power" and "Knowledge" dimensions. My suggestions for applying these dimensions involved a distinction between three "realms": (Social) Reality, Objectivated 'Knowledge' and Subjective 'Knowledge'. These in turn led to a consideration of people's beliefs about these realms and about the relationships between them, which involved questions of epistemology, framing, learning theory (both contextual and logical) and "ethics". These distinctions I find more useful, for instance, than Bernstein's Curriculum, Pedagogy and Evaluation. But beyond this, one cannot specify what "types" of

belief one would expect to find on each or any of these dimensions without a somewhat arbitrary decision to see certain lower level relevances as more important than others. Already attention has been directed to learning/education, rather than to other no doubt equally important - and no less related - aspects of human social existence. Generally, though Relevances can be specified, and a perfectly valid search for universal dimensions then undertaken, this does not then justify any claim that those Relevances are themselves the only or most valid ones possible. Social existence is too complex for such a claim to be legitimate, and Man too fallible.

To a large extent, then, this essay has been concerned with methodological issues, rather than education tout court. Or rather methodology has emerged as a distinctively educational issue. Whilst my initial concern was to develop a sociological understanding of beliefs and ideologies which seemed so lacking - but so necessary - in a study of education, that understanding is itself in the province of its own subject matter. It is in this light that the material on "Open Education" should be viewed. It is above all illustrative of the approach outlined in the early chapters of this essay. Yet the subject matter is peculiarly appropriate to that approach. The very closure that defines the rigidity of Value-Knowledge is what "openness" claims or attempts to escape. Beliefs in whatever form of "Open Education" are themselves inevitably historically situated. They arise in and from particular societal contexts. They have particular forms - by virtue of which they are beliefs. And they are at least potentially consequential. The subject, then, is not "merely" education, but ideologies. As such, this essay is, I hope, a contribution to more than a narrow field called The Sociology of

Education. The issues I have raised are, I believe, of significance to sociology in general. For this I do not claim any special credit for myself. It has been a feature of British sociology of education in recent years that it has re-emerged as a central, rather than a peripheral or specialised, field of sociology. It is to that re-emergence that I hope this essay has contributed.

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