Substitution and representation: patterns of thought in Christian atonement theology

David Jonathon Peter Hewlett

ABSTRACT

Substitution and Representation:

Patterns of thought

in Christian Atonement Theology

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This thesis examines the use of the terms Substitution and Representation as they are found to occur in Christian Atonement Theology. It is a theological investigation into the use of the terms, in order to establish their meaning and the relation between them.

Both terms are first subjected to a phenomenological enquiry in order to disclose the various patterns of thought in which the terms function and which they help to generate. The part played by the terms within these different contexts, together with the models they espouse, are then critically analysed and evaluated. In this way the full complexity of the terms Substitution and Representation is examined, the appropriateness of their range of meanings tested, and the part they play in Christian Atonement Theology determined.

To test the adequacy and accuracy of this analysis a more detailed study is made of the work of D. Sölle, <u>Christ the Representative</u>. Her place within the continuing debate surrounding the terms is established, and more light is shed on the use and meaning of the terms Substitution and Representation.

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Patterns of Thought
in Christian Atonement Theology

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I certify that the material of this thesis is the
product of my own research and that no part of it
has been submitted for a degree to this or in any
other university.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of the Thesis

        This thesis is an attempt to answer the question

'what do the terms substitution and representation mean

when they are used in the context of Christian atonement

theology?' The initial impulse that prompted this study

of the terms substitution and representation was provided

by the following passage found in the translators' preface

to the opening volume of K. Barth's Church Dogmatics on

the doctrine of reconciliation and which comments on the

difficulty of the term Stellvertretung:

> Stellvertretung ... enshrines the notions both
> of representation and substitution, and never
> the one without the other. Representation by
> itself is particularly inadequate as a rendering,
> though this aspect is present, and the word is
> used more often perhaps than it ought to be in
> view of the prevailing prejudice against
> substitution. In most cases the latter is both
> fuller and truer, but, as the text discloses, it
> is given a sense more radical than is normally
> the case in English, because Barth envisages it
> as a total displacement of sinful man by the
> incarnate, crucified and risen Son; and also
> more comprehensive, because it is related to the
> whole life and work of Jesus Christ, including
> His heavenly intercession (1).

        A number of questions are immediately raised by

these comments. What is the nature and force of this

'prevailing prejudice against substitution'? What is the

meaning of the term representation, so that despite being

'particularly inadequate' it may be reluctantly used as a more acceptable alternative to the term substitution? What is the relation between the terms substitution and representation, what 'aspects' are signified by the respective terms, such that both may be 'enshrined' in a single term with 'never the one without the other'? These questions indicate, at least in a preliminary way, the need for a closer study of the terms substitution and represent- ation and the relation between them. However, two problems are immediately encountered which hinder any attempt to clarify their respective meanings.

First, leaving aside any specific theological meaning the terms might have, in their everyday use their meaning is often very similar so that it is difficult to locate precisely where any distinction might lie that will assist in clarifying their theological meaning (2). For example, there are numerous circumstances where an act by proxy can be appropriately described by either of the words substitution or representation: a speaker standing in for another as his substitute and representing him; a foster parent substituting for the absent parent yet also repres- enting them; a delegate representing a group of people and yet in some sense acting as the substitute for each indiv- idual. In each case the terms substitution and represent- ation are both appropriate, although there are equally clearly situations where both terms are not appropriate. A substitute in a football team cannot be described as a representative; an ambassador represents his country but it would be unusual to describe him as a substitute for

that country; a lawyer represents a client in court but
the term substitute would only be used reluctantly and
with care. In other words, there seems to be much common
ground shared between the two terms in which their meanings
are very similar - a common ground usually indicated by
dictionaries as expressing the sense of standing in the
place of another - but there is also the recognition that
there are differences in meaning between the two terms
which is conveyed by an unease with certain inappropriate
uses, despite the fact that it is hard to articulate
precisely the basis for their divergence.

Second, when it comes to the theological use of
the terms substitution and representation the problem lies
in the fact that both terms have become to a greater or
lesser extent 'keywords' or 'theological labels'(3).
These labels come to characterise certain patterns of
thought, and can be used to evoke them, despite the fact
that in addition to the close resemblances within these
patterns of thought there may also be important divergences.
Because the terms become keywords for these patterns of
thought, not only may significant points of difference be
overlooked, but also the many layers of meaning which each
term can express may be ignored. For example, the desig-
nation 'penal substitution' is familiar, but even a cursory
examination will show that as there are significantly
different theories of punishment so also there may be
significantly different theories of penal substitution.
Moreover, what if there are substitutionary theories of
the atonement which explicitly exclude the notion of
punishment? Are these, as some would claim, no longer

theories of substitution? What happens to the keyword
substitution when this divergence is recognised? Equally,
the same is true for theories of representation. What is
the point of contact between a view of the representative
work of Christ in which Christ initiates a ministry which
all his community must perpetuate, and that view of the
representative work of Christ in which Christ is the
inclusive Man, the one who performs the work of all
humanity? These varying uses of the terms have yet to be
demonstrated and described, but it will be one of the main
arguments of this work that the 'keywords' substitution
and representation, far from being simple and readily
intelligible terms, conceal or embody many different mean-
ings which render them extremely complex terms, demanding
careful analysis.

Some Recent Discussions of the Terms

It might be thought that the discussion of these
two terms would have been exhausted, particularly given
the history of the term substitution and the controversy it
has aroused. However, a brief examination of a number of
recent writers who specifically consider the two terms
will serve to demonstrate the need for a study of the terms
that recognises their complexity and attempts to unravel
the many different meanings which each term is capable of
bearing.

L. Morris, a large part of whose writing has been
devoted to studies of the atonement, opens his discussion
of the terms with the observation that the term represent-

ative 'seems to mean much the same as substitutionary, but without quite the same clarity'(4). However, along with a number of other writers he argues that the distinctive meaning or reference of the term representation belongs in the sphere of 'personal delegation', a context that is said decisively to rule out the term as being 'unsuitable for Christian theology'(5). In this respect Morris is no doubt accepting the view of J. Denney that a 'representative, in all ordinary circumstances, is provided or appointed by those whom he represents, and it is practically impossible to divest the term of the associations which this involves, misleading as they are in the present instance'(6). However, only a few pages later Morris quotes with approval the view of R. Ottley that 'Christ was our substitute ... in virtue of his representative character as the head and flower of our race, in whom humanity is "summed up"' (7), so seeming to accept a use of the term representation without explanation or comment. To complete the confusion Morris proceeds to outline the 'Biblical view of substitution' where substitution is reckoned to be 'inclusive', so that Christ's work may be described as a 'representative and inclusive substitution' (8). Morris' somewhat cavalier treatment of the term representation, in contrast to the more sensitive and careful attention given to the term substitution, would seem to indicate that there is a 'prevailing prejudice' to be found against the former term as much as the latter.

The same objections can be levelled against

J. Packer (9), whose work on the language of substitution
will be given careful study in the next chapter, but
despite his recognition of the complexity of theological
language, particularly interpretative terms like substit-
ution, no such recognition is accorded to the term
representation. Packer accepts Denney's view of the
significance of a representative, although he does recognise
that there is 'in addition to this rather specialised usage'
a sense in which a representative 'involves others, for
good or ill, in the consequences of what one does' (10).
It is in this sense that Jesus can be called the
representative of humanity. Packer, therefore, identifies
four reasons for dismissing the term representative 'as
both confusing and confused':

> ... first, that we chose Christ to act for us,
> second that the death we die in him is of the
> same order as the death he died for us, and third,
> that by dying in Christ we atone for our sins -
> all of which are false. Here now is a further
> reason for rejecting the proposal - namely, that
> it misses or muffs the point that what Christ
> bore on the cross was the Godforsakeness of penal
> judgement which we shall never have to bear
> because he accepted it in our place (11).

Thus, Packer is prepared to accept that the term represent-
ation conveys some idea of the relation between Christ and
humanity, although he defines that only in terms of the
consequences that Christ's work has for humanity, and that
the two ideas 'representation and substitution are comple-
mentary, not alternatives' (12).

Unfortunately, the advocates of the term
representation are often equally culpable in failing to
treat seriously the complexity and nuances of meaning that

are present in the concept of substitution, preferring

instead to attack what is assumed to be a self-evident

moral and theological absurdity. As A. Beacock comments on

the work of H. A. Hodges:

> He groups under the heading 'substitutionary'
> or 'vicarious' atonement all theories which
> contain this idea in one form or another. Yet
> when he is criticising them he seems to have in
> mind a particular theory, and a rather crude
> one at that, of penal substitution (13).

In contrast to the term substitution advocates of the term

representation would wish to express at least one of the

following elements in their use of the term. First, the

sense of personal <u>presentation</u> before God in Christ, as

A. Richardson indicates when he comments that 'a substitute

takes or usurps our place whereas a representative keeps

it open for us, acts on our behalf and causes us to be

present where in fact we cannot personally appear' (14).

Second, the term representation may express the sense that

the work of Christ is not something independent of man,

but something to be 'owned and appropriated' (15). Third,

the term representation may be used to express the convict-

ion that Christ's work does not consist in a bearing of

punishment, but in an offering of holiness, obedience or

confession on behalf of man. As P. T. Forsyth puts it:

> I should, therefore, express the difference
> between the old view and the new by saying that
> the one emphasises substitutionary expiation
> and the other emphasises solidary reparation,
> consisting of due honour of God's holiness, and
> the honouring of that and not of his honour (16).

Finally, in this preliminary examination of the

recent discussion of the terms substitution and

representation mention should be made of two works which
deal more exclusively in this matter. The first discussion
is to be found in an article by G. Mather entitled 'The
Atonement: Representative or Substitutionary?' (17). Mather
suggests that both terms 'may be properly regarded as
different emphases of the same fundamental truth' (18).
He examines the work of L. Morris as an advocate of the term
substitution and V. Taylor for a presentation of the concept
of representation. Having outlined the position of both
writers he concludes that the two terms 'far from being
exclusive, are in fact complementary' (19). Each term
expresses a 'necessary aspect of the whole truth' (20), so
that the issue between them hinges upon the following
question:

> To what degree does the believer undergo the
> experience of Christ and reproduce this work?
> In so far as the experience and work of the
> believer are the same or similar, the sacrifice
> of Christ will be spoken of in terms of
> representation; in so far as they are different,
> it will be spoken of in terms of substitution.
> Representation emphasises similarity: substit-
> ution emphasises dissimilarity (21).

Mather's work contains a useful description of the use of
the terms substitution and representation by Morris and
Taylor, but his conclusion that the terms are complementary
is premature in the light of the fact that the account of
the terms given by no means exhausts their possibilities
and certainly does not represent an adequate basis on which
to determine their respective meanings and roles.

The second discussion of the terms is found in
the work of D. Sölle entitled 'Christ the Representative'
(22). Because of the importance of this work for the

present study, and because of her somewhat individual
approach to the subject, combining as she does the notion
of a post-theistic theology with the concept of represent-
ation, a separate chapter is necessary to do her work
justice. Chapter VI, therefore, will consist of a detailed
account of her work, and an evaluation and critique of her
argument. It will be shown that despite the distinctiveness
of Sölle's approach, there are none the less many points
of contact between it and the patterns of thought that
have been disclosed in the first part of this enquiry.
Sölle's work is therefore examined not only for the sake
of an assessment of any contribution towards the clarif-
ication of the terms substitution and representation, but
also as a test case for the adequacy and accuracy of the
work contained in the main part of this study.

The Method and Content of the Thesis

The brief description of the terms substitution
and representation given in the course of this introduction
has indicated that any attempt to investigate their
respective meanings in the context of Christian atonement
theology must recognise and accommodate their complexity
and variety of meaning. For this reason Chapters II and III
will consist of a description of the terms substitution
and representation, and the range of meanings that they
are held to be capable of expressing. Chapter II will
describe the full range of meanings that may be comprehended
in the term substitution, to be followed in Chapter III by

a similar exercise with respect to the term representation.
Both chapters consist of phenomenological studies of the
terms, drawing on the work of theologians both past and
present, adducing illustrations to demonstrate patterns of
meaning that are appropriate to both terms. These
illustrations are not intended to represent an adequate or
complete account of the thought or work of any particular
theologian, but simply to describe and illustrate the range
of meanings accorded to both terms.

An obvious objection to the pattern of this
investigation may be formulated as follows: is not every
use of the terms, substitution and representation, context-
specific, not merely in relation to a theologian's own
thought but also to his own times? Would not instances of
the terms substitution and representation occurring in the
minds of theologians vary according to different social
contexts? Indeed they would, and if the purpose of this
thesis were exhaustively to document the use of the terms
over their entire history the absence of detailed
consideration of their social contexts would be a fatal
objection to its methodology.

But, in fact, the resources of historical theology
are available for use in ways other than historical study.
Such is the nature of Christian theology that theologians
of the past are taken to be our contemporaries; and it is
as diverse instances of the contemporary use of the terms
substitution and representation that reference will be
made to theologians of the past. By a 'phenomenological
study of the terms' is meant, in this instance, the

occurrence of the terms in present circulation, including those which derive from the selective use of the past by contemporary theology.

Because the primary concern of the thesis is with the terms substitution and representation themselves, severe restriction is placed on the use of literature of other languages. A study of equivalent terms in other languages would have been revealing, but impossible within the limits of this thesis. However, the quotation with which this introduction began, commenting on the difficulty of the term <u>Stellvertretung</u> demonstrates the relevance of this study for other languages. Clearly, where a work exists in translation the terms substitution and represent-ation, where used, are taken as further examples of their range of meanings, although it is not thereby claimed that the author's intention or meaning has been comprehensively considered.

On the basis of this description of the full range of meanings of both terms there can take place an evaluation and assessment of the various patterns of meaning that have emerged. Because this descriptive study reveals that both terms are in fact reckoned to express a range of meanings that transcend any simple distinction between the two terms, Chapters IV and V will undertake the task of evaluation in a different form. Chapter IV will consider and assess the ways in which both the terms substitution and representation express the meaning of the work of Christ and their function in this context. Chapter V will consider and assess the ways in which both

terms function in the context of a description of the relation between Christ and mankind. The reasons for this division of the material will become clear as the study proceeds, but it ensures that the terms are treated in their full complexity and that their full range of meanings are recognised. As has already been mentioned, Chapter VI consists of a detailed analysis and critique of Sölle's work 'Christ the Representative', in order to determine the particular contribution she makes to the discussion of the terms. The concluding Chapter VII summarises the findings of the enquiry and offers some comments on their significance for Christian atonement theology.

CHAPTER II

PATTERNS OF SUBSTITUTION IN CHRISTIAN ATONEMENT THEOLOGY

Introduction

The term substitution has for some time been
the subject of considerable theological odium, to such an
extent that in 1948 F. W. Camfield, himself wishing to
defend the use of the term, could say:

> If there is one conclusion which had come almost
> to be taken for granted in enlightened Christian
> quarters it is that the idea of substitution has
> led theology on a wrong track; and that the word
> 'substitution' must now be dropped from the
> doctrine of the atonement as too heavily laden
> with false and even misleading connotations (1).

The situation cannot be said to have altered largely today (2).

Before beginning this enquiry into the theol-
ogical meaning and use of the term substitution it may
help to outline some non-theological uses of the word.
The most common and general use of the word is its
description of a replacement or the act of replacement
that takes place in a sports team. The substitute in this
context replaces an injured or inadequate member of the
team, who, as a result, has no further part to play. This
act of substitution describes a straightforward exchange,
although it should be noted that this exchange only takes
place within the clearly defined limits and rules of a
game. A second use of the word substitution carries
different connotations: ersatz products, coffee or tobacco
substitutes, replace a genuine product but are intended

to fulfil the same purposes, either more cheaply or in some other sense as an improvement on the original. A substitute product is thus different in some sense but equivalent in another. This notion of equivalence in association with the term substitution is also an integral feature of certain technical uses of the word in logic, medicine and ciphers, where a different expression or product may be substituted for another because it functions as an equivalent. Finally, the notion of replacement comes to the fore when the term substitution is used, as it was in the American Civil war, to describe a man hired to replace a drafted man. This was the same as the French system of remplaçant, where the term substitute described either the replacement or the fee that could be paid to avoid the draft.

Thus, the non-theological uses of the term substitution can be characterised by the concepts of exchange, replacement and equivalence, and while some uses of the term are only appropriate to things, others are applicable to people in specific circumstances. As an introduction to the theological uses of the term substitution these examples are instructive, but it is readily apparent that any theological use gives the term a more specific content by employing it in specific contexts and in association with particular theological concepts.

To anticipate the results of this chapter it will be shown that the term substitution stands in relation to a cluster of widely divergent ideas and that it functions as an interpretative tool, employed to articulate

and order theological material in order to establish and
preserve central and formative relations within this
diverse material. This study can therefore be said to
demonstrate in a practical sense the main contention of
J. I. Packer, who argues more theoretically and abstractly
for an understanding of this interpretative function of
the term (3). It will therefore be helpful to outline the
main points of Packer's argument, not because it provides
the basis for the study which follows, but because it
complements and highlights one of its conclusions.

Packer focusses on two characteristics of theol-
ogical thought. First, the character of God's reality
and work as <u>mystery</u>:

> ... a reality distinct from us which in our very
> apprehending of it remains unfathomable to us:
> a reality which we acknowledge as actual without
> knowing how it is possible, and which we
> therefore describe as <u>incomprehensible</u> (4).

Second, when this dimension of 'mystery' is recognised
and respected it will become evident that ordinary
language is 'stretched' when attempts are made to speak of
these mysteries (5). Theological language consists,
therefore, of <u>models</u>, which are 'analogies with a purpose',
functioning in a particular way to 'inform us about our
relationship with God and through the Holy Spirit enable
us to unify, clarify and intensify our experience in that
relationship' (6). Within Christian theology different
types of model are to be found: the control models of
scripture, the dogmatic models of the Church, and the
<u>interpretative models</u>, like that of substitution, standing
'between Scripture and defined dogma ... for stating the
faith to contemporaries' (7).

Because Packer recognises the interpretative
status of the term substitution he can, first, distinguish
the term from the context of penalty, although he believes
this to be a correct 'qualifier' (8); second, it allows
him to locate and define the concept of substitution within
a pattern of diverse and wide ranging theological criteria,
so that their unity and clarity may be apprehended (9).
Thus, Packer chides those who have seen the concept of
substitution in a 'rationalist' (10) way as though it
explained 'how' the work of Christ saves men (11). On
the contrary, Packer believes that as an interpretative
tool the function of the term is to express and bring to
our awareness central Christian experiences and insights,
namely the fact of 'the remission of my sins ... to
correlate my knowledge of being guilty before God with my
knowledge that ... no question of my ever being judged
for my sins can now arise' (12).

Whether Packer is correct in the particular
interpretative function he assigns to the term substit-
ution will be questioned, but his analysis of the term
as an interpretative tool operating in the context of
differing qualifiers will be confirmed by the phenomen-
ological study of the term which follows in this present
chapter. In the first section the use of the term
substitution will be considered in the context of the
term 'penalty', illustrating the variety of motifs and
ideas that can be grouped under the general heading 'penal
substitution'. In section 2 the use of the term sub-
stitution will be considered in the context of ideas of

public order or government. The bulk of the material of
this chapter will be found within these two sections since
these contexts provide the normal and most controversial
occasions for the use of the term substitution.
Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the use of the term
substitution in the context of non-penal descriptions
of satisfaction and in the context of descriptions of a
conflict with the powers of evil. The latter context in
particular contributes little to an understanding of the
term substitution but both sections point up possible
areas of confusion and the ability of the term to function
in diverse circumstances. Finally, in section 5, the use
of the term substitution is considered in the context of
the idea of 'inclusiveness', thus illustrating a different
and surprising use of the term.

1. Substitution in the Context of 'Penalty'

There can be no doubt that it is due to the
association of the terms substitution and penalty that the
former term has come to be castigated as 'sub-Christian'
and immoral (13). The force with which this position has
been both attacked and defended has led many to consider
the term substitution solely within the particular
context of such ideas and has helped to create the illusion
that the phrase 'penal substitution' describes a single or
self-evident conceptual framework (14). In reality the
situation is very different.   First, as shall be seen
the association of substitution and penalty constitutes

only one out of a number of contextual frameworks for the qualification and interpretation of the term substitution. Second, the material of this section will demonstrate that even within the description 'penal substitution' there is room for significant diversity (15). It will become evident that the concepts described by the phrase 'penal substitution' can respond to critical pressure or to insights that are generated by the concepts themselves, thus bringing about change in the pattern of theological ideas which may still remain under the increasingly diffuse and complex description of 'penal substitution'. It will be one of the tasks of this section to clarify these different patterns of penal substitution by pointing up the differences that are to be found between them. It should be noted that no attempt will be made to trace or to argue for a particular historical development of these different patterns, even to locate the causes for such a development. The only concern of this section is to demonstrate and describe with precision the different patterns of thought that can be expressed under the heading 'penal substitution'.

Before proceeding with a description of these different patterns it should be remembered that the designation 'penal substitution' is a comparatively recent addition to theological terminology (16). It is well known that the Reformation writers largely took over the existing vocabulary revolving around the term satisfaction which continued to provide the key element in atonement theology despite a change of context. As late as 1886

A. A. Hodge could prefer to organise his work on the
atonement around the term satisfaction, pointing out that
the terms substitution and vicarious were ambiguous and
open to a number of inadequate and misleading definitions
(17). The term substitution is used comparatively
infrequently before the 19th century, with terms like
'sponsor' or 'surety' being preferred (18).

The account of the use of the term substitution
in the context of penalty begins with the following
quotations from the work of W. G. T. Shedd:

> In every instance of transgression the penalty
> of law must be inflicted, either personally or
> vicariously; either upon the transgressor or
> upon his substitute. The remission of penalty
> under the divine administration is not absolute
> but relative. It may be omitted in respect to
> the real criminal, but, if so, it must be
> inflicted upon someone in his place. ... Justice
> necessarily demands that sin be punished, but
> not necessarily in the person of the sinner (19).

The same thoughts are given clear expression by J. Owen:

> God may give to everyone his own, or what is due
> to every one, in the infliction of punishment,
> although he do not inflict it on sinners them-
> selves, but on their surety, substituted in their
> room and stead (20).

This form of expression of the concept of penal
substitution is characterised by the logical and
consistent development of three basic propositions. First,
God is conceived as a just law-giver. This proposition
is illustrated, again by Shedd when he says:

> All true scientific development of the doctrine
> of the Atonement, it is very evident, must take
> its departure from the idea of divine justice.
> This conception is the primary one in the Biblical
> representation of this doctrine ... we shall
> find that just in proportion as the mind of the
> Church obtained a distinct and philosophic
> conception of this great attribute, as an absolute
> and necessary principle in the divine nature,

and in human nature, was it enabled to specify
with distinctness the real meaning and purport
of the Redeemer's Passion, and to exhibit the
rational and necessary grounds for it (21).

Second, transgression of God's law must be met

with punishment. L. Berkhof writes that punishment

denotes:

> ... [that] pain or loss which is directly or
> indirectly inflicted by the Law-giver, in
> vindication of His justice outraged by the
> violation of the law. It originates in the
> righteousness or punitive justice of God, by
> which He maintains Himself as the Holy One and
> necessarily demands holiness and righteousness
> in all His rational creatures. Punishment ...
> is, in fact, a debt that is due to the essential
> justice of God (22).

Shedd expresses the relation between transgression and

punishment with customary directness when he says:

> Retributive justice is necessary in its operation.
> The claim of the law upon the transgressor for
> punishment is absolute and indefeasible. The
> eternal Judge may or may not exercise mercy, but
> He must exercise justice (23).

Third, God is merciful and loving towards sinners

in that He permits a substitution, so that their due

punishment falls not on the guilty, but on their substitute.

J. Owen remarks that:

> Christ dying for us as a surety ... being made
> a curse for us, was an undergoing of death,
> punishment, curse, wrath, not only for our good,
> but directly in our stead; a commutation and
> subrogation of his person in the room and place
> of ours, being allowed and of God accepted (24).

Chapter IV of this thesis will deal in more

detail with the analysis and criticism of this model of

penal substitution; for the moment it is necessary simply

to continue with its description. This may best be done

by focussing on some of the shifts in meaning that can

take place even within the framework of thought designated

by the phrase 'penal substitution'. By examining the different senses in which Christ's work is said to be penal or to have a penal reference, it will be demonstrated that the phrase 'penal substitution' describes a range of conceptions such that any serious consideration of 'the theory of penal substitution' must recognise this internal diversity and any subsequent criticism must respect the fact that different expressions of this theory are not equally vulnerable to any particular critique.

The first understanding of the term penal in the phrase 'penal substitution' to be considered involves the close association of the concepts of penalty, punishment and suffering. If suffering is the dominant feature of punishment then interest may well be focussed on the thought of the physical or spiritual pain suffered by Christ. Of course, a choice made between speaking of Christ's physical or of his spiritual torment may already reflect a divergence in thought as to the role of suffering in this particular punishment. Many writers who wish to speak of Christ suffering the punishment of sinners may well regret the language of S. Charnock, who writes that God was:

> desirous to hear Christ groaning, and see him
> bleeding ... He refused not to strike him that
> He might be well pleased with us; quenched His
> sword in the blood of His Son that it might be
> for ever wet (25).

Instead, it is more probable that while not forgetting the physical pain suffered by Christ, it is some form of spiritual anguish which is seen to constitute his real suffering (26).

Further, if suffering is taken to be a fundamental
characteristic of punishment, interest may well be focussed
on the amount of suffering endured. Once it has been
accepted that Christ's substitution consists in his
receiving the punishment for our sins, then of necessity
it must be asserted that he really does suffer that
identical punishment, or else both a rational and consist-
ent basis for God's forgiveness will be abandoned and the
Christian's certainty of his liberation from punishment
will be taken away (27). In other words it is necessary
that Christ's sufferings are seen to be the same in kind
and extent as the penalty that was due to the sinners
themselves. This can be seen in a relatively undeveloped
manner in Calvin, particularly in his exposition of
Christ's descent into Hell.

> Nothing had been done if Christ had only endured
> corporeal death. In order to interpose between
> us and God's anger, and satisfy his righteous
> judgement, it was necessary that he should feel
> the weight of divine vengence. ... Like a sponsor
> and surety for the guilty, and, as it were,
> subjected to condemnation, he undertook and
> paid all the penalties which must have been
> exacted from them, the only exception being,
> that the pains of death could not hold him.
> Hence there is nothing strange in its being
> said that he descended to Hell, seeing he endured
> the death which is inflicted on the wicked by an
> angry God. ... Not only was the body of Christ
> given up as the price of redemption, but ... he
> bore in his soul the torures of condemned and
> ruined man (28).

J. Owen is more specific when he says that:

> ... if God laid the punishment of our sins upon
> Christ, certainly it was the punishment that was
> due to them; mention is everywhere made of a
> commutation of persons, the just suffering for
> the unjust, the sponsor for the offender ...
> but of a change of punishment there is no
> mention at all (29).

Owen translates the language of pecuniary debt from
'things real' to 'things personal' and argues that there
are two possible ways of seeing satisfaction (30):

> First, by a solution, or paying the very thing
> that is in the obligation, either by the party
> himself that is bound, or by some other in his
> stead: as, if I owe a man £20, and my friend
> goeth and payeth it, my creditor is fully sat-
> isfied. Secondly, by a solution, or a paying of
> so much, although in another kind, not the same
> that is in the obligation, which by the creditor's
> acceptation stands in the lieu of it; upon which
> also, freedom from the obligation followeth, not
> necessarily, but by virtue of an act of favour
> (31).

It is on this choice, between an identical payment and
a token that is accepted as a favour that Owen states his
case against Socinus (32).

However, although the language of an identical
payment may be said to be logically and evangelically
most rigorous and consistent, the difficulties involved
in such a concept prompt the use of a more subtle idea,
that of equivalence. 'Substitution excludes identity
of suffering: it does not exclude equivalence',
A. H. Strong argues (33), following the statement of
W. G. T. Shedd that:

> ... a golden eagle is worth a thousand copper
> cents. The penalty paid by Christ is strictly
> and literally equivalent to that which the sinner
> would have borne, although it is not identical.
> The vicarious bearing of it excludes the latter
> (34).

Thus, by employing the language of equivalence, the rigour
and consistency of the argument of penal substitution
appears to be sustained, while the precise nature of
Christ's suffering is left unstated. How then are Christ's
sufferings constituted an equivalent? Primarily because
of the 'dignity' consequent upon the union of the divine

with the human in Christ (35). The dignity of the subject
as the divine-human person renders such human sufferings
of the highest possible value, such that they more than
constitute an equivalent to the sufferings due to sinful
humanity. Owen relates this divine dignity to the dur-
ation of the sufferings of Christ: such sufferings,
although taking place only in a 'limited season', could
fully satisfy divine justice (36). Shedd, too, believes
that the suffering of Christ:

> ... contains the element of infinitude, which is
> the element of value in the case, with even
> greater precision than the satisfaction of the
> creature does; because it is the suffering of a
> strictly infinite Person in a finite time, while
> the latter is only the suffering of a finite
> person in an endless, but not strictly infinite
> time (37).

The notion of equivalence functions in response
to the Socinian critique that there was no intrinsic value
to the sufferings of Christ or to the satisfaction he is
said to have made. However, an increasing reticence can
be detected in the use of this concept to indicate a
quantifiable amount of suffering and it comes instead to
express simply the certainty that what Christ has accom-
plished is both adequate and appropriate for the
satisfaction of God's justice. That there is a tension
between the stricter, more logical language of an identical
substitution and this ambivalent and ambiguous use of the
concept of an equivalent substitution can be shown by the
discussions to be found in the work of A. A. Hodge and
C. Hodge (38). Both are seen to be theologians struggling
to express a notion of equivalent substitution that falls

neither into the sheer implausibility and the difficulties

associated with the language of literal identity of

punishment, nor into the inadequacies of a substituted

punishment that bears no relation to the penalty that the

sinner ought to have borne. A. A. Hodge writes that

Christ:

> ... did not render a pecuniary satisfaction, and
> therefore did not suffer the same degree or
> duration, nor in all respects the same kind, of
> sufferings which the law would have inflicted on
> the sinner in person. But he did suffer the very
> penalty of the law - that is, sin was punished
> in him with strict rigour of justice. His
> sufferings were no substitute for a penalty,
> but those very penal evils which rigorous justice
> demanded of this exalted person, when he stood
> in our place, as a full equivalent of all that
> was demanded of us. The substitution of a divine
> for a human victim necessarily involved a change
> in the quality, though none whatsoever in the
> legal relations, of the suffering (39).

C. Hodge is even more ambivalent, for although

he recognises that justice demands 'a real satisfaction',

he also sees that Christ did not suffer an 'exact quid

pro quo, so much for so much', but that his suffering and

death were 'adequate to accomplish all the ends designed

by the punishment of the sins of men' (40). In fact, when:

> ... we say that Christ's sufferings were penal ...
> we say nothing as to the nature or the degree of
> the pains which He endured. We only say ... that
> they were designed for the satisfaction of justice
> (41).

However, Hodge realises that such a statement could be

misunderstood, so he immediately adds:

> ... it is not to be inferred from this, however,
> that either the kind or degree of our Lord's
> sufferings was a matter of indifference ... He
> would not have suffered as He did, nor to the
> degree He did, unless there had been an adequate
> reason for it. ... There must be enough of
> self-sacrifice and suffering to give dignity and
> inherent value to the proffered atonement (42).

Both A. A. Hodge and C. Hodge oscillate between
the thought of the intrinsic value of Christ's sufferings
as constituted by his dignity as a divine human person,
and the value of Christ's sufferings as determined by
God's acceptance of them as an adequate and full satis-
faction of His justice. In other words, it would appear
to be the case that for the logical or rational pattern
of thought which speaks of the satisfaction of God's
justice through the infliction of a substituted penalty
it is essential that this is in all strictness and rigour
our penalty falling on another; but, the problems of
conceiving of an identical penalty falling on another
lead to statements which assert the equivalence of Christ's
penalty to that which should have been endured by sinners
themselves where such statements can be sustained only
by an appeal both to an intrinsic worth and to an extrinsic
worth determined solely by God. Thus, what might have
appeared as a rational and logical pattern of thought
is found to contain ambiguities that cast doubt on the
very principle involved in the notion of a substituted
penalty which fully satisfies justice in all its legal
demands (43).

By focussing on the concept of penalty, and
seeing the different ways in which penalty is seen to be
related to Christ's substitution, a variety of patterns
of thought has been disclosed, all of which fall under
the heading of penal substitution but which in fact
express quite different understandings of Christ's
substitutionary work. However, the discussion so far has
been confined to the narrow understanding of penalty and

justice as exemplified by the three propositions listed
above, but it is quite apparent that the language of penal
substitution can be sustained even in a very different
conceptual framework. This is the case when the concept
of penalty is associated directly with death rather than
with suffering or punishment although the resulting pattern
of substitution is still described as penal substitution
(44). The association of penalty and death has two
consequences.

First, it facilitates understanding that Christ
did in fact suffer the penalty for sin. If sin and death
are 'indissolubly united' (45), in the sense of a 'cause'
and an 'effect' (46), then the death of Jesus must have
a direct reference to sin. Sin issues in death, for that
is the consequence of a Holy God (47).

> God, as the One who is separated personnally
> from man, is the angry One: the necessary effect
> of this separation is the opposite of the effect
> of personal communion with God, absolute disaster,
> death in the pronounced human sense (48).

Therefore, Jesus, by his death, fulfilled the holy will of
God which decrees that sin issues in death, so that because
he came 'to die our death' (49) God's love 'breaks through'
(50) his wrath and he may forgive without denying His
holy nature.

Second, the association of penalty with death
allows for a change in perspective on how it is that
Jesus' undergoing of death satisfies God. God is satisfied,
not because an equivalent quantity of punishment deserved
by sinners has been meted out to Christ, but because
God's holy nature has been confirmed that sin issues in
death. For E. Brunner, because he retains the language

of penalty and equivalence, these consequences are less

clearly visible, although the following statement reflects

this change in awareness:

> The objective aspect of the Atonement, therefore,
> may be summed up thus: it consists in the
> combination of inflexible righteousness, with
> its penalties, and transcendent love; thus it
> means that the world-dualism caused by sin,
> which issues finally in death, is declared valid,
> and at the same time the overwhelming reality
> of the Divine Love is also justified (51).

For J. Denney, the change is more apparent:

> ... in His atoning work Christ is our Substitute.
> ... He enters into all the responsibilities that
> sin has created for us, and He does justice to
> them in His death. ... In perfect sinlessness
> He consents even to die, to submit to that
> awful experience in which the final reaction of
> God's holiness against sin is expressed. Death
> was not His due: it was something alien to One
> who did nothing amiss. But it was our due, and
> because it was ours He made it His. ... He died
> [for our sins], and in so doing acknowledged
> the sanctity of that order in which sin and
> death are indissolubly united ... for how could
> men be saved if there were not made in humanity
> an acknowledgement of all that sin is to God,
> and of the justice of all that is entailed by
> sin under God's constitution of the world (52)?

Despite the close association of this language

with the penal language that has already been described,

it is evident that there are differences which are not

superficial, and the term substitution is required to

reflect and express these changing conceptual frameworks.

Another change in the conceptual framework for

a penal understanding of the term substitution can be

discerned in the work of W. Pannenberg, which deserves

mention despite its individual character (53). The

concept of substitution employed by Pannenberg is shaped

by his hermeneutical presupposition that theological

statements must be justified 'from the human course of

the event', not 'on the basis of the incarnation' (54).
In other words, Pannenberg will not allow the theological
claim of Christ's divinity to be employed as an explan-
ation of the rationale of the cross (55). Instead,
Pannenberg gives distinctive content to the concept of
substitution by understanding Jesus' death as the
revelation of 'the punishment suffered in our place for the
blasphemous existence of humanity' (56). Jesus is judged
and condemned as a blasphemer, but his resurrection by
God shows that this judgement is unjust and invalid, so
that 'not he but the one who rejected him in the name of
the law was the blasphemer' (57). This inversion of
standards shows that those 'who rejected him as a blasphemer
... were the real blasphemers' who 'rightly deserved the
punishment that he received. Thus, he bore their punishment'
(58). The logical problems raised by this use of the concept
of blasphemy of which Christ's judges are guilty only after
his resurrection have been well argued by H. Neie, but
they are only of concern here to the extent that they
indicate that Pannenberg's treatment of the problem has
not indisputably clarified how it is that one may justly
suffer the punishment due to another (59). Further, it
should be noted, that although the concept of substitution
may be legitimised in this way from the historical events
of Jesus' death the penal aspect of the substitution
receives little attention as the significance of this
death is explored (60).

Finally, although it might seem to be going
beyond the bounds set by the heading of 'penal substitution'
it is instructive to note some uses of the term

substitution in which a penal context is denied and yet which appears to be evoked by the demands of the concept of substitution itself. F. W. Camfield, in an article already cited, attempts to outline a non-penal theory of the atonement based on the thought of P. T. Forsyth that 'not suffering, not death, not punishment, as such, but holiness' was the satisfying element in Christ's sacrifice (61). However, despite this intention, penal language reappears: 'The infliction and judgement which we could not bear, he bore for us' (62). Since the nature of this infliction is not specified further it remains unclear as to what part the concept of judgement is supposed to play in the satisfaction made by Christ (63). H. Neie detects in Moltmann's use of the term Stellvertretung (consistently translated as representation) a similar 'ambivalence' which arises because 'he too is arrested by the concept of God as the legislator who redeems intra legem' (64). Certainly such statements as 'God passes judgement on Himself, God takes the judgement on the sin of man upon Himself; He assigns to Himself the fate that men should by rights endure' (65), make use of a penal framework of thought, which Neie sees as creating an 'insoluble tension between the Christ and God who suffer out of love on our behalf and the God who suffers penally and vicariously the judgement on the unforgiveable sin and the unexpiateable' (66). Moltmann himself rejects as partial and inadequate the Jewish concept of expiatory sacrifice (67), but does not appear to have expunged such ideas from his own theology, perhaps because 'a judgemental connotation is ineradicably part and parcel of the understanding of Christ's suffering

within the framework of Luther's theologia crucis' (68).

A similar ambiguity, which can only be touched on here, is the rejection by K. Barth of the concept of punishment as the 'main concept', and particularly as the means by which satisfaction is offered to the wrath of God - 'the latter thought is quite foreign to the New Testament' (69). With regard to the idea that 'we are spared punishment by what Jesus Christ has done for us' Barth argues that 'the New Testament statements concerning the passion and death of Jesus Christ are not at all or only indirectly in this direction' (70). None the less, as a recent discussion has demonstrated (71), some confusion is created because Barth still continues to construe the atonement within the 'framework' taken from the 'sphere of the law' (72), and thus would appear to employ a penal understanding of substitution.

Summary and Observations

In this first section attention has been focussed on the penal context of the term 'substitution', a context that for many indelibly characterises the term, so that to speak of substitution a penal framwork of thought is automatically evoked. It remains to be seen in the rest of this chapter how far it is true that the concept of substitution is tied to this penal framework, but for the moment some points can be noted in summary of the material so far investigated.

First, it has been demonstrated that within a penal framework of thought there are a number of significantly different understandings of the concept of substitution,

with such 'theories' differing not just in emphasis, but in fundamental areas respecting the nature and purpose of penalty together with the manner of substitution that is appropriate to these different understandings. It is not just a difference of emphasis that sees, on the one hand, penalty being inflicted on the substitute Christ so that God's wrath may be mercifully diverted, and on the other hand, as the upholding of the moral order of the universe. Neither is it an insignificant variation that some see Christ as suffering the precise penalty that would have fallen on the sinners themselves; others see Christ as a suitable equivalent so that the demands of God's laws are fulfilled in a way that God Himself decrees to be fitting; others again see Christ substituting himself for men so that the validity of the law is demonstrated and God's government upheld. All of these variations are, and can be, described to a greater or lesser extent under the heading of penal substitution, but as the term 'penal' expresses different meanings and insights, so too the term 'substitution' comes to be associated with different patterns of thought and so carries with it these different associations.

Second, it follows from this divergence that different expressions of penal substitution are not necessarily equally vulnerable to points of criticism. It does not clarify the situation, nor does it do justice to the complexity of the issues, to seize on the least palatable expression of penal substitution in order to dismiss it as sub-christian, and thus claim to have disposed of the problem.

Third, doubt has been cast on the claim that
the conceptual framework of penal substitution offers in
itself a rational explanation of Christ's saving work,
since the notion of penal substitution can only be sub-
stantiated by an appeal to the idea of equivalence, not
to the literal identity of Christ's substitution. Any
use of the idea of equivalence, however, necessitates
some form of appeal to God who decrees or accepts that
there is indeed an equivalent. In other words, the logic
of penal substitution is not to be found in a 'closed
system', explicable in its own terms as a consistent
explanation of Christ's saving work, for at its heart
there is found to lie an appeal to God to accept this
particular substituted work, which can be advanced on
rational grounds only in the sense that it is somehow
'fitting', but which ultimately is seen to be a pure act
of grace.

Fourth, it would appear to be the case that even
in cases where those wishing to use the term 'substitution'
dissociate it from a penal context, the term may carry
with it that understanding, which then reappears without
examination, or it may evoke that context in the minds of
others and so create confusion.

Thus, the results of this section investigating
the use of the term substitution in the context of concepts
of penalty may be summed up by saying that the 'theories
of penal substitution' describe a range of interpretations
as to the nature of the penalty said to be involved in
Christ's substitutionary work, and so also describe a
range of perceptions as to the content and meaning of the

term substitution itself. Such theories shade almost
imperceptibly into theories that are claimed to be non-
penal, and they share signficantly in presuppositions that
extend beyond the confines of any particular definition
of penal substitution. It is this latter point that must
now receive further consideration and illustration under
the heading of 'substitution in the context of public
order'.

2. Substitution in the Context of Public Order

In the previous section it was demonstrated
that the language of penal substitution could accommodate
expressions concerning Christ's death where his sufferings
were seen as the means of preserving the order of God's
government. This was not necessarily seen to contradict
the principle statement that God's government is preserved
precisely because it is <u>our</u> penalty that is suffered,
but the ambiguous use of the concept of equivalence can be
seen to open up the possibility of conceiving of God being
satisfied through a means other than the literal penal
substitution of Christ in the place of the sinner (73).
The origin of this development is associated with the name
of Hugo Grotius (74), despite the fact that Grotius saw
himself as defending the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction
(75). The 'theory' linked with his name, the 'Governmental'
theory of the atonement, which was quickly seen by the
orthodox to pose a serious threat, could be developed
because Grotius' treatment of the satisfaction made by
Christ regarded his sufferings not as the penal consequence

of our sin as administered by the law but as demonstrating
an act of deference to the law, an act which is substituted
in place of the punishment of offenders so that God's
righteousness is proved as effectively as would have been
the case had offenders received their punishment (76).
In other words, Christ does not suffer penalty instead of
us, in the sense of bearing the just desert of _our_ sins,
bearing our punishment, but rather his suffering is
substituted for our punishment, replacing punishment, but
meeting the same ends (77). This is a subtle distinction,
but its force may be discerned more clearly by considering
the conceptual transformation that is involved from two
perspectives.

First, the concept of law is changed so that the
appropriate understanding is no longer governed by the
practice of criminal law, which is taken to demand
retribution in the form of punishment, but instead by the
demands of public order or rectitude. Sin violates the
moral order of the universe, which is in itself an
expression of God's order or holiness, so sin is a
challenge to God's government. It would be perfectly
just of God to punish the offender as a way of upholding
the sanctity of his law and as a way of maintaining that
order by deterring others, but there is no necessity which
compels God to act in this way. God is not bound by the
law, precisely because it is His law and therefore serves
Him and the community which He governs (78). Rather,
God is free to forgive so long as the order of this
government, His public order which maintains the good of
the universe, is maintained. To forgive freely, with no

action on God's part, would be to allow the breakdown of the order of the universe in that the law would be flouted, and would be seen to be flouted, with the result that there would be no compelling reason for it not to be flouted again in the future (79). But, Christ's sufferings are shown to uphold this moral order, for God clearly reveals His abhorrence of sin and demonstrates its seriousness for the order of the universe. Christ's death was a satisfaction, but it was not a satisfaction of distributive justice relating to the punishment of crimes, but of rectoral justice which relates to God's regard for the good of the universe (80).

Second, it can be seen that although the term 'penal' may still be used, in this context it is given the meaning of 'penal example' (81). Penalty is no longer seen to be the necessary punishment of sin, but instead is understood to be the expression of God's hatred of sin in His desire to uphold public law, which is now seen to be maintained because in the suffering of Christ there is an effective warning and deterrent against further sin.

> There is therefore nothing wrong in this, that
> God whose is the highest authority in all
> matters not in themselves unjust, and is himself
> subject to no law, willed to use the sufferings
> and death of Christ to establish a weighty
> example against the immense guilt of all, with
> whom Christ was most closely allied, by nature,
> by sovereignty, by surety (82).

When these two changes in perspective are recognised it can be seen that the treatment of the satisfaction made by Christ described by the term 'governmental' is clearly differentiated from theories of penal

substitution. The conceptual framework of the purpose
and manner of punishment has completely changed, and
therefore the character of the substitution involved is
also quite different. Those who recognised this change
argued that the concept of substitution should no longer
be used, as it had been emptied of its 'real' meaning, i.e.,
the meaning associated with a penal framework of thought
(83), but the problem with this demand is to recognise
when the context is penal and when it is governmental.
For example, the following quotation from R. Wardlaw
demonstrates just how difficult it is to specify precisely
the context of the argument and thus to determine the sense
being given to the term substitution:

> The righteousness of God is declared, or made
> manifest, by the infliction of the penalty of
> transgression on the person of Jesus Christ, as
> the voluntary surety and substitute of the
> guilty (84).

(The context at present seems to be firmly located in a
penal framework, but Wardlaw continues):

> The two great ends of public justice are, the
> glory of God, and, in connection with it, the
> general good of his creatures. -It is essentially
> necessary to the attainment of these ends ...
> that if any sinner be pardoned, it should be in
> such a way as, while it displays the Divine mercy,
> shall at the same time testify the Divine
> abhorrence of his sins (85).

The logic of substitution is then understood to be found
in the fact that:

> ... all the ends of <u>public justice</u> are fully
> answered. The law retains its complete unmit-
> igated perfection ... while the riches of mercy
> are displayed, for the encouragement of sinners
> to return to God, the solemn lesson is at the
> same time taught, by a most convincing example,
> that rebellion cannot be persisted in with
> impunity; and motives are thus addressed to the
> fear of evil, as well as to the desire of good
> (86).

Three points can be noted to conclude this section on the understanding of substitution in the context of public order. First, there is quite clearly a significant change in the concept of substitution when employed in this context as opposed to the contexts provided by the concepts of penalty outlined in section 1. This difference may be expressed in several ways: either, Christ suffers not as our substitute in bearing the penalty due to our sins, but as a substitute for punishment displaying divine abhorrence against sin; or, Christ does not suffer our punishment but is substituted as an example, witnessing to the moral order of the universe.

However, second, it is equally important to recognise that although these two contexts of penal and governmental ideas do offer significantly different accounts of how God is satisfied in the death of Christ, there is also continuity between them. Not only are the concepts of both areas of thought combined and muddled by those who wish to use the language of satisfaction, but more importantly, the governmental pattern of thought can be seen to be a reflection of an ambivalence discovered already in the concept of penalty. Even within the framework of penal theories of substitution the difficulty of the assertion that Christ has born our penalty because of our sins gives rise to an ambivalence in the language of equivalence so that Christ's sufferings are said to be adequate by God's decree; the governmental theories of substitution stand within the tradition of this problem, but offer a solution which separates further still any intrinsic relation between Christ's suffering and our penalty.

Third, within these shifting patterns of thought the term substitution is continually employed and it has to adapt to the changing context in which it finds itself. When the governmental context is clearly articulated it can be seen that the term substitution takes on a quite different meaning from that of its penal context. Christ is no longer our substitute in the sense of taking our place and suffering our punishment; rather, he is substituted by God instead of our punishment as a means of declaring His nature and purpose. In other words, when the term substitution is used it relates not to an exchange of persons, Christ for men, but an exchange of method, Christ displaying the divine abhorrence of sin substituted for our punishment (87). The logic of the term has changed, as has its function in theological vocabulary.

3. Substitution in the Context of Satisfaction

It has been noted already in the course of this chapter that the term substitution has only recently come to occupy a prominent place as a conceptual theological term in doctrines of the atonement and that the term satisfaction formerly occupied a more central and significant role. In the previous two sections reference has been made to the way substitutionary terminology changes in the context of penal understandings of satisfaction, but our concern is now with the reference of the term substitution to a non-penal understanding of satisfaction. Attention will be focussed on the work of Anselm, although it may be disputed that such a non-penal understanding of

satisfaction is to be found in the Cur Deus Homo (88).
Therefore, an outline of the argument that serves to
characterise Anselm's concept of satisfaction will be given
which seeks to demonstrate wherein such an understanding
is significantly different from the penal concepts of
satisfaction that have already been described (89). The
point of this section is not the provision of a fully
adequate outline of Anselm's atonement theology, so much
as an illustration of the fact that the term substitution
can be used in the context of an understanding of satis-
faction that is at least claimed to be non-penal, and that
it is given a different contextual framework from which its
meaning is derived, a meaning which is therefore possibly
different. The following, therefore, is an attempt to
focus on certain themes that shape the Anselmian concept
of satisfaction (90).

First, there needs to be considered Anselm's
view of sin and the consequences it has for man. Sin is
a failure of the whole man to subject his will to the will
of God, a failure of the creature to give the Creator
what is desired of him (91). Unatoned sin requires pun-
ishment, lest it be unjustly forgiven, and thus it follows
that either man must make satisfaction for this sin
against God or he must be punished (92). Since satisfaction
can only be effected by man making a positive gift to God,
over and above any repentance and correction of the sin,
Anselm regards it as impossible that man can render this
satisfaction, principally because man already owes every-
thing to God so that nothing remains to be offered as a
gift (93). Therefore, since man's offence is so serious

in being a violation of God and of His Kingdom, he must
be punished (94).

Second, there needs to be considered Anselm's
view of the Incarnation and its purpose. God does not
wish man to perish because of his sin; indeed, this would
be quite unfitting since God's purposes would then be
frustrated, but for man to be saved satisfaction must be
made (95). The solution is provided by God Himself
becoming man, who because of His sinless life can offer the
one thing which is not demanded of Him - His life (96).
The offering made by the God-<u>man</u>, the free gift of his
life, is a genuine satisfaction made by man, but because it
was the offering of the <u>God</u>-man, it was a gift greater
than all the sin and dishonour done to God, and can
therefore be the means whereby God's honour is restored
so that there is no longer the necessity that man be
punished (97).

Third, there needs to be considered Anselm's
view of the application of the work of Christ. The God-
man satisfies the violated honour of God, but it does
not thereby automatically follow that men are freed from
their debt (98). But, because the free gift of the God-
man can be said to merit a reward, and because he himself
needs nothing, in his love and mercy, and in harmony
with the saving purposes of God he gives his reward
instead to the men whom he came to save (99).

From these three points it should be clear that
the language of penalty is inappropriate as a central
description of Christ's work of satisfaction. Although
the sinner's death may be said to be the penalty for sin,

Christ's death is offered precisely not as penalty but as

an overwhelming gift to God. We must, therefore, agree

with J. McIntyre that 'St Anselm's theory cannot without

considerable explanation be called "penal"' (100), and

disagree with those who, like Brunner, see Anselm's concept

of satisfaction as holding 'the balance evenly between

the ideas of penalty and sacrifice' (101). McIntyre

comments:

> ... while St Anselm does not draw his argument
> to any conclusive statement, we may fairly say
> that the position is one of vicarious ... or
> representative satisfaction. ... If the word
> 'substitution' were not so frequently used in
> the phrase 'penal substitution' ... then the
> phrase 'substitutionary satisfaction' would not
> be inappropriate. Man ought to make the
> satisfaction, but the Deus-homo substitutes
> Himself for man and achieves that end to the
> honour of God (102).

Thus, it is possible to employ the language of

substitution in the context of an understanding of

satisfaction that contains little or no emphasis on the

role of penalty in that satisfaction. It must not be

hastily assumed, therefore, that either of the terms,

substitution or satisfaction, and in particular, in their

conjunction as substitutive satisfaction, must necessarily

evoke a penal context for their interpretation of the work

of Christ. When the term substitution is employed to

describe Anselm's thought, or any comparable framework,

its import and significance must be clearly and carefully

differentiated from the meaning given to the term in a

penal context. For McIntyre the sense of the term is

limited simply to the fact that Christ does for men what

they could not do for themselves, but the nature of the

work of satisfaction performed in the place of man directs

attention away from certain aspects of substitution and focusses attention instead on other aspects. For the main thrust of Anselm's argument is not that Christ underwent something that ought to have been undergone by man, but that he did something which man ought to have done but had failed to do. In other words, if the term substitution is characterised by the notions of replacement or commutation so that it can be said that Christ stands in our place and in our stead, then the term can not be appropriately used to describe Anselm's thought as McIntyre interprets it. However, as McIntyre realises, the term substitution also carries in its basic meaning of an exchange the sense of one standing in the place where another ought to be but in fact is not. According to this sense the term substitution can appropriately describe Christ's work of satisfaction in which in my stead and place he gives to God perfect obedience and thus restores God's honour. Thus, as McIntyre observes, the term substitution can be used in this context and is given an appropriate meaning, but only with careful qualification and in the full recognition of the different direction indicated by the term from that of its use in a penal context.

4. Substitution in the Context of the Defeat of the Devil

The material in this section may be treated briefly, since it is apparent that the use of the term substitution in the context of the defeat of the devil is not of primary significance for an understanding or

definition of the term itself. None the less, as in the previous section, the language of substitution may be employed in this context, where its meaning is determined by the understanding that Christ, in defeating the forces of evil, does something in man's place of which man himself is incapable of doing. K. Heim sees a substitutionary dimension of Christ's work against 'the Satanic will of rebellion' (103) and explains it in this way:

> Only the One whose life was a sacrifice without blemish to God could attempt the fight with the dark power without being wounded by its arrows. He fought a battle in which, if we had attempted it, we should not have stood a chance. What He did we cannot do. That is acting by proxy in the strict, exclusive sense of the word. ... It is precisely the exclusive character of His vicarious work for us that has that compelling power (104).

Indeed, for Heim, it is only in this context of a battle that the language of substitution becomes intelligible, for only here is there no immoral transfer of guilt, but an intervention by Christ to fight on our behalf and to stand for us where only he could stand (105).

> In a similar vein G. Aulén comments:

> It is clear, however, that the affirmation of Christian faith to the effect that the work of Christ was 'for us', 'for our sake', ultimately includes the conception 'in our stead'. The first expressions tend to be superceded by the latter. This approach to the work of Christ is intimately connected with the idea of his struggle and victory over the demonic forces. This struggle and victory have occurred for our sake, for our salvation and redemption. But since we have been unable to accomplish this work ourselves, it has manifestly been done in our stead (106).

> G. Lefebvre makes explicit the connection between

Christ's ransom and the term substitution:

> Just as the notion of substitutive satisfaction ... necessarily involves a relationship towards God, to whom satisfaction is given by means of

> sacrifice, so the notion of substitutive material
> ransom indicates a relationship towards the
> powers of evil in so far as they have illegit-
> imately arrogated this power to themselves (107).

Furthermore, Lefebvre links this substitution with penal

concepts by emphasising the persecution and captivity of

Christ at the hands of Satan's agents.

> Hence, if our Lord, in order to free us from this
> chastisement, from this slavery, from this
> captivity, had to substitute himself for us and
> endure from the agents of Satan the pains which
> we deserved, then truly he was a slave and
> captive (108).

Finally, J. Packer believes the term substitution to be

appropriate to describe the work of Christ in overcoming

the devil:

> The assumption is that man's plight is created
> entirely by hostile cosmic forces distinct from
> God; yet, seeing Jesus as our champion, exponents
> of this view would still properly call him our
> substitute, just as all the Israelites who
> declined Goliath's challenge in 1 Sam 17:8-11
> would properly call David their substitute (109).

Thus, in this admittedly limited use of the term substit-

ution, similar characteristics to those found in the last

section are apparent, in that the main thrust of the

argument points away from an understanding of substitution

in which our place, together with its accompanying judgement

or responsibilites, is said to be occupied by Christ, and

instead points to a work done by Christ of which we are

ourselves incapable.

5. Substitution and Inclusiveness

In the course of the study so far the attempt

has been made to illustrate and describe the varying

conceptual contexts in which the language of substitution

may be located and to explore the varying content that
can then be given to the term as it is used to explicate
the manner of Christ's salvific work. These varying
contexts have given rise to, and express different poss-
ibilities for, a range of understandings of the nature of
Christ's work before God. The present section introduces
a different topic in that the content of the term sub-
stitution is now to be found in the explication of the
relationship that exists between Christ and those for whom
his work is performed. This new context is, therefore,
not to be regarded as another alternative to those that
have already been discussed, in the sense that a penal
context can be regarded as an alternative to a non-penal
context, but instead it should be seen as providing material
for another sort of 'qualifier'(110) which is to be applied
to the term substitution to express and clarify the relation
between the substitute and those for whom he is substituted.
This new context is described by the qualifier 'inclusive',
where the concept of 'inclusive substitution' is not tied
exclusively to any particular view of substitution, but
where the term 'inclusive' may be employed to a greater
or lesser extent to qualify the meaning of substitution in
almost any context (111).

Before turning to illustrate this theme two
comments are needed to clarify the situation. First, the
context that is expressed by the term 'inclusive' is one
that occupies a prominent place in any discussion of the
term representation. It will become clear in the following
chapter that one of the central claims of those wishing
to use the term representation is that it expresses this

sense of inclusiveness more adequately than the phrase
'inclusive substitution'. Thus, it should be borne in
mind that an exploration of the theme of inclusivity
will be carried out in greater detail in the illustration
of the term representation. At present our concern lies
solely with the effect of the concept of inclusivity on
the term substitution and with the specific sense in which
the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is understood.

Second, the general description of 'inclusive
substitution' conceals two divergent patterns of thought,
which must be recognised and differentiated. The first
of these derives from the work of P. Marheineke, who
signifies by the phrase 'inclusive substitution' his under-
standing of Christ as a 'central individual', and 'centre
of history', who is determinative because he manifests
'embryonically world unity and world consummation' in his
God-manhood (112). Marheineke is exploring the Pauline
and Irenean motif of the Second Adam and the recapitulation
of all things in him (113), but his concern is to provide
a 'Christological interpretation of history' (114), and
only in this sense to relate the concept of inclusivity
to the substitutionary work of Christ. In other words,
Marheineke's use of the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is
closely related to certain uses of the term representation
that express an understanding of Christ as archetype or
prototype, a motif that will receive more detailed attention
in the next chapter.

The second pattern of thought that can be
expressed by the phrase 'inclusive substitution', and the
one that is to be considered in this section, is perhaps

best illustrated by the following words of L. Morris:

> Nothing less than this is adequate to the
> biblical view of oneness with Christ as the
> necessary correlate of substitution. ... The
> biblical substitution is not a purely external,
> more or less academic kind of substitution. It
> is a substitution in which the believer is
> existentially involved. He is caught up in the
> struggle. He is transformed. Substitution is
> inclusive (115).

Thus, according to this pattern of thought, the notion of

inclusive substitution is employed to counter the charge

of externality or exclusiveness that would seem to be

implied in the use of the term substitution alone. The

meaning that is given to substitution of an act 'in our

stead', or 'in our place', is now to be understood not as

a replacement, but as an act in which believers (or

possibly all humanity) are also 'involved'. As G. Capaldi

comments:

> The concept of 'substitution' must receive its
> content within the context of a Christ who acts
> once for all but yet to whom we are united in
> our actions as part of that original act. Hence
> 'substitution' can never be taken to mean simply
> 'replacement' (116).

Capaldi goes on to explain this act of Christ as that

which is:

> ... inclusive of my act in its own full part-
> icularity and individuality. For Jesus Christ
> makes room for my act; his act is precisely to
> provide time and place for my act (117).

W. Pannenberg, in a section entitled 'the concept

of inclusive substitution' relates this inclusivity to

the overcoming of death (118). Jesus dies alone, excluded

'from the nearness of God' and from 'community with the

God whose coming Kingship he had proclaimed' (119). But,

his substitution is inclusive so that:

> ... no one else must die this death of eternal
> damnation, to the extent that he has community
> with Jesus. Men still have to die, - Jesus'
> substitution does not take man's place in that
> sense - but now their death is taken into the
> community of Jesus' dying so that they have a
> hope beyond death, the hope of the coming
> resurrection to the life that has already
> appeared in him (120).

However, it remains true that the concept of
inclusive substitution is not widely employed in these
specific and explicit senses. This must be partly a
result of the obvious difficulties of associating two
concepts that would normally appear to be mutually
contradictory. How can an act that is initially defined
as being performed in my place, in stead of me, also be
understood to include me and my own act? The logical and
theological problems involved in the concept of inclusive
substitution will be investigated more fully in chapter V,
but it is already clear that the new and strange content
that is being given to the term substitution raises
serious questions as to its continuing intelligibility.
It would also appear to be the case that the concept of
inclusive substitution is employed comparatively rarely
because the concept of representation is believed to
express this inclusive dimension, and thus a combination
of the terms substitution and representation is more
common than the problematic phrase 'inclusive substitution'.
Thus, W. Wolf says that Christ:

> ... is our 'substitute' in that he does what
> we could never do by our own power, but it
> is a representative and inclusive 'substitution'
> (121).

The inverted commas around the term 'substitution' betray
Wolf's unease with the use of the term in this context.
Thus, it may be concluded that not only does the phrase

'inclusive substitution' raise questions as to the credibility and coherence of such a concept, but so too does a particular combination of the terms substitution and representation (122).

Summary and Observations

The use of the term substitution has been examined and described as it is found in the contexts of penalty, public order, satisfaction, victory, and inclusiveness. Attention was focussed on the first two contexts of penalty and public order since it is these contexts that are generally understood to provide the setting for the term and where its meaning is said to be established. It was observed, even within this limited contextual framework, that the term substitution could express significantly different meanings, thus already demonstrating that the term is not a simple concept with a single or narrowly defined meaning and that it can not be used in ways that assume a self-evident or self-explanatory meaning. The discussion of the contexts of satisfaction and victory demonstrates that even if the term substitution is not central or determinative here, it could none the less be employed and in so doing could express and evoke a different range of meanings. Finally, the concept of inclusiveness as employed in relation to the term substitution was seen to open up yet another conceptual sphere in which the term was claimed to have a direct reference. The impression that results from the complete study is one of the complexity of the term

substitution as evinced by the range and variety of the
meanings that it has been held to be capable of expressing.

One further observation must be made to prepare
for the critical discussion and analysis of these findings
in Chapter IV. It has become clear that the term
substitution is an interpretative conceptual tool which
organises and expresses a cluster of concepts that are
held to play some part in Christian thought on the
atonement. To adopt Packer's terminology, these concepts
may include the primary 'control' models of scripture,
but they may equally well include models which bear some
relation to scripture but which gain more precise content
from other sources - e.g. the concept of penalty, which
has been seen to be only partially and indirectly linked
with the Bible (123). The term substitution is employed
to organise and express the relationship between a number
of these concepts, and in so doing, becomes coloured by
the resulting framework of thought. The development that
then takes place around the term, and which is the cause
of such confusion, is a complex process involving an
interplay between these different concepts and between
these concepts and the different frameworks of thought
of which they are, to a greater or lesser extent, a part;
an interplay that may sometimes be occasioned by a creative
ability of the term itself. Thus, in giving conceptual
clarity and systematic structure to these various concepts,
the term substitution itself provides the opportunity for
new insights and fresh developments, perhaps even for
opposing or contradictory statements, as the resulting
concept of substitution is tested against the range of

concepts which it is attempting to interpret. Therefore, in any assessment of the term substitution this complex interplay that takes place between the different concepts, between the term substitution and certain specific concepts, and between the resulting conceptual framework and other concepts, must be recognised. This means that there is only limited value in taking a 'known' definition of the term substitution and judging other meanings in relation to this. Rather, this first chapter has demonstrated that the complexity and variety of the meanings given to the term substitution is an inevitable consequence of the complexity of the conceptual frameworks in which the Christian doctrine of the atonement is expressed.

CHAPTER III

PATTERNS OF REPRESENTATION IN CHRISTIAN

ATONEMENT THEOLOGY

Introduction

Our study turns now from examination of the
diversity and range of meanings that can be given to
the term substitution and focusses attention instead on
the use of the term representation in the context of
Christian atonement theology. As in the last chapter,
where a brief look at modern theological uses of the
word substitution helped to introduce its specific
theological senses, so too an account of the non-
theological uses of the term representation will assist
in the understanding of its theological uses. In the
case of the term representation this is of even greater
importance since the possible range of meanings is far
broader than was possible for the term substitution.
Three different aspects of the term can be readily
portrayed.

First, the political meaning of representation.
It has already been noted that critics of the theological
use of the term representation see this constitutional
or elective reference as a decisive reason for its
inadmissability in atonement theology since it cannot
be said that we elect or appoint Christ as our

representative (1). However, even a brief glance at
the discussion which surrounds the political concept of
representation reveals that such a criticism construes
the meaning of representation too narrowly and
simplistically. G. Sartori lists no fewer than seven
alternative descriptions of democratic representation,
listed here not only because they demonstrate the
complexity of this language, but also because they will
be seen to be paralleled by various theological uses
of the term.

i) The people freely and periodically elect
a Body of Representatives - the electoral
theory of representation.

ii) The governors are accountable or
responsible to the governed - the
responsibility theory of representation.

iii) The governors are agents or delegates who
carry out the instructions received from
their electors - the mandate theory of
representation.

iv) The people feel the same as the state -
the idem sentire, or syntony, theory of
representation.

v) The people consent to the decisions of
their governors - the consent theory of
representation.

vi) The people share, in some significant way,
in the making of relevant political
decisions - the participation theory of
representation.

vii) The governors are a representative sample
of the governed - the resemblance, or
mirroring theory of representation (2).

Thus, in the political sense of the term representation,
to be able to say that A represents B is to invoke any
number of complex models which serve to substantiate or
warrant such a description (3). If this is borne in
mind in any enquiry into the theological use of the
term representation it should guard against any premature
rejection of the term on the grounds of a simplistic
picture of election.

        Second, there is the more general sense in
which the term representation functions to denote 'a
making present', either of a person or a thing. It is
in this sense that a lawyer may be said to represent
a client, a salesman to represent a company or product,
an ambassador to represent a monarch or head of state.
In all such cases the representative speaks for and
acts in the name of the one represented so that the
two parties are in some sense identified, and the
representative can both be regarded and treated as though
he 'embodied' the person or the one represented (4).
In the case of the lawyer representing a client the
position is not so much that he 'makes him present' but
that he enables him to appear in the most favourable
light, and in this way so to act on his behalf. However,
in case it be supposed that this concept of representation
is confined to the area of personal delegation it should
be noted also that a national represents his country,
whether he wishes it or not. The American hostages
held in Iran represented America, and it was assumed
almost without question that an act of violence against
them could be legitimately construed as an act of
violence against America, or against all Americans.
Similarly, a soldier represents his country, not just
in the sense of fighting for it, but by the identification
of their fates and actions. A soldier who flees from
battle is taken to shame his country, precisely because
it is his country that is represented in that situation.
Thus, representation involves patterns of identification,
between people and between things, so that any 'making

present' is not simply a game of make-believe but an
issue of real importance (5).

Third, representation can also involve the sense
of 'typification'. Thus, someone or something is said
to be representative of a larger group if he or it is a
typical example, embodying or bringing to expression the
characteristics of that group. On the other hand, this
sense of representation may carry with it the idea of the
ideal or exemplar of a group, as one who does not simply
sum up characteristics already present, but who embodies
ideal qualities for which the rest of the group must
struggle but for whom they are normative (6). This
idea of representation may also carry with it a more
abstract aspect in which the sense of representation
is closely identified with the concept of a symbol. A
lion represents or symbolises strength, a character in
a story represents or symbolises good or evil, and
models or diagrams may represent or symbolise realities
in a manner that is possible to grasp.

These examples by no means exhaust the poss-
ibilities of the term representation, but they indicate
something of its complexity and point to the range and
variety of meaning that can be expected as the theolog-
ical concept of representation is explored. To
facilitate this description the material in this chapter
will be divided into three parts, each of which expresses
a facet or dimension that is taken to be of particular
significance to the term representation. First, the
use of the term will be explored as it gives expression
to an understanding of the work of Christ that is said

to be done 'on our behalf' but not 'in our stead'.
Second, the use of the term will be considered as it
expresses the conviction that Christ's work has a
communal or inclusive character. Third, the use of the
term representation will be considered that expresses the
Ideal or archetypal quality of Christ. In all three
parts these general headings provide the context in
which a detailed examination can be made of the variety
of uses to which the term representation can be put.
As will become clear, the boundaries between these
different meanings are not clearly defined, and the
different uses are not mutually exclusive, so that the
thought of any one theologian may well range across the
whole spectrum of thought, a phenomenon that accounts in
part for the attractiveness of the term. This means
that, as with the first chapter, the material used here
to illustrate these different uses should not be taken
to be an adequate account of any particular theologian's
thought or work, but instead as a means of illustrating
and advertising the complexity, variety and range of the
term representation.

1. Representation and the Work of Christ

It is a commonplace among writers on the
atonement that the term substitution describes an act
that is done in our stead, while the term representation
describes an act performed on our behalf, and although
a sharp distinction is often said to be present between
these two expressions it is generally the case that the

nature of the distinction remains unclear (7). This
discussion of the appropriateness of the terms substit-
ution and representation is often closely linked to a
discussion of the New Testament prepositions ἀντί and
ὑπέρ (8). However, it must be clear that if the terms
substitution and representation are given meaning
primarily from their contextual frameworks, as this
study argues, a discussion of these prepositions can be
of only limited significance for the terms themselves.
In addition, the task of determining the meaning of these
prepositions is itself fraught with difficulty (9), a
fact which prompted R. Dale to comment that 'the fact of
the Atonement - if it be fact - is neither to be
established nor imperilled by controversies on the force
of a greek preposition, about whose precise value
scholars can have any grave doubt' (10). An act may be
performed on our behalf by being done in our stead, and
an act performed in our stead may perhaps be rightly
interpreted as being on our behalf, but there is no
necessary exclusion of one from the other. If a
distinction is to be made between these expressions, and
thus between certain uses of the terms substitution and
representation, the distinction must be introduced on
the basis of the different contextual frameworks which
only then may give some substance to the claim that there
is a significant difference between a work done in our
stead and a work done on our behalf. These phrases
have to be given content, and, as has been shown, the
content of the phrase 'in our stead' has proved remarkably
diverse; it remains to be shown that the content of the

phrase 'on our behalf' is equally complex. Four different, but overlapping contexts will be examined in this section to illustrate this use of the term representation as expressing a work of Christ done on our behalf.

a)   There may be briefly considered the use of the term representation in the context of the 'active obedience' of Christ, as may be evinced by the following quotation from the work of A. A. Hodge:

> ... when we say that Christ was the substitute of his people we affirm this to be true of him viewed in his function as a sacrifice. When we say that he is the Representative, we affirm this to be true of him as the second Adam or federal Head, undertaking and discharging all the obligations of the broken law in our stead (11).

Hodge relates this obedience of Christ to his position as second Adam or federal Head, concepts which will be examined in more detail later, but H. Smith uses the term representation to describe the obedience of Christ in the course of an examination of Patristic writings:

> Salvation may be regarded as the result of the Incarnation itself; or of Christ's active obedience as our Representative, not necessarily as that of his substitutionary death (12).

Referring to Irenaeus' understanding of 'recapitulation' he says 'here we have the effect of Christ's "Active Obedience" as not only our example, but our Representative' (13). Christ is termed our representative in his fulfilment of the law's requirements because, even though there may be nothing that the believer's work can add to this fulfilment, and thus, although it is a work done 'in our stead', yet Christian discipleship

requires that his pattern of obedience is brought to bear on the believer's life, in order that it may begin to become his own, and therefore Christ's work is one of representation fulfilling perfectly what must be repeated imperfectly. V. Taylor comments on Christ's obedience:

> The obedience is also representative obedience;
> it is the obedience which men ought to offer to
> God, and which they would offer if they
> fulfilled the obligations of their sonship.
> As representing men, Christ in His suffering
> offers that obedience, truly embodied in
> Himself, in their name and for their sake,
> not by way of barter or exchange, but with
> the intention that they should identify them-
> selves with it and so offer it themselves (14).

b)   It is in the context of a theory of sacrificial offering that the term representation is most commonly used in connection with an act of Christ performed on our behalf. This interpretation of the meaning and rationale of sacrifice is raised in conscious opposition to the view of sacrifice that sees a confirmation therein of the principle of penal substitution and it diverges sharply from it. In this new interpretation three aspects or features of sacrifice can be related to the concept of representation.

First, the notion of identification, associated with the laying of the hands of the offerer on the head of the victim, an act which does not transfer sin but which identifies the animal victim with the guilty party and thus constitutes it the representative of that person. The language of identification will be explored more fully in section 2 of this chapter, but for the moment

it can be noted that this identification precludes the
possibility of regarding the animal as a substitute and
leads instead to the view that the animal's death
represents the desire of the worshipper to give his life
totally to God while recognising his own impurity and
defilement. Thus, for example, S. C. Gayford comments:

> We have seen that the connection between
> offerer and victim was so close that it could
> in no unreal sense be called an identity,
> and that the laying on of hands symbolically
> represented the identification ... the offering
> was not merely 'vicarious' in the sense of
> being made instead of, in the place of (vice),
> another. The victim was not a substitute but
> a Representative, a deputy, for that other,
> and in symbol identified with him (15).

Second, instead of the sacrifice being viewed
as a process of punishment, the aspect of 'offering' is
emphasised. In the animal the worshipper offers to God
a purified and sanctified life, an act which expresses
the worshipper's desire to be so regarded by God, to be
presented before God as this pure and pleasing gift (16).
If Christ's death is regarded as a sacrifice his role
will be seen not as victim but as Priest, the one in
whom we are presented before God, so that God looks on us
only as we are in him, a holy and pure offering acceptable
in his sight (17). V. Taylor well expresses this aspect
of the representative offering of Christ:

> The truer view of the representative activity
> of Jesus is one which recognises that in His
> suffering and death He has expressed and
> effected that which no individual man has the
> power or spirituality to achieve, but into
> which, in virtue of an ever-deepening fellowship
> with Him, man can progressively enter so that
> it becomes their offering to God (18).

Third, consequent upon this notion of identific-
ation and the idea that Christ's sacrifice is an offering
to God, the concept of representation expresses the
sense in which the offerer is obliged to participate in
the life of the offering by the conformation of his own
actions and attitudes to those expressed by his rep-
resentative (19). Thus, it may be claimed that the
crucial distinction between a substitutionary sacrifice
and a representative offering is that in the latter
there is a moral obligation on the part of the one
represented to repeat and appropriate in his own life the
qualities that have been claimed as potentially his in
the person of his representative. This concept of
representation as an imitative participation extends
beyond the confines of sacrificial views of the atone-
ment but its characteristics are to be clearly seen here.
Thus, for Taylor, the representative offering of Christ
does not 'indicate one whose activity lies apart from
ourselves, or serves instead of our own, but one whose
service leaves in our hands the decisive word in the
affirmation of faith' (20). This means that with respect
to Christ's offering of obedience, submission and
penitence it is in the name and for the sake of men
'not by way or barter or exchange, but with the intention
that they should identify themselves with it and so
offer it themselves' (21).

c)   The theme of sacrifice leads on naturally to
the theme of intercession as a context where Christ is

said to act as a representative on our behalf. The

theme receives detailed treatment in F. Schleiermacher

who argues that representation consists of two points:

> Christ appears before the Father, first, to
> establish our fellowship with Him, and then,
> further, to support our prayer before the
> Father. ... in virtue, therefore, of that
> relation to us which is based upon His peculiar
> dignity He remains the representative of the
> whole human race, for like the High Priest, He
> brings our prayer before God and conveys to us
> the divine blessings (22).

d)   The term representation has been commonly used

in the context of describing the theory of 'vicarious

penitence', and the conviction that Christ on our behalf

representatively offered a perfect penitence to the

Father's judgement on sin. Although neither McLeod

Campbell (23) nor Moberly (24), the main proponents of

this view, give an important place to the term repres-

entation, by the early part of this century their views

could be described under the heading of 'the represent-

ative theory' (25). This description is also aided by

such writers as V. Taylor who give an important place

to the term representation within the context of the

language of vicarious penitence (26). However, this

description can be misleading if the concept of rep-

resentation is identified or allied in any particular

way with the concept of penitence. It is correct to

indicate that in the theory of vicarious penitence a

significant place may be given to the concept of

representation as it denotes the identification of

Christ with mankind and the union that must be entered

into between each individual and Christ which establishes
and applies the vicarious quality of Christ's penitence,
but there is no intrinsic or necessary connection
between the concept of representation and penitence. The
theory of vicarious penitence may well include the concept
of representation, but there is no connection close
enough to warrant its description as 'the representative
theory'.

Summary

The first part of this chapter has demonstrated
how the term representation functions to express the
conviction that Christ's work is in some sense 'on our
behalf'. In the first three contexts described - the
active obedience of Christ, his sacrificial offering, and
his heavenly intercession - it was shown how the term
representation was employed to designate these works
as being on our behalf and some basic characteristics
were thereby illustrated which were taken to differ-
entiate the term representation from the term substit-
ution. This was seen most clearly in the description
of the use of the term representation in the context
of sacrificial language, emphasising the continuity
between Christ's work and our response through his
identification with us, through the presentation and
offering of himself to God with which we are identified,
and through our imitation of, and participation in,
those qualities and actions which evince the purity and
holiness of his life. Throughout the discussion, however,

(and this point came to the fore while considering the theory of vicarious or representative penitence) it was impossible to avoid making reference to the use of the term representation that is concerned to describe not the character of Christ's work but the nature of his relation to us. That is, to answer the problem of how any work may be said to be in the place of, or on behalf of, another. It is this use of the term representation to describe the inclusive character of Christ and his relation to mankind that must now be considered.

2. Representation in the Context of Inclusivity

In this section the fundamental question that the term representation is said to answer is 'what is the relation between Christ and other men such that his work can be said to be for them?' In other words the term representation is now considered not in the context of the work of Christ but in the context of the relation between Christ and others (27). Thus, with this use of the term representation, there may be found some complementary description of Christ's work which utilises the term substitution; or it may be the case that the term representation will carry a number of meanings which express both the relation that subsists between Christ and others and the manner of his work. This double reference of the term explains in part its complexity and the difficulties inherent in accurately determining its meaning, but the situation is complicated

further by the variety of means by which the relation
between Christ and others may be expressed. In order to
help clarify these different expressions and uses of the
term representation the material in this section will
be grouped under two main headings: the organic relation
and the elective relation. The material as a whole
points towards the concept of representation as expressing
inclusivity or community, and the divisions found in
this section are not intended to signify precise or
sharp boundaries, but only to point up the different
ways in which the term can be used to signify the
inclusive character of Christ's work. There is, of
course, a fluidity and ease of movement across this
spectrum of thought, and the quotations adduced from a
range of theologians are not intended to be an exhaustive
description of their thought but simply a means of
highlighting and illustrating the different patterns of
thought that can be expressed in this context by the
term representation.

a)   Representation and the Organic Relation Between
        Christ and Humanity

        The term 'organic' in the above heading is
perhaps misleading if it is taken to refer only to a
'biological' context, for the material in this section
will describe a range of concepts that illustrate some
dimension of inclusiveness that is ontological in its
formulation. Clearly there is an abundance of theol-
ogical material that describes such a relation between

Christ and humanity, but our concern here is limited to the specific use of such material within the context of the term representation, or to such material that the term representation is taken to describe or evoke. In order to recognise and appreciate the complexity and diversity of this material the following description will proceed from three different perspectives. First, there will be described the relation denoted by the term representation that employs the language of Christ's assumption of Man or Humanity in the Incarnation. Second, there will be described the relation denoted by the term representation that employs the language of solidarity, corporeity, or incorporation. Third, a number of biblical motifs are selected together with comments that serve to demonstrate the use made of such language to describe the organic relation between Christ and others with the aid of the term representation.

i)   The first approach to be described that associates the term representation with an organic relation between Christ and others involves a pattern of thought that sees in Christ's incarnation the assumption of Man or Humanity so that all individual men are thereby included 'in Christ' (28). This pattern of thought is exemplified in the writing of R. C. Moberly who argues that as Christ is to be understood not as a God among Gods but as perfect God so too he must be understood not as a man among men but as Man:

> His relation to the race was not a differ-
> entiating but a consumating relation. He was
> not generically but inclusively man (29).

E. Mascall comments on the same theme:

> In the language of traditional theology,
> Christ both paid man's debt to God and
> destroyed the power of the devil. And we must
> notice for the fulfilment of both these aspects
> of redemption it is necessary that he shall be
> both the consubstantial Son of God the Father
> and also, in his impersonal and universal
> human nature, the representative of all mankind
> (30).

With respect to this 'debt' which must be paid, Mascall

uses the terminology of representation to remove the

'crudity and barbarity' of some views of the atonement,

for there is 'no question of the wrong person being

punished for the offence, for Christ is one with us in

his function as the representative and universal man,

consubstantial with us as touching the manhood' (31).

One of the main problems that arises in

illustrating this theme of Christ as Man and the

representative of all men is to know precisely in what

sense such terms as man, Man, the Man, humanity or

Humanity are being used. In Chapter V a careful analysis

will be offered of the different models that underlie

these expressions, but for the moment the theme will

simply be illustrated. Thus, J. Dunn comments that:

> ... in Paul's theology Jesus represents <u>man</u>,
> not just a man, on the cross, ... the point is
> that he died not <u>instead</u> of man, but <u>as</u> man (32).

B. Westcott comments that:

> If Christ had been born as other men, he would
> have been one man of many, limited by an
> individual manhood, and not in very truth the
> Son of Man, the perfect representative of the

> whole race. ... We can see that the Divine
> personality of the Son, the Son of <u>God</u>, the
> Son of Man, harmonises the two facts of a true
> manhood and a universal manhood in Christ, and
> gives to this Humanity that absolute complete-
> ness in which each man to the end of time can
> find the fulfilment of his partial nature,
> and through which the will of God could be
> accomplished for all under the conditions of
> earthly existence (33).

Two additional points about this language of the universal and representative humanity of Christ need to be made at this stage. First, such language is widely to be found in those writers previously examined in the context of substitutionary expressions of the atonement. P. Van Buren makes considerable use of the term representative to denote Calvin's emphasis on the fact that it is <u>our flesh</u> that Christ lays down for our salvation, and that it is his and our humanity that is risen and ascended to heaven:

> Christ did not die as a single man, alone and
> to Himself; He died as our representative,
> so that we are united with Him in His death,
> because of the union He has made between Himself
> and ourselves by becoming our true Substitute,
> and we have therefore died with him (34).

In a different context Anselm can use the language of 'human nature' to link the salvific effect of Christ in individuals to his one act of satisfaction:

> For he who was not obliged [to undergo] death
> and who, having kept justice, would have avoided
> death, freely and for the sake of justice .
> endured death, which was inflicted upon him.
> Thus, in that man human nature freely and out
> of no obligation gave to God something of its
> own, so that it might redeem itself in others
> in whom it did not have what it, as a result
> of indebtedness, was required to pay (35).

Second, it should not be thought that writers who use this language of Christ's representative humanity

are unaware of the difficulties involved, or that they
suppose themselves to be committed to a particular
philosophical stance on the status of universals (36).
For example, J. Torrance claims that his description of
Jesus as representative and inclusive humanity does not
involve a platonic concept of the Ideal man, for if it
did:

> ... then the important thing would be not Jesus
> as an individual, but the Ideal, the Principle
> he embodied. It is rather the thoroughly non-
> dualistic biblical thought of Jesus being not
> only a man but the Man in whom God has given
> Himself to the world and for the world, that
> his purposes for Man might be brought to
> fulfilment (37).

ii)   The second approach to be considered of the use
of the term representation in the context of an inclusive
relation which is said to exist between Christ and others
is associated with the language of 'corporeity' and
'solidarity'. As was mentioned earlier there is no
clear boundary between this material and that of the
previous sub-section, but a number of new perspectives
will be seen to be given to the term representation by
this new material so as to warrant this differentiation.

. The language of corporeity is probably given
most explicit consideration in the use of the phrase
'corporate personality' (38). G. Lampe, commenting on
a range of scriptural ideas - the summing up of men in
Christ the New Adam, the ἀρχηγός of the epistle to the
Hebrews - claims that behind this language:

> There lies the Hebraic idea of corporate
> personality, the notion which finds expression
> in the Old Testament tendency to think of the
> nation collectively as a single person, Israel;
> to mingle ... the thought of the patriarchs
> as individuals with the idea of the same
> patriarchs as the corporate personae of the
> tribes which traced their descent from them,
> so that the ancestor can stand for the tribe
> as its Representative. ... life is more than
> the life of the individual ... it extends
> to the group, bound together as a single entity,
> capable of being represented by, summed up
> in and almost personified by a single
> individual life (39)

Christ is the representative of man because he includes

them (40) in his corporate personality and can act as

one on behalf of the many (41).

However, the language of corporeity extends

beyond the notions of corporate personality in its

bearing on the use of the term representation. The

motif of the Body of Christ is significant in this respect

since it can offer another context for defining the

inclusiveness of Christ so that he may be man's rep-

resentative. L. Thornton writes:

> When Christ died something happened once for
> all, not only to him who died, but to all for
> whom he died. They also died with him upon
> the cross. ... The Messiah and his people
> together form one organism. It was this new
> organism which was nailed to the cross and
> which was afterwards triumphantly raised from
> the dead. To it, in principle, all mankind
> belongs; and therefore, in some sense, 'they
> all died' upon the cross. They were identified
> with their representative in what he there did
> for them, just as in that same event he was
> identified with them in their sinful condition
> (42).

For Thornton the concept of the body of Christ has a

double reference in that it points back to the physical

constitution of Jesus and points forward to the reality

of the Church (43). This double reference allows Thornton
to make statements about the inclusive quality of Jesus'
physical constitution and the acts which he performed
as, for example, 'Christ and the Church are one flesh
... the mystical body was implicitly included in the
mortal body from the first' (44).

A more usual use of the language of corporeity,
however, is to be found in the concept of incorporation.
This incorporation of the believer into Christ may be
regarded as the realisation of a representation which was
already potential in Christ's assumption of humanity
(45); or incorporation may be regarded as the act that
actually constitutes Christ as our representative:

> ... Christ is the inclusive representative of
> the people of God, or redeemed humanity, which
> constitutes in union with him a sort of
> corporate personality. ... Now Christ died
> and rose again, and 'as One has died for all,
> then all have died' (2 Cor 5:14) - all, that
> is to say, who are incorporated in that people
> of God which is 'the body of Christ' (46).

In addition to the use of the language of
corporeity to express the inclusive and representative
significance of Christ there is also to be found the
closely connected language of solidarity.

> ... The priestly office expresses the fact
> that Christ is on the side of man, that in
> solidarity with him he lets himself come under
> the pressure of history, its guilt, its
> oppression ($\theta\lambda\tilde{\iota}\psi\iota\varsigma$), and its finitude. Here
> then, being true man, he is man's representative
> and in this capacity stands over against God
> (47).

The language of solidarity may function simply as an
alternative to the language of incorporation, preserving
the physical or ontological form of the union by the

concept of 'being made solid' with Christ (48). The

language of solidarity, however, takes on a different

set of ideas when it is used in the context of the idea

of social solidarity, a solidarity that is constituted

by patterns of dependence and interaction. B. Westcott

observes that:

> 50 years ago the term 'solidarity' and the idea
> which it conveys were alike strange or unknown.
> We had not apprehended in any living way that
> we are, as St Paul says, literally members of
> one another, as men and nations (49).

H. Johnson sees solidarity:

> ... Both in terms of heredity and environment.
> We are linked with the human race in the sense
> that we draw the raw material of personality
> from our ancestors through the medium of
> heredity. ... We are also connected to the
> rest of humanity through the medium of
> environment. What others do vitally effects
> us for good or ill; what we do does not merely
> concern us, but has effects upon our fellow
> men (50).

It is this phenomenon of solidarity that explains our

'link' with Christ and thus how his act is a 'victory

achieved by the One for the Many' (51). This, too, seems

to be what E. Peterman means by representative physical

satisfaction:

> Christ himself is representative in the order
> of physical reality, for Christ, in solidarity
> with human history, is the event that re-orients
> history's deviation; in solidarity with human
> society, he is that social Person who is able
> to shape the form of social living, in solid-
> arity with men, he is that person who is
> able to convert man's person and restore his
> nature (52).

iii)   This third sub-section is not concerned to

provide any new subject matter with regard to the

inclusive and representative work of Christ but to
illustrate the way in which this language can function
to interpret biblical themes. To this end four passages
have been chosen that specifically relate the term
representation to four different motifs. First, the
motif of Adam:

> Adam is a name which stands to [Paul] for the
> 'corporate personality' of mankind, and a new
> 'corporate personality' is created in Christ.
> All that Christ did and suffered he did and
> suffered as 'inclusive Representative' of the
> new humanity which emerges in him. This idea
> is very fundamental to Paul's thought about
> the person and work of Christ (53).

Second, the motif of the High Priest:

> The covenant between Yahweh and Israel was
> concentrated as it were, in the person of the
> High Priest ... it is this thought that lies
> behind the New Testament and patristic under-
> standing of the inclusive and representative
> humanity of Christ, the Mediator of the New
> Covenant, who represents God to man and man
> to God in his own Person as the One on behalf
> of the Many (54).

Third, the motif of the Son of Man:

> In the manhood of Jesus Christ is summed up
> the whole human race. He is not just one among
> many, a son of man, but One in whom all others
> are represented, the Son of Man (55).

Fourth, the motif of the New Israel:

> The New Israel, according to the New Testament
> thought, is 'in Christ' as the Jews were in
> Abraham, or as mankind was in Adam. The Messiah,
> the Christ, is at once an individual person -
> Jesus of Nazareth - and he is more: he is, as
> the representative and (as it were) the
> constitutive person of the New Israel, potent-
> ially inclusive. He includes, he is one with,
> the New Israel; and the New Israel is one with,
> is united to, him, as its head (56).

b)   Representation and Election

While the association of representation and

election is perhaps not surprising in a democratic
context, the treatment of this pattern of ideas may not
be supposed to occur most naturally under the general
heading of an _inclusive_ relation. However, even when
an elected representative is considered within a
political sphere, inclusive language is not judged to be
out of place (57). An MP represents his constituents,
speaking and acting in their name, concentrating them,
as it were, into a single person in whom they might be
said to be 'present'. While it should be noted that
this pattern of democratic concepts goes some way
towards an understanding of the theological use of the
term representation within the context of election, it
is by no means a sufficient description. For, as shall
be seen, it is precisely the concern of those who use
such theological language of representation and election
to establish the inclusive relation between Christ and
others _not_ in a constitutional sense but in terms of an
ontological unity or community. J. Owen indicates this
idea when he describes Christ as the Federal Head of
the elect so that:

> ... when he is punished, they also are
> punished: for in this point of view the federal
> head, and those represented by him, are not
> considered as distinct, but as one: for although
> they are not one in respect of personal unity,
> they are however one; that is, one body, in
> mystical union: yea, one mystical Christ: viz
> the surety is the head, those represented by
> him the members; and when the head is punished,
> the members also are punished (58).

The point is argued by H. Martin who pays more
exclusive attention to the concepts of the Covenant and

the Federal Union so that the substitutionary work of
Christ may be grounded in a 'real' relation with 'those
for whom his atonement is available' (59).

> The eternal covenant oneness - the federal
> union - grounds the representative character
> of the Messiah and his substitution and
> suretyship. Each of these three relations
> indeed, leans for support on that which
> preceeds it: suretyship justified by substit-
> ution; substitution by real representation;
> representation, by federal union or covenant
> oneness. And here ultimately the series
> terminates and rests - rests in the unchange-
> able council and will of the sacred three (60).

However, to illustrate the way in which the
elective relation between Christ and humanity can be
associated with the term representation, the use made
of that term by the translators of Barth's Church
Dogmatics will be briefly described (61).

> If we listen to what scripture says concerning
> man, then at the point where our attention
> and thoughts are allowed to rest there is
> revealed an elect man, the elect man, and
> united in Him and represented by Him an elect
> people (62).

In other words, although election is a decision, and as
such has verbal parallels with a constitutional pattern
of election and representation (63), precisely because
it is the decision of God this election is decisive and
constitutive for every man. Because Jesus Christ is
electing God and elected man in him is known the decision
of God concerning men, and Jesus' history becomes the
decisive and constitutive history of all men (64). In
Jesus, therefore, God is not dealing with humanity as
such, or with an abstract *humanum*, but with one man,
from whom all others take their being and their history

(65). Because of the primacy and completeness of the election of Jesus Christ and because of the derivative and dependent, but still decisive election that is made known concerning other men, ontological statements have to be made to describe this relation, but they are statements which are grounded in the decision of God which as such is decisive for the being of man (66).

The character and purpose of the election of Jesus Christ and therefore the election of all individuals in him shall be illustrated shortly, but first it should be noted that this pattern of election and representation cuts right across one of the most common objections that is raised against the use of the term representation. As was noted in Chapter I the objection is raised that the term representation always suggests or posits a relation between two parties that is established from the side of the constituent, so that the representative is considered to be dependent upon the constituent and cannot be conceived apart from him (67). However, in the use of the terms election and representation in the Church Dogmatics there could be no suggestion of this manner of relation. Election is the decision of God concerning men, and Christ is man's representative solely because all other elect are elect in him despite their decision concerning their representative (68). This pattern of representation is not established from the side of the constituent but rather is one that establishes the constituent (69).

The character and content of this representation

can best be illustrated by a consideration of the twofold

form that Christ's election takes - the rejection of

man and the election to exaltation and participation in

the glory of God (70).

First, regarding man as sinner, God wills his

rejection, which is to say, his destruction (71). It is

not simply a matter of the bearing away of sin, for sin

only has reality in the orientation of the man who

turns from God and therefore hastens to his destruction:

it is the man of sin who is judged and rejected by God

(72).

> This is what happened when Jesus Christ, who
> willed to make Himself the bearer and
> Representative of sin, caused sin to be taken
> and killed on the cross in His own person (as
> that of the one great sinner). And in that way,
> not by suffering our punishment as such, but
> in the deliverence of sinful man and sin
> itself to destruction, which He accomplished
> when He suffered our punishment, He has ...
> blocked the source of our destruction; ... He
> has saved us from destruction and rescued us
> from eternal death (73).

The election of Jesus Christ is, therefore, in this first

sense an election to rejection, to be the decision of

God concerning all the rejected, to be the representative

of all who are rejected, so that in him judgement is

passed on man, and therefore our judgement and destruction

comes to pass.

> It is [at Golgotha] to death that He bows his
> head and commits Himself. In and with the
> fulfilment there of the will of God it is
> nothingness which can triumph over Him - and
> in and with Him over the whole of the human
> race represented by Him ... It is also to the
> wrath of God ... that Jesus commits Himself and
> in and with Himself the world and the individual
> sinner. The reconciliation of the world with
> God which took place in Jesus Christ had there-
> fore the meaning that a radical end was made of
> Him and therefore of the world (74).

Second, the election of Christ and our election
in Him, establishes him not only as our representative,
as the one man in whom all are destroyed, but also as the
one man in whom all are raised to new life and are
exalted to fellowship with God (75).

> As He is man, the first born Brother of all
> men, He is the Head and Representative of man.
> He Himself is only as we also are elected and
> called in Him. But if it is the declaration
> of the New Testament witness that He Himself
> was not only dead, but also the One who is
> alive from the dead, He reveals that in and
> with Himself we also are alive - because we
> are elected and called in Him. The fact that
> we see our own humiliation in His is not the
> end of the story. The revelation of His
> majesty discloses also the relative and sub-
> ordinate but genuine majesty to which we are
> elected and called in Him. In the revelation
> of His being as the New Man He reveals us too
> in a new being. In and with His life from
> death He manifests our life as it is saved in
> Him, as it is graciously ... posited afresh
> in the fellowship with God which had been
> forfeited (76).

Thus, it can be seen that the term represent-
ation indicates the inclusive reality of Christ, an in-
clusiveness that is established as a result of the primacy
and decisiveness of his election, and which renders his
history of rejection and election determinative for the
history and being of all individual men. As man's rep-
resentative, he undergoes our death (and us in him) and
as man's representative he is exalted and raised (and
us in him) (77).

Summary

This discussion of the use of the term
representation in Barth's Church Dogmatics brings to an end

the illustration of the term representation in the
general context of inclusivity. In it attention has been
focussed on those themes and approaches that denote by
the term representation the inclusive significance of
Christ, first through an examination of organic models
- the description of Christ's assumption of Humanity or
Man, the description of Christ as a corporate person-
ality, the description of Christ as one into whom
believers are incorporated or with whom they are brought
into a relation of solidarity - and second through an
examination of the theme of election - the description of
Christ as the one chosen by God who is therefore the
representative of God's dealings with all men. In all
these cases the term representation could be employed
to express a particular understanding of the relation
between Christ and others, and thus, to express a
considerable range and variety of meanings. This range
of meanings is found in addition to those already
described in section 1 of this chapter which expressed
an understanding of the nature of the work of Christ.
One final context in which the term representation
functions and expresses another set of meanings must now
be considered to complete this demonstration of its use:
the description of Christ as the Ideal Man.

3. Representation in the Context of Christ as the Ideal Man

        The third dimension that may be present in the

use of the term representation picks up a common non-

theological use of the word where it means 'illustrative'

or 'typical'. The precise characteristics of this

language are not easily discerned, for there is no

sharp distinction between a person or act which is said

to be representative as a typical or determinative reality,

and the person who, or work which, is representative in

that it includes or embodies the person or act of another.

Perhaps the distinction can best be grasped by an

examination of the subtle difference between the phrases

'Christ the representative man' and 'Christ the

representative of man'. While the use of the term

representative in the description of Christ as the

representative man is not of central significance in

the debate concerning the meaning of representation and

its relation to the term substitution, it is another

element in an already complex field of meanings and

associations and it is a use that may often be found to

underlie other uses of the term and so may be a confusion

if its role is not clearly recognised.

> To indicate this use of the term representative

the following statement is taken from the work of J. Dunn:

> When we talk of Christ as representative man
> we mean that what is true of him in particular
> is true of men in general. When we say Adam
> is representative man in his fallenness, we
> mean that all men are fallen. So when Paul
> says Christ died as representative man he means
> that there is no other end possible for men –
> all mankind dies, as he died, as flesh, as the
> end of sinful flesh, as the destruction of
> sin (78).

In his article Dunn oscillates between this use of the

term representative to describe Christ or Adam as the manifestation or typification of a particular sort of existence, and the use of the term to describe Christ as one who includes others, but it is not clear what the relation is between the two concepts or indeed that Dunn is aware of using the term in these different senses (79). In the quotation given above Dunn would seem to regard Christ as representative man in that he manifests or typifies man's condition - one whose end is death - but he continues:

> Beyond death he no longer represents all men, fallen man. In his risen life he represents only those who identify themselves with him, with his death (in baptism), only those who acknowledge the Risen One as Lord (2 Cor 5:15). (80).

In his resurrection Jesus is representative man in that he typifies or manifests the condition only of those who identify with him (81). This use of the term seems to be closely related to H. Turner's definition of a representative as 'someone who sums up and makes articulate in word or deed the unexpressed aspirations and muddled gropings of the group he represents' (82).

This understanding of Christ as the representative man can be developed in two ways. First, his representative character may be related to certain qualities or attributes (83).

> If Christ had been born as other men, He would have been one man of many, limited by an individual manhood, and not in very truth the Son of Man, the perfect representative of the whole race. ... the life of Christ, the human life of Christ ... is a universal life, universal in character and experience: in the personal discipline of unnoticed solitude, and

> in the broad conflicts of public ministry:
> universal by the absence of every transitory
> element: universal by the embodiment of every
> essential feature of man's nobility (84).

G. Stevens argues that:

> ... in Jesus Christ we see humanity at its
> climax; he is the typical, representative man.
> His life and work must also partake in that
> representative character. His relation to
> mankind is such that in his career and
> characteristic acts and experiences we are to
> see revealed the true law of life for all
> men (85).

J. Robinson attempts to remove this talk of Jesus as the

representative man from the context both of the man who

had everything and from the context of the man who was

everything, and prefers instead to see in Christ the

single quality of the one who is for all:

> According to the New Testament Jesus is the
> man of God, the Son of God, God for us,
> precisely as he is not the man for himself,
> but the man for others, the man for all: he is
> the representative man, who dies - and lives -
> for all. He is the universal man, the final
> man, the man for all space and all time (86).

Second, the representative character of Christ

can be related more closely to the union of divine and

human natures in his person, and to his ideal, archetypal

or prototypical status for all human aspiration and

development (87). For T. Strong, man is the pinnacle

of nature, but each individual is limited by his finite

existence, and:

> ... so long as humanity was made up of limited
> individuals, so long as the Word of God was
> partially revealed in some one aspect in each,
> the ideal of humanity was not yet realised.
> For this the world was to wait till the Fulness
> of God should dwell among men bodily, till the
> Word should be incarnate (88).

So, Christ's humanity is representative and exemplary because 'He represented ideally the true and proper relations in which man should stand to God' (89). Christ, therefore, is the representative man because he brings to realisation an ideal of human perfection and destiny (90). E. Teselle, commenting on Hegel, refers Christ's representative character specifically to the unity of divine and human nature, which are already resolved within God but which:

> ... must first be represented (Vorgestellt) in an individual other than the ones who come to discover it, and this of course is the significance of Jesus. What makes such representation necessary is that they, occupied with their customary sphere of worldly activity, are unaware of their intrinsic potentialities; ... when Jesus exhibits, in his finite particularity, a fully achieved unity betwen God and man, he acts out the message that God is not alien to man and that man is even being taken up into God's life. It is appropriate, Hegel thinks, that there be one individual who represents the idea, for the idea also is one, concrete and real in God, not an abstraction from a multiplicity of individuals (91).

It is in this context that the phrase 'inclusive substitution' is also used, particularly as it describes the thought of Marheinecke as he expounds the signif- icance of Christ as the centre of history (92).

Whether the phrase 'Christ the representative man' is used to describe a quality, or whether it describes an archetypal state or condition, the concept of representation will generally include some reference to the imitation or participation from the side of the believer in order to make what is representative in Christ his own. Thus, for Stevens, the fact that Christ

is the typical, representative man, means 'that in him

we see what humanity truly and ideally is, then may we

not also dare to hold [with Paul] that we must in

principle rep_eat his life and death and resurrection

in ourselves in order to realise his salvation' (93).

In other words, Christ is representative 'in the order

of signs' as E. Peterman puts it, 'for what happened

in Christ manifests what must happen in man in order

that he be delivered from sin, namely, a death to the

flesh when a person, fortified by grace, resists to

death the sinful ways of nature' (94).

To anticipate at least one of the themes that

will emerge from the study of D. Sölle, the following

quotation of J. Robinson indicates the continuing

relevance and force of this use of the term represent-

ation:

> ... The realisation is fitfully dawning that
> 'God' now means, for us, not an invisible
> being with whom we can have direct communication
> as it were on the end of a telephone; but that
> by which he is represented, his surrogate –
> the power of a love that lives and suffers for
> others. ... that is the way Jesus pioneered,
> the first representative of the 'new being'
> (95).

Finally, attention must be drawn before the

close of this study to the use of the term representation

that describes Jesus as the representative of God. It

is difficult to know precisely what sense has been

given to the term when it is used in this context, for

it may mean that Jesus 'presents' God, that is, brings

Him near to men, and therefore represents Him to men,

but it seems that at root the meaning of the term must

be 'to actualise', 'manifest' or 'embody' in the sense
that has been seen above to apply to the description of
Jesus as the representative man. Thielicke refers this
representation of God by Christ to the doctrine of the
prophetic office which expresses the conviction that
Christ:

> ... who controls the active Word of judgement
> and grace, is on the side of God. He is God's
> representative and thus far stands over against
> men (96).

For Thielicke to describe Christ thus is to make 'ontic'
statements about his person (97), but this would not
seem to follow from J. Robinson's statement that because
Jesus:

> ... is the one completely obedient man, who
> 'always' does his Father's will, right 'to the
> end', ... he is the perfect reflection or
> representation of God, in the way that an only
> son may be said to be the very image of his
> father (98).

Thus, this use of the term representation to describe
Christ as the representative of God fails to clarify the
meaning of the term, for the sense in which Christ
represents God clearly shares the ambiguity already
found to be present in the term representation. However,
its use should be noted, not only because it enhances
the attractiveness of the term, since it is held to be
capable of expressing the relation of Christ both to
God and to men, but also because it is a theme that
recurs in D. Sölle's work, a theme that will be treated
in greater detail in Chapter VI.

Summary and Observations

The use of the term representation has been examined and described as it is found in three different contexts - the interpretation of the work of Christ, the inclusiveness of Christ's person and work, and the ideal quality of Christ. Within each of these contexts a variety of expressions and meanings was discerned and the use of the term representation was thereby illustrated. As with the term substitution it has been demonstrated that the term representation is a complex theological tool that can express and evoke a wide range of meanings in the course of interpreting diverse material that is held to be of relevance for understanding the salvific work of Christ, particularly in its relation to humanity. Thus, as with the term substitution, because such a range of different meanings accrue to the term representation, it cannot be assumed that in a particular use its meaning will be self-evident or self-explanatory, nor can the term be treated in a critical discussion as though it only had one meaning or a limited range of applications. Chapter V will be an attempt to explore and analyse critically the appropriateness and suitability of the term in Christian atonement theology on the basis of a recognition of this variety of meanings and of the range of contexts in which the term functions.

In one respect this examination has differed from that accorded to the term substitution, for the term

representation has not been the subject of a prolonged
and critical discussion with regard to its meaning or
appropriateness, and therefore with regard to the problems
involved in its use, in the complexity of its meaning,
and in the range of its application. Thus, whereas
there was found to be considerable discussion <u>within</u> the
context of different meanings of the term substitution,
with one meaning being measured critically against
another, this internal dialogue is lacking in respect
to the term representation, with two results: first,
the term is measured against the term substitution,
uncritically using the variety and range of meaning to
oppose a narrow and restricted understanding of sub-
stitution (a situation that can, of course, be reversed
when the complexity and variety of the term substitution
is recognised and is measured against a narrow and
restricted understanding of representation); second,
the term representation may be used in a variety of ways,
passing from one meaning to another, without a
sufficiently critical attitude to this movement because
the various meanings stand under the general auspices
of the term representation.

Finally, this study of the use of representation
in these varying contexts has disclosed material which
will be shown to bear directly or indirectly on D. Sölle's
work in 'Christ the Representative'. Although much in
that book is novel and involves a reassessment of the
term representation it will become clear that not only
is there a significant degree of continuity, but also

that some of the ambiguities in Sölle's work can be
illustrated and highlighted from the ambiguities that have
already been found to be present in the use of the term.

CHAPTER IV

THE USE OF THE TERMS SUBSTITUTION AND

REPRESENTATION TO DESCRIBE THE WORK OF CHRIST

Introduction

The material of Chapters II and III has
demonstrated the range of meanings that the terms
substitution and representation can be said to bear and
the variety of contexts in which they have been held
to be relevant and applicable. A picture has, therefore,
emerged of two terms that are intimately related in the
history of the discussion of Christian atonement theology,
but whose meanings, while coinciding to a certain extent,
can be seen to diverge and to reflect substantially
different understandings or aspects of Christ's
salvific work. It is possible, therefore, to make some
preliminary comments on the use and relation of the
terms substitution and representation before considering
a critical analysis and clarification of their respective
meanings.

First, it has become clear that the terms
cannot be used as though their meanings are self-evident
or as though they can evoke only one context for under-
standing the work of Christ; as a minimum it must be
said that the terms deserve a more careful consideration
and delineation if they are to be of continuing use in

discussions on a doctrine of the atonement.

Second, with the range and variety of meanings that have been shown to be expressed by both terms it is clear that they do not fulfil an identical role in Christian atonement theology and therefore cannot be treated as interchangeable or synonymous terms. It follows also that the terms should not be assumed to be complementary without careful discrimination and delineation to ensure the appropriateness or possibility of such a conjunction.

Third, because of the range and variety of meanings and contexts that have been described, any evaluation and criticism of their meaning must take account of their full complexity and cannot be satisfied with general comments that fail to recognise this diversity.

The purpose of this and the following chapter is to engage in a critical analysis and discussion of the terms, taking account not only of their interpretative function, but also of the range and complexity of their meaning as evinced by the previous studies. In order to facilitate this discussion and to ensure that the terms are accorded their full range of meanings and complexity, the examination will make use of the fact disclosed in Chapters II and III that each term has two aspects to it, or better, that each term functions in two areas of thought that are related and yet which refer to substantially different concerns. On the one hand, it can be seen that both the terms substitution and representation

are employed to interpret and express the manner and
content of Christ's saving work; on the other hand,
both terms can also be seen to interpret and express the
manner and characteristics of the relation between
Christ and mankind, or the relation of his work to others.
This is not to argue for or perpetuate a facile distinction
between the person and work of Christ but to recognise
that both terms contribute to an understanding of the
atonement in both these areas of thought, thus explaining
both their overlapping concerns and their divergence of
meaning. By examining the part played by both terms
in each of these aspects it is possible to ensure that
not only are the full ranges of meaning of both terms
adequately discussed, but also that the relation and the
divergence between the terms is most clearly recognised.
In this chapter, therefore, the contribution of both
terms is examined as they seek to interpret and express
the manner of Christ's work, although recognising that
the focus of attention will be on the term substitution.
In the following chapter the contribution of both terms
is examined as they seek to interpret and express the
manner of the relation between Christ and mankind,
recognising in this instance that the focus of attention
will be on the term representation.

The course of this chapter will be as follows.
Since the terms substitution and representation have been
described as interpretative tools which aid understanding
of the salvific work of Christ, it is necessary to review
the character of the Biblical material that can be said

to bear upon and generate these interpretative models (1). There then follows four sections, each involving a critical examination of some central theme that was disclosed in Chapters II and III in the context of the work of Christ. The first of these critical examinations probes the claim that substitutionary terminology, and particularly that which arises in a penal context, has the function of an explanation of Christ's work which is based upon a rational and consistent system of thought. The second discussion analyses the various concepts of justice that shape the concept of substitution and enquires critically into the problems and the value of these different expressions of substitution. The third discussion examines the claim that substitutionary terminology demands a concept of the atonement that is morally irrelevant to man because Christ's work is morally exclusive. It is in this context that the claim of the term representation to present a morally relevant understanding of atonement will be scrutinised. The fourth discussion focusses briefly on the Christological and Trinitarian dimension of substitutionary terminology in this context. The chapter concludes with some observations and comments on the meaning and use of the terms to express an understanding of the work of Christ.

1. The Bearing of Biblical Material on the Use of the Terms to Describe the Work of Christ

Four themes will be identified which bear on

the use of the terms substitution and representation in the context of the work of Christ.

a)   The Theme of Sacrifice

The use of sacrificial terminology in the New Testament (1 Cor 5:7, 1 Pet 1:18-19, Eph 5:2, Jn 1:29, Heb 9:15f, et al) points, not only to the sacrificial rites of the Old Testament patterns of worship (2), and not only to concepts of sacrifice mediated through Graeco-Roman culture (3), but also to the reality of Christ's sacrifice which is seen to be not merely an instance of a general occurrence but the sacrifice which controls and interprets all other sacrifices and to which they are pointers and shadows (4). This complex use of sacrificial language, together with the recognition that it is impossible to describe with certainty the Old Testament rationale of sacrifice, generates a wide variety of interpretations concerning the significance and meaning of Christ's sacrificial death (5). At least three different interpretations can be cited which embody and reflect different understandings of the terms substitution and representation.

i)   A sacrifice may be said to be the God appointed method whereby the penalty due to sin can be meted out on an animal victim in the place of the guilty party, so that the claims of divine justice are satisfied and God is thereby propitiated. C. Hodge gives a clear summary of this interpretation of sacrifice:

> 1) That the design of such offerings was to
> propitiate God; to satisfy His justice, and to
> render it consistent and proper that the offence
> for which they were offered should be forgiven;
> 2) That this propitiation of God was secured
> by the expiation of guilt; by such an offering
> as covered sin, so that it did not appear
> before Him as demanding punishment; 3) That
> this expiation was effected by vicarious
> punishment; the victim being substituted for
> the offender, bearing his guilt, and suffering
> the penalty which he had incurred; 4) That the
> effect of such sin-offerings was the pardon
> of the offender, and his restoration to favour
> and to the enjoyment of the privileges which
> he had forfeited (6).

Hodge concludes that if this is the correct interpretation

of Old Testament sacrifices then there can be no doubt

that Christ's death is similarly to be understood (7).

It is clear that this interpretation of sacrifice stands

in close relation to patterns of penal substitution,

focussing on the expiation of sin by the propitiation

of God through the exchange of an innocent victim for a

guilty party and the destruction of this victim (8).

Christ's sacrifice is therefore understood primarily

in terms of the sacrificial sin-offering.

ii)   A sacrifice may be regarded as an offering

accepted by God which is adequate or appropriate to

satisfy conditions under which He will forgive the

offender.

> Christ did not make satisfaction by enduring
> the punishment which we sinners had merited.
> This does not belong to the nature of a
> sacrifice, and has nothing in common with it.
> For sacrifices are not payments of debts, as
> is evident from those offered under the law.
> The beasts that were slain for transgressors
> did not expiate the penalty which they merited,
> nor was their blood a sufficient λύτρον for the

> soul of man. But they were oblations only,
> by which the transgressor endeavoured to turn
> the mind of God to compassion, and to obtain
> remission from Him (9).

Thus, sacrifice is seen as an act of homage which testifies to a repentance and which moves God to compassion.

iii)   A sacrifice may be regarded as an offering that demonstrates and signifies the relation in worship in which a man stands before God. It is the costly submission of devotion and service which expresses the self-offering of the worshipper. V. Taylor argues that:

> ... The aim of sacrifice is a restored
> fellowship; its medium is a representative
> offering; its spiritual condition is the
> attitude of the worshipper; its rationale is
> the offering of life; its culmination is
> sharing in the life offered by means of the
> sacred meal. These ideas form a natural
> background against which the Passion-sayings
> can be readily understood (10).

Sacrifice is therefore the movement from man to God, initiated by God, but in which man participates and through the offering provided is enabled to enter into the presence of God, not in his sinful and impure condition but as represented by the purity and holiness of the offering.

The complexity and fluidity of sacrificial concepts prohibits any definitive interpretation, but it is significant that interpretations of sacrifice are shaped by presuppositions concerning Christ's salvific work so that they are seen to be not so much a foundation for an understanding of substitutionary or representative

patterns of atonement but embodiments or reflections of those various patterns.

b)   The Theme of Redemption

The decisive experience of Israel in its liberation from Egypt, the expectations of redemption from bondage throughout the history of Israel, the redemption that was possible for slaves or captives, the redemption that was possible for certain wrongs, the redemption that followed from certain sacrifices, all form the background for the New Testament use of the term redemption, together with its cognate terms, to describe the salvific work of Christ (11). Its use in the New Testament is infrequent: λύτρον occurring only at Mark 10:45 (Matt 20:28), ἀντίλυτρον at I Tim 2:6, λυτρόω at Titus 2:14 and I Pet 1:18-19. Paul's use of the term ἀπολύτρωσις is more frequent, but has the general meaning of deliverance, referring to the bondage of sin (Eph 1:7, Col 1:14, Rom 3:24, Titus 2:14), or to the bondage of creation (Rom 8:23). The writer of the letter to the Hebrews uses both λύτρωσις and ἀπολύτρωσις , in the first instance in the context of sacrifice and in the second to refer to the deliverance from the transgressions of the first covenant (12). Gal 3:13 and 4:5 speak of deliverance from the curse and bondage of the law, but here Paul uses the verb ἐξαγοράζω . In I Pet 1:18 deliverance is from a vain manner of life, whereas Mark 10:45 gives no clear conception of what the 'many' are ransomed from. Thus, the theme of

redemption employs various images of deliverance, many
of which are associated with some form of price or cost
whereby such liberation is brought about, in order to
describe and express the change that has come about for
the believer, contrasting old patterns of bondage to
new patterns of freedom. The variety of contexts in which
redemption terminology appears suggests that the means
of redemption may be variously construed, but the force
of the image is on the reality of the deliverance for
the believer.

c)   The Judicial Theme

Judicial terminology is evident in the Old
Testament and New Testament in terms such as κατακρίνω ,
παράπτωμα, βῆμα , but the relation between judgement
and Christ's death is far from clear (13). J. Jeremias
argues that any allusion or appeal to the figure of the
suffering servant involves an implicit plea to a
judicial setting in which the innocent receives the
judgement and punishment of the guilty (14). In the
New Testament Col 2:14 can be cited as illustrating
another use of judicial language but the exegetical
problems of this passage together with those of
Rom 3:21 ff, Rom 8:3 ff, Gal 3:13, and II Cor 5:21 are
well known. It seems to be the case that because both
Old and New Testaments speak of the judgement that is
due to sin, a general context is established in which
the forgiveness of sins is viewed despite the fact that
a dichotomy appears between the judgement that is past

and the judgement that is still to come. Before
commenting further on the character and basis of the New
Testament judicial language it is necessary to point
out that the New Testament makes no explicit connection
between the concept of punishment and the death of Christ.
It is possible to interpret judgement, curse and sin in
penal terms, but this interpretation is dependent upon
the selection of particular judicial frameworks and
does not follow self-evidently from the notion of
judgement in the New Testament. At best the New Testament
points only partly in the direction of penal concepts
to interpret the death of Christ and it gives no clear
warrant for the development or interpretation of
judicial categories from this perspective (15).

However, there is good reason for judicial
categories, and inherent within these categories the
possibility of penal interpretation, since the character
of Christ's history embodies the tension between
judgement and justification, rejection and acceptance.
Jesus' story is one of unjust suffering (16), and of
subsequent vindication; but the theological problematic
that demands interpretation is due to the interrelation
between this man and the God he calls Father in the
light of this story of judgement and justification. As
one who claims and pro-claims the Kingdom, and thus
himself and his God, his death and resurrection are not
accidents of history but events which 'involve' God.
Thus, Paul's use of παραδιδόναι to refer not to the
betrayal of Judas, but to the handing over of Jesus

by God, represents the profoundest theological insight into the significance of the death and resurrection of this man (17). By their silence and acquiescence in this death, both Jesus and his God fill the event with meaning, and the resurrection impells both the necessity and the direction of theological reflection on this event as an event of life and death, judgement and justification, rejection and election, betrayal and unity of will, defeat and vindication. Thus, the theological issues are not superimposed on an otherwise simple 'Gospel of Jesus' but are themselves the very material and problematic out of which and in which the first Christians perceived and articulated the reality of salvation.

d)   The Theme of Reversal and Exchange

It follows from the character of Christ's story that at its heart, and in a manner that carries profound theological significance, there lies a pattern of exchange, a reversal, or an exchange of roles, which is a 'blessed exchange' (Diognetus) (18) because it is the articulation of a fundamental 'for us' (19). As in the Old Testament the remnant experience a reversal of roles for the sake of many, as in the Gospels where the Lord becomes a servant, as Barabbas is released but Jesus is condemned, so the theme of reversal and exchange emerges (20). Gal 3:13, II Cor 5:21, 8:9, in their different ways seek to articulate and interpret this pattern of exchange, seeing in it not only the mystery and

outworking of God's love but also the impulse for
Christian discipleship and service. M. Hooker is right
to draw attention to the fact that II Cor 5:21 speaks
not of a simple exchange (which she characterises as
substitution) but of an interchange (which she terms
representation) because our righteousness is found
'in him', and this insight will form an important basis
for our discussion and evaluation of the terms substit-
ution and representation as they describe the relation
between Christ and his people (21). However, it seems
as though this 'interchange' is itself the development
of the more basic pattern of exchange, a development
possibly occasioned by the misuse of the pattern of
exchange where it was taken to mean that there was no
continuing dependence of the believer upon Christ, or
that there was no place for present suffering or
humiliation in the Christian life because Christ had
suffered, or that Christ's exchange brought about
salvation, glory and riches for the believer. Paul
therefore, according to Hooker, has to correct the
distortion by emphasising the continued dependence on,
and identification with, Christ so that Christians only
share in Christ's glory through sharing in his sufferings
(22). The pattern of exchange as an articulation of a
basic experience of salvation may need correction or
refinement, but it none the less functions as a primary
theological model which the terms substitution and
representation seek to articulate within their own
contextual frameworks to interpret the saving work of

Christ.

In this brief review of four biblical themes
the intention has not been to find a doctrine of
substitution or representation in the Bible but rather
to highlight those motifs that seem to give grounds for
such language in Christian atonement theology, and which
may serve as a check and restraint upon their use as
theological interpretative tools. In order to help
assess the value of these terms and the frameworks in
which they operate, their coherence and consistency
will be examined, using the changes and variations that
have taken place in their meaning and use to focus on
those areas of difficulty and ambiguity which exist.
In this way a clearer picture will emerge of the
strengths and weaknesses, uses and limitations, of the
various patterns of thought that have been described.
Using Packer's terminology the recognition of the
interpretative role of the terms as models which seek
to articulate and interpret the 'control models' of
scripture means that the models themselves can be tested
and evaluated in terms of their own consistency, and
particularly as the different 'qualifiers' modify and
shape the models in new ways (23). In addition,
recognising the relation between such models and the
primary models of the Bible , the attempt must be made
to determine to what degree the framework and patterns
of thought comprised in the new models illustrate,
illuminate, or possibly distort and misconstrue those
biblical insights.

2. The Critique of 'Rational' or 'Explanatory' Patterns of Substitution

In Chapter II it was demonstrated that certain patterns of substitution, particularly those designated by the phrase 'penal substitution', derived some of their significance from the supposition that they offered an explanation of Christ's work (24). At the time it was noted that doubt had been cast on this explanatory role of the term substitution, since it was clear that not only did the qualifier 'penal' undergo significant variations in the attempt to 'make sense' of the death of Christ, but also the resulting pattern of substitution was neither as consistent nor as 'rational' as might at first sight be supposed. It is now necessary to examine this claim rather more closely, since if it can be demonstrated that even this use of substitution actually supports the claim that the term substitution is being used as a model which helps to articulate and interpret material that is not susceptible to rational explanation, then the argument for the interpretative status of the term is considerably strengthened.

a) First, it was seen to be the case that the validity of such a view depended upon the fact that the substitution of Christ in our place to receive our punishment was to be taken with absolute seriousness. Since the force of the explanation resided in the fact that 'God must punish' but that punishment may fall on

a substitute instead of the guilty, it is necessary to
assert that the punishment suffered by Christ is, in
all literalness, our punishment (25). Clearly this
context provides for an unambiguous use of the term
substitution, for the exchange that takes place between
Christ and sinful man is spatially and conceptually
governed by a one to one correspondence. Christ in our
place, ourselves in Christ's place (26). But it is
precisely this direct and unambiguous substitution that
is so problematic. The suffering experienced by Christ,
that is his punishment, does not appear to correspond
directly to that which is due to man - eternal punishment
or eternal death (27). Further, the suffering experienced
by one man cannot easily be seen to correspond directly
to a multiplicity of punishments that are due to each
man individually. Given these problems of construeing
Christ's exchange with guilty man as the occupation of
an identical place or the reception of an identical
punishment, the notion of 'equivalence' is developed (28).

The term equivalence allows the theologian to
assert that although there can be no identity between
Christ's suffering and that which is due to us, there is
none the less an equivalence which continues to 'explain'
why Christ's death satisfies God's justice (29). The
equivalence of Christ's suffering is established by the
christological argument from the dignity of his person
as the God-man, so that although identical neither in
duration nor perhaps in kind to the sufferings due to
men, the fact that they are the sufferings of this man

renders them an equivalent, thus preserving the rationale
that God's justice is satisfied (30). But the problems
are now clear: to assert equivalence recognises
implicitly that a comparison is made on the basis of an
accepted scale of values. The example often quoted of
100 dollars gold being exactly equivalent to 100 dollars
silver demonstrates that it is only on the basis of an
agreed or accepted convention that there is reckoned
to be such equivalence. To recognise this logic of the
concept of equivalence, is however, to strike at the
very heart of its intention as an explanatory device,
for it must be remembered that the rationale of the
argument depended upon the fact that there is a necessity
in the justice of God that the punishment due to our
sin is inflicted. The concept of equivalence now
implies that it is no longer our punishment that Christ
suffers in our place but a suffering and punishment that
is different, although it bears some relation to our
due, but which is accepted by God in its place (31).
In other words, the use of the concept of equivalence
only appears to sustain the rationale of the argument
that was necessary for the intelligibility of the model
of penal substitution; in reality the concepts of
punishment and justice are subtly changed, so that the
central insight of the model (that in Christ's suffering
he receives the judgement due to man's sin) is lost and
the model instead becomes an explanation of Christ's
death expressing the 'insight' that God cannot forgive
without inflicting some punishment (32).

b)   Second, the difficulty in the formulation of
the model of penal substitution can be approached from
another angle, which highlights the difficulty by
exposing the ambiguity of the concept of justice which
is employed. In order to argue for the necessity of
the infliction of punishment a concept of justice is
invoked which reflects the thought-forms of criminal law.
In technical terms this form of law may be called
distributive justice. Such justice demands that crime
be punished because, as an infringement of law, punish-
ment is the inevitable and necessary consequence.
However, in order to assert the exchange of punishment
that is said to have taken place between Christ and
sinful man, an appeal has to be made to a concept of
justice known as commutative or civil justice, a concept
that is expressed in terms of payments of debts. By
means of this appeal the concept of equivalence, or
even that of the identity of the punishment, may be
sustained, but at the expense of introducing an anomaly
into the argument which again attacks the very principles
on which it is based. The anomalies are that under
civil law there is no necessity for a debt to be repaid,
but only a relative good; nor can punishment have any
part to play in the payment or non-payment of a debt.
In other words, the conceptual framework provided by
the practices of criminal law to articulate the exchange
that takes place between Christ and man breaks down
because criminal law does not allow such an exchange;
the appeal to civil law makes the exchange possible,

but not if punishment or suffering is involved (33).

Thus, the patterns of substitution that
articulate the exchange between Christ and his people
in terms of punishment in the context of criminal law,
do not offer an explanation of the work of Christ, but
because they appear to do so and because such an
'explanation' must 'work', the concepts of punishment
and justice are altered and adapted, which results only
in the loss of awareness as to the function of the
model and the pattern of exchange to which it bears
witness. The models not only fail as explanations since
they are not coherent, but also they mislead and draw
attention away from the central insight they were
intended to express. It is this latter problem that
must now be explored more fully, by examining critically
the concepts of justice in which the reversal or
exchange between Christ and his people is said to take
place.

3. The Problem of Substitution in the Context of Law

In Chapter II three different patterns of
substitution were identified, all of which used the
terminology of law, but which expressed different models
of the atonement (34). Since this section focusses
on the critical problems of substitution as an
intelligible or viable concept within this context it
is necessary to do full justice to the different

patterns of substitution that have been disclosed. An
examination and evaluation of substitutionary terminology
will therefore be made in the three contexts of criminal
law, civil law, and pecuniary law, recognising that in
these different contexts the concept of substitution
will become vulnerable to criticism in different ways.

a)   The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in
           the Context of Criminal Law

Regardless of the specific interpretation of
the manner of punishment, whether it be physical,
spiritual, or emotional suffering, two types of
substitution are possible within the context of criminal
law. First, punishment may be thought of as being
'deflected' onto another party, which remains innocent
and holy even or precisely in its acceptance of such
suffering (35). The objections to this concept are
familiar and compelling. i) God is conceived as wielding
a retributive force which must find an outlet apart from
the sin which occasioned such wrath, but such a notion
departs from the New Testament and Old Testament under-
standing of sin and judgement, where the penalty is
bound up with the act of sin, where any 'problem' of
forgiveness lies not in the nature of God, i.e., in the
need to exercise punishment, but in the obstinacy and
disobedience of those whom He wishes to save (36).
ii) The notion of a 'deflected' punishment indicates
a curious distortion of criminal law, for there is no
intrinsic connection between sin and its punishment;

rather, the ideas of criminal law are taken to substantiate
a general framework in which sin demands punishment,
but this is used to justify a retributive principle where
the infliction of punishment regardless of who is punished
is a necessity for God. Such a concept of 'deflected'
punishment, while giving clear articulation of the
substitution of Christ, misuses ideas of criminal law
to establish a principle of retribution that conflicts
with the basic principles on which the notion of criminal
law is based, and therefore cannot be considered a suitable
model for further interpretation of the atonement (37).

Second, and more commonly, it is argued that
a transfer of sin or guilt or liability to punishment
takes place, so that the victim, while innocent in one
sense, in another sense is guilty in that it is reckoned
to be guilty and may therefore be justly punished. It
is possible merely to assert, as for example does
C. Hodge, that such a transfer is possible because
'the Bible asserts and assumes no moral principle which
does not underlie all the providential dealings of God
with individuals or with nations' (38). The rite of
sacrifice is interpreted and understood to embody this
principle (39), as is the statement that God 'visits
the iniquity of the fathers upon the children' (Ex 20:5)
(40).

However, it is clear that if the framework of
criminal law is being employed to give expression to
the conviction that sin demands punishment, then to

posit a transfer of sin from the guilty to the innocent is in fact to articulate an awareness of the incomprehensible grace of God. For in criminal law there can be no precedent for an act that is fundamentally unjust (within the criteria of this type of law), and the conditions that theologians list in the attempt to determine how in God's justice it can be said to be just only serve to highlight this fact (41). The basic proposition that sin demands punishment as rooted in the character of God Himself seems well founded, but the use of the framework of criminal law to articulate this conviction only serves to demonstrate the free mercy and grace of God when he does not punish someone as they deserve: it cannot articulate the justice of punishing an innocent party in stead of the guilty.

The problem is that if Christ's death is seen as the means by which the retributive justice of God becomes instead the strange righteousness of God which freely justifies the ungodly, then it is but a short step to argue that the cause is due to the infliction of God's retributive justice on Christ in his death. But it is precisely this last step which, while it is not disqualified, is not encouraged or demanded by the New Testament interpretations and accounts of Christ's death. There is little direct evidence that the New Testament sees Christ's death as a punishment inflicted by God, although it is possible to construe the New Testament in this way, particularly, as has been shown, if the language of sacrifice is held to be explicitly

penal in character. Rather, it seems to be the case that because the New Testament relates Christ's death to sin, and because sin in other contexts is related to punishment, then it is held to be the case that Christ's death is to be related directly to punishment. The sequence of thought is logically justified, but it is only indirectly present in the New Testament, and this by itself should be sufficient to limit the range and applicability of such an interpretation, and should certainly caution against the reading of the New Testament solely or even primarily from this perspective.

b)   The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in the Context of Civil Law

This framework of thought represents a development of, or an alternative within, the concept of criminal law, for God is not held to punish sin as a necessary consequence of His own reaction to sin, but rather that in His position as Ruler or Governor of the world it is to the good of the world that the validity of the law be demonstrated and upheld, so that Christ's suffering demonstrates the abhorrence of God towards sin, exhibits the consequence of sin in a morally ordered world, and holds out the deterrent against future sins, so allowing God to withold punishment from the sinner himself without bringing about a breakdown in the moral fabric of His kingdom. Put more technically in the language of the Edwardian school of New England theology, Christ satisfies neither distributive justice which

refers to the punishment of crimes, nor commutative
justice which refers to the payment of debts, but
rectoral justice which refers to the good of the universe
(42).

When the atonement is seen in this framework
of civil law the resulting model must be judged to be
inadequate on a number of grounds. First, as H. Bushnell
shows, the context provides no justification for seeing
any relation between Christ's suffering and the
preservation of moral order (43). Since Christ's
suffering is neither a punishment for sin nor a result
of sin there is no basis for seeing in it the abhorrence
of God upon sin, and therefore there is no reason why
it should uphold any moral order (44). Second, since
the suffering that Christ undergoes bears at best only
an indirect relation to anything due to man or any
condition experienced by man as a sinner, the basic
insight offered by the interpretation is not that of an
exchange which takes place between Christ and his people,
but only an exchange of _means_ of forgiveness (45).
Third, whatever the assessment of this understanding, it
must be noted that the term substitution comes to
reflect this new pattern of exchange, so that properly
speaking Christ may not be described as man's substitute
but only that his sufferings are substituted in the place
of our punishment (46).

A more complex situation is involved when the
above pattern of thought is taken to complement or

correct other judicial understandings of the atonement
(47). Here it may be argued that Christ bears the
consequences of sin, and that his punishment is substit-
uted for our punishment, not because of any retributive
principle in God, but because in so doing the validity
of the law is upheld along with the moral order of the
world, so that God may withold punishment from the
sinner without compromising His righteousness (48).
There is a sense in which this pattern of thought is
more adequate to interpret the work of Christ, in that
God is no longer regarded as being bound to a particular
form of retributive justice, and therefore that Christ's
death may be seen in terms other than those that are
strictly penal, without there being lost the insight
that sin and judgement are inextricably interwoven.
However, two points of possible confusion should be
noted.

First, because this pattern of thought does not
need to assert the penal character of Christ's death,
it may use the less clearly defined language of Christ
bearing 'the consequences of our sins', primarily in
the sense of 'dying our death'. While this may remove
the offensiveness of some penal language, it also
blurrs the basic issue of the significance of this
'death' or of 'these consequences'. Simply by replacing
the concept of punishment with these less clearly
defined penalties it is not clear that the argument
has been substantially altered but only that it has been
less clearly stated. The only circumstance which does

change the argument is when the consequences of sin

that Christ suffers are related less to the direct

judgement of God and more to a natural process which is

only indirectly due to God. Thus, it is possible to see

in Christ's death God's confirmation of the reality of

sin, without it being explicitly stated that God

punishes or inflicts anything on Christ (49).

Second, even in this latter case the link

between Christ's suffering or death and our sin remains

ambiguous and problematic. Some framework is still

necessary in which it may be asserted that it is the

consequences of our sins that Christ suffers, or that it

is our death which he dies, or else the pattern of

thought reverts to that outlined above as construed

solely in terms of civil law together with its critical

problems. It seems to be the case that in order to

make sense of the terms 'consequences of our sins' or

'our death' tacit appeal has to be made to those patterns

of thought which are embodied in criminal law and which

have already been criticised. The virtue of this

pattern of thought, despite these confusions, is that it

can be more clearly seen as an interpretative model which

articulates the exchange between Christ and his people

while minimising those features of the model that arise

from a strictly retributive view of punishment.

c)   The Use of Substitutionary Terminology in
          the Context of Pecuniary Law

In the context of the model that describes the

satisfaction of God through the payment of a debt on the analogy of pecuniary or commutative law, the term substitution can be seen to be less problematic, in that there is no difficulty in conceiving of one being able to discharge the debts of another. So long as the character of this debt is not construed in penal terms there seems to be no inherent objection to a substituted payment by another which satisfies the creditor. However, the problem at once arises as to the adequacy of the analogy of sin as a debt and consequently as to the adequacy of this model for the atonement. It is not the case that the concept of a debt precludes a moral and serious understanding of sin, for there is nothing strange in referring to a debt of service, a debt of honour, a debt of love or a debt of obedience. In all such cases sin is given the fullest seriousness for this debt is before God to whom is due absolute service, honour, love and obedience. The analogy of debt can make quite clear the structure of sin as the non-fulfilment of the highest personal responsibilities before God (50).

The question that comes to the fore when sin is construed as debt in this way is whether the analogy of the vicarious payment of this debt can still be conceived. Is it possible to use the language of debt after the analogy of financial transactions when the content of the debt has been expressed in such personal, moral and individual terms, which transcends pecuniary

analogies? In other words the model of a pecuniary
debt warrants the use of the concept of substitution,
since there are no longer moral or legal problems
inherent in such a vicarious payment, but as soon as
the language of 'debt' is filled out and personalised
in the sort of context that can relate it to the
seriousness of sin the model, as a substitutionary
model becomes susceptible to all the moral and legal
objections previously encountered. The strength of the
pecuniary model is that the fundamental reality of the
exchange in which Christ fulfils the debt which is owed
to God in our place is capable of clear articulation,
since Christ pays our debt in obedience, love, service
and honour. By means of an analogy of a vicarious act
that is instantly intelligible, the character of
Christ's vicarious act is at once articulated and
illuminated despite the fact that a literal application
of the payment of this debt is not instantly intelligible.
This is in contrast to a penal exchange, where the
vicarious aspect is not intelligible even in analogy
since there are no general circumstances in which the
innocent suffers justly for the guilty. The analogy of
a debt carries with it potential misunderstandings, as
does any model, but at its heart it illuminates and
expresses the exchange that takes place between Christ
and his people.

It is significant that, although the term
substitution has been used until now to describe this
vicarious payment of debts, the analogy on which it

rests allows for a recognition of the relation between this debt and the consequent response of mankind. Although Christ pays our debt and therefore man is free of his debt before God, the term representation may be employed at this point to express the insight that there is a continuing debt before God which man must pay and into which he is drawn by virtue of the character of Christ's work.

4. The Moral Relevance of the Terms Substitution and Representation

In this section the claim is critically investigated that patterns of substitution are essentially morally irrelevant while patterns of representation embody or generate moral value. The controlling presupposition for such claims is that the concept of atonement refers not solely or primarily to the satisfaction of sin before God but partially or wholly to the moral growth of the individual or community so that sin is overcome in reality and reconciliation is thereby effected between man and God. The use of the term substitution is held to denote or imply an exclusive work before God, removing from the sphere of atonement the moral state and growth of the individual which thus renders the act of atonement itself morally irrelevant. As shall be seen, the term representation may be employed to answer or avoid this charge of exclusiveness so that the atonement itself

can be seen to have moral content and relevance.

The claim that the concept of atonement itself must consist of a reconciliation between God and man which is based on man's actual moral condition and God's moral nature is put succinctly by Rashdall:

> For those who believe in a righteous God, God must be supposed to act in a way which the moral consciousness approves. If a man has actually returned to the right moral state - for this is what repentance means - a righteous God must forgive the past, must judge him according to what he is, and not according to anything he was and has ceased to be (51).

It would not seem possible that the term substitution could continue to function in this new context of thought on the atonement, but the following quotation from Bushnell provides an instructive example of how theological vocabulary is thought to be capable of new meaning:

> ... Christ, in what is called His vicarious sacrifice, simply engages, at the expense of great suffering and even of death itself, to bring us out of our sins themselves and so out of their penalties: being Himself profoundly identified with us in our fallen state, and burdened in feeling with our evils (52). ...this vicarious sacrifice only does and suffers, and comes into substistution for, just what any and all love will, according to its degree (53).

Although it is understandable that Bushnell should want to retain traditional vocabulary it is not clear how the term substitution can express the <u>identification</u> of Christ with humanity (54).

However, Bushnell picks up a theme, common in this context of the moral relevance of atonement, in which Christ is said to 'bring us out of our sins',

that is, to be not simply an example to be followed, but a power of life which enables and informs our response. In this pattern of thought the term substitution may still have a limited role, in that it may indicate the uniqueness, difference or pre-eminence of Christ's life over the secondary and derivative response of our moral growth. In a similar sense Christ may be seen as the sponsor or guarantor of our new life, who not only initiates it, but also completely realises it, so that even the goal of moral growth is determined by his accomplishment (55). In these contexts, in a limited sense, Christ may be described as our substitute in that his is our sole power and end, and his substitutionary role which sets him apart from mankind may be contrasted with a representative role in which he and mankind are brought together in a close relation (56).

However, because the focus of this pattern of thought is upon an imitation or participation in Christ's work by man which gives that work atoning value, it is more common that the term representation be introduced in place of the term substitution. Christ is one who represents before God a human nature in its moral stature and fullness which is pleasing to God, an offering which man may claim as that of his representative, thus putting himself within that sphere of moral intent which Christ inspires and completes (57). Or again, Christ in his holiness and perfect moral nature represents mankind in the sense

that he creates by his power that pattern of a new
humanity which is to be realised by individuals and the
community which follow him (58).

Two points must be considered in the light of
this discussion. First, any distinction to be drawn
between those views of atonement which are said to be
morally relevant and those which, by virtue of Christ's
substitutionary work, are not, must be stated with
precision if it is to be of any value, because the
majority of those using the term substitution would
wish to see the moral relevance of Christ's work in
terms of a response which is subsequent to, and
dependent upon, Christ's own work (59). Similarly,
those who use the term representation in this context
do not normally wish to deny the primacy and necessity
of Christ's work which sets our own response in
motion (60). In other words, the usual context for the
use of the terms substitution and representation is
formed by the common ground of Christ's atoning work
initiating, empowering, and in some sense including
the response of others (61). The use of the term
substitution does not necessarily denote the moral
irrelevance of Christ's work, but focusses and
concentrates on the primacy of this work, to such an
extent that this is regarded as constituting atonement,
while man's response, although significant, is secondary
and dependent. Equally, the use of the term repres-
entation does not necessarily relativise Christ's work,
but focusses attention instead on the fact that without

the response or the creation of the new humanity,
Christ's work cannot be considered to be atoning.
There is a distinction, but it can be drawn only in
terms of a difference of perspective, emphasis, or
degree (62). The term substitution highlights one
aspect of Christ's work, laying stress on its bearing
on God; the term representation highlights the bearing
of that same atoning work on man, but in any description
of the atonement both aspects would be present.

Second, this point can be brought out clearly
by noting that those patterns of thought which focus
on the moral relevance of Christ's work still presuppose
some framework in which the language of forgiveness,
repentance, moral worth, and adequacy still have
meaning. Moral evil or lack of holiness are said to
be 'judged' by God; repentance is said to be a
'condition' for God's forgiveness; the term 'forgiveness'
itself is meaningless apart from some framework in
which condemnation is presupposed or judged to be
appropriate. In other words, to whatever degree
atonement is expressed in terms of its bearing on man,
its presuppositions, explicit or implicit, will contain
some frame of reference which is directed towards God.
It is particularly the case that when the term rep-
resentation is used in this context it cannot be
assumed to solve or remove problems of construing
the atonement in its bearing on God; rather, it is more
often the case that this aspect is presupposed but
never clearly articulated or interpreted.

5. Substitution, the Atonement, and the Trinity

There will, almost by necessity, be some
reflection and articulation of trinitarian insights
to the doctrine of the atonement, as has been
demonstrated by the concept of the infinite merit of
Anselm's God-man, or the infinite dignity of Christ
which gives infinite value to the suffering of the
God-man, or even the concept of the perfect holiness
and offering of Christ (63). In all such examples
christological or trinitarian insights are an integral
part of reflection on the atonement and constitute a
part of the basic 'data' which demands evaluation and
consideration (64). However, there is a more explicit
use of trinitarian insights when it is claimed that
substitutionary models, particularly those which
involve suffering or punishment, are given greater
coherence and intelligibility by the assertion that in
this act God receives on Himself His own punishment
and judgement (65). Thus, such a trinitarian model
may counter the accusation that it is unjust for the
innocent to be punished or judged in place of the
guilty by arguing that there is no injustice if the
punisher himself assumes the place of punishment (66).

However, the use of trinitarian insights in
this context, rather than rendering the concept of
substitution more intelligible, in fact translate the
problems that have been encountered in the use of such
judicial language into the concept of God. It leads

to the concept of an opposition within God, between His

justice and mercy, or between His wrath and love.

> Side by side in the Godhead, there dwell the
> impulse to punish and the desire to pardon;
> but the desire to pardon is realised, in act,
> by carrying out the impulse to punish; not
> indeed upon the person of the criminal, but
> upon that of his substitute. And the subst-
> itute is the punisher himself. ... The divine
> compassion itself bears the infliction of the
> Divine indignation, in the place of the
> transgressor (67).

Such language is, indeed, only making explicit the

logical conclusion of penal substitutionary thought,

but in making it explicit and using it as an explanation

of the rationale of substitution, the character of the

exchange thereby articulated is transformed (68). An

act that was perceived to focus on the relation between

man and God, and on the condition of man before God,

now becomes an act within God, with Christ's humanity

instrumental and passive, having no significance for

our humanity. The general New Testament insight of the

exchange that takes place between Christ and his people

before God has become so narrowly focussed in penal

terms that it has become a transaction between God and

God, virtually independent of the human story which

formed its origin and impulse (69).

An alternative may be posited, that God

substitutes Himself in the place of man, not to

receive upon Himself His punishment, but to 'absorb'

the sin and disease of man, and to take upon Himself

man's alienation (70). G. Berkouwer comments:

> ... the theopaschite tendency in the new doctrine
> of reconciliation, the new doctrine of
> 'substitution', is a human attempt to present
> the trinitarian background of the incarnation
> in a logical synthesis. But in so doing it
> oversteps the limits of speculation, because
> the new doctrine is not concerned with the
> mercy, the concern, the initiative of God, of
> which the Confessions of the Church are full,
> but it speaks of God abandoning Himself, of
> God's taking upon Himself the misery and sin of
> the world, so that it brings in a separate
> concept, namely, the suffering of God, although
> it immediately adds: 'in Christ' (71).

Thus, it cannot be said that the concept of substitution,

particularly concepts of penal substitution, become

more intelligible or more coherent when viewed from this

perspective of God substituting Himself, punishing

Himself in place of the guilty. Further, when the term

substitution is employed in this context, it is often

held to express the sense of God's <u>identification</u> with

the human situation or plight - a sense of the term

that must be rejected for the same reasons as it has

already been rejected in the context of Christ's

identification with man.

Summary and Conclusions

From the critical analysis of the term

substitution, and in a limited sense, the term repres-

entation, the following summary is offered together with

some concluding remarks. The attempt has been made to

characterise and describe the scriptural material that

is held to warrant or generate substitutionary language

and 'theories' of the atonement. From this material

there emerged a basic pattern of reversal and exchange

which was rooted in the story of Jesus and his relation to God, but which could articulate in varying forms the salvific reality of Christian experience. This pattern of exchange could then constitute a source against which various substitutionary models could be checked in order to determine the sense in which they were interpretative of Christ's salvific work. In order to treat the actual patterns of substitution and representation as they refer to the work of Christ in their full complexity, four areas of their use were examined critically, areas which themselves arose from the material of Chapters II and III. From this critical discussion the following points have emerged.

First, where Chapter II described the variety of the uses of the term substitution, which indicated that the term functioned as an interpretative tool, the present discussion has demonstrated that substitutionary terminology is misunderstood if it is regarded as having explanatory power or significance in Christian doctrines of the atonement. In section 2) of this chapter it was demonstrated that substitutionary 'theories' which claimed explanatory power were always dependent upon and subordinate to the mysterious and inexplicable grace of God which wills and brings about salvation. The various expressions of penal substitution, which are most commonly held to embody a rational explanation of Christ's work, were shown to develop and change as their failure to explain became apparant, or as the explanation offered conflicted with other Christian

insights. Ultimately, it was argued, the categories of
law, whether criminal, civil or private, could provide
contextual frameworks within which interpretations
of the New Testament insight of an exchange can be
offered, but these models are misconstrued and they
mislead if they are taken to explain 'how' the work of
Christ saves.

Second, two particular patterns of substit-
utionary thought were judged to be inappropriate to
describe the atonement. On the one hand, the exclusive
use of the concept of civil law failed both to
substantiate the use of the term substitution since
the pattern of exchange articulated did not refer to an
exchange of Christ with man, and it failed to provide
a coherent framework in which Christ's work could be
expressed and interpreted. On the other hand, the use
of the term substitution to express a pattern of
identification, whether that be the identification of
Christ or God with man, was found to be misleading and
unjustified.

Third, in considering the broad range of penal
patterns of substitution, this dicussion points to the
conclusion that, with certain qualifications, penal
language can provide a contextual framework within
which the work of Christ may be expressed and within
which the concept of substitution articulates and
interprets the pattern of exchange between Christ and
his people that was discerned in scripture. Qualif-
ications are, however, necessary and can be summarised

under four headings: a) the penal framework is only

acceptable if it is construed as an interpretative

model, and it becomes unsuitable for Christian atonement

theology if it assumes the role of an explanatory

system; b) the penal framework is only acceptable if

it is construed as one among a number of interpretative

models, all of which articulate some dimension of the

work of Christ, and it becomes unsuitable if it assumes

the role of a control mechanism, subordinating the

diverse models of scripture to its single insight;

c) although penal language may constitute the framework

for an interpretative model, it should be recognised

that the judicial categories of the New Testament do

not demand, or are not necessarily best interpreted by,

such a framework; the New Testament itself does not

give prominence to penal terms, and such an inter-

pretation of the judicial and cultic language is in

danger of directing attention away from the New Testament;

d) the various models of penal substitution must be

assessed not only by their ability to interpret a

pattern of exchange that articulates an experience of

salvation but also by their ability to cohere with

other patterns of Christian thought. An interpretative

model must be evaluated not simply by its success in

interpreting one dimension of Christian thought, but by

its ability to illuminate a wider pattern of thought,

and it is on this account that models of penal

substitution are found to be least adequate. Only

narrow and restricted understandings of God, sin and

justice are admitted by these models, and the work of Christ is seen narrowly in terms of His death, excluding salvific significance to his ministry, life and resurrection. If penal frameworks are still to have a place in atonement theology, the models which they espouse must be more modest and limited in their range and significance.

Fourth, those patterns of substitution which were formulated within a non-penal framework were shown to contribute significantly to an understanding of atonement, since they better preserved their interpretative character, they raised fewer problems with regard to the central conviction of the vicariousness of Christ's work, and they proved better able to accommodate and open up other insights into the significance of Christ's work and its relation to man. Although problems clearly arise in relation to these models they must none the less be recognised as contributing significantly to any future discussion of the use of substitutionary or representative terminology in the doctrine of the atonement.

Finally, with regard to the relation of the terms substitution and representation, on the evidence of this discussion both terms were found to have a part to play. In relation to an interpretation of the work of Christ the use of the term representation was not held to solve the difficulties that arose as a result of judicial or penal frameworks, but in non-penal contexts it could aid interpreting the sense in which

Christ's work is appropriated and is relevant to man's moral condition. A more complete evaluation of the two terms must, however, wait until their role in expressing the relation between Christ and his people or mankind has been examined.

CHAPTER V

THE USE OF THE TERMS SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION

TO DESCRIBE THE RELATION BETWEEN CHRIST AND HUMANITY

Introduction

The second central issue that serves to
determine the range of meanings of the terms
substitution and representation is that of the relation
of Christ to humanity, or the relation of Christ to
a certain section of humanity. As in the previous
chapter we will be concerned first of all to describe
the biblical motifs that generate this discussion,
and then we will assess the various models specifically
related to the terms substitution and representation
that have been employed to interpret and order this
biblical material.

1. The Bearing of Biblical Material on the Use of the Terms Substitution and Representation to Describe the Relation Between Christ and Humanity

We begin by describing briefly four biblical
themes that indicate and express some relation between
Christ and other people.

a)   The New Testament language of ἐν Χριστῷ : since
this subject has been exhaustively treated by a number

of writers (1), it will be sufficient simply to indicate the subject matter under examination by listing the nine headings under which E. Best groups all of the New Testament texts. 1) The form A is in Christ; 2) the form A does or is something to B in Christ; 3) the form A does something in the Lord; 4) the form A is X in the Lord, where X denotes some quality; 5) the form God does something to us in Christ; 6) the form 'the gift of God that is in Christ Jesus'; 7) the form A, B, C, are one in Christ; 8) passages of cosmic significance; 9) natural forms that are not distinctive (2).

The variety of uses and contexts in which this phrase occurs weighs against any simple meaning or definition being given. As has been noted the phrase can frequently mean no more than our word 'Christian' (3). Or, it may be argued, the phrase is simply an expressive use of an instrumental meaning so that the ἐν lies close to the meaning of διά (4). In this instrumental sense the phrase may denote the sphere of reference of salvation, being accomplished by (in) Christ and not by (in) me: '... the term sums up what has come about for believers through Christ and constitutes salvation' (5). If it is denied that this phrase carries any more than this instrumental sense then its meaning may be taken to be !the new basic and all-comprehending reality', the reality of the Body of Christ, the Church (6). In Bornkamm's words:

> Quite often it only expresses membership of
> the church. Obviously, no profound theological,
> let alone 'mystic', meaning should be wrested
> from such turns of phrase (7).

However, following Deissmann's monograph on
the subject many writers believe the preposition
to express a spatial dimension so that the believer is
regarded as being physically in Christ (8). This may
be conceived of as a participation in the 'ethereal
substance', the 'sphere of vitalism', of the exalted
pneumatic Christ. Or, following A. Schweitzer, the
phrase ἐν Χριστῷ may be taken to refer to the sharing
in a quasi-physical sense, or the grafting into, the
corporeity of Christ (9). This refers to the mode of
being of Christ appropriate to the conditions of the
Messianic Kingdom which again results in the preposition
being given local force to indicate a sphere in which
the elect live (10). Théo Preiss contends that this
concept of Christ as an ethereal substance must be
rejected, for Paul's idea of new life is no diffuse
mysticism but flows from justification and remission
of sins and is expressed in 'the most common and secular
business terms' (11). Thus R. P. Martin concludes
that being in Christ 'is a cipher for a network of
relationships both divine and human ... that stem from
Paul's orientation as a justified sinner and a redeemed
man' (12). This relational interpretation is further
strengthened when it is noted that the phrase
appears in those very passages where judicial language
is employed (Rom 3:24, 8:1, 2 Cor 5:21).

Clearly, there is no discernable consensus of opinion as to the meaning of the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ, although several main alternatives have become apparent. The phrase may be taken to denote a spatial reference, pointing to a physical relation constituted by an act of inclusion or incorporation; the phrase may be taken in an instrumental sense, expressing a concentrated interest on the particular agency of Christ; the phrase may be taken to express a network of relationships within both the unity of the Church and between Christ and the Christian as an expression of the reconciling activity of Christ; the phrase may be taken to express the ultimate grounding of all reality as all things are created and consummated in Christ. However, the valuable term 'interchange', coined by M. Hooker, expresses clearly the main thrust of this language in its bearing on soteriology (13). The term points not only to the reversal and transforming reality of Christ's salvific work, to the <u>change</u> involved, but also to the concentration on the person of Christ and on the immediacy of the involvement in relation and participation on the part of the believer.

b)   The second biblical theme, that is closely related to the language of ἐν Χριστῷ , is the description of the Church, or the community of believers, as the Body of Christ (14). Commentators are divided as to whether this description is a result and extension of the language of being ἐν Χριστῷ , or whether the

description of Christ's Body is primary and generates
the description of being in Christ (15). Whatever
the precise relation, the description of the Church as
the Body of Christ bears on the relation between Christ
and believers in two different ways, depending on the
perspective adopted.

First, the description of the Church as the
Body of Christ can emphasise and explicate the nature
of the relation between Christ and believer, or between
Christ and the Church, as that which exists between a
head and a body (16). Basic to this view are such
passages as Col 1:18 - 'He is the Head of the Body,
the Church; he is the beginning, the first-born from
the dead, that in everything he might be preeminent'
- and Eph 1:22-23 - 'God has put all things under his
feet and has made him the head over all things for the
Church, which is his body, the fulness of him who fills
all in all'. As Küng comments, 'the concept of the
head always carries overtones of the ruler' and it is
this sense of Christ standing over and against the
members of his body that is to the fore (17).

Second, the description of the Church as the
Body of Christ can serve to characterise the union
between believers, so that the 'one body' constitutes
the continuing corporeal reality of Christ on earth (18).
By being members of this one body it is emphasised that
failure to maintain unity in belief and practise is
tantamount to separation from and a denial of Christ.
Since the believers in their life together make up the

Body of Christ, the life of this body must be congruous
with the paradigmatic life of Christ, which means that
this many-membered body can be identified to an extent
with Christ as the form of his continuing corporeal
presence in the world. Thus, the context of this
description of the Church as the Body of Christ is found
to be paraenetic or hortatory, as can be demonstrated
by the principal texts of 1 Cor 12:12 ff and Rom 12:4 ff
(19). While these two perspectives on the Church as
the Body of Christ are not contradictory, they do
develop distinctive insights from the description of
the 'Body', which result in quite different models
of the relation between Christ and believers.

c)   The third biblical theme, which deserves
separate treatment despite its close relation with the
theme of being in Christ, is found in the texts
1 Cor 15:21 ff and Rom 5:12 ff. In these passages
parallels are drawn and explored between Adam and Christ,
in which it is argued certain similarities can be
asserted as well as certain dissimilarities (20).
That there is a parallel between the two figures is
established by the complementary phrases ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ
ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, and through the designation ἄνθρωπος to
describe both figures. The fact that the phrase ἐν τῷ
Χριστῷ can be directly preceded by a parallel δι᾽
ἀνθρώπου warns against taking the relation between
man and Christ in any simple, local or inclusive sense.
Equally Barrett's questions should be borne in mind in

any consideration of these texts:

> In what sense is the whole race in Adam? Is
> it the same sense or some other that all men
> are in Christ? Are the 'all' who are in
> Christ the same as the 'all' who are in Adam?
> (21).

That there is a contrast between Adam and Christ
is expressed by a number of statements of opposite or
contrasting ideas. Death is contrasted with resurrection,
disobedience with obedience, judgement with justification,
and sin with grace. In addition, Christ's work is
contrasted with that of Adam by its scope and range.
This may be indicated by the repeated πολλῷ μᾶλλον, and
by such terms as ἐπερίσσευσαν, πλεονάζω, and
ὑπερπερισσεύω. Finally the contrast is expressed
between the 'spiritual' or 'heavenly' character of
Christ together with the consequences for those who
are 'in him' and the 'physical' or 'earthly' character
of Adam together with those consequences for men.
Despite these contrasts, which mitigate against any
simply parallelism between Adam and Christ, a basic
pattern of interchange is once again being given
expression. Whatever the precise force of the phrase
ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ it is clear that it is the condition of man as
characterised by his sin, the solidarity of all men in
sin and in its consequences of death that is being
considered. Equally, whatever the precise force of
the phrase ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ a contrast is being drawn which
both defines the quality of the change between the old
and the new, and the person 'in whom' this change has
been wrought, and the interrelation between the old and

the new.

d)   The fourth biblical theme that bears on the
relation between Christ and the believer is to be found
in the use of the phrase σὺν Χριστῷ together with those
verbs prefixed by σύν (22). Commentators have recognised
that due to the close relation between the phrases ἐν
Χριστῷ and σὺν Χριστῷ the one must be interpreted
in the light of the other, but it is not easy to see
how these different descriptions are related to one
another. The principle texts are to be found in
Rom 6:4-11, Eph 2:5-6, Gal 2:20, 2 Tim 2:11-12, with
additional references made almost in passing in Rom 8:17,
Col 2:20 and 3:1. In every case the reference is to
suffering, dying, rising, living or reigning with Christ,
thus stamping such language with an unmistakable
soteriological significance.

        However, it is again the case that any simple
explanation or account of our presence with Christ is
controverted by the variations as to the time of this
participation (23). For example, in the texts where
baptism is the specified context, Rom 6:4-11 describes
the believer as having died with Christ, as being raised
with him in the future and as being dead to sin in the
present, whereas in Col 2:12-15 not only the death of
the believer but also his resurrection is said to be
in the past. A similar contrast is to be found between
the texts of 2 Tim 2:11-12 and Eph 2:5-6, this time
relating to the time of our exaltation. As with the

phrase ἐν Χριστῷ , so the description σὺν Χριστῷ focusses

attention on the relation between Christ's salvific

work and the participation of the believer in that

work, but the New Testament leaves open the possibility

of expressing this relation in terms not only of

participation and interchange but also of imitation

and duplication (24).

The four biblical themes outlined above provide

basic insights concerning the relation between Christ

and others, a relation that could be expressed from

the side of the believer by such terms as identification,

incorporation, participation and imitation. As was

indicated in the previous chapter, the presence of this

language alongside the language of exchange (Rom 3:23,

2 Cor 5:21, 2 Cor 8:9), acting possibly as a corrective

of certain misinterpretations of this exchange, points

to a model of 'interchange' (25). In this language

of interchange, participation, and identification

physical or spatial metaphors are employed which result

in patterns of interpretation that are equally 'concrete'.

Chapter II demonstrated the patterns of thought and

the interpretative models that can be employed in the

context of the terms substitution and representation

to express and interpret these metaphors - the concept

of Man or Humanity, the concept of corporateness or

solidarity, the concepts of centre, paradigm and

consummator. In this chapter a critical examination will

take place of such models, evaluating their ability to

express coherently the biblical insights as to the

manner in which our destiny and existence is 'bound up'
with that of Christ. As in the previous chapter, where
both the terms substitution and representation were
considered in the context of the work of Christ, so
too in the context of the relation between Christ and
his people both terms will be considered. Although in
this instance the term representation has been found
to play the larger part, the contribution of the term
substitution to express the relation between Christ and
others, particularly in the phrase 'inclusive
substitution', must be considered and assessed. As in
the previous chapter the method employed will be to
test both the coherence of the model in its relation
to other Christian insights and the ability of the
model to express and interpret the biblical themes
outlined above.

2. The Theological Context in Which Christ's Relation to Others is Defined

As was shown in the description and discussion
of the term substitution, it is a common belief that
if the external and remote patterns of thought that
are associated with the term could be lessened,
emphasising instead the immediacy and internality of
Christ's work, then the concept of atonement should
become more coherent and intelligible. R. Dale expresses
this conviction in the following way:

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> ... no clear and articulate conception of that
> relation of Christ to mankind which renders it
> possible for him to sustain a representative
> character, appears to have rooted itself in
> the popular theology, or in the moral and
> spiritual life of Christendom. ... The general
> and growing dissatisfaction with the theory of
> expiation has probably arisen partly from this
> cause, and it will be impossible for that
> theory to retain its place in the theological
> thought of the church, unless it can be shown
> that the Death of Christ ... for the sins of
> men is the highest expression of an eternal
> relation between Christ and the human race,
> - a relation which ... has nothing in it to
> offend the higher reason or to provoke
> antagonism, and is capable of verification by
> the Christian consciousness (26).

If it can be affirmed that the believer is 'in Christ',

included in him, then it may be possible to argue that

'in Christ' mankind receives its punishment for sin,

or that 'in Christ' man dies and is resurrected to new

life, or that 'in Christ' man lives a life of obedience

and sacrifice pleasing to God. The various expressions

of the relation of Christ to mankind are not tied to

any particular model of the work of Christ; indeed, as

Mozley comments in connection with 'the modern notion

of Christ as the Representative Man', the theory of the

'inclusive humanity' of Christ 'is not self-sufficient:

it needs to be helped out from other sources before

we can say what it is that Christ, or mankind in Christ,

does to make amends for sin' (27).

However, if some inclusive relation is to be

affirmed, then it is apparent that some conceptual

framework must be employed in which this relation may

be given expression. The first such model to be examined

is that of Christ as the Universal Man, or more simply

as The Man, which is then followed by an examination of

the models of Christ as the Corporate man, the models

of solidarity, and the models of archetype and centre,

in each case considering the model in specific relation

to the terms substitution and representation as they

are used in the context of Christian atonement theology.

a)   The Model of Christ the Universal Man

        The model of the Universal Manhood of Christ

can be found expressed in the following way: Christ

was a man - on that all will be agreed - but he is also

more than a man; his manhood is God's manhood, he is

the man, he is Man, he is the totality of all humanity,

he is all men (28). In this sense, Christ is the one

who includes in himself all other members of the human

race. The argument for Christ's Universal humanity can

be expressed more precisely in the following way: all

individual men are human, belonging to the species

'man', but only Christ can be described as humanity,

as being in himself the reality that transcends and yet

embraces all members of the species. His manhood,

therefore, is generic, not simply one of a kind, not

differentiated from others in the way that all

individual members of a species are differentiated, but

consummating, Universal and inclusive (29). As Man

he stands in relation to men not by any external agency

of deputation or delegation, but by the inclusive

relation constituted by the fact that we are literally

in him, so that what he does all men do, what happens

to him happens in actual fact to all men. As K. Adam

has said:

> He is not merely a man, he is <u>the</u> Man; not one
> individual member of mankind <u>but</u> the Head of
> Mankind, its new beginning, the first born
> among his brethren, the New Adam. Just as the
> first Adam ... was not a man like us other
> men, but was <u>the</u> man, the God appointed
> representative of the whole race who in
> himself contained germinally all possible men
> ... so our Lord ... is the New Man ... whose
> life and fate are our life and fate also (30).

A common form in which this argument is to be found is

when a writer feels free to pass without comment or

explanation from the designation 'a man' to the general

terms man, human nature or humanity. This is esp-

ecially true in the case of the transition so often

effected from 'a man' to 'Man' (31).

The tradition which lies behind the designation

of Christ as the Universal man is extensive and varied.

In the Patristic period there can be little doubt that

some such concept provided the conceptual framework

for what is often called the physical theory of the

atonement, and it may be claimed that it provided the

impetus for the development of christological language

concerning Christ's nature as true man. G. S. Hendry

argues that the term ὁμοούσιος   when applied to

Christ's manhood was intended to assert an ontological

relation with the race of men so that 'just as it was

true to say that "God was in Christ", so also there

is a sense in which it could be said that "Man was in

Christ"' (32). Hendry illustrates this position not

only from eastern writers such as Athanasius and

Gregory of Nyssa, but also from the western Hilary of

Poitiers (33). As Hendry points out none of these

writers feel the necessity of justifying this language

of Universal manhood, nor do they seek to explain on

what basis the language of ontological union is

employed (34). It would seem that as G. Rupp says:

> ... In the ecclesiastically normative
> formulation of Chalcedon ... the affirmation
> that Christ is consubstantial with men in
> his humanity assumes a Realist ontology only
> implicitly. But the conception of universal
> or generic human nature in any case functions
> more or less consciously as a cultural
> presupposition in the Patristic and early
> medieval period to facilitate comprehension
> of the connection between Christ's work and
> successive generations of believers (35).

H. E. W. Turner recognises the part played

by Platonic philosophy in this 'cultural presupposition',

especially in Gregory of Nyssa for whom the 'Platonic

conceptions of Universals ... is basic to his theology'

(36), but the following statement of John of Damascus

exemplifies this Patristic presupposition.

> Essence ($οὐσία$) is predicated of the indiv-
> idual: therefore in each individual of the
> species the essence is perfect (or complete).
> Therefore neither do the individuals differ
> from one another in essence, but only in respect
> of the accidents which are their characteristic
> properties. For they define the individual
> as 'essence together with accidents'. So that
> the individual has what is common together with
> that which individualises it, besides existing
> substantially in itself. But the essence
> does not exist substantially in itself, but
> is only seen in the individuals. When, then,
> one of the individuals suffers, all the essence,
> in respect of which the individual has suffered,
> so far as it is capable of suffering, is said
> to have suffered in one of its individuals;
> without, however, its being necessary that
> all the individuals of the same species should
> suffer with the individual that actually
> suffers (37).

In the medieval period it is generally

recognised that the question as to the status of

Universals is 'one of the dominant intellectual issues',
but the discussion does not appear to have been related
closely to soteriology (38). According to Ch Duquoc
Thomas Aquinas loses sight of the ontological root
of the Universality of Christ, treating men as a mosaic
of separate individuals connected only by their actions,
so that 'en dernière analyse, c'est donc la grâce
sanctificante qui est le principe immédiat de
l'universalité de l'humanité individuelle de Jésus' (39).

It is only in the 19th century that the
concept of Christ as the Universal man again comes to
the fore as a theological concept for soteriology (40).
C. Hodge lists among german theologians the names of
Nitsch, Olhausen and Ebrard; among British theologians
the names of Maurice and Morrell; and among American
theologians the school of Mercersburg following a
professor Harbaugh (41). In Chapter III a number of
contemporary examples were given, but it should also
be noted that in Chapter II reference was made to the
concept of inclusive substitution which may also be
intended to express the conviction that an inclusive
relation exists between Christ and his people by virtue
of his Universal humanity (42).

However, as might be expected, the notion of
Christ's Universal manhood has been heavily criticised
by theologians, generally from the 'common sense'
perspective that the term humanity is an abstract noun,
as is the term Man, so to speak of Jesus as Man or
Humanity as the one who includes all men is meaningless

or unintelligible (43). Thus, for example, C. Hodge

complains that in addition to being merely speculative,

ethically impossible, anthropocentric and materialist,

the concept of the universal man is impossible since:

> There is no conceivable sense in which Christ
> had in Himself the whole of humanity, when
> millions of other men existed around him.
> This whole theory ... rests on an unintelligible,
> or meaningless proposition (44).

Similarly Denney rejects 'the fantastic abstraction

of a racial act' (45), and V. F. Storr asks 'Do we

mean that humanity has a life of its own apart from

the individuals who compose it?' (46). He concludes

that 'I find it very difficult to attach any meaning

to the phrase "Christ was inclusive man" which makes it

possible for me to think of the death on the Cross as

an act in which all humanity shared' (47).

H. E. W. Turner, commenting on the συναφή of

Athanasius asks:

> Is this humanity a single humanity or humanity
> as such? If the former, how can the assumption
> by the Λόγος of a particular humanity avail
> for the sins of humanity as a whole? If the
> latter, can any convincing significance be
> attached to a humanity which lacks part-
> icularity? We are here confronted with the
> dilemma which was to embarrass the Greek
> tradition of Christology for centuries, and
> which perhaps has not been successfully overcome
> even yet (48).

On a more aggressive note Rashdall opposes the concept

of Christ as Universal man on the grounds that it

testifies to a false 'metaphysical theory', supposedly

derived from Plato, but an 'insult' to him (49). The

result of this 'bastard platonism' (50) is that Christ

is regarded as a 'metaphysical entity which had somehow

got incarnated in a human body' and which necessarily
replaces the person of the Christ of history by an
impersonal, unreal and metaphysical Christ (51).
These comments are specifically addressed to Moberly,
but more generally he comments that 'a Universal
cannot be a particular member of the class indicated
by the class-name' (52). M. Wiles, commenting on the
Patristic understanding of a Universal human nature,
recognises that such a concept is understandable and
intelligible within the context of platonic thought
forms, but that although:

> there is something in common between all men,
> which we are indicating by our use of the
> words 'human nature' ... I doubt if many
> people today can really visualise or express
> that which is common to mankind as a whole as
> strongly as our principle seems to require
> if it is to retain its verisimilitude (53).

It may help in an assessment of the language of
Christ as the Universal, inclusive and representative
man, to outline the different ways in which it is
possible to use the language of universals, and thereby
to reach some understanding of the theological use
appropriate to this language (54). First, a universal
may be spoken of in the sense of a reality which has
logical and ontological priority over the particulars
which participate in and derive their characteristics
from the universal. In this sense the Universal man
is conceived as a reality standing over and before all
individual men, who only are men in that they
participate in the universal. In the incarnation
Christ may be thought to have been united to this

universal, or he may be thought of as the universal which has been given specific form (55).

Second, a universal may be taken as the common specific form which can be apprehended in a group of objects which enables both their common classification and the recognition of their individual status. In this sense universals cannot be said to exist in the same sense that individuals exist, for the individual is unique and cannot be common to many whereas the universal is that which is common to many and therefore cannot be. However, in this view, the universal can act as a subject, since something can meaningfully be said of it, and it can be predicated of an object. In this sense, to speak of a Universal man is not meaningless, but it would not be possible to speak of him in the same sense of which the individual is spoken (56).

Third, a universal may be construed as a necessary accompaniment to the perception of reality, functioning in the mind as a regulative concept which enables the observer to perceive and recognise reality. The universal is the presupposition or the product of the ability to classify and recognise community amongst complex and diverse forms. The universal is therefore an epistomological category that allows for the recognition of the individual and the class or species to which he belongs. The Universal man is thus a logical and epistomological construct which corresponds to the observer's experience of the complex reality of individual humans (57).

From this outline of the different ways in
which the language of universals may be used it follows
that the use of such language by a theologian does not
necessarily commit him to a particular metaphysic.
Rather, it is the case that the theologian uses the
language of universals in order to express the New
Testament insight that individual human destiny is
'bound up with' the person of Christ, that his life is
decisive for the life of all men, and that his relation
with God is constitutive of our relation. In other
words, the language of universals is an immediate
expression and consequence of the conviction of the
universality of Christ. Indeed, a careful study of
Patristic writers who draw heavily on such language
points to this conclusion, in that distinctions are
carefully drawn so as to subordinate the metaphysical
context implied in the language of universals to the
tensions and claims of Christian faith (58). Thus,
the language of universals can be a powerful model for
interpreting Christian insights, where the ambiguity
and diversity of this language, which results from the
different metaphysics in which it is formulated, is not
the immediate concern of the theologian. As a model
its coherence is founded not upon a particular
metaphysic, but upon the significance of Christ, of
whom it is said that he is 'before' all men in such a
way that all other men are wholly dependent upon him;
that he is the 'summation' of all men in such a way
that our common human nature is seen to receive its

full expression and destiny; that he is a paradigmatic form of humanity in such a way that individuals may define their actions and experience in the light and on the basis of his.

When a theologian moves from the language of 'man' to that of 'Man', or from a human nature to Humanity, he is drawing upon a model which has its roots deep in the structure of human perception, thought and language and which functions to express and interpret the universal significance of Christ.

However, there are occasions where this language would appear to be misconstrued and misused, where the charges of 'bastard Platonism', 'outmoded realism', have more force. For example, what is the significance and status of the language that as Jesus is Man, Universal Man, all men are thereby punished in his punishment, or all men die in his death and are raised in his resurrection? On the understanding given above, such language would be construed as expressing the significance of Christ's work, its universality, in the sense that if punishment is seen to be a legitimate understanding of that work then salvation is apprehended as liberation from punishment, and that liberation is effected through a universal range and efficacy. Equally, Jesus as Man undergoing death and resurrection expresses the conviction that the history of this man is decisive and constitutive for the history of all men. However, this language often seems to be employed and understood not as an interpretation which

expresses Christ's universal significance, but as an
explanation which justifies the belief that Christ's
work is salvific for other men (59). The pattern of
thought that, for example, finds Christ to be a
substitute in the sense of bearing our punishment or
death, and then seeks to apply that insight by appealing
to the universal category 'Man', not only misconstrues
such language, but also fails to recognise the origin
and impulse of its use. The very fact that Christ is
seen to bear our punishment or our death suggests that
his universal significance is an implicit part of
language about his salvific work, which may be expressed
and interpreted by means of universal categories, but
is not to be explained or justified by them. Such a
view reverses the pattern and direction of Christian
thought and experience and distorts the significance of
the language of universals by failing to recognise their
interpretative function as models.

b)   The Model of Christ as Corporate Man
        The second model that may be employed to
substantiate the language of the inclusiveness of Christ
draws specifically on the scriptural theme of the Body,
and indeed, has been advanced as the Hebraic pattern
of thought over and against the 'Greek' concept of the
Universal man (60). As was noted in Chapter III this
model can be employed to express both the consequences
of Christ's saving work, that we are thereby incorporated
into his Body, and to denote the presupposition for

that work, that in Christ, the corporate man, all men
have already died (61). The oscillation between these
two patterns of thought plays on the ambiguity of the
phrase 'the Body of Christ' which can be taken to refer
both to the physical constitution of the earthly Jesus
and to the community of the church in its communion
with the exalted Jesus (62). The concern of this
section is to examine the models of Corporate Personality
and the Body which substantiate this language of
corporeity and incorporation.

i)   The concept of Corporate Personality was first
advanced by H. W. Robinson (63) and it was rapidly
seized upon by many commentators as a means of rendering
intelligible 'a much too crude mythology' (64).
Robinson himself gave the term a restricted place,
because, as shall be seen, the logic of his argument
dictated that the notion of corporate personality could
play no part in a contemporary understanding of the
relation between Christ and mankind (65). However,
because the term corporate personality has become such
a familiar part of theological vocabulary, its origin
as an anthropological construct to characterise patterns
of 'primitive mentality' is often ignored. J. W. Rogerson
has subjected the concept to an anthropological enquiry
and argues that a distinction be made between 'corporate
responsibility' which is a phenomenon of social groupings
regarded without differentiation by law, and the
psychological dimension that the term corporate

personality is meant to indicate, that is, the inability
of the primitive consciousness to distinguish between
the individual and the group in the way in which
modern man does, and the corresponding notion that the
individual personality was conceived as being capable
of extension in society (66).

Rogerson rightly argues that this latter
dimension be rejected as an account of Hebrew thought
and institutions (67). In proposing it Robinson was
drawing on the anthropological theories of Lévy-Bruhl,
who argued that primitive mentalities, as opposed to
civilized mentalities, thought and perceived within
a network of alien concepts (68). Lévy-Bruhl argued
that such primitive mentalities thought in terms of
'participatory representations', so that identifications
between objects, persons and animals could readily be
made (69). Robinson applies this theory to Hebrew
thought and institutions, arguing that the ability of a
prophet to represent or 'be' God and the ability of the
individual to be identified with his family or nation
are not figures of speech or metaphors but literal
statements of fact (70). The term corporate person-
ality was therefore supposed to be an explanation of
patterns of Hebrew thought and behaviour that are now
problematic and alien.

Two comments must be made concerning the use
of this anthropological theory. First, for a number of
reasons Lévy-Bruhl's theory of primitive mentalities
and their manner of perceiving the world has been

largely rejected by anthropologists. Lévy-Bruhl was
possibly right to seek the resolution and meaning of
certain patterns of thought and behaviour within the
context of social structures, but he was wrong in his
interpretation of those structures and in his view of
primitive mentality (71). In particular the supposed
identifications between individuals, animals and
groups on closer inspection proves to be far more subtle
and less problematic than might have been supposed (72).
While corporate patterns of thought are certainly
present in the Old Testament and while these patterns
may be elucidated by an understanding of the social
structure of corporate responsibility, Lévy-Bruhl's
theory of primitive mentality cannot be drawn upon by
the theologian to substantiate the concept of corporate
personality as a psychological or ontological description.

Second, even if Lévy-Bruhl's theory were
correct it would be impossible to apply the concept of
corporate personality to the person of Christ as an
explanation of his inclusive salvific work. Not only
can there be no justification for applying a theory
of primitive mentality to first century Jews and Greeks,
but also its use as an explanatory or interpretative
device for a contemporary 'civilized mentality' must
also be illegitimate (73). The commentator cannot have
it both ways: either Lévy-Bruhl is correct, in which
case the theory of corporate personality must be tied
strictly to the primitive mentality of the early
Hebrews and remain contradictory or 'pre-logical' to us;

or, Lévy-Bruhl is incorrect in his description of
primitive mentality, in which case there is no justif-
ication for a continued use of the concept of corporate
personality as an explanation of that mentality (74).
It appears to be the case that theologians employed the
concept of corporate personality because it seems to
explain how and why the New Testament saw Christ as a
Universal figure to whom all are related so that they
may be said to be really or potentially 'in him'. Not
only, however, does the understanding of corporate
personality rest on a spurious abstraction from Hebrew
thought and is inapplicable to the New Testament, but
also its continued use as an 'explanation' of the sig-
nificance of Christ reveals the misunderstanding to which
language about the universality of Christ is prone (75).

ii)   The language of the 'Body' is more evidently
a model which is expressive of relations rather than an
explanation or a constitutive reality, and is therefore
less open to misconstruction than the model of corporate
personality. None the less, caution must be exercised
when considering the view, for example, of L. S. Thornton,
where the relation to Christ expressed by the concept
of 'the Body of Christ' (the Church) is referred also
to the body of Christ (his physical constitution),
particularly in his work on the cross (76). Rather, the
model of incorporation, more clearly expresses the
conviction of the universal significance of Christ,

interpreting and illuminating the sphere of relation-
ships and responsibilities into which the Christian
enters. The same may be said for the concept of
'solidarity' as it expresses the inclusive significance
of Christ in terms of the 'physical' model of union or
conjunction. In both cases the commentator is doing
little more than repeating scriptural analogies without
making explicit the frameworks of thought on which
such analogies are dependent. It is more likely that
if appeal is made to the concept of the Body or to the
notion of solidarity it will be undergirded by a
recognition of a social awareness of community and
interdependence and will be given expression in terms
of patterns of social solidarity.

iii) The presupposition for the model of social
solidarity is that every person 'is involved in the
society in which he lives by what he does and by his
share in the deeds of others' (77). The structure of
vocation, the division of labour, the common biological
and psychological heritage all involve relationships
of dependence so that not only do the actions of one
affect the fate of others, but it may be said that all
are involved in the actions of others (78). However,
a distinction must be drawn to preserve the validity of
the model of solidarity between the consequences of
actions and the actions themselves. The patterns of
dependence, and the social structures that order human
existence, clearly result in a participation in the

consequences of the actions of others, but only by

distorting the language of dependence can it be said

that in the participation of these consequences there

takes place a participation in the events themselves

(79).

Further, this distinction between consequences

and actions, or between effects and causes, must be

recognised when appeal is made to the model of social

solidarity to establish the possibility and reality of

a vicarious bearing of judgement, guilt, or punishment

(80). The fact that another may be involved in the

consequences of the sin of another does not establish

that they are therefore involved in the sin itself.

As H. Neie comments:

> Personal guilt and responsibility, in spite
> of all sharing with others who contributed to
> my failure through their sin of commission or
> omission, is not transferable. No one can
> vicariously bear my guilt even if he (she)
> bears the consequences of my failure (81).

Thus, the language of social solidarity may articulate

the conviction of Christ's universal and decisive

significance, and it may interpret this significance by

means of patterns of dependence with which all are

familiar, but when viewed more closely the model does

not point to the New Testament insight that the believer

is engaged with Christ himself, but rather indicates

a relation between Christ and the believer which is

expressed in terms of actions and their consequences.

The intention of the model is to interpret the sense

in which the believer is 'bound up' with Christ, but it

succeeds only in establishing a relation of dependence, and thus it fails to interpret the pattern of interchange which the New Testament applies between Christ and his people.

c)   The Model of Christ as Archetype or Centre

Attention must now be focussed on the use of the terms representation and inclusive substitution to describe the 'inclusive character' of Christ not in ontological terms but in terms of his quality as an archetype, prototype or centre - the 'typical' man who embodies, introduces and inspires a new humanity which hereafter looks to him both as its source and goal (82). In this pattern of thought Christ's universality is interpreted and expressed not in terms of an ontological inclusion in his being or work, but in relational terms of dependence and invitation. In Chapter III it was shown that this relation could be referred either to particular qualities exhibited by Christ which are taken as determinative and normative for all other men, as for example his love, obedience etc; or to particular conditions of Christ's being which are taken as archetypal and constitutive for the being of other men (his God-manhood, the union of divine and human) (83). Whatever the quality or condition of Christ that is taken to be fundamental and salvific, the relation that is posited with men follows a similar pattern: that which is evinced in Christ has universal significance as being determinative

for men, to be realised and reflected in their
individual existences, and as constitutive for all men
initiating a new pattern of humanity, realising a
destiny for mankind that is the first fruit of every
individual's destiny.

It would be possible only to see this pattern
of thought in terms of its philosophical or metaphysical
origins and to charge it as being 'Hegelian' or 'Kantian',
as the concept of Christ as Man could be labelled
'Platonic', but such a criticism would miss what is
significant in this contribution, in that once again
a range of models are employed to interpret the
universal significance of Christ (84). Two comments,
however, should be noted.

First, in this designation and description of
Christ the term representation plays an important
part, for it contains and evokes a double reference.
On the one hand, to describe Christ as representative
can point to Christ himself, in whatever quality or
condition that is taken to be the embodiment of true
humanity. On the other hand, to describe Christ as
representative can point instead to his followers in
the sense that what is seen in Christ is to be
realised or reproduced in them. This double reference
of the term representation allows a complex pattern
of relation and association to be established that
binds together the representative and those who are
represented in networks of dependence which constantly
evoke both the source and the goal of Christian

discipleship.

Second, this use of the term representation can be seen to underlie and establish its interpretative role in the ontological contexts that have been examined. The term representation can evoke an inclusive relation which can be expressed in ontological terms precisely because the pattern of the relationship embraces both partners in a description of their associated roles. In this sense the use of the term representation in a political context is revealing, for the use of the term allows a transition to be made from the language of a functional relation which serves the end of the constituent to the language of the actual presence of the constituent 'in' the person of the representative. Such a transition is not invalid when the term representation is allowed to evoke this double reference of mutual interdependence and responsibility. It is only when this pattern of relation fails on one side that representation becomes misrepresentation and to speak of a 'real' presence becomes morally impossible.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter attention has been focussed on the manner of the relation that exists between the believer and Christ, as this relation bears on the use of the terms representation and substitution. Four New Testament themes were examined which indicated a

pattern of inter-relation, dependence and community,
a pattern that was seen to be well expressed by the
term 'interchange'. Three different sets of models which
arose from the description of the terms in Chapters II
and III, were then examined as they attempted to
interpret and order this biblical material: the models
of Christ as Man or Universal Man; the models of Christ
as a corporate person, as a Body, and as existing
within patterns of solidarity; the models of Christ
as archetypal, typical or exemplary man.

As in the previous chapter conclusions are
offered on the basis of an assessment of the models in
their ability to interpret and express the New Testament
insights of the relation between Christ and men, and
on the basis of the coherence of these models as they
act as interpretative frameworks, particularly in their
relation to the terms substitution and representation
which can be used in these contexts. On these criteria
two models were judged to be inadequate to aid inter-
pretation. First, the model of corporate personality,
when used to express the inclusive relation between
Christ and his people, was seen to be an artificial
abstraction from the biblical material and from the
point of view of its own coherence could not be used
to interpret the significance of Christ. Second, the
model of social solidarity, to which appeal is often
made in the context both of the language of corporate
personality and that of the Body, was seen to be
inadequate as it could indicate only the relation of

dependence between the believer and Christ, but it
could not interpret the immediacy of this relation or
its interdependence as witnessed to by the New Testament.

In the course of this chapter it has twice
been noted that the phrase 'inclusive substitution'
could be used to express the relation between Christ
and his people. On the one hand it could express the
ontological relation of inclusiveness, while on the other
hand, it could be employed to express the universal
significance and centrality of Christ. In both contexts
the meaning and intelligibility of the phrase must be
challenged. In the first place, referring to the
inclusive significance of the work of Christ, the phrase
is at best confusing and at worst contradictory. The
term substitution, as was shown in Chapter IV, is
closely allied to a pattern of exchange, a pattern that
may be expressed and interpreted in varying conceptual
frameworks, but one which demands the use of phrases
such as 'in our place', and 'in our stead'. It is
understandable that those who wish to use the term
substitution should wish also to recognise the force
of the New Testament description of being 'in Christ'
or 'with Christ', but the mere addition of the term
'inclusive' to the concept of substitution that is
otherwise defined in terms of an exchange, or of an
exclusive work means either that doubt is cast on the
validity of the term substitution, or that its inclusive
character is not really taken seriously, or that
Christian atonement theology is faced with a fundamental

contradiction. It may be true to argue that the models

of substitution and inclusiveness both have a part to

play in illuminating and interpreting the Christian

understanding of atonement, but to use a phrase like

'inclusive substitution' demonstrates that the purpose

and function of these models has not been grasped.

In the second place, the use of the phrase 'inclusive

substitution' in the context of describing Christ as the

centre of humanity, or the one who has universal signif-

icance, is simply misleading. The term substitution

in this context is used in a sense that bears little

relation to the patterns of thought that are usually

associated with the term, and the addition of the term

'inclusive', while indicating the changed context of

the substitutionary thought does not evoke or express

this new context. Indeed it seems to be the case

that traditional language is preserved for the sake of

appearances, which, however, conceals a markedly

different pattern of thought.

The examination of the New Testament themes of

the inclusive and universal significance of Christ

indicated that this language is a significant part of

the problematic that demands interpretation and

expression as the meaning of the atoning work of Christ

is explored. The subsequent Christological affirmations

of Chalcedon and Nicea impressed this language with an

ontological frame of reference which continues to exert

a powerful influence on soteriological thought. It is

in this context that the language of Christ as Man or

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Universal Man was recognised to express and articulate
his universal significance, so that, despite the
difficulties and problems encountered in these form-
ulations, the attempt is true to the fundamental insight
that between Christ and his people there exists a
relationship such that man can be said to be 'bound up'
with Christ. It was recognised that although these
models appeal to underlying linguistic and philosophical
discussions as to the status of Universals, they are
not themselves philosophical constructs that can be
accepted or rejected on the grounds of their 'Platonism'
or 'Nominalism'. Rather, an awareness of the philo-
sophical discussion and problems should serve to
underline the appropriateness of the models as appealing
to a fundamental character of human discourse and
perception, and should also indicate the limits of the
model, preventing it from becoming an explanation which
is dependent upon a particular philosophical tradition
or metaphysical view. Provided that the description
of Christ as Man is seen to be interpretative of his
universal significance, and does not become an explan-
ation of inclusive patterns of thought, the model has
an important role in atonement theology. The reservation
that must accompany it lies precisely in the fact that
the model is so easily and frequently misconstrued to
authorise certain explanatory patterns of thought.

However, the final section of the chapter also
demonstrated that the universality of Christ could be
expressed and interpreted through the models of archetype

and centre. Despite the fact that these models make
use of functional rather than ontological descriptions,
the characteristics of interchange and inclusiveness
are preserved. The relation between an image and its
reflection, between an archetype and its copy, is
complex and mutually defined, so that a pattern of
interrelation and interdependence emerges which power-
fully interprets the New Testament themes of 'in Christ'
and 'with Christ'. It seems inevitable that functional
descriptions appear inferior to ontological descriptions
of inclusiveness or relation, but in this context at
least they are not to be despised as they articulate
and interpret the extent to which the believer is 'bound
up' with Christ.

The part played by the term representation
in this complex set of models must now be considered.
First, the term representation is understood in three
senses that are often described as wholly separate,
but which in fact are seen to overlap to a considerable
extent and to depend on the meanings of each other.
It would be possible to define the term representation
in the light of the models of section a) as referring
to a person who literally includes others in himself,
who is a representative of others because he is in some
sense a supra-individual; to define the term in the
light of the models of section b) as referring to a
person whose individuality is extended to embrace others
so that they may be said to be a part of their represent-
ative; to define the term in the light of the models of

section c) as referring to a person who initiates or typifies a quality or an action which is understood to be determinative and of central significance for others.

However, to define the term representation in these three different ways would be to fail to recognise the complex, ambiguous and often undisclosed structure of representation that is always present. For these three expressions of the phenomenon of representation reflect the ambiguity that is always present in the term between 'counting as present' and 'being present', between 'participation' and 'delegation', and between 'embodiment' and 'response'. When a literal inclusiveness is said to be denoted by the term representation it is clear that the language of 'being counted as present' is being 'stretched' by the insight that a representative is something that, or someone who, actually embodies or typifies those who are represented, so that it is often hard to distinguish between the language of Christ 'the representative of man' and Christ 'the representative man', although fundamentally different patterns of thought are being employed and evoked. Similarly, the language of Christ incorporating others so that they may be represented by him constantly oscillates between the individual and the supra-individual, between the earthly reality of Jesus and the spiritual constitution of the Church. The concept of representation used to describe this relation between Christ and man constantly reflects and embodies these different insights, so that the structure

of representation is never simple but always involves
an appeal to a complex set of representative
relationships.

Second, the complex set of associations attached
to the term representation is further enlarged by
considering the patterns of representation that were
discussed in Chapters III and IV, as the term was
taken to refer to the work of Christ. As was shown,
these patterns of representation describe and define
the work of Christ in terms of the manner in which it
becomes our work, in terms of our dependence upon it,
and in terms of our continuing dependence upon it, as
through Christ we are brought into the presence of God.
Clearly this use of the term representation to express
the work of Christ is not independent of its use to
express the relation between Christ and man, for it
draws upon common themes and ideas, but it refers these
insights to a different context and so further enhances
the term representation in its ability to evoke and
express the conceptual matter of the Christian faith
in its complexity. In this context the association of
the term representation with the term 'interchange' is
attractive, in that not only does it allow for
development and expression of the inter-relationship
that is understood to be a part of the New Testament
witness to the salvific reality of Christ, but also it
allows for the development and expression of the reality
of the reversal or change that is involved in and occurs
as a result of this saving work.

Thus, it may be concluded that the term representation expresses by means of various contextual frameworks the New Testament insight that believers are 'bound up' with Christ in a pattern of relationships that expresses and evokes structures of dependence and responsibility, participation and imitation, presence and absence.

CHAPTER VI

SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION IN THE WORK OF

D. SÖLLE

Introduction

Having completed our examination of the terms
substitution and representation as they have been
found to occur in the formulation of doctrines of the
atonement, and having discussed and criticised their
range of meanings together with the models that are
held to be appropriate to articulate those meanings,
the task remains to examine in greater depth the work
of one theologian who has given specific attention to
the terms and their use. The theologian in question
is D. Sölle, and the work in which she deals with
these issues is entitled 'Christ the Representative' (1).
As has been stated in the introduction to this study
the examination of Sölle's work that is found in this
chapter stands parenthetically to the main body of the
thesis, contributing towards an understanding of the
terms substitution and representation and acting as
a test case and a reference point to check on the
analysis of the terms that has so far been offered.
The reasons for Sölleš work occupying this place will
become clearer throughout the course of this chapter,
but briefly stated Sölle writes from a vantage point

and with intentions that are unique to this enquiry
and which render any discussion of her contribution
highly problematic. In particular two features of her
work must be singled out to illustrate the eccentricity
of her approach.

First, the controlling presupposition of
Sölle's examination, and the framework in which she
elucidates the meaning of substitution and representation
is that theology, as a 'reflective description of certain
experiences' (2), can only be conceived within a post-
theistic experience of the world (3). Theological
reflection must now be determined by 'the new experience
of God which characterises our contemporary situation,
the experience of the individual who finds himself
insecure and alone in a completely changed world and
society' (4). Sölle employs the familiar phrase 'the
death of God' to give 'theological expression to these
changed psychosocial conditions' (5). The character-
istics of these changed conditions will be considered
in more precise detail shortly, particularly in their
bearing on the formulation of Christology and Soteriology,
but for the moment it must simply be recognised that for
Sölle 'atheism is merely a different mode of speech
from theism' (6).

Second, this post-theistic context of 'theology'
means that Sölle's formulation of the concept of
representation is integrally bound up with her intention
to express anthropologically what was formerly expressed
theologically (7). In other words the term representation

embraces a complex set of functions, all of which are
interrelated in Sölle's intentions, which are difficult
to disentangle from one another, and whose precise
force and manner of interrelation is difficult to
perceive. One function of the term representation is
to express the character of Christ's representation of
men before God, but because Sölle has already argued
that the structure of representation itself is the key
to the quest for human identity, the phrase 'before
God' adds nothing new to the term representation (8).
Thus, it is the function of the term representation
to translate theological language into anthropological
language, and the pattern of representation disclosed
must be seen to be integrally bound up with that intention.
In a similar fashion Sölle also employs the term to
express Christ's representation of God to man, and
again the structure of representation becomes the means
by which this theological language can be given
anthropological content. In this case (as is perhaps
also the case with Christ's representation of man before
God) the issue is further complicated by the fact that
theological language is not wholly expressed by anth-
ropological language since God is said still to have
a future, although what this future is remains ambiguous.

Thus, because of the distinctive theological
context in which Sölle wishes to examine the meaning
of the terms substitution and representation, and
because of the variety of functions given to the latter
term, a separate examination has been regarded as

appropriate to grasp the complexity of Sölle's
investigation and to relate her discussion to the main
body of this study.

The intention of the chapter is as follows.
First, the phenomenon of representation and its relation
to the question of identity as conceived by Sölle will
be described and discussed. Second, the specific
characteristics that Sölle uses to describe Christ's
work of representation will be examined. Third,
Sölle's understanding and criticism of the term
substitution will be considered. Finally, some
assessment will be made of Sölle's use and understanding
of the terms, together with an assessment of the
contribution of her work in the light of the analysis
of the terms that has already been offered in this
study.

1. The Phenomenon of Representation as
Conceived by D. Sölle

Part One of 'Christ the Representative' is
sub-titled 'A Provisional Interpretation', whose
specific task is to 'describe the phenomenon of
representation, and to illustrate its structures from
a sociological and anthropological standpoint' (9).
This description is necessary since the concept of
representation 'can only be used to describe the work
of Jesus if it is firmly rooted in human relationships
in society - in other words, only if it matches a
universal phenomenon in our world as well' (10).

However it is necessary to recognise and clarify the
two controlling presuppositions of the enquiry which
are mentioned in a preliminary fashion in an intro-
ductory chapter to the book.

The first presupposition is constituted by the
question 'how can one achieve personal identity?' (11).
The search for the 'Kingdom of identity' (12), the
longing of man for identity, is regarded as 'axiomatic'
(13) and in need of no further demonstration.

> Whether there ever have been or ever will be
> human lives not engaged in this search for
> personal identity cannot be demonstrated
> empirically or historically. Nor does this
> lessen the gravity of the question for
> ourselves (14).

No further discussion is offered at this point by Sölle
to clarify what is meant by personal identity, nor
to substantiate the claim that the search for identity
constitutes the 'unconditional' (15) for contemporary
man, but the reasons for the crisis of identity become
apparant when Sölle's second controlling presupposition
is considered.

This presupposition refers to the circumstances
and conditions under which man's longing for identity
takes place, the historical condition experienced as
'the death of God' and embodied in a post-theistic
culture and pattern of thought (16). For Sölle the
phrase 'the death of God' describes an experience which
the terms theism and atheism both alike fail to
recognise, for this is a 'new experience of <u>God</u>' (17),
the historical condition of 'the absolute' (18), 'the

experience of the individual who finds himself insecure
and alone in a completely changed world and society'
(19). The point is not whether God exists, and those
who claim either that he does exist or that he does not
are both alike in their naivity and in their 'undist-
urbed ideological confidence' (20) which fails to
grasp the nettle of our time, which is that the
experience of God is that of 'the absence of God' (21).
Our condition is one of constant uncertainty which
cannot be ignored but which makes it impossible for us
either to answer or to forget the questions of meaning
and purpose which confront us (22).

It is under these new conditions that the
longing for identity takes on its particular features,
for in man's search for identity is discovered a concern
for the absolute - in other words, a concern that
corresponds in anthropological terms to the theological
language of God.

> For what does it mean to assert that God is
> dead if, and so long as, there is still
> something which concerns us unconditionally?
> Is not atheism merely a different mode of
> speech from theism? Does not everything depend
> on anthropology, that is to say on the problem
> of the irreplaceable man who is seeking
> personal identity and can never be freed from
> this search? (23)

Thus, Sölle makes the connection that will be of crucial
significance for her understanding and use of the term
representation: for if the question of identity expresses
the same concern as the question of God, and if identity
is seen to be gained by the phenomenon that Sölle
terms representation, then it may be argued that the

structure of representation itself will be the
appropriate anthropological language to express the
theistic language of a previous age. In this way the
term representation acquires its pivotal function as
a concept that interprets theological reality and at
the same time translates this reality into a form
suitable for a post-theistic understanding.

Thus, the two presuppositions of the search
for personal identity and of the contemporary experience
of the death of God form the context for the discussion
which Sölle pursues in the next six chapters with
regard to the phenomenon of representation as a universal
phenomenon rooted in social relationships.

Sölle begins that discussion with a 'linguistic
enquiry' (24), in which she attempts to disentangle
the confusion between substitution and representation
to which 'current linguistic usage ... has become
insensitive' (25). Sölle sees four criteria or
characteristics which determine the phenomenon of
representation: it is a temporary expedient; it is
limited in its scope to specific areas; it is conditional
on the approval of the one represented; it is incomplete
so that the representative only plays a role and thus
safeguards the memory of the one represented (26).
Substitution, on the other hand, is characterised by
Sölle as permanent rather than temporary; total in its
scope rather than limited; unconditional rather than
conditional; complete and final, so that the one who
is represented is replaced, forgotten and treated

impersonally as a thing (27). Thus, for Sölle, the
blurring of the distinction between substitution and
representation is a reflection of a depersonalised
world where people can be treated as things, where
'substitution is a final exchange of dead impersonal
or depersonalised being, whereas representation is
the provisional intervention of persons on behalf of
persons' (28).

It is difficult to know the precise purpose
of this 'linguistic enquiry' in the context of the work
as a whole, for, standing as it does at the beginning
of the work it is clearly intended to ground the terms
substitution and representation in common discourse so
that any similar patterns disclosed in the unfamiliar
discourse of the search for identity or in the technical
language of Christology might be appropriately named
and recognised. However, the definitions or portrayals
of the terms are stated dogmatically with little
illustration or explanation and while they reflect,
at least in part, some of the meanings which are
associated with the terms, a more thorough 'enquiry'
would have revealed alternative uses and contexts
which 'colour' the terms somewhat differently.
If these alternatives had been noted and discussed it
would not have been so easy for Sölle to identify
each of the terms with a particular theological or
anthropological stance, nor would it have been possible
to draw the contrast between them in quite so explicit
a way. For example, in considering the use of the

term representation Sölle fails to make any mention of
the political dimension of the term, which forms its
most common context and is one which embodies ambiguities
and subtleties that are central to the phenomenon of
representation as it is commonly perceived. Equally,
in connection with the term substitution, Sölle rightly
identifies the characteristic of exchange, but quite
arbitrarily decides that exchange and replacement always
treat one as a dead or as an impersonal thing. It is
true only in the pattern of an exchange which is
constituted by a simple either/or, as in the case of
a substitute for a football team, where the substitute
is a replacement to the detriment or disadvantage of the
one who is replaced. In a more complex pattern of
exchange it is possible to express the situation where
an exchange may displace someone from one position to
enable him to take up a place which is of greater
advantage to him. By focussing on the pattern of
exchange that involves only the notion of either being
'in' or being 'written off' Sölle fails to realise
that this concept of substitution does not exhaust the
possibilities open to the term. Whether or not it is
possible to construct an understanding of Christ's work
which involves this more complex pattern of exchange is
irrelevant here; what is at issue is whether Sölle's
account of the use of the terms can be called an
'enquiry', or whether the meaning of the terms has not
already been fixed upon as a result of her particular
interpretation of the significance of Christ's work (29).

However, whatever the limitations of the
linguistic enquiry, the main substance of the examination
of the phenomenon of representation follows in Chapters
2-6, and it is this material that must now be considered.
In these chapters Sölle explores the different ways in
which personal identity has been sought, preserved
and threatened in Western culture, tracing the process
that has given rise to the present challenge to identity,
and suggesting some of the criteria that are necessary
if personal identity is to be gained.

In the Western medieval culture identity was
assured because the theistic framework of belief allowed
for the conviction that the individual was known to
God, that his soul (identity) was safe in heaven, what-
ever the circumstances of his earthly life; in fact,
despite the 'role' that he was called on to play in
his mortal life. The irreplaceability of the individual
is guaranteed because identity (the real self) is safe
in heaven with God (30). However, with the breakdown
of this theistic confidence the 'role' performed on
earth becomes increasingly the only reality and this,
far from securing identity, only serves to highlight the
way in which the individual is not significant, since
in his role he is always replaceable and can be treated
as an 'it' (31). Sölle sees in German Idealism, notably
in Hegel, a conspicuous protest against this process:
a protest which affirms the irreplaceability of the
individual not only because of his differentiation from
God, which is expressed in his relationship with God

and in God's 'interest' in him, but also because of his
differentiation from society which he achieves through
his work and which must be overcome to 'make himself
what he is' (32). After Hegel, Sölle believes, these
two aspects fell apart, and identity is conceived either
in terms of the 'infinite value of the soul' (Harnack)
(33) or in the heroic achievement of the exceptional
individual (34). In the modern world, despite our
conviction that man is irreplaceable, the reality is
that most people are seen, and see themselves, as cogs
in a machine, valued not for who they are but only for
the particular function demanded of them (35). Identity
is not possible, either because one simply accepts
replaceability or because to attempt to make ourselves
irreplaceable is to attempt the impossible (36).

What hope then is there for identity? Sölle
answers that I become 'irreplaceable only for those
who love me' (37), that is those who do not write me
off when I fail but give me more time. It is those who
love me (who expect more from me than what I appear
to be at present) and those who hope in me (who allow
me more time to fulfill my potential) who hold my place
open for me, intervening on my behalf, not to replace
me, but to enable me to reach that place for myself.
But this is what Sölle has outlined in her linguistic
enquiry as 'representation', and so it becomes true to
say that it is as I experience representation that I
gain my identity or that identity becomes a possibility
(38). Representation takes seriously the irreplaceability

of man in that it is temporary, limited, conditional
and incomplete, but it also recognises that the
individual cannot always stand heroically on his own
but needs that sort of assistance which gives him time,
holds his place open, waiting for him until he is once
again capable and present. Thus, representation
recognises that man is <u>dependent</u> upon others, but it
also allows for identity to emerge because the dependence
expressed by the representation is of the kind that
establishes and safeguards the irreplaceability of the
individual.

> If the person is no longer regarded as
> irreplaceable, representation becomes unnec-
> essary, substitution will do. Only the
> irreplaceable man, who cannot abandon the
> search for personal identity, wants to be
> represented; but for him it is essential. He
> depends upon representation because he exists
> in time (39).

Thus, the phenomenon of representation is characterised
by temporality and personality which are also the
conditions under which identity is said to be capable
of realisation.

2.   The Structure of Christ's Representation

The provisional enquiry carried out by Sölle
in Part I of her work described the two criteria of
temporality and personality which together were said
to ensure a pattern of representation rather than
substitution, and therefore to be the conditions under
which identity may be realised. In Part II of the work

Sölle reviews a number of different attempts to express

the significance of Christ's work, using the two

criteria as a test of their adequacy and concluding

that these two conditions were:

> ... too easily lost sight of, with the result
> that personality was depersonalised. The
> irreplaceable individual became a mere pawn
> in God's chess game, and temporality (the
> basis of the hope of the represented) was
> ignored in the interests of a supra-temporal
> and timeless salvation mechanism, which lost
> none of its patent artificiality by being
> labelled 'salvation history' (40).

The material found in Part II will be of indirect

interest only so far as it assists in showing more

clearly what Sölle's own intentions and meanings are

as she engages in the constructive work of Part III.

In this third section of the work Sölle is

concerned to determine the relation between the structure

of representation as an anthropological reality and

the significance of Christ's person and work. As a

preliminary statement Sölle claims that:

> ... from now on representation is not just
> a postulate of the reason, nor an everyday
> occurrence, but the really decisive event of
> all human history. Anthropology and
> christology are related as question and
> answer. In Tillich's terminology, they exist
> in correlation. To ask about the structures
> of living representation is necessarily to
> ask about Christ (41).

In order to substantiate this claim and to elucidate

the meaning of Christ's representation, Sölle selects

three 'basic principles' which 'seem relevant' -

identification, dependence and provisionality - to be

examined to see 'what light they throw on christology',

and to assist in interpreting more precisely the

representation which was provisionally defined as
personal and temporal (42). Because Christ's represent-
ation is not only the representation of man before God,
but also the representation of God before man, the order
of Sölle's own exposition will be followed here,
considering first the bearing of these three principles
on the representation of Christ before God.

a)   Christ - the Representative of Man before God

Christ's representation of man before God is
first of all provisional, not in the sense that a
'precursor of someone greater' is provisional, but as
an 'ultimate and final provisionality' (43). Sölle
sees Christian anti-semitism as a direct consequence
of failing to recognise this provisionality, for
the final Christ is a 'totalitarian' Christ (44), and
those 'who have the final Christ need no future' (45),
for the present and the past become decisive. The
final Christ can only mean the crowding out of those
'underdogs' and 'also rans' (46) who need a future,
but if 'the still invisible kingdom of God remains open
as something still future rather than as something
which already exists and has to be defended by all
available means [then] there cannot possibly be any
ground for the brash and confident Messianism which
makes pogroms and courts of inquisition possible' (47).
It is only in the provisional Christ that 'the kingdom
of God is at the same time present and still not
present' (48). It is only in 'the pure and limited

representation of the One who is now already where
we have not yet arrived and who waits for us as the
forerunner' (49) that there is given a future, and it
is only when the Church recognises this that Christians,
too, can remain open to the future God and can take
responsibility for the world as its spokesman and
champion (50).

Christ's representation of man before God is
not only as forerunner, it is also as one who 'identifies
with those who follow after, those who remain behind,
those who no longer move forward' (51). This
identification can no longer be conceived after the
pattern of a 'mythical exchange' (52) of personality,
no matter how we may long for such an identification:
rather, identification is to be conceived after the
pattern of a teacher, one who gives himself to his
pupils, holding open the place for them which in their
ignorance cannot yet be attained, but gradually effacing
himself and making himself superfluous as the pupil
grows to maturity (53). Christ is the teacher whose
interest in us secures us time. But he is not the
'"eternal" teacher whose work is never done' (54), he
desires rather that 'we should graduate from his school
to his Kingdom' (55), calling us to freedom and
responsibility.

With the identification of the teacher and
the pupil Sölle believes she has found a means of
tackling the problem of punishment, for modern educational
theory stresses that 'punishment is only meaningful if

the person who inflicts it himself suffers under the
punishment he sets' (56). The representative act of
the teacher in identifying with the pupil in punishment
'abolishes the difference between the agent and the
acted upon' (57), so that as punishment is seen 'as
the restoration of a broken personal relationship' (58)
there is no longer room for 'those strange theological
controversies about law or grace, God's justice or
Christ's mercy, which land us in an artificial yet
irreducible tension' (59). Rather, 'representing us
provisionally, Christ punishes us in such a way that
he suffers himself' (60). What is this punishment?
In a post-metaphysical world the only possible view of
punishment is 'the complex of social relationships'
(61) which our actions shape and which operates on us
in a 'deadly cycle' (62). When Christ identifies with
us it is with those who are the agents of their own
punishment.

> Christ makes the prison warders aware of the
> prison in which they themselves live, and he
> does so by showing that he himself is its
> prisoner. ... Because Christ identifies
> himself with us in teaching and in punishing,
> he enables us to accept ourselves as guilty
> but also to be at peace (63).

In Christ's representation of man before God
he makes himself dependent on us, suffering for us by
suffering because of us. 'Representation can only be
thought of as a conditional and not as an automatically
effective event' (64) so that in his representation
Christ puts himself at risk. When representation
involves identification, the representative cannot

refuse to be involved or wish to withdraw; rather,
'the forerunner is shown up in all his provisionality
when no one follows him' (65). The resurrection is
not a reversal of this dependence, a final victory which
makes the cross a transitional stage. The resurrection
is 'simply an anticipatory sign of hope' (66), for
otherwise the future would be assured, there would be
nothing new to expect, 'simply the unfolding of the
pre-determined' (67). The resurrection does not
'abrogate this law of the world - the law that love
itself is destroyed, when it identifies itself with
those who are destroying themselves' (68), rather,
'in the symbol of the resurrection, this shadow of the
cross so imprinted itself in reality, that it can never
again be forgotten as the key concept for the objective
onlooker and as the possibility of life for those who
accept this identification of another with themselves'
(69).

Christ's representation of man, therefore, is
marked by provisionality, identification, and dependence.
Sölle now claims that to add the phrase 'before God'
is rhetorical if these basic characteriestics have
been understood correctly.

> All the anthropological characteristics we
> have described - that man needs a forerunner
> if he is to gain an extension of time; that
> man acquires identity through the identif-
> ication of another; that when he acts repres-
> entatively he makes himself dependent and
> suffers, because he puts himself at risk,
> all these statements speak of God, and do so
> in fact in the only possible theological sense
> by speaking of what God does in us (70).

God has made himself 'implicit in our history' (71),
so the only way to speak of God is to speak of man;
the only way to be or to act for God is to be in 'radical
existence for others' (72). Thus, when representation
takes place there also God is present and is spoken
of, but the vocable God adds nothing new to what has
been said. This language of representation _is_ language
about 'God' for it is unconditional, absolute language,
and in a post-theistic age corresponds to what was
previously said and experienced as a direct and 'in
that sense religious relation to God' (73).

> Christ is provisional - if we add 'to God'
> we emphasise the provisionality but say nothing
> new.
>
> Christ makes himself dependent on us - if we
> say 'dependent on God', this simply means that
> Christ is radically surrendered to men.
>
> Christ identifies himself with us - if we add
> 'before God' it amounts to the same thing,
> for whenever this identification takes place,
> God is there (74).

b)   Christ - God's Representative Among Men

Sölle argues that the representation of God
by Christ has been ignored by dogmatics because in a
theistic age the concept of a God who acts can be 'more
or less taken for granted' (75). In a post-theistic
age, where this sort of religious immediacy is no
longer possible, and where any 'metaphysical "positing"
of God [is] to remain a prisoner within the private
sphere of individual religious aptitudes and experiences'
(76), the 'truth that Christ represents the absent God

first takes on its full significance' (77). For there
are two options open: either 'we can assume that God's
absence means he is dead, and so seek or create a
substitute for him' (78), a function which modern
technological society attempts; or, 'we can regard his
absence as a possible mode of his being-for-us' (79).
In this case 'man depends on their being someone to
represent the irreplaceable God' (80). Thus, Christ
provisionally holds the place of the absent God open,
his representative activity is to hold together the
two experiences of 'the death of God and of faith in
Christ's resurrection' (81), and to mediate them into
a new unity - 'a theology after the death of God' (82).
Christ is not God's replacement, but his forerunner,
and that means that whenever anyone engages in the task
of representation, whenever 'a man acts or suffers in
God's stead' (83), there Christ's cause is served and
God is represented. This is the form, the 'cipher
"Christ"' (84) in which:

> Jesus continues alive to the end of the world
> - as the consciousness of those who represent
> God and claim him for each other. Where this
> representative claim on God is made, the
> implicit Christ is present. For it is not
> only Christ who represents God in the world.
> Christ's friends and brothers also represent
> God by allowing God - and this means necessarily
> those as well who need him - time (85).

In representing God Christ identifies with him
so that God is now identified with Christ.

> The God whom men believed in, and for centuries
> worshipped as the God who sits on his heavenly
> throne, comes to be regarded instead ... from
> the time of the man Jesus of Nazareth, as a
> disinherited and homeless being whom one might
> any day meet at any street corner (86).

In identifying with God, Christ played God's role and in the process 'God has changed' (87).

> In Christ God himself left the immediacy of heaven ... went out from himself into unrecognisability. ... The very God of power was played under conditions of helplessness, ... homelessness, in the far country. Christ ... claimed God for this new mode of existence - powerless, homeless, in alienation (88).

Christ's representation is now 'the only possible experience of God' (89), and what is real for Christ is also real for his followers: 'we, too, can now play God for one another' (90).

In representing God, 'Christ put himself in the place of God' (91), and yet he also made himself <u>dependent</u> upon God, acting in the name of God, putting himself 'unreservedly into the hands of the God who can accept or reject him' (92). So, too, whenever we do 'the same as Christ did, namely lay claim to God for each other, we too make ourselves dependent on God, by putting our existence at risk' (93). Put in non-theistic terms this means that if we cease clinging to our longing for happiness and pursue the 'way of love' (94) then in the pain and the renunciation of dependence in representation identity is discovered. As we identify with Christ and so participate in suffering as the representatives of God we wait for God's identity, a personalised world, the Kingdom of God.

> God wills to be represented. He has made himself representable. He has made himself conditional, provisional. He has become dependent; he has mediated himself into the world. He became man (95).

Thus, Christ's representation of God before man, no less than his representation of man before God, is characterised by provisionality, identification, and dependence. Because such characteristics constitute the conditions under which identity appears the language of representation functions to provide a 'theology after the death of God' which answers the longing for identity and which safeguards the future of God. Before continuing with an assessment of this structure of Christ's representation, a brief examination of Sölle's understanding of the concept of substitution is necessary.

3. The Use and Meaning of Substitution

As has already been mentioned Sölle discovers in her linguistic enquiry that substitution is marked by the characteristics of permanance, totality, and completeness; features that are appropriate to a depersonalised or an impersonal world where identity is impossible because people are treated as replaceable things. In religious terms Sölle sees this substitution most clearly in a magical view of the world, found even in the Old Testament, when dealing with ideas like the scapegoat.

> The important thing is not who removes the
> sin. What matters is that it disappears from
> the human sphere (96).

The agent which removes the sin may be a goat or a stick or stone. Modern technology bears a remarkable

resemblance to this magical world view, for technology

assumes universal interchangeability, although the

basis in magic is a lack of recognition of the distinction

between things and persons, whereas in technology the

basis is in the exchangeability of methods of production.

> Magical representation (sic), a natural growth
> on the soil of a pre-personal era, approximates
> to the technological substitution of post-
> personal thought (97).

According to Sölle the New Testament liberates

the concept of substitution from any magical view of

its efficacy by using a range of metaphors to elucidate

the significance of Christ's work ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν (98). This

was achieved by relating substitution to historicity,

universalisation, voluntariness, and suffering. These

features are said to remove Christ's substitution from

a magical sphere and therefore to express the sense of

personal representation, but succeeding interpretations

are seen by Sölle to lack the 'personalist' (99)

dimension and so to tend towards substitution.˙ Anselm

is seen as an example of this tendency, for despite a

'personalist view of sin' (100), the notion of a

satisfaction offered to God by Christ 'creates salvation

independently of those he represents' (101) so that it

lacks that provisional and dependent quality.

However, the strongest criticism is reserved

for Barth's 'objectivist interpretation' (102) which

fails to indicate 'any distinction between substitution

and representation' (103). Barth, according to Sölle,

'turns Christ into a replacement' (104) so that the

relationship between Christ and those who are represented 'is not conceived in personal terms' (105). This is because Christ's work is seen by Barth to be complete, which implies 'the complete incapacitation of man' (106), and because it is seen to be independent of any relation between the representative and those represented, so that the representative becomes a substitute and a replacement acting irrespective of the wishes of those who are supposed to be represented. Sölle locates the basic reasons for this depersonalising interpretation of Barth's to lie in his failure to recognise the perspective of time and constantly speaking instead of man's place - a feature more appropriate to things (107).

If substitutionary ideas remain dominant in Christian theology, that is, if exclusivist christologies and soteriologies persist as the proper formulation of Christian belief, Sölle believes that the contribution made by theology to the loss of identity will be continued so that the possibility of the establishment of the 'Kingdom of identity' becomes remote. Sölle is thus committed to eradicating any patterns of thought that display the characteristics of permanence, totality unconditionality, and completeness - in other words, any of the hallmarks she identifies as belonging to the concept of substitution.

4. An Assessment of the Use by Sölle of the Terms Substitution and Representation

Sölle has attempted to give the 'unfamiliar and almost unintelligible' (108) term representation a new content, removing it from its traditional place in dogmatics under the heading of the Priestly work of Christ and giving it a central role for christology and indeed for theology. The commitment to the term representation has already been noted as a consequence of its function as a correlative term to express in anthropological terms what was formerly said in theological terms, and the difficulty that this causes in attempting to uncover the precise thrust of Sölle's argument, particularly in relation to her understanding of the representative work of Christ before God. While it is not the concern here to enter into a detailed comment on Sölle's convictions that the experience of the death of God is formative for our age, and that any religious or metaphysical 'positing' of God is simply naïve or irrelevant, it must never the less be recognised that it is on the basis of this assumption that Sölle is able to make the link between the anthropological structure of representation, the longing for identity, and the significance of Christ as the representative of man and God. What the present assessment must consider is the contribution that Sölle makes towards an understanding of the terms substitution and representation, the manner in which she employs them,

the points of contact between this use and those uses
already outlined in the course of this enquiry, together
with the points of originality and divergence, and
the problems involved in Sölle's use of the terms.   The
three characteristics shall therefore be considered
that Sölle believes are appropriate to distinguish
representation from substitution - provisionality,
dependence and identification - and then some reflection
will be offered on some more general issues her study
raises, particularly in the light of our own analysis
of the terms and their uses.

a)   The Provisionality of Christ's Representation

With regard to the provisionality of Christ,
Sölle highlights a dimension of the term representation
which has been noted in other contexts, namely the
reference of the term to the responsibility of those
represented to reflect and continue the actions of the
representative.   As was noted in Chapter V such an
obligation could be interpreted and expressed in a
number of different ways, but it was seen to be a
persistent and central feature of the term.   However,
it should be noted that Sölle radicalises this aspect
of representation by her insistence on the necessity
that the representative becomes superfluous, vanishing
totally in favour of those represented, thus disallowing,
in contrast to many who would wish to use this feature
of the term, the possibility of some exclusive or
unique element of Christ's work which always renders

his work of representation significant and primary,
so that any subsequent repetition or imitation remains
secondary and derivative. While it was recognised
in Chapter V that there was considerable difficulty
in recognising on the part of some writers precisely
what element of Christ's work remained exclusive, and
what the basis was for that exclusivity, Sölle's own
position of pressing for the superfluity of the
representative, and thus, in principle at least, the
denial of any unique status to Christ's work, is no
less problematic.

The dilemma can be expressed in the following
way (109): if the task of the representative is to
make himself superfluous, to hold the place open of
someone who is temporarily incapacitated, then it must
be the case that the sought for identity is a recovery
of a lost identity, a restoration of an identity that
was once possessed but for some reason now awaits
discovery. The superfluity of the representative
carries as its correlate a concept of identity that
is 'objectively there', an identity that is 'there'
but is waiting for its recovery (110).

Certainly there are times when Sölle speaks
of identity in these terms, and in fact at one point
seems to indicate that our future identity made possible
by Christ's work of representation is constituted as
the identity of a direct relation to God, in other
words by a return to a former identity (111). However,
Sölle also speaks in another sense, where the identity

awaited is not something to be regained, but is some-
thing genuinely new, made possible by the particular
character of Christ's representation, and therefore
depending upon that work for its actualisation. In
this second sense of identity a different concept of
representation is involved, for it is not possible to
speak of the superfluity of the representative when
the act of representation has been creative rather
than restorative. As Moltmann puts it:

> A representative can only make himself super-
> fluous when the place is objectively there and
> cannot be occupied for a while by the real
> occupant for reasons of subjective weakness
> and incapacity. But if the place is not there
> or is not yet there in its full and free form,
> but first must be made ready, the the repres-
> entative does not make himself superfluous
> like an employment agency, but so to speak
> founds a new firm. In that case he has an
> effect not only on the subjective incapacity
> of the occupant of the place, but also on the
> making of the place. He not only represents
> but creates. ... In that case his represent-
> ation is not just mediation for a while but
> also the basis for the new being and the new
> identity which goes beyond the self-identity
> that men always desire (112).

Thus, Sölle's work is not free from an
ambiguity in the concept of representation, which is
reflected in the correlative concept of identity, so
that the actual content of Christ's representative
work remains in doubt. It is significant that precisely
the same problems are encountered when considering the
other aspect of Christ's provisional work of represent-
ation - his representation of God before man. R. Jensen
puts it this way:

> Jesus' representation of God must be non-
> identity with God, so as to leave an open
> future, something to expect more than what is
> - for this is the very point of our quest for
> identity. God's identity in our history still
> remains future, and the very function of his
> representative is to hold this future open
> for him.
>
> But here Sölle stops. She does not take us
> further on this promising path. We wait for
> her to give content to this talk of God's
> future, to tell us what to 'expect'. But
> this she refuses to do. Instead she bends
> everything back on itself, by identifying
> Christ's waiting for God to take over with
> his waiting for us to respond to his represent-
> ation. There is a sense in which this too is
> right. But it does not suffice to give content
> to the promise made by Christ's provisionality.
> Indeed, the only future beyond Christ's
> representation which Sölle ever mentions is the
> return of immediate religious certainty (113).

The characteristic of provisionality can certainly
function to clarify the concept of representation and
to express the conviction that the representative
initiates and inspires a work which is to be continued
or realised by those who are represented, but the radical
content given to the notion of provisionality expressed
in Sölle's understanding of the eventual superfluity
of the representative conceals a fundamental problem
in the concept of identity employed and the work of
representation that is said to make such identity
possible.

b)   The Dependence of Christ's Representation

        The second characteristic that Sölle uses to
characterise Christ's representative work is that of
his dependence on us and on God, a dependence which
involves his putting himself at risk, depending on the

assent of another for the success of his work. In this respect Sölle is surely correct to emphasise this dependence as a basic characteristic of representation, and further, to regard suffering as the indispensable correlate of dependence. It is the fact that Christ suffers because of man that he is seen to be 'radically surrendered' (114) to man. As was noted in Chapters II and IV one of the dangers confronting a substitution-ary view of Christ's work was that while suffering could be elevated to a central place in understanding the significance of Christ's death, paradoxically that suffering could come to be treated more and more artificially and abstractly so that an essential component of suffering - self giving - would appear to have been forgotten. By emphasising the characteristic of Christ's dependence on man and on God so that he has 'nothing of himself to fall back on' (115), not even 'God behind him' (116) as a guarantee of success, Sölle can give a distinctive recognition to the place of suffering within the representative work of Christ.

However, it is disappointing that Sölle does not give more attention to the sense in which Christ is dependent on God, instead of again simply turning everything in on itself and seeing Christ's dependence only in terms of his dependence on us, and therefore of God's dependence on us.

> [Christ] depends upon God by depending on us and living by our decisions. But that is to say that God depends on us, that he is at risk because he has linked his destiny with ours (117).

If Christ's dependence upon God turns out to mean chiefly God making himself dependent (118), then it is a pity that Sölle's understanding of Christ's dependence on us does not have a similar implication of our dependence upon Christ. In fact, for all Sölle's talk of a dialectic of dependence and responsibility, it is difficult to substantiate the claim that we remain dependent in any sense upon Christ, or that Christ remains dependent on God. The dialectic is all but swallowed up so that Sölle can mediate the two elements into the new sythesis of a 'theology after the death of God', and it only reappears in an attenuated form to give some justification for the continuing use of christological or theological language.

c)   The Identification of Christ's Representation

The third characteristic that Sölle selects as appropriate to the term representation is again one that is familiar from the description of the uses of the terms in previous chapters, the concept of identification. Sölle rejects as 'mythical' (119) any patterns of exchange such as a transfer of qualities or deserts, but closely associates the language of identification with that of acceptance.

> Identification is the readiness to accept
> without limit, without conditions. It means
> acceptance as a matter of course (120).

Furthermore, Sölle argues, it is only as we know ourselves to be accepted by another that we can learn to accept ourselves and hence to attain our identity.

Sölle believes that, rightly handled, the 'pattern of
the teacher' (121) can illuminate this identification
in acceptance and can therefore give content to the
concept of representation. A teacher is not one 'who
conveys certain intellectual goods' (122), nor one who
simply imparts knowledge, for 'a teacher who does not
also give himself - in, with, and under the facts which
he conveys - is not a genuine teacher' (123). Thus,
a true teacher holds the pupil's place open, effacing
himself as the pupil comes to occupy that position of
maturity which the teacher has made possible and which
he has safeguarded.

Two initial comments must be made concerning
this pattern of identification. First, the rejection
of 'mythical' patterns of identification and exchange
is based on the total rejection of any 'metaphysical'
view of reality for contemporary western man. The
universality of this experience has already been
questioned, but it remains pertinent to ask whether or
not Christian theology should remain a reflection of
contemporary thought, or whether it should be creative
of alternative patterns of thought, especially since
Sölle realises that there is a possible 'experience'
of such 'mythical exchanges' (124). Since Sölle
believes that the Christian faith has something
important to say about the reality of representation
as 'a decisive event of all human history' (125),
theology is clearly seen as a discipline which attempts
to shape thinking and acting. Despite this, Sölle

limits the scope of such creative activity by deciding
that in particular areas of thought theological
thought must operate within the parameters set by the
contemporary consciousness of self. Whether this is
an adequate foundation for the rejection of any
Christian metaphysical language must be disputed.

Second, the purpose of Christ's identification
with us, illustrated by the teacher/pupil relationship,
remains unclear. The teacher encourages the pupil to
take responsibility for himself and for his world, i.e.
to become adult, and this is apparently the purpose of
Christ's identification with us. The representative
must become superfluous, and cannot remain the eternal
teacher and yet this surely dissolves the dialectic
Sölle is anxious to establish between identity and
non-identity, dependence and responsibility. When
the pupil reaches maturity, when he reaches the place
that has been held open by the teacher, he becomes
independent. He did depend on the teacher to reach
this position, but does so no longer. Sölle, of
course, would wish to argue that the position of
maturity is precisely the point at which we accept
our dependence on others and our responsibility for
them, and in this sense the dialectic is continued,
but the dialectic of Christ's representation has
vanished into our representation as he makes himself
superfluous, like the true teacher, and even in Sölle's
terms that must be ground for questioning the

representative character of his work.

The real test for this pattern of identification occurs when Sölle uses it as a 'cleansing and clarifying ... touchstone' (126), for the concept of punishment. Punishment, Sölle believes, can be regarded as expiatory or rehabilitative, and she holds that both views are 'relevant for theology' (127). Both, however, must be viewed from the perspective of Christ as teacher, rather than simply as judge, for 'according to Maharenko, the infliction of punishment is only meaningful if the person who inflicts it himself suffers under the punishment he sets' (128). Thus, 'representing us provisionally, Christ punishes us in such a way that he suffers himself' (129). Punishment cannot then be regarded as an 'educative device which God needed in order to assert himself' (130), for that would be a 'metaphysical error' (131); rather, Sölle believes that punishment, and the agent of punishment, 'the punishing God, is nothing other than the whole complex of social relationships' (132).

> In this concrete worldly form, punishment is seen in the fact that those who destroy hope live themselves in an atmosphere of hopelessness. What they imagined they were inflicting on others they were really inflicting on themselves, and it marks them out. The curse of the evil deed is that it recoils upon the world and the 'I' inexorably. The liar deceives himself, the man who treats other men as prisoners is himself imprisoned. The loveless are bored; and there is no need for any worse form of punishment, perhaps in some post-mortal hell, than this abandonment to a world thus produced and determined (133).

Christ, in his role as true teacher, 'suffers everything

which results from the destruction of hope' (134).

> Christ's entire life is determined by this
> unending identification with those who are
> the agents of their own punishment. Christ
> makes the prison warders aware of the prison
> in which they themselves live, and he does
> so by showing that he himself is its prisoner.
> ... Christ belongs to both parties at the
> same time; he punishes and is punished. He
> thereby excludes any idea of punishment as
> a predetermined fate. It ceases to take by
> surprise those on whom it falls, as if it
> were something meaningless, for the judge
> identifies himself with the condemned, the
> teacher shares the punishment alongside the
> pupil (135).

Because Christ shares the punishment through his

identification with the 'botched cause' (136) of another

the pupil can learn 'to identify himself with his own

cause' (137).

What are we to make of this view of punishment

and of Christ's role in it? Two questions would seem

to challenge Sölle's view that the pattern of ident-

ification of the teacher gives the only theological

content to the notion of punishment. First, how in

Sölle's view does Christ himself impose punishment

on us? Since punishment is the complex of social

relationships it does not seem possible to speak

meaningfully of Christ punishing us. If Sölle means

that Christ is somehow the creator of the pattern of

social relationships in which 'the evil deed ... recoils

upon the world and the 'I' inexorably', then she is

guilty of a 'metaphysical' judgement on the significance

of Christ's person. If, on the other hand, we are

meant to take seriously the statements that it is our-

selves who are the agents of our own punishment, and

that the agent of punishment 'is nothing other than the whole complex of social relationships', then to state that this is <u>Christ</u> punishing us is simply an arbitrary application of the cipher 'Christ' and one that would seem to be intended to persuade the reader that the subject under discussion relates to <u>punishment</u>. For to remove the personal and relational elements from the source of this complex of social relationships is to cease to be able to see them as punishments and to see them instead solely as a part of a causal nexus.

Second, how does Christ, in Sölle's terms, make the prison warders aware of the prison in which they themselves live? Sölle's answer is that 'he does so by showing that he himself is its prisoner', but how is that so, and how does that disclosure reveal the prison of the warders? Sölle seems to be clinging to some notion of the unjust or undeserved suffering of Christ, but on what basis does she postulate this? Her only contribution is to state that 'as teacher – or precursor – Christ has reached a different stage' (138), but that surely is a piece of vague rhetoric which cannot bear the weight of argument that is put on it to declare Christ's 'separateness' (139) from us in order that he may acknowledge and impose punishment. Furthermore, the connection between Christ's acknowledgement of punishment and the revelation that the prison warders are themselves prisoners remains unclear and unexplained. Sölle may have dispensed with mythical patterns of exchange and identification, but she has

raised in their place a pattern of identification
which fails to answer the central problem of how such
identification may be salvific.

Thus, we have now considered in greater detail
the three characteristics that Sölle believes distinguish
the concept of representation from that of substitution
- provisonality, dependence and identification. In
each case it has been found that such characteristics
clarify and refine motifs that have been seen
previously in the study, and that such characteristics
are not inappropriate to the concept of representation.
However, it has also been noted that fundamental
problems are caused by Sölle's desire to refer the
language of representation to the possibility of a post-
theistic theology and to give it a non-metaphysical
content. While the characteristics she identifies
correspond to a significant degree to patterns of
representation that have been previously discussed
(thus confirming the adequacy and accuracy of the
analysis offered there), the specific content given to
them proves to be unsatisfactory and susceptible to a
similar range of problems that have already been
encountered in the use of the term representation.

In conclusion, the value and scope of Sölle's
work must be questioned in the light of our own
description and anlysis of the terms substitution and
representation, for it would appear that her under-
standing of the terms, while embodying many of the
elements of previous discussions, despite their

presentation in a novel context, lacks an awareness
of the breadth of meaning of the terms so that her
analysis remains insensitive to other possibilities
inherent in them. It was earlier noted that the political
dimension of the term representation was scarcely touched
upon by Sölle and yet she can hardly fail to be aware
of the possibilities and ambiguities inherent in such
a frame of reference. Again, to dismiss the complex
treatment of the term representation as denoting 'a
making present', together with the wide range of models
used to articulate this conviction, as 'mythical' is
to dismiss without comment some of the most significant
and complex uses of the term.

In a similar fashion, Sölle rejects with a
minimal amount of argument the term substitution as
being always depersonalising, and yet the history of
the discussion of the concept has been well aware of
this criticism and has sought in a number of ways to
remove or at least alleviate the force of such objections.
To fail to note either the intentions of such attempts,
or to fail to consider their results is to ignore the
complexity of the concept of substitution.

This lack of sensitivity to patterns of
substitution and representation that differ from her
own is demonstrated most signally in Sölle's discussion
of Barth's understanding of Stellvertretung. The
failure to note the persistent and sophisticated debate
in which Barth engages as he expresses both the
exclusiveness and yet the total inclusiveness of Christ's

work, its character as a once for all event within God and yet its determinative character as a foundation for the new life of man, its character as destruction and yet not as punishment, its links with the already complex and subtle understanding of election, is an indication of the inadequacy not only of Sölle's treatment of Barth but more importantly of her own analysis which fails to come to terms with the full complexity and scope of the terms substitution and representation.

CHAPTER VII

SUBSTITUTION AND REPRESENTATION:

THEIR MEANING AND USE IN ATONEMENT THEOLOGY

To conclude this study of the terms
substitution and representation it is necessary to
draw together the conclusions and observations of the
former chapters. From this material some general
points will be made regarding the terms as they have
been found to function in atonement theology, followed
by some specific comments relevant to each term, which
will be followed in turn by some comments on the
relation between the terms. Finally, the implications
of this study for 'a doctrine of the atonement' will
be considered.

1. General Observations on the Terms Substitution and Representation

First, and most obviously, both the terms
have been shown to be highly complex theological
words, expressing a range and variety of meanings.
The term substitution was shown to denote a range of
ideas that far exceeded the limits normally imposed
by the phrase 'penal substitution'; and even within
the general parameters set by the latter description
there was found to be not simply differences of

emphasis but fundamental differences of meaning which
radically shaped both the concept of substitution employed
and the general interpretation that has been offered
of the significance of the work of Christ. Further,
in contrast to the common assumption that the framework
of penal substitutuion formed the only valid context
for the use of the term, it was argued that certain
non-penal formulations of the concept were of decisive
importance for the meaning of substitution and for its
continued use as a theological term. Thus, with regard
to the concept of substitution, there can be no doubt
that a complex term of theological vocabulary is being
considered, and to ignore or minimise this complexity
is either to engage in shadow boxing, or to shelter
behind unexplored and undisclosed ambiguities.

In a similar sense the term representation
was also shown to be capable of expressing a wide range
of meanings. Because this term has not been subject
to the same intensity of theological scrutiny as
substitution, and because it is less closely allied
to particular theological schools or traditions, it
was shown that the task of discrimination between these
different meanings was correspondingly difficult and that
the transition from one set of ideas to another could
be accomplished with relative ease. This fluidity of
meaning in the term representation was seen, in part,
to account for its popularity as an alternative to the
term substitution, particularly because it was claimed
to be able to function both in the context of an

interpretation of Christ's work and also in the context
of the application and relation of this work to others.
Without at present commenting on this claim the term
representation has been clearly shown to be a complex
theological term that expresses a range of insights
concerning the work of Christ and the relation of that
work to others.

Second, the above conclusion has important
implications for the method of using the terms
substitution and representation in the course of a
theological enquiry. If their complexity is recognised,
then it is simply not possible to approach a particular
text or a particular theme with the question 'are
substitutionary ideas present here or representative
ones?' Such a question reveals that the enquiry is
still being conducted as though the meaning of the terms
could be assumed or could be taken as self-evident.
Their meaning clearly cannot be assumed to be self-
evident and therefore some careful delineation must take
place prior to such a question being asked so that the
reader is clearly informed as to what the distinction
is in any particular instance. In a similar vein,
the sort of study made by L. Morris must be judged to
be seriously flawed by the fact that Biblical concepts
like propitiation, sacrifice, redemption, and ransom
are seen to witness to substitution or to embody
substitutionary ideas, and yet it is clear that the
term 'substitution' is being used so indiscriminately

that any such observations are virtually meaningless
(1). A critical reading of Morris' work suggests that
the term substitution is used as a theological port-
manteau which blurrs the distinctions between the
different contexts under discussion and creates the
illusion that substitution is a 'key word' necessary
for a correct understanding of the different Biblical
language related to God's salvific activity.

Third, the study has demonstrated that the
terms are 'contextualised': they only receive meaning
in particular contexts, and that variations in meaning
and distinctions between meanings depend on the contexts
in which they operate (2). Thus, it can be seen that
the sort of distinction offered between substitution
and representation such that the former means 'in our
stead' and the latter 'in our behalf' is wholly
inadequate. These two phrases can only assist in
differentiating between the terms if the contextual
frameworks which support such a distinction are made
explicit. As long as these frameworks remain unstated,
little or no content is given to the terms and no
clarification if offered as to their meaning. The
distinction between substitution as an exclusive work
and representation as inclusive has more substance,
but only because it appropriately describes a particular
set of meanings of both terms. However, to raise this
as a general criterion for determining the use or
rejection of either term not only fails to recognise
that other meanings are possible, but also fails to

recognise that both terms may express exclusivity <u>and</u> inclusivity in particular contexts.

Fourth, following from the demonstrable complexity of the terms, and their inherently contextual nature, it has been shown that it is not possible to engage in a criticism of the terms themselves as though they expressed self-evident theological realities, nor is it possible to consider the range of meanings of the terms as equally vulnerable to a particular critical point. Rather, by letting the terms speak for themselves, advertising the contextual frameworks in which they were found to acquire distinctive meaning and content, it has been shown that the terms must be critically engaged <u>within their context</u>, and the recognition must be allowed that different contexts are not equally vulnerable to the same criticisms.

Fifth, the recognition of the contextual nature of both terms promotes a sensitivity to the change and development that takes place within the meanings of the terms and between the terms themselves. For example, having identified a particular pattern of penal substitution, the recognition of a change in the meaning of penalty enables and facilitates the recognition of a different pattern of substitution; and where a different use of the term substitution is observed a means is provided to detect the changes in the contextual framework that surrounds the term. Thus, not only does a study of the terms substitution and representation provide a sensitive means to detect

changes in patterns of thought, but the process of
development within those patterns of thought comes to
be more readily perceived as ideas are tested and
weighed in relation to the varying contexts and options
that are available.

2. The Meaning and Use of the Term Substitution

Taking first the use of the term substitution
as it was understood within the general description
of the heading 'penal substitution', three distinctive
patterns of thought were identified. First, the use
of the term substitution which operated within the
context of a framework of criminal law to articulate
the conviction that in his death Christ suffered or
bore an identical punishment that would have fallen on
guilty man had that exchange not taken place. Second,
the use of the term substitution which continued to
operate within the general field of criminal law, but
which was modified by the statement that Christ did
not suffer an identical punishment, but an equivalent
punishment which was accepted by God as satisfying
his justice. Third, the use of the term substitution
in a context that is distanced from the framework of
criminal law, modifying still further the sense in which
it may be said that Christ bore our punishment, and
expressing the conviction that not punishment, but
legal desert, is the guiding concept, so that it may
be said that Christ died our death, substituted for us

to give expression to God's law and satisfying the
demands for a just and moral universe in which God may
still remit punishment.

These three views are, and can be, all described
under the general heading of penal substitution, and
yet it is clear that the differences between them are
highly significant. Three comments will suffice to
summarise the conclusions reached in Chapters II and IV.

i)   The change that comes about in the description
and function of the concept of criminal law testifies
to the fact that the term 'penalty' is not a 'given'
in the data for a doctrine of atonement, but is rather
a construct built out of more general perceptions reg-
arding the relation of God to man. Even when the
bald statement 'God must punish' is given as a self-
evident theological truth, the question is by no means
settled as to what that punishment means, for the
concept of penalty is dependent upon particular frame-
works, although the same words are used. Furthermore,
the concept of substitution owes in part its resilience
to the fact that this framework of law may subtly change,
allowing the theologian to move across a spectrum of
thought to counter different objections and propositions.
He may do this under the auspices of the general terms
penalty and justice, thus seeming to establish firmly
this framework as the necessary context for an under-
standing of substitution, when in reality he is employing
several different frameworks which are not easily

reconcilable. The apparent uniformity of the concept
of penal substitution is an illusion, and a dangerous
one because it encourages the belief that any other
view surrenders the justice or holiness of God. In
reality, the understanding of the justice of God within
the description of penal substitution has already
undergone significant change and variation, a fact
which tells against any claim to be a necessary or self-
evident pattern of substitution.

ii)   This variation within the concepts of penalty
and law, which is most clearly seen in the debate
surrounding the identity, equivalence or appropriateness
of Christ's punishment also demonstrates quite clearly
that the concept of penal substitution cannot be raised
as the only theory which rationally and logically
'explains' the atonement. Whether or not this was its
original intention is hard to tell, but on no account
was it found to be capable of realising the claim that
a rational and consistent explanation was provided.
The assertion of an <u>identical</u> punishment could only
be an assertion which is incapable of demonstration
or rationalisation; the more sophisticated concept of
an <u>equivalent</u> punishment which might be held to supply
a rational basis for an explanation of how the atonement
worked was shown to depend on an appeal to an act of
God's grace which accepted that there was an equivalence;
the corresponding notion of <u>appropriateness</u> confirms
the suspicion that the framework of criminal law is in

abeyance, and some other basis for seeing Christ's death as penal is being asserted. No single pattern of penal substitution proved to be capable of bearing the explanatory role of why and how Christ's punishment secures the salvation of man, contrary to much popular expectation, indeed the extraordinary thing is that it might have been thought to do so. What is not surprising is that such patterns of thought should be thought to be fitting, and it is in the consequent interplay between what is regarded as fitting for God's justice, for man's redemption, for God's love, and for man's moral convictions that the various patterns of penal substitution are built up and are adapted.

iii)   Partly on the grounds of this internal variation in the concepts of penalty and law, and partly on the grounds of the Biblical testimony to the relation between punishment and atonement, it was argued that the relation between forgiveness and penalty was not direct or necessary, but rather indirect, so that vicarious punishment in whatever sense of the term might be able to articulate a perception of forgiveness, but it did not of itself constitute the basis of atonement, its rationale, or its only expression.

These three comments all refer to the various patterns of penal substitution that were disclosed in the course of the investigation into the uses of the term substitution. However, into this already confused

and confusing mix of ideas must be put four more ingredients.

First, while it was noted that some expressions of 'penal' substitution employed a concept of penalty that was progressively distanced from the context of criminal law and from concepts of retributive justice, there are also expressions still employing the term substitution that continue this process to the point where not only is the designation 'penal' misleading but the concept of substitution itself is transformed. Thus, the use of substitution in the framework of law that is interpreted in civil terms, a use which explicitly rejects the notion that Christ was punished by God, favouring instead the formulation that Christ's sufferings are an appropriate substitution for our punishment, was seen to remove the term substitution both from the context of penalty and indeed from those patterns of exchange which it was formerly intended to express. Neither the use of the term substitution in this context nor the framework of civil law was difficult to refute; what was more problematic was the way in which this range of ideas was mixed, often almost indistinguishably, with other more recognisable patterns of 'penal' substitution to provide support and an additional framework to give intelligibility to the term substitution. Although the different contexts afforded by 'penal' and 'civil' law appear to complement each other in many examples cited, it was argued that the manifestly different frameworks, presuppositions and

intentions rendered such mixing of ideas misleading and invalid. In these instances no genuine interpretation is offered, rather several interpretations, united by common terms although used in different ways, between which the theologian oscillates fitfully according to the question he is answering or the objection he is meeting. The synthesis presented is an illusion, although one that is difficult to expose because of the flexibility and ambiguity of the concepts in question.

Second, leaving penal context behind, an investigation into the possibility of the use of the term substitution with the concept of satisfaction demonstrated that a coherent and intelligible pattern of ideas could result. In fact, it was argued, that when pecuniary analogies were used the substitutionary bearing of the argument became more intelligible and proved an effective method of expressing and interpreting the significance of Christ's work. Its drawback was found in the fact that as due seriousness was given to the personal dimension of the debt to be paid so the possibility of this debt being paid by another recedes. However, this investigation exposes the underlying ambiguity of many uses of the term substitution in that different analogical relations are employed at different points to demonstrate the reality of substitution, failing to note that these different relations cannot be unified but must remain in opposition or in contrast to each other. This is true of

the varying patterns of law that are employed in the
internal dialogue within the concept of penal
substitution, but it is also true of the dialogue
between penal and non-penal formulations of substitution.
It is frequently the case that pecuniary analogies
will be advanced in order to validate the concept of
substitution, and penal analogies in order to express
the judgement due to sin, and then for both to be
'combined' to explain or interpret the significance
of the death of Christ. Again, an oscillation between
conflicting contextual frameworks is concealed by the
availability of common terms and the ambiguity of the
language employed. The very language of 'paying the
penalty' demonstrates just how deeply rooted is the
conviction that pecuniary and penal language are
mutually interpretative, and yet closer examination
reveals clearly the error in this judgement.

Third, partly in order to demonstrate the
versatility of the term substitution and partly to
disclose the sense that is often taken to be funda-
mental to its meaning, the use of the term was examined
in the context not of any kind of 'passion', but in
an active sense where Christ is said to defeat the
powers of evil in place of man. While this is not a
common context for the use of the term, the sense given
of 'doing what man could not do' is common. In fact,
as the 'passive' dimension of the term comes under
increasing attack, particularly as the penal framework
of the term is abandoned as it becomes increasingly

hard to speak of Christ suffering in place of man, so
it becomes increasingly attractive to refer substitution
to Christ's act as waged in man's place, and therefore
of benefit to him. Thus, the concept of substitution
may be commended on the grounds that it speaks of
performing an act which someone else cannot do - an
acceptable sense of the term - but not if the act in
question is the suffering of a penalty or a judgement.

Fourth, the final pattern of thought that the
term substitution sought to express and evoke concerned
the relation between Christ and man rather than the
content of Christ's work. Most explicit of these uses
was the concept of 'inclusive substitution', a concept
that seemed designed to repudiate the charge of
externality, exclusiveness or moral indifference, but
which failed to commend itself since it lacked the
conceptual frameworks to elucidate or interpret such
inclusivity, and it merely seemed to assert a new
sense of substitution in flat contradiction to patterns
of thought that were still being retained and utilised.
It could not be accepted that merely by adding the word
inclusive to the term substitution was anything
substantial being said, unless the concept of subst-
itution were recognised to be shaped and altered by
this new context. Since no such recognition was
apparent it might be concluded that the concept of
inclusive substitution is merely an apologetic device
used to deflect criticism of a particular concept,
suggesting another more congenial pattern of thought

and claiming the benefits of <u>both</u> patterns of thought
despite their essential contradictory nature.

Thus, with these four broad patterns of thought
engendered by the term substitution the picture has
emerged of a term that stands in relation to a cluster
of divergent and varied theological concepts. Since
these theological concepts are themselves variations
which stem from reflection on unresolved or ambiguous
theological themes - law (whether expressed in criminal,
civil or private terms), bondage (whether expressed
in penal, demonic or moral terms) - there is no simple
recourse to 'scripture' to prove or disprove a
particular cluster selection, nor to establish defin-
itively the 'correct' framework or set of criteria to
guide such a selection. All that can be done, and that
has been effected here, is to test the appropriateness
of any particular selection of concepts, to test the
resulting patterns of thought against one another in
order to discern the fundamental reality that they
are attempting to interpret, and to test the part
played by the term substitution in these different
frameworks for its coherence and its ability to direct
the enquirer to the heart of the matter.

3. The Meaning and Use of the Term Representation

In the presentation of the concept of
representation it was noted that linguistic convention
allows for three general areas of use of the word -

delegation, presentation and typification. Similarly
it was found that the theological use of the term
included and built on these general patterns of thought
so that a theological term was generated with a range
of meanings that spanned a number of different contexts
and issues, but which also related and unified them
by virtue of their being expressed by a single term.
This range of meanings was divided into three broad
patterns of thought which can be briefly reviewed here
together with the critical comments that were offered.

First, representation carries with it the
sense of an active work of Christ in contrast to the
passive suffering that was taken to be characteristic
of the term substitution. Thus, representation could
interpret and express the obedience of Christ, his
fulfilment of the Law, his offering of a holy and
pure 'sacrifice', or simply the perfection of his own
humanity to God. In each case, however loosely, it
may be claimed that Christ accomplishes something,
perhaps something of which man was incapable and yet
which was necessary both for his own self-realisation
and for the purposes of God. Thus, what might appear
to be an exclusive work is revealed to be of immediate
benefit to men in that what was formerly impossible
is now a potential reality, what was only glimpsed is
now realised perfectly. Thus, the content of the
representative work of Christ is comprised of a pattern
of offering, fulfilment and obedience in contrast to
the substitutionary patterns of suffering, punishment and

judgement. Underlying this contrast is the perception that a vicarious <u>action</u> has a different moral status from a vicarious passion; and the term representation comes in part to express this conviction that atonement consists not of a vicarious suffering but an offering; not a death but the free gift of a life; not a judgement but a true holiness and obedience.

However, this description of the content of the work of Christ is clearly shaped by the remaining two areas of meaning open to the term representation, in that the nature of the work is of the kind that is coherent with the concept of the 'making present' of man in Christ to God, and of the 'typification' of the destiny or ideal of each individual. Therefore, this first sense of representation cannot be viewed in isolation from these two other ranges of meaning, for it is constantly drawing on them and providing them with material in order to present a coherent and wide ranging interpretation of the significance of Christ's death.

When the second sense of the term representation is considered, that of 'making present', this interaction with the range of meanings of the representative work of Christ must be borne in mind, but so too must the possibility that this use of representation will be referred to quite different patterns of thought as to the content and nature of Christ's work. What emerged from the study of this use of representation was a range of models that could be employed to

articulate the manner in which such a 'making present' was to be conceived. The sense in which one could be said to be made present in another ranged from the conviction that all humanity was literally included in the one man Christ, to the conviction that one can be said to be present in another if, through imitation of actions, or participation in aims and objectives, a relation of sponsorship or discipleship is entered upon. Elucidating and substantiating this range of convictions is a set of models which can be reviewed under three headings.

First, the model which makes use of the language of universals, whether explicitly or implicitly, to express the conviction of the literal inclusiveness of the person of Christ. While it was recognised that this model expresses a deeply rooted perception of the universal and archetypal quality of certain acts or experiences, it was also clear that such language could be easily misconstrued. For example, if it was argued that since Christ was universal Man, all humanity was punished by God in his punishment, and therefore 'I' have been punished by God. The language of universals may be misconstrued, and yet it was recognised to be a powerful articulation of the conviction of the universality of Christ's salvific work; of the conviction and interpretation of his universal significance, but such language cannot be considered to provide an explanation of how a particular theory of atonement can be said to work.

The second set of models relate representation
and inclusiveness by means of physical or organic
concepts: incorporation and all related 'Body' language,
organism, and certain patterns of solidarity. Much of
this language was used in direct appeal to the Biblical
language of 'in Christ', 'with Christ', and 'the Body
of Christ', with little further development or
substantiation. However, the model of corporate
personality proved popular in giving this language
some additional foundation and to commend it to modern
readers. It was argued that not only was the concept
of corporate personality not clearly an adequate
description of the Biblical patterns of thought, least
of all of New Testament patterns of thought, but that
the concept cannot be used to undergird and rationalise
the act of the One on behalf of the many, or to explain
how the many are present in the One. The concept of
corporate personality does not justify or fund the
concept of representation, but, like the physical or
organic models of the relation of Christ to others it
can function to articulate the conviction that mankind
or believers are 'bound up' with the person and work
of Christ. Once again, the use of such models and
their association with the concept of representation
is a powerful pointer to the universality of Christ's
salvific work.

The third set of models protrayed the relation
of Christ to others by means of patterns of dependence
and interaction that were basically causal in nature.

The model of social solidarity was prominent in this respect, although it was noted that the model was often believed to be capable of portraying more than a pattern of cause and effect, dependence and responsibility, and to support the more 'physical' models of solidarity.

The examination of the range of models employed to express the relation of Christ to others demonstrated two things. First, the only way in which such language could be understood and assessed was in terms of its interpretative account of the universality of Christ. In order to articulate the fundamental soteriological significance of Christ's act as one for others it is necessary to give some account that communicates and expresses this universality. The models are not explanations of how this act can be said to be for others, but they are present to communicate and indicate the perception that this is the significance of the act.

Second, the models and the range of convictions concerning the universal significance of Christ's act were not only appropriately expressed by the term representation, but are endemic within the complexity and ambiguity of that term. Representation was shown to denote or invoke a complex and varied set of perceptions that allow for the articulation of fundamental insights concerning the relations of one person to another, without necessarily making those perceptions conscious or explicit. Any use of the term representation

be it theological, political or constitutional, relies
on these unspoken perceptions and constantly embodies
the unresolved tensions that are involved. The
questions: what is representation? how are the interests
of one represented by another? how does one person
stand for another? have no answer, only a variety of
answers, none of which are wholly adequate, but all
of which play a part in authorising and establishing
the use of such language.

The term representation is so far shown to
consist of a fluid range of ideas revolving around the
sense of 'making present', constantly shifting from
one perspective to another, evoking and invoking a
range of insights and models to attempt to articulate
the manner of the relation that subsists between Christ
and others.

The third general area in which the term
representation comes to have meaning and which reflected
another aspect of its general linguistic use was found
in the sense of typification or exemplification.
When applied to the person of Christ, it was noted
that such ideas were treated with suspicion and regarded
as inferior to the supposedly 'ontological' christol-
ogical formulations. The foregoing analysis queried
the strict ontological status of these formulations,
showing them to be more complex and ambiguous; this
latter use of representation cannot therefore be
rejected or slighted for this reason. On the contrary,
two points become evident.

First, the use of the language of archetype, prototype, ideal, and pioneer showed a depth and sophistication that removes it far from the level of 'mere example'. This language sets out to preserve fully the unique work of Christ in his initiation, demonstration and realisation of a destiny now capable of realisation, imitation and pursuit by mankind. There is both a creative act and a future consummation; there is still an unresolved tension between an 'objective' work and the 'not yet' of man's only partially realised destiny. Whatever the shortcomings and idiosyncracies of particular expressions of these convictions, they are expressions of the same convictions that prompted the development of ontological patterns of thought.

Second, this use of the term representation could not be dissociated from the former two general areas of use; rather, it became apparent that many of the senses of the term representation described by these ideas of typification and exemplification constituted the background and framework for those uses of the term that appeared to be more 'physical' or 'ontological'. Not only did it become clear in particular instances that the distinction between Christ as the representative man and Christ as the representative of man had almost disappeared, so that Christ was the representative of man because he was representative man, or that he was representative man because he was representative of man, but more

significantly this pattern of thought could be detected
in almost any use of the term representation. Any
talk of political representation will involve the
same issues: whether a delegate represents a party,
or is representative of his constituents; whether a
delegate represents his constituents and how he can do
so unless he is representative (typical) of their views.
It is readily apparent that the theological use of
the term representation involves and is confronted by
the same set of issues. Thus, in addition to the
range of models already described that elucidate Christ's
representative relation to others stands this new set
of ideas, not simply as an alternative mode of expression
and interpretation, but as a pattern of thought that
penetrates, shapes and even undergirds most other uses
of the term. Far from being slighted, due recognition
should be given to the part played by these ideas in
any formulation of the concept of representation.

4. The Relation of the Terms
Substitution and Representation

Some comments must now be addressed to the
question of the relation between the terms substitution
and representation although no clear cut or easy
answers are possible. Such generalisations as 'the
terms are complementary' or 'both terms are needed',
while not untrue, are not particularly helpful. For
if one of the conclusions of this study is that the

meaning of each term is constantly shifting within
(often loosely) given parameters then the question of
the relation of the terms, or of their complementary
status, becomes **vi**rtually impossible to answer with
any precision. Further, if the terms are agreed to
function in the manner described, then their 'meaning'
becomes much more elusive, built up from the patterns
of thought and the variety of models which establish
such patterns. Therefore, neither is it possible, on
the basis of this study, simply to draw up respective
lists of meanings, the various combinations of which
can then be checked for their complementary quality.

What this study has suggested is that, as has
often been recognised, but not always treated in an
assessment of the terms, both substitution and
representation function within two general contexts:
to interpret the content of the work of Christ, and
to interpret the manner of the relation of this work
to others. Clearly, between these two contexts there
will always be some relation since this is inherent
within the fundamental concerns of Christ's salvific
work. To this extent, then, it is not surprising to
see most of the staunch proponents of the term
substitution using also the term representation without
explanation or apology in the course of their work.
Between these two general contexts there will be, and
there needs to be, some complementary relation and use.

However, it has become equally apparent from
this study that not every relation between the terms is

complementary, nor that every expression is appropriately
complemented. Some expressions are mutually exclusive,
and their use together is little more than a juggling
with words, or the concealment of unexplained and
unadvertised changes in meaning. Thus, it was noted,
different uses of the term substitution which were
not complementary could give the appearance of being
complementary through being labelled 'substitution';
equally, it was noted that part of the success of the
term representation was due to its ability to bring
new contexts into relation with one another, and yet
it is also clear that there are uses of the term
representation which are not self evidently complementary
but which describe quite different perceptions as to
the meaning and significance of Christ. Most obviously,
it is not at all clear that certain meanings of
substitution are complementary with certain meanings
of representation, particularly if either term is used
to give coherence or rational justification to the
other.

There are no simple solutions to the problem
of the relation between the terms: all that can be
said is that each detectable shade of meaning that is
being suggested in relation to another be tested on
its own merits and in its own setting to determine
the appropriateness of such a combination of meanings.
The purpose of this study has been to advertise and
promote sensitivity to this range of meanings and to
describe their content and purpose so that their presence

and implications may be more reliably discerned in any
particular setting.

5.   Theological Language and Doctrines of the
Atonement

Some final comments and observations must
now be made concerning the significance of this study
for the wider issues of the meaning and purpose of
doctrines of the atonement. This is particularly so
as both terms occupy prominent positions in such
doctrines and are often treated as 'keywords' which
express and evoke them. It is in this area that the
first implication of the study is to be found, for it
ought to be clear that it is highly misleading to
suggest that there is such a thing as 'substitutionary
doctrine' or a 'representative doctrine' of the
atonement. It is inevitable that theological shorthand
will be developed, but the terms substitution and
representation are themselves distorted, and their
complexity overlooked, if they are taken to portray
doctrinal stances in this fashion. Any label, of
course, prohibits exploration and recognition of
diversity and variety, but in the case of the terms
substitution and representation there is no justific-
ation for elevating them to 'keyword' status and positive
harm is caused if they are.

However, a more significant implication of the
present study is to query not only the 'keyword' status

of such terms as substitution and representation, but also the contribution they are supposed to make to a 'doctrine' of the atonement. Throughout the study the distinction has been drawn between explanatory and interpretative functions, although it has been recognised that the distinction cannot be drawn sharply, or that the two aspects are always divided. None the less, a common perception of the terms is that they do have an explanatory role that is designed to answer questions 'how' and 'why'. Furthermore, particularly with the term substitution, they are held in this explanatory role to render consistent and coherent diverse areas of Christian theology, creating a theological system that binds together a range of different theological insights. It is precisely this system-forming capability of the term substitution which makes it a keyword for its supporters, so that a challenge to the term necessarily is said to involve an attack on the entire theological framework. In the study, this explanatory function of the terms was consistently challenged and was shown to rest on a fundamental misapprehension of each term as it actually functioned and as to what it was capable of realising. If, then, the terms are not explanatory but inter-pretative within frameworks that seek to articulate and apprehend the character and significance of Christ's 'story', then the 'doctrines' which they express and evoke are incorrectly seen as answering the questions 'how' and 'why', but are themselves the attempt to

apprehend within a particular conceptual form an appropriate expression of Christ's salvific work.

A doctrine of the atonement, then, can be understood as an interpretative construct for viewing and communicating the nature and significance of Christ in his relation to man and to God. A possible parallel to express this use of the term 'doctrine' is provided by the concept of ethics as a 'convention' which embodies and shapes moral decisions (3). An ethical proposition stems from a complex set of interactions between perceptions of the world, man and God, but is given a form that is conceptualised and institutionalised in order that the moral insight might be articulated and preserved. In the same way this study has shown how the terms substitution and representation both arise from basic perceptions as to the relations between God and man, perceptions that are themselves shaped and conditioned by the reading of Christ's story, and it has shown how the terms seek to embody, express and interpret those insights in a clear conceptual framework. The resulting patterns of thought are ascribed doctrinal significance in order that Christ's story may be correctly perceived as having an ultimate significance, and that the content of this story might be related to our own needs, aspirations and destiny, thus securing for it soteriological significance. In the patterns of thought which make up such doctrines the terms substitution and representation are an important part of the process of conceptualising and

institutionalising such relations, enabling the
ordering, expression and interpretation of theological
concepts such that they may help to embody and
communicate the significance of Christ. As such they
remain an integral part of the language of Christian
atonement theology, in all their complexity and
variety.

Endnotes to Chapter I

1. Karl Barth, <u>Church Dogmatics</u> IV, 1 (1956),
    p. vii. Full bibliographical details for
    this and subsequent documents are given in the
    bibliography at the end of this thesis.

2. For example, the Shorter Oxford English
    Dictionary defines 'represent' in the following
    way:

    > To stand for or in place of (a person or
    > thing); ... To take or fill the place of
    > (another) in some respect or for some purpose;
    > to be a substitute in some capacity for
    > (a person or body); to act for (another)
    > by deputed right.

    However, the same dictionary defines a
    'substitute' as:

    > One exercising deputed authority; a deputy,
    > delegate. ... One who acts in place of
    > another. ... A thing put in the place of
    > another.

    The difficulty in disentangling the meanings of
    the two terms in their non-theological senses
    has resulted in either the mistaken belief that
    the two terms can be used interchangeably as
    expressing substantially the same meaning, or
    in the equally mistaken belief that the terms
    can never be capable of any precision in
    theological contexts.

3. As, for example, the term 'substitution' is
    treated by J. Dwight Pentecost, <u>Things which
    Become Sound Doctrine</u> (1974), pp. 50-60.

4. Leon Morris, <u>The Cross in the New Testament</u>
    (1965), p. 408.

5. Morris, p. 408.

6. James Denney, <u>The Death of Christ</u> (1951),
    p. 195.

7. Morris, op. cit., p. 412.

8. Morris, p. 417.

9. James I. Packer, 'What did the Cross Achieve?
    The Logic of Penal Substitution' the
    <u>Tyndale Bulletin</u> Vol 25 (1974), pp. 3-45.

10. Packer, p. 24.

11.   Packer, p. 34.

12.   Packer, p. 34.

13.   Catherine A. Beacock, H. A. Hodges: The Pattern
        of Atonement in its Context, (unpublished),
        p. 48.

14.   Alan Richardson, article 'Atonement' in
        A Dictionary of Christian Theology (1969),
        editor, A. Richardson.

15.   Vincent Taylor, Jesus and His Sacrifice (1937),
        p. 283. See also the discussion of the term
        representative found on pp. 281-285, 305-312
        of the same work.

16.   Peter T. Forsyth, The Work of Christ (1965),
        p. 140.

17.   G. B. Mather, 'The Atonement: Representative
        or Substitutionary?' Canadian Journal of Theology
        No 4 October 1958, pp. 265-272.

18.   Mather, p. 266.

19.   Mather, p. 270.

20.   Mather, p. 270.

21.   Mather, p. 270. For a similar conclusion see
        the discussion of the terms in Ronald Wallace,
        The Atoning Death of Christ (1981), pp. 115-118.

22.   Dorothee Sölle, Christ the Representative - An
        Essay in Theology after the 'Death of God'
        (1967): a translation by David Lewis of
        Stellvertretung - Ein Kapitel Theologie nach
        dem 'Tode Gottes' (1965).

Endnotes to Chapter II

1. F. W. Camfield, 'The Idea of Substitution in the Doctrine of the Atonement' Scottish Journal of Theology Vol 1 (1948), p. 282.

2. See the comments of James I. Packer, 'What did the Cross Achieve? The Logic of Penal Substitution', the Tyndale Bulletin Vol 25 (1974), p. 19.

3. Packer, pp. 3-16.

4. Packer, p. 6 (Packer's italics). Cf Emil Brunner's use of the term 'mystery' in The Mediator (1934), p. 436f.

5. Packer, p. 8.

6. Packer, p. 11.

7. Packer, p. 12.

8. Packer, p. 25f. Packer acknowledges the work of Ian T. Ramsey as the source for his language of 'model' and 'qualifier'. A qualifier is understood by Packer to characterise a model and to provide a frame of reference in which a model is anchored.

9. Packer, pp. 29-43. Packer cites five areas of theological thought in which the term substitution both functions and by which it must be shaped. These are as follows: a) Substitution and retribution; b) Substitution and solidarity; c) Substitution and mystery; d) Substitution and salvation; e) Substitution and divine love. A similar pattern is followed in Leon Morris, The Cross in the New Testament (1965), pp. 404-419, and in The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross (1955), pp. 270-280. In Morris' case it is difficult to understand the place of these comments since they seem to modify or contradict an already defined concept of substitution that has been employed throughout the books in question. In Packer's case it is through and in these theological areas that the term substitution comes to be given meaning and is understood as a theological concept.

10. Packer, p. 5.

11. Packer, p. 26f.

12. Packer, p. 27.

13. See John Macquarrie, <u>Principles of Christian Theology</u> (1966), p. 284, and Hugo Meynell, <u>The Mechanics of Atonement</u> (1974), p. 21.

14. For a classic and sustained attack on the concept of substitution see Hastings Rashdall, <u>The Idea of Atonement</u> (1919), esp. pp. 420ff.

15. Cf. the comment by William J. Wolf, <u>No Cross, No Crown</u> (1957), p. 109:

> Here again the simplicity of the formula [we are saved by Christ's bearing the punishment of our sins] obscures many variant strands.

16. See Packer, op. cit., p. 38.

17. Archibald A. Hodge, <u>The Atonement</u> (1868), p. 37f:

> The meaning of the terms substitution and vicarious - these terms are admitted even in a loose sense by Socinians, and are paraded by Maurice, Young and Jowett, and very much in the same loose, indifferent sense by Barnes and the advocates of the Governmental Atonement Theory. When these parties say that Christ was substituted for us and that his sufferings are vicarious, they mean nothing more than that He suffered in our behalf, for our benefit. We hold, on the other hand, that Christ was in a strict and exact sense, the substitute of his people: ... he assumed all our legal responsibilities, and thus assumed our law-place, binding himself to do in our stead all that the law demanded of him when he suffered the penalty due to us, and rendered the obedience upon which our wellbeing was made to depend.

18. For example, in John Owen's work on the atonement the term substitution is seldom used, and then as a verb rather than as a noun, but the language of Christ as sponsor and surety is commonplace. See <u>Of the Satisfaction of Christ</u> p. 65, 119, 122, 420, et al; <u>The Death of Death in the Death of Christ</u> (1648), reveals a similar use of the terms. See also Paul Van Buren, <u>Christ in our Place - The Substitutionary Character of Calvin's Doctrine of Reconciliation</u> (1957), pp. 47-50 'surety and substitution'.

19. William G. T. Shedd, <u>Dogmatic Theology</u> Vol 1 (1887), p. 373. Also quoted in George B. Stevens, <u>The Christian Doctrine of Salvation</u> (1905), p.175f.

20. John Owen, <u>Of the Satisfaction of Christ</u> p. 473.

21.   William G. T. Shedd, <u>A History of Christian Doctrines</u> Vol 2 (1877), p. 216f.

22.   Louis Berkhof, <u>Systematic Theology</u> (1939), p.256.

23.   William G. T. Shedd, <u>Dogmatic Theology</u> Vol II '1889), p. 436.

24.   John Owen, <u>The Death of Death in the Death of Christ</u> (1648), p. 390.

25.   <u>The Works of Stephen Charnock</u> II (1864), p. 323. Quoted in Ronald S. Wallace, <u>The Atoning Death of Christ</u> (1981), p. 84.

      Cf Goodwin's comment that God's justice must have:

            its full pennyworth out of Christ. He let wrath suck the blood of his soul, till it falls off, as the leech when it is filled and breaks.

      <u>The Work of Thomas Goodwin</u> Vol V (1861), p. 189. Also quoted in Wallace, op. cit., p. 84.

26.   For example, Isaak A. Dorner, <u>A System of Christian Doctrine</u> Vol IV (1882), p. 30:

            But Christ's sufferings owe their intrinsic import to the fact that they are not merely physical, but <u>spiritual</u> sufferings, sufferings of his divine-human person.

      Cf also H. Wheeler Robinson, <u>Redemption and Revelation</u> (1942), p. 272.

27.   This is the central thrust of the writings of John Owen on the atonement; see particularly <u>The Death of Death in the Death of Christ</u> (1648), p. 247; <u>Of the Satisfaction of Christ</u> p. 122.

28.   Calvin, <u>Institutes</u> 2 Chap 16:10.

29.   John Owen, <u>Of the Satisfaction of Christ</u> p. 122.

30.   John Owen, <u>The Death of Death in the Death of Christ</u> (1648), p. 261.

31.   Owen, p. 361.

32.   Owen, p. 361.

33.   Augustus H. Strong, <u>Systematic Theology</u> Vol II (1886), p. 769f.

34. William G. T. Shedd, <u>Discourses and Essays</u>
     p. 307. Quoted in Strong, p. 770.

35. Cf. Athanasius, <u>De Incarnartione</u> para 9.

         It was by surrendering to death the body
         which He had taken, as an offering and
         sacrifice free from every stain, that He
         forthwith abolished death for His human
         brethren by the offering of the equivalent.
         For naturally, since the Word of God was
         above all, when He offered His own temple and
         bodily instrument as a substitute for the life
         of all, He fulfilled in death all that was
         required.

36. John Owen, <u>Of the Satisfaction of Christ</u> p. 120:

         Eternity is not absolutely in the curse of
         the law, but as a finite creature is cursed
         thereby. If a sinner could at once admit
         upon himself that which is equal in divine
         justice to his offence, and so make satis-
         faction, there might be an end to his
         punishment in time. But a finite, and every
         way limited creature, having sinned his
         eternity in this world, against an eternal
         and infinite God, must abide by it for ever.
         This was Christ free from: the dignity of
         his person was such, as that he could fully
         satisfy divine justice, in a limited season;
         after which, God in justice loosed the pains
         of death, for it was impossible that he should
         be detained thereby.

37. William G. T. Shedd, <u>Theological Essays</u> p. 300.
     Quoted in Stevens, op. cit., p. 177.

38. Archibald A. Hodge, <u>The Atonement</u> (1868).
     Charles Hodge, <u>Systematic Theology</u> (1875) Vol II.

39. Archibald Hodge, p. 28f. Cf. also his statement
     p. 62f:

         The substitution of a divine and all-perfect
         person in the stead of sinners necessarily
         involves, as a matter of justice, the subst-
         itution within the penalty of different kinds
         and degrees of suffering. Christ suffered
         precisely that kind, degree, and duration of
         suffering, that the infinitely wise justice
         or the absolutely just wisdom of God determined
         was a full equivalent for all that was
         demanded of elect sinners in person; - an
         <u>equivalent</u>, we mean, in respect to sin-
         expiatory and justice-satisfying efficacy;
         and a <u>full</u> equivalent, in being of equal

efficacy in those respects of rigour of
justice, according to the judgement of God.
Consequently, what Christ suffered is by no
means the same with what his people would
have suffered, when considered as suffering,
but is precisely the very same when
considered as penalty.

A. A. Hodge rejects Owen's view that Christ
suffered an identical penalty, although
he commends and respects the reasons for that
conclusion (p. 61). Cf. further Hugh R. Mackintosh,
Historic Theories of Atonement (1920) pp. 110-
111, for his comments on the difference between
'acceptation' (something fictitious, of little
or no value) and 'acceptiliation' (something
appropriate but of less value).

40.   Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology Vol II (1975)
        p. 471.

41.   Hodge, p. 474.

42.   Hodge, p. 474f.

43.   This theme will be examined more fully in
        Chapter IV.

44.   For example, the practice of describing the work
        of J. Denney as exemplifying the concept of
        penal substitution, despite the fact that
        nowhere, so far as I can determine, does he use
        the designation to describe his own thought.

45.   James Denney, The Death of Christ (1950), p. 193;
        See also p. 75f. Cf. Emil Brunner, The Mediator
        (1934), p. 479f. and James Denney, The Atonement
        and the Modern Mind (1930), pp. 63-76, 93-94.

46.   Brunner, op. cit., p. 483.

47.   Brunner, p. 480f.

48.   Brunner, p. 484.

49.   James Denney, The Death of Christ (1950), p. 76.
        Cf. also p. 61f. and p. 83ff. of the same work.

50.   Brunner, op. cit., p. 520.

51.   Brunner, p. 520.

52.   Denney, op. cit., p. 193.

53.   Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man (1968),
        pp. 38-49, 245-280.

54.   Pannenberg, p. 278.

55.   Pannenberg, p. 279:

> Methodological reasons do not permit us to
> work in this way with the incarnation as a
> theological presupposition. To do so would
> make the humanity of Jesus' life problematic
> from the very beginning. To be sure, all
> christological considerations tend towards
> the idea of the incarnation; it can, however,
> only constitute the conclusion of christology.
> If it is put instead at the beginning, all
> christological concepts, including that of
> penal suffering, are given a mythological
> tone.

Cf. further his comments on pp. 34-37.

56.   Pannenberg, p. 245.

57.   Pannenberg, p. 254.

58.   Pannenberg, p. 259.

59.   Cf. Herbert Neie, The Doctrine of the Atonement
in the Theology of W. Pannenberg (1978), for
a full discussion of the ambiguity of Pannenberg's
understanding of substitutionary atonement.

60.   Pannenberg translates the penal element of
Jesus' condemnation into the more general
anthropological statement that man is subject
to death 'because of his being closed in upon
himself, while his destiny to openness to the
world still points beyond death', Pannenberg,
op. cit., p. 62. See the comments of Neie,
op. cit., pp. 140-144. The use made by
Pannenberg of the concept of inclusive subst-
itution will be discussed later in this chapter.

61.   F. W. Camfield, 'The Idea of Substitution in
the Doctrine of the Atonement', The Scottish
Journal of Theology Vol 1 (1948), p. 293.

62.   Camfield, p. 292 (my italics).

63.   See also the use of the term substitute in
Alexander B. Macaulay, The Death of Jesus (1938),
where it is related not to an 'equivalent'
punishment, but to the conviction that salvation
is propter Christum. None the less, no clue
is given to the significance of this act, an
element which is not denied, but which is given
no coherent content.

64. Neie, op. cit., p. 204. The reference is to Jürgen Moltmann, <u>The Crucified God</u> (1974).

65. Moltmann, p. 193.

66. Neie, op. cit., p. 204.

67. Moltmann, op. cit., p. 183f.

68. Neie, op. cit., p. 204.

69. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1 (1956), p. 253.

70. Barth, p. 253.

71. The discussion takes place between R. G. Crawford and H. Cunliffe-Jones in <u>Theology</u> August and November 1971.

72. Barth, op. cit., p. 253.

73. A clear example of this movement of thought is Charles Jerram, <u>A Treatise on the Doctrine of the Atonement</u> (1828), pp. 309-319, 322-325.

74. Hugo Grotius, <u>A Defense of the Catholick Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ</u> (1692).

75. See for example this summary:

> <u>Christ was chastised by God</u>, that is was punished; <u>that Christ did bear our sins</u>, (that is the punishment of our sins); <u>that he was made sin</u>, that is, subjected to the punishment of sin; <u>that he was made a curse unto God</u>, or <u>liable to the curse</u>, that is the punishment of the law: But the passion of Christ itself, having been full of torments, bloody and ignominious, is a very fit matter of punishment.

Grotius, p. 35.

76. Grotius, p. 70:

> The right of punishing in a Governor is not either the right of absolute Lordship, or the right of the thing credited. ... The power of punishing is not for the sake of the punisher, but for the sake of some community; for all punishment hath the common good proposed, to wit, the preservation of order and example.

Cf. also the statement that 'it is for the publick good that crime should be punished' p. 73. See further R. W. Dale, <u>The Atonement</u> (1902), p. 391f, and the section in G. B. Stevens, <u>The Christian Doctrine of Salvation</u> (1905), pp. 157-173.

77.   See the succinct statement of Archibald A. Hodge
        The Atonement (1868), p. 156:

        A Substitute is not a different man in a
        different place, but a different man in the
        same place.

78.   Cf. Grotius, op. cit., p. 70, 111f; Dale, op.
        cit., pp. 370-373.

79.   Grotius, op. cit., p. 125.

80.   Stevens, op. cit., p. 264f.

81.   As for example in the translation of Grotius
        by Foster quoted in Stevens, op. cit., p. 165.

82.   Grotius, op. cit., p. 111f.

83.   See the comments of Archibald A. Hodge, op. cit.,
        p. 37f. given above at note 17.

84.   Ralph Wardlaw, Discourses on the Principal Points
        of the Socinian Controversy (1819), p. 209.
        See also Thomas J. Crawford, The Doctrine of
        Holy Scripture Respecting the Atonement (1871),
        pp. 381-394.

85.   Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 210f.

86.   Wardlaw, p. 211. John C. Macdonnell, The Doctrine
        of the Atonement (1858), p. 198f. clearly
        expresses the conviction that a middle path is
        to be desired between on the one hand the
        extremes of penal language and on the other
        Socinian expressions of the atonement.

        On this point, there are two extremes to be
        considered, the one which makes the sacrifice
        to be identical with the legal penalty of
        sin; and the other which denies that sacrifice
        has any reference to punishment at all.
        ... But if we discard the notion of atonement
        being only a particular form of punishment,
        and regard it as the substitute which Divine
        wisdom has appointed to take its place in
        certain cases; let us enquire reverently
        whether we can discover any fitness in the
        substitute for the part assigned to it,
        either by its fulfilling the same ends as
        punishment, or by its preventing the evils
        which might arise from simple remission.

87.   See Macdonnell, p. 197:

        Let us remark that expiation is not punish-
        ment. ... Expiation is rather a commutation

of punishment - a substitute for it - which
must be supposed to answer the same or
higher ends in the Divine Government, than
those for which punishment was ordained; but
with more tenderness to the offender.

88.   As for example Emil Brunner argues when he
       comments that Anselm elaborates the 'idea of
       penal expiation', The Mediator (1934), p. 481.
       See also p. 458, 475.

89.   Extensive use will be made of the work by
       John McIntyre, St Anselm and his Critics (1954).

90.   For excellent summaries of Anselm's argument
       see J. Patout Burns, 'The Concept of Satisfaction
       in Medieval Redemption Theory', Theological
       Studies Vol 36 No. 2, June 1975 pp, 285-304;
       Glen W. Olsen, 'Hans Urs von Balthasar and the
       Rehabilitation of St Anselm's Doctrine of the
       Atonement', Scottish Journal of Theology Vol 34,
       1981 pp. 49-61. See also the outline Anselm
       himself provides in his Meditation on Human
       Redemption pp. 139-140.

91.   See Anselm Cur Deus Homo 1/11, 1/12, 1/15; also
       McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 68-76.

92.   Anselm, op. cit., 1/12; McIntyre, op. cit.,
       pp. 78-116.

93.   Anselm, op. cit., 1/20, 1/24; McIntyre, op. cit.,
       pp. 77-81.

94.   For the problems in the force of this 'must'
       see McIntyre pp. 96-104.

95.   Anselm, op. cit., 1/25, 2/4, 2/5; McIntyre,
       op. cit., pp. 117-121.

96.   Anselm, op. cit., 2/6, 2/11, 2/14; McIntyre,
       op. cit., p. 121ff.

97.   Anselm, op. cit., 2/18; Meditation on Human
       Redemption p. 140; McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 168-
       178.

98.   Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 2/19; McIntyre, op. cit.,
       pp. 178-185.

99.   Anselm, op. cit., 2/19, 2/20.

100.   McIntyre, op. cit., p. 172.

101.   Emil Brunner, The Mediator (1934), p. 481.

102.   McIntyre, op. cit., p. 172.

103. Karl Heim, <u>Jesus the World's Perfecter</u> (1959) p. 116.

104. Heim, p. 116f.

105. Heim, p. 116f.

106. Gustaf Aulen, <u>The Faith of the Christian Church</u> (1961), p. 235.

107. Gasper Lefebvre, <u>Redemption Through the Blood Of Jesus</u> (1960), p. 196.

108. Lefebvre, p. 95.

109. James I. Packer, 'What did the Cross Achieve? The Logic of Penal Substitution', The <u>Tyndale Bulletin</u> Vol 25 (1974), p. 20.

110. The term 'qualifier' is used by Packer, see the comment at n.8.

111. Although, as will become more obvious, certain formulations of the concept of substitution lend themselves more readily than others to the ideas expressed in the qualifier 'inclusive'.

112. James Richmond, <u>Ritschl, A Reappraisal</u> (1978) p. 204. Philip Marheineke's views are to be found in <u>Die Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft</u> (1819). See also the comment of Isaak A. Dorner, <u>Doctrine of the Person of Christ</u> Div 2 Vol III (1863), p. 123:

    With Christ God is most completely one; only on the ground of this man's unity with God can humanity likewise be united with God. ... Jesus Christ is the Son of God, as the man who is individual in His universality and universal in His individuality; He is the human nature created by God in its full integrity and illability, and for that reason as the second Adam, the representative of humanity, He is the truth of the first Adam.

113. Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 263 terms Marheineke's concept one of 'inclusive substitution', so that

    Jesus' dying includes ours in itself and thereby transforms the latter into a dying in hope.

114. Richmond, op. cit., p. 204. Indeed it might be said that this use of the phrase 'inclusive substitution' rests simply on a matter of translation which could be resolved by the use of the term representation.

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115.   Leon Morris, <u>The Cross in the New Testament</u>
       (1965), p. 417. See also Leon Morris, <u>The</u>
       <u>Apostolic Preaching of the Cross</u> (1955), p. 279f.

116.   Gerard I. Capaldi, 'In the Fulness of Time',
       <u>Scottish Journal of Theology</u> Vol 25 (1972) p. 212.

117.   Capaldi, p. 214.

118.   Pannenberg, op. cit., p. 263.

119.   Pannenberg, p. 263.

120.   Pannenberg, p. 263.

121.   William J. Wolf, <u>No Cross, No Crown</u> (1957, p. 64.
       According to Wolf this inclusivity of Christ's
       work is 'implied in the Biblical understanding
       of the corporate nature of man' (p. 64).

122.   Thus, the reservations concerning Mather's
       conclusion that the terms substitution and
       representation are 'complementary', are seen to
       be justified - see Chapter I n.19.

123.   See Packer, op. cit., p. 12.

Endnotes to Chapter III

1. See Chapter I, and the discussion there of
    Leon Morris and James Denney. See also the
    following quotation from H. W. Clark, <u>The Cross
    and the Eternal Order</u> (1943), p. 158:

    > For instance, to speak of Christ as 'the
    > Representative Man' causes us ... to picture
    > immediately a relationship originating from
    > man as its source. A Representative sums
    > up, so to say, what exists in those whom he
    > represents: he acts for those who stand
    > behind him in accordance with the inspiration
    > and instructions they transmit to him,
    > translating these into whatever speech or
    > action successive occasions may require; and
    > such a relation is constructed and construed,
    > be it noted, along a line which starts from
    > the <u>constituency</u>, not from the <u>Representative
    > himself</u>.

2. Giovanni Sartori, "Representational Systems",
    <u>The International Encyclopedia of the Social
    Sciences</u> p. 468.

3. See Alfred de Grazia, "Representation",
    <u>International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences</u>
    p. 462:

    > Obviously representation must consist of
    > unconscious as well as conscious relations,
    > expressive as well as sanctioned actions,
    > unknown as well as known actions. Otherwise
    > one falls into the trap of regarding as
    > determinative of the representative relation
    > solely conscious, known legislative behaviour
    > - parameters that are more often missing than
    > present in the setting about which the scholar
    > wishes to say 'A is represented by M'.

4. The metaphor of the body is almost impossible to
    avoid as an illustration of the relation between
    representative and constituent as the language
    of 'embody' and 'incorporate' demonstrates.
    It is not surprising that the same terms should
    occur prominently in the theological use of the
    term representation. See section 2, part ii of
    this chapter.

5. The concept of identification, like the metaphor
    of the body, will again feature significantly in
    the theological use of the term representation.

6. Both the exemplary and the ideal aspects of

representation will be explored more fully
in section 3 of this chapter.

7.   For example, see in W. F. Lofthouse, Ethics
and Atonement (1906), p. 133:

> We must ask what is meant by the vicariousness
> of Christ's sufferings. We mean that he
> suffered instead of us. When we call his
> sufferings representative we mean that he
> suffered on our behalf. The difference
> sounds unimportant; but between the two
> phrases lies a whole theological gulf.

See also Leonard Hodgson, The Doctrine of the
Atonement (1957), p. 142; Ernest F. Kevan,
"The Person and Work of Christ", The Evangelical
Quarterly Vol 23, No 3 (1951) p. 216.

8.   For example, see the discussions in Thomas J.
Crawford, The Doctrine of Holy Scripture Respecting
the Atonement (1883), pp. 20-26, 493-496;
Vincent Taylor, The Atonement in New Testament
Teaching (1940), p. 59f; Ernest Best, One Body
in Christ (1955), p. 54f; R. W. Dale, The
Atonement (1902), pp. 475-478; Hastings Rashdall,
The Idea of Atonement (1919), p. 93; G. B. Stevens,
The Christian Doctrine of Salvation (1905),
pp. 45-48.

9.   The following footnote must suffice to give some
indication of the discussion that surrounds the
two words. If the word ἀντι is considered, it
is commonly agreed that its basic meaning refers
to an exchange which takes place when one party
stands in the place of another, (see the article
" ἀντι " by Büchsel in the Theological Dictionary
of the Bible edited by G. Kittel). Thus, the
word may properly be rendered by such phrases
as 'instead of' or 'in the place of'. However,
it may also be claimed that there are instances
where the sense of the word is less specific
so that it is better rendered 'on behalf of' or
'for the sake of' (Büchsel considers this to
be a second possible sense of ἀντι). R. E. Davies
in "Christ in our Place – the Contribution of the
Prepositions", The Tyndale Bulletin Vol 21 (1970)
pp. 71-91, disputes this and considers the
various examples that might indicate the
contrary. Davies, indeed, implies that the
attempt to weaken the force of ἀντι is pursued
not for linguistic grounds but because of an
independently conceived prejudice against the
possibility of this interpretation of Christ's
death (Davies, p. 80f.). However, Davies'
arguments concerning Matt 17:27 are unconvincing,
which together with Eph 5:31 and II Thess 2:10

indicates that ἀντι does not <u>necessarily</u> mean 'instead of', but that the context is significant for determining its meaning, and in reference to Christ's death it is precisely this context that is in question.

Turning to the word ὑπερ the general meaning 'on behalf of' is generally agreed upon (see the article " ὑπερ " by Riesenfeld in <u>The Theological Dictionary of the Bible</u> edited by G. Kittel). However, it may be claimed that ὑπερ has a more specific sense that lies closer to the meaning of ἀντι as described above (see Davies, op. cit., p. 82f.; Richard C. Trench, <u>New Testament Synonyms</u> (1865), quotes classical writers to this effect and includes Philemon 13 and, perhaps, I Cor 15:29; Maximilian Zerwick, <u>Biblical Greek</u> (1963), mentions in addition John 11:50 as well as Gal 3:13, II Cor 5:14f and I Tim 2:6, although the reasons for including these latter texts are less clear). The arguments adduced by Davies for giving the more specific sense to ὑπερ rely on the premise that an act performed on behalf of another may be so reckoned because it is performed in the stead of another. This can no doubt be true, but it is not certainly always the case, and cannot be proposed as a linguistic argument for reckoning ὑπερ to mean the same as ἀντι . Davies' reason for advancing this meaning of ὑπερ becomes clear as he considers the use of the phrase ὑπερ ἡμῶν to describe the death of Christ. Since the word ὑπερ , Davies argues, may embrace the meaning of the word ἀντι , we are justified in rendering the phrase ὑπερ ἡμῶν as 'instead of us'. R. W. Dale is more precise when he says that the preposition ὑπερ 'can only be alleged in support of the vicarious or substitutionary character of his death, because if his death had not that character, it is impossible to see how it could have secured for us the kind of benefits attributed to it' (Dale, op. cit., p. 476). Trench takes a similar line when he comments:

> If we only had the word ὑπερ we should not be entitled to construct a vicarious and penal soteriology. Only because of the presence of the word ἀντι are we led to assume that when we see ὑπερ we understand it as signifying also 'in our stead'.

Thus, it should be clear that the linguistic discussion of the words ὑπερ and ἀντι is itself surrounded and shaped by doctrinal considerations which relate to the use of the terms substitution and representation. It cannot be said that a

discussion of the prepositions in question
contributes to an understanding of the terms,
or that it resolves the dilemma of which term
may appropriately be used.

10.   Dale, op. cit., p. 129.

11.   Archibald A. Hodge, The Atonement (1868), p. 152.

12.   Harold Smith, "The Atonement in Patristic
        Writings", The Atonement in History and in Life
        (1929) edited by L. W. Grensted, p. 178.
        Paul M. van Buren, commenting on Calvin's
        understanding of the act of obedience of Christ,
        says:

        > We owed obedience and could not pay it. Christ
        > put himself in the position of being able to
        > represent us. He became a man, that he might
        > be the righteous man in our place, putting us
        > to one side, as it were, and taking over the
        > responsibility of performing our work and pay-
        > ing our debt.

        Paul M. van Buren, Christ in our Place (1957),
        p. 31. See the entire discussion on pp. 27-39
        where the terms substitute and representative
        are used virtually interchangeably.

13.   Smith, in Grensted, op. cit., p. 180. See also
        Charles F. D. Moule, The Sacrifice of Christ
        (1956), pp. 26-27, 38; J. S. Whale, Victor and
        Victim (1960), p. 14f.

14.   Vincent Taylor, Jesus and His Sacrifice (1955),
        p. 307.

15.   S. C. Gayford, Sacrifice and Priesthood (1924),
        pp. 110-111.

16.   See, for example, Moule, op. cit., p. 56.

17.   Cf F. R. Barry, The Atonement (1968), p. 171;
        Taylor, op. cit., p. 317. See the comment of
        E. C. Essex, "The Atonement in Post-Reformation
        Writers", The Atonement in History and in Life (1929)
        edited by L. W. Grensted, p. 242:

        > Would Denney have been willing to use
        > 'presentation', or ought he not to have allowed
        > that Jesus presents as an acceptable sacrifice
        > to God the ideal new Humanity his holy work
        > creates, and of which he is himself the
        > consecrated first fruits in humanity?

18.   Taylor, op. cit., p. 283.

19.   See for example the following comment of Albrecht
       Ritschl, <u>The Christian Doctrine of Justification
       and Reconciliation</u> (1902), paragraph 56:

       If Christ assures himself, by the obedience
       indicated, of his nearness, his priestly
       relation, to God, that includes the intention
       that the existing and future community should
       seek the same position. That is to say,
       Christ as a Priest is the representative of
       the community which he brings to God through
       the perfect fulfilment of his personal life.
       This use of representation is inclusive,
       not, as it generally is, exclusive. The
       meaning of the idea is not that what Christ
       does as Priest, the community does not
       require to do; but rather that what Christ
       does as a Priest in the first place and as
       the representative of the community, there the
       community itself has accordingly to take up
       its position.

20.   Taylor, op. cit., p. 306.

21.   Taylor, p. 307.

22.   Friedrich D. Schleiermacher, <u>The Christian Faith</u>
       (English Edition 1928, German Edition 1830),
       p. 464.

23.   John McCleod Campbell, <u>The Nature of the Atonement</u>
       (1856), uses the term only in passing and in
       no clear technical sense.

24.   R. C. Moberly, <u>Atonement and Personality</u> (1901),
       uses the term sparingly and then in the context
       of Christ as inclusive man, not specifically in
       the context of the offering of penitence.

25.   V. F. Storr, <u>The Problem of the Cross</u> (1919),
       p. 88f, 117; John K. Mozley, <u>The Doctrine of the
       Atonement</u> (1915), pp. 190-196.

26.   Taylor, op. cit., pp. 309-312.

27.   There is no intention to polarise artificially
       a doctrine of the person and a doctrine of the
       work of Christ, but simply to indicate the two
       main contexts or frameworks of thought in which
       the term representation is employed and in which
       it is given meaning.

28.   See for example the comment of John C. MacDonnell,
       <u>The Doctrine of the Atonement</u> (1858), p. 176:

       This peculiarity of Christ's human nature –
       by which he was not only a perfect man, but

in some sense comprehended all men -
theologians have in vain striven to express.
In dogmatic teaching it has been called
'impersonalitas'; and we hear continually
such expressions as the 'true man' - the
'representative man' - the 'archetype of
humanity' - and such like.

29. Moberly, op. cit., p. 86. For the whole
discussion see pp. 82-92.

30. Eric L. Mascall, Christ, the Christian and the
Church (1946), p. 75.

31. Mascall, p. 75.

32. James D. G. Dunn, "Paul's Understanding of the
Death of Jesus" in Reconciliation and Hope (1974),
edited by R. J. Banks, p. 141.

33. Brooke F. Westcott, The Victory of the Cross
(1889), p. 44.

34. Van Buren, op. cit., p. 80. See the following
comment on p. 53 where similar thoughts are
expressed but where the terms substitution and
representation are confused:

As the substitute for all men, He received
their punishment; at the same time they
received that punishment, for His death was
accepted as the death of all sinful humanity.
God's wrath against men was spent in that our
flesh was put to death to endure the punishment
that we deserved. Here we see the full
implication of the idea of substitution. It
would be only a step further to say that to
stand in the place of another is to be that
other, and to be truly represented by another
is to have that other become oneself. But
that is to make substitution into complete
identity, and Calvin does not do that, for
identity means the end of representation.

35. Anselm, A Meditation on Human Redemption p. 140.

36. See further the criticisms of Hastings Rashdall,
Archibald A. Hodge, and Maurice Wiles as cited
in Chapter V.

37. James B. Torrance, "The Vicarious Humanity of
Christ" in The Incarnation (1981), edited by
Thomas F. Torrance, p. 140.

38. For a critical discussion of this concept and its
background see Chapter V.

39.   Geoffrey W. H. Lampe, <u>Reconciliation in Christ</u> (1956), p. 54f.

40.   For the 'physical' or 'concrete' description of corporate personality and the inclusiveness thereby denoted see Jacques de Fraine, <u>Adam et son Lignage</u> (1959), particularly the following on p. 17:

> Il faut comprendre cette représentation d'une façon éminemment concrète: il n'est pas question d'une fiction juridique abstraite, qui met l'accent sur le « comme si », mais bien plutôt d'une vue intuitive et physique.

41.   For further illustrations of the use of the language of corporate personality see Charles H. Dodd, <u>The Epistle of Paul to the Romans</u> (1936), p. 80, where corporate personality is paralleled with the 'inclusive representative of the new humanity which emerges in him'; Edmund F. Sutcliffe, <u>Providence and Suffering in the Old and New Testaments</u> (1953), pp. 52-70, 93f; Ernest Best, <u>One Body in Christ</u> (1955), pp. 44-65, 83-114, 203-207; Russell P. Shedd, <u>Man in Community</u> (1958); H. Wheeler Robinson, <u>The Christian Doctrine of Man</u> (1911), and "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality" in <u>Werden und Wesen des Alten Testaments</u> (1936); and <u>Redemption and Revelation</u> (1942); Aubrey R. Johnson, <u>The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God</u> (1961); Harry Johnson, <u>The Humanity of the Saviour</u> (1962), pp. 213-221.

42.   Lionel S. Thornton, <u>The Common Life in the Body of Christ</u> (1946), p. 46.

43.   Thornton, p. 273.

44.   Thornton, p. 316.

45.   See, for example, Thornton, p. 316, 320.

46.   Dodd, op. cit., p. 86. The distinction between a representation which is the assumption of humanity to be realised in individuals, and the representation which can be attributed to Christ as a corollary of the incorporation of individuals into union with him can seldom be clearly drawn, although the emphases and tendencies of the different expressions are usually apparent. Dunn, op. cit., p. 131, attempts the unusual course of arguing that while Christ is the representative of humanity in his death - that is, he dies for <u>all</u> - he is the representative only of his own people in his resurrection:

> Jesus' representative capacity before
> resurrection ... is different from his
> representative capacity after resurrection.
> ... In short, as last Adam Jesus represents
> only those who experience life-giving Spirit.

> R. P. Martin agrees with Dunn in his insistence
> on Christ as the Representative Man, but
> disagrees that there can be two different
> representative capacities. Since he is reluctant
> to say that Jesus' representative capacity after
> the resurrection is that of all humanity, he has
> to argue that the death suffered by Christ of
> 'all' (II Cor 5:14f) is a death only on 'his
> people's behalf' and one 'in which they have a
> share'. See Ralph P. Martin, Reconciliation
> (1981), pp. 99-101. However, as shall be seen,
> Dunn is able to describe Christ as having two
> representative capacities because he employs
> two different uses of the term representation,
> and it is in part Martin's failure to recognise
> this that causes him to limit Christ's represent-
> ative capacity only to those who respond to him.

47. Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith Vol II,
(1978), p. 366.

48. See, for example, Johnson, op. cit., p. 219;
Sutcliffe, op. cit., pp. 52-70; C. Lattey,
"Vicarious Solidarity in the Old Testament"
Vetus Testamentum Vol I (1951), pp. 267-274;
E. Ehrhardt, article "Solidarity" in the
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics Vol XI, p. 677f.
For a fascinating discussion of the language
and problems of solidarity in the context of
human sin and its relation to the sin of Adam,
and the corresponding language of the represent-
ative role of Adam which parallels many of the
issues discussed in relation to Christ, see
David Weddle, "Jonathan Edwards on Men and Trees,
and the Problem of Solidarity" Harvard Theological
Review Vol 67 (1964), pp. 155-175; Archibald
A. Hodge, The Atonement (1861), p. 93-105;
Gerrit C. Berkouwer, Sin (1971), pp. 424-465.

49. Brooke F. Westcott, Christus Consummator (1886),
p. 120. For the entire discussion of the
meaning of solidarity see pp. 120-124.

50. Johnson, op. cit., p. 213. Johnson uses the term
representation to express this interdependence
of the human race, but the word substitution may
be used instead as for example in the following
comment of Nels F. S. Ferré, Christ and the
Christian (1958), p. 154:

> Morality, therefore, at its depths, is social.
> It is substitutionary both from the past
> and from the present. We act as we do, and are
> able to act as we do, because others through
> the ages and an innumerable company have
> acted and now act in our stead.

51.   Johnson, op. cit., p. 213.

52.   F. L. Peterman, article "Redemption" The Catholic
        Encyclopedia p. 158. See also the statement
        of R. C. Moberly, Atonement and Personality (1901),
        p. 87:

>   Even the wider phrase 'solidarity of humanity',
>   is one which ... is growing in directness and
>   depth of significance. Whatever we do, we do
>   not for ourselves alone. ... What I am is what
>   I am in relation to an environment.

53.   Charles H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the
        Romans (1936), p. 80.

54.   James B. Torrance, "The Vicarious Humanity of
        Christ" in The Incarnation (1981), edited by
        Thomas F. Torrance, p. 137.

55.   S. C. Gayford, Sacrifice and Priesthood (1924)
        p. 131.

56.   Alfred E. J. Rawlinson, "Corpus Christi" in
        Mysterium Christi (1930), edited by G. K. Bell
        and D. A. Deissmann, p. 235.

57.   See the discussion and comments earlier in this
        chapter.

58.   John Owen, Of the Satisfaction of Christ, p. 469.

59.   Hugh Martin, The Atonement, in its Relation to
        the Covenant, The Priesthood, the Intercession
        of our Lord (1870), p. 38.

60.   Martin, p. 212f.

61.   For an exposition of Barth's understanding of
        reconciliation see Berthold Klappert, Die
        Auferweckung des Gekreuzigten (1971) pp. 194-
        286..

62.   Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II, 2, p. 58. See
        also pp. 7-8, 53.

63.   See the interesting discussion in S. Matthews,
        The Atonement and the Social Process (1930),
        who links the increasing popularity of democratic

patterns of theological thought with the growth
of western political democracy, and particularly
the following comment on p. 135:

> The representative quality of both Adam
> and Jesus is an indication of the new social
> mind which in the 17th century was developing
> the formulas of democracy. Such represent-
> ation was, of course, far enough from being
> strictly democratic, for neither had the
> race elected Adam nor the elect selected
> Christ as their representative. To this
> extent, therefore, it would be quite impossible
> to regard the federal theology as an expression
> of democracy, and yet in a sense the democratic
> element is implied in that the believer is
> enabled to regard Christ as his representative,
> and thus to take advantage of the fact that
> Christ had borne the punishment of the elect.

64.   Barth, Church Dogmatics II, 2, p. 103. For
       Barth's presentation of Christ as electing God
       and elected man see para 33 pp. 94-145,
       especially p. 116f.

65.   Barth, Church Dogmatics II, 2, p. 8:

> The partner of God which cannot now be thought
> away is neither 'man' as an idea, nor
> 'humanity', nor indeed a large or small total
> of individual men. It is the one man Jesus
> and the people represented in Him. Only
> secondarily, and for his sake, is it 'man',
> and 'humanity' and the whole remaining cosmos.

Or again, p. 55:

> In the Bible we are not concerned with the
> abstract concept of man, or with the human
> race as a whole, or with the being and
> destiny of the individual man as such.

However, see also Church Dogmatics IV, 2, p. 46f
where the idea of a humanum is differentiated
from 'the concrete possibility of one man in a
specific form' which is a 'human existence
determined, elected and prepared' so that as
this one man he has 'a direct relevance for all
other men [and] signifies the promise of the
basic alteration and determination of what we
all are as men'. Thus, even though Barth can
say 'in Jesus Christ it is not merely one man,
but the humanum of all men, which is posited
and exalted as such to unity with God' (p. 49),
it is only in the light of God's election of this
one man that this humanum can be given
possibility and content.

66.   See Barth, <u>Church Dogmatics</u> II 2 p. 116f.

> ... His election is the original and all-
> inclusive election; the election which is
> absolutely unique, but which in this very
> uniqueness is universally meaningful and
> efficacious, because it is the election of
> Him who Himself elects.

Cf also IV 1 p. 35f; IV 2 p. 36, 117, 269-271.

67.   See Chapter I and the literature cited there.
In addition see Ronald S Wallace, <u>The Atoning</u>
Death of Christ (1981), p. 116; H. W. Clark,
<u>The Cross and the Eternal Order</u> (1945), pp. 158-
160, to which reference has already been made
in note 1 of this chapter.

68.   See Barth, <u>Church Dogmatics</u> IV 2 p. 270:

> ... in the union of God with our human
> existence which then took place uniquely in
> the existence of this one man, prior to our
> attitude to it, before we are in any position
> to accept or reject it, with no need for
> repetition either in our soul or elsewhere,
> we ... <u>were</u> taken up (quite irrespective and
> even in defiance of our own actions and
> merits) into the fellowship with God for
> which we were ordained but which we ourselves
> had broken; and that we <u>are</u> therefore taken
> up into this fellowship <u>in</u> Him, this One.

69.   A similar pattern of thought is evident in
Peter T. Forsyth, <u>The Work of Christ</u> (1965),
p. 168, who reckons that even the word
representation 'misleads us to think of Christ
as the spiritual protagonist of a democracy,
drawing his power from those he represents;
and it muddles the truth that his relation to us
is royal and not elective, that it is creative
and not merely expository'. Nonetheless,
Forsyth continues to speak of a representation
'by one who creates by his act the humanity
he represents, and does not merely sponsor it'
(p.151).

70.   See Barth, Church Dogmatics II 2 p. 94 for the
programmatic statement.

71.   Barth, Church Dogmatics IV 1 p. 296:

> Order is created then not by any setting
> aside of sins, but by that of the sinner
> himself, of the σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας (Rom 6:6),

of the σῶμα τῆς σαρκός (Col 2:11), of the
subject of sin. ... no word of separating
him from his sin, or his sin from him. He
stands or falls with it. If it disappears,
he disappears. And this is what happened
on Golgotha ... in His own person, in His
giving up to death, He actually took away
sinful man, causing him to disappear.

Cf Gerrit C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace
in the Theology of Karl Barth (1956), p. 135f,
although the term substitution is consistently
used instead of representation.

72.   See Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 251.

73.   Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 254.

74.   Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 306.

75.   Cf Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 1, p. 311, 316,
      350, 354f; Church Dogmatics IV, 2, p. 269, 275,
      et al.; Berkouwer, op. cit., p. 136ff.

76.   Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, 2, p. 300.

77.   Cf the summary in Barth, Church Dogmatics
      IV, 1, p. 309.

78.   James D. G. Dunn, "Paul's understanding of the
      death of Jesus" in Reconciliation and Hope (1974),
      edited by R. J. Banks, p. 130.

79.   See footnote 46 above for references to Dunn
      in relation to R. Martin's comments on represen-
      tation in II Cor 5:14f.

80.   Dunn, op. cit., p. 130.

81.   It is never entirely clear whether Dunn wishes
      to understand this latter representation as
      the activity of Christ in bringing man before
      God, acting as their mediator in a form of
      representation already described; or whether
      Jesus in his resurrection is representative
      in the sense of manifesting or exemplifying new
      life. Such phrases as the following would
      seem to indicate the latter meaning of repres-
      entation:

         ... For Paul Jesus in his life and death is
         representative man, representative of fallen
         man - by living out that fallenness to the
         death and overcoming it in resurrection he
         becomes representative of new life, of new
         man (p. 129).

Jesus too is representative man. He
represents a new kind of man - man who not
only dies but lives again. The first Adam
represents physical man - man given over
to death; the last Adam represents pneumatic
man - man alive from the dead (p. 127).

However, the impression also gained from Dunn's
argument is that representation is essentially
a personal phenomenon; one represents another
by 'solidarity' (p. 126), representing the sinner
in his sin as in a sacrifice (p. 134f.), and not
only representing man to God but God to man
(p. 140). The two patterns of thought are
closely related, but they are distinct, and
employ quite different connotations of the term
representation.

82.   Henry E. W. Turner, The Meaning of the Cross
        (1959), p. 49. Cf also pp. 49-51.

83.   See for example W. J. Sparrow Simpson, The
        Redeemer (1937), p. 191f; Thielicke, op. cit.,
        p. 404; V. F. Storr, The Problem of the Cross
        (1919), p. 121f; Stevens, op. cit., p. 295.

84.   Brooke F. Westcott, The Victory of the Cross
        (1889), pp. 44-45.

85.   Stevens, op. cit., p. 367f. Cf also p. 371, 374.

86.   John A. T. Robinson, The Human Face of God
        (1973), p. 212.

87.   See the comprehensive discussion of this
        christology in Eugene Teselle, Christ in Context
        (1975).

88.   Thomas B. Strong, A Manual of Theology (1892),
        p. 267. See the whole discussion on Christ
        as the representative man pp. 266-278.

89.   Strong, p. 276.

90.   See, for example, the comment of W. A. Lofthouse,
        Ethics and Atonement (1906), p. 245f:

            If he was God made visible to man, he was
            man set before the face of God. Nor was he
            the type, simply of what man was meant to be;
            he exerted in himself the renewing energy
            which actually approximated men to that type;
            as men drew near to him, they became like
            him; he was 'formed' in them. He thus
            represented man before God: he was, in
            attitude, purpose and will, what man was to

become when reconciled to God, and what man would actually become through him.

91. Teselle, op. cit., p. 102.

92. See the discussion in Chapter II and the literature cited.

93. Stevens, op. cit., p. 371.

94. Peterman, op. cit., p. 158.

95. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

96. Thielicke, op. cit., p. 366.

97. Thielicke, p. 364.

98. Robinson, op. cit., p. 176.

<u>Endnotes to Chapter IV</u>

1.   This is not an attempt to describe a 'Biblical
        doctrine' of substitution or representation, but
        simply to identify and illustrate some themes
        that have been seen to shape understanding of
        the terms and which can be reckoned to function
        in a fundamental way to generate the distinctive
        patterns of thought that the terms are intended
        to express and clarify.

2.   For the discussion surrounding the meaning of
        Old Testament sacrificial ritual see the following
        and the literature cited therein: R. de Vaux,
        <u>Studies in Old Testament Sacrifice</u> (1964);
        H. H. Rowley, <u>The Meaning of Sacrifice in the
        Old Testament</u> (1950); <u>Worship in Ancient Israel</u>
        (1967), pp. 111-143; W. O. E. Oesterley,
        <u>Sacrifices in Ancient Israel</u> (1937); Gerhard von
        Rad, <u>Old Testament Theology</u> Vol I (1975) pp. 250-
        262; John W. Rogerson, "Sacrifice in the Old
        Testament" in <u>Sacrifice</u> edited by M. E. C.
        Bourdillon and Meyer Fortes (1980), pp. 45-60;
        S. C. Gayford, <u>Sacrifice and Priesthood</u> (1924);
        F. C. N. Hicks, <u>The Fulness of Sacrifice</u> (1930).

3.   See particularly Martin Hengel, <u>The Atonement</u>
        (1981), pp. 19-32.

4.   See the essay by Stephen W. Sykes, "Sacrifice
        in the New Testament and Christian Theology" in
        Bourdillon and Fortes, op. cit., pp. 61-83, for
        a careful exploration of this theme.

5.   For the relation of sacrificial motifs to the death
        of Christ see among others: Frances Young,
        <u>Sacrifice and the Death of Christ</u> (1975);
        Vincent Taylor, <u>Jesus and His Sacrifice</u> (1955);
        Sykes, in Bourdillon and Fortes, op. cit.;
        C. William Swain, "'For our Sins': The Image of
        Sacrifice in the Thought of the Apostle Paul",
        <u>Interpretation</u> Vol 17 No 2 (1963), pp. 131-139;
        John P. Smith, <u>Four Discourses on the Sacrifice
        and Priesthood of Jesus Christ</u> (1828);
        Charles F. D. Moule, <u>The Sacrifice of Christ</u>
        (1950); Frederick D. Maurice, <u>The Doctrine of
        Sacrifice Deduced from the Scriptures</u> (1854);
        Eugene Masure, <u>Le Sacrifice du Chef</u> (1932);
        A. Ian Dunlop, "Christ's Sacrifice for Sin",
        <u>Scottish Journal of Theology</u> Vol 13 (1960),
        pp. 383-393; F. W. Dillistone, <u>The Christian
        Understanding of Atonement</u> (1968), pp. 29-75;
        Marcus Barth, <u>Was Christ's Death a Sacrifice?</u>
        (1961); Oliver C. Quick, <u>The Gospel of the New
        World</u> (1944).

6.   Charles Hodge, <u>Systematic Theology</u> Vol 2 (1875),
     p. 499.

7.   Hodge, p. 499. Cf. also the discussion on pp. 499-
     515.

8.   For a vigorous defence of the concept of
     propitiation and its relation to sacrificial and
     substitutionary motifs see Leon Morris, "The Use
     of ἱλασκεσθαι etc in Biblical Greek" <u>Expository</u>
     <u>Times</u> 62 (1951), pp. 227-233; "The Meaning of
     Hilasterion in Rom 3:25" <u>New Testament Studies</u> 2
     (1955, pp. 33-43; Cf. also Charles H. Dodd,
     "ἱλασκεσθαι", its cognates, derivitives and
     synonyms in the Septuagint" <u>Journal of Theological</u>
     <u>Studies</u> 32 (1931), pp. 352-360; T. W. Mansen,
     "ἹΛΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ" <u>Journal of Theological Studies</u> 46
     (1945), pp. 1-10; Vincent Taylor, "Great Texts
     Reconsidered" <u>Expository Times</u> 50 (1938-9),
     pp. 295-300; David Hill, <u>Greek Words and Hebrew</u>
     <u>Meanings</u> (1967), pp. 23-48.

9.   Curcellaeus quoted in Archibald A. Hodge, <u>The</u>
     <u>Atonement</u> (1868), p. 225.

10. Taylor, op. cit., p. 295. Cf the summary
     discussion pp. 294-298.

11. See the discussion in Leon Morris, <u>The Apostolic</u>
     <u>Preaching of the Cross</u> (1955), pp. 9-59;
     H. Wheeler Robinson, <u>Redemption and Revelation</u>
     (1942), pp. 219-244; Benjamin B. Warfield,
     "The New Testament Terminology of Redemption"
     <u>Princetown Theological Review</u> (1917), pp. 201-249;
     article "Redemption" by F. Büchsel, in <u>Theological</u>
     <u>Dictionary of the New Testament</u> p. 357f;
     Dillestone, op. cit., pp. 76-114; article
     "Redemption" by R. C. Denton in <u>Interpreters</u>
     <u>Dictionary of the Bible</u>; I. Howard Marshall,
     "The Development of the Concept of Redemption
     in the New Testament" in <u>Reconciliation and Hope</u>
     (1974) edited by Banks, pp. 153-172.

12. See Hebrews 9:12 and Hebrews 9:15.

13. See the discussion in Stephen H. Travis, "The
     Place of Divine Retribution in the Thought of
     Paul" (unpublished); Paul S. Minear, "Sin and
     Death, Atonement in Romans" <u>Interpretation</u> 7
     (1953), pp. 142-155; J. Arthur Baird, <u>The Justice</u>
     <u>of God in the Teaching of Jesus</u> (1963).

14. Joachim Jeremias, <u>The Central Message of the New</u>
     <u>Testament</u> (1965), p. 36f.

15. Cf. Karl Barth, <u>Church Dogmatics</u> IV, 1 p. 253.

16. For a development of this theme see Elizabeth R. Moberly, <u>Suffering, Innocent and Guilty</u> (1978).

17. See Jürgen Moltmann, <u>The Trinity and the Kingdom of God</u> (1981), the section 'The surrender of the Son' pp. 80-83.

18. <u>Ep. ad Diognetus</u> ix:

Τί γὰρ ἄλλο τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἠδυνήθη καλύψαι ἢ ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνῃ; ἐν τίνι δικαιωθῆναι δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνόμους ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ Υἱῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ; ὦ τῆς γλυκείας ἀνταλλαγῆς, ὦ τῆς ἀνεξιχνιάστου δημιουργίας, ὦ τῶν ἀπροσδοκήτων εὐεργεσιῶν· ἵνα ἀνομία μὲν πολλῶν ἐν δικαίῳ ἑνὶ κρυβῇ δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἑνὸς πολλοὺς ἀνόμους δικαιώσῃ.

Moberly translates ὦ τῆς γλυκείας ἀνταλλαγῆς, 'O the sweetness of the interchange' <u>Atonement</u> and Personality (1901), p. 330. More normally it is rendered 'O sweet exchange' or sometimes simply 'substitution', as in Archibald A. Hodge, <u>The Atonement</u> (1868).

19. Although the term 'exchange' is seldom made central in an exposition of the atonement see Hans W. Frei, <u>The Identity of Jesus Christ</u> (1975), "the pattern of exchange" pp. 74-84; George S. Hendry, <u>The Gospel of the Incarnation</u> (1959), pp. 109-114; Ronald S. Wallace, <u>The Atoning Death of Christ</u> (1981), pp. 67-69, 78, and the following, p. 116:

> The New Testament writers thought of Christ as making an exchange for us, and this view was current in the earliest days of the Church. ... Today it can be given effective and clear expression in the context of substitution. 'Here in Christ', writes Heinrich Vogel, 'is a substitution or an exchange, full of wonder and comfort. Christ experienced our death and entered hell; we experience his life and enter his blessed state. Just as he takes for his own everything that is ours, including our guilt and death, so that all that is his, his holiness and his eternal life become ours.'

See also Gerrit C. Berkouwer, <u>The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth</u> (1956), p. 106: "The content of Golgotha is therefore identical with the great <u>exchange</u> negotiated at Golgotha, as an exchange which cannot be undone through all eternity for it is God's eternal decision. Because of this exchange there is nothing to condemn any more in those who are in Christ."

20.   Karl Barth, _Church Dogmatics_ IV, 1, pp. 223-228,
        gives this theme classic expression. See the
        following comment on p. 226:

        > There is in fact a complete reversal, an
        > exchange of roles. ... The Judge allows
        > Himself to be judged.

        For references to the 'exchange' with Barabbas
        see p. 226, 230.

21.   See the following articles by Morna Hooker,
        "Interchange and Atonement" _Bulletin of John
        Rylands Library_ 60 (1978), pp. 462-81;
        "Interchange and Suffering" in _Suffering and
        Martyrdom_ (1981), edited by William Horbury and
        Brian McNeil pp. 70-83; "Interchange in Christ"
        Journal of Theological Studies 22 (1971), pp. 349-
        361. For a fuller discussion of these themes
        see Chapter V, sections 1 and 2.

22.   See Hooker, "Interchange and Suffering" pp. 76-77,
        82-83.

23.   See James I. Packer, "What did the Cross Achieve?
        The Logic of Penal Substitution", _The Tyndale
        Bulletin_ 25 (1974), pp. 3-45.

24.   Chapter II, section 1.

25.   See for example John Owen, _Of the Satisfaction of
        Christ_ p. 119, 122.

26.   However, it should be recognised that a certain
        amount of confusion may be admitted even in the
        use of the phrase 'he bore _our_ punishment', since
        this may also be construed in a somewhat looser
        fashion to mean that he bore the punishment that
        bears an intrinsic relation to our punishment and
        cannot be separated from our deserts although
        it is not an identical punishment to that which
        was due to us.

27.   See for example the quotation in John K. Mozley,
        The Doctrine of the Atonement (1915), p.210:

        > If physical death be the penalty of sin, then
        > Christ's death does not in fact save us from
        > this penalty. But did Christ then suffer
        > _eternal_ death, commonly called damnation, in
        > order to save us from that penalty? Obviously
        > not. So it is not clear, to say the least,
        > in what sense Christ did in fact endure the
        > penalty due to mankind.

28.	See Chapter II, section 1, for illustration of this process.

29.	Again, there is no consistent use of the term equivalence. Its similarity to the term 'equality' approaches the meaning of 'identity' referred to above; on the other hand, it may be used more explicitly as a term of measurement where identity is excluded but 'appropriateness' maintained. In the context of criminal judicial procedure see the discussion on the term equivalence in Walter Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment (1968), pp. 194-196.

30.	See the discussions of A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge and A. H. Strong as cited in Chapter II.

31.	A similar point is made in George Stevens, The Christian Doctrine of Salvation (1905), p. 161, where the concept of acceptilio is seen to be a necessary part of any formulation of penal substitution - the very point that the language of substitution was supposed to deny.

32.	Packer, op. cit., p. 31:

> The word penal is there, not to prompt theoretical puzzlement about the transfering of guilt, but to articulate the insight of believers who ... are constrained to say 'Jesus was bearing the judgement I deserved (and deserve), the penalty for my sins, the punishment due to me' ...

See also the comment of Paul Althaus "The Cross of Christ" in Mysterium Christi, edited by G. K. Bell and D. A. Deismann (1930), p. 204:

> The effect of the emphasis on equivalence has been to rationalise the mystery of forgiveness, which means that it does not sufficiently stress the incalculable wonder of forgiveness which simply faces us. Reconciliation and forgiveness belong together, but not equivalence and forgiveness.

33.	Stevens, op. cit., p. 160 gives the argument forcefully.

34.	Chapter II, sections 1, 2 and 3.

35.	Although some of the language of penal substitution approaches such a position, it is more often portrayed in caricature by its opponents.

36. See Travis, op. cit.; Von Rad, op. cit., p. 264-272;
    H. H. Rowley, <u>The Faith of Israel</u> (1956), pp. 87-
    98, and the following comment on p. 90:

    > Nowhere is sin thought of as atoned for by
    > punishment, so that by the mere fact of
    > punishment fellowship is restored.

37. For some of the complex moral, legal and
    philosophical problems surrounding the notion of
    retribution see <u>The Coming Penal Crisis</u> edited
    by Anthony E. Bottoms and Ronald H. Preston;
    H. L. A. Hart, <u>Punishment and Responsibility</u>
    (1968); Ernest W. Johnson, <u>Suffering, Punishment
    and Atonement</u> (1919); Elizabeth R. Moberly,
    <u>Suffering, Innocent and Guilty</u> (1978); Walter
    Moberly, <u>The Ethics of Punishment</u> (1968);
    Giles Playfair, <u>The Punitive Obsession</u> (1971);
    <u>Crime and the Responsible Community</u> (1980),
    edited by John Stott and Nick Miller; J. B. Mabbott,
    "Punishment" <u>Mind</u> (1939), pp. 152-167; Paul
    Tillech, <u>Love, Power and Justice</u> (1954); W. Lillie,
    "Towards a Biblical Doctrine of Punishment"
    <u>Scottish Journal of Theology</u> Vol 21 (1968),
    pp. 449-461.

38. C. Hodge, op. cit., p. 531.

39. Cf above section 1(a) of this chapter and the lit-
    erature cited.

40. The futility of such generalisation from
    scriptural verses is seen when this reference is
    simply contrasted with Jer 31:30a:

    > But each is to die for his own sin.

41. See for example Smith, op. cit., pp. 51-52;
    Augustus H. Strong, <u>Systematic Theology</u> (1886),
    pp. 416-419; Robert Hall, <u>Works</u> Vol I (1831),
    pp. 494-517; Louis Berkhof, <u>Systematic Theology</u>
    (1958), p. 376 which summarizes such arguments
    as follows:

    > (1) that the guilty party himself is not in
    > a position to bear the penalty through to the
    > end, so that a righteous relation results;
    > (2) that the transfer does not encroach upon
    > the rights and privileges of innocent third
    > parties, nor cause them to suffer hardships
    > and privations; (3) that the person enduring
    > the penalty is not himself already indebted to
    > justice, and does not owe all his services to
    > the government; and (4) that the guilty party
    > retains the consciousness of his guilt and of
    > the fact that the substitute is suffering for

him. In view of all this it will be
understood that the transfer of penal debt
is well-nigh, if not entirely, impossible
among men. But in the case of Christ, which
is altogether unique, because in it a
situation obtained which has no parallel, all
the conditions named were met. There was
no injustice of any kind.

42. Stevens, op. cit., p. 203.

43. See Horace Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice
(1866), pp. 305-339.

44. Bushnell, p. 309:

If he is put in our place to suffer the
penalty of our sins, then we can easily see
abhorrence to our sins expressed in his
suffering. But mere severities and pain laid
upon him, even though God violated His own
deep sympathies and loving approbations to do
it, can only show the fact of something very
abhorrent somewhere, and is much more likely
to raise abhorrence in us, than to signify
God's abhorrence to us.

45. Horace Bushnell, Forgiveness and Law (1874),
p. 145f:

The public justice is not made by Christ's
endurance of any man's penalty, but is a public
character of justice made up for God, by what
expression of justice may be yielded in Christ's
death, conceived to be equal to the expression
of justice that would be afforded by all the
penalties exacted of all the world. In this
view Christ is the virtual substitute or
compensation for all the pains of all
transgression. Sometimes a different way of
statement is adopted, to escape the obvious
objection that, as Christ is supposed to suffer
what is really nobody's penalty in particular,
his suffering can not make any expression of
God's justice at all; his death, therefore, it
is said, expresses the abhorrence of God to sin,
as the penalties exacted of all wrongdoers
would, and so they make up the desired
character of justice.

46. For example, the comment of Strong, op. cit.,
p. 740 on the 'Grotian' view of atonement: 'Christ
does not suffer the precise penalty of the law,
but God graciously accepts his suffering as a
substitute for the penalty'.

47.   See the examples quoted in Chapter II from
       Wardlaw, Macdonnal et al.

48.   While this pattern of thought cannot strictly
       speaking be labelled a retributive theory of
       punishment, the sense in which punishment or
       suffering 'validates' the moral order is seldom
       clear, and particularly the relation between
       the suffering of Christ and the upholding of the
       moral order seems to draw its force from hidden
       presuppositions. Within this way of thinking
       a deterrent view of punishment is often also
       included in that Christ's suffering is held to
       deter future sinners and thus to contribute to
       the preservation of the moral order. The view
       that deterrence and punishment should not be
       related in this fashion can be forcefully argued
       and is widely accepted, however, public
       perceptions and hidden presuppositions often
       introduce deterrence as a supposed justification
       for penal theory and practice.

49.   Clearly, there are certain attractions in this
       view, but it can be no more than an interim or
       diversionary argument, for the point at issue
       is still the relation of God to this natural
       order. If there is said to be no relation (an
       unlikely conception) then it is hard to see how
       such an instance of innocent suffering is atoning;
       if God is held to be responsible for the creation
       of this natural order then the question still
       arises as to the justice of God in accepting
       innocent suffering as atoning.

50.   See the discussion in John McIntyre, Anselm and
       His Critics (1954).

51.   Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement (1919),
       p. 49.

52.   Horace Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice (1866),
       p. 7.

53.   Bushnell, p. 13.

54.   As Strong, op. cit., p. 735 comments on the
       'Bushnellian' or 'moral influence' patterns of
       atonement:

              ... it substitutes a subordinate effect of
              the atonement for its chief aim, and yet
              unfairly appropriates the name 'vicarious',
              which belongs only to the latter. Suffering
              with the sinner is by no means suffering in
              his stead.

55.   Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 461f:

        If ... we wish to regard these two aspects
        of the High-priestly office of Christ in their
        indivisibility, ... then we may ... call
        Christ our <u>satisfying representative</u>: in the
        senses, first, that in virtue of his ideal
        dignity he so represents, in his redemptive
        activity, the perfecting of human nature,
        that in virtue of our having become one with
        him God sees and regards the totality of
        believers only in him; and second, that his
        sympathy with sin, which was strong enough to
        stimulate a redemptive activity sufficient
        for the assumption of all men into his vital
        fellowship, ... perpetually serves to make
        complete and perfect our imperfect consciousness
        of sin.

56.   See for example Wallace, op. cit., pp. 115-118;
        Mather, op. cit., p. 270; E. C. Essex, "The
        Atonement in Post-Reformation Writers" in <u>The
        Atonement in History and in Life</u> (1929), edited
        by L. W. Grensted p. 242.

57.   See for example the comment of Stevens, op. cit.,
        p. 223:

        God forgives sin in advance upon receipt of
        a guarantee that sin will be put away. This
        guarantee is, as it were, furnished to God
        by mankind in the person of their represent-
        ative, the second Adam. God may safely forgive
        the sins of the world in advance, since in
        Christ he has the assurance of the emancipation
        from sin of all who will enter into fellowship
        with him.

58.   Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 456, 461f.

59.   See for example Denney, op. cit., p. 197f, where
        Denney recognises that the term representation may
        be used to denote this response to Christ which
        claims him as moral exemplar.

60.   See for example the work of Vincent Taylor, where
        despite ambiguities in the presentation of
        precisely what is done in Christ's work there
        is no doubt that his representation is a <u>creative</u>
        work which is unique in that it initiates the
        response of men, but universal in that it
        consumates that response; <u>Jesus and His Sacrifice</u>
        (1955) p. 283, 306ff; <u>The Atonement in New
        Testament Teaching</u> (1940), p. 184f, 194ff;
        <u>Forgiveness and Reconciliation</u> (1941), p. 206.

61. See the whole argument in G. B. Mather, "The Atonement: Representative or Substitutionary?" Canadian Journal of Theology 4 (1958), p. 266-272.

62. Mather, p. 270:

> The two concepts representation and substitution, far from being exclusive, are in fact complementary; each presents a necessary aspect of the whole truth. The issue of representation and substitution hinges upon the problem: to what degree does the believer undergo the experience of Christ and reproduce this work? In so far as the experience and work of the believer are the same or similar, the sacrifice of Christ will be spoken of in terms of representation; in so far as they are different, it will be spoken of in terms of substitution. Representation emphasises similarity; substitution emphasises dissimilarity.

While not wishing to limit the issue of representation and substitution to the single problem given above, in this context of the moral relevance of both terms Mather's conclusion is largely correct.

63. Cf. Hugh R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness (1927), p. 208.

64. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man (1968), p. 279 is one of the few specifically to reject such a view.

65. For example, Leon Morris, The Cross in the New Testament (1965), p. 410.

66. For example Strong, op. cit., p. 752:

> This substitution is unknown to mere law, and above and beyond the powers of law. ... the righteousness of law is maintained, in that the source of all law, the judge and punisher Himself voluntarily submits to bear the penalty and bears it in the human nature that has sinned.

67. Quoted in Horace Bushnell, The Vicarious Sacrifice (1866), p. 316f, the author is not named but is probably W. G. T. Shedd.

68. See the comments of Bushnell, p. 317f.

69. Gerrit C. Berkouwer, The Work of Christ (1965), p. 267:

> The new doctrine places the wrath element at
> the top of the line which runs downward and
> thus the wrath conflict is projected into
> God himself, which he solves divinely by
> undergoing and overcoming the judgement and
> by surrendering himself in mercy.

> See also the discussion in T. J. Crawford, The
> Doctrine of Holy Scripture Respecting the Atonement
> pp. 452-455 where the looseness of this language
> is recognised but no division is admitted in God.

70.   See for example Charles F. D. Moule, The Sacrifice
of Christ (1956), p. 28; Leonard Hodgson, The
Doctrine of the Atonement (1951) pp. 61-67, 78-81.

71.   Berkouwer, op. cit., p. 280. Cf. also pp. 264-
267 and the literature cited there.

Endnotes to Chapter V

1. See the standard New Testament commentaries and
    the following: Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of
    the Theology of the New Testament (1969),
    pp. 208-212; W. G. Kümmel, The Theology of
    The New Testament (1974), pp. 218-220;
    Alan Richardson, An Introduction to the
    Theology of the New Testament (1958), pp. 249-
    252; Gunther Bornkamm, Paul (1971), pp. 154-156;
    E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism
    (1977), pp. 453-463; W. D. Davies, Paul and
    Rabbinic Judaism (1948), pp. 86ff.; W. Kramer,
    Christ, Lord, Son of God (1966), pp. 139-144;
    Théo Preiss, Life in Christ (1954); Albert
    Schweizer, The Mysticism of the Apostle Paul
    (1931). For full bibliographical references see
    Charles F. D. Moule, The Origin of Christology
    (1977), pp. 60-63 and Ernest Best, One Body in
    Christ (1955).

2. Best, op. cit., pp. 1-8.

3. For example, Conzelmann, op. cit., p. 209.

4. Conzelmann, p. 210.

5. Bornkamm, op. cit., p. 155. See also
    Conzelmann, op. cit., p. 211f.

6. Bornkamm, op. cit., p. 156.

7. Bornkamm, p. 154f.

8. Adolf Deismann, Die NT Formel "in Christo Jesu"
    (1892).

9. Schweizer, op. cit., p. 123f.

10. See Ralph P. Martin, Reconciliation (1981), p. 45.

11. Preiss, op. cit., p. 41f.

12. Martin, op. cit., p. 45f.

13. See the three articles by Morna Hooker:
    "Interchange in Christ" Journal of Theological
    Studies NS. 22 (1971), pp. 349-361; "Interchange
    and Atonement" Bulletin of the John Rylands
    Library 60 (1978), pp. 462-481; "Interchange
    and Suffering" Suffering and Martyrdom (1961),
    edited by William Horbury and Brian McNeil
    pp. 70-83.

14.   In addition to the standard New Testament works see Best, op. cit., pp. 83-159; Lionel S. Thornton, <u>The Common Life in the Body of Christ</u> (1946); John A. T. Robinson, <u>The Body</u> (1952); Hans Küng, <u>The Church</u> (1968), pp. 203-260; Sanders, op. cit., pp. 453-463; Davies, op. cit., pp. 56f.; Russell P. Shedd, <u>Man in Community</u> (1958); Lucien Cerfaux, <u>The Church in the Theology of Paul</u> (1959); Alfred E. Rawlinson, "Corpus Christi" in <u>Mysterium Christi</u> (1930), edited by G. K. Bell and D. A. Deissmann; Ernst Käsemann, <u>Perspectives on Paul</u> (1971), pp. 1-31, 102-121.

15.   See Käsemann, p. 106; Conzelmann, op. cit., p. 210.

16.   See Küng, op. cit., pp. 230-241.

17.   Küng, p. 236.

18.   See Küng, p. 224-236 and the literature cited.

19.   See Käsemann, op. cit., p. 118f.

20.   In addition to the standard New Testament works see Charles K. Barrett, <u>From First Adam to Last</u> (1962); Karl Barth, <u>Christ and Adam</u> (1956); Best, op. cit., pp. 34-43; R. Scroggs, <u>The Last Adam</u> (1966).

21.   Barrett, op. cit., p. 73.

22.   See Best, op. cit., pp. 44-64; Kümmel, op. cit., pp. 212-216; Jacques Dupont, ΣΥΝ ΧΡΙΣΤΩΙ : <u>L'union avec le Christ Suivant Saint Paul</u> (1952); R. C. Tannehill, <u>Dying and Rising with Christ</u> (1966).

23.   See Best, op. cit., p. 44f.

24.   See the development of this theme in relation to Ignatius of Antioch in Théo Preiss, "La Mystique de l'imitation du Christ et de l'unité chez Ignace d'Antioch". The unpublished thesis by Peter J. H. Adam, <u>The Practice of the Imitation of Christ</u> contains a detailed analysis of the use of the term imitation.

25.   See the argument of Morna Hooker in 'Interchange and Suffering" in Horbury and McNeil, op. cit., pp. 76f., 82f.

26.   R. W. Dale, <u>The Atonement</u> (1902), p. 404f.

27.   John K. Mozley, <u>The Heart of the Gospel</u> (1925), p. 21f.

28.   See Chapter III section 2(a)(i) for illustrations of this theme. In addition see the comment of

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, <u>Ethics</u> (1964), p. 72:

> Jesus is not <u>a</u> man. He is <u>man</u>. Whatever happens to Him happens to man. It happens to all men, and therefore it happens also to us. The name Jesus contains within itself the whole of humanity and the whole of God.

29. Cf. R. C. Moberly, <u>Atonement and Personality</u> (1901), p. 86.

30. Karl Adam, <u>Christ our Brother</u> (1932), p. 132.

31. For example, see Dunn, op. cit., p. 128: 'Indeed, he became ὡς ἀνθρωπος that is, not just as one man among many but <u>as man</u>, as representative man - man, who, be it noted, is immediately described as subject, obedient to death.'

32. George S. Hendry, <u>The Gospel of the Incarnation</u> (1959), p. 44.

33. Hendry, pp. 46-54.

34. Hendry, p. 25f., 45, 60.

35. George Rupp, <u>Christologies and Cultures</u> (1974), p. 38.

36. Henry E. W. Turner, <u>The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption</u> (1952), p. 91.

37. John of Damascus, quoted in Hastings Rashdall, <u>The Idea of Atonement</u> (1919), p. 317f., and also in <u>Ideas and Ideals</u> (1928), p. 157.

38. Rupp, op. cit., p. 32. See the discussion pp. 26-40. For a historical and philosophical discussion of the language of Universals, particularly in its bearing on theological issues see R. I. Aaron, <u>The Theory of Universals</u> (1952).

39. Christian Duquoc, <u>Christologie</u> I (1968), p. 240. See the excellent discussion "Le Christ, Homme Universal" pp. 226-261, and also Hendry, op. cit., pp. 65-68.

40. Rupp, op. cit., p. 39f.; Hendry, op. cit., p. 98 attributes to Hegel the reopening of the question.

41. Charles Hodge, <u>Systematic Theology</u> Vol II (1875), pp. 534-539.

42. A discussion of the relation between the terms 'inclusive substitution' and 'representation' will be deferred until the end of this chapter.

43.   Cf. John K. Mozley, <u>The Doctrine of the Atonement</u>
        (1915), p. 217:

        Now Christ's action was not the action of
        humanity in Him; it is impossible to treat such
        a conception at once seriously and lucidly;
        nor is it the meaning of St Paul's 'one died
        for all: therefore all died'.

44.   Hodge, op. cit., p. 536.

45.   James Denney, <u>The Death of Christ</u> (1950), p. 196.

46.   Vernon F. Storr, <u>The Problem of the Cross</u> (1924),
        p. 121. See the whole chapter in which Moberly
        and McLeod Campbell are discussed entitled
        'Christ our Representative' pp. 117-129.

47.   Storr, p. 121.

48.   Turner, op. cit., p. 89-90.

49.   Hastings Rashdall, "Dr Moberly's Theory of the
        Atonement" <u>Journal of Theological Studies</u> Vol 3
        (1901), p. 200f.

50.   Hastings Rashdall, <u>The Idea of Atonement</u> (1919),
        p. 353.

51.   Hastings Rashdall, "Dr Moberly's Theory of the
        Atonement" <u>Journal of Theological Studies</u> Vol 3
        (1901), p. 201f.

52.   Hastings Rashdall, <u>Ideas and Ideals</u> (1928), p. 157.

53.   Maurice Wiles, <u>Working Papers in Doctrine</u> (1976),
        p. 117.

54.   See Aaron, op. cit.; C. Landesman (ed), <u>The</u>
        <u>Problem of Universals</u> (1971); A. Quinton,
        <u>The Nature of Things</u> (1973); N. Wotterstorff,
        <u>On Universals</u> (1970); Rupp, op. cit., pp. 32-40;
        and the literature cited in these works.

55.   An approximation to the theory of Universals
        commonly labelled 'Platonic'.

56.   An approximation to the theory of Universals
        commonly labelled 'Aristotelian'.

57.   An approximation to the theory of Universals
        commonly labelled 'conceptualist'.

58.   See Rupp, op. cit., p. 38; Duquoc, op. cit.,
        pp. 232-246.

59.   I can put no other construction on, for example,

the late introduction by L. Morris of the term
'inclusive' to give the term substitution moral
credibility. See Leon Morris, <u>The Cross in the
New Testament</u> (1965), p. 417f.

60.   Wiles, op. cit., p. 117.

61.   Chapter III, section 2(a)(ii).

62.   See for example Thornton, op. cit., p. 316f.

63.   H. Wheeler Robinson, "The Hebrew Conception of
       Corporate Personality" in <u>Werden und Wesen des
       alten Testaments</u> (1936); <u>Redemption and
       Revelation</u> (1942), pp. 149f., 258-260, 287f.;
       <u>The Christian Doctrine of Man</u> (1926), p. 8, 27-30,
       121.

64.   Ernst Käsemann, <u>Commentary on Romans</u> (1980), p. 142.

65.   See his comment in <u>Redemption and Revelation</u>
       (1942), p. 257:

           ... but we certainly cannot simply transfer the
           ancient conception of corporate personality to
           a modern theology; our whole way of regarding
           life ... is far too individualistic.

66.   John W. Rogerson, "The Hebrew Conception of
       Corporate Personality: a Re-examination"
       <u>Journal of Theological Studies</u> (1970), pp. 1-16.
       See also J. R. Porter, "The Legal Aspects
       of the Concept of 'Corporate Personality' in
       the Old Testament" <u>Vetus Testamentae</u> (1965),
       pp. 361-380; George E. Mendenhall, "The
       Relation of the Individual to Biblical Society
       in Ancient Israel" in J. M. Myers (ed) <u>Biblical
       Studies in memory of H. Alleman</u> (1960), p. 89-108.
       Among the many who use the concept see
       Jacques de Fraine, <u>Adam et Son Lignage</u> (1959);
       Aubrey R. Johnson, <u>The One and the Many in
       the Israelite Conception of God</u> (1961);
       Charles H. Dodd, <u>Romans</u> (1936); and the other
       writers cited in Chapter II, section 2(a)(ii).

67.   Rogerson, op. cit., p. 13:

           The Hebrew thought which is allegedly so
           different from our own is not just based on
           the application to Israel of alleged mental
           processes of primitives; it is also an
           abstraction from those Israelite Institutions
           which corporate responsibility sought to
           explain, formed into an entity labelled
           'Hebrew thought' and then imposed on the rest
           of the Old Testament regardless of social
           context.

68.   Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, <u>Les Fonctions Mentales dans les sociétés Inférieures</u> (1912); <u>La Mentalité Primitive</u> (1922).

69.   See E. Evans-Pritchard, <u>Theories of Primitive Religion</u> (1965), pp. 78-90 for a full and sympathetic treatment of Lévy-Bruhl's thought. See also de Fraine, op. cit., pp. 29-32.

70.   H. Wheeler Robinson, <u>The Old Testament, its Making and Meaning</u> (1937), quoted in Rogerson, op. cit., p. 8.

71.   See the discussion in Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., p. 88ff.

72.   See the comments of Mary Douglas, <u>Purity and Danger</u> (1979), p. 73-93; Rogerson, op. cit., p. 10.

73.   See Rogerson, p. 6f., 13.

74.   See the comments of Robinson himself in <u>Redemption and Revelation</u> (1942), p. 257; <u>The Christian Doctrine of Man</u> (1926), p. 244. However, as both Evans-Pritchard and Douglas note, while the theory of primitive mentality and corporate personality may be wrong, it is possible that contemporary western man is also 'prelogical' in many respects, and the judgements we make concerning the world and our relation to it are not necessarily rational or scientific. As far as the concept of Corporate Personality is concerned, it remains the case that it cannot be used as an explanation of alien or problematic conceptions of the saving work of Christ, nor is it appropriate as an elucidation of the universal significance of Christ.

75.   See the conclusion of Rogerson, op. cit., p. 14:

        In the interests of clarity it would therefore be best to drop the term corporate personality completely, and at the same time to abandon any attempt to explain Old Testament phenomena in terms of primitive mentality.

76.   Thornton, op. cit., p. 46, 273, 295.

77.   Wolfhart Pannenberg, <u>Jesus, God and Man</u> (1968), p. 268.

78.   See for example the comments of Harry Johnson, <u>The Humanity of the Saviour</u> (1962), p. 213.

79.   See the discussion in Herbert Neie, <u>The Doctrine of the Atonement in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg</u> (1978), pp. 193-197.

80.   John K. Mozley, The Doctrine of the Atonement
        (1915), p. 217:

            Our modern feeling of the solidarity of
            mankind does not presuppose anything in the
            least similar to this type of mystical
            doctrine; what it does presuppose is the almost
            limitless reaction of individuals and their
            acts upon other personalities. This is the
            true analogue to the work of Christ.

81.   Neie, op. cit., p. 194.

82.   See Eugene Teselle, Christ in Context (1975),
        for a discussion of this theme.

83.   Chapter III, section 3.

84.   Neither should it be uncritically supposed, as
        Teselle is at pains to demonstrate, that this
        'archetypal' Christology is necessarily inferior
        to an 'ontological' formulation of Christology.
        Provided that full recognition is accorded to
        the significance and status of an archetype, or
        even an exemplar, Teselle believes that full
        justice can be done to an interpretation of the
        person and work of Christ.

Endnotes to Chapter VI

1. The English text used throughout this chapter will be D. Lewis' translation of 'Stellvertretung – Ein Kapital Theologie nach dem Tode Gottes' (Kreug Verlag, 1965), published as 'Christ the Representative – an essay in theology after the "death of God"' (SCM London 1967), and any references to the German are cited from the 1982 edition.

2. Sölle, Christ the Representative p. 10.

3. See also Dorothee Sölle, The Truth is Concrete (1969), p. 9.

4. Sölle, Christ the Representative, p. 11.

5. Sölle, p. 12.

6. Sölle, p. 44.

7. See Sölle, p. 127.

8. See the entire chapter 'Before God', Sölle, pp. 127-129.

9. Sölle, p. 15.

10. Sölle, p. 15.

11. Sölle, p. 9.

12. Sölle, p. 12.

13. Sölle, p. 10.

14. Sölle, p. 10.

15. See Sölle, p. 128.

16. See Sölle, p. 10ff.

17. Sölle, p. 11 (my italics).

18. Sölle, p. 10.

19. Sölle, p. 11.

20. Sölle, p. 12.

21. Sölle, p. 132.

22. See Sölle, p. 12.

23. Sölle, p. 44.

24. The title of Chapter 1, pp. 19-23.

25. Sölle, p. 20.

26. See the comments in Sölle, p. 20f.

27. See the comments in Sölle, p. 21.

28. Sölle, p. 23.

29. Sölle, p. 23: 'Denn "Ersatz" ist endgültiger Austausch von totem, dinghaftem oder verdinglichtem Sein, Stellvertretung dagegen vorläufiges Eintreten von Personen für Personen.'

29. The point is made forcefully by Helmut Gollwitzer in Von der Stellvertretung Gottes (1967), pp. 28-30. Gollwitzer goes on to note the inadequacy of Sölle's characterization of substitution as replacement as necessarily impersonal:

> Es kommt nur darauf an, wie man das Wort 'personal' faBt, ob die Analyse des Vorverständnisses unbefangen genug geschieht und ob sie offen ist für Veränderung da, wo es sich um göttliche Stellvertretung handelt, offen dafür, daB wir hier zwar sicher nicht unter das Menschliche herab, aber möglicherweise über das Menschliche hinaufgeführt werden. Dafür ist nötig einzukalkulieren, daB Stellvertretung der Person auch ersetzendes Tun umschlieBen kann. Darauf, daB das Verhältnis der Personen nicht ersetzend sei, kommt es an, nicht aber darauf, daB ihr Tun nicht ersetzend sei.

30. See Sölle, op. cit., p. 25.

31. See Sölle, p. 26ff.

32. See Sölle, pp. 31-35.

33. Sölle, p. 36.

34. See Sölle, p. 37f.

35. See Sölle, p. 39f.

36. See Sölle, p. 41.

37. Sölle, p. 46.

38. See Sölle, p. 55.

39.   Sölle, p. 55.

40.   Sölle, p. 101f.

41.   Sölle, p. 102f.

42.   See Sölle, p. 106.

43.   Sölle, p. 107.

44.   Sölle, p. 109.

45.   Sölle, p. 110.

46.   Sölle, p. 110.

47.   Sölle, p. 110.

48.   Sölle, p. 110.

49.   Sölle, p. 110.

50.   See Sölle, p. 112.

51.   Sölle, p. 113.

52.   Sölle, p. 114 ("mythischen Austausch" German
        edition p. 130).

53.   See Sölle, p. 115f.

54.   Sölle, p. 116.

55.   Sölle, p. 117.

56.   Sölle, p. 119.

57.   Sölle, p. 119.

58.   Sölle, p. 119.

59.   Sölle, p. 119.

60.   Sölle, p. 120.

61.   Sölle, p. 120.

62.   Sölle, p. 120.

63.   Sölle, p. 121f.

64.   Sölle, p. 123.

65.   Sölle, p. 125.

66.   Sölle, p. 125.

67.   Sölle, p. 125.

68.   Sölle, p. 126.

69.   Sölle, p. 126.

70.   Sölle, p. 127.

71.   Sölle, p. 128.

72.   Sölle, p. 128.

73.   Sölle, p. 128.

74.   Sölle, p. 129.

75.   Sölle, p. 130.

76.   Sölle, p. 131.

77.   Sölle, p. 131.

78.   Sölle, p. 131.

79.   Sölle, p. 131.

80.   Sölle, p. 132.

81.   Sölle, p. 134.

82.   Sölle, p. 134.

83.   Sölle, p. 134.

34.   Sölle, p. 136.

85.   Sölle, p. 136.

86.   Sölle, p. 138.

89.   Sölle, p. 140.

90.   Sölle, p. 142.

91.   Sölle, p. 143.

92.   Sölle, p. 143.

93.   Sölle, p. 144.

94.   Sölle, p. 146.

95.   Sölle, p. 149.

96.   Sölle, p. 65.

97.   Sölle, p. 66.

98.   See Sölle, p. 67ff.

99.   Sölle, p. 72.

100.   Sölle, p. 73.

101.   Sölle, p. 74.

102.   The title of Chapter 13.

103.   Sölle, p. 89.

104.   Sölle, p. 89.

105.   Sölle, p. 89.

106.   Sölle, p. 90.

107.   See Sölle, p. 91.

108.   Sölle, p. 13.

109.   The following discussion draws heavily on the
        comments of J. Moltmann in The Crucified God (1974),
        pp. 262-264, especially in his treatment of the
        concept of superfluity.

110.   See Moltmann, p. 264.

111.   See the following comment of Sölle, op. cit., p. 127:

        But acceptance of oneself, as one who lives in
        postponement, means nothing else except running
        ahead 'to God' and knowing that one's real life
        or identity is in him. What is known to be in
        him, saved in him - namely, our identity, which
        is not here but from which we derive the strength
        to deny plainly and definitely what actually is
        given - is symbolized in Christ.

112.   Moltmann, op. cit., p. 263.

113.   R. Jenson, God after God (1969), p. 65.   Jenson
        describes Sölle's concept of representation as
        "a valuable contribution; were I now attempting
        a soteriology I would appropriate it whole"(p. 64).
        However, although he recognises that "the ontological
        position of the whole discussion is left ambiguous"
        (p. 64) he does not appear to recognise that this
        ambiguity in relation to the future of God has its
        correlate in an ambiguous content of man's hoped for
        identity.

114.   Sölle, op. cit., p. 129.

115.   Sölle, p. 124.

116.   Sölle, p. 124.

117.   Sölle, p. 144.

118.   See the conclusion to the Chapter on Christ's
        dependence on God where Sölle states, p.149:

> God wills to be represented. He has made
> himself representable. ... He has become
> dependent; he has mediated himself into the
> world. He became man.

119.   Sölle, p. 114.

120.   Sölle, p. 115.

121.   Sölle, p. 115.

122.   Sölle, p. 115.

123.   Sölle, p. 116.

124.   See Sölle's comments (p. 114) that illustrate the
        'hint given by the unconscious', within the fields
        of psychoanalysis, the 'omnipotence of thoughts',
        and those societies that are shaped by a 'less
        differentiated sense of the body'.

125.   Sölle, p. 102f.

126.   Sölle, p. 119.

127.   Sölle, p. 118.

128.   Sölle, p. 119.

129.   Sölle, p. 120.

130.   Sölle, p. 120.

131.   Sölle, p. 120.

132.   Sölle, p. 120.

133.   Sölle, p. 121.

134.   Sölle, p. 121.

135.   Sölle, p. 121f.

136.   Sölle, p. 122.

137.   Sölle, p. 122.

138.   Sölle, p. 122.

139.   Sölle, p. 122.

Endnotes to Chapter VII

1. The reference is to L. Morris, <u>The Cross in the New Testament</u> (1965), and <u>The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross</u> (1955).

2. It must again be stressed that the contexts under discussion in this thesis are primarily theological. This is not to minimise or discount the significance of a study of the social, economic, political and linguistic contexts in which the terms operate.

3. See, for example, the work of G. Dunstan, particularly in his work <u>The Artifice of Ethics</u> (1974).

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