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LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING

IN THE TYNESIDE CONURBATION

Submitted by David John Woodhead
for the degree of Ph.D. in the
University of Durham.

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ABSTRACT

After examining some of the concepts central to the subject of community decision-making, notably power, leadership, elites, and participation, this study goes on to look at the literature on community power with special reference to the conflicting methodologies that have been developed. Of particular significance is the distinction between the 'reputationalists' and the 'decisionalists'; the former believing that community power can best be approached by discovering who have reputations for leadership, while the latter believe that the main focus of interest should be concrete cases of decision making. The conclusion reached is that both methodologies have their advantages and disadvantages and that, therefore, a combination of the two probably offers the best hope of advancement. As a result the study both examines seven issues with which Tyneside has been faced in recent years and, by means of questionnaires and interviews, seeks to discover who are considered to be the influentials in Tyneside politics. The seven issue studies were local government re-organisation, the building of the Tyne Tunnel, the development of the airport, the establishment of the Port of Tyne Authority, the re-organisation of police areas, the merger of shipbuilding interests on the river Tyne, and the establishment of a Passenger Transport Authority. The general conclusion was that effective participation in the decision making process was confined to a small group of individuals who owed their importance normally to their positions in the local authorities. The survey by means of questionnaires revealed that local leaders differ from the population as a whole in terms of socio-economic characteristics and that, therefore, what is essentially a traditional working class, Labour-dominated area is in fact not led by a representative leadership group.

PREFACE

In recent years there has been a considerable resurgence of interest in local government and politics. The initial impetus came from America where the problems of the cities in the fields of transportation, urban decay, pollution and race relations attracted the interest of a considerable body of academics. Of the political scientists involved a substantial number attempted to construct theories and models about the political systems of communities. A considerable debate developed which was at times bitter but ultimately proved constructive in so far as it launched a somewhat staid and traditional branch of political science in new directions. Eventually the shock waves of these activities reached Britain where they united with a growing interest in the reform of local government structure and management to produce a renaissance in the study of British local politics.

With the help and support of the Social Science Research Council a number of universities set up research projects to study the local government and politics of particular areas of Britain. One such research project was based on the University of Durham and its area of study was Tyneside. This thesis is the result of one part of this research project.

The aim of the Durham project was to examine the topic of participation in government on Tyneside and the particular part with which this thesis is concerned is participation in decision-making on a conurbation wide scale. The particular significance of this subject is that the period of study coincided with a time of official concern with the reform of local government which culminated in decisions to radically reduce the number of authorities in the country and consequently substantially increase the size of the remainder. Tyneside was an obvious candidate for reform with a large number of authorities of different types, many of which were too small to adequately perform the functions expected of them. It was possible, therefore, to regard the decision-making process over Tyneside as a whole as being in some ways an indicator of that which might occur in a post-reform situation.

Because of the co-operative nature of the Durham project the work on which this thesis is based owes a great deal to others. A number of members of staff at the Universities of Durham and Newcastle were extremely helpful, but in particular mention must be made of Henry Parris, Geoffrey Atkinson, and Richard Batley. My thanks go to them all. I must also not forget Norah Hope whose help and support was invaluable. Finally I would like to express my appreciation to all those busy men and women who found the time to complete questionnaires and submit themselves to interview. Needless to say, any faults and omissions are entirely my responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
Abstract	i
Preface	ii
Contents	
 <u>PART ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</u>	
Chapter 1. Theories, concepts and assumptions	1
Chapter 2. The study of community power structures	30
Chapter 3. Methodology and research setting	57
 <u>PART TWO: THE ISSUES</u>	
Chapter 4. Preview of the issues	64
Chapter 5. The re-organisation of local government areas	66
Chapter 6. The Tyne tunnel	77
Chapter 7. The development of the airport	83
Chapter 8. The Port of Tyne Authority	91
Chapter 9. The re-organisation of police areas	99
Chapter 10. The shipbuilding merger	107
Chapter 11. The passenger transport authority	113
Chapter 12. Summary of the issues	120
 <u>PART THREE: THE LEADERS</u>	
Chapter 13. The survey and the questionnaire	122
Chapter 14. The characteristics of the leaders	126
Chapter 15. The leadership groupings	136
Chapter 16. Reputational leaders and London influentials	152
Chapter 17. The issues and the leaders	168
Chapter 18. Top leaders, other leaders, and the led	196
 <u>PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS</u>	
Chapter 19. The power structure of Tyneside	208
 Appendix 1. Maps	
	222
Appendix 2. The questionnaire	234
Appendix 3. List of potential leaders	240
Appendix 4. Election results	247

PART ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKCHAPTER ONETHEORIES, CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The study of decision-making in the local community has occupied the attention of many sociologists and political scientists in recent years, particularly in the United States. This has not only led to a great debate on the methodologies which ought to be used but also to a re-examination of many of the central concepts of political theory and political sociology. In fact the relationships between methodology and definitions of concepts have in many cases proved to be so close that it is necessary to examine these concepts before proceeding to a discussion of the various methodologies.

The Meaning and Measurement of Power.

The concept of power is of fundamental importance in many aspects of social analysis and has been one of the primary concerns of all the great political theorists of the past. Yet it still remains vague and unspecific. Many investigators in this field have commented on this lack of clarity; for example, Kaufman and Jones complained that:

"there is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost ghostly quality.... We 'know' what it is, yet we encounter countless difficulties in trying to define it. We can 'tell' whether one person or group is more powerful than another, yet we cannot measure power."¹

This elusiveness has led to a great deal of confusion with arguments being waged by social scientists on completely different wavelengths. Particularly important in this respect is the dichotomy between those who see power as being primarily a structural feature of a society or group and those who regard power as being a more individualistic property belonging to an actor without much reference to the particular social situation. It has even been suggested that the former view is

that of sociologists while political scientists tends to prefer the latter.²

If we turn to the writings of a number of authorities on the subject of power, the variety of approaches is immediately obvious. For Max Weber power was "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action."³ This definition raises a number of the questions which are at the heart of the subject of power. By including the word 'chance' Weber clearly does not envisage the group getting its way all the time. This leads on to a distinction between potential for power and the actual realisation of will which is of crucial importance in many of the arguments that have taken place in the field of community studies. The mention of the resistance of others is also important, not only because it highlights the actions of the group but also because it raises the question of the possibility of competing centres of power. Thus we are confronted with the problem of pluralism and elitism and another source of argument and disagreement.

It has been suggested that one failing in Weber's definition is the lack of emphasis on the social dimensions of power.⁴ Thus attention is diverted from the fact that individual power is always worked out in some wider institutional framework which can itself be manipulated by the individual to his own advantage.

A rather different approach to the subject of power is made by Bertrand Russell.⁵ He sets out to prove that power is a fundamental concept in social science and that no particular aspect of power is subordinate to any other, nor are they derived from a single source. He thus raises the question of whether power over the economic resources of a society is in itself sufficient and necessary for a section of that society to achieve power over all other fields of activity. This is another problem which is to confront us repeatedly in discussing community power.

Russell suggests that "Power may be defined as the production of intended effects by some men on other men"⁶ This certainly lacks many of the refinements of Weber's definition although Russell does go on to make a distinction between what he calls 'organisational power' and 'personal power.' He also puts forward a division of power into three types:

1. direct physical power.
2. inducements and rewards
3. influence on opinion, i.e. propaganda.

Elsewhere he also distinguishes between traditional power, which does not continually have to prove itself, and newly acquired power, which may be based on fear or on a revolutionary creed.

Following on from his criticism of the idea of the economic base of power Russell suggests that the Classical economists were mistaken in regarding material self-interest as the driving force of men and that, in fact, at a certain stage men will chase power and not wealth. This leads him on to write that

".... in a social system where power is open to all, the posts which confer power will, as a rule, be occupied by men who differ from the average in being exceptionally power loving." ⁷

Thus we are presented with another important aspect of the exercise of power, namely motivation.

Russell also examines the relationship between those who exercise power and those who do not. He conceives the power impulse as having two forms: explicit in the leaders and implicit in their followers. The implicit impulse is revealed in the process of group identification. As Russell puts it

"When men willingly follow a leader they do so with a view to the acquisition of power by the group which he commands, and they feel that his triumphs are theirs." ⁸

This is one of the means whereby inequalities of power are made acceptable to members of a group.

One of the most comprehensive attempts at an analysis of power was made by Lasswell and Kaplan. ⁹ In their view, power is the key concept in the study of political processes and "Political science, as an empirical discipline, is a study of the shaping and sharing of power." ¹⁰ Power is placed firmly in its societal setting, e.g.

"The power process is not a distinct and separable part of the social process, but only the political aspect of an interactive whole. It is, in fact, only the political aspect of the social process in its entirety."¹¹

Furthermore, the interactions within this process are based on patterns of power which are manifested in symbols and stabilised in certain political practices.

Lasswell and Kaplan are also concerned with the problem of power potential. They argue that by itself potential is not enough but must be allied with position in the value structure of the society. Thus a ruling clique just before its overthrow may have a high value position but low potential while a revolutionary group just about to come to power will have a low value position but a high potential.

Because of this alliance of potential and position, Lasswell and Kaplan are able to ground their definition of power on actual political acts within the social process. By assuming a decision to be "a policy involving severe sanctions"¹² they regard power as "participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H."¹³ This definition is rather disappointing in the light of the preceding analysis for mere participation in the decision-making process may tell us little about whether an actor is powerful or not. We must investigate this question of participation in greater detail at a later stage.

Following this definition of power, Lasswell and Kaplan attempt to isolate the components of what they call the 'notion of amount of power'. They suggest three such components: (1) the weight of power, i.e. the degree of participation in the making of decisions, (2) the scope of power, i.e. the values whose shaping and enjoyment are controlled, (3) the domain of power, i.e. the persons over whom power is exercised. This multidimensional view of power is important and it has been the source of a great deal of controversy in the field of community studies.

Two other problems are raised by Lasswell and Kaplan which feature prominently in a lot of the writing about community power. Firstly, they attempt to clarify the differences between the concept of power and the concept of influence. They conclude that

"It is the threat of sanctions which differentiates power from influence in general." ¹⁴

Furthermore

"The base value of an influence relation is that which is the condition for the exercise of the influence in question. The power base is the value which is the condition for participation in decision-making in the given case." ¹⁵

And

"A form of influence is a kind of influence relationship specified as to base value and scope. A form of power is a form of influence in which the effect on policy is enforced or expected to be enforced by relatively severe sanctions." ¹⁶

Secondly, they raise the problem of anticipated reaction. This involves the idea that an actor or group of actors may modify their policies or actions so as to satisfy the expected demands of another actor or group. Lasswell and Kaplan conclude

"Power is, specifically, a deference value: to have power is to be taken into account in others' acts." ¹⁷

Perhaps finally in this context we ought to mention Lasswell and Kaplan's definition of authority as "formal power". ¹⁸ While not ruling out the possibility that the actual power structure may be different, they argue that authority is "the expected and legitimate possession of power." ¹⁹

Another important contributor to the discussions on the concept of power is Talcott Parsons. ²⁰ He suggests that there are three principal difficulties in an understanding of the concept of power:

1. Conceptual diffuseness - the fact that some people treat influence, money, coercion, etc. as forms of power.
2. The relations between the coercive and the consensual elements of power - there is a tendency for power to be explained in the last resort as resting on either one or the other.
3. the zero-sum problem - the idea that there is a fixed quantity of power and that if one actor in a power relationship increases his power then another actor must suffer a decrease.

Parson's general thesis is that there is an essential parallelism in the theoretical structure between the conceptual schemes appropriate for the analysis of the economic and the political aspects of societies. He looks at four facets of this parallelism:

1. Political theory is an abstract arrangement of primary variables and their inter-relations. These variables are subject to other variables operating in the wider system of society.
2. The empirical system to which political theory is applied is a 'functional' sub-system of society, (i.e. the polity), The polity is "composed of the ways in which the relevant components of the total system are organised with reference to one of its fundamental functions, namely effective collective action in the attainment of the goals of collectivities." ²¹
3. The goal-demands of interest groups serve the same function in the polity as consumer wants in the economy.
4. Power is the generalised medium in politics as money is in economics.

Proceeding further with the analogy, Parsons suggests that it is possible to identify in the polity the equivalents of the factors of production in the economy. He equates land with "the commitment of resources to collective effective action, independent of any specifiable 'pay-off' for the unit which controls them." ²² Labour is paralleled by "the demands for collective action as manifested in the 'public' " Capital is equated with "the control of some part of the productivity of the economy for the goals of the collectivity." Finally, accepting organisation as a factor of production, Parsons finds an equivalent in "the legitimation of the authority under which collective decisions are taken." Just as money is not a factor of production so Parsons argues that power is not in itself one of the inputs into the polity but a means of acquiring control over these inputs.

Turning to the outputs of the polity Parsons identifies two:

1. Opportunity for effectiveness; and
2. capacity to assume leadership responsibility.

Thus we can see that Parsons does not consider policy decisions to be part of the output process but rather factors in the integration of the total system. This we ought to bear in mind when we begin looking at actual instances of decision-making.

Having set his wider theoretical scene, Parsons then proceeds to his analysis of power as such. He conceives of power as "a circulating medium, analogous to money, within what is called the political system, but notably over its boundaries into all three of the other neighbouring functional sub-systems of a society (as I conceive them), the economic, integrative, and pattern-maintenance systems."²³ After outlining the main features of money as a circulating medium and its function in the economy he defines an institutionalised power system as

"a relational system within which certain categories of commitments and obligations, ascriptive or voluntarily assumed - e.g. by contract - are treated as binding, i.e. under normatively defined conditions their fulfillment may be insisted upon by the appropriate role-reciprocal agencies. Furthermore, in case of actual or threatened resistance to 'compliance', i.e. to fulfillment of such obligations when invoked, they will be 'enforced' by the threat or actual imposition of situational negative sanctions, in the former case having the function of deterrence, in the latter of punishment."²⁴

It follows, therefore, that power is "generalised capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organisation when the obligations are legitimised with reference to their bearing on collective goals and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational sanctions - whatever the actual agency of that enforcement."²⁵

Thus unlike some other analysts of power Parsons argues that the securing of compliance simply by the threat of superior force is not an exercise of power. The capacity to secure compliance must be generalised and not just the function of one particular sanctioning act. This means that power can be regarded as 'symbolic'. Just as the economy requires confidence in the mutual acceptability and stability of the monetary unit, so the polity requires the legitimation of the possession and use of power. Parsons argues

that questioning this legitimacy leads to a resort to more 'secure' means of gaining compliance, i.e. coercion and eventually force.

Continuing his argument Parsons attempts to place power in a general paradigm of the ways in which in the processes of social interaction "the actions of one unit in a system can, intentionally, be oriented to bringing about a change in what the actions of one or more other units would otherwise have been" ²⁶ The first unit (which Parsons calls 'ego') may operate in terms of two dichotomous variables. On the one hand, 'ego' may

"attempt to gain his ends from 'alter' (others) either by using some form of control over the situation in which alter is placed, actually or contingently to change it so as to increase the probability of alter acting in the way he wishes, or, alternatively, without attempting to change alter's situation, ego may attempt to change alter's intentions, i.e. he may manipulate symbols which are meaningful to alter in such a way that he tries to make alter 'see' that what ego wants is a 'good thing' for him (alter) to do."

On the other hand there is

"the type of sanctions ego may employ in attempting to guarantee the attainment of his end from alter. The dichotomy here is between positive and negative sanctions. Thus through the situational channel a positive sanction is a change in alter's situation presumptively considered by alter as to his advantage, which is used as a means by ego of having an effect on alter's actions. A negative sanction then is an alteration in alter's situation to the latter's disadvantage. In the case of the intentional channel, the positive sanction is the expression of symbolic 'reasons' why compliance with ego's wishes as a 'good thing' independently of any further action on ego's part, from alter's point of view, i.e. would be felt by him to be 'personally advantageous', whereas the negative sanction is presenting reasons why non-compliance with ego's wishes should be felt by alter to be harmful to interests in which he had a significant personal investment and should therefore be avoided."

Parsons calls the four strategies open to ego inducement, coercion, persuasion, and activation of commitments.

However, there are certain complications in this analysis. There is, for example, a basic asymmetry between the positive and negative sides of sanctions because ego must 'deliver' when positive sanctions are introduced. Also alter's freedom of action in compliance or noncompliance is a variable; the limiting cases are (1) in the case of inducement when alter is given no choice in accepting an object of value, and (2) in the case of coercion when ego simply imposes a disadvantageous alteration. In the first case alter may feel a sense of obligation to reciprocate in the future while in the second alter may feel that he has been 'taught a lesson' and thus will comply in future.

While recognising that force is the ultimate deterrent in a power relationship, Parsons argues that a power system based solely on the threat or actual use of force is a very primitive one. Just as money has become an institutionalised symbol so has power. Thus we have a situation where there is

"a range of alternatives, choice among which is optional, in the light of the promised advantageousness, situational or 'intentional', of one as compared to other choices. Positive sanctions as here conceived constitute a contingent increment of relative advantageousness, situational or intentional, of the alternative ego desired alter to choose." 27

These optional inputs are, in Parsons' opinion, control of productivity of the economy at one boundary and influence through the relations between leadership and the public demands at the other.

Parsons departs from this analogy with money to look at one particular dimension of power which money does not have. This he says "may be formulated in terms of the conception that A may have power over B." 28 This power is, in its legitimised form, "the 'right' of A, as a decision-making unit involved in collective process, to make decisions which take precedence over those of B, in the interest of the effectiveness of the collective operation as a whole." This right to use power to assert priority of a decision over others is what constitutes authority.

This question of A having power over B leads on to the zero-sum problem. Parsons contends that the idea of zero-sum breaks down in economics due to the fact of credit creation. Similarly in politics we can conceive of the creation of 'power-credit' which can be deposited with leaders by their followers and can, if necessary, be revoked e.g. at elections. Also the leader may use influence such as the prestige of a particular office as opposed to its formal powers, to add to the total supply of power. By this creation of additional power the leader takes risks in enhancing the effectiveness of collective action in valued areas and if he over-extends himself there is likely to be a crisis of confidence.

We mentioned earlier that Parsons differs from some other writers in that he did not accept that the securing of compliance simply by the threat of superior force is an exercise of power. One of these other writers is Robert Dahl who is one of the seminal minds in the whole field of community power research. We will come across his name and his ideas very often in later pages. For the moment, however, we will confine ourselves to his ideas on the concept of power.

In his 'Modern Political Analysis' ²⁹ R.A. Dahl devotes a chapter to a discussion of power and influence. He begins from the idea that influence is a relation amongst actors. In principle it is possible to determine both the existence of influence and its direction. However what it is really important to know is how much influence each actor has so that we are able to make comparisons. Dahl asserts that the most effective way of measuring influence is by studying the amount of change in the behaviour of an actor when influenced by another actor. This he considers to be made up of five underlying measures of influence:

- (1) The amount of change in the position of the actor influenced. But this does not take into account the effort that goes into producing a certain amount of change. Therefore we must look at
- (2) the subjective psychological costs of compliance. For example it takes more influence to make pacifists join the army than militarists.
- (3) The amount of difference in the probability of compliance. However this requires either random events or a large number of past occurrences of equivalent events and unfortunately political events tend to be neither random nor equivalent. It is also difficult to know the original position of the participants in a decision. Finally

this measure does not take into account either the extent of or the cost of compliance.

- (4) The differences in the scope of the responses. Influence is usually directed to some particular field and it is difficult to measure comparative influence in different scopes.
- (5) The number of people who respond.

Dahl also attempts to tackle the problem of potential and actual influence. He argues that the reasons why certain actors acquire more influence over some scope of decisions than other actors can be reduced to three:

- (1) some actors have more political resources at their disposal than others;
- (2) given the resources at their disposal, some actors use more of them to gain political influence;
- (3) given the resources at their disposal some actors use them more skillfully or effectively than others do.

In fact, of course, actual influence rarely approaches potential influence because very few actors have sufficient political skill and only a few actors feel it worthwhile to use their resources to the full in order to maximise the political influence in a given sector.

So far we have been talking only about Dahl's notion of influence but this is necessary to an understanding of his ideas about power. He points out that two particular kinds of influence have been singled out for special attention. Firstly there is what he calls coercive influence which is based on the threat of sanctions. Secondly there is reliable influence which is based on a high probability of compliance. It is the first of these that Dahl identifies as power.

Elsewhere ³⁰ Dahl has suggested that it is unlikely that a consistent 'Theory of Power' can be produced because a formal definition which would catch the full meaning of the concept would be difficult to apply to actual research problems. What is more likely is that a variety of theories of limited scope will be produced. As a contribution to this he attempts a fairly simple example. He begins with what he calls an intuitive idea of

power which states that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." ³¹ But this has to be amended to take account of three variables:

- (1) The base of power which must be exploited.
- (2) The amount of power.
- (3) The scope of power.

Dahl then proceeds to try to express in mathematical terms the fundamentals of a power relationship. He supposes that he tells a student (Jones) to read 'The Great Transformation' under threat of failing a course if he does not comply. Then he says let (D,w) = Dahl threatens Jones with failure if he does not read 'The Great Transformation', let (D,\bar{w}) = Dahl does not threaten Jones, and let (J,x) = Jones reads 'The Great Transformation'. Then the probability that Jones will read 'The Great Transformation' if Dahl threatens to fail him (say $p(1)$) is equal to $P(Jx/D,w)$ and the probability that Jones will read 'The Great Transformation' if Dahl does not threaten to fail him (say $p(2)$) is equal to $P(J,x/D,\bar{w})$. If we then let M = the amount of power, we can say that $M\left(\frac{D}{J} : w,x\right) = P(J,x/D,w) - P(J,x/D,\bar{w}) = p(1) - p(2)$. From this we can say that if $p(1) = p(2)$ then $M = 0$ and no power relation exists. Also the power is at a maximum when $p(1) = 1$ and $p(2) = 0$, i.e. Jones always does what Dahl tells him.

However, Dahl recognises that the main problem is not to discover the existence of power but to make power comparisons. He suggests there are five factors which we should look at:

- (1) differences in the basis of power;
- (2) differences in the means of employing this basis;
- (3) differences in the scope of power;
- (4) differences in the number of comparable respondents;
- (5) differences in the change in probabilities.

It is, of course, difficult to isolate these variables and even if this is possible it is difficult to compare different cases. Thus we cannot compare A's power with respect to $a(1)$, $a(2)$, $a(3)$... with B's power with respect to $b(1)$, $b(2)$, $b(3)$... Only if the scope and the respondents are the same can we say that A is more powerful than B with respect to the change in probabilities. We are still presented with the difficulty however of specifying the properties that will ensure comparability.

It seems that any decision will be arbitrary and will depend on the research problem in hand.

In concluding our look at Dahl's ideas on power we might mention the warnings he gives about some of the common errors that occur in the analysis of power. Firstly there is the common failure to distinguish clearly between an individual actor participating in a decision, influencing a decision, and being affected by the consequences of a decision. Then there is the failure to identify the scope or scopes within which an actor is said to be powerful. Another failure is that which does not distinguish different degrees of power, for example by equating the proposition that power is distributed unequally in a political system with the proposition that the system is ruled by a ruling class. Furthermore there is often a confusion between an actor's past or present power with his potential power, particularly by assuming that the greater the political resources an actor has access to the greater his power must be. Finally there is the equating of an actor's expected future power with his potential power by ignoring differences in incentives and skills. We shall be coming across these problems again.

The recent emphasis which has been placed on the study of local community power structures stems largely from Floyd Hunter's work on Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia). It is advisable therefore to look at what he has to say on the question of power. In his opinion, power "is no reified concept, but an abstract term denoting a structural description of social processes."³² Or as he puts it in rather simpler terms, "Power is a word that will be used to describe the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things."³³

Hunter recognises however that there are elements of power about which it is impossible to talk with any certainty. These he describes as 'residual categories' and he identifies three: firstly what he calls historical reference; secondly, motivation and other psychological concepts; and thirdly, values, moral and ethical considerations. In his study of Regional City he proposes to ignore these and also to avoid any ideological considerations of the power operations of a capitalistic community. It is interesting in this respect, therefore, to note that Hunter has been accused of adopting a Marxist perspective.

As we have said before there is often a close relationship between the definition of concepts and the particular methodologies of empirical research. This is very apparent in the case of Hunter's treatment of power. He assumes that

"In our society, men of authority are called power and influence leaders.... The difference between the leaders and other men lies in the fact that social groupings have apparently given definite social functions over to certain persons and not to others. The functions suggested are those related to power." ³⁴

This suggests a confusion over the differences between such concepts as power, influence, authority and leadership. This impression is strengthened when he goes on to present a number of postulates and hypotheses on the power structure. He puts forward four postulates, with a number of corollaries, which he regards as self-evident propositions. These are:

- "(1) Power involves relationships between individuals and groups, both controlled and controlling.
 - Corollary 1. Because power involves such relationships it can be described structurally.

- (2) Power is structured socially, in the United States, into a dual relationship between governmental and economic authorities on national, state and local levels.
 - Corollary 1. Both types of authority may have functional, social and institutional power units subsidiary to them.

- (3) Power is a relatively constant factor in social relationships with policies as variables.
 - Corollary 1. Wealth, social status, and prestige are factors in the 'power constant'.
 - Corollary 2. Variation in the strength between power units, or a shift in policy within one of these units, affects the whole power structure.

- (4) Power of the individual must be structured into associational, clique, or institutional patterns to be effective.

Corollary 1. The community provides a microcosm of organised power relations in which individuals exercise the maximum effective influence.

Corollary 2. Representative democracy offers the greatest possibility of assuring the individual a voice in policy determination and extension." ³⁵

From these he derives three hypotheses:

- "(1) Power is exercised as a necessary function in social relationships.
- (2) The exercise of power is limited and directed by the formulation and extension of social policy within a framework of socially sanctioned authority.
- (3) In a given power unit (organisation) a smaller number of individuals will be found formulating and extending policy than those exercising power.

Corollary 1. All policy makers are 'men of power'.

Corollary 2. All 'men of power' are not, per se, policy makers." ³⁶

Perhaps before leaving the question of power we should just mention what a number of other students of community power have said about the concept. Rossi conceived of power as a relationship "in which individual A affects the behaviour of individual B because B wishes to avoid the sanctions which A would employ if B did not comply with his wishes." Influence is exercised when "B's behaviour is affected in the absence of sanctions." ³⁷ On the other hand D'Antonio and Form regard influence as being merely a sub-class of power, along with authority. Thus power is made up of authority, which is based on the position a person holds in a formal hierarchial structure, and influence, "that more subtle phenomenon of power manifested in the willingness of people to obey others who lack formal authority.... They obey because they have respect or esteem for or fear of the person, office, group.... in its extreme form it becomes charisma." ³⁸ Schulze defined power as "the capacity or potential of persons in certain statuses to set conditions, make decisions, and/or

take actions which are determinative for the existence of others within a given social system." ³⁹ Haer preferred to define power as "the ability or authority of individuals or organisations to control, effectively guide, or influence other individuals or groups." ⁴⁰ Finally D'Antonio again, this time in collaboration with Ehrlich, wrote that "power in its most general sense refers to a capacity or ability to control others and.... to control the decision-making process." ⁴¹

The difficulties that have arisen in the search for a clear and comprehensive definition of power incline one to support Dahl in his view that many types of power exist and that the study of them will prove to be a bottomless swamp. Although it has been suggested ⁴² that the difficulties in the study of community power arise from the failure to apply a rigorous formulation to the concept of power, it seems that all we can do is to devise a theory of power of limited scope directly applicable to the particular research problem under consideration. So I shall, for the purpose of this study, regard power as a function of social interaction which is structured within an institutional framework, and which involves, when necessary, changing the behaviour patterns of some or all the individuals within that framework with respect to the values of the persons exercising the power.

Leadership, Elitism, and Pluralism.

Having discussed the concept of power we can now proceed to the question of how this power is exercised and by whom. Virtually all political theorists have argued that a certain number of individuals in any group or society will be raised up above the general level and will exercise leadership functions. For example, Aristotle wrote "There can be no objection in principle to the mere fact that one should command and another obey; that is both necessary and expedient. Indeed some things are so divided right from birth, some to rule, some to be ruled." ⁴³ A less provocative judgement is provided by Keller in her study of the 'strategic' elites of modern society:

"Whether a community is small or large, rich or poor, simple or complex, it always sets some of its members apart as very important, very powerful or very prominent. The notion of a stratum elevated above the mass of men may prompt approval, indifference or despair, but regardless of how men feel about

it, the fact remains that their lives, fortune, and fate are and have long been dependent on what a small number of men in high places think and do." ⁴⁴

While it is fairly easy to say that leaders exist it is rather more difficult to delineate the boundaries of leadership groups. In a sense this is one of the purposes of this study. The usual starting point is to regard the wielders of power as leaders. Thus Lasswell and Kaplan argued that "The leaders of a group are its most active power-holders, effectively and in the perspective of the group." ⁴⁵ This is interesting in that it combines the two aspects of leadership namely actual and reputed, which lay behind most of the controversy over community power structures. Similarly Speight has written that

"Leadership is the exercise of influence. Some few individuals function as leaders most of the time; the majority of the individuals in a community function at times as leaders and at times as non-leaders. A small portion of the community members never function as leaders." ⁴⁶

We may argue with the proportions Speight assigns to each category, but the categorisation itself is probably justifiable.

Although the term 'elite' has certain value connotations, in that the members of an elite are considered 'better' in some socially valued way, there seems to be no reason why we should not equate it with the leadership group in any particular social grouping. Therefore we agree with Keller that

"Elites are effective and responsible minorities - effective as regards the performance of activities of interest and concern to others to whom these elites are responsible. Socially significant elites are ultimately responsible for the realisation of major social goals and for the community of the social order." ⁴⁷

What is then of interest is the extent to which there is an overlapping of elite groups in a society and the extent to which they are open to penetration by members of the non-elite.

Many writers have contributed to the literature on elites. Probably the best guide to this literature is provided by Keller and I shall

base discussion of the question of elites on her work. She argues that past studies of elites have been characterised by two main perspectives, the moral and the functional:

"The first concentrates on the moral excellence of individuals, the second on the functional role of a stratum. Both, however, start from the existence of a group of people set apart from the rest by a distinctive set of duties and rewards. One accounts for the existence of elite groups in terms of the superiority of given individuals, the other in terms of the social function of a class or group. The moral approach easily degenerates into mysticism, the functional approach into tautology." ⁴⁸

We have already mentioned Aristotle's opinion that a ruling group was not only necessary but also expedient. He regarded this ruling group as fulfilling a socially necessary function. The state existed for the sake of the good life and in order for it to fulfil this mission it needed a special breed of men to run it who would value justice and the common interest above their own personal interests. These men would have to be wealthy because only the wealthy would have the leisure to be able to rule well. Aristotle's elites would be responsible for both the material and the moral needs of the community.

Saint-Simon also envisaged a functional elite although of rather a different kind to Aristotle. ⁴⁹ He believed that the good society was based upon man's natural capacities. However, he recognised that these capacities were highly unequal and so he proposed to divide society into three mutually exclusive social classes with selection on a functional basis. These were to be

- (1) those who performed the intelligence function of planning social action;
- (2) those who performed the motor function of carrying out essential social work, and
- (3) those leaders who performed the sensory function of fulfilling the spiritual needs of human beings.

Within each of these classes those individuals who most excelled would form the elite; these Saint-Simon called the scientists, the economic organisers, and the cultural-religious leaders.

Saint-Simon foresaw the profound importance of industry in society and he even regarded industrialisation as a method for the moral regeneration of society. The society he envisaged would have been hierarchically organised with a group of high priests of industrialism at its summit.

The inevitability of elites was a common feature of the ideas about society of both Pareto and Mosca⁵⁰. Both based their argument on the variety of human nature, both emphasised the importance of traditional and non-rational forces in society, and both thought that the chief dialectical principle is the conflict between those who hold and those who seek political office.

Mannheim distinguished between two fundamentally different types of elite.⁵¹ On the one hand there is the integrative elite which is composed of political and organisational leaders, and on the other there is the sublimative elite made up of moral-religious, aesthetic and intellectual leaders. Thus he belongs to the functional category for he believes that the elites have to perform certain functions for the society and that it is the nature of these functions rather than the nature of the particular leaders that determine the kinds of elites that arise. Each of the elites is somehow dependent on another and each participates in the body politic. Mannheim thought that functional power was gradually replacing personal and arbitrary power and so power was becoming more legitimate and limited.

We have already come across Lasswell's views on power; he also attempted to conduct empirical studies of elites on a world scale.⁵² In this case elites are defined in social-psychological terms. They are those who get "the most of what there is to get" and in Lasswell's opinion the three things most worth getting are deference, income and safety.

Presthus has defined elitism as "a system in which disproportionate power rests in the hands of a minority of the community."⁵³ The difficulty with this, of course, is the definition of 'disproportionate'. On this hangs much of the argument about 'who governs' in Western Society.

Presthus does offer a way out of the difficulty however by postulating a pluralist-elitist continuum. By this means we would say that a particular society is more or less elitist than another. However pluralism is a

notoriously difficult concept to deal with and it has often been approached in ideological terms. Presthus has defined it as "a sociopolitical system in which the power of the state is shared with a large number of private groups, interest organisations, and individuals represented by such organisation." ⁵⁴ He argues that it is not only proper but necessary that private groups are able to influence public policy. He quotes with approval the following extract from Durkheim:

"Collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed through the single and unique organ of the state. Moreover, the state is too remote from individuals, its relations with them too external and intermittent to penetrate deeply within individual consciences and socialise them within. When the state is the only environment in which men can live communal lives, they inevitably lose contact, become detached and society disintegrates. A nation can be maintained only if, between the state and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life." ⁵⁵

However the increasing complexity of modern society has meant a re-assessment of this idea of pluralism. As one student has written "the demand of traditional pluralist theory for individual participation in the policy forming process through primary voluntary groups has been made sentimental by modern organisational conditions." ⁵⁶ It is suggested that we usually have the situation today where organised units often achieve their ends at the expense of a broader, unorganised public whose rule is merely that of consumer. Pluralism has tended, therefore, to come to be regarded in terms of group membership rather than in terms of individual participation. But this also raises difficulties because "the voluntary organisations and associations which the early theorists of pluralism relied upon to sustain the individual against a unified omnipotent government, have themselves become obligarchically governed hierarchies." ⁵⁷ Thus we have a situation where the leadership of a group is often defined as being not truly representative, (e.g. 'unofficial' strikes). Presthus argues therefore that

"Viewed as independent systems, then, the private groups that give meaning to pluralism are rarely pluralistic, in the sense of having competing power centres within them. Such groups no longer meet traditional pluralist assumptions, because of the great inequality of bargaining power that characterises them. The pluralism that exists is too often restricted to the few powerful organisations that monopolise most social areas. Producer groups, linked fundamentally by an economic interest, dominate, and the less disciplined voluntary associations rarely compete successfully with them in the struggle for access and influence." 58

What passes for pluralism then in the writings of the apologists for Western pluralist society is in fact merely competition between elites. They work from the assumption that pluralism exists and only abandon this position if it can be shown conclusively that a single elite dominates decision-making in every field of public policy.

Rejecting this revisionist idea of pluralism, Presthus attempts to define some of the relevant conditions for pluralism. He enumerates five:

- (1) That competing centres and bases of power and influence exist within a political community.
- (2) The opportunity for individual and organisational access into the political system.
- (3) That individuals actively participate in and make their will felt through organisations of many kinds.
- (4) That elections are a viable instrument of mass participation in political decisions, including those on specific issues.
- (5) That a consensus exists on what may be called 'the democratic creed.'

If the above conditions do not operate then elitism exists.

In attempting to discover whether a particular society is pluralist or elitist it is necessary to try and avoid making distorting preconceptions. Thus we must not assume that those exercising power

necessarily constitute a monolithic elite or that the locus of power is constant. But alternatively we must be careful to separate appearance and reality and not assume that they are identical. For example, to take Presthus' fifth condition for pluralism, it would be possible for an elite group to create a consensus which may have little substance in fact. We will return to these difficulties when we discuss some of the work that has been done in the field of community power structures.

What is a Community?

In the previous discussion of power we argued that it was structured within an institutional framework. This may be a nation state, a trade union, a political party or a local community. By stretching the term somewhat we could regard each of these as a community of sorts. However, most of the writing on the subject has taken a more restricted view.

There have probably been three major conceptions of community - geographical-political, process, and functional. The first is by far the most common and this is the one we are concerned with in this study. If a group of people live together within a particular geographical area and the basic social relationships of this group are for the most part confined to this area then we can say that a community exists. However, very few communities are completely self-sufficient and it is becoming increasingly the case, in both the economic and political spheres, that communities are interdependent.

MacIver and Page defined a community as "an area of social living marked by some degree of social coherence."⁵⁹ The bases of a community are, in their opinion, locality and community sentiment. Every community, even a nomadic group, always occupies a particular territorial area. This gives the group a strong sense of solidarity especially in the face of opposition from other territorially based groups. To some extent this solidarity has been eroded by improved communications but this in itself can lead to a new and larger community. But a mere territorial base is not enough for a community to exist. It is also necessary for the members of the particular territorial group to feel an attachment to the area and to each other. This, of course, is a much more difficult concept to deal with empirically and it is noticeable that virtually all local community studies have been based on a territorial unit which is usually a political unit as well.

One recent example of this is Hampton's study of Sheffield.⁶⁰ Having discussed the difficulties of defining the term community, he proceeds to demonstrate that the city of Sheffield can justifiably be described as a community. More importantly, however, he follows this with an examination of the perceptions ordinary citizens have of their local community and the relationship this has with their political knowledge and interest. Hampton linked in here with the Community Attitudes Survey sponsored by the Royal Commission on Local Government in England, which was carried out in the summer of 1967.⁶¹ Using the concept of the 'home' area developed by the Royal Commission researchers, i.e. the area in which people feel 'at home', Hampton found that the size of this 'home' area was in most cases smaller than a local authority ward. I think it is legitimate at this stage to ask whether the 'home' area and the city of Sheffield as a whole are regarded as being communities and if so, what are the factors that they possess in common. It would seem that the 'home' area is a far more subjective concept than the city of Sheffield which at least has recognisable boundaries to which every citizen can relate.

On the question of the relationship between community and political knowledge and interest, Hampton concludes that "attachment to the 'home' area is not associated with the level of political awareness exhibited by the respondent."⁶² Rather this is only one of the factors which may stimulate knowledge and interest. This leads Hampton to the conclusion that there should be

"a more careful distinction drawn between a person's attachment to an area and the conditions that may enhance his civic consciousness. These two factors are not close related.... and it would appear, therefore, that local political affairs might be ordered within more rational boundaries without fear that such changes would reduce the interest shown in local politics."⁶³

The arena of this study is neither of the 'home' area nor the political community type. Rather it is a territorial unit made up of a number of political communities but having a social coherence which is recognised both by its inhabitants and by outsiders.⁶⁴

The size of the ideal political community has concerned many political philosophers in the past. Aristotle argued that in order to do civic business properly "it is necessary that the citizens should know each other and know what kind of people they are."⁶⁵ Similarly Rousseau, with his admiration for Geneva, looked back for inspiration to the Greek city-states. Again, today, attention is being turned to the region and the local community in an attempt to bring government closer to the citizen. It was the anticipation that government would be more meaningful that persuaded political scientists and sociologists to focus their attention on the local community in order to try and arrive at a better understanding of how the political process works. It was assumed that at the grass-roots the obstacles to participation in this process by ordinary individuals would be minimised and that effective democracy would be most likely to be operative. Before taking a look at the reality of the local situation, we should perhaps examine briefly the notion of participation.

Participation - Fact and Value⁶⁶

It is fairly obvious that participation characterises all systems of modern government in the sense that they are the products of many hands. What we are concerned with is the extent of this participation and whether it is sufficient.

It is clear that, as Dahl says, "In all human organisation there are significant variations in participation in political decision - variations which... appear to be functionally related to such variables as degree of concern or involvement, skill, access, socio-economic status, education, residence, age, ethnic and religious identifications, and some little understood personal characteristics."⁶⁷ It is relatively easy to measure these variables; the problem is what constitutes participation. The most obvious form of participation in Western society is voting in elections to national or local government bodies. However, we must bear in mind Rousseau's jibe that the English are only free when electing their representatives.⁶⁸ In discussing the question of pluralism we came across the idea that organisational membership could be regarded as a form of participation. In fact it would seem that this aspect of participation is assuming a greater and greater role in decision-making at all levels.

Whether this is a good thing or not is doubtful in view of the fact that many of the most important organised groups are in themselves undemocratic to a greater or lesser extent. Merely to assume, therefore, that organisational membership implies participation could be mis-leading. It would seem that the only way to measure participation is by examining in detail a particular decisional process to find out who was involved and to what extent. Then it would be possible to suggest a continuum of participation ranging from complete ignorance of the fact that a decision was being made, through implied consent through inaction and token forms of participation such as attending meetings, to decisive influence in the shape of the final decision.

In theory, therefore, we can make an attempt to assess participation as a fact of the sociopolitical process. Before we do this, however, we must clarify the idea of participation as a value. There are perhaps four arguments in favour of participation which should be borne in mind. Firstly there is the argument that participation is essential to the full development of the human being. This is implied in the words of Pericles: "We differ from other states in regarding the man who holds aloof from public life not as 'quiet' but as useless."⁶⁹ The distinction between the public and the private sphere is as important today as it was in the ancient world. While it may be true that "one of the central facts of political life is that politics - local, state, national, international - lies for most people at the outer periphery of attention, interest, concern and activity,"⁷⁰ we can still argue that "To live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life; to be deprived of the reality that comes of being seen and heard by others, to be deprived of an 'objective' relationship with them that comes from being related to and separated from them through the intermediary of a common world of things."⁷¹

Secondly we can argue that participation has value for without it politics would not exist. Politics is, in the words of Crick, "a way of ruling in divided societies without undue violence."⁷³ Furthermore, "political activity is.... moral activity; it is free activity, and it is inventive, flexible, enjoyable and human."

Thirdly it is possible to argue that participation is necessary for social justice. An enlightened despot may wish to consider the claims of all sections of the community but how can he be sure that all the claims

have been heard unless all have the right to speak out on their own behalf. As Mill pointed out "We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive class, that class will knowingly and deliberately sacrifice the other classes to themselves; it suffices that, in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns." ⁷⁴

Lastly participation may be held to be a condition of political obligation. "As soon as any man says of the affairs of the State: What does it matter to me? the State may be given up for lost" ⁷⁵ Under such circumstances the government does not necessarily cease to exist but it loses its legitimacy. "The moment the government usurps the Sovereignty.... all private citizens.... are forced, but not bound, to obey." ⁷⁶

We must always bear in mind, however, that participation must be meaningful both to the participants themselves and to the issue under discussion. If the population as a whole is only presented with the task of formal ratification of a previously agreed decision then we can question the effectiveness and the usefulness of this participation. Participation does not necessarily imply power.

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CHAPTER TWOTHE STUDY OF COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURES

The local community is one of the best sources of information about the theory and practice of politics. Until recently, however, it has been left largely to sociologists to attempt any coherent analysis of community power structures, although they have usually been more concerned with the social and economic aspects of power. Where political scientists did concern themselves with the local community their chief interest was often in administration and the institutional structure. We can, in fact, following Jennings¹ categorise the studies of local communities under five headings: (1) traditional political science, (2) traditional sociology, (3) interpersonal influence processes, (4) case studies, (5) power structure.

The traditional political science approach has usually concentrated on either the operation of party politics at the local level or on municipal administration. The weaknesses of this approach have been pointed out by Richards.

"Deficiencies in local government research result largely from a failure to be concerned sufficiently about relationships - relationships between legal norms and governmental practice, between forms of government and voter participation, between community structure and government policy, between the strength and practices of political parties and governmental organisation, between community growth and changes in governmental and social phenomena. Through a broader and more intensive study of relationships, it may be possible to predict more accurately governmental and political behaviour and, indeed, to encourage more socially approved types of behaviour."²

If traditional political science has been too restricted then we could perhaps argue that traditional sociology has been too ambitious. It is best exemplified by the work of Lloyd Warner and his associates and by the Lynds in their 'Middletown' series of studies.³ Although they usually identify the latent and manifest social structures, processes and functions within a community, these studies are limited in their applicability to more general community decision-making studies.

The interpersonal influence studies draw attention to less stable and less institutionalised relationships. Among the studies we can include in this category are those by Stewart⁴, Katz and Lazarsfeld⁵, and Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet⁶. Although, of course, this type of approach is primarily concerned with influence at a personal level, it does provide certain insights which can be useful at a community level.

The case study approach is much more closely related to the subject of decision-making in the local community. We could include under this heading studies by Freeman⁷, Myerson and Banfield⁸, and Garceau⁹. Although this approach may produce interesting data it is impossible to generalise from single case studies. In an attempt to get round this some investigators have made a series of case studies, but they are still usually presented with the problem of applying insights gained in one particular field to other different fields.

Finally we come to the approach which chiefly concerns us, that of power structure analysis. It attempts to explain all the major decision-making processes within a particular community. Although it is the most recently developed of the five approaches we can trace its roots back into earlier less sophisticated approaches. It is also possible to gain important insights from the work of novelists and journalists who were concerned with understanding the world around them.

It is probably justifiable to identify three approaches to the analysis of community power structures, although there may be variations within each. Also they are not mutually exclusive and a number of investigators have used a combination of approaches. We can categorise the three approaches as positional, reputational, and decisional.

The Positional Approach

Prior to 1953 this was the most common approach, primarily because it was the most obvious, the quickest and the easiest. Essentially it consisted in listing the holders of formal positions and offices within various institutional structures and defining these as the community leaders. A refinement could be introduced whereby those individuals who held the greatest number of offices were considered to be the key decision-makers. Attention was not necessarily confined to purely political or administrative structures but was also extended to include business executives, religious leaders, union leaders, and officials of voluntary associations. Examples of this approach include the work of Warner in

Jonesville, the Lynds in Middletown, and Smith.¹⁰

A variation of the approach is to describe the major positional actors in terms of their characteristics, their goals and strategies. Examples of this include Sayre and Kaufman's study of New York¹¹, a study of ten cities in Florida¹², and Adrian's study of the roles of city managers, mayors and interest groups.¹³

The great weakness of this method of studying the power structure of a community is, of course, that it prejudices the issue. It assumes that those people who hold positions of authority within a community actually make the key decisions. This we can only hypothesise and test by some other research procedure. Attempts have been made to relate this approach to the findings of other methods with varying degrees of success.¹⁴ It seems, therefore, that we must reject the positional method as a sufficient means of analysing community power structures although there is no reason why it should not be used as a preliminary to either of the other two methods for the purpose of comparison or introduction.

The Reputational Approach

Warner, Hollingshead and others used a form of reputational technique in their studies of community status stratification but it was not until 1953 that another sociologist first applied it to the study of community power, when Floyd Hunter published his study of Atlanta, Georgia.¹⁵ After examining the literature for theoretical insights, Hunter devised a research strategy. Working on the assumption that community life is organised life and that persons occupying 'offices' would be involved in some manner in the power relations of the community, he compiled a list of leaders occupying positions of prominence in civic organisations, business establishments, the University bureaucracy, office holders in politics, and of those of high wealth and social status. These were then divided into four categories - civic, governmental, business, and status leaders. From these lists a group of 14 'judges' who were presumed to have a good knowledge of the community were asked to choose the 'top ten' in each category. These people were then considered to be the top influentials in Regional City. A further refinement was to then ask these top influentials who they considered to be the ten people most necessary for the functioning of the decision-making process. Those nominated were then extensively interviewed to determine how the power structure worked.

The conclusions of Hunter's study were that in Regional City there was a small group of individuals who made the important community decisions and that "The test for admission to this circle of decision-makers is almost wholly a man's position in the business community in Regional City."¹⁶ The process of policy-making is usually covert, taking place in private houses and private clubs and involving 'crowds' of friends and colleagues. What Hunter found, therefore, in Regional City is the local equivalent of C. Wright Mill's 'power elite'.

Hunter's method, or variations on it, has been used by a number of investigators since 1953. Schulze in his study of Cibola assumed that "those persons who exercised major control over the community's economic system would tend to be the same persons who exercised preponderant control over its socio-political system, and this latter control would be reflected, at least in part, by their active leadership and participation in the political and civic life of the community."¹⁷ In fact he found that control had passed into the hands of middle rank business and professional men who usually did not possess dominant economic positions in the community. The economic dominants were only drawn in to the power structure to provide finance and/or prestige.

Form and D'Antonio in their study of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez were concerned to discover whether those who were reputed to be influential in the business field were integrated with those who were presumed to be influential in the political field. This integration they measured in four ways:

- (1) The extent to which businessmen and politicians were chosen as influential both in business and politics.
- (2) The extent of similarity in social backgrounds and participation in selected voluntary organisations.
- (3) The extent of perceptual agreement on business and governmental practices.
- (4) The extent of agreement on major problems facing the community and groups working for and against the solution to these problems.

The data they produce suggests that there was considerable integration between the economic and the political elites.

An attempt at cross-cultural analysis using the reputational method was made by Miller in his study of Pacific City (Seattle) and English City (Bristol). Hewas concerned with testing the hypothesis that businessmen exert predominant influence in community decision-making: he found it to be true in Pacific City but not in English City. Furthermore, he found that the city council in Pacific City was not a strong centre of power but that in English City it is "the major arena of community decision." 18

The chief advantage of the reputational method is that it is cheap and quick. But it has a number of defects which have been seized on by many investigators, among whom the foremost have been Dahl, Polsby and Wolfinger. The resulting debate has gone on every since with considerable degree of bitterness.

The first and most obvious defect is that the reputational method does not measure leadership as such but only reputation for leadership. How far is it justifiable to regard reputation for power as an adequate index of the distribution of power within a community? 19 All that we can say is that reputation for power can be in certain cases a resource at the disposal of some people. 20

Secondly, it can be argued that the reputational method tends to assume a monolithic power structure. Polsby has argued that most of those employing this method have regarded politics as being an epiphenomenon of social stratification and that, therefore, the top strata must of necessity make all the major decisions. 21 It is wrong to assume that on different issues and at different times the decision-makers will be the same. We must have proof that in specific situations those with reputations for power are actually exercising power.

Thirdly it has been alleged that the reputationalists make assumptions about the integration of those individuals with a reputation for power. Those persons who are nominated as being the top influentials in a community should only be regarded as an aggregate of leaders and not as a ruling group unless it can be shown that they have interactive relationships with one another, that they share common values, and that their views regularly prevail in the decision-making process. 22

Fourthly, the perceptions of the respondent may differ from those of the investigator. As we have seen, academics cannot agree on a definition of power and so it is highly unlikely that all the respondents will base their nominations on the same criteria. Polsby has argued ²³ that asking for reputed influentials may produce any one of the five groups:

- (1) the status elite;
- (2) people with specific influence on issues of recent interest, or of interest to the respondent, or of characteristic interest to the community;
- (3) the community 'letterhead' leaders;
- (4) the formal leaders;
- (5) the most vocal leaders.

Thus the critics of the reputational method have further argued that it is necessary to specify the scope of activity in which it is thought that a particular individual exercises influence.

Fifthly, it is necessary for the investigator to make an arbitrary decision about the 'cut-off' point when the leaders are being separated from the non-leaders. If this point is too high it will exclude a number of people who exercise leadership, while if it is too low it will include people who are merely followers. One of the criticisms of Hunter's work is that he set the limit at 40 which has been considered as being too restrictive and leading naturally to the conclusion that a small group rules in Regional City.

Finally, there is the problem of who are the 'judges' who make the nominations. How can we be sure that they are, in fact, knowledgeable about the community and have not been deceived by false reputations? If they are not leaders themselves how can we expect them to know what goes on behind the locked doors of the Country Club? Isn't it likely that the businessmen on the panel will tend to nominate other businessmen, union leaders will nominate other union leaders, and so on? By using the reputational method the investigator is putting himself in the hands of his panel of experts who may be genuinely knowledgeable or may be misled or biased.

The reputationalists have, of course, tried to refute these objections and have developed improved techniques. Thus D'Antonio and Erickson ²⁴ set out to answer three questions:

- (1) Is the community power structure obtained by the reputational technique an aggregate of limited-scope influentials of a single status elite, or of persons who are perceived to be general influentials?
- (2) Is there longitudinal reliability to the list of general influentials obtained by the use of the reputational technique?
- (3) Is there evidence of a relationship between the reputation for general influence and the actual exercise of power in a broad range of community decisions?

As a result of their studies in El Paso and Ciudad Juarez they concluded that the reputational technique does seem to measure general community influence when the question is stated in such a way as to get at this factor in decision-making. They found a high correlation between those nominated as generally influential and those chosen as specifically influential.

Before taking a closer look at some of the arguments that have been going on over the last few years in the field of community power, it is necessary to examine the methods and results of the reputationalist's chief protagonists.

The Decisional Approach.

Polsby has argued ²⁵ that reputation for leadership can be divided into two parts; that which is justified by behaviour and that which is not. Therefore he asks, why not study behaviour direct. That is what those who use the decisional approach have attempted to do.

The decisional approach and the theory behind it is most clearly defined in the work of Dahl, Polsby and Wolfinger. In his study of New Haven ²⁶ Dahl attempts to penetrate behind official positions, reputations, and mere participation in decision-making, and using operational tests to find out who really rules. Working on the assumption that the operational techniques that could be used to measure power are all somewhat crude, Dahl chooses to be eclectic in order to try to get as wide a view as possible. He uses six methods of assessing relative influence or change in influences:

- (1) Studying changes in the socio-economic characteristics of incumbents in city offices in order to determine whether any rather large historic changes may have occurred in the sources of leadership.

- (2) Isolating a particular socio-economic category and determining the nature and extent of participation in local affairs by persons in the category. Dahl chose to study the Social Notables who were invited to the annual assemblies of the New Haven Lawn Club, and the Economic Notables who were the presidents, chairmen, or directors of certain categories of undertakings.

- (3) Examining a set of 'decisions' in different 'issue-areas' in order to determine what kinds of persons were the most influential according to one operational measure of relative influence and to determine patterns of influence. This rests on the assumption that the following operations provide a method for estimating the relative influence of different actors:
 - a. restrict attention to 'comparable' respondents who directly participate in a 'single' scope;
 - b. examine decisions where the number of direct participants is more or less the same during the period under investigation;
 - c. assume that the following collective actions are of roughly the same strength and extent:
 - When a proposal initiated by one or more of the participants is adopted despite the opposition of other participants.
 - When a proposal initiated by one or more of the participants is rejected.
 - When a proposal initiated by one or more of the participants is adopted without opposition.
 - d. determine the number of successful initiations or vetoes by each participant and the number of failures;

e. consider one participant as more influential than another if the relative frequency of his successes out of all successes is higher, or the ratio of his successes to his total attempts is higher.

Three issue areas were chosen which seemed to cut across a wide variety of interests and participants; these were urban redevelopment, public education, and party nominations.

- (4) surveying random samples of participants in different issue areas to determine their characteristics.
- (5) surveying random samples of registered voters in order to determine the characteristics of those who participate in varying degrees and in varying ways in local affairs. Two surveys were in fact conducted, the first of 197 people and the second of 525.
- (6) studying changes in patterns of voting among different strata in the community.

The results of the study led Dahl to conclude that New Haven was a pluralist democracy with specialised leadership structures. Although only a very small percentage of the total population played an active role in the decision-making process the views of the rest were taken into account by the leaders. In fact the leaders may compete for the support of the electorate. Only one man, the Mayor, turned out to be a leader in more than one issue area. There was only a small overlap between the social, economic, and decision-making elites and no homogeneous group could be found to be ruling the community.

The decisional approach has been used to good effect by a number of other investigators. In his study of Bennington, Vermont, Scoble concluded that "no single power structure existed in the city".²⁷ He found that only in one issue area was there a "monolithic, flat-surfaced pyramid, with.... a small number of power-holders, acting in predetermined concert, and with wealth as the dominant power base."²⁸

Banfield, in his study of decision-making in Chicago²⁹, came to the conclusion that the leading businessmen in the city were not as important as had been assumed. Indeed they were often criticised for not playing their full part in civic affairs. However neither does Banfield conclude that decisions are made by a unified political elite under the direction of the

mayor because of the restraints provided by other political and governmental groups, by the courts, and by the voters and the neighbourhood political leaders who mobilise them.

But, perhaps, the most comprehensive study of decision-making in the local community is that of Freeman and his colleagues in Syracuse, New York State³⁰. They studied 39 decisions over a period of five years. This work is also notable in that it attempted to compare the results of the various approaches. Four assumptions were made:

- (1) that active participation in decision-making is leadership,
- (2) that formal authority is leadership,
- (3) that leadership is a necessary consequence of social activity, i.e. involvement in voluntary organisations,
- (4) that leadership is too complex to be indexed directly and that reputation for leadership should be assessed.

The investigators concluded that there were three kinds of leaders, Institutional Leaders, Effectors, and Activists. Furthermore there was a connection between the method used and the type of leader found:

"... the various differing approaches to the study of community leadership seem to uncover different types of leadership. The study of reputation, position, or organisational participation seems to get at the Institutional Leaders. Studies of participation in decision-making, on the other hand, tap the Effectors of community activity. And studies of social activity seem to seek out the Activists who gain entry by dint of sheer commitment, time and energy."³¹

Another important study which compares the reputational and the decisional methods is that of Presthus³². Not only is he interested in comparing methodologies, but also different communities. He chose two small towns in New York State which had sufficient similarities and sufficient differences to facilitate the task of differentiating their leadership structures. Other concerns of his were change over time, recruitment to leadership, and the values and attitudes of the leaders.

Presthus divides his leadership group into three sub-groups:

- (1) Decision-makers - those who are directly involved in vital community decisions. They could be further divided into political decision-makers who held some political office during the period of study, economic decision-makers whose power rested on their economic status or role, and specialised decision-makers, a residual category who were confined to one issue.
- (2) Influentials - those who were nominated as powerful by the reputational method.
- (3) Organisation leaders - those who were officials of voluntary organisations.

To measure what he called 'overt' power, Presthus selected five decisions in each community and active participation in one or more of these became the basic criterion of individual power. The choice of the decisions was based on the sum of money involved, the number of people affected, and the need to obtain a roughly 'representative' and comparable set of decisions.

A tentative list of decision-makers was built up initially by an analysis of newspaper accounts and by discussions with a number of community knowledgeable. These were then surveyed and by use of the 'snowball' technique the list was gradually extended. In order to define who were participants in a decision Presthus used the following criteria:

- (1) those who (a) were named as being 'active participants' or 'opponents' in a decision by others who were themselves active participants in response to the question "Could you give me the names of several other people in the community whom you know of first hand who also participated in (or were actively opposed to) the ----- decision?", and (b) nominated themselves as being active participants or opponents:
- (2) those were were nominated as being 'active participants' by at least three other individuals in terms of (1) above, whether or not they also nominated themselves.

To measure potential or reputational power Presthus asked his respondents "Suppose a major project were before the community, one that required decision by a group of leaders whom nearly everyone would accept, which persons would you choose to make up this group - regardless of whether or not you know them personally?"³³ Persons nominated were then interviewed until no new names were being suggested. Presthus decided that for an individual to be considered an 'influential' he must have received at least 20% of the total nominations.

Presthus states that initially he had assumed that

"the decisional method would prove to be superior to the reputational in identifying 'real' community power. On the surface it seemed highly probable that the more behaviourally orientated method would provide more accurate evidence of participation and would help solve the vexing problem of the differences between potential and overt power."³⁴

However,

"An analysis of all the evidence led (not without some resistance) to a reformulation of this initial perspective. We decided that the two methods were better conceived as mutually supportive means of ascertaining power."³⁵

The decisional technique led, Presthus found, to a disturbing tendency to assign high power to people who had mere formal participation in a decision. In the end Presthus admitted to the use of what Weber called 'Verstehen' i.e. "the use of a combination of intellectual and subjective frames of thought in interpreting an actor's 'state of mind' and in understanding the meaning of events from a functional point of view."³⁶

The results obtained by Presthus showed that in one of the communities there was evidence of elitism in community power structures which were usually dominated by the economic elites. In the other community, however, while the decision structure remains highly concentrated, the major roles were played by political leaders. In both communities "despite high levels of popular education, economic stability, a fair degree of social mobility, a marvellously efficient communication system, and related advantages usually assumed to provide sufficient conditions for democratic pluralism, the vast majority of citizens remain apathetic, uninterested, and inactive in political affairs at the community level."³⁷

It has been suggested that the decisional approach has a number of advantages over the reputational approach. But its opponents have not been slow to find faults. The first and most mundane objection is that the research process is expensive and time-consuming. This means that the number of issues that can be investigated in depth is limited as are comparative studies between communities.

One of the most violent criticisms of the work of Dahl and other 'pluralists' was provided by Anton.³⁸ He argues that Dahl's approach is based on the idea of power as a function of the individual actor and the research strategy is to measure the power of each individual. The difficulty for the pluralists is, Anton suggests, that no actor seems to have power for very long as each issue seems to bring forward a different group of actors. This is linked with the idea that human behaviour is "governed in large part by inertia"³⁹, which itself involves two subsidiary assumptions, namely that most people are motivated by self interest, and that they are rationally aware of their own interests and know how to enhance them. Unless their interests are directly threatened, therefore, most people are happy to carry on doing what they have always done.

Anton then goes on to ask just how useful the pluralist approach is in developing generalisations about community power. He argues that by focussing their attention on individual power the pluralists are not justified in drawing conclusions about community power:

"If the community is seen as simply a collection of individuals who have differing amounts of power depending on the issue, then to determine the power structure all that is required - according to the pluralist literature - is the discovery of those individuals who were active in decision making on selected key decisions. If the same people are found to make all or most of these key decisions (a finding that no pluralist has yet made), the conclusion is warranted that a power structure exists, and these individuals comprise it. Logically, of course, such a conclusion cannot follow from pluralist assumptions, for the simple reason that examination of selected issues can reveal only the power of selected individuals, not the power of every individual or group of individuals in the community; therefore there is no basis for concluding that the group named as the power structure does in fact have more power than any other possible group."⁴⁰

Anton recognises that it would be impossible to investigate the power of every individual or group of individuals in the community and it is therefore necessary to restrict attention to a number of selected issues. But he insists that it is imperative that the issues selected should be community issues and not reflect national or regional patterns or the patterns of sub-community behaviour. If the investigator does not have therefore a clear conception of community his research must be regarded as suspect. This Anton thinks is indeed the case with most of the pluralist literature.

Returning to the question of inertia, Anton suggests that it naturally leads the pluralists either to deny the existence of government as a wielder of power or to admit that power is a structured and therefore a recurring phenomenon. The only way out of this dilemma is to draw a distinction between private and public power and to argue that the exercise of public power is still based on inertia because it involves the continuation of activity which has to do with power. This leads, Anton continues, to the idea that power is defined in terms of public agencies.

Finally Anton suggests that if there were no overt political activity in a community and no issue became the subject of political debate, then the pluralist would have to conclude that no power was being exercised.⁴¹ This would be plainly ridiculous in view of all that is known about the powers of mass manipulation.

Dahl was quick to take up the cudgels in his own defence. He accused Anton of mis-statements, misunderstandings, and mis-interpretations.⁴² Many of the interpretations that Anton attributes to the pluralists are in Dahl's opinion inconsistent with the theories and analyses set out in *Who Governs?* They do not argue that there is no permanence of power unless permanent is meant to mean eternal. Similarly the pluralists have never argued that power was a function of the individual actor but had always insisted that power was a relationship between people.

Dahl accuses Anton of misrepresentation in his suggestion that power is defined in terms of public agencies. While recognising that businessmen will have considerable power in the economy and that this will penetrate to other aspects of society, controversy over 'community' issues arises in the arena of public government. The question that all students of community power have been concerned with is how far different groups, classes and organisations are involved in the processes of government.

The criticisms of the decisional approach to the study of community power led to what has been called the 'neo-elitist critique of community power'.⁴³ This considers that the pluralist methodology is deficient in three major respects, two of which were touched on in our look at Anton's criticisms. Firstly there is the idea that non-elites are encased in values foisted on them by the elites. The elite is able to create a 'false consensus' which limits conflict to trivial issues that do not threaten the elite. Secondly, the pluralists can only be successful when they are measuring conflict. It is possible that there may be disagreement and opposition to a proposal but the opponents realise that they have no chance of success and therefore do not raise the issue. In other words we have the phenomenon of anticipated reactions. In the words of Bachrach and Baratz,

"To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation."⁴⁴

Thirdly, pluralists tends to place too much stress on governmental decisions. There may be a variety of coercive devices and sanctions that prevent issues being acted upon by the governmental machine. Taken together these three objections mean that

"When the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force.... effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions, it can be said that a non-decision-making situation exists."⁴⁵

Merelman has attempted to deal with this objections. On the question of the creation of a 'false consensus' by an elite, he argues that this assumes the existence of an elite but makes it impossible to prove or disprove its existence.

"The absence of an event, conflict which threatens an elite, is taken as the evidence for the existence of an elite. However, we have no reason for accepting the absence of an event as evidence for any particular cause, unless it can be demonstrated that the cause (in this case, an elite) produced the absence of the event (threatening conflict). To do so, some threatening conflict must precede the coming of false consensus. But such threatening conflict is

incompatible with false consensus as defined. Therefore false consensus does not admit the evidence to support itself." 46

Far from non-elites being encased in values imposed by the elite, Merelman suggests that there is evidence for a lack of consensus on values. Indeed it is possible that consensus values will pass from non-elites to elites.

Assuming that an elite wished to erect a successful consensus it must ensure that the consensus values apply to the community as a whole and that these values control policy choices. Therefore there must be agreement within the elite itself for otherwise policy conflict can be justified by appeal to other values.

Another difficulty with the false consensus argument is, in Merelman's view, that it is dependent to some extent on system autonomy. Contacts outside the system may lead to competing allegiances and alternative values. For our purposes "neither economic nor political self-sufficiency exists in most local communities; therefore, this determinant of false consensus is absent also." 47

On the question of anticipated reactions, Merelman suggests that this can operate both ways and that, therefore, non-decisions offer no meaningful criteria for saying anything about community power. If a group plans to initiate policies hostile to the elite and the elite has to exert power to stifle this, then the non-elite is itself exercising a form of power in drawing a response from the elite. In reply to the neo-elitist retort that the elite can afford to refrain from action when there is little at stake but the non-elite must desist when there is a lot at stake, Merelman suggests that this leads the question back to a study of particular issues, the homeground of the pluralists.

The pluralist stress on governmental action is justified Merelman thinks for the simple reason that if the elite can prevent threatening issues reaching government then only the most intense issues can in fact reach the government. This is one of the weaker points of Merelman's argument for it may be that the elite only allows those issues which are not threatening to reach the governmental stage. He continues, however, by arguing that the action of an elite in preventing issues being raised is only negative and shows nothing about the capacity of the elite to achieve positive ends. Furthermore, if the non-elites cannot achieve their ends through governmental means they will seek other channels, and the elite will have to exert itself to close these up as well.

Even if we accept the existence of forceful non-decision-making, there is still a price to be paid, because it lessens the possibility of positive decision-making in the future. Merelman quotes Vidich and Bensman's conclusion about the village board in Springdale as evidence of this. Not only is the prestige of the particular agency diminished but also there is a tendency for rival agencies to supplant it.

Finally Merelman would argue that if it is thought that it is useless to press a particular policy against the opposition of an elite, then there must be some reason for this attitude based on past experience. As he says:

".... we have little reason to expect that any group will be listened to unless it has been tested and been forced to apply some of the sanctions it threatens." ⁴⁸

Also

"In politics, as in poker 'put up, or shut up' expresses a major formula for decision-makers. Also, in politics as in poker, bluffs work consistently only with novices and for short periods. The actions of politicians tend to redeem the utility of the pluralist methodology." ⁴⁹

It will have been noticed that much of the preceding discussion has been based on American studies. It is only very recently that British academics have moved with any considerable strength into the field of local politics. Although few of the published British studies can rival their American counterparts in their theoretical sophistication, yet there are signs that this situation is changing. Before leaving the question of community power, therefore, it might be useful to look at one recent study, which although rather restricted in scope, did raise a number of important questions. This was Clement's investigation of Bristol. ⁵⁰

The basic question that Clements asks is "Why do notables otherwise active in society not seek to take part, as members, in the work of their local councils?" To answer this question he interviewed 78 individuals who were active in local voluntary organisations and who were thought to be influential by such people as the local Bishop, the Vice-Chancellor of the University, the President of the Chamber of Commerce, and so on. Clements is careful to point out (and this is where he differs from most of the American investigators) that he is not attempting to discover the 'real' leaders of Bristol, but why a sample of people 'one might expect'

to participate as representatives in local government, do not do so.

The first part of Clements book is devoted to an examination of the characteristics of his sample, their reasons for not standing for the council, and their opinions about local government in general and local government in Bristol in particular. Very briefly, he finds that his sample are overwhelmingly upper-middle class, their most common reason for not standing is lack of time, and their attitude to local government is rather patronising. However, in the second part of the book Clements argues that the situation is rather more complicated than this. After examining the relationship between the notables and the local political system, he concludes

"Their role, then, within the local system, far from being characteristically an abstentionist one, is an active participating one. Or, one might say their interest in the 'output' of the system is large, and their 'input' is correspondingly high. Their relationship with both the appointed and elected sides of the local authority are so often extensive and close that they are of different kind from those enjoyed by most of the electorate." ⁵¹

Clements attempts to explain the non-council membership of his notables by pointing out that generally their main concerns are economic and in this field the power of the local council is not very great. Overall he argues that there is an

"acceptance by the economic and social notables of a pluralistic pattern of local influence, in which they concede a share of power to political notables, but which is set within a social-status system and an economic system in which influence and other rewards are distributed unequally, and to their advantage." ⁵²

Furthermore, he suggests that the cultural values of the economic and social life of the notables stress leadership and high status which tends to conflict with the cultural values of the local political system which are centred on democratic discussion and persuasion.

Although Clements' research strategy is not really designed to fit into the community power structure controversy, he does indicate that he finds the views of both pluralists and elitists rather over-stated.

The pluralists are too optimistic and the elitists too pessimistic.

We have seen that each of the methods used in the study of community power have their own faults and virtues. More and more it has come to be realised that a combination of approaches represents the best avenue open to us at the moment. This is especially true if we accept the argument that the different approaches are in fact measuring different aspects of the wider phenomenon. Thus while some of the questions raised in the community power debate are of great importance, in many cases they have been approached from different viewpoints and in the light of different values.

Typologies of Community Power Structure.

Alongside a willingness to recognise the utility of all approaches to the study of community power has come the idea that communities are not all either pluralist democracies or elitist dictatorships. As more and more data is obtained it becomes clear that there is a continuum of power dispersal. This has led to an attempt to isolate the determining characteristics of this continuum.

Of course many of the arguments have been in terms of the existence or otherwise of some kind of power elite. But even this is not as simple as it sounds. We would normally place Hunter's Regional City towards one end of the continuum as he seems at times to be arguing that the city is run by a unified elite group. But Rossi has said:

".... Hunter describes the power structure of Regional City as a 'pyramid' but also describes his forty top influentials as divided in several 'crowds' or 'cliques'. The latter description suggests a polyolithic power structure while the pyramidal supports the idea of a monolith." ⁵³

However, there seems little doubt that a number of investigators, usually employing the reputational method, have claimed to have uncovered either pyramids of power or power elites. I think we should be wary of their findings for where follow-up studies have been conducted the results have not always confirmed the original findings. ⁵⁴

The decisional approach has usually turned up more or less polyolithic power structures in conformity with pluralist theory. Dahl has summarised the findings

"Yet despite countless variations I don't think that the typical American community is a monolithic but rather a pluralist system.... I would contend that in most American communities there isn't a single centre of power. There is even a sense in which nobody runs the community. In fact, perhaps this is the most distressing discovery of all: typically a community is run by many different people, in many different ways, and at many different times." ⁵⁵

The simplest typology we could use, therefore, would be a continuum ranging from "one-man rule to a situation where there is a high degree of fragmentation of power, with no single person or group in control of community decisions." ⁵⁶ But a number of people have attempted to fill in the gap between the two extremities with a number of other types. Rossi distinguished four types of power model depending on the style of political life to be found in the community; pyramidal, caucus rule, polyolith and amorphous. ⁵⁷ Walton ⁵⁸ in his examination of thirty three community power studies, employed a similar categorisation; he called his types pyramidal, factional, coalitional, and amorphous. In the pyramidal type he puts Hunter's Regional City and Miller's Pacific City in both of which there is some kind of cohesive leadership group. In the factional type there are two or more groups contending for influence on the decision-making process over a period of time. The prime example of this is Schultze's Cibola. Here the community had been run in the past by an economic elite but the growth of absentee-ownership had allowed a new group of middle class businessmen and professionals to secure an influential position in overt community leadership. The power structure was therefore 'bifurcated'.

In the coalitional type the issue under discussion determines who will occupy leadership positions. There will be fluid coalitions of interested individuals and groups. Walton places Dahl's New Haven and Miller's English City in this category. We have already seen what Dahl found in New Haven; in English City Miller found comparatively specialised elite groups with union, governmental, educational, business and political leaders occupying the stage at different times and on different issues.

Finally the amorphous type concerns the situation where there are no persistent patterns of influence and leadership. In this category could be placed Klapp and Padgett's study of Tijuana where "a reputational study.... shows an elite to be composed mainly of businessmen, though no single group runs things; local government is weak, and the major sources of power are outside the community.... the elite is poorly integrated.... there seems to be a series of interconnected games with little unified leadership responsible for the entire community and its welfare." ⁵⁹

Although he includes one more category than Walton or Rossi, Miller probably is more restrictive in his typology. He suggests that there is evidence that a number of variables should be considered in drawing up a system of power-models; he mentions ecological variations, the extent of diversification in the economic base of the community, the political homogeneity of the community, and the size of the community. ⁶⁰ Miller's first type, which he calls Model A is a pyramidal structure centred on one person. In effect the local population are vassals under a feudal overlord. In Miller's opinion this is more likely to arise in a company town.

Model B is also a pyramidal structure but this time based on a small cohesive group of individuals. Miller suggests that Lynd's Middletown is an example of this type. It differs from Model A in that there is scope for the development of rival factions and independent political initiatives.

Model C is a stratified pyramidal structure where the leaders are drawn largely from the business class. Decisions are made at the top and then funnelled down to a lower tier bureaucracy for implementation. Miller assigns Hunter's Regional City to this category. He thinks it is usually associated with older, stable communities where "the social system has been congenial to the growth of a social aristocracy and where business control has a history of hereditary growth." ⁶¹

The next type, Model D, is a cone or ring structure and is, in Miller's opinion, the most characteristic of modern communities. Its three major qualities are (1) increasing heterogeneity of interests within the business sector, (2) the rise of new power structures, and (3) growing autonomy in all institutionalised sectors. The leaders in this type of situation play a number of different roles depending on the issue under discussion.

Miller considers his English City to be an example of this type. Representatives of both the political parties, trade unions, business, education, religion, and civic organisations all play a part in the decision-making process. "There is no single cohesive elite structure and no hierarchical dominance based on one institutional sector." ⁶²

Finally we have Model E which consists of segmented power pyramids. The simplest example of this is where there are two or more political parties in a community making all the major decisions and where everything is done along party lines.

Another way of approaching the categorisation of community power structures is by way of the characteristics of leadership. Probably the best example of this approach is that of Bonjean and Olson. ⁶³ They suggested four characteristics that were important in identifying the two ideal-type leadership structures and so anything in between. Firstly, there is legitimacy. If the community leaders hold official positions in public and private organisations then the leadership structure is also an authority structure. The legitimacy of a leadership structure could be measured by the proportion of leaders holding official positions.

Secondly there is visibility. If all the leaders in a community were office holders then the chance that they are visible would be high. But this is not clearly the case if the leadership is 'illegitimate'. By using the reputational technique it is possible to measure to some extent the degree of visibility of certain leaders. Bonjean and Olson suggest that by comparing the opinions of the general public and other leaders it is possible to discover three kinds of leaders: visible (those recognised by both the general public and the other leaders), concealed (those recognised by the other leaders but not by the general public), and symbolic (those recognised by the general public but not by the other leaders). The degree of visibility of leadership in the community is the proportion of visible leaders in the total number of leaders.

Thirdly, there is the scope of influence of the leaders. By using either the decisional or the reputational technique it should be possible to discover whether leaders tend to concentrate their attention in particular areas of policy or whether they tend to exercise general leadership.

Finally there is the question of cohesiveness of the leaders as a group. This can be measured by the extent to which the leaders nominate each other or by other sociometric methods such as acquaintanceship scales. It is also necessary to have some idea of the values and attitudes of the leaders. By using such methods it should be possible to identify unitary, bifactional, multifactional, and amorphous patterns.

On the basis of these variables, Bonjean and Olson suggest a typology of community power structures which has five categories. At one extreme would be a Covert Power Elite in which the leaders do not hold office, they are not recognised by the community as a whole as being decision-makers, they are active in a wide range of decision areas, and they work together as a group. At the other extreme would be a system of Legitimate Pluralism in which the leaders hold office, they are recognised to be decision-makers by the community, they concern themselves with specific issues related to their official positions, and there is not necessarily any cohesive group structure. Between these two extremes there would be Independent Sovereignities with covert sub-groupings concerned with a few decision areas; Rival Sovereignities where visible but illegitimate sub-groupings compete over a wide range of decision areas; and Interest Groups where leaders hold organisational but not political office, concern themselves with specific issues and are recognised by the community.

In conclusion it should be stressed that a number of important changes have taken place in recent years in the approach to the study of community power. There has been a decided shift from the positional to the reputational to the decisional method and it is now recognised that a combination of the three provides the most fruitful research strategy. It has also been recognised that no one leadership structure is applicable to different communities at different times. As a result more attention is being paid to comparative analysis in the hope that the important determining variables can be isolated. We should always bear in mind the advice of Mackenzie:

"Study your community in a matched pair or matched group of communities, corresponding closely except in the deviant characteristics in which you are interested. Use all three of the now classic power study methods, reputation, institutions, and decisions: and add a strong element of Verstehen as well. Follow the example of Banfield.... and consider carefully the element of 'political time', the span over which the game is played." ⁶⁴

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CHAPTER THREEMETHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH SETTING

Having looked at the conceptual and theoretical background we must now examine the actual methodology used in this study of leadership and decision making on Tyneside and say something about the setting of the research.

Following the now generally accepted view, as stated by Mackenzie¹ the methodology used was eclectic, involving elements of the institutional, the reputational and the decisional approaches. The various approaches were used in combination on the assumption that the strengths of one would make up for the failings of another.

The purpose of the research was to investigate how decisions were made on Tyneside, who made them, and why. To achieve this aim a number of research strategies were employed, although these could be grouped into two main areas. Because of the seeming utility of the decisional approach to community power studies it was decided that the main emphasis of the research should be on a detailed study of a number of important issues which have affected Tyneside in recent years. This immediately raised three main problems:

1. How many issues were to be considered?
2. What criteria were to be used in deciding on the importance of an issue?
3. What sort of time span was to be used?

The decision on the number of issues to be examined was to some extent an arbitrary one. However, there were a number of guidelines available. There had to be a sufficiently large number to ensure a wide coverage of different kinds of issues, but small enough to ensure that sufficient attention could be paid to each issue. A preliminary investigation of the field threw up 11 potential issues but on closer study this was reduced to 7.

In judging the importance of issues it was again rather difficult to lay down any measurable parameters. Obviously factors such as the

amount of money to be spent, the number of people to be affected, and the extent of change brought about, had to be considered. It was satisfying to discover that the choice finally made corresponded quite closely to the views of the individuals actually involved in the decision-making process.

The problem of the time span involved essentially two questions. If issues were examined in which the decision-making process had reached completion then the investigation was of a situation as it was at a time in the past and not necessarily what it is at present. But if issues were examined which were still not settled then the study would be a drama without a climax. It was decided that in this case compromise was the only solution and so some of the issues studied were complete while others were still in process. All the issues were, however, to some extent live in the five years previous to the time of the research.

The issues finally selected for study were as follows:

1. The re-organisation of local government areas on Tyneside.
2. The development of Newcastle Airport.
3. The establishment of the Port of Tyne Authority.
4. The re-organisation of police areas in Northumberland and Durham.
5. The merger of the shipbuilding interests on the Tyne.
6. The establishment of the Tyneside Passenger Transport Authority.
7. The building of the Tyne tunnel.

The first thing to be noticed is that virtually all these are 'one and for all' issues. It was considered that the operation of the 'power structure' would be more evident in such issues than in routine decision-making. But it is also important to realise that this study is concerned with decision-making over an area which has no formalised decision-making structure and therefore routine decision-making would have been impossible anyway, unless attention had been concentrated on certain sectors of the area as a whole.

It is perhaps possible to make certain criticisms of the range of issues studied. For example it can be seen that 3 or 4 of them are in the field of transportation, or that most of them are concerned with processes of rationalisation in particular fields. The merger of the

shipbuilding interests is also a rather exceptional case in that it is essentially a private matter while all the others are in the public sector. But because of the importance of the industry for the life of the area it was considered to be worthy of inclusion. Furthermore it would serve as a test case for the amount of interest that local government shows in the private sector.²

The techniques of investigation used on the issues were conventional. Preliminary data was gathered from published sources, especially newspapers and council minutes.³ This also generated a list of names of individuals who appeared to be concerned with the issues. These individuals were then sent a postal questionnaire which elicited further information about their participation in the issues and their opinions on the importance of other participants. Finally personal interviews were held with those individuals who seemed to occupy key positions in the various issue areas.

The second main area of research was a study of leadership on Tyneside. This involved the use of a postal questionnaire which was sent to a whole range of potential leaders. This is described in more detail later, in the chapter on the survey and the questionnaire. It not only helped to provide additional information about the issues under consideration but also was used to experiment with the idea of asking respondents to nominate people who were thought to be generally influential on Tyneside, people who were thought to have been influential on the particular issues, and people who were thought to have influence with the Government and the Civil Service. As a result of this it was possible to compare to some extent the reputational and the decisional methods. It also meant that it was possible to divide the leaders into different categories on the basis of their differing reputations. Primarily this allowed a division into 'top leaders' and the rest.⁴

Research Setting

The arena of the research was, of course, Tyneside. But this bald statement in fact begs more questions than it answers, for there is considerable doubt as to what exactly Tyneside is. There is no question that, in the minds of many people, it exists as a community but its boundaries may be regarded as variable. For the purpose of this study, Tyneside was taken to comprise all those local authority areas that fell wholly within the Tyneside Special Review Area as laid down by the 1958 Local Government Act. It, therefore, includes the county boroughs of

Gateshead, Newcastle, South Shields and Tynemouth, the municipal boroughs of Jarrow, Wallsend and Whitley Bay, and the urban districts of Blaydon, Boldon, Felling, Gosforth, Hebburn, Longbenton, Newburn, Ryton and Whickham. The main reason for confining the area of study to these 16 local authorities was that much of the available published data was in terms of the individual local authority area. To have included parts of surrounding local authority areas would have meant that information was not available for parts of the study area.

It might be useful at this point to look at some of the data relevant to the area. It is basically the lower valley of the River Tyne and so is divided into two by the river.⁵ In fact there is a great deal of local argument about what effect the river has on the unity of the area. Some people regard it as a spine holding the area together, while others regard it as a barrier with the result that the north and south banks are in some ways different communities. This controversy in fact had its effect on some of the issues under consideration.

The area is, of course, one of the oldest industrial regions in the country and so its economy is in process of changing from reliance on the traditional industries of shipbuilding, heavy engineering and coal-mining. Nevertheless, the influence of these industries is still very much in evidence, not only in economic terms, but also in regard to social relations and political argument. So for examples in some of the local authorities the local councils are dominated by miners although their position is now being challenged by other groups, especially professionals like teachers and journalists.

Tyneside is, of course, one of the strongholds of the Labour Party in Britain. Of the 11 parliamentary constituencies in the area only 2 (Tynemouth and Newcastle North) had Conservative MPs at the time of the research. This remained the position after the 1970 General Election despite the swing to the Conservatives. In many of the other constituencies the Labour majority runs into five figures.

The position in local politics is rather more complicated. This is primarily because the main opposition to Labour has taken different names

in different places. Thus, for example, in Gateshead they are called Rent and Ratepayers, in South Shields Progressives, and in Tynemouth Independents. If we assume that these various groupings can be equated with the Conservatives (which is not always the case) we find that the Conservatives do rather better in local elections than in parliamentary elections. Of the 16 local councils in the area, in May 1969 the Conservatives and their allies controlled five (Newcastle, South Shields, Tynemouth, Whitley Bay and Gosforth). We should remember, however, that 1969 was an exceptional year for the Conservatives and normally we would not expect them to control South Shields or even perhaps Newcastle. What is perhaps noticeable is the overwhelming position of the Labour Party in most of the smaller authorities in the area, with Ryton being the most extreme example having a council with 100% Labour membership. This dominance is of long standing and this has led to a feeling in many parts of the area that Labour control is part of the natural order of things. ⁶

The population of Tyneside is about a million and Newcastle is responsible for slightly over one quarter of this. Both Gateshead and South Shields have over 100,000 inhabitants and with Tynemouth having over 70,000, it means that the four county boroughs have a greater combined population than the other 12 local authorities put together. Seven of the authorities in fact have less than 30,000 inhabitants and together with the relative poverty of many of these authorities, this has led to a feeling that they are too small to adequately perform the functions entrusted to them.

Another notable feature of life on Tyneside is the very high percentage of council houses in many of the local authorities. In Felling, Jarrow and Longbenton there is a majority of council tenants, while only two authorities (Whitley Bay and Gosforth) have a majority of owner occupiers. As we would expect from these facts the social class distribution of the area is generally biased towards the lower end of the scale. Only Gosforth and Whitley Bay for example have more than 25% of their population in the Registrar General's Class 1 and 2.

To sum up, therefore, we can see that Tyneside is a generally well-established working class community with a traditional loyalty to the Labour Party. Unlike many other conurbations there is little doubt that it is an

homogeneous whole. Perhaps this is best exemplified by a quotation from the Local Government Commission for England:

"It is much more difficult to describe a community than to describe its physical setting, yet one word must be said about the inhabitants of Tyneside.

"The Geordies form as distinctive a group as can be found anywhere in Britain. Their characteristic speech and independent spirit - Blaydon Races and Newcastle United - things of this kind belong peculiarly to the people of Tyneside and mark them off not only from the people of distant parts of England, but also from their neighbours the miners and farmers of Durham and Northumberland." ⁷

Notes.

1. See above Chapter 2, p 52.
2. This relationship between the private and the public sector is examined by Clements, op cit.
3. One of the factors that has in the past been taken into account in defining socio-geographical communities has been local newspaper circulation. In the case of Tyneside both the Newcastle Journal and the Evening Chronicle, although published in Newcastle, can be regarded as conurbation newspapers.
4. See chapter on Top Leaders.
5. See map in Appendix.
6. See appendix for full details of election results.
7. Local Government Commission for England, 1962-63, Report No. 5. Tyneside Special Review Area.

PART TWO: THE ISSUESCHAPTER FOURPREVIEW OF THE ISSUES

In discussing the methodology of the research, mention has already been made of the reasons for selecting the seven particular issues to be studied. Although they varied in content they all had one thing in common - in each case there was no single institutionalised decision-making process in existence and so new forms had to be created. Much of the interest in the various issues stems from this search to find an acceptable and workable mode of operations. But this does present the outside investigator with one great disadvantage; much of the discussion and decision-making takes place in ad hoc bodies or even on an informal, personal basis which makes it difficult to discover the true facts. A great deal of reliance therefore, has to be placed on the testimonies of the participants in the various decisions who will naturally tend to exaggerate their own contribution and minimise that of others. This distortion can be reduced somewhat by taking as wide a sample as possible. Thus, for example, in the case of the airport, 14 people who had been concerned in some way with the issue were interviewed.

Most of the issues are, of course, in some way connected with local government and so we would expect local councils to be closely concerned. But also in many cases the outcome of the issue has some relevance for the central government with the result that the views of the government may be pre-eminent. So, for example, in the case of the airport the financial support of the Government was the crucial factor, while the re-organisation of the police could only be carried through by the Home Secretary. Essentially, therefore, we have two types of decision-making process. The first is by the establishment of some kind of joint committee of local authorities which then makes decisions on behalf of the local authorities. This is most clearly shown in the cases of the airport and the tunnel. The second is where the local authorities and other interests concerned are unable to agree and so the issue is shifted to a higher level of authority, viz, the central government. To some extent the shipbuilding merger is an exception but it is possible to regard it as being a rather special case of the former with the various shipbuilding firms replacing the local authorities.

Because there is no clear decision-making process it is rather difficult to say what is the exact source of authorisation for the various decisions. This is perhaps possible in only one issue, that of local government reorganisation, where the final decision lay with the Government. In all others, although the government was involved to a greater or lesser extent, the focus of decision-making was variable. In the case of the tunnel the decision was largely dependent on the views of the two county councils. On the airport the support of the various local authorities was necessary. The creation of the Port of Tyne Authority involved not only the Government but also the local authorities and various shipping interests on the river. The reorganisation of police areas basically arose out of tripartite negotiations between the Government, the county boroughs and the county councils. The shipbuilding merger was stimulated by the Government but was brought about by discussions within the industry itself. Finally the creation of the Passenger Transport Authority arose out of a political commitment of the Government, but its form was dependent on the pressures exerted by local authorities and various transport interests in the area.

One very interesting problem associated with studies of decision-making is the extent to which there is duplication of personnel from one issue to another. It has already been noted that there is some degree of overlap in the field of concern of some of the issues, e.g. the tunnel, the airport, and the passenger transport authority. We would perhaps expect, therefore, that the same individuals would be concerned with different issues. Of course not only would this overlap tend to occur but also the fact that most of the issues concern local authorities would suggest that certain individuals like leaders of councils and town clerks would be concerned with more than one issue. Something that must be looked at, therefore, is the extent to which certain individuals are multi-issue orientated while others are orientated to a single issue, and the reasons for this situation.

CHAPTER FIVETHE REORGANISATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS

The pattern of local government areas on Tyneside is, like that in most other parts of the country, a relic of the 19th century. With the increasing complexity of local government, the problems that face many local authorities cannot be solved solely within the context of that local authority. As a result neighbouring authorities have been forced into co-operation in many fields of mutual interest. But many people have argued that the best way to improve the operation of local government is to enlarge the areas of each local authority by a process of amalgamation.

This process of amalgamation is not new but has been going on in a piecemeal fashion for many years. However, there have been occasional attempts to reorganise the whole system of local government or at least substantial parts of it. Tyneside has been a prime target in many of these proposals.

As early as the 1920's Jarrow tried to absorb the neighbouring authority of Hebburn but was told by the Government to wait, as a wholesale reorganisation was imminent. Captain Ewen Wallace toured Tyneside and recommended reorganisation while the local Chamber of Commerce sponsored a study of the local government structure on Tyneside. In 1935 a Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside Area was set up and it reported in 1937.¹ The Majority report recommended that a new 'regional area' be established including the whole of the geographical county of Northumberland plus certain areas on the south bank of the Tyne, and that a new municipal borough of Newcastle-upon-Tyneside, incorporating most of Tyneside, be included in this regional area. The minority report proposed a new county borough of Newcastle-on-Tyneside which would include Newcastle, Gateshead, Wallsend, Jarrow, Gosforth, Hebburn, Felling and Newburn. However the Government of the day was not prepared to take action on the report and, as no local authority was prepared to sponsor a Parliamentary Bill, nothing was done.

In 1945 the Local Government (Boundary Commission) Act established the Boundary Commission. In its report in 1947² the Boundary Commission recommended that each bank of the river should be considered in conjunction with its own geographical country and that, with the exception of an enlarged Newcastle which would become a new one-tier county, the county boroughs on Tyneside would become most purpose authorities within the counties of Northumberland and Durham. But the Boundary Commission was wound up in 1949 and nothing further was done.

Throughout the early 50's Newcastle made continual attempts to extend its boundaries in order to acquire more land for its housing programme. But they were always frustrated by the Government who said they were considering a new local government bill. In July 1956 a White Paper on the areas and status of local authorities in England and Wales with special reference to the conurbations was presented to Parliament.³ In the light of this White Paper the Parliamentary and General Purposes Committee of Newcastle Council recommended that the creation of a single all-embracing county borough in the conurbation was not desirable or practicable and that the formation of a group of county boroughs covering the whole area of the conurbation was the best solution to the problem arising. However, the meeting of the whole council reversed this policy and came out in favour of a single county borough.⁴ This more than anything strengthened the opinion of many of the other local authorities on Tyneside that Newcastle was not to be trusted. In fact many of their argument can be traced to this fear and mistrust of Newcastle.

Under the Local Government Act of 1958 Tyneside was declared a Special Review Area. The Local Government Commission began work on Tyneside in January 1960 and published its draft proposals in February 1962. It had considered five different forms of organisation, namely 1. a single county borough; 2. a mid-Tyne county borough; 3. four or five county boroughs; 4. a two-tier system under the existing county councils; and 5. a continuous county. It concluded that the most appropriate form for Tyneside would be a combination of 3 and 5; in other words a continuous county within which would be incorporated four county boroughs.⁵

These draft proposals were discussed at a three day hearing in Newcastle in July 1962. The Chairman, Sir Henry Drummond Hancock, summed up the situation by saying "The areas of difference between the affected parties run deeper than in some other places. Indeed, they obviously run very deep in some cases."

Although the draft proposals were opposed by the two county councils and the four county boroughs, the Commission adhered very largely to its original ideas when it published its final report in July 1963.⁶ The reactions were naturally hostile from most of the local authorities on Tyneside.⁷ Because of the objections made to the Minister of Housing and Local Government, a Public Enquiry, under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Ritson, was held in Newcastle from March 24th to May 13th, 1964. The position was enormously complicated by the fact that there was so little agreement between the interested parties. Thus the two county councils supported,

subject to certain variations, by some of the county districts, proposed the two county scheme under which the two proposed boroughs on the north bank of the river would become part of Northumberland, and the two on the south bank part of Co. Durham. Newcastle on the other hand proposed that there should be one county borough for the whole conurbation. Gateshead, South Shields, and Tynemouth, supported by some of the county districts, proposed that there be four county boroughs without a continuous county. Finally Blaydon proposed that there should be five and not four county boroughs.

The position was further complicated by the change of Government in 1964. The new Minister, Anthony Crosland, rejected the Commission's report and instead announced that he favoured the single county borough scheme. This idea was supported in turn by his successor, Richard Crossman, who met representatives of the local authorities in October 1965 to try and hammer out some sort of agreement. However, emotions were now running rather high and no compromise was possible.⁸

As a result a second enquiry was held in June/July 1966 under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Armer. The line up now was:

Support for Minister's proposals	-	Newcastle Ryton Whickham
Support for four county boroughs	-	Gateshead South Shields Tynemouth Jarrow Whitley Bay Hebburn
Support for two counties	-	Co. Durham Northumberland Newburn
Support for Local Government Commission's proposals	-	Wallsend Blaydon Gosforth
In favour of deferment to a Royal Commission	-	Felling Longbenton.

As it turned out the position adopted by Felling and Longbenton was to

be the one that was taken by the Government. The Royal Commission on Local Government in England was established in 1966 with instructions to "consider the structure of Local Government in England, outside Greater London, in relation to its existing functions; and to make recommendations for authorities and boundaries, and for functions and their division, having regard to the size and character of areas in which these can be most effectively exercised and the need to sustain a viable system of local democracy." ⁹

This provided an opportunity for some of the authorities who were afraid of Newcastle's empire-building to press for a deferment of a decision on the reorganisation of local government areas on Tyneside. Both the county councils took this view as did the so-called Group of Six (Gateshead, South Shields, Tynemouth, Whitley Bay, Hebburn and Jarrow) and a number of the local M.P's. ¹⁰

It so happened that at this particular point in time Crossman was replaced as Minister by Anthony Greenwood who was thought to be less enthusiastic about pressing ahead with the reorganisation. As anticipated, in May 1967, Greenwood announced that he was postponing a decision until after he had received the report of the Royal Commission. His decision had a mixed reception, being condemned by among others Newcastle, the Tyneside Chamber of Commerce, The 'Newcastle Journal', and the Labour Party, while it was supported by South Shields, Gateshead, the Conservatives and the Liberals. ¹¹

The work of the Royal Commission took rather longer than anticipated and it was not until June 1969 that its report was finally published. The majority recommendation was that the whole of the Tyneside conurbation, extended somewhat from the old Special Review area, should form what was to be called a 'unitary authority' which was to be the normal pattern for the rest of the country. This would be responsible for most of the functions of local government. Below this there would be a series of local councils, corresponding to the existing local authorities which would act as mobilisers of local opinion in its dealings with the unitary authorities. Above the unitary authority of Tyneside would be a North East provincial council which would be indirectly elected and would be responsible for a strategic plan for the future development of the province.

The publication of the report let loose a storm of protest, especially from the counties which were to disappear entirely. The chief argument used against the proposals was that they had sacrificed local democracy in the

interests of efficiency. However, it is likely that the main reason why many local councils opposed the report was that it would mean their disappearance as local authorities. The position of a local political leader who has won his way to the top of his own little power structure is something about which all potential reformers have to be very much aware.

After some consideration the Government accepted the basic idea of the Royal Commission in regard to Tyneside,¹² but the issue was thrown back into the melting pot with the defeat of the Labour Party in the General Election of June 1970. The new Conservative Government had not committed itself one way or another on local government reorganisation prior to the election and so a good deal of consultation was thought appropriate before any declaration of intent was made. Eventually, however, in February 1971 it issued a White Paper setting out its ideas which it proposed to implement in subsequent legislation.¹³

Briefly the Conservatives proposed to base their new local government system on the counties which to a large extent would take over all the other local authorities within their geographical territories. But again exceptions were to be made in the conurbations. In the case of Tyneside it was proposed that it be amalgamated with neighbouring Wearside to form a metropolitan area within which there would be a second tier of district councils. So it would seem that the final decision on the reorganisation of local government on Tyneside will be to produce a structure which virtually no one had suggested.

Analysis of the Issue as a Decision-making Process.

We have already seen that many of the issues discussed in this study were closely connected in some way with the present and future structure of local government. In many ways, therefore, this is the most important of the issues considered. It has involved a great number of people and organisations over a considerable period of time.

The essential conflicts were between the various local authorities concerned, with various coalitions being formed as circumstances changed. Party political considerations were invoked from time to time but the issue was just as likely to cause intra-party as inter-party feuds. The only way to understand how and why decisions were taken or not taken is, therefore, to look at the attitudes of the various local authorities.¹⁴

The dominant role was, of course, played by Newcastle. For centuries the city has provoked a fear and dislike on the part of many of the surrounding areas. Not only has it made continual efforts to extend its territories but has also attempted to subvert some of the activities of other authorities, especially the boroughs. For example, in medieval times Newcastle was able to achieve a monopoly of right to hold markets and to take a large share of the revenue from the shipping trade on the river. As a result, the inhabitants of places like Tynemouth and South Shields had a dislike of Newcastle bred into their bones. Any scheme originating in or having the support of Newcastle was immediately suspect.

However, over the years the demands of the situation had led to ad hoc arrangements for dealing with common inter-authorities problems. By the late 1950's, largely due to efforts of Dan Smith and his friends, ad hoc committees had extended to the regional field. More and more people began to realise the necessity for a radical reconstruction of local government in the area.

Newcastle has changed its views a number of times over the years. At one time it seemed that the city would be satisfied with incorporating the neighbouring authorities of Gosforth, Newburn and Longbenton, with which it had many close links. Then came the suggestion that it should extend across the river to include Gatehead with which it was linked in a number of ad hoc schemes. Later this was supplanted by the idea of four county boroughs for the whole of Tyneside, either with or without some kind of overall coordinating body. As we have seen this was indeed suggested by the Parliamentary and General Purposes Committee of the city council only to be rejected by the whole council. Many people saw the hand of Dan Smith in this but it also received the support of a wide cross-section of Newcastle life. Even though the Conservatives opposed the one authority scheme many people thought that this was merely for the sake of opposition as many of the Conservative leaders were known to be sympathetic to the idea. This became clear when they took over control of the local council in 1967. The local government officials were also in favour of the one authority scheme, partly because of arguments of efficiency and partly because of the improved career prospects that the new authority would offer. As the negotiations proceeded more and more influential opinion swung behind the conurbation authority scheme.

The attitudes of the two political party groups on the city council were certainly influenced by the possible effects on party strength in the area. When the Labour Party was in control it obviously expected to be able to gain control of the proposed new authority. On the other hand it was possible that a system of four new authorities would mean two for the Labour Party and two for the Conservatives and their allies. The return of the Conservatives to control in Newcastle and the possibility of the same happening elsewhere on Tyneside meant that not only did the Conservatives see a chance of winning control of the new conurbation authority, but it also set the Labour Party pondering on whether they should be now thinking in terms of some even wider authority which would include the strong Labour mining areas in Durham and Northumberland. It has been suggested, therefore, that opinion in the Labour Party hierarchy in the area began to switch into support for some kind of regional authority and that this was one of the reasons why pressure was put on the Government to delay reorganisation until after the report of the Royal Commission on Local Government had been published.¹⁵

The attitudes of the three other county boroughs were remarkably consistent in view of the differing controlling groups. In Gateshead, where the Labour Party was in overwhelming control, the councillors of both groups were united with the officials in their view that Gateshead should be extended to become a county borough of about 200,000 people.¹⁶ The only opposition came from two Labour councillors who had close links with the Newcastle Labour Party and were in favour of a single conurbation authority.¹⁷

In Tynemouth which was controlled by a loose Independent Group, there was likewise virtually unanimous support for a system of four county boroughs.¹⁸ The council sponsored a series of meetings addressed by councillors concerned in the negotiations, to explain the position to the people of Tynemouth and to enlist their support. The Town Clerk of Tynemouth, Fred Egner, took on the job of coordinating the opposition to the one authority scheme. He considered that a local authority of about 200,000 was not only the most efficient but also possessed the greatest potential for democracy.¹⁹

The situation in South Shields was complicated by a split in the local Labour Party. The Labour group on the council was dominated by old party faithfuls who considered their prime loyalty to be to the town and not to the party. Their preoccupation with council work meant that a group of younger men, many of whom were teachers and therefore regarded with suspicion by the old guard, had been able to take control of the local party. These 'Young Turks' had soon got themselves onto the local council and

there formed a faction which on occasions rebelled against the rule of the 'old guard'. One of the issues which caused a rebellion was that of local government reorganisation. The rebels wanted to see a conurbation authority which was anathema to those people brought up in the tradition of opposition to Newcastle. However, the opposition Progressive group rallied behind the Labour group and gradually the rebels either lost their seats or their interest.²⁰

The two county councils were hostile to both the four county borough scheme and the conurbation authority, for in both cases they would be the losers. This was particularly the case with Northumberland for a large part of the rateable value of the county comes from that section bordering on the river. The counties proposals were, therefore, that they should take over those authorities that fell within their geographical areas. Again there was a high degree of unanimity on these views. This was, perhaps, not surprising in the case of Northumberland which has a reputation for non-partisanship, but was rather surprising in County Durham in the light of the often bitter party feuding in that authority.

The views of the other smaller authorities varied depending on their ambitions and their relations with their neighbours. Wallsend for example has for a long time had hopes of becoming a county borough and indeed pressed its case in the early stages of the discussions. But later it supported amalgamation with Tynemouth to form one of the four county boroughs. Blaydon also had ambitions of taking over some of the surrounding authorities and forming a fifth county borough, but this was really a non-starter. While many of the councillors in the smaller authorities were anxious to preserve their own little empires, it was becoming more and more obvious that they were incapable of providing services of a sufficiently high standard. The presence of a considerable number of county councillors in the ranks of the county district councillors, meant that there was considerable pressure in favour of the two-county scheme. But developments in various ad hoc bodies meant that a skeleton authority was already in being in the conurbation or in parts of it, and most of the smaller local authorities fell in with either the four county borough scheme or the conurbation authority. It was these authorities who had probably most to lose by any long delay in reorganisation for they were finding it increasingly difficult to attract staff to fill posts that could soon disappear.

Outside the local authorities a number of organisations took an interest in the issue. The political parties were, of course, represented at the inquiries and many of the professional organisations with interests in local government also made their views known. The Tyneside Chamber of Commerce set up a special committee to look into the whole question and the trade unions were, of course, interested in the future of their members employed in local government. But the overwhelming impression is that it was essentially a political and administrative issue and the local authorities were the dominating actors. In the end, however, it was the Government who had to make the final decisions. The local authorities could give evidence to committees of inquiry until the cows came home but if the Government was not convinced one way or the other then nothing would be done. There is evidence that the disagreement between the different authorities on Tyneside persuaded the Government that the best decision was to refer the whole thing to a Royal Commission.²¹ This meant that a change at the Ministry of Housing and Local Government was imperative for Crossman was determined that a decision should be made to set up a conurbation authority and quickly. Indeed it has been suggested that if he had remained in office for a day or two longer then Tyneside would have followed Teesside in getting a unified authority.²² In the end Crossman was replaced by Greenwood who was less convinced of the necessity for immediate change.

There is another source of influence which should perhaps be mentioned. The County Councils Association were naturally concerned at the precedent that would be set if large chunks of counties were handed over to conurbation authorities. They, therefore, did all they could at the national level to press the case of Durham and Northumberland. The Association of Municipal Corporations, representing the boroughs, also opposed the conurbation authorities for a number of reasons. Besides the obvious one of loss of status of some of their members, there was also a rather less obvious one. The six largest members of the A.M.C. were represented on all the permanent committees and the creation of a greater Tyneside would mean that the new authority would be one of these six. In a great display of solidarity the existing six decided to try and prevent this usurpation.

The actual policy-making within each of the local authorities was usually along similar lines. It was usually entrusted to an existing committee such as the Parliamentary or General Purpose Committee, or a special committee was established. The broad outlines of the policy were

drawn up by this committee and then the officials were asked to prepare the detailed evidence. In some authorities this was largely left to the Town Clerk while in others all the chief officers were involved. Some authorities sought views from groups outside the council such as trade unions, welfare organisations, and business groups. It seems likely that in many cases there was a good deal of cross influence both between local councillors and local officials and between the councillors and outside organisations. For example, one individual gave evidence at the first enquiry on behalf of the Tyneside Junior Chamber of Commerce, but later found himself as a spokesman for the Newcastle Conservative group. There was a similar duality between some Labour councillors and trade unions.

Many individuals were involved in the issue of local government reorganisation. But a number of names reappear time and time again, leaving aside the Ministers directly concerned, another Minister, Ted Short, was M.P. for Newcastle Central and so was very concerned with the issue, a number of Labour councillors in the area also became M.P.'s and became spokesmen within the Parliamentary Labour Party for their local areas. This could in fact lead to difficulties if their personal views conflicted with those of the local party. From the local authorities the most important names seem to be Dan Smith, Ald. Cunningham, Cllr. Grey (Newcastle), Cllr. Abraham (Newcastle), Ald. Crawshaw (Tynemouth), Ald. Newman (South Shields), Ald. Collins (Gateshead), along with officials like Frank Harris (Newcastle), Wilfred Burns (Newcastle), Fred Egner (Tynemouth) and R.S. Young (South Shields). Perhaps we should also mention the local press, especially the Newcastle Journal, which tried to stir up public interest in the issue, with varying amounts of success. On the whole, however, the position of the various individuals was often only that of spokesmen for much wider groups and organisations.

Notes

1. Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside Area, 1937. Cmnd. 5402.
2. Report of the Local Government Boundary Commission, 1947.
3. White Paper on the Area and Status of Local Authorities in England and Wales, 1956, Cmnd. 9831.
4. The story of this decision can be found in a subsequent report of the Parliamentary and General Purposes Committee presented to the council on 4.11.59.
5. A summary of these proposals can be found in Civic News, the monthly news sheet of the Corporation of Newcastle Upon Tyne, April 1962.
6. Report of the Local Government Commission for England 1962-63.
7. For some typical reactions see Daily Telegraph 19.7.64
8. Guardian 7.10.65, Evening Chronicle 13.10.65, 1.12.65, and 14.12.65.
9. Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in England, 1966-69, Cmnd. 4040, 1969.
10. Guardian 9.6.66.
11. Guardian 1.5.67, Newcastle Journal 4.5.67, Northern Echo 4.5.67.
12. It did suggest changes in some of the other conurbations.
13. Local Government in England; Government Proposals for Re-organisation, February 1971, Cmnd. 4584.
14. The following discussion is based on both the minutes of the relevant local councils and on interviews with many of the leading participants.
15. The suggestion came from a former leader of the Labour group on Newcastle City Council.
16. Gateshead Council minutes 5.1.66.
17. Interview with leader of Labour group.
18. See for example Tynemouth Council minutes 28.9.66.
19. Interview with Egner.
20. Interviews with two former leaders of the Labour group.
21. This was suggested by a number of our respondents.
22. Interview with local government official from Newcastle.

CHAPTER SIXTHE TYNE TUNNEL

The river Tyne has always been something of an enigma. Although in a way it serves as a backbone to the surrounding area, it also provides an effective barrier between the northern and southern parts of the region. This question as to whether the river is a barrier or a spine is a continuing one on Tyneside.

One of the recurring problems of Tyneside has been the necessity for adequate crossings of the river. Besides fords, bridges were the obvious solution. But as long ago as the 17th century there were plans for building a tunnel under the river in order for the Royalists in the Civil War to attack the Roundheads in Tynemouth Castle. Furthermore, during the 19th century the coalmines at Hebburn and Wallsend were linked under the river. ¹

In the early part of this century the lowest crossing on the river, apart from the ferries, was nine miles from the sea. Congestion was gradually building up in Newcastle and Gateshead where the main road to Scotland, the A.1, crossed the river. The question of another crossing was raised in 1920 when the North Eastern Railway Company suggested building a bridge at Pelaw. Although nothing came of this idea it did bring the issue into the forefront of public concern. Eight years later a new bridge was built but it only led from congested Gateshead to congested Newcastle.

However plans now began to flow in a quickening stream. ² In 1926 the Ministry of Transport made a Provisional Order authoritising construction of a tunnel between North and South Shields to carry a monorail, but because of objections from Tynemouth the subsequent bill was defeated on second reading. It did, however, raise a question which was to play a large part in all subsequent discussions about additional crossing of the river - would a tunnel or a bridge be most useful.

Throughout the 1930's schemes were put forward and either rejected or ignored. In 1937, however, the process began which was only to be completed (if indeed it was completed) in 1967. The two county councils of Durham and Northumberland put forward a plan for building a tunnel between their respective territories and established a Joint Committee to supervise it.

The Government finally gave its approval in 1943 and the county councils promoted a bill which became the Tyne Tunnel Act of 1946. This Act provided for three tunnels - one for pedestrians, one for cycles, and one for vehicles. Because of post-war financial restrictions however the Ministry of Transport decided that work should only go ahead on the pedestrian and cyclist tunnel, now combined as one unit. This was completed in 1951.

Despite the appeals of the county councils, successive Ministers refused to authorise construction of the vehicular tunnel. As a result the county councils had to secure the passage of the Tyne Tunnel Act of 1956 in order to extend the provisions of the 1946 Act. The continual delays lead to a re-assessment of the relative values of a tunnel and a bridge with a majority probably still favouring a tunnel. However, the question was settled by central government in co-operation with the shipping interests on the river. It was argued that if a bridge were built it would have to be very high so as not to interfere with shipping on the river. This would mean, however, that because of the flatness of each bank of the river it would completely dominate the surrounding areas and could, therefore, be criticised on aesthetic grounds. Furthermore, a high bridge would need extensive approach roads which would increase the cost markedly. A high bridge would also present certain wind problems. Another objection to a bridge which was thought to weigh heavily in the Government's mind was that in the event of war enemy bombing of the bridge would bottle up some of the most important shipyards in the country. So a tunnel remained as the only feasible alternative. ³

There was also the question of the exact location to be considered. Newcastle was insistent that any additional crossing of the river should be in its territory. It was thought that a further bridge between Newcastle and Gateshead would present no great engineering problems and was necessary to take some of the load off the existing bridges. The proponents of the tunnel, however, were not concerned solely with providing an additional crossing for the river. Both county councils, but especially Northumberland, were also interested in opening up isolated parts of their territory. With the development of the new towns of Washington in Co. Durham and Killingworth and Cramlington in Northumberland, the necessity for quick communications became that much more urgent. On the Government's side it was hoped to fit the tunnel into an improved road system which would take through traffic away from the congested areas of Newcastle and Gateshead.

The question of how a tunnel would be financed also gave rise to controversy. In 1957 the Minister stated that a tunnel would have to pay for itself and therefore tolls would have to be charged. This suggestion was not at all acceptable to the county councils who had gradually been removing all charges on river crossings. Despite their protests, supported by the A.A. and the R.A.C., the Minister insisted that it was a case of 'no tolls, no tunnel'⁴ When the county councils reluctantly accepted the inevitable the Minister announced in March 1958 that work on the tunnel should begin.

It was not until 1961 that construction of the tunnel began and because of delays caused by a shortage of skilled manpower, was not completed until 1967. Even the opening caused some controversy. The Tyne Tunnel Joint Committee, which comprised six representatives from each of the two county councils, was attacked by Jarrow council for not keeping them informed of the proceedings. They were joined by Wallsend in demanding that they, as the authorities on whose land the tunnel was built, should be the official hosts and not the county councils. The mayor of Jarrow went so far as to claim that if it were not for Jarrow council the tunnel would never have been built.⁵

Analysis of the Issue as a Decision-Making Process.

The building of the Tyne Tunnel was almost entirely a matter for the two county councils and the Government. Indeed the issue is very nearly an example of local authority non-co-operation.

The discussions surrounding the building of a tunnel under the Tyne have been so protracted that it is difficult to isolate particular decisive initiatives. Ever since the 1930's detailed plans have been put forward and it is perhaps interesting to note that many of those most closely concerned with the project have been in local government for many years. One could, perhaps, be excused from regarding the building of the tunnel as virtually a hangover from a past era.

The fact that the lowest bridging point on the river was nine miles from the sea meant that north-east Durham and south-east Northumberland were isolated from the main line of communications through the region. There was a ferry at the mouth of the river but this could not be regarded as an effective crossing point for anything but purely local personal travel. The county boroughs of Tynemouth and South Shields would have liked a tunnel under the river in place of the ferry but they were not prepared to foot the bill for such an undertaking.⁶

The county councils were in a much better position. With greater resources than the boroughs and with a higher probability of receiving Government assistance, they were able to contemplate a tunnel. Not only would a tunnel down-river from Newcastle open up the isolated parts of their territory but the diversion of the main north-south route through the tunnel would tend to change the centre of gravity of Tyneside, drawing it away from Newcastle.

Once the question of tunnel or bridge had been settled, the real problem for the county councils was to interest the Government sufficiently for it to provide a greater share of the cost of the project. Although this was achieved in the end the county councils had to pay the price of allowing tolls to be charged which they considered would put the whole scheme in jeopardy by driving away potential traffic. They obviously considered that the economic benefits of the tunnel were of greater importance than the financial benefits of a system of tolls. As it turned out the tunnel has been much more successful than was anticipated and the tolls will be used to pay off the substantial capital debts, which amount to over two million pounds in the case of the county councils and over six million pounds in the case of the Government. ⁷

Apart from the county councils and the Government there was little local involvement in the project. Although the tunnel would affect a large variety of interests the Tyne Tunnel Joint Committee was confined to six members each from the two county councils. The attitude of Newcastle varied between opposition and complete indifference. They would have preferred another bridge within the city limits so that the traffic load could have been eased on the existing bridges. A traffic survey conducted for them by Newcastle University suggested that much of the traffic entering Newcastle from the south had Newcastle as its destination and that, therefore, a scheme which sought to provide a by-pass was irrelevant to the city's needs. ⁸

The only other local authorities to take any interest were Tynemouth and South Shields who, when they realised that a tunnel was going to be built up-river, were chiefly concerned with its effect on the ferry service. ⁹ This service was, in fact, going to appear in a number of the issues considered in this study. Jarrow and Wallsend, in whose territory the tunnel was built, appear not to have taken a very active part except in the arguments over the official opening.

As far as local industry was concerned, it does not appear to have made its presence felt. Indeed it would appear that far from industry actively working to get the tunnel, the existence of the tunnel has served as bait to attract industry to the area, particularly to the newly established Tyne Tunnel Trading Estate. However, this is not to say that the tunnel has not proved useful to local industry. This is especially true of the shipbuilding industry after its reorganisation when there was a need for continual travel between the yards on either side of the river. ¹⁰

It would appear that there was little opposition to the building of the tunnel. There was some opposition from property owners at either end of the tunnel, although much of the land on the northern bank of the river was owned by the Duke of Northumberland who was sympathetic to the project. The general feeling seemed to be more one of apathy or a feeling that the tunnel was too small or in the wrong place. Regarding the question of size, the manager of the Tunnel, Harry Allenby, has argued that those responsible for the tunnel were aware of this objection but it was more economical to build two small tunnels rather than one large one. If the need arises a new tunnel can easily be added. ¹¹

The chief participants in the building of the Tyne Tunnel were the members of the Joint Committee, the officials of the Ministry of Transport, and a number of technical experts. In terms of personalities the evidence would suggest that pride of place be given to Ald. Dan Dawson, from Northumberland, who was on the Joint Committee for over twenty years and was Chairman over the crucial period, Harry Allenby, the manager of the tunnel, who was formerly an employee of Newcastle corporation, C.W. Gair, the divisional road engineer from the Ministry of Transport, Ald. Coates from Co. Durham who was Dawson's predecessor as chairman, and Ald. Sir Nicholas Garrow, for many years chairman of Northumberland County Council.

Notes

1. Financial Times Supplement 19.10.67
2. For details see the brochure published by the Tyne Tunnel Joint Committee to commemorate the opening 19.10.67.
3. These arguments against a bridge were spelt out in interviews with the manager of the tunnel and the chairman of the Joint Committee.
4. See commemorative opening brochure.
5. Northern Echo 11.10.67.
6. Interviews with representatives from Tynemouth and South Shields.
7. Daily Telegraph 6.12.59.
8. Interview with former leader of Newcastle City Council.
9. See for example Northern Echo 17.3.67
10. The Chairman of the Swan Hunter Group called it a 'godsend'.
11. Interview with author.

CHAPTER SEVENTHE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIRPORT

Any town or city which is intent on attracting its full share of new industries or even in maintaining those that already exist must possess good communications with other parts of the country. The development of the motorway system is evidence of this continual need. But alongside the means of rapid transit for heavy freight there must exist facilities for the movement of people. Increasingly in recent years this has meant air travel.

In its role as the chief city of the North East of England, Newcastle has become more and more conscious of the need for a modern, well-equipped airport. The story of how this need was satisfied provides an interesting insight into many aspects of local politics.

It is in fact a long story.¹ We can, perhaps, trace its beginning to March 1929 when Newcastle City Council decided to appoint a Special Committee to report on the advisability of an airport. The committee investigated 18 possible sites but finally recommended a site at High House Farm, Woolsington. Protracted negotiations followed with the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Health and it was not until October 4th, 1933 that the purchase of the site was authorised. The following year the City Council approved the establishment of an airport on about a third of the land purchased thus allowing considerable scope for future expansion. It was officially opened on July 26th, 1935 by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the then Secretary of State for Air.

The direction and management of all services at the airport were handed over to the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Aero Club with the result that little consideration was given to the commercial development of the airport. On the outbreak of war it was requisitioned by the R.A.F. but this had little effect on the facilities of the site for when it was handed back to the local authority in 1946 it still consisted of a grass runway and a number of huts. As such it fell far behind many of the other municipal airports in the country.

Very little was done until the early 1950's when James Denyer was appointed to be Chief Flying Instructor of the Aero Club and later, in 1952, Commandant of the airport. He was aware that the airport was rapidly becoming a laughing stock in the aviation world and so he determined to try and improve the situation.² Largely due to his efforts, together with

those of Ald. Mould-Graham, Chairman of the Airport Committee, Newcastle City Council set up a special committee under the Chairmanship of Ald. Sword to investigate possible development of the airport. The committee reported in October 1954 and concluded:

"The Committee are of the opinion that steps should be taken in the near future to bring the airport up to the standard which is required by the public for an airport serving such a large and important area as the North East of England." ³

In moving the report Ald. Sword said "I am sure that in two or three years time, if we carry the developments outlined, the committee and Newcastle will have something of which we can be proud." ⁴ His confidence was to be somewhat misplaced.

Opposition was building up from two main quarters. On the one hand there was the feeling prevalent among many of the economy-minded Progressive councillors in the city that the cost of development would be prohibitive and that the authors of the report of the special committee were deliberately misleading the council in underestimating the cost. Later events were to justify this charge of underestimation. One of the suggestions put forward at the time by Ald. Charlton Curry, a former M.P. for Bishop Auckland, was that Newcastle should approach other local authorities likely to benefit from the development of the airport and also to try and secure financial assistance from the Government. ⁵ These two questions were to reappear time and time again in the future.

On the other hand there were those who supported the idea of some kind of regional airport but were opposed to the particular site at Woolsington. These people, who included in their number Dan Smith, later to play a major part in many of the important issues facing the region, argued that it was a mistake to build an airport, ostensibly to serve the region as a whole, which would be a considerable distance from the chief growth area of the region, namely Teesside. However, there were other less objective reasons for opposition to the development of Woolsington. Many of the surrounding local authorities saw it as simply another case of Newcastle's 'empire-building'. The chief alternative site suggested was at White Mare Pool, Boldon, and the Government even went so far as to secure the establishment of a North East Airport Joint Committee under the chairmanship of a South Shields councillor to investigate the feasibility of building an international airport on this site. But for technical and climatic reasons and because of the pressure brought to bear by Newcastle this came to nothing and the Committee was disbanded in 1955. ⁶

An impasse had now been reached. Most people accepted the necessity for a regional airport and Woolsington was the generally accepted site. The problem was finance. Newcastle had approached the Government for financial assistance but had been told that this would only be forthcoming if Newcastle could secure the co-operation of the other local authorities in the area.⁷ The local authorities for their part were loath to commit themselves without first receiving a promise of Government financial assistance. There the matter rested for the time being.

As time passed the need for action became more and more evident. Scheduled flights were now being run from Newcastle, first by Hunting Air Transport and later by B.K.S. Ltd. More advanced aircraft were gradually coming into use and of necessity they required improved facilities at the airport. When Denyer asked the Newcastle Airport Committee for additional terminal accommodation he received another wooden hut.⁸ This was not because the Committee did not consider the development of the airport as important but because there was simply no money available. Complaints about the facilities at Woolsington became more and more frequent and the city was able to use these as ammunition in its fight to secure Government assistance. But although sympathetic to the idea of a regional airport in the North East the Government was insistent on its demand for the airport to be a joint venture between all the local authorities in the area.

This situation persisted until 1963. The other local authorities were very suspicious of Newcastle's motives and it was generally felt that control of the airport would remain in the hands of the city even though the burden of supporting the finances of the airport would increasingly fall on them.⁹ Some firm action was needed if any progress was to be made. This was forthcoming when Newcastle City Council Labour Group convened a meeting of other Labour Groups in the area and hammered out a political deal. The chief actors in this affair were Dan Smith, the leader of the Labour Group in Newcastle, and Ald. Andrew Cunningham, leader of the Labour Group on Durham County Council. Under the terms of this deal the County Council was prepared to provide a large part of the cost of the development in return for the Chairmanship of the proposed new airport authority. Once the decision had been made on the political level it was brought into the open and made official. From then on the obstacles tended to be technical rather than political and administrative.

In April 1963 a meeting was held in Newcastle attended by representatives from Newcastle, Northumberland County Council, Durham County Council, Gateshead and South Shields Borough Councils, which finally set up a consortium to run the airport at Woolsington which in future would be the legal property of all of the authorities participating. The new airport committee was to consist of six representatives from Durham County Council, three each from Newcastle and Northumberland, and two each from Gateshead and South Shields. The cost of running the airport was to be shared on the following basis:

Durham	45%
Northumberland	23%
Newcastle	22%
Gateshead	5%
South Shields	5%

The consortium was later to be joined by Tynemouth and Sunderland who were each allocated two seats on the new authority. The chairmanship of the new authority went as agreed to Andrew Cunningham and he has remained in office ever since.

The Government had often stated in previous negotiations that if the local authorities would get together it would be willing to help towards the costs of development. In fact the Government jumped the gun somewhat for after a visit to the airport in 1962 and a talk with the Commandant the Minister of Aviation, Thorneycroft, made available a grant of £100,000. So the consortium was able to begin operations with money already in the bank., Not only that but with the establishment of the consortium the grant was raised to £ $\frac{1}{4}$ million.

The new North East Regional Airport Committee now began drawing up plans for the development of the airport and it appointed Consulting Engineers, architects, and building contractors. It was intended that the development should take place in two stages, first the improvement of the runway, and then the construction of new terminal buildings. The original estimate of the cost was £1 $\frac{1}{2}$ million. But, as often happens in such circumstances, a number of factors, foreseen and unforeseen, presented difficulties.

Firstly, the building contractors found themselves in financial difficulties and were unable to complete their contract. One of the first actions of the newly appointed city manager of Newcastle, Frank Harris, was to dismiss the original contractors and appoint new ones. ¹⁰ As a result of

the changeover the cost of the development went up sharply.¹¹ A further consequence was that the two phases of the development were condensed into one in order to avoid the dangers of congestion that would arise if the terminal buildings were not adequate to cope with the increased traffic made possible by the extended runways.¹²

A second problem arose when it was pointed out that there were coal mines under the runways which could lead to subsidence and possible tragedy. After protracted negotiations with the National Coal Board, it was decided to sterilise the coal under the runway in return for which the N.C.B. were to receive £ $\frac{1}{4}$ million in compensation.¹³

As a result of the various delays the new runways were not opened until April 1966 and the new terminal buildings until February 1967. By this time the cost of the development had escalated to over £3 million.

Although the airport is not in itself financially profitable and has to be supported out of the rates there is widespread agreement that the development of the facilities and the way the airport is administered were on the right lines. More and more traffic is being attracted and with further extensions to the runway the airport is now capable of taking long-haul jets. In many respects the airport is now the gateway to the North East.

Analysis of the Issue as a Decision-Making Process.

In the beginning the airport was almost solely the concern of Newcastle Corporation although, of course, its users were not solely residents of Newcastle. The Government was soon drawn in however both because of its position as a source of finance and as the authority for civil aviation. The other chief participants were to be the surrounding local authorities.

It might have been expected that local industry would have taken a deep interest in the development of the airport as businessmen are prime users of internal air transport. However, it would seem that local industry was conspicuous by its absence in the discussions. The only commercial interests closely concerned were, of course, the airlines, especially Hunting Clan and B.K.S. Ltd., who began to operate scheduled flights from Newcastle and therefore wanted adequate facilities.

The heart of the decision-making process was the relationship between the local authorities on the one hand and the Government on the other. Alongside this, however, was the conflict between Newcastle and the other local authorities concerned. Indeed at times it becomes difficult to disentangle these two aspects of the problem.

We have already seen that there was some opposition to the development of the airport within Newcastle itself. This was chiefly over the cost of the project and involved not only many of the old Progressive councillors but also many of the city's financial experts. It was left to a very small group of councillors, including Dan Smith and Henry Russell, with the help and guidance of James Denyer, to keep the issue in the forefront of attention.

The attitudes of the other local authorities were somewhat mixed. Northumberland, within whose physical territory the airport was situated, was eager to improve communications to its new towns at Cramlington and Killingworth, and was, therefore, prepared to welcome the development of the airport. Co. Durham was in rather a difficult position. As the largest local authority in the area it should naturally play a large part in any inter-authority venture. However, it contained within its boundaries Teesside airport which was a possible rival to Newcastle as the regional airport. While the county would have liked to see the development of a large airport somewhere within its territory, it was prepared to support Newcastle provided it received adequate compensation.¹⁴ As we have seen, Newcastle wanted a large financial contribution from the county and so was prepared to surrender overall control to get it.

The other three county boroughs on the Tyne were very suspicious of Newcastle's motives. They had often been the victims in the past of the city's ambition and they were not prepared to offer financial support to something over which they would have no control. South Shields was also somewhat bitter over what they considered to be Newcastle's influence in getting the White Mare Pool project shelved. Tynemouth originally did not see any benefit in joining the consortium. Indeed she had plans to build her own airport, later scaled down to a heliport.¹⁵ However, with improved communications and the realisation that people from Tynemouth were using Newcastle airport, it decided to go into the consortium.

The members of the Joint Airport Committee were very proud of the fact that their consortium was the first of its kind in the country. When it was established most of the local authorities concerned were Labour controlled and so it is likely that the Chairman, Cunningham, had little difficulty in controlling the committee. However, Denyer insisted that politics be kept out of the committee in any case ¹⁶ and that decisions be based on technical considerations only. Whether this situation can be maintained now that the Conservatives control Northumberland, Newcastle, Tynemouth, South Shields and Sunderland is something that only time will reveal.

The position of Denyer as airport Director raises several interesting points. Having occupied his present position since 1952 it is evident that he has the interests of the airport at heart. Having seen the airport grow he was obviously concerned to see that nothing should hold up further development. Commenting on his role, he argued that the airport was a business and as such there are times when business procedures and not local government procedures have to be employed. ¹⁷ At times, when a decision was urgently required, he had by-passed the Committee and then presented them with a fait-accomplit for ratification. On the other hand many of the councillors on the committee argued that all important decisions were made by the committee and people like Denyer were only there to give technical advice.

The evidence from documentary sources and interviews suggests that the development of the airport was chiefly a local authority concern with other major roles being taken by the Government and various technical interests. The two most important turning points were the Government's insistence that the airport must be a combined venture and the political agreement reached by the Labour groups in the area. If we had to name the chief participants on the basis of the decisional method they would be Denyer, Smith, Cunningham, Russell, Mould-Graham, and Sword, along with a number of Ministers, especially Thorneycroft, and a number of technical specialists like Frederick Snow, the Consulting Engineer for the airport. ¹⁸

Notes

1. See the Official Handbook of Newcastle Airport.
2. Interview with Denyer.
3. Newcastle City Council Minutes 6.10.54
4. Ditto 20.10.54
5. Ditto 20.10.54.
6. Evening Chronicle 28.5.55 and interviews with various participants.
7. Journal 21.12.61.
8. Interview with Denyer.
9. See for example Newcastle Council Minutes 7.11.62.
10. Interview with Harris.
11. Journal 1.10.65.
12. Journal 27.11.65.
13. Interviews with participants.
14. See for example Durham County Council Minutes 7.11.62.
15. Interview with Town Clerk.
16. In an interview with the author Denyer actually said in this respect: "I wont have it, I told Andy Cunningham."
17. Interview with author.
18. A contrasting case study of airport development in Sheffield is provided in Hampton, op cit.

CHAPTER EIGHTTHE PORT OF TYNE AUTHORITY

The estuary of the river Tyne has been an important port for centuries but it was with the opening up of the coalfields of Durham and Northumberland that it achieved national significance. The demand by the coal-shippers for better navigation on the river led in 1850 to the establishment of the Tyne Improvement Commission which was a public trust responsible for the maintenance of most of the port installations, for conservancy and for lightering. However, alongside the T.I.C. there were about ten other installations, the largest of which was Newcastle Corporation Quay. Some of these were local authority undertakings while others were in private hands.

The T.I.C. was the scene of a continuing struggle between the shipowners and the local authorities which was to be one of the dominant themes in the discussions over the future of the river as a port. The Commission had 36 members comprising twelve representing the payers of port dues, five representing the National Coal Board, seventeen representing the local authorities and two representing the Ministry of Transport. Despite the numerical superiority of the local authorities, effective control was in the hands of the port users because the local authorities frequently disagreed amongst themselves, often over the influence of Newcastle.¹

The Commission as a result was not a particularly dynamic body. Until quite recently its minutes were written out in copper-plate handwriting, and all major, and some not so major, management decisions had to be approved by a general meeting. The Commission therefore, was in no position to deal with the crisis of the declining trade of the port which was largely due to the contraction of the coal industry in the region. The facilities of the port were allowed to run down and the Commission considered that there was little point in increased capital investment in the port until there was increased demand. This was contrary to the views of many of the local authorities, especially Newcastle, who argued that better facilities, particularly in regard to container traffic and ore handling, would attract trade to the river.²

The necessity for some kind of reorganisation of the port became more urgent with the report of the Rochdale Committee on the future of British ports.³ Among its recommendations, included in the Harbours Act of 1964, was the creation of a unified authority for the port of Tyne. The question to be settled was what kind of authority and who was to run it.

Because of the declining revenue from the port users, the local authorities argued that if the new authority was to have a sound economic base it would have to be subsidised out of local rates. In exchange for this financial support the local authorities would expect a controlling position on the new authority. Newcastle took the initiative by calling a meeting of other riparian authorities - Gateshead, Tynemouth, South Shields, Wallsend, Jarrow, Co. Durham, and Northumberland - to work out the attitude of the local authorities. The meeting set up a working party which worked out a constitution for the proposed new authority.⁴ It would have a board of 15 members which would consist of one representative from each of the eight local authorities concerned, one each from the shipowners, the shipbuilders, local industry, the N.C.B., and the trade unions, and two from the traders. Thus, assuming they agreed amongst themselves, the local authorities would be in control.

Naturally the T.I.C. and the port users did not like this proposal. In reply they suggested an authority of 17 members consisting of five from the traders, four from the shipowners, two from the Ministry of Transport, and one each from the N.C.B., the trade unions, Newcastle, Gateshead, South Shields and Tynemouth. They also differed from the local authority working party in wanting the new authority to take over the North Shields Fish Quay which the local authorities wanted to remain in the hands of Tynemouth corporation. One more source of disagreement was the Tyne Pilotage Authority which the local authorities wanted within the new authority while the T.I.C. wanted it to be left out.⁵

The situation was further complicated, and a note of urgency introduced, by a report of the National Ports Council which said that it could see no justification for any further development of the Tyne as a port.⁶ This led to a scramble among various interested parties, prominent among them being the Tyneside Chamber of Commerce and the Northern Federation of Trade Councils, to put forward plans to 'Save the Tyne'. It also meant that the local authorities and the T.I.C. would have to reach some sort of compromise for otherwise a solution would be imposed on them by the Government which would probably not be to their liking.

This threat of Government intervention was used by the local authorities when a meeting was held in May 1965 to try and work out a compromise.⁷

At the meeting the T.I.C., in the person of their chairman, C.B. Garrick, argued that the port should be financed out of revenue from the operation of the port and not out of the local authorities rates. This was clearly unacceptable to the local authorities who felt that the port would never be a going concern if it depended on the declining revenue of the port. So a stalemate existed.

In an attempt to break the deadlock the National Ports Council now stepped in.⁸ It called a meeting in Newcastle for November 25th, 1965 under the chairmanship of Sir Eric Milbourne, the vice-chairman of the N.P.C. As a result of this meeting it was decided that the new authority should have 16 members. These would comprise five from the local authorities, two each from the shipowners and the trade unions, three from the traders, including one shipbuilder, three independent appointees of the Ministry of Transport, and one ex-officio chief executive. The Tyne Pilotage Authority would be excluded from the new authority, but the North Shields Fish Quay would be included.⁹

Neither side in the dispute was particularly happy with the compromise, but they reluctantly accepted that they could expect little more.¹⁰ When the matter came before the Newcastle Trade and Commerce Committee only one member opposed the Milbourne proposals on the grounds that the new authority would be lacking in dynamism and would be no improvement on the old T.I.C. In this opinion he was to prove to be correct. In the T.I.C. the proposals were accepted by 16 votes to 6. The opposition was led by Peter Dalgleish who argued that the shipowners were under-represented and that too much power was given to outsiders.¹¹

There was now a feeling that everyone should accept the Milbourne proposals, stop arguing amongst themselves, and get down to working out the details of the new authority.¹² As a result a six man steering committee was set up which consisted of Ald. Collins (Gateshead), Clr. Harding (Newcastle) and Ald. Crawshaw (Tynemouth), representing the local authorities, and C.B. Garrick, J.N. Burrell and W.F. Blackadder.¹³ Its first meeting was held in April 1966 but a series of problems, especially that of the North Shields Fish Quay¹⁴ meant that the new Port of Tyne Authority did not come into existence until January 1st, 1968, and did not take full control until August 1st, 1968.

A further possible cause of delay occurred when the Conservatives took control of Newcastle Council in May 1967. When the council came to discuss the new authority approval was deferred by 40 votes to 34.¹⁵ Despite

appeals by Clr. Harding that any delays would be fatal, Clr. Arthur Grey, the Conservative leader, said there were some aspects of the new authority that demanded further consideration. However, two months later approval was given and Clr. Grey explained that he had been trying to secure Newcastle two seats on the new authority but had now settled for one. 16

The new Port of Tyne Authority has not been the success it was hoped it would be. Trade has continued to decline and attempts to attract new sources of revenue have failed. It was hoped that the Tyne would be chosen as the site of a new aluminium smelter but the port of Blyth was chosen instead. The Tees likewise was preferred to the Tyne as the site of an ore importing installation for the Northern and Tubes Group of the British Steel Corporation. The final blow came when a special committee of the Northern Region Economic Planning Council under the chairmanship of Don Edwards, Secretary of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions on Tyneside, suggested that the north east could only support one port and that this should be Teesport. The only possible reason for maintaining the Tyne as a port was the existence of the shipbuilding industry on the river, but it was thought that this was not likely to be of sufficient importance in the future. 17

The composition of the new authority confirmed the worst fears of the local authorities. The Ministry appointees were not independent in the opinion of many of the local authorities. For example, one of them, who was later nominated as chairman, was J.N. Burrell who is one of the leading shipowners in the north east. As a result of the local authorities finding themselves still in their old position vis-a-vis the port users, they gradually lost interest and the port returned to its old lackadaisical ways. 18

As a result, when the Minister of Transport announced in January 1969 that the Government intended to nationalise the ports, including the Tyne, the opposition was not as vociferous as in some other parts of the country. Indeed many people who object to nationalisation in principle were prepared to see the port taken over by the state in anticipation that this would mean that the Tyne would be subsidised by other ports in the country. It is possible, therefore, to see the establishment of the Port of Tyne Authority as a mere holding operation to see that the port was run as efficiently as possible while preparations were being made for nationalisation.

Analysis of the Issue as a Decision-making Process.

The issues we have looked at already, local government reorganisation, the airport and the Tyne Tunnel, were almost exclusively the concern of local and central government. The establishment of the Port of Tyne Authority saw a much greater involvement on the part of local business interests and thus a new element is introduced into our analysis.

We have already seen that the old Tyne Improvement Commission had been split between the representatives of the local authorities and representatives of the shipowners and the port users. The local authorities considered that the shipowners and the port users had no conception of the role of the port in relation to the rest of Tyneside. The only people who could remedy this situation were the local authorities themselves who could not only develop the port as an integral part of wider economic planning but also could subsidise the port out of the rates. The shipowners and the port users could only improve the facilities of the port with the intention of attracting new trade by raising the port dues. This was obviously self-defeating. So there the matter rested with trade dwindling and the facilities of the port falling into disrepair.

It was obvious that if anything were to be done there would have to be some dramatic action from powerful interests and people from inside Tyneside or direct intervention from central government. It so happened that despite a superficial concern for the future of the Tyne, many of the most important people in the area had already decided that there was only room for one large port in the north east and all the evidence suggested that this should be Teesport. The only possible source of change was therefore through Government intervention.

When the National Ports Council began its attempt to rationalise the port of Tyne, it was faced by a considerable amount of cross pressures. The local authorities were insistent that they should have control of any proposed new authority for they would be expected to provide a large part of the financial support. They were not prepared to see the port users and the shipowners in control for this would mean that the rates were being used to support private industry and this was still important enough to influence the thoughts of some Labour councillors. The National Ports Council had, therefore to tread very warily and try to balance the conflicting interests in the new controlling authority. But the local authorities were not satisfied with this and when they realised that they were not going to get any better terms, they gradually lost interest with the result that control devolved once again onto the shipowners and the port users.

Those local authorities that owned port facilities were in rather a quandry about the right course of action that should be taken in regard to the establishment of the new authority. On the one hand they were loath to lose control of these facilities but on the other the new authority would take over the debts, often substantial, incurred in the operation of these facilities. For example, Newcastle had one of the largest quays on the river but much of its capacity was unused and it was estimated that it was costing Newcastle about £70,000 a year. ¹⁹

Although the chief conflict on this issue was between the local authorities and the shipping interests there were other smaller sources of disagreement. The local authority working party was set up on the initiative of Newcastle but a Gateshead political leader, Ald. Collins, was appointed chairman much to the disgust of the chairman of the Newcastle Trade and Commerce Committee, Clr. E. Harding, who considered his claim had priority. Newcastle was further incensed by the fact that it received only one seat on the new authority whereas it had had six on the Tyne Improvement Commission.

Another source of controversy was the position of the shipbuilding industry on the river. With the declining import-export trade of the port it became clear that in time the only reason for maintaining the port would be for the use of the shipbuilders. Why, therefore, some people began to ask, did not the shipbuilding industry assume a much greater responsibility for the upkeep of the port, especially for such services as dredging, lightering, and navigation. The difficulty was that the industry was in desperate straits itself and could hardly afford the increased financial burden implied in these suggestions. However, in the last report the industry admitted that it might have to make itself responsible for keeping the port in existence. ²⁰

It would seem from the evidence that the chief actor in the setting up of the Port of Tyne Authority was the Government, often acting through the National Ports Council. As such the issue can be seen as part of a much wider movement towards rationalisation which the Labour Government pressed forward with in many aspects of economic and administrative activity. We shall be considering other aspects of this process in the discussion of other issues. Besides the Government and the National Ports Council the most active participants were the various shipping and fishing interests on the river and the appropriate committees of the various local authorities. In terms of personalities we could perhaps single out Sir Eric Milbourne, Ald. Collins, Clr. Harding, Ald. Crawshaw (Tynemouth), J.N. Burrell, the

chairman of the new Port of Tyne Authority, C.B. Carrick and W.F. Blackadder, both from the Tyne Improvement Commission. However, it is likely that in this issue the views of national interests and national officials were predominant and that local interests were fighting on the defensive for most of the time.

Notes

1. Guardian 28.3.66.
2. See for example Evening Chronicle 20.8.65.
3. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Major Ports of Great Britain, 1961-62, Cmnd 1824.
4. Evening Chronicle 10.9.65.
5. Evening Chronicle 10.9.65, Daily Telegraph 3.11.65.
6. Evening Chronicle 20.8.65.
7. For details of this meeting see Newcastle City Council minutes 5.1.66.
8. Journal 3.11.65.
9. Evening Chronicle 26.11.65.
10. Evening Chronicle 8.12.65.
11. Journal of Commerce and Shipping Telegraph 15.12.65.
12. See for example an editorial in Evening Chronicle 9.12.65.
13. Journal 7.12.65.
14. Journal 2.4.66.
15. Newcastle City Council minutes 7.6.67
16. Evening Chronicle 3.8.67
17. Interview with Edwards.
18. Interviews with various local authority representatives.
19. This estimate was given by one of the local authority representatives on the old T.I.C.
20. Interview with Chairman of Swan Hunter Group.

CHAPTER NINETHE RE-ORGANISATION OF POLICE AREAS

During the 19th century many local authorities in the country established their own police forces. However, with the growing complexities of crime prevention and detection it became evident that there were too many small forces. Gradually these smaller forces were absorbed by their larger neighbours. The process was quickened by the 1946 Police Act which many people saw as an attempt by the Government to establish a greater degree of control over the local police forces. In 1962 a Royal Commission on the Police recommended that forces with an establishment of less than 200 were not viable and should be abolished and that forces with a strength of under 350 were of dubious value.¹ These suggestions were accepted by the Home Office and the police themselves.

The permanent officials at the Home Office and the Inspectors of Constabulary had been in favour of large scale mergers for some time, and they got their chance when Roy Jenkins became Home Secretary.² The result was the Police Act of 1964 which removed a number of anomalies in police administration which simplified the task of merging. Especially important was the distinction between borough and county forces with the former being supervised by a statutory Watch Committee and the latter by a standing joint committee of councillors and J.P.'s. Previously, such matters as promotion and discipline had been subject to ratification by the Watch Committees in the boroughs and this had sometimes led to nepotism.³ In many cases, relationships between the police and the Watch Committee had depended on the characters of the Chief Constable and the Chairman of the Watch Committee. The 1964 Act put both borough and county forces on a similar footing.

Tyneside was an obvious candidate for the re-organisation of police areas. There were six different police authorities operating in the conurbation (seven if we include the river police), three on the north bank of the river - Northumberland, Newcastle and Tynemouth - and three on the south bank - County Durham, Gateshead, and South Shields. However, at the time discussions were still going on about the re-organisation of the total system of local government in the area, so it was decided to leave re-organisation of the police areas until this had been finalised.

However, when the process of local government reform ran into the sands of local rivalry the Home Secretary decided to go ahead with a police

merger. There were a number of alternative schemes around. The Home Office envisaging a system of about a dozen regional forces with possibly the eventual creation of a national police force. However, local opinion was on the whole opposed to this. The county forces wanted a system of re-organisation that would consist of them taking over the borough forces which fell within their geographical territories. There were precedents for this in the case of the absorption of Sunderland and Hartlepoons into the County Durham force. The boroughs were of course opposed to this. If they were in favour of any change at all it was likely to be in favour of a conurbation force. They argued that the problems of the urban areas of Tyneside were different from those of the neighbouring counties, especially Northumberland, and they should, therefore, be left to a force concerned entirely with urban problems. The difficulty with this was that legally the Home Secretary could only merge existing forces. The creation of a conurbation force would, therefore, have required new legislation.

In June 1967 the Home Secretary announced that re-organisation would take place on the basis of two county forces. The counties were naturally delighted - the chairman of the Durham Police Authority called it 'a great step forward.'⁴ The boroughs, especially Newcastle, were not. However, it was agreed to hold preliminary talks to discuss the ways and means of merging. The problems on the north bank of the river proved to be more difficult to solve than those on the south bank.

Although Newcastle wanted either a Tyneside force or a regional force, it decided to enter into voluntary talks with Northumberland and Tynemouth.⁵ The two important problems to be settled were the composition of the new authority and the financial arrangements. Newcastle argued that the incidence of crime and other police problems should be the basis for both while Northumberland argued that population was the main criteria. In the end, however, it was agreed that the costs of the new authority would be arranged in such a way that Northumberland would pay an extra £153,000, Newcastle would pay £140,000 less, and Tynemouth would pay £512,000 less.⁶ So it would appear that the two boroughs were being amply compensated for the end of their independence in police matters. However, the situation was again thrown into the melting pot when James Callaghan became Home Secretary. He allowed Hull and Bradford, both similar in many ways to Newcastle, to withdraw from proposed mergers. As a result Newcastle Watch Committee met and decided to send its chairman to visit the Home Secretary to see if the proposed merger arrangements could be altered. The Home Secretary said that if a merger could not be achieved voluntarily then he proposed to enforce a merger. If this happened, the financial arrangements would be changed

which would result in Northumberland contributing about £60,000 more. In the light of this information, Newcastle decided to pull out of the voluntary merger and wait for an enforced merger. Northumberland immediately demanded an enquiry which resulted in the contributions to the new authority being based on the respective rate products of the three contributing local authorities. This did not appear to satisfy anyone, especially Newcastle who considered that they had been misled by the Home Office. Northumberland also argued that their contribution to the new authority would put a brake on their plans for improvements in their social service provisions. Tynemouth also found that they were paying about £7,000 more for less policing. ⁷

The board of the new authority was to comprise 15 members from Northumberland, 9 from Newcastle, and 3 from Tynemouth. The County used this control to take all the top posts in the new authority, including that of Chief Constable. So there was some compensation for the increased costs it had to bear.

The merger in Co. Durham did not appear to create as much bitterness as that north of the Tyne. The county force was much larger than those of the two boroughs. However, local pride was still sufficient for Gateshead and South Shields to raise objections. When the original proposals were made South Shields decided to oppose them. But the chairman of the Watch Committee, Ald. E.W. Mackley, had seen the fight Sunderland had put up to prevent its amalgamation into the county force and he decided that if South Shields persisted in its opposition it would get worse terms than if it bowed to the inevitable. Although the borough was to pay about £30,000 more it was thought that this was the best that could be expected. ⁸

Similarly Gateshead would have preferred a conurbation force but realised that the Home Office was insistent on its county scheme. However, when Newcastle withdrew from the proposed merger north of the Tyne, Gateshead decided to withdraw as well. ⁹ This was not very effective as the Home Office simply over-rode the objections. Gateshead also attempted to postpone the merger until the whole system of local government had been changed ¹⁰ but the Home Office was insistent and so the merger came about. Again the county took a dominant position in the new authority with both the chairmanship and the post of Chief Constable going to their nominees.

The question of relating the police areas re-organisation to the re-organisations of local government as a whole is still under discussion. With the report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in June 1969 and the Conservative Government's Proposals of 1971 a new complication was added, because the system of police administration and the system of local government would be out of alignment. The only possible solutions would seem to be either to put the police under the control of the proposed new authorities or to establish a national police force. As in so many other aspects of local government it would seem that the interests of efficiency will be given priority over those of democracy.

Analysis of the Issue as a Decision-Making Process.

The operation of the police service in Britain is one that may have a profound effect on the lives of many people, but it is probably the least open of all the local government services. If control has proved to be difficult in small borough forces then we can perhaps sympathise with those people who are concerned at the implications of wide-ranging mergers. However the re-organisation on Tyneside did not cause much argument over the correctness or otherwise of a merger, but rather over the precise form of this merger.

Most local authorities, when threatened by the loss of one of their most important services, will of course be resentful. There will be a tendency for members of both the Watch or Police Committee and the police force itself to fight to preserve their own little empires. However, the criminal does not recognise local authority boundaries and this has meant that in practice there has been increasing co-operation between neighbouring police forces. Why not therefore recognise the problem, create larger police areas, and make the police force more efficient?

The experts at the Home Office had long seen the need for larger and more efficient police forces. This would allow greater specialisation and the use of more efficient forms of policing. The introduction of Regional Crime Squads was a step in this direction. Thus by the time that the Labour Government came to power in 1964 the Home Office was thinking in terms of regional police forces and even ultimately of a national force. A campaign was launched to convince the local authorities of the necessity of this course of action.

The violent opposition that was forthcoming from the local authority organisations convinced the Home Office that they would have to proceed very carefully. A compromise would have to be reached in each area between what the Home Office wanted and what the local authorities would stand. As usual in such cases the result was not likely to please anyone.

The two particular problems facing police re-organisation in the Tyneside area were the rivalry between the boroughs and the counties and the existence of the river. The boroughs argued, with some justification, that the problems facing the police in the urban areas were completely different from those in the counties. As one local councillor in Newcastle said 'The only problems facing the Northumberland police force are foul pest and sheep-stealing.'¹¹ There was also a feeling that the police hierarchy in the counties was, or thought it was, part of the 'county set', while the borough police chiefs were just ordinary 'coppers' doing a job of work.

There was considerable disagreement in the effect of the river on the operation of police forces. Some argued that the river was an effective barrier to the criminal and it was relatively easy for the police to close all the crossings on the river if necessary. Therefore the river should be the boundary between two forces. Others argued, however, that crime in the area was essentially an urban phenomenon and the river made little difference. The best solution was, therefore, a conurbation police force. Still others argued that while the river was not a barrier the problems of crime prevention and detection were much wider than the area of the conurbation and that, therefore, there should be a police force from the Tees to the Tweed. Similar arguments were also used in relation to the other great concern of modern police forces, traffic control.

The views of those who regarded the river as a boundary seem to have been given most weight. This was obviously to the benefit of the counties. In this context it is interesting to note that the Chief Inspector of Constabulary at the time, Eric St. Johnstone, was at one time Chief Constable of County Durham, and that the regional Inspector of Constabulary, Alan Scroggie, was a former Chief Constable of Northumberland. Indeed many of the people most concerned with the issue in the boroughs considered these two to be the villains of the piece as far as they were concerned.

Those local authorities that opposed the Home Office scheme found themselves rather short of allies. It might have been expected that the local M.P.'s would have been concerned to see local autonomy preserved but in fact this was not usually the case. It has been a continuing complaint of many M.P.'s that questions concerning local police forces were often not answered by the Home Secretary on the grounds that it was not within his competence to do so, but the proposed merger did nothing to alleviate this problem.

Two other possible sources of opposition were not really brought into the picture. There was little public interest in the issue and little attempt was made to stimulate it. Many people within the police force itself felt that the public were not concerned about how the force was administered but only that sufficient contact was maintained between the public and the police through the local police station and the man on the beat.¹² Some of the police themselves were rather apprehensive about the merger but the general feeling was that it was better to be a little fish in a big pool with the chance of becoming a big fish, rather than a big fish in a little pool.

Of the six existing police forces it is evident that the chief gainers were the two counties. It was generally recognised that the Tynemouth force was too small and so opposition from this quarter was not particularly strong. It is interesting to note, however, that the Tynemouth force was surprised by the suddenness of the decision to go ahead with the re-organisation for the force had been re-equipped only five years earlier. The main opposition, therefore, came from South Shields, Gateshead, and especially Newcastle.

The chief participant in this issue was clearly the Home Office with other leading parts being played by the local Watch or Police Committees. In terms of personalities we can perhaps isolate Clr. Petty, chairman of the Newcastle Watch Co., Ald. Barnett, the chairman of the Northumberland Police Co., Ald. Cunningham, the chairman of the Durham Police authority, and the Chief Constables of the three largest forces, Muir from Durham, Cooksley from Northumberland, and Gale from Newcastle. It should perhaps be pointed out that Petty and Barnett work in the same solicitor's office and it has been suggested that many of the details of the merger were hammered out here.

In the light of the recent proposals on local government reform it is likely that the re-organisation will be only temporary. It seems inconsistent to first reorganise on the basis of county forces and then to change the local authority boundaries. Unless the Home Office intends to organise its police into forces that cut across local authority boundaries, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that we will see a national police force before very long.

Notes

1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Police 1962, Cmnd 1728
2. This view was shared by the Chief Constables of both Durham and Newcastle.
3. According to one of the local Chief Constables.
4. Northern Echo 22.6.67.
5. Guardian 6.7.67.
6. Journal 2.2.68.
7. Information from interviews with participants, Guardian 3.5.68 and Northern Echo 31.10.68.
8. Interview with Mackley.
9. Journal 9.2.68.
10. Gateshead council minutes 10.1.68.
11. Interview with author.
12. This view was stated emphatically by one local Chief Constable.

CHAPTER TEN

THE SHIPBUILDING MERGER

The Tyne is one of the main shipbuilding areas of Britain. However like many others it has found it difficult to maintain its share of world markets largely due to methods which compare badly with those in use in other shipbuilding countries like Sweden and Japan. The problem was complicated by the fact that there were a number of separate yards on the river each of which was in many cases fighting for the same orders. As one of the chief sources of employment in the conurbation the future of the shipbuilding industry was of profound importance for everyone concerned with the area.

0 Following the Plowden report on the aircraft industry it was decided that a similar study should be made of the shipbuilding industry in Britain. An inquiry committee under the chairmanship of A.R.M. Geddes was set up by the Government whose terms of reference were 'to establish what changes are necessary in organisation, in the methods of production and any other factors affecting costs to make the shipbuilding industry competitive in world markets; to establish what changes in organisation and methods of production would reduce costs of manufacture of large main engines of ships to the lowest level; and to recommend what action should be taken by employers, trade unions and government to bring about these changes.'¹

As part of its inquiry, the Geddes Committee studied the four largest yards on the Tyne. These were Vickers Ltd. (Shipbuilding Group) which during the period January 1st, 1960 to December 31st, 1965 built over 250,000 tons of shipping, Swan Hunter and Wigham Richardson Ltd., (over 500,000 tons), Hawthorne Leslie (Shipbuilding) Ltd. (over 220,000 tons), and John Redhead & Sons Ltd. (over 100,000 tons). Much of the evidence that the Committee received suggested some kind of grouping of yards which shared the same river and this is what the Committee recommended for the Tyne.

Even before the Geddes Report was published there had been discussions about rationalisation of the industry along the river. The largest firm, Swan Hunters, had entered into negotiations with Smiths Dock Ltd., one of the largest repair yards on the river, with a view to a merger.² After the publication of the report an additional impetus was given to the process although it was felt that there might be difficulties with some of the smaller private firms, especially Redheads.³ However, the creation of the

Shipbuilding Industry Board as recommended by the Geddes Report, with power to encourage mergers, helped to maintain the pressure.⁴

Most opinion on the river was in favour of some kind of rationalisation. Both the Tyne Shipbuilders Association and the Tyne District Committee of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions met in June 1966 to discuss the implementation of the report.⁵ The employers had to be very discreet as any advance indication of their intentions would lead to a reaction on the Stock Exchange which might possibly have jeopardised the negotiations. However, they knew that they had the support of the unions for a meeting of 250 shop stewards had unanimously accepted the recommendations contained in the Geddes Report.⁶ As a result on June 14th, 1967 the four shipbuilding yards were able to announce their intention of merging their shipbuilding interests into a new combine. The new group, in which Swan Hunters were to have a majority interest and which was to be led by Sir John Hunter, would be the biggest in the country, accounting for about 20% of the merchant shipping built. A working party consisting of two representatives from each of the component firms was set up to work out the details of the merger. At the same time the trade unions also set up an advisory committee of two representatives from each of the yards to help the work of the firms' committee.⁷

The progress of the merger was expedited by the decision of Swan Hunters to take over Redheads.⁸ This takeover, masterminded by Barings, was to solve the difficulties raised by Redheads status as a private company. Further difficulties were presented by the fact that Vickers were concerned with other forms of engineering besides shipbuilding. This problem was put on one side with Vickers hanging on to its other interests including its ship repairing business.⁹

Although the unions had been generally in favour of the merger when it was first announced they later began to have doubts. Lack of information from the management about the labour prospects under the new regime and especially the threat of redundancies led the shop stewards to demand a meeting with the management. As a result in June 1968 Sir John Hunter faced 250 shop stewards at a meeting in Wallsend which made it clear that the enthusiasm generated when the consortium was set up had now evaporated.¹⁰ The meeting seemed to clear the air for in October an agreement was signed between the management and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions which laid down the basis for what was called a shipyard workers' charter.¹¹

One of the main points of the charter was that wage rates were standardised to such an extent that where there had been over 100 before there were now only 3 or 4.¹²

The problems of the rationalisation were, of course, complicated by the fact that the industry was in a serious position. The management was, therefore, in a position to blackmail the unions by arguing that if the merger was not a success then 10,000 people might find themselves out of work. As it turned out the new consortium was able to attract a good number of orders including several $\frac{1}{4}$ million ton tankers. Although the position is satisfactory at the moment, therefore, the future is not particularly bright. Sir John Hunter has already expressed his fears that mounting price of steel will soon eradicate all the advantages gained by the rationalisation.¹³ If this should happen then Tyneside will be in serious economic trouble.

Analysis of the Issue as a Decision-Making Process.

This is the only issue considered that is not a direct concern of the local authorities. However, the position of the shipbuilding industry in the economy of Tyneside means that its future will affect many aspects of the life of the area. Although the local authorities were not consulted in the negotiations surrounding the merger they all gave their blessing. There had in fact been quite close contacts between the industry and some of the local authorities. In Tynemouth the local authority had facilitated the expansion of the Smiths Dock site and in Wallsend, the home of Swan Hunters, many of the local councillors were shipyard workers.

The issue was essentially a three-sided affair involving the Government, the management of the industry and the trade unions. Because Britain is so dependent on foreign trade for her livelihood the future of the shipbuilding industry is of profound concern to the Government. Increasingly in recent years the ties between private industry and the Government have been tightened with the Government in some cases buying their way into large industrial enterprises. The shipbuilding industry seemed an obvious candidate for this sort of treatment.

The structure of the industry was in a hopeless mess. A number of family firms had grown up in the past and these often proved incapable of adapting to modern conditions. The shipbuilding families were extremely loath to accept any kind of Government interference in the industry and it

gradually became evident that the only way this could be avoided was to make themselves more efficient by voluntary mergers. As a result when the Geddes Committee sat down to consider the future of the industry, the more far-sighted shipbuilders put forward suggestions for mergers in the various shipbuilding regions of the country.

Although there were a number of firms on the Tyne the dominant position was occupied by the Swan Hunter group and the chairman of the group, Sir John Hunter, was the accepted spokesman for the industry. The Geddes Committee had no shipbuilders among its members and was, therefore, dependent to a large extent on the information fed to it by the shipbuilders. As a result Sir John Hunter was later able to claim that the Geddes Report followed closely the evidence he had given and where it deviated was to be the source of most of the later troubles. ¹⁴

The reactions of some of the other shipbuilding firms to be included in the merger were not quite as enthusiastic as those of Swan Hunters. A firm like Redheads was extremely proud of its history and its independence and it required some skilful wooing before the match was made. It was here that the role of an outsider was important in trying to reach a compromise. The case of Vickers was also interesting for the merger allowed them to unload onto the new group one of the less-profitable parts of their business.

When mergers have taken place in many industries the trade unions have usually been extremely concerned about the possible effects on employment opportunities. The shipbuilding industry is traditionally a labour-intensive industry so it was likely that rationalisation would lead to redundancy. However, the unions found themselves in rather an invidious position. The area as a whole is one of high unemployment and the threat of the complete shut-down of the shipbuilding industry was an extremely potent one. All the unions could do, therefore, was to try and obtain the best terms possible. Both employers and unions were careful to see that communications were kept open between them. However, as the negotiations dragged on many of the rank and file began to grow restless with the feeling that the union leadership and the management were making agreements above their heads. But their fears were allayed somewhat by the steady stream of orders that began to flow into the new consortium.

In our consideration of other issues we have found that the participation of local industry in communal affairs has been extremely limited. In the case of an industrial issue the participation of the local authorities seems

to be virtually nil. On the level of Tyneside, therefore, the degree of interdependence between government and industry seems to be fairly low. This is not to say, however, that interdependence is not higher at other levels of government particularly at the national level.

In the issue of the shipbuilding re-organisation the principal participants appear to have been the Government, the management of the shipbuilding firms concerned, and certain of the trade unions. In terms of personalities, the figure of Sir John Hunter seems to stand out above all others, with Mr. Reay Geddes, Don Edwards, Secretary of the Tyne Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, and Dan McGarvey, the President of the Boilermakers Society, as supporting figures.

Notes.

1. Report of the Shipping Industry Committee, 1965-6, Cmnd. 2937, p.3.
2. Shipbuilding and Shipping Record 5.5.66.
3. Ditto 24.3.66.
4. Interview with Hunter.
5. Northern Echo 4.6.66.
6. Information from interview with Edwards.
7. Times 15.6.67.
8. Times Business News 2.9.67.
9. The Economist 17.6.67.
10. Financial Times 15.6.68.
11. Ditto 9.10.68.
12. Interview with Hunter.
13. Interview with author.
14. Interview with author.

CHAPTER ELEVENTHE TYNESIDE PASSENGER TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

The possibility that the life of many of our towns will be strangled by the ever increasing volume of road traffic has lead to a great deal of discussion on how best to organise transport. In the case of Tyneside this means dealing with not only the private motorist, but also the local rail services, the bus undertakings of two local authorities, Newcastle and South Shields, and a number of private bus operators.

When the Labour Government came to power in 1964 one of the measures that it promised was a Transport Act which would include plans for integrating the passenger transport undertakings in a number of conurbations throughout the country. This scheme had been under discussion for some time and had involved a number of the local Labour Party leaders on Tyneside. In fact a policy committee of the regional Labour Party had prepared a plan which became the basis for the subsequent Government proposals. The idea was also discussed by the regional Economic Planning Council.¹

The plans for the Passenger Transport Authorities were thought to be most suitable for the areas around Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Newcastle. When the plans were first announced the Labour Party was in control of the local council in each of these areas. It was, therefore, assumed that there would be little opposition from the local authorities who would be losing control of their transport undertakings. However, in subsequent municipal elections the Conservatives took control of all these councils and a bitter fight seemed imminent.

The Conservatives in Newcastle were already angry about the exclusion of the city from the Northern Regional Transport Co-ordinating Committee.² With the help of Conservative councillors from the other conurbations and a number of Conservative M.P.'s the Conservatives in Newcastle, led by Clr. Neville Trotter, began a campaign to defeat the P.T.A. plans.³ In this they were joined by the local private bus operators who in October 1967 had formed a branch of the Passenger Transport Vehicle Operator's Independence Committee.

The Conservatives' argument was that the local conditions on Tyneside were not amenable to a system of integrated transport as suggested by the Government. They also felt that Newcastle should be allowed to keep control

of its own transport undertakings so that operation and finance would be under the control of the same body. However, their appeal to this effect was turned down by the Minister of Transport. This was taken as clear evidence that the plan was based purely on doctrinaire grounds and paid no attention at all to the particular conditions of Tyneside. Trotter, in his capacity as chairman of the Transport Committee of Newcastle Council, made an intensive study of the transport needs of Tyneside and presented his findings to the Minister. In February 1968 he led a delegation from Newcastle which tried to persuade the Minister to change his plans, but without success.

The opponents of the plans thought they had achieved a victory of sorts when the Minister announced that the plan for the P.T.A.'s to take over the private bus companies in the area had been dropped. However this was because the publicly-owned National Bus Company was paying £35 million for the bus interests of British Electric Traction which would mean that 90% of Britain's buses would be in public ownership of one kind and another. This did mean, however, that the proposed P.T.A. on Tyneside would now operate only the municipal bus fleets of Newcastle and South Shields as well as the local commuter rail services. In the opinion of the opponents of the plans this would mean that either fares would have to be increased or the services would have to be subsidised out of the rates.⁴ Any hope of providing an integrated service was also considerably diminished.

Throughout 1968 Trotter persisted in his fight to halt the plans. In July he visited the Minister and suggested that the setting up of the proposed authority be delayed for a year to allow more time for the proposals to be worked out. He seems by this time to have accepted the need for some kind of integrated system but was unhappy about the form it would take. He suggested that there be an overall body to take major policy decisions but that the day to day running of the transport undertakings be run by subsidiary bodies under the control of the local councils. However, the Minister was not interested. He wrote back to Trotter saying that the change could not be delayed because otherwise there would be a long period of uncertainty. He added that the new authority would be set up on April 1st, 1969 and would take over the municipal bus fleets on July 1st.⁵

So the campaign to prevent the setting up of the authority failed. Attention now turned to the question of the form of the new authority and its membership. The original proposals had suggested that the new authority

be run by a board consisting of representatives of the local authorities plus nominees of the Minister. It was assumed that the chairmanship of the new authority would go to a representative of the largest participating local authority, namely Newcastle. Because of his position as chairman of the Newcastle Transport Committee and his dominant role in the discussions that had taken place, it was widely assumed, even by some of his political opponents, that Trotter would be the natural choice. However at the inaugural meeting of the new authority on 21st April, 1969, it was announced that the Minister had appointed as his nominees on the new authority, two trade unionists.⁶ This would give the Labour Party a clear majority on the new authority even though the two local councils most concerned were now controlled by the Conservatives or their allies. The Conservatives attacked these nominations as it meant that Andrew Cunningham, one of the trade unionists concerned and also a leading figure in the Labour Party in the north east, was elected Chairman, despite his admission that he did not know very much about transport. Their criticisms were answered by the Labour Party who claimed that it was necessary that the people who were running the new authority should have faith in its aims and purposes. Further fuel was added to the fire when it was discovered that there would be no Newcastle representative on the eight man committee set up to appoint the professional head of the new authority. As a result the five Conservative representatives from Newcastle on the new authority called a special meeting of the City Council to ask the Minister not to confirm Cunningham's appointment.⁷ The special meeting was held a week later and was boycotted by the Labour group. Ald. Grey, the leader of the Conservative group said that Tyneside was the only area where a representative of the largest authority had not been elected chairman. He also accused the Labour Party of gerrymandering the allocation of seats to the new authority by putting Conservative areas together with slightly larger Labour areas. However the Conservatives were on rather dangerous ground here as they had taken all the seats allocated to Newcastle.

The new authority got off to a bad start therefore. There have been demands that it should be dissolved on the grounds that the political squabbling will make it incapable of performing its function of providing an adequate transport system for the public.⁸ The area which it covers is not related to any other area of planning or related topics. With the report of the Royal Commission on local Government and the Conservatives proposals of 1971 it is likely that within the not too distant future the new transport authority will become obsolete.

Analysis of the Issue as a Decision-Making Process.

Of all the issues considered in this study, the establishment of the Passenger Transport Authority was the one that aroused the most partisan feelings on the part of the Labour and Conservative parties. In a number of other issues parochial loyalties were strong enough to outweigh party loyalties but as only two local authorities were directly concerned in this case the political argument were allowed to predominate.

The issue had quite a long history but it was only with the return of the Labour Government that the controversy came into the open. The Labour party had worked out plans for the future of conurbation transport in close consultation with the local Labour parties in the areas concerned. With the Labour Party in control of most of the local authorities who would be affected by the changes, it was not envisaged that there would be much difficulty from this quarter. The greatest opposition was expected to come from the private bus companies who would find themselves under the control of an authority dominated by Labour councillors and Government nominees. This opposition was forthcoming but was soon undermined by the action of the Ministry of Transport in setting up the National Bus Company which managed to acquire a large part of private bus fleets on scheduled services. From now on, therefore, Opposition became concentrated in the Conservative Party at both national and local level.

On Tyneside, this opposition was centred around the person of Cllr. Neville Trotter, the Chairman of the Newcastle Transport Committee. When the Conservatives took control of the city council they took steps to rationalise the committee system. The first new committee to become operational was the Transport Committee so Trotter was able to get down to serious consideration of the issue from an early date. Even his opponents agreed that Trotter made himself thoroughly familiar with the problems of transport on Tyneside but there was considerable disagreement about his motives. Some of his Labour opponents argued that the Conservatives owe a considerable debt to private transport interests in the country and that opposition to the passenger transport authorities was part of the pay-off. It is possible, however, that another consideration that weighed heavily was that the Newcastle Transport undertakings were profitable. If they were not then the Conservatives might not have been so keen in their opposition to the take-over.

Trotter was very critical of the Government over a number of considerations.⁹ He thought that the Government's White Paper which first outlined the future of conurbation transportation identified many of the problems. But it was written by a theorist who was not aware of many of the practical problems involved, especially in the case of Tyneside. Trotter even went so far as to take a Ministry official up in an aeroplane to show him what Tyneside really looked like. One of his chief objections to the proposed authority was that it would be concerned with operations. This Trotter considered should have been left to some lower level of administration and the P.T.A., if established, should concern itself solely with licensing and overall planning. Many of his opponents, however, regarded this as merely a wrecking tactic designed to allow Newcastle to retain control of its buses. The fears of the Conservatives that the issue was being considered in party political rather than in efficient transport terms were, in their eyes, justified when the passenger transport authority was established and the members appointed. In the other conurbations the leading positions had gone to the representatives of the chief authorities and the Conservatives had expected that the same would apply to Tyneside. But their Labour opponents were able to use their own argument that Tyneside was different, by pointing out that Newcastle did not occupy the dominant position that Manchester and Birmingham did in their conurbations. There was no real reason, therefore, why the chairmanship of the new authority should go to a Newcastle representative.

This issue is an example of Government imposition of accepted party policy against strong local opposition. On Tyneside the Government was able to call on a good deal of support, however, from both local Labour councils and from trade unions. The growth of Conservative influence in the area complicated the issue. It did, however, mean that the Labour Government had an additional reason for setting up the authority for it would mean that an important local service was being taken out of the hands of Conservative local councils and given to a body over which the Government had a considerable degree of control. How the existence of such bodies as the passenger transport authority can be reconciled with the proposed re-organisation of local government is a question which will have to be answered in the near future. As a conurbation enterprise it is possible that the administration of the transport authority will be handed over to the proposed Tyneside authority. However, there have already been demands that the area covered by the transport authority should be widened to include some of the surrounding rural areas.

This would seem to be reasonable especially with the growth of commuting in the area. The answer may be to make a provincial authority responsible for the overall planning of transport in the area but leave the operational side to the main local government authorities.

The principal actor in this issue was undoubtedly the Government. Supporting roles were taken by Newcastle City Council and the various private bus companies in the area. The personality most often appearing was Trotter, who the leader of the Conservative group on Newcastle City Council said did all the thinking for the group.¹⁰ A somewhat enigmatic role was played by Ald. Cunningham who claimed publicly to have little interest in the issue but who ended up as chairman of the new authority. One problem that may arise is that Cunningham's union, the General and Municipal Workers has members who will be employed by the transport authority. Cunningham may, therefore, find himself in the future on both sides of the negotiation table. Minor parts in the issue were played by Ald. Grey, Frank Taylor, the Newcastle Transport manager, and James Forster, the chairman of the local branch of the Passenger Transport Vehicle Operator's Independence Committee.

Notes

1. Interview with Smith.
2. Northern Echo 25.2.67
3. Guardian 7.2.68.
4. Ditto 27.2.68
5. Ditto 24.8.68.
6. Northern Echo 19.4.69.
7. Evening Chronicle 21.4.69.
8. See for example Northern Echo 2.5.69.
9. Interview with author.
10. Interview with author.

CHAPTER TWELVESUMMARY OF THE ISSUES

Having looked at each of the issues in turn it may now be possible to draw out some of the main features.

The first thing to be said is that contrary to the position in the United States decisions appear to be made by people who occupy formal decision-making offices. While we cannot ignore the pressures that may be applied behind the scenes, in each case the final decision or decisions was made either by the Government or by the local councils. In this sense, therefore, it seems that the decision-making process in the British situation is more formalised than in the American, even when a decision-making structure has to be created. One consequence of this is that the chief participants in the decision-making process are not businessmen or media-men but local or national politicians and local officials. Whether these individuals are any more responsive to the wishes of the population as a whole is, however, another question. At the very least they must claim to be acting in the name of the people.

As has been noted previously, the role of the central government appears to be of crucial importance in most issues. This again is in contrast to most American findings where it is generally assumed that the local community is completely isolated from its social and political environment. Whenever local authorities cannot agree amongst themselves, as in the case of local government re-organisation, then the central government is virtually forced to intervene and impose its own solution, assuming that the issue is considered to be important. Even if the local authorities do agree, the central government may feel that it must have some say in the issue under discussion. The relationships between local and central government are, of course, a constant source of controversy and the evidence from Tyneside would suggest that it is the central government which usually gets its own way. The dangers this has for local autonomy are obvious and indeed it was one of the constant complaints of the issue participants that the Government was often not in a position to make informed decisions on what were purely local problems.

Examination of the seven issues allows us to some extent to isolate two kinds of issue participants. Firstly there are the single issue participants who may be of crucial importance on one issue but of no importance whatever on the others. In most cases this arises from the nature of the role they

perform. Thus for example Dawson owed his influence on the Tyne Tunnel to his chairmanship of the Tyne Tunnel Joint Committee which arose out of his chairmanship of the Northumberland Highways Committee. Similarly Barnett and Petty owed their importance on the police re-organisation to their chairmanship of the Police Committee in Northumberland and the Watch Committee in Newcastle respectively. On the airport Denyer owed his importance to his position as Commandant of Newcastle Airport.

Secondly there are the multi-issue participants. Once again their importance is due to the roles they perform. So for example Smith owed his importance to his chairmanship of the regional economic planning council and his previous leadership of Newcastle City Council, a position now held by Grey. Cunningham's importance stems from his former chairmanship of Durham County Council, his position on the National Executive of the Labour Party, and his office in the General and Municipal Workers Union.

What is noticeable about this situation is that an individual's importance stems from his official position and not from his innate abilities. Thus, for example, when the political control of Newcastle City Council changed from Labour to Conservative, Grey took over the important role previously played by men like Smith, Butterfield and Abrahart. In other words it would seem that it is the institution which is important rather than the personnel. Any discussion of the importance of individuals therefore should first discover their institutional background.

PART THREE: THE LEADERSCHAPTER THIRTEENTHE SURVEY AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Having examined a number of issues which have affected Tyneside in recent years it is now necessary to move on to a study of the personnel who actually participated in these issues. This was achieved to some extent by direct personal interviews with some of the more active decision-makers, but mostly by means of a postal questionnaire.

An investigation of the characteristics of local leaders immediately involves the danger of prejudging the issue of who is a local leader. As we have already seen the fundamental problem facing students of community power and community decision-making is how to identify those people who can be considered leaders without making untenable assumptions. It was felt necessary in this case, therefore, to throw the sampling net as wide as possible so as to encompass the optimum number of potential leaders.

For the purpose of compiling a list of potential leaders it was assumed that they would fall into one or more of three categories - institutional leaders, decisional leaders and social leaders. These were the basic original groupings, therefore, although, of course, an individual could be classified in terms of any combination of these categories.

A person was considered to be an institutional leader if he occupied a certain office in a relevant organisation. Some element of judgment was, of course, required in this case but an attempt was made to include the widest possible range of organisations, including not only the political but also the economic, the cultural, the social, and the religious. Thus, for example the final list included, amongst others, the leaders of the party groups on each of the local councils in the area, the chairmen of the local council finance committees, the chairmen and managing directors of the largest local companies, the local secretaries of the largest trade unions, the chief officers of the local authorities, the local bishops, and the Vice-Chancellor of Newcastle University.

Decisional leaders were considered to be those whose names appeared in the preliminary analysis of the seven issues under consideration. In fact some of these could not be considered leaders, but at this stage of the investigation there was no way of telling who were the important figures in each issue.

Social leaders were a much more difficult category to define but in view of the importance attached to such people in many studies of community politics it was considered essential to include them. For an outsider it is virtually impossible to determine with any accuracy who is socially prominent within a community and when the community in question is as large as Tyneside it is quite likely that it is impossible for an insider as well. Any method used to determine the local social elite, therefore, is almost bound to be subject to question. It was finally decided that the most appropriate method in this case was to examine the frequency with which an individual's photograph appeared in the pages of a local magazine which purported to concern itself with the activities of top people in the area. Copies of the magazine for the past three years were examined and any individual whose photograph appeared three or more times in that period was considered to be a social leader. While recognising that this is a very rough and ready method, subsequent inquiries suggested that it produced a reasonable approximation to the social elite of Tyneside.

It was possible, therefore, to build up a list of potential local leaders from these three different angles. Altogether a total of 503 names were revealed which was made up of 59 social only leaders, 250 institutional only, 45 institutional and decisional, 5 social and decisional, and 7 social, institutional and decisional. On investigation it would found that not all the 503 were contactable, mainly because of death. As a result the potential leadership pool was reduced to 469.

A copy of the postal questionnaire was then sent to each of these individuals together with a letter explaining the purpose of the inquiry. Despite follow-up letters the response was very disappointing and only 193 completed questionnaires and were available for analysis. In terms of the original groupings these were made up as follows: 17 social only, 96 institutional only, 45 decisional only, 8 social and institutional, 21 institutional and decisional, 2 social and decisional, and 4 social, institutional and decisional. In the final sample, therefore, social only leaders accounted for 8.8% of the total (as compared to 11.7% in the sample

population), institutional only for 49.7% (49.7%), decisional only for 23.3% (24.3%), social and institutional for 4.1% (3.0%), institutional and decisional for 10.9% (8.9%), social and decisional for 1.1% (1.0%), and social, institutional and decisional for 2.1% (1.4%).

Of the 276 people who did not complete the questionnaire only 90 reported their decision not to do so. Of these 90, 28 gave no particular reason for their refusal. Of the others, 23 said they were not involved in local affairs, 6 said they had no useful information to give, 11 said they were too busy, 10 said their position made it impossible to reply, and 12 gave various other reasons for refusal. Although these refusals are disappointing, some of them were in fact quite illuminating. Of particular significance was the relatively high number of individuals concerned with trade and industry who claimed to have little to do with local government and politics. As we have seen with the shipbuilding controversy this seems to be a fairly typical attitude. It may, in fact, be the case that the disappointing response was at least in part due to the very low level of interest in and knowledge of local government that is found not only on Tyneside but also in the country as a whole.

When all the 193 completed questionnaires had been received the results were coded and transferred to punched cards for analysis. In some cases, however, information from the questionnaires could not be coded and this was analysed directly.

The questionnaire that was used in the survey was quite a short one, comprising only 36 questions (see Appendix 2). It had three main purposes. Firstly it sought to discover the characteristics of the leaders including not only basic socio-economic data such as age, place of birth, occupation, and education, but also information regarding a person's organisational memberships and political background. Secondly the questionnaire attempted to uncover details of the individuals involvement in the decision-making processes surrounding the seven issues under discussion as well as their attitudes to the outcome of the issues. Thirdly an attempt was made to discover who the leaders thought were the influential people not only in the specific issues concerned but also in general. Finally there were a few questions on specific problems such as whether respondents preferred dealing with Government departments in Whitehall or with their regional offices in Newcastle, and whether they thought the Government and Whitehall were concerned about the problems of Tyneside.

There was a mixture of closed- and open-ended questions which meant that some information was capable of being quantified and some was not. In certain cases, however, information from open-ended questions was of a kind that allowed some degree of quantification but did not allow cross-tabulation.

CHAPTER FOURTEENTHE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEYED LEADERS

As we have seen the survey yielded a total sample of 193 leaders. It is now necessary to examine the characteristics of these people as revealed by their answers to the questionnaire.

As we might expect, males heavily outnumber females (Table 1).

Table 1. Sex of Surveyed Leaders

	No.	Percentage
Male	179	92.7
Female	14	7.3

The bias would have been even more emphatic were it not for the inclusion of a number of female social leaders.

In terms of age distribution the sample is heavily biased towards the older groups with over a third being over 60. (Table 2)

Table 2. Age Distribution of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
21-30 years	0	0
31-40 "	15	7.8
41-50 "	42	21.8
51-60 "	62	32.1
61-65 "	32	16.5
Over 65 "	42	21.8

In contrast there is no representative of the under 30's.

Approximately two thirds of the leaders were locally born with slightly over one third being born within Tyneside itself. (Table 3).

Table 3. Place of Birth of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Tyneside	75	38.9
Rest of Northumberland	29	15.0
Rest of Co. Durham	22	11.4
Rest of Britain	64	33.2
Abroad	3	1.5

Just over three quarters of the leaders now live on Tyneside, but probably the most interest feature is the marked popularity of Northumberland as a place of residence as compared to County Durham. (Table 4).

Table 4. Present Residence of Surveyed Leaders

	No.	Percentage
Tyneside	148	76.7
Rest of Northumberland	30	15.5
Rest of Co. Durham	10	5.2
Rest of Britain	5	2.6

Of the leaders who live in the rest of Britain the majority are in fact businessmen.

An examination of the occupational position of the leaders reveals a very interesting feature. This is the very high percentage of self-employed. (Table 5).

Table 5. Employment Position of Surveyed Leaders

	No.	Percentage
Self-employed	43	22.3
Not self-employed	108	56.0
Not employed	42	21.7

Clearly this would be a useful factor in allowing people to participate in community activities.

Using the Registrar-General's classification of occupations it was possible to assign the leaders surveyed to slightly modified class groupings. There is a very marked bias towards the middle class even in such a predominantly working class as Tyneside. (Table 6).

Table 6. Objective Social Class of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Class 1	79	40.9
Class 2	57	29.5
Class 3 (non-manual)	31	16.1
Class 3 (manual)	23	11.9
Class 4	2	1.0
Class 5	1	0.6

By looking at the respondents father's occupation and assigning them to social classes, we see that a large percentage of the leaders came from a middle class background. (Table 7)

Table 7. Social Class of Father of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Class 1	43	22.4
Class 2	34	17.7
Class 3 (non-manual)	20	10.4
Class 3 (manual)	50	26.0
Class 4	15	7.8
Class 5	8	4.2
Not answered or Don't Know	22	11.5

N.B. There was one rejected card.

However this background is not as markedly middle class as the present situation of the leaders, although there is still a shortage of representatives who came from the lowest social groupings.

The educational background of the leaders shows quite a remarkable variation. (Tables 8 and 9).

Table 8. Terminal Age of Education of Surveyed Leaders

	No.	Percentage
11-14	68	35.2
15	7	3.7
16	23	11.9
17	12	6.2
18+	83	43.0

Table 9. Type of Terminal Education of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Elementary	58	30.1
Secondary	12	6.1
Grammar	32	16.6
Public	15	7.8
University	59	30.6
Other higher education	17	8.8

Over one third of the leaders left school at the age of 14 or under, while over 40% carried on their education past their 18th birthday. There were almost exactly equal numbers with university and elementary only education. This is, of course, due to the age distribution of the sample and the fact that many of the leaders completed their education before the Second World War and the 1944 Education Act. As time passes the educational level of the leaders will no doubt improve with the elementary only group shrinking in size and the secondary and grammar groups increasing. Whether this will extend through the higher education groupings is difficult to say because they are already pretty large.

The predominant middle class status of the leadership group means, of course, that there is a very high percentage of people owning their own homes. (Table 10).

Table 10. Type of Dwelling of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Own House	148	76.7
Hotel	1	0.5
Council house	28	14.5
Privately rented	11	5.7
Other	5	2.6

What is also very noticeable is the particularly low number of people living in privately rented accommodation.

The result of asking the leaders to state to which social class they think they belong is rather interesting. As we have seen they are objectively very middle class but subjectively they are very much less so. (Table 11).

Table 11. Subjective Class Position of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Upper	14	7.5
Middle	97	52.2
Working	69	37.1
Not answered	6	3.2

N.B. There were 7 rejected cards.

The fairly significant working class representation is possibly due partly to the family background of some individuals and partly due to the pressures of the social environment in which their leadership is exercised. In fact one of the respondents who claimed working class status was a peer of the realm! If we compare objective and subjective class we find that more middle class respondents claim working class membership than vice-versa. (Table 12).

Table 12. Subjective and Objective Class Position of Surveyed Leaders.
(Percentages)

Objective Class	Subjective Class			
	Upper	Middle	Working	Not Answered
Class 1	93	54	12	50
Class 2	7	34	26	50
Class 3 (non-manual)	-	8	30	-
Class 3 (manual)	-	4	28	-
Class 4	-	-	3	-
Class 5	-	-	1	-
No. of Cases	14	97	69	6

N.B. There were 7 rejected cards.

Also all those who refused to classify themselves were middle class.

About half the surveyed leaders were sitting local councillors, but this was, of course, partly a result of the selection of the original leadership pool which included institutional leaders such as leaders of party council groups and chairmen of finance committees (Table 13) What is perhaps interesting is that of the 86 councillors, 13 had dual membership, almost entirely on one of the county councils of Northumberland and Durham and on one of the urban districts or municipal boroughs. This dual membership may possibly have important consequences for a leader's loyalties when faced by issues which cause conflict between local authorities.

As we would expect many of the councillors had served on their local council for a considerable length of time. (Table 14) Thus over one third of them had served for 20 years or more.

Table 13. Present Local Council Membership of Surveyed Leaders.

Council	No.
Co. Durham	9
Northumberland	19
Gateshead	9
Newcastle	12
South Shields	6
Tynemouth	4
Jarrow	3
Wallsend	5
Whitley Bay	4
Blaydon	2
Boldon	1
Felling	2
Gosforth	3
Hebburn	1
Longbenton	2
Newburn	3
Ryton	2
Whickham	1
Others	11
None	107

N.B. There are 13 cases of dual membership, eg county council and urban district council. Therefore there are 86 councillors and 107 non-councillors.

Table 14. Length of Council Service of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
0-5 years	16	18.6
6-10 "	19	22.1
11-15 "	10	11.6
16-20 "	11	12.8
Over 20 "	30	34.9

N.B. In the case of dual membership, the longer period of service has been taken.

Besides sitting councillors there were a number of respondents who had experience of council membership. (Table 15) 28 of the respondents claimed to have sat on councils which they had now left. However these included

Table 15. Previous Council Membership of Surveyed Leaders.

Council	No.
Northumberland	4
Gateshead	2
Newcastle	10
South Shields	2
Jarrow	1
Blaydon	1
Newburn	1
Others	8

N.B. 28 respondents had previously been on a council including one who had dual membership.

There were no respondents who had served previously on the other local councils on Tyneside, e.g. Tynemouth, Wallsend, etc.

a number of people who were still local councillors but were now sitting on different local councils than previously. In fact only 7 of the 28 no longer sat on a local council which meant that of the 193 leaders 114 had some council experience.

It is a reasonable assumption that people who can be regarded as leaders in a community are likely to be actively involved with organisations in that community. As we might expect, therefore, over 80% of the respondents claimed membership of organisations which were concerned with public affairs at either the national or the local level. (Table 16).

Table 16. Public Affairs Organisational Membership of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Political Party	91	47.4
Trade Union	41	21.9
Rent & Ratepayer Association	4	2.1
Trade or Professional Assoc.	52	27.1
Parent-Teacher Association	3	1.6
Religious	10	5.2
Other	41	21.4
None	37	19.3

N.B. There was one rejected card. Due to multiple responses the total is more than 100%

More often than not this was a political party but trade unions and trade and professional associations were also well represented. Again, to some extent, we would expect this because of the method of selecting the leadership pool. What is significant, however, is the very high level of office-holding in these organisations. (Table 17)

Table 17. Public Affairs Organisational Office-holding of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Yes	110	71.0
No	45	29.0

N.B. There was one rejected card.

It was also thought possible that leaders were likely to be members of organisations which are not directly concerned with public affairs. (Table 18)

Table 18. Non-public Affairs Organisational Membership of Surveyed Leaders.

	No.	Percentage
Charity	22	11.4
Rotary	14	7.3
Cultural	23	11.9
Sport	26	13.5
Social	41	21.2
Trade or Professional Assoc.	36	18.7
Religious	9	4.7
Other	25	13.0
None	72	37.3

(The decision as to whether the organisation was or was not concerned with public affairs was left to the respondent). However there is a slightly higher proportion of people not involved than in the case of public affairs organisations, and the proportion of office holders is also less. Clearly the leaders know to which organisations they should belong.

Turning now to the political background of the leaders we find that despite their middle class bias they are clearly Labour-inclined. (Tables 19, 20 and 21). It is interesting that at the time of the survey the opinion polls were showing a massive Conservative lead, but this was clearly not evident amongst Tyneside leaders who seem very politically committed. What is also noticeable is the very high proportion who claim to have voted in both national and local elections. In the case of the last local elections, at least 70% claimed to have voted which is approximately twice the annual turnout.

Table 19. Voting Behaviour of Surveyed Leaders at last General Election.

	No.	Percentage
Labour	84	43.5
Conservative	69	35.8
Liberal	4	2.0
Other	0	0
None	10	5.2
Not answered	26	13.5

Table 20. Voting Intention of Surveyed Leaders at next General Election

	No.	Percentage
Labour	82	42.5
Conservative	69	35.8
Liberal	5	2.6
Other	0	0
None	6	3.0
Don't Know	5	2.6
Not answered	26	13.5

Table 21. Voting Behaviour of Surveyed Leaders at last Local Elections.

	No.	Percentage
Labour	76	39.4
Conservative	43	22.3
Liberal	1	0.5
Other	0	0
Progressive	4	2.1
Rent and Ratepayers	4	2.1
None	33	17.1
Not answered	22	11.3

One further consideration that can be looked at is the geographical power base of the leaders. In some cases this is very easy to determine but there are obviously a large number of people whose influence cannot be confined to any one area. So, for example, trade union leaders, the local bishops, and many businessmen are likely to be concerned with the whole conurbation. However it is possible to allocate the leaders as follows:

General	30.1%	South Shields	4.1%
Newcastle	16.1%	Co. Durham	14.0%
Gateshead	7.3%	Northumberland	25.3%
Tynemouth	3.1%		

Probably the most noticeable feature of these figures is the relative importance of the leaders from Northumberland. Although this could be partly due to a bias in the sample it is probably true to say that there are a number of factors which could also have their effect. For example the county council meets in Newcastle and in general the centre of gravity of the county is much nearer Tyneside than is the case with Co. Durham.

CHAPTER FIFTEENTHE LEADERSHIP GROUPINGS

As we have seen the original leadership pool was built up on the basis of three possible types of leader - decisional, institutional, and social. In some respects this was a rather crude division and so when the survey was complete the respondents were reclassified into groups according to their main feature relevant to participation in decision-making. The first group were called economic dominants and consisted of chairmen and managing directors of some of the largest firms on Tyneside. The second group were union leaders who were generally at the area secretary level. The third group were public officials who were normally local government officers of various kinds but also included a number of regional civil servants. The fourth group were private officials which included a rather wide range of individuals such as people from churches, interest groups, newspapers, political parties, etc. The fifth group were the politicians who were mostly local councillors but also included a number of Members of Parliament. The sixth and seventh groups were residual categories made up of those original social or decisional leaders who could not be put into any of the other groups. The leadership sample was now redistributed into these new groups. (Table 22).

Table 22. The New Leadership Groupings

	No.	Percentage
Economic Dominants	19	9.8
Union Leader	10	5.2
Public Official	30	15.5
Private Official	24	12.4
Social only leader	14	7.3
Decisional only leader	6	3.1
Politician	<u>90</u>	46.6
	<u>193</u>	

It may be interesting to see how these new groupings compare with the original. (Table 23). To some extent this shows the inadequacy of the original groupings and the fact that individuals may have different claims to leadership. For example we find one decisional leader and one social leader turning up as an economic dominant. However only the

Table 23. The New and the Original Leadership Groupings

	(percentages)						
	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Decisional	5	-	20	8	-	100	33
Social	5	-	-	-	100	-	2
Institutional	58	90	63	76	-	-	44
S.I.	16	-	7	8	-	-	1
S.D.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
I.D.	11	10	10	8	-	-	15
SID	5	-	-	-	-	-	3
No. of cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

politicians group had representatives from all the original groupings and it is noteworthy that this group was responsible for providing three out of the four social/institutional/decisional respondents.

One other preliminary exercise is to look at the representation of each new group in the final survey. (Table 24)

Table 24. Comparative Representation of New Leadership Groupings

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
No. surveyed	19	10	30	24	14	6	90
Percentage of each category surveyed	30.2	50	39.5	46.1	26.9	30	48.4
Total no. in each category as %age of total population of leaders	13.4	4.3	16.2	11.1	11.1	4.3	39.6

This shows that economic dominants, social only and decisional only leaders were most reluctant to take part. In the final survey the politicians were most over-represented and economic dominants and social only leaders most under-represented.

We can now proceed to examine how the new categories of leaders differ from one another in terms of the variables investigated by the questionnaire. We have already seen that women are very much under-represented amongst Tyneside leaders and we can now see in what fields we are likely to find those that there are. (Table 25)

Table 25. Sex of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage)

	Male	Female	No. of Cases
Economic Dominant	100	-	19
Union Leader	100	-	10
Public Official	100	-	30
Private Official	96	4	24
Social only Leader	71	29	14
Decisional only Leader	100	-	6
Politician	90	10	90

It is quite clear that if a woman wants to become a local leader the only possible channels open to her at present are social life or party politics. But even here the women are still overwhelmingly dominated by men.

Turning to the ages of the leaders it would seem that different types of leaders tend to be important at different periods in their life. (Table 26)

Table 26. Age of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
21-30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31-40	-	10	3	8	-	-	12
41-50	16	20	37	13	36	33	18
51-60	42	40	33	54	29	50	22
61-65	16	30	24	17	14	17	14
Over 65	26	-	3	8	21	-	34
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

In most cases 51 to 60 is the dominant period but for public officials and social leaders it is 41 to 50 and for politicians it is over 65. If we work out the average age of the various types of leader (taking 70 as the mid-point for the 65+ group) we find that economic dominants have the highest mean age at 58.6. They are followed by the politicians (57.2), social only leaders (56.1), private officials (55.0), union leaders (53.6), and finally public officials and decisional only leaders (53.3 each). In other words a public official is likely to achieve a leadership position at an earlier age than an economic dominant or a politician.

An examination of the birth places of the leaders yields some quite interesting results. In the case of politicians and union leaders, local birth seems to be predominant, while officials and social leaders are likely to be immigrants to the area. (table 27).

Table 27. Place of Birth of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Tyneside	36	50	20	29	29	17	50
Elsewhere in Northumberland	16	20	7	13	7	17	19
Elsewhere in Co. Durham	16	-	17	4	7	-	13
Elsewhere in Britain	32	30	53	50	50	66	18
Abroad	-	-	3	4	7	-	-
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

We should remember, of course, that amongst the social leaders there is a fairly high proportion of women, some of whom are likely to be strangers who have married locally born husbands. Overall, probably the most important finding is that politicians tend to be overwhelmingly locally born, assuming that Northumberland and County Durham are considered to be local.

The residence patterns of the leadership groups are of considerable interest. Although all groups except one have a majority of members living within Tyneside, the attractions of Northumberland are pretty clear, especially for economic dominants and social leaders. (Table 28).

Table 28. Place of Residence of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Tyneside	47	80	63	96	71	100	82
Elsewhere in Northumberland	32	10	17	4	29	-	14
Elsewhere in Co. Durham	5	10	17	-	-	-	3
Elsewhere in Britain	16	-	3	-	-	-	1
Abroad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

It also seems to be the case that politicians tend to live within the administrative area which concerns them. This is brought out by looking at maps of the actual residences of the various types of leaders. (Maps in Appendix 1).

In the case of economic dominants we can see that only three of the local authority areas within Tyneside contain economic dominants, and of those Gosforth and Newcastle are clearly the most popular. A majority of economic dominants live outside Tyneside - 6 in Northumberland, 1 in County Durham, and 3 in other parts of Britain.

The union leaders tend to be rather more scattered than the economic dominants but even so it is noticeable that middle-class Gosforth has its attractions for the official representatives of the workers.

It might have been expected that like the politicians the public officials would live within the administrative area that concerns them. However this does not seem to be the case, as they tend to congregate in certain areas, noticeably Gosforth and Whitley Bay. It is interesting that Whitley Bay seems to have an attraction for public officials. No other leadership group except the politicians have a representative in this authority area.

Private officials have a very high proportion of Tyneside residents and they tend to be spread fairly widely over the whole area, although there is a concentration in Newcastle.

The pattern of residence of social leaders is quite remarkable with half of them living in Gosforth. Apart from two in Newcastle the rest live well away from the centre of the conurbation.

The politicians are the only grouping which has representatives in all the local authority areas. To some extent there is a direct relationship between the size of the local authority and the number of politicians who live there, but there are exceptions like Gosforth and to some extent Whitley Bay. There is also a marked difference in the representation of Northumberland and County Durham. We should remember that at the time of the research it was possible for an individual to live in one local authority and serve on the council of another, provided he owned property in that authority.

Altogether 150 out of the sample of 193 live within the Tyneside area (Table 29). Altogether Gosforth is easily the most favoured residential area, but four other local authority areas have more than their share of leaders (Table 30). We could have anticipated the position of Whitley Bay on the grounds of socio-economic status, but not perhaps the positions of Ryton and Jarrow. It may be that it was simply due to peculiarities in the

Table 29. Residence of Leaders living in Tyneside. (Percentage)

Local Area	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	FR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.	Total Leaders	Total pop.
Newcastle	44.4	12.5	21.1	28.6	20.0	60.0	20.5	24.0	29.4
Tynemouth	11.1	-	-	14.3	-	-	9.0	7.3	7.6
Gateshead	-	-	10.5	9.5	-	-	10.3	8.0	11.2
South Shields	-	12.5	-	9.5	-	20.0	9.0	7.3	11.9
Wallsend	-	-	-	4.8	-	-	6.4	4.0	5.4
Whitley Bay	-	-	21.1	-	-	-	9.0	7.3	4.0
Jarrow	-	-	5.3	9.5	-	-	5.1	4.7	3.1
Newburn	-	12.5	-	4.8	-	-	3.8	3.3	3.0
Longbenton	-	12.5	5.3	-	-	-	3.8	3.3	5.0
Gosforth	44.4	37.5	26.1	9.5	70.0	20.0	9.0	19.3	2.9
Ryton	-	-	5.3	9.5	-	-	3.8	4.0	1.5
Blaydon	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.6	1.3	3.3
Whickham	-	12.5	5.3	-	-	-	1.3	2.0	2.7
Felling	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.6	1.3	3.9
Hebburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	0.7	2.7
Boldon	-	-	-	-	10.0	-	2.6	2.0	2.4
No. of Cases	9	8	19	21	10	5	78	150	921,826

Table 30. Deviation of Number of Leaders resident in Local Authority Areas from Expected Number Based on Percentage of Total Population.

Local Authority Area	Percentage Deviation
Gosforth	+ 565.5
Ryton	+ 166.7
Whitley Bay	+ 82.5
Jarrow	+ 51.6
Newburn	+ 10.0
Tynemouth	- 4.0
Boldon	- 16.7
Newcastle	- 19.4
Wallsend	- 25.9
Whickham	- 25.9
Gateshead	- 28.6
Longbenton	- 34.0
South Shields	- 38.7
Blaydon	- 60.6
Felling	- 66.7
Hebburn	- 74.1

sample e.g. both Ryton and Jarrow had 2 private officials resident in their areas and, of course, the small number of cases involved.

We noticed earlier the comparatively high proportion of self-employed individuals amongst the sample of leaders. There are, however, significant variations between the different types of leaders. (Table 31)

Table 31. Employment Status of New Leadership Groupings (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Self-employed	36	-	-	21	50	33	24
Not Self-employed	64	100	100	67	21	67	38
No. of Cases	19	10	29	21	10	6	56

Quite a number of respondents did not answer this question. They are probably people who are not employed (e.g. retired). Percentages therefore total less than 100.

As we might expect the proportion of self-employed is greatest among social leaders and economic dominants but there is also a significant group of politicians who are self-employed. What is probably most noticeable, however, is the number of politicians who are not employed, most of whom are retired.

The social class characteristics of the various types of leaders are much as expected. (Table 32).

Table 32. Objective Social Class of New Leadership Groupings (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Class 1	100	-	43	33	100	50	24
Class 2	-	22	57	33	-	33	30
Class 3 (Non-manual)	-	67	-	25	-	-	21
Class 3 (Manual)	-	11	-	9	-	17	21
Class 4	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Class 5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
No. of Cases	19	9	30	24	14	6	90

N.B. There was one reject amongst the union leaders.

Economic dominants and social leaders come exclusively from Class 1 and the union leaders come lowest on the social ladder. We can also note the fact that a majority of public officials fall into Class 2 and that politicians

are the only group to be spread over all classes, although there is still great under-representation at the lower levels. Of course we should remember that the classification is according to occupation and so groups like public officials tend to be allocated to one particular class.

The family background of the leaders is also much as expected. (Table 33).

Table 33. Objective Social Class of Fathers of New Leadership Groupings

	(Percentage)						
	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Class 1	68	-	4	21	50	20	11
Class 2	16	10	46	8	21	20	14
Class 3 (Non-manual)	-	30	8	13	8	-	12
Class 3 (Manual)	-	40	25	29	-	40	34
Class 4	-	-	4	4	-	-	14
Class 5	-	20	-	8	-	-	5
Don't know or not answered	16	-	13	17	21	20	10
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	5	90

N.B. There was one reject amongst the decisional only leaders.

The social class of the father tends to be lower than that of the respondent which implies that many of the present-day leaders are upwardly mobile. What is particularly interesting is the background of the public officials with nearly half of them having Class 2 fathers. Although Class 2 is a rather vague grouping, this seems to suggest that there is something like a bureaucratic class with son following father into similar official positions.

In the case of the subjective class of the leaders we have already seen that there is quite a readiness for them to consider themselves as working class. In fact union leaders and politicians are more likely to consider themselves as working class than middle class. (Table 34).

Table 34. Subjective Class of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage.)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Upper	26	-	4	9	36	-	1
Middle	58	30	85	43	57	67	44
Working	11	70	4	43	7	33	53
Not Answered	5	-	7	5	-	-	2
No. of Cases	19	10	27	23	14	6	87

N.B. There were 3 rejects in public official grouping, one in private official grouping, and 3 in politicians grouping.

As we might expect social leaders are most likely to consider themselves as upper class, together with economic dominants. The public officials are again an interesting case and they are obviously the middle class group 'par excellence'.

The educational background of the leaders shows some marked differences. (Table 35).

Table 35. Terminal Age of Education of New Leadership Groupings

	(Percentage)						
	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
11-14	-	70	-	29	14	50	55
15	-	-	3	8	-	17	3
16	5	10	13	17	21	-	11
17	16	-	7	-	29	-	3
18+	<u>79</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>28</u>
No. of Cases	<u>19</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>90</u>

Union leaders and politicians are clearly less well educated than the other categories (or at least their period of schooling was shorter). Economic dominants and public officials are also clearly the best educated. The type of education received is quite clearly associated with the social class of the leader. (Table 36).

Table 36. Type of Terminal Education of New Leadership Groupings

	(Percentage)						
	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Elementary	-	60	-	20	8	50	48
Secondary	-	20	-	13	-	17	7
Grammar	-	-	21	25	37	-	17
Public	32	-	3	4	32	-	3
University	63	10	76	25	15	33	15
Other Higher	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>10</u>
	<u>19</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>90</u>

N.B. There was one reject in both P.O. and S.O.L.

This is particularly noticeable in the percentage of economic dominants and social leaders who attended public school. Also of interest is the very high percentage of public officials who had attended university. The figures for social leaders are rather remarkable with the high percentage terminating at grammar school or public school and the relatively low number of

university products. This may, in fact, be due to some extent to the number of women in the group.

The housing situation of the leaders is much as expected with the politicians being nearest to the population as a whole. (Table 37)

Table 37. Type of Dwelling of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Owner Occupier	89	70	94	75	100	83	66
Hotel etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Council Rented	-	20	-	13	-	17	24
Private Rented	11	-	3	4	-	-	8
Other	-	10	3	8	-	-	1
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

When we look at the length of residence of the leaders (Table 38) we find that the most noticeable features are the long residence of the politicians, the fairly short residence of the public officials and the remarkable mobility of the decisional only leaders (although in this case the numbers are far too small to draw any significant conclusions).

Table 38. Length of Residence of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
0-1 years	5	10	3	-	-	50	3
1-5 "	26	30	28	21	28	33	19
5-10 "	22	10	38	33	22	-	18
Over 10 "	47	50	31	46	50	17	60
No. of Cases	19	10	29	24	14	6	89

N.B. There was one reject in P.O. and one in Pol.

In terms of council membership the politicians are, of course, responsible for the vast majority. (Table 39.) Five individuals whose main claim to leadership lies outside the council chamber are local councillors but of these only one sits on a council within the Tyneside area. However, a number of other leaders have had council experience. (Table 40). In fact at least one member of every group has had some experience on local councils.

Table 39. Local Council Memberships of New Leadership Groupings

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Durham	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Northumberland	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
Gateshead	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Newcastle	-	-	-	1	-	-	11
South Shields	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Tynemouth	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Jarrow	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Wallsend	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Whitley Bay	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Blaydon	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Bolden	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Felling	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Gosforth	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Hebburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Longbenton	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Newburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Ryton	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Whickham	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Other	1	1	1	-	1	-	7
Total	1	1	1	1	1	0	99

N.B. There are some dual council memberships

Table 40. Former Council Memberships of New Leadership Groupings

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Durham	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Northumberland	-	-	-	-	1	-	3
Gateshead	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Newcastle	2	-	-	-	1	3	4
South Shields	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
Tynemouth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jarrow	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Wallsend	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Whitley Bay	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Blaydon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Felling	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gosforth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hebburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Longbenton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Newburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Ryton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Whickham	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	1	3	1	1	2
Total	2	0	1	5	3	6	12

The organisational memberships of the leaders appears to present a number of difficulties. (Table 41).

Table 41. Public Affairs Organisational Memberships of New Leadership Groupings. (Percentage)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Political Party	5	60	-	28	28	50	77
Trade Union	-	80	13	8	-	17	29
Rent or Ratepayer Association	-	-	-	-	7	-	4
Trade or Professional Association	79	10	50	29	14	17	12
Parent Teacher Assoc.	-	-	-	-	-	17	2
Religious	-	10	3	8	7	17	4
Other	26	40	3	12	36	17	24
None	16	10	37	25	36	17	11
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

N.B. The total percentage for each grouping may be more than 100 because of multiple answers.

Thus, for example, there appears to be a union leader who is not a member of a trade union. This is also certainly a question of faulty questionnaire completion. Another rather surprising finding is that only 77% of the politicians claim to be members of a political party. It is probably the case that the other 23% are Independent, Progressive, Moderate, or Rent and Ratepayer local councillors. As we would expect no public official claimed to be a member of a political party and this is probably the reason why public officials have the highest proportion of respondents without any public affairs organisation membership.

Political party membership amongst economic dominants and union leaders is also rather unexpected. Only one economic dominant is a member of a political party while four union leaders claim not to be. However, as we shall see the traditional alliance between business and the Conservatives and the unions and Labour is re-asserted in leaders' voting patterns.

If we look at the actual number of organisations to which leaders claim to be affiliated, we find that over half belong to one or two. (Table 42).

Table 42. Number of Organisational Memberships of New Leadership Groupings

No. of Organisational Memberships	No. of Leaders	Percentage of Leaders
0	7	4
1 - 2	102	53
3 - 4	63	32
Over 4	<u>21</u>	11
No. of Cases	<u>193</u>	

Some of the leaders who claimed an organisational membership greater than 4 were actually members of many more. Thus one respondent claimed membership of the Labour Party, the Fabian Society, the United Nations Association, the Workers Educational Association, the Town and Country Planning Association the National Trust, the Ramblers Association, the Civic Trust, and the Clerical and Administrative Workers Association, and said this was only a selection.

When we look at office holding in organisations we find a clear preference for public affairs organisations. (Table 43). In fact only social leaders appear to be more involved in non-public affairs organisations than in public affairs organisations, although economic dominants approach that situation.

Table 43. Organisational Office Holding of New Leadership Groupings.

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Office Holding in organisations active in public affairs	63	90	37	75	50	83	57
Office holding in other organisations	63	10	27	33	57	0	40

This role of the social leader is even more visible if we look at the non-public affairs organisational memberships of the different groups. (Table 44.)

Table 44. Non-Public Affairs Organisational Memberships of New Leadership Groupings.

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Charity	-	10	3	17	28	-	14
Rotary	5	-	10	8	14	17	6
Cultural	11	20	13	8	36	-	9
Sport, Recreational	-	-	7	-	36	-	22
Social	16	-	10	4	28	-	34
Trade, Professional	58	-	27	21	36	17	7
Religious	-	10	-	-	7	-	8
Other	11	10	7	17	-	33	9
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	87

N.B. There were 3 rejects in Pol.

In virtually every category of organisation the percentage membership is greatest among the social leaders.

On the question of preference for dealing with the Government centrally or regionally, all groups appear to prefer dealing with the regional offices. (Table 45).

Table 45. Preferred Contact with Government of New Leadership Groupings

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol
Regional Office	37	70	37	61	64	50	46
Whitehall	37	10	30	17	14	17	34
Don't Know	26	20	33	22	22	33	20
No. of Cases	19	10	30	23	14	6	90

N.B. There was one reject in PR.O.

It is perhaps significant, however, that quite a number of economic dominants, public officials, and politicians seem to suggest that they know their way around Whitehall.

Turning now to the voting patterns of the leaders we find the results much as we might expect. (Table 46).

Table 46. Voting at Last General Election of New Leadership Groupings

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Labour	5	100	17	47	7	66	58
Conservative	58	-	20	33	79	-	37
Liberal	5	-	-	4	-	17	1
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
None	11	-	17	8	-	17	-
N.A.	21	-	46	8	14	-	4
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

The relationship between the leadership grouping and voting behaviour is quite striking in the cases of union leaders, social leaders, and economic dominants. We could also have expected the reluctance of public officials to declare themselves. There also appears to be great stability in voting patterns amongst the leaders. (Table 47).

Table 47. Intended voting at next General Election of New Leadership Groupings

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Labour	5	100	14	43	7	66	58
Conservative	64	-	20	33	79	171	35
Liberal	5	-	3	4	-	-	2
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
None	-	-	10	8	-	17	1
Don't Know	5	-	7	4	-	-	-
N.A.	21	-	46	8	14	-	4
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

There are very few cases of potential changes in allegiance and what there are tend not to be between the two major parties.

The voting patterns of the various groups are maintained at local level, although not to the same extent. (Table 48). What is perhaps most interesting is the differential turnout of the various types of leaders. As we might expect the politicians claim the highest turnout rate, but rather surprising perhaps, the economic dominants claim the lowest. However, the claimed turnout of the economic dominants is still above the actual turnout in local elections.

Table 48. Voting at Last Local Elections of New Leadership Groupings.

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.
Labour	-	90	10	38	7	66	56
Conservative	26	-	20	17	57	-	22
Liberal	-	-	-	-	-	17	-
Independent	5	-	-	8	7	-	7
Progressive	5	-	-	8	-	-	1
Rent & Ratepayer	-	-	-	4	-	-	3
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
None	48	10	24	21	22	17	8
N.A.	16	-	46	4	7	-	3
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90

The information in this chapter would seem to suggest that talk of a cohesive leadership group on Tyneside is misleading. Although in some ways the different leading groupings may be similar, e.g. in their high class position or their relatively high membership of organisations, the general impression is of variety. This is a topic that will be considered again at a later stage.

CHAPTER SIXTEENREPUTATIONAL LEADERS AND LONDON INFLUENTIALS

While recognising that the reputational method by itself is not sufficient in uncovering the leadership structure of a community, it was nevertheless thought to be a useful supplement to the study of particular issues. By means of the questionnaire survey it was in fact possible to differentiate between three different kinds of leaders, viz. decisional reputationals, general reputationals, and London influentials. The names of decisional reputations were generated by asking respondents to nominate people who they thought had been important in each of the issues under consideration. General reputationals arose out of answers to the question about who should be involved in any overall Tyneside project. Finally London influentials were those who were considered to have most influence with the Government and Whitehall.

The decisional reputations will be examined later in the context of the separate issues. For the moment, therefore, it is proposed to combine them with the general reputationals to form a new category of reputational leaders and to compare these with the London influentials.

It was decided that an individual should be considered a reputational leader if he was nominated as influential four or more times on either a particular issue or on a general Tyneside project. Altogether 47 people were nominated as being general reputational leaders but of these only 9 received 4 or more nominations. Of these 9, 5 received 4 or more nominations on particular issues and so were included twice over. On the basis of nominations on issues 21 more names were added to the list of reputational leaders. There was thus a total of 30 reputational leaders and of these 17 returned completed questionnaires.

On the question of London influentials 16 individuals received 4 or more nominations and of these 7 returned completed questionnaires. In the analysis which follows therefore it is necessary to bear in mind that we are dealing with a very small number of cases.

One other problem of methodology should also be mentioned. The decision to use 4 as the cut off point was purely arbitrary. It was felt, however, that a higher number would have left a very small group which almost certainly would not have included some individuals who were important, while any lower number would run the risk of including individuals whose importance would be exaggerated.

Before looking in detail at some of the characteristics of the surveyed reputational leaders and London influentials it may be as well to look at which individuals were actually included in the various categories. The 9 people nominated as general reputationals were Smith, Grey, Hunter, Short, Viscount Ridley, Newman, Cunningham, Abrahart and Elliott. Of these Smith, Grey, Hunter, Newman and Cunningham also received 4 or more nominations in at least one of the issue areas.

The 16 individuals nominated as London influentials were Smith, Grey, Hunter, Short, Viscount Ridley, Cunningham, Abrahart, Elliott, Rhodes, McGarvey, Duke of Northumberland, Harris, Ward, Garrett, Forster, and Brown. Of these Smith, Grey, Hunter, Cunningham, McGarvey and Harris received 4 or more nominations in at least one of the issue areas. The complete picture is summarised in Table 49.

It may also be useful to examine the total number of nominations received by various individuals. This total is built up from nominations received on the 7 issues, on the general Tyneside project, and on London influence. Leaders can then be ranked as in Table 50.

A number of points must be made about these figures. Not all the individuals named can be considered as Tyneside leaders but their names have been included because they were considered important in a particular issue. For example in a number of issues the name of the appropriate Minister was sometimes given and this accounts for people like Crossman, Greenwood, Castle and Jenkins. There were also cases where an individual was responsible for helping to create a situation in the country as a whole within which the particular issue on Tyneside was set, e.g. Geddes, Rochdale.

The figures do not show whether a particular individual was involved in one issue or more than one. To take an example, Crawshaw and Trotter both received 10 nominations for involvement in an issue, but Crawshaw's were spread over a number of issues while all Trotter's were for one issue.

What the figures do show quite clearly is the overwhelming importance of Smith. Only Hunter approaches his total of nominations but this is largely because of Hunter's overwhelming position in one issue for which he received 71 nominations.

Table 49. Summary of Influential Nominations

Name	Nominated as Decisional Reputational	Nominated as General Reputational	Nominated as London Influential
Smith	X	X	X
Crossman	X		
Newman	X	X	
Harris	X		X
Crawshaw	X		
Grey	X	X	X
Greenwood	X		
Mackley	X		
Butterfield	X		
Egner	X		
Collins	X		
Cunningham	X	X	X
Russell	X		
Denyer	X		
Hunter	X	X	X
Ibison	X		
McGarvey	X		X
Geddes	X		
Dawson D.	X		
Garrow	X		
Burrell	X		
Rochdale	X		
Harding	X		
Jenkins	X		
Barnett	X		
Petty	X		
Muir	X		
Castle	X		
Trotter	X		
Short		X	X
Rhodes			X
Ridley		X	X
Northumberland			X
Ward			X
Garrett			X
Abrahamart		X	X
Forster			X
Elliott		X	X
Brown			X

Table 50. Total Number of Influence Nominations.

Rank	Name	No. of Issue Nominations	No. of General Project Nominations	No. of London Nominations	Total No. of Nominations
1	Smith	58	38	80	176
2	Hunter	72	9	24	105
3	Cunningham	45	6	18	69
4	Dawson D.	25	0	2	27
5	Grey	8	13	5	26
6	Short	1	5	18	24
7	Ridley	5	8	10	23
8	Castle	21	0	0	21
9	Collins	14	2	0	16
10	Newman	9	4	1	14
	McGarvey	6	1	7	14
12	Russell	12	0	1	13
13	Harris	5	2	5	12
	Trotter	10	1	1	12
	Abraham	4	4	4	12
16	Crawshaw	10	0	0	10
17	Crossman	9	0	0	9
	Garrow	7	0	2	9
	Burrell	9	0	0	9
	Rhodes	1	3	5	9
21	Ibison	8	0	0	8
	Elliott	0	4	4	8
23	Mackley	7	0	0	7
	Egner	7	0	0	7
	Rochdale	7	0	0	7
	Jenkins	7	0	0	7
	Northumberland	0	0	7	7
	Forster	0	3	4	7
	Brown	1	2	4	7
30	Butterfield	5	0	1	6
	Denyer	6	0	0	6
	Ward	0	1	5	6
33	Harding	5	0	0	5
	Barnett	5	0	0	5
	Petty	5	0	0	5
	Garrett	0	1	4	5
37	Greenwood	4	0	0	4
	Geddes	4	0	0	4
	Muir	4	0	0	4

By using the various categories of reputational leader it is possible to suggest a typology for local leadership. This would include 7 types: decisional only leader, London influential only, general project reputational only, London influential and general project reputational, decisional and London influential, decisional and general project reputational, and a combination of all three groups. We could perhaps call these types of leaders the decision-makers, the London influentials, the local motivators, the general motivators, the specific influentials, the specific motivators, and the generals. We can then allocate the individual leaders to these categories. (Table 51).

Table 51. Allocation of Leaders according to Influential Type.

Decision-Makers	London Influentials	Local Motivators	General Motivators
Dawson D	Rhodes	-	Short
Castle	Northumberland		Elliott
Collins	Forster		
Russell	Brown		
Trotter	Ward		
Crawshaw	Garrett		
Crossman			
Garrow			
Burrell			
Ibison			
Mackley			
Egner			
Rochdale			
Jenkins			
Butterfield			
Denyer			
Harding			
Barnett			
Fetty			
Greenwood			
Geddes			
Muir			
	Specific Influentials	Specific Motivators	Generals
	McGarvey	Newman	Smith
	Harris		Hunter
			Cunningham
			Grey
			Ridley
			Abrahart

This allocation is based on the requirement of receiving 4 nominations in the various categories, e.g. Harris received more than 4 nominations in both issues and London influence and so is allocated to the specific influential type.

A number of interesting features are revealed by this typology allocation. Of the 6 generals, 5 are or have been leaders of important local councils, while the other is probably the most important industrialist in the area.

Of the 6 local MP's amongst the total of leaders, 4 are London influentials and 2 are general motivators. In other words none of them were considered important in any of the decisions under consideration. This clearly shows that despite the protestations of many MP's their importance is as a channel of communications to the national level rather than in participating in the local decision-making process.

The absence of any local motivators suggests that it is virtually impossible to be considered as being important for the success of a local project unless the individual concerned has proved himself important on a particular local issue or has a reputation for having influence in London. On reflection this is what we might expect.

So far we have been concerned with nominations for leadership from the whole sample of 193 leaders. It may be of interest to examine for a moment the nominations for leadership from the top leaders we have been considering above. Altogether 19 top leaders completed questionnaires and of these 13 were prepared to nominate people or institutions as being either important for a Tyneside project or as having influence in London.

In the case of project influentials only 6 individuals received nominations from other top leaders. The figures re-emphasise the importance of Smith. (Table 52)

Table 52. Project Influential Nominations from Other Top Leaders.

Name	No. of Nominations from Top Leaders
Smith	4
Grey	1
Hunter	1
Short	1
Ridley	1
Cunningham	1
Chetwynd	1
Harper	1
Dawson F.	1

This is not the whole story however for a number of people nominated institutions rather than individuals and 6 of the nominations were from one individuals. This can be seen in Fig. 1.

Figure 1. Personal and Impersonal Project Influential Nominations from Top Leaders.



The nomination of local council leaders and local Labour Party leaders is clearly of great importance and the question of the relative roles of individuals and institutions is something that will have to be examined later.

Turning to the nominations for London influentials by top leaders we find a similar situation. Of the 19 top leaders surveyed only 10 were prepared to give nominations. In all 9 individuals were nominated. (Table 53)


Table 53. London Influential Nominations from Other Top Leaders.

Name	No. of Nominations from Top Leaders
Smith	6
Short	3
Hunter	1
Cunningham	1
Ridley	1
Northumberland	1
Harris	1
Ward	1
Abrahart	1

Once again the importance of Smith is recognised with, in this case, some importance being attached to Short who was at the time of the survey both a local MP and a member of the Government.

If we look at the actual nominations of the various individuals we find that people seem to be more important than institutions in the case of London influence compared with the project influentials. (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Personal and Impersonal London Influential Nominations from Top Leaders.



The number of cases of reputational leaders and London influentials is really too small to allow us to make meaningful comparisons with regard to the usual variables. What is possible, however, is to indicate briefly where there is evidence of significant features.

If we look at the groupings to which the reputational leaders and the London influentials originally belonged, we find that the reputational leaders were all decisional leaders and the London influentials were all institutional leaders. (Table 54).

Table 54. Original Groupings of Reputational Leaders and London Influentials.

	Reputational Leaders	London Influentials
Decisional	41	-
Social	-	-
Institutional	-	14
S.I.	-	-
S.D.	6	-
I.D.	35	57
S.I.D.	18	29
No. of Cases	<u>17</u>	<u>7</u>

One possible explanation for this may be that reputational leaders owe their position to some extent to the fact that their names appear in the mass media, while London influentials are those people who occupy certain offices.

One frequent source of interest to students of local government is the relationship between 'locals' and 'comers-in'. It is rather interesting, therefore, to look at the reputational leaders and the London influentials in terms of their birthplace. (Table 55).

Table 55. Birthplace of Reputational Leaders and London Influentials.

	Reputational Leaders	London Influentials
Project Area	41	29
Elsewhere in Northumberland	18	14
Elsewhere in Co. Durham	-	-
Elsewhere in Britain	41	57
Abroad	-	-
No. of Cases	<u>17</u>	<u>7</u>

Although the evidence is by no means clearcut there appears to be a tendency for reputational leaders to be locally born while London influentials are more likely to be 'comers-in'. Part of the explanation for this is likely to be the fact that some of the MPs amongst the London influentials came into the area seeking a parliamentary seat.

More significantly, one of the prime reasons for inclusion as a reputational leader or London influential seems to be membership of a local council. Out of the 17 reputational leaders 13 were local councillors - 4 from Newcastle, 4 from Northumberland, 2 from South Shields, and one each from Gateshead, Tynemouth, and a council outside Tyneside. Of the 7 London influentials 4 were local councillors - 2 from Newcastle, and one each from

Northumberland and a council outside Tyneside.

One final point of interest is in the political background of the reputational leaders and London influentials. Particularly noticeable is the low percentage of Conservatives. (Table 56).

Table 56. Voting Behaviour at Last General Election of Reputational Leaders and London Influentials.

	Reputational Leaders	London Influentials
Labour	59	72
Conservative	24	14
Liberal	-	-
Other	-	-
None	-	-
N.A.	17	14
No. of Cases	17	7

It is significant that London influentials are more Labour inclined than the reputational leaders and this suggests that one of the main factors affecting reputations for influence is the political complexion of the national government. At the time of the survey a Labour government was in power and hence additional importance was attached to local Labour MPs and local Labour Party leaders generally.

So far we have been concerned with the reputational leaders and London influentials chiefly as individuals. It might be useful to examine the nominations for both support for a Tyneside project and for London influence including this time both personal and non-personal nominations. As has been mentioned earlier some respondents when asked to make nominations gave institutions as well as or instead of individuals. In regard to the proposed Tyneside project the actual distribution of nominations was as shown in Table 57. We can in fact re-tabulate the personal nominations according to the institution to which the individual nominated principally belongs. We then obtain the figures shown in Table 58. This clearly brings out the importance attached to local councils, local councillors, and local officials.

Turning now to the purely institutional nominations we find this emphasis on local authorities again (Table 59).

Table 57. Nominations for Project Influentials

	No.	Percentage
Respondent gave name or names only	21	11
Respondent gave both personal and non-personal nominations	25	13
Respondent gave non-personal nominations only	88	46
Respondent said it depends on the project	28	14
Other answer	8	4
No answer	<u>23</u>	<u>12</u>
No. of Cases.	<u>193</u>	<u>100</u>

Table 58. Personal Nominations for Project Influence re-tabulated according to group to which individual nominated principally belongs

	No.	Percentage
Government, etc.	3	2
Local authorities, councillors	45	30
Local officials, regional civil servants	45	30
MPs, political parties, etc.	19	12
Industry	25	16
Trade unions	6	4
Miscellaneous	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>
No. of Cases	<u>152</u>	<u>100</u>

Table 59. Non-personal Nominations for Project Influence.

	No.	Percentage
Local authorities, councillors	73	27
Local officials, regional civil servants	65	24
MPs, political parties, etc.	40	15
Industry	41	15
Trade unions	25	9
Miscellaneous	<u>24</u>	<u>9</u>
No. of Cases	<u>268</u>	<u>100</u>

Easily the most popular single nomination was local authorities with 57 followed by the regional economic planning council or board with 39, industry with 25, and the trade unions with 24. The actual list of nominations is shown in Table 60.

Table 60. Actual Non-personal Nominations for Project Influence

Category	No. of Nominations
Local authorities	57
Local councillors	3
Durham C.C.	5
Northumberland C.C.	5
Newcastle C.B.C.	2
Local planning officers	6
Local government officers	4
Mayor of Newcastle	1
Political parties	6
Dominant political party	11
Local Labour party leaders	2
Labour Party	1
Principal ratepayers	1
The people	5
Local government electors	1
Tyneside Labour MPs	4
MPs	14
Prime Minister	1
Chancellor of Exchequer	1
People who control finance	2
Gnomes of Zurich	1
C.B.I.	1
Industry and industrialists	25
Chamber of Commerce	8
Employers	7
Employees	1
Trade Unions	24
North East Development Council	21
Northern Economic Planning Board	18
Government departments	15
Minister for North East	1
Press	7
The 'Journal'	1
Television	2
Universities	1
Miners	1
Churches	2

If we combine the personal and non-personal nominations we obtain the results seen in Table 61.

Table 61. Combined Personal and Non-personal Nominations for Project Influence

	No.	Percentage
Government, etc.	3	1
Local authorities, councillors	118	28
Local officials, regional civil servants etc.	110	26
MPs, political parties	59	14
Industry	66	16
Trade unions	31	7
Miscellaneous	33	8
No. of Cases.	420	100

Clearly then in any Tyneside project the support of the local authorities is considered to be of the greatest importance.

It is possible, of course, that because of the large number of local councillors in the leadership sample there is an undue bias attached to these figures. However if we look at the institutional base of the nominator as well as the nominee we find that all groups except industry give priority to local authorities, and even in the case of industry first place is given to local officials. (Table 62).

Table 62. Nominations for Project Influence by Institutional Group of Nominator (Percentages)

	Govt.	Council	Offic.	Polit.	Ind.	Unions	Misc.
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	7	29	23	15	11	9	6
Official	9	31	24	7	17	9	2
Political	13	20	17	20	17	13	0
Industry	10	19	26	3	23	13	6
Union	0	25	8	17	25	17	8
Miscellaneous	4	28	14	10	22	10	12
No. of Cases	23	84	63	39	51	33	19

It is also interesting that in every case with the obvious exception of the Government, the nominations for the nominator's own group are greater than average.

A retabulation of the nominations of individuals with London influence according to the institution with which they are most closely connected gives great importance to local officials. (Table 63).

Table 63. Personal Nominations for London Influence re-tabulated according to the Group to which the individual nominated principally belongs

	No.	Percentage
Government	1	*
Local authorities, councillors	49	18
Local officials, regional civil servants	107	40
MPs, political parties, etc.	50	18
Industry	35	13
Trade Unions	11	4
Miscellaneous	18	7
No. of Cases.	<u>271</u>	<u>100</u>

However, this is largely due to the large number (80) of nominations given to Smith. If we look at non-personal nominations we find, in fact, that MPs and political parties replace local officials as most important. (Table 64)

Table 64. Non-personal Nominations for London Influence.

	No.	Percentage
Local authorities, councillors	23	14
Local officials, regional civil servants	42	25
MPs, political parties, etc	53	31
Industry	22	13
Trade Unions	19	11
Miscellaneous	10	6
No. of Cases.	<u>169</u>	<u>100</u>

Examining the actual nominations we can see that local MPs were the most popular single nominations, followed by the regional economic planning council or board, trade unionists and industrialists. (Table 65) Combining the personal and non-personal figures we get the results shown in Table 66. Compared to the nominations for project influentials there is a larger role for local officials and MPs and a smaller role for local councillors.

Table 65. Actual Non-personal Nominations for London Influence.

Category	No. of Nominations
Local authorities	14
Local councillors	1
County councils	5
Newcastle C.B.C.	1
Local government officers	7
Regional civil servants	5
Local Board of Trade officials	2
Regional officer, Ministry of Housing	1
Education officials	1
Minister for North East	1
Local MPs	29
Local Labour MPs	12
Local Labour parties	5
Governing party politicians	5
House of Lords	1
The Lords Spiritual	1
The Establishment	1
North East Development Council	14
Northern Economic Planning Board	11
Industry	16
C.B.I.	3
Trade Unions	17
T.U.C. Regional Advisory Co.	2
Chamber of Commerce	2
Shipbuilders	1
Vice-Chancellors of Universities	2
Editors	2
JPs	1
Miners	1
The general public	1
Those who shout loudest	1
Northern regional council of Labour Party	1
Tynemouth	1
Chairmen of local authorities	1

Table 66. Combined Personal and Non-personal Nominations for London Influence

	No.	Percentage
Government	1	x
Local Authorities, councillors	72	16
Local officials, regional civil servants, etc.	149	34
MPs, political parties	103	23
Industry	57	13
Trade Unions	30	7
Miscellaneous	28	6
No. of Cases.	<u>440</u>	<u>100</u>

Again if we look at the institutional background of the nominators we find that all groups without exception give priority to local officials (Table 67).

Table 67. Nominations for London Influence by Institutional Group of Nominator. (Percentages)

	Govt.	Council	Offic.	Polit.	Ind.	Unions	Misc.
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	1	22	32	25	8	9	4
Official	6	11	42	17	11	6	8
Political	0	16	28	28	12	8	8
Industry	4	0	31	24	24	10	7
Union	4	15	23	15	15	23	4
Miscellaneous	2	10	28	21	19	6	13
No. of Cases	<u>7</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>19</u>

But also in every case with the exception of the Government, the nominations for the respondent's own group are greater than average.

CHAPTER SEVENTEENTHE ISSUES AND THE LEADERS

Having looked at the characteristics of the various kinds of leaders, we can now proceed to an examination of the involvement of these leaders in the various issues under consideration and their attitudes to them.

To begin with we can look at the claims made by all leaders for involvement in the various issues. (Table 68).

Table 68. Total Claims for Involvement in Issues

Issue	No.	Percentage
Local Government Re-organisation	126	65
Tyne Tunnel	41	21
Airport	54	28
Port of Tyne	41	21
Police Re-organisation	46	24
Shipbuilding	25	13
Passenger Transport Authority	60	31
None	40	21

As expected, all the decisional only leaders claimed involvement in at least one issue, as did most politicians and public officials. (Table 69).

Table 69. Claims for Involvement in Issues of Leadership Categories (Percentages)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.	Rep.	L.I.
Local Government	11	40	77	54	21	83	84	94	100
Tunnel	11	20	27	12	7	17	27	29	28
Airport	26	10	37	17	14	33	32	53	71
Port of Tyne	11	20	23	17	-	67	24	47	57
Police	11	-	23	12	-	17	36	71	71
Shipbuilding	31	20	3	17	14	-	12	18	57
Passenger Transport	5	40	40	33	-	17	37	59	71
None	37	40	10	38	64	-	9	-	-
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90	17	7

Rep. = Reputational leader

L.I. = London influential

The other categories, especially the social leaders, had quite a high proportion of non-involved members.

Local government re-organisation was easily the issue in which most people claimed involvement, with the primary roles being played by politicians, decisional only leaders and public officials. These categories also claimed the greatest involvement in the Tyne Tunnel, the airport, the port of Tyne, and the police re-organisation. On the shipbuilding issue the economic dominants and the union leaders were predominant as we would expect, while passenger transport attracted involvement pretty much across the board. All reputational leaders and London influentials claimed involvement in at least one issue, and many in several. The London influentials appeared to be more involved than the reputational leaders, especially in shipbuilding and the airport.

Local government re-organisation was not only the issue in which most leaders claimed involvement but it was also usually regarded as being the most important. (Table 70).

Table 70. Leaders Conception of the Importance of the Issues.

Issue	No.	Percentage
Local Government	116	60
Tunnel	14	7
Airport	16	8
Port of Tyne	5	3
Police	1	x
Shipbuilding	27	14
Passenger Transport	0	0
Don't Know	25	13

x = less than 1%

The only categories who deviated from this norm were the economic dominants and the social leaders who favoured either the airport or the shipbuilding re-organisation. (Table 71). The Tyne Tunnel was the only other issue to secure some support from all categories of leader. The reputational leaders and London influentials had quite a high proportion of members unprepared to chose the most important issue, but those that did usually chose local government re-organisation or the tunnel.

Table 71. Importance of Issue according to various Leadership Categories.
(Percentages)

	E.D.	U.L.	P.O.	PR.O.	S.O.L.	D.O.L.	Pol.	Rep.	L.I.
Local Government	26	70	87	58	21	100	61	53	71
Tyne Tunnel	11	20	27	12	7	17	27	29	28
Airport	31	-	3	4	43	-	4	-	-
Port of Tyne	5	-	3	-	7	-	2	4	-
Police	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Shipbuilding	31	20	7	21	21	-	12	4	14
Passenger Transport	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Don't Know	31	10	10	8	7	-	15	29	28
No. of Cases	19	10	30	24	14	6	90	17	7

One factor which might be expected to have some influence on whether an individual is involved in an issue or not is organisational membership. The evidence seems to bear out this expectation. (Table 72)

Table 72. Involvement in Issue by Organisational Membership (Percentage)

	Political Party	Trade Union	R. & R. Assoc.	Trade/Prof. Org.	P.T.A.	Rel.	Oth.	None
Local Government	86	83	75	58	67	60	63	38
Tunnel	22	24	25	23	67	30	17	22
Airport	32	22	50	40	67	40	27	22
Port of Tyne	22	32	-	25	67	30	24	22
Police	26	24	25	17	-	30	27	32
Shipbuilding	9	20	-	15	-	-	20	14
Passenger Transport	36	49	25	25	33	50	29	11
None	11	10	50	15	33	30	24	38
No. of Cases	91	41	4	52	3	10	41	37

There was one reject in R. & R. Assoc.

In most cases the percentage of non-organised leaders involved in issues is less than the percentage of organised leaders, especially in regard to local government re-organisation and passenger transport. Furthermore, of the leaders not claiming organisational membership, the largest group were not involved in any issue. For all organisational memberships local government re-organisation was still the issue which secured the greatest claimed involvement.

It may be interesting to look at the total claimed involvement of the various categories of leaders. (Table 73).

Table 73. Total Claimed Involvement in Issues by Organisational Membership (Percentages)

	Total number of active involvements	Number of Individuals Concerned	Average number of Involvements per head
Political Party	212	91	2.3
Trade Union	104	41	2.5
R. & R. Assoc	8	4	2.0
Trade & Professional Organisation	106	52	2.0
Parent-Teachers	9	3	3.0
Religious	24	10	2.4
Other	85	41	2.1
None	59	37	1.6

If we ignore members of Rent and Ratepayer associations and Parent-Teacher associations because of the small numbers involved, we find that trade unionists appear to have the greatest spread of involvements, followed by members of religious groups and political party members. As expected, at the bottom of the list we find those leaders with no organisational membership.

We can also look at the relative involvement in issues of top leaders and other leaders. (Table 74).

Table 74. Relative Involvement in Issues of Top Leaders and Other Leaders. (Percentages)

No. of Issues in which involved	Top Leaders	Other Leaders
0	0	22
1	5	27
2	16	24
3	21	10
4	26	7
5	21	6
6	5	3
7	5	x
No. of Cases	<u>19</u>	<u>174</u>

Mean number of issues top leaders involved in = 3.8

Mean number of issues other leaders involved in = 1.8

This clearly shows a much greater degree of involvement on the part of the top leaders but this is partly to be expected because reputed involvement in issues is one of the criteria for selection as a top leader. However, the difference in the mean number of issue involvements is statistically significant

A factor which may affect a person's judgment of the importance of an issue is whether he was actually personally involved in that issue or not. Presumably in some cases involvement arises simply because of the importance attached to a particular issue. The figures seem to bear this out. (Table 75)

Table 75. Most Important Issue by Involvement in Issues. (Percentage)

Most important issue	Local Govt.	Tunnel	Airport	P.O.T.	Pol.	Ship.	P.T.	D.K.
Involvement in Issue								
Local Government	76	57	31	20	100	63	-x	52
Tunnel	17	36	25	40	-	30	-	20
Airport	29	29	31	20	100	15	-	28
Port of Tyne	24	14	13	20	-	15	-	24
Police	23	29	19	20	100	19	-	32
Shipbuilding	9	7	6	20	-	37	-	12
Passenger transport	36	29	25	20	-	26	-	28
None	16	36	31	20	-	22	-	32
No. of Cases	116	14	16	5	1	27	0	25

N.B. The one person who thought that the police re-organisation was the most important issue was also involved in local government and the airport. That is what column Pol. means.

In nearly every case the percentage of people nominating an issue as important and being involved in that issue is above average. The only major exception is the passenger transport issue which nobody regarded as being most important.

Because of the particular character of some of the issues, we would expect that there would be differential involvement of local councillors from different local authorities. The figures for each individual local authority are really too small to be meaningful but we can combine them according to the type of local authority. (Table 76) This bears out something of what we already know about the issues. For example local government re-organisation affected all types of local council members, the tunnel was primarily a county council responsibility and the port mostly the concern of the county boroughs. Overall it would seem that county borough councillors were most involved in the issues and the urban district councillors the least.

Table 76. Involvement in Issues by Type of Present Council Membership
(Percentage)

	County	County Borough	Municipal Borough	Urban District	Others
Local Government	89	87	92	82	64
Tunnel	57	6	42	24	27
Airport	36	39	17	12	55
Port of Tyne	11	45	25	12	18
Police	43	55	17	-	55
Shipbuilding	11	3	17	-	-
Passenger Transport	43	52	25	29	45
None	14	6	8	18	18
No. of Cases	28	31	12	17	11

So far we have been concerned with an individual's own claims for involvement in issues. Now we must move on to look at nominations for involvement received from other leaders. It would seem appropriate to examine these issue by issue, but first a number of general points can be raised.

When we looked at nominations for London influence and for involvement in a general Tyneside project, we found they could be either personal or non-personal. A similar feature is found in nominations for involvement in particular issues and so we will have a look at personal nominations, non-personal nominations and combined nominations in each case. The combined nominations involve allocating nominated individuals to a group with which they are most closely associated.

The difficulty that we face is that a large percentage of respondents were not prepared to make any nominations on most of the issues. (Table 77)

Table 77. Nominations for Involvement in Issues. (Percentages)

	Respondents giving name or names only	Respondents giving both personal and non-personal	Respondents giving non- personal only	Respondents giving no answer
Local Government	23	6	38	33
Tunnel	9	6	35	49
Airport	17	7	33	43
Port of Tyne	10	3	31	56
Police	12	3	38	47
Shipbuilding	34	4	18	43
Passenger Transport	11	6	32	51
Overall percentages	17	5	32	46
No. of Cases	226	67	434	624

However, when nominations were made they were more likely to be non-personal than personal, the only exception being shipbuilding. Of course when nominations were made, there were often more than one. The relative importance of personal and non-personal nominations changes somewhat because of this. (Table 78)

Table 78. Personal and Non-personal Reputed Involvement in Issues.

	Personal		Non-personal	
	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
Local Government	126	51	120	49
Tunnel	51	26	146	74
Airport	85	44	108	56
Port of Tyne	46	33	94	67
Police	60	35	112	65
Shipbuilding	97	61	62	39
Passenger Transport	44	29	109	71
Total	509	40	751	60

However, although local government re-organisation now joins shipbuilding in having more personal than non-personal nominations, the balance is still substantially in favour of the non-personal nominations.

Local Government Re-organisation.

Looking at the personal nominations of individuals involved in local government re-organisation, we find that 44 respondents made a total of 126 nominations covering 40 different individuals. One individual had a clear lead in nominations with a total of 34 and this was Smith. His nearest challenger was Crossman with 8 who was followed by Newman with 6, Harris and Grey with 5 each, and Crawshaw, Greenwood, Mackley, Butterfield, Egner and Collins all with 4. Altogether therefore, we had one individual with 34 nominations, one with 8, one with 6, 2 with 5, 6 with 4, 4 with 3, 6 with 2, and 19 with 1.

If we tabulate these nominations according to the group to which the individual nominated principally belongs a clear pattern emerges. (Table 79).

Table 79. Reputed Involvement in Local Government Re-organisation by Personal Categories

Group	No.	Percentage
Government	12	10
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	47	37
Local officials, etc.	51	40
MPs, political parties, etc.	6	5
Industry, etc.	0	0
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>10</u>	8
No. of Cases	<u>126</u>	

There is a clear predominance of representatives from local government, both elected and official. We should remember, however, that the figure for local officials is largely a result of nominations for Smith who was chairman of the regional economic planning board at the time.

Nominations for reputed involvement by non-personal categories reveal a rather different picture. (Table 80)

Table 80. Reputed Involvement in Local Government Re-organisation by Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	29	24
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	44	37
Local officials, etc.	25	21
MPs, political parties, etc.	6	5
Industry, etc.	1	1
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>15</u>	12
No. of Cases.	<u>120</u>	

The most frequent single nomination was local authorities with 38, followed by the Government with 27. Compared to the personal nominations there is a significant drop in nominations for local officials and a significant rise in those for Government. This reinforces the importance of Smith in the personal nominations and emphasises the importance of anonymous Government or Ministry.

If we combine the personal and non-personal nominations the situation is as shown in Table 81.

Table 81. Reputed Involvement in Local Government Re-organisation by Combined Personal and Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	41	17
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	91	37
Local officials, etc.	76	31
MPs, political parties, etc.	12	5
Industry, etc.	1	x
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>25</u>	10
No. of Cases	<u>246</u>	

Overall local councillors are regarded as being the most important group, although local officials run them fairly close. It seems that all is as it constitutionally should be.

One final point to be considered is the relationship between the group background of the nominator and his nominations. (Table 82).

Table 82. Nominations for Involvement in Local Government Re-organisation according to Group of Nominator. (Percentages.)

Nominee	Govt.	Council	Officials	Political	Ind.	T.U.	Misc.	No. of Cases
Nominator								
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	15	36	34	6	1	0	9	107
Officials	21	37	34	3	0	0	5	38
Political	39	22	28	6	0	0	6	18
Industry	0	38	50	12	0	0	0	8
Trade Unions	40	40	20	0	0	0	0	5
Misc.	21	33	33	0	0	0	12	24
No. of Cases	<u>38</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>16</u>	

There appears to be agreement amongst local councillors and local officials that they are about equally influential, and their importance is agreed upon by all the other groups except one. The exception is the political parties and MPs group who attached greatest importance to the role of the Government. (The trade unions also differ somewhat but the numbers are too small to be meaningful.)

Tyne Tunnel

The personal nominations for involvement in the Tyne Tunnel total 51 which are spread over 20 individuals and come from 18 respondents. As with local government re-organisation one name was clearly ahead of all the rest; in this case Dan Dawson with 24 nominations. He was followed by Garrow with 4, and Smith, Goodwin, Cotton, Cunningham and Coates with 2 each. Altogether we had one individual with 24 nominations, one with 4, 5 with 2 and 13 with one each.

If we tabulate the results according to the groups to which the individual principally belongs we are presented with a clear conclusion. (Table 83)

Table 83. Reputed Involvement in Tunnel by Personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	2	4
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	38	75
Local officials, etc.	6	12
MPs, political parties, etc.	0	0
Industry, etc.	0	0
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>5</u>	10
No. of Cases.	<u>51</u>	

It appears that in terms of personalities the Tyne Tunnel was obviously regarded as being a matter for local councillors, assisted to some extent by local officials.

Turning to reputed involvement by non-personal categories we find the pattern reinforced. (Table 84).

Table 84. Reputed Involvement in Tunnel by Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	31	21
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	91	62
Local officials, etc.	9	6
MPs, political parties, etc.	2	1
Industry, etc.	2	1
Trade unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>11</u>	7
No. of Cases	<u>146</u>	

The most popular single nomination was Durham County council with 33, followed closely by Northumberland County Council with 31. We should note again, however, that when it comes to non-personal nominations the role of the Government and the appropriate Ministry is emphasised rather more than is the case with personal nominations.

The situation is confirmed when we look at the combined personal and non-personal nominations. (Table 85)

Table 85. Reputed Involvement in Tunnel by Combined Personal and Non-Personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	33	17
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	129	66
Local officials, etc.	15	8
MPs, political parties, etc.	2	1
Industry, etc.	2	1
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>16</u>	8
No. of Cases	<u>197</u>	

Overall, therefore, local authorities had a predominant position with only the Government of the other groups receiving any significant support.

Finally we can look at the group background of the respondents. (Table 86)

Table 86. Nominations for Involvement in Tunnel according to Group of Nominator (percentages)

Nominee	Govt.	Council	Officials	Polit.	Ind.	T.U.	Misc.	No. of Cases
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	18	60	16	0	4	0	1	73
Officials	25	50	18	4	0	0	4	28
Politicals	31	44	12	6	0	0	6	16
Industry	14	71	0	0	14	0	0	7
Trade Unions	20	80	0	0	0	0	0	5
Miscellaneous	12	59	18	0	0	0	12	17
No. of Cases	<u>29</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	

Every group in fact gives priority to the local authorities and councillors, often overwhelmingly so. There is, however, fairly significant support for the Government from local officials and MPs and other political figures.

Airport

Personal nominations for involvement in the airport were received from 32 respondents, they totalled 85 and were spread over 19 individuals. The distribution was rather more even than in the two previous issues, but even so there was a clear group of most influential leaders. The individual with the greatest number of nominations was Cunningham with 32, followed by Smith with 16, Russell with 12 and Denyer with 6. Overall there was one individual with 32 nominations, one with 16, one with 12, one with 6, one with 3, 2 with 2, and 12 with one each.

If we retabulate these personal nominations according to the group to which the individual principally belongs, we find once again that it is the local councillors who are regarded as being most important with only local officials of the other groups receiving much support. (Table 87)

Table 87. Reputed Involvement in Airport by Personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	0	0
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	57	67
Local officials, etc.	18	21
MPs, political parties, etc.	1	1
Industry, etc.	0	0
Trade unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>9</u>	10
No. of Cases	<u>85</u>	

The situation was emphasised by the nominations for reputed involvement on a non-personal basis. (Table 88)

Table 88. Reputed Involvement in Airport by Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	15	14
Local authorities, councillors, etc	72	67
Local officials, etc.	8	7
MPs, political parties, etc.	2	2
Industry, etc.	8	7
Trade unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>3</u>	3
No. of Cases	<u>108</u>	

The most popular single nomination was local authorities with 33, followed by Newcastle City Council with 20. Apart from these there was a pretty wide dispersion of nominations. In passing we might note that industry in the guise of airlines, travel agencies, exporting industries and so on, received a number of nominations. Once again the role of Government was emphasised in non-personal nominations.

The combination of personal and non-personal nominations shows once again that the local authorities are predominant, and with local officials in second place, the airport was overwhelmingly regarded as being a local authority concern. Perhaps surprisingly the role of the Government was not thought particularly important in this case. (Table 89).

Table 89. Reputed Involvement in Airport by Combined Personal and Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	15	8
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	129	67
Local officials	26	14
MPs, political parties, etc.	3	2
Industry	8	4
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>12</u>	6
No. of Cases	<u>193</u>	

Looking at the group background of the nominators we find that all groups agreed on the role of the local authorities. (Table 90).

Table 90. Nominations for Involvement in Airport according to Group of Nominator. (percentages)

Nominee	Govt.	Council	Official	Polit.	Ind.	T.U.	Misc.	No. of Cases
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	6	65	18	3	6	0	3	72
Official	10	55	17	4	7	0	7	29
Politicals	29	43	7	7	7	0	7	14
Industry	8	58	17	0	8	0	8	12
Trade Unions	12	50	25	0	12	0	0	8
Misc.	0	76	12	0	0	0	0	17
No. of Cases	13	93	25	4	9	0	8	

Once again however we find that the politicians were more inclined than the other groups to attribute some importance to the Government.

Port of Tyne

A total of 46 nominations covering 20 individuals were received from 20 respondents for involvement in the port of Tyne. No individual was singled out as being particularly important as in the three previous issues. The individual with the most nominations was Burrell with 8, followed by Rochdale with 7, Collins with 6, Harding with 4, and Crawshaw with 3. Overall there was one individual with 8 nominations, one with 7, one with 6, one with 4, one with 3, 3 with 2, and 12 with one each.

The group background of these personal nominations follows the now traditional pattern. (Table 91)

Table 91. Reputed Involvement in Port of Tyne by Personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	1	2
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	21	46
Local officials, etc.	12	26
MPs, political parties, etc.	0	0
Industry, etc.	3	6
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>9</u>	20
No. of Cases	<u>46</u>	

Individuals from local authorities predominate although in this case there is a fairly high miscellaneous figure due to the nominations for Rochdale who was allocated to this group in preference to the Government.

The non-personal nominations on this issue tend to complicate the situation rather than strengthen it. (Table 92) The most popular single nomination was local authorities with 21, but the Tyne Improvement Commission which was allocated to the local officials group received 19 and the Government and Ministry of Transport received 17. There was thus a fairly even distribution between Government, local authorities, and local officials, and also a fairly strong showing by industry in the form of shipowners, shipbuilders, port users, and so on.

Table 92. Reputed Involvement in Port of Tyne by Non-personal categories.

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	23	25
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	27	29
Local officials, etc.	21	22
MPs, political parties, etc.	2	2
Industry, etc.	15	16
Trade Unions	1	1
Miscellaneous	<u>5</u>	5
No. of Cases	<u>94</u>	

The combined personal and non-personal figures emphasise this situation. (Table 93)

Table 93. Reputed Involvement in Port of Tyne by combined Personal and Non-personal Categories.

	No. of Nominations	Percentage
Government	24	17
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	48	34
Local officials, etc.	33	24
MPs, political parties	2	1
Industry, etc.	18	13
Trade Unions	1	1
Miscellaneous	<u>14</u>	10
No. of Cases	<u>140</u>	

Although local authorities are still the most important group, Government, local officials, and industry all have significant support. More than any other issue so far, therefore, the port seems to be somewhat of a joint undertaking.

Looking at the group of the respondents we find some quite wide variations in nominations. (Table 94) Thus a large number of councillors nominated officials, but the officials tended not to nominate themselves, preferring instead the role of the Government. Politicians again emphasised the role of the Government and they were joined in this by those from industry. One final point is that the unions received its first nomination, albeit from a trade unionist.

Table 94. Nominations for Involvement in Port of Tyne according to Group of Nominator (percentages)

Nominee	Govt.	Council	Officials	Polit.	Ind.	T.U.	Misc.	No. of Cases
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	7	40	36	0	7	0	10	53
Officials	26	37	16	0	0	0	21	19
Politicals	38	25	12	12	12	0	0	16
Industry	50	0	33	0	0	0	17	6
Trade Unions	22	22	22	0	22	11	0	9
Misc.	5	32	26	0	21	0	16	19
No. of Cases	21	40	33	2	12	1	13	

Police Re-organisation

On the issue of police re-organisation a total of 60 nominations were received from 24 respondents covering 23 individuals. Again there was a wide dispersion of nominations with no one individual having a predominant position. First place went to Cunningham with 8 nominations, followed by Jenkins with 7, Barnett and Petty with 5 each, and Muir with 4. Altogether one individual had 8 nominations, one had 7, 2 had 5, one had 4, 3 had 3, 5 had 2, and 10 had one each.

The distribution of these nominations according to group shows again that local authority representatives predominate although there was a reasonably strong showing by the Government. (Table 94)

Table 95. Reputed Involvement in Police by Personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	10	17
Local authorities	36	60
Local officials	12	20
MPs, political parties, etc.	2	3
Industry, etc.	0	0
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	0	0
No. of Cases	60	

The non-personal nominations, however, put a rather different complexion on the situation. (Table 96)

Table 96. Reputed Involvement in Police by Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	48	43
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	41	37
Local officials, etc.	17	15
MPs, political parties, etc.	2	2
Industry, etc.	0	0
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>4</u>	4
No. of Cases	<u>112</u>	

By far the greatest single number of nominations (46) was for the Government in the form of the Home Office or the Home Secretary. The local authorities group includes 19 nominations for Watch Committees and the local officials group 15 nominations for Chief Constables and other policemen.

The combined personal and non-personal figures, therefore, are rather interesting. (Table 97)

Table 97. Reputed Involvement in Police by Combined Personal and Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government,	58	34
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	77	45
Local officials, etc.	29	17
MPs, political parties, etc.	4	2
Industry, etc.	0	0
Trade Unions	0	0
Miscellaneous	<u>4</u>	2
No. of Cases.	<u>172</u>	

Although the local authorities are still the most important group, the most noticeable feature is, of course, the strong showing of the Government. We should remember, however, that there is quite a large disparity between the figures for personal and non-personal nominations which is probably due to the fact that local councillors and local officials tend to be known while representatives from the central government are not.

An examination of the group of respondents is very interesting because it reveals that all groups except councillors give priority to the Government. It would appear, therefore, that local authorities are regarded as being more important than the Government only because the local councillors are the largest single group of respondents. (Table 98).

Table 98. Nominations for Involvement in Police according to Group of Nominator (percentages)

Nominee	Govt.	Council	Officials	Polit.	Ind.	T.U.	Misc.	No. of Cases
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	34	47	17	0	0	0	2	70
Official	44	31	22	3	0	0	0	32
Politicals	39	39	17	5	0	0	0	18
Industry	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	2
Trade Unions	57	29	14	0	0	0	0	7
Misc.	37	32	32	0	0	0	0	19
No. of Cases	57	59	29	2	0	0	1	

Shipbuilding

Shipbuilding is, of course, a rather special issue and the nominations for involvement bear this out. A total of 97 personal nominations were received from 66 respondents covering only 10 individuals. One person was far and away the most nominated; Hunter with 71 nominations. Of the rest Ibison received 7 nominations, McGarvey 6, and Geddes 4. Overall one individual received 71 nominations, one received 7, one received 6, one received 4, one received 3, one received 2, and 4 received 1.

This distribution means that the figures for the group to which the individual principally belongs are overwhelmingly biased towards industry. (Table 99) For the first time local councillors and local officials are ignored entirely and also for the first time trade unionists are nominated.

The pattern is maintained, although to a lesser extent, when we look at non-personal nominations. (Table 100) The largest single nomination was shipbuilders with 18, followed by the shipbuilding management with 11. The role of the Government, especially the Ministry of Technology, is clearly regarded as being of some importance, as is that of the unions. Once again, however, there is a complete absence of nominations for local authorities and local officials, despite the importance to the area of the industry.

Table 99. Reputed Involvement in Shipbuilding by Personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	2	2
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	0	0
Local officials, etc.	0	0
MPs, political parties, etc.	0	0
Industry, etc.	81	84
Trade Unions	9	9
Misc.	5	5
No. of Cases	<u>97</u>	

Table 100. Reputed Involvement in Shipbuilding by Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	13	21
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	0	0
Local officials, etc.	0	0
MPs, political parties, etc.	1	2
Industry, etc.	30	48
Trade Unions	10	16
Misc.	<u>8</u>	13
No. of Cases	<u>62</u>	

The combined personal and non-personal figures merely emphasise the role of industry. (Table 101)

Table 101. Reputed Involvement in Shipbuilding by Combined Personal and Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	15	9
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	0	0
Local officials, etc.	0	0
MPs, political parties, etc.	1	1
Industry, etc.	111	70
Trade Unions	19	12
Misc.	<u>13</u>	8
No. of Cases.	<u>159</u>	

The shipbuilding re-organisation was clearly regarded as being an internal affair of the industry with some prompting from the Government, but with absolutely no interference from local authorities. The role of industry was clearly recognised by all groups of nominators, with the exception of the politicians who gave equal importance to the Government. (Table 102)

Table 102. Nominations for Involvement in Shipbuilding according to Group of Nominator (percentages)

Nominee Nominator	Govt.	Council	Official	Polit.	Ind.	T.U.	Misc.	No. of Cases
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	8	0	0	1	71	13	7	62
Officials	13	0	0	0	69	6	13	16
Politicals	41	0	0	0	41	18	0	17
Industry	6	0	0	0	88	6	0	16
Trade Unions	17	0	0	0	50	25	8	12
Misc.	0	0	0	0	89	11	0	18
No. of Cases	17	0	0	1	98	18	7	

Passenger Transport

The passenger transport issue received fewer personal nominations than any other. Only 44 total nominations were received from 22 respondents covering 13 individuals. Only three people received more than one nomination and these were Castle with 20, Trotter with 10, and Smith with 4. Then there were 10 individuals who received one nomination each.

A retabulation of these personal nominations according to the group to which the individual nominated principally belongs reveals that for the first and only time the role of representatives from Government is considered most important (Table 103)

Table 103. Reputed Involvement in Passenger Transport by Personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	21	48
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	15	34
Local officials, etc.	6	14
MPs, political parties, etc.	1	2
Industry, etc.	1	2
Trade Unions	0	0
Misc.	0	0
No. of Cases	<u>44</u>	

This is, of course, due to the nominations for Castle who was Minister of Transport at the time.

Non-personal nominations emphasise the role of the Government. (Table 104)

Table 104. Reputed Involvement in Passenger Transport by Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	42	39
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	36	33
Local officials, etc.	3	3
MPs, political parties, etc.	4	4
Industry, etc.	17	16
Trade Unions	1	1
Misc.	<u>6</u>	6
No. of Cases.	109	

The largest single nomination was the Ministry of Transport with 38 nominations followed by the local authorities with 23. A significant feature, however, is the reasonably strong showing of industry which in this case was made up of the transport companies and British Rail.

The combined personal and non-personal figures give priority to the Government and this is the only issue in which this is the case. (Table 105)

Table 105. Reputed Involvement in Passenger Transport by Combined Personal and Non-personal Categories

	No. of Nominations	Percentages
Government	63	41
Local authorities, councillors, etc.	51	33
Local officials, etc.	9	6
MPs, political parties, etc.	5	3
Industry, etc.	18	12
Trade Unions	1	1
Misc.	<u>6</u>	4
No. of Cases.	<u>153</u>	

Local authorities are still regarded as being important although perhaps rather surprisingly local officials are not.

The role of the Government is recognised by all groups of nominators. (Table 106) In fact there seems to be a high degree of unanimity between the different groups of nominators.

Table 106. Nominations for Involvement in Passenger Transport According to Group of Nominator (percentages)

Nominee	Govt.	Council	Official	Polit.	Ind.	T.U.	Misc.	No. of Cases
Nominator								
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Council	45	27	6	8	12	0	3	67
Officials	46	31	15	0	4	0	4	26
Politicals	39	28	11	11	6	0	6	18
Industry	33	33	0	33	0	0	0	3
Trade Unions	50	38	0	0	12	0	0	8
Misc.	30	35	10	5	10	5	5	20
No. of Cases	60	42	12	9	13	1	5	

We can summarise the nominations for involvement in the various issues by saying that in most cases priority was given to the local authorities or to local councillors. The exceptions were shipbuilding where industry was regarded as being dominant, and passenger transport where the influence of the Government was thought to be most important. Other noticeable features were the importance attached to the Government in police re-organisation and to local officials over local government re-organisation and the port. (Table 107)

Table 107. Combined Personal and Non-personal Involvement in all Issues by Group (percentages)

	L.G.	T.T.	Airport	P.O.T.	Pol.	Ship.	P.T.A.
Government	17	17	8	17	34	9	41
Council	37	66	67	34	49	0	33
Officials	31	8	14	24	17	0	6
Politicals	5	1	2	1	2	1	3
Industry	x	1	4	13	0	70	12
Trade Unions	0	0	0	1	0	12	1
Misc.	10	8	6	10	2	8	4
No. of Cases	246	197	193	140	172	159	153

In three of the issues there was unanimity between different groups of respondents on the choice of the most important involved groups. (Table 108) When this unanimity was not present the main alternative was usually the Government.

Table 108. Unanimity in Nominations for Involvement in Issues

Issue	Chief group nominated in combined nominations	Groups not nominating chief group (in brackets is chief group which they nominate)
L.G.	Council	Politicals (Government) Industry (Officials)
Tunnel	Council	-
Airport	Council	-
Port	Council	Politicals (Government) Industry (Government)
Police	Council	Officials (Government) Trade Unions (Government) Miscellaneous (Government)
Shipbuilding	Industry	-
P.T.A.	Government	Miscellaneous (Council)

Attitudes to Issues

So far we have only been concerned with the question of whether or not a particular individual was involved in a particular issue. But, of course, it is also important to discover what were the attitudes to these issues of those people who were involved and also those people who were not involved. We could perhaps postulate that there would be more leaders in favour of the particular decision reached than against it. To see whether this is true or not we can examine each of the issues in turn.

Local Government Re-organisation.

It is rather difficult to assess attitudes to local government re-organisation because of the indefinite nature of the issue. As we have already seen the basic disagreement was between those who wanted a single local authority for Tyneside and those who did not. But there was also a subsidiary question of whether or not re-organisation should have been delayed in view of the appointment of the Royal Commission. Not every respondent dealt with both these points and there was also a large number who were not prepared to offer an opinion (71 in fact). On the question of one authority or not there were about equal numbers on either side with 41 approving of a single authority and 37 opposing it. However, there was an overwhelming majority of respondents who regretted that a decision had been postponed (50 to 7).

If we look at the views of the top decision-makers on this particular issue we find that their views are equally split. Three were unable to give an opinion, one approved of a single authority, two opposed a single authority, one approved of the delay, and two regretted the delay. Of the people reputed to be influential on this issue 6 were unable to give an opinion, 2 approved of a single authority, 3 opposed a single authority, one approved of the delay, and 5 regretted the delay.

Overall, therefore, it seems as if there was considerable disagreement among local leaders on Tyneside as to the future local government structure of the conurbation. It is not surprising, therefore, that no definite decision was arrived at and that the question was taken out of the hands of the local authorities.

Tyne Tunnel

The building of the Tyne Tunnel was a much clearer issue with a greater crystallisation of attitudes. Altogether 133 respondents approved of the tunnel, 31 disapproved for one reason or another, 4 thought it irrelevant, and 18 had no opinion. There was, therefore, a clear majority among local leaders who approved of the building of the tunnel.

There were, of course, only two top decision-makers on the tunnel and both approved of it. Amongst people reported to have had influence and been involved, however, the issue was less clear, with 8 being in favour, 6 against, and 3 without an opinion. This would seem to suggest that those who opposed the building of the tunnel were able to put across their views, at least amongst other leaders, and their opposition was recognised.

Airport

The redevelopment of the airport was the issue which had the greatest general approval from Tyneside leaders. $158\frac{1}{2}$ individuals approved of the scheme (if an attitude was held with reservations it was counted at $\frac{1}{2}$), while only 14 opposed it and 20 had no opinions.

Only one top decision maker on the airport was surveyed and his attitude was that he did not know whether the redevelopment had been worth it or not.

However, amongst those people reputed to have been involved 15 approved of the scheme, nobody opposed it, and 3 had no opinion. Clearly then the airport was popular at all levels of leadership.

Port of Tyne

The question of re-organising the port of Tyne was not one which aroused a great deal of emotion. A majority of leaders approved of it (112½ approved while only 3 disapproved) but 50 had no opinion and 27 thought the issue irrelevant.

Amongst top decision makers on this issue 2 approved and one thought it irrelevant, whilst those who were reputed to have been involved divided 9 in favour, 5 with no opinion, and 3 who thought it irrelevant.

Police Re-organisation

The question of police re-organisation was another which offered a variety of attitudes because of the number of options open. The final decision to have two county forces was approved by 102½ respondents, while 30 favoured some other scheme, 28 wanted no change at all and 32 had no opinion.

Amongst the top decision-makers on this issue 2 approved the final scheme, one favoured some other scheme, 2 wanted no change and one had no opinion. Amongst respondents reputed to have been involved 6 approved the final scheme, 5 favoured some other scheme, 3 wanted no change and 3 had no opinion. This seems to be another issue, therefore, where those most closely concerned with the issue were more divided in their opinions than the leadership group as a whole.

Shipbuilding

The re-organisation of shipbuilding on the Tyne was overwhelmingly favoured by Tyneside leaders. 152½ approved of it while only 4 disapproved. 34 respondents had no opinions while 2 argued that the industry should have been nationalised. The two top decision-makers surveyed were in favour of re-organisation, whilst among those reputed to have been involved 13 were in favour, none were against, and 4 had no opinion. There was clearly, therefore, approval at all levels of leadership.

Passenger Transport

Attitudes towards the passenger transport authority were very divided, partly because there were a number of options open. 69 of the respondents approved of the proposed scheme, 18 favoured some other scheme, 46 opposed any change in the existing situation and 56 had no opinion. No top decision makers were surveyed although from other sources we know that 2 were in favour of the proposed scheme while one opposed it. Amongst those reputed to have been involved 10 favoured the proposed scheme, one favoured some other scheme, 2 opposed any change and 4 had no opinion.

Overall, therefore, we can say that on most issues there was general approval of the outcome. The airport was the issue which had the greatest approval and the passenger transport authority the least. Top decision-makers and reputational leaders were by no means united, especially on local government re-organisation and the police. Indeed on some issues there appeared to be less unanimity amongst top leaders than amongst the leadership group as a whole. It would appear, therefore, that when there is opposition to a particular policy the individuals expressing this opposition can make their voice heard and their opposition is recognised, even if it is ultimately ineffective. We should remember, however, that we are talking about leaders who normally have some sort of power base. Individuals without such a base may not have the same opportunities for expressing opinions.

Other potential issues

Before leaving the question of the views of the leaders on the various issues it may be useful to look at whether the issues under consideration were really recognised by the leaders as being important. We have seen that in one or two cases a number of respondents claimed that the issue was irrelevant. To get some idea of the views of Tyneside leaders we asked them to suggest other issues which they considered were more important than those mentioned. Altogether 80 respondents suggested other such issues. This may seem rather a lot but a closer examination reveals that the nominations are not always important or relevant. (Table 109).

As we can see by far the most popular nomination was the economic future of the area and especially the attraction of new industry. Importance was

Table 109. Nominations for Other Issues as being most Important.

Issue	No. of Nominations
1. Economic:	
Future of coal industry	2
New industry; development area, etc.	32
Employment position	8
Rationalisation of electrical engineering industry	1
Re-training	1
2. Regionalism	11
3. Transport:	
Improved transport	15
Newcastle ring road	2
More Tyne crossings	3
Tyne-Solway canal	1
4. Environment:	
Dereliction	8
Sewage disposal	8
Cleaning up Tyne	3
Clean air	2
Tourism, leisure, etc.	2
5. Services:	
Education re-organisation	6
Regionalisation of education	1
Housing	6
Welfare services	1
National Health Service	1
6. Development of Tyne	3
7. Miscellaneous:	
Policy for youth	1
Fower stations	1
New towns	2

also attached to transport in the area, to the need for some kind of regional structure, and to the improvement of the environment.

The issues mentioned do not particularly detract from the importance of the issues considered however, for two main reasons. Firstly some of the issues nominated bear directly on the issues studied. So for example transport is covered by the tunnel, the airport and the passenger transport authority, the development of the Tyne is covered by the Port of Tyne authority, the regionalism is involved in the question of the reform of local

government, and more generally the economic situation is involved in the shipbuilding industry and more indirectly in the improved communications offered by the tunnel and the airport. The second main reason is that many of the issues nominated are those that ought to be tackled while we were concerned with issues which had arisen and had been, or were in the process of being, settled. It is probably justifiable, therefore, to claim that the issues studied were both important in their own right and were representative of the problems facing the area.

CHAPTER EIGHTEENTOP LEADERS, OTHER LEADERS, AND THE LED

So far attention has tended to be concentrated on leaders as a whole or as representatives of particular institutional groupings. However, it would also be interesting to try and isolate those individuals who can be called 'top' leaders - i.e. those who seem to be most influential in the affairs of Tyneside - and to see how they differ from the rest of the leadership sample.

'Top' leaders were selected on the basis of the nominations for important involvement in the seven issues or of the nominations for general influence. Included on the list was anyone who received 4 or more issue nominations, anyone who received 2 or more nominations together with a self-nomination, and anyone who received 4 or more general nominations. This gave a total of 19 individuals who completed the questionnaire.

It is fairly obvious that any such selection of top leaders is by its very nature arbitrary. Not only is the cut-off point arbitrary but also there is no allowance made for the fact that some of the issues are more important than others and, therefore, attracted the attention of more important people. Despite these reservations, however, I believe the final selection to be a reasonably accurate assessment of the leadership situation on Tyneside.

Another difficulty is that not all those nominated as being influential were actually surveyed. Indeed some of the most important individuals did not complete questionnaires. To get some idea of the situation we can briefly examine the nominations for inclusion on the issue and general influential lists. On the basis of these nominations it is possible to divide them into primary, secondary and tertiary influentials. A primary influential is anyone who received above 5% of the total nominations in a particular field; a secondary influential is anyone who received between $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ and 5% of the nominations; and a tertiary influential is anyone who received under $2\frac{1}{2}\%$. The numbers in each of these categories were as shown in Table 110.

Table 110. Primary, secondary and tertiary influentials

	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
General Project	4(2)	5(2)	37(17)
London Influence	4(0)	3(1)	57(21)
Local government	2(0)	9(7)	29(8)
Tyne tunnel	2(2)	5(0)	13(2)
Airport	4(1)	3(1)	12(4)
Port of Tyne	5(2)	3(2)	12(3)
Police	8(6)	5(1)	10(4)
Shipbuilding	3(0)	2(1)	5(1)
Passenger transport	3(0)	0(0)	10(4)

The figures in brackets are the numbers who were actually surveyed.

It is clear from these figures that some of the people who are called top leaders are not included in any of the groups of primary influentials. The explanation for this is that in some issues, notably local government re-organisation, a large number of individuals received a relatively small number of nominations. So for example, taking the case of local government re-organisation, 6 people (of whom 4 were surveyed) received 4 nominations each, which was sufficient for them to be primary influentials on this issue.

Bearing these difficulties in mind we can now proceed to examine the characteristics of the top leaders in comparison both with other leaders and with the population as a whole.

(Note: the figures for the population as a whole are taken from a random survey of the electorate of the Tyneside area. A total interviewing sample of 1200 was decided upon with 600 each from north and south of the river. The actual selection from each authority area was based on a series of calculations. It was decided that north of the river 300 of the sample should come from county boroughs, 120 from municipal boroughs, and 180 from urban districts, and that south of the river 300 should come from county boroughs, 60 from municipal boroughs, and 240 from urban districts. Then the actual sample figures for each authority area were found by using a sliding scale based on equal division and population proportionality. For example in the case of the county boroughs north of the river (Newcastle and Tynemouth) we had:

Equal Division	Mid Point (sample used)	Proportion to Population
150:150	195:105	240:60

The final distribution of completed survey questionnaires was in fact as follows:

Gateshead 99, Newcastle 124, South Shields 90, Tynemouth 68, Jarrow 37, Wallsend 39, Whitley Bay 35, Blaydon 31, Boldon 29, Felling 25, Gosforth 32, Hebburn 25, Longbenton 46, Newburn 32, Ryton 34, Whickham 35.

Thus the total number of completed questionnaires was 771.)

The first characteristic we can examine is sex. (Table 111).

Table 111. Sex Distribution of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population (percentages)

	Top Leaders	Other Leaders	Population
Male	100	92	48
Female	0	8	52
No. of Cases	19	174	771

Local leadership on Tyneside is clearly a male preserve with not a single woman included amongst the top leaders. (In fact the most frequent nomination in the issue of passenger transport was a woman who was minister of Transport at the time.)

The age distribution of the leaders reveals a predominance from the higher age groups. (Table 112)

Table 112. Age Distribution of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population (percentages)

	Top Leaders	Other Leaders	Population
21-30	0	0	16
31-40	11	7	19
41-50	26	21	22
51-60	21	33	19
61-65	16	18	9
Over 65	26	21	15
No. of Cases	19	174	771

However there appears to be a slight tendency for top leaders to be either younger or older than leaders in general (37% under 50 compared with 28% of all leaders, and 26% over 65 compared with 21%).

When we look at place of birth the most noticeable characteristic of the leaders is the relatively high percentage who have come into the area from elsewhere in Britain. (Table 113).

Table 113. Place of Birth of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population
Project Area	42	39	74
Elsewhere in Northumberland	21	14	} 14
Elsewhere in Co. Durham	0	13	
Elsewhere in Britain	37	33	11
Abroad	0	1	1
Don't Know	0	0	x
No. of Cases	19	174	771
x Less than 1%			

The only major difference between top and other leaders is that it appears to be advantageous to be born in Northumberland rather than County Durham. This feature is further emphasised if we look at the present place of residence of the leaders. (Table 114).

Table 114. Place of Residence of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population
Project Area	68	78	100
Elsewhere in Northumberland	26	14	
Elsewhere in Co. Durham	5	5	
Elsewhere in Britain	0	3	
Abroad	0	0	
No. of Cases	19	174	771

There is no comparison here with the population as a whole because the sample was taken only from those resident within the project area.

By far the most significant difference between leaders and the population as a whole occurs in the area of occupational status. (Table 115). There appears to be a very strong correlation between local leadership and self-employment which is fully borne out in the differences between top and other leaders. If a man wants to reach the top on Tyneside it is obviously advantageous to be self-employed, although it could be the case, of course, that reaching the top brings with it opportunities for self-employment.

Table 115. Occupational Status of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population
Self-employed	57	26	3
Not self-employed	43	74	97
No. of Cases	14	137	771

The objective class position of the leaders is clearly far higher than the population as a whole, with well over two-thirds falling into Class 1 and 2. (Table 116)

Table 116. Objective Class of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population
Class 1	58	39	4
Class 2	21	30	16
Class 3 (non manual)	5	17	} 54
Class 3 (manual)	16	11	
Class 4	0	2	14
Class 5	0	1	12
No. of Cases	19	174	771

If anything the top leaders are even more middle class than ever, although subjectively they do not feel this. (Table 117)

Table 117. Subjective class of Top Leaders and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
Upper	6	8
Middle	53	52
Working	35	37
N.A.	6	3
No. of Cases	17	169

There were 2 rejects in the top leaders column and 5 rejects in the other leaders column.

One of the reasons for this may lie in the social class of their fathers which is slightly higher than that of the fathers of other leaders. (Table 118)

Table 118. Social Class of Fathers of Top Leaders, and Other Leaders.
(percentages)

	Top	Others
Class 1	22	22
Class 2	28	17
Class 3 (non-manual)	11	10
Class 3 (manual)	28	26
Class 4	6	8
Class 5	6	4
NA/D.K	0	13
No. of Cases	18	174

There was one reject amongst the top leaders.

Associated with the high social class of the leaders is a late terminal age of education. (Table 119)

Table 119. Terminal Age of Education of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population. (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population
Under 11	0	0	0
11-14	47	34	58
15	0	3	21
16	6	13	12
17	0	7	3
18	47	43	6
No. of Cases	19	174	771

A leader is seven or eight times more likely to have had education past the age of 18 than the average member of the population. One interesting fact seems to be that top leaders fall quite distinctly into two more or less equal groups - those who had some kind of further education and those who left at or below the school leaving age. If in fact we look at the type of education the leaders received (Table 120) we can see that although a university education is clearly an advantage it is still possible for those with only elementary education to reach the top.

Compared to the population as a whole, leaders are more than twice as likely to own their own homes. (Table 121). It is also significant that there is quite a large council house element amongst the top leaders, no doubt due to the presence of several leading Labour Party politicians and trade unionists.

Table 120. Type of Terminal Education of Top Leaders, and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
Primary/Elementary	37	29
Secondary	11	5
Grammar	5	18
Public	0	9
university	47	29
Other higher education	0	10
No. of Cases	19	174

Table 121. Type of Dwelling of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population	
Own	68	78	33	
Hotel, etc.	0	x	x	
Council rent	21	14	36	
Private rent	5	6	22	
Other	5	2	9	
No. of Cases	19	174	771	x Less than 1%

An examination of organisational membership reveals quite clearly which organisations are important to local leaders. (Table 122)

Table 122. Organisational Memberships of Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population. (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population
Political Party	74	45	7
Trade Union	37	20	30
Rent & Ratepayer Association	0	3	5
Trade or Professional Organisation	42	40	8
Parent Teacher Association	0	2	3
Religious	10	25	36
None	11	20	22
No. of Cases	19	173	771

There was one reject in other leaders column.

The most obvious contrasts with the population as a whole are in membership of political parties and trade and professional organisations. What separates top leaders from other leaders appears to be membership of a political party or a trade union. Although it seems that top leaders are more

'organised' than other leaders it is perhaps somewhat surprising that there are some top leaders who claim no organisational memberships at all.

One fairly obvious way in which local leaders differ from the population as a whole is in their membership of local councils. (Table 123)

Table 123. Council Membership of Top and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
County Durham	0	3
Northumberland	21	11
Gateshead	5	5
Newcastle	21	5
South Shields	11	2
Tynemouth	5	2
Jarrow	0	2
Fallsend	0	3
Whitley Bay	0	2
Blaydon	0	1
Boldon	0	x
Felling	0	1
Gosforth	0	2
Hebburn	0	x
Longbenton	0	1
Newburn	0	2
Ryton	0	1
Whickham	0	x
Other	5	6
None	<u>32</u>	<u>50</u>
No. of Cases	<u>19</u>	<u>174</u>

x Less than 1%

(Figures for the population as a whole are not given because they would be negligible.) Comparing top leaders with other leaders we find that the former are more likely to be members of local councils ($\frac{2}{3}$ as compared with $\frac{1}{2}$). It appears that Newcastle and Northumberland are the councils to which top leaders ought to belong. As we might expect top leadership seems to be associated with length of service on a local council. (Table 124) It seems clear that seniority on a council is one way to break into the top decision-making circles.

Table 124. Length of Council Service of Top and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
0-5 years	8	21
6-10 years	23	21
11-15 years	8	12
16-20 years	15	12
Over 20 years	<u>46</u>	<u>34</u>
No. of Cases	<u>13</u>	<u>73</u>

The political complexion of leaders can be examined by looking at their electoral behaviour at both the national and the local level. In terms of voting at the 1966 General Election there was a very heavy bias towards the Labour Party amongst top leaders. (Table 125)

Table 125. Voting at last General Election of Top and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
Labour	75	48
Conservative	25	43
Liberal	0	3
Other	0	0
None	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>
No. of Cases	<u>16</u>	<u>151</u>

This is clearly a result of Labour's normal political dominance on Tyneside which recent events have not really shattered. Indeed despite the national swing to the Conservatives the commitment to Labour was even stronger when we look at future voting intentions. (Table 126)

Table 126. Intended Voting at next General Election by Top and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
Labour	75	46
Conservative	18	44
Liberal	0	3
Other	0	0
D.K.	7	3
None	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
No. of Cases	<u>16</u>	<u>151</u>

In terms of local elections the most noticeable feature is the marked propensity to vote or at least to have claimed to have voted amongst leaders. (Table 127)

Table 127. Voting at last Local Elections by Top Leaders, Other Leaders and Population. (percentages)

	Top	Other	Population
Labour	71	42	24
Conservative	18	26	18
Liberal	0	1	x
Independent	6	6	3
Progressive	0	2	1
Rent & Ratepayer	0	2	4
Other	0	0	x
None	6	21	50
No. of Cases	17	154	771

x Less than 1%

Once again we find a very strong bias towards the Labour Party which in no way reflects the declared voting patterns of the population as a whole.

Because our top leaders were defined in terms of their reputed involvement in issues, it is not surprising to find that they have been more involved than other leaders. This is especially true of the least public issues such as port re-organisation, the police, and shipbuilding. (Table 128)

Table 128. Claimed Involvement in Issues by Top and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
Local Government	95	62
Tunnel	26	21
Airport	58	25
Port of Tyne	47	18
Police	68	18
Shipbuilding	26	11
Passenger Transport	53	28
None	5	23
No. of Cases	19	174

If we look at the importance which the leaders attach to each of the issues we find that local government re-organisation is still given a clear priority. (Table 129)

Table 129. Importance of Issues to Top and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
Local Government	58	60
Tunnel	11	7
Airport	0	9
Port of Tyne	5	3
Police	0	x
Shipbuilding	5	15
Passenger Transport	0	0
D.K.	<u>26</u>	<u>11</u>
No. of Cases	<u>19</u>	<u>174</u>

However, top leaders appears to downgrade the importance of the shipbuilding re-organisation and the airport development. What is also perhaps noticeable is the reticence of the top leaders to specify what they considered to be the most important issue.

One final comparison that can be made between top and other leaders is to examine the type of leaders that they are. (Table 130)

Table 130. Type of Leader of Top and Other Leaders. (percentages)

	Top	Other
Economic Dominant	0	11
Union Leader	0	6
Public Official	16	16
Private Official	0	14
Social only leader	0	8
Decisional only leader	0	2
Politician	<u>84</u>	<u>43</u>
Reputational	89	0
London Influential	<u>37</u>	<u>0</u>
No. of Cases	<u>19</u>	<u>174</u>

All top leaders are either politicians or public officials, with the former being predominant. It is particularly noteworthy that no economic dominants are included, in marked contrast to most of the American studies. X

As we might expect all the top reputational leaders and London influentials were top leaders, but two top leaders were not named as general influentials and 12 were not named as London influentials.

x It may be of course that they were not uncovered or did not complete the questionnaire. Clearly in the shipbuilding issue most of the decisions were taken by businessmen.

PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONSCHAPTER NINETEENTHE POWER STRUCTURE OF TYNESIDE

One of the most noticeable features of much of the research that has taken place in the field of community power is that the methodology used has had an important, and often a decisive influence on the conclusions reached. It has been one of the purposes of this study to discover whether such a result is forthcoming in the British context by using elements of both the decisional and the reputational methods. We must, therefore, compare the results produced by the traditional study of the seven issues and the results produced by the survey of potential leaders. This can best be achieved by looking at each of the issues in turn.

Local Government Re-organisation.

The reform of local government on Tyneside was generally taken to be the most important of the issues under discussion and it produced the widest range of participation. In terms of personalities involved the two methods suggest the following lists:

Decisional

Crossman
Greenwood
Smith
Cunningham
Grey
Abrahart
Crawshaw
Newman
Collins
Harris
Burns
Egner
Young

Reputational

Smith
Crossman
Newman
Harris
Grey
Crawshaw
Greenwood
Mackley
Butterfield
Egner
Collins

As we can see the overlap is considerable. Both methods seem to have uncovered the chief participants and those individuals who appear on one list but not on the other are on the whole of minor importance on this particular issue.

But of course, as we have seen, one of the most important conclusions to emerge from this study is the extent to which individuals participate in decision-making because of their role position in the authority structure, and so we must bear in mind the relative importance attached to personal and non-personal influence in each of the decisions. In the case of local government re-organisation the data from the survey suggests that about equal importance was attached to the two sources. (51% of nominations were personal and 49% were non-personal). Of the non-personal nominations 39% were for local councils, 24% were for the Government, and 21% were for local officials. This would tend to bear out the evidence of the decisional approach although, of course, in the end it was the Government who made the all-important decision.

Tyne Tunnel

In terms of personalities involved in the building of the Tyne Tunnel the lists produced by the two methods were as follows:

Decisional

Dawson
Allenby
Gair
Coates
Garrow

Reputational

Dawson
Garrow
Smith
Goodwin
Cotton
Cunningham
Coates.

Although there is agreement about the role played by Dawson the degree of unanimity on the supporting actors is rather less than in the case of local government re-organisation. The importance of this, however, is lessened by the fact that when we look at the nominations for involvement in the issue we find that only 26% were for individuals while 74% were for institutions. Of these non-personal nominations 62% were for local councils, 21% were for the Government and 6% were for local officials. Again it would seem that this sort of relationship between the participants bears out the findings of the direct study of the issue.

Airport

The development of the airport was one of the most widely supported of the issues under discussion and it is interesting that there is considerable agreement on the major participants between the two methods. The lists were as follows:

<u>Decisional</u>	<u>Reputational</u>
Denyer	Cunningham
Smith	Smith
Cunningham	Russell
Russell	Denyer
Mould-Graham	
Sword	
Thornycroft	
Snow	

Those individuals included on the decisional list but not on the reputational list are either from an earlier generation or they played relatively minor parts. Apart from these there is in fact total agreement between the two methods on the major participants.

As far as nominations for involvement were concerned, 44% were for individuals and 56% for institutions. Of those for institutions 67% were for local councils, 14% for the Government and 6% for local officials. Once again these support the impression gained from the decisional study.

Port of Tyne

The establishment of the Port of Tyne Authority was, of course, one issue in which there was no clearly defined group of leading participants. We might, therefore, expect to find a rather more confused situation when we come to compare the leadership lists produced by the two methods. But, in fact, this expectation is not really borne out:

<u>Decisional</u>	<u>Reputational</u>
Rochdale	Burrell
Milbourne	Rochdale
Collins	Collins
Harding	Harding
Crawshaw	Crawshaw
Burrell	
Carrick	
Blackadder	

The only really major difference is that the reputational method tended to ignore the part played by representatives of the port users such as Carrick and Blackadder. This may, of course, be significant in so far as they will tend to work in a less public environment than the representatives of the local authorities.

But, of course, we should bear in mind that of the nominations for involvement in this issue only 33% were for individuals while 67% were for institutions. No one institution or group of institutions was thought to be predominant, with local councils receiving 29% of the nominations, the Government 25% and local officials 22%. This clearly seems to be a case, therefore, of individuals participating as representatives of institutions and it seemed to be basically a three-sided affair between the local councils, the Government and the port users.

Police Re-organisation

The degree to which the two methods support each other is once again evident in the case of the re-organisation of police areas. The lists produced by the two methods were as follows:

<u>Decisional</u>	<u>Reputational</u>
Jenkins	Cunningham
Petty	Jenkins
Barnett	Barnett
Cunningham	Petty
Muir	Muir
Cooksley	
Gale	

There was thus total agreement on the major participants.

As far as personal and non-personal nominations were concerned 35% were for individuals and 65% for institutions. The role of the Government was considered most important with 43% of the institutional nominations, with 37% for local councils, and 15% for local officials. As the decision to re-organise the police areas was taken by the Government this is not unexpected.

Shipbuilding Merger

As has been frequently pointed out, the merger of the shipbuilding interests on the Tyne was somewhat of an exceptional case but in terms of the validity of the two methods used it fits fairly well alongside the others. The lists were as follows:

<u>Decisional</u>	<u>Reputational</u>
Hunter	Hunter
Edwards	Ibison
Geddes	McGarvey
McGarvey	Geddes

The only difference between the lists, Ibison and Edwards, would tend to reinforce the view that in the opinion of Tyneside leaders the basic decisions were taken within the management structure of the industry, and thus more importance should be attached to Hunter's right-hand man than to one of the leaders of the trade union movement in the area.

The shipbuilding issue is, of course, the one where personalities were considered most important, largely due to the position of Hunter. 61% of the nominations for involvement were for individuals with only 39% for institutions. Of these nominations for institutions 48% were for industry, 21% for Government, and 16% for the unions.

Passenger Transport Authority

The issue of the passenger transport authority was notable for the low priority given to individuals and the small number of individuals nominated. This is evident when we compare the lists provided by the two methods:

<u>Decisional</u>	<u>Reputational</u>
Castle	Castle
Trotter	Trotter
Cunningham	Smith
Grey	
Taylor	
Forster	

Both methods, therefore, uncovered the two major participants but the role of the lesser participants was somewhat indeterminate. However, we should remember that only 27% of the nominations were for individuals with 71% going

to institutions. Of these non-personal nominations 39% were for the Government, 33% for local councils, and 13% for industry.

It would appear, therefore, that all the evidence points to a quite remarkable degree of unanimity between the results produced by the two alternative methods. In virtually every case the lists of participants produced are almost identical and although the two methods are not strictly compatible it seems as if the relative weights attached to various institutions are similar. However I think it is possible to argue that the reputational method does contribute something towards the overall picture. For example it gives some indication of the relative parts played by individuals and institutions. Furthermore it does help to confirm many of the impressions which can be obtained from the direct study of the issues. Although evidence from tables and diagrams is not conclusive proof of the validity of statements, when it is accompanied by documentary and oral evidence the case is substantially strengthened.

In some ways the comparison between the two methods which has been made so far does not get right to the heart of the methodological dispute between the decisionalists and the reputationalists. This is because the reputations for leadership that we have been concerned with were related to specific issues. It is, therefore, necessary to consider also the reputations for general influence accorded to particular individuals.

The basic evidence we are concerned with is included in Tables 49 and 50. If we rank individuals according to the nominations they received on both specific issues and for general influence we have the lists shown overleaf.

It is thus apparent that there is far less unanimity between the lists than was the case with the lists for the issue participants examined earlier. So, for example, only 7 individuals appear in the top 19 of the issue participants and the top 18 of the general influentials. This is, perhaps, slightly misleading because some individuals would appear twice if the lists were extended somewhat. So for example, Ridley had 5 issue nominations, Abrahart 4, Harris 5 and McGarvey 6.

In considering this situation earlier it was suggested that a typology of leaders could be devised based on nominations for issue involvement, general influence and London influence. It is possible to offer an alternative scheme of leadership by considering the lists below. Clearly we can argue that the 7 individuals who are included on both lists are the

<u>Issue Importance</u>	<u>General Project Influence.</u>
1. <u>Hunter</u>	1. <u>Smith</u>
2. <u>Smith</u>	2. <u>Grey</u>
3. <u>Cunningham</u>	3. <u>Hunter</u>
4. Dawson	4. Ridley
5. Castle	5. <u>Cunningham</u>
6. <u>Collins</u>	6. Short
7. Russell	7. <u>Newman</u>
8. <u>Trotter</u>	Abrahart
Crawshaw	Elliott
10. <u>Newman</u>	10. Rhodes
Crossman	Forster
Burrell	12. <u>Collins</u>
13. <u>Grey</u>	Harris
Ibison	Brown
15. Garrow	15. McGarvey
Mackley	<u>Trotter</u>
Egner	Ward
Rochdale	Garrett
Jenkins	

(Those underlined appear in both lists)

most important personalities in local politics on Tyneside. Therefore we can say that Smith, Hunter, Cunningham, Grey, Trotter, Newman and Collins are at the top of the power structure of Tyneside. Dawson, Castle, Russell, Crawshaw, Crossman, Burrell, Ibison, Garrow, Mackley, Egner, Rochdale, and Jenkins were important when particular issues were under discussion. Ridley, Short, Abrahart, Elliott, Rhodes, Forster, Harris, Brown, McGarvey, Ward and Garrett were considered to be important but at least on the issues considered they did not really live up to their reputations.

The list of individuals considered important in issues we have just looked at was, of course, based on the total of nominations. We can approach the subject a different way by simply listing those individuals who were considered important on at least one issue, irrespective of their total number of nominations. This then would produce the following lists:

Issue Importance

Smith
 Crossman
Newman
Farris
Grey
 Crawshaw
 Greenwood
 Mackley
 Butterfield
 Egnor
Collins
 Dawson
 Garrow
 Goodwin
 Cotton
Cunningham
 Coates
 Russell
 Denyer
 Burrell
 Rochdale
 Harding
 Jenkins
 Barnett
 Petty
 Muir
Hunter
 Ibison
McGarvey
 Geddes
 Castle
Trotter

General Project Influence

Smith
Grey
Hunter
 Ridley
Cunningham
 Short
Newman
 Abrahart
 Elliott
 Rhodes
 Forster
Collins
Harris
 Brown
McGarvey
Trotter
 Ward
 Garrett

This changes somewhat the allocation of individuals to different categories. We now have 9 most powerful leaders: the 7 mentioned earlier plus Harris and McGarvey. Into the decisional leaders group go Greenwood Butterfield, Goodwin, Cotton, Coates, Harding, Barnett, Petty, Muir and Geddes. Out of the general reputation category come Harris and McGarvey who have been transferred to the first category.

One final way of looking at the situation would be to combine the nominations for general project and London influence. This would give the following lists:

<u>Issue Importance</u>	<u>Combined Reputation Importance</u>
<u>Smith</u>	<u>Smith</u>
Crossman	<u>Hunter</u>
<u>Newman</u>	<u>Cunningham</u>
<u>Harris</u>	Short
<u>Grey</u>	<u>Grey</u>
Crawshaw	Ridley
Greenwood	Abrahamart
Mackley	Elliott
<u>Butterfield</u>	Rhodes
<u>Egner</u>	<u>McGarvey</u>
<u>Collins</u>	Forster
<u>Dawson</u>	Northumberland
<u>Garrow</u>	<u>Harris</u>
Goodwin	Brown
Cotton	Ward
<u>Cunningham</u>	<u>Newman</u>
Coates	Garrett
<u>Russell</u>	<u>Collins</u>
Denyer	<u>Trotter</u>
Burrell	<u>Dawson</u>
Rochdale	<u>Garrow</u>
Harding	<u>Russell</u>
Jenkins	<u>Butterfield</u>
Barnett	
Petty	
Muir	
<u>Hunter</u>	
Ibison	
<u>McGarvey</u>	
Geddes	
Castle	
<u>Trotter</u>	

To the most powerful category of 9, therefore, we should add Dawson, Garrow, Russell and Butterfield and deduct them from the decisional importance category. Also to the general reputation list category we should add Northumberland.

We thus have these alternative ways of describing the power structure of Tyneside. Overall, however, I think it is possible to argue that the most powerful individuals were Smith, Hunter, Cunningham, Grey, Collins, and Newman with Trotter, Harris, McGarvey, Dawson, Garrow, Russell, and Butterfield as a kind of outer inner circle. Then we have a group of individuals whose importance lies in the contributions they made to particular issues. This group is made up of Crossman, Crawshaw, Greenwood, Mackley, Egner, Goodwin, Cotton, Coates, Denyer, Burrell, Rochdale, Harding, Jenkins, Barnett, Petty, Muir, Ibison, Geddes, and Castle. Finally we have a group of what we might almost call symbolic leaders - those who have a reputation for leadership but have not manifested it to any great extent in the issues discussed. This group includes Short, Ridley, Abrahart, Elliott, Rhodes, Forster, Northumberland, Brown, Ward, and Garrett.

Now an important question that must be asked is whether these groups contain particular types of leaders. If we look at the most powerful group we find that it comprises the chairman of the regional economic planning council who was a former leader of Newcastle City Council, the area's leading industrialist, a former chairman of Durham County Council who is also a leading local trade unionist, the present leader of Newcastle City Council, the leader of Gateshead City Council, and a man who was South Shields' representative in many of the issues under discussion. Clearly, therefore, it seems that a man's position in the power structure of Tyneside is largely dependent on his position in his local council. Those individuals concerned with particular decisions tend to be central government ministers, chairmen of relevant local council committees, relevant local officials, or experts. The latent general influentials include 6 MPs, an individual who had just become leader of Northumberland County Council and, therefore, had not really had a chance to make his mark, the leader of the opposition on Newcastle City Council, an important local industrialist, and the most high-ranking local peer of the realm.

To summarise the power structure of Tyneside we can look at several dichotomous variables. Firstly there is the dichotomy between personal and institutional importance. There was considerable variation in the relative weight attached to these in each of the issues. It seems to be the case that whenever one or more of the most powerful group are closely concerned with the issues then it is seen in less institutional terms.

So, for example, local government re-organisation saw the participation of Smith, Grey, Newman and Collins, and the airport Smith and Cunningham, and shipbuilding Hunter. On the other hand the issues seen mostly in institutional terms were those where the leading participants tended to be confined to that issue, e.g. the port, the police, the passenger transport authority. We should always bear in mind, however, that even the personal involvements are almost entirely on the basis of representation of institutions, be they local councils or central departments. Indeed this seems to be one of the most noticeable conclusions of the whole study; the extent to which, even in a non-institutionalised decision-making arena, participation is through institutional channels. The only doubts which do arise are centred around the activities of Smith and Cunningham both of whom seemed to have built up around them a small, informal group of advisers who tended to work outside and across normal institutional frameworks. Indeed it is possible to argue that the group around Smith was responsible for a good deal of generalised thinking about the role of Tyneside and the north east region which was particularised in certain of the issues considered. In the end, however, the decisions had to be made by visible, formal organisations.

This leads on to the second dichotomy concerned with the way in which decisions were made. Basically two processes were involved: on the one hand the establishment of a joint committee of interested parties, sometimes local authorities, sometimes outside interests, which led to some form of agreement; and on the other hand a process of negotiation, disagreement and eventual imposition of a settlement by central government. One would assume that if there had been a single local authority for the whole of Tyneside in most cases this disagreement would have been confined within the walls of the council chamber and so the chances of government intervention would have been less. This is not to say that government concern would have been eliminated. In a number of the issues, even if the local authorities had agreed, there would still have been a role for the government to play in the financing of the operation. This is something which reform of the local government structure will not remove.

A third and final dichotomy is between what can be called single- and multi-issue participants. I think on the whole it is fair to say that the norm is for participants to be involved in a single issue because of their specialised role in that field, be it on a council committee, employment in a particular industry, or employment in a particular local government department. What we then have to explain is why certain individuals become involved in

more than one issue area. Probably the simplest reason is that the individual's institutional role is diverse. Therefore we would expect the leader of a council, the chairman of the finance committee, the chairman of a local political party, or the town clerk to be involved across the board, irrespective of the nature of the particular issue under discussion. In some senses, therefore, the evidence of this study would tend to follow Dahl's findings that no unified power structure exists but that on each issue a new coalition of leaders is created.

The introductory discussion on theories and concepts highlighted the present confusion that exists in defining such terms as power, influence, leadership and participation. Has this study of Tyneside any contribution to make to the solution of this problem? Power was earlier defined as 'a function of social interaction which is structured within an institutional framework and which involves, when necessary, changing the behaviour patterns of some or all the individuals within that framework with respect to the values of the persons exercising the power.' This clearly indicates that we are not simply concerned with who exercises power, but also over whom the power is exercised and in what context. From this definition it is possible to go on and argue that the study of decision-making in the political arena should be based on a number of considerations. To begin with we must recognise that all decision-making takes place within the context of values and beliefs which may determine not only who participates in the decision-making process but also what issues come up for consideration. It may be the case that those individuals in leadership positions can screen out certain contentious issues or it may be that there is some element of value consensus in the community about what issues are, and what are not, relevant for political discussion. If this is accepted it can be argued that the issues which are important and ought to be studied are those which threaten changes in the political values of the community. The difficulty with this argument, however, is that it may involve making some kind of value judgement as to whether or not change is threatened. It frequently appears to be the case that an issue which is seen as highly disruptive by one section of the community is virtually ignored by another.

This raises one of the fundamental difficulties in the study of community decision-making in Britain. To what extent is it possible for a decision made in the local community to affect the value system within which that community operates? Just as local authorities are more or less trapped within a national legal and administrative framework, so it would appear that local communities are more or less trapped within a national cultural framework.

If we look at the issues discussed in this study we find that most of them were examples of what in fact has happened in other parts of the country. If we had to isolate the one characteristic which united them all it would probably be that they were concerned in some way or another with the maintenance of the status quo. They were virtually all concerned with modernising political and administrative arrangements with a view to making them more efficient in the performance of their functions. It is perhaps significant that this was an attitude which had widespread support in Britain throughout the 1960's.

In the final analysis therefore, it could be argued that none of the issues discussed were 'important' in the sense mentioned above. There were very few instances of demands being made for changes which would radically have affected either the personnel of the power structure or the values within which they operate. So for example, the shipbuilding merger was allowed to proceed with virtually no demands being made for worker control or even greater worker participation. The contestants in the local government re-organisation issue were more concerned with seeing that their interests were safeguarded than with attempting to bring about a radical redistribution of power from central to local government.


One of the most frequently cited reasons for the existence of local government in Britain is that it provides a means whereby the average citizen can participate in the political process. The evidence from this study suggests that this is an over-optimistic view. Perhaps one of the most noticeable features of the examination of the issues was the almost complete absence of any mention of the role of the public in decision-making. In very few cases were any of the issues ever put before the public in elections and even then the voice of the public was indiscernible. Where attempts were made to involve the public, e.g. by holding public inquiries, the response was negligible. It may be possible to justify this situation if decisions were effectively made by the elected representatives of the people. But in many cases this did not appear to be the case either. As we have seen the role played by local government officials and representatives of central government was crucial in many instances. Moreover we should remember that even when decisions were made by local councils the chief participants either owed their position to the votes of perhaps 15% or 20% of their electors or they were aldermen who had only very tenuous connections with the electorate.

Therefore to call the power structure of Tyneside pluralist would probably involve stretching definitions too far. But to call it elitist is also probably misleading. The people may not participate to any great extent but there is no evidence of any tightly-knit group of individuals with similar beliefs and values who effectively run things. Although Tyneside leaders are not really representative of the people they lead, they are not totally remote from them. We have in effect a system of pluralist elites operating within the context of what might be called guided democracy.



A P P E N D I X 1

M A P S

- A Newcastle Airport
- C Cramlington New Town
- G Gosforth
- H Hebburn
- J Jarrow
- K Killingworth New Town
- P White Mare Pool
- U Usworth Airport
- W Washington
- WB Whitley Bay
- ⋈ Tyne Tunnel
- || Lowest Bridging Point




General Map of Tyneside and the Issues




- 1.0 +
- 0.5 - 1.0
- 0.3 - 0.5
- 0.2 - 0.3
- 0.1 - 0.2
- 0.0 - 0.1

Number of All Leaders Resident in Each Area per 1000 of the Population


◦ ◦ Outside
◦ Project Area



Residence of London Influentials




Residence of Reputational Leaders




Residence of Economic Dominants

•• Outside Project Area




Residence of Trade Unionists



Residence of Public Officials




Outside
Project Area



Residence of Private Officials




Outside
Project Area




Residence of Social Leaders

□ Outside
Project Area



Residence of Decisional Only Leaders



Residence of Politicians

A P P E N D I X 2

THE LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIALTYNESIDE RESEARCH PROJECTLEADERSHIP SURVEYNotes for Guidance

- (a) Please answer all questions which apply to you.
- (b) Some of the questions merely require a tick in the appropriate box. Some require one word answers. Some require a few sentences.
- (c) If there is not enough room for answers in the space provided, please use the back of the sheet, clearly indicating to which question you are referring.
- (d) Please leave Question 1 blank.

1. FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

S.

I.

S.I.

S.D.

I.D.

S.I.D.

2. Name

3. Sex

4. Date of Birth

5. Place of Birth

6. Present Address

7. Marital Status

8. (a) Are you self-employed? Yes..... No.....

(b) If self-employed, please give details of your work.

(c) If not self-employed, what is your occupation and who is your employer?

(Please give full details, i.e. not simply "clerk", "businessman," "engineer", etc.)

(d) If you are a married woman (or a widow), what is (or was) your husband's occupation?

(e) If you are not employed, what was your last occupation?

16. If 'Yes' to Q.15

How long have you been a member?

(If your membership has not been continuous, only give the total period of membership and do not count the intervening periods.)

17. If 'No' to Q.15

Have you ever been a member of a local Council? Please indicate which:

(If not, please leave blank)

Durham County Council

Northumberland County Council

Gateshead Borough Council

Newcastle City Council

South Shields Borough Council

Tynemouth Borough Council

Jarrow Borough Council

Wallsend Borough Council

Whitley Bay Borough Council

Blaydon Urban District Council

Boldon Urban District Council

Felling Urban District Council

Gosforth Urban District Council

Hebburn Urban District Council

Longbenton Urban District Council

Newburn Urban District Council

Ryton Urban District Council

Whickham Urban District Council

Other (Please specify)

18. Are you a member of any organisations which take an active interest in public affairs, at national or local level?

If you are, please state which: if not, please write NONE

19. If 'Yes to Q.18

Do you hold any offices in any of these organisations?

If you do, please state which: if not, please write NONE

20. If 'Yes' to Q.18.

How and why did you come to join each of these organisations?

21. Are you a member of any other organisations?

If you are, please state which: if not, please write NONE.

22. If 'Yes' to Q.21

Do you hold any offices in any of these organisations?

If you do, please state which: if not, please write NONE

23. The following issues have all faced Tyneside in recent years.
 Could you say in which of them you were actively concerned,
 regardless of whether you were in favour of them or not?
 The re-organisation of local government areas
 The building of the Tyne Tunnel
 The development of the airport at Woolsingham
 The establishment of the new Port of Tyne Authority.
 The re-organisation of police areas.
 The merger of shipbuilding interests on the Tyne.
 The proposal for a Tyneside Passenger Transport Authority
24. Regardless of whether you were involved or not, could you say which
 of these issues you think was the most important?
25. Do you think that there were other issues on Tyneside that were more
 important? If so, please list them.
26. What do you feel about the decisions reached in the following issues?
 The re-organisation of local government areas.
 The building of the Tyne Tunnel
 The development of the airport at Woolsingham
 The establishment of the new Port of Tyne Authority
 The re-organisation of police areas.
 The merger of ship-building interests on the Tyne.
 The proposal for a Tyneside Passenger Transport Authority
27. If 'Yes' to Q.23
 Can you remember, in each case, how you became involved, e.g. how did
 the issue come to your notice, what made you take an active part,
 etc.?
28. If 'Yes' to Q.23
 What part did you play in each of these issues?
29. Who would you say were the chief people involved in each of these issues?
- | Issue | Chief People Involved |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Local government re-organisation | |
| Tyne Tunnel | |
| Airport | |
| Port of Tyne Authority | |
| Police re-organisation | |
| Shipbuilding merger | |
| Passenger Transport Authority | |

30. Suppose an important project came up on Tyneside. Who do you think would be the people who would have to support it in order for it to have a chance of being accepted?
31. Do you think the Government and Whitehall are concerned about the problems of Tyneside?
32. Which people on Tyneside do you think have most influence with the Government and Whitehall?
33. Taking the people you have named in Questions 30 and 32, could you say how well you know each of them? (Please tick appropriate column).
- | Name of Person | Know by name only | Know professionally, officially, etc. | Know Socially | Know very well, i.e. invite to house | Related |
|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|---------|
|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------|---------|
34. Do you prefer to deal with the Newcastle regional offices of such departments as the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, or would you rather go straight to Whitehall?
35. For which party did you vote in the last General Election?
(If you did not vote, write NONE)
36. If a General Election were to be held tomorrow, for which party would you vote? (If you would not vote, write NONE)
37. For which party did you vote in the last local government elections?
(If you did not vote, write NONE).

A P P E N D I X 3

L I S T O F P O T E N T I A L L E A D E R S

The following is the complete list of those people who completed the leadership questionnaire together with some indication of why they were originally selected as potential leaders.

1. Wilson W. Secretary, Newcastle City Labour Party.
2. Rotherford A.W. Chairman, Castle Ward R.D.C., which adjoins Newcastle to the north west.
3. Florence A.J. South Shields councillor
4. Elliott V.H. Durham County councillor, Blaydon district
5. Blenkinsop A. MP for South Shields
6. Foster J.R. Durham County councillor, Felling District
7. Gale F.S. Chief Constable, Newcastle
8. Harris W.F. Principal City Officer and Clerk, Newcastle
9. Lesser B Social leader
10. Peel T.W. South Shields alderman
11. Steel C.G. Financial Secretary, Newcastle and District Trades Council
12. Evers R. Labour Party regional organiser
13. Dargavel R.W. Regional Officer, National Union of Teachers.
14. Murray, N.W. Northumberland County councillor, Whitley Bay district
15. Robinson D.M. Chairman, Stag Line Ltd.
16. Smith N.S. Leader, Progressive Group, South Shields Council
17. Todd E.P. Social Leader
18. Brown R.C. MP for Newcastle West
19. Burns W. Former Chief Planning Officer, Newcastle
20. Brown E.C. Representative of Tyne Pilotage Authority in negotiations on the future of the port.
21. Edwards F.J. Managing Director, Thermal Syndicate Ltd.
22. Dargon T. Vice-President, Newcastle and District Trades Council
23. Gillespie R.M. Editor, Shields Weekly News.
24. Bradshaw D.T. Chief Engineer, Newcastle.
25. Dalgliesh P. Shipowner representative on Tyne Improvement Commission.
26. Brown G. Social leader and prominent Conservative.
27. Craster J. Social leader.
28. Branson H.I. Social leader.
29. Baird R.B. Social leader and Conservative parliamentary candidate.
30. Barnett C.M. Divisional Officer, National Union of Public Employees.

31. Butterfield F. Former leader, Labour Group, Newcastle.
32. Clough R. Managing Director, Newcastle Evening Chronicle.
33. Blackett, J.H.B. Northumberland County councillor
34. Barnett R.A. Chairman, Northumberland Police Committee.
35. Bosanquet C.I.C. Vice-Chancellor, Newcastle University.
36. Burton J.F. Former Lord Mayor of Newcastle.
37. Edwards D.F. President, Newcastle and District Trades Council
and Secretary of the Confederation of
Shipbuilding and Engineering Workers.
38. Laws F.M. Chairman, Finance Committee, Whitley Bay Council.
39. Connell T. Secretary, Labour Group, Wallsend Council.
40. Lewcock C.M. Newcastle councillor
41. Pickup S. Chairman, Finance Committee, Northumberland C.C.
42. Price D.P. Social leader.
43. Allenby H. Manager, Tyne Tunnel.
44. Young B.N. Gateshead alderman
45. Hunting L.C. Local businessman with interests in shipping and
air transport.
46. Wolters C.C. Provost of Newcastle.
47. Luxton H. Gateshead councillor
48. Kay A.W. Chairman, Newcastle Regional Hospital Board.
49. New P.J. Durham County councillor, Whitburn district.
50. Keenleyside A. Durham County councillor, Ryton.
51. Pattison F. Gateshead alderman.
52. Cooper M.K.L. Durham County councillor.
53. Davison A.A. Newcastle councillor.
54. Garrow N. Chairman, Northumberland C.C.
55. Harding E. Newcastle councillor.
56. Fenwick R. Chairman, Hebburn U.D.C.
57. Abraham B.W. Leader, Labour Group, Newcastle council
58. Barrett S.G. Managing Director, Newcastle and Gateshead Water Co.
59. Dobson E.B. Editor, Newcastle Journal.
60. Lye J.J. Secretary, Blaydon Labour Party.
61. Bamber A. Leader, Conservative Group, Whitley Bay council.
62. Robinson, N.J. Vice-President, Tyneside Chamber of Commerce.
63. McCormack D.F. Secretary, Wallsend Labour Party.
64. Cummings M.B. Northumberland County councillor.
65. Reid W. Chairman, Northumberland and Durham district,
National Coal Board.
66. Mullens H. Chairman, Reyrolle & Co. Ltd.

- | | |
|------------------------|--|
| 67. Keys E.N. | Decisional leader. |
| 68. Ridley, Viscount | Leader, Moderate Group, Northumberland C.C. |
| 69. Collins W. | Chairman, Finance Committee, Gateshead Council |
| 70. Ellerington R. | Principal Regional Officer, Ministry of Health. |
| 71. Davies C.J. | Decisional leader. |
| 72. Clark J. | Chairman, Newcastle and Gateshead Water Co. |
| 73. Dunford R.H. | Vice-President, Tyneside Chamber of Commerce. |
| 74. Festing F. | Social leader. |
| 75. Rhodes G. | MP for Newcastle East. |
| 76. Henderson A. | Gateshead alderman |
| 77. Waite E. | President, National Guild of Co-operators. |
| 78. Ferneyhough E. | MP for Jarrow. |
| 79. Muir A.A. | Chief Constable, Durham County. |
| 80. Lomas J. | Deputy clerk, Durham C.C. |
| 81. Robson D. | Durham County councillor, Blaydon district. |
| 82. Weeks W.G.R. | Newcastle councillor |
| 83. Westwood, Lord | Social leader. |
| 84. Michelson J.B. | Chairman, Gosforth U.D.C. |
| 85. Davidson G.H. | Northumberland County councillor. |
| 86. Lipman C | Newcastle councillor |
| 87. Martindale C.W. | Social leader. |
| 88. Galpin B.W. | Northumberland County councillor. |
| 89. Taylor E.G. | Chairman, Finance Committee, Longbenton. |
| 90. Russell T.S. | Former Lord Mayor of Newcastle. |
| 91. McKee J. | Vice-Chairman, Northern Area Conservative Council. |
| 92. Shackleton W.H.F. | Former Northumberland County councillor. |
| 93. Scott-Batey R.W.J. | Chairman, Newcastle City Labour Party. |
| 94. Patterson A. | Whitley Bay councillor. |
| 95. Bilcliffe F. | Chairman, Blaydon U.D.C. |
| 96. Harrison G. | Clerk to Longbenton Council |
| 97. Slattery M.S. | Chairman, Hawthorn Leslie Ltd. |
| 98. Ogilvie D.G. | Managing Director, Hawthorn Leslie Ltd. |
| 99. Dixon D. | Chairman, Finance Committee, Jarrow. |
| 100. Clark J.A. | South Shields alderman. |
| 101. Nixon L. | Gateshead councillor. |
| 102. Harrison G. | Leader, Labour group, Newburn Council. |
| 103. Crawshaw T.W. | South Shields alderman. |
| 104. Jenner A. | Decisional leader. |
| 105. Gladstone W.C. | Northumberland County councillor. |

106. Dawson R.H. Medical Officer of Health, Tynemouth.
107. Sylph A.S. Mayor of Tynemouth.
108. Doyle L. Transport and General Workers Union local official.
109. Fenwick J.F.T. Chairman, Fenwicks Ltd.
110. Wardle, G.R. Northumberland County councillor.
111. Dawson D. Northumberland County alderman
112. Baptist R.N. Leader, Labour group, Gateshead Council.
113. Moore B.G.R. Chief Education Officer, Wallsend.
114. Prudham T.P.S. Leader, Labour group, Felling Council.
115. Burns J. Chairman, Northern Gas Board.
116. Graham N. Clerk to Blaydon Council.
117. Hogg, R.G. Northumberland County councillor.
118. Pugh E.T. Chairman, Co-operative Party.
119. Gair C.W. Decisional leader.
120. Newman A.L. South Shields alderman.
121. Steel J. Chairman, Washington Development Corporation.
122. Morton L.T. Managing Director, Clarke Chapman & Co. Ltd.,
123. Mallett A. Leader, Labour Group, Whickham Council.
124. Hopper W. Mayor of Wallsend.
125. Ashdown H.E. Bishop of Newcastle.
126. Campbell A.M. Secretary, Labour Group, Jarrow Council.
127. Stewart R. Chief Engineer, Jarrow.
128. Larrow, C.D. Newcastle councillor.
129. Stokes, F.A. Chief Education Officer, Gateshead.
130. Pears J.R. Chairman, Finance Committee, Boldon.
131. Hay, A.W. Medical Officer of Health, Whitley Bay.
132. Towers G.H.R. Executive Director, Swan Hunter and Tyne Shipbuilders Ltd.
133. Pearson R.C.M. Medical Officer of Health, Newcastle.
134. Stephens P.N.S. Editor, Newcastle Evening Chronicle.
135. Heppell J.G.M. Northumberland County councillor.
136. Finniston H.M. Managing Director, International Research and Development Co. Ltd.
137. Watson F.S. Clerk to Whitley Bay Council.
138. Sinton J. Editor, Shields Gazette.
139. Chapman S. Northumberland County councillor.
140. Sisterson H.M. Social leader.
141. Walton J.R. Managing Director, Isaac Walton Ltd.
142. Chapman R. Social leader.
143. Rush J. Social leader.
144. Howie E.G. Social leader.

145. Mellowes C.L. Chief Education Officer, Northumberland.
146. Grey A. Leader, Conservative group, Newcastle Council.
147. Coker J.A. Divisional Officer, U.S.D.A.W.
148. Weir H.C. Medical Officer of Health, Jarrow.
149. Turnbull F.L. Managing Director, Armstrong Whitworth.
150. Curran K.R. Tynemouth councillor.
151. Robson N. Chairman, Finance Committee, Gosforth.
152. Hadwin R. Lord Mayor of Newcastle.
153. Hurley C.W. Clerk to Northumberland Council.
154. Hallett, J.A. Chief Constable, Gateshead.
155. Galbraith A. Chairman, Gateshead Hospital Management Committee.
156. Garrett E. MP for Wallsend.
157. Brockbank J. Clerk to Durham C.C.
158. Metcalfe G.H. Chief Education Officer, Durham C.C.
159. Evans R. Leader, Independent group, Jarrow Council.
160. Slater J.H. District Secretary, National Union of Seamen.
161. Charlton R.M. Northumberland County councillor.
162. Irving H. Managing Director, Gateshead Post.
163. Elder T.G.W. Treasurer, Northumberland Area, N.U.M.
164. Bamford T.A. Secretary, Jarrow Labour Party.
165. Squires G. Chief Education Officer, Newcastle.
166. Percy A. Northumberland County councillor.
167. Petty J.W.N. Newcastle councillor.
168. Jewitt A.E. Leader, Rent and Ratepayers group, Gateshead Council.
169. Peile G.H. Northumberland County councillor.
170. Matheson T. Northumberland County councillor.
171. Mayo J. Chairman, Finance Committee, Tynemouth.
172. Tilley J.B. Medical Officer of Health, Northumberland.
173. Middlewood J.R.S. Chairman Durham C.C.
174. Turnbull A.V. Mayor of Gateshead.
175. Turner E. Social leader.
176. Chute P. Chairman, Finance Committee, Wallsend.
177. Black T. Northumberland County councillor.
178. Sutton M.E. South Shields alderman.
179. Etherington J.T. Gateshead alderman
180. Blackhall D. Editor, Whitley Bay Guardian.
181. Reed W.M. Chief Executive Officer, Newcastle Co-operative Society.
182. Doyle F.F. Transport and General Workers Union Official.
183. Gray J. Northumberland County alderman.
184. Riley D.F. Durham County alderman

185. Harding W. Chairman, Finance Committee, Newcastle.
186. Bloomfield M.W. Secretary, Tyneside Liberal Council.
187. Mackley E.W. Leader, Labour group, South Shields Council.
188. Straker-Smith W. Vice-Chairman, Swan Hunter Group Ltd.
189. Dodsworth D. Northumberland County councillor.
190. Blackett D. Social leader.
191. Cowans S. Chairman, Ryton U.D.C.
192. Russell H. Newcastle alderman
193. Vert R. Secretary, North East Coast Engineering Employers Association.

A P P E N D I X 4

ELECTION RESULTS.

GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS ON TYNESIDENEWCASTLE (CENTRAL)

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	25,190	63.7	L. Wilkes	79.6%
	Con	13,567	34.3	11,623	
	I.L.P.	812	2.1	29.4	
1951	Lab	25,637	64.0	E.W. Short	80.9%
	Con	13,325	33.3	12,312	
	I.L.P.	1,066	2.7	30.8	
Boundary revisions					
1955	Lab	26,102	66.6	E.W. Short	70.9%
	Con	13,079	33.4	13,003 33.2	
1959	Lab	24,051	65.8	E.W. Short	73.2%
	Con	12,485	34.2	11,566 31.7	
1964	Lab	20,547	70.9	E.W. Short	69.1%
	Con	7,896	27.2	12,651	
	Comm.	532	1.9	43.7	
1966	Lab	19,291	76.6	E.W. Short	65.9%
	Con	5,474	21.7	13,817	
	Comm	404	1.7	54.9	
1970	Lab	13,671	70.6	E.W. Short	61.2%
	Con	4,256	22.0	9,415	
	Lib	1,433	7.4	48.6	

NEWCASTLE (NORTH)

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Con	25,325	53.7	Sir C. Headlam	83.7%
	Lab	16,860	35.9	8,465	
	Lib	4,839	10.3	18.0	
1951	Con	23,930	51.1	G. Lloyd-George	84.6%
	Lab	17,005	36.3	6,925	
	Ind. Con	5,904	12.6	14.8	
1955	Con	25,236	63.8	G. Lloyd-George	77.6%
	Lab	14,303	36.2	10,933 27.7	
1957 (Bye- Elect).	Con	19,017	60.2	R.W. Elliott	64.1%
	Lab	12,555	39.8	6,462 20.5	
1959	Con	24,588	64.9	R.W. Elliott	79.1%
	Lab	13,316	35.1	11,272 29.7	
1964	Con	19,502	61.0	R.W. Elliott	75.7%
	Lab	12,515	39.0	6,987 21.8	
1966	Con	15,243	49.7	R.W. Elliott	75.0%
	Lab	12,550	40.7	2,693	
	Lib	2,902	9.6	8.8	
1970	Con	15,978	56.1	R.W. Elliott	67.4%
	Lab	12,518	43.9	3,460 12.2	

NEWCASTLE (EAST)

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Con	18,866	39.3	A. Blenkinsop	85.6%
	Lab	24,694	51.4	5,828	
	Lib	4,446	9.3	12.1	
1951	Con	22,850	47.1	A. Blenkinsop	86.6%
	Lab	25,621	52.9	2,771 5.7	
1955	Con	20,994	47.9	A. Blenkinsop	81.3%
	Lab	22,816	52.1	1,822 4.2	
1959 *	Con	21,457	50.1	W.F. Montgomery	84.6%
	Lab	21,359	49.9	98 0.2	
1964 *	Con	19,556	48.0	G.W. Rhodes	83.4%
	Lab	21,200	52.0	1,644 4.0%	
1966	Lab	22,408	59.8	G.W. Rhodes	80.5%
	Con	15,082	40.2	7,326 19.5	
1970	Lab	20,780	58.3	G.W. Rhodes	75.2
	Con	14,832	41.7	5,948 18.0	

* Seat changed hands

NEWCASTLE (WEST)

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	31,230	58.2	E. Popplewell	87.2%
	Con	21,949	40.9	9,281	
	Comm	492	0.9	17.3	
1951	Lab	31,765	57.9	E. Popplewell	87.2%
	Con	23,081	42.1	8,684	
				15.8	
Boundary revision					
1955	Lab	25,401	55.7	E. Popplewell	79.8%
	Con	20,217	44.3	5,184	
				11.4	
1959	Lab	28,956	54.7	E. Popplewell	82.0%
	Con	23,933	45.3	5,023	
				9.5	
1964	Lab	29,603	58.3	E. Popplewell	79.4%
	Con	21,149	41.7	8454	
				16.6	
1966	Lab	30,219	62.7	R.C. Brown	75.8%
	Con	18,002	37.3	12,217	
				24.8	
1970	Lab	30,805	58.9	R.C. Brown	70.1%
	Con	21,644	41.1	9,161	
				17.5	

GATESHEAD (EAST)

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	15,249	45.1	A.S. Moody	85.8%
	Con	13,530	40.1	1,719	
	Ind.Lab	5,001	14.8	5.1	
1951	Lab	19,525	57.6	A.S. Moody	85.7%
	Con	14,344	42.4	5,181	
				15.3	
Boundary revision					
1955	Lab	21,653	56.4	A.S. Moody	78.8%
	Con	16,706	43.6	4,947	
				12.9	
1959	Lab	25,319	58.9	A.S. Moody	81.6%
	Con	17,654	41.1	7,665	
				17.8	
1964	Lab	26,633	64.5	B. Conlan	79.9%
	Con	14,654	35.5	11,979	
				29.0	
1966	Lab	27,628	69.6	B. Conlan	75.7%
	Con	12,084	30.4	15,544	
				19.1	
1970	Lab	28,524	64.8	B. Conlan	70.2%
	Con	15,489	35.2	13,035	
				29.6	

GATESHEAD (WEST)

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	20,872	64.2	J.T. Hall	83.7%
	Con	11,660	35.8	9,212 28.3	
1951	Lab	20,770	63.8	J.T. Hall	83.8%
	Con	11,811	36.2	8,979 27.5	
Boundary revision					
1955	Lab	22,040	65.3	J.T. Hall	72.4%
	Con	11,709	34.7	10,331 30.6	
1955 (Bye- Elect.)	Lab	13,196	66.5	H.E. Randall	42.3%
	Con	6,661	33.5	6,535 32.9	
1959	Lab	21,277	64.9	H.E. Randall	76.7%
	Con	11,509	35.1	9,768 29.8	
1964	Lab	21,390	69.0	H.E. Randall	74.7%
	Con	9,623	31.0	11,767 38.0	
1966	Lab	20,381	74.8	H.E. Randall	70.1%
	Con	6,878	25.2	13,503 49.5	
1970	Lab	15,622	68.1	J. Horan	66.3%
	Con	7,328	31.9	8,294 36.1	

SOUTH SHIELDS

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	33,452	56.5	J.C. Ede	81.7%
	Con	15,897	26.8	17,555	
	Lib	9,446	15.9	29.6	
	Comm	415	0.7		
1951	Lab	33,633	56.0	J.C. Ede	80.6%
	Con	20,208	33.6	13,425	
	Lib	6,270	10.4	22.4	
1955	Lab	31,734	59.6	J.C. Ede	71.6%
	Con	21,482	40.4	10,252 19.3	
1959	Lab	32,577	57.9	J.C. Ede	74.4%
	Con	23,638	42.1	8,939 15.9	
1964	Lab	29,694	55.1	A. Blenkinsop	74.1%
	Con	16,344	30.3	13,350	
	Lib	7,837	14.6	24.8	
1966	Lab	31,829	64.7	A. Blenkinsop	68.5%
	Con	17,340	35.3	14,489 29.5	
1970	Lab	30,191	60.2	A. Blenkinsop	66.4%
	Con	19,960	39.8	10,231 20.4	

TYNEMOUTH

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Con	28,785	49.3	I. Ward	84.0%
	Lab	23,148	39.6	5,637	
	Lib	6,452	11.1	9.7	
1951	Con	33,800	56.4	I. Ward	84.5%
	Lab	26,144	43.6	7,656	
				12.8	
1955	Con	30,949	55.1	I. Ward	79.3%
	Lab	20,113	35.8	10,836	
	Lib	5,092	9.1	19.3	
1959	Con	32,810	56.4	I. Ward	80.5%
	Lab	18,866	32.4	13,944	
	Lib	6,525	11.2	24.0	
1964	Con	33,342	56.3	I. Ward	79.0%
	Lab	25,894	43.7	7,448	
				12.6	
1966	Con	29,210	49.6	I. Ward	78.4%
	Lab	25,814	43.8	3,396	
	Lib	3,846	6.6	5.8	
1970	Con	30,773	51.4	I. Ward	75.2%
	Lab	23,927	39.9	6,846	
	Lib	5,221	8.7	11.4	

WALLSEND

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	33,790	56.3	J. McKay	87.5%
	Con	21,643	36.1	12,147	
	Lib	4,532	7.6	20.3	
1951	Lab	35,578	58.7	J. McKay	87.2%
	Con	25,099	41.3	10,579	
				17.4	
1955	Lab	34,625	57.8	J. McKay	81.0%
	Con	25,275	42.2	9,350	
				15.6	
1959	Lab	37,862	56.5	J. McKay	83.5%
	Con	29,096	43.5	8,766	
				13.1	
1964	Lab	39,841	60.4	W.E. Garrett	81.5%
	Con	26,096	39.6	13,745	
				20.8	
1966	Lab	39,744	65.2	W.E. Garrett	77.5%
	Con	21,205	34.8	18,539	
				30.4	
1970	Lab	39,065	61.3	W.E. Garrett	73.6%
	Con	24,650	38.7	14,415	
				22.6	

JARRON

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	33,751	63.0	E. Fernyhough	82.8%
	Con	16,895	31.5	16,806	
	Lib	2,940	5.5	31.5	
1951	Lab	35,963	65.2	E. Fernyhough	84.6%
	Con	19,217	34.8	18,747	
				30.3	
Boundary revision					
1955	Lab	24,706	63.3	E. Fernyhough	79.1%
	Con	14,304	36.7	10,402 26.7	
1959	Lab	25,638	62.7	E. Fernyhough	80.3%
	Con	15,286	37.3	10,352 25.3	
1964	Lab	26,053	64.2	E. Fernyhough	80.0%
	Con	14,503	35.8	11,550 28.4	
1966	Lab	26,006	67.6	E. Fernyhough	76.7%
	Con	12,449	32.4	13,557 35.3	
1970	Lab	25,861	63.5	E. Fernyhough	73.9
	Con	14,847	36.5	11,014 27.0	

BLAYDON

	Party	Vote	%age	M.P., majority, and majority as %age of total vote	Turnout
1950	Lab	28,343	68.9	W. Whiteley	87.5%
	Con	12,772	31.1	15,571 37.9	
1951	Lab	28,337	68.2	W. Whiteley	87.6%
	Con	13,223	31.8	15,114 36.4	
1955	Lab	25,273	66.5	W. Whiteley	80.7%
	Con	12,750	33.5	12,523 32.7	
1956 (Bye- Elect.)	Lab	18,791	69.9	R.E. Woof	57.0%
	Con	8,077	30.1	10,714 39.8	
1959	Lab	25,967	65.4	R.E. Woof	82.9%
	Con	13,719	34.6	12,250 30.9	
1964	Lab	25,926	66.7	R.E. Woof	80.0%
	Con	12,932	33.3	12,994 33.4	
1966	Lab	26,629	69.2	R.E. Woof	77.4%
	Con	11,849	30.8	14,780 38.4	
1970	Lab	25,724	64.8	R.E. Woof	71.9
	Con	13,926	35.2	11,798 29.7	

TYNESIDE LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS1967GATESHEAD

Ward	Rent & Ratepayer	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Riverside	197	649		Ind. 148	No change
Claxton	385	1135			No change
Chandless (2 seats)	230 213	560 541			No change
Askew	189	564			No change
Teams	398	1488			No change
Bensham	912	1116		Com. 63	No change
Claremont	1016	1198			No change
Shipcote	1332	1105			No change
Saltwell	1451	1199			R. & R. gain
Enfield	2106	709			No change
Low Fell	2242	802			No change
Wrekenton	1671	1974			No change
Total Vote	12342	13040		Ind. 148 Com. 63	
Percentage Vote	(48.3%)	(51.1%)		(0.6%)	

NEWCASTLE

Ward	Con.	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Armstrong	389	741		Com. 56	No change
Arthur's Hill	2905	808			No change
Benwell	1065	1813		Com. 126	No change
Blakelaw	2150	2124			Con. gain
Byker	635	901		Com. 41	No change
Dene	4007	965			No change
Elswick	2219	2075			Con. gain
Fenham	3655	1422			No change
Jesmond	3804	410	506		No change
Heaton	3055	870			No change
Kenton	3822	2768			No change
St. Anthony's	302	1185		Com. 126	No change
St. Lawrence	924	1965			No change
St. Nicholas	1183	413			No change
Sandyford	2073	564	256		No change
Scotswood	1352	1534			No change
Stephenson	477	717		Com. 73	No change
Walker	870	1810			No change
Walkergate	2615	1693	618		No change
Westgate	1653	1724			No change
Total Vote	39045	26502	1380	422	
Percentage Vote	(58.0%)	(39.3%)	(2.0%)	(0.7%)	

SOUTH SHIELDS

Ward	Progressive	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Beacon	977	369			No change
Rekenyke	543	688		Com. 34	No change
Bents	871	292			No change
Victoria	601	557		Com. 14	Prog. gain
Westoe	1557	515			No change
West Park (2 seats)	1593 1561	517			No change
Marsden	637	886			No change
Horsley Hill	1437	968		Ind. 262	Prog. gain
Brinkburn	581	893		Ind. 285	No change
Whiteleas	375	990			No change
Harton	1630	595			No change
Cleadon Park	1364	812	350		Prog. gain
Tyne Dock	542	795			No change
Simonside	924	1058			No change
Biddick Hall	436	971		Com. 115	No change
Total Vote	15629	10906	350	Ind. 547 Com. 163	
Percentage Vote	(56.7%)	(39.5%)	(1.3%)	(2.5%)	

TYNEMOUTH

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Tynemouth	1527		404	Ind. 988	No change
Dockway	956	494			No. change
Linskill	874	584			No change
Trinity	548	664			No change
Percy	275	817			No change
Collingwood	1684	1763			No change
Chirton	1233	870			Ind. gain
Preston	1595	272			No change
Cullercoats	No contest				Ind. held
Total Vote	8692	5264	404	988	
Percentage Vote	(56.6%)	(34.3%)	(2.7%)	(6.4%)	

Bye-election 26.7.67 Collingwood Ind. gain Maj. 89

JARROW

Ward	Con	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Central		281		Ind.Lab. 265	No change
West	155	167			No change
East		263		Ind.Lab. 296	Ind.Lab. gain
Simonside		906		Ind.Lab. 897	No change
Springwell	843	404			No change
Grange	886	290			No change
Primrose		748		Ind.Lab. 1169	Ind.Lab. gain
Total Vote	1884	3059		Ind.Lab. 2627	
Percentage Vote	(24.9%)	(40.4%)		(34.7%)	

WALLSEND

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Buddle	850	646			No change
Northumberland Wallsend Holy Cross Carville Hadrian Willington Willington Quay Howdon	No contest				Lab. Held
Total Vote	850	646			
Percentage Vote	(56.8%)	(43.2%)			

BOLDON

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Newtown					
Boldon Colliery					
East Boldon					
West Boldon	No contests.				
Cleadon					
Whitburn					
Whitburn Colliery					

FELLING

Ward	Rent & Ratepayer	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
North (3 seats)	785	831 782 748			1 R.& R.gain
East (3 seats)	668	566 551 488			1 R.& R.gain
Pelaw (3 seats)	1140 1118 1097	765 753 741			No change
South (3 seats)	877	875 713 700			1 R.& R.gain
Leam (3 seats)	700	718 715 598			1 R.& R.gain
Wreken (3 seats)	600	961 900 830			No change
Central (3 seats)	1506 1333 1327	844 746 731			No change
Total Vote	11151	15556			
Percentage Vote	(41.8%)	(58.2%)			

GOSFORTH

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
All Saints		No contest			Con. held
St. Nicholas	1002	540			No change
Coxlodge	1936	1916			Con. gain
S. Gosforth		No contest			Con. held
Total Vote	2938	2456			
Percentage Vote	(54.5%)	(45.5%)			

HEEBURN

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
West					
Central					
South					
North		No contests			
East					
Victoria					
Monkton					
Monkton Ward Bye Election 26th June, 1967					Lab.held

LONGBENTON

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
West Farm		377		Comm. 35	No change
Seaton Burn	1081	1179			No change
Balliol					Lab. held
Benton					Ind. held
Forest Hall		No contests			Lab. held
Holystone					Lab. held
Camperdown					Lab. held
Dudley					Lab. held
Total Vote	1081	1556		35	
Percentage Vote	(40.5%)	(58.2%)		(1.3%)	

NEWBURN

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Throckley (4 seats)		814 718 705 608		Ind. 997	1 Ind. gain
Newburn					
Lemington		No contests			
Westerhope					
Denton					
Total Vote		2845		977	
Percentage Vote		(74.1%)		(25.9%)	

RYTON

Ward	Con or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Ryton					
Crookhill		No contests			
Crawcrook					
Greenside					

WHICKHAM

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Dunston (8 seats)	1168 1160 1178 1178 1145 1122 1101 1063	2021 1967 1922 1908 1916 1886 1798 1780			No change
Swalwell (3 seats)	340 328	697 679 588			No change
Whickham West (3 seats)	1490 1488 1454	612 597 583			Ward Re-organisation
Whickham East (3 seats)	928 857 813	1057 1025 1005			
Marley Hill & Byermoor		No contest			Lab. held
Total Vote	16813	22041			
Percentage Vote	(43.3%)	(56.7%)			

TYNESIDE LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS1968GATESHEAD

Ward	Rent & Ratepayer	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Riverside	150	480		Ind.186	No change
Claxton	391	809			No change
Chandless	184	362			No change
Askew	145	410			No change
Teams	514	1184			No change
Bensham	897	779		Comm.91	R.& R.gain
Claremont	989	777		Ind. 92	R.& R.gain
Shipcote	1211	768			No change
Saltwell	1526	865			R.& R.gain
Enfield	1984	416			No change
Low Fell	2118	614			No change
Wrekenton	1803	1931		Ind.219 Comm.85	No change
Total Vote	11912	9395		Ind.497 (2.3%) Comm.176 (0.8%)	
Percentage Vote	(54.2%)	(42.7%)			

NEWCASTLE

Ward	Con.	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Armstrong	361	493		Tenants 243	No change
Arthur's Hill	2418	562			No change
Benwell	1279	1302		Comm. 87	No change
Blakelaw	2064	1783			No change
Byker	679	553			Con. gain
Dene	3310	721			No change
Elswick	1932	1637			No change
Fenham	3161	986	247		No change
Jesmond	3398	235	577		No change
Heaton	3067	628			No change
Kenton	3461	1136			No change
St. Anthony's	541	1222		Comm. 66	No change
St. Lawrence	682	1180			No change
St. Nicholas	868	276			No change
Sandyford	1671	477			No change
Scotswood	1877	1678			Con. gain
Stephenson	426	588		Tenants 78 Comm. 28	No change
Walker	750	1262			No change
Walkergate	2143	851	580		No change
Westgate	1725	1253			No change
Total Vote	35813	18823	1404	Tenants 321 (0.6%) Comm. 181 (0.2%)	
Percentage Vote	(63.4%)	(33.3%)	(2.5%)		

SOUTH SHIELDS

Ward	Progressive	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Beacon	1087	207			No change
Rékendyke	618	437			Frog. gain
Bents					Frog. unopp.
Victoria	482	411	138		Frog. gain
Westoe	1316	353			No change
West Park	1217	315	214		No change
Marsden	574	586			No change
Horsley Hill	1421	471			No change
Brinkburn	558	752			No change
Whiteleas	341	513			No change
Harton					Frog. unopp.
Cleadon Park	1282	410			No change
Tyne Dock	707	509	198		Frog. gain
Simonside	1717	388			No change
Biddick Hall	370	634		Comm. 60	No change
Total Vote	11690	5986	550	60	
Percentage Vote	(63.9%)	(32.7%)	(3.0%)	(0.4%)	

TYNEMOUTH

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Tynemouth					Ind. unopp.
Dockway	907	313			Ind. gain
Linskill	819	425			Ind. gain
Trinity	685	594			Ind. gain
Percy	531	477			Ind. gain
Collingwood	1919	1116			No change
Chirton	993	784			Ind. gain
Freston					Ind. unopp.
Cullercoats					Ind. unopp.
Total Vote	5854	3709			
Percentage Vote	(61.2%)	(38.8%)			

JARROW

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Central	270	312		Ind.Lab. 137	No change
West	125	141		Ind.Lab. 96	No change
East		328		Ind.Lab. 240	No change
Simonside	657	799		Ind.Lab. 555	No change
Springwell	702			Ind.Lab. 247	No change
Grange					Con. unopp.
Primrose	1296	1148			Con. gain
Total Vote	3050	2728		1275	
Percentage Vote	(43.2%)	(38.7%)		(18.1%)	

WALLSEND

Ward	Rent & Ratepayer	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Buddle	914	374			No change
Northumberland	612	420			R.& R. gain
Wallsend					
Holy Cross	665	686			No change
Carville					
Hadrian					
Wilbington					
Willington Quay					
Howdon					
Total Vote	2191	1480			
Percentage Vote	(59.7%)	(40.3%)			

WHITLEY BAY

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Monkseaton S.	776	437		Ind. 369	No change
Monkseaton N					
Central	430	241			No change
Haztley	744	864			No change
Marden					
Monkseaton W	1238		821		Con. gain
Rockcliff	395	284			No change
St. Mary's	505			Ind. 579 Ind. Con. 501	No change
Total Vote	4088	1826	821	1449	
Percentage Vote	(50.0%)	(22.3%)	(10.0%)	(17.7%)	

BLAYDON

No contests

BOLDON

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Newtown		721		Ind.Lab. 350	No change
Boldon Colliery	162	576			No change
East Boldon					
West Boldon					
Cleadon					
Whitburn	743	1497			No change
Whitburn Colliery	225	365			No change
Total Vote	1130	3159		350	
Percentage Vote	(24.4%)	(68.1%)		(7.5%)	

FELLING

No contests

GOSFORTH

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
All Saints					
St. Nicholas	880	338			No change
Coxlodge	1307	796			Con. gain from Lab.
S. Gosforth	720		148		No change
Total Vote	2907	1134	148		
Percentage Vote	(69.4%)	(27.1%)	(3.5%)		

HEBBURN

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
West	61	351			Lab. gain from Ind.
Central	61	183			No change
South	1437	1018			No change
North					Lab. unopp.
East	88	274			No change
Victoria	401	611			No change
Monkton	861	1133			No change
Total Vote	2509	3570			
Percentage Vote	(41.2%)	(58.8%)			

LONGBENTON

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
West Farm		248		Comm. 76	No change
Seaton Burn	1232	1215			Con. gain from Lab.
Balliol					
Benton	887			Ind. 766	Con. gain from Ind.
Forest Hall					
Holystone	248	600			No change
Camperdown	572	922			No change
Dudley					
Total Vote	2939	2985		Comm. 76 (1.3%) Ind. 766 (11.3%)	
Percentage Vote	(43.3%)	(44.1%)			

NEWBURN

No contests

RYTON

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Ryton					
Crookhill					
Crawcrook					
Greenside		575		Ind. 486	No change
Percentage Vote		(54.2%)		(45.8%)	

WHICKHAM

No contests

TYNESIDE LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS1969GATESHEAD

Ward	Rent & Ratepayer	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Riverside	134	408		Ind. 205	No change
Chandless	243	313			No change
Claxton	713	773			No change
Askew	164	311			No change
Teams	610	966			No change
Bensham	1015	839			R. & R. gain
Claremont	1058	500			R. & R. gain
Shipcote	1280	586		Ind. 162	R. & R. gain
Saltwell	795	151			R. & R. gain
Enfield	1955	440		Ind. 112	No change
Low Fell	1799	234		Ind. 281	No change
Wrekenton	2640	1829		Comm. 152	R. & R. gain
Total Vote	12406	7350		Ind. 760 (3.7%) Comm. 152 (0.7%)	
Percentage Vote	(60.0%)	(35.6%)			

NEWCASTLE

Ward	Con.	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Armstrong	312	699			No change
Arthur's Hill	2147 2058	508 515			No change
Benwell	1310	1399			No change
Blakelaw	1583	1309		Tenants 349	Con. gain
Byker	623	554	20		Con. gain
Dene	3076	656			No change
Elswick	1812	1315			Con. gain
Fenham	2821	1260			No change
Jesmond	3212	441			No change
Heaton	2545	656			No change
Kenton	3031	1236		Tenants 452	No change
St. Anthony's	333 332	1679 1646			No change
St. Lawrence	745	1505			No change
St. Nicholas	696	612			No change
Sandyford	1656	592			No change
Scotswood	1539	1490			Con. gain
Stephenson	387	491		Comm. 61	No change
Walker	612	1364			No change
Walkergate	1991	959			No change
Westgate	1280	1264			Con. gain
Total Vote	34101	22150	20	Tenants 801 (1.4%) Comm. 61 (0.1%)	
Percentage Vote	(59.7%)	(38.8%)			

SOUTH SHIELDS

Ward	Progressive	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Beacon	841 815	178			No change
Rekendyke	474	392			Prog. gain
Bents					Prog. unopp.
Victoria	591	285			Prog. gain
Westoe					Prog. unopp.
West Park	1387 1366	235			No change
Marsden	643	670			No change
Horsley Hill	1335	741			Prog. gain
Brinkburn	668	554			Prog. gain
Whiteleas	341	481			No change
Harton					Prog. unopp.
Cleadon Park					Prog. unopp.
Tyne Dock	803	558			Prog. gain
Simonside	963	639			Prog. gain
Biddick Hall	456	636			No change
Total Vote	10683	5369			
Percentage Vote	(66.6%)	(33.4%)			

TYNEMOUTH

Ward	Con. or Supporter	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Tynemouth					
Dockway					
Linskill	882	289			No change
Trinity	545	411			Ind. gain
Percy	482	422			Ind. gain
Collingwood	1415	1202			Ind. gain
Chirton	867	438			Ind. gain
Freston					
Güllercoats	2242			Ind. 646	No change
Total Vote	6433	2762		646	
Percentage Vote	(65.4%)	(28.1%)		(6.5%)	

JARROW

Ward	Con.	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Central	247	315			No change
West	113	153			No change
East	317	390			No change
Simonside	689	898			Lab. gain from Ind.Lab.
Springwall	668	293			No change
Grange	874	175			No change
Primrose	1090	1253			Lab. gain from Ind.Lab.
Total Vote	3998	3477			
Percentage Vote	(53.5%)	(46.5%)			

WALSSEND

Ward	Con.	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Buddle	768	344		R. & R. 376	Con.gain from Lab.
Northumberland		415		R. & R. 651	R.& R.gain from Lab.
Wallsend					
Holy Cross		614	669		Lib.gain from Lab
Carville					
Hadrian					
Willington					
Willington Quay					
Howdon					
Total Vote	768	1373	669	1027	
Percentage Vote	(20.0%)	(35.8%)	(17.4%)	(26.8%)	

WHITLEY BAY

Ward	Con.	Labour	Liberal	Other	Result
Monkseaton S.	948	483			No change
Monkseaton N.					
Central	414	280			Con. gain from Ind.
Hartley	639	636		Ind.Soc. 396	Con. gain from Lab.
Marden	717	203			No change
Monkseaton W.	1150		972		No change
Rockcliff	345	181			No change
St. Marys					
Total Vote	4213	1783	972	396	
Percentage Vote	(57.2%)	(24.2%)	(13.2%)	(5.4%)	

BLAYDON

No contests

FELLING

No contests

GOSFORTH

No contests

HEBBURN

No contests

LONGBENTON

No contests

NEWBURN

No contests

RYTON

No contests

WHICKHAM

No contests