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## *Grillparzer's adoption and adaptation of the philosophy and vocabulary of Weimar classicism*

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## Summary

After a summary of German Classicism and of Grillparzer's at times confusing references to it, the main body of the thesis aims to assess Grillparzer's use of the philosophy and vocabulary of Classicism, with particular reference to his ethical, social and political ideas.

Grillparzer's earliest work, including Blanka, leans heavily on Goethe and Schiller, but such plagiarism is avoided after 1810. Following the success of Ahnfrau, however, Grillparzer returns to a much more widespread use of Classical themes, motifs and vocabulary, especially in Sappho. Grillparzer's mood in the period 1816-21 was one of introversion and pessimism, and there is an emphasis on the vocabulary of quiet peace and withdrawal. In Vlies, these ideals cannot help man out of the disaster and despair which Grillparzer repeatedly depicts in the 1810s and early 1820s, and there is a consequent tendency for the optimistic vocabulary of Classicism to appear incongruous.

The more political plays of the 1820s reject the style and vocabulary of Classicism but still retain its central moral ideals. From 1830 onwards, Grillparzer begins to examine more closely those ideals and concepts inherited from Goethe and Schiller, which had been doomed to failure in the pessimistic atmosphere of earlier years. The very validity of such ideals is now appraised, their relevance in political situations which Classicism had often neglected to depict. It is recognised that ideals considered as absolutes can only be achieved in isolation from chaotic human reality, and that any attempt to transfer aesthetic ideals to political and moral spheres may be detrimental to humanity rather than advantageous. There is a gradual return to Classical concepts such as moderation, limitation, right, truth, and especially "der Mensch", but these ideals must be standards for, not barriers to life and humanity.

GRILLPARZER'S ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION  
OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND VOCABULARY OF  
WEIMAR CLASSICISM

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in the University of Durham.

German Department  
1978.

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I hereby declare that no part of this thesis has been submitted for a degree in Durham or any other university, and that all work in the thesis is the author's own.

I.F. Roe,

Reading, November 1978.

## References and Abbreviations

Wherever possible, reference is made to volume and page of the Hanser edition of Grillparzer's works (e.g. I,213). Line references only are given for plays and major poems; diary entries and conversations are identified by the conventional numeration and the abbreviations "Tgb." and "Gespr.". Where necessary, reference is made to the critical Vienna edition, abbreviated "HKA" (e.g. HKA I/1, 173). Conversations not in the Hanser edition are referred to by the numbered entries in Sauer's edition of the Gespräche.

References to the Jahrbuch der Grillparzer-Gesellschaft and the Grillparzer-Forum Forchtenstein are abbreviated GrJb and GFF respectively.

References to Classical works and the abbreviations used are as explained in the notes. Modern orthography has been adopted in all quotations from Classical writers.

The titles of the major works by Grillparzer and the Classical writers have been abbreviated in the notes and references, and also in the text where this seemed appropriate (e.g. Vließ, Traum, Weh dem, Tasso, Lehrjahre, Jungfrau, Braut). In the notes and references, Wallensteins Tod has been abbreviated to Tod, Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen to DMudLW.

## Introduction

"Die Werke Franz Grillparzers kann eigentlich nur der Österreicher ganz verstehen".<sup>(1)</sup> This view of Moriz Enzinger's in 1923 has become a standard line of Grillparzer criticism, which has inevitably attracted Austrian critics above all. Especially in recent years, much work has been carried out to stress Grillparzer's links with Austrian traditions. This has been primarily in stylistic and dramatic matters, where Herbert Seidler has sought to demonstrate Grillparzer's adoption of the techniques of the Viennese stage and the Austrian Baroque tradition as a whole; similar work has been undertaken by other critics, Austrian and otherwise (Nadler, Oplatka, Alker, Gmür, von Matt, Helmsdorfer, Partl, Pichl).<sup>(2)</sup>

In the same vein are the suggestions that Grillparzer's philosophical ideas go back to the Austrian or Josefinian Enlightenment. In Richard Alewyn's opinion, "seine Begriffe entstammten der Aufklärung", according to Seidler, "Grillparzer wird vom deutschen Idealismus und der deutschen Klassik nur insofern angesprochen und angeregt, als er sie mit dem Geist der Aufklärung in Einklang bringen kann", yet in discussing the same theme in another context, Seidler's comments, especially his valid distinction between Grillparzer's and Schreyvogel's attitudes to literature, make it unintentionally apparent that Grillparzer was influenced by Classicism as opposed to the Enlightenment.<sup>(3)</sup> Politzer, Oplatka and Alker equally seek to stress Grillparzer's links with the Austrian Enlightenment.

Where Classicism is mentioned as a possible influence, this is usually done in order to dismiss it. The natural corollary to Enzinger's view is Emil Staiger's insistence that Grillparzer cannot be understood from Weimar. Robert Mühlher, writing immediately after the Second World War, sought to prove that Grillparzer embodied the very opposite of the German idealistic philosophy that had paved the way for recent atrocities, but Mühlher's work shows a marked abhorrence of all things German, a dangerous tendency to generalise about Classicism and a confusion of

Classicism and idealism. Equally prone to generalisations is Kaufmann's article on Grillparzer and idealism.<sup>(4)</sup> Various reasons are given by critics for their insistence on Grillparzer's distance from Weimar, in addition to the dramatic criteria already mentioned: the "Ritzen und Risse" in his character (Politzer), his "Zerrissenheit" (Morris), his "Auffassung von der Gespaltenheit der Welt" (Oplatka), his need to be isolated, "weltfern" (Fricke), his lack of decisiveness, what Gerhart Baumann calls "das Unschlüssige" in his work. Hence for Andreas Oplatka, "der klassische Augenblick ist für ihn unwiederbringlich vorbei".<sup>(5)</sup> There is some truth in most of these views, as we shall see, but neither Staiger's nor Oplatka's conclusions can be accepted as logical assumptions. Very often the insistence on Grillparzer's need for withdrawal, for "Sammlung" goes hand in hand with the attempt to see Grillparzer as a Biedermeier writer (Bietak, Alewyn, Sengle, Gmür), an approach which is even more suspect than the study of Grillparzer's obvious connections with the traditions of his capital city, and Jost Hermand has rightly insisted that a writer as complex as Grillparzer cannot be adequately summed up under the "Biedermeier" label.

There can certainly be no doubt that Grillparzer was conscious of writing for the theatre audience of his native Vienna, and that consequently he strove for dramatic effect to a far greater extent than did Goethe and Schiller. Nevertheless one does Grillparzer a great injustice by linking him too closely with Viennese traditions of popular theatre of which he himself was repeatedly scornful. He refers to Goethe's attempts to give the audience what it needed rather than what it wanted, and it is clear that his own plays, except the obviously popular Ahnfrau and Traum ein Leben, are part of a similar attempt to encourage his audience to appreciate something on a higher plane than the plays of Weisl and Gleich or even of Nestroy and Raimund; he was in fact annoyed that Die Ahnfrau and Traum ein Leben were his most successful plays. Outside

the sphere of the theatre, Grillparzer is equally cynical towards the Viennese taste in other arts: they prefer Lanner and Strauß to serious music. It is also worth stressing that Grillparzer saw himself as a dramatist halfway between Goethe and Kotzebue, a popular Viennese dramatist is not however mentioned.

In any case, critics have the greatest difficulty in ascertaining exactly what constitutes "das eigentlich Österreichische", it is arguable that an Englishman, J.P.Stern, has made the best analysis of that particular aspect of Grillparzer's work. In 1976, Zdenko Skreb devoted a complete chapter of his book on Grillparzer to criticising the search for an Austrian tradition in his work. Already in 1934, Reinhold Backmann had attacked Enzinger's view, pointing out that the Austrians seemed to have great difficulty in understanding Grillparzer, who in fact had written for the audience of Goethe and Schiller. According to Braunscheid, "Grillparzer ist keineswegs ein barocker Dichter". A more balanced view is provided by those critics who see Grillparzer combining Vienna and Weimar. For David Heald, Grillparzer is torn between Germany and Austria; W.E. Yates has demonstrated how Grillparzer's use of Austrian theatrical traditions is either somewhat muted or even out of place; for Heinz Politzer, Grillparzer was "der Dichter des ersten Bezirks", who nevertheless saw the Burgtheater representing "der Träger der Humanität"; Ludwig, Schneider, Nadler and Koch are among those who have also considered Grillparzer as an intermediary between Vienna and Weimar.<sup>(6)</sup>

Some critics have more fully acknowledged Grillparzer's debt to the Classicists; Hofmannsthal saw his fellow-countryman as "ein Sohn des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts", for Hermand he is "ein Spätklassiker", for Harold Lenz a "devout disciple and original revaluator of the Weimar Classicists". Škreb, who attacks the Austrian view of Grillparzer, insists that Goethe and Schiller exerted the most important influence on him, that "Grillparzer stand völlig auf dem Standpunkt der deutschen Klassik, wenn er

sich zu den Anschauungen des Goethe-Schiller Briefwechsels bekannte". Hermand considers Grillparzer the poet of moderation, harmony, decency; for Burckhardt, Grillparzer is the poet of moderation; Heald stresses his love of form, order, discipline; various critics have underlined his ideal of "der Mensch" (Škreb, Helmensdorfer, Schneider, Dietrich).<sup>(7)</sup> All these are however brief comments without any detailed discussion. Equally the studies of Grillparzer's interest in Goethe confine themselves on the whole to listing references to Goethe in Grillparzer's work and supplementing this with a resume of Grillparzer's visit to Weimar in 1826 (Horvay, Müller, Seidler), Elisabeth Krueger is mainly concerned with Grillparzer's interest in Goethe the individual. Josef Nadler gives a more critical, though frequently unsubstantiated analysis of Grillparzer's approach to Goethe, but he lays exaggerated emphasis on contrasting Goethe and Grillparzer as characters, also he seeks to stress that the aesthetic totality of Grillparzer's plays is made up of different layers of the Austrian tradition. Walter Naumann gives both a detailed list of Grillparzer's discussion of Goethe, and also an analysis of the contrast between the two writers; like Nadler, Naumann exaggerates this contrast, but in order to stress Grillparzer's links with the Spanish Baroque theatre of Calderon and Lope de Vega. Petak and Waniek simply discuss Grillparzer's use of phrases and motifs from Goethe's work. O.E. Lessing uses the same approach to Schiller's work, but otherwise little attention has been paid to the importance of Schiller until recent analyses of Blanka von Kastilien sought to show that Don Carlos was not as important as Grillparzer himself had suggested. None of the critics listed<sup>(8)</sup> attempt a detailed study of what ideas in the work of Goethe and Schiller appealed to Grillparzer, instead Grillparzer's discussion of various Goethean works is presented without comment.

More detailed and critical are the investigations of links between specific plays of Grillparzer on the one hand and the Classicists on the other. These will be examined

in the context of the particular play concerned. Otherwise the only fuller analysis of Grillparzer's debt to Classicism is Erich Hock's Besinnung auf Humanität, published in 1949. Hock deals with a number of themes, totality, moderation, humanity and "das allgemein Menschliche", "Bildung", morality, the ideals of art. It is a solid introduction to the field, but has shortcomings which are inevitable in a book of such brevity. There is a tendency to treat Classicism as an indivisible concept, which leads to confusion on matters where Goethe and Schiller clearly did not have entirely the same opinion; the possibility of action, the importance of morality, the contrast of individual and society. Secondly Grillparzer's adoption of Classical ideas is treated without any analysis of the problems involved, whether it be adaptations made by Grillparzer or changes in his attitudes. As a result, the insistence on harmony and totality (pp.24-5,52), on moderation (24), or on "Bildung" (8,44-5,58) is not in keeping with the more limited role of these ideas in Grillparzer's work; furthermore, Hock's definitions especially of "Bildung" and "Reinheit" seem those of Classicism rather than Grillparzer's,<sup>(9)</sup> the problematic nature of Grillparzer's views on totality and "Sammlung" is not considered. Consequently, despite Hock's insistence on Grillparzer's "tiefer Pessimismus" (p.12), we are left with a rosy picture of wholehearted approval of Classical ideals; the pessimism seen by Hock consists in Grillparzer's doubts as to the possibility of achieving these ideals and the resulting gulf between ideal and reality (p.19), involving a rejection of the present age (p.11). No mention is made of whether Grillparzer questions the validity of the ideals themselves, whether he does in fact accept the ideals inherited. Finally Hock limits himself to a thematic summary of Grillparzer and Classicism; it is never clear whether Hock wishes to stress the influence of an idea or of the specific terminology employed. In the case of "Bildung", there is no problem, otherwise Hock's treatment is ambiguous. Nevertheless Hock's views, if at times

oversimplified and exaggerated, are a necessary antidote to the excessive stress on Grillparzer's Austrian characteristics; Hock emphasises the link with "der Geist Weimars ... die Bildungsidee der Humanität" (pp.44-5), and repeatedly underlines Grillparzer's own insistence on "Menschsein", "Humanität", "der Mensch" (pp.58,61,65).

The aim of this thesis is to examine in detail the influence of Weimar Classicism on Grillparzer, and his own evaluation and adaptation of Classical ideas. This will first of all involve a brief summary of Classicism in order to ascertain the main themes but also the terminology, the specific vocabulary, in which these themes are expressed. No attempt is being made to give a new appraisal of the period, the first chapter aims to give an introduction to Classicism which can serve as a basis and a framework for Grillparzer's ideas. Secondly a short resume is given of Grillparzer's own discussion and assessment of Goethe and Schiller and their works. This has, we have noted, already been discussed in some detail by a number of critics, but there is in addition the need to isolate any specific themes or ideas which Grillparzer found particularly interesting or praiseworthy.

The main body of the thesis involves a detailed analysis of Grillparzer's use of Classical philosophy in his writing as a whole, not simply in his dramatic work. It is also vital to examine his adoption and adaptation of Classical vocabulary, of the key concepts in which the principle themes of Classicism are expressed. Particular attention must be paid to the use Grillparzer makes of these concepts in his political, social and ethical ideas. I would argue that the adoption of vocabulary is a more specific sign of influence than the mere discussion of moral and political topics of perennial interest. It is a commonplace to consider Grillparzer the poet of moderation, to speak of his interest in "der Mensch", but it remains to be investigated what use Grillparzer makes of the key concepts of Classicism, of the specific items of vocabulary in which the Classical writers express their



ideas. One may preach moderation, or totality, without using the words "ganz" or "Mäßigung". Hock quite correctly believes that Grillparzer approved of "moderation", but his treatment leads one to assume that the word "Mäßigung" is common in Grillparzer's work. As we shall see, this is not obviously the case, much more common are other terms which taken together constitute an insistence on moderation and the avoidance of extremes. Reading Hock, one would equally assume that "Humanität", "Harmonie", "ganz", "Bildung" are common terms in Grillparzer's work. "Harmonie" however is not a common term in Grillparzer's vocabulary, nor is it a frequent subject of discussion, in the other instances, one may say that humanity, totality, "Bildung" are vital themes of Grillparzer's work, but this need not in any way imply that "Ganz" or "Humanität" are frequent terms - as far as "Humanität" especially is concerned, this most certainly is not the case. To a certain extent of course, philosophy and vocabulary, themes and terms must overlap, but it is not at all inevitable that they must coincide, the vocabulary of liberty and freedom may be common in a play which implies the exact opposite, a play may preach moderation without ever using the word for moderation. It is therefore necessary to isolate Grillparzer's use of the specific vocabulary of Classicism, without losing sight of his concern for the overall themes. In so doing, one is more easily able to detect differences in usage of Classical ideas. Classicism is first and foremost an aesthetic philosophy which sees life as a harmonious totality comprehensible in aesthetic terms. Art and beauty are the key to progress in other spheres, the optimistic belief in man's ability to create aesthetic perfection is extended to an equally confident belief in perfection and totality in the individual and society. Grillparzer was less convinced of such a totality, firstly because of his very nature which was inclined to introversion and pessimism, but also because, unlike Goethe and Schiller, he refused to overlook or blur the dividing lines between the various spheres of human life.

Grillparzer had, as Hock stressed (p.12), a very complete picture of his age, but this is something that separates Grillparzer from Goethe and Schiller. Grillparzer was openly critical of his age, rather than seeking to ignore it, but he sought to criticise it in terms borrowed from a previous age which had scrutinised not its own contemporary reality but an idyllic reality of its own creation. From this viewpoint also, it is vital to consider the way in which Grillparzer uses the terminology he inherited or chose to inherit from the Classical era. It is only in aesthetic matters that one can agree with Škreb that Grillparzer accepted the tenets of Goethe's and Schiller's correspondence, outside the aesthetic sphere it may be more a question of "sich auseinandersetzen mit", rather than "sich bekennen zu".

Where appropriate, consideration will be given to links and parallels between specific works of Grillparzer on the one hand and Classicism on the other, as a further means of examining Grillparzer's affinity with or distance from the Classical writers. Mention has already been made of the undoubted fact that Grillparzer was more concerned with dramatic effect than were Goethe and Schiller. Otherwise, however, I do not propose to undertake any detailed analysis of Grillparzer's aesthetic philosophy, either in his theory or in the way this manifests itself in the plays. This field was excellently covered as long ago as 1905 by Fritz Strich and it seems repetitive and impractical in the context of a wider discussion of Grillparzer's debt to Classicism to embark on a comprehensive study of his aesthetic ideas. Occasional reference to this field will nevertheless be made, but, despite what has been said concerning the aesthetic basis of Classical philosophy, Grillparzer's ethical and political concerns can be considered in their own right; an analysis of Grillparzer's views on what constitutes beauty, sublimity, tragedy, aesthetic totality is not necessary in that context. It is however worth stressing the extent to which Strich finds many obvious echoes of Classicism in Grillparzer's aesthetics.

It seems most suitable to combine a chronological approach with a thematic one. The former method is vital in coming to terms with a writer's formative years, and certainly in the case of Grillparzer quite clear periods can be delineated in which the influence of Classicism is excessive or minimal. The chronological approach therefore predominates in considering the works up to 1830, within this period the changing patterns in the usage of Classical terminology must be investigated. Even within this period however, particular themes are treated in the context of the play in which they occur with the greatest significance. After 1830, in many ways an important milestone in Grillparzer's life, there is an overriding consistency in Grillparzer's attitude to Classicism, and the later plays are dealt with in thematic groups, an assessment of any chronological development of themes or vocabulary being postponed until the concluding chapter. As a result of the division made at 1830, the plays which, for the sake of convenience, I have labelled as political, are dealt with in two separate chapters. To some extent the terminology especially defies all convenient thematic divisions, above all the term "Mensch" has a part to play in almost every aspect of Grillparzer's philosophy - the same is true to a lesser extent of "Recht". Any attempt to consider these terms and certain others in one context alone is artificial.

Classicism does not mean only Goethe and Schiller, reference will be made to obvious echoes in Grillparzer's work of Classical ideas in other writers, such as Herder, Hölderlin, Lessing. But Grillparzer himself was above all concerned with Goethe and Schiller, and our main interest must also lie in that direction. Yet Goethe and Schiller themselves were not always in agreement - it is a fault of Hock's book that this is suggested - and it will at times be necessary to stress Grillparzer's leaning towards the one or the other.

Grillparzer's links with other epochs and writers cannot be denied, there is no exclusive influence of

Classicism, his plays, his writing as a whole, cannot be tied down to handy formulae in the way that Schiller's Classical tragedies can be seen as variations on the themes of freedom, sublimity and morality. Baumann has stressed the extent to which "Grillparzer entzieht sich jeder systematisierenden Begrifflichkeit ... widerstrebt der formelhaften Einordnung".<sup>(10)</sup> Nevertheless Grillparzer's ethical and political ideas and his vocabulary have their origins to a considerable degree in German Classicism, his work reveals the attempt to evaluate the themes of the Classical era and to assess their applicability to his own personal and political situation.

#### NOTES

1. Moriz Enzinger, "Grillparzer und das Wiener Volkstheater", in Grillparzer-Studien, hrsg. von Oskar Katann, Vienna, 1924, pp.9-39, p.9.  
Unless there is the possibility of ambiguity or confusion, full bibliographical details will not be given in this introduction, but may be found in subsequent chapters and/or the bibliography at the end.
2. Seidler's articles on frameworks, conclusions, "Prunkreden" etc. are collected in Studien zu Grillparzer und Stifter, Vienna, Cologne, Graz, 1970.
3. Richard Alewyn, "Grillparzer und die Restauration", Publications of the English Goethe-Society (New Series), XII (1937), 1-18, p.10; Herbert Seidler, "Die Entwicklung des wissenschaftlichen Grillparzer-Bildes im deutschen Sprachraum", in Das Grillparzer-Bild des 20. Jahrhunderts, hrsg. von Heinz Kindermann, Vienna, Cologne, Graz, 1972, pp.33-107, p.45; Seidler, "Grillparzers Bild von der deutschen Literatur der Goethezeit", GFF (1973), 63-84, p.78.
4. Staiger, p.223; Robert Mühlher, "Grillparzer und der deutsche Idealismus", Wissenschaft und Weltbild, I (1948), 62-75.
5. Politzer, p.124; Irene V. Morris, "Grillparzer's Individuality as a Dramatist", Modern Language Quarterly, XVIII (1957), 83-99, p.98; Oplatka, p.80; Fricke, p.276; Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, p.23.
6. J.P.Stern, "Grillparzer's Vienna", in German Studies presented to Walter Horace Bruford, London, 1962, pp.176-92; Reinhold Backmann, "Grillparzer und die heutige Biedermeier-Psychose", Jahrbuch der Grillparzer-Gesellschaft, XXXIII (1934), 1-32, pp.3-4; Waltraud Braunscheit, Grillparzer und Calderon, (Diss.) Cologne, 1963, p.27 (quoted by Skreb, Grillparzer, p.229); W.E.Yates, "'Die Jugendeindrücke wird man nicht los ...'";

- Grillparzer's Relation to the Viennese popular Theatre", Germanic Review, XLVIII (1973), 132-49; Politzer, pp.20-1.
7. Hofmannsthal, "Rede auf Grillparzer", in Prosa IV, p.119; Hermand, pp.194-5,192; Lenz, p.265; Skreb, Grillparzer, pp.68,48.
  8. See Chapter 2, note 2, and Chapter 3, notes 2 and 3.
  9. According to Hock, "Bildung" for Grillparzer means "Formung, Prägung, Erziehung zu harmonischem Menschentum durch allseitige Förderung der geistigen, gemüthhaften und sittlichen Kräfte" (p.8), "Roheit" signifies "jene innere Gefahr des Deutschen ... sich gewaltsam über das Maß des Wirklichen hinwegzusetzen, die gottgeschaffene Welt betrachtend und handelnd zu verzerren und zu zerstören, ihre Ganzheit und Harmonie zu zerbrechen und dabei in sich selbst die Einheit des ganzen Menschen aufzuheben" (p.52). It is not that Grillparzer would have disagreed with these definitions, but that Grillparzer's statements are not specific enough to enable us to construct such detailed analyses.
  10. Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, p.9.

## Chapter 1. German Classicism

"Im Zentrum aller Bemühungen aber, als Ziel und Kraftquell zugleich stand die Idee des Menschen."<sup>(1)</sup> This central importance of man, as seen by Paul Kluckhohn, is the overriding feature of German Classicism. Man is looked at entirely in his own context, his character, his qualities, his potential, his aims are all examined from man's own viewpoint. Man is the centre of the universe for Classicism, he is his own justification. "Der Mensch ... existiert als Zweck an sich selbst", according to Kant.<sup>(2)</sup> Man for Herder is the culmination of nature's development, the confluence of all lower forms.<sup>(3)</sup> The supreme ideal is that of "Humanität", a concept made popular by Herder, who attempts numerous definitions, the most frequent being the combination of "Vernunft und Billigkeit" (XIV,150). Man achieves or develops "Humanität" by improving his specifically human attributes, "das Menschliche" in him. In Hermann und Dorothea, we are to be taken "in die stillere Wohnung, / Wo sich, nah der Natur, menschlich der Mensch noch erzieht" ("Hermann und Dorothea", 33-4).

Man's development is a long process, as Herder tells us, for man's original state and nature approximates more to that of an animal:

Der größte Teil der Menschen ist Tier; zur Humanität hat er bloß die Fähigkeit auf die Welt gebracht und sie muß ihm durch Mühe und Fleiß erst angebildet werden. (XIII,196)

Although ultimately only a mythical creature such as Euphorion can be "ohne Tierheit" (Faust,9603), man must strive to overcome his animal tendencies and develop those which place him above animals (Herder, XIII,144). A man who fails to control his instincts remains an animal, according to Schiller,<sup>(5)</sup> Goethe concludes, "Im Menschen ist das Tierische zu höhern Zwecken gesteigert" (XIII,170). Equally man should not be too concerned with things above him, he should not try to challenge the gods, as the man in Goethe's "Grenzen der Menschheit" and the King in

Schiller's "Der Taucher" are warned. In undergoing this development to humanity, and in ignoring as far as possible thoughts of other realms, whether above or below, man makes the greatest progress:

Je mehr du fühlst ein Mensch zu sein,  
Desto ähnlicher bist du den Göttern. (Goethe, I.307)

Similarly for Hölderlin, "der Mensch ist aber ein Gott, sobald er ein Mensch ist".<sup>(6)</sup> The changes in the final version of Iphigenie auf Tauris stress the role of man rather than of the gods or fate. Nathan tells Daja in Lessing's play:

dem Menschen ist  
Ein Mensch noch immer lieber als ein Engel.<sup>(7)</sup>  
(Nathan der Weise, I,1)

Faust wishes to reject magic and stand alone and independent as a man:

Stünd' ich, Natur, vor dir ein Mann allein,  
Da wärs der Mühe wert, ein Mensch zu sein!  
(Faust, 11406-7)

Classicism makes man explain himself, eschewing where possible the introduction of higher powers. "Humanität", according to Benno von Wiese, "verwirklicht das Ideal des Menschen, indem sie den Menschen aus sich selber rechtfertigt".<sup>(8)</sup>

Man's aim is to become a man in the fullest possible sense. The individual seeks his own perfection, man has no better name for his purpose than the word "Mensch" (Herder, XIII,154). The main law of nature is: "der Mensch sei Mensch! er bilde sich seinen Zustand nach dem, was er für das Beste erkennt" (Herder, XIV,209), or in Goethe's words, "der Mensch verlange nicht Gott gleich zu sein, aber er strebe sich als Mensch zu vollenden".<sup>(9)</sup> Humanity is man's aim, the development of his human nature is in his own hands. This specifically human nature is something constant: "die Natur des Menschen bleibt immer dieselbe", according to Herder (XIV,205), whilst Hölderlin wrote to his brother Karl (4/6/1799), stressing the basic similarity of all men.

"Humanität ist der Schatz und die Ausbeute aller menschlichen Bemühungen", not to seek it means falling back "zur rohen Tierheit, zur Brutalität"

(Herder, XVII,138). An attack on man's humanity, as in Wilhelm Tell by blinding a man or by making him shoot at his own son, is the supreme crime. Humanity is the key to man's happiness. Goethe, especially in Wilhelm Meister and in his conversations with Eckermann, and Herder and Humboldt, in their essays, stress the importance of "Bildung". For Goethe, it is a natural process, and he insists that "alles trägt unmerklich zu unserer Bildung bei" (Lehrjahre, VIII,1, II,9). It is important for man "auf eigene moralische Bildung loszuarbeiten" (HA X,88). For Herder, "das Göttliche in unserem Geschlecht ist also Bildung zur Humanität" (XVII,138), and Herder continually writes of "Bildung der Humanität", "Humanität bilden", "Bildung zur Humanität" (XIII,181, XIV,209-11), upholding the ideal picture of a "goldene Kette der Bildung" (XIII,353); "Bildung" in Herder's eyes is "die Tradition einer Erziehung zu irgend einer Form menschlicher Glückseligkeit und Lebensweise" (XIII,348-9). For Humboldt, man strives to "seine ganze Bildung vollenden" (I,239),<sup>(10)</sup> and Humboldt set out to write a "Theorie der Bildung der Menschen" (I,234-40), his ideal was the general education of the whole human mind. As an autodidact, he believed in the superiority of self-education, each man taking it upon himself to educate himself as a human being. Humboldt was sceptical of organised state education (I,103-9), at least until his appointment as Minister of Education. Schiller's journals "Rheinische Thalia" and "Die Horen" were both intended to serve the cause of "Bildung" (NA XXII,95,103) and his major philosophical essays seek to describe that development.

The search for humanity is not based on reason alone, man ideally should develop all his attributes, his natural as well as his intellectual side, except for his most base characteristics, although Herder and Goethe were more encouraging than Schiller. Especially, however, man should reject his selfish materialistic instincts and unfold his better, his moral nature in order to make the most of his potential. Man in Goethe's "Das Göttliche"



should produce what is useful and right, be "edel, hilfreich und gut", a man such as Max Piccolomini stands for virtue, truth, honesty and goodness. Schiller's "schöner Charakter" in Über das Erhabene practises "Gerechtigkeit, Wohltätigkeit, Mäßigkeit, Standhaftigkeit und Treue" (XXI,43). Pure humanity can atone for all crimes; "es kommt jetzt darauf an", Goethe told Eckermann (23/10/1828), "was einer auf der Waage der Menschheit wiegt".

"Humanität" was conceived of as cosmopolitan, not linked to rank, race or creed. Marquis Posa is "ein Bürger dieser Welt" (Don Carlos, 3007), Nathan tells the Templar:

Ich weiß, wie gute Menschen denken, weiß,  
Daß alle Länder gute Menschen tragen. (Nathan, II,5)

Nathan asks, "Sind Christ und Jude eher Christ und Jude/ Als Mensch?" (ibid), and Ernst und Falk makes the same observation on the political and social level. Thoas has the ability to be "ein Mensch" and hear the voice of truth. Man is seen by Herder as one large family (XIII,255), "Humanität" can overcome all differences of race, religion, customs; man should set up a "Bund der Humanität". These ideas are reflected in the view of the ruler. Posa wants Philipp, Lerma wants Don Carlos to be "ein Mensch" on the throne; Goethe saw Ludwig I of Bavaria as a monarch "der neben der königlichen Majestät seine angeborene schöne Menschennatur gerettet hat" (Eckermann, 8/4/1829), and similar criteria enable Herder in his letters on humanity to single out such rulers as Frederick the Great and Joseph II. Lessing points to Christ as the supreme human being, insisting in the opening paragraph of Die Religion Christi, "daß er nie aufgehört hat, Mensch zu sein" (I,1126). In the early eighteenth century, Pufendorf had seen the search for humanity uniting all men, and this same totality of aims is very much a part of Classicism. Lessing in Ernst und Falk and Nathan der Weise sees the brotherhood of man, as does Posa in Don Carlos. There is a need to ensure the happiness of all, to have "Sinn und Mitgefühl für die gesamte Menschheit" (Herder, XVIII,291). "Das

Menschengeschlecht ist ein Ganzes", Herder believed, "wir arbeiten und dulden, säen und ernten für einander" (XVIII,284).

The Classicist saw the two sides of human nature, the animal and sensual, the divine and spiritual. Kant especially observed the incompatibility of these two, for Schiller man had to choose between "Sinnenglück und Seelenfrieden" ("Das Ideal und das Leben"). Faust has two souls, one keeping him firmly in the squalor of the earth, the other drawing him up above to higher spiritual things. Man for Goethe and Schiller has a divine spark in him, he is aware of his divinity: "Die Anlage zu der Gottheit trägt der Mensch unwiderrprechlich in seiner Persönlichkeit in sich" (Anmut und Würde (XX,343)). This divinity is not always used correctly, as Mephisto cynically comments -

Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein,  
Nur tierischer als jedes Tier zu sein. (Faust,285-6)

Goethe once told Müller (29/4/1818):

Der Mensch, wie sehr ihn auch die Erde anzieht mit  
ihren tausend und übertausend Erscheinungen, hebt  
doch den Blick forschend und sehnd zum Himmel auf,  
... weil er ... fühlt, daß er ein Bürger jenes  
geistigen Reiches sei, woran wir den Glauben nicht  
abzulehnen noch aufzugeben vermögen.

Clearly such preoccupation must not be extreme, man's ideal is to reach a perfect balance of his two sides, for Schiller tells us: "Freiheit liegt nur in der Zusammenwirkung seiner beiden Naturen" (XX,365).

The concept of harmony as the correct balance of all man's faculties is an ideal which for Schiller is expressed in grace: "die Anmut nämlich zeugt von einem ruhigen, in sich harmonischen Gemüt" (XX,300). Such harmony is the artist's goal in "Die Künstler", and Goethe, according to Schiller, had achieved it in Iphigenie: "Die wilden Dissonanzen ... lösen sich hier ... in die süßeste Harmonie auf" (XXII,233). Wilhelm Meister seeks the "harmonische Ausbildung (seiner) Natur" (Lehrjahre, V,3). Hölderlin, in the novel Hyperion, sees the child as naturally harmonious;

Im Kind ist Freiheit allein. In ihm ist Frieden,  
es ist noch nicht mit sich selber zerfallen .... Von  
Kinderharmonie sind einst die Völker ausgegangen.  
(III,10,63)

and hence he wishes, "daß man werden kann, wie die Kinder" (III.61). Schiller also sees man lamenting "über die in unserm Handeln vermißte sittliche Harmonie" (XX,427) and longing for an earlier age of natural harmony; "So lange der Mensch noch reine Natur ist, wirkt er als ungeteilte sinnliche Einheit und als ein harmonisierendes Ganze" (XX,436). Hence man takes a delight in the naivety of children. But Schiller, more than Hölderlin, insists that man must look ahead, not back, he must seek the natural harmony of children on a more conscious moral level:

Sie sind, was wir waren, sie sind, was wir wieder werden sollen. Wir waren Natur wie sie, und unsere Kultur soll uns, auf dem Wege der Vernunft und der Freiheit, zur Natur zurückführen. (XX,414)

Ist der Mensch in den Stand der Kultur getreten und hat die Kunst ihre Hand an ihn gelegt, so ist jene sinnliche Harmonie in ihm aufgehoben, und er kann nur noch als moralische Einheit, d.h. als nach Einheit strebend sich äußern. Die Übereinstimmung zwischen seinem Empfinden und Denken, die in dem ersten Zustande wirklich stattfand, existiert jetzt bloß idealisch. (XX,437)

Ultimately, the same conclusion is also reached by Hölderlin: "Ideal wird, was Natur war" (III,63).

Ideally man voluntarily does his duty, what is right also seems natural. This is "reine Menschlichkeit", the person who achieves this balance is considered to be a "schöne Seele", such as Natalie in Wilhelm Meister, "da ihre Natur nichts fordert, als was die Welt wünscht und braucht" (Lehrjahre, VIII,5) or Max Piccolomini, to whom Wallenstein says, "Du konntest spielend deine Pflichten üben" (Wallensteins Tod,720), and who himself believes, "dem edlen Herzen könnte/ Die schwerste Pflicht die nächste scheinen" (2326-7).<sup>(11)</sup> Humanus, the leader of the community in Goethe's Geheimnisse, is a similar figure. Life ultimately is a moral striving but the ideal is beauty of the soul, moral excellence; "das letzte Produkt der sich immer steigernden Natur ist der schöne Mensch"

(Goethe, XII,102). This moral excellence, an inclination to do one's duty, is also an attitude expressed by grace: "In einer schönen Seele ist es also, wo Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, Pflicht und Neigung harmonieren, und Grazie ist ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung" (Anmut und Würde (XX,288)). In times of catastrophe, such beauty is impossible, in which case man's moral side must conquer his physical side and produce sublimity through a voluntary renunciation of man's natural instincts. This in Schiller's classical tragedies involves acquiescing in one's own death.

An important prerequisite for man's successful development was the faculty for self-knowledge, "sich kennen": "Wer sich kennt, kann sicher vor- und rückwärts gehen" (Egmont, II,2). "Das eigentliche Studium der Menschheit ist der Mensch", wrote Goethe (VI,417), echoing Pope; similarly in Humboldt's words, "die höchste Menschlichkeit wird durch das tiefste Studium des Menschen gewirkt" (II,7). Wilhelm Meister is told: "Sie haben Recht, der Mensch ist dem Menschen das Interessanteste und sollte ihn vielleicht ganz allein interessieren" (Lehrjahre, II,4). Goethe felt he had achieved insight into his own nature in the early Weimar years, though he later said that he was going to Italy to achieve self-knowledge, a sign that it is an ever continuing process. It is a demand made of many of Goethe's characters, of Meister, of Tasso, who is told, "Erkenne, was du bist" (3420). Faust believes he had achieved this insight in the scene "Wald und Höhle" through the Erdgeist:

Dann führst du mich zur sichern Höhle, zeigst  
Mich dann mir selbst, und meiner eignen Brust  
Geheime tiefe Wunder öffnen sich. (Faust, 3232-4)

Goethe himself is told by the muse, "Erkenne dich, leb' mit der Welt in Frieden" ("Zueignung", 1.64). Joan of Arc reaches this state of self-awareness in Die Jungfrau von Orleans (3170), Posa in Don Carlos demands that man come to a recognition of his own merits (3247-8). Goethe states this aim in more detail in the essay "Shakespeare und kein Ende":

Das Höchste wozu der Mensch gelangen kann, ist das Bewußtsein eigener Gesinnungen und Gedanken, das Erkennen seiner selbst, welches ihm die Einleitung gibt, auch fremde Gemütsarten innig zu erkennen.  
(XII,287)

This ability to understand others works in two ways. Tasso is told that he will only understand himself through understanding other people and hence it is vital that he does not avoid people and seek an unnatural state of isolation;

Der Mensch erkennt sich nur im Menschen, nur  
Das Leben lehret jedem, was er sei (Tasso,1242-3)

This recognition of others is also a theme in Lehrjahre, it is a difficult task (Maximen,1164),<sup>(12)</sup> lack of it proves to be Wallenstein's downfall and Gessler's, for they fail to grant other people independent existence and treat them instead as puppets.

Man is limited, he cannot know everything, as the youth warns the king in Schiller's "Der Taucher". The important point is that he must recognise and accept this, must fully understand his own nature. It is Faust's final insight into his own nature that is partly responsible for his salvation, and it is typical that art and beauty in the shape of Helen of Troy help him to reach this awareness. Man must accept the way he is, he cannot change his human nature which is basically unalterable; this is Schiller's idea of the unalterable "Person" in the eleventh aesthetic letter. If God had wanted him to be different, Goethe once said ("Sprüche",100), then God would have made him differently, which is what the mother in Hermann und Dorothea realises: "So wie Gott sie uns gab, so muß man sie haben und lieben" (III,48).

For Goethe, even God is conceived of in terms of man's highest potential ("Proömion"), the gods need man to prove their very existence (Iphigenie, "Das Göttliche"). Man does nevertheless believe in a higher order, though with Goethe and Schiller it would be difficult to attach the word "God" to this belief, at least not in a strictly Christian sense. Religion for Herder was the highest humanity (XIII,161), but he attacked the existing church

and outdated dogma for stopping progress and free thought, which is Marquis Posa's criticism of Philipp's regime. Goethe prefers the concept of "the gods", and divinity for a pantheist was as much within man as something external. Schiller recognises the importance of a higher will in the universe: "Und ein Gott ist, ein heiliger Wille lebt" ("Worte des Glaubens"), but here again the Classical writer remains more interested in man himself.

One of the highest ideals was truth, the ultimate aim of man's attempts to understand himself and the universe. To discover truth gave man great pleasure (Herder, XVII,36), and all men should strive to find truth (XVII,247):

Irrtum verläßt uns nie, doch ziehet ein höher Bedürfnis  
Immer den strebenden Geist leise zur Wahrheit hinan.  
(Goethe, I,226)

Each man should try to discover truth for himself and then repeat it - "Das alte Wahre, faß es an!" ("Vermächtnis"). Herder hoped to spread truth through his "Bund der Humanität" and saw truth as ultimately victorious (XVII,338). Truth is the demand made by Orest - "Zwischen uns/ Sei Wahrheit (Iphigenie,1080-1) - and in Iphigenie's call to the gods: "Verherrlicht/ Durch mich die Wahrheit!" (1918-9). It is the guiding light in Schiller's philosophical poems: "Die Künstler", "Die Götter Griechenlands", "Das Ideal und das Leben", "An Goethe", "Die Ideale";

So fließt in einen Bund der Wahrheit  
In einen Strom des Lichts zurück! ("Die Künstler",480-1)

Truth is fruitful, unlike falsehood, but truth is not simply that which is not false, it is rather that which is eternal, generally valid. Truth is seen in nature, and Goethe sought to make the truth available to a confused world (Eckermann, 16/12/1828). Truth could not often be seen, ultimate truth had to be veiled, otherwise the naked eye could not bear the sight. The boy in Schiller's "Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais" discovers this too late. In his Witterungslehre Goethe wrote, "Das Wahre, mit dem Göttlichen identisch, läßt sich niemals von uns direkt erkennen, wir schauen es nur im Abglanz, im Beispiel, Symbol, in einzelnen und verwandten Erscheinungen" (XIII,305),

and hence Faust discovers: "Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben" (4727). For Hölderlin there are certain things which the gods have wisely hidden from man, who is allowed only a glimpse of divinity ("Dichterberuf", "Friedensfeier", "Brot und Wein"). Nevertheless man must continue to strive in the hope that he will find truth.

In this the artist is a great help. Poetry shows timeless truth, not "die gemeine enge Wirklichkeit" which Schiller rejects.<sup>(13)</sup> Some of these timeless truths are seen in Goethe's "Urworte" or in Schiller's "Worte des Glaubens". Goethe receives the gift of poetry "aus der Hand der Wahrheit" ("Zueignung"); he saw truth as the guiding light, the inner core of all art,

Wie Natur im Vielgebilde  
Einen Gott nur offenbart,  
So im weiten Kunstgebilde  
Webt ein Sinn der ew'gen Art,  
Dieses ist der Sinn der Wahrheit,  
Der sich nur mit Schönerem schmückt  
Und getrost der höchsten Klarheit  
Hellsten Tags entgegenblickt. (Wanderjahre, II,8)

Schiller sees the vital necessity of art revealing truth. In Schiller's eyes, Goethe knew "durch tiefe Wahrheit zu entzücken, .... und in der Wahrheit findet man das Schöne" ("An Goethe"). Schiller was at times so perturbed by the prosaic nature of the age that he suggested that the artist should leave reality entirely rather than reach an unhappy compromise (letter to Herder, 4/11/1795). On the whole, however, despite a rejection of all servile imitation of nature (letter to Goethe, 29/12/1797), there is an insistence that art be based on reality, life and nature, not on anything abstract as often in Romantic art. Poetry uses reality, but reality which has been idealised, generalised and purified both by the selection of more general topics and by the influence of the artistic form. But it is truth rather than limited reality: "der Natur nachlässig rohe Töne" have no place in art (Schiller: "An Goethe"). Artistic truth is the depiction of ultimate reality. Goethe saw this ideal in the paintings of Claude Lorrain: "Und das ist eben die wahre Idealität, die sich

realer Mittel so zu bedienen weiß, daß das erscheinende Wahre eine Täuschung hervorbringt, als sei es wirklich" (Eckermann, 10/4/1829). Schiller warned Goethe in similar terms, "Der Schein soll nie die Wirklichkeit erreichen" ("An Goethe"), poetry should never coincide with ordinary reality if it is to remain absolutely true (Schiller to Goethe, 4/4/1797). Goethe sought the true aspects of reality: "Nur das innig und ewig Wahre kann mich nun erfreuen" (XI,475).

The achievement of self-awareness enables man to control himself and reach self-mastery, the toughest test in life, according to Goethe's Die Geheimnisse (182). Kant had told man, "Bestimme dich aus dir selbst", and for Classical man this meant recognition of his weaknesses and limitations, and the ability to control these in order to make optimum use of his potential. This is the moral of Die Geheimnisse:

Von der Gewalt, die alle Wesen bindet,  
Befreit der Mensch sich, der sich überwindet. (191-2)  
- and it is the lesson the master spells out to the youth who has slain the dragon in Schiller's poem ("Der Kampf mit dem Drachen", 283-4). Man is independent, responsible for his own welfare, and hence also for not letting himself run riot. Tasso however "beherrscht/ So wenig seinen Mund als seine Brust" (2147-8). "Die Hauptsache ist, daß man lerne, sich selbst zu beherrschen", Goethe told Eckermann (21/3/1830). If man was free and independent, he must be able to control himself (Goethe, WA XLIV,352). To declare oneself free meant stating that one could control oneself, hence in Hermann und Dorothea, man is warned, "Sprech' er doch nie von Freiheit, als könn' er sich selber regieren!" (VI,78), and in "Ilmenau" Goethe praises the ruler for limiting his own freedom, for being capable of renunciation. For the sake of himself and of humanity at large, man voluntarily accepts limitations, recognising the "Grenzen der Menschheit" within which man can lead a full and happy life, just as the various parts of nature are limited for the good of the whole ("Metamorphose der Tiere").

The "Sturm und Drang" had seen all limitations as evil,



had stood for complete freedom, but Classicism saw limitations as necessary and beneficial; "sich zu beschränken ... das macht den Dichter, den Künstler, den Menschen" (Goethe to Frau von Stein, 22/7/1776), and Wilhelm Meister is made to realise that "allem Leben, allem Tun, aller Kunst muß das Handwerk vorausgehen, welches nur in der Beschränkung erworben wird" (Wanderjahre, I,12). Each man doing any sort of job concentrates on the qualities needed for that work, whilst in ordinary life man limits each of his faculties in order to develop a more harmonious, a more complete character. Only in the ideal "schöne Seele" is such harmony already present. "Nur also beschränkt war je das Vollkommene möglich", is the message of "Metamorphose der Tiere"; Wilhelm Meister is taught: "der Mensch ist nicht eher glücklich, als bis sein unbedingtes Streben sich selbst seine Begrenzung bestimmt" (Lehrjahre, VIII,5).<sup>(14)</sup> Schiller, in the aesthetic letters, sees the danger of a one-sided development in man, Hölderlin fears that the Germans of his day are fragmented, lacking totality and humanity, Goethe however believes that man can realise all his potential despite the necessary limitations of specialisation.

Total freedom, so vital for the "Stürmer und Dränger", is now rejected as dangerous for many people who do not know what to do with it.<sup>(15)</sup> Too much freedom may lead to excess, loss of humanity due to too much emphasis being placed on one part of man's character. Schiller's "Der Tanz" shows the dancers voluntarily accepting the limitations on their freedom imposed by the movements in the dance and fitting in with the interests of the whole. Gordon in Wallenstein recognises his own limitations and is satisfied with his lot, whilst Wallenstein seeks to go beyond his true position in life. The Swiss in Wilhelm Tell insist on remaining within their correct limits (1372). Tasso realises, "Der Mensch ist nicht geboren, frei zu sein" (930). Both Schiller and Goethe were dubious about the effects of freedom on men not yet educated to make the best use of it, Goethe thought that most men had enough freedom

if they were able to work, eat, and keep a family (Egmont, II,1, Eckermann, 18/1/1827).

The ideals which are now held aloft, by Goethe especially, are "Grenzen", "Schränken", "Gesetze", "Ordnung", "Geduld", "Entsagung". Herder points to the virtues underlined by Homer, among them "Gerechtigkeit, ... Geduld, Weisheit, Mäßigung, Sanftmut, ... Treue, Wahrheit" (XVII,182). Order, both in man and in the state, is seen to overcome the chaos of the "Sturm und Drang", and it is an ideal extolled in "Lied von der Glocke" as "heil'ge Ordnung, segenreiche/Himmelstochter" and in Wilhelm Meister: "Welchen Überblick verschafft uns nicht die Ordnung, in der wir unsere Geschäfte führen" (Lehrjahre, I,10). The best cure for the mentally ill is: "Man erzeuge ihre Selbsttätigkeit, man gewöhne sie an Ordnung" (Lehrjahre, V.16).<sup>(16)</sup> Patience is continually praised by Goethe, in Tasso, Iphigenie, in Hermann und Dorothea, but also by the hero in Schiller's Wilhelm Tell, it is "ein liebliches Gebild, eine Pandora im höhern Sinne (Maximen, 56) - "Glaube nur, du hast viel getan,/ Wenn dir Geduld gewöhnest an" (HA I,316). Renunciation is preached by Gordon in Wallenstein, Agnes Sorel in Jungfrau, by the princess in Tasso, it is lacking in Eduard in Wahlverwandtschaften, Lydie in Wilhelm Meister, by Eugenie at the start of Die natürliche Tochter.

Goethe's "Natur und Kunst" concludes with the assertion, "Das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben", and this would clearly seem to reflect his social as well as his aesthetic views. A common theme is the stress on the eternal laws of nature according to which man lives,<sup>(17)</sup> and from Tasso onwards the "Sturm und Drang" rejection of laws in society is overcome and their beneficial effect is recognised. Laws are seen as man's attempt to approximate to the moral order of the universe (Maximen,109), in Hermann und Dorothea chaos results from the overthrowing of the law (VI,58, VI,79-80), hence the mature older man sees their value (Maximen,112). Man for Schiller is "stark durch Gesetze" ("Die Künstler", 1.7), in "Lied von der Glocke" the eye of the law watches over man, in Wallensteins Tod Gordon says

of man, "Ihn hält/ In Schranken nur das deutliche Gesetz" (2485-6). Only the person who tries to ignore the law will notice its force. Goethe even suggested that it was better for man to risk some unjust laws than for there to be no laws at all. In Schiller's aesthetic letters, it is specifically the "Formtrieb" that furnishes the laws of existence (XX,346). For both Goethe and Schiller, laws are a vital part of the creation of aesthetic beauty. (18)

A vital theme of self-control is that of moderation, whether between physical and spiritual, individual and society, or between nature and art. The human body is a combination of "Freiheit und Maß" ("Metamorphose der Tiere"). "Der Tanz" shows freedom moderated by the demands of the whole group. Gordon sees the dangers inherent in man's being unable to moderate his own desires (Wallensteins Tod, 2485), Wilhelm Meister comes to learn that "nur durch Mäßigung erhalten wir uns" (Wanderjahre, I.7). (19) Moderation especially involves an avoidance of extremes, to which youth is most susceptible, as the Templar in Nathan or Tasso. Extremes usually bring tragedy - for Mignon, for Wallenstein's excessive ambition, Tasso's excessive introversion, for the brothers' jealousy in Braut von Messina, for Euphorion. A sensible man "braucht sich nur zu mäßigen, so ist er auch glücklich" (Wanderjahre, II,4).

The complete external freedom demanded by the "Sturm und Drang" is not retained, but the concept of "Freiheit" is still an important one, now however in the form of inner freedom. Man should remain free to develop himself, according to Humboldt, but this development is a full one within a voluntary acceptance of limitations. This balance between freedom on the one hand and limitation on the other is the overriding concern which characterises the use of many of the ideals and concepts so far considered. Man freely does what is right, he realises:

daß das unschätzbare Glück der Freiheit nicht darin besteht, daß man alles tut, was man tun mag und wozu uns die Umstände einladen, sondern daß man das ohne Hindernis und Rückhalt, auf dem geraden Wege tun kann, was man für recht und schicklich hält. (Lehrjahre, VI)

Man always has this freedom, and it is ironic that the evil Alba points to precisely this freedom "recht zu tun" (Egmont, IV,2). In the ideal state, man has complete freedom of determination, but it is in his nature not to make excessive use of this. Man is free within the laws of the state, or within an acceptance of his own limitations. Freedom is in any case something which is not permanent, but which man should earn for himself each day (Faust, Tell, "Ilmenau"). The freedom of man's mind, his moral will is never challenged and is the source of victory in tragedy in Schiller's mature plays.

Goethe, Schiller, Herder all feared an outbreak of elemental forces in society, were against the destructive powers of revolution.<sup>(20)</sup> Wilhelm Tell and the Swiss rebel in a good cause however, with moderation and self-control and with deliberation. The Swiss reveal bourgeois values and ideals - order, justice, moderation, patience, modesty, the desire for peace. Not everyone is capable of using freedom in such a way:

Freiheit ist ein herrlicher Schmuck, der schönste  
von allen  
Und doch steht er, wir sehn's, wahrlich nicht  
jeglichem an. (Goethe, I,230)

The "Sturm und Drang" had upheld the cult of the individual, the daemonic personality defying authority or the heavens; men such as Faust, Prometheus, Karl Moor, Götz. Classicism however sees the importance of the totality of man and hence the community is seen as vital for man's development. Man follows mutually useful laws, morals, orders, even risking an occasional injustice rather than reject such institutions. Man is free within the state, which ideally will be "der Ausleger seines schönen Instinkts, die deutlichere Formel seiner innern Gesetzgebung" (Schiller, XX,318). Man is weak by himself, limited, "kein einzelner von uns ist durch sich selbst Mensch worden" (Herder, XIII,346), hence man joins a community: "Allein kann der Mensch nicht wohl bestehen, daher schlägt er sich gern zu einer Partei" (Maximen,153). The individual is always likely to fail due to idleness,



The community for Herder enables man to reach his full potential.

The sort of community that was best suited to such ideals was of course itself ideal. The government was to follow the best interests of its members. "Fürstengröße" was to be allied to "Bürgerglück" (Don Carlos, 3152-3). The ideal state would not need to be spoken of, but the depressing situation of most contemporary communities, even the relatively benevolent despotism of Karl August in Weimar, was clearly realised, if not openly admitted by the Classicists. Consequently the emphasis is placed on small natural forms of community. The "Turmgesellschaft" in Wilhelm Meister is a small select band encompassing all facets of humanity. One man promotes one aspect, another a further aspect, both together constitute "ein Mensch". Herder believed the most natural state was like a family (XIII, 384), for Schiller the family often represents the basic community. The family is the basis of society and crimes against the family are the worst of all, as in Tell and Die Braut von Messina, as earlier in Räuber. Herder saw the dehumanising nature of life in the big city, Goethe's Hermann und Dorothea compares this type of society unfavourably with a small rural community. There is a generally dim view of large states, a distrust of the mob, especially if given too much freedom. There is also an avoidance of real political questions, though this is perhaps understandable in the Germany of small petty principalities.

All saw the need for a community however. Progress was possible only through the community - at least until man had been aesthetically educated in Schiller's terms. The community for Goethe bears man's good qualities. Schiller perhaps is less optimistic about society, he places more stress on the exceptional individual as the way to an ideal society, and ultimately he hoped to make any sort of government redundant. In the meantime he, like Goethe, saw progress being achieved through society rather than the individual, but in any case their works, if not

their theories, use the great individual (Iphigenie, Faust, Johanna, Wallenstein), and only in Tell and to some extent in Hermann und Dorothea do we see a community presented on stage.

Within the community, Goethe and Herder placed great stress on activity, on leading a full life and striving for greater things. The Abbé in Wilhelm Meister believes "das Erste und Letzte am Menschen sei Tätigkeit" (Lehrjahre, VIII,3), whilst the wanderers' song tells us "und dein Leben sei die Tat". Tasso is advised to take a greater active part in life, in society, whilst Faust's raison d'être is his insatiable desire for activity and his continual striving is the key to his salvation. "Der Mensch soll/ Immer streben zum Bessern" (Hermann, V,6-7), and this is echoed by Herder in the twenty-fifth Humanitätsbrief. Even for the optimistic Goethe, activity is dangerous - "der Handelnde ist immer gewissenlos" (XII,399) - and deeds limit man, endangering his harmony and the achievement of totality. Especially for Schiller, activity often means loss of humanity, above all in the political field, as also for Goethe. The innocent are enmeshed, except in the ideal case of Wilhelm Tell, unity is lost, man ceases to trust others. Goethe underlines the need for a balance of thought and action (Wanderjahre, II,9), but activity ultimately is the source of his belief in man's eternity (Eckermann, 4/2/1829). All the Classicists disliked the activity of the big wide world. The citizens in Hermann, the peasants in Jungfrau want to let the world outside go on without them, secure, or so they think, in their cosy idyll;

Kommt! Und denke jeder  
Nur an das Nächste! Lassen wir die Großen,  
Der Erde Fürsten um die Erde lösen. (Jungfrau, 374-6)

The Swiss prefer to stay in the midst of nature with their small community rather than enter the world outside which Tell thinks is inhuman. After the bustle of the "Sturm und Drang", Goethe cultivated a quietist period, and the vocabulary of this period, above all the adjectives "still", "ruhig", "sanft", remained with him throughout and were increasingly used by Schiller after the meeting with Goethe.

The view of the state and the world at large remains a rather reluctant inclusion in the world of the Classicists, there is none of the importance which Romantics such as Adam Müller were to attach to these institutions.

Goethe and Herder retained the "Sturm und Drang" affirmation of nature even in their later work. Nature is one vast creative whole, a chain or sphere, "ewig-schaffend". Man, God and Nature are as one, God works within Nature and within man. Nature was the basis of reason, a source of eternal laws which could be observed in man and in life in general, also a proof of the permanence which man could not always see in himself ("Das Göttliche", "Vermächtnis"). Nature, as well as being a source of laws, was a guide; man grows up in a more human way in the midst of nature ("Hermann und Dorothea"). The laws of nature rule man's life as well, but in stressing the "ewige, ehrne, große Gesetze" ("Das Göttliche"), Goethe was going against the irrational, lawless view of nature of the "Sturm und Drang". Nature is a source of eternity (Maximen, 5), of divinity, of wisdom and truth (Novelle), "ihre ewig unwandelbar große Wahrheit vereinigt mehr und mehr die Menschen" (letter to Schubarth, 24/8/1819), to Eckermann (13/2/1829) Goethe said that nature was always right.

Art in the "Sturm und Drang" had been an attempt to reflect nature in all its illogicality and wildness. For the mature Goethe, art still mirrors nature, but it is now more a case of that which is natural. Nature remains the key to artistic creation, and antiquity is seen to give the poet a great feeling for nature. The basis of all art is "das Wahre, das Naturgemäße" (Goethe, VIII, 479). In his early Weimar years, Goethe had tried to keep literary art and scientific study apart, but he found this division increasingly unsatisfactory. After 1786 and the journey to Italy, he combined the two again, a marriage praised in "Natur und Kunst", and reaching full poetic form in Novelle, in which art and nature are happily mixed. Culture intrudes tastefully into the seemingly impenetrable



landscape around the castle, music tames the king of the jungle. One way in which Hölderlin reveals his greater affinity with Romanticism is in the great emphasis on nature as something overpowering and permanent. The child is perfectly at one with nature, but in growing up the man becomes estranged from its beauties ("Da ich ein Knabe war", "Der Mensch"). Hence Hölderlin demands a return to nature and natural feelings:

Eines zu sein mit Allem, was lebt, in seliger  
Selbstvergessenheit wiederzukehren ins All der Natur,  
das ist der Gipfel der Gedanken und Freuden, das ist  
die heilige Bergeshöhe, der Ort der ewigen Ruhe.  
(GSA III,9)

Hölderlin insists that art owes everything to nature ("Natur und Kunst"), though it must be said that the formal artistic structure of his poetry belies this assertion to a great extent.

For Kant, nature ran contrary to reason, and this was Schiller's belief in the period of his early philosophical essays. Schiller had no joy in nature for its own sake, he saw it as unjust, irrational and amoral, thus retaining the "Sturm und Drang" view of nature which was however now seen as bad, as is to some extent still the case in Goethe's "Das Göttliche". In the essay Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen, the forces of nature are to be defeated by freedom and the mind (XX,139), and art was "die Darstellung des Übersinnlichen" (XX,196). Schiller however saw the impossibility of presenting this on stage, and under Goethe's influence he came to at least a partial affirmation of nature, as in the essay on the two types of poetry, although even here nature is still more a symbol of the human sphere than used for its own sake. It is still more the ideas that nature arouses within us that please us rather than the objects of nature themselves. Schiller is nevertheless interested in art in "der Natur getreues Bild" ("An Goethe"). Schiller sees man's weakness as a natural being (Vom Erhabenen), and architectonic beauty is inferior to grace or moral beauty. Nevertheless Schiller comes to see nature as important for his ideal of totality, even if at first nature is only

present to be defeated by man's freedom of mind. Poets were "schon ihrem Begriffe nach die Bewahrer der Natur", or they will seek the lost nature (XX,432). Schiller comes to see nature as a guarantee of permanence. In "Der Spaziergang" Homer's sun shines for us also, whilst in Tell the mountains and lakes reflect the lasting nature of man's rights. In the midst of all the changes of life, nature maintains "das alte Gesetz" (Braut von Messina, 2286-8).

The ideal becomes the man of naturally moral behaviour, the regaining on the moral level of the naturalness of children. In the aesthetic man or state there is no compulsion, but a mutual limitation of the mind and the senses. In tragedy however there is a need still to overcome nature and the senses (Über das Erhabene), hence sublimity is required by the tragic heroes of Schiller's plays. Only in Tell does the aesthetic state reach fruition, do we see moral beauty.

Concomitant with the insistence on nature in Goethe's work is the stress placed on experience. Goethe, unlike Kant, believed man could trust his senses fully ("Vermächtnis"), hence the importance of observing the world - "Anschauen" (letter to Humboldt, 3/12/1795). Man can perceive the essence of nature through his senses, and Goethe believes in intuition, imagination, in the importance of his own subjective observation. Instinct, sense, feeling are for Goethe a guide to humanity. Iphigenie tells Thoas, "gewähre, wie du's fühlst" (1992), Orest's heart tells him he is cured, and Iphigenie believes the voice of humanity speaks to her heart (494). For Kant, "Gefühl" was negative and destructive, Schiller also was distrustful. Gradually however, Schiller comes to affirm natural feelings and goes against reflection and abstraction. It is the heart which preserves the words of truth for man; Max, Thekla and Gordon all believe the heart can tell man the right way to behave, and Max seems to echo Iphigenie in telling Thekla: "Bedenke nichts. Sag wie du fühlst" (Wallensteins Tod, 2309).<sup>(22)</sup> The matters of importance which overtake Max cause him to

lose this natural humanity - "O! welchen Riß erregst du mir im Herzen!" (Tod,736) - just as Joan of Arc loses hers, and ultimately, real humanity can only be achieved through the conscious powers of thought, through Max's deliberate desertion of Wallenstein or Johanna's refusal to defend herself. Mere instinct is inadequate to face life fully, Max and Johanna are only like children at the beginning, a more mature approach to one's position is needed to face a crisis. For Iphigenie, however, deliberation confuses her natural humanity, it is only when she returns to a belief in the rightness of her instincts that she succeeds.

For Schiller and Kant morality was vital. Kant stressed that all man's actions should be carried out for the sake of the moral law (IV,390), and he rejected any place for man's natural side in such considerations. The moral law was to be followed even if this meant overcoming sensuality entirely in death. This is still the case in Schiller's tragedies, if not in his theories, and Goethe himself stresses in Tasso that "erlaubt ist, was sich ziemt" (1006). Morality for Kant is the expression of man's deepest will, appreciated by his reason (Vernunft), even though his understanding (Verstand) sees it as unnatural and against his interests (IV,460). Man for Goethe becomes a "Mensch" in behaving morally: "Wo ich aufhören muß, sittlich zu sein, habe ich keine Gewalt mehr" (VIII,469) ... "Das Wirkliche ohne sittlichen Bezug nennen wir gemein" (Maximen,1042). Moral behaviour is the source of freedom for Schiller - "Der moralisch gebildete Mensch und nur dieser ist ganz frei" (XXI,39) - and for Schiller especially freedom is seen in moral terms as the freedom of the will. The Classicists believed in the moral goodness of man, insisted on man's inclination to virtue. In "Das Göttliche" man naturally should do what is useful and right. Man has a moral choice which he must exercise. He puts the interests of the community above his personal ones and follows the categorical imperative: "handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein allgemeines Gesetz

werde" (Kant, IV,421).

Morality is seen more in practical terms by Goethe, man's conscience is his moral guide ("Vermächtnis"), morality is within man ("Das Göttliche"). Goethe is interested in general attitudes to life in the individual and the community rather than abstract laws of morality. Life was an end in itself, whereas Schiller at first saw life as a means to morality (XX,141). Schiller himself, however, gradually becomes more interested in freedom and beauty than in morality, and this is now rejected when inimical to man's freedom. It becomes wrong to demand "moralische Zweckmäßigkeit" (Über das Pathetische), which he had earlier seen as essential (Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen). Beauty and grace are joined in a moral action, morality is not strictly necessary for a "schöne Natur", though in practical terms it usually is:

Kannst du nicht schön empfinden, dir bleibt doch  
vernünftig zu wollen,  
Und als ein Geist zu tun, was du als Mensch nicht  
vermagst. ("Die moralische Kraft")

His later tragedies still show a moral victory, insist on duty - "O kehre/ Zurück zu deiner Pflicht", as Max begs Wallenstein (Tod,813-4) - although his late essays demand that the plays should appeal to aesthetic rather than moral judgement.

For both Goethe and Schiller, the woman is a guide to natural morality:

Aber mit sanft überredender Bitte  
Führen die Frauen den Zepter der Sitte.  
(Schiller, "Würde der Frauen")

Willst du genau erfahren, was sich ziemt,  
So frage nur bei edlen Frauen an.

Nach Freiheit strebt der Mann, das Weib nach Sitte.  
(Torquato Tasso,1013-4,1022)

A noble man will listen to the words of a woman (Iphigenie, 213-4,1863-4), "Der Umgang mit Frauen ist das Element guter Sitten" (HA VI,396). Similar ideas are found in Schiller's Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung: women are more naturally harmonious, they show moral beauty. For Hölderlin also, German women preserve the spirit of the

gods in difficult times, whilst the vital importance of Diotima need hardly be underlined. The Classical "schöne Seele" is almost invariably a woman, Wilhelm Tell being the exception rather than the rule, and for Goethe especially the effect of love on man is a moralising, ennobling force. Faust is saved by the help of Gretchen and "das Ewigweibliche" draws him onward.

Despite the insistence on limitations and on man's need to join a community, a major Classical theme is the search for totality, completion, perfection. The ideal state would be reached "wenn die gesunde Natur des Menschen als ein Ganzes wirkt" (Goethe, XII,98). Man should make use of, combine all his faculties, as Goethe had sought to do in the Roman Elegies. Schiller seeks totality of character (XX,318), man must wait "bis die Trennung in dem innern Menschen wieder aufgehoben und seine Natur vollständig genug entwickelt ist" (XX,328). Tell is a man of harmony and totality, as a result he can perform apparent miracles. Faust wants to experience the totality of humanity:

Und was der ganzen Menschheit zugeteilt ist,  
Will ich in meinem innern Selbst genießen -

but Mephisto has to tell him,

Glaub unsereinem: dieses Ganze  
Ist nur für einen Gott gemacht! (Faust, 1770-1, 1780-1)

Nevertheless, within himself, man can utilise his full humanity. Hyperion discovers "wer nur mit ganzer Seele wirkt, irrt nie" (GSA III,104), and Schiller sees man's task as the striving for perfection:

Keiner sei gleich dem andern, doch gleich sei jeder  
dem Höchsten.

Wie das zu machen? Es sei jeder vollendet in sich.  
("Aufgabe")

The ideal in life can be seen in nature, a totality revealing the perfection man cannot see in himself (Schiller, XX,414), or in art, where the artist creates a whole in his work, where beauty is the key to totality and moral excellence (XX,364,410). Man is a microcosm parallel to nature, "Im Innern lebt ein Universum auch" ("Proömion"), and each man strives to be "ein ganzer Mensch": "Er [der Mensch] ist ein Ganzes, eine Einheit vielfacher, innig

verbundener Kräfte" (Goethe, XII,81). Goethe, however, often has his doubts on this matter. If man cannot be a totality, he should join one, this is "Pflicht für jeden";

Immer strebe zum Ganzen, und kannst du selber kein  
Ganzes  
Werden, als dienendes Glied schließ an ein Ganzes  
dich an. (I,226)

This aim of man is underlined by Humboldt: "Der wahre Zweck des Menschen ... ist die höchste und proportionierlichste Bildung seiner Kräfte zu einem Ganzen" (I,64). Women are again nearer the ideal of totality, they combine nature and intellect more perfectly than men, they bear natural morality.

Goethe sees the universe built up of pairs, material and spiritual, good and bad, light and dark, night and day. In each case the bad side is necessary to make one aware of the good, but also Goethe is able to subsume this apparent disharmony, through his concept of polarity, under a new totality which envelops the two opposites. In "Metamorphose der Tiere" the whole universe is seen in this way:

Dieser schöne Begriff von Macht und Schranken, von  
Willkür  
Und Gesetz, von Freiheit und Maß, von beweglicher  
Ordnung,  
Vorzug und Mangel erfreue dich hoch! Die heilige Muse  
Bringt harmonisch ihn dir, mit sanftem Zwange  
belehrend. (II.50-3)

This totality in the midst of apparent disunity is achieved through the idea of the archetype, the "Urpflanze", "Urbild" which forms the basis of all later developments. The union of the sexes is a further example of this harmony, as are the symbols of chain and sphere connecting the phenomena of the universe. Goethe saw the perpetual splitting up and reuniting in nature, which he described as inhalation and exhalation, "die ewige Systole und Diastole, die ewige Synkrisis und Diakrisis, das Ein- und Ausatmen der Welt" (XIII,488, cf. also XIII,337). Hence there are the twin urges in man for material contraction and spiritual expansion, symbolised by the motifs of hut and wanderer, but the concept of polarity enables Goethe

rather artificially to overlook conflicts through the belief in overlapping totality.

It was more in keeping with Schiller's character, and also a result of his instincts as a dramatist, to heighten the dualistic nature of the universe and insist on a number of antithetical pairs - nature and spirit, grace and dignity, beauty and sublimity, "Formtrieb" and "Stofftrieb", woman and man, sentimental and naive poet. There is still a search for harmony but the totality has become all the more ideal as a result of such stark dualism, and the word "ganz" is almost entirely lacking from his classical plays. The importance of harmony for Schiller is reflected in the attention he paid to Goethe, the only modern naive poet combining nature and intellect, ancient and modern. Schiller gradually managed to reach a belief in totality, including nature, despite the apparent incompatibility of "Sinnenglück" and "Seelenfrieden". There is a continued search in Schiller for a unifying principle: grace, the aesthetic state, ideal poetry, the "Spieltrieb", "schöne Humanität". Love, for Schiller, was an ideal, aroused by freedom and beauty together (Anmut und Würde, Ästhetische Erziehung), and joining opposites, as in "Die Geschlechter". The conflict within Schiller of theoretician and practising dramatist tends to produce an unbridgeable gulf in his aims. The writer of theory sought harmony, the needs of the dramatist involved conflict, and as a result Schiller developed two sets of ideals, one for harmony and one for conflict, with the plays on the whole reflecting the latter.

The ideal for Classical man was seen best in the Greeks, as presented by Winckelmann. The Greeks were seen to be blessed with a propitious climate and setting, they showed the perfect beauty of the human body and had no false shame. They had a natural, harmonious attitude to life, showed no dualism or dichotomy between intellect and nature. In the words of Schiller's review of Iphigenie, they possessed a calm dignity, for Goethe they were "schöne Menschen", revealing in themselves and in their creations "das Reinmenschliche" (Eckermann, 1/4/1827). For Hölderlin,

Greek man was beautiful; "Schön kam er aus den Händen der Natur, schön an Leib und Seele, wie man zu sagen pflegt" (III,79); for Herder, the Greeks show healthy reason (XVIII,82); according to Humboldt, they demonstrate natural limitations, yet give a glimpse of infinity (II,98), they reveal individuality in its purest, most perfect form. The Greeks spontaneously behaved morally for the good of all, they were "von dem Drange beseelt, das höchste Leben als Nation darzustellen" (II,102). They expressed pure human ideals, yet were in touch with divinity.

The "Sturm und Drang" had stressed the naturalness, the power and strength of emotions, the totality in the Greeks. Classicism praised the totality but also the voluntary moderation, the mutual limitation of the faculties which produced this totality. Similarly vital was the concept of calm, in both man and art. The beauty of Greek art lay in a natural limitation and moderation, in the perfect harmony of subject matter and form, in the linking of opposites. Herder saw this as a joining of "Einfalt und Würde, Bedeutung und Anmut" (XVIII,85), for Winckelmann it was the combination of expression and beauty, of apparent activity expressed in a static state:

Das allgemeine vorzügliche Kennzeichen der griechischen Meisterstücke ist endlich eine edle Einfalt und eine stille Größe, sowohl in der Stellung als im Ausdrucke. So wie die Tiefe des Meers allezeit ruhig bleibt, die Oberfläche mag noch so wüten, ebenso zeigt der Ausdruck in den Figuren der Griechen bei allen Leidenschaften eine große und gesetzte Seele. (23)

These qualities of quiet peace and simplicity were extended to Greek man himself, wrongly according to Lessing. The resulting virtues of "Einfalt", "Ruhe", "Stille", "Klarheit", "Einheit", "Harmonie" became vital concepts for the Classicists. The Greeks were believed to have produced harmonious and beautiful works of art in sculpture and literature. Goethe saw "Klarheit, Heiterkeit, Leichtigkeit" in Greek writers. Greek works of art showed nature combined with a purity and simplicity of style. The observing of Greek art was thought of as a means to acquiring clear artistic concepts. The characters in Homer showed ideal, constant human qualities. (24)



The picture of the Greeks was ludicrously idealistic, and even misleading in its insistence on peace and harmony. This in no way invalidates the ideals drawn from this picture; Humboldt realised that such an ideal was most likely to have an effect on man (III,406). It was a picture of purity, totality, harmony. Hölderlin, for whom the Greeks were so important, spent his life trying to rediscover the lost golden age and seeing the inadequacy of the present by comparison. Greece was still very much a valid ideal for Hölderlin, he proposes a marriage of German and Greek as in "Die Wanderung". Hölderlin, unlike Goethe and Schiller, lays great stress on the ideal Greek community ("Brot und Wein"). For Schiller, the Greeks were definitely historical, there was no going back, they remained rather a cliché and were never really assimilated into his philosophy. His main interest was in their literature, in Greek artistic form, rather than in their people or their way of life. Goethe for a long time thought the Greeks could be emulated and recreated in the present. He hoped to become a Greek himself and be the last Homerid, producing a new great epic, Achilleis. Schiller saw Goethe as the only writer able to write as a Greek, but Goethe himself found the task too much for him, for it meant taking up those aspects of the Greek mind which he disliked. Schiller believed the new ideal would surpass both the ancient and the modern world, but he too was unable to write his epic on the subject of man becoming God. He saw the unbridgeable gap between ancient and modern (letter to Körner, 3/6/1797), and denied the use of Greek drama as a criterion for modern drama. Herder also had his doubts, he saw the Greeks as near perfect but wanted the Germans to find their own form, their own culture; Hölderlin sought to overcome his passion for returning to Greece in order to concentrate his attention on contemporary Germany.

Art for the Classicists appeals to all men,<sup>(25)</sup> it is generally valid; "die schöne Mitteilung vereinigt die Gesellschaft, weil sie sich auf das Gemeinsame aller bezieht" (Schiller, XX,411). The characters in Classical drama

express what is general in humanity, the poet must remember "daß alle poetische Formen symbolische Wesen sind, daß sie als poetische Gestalten immer das Allgemeine der Menschheit darzustellen und auszusprechen haben" (Schiller to Goethe, 24/8/1798). The use of the chorus in Die Braut von Messina is defended because it helps to provide this general focus. The poet expresses the whole of humanity in his work (Schiller to Goethe, 27/3/1801). Art appeals to the specifically human in man, "das Reinmenschliche", and Goethe praises this quality in Wallenstein, whilst Schiller finds the same virtue in Wilhelm Meister: "Es ist übrigens sehr schön, daß Sie, bei aller gebührenden Achtung für gewisse äußere positive Formen, sobald es auf etwas rein Menschliches ankommt, Geburt und Stand in ihre völlige Nullität zurückweisen" (Schiller to Goethe, 5/7/1796). Wallensteins Tod for Goethe had "den großen Vorzug, daß alles aufhört, politisch zu sein und bloß menschlich wird, ja das Historische selbst ist nur ein leichter Schleier, wodurch das Reinmenschliche durchblickt" (letter to Schiller, 18/3/1799). Poetry should "nicht auf den Staatsbürger in den Menschen, sondern auf den Menschen in dem Staatsbürger zielen" (Schiller, XX,219). Beauty appeals to all of man's faculties simultaneously (XX,487), and Schiller's magazine "Die Horen" had similar aims. Goethe believed in the universality of art's appeal and wanted to set up a "Weltliteratur" to combine the best of all countries' literatures.

The poet should show general matters - the true, the beautiful, the noble. In literature there should be no extremes, no narrow, personal views, no limitation through political aims, "also bleibe die Poesie in ihrem reinen Äther, der Sphäre der Menschheit" (Herder, XVII,67). Lessing had earlier insisted that the characters in drama should behave like normal people, but it is a matter for debate whether Schiller's characters - murderers, saints and rebels - are really "allgemeingültig". Art uses an individual case but with a symbolic treatment to achieve its purpose: "Das lebhaft poetische Auschauen eines

beschränkten Zustandes erhebt ein einzelnes zum zwar begrenzten, doch unumschränkten All, so daß wir im kleinen Raume die ganze Welt zu sehen glauben" (Goethe, XII,282). Drama, according to Lessing, shows how all men of a certain character would act under certain circumstances, although Lessing's belief in the "Bürgerliches Trauerspiel" was not taken up by the Classical Schiller, though it was to a certain extent by Goethe, albeit in other genres (Hermann und Dorothea, Die Wahlverwandtschaften). Humboldt believed that in the individual we should see the whole of humanity, and this is indeed the case in Goethe's Faust.

Art aims to please - "die rechte Kunst ist nur diese, welche den höchsten Genuß verschafft" (Schiller, SA XVI,119) - but there is to be no escapism. Pleasure is analysed in different ways by Schiller, finally it is seen to lie in a realisation of the mind's freedom over suffering. For Schiller, pleasure arises through mental activity, for Goethe it was something much more instinctive, but the nature of art ensured that pleasure was usually combined with moral ennoblement.

Art shows the typical, the necessary, that which conforms to general laws. This contrasts with the "Sturm und Drang" desire for originality, the daemonic element, often presented in a rather vague form, and this is equally against the Romantic love of the irrational, the strange and magical, and their desire to surprise or mystify. The dramatist takes the general situation from history, removing anything insignificant, as Schiller wrote to Goethe (20/8/1799) and as Goethe replied in agreement on the following day. The poet unites the ideas of many into one thought (Tasso, 3035-8). Art is timeless, appealing to all ages, the artist is not bound to his present age or nation, but combines ancient and modern.

Poetry reveals timeless truth through beauty and preserves the ideal in a hostile age:

Was unsterblich im Gesang soll leben,  
Muß im Leben untergehn. ("Die Götter Griechenlands", 127-8)  
Und das Schöne blüht nur im Gesang.  
("Der Antritt des neuen Jahrhunderts")

The highest aim in art is beauty, which is a panacea to brighten up man's life and limit his anger (Faust, 9245). Beauty is sensuous truth for Schiller, an aesthetically pleasing depiction of truth for Goethe, who sees a natural development "vom Nützlichen durchs Wahre zum Schönen" (Wanderjahre, I,6). For both Goethe and Schiller, beauty is veiled truth. Man cannot look directly at truth, hence beauty is a pleasant way of perceiving beauty through a medium:

Was wir als Schönheit hier empfunden,  
Wird einst als Wahrheit uns entgegengehn. ("Die  
Künstler", 64-5)

Even beauty was an ideal which could not always be seen itself, but only in many different reflections (Eckermann, 18/4/1827). It is a realm of potential, possibility. Man in looking at beauty is entirely open, aesthetic semblance ("Schein") is an area of infinite potential. To Körner, Schiller spoke of "der Begriff einer völligen Abwesenheit einschränkender Bestimmungen und des unendlichen Vermögens im Subjekte des Schönen" (21/9/1795). In beauty man overcomes normal limitations. It is the aim of art to make men free (Schiller, SA XVI, 120), hence it is the perversion of Tell's art that constitutes Gessler's greatest crime, until freedom is restored by Tell's "Meisterschuß". Beauty lies in harmony and the ideal in life is the transference of this harmony to man's behaviour and activity, so that man behaves as a whole harmonious being with all his faculties evenly balanced: "die Schönheit ... (macht) ... den Menschen zu einem in sich selbst vollendeten Ganzen" (Schiller, XX, 364). Hence it is vitally necessary to cultivate man's aesthetic sensibility, "Der Geschmack allein bringt Harmonie in die Gesellschaft, weil er Harmonie in dem Individuum stiftet" (XX, 410). For Hölderlin it is vital for a nation to appreciate beauty, which is the expression of the one and all, "das Eine in sich selber Unterschiedne" (III, 53, 81). The new age will see the re-emergence of art, the German mountains will become "Berge der Musen" (III, 156, "An die Deutschen").

General validity in art is especially achieved by the influence of form, which overcomes the individuality of the subject matter and its creator. Form produces proportion and control; "nur von der Form ist wahre ästhetische Freiheit zu erwarten", and Schiller is led to the conclusion that "darin also besteht das Kunstgeheimnis, daß er den Stoff durch die Form vertilgt" (XX,382). Through form, the artist concentrates the various strands of the work; "sie [die Form] ist ein für allemal das Glas, wodurch wir die heiligen Strahlen der verbreiteten Natur an das Herz des Menschen zum Feuerblick sammeln" (Goethe, XII,22). The recurring forms of art are a sign of permanence. Form provides harmony, moderation and limitation, as does the form of the dance in Schiller's poem. Beauty is a result of such control, as Goethe stresses in the essay Über Laokoon (XII,57). Classical form involved simplicity, "edle Einfalt", and symmetry. Goethe's plays especially have a small number of characters, a gradual progression rather than an episodic structure. There is considerable symmetry in the structure of the acts. Verse is the major controlling element, as Schiller realised in writing Wallenstein, it produced "ein Allgemeines, rein Menschliches" (letter to Goethe, 24/11/1797). A Classical work would be a perfect fulfilment of its genre, as Schiller wrote to Körner (10/3/1789), "Klassizität" meant formal perfection. Classicism saw the validity of the different genres which Romanticism sought to transcend.

The Classical poet is above ordinary mortals, he is nearer the gods:

Er saß in der Götter urältestem Rat  
Und behorchte der Dinge geheimste Saat.  
(Schiller, "Die vier Weltalter")

The poet must be near perfect, mature, for he bears a great responsibility. The poet is a part of all ages, not directly linked to the present:

Er hat sich, ein fröhlicher Wanderer, gesellt  
Zu allen Geschlechtern und Zeiten.  
("Die vier Weltalter")

The poet is a prophet, a bearer of humanity, his task is

"edlen Seelen vorzufühlen" (Goethe: "Vermächtnis"). For Hölderlin, poets are "heilige Gefäße", they remain awake during the long age of night ("Buonaparte", "Dichterberuf", "Brot und Wein"), although in Hölderlin there is a Romantic religious connotation, the poet is in the service of "der Höchste", a preserver of religious truth in the dark age. Herder saw the Greek artist cultivating humanity, and the poet in general is meant to unite man's divided nature. Schiller tells the poets: "Der Menschheit Würde ist in eure Hand gegeben" ("Die Künstler"). At times the poet is seen as distant from ordinary life, as in Schiller's "Dithyrambe", but this is never as extreme as in the Romantic era. The Classical poet still remains well within the bounds of reality, and this ambivalent position is underlined by Schiller:

Zweierlei gehört zum Poeten und Künstler; daß er sich über das Wirkliche erhebt und daß er innerhalb des Sinnlichen stehen bleibt. Wo beides verbunden ist, da ist ästhetische Kunst. (letter to Goethe, 14/9/1797)

The poet unites everything of the age in his mirror, he re-establishes the lost harmony in man. The poet creates something whole. To Böttiger in 1795, Goethe said: "Mein Beruf ist zusammenfügen, verbinden, ungleichartige Teile in ein Ganzes vereinigen". It is with some regret that in Faust he shows the audience pulling apart the totality that the poet seeks to create.

Wieland saw the poet as a "Sittenlehrer", Lessing, if freer than the general tone of the Enlightenment, believed "Bessern sollen uns alle Gattungen der Poesie" (I,661). Classicism in general disliked a specifically educative, didactic aim in literature. Instead it had a more generally educative aim, nothing narrowly moralising. Beauty always improves - "da das wahrhaftig Schöne und Vollkommene in der Kunst den Menschen notwendig verbessert" (Schiller to Goethe, 7/8/1797) - but the poet who sacrificed aesthetic perfection for a moral aim was failing in his purpose. The poet shows man his highest ideals;

wir lieben nur  
Mit ihm das Höchste, was wir lieben können,  
(Tasso, 216-7)

The idea of poetry is "der Menschheit ihren möglichst vollständigen Ausdruck zu geben" (Schiller, XX, 437).

Poetry, which the Classicists believed would always remain part of life, shows the power of good and right, gives the world "die Richtung zum Guten" (Schiller, XX, 335). In "Die Kraniche des Ibykus" it even causes the murderers of Ibykus to be apprehended. In general, poetry makes man look at himself, achieve self-awareness (Herder, XVII, 344-5), it prepares him to face life, inoculates him against future evil or catastrophe. Man is released from narrow preoccupations, his mind is opened to ideal values. Through art man should be returned to a state of harmony or dignity and be made into a fully responsible member of the community. In enjoying beauty, he is both an individual and a representative of mankind. Beauty in the aesthetic state makes man capable of achieving his full potential and completely realising his abilities.

Yet on the whole Goethe and Schiller lacked an interest in the effect of their plays on the audience, they often felt that a play's general validity was jeopardised by the strictures of making it stageable. Schiller nevertheless was concerned to see his plays performed, whereas Goethe was seemingly quite indifferent, allowing Schiller to alter his plays to suit his own ideas and purpose. Art had to be judged from its own standards: "Ich bin überzeugt", Schiller wrote to Körner (25/12/1788), "daß jedes Kunstwerk nur sich selbst, d.h. seiner eigenen Schönheitsregel Rechenschaft geben darf und keiner anderen Forderung unterworfen ist". Art was independent, ideal art entirely autonomous with its own laws and rules, it has no practical use, as the characters in "Pegasus im Joche" discover.

There is in Classicism a general confusion of the aesthetic sphere with moral, political and wider philosophical matters. The same vocabulary is used in all the fields, which leads to considerable confusion when

the subject under discussion is beauty, or truth, or freedom, to name the most obvious examples. Goethe, and especially Schiller, see politics and morals in aesthetic terms. Ideals for art - beauty, harmony, unity, totality - are applied to life in general without necessarily considering or allowing for all too obvious differences between the philosophical realm of art and the realm of social and political reality. The dangers of such a process are glossed over by treating society on a very general level which is not concerned with detailed discussion of individual cases. Art is proclaimed to be the key to correct development in other spheres. Schiller's "Die Horen" aims to foster truth and education, ennobling and purifying man's nature and morals, it intends "die politisch geteilte Welt unter der Fahne der Freiheit und Schönheit wieder zu vereinigen", and above all, "wahre Humanität zu befördern" (XXII,106-7). Art is the culmination of all branches of knowledge, the artists will set the crown of completion on science ("Die Künstler"). Herder praises the ideal of remaining "innerhalb der Grenzen, in denen das Wahre, Gute und Schöne Eins ist" (XVIII,81). Classicism sets the artist on a pinnacle of humanity, showing man his ideals, his potential, working at the centre of mankind, if above coarse reality. Romanticism raised the poet to a higher level only by cutting him off from ordinary life and starting the conflict between artist and philistine.

The Classical age was one of reasoned, measured optimism. This world is the best of all worlds, man is supreme in nature (Herder, XIII,68). The saddest day brings happiness for Hermann's parents, Nathan overcomes the death of his seven children with the discovery of Recha. For Herder all things work out for the best, only good things last (XIV,86,250). Man is free;

Der Mensch ist frei geschaffen, ist frei,  
Und würd er in Ketten geboren. (Schiller, "Die Worte  
des Glaubens")

In Herder's words, "der wahre Mensch ist frei und gehorcht aus Güte und Liebe" (XIII,163). An attack on man's freedom, especially his inner freedom, is the worst crime.



No man should allow force to dominate him, for Schiller "alle andere Dinge müssen, der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches will" (XXI,38), whilst Lessing's Nathan expresses this in the famous words: "Kein Mensch muß müssen" (Nathan,385). Only a materialist such as Wallenstein can believe "Geschehe denn, was muß" ( Wallensteins Tod,654). Man is watched over by a higher will or God, whose benevolence and wisdom are firmly believed in, by Herder (XIII,352-3), and by Goethe:

Denn die Unsterblichen lieben der Menschen  
Weit verbreitete gute Geschlechter. ( Iphigenie,554-5)  
whilst for Schiller, the existence of a god or a higher will is the third "Wort des Glaubens".

Everything in nature and man seems ultimately to contribute to a positive development. Mephisto has to admit this and see himself as -

Ein Teil von jener Kraft,  
Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.  
(Faust,1335-6)

This is underlined by Herder: "Alle zerstörenden Kräfte in der Natur müssen den erhaltenden Kräften mit der Zeitenfolge nicht nur unterliegen, sondern auch selbst zuletzt zur Ausbildung des Ganzen dienen" (XIV,213). There is seen to be a universal form of good, man has the basic moral goodness demanded in "Das Göttliche", he seeks truth and beauty (Herder, XIII,191). Kant saw man as evil by nature, Schiller rejected this however, and man for the Classicists is basically good. Man acts freely in a moral fashion, and good overcomes evil as man ultimately finds the right path:

Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunklen Drange  
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewußt. ( Faust,328-9)  
Faust is saved at the end, even his mistakes are cancelled out, for they are a necessary part of striving for higher things, which is essential for man's improvement:

Es irrt der Mensch, solang' er strebt.

Wer immer strebend sich bemüht,  
Den können wir erlösen. ( Faust,317,11936-7)

There is no real tragedy in Classicism, even death is the victory of morality, of humanity. The ideal may be impossible in real life - "Das ist das Los des Schönen



"zu was Besserem sind wir geboren" ("Hoffnung"). If the individual was inadequate, then society would take over to ensure a continuance of progress, making man aware of his potential and driving him onwards. Schiller's Ästhetische Erziehung envisages the creation of the ideal state of harmony and beauty, even if for the time being this can only be achieved in a small circle of thinking individuals. Schiller believed that the day would arrive when truth was fully revealed to man. In "Die Künstler" and in the lecture on "Universalgeschichte", there is a belief in man's progress to full humanity, whilst for Herder the whole history of nations was "eine Schule des Wettlaufs zu Erreichung des schönsten Kranzes der Humanität und Menschenwürde" (XIV,212-3). Lessing believed the age of perfect goodness would come: "Nein, sie wird kommen, sie wird gewiß kommen, die Zeit der Vollendung, da der Mensch das Gute tun wird, weil es das Gute ist" (I,1030).

Classicism nevertheless observed the transience of life, the force of time, stressed particularly by Schiller - "doch zittre vor der langsamen,/ Der stillen Macht der Zeit" (Wallensteins Tod, 83-4) <sup>(26)</sup> - but man for Goethe can overcome this through deeds, as he told Eckermann (4/2/1829), "Die Überzeugung unserer Fortdauer entspringt mir aus dem Begriff der Tätigkeit", or through his thoughts:

Und was in schwankender Erscheinung schwebt,  
Befestiget mit dauernden Gedanken. (Faust, 348-9)

For both Goethe and Schiller, the poet can overcome transience and produce something permanent:

So drückt er ein Bild des unendlichen All  
In des Augenblicks flüchtig verrauschenden Schall.  
(Schiller, "Die vier Weltalter")

In "Dauer im Wechsel", the favour of the muses also promises "Unvergängliches". For Schiller man overcomes transience through the permanence of his ideals, whilst artistic form is in general a guarantee of such permanence. In any case, the individual moment is still affirmed by Goethe, it is like a microcosm of time. "Der Augenblick ist Ewigkeit", according to the poem "Vermächtnis"; in "Proömion", "jeder Schritt ist Unermeßlichkeit". Man attempts to create

something permanent from the individual moment; "Er kann dem Augenblick/ Dauer verleihen" ("Das Göttliche"). Goethe often insists that man live for the present rather than for any dim and distant future; "Mußt stets die Gegenwart genießen ... Und die Zukunft Gott überlassen", is Goethe's "Lebensregel" (Sprüche, 98). Schiller was sadly unable to follow this advice, he was too involved in his ideals for the future to have much time for the individual moment in the present.

For Goethe however, and under his influence for Schiller also, nature is a guarantee of permanence, in Wilhelm Tell, in "Der Spaziergang", in "Proömion" and "Vermächtnis";

Kein Wesen kann zu Nichts zerfallen!  
Das Ew'ge regt sich fort in allen. ("Vermächtnis")  
Und die Sonne Homers, siehe! sie lächelt auch uns.  
("Der Spaziergang")

The earth moreover is beautiful if one knows how to look at it. Classicism ultimately affirms the importance of life on earth:

Wie es auch sei, das Leben, es ist gut.  
(Goethe, "Der Bräutigam")

Faust finally realises "dem Tüchtigen ist diese Welt nicht stumm" (11446) and Marquis Posa sees the beauty of life; "O Gott! Das Leben ist doch schön" (Don Carlos, 4396). Similar affirmation is found in Wilhelm Tell, from Max in Wallenstein, from the princess in Tasso, and one might say in the whole life and work of Goethe. The ideals of Classicism are to be achieved in this life, whilst the Romantic ideal was one of infinity, never to be attained on earth. With its belief in man's freedom, harmony and totality, its ultimate confidence in man's naturally doing what is good and for the benefit of the whole, with its insistence on man's natural goodness and reason, and above all with its view of the power of art and beauty to lead man to higher things, the optimism of Classicism, which covered all aspects of life, was greater than that of any previous epoch of literature. It is doubtful whether that optimism has ever been remotely matched since.

NOTES

1. Paul Kluckhohn, Die Idee des Menschen in der Goethezeit, Stuttgart, 1946, pp.7-8.
2. Kant's gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1910ff., IV.Band, P.428. Further references are to volume and page of this "Akademie-Ausgabe" (e.g.: IV,428).
3. Herders Sämtliche Werke, hrsg. von Bernhard Suphan, Berlin, 1877-1913, XIII.Band, pp.180-1. All further references are to this edition.
4. Unless otherwise specified, references are to Goethes Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden, Hamburg, 1948-1960, abbreviated where necessary: HA. Where quotations from major works, poems, letters and conversations are easily identifiable, reference is made to line, chapter or date only.
5. Schillers Werke, Nationalausgabe, Weimar, 1943ff., XX. Band, p.292. All further references are to this edition, unless otherwise specified, abbreviated where necessary: NA.
6. Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe, hrsg. von Friedrich Beißner, Stuttgart, 1944ff., III. Band, p.79. All further references are to this edition, abbreviated where necessary: GSA.
7. References are to Lessing, Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von Wolfgang Stämmeler, 2 vols., Munich (Hanser), 1959.
8. Benno von Wiese, "Das Humanitätsideal in der deutschen Klassik", Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, XX (1932), 321-33, p.321.
9. Goethes Werke, hrsg. im Auftrage der Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen, Weimar, 1887-1919, XLV.Band, p.311. Further references to this edition are abbreviated: WA.
10. References are to Wilhelm von Humboldt, Werke in fünf Bänden, hrsg. von Andreas Flitner und Klaus Giel, Darmstadt, 1960.
11. See also the description of "der schöne Charakter" in Über das Erhabene: "Alle Pflichten ... sollen ihm zum leichten Spiele werden" (XXI,44).
12. See also Goethe's essay "Bedeutende Fördernis durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort": "Der Mensch kennt sich nur selbst, insofern er die Welt kennt, die er nur in sich und sich nur in ihr gewahr wird" (XIII,38).
13. Schillers Sämtliche Werke, Säkular-Ausgabe in 16 Bänden, Stuttgart, 1904-5, XVI.Band, p.121. This edition is referred to where the "Nationalausgabe" is incomplete (e.g.: Braut, Tell); such references are abbreviated: SA.
14. Cf. Maximen, 1223 (XII,530) and "Betrachtungen im Sinne des Wanderers", 34 (VIII,288).
15. See "Das Lied von der Glocke", "Der Spaziergang", Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, also Goethe's Hermann und Dorothea.
16. See also Hermann und Dorothea, III,19, Die natürliche Tochter, 1534, Goethe's letter to J.C.Kestner, 14/5/1780.

17. See "Das Göttliche", "Euphrosyne", "Metamorphose der Tiere", "Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen", "Vermächtnis", also Schiller's "Der Spaziergang", Die Braut von Messina, 2286-9.
18. In addition to "Natur und Kunst", see Maximen, 747, Wanderjahre (HA VIII, 250), also Schiller's "Der Tanz", l. 18, "Die Künstler", 143, Über das Pathetische (XX, 221).
19. See also Die natürliche Tochter, 1076, letter to Kayser, 20/1/1780.
20. See especially Schiller's "Lied von der Glocke", "Der Spaziergang", Herder's Humanitätsbriefe, Goethe's plays of the 1790s and Hermann und Dorothea.
21. Berno von Wiese, "Das Humanitätsideal ...", p. 325.
22. Cf. Piccolomini, 1720, Tod, 2302, 2337.
23. Johann Winckelmanns Sämtliche Werke, Osnabrück, 1965, I. Band, p. 30.
24. Goethe, HA XII, 176, Schiller, letters to Körner, 20/8/1788, 12/12/1788, letters to Goethe, 4/4/1797, 7/7/1797.
25. Although there is no intention of discussing Grillparzer's debt to Classical aesthetic philosophy, a brief account of the main ideas is included for the sake of completeness and because the occasional reference to Grillparzer's aesthetic principles will be necessary.
26. See Braut von Messina, 249, 941-3, 1962-3, 1971-3, 2306-9, "Das Lied von der Glocke", 416-7, "Die Worte des Glaubens", "Das Ideal und das Leben".

## Chapter 2. Grillparzer's discussion of Classicism

Before attempting to trace the influence of Classical ideas on Grillparzer's work, it is worth considering briefly his own references to Classicism and to Goethe and Schiller in particular.<sup>(1)</sup> In the case of Goethe, such references have already been collected and analysed in the articles by Nadler, Horvay, Joachim Müller, in the chapter of Naumann's work on Grillparzer, and in the dissertation of Elisabeth Krueger.<sup>(2)</sup> I cannot claim to be presenting any new interpretation of a small body of comments by Grillparzer on the subject, but it would seem indispensable to the current discussion to examine what Grillparzer himself had to say about the writers of the previous generation.

In fact Grillparzer never mentions Classicism by name as a literary epoch, but this is commensurate with his own dislike of systems and an organised view of literature. He does nevertheless consider "das Klassische", whereby it is not always clear whether ancient Classicism or the Neo-Classicism of Weimar is referred to. A diary note of 1835 says simply, "klassisch ist fehlerfrei" (Tgb.2808), a further note, probably of the same year, distinguishes between Classical and Romantic poetry as between "die männliche und weibliche (weibische?)" (Tgb.3304). The obvious inferiority of Romantic poetry in this distinction is implied even in an apparent rejection of such distinctions three years later:

Die Streitfrage über den Vorzug des Klassischen und Romantischen kommt mir vor, wie wenn ein Hauswirt an der Mittagstafel seine Gäste fragte, ob sie lieber essen oder trinken wollten? Ein Vernünftiger wird antworten: Beides. (Tgb.3321)

Most certainly a sensible man would wish to do both, but a sensible man, if compelled to choose, would presumably eat, which the diary note suggests is the substance of Classical poetry. In an essay of 1852 finally, Grillparzer distinguishes between the outstanding and the exemplary artists, adding that the term "mustergültig" is "der eigentliche Begriff für das was man klassisch nennt"

(III,252). The outstanding artists take a path "der nur für sie gangbar ist", the exemplary artists take the path "der für alle paßt". This is not a particularly original definition of the Classical, it does however cast an interesting light upon Grillparzer's attempts to distinguish between Goethe and Schiller, an aspect to be considered later in more detail.

Grillparzer's first references to either Goethe or Schiller concern the latter. The character Linker in "Die unglücklichen Liebhaber" of 1806 quotes lines from "An die Freude" "von einem gewissen Schiller" (II,566), and in one of his first diary notes, Grillparzer doubts whether Schiller really is the ideal dramatist (Tgb.9). Grillparzer's first encounter with Schiller's work had been in 1804, when amongst the books of his aunt Therese Sonnleithner he found Wallensteins Lager and Die Piccolomini (IV,34). There also he found a volume of Goethe's work, including Götz and Clavigo. In 1808 he read Die Räuber, Kabale und Liebe and Don Carlos, and saw a performance of Fiesko (IV,46). It was of course Don Carlos that inspired him to write his own Blanka von Kastilien - "wobei ich immer den Don Carlos im Auge hatte" (IV,47). It was the theatre management's long delay in considering Blanka and the closer acquaintance with Goethe's work gained at this time which produced an important watershed in Grillparzer's views and prompted the re-opening in June 1810 of his diary which had lain dormant since his father's death. The new diary notes express a violent rejection of Schiller and an only slightly more sober affirmation of Goethe.

Schiller's work he now sees as empty and bombastic, as "rohe, groteske Skizzen" (Tgb.92), whilst he despises Schiller as a person for being arrogant, too determined. Kabale und Liebe he considers "das elendste Machwerk" (Tgb.91), and Grillparzer especially attacks "die lächerliche, patzige Sucht Schillers, den Philosophen spielen zu wollen". Most revealing however is the reason added almost, it seems, as an afterthought, the



idea that Blanka could be seen as similar to Don Carlos. These similarities he dismisses as completely unintentional, "einige Gedanken, auf denen ich mich ertappte, und die ich, ohne es zu wissen, von ihm entlehnt hatte" (Tgb.91), though remarks made elsewhere in the diaries and later in the Selbstbiographie suggest that Grillparzer knew the connections between the two plays were too obvious to be passed off in this flippant fashion. What is important is that this reason for rejecting Schiller becomes the leading one - "dies und was weiß ich noch was alles ist" - whilst in the same diary note he admits that certain personal motives may be involved - "andere vermutlich in mir selbst, und wohl zum Teile in meiner Eitelkeit, Ruhmsucht liegende Gründe, von deren Dasein ich zwar überzeugt bin, die ich aber nicht anzugeben vermag". Clearly Grillparzer disliked the fact that his work had been linked with Schiller's and hence he rejects him "auf eine leidenschaftliche Art". It is presumably quite feasible that the criticism of Schiller in the diary note of two years earlier had also been part of the same desire to remove Schiller from his pedestal as the unattainable ideal.

With Goethe, whose work, apart from Götz, Clavigo and the lyric poetry, he had scarcely known in previous years, Grillparzer felt a much closer and more personal connection. One might suggest that Grillparzer could never feel entirely at home in the world of Schiller's strong, forceful heroes. As I shall seek to show in the next chapter, there is a considerable gulf between Grillparzer's and Schiller's characters in Blanka and Don Carlos, or more specifically between the figures of Fedriko and Carlos. Grillparzer especially develops the contrast of "Roheit" and "Zartheit" in comparing Schiller and Goethe. He writes of Goethe's "unaussprechlich zartes Gefühl", Goethe has "die Zartheit des Miniaturmalers" instead of "die zwar kräftigen, aber rauhen Pinselstriche" of Schiller the fresco-painter (Tgb.92).

It is interesting to consider the works and characters that drew Grillparzer to Goethe, firstly Werther,

the man unable to find his true place in life, in search of close friendships, full of passions and emotions which cannot find a true outlet, a poetic nature forced into the straitjacket of bourgeois life and conventions and unable to conform; secondly Faust - "in dem ich so oft mich selbst wiederfand" (Tgb.92) - eternally discontented in search of life and enjoyment, but in league with the devil and hence perpetually immersed in guilt and suffering. But above all it was the figure of Tasso that attracted Grillparzer; his desire for friendship, yet his inability to fit in with other people, his detachment from ordinary life due to his poetic nature, his feverish attempts to return to what he considers normal active life. All these are recurring themes in Grillparzer's youthful writings:

Ich selbst glaubte es zu sein der als Tasso sprach,  
handelte, liebte, nur Worte, so schien es mir, hatte  
Goethe meinen Gefühlen gegeben, ich fand mich in  
jedem Gefühle, in jeder Rede, in jedem Worte. (Tgb.92)

These characters obviously had so much to say to Grillparzer, and perhaps the way in which they underlined his own problems and characteristics was as much to blame for Grillparzer's melancholy as the impossibility of reaching his new idol.

The personal link with Goethe and his creations is clearly vital, it is not simply a shift of literary allegiances. In a diary note of June 20, 1810, Grillparzer denies that his judgement was determined by the reading of Schreyvogel's Sonntagsblatt, which did no more than focus his attention on Goethe in the first place (Tgb.92). Certainly there is no extreme rejection of Schiller, nor any extreme praise of Goethe in the journal. There is criticism of Schiller: Die Braut von Messina is thought to lack clarity, an important formal requirement for Schreyvogel (SB I/2,81),<sup>(3)</sup> Kabale und Liebe is described as "der unsichere Gang eines noch richtungslosen, unreifen Geistes" (SB II/2,312), whose weaknesses were intensified in the appalling adaptation first performed at the Burgtheater on July 23, 1808,

Die Räuber shows great power but ugly elements, it is "eine jugendliche Verirrung Schillers" (SB II/2, "Literarischer Anzeiger", 14. August). Schiller is thought to be one of many who have misused Kant's aesthetic principles (SB I/2, 262). But Schreyvogel is quite happy to link Goethe and Schiller as "zwei neuere Genies" (SB I/1, 276), and he is not averse to challenging Goethe's claims to fame: he lacks originality, it is suggested (SB I/1, 180). Schreyvogel is not concerned to set Schiller off against Goethe, he is concerned to praise any writer who seems in contrast to the new literary ideas which he so steadfastly opposed. The champion of this opposition is neither Goethe nor Schiller, but Lessing,<sup>(4)</sup> of whom there is no mention in Grillparzer's diaries of this period, whom he later described as "ein ausgezeichneter, aber kein großer Schriftsteller" (III, 51). It may well be implied criticism of Schreyvogel when, in his diary for 1851, Grillparzer warned against the "Vergötterung" of Lessing, a fault of people "die eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen ihm und sich finden, und sich loben wenn sie ihn preisen" (Tgb. 4050). Certainly Schreyvogel did see such an affinity (Schr. Tgb. I, 247; II, 13). For Schreyvogel, Lessing is responsible for all the lasting achievements of German literature, just as Kant is the standard against which all recent philosophy is found lacking. The Sonntagsblatt may have made Grillparzer aware of Goethe, but equally it may have brought Schiller to his attention more fully. Before the Sonntagsblatt appeared, Grillparzer had still not read many of Schiller's works, and he had only completed one act of Blanka when Schreyvogel's adverse comments on Kabale und Liebe appeared in August 1808. But in his violent rejection of Schiller in 1810, in his dismissal of Kabale und Liebe as "das elendste Machwerk" (Tgb. 91), he may well have drawn on his recollection of the Sonntagsblatt or even refreshed his memory of Schreyvogel's comments. But any question of a lasting influence of Schreyvogel on Grillparzer's ideas or vocabulary must be dealt with in another context.<sup>(5)</sup>

One great problem for Grillparzer in his change of opinion was that Schiller had always seemed an attainable ideal to be striven for. Goethe however seemed to be from another world, so superior did he seem to Grillparzer in artistic terms. Schiller is the poet, the dramatist who can be imitated, even emulated, he is the model to be followed in writing drama. Grillparzer's comments on Schiller, far fewer in number than his references to Goethe, are concerned entirely with Schiller's work. His rejection of Schiller was by no means as extreme as his diary notes of 1810 suggest. Even at that time he continually tried to find excuses for his earlier and still persisting interest in Schiller. There is the idea that Schiller seems good when being read, Goethe when being thought about (Tgb.93) or the theory that he had put his own ideas into the music of Schiller's verse (Tgb.96), and here also it is the stress on Schiller the poet, the artist that stands out.

Certainly Grillparzer continued to take a lively interest in Schiller. The few criticisms he makes after 1810 are of his subjective approach - "Schillers größter Fehler ist gewiß der, daß er zu oft selbst statt seiner Personen spricht" (Tgb.1227 (1822)) - or of his years "wasted" on theoretical matters which never fit the demands of dramatic practice (Tgb.4244 (1859)). In the sketch "Friedrich der Große und Lessing", Frederick considers Schiller as the German Racine (III,54), and if Frederick can see Schiller as no more than "gut", Grillparzer's toast for the Schiller Centenary celebrations describes him as "ausgezeichnet" (III,763). Grillparzer especially praised Wallenstein, whose only blemish was its form as a trilogy (III,54; IV,88). A letter of 1855 to the "Schiller-Verein" in Leipzig praises Schiller's artistic form as exemplary, a perfect balance of English and French (IV,852). In the same letter he insisted that Germany had no greater admirer of Schiller than himself, in his further comments on the centenary celebrations he affirms, "ich habe ihn durch die Tat

geehrt, indem ich immer seinen Weg gegangen bin" (III,764), and in accepting a doctorate from Leipzig University on the same occasion, he makes the identical claim (IV,855). He underlines Schiller's superiority in an epigram of the same year:

Gar mancher andre hat Deutschland erleuchtet,  
Der edle Schiller hat es erwärmt. (I,560)

In 1853 he had reflected ruefully on the honours bestowed on himself, compared to which Schiller had received nothing ("Die Orden" (I,521)).

All these comments concern Schiller the poet. His toast for the centenary of Schiller's birth begins by insisting, "Lassen Sie uns Schiller feiern als das was er war: als großen Dichter, als ausgezeichneten Schriftsteller" (III,763), and he repeats this theme in replying to criticism of his rather withdrawn attitude to the celebrations (III,764), an attitude which he explains by his habitual dislike of public events. The insistence on Schiller the poet is seen in three diary notes of 1836, which compare Schiller with Goethe:

Ich glaube selbst, daß Schillers Gattung die höhere ist, aber Goethe war als Individuum größer. (Tgb.2849)

Aber Goethe verehren, und ihn nachahmen sind verschiedene Dinge. Schiller kann und soll man nachahmen, weil er der Höchste einer Gattung ist, und daher ein Muster für alle seiner Gattung. Goethe dagegen ist ein Ausnahms-Mensch, eine Vereinigung von halb widersprechenden Eigenschaften, die vielleicht im Lauf von Jahrhunderten sich nicht wieder beisammen finden. Er gehört keiner Gattung an. (Tgb.3211, cf.also Tgb.3251a)

In 1817 Grillparzer had written that Goethe was an outstanding poet, but poor as a dramatist (Tgb.225). It is therefore not a complete reversal of the contrast between the two writers when Grillparzer twice in the early 1850s distinguishes between Goethe as the greater poet and Schiller as the greater possession of the nation. Here again, in the letter to the "Schiller-Verein" (15/6/1855), and in the Selbstbiographie, Schiller is the man who can inspire the nation to follow him:

Er ist nicht zum Volke herabgestiegen, sondern hat sich dahin gestellt, wo es auch dem Volke möglich wird zu ihm hinaufzugelangen, und die Überfälle des

Ausdrucks, die man ihm zum Fehler anrechnen möchte, bildet eben die Brücke, auf der Wanderer von allen Bildungsstufen zu seiner Höhe gelangen können. (IV,852)

A diary note of 1834 saw Goethe observing nature from the standpoint of the ideal, Schiller idealising nature (Tgb. 2172). The Selbstbiographie distinguishes between Schiller's subjective creations which become objective when performed and the opposite process which Grillparzer detects in Goethe (IV,146).

The unifying thread in all these statements, despite the at times confusing, even contradictory terminology, is that Schiller is more the man of the people, natural and down to earth, who, in the one genre in which he excels, creates works which inspire and encourage emulation, Goethe on the other hand is more the exceptional individual above the ordinary world and occasionally deigning to descend to the level of the people, something that Schiller was not guilty of, according to the 1855 letter to the "Schiller-Verein". This distinction is pithily summarised in a further diary note of 1836: "Schiller geht nach oben. Goethe kommt von oben" (Tgb.3183). One may refer back to Grillparzer's distinction between exemplary and outstanding artists (III,252).<sup>(6)</sup> It is precisely this distinction which Grillparzer makes in a dedication of 1835:

Möchten die Deutschen bald einsehen, daß Goethes Pfad für ihn allein gebahnt war, Schillers Weg aber auch andere zum Ziele führt. (I,415)

Schiller takes the road to be followed by others, he is in Grillparzer's eyes the true Classical poet in that sense. Goethe however is the absolutely great poet whose intricacies and idiosyncracies cannot be imitated with safety.

Throughout his life Grillparzer saw Goethe as more than just a poet, but as a human being worthy of imitating, but so often impossible to emulate, as the diary note of 1836 (Tgb.3211) makes clear. In an epigram of 1821, Grillparzer wrote of Goethe:

Doch will er nicht bloß gelesen,  
Er will auch gelebet sein. (I,384)

In meeting Goethe in Weimar in 1826, Grillparzer describes him not as a poet but as a man to be admired, even as a god, according to the poem "Reiselust" (I,217). "Halb wie ein Vater und halb wie ein König" is how he sees Goethe both in a letter to Kathi Fröhlich (5/10/1826) and later in the Selbstbiographie (IV,147), though he is rather horrified by the idea of his idol blessing his guests' tea, in other words by the complete disappearance of Goethe the poet: "den Dichter des Faust, Clavigo und Egmont als steifen Minister zu sehen" (IV,144). In his autobiography, he checks himself in the process of describing the encounter with Goethe as "dieser wichtigste Moment meines Lebens" (IV,147), but there seems little doubt that at the very least it ranked amongst such moments. Certainly the Selbstbiographie makes continual reference to Grillparzer's admiration, love and respect for Goethe (IV,150,155), and his insistence that he was never "ein blinder Anbeter Goethes" (IV,131) merely underlines Grillparzer's constant rejection of extremes in all matters. In 1863 he wrote to Sztankovits: "Meine Verehrung für Goethe hat nie gewankt" (3/1/1863); in a diary note of 1836 he had insisted: "Wer kein Verehrer Goethes ist, für den sollte kein Raum sein auf der deutschen Erde" (Tgb.3211). (7)

In his autobiography, Grillparzer describes Goethe as "einer der größten Dichter aller Zeiten und der Vater unserer Poesie" (IV,132), but Grillparzer is not solely concerned with Goethe the poet. In fact he had little time for Goethe's work written after the death of Schiller. In the draft of a prologue to Das goldene Vließ he sees Goethe living apart from other men and taking no interest in Grillparzer's work (I,970), the epilogue to Vließ describes Goethe as reluctantly living on (I,137). In 1818 he had planned to write to Müllner of Goethe's "literarischer Tod" (21/1/1818), and an epigram of the same year considers a similar theme:

Sage, was stört deine Ruh, O Schatten des göttlichen  
Goethe,  
Daß du neblicht und kalt wallst um dein eigenes Grab?  
(I,375)

It is then not surprising to find Grillparzer fairly critical of Goethe's late works;

Und in der Tat, man mag Goethen noch so hoch verehren;  
Die Wanderjahre sind kein Werk, der zweite Teil des  
Faust kein Gedicht, die versifzierten Maximen der  
letzten Zeit keine Lyrik. (Tgb.3242 (1836-7))

Faust II is seen as a jumble of various plans from different periods of Goethe's life, pasted together without concern for an organic aesthetic whole (Tgb.2003), and he believes: "der zweite Teil von Faust wurde redigiert statt gedichtet" (Tgb.3215). Goethe wished to bring his earlier ideas to a conclusion, hence the writing of Faust II and of Wanderjahre, but the poetic figures of his youth have become anaemic shadows. Grillparzer criticises Goethe's late work as artificial (III,54), as cool and mannered (IV,132): "Goethe ist endlich wirklich so schnörklicht geworden als seine Vaterstadt" (Tgb.2879 (1836)).<sup>(8)</sup> In addition Grillparzer attacks the lack of concentration that these works reveal, the dullness of feeling.<sup>(9)</sup> In Grillparzer's eyes, this produced the coarse reaction of the later generation and was hence indirectly responsible for the collapse of German literature, because "das Publikum war froh nur wieder etwas Substantielles zwischen die Zähne zu bekommen" (IV,132).

The criticism levelled at Die Wahlverwandtschaften is not literary but ethical in nature:

Goethe ist überdies ein unmoralischer Dichter. Die  
gefallenen Mädchen sind seine Lieblingsfiguren und  
die Wahlverwandtschaften sind abscheulicher als die  
französischen Schmutzromane. Die Sünde war da und  
wird da sein und im Leben mag sich der Mensch mit  
ihr abfinden wie er kann, aber für den Schriftsteller  
muß sie nicht bloß ein Unglück sein, sondern ein  
Verbrechen. (III,55)

This stark attack is put into the mouth of Frederick the Great, but it is a criticism which is echoed elsewhere. In a diary note of 1841, Grillparzer sees Goethe failing to make the moral aspects of the novel clear, for presenting such "abscheulich" elements as the paradoxically adulterous night of love between Eduard and Charlotte. Grillparzer concludes:



Wenn man mir es übrigens schenken wollte, ich möchte es nicht geschrieben haben. Die leidenschaftliche Steigerung eines Byron mag es immerhin mit Grenzen und Schranken nicht genau nehmen, ja die Poesie lebt zum Teil in diesem Sichhinaussetzen, je näher ein Werk aber dem gewöhnlichen Leben steht, je mehr muß es dasjenige achten, ohne welches dieses Leben ein Greuel und ein Abscheu ist. (Tgb.3538)

Nevertheless here, unlike in the satire, Grillparzer admits that Die Wahlverwandtschaften is "ein unendliches Meisterstück":

An Menschenkenntnis, Weisheit und Empfindung, Darstellungsgabe, Charakterzeichnung und dichterischer Veredlung des scheinbar Gewöhnlichen hat es in keiner Literatur seinesgleichen.

Clearly this work does not in Grillparzer's mind fall into the same category as the late works. There is no "Empfindungs-Mattigkeit", no anaemic artificiality (although Grillparzer does detect a lack of concentration as in other late works). On the contrary the criticism is more the one levelled at Goethe's early work. As Frederick the Great claims in the satire:

Um wieder auf Goethe zu kommen, Seine frühern Werke sind zu natürlich und seine spätern zu künstlich. Am besten noch gefällt mir sein Wilhelm Meister.  
(III,54)

The comments on Wahlverwandtschaften make it clear that this closeness to nature brings its own particular problem. Again according to Frederick the Great, Goethe reflects nature and brings it all down to his own level, making Egmont and Alba, for instance, into perfectly plausible human beings. But it is precisely for this reason, because Goethe is not presenting us with an idealised realm of art, that immoral elements should be avoided. That they are not always avoided, is a criticism found elsewhere also. A diary note of 1836 refers to Goethe's "moralischer Indifferentismus" which has also influenced Tieck (Tgb.3116). Goethe's popularity with the Hegelians is also thought to be for similarly unfortunate reasons:

Wenn Goethe bei den Wortführern in großer Achtung blieb, so verdankte er es weniger seinen Vorzügen

als seinen Fehlern, worunter eine gewisse Gleichgültigkeit gegen Recht und Unrecht gehört, so daß das Moralische dem Tatsächlichen untergeordnet wird.  
("Zur Literaturgeschichte" (III,730))

Grillparzer considers both Goethe himself and his literary creations from a human or personal viewpoint; Schiller and his work are seen much more in a purely literary light. Hence Grillparzer concludes his condemnation of Goethe's late works with the assertion:

Aber alles gehört zusammen. Goethe der Jüngling, Goethe der Mann und Goethe der Greis sind ein Riesenbild, an dem sich die kommenden Jahrhunderte erquicken, dessengleichen sie nicht sehen werden. Aber er war eben ein Mensch. (Tgb.3242; cf.Tgb.2850)

For Grillparzer, as for Goethe, this last comment is the highest praise. Schiller's work is seen as the ideal in literature, Goethe's on the other hand is a source of wisdom. In Wilhelm Meister, which the Frederick the Great of the satire, and hence presumably Grillparzer also saw as Goethe's greatest work, we are told: "Mensch treibe wozu du berufen bist und versplittere nicht Leben und Kraft an Unerreichbares" (Tgb.2342). Grillparzer in fact criticises Goethe for dissipating his own talents in later life through his devotion to the sciences. In 1822 he wrote a poem for Goethe to show how his works spread "Ruhe und Klarheit";

Der Mensch kann alles was er will  
Denkt, klimpernd, manch' ein Mann;  
Du aber sprichst, vorsichtig-still;  
Er wolle was er kann! (Tgb.1147)

The mood of quiet moderation and awareness of limitation is one which Grillparzer continued to find in Goethe's work. In 1818 and 1826, according to the Selbstbiographie, Grillparzer had felt incapable of matching such "großartiger Quietismus", such "Ruhe und Gemessenheit" (IV,80,149). Grillparzer himself had not yet reached the power of Goethe's creations which made the need for quiet control all the greater, a self-criticism found not only in the autobiography but also implied in a diary note of 1822:

Wenn Goethe in seinen Schriften Selbstbeschränkung oder vielmehr Selbstbegrenzung predigt, so lehrt er durch sein Beispiel sie erst für den Fall, wenn man sich vorher nach Erforderlichkeit selbst-erweitert hat. (Tgb.1189)

A further aspect of this is the rejection of absolute ideals which usurp universal relevance - a theme particularly of Grillparzer's late plays, - and Grillparzer clearly felt that Goethe had gone too far in praising limitation in Wanderjahre.<sup>(10)</sup> In any case Grillparzer deprecates, in a diary note of 1834-5, the critics' tendency to shift the emphasis on to the philosophical ideas of Goethe's work (Tgb.2351), but Grillparzer himself may be seen as susceptible to the same tendency, and the stress on Goethe the man rather than Goethe the poet is symptomatic of this tendency.

Hence Goethe's excellence as an individual is to some extent used to balance the poetic deficiencies of his later work. In 1823 he insisted that his criticism of Wanderjahre did nothing to dampen his "innige Verehrung für Goethe" (Tgb.1312). In the same diary entry, Goethe is the omniscient superman, looking down on all below him. He is superior to the point of being capable of self-irony, which Grillparzer feels is the basis for Wilhelm Meister and Tasso (Tgb.4292).<sup>(11)</sup> If Goethe at times seems cold, it is merely because he tries to spread his warmth evenly over everything (I,476). Grillparzer agreed with Goethe in 1820 that "Die wahre Darstellung hat keinen didaktischen Zweck" (Tgb.639, quoted from Dichtung und Wahrheit, Book III), yet on the other hand he disagreed with Tieck and insisted that it was Goethe's aim, "dem Publikum aufzudrängen was es nicht wollte" (Tgb.2848). Grillparzer does see Goethe as a source of common sense, of practical philosophy, and it is perhaps a tragedy that Grillparzer did not bring himself to risk a more intimate conversation or even to start a correspondence with the man he always admired, despite the mocking description of him in 1826 as "der alte Dichterkönig ... zu dessen Untertanen ich einmal gehörte" (Tgb.1536). What Grillparzer is criticising here is the blind subservience which he also rejected in his autobiography (IV,131). Despite the criticisms of

Goethe's later work, Grillparzer saw Goethe as a poet and above all a man to look up to. Goethe had succeeded in being both man and poet, and according to Elisabeth Krueger, Grillparzer in a mood of dejection went to Weimar for help and advice on the ways to achieve this balance.<sup>(12)</sup> It was Tasso that most affected Grillparzer, but Goethe had apparently overcome the dichotomy of life and art which plagued Grillparzer throughout his life. Grillparzer sees Goethe as not simply the greatest German poet (IV,132), but also more significantly "der Größte aller Deutschen" (essay on Zedlitz, III,836), praise which in 1836 he had prefixed with the limitation "vielleicht" (Tgb.3251a).<sup>(13)</sup>

Yet Grillparzer could not bring himself to ask for advice. In a diary note of ten years later, he explains this by quoting a passage from Eckermann's conversations:

"Im Grunde ist es auch von dem, der einen Rat verlangt, eine Beschränktheit, und von dem, der ihn gibt, eine Anmaßung." Das war der Grund warum ich Goethen nicht um Rat fragte, und was ihn, trotz jener Maxime, verdrossen hat. (Tgb.3215)

A further reason may have been his initial dismay caused by Goethe's appearance as the minister who had seemingly lost his poetic half. But above all it appears to be a further example of Grillparzer's sense of inadequacy. Whilst the desire to imitate Schiller had encouraged Grillparzer to write in his youth, the apparent impossibility of emulating Goethe had caused him to despair, as he had described in his diary of 1810: "ich fühlte meine Hand zu schwach!" (Tgb.92). In 1826 he still saw his own works as inferior to Goethe's, they seemed "roh und unbedeutend" (IV,148). Hence he turned down a more intimate encounter with Goethe because he felt incapable of talking to him on equal terms. He left Weimar with the intention of dedicating his next work to Goethe, but Treuer Diener seemed "viel zu roh und gewalttätig" (IV,155). In 1847 he compared his own Armer Spielmann unfavourably with Goethe's Die Geschwister (Tgb.3979), a totally unjustified but typical denigration of his own work. In 1821 Grillparzer had feared that Goethe was not interested in

his work (I,970), and in his autobiography he still laments: "Er ist mir auch in der Folge nicht gerecht geworden" (IV,150). F.E. Sandbach has shown that this was not in fact the case,<sup>(14)</sup> but in 1826 Grillparzer was not able to overcome his earlier pessimism on the matter. Above all the poem "Reiselust" in the Tristia cycle shows his awareness of the gulf between them: Goethe is a god whose presence he could not stand up to:

Schien er wie ein Zeus zu schreiten,  
Mir hielt er, ein Chronos, vor  
All den Unterschied der Zeiten  
Ach, und all, was ich verlor. (I,217)

In 1826 Grillparzer returned from Germany refreshed, but his own inability to make the most of the meeting with Goethe meant that a lasting rejuvenation was not possible.

Both Goethe and Schiller are continually referred to as ideals worthy of being pursued. Schiller it was who inspired Grillparzer to write his first full-length play, and he took up the interrupted work on Die Ahnfrau after Schreyvogel had recalled Goethe's advice to him in similar circumstances. The Selbstbiographie looks back on that period and sees Goethe and Schiller as "zwei große Geister, wie eine Zentralsonne in der Mitte" (IV,70). Schreyvogel seems a living link with Weimar and "die damaligen Heroen der deutschen Literatur" (IV,73). The toast for the Schiller anniversary considers them both as progressive elements which the present age cannot match:

... wenn aber zwei ausgezeichnete Geister wie  
Schiller und Goethe den ungeheuern Fortschritt  
einmal gemacht haben, so braucht die Enkelwelt  
eine Reihe von Menschenaltern um sich zu jener  
Höhe nur emporzuarbeiten, auf der diese Männer  
dastehen für alle Zeiten. (III,763)

In 1850 Grillparzer wrote that they had had Goethe and Schiller, now they had no poet worthy of the name (Tgb.4045). A poem of 1853 suggests the need to follow their example - "So folgt ihrem Beispiel und horcht ihren Lehren" (I,520) - rather than erecting statues to them. Again we find the reference to their educative role, despite Grillparzer's proclaimed scepticism towards such aspects in literature,

and this theme is echoed in the autobiography, speaking of Goethe, Schiller and Lessing, Grillparzer insists "daß der Wert dieser Heroen nicht bloß in ihrem Talent, sondern auch in ihren leitenden Grundsätzen lag" (IV,135).

Exactly what these principles are, is not made clear. Grillparzer's own discussion of Goethe and Schiller is brief and inconclusive in this vital matter. We have noted the reference to "Ruhe und Klarheit" (Tgb.1147), to "Selbstbegrenzung" (Tgb.1189), and to the need for moderation and limitation (IV,80,148). Elsewhere, Grillparzer stresses the importance of "Tätigkeit" in Wilhelm Meister (Tgb.1187), in 1834 he considers "Wahrheit" to be Goethe's goddess (Tgb.2165). There is however a certain reservation in many of the words of approval. Further investigation of the ideas which Grillparzer must have considered important will be the concern of subsequent chapters. One common theme does appear in Grillparzer's references to his two idols, and that is the question of general humanity. Writing of the reception of Sappho, he stresses:

Damals herrschten noch Lessings, Schillers, Goethes Ansichten in der deutschen Poesie, und daß menschliche Schicksale und Leidenschaften die Aufgabe des Drama seien, fiel niemand ein zu bezweifeln. (IV,84)

Grillparzer stresses that Goethe and Schiller were apart from narrow political considerations. Schiller must not be mixed up with "weiß Gott! was für politische und staatliche Ideen" - "etwa das deutsche Bewußtsein, die deutsche Einheit, die Kraft- und Machtstellung Deutschlands" (III,763-4). Goethe's greatness, he insists, had nothing to do with Frederick the Great, but with Goethe's own talents (III,709), and ten years previously, in 1834, he had intended to write an essay in defence of Goethe's distance from politics (Tgb.2165). Grillparzer himself hoped to follow Goethe in this: "Goethes Widerspiel, möchte ich außer der Poesie und dem allgemeinen Menschlichen sonst nichts betreiben" (Tgb.2982). The centre of Goethe's poetry was "die Menschheit, das Wirkliche, das factum, die Welt" (Tgb.1198).

Although Grillparzer admitted once that both Goethe and Schiller were lacking certain ingredients of a truly great poet (Tgb.3210), although he reluctantly included Goethe and Schiller in the category "Bildungsdichter" of which he was suspicious (IV,163), he was fully aware of their vital significance. In England he discovered that a German who was not called Goethe or Schiller went unrecognised (IV,173). As a man of seventy, he still considered Goethe's age as "das goldene Zeitalter der deutschen Poesie, ja der deutschen Literatur überhaupt" (III,726). Hence he looked to Weimar as the lost ideal, where art was life (I,511):

Weimar ist ein heiliger Ort,  
Es lebten große Männer dort.  
Die großen Männer sind jetzt fort,  
Und Weimars Ruhm lebt nur im Wort. (I,585)

In 1827, a year after his ill-fated trip to Weimar, he wrote that his whole being would follow the man making a journey there (I,394). It was to the German Empress Augusta that Grillparzer sent perhaps his most famous statement on the importance of Weimar for him:

Dort ist jetzt trotz Main- und Rheinlinie das wahre  
Vaterland jedes gebildeten Deutschen und als solchen  
mich erachtend unterzeichne ich mich als Ihr tief-  
ergebener ja gewissermaßen Ihr Untertan. (IV,876)

In his last years Grillparzer emphasised the fact that he was a German poet, and that if he was no longer a German, then at least no one could take away what he had written in German (I,583). In view of Grillparzer's dislike of Germans for their arrogance and egoism, this desire to be a German poet can only be explained by the resulting links with the country's two greatest poets. After early attempts to play one against the other, Grillparzer increasingly sees them as inseparable. He finds it fitting that his honorary membership of the Freies Deutsches Hochstift should be awarded "in Goethes Vaterhause am Schillertage" (IV,868). In 1828 he had written of his position between Goethe and Kotzebue (Tgb.1626), in 1844 however he wrote the first version of an often repeated epigram:

Endlos ist das tolle Treiben,  
Vorwärts, vorwärts schallts durchs Land,  
Ich möcht lieber stehen bleiben  
Da, wo Goethe, Schiller stand. (I,461)

The version of 1846 adds the important clause to the third line - "wär's möglich" (I,1257). Although in the autobiography he considered himself as the best since Goethe and Schiller (IV,150), or, in a letter to the Emperor, saw his works as among the best since Schiller's death (IV,853), neither from a literary nor a philosophical viewpoint could Grillparzer remain entirely with his eighteenth-century ideals. The adoption yet adaptation of these ideals remains to be investigated.

#### NOTES

1. There are in fact no references at all in Grillparzer's work to Hölderlin, and none of any consequence to Herder.
2. Josef Nadler, "Goethe und Grillparzer", Corona, III (1932-3), 491-511; Frank D. Horvay, "Goethe and Grillparzer", Germanic Review, XXV (1950), 85-94; Joachim Müller, "Grillparzer und Goethe. Grillparzers Goethe-Verständnis und Goethe-Bild", Jahrbuch des Wiener Goethe-Vereins, LXXIV (1970), 30-57; Walter Naumann, Franz Grillparzer. Das dichterische Werk, Stuttgart, 1967, pp.111-28; Elisabeth Krueger, Das Goethe-Bild Grillparzers, (Diss.) Vienna, 1934.
3. References are to year, volume and page of Das Sonntagsblatt, abbreviated SB (e.g.: SB 1/2, 81), and to Josef Schreyvogels Tagebücher 1810-1823, hrsg. von Karl Glossy (Schriften der Gesellschaft für Theatergeschichte, II-III), Berlin, 1903 (referred to as: Schr.Tgb. I/II).
4. See SB I/1, 180, 227, 276, 318; 1/2, 286; II/1, 302, 387; II/2, 117.
5. See below pp.175-8.
6. See above p.53.
7. See also Tgb.1312 (1823).
8. See also Tgb.3148.
9. See III,725,836; IV,132.
10. See also Tgb.3209.
11. See also III,55.
12. Krueger, p.40f.
13. See also "Meine Erinnerungen an Feuchtersleben", in which Goethe is "dieser allerdings Größte aller Deutschen" (IV,223).
14. F.E.Sandbach, "Goethe's Interest in Grillparzer", Publications of the English Goethe-Society (New Series), III (1926), 56-82.



Chapter 3. The debt to Classicism: Grillparzer's youthful works

Grillparzer's juvenilia may conveniently be divided into two periods; firstly the years up to 1810, secondly the period from 1811 until the writing in 1816 of Die Ahnfrau, which established his lasting fame. The turning point in this early period is marked by Grillparzer's frantic analysis in his diaries of his attitudes towards Goethe and Schiller and receives its poetic expression in the one completed full-length play, Blanka von Kastilien, and in the fragment "Irenens Wiederkehr".

The diaries of the first period reveal Grillparzer's overwhelming desire for originality, his refusal to conform to conventional standards or to jeopardise the sanctity of his inner feelings. He is convinced that the poet is a being apart, "nur der Dichter kann den Dichter verstehen" (Tgb.15); "Das Genie gleicht der Glocke, frei im reinen Äther muß sie schweben wenn sie tönen soll" (Tgb.40,82). On the other hand there runs parallel to this a feeling of inferiority, insufficiency, a fear that he lacks poetic ability. He mercilessly attacks himself for his bad characteristics:

Mir mangeln aber nicht nur die meisten guten Eigenschaften, nein, die bösen, die lasterhaften haben bei mir ein so großes Übergewicht, daß ich oft vor mir selbst zurück schaudere. (Tgb.17)

Above all he cannot conceive of himself as a poet, for he lacks originality and spontaneity, "furor poeticus", as he calls it (Tgb.32), and it was in a tone of gloomy resignation that he recorded the death of Madame Roose, for whom he had intended the roles of Blanka von Kastilien and Sibille, the wife of the eponymous hero in "Robert, Herzog von der Normandie". The medium of language troubled him, "das Haschen nach Worten, Silben, Reimen ermüdet mich" (Tgb.32), and he reaches the conclusion: "Ich möchte eine Tragödie in Gedanken schreiben können, Es würde ein Meisterstück werden!" (Tgb.45). In 1809 he dreamed he was in the theatre hearing Blanka booed and whistled.

In his diary, Grillparzer wrote of his great desire to imitate (Tgb.59), and he was later to see this as a proof of his lack of originality, of his inability as a writer. In his study of Grillparzer's fragmentary plays, Helmut von Wartburg<sup>(1)</sup> was able to strip "Robert, Herzog von der Normandie" practically naked in finding two, three or more sources for every scene, but this is surely only normal for a young writer of eighteen. Certainly these early years are a time of experimenting with almost all the forms of literature current at the time: historical pageant, comic opera, short situation comedies and farces. In addition the diaries contain innumerable notes, jottings, drafts for further plays, especially for historical dramas. Some of the genres he experimented with at this stage were never used again. The influence of established traditions is clear in the way Grillparzer first sets out title, type of play, number of acts and list of characters, but after writing a number of lines he seems to lose interest.

At this stage Grillparzer was clearly attracted to the short situation comedy that was a frequent feature of the Viennese theatre. Die unglücklichen Liebhaber and Das Narrennest were obviously written for the stage, Grillparzer even considering who would take which part, as he did also in the case of Blanka and "Robert", basing his assessment no doubt on productions of Kotzebue's comedies or of the popular Viennese farces. These two comedies are crude and unsophisticated. In Die Schreibfeder however there is an obvious attempt at the bombastic pathos of the early Schiller, but this seems quite out of place in the trivial situation that is depicted, and the play, even in the less extreme version of 1809, is far from the success that Grillparzer strangely forecast for it in a diary note in which he underlines the qualities "Zeichnung der Charakter, Haltung derselben, und vielleicht auch Sprache", which he thought "vereinigen sich ... zu einem nicht unangenehmen Ganzen" (Tgb.21).

The language employed in Die Schreibfeder is perhaps

more fitting in the fragment "Robert, Herzog von der Normandie". This is the first attempt at a historical play to go beyond a mere handful of lines. The two earlier fragments, "Lucretia Creinwill" and "Rosamunde Clifford" are too short to give any real indication of aim or influence, although critics have pointed to the occasional phrase from Die Jungfrau von Orleans in "Lucretia Creinwill".<sup>(2)</sup> "Robert", shorter only than Blanka among the early works, is written in an attempt at powerful "Sturm und Drang" prose, but in its incomplete state lacks any real interest. It is a mere literary exercise in writing a historical play, which draws on a patchwork quilt of influences. Many of the situations are reminiscent of Götz von Berlichingen - a drinking scene in which no wine is left, Robert's standing for freedom and peace, the attempts to poison him - or of Egmont - the hero takes life as it comes but consequently falls into a trap.<sup>(3)</sup> Other motifs in the play echo Schiller: Robert looks over his lands from a window, his wife attempts to persuade him to retire to a peaceful idyll (as in Fiesko), Henry pretends not to recognise his adversary, tries to bait him, there is a play on the words denoting rank and personal relationships (Maria Stuart); it is suggested that there is still time to withdraw as long as the first step has not been taken (Wallenstein); Sibille uses her son to try to change her husband's mind, Henry calls to have "Menschen" around him (Don Carlos). Robert's situation, cheated out of his inheritance by his brother, is like that of Karl Moor in Die Räuber.

Goethe and Schiller were certainly not the only writers to influence Grillparzer at this stage, one could also find elements of Kotzebue, Iffland, Shakespeare, Molière, and the Viennese theatre. The plagiaristic impression of Grillparzer's early work is enhanced by a glance at the poetry of these years. A list of the models discovered by critics encompasses Klopstock, Ewald von Kleist, Blumauer, Wieland, Bürger, Gellert, Stolberg,

the poets of the Wienerischer Musenalmanach and of the "Göttinger Hain", as well as the writers already mentioned in connection with the dramatic works.

If we consider briefly the vocabulary of this early period, we can observe a certain difference between the plays on the one hand, and the poems and essays on the other. In the plays, any occurrence of Classical vocabulary is largely insignificant; even where words seem to occur quite frequently, they are used in a purely neutral or stereotyped way without any apparent awareness of a wider meaning. Equally, the proliferation of "Herz", "Liebe", "Schuld", "lügen" in Die Schreibfeder, of "Treue", "Schicksal", "Pflicht", "edel", "Herz", "frei", "Ruhe" in "Robert" is to be explained firstly by the subject matter and secondly by an exaggerated repetition which is natural in such a young writer. Nevertheless it is interesting to note the insistence on themes of duty, loyalty, justice, and also on peace and quiet - themes which were to remain important for Grillparzer. The words "Pflicht", "Treue", "Ruhe" are especially common, and in addition there is an insistence on the word "Mensch", which is used on a number of occasions in an archetypal sense much favoured by the Classicists. "Das Schicksal gebeut und der Mensch muß weichen", Odo tells Robert (II,888), Robert in turn tells Hereford, "Gib der Natur dein Menschenantlitz zurück", because he has no trace of human sympathy (II,886). "Der Mensch kann alles vergessen, alles entbehren", says Franz Moser in Die Schreibfeder (II,610), whilst the same character pleads with Wilhelm, "sei zornig, wüte, tobe, daß ich doch wenigstens den Menschen in dir erkenne!" (II,621).

In the poems and essays there seems to be a proportionately much greater use of Classical vocabulary. This I think is due simply to a higher degree of imitation. In the plays Grillparzer was more able to produce his own ideas in his own words, despite taking a considerable amount from his stock of reading. In his adaptation of these ideas, the influence of the vocabulary of the original is haphazard. In the essays and poems of this period, the content is

taken over from other sources and with it the mode of expression. Grillparzer was either unable to find new ways of presenting standard poetic themes or, in his relative inexperience, may even have considered that there was only one way to express such ideas. For whatever reason, the lyric poetry abounds in words such as "Herz", "Liebe", "Ruhe", "sanft", "still", "rein", "hold", "wallen", but although one can safely say that these words are rather common in the poetry of Schiller and of Goethe in particular, it must also be admitted that many of them are common to poetic diction, and that other writers of the time were using them. The poems of recent or contemporary Austrian writers such as Alxinger, Blumauer, Ratschky or Leon<sup>(4)</sup> make regular use of "Herz", "Liebe", "Ruhe", "hold", "sanft", so that only the insistent use of "rein", "still", "wallen" might conceivably suggest a more specific Classical influence.

In the philosophical poetry, we discover an adoption of almost all the significant vocabulary of the late eighteenth century. There is an insistence on vice and virtue, duty and loyalty, beauty and freedom, law and justice, peace and quiet. In "Der wahre Glaube", the man is told:

Doch nur erfülle deine Pflichten! -  
Tu jeder Gutes, was er kann,  
Und hat er recht und brav getan;  
So wird Gott jenseits gnädig richten. (I,25)

Man is told to do good and carry out his duties, to get on with life rather than attempt to leap over "die Schranken seiner schwachen Unendlichkeit", which is only possible after death ("Der wahre Glaube", "Der Unzufriedene"). In "Der Abend", the sun is seen as the fall of the great man:

Nichts kann seinen Mut ermatten,  
Wenn die Pflicht den Edlen ruft, (I,28)

whilst in "Der Triumph der Liebe", a poem written in the same year, 1806, Lykoon is the man:

Der in des heitern Knaben junges Herz  
Den Keim zum Edlen und zum Guten legte. (I,36)

The discontented man in the poem of that title asks for "ein Tropfen Wahrheit - aus dem ewgen Quell", whilst the

reply given to him the course of the poem - that man cannot be given absolute truth in life, that he must create a poetic truth as a substitute until the real truth can be revealed to him after death - is only too obviously taken from Schiller's "Die Künstler" or "Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais". In addition, Schiller's "Das Lied von der Glocke" and "Würde der Frauen" seem to have exerted an influence on Grillparzer's early poetry as a whole, whilst the influence of Goethe was a more general one, although one could point with some justification to "Ganymed", "Willkommen und Abschied", "Der Wanderer" amongst the "Sturm und Drang" poems, and to "Warum gabst du uns die tiefen Blicke", "Ilmenau", "An den Mond", "Euphrosyne" from the early Weimar period, in all of which the vocabulary used by Grillparzer occurs with particular regularity. As such a varied list of poems suggests, one cannot at this stage speak of a specifically Classical influence on Grillparzer. Instead there is evidence of a wide borrowing from Goethe's work as a whole. Similarly we detect in "Robert" the influence of Schiller's and Goethe's early plays just as much as their Classical works, Werther, it must be recalled, was one of the first works to make a lasting impression on the young Grillparzer.

The vocabulary so far discussed is also found in the early essays. Of the grandson looking back on Napoleon and his defeat of Austria, Grillparzer writes:

... wenn ein edles Herz ihm im Busen pocht, das der Menschlichkeit heilige Gefühle hegt, so kann er den zerstörenden Eroberer unmöglich lieben. (III,1015)

The essay on Rudolf of Habsburg praises the emperor for upholding "weise Gesetze ... Gerechtigkeit, Milde", for carrying out his "erhabne Pflichten", and for restoring "Ruhe und Friede", and above all for being not just a king and hero, but also "ein Mensch" (III,969-73). Grillparzer considers the importance of beauty for man in terms of divinity and sublimity, concluding: "Unverkennbar ist die Wirkung des Schönen auf die Seele des Menschen" (III,1095). Man without art "wäre kein Mensch, er wäre ein Tier" (III,1093). It is of course impossible to say how conscious

Grillparzer was of the traditions he was borrowing or whether he was echoing familiar motifs in his first tentative literary steps. It is however quite justifiable to note that some of the ideas borrowed at this stage do remain with Grillparzer later.

The only full-length play that Grillparzer completed in this whole period of ten years was Blanka von Kastilien, and for this reason, even if for no other, it merits a detailed analysis. In most critical studies of Grillparzer, the play is dismissed in a line with a reference to the strong influence of Schiller's Don Carlos, which is considered the one feature of note.<sup>(5)</sup> "Ich las anfangs Schillern und schrieb dabei meine Blanka", Grillparzer wrote in his diary (Tgb.92), and until recently critics have sought to prove him correct in this statement. The critical Viennese edition points to the scene in Don Carlos to which each scene of Blanka corresponds. Recently however Wolfgang Paulsen, sensibly, and Leo Tönz, in more extreme fashion, have questioned this traditional view.<sup>(6)</sup> Tönz, in a manner typical of many Austrian critics, goes out of his way to show that the real influence was provided by the Austrian stage, in the popular dramas, in Sonnleithner's Fidelio and Schikaneder's Zauberflöte. It remains to be seen to what extent these theories are justified.

Despite the title, the interest of the play is centred on Fedriko Guzman. The other characters are too stylised, too straightforward to fascinate us. Pedro is the stereotyped tyrant torn by pangs of conscience and remorse, but unwilling to take steps to change the situation. Rodrigo is the petty schemer, the typical villain desirous of greatness. Blanka herself is a dubious claimant to the title role - although her name admittedly provides a better title than Fedriko Guzman's! Tönz sees in her the typical, much-suffering passive heroine of Viennese melodrama, and it is with justification that he stresses the vast gulf separating her from Elisabeth von Valois in Don Carlos, with whom she shares only her French origins and her fate in being torn away from her lover (although in Blanka's case,

he has already departed of his own accord), in order to be given to an undesirable husband who is a ruler in foreign lands. It is also true that Blanka and Elisabeth appear in a small number of scenes. But in addition, Grillparzer's heroine is not at all involved in affairs of state, she is a lonely, isolated figure, full of her own fate to which she is resigned, she remains virtuous throughout, upholding ideas of moderation, self-control, "stilles Dulden" (1032). She insists, "Es folgt das Glück getreu der Tugend Schritte" (1035), and stresses the harmony in man which is often destroyed by clumsy hands. She is justifiably referred to as "die Reine", but her passive clinging to virtue and to her principles seems, unlike that of Elisabeth, to be out of touch with the concrete political situation into which she is placed, and only serves to plunge Fedriko ever further into indecision at a time when action is vital to save Blanka from the totally unjust position in which she finds herself, and which has been created not by the King but by his evil adviser. When she finally acts it is too late, nothing has been achieved by her scruples except her own and Fedriko's deaths, and perhaps that of Maria as well.

Fedriko is the first of many Grillparzerian characters who are torn between love and duty, he adumbrates the problems faced by Hero, Alphons and to some extent by Sappho and Bancbanus. This conflict makes him unable to take decisions and action until it is too late, a Hamlet-complex one might say, which finds its culmination in Rudolf II. In Acts I and II he thinks only of Blanka, rather than of country, people, or his murdered mother. He is prepared to see the destruction of all Castile if it means keeping Blanka, he forgets state and politics, just as Don Carlos blithely affirms that

es ihm

Nichts als den Umsturz der Gesetze kostet,  
Der Glückliche zu sein. (727-9)

In Act III Fedriko's good side is seen, his love of his fatherland, his overcoming of merely selfish motives, and he goes to see Pedro, only to be defeated by the cunning



of "die schrecklichen Geschwister". In Act IV the conflict is restated but still unresolved;

Im Busen kämpft  
des Herzens Regung gegen seine Treue. (3240-1)

On the one hand he is trying to save Blanka without breaking his oaths of allegiance to Pedro, on the other hand he is prepared to go to war to save her.

The general idea is reminiscent of Carlos's situation in Schiller's play. Both dramas attack tyranny; the tyrant cannot allow others to exhibit great nobility for he fears it as a potential threat. Politics is seen as a source of inhumanity, involving the abandonment of a normal human existence, the sacrifice of love, of human relationships, in fact of humane standards and principles in general. Politics and the state have demanded Carlos's sacrifice of Elisabeth and Fedriko's of Blanka, and have given the woman to an undesirable husband. Both Carlos and Fedriko are torn between continuing to fight for the hand of their beloved and abandoning her in the cause of a higher duty. In each play the two male rivals are related, father and son in Don Carlos, half-brothers in Blanka. But, even apart from the obvious dissimilarity between Pedro and Philipp, the parallels are misleading. Carlos has been drawn away from his political beliefs by his infatuation for Elisabeth. For him, certainly at least for Posa, the matter is clear cut. Carlos must choose between his love for Elisabeth, now his mother,<sup>(7)</sup> and, on the other hand, a return to his fight against tyranny in favour of "Gedankenfreiheit" and the liberation of the Netherlands from Spanish rule. Clearly there is only one course Carlos can choose, other than sulking or seeking a foreign paradise, both of which would have been quite untypical of a Schillerian hero, who in most instances will look forward to a future age of freedom.<sup>(8)</sup> At this stage one should further notice that both courses of action will bring Carlos into conflict with his father. What Posa sees as Carlos's duty will do so on a large political scale rather than on a merely personal level, in addition, this duty is in no way connected with limited

ideas of patriotism but with more grandiose and praiseworthy concepts of humanity in general.

If we turn our attention to Fedriko, we discover a mixture of contrasts and unintentional parallels with Carlos's situation. It was out of a belief in patriotism and what constituted his duty that Fedriko had abandoned Blanka, almost without a farewell, and returned to Castile:

Das Glück der Nation,  
ein weitgedehnter, schöner Wirkungskreis,  
und Größe war das hohe Ziel, nach dem  
ich alle Freuden meines Lebens warf! (68-71)

Obviously he had entertained lofty ideals of freeing Spain, just as Carlos has of freeing the Netherlands, but due to circumstances, one assumes, but also, one suspects, due to his own lack of strength and determination, he has been unable to see his ideals realised, and he now mocks his present tasks, "Dem König widerspenstige Mädchen hüten" (98). More importantly, he sees his present position resulting from a rejection of all that is naturally human in man; it is then in no way surprising that the appearance of Blanka reawakens all his old longings and feelings:

den Menschen hab ich frevelnd ausgezogen,  
um nur dem Helden freien Raum zu geben,  
erstickt hab ich des Herzens Hochgefühle! (55-7)

denn was das Süßeste dem Menschen ist,  
was ihm die Leiden minder lastend macht,  
was jede Freude tausendfach erhöht,  
den Trieben der Natur, der Menschlichkeit  
hab ich entsagt. (64-8)

Thus Fedriko has now to rethink matters and choose afresh between love and duty. Unfortunately duty now means something different to him. Whereas in the first place he had left Blanka to save Spain, or at least alleviate its suffering, a course of action which must surely have involved the overthrow of Pedro in favour of Trastamara, he has in the meantime sworn allegiance to Pedro, and there lies his duty as he now sees it. The conflict is between attacking Pedro on a personal level and supporting him on a political level, which is quite different from the situation in Don Carlos. But is it? Are we not justified in asking whether Fedriko's new concept of duty

is not somewhat misguided. He himself at one point sees it as "ein Phantom der Pflicht" (1169). Surely his duty as before should lie with the people of Castile, as Lara points out (1276-9). Pedro is a tyrant far more than Philipp of Spain, he is inhuman in all senses of the word, Philipp only in adhering to despotism. In supporting Trastamara against Pedro, Fedriko would be bringing love and duty into harmony. But equally one can see some justification in Gomez's arguments in favour of loyalty to the state; he believes that the country would be harmed more by civil war than even by Pedro's cruelty and tyranny.

In short, therefore, whilst in Don Carlos the matter is clear cut, the path the hero must take, the choice he must make, are implicitly settled for him, in Blanka von Kastilien the conflict is confused, with right and wrong on both sides. Fedriko therefore is torn between the two courses open to him. In this respect, in the confusion of right and wrong and man's consequent inability to choose the right path, Grillparzer is already a much more modern writer than Schiller and Goethe. It is hardly surprising that some of the characters, like Grillparzer himself, are torn between the desire for action, glory, success on the one hand, and a longing for a peaceful idyll away from life with its decisions, confusion and inevitable guilt. There is a certain fatalistic element in the play. As in "Robert", the word "Schicksal", together with "Geschick", "Unglück", occur on a strikingly large number of occasions. All the characters feel doomed to suffering, feel that they have no control over their actions, which are guided by a superhuman and predominantly malevolent fate that seems to throw dice, cast lots in order to decide what will befall man;

doch was vermögt ihr gegen das Geschick!  
Denn ehern herrschst die Notwendigkeit,  
und nicht vermag der Mensch, ihr zu begegnen, (1792-4)

Die Lose liegen  
noch in des Schicksals Urne tief verschlossen,  
und auf der Wage ungewissen Schalen  
schwankt immer wechselnd Tod und Leben. (2429-32) (9)

This is glaringly in contrast to the Classical idea of man's freedom of will, the ability to choose and act, to overcome all external forces and fate, even if this may involve a tragic but victorious death. In fact both examples quoted above seem to echo Wallenstein's recognition of his inability to challenge fate:

Ernst ist der Anblick der Notwendigkeit.  
Nicht ohne Schauder greift des Menschen Hand  
In des Geschicks geheimnisvolle Urne  
(Wallensteins Tod, 183-5)

but fate in Wallenstein is of human proportions - Wallenstein's self-delusion and the forces of tradition and society that are represented by Octavio. Heinz Schafroth, in his study of "die Entscheidung" in Grillparzer's work, <sup>(10)</sup> seeks to show that fate is a mere cliché in Blanka, used as an excuse by characters who are morally inferior. It is quite true that the second courtier praises freedom and the strength to carry out one's decisions (3911-3), but nevertheless the characters in the play all seem weak, passive, inactive, <sup>(11)</sup> in stark contrast to the degree of strength, purpose and nobility exhibited in Don Carlos. If in Wallenstein fate seems to be in human hands, Grillparzer's play reveals the power of circumstances, the intricate nature of the problems besetting man, so that the characters seem partly like puppets, the playthings of fate, running around aimlessly and to no avail. When one has the strength and purposefulness of Goethe's, and especially Schiller's early characters in mind, however many questions one might justifiably raise about the aims and achievements of their striving, then on turning to Grillparzer's first full-length drama, one is surprised to find such a pessimistic view of life in one so young.

The main problem is that, if Grillparzer is giving a solution in the play, then it is rather hazy. Blanka does admittedly contain a number of references to basic humanity such as Grillparzer could not fail to find in Don Carlos. The comparison of "Mensch" with a word denoting rank or position, as already noted (55-7), occurs

elsewhere also. In the first meeting of Fedriko and Blanka, the former tears off his cloak, the sign of his former life (a motif much used in later plays), and announces his intention of rejoicing simply in his humanity, in terms similar to those used in Nathan der Weise and Ernst und Falk:

Nicht Ritter will ich nun mehr sein, nicht Krieger,  
und gern entsag ich jedem Rang und Titel,  
ein einzger nur, ein einzger sei mein Stolz  
und hebe über Fürsten mich empor;  
der schöne Name Mensch, den die Natur  
dem Bettler wie dem König gütig gab,  
den schönsten, den sie ihnen geben konnte: (963-9)

In matters of love, Blanka rejects even the slightest consideration of rank or title, love is above all such boundaries. Maria says she gave her love to Pedro as "König", never as "Mensch" (2039-40).<sup>(12)</sup> But the picture is confusing, as suggested already by the last example, where one is not sure which is better, "Mensch" or "König". The term "Mensch" is often used as a sign of weakness, especially when man is threatened by fate and its machinations. Pedro tells Rodrigo, "Der Mensch kann wohl, nie die Natur betrügen (2603), and he sees Blanka as "erhaben über Menschenfühlen" (4766).<sup>(13)</sup> Fedriko, on considering his plight, cries out:

Ich bin ein Mensch! Ein Engel müßt ich sein,  
um, was er tat, ihm zu vergessen. (3329-30)

The culmination of this basic dichotomy lies in the fascinating first scene of the final act, which holds up the action at a critical stage with a longwinded discussion about Trastamara, who appears to be approaching the city gates and does in fact arrive at the end of the play. In that it retards the action so much, it seems to be a scene whose significance for Grillparzer went beyond its specific context in the play. In the first place it serves as a much-needed if not wholly successful reminder of the political background of the play, but also in its discussion of Trastamara contains a long argument on the nature of man.

The second courtier, who dominates much of the scene, puts forward the optimistic view. He sees the natural

equality of man, his freedom and strength to carry out his decisions, all of which are held up as proof of man's divinity. All men have the potential for greatness and cannot be damaged by fate if they stand firm, only a bad man will illtreat "der Menschheit Siegel". As an example of a good man he cites Trastamara, who is noble and follows the course of justice and virtue. The culmination of the second courtier's argument is:

Er ist ein edler Mensch!

- but the third courtier objects:

Ganz Recht! Ein Mensch!  
Ein edler Mensch? Mag sein! Doch nur ein Mensch!  
(3961-2)

The third courtier has a more gloomy view of the matter. Man is a weak creature who acts only from selfish motives; the lure of the crown will prevent Trastamara from hearing the voice of right and virtue.

The second courtier, it would seem is the mouthpiece for Grillparzer's ideal, for what he would like to believe is the case, especially having read Don Carlos with its stress on humanity in man over and above all considerations of rank, status, race and creed. But Grillparzer cannot be as optimistic as Schiller, and hence feels compelled to present the opposing view with equal force.<sup>(14)</sup>

Furthermore, even the second courtier's description of the fate which will overcome Rodrigo and Maria, a section which shows the obvious influence of the "Parzenlied" in Iphigenie auf Tauris, is rather unnerving in a situation where, as we have seen, the line dividing good from evil is so hazy and the difficulty of choosing the right path so great. In the words:

es knüpfen sich Taten  
mit Taten zusammen;  
ein Frevel zieht tausend,  
verworfner und schwärzer,  
nach sich im Geleite (4056-60)

a theme of many of Grillparzer's later plays is adumbrated, in particular Das goldene Vließ, with its motto taken directly from the famous lines in Die Piccolomini.

Clearly this scene reminds us also of Trastamara, and with him the political background against which the play

is taking place. Are we perhaps to look outside the action to find the play's centre of gravity and the basis upon which affairs should be judged? Politzer believes this to be the case; he shows Trastamara as an indication of the permanence of life lurking behind the apparent transience, and talks of Grillparzer's continual attempts, "den lieben Gott zumindest hinter den Kulissen seines Theaters ahnbar zu machen".<sup>(15)</sup> This is stated in rather unfortunate terms - Grillparzer was a "Randkatholik" in the loosest possible sense - but it is nevertheless an intriguing and not entirely implausible suggestion. If valid, it would surely point to the meaning that Grillparzer was seeking to convey, namely that Rodriko should take sides with Trastamara, overthrow Pedro and save Blanka. However I feel that if this had been Grillparzer's firm position in the matter, it would have been made clear. "Robert, Herzog von der Normandie", written in the time between Acts I and II of Blanka, reveals a very obvious black and white presentation of good and evil, and this is also the case in most previous dramatic works which are long enough to allow of genuine conclusions. In Die Schreibfeder, which is more subtle in this respect, Grillparzer's sympathies are quite plain, and it seems reasonable to suppose that such clarity would have been possible if it had been Grillparzer's intention to make matters plain. The interest in Blanka is in no way centred outside the play. Grillparzer admittedly feels obliged at times to introduce a mention of the wider setting, but these are at best half-hearted attempts. The historical background is poorly used and never has any force within the play; one is never encouraged to think that the action is set in the context of important historical events. Blanka von Kastilien is not a historical tragedy even in the widest sense of the word. The play ends with interest firmly focused on the sad and lonely figure of Pedro in a setting of death and destruction, not on the imminent arrival of Trastamara. The periodic attempts to rekindle interest in the historical

setting seem out of place. The first scene of the final act constitutes one such attempt, but the real significance of this scene lies in the opinions put forward, the argument conducted, not in the mention of Trastamara. Man is not good or bad, but a mixture of the opposing characteristics outlined by the second and third courtiers. Fedriko is torn between two courses of action and neither he nor Grillparzer really knows the correct one to take.

The parallels between Grillparzer's play and Schiller's consist in the correspondence of the characters used, the constellation of characters in the individual scenes, the general relationship of the characters, and also the situations depicted, especially as far as the pre-history of the play's events is concerned. Furthermore one can point to the exaggerated rhetoric, and above all a host of motifs, phrases and expressions, which the critical edition of the works has considered in detail. It should be stressed that not all of these elements originate in Don Carlos, but that all of Schiller's plays exert some influence.

The differences between Don Carlos and Blanka are nevertheless great, above all in the real nature of the characters. In contrast to Schiller's play, the characters in Blanka reveal weakness, inactivity, indecisiveness, lack of freedom. Also there is the lack of a meaningful political background, the play is not in any way evocative of an age. There is a constant looking back to the past instead of forward to the future. The real problems and issues of Don Carlos are not taken up: the question of friendship, the father-son conflict (the corresponding clash of half-brothers is never developed), the questions of political and social freedom. The absence of these problems, especially the latter, limits the scope of the play considerably. Paulsen and Politzer both see Blanka as a "Haupt- und Staatsaktion", but it is much more a personal matter of where man's priorities lie, how he is to act in a situation of conflicting loyalties, and the fact that one of these loyalties has a political connotation



is not of prime importance. Elsewhere, in Grillparzer's later plays, it is poetry, master, homeland, family, church that come into conflict with matters of the heart, and although the two sides of the conflict may be more convincingly drawn, the choice to be made is nowhere as obvious as in Don Carlos.

One way in which Don Carlos or Schiller in general did exert considerable influence was in the language. Words such as "Herz", "Treue", "Schuld", "Tugend", "Laster", "Schicksal", "Pflicht", "Mensch" are very common in Blanka. Here I think it is rather dangerous to deny Schillerian influence, as Tönz tries to do. Despite the examples he quotes, the words I have listed are not particularly common in Viennese drama of the time, certainly not sufficiently so to warrant their wholesale usage in Blanka. Furthermore Grillparzer uses these words much less, even allowing for relative length, in the short plays based most directly on the Viennese stage. The word "Mensch" does not once occur in Wer ist schuldig? for instance. On the whole it might be said that in many instances where the influence of Don Carlos is superficial or non-existent, the reason is to be found as much in Grillparzer's own character and personal problems as in the traditions of the Viennese stage, whose influence may be seen as equally superficial and not touching the essence of Grillparzer's play.

On a matter of minor importance, Tönz attempts to disprove the Schillerian influence of the phrase "des Daseins erste Rosenjahre" (Blanka, 45), but his argument founders on the fact that the quotations he provides from Viennese plays<sup>(16)</sup> do not, despite similarity of meaning, actually include the word "Rose", whereas the passage Tönz himself quotes from Don Carlos does include the phrase "der Jugend Rosenbahn". Tönz is on dangerous ground in the following comments which should be quoted in full for the sake of clarity. Tönz quotes:

den Menschen hab ich frevelnd ausgezogen,  
um nur dem Helden freien Raum zu geben;  
erstickt hab ich des Herzens Hochgefühle! (55-7)

and continues:

Der Antagonismus zwischen Herz und Heldentum war im Theater der Zeit, sowohl jenem im Gefolge des Sturm und Drangs [a movement he has previously said did not exist in Vienna (p.71)] als auch im stoisch-klassizistischen etwa eines Collin, vollkommen geläufig. Interessant ist nun aber, daß sich in der Blanka der Held nicht am Herz-Begriff des Sturm und Drangs orientiert, wo jeder Abfall vom Herzen Verrat bedeutet, das Herz also die oberste instanz, die Fülle und Ganzheit des Menschlichen verkörperte, sondern am vulgärstoischen Tugendideal, das im Verzichten, in der Selbstverleugnung, im Sieg über das eigene Herz den höchsten Wert erkennt. Grillparzer liegt damit nicht auf der revolutionären Linie eines Don Carlos sondern auf der reaktionären des klassischen und klassizistischen Theaters. (17)

The last sentence appears to echo the leitmotif of this dissertation, namely Grillparzer's debt to Classicism, but the argument leading up to it and the terms used seem terribly suspect. In the first place it would seem dangerous to equate Don Carlos either with the standard "Sturm und Drang" drama or with the philosophy of the movement and hence to consider Don Carlos and Classicism as opposites; and it seems totally simplistic to consider Don Carlos, a play which deals with the problems inherent both in politics and in idealism, as revolutionary, whilst giving Classicism the label "reactionary". To deny the presence of the heart in Classicism is quite unbelievable. What after all do Max and Thekla stand for, if not for the heart as the ideal source of truth and inspiration, and the same applies to Iphigenie. What is art meant to appeal to in Schiller's and Goethe's opinion, if not to heart and mind equally? There is no question in Classicism of a "vulgärstoisches Tugendideal, das im Verzichten, in der Selbstverleugnung, im Sieg über das eigene Herz den höchsten Wert erkennt". Even within the context of Blanka, the distinctions have to be examined. Fedriko's heart may have been overruled when he left Blanka, but surely in the very act of speaking the lines which Tönz quotes, his heart is re-awakening, and it is his heart which demands a return to times of old, which is overjoyed at Blanka's appearance and passionately threatens to

destroy the whole of the country rather than let her go, and which in the end chooses in favour of Blanka's rescue rather than in favour of duty as he sees it. The very sentence that Tönz uses as the basis of his dangerous generalisation seems to prove the opposite; far from showing an ideal of virtue founded on renunciation, the tone of what Fedriko is saying suggests that "des Herzens Hochgefühle" are in fact a higher phenomenon than heroism. In any case, Carlos most certainly has to quieten the demands of the heart in abandoning his love for Elisabeth and devoting himself to tasks of a higher nature.

The word "Herz" occurs with great regularity in Blanka, and on the whole it is compared favourably or at least sympathetically, with an often strict, inhuman duty and with the dictates of cold reason. In Blanka herself, "die Reine", these are seen as corresponding in Classical terms: "In ihrem Herzen blühet nur die Tugend" (1400). In her long monologue (V,5), Maria equates the period of her evil deeds and crimes with the time when;

... leer und schaurig, wie ein Eisgefild,  
lag starr mein Herz in dem entweihten Busen! (4610-1)  
and her return at least to consciousness, if not to virtue, is equated with the re-awakening of her heart. Only once does the heart get an unfavourable mention in the play, when the courtier says of Trastamara;

Des Herzens Regung schweigt in seinem Busen,  
wenn er das Schwert ergreift fürs Vaterland. (3959-60)  
Although this is admittedly an important passage, the generally positive view of the heart cannot be offset by this one major instance of the contrary. With the possible exception of Blanka, there is no question of the Schillerian ideal of inclination and duty being synonymous, but even in Schiller this is an unattainable ideal in most cases. In answer to Tönz however, it must be stressed that the term "Herz", although often used in Blanka in a somewhat weak, stereotyped fashion, has a positive connotation as is normal in the works of Goethe and Schiller.

Turning from Schiller, one must not overlook the smaller but significant influence of Goethe. Blanka von Kastilien

was written during the period when Grillparzer was slowly becoming acquainted with Goethe's work, especially Werther and the dramas (the early poetry suggests that Grillparzer already knew some of Goethe's lyrical work). This is reflected in Blanka in a number of recurring images ("Hütte" and "Becher" for example), in the influence of the "Parzenlied" on the opening scene of Act V, of Mignon's song on Blanka's lament (I,7), and of the opening scene of Iphigenie on Blanka's story (IV,1). More apparent is the consistent use of words such as "Hoffnung", "Natur", "Ruhe", "sanft", and also "weben", "wallen", "glühen".

Too much of a distinction between Goethe and Schiller may be dangerous, but it is impossible to overlook the general influence of their vocabulary in the play, the use of "edel", "Gesetz", "Grenze", "Pflicht", "Ruhe", "schön", and above all the persistent use of "Herz", "Tugend" and "Mensch".

The years 1809-10 were turbulent ones for Grillparzer for a number of reasons. He was a member of the student militia defending Vienna against Napoleon, and the occupation of the Austrian capital led indirectly to the death of his father in November, 1809. The resulting financial plight of the family spurred him to complete Blanka and submit the play to the Burgtheater in January of the following year. After seven months, however, the play was returned to him without being accepted for production. Grillparzer had gone continually to inquire as to its fate (Tgb.97), and although he had feared the worst, he significantly distances himself from the final rejection by writing in Spanish, and he continues; "ich fürchte, es wird mir noch manche schwere Stunde machen" (Tgb.99). Blanka had been his first completed attempt at a full-length play, and its rejection clearly left him depressed. His diary notes dry up almost immediately and he wrote nothing more for a year.

But it is equally important that the rejection of Blanka comes at the end of the transition from Schiller to Goethe which was considered in the previous chapter. If

Grillparzer was concerned to defend his play against accusations of similarity with Schiller's work, then it is equally true that Blanka appeared even more inadequate as a result of his new acquaintance with Goethe's work; "(Blanka) kam mir unerträglich vor, ich verwarf sie" (Tgb.92). As we have seen, the discovery of Goethe intensified all Grillparzer's doubts concerning his artistic ability, and it is the comparison of Goethe and Schiller and Grillparzer's resulting anxieties that fill the diaries of 1810, rather than the question of Altmütter's friendship, which apparently provided the initial impetus for the recommencement of the diary notes.

The diaries do not make it clear exactly when Grillparzer read the works of Goethe which made such an impression on him. According to the entry of June 19, the change in his opinions had been in progress for no more than six months. Yet a diary entry one day later suggests that this process had in fact started much earlier;

Werthers Leiden war es vorbehalten, mich zu bekehren. Ich las sie mit Entzücken, und hohe Begierde bemächtigte sich meiner Seele, die Werke dieses außerordentlichen Mannes, dessen Vortrefflichkeit ich nun einzusehen begann in ihrem ganzen Umfange zu kennen, eine Sache, die in Wien nicht leicht ist. Die Franzosen kamen nach Wien, und ein Nachdruck seiner Schriften erschien, ich schaffte mir sie so schnell wie möglich an, und blickte mit unbeschreiblicher Wonne nun in die Tiefen seines unaussprechlich zarten Gefühls. Ich las Fausten ... (Tgb.92)

The French captured Vienna in May 1809, so that Werther had been read and appreciated before then. Faust must have been read shortly afterwards, but from then on the picture is less clear, and the vital second reading of Faust and the equally important discovery of Tasso may have taken place any time between May 1809 and June 1810. It is conceivable that after reading Faust for the first time, his professed embarrassment as to how to compare it with his ideal Schiller, and his continuing work on Blanka made him abandon Goethe until he had completed his own drama. The shock of fully realising Goethe's genius may then have

been a major cause in the drying up of the diary notes late in 1809. At all events however, the discovery of Goethe must have accompanied the latter stages of work on Blanka, but this is not reflected in any change in the ideas or vocabulary of the play, no obvious contrast stands out between first and last acts.

The development of Grillparzer's interest in Goethe throughout 1809 is reflected much more clearly in "Irenens Wiederkehr", written late in that year, which in form and content is so obviously in contrast to most of Grillparzer's earlier work. It could be suggested that it is this fragment that Grillparzer is referring to in accusing himself of a compulsive desire to imitate what he has just read:

Meine Nachahmungssucht übersteigt allen Glauben.  
Alle meine Ideen formen sich nach jüngst gelesenen.  
Ich fürchte ein neuer Beweis, daß ich nicht leicht  
jemals exzellieren werde. (Tgb.59)

The diary note was made some time between July 1 and November 10, and which work or works Grillparzer was reading is not clear - if indeed the note refers to "Irene" at all - but certainly the characters and the sententious statements of the fragment have an obvious affinity with such works as Pandora, lines 1-402 of which were first published in Vienna in February and March, 1808 under the title Pandora's Wiederkunft. Ein Festspiel von Goethe, and which includes the words "Pandorens Wiederkehr" (1.345).<sup>(18)</sup> The complete text of Pandora appeared, also in Vienna, in mid-1810, and although it would seem beyond doubt that Grillparzer's "Irene" was written by then, the appearance of one further proof of Goethe's genius may have inspired Grillparzer to write down an account of his changed opinions.

Pandora was clearly influential for the setting of Grillparzer's fragment, the time of day, the relationship of the characters, the constellation of the various scenes. This connection has already been considered by critics. Hans Lorenz, in his article on "Spartakus"<sup>(19)</sup> sees Grillparzer's wanderer, youth, girl and ploughman corresponding to Goethe's Epimetheus, Phileros, Elpore and the blacksmith respectively. In both plays, a character

enters at dawn full of great thoughts, both are disturbed by the entry of the youth:

Hinaus, hinaus,  
aus engendem Haus ("Irene", 72-3)

Zu freieren Lüften hinaus, nur hinaus!  
Wie drängen mich Mauern! wie ängstet das Haus!  
(Pandora, 36-7)

Grillparzer's fragment shows a similar use of different metres as a means of characterisation. Lorenz admits that the characters in Pandora do actually have names, and one might suggest that the use of archetypal names was taken from Goethe's Hermann und Dorothea, which seems to have furnished Grillparzer with a number of motifs. Hermann und Dorothea lays great stress on a peaceful harmonious life away from the bustle of the world at large, and on the overcoming of the ambitious exuberance of youth. Grillparzer's fragment reveals a striving for a peaceful idyllic life of hard work and family bliss as outlined by the ploughman and the wanderer. This is compared favourably with the youth wishing to go out into the turmoil of the world in search of action. Both works show the danger of carrying such behaviour over into the real adult world, and warn of the inhuman horrors of war. There is also the generally tendentious, moralising tone of the characters in Hermann und Dorothea, echoed especially in Grillparzer's figure of the wanderer.

The increased influence of Goethe can also be traced in the vocabulary of "Irenens Wiederkehr". There is the pantheistic use of "das All", where especially the phrase "das liebende All" (1.19) seems an echo of Goethe's "alliebend" ("Ganymed", Werther (letter of 10/5/71)); there is the persistent use of "Natur", and for the first time the direct comparison of "Mensch" with "Tier":

Das Tier in uns hat die Natur hervorgebracht,  
den Menschen schuf erst seine Göttermacht! (57-8)

The relatively short fragment abounds in words such as "Herz", "Liebe", "Wonne", "hold", "sanft", "rein", "still", "ruhig", "glühen", "heiter", "wallen", "wehen", "streben". Of these, only "Herz", "Liebe", "ruhig", and to a lesser

extent "wallen" and "glühen" are to be found throughout Grillparzer's work up to 1810, the others occur really for the first time, or are to be found otherwise only in the early poetry and to some extent in Blanka ("Natur", "Wonne", "rein", "still" for example). Hence, with the partial exception of Blanka, these words, which one can show to be common in Goethe's work in general, or at least in certain works which Grillparzer read at this time,<sup>(20)</sup> are found for the first time in a dramatic work of Grillparzer's.

This is also of course in keeping with the subject matter of the work. "Irene", with its lyrical quality, its aspect of peace and tranquillity, its symbolic characters, is of a type not previously attempted by Grillparzer, and in a style which Goethe used rather than Schiller. A comparison of the vocabulary of "Robert" with that of "Irene" reveals interesting contrasts. The earlier drama is marked by words such as "frei", "Recht", "Schicksal", "Treue", "Pflicht", as well as "Herz", "Liebe", "Ruhe", which are used throughout Grillparzer's early work. Further elements of the vocabulary of "Irene" are the large number of verbs which Grillparzer uses with the prefix "um-": "umweben" (1.12), "umziehen" (29), "umfließen" (36), "umflechten" (45), "umschauen" (69), "umschleiern" (142), "umspannen" (155). This is very much a characteristic of Goethe, above all in his poems. Of those used by Grillparzer, "umflechten" and "umfließen" can be traced to Goethe, as well as the fairly common "umschauen" and "umziehen", but I have been unable to trace "umschweben" or "umschleiern" in Goethe's work.<sup>(21)</sup> On the whole, Goethe's use of such verbs is somewhat more adventurous; for example "umsäuseln", "umflügeln", "umgießen", "umhauchen", "umwallen". A further feature of "Irene" is the considerable number of compound nouns, over forty in fact. "Erdensohn" (1.50), "Sternenheer" (123), "Götterbild" (190) are to be traced to Pandora (757, 115, 101 respectively), and there are in Pandora numerous compounds in "Götter-". A number of these compounds are used by Goethe but are in common



usage ("Sonnenstrahl", "Götterlist", "Göttermacht"), further ones occur in Schiller's work - "Erdensohn", "Himmelszelt" are to be found in "Das Lied von der Glocke", a poem which abounds in compounds of "Himmel-", and Grillparzer's phrase "der Unschuld Schwanenkleid" (344) may well have been borrowed from Schiller's poem of 1781 "Die Kindsmörderin". However the point seems not to be one of originality, nor of sources, but of quantity. The short fragment reveals a relatively large proportion of compound nouns, which constitutes a further indication of the influence of Goethe's work.

Pandora has a vocabulary very similar to Grillparzer's fragment. There is consistent use of "Herz", "Liebe", "Ruhe", "hold", "still", "streben", "glühen/Glut", "Wonne", - and to this list one could also add "lieblich" and "schaffen", which are used on a number of occasions in "Irene". The words "rein", "still" and "ruhig" are vital concepts in Tasso, which made such an impression on Grillparzer at the time of writing "Irene". "Heiter" is frequent in Hermann und Dorothea. One can also find echoes of the "Erdegeist" scene in Faust, especially in the use of the verbs: "wallen", "wehen", "weben", "wühlen", "glühen", "schaffen" (Faust, 460-81, 501-9). These echoes can be heard in the vocabulary of the whole fragment, but more particularly in the wanderer's opening speech -

Ein Sturm von Gefühlen  
durchwaltet die Brust (13-14)

- and also in the girl's expression of her love -

im Busen wogts wie ein wallendes Meer ...

Ein unbekannt Etwas die Seele fühlt,  
das nimmer ruhend im Busen wühlt. (264, 270-1)

A more obvious source for the wanderer's speech, however, is Goethe's "Ganymed", both in the opening lines -

Wie im Morgenrot  
Du rings mich anglühst ("Ganymed", 1-2)

Die Nacht entflieht,  
der Aufgang glüht ("Irene", 1-2)

- and in the desire to strive upwards:

Hinauf, hinauf strebt's ...  
In eurem Schoße  
Aufwärts,  
Umfangend umfassen!  
Aufwärts  
An deinem Busen,  
Allliebender Vater! ("Ganymed", 22, 27-32)

Das entfesselte Herz  
strebt himmelwärts  
und will an das liebende All sich schließen.  
("Irene", 17-19)

In "Ganymed" it is the clouds that descend to man, in "Irene" it is "der Geist der Eintracht" (l. 24). It is the wanderer's speech that makes such great use of verbs in "um-", of compounds in "Morgen-".

It was pointed out that some of the many compounds in the fragment are also to be found in "Das Lied von der Glocke", and it would indeed be foolish to seek to deny the continuing influence of Schiller. There are other obvious links with Schiller's poem, in the metre of the ploughman's speech, in expressions such as "Geist der Eintracht", "Geist der Friede", "holder Friede" ("Irene", 24, 38, 240):

Holder Friede,  
Süße Eintracht. ("Glocke", 322-3)

A passage such as

Schwer und heiß  
Rinnt der Schweiß ("Irene", 194-5)

echoes a similar section of Schiller's poem:

Von der Stirne heiß  
Rinnen muß der Schweiß. ("Glocke", 5-6)

The danger of revolution overtaking a peaceful existence is also a theme of Schiller's poem:

Gefährlich ist's, den Leu zu wecken,  
Verderblich ist des Tigers Zahn, ("Glocke", 374-5)

and Grillparzer makes use of the same imagery to warn of a similar danger:

Wohl, wohl dem Land, das ihn erzogen,  
wenn nur auf Tiger und auf Leun  
er schwingt den Speer und zieht den Bogen.  
("Irene", 158-60)

Schiller's phrase "der Schoß der Städte" ("Glocke", 354) twice finds its way into Grillparzer's fragment in the

form "der Städte trauriger Schoß" (101,318). In general the word "Schoß" is common in Schiller's work, more so than in Goethe's. (22)

The picture of the vocabulary in "Irene" is in no way clear cut. Of the words listed above, "wallen" and "wehen" are as common in Schiller as in Goethe, "sanft" more so in Schiller. Furthermore the words "Ruhe", "Liebe", "still" are common in the two poems by Schiller which influenced Grillparzer in the writing of his fragment.

The second of these poems is "Würde der Frauen", of which the last section of "Irene" is a paraphrase. The contrast between man and woman very much echoes the comparison established in Schiller's poem, and in many instances the vocabulary is identical. The man in "Irene" is described in the first lines of the wanderer's final speech:

Mit ungezähmtem, starrem Willen  
tobt rastlos, nimmersatt der Mann,  
nichts kann der Wünsche Streben stillen,  
es sei die Erd ihm untertan,  
und keck wünscht er zum Sternenkreis zu dringen,  
auch jene Welten in sein Joch zu zwingen.

Was widerstrebt, will er zerschmettern,  
In seinen Armen liegt sein Recht ... (323-30)

The ideas of restlessness and the search for the stars find their parallel in Schiller's lines:

Rastlos durch entlegne Sterne  
Jagt er seines Traumes Bild. ("Würde der Frauen", 13-14)

For Grillparzer's man, "nichts kann der Wünsche Streben stillen", Schiller speaks of "des Mannes Streben" (1.21) and states, "Nimmer ruht der Wünsche Streit" (26), "Nimmer wird sein Herz gestillt" (12). For both poets, man derives his rights from his arms, his strength - "Gilt der Stärke trotzig Recht" ("Würde der Frauen", 50). The world of man is "rauh" ("Irene", 348, 355, 363; "Würde der Frauen", 55) and "roh" ("Irene", 354; "Würde der Frauen", 54), a realm of destruction ("Irene", 329; "Würde der Frauen", 22, 25).

The words used to describe woman are also similar, if not identical in both works: "sanft" ("Irene", 332, 347; "Würde der Frauen", 57), "still" ("Irene", 346; "Würde der

Frauen",29), "bescheiden" ("Irene",350; "Würde der Frauen",18), "Scham" ("Irene",336; "Würde der Frauen",19), "Fühlen" ("Irene",333,356; cf."Würde der Frauen",6 ("Gefühle"), 45 ("fühlende Seele")), "zart" ("Irene",333,336,353; cf."Würde der Frauen",46 ("zärtlich")), "Tränen" ("Irene",339; "Würde der Frauen",40,48). For Grillparzer and Schiller, the woman wins by her charm and art of persuasion, "hold weiß zu gewinnen" ("Irene",334), working "mit zauberisch fesselndem Blicke ... mit sanft überredender Bitte" ("Würde der Frauen",15,57). In Schiller's man, "Nimmer ruht der Wünsche Streit" (26), whilst Grillparzer's woman has "der Wünsche Streit in stiller Brust geschlichtet" (346). Women in each case preserve the realm of love ("Irene",342-3; "Würde der Frauen",3), are more favoured in the sphere of art and beauty ("Irene",337-340; "Würde der Frauen",34), and have links with the divine and the holy ("Irene",341,351-2; "Würde der Frauen",1-2,6). In both works the woman's realm is "Sitte";

Aber mit sanft überredender Bitte  
Führen die Frauen den Zepter der Sitte ("Würde der Frauen",57-8)

Im innern hegt sie reine Sitte. ("Irene",349; cf.  
"der Tugend sanftes Szepter",1.56)

There are also ideals in the description of woman which are not to be found in Schiller's poem: "hold" (334), "rein"(349), "mild"(362). Certainly the first two of these could be attributed to Goethean influence. The main differences however between Grillparzer's fragment and Schiller's poem are of degree. Grillparzer's man wishes to subjugate the whole world, even the universe, Schiller's man exhibits a rather aimless striving for distant victories. Hence Grillparzer's woman was created to save man, Schiller's merely calls man back to the present, to a more limited sphere. There is no suggestion of Schiller's woman being "über dieses Leben erhaben" ("Irene",352), instead she is the centre of life, uniting opposites ("Würde der Frauen",59-62), which Grillparzer's woman achieves only within herself ("Irene",346). The Schillerian image of "vereinen, was ewig sich flieht" is however used at

the beginning of Grillparzer's fragment, in the description of "der Geist der Eintracht",

(er) will das Getrennte mit Liebe vereinen,  
sein Band umzieht,  
was feindlich sich flieht. ("Irene", 28-30)

The final line of Grillparzer's fragment mocks, to some extent at least, Schiller's ideal as expressed in the title: "vergebens suchst du dann nach Frauen Würde!" ("Irene", 364). Significantly Grillparzer, unlike Schiller, sees the danger of noble feminine ideals being swept away either by dangerous forces within ("Roheit"), or by overwhelming external forces such as war.

The contrast between man and woman is of course also a vital theme of Tasso, and it is interesting to note that Grillparzer was attracted to such a theme at this stage, a theme he returns to in Sappho, Libussa and Jüdin. A further Classical theme is the motif of the unknowable truth, as also in the early poems, "Der Unzufriedene" and "Der wahre Glaube". God has given man all he needs to know, certain things remain hidden until death. The youth in "Irene", like the boy in Schiller's "Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais", wishes to know everything, and the image of the veil is the same in both works, the veil hiding what it is best for man not to see. In "Irene" the youth thinks he has seen behind it;

Wenn ihr [der Natur] Odem um mich spielt mit labendem  
Wehn,

läßt sie Ungeschautes entschleiern mich sehn! (108-9)  
but it is in the nature of Grillparzer's philosophy in the fragment that the boy merely thinks this to be the case, if he had succeeded, he would no doubt have met with the same fate as the boy in Schiller's poem. This motif is of course common in Goethe's work, in Faust, "Zueignung", "Jugendlich kommt sie vom Himmel". The message of Grillparzer's fragment is one of limitation and moderation, the praise of a clearly defined but nevertheless quietly active and productive life with a family and children. It is perhaps strange to find such views in an eighteen year old. One could argue that they were not his own, that "Irene" is a literary exercise, but that makes the

works chosen as a basis all the more significant. In either case it is in marked contrast to Goethe's and Schiller's earliest works, but has clear parallels with their mature work. In addition, as I have sought to show, "Irene" reveals a gradual shifting of interest towards Goethe, without at this stage losing links with Schiller.

After 1810 and the troubles which culminated in that year, a new period of writing began for Grillparzer, a period of little finished work except for the short Viennese situation comedy Wer ist schuldig? The fragments of these years also reflect the change in Grillparzer's literary allegiances, both in the treatment of the subjects and in the style and vocabulary employed.

The first dramatic work of the years 1811-1816 is "Spartakus", written in 1811. In many respects it mirrors Grillparzer's unhappy circumstances around 1810, reflecting his desire for friendship, love, respect and recognition, but also the failure of others to understand him. Lorenz, in his article on the fragment, sees "Spartakus" as influenced by Werther and Tasso. Certainly Werther, in communion with nature, avoiding other people, completely involved in his own world to the exclusion of things outside, cherishing all tokens of affection, may justifiably be seen as a kindred spirit, but Lorenz's claim that Spartakus, like Tasso, lives in conflict with reality, is less convincing, whilst Wartburg's belief that Spartakus, like Tasso, seeks to give himself to a friend and is rejected,<sup>(23)</sup> seems to make light of the very obvious differences between on the one hand Tasso's desire for Antonio as a friend and thereby a more solid connection with what he considers to be real life, and on the other hand Spartakus's search for love in the arms of Cornelia and the complete withdrawal from the real world of politics which this love entails. Spartakus is not really a poet, and the problems involved are not specifically those pertaining to a poetic nature. What the result of Spartakus's rejection at the hands of Cornelia was to have been, one can only surmise. Lorenz believes that the political theme was to remain subsidiary,

and the play was to be a love-tragedy. On the whole I am inclined to believe the reverse; that Grillparzer broke off work on the fragment once the political themes were about to take over from the more personal, individual questions involved.

"Psyche", also written in 1811, is too short to give much indication as to Grillparzer's intentions. The feelings of awakening love in a girl, experienced as a strange malaise, point back to the young girl in "Irene", and both plays show the general influence of Goethe in this motif, especially of Gretchen, who also breaks into song to give expression to her vague feelings; the extent to which this is a motif in later Grillparzer plays need hardly be stressed, Hero and Psyche even sing the same song of Leda and the swan. The same theme of awakening love, this time however in a man, is also what attracted Grillparzer to plan a continuation of Faust in 1812 (Tgb.117). (24) Wer ist schuldig? is very much a comedy on Viennese lines, "Alfred der Große" is the play which most reveals the influence of a closer study of Shakespeare in 1812.

In general the plays of 1811-1816 show Grillparzer's increasing maturity and the development of greater individuality as a writer. There is a more personal approach to drama than before, the influence of other writers is much less obvious, there are far fewer direct borrowings. Much stronger is the confessional aspect, the reflection of deeper experiences, of personal feelings. This aspect might well be attributed to the influence of Goethe as well as to a change in Grillparzer's own needs. Figures such as Tasso, Faust, Werther, Egmont, one might suggest, caused Grillparzer to turn to a character-study of the hero who dominates the whole action, but whose inner feelings and experiences are also vitally important. Grillparzer often now shows a determination to come to grips with his hero, to work out his psychological make-up first of all in a plan. This is the case with "Die Pazzi", "Faust", and "Friedrich der Streitbare". The psychological insight which now goes into the observation of character is

much more apparent. The heroes especially are credible creations, rather than stereotyped characters who make the plot move along. This contrast is seen in a comparison of the straightforward character of Robert on the one hand, and on the other the enigmatic figure of Spartakus, whom all try but fail to comprehend fully. The concern is with character rather than with plot, once the character of the hero has been sketched in the light of Grillparzer's problems at the time, the plot alone is not sufficient incentive to make him complete the work.

In both "Spartakus" and "Alfred" we see the change to a less direct structure, to a more varied, subtle approach rather than each scene being a link in the chain which leads to the climax. Instead each scene presents a new situation or problem. Despite the greater degree of individuality which is obvious in Grillparzer's work at this time, the influence of Goethe and Shakespeare is apparent; the construction is more open, the tone more lyrical than before.

This development becomes particularly apparent in the three fragments "Die Pazzi" (1812), "Faust" (1813), and "Friedrich der Streitbare" (1816), of which the first and last deal with similar problems. Francesko Pazzi feels inferior in all matters to Lorenzo di Medici (Tgb.312), feels he is unjustly treated by all, and the same is true of Jerindo Frangipani. Both avoid society because of a fear of appearing inferior to others. By comparison, in the figures of Lorenzo di Medici and Herzog Friedrich, Grillparzer has perhaps expressed his personal ideal. Here he has depicted men of strength, great character, self-assurance, men who take a full and active part in the life of the community. Much more than in "Spartakus", we find in these two fragments elements of Tasso. There is the desire to prove oneself in life, also the need for friendship, in Pazzi's case love. In both it is the rejection of this, the failure to find friendship, that leads to an eruption of the inner forces and feelings, with Grillparzer much more than in Goethe's



play, where Tasso's inner confusion and lack of moderation are merely increased as a result.

The feelings of inferiority and insufficiency in Pazzi and Frangipani are equally to be found in the series of pessimistic poems from the winter of 1812/13. The most sophisticated expression of these feelings is in the poem "An Ovid", interesting for the additional reason that it points forward to the later use of Ovid's reflections on isolation in the Tristia cycle. In the present poem, hope has abandoned him and he is guided only by desperation and thoughts of self-destruction. But there is not complete despair, for he turns to his poetry in the hope of salvation:

Trotz sei geboten dir! Dies Blatt soll leben,  
wenn meines Seins Atome längst zerstreut.  
Zertritt mich auch der Fuß der nächsten Stunde,  
so leb ich ewig in der Nachwelt Munde. (11.51-4)

This again is reminiscent of Tasso, who also turns to his poetry at the last moment as a ray of hope, though the way in which poetry provides this hope is different in each case. It provides Tasso not so much with a guarantee of life after death, though this may also be the case, but rather with a way of overcoming his present woes by putting them into words. As for Grillparzer, some of his other poems would suggest the hopelessness even of this means of escape, for we continue to find his lack of confidence in his poetic ability. This theme is found in the diaries of these years, especially in the autobiographical comments of Fixlmüller:

Ich bin nun überzeugt, sprach Fixlmüller, daß ich keine Anlage zum Dichter habe; Keine Originalität, wenn auch nicht gestohlene Ausdrücke doch zusammengestoppelte Gedanken. Wenn Goethe, Schiller und Shakespeare über mich einen Konkurs eröffneten ich müßte affenkahl dastehen. (Tgb.168)

Such criticism is not perhaps as justified as it might have been up to 1810, nevertheless the influence of the three writers listed is obvious, though the importance of Shakespeare does not concern us here. From Goethe there is a great influence of a more lyrical language,

of metre and structure, the use of songs. Lorenzo di Medici is one of the people, an idol, in much the same way that Egmont is, whilst Frangipani's adoration of Friedrich is reminiscent of Egmont's effect on Ferdinand (also Wallenstein's on Max). Egmont could also be linked with Heinrich IV's determination to take things as they come.<sup>(25)</sup> Grillparzer's great interest in Faust is reflected not only in the plans to write a second part for Goethe's tragedy, but also in "Drahomira", where the heroine's call to the spirits (II,1116-8) has many echoes of Faust's summoning of the Erdgeist.

Schiller is still important, despite Grillparzer's apparently total rejection of him in 1810. The influence is now less direct, but it is still clear in motifs, in the occasional situation. In "Spartakus" one can find verbal echoes of Jungfrau (II.123,261), Fiesko (II.144,556), also of Don Carlos, Wilhelm Tell and Kabale und Liebe. In "Alfred", Emma fears for the hero as Hedwig does for Tell, the father challenges the Danish captain in words reminiscent of Miller's attack on the President in Kabale und Liebe, whilst the whole scene in which this incident occurs is similar to the "hohle Gasse" in Tell, where Gessler, like the captain in "Alfred", dies as he utters his direst threats. Masked guests come to the banquet in "Die Pazzi", as they do in Fiesko.

In the vocabulary of this period, we discover a movement away from the very obvious influence of Goethe and Schiller. This is most noticeable in the "Shakespearian" plays, and in the very personal poetry of 1812-13, and is already apparent in the diaries of 1810, above all in the passages in which Grillparzer is carried away by his ideas. Here there is a complete absence of the terms we have been considering up to now. In the more sober passages, we still find considerable use of "Herz", "rein", "ruhig", "Mensch", but these are overshadowed now by such words as "ekelhaft", "Ruhmsucht", "Eitelkeit", "Freundschaft", "Glück", "Fantasie", "selig", which were favourite ideas of Grillparzer at the time. Many of the

words we have considered occur no more than once or twice. The poetry of this period is particularly "barren" in this respect. During Grillparzer's illness of 1812-13, his lyrical work is characterised by a mood of despair and gloom, which is amply reflected in the adjectives "matt", "lahm", "rauh", "welk", "bleich", "tot", "entblättert", "trüb", "grau", "stumm", "starr", as well as such words as "Winter", "Grab", "Leichentuch". One is left to reflect that the vocabulary we have so far considered to be Classical simply does not cover moods similar to Grillparzer's at this time.

In "Spartakus" we still find much use of concepts common in the work of Goethe and Schiller: "Freiheit", "Herz", "Mensch", "Ruhe", "Schuld", "Tat", "Tugend", also "hold", "wehen", "glühen", whilst the 114 lines of "Psyche" have a distinctly Goethean atmosphere and vocabulary: "heiter", "hold", "Wonne", "weben", "wallen". Many of these are scarcely found in Grillparzer's work afterwards, a fact especially noticeable in a longer fragment such as "Alfred". Words such as "Mensch", "Freiheit", "Herz", "Liebe", "Natur", "Ruhe", "schön", "Tat", "Treue", "streben", "wahr" are still found, but "Pflicht" and "Tugend" disappear entirely, together with "Laster", "Grenze", "Gesetz", previously found only in Blanka, whilst terms such as "Recht", "sanft", "Schicksal", "still", "edel", "rein" become uncommon. On the one hand, the rejection of terms such as "Laster", "Tugend", "Schicksal", "Pflicht" may be a result of at least a partial rejection of Schiller after 1810. In more general terms, the desire for greater originality would lead Grillparzer to guard against the wholesale borrowing of vocabulary, of which he had been guilty before 1810, especially in the poetry, hence words such as "sanft", "still", "hold", "wallen", "Glut", "heiter", "Wonne" almost entirely disappear, and the fact that Grillparzer now dispenses with such terms suggests that they are not simply standard poetic diction, and makes their adoption before 1810 all the more significant. The desire for originality is now however reflected in a

change of style, a rejection of standard epithets, so that a work such as "Alfred" is comparatively lacking in all but the most necessary adjectives. The use of the Classical "Sentenz", the epigrammatic style that carries recurring philosophical themes, is already being avoided. The one partial exception to these trends is found in the fragments of the play entitled "Drahomira". Here the obvious influence of Faust is reflected also in the vocabulary, in the use of "Wonne", "wallen", "wehen", "Glut", and in the more lyrical style of the fragments as a whole. Nevertheless it is only the passages which echo Faust that show any clear influence of Classical vocabulary, otherwise "Drahomira" can be encompassed within the general trend of these years.

Above all the change in vocabulary seems to be affected by the move to a greater autobiographical content. The confused, turbulent, introspective mood which went into "Die Pazzi", "Faust", "Friedrich der Streitbare" carried with it a vocabulary of its own which Grillparzer had already employed in his diaries. The vocabulary of Classicism, especially in its descriptive terms, is one of optimism, happiness and goodness: "schön", "gut", "wahr", "edel", "rein", "ruhig", "hold", "heiter", "still", "sanft". Grillparzer however was discussing jealousy, dissatisfaction, weakness, vanity, frustrated ambition, and it is perhaps more relevant to stress that despite this situation, words of Classical optimism do still recur, such as "ruhig", "treu", "schön", "wahr", and to a lesser extent "still", "hold", "rein", "sanft".

The concepts which Grillparzer retains are of importance and it is appropriate at this stage to give brief details about Grillparzer's use of some of them. Love is "rein", a divine flower ("Irene"), "das heiligste Band" (Blanka), "der schönste aller Triebe" ("Sehnsucht nach Liebe"), and Grillparzer makes a distinction between "Liebe" as true love and "Wollust", which is purely animal desire, an

obvious distinction to make, but one to which Grillparzer returns in his work on Jüdin.

"Rein" is normally connected with such ideas as innocence, pure conscience, virtue, harmony ("rein und schuldlos" is a favourite phrase), although later Grillparzer would appear to see the word as self-explanatory, as he frequently leaves it to stand by itself.

Receptiveness to art is only achieved through purity:

Geliebter! nur der reine Spiegel  
Strahlt ungetrübt die Welt zurück. (I,86)

Associated with this is the great importance attached to the theme of innocence from 1810 onwards. Previously guilt and innocence were dealt with in stereotyped terms. "Irene", however, sets up the ideal of purity and innocence in women, who possess "der Unschuld Schwanenkleid ... bescheidnen unschuldsvollen Sinn". Innocence is what Spartakus praises above all in Kornelia. A diary note of 1810 (Tgb.95) reflects this same belief in the women's innocence, though here his dreams have been shattered, so that he seeks "jene Gebilde, wo noch reine ungeschminkte Natur thront, wo Unschuld kein Märchen, und Treue kein leeres Wort ist". The poem "Die Musik" bemoans the disappearance from life of "Recht und Unschuld". In "An Ovid", he protests his innocence in the strongest possible terms, and sees the greatest happiness to consist in "frei von Schuld sein und von Sorgen" (I,80). "Faust" especially reflects this same desire for innocence, for an escape from guilt and crime, a search for "der Unschuld reine Sonne", "der Genuß all des unschuldigen Glücks".

"Freiheit" is still very much seen in terms of personal freedom, lack of external pressure and determination. As such it is praised in strong terms. The second courtier in Blanka speaks of

die Zeugen der Gottähnlichkeit, die Freiheit  
und Kraft, das Freibeschloßne zu vollziehen (3912-3)  
and freedom is a vital concept in "Spartakus" and "Alfred". In "Irene", we may feel, Grillparzer rejects too great a

freedom in favour of more modest aims, just as Goethe did in his early Weimar years. At the same time, "streben" has become a more positive concept. Until 1810 it had been dismissed as bad and dangerous, "eitles Streben" (Blanka, "Robert", "Der Unzufriedne"), whilst the "sehrend Streben" of the youth in "Irene" is compared unfavourably with the mature adult's "bescheidne Bezirke", and the man's "der Wünsche Streben" is contrasted with the "bescheidner unschuldsvoller Sinn" of the woman. The same terms are still used to describe Napoleon - "dies ungezähmte schrankenlose Streben" - or Frangipani - "ein seltsam unheilvolles Streben" - but one feels that it is accepted more as a necessary part of man's existence, so that Frangipani, like Faust, is "des geistigen Strebens in sich nur halb bewußt". This would appear to be reflected in the increased importance of action ("Tat") in the second youthful period. Before 1810 the word has little significance. The second courtier in Blanka makes an early reference to the snowballing effect of deeds, especially evil ones, but only an evil character like Hereford or Maria can produce a statement that "nicht Worte, die Tat beweist" (II,868). After 1810 however, we find the contrast of action versus intention or words which was to remain with Grillparzer throughout his life as a basic conflict, and which also concerned Goethe in Wilhelm Meister and elsewhere. In "Spartakus" the gladiators consider the gulf between wanting something and putting that desire into practice:

Es steht die Tat vor euch gleich einem Riesen (815)  
whilst Devon says of his fellow countrymen:

Es fehlten Worte nicht, an Taten fehlt' es.  
("Alfred der Große", 874)

Friedrich is able to bridge the gap, "die zwischen Tun und Wollen sonst sich dehnt" (II,1019). Grillparzer saw this as a personal problem -

Blöd stand ich vor des Wirkens Pforten  
Und Taten mangelten den Worten (I,76)

- and it is therefore not surprising that within the same work diverging views are to be found as to which is better,

deeds or words. Hence Edelswitha in "Alfred" says, "Der Handelnde gewinnt nur die (Krone) der Welt" (I,182), but Edred informs Emma that both are equally dangerous and that man's eye is the true expression of his feelings:

Des Menschen Tun ist scheinbar und kann trügen,  
das Wort, von Luft gezeugt, ist wie sein Vater Luft,  
doch Gottes Schrift in eines Menschen Auge  
ist wie der Schreiber wahr und kann nicht lügen.  
(1093-6)

Music however is seen to "den Funken zur Tat entflammen", and the essay on the crusades makes the unequivocal statement that "Des Menschen Größe ist weder Wissen noch Sprechen, sondern Tun!" (III,949). The problems of deeds were already apparent to Grillparzer and the early epigram "Lebensregel" could well serve as a motto for some of Grillparzer's later plays:

Frei in unendlicher Kraft umfasse der Wille das Höchste,  
Doch nach dem Nächsten nur greife bedächtlich die Tat!  
(I,371)

"Ruhe", especially in the 1810-16 period, is seen as the opposite of emotional turmoil, of feelings of guilt and despair. It is found in the diaries, in "Irene", in "Faust", in "Friedrich der Streitbare" in this meaning, and is in general connected with ideas of a harbour in which to shelter from the storm. Even when Robert of Normandy uses the word, there is a great deal of personal peace and calm involved in thoughts of escape from political confusion, "ich sehne mich nach Ruhe ... an der Seite meines Weibes" (II,851), a desire which Sibille, his wife, echoes. Rudolf von Habsburg is praised because "Er stellte in Deutschland die Ruhe und den Frieden her" (III,973). The idea becomes increasingly important in this early period, as Grillparzer's characters reflect his own desire for inner peace.

The use of "schön" and "wahr" is limited to their obvious meanings, together with the use of "schön" in aesthetic terms (hence the use of "das Schöne, das Wahre, das Gute" in the poem "In ein Stammbuch" (I,86)), and the Classical use of "wahr" to mean "real, genuine", as in "Der wahre Glaube", "Die wahre Tugend", "sein wahres Wesen".

But there is no trace of the complex usage of "schön" and "wahr" that is to be found in the language of Goethe and Schiller.

The use of all the terms mentioned is haphazard; one may justifiably see Grillparzer as influenced by Goethe and Schiller, but too much insistence on Classicism is dangerous. The use of "rein" and "ruhig" would seem to point in that direction, to some extent also the use of "wahr", but "frei" is employed in a way more reminiscent of the "Sturm und Drang" than of Classicism. The most important concept for the Classicists was undoubtedly "der Mensch", and it is perhaps in the use of this term that we can more readily speak of an early influence of Classical ideas on Grillparzer. As we have seen, the word is much used in the plays before 1810, with both positive and negative connotations.<sup>(26)</sup> From 1811 onwards, it is the positive sense of "Mensch" that is most common, and it is in this increasing insistence on such positive connotations that we may detect a more specifically Classical influence rather than the mere borrowing from Goethe's and Schiller's work as a whole. Man in "Spartakus" is a mixture of the spiritual and the physical, full of feeling but also awareness of his situation, and we find a comparison similar to that in Blanka:

Wohl mir, daß ich den Augenblick gesehn,  
der ihn zum Menschen macht, der sonst nur Held war.  
("Spartakus", 449-50)

Important also is the contrast between "Mensch" and "Tier" in "Faust" (II, 993), previously used in the essay on fashion and in "Irene". Pazzi is finally aroused when he thinks his integrity as a human being is under attack:

Als Bürger sieht er sich überall von jenem besiegt,  
es fehlt nichts mehr, als daß ihm sein Feind auch  
noch als Mensch den Rang abläuft. (Tgb. 166)

The nurse in "Spartakus" says grudgingly, "Doch sind wir alle Menschen, mag das hingehn" (1.658), reluctantly accepting Spartakus as their equal. The crusades are seen as an age in which men realised, "daß ein Nichtchrist doch auch wohl ein Mensch sei" (III, 951). Only



occasionally is a distinction made between man and something higher. Socrates is asked, "Warst du kein Mensch" (I,370), or in the poem "Die Musik", literature is seen as speaking "nur der Menschen Sprache", compared to music's speaking "wie man im Himmel spricht" (II.140-1).

It is at this stage worth underlining the fact that we are dealing with juvenilia: Grillparzer was twenty-four when he wrote "Friedrich der Streitbare", the latest of the works we have so far considered. Grillparzer's fears that he was a plagiarist were perfectly justified, and we can never be sure how personal a statement we are dealing with. We should not therefore lay too great a stress on the borrowing or rejection of items of vocabulary. This is a particular problem in the period up to 1810, from then onwards themes and motifs begin to assume a clearer pattern, which is made up of autobiographical themes that for the time being dispense with a predominantly Goethean or Schillerian vocabulary. The extent to which Grillparzer persisted in this remains to be seen - in the years immediately following the failure of Blanka, Grillparzer may have been neurotically deliberate in rejecting Schillerian ideas. Equally however, the terms which Grillparzer did retain throughout the period under review - especially "Mensch", "Freiheit", "Herz", "Ruhe", "schön", "streben", "wahr", "Tat" - may indeed be indications of a concern for Classical ideas, but must be viewed with some scepticism until the important concepts of Grillparzer's mature work have been ascertained.

It would be equally dangerous to attempt a full assessment of Schreyvogel's influence as a catalyst at this stage: Grillparzer did not meet Schreyvogel until 1816, until then he could only know his ideas through the Sonntagsblatt. One may point out however by way of preliminary comment, that of the vocabulary so far mentioned, only truth forms a recurring theme of the discussion in the magazine. The other philosophical leitmotifs of the Sonntagsblatt are the Kantian ones of reason, morality and virtue. "Vernunft" is however rare throughout

Grillparzer's work, the early works do not concern themselves with morality as a separate concept, and although "Tugend" is excessively common in Blanka, it occurs with increasing irregularity afterwards, returning only in a very ambiguous light in Bruderzwist and Jüdin.<sup>(27)</sup> But in any case, the theme of virtue is central to Don Carlos. The vocabulary of duty and virtue, which dominates Don Carlos, is also a vital part of Schreyvogel's essays in the Sonntagsblatt, so that paradoxically Grillparzer's imitation of Schiller in Blanka may have been cemented in the first instance by a preliminary reading of the journal. Schreyvogel praised Goethe in Kantian and hence to some extent Schillerian terms, so that Grillparzer's change of allegiance from Schiller to Goethe also resulted in a rejection of the moral ideals of the man who to some extent influenced his change of opinion.

#### NOTES

1. Helmut von Wartburg, Grillparzers dramatische Fragmente, Affoltern, 1945.
2. O.E.Lessing, Schillers Einfluß auf Grillparzer, Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1902; R.F. Arnold, "Schiller and Grillparzer", GrJb, XV (1905), 130-57; see also HKA II/3.
3. Compare Henry waiting for Robert (II,871), and Blois's speech (II,891) with Egmont IV,2 and II,2 respectively.
4. Wiener(ischer) Musenalmanach auf das Jahr 1777 (-1791), hrsg. von J.F.Ratschky (und A. Blumauer), Vienna, a selection of these poems is in Dichtung aus Österreich (Lyrik), hrsg. von Kindermann, Dietrich, Mühlher, Thurnher, Vienna, 1976.
5. That is of course slightly exaggerated! Of recent English critics, G.A. Wells allows Blanka one page, W.E.Yates less than half a page.
6. Wolfgang Paulsen, "Grillparzer und Schiller. Der Don Carlos als Vorbild der Blanka von Kastilien?", Festschrift für Detlev Schumann, Munich, 1970, pp.281-93; Leo Tönz, "Grillparzers Blanka von Kastilien und Schillers Don Carlos", GFF (1969), 65-84.
7. Grillparzer, it is interesting to note, was not inclined to produce such a relationship in his play.
8. Karl Moor, admittedly, also looks back at times to a childhood paradise, but these are isolated interludes.

9. Cf. "Mein hartes Schicksal ruft, wir müssen scheiden" (771), "Nicht ich, das Schicksal reißet mich von euch!" (1071); see also 1068-9.
10. Heinz F. Schafroth, Die Entscheidung bei Grillparzer, Berne, 1971.
11. Heinz Politzer, (Franz Grillparzer oder Das abgründige Biedermeier, Vienna, 1972) calls the play "eine Tragödie der Schwäche, und zwar der Schwäche aller Figuren" (p.46). Tönz points out that only the villains in the play are capable of action (p.82).
12. Further examples could be cited of "Mensch" used as an ideal concept, e.g. 902-3, 3458-9.
13. See also Blanka, 692-3, 1793-4, 5022.
14. Grillparzer could easily have found similar sentiments in Schiller, in the words of Wallenstein (Tod, 211-2), of Illo (Piccolomini, 188-91), and of Buttler (Tod, 2876-9), or in "Das Lied von der Glocke" (207-8, 376-7), but these tend to be the words of obviously negative characters and are not allowed to obscure the overriding, if precarious optimism. See below p.352 for a lengthier comparison of Schiller and Grillparzer in this context.
15. Politzer, p.55.
16. Tönz, p.72.
17. Tönz, p.72; surprisingly, Zdenko Škreb (Grillparzer, Eine Einführung in das dramatische Werk, Kronberg/Taunus, 1976, pp.110-1), who is sceptical of Grillparzer's debt to Austrian traditions, also links Blanka with the plays of Collin.
18. Pandora and the journal Prometheus, in which it appeared, were discussed by Schreyvogel in the Sonntagsblatt for February 2, 1808.
19. Hans Lorenz, "Zu Grillparzers 'Spartakus'", Euphoriön, XVI (1909), 772-83.
20. See especially the entries on "glühen", "heiter", "hold" in Grimm's Deutsches Wörterbuch (Vols. 4I, 4II), which list a particularly high proportion of examples from Goethe; Ewald Boucke, in his study of Goethe's vocabulary, wrote of "der überaus vielseitige Gebrauch von 'heiter'" (Wort und Bedeutung in Goethes Sprache, Berlin, 1901, reprinted Berlin, 1977, p.47).
21. Reference was made to Grimm's Deutsches Wörterbuch, Fischer's Goethe-Wortschatz, and the dtv-Lexikon der Goethe-Zitate.
22. A large proportion of the eighteenth-century examples given by Grimm (vol.9) are taken from Schiller. Grimm also gives a considerable number of examples from Grillparzer, and the word remained common in his vocabulary from this period onwards.
23. Wartburg, p.36.
24. A discussion of the various fragments of "Faust" is best postponed until the next chapter.
25. It does indeed seem strange that no attention has so far been paid to Egmont as an influence on Grillparzer's early work.
26. See pp.74, 82-4 of this chapter.
27. See below pp.251-5.

Chapter 4. Pitfalls of ambition; the rejection of Classicism?

The first four major plays that Grillparzer wrote or, in the case of Der Traum ein Leben, began in the period 1816-1821, are linked by the themes of fame and ambition and a peaceful existence. All of them deal with the dangers of striving for a certain goal and all present the attractions of quiet withdrawal. The treatment of these themes is not the same in every play, nor are the two themes seen as necessarily opposed in each case. Jaromir's ambition involves precisely the overcoming of his turbulent life and the acquiring of a sheltered harbour in the arms of the Borotin family, Sappho's troubles begin when she turns her back on her fulfilled poetic ambitions in order to search for peaceful marital bliss, in Das goldene Vließ the whole possibility of withdrawal is thrown into question.

Clearly these are themes found in Classicism - on the one hand the ideals of calm repose which were developed from Winckelmann's concept of Greece, on the other hand the presentation of Faustian striving, as encapsulated in Goethe's images of the hut and the wanderer respectively, and it will be necessary to examine Grillparzer's adoption of these themes. In addition, all four plays have clear links with one Classical work in particular. Die Ahnfrau is Grillparzer's fate-tragedy as Die Braut von Messina was Schiller's, Der Traum ein Leben has many echoes of Faust, Sappho was Grillparzer's tragedy of the poet which parallels Goethe's Tasso, and Das goldene Vließ compares Greek and Barbarian and presents the invasion of the latter by the former in a manner reminiscent of Goethe's Iphigenie.<sup>(1)</sup> As is especially true of Vließ, the parallels are in each case balanced by startling contrasts which in every instance reflect a less idealistic, less optimistic attitude on Grillparzer's part. All these links and contrasts must be considered in some detail, although the contrast of civilised man and barbarian will be treated in the later context of Weh dem, der lügt!.

i) Die Ahnfrau

If the philosophy of German Classicism stresses humanity and freedom, then Grillparzer's first major play seems a far cry from any such optimism. With its ghosts, fate, adultery, decaying castles, gloomy settings and forecasts of doom, it is a worthy successor, albeit in a somewhat higher class, to the Viennese plays of knights and ghosts that were prevalent at the turn of the century. The end of the family is ordained (90,999), fate has caused the robbers' predicament (1325), fate now brings Jaromir and Bertha together (1067) and causes Jaromir to kill his father (2541-3). There is nothing left for man but to bow to the will of fate.

In his essay "Über das Fatum", Grillparzer insisted that the dramatist must not be dogmatic, that the audience must remain free to find perfectly logical explanations for the mysterious events depicted. Yet despite this, Grillparzer, unlike Kleist, Schiller, Werner, remains true to his Viennese background by giving physical presence to fate in the figure of the ancestress. The motif of man's inexorable destiny is proclaimed at the very beginning by the Count -

Nun wohl!an, was muß, geschehe!

- and again as he lies on his death-bed;

Willst du mit den Kinderhänden  
In des Schicksals Speichen greifen?  
Seines Donnerwagens Lauf  
Hält kein sterblich Wesen auf. (2382-5)

The very language highlights this inevitability, not only in the doom-laden monotony of the Spanish trochees but also in the stylistic use of emphasis and exaggeration, of parallel constructions, the insistent repetition of vital words, the widespread use of antithetical pairs, the stress on doom, decay and fear. Sauer in the critical edition underlines the numerous Classical links in language and motifs, but there is not the continual use of related terms as later in the equally pessimistic Vließ.

Even without the idea of fate, Jaromir lacks restraint and self-control, he is impetuous and lascivious. He looks

forward to a new life of peace and quiet with Bertha (785-6),  
a return to humanity;

Wieder bin ich aufgenommen  
In der Menschheit heilgem Rund. (1983-4)

But he is incapable of the ideals which are concomitant  
with such a life;

Steht auf meiner offenen Stirne  
Doch der heitre Name: Mensch!  
Und der Mensch hat seine Grenzen! (870-2)

Jaromir overlooks such limits, he is rash and impulsive,  
uses emotional blackmail on Bertha (2015-27). Above all,  
he seeks to blame fate and chance for what he does instead  
of accepting responsibility for his actions and coming to  
terms with the fact that Bertha is his sister. He rushes  
ever onwards and dies in the arms of the ancestress. The  
demise of Bertha is equally significant. Rather than  
taking her own life with some semblance of deliberation,  
she collapses before she can even reach the bottle of  
poison on the table.

The famous attack by Jeitteles and Hebenstreit compared  
Grillparzer's play unfavourably with Classical ideals of  
independence and moral strength in suffering. Certainly  
the combination of weak characters and, to say the very  
least, unfortunate circumstances, is not conducive to free  
and noble action. Amongst modern critics, Joachim Kaiser  
calls the play "ein Drama der Willensschwäche"; Jost Hermand  
speaks of "die Nichtigkeit menschlichen Willens"; according  
to Ruth Angress, "Eigenwille, Tatendrang und Leidenschaft  
werden als nichtig verdammt und zum Untergang bestimmt".  
In Ulrich Fülleborn's view, "wird der freie Wille ... von  
Anfang an ironisch behandelt"; Naumann insists that  
Grillparzer "leugnet die Willensfreiheit", and also sees  
the characters living in a permanent state of "Täuschung",  
which is the basis of all life.<sup>(2)</sup> In his autobiography  
however, Grillparzer justifiably pointed out that Schiller  
himself had written a fate-tragedy in Die Braut von Messina,  
but in fact important differences are revealed by a  
comparison of Grillparzer's Ahnfrau and the most pessimistic  
play of Schiller's classical period.

Both plays give a gloomy view of humanity. The chorus in Braut speaks of "der Menschheit traur'ge Gestalt" (2581) and contrasts man unfavourably with nature:

Die Welt ist vollkommen überall,  
Wo der Mensch nicht hinkommt mit seiner Qual. (2588-9)

Here also the world is one of transience and loss. As Bertha laments, "Weh! Besitzen und verlieren!" (1532), so Schiller's chorus warns, "Wer besitzt, der lerne verlieren" (2308).<sup>(3)</sup> In both plays fate or chance appears to have had a significant role in events prior to the action depicted on stage, Beatrice especially blames the forces of destiny for her predicament (1039, 1226-9, 1894-5), but in Schiller's play fate seems to be much more a result of people's behaviour - hatred, tyranny, secrecy, selfishness, jealousy, lack of self-control. The banishing of Beatrice was a deliberate act unlike the disappearance of Jaromir. The murder of Don Manuel is committed by Don Cesar in the full knowledge of his brother's identity. There is a much greater degree of human volition in Schiller's play.

A similar comparison was made in connection with Grillparzer's borrowing in Blanka of the term "Schicksalsurne" from Wallenstein.<sup>(4)</sup> The very first line of Ahnfrau - "Nun wohlan, was muß, geschehe!" - is an interesting parallel to Wallenstein's resigned "Geschehe denn, was muß" (Tod, 654), but here again Wallenstein will have a major part in shaping events after the seemingly inevitable first step. Borotin by comparison is referring to events as yet unknown, over which he may have no control. Emil Reich argues that the characters in Ahnfrau are not prevented from acting to change the situation,<sup>(5)</sup> but an important factor is provided by the characters' ignorance of the true situation, especially on the part of the main protagonist. In Schiller's play it is Beatrice who was taken away at childhood, and she has a largely passive role in the action. The active characters lack only one, admittedly vital, piece of information, namely Beatrice's identity. In Grillparzer's play it is significantly the

man of action who, because of his childhood fate, lacks all adequate knowledge of the situation facing him.

Reich however correctly underlines Jaromir's guilt once he is fully aware of the real state of affairs. By comparison, Schiller's tragedy culminates in the typical act of voluntary self-sacrifice to atone for crimes committed. Don Cesar sees this as the way to break the power of fate; "Der freie Tod nur bricht die Kette des Geschicks" (2642). He sees his death as a purifying force to cleanse the house (2732, 2621-2). Having first considered the killing of his brother as just and divinely ordained, he now accepts it as his responsibility, and his suicide, a free and conscious act to atone for his guilt, throws into even harsher perspective the way in which Jaromir and Bertha drift helplessly to their deaths. The chorus in Braut proclaims, "Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht" (2839) and Don Cesar enters a higher realm at the end. Jaromir however remains convinced of life's supremacy -

Ist das Leben doch so schön,  
Aller Güter erstes, höchstes (1359-60)

- but he clings not to life as something noble, but to its sensual and less than human aspects as he sinks to his doom. The ending of Grillparzer's play underlines the power of fate and human weakness, Schiller's play denies the same and replaces it with the free human act.

ii) Sappho

By comparison we have in Sappho Grillparzer's nearest approximation to the Schillerian grand finale. The poetess is described as "verklärt" (2023), a word used by Schiller to designate the appearance of Maria and Johanna as they face death. Like Maria, Sappho enters in symbolic change of attire and forgives her enemies, exhibiting a return to calmness after earlier emotional outbursts. Sappho, like Johanna and Don Cesar, sees death as a way to atone for her guilt. The leap from the rock was already part of the story of Sappho, but



the chance to portray a tragic climax in the grand style may have appealed to Grillparzer, who was very sensitive to criticism and may have been glad to escape from the situation he had portrayed in Ahnfrau. Whether it is a suitable ending for the play is a point to be considered later, at all events it may be seen as a deliberate turning away from his previous play. Grillparzer disliked the connection of Ahnfrau with the Romantics and their fate-tragedies, both of which he attacked throughout his life. Their art lacked purity and unity, was full of elements which were not strictly artistic, and was plagued by too many theoretical considerations, "so daß man in ihren dramatischen Werken alles bis auf das dramatische antrifft" (III,311). In his attack on criticism of Ahnfrau he stated his intention:

mich übrigens fern von dem Treiben einer faselnden, frömmelnden, geistlosen Schule zu halten, die, wenn sie nicht bald in sich selbst zerfällt, unsere deutsche Poesie in ihr ehemaliges Nichts zurückführen wird, und deren Impotenz und Unfruchtbarkeit am Tage liegt. (HKA I/14,9)

Grillparzer sought to deny the importance of fate in his play - "Genau genommen nun, findet sich die Schicksals-Idee gar nicht in der Ahnfrau." - and he saw the play showing "ein Akt geheimnisvoller Gerechtigkeit ... statt eines Schicksals" (IV,79-80), which is terribly unfair on the Count and his daughter who have done nothing wrong.

Grillparzer attributed much of the success of the play to the "Räuber, Gespenster und Knall-Effekte" (IV,80), which may have attracted him in the first place precisely because they guaranteed a certain popular appeal. From the start however he saw the plot of Ahnfrau to be "höchstens für die Vorstadttheater geeignet" (IV,72), which he clearly regarded as something of an insult, despite attempts by Austrian-minded critics to see not only Ahnfrau but Grillparzer's whole work as influenced by writers of the popular theatre, "eine Klasse von Dichtern ... die ich immer verachtet hatte" (IV,72). Hence Grillparzer insisted that Schiller had himself written a play along similar lines as his own. In later life he seems to have told

everyone he talked to that the play as it stood was not really his Ahnfrau, and that it ought to be presented in its original form, although he himself never set about facilitating this. Certainly Grillparzer did not wish to have his name forever linked with the philosophy of his first play. In his defence of the play, Schreyvogel insisted that the play did not represent Grillparzer's "Glaubensbekenntnis" (HKA I/1,4). Grillparzer himself in his autobiography was perhaps making the same point in underlining that "ein Trauerspiel, so traurig es sein mag, doch immer auch ein Spiel bleibt" (IV,80). Some critics have refused to take the play seriously. Zdenko Škreb considers it "ein Reißer", written to make Grillparzer's fame, Angress describes it as mere "Unterhaltungsliteratur", Bernd Breitenbruch finds both Ahnfrau and Traum unrepresentative and leaves them out of his assessment of Grillparzer's ethics.<sup>(6)</sup> There seems to be considerable justification for these views.

For numerous reasons therefore, Grillparzer set out to write a play that avoided all the faults of his earlier work. In a draft of a letter to Müllner, he wrote:

Ich nahm mir vor mein nächstes Produkt ein Gegenstück dieses tollen Treibens werden zu lassen, und suchte daher ... nach einem solchen, der es mir möglich machte, in der Behandlung eine Ruhe walten zu lassen. (IV,741)

In Sappho he aimed at cool, calm objectivity, and in addition he intended to achieve the desired effect by purely poetic rather than theatrical means;

ich beschloß ... den möglichst einfachen Stoff zu wählen um mir und der Welt zu zeigen, daß ich durch die bloße Macht der Poesie Wirkungen hervorzubringen imstande sei. (IV,80)

There is in Sappho a conscious attempt at Classical style, in the sense of Goethe's Iphigenie rather than Greek Classicism. According to Politzer, it was Grillparzer's aim, "das Ebenmaß der Weimarer Klassik in das mildere und lautere Klima des Wiener Burgtheaters zu übertragen".<sup>(7)</sup> The language itself is much more restrained, partly as a

result of the different metre. There is much less repetition and emphasis. It is the only play that Grillparzer divides into scenes, using the conventional division of entry and exits. Acts I, III and V, in which Sappho dominates the action in person, all have six scenes. The scene is merely a "freie Gegend", although it has more substance than the setting of Iphigenie. There is a small number of main characters, although the people of Lesbos make some appearances, unlike in Iphigenie, where Thoas would seem to have no-one to rule. As a whole, the play is much more lively than Goethe's Greek play, it is possible to imagine it in a modern setting. Grillparzer jokingly saw his play illustrating a "Fiakeridee", the type of cliché used by a cab-driver: "gleich und gleich gesellt sich gern" (IV,973). Nevertheless the influence of his own native theatre is considerably less marked in Sappho than in his previous drama.

It does not appear that Grillparzer had the intention of creating a Greek Classical play. In a letter to Böttiger (20/2/1818) he recognised the "nordisch" spirit especially in the central acts, in his letter to Müllner he described Act IV in particular as "etwas nordischer", and in the Selbstbiographie he said that he was writing for Germans, not Greeks, and hence it was quite right to find the play not particularly Greek. Grillparzer was clearly concerned to write a play that was a worthy successor to the Classical dramas of Goethe and Schiller; hence in his autobiography he admitted that he had "so ziemlich mit [Goethes] Kalbe gepflügt" (IV,147-8) and wrote of the critics' basic approval of the play:

Mit der Kritik kam ich diesmal sehr gut zurechte. Damals herrschten noch Lessings, Schillers, Goethes Ansichten in der deutschen Poesie, und daß menschliche Schicksale und Leidenschaften die Aufgabe des Drama seien, fiel niemand ein zu bezweifeln. (IV,84)

In view of the stress placed on Sappho's poetic nature, one is slightly reluctant to agree fully with this assessment, and Grillparzer himself in 1851 criticised the "Künstlerdrama" for failing to show "die allgemeine

Menschennatur" (III,846), but it is to be assumed that Grillparzer set out with the aim of presenting a subject more universally valid, more Classical than in Ahnfrau, or in the autobiographically orientated fragments of the period 1811-16. It is this "allgemeingültig" aspect that Grillparzer especially stresses in later years, pointing out somewhat ironically the "Fiakeridee" and underlining the basic human situation which the play presents, but which may have got short-changed when he wrote it:

Aber Sappho springt ins Meer, weil Phaon ihr die Gegenliebe weigert, das konnte keinen triftigern Grund haben, als weil er eine andere liebte, und damit ist alles gegeben. (Gespr.1185)

Grillparzer also saw his original plans for Ahnfrau consisting in "ein Gespenstermärchen mit einer bedeutenden menschlichen Grundlage" (IV,76), which had been distorted by Schreyvogel's intervention. If this is a true statement of his intentions at the time, then Sappho must have appealed to him in this respect also as a means of repairing the damage caused by his adviser.

As far as showing general human matters is concerned, Grillparzer has probably been more successful than his model, Goethe. In presenting human emotions in real psychological depth, Grillparzer is much more convincing and modern. J.W. Dyck is correct in his implications when he says that Grillparzer "spricht dem Goethe der klassischen Zeit die Fähigkeit, in die letzten Tiefen einer suchenden Seele einzudringen, nicht zu",<sup>(8)</sup> though it is perhaps more unwillingness on Goethe's part than inability. The genuine human feelings that we see in Sappho, even in such superficial characters as Melitta and Phaon, are quite lacking in Iphigenie and Tasso, but Goethe was on the whole more concerned with man's external relationships with society, his fellow men, and the universe.<sup>(9)</sup> Goethe's characters are at times too universally valid to have any credibility as real individuals; Schiller's, although much more plausible, are often stereotyped by the influence of the schematic nature of his dramatic work, which builds

everything up to the climax which is all-important but similar in most plays. Grillparzer may tend to the other extreme, despite his diary note of 1816 that "Der Mensch verschwindet in eben dem Verhältnisse in welchem das Individuum hervortritt" (Tgb.193). Nevertheless the tendency is a welcome one, not least in its treatment of the psychology of the sexes and the powerful emotions of love and hatred.

In his 1965 article, Dyck rejects any major Classical influence on Sappho:

In seinen Bemühungen um "Iphigenie" und "Tasso" darf daher keine Rede von einem freiwilligen Sich-Überwinden sein. Den Grund für Iphigeniens humanen Entschluß sieht Grillparzer im Keime ihrer eigentlichen Natur, und der Einfluß von "Iphigenie" und "Tasso" muß daher aus der Ablehnung des Goetheschen klassischen Humanitätsbegriffs verfolgt werden. (10)

Dyck's thesis is that Goethe had a personal need to subjugate inclination to duty, that this is then portrayed in his ideal characters as feasible. Grillparzer, according to Dyck, shows in Sappho that this is unnatural, hence Sappho's collapse, and hence the depth and meaning of Melitta's role as the truly natural character. There is some truth in this argument, but Dyck's terms need a closer examination, and above all his picture of Melitta can scarcely be defended.

Dyck does in fact point out Grillparzer's praise of Goethe apart from his doubts "in Bezug auf Goethes Mannesalter", (11) and it is Goethe's views of this period that Dyck sees Grillparzer struggling with in Sappho: Goethe uses art as a means to acquire humanity (in the sense in which Dyck uses the term), and hence Grillparzer deliberately chooses the figure of the poetess to show that the artist also collapses when his or her whole existence is attacked. I personally do not see Grillparzer making such a conscious attempt to assess and reject Goethe's views at this stage. In any case, Dyck's use of the term "Humanität" is a dangerous one, it is not a reflection of Grillparzer's use and it can really only be applied to Goethe's work of the early Weimar years when Goethe was

desperately seeking to overcome the excesses of the "Sturm und Drang" and hence may have been guilty of an unnatural rejection of ordinary emotions in order to achieve a greater calm and objectivity. Goethe himself fled to Italy to escape this unnatural state of affairs and returned with a much more balanced frame of mind which H.A. Korff has defined as "schöne Humanität",<sup>(12)</sup> and which was also Schiller's ideal for the aesthetic state, namely the complete balance of inclination and duty. The aesthetic state was an ideal for Schiller, although he saw Goethe as having gone a considerable way towards achieving it. Sappho has not reached this ideal state, but she has certainly reached what Schiller saw as the next best thing, the moral state of subjecting powerful emotions to voluntary self-control. Moreover, quite contrary to the opinion of Dyck, it is manifestly plain that Grillparzer approves of this state of mind for such a person as Sappho. Dyck may be correct in believing that Grillparzer rejects the possibility of man always using reason, certainly Grillparzer's view of man is much too realistic for him to hold such an opinion, this however does not preclude a preference for reason as opposed to untamed nature. Melitta may be natural, but she is also too young and innocent to be much else. In any case even Melitta is guilty of dissembling when she tells Sappho she has not looked at Phaon. Her repeated incomplete questions in the first scene show that she is immediately attracted to Phaon. But above all she was not Grillparzer's ideal, as Dyck would have us believe. She was no more than "die Andre" (Gespr. 1185), to Müllner he described her as "unschuldig, geistesarm" and in later years Grillparzer wished he could get rid of her, if we can believe the anonymous report of the 1840s:

Ich habe mir überhaupt lange und lange überlegt,  
ob ich diese Melitta nicht ganz aus dem Spiele  
lassen soll, aber ich mußte doch dem Phaon etwas  
für seinen Schnabel geben! (Gespr. 935)

In his drafted letter to Müllner early in 1818, Grillparzer describes Sappho as:

Ein Charakter, der Sammelplatz glühender Leidenschaften, über die aber eine erworbene Ruhe, die schöne Frucht höherer Geistesbildung, den Szepter führt, bis die angeschnittenen Sklaven die Ketten brechen und dastehen und Wut schnauben. (IV, 741)

It is in the state of "Leidenschaft" combined with "Ruhe" that Sappho writes her poetry, not through her violent emotions alone, and this state is the correct one for Sappho, both in poetry and life, contrary to what Werner Vordtriede believes, when he describes Sappho's calm humanity as unnatural. (13) Melitta is too young to be natural in any positive sense, she is simply immature. Phaon is only just awakening to an understanding of himself, and cannot be taken as representative of Grillparzer's views on a mature man's behaviour. Neither at the beginning nor at the end does Phaon have the insight of Alphons in Die Jüdin von Toledo, for whom love similarly produces an awakening to full manhood. Sappho however is wrong in not controlling her feelings, she must recover her "erworbene Ruhe", and the tone of the play entirely suggests that Grillparzer approves of her desire to regain this, even if it can now be fully achieved only through a voluntary death, which is surely the ultimate "freiwilliges Sich-Überwinden" of which Dyck and Naumann see no trace in the play. (14) The play does not show nature victorious in all three main characters, nor does it reveal the impossibility of voluntary renunciation, as Dyck believes. In Phaon and Melitta, nature as yet has had nothing to be victorious over, but perhaps even in Phaon reason triumphs at the end insofar as he realises the position he is in. In Sappho, nature makes its presence felt, but in the end she both conquers her baser nature and achieves some degree of expiation of her guilt by the highest possible act of voluntary renunciation.

A more specific comparison which has found its way into most critical appreciations of Sappho is that suggested by the figure of the artist. As we have seen, Tasso was one of the works which most attracted Grillparzer to Goethe between 1808 and 1810, as a result of which his love

for Goethe was "felsenfest gegründet" (Tgb.92). The extent of Grillparzer's attraction to the theme of the poet makes it difficult to deny the importance of this aspect in Sappho, however much Grillparzer sought an objective treatment, however much Sauer may try to convince us that "Sappho zog ihn zuerst als Weib und erst später als Künstlerin, als Dichterin an" (HKA I/1, lxxxiv), and however much Grillparzer may have stated later that he was always against "Künstlerdramen". Why was Grillparzer so attracted to Tasso? It was surely the extremes which are inherent in a poetic nature and the artist's attempt to come to terms with reality which seemed to echo his own character, but in addition the great importance attached to poetry by the other characters in Tasso.

In Tasso the term "mäßig" is applied to every character except the poet himself, and all the others attempt to teach him moderation as a source of common sense and a sensible attitude to life;

Es ist gewiß, ein ungemäßigt Leben,  
Wie es uns schwere wilde Träume gibt,  
Macht uns zuletzt am hellen Tage träumen. (2918-20)

This susceptibility to extremes is dangerous, leads to an unbalanced, insecure attitude, yet at the same time it is the essence of Tasso's art. When Antonio tells Leonore

Die letzten Enden aller Dinge will  
Sein Geist zusammenfassen (2135-6)

he is both condemning Tasso as a man, yet unconsciously expressing the nature of Tasso's poetic existence. In his work, Tasso is able to encompass extremes and polarities within a unifying formal framework, in ordinary life however Tasso lacks self-control, "er beherrscht/ So wenig seinen Mund als seine Brust" (2147-8), and at times he is overcome by his own emotions. When the princess, the spokesman of renunciation and moderation, tells him to control his feelings, he replies;

Beschränkt der Rand des Bechers einen Wein,  
Der schäumend wallt und brausend überschwillt? (3267-8)

As a result of his inability to find a happy medium, Tasso encounters great problems in life. He avoids large crowds, finding only the small court circle bearable, and



even here he is unable to make real friends. He is forgetful, impractical, easily confused or upset. On the whole, Tasso indulges fully in his poetic nature, occasionally however he is troubled by his inactivity. He wants to be useful, feels unworthy of the laurel wreath, which he believes should be reserved for heroes. Hence after hearing Antonio's praise of Rome - "Was gelten soll, muß wirken und muß dienen" (671) - he expresses his own ideas in similar terms:

Wenig nur,  
Doch etwas, nicht mit Worten, mit der Tat  
Wünscht' ich's zu sein. (908-10)

On the whole, Tasso's misgivings and consequent problems are caused not so much by his own feelings but by those around him. They are continually trying to draw him out of his isolation, make more of a man of him, an active member of society. He must be made aware of his duties and responsibilities as a man, not only as a poet. Contact with the world produces a sensible attitude to one's fellow men:

Die Menschen fürchtet nur, wer sie nicht kennt,  
Und wer sie meidet, wird sie bald verkennen. (310-1)

The stress on "Menschen" is of course typical of Goethe. It is the need to be a more active member of society which is brought home to Tasso, as Alfons points out to him:

Der Mensch gewinnt, was der Poet verliert. (3078)  
This involves a greater participation in life, and Tasso is told: "Lern' .../ Den Wert des Lebens kennen" (3093-4).

Both these aspects - extremes of emotion, distance from ordinary life - are essential to Grillparzer's treatment of Sappho. Moreover they are present from the start and cannot be considered to have been added after the brief break in writing caused by toothache on July 19 (HKA I/1, lxxxv). Sappho warns Phaon of the dangers of her finding him false:

Du kennst noch nicht die Unermeßlichkeit,  
Die auf und nieder wogt in dieser Brust. (126-7)

Rhamnes tells Phaon of the boundlessness of Sappho's love and anger, whilst Sappho asks the gods to protect her from her own inner self:

Des Innern düstre Geister wachen auf  
Und rütteln an des Kerkers Eisenstäben! (1220-1)

Melitta sees Sappho as "heftig manchmal, rasch und bitter" (671), and George Wells even goes so far as to see in her an unbalanced woman, although this seems exaggerated. (15)

As we have seen, Grillparzer himself described her character as a mixture of passions and calm (IV,741). In the partly artificial world of poetry, her passions are under the control of her "erworbene Ruhe", and in this balanced state she is able to write. The important parallel between Sappho and Tasso consists in the dangerous effect of their passions when let loose on ordinary life. After his argument with Antonio and his subsequent banishment, Tasso loses all sense of proportion, acquires a massive persecution complex, and finally behaves in a way which the princess at least and probably social conventions see as improper. Sappho sees Phaon as her last chance of ordinary happiness, and on seeing what she considers to be his infidelity, her desire for revenge is extreme and she also offends against normal codes of behaviour in her treatment of Melitta. She is blind to all reason and common sense, like Tasso she is guilty of emotional blackmail in seeking to force Melitta into submission. She revels in her suffering which she magnifies out of all proportion, even if with greater justification than Tasso. Ingratitude becomes for her the worst possible crime. Throughout the play her tendency to extremes has been visible, now she deliberately polarises her situation in exaggerated fashion. Above all, her "erworbene Ruhe" proves quite inadequate in a situation of real life. Adolf Klarmann sees this as the thin veneer of art peeling off under strain, though it would appear to be her "höhere Geistesbildung" and not actually art which produced her calm. (16)

The disaster for Sappho is of course much greater. Tasso's concern for life had been only a momentary problem from his point of view, and the trouble is caused principally by the attempts of others to educate or

indoctrinate him. Once he has been exiled to his room, Tasso gives up the others as an unsavoury group of people and decides to seek a more poetic environment in Rome. Even when he commits his faux pas at the end, it is no more than an extreme example of what he has no doubt done in the past, and it is only the standing of the princess and his affection towards her that cause his despair. Sappho however has made a positive decision to take a normal part in the life of the community, which she feels she has not done previously in her poetic isolation. The irony is that the community is perfectly happy with her role as poetess. Her work has brought fame, enrichment to the island, the people happily obey her and look after her, see her as a goddess, and would never think of telling her to alter her ways. Even at the end of the play, the citizens chase the fugitives, and there is not the slightest doubt in Rhamnes's mind that Phaon is the villain of the affair. Nevertheless Sappho has come to see her poetic existence as inadequate, as barren and infertile, hence the symbol of the laurel (272). Tasso feels ashamed to wear the laurel wreath, so also Sappho feels that only in the midst of her fellow citizens is she entitled to wear it;

Um euretwillen freut mich dieser Kranz,  
Der nur den Bürger ziert, den Dichter drückt,  
In eurer Mitte nenn ich ihn erst mein. (45-7)

Hier wird die frevle Zier mir erst zum Schmuck. (58)

Poetry seems lifeless and empty, a vast sea without a tree in sight. So far her life has been one of loss and renunciation (113). By comparison, life is full of "heitre Blütentäler" (91), with Phaon by her side she wants to catch up on what she has missed. For her, Phaon possesses "Entschlossenheit und Lust an dem, was ist" (267), suggesting that poetry is a world of "Schein", of unreal things. Life is now her aim - "Und leben ist ja doch des Lebens höchstes Ziel!" (270) - but poetry lacks life of its own;

Und ewig ist die arme Kunst gezwungen,  
Zu betteln von des Lebens Überfluß. (276-7)

Sappho presents Phaon to the people as a "Bürger" (71), and talks of singing only of "häuslich stille Freuden" (96),

but it is clear in fact that she seeks to combine the two worlds through Phaon. He has proved himself in both words and deeds, and he can supply them with:

Des Redners Lippe und des Dichters Mund,  
Des Freundes Rat, des Helfers starken Arm. (77-8)

This desire she expresses directly to Phaon:

Laß uns denn trachten, mein geliebter Freund,  
Uns beider Kränze um die Stirn zu flechten,  
Das Leben aus der Künste Taumelkelch,  
Die Kunst zu schlürfen aus der Hand des Lebens. (280-3)

In ordinary life, Sappho sees a peaceful, contented existence, involving limitations and moderation, far from the lofty, remote peaks of the poetic world, she desires "the simple contentment of affectionate domesticity".<sup>(17)</sup> Tasso almost certainly is not attracted by such limitations, he desires his own world despite momentary doubts, and this is one of many differences between the two plays. The problems facing Tasso are very much a product of society's desire to change him, Sappho causes her own problems. Grillparzer said he was not concerned "die Mißgunst, das Ankämpfen des Lebens gegen die Kunst zu schildern wie in Corregio oder Tasso" (IV,743). Tasso, the young poet, is altogether more childish, immature than Sappho. It is clear that even the superficial relationships he has had, have caused him difficulties, whereas Sappho has had no difficulty in leading her life so far. She is superior to those around her, Tasso is treated rather condescendingly as a temperamental genius. Sappho seeks enjoyment, Tasso finds this in his art but feels a need to be more active. Society is quite prepared to accept Sappho as she is as a poet, she is in harmony with a society that admires her poetry as an essential part of life; in Tasso, society sees the importance of poetry but equally tries to put it to some use, which Sappho would no doubt welcome, but which is contrary to the ideas of Tasso, who wants to be useful but with something other than his poetry. Michael Ossar has touched on some of these differences,<sup>(18)</sup> although I would suggest that he fails to recognise their basis, namely the youth and inexperience of Tasso compared

to the mature, educated Sappho, also the great awareness shown by Sappho of her position as a poet compared to Tasso's ignorance of and indifference to what is happening around him despite brief periods of concern for such matters, and furthermore the fact that Sappho herself is the driving force and the instigator of the conflict whilst it is society that drives Tasso into his predicament. In general, Vordtriede's distinction between Sappho as the sentimental poet and Tasso as the naive would seem to be apt.<sup>(19)</sup> In addition, although it may be true, as Ossar says, that Sappho has no need to assert her value as an artist, it is surely the case that Sappho herself feels an even greater need than Tasso to assert her value outside art.

A further source of attraction for Grillparzer in Tasso must have been the words of praise spoken about art and poetry, even though the characters are not without utilitarian motives in stressing art's importance. Grillparzer felt he had "als der letzte Dichter in eine prosaische Zeit hineingekommen" (IV,80), and it must have been heartening to read the words of Alfons or of Leonore:

Und wer der Dichtkunst Stimme nicht vernimmt,  
Ist ein Barbar, er sei auch, wer er sei. (2848-9)

... wir lieben nur  
Mit ihm das Höchste, was wir lieben können. (216-7)  
This is reflected in Sappho, despite the heroine's attempts to escape from the poetic world. The citizens praise her great contribution to the life of the community, and are proud to consider her one of them. Phaon, if perhaps biased, talks of the great effect her poetry has on others.

Grillparzer, who suffered so much anguish as a result of his poetry and the responsibilities he believed it to entail, must also have been drawn to Tasso's realisation at the end of the play:

Und wenn der Mensch in seiner Qual verstummt,  
Gab mir ein Gott, zu sagen, wie ich leide. (3432-3)

So klammert sich der Schiffer endlich noch  
Am Felsen fest, an dem er scheitern sollte. (3452-3)

Poetry is the cause of Tasso's problems, but ultimately it is a solace, a way of overcoming the worst depths of

despair. Why then is Sappho not able to find the same way out? The problem of Sappho's death has engaged the attention of critics continually, one of the main difficulties being the two levels on which the tragedy reaches its climax, a factor not always considered. On the one hand there is the more obvious meaning of the tragedy as Sappho herself sees it, and which Grillparzer, half in resignation, half in self-defence, must have considered valid for himself; namely that Sappho has sinned against her art in trying to lead an ordinary life. Secondly there is the deeper question of Sappho's position as a woman, an ageing woman - a question which is largely forgotten in the latter half of the play, certainly by Sappho herself, which Grillparzer half considers in his letters and says is important, but without drawing the real consequences of the matter, perhaps not wishing to delve into its full significance.

On the surface the message of the play is clear. Sappho has tried to combine art and life and has seen life as the ideal with art in a subsidiary role. Once Phaon has been apparently unfaithful, she explains this to herself by concluding that an artist must remain in his own sphere and cannot partake of normal life. The two worlds cannot be combined, a choice must be made and consequently adhered to;

Der Menschen und der Überirdischen Los,  
Es mischt sich nimmer in demselben Becher,  
Von beiden Welten eine mußt du wählen,  
Hast du gewählt, dann ist kein Rücktritt mehr! (950-3)

Phaon echoes the same sentiments in stronger terms;

Man steigt nicht ungestraft vom Göttermahle  
Herunter in den Kreis der Sterblichen.  
Der Arm, in dem die goldne Leier ruhte,  
Er ist geweiht, er fasse Niedres nicht! (1727-30)

The tone in which all this is said, the clear division between man and gods, including poets, leads one to think that such a distinction is generally valid. Certainly Sappho never wonders whether she is personally to blame, but accepts her fate as the normal one for the poet who attempts to be involved in low, ordinary life. Such

involvement is limited, she may sip at the draught of life, but not drink. The balance of affairs is however not so easily restored. The words "hast du gewählt, dann ist kein Rücktritt mehr" apply in more than one way. Having tried to leave the world of poetry, there is no easy return, the only path to the divine sphere is through a voluntary death. Tasso's desire for a life of activity is an occasional problem, and the prospect of withdrawing into his art, "zu sagen, wie ich leide", is not a disastrous one. Sappho's commitment to life is and always has been much more consistent, she cannot face the prospect of living on as the object of mockery, hereby failing to notice that the citizens of Lesbos show no sign of changing their attitude towards her. Equally she feels unable to return to her poetry after what she considers her betrayal of her art, realising, as Wells correctly states, "that she would be a very unworthy ambassador of the gods if she went on living".<sup>(20)</sup> She has not previously envisaged the possibility of immortality in communion with the gods, but this does not mean, as W.E. Yates believes, that she is insincere in affirming this belief now, nor can the grave which she had once connected with earthly matters be compared with the more glorious death which she associates with the gods and which she sees the gods now granting her through their sign of the wind playing her lyre (1925-6).<sup>(21)</sup> One is perhaps justified in denying that her work is complete (2001), and her death will admittedly save her from her present predicament, to which she cannot see any satisfactory solution. But it is important to stress the positive terms in which her death is presented. She is "begeistert", "verklärt" and in Grillparzer's terms she sees or certainly convinces herself that she sees death, "der freie Tod" in Don Cesar's words, as a reward for her work.

Clearly the escape into art, which Tasso finds possible, is out of the question for Sappho. Goethe of course said he was incapable of writing a tragedy, but in any case Tasso has never been unfaithful to his art, his desire for

something else has been brief and half-hearted. Even Antonio, whom he has come to consider his bitter enemy, reminds him of his role as a poet which will provide him with solace and a means of overcoming his sorrow. Sappho however has tried to reject her art, in so doing she has been untrue to her poetic nature, which is her true nature. It is therefore impossible for her to return to poetry as if nothing had happened, and equally she cannot continue in life for she has discovered that her character is most unsuited to cope with ordinary situations. Poetry can however help her overcome her baser feelings and provide a means of escape for her, as it does in a different way for Tasso. As Douglas Yates writes, "death, we must feel, is the only way out", and it is to her great credit that she turns a very hopeless situation into what is almost a triumphant end; there is considerable justification in Schafroth's assessment of Sappho's death as "eine Tat der Stärke und Kraft". (22)

The message of Sappho is therefore on the surface that poetry and life cannot be combined. Their representatives belong to different spheres and the ways in which they deal with other people and vice-versa are different. "Den Menschen Liebe und den Göttern Ehrfurcht" (1782), is what Phaon tells Sappho and it is a motto she repeats herself at the end. Phaon also warns her to become aware of her position as a poet,

Bedenke, was du tust und wer du bist! (1784)  
and this must remind us of the words Antonio utters to Tasso:

Und wenn du ganz dich zu verlieren scheinst,  
Vergleiche dich! Erkenne, was du bist! (3419-20)

Although the message is the same, namely that the poet should be aware of his role and what it means, the context is quite different. Throughout Goethe's play, Tasso is told to be more of a man, to come out of his solipsistic existence as a poet, and it is only when he touches the depths of despair in the final scenes that Antonio reminds him of his poetic ability, which will enable him to overcome



his suffering. The desired integration of genius and humanity, to borrow Korff's formulation,<sup>(23)</sup> is in no way jeopardised in its general validity. In Sappho however, it is precisely because the poetess has sought at best to combine art and life and presumably, if necessary, to abandon her artistic calling, that Phaon issues his admonition to Sappho to realise what her poetic mission involves, namely the infeasibility of playing a full role in life, and Sappho comes to accept that this is inevitable.

Douglas Yates has said that Sappho's guilt was originally to lie in her behaviour after rejecting her art, in her treatment of Phaon and Melitta, but later came to consist in the very betrayal of her art.<sup>(24)</sup> This, as we have seen, is the message of the play in Sappho's words, and hence the lesson we are asked to learn from the play. Sappho's guilt as a woman remains hidden under the surface, but this aspect of her guilt must be considered.

Sappho herself never recognises that she has behaved wrongly as a woman;

Sappho ist in der Katastrophe ein verliebtes, eifersüchtiges, in der Leidenschaft sich vergessendes Weib; ein Weib das einen jüngern Mann liebt. In der gewöhnlichen Welt ist ein solches Weib ein ekelhafter Gegenstand. (IV,743)

Grillparzer intended to point this out to Müllner and explain that the first act must show her in her former calm state. On the whole however the desire to save Sappho from being "ekelhaft" leads to an exaggerated emphasis on her poetic nature. At the end she returns in her regalia, addresses the gods, Rhamnes holds a diatribe against Phaon's ignorance of her great merits, and she leaps off the rock in the belief that she will rejoin her companions in the realm of poetry. Her poetry is the source of her nobility and hence has to be re-introduced at the end to underline this dignity and nobility, it is, one might say, a repair job similar to that undertaken by Schiller to save Wallenstein as a noble, tragic figure. Grillparzer later claimed he had shown Sappho as a woman;

Was man meiner Sappho zum Vorwurf machte, ist vielmehr ein Vorzug des Stückes - daß ich nämlich mehr das leidende Weib als ihr poetisches Element hervorhob. (Gespr. 814, cf. IV, 84)

This may be true for much of the play, but it does not apply to the final act where we should be able to see the reason for Sappho's suicide. Sappho has behaved quite unreasonably as a human being and we are made to think that this results from her poetic nature. The situation in the play does not wholly justify this assumption. Her poetic nature, or at least the violent emotions that go to make up one part of her poetic ability, may be responsible for her unsavoury reaction to Phaon's supposed infidelity, but it cannot be used to explain her lack of attractiveness in Phaon's eyes. The message of the play does seem to be precisely this, that people of a poetic disposition are incapable of achieving lasting relationships. This assumption cannot be maintained however. Sappho is an ageing woman and it is quite natural that Phaon prefers the young innocent Melitta. Sappho herself must realise this at the beginning, she speaks of Phaon "in seiner Jugend Fülle", she desires to return to youthful years. She sees the huge gulf between them;

Da steh ich an dem Rand der weiten Kluft,  
Die zwischen ihm und mir verschlingend gähnt. (394-5)

But even here she goes on to interpret this chasm in terms of art or ambition as opposed to a quiet life. The point to be made is not that Phaon and Melitta have "die Partie des Lebens" (IV, 743), suggesting that Sappho's poetry is the barrier to happiness, but that they have "die Partie der Jugend". Phaon would no doubt have preferred Melitta, whether or not Sappho was a poetess, only her poetry attracted him to her in the first place. On the other hand we must tend to think that a younger Sappho, even as a poetess, would have been able to hold Phaon's affection, and that any older woman, even though not a poetess, would have been defeated by Melitta in a battle for Phaon's hand. By introducing the disparity in age, Grillparzer is able

to avoid a valid discussion of whether the poet really is unable to lead an ordinary life. As an older woman, Sappho cannot retain Phaon's affection, and her poetic nature causes her to react violently. The conclusion which Grillparzer invites us to draw, is that the whole situation from start to finish is caused by Sappho's being a poetess. The constellation of characters enables him to conclude with a statement of art's isolation from life after having apparently provided the evidence for this conclusion.

The contrast has already been noted between the unheroic death of the characters in Die Ahnfrau and the climax of Schiller's fate-tragedy. It could be suggested that the Schillerian finale of Sappho would have been more suited to the melodrama of Grillparzer's previous play. Significantly in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, as I shall consider later, Grillparzer deliberately avoids the heroic finale depicted in Schiller's ballad "Hero und Leander", which would have been quite unsuitable for his own presentation of the priestess. In the case of Sappho, despite the obvious contrasts noted, the open ending of Tasso would have been perhaps a more fitting and certainly a more typical ending for Grillparzer (as in Vließ, Treuer Diener, Jüdin).<sup>(25)</sup> Not only the finale is unusual for Grillparzer, the apparent praise of suicide in order to preserve honour or integrity, rather than an insistence on making the best of life's problems, would also be out of place in Grillparzer's later work, in which "Leben" is a higher ideal than "Reinheit". In Sappho however, Grillparzer wished to demonstrate his ability to write a Classical tragedy, the play unfortunately then combines Goethean motifs and style with a Schillerian climax, whilst the play's themes are much more complex than is the case in most Classical plays. The grand Schillerian finale, however, encourages us to see the play in lofty but straightforward terms of life versus art, but it is quite out of place as a conclusion to the presentation of modern psychological subtleties of love and hatred in ageing.

women. In this context certainly one would be justified in agreeing with W.E. Yates that "Sappho's death is no kind of a solution".<sup>(26)</sup>

iii) Das goldene Vließ

In the statement of the poet's seemingly inevitable isolation, Grillparzer was no doubt defending his own situation. In Das goldene Vließ, one can also detect such subjective motifs and a similar sleight of hand in their treatment. Grillparzer goes out of his way to underline the contrast of Greek and Barbarian, and Jason and Medea are seen to be totally incompatible. In Sappho, Grillparzer had given a defence of his own separation of life and art, in the Vließ he is defending his own fear of marriage. In Sappho, the problem is over-simplified by making the representative of "life" more attractive to Phaon through her youth, beauty and simplicity, so that Sappho, the older woman, is bound to lose whether or not she is a poetess; in Vließ, the marriage of Jason and Medea is unsuccessful, not because all marriages are doomed to failure but because the protagonists are such totally different people from quite incompatible backgrounds. Grillparzer seems, to some extent at least, to be presenting a convenient explanation of his own avoidance of a lasting relationship; in the process however, his trilogy suggests that all contact with reality will lead to unhappiness and catastrophe.

H.H. Lesch, in his study of the tragic content of Grillparzer's trilogy, described it as "ein durch und durch pessimistisches Drama, das schwermütigste unter allen Werken Grillparzers". He concludes by stating: "Leben heißt Leiden." Rudolf Stiefel, in his long and intricate work, considers man's very existence to involve guilt automatically. Ilse Münch speaks of "die Spaltung, die in allem Dasein sich auswirkt", and sees the drama permeated by "das Gefühl der Nichtigkeit alles äußeren Besitzes, der Sinnlosigkeit alles Strebens".<sup>(27)</sup> Such strong terms are not without a great deal of justification. The work

reaches a crescendo of pessimism in the final words of Medea:

Was ist der Erde Glück? - Ein Schatten!

Was ist der Erde Ruhm? - Ein Traum! (Medea, 2366-7)

One must avoid the temptation to find any other interpretation of the conclusion, despite Konrad Schaum's more positive discussion of justice and humanity.<sup>(28)</sup> It is Grillparzer's most pessimistic work without a doubt, and if one considers the continual references to man's weakness and stupidity, it may seem difficult to conceive of a more complete rejection of Classical optimism and affirmation of life.

The play is the supreme statement of Grillparzer's pessimism of the period under consideration. He was certainly distressed by both his artistic and his personal problems at the time. Die Ahnfrau and Sappho had been great successes, but had been the object of much attack from critics, which in the case of Ahnfrau Grillparzer considered partly justified, and which in the case of Sappho he largely ignored yet which could not leave him entirely unaffected. Der Traum ein Leben, a further play with a basic note of resignation, had been abandoned in its infancy. The Vließ trilogy had taken over two years to write; he doubted the wisdom of writing a trilogy but gave up all attempts to condense the action into one play. In the end he lost much of his original interest but wanted to finish it. At the time when he had stopped work on Die Argonauten owing to lack of inspiration, his mother committed suicide in an attack of religious ecstasy, a fact which he was never able to admit to himself. In addition he was overlooked on at least two occasions when he justifiably expected promotion, and encountered considerable unpleasantness over his poem "Campo Vaccino", which compared the glories of antiquity with the "neue, flache Zeit" (I, 117). Hence he saw himself as a failure as a poet and in life, hence both Jason and Medea are unsuccessful; Medea with her concern for emotions and human relationships, Jason with his interest in possessions and fame. Their lack of success is obvious, whether or

not they stand for poetess and man of the world, as Stiefel suggests.

On the surface at least, the trilogy has little solace to offer. By comparison Der Traum ein Leben and the ensuing plans for "Faust" and "Krösus" were to offer an escape into quiet withdrawal, Sappho questions only the attempt to combine art and life, even Ahnfrau, whose philosophy one is not in any case encouraged to take too seriously, blames everything on an evil fate, rather than presenting the totally negative view of human nature that permeates Das goldene Vließ. And yet Grillparzer wrote in his preface to the trilogy that he wished to please Schreyvogel and very few others, "außer einem, der aber mit seinen Gedanken nicht mehr unter uns lebt und der von meiner Arbeit wohl keine Notiz nimmt" (I,970), by whom he can only mean Goethe. On the assumption that Grillparzer had more than merely formal considerations in mind, one might ask how he hoped to please Goethe with such a work, which appears to be in a different world from Iphigenie. Grillparzer specifically mentions Goethe's play in saying that his own method of dealing with a Greek subject is rather different from the one in vogue since Iphigenie, but he must surely also have been struck by the thematic contrasts between the two plays, which throw considerable light on the abyss separating Grillparzer from Classical ideas at this stage of his work.

Both plays deal with "der Fluch der bösen Tat", much more so than does Wallenstein, from which Grillparzer borrowed the famous couplet. In both plays, a long chain of events is caused by an initial crime, in each case this is seen in terms of human weakness rather than divine intervention or an all-pervading fate. Grillparzer, fearing another fate-tragedy like Ahnfrau, deliberately played down the importance of the fleece as a fateful object, concentrating attention on the characters instead. In the trilogy, Grillparzer avoids the word "Schicksal", so common in Ahnfrau and before. Hence he correctly points out:

Es ist da nicht von Schicksal die Rede. Ein Unrecht hat ohne Nötigung das andere zur Folge und das Vlies begleitet sinnbildlich die Begebenheiten ohne sie zu bewirken. (HKA I/17,301)

Grillparzer in fact hardly uses the word "Schicksal" from now on, and, certainly in the trilogy, guilt is placed squarely upon men's shoulders, even though the characters may try to see themselves doing the will of the gods, as do Phryxus and Aietes and above all Jason. Similarly in Iphigenie, Orest is responsible for his own guilt, and it is the discovery of Iphigenie rather than Diana's statue that is to provide Orest with release from the Furies, or more exactly, the torments of his own conscience. The desire to diminish the influence of the gods is made very apparent by a comparison of the first and last versions of the play. Responsibility is taken out of the hands of the gods except insofar as this is necessary for the plot, as for example when the oracle tells Orest to go to Tauris. On the whole, Classicism disliked the explanation of human matters by divine intervention or fate. In Schiller's Braut von Messina, the whole catastrophe is caused by human failings, and hence the situation can only be saved by an act of supreme human sacrifice. As with the versions of Iphigenie, a comparison of Wilhelm Meisters theatralische Sendung with the later Lehrjahre shows an increasing stress on human responsibility; the continual reference to fate in the early version is later removed or questioned.

This playing down of the role of fate or superhuman elements is to be found elsewhere in Grillparzer's work, significantly in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, which also reveals close parallels with Iphigenie, as I shall seek to show elsewhere. In this play it is the priest who puts out the lamp, not the gods, at least the priest moves the lamp so that the wind will blow it out. The priest's assertion that he is merely the tool of the gods, cannot be taken too seriously; there is, as Schaum has recently insisted, no hint of divine intervention. (29) If Orest thinks the gods have used him as an instrument,

then Leander believes the gods are protecting him, and he tells Naukleros:

Tor, der du bist! und denkst du den zu halten,  
Den alle Götter schützen, leitet ihre Macht? (1636-7)

Leander believes he is above mere humans, and that he can do things which no ordinary human can do. In this mistaken assumption he does not so much incur the wrath of the gods, although one may see it in such picturesque terms, as challenge the order of the world as a whole. Once he may escape, but a second attempt may well end in catastrophe, as it does for the young man in Schiller's "Der Taucher". In Jüdin finally, all attempts to see love as the result of magical powers, a view which the Queen holds, are dismissed. The real magic is in man (1430-4).

In both Vließ and Iphigenie the initial crime may be one of hubris, but the crimes that follow are those of murder and revenge. The motto, "Nimm Sieg und Rache hin", might stand for the events narrated by Iphigenie to Thoas. Equally the question Thoas asks concerning the Tantalid race, "Trug es die Schuld des Ahnherrn oder eigne?" (327), is a fair comment on the saga of the fleece. There is nothing supernatural about the golden fleece, but people see it as the key to fame and happiness, though in fact it is useless if not worthless. Škreb in his recent book says of Vließ, "auch in dieser Märchenwelt bleibt im Mittelpunkt der Mensch". (30) The curse as such is very much in human hands, hence the curse must be ended by human action. The way in which this is done in the two plays is different in the extreme. Iphigenie believes in her own heart as the source of divine guidance, hence she trusts in her heart to tell her the right course of action, and she has faith in her ability to do right instinctively:

Um Guts zu tun, braucht's keiner Überlegung...

Der Zweifel ist's, der Gutes böse macht.

Bedenke nicht, gewähre, wie du's fühlst. (1989-92)

Medea makes a similar plea to Jason when she begs him to support her: "sprich, wie dein Herz dirs heißt" (Medea, 271). Sadly this can have little hope of success. Even if Jason



were to follow his heart, it is unlikely that his heart would provide a consistent source of inspiration. When Thoas tells Iphigenie, "tu, was dein Herz dich heist" (463), he is being ironic, but the irony rebounds, for Iphigenie will do precisely that, and be successful and just in so doing. At an early stage, when she is in a state of some unity and harmony, Medea tells her father to listen to his conscience, "des Gottes Stimme in dem eignen Busen" (Argonauten, 155), and this must remind us of Iphigenie's explanation to Thoas (494), also of Gordon's assertion in Wallensteins Tod, "das Herz ist Gottes Stimme" (2883), but in Grillparzer's play, man suffers from Thoas's original fears: "Es überbraust der Sturm die zarte Stimme" (496).

Throughout Medea, the heart is appealed to as a source of an instinctively balanced attitude to the world in the face of violent emotions or the shifting dictates of the mind, of reason, <sup>(31)</sup> but unlike in Iphigenie, the heart proves inadequate, it is overpowered by passion or the demands of supposed reason. Kreusa's heart is seen as an ideal (675), and she especially considers the heart a source of balance (829), but Kreusa is not strong enough to conquer the overwhelming force of circumstances, and Medea's heart is ultimately overcome by the desire for revenge (1808, 1867, 1988). In Vließ all the main characters are torn by inner conflict, which may be between mind and heart or even within the heart. All are plagued by a guilty conscience, even Jason shows some traces of affection for Medea and regret for what he has done, although this is mainly connected with his fears for his own future. At the beginning, Medea says everything she does is right, but this is only in her solipsistic state of harmony and is no more laudable than Jason's egocentricity: "Er tut nur recht, doch recht ist, was er will" (Medea, 637). Later, in fact, everything Medea does appears to be wrong. The idea of inner harmony, of the "schöne Seele", seems to have vanished. Man cannot trust his heart, love and affection are dangerous instincts, ultimately destructive.

When she first met Jason, Medea knew that her affection was wrong and she was prepared to help her father kill him as a means of removing the conflict within her. At that stage, however, her heart overruled her reason. In the final catastrophe she overcomes her love for her children in a cold-blooded act of revenge. It is such a monstrous crime, aimed at her own flesh and blood, so different from the previous crimes insofar as it is perpetrated without any desire for fame and riches, that by its very brutality it puts a stop to the chain of events. As Lesch points out,<sup>(32)</sup> as long as Medea's will was directed towards anything praiseworthy, she was unsuccessful. No goodness in man, if it exists at all, can be used to undo the curse, only one of the worst crimes imaginable, the murder of one's own children, can paradoxically make the world stop and reflect. It seems dangerous to call her revenge "Erfüllung einer Gerechtigkeit", as Schaum does, or to employ Fülleborn's argument and see her revenge not as voluntary action ("Tat") but as the inexorable course of events, "Tun als reines Geschehen", which is outside humanity and moral, human judgement.<sup>(33)</sup> It is as if the chain of events had been broken by the addition of a link which is too big for the chain to bear, but certainly it is broken by an act of inhumanity, not by ultimate humanity, as in Iphigenie.

At this stage one might briefly mention other links between Vließ and Iphigenie, all of which highlight the contrast between the plays. Iphigenie warns Thoas, "Verdirb uns - wenn du darfst" (1936), and the king's decision to let the Greeks go is a proof of his newly found humanity. When Jason tells Medea, "Töte mich, wenn du kannst" (Argonauten, 1151), her inability to do so is a sign of her inner conflict between the dictates of reason and the pull of her heart. Her failure to kill Jason when given the opportunity, is both a sign of her humanity yet also the end of her freedom. Medea tells Kreon, and Pylades tells Iphigenie not to be too severe (Medea, 1610; Iphigenie, 1654-5). Iphigenie shows that she

can be so, because she believes in a constant source of humanity and good conduct, Kreon however is endangering people's existence by being too strict, for in the situation in Grillparzer's play allowances must be made to suit the particular circumstances. Finally the vision that Orest has of peaceful co-existence (1258ff.) leads to his recovery, but Medea's similar vision (Medea, 2081ff.) leads to a renewed awareness of her own tragic situation and spurs her on to her final deed.<sup>(34)</sup>

Until Medea's final act, all the characters in the trilogy lack the strength and willpower to halt the chain of events, even though most of them would be in a position to do so. One may spare a moment of pity for Absyrtus and Kreusa who are dragged into the whirlpool, but Kreusa, and Kreon as well, seem too unaware of the inherent tragedy of life. Kreusa especially has led a sheltered existence which makes her incapable of assessing the situation properly.

Above all the trilogy stresses that man is not able to face up to misfortune:

Es ist des Unglücks eigentlichstes Unglück,  
Daß selten drin der Mensch sich rein bewahrt.  
(Medea, 757-8)

Most of Schiller's classical tragedies deal with precisely the reverse of this theme. Johanna and the Swiss citizens are able to remain pure and constant in the face of adversity, and Tell himself is seen to act only under the most extreme provocation in a situation in which his very existence as a human being is endangered. Both Wallenstein and Maria Stuart rise to the peak of their potential when threatened with calamity, Maria attaining a degree of purity which she could never find when fate was smiling upon her. Even Don Cesar is able to overcome fate and acquire a noble stature through an act of self-sacrifice. Iphigenie also is faced with a situation whereby she will have to sacrifice her own brother, but she remains firm despite the attempt of Pylades to make her resort to cunning, and her constancy is rewarded. It is of course to be noted that in Goethe's play the chain of

evil events is in the past and Iphigenie's success in breaking the curse constitutes the action on stage, whilst in Vlies it is the grim course of murder and revenge that is presented on stage and Medea's act forms an even more brutal finale.

Throughout the play we are told not of man's strength and goodness as is common in Classicism, but instead, "ein töricht Wesen dünkt mich der Mensch" (Argonauten, 230), "aber - schwach ist der Mensch" (Medea, 1284), and there are many further statements of man's weakness, stupidity or tendency to evil. (35) Grillparzer later overcame such a pessimistic view of mankind, hence in Libussa the heroine realises, "der Mensch ist gut, er hat nur viel zu schaffen" (2461). At this early stage however we have an apparent rejection of Classical optimism. The belief of Classicism was normally that crimes and guilt could be overcome by humanity, hence the motto for Iphigenie:

Alle menschliche Gebrechen  
Sühnet reine Menschlichkeit. (HA I, 353)

Thus Orest who has committed matricide is forgiven after being tortured by his own guilty conscience, and he is told: "Es erbt der Eltern Segen, nicht ihr Fluch" (717). For Goethe especially it is only a figure such as the harper who believes that "alle Schuld rächt sich auf Erden" (Lehrjahre, II, 13), but he is intended as a warning example of exaggerated pessimism. In Schiller there is a less optimistic view of man's fate, above all in Braut von Messina, where sentiments are expressed similar to those of the harper:

Denn gebüßt wird unter der Sonnen  
Jede Tat der verblendeten Wut. (971-2)

More than any other play of Schiller's, Die Braut von Messina presents a gloomy picture of mankind, but even here, as elsewhere in Schiller's tragedies, there is the possibility of an act of free will to break the chain of gloom and fate. Medea however cannot escape the curse of the past. Her burying of the fleece is in vain, she cannot live for the present, "am offenen Strahl des Lichts", in "des heitern Lebens Nähe" (Medea, 6, 10). Gora acts as her guilty

conscience, telling her of the impossibility of cutting one's links with the past:

Grab ein, grab ein die Zeichen deiner Tat,  
Die Tat begräbst du nicht! (Medea,109-10)

An important theme of the play is that of man's position in relation to the changing course of time; according to Politzer, "so wird der Fluß der Zeit zum Helden dieses Trauerspiels". (36) It is Jason's tragedy "daß der Mensch in seiner Jugend sucht, was er im Alter nicht brauchen kann" (HKA I/17,308). Elsewhere Grillparzer quoted Rousseau as a motto for his trilogy: "L'on a remarqué que la plupart des hommes sont dans le cours de leur vie souvent dissemblables à eux mêmes, et semblent se transformer en des hommes tout différents" (Tgb.1082). Man is constantly altering, his needs are changing, his views on life become different. As Medea looks back on her life, it seems she has become an entirely different person, scarcely able to believe what she once did. Jason sees the matter in similar terms in describing his own life:

Und an dem Ziel der Bahn steht man ein andrer,  
Als der man war, da man den Lauf begann. (Medea,761-2)

Youth is a time of adventure, of striving, yet it is a time of "Schein" (Medea,778); maturity is a time of reality and of worries as to one's job, home, wife and children. It is a realisation similar to that made by Faust as he contemplates suicide. For Jason the fleece and his other adventures now seem worthless. Kreusa alone is able to say, "ich selber bin dieselbe, die ich war" (Medea,752).

Clearly man changes for Goethe and Schiller. Like Kreusa, Wallenstein believes, "noch fühl ich mich denselben, der ich war! (Tod,1812), but he and also Faust must learn the truth that Illo hands out to Wallenstein: "doch zittre vor der langsamen,/ Der stillen Macht der Zeit" (Tod,83-4). Time stands still only for the idealist who is outside the ordinary problems of life, but the process of time which affects everyone else is not viewed in any negative way. The transience of life is overcome by the sense of permanence inherent in art and also in nature, as I have considered in the opening chapter.

In fact as Medea discovers, there is a certain continuity in the Vließ, and this awareness is enhanced by the final scene in which one gains the impression that events have turned full circle. The first scene of Gastfreund has the setting: "wilde Gegend mit Felsen und Bäumen", the last scene of the trilogy is set in a "wilde einsame Gegend von Wald und Felsen umschlossen". Both take place at dawn, the sunrise that highlights the gloom of Medea's parting words also suggests that we have gone back to the start. Medea again is defiant and dominant, she announces her intention of returning the fleece to the god in Delphi, and of accepting her fate, whatever that may be. Schaum has devoted a lengthy and at times complicated article to the question of "Gesetz und Verwandlung im Goldenen Vließ", but I find it difficult to agree with his conclusions, especially the emphasis placed on the constant nature of man's existence. According to Schaum, Medea's fate grants us "einmalige Einsicht in universale Gesetze", we see "das ewig Wirkende ... das Bleibende ... das nie ganz begreifliche Ewige in der Gestaltung fortschreitenden Lebens".<sup>(37)</sup> If Medea's fate shows this, then one would have a rather disastrous picture of human existence, which was not Grillparzer's permanent view on the matter. The story of Medea is too individual to stand in any way as a representation of "das allgemein Menschliche". As Medea finally realises, there is permanence in nature but transience in man:

So wandellos, sich gleich, ist die Natur,

So wandelbar der Mensch und sein Geschick. (Medea, 2071-2)

This would in fact seem to echo Classicism, but Grillparzer's emphasis in the trilogy is on the transience rather than the permanence.

Ironically Medea, unlike many characters in the trilogy, does not seek the past, instead she wishes to bury it, but it is in keeping with the general mood of the play that precisely the evil deeds catch up with man, that evil rather than goodness can overcome transience - in obvious contrast to Classicism, in which the effect of time is removed by

noble acts of freedom. Kreon tells Jason that the world will forgive the mistakes of man's youth, and Kreusa insists to Medea that gods and men are prepared to forget. Men at least seem incapable of so doing, and the play is full of warnings about the force of past evil, "daß sich der Frevel rächt auf dieser Erde" (Argonauten, 1769), a phrase which undoubtedly echoes the words of Goethe's harper.

iv) Der Traum ein Leben

In Vließ, man is easily overcome by greed or his emotions, one false step may be enough for a fall on the slippery path of life, and man is easily lost;

Weil du in leichtem Kahn den Strom hinabgeglitten,  
Dich haltend an des Ufers Blütenzweigen,  
Von Silberwellen hin und her geschaukelt,  
So hältst du dich für eine Schifferin?  
Dort weiter draußen braust das Meer,  
Und wagst du dich vom sichern Ufer ab,  
Reißt dich der Strom in seine grauen Weiten.

(Medea, 389-95)

The image of man venturing out from the safety of the shore or harbour in a fragile craft is common especially in Grillparzer's early works, such as "Irene", "Robert", or Blanka. In Ahnfrau, even the most modest hopes or ambitions are dashed, in Sappho the poetess discovers the barren nature of fame and ambition;

Weh dem, den aus der Seinen stillem Kreise  
Des Ruhms, der Ehrsucht eitler Schatten lockt.  
Ein wildbewegtes Meer durchschiffet er  
Auf leichtgefügttem Kahn. Da grünt kein Baum,  
Da sprosset keine Saat und keine Blume. (398-402)

Even if one's ambitions are realised, it would seem that the person on the pinnacle of fame cannot mix with ordinary human joys (Sappho, 954-6), and Phaon insists to Sappho,

... daß der Unschuld heitrer Blumenkranz  
Mehr wert ist, als des Ruhmes Lorbeerkrone. (1144-5)

Medea finally proclaims that fame is a mere dream. The play which equally seems to reflect such a pessimistic view of ambition is Der Traum ein Leben, completed in the early 1830s but essentially a product of the period at present under consideration. Significantly it is a work

that accompanies the more depressing stages of Grillparzer's life. Act I was written after Die Ahnfrau and the resulting commotion, so that Grillparzer may well have been reluctant to produce a further play on popular lines. The rest of the play was drafted during the depression of the late 1820s caused by the censors and Marie von Smolenitz, a state of mind amply reflected in the poems which were to be included in the Tristia cycle. The play was completed after the failure of Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen when he wished to withdraw from public life and return to being simply "ein Mensch" (Tgb.1893). The themes of the play after suspension of work in 1817 are taken up not only in Vlies, but also in the plan for a drama "Krösus" and in the notes for a second part of Faust in 1822.

In the first of these, Krösus discovers the danger of all striving for greatness and happiness and the futility of all attempts to overlook this danger:

Die Idee beim Krösus war, daß er sich über die  
Unbeständigkeit des Glücks erhaben glaubt und  
ihm trotzen zu können wähnt. (II,1071)

But the king finally retreats to a safer realm of quiet happiness away from the dangers of fame and glory: "er hat die Gefahr der Größe, die Glückseligkeit des Privatlebens erkannt" (II,1071). The same theme of the fleeting nature of happiness is also reflected in the plans for a play or cycle of plays, "Die Glücklichen", first mentioned at the time of the "Krösus"-fragments. In a note of 1827, when Grillparzer was working on Traum and Tristia, he wrote as a motto: "Keinem ist beständig das Glück" (Tgb.1585).

The first mention of the plans for "Faust" was a diary note of 1812 (Tgb.117), suggesting that it was the awakening of passion in a young man that attracted him to the theme. By the time Grillparzer came to write a scene from his second part of Faust, it was the hero's reaction to his guilt that most interested Grillparzer. Goethe makes Faust forget all his guilt at the beginning of the second part:

Besänftiget des Herzens grimmigen Strauß,  
Entfernt des Vorwurfs glühend bittre Pfeile,  
Sein Innres reinigt von erlebtem Graus. (4623-5)



Thus Faust is able to go onwards into a new sphere of life, refreshed and rejuvenated. Grillparzer's Faust is however tormented by the memories of the suffering he has caused, the crimes he has committed. He seeks "Ruh und Friede" in the bosom of nature, a safe harbour such as Medea sees herself leaving. Above all he desires forgiveness, which he sees granted to others but not to him, and he concludes with a couplet so very reminiscent of Sappho's realisation four years later;

mein Auge kann das Himmelsland erreichen,  
doch, weh mir, weh! mein Fuß vermag es nicht! (II,994)

In the diary note of 1822, Grillparzer discusses the course the play was to take. Faust was to discover "worin eigentlich das Glück besteht; in Selbstbegrenzung und Seelenfrieden" (II,995). Faust seeks peace and happiness in moderation, learning "die kleinen Verhältnisse des menschlichen Lebens ... das Glück der häuslichen Liebe ... der Genuß des unschuldigen Glücks", the latter of which he tries to find in the affection of a second Gretchen. But he is tormented by his feelings of guilt, "durch das Bewußtsein seiner vorausgegangenen Handlungen, seiner frühern Verworfenheit", and finally he begs Mephisto to take him away. As in Goethe's Faust, Mephisto tries to give him all he wants, but his reasons for failure are quite different. Goethe's Faust finds the delights which Mephisto gives him, even the enjoyment of Gretchen, insignificant and unable to satisfy his longing and striving. Faust has to go onwards to new things, he cannot find satisfaction in repetition or monotony, and Goethe is prepared to forgive Faust his crimes if he continues to strive, which Goethe sees as beneficial for man in general. The very things which Grillparzer praises - "Selbstbegrenzung und Seelenfrieden" - are anathema within the context of Faust, if not necessarily Goethe's work as a whole, and Faust is prepared to give himself to the devil if he should ever be content. Grillparzer ignores the wider implications of Faust, already suggested in the "Prolog im Himmel", restricts its significance to the individual case and sees

Faust overcome by guilt. The striving which is so important in Goethe's opinion is implicitly rejected as man's misfortune by Grillparzer.

Grillparzer's continuing interest in Faust is also reflected in the fragments of the play "Drahomira". Above all however, it is possible to see Der Traum ein Leben as a variation on the theme of Faust. There are a number of verbal links between the plays: "lobesam" (Traum, 714), "lichterloh" (729), "Gnadensuppen" (1446, cf. Faust, 2392: "Bettelsuppen"), "nicht ruhn, nicht rasten" (679). At one point, Rustan cries, "wär ich nie geboren" (1154), as does Faust (4596). Zanga suggests they both dress as Junker, which is Mephisto's first ploy in Faust. Both Rustan and Faust seek to escape from a monotonous, lifeless world; both achieve their escape by somewhat unnatural means, are accompanied by a minister of evil, who in each case makes cynical remarks about love and life, on his master's aspirations and scruples, on his success or failure, and generally sums up the scenes with a proverbial saying: according to Škreb, "Zangas Sentenzen erinnern deutlich an Mephisto".<sup>(38)</sup> Clearly however the action of Traum is played out on a much lower level than in Goethe's great work. Faust at the beginning of the play has already achieved much more than Rustan can ever hope for, and the source of his longing is a desire for insight into nature and absolute truth, or even in the mature form of Faust I, a craving after the totality of human experience (1770-2). Faust himself does not know what his goal is, it is the accumulation of individual experiences that attracts him, hence he seeks both good and bad, pain and happiness, a totality of emotion:

Dem Taumel Weih' ich mich, dem schmerzlichsten Genuß,  
Verliebttem Haß, erquickendem Verdruß. (1766-7)

Rustan however is interested only in the final aim, his vague ideas of fame and success as a source of happiness. He lacks the Faustian striving for totality including pain.<sup>(39)</sup> It is the pleasant side of experience he seeks, as soon as anything goes wrong, his first thought is to

turn back and renounce his ambitions. His striving is purely selfish, he seeks aggrandisement, speaking of the "neidenswertes Glück der Größe" (323). He wants to be the equal of Osmin, but it is indicative of the poverty of his ambition that he measures success against such an obviously insignificant hanger-on. Faust's ambition is not related to anyone else, he does not seek to prove himself in society. His desires, though selfish in a solipsistic way, are concerned totally with inner experience, with the enlarging of his own totality and are considerably less worthy of condemnation as a result. Grillparzer could not of course know how Faust was to end when he wrote Traum, hence Faust's actions in the first part of the tragedy may have seemed particularly reprehensible and liable to lead to a life of remorse and feelings of guilt, such as Grillparzer planned to depict in his own continuation of Faust. Both Goethe's and Grillparzer's Faust find it impossible to accept "Selbstbegrenzung und Seelenfrieden". Grillparzer sees the cause to lie in an overpowering awareness of guilt, for Goethe it is a raging desire for further experience. Nevertheless such a guilt-complex is understandable if we consider Faust's guilt without the wider allegorical framework, which is not made clear until the second part of Goethe's drama. Grillparzer himself, as I shall seek to show, found the ideal he had expounded in Traum to be illusory, and with his own determination to go on, to taste the bitter and the sweet, he approximates more closely to Goethe's Faust than to his own character Rustan.

Indicative of the contrast between Rustan and Goethe's Faust are the respective roles played by Zanga and Mephisto. Whilst Mephisto is a helpful servant who provides the means whereby Faust can acquire the experience he seeks, Zanga is the driving force behind Rustan, cajoling him into action, persuading him to gamble or deceive, supporting him when his courage fails, smoothing over embarrassing situations, and in general doing his best to ensure that Rustan does not give up at the first sign of difficulty.

The really important experiences for Faust are the ones that come from his own initiative; Gretchen, Helen, the reclaiming of new land. Those which Mephisto provides are empty and meaningless for Faust; Auerbach's cellar, the "Walpurgisnacht", the Imperial Court. It is Faust's determination to break away from Mephisto that is the crowning of his development and the sign of his new insight into his position in life. Rustan needs inspiration for all his deeds, at least until the last act, he owes his success to the deeds or at least the persuasion of others.

v) Ambition and withdrawal

Der Traum ein Leben concludes with Rustan's realisation of the dangers of glory and greatness:

Und die Größe ist gefährlich,  
Und der Ruhm ein leeres Spiel.  
Was er gibt, sind nichtge Schatten,  
Was er nimmt, es ist so viel. (2653-6)

Rustan's ambitions have proved to be dangerous, in the end he rejects his striving and accepts the need for "des Innern stiller Frieden/ Und die schuldbefreite Brust" (2651-2). Act I especially is a paean of praise to calm tranquillity as Rustan is contrasted with the peace and calm in nature, in Massud and Mirza, or in his own past.<sup>(40)</sup> The ideal is expressed in Classical terms of peace and quiet. "Ruhig" and "still" especially occur with great regularity, but there are other familiar terms of approbation to describe Rustan's previous life; "Wo er sanft war, fromm und mild" (109), "Er war damals sanft und gut" (115). Zanga, who desires his own freedom, is suitably cynical about such a life and Rustan is caught up in the desire to escape. He can no longer find anything appealing in the "stilles Tun und Treiben", in "diese Ruhe, diese Stille" (467, 533) which the others praise.

Grillparzer's Faust had sought "Ruh und Frieden" and was to find happiness in limitation. Krösus retires to lead a peaceful, private life with his son, and this is a leitmotif of this period. Jaromir in Ahnfrau seeks a

"heiliger Asyl" in the Borotin castle (748), he desires "ein Stündchen Ruhe" (599), Berta seems to promise him "Ruh und Frieden" (786), and all the characters seek peace and quiet, "der Seele Frieden", which however they find only in death.<sup>(41)</sup>

As in the first act of Traum, "still" is extremely common in Sappho. The heroine seeks "ein einfach stilles Hirtenleben" (94), "häuslich stille Freuden" (96), she pities anyone who is drawn out of "der Seinen stiller Kreis" (398). Melitta especially is described as "still", she is "das liebe Mädchen mit dem stillen Sinn" (755),<sup>(42)</sup> and Phaon sees her in such terms, looking forward to their happiness, "unterm breiten Lindendach,/ Das still der Eltern stilles Haus beschattet" (1459-60). It is interesting to note the linking of peace with simplicity (94,286), a linking which Backmann specifically calls "schillerisch" (HKA I/2,334), but which has its roots in Winckelmann's assessment of Greek art. Melitta herself is described as "einfach" (1086), and it is meant to be something positive. Elsewhere, the king in Treuer Diener describes his people as "ein einfach stilles Volk" (293).

The search for peace was a feature of Grillparzer's earliest works: "Robert", "Irene", Blanka, as well as in "Faust". Sappho looks back to her poetry, Phaon looks forward to the future with Melitta in thoughts of "Ruhe" (1272,1458), Sappho sees "Ruh und stille Heiterkeit" on Phaon's brow (844). Grillparzer later saw that he had "mit Goethes Kalbe gepflügt" in writing Sappho, and his choice of certain emotive words may well have been one aspect of this.

Significantly these same terms are found in Vlieg. If there is one ray of hope in the trilogy, it must lie in the occasional references in Medea to a life of quiet simplicity in harmony with the world. As Gora taunts Medea in order to make her rebel, Medea replies:

Laß uns die Götter bitten um ein einfach Herz,  
Gar leicht erträgt sich dann ein einfach Los! (86-7)

Jason also suggests the correct attitude to adopt, even

though he realises man's inherent inability to do so;

Es ist des Menschen höchstes Unglück dies;  
Daß er bei allem, was ihn trifft im Leben,  
Sich still und ruhig hält, bis es geschehn,  
Und wenns geschehen, nicht. Das laß uns meiden. (260-3)

Jason has previously told the slave, "haltet ruhig euch und still", and it is of interest to observe Phryxus's reaction on landing in Colchis, which proves sadly ironic. He sees the land as one,

Wo Sicherheit und einfach stille Ruh  
Mit Kindesblicken mir entgegenlächeln. (Gastfreund, 205-6)

Kreusa provides the clearest message; when she answers Jason's desire for a way out of his troubles. He sees wiping out the past as the only solution, but Kreusa thinks otherwise;

KREUSA. Das wärs allein? Ich weiß ein andres Mittel;  
Ein einfach Herz und einen stillen Sinn.  
JASON. Ja, wer von dir das lernen könnte, Gute!  
KREUSA. Die Götter gebens jedem, der nur will.  
Auch dir wars einst und kann es wieder werden.  
(Medea, 828-32)

The words of approbation in which such advice and warnings are couched occur especially in Medea, but are notably lacking in the two parts that take place on Colchian soil. Kreusa above all is described as "still", "rein", "einfach", "klar", "fromm", "mild". Grillparzer did to some extent see her as an ideal. In the notes he wrote whilst planning the trilogy, he called her "fast überirdisch rein ... leidenschaftslos" (I/17,294), he considered her quality of "Einfachheit", her naivety which was "die Naivetät der Reinheit" rather than "Naivetät der Kindlichkeit" (I/17,300). Medea, the barbarian, is impressed by her "Himmelsklarheit" (Medea, 680), sees her as "hell und rein" (675).

One is tempted to suggest that the ideas of peace, calm and harmony were originally intended to be more idealistic, that Grillparzer planned a more positive picture of Greece. As the trilogy now stands, the praise of Greece in Argonauten (1237-42) is scarcely in keeping with its later presentation. In early jottings, Grillparzer wrote of Jason as "ein glänzender Held" with "eine gewisse ruhige

(griechisch antike) Haltung im Gegensatz der barbarischen Medea" (I/17,284), the king was to be seen demonstrating "Rechtlichkeit ... Klugheit ... ruhiger Verstand" (I/17,300), and other remarks also suggest a less negative view of Greece than finally presented. Nevertheless, Kreusa remains partly as an ideal, and even after writing the first two acts, he noted in December 1819:

Kreusa weniger naiv sein als einfach ... Kreusa als eine durch das Beisammenleben mit guten, frommen Menschen Gebildete, Medeen entgegen stehn. (I/17,304)

Notes he made after completing the play show that he thought he had gone too far in the negative direction. He reminds himself: "dein erster Plan war, die Argonauten abenteuerlich zu halten, ritterlich; die Medea hellenisch" (I/17,309), and he tries to find a way to banish the fleece from the last part until Medea can recognise it at the end. Grillparzer however changed very little as a result of these notes. In consequence the finished play, despite the insistence on peace and quiet, has little of the "edle Einfalt und stille Größe" which one might have expected. Above all the ideals put forward seem to have little chance of fruition even in the more cultured atmosphere of Greece. Once Jason and Medea arrive on the scene, even Kreusa's naive simplicity and harmony is not able to cope with the situation. She is too naive to be an ideal. She initially rejects Medea because of the rumours surrounding her, she then shows her kindness towards the children, but thereby also her utter lack of tact towards Medea in treating them as orphans. She has no concept of marital strife, and although she tries to be kind to Medea and wonders whether they have all done right in banishing her, she raises no immediate objection to being married to Jason. Her security, as Grillparzer says, has been founded on living "mit guten, frommen Menschen". In the world of clashing personalities and overwhelming emotions, there seems not the slightest chance of success for her ideals. Kreusa's ideal of peaceful simplicity, calm harmony with the world is endangered in any exceptional circumstances, whilst

Iphigenie's tranquil humanity survives brief tremors and emerges unruffled at the end. Certainly Kreusa fails to have the healing effect on others for which Iphigenie is renowned.

Medea's desire for "ein einfach Herz" refers to "ein einfach Los", but her fate is far too complicated for such a solution. Unlike Iphigenie, man in the Vließ is concerned solely with personal gain and happiness. Man is neither "einig mit der Welt" as Medea desires (Medea, 120), nor "eins mit sich selbst" as Goethe said to Riemer (2/8/1807) and as Schiller also stressed as the ideal of natural existence (NA XX, 414, 438). Man is not prepared to face up to his own existence, nor to accept responsibility for what he does. Jason is particularly guilty in this respect; he continually attributes things to the gods, to fate: Medea's tears (Medea, 910), the children's rejection of her (1701), the breakdown of their marriage (1506). As Schaum says, there is no absolute moral code, and this is reflected in the lack of absolute standards:

Der Maßstab aller Dinge war verloren,

Nur an sich selbst maß jeder was er sah. (Medea, 446-7)

Wo kein Maß ist, ist keine Vergeltung. (1748)

Gora later believes that retribution has taken place, but this is no reason for thinking that some standards have returned. There is nothing, not even the traditions of Greek civilisation, for people to use as a guideline, a means of support, and ideals become unattainable in such circumstances. Kreon does say "nie recht ist Unrecht, Schlimmes nirgends gut" (Medea, 458), which is most certainly a sentiment that Iphigenie would endorse, but in Grillparzer's trilogy such rigid principles are untenable owing to the inconstancy of man's attitudes and behaviour.

This does not invalidate these ideals as such, it does however make them even more idealistic. Grillparzer was however able to return to them in later works. The emperor in Bruderzwist was envisaged as "der stille Kaiser Rudolf" (Tgb. 1494), and in the play itself he continually seeks and enjoys "Ruhe", "Stille".<sup>(43)</sup> The mood of peace



and quiet is an essential prerequisite for insight into the truths of the universe (411-17), and this message is echoed in the 1849 poem "Der Christbaum" (I,335), as also in a poem of the same year, "Ruhe" (I,329). The same ideal is praised by Mathias at the beginning and end of Bruderzwist, despite his apparent desire for action.<sup>(44)</sup> After the noise of the festival, the narrator in Der arme Spielmann enjoys "die Stille des Ortes" in more peaceful surroundings (III,154). The priestly community of Sestos in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen is seen as a realm of peace and quiet. Hero enjoys "ihres Glückes sturmbeschützte Ruh" (287), "das Glück des stillen Selbstbesitzes" (392).<sup>(45)</sup> Yet this play already suggests further problems. Leander comes to disturb Hero's peace (812,1012,1171), and we must on the whole see Hero's earlier life as artificial, as even more sheltered than was Kreusa's. Rudolf II's search for "Stille" is excessive, if not in absolute terms, then at least in his position as the emperor who needs to act. If peaceful withdrawal is an ideal, then it is also a dangerous one. Weh dem, der lügt! makes little or no mention of such ideals, the same is true of Libussa, where the heroine rejects her sisters' "stille Wohnung" as too quiet.<sup>(397)</sup> If H.G. Adler is justified in seeing Der Traum ein Leben as the portrayal of "das Gesetz der Stille", he is surely wrong in believing that Libussa depicts similar ideals.<sup>(46)</sup> Melusina's poetic realm is one of "Ruhe" (169,245), but Raimund is the man of action, of "Unruh",<sup>(47)</sup> and only in death can he finally be united with Melusina. Fred Nolte calls Grillparzer "the dramatist of quietism" and insists that "still" was his favourite adjective,<sup>(48)</sup> yet the terms that Nolte considers as quietist are never again as predominant as in the early period under review, and it is important in this aspect to compare the first act of Traum with the remaining acts written later. The words "ruhig", "still", "sanft" occur twenty-eight times in Act I, but only six times in the rest of the play.

In Vließ the ideal of peaceful harmony has nothing

to do with Medea's early secure position of innocence. Medea at that stage is as egocentric as Jason later, she is unsympathetic and lacks consideration for others. Schaum also rightly stresses that the existence Medea leads in the tower is wrong, even though at times it does seem the only way to remain pure. It is an escape from life rather than a balanced attitude towards it. As Libussa tells her sister, the life of contemplation is as likely to lead to disaster as is the life of action, and Grillparzer would see the entry into life and action as necessary in order to avoid the dangerously naive position in which Kreusa finds herself. But in the trilogy, this necessity is viewed in much greater tragic terms. Hence it is only in Traum that the possibility of peaceful withdrawal is an unproblematic solution to the problems of life, because Rustan is able to discover in a dream his inadequacy for other forms of existence. Grillparzer in any case saw that play as "Unterhaltung" (Tgb.1284), and as Caroline Pichler reports, he was annoyed to some extent by the play's success:

Er selbst soll aber doch nicht recht mit diesem glänzenden Erfolg zufrieden sein, es soll ihn kränken, daß dieser Beifall einem Stücke wurde, welches er schon früher (wenigstens zum Teil) geschrieben, indessen seine neuern Produkte sich dieses Glückes nicht erfreuen. (IV,940)

In a letter to Graf Redern (4/11/1834) he criticised the play in terms reminiscent of his rejection of Ahnfrau, because of its tendency to "Effektmacherei", adding that he much preferred Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen. Significantly this latter work sees the priest's life as too narrow, too withdrawn. Even the priest himself deprecates too limited an ambition:

... Ists gleich nicht gut und recht,  
Beim Anfang einer Bahn das Ziel so nah,  
So ärmlich nahe sich das Ziel zu setzen. (973-5)

It is therefore totally dangerous and misleading to consider Der Traum ein Leben as a statement of Grillparzer's views in general, a condemnation of all action and ambition. According to Baumann:

Jede Form von Streberei wird in Österreich verachtet ... in dieser Hinsicht erscheint Rudolf II. ganz Habsburger und ganz Grillparzer ... Immer bleibt ihm [Grillparzer] die Größe frevelhaft und gefährlich ... in Selbstbegrenzung und Seelenfrieden sollten der Faust und der Rustan Grillparzers das Wünschenswerte erblicken.

For Münch, the play represents "eine Abkehr vom tätigen Streben überhaupt", according to Richard Alewyn it is Grillparzer's praise of happiness "im engsten Lebenskreis in einer gewohnten Häuslichkeit". Similarly, Emil Staiger considers that König Ottokars Glück und Ende reveals "der Fluch der Tat überhaupt", for Robert Mühlher, Grillparzer's work shows "die Fragwürdigkeit allen autonomen Handelns schlechthin".<sup>(49)</sup> The idea that all forms of striving and activity are anathema to Grillparzer must however be rejected.

Certainly "streben" is not a particularly positive concept for Grillparzer. Striving is seen as a feature of youth and immaturity, as for Fixlmüllner: "Ein vages Streben ohne Ziel und Richtung charakterisierte seine ganze Jugend" (Tgb.1653).<sup>(50)</sup> Striving is also part of the egocentric realm of man, as opposed to woman ("Irene", 325; Sappho, 820; Bruderzwist, 1874). Frequently the whole idea of striving is seen as something selfish, solipsistic. Herod is "durch seinen Ehrgeiz ... zum Streben nach Hohem getrieben" (II, 1099).<sup>(51)</sup> Striving in man is often carried to excess. This is the cause of Napoleon's downfall:

Dies ungezähmte, schrankenlose Streben  
Hat ihn dem Teufel in die Hand gegeben. (I, 78)<sup>(52)</sup>

Striving of an intellectual kind is not looked upon with such dislike however, as in the case of Jerindo Frangipani (II, 1013). This is especially true of poetic striving:

Willst du haben, mußt du streben,  
Nichts gewährt, als was erreicht. (I, 196)

The poet is seen to be "auf das Edle und Große hinstrebend" (Tgb. 4292), and there is praise for man's "Streben nach dem Wahren, nach dem Guten, nach dem Schönen" (Tgb. 871). Graf Borotin praises "des Herzens edles Streben, / Recht

zu tun und groß und gut" (Ahnfrau,706-7), the priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen approves of an inner striving for totality (982-3), a diary note comments that, "des Menschen unabweisliches Streben ist sich mit der Welt in Übereinstimmung zu setzen" (Tgb.2147). (53)

But such intellectual striving can also be taken to excess:

Nur weiter! weiter! geht das rasche Streben.  
Das Höchste will nur jeder und verfehlt  
Das Nächste drüber kindisch schwachen Flugs. (I,137)

Strebt jeder hastgen Drangs nach dem, was neu. (I,245)

In any case, many of the statements above are positive because of the aim being striven for, not because the idea of striving as a separate concept is a positive one. Where "streben" is used by Grillparzer with independent meaning in the way the term is employed in Goethe's Faust, then there is considerable doubt as to the value or efficacy of striving, which is very often corrupted or comes to nothing because of hostile circumstances. The poet in "Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen" accuses life:

Rein war mein Herz und rein war all mein Streben,  
Du aber zahltest Trug und Täuschung mir dafür. (47-8)

Drahomira addresses the spirits:

Die ihr des Menschen kindlich reinem Streben  
So schlau versteht ein andres Ziel zu geben. (II,1117)

Fixlmüllner's "redlich gemeintes Streben", the desire to bring reason and order into his thoughts, had a disastrous effect on his poetic imagination (Tgb.1652). In 1827 Grillparzer tries to convince himself of the need to strive, to commit himself to life:

Drum auf ins Leben, mutbewährt!  
Gestrebt, geliebt, gehaßt! ("Böse Stunde" (I,214))

- but the rest of the poem and of the Tristia cycle to which it belongs, casts a shadow over such a desire. In a poem of 1847, the poet's striving for a distant goal always remains in vain ("Ruhe" (I,329)), and his Christmas present for 1844 was "die Gewißheit,/ Mein Streben sei verkannt" (I,302). Graf Borotin speaks of his "vergeblich Streben" (Ahnfrau,134), and the theme of striving in vain is found elsewhere, especially in the youthful works such

as Blanka (3895). A diary note of 1820 or 1821 considers man's "Streben nach Wirksamkeit", but this is a desire man shares with animals (Tgb.871), a similar striving is mentioned favourably in the poem "Rechtfertigung", but the poem as a whole defends Grillparzer's own silence. A diary note of 1825 speaks of "das Streben der Völker nach Freiheit" as the new virtue (Tgb.1410), but a note of 1847 mocks precisely that striving (Tgb.3875). All other apparently positive contexts of striving are limited or shaded in some way.

Grillparzer is much more aware of the dangers of ambition than was Goethe. In Faust, Goethe sees the good in even the worst situation, accepts mistakes, even guilt, as part of the ultimately beneficial totality of experience. The whole essence of Faust's development is the discovery of an active and constructive outlet for his striving. Striving and activity produce progress, stagnation is fatal. Grillparzer however comes nearer to Schiller, he sees the problems inherent in action and ambition, the fatal flaw of selfishness in man which encourages but corrupts ambition, and this is clearly seen in the parallels between Wallenstein and Ottokar.<sup>(54)</sup> In Grillparzer's early work there is an attack on ambition, on the desire for greatness, as we have seen in Sappho, Vließ, Traum, as also in the figures of Krösus, Napoleon and of course Ottokar:

Weh ihm! - Der wählet sich kein festes Ziel,  
Den Ruhm- und Ehrsucht führet in die Schranken. (I,78)

Sieh hin, da sitzt der Stolze, Übermächtige,  
Dem sonst die Welt zu klein für seine Größe.  
(Ottokar, 2098-9)<sup>(55)</sup>

Striving for fame and ambition may well result in a loss of integrity, as evil means are used to compensate for insufficient ability, as ethical concerns are sacrificed to the achievement of one's goal. This is true of many of Schiller's characters (Karl Moor, Wallenstein, Marquis Posa, Elisabeth and Maria), it is true of Jason, Ottokar, Mathias and Klesel. Rustan's ambition also entails a loss of integrity. He is advised to deny his origins,

dress as a nobleman, in other words to reject his true existence in order to have a chance of success. In the process, he is going against Gregor's warning to Leon to be true to oneself.

In his early theoretical essays, Schiller saw the delight in "Zweckmäßigkeit" as the reason for our enjoyment of a criminal's schemes (XX,145). Rustan however is basically incompetent, he is not in any way cut out for a life of greatness and glory. Rustan's place is at the plough, with Mirza by his side. In the world beyond such limitations he is at a loss, indecisive, he is a coward once things go against him, he is not prepared to take risks. Rustan is the man who needs to accept his station in life, a view upheld by Goethe in a number of his epigrams and maxims, and exemplified in "Der Zauberlehrling", in the peaceful idyll of Hermann und Dorothea, and also, if on a slightly higher level, in Wilhelm Meister. Politzer suggests a political angle to the play - Rustan is the frustrated revolutionary in the age of enforced Biedermeier quietism - but the emphasis of the play is on the acceptance of one's own potential, not on a man of great potential hampered by unnatural limitations, of which there are none to be seen in the play. Rustan is wood trying to be a jewel (1200), not a jewel which circumstances prevent from shining.

In addition, and on a more positive note, Rustan has too many moral scruples to succeed in the way in which Ottokar, Jason and Mathias (or, to be more exact, Klesel) at least partly realise their ambitions. Rustan is troubled by his conscience, by a desire to keep to the right path, a refusal to take the rewards that others deserve. After symbolically killing his conscience by stabbing the man on the rock, he is still plagued by doubts, by the desire to return home to rediscover "des Innern Wert" (1502), and by a growing sense of guilt which is externalised in the dream in the King's misgivings, in the appearance of the old woman, and in the presence

of old Kaleb, whom Rustan cannot bring himself to dispose of. He becomes obsessed with this idea of guilt, until upon awakening, "die schuldbefreite Brust" is one of the attributes he most treasures. At the end he kneels in thanks for his fortunate escape, just as Ottokar and Mathias kneel in the final act in recognition of their own guilt.

Der Traum ein Leben may be a rejection of selfish striving, it is not a rejection of activity as such. Škreb recognises this fact, but still sees as dangerous all action concerned with "Heldisches, Krieg und Kampf, Macht und Herrschaft".<sup>(56)</sup> This exclusion of all political action is not justified even in Traum. The King has risen from humble origins and is the upright figure against which Rustan's increasing evil becomes apparent. Osmin, whom Rustan seeks to emulate, is a success at court. Rustan however is limited, indecisive, lacking in courage and determination. Contrary to the views of many critics, Traum rejects not deeds as a whole, despite the dervish's words, "Schatten Worte, Wünsche, Taten" (630), but exactly as in Ottokar, condemns evil deeds for personal gain. As the dervish's song itself continues, "das Gute, das du tust" (633) is to be praised as true. The words, wishes and deeds that are condemned are the empty or selfish ones. It is vital to note that the Rustan of the dream is incapable of good deeds. In the first instance he has to rely on the deeds of other people, when he finally does act himself, it is in an evil way. Zanga's taunt,

Weil dem mächtgen Willensriesen  
Fehlte Mut zur kühnen Tat (2438-9),

is quite justified, but in a general sense, not simply because he was not bold enough to burn the city, which is what Zanga is referring to. Rustan's demand to the King that his own deeds should count (1656) is hence deeply ironic, for this is precisely what does happen; his killing of the courtier and the King, his only independent actions, bring their just deserts.

In the early years there is mention of renunciation

("entsagen", "entbehren") in Grillparzer's work, as in Sappho: "Ich hab gelernt verlieren und entbehren" (113, 122).<sup>(57)</sup> But it is not a common concept in Grillparzer's work after 1820, and the famous poem "Entsagung" of 1836 is an exception in this respect. Equally in the early work we find the theme of withdrawal to a private existence, to what Sappho calls "häuslich stille Freuden" (96),<sup>(58)</sup> and Grillparzer himself felt that he needed periods of quiet withdrawal in order to achieve artistic concentration, as expressed in "Die tragische Muse", "Der Bann", and "Bescheidenes Los". Yet this is looked upon as occasionally essential rather than in any way desirable. The very idea of "Sammlung" is something unnatural (Tgb. 1413).<sup>(59)</sup> The Biedermeier age found contentedness in withdrawing from the world at large; Grillparzer does not represent Biedermeier even though in pessimistic moods he must have been attracted by the concept of blissful inactivity. The moral of Der Traum ein Leben is an ideal for Grillparzer only in such gloomy moods of resignation. In suggesting that Rustan is the poet's ideal, we overlook his obvious limitations. Rustan is not intended as an allegorical figure of man, as Goethe's Faust is; Rustan's realisation is valid for him alone. The play may be, as Baumann insists, "ein höchst österreichisches Menuett der Resignation", it is also, as W.E. Yates points out, a literary cliché,<sup>(60)</sup> which Grillparzer had intended to write in order to amuse himself (Tgb.1284). The concept of renunciation is usually a negative one in Grillparzer's language. Grillparzer himself could not find satisfaction in withdrawal, he sought life, activity, "das vor allem Erforderliche wäre wohl einen angeborenen Hang zur Untätigkeit zu besiegen" (Tgb.1434). Stagnation was a crime in his eyes (Tgb.1409), just as the idea of "Beharren" is anathema to Faust.

The stress on "Stille", "Ruhe" is excessive in the early works, to an extent that is not in keeping with the ideas of Classicism. Goethe praises quiet peace in his poems and plays of the early Weimar years whilst actively



working for the government, and Tasso is specifically advised to take a more active role in life. Classical quietism signifies a harmonious rejection of extremes, whether in life or in art. Only in the exceptional political situation of Die natürliche Tochter is there a suggestion of withdrawing from social reality, but there also, as in Hermann und Dorothea and Wilhelm Meister, there is praise of the limited bourgeois realm and of the full life which can be led within such accepted limits. Renunciation is a much more positive concept than when used by Grillparzer. But this is recognised by Grillparzer who on the one hand praises Goethe's insistence on limitation (Tgb.1147), but also stresses the obvious need for "Selbsterweiterung" in the first place (Tgb.613, 1189). Grillparzer underlines the vital importance of "Tätigkeit" in Wilhelm Meister (Tgb.1187), and insists that Goethe himself "trotz seiner Ruhe, immer höchst praktisch und tätig war" (Tgb.2165).

The excessive rejection of ambition and the emphasis on peaceful withdrawal is very much a product of Grillparzer's early years. Again it must be stressed how much Traum is a product of this early period, though even in Traum one may detect signs of its later completion and hence a less negative attitude to striving. With considerable justification, Mark Ward has recently underlined the way in which Zanga and the Dervish go off together at the end, playing the tune which accompanied Rustan's entry into the dreamworld of ambition. What Ward calls "this strange rehabilitation of the vital and active forces, for all their negative potential and consequences"<sup>(61)</sup> is no more than a mere hint in Traum, but it is an interpretation supported by the imbalance we have observed in the vocabulary of the first and subsequent acts.

The plays of Grillparzer's maturity present a much more complex picture of ambition and activity and no simple answer. None of them however condemns action in the terms employed in Traum and Vließ, none of them makes withdrawal an answer as in Traum or "Krösus". Ottokar shows the

dangers of the hero's selfish ambition, but Rudolf I succeeds in his ambition as emperor because he is completely altruistic, because he upholds general standards of humanity and justice, and it is not held against him that he was selfish and egocentric in his youth. The preparatory notes for the play make numerous references to his ideal qualities. He is "frugal und sparsam. In der Kleidung einfach wie Karl der Große. Im Essen, vorzüglich aber im Trinken mäßig", he possesses "die Begeisterung der Einfachheit", and especially "der Geist des ganzen wohnt in diesem Haupt". An 1821 draft refers to him as "du edler Mann, Du menschlich frommer Held" (I/18,157-60,105). As in Medea, the concept of simplicity is very much an ideal, but it is important that in Ottokar this in no way precludes positive action. Activity can be combined with the maintaining of humanity, to rephrase Goethe, the man of action does not have to be "gewissenlos". Perhaps however Rudolf is too idealistically conceived, deliberately so as an answer to what Grillparzer may have seen as the excessive pessimism of Vließ, and it is not entirely satisfactory as a solution for this reason. In any case, Rudolf's policies, although aimed at creating a new and better society, are still very much involved with ideals of peace and quiet.

Ein treuer Diener seines Herrn reveals a more realistic and consequently problematic treatment of similar themes. If Rudolf I is supremely capable of carrying out his role as emperor, Banchan is too much a bureaucrat, "ein ziemlich bornierter alter Mann" (IV,153), to be able to control the situation fully. Although he has been put in charge, he does not possess the qualities to take command, and merely makes the best of a bad job in the king's absence. He becomes obsessed with his duties, with the preservation of peace at all costs, he neglects his own rights as a human being in the process. He is an example of what Grillparzer meant in his diary note of 1822: "die meisten Laster sind eigentlich nur der Exzeß guter Eigenschaften" (Tgb.1202). Nevertheless his two decisive

acts prevent a confrontation of the two sides until the king can return to restore peace.

A more extreme situation is encountered in Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg. Rudolf II sees peace endangered by the rebellious tendencies surrounding him, but he is so concerned with his ideal of order that he will not act decisively to maintain the admittedly imperfect political order of the empire. In the character of Rudolf II, but also in the whole spectrum of events in Bruderzwist, Grillparzer comes nearest to demonstrating the impossibility of action. In an early note, Grillparzer wrote of Rudolf's "ahnungsvolle Unschlüssigkeit" (I/21,106), Gerhart Baumann writes of the emperor's "Ohnmacht aus Einsicht".<sup>(62)</sup> Rudolf foresees the approaching catastrophe and believes that any action will merely precipitate the chaos:

Zudem gibts Lagen, wo ein Schritt voraus  
Und einer rückwärts gleicherweis verderblich. (1175-6)

Dazu noch das Bewußtsein, daß im Handeln,  
Ob so nun oder so, der Zündstoff liegt,  
Der diese Mine donnernd sprengt gen Himmel. (1448-50)

Gemartert vom Gedanken drohnder Zukunft,  
Dacht ich die Zeit von gleicher Furcht bewegt,  
Im weisen Zögern sehnd die einzige Rettung. (2299-2301)

In 1827 and 1828 Grillparzer made a number of notes on this theme of the play (HKA I/21,145-8), according to one of which, "seine Untätigkeit wäre das Glück, die Tätigkeit der übrigen zerstörte alles". Certainly the selfish, bigotted or simply blind actions of Ferdinand, Klesel and Mathias bring matters to the brink of disaster,<sup>(63)</sup> and even the well meant action of Leopold is an additional spark which Rudolf fears will detonate the highly explosive situation. Julius, the one really positive and noble figure in the play, is the one character who is never seen in action. Rudolf's own actions, his signing of the "Majestätsbrief", his agreement to Leopold's invasion, do prove disastrous as he dreads, and his judgement of his son is of a very dubious nature indeed.

Rudolf sees himself as the central focus of unity and goodness in the state (1163-70,1421-2,2483-4),

according to Dolf Sternberger the emperor's task is not to act, but to be.<sup>(64)</sup> This however suggests an absolute view of the ruler as a god, rather than a human being, which was not Grillparzer's opinion, as I have sought to show elsewhere.<sup>(65)</sup> Rudolf, like Bancbanus, is the man not cut out to rule, he is the private individual interested in art and literature. If Bancbanus is "borniert", then Rudolf is "blöd, langsam, verschlossen" (HKA I/21,107). As Reich believes, he is unsuitable for the job and causes his own downfall; according to Claude David, Rudolf's power is non-existent, he can no longer hold things together.<sup>(66)</sup> Like Bancbanus, Rudolf is aware of his own limitations. He twice tells Ferdinand, "ich bin ein schwacher, unbegabter Mann" (351,421), he recognises his own inherent inability to act, a failing which he shares with his brother;

Wir beide haben  
Von unserm Vater Tatkraft nicht geerbt,  
- Allein ich weiß es, und er weiß es nicht. (446-8)

His insight into his inability is a characteristic which guarantees some degree of sympathy for his impossible situation, but it cannot excuse him. Not only the bigoted Ferdinand (347-8), also the noble Julius wishes he could act more forcefully (2191-3). He does not rule and is incapable of doing so, he withdraws from the political arena and is thought to be dead. His inactivity is ultimately action, for it forces others to act on his behalf but without the benefit of experience or of Rudolf's moral scruples. In the notes he made for the play in the 1820s, Grillparzer seems to approve of Rudolf's inactivity, but in view of the development of Grillparzer's ideas it is dangerous to place excessive emphasis on these early notes; in an epigram of 1846, Grillparzer suggested that doing nothing might be just as culpable as taking action ("Galizische Sicherheitsmaßregeln" (I,474)). Rudolf II is weak-willed, lacks confidence, he is in short no politician, with all the negative and positive connotations that the term suggests. In the circumstances a stronger man is needed, positive action must be a better

solution to the situation than Rudolf's timorous hesitation.

In Bruderzwist nevertheless, Grillparzer gives no indication as to what form this action should take. The character of Rudolf seems to be the negative proof of Libussa's famous reply to her sisters:

TETKA. Wer handelt, geht oft fehl.

LIBUSSA.

Auch wer betrachtet!  
(440)

But Libussa as a whole suggests a more positive side to this realisation. If mistakes are a necessary part of human life, as Goethe and Grillparzer both realised, then one might as well act and face the consequences rather than stagnate and face similar results as Rudolf II does. Libussa is fully justified in leaving her isolated realm of contemplation for the world of action, just as Grillparzer set off for France and England in 1836 to accustom himself to activity (Tgb.3042,3099), for as Grillparzer wrote in his diary during a period of work on Libussa, "der Mensch ist einmal nicht da um rein zu sein, sondern zu nützen, zu wirken" (Tgb.1935). Similarly in 1828 he had written of a certain feeling, "daß es Pflicht jedes Menschen sei nach Kräften tätig zu sein" (Tgb.1627).<sup>(67)</sup> Libussa wishes to honour her father through deeds (389), an early note describes her as "zum Wirken geneigt" (I/20,372), and to the end her great desire is to be useful (2274). Her activity is of an altruistic nature such as Rudolf I's, whether as ruler or as consort she devotes her life to her country to help it prosper, and her work should be seen in a positive light. It is not in any way invalidated by her death, which is a result of Primislaus' lack of insight into the extent to which she has changed, nor is it invalidated by her difficulty in realising her ideals in action. She has, it must be admitted, a considerable affinity with Rudolf II, she is more of an idealist, a seer, than a practical woman of action, but she comes to subsume her considerable desire for action within her love for Primislaus. He is very much the man of striving and ambition (2059-61, 2069-70,2191-2), and he is most certainly not to be

considered a completely negative character. If his excessive desire for activity, his Faustian rejection of "Genügsamkeit" (2058-9) threatens the ideal nature of society, then Libussa is still able to see a time when her ideal influence will be more fully integrated into the practical world of politics. The sisters meanwhile continue their stagnant life isolated from all ordinary human reality.

It is above all the comedy Weh dem, der lügt! which provides Grillparzer's most optimistic statement on the need for action and the possibility of success. Leon accomplishes his task because he is selfless and is acting to help others. He has entered the bishop's service for noble reasons because Gregor seemed to embody higher ideals:

Das Haupt gebeugt von Alterslast,  
Und doch gehoben von - ich weiß nicht was,  
Doch von was Edlem, Hohem muß es sein. (46-8)

Hence Leon feels that the apparent stain on Gregor's character which his hoarding of money suggests, involves a degradation of humanity in general. Because of his glorified image of Gregor as well as his general friendliness and altruism, Leon goes off to facilitate the escape of Atalus. Apart from his love of adventure he has no selfish motives for undertaking the far from easy task. Leon is prepared at the very beginning to kneel, to make the gesture of humility which Rustan, Ottokar and Mathias reach only in the final act. In this way he is completely different from those Grillparzerian characters who set out to prove themselves and achieve personal glory. Like Faust, Leon makes mistakes. He is too self-reliant and self-confident, too naively sure of success. He does not fully realise the meaning of the Bishop's command, but in the context of the play as a whole, and in view of Grillparzer's mistrust of absolute ideals, it is one cause of his success that he does not entirely follow the letter of Gregor's imperative. By the time he grasps its full impact, as opposed to avoiding the difficulties involved, his operation is fully in motion, and some useful

coincidences help him during his growing moral concern. He realises that he has been involved in lies and deception, but at the end he challenges God to agree that he, Leon, has behaved correctly and in good faith. This is the important aspect of Leon's activity, for if he has never been in danger of committing the crime of Rustan, Jason, Ottokar, namely action for selfish motives, then he has been dangerously close to the fault of Rudolf II, not acting because of excessive moral scruples or through devotion to absolute ideals of the kind which the comedy, which Jüdin, Libussa, Bruderzwist all seriously challenge. It is in the nature of the comedy that Leon is able to steer a middle course between the two extremes, and it is only after making considerable use of deception that he realises that the end does not justify the means, an insight which Rustan never acquires in his dream, and which Ottokar does not obtain until it is too late. Leon is nevertheless the successful man of action, unlike Gregor who is the man of contemplation and consequently impractical in real life when the need is for action to rescue his nephew. As Škreb has recently insisted, "es ist die sinnvolle menschliche Tätigkeit, die im Lustspiel den Sieg davonträgt", something that Grillparzer always praised. (68)

In the early works, fame and glory seem if not intrinsically evil, then inherently dangerous. But Libussa approves of the "Ruhmesbahn" (433), Primislaus built his city for "des Landes Glück und Ruhm" (2101), the fame of Alphons is praised (Jüdin, 146), Esther foresees "die Zeit zur Größe" (413). Even in 1821, Napoleon, despite his destruction of peace, had been praised for demonstrating that "Ganzheit, Hoheit, Größe" were still possible (I, 145), and the poem "Campo Vaccino" recommends Titus's monuments in a way which seems to typify Grillparzer's attitude to the question:

Titus, nicht dem Ruhm, dem Frieden  
Bauest du dein Heiligtum;  
Doch dir ward, was du vermieden,  
Jeder Stein spricht deinen Ruhm. (I, 115)

The problems of striving and activity are not forgotten in the later works, one could even say that they are increased precisely because the earlier possibility of peaceful withdrawal is rejected. But similar problems are found in the treatment of activity in Classicism.<sup>(69)</sup> Only in the idyllic world of Wilhelm Tell are the dangers of political activity overcome, only in the allegorical realm of Faust are the problems of striving minimised. Goethe himself was aware of the dangers inherent in action, and Faust is extreme in the extent to which these dangers are glossed over. Oplatka justifiably suggests that Grillparzer's plays reveal the wisdom of Goethe's Wilhelm Meister: "Der Sinn erweitert, aber lähmt, die Tat belebt aber beschränkt".<sup>(70)</sup> In any case, with the exception of Der Traum ein Leben, the ideals of peace and withdrawal had not proved adequate answers to the complex and often pessimistic picture of life and its problems. After Das goldene Vließ and Der Traum ein Leben, Grillparzer faces up to all these problems in a variety of ways, he does not turn his back on activity or reject it out of hand. Most certainly, Grillparzer underlines the curse of evil or selfish deeds, but not the curse of activity as a whole. Returning to Goethe's aphoristic distinction between thought and activity, it is important for Grillparzer that "die Tat belebt" (my italics). The insistence on life even in the context of a mission that demands renunciation is a vital aspect of the later plays which must be considered in subsequent chapters.

vi) Grillparzer's vocabulary, 1816-1821

It remains to make a few concluding remarks on the vocabulary of this period, which in many respects finds Grillparzer returning to the common use of Classical terms in which he had indulged prior to 1810. The plays especially are rich in the key terms of Classical vocabulary: "frei", "Herz", "Natur", "Mensch", "Recht", "schön", "rein", "Tat", "Treue", "wahr", "streben", as well as the quietist vocabulary which I have specifically



considered. A number of these re-appear after being uncommon in the period 1810-16 - words such as "Recht", "sanft", "still", "rein". This period also reveals a partial return to the more poetic, if not specifically Classical vocabulary of Goethe and Schiller which we perceived in the first period of juvenilia but which disappeared almost entirely from 1811 or 1812 onwards; "Glut/glühen", "heiter", "hold", "süß", "wallen", "wehen", "wild" - all these are common in the drama and the poetry of these years. The use of these terms is highlighted in Der Traum ein Leben, the first act of which makes more use of Classical vocabulary than does the rest of the play, written in the late 1820s and early 1830s, especially in the case of the quietist vocabulary I have referred to.

Nevertheless, within the period 1816-21 one may detect greater discrimination in the use of many of these terms; the third part of the trilogy, which takes place on Classical Greek soil, is much richer in this respect than are the first two parts. Even here it is talk of Kreusa that produces the greatest density of Classical terms. We find in this period, in Sappho in particular, a return to a more epigrammatic Classical style, which Grillparzer had avoided from 1811 onwards. In Sappho the use of Classical vocabulary is particularly noticeable in certain key scenes: Sappho's discussion of her past fate and her ideals (I,3;I,5), her contrast of man and woman (III,1), the conversation of Phaon and Melitta (II,4) and Phaon's awakening after his dream of Melitta (III,1), Sappho's own description of Melitta (II,6). There is a certain decline in the use of such terms in the last two acts, despite the superficially Classical ending. Nevertheless, both Sappho and Medea show a greater density of Classical vocabulary than Ahnfrau, and this may be one sign of Schreyvogel's influence.

In a recent article, W.E. Yates has said of Schreyvogel: "it seems certain that he must have helped to form, or at least to strengthen, some of the most central of

Grillparzer's ideas". (71) The key words of Schreyvogel's diaries, and no doubt also of his conversations with Grillparzer, are "Vernunft", "Pflicht", "Ordnung", "Tugend", "Mäßigung", "Ruhe", "Reinheit", "Klarheit", "Moralität", "der Mensch", and there is considerable discussion on the themes of self-knowledge and self-control. Schreyvogel tells himself:

Ordnung und Mäßigung sind die zwei ersten, unentbehrlichsten Tugenden, nach denen ich streben muß ...  
 Erkenne dich selbst! - Das ist der Anfang aller  
 Weisheit und Tugend ... Der Vernunft, der Pflicht  
 und Tugend gehört alle Kraft des Menschen ...  
 Mäßigung - das ist die große Regel des Menschenlebens. (72)

The most common themes are the first five listed above. Of these, "Ordnung" and "Tugend" are scarcely found in Grillparzer's work of these years, "Vernunft" is still rare. One may cite two diary notes (Tgb.221,871) as references to reason as an ideal, but Grillparzer attacks Hebenstreit's attempt to improve man's taste through "gereinigte, vernunftgemäße Prinzipien" (III,64). "Pflicht" enjoys a revival in Ahnfrau, but is uncommon elsewhere. "Mäßigung" is used more than before without in any way acquiring the importance it has for Schreyvogel, the same is also true of "Selbstbegrenzung" or a similar term, and the theme of "sich kennen" is now to be found in Grillparzer's work. (73) "Ruhe", "rein", and "Mensch" are frequently used in the period under consideration, "rein" more so than in previous years. In 1822 Grillparzer wrote of Goethe's works spreading "Ruhe und Klarheit" (Tgb.1147), which is a phrase Schreyvogel also applied to Goethe (Schr. Tgb.I,142), so that there may be some influence involved in Grillparzer's use of "klar" as a positive term in Vließ:

Klar muß es sein um Medea, klar! (Argonauten,1010)

Klar sei der Mensch und einig mit der Welt. (Medea,120) (74)

It is also worth examining the passages Grillparzer changed or added in Ahnfrau after Schreyvogel had made his comments on the play. These include some important references to basic humanity:

Nicht doch! Wollt ihr Menschen richten,  
 Geht als Mensch ans blutige Werk! (1270-1)

Ich mag Menschenleben schonen,  
Weiß zu schätzen Menschenwert. (1344-5) (75)

In general one finds in these additions a greater use of such terms as "Pflicht", "Recht", "rein", "edel", and considerable stress is also laid on sin, and on guilt and innocence. (76) The instances of "Recht", "Pflicht", "edel" in the additional passages constitute almost the only use of these terms in the whole play, and here one may well assume that Schreyvogel asserted a considerable influence on the actual phrasing of these additions. "Recht" and "edel" are not such obvious leitmotifs in Schreyvogel's diaries as the other terms listed, but they are used on a number of important occasions, (77) and the fact that these two words hardly occur in Grillparzer's work between 1811 and 1816, nor in the first version of Ahnfrau, suggests clearly that they can be included in the context of Schreyvogel's influence.

Unfortunately, this thesis cannot do full justice to this influence, which undoubtedly was great in the aesthetic sphere. In the vocabulary, one cannot detect any totally obvious influence. One may indicate the use of certain terms in Ahnfrau, the return to the use of "rein" and "Recht", the first discussion of moderation and limitation, and Schreyvogel can be considered to be generally responsible for the renewed adoption of Classical terms previously common in the period before 1810. But significantly there is no major consideration of duty, virtue, morality and reason in the works of the period. W.E. Yates points to Schreyvogel's "recurrent concern for the moral effect ... of all literature" as an approach more limited than Grillparzer's own, and this fact is underlined precisely by Grillparzer's refusal to take up the vocabulary of duty and morality at this stage. As I have already insisted in the introduction, Seidler recognises Grillparzer's interest in art rather than morality, admits that "das unterscheidet ihn von der üblichen Aufklärung", but fails to see the way in which this distinction marks Grillparzer as a man influenced by the Classical era,

rather than by the age of Enlightenment. (78). Grillparzer disliked strict Kantian rigorism, and when he does devote more attention to such themes in later plays, they are seen in a far more ambivalent light than in Schreyvogel's one-sided dogmatic presentation. In Ahnfrau one may detect the influence of Schreyvogel's own particular brand of Classicism, elsewhere it is more correct to see him as a catalyst in Grillparzer's more individual adoption of Classical ideals and concepts.

The more specific use of the various key words has either been discussed in this chapter or will be reserved for later discussion. One may however point out that, despite the apparently more careful use of these terms noted above, it is predominantly the volume of the vocabulary that stands out. The terms listed occur with obvious frequency and all the terms taken together constitute a clear indication of the influence of Goethe and Schiller. But the use of these terms is still not consistently Classical, "schön" and "wahr" for instance have their most obvious meanings in the great majority of cases. Das goldene Vließ in particular uses "frei", "Herz", "Mensch" in a way that challenges Classical nuances. In general one may say that the gloomy settings in which much of this vocabulary is used are in stark contrast to the optimistic connotations which these terms had in the works of Goethe and Schiller. That is true even of "still" and "ruhig", in so far as these ideals do not prove adequate as answers to the despair and chaos depicted. Especially in writing Sappho, Grillparzer had intended "eine Ruhe walten zu lassen" (IV, 741), but Sappho's "erworbene Ruhe" fails in a crisis and is regained only at the expense of her life. In Winckelmann's terms, peace and simplicity might well hide turmoil under the surface, but it is doubtful whether any of Grillparzer's plays are "simple", and even in Sappho the turmoil breaks through the surface rather more often than in the statuesque atmosphere of Iphigenie and Tasso. In many ways, the striving for Classicism in this period is

superficial, it affects the outer framework and the vocabulary, as well as the motifs and situations adopted, but it has less influence on the ethos and essence of the plays.

It is therefore worth underlining the few indications of genuine Classical ideas: the description of Kreusa as "schön an Leib und Seele" (Medea, 674), the contrast of Greek and Barbarian in terms of "Mensch" and "Tier" as adopted more fully in Weh dem, the claiming by Jaromir of "der heitre Name: Mensch" (Ahnfrau, 871), together with further references to humanity in that play. In the poem "Vater Unser", Grillparzer wishes:

Wenn der Mensch den Menschen säh im Freunde,  
Und auch in seinem Feinde nur den Menschen. (I, 148)

In a diary note of 1820/1, Grillparzer writes of man's "Streben nach dem Wahren, nach dem Guten, nach dem Schönen" (Tgb. 871). Also it must be remembered that the diary notes, especially those dealing with aesthetics, make regular reference to art as a realm of basic humanity, of eternal truth and beauty:

Religiöse Entzückungen unterscheiden sich dadurch von poetischen, daß erstere nur einer innern Wahrheit bedürfen (gleichviel sei sie nun objektiv oder subjektiv), letztere aber nebst der formalen innern noch auch eine äußere Wahrheit brauchen, d.h. daß sie sich auf das allgemeine Menschengefühl stützen, mit dem wirklichen oder möglich geglaubten Gang der Natur zusammentreffen müssen. (Tgb. 717)

... der Mensch bleibt Mensch "im Filzhut und im Jamerlonk" und was einmal wahr gewesen muß es ewig sein und bleiben. (Tgb. 639) (79)

Grillparzer insists at this stage that drama must deal with "der Mensch mit seinem Tun und Treiben" (III, 311), his trilogy will show "von wo der Mensch beginnt, womit er endet" (I, 137). Ideas of humanity may be seriously endangered in the gloom of these years, but one cannot agree with Dyck that Sappho - or even the period as a whole - rejects the Goethean notion of "Humanität", (80) certainly not if one sees "Humanität" in the full Classical sense rather than in the artificially limited context presented by Dyck. As we shall see, the concept of humanity is developed more fully in later works.

NOTES

1. Gerhart Baumann suggests rather grudgingly (Franz Grillparzer, Dichtung und österreichische Geistesverfassung, Frankfurt/Main, 1966, p.133) that all Grillparzer's plays could be seen as variations on Classical themes, but prefers to link Ahnfrau with Die Räuber, as does Wolfgang Paulsen (Die Ahnfrau, Zu Grillparzers früher Dramatik, Tübingen, 1962). Die Räuber is not however a Classical play, and Grillparzer's play is far removed from Karl Moor's fiery battle for freedom, and from the social context of Schiller's first play. As Paulsen himself points out, there is no Franz Moor, no consideration of absolute evil in Ahnfrau, and no clash of hostile brothers. The vital theme of Ahnfrau is fate and the sins and downfall of the family. Nevertheless, the obvious links between the two plays cannot be denied, and there is certainly no justification for Ernst Alker's assertion that Ahnfrau marks the rejection of all imitation of Schiller (Franz Grillparzer. Ein Kampf um Leben und Kunst, Marburg, 1930, p.149).
2. Joachim Kaiser, Grillparzers dramatischer Stil, Munich, 1961, p.79; Jost Hermand, Die literarische Formenwelt des Biedermeiers, Giessen, 1958, p.181; Ruth K. Angress, "Das Gespenst in Grillparzers Ahnfrau", German Quarterly, XLV (1972), 606-19, p.609; Ulrich Fülleborn, Das dramatische Geschehen im Werk Franz Grillparzers, Munich, 1966, p.93; Naumann, Franz Grillparzer, pp.134, 67-8.
3. See also Ahnfrau, 1360, Braut, 2839, as considered below. Jaromir's monologue to close Act I (742-8) and Borotin's final speech (2571-6) both have echoes of the chorus in Braut IV, 4 (2421-8). Further links, some less obvious, are noted by Sauer (HKA I/1).
4. See above, pp.81-2.
5. Emil Reich, Grillparzers dramatisches Werk, Vienna, 1938, p.39.
6. Zdenko Škreb, "Grillparzer-Studien", in Festschrift Julius Franz Schütz, Graz, Cologne, 1954, pp.127-35; Angress, op.cit., p.606; Bernd Breitenbruch, Ethik und Ethos bei Grillparzer, Berlin, 1965, pp.70-1.
7. Politzer, p.83.
8. J.W.Dyck, "Goethes Humanitätsidee und Grillparzers Sappho", GrJb (3. Folge), IV (1965), 65-79, p.75.
9. Herbert Seidler ("Das sprachliche Bild in Goethes Iphigenie und Grillparzers Sappho", in Seidler, Studien, pp.19-46) has used a comparison of the images in the two plays to show that the characters in Sappho are much closer to real life - in Sappho the images are much more differentiated, more disturbed - although both plays tend (in Sappho, especially at the end) to make "allgemeingültig" statements.
10. Dyck, p.75.

11. Tgb.3242, quoted by Dyck, p.75.
12. H.A.Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, II.Teil, Darmstadt, 1974, p.286ff.
13. Werner Vordtriede, "Grillparzers Beitrag zum poetischen Nihilismus", Trivium, IX (1951), 103-20. I cannot agree with Vordtriede's view of Sappho as a forerunner of solipsistic aestheticism. Sappho's desire is not to live in an aesthetic world of her own creation, but on the contrary to integrate herself into life. She sees the "Bürger" as the symbol of ordinary life, as is the case in Wilhelm Meister.
14. Dyck, p.75; Naumann, Franz Grillparzer, pp.69-70.
15. George A. Wells, The Plays of Grillparzer, London, 1969, p.38.
16. Adolf D. Klarmann, "Psychological Motivation in Grillparzer's Sappho", Monatshefte, XL (1948), 271-8, p.274.
17. W.E.Yates, Grillparzer, p.63.
18. Michael Ossar, "Die Künstlergestalt in Goethes Tasso und Grillparzers Sappho", German Quarterly, XLV (1972), 645-61.
19. Vordtriede, p.105.
20. Wells, p.45.
21. W.E.Yates, Grillparzer, pp.72-3.
22. Douglas Yates, Franz Grillparzer. A critical biography. Oxford, 1964, p.54; Schafroth, p.31.
23. H.A. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, II. Teil, p.175.
24. Douglas Yates, p.52.
25. According to Herbert Seidler, the endings of Grillparzer's plays are open, in contrast to Classical plays, and yet Ahnfrau, Ottokar, Traum, DMudLW, as well as Sappho, do not really fit this scheme. A more crucial point is that only Sappho and Ottokar have violent endings of the type found in Schiller's plays. Perhaps not surprisingly, Robert Pichl arrives at conclusions similar to those of his mentor, Seidler. (Pichl, Dualismus und Ambivalenz, Die Dramenschlüsse Schillers und Grillparzers als Indizien individueller Vorgangsgestaltung, Vienna, 1972). The contrast made is between Schiller's "linearer Finalduktus" and Grillparzer's "Rahmung" (p.168); Schiller's plays show linear progression towards the catastrophe which finally demonstrates the thesis apparent from the beginning, Grillparzer's plays, despite the closed formal structure of the framework, are more open in that they show the ambivalence, the problematic nature of the ideas presented at the beginning. Pichl concludes "daß die Rahmentchnik ein dem klassischen Dramentypus und Schiller völlig wesensfremdes Strukturprinzip sein muß und mit einer ganz anderen Weltsicht und anderen Gestaltungsintentionen verbunden ist. Besonders steht sie in Widerspruch zum klassischen Bild des autonomen Menschen und zu jeder transzendierenden Konstruktion" (p.173). Whilst there can be no doubt of the differences in dramatic technique, the extension of these differences

to suggest philosophical and metaphysical contrasts is dangerous in the extreme, and it is a danger to which Seidler and his pupils continually succumb. Pichl quite correctly states that "das Welt- und Menschenbild der Klassik (wird) gleichsam einer empirischen Prüfung unterzogen" (p.177) - this is especially true of Grillparzer's later plays - but this does not mean that the Classical ideas are rejected. In any case, different dramatic technique cannot possibly prove differing "Weltanschauungen"; if that were so, Faust, which has both a framework and an open ending, would be a totally un-Classical work according to Seidler's and Pichl's definitions. Furthermore, Pichl systematises the endings of Grillparzer's plays to such an extent that the untypical ending of Sappho is not considered as such, and there is no attempt to examine the obviously Schillerian ending to a play which has a greater degree of complexity than is typical of Grillparzer. This omission by Pichl is somewhat surprising in a book supposedly devoted to comparing the endings of Schiller's and Grillparzer's plays.

26. W.E.Yates, Grillparzer, p.73.
27. H.H.Lesch, "Der tragische Gehalt in Grillparzers Drama Das goldene Vließ", GrJb, XXIV (1913), 1-54, pp.43,53; Rudolf Stiefel, Grillparzers "goldenes Vließ". Ein dichterisches Bekenntnis, Einsiedeln, 1959, Ilse Münch, Die Tragik in Drama und Persönlichkeit Grillparzers, Berlin, 1931, pp.33-4.
28. Konrad Schaum, "Gesetz und Verwandlung in Grillparzers Goldenem Vließ", Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, XXXVIII (1964), 388-423 (henceforth referred to as: Schaum, "Goldenes Vließ").
29. Konrad Schaum, "Grillparzers Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen: Seelendrama und Kulturkritik", GrJb, XI (1974), 95-114, p.110 (henceforth referred to as: Schaum, "DMudLW").
30. Zdenko Škreb, Grillparzer, p.133.
31. See Medea, 86,271,320,860,1399,1474,1479.
32. Lesch, p.38.
33. Schaum, "Goldenes Vließ", p.415; Fülleborn, p.87.
34. See also Gastfreund, 199 and Iphigenie, 151, Argonauten, 839 and Iphigenie, 913.
35. See Argonauten, 131-2, 495, 1039-40, Medea, 654, 757-8.
36. Politzer, p.127.
37. Schaum, "Goldenes Vließ", p.423.
38. Škreb, Grillparzer, p.199.
39. Erich Hock, "Grillparzers Drama Der Traum ein Leben", Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde, LIV (1940), 49-65, p.52.
40. Traum, 48, 56, 87, 125, 141.
41. Ahnfrau, 2841, 3259 ("der Seele Frieden"; cf. also Blanka, 740, 884), 112, 497, 798, 898, 1958, 3066 ("Ruhe"); 861, 1002 ("Frieden"). The idea of peace in a personal sense is a theme of the poems "Des Kindes Scheiden", "Der Genesene", "Incubus". For a discussion of the political connotations of peace, see the next chapter.



42. Sappho, 340, 761, 981, 1143.
43. Bruderzwist, 1177, 1514, 1555, 1690, 413, 2246, 2358, 2373.
44. Bruderzwist, 213, 219, 2877, 2900.
45. See also DMudLW, 312, 325, 893, 923, 941, 1494, 1527.
46. H.G. Adler, "Franz Grillparzer: Ein Dichter gegen seine Zeit", Hochland, LIX (1966-7), 261-79, p. 275.
47. Melusina, 53, 285, 530, 794.
48. F.O. Nolte, Grillparzer, Goethe and Lessing in the Perspective of European Literature, Lancaster, Pa., 1938, pp. 50, 64.
49. Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, pp. 203-4, 209, Münch, p. 65; Richard Alewyn, "Grillparzer und die Restauration", Publications of the English Goethe-Society (New Series), XII (1937), 1-18, p. 13; Emil Staiger, "Grillparzer: König Ottokars Glück und Ende", in Interpretationen (Band II). Deutsche Dramen von Gryphius bis Brecht, hrsg. von Jost Schillemeit, Fischer-Bücherei, 1965, 223-39, p. 228; Robert Mühlher, "Grillparzer und der deutsche Idealismus", Wissenschaft und Weltbild, I (1948), 62-75, p. 64.
50. See also "Irene", 154, "Die Pazzi" (II, 982), Medea, 774, "Der Gegenwart" (I, 285).
51. See Bruderzwist, 2502, 2525, 2532, "Philosophische Gedichte" (I, 590).
52. See also Argonauten, 733, Medea, 437, and the description of Marius (II, 1161, 1166).
53. For similar positive contexts, see Sappho, 55, "Vorrede zum Vließ" (I, 970), "Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen", 33, "Waldfräulein von Zedlitz" (III, 694), "In eure Mitte" (I, 276), Tgb. 3196, 4018, 4025, 4292.
54. See below pp. 208-13.
55. See also Blanka, 960-1, Sappho, 398-9, 954, 1144-5, Medea, 1522, 2364-6, Traum, 323, 2653-4, Ottokar, 596-7, 683, 2898; also "Robert" (II, 856), "Drahomira" (II, 1111), "Die Pazzi" (II, 990), "Rechtfertigung", 35-6, "Bescheidenes Los" (I, 95).
56. Skreb, Grillparzer, p. 201.
57. See also "Robert" (II, 850), Blanka, 964, 1180, "Der Bann", 23-4, 43, Melusina, 779-80.
58. See Medea (HKA I/17, 302), Traum, 133, "Faust" (II, 995), "Krösus" (II, 1071).
59. See below pp. 263-8.
60. Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, p. 258; W.E. Yates, Grillparzer: "Der Traum ein Leben", Cambridge, 1968, p. 33.
61. Mark G. Ward, "A Note on the Figures of Zanga and the Dervish in Grillparzer's Der Traum ein Leben", in Essays on Grillparzer, edited by Bruce Thompson and Mark Ward, Hull, 1978, 47-58, p. 52.
62. Gerhart Baumann, Zu Franz Grillparzer. Versuche zur Erkenntnis, Heidelberg, 1969, p. 64 (henceforth referred to as: Baumann, Versuche).
63. See Bruderzwist, 444, 460, 922, 2476 (Mathias), 482, 1018, 2278, 2595 (Ferdinand).
64. Dolf Sternberger, "Politische Figuren und Maximen Grillparzers", Merkur, XVII (1963), 1142-53, p. 1149.

65. See below p.199.
66. Reich, p.284; Claude David, "Grillparzer: Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg", Literatur und Kritik, LXX (1972), 17-34, p.30.
67. For similar sentiments, see also "Nachruf an Zacharias Werner", "Rechtfertigung", Tgb.1434,1654, and also, in the youthful works, "Alfred",182, "Das Jahrhundert der Kreuzzüge" (III,949). In Melusina, the human realm is seen as one of activity (439-40,813,831,848), art is a timeless realm of fruition.
68. Škreb, Grillparzer, p.209.
69. See Chapter 1, p.29.
70. Andreas Oplatka, Aufbauform und Stilwandel in den Dramen Grillparzers, Berne, 1970, p.40.
71. W.E.Yates, "Josef Schreyvogel ...", p.108.
72. Schreyvogels Tagebücher, I,3,38,174, II,64. The themes listed occur repeatedly throughout the diaries, see especially I,11,48,71,81,101,122,164, II,69,152.
73. For the concept of moderation, see Medea,446,1748, Tgb. 759,760, "Werbung" (I,92); for self-control, see "Faust" (II,995), "Der Bann", Tgb.295,613; "sich kennen", see Sappho,1784, Tgb.877, "Über das Wesen des Drama" (III,303).
74. See also Argonauten,459,1037,1344, Medea,680.
75. See also II.1448,1787-90,2558-9.
76. "Pflicht" (1350,1459,1489); "Recht" (174,707,1253,1256); "rein" (746,1291-2,1627); "edel" (201-2,272-3,706,720).
77. Schr.Tgb.I,101,109, II,21,125.
78. W.E.Yates, "Josef Schreyvogel ...", p.94; Herbert Seidler, "Grillparzers Bild von der deutschen Literatur der Goethezeit", GFF, 1973, 63-84, p.78.
79. See also Tgb.221,581,591,881.
80. Dyck, p.75; see above pp.123-4.

## Chapter 5. Early political views

In König Ottokars Glück und Ende nun aber befreit sich Grillparzer aus dem Bann der klassischen Poesie und schafft ein Werk, das nur würdigen kann, wer es nicht von Weimar aus beurteilt.

This is one of Staiger's opening comments in his discussion of Grillparzer's first major historical and political drama.<sup>(1)</sup> Staiger, as so many critics have done, stresses the weight of Austrian traditions in the play, points to the great use of pomp and pageantry, of stage props and vivid action. He detects a dreamlike quality in some of the scenes, "ein leiser Hauch von Zauberspielen", and hence an echo of Der Traum ein Leben, work on which had been dormant for some time. Politzer also has underlined the Austrian nature of the portrait of Rudolf I, "halb Kaiser Franz und halb Heiliger Florian", was how the actor Heurteur intended portraying Rudolf.<sup>(2)</sup> Clearly the patriotic Austrian background is an important ingredient, if only because the suggestion of permanence which the Habsburgs imbue into the play would be unattainable in any other German context. However, the dangers inherent in linking Rudolf I with Franz I are apparent, and can only lead to the unbalanced picture of Grillparzer as a reactionary traditionalist, a picture upheld by both Staiger and Naumann, but which Harald Steinhagen has successfully questioned in a more recent article.<sup>(3)</sup> Above all, too great a stress on the Austrian links in the play inevitably produces the interpretation of Ottokar as a trivial historical pageant aimed at entertainment and empty patriotism, such as were produced for official occasions, and which Grillparzer refused to write even when formally asked to do so, as for example in 1825.

Ottokar is not such a play, and it is not insignificant that the censors had been uneasy at the prospect of its being performed. Personal intrigues may have been partly to blame, but they no doubt had a fine sense of what constituted a dangerous play. Don Carlos and Wilhelm Tell were banned for a long time, the former could only be

produced after the more revolutionary ideas such as "Gedankenfreiheit" had been eradicated by Schreyvogel. In many ways, the message of Ottokar is similar to that of Schiller's two plays, whilst in construction and general situation, parallels can also be drawn with Wallenstein. It is these links which must concern us rather than the problem of whether the play is radical or reactionary, ultimately however the two questions are closely interwoven.

Neither Goethe nor Schiller paid particular attention to political questions as such, where these intrude, it is usually more from generally human considerations than in terms of a precise discussion of the state and its affairs. In both Egmont and Iphigenie, the state is pushed into the background in order to cast more light on the main characters as individuals. Egmont is concerned with his personal freedom and only secondly with the fate of his compatriots, so that no convincing political answer is given to Alba's strategy. Iphigenie carries through her ideals of truth and trust to the exclusion of Thoas's pressing political troubles, which are conveniently forgotten in the praise of humanity at the end, any wider social significance of these ideals remains at best implicit. In Faust the allegory of the whole situation has become too involved by the end for us to attach any considerable political connotation to Faust's activity in the closing scenes, which are concerned predominantly with the culmination of Faust's personal development. Die natürliche Tochter concentrates increasingly on the fate of Eugenie, the political situation that necessitates her predicament is a storm on the horizon rather than the central issue, and Goethe never completed the more politically orientated parts of the planned trilogy. In Hermann und Dorothea, the all too real political events of the age are dealt with ironically, even if they are taken far more seriously than in the earlier Bürgergeneral, they are not allowed to obscure the bourgeois idyll that is also a vital theme of Die natürliche Tochter. The

tendency to concentrate on the small community, which was highlighted in the opening chapter, is to be found in both these works, as also in Tasso, Wilhelm Meister, and at the end of Faust, but only in Hermann und Dorothea are the links with a recognisable outside world made explicit. In Faust for instance, the collapse of the economy and the ensuing war are both simply stages in the hero's development, platforms for his activity.

Goethe's comments on political matters are few and far between; some of them show a dangerous naivety - "Es ist besser, es geschehe dir Unrecht, als die Welt sei ohne Gesetz. Deshalb füge sich jeder dem Gesetze" (Maximen, 113) - or are self-evident - "Allein kann der Mensch nicht wohl bestehen, daher schlägt er sich gern zu einer Partei" (Maximen, 153). Goethe's political views are more concerned with the individual and his relationship to society in terms of a small community, a result no doubt of his own existence as a leading figure in the small state of Weimar. Goethe looks from the viewpoint of the individual, not from that of society, rarely does Goethe concern himself with the ruler and his duties or the organisation of the state. For Goethe, the best government is "diejenige, die uns lehrt, uns selbst zu regieren" (Maximen, 99), and Goethe's discussion of such ideas as freedom, laws, rights, restrictions, is very much related to man's own attitude to himself and those around him. Narrow political matters did not concern Goethe, he saw them as not part of a poet's work, as he told Eckermann in March 1832:

Sowie ein Dichter politisch wirken will, muß er sich einer Partei hingeben, und sowie er dies tut, ist er als Poet verloren; er muß seinem freien Geiste, seinem unbefangenen Überblick Lebewohl sagen und dagegen die Kappe der Borniertheit und des blinden Hasses über die Ohren ziehen.

Goethe and Schiller praised Wallenstein and Wilhelm Meister respectively for the depiction of the specifically social or political in terms of pure humanity. Nevertheless Schiller makes clear use of a political background in his early works, even if they are not as revolutionary as is sometimes claimed. Schiller also is more concerned with

the individual, his weaknesses and failings. The gap between abstract theories and practice, the ambiguity and guilt involved in action, result from man's nature as well as from the political situation. In both Fiesko and Don Carlos, however, we observe the loss of natural humanity that results from political activity, the lack of respect that politics and the state have for the individual and his rights as a human being. The French Revolution made Schiller more convinced than before that political change was impossible or at least pointless as long as man was unable to make the best use of freedom. Man had shown himself unready for the responsibilities placed upon him. Art must carry out the task of educating man to live as a full individual yet also a responsible member of the community, for whose benefit he will instinctively work. The state merely holds men together, reflects man's best instincts. The aesthetic state "den Willen des Ganzen durch die Natur des Individuums vollzieht" (XX,410). At all costs, man must retain his freedom, his harmony, beauty and totality. Unfortunately the closing aesthetic letters seem a long way from the pressing questions posed at the beginning, and Schiller himself admits that his ideals may only be realised in small circles. Both Goethe and Schiller, like Marquis Posa, saw themselves distanced from contemporary events, writing for a future age of general humanity.

Some critics have interpreted the later plays as cries for German freedom, but here again the concern is with the individual case, even though this serves to illustrate something of more general validity. The freedom that Wallenstein claims as one of his targets is of minor importance in the play. Schiller himself saw the subject matter as barren and uninteresting, he hoped to rescue the play by the perfection of the form and by saving Wallenstein as a tragic hero. Johanna has succeeded politically, but this is not underlined in any way, and to suggest that freedom for France is meant to signify Schiller's desire for German liberty at a time when this

was threatened by France, seems to attribute even less political sense to Schiller than usual. In this play, as in Maria Stuart, the attention is focused on the dilemma and subsequent triumph of the heroine; Schiller distorts the whole historical picture, especially in Jungfrau, in order to achieve this concentration. Even in Tell there is a rather unreal fairytale atmosphere which makes direct connection to contemporary events problematic, and again the interest (and the title!) rests with the individual who has no time for planning but only acts instinctively, or one might say aesthetically, when his own personal integrity is endangered.

Nevertheless, Wilhelm Tell does present the most concrete political situation since Don Carlos. This latter play itself, with all its youthful enthusiasm, reveals an idealistic picture of the ruler's task. The important central scene involving Philipp and Posa places the stress firmly on "Menschenwürde", demands that the king promote "Menschenglück". In the ideal state, "Bürgerglück/ Wird dann versöhnt mit Fürstengröße wandeln" (3152-3), and man will awaken to a new self-awareness;

Wenn nun der Mensch, sich selbst zurückgegeben,  
Zu seines Werts Gefühl erwacht. (3247-8)

Posa reminds Philipp that as King he still remains "ein Mensch" (3113), and that hence he must be a model for his subjects. This same idea is repeated by Lerma to Carlos: "Seien Sie/ Ein Mensch auf König Philipps Thron" (4947-8). Posa sees the richness and fullness which nature acquires through freedom, he foresees the flourishing in man of "der Freiheit/ Erhabne stolze Tugenden" (3248-9). It is this maintaining of the individual's rights that is echoed in Schiller's final completed play. Here the ecstatic insistence on freedom, even in the muted form of "Gedankenfreiheit" which is the most Posa dares to demand, has been lost. Instead Stauffacher believes;

Denn herrenlos ist auch der Freiste nicht.  
Ein Oberhaupt muß sein, ein höchster Richter,  
Wo man das Recht mag schöpfen, in dem Streit. (1216-8)

It is the idea of "Recht" which is the leitmotif in the

demands of the Swiss. Old Melchthal has striven "für Recht und Freiheit" (488), but under the yoke of tyranny all conception of right has been overlooked. The Swiss wish to reclaim their "gutes Recht" (1103), if possible by legal means, though Auf der Mauer warns the Rütli assembly:

Ihr habt's gehört. Recht und Gerechtigkeit  
Erwartet nicht vom Kaiser! Helft euch selbst! (1349-50)

The Swiss seek a return to their "ew'ge Rechte" (1279, cf. 1354), which have been attacked by the inhumanity of Gessler and his henchmen.<sup>(4)</sup> Hence rebellion, rejected in "Lied von der Glocke" and in "Der Spaziergang" because of the danger of inhuman excesses and a loss of reason and moderation, is now seen as necessary because of the extent of the provocation, because the state that makes a father shoot at his own son is the total denial of the ideal aesthetic state, which is the expression of man's best instincts. The Swiss victory is pure and bloodless, a new regime is created in which "das Herrliche der Menschheit" can survive and ancient rights are restored. In contrast to the Swiss, the Austrians corrupt all notions of right (1245, 2594, 2761); in Maria Stuart there is a consistent attack on Elisabeth and the English for committing similar sins:

Wenn man mich denn so streng nach englischem Recht  
Behandelt, wo dies Recht mich unterdrückt,  
Warum dasselbe Landesrecht umgehen,  
Wenn es mir Wohltat werden kann? (917-20)<sup>(5)</sup>

The political message of the two plays that Grillparzer wrote in the 1820s is based on precisely such a view of the links between ruler and subjects, and it is in these terms of right, justice, humanity, recognition of the community's interests, that Ottokar is compared with Rudolf von Habsburg and found lacking. After his stormy youth, Rudolf's life has been founded on Christian ideas and duties, on helping and respecting others no matter what their rank or position. As emperor he condemns all looting and treachery even if these work to his advantage, he promises help and support to all. Above all he remains



"ein Mensch", knocking out the bumps in his helmet and suggesting to his servant that he might perhaps give him a hand. He can distinguish between the man and the rank:

Warum steht ihr entblößten Hauptes da?  
Kommt Ottokar zu Habsburg, Mensch zum Menschen,  
So mag auch Hinz und Kunz sein Haupt bedecken,  
Ist er doch ihresgleichen; Mensch. (1726-9)

Ottokar has lost this ability to distinguish, he behaves dictatorially in all matters, even telling the Lord Mayor of Prague to pull off his, Ottokar's, armour. He is concerned with his own grandeur, he sees others purely as stepping stones on his own climb to fame. Those who disagree will fall. Gleefully he accepts the crown of his dead uncle without a moment's thought of sympathy. It is only at the end that he realises the evil of his ways, as he prays to God:

Den Menschen, den du hingesezt zur Lust,  
Ein Zweck, ein Selbst, im Weltall eine Welt -  
Gebaut hast du ihn als ein Wunderwerk ...

...  
Ich aber hab sie hin zu Tausenden geworfen,  
Um einer Torheit, eines Einfalls willen. (2834-47)

Previously he had no respect for the individual existence of his subjects, hence his rough treatment of the Tartars, whose separate identity he makes no attempt to understand. This is similar to Jason's view of the Colchians, neither of them realises that "der Mensch bleibt Mensch 'im Filzhut und im Jamerlonk'" (III,303). In a preparatory note for the play, Grillparzer wrote: "Ottokar, der Übermut, der Wahnsinn des Glücks; der nur sich sieht und in der ganzen Welt das Werkzeug. Menschenverachtung" (I/18,173). This is reflected in Ottokar's fundamentally poor opinion of people - "der Undank/ Der Menschen Schlechtheit ekelt tief mich an" (1946-7) - and at the end he has hardly changed his views in this respect: "Die Welt ist voll von Bösen und von Argen" (2452). Perhaps as a result, Ottokar cannot really understand others except in his own terms of greed and materialism, and even so he cannot detect who is faithful and who is planning revolt. He places his trust in Bohemians in general, just as Wallenstein trusts the message of the stars and hence

Octavio. Wallenstein also, as the materialist, has a dim view of humanity:

Denn aus Gemeinem ist der Mensch gemacht,  
Und die Gewohnheit nennt er seine Amme. (Tod, 211-2)

Dem bösen Geist gehört die Erde, nicht  
Dem guten. (799-800)

Ottokar himself sees the heavy force of tradition weighing upon him. He wishes to turn Prague into another Paris, hence naturally enhancing his own magnificence, but the dilatory nature of his own subjects is a barrier to his plans. As with Wallenstein and his concern for peace, it may well be that Ottokar has some basically good motives, and he still asserts at the end that he was "durchs Böse suchend einen Weg zum Guten" (2833), but just as Wallenstein believes that a new peace will make Europe look to him as a saviour, so Ottokar wants the glory of Prague to be a further reflection of his own splendour. This is not to deny that he is concerned for his subjects' welfare.

Wallenstein states that he now carried his staff of office

Zur Wohlfahrt aller, zu des Ganzen Heil,  
Und nicht mehr zur Vergrößerung des Einen!  
(Piccolomini, 1182-3)

- but ultimately for both him and Ottokar the two go together. Hence although Rudolf, perhaps flatteringly, tells Ottokar, "ihr habt der Euren Vorteil stets gewollt" (1927), and although this is the one excuse Ottokar still retains to the end, both he and Wallenstein have their own egocentric views of what is best for the community. Ottokar wants to drag the Bohemians out of their stupor and put them in a position where they have no choice but to follow. Hence significantly the statement that it is his country which necessitates his leaving Margarete is followed immediately by a further praise of his own greatness and his empire (594-7). He has no time for the simple life and happy memories that his subjects enjoy. When he re-starts the war, he insists that this is for his country's sake, "für unsers Landes Ruhm und seine Macht" (2442), yet it is only too obvious from everything his subjects have said at the beginning of the fourth act that they want peace, that they want to settle the peace treaty before Ottokar can

object.<sup>(6)</sup> It may be that he has improved the lot of his people, as the Chancellor stresses, it may be that his aims are good, but his heavyhanded way of doing things is only likely to drive his people further into their mood of quiet withdrawal, and his intention to destroy his country in his spite can only make one doubt a purely altruistic desire for his nation's happiness. In the dramatic fragment "Hannibal", Scipio silences his own opinions in speaking for Rome, whilst Hannibal thinks that his views are automatically those of Carthage, a failing which is very much Ottokar's, only at the very end can he separate thoughts of his people from concern for his own position.

By contrast, Rudolf seems to act always in the interests of the nation. He has overcome selfishness and egoism and sees himself fighting for the general cause. The people see him as a saviour (1490), and will fight for him in a way which they can never do for Ottokar. He believes in independence for all: "Die Welt ist da, damit wir alle leben" (1912). Far from using others as mere tools, Rudolf lets each man get on with his own job:

Der Bauer folgt im Frieden seinem Pflug,  
Es rührt sich in der Stadt der fleißige Bürger. (1921-2)

This seems to fit in perfectly with both Goethe's and Schiller's view of the ideal state. The same views are expressed in Ein treuer Diener seines Herrn: the ruler should be a model, a guide for his people's best instincts, he should not attempt to dominate them as though they were tools for his own desires. The ability to control one's own personal aims is a vital quality as a ruler (425,2113-4), but Otto, Gertrude and Ottokar all fail to live up to this demand. The former two use the official festivities for their own aims, Otto uses his own power in the court to indulge his own whims and lusts. The ruler must respect his subjects:

Sei ein getreuer Herr erst deinen Dienern,  
Dann sind sie treue Diener ihres Herrn. (HKA I/18,607)

The main characters in the central part of Treuer Diener all lack devotion to the common cause, with the exception

of Bancbanus, whose sacrifice is all the greater precisely because he is the only person who can control his personal instincts. Grillparzer's later political writings enlarge on these themes of altruism and limitation, and I shall consider them in more detail in that context.

Ein treuer Diener seines Herrn ends in its final version with the important demand for recognition of each person's independence as a human being:

Laß dir den Menschen Mensch sein, und den Diener  
Acht als ein Spargut für die Zeit der Not. (2115-6)

This links with many of the themes in Ottokar, especially the insistence on men's independence rather than their being treated as mere tools, the contrasting attitudes of Ottokar and Rudolf to their servants. In Wallenstein, Max, the idealist and Wallenstein the materialist see everyone in terms of their respective philosophies, hence at one stage Max, who sees all people as basically good, noble, and altruistic, attacks his father's view, which in his eyes debases man and drives him to evil:

O! hättest du vom Menschen besser stets  
Gedacht, du hättest besser auch gehandelt. (Tod, 1255-6)

Like Max, both Rudolf and on the whole Andreas retain an optimistic view of human nature which brings out the best in others. This does not involve anything revolutionary. Like Posa in Don Carlos, Grillparzer is merely underlining the potential equality in man, and the need both for the ruler to respect this and to remember that he also is only human. There may be some justification in Otto von Meran's complaint that as a ruler one does not meet "Menschen", only flatterers and crawlers (1221), a complaint he shares with Schiller's Philipp, but Rudolf I is able to find a way out of this problem. Grillparzer was far from denying that respect was due to rulers, but he wished to stress that rulers were human and must not break generally accepted laws of conduct. Rudolf demands respect for Ottokar when he enters in his official capacity as King, but no more than human politeness when he comes as man to man. The contrast is put into a humorous light in Treuer Diener, where Bancbanus first of all refuses to believe evil of

Otto just because he is the King's brother-in-law, then alternates between calling him "du ... blutiger Mörder" and "Ihr ... Herzog" in the final act. The contrast is put most succinctly in a further variant for the final scene in Treuer Diener, which Grillparzer felt obliged to suppress:

Das Schönste was die weite Schöpfung kennt,  
Ist eines Königs Kron' auf eines Menschen Scheitel.  
(I/18,607)

Similarly in the early essay on Rudolf, Grillparzer had written: "Aber mitten im wilden Getümmel des Streits legte er nie der Menschheit süßes Gefühl ab, er war nicht nur Held, er war auch Mensch" (III,970). This theme is found in the mature play and elsewhere. In 1830 Grillparzer produced a poem which insisted most strongly on the humanity of rulers. The mother of the future Franz Joseph is in no way spared ordinary human suffering by virtue of her exalted position, she suffers the labours of childbirth "gleich des letzten Bettlers Weibe", despite the myths which are concocted to make rulers feel outside mere human matters. He feels sympathy with her in her pain, "das dich verknüpft mit andern Erdentöchtern", and he tells her:

Ich liebe dich, wie ich die Menschen liebe,  
Ich achte dich, weil du ein Mensch und gut. (I,192)

The clear link with Classical ideas may be underlined again by reference to Schiller's epigram of 1795, "Deutschland und seine Fürsten":

Aber versuch es, o Deutschland, und mach' es deinen  
Schwerer, als Könige groß, leichter, nur Menschen zu  
Beherrschern  
sein.

Within the framework of an insistence on general humanity, a number of ideals are presented for political and social existence, which can best be examined under the twin concepts of peace and justice. Under justice we may consider both the just working of the state, and the right behaviour of the individuals in the state - subjects and ruler - which would minimise or even obviate the need for justice to be administered. Bancbanus has an almost

fanatical devotion to right conduct:

Nur eine Schmach weiß ich auf dieser Erde,  
Und die heißt: Unrecht tun! (83-4)

It is this virtue which he hopes Erny will most treasure in him (830), and he is chosen by Andreas to act "in Sachen bloß des Rechts" (370). Ottokar on the other hand is repeatedly seen by his first wife as acting wrongly, and his desire for an heir is no excuse for such conduct:

Er soll vor Unrecht sorglich sich bewahren,  
Denn auch das kleinste rächt sich. (380-1, cf. 214, 267)

The "Unrecht" of most of the characters consists, as we have seen, in putting personal interests before those of the common good. A diary note for "Die letzten Römer" compares Brutus and Tarquinius in these terms: "Brutus für das Recht, Tarquin für seinen Willen" (II, 1162). Rudolf however restores a sense of common purpose. Twice he insists to Ottokar that he has sworn to reinstate "Recht" in Germany (1751, 1809), which Ottokar has endangered by the arbitrary use of his power in imprisoning and punishing without trial. In both political and moral terms, Ottokar has behaved badly and he realises this at the end:

Mit Willen hab ich Unrecht nicht getan!  
Doch einmal, ja! - und noch einmal: O Gott,  
Ich hab mit Willen Unrecht auch getan! (2864-6)

In a draft of Act III, Rudolf I exclaims, "Recht muß wieder herrschen, auch über mich, auch über dich" (I/18, 160), and Grillparzer later described the play as "der Kampf einer wilden Heldennatur mit einem Repräsentanten des Rechts und Gesetzes" (Gespr. 1191).

The ruler should be able to decide what is right without bias, and it is clear that Rudolf is able to do so. Bancbanus believes that Andreas is equally capable (1381-2), but it is symptomatic of the contrast between the ideal picture in Ottokar and the more realistic attitudes in Treuer Diener that Andreas has to be coaxed into being just and fair, "du forderst viel", says Andreas (2015), as does Thoas in Iphigenie when confronted with the heroine's demands. Similarly, whilst the question of right in Ottokar is quite straightforward, in Treuer Diener matters are not as simple. With some justification, Simon insists that he

is in the right, both to Bancbanus (1425,1445) and to the King's chargé d'affaires:

Ich zog das Schwert, weil man mir Recht verweigert,  
Spricht uns der König Recht, so steck ichs ein. (1812-13)

Even Ottokar is partially right in his own terms, and in Treuer Diener both Bancbanus and Simon represent apparently justifiable standpoints, especially as Simon's aim is merely to ensure that Otto is still there when the King returns to administer justice. The confusing situation is quite typical of Grillparzer's tendency to blur the strict outlines and dividing lines which the Classicists constructed, especially in the field of human psychology. The concept of "Recht" is not however thrown into question at this stage, although that is true to some extent in the later political plays, but one must take care in deciding what is actually right. Ultimately the evil in Treuer Diener is caused by Otto and Gertrude misusing their position of power, just as Ottokar's overweening pride is the cause of the wrongs he commits. A just ruler will be able to unravel the tangled situation and keep the peace, and Bancbanus at the end warns the young Bela to be "gerecht" (2111), although this warning is really directed at Andreas himself, who is called "der Gerechte". Rudolf I especially is seen as the minister of justice, whilst Ottokar has consistently ignored the right of his people (1255). The German lords sought someone who is "gerecht und gnädig" (1249), of which the former is the more important (1261). Rudolf has sworn "daß Recht soll herrschen und Gerechtigkeit" (1751), whilst Ottokar's acts against the Reich are unjust (1763). Through his own sense of justice Rudolf, we must assume, will be able to deal correctly with matters of right and wrong and preserve "das Recht", though it is worth noting that in his own idealistic setting he has to deal with none of the complicated problems which beset Bancbanus and Andreas in the more realistic play, and certainly nothing as complex as the situation confronting Rudolf II in Bruderzwist. Rudolf I believes they are fighting with God and right on

their side (2749-51), both of which Ottokar has attacked.

In his essay "Über das Wesen des Drama" (III,301-3), Grillparzer had stressed the force of "das ewige Recht", any offence against which must be punished, and it is in these terms that we are meant to condemn Ottokar and Otto. It is not to be equated with mere legalistic justice, although in Ottokar especially the two do coincide to a great extent, but is on a more generally human level in keeping with Classical ideas. In Vließ the problem is already present: the question is continually raised as to whether certain behaviour is right or wrong. Medea fears that such judgements are reversed in Corinth, she realises that both for herself and for Jason right can be what the individual wants it to be. The King points out, "nie Recht ist Unrecht, Schlimmes nirgends gut" (Medea,458), but he finally has to see the difficulty of administering justice in an absolute human sense. His banishing of Medea is not illegal, but is inhuman, and he suffers as a result.

Der Traum ein Leben presents a similar insistence on matters of right. Rustan wishes to avoid "Unrecht" (1044), but is gradually made to realise that he has not done so (1575-6). Nevertheless he continues to insist hypocritically on his rights (1671), despite the knowledge that he has got where he is by evil means. The man on the rock points this out from the start, scoffs at the madness of seeking to combine "Glück und Unrecht" (1122). By contrast with Rustan, there is the often repeated desire of the other characters to be right and just, in the King (1651-2,1690-1), in Gülnare (2194), and especially in Karkhan (1957-2000), who underlines the unjust nature of Rustan's regime which imprisons without trial, arrests on the slightest suspicion, and has spies everywhere. Zanga of course is indifferent to justice and prefers "vor Recht Gewalt" (2130). He is only concerned with the end, not with the right or wrong ways of achieving it.

The essay on the drama sees the aim of tragedy in "die Verherrlichung des Rechts" which will have an effect



on the spectator if he arrives "mit den ewigen Begriffen des Rechts und der Tugend". The Swiss in Wilhelm Tell are, we recall, seeking their "ewige Rechte" which they see in a divine context - "Doch Gott/ Ist überall, wo man das Recht verwaltet" (1114-5). In Ottokar it is clear that the King has offended this humanitarian idea of "Recht" in abandoning Margarete and Ottokar's "Unrecht" is continually stated in these terms. In Treuer Diener it also seems that Bancbanus is more justified in trying to maintain the safety of the community as a whole than is Simon who seeks a legal outlet for thoughts of revenge.

It certainly seems wrong in the context of this early period to suggest as Manfred Roschek does that "das Recht besitzt keine moralische Werthaftigkeit".<sup>(7)</sup> If Ottokar at any stage reveals what Roschek describes as "der Widerstreit zwischen göttlichem Recht und irdischem Streben" (p.93), then Rudolf succeeds in combining the two, and Ottokar by the end realises his folly in striving against what is right. And if, again according to Roschek (p.103), both Ottokar and Treuer Diener show "das Scheitern und die Tragik des Menschen angesichts des absoluten Rechts", then it must be stressed that if right is something absolute, it is at this stage of Grillparzer's work seen very much as a human absolute. Any conflict between moral and legalistic right is overlooked in the early plays. This may perhaps be because Rudolf and Andreas are ideal rulers, but they are also, contrary to what Roschek and Naumann believe,<sup>(8)</sup> ordinary human beings, as is continually stressed in the case of Rudolf I, and as is perfectly clear from Andreas's errors of judgement and the time he takes to overcome his instinctive desire for revenge against the rebels who were responsible for the death of his wife. Alfred Doppler quite rightly shows how Andreas recognises his own guilt at the end and cannot be seen as a representative of any divine order.<sup>(9)</sup>

In the 1807 essay, "Rede zum Lobe Rudolfs von Habsburg", Grillparzer had already presented Rudolf as the ideal ruler in terms similar to those under consideration. As well as

the stress on "Menschheit", Rudolf was seen administering "Gerechtigkeit" (III,968,972). A further theme in the essay is the overcoming of disorder in Germany: "stets war er für das Glück seiner Untertanen besorgt, er stellte in Deutschland die Ruhe und den Frieden her, die Faustrecht und Barbarei vertrieben hatten" (III,973). This was a theme dear to Grillparzer and it is fully represented in the two plays of the 1820s. Whilst Ottokar has produced disorder, unrest, unhappiness, through his arbitrary, if partly well-meant activity, if he and his father before him have plunged Europe into war for the sake of selfish designs, then Rudolf is the man to restore peace and quiet to the political and social scene. The words "Ruhe" and "Friede", especially the former, continually occur. Even Ottokar's faithful chancellor underlines the results of Rudolf's reign:

Die Ruh ist hergestellt im weiten Deutschland. (1485)  
Rudolf himself sees his role in these terms:

Geschworen hab ich, Ruh und Recht zu schirmen (1809,  
cf. also 1619-20)

and he spells this out to Ottokar in their vital meeting in Act III:

Hier aber gilts nicht Fehde, Ruhe, Herr! (1760)

Ottokar is asked to grant "Ruhe" both to his people (1928) and to his wife (2622), but it is typical of the chaos that Ottokar causes that not even the dead can have a calm existence (2943).

"Ruh und Friede" was a phrase Grillparzer liked from his earliest days, and the idea of spiritual peace is a common theme of the early plays, as I have considered in the previous chapter. In both Ottokar and Treuer Diener there is an added political connotation. Ottokar's reaction to peace is somewhat sarcastic, a peace settlement being yet another means for him to display his own glory (517,1593). Rudolf however has driven away the "Friedensstörer" (1800), which is also Bancbanus' word for the rebels in Treuer Diener (1747). Margarete, on the few but significant occasions on which she is mentioned

after leaving Ottokar, is connected with ideas of peace. Rudolf calls her "Friedensengel" (1935), and we are told that she died on her way to see Rudolf in order "Frieden zu vermitteln" (2636).

In Treuer Diener it is Bancbanus who is continually seen as the man to bring peace and quiet in a troubled situation. The King tells him:

Als ich dich wählte, dacht ich Ruhe mir,  
In Feld und Stadt, in Schloß und Hütten Ruhe. (419-20)

Bancbanus insists that his is a house of peace (20), that he has promised the King, "den Frieden zu bewahren hier, die Ruh" (638). His whole strategy is geared towards preserving this state at all costs. His own inner peace is terribly shattered by Erny's death, his one sentence on the occasion revealing much more than a theatrical monologue could, but he can still clearly see his task and decide what is best for the community as a whole, even if this means his wife's apparent murderer escaping. He tells the would-be rebels "haltet ruhig euch und still" (1371) (a demand we have already seen in Medea), and he is again forced to spell out his task more clearly:

Ich bin der Mann des Friedens,  
Der Hüter ich der Ruh - Mich hat mein König  
Geordnet, seinen Frieden hier zu wahren. (1418-20)

At the end the King again underlines this side of Bancbanus' task: "Ich gab mein Land dir ruhig und in Frieden" (1972). By contrast, Simon is prepared to risk a war both to ensure Otto's continued presence and to avoid capitulation to the King. Gertrude would prefer to die in battle rather than hand Otto over. Ottokar's family has consistently used war as a means to aggrandisement, Ottokar himself plunges his country into an unpopular war in order to remove the stain on his honour. It is clear that all these characters are being criticised, whilst the ideal Rudolf is seen to be fighting a good cause, forbidding all unnecessary slaughter, and insisting only on what rightly belongs to the empire (this also applies presumably to the cause for which Andreas goes off to fight). The same picture of peace disturbed is found in other works of Grillparzer at this time.

The "Hannibal" fragment echoes sentiments in Ottokar:  
Die Welt hat Krieg und braucht den Frieden,  
Der Pflug will auch sein Recht, nicht bloß das Schwert.  
(55-6)

The figure of Napoleon also interested Grillparzer as a bringer of war instead of peace:

Schienst du der Feind allein auch aller Ruh ...  
Das Schwert hast du gebracht und nicht den Frieden ...  
Schlaf wohl! und Ruhe sei mit deinem Tod,  
Ob du die Ruhe gleich der Welt gebrochen. ("Napoleon",  
11.13,31,57-8)

This desire for peace, both internal and external, was a constant lament of Grillparzer's; its wider implications, especially in an internal context, have already been considered in the previous chapter. Grillparzer's longing for peace has often been dismissed as indicative of Biedermeier quietism, the simple wish to lead one's own unruffled existence and let the world of politics go on elsewhere. For Staiger, Ottokar reveals a message of reverence for the world after Napoleon's fall, and he concludes:

Politisch bekennt sich Grillparzer so zum Grundsatz der Legitimität, der im Wiener Kongreß maßgebend war ... (daß) er sich ... zum Segen der Tradition bekennt und damit einer ... mehr und mehr zu eitler Unrast versuchten Zeit den Weg zum Brunnen des Heils erschließt.

Hermans writes of "das eindeutige Übergewicht des konservativen Elementes" in Ottokar; for Alewyn, Grillparzer reveals "konservative Vernunft". According to Alker, the ideology of human rights has no place in Treuer Diener; for Naumann also, Ottokar reflects Grillparzer's affirmation of the peace and new order after 1815; in Baumann's view, Grillparzer is concerned with Restoration, not revolution.<sup>(10)</sup> All this fits into the by now familiar pattern of seeing Grillparzer as a reactionary, a view that is in constant need of reconsideration. There is certainly very little mention in the two plays of political freedom, which is such a leitmotif in Don Carlos and Wilhelm Tell, and the stress on peace and quiet in Ottokar and Treuer Diener and elsewhere at this time is strong. Nevertheless the reactionary Biedermeier label must be questioned from two angles. Firstly both Schiller and

Goethe place considerable emphasis on political peace and inner calm. That will be the first message of the bell in "Lied von der Glocke" (425), and the narrator calls for "holder Friede,/ Süße Eintracht" for the "ruhige Bürger" (322-3,363). The poem on the start of the new century asks for a refuge for peace, Wallenstein believes that his actions will bring peace. The theme of political withdrawal is more present in a work such as Hermann und Dorothea or Die natürliche Tochter than it is in either Ottokar or Treuer Diener. Goethe's epos contrasts the "ruhige Bürger" with those who madly seek freedom and equality, a peaceful existence is preferred to the hustle and bustle of political activity. Die natürliche Tochter stresses "das Häusliche" (1812), "des Bürgers hoher Sicherstand" (2205). The citizens in Egmont demand "Ruhe" as much as anything else. The importance of inner peace for Goethe, especially in his early Weimar days, need hardly be stressed again at this juncture.

These similarities may of course indicate that Grillparzer was as conservative as Goethe and Schiller, rather than saving him from the criticism of Biedermeier reaction. We must therefore ask whether the two plays under consideration really reflect an affirmation of the status quo, "der Grundsatz der Legitimität" in Staiger's terms. Throughout the 1820s, Grillparzer attacks the political situation in Austria, even though this is first and foremost from his own personal angle as a writer suffering from dictatorial censorship. After his trip to Germany in 1826, a journey which enabled him to complete Treuer Diener, Grillparzer was forced to compare what he had just seen with what he knew only too well. He begins, "weiß Gott wie fern mir alles politische liegt", but concludes: "ich erkenne aber das Verfahren Österreichs auch von Seite des Interesse der Regierung betrachtet, als völlig unzweckmäßig" (Tgb.1544). The limitations on freedom were too severe in Austria, so that the individual would ultimately give up or rebel. The restrictive intellectual climate is satirised in the poems "Dezemberlied"

and "Jagd im Winter", written in the winter before Grillparzer felt the need to escape to Germany. There he saw no visible limitations on the individual, there seemed to be nothing oppressive. The poem "Der Tag brach an" attacks Metternich as "Der Ritter und Held der Legitimität" (I,159), and the satirical continuation of Die Zauberflöte sees Metternich as a pathetic frustrated character demanding respect and insisting laughably on his own interpretation of morality.

Grillparzer was not however consistent, he never committed what Goethe saw as a crime for the poet, namely joining a particular faction. In the satirical "Zauberflöte", Grillparzer presents the head of the state, the Queen of Night, as dictatorially forbidding everything she does not herself like, wanting to prevent all reading and writing except in her own offices. Yet in the poem "Vision" Grillparzer's picture of Franz, as opposed to his henchmen, is that of a good husband, father and King, adored by his people. Nevertheless Grillparzer was not happy with the system of restriction, and he sensed its inherent dangers. Metternich's regime fails to live up to any of the demands outlined in Ottokar and Treuer Diener, though it would seem to have formed the basis for Rustan's dictatorship in Traum. Grillparzer may have been pleased with the peace of the 1820s after the Napoleonic era, but it must be stressed that Napoleon, despite all his faults and all the upheavals he has caused, is compared favourably with the emptiness of the present age of "Mäkler, Schreiber, Pfaffen". Napoleon embodied "Ganzheit, Hoheit, Größe", the new age after 1815 is a "Stückelwelt" (I,145).<sup>(11)</sup> The new regime is in no way humanitarian, has no respect for the individual and his freedom, interferes in everyone's lives - a fact brought home forcibly to Grillparzer after the "Ludlamshöhle" fiasco - and preserves a rather dubious calm only with the greatest sacrifice of the best principles of humanity. Grillparzer loved his country, disliked being away, hence he could even praise its regime when pleased to be home again:

Um recht zu tun und gut, gebricht  
Dem Östreichs Mann die Freiheit nicht. (I,172)

This however is an isolated instance provoked by the excesses he had seen predominantly in the intellectual sphere in Germany. The famous adulation of Austria spoken by Ottokar von Horneck praises the beauty of its nature and scenery, rather than any outstanding qualities of its people. They possess "der klare Blick, der offne, richtige Sinn" (1696), but they lack education and the courage to make their views heard. Perhaps it is not mere coincidence that this passage contains none of the positive concepts of Classicism.

The message in Ottokar and Treuer Diener is that of a new ideal age when men will be treated as human beings, not as tools, and the final address in Treuer Diener is made significantly to the heir to the throne, with hope for his future reign. It is a new age that is heralded in both plays, not a return to the old traditions, and in this respect they are more progressive than Wilhelm Tell. The humanitarian principles on which the new age was to be built, had not yet been achieved in the Austria of the 1820s. It is common to see Bancbanus especially as a preserver of the status quo, he himself admits to being "ein Feind von Neuerungen" (64), and at the end he wishes to escape from politics in order to live peacefully with memories of Erny. Furthermore he upholds the law, has an exaggerated respect for all royal personages, and is entirely loyal to the ruling house. But Grillparzer makes it clear that Bancbanus's opinions cannot be taken as his own. Bancbanus is limited in his horizons, "mehr Geschäftsmann als Krieger" (HKA I/18,407), as is suggested by his whole appearance. Bancbanus's fault lies in his loyalty which makes him neglect his duties as a human being towards his wife. Once Erny is dead, he does his best to avoid any further catastrophes, and his desire to rescue Gertrude and Bela is both a desire to postpone direct confrontation as well as a realisation of the royal family's importance. Continued loyalty

seems to Bancbanus to be the best way to alleviate the situation, given the Queen's stubbornness, and it is her fault alone that she dies.

It would of course be pointless to deny the influence of Grillparzer's own nature, and of the prevailing desire for quiet withdrawal, on his ideal political set-up. It is however vital to stress the insistence on general human considerations in political matters: on justice, on what is right and proper, on peace, on the need for the ruler to be aware of other people and himself as "Menschen" and treat them accordingly. These themes must lead us back to similar ideas in the works of the Classicists, and in addition the quietistic ideal can be attributed to Goethe as much as to the Biedermeier era. Equally there is Andreas's insistence on "Sitte" as the central pillar on which the community is built, as the source of a basic standard to avoid extremes (Treuer Diener, 295-6).

In addition, the whole idea of "Treue", loyalty to the state and to others, is an important ideal for Goethe and Herder, and especially in Schiller's dramas, a loss of trust or loyalty is frequently decisive. The words "treu" and "Treue" are very common in Wallenstein, Maria Stuart and Jungfrau. Wallenstein stresses the importance of loyalty as a moral force of tradition which he fears to go against:

Die Treue, sag ich euch,  
Ist jedem Menschen wie der nächste Blutsfreund.  
(Tod, 424-5; cf. also 436)

Only for Illo is it a meaningless concept (Tod, 452), Octavio however insists, "der Kaiser hat noch treue Diener" (Piccolomini, 2517), and it is the troops' and generals' basic loyalty to the emperor that causes Wallenstein's downfall. Maria Stuart also praises her "treuer Diener" (3778). Loyalty is one of the virtues of Schiller's "schöner Charakter" (XXI, 43), but which disappears from life during a rebellion ("Der Spaziergang"). Switzerland is a country "wo die alte Treue heimisch wohnt" (Tell, 1702). The poem "Die Bürgschaft" is especially concerned with the quality of "Treue". In general, loss of loyalty implies



a loss of trust in human dignity and integrity, a lack of confidence and a tendency to be swayed by misleading circumstances.

The ideal of loyalty is less common in the work of Goethe, but nevertheless important. Praise of such a virtue is extreme in Wilhelm Meisters theatralische Sendung:

Die Treue, die schönste und menschlichste Eigenschaft.  
Welch ein Glück! welch ein Genuß, für den Geber und  
Empfänger! welche überirdische Glückseligkeit gewährt  
uns die Treue! Sie gibt dem vorübergehenden Zustande  
des Menschen gleichsam eine himmlische Gewissenheit.  
(V,1, V,13)

The version in Lehrjahre is only slightly less ecstatic. Similar praise is voiced in Faust:

Beglückt, wer Treue rein im Busen trägt,  
Kein Opfer wird ihn je gereuen! (1724-5)

Leonore tells Tasso, "welchen Wert/ Die Treue wahrer Freunde hat" (Tasso, 2405-6). (12)

It is not Bancbanus's loyalty that is condemned, but merely his excess of it in circumstances which show that the other side has long since ceased to be worthy of it. The phrase "treuer Diener" occurs elsewhere in a positive context, (13) and Grillparzer praised Bancbanus's "Heroismus der Pflichttreue" (IV,153) and considered loyalty "eine heilige Tugend unter den Menschen" (Gespr.1182). Loyalty forms a basic problem in Blanka - significantly so in a play showing such a large Schillerian influence. Lack of loyalty is condemned in Vließ, where it starts the chain of events (Gastfreund, 470-1, 487), Kreusa is "du Reine! Treue!" (Medea, 2181), Margarete remains loyal to Ottokar (2652-5). The treatment of the idea in Treuer Diener is of course slightly ambiguous, though it is the quality that Andreas demands from Bancbanus (382, 426). In Bruderzwist, loyalty is a noble quality seen in all sections of the nation, (14) though inevitably Rudolf has doubts as to its ideal nature:

Ich will hinüber zu den treuen Ständen,  
Treu nämlich, wenn - und ehrenhaft, obgleich -  
Der Eingang, wie gewöhnlich, leere Formel.  
Von Treu, Anhänglichkeit - wohl Liebe gar!  
(1472-3, 1581-2)

Die Jüdin von Toledo stresses the importance of the country's loyalty (99,141,260), and the poems of the 1840s and 1850s make frequent reference to the ideal of loyalty, something the army is responsible for preserving in troubled times.<sup>(15)</sup> Loyalty is the roots of life;

Die Wurzel stätig, fest und altergrau,  
Dasselbe, was beim Menschen heißt: die Treue.

Treu jedem Wort, das Mann dem Manne gab,  
Treu jener Wahrheit, die mit uns geboren,  
Dem Lande treu, das Wiege uns und Grab,  
Dem Fürsten treu, dem wir den Eid geschworen.

("Einem Soldaten" (I,323), 11.19-24)

There would seem to be some justification for Max Kommerell's description of Grillparzer as "ein Dichter der Treue".<sup>(16)</sup>

I have already suggested some of the links between Ottokar and Wallenstein. These are numerous and revealing, and the end of the two leaders has led critics to point out the weakness of Grillparzer's characters in comparison with Schiller's.<sup>(17)</sup> Both Wallenstein and Ottokar are betrayed by their ambitions. Ottokar seeks to retain what is not rightly his in order to build the finest empire since Charlemagne, Wallenstein seeks to secure his powerful position by a treacherous alliance with the Swedes and hopes for the Crown of Bohemia. Both desire an heir to their glory as the key to continued fame after death.<sup>(18)</sup> As a result, Wallenstein will not consider his daughter marrying Max, whom she loves, Ottokar rejects his first wife who has no hope of conceiving. Both believe they are the men of the moment, the saviours of their people, in whose interests they claim to act. As a result of their dangerous acts, both gradually lose their following, until they attempt to save the deteriorating situation, Ottokar by a further war, Wallenstein by agreeing to join the Swedes. Both now insist that they have returned to their former strength;

Ich bin noch Ottokar, man soll schon sehn. (Ottokar,2467)

Noch fühl ich mich denselben, der ich war! (Tod,1812)

In each case the wheels of fortune have turned against them and they are overtaken by death. Both have been

betrayed to a great extent by the people in whom they had placed most trust, both feel they have been held back by the stagnating effects of tradition and dilatory subjects. The warning to Wallenstein from his wife -

O lieber Herzog! Streben wir nicht allzuhoch  
Hinauf, daß wir zu tief nicht fallen mögen (Tod,1514-15)

- or the summary in the prologue -

Und ungesättigt immer weiter strebend  
Der ungezähmten Ehrsucht Opfer fiel (100-1)

- or Gordon's similar views (Tod,2482), could all equally well stand as the moral to Ottokar.

By removing "das Rohe und Ungeheuere ... was ihn zum tragischen Helden schlecht qualifizierte" (letter to Böttiger, 1/3/1799), Schiller was concerned to save Wallenstein as a tragic hero, to make him appear impressive at the end despite his lack of success, despite his apparent incompetence. This Schiller does through the unsavoury characters surrounding the hero, above whom Wallenstein stands out as one fighting for less selfish motives and possessing at least some concern for the common good. In addition the astrology motif is introduced to explain Wallenstein's seeming lack of judgement, his blind faith in certain accomplices, his confidence in his own ability to control time and events. These two themes come together when Wallenstein is forced to make his final decision due to the lack of trust shown by others, including the emperor. The good side of Wallenstein is highlighted by Max, who sees his own good qualities reflected in the general; Wallenstein's men are initially at least fanatically devoted to him. Finally his stature begins to show again once necessity has caught up with him and he is moving towards treachery and also, unbeknown to him, his death. In the end his death does seem tragic, carried out by Buttler, whom Wallenstein once tricked, by the two captains who are only too easily persuaded, and hypocritically denounced by Octavio, now a prince, who is concerned above all to maintain the status quo that has already produced sixteen years of death and pointless destruction.

Grillparzer was not concerned with the individual or the tragic hero to the extent that Schiller was. In Ottokar, Grillparzer was as much interested in issues at stake, the differing attitudes to rule and government, as he was in the hero, and he comes nearer to Goethe than to Schiller in that respect. Hence at times there is a dangerous division of interest between Rudolf and Ottokar. The ideals and standards that are stressed are those of Rudolf; nevertheless, both in its title and in the majority of the action, the play concerns itself with Ottokar, and the question of the tragic hero is therefore worth considering.

Grillparzer in fact makes use of a number of Schiller's devices, both to make Ottokar less of a villain and also to improve his stature in the last quarter of the play. Seyfried von Merenberg used to look up to Ottokar as a model in former days, Ottokar's chancellor is also devoted to him. The Rosenbergs follow entirely selfish motives in their intrigues, they desert Ottokar in his hour of need because he has not chosen one of their family as his wife. Just as Wallenstein believes others are pushing him to the brink, so Ottokar believes his country forces him to behave unjustly towards Margarete (509, 594-5), and that it is for his country that he enters a futile war (2441-2). In addition he is sorely taunted by his wife, a motif which is not Schillerian and which makes Ottokar's desire for ultimate victory rather more complex than Wallenstein's. But at the end of the play Ottokar, like Wallenstein, has become a better man, above all having more insight into his own position. If he in no way reaches the sublime heights of Schiller's tragic heroes, it is quite wrong to say, as Steinhagen does, that Ottokar is the same person at the end.<sup>(19)</sup> He is more generous, more sympathetic, he is concerned for Merenberg's comfort despite being convinced that he is a traitor, he wants only voluntary support for the cause and fully realises the import of his deeds:

Doch hört! Aufs neue rast der Teufel Krieg,  
Aufs neue dampft das Land in Rauch und Blut. (2397-8)

He now accepts God's omnipotence and his own weakness. He realises the meaning of his behaviour; he had used men as tools, has sacrificed thousands. Whilst previously he had spitefully hoped to lay waste to an area which would not support him, now he hopes his people will be spared when judgement is passed upon him. He sees his own madness and blindness (2847), recognises his guilt and is prepared to pay for it:

Ich hab nicht gut in deiner Welt gehaust,  
Du großer Gott!

Geblendet war ich, so hab ich gefehlt. (2825-6, 2863)  
Before his dead wife he realises that he has gained nothing, what he has won has gone with the wind (2662), and his attainment of moral stature is symbolised by his voluntary kneeling, before his wife and later before all the world and God. On the battlefield he accepts all the blame, and in the presence of the Almighty, whom he calls to judge him, he speaks of only one extenuating circumstance, namely that his intentions were basically good even though the means he chose were evil:

Und hab ich auch das Schlimme nicht gewollt,  
Wer war ich, Wurm? daß ich mich unterwand,  
Den Herrn der Welten frevelnd nachzuspielen,  
Durchs Böse suchend einen Weg zum Guten! (2830-3)

There is, I think, no doubt that Ottokar is an improved man, a fuller man at the end. He has gradually gained insight into himself and his behaviour, into the results of his activity, but only at the very last does he overcome the tendency to blame others, does he accept the fact that at times he has deliberately behaved wrongly. He acquires an awareness that neither Sappho, nor Jaromir, nor Jason ever achieve, and which Medea can only partially match, and with this awareness he gains a truly tragic stature. If however, as in Sappho, the depiction of the hero's fate draws on the Schillerian model, then here also, as in Sappho, the nature of the hero's fate and motives is rather more complex than in Schiller's plays. In Ottokar however, unlike in Sappho, the hero himself seems aware of this complexity, even if he is reluctant to admit

it even to himself.

It is not feasible in this context to embark on a detailed analysis of Kurt Partl's lengthy and at times verbose comparison of Ottokar and Wallenstein.<sup>(20)</sup> His comments are primarily concerned with aesthetic and structural matters (settings, dialogues and monologues, construction of acts, gestures, symbolic characters, formal perfection), and are consequently outside the scope of this thesis. Perhaps one might make the general point that Partl, despite acknowledging Grillparzer's Classical inheritance, places too much stress on Grillparzer's links with the Baroque stage and the Jesuit ludi caesari. Partl quite correctly considers Ottokar more subtle, more ambiguous than Wallenstein, but precisely that fact distances Grillparzer even further from the didactic, superficial black and white nature of the religious Baroque pageants. If Ottokar does have a tendency to pomp and pageantry, then it is alone amongst Grillparzer's plays in that respect. The insistence on the Jesuit stage and the clash of the human soul with metaphysical forces (p.99f.) leads to a view of Ottokar or of Grillparzer's work in general as Christian: "Erlösung und Gnade werden für Grillparzer zum organischen Zielpunkt christlicher Tragödie" (p.255). Ottokar, in Partl's opinion, recognises the new "christliches Staatsethos", is concerned with "die Rettung seiner Seele durch den Sprung in die Eindeutigkeit seiner transzendenten Bezogenheit" (p.153), but it seems in Ottokar to be far more a question of the moral order of the universe. Partl himself speaks of the moral law being visible (p.45), and Grillparzer may well, as Goethe frequently does, cloak this in religious terms, but he is not concerned with a "religiöser Ordnungsglaube" (p.78). Partl is right to see a lack of Schillerian freedom in Ottokar and a greater stress on Ottokar's guilt (pp.153,254), but one should point out that there is a lack of Schillerian freedom in Wallenstein also, compared to Maria Stuart, Jungfrau, Braut von Messina, and that Ottokar, with his repentance and desire to atone for his crimes, is more Schillerian

than Wallenstein himself, who goes to his death in blissful ignorance of the true state of affairs. The fact that Ottokar, in a number of ways, is untypical of Grillparzer's work as a whole, not least in its use of an ideal character and in its optimistic belief in ordered existence, and the additional fact that Wallenstein, although Schiller's greatest work, is also his least representative drama - both make an attempt to extend analysis of the two works to a comparison of the two authors' oeuvres problematic in the extreme.

For Staiger, Grillparzer's characters (he is thinking predominantly of Ottokar) are weak by comparison with Schiller's, and certainly Ottokar's moral recovery is one born of an insight into human failings. Wallenstein says that he feels the same as before, and we have no reason to doubt it; we have every reason to doubt the validity of Ottokar's similar statement. Schiller's tragic heroes are judged by the highest standard conceivable. The slightest deviation from the path of duty is a crisis for Johanna, victory is only achieved by a return to complete harmony of character. Yet Maria, Don Cesar and Wallenstein are all criminals in one way or another, like Ottokar; Maria, Don Cesar and Johanna all accept their deaths as a means to atone for past crimes, just as Ottokar also does when he sees his end approaching. The contrast lies in the emphasis placed on the individual in Schiller's plays. In Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, Jungfrau, the political matters are largely irrelevant and certainly forgotten by the end of the play, if they were ever present in the first place. What is important is the main figure's attainment of moral harmony through a subordination of earthly matters to spiritual ones. A criminal can achieve nobility and dignity because his past crimes are not allowed to interfere if he feels sincerely repentant and wishes to atone, even though Wallenstein meets an unexpected death, he has at least approached this same glorious position by the end of the play. For Grillparzer, the individual is seen within a wider framework wherever

appropriate, in Ottokar and Treuer Diener in terms of the political ideals represented. Naumann in fact suggests that the characters in Ottokar are judged against the historical situation, but this is not quite correct, as it is obvious that the ideals presented are meant to be universally valid, not limited to the thirteenth century, Partl's insistence on the historical Habsburg mythology is dangerous for the same reason.<sup>(21)</sup> As a result Ottokar can never escape being contrasted unfavourably with Rudolf. His ability to rival Rudolf depends on a blind trust in his own importance and in the inevitability of success; once this is gone, he gains as a human being but loses as a leader. Dramatically, Ottokar is the main character in the play, but from a moral viewpoint he is overshadowed by the ideal Rudolf. Wallenstein of course has never been as great a villain as Ottokar, he stands above both friends and enemies with the exception of Max, he however is outside Wallenstein's political sphere, his solutions would almost certainly be impracticable in the materialist world in which Wallenstein is involved. Hence despite the effect which his death has on Wallenstein, Max is sufficiently distanced not to jeopardise the undivided attention which we should devote to the character of Wallenstein at the end.

The idea that necessity compels actions is another theme that highlights Ottokar's initial inferiority. Once Wallenstein has made his first approach to the Swedes, everything starts to go against him. He loses the confidence of the court, his followers begin to slip away, rumours of treason are rife, his own loyal supporters contrive to force him onto a course which he claims to have considered but not fully intended:

Beim großen Gott des Himmels! Es war nicht  
Mein Ernst, beschloßne Sache war es nie.  
In dem Gedanken bloß gefiel ich mir,

Die Freiheit reizte mich und das Vermögen. (Tod, 146-9)

Finally he feels compelled to take decisive action, because there is no way out. A number of diary entries in these years reveal Grillparzer's interest in the theme of the



initial cause of a disaster;

Herodes ... fühlt wohl das Unwürdige seines Benehmens, klagt aber die Welt und die Menschen an, als von ihnen genötigt. Wirklich nötigen auch diese zum zweiten und den folgenden Schritten, und man vergißt nur zu leicht, daß man den ersten Schritt freiwillig getan.

(Tgb.1182, cf.also Tgb.1339)

Like Wallenstein, Ottokar realises that he was responsible for the course of events. He has got where he is by unscrupulous, if not illegal means; crowns and dukedoms seem to fall into his lap. Where he goes wrong is not in his desire for more power - his rule over his lands, his coveting of the imperial crown are both quite legitimate, unlike Wallenstein's designs - but in his desire for an heir. What in Wallenstein is a relatively minor element and merely indicative of the extent of the hero's ambition, is for Ottokar the root cause of his downfall, for it entails the rejection of Margarete, a moral rather than a political crime. Whilst he can defend with some justification his other measures by referring to his nation's welfare, his desire for an heir is a purely private matter of ensuring his fame after death. (The possible threat of a war of succession does not enter Ottokar's head and need not concern us.) Grillparzer may be guilty of more self-accusation concerning his own rejection of Charlotte Paumgarten for the sake of his art, but it is also a motif he saw in Napoleon's story. Walter Silz has stressed the very unsatisfactory nature of Ottokar's marriage to Margarete, which was in any case undertaken for political reasons, but this apparently makes no difference for Grillparzer.<sup>(22)</sup> The rejection of Margarete, the attack on her integrity, that is the phantom which follows Ottokar throughout, it is his treatment of her that loses him the imperial crown, forfeits the support of the Austrians, and also indirectly incurs the wrath of the Rosenbergs because Ottokar does not favour Bertha. The ghost of Margarete is constantly invoked, by Rudolf initially, and then she appears as he approaches his doom; it is to her that he makes his first admission of guilt. Naumann correctly points out that this insistence on

personal, moral guilt brings Grillparzer close to Classicism, (23) but in fact Ottokar's guilt appears more human, more tangible than Wallenstein's, hence his recovery at the end is more impressive from a human point of view than that of Johanna or Maria Stuart, whose crimes are either meaningless or long since forgotten.

Grillparzer's characters may not achieve the ideal moral strength of Schiller's, but they are more human as a result and more complex, as Partl stresses (p.56). Ottokar's motives are an intricate blend of personal and political, in his initial rejection of Margarete, his inability to punish Zawisch, in his desire to wipe out his disgrace. Zawisch himself does not seem to know exactly why he behaves as he does, he has merely a vague notion of wanting to cause Ottokar's downfall. The complexity is even more striking in Treuer Diener. Here the best characters are not without serious faults - Andreas's trust in his wife and failure to recognise the influence of Otto, Bancbanus's fanatical loyalty and his otherwise limited outlook - whilst the worst character, Otto von Meran, is able to do a good deed at the end in rescuing the young prince. The psychological depth of Gertrude, Otto, Erny, is quite foreign to Schiller's plays. Baumann writes of "die Wahrheit des Nie-völlig-Deutlichen", (24) seen in the language in the use of broken sentences, silence, words involuntarily spoken. Whilst Schiller's and Goethe's heroes normally tell us what they think, Grillparzer's are more inclined to suggest but no more, especially in Treuer Diener, but in Ottokar also, despite the King's long confession at the end. The characters are strikingly modern, especially in the recurring sexual problems, in Ottokar and Gertrude in particular, as later in Alfons in Jüdin, or in Libussa. Human affairs are complex, success is a chancy business. Bancbanus says he has carried out his task, "gut und schlimm, wies eben möglich war" (1971). Things do not work out, hence significantly it is Peter, not Simon, who kills the Queen by accident. It is important to judge a man's intentions,

not the possibly fortuitous results (2007-8), but as the court official points out in Bruderzwist, this is not always feasible in human affairs (33).<sup>(25)</sup> The moral strength required to steer a course through life or to face death is consequently more impressive if less complete than that of Schiller's characters in their comparatively straightforward world. Schiller's classical tragedies, except Wallenstein, are strikingly similar in pursuing a theoretical pattern; Grillparzer's plays, despite all critical attempts to encompass them within one framework, are far from identical, for which we should be grateful.

Equally, however, this complexity and ambiguity does not cause Grillparzer to abandon totally his standards and principles. It was in connection with Treuer Diener that he made the famous statement of his desire to achieve a balance of Goethe and Kotzebue. If the action in the central part of the play showed the colourful chaos of life, then the calm composure of the final act was designed to "die Handlung in das menschliche Geleise zurückzuführen" (Tgb.1626). Typically, Grillparzer feared he had been unsuccessful in this operation, the play seemed too "roh und gewalttätig" to be dedicated to Goethe (IV,155). Nevertheless we may dismiss this as a further example of the author's inveterate pessimism; on the other hand, August Sauer's view of 1893 still seems valid:

Er nähert sich daher nun in der Darstellung noch mehr dem Bunten, Sprunghaften, Verwirrenden, Zufälligen des Lebens, ohne dabei die hohen Grundgedanken aus dem Auge zu verlieren. (26)

It is such high principles which continue to testify to Grillparzer's adoption of the ideas of German Classicism.

In terms of volume, the poetic works of the period from Ottokar to the end of the decade show a marked decline in the use of Classical vocabulary, especially its adjectives; "edel", "frei", "sanft", "rein" are rare during the period, similarly also "Maß", "Pflicht", "Tugend". The words "Gesetz", "Grenze", "Schicksal", "Schuld" disappear almost entirely, "wahr" and "Tat" are found in Melusina but are otherwise rare, "Herz" and "schön" are

much less common than before, only in Melusina do they occur with any regularity. Although Melusina does retain some of the Classical vocabulary that is otherwise uncommon in this period, even this obviously lyrical work shows to a great extent the lexical tendencies of these years. The vocabulary retained is only that which is essential to the action: the battle of love between the peaceful world of poetic truth and the human realm of activity (hence "Herz", "Liebe", "Treue", "Ruhe", "schön", "wahr", "Mensch", "Tat"). In Melusina also we find only the occasional glimpse of the more lyrical vocabulary of Classicism which had enjoyed a revival in Grillparzer's work between 1816 and 1821 after comparative neglect in the previous quinquennium; "hold" and "glühen/Glut" are still found occasionally in both poetry and drama, "wallen" in the poetry, otherwise words such as "heiter", "süß", "wild", "wehen", "Wonne" disappear almost completely.

One may see this trend as a quite deliberate poetic policy, perhaps as a wish to overcome the imitative tendencies of his earlier plays, a desire to create a new dramatic style. The diaries of the period do not follow this trend to anything like the same extent, but continue to make full use of "frei", "schön", "still", "streben", "Tat", "wahr", as well as the terms retained in the plays. Grillparzer's style in the two plays of the 1820s is much more precise, there is a lack of powerful speeches, philosophical rhetoric, wordy monologues. In Treuer Diener, according to W.E. Yates, Grillparzer "eschews operatically grandiloquent effusions".<sup>(27)</sup> Grillparzer is striving for a more realistic style which, despite Bancbanus's liking for proverbs and aphorisms, is at times even prosaic within the verse. The language is shorn of all unnecessary epithets. All this accounts to a considerable extent for the general decline in the use of Classical vocabulary, but consequently the retention of certain words acquires a greater significance, becomes a more definite sign of their importance. This is clearly the case in Ottokar and Treuer Diener with such terms as

"Recht", "Mensch", "Ruhe", "Friede", "Treue", which alone remain frequent throughout the 1820s. The decline in the volume of Classical vocabulary might seem to support Staiger's assertion quoted at the beginning of this chapter, but the ideals which are retained and against which the characters in both the plays of the period are judged, can only make one reverse the conclusions which Staiger reaches. Stylistically, Grillparzer may be moving away from Classicism, but thematically the link is much closer. The ideals of humanity whose validity was seriously questioned in Vließ, are wholeheartedly upheld in Ottokar and Treuer Diener.

#### NOTES

1. Staiger, p.223.
2. Politzer, p.168, quotation from Selbstbiographie (IV,126).
3. Walter Naumann, "Grillparzer. König Ottokars Blück und Ende", in Das deutsche Drama vom Barock bis zur Gegenwart, hrsg. von Benno von Wiese, Band I, Düsseldorf, 1958, pp.405-21, Harald Steinhagen, "Grillparzers König Ottokars Glück und Ende. Drama, Geschichte und Zeitgeschichte", Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft, XIV (1971), 456-87.
4. See also Tell, 702, 1029, 1118, 1149, 1303, 1617, 1654, 2119.
5. See especially Maria Stuart, 937, 957, 2300, 2450, for the concept of justice in Jungfrau, see 11.698, 1785, 2089.
6. In Wallenstein, we are given no insight into the wishes of the people. Only Max is interested in peace, otherwise we hear only of the soldiers' thirst for war.
7. Manfred Roschek, Grillparzers Staatsauffassung, (Diss.) Cologne, 1961, p.68.
8. Roschek, p.107; Naumann, Franz Grillparzer, p.87.
9. Alfred Doppler, "Der Herrscher, ein trüber Spiegel der absoluten Ordnung", Études Germaniques, XXVII (1972), 207-23.
10. Staiger, p.239; Hermand, p.186; Alewyn, p.18; Alker, p.62; Naumann, "König Ottokar ...", pp.420-1; Naumann, Franz Grillparzer, p.195.
11. In Friedrich Sengle's view, the Biedermeier writer welcomed the defeat of Napoleon as "eine Gottesgabe, an der er Anteil nehmen durfte" (Biedermeierzeit, Deutsche Literatur im Spannungsfeld zwischen Restauration und Revolution, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1971-2, vol.1, p.131). Grillparzer's less negative opinion of Napoleon is however typical of his distance from the Biedermeier reaction.

12. See also especially Tasso, 1037; Wanderjahre, III, 9; Römische Elegien, VI, 1.24, "Sprüche", 57 (HA I, 313); Jungfrau, 669, 752, 1942, 3277; Tell, 1601-3, 1625-6.
13. Blanka, 4124; Ahnfrau, 642, 2366; Weh dem, 271; Esther, 503.
14. See Bruderzwist, 688, 691, 1155, 1312, 1487, 1741, 2050, 2106, 2759.
15. See "Der Christbaum" (I, 335), 1.50, "Einem Regiments-Inhaber".
16. Max Kommerell, "Grillparzer. Ein Dichter der Treue", in Kommerell, Dichterische Welterfahrung, Frankfurt/Main, 1952, pp. 7-22. For further similar descriptions of loyalty in Grillparzer's work, see Tgb. 3990, "Dem Banus" (I, 333), "Nachruf" (I, 339), "Ihr nennt euch" (I, 506), "Es steht nicht gut" (I, 528). In an epigram of 1868, "Deutscher Bund", he laments that loyalty is now seen as old-fashioned.
17. Staiger and Steinhagen, for example.
18. See Piccolomini, 744-5, Tod, 1521-3; Ottokar, 511.
19. Steinhagen, p. 472.
20. Kurt Partl, Friedrich Schillers "Wallenstein" und Franz Grillparzers "König Ottokars Glück und Ende", Bonn, 1960.
21. Naumann, "König Ottokar ...", p. 419; Partl, pp. 78, 232.
22. Walter Silz, "Grillparzer's Ottokar", Germanic Review, XXXIX (1964), 243-61, pp. 253-4.
23. Naumann, "König Ottokar ...", p. 406.
24. Baumann, Versuche, p. 41.
25. See also Ahnfrau, 1880-1, 2997-9, 3003-4; Medea, 1441; Bruderzwist, 2211-2.
26. August Sauer, "Ein treuer Diener seines Herrn", GrJb, III (1893), 1-40, pp. 23-4.
27. W.E. Yates, Grillparzer, p. 139.

Chapter 6. The conflict of love and duty

Grillparzer's first discussion of the theme of Hero and Leander occurs in 1820 (Tgb.322); Die Jüdin von Toledo was completed some twenty years after Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, but interest in the subject goes back to an even earlier period. In 1816, Grillparzer noted in his diary: "Alphons VIII König von Kastilien verliebt sich in eine Jüdin" (Tgb.152). The two plays have so many similarities centering around the basic conflict of love and duty that it seems appropriate to consider these plays together, despite the subsidiary political aspect in Jüdin, which may be considered in the context of the late political plays, and it will be necessary to examine the way in which Grillparzer draws on the Classical heritage for his treatment of these themes.

In both these plays we witness a character awakening to full experience and existence through the intrusion of love, in both cases one might argue that "awakening" is the exact opposite of what actually happens. The issues of right and duty are fully represented in each play, although the forces of duty are more numerous in Jüdin and also more powerful and total, encompassing both the voice of the state in Manrique and the nobles, as well as a much closer family link than the avuncular voice of wisdom in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen. There are of course major differences; Hero is a woman about to become a priestess, Alphons is a man who has been a king for some time, Hero alone is affected by new new experience, in the later play the welfare of the whole state is jeopardised, for Alphons, life goes on at the end as he accepts his duties and sets out to fight the enemy massing at the border, Hero is totally incapable of existing once Leander has died. In addition there are subtle differences in the conflicting concepts of love and duty that need closer attention.

i) "Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen" as a Classical play

In order to explain the slightly strange title he had given to his tragedy of Hero and Leander, Grillparzer wrote in his diary for 1836: "Mir lag aber daran, gleich von vornherein anzudeuten, daß die Behandlung, obgleich mit antiker Färbung, doch romantisch gemeint sei. Es war überhaupt ein Versuch, beide Richtungen zu vereinigen" (Tgb.3247). Grillparzer expressed the same idea in his autobiography fifteen years later: "Der etwas prätios klingende Titel: Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen; sollte im voraus auf die romantische oder vielmehr menschlich allgemeine Behandlung der antiken Fabel hindeuten" (IV,177). Grillparzer's use of the word "romantisch" may strike us as slightly odd, but he is obviously employing the term in the sense of "modern, intelligible for the present day", as he goes on to stress more specifically. Certainly Grillparzer has achieved a synthesis of the classical story and a more general presentation, in addition he has combined Classicism and Romanticism in a more contemporary sense, blending the austerity and formal precision of Goethe's Iphigenie or Tasso with the richness of symbol, the liveliness and theatrical effectiveness of more Romantic writers such as Kotzebue or the Viennese popular dramatists such as Raimund. It was during work on this play that Grillparzer wrote in his diary, "ich fühle mich gerade jenes Mittelding zwischen Goethe und Kotzebue, wie ihn das Drama braucht" (Tgb.1626), and although, as we have seen, Grillparzer was discussing his previous play, Treuer Diener, it is not unreasonable to assume that he was also thinking of the work immediately at hand. The contrast between violent theatrical effects and a more peaceful act on a generally human level is also clear in the later play. The fifth act of Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, which Grillparzer considered "der zu theatralische Schluß" (Tgb.1709), has a powerful effect on the audience, but it focuses the attention almost exclusively on Hero's plight. As a result, the figure of the priest, who to some extent at least represents more general values and



ideals, comes off rather badly, "vor allem ist die Figur des Priesters dabei zu kurz gekommen" (Tgb.3247), and the fourth act, which caused Grillparzer so much trouble, yet which he claimed to have written with particular enthusiasm, was almost certainly intended to provide a wider basis for the play, and to suggest greater significance than the mere personal fate of one unfortunate girl.

On the surface, Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen is formally a classical play in the German tradition. Into five acts are compressed the events of two days, in settings which are different parts of the temple grounds, apart from a short trip across the Hellespont to Abydos. There is a small number of characters, apart from a brief intrusion by the crowds attending the ceremony at which Hero takes her vows. The general arrangement of the play owes much to Goethe's Iphigenie, as already examined by Gustav Waniek.<sup>(1)</sup> Both plays begin with a monologue by the heroine, and after a brief interlude the man who is the heroine's guardian appears for an important discussion with the heroine. Act II of each play opens with a discussion between hero and companion before the heroine enters, to be greeted in the first instance by the companion until the hero himself can find sufficient courage to intervene. A climactic meeting between hero and heroine in Act III gives way to an act of intrigue before the final climax is reached in Act V. The closeness of layout in the two plays, above all in the first two acts, certainly seems obvious enough to negate the suggestion of purely dramatic convention.

In addition there are a number of thematic links, even though the way the themes are used may be totally different. Both Hero and Iphigenie are priestesses, both have a beneficial effect on the hero, who is awakened to a more positive attitude to life, aroused to action and the overcoming of pointless melancholy. The classical material is adapted in similar ways, as I have considered in the context of the Vließ trilogy, fate is no longer superhuman but is placed in human hands. It is of course quite clear

that Grillparzer's play is much richer than the German Classical plays, especially Goethe's, despite the formal links we have detected. According to E.E. Papst, Grillparzer desired "to vitalise the rarefied poetry of Weimar Classicism with the full theatrical substance of the Austrian tradition".<sup>(2)</sup> As in the majority of his plays, Grillparzer makes much more use of activity and plasticity, which a comparison with the bare outlines of Iphigenie would only stress, and he hoped for great effect from "die große Bildlichkeit des Stückes" (Tgb.1709). Grillparzer uses symbolic props and episodes, such as cloak, lamp, and dove; his stage directions are detailed and precise, as at the beginning of Act IV, in complete contrast to those of Goethe. In Iphigenie and Tasso the characters seem to enter on cue to deliver beautifully devised speeches, in Grillparzer's play much is revealed by gestures - Hero caressing the dove, looking over her shoulder at Leander - or by mere hints and suggestions, as when Hero sings of Leda and the swan or when she continually thinks in terms of years and hence the next occasion on which she can see Leander. There is much use of realistic broken language, short clipped sentences, lines split up even into four speeches (259-61, 270, 278). This contrasts particularly with the stylised and artificial stichomythia which in Iphigenie and Tasso is the only means used to break up the long speeches. Leander is characterised by his reticence, even silence, above all in Acts I and II, and this expresses his melancholy, his pessimistic attitude far more eloquently than Orest's lengthy depiction of his own gloom in Act II of Iphigenie. Reich aptly sees Grillparzer expressing feeling without pompous rhetoric and exaggeration, and this tendency is apparent in Grillparzer's work from Treuer Diener onwards. Grillparzer's play is one of simple language, in the opening monologue, in the classic simplicity of the love scene in the tower; rhetoric enters only in Leander's proud statement of his power or in Hero's farewell to Leander's body, and also in the speeches of the priest.

Even the rhetorical passages mentioned are couched in far simpler language than, for example, Hero's accusations in Schiller's ballad on the same theme, and one may easily agree with Politzer's description of the language as "mythische Alltagsrede".<sup>(3)</sup> All this is in keeping with the complete innocence of the two main characters, whose awakening to maturity and self-assurance is then partly seen in a greater ability to talk at people, but whose continuing immaturity is seen in their inability really to converse with others. It is precisely in this simplicity, the naivety of much of the language, that Grillparzer achieves not only the beauty but also the general appeal which he was seeking, because so little is said and so much suggested.

ii) The depiction of love in Grillparzer's work

The stylistic elements of Grillparzer's dramatic art and the obvious contrasts with Classicism are commonplaces of criticism, with which I have no wish to take issue. Equally however, the thematic content of Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen is in conflict with much Classical tragedy. The play shows the overwhelming power of love which takes over two young people, makes them oblivious to everything else, causes them to defy the forces of nature, challenge their superiors, and in general forget their duties and responsibilities. Hero was originally to be much more culpable than she now is, she was to throw down a cloak for Leander to make himself less conspicuous (Tgb. 322). Now it is a more gradual development in Hero, although the initial effect of Leander's presence is still a powerful one. Nevertheless, both Hero and Leander are matured by love, both acquire a real sense of existence. Far from being "the tragedy of a loss of self", as Papst believes,<sup>(4)</sup> love is the discovery of self in inimical and ultimately impossible circumstances. In the process, their roles are reversed; Leander becomes forthright, Hero reticent, Leander avoids friends, Hero seeks them. As long as Leander is far away,

Hero believes love can be avoided (1010-2); once he has appeared she is gradually but systematically overcome and by the end of Act III she is Leander's prisoner, not vice-versa as she would like to think. Yet she is completely self-confident, "ich denke, künftig selbst mir zu gebieten" (1686), and the priest describes her as "so still, so klug, so Ebenmaß in jedem" (1751).

Grillparzer had written in his preparatory notes of "das Gleichgewicht des Gefühls ... als Weib (I/19,232), and it is this feeling which dominates Hero and consequently the play as a whole. Hero is "höchst gesteigert, sensuell, all das Dämonische, der ganzen Welt vergessende, taub und blinde was die Weiber befällt wenn eine wahre Liebe eine Beziehung auf die Sinne bekommen hat" (ibid.). The beauty of the play lies in the way in which love is depicted, "kein brausender Wasserfall, ein Bach der durch Kiesel schäumt" (I/19,196). Nevertheless, the two lovers are by the end of the play completely blind to everything else, Leander has become everything for Hero, the rest of life and the world is a mere shadow:

Sein Leben war das Leben, deines, meins,  
Des Weltalls Leben. Als wirs ließen sterben,  
Da starben wir mit ihm. (1978-80)

Outwardly, Hero's vows are the cause of their downfall, and it is tragic that she herself had chosen them when she knew nothing better, but underneath the surface one is justified in asking whether the complete dominance of love would not have proved their undoing in some other way, in that it isolates them entirely from anyone or anything else. Gert Kleinschmidt speaks of the characters' loss of all contact with reality and concludes, "nicht das, was ist, sondern das, was sein soll, wird zur Wirklichkeit ... Die Liebe verfremdet dem Menschen die Wirklichkeit".<sup>(5)</sup> In its ferocity and total dominance, love does seem almost unnatural;

Das ist nicht gut,  
Was so verkehrt die innerste Natur,  
Auslöscht das Licht, das uns die Götter gaben,  
Daß es uns leite, wie der Stern des Pols  
Den Schiffer führt. (1187-91)

Despite Leander's justified reply to this, Grillparzer is clearly suggesting that love is something abnormal, excessive, in that it prevents man from seeing the light of reason. At the same time, however, there is an autobiographical extension of this view, as was the case especially in Sappho and Vließ, for Grillparzer is undoubtedly defending his own continuing withdrawal from affairs of the heart, which threaten to extinguish the light of his creative genius. In an early draft, he wrote of the man in love: "Die rechte Bahn verliert er und das Maß" (I/19,211). In so far as Grillparzer has been considered a poet of moderation, this is a strong condemnation of the power of love. It is no coincidence that Hero is modelled on Marie von Smolenitz, who threatened more than any other woman, including Kathi Fröhlich, to draw him away from his art by the force of her beauty and sensuality.

Grillparzer's experience is one source for Die Jüdin von Toledo, in which King Alphons, like Hero and Leander, loses his grip on reality under the influence of Rahel. For him it is a more gradual process in keeping with his greater experience. He believes that he is in control of the situation, that he has defeated Rahel (739,777), and even in Act III when the affair has lasted for some time he assures Garceran:

Doch weiß ich auch, daß eines Winkes nur,  
Es eines Worts bedarf, um dieses Trauerspiel  
Zu lösen in sein eigentliches Nichts. (903-5)

He remains throughout more aware of what is happening than does Hero, but this does not in any way detract from the power of passion that overtakes him. He is quite clearly not in control of events, as his gestures and half-completed sentences make manifestly obvious. Politzer writes of "die Unterlegenheit des Willens gegenüber dem Trieb",<sup>(6)</sup> in consequence of which Alphons turns his back on family and state. As in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, the question is asked as to the naturalness of these emotions. Whilst still enthralled by Rahel, Alphons believes that his attraction to her is natural (1462), a fact hotly disputed by his wife. Once Rahel is dead, his views

change:

GARCERAN. Zum Teil wars freilich wieder auch natürlich.  
KÖNIG. Natürlich ist zuletzt nur, was erlaubt. (1843-4)

Yet a number of vital differences appear to exist between the two plays in this context. What is unnatural about the love of Hero and Leander is its excessive quality, what is unnatural about the love of Alphons and Rahel is the fact that it is not love in any full sense of the word, but sheer erotic attraction. In Jüdin the emphasis is placed on the purely physical aspects of the affair between Alphons and Rahel. She is "das Weib als solches, nichts als ihr Geschlecht" (859), her beauty is continually stressed in terms of voluptuous curves, "üppiger Wuchs", terms which destroy any attempt to link her with Classical ideas of "Schönheit" such as Grillparzer also upheld.<sup>(7)</sup> Rahel sees Alphons as "schön" (20,572,593), and the completely physical aspect of the union is underlined once Rahel's physical self is distorted and deceased, at which point Alphons comes to the conclusion: "sie war nicht schön" (1848). Hence his brief wish to believe, "sie aber war die Wahrheit", must be exaggerated and ultimately wrong. Their liason was much too one-sided to be commensurate with ideas of truth, as the term is used by Grillparzer. An early note on the subject reveals the nature of the relationship: "Da erscheint jene Jüdin, und ein Etwas wird in ihm rege, von dessen Dasein er bis jetzt noch keine Ahnung gehabt; die Wollust" (Tgb.1330). In a poem of 1808, "Liebe und Wollust", Grillparzer compared the calm and gentle forces of love with the dangerous, cunning and deceptive power of lust. In a diary note of the same year he had written of his ability to keep love and lust completely apart, and he continues, "als ich Theresen liebte ... wußte ich nie daß sie einen schönen Busen habe, und das ist doch wahrlich viel bei mir gesagt" (Tgb.17). It is of course, as the note on Jüdin makes clear, precisely Rahel's shapely breasts which so captivate Alphons. The love of Hero and Leander is "eine wahre Liebe" (I/19,232), the love of Rahel and Alphons is neither

"wahr" in any wider metaphysical sense, nor "Liebe" in the full meaning of the word.

But the word used in the play to describe the relationship of King and Jewess is "Liebe". Not surprisingly, this love is revealed in a very negative light. Love is equated with madness (405,958), it is a play, a ritual (904,961), a battle fought with closed visors so that the eyes cannot be seen (1020-1). For Alphons, love goes together with contempt (990). This emphasis on love as something insane, unnatural is heightened by the fact that the word only occurs in Acts II and III, which present the King in his folly. Even here, Rahel doubts whether she has ever loved (957), before confirming in her last words, "und hab ihn, Schwester, wahrhaft doch geliebt" (1136). Also she claims that the King does not really know what love is: "Er glaubt zu lieben" (966). The King describes his experience as a sickness (1385), and Kleinschmidt's view of love in Grillparzer's work as a sickness or madness seems apt here.<sup>(8)</sup> It is however a significant comment on Kleinschmidt's excessively negative views that here in Jüdin it is lust, not love that we are dealing with.

Elsewhere in Grillparzer's work, the problematic and dangerous nature of love is seen. In Sappho love has an ennobling quality (355-6), true love is part of the woman's realm that is unknown to man (39,825-36), a comparison that is reminiscent of the youthful fragment "Irene" and the Classical sources for that fragment. But already in Sappho and especially in Vließ, love is seen in terms far removed from the Classical ideal of perfect harmony. In both plays, love is illogical and unbalancing, frequently approximating to hatred in a manner reminiscent not of Classicism, but of Kleist's Penthesilea, which Goethe found so abhorrent. The proximity of love and hatred is also found in Esther (190). It is only in a small number of poems that a more pretty and conventional picture of love is painted ("Ständchen" (I,107), "Notturmo" (I,178)), as also in Melusina, but even there the situation is complicated by the essential difference between the

would-be lovers. Otherwise love is a complicated, intricate matter, as in the various degrees of love depicted in Treuer Diener, or in Grillparzer's own self-torturing because he felt incapable of love,<sup>(9)</sup> a sentiment echoed in certain of his characters such as Alphons and Rahel, or Mariamne in "Die letzten Könige von Juda" (II,1100), a concept of love which Kleinschmidt terms "Bewahrung zweier Einsamkeiten".<sup>(10)</sup> Love is an independent force, its effect in Jüdin and Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen is as overpowering as it is in Vließ, where it is seen to destroy man's ability to use his will:

Es gibt ein Etwas in des Menschen Wesen,  
Das, unabhängig von des Eigners Willen,  
Anzieht und abstößt mit blinder Gewalt.  
(Argonauten, 1012-4)<sup>(11)</sup>

According to Kleinschmidt, "der Mensch kann sich nicht für oder gegen die Liebe entscheiden", but in view of the excessively pessimistic nature of the Vließ it is dangerous to follow the same critic's opinion that the trilogy represents Grillparzer's "endgültige und entscheidende Bild der Liebe".<sup>(12)</sup> Kleinschmidt himself admits (p.96) that Primislaus and Libussa present an ideal of love and marriage for the good of the whole as "eine gesellschaftliche Humanität". Certainly, however, plays such as Ahnfrau, Vließ, Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen and Jüdin show love dominating a character to the exclusion of all other considerations, a picture that is quite contrary to Classical ideas, whichever of the contrasting pictures of love one draws from Classicism.

On the one hand there is praise of love as an ideal, an ennobling force which produces harmony in man through a linking of his sensual and spiritual drives:

Die Liebe allein ist also eine freie Empfindung, denn ihre reine Quelle strömt hervor aus dem Sitz der Freiheit, aus unsrer göttlichen Natur. Es ist hier nicht das Kleine und Niedrige, was sich mit dem Großen und Hohen mißt, nicht der Sinn, der an dem Vernunftgesetz schwindelnd hinaufsieht; es ist das absolut Große selbst, was in der Anmut und Schönheit sich nachgeahmt und in der Sittlichkeit sich befriedigt findet, es ist der Gesetzgeber selbst, der Gott in uns, der mit seinem eigenen Bilde in der Sinnenwelt spielt. (Über Anmut und Würde, XX,303)



Similar sentiments are expressed in the Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, in addition the free choice involved in love can serve as a model for the voluntary linking of the various elements in society (XX,409). Schiller's poem "Die Geschlechter" gives a vision of love as a divine force uniting opposites. Goethe typically uses a less theoretical framework but still presents love in similar terms, uniting the beautiful or simply multifarious elements of life. It is one of the basic elements of life ("Urworte"), to which a complete book of the Westöstlicher Divan is devoted. In the Römische Elegien, love is seen as a perfect totality of spiritual and sensual, love helps the poet to understand the statues and monuments, and he taps out classical metres on the back of his sleeping partner. In "Die Braut von Korinth", natural love is destroyed by an excessive insistence on religious beliefs, in a manner reminiscent of Grillparzer's treatment of the story of Hero. The power of love is partly responsible for Faust's salvation, Mephisto by comparison is quite incapable of love (3489-90, 11864-5, 11938-41). Love, it would appear, helps Faust to be "des rechten Weges wohl bewußt"; one of Goethe's "Sprüche" presents the same message:

Wer recht will tun, immer und mit Lust,  
Der hege wahre Lieb' in Sinn und Brust.

(HA I,311; cf. also No.70 (I,315))

Hermann und Dorothea would seem to present such an idyllic picture of love in the uniting of the main characters as an apparent answer to the chaos of political events. On the whole however, the picture of love in the creative works of Classicism is not in any way ideal. Love in Wilhelm Meister is very much a matter of convenience, with a view to setting up a family, and also as part of a general educative process, whilst Die natürliche Tochter depicts the most extreme example of a marriage of convenience. The princess in Tasso makes love almost meaningless by her insistence that it can only be achieved by renunciation. In Wallenstein, Max chooses the path of duty in abandoning Thekla, but she supports him in this action, even though they were ideally

suited to one another. Joan of Arc in her divine mission rejects all suggestions of earthly ties and it is her one brief moment of weakness at the sight of Lionel that causes her downfall. For Schiller, love in any daemonic sense is a force that can jeopardise man's freedom and the carrying out of his moral duty. It is consequently a potentially dangerous element in all Schiller's Classical tragedies except Tell. Its power is seen at its greatest in Die Braut von Messina, but even here the love of the two brothers for the same girl is heightened by their inherent jealousy towards one another, and Don Cesar's self-immolation, the ultimate act of moral freedom, puts an end to the chain of catastrophe but also his earlier hopes of happiness with Beatrice. Goethe himself was far from belittling the importance of love despite his stoic insistence on moderation and renunciation especially in the early Weimar period, but even in the greatest of his love poems there is always an objective view, an intellectual element involved, as in the Römische Elegien. His notes to the "Urworte" at first suggest that love is something akin to an elemental force as in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen: "er glaubt zu erhaschen und wird gefangen, er glaubt gewonnen zu haben und ist schon verloren" (HA I,406) - but ultimately this picture is replaced by the cosy establishment interpretation of "Kinder, Kirche und Küche". Gretchen's love for Faust is similar to Hero's for Leander in its innocence and its overcoming of responsibilities and ethical considerations, but Faust's approach is very much the intellectual attitude of a man seeking experience, and he, rather than Gretchen, is the dominating partner not only in the love affair itself but also in the general focus of the play.

The major work by Goethe which comes nearest to Grillparzer's plays in its depiction of love is quite definitely Die Wahlverwandtschaften. Ottilie and Eduard are quite overcome by their love for one another, they forget marital duties, moral and social responsibilities. For Ottilie, life is only coherent through Eduard, life

is totally empty without love, the world is non-existent without him: "Ein Leben ohne Liebe ist nur eine comédie à tiroir" (II,9). Similarly, Hero cannot envisage the possibility of life without Leander. Love seems to overcome all concepts of "Vernunft und Tugend, Pflicht und alles Heilige" (II,14). Ottilie, like Hero, realises the subjectivity of time under the influence of love. Ottilie however finally decides that she has behaved wrongly, she accepts the child's death as a warning. Alphons in Jüdin comes to such an insight but Hero continues to see her own guilt predominantly in her lack of vigilance. The two lovers are nevertheless united in death in Goethe's novel, and Janthe demands this right for Hero and Leander (2111). Goethe makes use of symbols, the medallion, the goblet, and the landscape have great significance as do the sea, the tower, night and day in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen or the pictures in Jüdin. Significantly however, Die Wahlverwandtschaften is one of Goethe's least Classical works, not only in the mysterious use of landscape, symbols, tableaux, mesmerism, but in general in the romantic view of love as an all-embracing, all-conquering force which man cannot really control and which challenges the very human concepts of free moral choice and self-mastery. Grillparzer himself looked upon the novel with a certain suspicion because of its moral aspects (III,55), equally however he considered it an "unendliches Meisterstück" (Tgb.3538) and one may argue that the knowledge that Goethe himself could write such a work may have acted as added encouragement to Grillparzer, who wanted in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen to produce a theatrically effective play of powerful emotions but who did not wish to be carried away to excessive Romanticism in either theme or presentation.

Schiller's ballad "Hero und Leander" also provides the theme of love conquering all barriers (11.10,30). Here there is no mention of any priest, and Leander comes and goes for a whole month before the gods of the sea and nature take the life of Leander, who has not noticed the

change of season and the consequent dangers of Autumn weather. In Schiller's ballad as in Grillparzer's play however, there is a suggestion that the sea represents the more permanent aspects of life, in contrast to which man's love, so all-embracing to him, is transient and brief. A number of links can be traced in addition. In both works Hero promises to sacrifice to the gods for sparing Leander; in the ballad it is offered as a bribe as the storm rages, in the play Hero is under the mistaken impression that Leander has survived. Schiller's Leander has sworn that only death will prevent him from reaching Hero: "Ihn entbindet nur der Tod" (176). Grillparzer's Leander makes a similar vow:

Amor und Hymen, ziehet ihr voran,  
Ich komm, ich folg, und wäre Tod der dritte. (1658-9)

Schiller's Hero believes the gods are friendly to the lovers just as Grillparzer's Leander does. One important difference between the two treatments of the theme lies in the degree of awareness involved. Hero in Schiller's ballad watches the whole catastrophe, sees the storm arising, the sea foaming, and she prays to the gods as she foresees the catastrophe. When Leander's body is washed ashore, she calmly addresses the gods:

Ich erkenn' euch, ernste Mächte,  
Strenge treibt ihr eure Rechte. (241-2)

Then, without a word of grief or lamentation, she leaps from the top of the tower into the sea:

Keine Klage läßt sie schallen,  
Keine Träne sieht man fallen,  
Und ein edles Feuer rötet  
Das erbleichte Angesicht. (234-5, 239-40)

Grillparzer's Hero spends Act IV in a complete daze, the result of tiredness and her sexual elation, she is unaware of the priest's suspicions and schemes, or at least fails to connect the two (1784-6, 1794-6), she even welcomes the freshness of the wind as likely to drive Leander more quickly to the shore. After her fatal sleep, she rushes about helplessly as Leander's body is carried to and fro, she pours forth her lament, her accusations, until "Leander"

is the only word she can utter and she dies of a broken heart. Her whole being has been taken over by Leander and hence her existence is destroyed by his death. For Grillparzer's Hero to have committed suicide would have been totally out of character, her freedom to act in any way has been lost, there is no chance of her reaching the quiet nobility ("stille Größe", one might say), of her making the calm collected decision reached by the priestess in Schiller's ballad. Love, which has caused Hero and Leander to reach maturity, has proved to be a deceptive force, tempting man onward before destroying him; "Versprichst du viel und hältst du also Wort?" (2119).

iii) The concept of duty

In Schiller's ballad, the enemy of the lovers is the sea. In Grillparzer's play however, there is a much more concrete opposition in the figure of the priest and the responsibilities he defends, namely the obligations and duties of Hero's priestly vows. In general the priest is concerned with the preservation of order, "die heilige Ordnung dieses Götterhauses" (353), he is amazed that Hero does not yet accept "was Brauches hier und Sitte" (348). When he is disturbed by the carrying of Leander's body to the temple, he is appeased when reminded that this is the custom:

Wills so der Brauch, wohlan!

Die Bräuche muß man halten, sie sind gut. (1996-7)

Like the Swiss in Wilhelm Tell (1111,1233) he insists on the ancient customs and rights. He believes Hero to be the property of the gods, and he as priest has the right to protect her from intruders. The priest is convinced that he is doing the will of the gods:

In meinem Innern reget sich ein Gott,

Und warnt mich, zu verhüten, ehs zu spät! (1365-6)

He himself makes the preparations for the sacrifice of Leander, but tells the gods, "trefft, Götter, selbst das Opfer!" (1833). He later claims: "Ihr nahmt ihn an. Er fiel von eurer Hand!" (1905). The priest is concerned

to avoid evil at all costs and he remains firm in the belief that he is forestalling future misdemeanours rather than punishing past crimes. In Act V the priest was to have said:

Und dies Gefühl im ersten Keim erstickt,  
Beschützt auf immerdar vor jedem Künftigen. (I/19,230)

He has not forced Hero to take her vows; he does not agree with Hero's father, who wishes to push her into her new role at all costs for the sake of the family's glory. Instead he insists, "Wüßt ich sie schwach, noch jetzt entließ ich sie" (408). Once she has taken the step, however, Hero must accept the full meaning of her position, not only her rights, as Hero stresses, but also her duties, as the priest points out.

We have already examined the vital idea of right in Classicism; in addition the concept of duty is important especially for Schiller, but also for Goethe. The noble characters in Iphigenie and Tasso are all aware of what their duties are, whilst Tasso seeks to do his.<sup>(13)</sup> In "Ilmenau", Goethe praises Karl August because "du kennest lang die Pflichten deines Standes", whilst in "Zueignung" he criticises himself: "Versäumst die Pflichten des Mannes zu erfüllen". Egmont and Alba both speak of duties (IV,2), but they each mean something quite different. As Egmont explains in the final scene, "an jedem Tage (habe ich) mit rascher Wirkung meine Pflicht getan, wie mein Gewissen mir sie zeigte" (V,4). This is clearly Iphigenie's view of duty, whilst Thoas in contrast seeks to use duty as an excuse for continuing the sacrifices: "Tu deine Pflicht, ich werde meine tun" (531). This former view of duty is encapsulated in one of Goethe's maxims: "Pflicht; wo man liebt was man sich selbst befiehlt" (Maximen, 1089). The rejection of absolute duty is seen also in Wanderjahre, where duty is "die Pflicht des Tages" or "die Forderung des Tages" (HA VIII, 426, 283).

Schiller's ideal was the equation of duty and inclination which Kant's moral rigorism had deemed impossible. Wallenstein tells Max, "Du konntest spielend deine Pflichten üben" (Tod, 720). Marquis Posa wishes to do naturally what

others consider as a duty (Don Carlos, 3032-3) and he seeks a similar ideal for the citizen of Spain: "Ihn binde keine Pflicht,/ Als seiner Brüder gleich ehrwürdige Rechte" (3245-6). The heart which follows beauty does not need slavish attention to duty ("Die Künstler", 82-3), and the poet rejoices in the ideal:

Daß der entjochte Mensch jetzt seine Pflichten denkt,  
Die Fessel liebet, die ihn lenkt. (320-1)

In Anmut und Würde this is summed up in theoretical terms:

Tugend ist nichts anders als eine Neigung zu der Pflicht. ... In einer schönen Seele ist es also. wo Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, Pflicht und Neigung harmonieren, und Grazie ist ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung. (XX, 283, 288)

The ideal nature of this is revealed in the second half of the essay, in which dignity is proclaimed as the safeguard where grace is impossible. Octavio sees himself defending the cause of duty which Wallenstein is challenging, and Max tells Wallenstein: "O! kehre/ Zurück zu deiner Pflicht (Tod, 813-4). The importance of duty is stressed throughout Schiller's Classical drama.<sup>(14)</sup> The Swiss especially insist on observing their duties, even in the midst of planning a rebellion (Tell, 1225, 1360), they will cast these duties aside only in an extreme situation (1371).

The concept of duty is not common in Grillparzer's early work except in Blanka, which is closely linked with Schiller, and in the part of Ahnfrau added on the advice of Schreyvogel. The word is scarcely found in the plays or poems of the 1820s, hence Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen is the first mature play in which the idea of duty forms a dominant theme. It is the first and fourth acts that stress its importance. In Act I Hero recognises the existence of duties, she attacks Janthe for neglecting hers (48) and sees the priest as only doing his duty in removing the dove (386). In the fourth act however it is the priest who has to underline the importance of duty to Hero as she seeks to neglect such considerations and is herself afraid to mention the word:

HERO. Und meine Rechte kenn ich so wie meine -  
Ich kenne, Herr, mein Recht.

PRIESTER.

Wie meine Pflichten;

Du wolltest sagen so.

HERO.

Ich wollte, Herr,

Und sag es jetzt; auch meine Pflichten kenn ich,

Wenn Pflicht das alles, was ein ruhig Herz,

Im Einklang mit sich selbst und mit der Welt,

Dem Recht gegenüber stellt der andern Menschen. (1727-33)

This appears at first sight to be the Classical idea of duty, but is revealed on closer investigation to be more a definition of "Recht" than of "Pflicht". One's duties should equal the rights of others, not be opposed to them. Hero's rather mild definition of duty is clearly inadequate in the circumstances, in any case duties may need to be followed which are not concomitant with being at one with oneself, and the priest stands for the sterner, even extreme demands of duty. He does not even believe in the importance of man's freedom to choose the path of duty:

Die freie Wahl ist schwacher Toren Spielzeug.

Der Tüchtige sieht in jedem Soll ein Muß,

Und Zwang, als erste Pflicht, ist ihm die Wahrheit.

(414-6)

The priest is determined that Hero shall keep her vows whether she wants to or not, and insists on the avoidance of even a hint of guilt which may stain her reputation:

Auch riet ich dir, den Schein zu meiden,

Den Schein sogar, viel mehr noch wahren Anlaß. (1434-5)

Whereas in Act I, and even up to the arrival of Leander at her window in Act III, Hero had accepted the beliefs and behaviour of the priest as right (386,815,1005), she later seeks to challenge his rule or simply ignore it (1686,1722,1728). She now denies the application of "rights" to affairs of the gods - "Die Götter sind zu hoch für unsre Rechte" (1736) - and hence implicitly she denies any feeling of responsibility towards them. Previously Hero had been proud of her rights that she would enjoy as priestess, as she tries to convince her mother (279), but later Hero comes to seek only the benefits of her rights, not the responsibilities and duties that accompany them. She had wanted to:

Das Rechte tun, nicht, weil man mirs befahl,

Nein, weil es recht, weil ich es so erkannt. (334-5)

But such a Classical notion is now beyond her, she can no



longer recognise what is right. The priest stands precisely for what is right in general, rather than any limited individual rights. He would gladly shed his own blood in order to cast out evil, as he tells both Hero (999-1002) and later Janthe:

Und gälts ihr Leben! Gäb ich doch auch meins,  
Um Unrecht abzuhalten. (2107-8)

The priest sees the gods as just, hence his actions are geared to preventing evil, preserving right, order and duty.

There is a similar conflict in Jüdin. Alphons's lustful relationship with Rahel makes him come alive just as true love does for Hero, and for Alphons, as for Hero, the discovery of love involves the rejection of duties and a challenge to law and order. King Alphons sees his role consisting in protection for his people and their rights (126-7), and at the end of the play he intends to prove that he is still capable of so doing:

Dann sollt ihr sagen, ob ich wieder wert,  
Das Recht zu schützen, das ich nun verletzt. (1891-2)

For the King it is not simply a question of right, but of his duty to protect the state's interests (1173-5), and the King recognises this himself (612,1518). He admits to the Queen:

Ein König, der an sich nicht gar so schlimm,  
Hat seines Amts und seiner Pflicht vergessen. (1438-9)

His love for Rahel has challenged this duty and all ideas of duty (848-9), and he repeatedly, quite unlike Hero, acknowledges the error of his ways in neglecting his role as King (902,1075,1422). He will blame neither Garceran nor Rahel for what has happened. After Rahel's death he realises, "denn war nicht selber ichs, der sie getötet?" (1665), and although the arrival of the nobles causes his anger and desire for revenge to revive briefly, this is soon overcome and he acknowledges his own guilt in the affair:

KÖNIG. Kein Unterschied, denn alle seid ihr schuldig.  
MANRIQUE mit starker Stimme.  
Und ihr nicht auch?  
KÖNIG nach einer Pause. Der Mann hat recht, ich auch.  
(1865-6)

At the beginning he is sure he can defeat the Moors "weil im Recht" (274), but there is an early hint from Garceran that the King's interest in Rahel is wrong:

Auf Maurinnen sind Streiter wir der Grenze  
Zu Recht verwiesen, doch die Jüdin, Herr - (480-1)

The King himself tells Garceran, "ich fühle ganz mein Unrecht" (902), and in the course of the play it is others who have to protect what is right (1286).

Like the priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, so the nobles in Jüdin see themselves defending "die heilige Ordnung", the word of God (1238). They will try to reason with Alphons, but if that fails -

dann walte blutges Recht,  
Bis wieder eins der Fürst und das Gesetz,  
Und wir den beiden in dem einen dienen. (1243-5)

It is perhaps symptomatic of the mature Grillparzer that the nobles recognise that in protecting law and order, they themselves are doing wrong:

Wir haben an dem König uns versündigt,  
Das Gute wollend, aber nicht das Recht.  
Wir wollen uns dem Rechte nicht entziehn. (1760-2)

What they have done is good for the state as a whole, but wrong in any legal or moral sense. It is a sign of Grillparzer's refusal to let the end justify the means, which is a vital aspect of the play as a whole and which contrasts with Goethe's attitude on the matter, as we shall see. In the reference to "blutges Recht" and in the contrast of what is good with what is right, one may also detect the much more ambivalent approach to "Recht" which distinguishes Grillparzer's later political plays from Ottokar and Treuer Diener. (15)

By comparison, the earlier Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen still seems to insist on what is generally right, in keeping with the ideas of justice as seen in the figure of Rudolf I in Ottokar and in the diary note to the effect that offences against "das ewige Recht" must be punished. It is however important to note the relative lack of stress placed on these concepts of right and duty in the final version of the play. A study of the first drafts and variants reveals that Grillparzer originally intended

a greater emphasis on these aspects of the play in keeping with the sterner view of duty he had envisaged. The first notes for the play make fuller reference to duty, right, customs as well as moderation. Hero attacks Leander, or men in general, for having no concept "ob Recht nun oder Unrecht", but of merely following whatever is pleasing (I/19,195), and in addition her condemnation of her mother is much stronger than in the final version;

Mit Recht bewahrt man heilige Gebräuche ...

Wir kannten ja die bindend strengen Pflichten,  
Als du hierher mich brachtest, halb noch Kind.  
(I/19,277)

Even in Act IV one might have expected a greater insistence on the principles which the priest defends, and one cannot help thinking that this was originally intended. Originally Hero was to be seen as much more culpable, the stress was to be on her breaking of her vows and duties and on her being punished accordingly. The priest was seen very much as the agent of divine retribution, preserving the standards of right conduct, an instrument of fate that catches up with the two lovers. Grillparzer was punishing himself for the neglect of his own poetic duties. In the end however, his love for Marie von Smolenitz produces a more sympathetic depiction of the lovers and a much greater questioning of the isolated existence of the priestess and in addition a questioning of the absolute concept of duty defended by the priest.

As a result of the shift in Grillparzer's attitude, the priest suffers as a character. He was originally seen as "herb und düster" in his role as representative of fate (I/19,234), he revealed "Verstandesschärfe und Kälte" (I/19,239), but although Grillparzer specifically says of him, "keine moderne Humanität" (I/19,233), he has become a more sympathetic character to counteract the fact that what he stands for is no longer wholeheartedly accepted by Grillparzer. As Urs Helmsdorfer insists, "die Ansichten des Priesters sind nicht Grillparzers eigene"; Škreb and Schaum stress the same point.<sup>(16)</sup> The priest sees the dangers of the lonely existence of the priestess,

tries to persuade Hero to find a friend, hopes to avoid punishing her by merely removing the source of temptation, and throughout shows a great deal of sympathy towards her. He prefers to suspect Janthe or see Hero as an unknowing accomplice in the intruder's crime (1361). He is concerned not to be too hasty, he would like to warn her of the impending danger (1752-3) and make her aware of the consequences of her action. He does not want Hero to suffer and tries to cloak Leander's death in secrecy. Unfortunately, the improvements which would have been unnecessary if the tragedy had been one of neglected duty, are inadequate when it is a love-tragedy. After the beautiful climax of Act III, even a sympathetic priest dominating Act IV is unsatisfactory. At the end, in his insistence on Hero's swift recovery, his inability to see how deeply she is affected, he becomes a rather pathetic figure. His standpoint has been undermined by the shift of emphasis in the play, the insistence on duty has been toned down and the priest is consequently swept away in the beauty and tragedy of the lovers, which leaves no room for his moralising words which were meant to close the play in Grillparzer's original plans.

The priest can understand duty and responsibility, but not love and the human heart. As Schafroth has indicated, "des Priesters Begriffe sind die Kant-Schillers", but duty is seen as one-sided, the element of "Neigung" has been excluded.<sup>(17)</sup> The priest is limited in his outlook, his experience is bounded by the temple precincts. He is on the whole "weltfremd" and his views could not in any deep sense be taken as "moderne Humanität". Marriage he sees as an institution, "die Mensch an Menschen knüpft wie Tier an Tier" (364), which in Classical terms is a terrible insult compared for instance to Eleonore's definition in Jüdin (1204-7). He denies personal freedom of choice, preferring compulsion, at least to the extent of giving man only one possibility, and this equally is against Lessing's and Schiller's insistence that "kein Mensch muß müssen" ... "der Mensch ist das Wesen welches will". The priest is

hence unable to judge people from a profound, humane viewpoint, but only in rigid moral terms. The re-introduction of the themes of duty and responsibility, even when stressed less than originally planned, seems an unwanted intrusion. These concepts are not invalidated; Hero is wrong to seek to challenge them, although her greatest mistake was to accept them in the first place, and it would be unjust to dismiss the priest as misguided. However the priest's desire to see duty and responsibility in absolute terms is a dangerous one, such abstract concepts cannot cope with the complicated and exceptional aspects of life that confront them. Moral absolutes as defended by the priest destroy life instead of promoting it. In his diary for 1820, Grillparzer had criticised any attempt to make morality the sole aim of life (Tgb.743), and the story of Hero and Leander seems more in keeping with the words of Sappho: "Und leben ist ja doch des Lebens höchstes Ziel!" (270). Equally however the picture of love, for all its beauty, is an extreme and dangerous one, not conducive to life in any balanced sense of the word. Similarly in Die Wahlverwandtschaften the beautiful image of love is contrasted with an unsatisfactory society of idleness, boredom and dilettante activity on the one hand and with the ideal world of social morality and beneficial activity on the other (as with Hero's family and the priestly ideals in Grillparzer's play). Here also the excellent ideals of moderation, renunciation, patience and the concept of marriage seem unsuitable in the exceptional circumstances portrayed. If Hero was wrong to take her vows in the first place, so Eduard and Charlotte should not have been married. Mittler's ideals (those of an inexperienced man like those of the priest) cause death rather than promoting life and happiness. The natural and instinctive link between Eduard and Ottilie seems superior to everything else, and the ending of the novel appears to verify this despite all Ottilie's self-recriminations. In Die Wahlverwandtschaften as in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, aesthetic excellence cannot hide a certain ambivalence on

the moral or philosophical level. For Goethe this was an unusual facet of his work and Die Wahlverwandtschaften represents something of an exception, for Grillparzer however such ambivalence or ambiguity becomes an increasingly vital aspect of his plays.

It is nevertheless worth stressing that this play represents Grillparzer's first use of duty as a motif in a mature work, and that the play does not immediately reject the concept. What is criticised is the priest's excessive insistence on Hero's responsibilities and duties when it is clear that she accepted these without prior knowledge of their full significance. It would be equally wrong to reject the concept of duty in Schiller's work because of the rather dubious application made of it by Buttler, who voices an opinion similar to that of Grillparzer's priest:

Wo viel Freiheit, ist viel Irrtum,  
Doch sicher ist der schmale Weg der Pflicht. (Tod, 2514-5)

The concept of duty continues to be more common in Grillparzer's work after Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, and its adoption coincides with his increasing doubt as to the validity of "Recht" as a foolproof ideal. Hero's definition of duty is inadequate precisely because it is little more than an assessment of her rights. By comparison, Alphons sees his duties to lie beyond his rights, as something more vital and binding. The insistence on duties in precisely this context is a matter dear to Libussa's heart:

Daß du dem Dürftgen hilfst, den Bruder liebst,  
Das ist dein Recht, vielmehr ist deine Pflicht.  
(905-6)

In Libussa, as in Jüdin, the power of ruling is not a right, but a duty: "Hier ist von Wollen nicht, / Von Müssen ist die Rede und von Pflicht" (Libussa, 411-12).<sup>(18)</sup> Like Libussa, Grillparzer rather resignedly realises, "und eine Pflicht knüpft sich an jedes Recht" ("Entsagung" (I, 247)), but in the political arena this is seen in more positive terms. Prussia is condemned for failing in her duty towards the Poles ("Warschau"), Grillparzer writes of the citizens'

duties (III,1044-5), and after the events of 1848 the military is seen as the bulwark of duty, which is "das Maß des Lebens" (I,359).<sup>(19)</sup> Such an insistence on duty is as potentially problematic as is the priest's in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, and the ambiguity of political ideals must be considered in the context of Libussa and Bruderzwist, but in Jüdin also the praise of duty is not as absolute as might at first glance appear to be the case.

iv) Virtue and purity: the danger of absolutes

The conflict of love and duty is not complicated in Jüdin by any shift of emphasis or change of plan; it is complex nevertheless owing to the ambivalent character of the defenders of duty, and owing to the positive connotations inherent amidst all the negative aspects previously outlined in the relationship between King and Jewess. This latter problem has its origins in the King's existence before the fateful encounter with Rahel, an existence which in its own way was as unnatural as his lustful passion for the voluptuous girl.

The King had previously had inadequate knowledge of the totality of life. He had no time for "dieses Lebens Güter" (180), above all no time for women:

Daß Weiber es auch gibt, erfuhr ich erst,  
Als man mein Weib mir in der Kirche traute. (182-3,  
cf. also 354,396)

As a result he is quite at a loss when he first meets Rahel, he has no defence against her, none of the immunisation which the sowing of youthful wild oats would normally provide (851-3,863-4). But on a wider plane, his lack of experience is symptomatic of his earlier failure to live a normally balanced life, which includes the more instinctive, even the more sinful aspects. Manrique testifies to the King's being without fault, "fleckelos" (159), and Alphons himself agrees: "Mir selber ließ man nicht zu fehlen Zeit" (176). But Alphons is not proud of this, he realises the dangerous side of such a lack of faults;

Bin ich nicht schlimm, so besser denn für euch.  
Obgleich der Mensch, der wirklich ohne Fehler,  
Auch ohne Vorzug wäre, fürcht ich fast.  
Denn wie der Baum mit lichtentfernten Wurzeln  
Die etwa trübe Nahrung saugt tief aus dem Boden,  
So scheint der Stamm, der Weisheit wird genannt  
Und der dem Himmel eignet mit den Ästen,  
Kraft und Bestehn aus trübem Irdischen,  
Dem Fehler nah Verwandten aufzusaugen.  
War einer je gerecht, der niemals hart?  
Und der da mild, ist selten ohne Schwäche.  
Der Tapfre wird zum Waghals in der Schlacht.  
Besiegter Fehl ist all des Menschen Tugend,  
Und wo kein Kampf, da ist auch keine Macht. (162-75)

Similarly in Act IV Alphons warns of the danger of abstract virtue which is "ohne Fehl/ Doch eben drum auch wieder ohne Vorzug" (1507-8). As Alphons's elaborate image reveals, the King recognises, even if at this stage it is the result of "Bücher-Weisheit" (Tgb.1330), the intricate nature of life. It is a mixture of good and bad, what is good results from the overcoming of what is bad. Man himself acquires insight into what is correct and virtuous by overcoming mistakes, by a process of trial and error. According to the essay "Preußische Konstitution", "jeder Mensch erkennt sein Leben als eine Verkettung von Leiden-schaften und Irrtümern" (III,1075).

This is a very Goethean approach to life, as revealed especially in Faust. The Lord happily admits "es irrt der Mensch, solang' er strebt" (317), and he provides Faust with the devil to make sure he is driven on to more activity. Elsewhere in Goethe's writings we find a similar view:

Nicht vor Irrtum zu bewahren, ist die Pflicht des  
Menschen Erziehers, sondern den Irrenden zu leiten,  
ja ihn seinen Irrtum aus vollen Bechern ausschöpfen  
zu lassen, das ist Weisheit der Lehrer.  
(Lehrjahre, VII,9)

Wer nicht mehr liebt und nicht mehr irrt,  
Der lasse sich begraben. ("Sprüche",70)

To Eichstädt, Goethe wrote (15/9/1804), "jede Rückkehr vom Irrtum bildet mächtig den Menschen im einzelnen und ganzen aus", to his son August (14/1/1814): "irrend lernt man". Significantly in one of his maxims, Goethe insisted that mistakes were fine in one's youth, but should not be



taken over into one's maturity. Mephisto realises he is S.D.  
"ein Teil von jener Kraft,/ Die stets das Böse will und  
stets das Gute schafft" (Faust, 1335-6), and a consideration  
of Faust may dispel any doubts as to the nature of what  
Goethe is prepared to allow as "mistakes". The deaths  
of Gretchen and of her mother and brother are most certainly  
as evil as the murder of Rahel, and it could well be argued  
that Alphons is less directly to blame than is Faust. The  
great difference between Goethe and Grillparzer in this  
context lies in the consequences each draws. Goethe  
allows Faust to forget his past crimes, and sees the various  
disasters as unfortunate but inevitable stations in Faust's  
striving for awareness and activity. Goethe concentrates  
on the good that finally comes out of the mistakes,  
Grillparzer however on the mistakes themselves. In  
Grillparzer's early plan for a continuation of Faust the  
hero is not allowed to forget in this way, so also in  
Jüdin, Alphons's "Fehler" is both necessary and damning,  
and as the ending of play testifies, most certainly not to  
be forgotten, neither by Grillparzer nor his characters.

When we first meet Alphons, his great desire is to be  
a man among his people:

Laßt näher nur das Volk! es stört mich nicht.  
Denn wer mich einen König nennt, bezeichnet  
Als Höchsten unter vielen mich, und Menschen  
Sind so ein Teil von meinem eignen Selbst. (94-7)

Yet it has been his fate that he has grown up as a King,  
not as a human being. Man, as we have seen, needs faults  
to be "ein Mensch", and it is precisely through his  
encounter with Rahel that he becomes one. He is now able  
to distinguish between his role as King and "ich, Alfonso,  
ich, der Mensch, der Mann/ In meinem Haus" (1519-20),  
between his regal life and his domestic circle, and he  
no longer wishes to lock himself away from the ordinary  
world (1395-1401). He now understands this difference  
subjectively, not simply as a result of wisdom culled from  
books. As Reich says, Alphons is catching up on what he  
had missed before, his "Menschenrecht".<sup>(20)</sup> In a comment  
which might be dismissed as an instance of the most neutral

use of the word, Alphons compares his own innocence with Garceran's experience, telling him: "Im Grunde bist du glücklich, Mensch!" (444). Lola Montez, in the poem of that title, has a similar effect on Ludwig I of Bavaria:

Drum kehrt euch nicht verachtend von dem Weib,  
In deren Arm ein König ward zum Mann. (I,311)

As we have seen, this discovery of his full humanity also involves his guilt as a King, his challenge to his duties and the rights of the state. At the end Alphons accepts the role of the state and this also means that he accepts, if still with some reservation, the conception of morality represented at court by his wife and by Dona Clara. For if his love for Rahel is against what is right, then love for his wife is perfectly acceptable and is in fact the duty of a married man:

Ist denn die Ehe nicht das Heiligste,  
Da sie zu Recht erhebt, was sonst verboten,  
Und, was ein Greuel jedem Wohlgeschaffnen,  
Aufnimmt ins Reich der Gottgefälligen Pflicht? (1204-7)

As in Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften, the view of the sanctity of marriage is not to be accepted without a certain questioning, even scepticism. Mittler in Goethe's novel considers marriage "diesen Grund aller sittlichen Gesellschaft. Die Ehe ist der Anfang und der Gipfel aller Kultur" (I,9). At the end of both works this view is accepted despite certain reservations.

The Queen is "ohne Fehl" (184) and will not live with any suggestion of guilt (1218), she is the embodiment of purity (1411). She finds it impossible to understand her husband's affair with Rahel: "ich faß es nicht" (1378). The Jewess has challenged the sanctity of their marriage, and the King must be made pure again, "so reinigt euren König und sein Land" (1224). Dona Clara, who never speaks in the play, but who is the object of Garceran's most pious attentions, is seen in similar terms. It is her and the Queen's displeasure at Garceran's behaviour that prefigures the attitude to Alphons's later antics. Garceran is also afraid that his involvement with Rahel will further condemn him in Dona Clara's eyes, and it is to her as "jene Stille,

Sittigreine" (1907) that the King turns at the end of the play as a source of new innocence in contrast to the recognition of the guilt in everyone else.

There is here a clear link with the role of woman in Classicism, especially in Goethe's Iphigenie and Tasso. Garceran testifies to this in his first words:

Ein wackrer Mann, Herr, fürchtet keinen Feind,  
Doch schwer drückt edler Fraun gerechter Zorn. (249-50)

This seems an obvious echo of numerous passages in Iphigenie:

Ein edler Mann wird durch ein gutes Wort  
Der Frauen weit geführt (213-4)

und es ziemt

Dem edlen Mann, der Frauen Wort zu achten (1863-4)

- or in Tasso:

Willst du genau erfahren, was sich ziemt,  
So frage nur bei edlen Frauen an. (1013-4)

The contrast between man and woman in Jüdin is also seen in terms of words as opposed to deeds:

Nicht also, edle Frau! Ihr sprach das Wort.  
Doch als es kam zur Tat, habt ihr gezittert. (1769-70)

It is the Queen who gives the word for the Jewess to be killed, a solution which the nobles are afraid to mention explicitly.

At times, Grillparzer's contrast of man and woman has clear echoes of the picture painted by Goethe and Schiller. This was very true of the youthful fragment "Irene", the last section of which amounts to a paraphrase of Schiller's "Würde der Frauen". Equally close parallels are to be found in the more mature works such as Sappho. Like the man in Schiller's poem or in Goethe's Tasso, Sappho sees man searching restlessly for a dim and distant goal - "nach außen geht sein rastlos wildes Streben" (820) - and this is a theme to which Grillparzer returns in later plays: "O, daß die Männer nur ins weite streben!" (Bruderzwist, 1874, cf. also Libussa, 1318). For both Goethe and Schiller, only the woman truly appreciates and experiences love (Tasso, 1035-8, "Würde der Frauen", 36-8), so similarly for Grillparzer, man is incapable of such feelings:

Er kennet nicht die stille, mächtige Glut,  
Die Liebe weckt in eines Weibes Busen! (Sappho, 825-6)

Schiller's man leaves the bounds of truth ("Würde der Frauen", 6), Grillparzer's frequently overlooks truth in his frantic search (Libussa, 1317). On the whole the early works (Ahnfrau, Vließ, Traum) fit into this pattern, but already in the cataclysmic ending of Medea there is the first obvious sign that the woman is a rather less ideal figure than that presented by Schiller's poem or Goethe's princess. The idea in both cases that the woman is a paragon of virtue and purity is also to be found in Grillparzer's "Irene" - "im Innern hegt sie reine Sitte" (349) - but is not an element of any subsequent discussion until the description of Dona Clara as "sittigrein", but this is no longer the complete ideal one might expect, as remains to be investigated.

Iphigenie is seen as "rein" (774, 1166, 1583, 1968) and it is a word of approbation throughout Goethe's work, the constant epithet for Hermann and a recurring description of Frau von Stein. Schiller's Joan of Arc is "die reine Jungfrau" (1087, 1771, 2202), William Tell and the revolutionaries all see themselves as "rein" (2913, 3181), and it is the ideal virtue sought by Philipp of Spain (Don Carlos, 2823), held by his wife (2535), by Posa at the beginning (3048), and gained by Carlos at the end (5316). Of his relationship with Wallenstein, Max Piccolomini insists, "rein muß es bleiben zwischen mir und ihm" (Piccolomini, 2649, cf. Tod, 1220). But Schiller is not as confident as Goethe of the feasibility of purity. Pylades in Iphigenie challenges the heroine's demand for absolute purity:

So wunderbar ist dies Geschlecht gebildet,  
So vielfach ist's verschlungen und verknüpft,  
Daß keiner in sich selbst, noch mit den andern  
Sich rein und unverworren halten kann. (1656-9)

The identical claim is made by Max's father, Octavio -

Main bester Sohn! Es ist nicht immer möglich,  
Im Leben sich so kinderrein zu halten,  
Wie's uns die Stimme lehrt im Innersten.  
(Piccolomini, 2447-9)

- and supported by Wallenstein himself in his long discussion with Max (Tod, 804-9). In Goethe's play, the fears of

Pylades are shown to be unfounded, whilst the resigned comments of Octavio and Wallenstein are only too justified.

For Grillparzer, the question of purity, and as a result the role of Eleonore and Dona Clara is equally problematic. As in Goethe's state of Ferrara, it can be said of the women at court in Toledo, "wo Sittlichkeit regiert, regieren sie" (Tasso, 1019), and both Alphons and Garceran acknowledge the wisdom of one of Ottilie's aphorisms in Wahlverwandtschaften: "Der Umgang mit Frauen ist das Element guter Sitten" (II,5). The danger lies not as in Schiller in the impossibility of such a virtue, nor as in the youthful "Irene" in the fear of its being overrun by the coarse world, but in its very impracticality. Alphons complains of excess morality, which will not forgive Carceran for his misdemeanour (240-5), and of excess virtue, which as in Alphons himself is a sign of incomplete humanity. Alphons speaks of his wife,

Die wirklich ohne Fehl, wenn irgend jemand,  
Und die ich, grad heraus, noch wärmer liebte,  
Wär manchmal, statt des Lobs, auch etwas zu verzeihn.  
(184-6)

Like Alphons's dallying with Rahel, this comment is incomprehensible to Eleonore and a complete shock. For Alphons however, it is a sign of her humanity when he detects a flaw in her, namely ordinary human jealousy:

Wohl etwa Rachsucht gar? Nun, um so besser.  
Du fühlst dann, daß Verzeihen Menschenpflicht  
Und niemand sicher ist, auch nicht der Beste. (1415-7)

Forgiveness, one might say, is a human virtue practised in the recognition that one's partner is fallible, and as a result human. Excess morality is a sign of coldness and inhumanity which affects the partner adversely. This Alphons spells out to his wife:

Das ist die Art der tugendhaften Weiber,  
Daß ewig sie mit ihrer Tugend zahlen.  
Bist du betrübt, so trösten sie mit Tugend,  
Und bist du froh gestimmt, ist's wieder Tugend,  
Die dir zuletzt die Heiterkeit benimmt,  
Wohl gar die Sünde zeigt als einzige Rettung. (1499-1504)

Alphons had suggested the same at the start, as Eleonore and her ladies went off, leaving him with Rahel (335-6), and it is precisely what happens to Alphons. Again and

again, Rahel is described as a ray of light and life illuminating the boredom of the court and its lifeless morality:

So wollt ich denn, sie wäre eine Christin  
Und hier am Hof, wo Langeweil genug,  
Ein bißchen Scherz käm etwa uns zustatten.  
(346-8, cf. also 511-2, 620-1, 726-7)

The Queen in her exaggerated purity and virtue, in her abhorrence of the sexual act, fails to satisfy Alphons's more physical needs, or even his more modest desire for a happy home life. Breitenbruch entitles one of the sections of his book "Die Ambivalenz von Tugend und Laster",<sup>(21)</sup> and points to the diary note of 1822: "wo die Tugend aufhört, fängt das Laster an, ja die meisten Laster sind eigentlich nur der Exzeß guter Eigenschaften" (Tgb. 1202). These comments seem particularly apposite in relation to Queen Eleonore.

"Reinheit" or purity is undoubtedly an important concept for Grillparzer. This is especially true of his youthful work, in which he leans on Goethe and Schiller to such a great extent. Hence we find the expressions "schuldlos und rein" (Blanka, 4476, 4752, cf. also 4655), "engelrein" (Ahnfrau, 796, Blanka, 1387, cf. also Tgb. 92), "reine Harmonie" (Blanka, 3476, 3751, Tgb. 91). In Ahnfrau and Sappho, "rein" is still a popular description of an ideal,<sup>(22)</sup> Rustan in Traum has a great desire to be "rein" (2217, 2221, 2647) and it is a virtue the King demands of him (1679). Purity is still a positive ideal in Medea (it is noticeably lacking in the two parts of the trilogy which take place on Colchian soil), where it especially applies to Kreusa.<sup>(23)</sup> But here there are doubts above all about Jason's supposed purity (1139, 1433), and even concerning Kreusa - "oder sie? Die Falsche! Die Reine!" (1238). Also man's ability to remain pure is questioned:

Es ist des Unglücks eigentlichstes Unglück,  
Daß selten drin der Mensch sich rein bewahrt. (757-8)

If yließ doubts the possibility of purity without explicitly questioning its validity as an ideal, then graver doubts are raised in 1822 in the notes for the cycle

of plays on the Kings of Judaea, which have thematic similarities with Jüdin:

Der Salome soll Mariamne ein immerwährender geheimer Vorwurf wegen ihrer Reinheit sein. Sie sucht nach Fehlern. (II,1098)

Mariamne ist nicht demütig genug, um eigentlich gut zu heißen, aber sie ist rein. Sie hat die Liebe nie gekannt, ja durch ihre lasterhafte Umgebung immer zur Bewahrung ihres Innern aufgefordert, hat sie selbst keine deutliche Vorstellung, was es mit dem: "in einem andern Wesen leben", das als eigentliches Merkmal der Liebe gilt, für eine Bewandtnis habe. (II,1100)

That purity lies in a lack of faults, that it is not synonymous with goodness, and that it results from ignorance of true love, all these ideas reflect Grillparzer's less positive approach to purity and point forward to the questions I have been considering in Jüdin. This latter play also throws a certain ironic light on Grillparzer's perhaps unnatural desire to preserve Kathi Fröhlich's virginity:

es war kein eigentlich tugendhafter Entschluß, er war erzeugt durch ein vielleicht bloß ästhetisches, künstlerisches Wohlgefallen an des Mädchens Reinheit. (Tgb.1436 (1826))

It is worth noting that the plays of the mid-1820s make little or no reference to the concept of purity. A further hint is provided by a diary note of 1831, in which Grillparzer gives his reasons for advising a former schoolfriend to publish:

Es ist einmal Pflicht des Menschen sich der Menschheit hinzugeben mit dem was er vermag. Im Grunde steht es auch den züchtigen Fräuleins nicht wohl zu heiraten und sich da allerhand sonst verabscheute körperliche Dinge gefallen zu lassen, aber der Mensch ist einmal nicht da um rein zu sein, sondern zu nützen, zu wirken. (Tgb.1935)

As I have suggested briefly above, purity is rejected which is unpractical. To a lesser extent the same point is made in the political sphere by Rudolf II ("Der reinste Wille wertlos - wenn erfolglos" (Bruderzwist,1689)), and in the artistic sphere in Der arme Spielmann, where Jakob's desire for pure music (III,163) is ironised by his inability to play any more than the one recognisable tune. In the

autobiographical poem "Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen", Grillparzer sees the original purity with which he confronted life as being answered with deceit.<sup>(24)</sup> In Weh dem, Leon wishes to see the bishop as a representative of total purity (69,78), but himself comes to the realisation, "nun gar so rein gings freilich denn nicht ab" (1721). But here also Gregor's purity is criticised because it is unpractical, it will not free Atalus from captivity. The Protestant Ferdinand's desire in Bruderzwist is not only unpractical, in that it destroys his country's talents, but also inhuman, a fact made amply clear by Rudolf's desire for "Menschen" as an antidote to Ferdinand's barbarity.

This more realistic rejection of excessive purity is precisely the theme of Jüdin, and indirectly Grillparzer's own criticism, intended or otherwise, of his unnatural attitude to Kathi. Just as the priestly existence demanded by Hero's uncle is seen as unnatural and inhuman, so the Queen's purity is exaggerated. Nevertheless the King echoes her desire for him to be purified (1351), he recognises the need to wipe away the stain of Rahel. He is then horrified by the thought that his country lacks all purity:

Allein was ist die Welt, mein armes Land,  
Wenn niemand rein und übrall nur Verbrecher? (1867-8)

And so he turns to his son, and then to Dona Clara, to find a ray of hope, a new ideal. Purity here is very much the key word in his call to Garceran:

Und hast du dich gereinigt, so wie ich,  
Vielleicht hält jene Stille, Sittigreine  
Dich ihrer Huld und ihres Auges wert. (1906-8)

But if the woman's purity seems to hold up a new ideal in contrast to what has gone before, then one must take into account the immediate qualification that Alphons makes as a result of his painfully acquired experience. He warns Dona Clara:

Macht ihm die Tugend nicht nur achtungswert,  
Nein, liebenswürdig auch. Das schützt vor vielem.  
(1910-11)

Virtue must have a pleasant face, seem worth following and



encourage followers, in order to avoid the dangers that the King had underlined in his warning to his wife (1499-1504). In any case the King had in the same speech made his final and most complete statement on the relative nature of all virtue:

Was man die Tugend nennt, sind Tugenden,  
Verschieden, mannigfalt, nach Zeit und Lage,  
Und nicht ein hohles Bild, das ohne Fehl,  
Doch eben drum auch wieder ohne Vorzug. (1505-8)

Grillparzer in no way considers virtue an ideal in its own right. After excessive use in Blanka, the discussion in Jüdin is the first treatment of the theme in a mature work. In the two other plays in which virtue is a concept, namely Treuer Diener and Bruderzwist, it is almost exclusively the negative characters, Otto von Meran, Gertrude and Don Cäsar, who make use of the term in a generally ironic tone. (25)

In the course of the play the King acquires a full awareness of what at the beginning he can abstractly conceptualise, the need for a balanced view of life which eschews excesses and avoids meaningless absolutes. He suggests this middle way in his attitude to Garceran:

Und unversöhnlich sein wär etwa schlimmer,  
Als leichtgesinnt den Fehler übersehn. (240-1)

This is an attitude of which the Queen and her ladies do not approve. Immediately afterwards Garceran speaks of his fear of the noble ladies' anger. Alphons reply is again highly instructive:

Gerechter Zorn, ja wohl! und glaube nicht,  
Daß ich mit Brauch und Schick es minder streng  
Und minder ernstlich halt als meine Frau.  
Doch hat der Zorn und alles seine Grenze. (251-4)

As his later action shows, the final comment is a more accurate reflection of his views than is his claim to follow the customs of the court, which he has observed previously because he has had neither the time nor the opportunity to do otherwise. As in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, the idea that "die Bräuche muß man halten, die sind gut", is challenged where such customs are artificial and exaggerated. On the contrary, the belief,

however untried it may be at this stage, that everything has its limits, is a refreshing sign of the King's moderation in a stuffy atmosphere of antiquated formality and morality. This moderation is also seen in his rejection of anti-Semitic prejudices, just before his encounter with Rahel (288-90). Later of course he is even more concerned to be unbiased; as he says in a passage reminiscent of Lessing's Nathan, "und da gilt gleich denn: Christin, Maurin - Jüdin" (479).

By the end of the play, the King's one-sided experience has been filled out, he knows, in the words of Goethe's Antonio, both "des Lebens Güter", and also "des Lebens Mühe" (Tasso, 2948-9), whereas previously he had lamented his lack of "dieses Lebens Güter" (Jüdin, 180). By the end of the play he has realised the need to apply both sides of his character, intellectual and sensual, to life as a whole. Man should put both "Gefühl" and "Verstand" into what he does and says (1366-8), previously he has had only the latter. This sentiment is echoed elsewhere in Grillparzer's mature work. The satire, "Friedrich der Große und Lessing", sees man's awareness as a linking of "Gefühl und Verstand" (III, 53). This same human "Empfindung" is later seen to combine animal and human and to be "der Mittelpunkt des menschlichen Wesens" (III, 718). At times man is weak:

Allein Gewohnheit ist des Menschen Meister  
Und unser Wille will oft, weil er muß. (427-8, cf.  
Wallensteins Tod, 212)

But this is not a permanent state, as the rather harsh words of the priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen suggest, but an insight into the way man is often a prey to temptation and can lose his balanced view of matters. Politzer, as I have already indicated, writes of "die Unterlegenheit des Willens gegenüber dem Trieb", but Egbert Krispyn manages to suggest the opposite; according to him, the ending of the play demonstrates "the Kantian notion of virtue as the predominance of duty over inclination". (26) Both views are true of certain situations in the play. Alphons does lose control of his

better judgement in following Rahel, and at the end of the play he does put aside his inclination for revenge in order to attend to his country's more pressing needs. (I assume that this is what Krispyn means by "inclination", for as Wells has amply demonstrated, the King's inclination for Rahel disappears once she is dead.<sup>(27)</sup>) The whole meaning of the play seems to lie in a rejection of Kantian absolutes of virtue and duty, and that is the message of both versions of Alphons' speech in Act I concerning "besiegter Fehl" (unlike Krispyn, I can detect no contradiction between the two versions). Alphons's admission, "natürlich ist zuletzt nur, was erlaubt" (1844), with all its tempting echoes of the princess's motto in Tasso - "erlaubt ist, was sich ziemt" (1006) - is not his final word, but merely an exaggerated but resigned reaction to his discovery of Rahel's loss of beauty. Similarly, in a late essay "Zur Literaturgeschichte", Grillparzer ridicules any idea that one side of man's nature may take over the jurisdiction of the other: "der Trieb, die Neigung, das Instinktmäßige sind ebenso göttlich als die Vernunft" (III,719). Even more vital are the ideas expressed in the poem "Lola Montez", written at the same time as work on Jüdin:

Denn harrest du, bis aus Vernunft und Recht  
Entstünde, was das Recht und die Vernunft gebot,  
Schlimm wärs bestellt ums menschliche Geschlecht,  
Der Trieb erzeugt die Handlung, die uns not. (I,311)

In pointing to Dona Clara, Alphons demands that man be inclined to virtue, which is the Classical idea of moral beauty and a further expression of the middle way that is advocated. According to Baumann, any conception of such a path is an illusion, his complex psychological interpretation of the play includes the insight into "das Unzuverlässige des Menschen, der sich beständig entlang einer Grenze bewegt, ohne zu wissen, wo diese verläuft, ja zuweilen der furchtbaren Täuschung unterliegt, diese für die Mitte zu halten".<sup>(28)</sup> For the many reasons I have highlighted, I find it impossible to agree with Baumann.

Of course, life as seen in Grillparzer's work is not easy or straightforward, but equally Max Piccolomini's existence, in which Wallenstein tells him, "du konntest spielend deine Pflichten üben" (Tod, 720), is also faced with grim reality, and Max achieves success of a kind only in death. The problem in Jüdin is of a quite different nature to that encountered in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen. In the earlier play, all questions of duty, right and wrong, guilt and punishment, are swallowed up by the all-consuming power and beauty of love which takes over the play, so that Grillparzer's perhaps well-intentioned attempts to re-introduce such questions in Act IV were doomed to failure. But even in that play the implicit message can be read as one of moderation between excessive insistence on duty and an overwhelming involvement in love. In Jüdin we are dealing with love of a much less attractive nature, and duties of a much more far-reaching kind. In Act IV the King returns to Toledo to rejoin his nobles and go to war. By this time he is tired of Rahel, as the previous act has indicated, and it seems to require only the merest hint of forgiveness and humanity to add to his firm resolve and guilty conscience, in order for him to leave Rahel. This seems perfectly feasible. The King admits his faults and expresses his desire to purify himself by attention to his duties as King, and his wife gladly takes his hand. At this stage there is no question of overpowering guilt, the King absolves himself of his sins (1410), glibly dismisses his escapade as an inevitable sickness on the way from one era to another, significantly from childhood to manhood.

But he hopes that his wife can make the change also, her inability to do so until later is a major cause of the catastrophe. For it is now that she reveals gradually but unmistakeably that she is the same as before, unable to comprehend anything but morality and devotion to duty. The King's warm desire for a satisfactory home life is met with the cold reply, even rebuff: "Wenn du begehrst, ich selbst vermiß es nicht" (1403). Her greatest single

mistake occurs when he insists again that he is back in control, for it is at this point that she reminds him of the Jewess's portrait which he still wears round his neck. The King does at first remove it and places it on the table, but the damage to his resolve has already been done in her inability to make the leap with him into full adulthood. The King is reminded of what partly drove him to Rahel, her natural instincts compared to the unnatural life of court which his wife represents, and his wife's insistence that he put aside the portrait (which, in any case, he has again forgotten) only makes him spell out the difference between the two women. His defiance, his warning that he would go back to Rahel, is not a sign of her continuing power over him, but part of his insistence that he now understands his role and position as a human being, not merely as King. It is at this juncture that the Queen makes her despairing gesture to Don Manrique and Rahel's die is cast. Bruce Thompson is quite right to underline the superficial nature of the affair with Rahel, and ask whether her death was really necessary, but his statement that "Rahel owes her death to a misunderstanding, indeed to a 'joke' on the King's part",<sup>(29)</sup> referring to Alphons putting Rahel's picture around his neck again, this view needs some revision. Rahel owes her death to the gulf between King and Queen, to the Queen's continued insistence on excessive morality which causes the King to re-assert his newly found independence and manhood. The King is still also to blame; he again loses control and rises to the Queen's bait. At the end of Act II he had seen the need to "sich erobern" (777). The use of the term there was full of dramatic irony, but it is the King's failure to put it into practice later that is unfortunate in the extreme. As Reich aptly puts it, "Herr darf nur sein, wer Herr seiner selbst".<sup>(30)</sup>

Gretchen, her brother and mother, all die as a result of Faust's search for experience, and Faust is allowed to forget these crimes and go on to fresh pastures. In

Jüdin the problem is not so simple. The Queen has changed for the better, she has discovered the force of evil and of guilt and has recognised the limited nature of purity. Her cold voice demanding death for Rahel (1199) has given way to trembling uncertainty (1770). She is prepared to accept the brunt of Alphons's anger (1768). Her words and gestures in Act V reveal new depths of human emotion. Grillparzer described her in a note of 1827 as "scheinbar kalt" (I/21,369), but she has now rejected such "Schein", she is prepared to kneel before him, face his verdict, if possible beg his forgiveness. Once Rahel has died, however, it cannot simply be a matter of forgiving and forgetting. Grillparzer believes in the relative nature of virtue, what Breitenbruch sees as "die Unmöglichkeit, die Tugend rein zu verwirklichen",<sup>(31)</sup> the need for it to be practical. But whilst he is prepared to excuse Alphons's affair with Rahel, especially as it is essential in turning the King into a full human being, he cannot, as Goethe can, excuse murder. The nobles are convinced that it is for the good of the state, but as a diary note of 1849 makes clear, this attitude is highly questionable:

Das Grundübel unserer Zeit ist die historische Abschätzung moralischer Handlungen ... Handlungen, die in die Zukunft hinausreichen unterliegen der moralischen Beurteilung, aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil wir für die Folgen nicht eintreten können. Gutes aus Üblem hervorzubringen ist die Sache Gottes oder des Weltgeistes .. (Tgb.4006)

Earlier, in 1835, he had expressed his concern at a historian's view of Innocent III, "daß konsequentes Handeln nach einer großartigen Idee von aller moralischen Zurechnung befreie" (Tgb.2532). Breitenbruch, who in his book on Grillparzer's ethical views also lists these references, makes the valid distinction between the possibility that good may come from evil, and on the other hand a deliberate policy of banking on such a development. The latter is certainly true of the nobles, whilst the former is true of the King's affair with Rahel. The state, or the nobles who represent it, are not in any way ideal, and they as much as the King will pay for what has happened.

But it is not a personal guilt to be paid for by personal sacrifice, by suicide, it is a collective guilt to be atoned for in the disastrous defeat of Castille's army in the battle of Alarcos. Quite rightly the King does not seek vengeance, the linking of vengeance and humanity which he strives for at the end of Act IV (1570-2) is impossible, as he later realises:

Dazu muß ich mich stärken, mich verhärten,  
Denn alles, was dem Menschen hoch und wert,  
Wird man entgegenstellen meinem Grimm. (1718-20)

Once he has overcome his initial rage, it is precisely his newly acquired humanity that makes these inhuman desires impossible for him. Unfortunately what has made him more completely human has led to a considerable stain on his life as a King. As a result he makes the great gesture of abdicating in favour of his son, as he himself no longer feels worthy of his position in the land. In fact this abdication is meant as a gesture, as a temporary measure until he can prove that he is again fit to rule (1890-2), hence his reference to his son's first and second thrones. He is certainly convinced that in the meantime he and his fellow countrymen can cleanse themselves of their guilt, but his parting words are sadly ironic, and Esther remains to cast a different light on the matter. In the ensuing battle, the King will discover that only "ein Herz, das rein und stark und schuldlos" (1933) can withstand the enemy.

Esther is seen throughout the play as possessing a balanced view of life, a keen insight into what is going on around her. She knows from the start what will happen (560,659,1045-6,1054-5), Rahel looks to her for firm guidance and strength of will. It does however seem wrong to see Esther as the voice of reason and hence to place exaggerated stress on her words of warning to the King, words which shift the blame onto his shoulders to an extent which is not commensurate with much of what has gone before. Her earlier comment on Eleonore, "unschuldig halb und halb auch, halb nur schuldig" (1793), seems more reasonable and in keeping with the evidence. Esther

herself retracts her final curse, recognising that she is not in a position to speak it. Nevertheless it forms an important contrast to the almost triumphant exit of the King and is a forceful reminder that, despite all the noble intentions of the characters, for Grillparzer, unlike for Goethe, guilt and evil cannot be so happily subsumed into a higher vision of goodness. Hence in a diary note of 1834, Grillparzer criticised the newfangled ideas of "Gut und Böse eine Art Polaritätsgegensatz, an dem der negative Pol nicht ein Haar schlechter und nicht minder notwendig als der positive" (Tgb.2169). Goethe, it must be stressed, defended precisely such a view in the admittedly early essay "Zum Shakespeares-Tag", and his Faust still reflects such a positive view of evil, which Grillparzer could never entirely endorse, as his comments on the immorality of Wahlverwandtschaften make clear. At the same time however, Die Jüdin von Toledo makes a much more positive appeal than in many early works for an understanding of mistakes and wrongs, and for the incorporation of them into a balanced view of life. The ideas of virtue, duty, purity are not absolutes, on the contrary to treat them as such without an awareness of man's imperfections is to court danger and inhumanity, but they still exercise a considerable influence as moral guidelines, and to reject them entirely is not in any way Grillparzer's intention. Within this context the pessimism of Vließ and other works of that period, which saw the unstoppable snowballing effect of evil and the apparent uselessness of all standards, has been overcome, and Grillparzer's more mature view is expressed in the words of Zares in Esther:

Niemand ist rein. Das Schlimme will sein Recht,  
Und wers nicht beimischt tropfenweis dem Guten,  
Den wirds gesamt aus Eimern überfluten. (277-9)

Such an attitude entails an acceptance of and a participation in life with all its faults and problems even if, for Grillparzer more than for Goethe, the results are not always exactly ideal.



v) The value of "Sammlung"

By comparison, the order that the priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen seeks to preserve is a life of quiet contemplation in communion with the gods. He sees himself preserving the peace (1527), and in Act I Hero also approves of such a life. She has the ability to think quietly (277), and she contrasts her present existence, "ihres Glückes sturmbeschützte Ruh", with a life of narrow cares at home (287-8). The calmness of a priestess's life is positively compared with the disorder, turmoil and coarseness of the world of action. The priest's supreme term of praise however is "Sammlung", a word which occurs more often in the early plans of 1826, a time when Grillparzer himself was in greater need of such a calm state of mind as a result of the turmoil in his private life. In 1823 he had been determined to keep a regular diary as a source of "Sammlung, Ruhe und Klarheit" (Tgb. 1300), the poem "Dezemberlied" of 1825 presents the search for

Sammlung, jene Götterbraut,  
Mutter alles Großen. (I,165)

In 1826, Grillparzer made perhaps his most famous diary entry on the subject:

Sammlung, Hinrichtung - auf einen einzigen, ausschließenden Punkt ist wohl im Grunde kein in der allgemeinen Menschennatur gegebener Zustand; der Mensch ist ursprünglich dazu eingerichtet mit allen seinen Fähigkeiten sich nach allen Richtungen zu bewegen; - und doch entsteht nichts Großes ohne Ausscheidung, ohne Hinrichtung auf einen Punkt, ohne Sammlung. (Tgb.1413)

In the final version of the play, "Sammlung" is mentioned in only one place, in the tower scene, when apparently quite fortuitously Hero speaks of the need for "Sammlung", in order to recover from the events of the day. For the priest such a mood of concentration produces all the great things in life, and reveals the hidden meanings to the man who reflects in this way:

Du hast genannt den mächtigen Weltenhebel,  
Der alles Große tausendfach erhöht. (948-9)

In one of his early notes for the play, Grillparzer wrote: "Die Sammlung ists, die Großes größer macht, die auch das kleinste zum Ganzen macht zum ewig schönen Ganzen" (I/19, 206). In terms of the Classical aesthetics to which Grillparzer subscribed, this is praise indeed. The same idea of totality as the product of concentrated contemplation is found still in the final version, in the comparison with the man of action:

Doch wessen Streben auf das Innre führt,  
Wo Ganzheit nur des Wirkens Fülle fördert,  
Der halte fern vom Streite seinen Sinn. (982-4)

Throughout his life, repeatedly in his diaries, Grillparzer insisted on the Classical idea of totality in a work of art, and in general he sees total concentration as a prerequisite for the creation of something beautiful and whole. The term Grillparzer uses - "Sammlung" - is also used by Goethe (letters to Schiller, 9/8/1797, 12/8/1797). W.E. Yates correctly points out that this section of the correspondence of Goethe and Schiller was not available until the late 1820s (1829, to be precise), but it is worth noting that Grillparzer quotes Goethe's letter of August 12 in his diary the following year (Tgb.1854), shortly after noting his own lack of "Sammlung" (Tgb.1824). (32)

In the implications Grillparzer attaches to the idea, he is more extreme than Goethe. Grillparzer's idea of concentration seems to involve isolation from the rest of humanity, for Hero and for Libussa's sisters, which is precisely what Goethe rejects in Tasso and Wilhelm Meister, and which is somewhat out of keeping with the idea of the poet as a full, even a leading member of society. The picture of the tower in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, isolated on the edge of the sea, is nearer the Romantic view of the poet in an ivory tower, a view that Tasso still seeks to uphold. In Sappho, where the poetess is certainly not as isolated as Hero will be, Grillparzer is prepared to underline the heroine's need to avoid complete involvement in human affairs. In 1826 he had seen the need to choose between "Dichter" and "Mensch", and had concluded, "ist einmal der Dichter über Bord, send ich ihm

den Menschen auch nach", yet also he had cursed "alles Wissen und Schreiben, wenn dem Innern der Ausbildung als Mensch gar nichts davon zu Gute kommt" (Tgb.1413,1424, 1426). In the following year he wrote of the need to "den Menschen wieder erwecken, sonst ist auch der Dichter verloren" (Tgb.1613).

In Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, Grillparzer recognises the great sacrifice involved in isolated pursuits, and perhaps he also felt that he had chosen to be a poet before he fully knew the losses this entailed. In addition, his affair with Marie von Smolenitz made him much more sympathetic towards Hero than he was when the idea for the play first occurred to him in the early 1820s. The play now includes a number of attacks on the life of isolation, from Naukleros (861), from the priest himself reporting the opinions of others who see such a life as "widrig, unerlaubt, ja ungeheuer,/ ... auch wieder eng und schwach und klein" (171-2), and from Hero's mother who tells her daughter, "das Weib ist glücklich nur an Gattenhand" (320). As Konrad Schaum has recently stressed, the religious order of the temple seems unnatural, "lebensfeindlich",<sup>(33)</sup> everything is banned which seeks a partner (357), and the priest views marriage as something animal (364). The priest believes that full existence can only be achieved through a life of peaceful isolation, hence he says of Hero:

Die einzige sie des dürftgen Geschlechts,  
Ein Selbst zu sein, ein Wesen, eine Welt. (375-6)

This view is echoed by Hans Gmür, and by Leonhard Beriger, who says of Grillparzer, "seine Seele ist ein Kosmos in der Sammlung, ein Chaos in der Zerstreuung", but Krispyn has more correctly insisted that man for Grillparzer becomes human by succumbing to Eros.<sup>(34)</sup> It is life and love that turn Hero and Leander from children into adults, and the priest's words cannot be taken as Grillparzer's opinion. Originally Grillparzer had been guilty of a possibly deliberate muddling of the argument, such as was also detected in Sappho. Compared to the light of reason

(1189), love may well be seen as excessive, unnatural, but there is then a tendency to see love as unnatural when also compared with the state of "Sammlung". According to Papst, "Sammlung" is "the positive principle to which love stands opposed".<sup>(35)</sup> When Grillparzer first planned the play, he may have wished to encourage this assumption, increasingly, however, it is "Sammlung" that is seen as the isolated and unnatural existence, and love is the natural form of life, however excessive Hero and Leander are in pursuing their emotions. Hero's complete existence becomes bound up with Leander, and the priest has to realise at the end that there is nothing left of her to retain the dignity of a priestess. Grillparzer must have felt that his poetic life was not a source of existence, and that to withdraw from life in order to be a poet would mean gradual stagnation, so that he also would become unable to judge the situations of real life, as is the priest's sad fate. In questioning the ideal of pure concentration, Grillparzer has in a paradoxical fashion come nearer to a Goethean view of the poet involved in life and society, whilst the term "Sammlung", although used by Goethe, is distinctly contrary to the general spirit of Classicism.

Grillparzer does not reject the concept of "Sammlung" from now on, in fact whilst revising the play he specifically mentions that "Ruhe und Sammlung, so lange Fremdlinge in meinem Gemüt, kehren zurück" (Tgb.2037), and in the following year, 1833, Grillparzer writes the poem "An die Sammlung", addressing his words to this ideal:

Was Großes wird, des bist du Mutter ja,  
Und wo du nicht bist, da zerfällt in Staub  
Das Götterbild der Menschheit und zerbröckelt,  
Wie Mauersteine, deren Bindung wich. (I,210)

His journey to England and France in 1836 is undertaken in the search for "Sammlung", and in an essay of the early 1860s he sees the curse of the age to be the lack of "jene innere Konzentration ... ohne die eine Tat oder ein Werk nicht möglich ist" (III,725). Significantly though, this is expressed through the foreign word, and the German

term "Sammlung" is not found in Grillparzer's work after 1836, except once in Esther (715), and in Libussa, where it is cast in a much dimmer light than in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen. The realm of the sisters is a haven of quiet concentration:

Wer gehen will auf höh'rer Mächte Spuren,  
Muß einig sein in sich, der Geist ist eins.  
Wem's nicht gelungen, all die bunten Kräfte,  
Im Mittelpunkt zu sammeln seines Wesens,  
So daß der Leib zum Geist wird, und der Geist  
Ein Leib erscheint, sich gliedernd in Gestalt,

...  
Für den gibts fürder keine Einsamkeit,  
In der der Mensch allein ist mit sich selbst. (1144-54)

But the sisters show the dangers of such a life, they are concerned with the spirit, with meditation (173,242-3), their search for totality causes them to avoid all limiting actions (218,440), they are above human considerations (128), they need to remain untarnished by human affairs (439,469).

In the poem "An die Sammlung", Grillparzer addresses the ideal, "die du dein Haus entfernt von Menschen baust" (I,210). Before her final prophecy, Libussa needs to collect herself (2238), but she is dangerously seeking to return to a state she has rightly left, whilst Primislaus deliberately adds the idea of ordinary nature to any mere concentration of man's powers (2108-12). The sisters' isolated realm of spiritual concentration is barren, artificially removed from the realistic social world which Libussa espouses in marrying Primislaus. Despite its attractions for an at times frustrated or resigned Grillparzer, any desire to see "Sammlung" as an ideal for the whole of life is repressed and rejected. Critics such as Gmür, Papst, Whitaker, and Beriger, who uphold "Sammlung" as an ideal, fail to recognise such problematic aspects. According to Gmür, safety is to be found only in withdrawal, but the plays reveal the impossibility of such withdrawal.<sup>(36)</sup> The plays however show the impracticality of such withdrawal; Schaum rightly stresses the need to enter life and leave a cosy idyll. The chaos of which Beriger writes is ultimately more total, more fertile than spurious totality seen or recognised in

Sappho, Hero, Kascha and Tetka. Grillparzer comes to accept what Schaum calls "der Verlust des Hohen in der Vielfalt und dem Chaos des Irdischen",<sup>(37)</sup> as he repeatedly acknowledges, "Sammlung" is inhuman, "kein in der allgemeinen Menschennatur gegebener Zustand" (Tgb.1413), it involves unnatural concentration and the rejection of ordinary life. The unified totality as understood and sought by the priest (DMudLW,983) or by Libussa's sisters (Libussa,219) is an aesthetic idea of harmony and perfection. The important Classical term "Harmonie" is scarcely found, however, in Grillparzer's work except in the youthful period, where phrases such as "reine Harmonie", "die Harmonie des Ganzen", occur.<sup>(38)</sup> In 1828, Grillparzer sees his life's aim as "die harmonische Ausbildung der eignen Empfänglichkeit für das Gute und Große" (Tgb.1627), in 1834 he writes that "widersprechende Eigenschaften in Harmonie gebracht machen den großen Mann" (Tgb.2136), but further use of the concept is minimal; of Grillparzer's mature works, only Der arme Spielmann concerns itself with harmony, but Jakob's love of aesthetic harmony is no help, even a hindrance, in ordinary life, and Grillparzer increasingly acknowledges that such ideals cannot be transferred to the everyday world, as will be considered in detail in subsequent chapters. The new idea of life is not aesthetic and harmonious, it is "buntverworren", chaotic and problematic, but it is ultimately more fruitful and meaningful.

#### NOTES

1. Gustav Waniek, "Grillparzer unter Goethes Einfluß", Xenia Austriaca, Festschrift der österreichischen Mittelschulen zur 42. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in Wien, Vienna, 1893, pp.65-99.
2. E.E.Papst, Grillparzer: "Der Meeres und der Liebe Wellen", London, 1967, p.20 (henceforth referred to as: Papst, "DMudLW").
3. Politzer, p.229.
4. Papst, "DMudLW", p.12. It may be felt that critics are too ready to attach the dangerous and potentially misleading notion of "loss of self" to Grillparzer's work, a trend supported by Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Prosa II, p.89) and followed over the years by, among

Sappho, Hero, Kascha and Tetka. Grillparzer comes to accept what Schaum calls "der Verlust des Hohen in der Vielfalt und dem Chaos des Irdischen",<sup>(37)</sup> as he repeatedly acknowledges, "Sammlung" is inhuman, "kein in der allgemeinen Menschennatur gegebener Zustand" (Tgb.1413), it involves unnatural concentration and the rejection of ordinary life. The unified totality as understood and sought by the priest (DMudLW,983) or by Libussa's sisters (Libussa,219) is an aesthetic idea of harmony and perfection. The important Classical term "Harmonie" is scarcely found, however, in Grillparzer's work except in the youthful period, where phrases such as "reine Harmonie", "die Harmonie des Ganzen", occur.<sup>(38)</sup> In 1828, Grillparzer sees his life's aim as "die harmonische Ausbildung der eignen Empfänglichkeit für das Gute und Große" (Tgb.1627), in 1834 he writes that "widersprechende Eigenschaften in Harmonie gebracht machen den großen Mann" (Tgb.2136), but further use of the concept is minimal; of Grillparzer's mature works, only Der arme Spielmann concerns itself with harmony, but Jakob's love of aesthetic harmony is no help, even a hindrance, in ordinary life, and Grillparzer increasingly acknowledges that such ideals cannot be transferred to the everyday world, as will be considered in detail in subsequent chapters. The new idea of life is not aesthetic and harmonious, it is "buntverworren", chaotic and problematic, but it is ultimately more fruitful and meaningful.

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3. Politzer, p.229.
4. Papst, "DMudLW", p.12. It may be felt that critics are too ready to attach the dangerous and potentially misleading notion of "loss of self" to Grillparzer's work, a trend supported by Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Prosa II, p.89) and followed over the years by, among

others, Benno von Wiese (Die deutsche Tragödie von Lessing bis Hebbel, Hamburg, 1955, p.391), by Baumann (Franz Grillparzer, pp.69,99), Oplatka (p.47), and by Kleinschmidt (passim). It was admitted in the previous chapter that Grillparzer's characters lacked the strength and resolution of Goethe's or Schiller's, but that should not be seen as entailing a complete breakdown or disintegration of personality, which the idea of "Selbstverlust" suggests. Certainly the Classical ideals of "self-control" and "self-knowledge" are seriously jeopardised at times, and one can no longer assume that characters are "des rechten Weges wohl bewußt", but it must again be stressed in Grillparzer's defence that his characters, in comparison to those of Schiller, are not allowed to preserve their integrity by withdrawing from reality, a point to be discussed in detail in the final section of this chapter.

5. Gert Kleinschmidt, Illusion und Untergang, Die Liebe im Drama Franz Grillparzers, Lahr, 1967, pp.58,82.
6. Politzer, p.330.
7. See Tgb.3178,3182,3481, and a more detailed discussion in the following chapter.
8. Kleinschmidt, p.88.
9. "Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen", Tgb.1835, letter to Altmütter, early 1821 (IV,762).
10. Kleinschmidt, p.96.
11. See also Medea,660,1128,1236-7,1844.
12. Kleinschmidt, pp.44,85.
13. Iphigenie,216-7,1661-2; Tasso,46-7,2679-80,2715.
14. See Piccolomini,350-1,2293,2351-2,2389; Maria Stuart, 1180-1,3182; Jungfrau,137-8,668-9,1102.
15. For a discussion of this point, see pp.333-41.
16. Urs Helmsdorfer, Grillparzers Bühnenkunst, Studien, Berne, 1960, p.56; Skreb, Grillparzer, p.177; Schaum, "DMudLW", p.110.
17. Schafroth, p.65.
18. See also Libussa,327,2248; Jüdin,611-2,1173-5,1438-9, 1517-8.
19. See also "Einem Soldaten" (I,324), "Der Christbaum" (I,335), "Einem Regiments-Inhaber" (I,342).
20. Reich, p.259.
21. Breitenbruch, p.21.
22. See Ahnfrau,746,776,781,785,796,1290-2,1627,1948,2580, 2794,3265; Sappho,853,1450,1601,1690.
23. For the use of "rein" to refer to Kreusa, see Medea,675, 684,903,1238,2181; see also 1036,1763,2079.
24. See also "Da ich ein Knabe war" (I,352), "In trüber Stunde" (I,354).
25. Treuer Diener,741,951,1244,1281; Bruderzwist,1917,1925, 1986. The one exception to this comment is Erny's use of the word (Treuer Diener,1270), but this is itself a reply to a question from Otto.
26. Politzer, p.330; Egbert Krispyn, "Grillparzer's tragedy Die Jüdin von Toledo", Modern Language Review, LX (1965), 405-15, p.414.



27. Wells, p.142.
28. Baumann, Versuche, p.115.
29. Bruce Thompson, "An ironic tragedy, Grillparzer's Die Jüdin von Toledo", German Life and Letters (New Series), XXV (1971-2), 210-9, p.215.
30. Reich, p.279.
31. Breitenbruch, p.121.
32. W.E.Yates, "Josef Schreyvogel ...", p.106. Yates suggests quite plausibly that Schreyvogel acted as a catalyst in Grillparzer's use of this concept.
33. Schaum, "DMudLW", p.102.
34. Hans Gmür, Dramatische und theatralische Stilelemente in Grillparzers Dramen, Winterthur, 1956, p.24; Leonhard Beriger, Grillparzers Persönlichkeit in seinem Werk, Zurich, 1928, p.22; Krispyn, "Jüdin", p.409.
35. Papst, "DMudLW", p.12.
36. Gmür, p.136; Papst, Beriger, op.cit.; Paul K. Whitaker, "The concept of Sammlung in Grillparzer's works", Monatshefte, XLI (1949), 93-103.
37. Schaum, "DMudLW", p.112.
38. See Blanka, 3475, 3751; "Heinrich IV" (II, 998); Tgb. 91, 283; for further uses of the concept of harmony, see "Irene", 1.7, "Der Triumph der Liebe" (I, 32), "Die dreifache Muse" (I, 381), Tgb. 13, 19.

Chapter 7. Humanity and truth: "Weh dem, der lügt!"

Ernst Alker, in his discussion of Grillparzer's comedy, insists: "Von Klassik findet sich keine Spur mehr". On the whole however, in the relative optimism of Grillparzer's one completed comedy, critics have more readily observed the influence of eighteenth-century ideas than in most other plays by Grillparzer. Ruth Angress describes the play as "an Austrian puppet-show on Goethean themes", as Grillparzer's "Iphigenie in Vienna". The term "puppet-show" perhaps suggests a rather playful approach to serious topics and is to be criticised for that reason. Furthermore, as Hock already underlined in 1954, there is more to the comedy than just the theme of truthfulness and honesty, which prompts the drawing of parallels between Grillparzer's play and Goethe's Iphigenie. There is more than just a "dash of humanism" (Angress), the whole basis of the play is taken from Classical ideas of humanity. Baumann rather insultingly links the play with Goethe's comedies on the French Revolution and criticises the "Predigtcharakter" of the comedy for making the meaning too obvious. As I shall seek to demonstrate, there is no obvious meaning and the bishop's preaching is cast in an ironic light.<sup>(1)</sup>

The situation at the court of Kattwald, the Germanic Count, is a contrast between cultured Franks and the barbarian Germanic tribe which is expressed in terms of humanity and brutishness. Leon, although a mere cook who has only just ceased to be an apprentice, considers himself to be "ein Mensch" and consequently superior to the Germans. He tells Edrita, "vom Tier zum Menschen sind der Stufen viele" (668), and it is clear that in his eyes the Germans have not taken very many of these steps, even though he will not class them as animals. Kattwald, significantly, is a man who takes an excessive delight in his food, consumes too much wine, and at the end of Act IV fumes uncontrollably as his daughter, slave and prisoner escape. Man however should be aware of those attributes

which distance him from the merely animal in him and be proud of his own potential. To Edrita, Leon insists:

Ein Mensch ist um so mehr, je mehr er Mensch  
Und hier herum mahnts ziemlich an die Krippe. (676-7)

This distinction between the man still controlled by animal instincts and the true human being, "der Mensch", is of course central to Classical ideas.<sup>(2)</sup> The contrast of "Mensch" and "Tier" is one which is found in Grillparzer's work from an early date. According to the wanderer in "Irene":

Das Tier in uns hat die Natur hervorgebracht,  
den Menschen schuf erst seine Göttermacht! (57-8)

In his early diaries, Grillparzer had written of his fear that his sins such as jealousy could put him into the class of wild animals (Tgb.17). Grillparzer's Faust enjoys the pleasure of being "ein Mensch" amongst the animals of the forest (II,993), whilst Jaromir in Die Ahnfrau realises that he has become an animal himself in the company of the robbers (1330-1), a situation similar to that of Atalus in the midst of the barbarians without a truly human example to guide him. Grillparzer saw the Middle Ages as a barbaric era when tough measures were required: "Menschen mag man lehren und ermahnen, aber für Tiere gehört ein Maulkorb" (Tgb.2753). In strictly political terms, Grillparzer describes the Russians in 1839, the Hungarians in 1840 as animals (I,262; I,441). Rudolf II in Bruderzwist sees order turning animals into men (1267), but regrets that man's animal nature is still seen when he is in a crowd (1482). Julius requests a fair trial for Don Cäsar,

Daß nicht wie ein verzehrend, reißend Tier,  
Daß wie ein Mensch er aus dem Leben scheide. (2183-4)

Grillparzer however saw the nationalistic tendencies involving a reversal of the development praised by Rudolf. In the poem "Sprachenkampf" of 1849 (I,500), the desire to insist on national languages turns men back into beasts and undoes the advantages of education. The same year gave rise to one of Grillparzer's most famous epigrams:

Der Weg der neueren Bildung geht  
Von Humanität  
Durch Nationalität  
Zur Bestialität. (I,500)

Elsewhere Grillparzer writes in his diary, "ohne Ahnung vom Übersinnlichen wäre der Mensch allerdings Tier" (Tgb. 753); and he sees the newly born child in a similar position between the two extremes:

Und Mensch- und Tierheit streiten,  
Wem sie gehört. ("An der Wiege eines Kindes" (I,99))

Like the Classicists, Grillparzer stresses that man is in fact made up of animal and more ideal human qualities, which cannot be separated, and none of which may be removed (III,718-9).

It is Das goldene Vließ which comes closest to the comedy in its treatment of this conflict. Milo thinks the Colchians are "wilde Tiere" (Argonauten,1650), just as Leon, more jokingly, speaks of the Germans: "hat man nicht seine Not mit all den Tieren?" (Weh dem,614). The Greeks are seen spreading "der Menschheit Samen/ ... in die leere Wildnis" (Argonauten,835-6). The gulf between the cultured Greeks and the coarse barbarians is stressed. When Jason asks Medea to remove her magic veil, he tells her:

In Kolchis sind wir nicht, in Griechenland,  
Nicht unter Ungeheuern, unter Menschen! (Medea,182-3)

He wants to give Medea the chance to prove

Ob sies vermag, zu weilen unter Menschen (561)

- but finally he decides that if he can only get rid of her,

Dann will ich wieder Mensch mit Menschen sein. (827)  
Colchis however he considers to be a land of "Menschenopfer, Todesmahle" (Argonauten,1276), it is repeatedly seen as a land of coarseness and barbarity. This contrast between Greek and Colchian is set out in Classical terms of man and savage, yet a glance at Goethe's play on a similar theme will reveal startling differences.

The conclusion reached in Iphigenie, and in Classicism in general, especially in a play such as Nathan, is that all men are equally good and humane. Thoas doubts that

it is his duty or even doubts his ability to hear "die Stimme der Wahrheit und der Menschlichkeit", but Iphigenie tells him:

Es hört sie jeder,  
Geboren unter jedem Himmel, dem  
Des Lebens Quelle durch den Busen rein  
Und ungehindert fließt. (1939-42)

Nathan tells the Templar:

Ich weiß, wie gute Menschen denken, weiß,  
Daß alle Länder gute Menschen tragen. (Nathan, II,5)

Certainly Medea is no worse, and arguably better than Jason, and Absyrtus is as innocent a victim as Kreusa, one might therefore suppose that Grillparzer was envisaging a similar message to that of the Classicists. Yet in fact Grillparzer goes out of his way to stress the contrast of Greek and Colchian as a means to underlining the essential incompatibility of Medea and Jason. Aietes first and foremost is a nasty, cunning, greedy barbarian, quite the opposite of the cultured Thoas, and the contrast in the language they use is merely symptomatic of this glaring difference. By way of contrast, Jason sees Greece in ideal terms (Argonauten, 1237 ff.), and Kreusa is constantly seen in Classical terms of approval. Jason, having described Greece as so superior, then makes Medea seem more impressive by seeing her in similar terms, though, as he later discovers, it is more the case that Medea seems attractive against the background of the Colchian surroundings which prompt the gruesome descriptions from Milo and Jason in Die Argonauten.

It is possible that Grillparzer originally envisaged Greece in terms of the ideal, the poem on the ruins of Campo Vaccino compares the Classical age favourably with the dull present. Nevertheless a closer examination of Vließ reveals that the theoretical difference between the two cultures is less harsh in practice. Jason was to have had "eine gewisse ruhige (griechisch antike) Haltung" (HKA I/17, 284), but Medea is now nearer the truth in calling him "Grausamer, Unmenschlicher" (Argonauten, 1515), and the Greece that appears in the last part of the trilogy

is perhaps nearer to historical reality, to the Greece as presented by the Greeks themselves, than it is to the idealised picture found in German Classicism. As a result however, the levelling off which is apparent in Grillparzer's trilogy is not in an upward direction as in Iphigenie, where Taurians (what we see of them) are as good as the Greeks, but in the opposite direction, so that the Greeks are discovered to be no better than the Colchians despite their veneer of culture and civilisation. Kreusa's purity or Kreon's sense of justice do not prevent them doing wrong, and it is ultimately the King's desire to have the fleece which precipitates the catastrophe. This inevitably helps us to feel a greater degree of sympathy for Medea, and Grillparzer may have viewed the matter in this light, but it is symptomatic of the pessimism in the early play that we are in a position to see the murderer of three people, two of them her own children, as one of the better of a pusillanimous group of characters. We are faced apparently with an unclassical distinction between a higher and a lower level of humanity and a partial destruction of this division which only serves to show that all people are equally evil or misguided.

As I have tried to show however, Vließ is an extreme example of Grillparzer's pessimism, and Iphigenie can be seen as an extreme example of Classical optimism. Goethe himself realised that only an idealised and ethereal character such as Euphorion could be entirely "ohne Tierheit" (Faust, 9602), whilst Mephisto speaks of the dubious use man makes of his divine spark:

Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein,  
Nur tierischer als jedes Tier zu sein. (Faust, 285-6)

In Wilhelm Tell, the Austrians are seen as inhuman (1922), the term "Mensch" applied to the Austrians is one of abuse (158, 1814, 2271). On the whole however, it is more the refined type of human being that is depicted in the creative works of Goethe and Schiller, they do not portray the different stages between animal and man which are discussed in the essays of Schiller and Herder. Grillparzer's

comedy shows us precisely these stages.

In Vließ the stress on "Menschen" which is implied in the Greeks and their civilisation proves hollow and unintentionally ironic. In the comedy it is quite clear that the Franks are superior to the barbarians and the gulf between the inarticulate Galomir and the fine Gregor preparing his sermon seems almost unbridgeable. Nevertheless, as Leon points out, there are many steps between the extremes and there is no obvious break to divide the two. As in Lessing's Nathan, Grillparzer presents us with a hierarchy of characters, but it is significant that Galomir, "tierisch, aber nicht blödsinnig" (Tgb.3491), is considerably lower on the scale of humanity than is the Patriarch, and also that the forces of bestiality are considerably more powerful and dangerous even in the relative optimism of Grillparzer's comedy than they are in Lessing's play, where the Patriarch is too isolated, too much a comic caricature to be at all a threat to the other more or less enlightened characters.

Furthermore the division between Franks and Germans is not entirely clear-cut. Atalus, although a Frank, is a snob, conscious of his superiority, which is a result of his origins rather than his own qualities. Atalus, in Hock's words, has "innere 'Roheit' ... unter dem 'Schein' der Bildung", (3) he will marry Edrita if her family is ennobled, he cares only for himself, as does Otto von Meran in Treuer Diener. He rejects any task which seems out of keeping with his inflated sense of importance. Finally he improves somewhat in the company of Leon and renounces Edrita at the end. Away from the barbarian surroundings, Atalus has changed and improved, he has moved nearer the ideal humanity which it is everyone's duty to strive for. In Schiller's words:

Jetzt fiel der Tierheit dumpfe Schranke  
Und Menschheit trat auf die entwölkte Stirn.  
("Die Künstler", 183-4)

Atalus had been happy to stagnate until forcibly dragged out of his gloomy apathy. Edrita however had a desire to improve herself. Although a German, she has a natural

nobility and morality, she is uncorrupted, unaware of deception until Leon comes along. Like Thoas she is able to hear the voice of truth and humanity, for she seeks the culture of the Franks and also their religion, which in the play is very much, as W.E. Yates believes, a symbol for moral duty and truth. (4)

Leon is convinced from the start of Edrita's potential for improvement: "Das läßt sich bilden, ich verzweifle nicht" (670). He makes the same claim for Atalus, "er ist ein Frank und läßt sich bilden" (826), though one must see this as ironic, if unintentionally so on his part. Atalus can be educated because he is "ein Mensch" not because he is a Frank, although membership of a cultured community provides him with an inherent advantage. But Edrita makes it clear that the capacity for "Bildung" is not an exclusive right of certain nations, and Atalus shows that it is not in any way a natural process, but a fight to overcome the coarseness of bestiality.

According to Herder in the Humanitätsbriefe:

Humanität ist der Schatz und die Ausbeute aller menschlichen Bemühungen, gleichsam die Kunst unsres Geschlechtes. Die Bildung zu ihr ist ein Werk, das unablässig fortgesetzt werden muß, oder wir sinken, höhere und niedere Stände, zur rohen Tierheit, zur Brutalität zurück. (XVII,138)

The use of "roh" as an attribute of the less-than-human is common in Classicism. Goethe in Die natürliche Tochter writes of "die rohe Menge" (2352), "das rohe Leben" (2768), in "Ilmenau" the youthful Karl August and his group cloak their nobility in coarseness. "Roh" is a particularly common epithet for Schiller: Grimm's Deutsches Wörterbuch lists a disproportionately large number of references from Schiller's writings. (5) Schiller also sees coarseness as a quality of animals as opposed to humans (NA XX,90,254). War is "ein roh gewaltsam Handwerk" (Piccolomini,182), the Thirty Years War was a time of "rohe Horden" (Wallenstein, Prolog,89), Max and Thekla in particular dislike the coarseness of their fate (Tod,2275,3160,3177). (6)

In Weh dem Leon finds everything in the Rheingau coarse (949). Gregor sees the Germanic lands in a similar



light, it is a region,

Wo noch die Roheit, die hier Schein umkleidet,  
In erster Blöße Mensch und Tier vermengt. (290-1)

Elsewhere, in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, coarseness is seen in the ordinary people as opposed to the isolated priestly community (309,429); in his autobiographical poem "Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen", Grillparzer sees his own work manhandled by the coarse age, and he frequently refers to the coarseness of many modern literary productions.<sup>(7)</sup> The condemnation of coarseness in society acquires added force from the 1830s onward. The Emperor Joseph's statue looks down on "Trotz und Roheit ... der Menge" (I,253), an epigram of 1835, repeated ten years later, finds the Germans using "Roheit" to cover up a lack of "Hoheit" (I,417). Libussa and her sisters see themselves surrounded by such coarseness, and this was very much Grillparzer's view of events in 1848.<sup>(8)</sup>

Mosenthal's tragedy Orsini, given its premiere at the Burgtheater in 1869, produced generally disastrous criticism, but praise from Grillparzer. One epigram applauds "die gebildete Sprache in verwilderter Zeit", a second is pleased to find "eine gebildete Rede/ In einer roh gewordenen Zeit" (I,588). It would seem that "wild" and "roh" occupy similar positions in Grillparzer's thought, and certainly "wild" is an even more frequent critical epithet in his work than "roh", which only acquires force after 1830. "Wild" is the adjective used by Melitta to describe anything of which she does not approve (Sappho, 648,651,663,700), used by Sappho in comparing man's "rastloses Streben" with the more circumscribed fortunes of woman (820). It is especially common to depict Medea (Medea,403,571,1306,etc.,etc.), Rustan (Traum,3,84,102,etc., etc.), and inevitably also the barbarians in Weh dem (1320, 1474,1602,etc.,etc.). In an alternative version to a scene in Act II, Leon was to say of Atalus, "er scheint mir was verwildert hier im Freien" (I/20,277). In a political sense, Rudolf II sees his age in such terms of savagery (Bruderzwist,321,344,1260,etc.,etc.), and Don Cäsar

is "wild" (2076) as he himself admits (1945).<sup>(9)</sup> Here also one may trace the influence of Schiller. "Wild" is used especially to describe the more unsavoury aspects of human behaviour in Braut von Messina, Jungfrau, but one could list endless instances of its use in Wilhelm Tell, Wallenstein, and in poems such as "Lied von der Glocke".<sup>(10)</sup> Hölderlin also was prone to see the age as one of savages, as in "Der Archipelagus" (1.244) and "Die Wanderung" (1.109), and he considered the Germans to be even worse than savages (Hyperion, GSA III,153).

If the description of animals or animal characteristics in man is similar in Grillparzer and the Classicists, then that is also true of the means to overcome such handicaps, namely through the process of "Bildung", which is such a vital concept for Goethe, Herder, Humboldt, and Schiller also.<sup>(11)</sup> In Grillparzer's comedy, the contrast between savagery and culture is seen in the two nations' attitudes to eating; "Hier nährt man sich, der Franke nur kann essen" (497), but on a more serious level both Atalus and Edrita are thought to be capable of education. Elsewhere Grillparzer insists in Classical terms, "die Bildung ... beruht auf einem Gleichgewicht aller menschlichen Fähigkeiten" (III,250-1), and he affirms "daß der Mensch nicht von Anfang her verständig und gerecht war, sondern es erst durch die steigende Bildung geworden ist" (Tgb. 3803).<sup>(12)</sup> But Grillparzer was not always particularly optimistic, he fears that "die ganze Bildung der deutschen Nation in den letzten zwanzig Jahren war eine falsche" (III,715-6; cf. III,712,717,915). He believed that nationalistic tendencies were a barrier to true cultural humanity and opened the door to bestiality. On the other hand, "Bildung" would bring greater similarity between nations, "bei zunehmender Bildung werden sich die Menschen daher immer ähnlicher" (Tgb.4022), and in refusing to recognise this, the Hungarians were unable to partake of true "Bildung" (III,1020; I,500,503). In 1836 Grillparzer had written in his diary, "von Unsinn zu Unsinn geht der Bildungsgang der Welt" (Tgb.2856), and in the poem "Der

Reichstag" he especially scoffs at the suggestion that the process of "Bildung" is complete:

Das schönste Werk der Weisheit und der Kraft,  
Daß sie die Roheit, schwer genug, gebändigt,  
Hebts auf! Entlast den Pöbel seiner Haft,  
Erklärt der Bildung Werk als schon beendet. (I,325)

The new powers are quite incapable of understanding the meaning of "Bildung". Grillparzer believed that, far from "Bildung" being complete, Austria in fact lagged behind other nations in this respect ("Aufrufe" (III,1040)). Perhaps significantly, Grillparzer is less optimistic than Goethe and Schiller on the link between art and education. In 1849 he saw poetry as "der Ausdruck und die Zusammenfassung der literarischen und menschlichen Bildung einer Nation" (Tgb.4023), six years later he described literature as "das Organ der Bildung" (Tgb.4106), but elsewhere he insisted that literature and education were opposed (III,241,709), that an artist must forget his "Bildung" when creating a work (I,543; III,242). Politzer considers "Bildung" to be "dieser in Grillparzers Augen heilige und allumfassende Begriff",<sup>(13)</sup> but it is not as common and, typically, not seen in such an optimistic light as in the work of the Classicists. It is a vital concept in his thought nevertheless.

Certainly the comedy makes it clear that beasts can be educated to humans, even though this is expressed in humorous terms. The Franks are seen as cultured, and hence a person in their midst is capable of culture. Leon stresses his "feinste Sitten" (466) in recommending himself to Kattwald, for as Edrita points out to Leon, "man rühmt die feinen Sitten deines Volkes" (681). In a variant reading to line 862, Leon insists:

Ein Franke duldet nicht,  
Daß eine Frau bemüht um seinetwillen. (I/20,280)

Edrita however is dismayed when Leon appears to possess none of these fine manners, but is instead no better than they are, "ungeschlacht und roh" (694).

Leon's worry at the end of the play is that Atalus and Edrita will adopt barbaric ways if allowed or forced to return to German lands. It is only in the cultured

surroundings of France that man can be expected to achieve a high degree of humanity.<sup>(14)</sup> The community is all important, as had been stressed by Kant, Herder, Goethe, even if all of them had a tendency to prefer the small community to a large state. In a letter to K.A. Fichtner (25/2/1838), Grillparzer explained that Atalus's poor character was a result of his being in the midst of "Wilde ... Halb Tiere, die ihn verhöhnen, mißhandeln, herabsetzen". In a variant to Act II, Leon says of Atalus,

Hat erst der Mensch kein Beispiel als das seine,  
Wird er wohl ab und zu sein eignes Zerrbild. (I/20,277)

In his diary for 1825, Grillparzer compared animals who are isolated, unable to communicate and pass on information and education, with human beings:

Wodurch ist denn der Mensch, was er ist, als durch seine Gattung? Sein ganzer Bestand als Mensch liegt nicht in einem Individuum, nicht in tausend, sondern in der Menschheit, als ganzes, als moralisches Wesen, entgegengesetzt dem physischen, dem einzelnen. ... er lebt nur als Mensch, als Glied seiner Gattung. Darin liegt das Heiligtum seiner Existenz, das ist das Palladium seiner Vorzüge, in dieser allgemeinen Menscheneinsicht, in diesem allgemeinen Menschenwillen tritt der Gott ein in die Natur. (Tgb.1409)

Such views are an echo of Herder's mature philosophy, man is most likely to reach his full potential in a community of like-thinking people in which each individual is proud of his status as a human being. As Grillparzer wrote in his diary for 1844:

Wer die Gesellschaft in ihren Grundbedingungen angreift schließt sich selbst von der Menschheit aus, die ihre Grundbedingungen in der Gesellschaft hat. Er macht sich selbst zum Tier und muß als Tier behandelt werden. (Tgb.3780)

Leon, once he is brought face to face with a lesser species, realises the wisdom of Herder's words, "der Mensch hat kein edleres Wort für seine Bestimmung als er selbst ist" (XIII,154). Atalus is very much criticised for stressing his ancestors' merits rather than his own human qualities. As Gregor has to point out, all men are equal because all are descended ultimately from God.

The bishop, in his description of the Rheingau, sees a coarseness which the Franks hide by "Schein" (290). In

a short article on Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, Politzer refers to Grillparzer's use of the word "Schein" -

Auch riet ich dir den Schein zu meiden,  
Den Schein sogar, vielmehr noch wahren Anlaß.  
(DMudLW, 1434-5)

Poltzer sees this as typical of the way in which Schiller's use of the word has been debased, and Backmann comments in the critical edition, "Gegenüberstellungen von Scheinen und Sein sind bei Grillparzer ungemein beliebt".<sup>(15)</sup> In fact the instance quoted by Politzer seems a perfectly standard, neutral use of the word "Schein" in the sense of "appearance". Certainly it must be admitted however that Grillparzer on the whole sees "Schein" in negative terms, inferior to reality,<sup>(16)</sup> and he fears, "allein die Welt, sie urteilt nach dem Scheine" (I, 342, cf. Bruderzwist, 1504). For his birthday he proposed a toast,

Auf das Wohl derer,  
Die nicht scheinen,  
Sondern - seinen! (I, 460)

It should be pointed out that Goethe and Schiller both make full use of these negative connotations of "Schein".<sup>(17)</sup> Nevertheless the positive aesthetic connotation which is so important in Schiller's essays, the idea of aesthetic semblance, is reflected only in Grillparzer's early diary entries (e.g. Tgb. 890). In Weh dem, Gregor's one use of the word does seem to suggest the idea of "Schein" as a veneer of culture (about which he is perhaps being slightly cynical), just as Schiller, in his aesthetic letters, sees the first signs of "Bildung" revealed in the savages' delight in beauty and decoration for its own sake. In the comedy there is a hint of the importance of aesthetic culture in man's development, and this is underlined by the role of beauty. Edrita insists, "ich kann am Guten mich und Schönen freun" (1162), and this ability to take a delight in the good and beautiful is an essential prerequisite for cultural development. In the early fragment "Irene", the spirit of peace improves man in this way:

Das Gute mit dem Schönen lieblich gattend,  
Schmückt er das dürftge Dasein köstlich aus. (48-9)

Phaon tells Sappho he loved her, "wie man das Gute liebet und das Schöne" (Sappho,1725). One of man's instincts which separates him from animals is "sein Streben nach dem Wahren, nach dem Guten, nach dem Schönen" (Tgb.871). The combination of goodness and beauty is a common one in Grillparzer's writing.<sup>(18)</sup> So also Herder tells man, "strebe nach Wahrheit, Güte und gottähnlicher Schönheit" (XIII,194), and numerous instances of such linked ideals could be drawn from Goethe's work. In the poem "Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen" however, Grillparzer asks despondently, "lebt denn das Schöne nur in Bild und Sage" (1.107), and on the whole Grillparzer's use of the word fails to suggest ethical overtones that are explicit in the Classical view of beauty as spiritual and moral excellence. The term can nevertheless be found in certain important contexts. In the poem "An der Wiege eines Kindes", Grillparzer believes: "Das Schöne, es ist gut und schön das Gute" (I,99). Kreusa in Vließ is not only "weiß in ihrer Schönheit" (Medea,2204) but also "schön an Leib und Seele" (Medea,674). In Weh dem, Leon tells Edrita:

Schönheit war und ist  
So Adelsbrief als Doktorhut den Weibern. (678-9)

Elsewhere, however, Grillparzer warns of the dangers of seeing external beauty as a guide to inner excellence. Banchanus is decidedly unattractive but a paragon of virtue and uprightness. Bertha and the Count tell Raimund in Melusina, "ach die Schönheit - Täuschet lange" (593), and warn:

Unter Schönheit, Anmut, Zier,  
Naht das Böse lauernd dir. (595-6, cf. also the early  
"Spartakus",715)

It is worth noting that the comedy appears to present Grillparzer's more optimistic view of beauty as a positive value. Grillparzer clearly also stressed the importance of beauty in art, but a discussion of that aspect is outside the scope of this thesis.

If the search for beauty is one of man's human instincts, then the search for truth is another equally

vital one. The theme of truth is one which concerned Grillparzer from an early age. The diaries of his youth are full of an investigation into his own sins, one of the greatest being his enjoyment of lies; he sees himself taking a positive delight in untruths (Tgb.17). As Oskar Katann has shown,<sup>(19)</sup> his religion teacher Jakob Frint no doubt played a great part in developing Grillparzer's preoccupation with such ideas. Many of Grillparzer's early characters hurl the accusation "du lügst" at one another. In Die Schreibfeder, Franz Moser's fanatical devotion to absolute truth, a trait taken from Grillparzer's father, causes the dramatic action and threatens catastrophe. The problem is not considered in any depth however, in the end it transpires that no lie has been told, which makes the threat to everyone's happiness from Moser's fanaticism seem all the more unjustified. The libretto Melusina contrasts the truth of the real world with the dream-like nature of the spiritual world (166-7). Raimund insists that Melusina is true (629), he challenges his friends,

Ist sie wahr,  
Fliehet ihr!  
Ist sie Lüge,  
Folgt ich euch. (620-3)

The others hope, "laß ihn Wahrheit ganz erreichen!" (628), but Raimund is ultimately lost to the world of truth.

Grillparzer soon took an interest in Kant and Rousseau and in the early 1820s consideration of Rousseau's theories on truth and the extent to which lies are permissible goes together with a first plan for the later comedy. In a diary note of 1822, Grillparzer attacks Rousseau's view that there is such a thing as a harmless lie:

denn wenn der Mensch als Mensch eigentlich nur in Berührung mit andern seinesgleichen, in Gesellschaft, leben kann; jedes gesellige Verhältnis aber Vertrauen voraussetzt, und Vertrauen ohne Wahrheit nicht denkbar ist; so greift jede, auch die kleinste Lüge die Grundlage aller menschlichen Zustände an, und jeder Lügner ist ein Verräter an seinem ganzen Geschlechte.  
(Tgb.1041)

This is exactly Gregor's belief at the beginning of the comedy. Lies destroy "das Vertrauen, das Mensch dem

Menschen gönnt" (373), and Edrita makes Leon realise that his ambiguous behaviour has invited but then disappointed both the trust placed in him by Kattwald and also the confidence and affection which she has for him. According to a variant reading, Edrita accuses him, "war Lüge denn was dir erwarb Vertrauen" (I/20,264). Franz Moser in Die Schreibfeder believes that "ein Lügner ist jedes Lasters fähig" (II,606), and Gregor likewise sees untruth as the first cause of man's wickedness. It is this message that he is preparing to put into his next sermon at the start of the play:

Denn was die menschliche Natur auch Böses kennt,  
Verkehrtes, Schlimmes, Abscheuwürdges,  
Das Schlimmste ist das falsche Wort, die Lüge.  
Wär nur der Mensch erst wahr, er wär auch gut. (119-22)

Gregor makes a distinction between lies which are not realised as such - vanity, pride, false shame - before considering the worst sin of all, the deliberate lie. All the fine things in life are tied to truth, so that a lie destroys everything we cherish, such as friendship, love, sympathy. Above all, a lie challenges God's creation in seeing something as false which is true, or vice-versa:

Was, Mensch, zerstörst du deines Schöpfers Welt?  
Was sagst du, es sei nicht, da es doch ist,  
Und wiederum es sei, da es doch nie gewesen? (139-41)

Nature is true, by its very existence, hence a man who lies is worse than an animal, he is a devil:

Ein Teufel bist du, der allein ist Lügner,  
Und du ein Teufel, insofern du lügst,  
Drum laßt uns wahr sein, vielgeliebte Brüder. (156-8)

The sermon is impressive and powerful, but the argument depends for its logicality on a confusion between different meanings of the word "wahr", such as was also perpetrated by the writers of Classicism. Truth could be found in man, in nature, and in poetry, and with Goethe especially, "wahr" has more the sense of conforming to generally valid rules, revealing ultimate truth, rather than simply not containing or telling lies. In Venice, Goethe describes the little creatures on the seashore as "wie wahr, wie seiend" (Italienische Reise (HA XI,93)), he speaks of "die Natur, die in allen ihren Teilen wahr und konsequent



ist", and sees the "innerliche Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit" of the "Urpflanze" (XI,324), or the "Reinheit und Wahrheit" of light (Eckermann,4/1/1824). Goethe told Eckermann that in nature "haben wir es mit dem unendlich und ewig Wahren zu tun" (18/10/1827). To Schubarth he wrote of nature's "ewig unwandelbare große Wahrheit" (24/8/1819). These examples express the concept of ontological truth which is contained in Gregor's sermon:

Wahr ist die ganze kreisende Natur;  
Wahr ist der Wolf, der brüllt, eh er verschlingt,  
Wahr ist der Donner, drohend wenn es blitzt,  
Wahr ist die Flamme, die von fern schon sengt,  
Die Wasserflut, die heulend Wirbel schlägt,  
Wahr sind sie, weil sie sind, weil Dasein Wahrheit.  
(146-51)

This theme of truth in nature is found elsewhere in Grillparzer's work. In the youthful Blanka, Pedro says, "der Mensch kann nur, nie die Natur betrügen" (2603), and in his final play, the character Mardochái contrasts deceitful humanity with the truth of nature, "geliebte Blätter, ihr seid treu und wahr" (Esther,828). It is especially Rudolf II in Bruderzwist who comes closest to the ideas of Gregor:

Drum ist in Sternen Wahrheit, im Gestein,  
In Pflanze, Tier und Baum, im Menschen nicht. (411-2)

In the bishop's sermon the argument ceases to be logical if we break down the idea of truth into its different meanings. The truth in nature and the universe has little or nothing to do with man not telling lies. There are many lies which could not in any way be seen as a challenge to the existence or validity of the universe. Equally Leon himself proves that truth is not necessarily commensurate with honesty or decency. Gregor's views at the beginning of the play are very much a naive oversimplification of the theme of truth, the rest of the play constitutes a minute analysis of the different types of truth and their varying relationship to the ideal.

The insistence on truth in one sense or another is very much part of the Classical heritage. On his Italian journey, Goethe sought "nur das innig und ewig Wahre" (HA XI,475), he told Eckermann he was seeking "in einer

konfusen Welt dem Wahren wieder Eingang zu verschaffen" (16/12/1828). In his study of weather he described "das Wahre, mit dem Göttlichen identisch" (XIII,305). He saw man always striving for truth, which was fruitful unlike untruth; "das Wahre fördert" ... "was nicht wahr ist, baut nicht" (Maximen,324,331). Truth, as he once told Müller (28/3/1819), was the basis of laws and morality. Herder believed that "ein Mensch, der sich um Wahrheit bemühet, ist immer achtenswert"; man, he thought, needed "reine, helle, offenbare Wahrheit", and he believed that the ultimate victory of truth was inevitable if man himself followed "die Regel der Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit" (XVII,247,132; XIII,160). (20)

Max in Wallenstein laments his father's devious ways:

O! wärest du wahr gewesen und gerade,  
Nie kam es dahin, alles stünde anders! (Tod,1193-4)

Max seeks "eine Stimme der Wahrheit" such as Iphigenie represents in Goethe's play. Thoas himself belittles his own inability to hear this voice, but finally succumbs to the humanity of the priestess. Iphigenie regrets the apparent need for lies to get them out of their predicament, crying out, "O weh der Lüge!" (1405), which is strangely close to the title of Grillparzer's comedy. Orest demands that there should only be truth between him and his sister, a demand made all the more emphatic by the exceptional short line of verse. Iphigenie finally calls on the gods to rescue truth by supporting her as she puts all her faith in honesty:

Wenn  
Ihr wahrhaft seid, wie ihr gepriesen werdet,  
So zeigt's durch euern Beistand und verherrlicht  
Durch mich die Wahrheit! (1916-19)

Orest finally can tell the King:

Gewalt und List, der Männer höchster Ruhm  
Wird durch die Wahrheit dieser hohen Seele  
Beschämt. (2142-4)

In a diary note of 1834, Grillparzer saw truth as Goethe's "eigentliche Göttin" (Tgb.2165), and Gregor insists on the sort of absolute truth that Iphigenie stands for. The possibility of man being completely true is however

rather more dubious in Grillparzer's play. On the one hand man can lie through truth. Leon tells the truth but in such a way that no one believes him. He takes the condition set by the bishop very much as a handicap in his adventure, he seeks to avoid the bishop's demand rather than face up to its implications. He is rather dubious about the efficacy of truth for getting Atalus released;

Um Gottes willen gibt man ihn nicht frei.  
Da bleibt nichts übrig, als; wir reden Wahrheit  
Und er bleibt, wo er ist. (330-2)

He sees Gregor's desire for absolute truth as something of a quirk in one who has such high standards. Some of his statements to Kattwald take the concept of truth to its limits, but it is as if he enjoys the gamble of fitting in with the conditions of his mission. What he does not realise is that his whole behaviour is deceitful, for he misleads Kattwald and Edrita. She tells him;

Hast du die Wahrheit immer auch gesprochen,  
die Hand aufs Herz legend  
Hier fühl ich dennoch, daß du mich getäuscht. (1137-8)

In an alternative version, Edrita was even more explicit:

Es lügt der Mensch mit Worten nicht allein,  
Auch mit der Tat. (I/20,288)

This is partly unfair to Leon, for although Edrita thinks he has deceived her, he is also attracted to her, as his actions have led her to believe. Nevertheless Leon comes to realise that the letter of Gregor's command is vastly inferior to the spirit of the bishop's beliefs. Leon has told the truth but has behaved deceitfully, not only in his actions but also because he hoped that the truth he uttered would be taken as a joke, as indeed it was. In addition he comes to see the error of one of his beliefs, namely that evil can be used for good purposes (249), now he sees that his deception of Edrita is wrong, whatever good cause he may be pursuing.

Edrita finally suggests that silence is the only way to avoid lies and the deception of others;

Doch weiß ich ja, daß du die Wahrheit sprichst.  
So laß uns schweigen, dann sind wir am wahrsten.  
(1446-7)

This has led some critics such as Politzer and Škreb to suggest that truth is only possible in silence, whilst Jean-Louis Bandet asserts that truth is to be found in action, not speech. Jakob Minor believes that "innere Wahrheit, wahr handeln" becomes more important than "äußere Wahrheit, die Wahrheit reden".<sup>(21)</sup> Leon, it is true, becomes more reticent as the play goes on, but this is not to suggest a rejection of language. Galomir is seen as the most brutish of the characters precisely because of his inability to communicate. Language for Grillparzer was one of the most important developments of culture, the power to communicate meant that man could assimilate the knowledge of his contemporaries and of past ages, whilst each animal had to start from the very beginning (Tgb.1409). Just as Herder insisted that "das sonderbare Mittel zur Bildung der Menschen ist die Sprache" (XIII,354, cf.also XIII,142), so Grillparzer writes: "das Palladium der Geistesbildung ist die ungehinderte Mitteilung" (III,695). Leon himself shows that actions as much as words can deceive, whilst Kattwald and Galomir, who do not practise deceit or cunning, may be "wahr" in the ontological sense preached by Gregor, but they are not morally good, which is what truth is supposed to entail.<sup>(22)</sup> The supreme confirmation of Leon's awareness of his responsibility is his telling of the truth to the ferryman, because of the conviction that this is the only thing to do. Cunning and deception, which Edrita now practises, are not the way for him to achieve his aims. His interpretation of his own mission is now too rigid, and he tries to prevent Edrita accompanying him, although he is aware of Edrita's feelings and recognises that she is superior to the other barbarians but consequently needs cultured surroundings in order to improve further. In the belief that he has done his best, he challenges God to guarantee truth, as Iphigenie does. He calls out, "Halt mir dein heilig Wort! - Weh dem, der lügt!" (1688). An apparent miracle then happens, the gates of Metz open to reveal that the Christians captured the town on the previous night.

The position of truth is much more problematic in Grillparzer's play than it is, for example, in Goethe's Iphigenie. Whilst the critics mentioned above see truth as possible only in action, Fritz Martini believes that not even action can contain truth, but that only an ideal character such as Gregor can be true, who remains apart from active life.<sup>(23)</sup> The distinction between action and words seems to confuse the issue however. Grillparzer in fact shows us that complete truth is difficult in ordinary life, in both action and words. The bishop, whom Seidler describes with some justification as embodying "die reinste und edelste Form kulturvoller und bildungsgegründeter Menschlichkeit", is himself incapable of adhering to his own principles, for he has lied to the King and consequently not received the ransom money which he needs to secure his nephew's release. According to Renate Delphendahl, "Leon muß notwendigerweise vom schmalen Pfad der Wahrheit abweichen, um zu seinem Ziel zu kommen ... denn der handelnde Mensch wird in Lüge verstrickt", both Seidler and Hock have pointed to Iphigenie's assertion, "ganz unbefleckt genießt sich nur das Herz", and stated that Grillparzer agrees more with the fear expressed by Pylades:

Daß keiner in sich selbst, noch mit den andern  
Sich rein und unverworren halten kann.  
(Iphigenie, 1658-9)<sup>(24)</sup>

This is probably a valid assessment of the difference between the two plays, but as in Jüdin this should not be seen as an entirely negative realisation. Whilst it must be stressed that Leon achieves his mission by telling the absolute truth, Leon himself finally shows that this is not always possible as he slips back into lies over his feelings for Edrita. Just as Gregor cannot live up to his own principles, so his extreme views on truth are seen as ideal but impractical in ordinary life. The same applies to Rudolf II with his similarly idealistic view of truth which is either incapable of being put into political practice or even a source of inhumanity. Man instead must strive to do the best he can. Just as

Bancbanus tells the King that he has carried out his task, "gut und schlimm, wies eben möglich war" (Treuer Diener, 1971), so Leon admits to the bishop:

Nu, gar so rein gings freilich denn nicht ab,  
Wir haben uns gehütet, wie wir konnten.  
Wahr stets und ganz war nur der Helfer; Gott! (1721-3)

Nevertheless, although absolute truth is almost impossible in life, it is still an ideal to be striven for, and Gregor's greeting to Leon - "Nu, hübsch gelogen? ... Mit Lug und Trug verkehrt?" (1718-20) - is an expression of his fear that things may have gone disastrously wrong, rather than a rejection of the ideal. His early connection of truth and goodness remains valid. This was very much the message of the earlier Traum ein Leben, which shows the importance of truth and the evil of lies. Rustan continually claims that others are lying, yet Kaleb is clearly the voice of conscience and of truth. In Melusina we are told, "Wahrheit spricht, der Trug ist stumm" (606), and at the end of Traum, Kaleb does speak to denounce Rustan. It is Rustan's own lies and finally the truth of others that bring about his downfall. Rustan is glad to discover that he has had a dream. This he sees as "Warnung nur, nicht Wahrheit" (2642), but the dream, if not physically true, is true in the Classical sense of valid and ultimately true, as Massud tells Rustan, for it has revealed the truth of his longings and also the catastrophe which would have resulted from an attempt to fulfil such hopes with his own limited potential.

In Weh dem, Leon's appreciation of the importance of truth marks the turning point in his career, the start of his moral awareness. He becomes quieter, more thoughtful, less boisterous and naive. His own failure and the words of Edrita have given him a new humility, he accepts a higher order rather than being totally self-reliant and slightly self-centred. He begins to dread the approaching confrontation with the bishop, and the judgement on the mission that this will inevitably entail. Münch sees truth as "der Inbegriff alles ethischen Wertes", (25) and in his increasing insistence on truth there is reflected

Leon's desire to behave well, in an honest fashion, and he strives not so much for narrow literal truth as for correct action. In an essay on censorship, written at the time of Weh dem, Grillparzer spoke of "das Wahre" as "die Quelle alles Guten" (III,1063), and this linking of truth and goodness is common in his work. (26) One important aspect of truth is honesty and decency, being true to oneself, as it was for Goethe: "Wer gegen sich selbst und andere wahr ist und bleibt, besitzt die schönste Eigenschaft der größten Talente" (Maximen,1344). Gregor tells Leon, "sei dir selber treu und Gott" (384), and this Leon does achieve. Similarly the statue of Joseph II insists, in a poem of the same period:

Der Lüge ist die äußere Welt gegeben,  
Im Innern sei der Mensch sich selber wahr.  
("Des Kaisers Bildsäule",39-40)

An epigram of 1850 tells the Germans to be true to themselves (I,507), Feuchtersleben is praised for "die in unseren Zeiten, besonders in Deutschland selten gewordene Wahrhaftigkeit gegen sich selbst" (IV,222). Grillparzer disliked inner dishonesty, a diary note of 1825 proclaims his horror on witnessing "ein unwahres Gefühl" (Tgb.1411). In 1836 he wrote, "Wahrheit des Gefühls ... geht den Menschen an und bestimmt seinen Wert" (Tgb.3177), and one of the criticisms he made of his alter ego, Fixlmüllner, was that he and his work were "unwahr" (III,204-5).

By the end of the play, Leon has overcome such failings. Nevertheless he fears that Gregor will find him lacking:

Sein letztes Wort war Mahnung gegen Trug,  
Und nun, wie bunt, was alles wir vollführt. (1590-1)

Gregor however accepts that Leon has done his best in the circumstances of human life, and this is the most one can hope for. In demanding absolute truth, Gregor is standing outside the human realm, ultimate truth is not within man's grasp - "Die Wahrheit ist wirklich etwas für den Menschen Unerreichbares" (Tgb.4349). Ordinary life is a mixture of truth and lies, as Libussa's sisters recognise (Libussa,221), in Primislaus's eyes truth is ever changing (1449). Grillparzer was critical of the Protestants'

claim to know the truth (Tgb.4072), or of any belief that truth could be reduced to straightforward formulae ("Mein Vaterland",25-6). Rudolf II inevitably laments the relative nature of truth in his present circumstances; truth dissected by the various partial truths of religious beliefs (Bruderzwist,1362), truth which is given an official stamp by the blood of battle;

Blut ist das rote Wachs, das jede Lüge  
Zur Wahrheit stempelt. (1660-1)

Man however should continue to seek truth, as Goethe believed. People are proud of speaking what they think is the truth;

Wer deutet mir die buntverworrne Welt!  
Sie reden alle Wahrheit, sind drauf stolz,  
Und sie belügt sich selbst und ihn, er mich  
Und wieder sie, Der lügt, weil man ihm log -  
Und reden alle Wahrheit, alle. Alle. (Weh dem,1800-4)

In fact, absolute truth is only attainable in the afterlife. Gregor tells Atalus:

Du wardst getäuscht im Land der Täuschung, Sohn!  
Ich weiß ein Land, das aller Wahrheit Thron. (1816-17)

Leon has already realised, "wahr stets und ganz war nur der Helfer: Gott! (1723); Delphendahl has written of "die Unmöglichkeit des Bemühens, absolute Wahrheit in eigensinnigem Streben zu finden",<sup>(27)</sup> and certainly it is only a character such as Don Cäsar who searches for complete truth in the belief that he can find it (Bruderzwist,1917,1982). His great ideal is knowledge, he has "als einzige Leidenschaft der Wunsch; zu wissen" (1914). In his essay in 1860 on literary history, Grillparzer seems to approve of the fact that "der Mensch will alles wissen" (III,724), but not in a man such as Don Cäsar who has no respect for necessary limitation and no comprehension of humanity. He sees Lukrezia not as an ordinary human being but first as an ideal of innocence and purity, then as an incarnation of evil and hypocrisy. Others such as Ferdinand seek or think they know the absolute truth, but Rudolf warns against such a belief, telling the Bohemians, "maßt euch nicht an, zu deuteln Gottes Wahrheit" (1352). Later he makes use of the imagery of night and day:



Des Menschen Innres, wie die Außenwelt,  
Hat er [Gott] geteilt in Tag und dunkle Nacht.  
Das Aug ertrüge nicht beständiges Licht,  
Da führt er an dem Horizont herauf  
Die Dunkelheit mit ihrer holden Stille,  
Wo die Empfindung aufwacht, das Gefühl,  
Und süße Schauer durch die Seele schreiten.  
Doch immer Nacht wär schlimmer noch als nie.  
Und was du weißt, weißt du durch Tag und Nacht.  
(2354-62)

Similarly, in a youthful poem, the discontented man had complained -

Uns umhüllt mit dunklem Schleier  
Wahn und Trug mit tiefer Nacht

- but he is told,

Manches kann er nicht verstehen,  
Was Gott weise ihm verhehlt. ("Der Unzufriedene",  
9-10,69-70)

Don Cäsar seeks "beständiges Licht" in absolute truth, but this is as impossible in Grillparzer's work as it had been in the Classical era. Faust's more positive, less solipsistic desire for total knowledge is equally doomed to failure, he is blinded by the eternal light at the beginning and end of the second part of the tragedy. Not even the totality of human experience is accessible to man:

Glaub unsereinem: dieses Ganze  
Ist nur für einen Gott gemacht!  
Er findet sich in einem ew'gen Glanze,  
Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebracht,  
Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht. (Faust, 1780-4)

The same symbolism of day and night is also common in Hölderlin's work to describe the gulf between Greek day and the present age of night, but the image is also used in the same way as in Bruderzwist and the early poem:

Der Vater aber decket mit heilger Nacht,  
Damit wir bleiben mögen, die Augen zu.  
("Dichterberuf", 53-4)

Rudolf's words have something of the atmosphere of "Brot und Wein", in particular the second stanza, but Grillparzer shows a resigned sense of night's necessity rather than the fervent religious approach in Hölderlin's poem, and Rudolf's words cannot convey Hölderlin's complex web of symbolic meaning.

This view of complete truth being impossible in this life is very much Schiller's belief also, as he stated in the aesthetic letters. Beauty man can reach in the sensual world, truth only beyond it (XX,396). Beauty is for Schiller the depiction in this life of the truth which will be fully revealed in a later life;

Was wir als Schönheit hier empfunden,  
Wird einst als Wahrheit uns entgegengehn.  
("Die Künstler", 64-5)

Truth in this life is only revealed through art, which destroys lies ("Die Macht des Gesanges"); in ordinary life, truth is often obscured by doubt. Art shows "tiefe Wahrheit" ("An Goethe"), but it presents truth in a way that man can bear. There is a similar idea at the end of Libussa, when the prophetess presents her inspired view of truth:

Ich aber rede Wahrheit, Wahrheit, nur verhüllt  
In Gleichnis und selbstgeschaffnes Bild. (2444-5)

Grillparzer had once written in his diary, "für mich gab es nie eine andere Wahrheit als die Dichtkunst" (Tgb.1614), but in fact Grillparzer was less certain than the Classicists, fearing that literature was based on deception ("Le poète sifflé" (III,39); cf. also III,688).

Under normal circumstances, truth is overpowering, as the youth discovers to his cost in Schiller's "Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais". For Goethe, as implicitly for Schiller, beauty is the veil through which one may view the truth ("Zueignung", "Jugendlich kommt sie von Himmel"). This image of the veil is used by Grillparzer in the youthful poem "Der Unzufriedene", and also in "Irene", in which the young man thinks that nature gives him insight into the unknowable;

Wenn ihr Odem um mich spielt mit labendem Wehn,  
läßt sie Ungeschautes entschleiert mich sehn! (108-9)

In Grillparzer's comedy, the veil shrouding truth is provided by lies, which prevent man being blinded by absolute truth; in Seidler's words, "die Klarheit der göttlichen Seinswelt (wird) im Irdischen und für das Irdische getrübt." (28) The higher realm that Gregor speaks of is one,

Wo selbst die Lüge nur ein buntes Kleid,  
Das schaffend Er genannt: Vergänglichkeit,  
Und das er umhing dem Geschlecht der Sünden.  
Daß ihre Augen nicht am Strahl erblinden. (1818-21)

In the acceptance of a more moderate view of this life, but in the continuing stress on the ideal which may not be achieved until a later existence, Grillparzer shows a more realistic, and also a more positive attitude that is often beyond the reach of the characters in the tragedies. Gregor is prepared to accept the unavoidability of some untruth in life, but hopes that some good can nevertheless develop:

Das Unkraut, merk ich, rottet man nicht aus.  
Glück auf, wächst nur der Weizen etwa drüber. (1805-6)

Basically the same view is expressed in a poem of 1839:

Und wenn auch Unkraut wächst,  
So hütet euch vor Jäten,  
Ihr könntet im Bemühn  
Die gute Saat zertreten. ("In das Gutenberg-Album"  
(I,266))

In many ways this is a realisation similar to that of the Lord and the angels in Faust. There mistakes are accepted as part of life, unavoidable if man continues to strive for better things. The Lord believes, "es irrt der Mensch, solang' er strebt", but the angels can redeem the person who has continued to strive. Clearly this striving must be in a good cause, improvement must have been achieved.

Leon is made aware that he has been involved in lies and deception and that consequently he can expect no help from above:

Du irrst, kein Engel hilft, da wo der Mensch  
Mit Trug und Falsch an seine Werke geht. (1132-3)

In the final version of the play he realises that he has been over-confident - "wo ich mich vermaß" (1119) - in one of the earlier variants the moral was made more explicit: Leon was to lament,

Statt jenem Schutz, dem mich mein Herr befahl,  
Vertraut' ich eigener List, dem eignen Wahnsinn.  
(I/20,264)

Leon comes to place more emphasis on telling the truth and on behaving truthfully and correctly. Furthermore he

comes to see this as the only way to obtain God's help in a difficult situation. As he tells Atalus: "Vertraut auf Gott, der uns so weit geführt" (1261). More and more he begins to thank God and rely on him, especially when telling the ferryman the true state of affairs. Finally, as defeat stares him in the face before the gates of Metz, he asks God to show that he, Leon, has behaved correctly and he challenges God to keep his side of the bargain struck, as he thinks, by the flash within him in Act I. Throughout he has sought to help those who deserve it in any way. Although Atalus perhaps is not worthy of such assistance, Gregor certainly is, and Leon has put himself in much personal danger for his sake. He sees it as his task to protect Atalus and Edrita.

In so doing, Leon has helped them to overcome the coarse aspects of barbarity and start along the path to culture and humanity, and as for Herder, such "Bildung zur Humanität" is seen in terms of divinity. Leon above all comes to appreciate the value of truth and the divine but also the moral human order. So also Faust arrives at an affirmation of life and an awareness of his own position in life. Leon has matured and improved considerably by the end of the play, as a result his earlier mistakes and faults can be excused. Lies are seen as an inescapable part of life, just as Goethe accepts mistakes, and in the comedy such "irren" is seen in an even more positive light than in the later Jüdin von Toledo, whilst standing in obviously stark contrast to earlier plays such as Vließ and Traum. As we have already seen elsewhere, it is vital that Leon act rather than stagnating because of an excessive guilty conscience. (29) Faust has striven for more experience and has avoided stagnation, he has remained dimly aware of the "rechter Weg", Leon has overcome his naive enthusiasm and his own dim awareness of Gregor's merits and can now appreciate exactly what Gregor stands for. He realises that he should not even tell lies in a good cause, he has even shown himself willing to renounce Edrita for the sake of his ideal mission, and he is

rewarded with her hand at the end, very much in keeping with the message of the poem "Entsagung":

Und kein Besitz, als den du dir versagst ...

Nur was du abweist, kann dir wieder kommen. (11.4,17)

He has acquired humility, a vital virtue in Libussa, due to the example of those whom he considered inferior. He has not achieved the ideal except in one brief moment of confessing the truth to the ferryman, but this is impossible anyway in real life. As Reich comments however, man overcomes his weaknesses by his striving; Leon has proved this amply. (30)

#### NOTES

1. Alker, Franz Grillparzer, p.161, Ruth K. Angress, "Weh dem, der lügt. Grillparzer and the avoidance of tragedy", Modern Language Review, LXVI (1971), 355-64, pp.362-4, Erich Hock, "Grillparzers Lustspiel", Wirkendes Wort, IV (1953-4), 12-23, p.12; Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, p.255.
2. See Chapter 1, pp.12-13.
3. Hock, "Grillparzers Lustspiel", pp.13-14.
4. W.E.Yates, Grillparzer, p.202.
5. Deutsches Wörterbuch, Bd.VIII, Spalte 1113ff.
6. See also Maria Stuart, 255,262,308.
7. "Preislustspiele" (III,849,853,856), Selbstbiographie (IV,132), Tgb.3792.
8. "Der Reichstag", "Aufrufe" (III,1043), "Erinnerungen an Feuchtersleben" (IV,224), Tgb.4022.
9. See also "Der Christbaum" (I,335), "Ungarn" (I,503), Libussa,1141, "Radikal" (I,504).
10. See Braut,42,1251,1422,1491,2579,etc.,etc., Jungfrau,198,799,2011,3058,3122.
11. See above p.14.
12. See also Tgb.4115, "Meine Erinnerungen an Feuchtersleben" (IV,223).
13. Politzer, p.294. Hock also tends to exaggerate the importance of this concept in Grillparzer's work; see Introduction p.5.
14. In his diary of 1838, Grillparzer wrote: "Die Franzosen sind die gebildetste europäische Nation" (Tgb.3423).
15. Heinz Politzer, "Der Schein von Heros Lampe", Modern Language Notes, LXXII (1957), 432-7; Reinhold Backmann, (HKA 1/2,412).
16. Especially "Der Bann" (I,110), "Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen",44, cf.also I,306,314,322,354,429.

17. Faust, 1329-30, 5733; Hermann und Dorothea, VI, 161; Wallensteins Lager, 100; Tod, 165, 674.
18. "An der Wiege eines Kindes" (I, 99), "Kantate" (I, 157); Tgb. 1825, 4042; I, 444; III, 1063.
19. Oskar Katann, "Weh dem, der lügt! und das Problem der Wahrhaftigkeit", in Grillparzer-Studien, hrsg. von Oskar Katann, Vienna, 1924, pp. 184-220.
20. For further examples, see Chapter 1.
21. Politzer (Franz Grillparzer), p. 259; Škreb, Grillparzer, p. 212; Jean-Louis Bandet, "Grillparzers Weh dem, der lügt!", in Das deutsche Lustspiel I, hrsg. von Hans Steffen, Göttingen, 1968, pp. 144-65; Jakob Minor, "Grillparzer als Lustspieldichter und Weh dem, der lügt!", GrJb, III (1893), 41-60, p. 55.
22. In this amoral sense of the word, Alphons is no doubt justified in insisting of Rahel: "sie aber war die Wahrheit" (Jüdin, 1685).
23. Fritz Martini, "Weh dem, der lügt! oder von der Sprache im Drama", in Die Wissenschaft von deutscher Sprache und Dichtung, Festschrift für Friedrich Maurer, Stuttgart, 1963, pp. 438-57.
24. Herbert Seidler, "Grillparzers Lustspiel Weh dem, der lügt!", in Seidler, Studien, pp. 66-84; Renate Delphendahl, Grillparzer, Lüge und Wahrheit in Wort und Bild, Berne, 1975, p. 21; Hock, "Grillparzers Lustspiel".
25. Münch, p. 75.
26. See Tgb. 3313, "Rede am Grabe Beethovens" (III, 882), "Einem Grafen und Dichter" (I, 205).
27. Delphendahl, p. 66.
28. Seidler, Studien, p. 80.
29. See above, pp. 172-3.
30. Reich, p. 228.

Chapter 8. Grillparzer's mature political writings

In Wien ist der Sonntag nach dem Vollmonde im Monat Juli jedes Jahres samt dem darauf folgenden Tage ein eigentliches Volksfest, wenn je ein Fest diesen Namen verdient hat. Das Volk besucht es und gibt es selbst, und wenn Vornehmere dabei erscheinen, so können sie es nur in ihrer Eigenschaft als Glieder des Volks. Da ist keine Möglichkeit der Absonderung, wenigstens vor einigen Jahren noch war keine ...

... Die Stille des Ortes, im Abstich der lärmenden Volksmenge, tat mir wohl. (Der arme Spielmann, III, 146, 154)

It may seem slightly unusual to introduce a consideration of Grillparzer's political views with these extracts from his principal Novelle, a work which is most important for the ironic presentation of social and artistic failure. And yet in the character of the narrator we are given a brief but illuminating insight into the paradoxical nature of Grillparzer's approach to the social world around him. The narrator is a mine of contradictions: on the one hand he seems keenly interested in the festival, where the people appear as one, and he is critical of more recent developments that have jeopardised this unity. The festival is a time of fun, humour, enjoyment, when the upper classes are not granted any undue respect, when those who come on foot mix with those who arrive by coach, and all travel at the same speed. The narrator goes on to stress his love of the people, and in his capacity as a dramatist insists on the validity of their judgement. He gives his opinion,

Als ein leidenschaftlicher Liebhaber der Menschen, vorzüglich des Volkes ... als ein Liebhaber der Menschen, sage ich, besonders wenn sie in Massen für einige Zeit der einzelnen Zwecke vergessen und sich als Teile des Ganzen fühlen, in dem denn doch zuletzt das Göttliche liegt. (III, 147-8)

This cannot be dismissed as hypocrisy, "a pretentious aristocratic pose" in a man guilty of "incessant posturing and posing", as Ellis believes, nor can one agree with Politzer that this whole sentiment "bebt vor Skepsis", (1) for the accompanying consideration of the theatre audience is most definitely Grillparzer's, but it becomes

increasingly questionable whether the narrator really is interested in the masses, and the highly stylised sentences do not exactly convey the impression of a man in touch with the ordinary populace. His attitude to the "Volk" has from the start been tinged with a certain irony, even sarcasm. The crowd milling around the festival is "eine wogende Menge" (III,146), and the long description abounds in images of floods, waves, seas and dams. This not only links with the real floods at the end of the story, it also suggests the menacing nature of the crowd, as the narrator admits: "Ein neu Hinzugekommener fände die Zeichen bedenklich" (ibid.). The apparent harmony of the crowds gives way to the occasional scuffle or verbal attack. There is a trace of pity for the ladies who are "begafft, bedauert, bespottet". The festival lasts only two days, "leider, oder glücklicherweise, wie man es nimmt" (III,147), and finally the encounter with Jakob, the fascinating individual in complete contrast to the monotonous masses, removes his interest in the festival and he retires to a quiet pub.

It is important to note that such contradicting views are expressed by the same character. The Novelle does not present a simple contrast between Grillparzer the social thinker and Grillparzer the poet,<sup>(2)</sup> the contrasts that do exist are far from simple. The narrator himself gives expression both to Grillparzer's liberal interest in the people, in the need for equality and progress, but also to his reactionary elitism, his fear of the masses, his interest in the individual which was so instinctive in a dramatist such as Grillparzer. In addition, narrator and musician have a number of things in common, one of which is a mistrust of the masses, but as is the case with such similarities, Jakob is perfectly firm in his belief, whilst the narrator, as we have seen, wavers in his. On the other hand the would-be artist Jakob, described by Alewyn as "idealer Untertan des Regimes Metternich",<sup>(3)</sup> must be seen in an ironic light with his naive refusal to challenge the unsavoury society in which



he lives, and with his distance from all political awareness.

This unsavoury society must be considered in more detail in this chapter, the ethical concepts which ruin Jakob's music but which otherwise lift him above such a society are best discussed in the final chapter. At this stage, however, it is worth underlining the way in which the *Novelle* distorts any clear distinction between Grillparzer the political man and Grillparzer the poet - both Alker and, more recently, Roschek make basically the same distinction between what they consider enlightened Josefinian social thinking and Baroque, Catholic literary activity. By comparison, Lenz in 1936 showed the clear contradictions within Grillparzer's diaries, and one must add that similar contrasts obtain in the creative writing, not only in Armer Spielmann, but also between the relative optimism of Libussa and the much greater pessimism of Bruderzwist, or between the clearly defined ideals of Ottokar and Treuer Diener and the at times more ambiguous use of the same ideals in the later political plays.

Grillparzer of course would not have approved of such an explicit linking of literature and politics, and this is something he criticised in the political poets, in the "*Jungdeutsche*", and in the political exploitation of the Schiller centenary in 1859. He violently attacks Gervinus's attempt to interpret literature from a political standpoint (Tgb.4077), in 1836 he had written of art as "die Kunst ... die eben auch von allem Wirklichen mit Recht absieht" (Tgb.3213). Nevertheless, as I have sought to show in the context of his earlier work, the political content of Grillparzer's plays is greater than that found in the work of Goethe and Schiller. This is even truer of the two plays Grillparzer completed immediately before the revolutions of 1848. Both Libussa and Bruderzwist would still satisfy the aesthetic demands of Weimar Classicism for generally valid themes which are fully comprehensible even without a knowledge of the author's political background: one need look no further than the

contrasts between man and woman, active life and isolation in Libussa, or between tolerance and bigotry, arrogance and humility in Bruderzwist. On the other hand a knowledge of the age enhances one's understanding of these plays not only in a way unthinkable in German Classicism but also to a much greater extent than in Grillparzer's own plays of the 1820s. Grillparzer himself admits this in pointing out the deeper significance of Don Cäsar in Bruderzwist: "Rudolf soll in D. Cäsar nicht nur ein Bild seiner Zeit sondern auch ein Vorbild der künftigen, der heutigen sehen" (Tgb. 3835).<sup>(4)</sup> Both plays give a reflection, if somewhat one-sided, of Grillparzer's concern with the political and social situation of his time. They alone do not present a political philosophy, this must be pieced together from all of Grillparzer's writing, especially in the 1830s and 1840s, but they do mirror some of Grillparzer's major fears and concerns. He sought freedom yet feared its more extreme manifestations, he looked for change but not upheaval, approved of patriotism but not nationalism, praised order but not tyranny. Such a mixture of apparent contradictions is also to be seen in the narrator in Der arme Spielmann. His views do not in fact represent an illogical contradiction, a sign of hypocrisy, as many critics believe, but are a perfectly plausible externalisation of Grillparzer's own opinions. Firstly the narrator is a dramatist who sees society as a vital background to his plays, yet is ultimately more concerned with exceptional individuals as possible models for the characters in his plays, and he is hence attracted immediately to Jakob, noting especially the conflicts in the musician's appearance which reflect the conflicts in his own character. But also in more general terms, the narrator seeks the crowds, desires their approval for his work, enjoys their freedom and liveliness, attacks excessive privileges, insists that "da ist keine Möglichkeit der Absonderung", and ideally seeks in the masses a reflection of humanity as a whole and hence ultimately an expression of divinity, on the other hand he fears the excesses of the masses, the

impersonal side of their behaviour, and he is consequently driven at times to search for isolation, peace and quiet, and the opportunity to consider matters and to collect his thoughts into some state of order. He himself feels the need for the "Absonderung" which the festival seems to reject, and he ultimately takes an interest in Jakob, the "Sonderling" who has a sense of order in his life as opposed to the chaotic nature of the masses.

It is this dichotomy between chaos and order that informs Grillparzer's use of all the political and social concepts and ideals which I shall consider in this chapter. Furthermore it must be stressed that Grillparzer's political thought is couched in terms of order and restraint, freedom within limitations, moderation and humanity, which have their origins in the Classical era.

i) Grillparzer's approach to politics after 1830,  
the concept of freedom

A turning point in Grillparzer's political thought is provided by the July revolution in France in 1830. Here for the first time Grillparzer saw a viable alternative to the oppressive state in which he lived. The significance of these events both for Austria and for himself is underlined in a long diary note of that year:

Die Franzosen haben ihren König verjagt, der, ihnen in die Zähne, versucht, die Verfassung zu brechen, und sie zu einer Art-Östreicher zu machen, was denn, bürgerlich und politisch genommen, offenbar das Schlimmste ist, was man irgend werden kann. (Tgb.1826)

Grillparzer inevitably sees the dangers of excessive freedom and democracy, but in 1830 he is still prepared to face the risks involved:

Und doch! immer besser, als der Geist erliegt und die edelsten Bedürfnisse des Menschen werden einem scheußlichen Stabilitätssystem zum Opfer gebracht. (ibid)

The state and the participation of all its citizens is the best answer to the egoism of the time. But at the same time Grillparzer fears that the new developments will destroy the Austria he loved despite all reservations, that what he sees as inevitable nationalism will cause the country to break up into its constituent ethnic parts.

A mixture of such hopes and fears, and the overriding desire to find the middle path between the potential extremes, form the basis of Grillparzer's thought at the time, whilst the two plays present rather more the fears than the hopes. In the 1830s however, Grillparzer drew hope from the foreign events and paid increasing attention to political matters. If in 1826 he had insisted, "wie fern mir alles Politische liegt" (Tgb.1544), in 1834 he complained it was the only thing in which he could take any interest, in 1836 he feared that the events in Spain were making him neglect his own affairs (Tgb.3190). In complete contrast, Schiller's letters in 1789 do not contain a single reference to developments in France, and Goethe spent a large part of the French campaign observing flowers, colours, human behaviour - everything but the political events being played out around him. Grillparzer however concerned himself with every attempt by a foreign power to achieve freedom and every new move by the Austrian government to counter such attempts at home and abroad. Typical is the poem on the fall of Warsaw which concludes with a lament at the all too brief appearance of freedom and a hope that it will emerge again before too long (I,200-4). Grillparzer attacks the government for its restriction of progress and freedom, he sees the system of Metternich as antiquated and bigotted (I,451, 486,487). The satire "Nachrichten aus Cochinchina" mocks the government and its stupidity, "Bittschrift der Spitzbuben" sees rogues in every corner of the system. The regime is corrupt (I,487), a hive of bureaucracy which engenders no confidence (Tgb.3761), even the imperial house to which Grillparzer remained so loyal is "ein Haus der Gemeinen" (I,475). Inevitably Grillparzer is particularly scathing towards the government's policy on censorship. The man of intellect is persecuted no matter what his views, only the mediocre writer is able to remain within the law. The dangerous aspects of this are hinted at in the poem "Hamlet" ("Der stärkste Sinn muß sich in Mißmut wandeln,/ Fehlt erst der Raum zum Anlauf und zur Tat"

(I,281)), and both the poem "Vorzeichen" and his notes on Hügel's article in defence of censorship suggest that such excessive restriction will ultimately drive people to an equally excessive challenge. Grillparzer believed that Metternich's policies were misguided and had not even achieved their aims, namely "Niederhaltung des Liberalismus, und Erhaltung des status quo" (III,1033), instead Metternich had brought Austria to the brink of the abyss (Tgb.3503,3531).

Grillparzer's views of these years are in no way reactionary. He criticises the once liberal Zedlitz for joining the regime, and praises the liberating influence of Lola Montez on the King of Bavaria. He saw the need, in fact the inevitability of change, calling on Metternich to make Austria free (I,445). The attack on Metternich's madness is echoed in the words of the narrator in Armer Spielmann - "wie wenn in dieser Welt jedes noch so hartnäckige Stehenbleiben doch nur ein unvermerktes Weiterrücken ist" (III,147). Ideally Grillparzer looked to the English process of gradual evolution, but saw that some more decisive action was needed in a country that had stood still for so long. Hence he welcomed the plans for a constitution in Prussia, which he hoped would set the fashion for Austria, a hope he had cherished after the 1830 revolution in France (Tgb.3532).

Increasingly however Grillparzer came to fear what might be the results of such changes. His view of the age has clear signs of pessimism even before 1848. It is an era without greatness, a prosaic age of inactivity, of spurious attempts to suggest unity such as the building of Cologne Cathedral. This pessimism extends over the whole spectrum of society as in Armer Spielmann. Jakob is of course a failure if judged by the standards of his society, but there is every reason to be sceptical of these standards. An aristocratic father is concerned only with social advancement, lacks all consideration for his son's welfare, is able to corrupt teachers and officials who themselves are involved in swindles.

Barbara's father, the grocer, wishes to marry his daughter off to the richest suitor, and lacks all sympathy for Jakob once he is penniless. Everyone is interested in Jakob's money except Barbara, but even she is brusque and rather coarse, scolding Jakob for being too polite, and her financial sense is rather better developed than her human qualities, which flicker only now and again.

Bruderzwist also presents a collection of unsavoury characters. Mathias is a man of extremes, lacking self-control, weak-willed, easily persuaded, but blind to his weakness. He seeks action but is a coward and a vacillator once a real decision has to be taken. Klesel is the cynical political schemer, hypocritical in his faith, twisting everyone for his own schemes. He is decisive but has no conscience to keep a watchful eye over his actions. Ferdinand is the fanatical bigot, defending the purity of the faith without the slightest sign of human feeling. By comparison with these, Don Cäsar, whom Grillparzer saw as a symbol of the age, is relatively harmless, a youthful adventurer who lacks a real sense of perspective. Rudolf himself sees the age as "die wildverwornne, neue" (321), an age lacking respect for tradition -

Wo ist noch Achtung für der Väter Sitte,  
Für edles Wissen und für hohe Kunst? (328-9)

- an age of barbarians who destroy art, science, state and church (1273), a view echoed in the poem of 1847, "Gottlose ihr sucht einen Gott" (I,309).

Grillparzer was therefore sceptical of all excessive demands for freedom. He sees the Prussians especially as obsessed with the idea (I,480), and he had criticised this as early as 1838: "Der Radikalismus der Deutschen eine Freiheits-Onanie" (Tgb.3324). He mocks the poets who write of freedom, such as Herwegh, Prutz (III,98), or his fellow Viennese Anastasius Grün, "Guckuck der Freiheit" (I,422), and suggests that in fact they have nothing to say (Tgb.3609). It must be stressed that there is a certain double-edged irony in many of

Grillparzer's statements on freedom. The figure of the night-watchman Germanikus Walhalla realises to his horror,

daß das Publikum die Klage um meine verlorne und wieder zu erlangende Freiheit, die Kuhweide nämlich, in einem ganz andern, in einem verbotenen, mir als echten Deutschen völlig fremden, politischem Sinne aufnahm. (III,99)

A diary note of 1847 says of the Germans: "mit der Freiheit selbst wüßten sie nichts zu machen, aber das Streben darnach beschäftigt sie angenehm" (Tgb.3875). In his essay on the Prussian constitution, Grillparzer underlines the danger of taking Germany as a model: "Namentlich kommt das was wir jetzt suchen, das Merkmal der Freiheit, nur in den absurdesten Verzerrungen darin vor" (III,1076).

As a result the Germans use freedom as a concept which has no comprehensible or tangible meaning:

Auch seid ihr frei.- Nicht in Worten,  
Geschriebne bewacht die Zensur,  
In Taten? Noch minder, als dorten,  
Wie treff ich die Sache doch nur?

Nun denn; ihr seid frei mit dem Maule.  
Nun hab ich den rechten Pfiff,  
Wir sitzen auf Hegelschem Gaule,  
Ihr seid denn frei; im Begriff. ("An die Überdeutschen",  
11.33-40)

As in other fields, Grillparzer feared abstract concepts and ideologies, and to connect any idea with the philosophy of Hegel amounted to a complete rejection on Grillparzer's part. In an epigram of 1839, Grillparzer criticises Hegel for destroying human thought in favour of divine but presumably abstract ideas ("Hegel" (I,435)). In her prophecy, Libussa warns of the dangers of abstract concepts for the sake of which man hates, persecutes, kills (2361-8). Grillparzer suspected that Germans were not sufficiently concerned with reality, with the practical consequences of their abstract concepts. Hence he warns the Germans, both ruler and subjects, of the danger of playing with the idea of freedom ("Warnung" (I,276); "Sie wollen Freiheit" (I,280)), insisting:

Lern erst, was Freiheit will zu Recht bedeuten,  
Eh Wort und Wahlspruch du entlehnst von ihr. (5)  
(I,441)

In his own field, Grillparzer challenged the right to say anything, however incorrect or pernicious (III,1063). Above all Grillparzer saw the danger of a challenge to society from ideas of total freedom. He scoffs at the idea of setting up an elective monarchy or a republic, which are theoretically the best forms of government but the most dangerous in practice ("Über die Aufhebung der Zensur" (III,1065)). Rudolf II is sceptical of the Bohemians' demand for complete freedom of belief. Freedom must be kept under the control of reason, of common sense. This theme recurs before, during and after the events of 1848:

erst zwischen Gesetzlichkeit und Zügellosigkeit liegt mitteninne die Freiheit. (Tgb.3494 (1839))

Für die Freiheit aber ist da nichts zu lernen wo der Begriff von Ordnung fehlt. ("Preußische Konstitution" (1844), III,1076)

Reif zu Freiheit ist nur wer sich selbst zu beherrschen weiß. ("Aufrufe aus der Revolutionszeit" (1848), III,1042)

Wollt frei ihr sein seid erst vernünftig  
Denn, glaubt, nur der Vernünftige ist frei. (Tgb.3988 (1848))

Zur Freiheit gehört vor allem gesunder Verstand und Selbstbeschränkung, und gerade daran fehlte es in Deutschland. ("Meine Erinnerungen aus dem Revolutionsjahre 1848" (1850), IV,220)

Die politische und bürgerliche Freiheit ist ein schönes Ding, aber die Wege dazu müssen mit dem Verstande erwogen und angebahnt werden. ("Zur Literaturgeschichte" (1860), III,732)

One final example should be taken from the words of Tetka in Libussa. If the two sisters present a rather one-sided philosophy that should not be taken as Grillparzer's, then nevertheless the comment made on freedom does seem in complete harmony with his views:

Wer seine Schranken kennt, der ist der Freie,  
Wer frei sich wähnt, ist seines Wahnes Knecht. (II,185-6)

Significantly Grillparzer's use of the term "Freiheit" undergoes a change corresponding to the development of the term in German Classicism, above all in the work of Goethe. In Grillparzer's youthful work, in "Robert", Blanka, "Spartakus", the call for personal and political freedom is a common one. Freedom is a panacea, a great ideal to



be striven for, as it is in Räuber or in Götz, and it is as much a cliché as it is in the early work of Goethe and Schiller. In Sappho, Phaon insists on his personal liberty (866,1621,1626,1656), Sappho sees freedom as the realm of the man (815,838) in keeping with her Classical comparison of the sexes. In Vließ it is always personal freedom that is spoken of and ultimately lacking, and significantly the word is completely absent from the third part of the trilogy after Gora's brief lament at her lack of freedom (Medea,61) and after it has earlier been shown to be an illusion - "Du wähnst dich frei und du bist gefangen" (Argonauten,130). Outside the plays, Grillparzer doubts his own freedom ("Der Bann", "Incubus"), sees the lack of political freedom in the age ("Napoleon"). In his diary of 1822 he wrote, "der Mensch ist ein selbstständiges frei-wollendes und demgemäß handelndes Wesen höchstens dann, wenn er allein ist" (Tgb.1165).

The connotation of individual and political freedom continues to be the only one in Grillparzer's work until the late 1830s, with perhaps two exceptions. Phaon suggests that freedom is something inside man rather than a result of one's external circumstances:

Es binden Sklavenfesseln nur die Hände,  
Der Sinn, er macht den Freien und den Knecht.  
(Sappho, 619-20)

A more restricted concept of freedom also occurs in a poem of 1826:

Um recht zu tun und gut, gebricht  
Dem Österreichs Mann die Freiheit nicht. (I,172)

The term is in fact uncommon in the 1820s, surprisingly so in the two political plays of those years, which have nothing to do with ideas of freedom despite Ottokar's need for independence, and the two plays contain not a single epigrammatic or highlighted use of the term "Freiheit". As a result of 1830, Grillparzer acquires a new interest in freedom, but still in the straightforward political sense as in poems such as "Warschau" or "Rußland". As I have shown, Grillparzer mocks excessive insistence on freedom, and the same is true in Der Traum ein Leben, in which

Rustan's demands for freedom (639,647,660) are cast in an ironic light by the play as a whole. But equally he complains in Munich in 1836 that he finds "nirgends freier Trieb, überall das Angeordnete" (Tgb.2876), he insists in his diary of 1831 that man must be free to commit evil (Tgb.1951). It is only in the 1840s that Grillparzer attempts a limitation, even a new definition of the concept of freedom. Without one of the restrictions in the statements referred to above, freedom is abhorrent to Grillparzer, it is confused with disorder ("Aufrufe" (III,1045), "Adresse des Herrenhauses" (III,1056)), or with "Gemeinheit" (Libussa,2386). Grillparzer sees the need to reject this new freedom of the masses:

Mach dich erst von der Freiheit frei,  
Willst wirklich frei du werden,  
Kein Sklave sein von der Menge Geschrei  
Heißt frei erst sein auf Erden. (I,505)

He criticises the "Freiheitsglut" of the contemporary poets (I,511) as he had criticised the poets of the 1830s. The time is not right for freedom, the people are not ready ("Der Reichstag", "Aufrufe"), which were the conclusions Schiller drew from the French Revolution: "Wo der Naturmensch seine Willkür noch so gesetzlos mißbraucht, da darf man ihm seine Freiheit kaum zeigen" (XX,329). Grillparzer describes freedom in one of his most famous epigrams of 1848 as the new destructive force:

Die Knechtschaft hat meine Jugend zerstört,  
Des Geistesdruckes Erhalter,  
Nun kommt die Freiheit sinnbetört  
Und raubt mir auch mein Alter. (I,491)

Only briefly does political freedom seem commensurate with order and progress, and in Grillparzer's one relatively optimistic poem of 1848, "Mein Vaterland", he greets the translation of inner freedom into its external political equivalent;

Die Freiheit strahlt ob deinem Haupt  
Wie längst in deinem Herzen. (I,317)

Otherwise freedom is a more circumscribed idea which can easily transcend its bounds with disastrous results:

Die Freiheit, ihres eignen Wesens frei,  
Lehrt durch Gewalttat, redet durch Geschrei.  
("Der Justizminister" (I,341))

The essence of freedom is limitation, without it freedom is dangerous, the freedom of the masses which the people are told to avoid in the epigram (I,505,loc.cit.) which appears to be a complete contradiction of "Der Justizminister". Freedom includes the need for inner discipline, and this was exactly how the Classical writers saw freedom. In the first chapter I have given sufficient examples from the earlier era; it is however worth underlining the particularly obvious parallels. There is the need for self-control (Hermann, VI,78; Benvenuto Cellini (WA XLIV, 352)), the acceptance of limitations ("Ilmenau", 179; Maximen, 1116; Wahlverwandtschaften, II,5), the freedom to do what is right (Egmont, IV,2). It is interesting to note that Goethe went through the early Weimar years with little or no mention of the previously very positive concept of freedom, not until Tasso does the word "Freiheit" occur again with any regularity. In general, Grillparzer's use of the term in later years has clear links with Goethe, whose own use of the term always remains more tangible and firmly rooted in life than Schiller's rather abstract view of moral freedom.

ii) 1848: nationalism and the masses

Grillparzer's changing views on freedom are reflected in his approach to the events of 1848. In 1830 Grillparzer had been prepared to risk the more extreme consequences of freedom; in 1848, as a man of fifty-seven, he was less willing to make allowances, especially for events on his own doorstep. At a meeting in 1847 of intellectuals dissatisfied with the system, Grillparzer delivered a violent attack on inefficiency and the lack of liberty (Gespr. 1475), but when events came to a head a year later, Grillparzer lacked the strength of his liberal convictions, as his essays and memoirs in the wake of the revolution testify. In March he was impressed by the peaceful nature of the uprising, by the moderate

action taken, but he warns the people, "hemmt nicht länger allen geordneten Gang der Regierung" (III,1041). In the spirit of the first "Aufruf", the poem "Mein Vaterland" greets the moderate achievements of the first weeks but warns against abstract ideas and demagogues. By late May he is warning more severely against "Unordnung ... als eine Folge der Freiheit" (III,1045), foreseeing the dangers inherent in the path taken, prophesying "die furchtbarsten Ereignisse" (III,1046); excessive zeal may make the pre-March days seem more desirable to the moderates, amongst whom he obviously numbers himself. In the "Erinnerungen aus dem Revolutionsjahr 1848", Grillparzer admits the need for reforms, but he prefers to envisage a slow process of change which he is convinced was about to begin (IV,205). If in the 1830s he had attacked stagnation, then increasingly in the 1840s he criticises excessive and misguided concepts of progress. No one has learnt that

Ein Fortschritt sei, was näher bringt dem Ziele,  
Zuviel sei, wie zu wenig, gleich entfernt.

("Fortschritt-Männer", 51-2)

Progress means improving the old (I,327), not starting on a completely new course (I,490) as he saw in 1848, and there is a danger of progress being sideways or even backwards (I,505). These views are summed up in a diary note of 1850:

Immerwährender Wechsel auf den alten Grundlagen ist das Gesetz alles Daseins. Hiedurch wird nicht das Neue geleugnet, sondern das Sprungweise, vor allem aber das Unzusammenhängende und das Plötzliche.  
(Tgb.4037)

Similarly Goethe told Eckermann: "ich hasse jeden gewaltsamen Umsturz, weil dabei ebensoviel Gutes vernichtet, als gewonnen wird" (27/4/1825).

Grillparzer's greatest fear is the disintegration of the monarchy and the linking of the German parts of Austria to a German state under Prussian domination. It is ultimately such an un-Classical concept of patriotism that gains the upper hand, but the Classical ideas of order, moderation, self-control, and a limited conception

of freedom are called up in support of this notion. In July he warns his compatriots of the need for self-control in order to be worthy of freedom, as the judge had warned in Hermann und Dorothea: "er spreche nie von Freiheit als kann er sich selber regieren" (VI,78). Hence in the "Erinnerungen", Grillparzer feels constrained to explain his lack of revolutionary fervour:

Der Despotismus hat mein Leben, wenigstens mein literarisches zerstört, ich werde daher wohl Sinn für die Freiheit haben. Aber nebstdem, daß die Bewegung des Jahres 48 mein Vaterland zu zerstören drohte, das ich bis zum Kindischen liebe, schien mir auch überhaupt kein Zeitpunkt für die Freiheit ungünstiger als der damalige. ... Zu Freiheit gehört vor allem gesunder Verstand und Selbstbeschränkung, und gerade daran fehlte es in Deutschland. (IV,220)

Consequently there is a desire, especially in the memoirs, to trivialise the events of 1848, to dismiss them as harmless student pranks or as the product of intellectual vanity, which the overreaction of the government turned into rebellion. On the other hand there is an excessively naive belief in the possibility of gradual reform, and a denigration of the minority races in the monarchy, whether Czech or Hungarian, whilst the preservation of Habsburg unity is the essential standard against which everything is judged.

In mid-1848 Grillparzer told Foglar: "ich habe wohl mehrere Aufsätze angefangen, aber ehe sie beendet sind, überkommt mich der Ekel über unsere Zustände" (Gespr.951). It is perhaps excessive to follow the opinion of Bücher that "seine in der Theorie so liberale Gesinnung schlug ins Gegenteil um", but it is equally difficult to marry this stage of Grillparzer's political life to Thompson's recent statement that "all his life Grillparzer appears to have fallen into line with liberal views of some form or other", however valid this assertion may be with reference to other periods. In Roschek's view, "Grillparzers freiheitliche Gesinnung ist also niemals radikal-revolutionär", and Backmann's generally excellent assessment of "Grillparzer als Revolutionär" is misleading only in the title. (6) Certainly Grillparzer comes

increasingly to sympathise with the reaction to the revolution and in consequence he turns to the army as the basis of loyalty and the fatherland, as a safeguard against present and future excesses. Grillparzer was perhaps all too ready to see his worst fears realised. Strife is causing the death of his country (I,492), he comes to see 1848 as "ein Jahr von Not, von Jammer, ja von Blut" (I,335). The soldiers have preserved order, justice and peace. In 1848 his concern for his country's fate outweighed all interest in freedom and progress, in 1851 he stressed that every decent man should support the government (Tgb.4046).

Once the worst was over, his old liberalism returned. He is suspicious of both parties, the conservatives (I,504, 506) and the radicals (I,504,510). Windischgrätz, the great hero, has too much sympathy for the aristocracy (I,499). Increasingly he challenged the new measures of Franz Joseph, in revoking the constitution (I,514,530, 552), in enslaving Austria to Rome through the concordat, which puts an end to all reforms (Tgb.4276, I,521,525,530, 546). By 1866, Grillparzer's views have turned almost a complete circle, and he calls for the people's freedom to restrict the government's, a sentiment which forms the theme of one of his last epigrams:

Niemand soll frei sein!  
Nur damits auch der König nicht sei,  
Wünsch ich die Völker frei. (I,591)

It is dangerous to talk of a complete change in Grillparzer's views, it is the emphasis that changed depending on the particular faction in power. The unifying element of his politics is the rejection of extremes, as he wrote in 1848:

Nicht hier noch dort in den Extremen zünftig,  
Ich glaube bald, ich bin vernünftig. (I,490)

Grillparzer was a critic, and one does most justice to his views by seeing him as an inveterate member of the opposition.

If Grillparzer's patriotism caused him to reject the revolution, then one of his greatest fears was an exaggerated nationalism in which he felt the Germans were the worst offenders. According to Grillparzer, nationality meant

simply "daß irgendwo der Mensch geboren" (I,490), to insist on it meant challenging one's common humanity and returning to bestiality. This is the message of his writings on language, but also of his famous epigram of 1849 on "der Weg der neuern Bildung" (I,500). Nationalism produces a reversal of the development towards humanity which is portrayed in Weh dem.

Similar fears form the basis of Grillparzer's dislike of the masses, a subject on which Grillparzer was prone to contradiction, as I have already suggested is true of the narrator in Armer Spielmann. From an artistic viewpoint, Grillparzer saw the audience as a jury (III,734,873, IV,112), "die Stimme der allgemeinen Menschheit" (Tgb.2304), representing "das Gefühl der Menschheit als Ganzes" (III,84, also III,835). Grillparzer however disliked any attempt by the poet to follow the masses, "auf die Masse soll und muß jeder Dichter wirken, mit der Masse nie" (Tgb.3779), and he saw a similar aim in Goethe, "dem Publikum aufzudrängen was es nicht wollte war sein Streben" (Tgb. 2848), though he feared that Goethe and Schiller's rejection of the audience was excessive (III,734). Outside the theatre however, Grillparzer was rather less than enthusiastic about the representative value of the masses, despite the long diary note on the divine nature of the human community (Tgb.1409). The narrator in Armer Spielmann talks of the "lärmende Volksmenge" (III,154), the statue of Joseph II sees "Trotz und Roheit ... der Menge" (I,253). Similar views are to be found in Bruderzwist:-

Erträglich ist der Mensch als einzelner,  
Im Haufen steht die Tierwelt gar zu nah (1481-2)

- and in Esther in the King's mistrust of his subjects:

Weil ihr der Haufe seid, die Menge, das Gemeine. (266)

Such elitism or simple pessimism is not commensurate with ideas of unity and equality, but the same contradiction is to be found in the work of Goethe and Schiller. In the "Votivtafeln", Schiller wrote:

Majestät der Menschennatur! Dich soll ich beim Haufen Suchen? Bei wenigen nur hast du von jeher gewohnt. Einzelne wenige zählen, die übrigen alle sind blinde Niete, ihr leeres Gewühl hüllet die Treffer nur ein.  
("Majestas populi")

Millionen beschäftigen sich, daß die Gattung bestehe,  
Aber durch wenige nur pflanzt die Menschheit sich fort.  
("Die verschiedene Bestimmung")

Similar views are expressed in Goethe's poem "Hypochonder", but Goethe himself was more favourably disposed to the masses, the xenion "Goldenes Zeitalter" seems more a reflection of his philosophy than Schiller's;

Ob die Menschen im ganzen sich bessern? Ich glaub' es,  
Suche man, wie man auch will, sieht man doch gar nichts  
denn einzeln,  
davon.

As we have seen, Goethe and Herder were more concerned with the community than was Schiller, all however feared the dangerous results of life in a large state, a portrayal of which they consistently avoided. The one exception is Goethe's Natürliche Tochter, which reflects Goethe's attitude to the French Revolution;

0 diese Zeit hat fürchterliche Zeichen:  
Das Niedre schwillt, das Hohe senkt sich nieder,  
Als könnte jeder nur am Platz des andern  
Befriedigung verworrner Wünsche finden,  
Nur dann sich glücklich fühlen, wenn nichts mehr  
Zu unterscheiden wäre, wenn wir alle,  
Von einem Strom vermischt dahingerissen,  
Im Ozean uns unbemerkt verlören. (361-8)

In Bruderzwist, Rudolf II fears the trend towards equality which will continue, "bis alles gleich, ei ja, weil alles niedrig" (1276). The satire on "Spitzbuben" mocks any suggestion that privileges be accorded to honourable people (III,101), and these ideas are echoed in the poem "Der Reichstag":

Macht alles gleich ...  
Bis alles ärmlich, wie ihr selber seid,  
Und euer Maß die vorbestimmte Größe. (I,325)

Throughout the political writings, Grillparzer expresses his horror of the rabble, of "Pöbelherrschaft", (7) he dislikes the masses for their coarseness, which is a sign of their inhumanity. Libussa and her sisters see themselves surrounded by "Roheit", Rudolf II continually



attacks the age as "wild", and as I have suggested in the context of Weh dem, it is these epithets that Grillparzer frequently uses as a sign of bestiality in contrast to the positive concepts of "Bildung" and "Menschheit". If there are more poignant references to coarseness and savagery in Grillparzer's work than in Goethe and Schiller, then it must again be stressed that there is more reference to the ordinary people in the Austrian's work than in that of his Classical predecessors.

In his more pessimistic moments, Grillparzer saw the age as one of arrogance, of egocentricity. Don Cäsar in Bruderzwist challenges all authority, demands his own version of justice. In an early note for the play, Grillparzer described him as "übermütig, tollldreist, frech mit dem Höchsten spielend" (I/21,135). As we have seen, his great ideal is for total truth and knowledge. Don Cäsar sees himself as the centre of the universe, creating those around him, a madness which Grillparzer continually attacked in Romantic and idealist philosophy. Libussa sees the future as an age of "Eigenliebe" (2374), for Rudolf II, "Eigendünkel war es, Eigensucht" (Bruderzwist, 336), and for him this selfish attitude even informs man's approach to religion. Like Goethe's Iphigenie, Rudolf sees man attributing his hatred of his fellow men to God:

(Die Türkenfurcht)

Sie schreckt den Eifrer meines eignen Glaubens,  
Der seinen Haß andichtet seinem Gott. (1191-2; cf.  
Iphigenie, 523-5)

This selfish conceit, which is also one of the aspects of German life criticised by Hölderlin in Hyperion, is above all part of man's attitude to life and his fellow-men. (8) It is an age of material interests, and again Grillparzer uses a term favoured by the Classicists: "Nutzen". As early as 1820, Grillparzer had written, "die Triebfeder der menschlichen Handlungen ist aber der Nutzen" (Tgb.759), and this theme is taken up with a vengeance in the 1840s:

Der Staat, der jedes einzelne in sich verschlingt,  
Statt Gut und Böse, Nutzen wägt und Vorteil.

(Libussa, 2334-5)

Man sprach hier viel von Nutzen und von Vorteil.  
(Esther, 208)

Daß euch der Nutzen, das Mein  
Gott und Götze allein. (I,261)

der Staat ist ... eine weltliche, auf das starre  
Recht und den Nutzen gerichtete Anstalt. (Tgb.4013)

Man is only concerned with what is of material use  
(Libussa,1188, Bruderzwist,1246), and this is an aspect of  
the age which is particularly repugnant to Libussa's  
sisters (220). It is a criticism made of Primislaus  
by other characters that he is the man of "Nutzen" (928,  
1103,1970), though here one would argue that he is concerned  
with the benefit of the community as a whole. As W.E.Yates  
has pointed out,<sup>(9)</sup> similar rejection of material gain  
is also to be found in Schiller and Goethe;

Denn nur vom Nutzen wird die Welt regiert. (Tod,443)

Der Nutzen ist das große Idol der Zeit. (NA XX,311)

Es sei auch schicklich, was <sup>jeder glaubt,</sup> ihm nützlich ist.  
(Tasso,1009-10)

To the examples given by Yates, one might add Maria Stuart's  
warning to Burleigh not to confuse justice and "der Nutzen/  
Des Staats" (797-8), but in fact Yates's point needs some  
modification. The example from Goethe is very untypical,  
insofar as Goethe was normally full of praise for what was  
useful - it amounts to a leitmotif of Wanderjahre - and  
Goethe does not use the term "Nutzen" in a negative sense  
as Schiller does. Nevertheless the general comparison  
of materialism and expediency with a wider awareness of  
community or of moral values is an important one.

### iii) Law, order, and limitation

I have so far examined some of the negative aspects  
of Grillparzer's view of his age; it remains to be  
considered which ideals he upheld as a cure for these  
dangerous tendencies. The development in Grillparzer's  
concept of freedom was towards an insight into the need  
for law and order in society, for common sense, self-  
limitation, moderation and a greater humility in man.

Concern for laws is not as noticeable in Grillparzer's  
writing as it is in that of the Classicists, until 1840

it is somewhat rare, only in Blanka does mention of "Gesetze" occur with any frequency. On the few occasions where the word stands out in an important context, it has positive overtones; in his youthful essay on Rudolf of Habsburg, Grillparzer praises "weise Gesetze" (III,968), only for someone like Napoleon are there no laws ("Der Schiffer und sein Sohn"). There is no question of Grillparzer using the term in a negative context as Schiller and Goethe do in their early works. In the mid-1840s however, Grillparzer comes to see the perhaps unfortunate necessity of laws in a modern state, "als Staat gibt er Gesetze und erzwingt ihre Befolgung" (Tgb.3780). Libussa regrets that laws are needed because her ideal state of love is not feasible (1001). A poem of 1843 sees the law as a more absolute concept limiting man's striving for knowledge and freedom:

Denn etwas ist, du magsts wie weit entfernen,  
Das dich umspinnt mit unsichtbarem Netz,  
Das, wenn du liebst, du aufschaust zu den Sternen,  
Dich unterwerfend dasteht als Gesetz.

("Wieviel weißt du.." (I,293))

Rudolf II insists on laws in society (Bruderzwist,1603), and on the eternal divine laws (2370); the nobles in Jüdin intend taking over, "bis wieder eins der Fürst und das Gesetz" (1244). If Goethe in one of his maxims considered it better to have some unjust laws than none at all (Maximen,113), so Grillparzer made a similar point with reference to himself:

Selbst die Zensurgesetze habe ich geachtet, weil ich glaubte es zieme dem rechtschaffnen Manne sich den Gesetzen des Vaterlandes zu fügen, gesetzt auch sie wären absurd ("Aufrufe" (III,1041))

In 1848 Grillparzer praised the section of the Viennese population which had shed its blood for "Ordnung und Gesetz" (III,1050). The concept of order is also an important one in Grillparzer's views on the revolutionary events. He saw the need for order to counter the chaos of upheaval, and the army was vital in preserving it:

Sie holten aus dem Aufruhr, dem Verrat  
Die Ordnung uns zurück, zusamt dem Frieden.

("Der Christbaum" (I,336))

As I have sought to show, order was an essential precondition for freedom (III,1056), it was dangerous to mistake disorder for freedom. In an epigram of 1850, Grillparzer informs the Germans that

Doch außer der Ordnung, ich mein,  
Ist nicht außerordentlich sein. (I,509)

The concept is more frequent in the revolutionary era than before, but it had been praised by the priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen (353,428), by Starschensky and his servant in Das Kloster bei Sendomir (III,128,131), and especially by Jakob in Der arme Spielmann (III,152,157). In Treuer Diener, Bancbanus insists, "nur Ordnung, sag ich euch" (535), and Helmensdorfer, who links Grillparzer's ideas on order with Goethe's, sees order as a prerequisite of humanity, writing of Bancbanus: "als Hüter der Ordnung ist er ein Diener des "Schönmenschlichen" und Lebensfreundlichen".<sup>(10)</sup> It was lack of order that Grillparzer gave as a reason for his poetic silence in 1827 ("Rechtfertigung", 69), and in the same year, in one of his most famous diary entries on the theme of art as the only truth, Grillparzer insists that only artistic matters give him order (Tgb.1614), whilst Beethoven is the composer who endangers the essential order of music (Tgb.2174). Grillparzer believed that all literature depended on ideas of order - "aller Poesie liegt die Idee einer höhern Weltordnung zum Grunde" (Tgb.3196) - and such an artistic insight into a higher order is the privilege of Rudolf II, himself more of a poet, an artist, than a ruler. Significantly his one attempt to explain this higher order in comprehensible terms fails and he descends into incoherence and finally silence.

It is in Bruderzwist that the ideal of order is most strongly but also most problematically presented. It is demanded by soldiers and citizens (531,2018), it is praised by Julius von Braunschweig (2160), in each case in terms that echo Grillparzer's political statements of the period. Above all however it is the ideal of the emperor, who seeks to make his state reflect God's order, but who is fated, as the title of an article by Doppler underlines,

to be only "ein trüber Spiegel der absoluten Ordnung". According to Doppler, order is "allgemeine Menscheneinsicht in die geschichtliche Existenz",<sup>(11)</sup> but this does justice neither to the specifically political concept of law and order, which is the normal meaning, nor to the more poetic, symbolic connotations in Bruderzwist. In Jüdin and Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, order is something holy, and this is its main characteristic in the later play, as outlined by Rudolf to Ferdinand:

Kennst du das Wörtlein: Ordnung, junger Mann?  
Dort oben wohnt die Ordnung, dort ihr Haus,  
Hier unten eitle Willkür und Verwirrung. (427-9)

Kleinstück believes that there are a number of orders and that Rudolf is wrong to insist only on his conception of it: "Nur für das Bewußtsein Rudolfs, nicht aber für das Grillparzers, gibt es die Ordnung, die eine".<sup>(12)</sup> Certainly Rudolf does not distinguish between different uses of the word, but that is also true of Grillparzer himself. The order on earth, however unsatisfactory or imperfect, is a reflection of the ideal higher order, which by its very nature can never be fully appreciated. Hence when Rudolf insists to Julius,

Gott aber hat die Ordnung eingesetzt,  
Von da an ward es licht, das Tier ward Mensch (1266-7)

- or when he prays to God that it is

mein eignes Amt, daß diese Welt  
Ein Spiegel sei, ein Abbild deiner Ordnung (1467-8)

- he is not so much contradicting his earlier statement (427-9), but merely considering different stages of order between ideal and reality. There is an inevitable note of resignation in Rudolf's attitude to order, the terms in which he describes it underline its idealistic nature, and the means of comprehending it by quiet concentration preclude all attempts to realise this ideal in the world of political action. In Erich Hock's words, "es gehört zur Situation des Menschen, daß er nicht fähig ist, die göttliche Ordnung zu verwirklichen", according to Kleinstück, "die himmlische Ordnung nützt dem Menschen, der lebt und handelt, der handeln muß, solange er lebt, nichts".<sup>(13)</sup> The political sense of order is not comparable to the ideal,

it is an important if unfortunate necessity. In a note for Libussa of 1831, Grillparzer wrote that the play "sich eigentlich um den Widerstreit der Gefühls- und Verstandeswelt, des goldenen Zeitalters und der nüchternen Ordnung handelt" (I/20,386). Libussa's ideal order gives way to Primislaus's more realistic concept of an ordered state.

Kleist also suggests that Ferdinand's autocratic rule represents the inhuman results of applying Rudolf's ideal order to the world of politics: "Die Ordnung, die Ferdinand hergestellt hat, gleicht der der Sterne und Pflanzen, sie ist unmenschlich ... die Ordnung der Sterne bedeutet den Tod des Menschen".<sup>(14)</sup> This is slightly misleading - Rudolf sees "Wahrheit" in the stars and plants rather than specifically "Ordnung" - nevertheless Rudolf's policies do again reveal the danger of applying abstract ideologies, whose origins lie outside politics, to what Gregor in the comedy calls "die buntverworfene Welt". This is a problem inherent in Classicism. The concepts of order, limitation, laws, moderation are derived from art (Ästhetische Erziehung, "Natur und Kunst") or the natural world ("Metamorphose der Tiere") and are transferred to the social or political sphere - beauty will be the gateway to freedom. In the idyllic or idealistic communities presented in Hermann und Dorothea, Wilhelm Meister, Wilhelm Tell, such a transfer of ideals is feasible, but already in a work such as Die natürliche Tochter the ideals of order and moderation are not an answer to the real political problems posed. In Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, Jungfrau there may be a more realistic presentation of society, but the corrupt political world goes on regardless of any ideals the protagonists may cherish. Schiller is ultimately concerned with other matters: in the last two of the plays mentioned, the political questions are overlooked at the end in order to focus attention on the purely personal fate of a sublime character who is ultimately unconcerned with the workings of political reality, and who is ideal and sublime for precisely that reason, among others. In Wallenstein, Max is brought

face to face with social realities, but his death is an escape, not an answer, and Gordon, who remains to defend his aesthetic ideals of moderation and limitation, is powerless to alter the course of political events. In Classicism therefore the world of ideals and the world of politics are deliberately kept apart, unless an idyllic setting such as the Swiss cantons in Tell makes such a link possible. Grillparzer however makes no such compromise, his later plays especially show the inherent dangers of using aesthetically orientated ideals in a political setting, however reluctant he may at times have been to admit this danger. Rudolf II may be seen in this light, as an externalisation of Grillparzer's own poetic desire to see order as an indivisible ideal. But certainly, however legendary or mythological the setting, the situations in Ottokar, Treuer Diener, Libussa, Bruderzwist, Jüdin are realistically political, and the aesthetic ideals of Classicism are not an adequate answer and on the whole are recognised as such. Despite the confusion noted, Kleinstück's reference to Ferdinand's "order" is a valid one. The concepts of law and order are potentially worthy ones when applied to a work of art, they are inherently dangerous when they involve the brutal suppression of those who challenge the status quo, whether political or religious. The ideals which are fine in an ideal community are dubious in the extreme in a world such as Grillparzer's where people are far from perfect. This is true to some extent of the other ideas that Grillparzer uses in the political field.

In Wallenstein, Max with his ideals occupies a timeless realm. Similarly in Bruderzwist Rudolf's concept of order is timeless and artistic, not political, and his attempt to create political order lies in an attempt to stop the process of time, a characteristic he shares with Wallenstein:

JULIUS. Es ist zu spät.

LEOPOLD.

Und früher wars zu früh.

Wann ist die rechte Zeit?

(1823-4)

TERZKY. Wann aber wird es Zeit sein?

WALLENSTEIN.

Wenn ichs sage.  
(Piccolomini, 959)

This is in keeping with Grillparzer's view of the house of Habsburg, which according to Baumann, "verkörperte überzeugend das Konstante, an welches zu glauben er niemals aufgehört hatte"<sup>(15)</sup> but here also it is a matter of extremes. Grillparzer once insisted that any attempt by man to stand still was a crime against God (Tgb.1409), but Rudolf attempts to do precisely that. He sees himself as "die Wage" (1421), an image used by Ferdinand (2483), he is "das Band, das diese Garbe hält" (1163), "ein Mittelpunkt" (1169), or, according to a line now omitted after line 1174, "die Axe, die die Pole bindet" (I/21,283). All these however are static, as Rudolf in fact is. According to Roschek, order means "durch Maß und Begrenzung jedes Handlens Frieden und Eintracht gewinnen",<sup>(16)</sup> but Rudolf seeks to preserve order not by moderate action, but by not acting at all, an extreme which, like all others in Grillparzer's work, is doomed to catastrophe.

Roschek's definition must lead us on to a further important ideal, namely limitation. Here Grillparzer is not entirely consistent, but as with his views on order, this results from a rejection of any extreme insistence on limitation. As for Goethe and Schiller, there seems little difference between "Schranke" and "Grenze" and their respective derivatives, but Grillparzer seems to prefer the former. Nevertheless Grillparzer specifically links the concept of "Selbstbegrenzung" with Goethe:

Wenn Goethe in seinen Schriften Selbstbeschränkung oder vielmehr Selbstbegrenzung predigt, so lehrt er durch sein Beispiel sie erst für den Fall, wenn man sich vorher nach Erforderlichkeit selbst-erweitert hat.  
(Tgb.1189)

Self-limitation is one of the ideals portrayed in Grillparzer's version of Faust (II,955), and later he uses the idea in a more political context. In 1847 he looked forward to "die Zeit der Selbstbegrenzung" ("Fortschritt-Männer"). It is important for man as a



social being to acknowledge his limitations, and the early work especially warns of the danger of breaking them.

Fedriko in Blanka is clearly in the wrong in promising,

Kühn überschreit ich alle jene Schranken,  
Die heilige Pflicht und die Natur geweiht. (1172-3) (17)

Jaromir recognises that "der Mensch hat seine Grenzen" (Ahnfrau, 872), but he does not heed these limits, just as Jason has the feeling, "als hätt des Lebens Grenz ich überschritten" (Argonauten, 1180). Rudolf I in his youth and Gertrude still as Queen fight against such limitations (Ottokar, 1901; Diener, 329). The ruler especially must be capable of and aware of the need for limitation. In 1836, Grillparzer sees Louis Philippe of France in danger of overlooking such limits (Tgb. 3009). King Andreas places clear limits on Bancbanus' sphere of activity (Diener, 406). Bancbanus is warned of the need for self-control, he may face the accusation that "er war ein Greis, und konnte sich nicht zügeln" (425). It is Bancbanus himself who at the end utters the important challenge to the future king:

Bezähm dich selbst; nur wer sich selbst bezähmt,  
Mag des Gesetzes scharfe Zügel lenken. (2113-4)

This challenge so clearly echoes Goethe's praise of Karl August:

Du kennest lang' die Pflichten deines Standes  
Und schränkst nach und nach die freie Seele ein.

...  
Allein wer andre wohl zu leiten strebt,  
Muß fähig sein, viel zu entbehren. ("Ilmenau", 178-83)

There is a danger of confusing two related themes here. Man, whether subject or ruler, must limit himself, he must also accept his inevitable limitations as a human being. Freedom results from both attitudes. Primislaus insists optimistically that "das Höchste, wie beschränkt auch, ist der Mensch" (Libussa, 1396), and in his late essay "Zur Literaturgeschichte", Grillparzer considered Kant's philosophy as "die wissenschaftliche Anerkennung der menschlichen Beschränktheit" (III, 716). It was precisely such a rejection of limitations, both in their art and in

their view of man, which Grillparzer disliked in the work of the Romantics.<sup>(18)</sup> In his diary of 1820, Grillparzer had written of the exceptional man's need for limitation (Tgb.613), and the same virtue is praised in one of his two musical idols, Mozart, "Nennt ihr ihn groß? er war es durch die Grenze" ("Zu Mozarts Feier", 62).<sup>(19)</sup>

Grillparzer also realises that external limitations on the individual can be excessive. In the poem "Vorzeichen" he warns the regime of the danger of driving the people to an extreme rejection of excessive restrictions, and in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen the priest fears, rightly so in the case of Hero, that the religious life is unnatural in its "so beschränktes Streben" (165).

On the whole Grillparzer's view of limitations is in line with that of Goethe. For Lenz, Grillparzer's demands for "Selbstbegrenzung" constitute a mixture of Weimar Classicism and Josephinism, and ~~in so far as~~ Grillparzer describes Joseph II in Classical terms of humanity this is a correct assessment.<sup>(20)</sup> For Goethe especially the man who tries to ignore or cast aside his limitations is wrong, as in "Grenzen der Menschheit", as in Tasso, whilst the man who practises self-restraint, who accepts the need for and the inevitability of limitations, will be contented and successful. Goethe also believed that perfection was possible, in life and in art, within such voluntarily accepted restrictions. Apart from the instances quoted in the discussion of Classicism,<sup>(21)</sup> Schiller ignores the social and political aspects of freedom, except in the aesthetic essays which frequently compare the apparently unrestricted freedom of art with man's awareness of his own limitations. Schiller does however consider the mutual limitation of man's two basic drives (XX, 352), and there seems to be more meaning from a human than from an aesthetic viewpoint in his depiction in the Kallias letters of a beautiful landscape, in which:

jede Partie sich selbst ihre Grenze setzt ... jedes aus innerer Freiheit sich gerade die Einschränkung vorschreibt, die das andere braucht um seine Freiheit zu äußern. (letter to Körner, 23/2/1793)

iv) The ideal state and the concept of right

It is from such a viewpoint and from Goethe's comments on limitation as the source of perfection that we must consider the question of the state in Libussa. An important light is cast on Libussa's concept of the state by a diary note of 1838:

In manchen Ländern Europas faselt man noch von der Möglichkeit einer patriarchalischen Regierung, einem blindgläubigen Zusammenleben der Staatsbürger, einer bewußt zufriedenen Selbstbeschränkung der Ansprüche der einzelnen. Die Möglichkeit läßt sich nicht ableugnen. Zahlt eure Staatsschulden, reduziert eure stehenden Heere auf das Drittel und eure Abgaben auf das Fünftel, mischt euch nicht in die Weltangelegenheiten, dann könnt ihr zu Hause allerdings einen solchen Versuch machen. (Tgb.3418)

As the diary note goes on to explain in fuller detail, the preservation of such an ideal regime is possible only on a small scale and in isolation from one's neighbours, or one might add, in the sort of community depicted in the works of German Classicism. The state of Libussa is however just such a regime - matriarchal, of course, as opposed to patriarchal - whilst Primislaus's society is the modern state engaged in trade, even war, striving for improvement and expansion, and unable to preserve the more confined ideals of its predecessor. But in addition Libussa fails to take account of the limited, the selfish, the all-too-human aspects of man, of the realisation which Rudolf II hopes will soon be his brother's;

Er sieht dann ein, daß Satzungen der Menschen  
Ein Maß des Törichten notwendig beigemischt.  
(Bruderzwist, 2336-7)

This same realisation is found in a diary note of 1834:

Die schwerste Aufgabe für jeden Staat- und Welt-Verbesserer ist offenbar, zu wissen, wie viel Dummheit und Schlechtigkeit in jeder menschlichen Anstalt notwendig gelassen werden muß. Denn das rein Verständige und Gute kann als Kollektivum schon darum praktisch nicht bestehen, weil so viele Unverständige und Schlechte oder doch Gemeine daran fördernd teilnehmen sollen. (Tgb.2170)

Libussa fails to take account of such aspects of mankind. She is a woman cast in the role of ruler, and it is worth

noting that Grillparzer here makes the attempt which neither Goethe nor Schiller ever made, to transfer the female ideal to the political sphere. In one of his earliest notes for the play, Grillparzer described Libussa's regime as "Frauenherrschaft des Gefühls und der Begeisterung" (Tgb.1035). Libussa attempts to produce precisely the type of state whose feasibility Grillparzer doubts in the diary note of 1838 (Tgb.3418), a state based on instinctive voluntary limitation for the good of the whole. It is a state of equality founded on complete trust in others. When the Wladiks talk of themselves as her subjects, she dismisses such a concept:

Dies letzte Wort, es sei von euch verbannt.  
In Zukunft herrscht nur eines hier im Land;  
Das kindliche Vertraun. Und nennt ihrs Macht,  
Nennt ihr ein Opfer, das sich selbst gebracht,  
Die Willkür, die sich allzu frei geschienen  
Und, eigner Herrschaft bang, beschloß zu dienen.  
Wollt ihr als Brüder leben, eines Sinns,  
So nennt mich eure Fürstin, und ich bins. (443-9)

Her realm is one of peace, rejecting all quarrel and competition. It is a welfare state where those who are hungry can eat, where class distinctions are removed, where money has been abolished. Everything is properly organised, work, rest and play strictly allocated.

But Libussa's instinctive and natural regime of love and mutual trust cannot exist in the world of human frailty and imperfection. Libussa's state corresponds exactly to Schiller's description of the beautiful landscape in the "Kalliasbriefe", and the aesthetic aspect of this regime is heightened by its being described as a realm of "Begeisterung", of poetic inspiration. In Classicism the larger political world is seen as evil, the attempt to create an aesthetic state in Tell is in danger of failure until the great individual commits the unsavoury, but highly necessary criminal act. The relative optimism of Classicism is only maintained by concentrating attention on the individual or on the small secluded community, for it is only in this way that basically poetic ideals can be translated to the political

realm. Grillparzer, as I have suggested, is not prepared to compromise in this way. In Bruderzwist the aesthetic idea of order which Rudolf seeks to uphold is impractical in the realistic world of politics, and it is left to other characters in the play and to Grillparzer himself in other political statements of the period to represent a less idealistic but more practical concept of order. In Libussa the same applies to the idea of the state. Erich Hock shows how the state is gradually distanced from the divine, how to be human and succeed means losing the divine: "ihr Versuch, als Fürstin das Hohe in der Menschen Welt zu verwirklichen, mißlingt".<sup>(22)</sup> But this is not in any way a disaster in a political sense, even though the play concentrates on the fate of the partly divine individual and highlights the personal tragedy involved. Bücher was quite right to insist on the tinge of irony which pervades the depiction of Libussa's regime.<sup>(23)</sup> Her society is too weak, too theoretical, too idealistic, and such views are not invalidated simply because they are put into the mouths of the comic Wladiks. Biwoy's criticism of the matriarchal regime echoes Wallenstein's doubts:

Doch wie's entstand unter einer Stirn,  
Hats nirgends Raum als im Menschenhirn. (577-8)

Eng ist die Welt und das Gehirn ist weit.  
Leicht beieinander wohnen die Gedanken,  
Doch hart im Raume stoßen sich die Sachen. (Tod, 787-9)

Their fears are similar: the effeminate idealist will be vanquished by the more realistic neighbour. In addition, Grillparzer implicitly criticises Libussa's regime in a diary note of 1843/4: "Der Staat ist eine Anstalt zum Schutz nicht zur Versorgung. Was der Staat dem Verhungerten gibt, muß er dem Hungernden nehmen" (Tgb. 3714).

For Libussa the state is first of all threatened from within. Equality of reward does not, perhaps cannot produce equality of effort (919), and man, in particular man as opposed to woman, is a naturally competitive being who wishes to be rewarded in keeping with his achievement. Equality on the other hand can only be achieved by

artificially restricting the more efficient members of society. This is a question conveniently overlooked by the Classicists, who talk in general and theoretical terms of man achieving his full potential within voluntarily accepted limitations. Only Lessing tackles the problem in his essay Ernst und Falk, which together with Nathan may be seen as an important adumbration of Classical ideas. Lessing sees true equality as impossible, even to make each member of a particular generation equal can only halt the natural process temporarily. Once each individual has made more or less use of his equal share, the succeeding generation will inherit more or less respectively. (24)

Much of Grillparzer's political thought seeks to come to terms with these various assumptions, and in Libussa it is Primislaus who sets out to found a state which takes due account of man's human failings and distance from the impossible ideal. On the whole Grillparzer sees the "necessity or inevitability" of Primislaus's regime, as Gisela Stein argues, but one need not agree with Stein that Grillparzer arrives only "reluctantly" at this insight. (25) Primislaus however suffers from being unfavourably compared with Libussa in the context of the play. Both Libussa and Rudolf II are poetic characters in a literary work, and Grillparzer, as is well known, disliked the mixing of literature and politics. Both characters present aesthetic ideals of unity and harmony which are doomed to failure in the practical world, a fact which Grillparzer in his more realistic, non-literary moods fully realised. Schiller comes very near to such a realisation in the final stages of Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung and in Wallenstein, where the view of the realist becomes gradually more positive. After Wallenstein however he returns to the ideal realm in his subsequent dramas. The danger which must be avoided however is that of seeing Libussa and Rudolf as representatives of viable political philosophies, which they are not.

By comparison Primislaus represents the realistic realm of "nüchterne Ordnung", of intellect as opposed to feeling (HKA I/20,386). The ordinary people need more specific limitations and definition of their possessions and sphere of activity, as Grillparzer stressed in a number of early notes to the play (Tgb.1035). It is to some extent a matter of degree, and Primislaus's view of the state is not vastly different from Libussa's family state:

Es ist der Staat die Ehe zwischen Bürgern,  
Der Gatte opfert gern den eignen Willen,  
Was ihn beschränkt, ist ja ein zweites Selbst. (2036-8)

Primislaus however sees the need for conscious awareness of limitations as opposed to a reliance on instinctive self-limitation. He sees the masculine world of ambition and striving (2059-61,2191-2) and the need to structure this in a city state. He accepts the spirit of competition which the diary note of 1838 (Tgb.3418) recognises as the downfall of the ideal patriarchal form of government. Like Rudolf, Libussa fears that man will be separated from the ideal order of the universe, "der Geist des All" (Libussa,2023; Bruderzwist,1282), but she is much more ready than Rudolf to accept the realistic views represented by her husband:

Drum, wo uns Widersetzlichkeit gedroht,  
Dort findet er Gehorsam. Jeder hilft  
Teilnehmend am Vollbringen, am Vollbrachten.  
Es ist so schön, für andere zu leben! (1971-4)

One main distinction between the regimes of man and woman is that Libussa's is concerned with preservation, the maintaining of a timeless status quo - Rudolf II's is in that respect a feminine state - whilst Primislaus is concerned with progress and expansion, a comparison quite in keeping with the contrast of the sexes which Grillparzer inherited from the Classicists. Such a masculine striving needs the reason and planning which Primislaus can provide. He is the man of practical common sense which Grillparzer saw as sadly lacking in his own day. He sees the need for laws, order, decisions and action. Especially he stands for justice (1439,1445), the just man he believes

should be king of the world. Primislaus stands up for his rights, what he feels to be correctly his (1744,1780) and in this he is typical of the new age. In the context of the earlier political writings and of the two political plays of the 1820s, this would have been the highest praise. In the 1840s however, the question of justice and rights is not so straightforward, as Škreb points out, Grillparzer's use of the term "Recht" has changed by the time of Bruderzwist. (26)

The previously positive use of the word is still common. In 1834 Grillparzer saw man distinguished from the animal kingdom by "die Liebe und das Recht" (I,410), in 1839 he complained of the faults of the modern thinkers -

Aber was fehlt und was schlecht  
Ist das Gefühl für das Recht. (I,261)

- and in the same year he saw the Russians threatening "des Rechtes heilig Haus" ("Rußland" (I,263)). In Bruderzwist the noble Julius, the only positive character in the play, is a champion of what is right: "die Sonne aller aber ist das Recht" (2121). He insists that Don Cäsar be justly tried (2186), that Rudolf be properly treated (2069), he wants Rudolf to defend what is right (2192). Yet he is sceptical also - "Die Mehrheit siegt und mit ihr siegt das Recht" (2129). He fears that "das Recht" is a negative concept, supported only in order that man may protect and keep what in the first place was unjustly obtained (2123-6). (A similar point is made by Goethe's Götz (I,2).) In more general terms, Grillparzer comes to fear that the concept of right is an unfortunate necessity of human society. In 1839, in the same year as his repeated poetic praise of "das Recht", Grillparzer wrote in his diary:

Es ist schon darum Unsinn von einem göttlichen Rechte zu sprechen, weil der Begriff von Recht die Idee einer Unvollkommenheit mit sich führt. Das Recht widerstreitet der moralischen Gesetzgebung, indem es das Prinzip des Egoismus über das der Liebe setzt, indes wir doch alle übereinstimmen, daß Gottes Wille gerade das Gegenteil sei. Gottes Wort sagt: liebe deinen Feind, das Recht sagt: schlag ihn tot, wenn er dich beschädigt. (Tgb.3500)



Clearly this view is in keeping with the people's claim for their rights in Libussa (896,958,1326; cf.also Tgb.1035). Libussa's answer to these claims also echoes the diary note:

Und diese Würmer sprechen mir von Recht?  
Daß du dem Dürftgen hilfst, den Bruder liebst,  
Das ist dein Recht, vielmehr ist deine Pflicht,  
Und Recht ist nur der ausgeschmückte Name  
Für alles Unrecht, das die Erde hegt. (904-8)

Rudolf is equally cynical, he fears "das Recht" is no more than the voice of the strong majority, and he insists, "des Menschen Recht heißt hungern, Freund, und leiden" (Bruderzwist,1257). Here also one is sceptical of the value of the various characters' demands for right, whether it be Ferdinand (2763), Klesel (2576), the nobles (1526,1591), or Don Cäsar, who sees right and wrong as a product of his own brain (1903). A further diary note, of 1846, questions a person's claim to have rights:

Es ist eigentlich lächerlich von natürlichen (angeborenen) Rechten zu sprechen. Recht ist nichts anders, als daß ich in irgend einer Kraftäußerung von andern nicht gehindert werden darf. (Tgb.3850)

Hence Grillparzer ridicules the insistence of the 1849 Reichstag on basic rights ("Der Reichstag", Tgb.4010).

Rudolf in Bruderzwist however, whilst challenging the validity of rights, nevertheless sees himself as a sign of what is right -

weil ein Mittelpunkt vonnöten,

Um den sich alles scharf was gut und recht (1169-70)  
- and he sees his task as being to wait, "bis frei der Weg, den Gott dem Rechten ebnet" (1178). The aim of his order of Knights of Peace is to set up "ein heimliches Gericht des offenen Rechts" (1215), and he seeks to protect his empire against all "Unrecht" (1470), although Julius fears that he has succeeded only in his own house but not in the state (2192). Yet as with so many of his ideals, Rudolf's concept of right is something ideal, absolute and inexplicable, it is part of the natural order of the universe, "dieses Ganze,/ Des Grund und Recht in dem liegt, daß es ist" (1615-16), and his gesture towards

heaven (after line 2121) suggests that he sees right dwelling only above. All these statements on right seem to add up to an impossible contradiction.

According to Roschek, one must distinguish between Grillparzer the poet and Grillparzer the thinker; Grillparzer denies the concept of divine right as a philosopher but personifies right in God as a poet.<sup>(27)</sup> This conflict is true in so far as Grillparzer does hold both views, but this does not constitute a contradiction, nor are these two views limited to Grillparzer's philosophy and poetry respectively. In his early writings, as in the work of the Classicists on the whole, no distinction is made between different meanings of the word "Recht", and it is by and large a positive concept. In the period under present analysis however, one can distinguish three separate meanings. Firstly there is the concept of "ein Recht", "Rechte": rights, claims made by people for what is seen as rightly theirs. Secondly there is "das Recht", the extension of the first meaning to a codification of rights, of what is legally right and permissible, constituting political justice. Finally there is the more ethical concept of "das Rechte" (but also "das Recht"), namely that which is correct, morally just or right. There is some confusion between these three meanings, mainly between the last two, and there is inevitably more confusion in the plays than in the diaries and essays, where Grillparzer is usually talking quite specifically about one kind of "Recht".

The first type of "Recht" is seen in negative terms in the revolutionary period. Rights are usually demanded for selfish reasons, by the nobles in Bruderzwist, by the peasants in Libussa. They often entail doing as much wrong as one can get away with. Increasingly, as we have seen in the context of Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, Grillparzer comes to see the need for rights to be linked to and balanced by duties in order for them to acquire more positive value (DMudLW, 1728-30, Libussa, 905-6, Jüdin, 1173-5, "Entsagung", 16). Grillparzer is however suspicious

of the idea that rights are automatic. Can one, he wonders, have the right to do something that is dangerous or even wrong, and he is torn between both answers in his essays and comments on the question of censorship (III,1061, 1063, Tgb.3977).

Grillparzer is less pessimistic on the second concept of right, on the state machinery for administering right. He insists repeatedly that the state can only function in this way (Tgb.3714,3780,4013). In the poem spoken by the statue of Joseph II, the emperor is the supporter of one single concept of justice, as he stood for one faith and one humanity (I,253). Primislaus is the man of justice, and in a letter of 1854, Grillparzer praised the "Donauzeitung" for being "beinahe das einzige Organ für Treue und Recht" (letter to Ignaz Klang, 4/12/1854). It was the ignoring of the latter of these virtues that Grillparzer criticised in the 1850s:

Um Recht und Folgen ängstlich nie,  
Heißt unsern Zeiten Energie. (I,515)

Grillparzer is however aware, as the diary note of 1839 (Tgb.3500) makes clear, that right is a human element, and he mocks the idea of divine rights. In 1821 however he had happily linked "göttliche und menschliche Rechte" (II,1095), and this is also a common motif in Schiller's dramas (Jungfrau,1213,1400, Tell,1115). In a poem of 1844, Grillparzer wrote that right was something cold (I,300), he is suspicious of attempts to form an absolute idea of right, as in the parliamentarians' concept of basic rights.

According to Roschek, "Grillparzers Rechtstaat entspricht nicht Schillers 'moralischem Reich' sondern kommt dessen Naturstaat nahe", and he insists that Grillparzer's concept of right "besitzt keine moralische Werthhaftigkeit".<sup>(28)</sup> With the first comment one may to some extent agree, although Schiller's "Naturstaat" is a primitive emergency state ("Notstaat") for the protection of the physical man described in extremely negative terms in the twenty-fourth aesthetic letter, whilst Grillparzer's

"Rechtstaat" is a fully organised modern state which observes justice. But if Grillparzer's "Rechtstaat" is not the same as Schiller's moral state, then Roschek is wrong in denying a moral force to Grillparzer's concept of right.

For the third meaning of "Recht" can only be seen in moral terms. Of the Austrians in 1848, Grillparzer writes, "was soll man einem Volke sagen, das durch einen glücklichen Instinkt überall das Rechte selbst herausfindet" (III,1040). After things had not worked out as he would have liked, he speaks of the military, "ein einziger Stand fiel nicht vom Rechten ab" (I,336). Theres in Esther wishes to talk of what is right rather than what is advantageous, and it is only the evil courtier Haman who debases the idea to the level of pure expediency:

THERES. Man sprach hier viel von Nutzen und von Vorteil.  
Nur eines ward noch nicht erwähnt: das Recht. ..

HAMAN. Was Recht! Was Recht! Das Rechte ist das Recht!  
Heißt das: was allen recht und deshalb möglich.

(Esther,208-13)

The poem to Lola Montez calls for "was das Recht und die Vernunft gebot" (I,311). Offences against such ideas of right may need to be punished, if necessary by force:

Doch oft verschafft sich auch das Rechte

Nur durch Gewalt den schweren Sieg. ("Lebensregel" (I,320))

Significantly by comparison, the legal sense of right should not be defeated by such means. In an epigram on the appearance of a biography of Götz von Berlichingen, Grillparzer complains, "das Faustrecht gilt noch heut, die Faust bestimmt das Recht" (I,565). In Jüdin the nobles seem to contradict themselves in talking of "das Recht". If the King refuses to remove Rahel,

dann walte blutges Recht,

Bis wieder eins der Fürst und das Gesetz. (1243-4)

Their action is not right in any legal sense, as they themselves realise:

Das Gute wollend, aber nicht das Recht,

Wir wollen uns dem Rechte nicht entziehn. (1761-2)

Yet one may argue that they see their action as morally justifiable in a wider sense, to protect the good of the

the state as a whole, and the poem "Lebensregel" could be quoted again in support of such an interpretation. Equally one must again point to the potentially inhuman consequences of taking such principles to the extreme. As a thinking man, Alphons is keenly aware of what is morally correct:

Und ist ein Gott, wie er denn wirklich ist,  
Und Recht der Ausspruch seines Munds, so hoff ich  
Zu siegen, weil im Recht, und weil ein Gott. (272-4)

At the end of the play he no longer feels himself capable of protecting the right that he has endangered by his action (1892). There is an obvious danger here of making the poetic work fit a philosophical scheme, a danger which Grillparzer would have been the first to warn against, nevertheless some light can in the process be cast on what are otherwise complete contradictions. One is also forced to be careful by Esther's fatalistic statement, "all, was geschieht, ist Recht" (Jüdin, 1755). Grillparzer was not such a pessimist, and his 1849 poem "Der Christbaum" reverses the statement: "das Recht, es ist" (I, 355).

Roschek's view that God is used to personify right is clearly inspired by Rudolf II, by his words and his mime in Act IV in which he points to heaven as the seat of "das Recht". Yet Julius insists that right must be seen on earth as well, however imperfect. This is a recurring theme of the play. Rudolf's idea of right is seen to reside beyond this earth, like his idea of order, it is too abstract as a result. On a number of occasions Grillparzer insists that strength, even force may be needed to protect what is right, and he could have quoted Goethe in support: "Wer das Recht auf seiner Seite fühlt, muß derb auftreten, ein höfliches Recht will gar nichts heißen" (Maximen, 329). Rudolf I in Ottokar is prepared to do precisely that, Rudolf II is again at fault for being too weak to take action against criminal elements. Moral right needs to be turned into political right. Roschek concludes one argument with the dramatic words, "Gott selber weist seine Geschöpfe durch den Mund

des Staates in die Rechtsgrenzen", (29) but this is ineffectual if it is only by word of mouth and not by the exemplary action of Rudolf I. Despite Rudolf II's desire to serve right and God, his one positive action in this direction, his judgement of his illegitimate son, is clearly not entirely praiseworthy, as Julius tries to demonstrate. In its call for humanity and right, Julius's appeal on Don Cäsar's behalf is particularly firm, and his later wish that Rudolf might act with equal severity against the evils of the state should not be allowed to cloud the issue. Rudolf "murders" his son for entirely the wrong reasons - out of frustration at his inability to control the age, out of a sense of guilt because Don Cäsar reminds him of his own immoral youth. Kleinstück sees Rudolf acting as a tyrant outside the law and quite correctly underlines "die gesetzlose Unordnung, die vom Kaiser ihren Ursprung nahm, als er seinen natürlichen Sohn zeugte". (30) Rudolf may stand for absolute ideals of right, but he is quite incapable of translating them into useful action, as with the King in Goethe's Die natürliche Tochter, Rudolf's virtues equip him "zur Häuslichkeit, zum Regimente nicht" (433-8), and in addition, as Breitenbruch points out, Rudolf's basic goodness and humanity is "getrübt durch Starrheit und Eigensinn", Wells rightly accuses him of "culpable negligence". (31)

At the risk of oversimplification, one might suggest that in the early work political notions of right had moral value also, especially when defended by such an ideal character as Rudolf I. It must be admitted that the situation in Treuer Diener is not so simple, but even here, despite the claim of the various characters to be defending what is right, there is a clear indication that Bancbanus is superior from both a political and above all from a moral viewpoint. In the later period there is considerable suspicion of what is politically right and an inclination towards what is morally right, with the at times faint hope that this can also become political reality. It is interesting to compare the two new versions of the national

anthem drafted by Grillparzer in 1835 and 1849 for Ferdinand and Franz Joseph respectively, however careful one must be with such official productions. Ferdinand is "jeden Rechtes ein Beschirmer" (I,242), but Grillparzer's hope for Franz Joseph is, "führt das Recht ihn in den Streit" (I,337).

In the process, Grillparzer moves from a predominantly Schillerian view of right, as in Tell, Maria Stuart, to a more Goethean conception. Goethe speaks not so much of rights or legality but of what is right. Man's task is, "Unermüdet schaff' er/ Das Nützliche, Rechte" ("Das Göttliche"), and the call for man to do what is right is a common theme.<sup>(32)</sup> Antonio in Tasso sees the perfect state as one,

Wo jeder sich nur selbst zu dienen glaubt,  
Weil ihm das Rechte nur befohlen wird. (Tasso,642-3)

Such a treatment of the idea is not unknown to Schiller, on the contrary Max's dilemma in Wallenstein is caused by his inability to choose instinctively what is right (Tod,2273,2281,2299), and Schiller praises "der Gürtel des Schönen und Rechten" woven by women and poets together ("Die vier Weltalter"). But his plays are more specifically concerned with the question of rights and of legal and political right.

Goethe once insisted, "in einem wohleingerichteten Staate soll das Rechte selbst nicht auf unrechte Weise geschehen" (HA X,18), but Grillparzer was not certain that his state was "wohleingerichtet" and hence feared the consequences of seeking to put what was right into action. The inherent dangers are great, Ferdinand's inhumane zeal and Rudolf's excessive hesitation are both unsatisfactory. But right is clearly a moral force, and it is in such terms that in a late essay Grillparzer criticises Goethe for his faults, "worunter eine gewisse Gleichgültigkeit gegen Recht und Unrecht gehört, so daß das Moralische dem Tatsächlichen untergeordnet wird" (III,730). Grillparzer as we have seen found the question of right problematic, especially so in Jüdin, and rather

more in the plays than in his other work. The distinction between the three meanings of the word, whether qualitative or merely lexical, is not always perfectly clear, and this produces considerable ambiguity on the question of political and legal right, which scarcely arises in the work of the Classicists. It could never be said that Grillparzer was indifferent towards such matters.

v) Moderation and humanity

I have placed considerable stress both in this chapter and elsewhere on the avoidance of extremes. In fact the diary note of 1822, to the effect that most vices are good qualities taken to excess, might well stand as a motto to much of this chapter and to the character of Rudolf II. It is then perhaps fitting to turn to the one ideal which sums up Grillparzer's attitude to many others, namely moderation.

Grillparzer saw himself as a moderate man, in Paris he writes of his "gemäßigte Gesinnungen" (Tgb.2924), and he avoided political arguments as a result, because, as he feared, the moderates were always considered to be in the wrong (Tgb.2925). In the same year Grillparzer wrote in his diary, "jeder Mensch, der lebhaft Partei nimmt, ist ungerecht" (Tgb.3038), a view which echoes Goethe's conversation with Eckermann in March 1832 on the subject of the politically committed poet. Grillparzer attacked extremes in art:

Überhaupt hat jedes Extrem auf das der menschliche Geist mit Parteilung gerät, schon das Schlimme, daß diejenigen, die den Unsinn jenes Strebens erkennen, statt die richtige Mitte zu halten, leicht in der Hitze des Streits sich dem entgegengesetzten Punkte nähern und so auch unkonsequent werden. (Tgb.760)

Hence he saw himself as "gerade jenes Mittelding zwischen Goethe und Kotzebue, wie ihn das Drama braucht" (Tgb.1626). Grillparzer's diaries and his notes for plays make reference to characters who are "mäßig": Rudolf I (I/18, 157), Innocent III (Tgb.2420), Kaiser Albrecht (II,1148). This is a quality he saw in Mozart, an awareness of how far he could go and a refusal to transcend such limits,



because "alles Wirkliche gehorcht dem Maß" (I,285). At the start of the revolution, Grillparzer calls for moderation from the people - "aber sie waren mäßig" (III,1040) - though in his memoirs of the year 1848 he claims, "daß bei jedem gewaltsamen Ausbruche ein Überschreiten alles vernünftigen Maßes mit Zuversicht vorausbestimmt werden konnte" (IV,205). Moderation is seen in moral terms. In Treuer Diener, Andreas insists,

Doch Sitte hält ihr unverrückbar Maß  
Streng zwischen allzuwenig und zuviel (295-6)

- and it is Alphons's hope in Jüdin that he can "das Maß einhalten des, was groß und gut" (1343). Equally there is the danger of having no external measure against which to judge oneself;

Mit sich allein,  
Hat der Gedanke keinen Maßstab mehr  
Als den Gedanken, der nur er, er selbst -  
("Der kranke Feldherr", 46-8)

Die eigne Schätzung ist ein schlimmer Maßstab.  
(Esther, 380)

Der Maßstab aller Dinge war verloren,  
Nur an sich selbst maß jeder was er sah. (Medea, 446-7)

An adjunct of this need for standards, for moderation, is to be found in the constant demand for common sense. It was this quality which he found in Heine (Tgb.2971), which was lacking in the Germans (Tgb.3426), and which he called for in the turmoil of 1848 ("Mein Vaterland", "Aufrufe").

Moderation is not the most commonly expressed ideal in Grillparzer's work, it rarely forms the basis for dogmatic statements as it so frequently does for Goethe and Schiller.<sup>(33)</sup> It is however always a very positive concept. For Baumann, the theme of moderation is a sign of Grillparzer's debt to Austria.<sup>(34)</sup> Grillparzer undoubtedly saw his fellow-countrymen as less prone to extremes than the Germans, he especially attacks the Prussians for rejecting limitations, for being arrogant and convinced of their ability and supremacy ("Fortschritt-Männer"), and Breitenbruch perhaps correctly considers Grillparzer's dislike of ideologies as "eine sehr österreichische Einsicht",<sup>(35)</sup> but there is little in

Grillparzer's work to suggest that he saw Austria as a haven of moderation. I am more inclined to see the theme of moderation as a further indication of Grillparzer's debt to Classicism. If Grillparzer did not insist on the idea, then it is because all the other themes - limitation, right, order, law - and the general mistrust of extremes, all implicitly include the overriding concern with moderation. Moderation is itself a rather loose idea, Grillparzer chooses to make more specific mention of how such moderation is to be achieved. His political leanings can only be understood fully in the light of what Gordon in Schiller's Wallenstein calls "der goldene Mittelweg". Grillparzer believed in the importance of the nation as a political unity but rejected any strong form of nationalism which led to particularism, blind ideology and fanaticism. He rejected a constitution which ruled despotically, inhumanely, without full consideration for the individual, and his rights, but equally he saw the individual's own responsibilities to the state, his duty to consider the good of the whole in his actions. He questioned all freedom which had no roots in these mutual responsibilities, and all reforms which were not useful in this direction. He believed in the need for, the inevitability of progress, but he feared that the overthrow of the status quo would result in rule by the rabble. After early cautious optimism, he came to feel that the events of 1848 had challenged all idea of progress, of perfectibility, of "die sogenannte Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts", and in the same diary note he gives a gloomy picture of the age:

Das natürliche Denken durch ein künstliches  
Gedankenspiel verdrängt, die Vorurteile entfernt,  
aber durch keine Vorteile ersetzt, die Empfindung  
nur noch in der Selbstsucht lebendig, Autorität  
und Vertrauen erloschen, und die Rechtschaffenheit  
einer erlogenen oder geträumten Großartigkeit  
untergeordnet ... man muß ein starkes Vertrauen in  
die Vorsehung haben, um nicht schwarz zu sehen.

(Tgb. 4042 (1850))

The same note concludes with his fears for the continued existence of "das Gute und Schöne". The draft of a letter in the same year praises inspiration, which was one element of Libussa's regime, "die Begeisterung, welche nichts ist als das Selbstvergessen des Menschen gegenüber dem Ewigen, dem Rechten, dem Wahren" (IV,844). The diary note of 1850 had suggested one rather forlorn hope of a cure for the nation's ills:

Wie die Deutschen dazu kommen sollen, ihrem Eigendünkel zum Trotz, von der hohen Stufe herabzusteigen die sie erreicht zu haben glauben und die Sache wieder anzufangen, wo Lessing und Kant und Goethe sie gelassen haben, das übersteigt jede Voraussagungsgabe. (Tgb.4042)

The reference to the ideals and figures of the eighteenth century is of course a further indication of Grillparzer's standards, but there is a danger here of a return to abstract aesthetic ideals, to a resigned avoidance of political questions. In fact Grillparzer continued to take a lively interest in politics, as I have shown. In 1855 he again returns to the statue of Joseph II as the ideal against which to measure the failings of the present, suggesting that Franz Joseph has no right to use the former emperor's name (I,356).

In any case all the days of the 1840s had shown the danger of absolutes, of abstract ideals which are not in keeping with reality, whether extreme purity or morality in Jüdin, excessive elitism or egalitarianism in Libussa, or absolute concepts of order and right in Bruderzwist. The prophecies of Rudolf and Libussa most certainly show the opposing dangers of neglecting such ideals, and in view of the holocaust threatened at the end of Bruderzwist, one cannot fail to have a certain sympathy for Rudolf's essentially moral principles in a seemingly impossible situation, even though his reactionary policy of stagnation is very similar to the aims of Metternich which Grillparzer had previously condemned. But Rudolf's failing is a refusal to compromise. Because he realises that his ideals cannot be transferred unsullied into the grim world of reality, he dismisses reality, neglects it and invents

excuses for so doing. But an emperor who is so inactive, so isolated that he is thought to be dead, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be seen as holding the situation in balance, as preserving a focal point for what is good in the state. The fact that others see the need to act for him only serves to precipitate the catastrophe. Politzer rightly concludes, "Geschichte entpuppt sich hier als die Überwältigung des Tatenlosen durch die Tat", but Rudolf is himself to blame for this state of affairs. (36)

In contrast, Libussa is prepared to compromise. She recognises that Primislaus, however inferior from an absolute standpoint, is more able to face and control the world as it is. In the terms of Roschek's distinction between the poet's and the thinker's view of the state, it could be argued that Primislaus presents the latter. He accepts the status quo and seeks to derive the best from its potential. This indeed entails the rejection of many of the high ideals which Libussa and Rudolf II stand for and which Grillparzer would have liked to see achieved. As in Weh dem, as in Jüdin, as in the story of Hero however, life is more important than impossible ideals, and at the end of Libussa the pessimistic view of the present age to be introduced by Primislaus, an era of "Gemeinheit, Roheit, Nutzen" which is a reflection of Rudolf's worst fears, this view has been overcome in the hope for a compromise between aesthetic and political, between ideal and real, inspiration and common sense. The Classical age had sought to preserve a sense of totality. Hölderlin in "Der Archipelagus" and in Hyperion, Schiller in the aesthetic letters both lamented the fragmentary nature of modern man caused by specialisation. Hölderlin looked forward to a new Greek age, Schiller sought to introduce the aesthetic education of man as ways to overcome such lack of totality. Herder and Goethe were from the start more optimistic that man could achieve totality through his own particular job in the wider context of the state, and the whole of Wilhelm Meister is concerned with precisely this theme. The marriage of Libussa and

Primislaus is a symbol of this totality, which replaces Libussa's former more isolated totality that she has since lost, according to Erich Hock:

In diesem ständig neu zu vollziehenden Ausgleich zwischen der höheren und der niederen Ebene des menschlichen Seins besteht nach Grillparzer der Sinn echter Humanität. Der Liebesbund zwischen Libussa und Primislaus ist sein dichterisches Symbol. (37)

Ultimately one may suggest that the marriage is a symbol for the need for compromise in life. The chain which symbolised the earlier divine totality is only reconnected in Act IV as a sign of the new more realistic totality. Rudolf II is criticised for being too concerned with "das Ganze" rather than the details of the present (1277), and it is his great aim to preserve this divine totality (1615,2323). Similarly the priest's idea of "Ganzheit" is not commensurate with ordinary life (DMudLW,983).

Libussa herself remains too much a creature of the earlier age to be entirely at home in the new, at the same time Primislaus fails to recognise how much Libussa has had to sacrifice, how incapable she is of the "Sammlung" required to survive as a prophet. Her attempt to do so, to return to her former self, even if only momentarily for the good of the state, is doomed to failure. She herself realises how the new age will be one of limited specialisation:

Nicht Ganze mehr, nur Teile wollt ihr sein  
Von einem Ganzen, das sich nennt die Stadt. (2332-3)

Und wie er einzeln dies und das besorgt,  
Entgeht ihm der Zusammenhang des Ganzen. (2462-3)

As we have seen elsewhere, Grillparzer was concerned with the idea of humanity as a whole: "sein ganzer Bestand als Mensch liegt nicht in einem Individuum, nicht in tausend, sondern in der Menschheit, als Ganzes, als moralisches Wesen" (Tgb.1409). Grillparzer also saw his audience as "die Menschheit im ganzen" (III,835). Primislaus's concept of the city-state does not seem in conflict with such ideas, on the contrary it seems in harmony with Goethe's views in Wilhelm Meister or at the end of Faust. On the other hand, Grillparzer expresses Schiller's fears

that the individual will cease to exist as such. -- In 1821 he had praised Napoleon because he had been able

Zu zeigen, daß noch Ganzheit, Hoheit, Größe  
Gedenkbar sei in unsrer Stückerwelt. (I,145)

In 1827 he had praised Beethoven for the same reason:

"Wenn noch Sinn für Ganzheit in uns ist in dieser zerstückelten Welt, so laßt uns sammeln an seinem Grab" (III,884). In 1823 he had ridiculed the idea that man was "zum gesellschaftlichen Zustande bestimmt", and had insisted "jeder Mensch steht als ein Ganzes da" (Tgb.1320).

Yet in his dealings with Kathi Fröhlich and with women in general, he had discovered the dangers of being excessively isolated and unable to compromise ("Jugenderinnerungen im Grünen"). Both in the marriage of the main characters and in the creation of the new state, such compromise is envisaged. Despite her doubts, in which she describes the forthcoming excesses of freedom and equality in terms which closely echo Schiller's "Spaziergang" and "Lied von der Glocke", Libussa's final optimism is based on a trust, twice asserted, in human goodness (2458,2461), and she looks forward to a future age of unity and harmony, when a more complete totality will reign: a totality of "Gefühl" and "Verstand" (despite the somewhat misleading note on "Rückkehr zum Gefühl" (HKA I/20,388)):

Beschwichtigt das Getöse lauter Arbeit,  
Vernimmt er neu die Stimmen seiner Brust:  
Die Liebe, die nicht das Bedürfnis liebt,  
Die selbst Bedürfnis ist, holdselge Liebe,  
Im Drang der Kraft Bewußtsein eigener Ohnmacht,  
Begeisterung, schon durch sich selbst verbürgt,  
Die wahr ist, weil es wahr ist, daß ich fühle,  
Dann kommt die Zeit, die jetzt vorübergeht,  
Die Zeit der Seher wieder und Begabten.  
Das Wissen und der Nutzen scheiden sich  
Und nehmen das Gefühl zu sich als Drittes,  
Und haben sich die Himmel dann verschlossen,  
Die Erde steigt empor an ihren Platz,  
Die Götter wohnen wieder in der Brust  
Und Demut heißt ihr Oberer und Einer. (2475-89)

One must avoid any temptation to dismiss this final speech as unimportant or unconvincing. It is a statement of Libussa's and Grillparzer's fervent hope for totality and

humanity, it is indeed Grillparzer's "geistiges Vermächtnis". (38) As she sees this future age, she is content and dies, and her last words, as Baumann has suggested, (39) echo Johanna's final vision in Schiller's Jungfrau.

Her final praise of humility is all the more striking when one considers how many other qualities Grillparzer tried out as alternatives, including "Menschheit", "Menschlichkeit", "Menschenwert", "Seelenfriede", "Selbstbeschränkung" (HKA I/20,434). Clearly Grillparzer saw humility to be on a par with such virtues, and it has been taken as the final reading by Kaderschafka because it is the term most frequently employed in the various manuscripts. It is also a quality praised by Rudolf II (Bruderzwist,415), by the nobles in Jüdin (1802), by Jakob in Armer Spielmann (III,176), but rejected by Don Cäsar (Bruderzwist,1984), it is also the essence of Kant's philosophy, "die das demütige 'Ich weiß nicht' an die Spitze des Systems stellt" (IV,222). Together with the equally important virtue of "Ehrfurcht", (40) it is seen as the reversal of the tendency to conceited arrogance, "Eigendünkel", and Libussa presents such a development as both Libussa and Primislaus overcome their pride and bow to the other:

Nun fort auch jeder Anspruch, jedes Recht,  
All was nicht Demut ist und Unterwerfung. (1780-1)

At the end both have respect for one another and a more humble assessment of their own limitations, an attitude which the conclusion of the play raises to an ideal for all human activity as an answer to the selfishness and extremes which Grillparzer saw in the world.

The problematic nature of the later plays is seen in the more ambiguous treatment of two of the important virtues praised in the dramas of the 1820s. The great ideal of political peace which pervades Ottokar and Treuer Diener is not to be found in the later political plays. Rudolf II's goal is inner peace, and it is in this vein that he establishes his order of "Friedensritter" and looks forward to a time of peace (1197,1207). Such

ideas however, his hope for "Fried und Eintracht" (1469, 2379, 2386), his desire to overcome "die Unruh in dem Land" (1555), are out of touch with the country's need for political peace. On the contrary Rudolf does not want peace (581, 855), because he believes the war with the Turks is better than the apparently inevitable civil strife. By comparison those who desire peace, do so for personal reasons, above all Klesel, who sees it as a way to further Mathias's ambitions and consequently his own (728, 751, 755, 1782). Also for Ferdinand, peace will serve as a chance to rid his country of supposed heretics (908). Libussa's realm is one of peace, but it is seen by many as unnatural and debilitating (487), and Primislaus's regime is a more robust one which acknowledges the possibility of war. Similarly the poem "Vorzeichen" complains of the excessive calm of the country which results from oppression:

Das Höchste schien des Niedern Schmach zu teilen,  
Und Ruhe war nicht bloß der Bürger Pflicht. (I, 315)

A number of poems stress the need for "Ruhe" after the revolution ("Einem deutschen Fürsten", "Dem Banus"), but the word "Friede" is scarcely to be found during the period, it does not occur in a single epigram after 1840, and the only two poems which praise the idea are for official occasions ("Der Christbaum" (I, 336), "Die österreichische Volkshymne" (I, 337)). Peace is no longer an ideal perhaps because, as the cynical Klesel points out in Bruderzwist: "Erzwungen ist zuletzt ein jeder Friede" (2559).

It may be suggested that the more flexible concept of humility or reverence, an inner attitude or frame of mind in which the problems of life are to be faced, has replaced the more concrete idea of peace which is susceptible to extremes, both in Rudolf's extreme quietism and also in all the characters' misuse of peace (and war) for selfish ends. Even here, whilst Libussa recommends humility as the highest virtue, Rudolf may be seen to take it to an excess of inactivity which Libussa's praise of the ideal



does not entail.<sup>(41)</sup>

It is indeed remarkable that Grillparzer should finally decide on humility as the highest God rather than "Menschheit" or "Menschlichkeit" in view of the high esteem regularly bestowed on such ideals. According to Margret Dietrich, "Mensch" is a term of nobility for Grillparzer; for Reinhold Schneider, "der Mensch ... das war vielleicht Grillparzers heiligstes Wort".<sup>(42)</sup> Certainly this is borne out by the assertion that Goethe, despite all his faults, "war eben ein Mensch" (Tgb.3242), or by the description of Beethoven: "Ein Künstler war er, aber auch ein Mensch. Mensch in des Wortes vollkommenster Bedeutung" (III,882). (A variant to this passage reads: "Mensch - in jedem, im höchsten Sinne des Wortes" (HKA I/22,140).) Grillparzer's great praise of Joseph II is based on the emperor's equal respect for every individual. His statue proclaims:

Mir war der Mensch nicht Zutat seiner Röcke,  
Als Kinder, Brüder liebt ich alle gleich. (I,252)<sup>(43)</sup>

By comparison, the emperor Ferdinand lacks "die Kenntnis des Volks" (III,1039), Franz had no "Vorstellung von der Würde der menschlichen Natur" (III,1018), and the ability of the ruler to be and be seen to be a normal human being, which Primislaus praises in Libussa, is mockingly denied in Franz, as the courtier finds it quite impossible to appreciate the emperor as a person (III,86).

In Bruderzwist, Rudolf is horrified by Ferdinand's treatment of the Protestants:

Mir kommt ein Grauen an. Sind hier nicht Menschen?  
Ich will bei Menschen sein. (500-1)

He asks to see Leopold instead because "er ist ein Mensch" (515). Similarly Philipp of Spain asks providence, "jetzt gib mir einen Menschen" (Don Carlos,2809), and Grillparzer had used the same insistence on "Menschen" in Ottokar (67-9). But Rudolf II finds it impossible to combine his task as ruler with his desire to be an ordinary human being. He would gladly give up the crown in order to start a new life as "ein Mensch" (1493), but there is no one suitable to follow him. At the end he is glad to

discover, "nicht Kaiser bin ich mehr, ich bin ein Mensch" (2406). Similarly in Jüdin, Alphons laments his lack of basic humanity as a King, but undermines his position as King in the process of becoming a more complete human being. Politzer's description of Esther is "Menschwerdung eines Mannes und Königs",<sup>(44)</sup> and this applies equally well to Jüdin. In his diary of 1824 Grillparzer had written of Louis XV who "hoffte sich um so mehr als eigentlicher Mensch zu fühlen, je schlechter er als König sich erkennen mußte" (Tgb.1385). The apparent ease with which Rudolf I combines the roles of "Kaiser" and "Mensch", a combination which Andreas in Treuer Diener also achieves after some persuasion, is now open to question, and the same applies to the earlier belief in humanity. In the early political plays, it is only the negative characters who use people for their own ends, treat them as pawns and have a dim view of their value (Ottokar, 1947, 2834ff; Diener, 699, 715, 1221), and even Ottokar recognises his mistake in so doing at the end (2834f.). In the later plays scepticism and cynicism are more widespread. In Bruderzwist it is Rudolf's basic mistrust of mankind that encourages him to cling to abstract ideals rather than attempting to be active in the human sphere. Man has fallen from divinity and truth (407, 412), he is susceptible to pain (2233), transience (2302) - a theme echoed in Esther (830) - stupidity (2336-7), and destructive tendencies (1507-9, 1641). Rudolf is excessive in his rejection of humanity, he is misguided in completely separating humanity and kingship, in regretting "daß ich .. nur ein Mensch, kein Gott" (1427). He himself reveals his desire for humanity in preferring Leopold to Ferdinand, in his belief in religious faith as a token of humanity (1631-3), compared to which Ferdinand's religion is a complete travesty of everything human. Rudolf regrets that kingship is the art, "in der, verkehrt, was sonst den Menschen adelt" (1687), but nevertheless the theme of man's weakness and faults is too consistent to be overlooked, it cannot simply be dismissed as the pessimism

of a negative character. Similar pessimism is to be found in poems and epigrams of this period, in obviously ironic descriptions of "Mensch, der Schöpfung König" (I,292), pouring scorn on beliefs such as "der Mensch wird doch täglich gescheiter" (I,519), "gut, wie die Menschen sind" (I,302). (45)

Goethe and Schiller are not without their pessimistic comments on mankind, and most of their works - inevitably one might say - encompass characters with such negative views. Even Iphigenie speaks of her ancestor Tantalus as "nur ein Mensch" (321), but this is in keeping with Goethe's realisation that man must accept his inferiority to the gods, his "Grenzen der Menschheit". Elsewhere man is the creature of suffering and sorrows (Jungfrau, 71-2; Braut von Messina, 2589; Tasso, 3432), of transience (Braut von Messina, 1963; Wallenstein, passim), of serious limitations (Wanderjahre, I,7; Goethe to Charlotte von Stein, 9/6/1784). Wallenstein laments man's commonness (Tod, 211), Tell compares nature favourably with the inhumanity of the Austrians (Tell, 158, 1814, 2271), and Gordon in Wallenstein can only bemoan man's sad fate: "O was ist Menschengröße!" (Tod, 2480). In almost every case however, such pessimistic statements are made by or about characters who are seen in a negative light, or concern aspects of man's nature that are in fact to be accepted as a necessary limitation. They do not challenge the basic confidence in man's destiny, to the extent that similar statements in Bruderzwist do.

In Libussa it is the heroine's two sisters who echo Rudolf's pessimism. Man is weak (468), born to obey (1194), unable to challenge the eternal order of nature (1178-9, 1197-8). Their negative view of man is highlighted by their description of human affairs as "irdisch" (439, 2269). Hence they stress the need to avoid human contacts:

Wer nicht wie Menschen sein will, schwach und klein,  
Der halte sich von Menschennähe rein. (468-9)

They tell Libussa at the end:

Wir warnten dich.

Warum hast du an Menschen dich geknüpft? (2453-4)

As I have considered elsewhere however, Libussa's sisters represent the world of quiet contemplation, of "Sammlung", whose validity Grillparzer increasingly questioned. For Grillparzer's characters, as for Goethe's Tasso, withdrawal to a realm of artistic contemplation is barren and potentially dangerous. In the poem "Zu Mozarts Feier" Grillparzer had written, "Für Menschen - nur durch Menschen - wird der Mensch" (I,283). According to Hock, "trotzdem hat das tätige Bemühen um die Verwirklichung des Guten im Dienste der Mitmenschen höher zu gelten als die ängstliche Bewahrung der Reinheit in unfruchtbarer Beschaulichkeit", and for Libussa it is amongst other things the isolated inhuman aspects of her previous life which drive her to accept her father's crown - "Mit Menschen Mensch sein, dünkt von heut mir Lust" (404) - and as Hock comments in another context: "Libussas tiefstes Wesen erfüllt sich erst, indem sie die Grenze überschreitet, die ihre Schwestern von der Welt trennt". (46)

Libussa herself has her doubts, especially when faced with the Wladiks (1231-3), or when foreseeing the monotonous uniformity of the future dominated by slogans:

Gilt jeder nur als Mensch, Mensch sind sie alle,  
Krieg jedem Vorzug, heißt das Losungswort. (2388-9)

Primislaus however insists on the humanity of the ruler and subjects, on the mutual respect for each other's humanity which informs Grillparzer's non-dramatic writing of the period. He insists:

Das Höchste, wie beschränkt auch, ist der Mensch,  
Im König selbst der Mensch zuletzt das Beste.  
(1396-7; cf. Jüdin, 94-7)

In an early note for the play, when Libussa asks whether he awards man or woman the highest prize, he replies "dem Menschen" (I/20,387). He believes in the progress of his people, "als Bürger und als Menschen" (2192), a distinction also found in epigrams of the period (I,361; I,589). From her ideal viewpoint, Libussa supports such humanitarian principles. She tells one of her people to treat his

wife more fairly:

Fühlt sich dein Knecht als Mensch dem Herren ähnlich,  
Warum soll sich dein Weib denn minder fühlen? (629-30)

She praises marriage as something human (655), even though she at first fears it cannot be for her, and she does manage to combine humanity with at least a share in her husband's rule. Although her idealism makes her criticise man's nature and long at times to return to her sisters, she remains convinced of "des Menschen Leben" (1945). Her final vision is introduced by an affirmation of mankind with all its failings:

Der Mensch ist gut, er hat nur viel zu schaffen.  
(2461; also 2458)

A long epigram of 1854, which begins pessimistically "Es steht nicht gut in unsrer lauten Welt", concludes with the firm hope:

Der Mensch, er ist nicht schlimm. Denn wär er es,  
Dieselbe Welt bestünde nicht bis heut  
Und Untreu und Verrat und jedes Unrecht,  
Sie hätten längst zerstört das schöne Ganze,  
Das, als bestanden, bürgt für sein Bestehn.  
Der Mensch, er ist nicht schlimm. (I, 528)

One cannot agree with Irene Morris when she asserts that "Grillparzer's view of man is ruthlessly analytical and pessimistic",<sup>(47)</sup> for it is precisely such guarded optimism, in keeping with the beliefs of Classicism, which should be seen as more of a statement of Grillparzer's views than the negative pessimism of Rudolf II, whom critics are only too keen to see as Grillparzer's mouthpiece.<sup>(48)</sup>

#### NOTES

1. John M. Ellis, "Grillparzer's *Der arme Spielmann*", *German Quarterly*, XLV (1972), 662-83, pp. 669, 671; Heinz Politzer, *Franz Grillparzers "Der arme Spielmann"*, Stuttgart, 1967, p. 12.
2. W.E. Yates, *Grillparzer*, p. 83; Günther Jungbluth, "Franz Grillparzers *Erzählung: Der arme Spielmann*", *Orbis litterarum*, XXIV (1969), 35-81.
3. Richard Alewyn, "Grillparzer und die Restauration", *Publications of the English Goethe-Society (New Series)*, XII (1937), 1-18, p. 14.

4. This diary note was originally dated 1846, but a study of the manuscripts has led Backmann to reject this in favour of 1839 (HKA I/21,91). The reasons for this change do not however seem entirely conclusive and it must be suggested that the development of Grillparzer's political views makes 1846 a much more likely year for such an entry than 1839.
5. Grillparzer's suspicion of German excesses has been amply documented by David Heald: "Grillparzer and the Germans", Oxford German Studies, VI (1971-2), 61-73.
6. Wilhelm Bücher, Grillparzers Verhältnis zur Politik seiner Zeit, Marburg, 1913, p.87; Bruce Thompson, "Grillparzer, Revolution and 1848", in Essays on Grillparzer, Hull, 1978, 81-91, p.83 (I am gratified to discover that Thompson arrives at essentially the same assessment of Grillparzer's political views in this period); Roschek, p.27; Reinhold Backmann, "Grillparzer als Revolutionär", Euphorion, XXXII (1931), 476-525.
7. Bruderzwist, 1533, 1580; "Das Ministerium" (I,320), "Der Justizminister" (I,341); also I,497.
8. See I,497,578,580, Tgb.4042. Grillparzer attributes such attitudes to the philosophy of Hegel (III,716,720).
9. W.E.Yates, Grillparzer, p.260.
10. Helmsdorfer, p.64.
11. Alfred Doppler, "Der Herrscher, ein trüber Spiegel der absoluten Ordnung", Études Germaniques, XXVII (1972), 207-23.
12. Johannes Kleinstück, "Don Cäsar und die Ordnung. Zu Grillparzers Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg", Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch, VI (1965), 207-26, p.221.
13. Erich Hock, "Grillparzer. Libussa", in Das deutsche Drama, hrsg. Benno von Wiese, Band I, Düsseldorf, 1958, 451-74, p.468; Kleinstück, p.223.
14. Kleinstück, p.220.
15. Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, p.18.
16. Roschek, p.143.
17. See also Blanka, 695,1385,4359,4599. Elsewhere in the juvenilia "Irene", 227, Tgb.270.
18. See "Rechtfertigung", 43, "Vorrede zum Goldnen Vließ" (I,970), "Chor der Wiener Musiker beim Berlioz-Feste" (I,304).
19. The question of the aesthetic aspects of limitation cannot be considered in detail in this thesis, but it may be pointed out that limitation as a formal characteristic is a common demand in Grillparzer, whilst he is less convinced of the extent to which art should retain the limitations imposed on real life by morality and propriety. In a diary note of 1832 he wrote, "die Poesie ist die Aufhebung der Beschränkungen des Lebens" (Tgb.2065), but Adele in "Le poète sifflé" attacks precisely this aspect of art as a dangerous immoral force, and Grillparzer was suspicious of the immoral elements in Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften, suggesting that realistic literature was better advised to observe life's limitations (III,773).

20. Harold Lenz, "Grillparzer's Political Ideas", Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XXXVII (1938), 237-66, p.240.
21. See above, pp.25-6.
22. Hock, "Libussa", p.453. Schaum makes a similar point with reference to DMudLW: "Verlust des Hohen in der Vielfalt und dem Chaos des Irdischen" (Schaum, "DMudLW", p.112).
23. Bücher, p.154.
24. This clearly is not the place to enter into a discussion on natural equality and the role of heredity and environment; Grillparzer's affinity with earlier ideas is the point to be stressed.
25. Gisela Stern, The Inspiration Motif in the Works of Franz Grillparzer, The Hague, 1955, p.191.
26. Skreb, Grillparzer, p.162.
27. Roschek, op.cit. The same distinction between poet and thinker is made by critics in the context of Armer Spielmann - see above p.301 and note 2.
28. Roschek, pp.79,68.
29. Roschek, p.130.
30. Kleinstück, p.216.
31. Breitenbruch, p.114, Wells, p.113.
32. See Lehrjahre, VI, Buch, "Sprüche", 61, Maximen, 1082, letter to Zelter, 27/7/1807.
33. See above p.25 and the comments on Hock's discussion of moderation in the introduction.
34. Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, pp.210-11.
35. Breitenbruch, p.98.
36. Politzer, p.358.
37. Hock, Besinnung auf Humanität, p.73.
38. Hock, "Libussa", p.451.
39. Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, p.267.
40. See especially Bruderzwist (423,1301,1603). Here again reverence is lacking in Don Cäsar (1920). Significantly it is "Ehrfurcht" which is the great ideal of Goethe's pedagogic province in Wanderjahre. Of the three kinds of reverence, "vor dem, was über uns ist ... , was unter uns ist ... , was uns gleich ist" (HA VIII,155-6), Don Cäsar has none at all. Rudolf lacks the second kind, but one could argue that both Primislaus and Libussa finally acquire all three. In view of the close proximity of "Demut" and "Ehrfurcht" as virtues, I am inclined to take issue with Erich Hock, for whom the insistence on humility demonstrates Grillparzer's "Ferne von Weimar" (Hock, "Libussa", p.473).
41. Goethe's idea of reverence is in no way to be equated with stagnation, but is on the contrary a preparation for a life of useful activity.
42. Margret Dietrich, "Grillparzer und die Gesellschaft seiner Zeit", in Grillparzer-Feier der Akademie 1972, Vienna, Cologne, Graz, 1972, pp.35-67; Reinhold Schneider, "Grillparzers Epilog auf die Geschichte", in Schneider, Dämonie und Verklärung, Vaduz, 1947, pp.329-75, p.372.

43. It seems quite ridiculous to link Mathias in Bruderzwist with Joseph II, seeing them both as the cause of the country's collapse because they disturb the sleep of the country (Alker, p.88).
44. Politzer, p.284.
45. See also "Zu Mozarts Feier" (I,283), 11.45,51, "Appellation" (I,333), Tgb.3851.
46. Hock, Besinnung auf Humanität, p.74, "Libussa", p.470.
47. Irene V. Morris, "Grillparzer's Individuality as a Dramatist", Modern Language Quarterly, XVIII (1957), 83-99, p.93.
48. Karl Kaderschafka (HKA I/6,435); Naumann, Franz Grillparzer, pp.42,46; Helmsdorfer, p.99; Gerhard Meyer-Sichting, "Grillparzers dramatisches Spätwerk", GrJb (3. Folge), IV (1965), 80-108, p.83; Josef Nadler, Franz Grillparzer, Vaduz, 1948, pp.429,433.



Conclusion: "Der arme Spielmann"

The plays of the 1840s represent the final stage in the development of Grillparzer's use of the ideals and concepts inherited from the Classical age. The youthful period made full but arbitrary use of these ideas, especially the years 1806-12 show wholesale adoption not only of specifically Classical terms but of the vocabulary of Goethe and Schiller's work as a whole. Despite increasing awareness of his own plagiaristic tendencies, Grillparzer's first mature works reveal similarly full use of Classical vocabulary. In this period however, namely 1816-21, years of pessimistic self-doubt, the positive vocabulary inherited from Classicism is frequently used in a negative context, the content belies the concepts used, and especially in Vließ the atmosphere and philosophy are in stark contrast to the Classical ideals that litter the trilogy. Inevitably in such a mood, Grillparzer was drawn to the quietist vocabulary of Goethe in particular, endowing it with an excessively "weltfremd" connotation which is foreign even to Goethe's early Weimar years, let alone his more mature works, whilst the vital distinction between man and animal is used in a way that only serves to highlight Grillparzer's distance from Weimar optimism.

The excessive gloom of Vließ is followed however by the ideal of Rudolf I in Ottokar, who defends justice and peace, and represents a vision of humanity, equality and mutual trust and respect which is the equal of Goethe's Iphigenie, and which, in so far as Rudolf's ideals do not bring about his death, surpasses any of Schiller's creations. At the same time however, the use of Classical vocabulary in Ottokar and especially Treuer Diener is restricted to all but the most essential ideals. The language is pruned of all unnecessary verbiage, except in the occasional long and vital speech, as towards the end of both plays. As I have sought to show, of the Classical terms only "Mensch", "Recht", "Ruhe", "treu" are common in the two plays and even "Mensch" and "treu" are less

common than in any other play, whilst previously common terms become rare. Whether Grillparzer saw Sappho, Vließ and the unfinished Traum ein Leben as plagiaristic and wished deliberately to create his own style of dramatic language cannot be satisfactorily proven, but the marked change in Grillparzer's plays is not reflected in the poems and certainly not in the diaries of the period. If on the other hand he recognised the contrast between pessimistic content and optimistic vocabulary in his earlier plays, then paradoxically this is no longer the case in Ottokar nor, despite a more realistic and problematic treatment, in Treuer Diener. The smaller number of ideals depicted are upheld, the virtues extolled by Rudolf I and Bancbanus ("Ruhe", "Recht", "Menschheit", "Treue", "sich bezähmen") are those of the Classical era, and in addition they are depicted in a political world that is more realistic than the idyllic settings of Goethe and achieved in this life despite a background as problematic as that in Schiller's historical dramas.

Bancbanus's final answer to the problems posed is to withdraw into seclusion, a course he would probably have been happy to take much earlier. This is also still the solution in Traum ein Leben, a play whose ethos very much belongs to an earlier period of Grillparzer's work. Otherwise the 1830s see the gradual move away from such a negative attitude. Increasingly the concept of "Sammlung", as represented by the priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, is questioned, instead the fullness of life is affirmed and with it the complexity of human nature. In 1834 Grillparzer quotes in his diary from a book by Rahel Varnhagen von Ense: "Widersprechende Eigenschaften in Harmonie gebracht, machen den großen Mann" (Tgb.2136). According to Breitenbruch, "wie die Welt wird auch der Mensch als widerspruchsvolle Totalität bejaht".<sup>(1)</sup> In Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen and Weh dem, the active side of man is brought to the fore, as opposed to an isolated existence in search of absolute values. Lies, evil, mistakes,

sensuality are accepted as part of "die buntverworrene Welt", to seek to exclude such aspects is to court disaster, this applies to all Grillparzer's work from 1830 onwards. Such views are certainly in keeping with Goethe's optimism, even though, as we have seen, Grillparzer was not so willing to gloss over the moral implications of such an attitude to life as Goethe had been.

It is therefore not surprising to find a greater use of Classical vocabulary than in the plays of the 1820s, without however returning to the extensive use made in Sappho for instance. Paradoxically the renewed interest in Classical terms may well have been encouraged by further work on Traum ein Leben, which itself belies many Classical ideas, and Acts II-IV of which make much less use of Classical vocabulary than does Act I, written in 1817. In the plays of the 1830s the return to Classical vocabulary is only partial, Grillparzer was no doubt still concerned to avoid wholesale adoption of Classical ideas. Nevertheless, in addition to the terms retained in the 1820s, Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen does make considerable use of "frei", "Herz", "Pflicht", "schön", "still", "Tat", whilst Weh dem is concerned with "Freiheit", "Wahrheit", "Tiere".<sup>(2)</sup> As Grillparzer makes clear, he saw plays such as Treuer Diener and Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen as attempts to combine the previous generation with the new, and this is equally obvious in Weh dem without Grillparzer saying so. Ideals are retained but presented in more dramatic, even theatrical fashion, so that lengthy philosophical passages are kept to a minimum.

The gradual return to Classicism is however clear, and is seen in the poems and above all the diaries of the 1830s. If in the previous decade the diaries had continued to use terms avoided in the plays, then in the 1830s the diaries make full and obvious use of terms which are slowly finding their way back into Grillparzer's dramatic writing - "schön", "wahr", "Natur", "streben", "rein", "Tier", "frei", "still" - whilst continuing to

make full use of terms which had remained common - "Mensch", "Recht", "Ruhe". Basically the same applies to the poetry of the 1830s, which earlier had followed the trend away from Classical vocabulary in the 1820s. Particularly common in the poetry of the 1830s are terms such as "Mensch", "frei", "Recht", "wahr", "schön", "Herz", also common are "Natur", "streben", "Tat/Tätigkeit", "edel", "Ruhe".

Grillparzer's attempt to combine Weimar and Vienna on stage reached its culmination but also was dealt its death-blow in Weh dem, der lügt!, the failure of which prompted Grillparzer's withdrawal from the theatre. Grillparzer considered his subsequent works unsuitable for the stage, "lebloose und ungenügende Skizzen", as he called them in his will of 1848 (IV, 964). Libussa and Bruderzwist especially are obviously more philosophical in style than the plays of the 1820s and 1830s, in the speeches of the main characters there are long reflective passages which hold up the action, Rudolf II's role is the very denial of action. The terms in which such speeches are couched are those of Classicism, "Mensch" and "Recht" are exceptionally common in all three plays of the period and in the unfinished Esther; "Mensch" occurs 38 times in Libussa, 41 times in Bruderzwist, 17 times in Jüdin, "Recht" occurs 37 times in Libussa, 43 times in Bruderzwist, 25 times in Jüdin. Bruderzwist, which exceeds the other two plays in philosophical content, makes great use of "edel" (which is found 18 times), "frei" (18 times), "Tat/Tätigkeit" (27 times), "Treu(e)" (17 times), "wahr" (19 times). In general however the three plays together make considerable use of "edel", "frei", "Herz", "Pflicht", "rein", "schön", "Tat", "treu", "wahr".<sup>(3)</sup> Some of these terms have been common throughout, as we have seen, some ("frei", "Herz", "Pflicht", "schön", "Tat", "wahr") are common again after a decline in their use especially in the 1820s. Above all the sheer volume of such vocabulary is noticeable in the late plays, in many cases it is equalled only by the plagiaristic Blanka and exceeds the usage in a deliberately Classical work such as Sappho. Significantly, the only

field of vocabulary which, although still quite common in the late plays, is considerably less frequent than before, is the quietist vocabulary - "ruhig", "sanft", "still" - in keeping with Grillparzer's increasing distance from such ideals. Hence "still", which occurs 13 times in Ahnfrau, 32 times in Sappho, 22 times in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, is found on only 18 occasions in the three late plays together, "ruhig" occurs at least 20 times in Blanka, Ahnfrau, Medea, Traum ein Leben, Ottokar, and is almost as frequent in every other play before 1840 except Argonauten, but occurs only 28 times in the three late plays together (mainly in Bruderzwist). By comparison, the ethical and political vocabulary - "edel", "frei", "Mensch", "Pflicht", "Recht", "Tat", "treu", "wahr" - is as common as in the earlier periods before Ottokar or even increases in volume. Hence for example "edel", which occurs on average five times in the plays up to 1840 (although more common in Blanka), is found 17 times in Libussa, 18 times in Bruderzwist; "wahr" occurs on average four times in the plays before Weh dem, but is found 30 times in the comedy, 12 times in Libussa, 19 times in Bruderzwist; "Recht" occurs more often in Libussa than in Ahnfrau, Sappho, and Vließ together, in the plays of the 1820s and 1830s it is found on average 20 times; "Mensch" occurs frequently in all plays except Treuer Diener and Traum ein Leben, but the usage in Libussa and Bruderzwist (38 and 41 times respectively) still contrasts obviously with earlier plays such as Ahnfrau (25 times), Sappho (14 times), Ottokar (13 times), Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen (19 times), Weh dem (21 times).<sup>(4)</sup>

In addition, the plays of the 1840s make more use of terms previously uncommon in Grillparzer's work: "Gesetz", "Maß", "Nutzen", "Grenzen", "Schränken", and cognate ideas of self-limitation. These are again words with a political or ethical slant. The vocabulary found in the plays is reflected in other writings of the 1840s and 1850s, and additional lists of vocabulary are unnecessary. Apart from the terms common in the plays, the non-dramatic

writings also reveal much use of "Bildung" and "Ordnung" (the latter of which is common in Bruderzwist but in no other play, whilst the concept of "Bildung" had only been suggested in Weh dem).

There is no wish to imply that every occurrence of the terms noted is of great significance, a careful analysis of the 43 uses of "Recht" or the 41 occurrences of "Mensch" in Bruderzwist would reveal some clichéd, watery or completely neutral uses of these words - although that may be equally true of Goethe and Schiller. Nor is the volume of such vocabulary always as great as in Classicism. The frequency of "Mensch" and "Recht" in Libussa and Bruderzwist is unusual for Grillparzer, but would be much more normal in Goethe's Classical works and especially in Schiller's mature dramas. For instance, "frei" occurs 40 times in Maria Stuart, 69 times in Tell, "Herz" occurs 74 times in Maria Stuart, 91 times in Jungfrau, "Recht" is found 32 times in Maria Stuart, 33 times in Tell.<sup>(5)</sup> Taking Wallensteins Tod and the plays from Maria Stuart to Wilhelm Tell, we find that "Recht" and "treu" occur on average more than 20 times, "edel", "frei", "Mensch" more than 25 times, "Herz" over 60 times. Common by Grillparzer's standards are "Pflicht", "rein", "ruhig", "schön", "still", "Tat/tätig". Goethe's vocabulary is not as obviously consistent as Schiller's, there is a higher degree of fluctuation between works. Nevertheless, an analysis of representative works - Iphigenie, Tasso, Hermann und Dorothea, Die natürliche Tochter, Faust I <sup>(6)</sup> - reveals high average use of "Herz", "Mensch", "schön" (more than 30 times on average), "edel" (more than 20 times), "frei", "Recht", "Tat", "still" (more than 15 times), "ruhig", "rein" (similarly common, except in Faust).<sup>(7)</sup> Even allowing for the fact that Schiller's plays are on average fifty percent longer than Grillparzer's, and that the Goethean works considered are fractionally longer, this volume is not found consistently in Grillparzer's plays, it is matched

throughout only by the use of "Mensch", and by the use of "ruhig" and "still" in the early plays, of "edel", "Recht", "Tat", "wahr" in the later plays.

Nevertheless the combined weight of the evidence is considerable, the frequency of Grillparzer's use of these terms is obvious, and they are undoubtedly essential elements of the Classical vocabulary of Goethe and Schiller. That Grillparzer contrived to avoid many of the terms in the 1820s makes their renewed use in the 1830s and especially after 1840 an unmistakeable sign that he was aware of the origins of such a body of concepts. In addition the plays of the 1840s employ much clearer echoes of and parallels with Classical motifs than had been the case since Vließ. I have considered some of the most important instances, otherwise I refer the reader to the notes in the critical edition for further ample evidence on this matter.<sup>(8)</sup> There is not however a return to the earlier tendency for a play to echo one particular Classical work; Baumann's attempts to link Libussa with Pandora in this way seem unsatisfactory. There is far less cause for agreeing with Fricke, who asserts that in Bruderzwist, "hat Grillparzer sich von den letzten klassischen Traditionen gelöst", in fact the opposite seems to be the case. According to Helmsdorfer, Grillparzer's language lacks the Classical conventions of tirade, rhetoric, monologue, stichomythia, "Sentenzen", but what is a valid distinction for the plays up to and including Weh dem is no longer true to anything like the same extent subsequently; Bruderzwist especially has long speeches, considerable use of rhetoric and "Sentenzen" and Sengle recognises the "neue, tiefere Rhetorik" of the later plays.<sup>(9)</sup>

Furthermore it is the vital speeches of the plays which carry an obvious preponderance of Classical vocabulary. These are often the "Prunkreden" which Herbert Seidler uses as a sign of Austrian-Baroque influence. Stylistically this may be true, thematically however it is worth noting the vocabulary in support of the present argument. Stylistically it may be correct, as Škreb has sought to

demonstrate, that Primislaus has more of a Classical diction than Libussa, though I do not find the contrast as marked as Skreb insists, certainly not on the question of the Saxon genitive, which a random selection of speeches shows to be as frequent in Libussa's speech as in Primislaus's. Thematically however it is Libussa's "Prunkreden" which reveal obvious use of Classical concepts. Her speeches in the final act (2316-2504) make use of "frei", "Grenze", "Mensch", "Nutzen", "schön", "wahr", also "edel", "entbehren", "streben", "Tat", "treu". Such usage is more marked in Bruderzwist in Rudolf's major speeches (391-439, 1233-76, 1589-1652, 2286-2380). In these speeches alone, the term "Mensch" occurs 20 times, "Ganz", "Gesetz", "Ordnung", "Recht", "still", "wahr" are much in evidence, also "edel", "Ehrfurcht", "Grenze", "Pflicht", "rein", "Tat", "Tier", "Nutzen". These speeches, but also the late plays as a whole, make use of the vocabulary which in the work of Goethe and Schiller accompanied the more specifically Classical concepts, hence we find "hold", "wild", "roh", "fromm", "gemein". This can of course be no more than circumstantial supporting evidence, the main point to be made is to insist on the volume of the major concepts we have noted as an overall characteristic of Grillparzer's vocabulary at the time.

I have however no wish to claim that these terms are always used with the same emphasis or connotation as in the works of Classicism. Where that is obviously the case, I have referred to the matter in preceding chapters. It is above all the use of fields of related concepts and the very volume of such terms that indicates Grillparzer's links with Classicism. But as we have come increasingly to notice, Grillparzer did not wholeheartedly accept the ideals of Classicism, and the volume of vocabulary is not in any way a sign of complete endorsement. On the contrary, the excessive use of "Recht" in all the mature writing is the result of Grillparzer's examination of the term in all its positive and negative connotations, the same applies to his analysis of freedom in the plays,



but above all in the diaries and poems of the period. Grillparzer's increasing suspicion of the concepts of quietism has been noted, however frequently they may still occur in Bruderzwist for example, and this suspicion is directed at many other terms as well - "rein" and "Tugend" in Jüdin, "wahr" in Weh dem, "Tätigkeit" in almost every play, even the idea "Mensch" is exposed to much greater scrutiny than in Classicism. The ambivalence of political ideals is explicitly or implicitly revealed ("Grenzen", "Gesetz", "Ordnung"). The unifying theme we have observed is the rejection of extremes - praiseworthy virtues taken to excess are as potentially dangerous as vices. It is highly revealing that with the exception of Jüdin, the specific terms "Laster" and "Tugend", so common in Schiller's work, are avoided by Grillparzer after the youthful Blanka; Grillparzer is not prepared to commit himself to a statement that something is obviously virtuous or otherwise, and Jüdin shows the dangers of any attempt to do so. By comparison the distinction between good and bad, virtue and vice in Classicism is much more straightforward; the extremes in the characters of Wallenstein, Tasso, Mignon, the brothers in Braut von Messina are obviously to be criticised, whilst the noble qualities of Iphigenie, Max Piccolomini, Faust, Wilhelm Tell are scarcely called into question in the way that similarly laudable traits are analysed by Grillparzer.

In the early period the various ideals are not in fact questioned, but they prove impossible in the gloomy settings portrayed by Grillparzer's jaundiced introspective pessimism of the time. From Ottokar, certainly from 1830 onwards, Grillparzer overcomes such excessive brooding sufficiently to write plays which set the inherited ideals in a very clear social and political context. In the equally exaggerated optimism of Rudolf I, the ideals are easily maintained and upheld, the same is true, after a struggle, of Treuer Diener, but the ideals portrayed in these two plays are in any case kept to a minimum. Commencing with Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, however,

Grillparzer presents us with a variety of ideals set in the "buntverworrene Welt", which is neither the gloom of Vließ and Ahnfrau nor the idyll of Rudolf I's altruistic reign. Naumann has argued that while Goethe and Schiller present "privates Lebensschicksal" in their works, Grillparzer insists on political relevance and presents "politisches Gemeinwesen". Bietak on the other hand, who sees Grillparzer in terms of Biedermeier, writes of "Beschränken auf die Innenwelt, Scheu vor der Wirklichkeit, Sehnsucht nach den Idealen".<sup>(10)</sup> From Ottokar onwards one must agree with Naumann rather than Bietak, nevertheless the latter's insistence on "Sehnsucht nach den Idealen" is justified. In an inimical world Grillparzer clings to his ideals as a solace, characters such as Rudolf II and Libussa show the poet's dismay at the impossibility of realising these ideals in such a world. Grillparzer fears for a loss of ethical standards in the chaotic world, a loss of order, humanity and "Bildung" and the standards and principles that accompany such ideals. As Papst has rightly insisted, "pessimism about the ethical capacities of mankind must not be confused with the abolition of all objective ethical values".<sup>(11)</sup> Grillparzer's characters are judged by the highest moral standards for the individual, but they are also judged against a background of history and community that is much more powerful and demanding than in Classicism, and yet which is not used to explain or excuse man's corruptness or weakness as is the case in much drama of the nineteenth century, for example Grabbe, Büchner, Hebbel. Like Schiller, Grillparzer shows man's weaknesses, the dangers with which he is confronted in an inimical political reality, but with the partial exception of Sappho he cannot accept Schiller's solution, namely to lift the individual out of the historical and social context and judge him in ethereal terms of sublimity and moral freedom which are only accessible in death. Like Goethe, Grillparzer is concerned with life, not with victory in death, but Grillparzer is much less willing than Goethe to compromise

with individual morality for the sake of the community as a whole or for the sake of the final goal, and he criticises Goethe on a number of occasions for being somewhat lax in such matters.

Increasingly however one detects the tendency in Grillparzer's work to put life higher than morality, to compromise, however reluctantly, for the benefit of activity and life as a whole. Grillparzer comes to recognise that mistakes are human, to acknowledge the Goethean dictum, "es irrt der Mensch, so lang' er strebt", even if the eventual "erlösen" is more problematic or doubtful. If we have noted the echoes of Schiller's Jungfrau in Libussa's final vision, then one must also recognise the contrast between Johanna's

Kurz ist der Schmerz und ewig ist die Freude! (3543)  
and Libussa's

Ein dunkler Schmerz, er kriecht an meine Brust,  
Ich sehe nicht mehr, die mir angehören. (2503-4)

Despite such contrasts, the desire for compromise, the recognition of the undesirability or impracticality of extreme moral standards is apparent in Grillparzer's mature work, explicitly so in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen, Weh dem, Libussa, Jüdin, implicitly so in Bruderzwist. There is no question of rejecting morality, but there is an insight into the danger of turning any legitimate idea into an abstract ideology, which is then insisted upon in defiance of the practical demands of the situation.<sup>(12)</sup> Such an insistence, of which Grillparzer himself was guilty at times, especially during 1848, may be not only impractical, but inhuman and a danger to life. To insist dogmatically on moral standards condemns the individual to an isolated existence that fails to do justice to the totality of his humanity. This is the fate of the priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen ("keine moderne Humanität"), Gregor in Weh dem, Rudolf II, Libussa's sisters, the Queen in Jüdin.

It is also the fate of Jakob in Der arme Spielmann, which in many respects serves as further evidence in support

of the arguments I have put forward. It is the problem of moral values and standards in a far from perfect world, in a man who is far from competent to realise these standards fully, and in a situation where they are far from suitable.

In the previous chapter I examined briefly the conflicting views of society as seen in the narrator. It must of course be stressed that the narrator's description of the festival is drawn from Goethe's depiction of the Roman Carnival in the Italienische Reise. This stands out in a work which is otherwise short of all obvious echoes of Classicism, both in motifs and in vocabulary. The influence of various sections of Goethe's "Reisebild" is noted in the critical edition, but in particular the description of the "saturnalisches Fest", given and visited by the "Volk" itself, a mystery to strangers, with no class differences, a time of "Losgebundenheit" - all these are taken almost word for word from Goethe, who concludes "daß Freiheit und Gleichheit nur in dem Taumel des Wahnsinns genossen werden können" (HA XI, 484-5, 514-5).

Also in the previous chapter I considered the gloomy picture of society presented by the story as a whole. In the context of this society, Jakob does indeed lead "a life of failure at every step".<sup>(13)</sup> He fails at school, at work, in love and in music - significantly it is only this last failure that he fails to recognise. Again and again the other characters, or where necessary the narrator, point out this failure or the inadequate nature of his successes. His handwriting is "widerlich steif" (III, 153), Barbara's song "gar nicht ausgezeichnet" (162) his music "ein höllisches Konzert" (156), Barbara "galt nicht für schön" (164), "es schien fast als ob sie nie schön gewesen sein konnte" (185). After saving children from the floods, he dies of a chill because he returns to save some ledgers and money. The happiest day of his life is a kiss through a glass door. He cannot pluck up courage to see Barbara, he is over-conscientious at school and at work, he is

condemned as weak, effeminate, as a child who ignores important matters.

And yet one of the clearest indications of Jakob's isolation from others also gives a first pointer to the positive side of his character. The chalk line in his room divides "Schmutz" from "Reinlichkeit", chaos from order (156), Jakob himself insists, "die Unordnung ist verwiesen" (157), order was a theme of his first conversation with the narrator: "muß sich der Mensch in allen Dingen eine gewisse Ordnung festsetzen, sonst gerät er ins Wilde und Unaufhaltsame" (152). Similarly he believes he could have learnt at school, "wenn man mir nur Zeit und Ordnung gegönnt hätte" (159), if he had been given time to organise each item "im Zusammenhange mit dem übrigen" (160).

This search for order is a sign of Jakob's moral fibre. He disapproves of the activities of "Nachtschwärmer" which he considers "ein widerliches Vergehen" (152), he condemns the masses for their "genossene Tanzfreuden oder sonst unordentliche Ergötzlichkeiten" (153). His music must not encourage such dubious entertainment with "unartige Lieder", instead he hopes that the effect of his music will be "Veredelung des Geschmacks der ohnehin von so vielen Seiten gestörten und irregeleiteten Zuhörerschaft" (ibid.). Jakob is normally a man of modesty, self-critical, content with his lot, but he takes a certain pride in his appearance, upholds middle-class values of cleanliness, tidiness, order, as well as morality. Above all he has a pride in his music, he does not want to be thought of as a beggar, insists on practising in order to put on a worthy performance.

The only song he can play however is Barbara's song. The reason why he cannot otherwise play a recognisable melody is fascinating, and becomes clear from two descriptions of his idea of music, the first of which is introduced as the narrator visits Jakob:

Der Alte genoß, indem er spielte. Seine Auffassung unterschied hierbei aber schlechthin nur zweierlei, den Wohlklang und den Übelklang, von denen der erstere ihn erfreute, ja entzückte, indes er dem

letztern, auch dem harmonisch begründeten, nach Möglichkeit aus dem Wege ging. Statt nun in einem Musikstücke nach Sinn und Rhythmus zu betonen, hob er heraus, verlängerte er die dem Gehör wohlthuenden Noten und Intervalle, ja nahm keinen Anstand, sie willkürlich zu wiederholen, wobei sein Gesicht oft geradezu den Ausdruck der Verückung annahm. Da er nun zugleich die Dissonanzen so kurz als möglich abtat, überdies die für ihn zu schweren Passagen, von denen er aus Gewissenhaftigkeit nicht eine Note fallen ließ, in einem gegen das Ganze viel zu langsamen Zeitmaß vortrug, so kann man sich wohl leicht eine Idee von der Verwirrung machen, die daraus hervorging. (156-7)

Jakob distinguishes between harmony and dissonance, between good and evil notes. He lengthens, repeats the good notes; the bad notes he skips over as quickly as possible. The reason for such a musical interpretation becomes clear in Jakob's own words later:

Ich konnte daher nicht das und das, sondern nur überhaupt spielen. Obwohl mir das jeweilige Was der Musik, mit Ausnahme jenes Liedes, immer ziemlich gleichgültig war und auch geblieben ist bis zum heutigen Tag. Sie spielen den Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart und den Sebastian Bach, aber den lieben Gott spielt keiner. Die ewige Wohltat und Gnade des Tons und Klangs, seine wundertätige Übereinstimmung mit dem durstigen, zerleczenden Ohr, daß" - fuhr er leiser und schamrot fort - "der dritte Ton zusammenstimmt mit dem ersten und der fünfte desgleichen und die Nota sensibilis hinaufsteigt, wie eine erfüllte Hoffnung, die Dissonanz herabgebeugt wird als wissentliche Bosheit oder vermessener Stolz und die Wunder der Bindung und Umkehrung, wodurch auch die Sekunde zur Gnade gelangt in den Schoß des Wohlklangs. - Mir hat das alles, obwohl viel später, ein Musiker erklärt. Und, wovon ich aber nichts verstehe, die fuga und das punctum contra punctum, und der canon a duo, a tre, und so fort, ein ganzes Himmelsgebäude, eines ins andere greifend, ohne Mörtel verbunden, und gehalten von Gottes Hand. (162-3)

Harmony he sees in moral, even religious terms as eternal grace and goodness, dissonance however is evil arrogance. So also he praises those aspects of music which suggest order, and harmony - fugue, counterpoint, canon - the learning of which in his youth Grillparzer saw in terms of order (IV, 54). Jakob stresses the purity of music which must not be sullied by common words, and again he sees this in religious terms, "wie die Kinder Gottes sich

verbanden mit den Töchtern der Erde". Music is a gift from God's finger, hence he desires to play music "überhaupt", absolute music, one might say, he even hopes to play God himself. Like Rudolf II, he seeks the cosmic order of the stars, the music of the spheres, such as is praised by the archangels in Goethe's Faust.

Sadly Jakob has drawn his theories from listening to an expert, his own musical skill and insight are not equal to such considerations. The expert has told him how even the dissonant notes of a chord are taken up into a higher totality and harmony - "wodurch auch die Sekunde zur Gnade gelangt in den Schoß des Wohlklangs" - but it is clear that in practice Jakob cannot apply this insight to his playing as a whole. We discover that he has no ear for music, he is amazed by Barbara's natural ability to sing without notes. Hence also the narrator tells us that he avoids all dissonance, even that which is "harmonisch begründet", he plays only the notes that he conceives of as good. If this were not fatal enough, he tries in addition to play the most complex passages of the old masters. Here of course there is an autobiographical touch. Jakob's idols are Bach and Mozart, the musical masters of the eighteenth century. These were Grillparzer's idols as well, but Jakob's inability to play such pieces is presumably also an ironic indication of Grillparzer's fear that even, as it were, with notes, he had failed to emulate the literary greats of the eighteenth century, Goethe and Schiller. <sup>(14)</sup>

In the rather corrupt society in which he lives, Jakob's moral concerns encourage admiration. For J.P. Stern he is a man of integrity, of "disembodied good will", Walter Höllerer sees him in terms of a "schöne Seele", according to Ellis we should all choose to lean in the Spielmann's direction, Schafroth writes of Jakob's "seelischer Aristokratismus", Walter Silz insists on his "rare saintly spirit", whilst in 1871 Gottfried Keller had spoken of the "Gewalt der absolut reinen Seele über die Welt". <sup>(15)</sup> It is important to see Jakob's apparently

religious approach to his music in more general ethical terms. Like Goethe, Grillparzer had no orthodox Christian belief. Anzenberger, in his study of Grillparzer's religious views, insists, "also war Grillparzer kein Christ", and he justifiably concludes, "er war nicht atheistisch, sondern areligiös". Numerous diary entries reveal Grillparzer's scepticism towards God (Tgb.1680,1681, 2803,3288,4073,etc.), though he insists that God be taken seriously rather than be mutilated by Strauß and the Hegelians. It is dangerous to speak of Grillparzer's work revealing "Ahnung eines höheren göttlichen Zusammenhangs", which is Hock's view. Grillparzer saw God as a personification of "das ewige Recht" (Tgb.641), like Goethe he uses the idea of divinity as a symbol of a higher moral order - "daß das Gute und Wahre eine objektive Geltung erhält" (Tgb.3313) - and one must agree with Oplatka that "Grillparzers Blick ist grundsätzlich auf das Diesseitige gerichtet", and with Škreb: "Das Göttliche ist für Grillparzer die Bezeichnung für die höchste Ausprägung des Menschen".<sup>(16)</sup> This use of divinity to symbolise morality is found in Ottokar and Weh dem, and, I would argue, also in Bruderzwist, where Rudolf should be seen preserving the moral order of the universe. Jakob, like Gregor and the two Rudolfs, talks in religious terms, but in the context of Grillparzer's work as a whole one may justifiably transfer such themes to a wider ethical field.<sup>(17)</sup> Jakob hopes that his music will improve people's taste but also discourage them from immoral pursuits, his own day is perfectly ordered, his own surroundings meticulously tidy. In the plays, characters such as Jaromir, Jason, Ottokar, Otto von Meran, Rustan, Leon, Don Cäsar, Alphons, are judged in quite specifically moral terms, and the moral awareness acquired at the end by Ottokar, Rustan, Leon, Alphons, is to be praised.

Walter Seitter, in his thesis on Grillparzer's philosophy, writes of "die unbedingt bejahten sittlichen Werte", Schafroth in the context of Vließ refers to "was



bei Grillparzer über alle Mächte gesetzt wird: das Ethische, die rächende Gerechtigkeit". (18) It was at the time of writing Vließ that Grillparzer wrote that "jede Störung vernichtet werden muß des ewigen Rechts" (Tgb.639).

Nevertheless such rigorous pursuance of morality is a facet of the early plays. Even in 1820 he had criticised any attempt to make morality man's sole purpose:

Wer Sittlichkeit zum alleinigen Zwecke des Menschen macht, kommt mir vor, wie einer, der die Bestimmung einer Uhr darin fände; daß sie nicht falsch gehe. Das erste bei der Uhr aber ist; daß sie gehe, das Nicht-Falsch-Gehen kommt dann erst als regulative Bestimmung hinzu. Wenn das Nicht-Fehlen das höchste bei Uhren wäre, so möchten die Unaufgezogenen die besten sein. (Tgb.743)

In 1832 Grillparzer makes a further attack on moral rigorism in terms which adumbrate themes of the mature plays:

Die aktiven Faktoren der Menschennatur sind die Neigungen und Leidenschaften, ihr Übermaß zu hemmen ist die Aufgabe des Sittlichen. Letzteres ist daher negativ und kann als solches nicht der Zweck des Menschen sein. (Tgb.2057)

Despite his criticism of Goethe's moral lapses, Grillparzer saw the danger of using morality as a yardstick for art, as it limited artistic potential to examine all aspects of life:

Die sogenannte moralische Ansicht ist der größte Feind der wahren Kunst, da einer der Hauptvorzüge dieser letztern gerade darin besteht, daß man durch ihr Medium auch jene Seiten der menschlichen Natur genießen kann, welche das Moralgesetz mit Recht aus dem wirklichen Leben entfernt hält. (Tgb.1775)

Die moralische Kraft gehört auch in den Kreis der Poesie, aber nicht mehr als jede andere Kraft, und nur insofern sie Kraft, Realität ist, als Negation, als Schranke liegt sie außer der Poesie. (Tgb.2064)

The last three diary entries were written between 1830 and 1832, a time when, I would argue, Grillparzer was moving towards recognition of a less absolute concept of morality, as is reflected in his subsequent writing.

Jakob exhibits precisely the results of applying strict ethical concerns to the aesthetic realm. He applies these concerns not simply to types of music, but

to the actual process of playing. His attempt to play only harmonious chords, the good notes, results not in harmony, but in cacophony. He apparently cannot come to terms in practice with what has been explained to him in theory, namely the idea that the totality of music is composed of harmony and discord, that the discord is also "harmonisch begründet". According to Schafroth, "es ist vollkommen unwichtig, daß der Spielmann technisch ein Stümper ist. Auf die geistige Haltung allein kommt es an", but it is surely not irrelevant that Jakob cannot play, he is the incompetent artist. In 1825/6 Grillparzer had written of the dilettante who has poetic ideas: "nur fehlt ihm bei allem Streben, doch das Vermögen einer genügenden Darstellung" (III,253). Papst rightly stresses this aspect of Jakob's incompetence, the need for illogicality, for dissonance in art.<sup>(19)</sup> Much more vital however is the wider context involved; his music is a sign of his dangerously solipsistic attitude to life in general. According to Hermand, Jakob is "lebensuntüchtig",<sup>(20)</sup> and he is so because he fails to realise what Rudolf II does recognise in theory - "daß Satzungen der Menschen/ Ein Maß des Törichten notwendig beigemischt" (Bruderzwist,2336-7) - or what Zares insists on in Esther: "das Schlimme will sein Recht" (277). Jakob may indeed be an "absolute reine Seele" in Keller's words, but he has no "Gewalt über die Welt" as a result, on the contrary he can only exist in total isolation from everyday affairs - misunderstood, incompetent, unpractical. As many critics have argued, Jakob's sense of order is artificial, it concerns him alone, it is the indication of his distance from ordinary reality. As Roland Heine has recently insisted, Jakob, despite his belief in order and totality, lacks what Libussa calls "der Zusammenhang des Ganzen".<sup>(21)</sup> In ordinary life, not just in music, Jakob fails to see the unavailability of dissonance. Perfection in one's work is impossible, life goes on too fast, people are not perfect, the inability to see this is dangerous in the

extreme. Like Max Piccolomini, Jakob sees only good in everyone and everything, but the world is full of Octavios and Pylades. As for Rudolf II, Jakob's ideal concept of order and harmony is quite incapable of being applied to real life, especially when Jakob cannot come to terms with the place of night, of the dark side of music and of man's nature within this harmony. As I have discussed in the context of Rudolf II, Jakob also inhabits a timeless realm of his own creation, as Heine concludes, "er hat so viel Zeit, weil er zeitlos lebt",<sup>(22)</sup> But Rudolf at least comes to realise the error of his ways at the end:

Allein der Mensch lebt nur im Augenblick,  
Was heut ist, kümmert ihn, es gibt kein morgen.  
(Bruderzwist, 2302-3)

One may, as Heine suggests, see Jakob's life as an artistic whole rather than an existential totality, and in support of such a view one might refer to two diary notes of 1839 and 1841:

Das in seiner Art, also isoliert Vollkommene ist das ästhetisch Schöne; das in seiner Beziehung auf das Ganze Vollkommene, das moralisch Gute. (Tgb. 3489)

Es ließe sich sehr gut durchführen, daß der Poesie die natürliche Ansicht der Dinge zu Grunde liege, der Prosa aber die gesellschaftliche. Die Poesie würdigt Personen und Zustände nach ihrer Übereinstimmung mit sich selbst oder der ihnen zu Grunde liegenden Idee; die Prosa nach ihrem Zusammenhang mit dem Ganzen. Sie sind daher wesentlich von einander getrennt, zwei abgesonderte Welten; und wer poetische Ideen in die wirkliche Welt einführt, steht in Gefahr mit prosaischen die Poesie zu verfälschen. (Tgb. 3537)

Jakob's life of internal order, his desire to play pure music, this does tally with Grillparzer's distinctions between poetry and prose as between drink and food (Tgb. 1176, 3493) and the fear that contemporary poetry was tending increasingly towards prose (Tgb. 2768, 3362). And yet such a distinction would be valid in Jakob's case if he were able, like Tasso, to produce perfect art and were simply "lebensuntüchtig". But such an interpretation collapses once one remembers that Jakob cannot play. He is incompetent at all levels, he is competent only in an artistic world of his own creation which is cacophony to

everyone else. In his earlier work, Grillparzer had often longed for "Sammlung", for a state of complete concentration as a prerequisite for the achievement of aesthetic totality, in his later work there is an increasing realisation that such a state is inferior to the ordinary world of reality, however chaotic and discordant this world may be. The idea of harmonious aesthetic totality gives way to the wider, if chaotic totality of "die buntverworrne Welt". In Spielmann, the concept of aesthetic totality is not simply barren, as in Libussa, or dangerous as in Weh dem, Bruderzwist or Jüdin, it is quite impracticable, even farcical or ridiculous. In many respects, Spielmann represents the culmination of Grillparzer's questioning and rejection of "Sammlung".

Of course Jakob stands for moral ideals such as purity, order, propriety, although in fact "Ordnung" is the only one stressed in any way, and one may respect him for this in the midst of sordid reality, which incidentally does not provide any of Jakob's family with lasting success, yet Jakob also, with all his morality, is a failure in all practical senses. The narrator, who has no obvious moral code, is a successful dramatist. It is perhaps for this reason that there is a shortage, even absence in the story of so many of the terms we have studied, the narrator has no cause to stress them, whilst Jakob takes them to extremes, so that Grillparzer is not inclined to stress the actual concepts he otherwise employs. He avoids the danger of any obvious suggestion that Jakob's attitudes are the right ones. According to Silz, Jakob is both "Wunschbild" and "Schreckbild", and Martin Swales is undoubtedly correct when he stresses that the narrator "dare not answer the question whether Jakob is fool or saint",<sup>(23)</sup> equally however there seems little doubt that Jakob's moral stand is impractical, that his saintliness allows of no compromise with reality.

This is noted by almost all the critics I have quoted. Surprisingly however, there is a great tendency to treat Der arme Spielmann in isolation, yet it would seem clear

that it is symptomatic of Grillparzer's mature work as a whole. What is true of Jakob is true of Gregor, Rudolf II, Libussa's sisters, the Queen in Jüdin and Alphons also at the beginning of the play, the priest and his community in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen. The fact that Jakob is also incompetent in his art merely makes him a more extreme case, but he is no more "lebensuntüchtig" than many other characters mentioned, and for the same reason: that he will not compromise. Beriger sees Rudolf II failing to allow for the "harmonisch begründet" discords of life,<sup>(24)</sup> and the same point could be made in the context of other plays. I have argued earlier that Grillparzer's mature plays present his fears rather more than his confidence, and there is a constant stress on the need for ethical standards, a warning to the audience of the dangers of rejecting such values. But even the plays, and certainly Der arme Spielmann and Grillparzer's mature writing as a whole, contain numerous warnings of the danger of excessive morality which itself becomes "laster". In the world of reality and activity, a less absolute approach to morality is required; as Breitenbruch says of Grillparzer's view of man, "er nimmt die schuldhafte Trübung seiner Seele, die mit dem Handeln verbunden ist, in Kauf".<sup>(25)</sup>

Referring to such a case in Libussa, Hock insists, "trotz dieser Verdüsterung bleibt der Dichter im Bannkreis der klassischen Humanitätsidee".<sup>(26)</sup> Grillparzer in fact, like Goethe and Schiller but unlike Herder, makes little use of the term "Humanität". The priest in Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen is considered to be "keine moderne Humanität" (HKA I/19,223), but otherwise the word is used on a small number of occasions from 1843 onwards. It is used ironically in a context depicting the lack of humanity (I,522,537; III,100). Of religion, Grillparzer writes, "sie bereitet daher allerdings durch ihren Charakter einer allgemeinen Humanität der Bildung den Weg" (Tgb.3750); but perhaps the most significant reference to the idea is in an essay "Von den Sprachen" of 1843:

Aber bedenkt: mit Umschlag der Mode wird die jetzt verspottete Humanität wieder in ihre frühern Rechte treten und man wird einsehen, daß das Beste was der Mensch sein kann, eben ist, ein Mensch zu sein, ob er nun einen Attila trägt und ungarisch spricht, oder trotz seiner deutschen Sprache in einem englischen Frack und französischen Hut einhergeht.  
(III,1021)

The essence of this belief is repeated in a letter to Barcsfa in 1861: "Das Beste was der Mensch sein kann ist er als Mensch" (IV,860). According to Helmensdorfer, "Der Mensch, nicht ein Mensch ist sein Anliegen", (27) and certainly Grillparzer's vital concern is for man, "Mensch in des Worts vollkommenster Bedeutung" (III,882), and the ideals for Grillparzer are those which help man to achieve this full humanity, ideals drawn essentially from the era of Classicism: right, truth, order, moderation, (self-) limitation, a uniting of sensual and spiritual, inclination and duty. But despite his distinction between poetic and prosaic ideas (Tgb.3537), Grillparzer clearly insists on judging ideas and people "nach ihrem Zusammenhang mit dem Ganzen". In so far as he insists on this link with social reality (unlike Schiller) and refuses to present an idyllic world (unlike Goethe), then we are presented with a less optimistic picture of mankind than in the work of the Classicists. But Grillparzer's writing as a whole produces an ultimately more realistic, more modern view of political ideals and of morality, none of which can be absolute. Such Classical ideals and concepts must not be overthrown, they are vital standards in an increasingly immoral world, but they must be treated with caution and modified where absolute insistence upon them would lead to incomplete humanity or even inhumanity rather than furthering humanity. The danger of the "Exzeß guter Leidenschaften" is made apparent, and as Grillparzer insisted in 1831, "der Mensch ist einmal nicht da um rein zu sein, sondern zu nützen, zu wirken" (Tgb.1935). Political and ethical ideals must satisfy that condition first, before they can be treated in any absolute fashion, however much Grillparzer may have regretted that morality and life could not always be in harmony.

NOTES

1. Breitenbruch, pp.193-4.
2. These plays also return to the use of the poetic vocabulary common until Vließ but rejected in the 1820s, especially "fromm", "hold", "wehen", "wild".
3. In deciding what constitutes "common" usage, I am indebted to Kaderschafka's note to line 103 of Bruderzwist in the critical edition: "Das Wort 'schlimm' ein Lieblingswort im Bruderzwist (22 mal angewendet)" (HKA I/6,427). In certain cases, the statistics quoted may appear incorrect, but this will be found to result from the omission of completely insignificant uses of the term concerned (e.g. "Mensch!" as an exclamation, or "du hast recht"). Cognate terms such as "still/Stille", "frei/Freiheit" are treated together.
4. "Frei" occurs 4 times in Ahnfrau, once in Medea, twice in Treuer Diener, but 18 times in Bruderzwist; "Tat" scarcely occurs in Ottokar, Treuer Diener and Weh dem, but is common in Ahnfrau, Vließ and the plays of the 1840s; "Pflicht" is scarcely used until Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen.
5. "Edel" occurs 34 times in Maria Stuart, 43 times in Jungfrau; "Mensch" 36 times in Tod, 27 times in Jungfrau, 25 times in Tell; "schön" 35 times in Braut von Messina; "treu" 40 times in Tod, 37 times in Maria Stuart.
6. Lines 1-2604 of Faust I have been used as a sample comparable in length to the other works by Goethe, also because such a sample is made up predominantly of scenes written in Goethe's Classical period.
7. More specifically, "edel" occurs 40 times in Tasso, 41 times in Die natürliche Tochter; "frei" 35 times in Tasso; "Mensch" 46 times in Tasso, 39 times in Hermann, 40 times in Faust. "Herz" is particularly common in all works, "Tat" especially in Iphigenie, "schön" in Tasso, "still" in Tasso.
8. See especially Libussa, 320, 1185-6, 1316-8; Bruderzwist, 37, 258-64, 410, 895, 897, 987, 1183, 1766, 2196, 2274, 2354ff.
9. Baumann, Franz Grillparzer, pp.133, 267; Fricke, p.283; Helmendorfer, p.120; Sengle, Biedermeierzeit, Vol.I, p.429.
10. Walter Naumann, "Die Form des Dramas bei Grillparzer und Hugo von Hofmannsthal", Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, XXXIII (1959), 20-37, p.33; Wilhelm Bietak, Das Lebensgefühl des "Biedermeier" in der österreichischen Dichtung, Vienna, 1931, p.20.
11. Papst, "DMudLW" p.17.
12. Breitenbruch, p.98.
13. J.P. Stern, "Beyond the Common Indication: Grillparzer", in J.P.S., Re-Interpretations, London, 1964, pp.42-77, p.66.
14. According to Hermand (p.109), the chalk line in Jakob's room signifies Grillparzer's awareness of being the last poet in an age of prose. This is more problematic, in view of Jakob's total incompetence, as will be seen later.

15. J.P. Stern, Re-Interpretations, p.72; Walter Höllerer, Zwischen Klassik und Moderne, p.257; J.M. Ellis, p.678; Schafroth, p.67; Walter Silz, Realism and Reality. Studies in the German Novelle of Poetic Realism, Chapel Hill, 1954, p.70; Gottfried Keller, conversation with Emil Kuh, 10/9/1871 (quoted in HKA I/22,78).
16. Alfred Anzenberger, Grillparzer und die Religion, (Diss.) Vienna, 1948, pp.39,88; Hock, Besinnung auf Humanität, p.93; Oplatka, p.72; Zdenko Škreb, "Das Göttliche bei Grillparzer", German Quarterly, XLV (1972), 620-8, p.627. See also W.E. Yates, Grillparzer, p.202. For Schafroth, Grillparzer's God is "nur die Verkörperung des Willens zum Guten im Menschen" (p.55; see also p.91).
17. For this reason, the conclusion reached by Robert M. Browning in a recent article seems rather limited ("Language and the Fall from Grace in Grillparzer's Spielmann", Seminar, XII (1976), 215-34). For Browning "the Spielmann's playing is a peculiar kind of theodicy ... a theodicy that leaves out evil altogether" (p.224), Jakob lives utterly apart, in a world before the fall from grace, which consequently cannot be understood by others: "because Jakob keeps the drink pure, he cannot pass it on to others" (p.227). This interpretation seems not only restrictive, but also misleading, in so far as it lays undue emphasis on his ideal, saintly qualities, glossing over the problematic nature of Jakob's situation.
18. Walter Seitter, Franz Grillparzers Philosophie, (Diss.) Munich, 1971, p.10 (see also p.137); Schafroth, p.36.
19. Schafroth, p.110; Edmund Papst, "Grillparzers Theorie des psychologischen Realismus", GFF (1973), 7-23, pp.15,20.
20. Hermand, p.112.
21. Roland Heine, "Ästhetische oder existentielle Integration? Ein hermeneutisches Problem des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in Grillparzers Erzählung Der arme Spielmann", Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, XLVI (1972), 650-83, p.667. One may agree with Wolfgang Paulsen, when he states that, "das Prinzip der Ordnung und Sauberkeit ... überbewertet den äußeren Schein gegenüber dem wahren Wesen der Dinge", but I am less inclined to follow his sociological interpretation of Jakob as a "Verfallserscheinung des Bürgertums" ("Der gute Bürger Jakob", Colloquia Germanica (1968), 272-98, p.277).
22. Heine, p.654.
23. Silz, Realism and Reality, p.75; M.W.Swales, "The narrative perspective in Grillparzer's Der arme Spielmann", German Life and Letters (New Series), XX (1966-7), 107-16, p.116.
24. Beriger, p.104.
25. Breitenbruch, p.48.
26. Hock, "Libussa", p.473.
27. Helmsdorfer, pp.112-3.



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- 1) Texts, Editions
- 2) Critical works
  - i) Classicism and Eighteenth-Century Literature
  - ii) Grillparzer's Links with Classicism
  - iii) Grillparzer's Political Views
  - iv) Further Critical Studies of Grillparzer
  - v) Nineteenth-Century Literature,  
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