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A B S T R A C T

The Logic of Educational Studies:
A Philosophical Investigation of the Literature,
1952-1961

Arthur Tubb

The little-appreciated literature of the 1950s offers, in its 'reflexive' parts, a polarized discussion of Education. Two groups of contributors hold implicit philosophical positions, clarified by the slogan-terms 'rigour' and 'relevance'.

In the first half-decade, each of the conventional 'fields' of educational study - historical, psychological, philosophical, social and pedagogical - witnessed growing disagreement between specialists and generalists in teacher training. The former aimed at establishing their subjects as academically respectable branches of 'pure' descriptive disciplines taught in non-vocational university departments. The latter emphasized the prescriptive nature of educational theory, which relates many kinds of knowledge to various levels of educational activity - particularly as curriculum theory and theory of teaching. The motives for specialization were partly non-intellectual or 'political', whereas the 'logic' of generalism was intellectually warranted in philosophy, traditionally conceived as not excluding normative and speculative elements in favour of analysis. In each 'field'-context this 'hidden' philosophical controversy presented a variation on the fundamental issue of thought-in-relation-to-action.

During the second half-decade, the differentiated 'four disciplines' approach gathered the momentum which led to its institutional success in the 1960s - particularly through the activities of self-confident analytical philosophers and empirical sociologists of education. Nevertheless, generalists continued to defend 'integrated' theorizing. An awareness of the powerful American philosophical literature would have strengthened their 'intuitive' position against charges of amateurism by showing that 'rigour' takes many forms. In 'pure' psychology, behaviourism emphasized technology, humanism focussed on the 'person' and technical philosophers maintained their claim on 'mind'. A demand then emerged for an autonomous educational psychology, based on classroom learning rather than extrapolations from orthodox research. In history, there was much conventional substantive writing, but little reflexive comment.

The logic concealed in the works of this significant decade is not inferior to that in the vast literature produced since 1961, much of which is derivative and so obscures the basic philosophical problem of relating knowing to doing in education.

THE LOGIC OF EDUCATIONAL STUDIES:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE LITERATURE,
1952 - 1961

In Two Volumes

V O L U M E O N E

Arthur Tubb

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C O N T E N T S

V O L U M E O N E

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (ix)

INTRODUCTION 1

PERIOD ONE: 1952-1956

RIGOUR AND RELEVANCE IN THE FIVE 'FIELDS' OF
EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORICAL FIELD: FROM THE
PARTICULAR TO THE GENERAL 14

W.H.G. Armytage: The Demand for Real
History 15

W.H. Burston and Ben Morris: The
Logic of History and of Education 21

Wider Points of Logic 31

CHAPTER TWO: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FIELD: A FOCUS
FOR PHILOSOPHY 36

Scientific Psychology: Its Eclectic
Use in Education 36

The Opposition of Humanistic
Psychology 46

A Third Approach: Autonomous
Educational Psychology 52

Jean Piaget: Both Psychologist and
Philosopher 63

CHAPTER THREE:	VARIETIES OF RIGOUR IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL FIELD	69
	Before Analysis: Great Thinkers and 'Isms'	72
	Analysis and Beyond Analysis: The British Priority	80
	Normative-Speculative-Analytic: The American Superiority	89
CHAPTER FOUR:	THE SOCIAL FIELD AND THE APPEARANCE OF 'REAL' SOCIOLOGY	114
	The 'Social' Dimension to Generalist Thinking	115
	Advocates of Durkheim and Mannheim - Philosophical Sociologists	122
	'Real' Sociology: The Coming of Empiricism	133
CHAPTER FIVE:	THE PEDAGOGICAL FIELD: GENERAL THEORY OF EDUCATION	144
	'Educational Theory': A Term Without Restriction	145
	Observations on the 'Politics' of Academic Theorizing	156
	The Concept of 'Person' in Educational Theory	167
	Towards the Logical Centre: Curriculum Theory	179
	Theory-Practice or Teaching Theory	188

PERIOD TWO: 1957-1961
GENERAL THEORY AND THE DISCIPLINE OF EDUCATION

CHAPTER SIX:	WORDS AND THE WORLD IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION	202
	Responses to O'Connor's 'Stony Diet'	202
	The Reappearance of Frankena	210
	Scheffler: Philosophical Territory and Philosophical Tools	219
	Scheffler Demonstrates the Tools In Use	235
	Concept Analysis: The 'Narrow, Piecemeal Approach'	242
	Richard Peters Discovers Education	248
	The Persisting Tradition of Philosophy as System	262
	W.B. Inglis: 'Existence Precedes Essence'	272
	Theodore Brameld: The Last Great 'Ism'	289
CHAPTER SEVEN:	SCIENTISTS, HUMANISTS AND AUTONOMISTS IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY	297
	From Behaviourism to Educational Technology	298
	'Non-extrapolation' Approaches: David Ausubel and His Competitors	305
	Humanists All: From Carl Rogers to Harry McFarland	315
	The Unchanging Text-books and Journals of Orthodoxy	331

CHAPTER EIGHT:	SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION OR EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY?	339
	Practical Prescription from Two 'Social' Generalists	339
	A Programmatic Trend Report and Its Philosophical Critique	345
	The Empirical Sociologists and Verstehen	358
	The Two-Fields Debate in America and Europe	373
CHAPTER NINE:	THE MANY LEVELS OF GENERAL THEORY OF EDUCATION	385
	Helen Adams: The Positive, The Normative and The Pragmatic	386
	General Theory in Europe: Martin Langeveld Again	401
	A Great Variety of Curriculum Theory and Theorists	408
	The Theory of Teaching: Towards Harry Knox or Asahel Woodruff?	422
	A Last Look at Contextual Matters...And a Kind of Conclusion	435

Period Two: 1957-1961

General Theory and the Disciplines of Education

Chapter Six:	Words and the World in the Philosophy of Education	38
Chapter Seven:	Scientists, Humanists and Autonomists in Educational Psychology	62
Chapter Eight:	Sociology of Education or Educational Sociology?	72
Chapter Nine:	The Many Levels of General Theory of Education	83
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	98

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In this group of Educationists there are two to whom I am especially grateful. My supervisor, Mr. Beverley Shaw has, for many years, shown the kind of patience and sensitivity to the needs of a rather old student without which the motivation to complete such a lengthy piece of work would not - given my circumstances - have lasted. I have greatly valued his comments and advice, based upon his deep philosophical grasp of a wide range of subjects. This is always in evidence in his thinking and in his own substantial contributions to the more recent literature of education. I recognize my good fortune in having had prolonged exposure to it. To Mrs. Lucy Tubb I owe an equal intellectual debt, in that she has provided me (close to home) with a living model of the 'generalist' in teacher education that this thesis seeks to defend; a model who operates at the level of teacher preparation where generalism is most patently essential - that concerned with early childhood education. However, beyond the intellectual debt, I owe something much more to her as my wife; that is, a deep gratitude for nearly forty years' love and support without which I would never have written anything.

Everyman must in a sense be his own educational philosopher

William Klaas Frankena

Introduction

The period covered in this investigation has, in a sense, chosen itself. An earlier hypothesis than the one which finally appears in the thesis directed the writer to the literature of education produced from the early 1960s to the 1980s. This is such a vast body of work that one aspect of it alone was eventually picked out. It had become clear that much of the most significant educational writing is what hereafter is called 'reflexive'. That is, its authors reflect on the nature of what they are writing. They therefore philosophize, whether they know it or not and whether or not their books and articles are conventionally classified as philosophy of education. This 'hidden' philosophy, which is to be found in abundance during the last two decades, was the original object of inquiry. 'Hidden' philosophy remains the focus. However, the period in which it was produced has shifted to the 1950s - for reasons which this introduction will give.

The original hypothesis, which was formulated on the basis of the writer's involvement in teacher training for most of the period in question, ¹ was a fairly obvious one. It was simply that a new emphasis on 'rigour' in the reflexive literature of the early years of the period eventually provoked a counter-emphasis on 'relevance'. ² The intention was to examine the 'logic' of these familiar terms ('logic' in a sense which the whole of the present work is designed to clarify), not by attempting a supposedly definitive new analysis of them but by displaying them as embodied in the many and varied contexts of a total literature. It had become



clear to the writer that no such extensive piece of work had been attempted before. One characteristic of educational studies which this thesis will repeatedly indicate is what will be called the 'isolation' of contributors within sub-areas of that domain which usually has the single institutional title of 'Education'. As will be shown, this characteristic has 'political' as well as intellectual causes, and is one of the reasons why an earlier and shorter period than the one originally chosen forced itself, in a sense, on the attention of the writer.

Meanwhile, the intention of the original investigation remained unchanged with respect to the earlier period. An account was to be given of the development within the reflexive literature of the conflicting positions taken under the slogans of 'rigour' and 'relevance'. It was clear that the literature of education is by far the most extensive body of writings in which this fundamental philosophical problem of the relationship of thought to action is discussed - knowingly or not. The two terms in question are pointers to the presence of this problem. Reflection on the nature of educational theory or the nature of any of the disciplines of education which are said to 'constitute' such theory can neither avoid the use of the terms nor, thereby, an involvement in the philosophical problem. Therefore an account of these reflections is an account of philosophy. Further, if the reflections are to be found in various writers and over a period of time, the account is of a period - even though it is a short period - in the history of philosophy. Accordingly, a standpoint is required for undertaking such an exercise, once its nature is recognized. The present thesis

draws, in this respect, on the work of the Australian philosopher John Passmore. His definitive 'Historiography of Philosophy'³ indicated to the writer as many as six different ways in which such a history of philosophy could be written, of which one was close to his original intention. In Passmore's words: 'To write a problematic history is to write about philosophy in a philosophic manner'.⁴ In contrast, he makes clear, to write in any of the other modes that he identifies - 'polemical', 'doxographical', 'retrospective', 'classificatory' and 'cultural' - is to write about philosophy from a standpoint 'outside' the discipline.

This, then, is a philosophical investigation in Passmore's terms. It seeks to handle essentially philosophical material - the reflexive literature in question - from the 'inside' as it were. But it is now, in its final form, an investigation of a period other than that with which the inquiry began six years ago.⁵ For, at a mid-point in the inquiry, a scrutiny was made of the literature of the 1950s merely to confirm the received opinion that the new rigorous work of the early 1960s was accurate in its estimate of the preceding educational literature. For the moment, this opinion can be summed up in Richard Peters' words: 'When I moved over into the field of philosophy of education I found very little which was particularly helpful'.⁶ The scrutiny became a further detailed study as it became clear that the judgement of the literature of a whole decade as in some way 'amateurish'⁷ was totally misleading. A wealth of material was found. Some of it was clearly of the highest standing in terms of its own kind of 'rigour'; and all of it, once viewed as an inter-connected totality, was of great significance

for reaching a balanced view of the logic of educational studies.

In particular, there was found a type of thinking which this account will refer to as 'generalist', which the familiar disciplines-emphasis of the 1960s was to inhibit. In the decade in question, support for the typical generalism of those closely involved in teacher training existed in work which was little known to those practitioners - philosophical work of the highest quality produced by professional philosophers. Because the work was unknown, generalists found themselves on their own, as it were, once the new-style philosophers began to define the discipline as technically analytic and to dismiss synthetic or generalist attempts to discuss education. They succumbed to the new specialists, not knowing that in America there was a powerful defence available for generalist thinking about education being not only philosophically respectable but, in fact, logically necessary. Chapter Three in particular will present the material which drew the writer fully into the earlier decade and persuaded him to put aside his less surprising account of later decades - an account which will be seen at many points to 'lurk in the background' to this final offering.

In this way, the period 1952 to 1961 came into focus. Within it was to be found all the necessary material for supporting a logical thesis about educational studies - the complexity of which arises from the inter-relationship between its factual, normative and conceptual elements. Being a relatively unfamiliar body of literature, this substituted object of inquiry could be approached with few preconceptions and almost left to tell its own tale once the 'specialist-generalist' and 'rigour-relevance' notions were identified as operating within it. Also, as it was the literature

produced in that period which preceded the vast expansion in teacher-training with its concomitant explosion in publications, it was limited enough to be investigated in all its various parts without the inquirer being overwhelmed. In contrast, what had become clear in studying the vast mass of books and articles which poured out from the 1960s was the sense of being immersed in repetitive material. Much of it seemed to add nothing to an elucidation of the logic which was of primary concern to the writer. It appeared as parasitic on a few seminal contributions and seemed to exist in print merely as a function of the greatly increased numbers employed in teacher education and the consequent opportunities for doctrinal disputes.

The eventually-chosen period begins in a year marked by a very relevant publication. In 1952 appeared the first issue of the British Journal of Educational Studies which contains what amounts to a manifesto by the country's senior educationists. For the moment the importance of this journal for our inquiry can be shown simply by a short quotation from the professors' declaration of intent, for it names what much later were to become well-established as the disciplines of education and provides us with appropriate chapter headings for the first half of the account to follow. The Editor says:

It is generally felt that British studies in the various fields of education - philosophical, historical, social, psychological and pedagogic - need to be better organized and better known.

This naming of the fields of education, written in the year in which John Dewey died,⁹ immediately raises an important question

on which his long life's work bears. It is a question of the meaning of the term 'organization' in the mind of the Editor, given that a clearly logical organization of these five elements in the subject Education had been presented in Dewey's pre-analytical philosophy at least forty years before.¹⁰ There is no indication in the plan of The Standing Conference On Studies in Education that their scheme for the development of educational studies in the new journal is the result of a logical critique of Dewey's architectonic model. The obvious reason for this omission is that logic does not at all enter the debate, whereas what will be referred to in this account as academic 'politics' does. This is a sub-theme in the thesis which forces itself, as we shall see, into the discussion from this well-marked beginning to its end ten years later. Here, we can observe that the academic standing of the subject Education in its various specialized forms as named above is what motivated the professors in the subject to create an organization and a journal. We shall find however, that the interpretation of 'rigour' solely in terms of the established university disciplines provides no solution for educationists who wish their work to be intellectually defensible; for the disciplines themselves reveal, in their 'pure' form, a variety of conflicting viewpoints and no simple prestige-claims based on titles can withstand a critical scrutiny.

So, the senior educationists in 1952, all of whom had in their professional work a generalist function in teacher training (as will be argued later on grounds of a type of 'contextual implication') collectively chose a non-Deweyian specialist path, eschewing the alternative of reconsidering the Deweyian model in the light of

contemporary knowledge in the disciplines which, in some sense, must bear on education. As will emerge, their efforts were as little valued later by the 'real' specialists in the named subjects as were the less status-orientated efforts of committed generalists found typically at work in the lower-level college world of training. Both the rigour-aspirations of the former and the relevance-focus of the latter were to come under attack in ways which the nine chapters to follow will analyze.

The end of the chosen period has not such a definite marker as the birth of a journal and the death of a great educational philosopher. Yet 1961 does not lack significance as the closing year of an era. In Britain, the new rigourists who were, within half a decade, to make the most influential contributions to The Study of Education - the definitive exposition of the four-disciplines standpoint ¹¹ - were poised to move into a dramatic ascendancy. In particular, Paul Hirst would be, at that time, forming and reforming his views on the nature of educational theory to which we shall have occasion many times to refer in the light of writings in the present investigation which anticipate his type of position without the specialist corollaries which became attached to his account.

A span of ten years covering a total literature presents a problem of structuring the contents in such a manner as to best display the logic. The decision to deal with it in two sub-periods of equal length was not difficult to make following a preliminary investigation of the literature of the five 'fields'. A glance at two alternative structurings to that which, again, virtually

offered itself will make this clear. First, a chronological account, taking one year at a time, would have necessitated either an arbitrary decision as to the order in which the five types of content were taken, or the material could have been regarded as a heterogeneous body of work and examined in strict order of publication. But a trial essay showed that this was unsatisfactory for the purposes of this kind of inquiry. While it certainly allows cross-referencing from one field of education to another, it gives no opportunity for developments within a field over time to reveal themselves. As a pre-condition for effective meta-thinking within a field or discipline is knowledge of the reflexive arguments of predecessors,¹² it is clear that a mechanical year-by-year account would not permit a Passmoreian 'problematic' approach to be made.

The above pre-condition suggests the second alternative approach. The whole decade, rather than each year, could have been taken as a unit and the reflexive aspects of history, psychology, philosophy and sociology of education, as well as pedagogy (or general theory) examined separately. In this way, the five tracks of philosophical reflection within those areas would have been travelled independently. But the independence, of course, while it would certainly allow the precondition to be satisfied so far as any one field was concerned, would have made the whole investigation merely five separate mini-theses bound together physically but not logically. One point of the present work is to show that, though most educational writing is undertaken under one disciplinary heading without reference to other disciplines 'of' education, a proper view of the logic of educational studies requires much cross-referencing between

the disciplines. The 'isolationism' already mentioned makes it impossible for specialist writers to grasp the philosophical-generalist nature of educational thought which encompasses all the disciplines as subordinate elements in a manner which only an inter-disciplinary inquiry can reveal.

Accordingly, the present structure has emerged. It allows developments within a long-enough period of time to be analyzed for each of the five fields. Yet it moves from one field to the next at a point which certainly allowed the writer and will, it is hoped, allow the reader to retain a sense of what developments are taking place in the other areas which bear on the total argument. This is particularly the case as, in each chapter, forward-looking and retrospective reference is continually made to the literature which conventionally falls under other headings. A discussion is thus created which, in a less specialist-dominated world than that of the teacher training which provides the bulk of the literature of interest in this investigation, might well have taken place in reality and not be just appearing in an extensive academic inquiry. The thesis is, thus, in two parts covering what will be referred to as Period One from 1952 to 1956 and Period Two from 1957 to 1961. The quantity of reflexive literature produced in Period One was, naturally, less than in Period Two for reasons already touched upon and to be developed later in detail. Nevertheless, each part is of a similar size by design, for once the conceptual mapping of the first part had been completed, it was important for the overall argument to repeat it without altering the scale, as it were, in the second part. This was no loss to the final form of

the inquiry as a 'reflection' of the literature, because an undeniable finding during the process of such a wide-ranging investigation has been that an increase in the quantity of writing did not offer a commensurate increase in the number of high-quality contributions to the philosophical discussion. Such contributions show an equal distribution in both parts. However, their focus in terms of the rigour-relevance dimension which is central to this thesis can be seen, even from the overview of the Contents page, to change. For, by Period Two, those who saw themselves as the 'real' specialists in disciplines which lay claim to education as a field of application - particularly in philosophy and sociology - were assuming a dominant posture in the literature as a prelude to taking on institutional dominance in the 1960s. So, the various 'fields' of The Standing Conference declaration which provide the chapter titles for Period One are replaced, in Period Two, by titles which mark the change by including the disciplines of education as they have been familiarly labelled during the last twenty years.

Apart from the limits in terms of the length of period covered, there are equally essential limits in terms of the countries whose literature has been examined. The reference to important American philosophy of education ¹³ has already indicated that other than British material is of importance for presenting the main theme. Nevertheless, it is the British literature which forms the core of the work. ¹⁴ The criterion used for going to other English-speaking literatures has been a simple one which is in keeping with the judgement made earlier - that educational writing suffers from 'isolationism'. The more obvious books and journals from abroad

enter this investigation at many points on the grounds that any British educationist who, during this period, was prepared to present an implicitly-philosophical view about the nature of educational studies should have been aware of outstanding and very relevant work being done elsewhere. An obvious example in this respect is Harvard Educational Review,¹⁵ which can be taken as the long-standing model for the British journal launched in 1952.

Finally, it only remains to comment briefly on two of the elements which form the content of an inquiry whose origins, limits and internal organization have been explained. History, psychology, philosophy, sociology and general educational theory, taken as they have been here as subject areas at least as old as the Deweyian integrated formulation of them and yet as new as the different understandings of them which are evident at the beginning and the end of our period, do not offer equal-sized reflexive literatures. Most strikingly, in the history of education there is a paucity of material of this kind - a fact to be put aside for consideration in the last paragraph of this introduction.

On the other hand, general educational theory (or 'pedagogy') is a title for heterogeneous writings which do not fall readily under the other specialized headings; and within it there has been produced a vast literature, much of it concerned with its own nature. Prior to the present kind of investigation designed to reveal a logical order this literature could be taken as the sprawling evidence of precisely the kind of intellectual untidiness which causes many educationists to choose a firm disciplinary framework for their work. However, what will be suggested in detail, throughout the

following chapters, from the historical 'field' of Period One to the general educational theory of Period Two, is something radically different. Educational theory in this general, non-specialized, non-descriptive and therefore prescriptive sense is logically necessary in discussions carried on within the essentially normative enterprise of education. We shall see that it is, in the final analysis, nothing less than a type of philosophizing which properly accommodates when properly carried out the narrower material of the orthodox disciplines of education.

Finally, as mentioned, there is a striking lack of meta-discussion in the history of education, for all its size as a popular field for writers. The single contribution relevant to our theme appeared early in Period One and will be investigated in the first chapter. Thereafter history will disappear as a major content area from this work, effectively reducing the components of the subject of Education to four. However, this does not mean that the logic of educational studies as will be displayed in this thesis is such as to exclude the historical dimension as unimportant. It means only that historians of education have been less active - for reasons that are implied to some extent in the discussion about to follow - in the philosophizing which is necessary to demonstrate the importance of a discipline than have other writers concerned with other disciplines. To the great exception to this charge of inactivity we can now turn, thereby moving from rather general observations with limited meaning in the absence of concrete arguments to the arguments themselves - all of which, in revealing themselves in the context of a particular area of study, embrace in a general way the whole wide domain of the subject of Education.

Period One: 1952-1956

Rigour and Relevance in The Five 'Fields' of Educational Thought

*Just as M. Jourdain unavoidably spoke prose
so educationalists unavoidably philosophize*

Geoffrey Bantock

Chapter One

The Historical Field: From the Particular to the General

In this, the shortest chapter, we shall be considering three writers only. Two are historians and the other is a general educationist, who, in keeping with his role, has an interest in history along with an equal interest in the other disciplines which claim to bear on education. Each reflects on history or the history of education in his own individual way and each voices his view in a teacher-training context - a fact which is of importance, not only for the argument of this initial chapter, but for the thesis as a whole. For without this context there would be no such vast literature of education as we are about to examine, and, consequently, little point in developing a major theme of the present work; that the essential core of educational theory is that which centres on learning and teaching. A comparison of the standpoints of these three writers will allow this theme to emerge, to become pervasive throughout later chapters. The inevitability of certain logical features of educational discourse arising from any discussion of education is thus evidenced by its emergence in an apparently limited sector. The chosen sector is history, ideal because the paucity of material permits the logic to be seen in its simplest form. But, as we shall note repeatedly, the other 'fields' would have served the same purpose, albeit in a more complex way. ¹

The logic of history is an evident concern of both the historians in question. They have firm views about what history is. They differ,

however, in their answers; for they draw upon different traditions in what is usually referred to as the critical philosophy of history. ² One argues from a contemporary analytical base: the other from a pre-analytical base with its roots in the nineteenth century. They differ, too, in the bearing of their work on education. One is explicit in his attention to the history of education as the primary element in educational thought: the other makes no reference to history of education itself, but his work has unusually clear implications for general pedagogy. Both have in common a high reputation in the historical field which was heralded by these early contributions, the first and only examples of reflexive discussion in Period One. ³ Of the two, W.H. Burston speaks with the quieter voice of analysis and can be better noted following a brief account of the position of his most positive fellow historian.

W.H.G. Armytage: The Demand for Real History

Armytage appeared in the literature as a powerful censurer of theoretical practices of which he disapproved. ⁴ The educational community was left in no doubt about where he stood. He demanded for education real history written by real historians. With a Cambridge First in the subject, he confidently reminded his colleagues of the achievements of such formidable thinkers as R.G. Collingwood ⁵ and Ortega y Gasset, ⁶ with the implications for education of their 'philosophical' perspectives always to the fore. More specifically, he instanced R.H. Quick and Thomas Davidson as first-class historians whose work is a model for re-creating the history of education.

In fine style he makes his point:

The correction of a Karl Marx by Isaiah, the elaboration of a theory of life based upon the results of carefully digested science, is a paramount duty of the historians of education at present, and those outside ⁷the Departments of Education see it most clearly.

This is the voice of a man convinced of the importance of his own discipline. History offers this 'theory of life'. Elsewhere Armytage's phrases are equally resounding. History gives a person a 'high outlook'; it endows him with a 'central core of belief'; ⁸ it has a 'moral function' ⁹ in human affairs and particularly in education. For it follows from a high estimation of history conceived in these terms that this is the subject whose place in the training of teachers is of the first importance. This corollary is strongly advanced. History offers the teacher insight and understanding which just cannot be attained through any other study. Such is Armytage's claim.

Clearly it is a claim for the vocational or professional significance of history of education. This is no 'merely' liberal element, unrelated to the fact that those exposed to it are preparing to undertake the most complex of practical jobs. It has, it is argued, the most practical importance imaginable. The reason is that a teacher is not a technician, but a person who practises a vocation. For such a person, the conventional distinction between the academic and the vocational, the liberal and the professional elements in his education, is inappropriate. His situation is governed by 'The need for a perspective of the past in framing a policy

for the future'.¹⁰ History has a central, not a peripheral place. Armytage admits no qualifications to this firm assertion. What will have to be examined - briefly at some point in this chapter and more closely in later contexts - is the term 'policy'. Everyone in the educational enterprise can be said to have some policy. This applies to the beginning teacher as it does to the most powerful state minister. The policy may be parochial and not even explicitly articulated or it may be nation-wide and systematic. Policies abound. What Armytage's vigorous demand for history of education implies is that it is essential for the class teacher's 'policy' making. He would have his 'visionary' kind of history replace studies of the more mundane kind that he perceives all around him in teacher training.

Criticism of these other studies is directed straight at two targets. The first is the kind of conventional histories of education which historians regarded by Armytage as second-raters produce in abundance. He describes them scathingly as 'the antiquarian catalogues of acts and reformers'.¹¹ They are an insult to his cherished subject. Their existence explains the charges of boredom and irrelevance which are endemic amongst students who are offered them. But the second target does not even, to him, have the virtue of aspiring to be humanistic. In teacher training he notes the time taken up by a whole range of method work. This centres on restricted techniques of teaching, underpinned by a 'rival' discipline which he does not hold in high regard. Psychology, in the form it takes as the dominant element in educational studies, is anathema

to one who has expressed himself about 'understanding' in the kind of terms seen above. He therefore proclaims that 'Our duty to these students extends further than mere initiation into techniques of teaching'.¹² He suggests, in magisterial fashion, that the historian could and should provide ideas 'which our psychologists might use to humanise what is often described as a course in the measurement of things which can't be measured'.¹³ This attitude to psychology puts Armytage on common ground with many humanist educators of the time.¹⁴ We shall be examining the defects of conventional psychology of education in depth later. For the moment what can be noted is that Armytage's antidote to the deficiencies of the other discipline offers no consolation to his fellow historians. His 'philosophical' position on history is very much his own. Whether it, in its turn, can withstand philosophical criticism of a less idiosyncratic kind we shall know only after that discipline has been investigated.

What can be said now is that these early reflexive writings withstood the scrutiny of journal editors in all sectors of education.¹⁵ So, Armytage's output illustrates another general theme. This is that the literature of education as understood in this academic thesis was produced in what can be thought of as the two worlds of teacher training.¹⁶ Armytage contributed to the publications of both. In a sense, his advocacy of the discipline of history - 'real', that is, rigorous history - symbolizes one of those worlds. For he is there adopting a classic University posture. But his unusual claim, with its confident justification, for the vocational relevance of his kind of history symbolizes

the other world of the Training College. The tension, perennial in educational thinking, between the demands of rigour and those of relevance, can never be distant from the mind of anyone reading Armytage. His resolution of the problem is so simple and uncompromising. The insight which comes from proper historical understanding makes the subject the most relevant in the world, in his view. In fact, it is the simplicity which rouses suspicions. The mysterious effect of historical study on the class teacher who faces concrete daily problems is not spelled out in terms which are as strongly convincing as they are strongly asserted. There appears to be a gap in the argument: it moves from a particular definition of rigour to an assumed practical relevance.

Thus, any attempt to write a purely 'problematic' history of the material to be found in these two worlds would be naive. Some attention must be paid to the fact that 'rigour' equated with the intellectual content of a discipline is so described by persons who work, write, have careers and aspirations in a particular context. There is a 'political' dimension to academic life, which it would be foolish to ignore when investigating academic literature.¹⁷ This general theme will be developed during the course of this thesis with evidence from outside the literature of education, particularly from a group of contemporary philosophers who stress the 'human embodiment' of disciplines. Armytage is a clear example of an individual writer whose arguments must be taken in context. The context is that of the two worlds of teacher training, one superior and one inferior in terms of academic respectability. The wider context is that of the University at its centre which sets the

standards in those rational enterprises which it recognizes as fully-fledged disciplines.

This background explains Armytage's remark, above, that 'those outside the Departments of Education see it most clearly'; that is, that it is the real historians who see the need for history. Elsewhere he becomes even more frank and thus reveals even more clearly evidence to the point being made here about the 'political' dimension to studies when he refers directly to academic status. For he suggests that proper history of education courses be 'conducted, not by some pretentious second rater, but by someone specially recruited for the task'.¹⁸ The impression given is that, provided the genuine article is made available by those qualified to offer it, then the major problems of teacher preparation are solved. This is an 'argument from qualification' which cries out for the obvious question: 'Qualification for precisely what?' We shall see that it is merely the first example in the first of the disciplines of such an argument. Each of the University-acknowledged subjects - those where there are departments in the pure subject - eventually makes Armytage-type claims.¹⁹ The suspicion must be that there would be no difference between a claim of this type and one motivated, not by intellectual conviction which has withstood the considered doubts of the impartial thinker, but by a desire to achieve standing according to University criteria by those who are not housed in an academic department where such standing is unquestioned.

In short, forceful arguments such as those presented on behalf of his subject by Armytage must be treated with caution. They easily

transmute themselves into arguments, not for the subject, but for some other subject whose logic is entirely different. History is history, not education. The rigorous history Armytage was demanding at this time, he had the real historian's right to demand. But there are other kinds of rigour: in a sense, there is a different kind wherever there is a different rational enterprise, of which the subject Education is, on the evidence of the present investigation, one. We can turn to the two other writers in order to support a preliminary delineation of this rigour. Its full development will, of course, be seen only on completion of this investigation. What we can assert, in leaving Armytage, is that his early work throws little light on the relationship between knowing and doing - the concepts which he tries to encompass. History, whether first or second class, is a descriptive discipline. To argue for the place of history in teacher preparation as if the necessary prescriptions flowed effortlessly from the descriptive material is to undervalue not only the psychologists who feature as targets in the argument, but all the other claimants who do not.

W.H. Burston and Ben Morris: The Logic of History...and of Education

The historian and the generalist (though one with a thorough background in humanistic psychology, as we shall see) have one thing in common. Their contributions to the historical field have, in their different ways, the effect of focussing our attention on education rather than history itself. Burston ²⁰ would, on the face of it, appear to have more in common with Armytage. However,

'real' history to him (were he to address himself in such terms to the question) would not be a discipline to be described in oratorical fashion. He draws on the then recent work in the critical philosophy of history. His reflexiveness is more obvious because more in the form of an argument than that of Armytage, Burston's 'rigour' has an entirely different flavour to it. So much so that the contrast immediately raises the question as to who are the qualified when an argument from qualification is advanced, as we have seen it from Armytage's pen. There is the quite general observation to be made here, and amplified in many later contexts, that most disciplines in their 'pure' form are battlegrounds for conflict when it comes to reflexive questions of their own nature. Burston's intention is quite explicitly to indicate how the logic of historical explanation differs radically from the logic of scientific explanation.²¹ History to him is that which reveals such logic. It 'explains' in the manner appropriate to the discipline whose primary interest is in the individual event. Such explanation gives 'understanding', but it is difficult to see how it can be the same kind of understanding as that on which Armytage places insupportable weight.

So, Burston's work undermines, indirectly, the categorical nature of his fellow-historian's bold pronouncements. However, we can translate his main purpose into a more direct support of our own theme. He tries to show that a particular method of teaching school history - the 'topic method' - is sound. He carefully derives the method from the logic: he is filling the gap which is similar to that which Armytage did not recognize. But this procedure applies

to all history, not just school history. It applies to the history of education. We can accept the argument as if it had been written by Burston, not with history-method personnel in mind, but historians contributing to educational studies (it being recognized that the same persons frequently occupy both roles: the concept of role is here, as elsewhere, important in that what a person says has a meaning not unrelated to the context in which he says it - this is a point of informal logic which will be further developed). In other words, we identify an implication for the present enquiry from a piece of work which, on the face of it, was not intended for such use. We shall find other occasions in future chapters where this form of elucidation is possible; for explicitly reflexive literature is always merely the core of a larger literature which has implicit reflexiveness.

Burston's main point is simply 'that the method of teaching any subject depends directly upon the logic of explanation in that subject'.²² This statement means, for us, that the logic of explanation in history should be clarified before history of education courses are devised for teachers.²³ But what logic of this type did Armytage investigate before prescribing for his colleagues? None: philosophizing within an entirely different tradition - the pre-analytic tradition - he presented more an eloquent advocacy of history than a systematic analysis of it. Burston himself was to develop later the consequences of this initial article for syllabuses and techniques only in relation to school history, not the history of education in teacher training. Nevertheless, a 'translation' in imagination shows that many of the questions which

Armytage's account leaves unanswered - questions which come immediately to mind for the teacher of teachers - are answered in this alternative tradition as revealed by Burston.²⁴ The actions and decisions which a class teacher must make and for which he must be prepared in training are, on Burton's account, not such as can be taken or made because historical study has equipped the teacher with some relevant though mysterious 'insight' and 'understanding'. They are actions and decisions which fall under a different logic which Burston's analysis identifies, by implication, as being different from that of history which aims at explanation.

This further implication follows from the above quotation. The logic of the subject Education - of the whole of educational studies, both in terms of its elements and whatever relationship exists between the elements - will determine its teaching through displaying its nature.²⁵ This is precisely what we are investigating. We find, at this early point in the enquiry, that the kind of claim made by Armytage for the sovereignty of one of the elements - history, conceived in a Collingwoodian sense as having more validity than any other field of human experience - is not justifiable. It is not a claim that the equally well 'qualified' Burston would make. It is understandable in psychological and 'political' terms, as we have seen and as we shall see Ben Morris making even more explicit, but it has no other justification. Specialist educationists in other areas, possessed of equal enthusiasm for their own disciplines, are bound to view the claim as inflated. In fact, a recognition that there exist such other potential claimants would immediately moderate most thinkers on the subject. This is particularly the

case when, in viewing Armytage's position, we note that the central term he uses - 'understanding' - is one which the philosophers of education, following certain developments in their 'real' philosophy, have taken a close interest in.

So, we arrive at Morris's contribution, ²⁶ noting that he, too, has an interest in understanding. He is no 'technical' philosopher, yet is 'philosophical' in a sense which will become clearer at many points in future sections. Morris, a most unusual psychologist, subordinates his specialist role within a generalist perspective on education in a manner which is in direct contrast with the stance of Armytage. Always he is found making explicit his realization of the necessity of doing this. A fundamental truth about educational thinking appears early in the literature in his work. It is that such thinking is normative, assimilating the descriptive elements such as history. The function of the discipline specialist in the context of education - and particularly in the very 'theoretical' context of teacher education - is not what the specialist himself may realize it to be.

We shall be amplifying this notion of 'contextual implication' when we investigate the philosophers. Here it emerges in simple form when Morris - commenting on the history of education in the journal of the college 'world' - contrasts the needs of the scholar and the student: the first needs to know for knowledge's sake while the latter needs to know in order to do something with the knowledge, if he is a student of education:

Many of our problems in education arise, I think,
because there exists, through custom and tradition

and through other reasons within ourselves an overwhelming pressure to believe...that student and scholar have identical needs and have only to become acquainted for education to take place.²⁷

This is a typically restrained insight into the demand made in educational studies for rigour when the practical necessity is for relevance. It is accompanied by the depth psychologist's suggestion about what can motivate the former demand. He reminds us of what personal psychological mechanisms underlie what we have called the 'political' dimension of the situation. Our egos are involved and complicate all discussions about what constitutes rigour. The glittering prizes are known to be confined to well-defined areas of academic life.

But Morris wants relevance in the student's courses. He enquires 'how the history of education can function as a liberal component in the vocational preparation'²⁸ of teachers. It will be recalled that, to Armytage, the subject functions only by being real history: that is, if there is a problem, it is solved simply by offering superior scholarship. This solution is precisely that which Morris condemns, not by blunt censure, but by introducing certain distinctions which clarify the logical relationship of this particular element of educational studies to educational theory which centres on the class teacher's professional task. Morris is in no doubt that the history of education can only be made to function in relation to this primary educational role by becoming 'integrated' into a form of thinking other than itself.²⁹

Talk of integration is a mark of what we have called the

'generalist'. This one argues that all disciplines focus on the child who is to be educated by the teachers in training. The model Morris points to is his own kind of humanistic psychology, which, it can be noted, is very different from that which we have seen Armytage dismiss. Such relevant psychology, which we shall consider in depth in the next chapter, enters into general educational thinking which possesses a unity and a concreteness precisely because it is educational; that is, it is fundamentally concerned with the individuals who are to be educated and the individuals who are to educate. This unity and concreteness 'reflects' those characteristics of the persons involved in the educational enterprise. We shall have many occasions to note the strength of what can be termed 'personalism' in Morris's and other generalists' thinking. It is a notion which, taken seriously, clearly puts limits on the scholar's claims, based so clearly on an enthusiasm for the subject and not for the whole learner.

Neither Morris nor the present writer is unsympathetic to the claims of history. It would be foolish to think that a knowledge of what is in the past is not in some way relevant to the educational enterprise. However, the point is that, in the context of teacher training, there are prior claims which dictate the place of the contributions which can be made by the scholarly disciplines to courses of preparation. The core of the academic educational institution is, it cannot be too often repeated, education for teaching: all else springs from this. Bearing on this, Morris offers for the first time in the literature under consideration, the notion that there are what can be called 'levels' of educational theorizing.

The distinction between the class teacher level found at the core and other levels which relate to other roles within the educational service enables him to accommodate the claims of the scholar and the student which he has identified as in potential conflict without such an argument.

This concept of level will recur throughout the present thesis. It indicates that certain disciplines of education may be more able to function in educational theorizing, conceived as normative, more appropriately at other than the central level. To put the matter bluntly, it is fairly obvious that psychology in some form must, despite Armytage's strictures, provide much of the knowledge that a teacher requires to act at all in a classroom. This much can be said even before the nature of educational theory is carefully investigated. But it is not at all obvious that history is required, even the upgraded and visionary history advocated by Armytage. It may well be - and again this is a preliminary judgement which will take on fuller meaning in the context of the whole thesis - required at other levels which relate to other roles, as suggested above. Armytage's earlier insistence that 'policy' needs historical perspective raised the question of what level of policy. Morris provides an answer, for he identifies roles whose thinking does require such a perspective. He uses the same term in referring to the persons occupying these system-related roles: 'Their first and general need is for perspective, and this is true for both future scientist and future administrator.' Then he typically adds a reminder that, even at the levels of educational thinking more accommodative of the specialist contributing on his own terms,

there is need to remember that education is in the realm of action, not just thought: 'Perspective can, however, only come from a skilful blend of particular case and general idea.'³⁰

His commentary is therefore not only based on the illuminating concept of 'level', but on the necessity for that concrete experience which, at all levels, forces a thinker to realize that the abstractions of scholarship must connect with the world. He is sensitive to the ease with which a certain kind of scholar can come to love dwelling in an ivory tower while justifying his life-style as being in some elusive way relevant to the world outside. He knows that there are other clients in teacher training than those preparing for the initial, limited role. There are higher degree students, already experienced and ready for 'perspective' in keeping with their wider responsibilities in the system and there are research students with career prospects in areas not directly connected with actual teaching. The existence of such students makes it easy for the whole business of an Education Department to be orientated towards satisfying the 'needs' of the scholars amongst its teachers, of the kind which Morris indicates. A barely-examined notion of scholarship or 'research' can set the tone of all work, to the detriment of students at the beginning level.

Accordingly, Morris exposes this notion alongside that of the 'needs' of ordinary teachers in training. 'What of the majority, the general practitioners, on whom in the last resort all depends?',³¹ he asks. And the dependence he indicates is at once institutional and logical; and too easily forgotten in talk generated by a

consciousness within educationists that academic status achieved through association with a recognized discipline is easier to come by than by redefining 'rigour' in terms of a subject Education taken off the defensive in the context of higher education. Morris, as we shall see, spent a long professional career indicating ways in which Education could be made relevant without being an inferior study: could, in a sense, become 'rigorously relevant'. Here, early, he points to the classroom, where the child learns and the teacher teaches, as the proper focus for educational theory.

However, it is theory which does not just explain what is going on in learning and teaching. It seeks to change it for the better: it is prescriptive theory, not an aggregate of several descriptive disciplines. This theory is not to be found in history or any other single discipline; no matter how eloquently specialists like Armytage argue that it is, on the basis of a characterisation of their own specialism which conceals logical gaps with fine words. It is of a different nature. It is practical theory - theory of what to do. Ultimately, as we shall see demonstrated fully by one little-publicized group of philosophers, it is normative theory of a philosophically justified kind. Morris, in his very personal way, is, in his comments on the history of education, one of the first to point in this direction, aware as he is of the pressures in academic life which force organizations in the opposite direction. The strongest of these pressures this most tolerant of general educationists illuminates in the observation that:

For the scholar it may be almost a necessary article of faith to believe that his scholarship and his vision are at once uniquely his own, and also of universal importance.³²

In inter-relating, in the present chapter, the views of a scholar who certainly fits this description with those of one who shows a much less passionate standpoint and those of a 'non-scholar' by conviction, we have touched on several general themes which go well beyond what the chapter title connotes. These are significant enough themes for the parallel exercises in analysis which are to follow in the the other chapters that they are best displayed as a bridge from history to wider concerns. In fact, the reflexive, meta-literature of history of education is exhausted in these few offerings: in itself this has a significance which will need comment at the very end of the chapter.

Wider Points of Logic

Morris referred to the scholar - any scholar. Our theme is Education, not just the history of education which has provided a convenient starting point before virtually disappearing from the account. One characteristic of logic is that it is formal rather than substantive, and this applies to the present enquiry where 'logic' carries a meaning loose enough to fit the purposes stated in the Introduction. So, from the particular field in focus we have identified some quite general topics: the literature examined has had something to offer the philosophical investigator beyond its face-significance. The first realization is that, whenever a discussion of education presupposes that there is speaking a kind of rigorous professional whose qualifications, background, status and the rest give him authority to pronounce, we should

be on guard. It could be said that we should be on our logical guard, for the claim is not dissimilar to that disposed of in the technical logical fallacy known as *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*; that is, the appeal to an authority with respect to matters not within the authority's special province. The authority on history - or psychology, philosophy or sociology - is not thereby an authority on education the normative enterprise, only on education the social institution regarded as an object of description and explanation. (The case of philosophy is complex, as we shall see.)

Moreover, even granting that there are authorities in the disciplines viewed as descriptive enterprises which bear on education in some way, there is the problem of rival authorities of which the differences between the positions of Armytage and Burston in the philosophy of history give some indication. We shall see that, in the other disciplines of education too, the argument from qualification is radically undermined by the fact that there are competing 'qualifications'. The question can then be reasonably asked by any generalist who is being criticized for his inadequacies by real psychologists, philosophers and sociologists; 'Which species of the "real" do I accept; and why?'

The existence of this kind of situation in the academic sector which is most closely related to the practical business of education is one good reason for the scepticism which seeks an alternative explanation of the exaggerated claims made by some on behalf of their own subject. We have suggested that to ignore the political and personal-psychological dimensions of academic discussion would

be to respond naively to it as a social phenomenon. This is certainly borne out by the report of the Standing Conference of professors of education discussing the disciplines later in the 1950s. The following brief remark says all that needs to be said about the top end of this particular academic hierarchy and the likely effect of the value indicated right down through the system of teacher training: 'What was clear, however, was the importance almost every speaker attached to academic respectability as the only armour against disdainful colleagues.' ³³

A second general theme is that the field of education has produced thinkers like Morris - general educationists. Their concern is for relevance in educational studies, but this requirement does not rule out on their part a kind of rigour. They have a different conception of rigour from that assumed by specialists who prefer not to describe themselves as Educationists. Rigour to a generalist is rigour of a kind appropriate to the practical task which has to be accomplished in education. It is not the rigour of a descriptive specialism defined in such a manner as to satisfy the scholar or researcher whose reference group lies elsewhere in academic life. Nevertheless, the generalist is no inferior intellectual. Often he has come to his position, as Morris did, from a specialism with which he continues to be associated. Nevertheless, his thinking is different in that he is prepared to draw material from all the disciplines as required; and, consequently, to become knowledgeable enough in these disciplines to achieve his generalist purposes. Eventually we shall find it confirmed that this kind of thinking is, in fact, philosophical thinking; so that the generalist is,

in essence, a philosopher. But he is so in a sense which is not confined within the definition of philosophy that we shall in a later chapter identify as just another restricted and specialized attempt to introduce academic rigour into this area. For the moment Morris, open to all scholarly claims yet cautious in his tolerance, can stand for the generalist.

The third theme is present in embryo in the discussion of the history of education. It is that the concept of a 'Person' emerges. It is a person who does the thinking which, in more systematic and explicit form, becomes educational theory. He is the vehicle for Armytage's 'understanding' as he is for Morris's complex mode of thinking. We shall come to realize at many points in the present work that what can be called 'personalism' appears in very varied contexts as a protest against a conception of educational theory which is too abstract in its level of discussion.³⁴ It is an orientation which is consonant with the notion that educational theory is essentially normative. It is the person who philosophizes: philosophical systems are rooted in this easily forgotten fact about the human situation. It is the person around whom generalist thinkers in every age have felt impelled to cluster all those terms which are so difficult to ban from educational discourse by the most authoritative, even, of scholarly prohibitions in the name of rigour - terms like 'integration', 'synthesis', 'constructive', 'whole', 'unified'. One implication of Morris's criticism of the history of education is precisely that the scholar, in single-minded pursuit of his valued discipline, ceases to some extent to be a person in the

world of teaching and becomes more of an embodiment of a subject. To cease to be a person to any degree while professionally involved in education is, Morris would argue, to lose the capacity to think truly about it - what it is and what it should become.

We move on from the history of education to psychology, the second and most evident discipline of the time, in terms of the bulk of literature. In a sense, Armytage is the only direct reflexive thinker from history itself. And, as we have seen, reflection on the nature of history in the context of teacher training is reflection, implicitly, on all the other elements which constitute Education as well as on their inter-relationship, simply because it is the history of education which is under consideration. Armytage's resolution is draconian and unacceptable. However, it is at least an attempt. Other historians seemed to be content to carry on in the old ways which were one of the objects of his scorn. The reasons are, no doubt, complex and it would take us too far from our main purpose to speculate about them other than to suggest that there is something straightforward about the accumulation of descriptive historical material, its teaching and its learning which appeals because it has long been done that way and not found wanting. This type of 'conspiracy of acceptance' by tutors and students survives provided there are no strong claims made for the bearing of the material on the act of teaching. Armytage's own very strong though obscure claims on this matter were soon forgotten, to judge by the absence in the literature of any following debate. The situation in psychology is, we shall now see, very different.

Chapter Two

The Psychological Field: A Focus for Philosophy

This will be a considerably longer chapter, not only because there is a large literature (for there is that, too, in history), but because a considerable portion of it is reflexive in the sense identified earlier. Psychologists, being members of a relatively new profession, spend much time in discussing the nature of what they are doing, explicitly or by implication.

The concept of the personal will emerge quite strongly in this chapter, as would be expected following earlier remarks and the fact that Morris is, out of the context of education, a psychologist. However, the main feature of the discussion will focus on a tension noted in the history chapter. Many see educational psychology in terms of its parent subject - a rigorously scientific discipline. The opposition conceive of it as being primarily educational, in the sense that relevance to the learning of complex curriculum material in the setting of ordinary classrooms is sought.¹ The discussion is not based on such a simple contrast, as will become clear, but it will serve to orientate it in terms already familiar from the first chapter.

Scientific Psychology: Its Eclectic Use in Education

There is no problem to many writers of this period about the nature of educational psychology. It is psychology, without qualification other than the use of an adjective to denote the

sub-area. Some parts of such a vast scientific enterprise are 'clearly' more relevant to education than others, so that the subject consists of those parts. Difficulties arise when it is observed that different writers consider different parts to be relevant. Assumptions about relevance are, on the evidence of the literature, both very individual and yet apparently unembarrassing in their diversity to the writers themselves. Once more, there is the impression given that by and large this situation is found to be satisfactory by many, as the product of tradition, albeit a more recent tradition than that of the history of education. 'Relevance' is not viewed as a problematic term by those who define educational psychology as the eclectic gathering of what seems useful from the parent science.

Of course, behind the acceptance of pure psychology as the model there are all the problems within that parent discipline concerning its own nature. Eventually they will become reflected in the literature of educational psychology, as we shall note in detail throughout later sections. One aspect of this discussion - at one remove from education - which will assume great importance concerns the discipline of philosophy directly. To philosophers, the breaking away of scientific psychology from philosophy itself has always been viewed with a certain amount of scepticism. So, there is their criticism of a radical kind concerning the logical status of psychology's claims to be a science to be taken into account. It can be said that, wherever psychology is, philosophy is never far behind. This is particularly the case with those parts of psychology which appear in the context of education. Philosophers

persistently refuse to abandon their primary interest in the whole range of mental concepts which feature in any talk about education. They do not, either to psychologists who claim scientific understanding of these matters or, as has been touched upon, to historians who claim historical insight and understanding of the same. 'Philosophers' in this context will appear in both their 'technical' form, ² laying claim to a professional standing as strongly as Armytage did, and also in the form of a Morris, unbound by technicalities yet with an equally strong concern to make a humanistic comment on the claims of scientific psychology.

Nevertheless, these anticipatory remarks already appear complicated in comparison to the major tradition of the time in educational psychology. It consists of a conventional eclecticism. There is little sign here of reflexive debate. Yet there is strong reflexive implication. This assured and predominant position in teacher education is symbolised by the long-standing journal The British Journal of Educational Psychology. In its pages educational psychology is manifestly modelled on empirical pure psychology - in its turn modelled on one mathematically-adorned conception of natural science. ³ The pages reveal much empiricism and little meta-commentary.

The journal lacks any theoretical unity; more a unity of attitude as it confidently proffers material of a certain kind. What kind this is can be gauged from the remarks of educationists who have a different background to that of contributors to this journal. Two of them are not restrained in comments which appear in the first volume of the aspiring 'rival' journal, British Journal of

Educational Studies. H.M. Knox, as noted above, refers to 'much of the duplicated statistical outpourings that frequently pass for educational research'.⁴ We shall see at the end of the next period that his own concept of humanistic research was to result in a book on educational method which attempts to provide that bridge between knowing and doing which the journal of the educational psychologists seems not to be concerned to build. N.T. Walker similarly comments: 'It is, however, very much open to doubt whether many of the vital problems in education will ever admit of quantitative investigation or statistical solution'.⁵ The face appearance of the more prestigious journal arouses such scepticism.

Clearly the scientific trappings of this brand of educational psychology do not impress these and other commentators on the research scene. They respond with the perennial student-type response: 'So what?'. But this is a question which rarely occurs to those at the centre of the psychological sector. The influential C.M. Fleming, for instance, happily observes: 'Not unreasonably...it may be claimed that the basic discipline for the training years is psychology - the scientific study of human behaviour'.⁶ Little wonder it is that, in the same year as that all-embracing and unqualified claim, the non-psychologist educationists should see fit to establish their own journal, no matter how tactfully it was advertised. For Fleming gives no justification for the claim to primacy. She assumes it without analysis. Instead of logic she offers history. Psychology's development is described as if she believed that what is is what ought to be.

However, she is just one individual. The case against

conventional eclecticism is more effectively made by considering an influential volume of the time whose contributors read like a role of honour in pure psychology. The Bearings of Recent Advances in Psychology on Educational Problems⁷ is a title which promises a lot. Appearing under the aegis of the University of London Institute of Education it would seem to be definitive of the nature of educational psychology. 'Bearings' is the key logical term: the application of science to the real world of education is apparently at hand. But the 'Foreword' soon disappoints expectations: 'Each lecturer was asked to exhibit the most recent advances in psychology which might have a bearing on some aspect of educational practice'.⁸ The 'might' sums up the problem of eclecticism. These lectures confirm the weakness of the approach, with regard to 'implication' as the distinguished professors have their say. Rex Knight establishes the strategy of the whole volume by admitting that his 'task is to examine some of the main theories of motivation'⁹ while he declines to go beyond description into the area of prescriptive practicalities. His reason is that the field he covers reveals such a wide divergence of position and lacks any unifying concepts.

Others are in the same position. Fleming repeats her theme by offering a second historical survey, this time emphasizing the emergence of social psychology, an area she had made her own in education. 'The child within the group,' she says 'is the necessary subject of our study'.¹⁰ But there is no gap-bridging; only an identification of further content with assumed educational relevance. R.W. Russell, given the task of talking on learning, the central concept in any educational psychology which is to have application,

finds the contemporary psychological theories of learning to be so varied and in dispute that they can, in his view, throw little light on how children learn in school. His admission that 'it is unlikely that detailed suggestions desired by educators will be derived from psychological theories of learning'¹¹ is as clear an indication as possible that the concept of educational psychology which guides the whole volume needs logical scrutiny. We shall be examining the work of those persons in education - who still legitimately operate under the label 'psychologist' yet who argue for a separate and non-extrapolated discipline - in the next major phase of this chapter. Unlike Fleming or Russell they are prepared to challenge conventional assumptions, particularly about the research 'base' which can elucidate children's school learning.

What emerges from the volume of lectures is that there is a logical gap to be bridged. Psychologists make pronouncements derived from empirical situations which are often far distant from the classroom. The teacher wants knowledge which relates to the classroom. Morris, who will turn out to be ubiquitous, appears again to relate, in his characteristic fashion, dynamic psychology to the problem of mental health in schools.¹² But we can pass by his contribution, whose point will be best seen in some of his later work. This leaves one contributor who shows concern at the identified gap. W.D. Wall deals with the more proximately 'educational' topic of the curriculum and classroom teaching. He is therefore in a position to cite Piagetian-type research and thus give some indication of a possible change of emphasis in the content of educational psychology. Nevertheless, his remarks are

sketchy. He shows little in the way of a positive re-thinking of the nature of educational psychology which new types of research of an unconventionally 'empirical' cast suggest. Later the place of Piaget will be clarified. Here, Wall asks questions rather than provides answers. He confesses that the new-style body of knowledge about children's thinking is such as to raise doubts about conventional findings. However, he too admits, of the innovative workers, that 'attempts to apply their findings to the real situations of the classroom draw attention to their incompleteness'.¹³

Turning from this recognition of a growth point in an otherwise strangely self-satisfied volume to the most popular text-book of the time, we can confirm both the nature of eclecticism and the fact of its unreflecting acceptance. E.A. Peel's book offers as the psychological 'basis' of education a descriptive account of the findings of contemporary psychology which covers the usual range of topics. This is the eclectic substance. Of concern to us is the explicit statement that 'Educational psychology is an applied branch of psychology'.¹⁴ For the expectation that the nature of the application will be carefully elucidated in a text intended for teachers is nowhere met. The author merely remarks that it is that part of psychology which is relevant to the aims of education. Again, this is not helpful as a guide to action; particularly as he continues with the first of many puzzling assertions: 'In a way there are as many educational psychologies as educations'.¹⁵ This remark is either very deep - designed to provoke thought by its cryptic form - or it is just unintentionally confusing.

Evidence that there is no deep intention can be found by inspecting Peel's contribution of the same year to an early issue of an international journal of education. In 'Some Contributions of Psychology to Education',¹⁶ he presents some simple, unanalysed notions which are in keeping with the concept of an educational psychology whose primary purpose is to provide a corpus of psychological findings, leaving the client with the job of working out what to do with the offering. He suggests that 'educational science as a complementary discipline to principles of education'¹⁷ has educational psychology at its core. If, by this, the author means that the instrumental know-how for achieving proper educational purposes is in some way dependent on some kind of psychology, then he has said little; for, as we shall see with other approaches later, it is the nature of the dependence which is problematical. Little is gained by the teacher from reading that such psychologically-based science should promote 'critical thinking', provide a 'frame of reference', 'confirm established facts' and 'suggest new methods and techniques'. Perhaps in 'political' terms the most plausible explanation of this account is that the readers of this journal are being acquainted with the fact that a British text-book exists in the subject which is not lacking in a knowledge of the findings of pure psychology.

Logically, what strikes a reader aware of work in other disciplines (and indeed work in educational psychology conceived in a different way) is that the author confuses distinct types of questions because he thinks in pictures. The following passage is remarkable from this point of view:

We have a sort of Holy Trinity in these three subjects: psychology, principles, and methods. They are, as it were, at the apices of a triangle. The lecturer at any one of these apices is involved in the other two points. Indeed, if we were to add the all important practical teaching, these three would become four and we should have a tetrahedron each of whose four apices is dependent upon the other three aspects of education. ¹⁸

It is ironical that such a pronouncement is made in the name of rigour. However, as we have already suggested, in looking at history, there can be rigour and rigour. Perhaps a more adequate notion of what scientific psychology can contribute to education can be gained by turning from eclecticism and the conventional literature which assumes that the question of application is a minor one to the early work of the most tough-minded of scientific psychologists. For there is nothing eclectic about B.F. Skinner. Nor are we in any doubt about the mode of application of his psychology, even if there are those, as we shall see, who doubt his whole philosophy.

Skinner's radical behaviourism is uncompromisingly distant from the kind of conventional eclecticism which we have briefly considered. It is in this period that he begins to make explicit its clear technological implications for the tasks of teaching. His then recent advances in the experimental psychology of learning, more extensive and unified than any other approach, had been based on the design of techniques for precisely manipulating reinforcement in animal learning. He now sees himself in the position to argue strongly that this type of mechanism is noticeably absent from classroom procedures. So, teaching machines are, in his view,

necessary. Skinner's words sound out the voice of positivistic science, commenting with no inhibition on human affairs:

Education is perhaps the most important branch of scientific technology. It deeply affects the lives of all of us. We can no longer allow the exigencies of a practical situation to suppress the tremendous improvements which are within our reach. The practical situation must be changed.¹⁹

Such an imperative can come only from a thinker who has anticipated and thought through philosophical objections to his presuppositions about the nature of man. Skinner, unlike the eclectics, knows himself to be operating at the meeting point of philosophy and psychology. He argues that, in educating, we must have regard directly to the behaviour of human beings as the only evidence for the presence of 'mind', 'understanding' and all the other mental characteristics whose verbal designation is so beloved of educationists who lack a consistent rationale such as his own. Clearly, the nature of educational psychology is not problematical to Skinner. There is no logical gap to be bridged by the reader of his work. To talk of 'applying' psychology to education in relation to him hardly fits the tight connection there is between the various parts of his total conception of an educational technology based on behaviourism. It will be left to future commentators in the present account to expose the value-presuppositions which, even in the short quotation above, can be detected, and which underpin his bold prediction that 'We are on the threshold of an exciting and revolutionary period, in which the scientific study of man will

be put to work in man's best interests.' ²⁰

We shall see a lot more of Skinnerian developments in Period Two. Now, it is time to turn from a consideration of scientific psychology in its eclectic and radical manifestations in the context of education to a contrasting perspective on psychology. It takes little imagination to guess that the psychologist in Morris will be very evident on this scene. He is the one to be picked out from those who, while not being 'technical' philosophers, insist on placing the 'science' of psychology within a humanistic framework which is a clue as to their philosophical world-view. We have already seen how the concept of the person appears readily in educational discussion. We shall see further how personalism represents the strongest 'lay' philosophical resistance to behaviourism identified as another form of world-view.

The Opposition of Humanistic Psychology

Morris was at this time a most unusual Director of the National Foundation for Educational Research. In the same journal as that in which Peel acquainted continental colleagues with one British view of 'Educational science', he has the revealing comment that 'it is only too easy to slip into an uncritical acceptance of the notion that the term "research" ought to be restricted to empirical and experimental studies, preferably involving some form of measurement or quantitative assessment'. ²¹ The lengthy footnote to this pronouncement, given below, reaffirms the generalist position which dictates all Morris's responses. ²² He identifies the

pervasiveness of scientific modes of thought in education, exemplified in the popularity of experimental psychology. To Morris, this approach generates a narrow vision of education: it is symptomatic of a rigidity of outlook which it is essential to oppose. He draws attention, approvingly, of the 'movement to "humanise" educational research'²³ - to develop a fundamentally different attitude to enquiry. The most important question for him is what the character of educational research should be. Unlike Fleming, it will be recalled, he is not of the view that what is should be. His consciousness of the normative nature of the whole educational enterprise, including those sectors of it which provide the knowledge on which action is to be based, is always evident. 'If education is approached purely through scientific knowledge', he says, 'it becomes nothing more than a technology - a branch of human engineering.'²⁴

Strikingly, this comment shows that what Skinner considers an imperative, Morris condemns. That the argument is one about the nature of man, as suggested above, comes out nowhere in the literature more strongly than in Morris's writings, here and elsewhere. All discussion of education, no matter how restricted to the 'technical' it may appear to be, leads to wider issues. These issues can not, in his judgement, be illuminated by any single academic subject. They must be thought through, in their complexity, by a mode of thinking which allows conceptual questions, value questions and empirical questions to be identified yet seen in relation. He optimistically assures his fellow educationists, against all the evidence that we are in process of recording concerning

the pressure from specialist studies, that 'there is now a growing awareness of the need to approach education as a single study calling for a truly catholic approach to knowledge.' ²⁵

One favoured element in the 'catholic approach' features in a whole issue of the non-academic, progressive journal New Era when Morris and others look to Freud, Jung and Adler for insights into the work of the teacher. ²⁶ The substantive content of the articles is of no direct relevance to the present discussion ²⁷ but is, indirectly because of its notice by a philosopher of distinction, a good occasion for indicating the kind of critique which humanistic psychology in this form attracts. J.O. Wisdom, a first-class 'real' logician, whose credentials would meet even the strictest Armytage-type specification, adopts the role of the tough-minded sceptic against the tender-minded content of the articles under consideration. The force of his criticism is, it can be added, even stronger than appears because of his well-known interest, unusual in an academic philosopher, in psycho-analysis as a mode of explanation. To this characteristic of his we shall be returning in a later section. Here he can be seen as showing that it is not only Skinnerian behaviourism about which the philosopher is uneasy: the humanistic alternative is, when popularly presented in brief form, in the same case.

Wisdom assumes the role of the class teacher to put his questions. The claims made by Morris and his colleagues for the relevance of depth psychology are probed to reach the judgement that 'Alas, the conclusions reached are meagre and far from concrete. This is not disguised - it is even underlined - by the admirable

sentiment pervading them'.²⁸ Several points can be made here. First, the absence of the 'concrete' reminds us that this was the very charge levelled by Morris himself against the historians of education. Second, Wisdom is not unsympathetic to the attempt made; but, like the perceptive analytical philosopher he is, he recognizes the persuasive nature of the argument. We will eventually examine powerful use made of the notion, taken from philosophical ethics, of 'persuasive meaning' in educational discourse of which this is the first inkling.

His point is that such writings sound right. They seem to say to us what we want to hear about the nature of ourselves, which we 'know' intuitively to be more complex than the animals whose behaviours form the basis of the other kind of psychology - that seen in 'hard' behaviourism. The clinical situation of depth psychology seems more 'relevant' than does the laboratory to our ordinary grasp of ourselves as persons. However, Wisdom insists that the proposals are too indeterminate. One has to guess the answers to the practical teacher's question: 'That is all very well. It sounds good, but so what? What do I now actually do?' In Wisdom's own, somewhat ironical words: 'Is the thesis here that teachers should undergo psycho-analysis?';²⁹ or, at another level of school action, 'how is a headmaster going to advise his staff on fostering contemplation?'³⁰

This brief glimpse of one acute analyst's response to one expression of humanistic psychology is sufficient to illuminate one of our major themes. There appears to be no position in educational thought - in this case, thought in the limited context

of the psychology of education - which has not its competent critics, as convinced of their identification of weaknesses as the proponents of a position are of its strengths. Educational thought thus begins to reveal a characteristic which has been traditionally associated with philosophy itself. The apparent endlessness of debate is often said to mark that discipline, in comparison with other inquiries in which proof and progress appear to have some possibility of attainment. To anticipate, we can suggest that educational thought or theory of the general kind is demonstrable as philosophy - a suggestion which has been made already, though less firmly than in the next, very substantial chapter.

Philosopher Wisdom's insight into the incompleteness of the articles in question points to this truth. For what the rather woolly, vacuous accounts they provide lack is precisely the analytical attention to the term 'relevance' and a more explicit consideration of the value-questions involved in moving from the clinical situation to the teaching situation which less specialist-referenced theorising would supply. Thus, it is amusing that the basis of Wisdom's criticism of Morris is exactly that which forms the basis of Morris's criticism of Skinnerian technology. We can observe, with reference to this, that any expectation of total consistency from any writer in a field as complex as the whole literature of education is soon left behind. But this is, of course, part of the education which comes from exposure to such a literature in its reflexive parts which is similar to that which comes from philosophy itself.

Wisdom's final observation bears on another of our emerging themes. For he recommends that the kind of account of depth psychology

which the articles he is reviewing give really has no more specific bearing on the work of teachers than is to be gained by considering it as one element in that education of teachers as persons which we have already noted. Offered with this objective it would, Wisdom accepts, not provoke the kind of sceptical comment which the implication that there is, in the material, a guide to specific action has caused him to give. Thus he regards as useful the distinction, met before, between the teacher as a person and the teacher as a professional who needs to have available particular methods and techniques for his daily decision-making and acting. This is a distinction likely, on a Wisdom-view, to be assimilated too quickly in the Morris-type humanistic approach by the notion of the 'personal', as it is in the Skinner-type scientific approach into the 'technical'. There would appear to be room left for a third approach under the heading of 'educational psychology', in which the technician and the person are afforded equal consideration.

This third approach we shall shortly see emerging in this Period One. Meanwhile, touching on the personal can move us briefly to the underlying scientific-humanistic discussion illustrated at the highest possible level by returning to Skinner in direct confrontation with an opposed thinker of equal fame. Carl Rogers engages with him in a symposium which offers a deep debate of the issues concerning the control of human behaviour.³¹ Our purposes are served, not by examining its complexities, but by merely recording Rogers' concluding affirmation about the nature of the human person. For this impassioned statement bears closely on a theme which will emerge time and time again, in less exalted contexts, as more of

the reflexive educational literature is examined. Rogers says:

In conclusion, then, it is my contention that science cannot come into being without a personal choice of the values we wish to achieve. And these values we choose to implement will forever lie outside of the science which implements them; the goals we select, the purposes we wish to follow, must always be outside of the science which achieves them. To me this has the encouraging meaning that the human person, with his capacity of subjective choice, can and will always exist, separate from and prior to any of his scientific undertakings. Unless as individuals and groups we wish to relinquish our capacity of subjective choice, we will always remain persons,³² not simply pawns of a self-created science.

It is tempting to offer a Wisdom-type response to this Kierkegaardian conviction. Skinner, of course, does so in the symposium - and at great length. But in this section on humanistic tendencies, we can leave Rogers with the last word. It is time to turn to the third kind of answer to the question of what educational psychology is. Within this approach, it will become clear that the scientific orientation and the humanistic opposition are still both in evidence. Yet the focus is different: it can be summed up by saying that the emphasis is placed on the 'educational' half of the term, as certain thinkers attempt to free the sub-discipline from too heavy a dependence on the findings and debates of the parent study.

A Third Approach: Autonomous Educational Psychology

The motivation for this approach can be understood by noting

the limitations discussed above of both the perspectives on education which rely on the findings of pure psychology in one or the other of its major forms. Neither the clinic nor the animal laboratory is a classroom. To some thinkers this means that an educational psychology should start from the obvious location for children's learning. They want to develop an educational psychology which is equal in rigour to the parent discipline yet conceived as a distinct enterprise whose focus is pupils in school rooms.

This is a view now very strongly associated with the work of David Ausubel, an educational psychologist whose decades of argument against an establishment which shows the weaknesses we have touched upon have at last been successful. His standing in circles where rigour is demanded is high, while the relevance of his work to the classroom is clear. In brief, he has achieved a rigorous relevance by redefining the logic of educational psychology. He has achieved an aim which we have identified as that of generalists working in other sectors, without abandoning a recognisably scientific approach for the more persuasive vaguenesses of one kind of humanism.

Here, in 1953, he starts on this long journey with an examination of the nature of educational research, fittingly offered in one of the first issues of the American journal Educational Theory.³³ As his thinking, both in its first sketch and in its massively developed later form, is one element in the critical position adopted throughout this thesis, it can be taken as read for the moment in order to turn to other evidence that Ausubel was not alone in his dissatisfaction with the state of educational psychology as an extrapolation from academic psychology.

The evidence is to be found most notably in the Soviet Union. Ironically, in view of the judgement made earlier on the work of historians of education, it is one such historian who gives the account. Brian Simon has, of course, turned out to be as unusual a representative of his subject as Armytage himself. At this time he writes without inhibition in The Marxist Quarterly about the grave limitations of orthodox educational psychology in the West.³⁴ He sounds very much like Ausubel when he says: 'It turns its back, as it were, on all the more complex problems of teaching and learning'.³⁵ In a word, 'it' is irrelevant. The obvious focus for enquiry - the classroom - is avoided in order to pursue, in a negative way, all the peripheral topics which, as we have seen, an unexamined notion of what constitutes educational psychology suggests because it has psychology rather than education in focus. No doubt Simon has in mind most clearly all the kind of material which we examined in the first section of this chapter.

What he requires is a positive discipline. He claims that the model for this is to be found in work done in the Soviet Union. In support of the claim, he gives a brief history of that work which culminates in his showing the radical misinterpretation made in the West of Pavlov's investigations. According to Simon, the concept of the conditioned reflex had been taken out of context in the West, with the result that American and British psychology was largely based upon a misconception about the warranty often claimed for it from Pavlovian research. Thus, he says, an attempt was made outside the Soviet Union 'to build a system of psychology based on the stimulus-response formula which denied or ignored

consciousness.' ³⁶ This is an early revelation, made in an unusual journal, of a fact admitted by J.S. Bruner much later with considerably greater effect on the world of psychology.

Thus, Simon condemns, in addition to the conventional material of British educational psychology, the Skinnerian behaviourism which is the heir to Pavlov-misjudged. For Simon lays emphasis, following the real Pavlov to be found in Soviet psychology, on the differences between man and the animals which inhabit the psychologist's laboratory. In this he is a kind of humanist, as we shall see in greater detail in Period Two. The fact that this is not Rogerian humanism perhaps illustrates the care with which labels in educational discourse require a specification in terms of a sustaining literature of the type that we are offering. Educational psychology, partaking in this humanistic science by simply focussing on human beings, investigates children's learning of complex subject-matter in school settings. It is concerned directly with a reality which is very familiar to the teacher. There is, in Simon's words, 'a basis for a return to a positive systematic psychology which can take the place of the eclecticism which at present dominates the field.' ³⁷ From this comment we can turn once more to the American scene, noting that the logic of a position on educational psychology which gives us 'eclecticism' as an appropriate label for the different logic of that which it opposes, is not, on Simon's account, new. He has in mind, of course, an earlier Western tradition in which the learning of real children was central, the survey of which is not part of the present exercise. What can perhaps be added which is of relevance to this thesis is

that one cause of the overthrowing of this earlier tradition was the operation of the 'political' factors we have seen to accompany academic debate; for rigour can always be demonstrated more easily with simple material than with complex!

Meanwhile, to return to the United States: other writers than Ausubel were concerned at the gap between psychological knowledge and educational practice. Clearly this gap is likely to be noticed wherever students ask persistent questions of psychology tutors as to the bearing of what they are offered on what they have to do. As a consequence, it is in the text-book field that there are bound to be attempts made to bridge this gap. What can be called 'bridging' theories, devised as part of the fabric of the less advanced texts aimed at the beginning student, are in evidence - particularly in the two books which dominated the market at this time. These bridging theories, while written under the label of educational psychology, are, in fact, rudimentary educational theories of a prescriptive kind. Their logic is more tentative and less radically worked out than that which Ausubel had in mind and was yet to develop as a comprehensive theory of school learning. Yet these American text-books contrast favourably with that of Peel which we examined earlier. They recognize that knowledge offered to intending teachers is, by 'contextual implication', intended to relate to the interests of those who receive it. And the primary interest of any teacher as teacher is the professional one of wanting to cope with the classroom problems which will face him, in as successful a way as possible. It is not a mere interest in being exposed to psychology as if it were just part of a liberal education.

So, Lee Cronbach and Henry Clay Lindgren offer in this period a book each which illustrate the shape which psychology takes when translated into a teacher education context by, on the one hand, a broadly 'scientific' educationist and, on the other, by a broadly 'humanistic' one. They differ in disciplinary orientation, yet agree in their aim to give explicit answers to the implied question of utility found in a professional context. They take seriously, that is, the 'So what?' ignored wherever psychology is presented as being 'obviously' relevant in unstated ways. It is of interest to note here that the very concept of 'contextual implication' which underlies this approach had been elucidated round about this time in a distant domain by the English moral philosopher P.H. Nowell-Smith in his classic Ethics. Nowell-Smith's 'Rule 3' of contextual implication - 'What a speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his audience. This is the most important of the three rules; unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more common than liars or careless talkers.' ³⁸ - bears closely on the question of the nature of educational psychology as distinct from psychology as a descriptive science. Later, we shall note how the formidable Israel Scheffler makes a systematic re-interpretation of this concept in order to analyze the language of education.

For the moment we can note briefly that, of the two writers in question, Cronbach shows the most 'obvious' attempt at bridging. ³⁹ He surveys the conventional content areas of scientific psychology in the manner of eclecticism, but does not merely load them on to the student on the assumption that the recipient will know what

use to make of them. 'The evident need', he insists, 'is for a unifying pattern to which specific concepts and bodies of evidence relate.'⁴⁰ Accordingly, he bridges the gap with a model of the teaching-learning situation. In the terms of this thesis, which will move later to consider the various species of educational theory in a more explicit form than that which appears in the literature ostensibly devoted to the disciplines of education, Cronbach offers a rudimentary theory of teaching derived from his own characterization of what learning is. One could, with hindsight, say that it is sub-Ausubelian. As a conceptualization of the teaching-learning process, it certainly lacks the comprehensiveness of what Ausubel was to develop on the basis of his theory of meaningful learning. Yet, at the time, it was a firm step back to that tradition which we have noted Simon describe as 'positive' educational psychology - the tradition of William James and E.L. Thorndike which was interested in complex educational processes rather than simpler behaviours.

Lindgren is interesting as a bridging theorist who is at the other pole of educational thinking about psychology: he is a humanist-personalist alternative to Cronbach. These philosophical underpinnings in what are essentially elementary texts are fascinating to see, particularly in Lindgren. His concern for relevance, rather than for displaying the warranted academic status of the psychological content he cites, is evident throughout a substantial volume. Its very title - Educational Psychology in the Classroom⁴¹ - is intended to show this. As to the contents, there is a new stratum not found in Cronbach or the eclectic English material. Lindgren draws on

phenomenological material which emphasises concepts such as 'meaning' and 'understanding'. The teacher is seen as in the business of transactions which can be accounted for only on such terms - terms which apply equally to the teacher as to the children in his care.

This approach is tender-minded: it lays its emphasis differently to that of Cronbach, while having the same problem in mind. It is an approach which has the unified thinking about education of a Dewey in mind as a model, while consciously attempting to go beyond it by assimilating new perspectives in humanistic psychology. Its 'tone' is very reminiscent of Morris. There appears from first to last an emphasis on the self or person. An existentialist notion of philosophy, of a type we shall touch on more fully in the next chapter, is never too distant from prescriptions which are often surprisingly homely in appearance; as if the author were attempting to exemplify the truth that the value-enterprise found in a single classroom links inevitably with the widest concerns of man. He wants to show his readers how to 'gain a better understanding of their roles as teacher-psychologists, as artists and scientists in the field of human relations.'⁴² Most certainly he is not aiming at showing them that he is a 'real' psychologist with the right credentials.

This book is far from the technological world of Skinner. It is little surprise that Lindgren cites Rogers in support of his approach. Nor is it surprising that so many editions of the work have appeared, right up to the present day. For much of its content is reflexive in an obvious way. He deliberates quite explicitly on what he is offering the practical teacher, sharing with the reader his thoughts about the material he is using - its

origin in those sectors of psychology which border on philosophical concerns, of the kind we shall see occupying the thought of personalists who have yet to contribute to this account. In short, he discusses and exemplifies a whole range of matters which fall under the heading of 'logic' as understood here. He explicates, sometimes quite explicitly but often merely by the implication of the content he has selected, the nature of educational psychology as he sees it - that is, general, normative thinking about education at classroom level to which psychology found 'out there', as it were, is assimilated. Few books in the literature make such frequent use of the phrase 'teachers should'. Its popularity is strong evidence of the strength of what Morris, in another particular context but with general applicability, as we saw, identified as the student's as against the scholar's 'need'.

Of relevance to this theme of bridging theories is the work of A.P. Coladarci for his occupation of a position mid-way between that of Lindgren and that of Cronbach. In an explicit article on 'relevancy'⁴³ there is none of the one's phenomenological emphasis on the teacher as a person nor of the other's less introspective emphasis on the teacher as learning-situation analyst. The teacher's 'needs' are still paramount in the account given, but it is a model of action-research which encompasses them. In offering such a model, Coladarci can be seen to anticipate by several decades, not only its embodiment in Ausubel's mature versions of a cognitive educational psychology, but also the trend associated in British studies much later with Lawrence Stenhouse and the East Anglian School - one of the most rigorous of contemporary attempts to base teachers'

continuing education on a notion of relevance rather than one of differentiated disciplines. Coladarci makes his central point very clear:

Any particular combination of teacher-pupil-class-group-community-available materials, etc., is somewhat different from any other combination. There is no general prescription that can be considered to be clearly valid for particular cases. The teacher, then, must be an active, continuous inquirer into the validity of his own procedures. 44

This pronouncement is made in the name of an educational psychology conceived in radically different terms from those found in the conventional courses of the time. The teacher makes hypotheses, as well as taking from educational psychology its content as hypotheses, about his own unique situation. He tests them; but not necessarily in a formal way, for the job of the teacher essentially requires him always to be moving on, deciding and acting within a stream of events. His testing is in the reflection which takes place between the flow of teaching experience: in this lies the professionalism which, in other models of the teaching-learning process, is often described more in terms of the qualities of a person than in the 'application' language found here.

What Coladarci opts for - in order to describe a situation familiar to anyone with substantial experience of real classrooms and the inclination to reflect on it - is a language which stresses that very analytical and scientifically orientated 'application' mode of thinking, as the most meaningful; rather than a language which puts stress on the teacher as person who has a sensitivity to 'meanings' in a wider sense. Yet, in all these bridging theorists,

there is held in common that conviction that what is called educational psychology must make sense to the practising teacher - a conviction which we have described as 'logical' and which considerably lessens the obvious differences between the theorists considered in this section. This influential writer characterizes the teacher as a thinking person who looks to educational psychology not for fool-proof rules but for possible principles - not ready-made procedures, but hypotheses which suggest appropriate action in a situation where there are, as it were, initial conditions known only to himself. In short, the intelligence and responsibility of the individual teacher is presupposed in the model.

In this way Coladarci, together with the two text-book writers, is moving in a direction which is education-centred and not just discipline-centred. A conceptualization of the teacher's central role in relation to his pupils' learning of this sort affords weight, certainly, to the findings of psychology; but it does not ignore the very obvious constraints in individual classrooms, of which the teacher is more aware than those who offer him mere generalizations. Within this type of model, there is obviously room for great differences, as we have seen, in answering the question of what the findings of psychology are, according to where the respondent stands on the scientific-humanistic issue. Nevertheless, these differences are minimized in a way which was not evident in the discussion of earlier sections of this chapter. Centring educational psychology on education in the fashion of bridging theories - even these rudimentary ones - has the effect of making it less prone to indulge in debates about the nature of pure

psychology itself.

Jean Piaget: Both Psychologist and Philosopher

An amplification of the status of bridging theories, produced by psychologists who are eager to establish the autonomy of a sub-discipline, must await developments in the literature to be investigated in Period Two. We now must give some attention to the emergence in the present period of a third force, found back in Europe. Jean Piaget has, of course, become increasingly important, in the eyes of many, as a psychologist whose work has great relevance to education. In this period his later work begins to receive attention. It falls into a class of its own, simply because it is neither pure psychology of the scientific or humanistic kinds we have examined, nor is it educational psychology of the type just described. For Piaget has always regarded himself as philosopher as well as psychologist. He does not recognize the orthodox academic distinctions which allow these disciplines to claim separate identities. The hovering of philosophy about the psychological domain, to which we have earlier made brief reference, becomes in Piaget a total entry of the one into the other. He therefore requires a separate section to keep the logic of the account clear.

Not surprisingly, in view of this logic - but certainly so in its inclusion of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in our corpus of 'educational' literature - it is a philosopher who introduces this, the later, Piaget to Britain. ⁴⁵ As usual, we are not interested in the substantive content of the article under

consideration; but of its bearing on our reflexive thesis. Mays illuminatingly links the genetic epistemology which he outlines with a well-known section of Gilbert Ryle's seminal bok The Concept of Mind. His observation at this point is of great relevance to our enquiry:

Ryle thinks there could exist a "theory of knowledge" in the sense of getting to know, concerned with the concepts of learning, teaching and examining, which might be called "the philosophy of learning", "methodology of education", "Grammar of Pedagogy". The "Épistémologie Génétique" would obviously fall under this heading. ⁴⁶

This is a very perceptive remark in its anticipation by many years of links in the philosophy of education which were to become part of the orthodoxy of the 'London Line' of R.S. Peters. We are taken by this acute observation into intellectual territory far distant from, say, that of Peel. Yet both discussions fall without strain under the question of the nature of educational psychology. This is a far cry from eclecticism. It can be said that the eventual domination of educational psychology by Piagetian material is evidence of the unsatisfactory nature of eclecticism. For in this approach, there is promise that the relationship between psychology and pedagogy will be set out in such a way as to answer the question of relevance. Whether the promise is fulfilled we shall be better able to judge once the criticisms of Piaget made by psychologists with the orientation of an Ausubel and philosophers with the more strictly philosophical inclinations of a David Hamlyn are indicated during Period Two. For the moment, it can be said that, on the basis of Mays' appreciation of Piaget's logical position in the middle ground

between technical psychology and technical philosophy, Piaget gives systematic attention to those mental concepts which are the educator's concern in an everyday sense - a concern which can little afford to wait on the settlement of boundary disputes as to the name of the discipline which 'properly' investigates them. Piaget, from this point of view, is undoubtedly a generalist; for the definition of a generalism begins to emerge as simply one whose concerns are not limited by academic prohibitions as to what intellectual domains a practically-orientated thinker can occupy.

This thought can take us immediately to a sector of educational studies which lies at an entirely different level to that of the prestigious philosophy journal just cited. The homely house magazine of the National Froebel Foundation abounds with comment which shows the excited discovery of the later Piaget, perceived as clearly relevant to the work of those who teach young children. Here, the reflexive observations come, then, not in a context of academic philosophy, but in one of very practical affairs. Committed progressive educators are urged to become Piagetian 'philosophers' by one of the most insightful analysts of his work's significance for the learning-teaching process.⁴⁷ Nathan Isaacs contrasts markedly with other contributors to this journal. They focus, in a limited way, on Piaget's work on number concepts, expressing with hopeful expectation rather than a demonstration of their grasp of the scope of this whole Piagetian approach, what one describes as 'a conviction that Piaget's experiments both in their methods and in their results have an important message for teachers.'⁴⁸ He, on the other hand, writes with the authority of a general educationist in possession of a systematic theory, synthesised out of a range of discipline-

materials which are available to a man of polymathic interests and competence.

Isaacs, accordingly, states a broad intention: 'to try and bring the present volume into relation to the wider context of Piaget's work as a whole and the still wider framework of the genetic psychology of learning and knowing as such.'⁴⁹ This is the language of generalism, inevitable in its appearance whenever education is the theme. It is generalism typically open to the accommodation of new insights, without reference to whether conventional boundaries are being overstepped. Isaacs considers that the scope of Piaget's total work is such as to require a rethinking of his own and his colleagues' existing progressivist philosophy in its complex relationship with psychology.

For our purposes, the logical acumen of Isaacs is a welcome addition to that part of the literature which focusses on the education of children. His undeniably rigorous thinking about the activities of teaching is not confined by a recognition of lines of demarcation. These, he maintains with Piaget, are the result of a historical separation between philosophy and psychology which has to be resisted. We would add that the intellectual justification for the separation has a non-intellectual side to it, which we have glimpsed in noting the keenness with which certain academics defend their subject's sovereignty over boundary areas. Further comment on this phenomenon will be found in Period Two, where it will be more appropriate to introduce the insights into the nature of 'intellectual professions' offered by the philosopher Stephen Toulmin and others. For now, we can note Isaacs' relevant comment:

Piaget seeks to claim or reclaim for psychology territories which are usually regarded as falling of necessity within the philosophic domain. Now the interesting fact is that most psychologists are not at all disposed to welcome such a reclamation. For it goes against the whole historic grain of the relationship of scientific psychology to philosophy.⁵⁰

Isaacs appreciates that 'scientific' psychology needs to be expanded and transformed in conception from the kind of position we examined earlier. Our own outline of the humanistic opposition to psychology conceived in narrow scientific terms identified the 'philosophical' reservations which come out in force in a psychologist such as Rogers. But this perspective of Piaget, as seen by the psychologist-philosopher Isaacs in similar terms to those of the philosopher-psychologist Mays, is potentially more radical than the humanist-scientist controversy carried on in the context of the discipline to which this chapter is, in theory, devoted. It is psychology-philosophy rooted in the observation of children. It therefore invites comparison, as a perspective, with the 'third approach' described above. It raises the question which an Ausubelian theory, on the one hand, or the Soviet theory, on the other, forces - the extent to which there can be found in the complexities of this unique investigator a theory of learning with applications to the conditions of a classroom.

The question can not be fully answered at this early point in the account. What we have is a foretaste, in the skilful use to which Isaacs puts Piagetian material to work within an existing progressivist theory of education, of the kind of interpretation which was to become almost an orthodoxy itself in educational

psychology within a few years. It is no surprise, in view of the direction which this interpretation takes Piaget - the direction of an autonomous psychology-theory domain as sketched above - to find that the most incisive critic of the new orthodoxy will eventually turn out to be the Ausubel of later years offering his own comprehensive 'assimilation' theory as the truth about educational psychology. For the moment we can end by carefully noting this very close association of psychology, philosophy and pedagogy or general theory which comes, in Isaacs' words from 'Reconciling Piaget's findings with our "progressive" beliefs.'⁵¹

So, a chapter on psychology terminates with a section in which the intrusion of philosophical matters is more evident, even, than in earlier sections from which it was not absent. We can move opportunely to the investigation of the intrusive discipline itself - to its own literature. In doing so, we can recall that the references to 'philosophy', 'psychology' or any other subject are - given that this thesis is concerned with a reflexive literature in the main - merely convenient ways of identifying contexts. For we are dealing with philosophical questions about the nature of subject areas and their inter-relationships the whole time and these contexts can, unless we are careful, easily lead us to forget this.

Chapter Three

Varieties of Rigour in the Philosophical Field

The writers in this chapter know that they are philosophizing. Those examined in earlier chapters can not be assumed to have such knowledge of their own reflections. Here, then, we would expect that the themes of logical interest which have begun to emerge from the substantive contexts of history and psychology of education would appear more plainly and be discussed more explicitly. This, in fact, is the case. A brief reminder of the relevant themes will point the most effective way into what is, even in this early period, a formidably large literature.

It has been noted, first, that the attempts made to clarify the nature of the disciplines so far examined indicate a lack of consensus. There is controversy about what history is and what psychology is. This controversy exists in the pure disciplines, apart from the teacher training context to which they are imported. The differences of viewpoint are philosophical differences in a straightforward use of the term 'philosophy' - a use which this chapter will show is not the only or primary use, nevertheless. As pure historians and pure psychologists are in disagreement about their own disciplines, the strength of a familiar and growing argument, that the disciplines applied in some way to education will constitute an improvement in the rigour of the subject Education, has to be examined carefully. There are multiple authorities, each claiming to be rigorous. It is difficult to tell who the 'real' experts are, so that there is bound to be a suspicion that the

argument from authority, always couched in terms of the intellectual content of the subject, can disguise what, in political terms, is often called 'empire building'. Questions of status, power and influence are not absent from the discussion, as has been strongly suggested.

Furthermore, when arguments on behalf of academic disciplines are advanced in the context of teacher training, a logical 'sea change' takes place. For they become the history of education or the psychology of education: and the 'education' makes a significant difference, in that the normal interests of the teachers to whom these subjects are addressed are professional interests centred on the learning-teaching processes found in what is an essentially normative enterprise. The education-discipline proponent presents, by contextual implication, a tacit view of what general, normative educational theory consists in, while apparently clarifying only the nature of his own discipline. This has to be the case for that discipline to be referred to as, say, the history of education rather than just plain history. Education in the context of professional training is not education as part of 'the world': it exists in the realm of values as well as the world of bricks and mortar.

Other themes can be more briefly dealt with. The notion of 'levels' of educational theory would allow the disciplines to lay greater claim to relevance in the manner suggested by Morris for history of education. It also, as a corollary, reveals the exaggeration in some of the claims made - as, again in history, with Armytage's claim concerning 'Policy' which can not, as we

have shown, mean policy at the level of the daily activities of teaching.

Less of a major theme and more of a realization which any investigation of this kind - across a wide range of literature - forces on the reader, is the lack of awareness of many of the writers investigated as to what is going on in other sectors. Very often, this is with regard to other sectors of the very subject professed. As to other subjects, the lack of knowledge from one to another is manifest in the specialists to a degree which makes it easy to spot a generalist by casual inspection of his typically wide-ranging sources. This lack of awareness by specialists of developments in other disciplines which bear on the very claims made from within a single discipline for its relevance to education is striking. Given that what is under investigation is the literature of a broad domain called, in most organizations, simply Education, the isolation of one sector from another is a clear indication of the preferred reference-groups for many people whose terms of employment, too, formally label them as Educationists, no matter how they style themselves.

This isolationist tendency becomes more remarkable when it is remembered that it is the philosophical aspects of the various bodies of literature which are being inspected. For, in philosophy itself, not to be well-acquainted with the work of other philosophers would be regarded as a very odd condition. The tradition in pure philosophy is, for good reasons, to know what others are saying. We shall now see whether this tradition operates in the philosophy of education.

Before Analysis: Great Thinkers and 'Isms'

In this period, the 'linguistic turn' was in fact taken in the philosophy of education; though it is commonly associated with the 1960s as a suddenly-developed 'application' of analytical techniques established through the so-called revolution in pure philosophy. The point of this approach can perhaps best be appreciated by first sketching in the kind of philosophy of education that the new 'rigourists' were reacting to. Pre-analytic orthodoxy typically consisted in providing alternative systems or 'isms' of a philosophical kind,¹ together with their supposed educational implications. The parallel with the situation in orthodox eclectic educational psychology is not surprising. In both, some body of knowledge from outside education is paraded within education as being of good standing and as having application to the professional task of teaching.

In the case of philosophy, a popular variation on the theme was to present the philosophical knowledge in the form of the thought of Great Thinkers.² Some were more clearly philosophers than others - Plato, for instance, more so than, say, Froebel - but the essential point was that the thought in question supposedly indicated the 'derivations' which could be made from high-level 'philosophical' material to guide the practicalities which are the daily concern of the teacher.

This kind of philosophy of education is so familiar to any reader of this thesis that an unusual entry into a discussion of it can be chosen to fit our purposes. R.A.C. Oliver, not a philosopher

nor an ancient, takes on a 'philosophic' role as an idiosyncratic expositor of this traditional approach.³ He focusses not only on systems of philosophy but on the teachers who are exposed to them in orthodox training. He thus has in view the person who is, as we have observed in several earlier contexts, the living link between philosophical system and classroom practice. Systems do not connect with the world of education unless they are embodied in this way; made part of the teacher, not just learned by him as an academic exercise while he is in training. Oliver says, about what he regards as certain perennial questions of education which systems attempt to answer:

The beliefs, opinions and attitudes a teacher or a layman holds about these recurrent questions, the policies he supports and the methods he uses, may be⁴ said to constitute his philosophy of education.

This is an unusual point of view in that it connects, as we shall see, with the perspective of the earliest critics of the 'isms' approach, while itself being expressed within that approach. To Oliver, systems are large-scale versions - which have been created through endless discussion throughout the history of philosophy - of what he identifies as the individual teacher's own 'system' or personal philosophy of education. The orthodox systems of philosophy which appear in education are writ large: the teacher's is writ small. Nevertheless, in type they are the same. There are many systems and, of course, considerably more individual teachers. But a logical relationship can be established between the two, according to Oliver, in that it is the kind of human activities

which form, for instance, teachers' classroom practices, which, once fully articulated, become what we call philosophical systems.

Oliver's aim in arguing this point is to identify just two systems or super-systems which allow him to present the next step in a discussion which is clearly designed to move the philosophy of education of the time out of the rut of orthodoxy that it was in. He says: 'Of the distinctions made by educational taxonomists, the most far-reaching seems to be that between idealism and naturalism.'⁵ Now, we can note that this is precisely the distinction which underlies the controversy already discussed at several points in the previous chapter, where philosophy 'showed' itself. At the most fundamental level, Skinner and Cronbach can be clearly identified as philosophical naturalists whereas Rogers and Lindgren are philosophical idealists. Oliver's perception is therefore acute, in seeing that there are two fundamental attitudes (his article is entitled 'Attitudes to Education') to the world, to man and to his place in it.

His ingenious correlating of the philosophical systems with the personal characteristics of teachers viewed psychologically need not detain us. What we can take from this unorthodox essay in orthodoxy is his rejection of the notion associated with that tradition which has attracted the logical criticism we shall see in examining the analytical philosophers, shortly. Oliver does not assume that educational principles can be 'deduced' from high-level metaphysical propositions. While his alternative to such a deduction is never made positively clear, his unease with the derivational approach causes him to identify the starting point for a discussion

of philosophy of education as the person rather than the system. This provides a very interesting link with the technical philosophers to come.

It follows that he rejects the idea, implicit in much orthodoxy, that a student teacher, offered alternative philosophical systems like so many portraits of life, chooses one which he likes and then 'applies' it in that part of his life which is teaching. The student, on the contrary, already has a 'philosophy of life' which includes, necessarily, a barely-articulated philosophy of education. He already, in his beliefs and his actions, shows an 'attitude' to life and education which, refined and systematized, would fall under either Idealism or Naturalism. This is perhaps Oliver's version of the well-known saying that all men, whether they know it or not, are either Platonists or Aristotelians!

What is missing from Oliver's analysis is as important as what is included. The time was obviously ripe for some more competent analyst to expose, with technical philosophical skill, precisely where the logical oddness of 'deductionism' as the mode of philosophizing in education lay. But it is to Oliver's credit that he - trained as a psychologist, employed as an educationist and appearing here as a philosopher - points in the right direction, to the concrete level where the abstractions of philosophy must be embodied if they are to affect human affairs. We can now briefly turn to just one other development of a significant kind within the corpus of 'orthodox' literature, before considering the analytical critique. Idealism, like naturalism, is a house with many mansions. One of these - that which houses the existentialist and phenomenological thinkers - has already been in evidence elsewhere in the

context of psychology. But it is in philosophy of education that it makes its most obvious appearance as the contemporary 'ism' which claims to value the person in a unique way: 'existence precedes essence', as it is traditionally put.

Like Oliver, the two writers to be touched on offer themselves as philosophers without technical training. In fact, their philosophy is such as to reject much that professional English philosophers take for granted about the nature of their own subject. W.R. Niblett and M.V.C. Jeffreys occupied chairs in Education, so their views can be taken as representative of the target aimed at by the analytical philosophers. Niblett's most explicit contribution to the literature shows a passionate commitment to the view that 'existentialism... has a great deal to say that is relevant to education',⁶ thereby classing himself, in our terms, with those who advance a system of pure philosophy and draw out its implications for education.

Unfortunately, there is much in Niblett about existentialism but little about education which would withstand the type of questioning which, it will be recalled, Wisdom directed at an equally 'derivative' approach made from depth psychology to educational practice. Yet Jeffreys, in reviewing Niblett's more diffuse exposition in Education and the Modern Mind responds with the enthusiasm of a like-minded thinker. To him, existentialist thinking is as necessary for a true understanding of education as historical thinking was to Armytage. The concept of 'understanding' is clearly the first one to be claimed by anyone hoping for influence in the sphere of educational thought. Jeffreys claims it in these words:

If we are to be rational and moral beings we need more than knowledge about the world and ourselves. We need that kind of inward experience and understanding which gives rise to personal belief. 7

It was to be some time before this lay expression of the basic premise of anti-positivistic epistemology was to work itself down to the level of practical techniques, as we shall see in Period Two. For the moment it certainly has the appearance of a plum right for analytical picking.

These thinkers, in this context, have little patience with the type of mundane question which can be asked about what one is to do, given acceptance of their lyrically-expressed view of the human person. Their emphasis is on the cosmic setting, not the parochial classroom. In a grander way they repeat Oliver's view that we all have a philosophy of life; but, in their case, they argue for such a philosophy taking a particular form - that form which is the twentieth century's refinement of the best element in nineteenth century idealism. For them, only existentialism as a world-view can make sense of the daily activities of the teacher. The knotty question of 'application' becomes, in this literature, swallowed up in a description of what living by such a philosophy does to the teacher as a person. The amateur existentialist-educators of this period thus raise for, say, the interested student who may have turned to the philosophy of education after discovering philosophical discussion in his psychology reading, the question of choice between 'isms'. For they argue with such conviction about existentialism that it becomes a puzzle as to why there exist so

many philosophical systems in competition for the teacher's allegiance - systems of which existentialism looks, to the uncommitted outsider, merely the latest.

That this profusion of 'isms' is the case can be seen in glancing at the definitive American volume of the time which sought to display what we have regarded as the orthodox approach in philosophy of education. Then we shall be in a position to move to analysis, for orthodoxy really has no more significance than can be given it by classing authors such as Niblett and Jeffreys as generalists who have lost their way - a judgement which can be clarified only in the light of a later section of this chapter.

The yearbook Modern Philosophies and Education,⁸ the second of two in an influential series, gives a number of professional philosophers the opportunity to exhibit competing systems of philosophy. There are many such systems: merely to have them displayed in one volume illustrates the artificiality of the whole approach. It is little surprise, therefore, to note that J.S. Brubacher introduces the volume with the muted expectation found in his description of the contributors as 'a number of prominent philosophers whose views on education, if once worked out from their author's philosophical premises, may very well provide fresh insights into educational problems.'⁹ Nevertheless, he enters into the task of searching for implications across the whole domain of the educational enterprise. Aims, values, the curriculum, schools, individuals, methods, the social context - everything that falls under the heading of 'thinking about education' - is touched on.

But, from our point of view, his introductory chapter merely

confirms that philosophy of education conceived in these terms, while it might confer on any educationist a status by association with such distinguished figures, is practically barren. The bewildering variety of positions which follow Brubacher's efforts have not only nothing in common in substantive terms, as would be expected, but nothing in common in the logic of implication, even when some of the philosophers take seriously the request to attend to this aspect of their brief. The emphasis of the volume is all wrong: it is the emphasis of orthodoxy, more clearly in evidence here than elsewhere precisely because the collection of authors is such a high-level one. Their efforts underline the misplaced focus which forces the judgement that the book may be strong on philosophy but weak on education. Nowhere is this focus better revealed than in Brubacher's simple view as to where the priority between philosophy and education lies, expressed in the following way:

The nature of knowledge, of value, of man, of society, and of the world must each be met before a satisfactory conclusion can be formed of what to do next in our present predicament.¹⁰

There is, of course, something about this statement to which anyone who regards education as more than a mundane job carried out on a moment-by-moment basis can respond to. But its unqualified listing of philosophical prerequisites for teaching in school really confirms the view that 'odd' is the right description for the deductive approach. There must surely be some other way in which philosophy and education are connected, the commonsensical reader

must think. And his response can now be confirmed in that of the first analytical philosopher to appear in the philosophy of education with the necessary tools to do the critical job required. We move on from orthodoxy to consider his views as forming what we shall come to see as the rather idiosyncratic foundation for analytical philosophy of education in this period.

Analysis and Beyond Analysis: The British Priority

Louis Arnaud Reid, former professor of pure philosophy and at this time the only British professor in the philosophy of education, offered the alternative which has been, in a sense, trying to emerge from orthodoxy in such views as those of Oliver. Reid, in simple terms, alters the focus from philosophy as system to philosophy as the activity of philosophizing, and thus from the tidy book of philosophical knowledge to the person who is engaged in the activity. He does this - moves, that is from syntheses to analysis - while retaining a strong feeling for synthesis such as must have motivated the amateur philosophers whose efforts he is to condemn. In this he justifies the use of the above term ('idiosyncratic'), for later philosophers in this new approach were to be more single-minded in their claiming for philosophy the critical-analytic rather than the constructive role.

The core of his reflexive work is to be found at this time in reviews, as he mounts a characteristically gentle attack upon an establishment; and, once the attack is well started, in a notable debate of the

Standing Conference of his professorial peers on the nature of philosophy of education. The first review is, appropriately, of the American volume just touched on. And the first demand he makes is one now to be expected. He wants 'real' philosophy in education. Like Armytage on history, Reid proclaims the importance of having proper qualifications in his own discipline: 'not any amateur or any fool can contribute equally well to "philosophy of education".'¹¹ Therefore, the conspicuously professional contributors to the American volume have, on this count, his approval. But they have it only on this count, as will be noted shortly.

Whereas, elsewhere, he is critical of identifiable so-called 'philosophers' of education in a politely moderated tone of voice but one which, nevertheless, carries the same message as that which is more outspokenly delivered when his comments are directed to common anonymous practice. Philosophy must be real philosophy. Jeffreys' Beyond Neutrality, for instance contains arguments which Reid finds 'not at every point clear to me in their logic'.¹² He is not impressed. So much orthodox philosophy of education of which, as we have seen, the existentialist type is only the most recently publicized, Reid finds superficial, brash, incompetent, even claptrap. This is why he gives the partial commendation seen above to a transatlantic offering which, at least, allows proper philosophers to have a say on education.

However, this is not sufficient. Philosophers who know nothing of the realities of everyday educational experience from the inside are, to Reid, as deficient in their understanding as are educationists who think that they can become 'philosophical' by merely uttering

high-flown language in a serious tone of voice. Philosophy of education must, in Reid's strong opinion, be both philosophical and educational in a sense which, presumably, can best be grasped by looking at his own background and career as a professional in both domains. Certainly the uniqueness of his career gives an authenticity to his writings which is noticeably absent, for precisely the reasons he identifies in this analysis, in those we have so far been considering in this chapter. It is a career which continued beyond Period Two, so that we have an opportunity to see his ground plan for a new approach to the subject which he eventually expanded into a splendid book. Central to this plan is Reid's belief that:

...it is the submission of the educationist, with his experience, to the discipline of philosophy, or the coming of the philosopher to learn not only of the problems of education, but of how philosophy itself may be enlarged by including (as is seldom done) education within the field. ¹³

The new viewpoint is simply stated. The discipline of philosophy is important. This means that philosophical process must accompany the 'application' of philosophy to education: systematic bodies of knowledge are, without the involvement of those to whom they are addressed in this process which produces the knowledge, mere accumulations of words. Philosophy is first an activity, and only then a resulting set of beliefs. The educationist, including the teacher that the educationist must always be, has to do his own philosophizing in a manner which is acceptable to a professional in the discipline if it is to be regarded as philosophy at all.

However, as intimated above, there is a complication to Reid's

apparent simplicity concerning analysis. He firmly places analysis in a wider context in a manner which is not characteristic of his eventual successors who were to make a new orthodoxy for the 1960s and beyond from the stress laid on 'real' philosophizing. He goes beyond analysis by insisting that philosophy must retain its traditional task of constructing syntheses. His point is that a person philosophizing as competently as he is able to, using the techniques developed within the academic discipline, can not avoid doing so within a 'philosophy of life' - such as is found in the amateur existentialists in the lamentable absence of the necessary techniques - which, so far as a teacher is concerned, includes an integral philosophy of education.

Thus does Reid, critic of both amateurism and the inert brand of professionalism, confirm and elaborate the suggestion which we found in the modest contribution of Oliver. To the notion of a person being the correct focus for talk of philosophy and education, he adds the professional's inside knowledge of what that person needs in the way of specialised equipment.

Significantly, the opening article of the first issue of British Journal of Educational Studies reveals Reid in action, applying the kind of specialized equipment he wants all to learn how to use. ¹⁴ Here he is not talking about the nature of the sub-discipline, but showing its nature during the course of a full and penetrating analysis of a fundamental concept of concern to both philosophers and educationists, not least those with existentialist leaning. Soon, the Standing Conference of senior educationists which, as we have noted, brought this journal into existence to combat the

dominance of psychology with a more 'philosophical' outlet for educational thought, was debating philosophy of education. ¹⁵

The debate is illuminating for its conclusions, which manage to accommodate the wide range of opinions to be expected from educationist with different intellectual backgrounds and commitments to existing ways of offering philosophy in their courses. A number of issues and problems experienced in their individual teaching situations is in evidence. The unsatisfactory nature of the systems approach through 'isms', such as we have criticized, is to them 'a source of anxiety'. The Great Thinkers approach, too, causes 'some expression of uneasiness'. ¹⁶ However, there is little sign that the distinguished gathering is willing to accept the Reidian solution.

On the contrary, there is a strong sense in the discussion that orthodox approaches, being an evolutionary product of the system of teacher training in which they had reached the most influential positions, require only evolutionary modification and not a total revolution. Of course, any idea that the ways of handling philosophy which they are prepared to admit are not perfect - are in fact as radically defective as a Reidian perspective suggests - is not likely to be acceptable to such a group or any other group which has as much intellectual capital stored in courses of a particular type as they have. To be classed as philosophical 'amateurs' at exactly the point in time when 'philosophy' of the traditional kind is asserting its claims against psychology in teacher preparation courses is probably to be roused to the defence of the traditional ways, no matter how many difficulties these are seen to present.

Accordingly, the doubts about the aims, scope and content of what is often taught as Principles of Education are certainly expressed in this discussion, but expressed within a more basic agreement that the tradition, interpreted quite rightly in different ways by the individual institutions, is fundamentally sound. The traditionalists do not welcome the revolutionary suggestions in their personal work; though it may be more relevant elsewhere. Therefore, the conclusion of a tangled, many-voiced and often amusing discussion is, as said, accommodative of Reid without committing anyone to radical change:

What finally emerged was general agreement that any decision in the classroom implied assumptions which certainly could be paralleled in the theory of philosophers and educators; that any justification of action involved terms that required philosophical analysis; and that any question of aims led to discussion, sociological, psychological and philosophical, of the nature of man. ¹⁷

This sort of passage would no doubt be read by our second British analytical critic of orthodox philosophical approaches with disapproval. G.H. Bantock appears in the present account as a philosopher. He contrasts with Reid in several ways. He philosophizes confidently on the basis of having taught himself the 'techniques'. ¹⁸ Thus, he exposes the uncertainty in the use of the term 'amateur', for his analyses are far from amateurish. He was, too, not at this time a professor, so had no right of attendance at the Standing Conference discussions. Also, unlike Reid, a person of legendary tolerance, Bantock is strikingly polemical, as can be seen in a typical passage from an early book which bears on our theme:

Such a situation seems to me to have arisen in current talk - it hardly merits the term "theory"-about education. The tiresome iteration of current cliches, the vapidness of so much of the writing, the inexactness of the terminology used, the unawareness of implication or assumption shows that the time has come to call for a serious and sustained critical and philosophical effort. ¹⁹

Bantock's own philosophical effort is directed at establishing the practicality of the discipline. The starting point is the now familiar one of the teacher's daily work, as with Reid. What is new in Bantock is the determination to write in a provocative manner in order to move those concerned to alter their ways: the scandalized tone is unmistakable. Yet his logic is not much different from that which we have seen emerging as the new model. Philosophy exists as systems which are end-products of a process which starts, so far as education is concerned, with the concrete situations of everyday teaching. So, Bantock too demands rigorous analysis of the large abstractions which are typical of the work of those who start from the systems end. This analysis will reveal the worn-out use of worn-out words. What he wants is 'a probing and prodding of words: the halt, lame and footsore, those worn out with usage and ripe for retirement might well be put to hospital and there either nursed back to life or provided with decent burial.' ²⁰ In this, the literary Bantock adds passion to his logic.

Vigorously, this critic of orthodoxy pinpoints the fundamental questions concerning the nature of man which underpin the inescapable value-activity of the ordinary teacher. But these should be reached, not by direct approach but by 'this long chain which leads from the

minutiae of classroom management to the ultimate problems of man.' ²¹ Philosophy is not to be understood as an academic body of knowledge but as an essentially practical activity. A teacher needs to philosophize himself, or he is no teacher. This is particularly the case when his techniques and methods are supposedly warranted by the discipline of psychology, focussed on learning.

Here Bantock argues a topic considered by us under the heading of another section of the literature. Psychology is in need of philosophical analysis, for it is 'vitiating...because much of it springs from conceptions about human nature that are naive'. These conceptions - we noted them in the other context - are as naively accepted as they are created because of what Bantock, in an uninhibited expression of the humanist point of view found more politely stated by all the other educationists of the time, calls the 'enormous stranglehold which the young and still presumptuous science of psychology has obtained'. ²² In this way does Bantock direct his critique from one discipline to the next, illustrating well (and not for the last time), the logical inter-relatedness of the elements which constitute educational theory.

He has elsewhere a thorough analysis of fact and value in education which shows a grasp of the bearing of both disciplines on education of a kind which, much later, was to become associated with the name of Peters. Susan Isaacs is his target as he asserts that 'many psychologists will dogmatize about the "needs" of children without appreciating that in the expression of a "need" there is usually involved a suppressed value judgement.' ²³ For 1956, this represents a Humeian observation which is of notable originality

in the literature of education. His publicizing the ease with which psychology-based thinking moves illegitimately from an 'is' to an 'ought' is, as we shall see, not the only service he does for the subject of Education. It is a philosophical observation which can, retrospectively, clarify much of our discussion of the complex nature of educational psychology offered in the previous chapter.

This fact-value clarification is of a 'technical' analytic kind, for all its appearance in the work of a self-taught philosopher. Of interest here in showing more of the homogeneity of the whole field of Education is a response made to its author by John Pilley.²⁴ For Pilley's philosophical concern in psychological matters can usefully be called 'non-technical': it is of a type which, in the previous chapter, was present wherever there were humanistic reservations about the scientific definition of psychology. The existence of technical or professional philosophy is guaranteed by the existence of academic institutions - departments of philosophy in universities. But the existence of non-technical, lay or amateur philosophy is guaranteed much more widely - merely by the desire to think things together, as shown in the existentialist educators we examined above. Pilley falls into the latter class and is a formidable polemicist himself, so that there is little surprise that he criticizes Bantock in the way he does. Both are philosophers, both know that psychology without philosophy is barren; but they 'know' it in different ways!

What Pilley's way is, will be better examined when he re-appears in a later context with his views more positively displayed than in this mere critical review. However, we can note the effect on

Bantock; for it is evidence of the division between two conceptions of philosophy whose uneasy co-existence is an important theme throughout this thesis. Bantock replies to the review written by Pilley of his Freedom and Authority in Education in a letter to the 'top' journal (a most unusual occurrence) which shows analysis on the attack. He makes, step by step, eleven points in refutation of his critic as though he were marking a particularly dense piece of student work, and ends: 'Indeed, I attempt in my book to demonstrate the need for careful analyses of just such high abstractions as Professor Pilley bandies about, without hesitation, in his review.' ²⁵

We shall be encountering both Pilley and Bantock again. But it is time to leave this Bantockian pursuit of the question 'What is philosophy of education?' across the unguarded border with psychology. It is time, in fact, to move from Britain to America once more; for that is where a discussion was taking place which makes both the gentle reproof of orthodoxy by Reid and the fiercer criticism by Bantock both appear somewhat small-scale.

Normative-Speculative-Analytic: The American Superiority

Israel Scheffler is perhaps the most thorough and systematic of the technical analytical philosophers who has written in the field of education. His 'Toward an Analytical Philosophy of Education', which appeared early in this period, was a milestone. In it Scheffler notes that the term 'philosophy of education' covers a wide range of literature, as we have discovered; for, in his

words, it 'is currently widely employed to mean practically anything from a well-articulated metaphysics of knowledge to the vaguest expression of attitudes'. What he wants it to be is indicated in his further comment that it 'is rarely, if ever, construed as the rigorous logical analysis of key concepts related to the practice of education'.²⁶ We know that Reid and Bantock, of course, construed it - or at least a part of it - in precisely these terms.

However, in comparison with them, Scheffler has a more positive programme for the development of analysis in mind than mere criticism of other approaches. He suggests two directions for development. The first is that the results of analyses, undertaken in pure philosophy without any reference to education, can be used in an educational context. Analytical philosophy is, then, a source. The second is that analytical methods can be applied directly in the clarification of specifically educational concepts - those concepts which are essential for the rational discussion of the actual practice of education. In this second use, particular care will have to be taken in analyzing concepts which may have originated in the context of another enterprise than education - for example, in a scientific context. The care is demanded because the context alters the meaning of terms. We have already noted this important idea of 'contextual implication'. Scheffler's point, which he was to develop greatly in a later book, is that the fact that education is a value-domain whereas science, for example, is not, means that terms such as the 'needs' we saw Bantock picking out, can not have simply the descriptive meaning which their separate use in scientific psychology might imply that they have to the logically naive.

Transplanting 'science', widely defined, into educational discussion is not the straightforward business it may appear.

We can defer this discussion of contextual implication to include the details of Scheffler's relevant book which comes in Period Two. This book, together with another which takes the form of edited readings from pure philosophy, embody the two approaches Scheffler distinguishes in this manifesto-type article. These are the two major tactics of a strategical revolution in the philosophy of education - a revolution which Scheffler, with others, seems very keen to relate to philosophical tradition. He claims that as:

...philosophy of education accepts this task of clarification, it will be assuming not merely a familiar historical role, but one which is proving increasingly fruitful and stimulating in wide reaches of current philosophy and which cannot fail to deepen our understanding of what we do when we educate. ²⁷

Shortly we shall see whether the claim for analysis is one which can really be justified, without misleading us, in terms of philosophy's past.

Meanwhile, analysis has been declared by Scheffler to be present, willing and able to aid educationists. He is a philosopher of large stature in other fields than education, so his initial pronouncement is of significance. And he is followed almost immediately by no less a figure than the Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, reinforcing his position. H.D. Aiken, moral philosopher of distinction, insists that it is the analytical philosopher who is the true philosopher.

In words which remind us of Reid and Bantock as they attack the writings of traditional orthodoxy, he says of this newly-defined true philosopher: 'his only but mortal enemy is the obscurantist and the mystagogue.'²⁸ It remains to be seen whether all philosophy written within conceptions other than the analytical one which is here forcefully advocated can be condemned in this way.

To this point, we have already noted that Reid in particular is anxious that the analysis whose technical handling is a mark of the professional philosopher should be carried on within a wider notion of what philosophy is. Now, in America, we can examine the most impressive symposium in the whole literature, of this or of any other period, on what one important contributor calls 'the philosophy of philosophy of education'. We shall do so, having very much in mind the question of whether the analytical revolution, now spread into the field of education, reduces the philosopher's role to that of mere 'philosopher-umpire', as is implied by its focus on the analysis of concepts which originate at some 'first-order' level which is not typically the philosopher's own level.

Stringent selection from this debate is necessary. It is too complex to handle in entirety in a thesis designed to be extensive. There are just too many first-class philosophers engaged in it for justice to be done to all; so that a reasonable principle of selection is required. This can be found by going initially outside the symposium itself to note the two original papers which suggested it. They appeared, as mentioned in the notes to our Introduction, in the prestigious Journal of Philosophy, a fact of significance as illustrating the seriousness with which the Americans take the

subject.²⁹ The possibility of Mind in Britain entertaining a similar project even thirty years later would cause astonishment in the professional community.

Harry Broudy, opening the discussion, asks the question which beautifully focusses the main issues: How philosophical can this field be 'in which concepts, theories and systems meet their existential kin?'³⁰ His answer fits well the trend of our argument. There is a philosophical job to be done in making explicit the relationship between general philosophy and education; but it has to be done in such a way as to avoid an obvious artificiality in the linkage. This can be accomplished only when philosophy of education has as its starting point actual educational problems; but also only when philosophers of education know that theories will need to be built and criticized which take the philosopher a great distance from that starting point.

So, the process of solving educational problems necessitates the construction of educational theory which is grounded in philosophy; for education is an enterprise where technical problems have 'solutions' which can only be regarded as educational by means of a justification of a philosophical kind. In short, technique-thinking which directs immediate teacher-actions is 'educational' only if it is meshed within a much wider framework of thought. The logic of this view is now very familiar to us, but Broudy puts it fully and well. An object of his criticism is, naturally, the 'derivative' method of using philosophy - the attempt to spell out educational implications from systems. This creates 'a tendency to make this labelling and classifying almost an end in itself.'³¹ No doubt the then recent appearance of the big American book noted above had not escaped his attention.

In the work of this philosopher-educationist we note, then, not a denial of system, but rather a great importance attached to one of the alternative avenues to system - that which leads from 'below' rather than from 'above'. His stress is, like that of his British colleagues, on philosophy as activity - undertaken by those who not only try to understand education but also to improve its practices. The activity is, too, in more than one mode, more than merely analytical. It is characteristically a synthesis of elements directed towards practical action, embracing critical thought but not confined to it. Broudy reveals, here and at greater length elsewhere, a firm resistance to the philosophy-as-analysis claim which is significant for the year 1955, given Scheffler's manifesto of the preceding year. This response we shall find strongly echoed by other philosophers in the symposium which was to follow. The class of thinkers who value analysis - a valuation which will accompany any claim to professionalism - but who wish to assimilate it within a broader notion of philosophy along Reidian lines, is impressively large. Broudy speaks first for this class in this most significant of debates, and his own words express exactly the necessary caution:

One special mode of criticism should be noted: the linguistic and conceptual analysis currently so popular. Whether the claim that this type of analysis alone is philosophy in the disillusioned meaning of this term is anything more than a claim or not there is no doubt that semantic dissection is philosophically useful; and particularly so in educational philosophy where slogans and cliches carry so heavy a burden of communication. ³²

We shall return to this position of Broudy when he comments on the proceedings at the end of the symposium. Meanwhile, we turn to his co-contributor to the original discussion in the philosophy journal for confirmation that the meta-questions we are pursuing have many individual answers in spite of their common logic.

Kingsley Price,³³ addressing the community of pure philosophers, offers his definition of philosophy of education in the course of a step-by-step analysis of the constituent terms, 'philosophy' and 'education'. He thus exemplifies the importance of philosophical technique from the outset. Our immediate interest in him is to note that the substance of his argument, which was to be developed later into a large book, is assimilated within the thinking of the most systematic of the symposiasts whose views are to follow. We shall, therefore, deal with it in that form, for Price will appear again as a commentator on the symposium and in other contexts. In this way, we can avoid overburdening the account with repetition of the position of one philosopher - no matter how influential he has been. In this respect - that of influence - it can be said that Price's mode of analysis is very distinctive. It is workmanlike and prosaic to an extent as to attract the criticism of Scheffler himself, who will later be seen to consider it as somewhat 'mechanical'.

This charge illustrates the dangers of assuming that the term 'analytical philosophy' is any more revealing, without closer inspection of the individuals supposed to be practising it, than were the terms 'history' or 'psychology' whose varied proponents we have examined. That Price is 'mechanical' in a sense can be

seen as his present article appears alongside that of Broudy, a most 'aesthetic' philosopher in terms of his interests and his mode of expression. The modes of analysis are thus many, and the wider modes of philosophizing within which analyses are but a part are as great. This profusion goes some way towards clarifying why it is that ultimately it is the individual person who, as teacher, is identified by the real philosophers as needing to philosophize himself in his own situation.

This is a strong corollary of the symposium contribution of William Frankena, moral philosopher of the highest standing, whose views - clearly influenced, as we mentioned above, by Price - are of great significance for our theme. Of all the contributors, he is the most explicitly metaphilosophical, as his title 'Toward a Philosophy of Philosophy of Education' shows.³⁴ He philosophizes about philosophy of education. But this entails much more of interest to us than at first sight appears. In the process, Frankena answers a cluster of questions which centre on his primary question. 'What is philosophy of education?' embraces, in his scheme, 'What is educational theory?'; and further embraces 'What are the elements which constitute educational theory?' And the answers, in the end, identify the teacher as essentially working in a situation which makes him the philosopher of education for education to exist there at all.

In sum, Frankena presents the best articulated conceptual map found so far in the literature of the kind of logic that we have discovered in a variety of territories. The American's map fits well the British scene on which our survey has concentrated; and, in this, exemplifies a fact about educational studies generally -

that intellectual products of a varied and innovative kind are often to be found across the Atlantic in a more systematic form than in Britain. This phenomenon, a function no doubt of the numbers involved in the educational enterprise, is of importance in raising a question mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis. For the parochial reading of the literature which was apparently habitual amongst too many generalists of this period in Britain must surely explain why they responded to the onset of critical 'rigour-talk' unsuccessfully. A knowledge of the perspective of Frankena and others of equal philosophical standing would have enabled many an intuitive generalist to withstand the attacks of the self-judged 'real' discipline experts, by realizing that their own position had superior philosophical justification. The argument from authority discussed earlier would have not seemed so overbearing to general educationists had they read Frankena carefully.

At first sight, Frankena seems to be arguing along Reidian lines: philosophy of education needs the attention of real philosophers. He, too, takes a large view of real philosophy: in no sense is analysis predominant in it, though it is present. On the contrary, philosophy seeks 'world-hypotheses' about what exists as its first objective. It pursues also, not only this reality, but an ideal: it offers guidance for individual and social action. Thirdly, it certainly uses analysis in the process of philosophizing which is carried on under its two prior aspects. Thus does Frankena remind us of all the features of philosophical tradition: 'Let us call these three philosophical activities,' he says, 'respectively, speculative, normative and analytical philosophy.' 35

This mapping shows an entirely different intellectual scene from that implied in the analytical philosophy of education on its first showing - and certainly on the evidence of its later development into an orthodoxy. Frankena offers two alternatives in inter-relating these three elements of philosophy. They can be regarded, on the one hand, as constituting a totality - a three part whole. On the other hand, they can be interpreted as three kinds of philosophy. It is clear which choice the enthusiasts for analysis make: to them there is one kind of philosophy which may or may not be related to other kinds but which, in any event, has priority in reflexive accounts of the discipline of philosophy.

Frankena is, in contrast, a 'three-part' philosopher. Further, he has his own preferred part when it comes to focussing on education. As he says: 'As for the normative part of education - that seems to me to contain the heart of the philosophy of education.'³⁶ This is a positive confirmation of the position we have perceived in other, less prestigious contexts. To Frankena, the concrete enterprise of education is under the guidance of thinking which is best described as 'educational theory' at an early stage in any discussion of its logic. Then, this theory, no matter what it might be mistakenly called wherever logical understanding is not in evidence, is in fact part of his second activity - normative philosophy.

A teacher, on this view, typically judges what should take place in a classroom in accordance with a type of reasoning which is not just practical reasoning but that sub-species of it which we know as moral reasoning. This is the logic of the teacher's situation, as it is of everyone else who is involved, at other

levels, in the essentially normative enterprise of education. Frankena's standpoint as a moral philosopher is simply that the teacher is his own activity-focussed moral philosopher - whether he knows it or not. And at this point in his argument Frankena accepts that there is room for disagreement about the logic of this moral reasoning which does not really affect the all-important truth about the teacher's situation. In the means-end thinking of the teacher, the 'means' aspect can be regarded as included in the recommending part of an educational theory, and Frankena himself so includes it. This part is then complemented, in a manner which Frankena derives from the analysis of Price, by the factual part of what is a 'composite' theory - a part that typically relies on the descriptive disciplines for knowledge of the world in which moral actions take place. In this way, the ends of education lie within normative philosophy.

Frankena's tolerance on this issue can be profitably compared with the entirely different attitude to it displayed in the much later Hirst-O'Connor debates on the nature of educational theory. Frankena puts the matter in terms of choice rather than logical compulsion; and further embeds his remarks in a wider argument, as we are noting, which makes more sense as a high-level philosophical comment on the teacher's moral role than does the rather intense later confrontation - an episode in the literature of education which has all the marks of the 'political' dimension to educational studies which we have identified. Read together, these two different kinds of elucidation force on us the conclusion that a knowledge in British circles of this detached American commentary would have

somewhat altered the course of development of the field we are investigating!


This is confirmed in inspecting Frankena's further observations on philosophy-beyond-analysis while holding both Hirst's and O'Connor's later-publicized and influential viewpoints in mind. He says: 'there is left as a proper part of the philosophy of education the analysis of concepts which are peculiarly central to either the scientific or the normative parts of education.'³⁷ By 'education' here he means that educational theory which, in the analysis of Price which he assimilates to his own perspective, has the two primary 'parts' mentioned above. The theory makes statements of fact and makes recommendations. For fact, it draws upon many areas, including common sense and those bodies of knowledge which go beyond common sense and are known as 'disciplines'; for recommendations, moral statements must supplement the 'facts', and these statements are ultimately justified only by going deep into philosophical ethics. Such composite-because-normative theory is what, once identified, becomes the object of analysis.

Thus Frankena distinguishes analytical philosophy of education not as a total redefinition of the field, which is what is implied in the writings of enthusiasts for analysis as the vehicle of 'rigour', but as the philosophy of the discipline of education. It is philosophy of education in the second-order sense, but with an emphasis placed on philosophy of the process of education at another level which is typically lacking in many who imagine themselves to be bringing 'real' philosophy to the educational scene. The philosophy of the process of education is clearly what those

Educationists in, say, Britain at this time were attempting to articulate in what we have called a generalist way - with little success only in the eyes of critics possessed of a narrow view of what constitutes philosophical rigour. The core of this philosophy is, as Frankena has made clear, normative philosophy; and this is a presupposition of much 'amateur' generalist writing examined in this thesis - even though not a presupposition which is recognized as such and expressed in this way by the generalists themselves.

Of this normative philosophy of education, two further clarifications can be made on the basis of Frankena's work. First, much of it - and of the daily thinking which is its mundane expression - is concerned with immediate means to quite restricted ends which are in evidence in particular situations. It appears more technical than ethical; but, in the light of the full perspective provided by this philosopher, it can be seen that these two terms are just convenient ways of indicating that the moral reasoning of the classroom teacher is of necessity at a concrete level where 'fact' about children, subjects and the rest is much in the foreground. Nevertheless it is ethics, albeit very practical ethics. Second, the 'fact' dimension to the thinking includes, on Frankena's broad view of the education-philosophy relationship, not only the scientific facts found in, say, psychology, but beliefs from philosophy itself viewed as a body of knowledge.

In this way, Frankena comes close to the position we have already seen Reid adopting on the need for the rigour of analysis in education yet the continuing need for philosophy conceived in broader terms. Of the two, Frankena is the more explicit, the more



systematic and the more detached about the possibilities of altering the philosophy of education so that it fits the logic of the situation more effectively. Perhaps it can be said that, as he speaks from outside education, his words have greater worth if our sub-thesis advanced concerning the 'political' dimension to the production of educational literature has any substance. For Frankena has clearly no axe to grind of the type which thinkers on philosophy within the academic setting of teacher training may well have. He was to show this over the years, with occasional further contributions at all levels from the homely teachers' journals to the most prestigious encyclopaedias - all his offerings written with a 'tone' which is invariably 'philosophical' in an old connotation of the term. From his thorough meta-philosophizing we can turn to the second of the symposiasts to be examined. Abraham Edel, philosopher-anthropologist and, as such, not one likely to equate one late development of techniques within just one sector of Western philosophy as the whole of that discipline, is chosen from the distinguished remainder for two reasons. First, his later writing was judged by Peters himself to be the most incisive in its criticism of purely analytical approaches. Second, he complements Frankena and thus illustrates the rich variety to be found within this little-known 'seam' of philosophy of education.

For Edel expresses memorably the 'large' view of philosophy in a metaphor: 'At the very least, then, philosophy runs a speculative workshop equipped with logical machinery.'³⁸ To this workshop, which has been equipped from the time of the pre-Socratics to the present with many modes of analysis (as he was to show in detail

over two decades later) existing educational theories can be brought for logical scrutiny. In such an operation, the concepts of a theory and their inter-relationships would be inspected, its presuppositions examined with reference to the various domains in which human knowledge is stored - both its factual and value presuppositions, for Edel is assuming the same logical type of educational theory as does Frankena and as we have too in commenting on what is implied in the literature reviewed earlier.

Edel creatively imagines an example of such a theory stripped down in this manner, to reveal how its parts 'work' together. It is then reassembled with the relationship of the parts to the domain of philosophy-as-speculation made clear. That is, philosophy-as-analysis has then done its work, acting as a tool in this workshop; but the workshop has its many designs of systems with which a particular theory can be compared, once it is displayed in this way. For in an educational theory is always an implicit theory of human nature which philosophy, at its own level and without reference to educational concerns, has already propounded during its long years of development - and propounded within an encompassing system. Thus does philosophy as 'ism' appear in Edel, linked to practical concerns through the level of thinking which we have identified as normative educational theory. In his words: 'What I am saying is simply that both educational theories and scientific theories of man seem to involve implicit use of some model which ties in with a whole philosophical outlook.'³⁹

This remark throws considerable light on our chapter on

educational psychology by putting educational and scientific theories in the same logical relationship to philosophical systems. There is a value commitment in each type which analysis reveals, thus showing to those who talk about education as if they were unaware of it that where the two come together the normative nature of the enterprise is unquestionable. Here, the professional philosopher sets out plainly what generalists such as Bantock have, with more passion, insisted on in the face of non-normative educational writings based on psychology. Edel says, of philosophers and, therefore, of the philosophers that teachers must be: 'No philosopher at this point is without his own recommendations, his own conception of the human good in the human predicament'.⁴⁰

It follows that the goals of education to be found - explicit or implicit - in any educational theory need to be closely examined and compared to what has been achieved in philosophical ethics. This applies to the general theories found in the literature, as it does to the less public theories found in the thinking of the individual teacher. As the latter are arrived at by the reflective teacher through the study of and thinking about the former, it is the examination of general theories by the professional philosopher which will directly enable him to contribute to the improvement of theorizing. Nevertheless, the individual teacher, in possession of some normative theory - whether sophisticated and quite consciously held or simple and hardly recognized as such - needs philosophy too for any improvement in what he professes. Certainly he has a philosophy, for, as we have seen, he can not avoid having one; but this philosophy needs philosophizing about in an analytic way

and needs, too, to be recognized by its owner as not unrelated to the systems of philosophy which have been created by thinkers whose lives could be devoted to the task. In a sense, both the claims of the 'isms' approach and the 'philosophical activity' approach are met in this Edel-Frankena perspective on the problem of philosophy of education.

In essence the perspective presents a simple logical model. Its recognition in Britain during this period would no doubt have reduced the number of endless debates over such terms as 'philosophy of education', 'principles of education' and 'theory of education' carried on at a very semantic level in the literature and the course planning in institutions. Educational theory guides the enterprise of education. It does this in the light -ultimately - of a conception of the good life for man. Such a conception is clarified and justified - again, ultimately - in philosophical ethics. At one end of the long line of connection are problems which lie deep in the rational enterprise of philosophy. At the other end are the prescriptive principles for practice: what ought to be done in education, given the concrete circumstances on which other rational enterprises concerned with the world as 'fact' throw light. At this end is the teacher, primarily; and the unbroken connection makes him a philosopher too, no matter how humble a one.

This truth was to be asserted by Edel's co-contributor Frankena many years later in no uncertain terms: 'Every man must in a sense be his own educational philosopher - that is the spirit of what Socrates called the examined life as well as of our contemporary culture'.⁴¹ This meta-position held in common by these two

symposiasts leaves open many rational possibilities for a substantive position in the philosophy of education. In Edel's words, which can be applied not only to the concept of philosophy of education but also to the substantive philosophies generated within a particular concept: 'One reason why there can be no definitive description of the philosophy of education is that there cannot be a definitive description of philosophy'.⁴² In the end, therefore, the manifold abstract discussions which are ceaselessly carried on in the name of philosophy are resolved only in the personal choice of individuals who wish their personal philosophy to be as close to the consensus of such discussions as it is possible to make it while remaining true to their own unique experiences. What Edel implies is that a constraint placed upon debate about the nature of philosophy by those who wish to define it in narrow analytical terms is a time-bound, parochial choice and in no way represents the consensus of generations of philosophers.

Therefore, in education at a time when philosophy of education was about to be redefined narrowly - with success in terms of developments seen during the next decade and a half - we see here a tolerant view of what philosophy of education consists in. It is a view which mirrors all aspects of philosophical tradition far more effectively than does philosophy-as-analysis, in spite of the claims of the latter to be the heir to what is most valuable in that tradition. It is also a view which, as we have seen, puts the teacher as a person rather than the teacher as a semantic critic of his own first-order beliefs right in the centre of the picture.

In concentrating just on Frankena and Edel, we omit the

formidable set of arguments presented in the rest of the symposium. However, Broudy and Price return to comment, once the debate is ended. Their comments must serve to indicate the consensus of which our chosen two are the most significant architects. Broudy notes unanimity on the one issue which we have stressed. A philosophy of education as part of a philosophy of life is, of necessity, possessed by a teacher. What the precise relationship of it to the practicalities of his teaching is remains, on the evidence of varied contributions, obscure and in dispute. This is Broudy's judgement only with reference to the persistence of attempts to move from philosophical systems to everyday activities on the basis of a logic of 'derivation' such as we have examined in an earlier chapter. His own inclination, as the writer of a fine text-book called, appropriately, Building A Philosophy of Education is towards that logic which we have just set out.

But he sees no unanimity in that part of the discussion which attempts to distinguish between philosophy conceived in broad traditional terms and philosophy defined in a more technical way. On this question of philosophy as the discipline of analysis, his own words are revealing:

For some of the writers, the analytical function is only one function and not always the most important one; for others it is the only function that makes "sense" out of philosophy. Both views of analysis are found in these essays, but on the evidence of certain interests among graduate students in the philosophy of education, it seems safe to predict that an analytical school in the area is about to emerge. Should it develop, it will encounter the same sort of criticism that its parent in general philosophy has met. 43

So, in 1956 when the sorts of criticism to which Broudy refers were already mounting under the slogan 'clarity is not enough', he notes with regret the importation into his own field of philosophy-as-technique as a school. His own viewpoint is supportive of the notion that philosophizing about the process of education in the manner which we have discussed is, of necessity, the primary focus of philosophy of education to which all improvements in technique must relate.

Price, too, refuses to constrain philosophy when he develops his own position in a review of the symposium. One of his points of summary is: 'Philosophy of education, I would say, is a chapter in analysis, in ethics, and (in a different way from those two) in metaphysics'.⁴⁴ With these three 'chapters' he indicates the three-part concept of the field which we have considered in its assimilation within the model offered by Frankena earlier. Enough has been said on this model for us to take from the arguments of Price a different point of importance for its bearing on the whole question of the 'politics' of debate as it shows itself in this area. Price, whose thinking has influenced, as we have noted, a philosopher - Frankena - of the highest standing in general philosophy, argues strongly that philosophy of education must be, indeed, 'real' philosophy at that institutional level where it has a separate identity. That is, those who profess to be professional philosophers of education in higher academic institutions should be 'real' philosophers. But his further comments indicate the hidden dimension to the whole discussion as exemplified not only in this symposium but also, as we have noted, in such places as the Standing

Conference meetings in Britain. He says, of the professional philosophical activities which alone make philosophy of education part of philosophy that they are undertaken in a quite unique context: 'Its uniqueness consists not in the nature of these activities, but in the materials upon which they are exercised, i.e., materials drawn from the discipline of education.' ⁴⁵

This observation of Price echoes both Reid and Broudy in its implication that philosophy immersed in the real world of education needs more than just 'real' philosophers as this is usually meant in staffing debates. This requirement is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Wherever teacher training is grossly unphilosophical in its approaches, then the argument from the authority of academic philosophy tends to be advanced. Whereas, when the acceptance of this argument from the authority of the subject seems to imply that any general philosopher, no matter how inexperienced in educational concerns he may be, is 'qualified' in the philosophy of education, then an appropriate restriction tends to be placed on what constitutes the real qualification. As Price puts it: between philosophers whose primary interest in ensuring that anything carried on in the name of their subject is of good academic standing and philosophers whose primary interest is in ensuring that education is improved through the application of philosophical thought, there is a 'possibility of jurisdictional disputes'. ⁴⁶

He expresses himself on this topic with circumspection. Nevertheless, the importance of the politics of the discussion is clear in his commentary. His point can be generalized to underline

our own earlier suggestion. Much discussion of the nature of philosophy of education and of the nature of the other elements of educational studies under investigation has to be approached without naivety. For it is invariably discussion carried on in an academic context from which considerations of status and authority are never absent. As Price observes, frankly, the result is that there are difficult problems within academic organizations about the appropriate qualifications for various kinds of teaching. Who rightly teaches the philosophy of education - the best qualified philosopher, the best qualified educationist or the person whose 'qualifications' in each of the fields is sufficient for the vocational objectives of teacher education to be achieved? This question is answered, Price says, 'only in the miasmic vapors of the swamps and jungle bottoms of administration',⁴⁷ a comment that can stand as one serious philosopher's poetic recognition of an important aspect of academic life.

Given this recognition of the real world in which intellectual production such as the literature of education is carried on, it is indeed rational to inspect closely all claims for the 'stiffening' of studies based on a parade of authority defined in terms of the particular university education and qualifications of those making the claims. We shall see, in the next chapter, a clear example, in the emerging 'real' sociology of education, of the kind of case to which Price's insights can sensitize us. Meanwhile, it would not do justice to this impressively intellectual symposium to leave it with a discussion of what is a secondary theme; so we shall return to a conclusion to the present chapter which is in keeping with the Passmoreian problematic mode of investigation which is

consonant with our primary purpose.

As anticipated, more light has been thrown on the logic of educational studies in this chapter than in those offering the reflexive deliberations of historians and psychologists. It would be now difficult to reject the central notion that the philosophy of the process of education so luminously presented by Frankena is at the logical centre of all studies which claim to be educational studies. This is the philosophical theory of education: it is educational theory conceived in the widest possible terms to include beliefs and values with their justifications in metaphysics or speculation and in ethics at one end of the spectrum of thinking, while including too the technical or instrumental activities of the class teacher at the other end. It is both general and philosophical, for to be philosophical in this sense is to think with materials provided generally by bodies of knowledge about the world, of which the systematic expressions are the academic disciplines.

In short, the intuitive generalist, who knows that educational thinking must be rooted in practical activities, is rationally justified in his intuition which is born out of experience of the enterprise of education, not of the scholarly study. Yet it can be easily seen how the 'scholar' comes to emphasize the importance of his own discipline within this framework. For descriptions and explanations of those parts of the world which constitute education need to be known by the deciding and acting participants in the business: teaching is itself in the world, even though it aims at ideal situations which lie only in the imagined future. The

'reasons' for teaching lie outside the deciding and the actions; and they are best found, according to the scholar, in the disciplines of which, typically, his own appears to him to be of first importance. As we have seen, the existence of uncontroversial findings within the educational disciplines would make it easier to accept the scholar's claim. But the actual situation within the disciplines is one of such constant dispute that the term 'bandwagon' seems not too strong to describe the effect that each of the latest of conflicting views has when it appears in education. In addition, the isolation of each of the disciplines, not only from the other disciplines but from general theory such as has been delineated above, raises those 'political' suspicions which are introduced into the debate by the more outspoken contributors at all levels.

Finally, in repeating general themes which arise from this particular context with more force than hitherto, we can emphasize the extent to which any person whose institutional title includes the term 'of education' and whose audience, whether he is performing as lecturer or author, is 'inside' education (and, in a sense, everyone - parents and others with familial roles, as well as teachers - is 'in' education) works in a situation where an implicit philosophical theory of education of the kind we have analysed governs his activities. The scholar-historian, research psychologist and analytical philosopher are all propounding a theory of education. The more exaggerated the importance attributed by any one of them to their own discipline, without further specification as to where and how it fits the general theory and answers the question of what the teacher is to do, the more such a person misses, through

a kind of sin of omission, the central logical point about teaching and what is necessary for preparation for teaching.

However, a point has been reached in this account where general themes are well enough established for us to move on to the next discipline-context. But we can take one last look at this symposium as the high point in reflexive discussion of philosophy of education in a period conventionally regarded as barren. Lest the enthusiasm for the discipline of philosophy defined in the broad terms we have described become as exaggerated, as a result of exposure to this rich discussion, as the enthusiasm shown by the narrow specialists, we can allow Price to have the last word, offering a very realistic caution. He says:

Several authors suggest that teachers ought all to be philosophers, and this recommendation, too, must be taken with a grain of salt. If to be a philosopher is to be thoughtful and critical about all things, it would be difficult to disagree with this recommendation; but if to be a philosopher is to be more than that, to be well versed in the history of the subject and a proficient practitioner of the art, then the recommendation is futile because it is unrealistic. 48

This is fair comment. A teacher is first and foremost a teacher: in a sense, he always remains Morris's 'student' rather than his 'scholar'. In the next chapter, we shall find the emergence of a demand that he becomes, not a philosopher, nor an historian or psychologist, but a sociologist - a demand made with all the authority-pressures we have noted in the longer-standing disciplines.

Chapter Four

The Social Field and the Appearance of 'Real' Sociology

The demand for 'real' sociology of education is not, in this period, a heavy one; but it is there. Its eventual emergence will make more sense if placed in a context of 'social' thinking whose status can be made explicit by reference to a pattern we have observed in earlier chapters. Briefly, we have noted that where in a discipline there is a prevailing orthodoxy which, in the judgement of some writer or writers, is not rigorous enough, criticism is mounted. This applies clearly to history and to philosophy. In psychology, the debate about rigour is more or less within the established field of education: there are competing orthodoxies in this sector which is already well-established and dominant in teacher preparation. Thus, for all three, a reflection of the status of the pure disciplines is sought in the 'applied' field.

In contrast, there is in each of the areas a perspective which is best indicated by use of the term 'relevant' as its aim for educational studies. Thus, Armytage, Skinner and Scheffler, for example, can be identified as rigourists whose views are challenged, in effect, by such writers as Morris, the psychological 'bridge-theorists' and the 'synthetic' philosophers of education. The arguments of the latter group are somewhat strengthened by the fact that, in history and psychology, there are competing notions of what is rigorous; and, in philosophy, the strongly advanced view of what constitutes philosophical rigour is opposed by another,

no less rigorous perspective, which can be taken as supporting 'relevance'. Though the two terms - 'rigour' and 'relevance' - function as slogans only in such a retrospective summary as this, the detailed arguments for which they stand have been given; and the complex pattern of those arguments is to be understood here.

It follows that the allegations from the early 1960s concerning this and the following period - that its literature was 'amateurish' in the main - are unfounded. The generalist, that is non-specialist, literature was focussed on relevance. In this it had the support - though it seemed not to know it - of philosophy of the highest standing. No doubt much of the manner of presenting the argument from the point of view of relevance was amateurish; but the standing of its logic - intuitively grasped - was unimpeachable according to the very criterion of rigour used so freely yet restrictedly by its critics. In a sense the generalists of the period, many of whom are yet to appear in this and the following chapter (relevantly, on general pedagogy), were 'rigorously relevant' in the position they held while not, unfortunately, able to defend it effectively against the single-minded type of attack which was mounted. The 'social' field exemplifies this well, as we shall now see.

The 'Social' Dimension to Generalist Thinking¹

At the beginning of this period there was not much 'rigour' in sight, even in the 'pure' domain. Sociology as a university discipline had been barely established in Britain,² though, of course, there were the works of the European founding fathers from

Comte onwards available, as we shall see. In teacher training there was, therefore, no pressure from 'real' sociologists, initially in the period, that revealed itself in the literature. What there was, much in evidence, was the attention paid by general educationists to the social aspects of educational theory. A significant issue of The Bulletin of Education reveals much of interest. ³

J.W. Tibble, a generalist of good standing in both worlds of teacher training, introduces in 'Social Studies and the Education Course' a broad notion of such studies which will be found later to be typical of a humanistic perspective similar to that encountered in psychology. Tibble includes, in fact, social psychology and social anthropology with sociology in this domain. They are important, he argues, for two reasons:

The first is that all human learning has, directly or indirectly, a social aspect; the second is that much human learning actually takes place in groups, many of them expressly structured to facilitate the learning process. ⁴

The emphasis on learning is pronounced - a sure sign that it is a generalist writing. Though he is drawing attention to an aspect of educational thinking strongly established in the British tradition by Sir Fred Clarke, with his emphasis on the social framework of education, Tibble sets up this more central focus of learning because he has, in our terms, a firm grasp of the notion of levels of educational thinking, of which that which encompasses the teaching-learning process is the foundation.

Already, then, it is clear that the 'social' field is to offer us normative rather than descriptive material. This becomes even

clearer in turning to the following article in this journal, written by Gerald Collier, another generalist of high standing and influence.⁵ He, unlike Tibble, has much to say quite explicitly about the newly emerging academic discipline. Significantly, he draws on the work of the most 'philosophical' of the university sociologists - Morris Ginsberg⁶ - for Collier, too, puts the scientific material he wishes to acquaint his educationist-colleagues with into an educationist's theory.

Accordingly, the information given about social structure, social function, social control and social change is in fact the provision of a set of sociological concepts for assimilation within educational theory. This theory, like that of Tibble, has the classroom teacher at its centre. It is no part of Collier's intention merely to describe the features of an unfamiliar discipline and then to leave the reader with the problem of its relevance to be solved by them if they consider relevance to be the crucial issue. For it is crucial to Collier himself, as the title of his article - 'Sociological Studies in the Training of Teachers' - shows.

So, within this first contribution to a field which he was to play a key role in developing during the following decade, Collier theorizes in the light of sociological findings and other considerations. His views take on the 'composite' appearance whose logic has been set out in Price and Frankena. Teaching, he argues, is effective only when there are clear aims in the mind of the person engaged in it - values to which the teacher is committed. Such values cannot but have a 'social' content: teaching is carried on within a society which has certain characteristics. To know

these characteristics as fully and as systematically as possible is therefore essential to the teacher, if his convictions are to be well-founded. The science of sociology attempts to give us this knowledge, and is of great importance.

This is the way in which Collier introduces sociology, as providing part of the reasons for teacher-actions which a concept of the good life in the good society requires. A more individual-centred theory of education, with its corollary of a more 'personal' belief and value system to be found in the teacher, appears less defective when there is no science of society to go to. In discussing the matter in these terms, Collier clearly displays his own values which are influenced by the 'social' turn of educational thinking away from, say, the position of a Sir Percy Nunn. But in Collier's case the turn is more positively towards the science of society as an element in educational thinking than in other generalists of the period. We shall see shortly what a humanistic response it provoked in one critic who failed to perceive the humanism in Collier's use of the new science.

This type of humanism is clear when he refers to the aims which must guide education:

...in reaching an order of priority, two types of factor have to be taken into account - on the one hand the society we are sending our children into; and on the other the world-view and scale of values that we ourselves hold.⁷

There is no doubt, in writing like this, that the conception of philosophy of education as being of the process of education in its 'speculative' and 'normative' dimensions, is strongly intimated;

though its author very probably knew nothing of the work of Frankena.

Further, when Collier develops, from this meta-comment on high level aims, his view of theorizing in relation to the actual practices of teachers which are never out of his sight, he impressively ranges up and down the 'levels' of theory - 'levels' in a sense different from that associated with the roles different persons play within the whole enterprise. For the class teacher is not only the foundation, as it were, of education as the one who engages in activities without which other personnel in education would never have to make decisions or act - and therefore be identifiable as having their own 'levels' of normative theory - but is also the foundation in relation to the world of thought rather than institutions. Philosophy, as the previous chapter showed, connects with the material world through the person of the individual teacher. In two senses he is at the centre. And what he does supports education conceived both as an institution and as a normative enterprise. In Collier's terms, the thinking-work by teachers and teacher trainers, no matter how apparently remote from concrete matters it has to become, ultimately gains its significance from action: 'The object of this work is to help students to form criteria by which to judge the use of different educational methods.'⁸

Collier was to develop these views systematically in an influential book which we shall examine in a later chapter. Meanwhile his present article provides the occasion for Pilley - critic of Bantock and mentor of Morris - to give evidence that the subject of sociology is, in the words of the editors of the journal, 'explosively controversial'. It is thus for the same reasons as

were found in considering psychology. The scientific perspective on man considered as an individual or in social context is unacceptable to a certain kind of humanist. Pilley is one such: he is ready to seize any opportunity to present philosophical objections to the very concept of scientific inquiry into human affairs. To him, 'sociology' is the wrong term to use because of its implication that the study of human affairs can be made scientific without qualification. His vigorous response to Collier - less a critique of that individual author than a positive thesis harnessed to a particular expression of what he (mistakenly, as we have noted) believes is 'scientism' - illustrates two general points about the relationship of non-technical philosophy and social science. First, philosophy will have its say - here, as in psychology; second, what it has to say displays a variety of individual viewpoints of which Pilley's is at the 'strong' pole.

He makes straight for the logical core of the issue: 'In any attempt to assess the value that sociological studies can have for teachers in training, it is essential to be clear as to just what kind of studies are in question'.⁹ Thus does he declare that different presuppositions underlie different perspectives on society. He charges Collier with the error of drawing his 'facts' about society from a deterministic, natural-science type of sociology. But the truth of the matter is, in his judgement, that which is discovered only in the other approach - that which understands:

...social development and especially the development of civilizations as essentially dependent upon the exercise by individual men and women of those powers of imagination and judgement to which human beings owe their humanity, but which the "scientific" sociologist regards as illusory.¹⁰

The personalism in the comment is very strong. Oddly directed at Collier, it, nevertheless, is a very relevant indication, for our purpose, of the type of humanistic presuppositions which personalists (of whom we shall hear much more) maintain against the naturalistic assumptions of Comteian sociology. Pilley, as said, rejects even the term. Its presence in an educational context is doubly unacceptable to his way of thinking, for it encompasses, as he says, the study of 'human beings only in-so-far as they are not human'.¹¹ To him, 'Social Studies' are not just concerned with 'brute fact'. They form an essential element in a philosophically sustained theory of education.

His anti-positivism, which we shall find even more vigorously expressed when his views on pedagogy emerge in the next chapter, is advanced with all the emotion of one who sees in that perspective the end of human freedom. In leaving Pilley for the time being, we can note that a remarkably similar emotion was to be seen twenty years later in the revolt within a then well-established sociology of education against its own positivistic traits.

But at the present point in this period, the 'establishment' has yet to appear - far less to develop. And, in spite of Pilley's charges and warnings, the prevailing attention to society is along the humanistic lines of generalists which the early sections of this chapter have sketched. 'Social' educational theory is, in a sense, the orthodoxy. Its most systematic presenter is Kenneth Ottaway in his text-book Education and Society - a title which, taken with the sub-title An Introduction to the Sociology of Education,¹² at once indicates that the author is as little likely

to be guilty of the error identified by Pilley as was Collier.

Advocates of Durkheim and Mannheim - Philosophical Sociologists

Ottaway's aim is to utilize the work of Emile Durkheim; but in such a way as to make it relevant to the contemporary British educational scene. He thus brings to bear on the discussions we have witnessed a major figure in sociology and a content from a long-standing, though at the time underestimated, European tradition. The background to his work is indicated in Lester Smith's introductory references in the book to, not only Durkheim, but also Max Weber and Karl Mannheim. Clearly the 'giants' of earlier sociology are in Ottaway's sight where Ginsberg was in Collier's. Smith also recognizes the now familiar need to create a 'bridge' between such material and the practical demands of education in modern times.

Ottaway, then, attempts to create this bridge. He interprets 'the scope of sociology very broadly', ¹³ as it was interpreted by those thinkers from whom he has learned. It is clear from the outset that this text has been written with an awareness of the relationship between generalist thinking in an educational context and the specialized thinking carried on in sociology. Hence, though the book is offered in the sociology of education to give an indication that it has its roots in significant inquiries, it is in fact a comprehensive version of the type of 'social' theory of education which we have seen other generalists writing about earlier. Ottaway has not come to sweep away 'amateur' theorizing with the 'real' stuff, for he knows, as an educationist, that

normative theorising is essential for education.

He intends, therefore, to do the 'composite' job which by now we are familiar with: 'to make a scientific approach to social problems, and to separate fact from speculation'.¹⁴ The distinction between scientific sociology and social philosophy is firmly grasped and developed in his book in a positive way which is in contrast with the polemical approach to the distinction made by Pilley. Ottaway consistently and explicitly marks the difference between description and prescription; and makes his own prescriptive pre-suppositions clear, particularly in the chapter entitled 'Beyond Sociology'.¹⁵

He is an educationist first.¹⁶ Accordingly, his work encompasses the scientific concerns noted in Collier as well as the humanistic concerns noted in Pilley; but on a scale which reflects the substantial work of his main model - Durkheim, sociologist, social philosopher and educational theorist in one. He develops the themes of 'scientific' sociology in impressive detail: it is centrally concerned with 'the social relationships of mankind. It includes such topics as social structure and organization; the interaction of social groups the means of social control and the processes of social change'.¹⁷ With these concepts, a sociology of education can give a disciplined description of the functional relationship of the institution of education to the other institutions of society. Ottaway identifies, then, the major content areas of the sub-discipline: education in relation to culture and its transmission; the social determinants of education; social interaction.

The significance of these areas, for the present account,

is great. The first and third of them were to be ignored by the empirical sociologists about to appear on the educational scene in favour of the second. Knowing this and the subsequent development of empirical sociology of education into the orthodoxy of the 1960s, we can see in Ottaway a grasp of the importance to educationists of curriculum and classroom method concepts which was not to be equalled in the 'social' field until the developed orthodoxy came to be challenged much later.

Further, Ottaway does not confine himself to merely displaying sociological concepts. He keeps the promise of the book in recognizing that this synoptic science stands in close relationship with moral and social philosophy. In this he follows his master Durkheim, not to mention Mannheim whom we shall consider in a little while. He draws on that strength of European sociology which, during the ascendancy of home-grown empiricism, was under-valued. To Ottaway, social philosophy, therefore, provides the matrix within which sociological problems are formulated; and social philosophy of education embraces the scientific elements in a manner familiar to us from the analysis of moral philosopher Frankena.¹⁸

The closeness of the one to the other, despite the radically different contexts in which they write, comes out when Ottaway advances his argument from the scientific material to the normative theory. He offers 'a brief examination of what this "subject" called "education" really is'.¹⁹ Fundamentally it is, as we would now expect, prescriptive theory. It prescribes for the teacher first and foremost. The activities of teaching are determined by the needed learning of pupils and are best characterized as being an

art based on scientific principles. That is, teaching is done by a person and is not in the final analysis governed by rule, yet the application to it of rules derived from appropriate general inquiry is possible. Ottaway appears, thus, as a realist writing a text-book, not a polemicist defending a position.

Moving out from the teacher, we see that education is a process which takes place, so far as the formal arrangements made for it are concerned, in a system. Classrooms are many and the system is a multi-levelled abstraction from all of them. Educational theory includes, therefore, more than just the 'core' theory of teaching. Ottaway identifies here the 'levels' we have noted as implications of the views of other writers. He pictures a complex totality which is the formal educational system. It operates at classroom, school, regional and national levels, being an 'object' which can be described, but being also an institutionalized object which is the location of values. Therefore, the prescriptions covering education are based, not only on the descriptions of it as it is and has been, but also on the value considerations which define it.

The process at any level has a past: therefore the history of education is of importance. ²⁰ This is Ottaway's first assertion in charting the relationships between what we have taken as the five 'fields'. We can recall our conclusion in an early chapter that the importance of history as traditionally presented is hardly at the 'core' level of teaching theory. The discipline which is really significant for that level is, again, named by Ottaway: educational psychology describes for us best the characteristics of the individual learner. Our comment must be, recalling our own

analysis of this discipline, that Ottaway contextually implies that it is educational psychology in the clarified sense which he has in mind.

He continues to the discipline - sociology - which ostensibly provides the context for what is in fact a generalist's discussion. The individuals in question are, as we have seen Tibble emphasize, inter-related in the learning situation, just as the organizational units within the total system are not in isolation. Therefore sociology of education, including what social psychology has to say about classrooms, are necessary elements in the overall theorising. Clearly, to Ottaway the 'of' in 'sociology of education' is the paramount term in defining it. He arrives at the now-familiar general educational theory as surely as any thinker does who focusses on education and discusses any of its disciplines with this focus clearly established. He says, as a summary of the 'descriptive' phase of his analysis: 'the theory of education is a branch of social science, which has an historical, a psychological, and a sociological aspect'.²¹

But beyond this descriptive-explanatory account of how the world is comes the building of principles to guide education - always an enterprise aimed at desirable ends - more effectively, in the light of increasing knowledge and clarified aims, towards the moral life. In this process the philosopher-in-the-educationist, aided by the philosopher-in-the-discipline, is the main builder of justified principles of education. One part of his building, but one part only, consists in 'the use of philosophy as a technique

of clear thinking and analysis'.²² For the rest, he thinks within the type of speculative and, especially, normative framework so clearly laid out in Frankena's symposium contribution in another place at another time.

The similarities of conclusion between these two widely-separated writers is striking. To Ottaway, too, the analysis of terms and the unearthing and criticism of presuppositions is part only of wider philosophical activity. To him, too, the class teacher at the centre must engage in this activity as well as he can make himself competent to do, creating a set of personal beliefs and values which consistently cover both his life as a person and his vocation as an educator. In this way, Ottaway reveals himself as an educator of educators, stressing in sociology one of the elements which must contribute to normative theory because it has been under-emphasized in the past. His book's title and contents is to be interpreted accordingly. His 'sociology of education', unlike that of those who were to soon displace him, is defined in keeping with a clear generalist self-conception.

What he achieves in this logically illuminating book is possible, as he recognizes, only because he is, as it were, standing on the shoulders of a giant. It will be fruitful, then, to stay with Ottaway a little longer to note the observations he thinks it important to make about Durkheim to pure sociologists themselves in the pages of the then recently established British Journal of Sociology.²³ He reaffirms the relationship between the descriptive and the prescriptive elements in educational sociology. Quoting from Durkheim, he insists that, though education can and must be made an object

of scientific inquiries undertaken by sociology as well as psychology, it must also be guided by educational theory. His comment is clear:

Educational theories are of a completely different nature. "Their objective is not to explain what is or has been, but to determine what ought to be. They are directed not towards the present or the past, but towards the future. They are not intended to express faithfully given realities, but to declare precepts of conduct. They do not say to us this is what exists and this is why, but this is what should be done". 24

Once more we can note that the Hirstian thesis of the 1960s about the nature of educational theory is virtually anticipated here, as we saw that it was, too, in the American philosophical work. There is nothing surprising in this, apart from the critical judgements made by the later writers concerning the quality of 1950s theorizing. It can perhaps be explained only as part of the 'political' aspect of intellectual production. In each generation the 're-invention of the wheel' looks more impressive if it is said that it is an original invention. In educational studies, too, later claims are often made on the basis of a casual inspection of preceding literature which contrasts, as we have noted, with the thorough knowledge of its own past characteristic of philosophy itself.

Ottaway himself certainly knows the literature of the past. He makes his own translation of Durkheim for this article. From it emerges even more clearly what can be called the Hirstian notion that action-directing theory of education resembles theories to be

found in other essentially practical areas of life such as politics. They are named in accordance with their practical function, a point that the later writer was to make much of; as Ottaway says, 'Durkheim proposes to call speculations of this sort théories pratiques'.²⁵ The term 'speculations' here further confirms, in its echo of Frankena's three-part concept of philosophy of education, the identity of the domain which Ottaway is eager to mark out. His purpose, for an audience of sociologists as, earlier, for the educationists who would read his book, is to show that one of the really great figures in both sociology and educational thought had got the relationship between the two right. Of Durkheim he says:

Yet he laid down a theory and a methodology for the study of education which show a remarkable unity of purpose and clarity of thought. In fact he prepared a programme of investigation into which almost all sociological studies in the field of education could be fitted.²⁶

Within a few years, as will be seen, Ottaway and Durkheim were defined out of the field by the empiricists who judged the work of this founding father of sociology to be time-bound within the conditions of pre-industrial society. Meanwhile, for his part Ottaway greets the earliest empirical work as the necessary 'data' for his type of normative theorising, with little indication that he was giving a welcome to a narrow perspective on the sociology of education which would shortly replace his own.²⁷

It would replace, too, another broader view which we can indicate more briefly than that based on Durkheim; for, in terms of the nature

of the field under examination, Mannheim - to be considered now - and Durkheim can be classed together as 'large' thinkers for whom the emerging 'real' sociologists had less regard than had educationists of the time. In Mannheim's case, too, an expositor appeared early in this period to commend a point of view which assumes that empirical investigation in sociology, like clarity in philosophy, is not enough.

W.A.C. Stewart shows how, in Mannheim's papers which he was ordering in preparation of a book, science interacts with philosophy to account for and guide education. In this, he says, 'Mannheim's viewpoint and method as a philosopher and as a sociologist have much in common with pragmatism.'²⁸ There is not only Mannheim's relationship to the work of Dewey but also to that of G.H. Mead - a connection of significance when we consider the influence of Mead's work twenty years later on the 'new directions' in the sociology of education.²⁹ Mannheim is thus placed in a tradition of socio-educational thinking of which he is perhaps the most 'abstract' representative in comparison with some of the generalists we have examined. For his mode of thinking is one which starts at the intellectual end with general principles rather than from the more practical end with concrete situations.

By this, Stewart means that Mannheim was typically European. He stresses the way in which his thought brings together disciplines - in the manner of Ottaway modelling himself on Durkheim or of the college generalists working from a variety of less distinguished sources. Mannheim saw Education as 'a synoptic study for pursuing which data could be collected from many different fields.'³⁰ He

therefore, according to Stewart's first analysis, distinguished sociology for the educator from the sociology of education. This bears on distinctions within our own account, as is evidenced by the further distinction which Stewart suggests: within the sociology of education there is a more concrete level of the sociology of teaching. While in a single, exploratory article the precise relationship of Mannheim's sketches of the domain cannot be given to other reflexive comments on the sociology of education of the time, it is clear that Mannheim as interpreted by Stewart is close enough to Durkheim as assimilated in Ottaway to justify talk of a common perspective in terms of the logic of their positions.

For educational theory to Mannheim is the normative theory it must be to any philosophically orientated social thinker. The nature of the disciplines which bear on education is, then, simply that they are disciplines: they have the nature they are said to have when the context of such a declaration is not an educational one. They provide grounds for conducting the enterprise in a particular way given the justifiable aims which do not come from the disciplines. Therefore sociology of education is sociology. But there is another discipline which is of central importance if 'education' is to mean a moral undertaking and not merely a social institution. If this discipline is called Education rather than the 'educational theory' analysed out in our own account, then Stewart's words on behalf of Mannheim bring us as close as we can get to summarizing the position held by, though not so explicitly stated by, college generalists of the time:

Education, from the sociological point of view, would have to show aspects of history, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, economics, political theory, aesthetics and pedagogy could be brought into some synthesis, or, in another fashionable word, could form some discipline. ³¹

'Synthesis' is the term to be held in mind as we near the brief examination of the early signs in this Period One of a sociological approach which was to eventually supersede the type of position we have sketched as a focus for social thinking about education. In both Mannheim and Durkheim, as introduced into the discussion of education, we find this stress on 'synthesis' along with 'synopsis', 'unity' and the cognate cluster of terms which characterize the language of lesser generalists in this and, as we have observed, in other fields of education. The language reflects the logic of the situation as perceived by non-specialists concerned more with the preparation of teachers than with the extension of a discipline's sphere of influence.

In turning to the proponents of an empirically-based sociology, who aggressively define themselves as the 'real' sociologists, we need to hold in mind the fact that two formidable thinkers of an earlier time accepted quite explicitly both the descriptive and the prescriptive tasks to be undertaken. They made what we would understand as a logical distinction and accepted the consequence of it for social theory of education. At least one of them was to re-emerge once the empiricists had been found wanting. For the moment, we can show the new sociologists initiating their twenty-year period of influence by returning once more to America.

'Real' Sociology: The Coming of Empiricism

Academic sociologists began to publicise their interest in education earlier in America than in Britain. Once more, an important issue (in two whole numbers) of the Harvard Educational Review contains the material relevant to our theme. For it is a counter, by professional sociologists, to the long-standing activity in the United States often pejoratively described as 'educational sociology' - an institutionalized and often pretentious form of the generalist social thinking which we have just commended for its roots in the real sociology of the European tradition. We shall return, in the next period, to the differences between the two. For the moment, our purpose is best served by taking from this impressive volume of substantive material, offered by sociologists of good standing, the reflexive comments made by Neil Gross in his critique of the whole issue. For Gross notes the potential weaknesses in the remedy offered by keen professionals provoked by what they see as the inadequacies of educators dabbling in the sociological domain.

Gross first establishes that there are, as is evidenced by the contributions he is about to criticize, those:

...who take the position that bringing to bear the concepts and methods of the behavioral sciences on important educational problem areas may be the most significant development in education in the next several decades. ³²

With this comment we cannot but be reminded of Broudy's observation in similar words on the coming of analytical philosophy of education:

the parallel illustrates the generality of our theme that the 'real' disciplines are showing territorial ambitions. In the case of sociology and philosophy, these ambitions are encouraged by (from our point of view) a faulty analysis of the kind of activity which takes place in teacher training institutions. On this point Gross shows good insight into the exaggerated claims likely to be made on behalf of the more rigorous work of the professional sociologists which will bear, in a moment, even more strongly on the impending British work than on the American.

For, in examining the social science research reported in the many articles before him, he makes a point of accompanying his recognition of its potentialities for the better understanding of education by a warning. He is specific enough to note seven dangers. For example; he warns against 'using "social class" or social stratification as the single explanatory "cause" of educational phenomena'; ³³ he draws attention to the ways in which empirical techniques can be questionable. In sum, he shows himself very wary, with reference to a wide range of contributions to this particular symposium, about accepting sociological pronouncements on education at the face value assumed by merely stating that they are real sociologists' offerings.

The impressive-looking, 'rigorous' material to be found in the issue may convince some, by its appearance and its authority, that it is a genuine stiffening of educational sociology; but Gross shows caution. He prescribes a close inspection of the contributions: their assumptions should be unearthed and their methods carefully looked over. He sounds - not surprisingly, given the realisation

that 'philosophical' reservations about scientific claims will be found similarly in all social sciences - like Bantock commenting on psychology. This is particularly the case when he identifies the two strongest temptations to which social scientists are prone to succumb: 'to confuse causation with statistical association or covariance' and 'to confuse value propositions with conclusions based on scientific research findings.' ³⁴

These are temptations to be borne in mind as we move immediately from America to Britain, for it is at home that the empirical sociologists were to make the greatest impact and their work was to show that the temptations are very real. The work of David Glass is, at one remove from education, of importance. Working withing the British tradition of 'political arithmetic' ³⁵ which contrasts strongly with that European 'philosophical' tradition which was reviewed earlier in the chapter, he lays strong emphasis on establishing 'the facts' with two purposes in mind. Research findings, he says in Social Mobility in Britain, 'are of direct concern both for the development of sociological theory and for the formation of social policy.' ³⁶ Fact and value are both in view. Theory, it is anticipated, will emerge at the macro-level on a foundation of empirical findings. Policy makers, including those responsible for the educational system, will have fact rather than opinion to guide them.

Out of this background, associated with the London School of Economics, emerged the specific educational investigation into Social Class and Educational Opportunity which Jean Floud, A.H. Halsey

and F.M. Martin³⁷ were to offer as the first substantial evidence that a 'proper' approach to sociology of education was available.³⁸ They stand on the social science ground carefully examined by Gross - and not without an explicit awareness of the kind of limitations which we have seen him identify. For they recognize 'the substantial philosophical and educational objections to our definition of equality of opportunity.'³⁹ That is, they give at least verbal assent to the truth that value-freedom is hard to achieve in research undertaken in a context dominated by the need to frame educational policy. In the event, however, as we shall see, there is an obvious enthusiasm for the replacement of speculation by empiricism and the creation of a body of knowledge whose presuppositions are, once admitted to exist, allowed to disappear from discussion. One kind of premise, that is, becomes suppressed in the drive to establish a scientific discipline.

This is even more evident in Floud's advertising of the material in the general educational periodical The Journal of Education. The wide range of educationists who formed its readership would see in her article a specialized viewpoint which was alien to their non-specialist way of thinking about education. She therefore emphasizes that their research 'was designed primarily as a sociological and not as an educational investigation'.⁴⁰ The open admission of limitations, with its clear implication that sociological material is not 'neutral' and becomes relevant to education only within a wider frame of thinking, is strangely at odds with the use to which the same material was soon to be put in the training of teachers. She is here quite candid about that distinction between

description and prescription which we have identified as crucial to an understanding of educational thought. It is one which, in her words:

...explains the limitations of the work from an educational point of view - for instance, as I shall explain later, some of the underlying assumptions, especially those concerning the nature of educational opportunity and success, are understandably objectionable in the eyes of many educationists. ⁴¹

Notwithstanding this recognition of the real focus for any educational discussion which has to be about education understood as a value-enterprise, Floud insists that rational policy depends on our knowing those inter-relationships between social phenomena which only careful empirical enquiry can provide. The value-freedom of her kind of functionalism is thus implied at the very same time as it is admitted to be problematical. Such illogicality can best be explained, in the terms of our own account, by invoking the 'political' dimension already discussed in other areas. Missionary work on behalf of a discipline of sociology of education was the main objective - a discipline set up to replace what the graduates of the London School of Economics would see as the essentially vague and imprecise speculations of that earlier tradition which this chapter has been earlier concerned with.

We shall discover in the next period how the 'facts' deemed to be important here for policy-making were set out as a programme for an entirely new component of teacher-training studies. This raised all the issues connected with the notions of 'levels' of

educational theorizing, for teachers are not in any direct sense 'policy' makers as understood in the original research into social class and educational opportunity. Therefore, the justification for inclusion of such material had to be made by reference to sociological studies as an essential element in the teacher's 'understanding' of his and his pupils' situation. Such an argument raises precisely the same kind of question about 'relevance' to the core of a teacher's work - his organization of learning experiences in a classroom - as did the Armytageian argument for the 'understanding' supposedly found only in historical studies. Floud's article thus opens up issues which have appeared in other contexts and which will continue to emerge as the literature is investigated; for they are as field-independent as the generalist thinkers who typically raise them.

One such generalist re-appears in this context as a critic of the Floud, Halsey and Martin research. Morris, at this time recently moved to a Chair in Education from his directorship of research - a symbolic move from science to education - comments in the language of a personalist, though more gently than his mentor Pilley.⁴² He naturally wants to place empiricism within a wider framework, insisting that 'it becomes most evident that the questions asked in this study depend ultimately for their meaning on a set of much wider questions'.⁴³ This emphasis on 'meaning' as grasped only in contextual terms is the trade-mark of the non-technical philosopher (as we shall find it is, too, of the technical philosopher when we come to the further work of Scheffler in the next period).

Morris's point is that the presuppositions of the scientific

sociologists concerning social egalitarianism, once expressed, do not have the neutral meaning in the resulting terms which the label 'scientific' connotes. 'Equality' is a term in ethics, not science. The educationist's notion of egalitarianism recognizes this. He conceives of progress in education as a reconstruction of an already value-laden enterprise to foster more adequately those dispositions of individuals which are valuable to the individuals first and society second. In contrast, the social egalitarianism which motivates the 'scientific' enquiries under consideration aims at progressing to a meritocracy whose educational system is viewed as a selective agency, not as a location for the transmission of worthwhile content between the generations. Morris holds to the educationist's view:

For this view the essence of equality lies in educating every child, not only the most intellectually able in the traditional sense, up to the limit of and in accordance with its own powers, irrespective of its social origins.⁴⁴

In a word, the focus of attention is entirely different in the educationist and the sociologist. Research unguided by a consciously-held normative theory is, to Morris in this context as much as when he was passing observations on psychology, inadequate. There are implications in all enquiry purporting to bear on education which, as he says, 'do not in fact lie in the future, but are part of the present, since our awareness or ignorance of them may modify all our subsequent actions'.⁴⁵ The main such implication is that 'education' is not primarily a scientific concept, but of another logical type. It is not, as Frankena himself was to put it

definitively fifteen years later, 'the social science concept of education', but one seen from inside the activity of educating - 'This kind of a concept of education is a normative one'.⁴⁶ Morris, in insisting on the distinction in the face of prestigious research, reveals that intuitive grasp of the logic of studies which the technical philosopher was to continue articulating.

Thus Morris here - and it can be noted that his critique is contained in the same widely-read general journal in which Floud's report appeared - insists that all research into the so-called 'facts' of education must be searched for its assumptions about the process of educating which is the only justification for the existence of the social institution of education. If the assumption turns out to be that the process is hardly worth mentioning because other features of the system - selection in schooling, for example - are more important areas for inquiry, then the research is indeed sociological and not educational. It is then as Floud admitted it to be, without fully realizing the implications of the admission. For such sociological research has no bearing on the central concerns of the teacher, even granted that this key figure in education is understood to be involved, indirectly and through association with his colleagues, in other levels of decision-making than that which relates to his everyday activities. This is the import of Morris's second semantic comment: that scientific sociology of education must be appraised in the light of the philosopher-educationist's sensitivity to 'the penumbra of unrealised meanings surrounding the sharp definitions used for empirical investigation'.⁴⁷

With this somewhat poetical comment we can move into the conclusion to this first investigation into the fourth field of education. It is, once more, a conclusion which underlines the presence in the particular of the general. One theme has emerged strongly from our examination of the 'social' field: that the coming of empiricism, even in the quantitatively small literature of this first period, is to be equated with the claim that 'real' sociologists - in this case, persons associated with a single academic organization, The London School of Economics - have arrived to start building a rigorous sociology of education. The demand for rigour here parallels that seen in history with Armytage, in psychology with various competing schools and in philosophy with the analytical philosophers.

In each discipline we have noted a tendency to stress the importance for educational thinking of that discipline beyond the point of credibility for outsiders with no vested interest in any of the claims - for generalists, that is, whose very title is derived from their position of impartiality with respect to specialist domains. And in the reflexive literature, because it has to be more widely reflexive than the discipline-headings under which it has been considered indicates, we have found these mediatorial writers who are concerned to accommodate the specialist claims within general educational theory. Such writers, at one end of the spectrum, answer the cluster of questions which attach to the initial question 'What is educational theory?' with an intuitive conviction marked more by a rejection of the exaggerated claims of specialists than by well-formed positive argument; but, at the

other end, they answer the questions with all the authority and systematicity of first class professional philosophers. In sum 'mother hen' (whom we shall encounter in the next period) has the backing of Frankena - and for good reasons.

The logical inevitability of normative-generalist thought in specialist contexts is thus confirmed. It is often implicit, but it is there whenever the specialist believes himself to be answering 'What is the nature of my discipline?'. For what he really answers is 'What is the nature of my discipline in relation to education?', for the purpose of showing its application. Application simply entails prescription to a readership or audience of teachers, whether the specialist realizes or not that this is the contextual implication of his utterances. We pass on now to the 'pedagogic' field identified in 1952 as constituting the fifth domain. In terms of the literature as normally classified, this field is the one in which reflexive comment has not the obvious association with any of the preceding four fields which would lead, say, a librarian to include it with one of them. As suggested earlier, this means that pedagogy or general educational theory which relates to those levels which are close to actual teaching, could be regarded, on its face value, as merely what is left over when the classification according to disciplines has been made.

This judgement would be naive, as the first four chapters have shown. The logic of educational studies is not so easily open to inspection as the arrangement of library shelves would suggest. General theory is of first importance, not last, for education. The literature of pedagogy is not a rag-bag of low-status remainders,

but the explicit core of studies of education. Though its writers in this first period may not be fully aware of their status, they are the philosophers of education in the only sense in which that rigorous discipline can be relevant to education. It will, then, not be surprising to find in the next chapter authors already encountered under other headings, for just as general theory is central so are its creators ubiquitous, not in the habit of recognizing the academic boundaries we now leave behind until the further investigations of Period Two.

Chapter Five

The Pedagogical Field: General Theory of Education

It follows from the argument so far advanced that much of the material contained in earlier discussions could have found a place in this chapter. Familiar names will re-appear, their work placed under 'pedagogy' on a principle of selection from their varied contributions which is roughly satisfactory for our purposes, once it is accepted that the words contained in article and book titles are but a first step to locating their content within the whole body of this thesis. In short, there are alternative routes through the long argument we are presenting. The important point is that, on any route, the conclusion would be the same: such is the nature of the material. The factual, conceptual and evaluative questions to be distinguished and clarified in the total literature of education are our concerns, not the librarian's. He contents himself with the conventional ordering of the domain, as is appropriate; whereas this account seeks to expose the inadequacies of the conventions from a philosophical point of view.

For it will be emphasized once more that philosophy has been our concern all along. This is the case even though many, or even most, writers on education do not show a full awareness that they are philosophizing when they reflect on the nature of the contributions they make to educational thought. The difference in this chapter will be that a greater awareness of involvement in philosophy will show itself. Much of the discussion which centres on the term 'educational theory' is explicitly directed against

the dominance in teacher education of psychology. This is particularly the case with that level of theory which is concerned with the activities of the class teacher. One writer describes the situation succinctly when he describes the subject Education as one which 'began as an obscure branch of moral philosophy and turned in the course of time into a subordinate section of applied psychology.'¹ This thought provides an appropriate over-view of the chapter.

'Educational Theory': A Term Without Restriction

Before examining familiar figures, we can note briefly one or two comments made by fresh contributors to the discussion which bear on the view that psychology is too dominant in 'theory'. W. Sparrow, writing in one of the Institute of Education journals located, as it were, between the two identified worlds of university and college training, expresses his concern as one who sees himself as a philosophically-inclined educationist, rather than as a historian, psychologist, sociologist or even a 'technical' philosopher. In examining teacher preparation, he regrets that 'the amount of philosophical thinking or examination in the courses is relatively small' because of the 'veering of interest in our own day towards the experimental and the measurable aspects of education.'² His analysis of educational theory insists, therefore, that there are two kinds. What these are is, of course, no surprise; but his labels are of interest. The scientific theory which he notes is derived mainly from psychology he calls 'immediate' theory: the non-scientific kind, which in a negative sense represents

Sparrow's intuition against the insufficiency of the first kind, is somehow related to philosophy and is called 'ultimate' theory. The latter 'has to do with values and beliefs'.³

This is not now to be regarded by us as very original; but its appearance in an article entitled 'A Note on Educational Theory' illustrates well the philosophical nature of the pedagogical field as perceived in this non-discipline context. Sparrow's distinction between ends and means parallels that seen more systematically set out elsewhere as a counter to specialist aspirations in the field of education. Here, he too argues that suggested scientific means offered to the teacher require scrutiny in order to unearth those assumptions which enthusiasm for the apparently useful techniques tends to suppress. Philosophy in some sense is lacking, though vital. This is Sparrow's main point, reinforced by the Editor's introduction to the journal issue, where he gives the kind of simple support to a simple model which raises once more the question of 'isolationism' in the literature of education. For his comment cries out for a cross-referencing to discussion of a more substantial sort such as we have found even in Britain of the time: 'Educational theory, as taught, sometimes tends to confuse the means and ends of education... Dr. Sparrow's article clearly draws our attention to the confusion which may arise when these two sides to educational theory are not clearly stated'.⁴

Elsewhere, we can note that Knox, already encountered giving a pungent comment on the statistical outpourings of research, surveys all the available theses in educational theory with a similar distinction in mind. He comments: 'it is difficult to escape the

conclusion that in contemporary research the philosophical bases of education have been unduly subordinated to the more tangible aspects of the subject'.⁵ This is an observation very much in tune with the stated objectives of the new British Journal of Educational Studies in the first issue of which it in fact appears. Editor Beales gives these objectives when he assures readers - most of whom would be experiencing in their professional lives the dominance of psychology - that the journal 'will be not narrowly specialist' and will aim 'to provide philosophical discussion at a high level'.⁶

Other evidence on this felt need for 'philosophy' in educational theory abounds in this period. It is fragmentary and, in its published form, can be fairly taken as representative of more widespread thinking within teacher training institutions. It shows as a concern intimated in an often rudimentary form which justifies the description 'intuitive' that the awareness of other, better articulated indications of it, suggest. A science of education is felt to be inadequate, and the prestige attached to its publications therefore felt to be misleading as to the real nature of educational thought. Such thought is known to the Sparrows and Knoxes to be essentially prescriptive and therefore ultimately philosophical in some sense. In this consists its unity.

The emphasis on this kind of unity or integration can be found even in writers who stress other modes of thinking than the philosophical mode as providing it. Two can be picked out, for different reasons. M.M. Lewis, noted earlier as the reporter of the Standing Conference debate on the philosophy of education, here

at an earlier point in the period suggests what he calls 'communication' as the focus for integration. He urges his colleagues to 'put the study of communication in the forefront of studies that underlie the practice of education'.⁷ Again, what he is against is as clear as in the comments of those just considered; and what he is for, his later experiences in recording the discussion of Reid and the other Professors of Education would no doubt transmute from 'communication' to the 'philosophy' it actually is.

Even Armytage reappears to reveal the extent to which a concern for integrated, generalist thinking in teacher training was felt in the face of the one specialized area which paid such a small amount of attention to educational applications as our earlier chapter noted. He says: 'the division of "education" into philosophy, history, psychology, methods and sociology...is rather ironic in view of the frequent use...of the term "integration"'.⁸ His own solution to the problem is, of course, no surprise. Unity, to him, comes clearly from the second of the divisions he mentions: though, to be fair to the account already given of his notion of history, it is a division which seems to embrace his concept of the first-mentioned discipline - philosophy - too. As he opines, in familiar style: 'students become aware of the difference between what is and what might be from studying what we intended and what came about'.⁹

But it is to Bantock that we return for explicit comment on educational theory which is at once more substantial and more provocative than these minor attempts to stake out the claims of some sort of philosophy. He addresses the readers of Universities Quarterly unapologetically as an Educationist. His defence of a

proper notion of educational theory is not only against the scepticism of academics housed in well-established departments of universities, but also against the shoddiness of those in education whose work attracts the scepticism. Bantock thus continues to be on the side of rigorous relevance. His main target is once more:

...that large and vociferous body of educationalists to whom questions of training are questions exclusively of method, to whom theoretical queries as to what purposes these methods shall subserve are irrelevant and unnecessary. ¹⁰

Educational thinking is characterized, according to Bantock, by the sorts of question which 'technicians', often proud of their relationship to the science of psychology, ignore but cannot really escape. A philosophical analysis of these questions reveals two main constituents - 'A conception of man's nature is involved and a conception of knowledge'. ¹¹ Thus does Bantock point to the importance of the three parts of philosophy which we have found in Frankena - and indeed before Frankena had written. Using analytical philosophy in his own censorious way, he identifies both speculative philosophy and normative philosophy as linked with the practical activities of teaching. And it is the person who philosophizes, integrating within his thinking all the necessary elements. Bantock expresses his familiar thesis vividly and without qualification: 'Just as M. Jourdain unavoidably spoke prose so educationalists unavoidably philosophize.' ¹²

From this standpoint he views the disciplines. There is a place for psychology of course; but it is an appropriate place, not an ambitious occupation of the centre with talk of 'needs' and the like

in a philosophically naive idiom. The educationist welcomes any contribution which recognizes its own limits as laid down by the descriptive nature of its material. This applies to history, too. It is acceptable to Bantock - in a form other than the mere cataloguing of events - on similar grounds; for any discipline 'will provide an important adjunct to the philosopher's task. Integrated in this sort of way, and brought into vital relationship with...practical experience', ¹³ it will then justify its claim to be a discipline 'of education'.

This personal declaration of Bantock certainly raises the level of discussion of a range of issues in the British literature which others deal with less confidently and in an *ad hoc* fashion. He is very much aware of what he is doing and the context in which he does it. His clear intention is to introduce:

...a much-needed measure of clarification into our present confusion, where controversy so frequently rages in a fog of unexamined terminology and unheeded assumption'. ¹⁴

This is no new tale he tells, but one which, it has to be emphasized when dealing with the rather aggressive tactics of this particular writer, is rightly told in all parts of the literature of education. Bantock's defiance of all those who suggest, by word or deed, that the university subject of Education is less rigorous than any other when it is properly conceived and taught, is found as strongly here - undirected at any particular discipline - as in those other contexts where the identity of the target-discipline is quite

clear. It is a defiance matched by his concern that the rigour be focussed on the school learner through the mind of the teacher. We can now pass on to a new writer, addressing a different set of readers, for whom the concern for relevance in educational theory is paramount and not blurred at all by rigour-talk.

Brian Holmes writes on and for 'The Teacher of Teachers'.¹⁵ This is a very thorough review of an outstanding American book which is used by Holmes to present his own early analysis of educational theory and the studies which centre on it. What emerges at once, in an emphasis already noted in our account but yet to be fully developed, is the relationship of the teacher who possesses a theory to that theory itself. Holmes thus thinks within a Bantock-like frame. He has much to say on 'liberal' education in relation to 'professional' education as a counterpoint to the content of the influential work he is examining. The teacher, he argues, must certainly be liberally educated. But this can mean many things. We can point to Armytage, who would be content with an education in history as, on its own, constituting such a liberal education. We shall encounter Pilley again, illuminating this concept of the 'liberal' with an insistent humanistic perspective which is radically different from that of the bold historian. For the present, we can note merely that Holmes sees no contradiction in passing to the topic of vocational preparation from that of the teacher as necessarily an educated person; and we can leave 'person' and 'liberal education' to be amplified by later writers.

For, no matter how these terms are conceived, it is clear to Holmes that a teacher must teach: must decide and act in a concrete

situation and not just remain passively elevated in a state of 'liberally-educatedness'. Understanding and insight are not enough: action in keeping with these mental competencies is necessary on the floor of education. Holmes' model for translating thought into action is one described in the language that we now associate with a generalist perspective, for he argues that 'A case can be made for a more thematic approach'¹⁶ in the content of teacher education than that approach which starts with separate specialist studies.

His first suggestion is that the themes could be selected from practical experience without a total relinquishment of the academic disciplines; for the latter would be used to analyse the themes critically from their various standpoints. This way of bridging the gap between theory and practice is more a change of starting point, designed to reduce the isolation of specialists from each other, than a radical reconceptualization of the problem. The disciplines would be perceived by students as attempting to inter-relate and focus on whatever practicalities they could find in common. This model was much later propounded as that which was appropriate for the heavily differentiated approach of the 1960s; but it is here just Holmes's first signpost to the heart of the problem. For it is apparent in the model that the receiving student is expected to unify all the perspectives offered in his own thinking. It is therefore odd that his tutors should not attempt to do the same individually, rather than as a team. In fact, as we have seen, to offer what appears to be a single specialist elucidation of an educational theme is to offer by implication of the context a kind of unified view in any event - but one which is dangerous

because unrealized.

So, Holmes moves the argument on. He focusses educational theory, not on themes which hopefully have their origin in both the practical situation and the content of the disciplines, but on the content of education itself: he identifies the curriculum as the required centre of attention. As he says:

On the other hand, more strictly educational problems might give coherence to the whole course. The content of the curriculum, ¹⁷with its many facets, could be used to advantage.

'Coherence' is his key term: abandoning rigour-talk, he suggests the content of education - What shall we teach? - as the integrative theme. Educational theory becomes, for the teacher, primarily curriculum theory ¹⁸ as Holmes develops his discussion with this implicit recognition of the 'levels' of theory which we have seen intimated in several other writers.

Of course, once he focusses on the curriculum as an educationist who seeks for what is important in the school situation without prejudice for or against any discipline of education, it becomes clear that those disciplines as orthodoxly defined do not have equal bearing on the chosen area. We are back, then, with the insight of a Morris into the ways in which history of education could be, but is typically not, made to relate to that 'policy' level which is the teacher's. Now Holmes suggests that curriculum theory is that level, and we are sufficiently close to the ground to make the important distinctions about what to teach and how to teach it which becomes lost when the discussion is conducted

in terms of disciplines-versus-general theory. Curriculum theory, we can say, is one species of educational theory. Holmes thus opens up an area on which little significant meta-thinking had been employed since the publication of the interim report of the Council for Curriculum Reform - The Content of Education - well before our Period One, in 1945.

Of the distinctions in question, the main one is that which would allow the kind of theory of teaching which we saw emerging from Ausubel and the 'bridging' theorists in the chapter on educational psychology to be logically separated from curriculum theory. How to teach, though intimately connected to the question of what to teach, will increasingly emerge as the real core question for educational theory in a teacher training context. Holmes shows himself to be a pioneer, in this notable review, by moving close to that core. But there are very individual aspects of his account which we can mention, leaving the further development of the discussion of the curriculum-method distinction to be reported in relation to the writings of later educationists.

The first of these aspects is simply the insistence to be found in his analysis on 'a unified course of study' ¹⁹ - an insistence tailored to the context in which he writes, for, as we shall soon find, the readers of the newly re-titled journal Education for Teaching were in a political situation which made it difficult for them to resist the argument that their courses should be stiffened by an injection of material from the disciplines. However, it is the second aspect of Holmes' article which both throws new light on the problem of 'integrating' course and indicates

those hidden relationships in the literature of education which only a wide-ranging survey can reveal.

For he conceives what Peters was much later and with a less appropriate metaphor to call the 'meshing' of disciplines very much in aesthetic terms. This throws light on our own term - 'intuitive' - used at many points to indicate the feel for wholeness and against fragmentation found in those educationists whose primary concern is with schools and the improvement of practice within them. It is therefore no surprise that Holmes who, from this first piece of work was to go on publishing in as many varied contexts as any educationist in the literature and to become a 'philosophical' comparative educationist of distinction, was to record nearly thirty years later the influence of the American philosopher Broudy on his thinking. We have noted above the 'aesthetic' individuality of Broudy in his adopting at that level of debate a position to which Holmes's here is strikingly similar. The passage in Holmes is a clear statement of generalist thinking in terms other than what can be called 'hard' logic:

The ability to see the constituent parts as a whole, and in their organization to recognize aims, is basic to aesthetic theory. Synthesis like this is needed in all spheres of activity: not less in teacher training and in teaching itself. 20

Thus speaks a Deweyian, providing support which was no doubt welcome in the arguments carried on in college staff-rooms at the time. Holmes, both like and unlike Bantock, argues for relevance. There are no academic status-references at all in his contribution. We can soon appropriately move on from his very individual analysis

of educational theory to pick up the connections between his initial attention to the liberal rather than the professional education of teachers and the strong vein of personalism to be found at this time in many educational writings. First, however, we must digress from the content of the arguments found in the literature of the pedagogical field to the context of its production. A more sustained examination of the 'political' dimension is required than has been given hitherto, if the tensions in the content are to be fully understood.

Observations on the 'Politics' of Academic Theorizing

It will be recalled that Passmore's 'problematic' mode of writing the history of philosophy has been the model for this thesis. Now, we change somewhat to his 'cultural' mode by giving more of the setting in which Education is reflected upon.²¹ The tension between opposed demands in the literature, suggested by several pairs of terms - rigorous-relevant, academic-professional, discipline-centred - practice-centred - can be more fully grasped by locating it in its institutional context. It was obvious even from the content of the Bantock and Holmes articles that they were writing for different types of reader. The university world and the training college world, together with the newly created 'world-between' of the Institutes of Education, have unsurprisingly provided us with much of the literature so far examined by means of their journals. Few would mistake an article from the British Journal of Educational Studies for one from Education for Teaching: and, if our

argument as so far developed is sound, the correct identification would not depend simply on being able to spot that the article was either first-class or second-class in its handling. It would depend more on the orientation that we have described in terms of its 'logic'.

The present 'pedagogic' field is exemplified far more often in the pages of the colleges' journal than in the university literature. This follows from the nature of the two different contexts. An interesting illustration of this two-world situation is the different tone of the welcome given, when British journal of Educational Studies appeared, from, as it were, 'above' by the non-vocational university, and, from 'below' from the colleges concerned with two-year teacher training. The first Editor wonders how well the new publication is likely to achieve its stated broad aims. He refers to 'educational scholars and craftsmen, and even more...the philosophers of our day' in a manner which at once suggests that it is the scholarship and philosophy which are of real importance in a learned journal, and that to actually claim such attainments for the subject Education may be somewhat premature. 'Have they something to say to their generation', he asks, 'or do they still need time and space for speculative manoeuvre before they know from where to start?' ²² This is certainly a scholarly-looking and philosophically-sounding question: not much action is likely to flow from it into the craftsman's classroom, though.

Whereas Collier, now editing the journal of college educators, welcomes the newcomer by drawing his readers' attention to the fact that it has 'the united backing of the senior educationists in

the country'.²³ We can note, in the light of our earlier investigation, that Collier himself on another criterion than that to which the political context here seems to commit him, is a 'senior educationist'. He politely anticipates high standards and national standing for the professors' periodical; then, in fact, offers in the same issue the kind of content for his college colleagues which is in marked contrast to the content of the first number of the new journal. The dissonance can be felt, particularly by anyone who reads through many issues of the two journals side by side.

When Beales, a little later, describes the one journal in the pages of the other as an exercise in communication between the two worlds, he looks back over four years and is satisfied that the stated aims have been achieved, in spite of the reservation we have noted in the Universities Quarterly. And what these aims are is significant for the present theme - both in terms of the words used to express them and the implied self-assessment, on behalf of the members of Standing Conference, of the status of their work. The main aim, he says, is:

...to reflect and represent educational studies in every field; to do this with particularly in mind the specialist and research worker in each field yet without being narrowly specialist or professional or ethereal.²⁴

What this really means is then clarified by example: the series of historical 'Sources' articles is, to him, the clearest permanent thread in the journal and a model for other disciplines to follow. We can note that this series is precisely what Morris had in mind

when he gave us a picture of 'the scholar'. This journal seeks 'to avoid needless overlap with other journals already catering for specific needs (e.g. current developments, methodology, educational psychology)' ²⁵ by becoming scholarly in a sense which is indisputably academic and long familiar to everyone in departments of universities, to whom any suggestion of application to the practical world is ill-favoured.

In the situation implied in these inter-journal communications there is hierarchical pressure. The standards are defined at the highest academic level, so that departments of education, if they want status in the university, must be seen to do well that which the university knows and values: their vocational purpose is a hindrance in achieving this objective. In such circumstances, individuals can more easily achieve status by distancing themselves from the vocational purpose with arguments about the real relevance of their preferred type of rigour. At a lower level, training colleges, if they too want status, must do likewise - showing how their courses, which are validated by the universities, are recognizable to the authorities on the terms of the latter. As a Correspondent writing on the in-between position of the Institutes of Education at the time puts it: the universities, after sixty years or more of involvement in the professional preparation of teachers, still look down on 'applied' studies, particularly Education, so that 'few have even now wholeheartedly reconciled themselves to their departments of education.' ²⁶ That this is stating the position mildly can be seen by recalling the conclusion reached in the discussion of the disciplines by the Standing

Conference of professors, where they identify 'academic respectability as the only armour against disdainful colleagues'.

Therefore, it can be seen that in the training college world the long-standing 'tender-minded' concerns are not likely to be valued from above. The whole cluster of pedagogical terms such as 'relevance', 'integration' and 'synthesis', which connote the relating of theory to practice, are not part of the normal vocabulary of an academic system which is characterized by specialization and 'pure' studies - typified in the single subject Honours degree. The upgrading of college work - like the upgrading of university work in Education - depends on replacing that language with the language of rigour and the consequent need for Education tutors to precede any improvement in the qualifications of their students by specialist improvements in their own. Within a decade, this demand for qualifications in the disciplines was to become overwhelming; but already at this time the origins of it in the politics of academic life are in evidence.

The possibility of school-related generalist thinking of the type we have identified being defended against a narrow definition of rigour was hardly entertained. There were probably two reasons for this, the first of which is the one already suggested in our discussion of the American philosophers of education. Generalist thinking is within a discipline - the discipline of philosophy. But this is a discipline which was not conceived in British academic circles of the time in the broad terms which would have enabled generalists in teacher training to find support there and appropriately supportive qualifications for their work. Their philosophical status was that of amateurs even though, on a wider view

than that taken by their critics, their philosophical logic was correct, as we have seen. The arguments for the correctness of it were to be found too far away, apparently, from their own universe of discourse for them to benefit by being able to cite it.

In any event, the second reason is simply that he who pays the piper calls the tune. At this time it had become evident that teachers of most of the nation's children needed more than two years training if they were to teach in accordance with those very principles which generalist thinking, once reflected upon, connects with the 'large' concerns of the justifiable Good Life in the Good Society. But to extend courses of training and make them more educative is possible only by a political act, within the making of which academic politics of the kind we are examining plays no small part. So, by and large, the price paid for the extension of teacher training was that courses had to become more reflective of those courses at 'the top' which were the model for all kinds of learning in higher education. In a moment we shall see the effect that this requirement had on those in the college world who were seeking improvement in teacher training. They were not of one mind, for academic status and educative concern are now open to view and in obvious conflict.

Meanwhile, before leaving the revealing relationship between the two main journals of the divided world of teacher training, we can note Collier's comment as he changes The Bulletin of Education into Education for Teaching. He hopes that the new title 'will give greater substance and dignity to the journal'.²⁷ The colleges want their work to be better appreciated. The journal becomes less of

a house journal for college teachers and more of a serious intellectual forum. Yet the tension remains between two conceptions of what constitutes serious work. For later, when Collier was to repay Beales by describing the newly-styled journal to the readers of its university counterpart, he echoes remarks of his which we noted earlier. What he describes as 'the general acceptance of the broader aim implied by the word "education" as opposed to "training" for teachers'²⁸ dictates the purpose of the colleges' periodical; but he stresses that editorial policy would favour contributions which are relevant to the act of teaching. In other words, the content of the journal would be of a type which - we can judge - would be very likely to be dismissed as still 'mere training' by those who define 'real' education as the liberal initiation into those subjects which have university standing.

The most revealing discussion is, however, not in these symptomatic exchanges. They occur in the mounting debate on the extension of training into a three year course. Outspoken against the university domination of course-content is Cyril Bibby. He contributes to an important symposium on the topic with impolitic bluntness. This radical integrationist's plain assertion is that 'we want a three-year course, not a third-year course'.²⁹ He urges a total re-thinking of content, arguing that since the inception of the Institutes of Education there have been developed conceptions of teacher education which are fundamentally different from both that which believes that scholarship magically confers pedagogical competence and that which believes teaching to be merely a question of possessing warm child-directed attitudes.

What is required, Bibby declares, is relevant professional preparation which embraces thought in relation to action, not 'potted portions of psychology and philosophy and sociology along the lines of "Listener's Digest"'.³⁰ His prescription is, in keeping with this remark, along lines similar to that with which Holmes started his analysis given above. Bibby recognizes that the disciplines do, in some way, bear on education; but it is not in the simple way assumed by universities who do not take seriously the lessons to be learned from the thorough work of the Institutes of Education. His point is that, given say the obvious need for a teacher to understand child development, that is where the course for the teacher should start. Then the findings of psychology are approached with a specific requirement in mind: educational topics determine which psychological elements are to be included, not vice-versa. Clearly Bibby is on the wave-length of those whose desire for an autonomous educational psychology was set out earlier.

Similarly, Bibby contends, a teacher needs to have some conception of the ends of education in the shape of the kind of person he is helping to produce. In a word, he will have a philosophy of life which includes his professional activities as a very important part. This necessitates 'going to' philosophy to ensure that the personal philosophizing and its product in the mind of the teacher is as informed as possible. For the teacher needs to 'search unceasingly for semantic subterfuge masquerading as educational principle'³¹ in his own thinking as well as in others. Bibby thus shows himself to be familiar, as a generalist, with the analytical talk in the air at the time while not unfamiliar with the conception

of philosophy as world-view which we have identified as central to educational thinking.

Unified, personal thinking has its professional point of application in the real world of the classroom: the particulars of the teacher's unique situation are of great significance. The chances of these being taken into account as factors that have been generalized as variables in the conceptual schemes of disciplines are greater, Bibby is suggesting, if teachers are prepared from the low-level starting point, not the high-level one. Thus does he conceptualize his three year course, while already looking ahead from 1954 to the possibility of this extension becoming even more significant by the creation of graduate qualifications in Education. The B.Ed. is already in his aspirations for a teaching profession which must be educated in order to educate.

However, it is plain that Bibby eschews the politically easy way of achieving improved status for Education by conforming to the academic definition of it. He chooses to champion the alternative conception of a subject which has its own respectable way of providing 'a unifying centre to the philosophical, psychological, developmental, sociological and historical sectors of our students' studies'.³² As a representative of those whose experimental work in teacher education was practical in intent while thoughtful in its planning, he resisted the political blandishments of those colleagues at the college level who were motivated by status considerations.

One such whom we can cite is another Principal who analyzes developments in teacher training since the McNair Report. J.W. Bridgeman's position can be recognized at a glance to be directly

opposed to that of Bibby. His talk is of status, standards, and salary. He notes a recent general upgrading, with respect to these matters, of the training colleges: they begin to approach the position of the university departments of education, just as the latter establish themselves more firmly by associating their studies more closely with those of better-established university departments. Bridgeman's over-riding criterion for progress is clear:

This approach to University standards on the part of Training Colleges is a very good yardstick for measuring the progress made in the whole field of the training of teachers during the past ten years and for estimating the relative values of further proposals for advance.³³

His probable estimation of the value of Bibby's proposals does not take much guessing. For he asks no questions about the meaning of 'standards': the submissiveness of his interpretation of recent history is unqualified. There is no sign of reservation - intellectual or otherwise - in his acceptance that what is deemed to be appropriate 'above' is appropriate for the colleges. The content of a professional preparation of this type is not, to him, suspect in the light of the colleges' experience as it is for Bibby. The objective he holds to be primary is about to be reached, for the three-year course and the improved standing in the world of education which it will bring to the institutions which mount it 'at long last is within sight of accomplishment'.³⁴ The willingness to earn the privilege of improved status by a silence on the issues which so concerned Bibby is so evident in Bridgeman that it cannot but remind any experienced generalist of a phenomenon commonly observed much lower

down in the educational system - the playing of the 'good pupil role' by pupils who have settled for advancement rather than an education which engages the questioning mind. Bridgeman's exhortation is like that of a headmaster addressing his pupils: 'The attempt to live up to University standards is a constant challenge to us all'.³⁵

So, the debate was prosecuted in this early period. Now comes H.C. Dent with the characteristically commonsensical view of one who had written several general books on English education.³⁶ His concern is closer to the position of Bibby than to that of Bridgeman. It is the content of teacher education that he discusses, not the social standing of those who teach it. All the elements which enter into the preparation of the teacher as artist and craftsman are in his sights. They should, he argues, form a unity which is evident to the student himself, so that personal education, professional theory and practical implementation are experienced in a meaningful way: all three according to 'their relative places and degrees of importance',³⁷ centred on the realities of the educational enterprise. Dent's observations on the teacher education scene from outside can immediately be seen to have about them a quality which can be called 'balanced' when compared to much of the internal debate on the present theme.

His realism shows when he suggests that university scholarship and standards need questioning and re-interpreting to embrace sound vocational preparation. He finds quite pathetic the 'phoney highbrow' who has been 'turned by a misconceived education into an intellectual snob'.³⁸ A Whiteheadian notion of inert knowledge, similar to

that which reveals itself in Collier's work, is evident in Dent's philosophy of education. Such knowledge, he says, is of little use in schooling. Teacher courses which are over-concerned with how they stand academically and under-concerned with their usefulness to a profession are to be condemned. An honest workman's job needs an honest workmanlike preparation, not an inflation of its contents with prestigious titles: 'Any idea of a teaching profession made up of philosophers is to my mind doubly fantastic.'³⁹

His point is clear - and indeed it is a philosophical point in another sense, as we know. Dent is, in fact, offering a robust version of our concept of normative theory applied to the education of the educators. Perhaps he would think such a description of it too grand. Nevertheless, it accurately classifies the pronouncements he feels obliged to make in response to the 'political' discussion in which he partakes. The conflation of questions of prestige and questions of the content of Education does not escape his knowing eye. We can leave, then, this issue with his shrewd observations in mind to return to the 'problematic' mode and a consideration of the concept of 'person' which underlies his more homely comments as surely as it does the work of both Bibby and Holmes.

The Concept of 'Person' in Educational Theory

Pilley will return in this section as the major figure. But there is a wider context within which person-centred thinking is typical and which includes a few university educationists who express

a minority position for that sector. Tibble, noted already for his breadth in relation to the social field, is one. He is humanistic rather than discipline-orientated, and we find him contributing to a symposium which seeks to bridge the gap between the two sectors of teacher training by first emphasizing the fact that orthodox English higher education shows certain features which preparation for teaching should try to avoid. His concern is about:

...the products of a highly compartmented system of higher education which may still pay lip service to the notion of a liberal education but does little else to make it a reality. ⁴⁰

The point he wishes to make is illustrated by the unusual approach made in his own department at the University of Leicester. Educational studies is organized not only on an integrated basis, such as we have been discussing, which avoids the labelling of its elements in ways familiar to graduates from their recent degree courses, but is taught in such a way as to involve the student as a person. ⁴¹ Tibble's philosophy is clear: he, like many others already encountered, does not accept the distinction between liberal and vocational education as it is usually made. The techniques and know-how which form the active part of general theory of education are not separate from those parts of a total course which are supposed to constitute the liberal education of the person who will, in his professional capacity, employ the techniques. The precise meaning of Tibble's objection to the traditional dichotomy is, of course, only to be found in the details of its organizational embodiment. For our purposes, it is his emphasis on the person rather than on the

subject which is in itself relevant to the present theme.

The commentators on his views in this symposium come from the other 'humanistic' Education Department - that of the University of Bristol, to which Morris was soon to move. They support Tibble's anti-specialist stance, for to them, too, 'Isolated brilliance is not enough'⁴² in a teacher. Teaching is not primarily about subjects, even though a content-less education is clearly impossible. At all levels of education - therefore particularly at the level of preparing the teachers themselves - the over-riding aim is the shaping of persons. Consequently, what is necessary in those who have the responsibility for achieving this aim is a flexibility - a willingness to be unconstrained by barriers set up in pursuit of other, alien purposes. This can only result from studies centred on the person himself. In educating teachers the organization of their studies should improve on that which is so familiar in schools and universities if that type of organization is ever to be improved. That is, it should be structured 'so that subject divisions can easily be o'erleaped whenever the value of educational experience makes it desirable'.⁴³

What these two humanists recognize is the subject-matter focus of 'much common practice'.⁴⁴ The isolation of specialized subjects in schools and universities makes it difficult for the whole person who is the student to perceive a wholeness in his studies. Teacher preparation thus has the problem of taking such students, who are usually ill-equipped to conceive of education in terms other than those which are very familiar to them from their own experiences, and trying to educate them as professionals who are, first, persons.

This is unusual argument from the university sector, but less so when it comes from the training colleges. The notions of a person's commitment to and involvement in teaching as a moral enterprise, rather than as a knowledge-transmission process, can be sampled by looking briefly at one college article. Its very title, 'Educating the Teacher as a Person: A Conversation',⁴⁵ underlines the significance of the concepts in this section to a grasp of the reflexive literature; and the fact that it is written anonymously perhaps makes it even more significant, bearing in mind the discussion of the preceding section on politics and preferment. It opposes the view that 'deep' study of a limited field is in itself educative. The author's belief is that it is only the adult as a person, not as a method-man or as a scholar, who is able to 'catch a certain spirit, a certain attitude to children'.⁴⁶ There is an existentialist ring to this assertion and its development which 'locates' it for us in an important niche of the present investigation, while raising questions noted in another niche - for we can guess the kind of comment Wisdom would be as likely to make here as he did on the bearing of depth psychology to the work of the teacher.

Nevertheless, the anonymous author does make his point in his own way that educational thinking is of necessity normative and that it can only have application through the thinking person. 'Application' of theory to practice in teaching is not a mechanical affair as is found in, say, engineering, where one situation is pretty much like another and the theory-practice relationship is easily covered by rule. The educated person decides and acts in very individual situations in an educative way only because his

thinking is 'charged' to embrace the barely-analyzable concrete realities in which he carries on his profession. This is why, in the student's education as a teacher, educational theory is of great importance. The author makes this point strongly:

I would like to emphasize the contribution of educational theory in helping the student to form the right attitudes and expectations. The object of the theory is to lead students to think more clearly about the nature of man and the good life, to deepen their insight and to cultivate their discrimination. ⁴⁷

This is a familiar philosophy: perhaps it is no surprise that the editor of Education for Teaching in which it appeared was still Collier.

All these personalistic tendencies appear weakly developed, however, in comparison with Pilley's 'Liberal Education in the Making of Teachers' to which we now come. This is a substantial piece of work, with nothing tentative or context-bound about it. His voice is that of philosophy in the grand manner, as he unapologetically uses all the disciplines which make a claim on education as grist to his mill. Immediately he takes the distinction between real 'education' and mere 'training' and roots it in opposed concepts of man in a systematic manner which was not in evidence in the anonymous contribution above. From the proper view of man, as Pilley sees it as opposed to the common view, there arises the familiar notion that teachers are to be educated as persons not as appliers of craft skills supposedly derived from scientific psychology.

All this is not new, as we know. What is, is Pilley's diagnosis

of the malady of teacher education of the past. It has lacked 'a fundamental theory of the part that can be played by theorizing in the development of personal quality'.⁴⁸ Thus he quite explicitly identifies his own meta-theoretical preoccupation, becoming a clear exemplar of the reflexive thinker that the present account is revealing. He supplies his own theory of theorizing by arguing for the importance of philosophy, psychology and history, not as sources of methods or of any kind of 'application' to teaching that the specialists can think of, but as vehicles for the creation of mind. Pilley clearly stands, in his own very individual way, within the broad Idealist tradition of philosophy, in which the teacher has enormous importance because his professional business is no less than the making of man-as-mind. The teacher's 'equipment' for this cosmic task is nothing less than becoming and being such a person as he seeks to make his pupils. As it is put:

...the essential professional qualification of a teacher, unlike that of the lawyer or doctor, lies in his quality as an educated person...the prime purpose of a teacher's theoretical studies should be to give him the kind of understanding of humanity which makes him a more fully human being than he was before.⁴⁹

It follows that at what might be called the ontological centre of Pilley's world are Great Persons, not bodies of knowledge or abstract values.⁵⁰ The writings of these persons are of much greater importance than text-books, for the mark of the true teacher is his capacity to bridge the gap between the learner and those who are fully human. The teacher develops this by partaking in greatness through his exposure to greatness: he is initiated through the

attainments of the finest examples of humanity into that human-ness without which he cannot be said to teach. Such learning - first for the teacher and then the pupil - is justified within a conception of studying which is radically different from any that a merely behaviouristic psychology can suggest. This conception is, Pilley asserts, 'a theory of the imaginative and symbol-sustaining learning'⁵¹ which has as its content the finest works of great men in all spheres of civilized life.

In other words, this most oratorical of personalists views the various branches of knowledge very much as expressions of human nature; man in his world is no passive spectator of a world which has an 'objective' structure. Knowledge therefore has a unity because the person has a unity and it is this that a liberal education must stress. In the arts, the existence of works of genius makes it easy to see the truth of this human-centred philosophical view, for these are clearly the product of mind while being pointers to reality. But in science too, Pilley argues, the same truth obtains, only the anonymity of its conclusions masking the fact that it is as 'equally born of the imagination'⁵² as poetry or drama. Consequently, the type of compartmentalized curriculum which we have seen criticized earlier in this section by educationists who do not have either Pilley's commitment to personalism as a systematic philosophy or his passion for commending it to others, is dismissed as inappropriate for the teacher. What the teacher needs is a course in which knowledge is integrated into a personal perspective which sees all things in their inter-relationships:

It is only by developing such a synoptic view of the various branches of learning that he recognizes how in himself, as in others, they spring from a common root in imagination and judgement. ⁵³

Clearly, in this kind of writing we find the passionate conviction of an Argyropoulos sweeping over the whole domain of human knowledge. Pilley's metaphysical view of the unity of subjects makes orthodox university practice mundane indeed. And when it comes to the work of departments of education who meekly, in his view, reflect the specialist inclinations of the rest of the university, his condemnation is total, for they:

...have a special responsibility inasmuch as they are not only required to educate liberally but to preserve and develop a theory of what it is to educate liberally. ⁵⁴

With this uninhibited 'second-order' comment, educational theory, understood in terms which we recognize as an idiosyncratic version of the generalist notion we have been pursuing, is established as the universal guide. The subject Education, far from being one to be held in disdain by those with a qualification in a better-established discipline, is of first importance - for prescribing education in schools, in teacher preparation and even in the rest of the university!

An author with such a standpoint - one which advances philosophical reasons for an organization of studies which is the clear opposite of that favoured by those who determine the criterion which we have seen produces a 'political' response from so many educationists - deserves to be examined further. He falls into the class occupied by both Frankena and Ottaway elsewhere - each

merits fuller consideration than the large number of writers who can only be touched on in an account such as this. Pilley does not rest with the thoughtful self-insight of the teacher: his theory moves to a programme of action. What he has in mind is heightening the practice of a student, not by instructing him beforehand in rules which may or may not have 'application', but by allowing whatever grasp of the art of teaching the student already has by nature to be reflected on in a particular way between teaching episodes. The student, alternately concentrating on the thinking and the doing, derives an authentic theory of teaching-learning from his own introspections as a learner. It is in this that the best catalyst proves to be great literature, which provides 'some of the finest accounts of the development of the individual mind'.⁵⁵

Wordsworth is one example offered by Pilley. However, there is such a wealth of material to choose from that the student is best left to do his own choosing. It is in this way that his learning is most likely to be 'authentic' and his teaching to allow authenticity in the learning of his pupils. Orthodox textbooks, written for the market and based upon the philosophy of fragmentation which Pilley abhors, are of infinitely less value for the making of teachers than the conversation with great men which literature makes possible. It is in the light of such encounters that students are 'asked to give constant expression to, and submit to criticism, their own reflections upon what they are doing in teaching and learning'.⁵⁶

What makes Pilley's scheme so interesting as reflexive comment is his persistent anti-positivism - evident in this article in

the strong preference for humanistic literature against scientific texts in psychology and the like. It is this pro-synthesis point of view which lets him perceive those truths in great books which the specialized texts define away. All the literature that he prescribes is, in his sense, philosophical, not psychological or sociological. He repeats the kind of objection that he levelled at Collier in the earlier 'social' chapter with reference to the so-called sciences of man: 'in each case there is both a positivistic science and also a field for moral and poetic insight'.⁵⁷ The non-technical philosopher's interest (which we shall see supported in technical philosophy of mind in Period Two) in defending man against being defined as only an object for scientific enquiry is the most marked feature of all his work. Science to Pilley rests on:

...methodological assumptions which are in conflict with the fuller account of human nature upon which any theory of liberal education must be based.⁵⁸

This fuller account stresses the primacy in the universe of persons. The opposed naturalistic position affords no such privileged status to the concept. What follows from this fundamental difference, in teacher education, are the alternative positions on the use of psychology and sociology which Pilley highlights. His argument is that to offer these sciences unilluminated by a philosophical recognition of 'the common humanity which is active in these diverse forms of experience'⁵⁹ is pointless. 'Scientism' is no substitute for a liberal education which allows students to promote their own personal freedom and thereby to become properly equipped for

helping children to promote theirs.

Like Rogers, Pilley's vision of the teacher is far removed from the mundane picture of him as an instrumental technician. All in all, this article anticipates in a remarkable way a perspective in education which was to flourish in the 1970s. He has a view of the concept of 'human action' which not only, as mentioned, points the way to more technical philosophical commentaries on the teacher's actions, but also makes the phenomenological emphasis of the later 'new sociology of education' appear like old wine in new bottles. In our terms, he shows that educational theory is made relevant only by rigorous attention to certain philosophical questions which constitute a total position or world-view when the answers are put together. Pilley is iconoclastic concerning the unexamined, conventional acceptance of the disciplines of education as providing the rigour needed to make teacher education a serious business. What is constant in his missionary-like advocacy of 'applied' personalism is the 'plea for a synoptic view of studies' ⁶⁰ in the making of teachers.

This work emerges, of course, from the strong tradition of Scottish personalism. It provides, in its metaphysical way, support for those tendencies in the thinking of, for example, Tibble as well as Morris, which focus on the teacher as more than just the occupant of an organizational role. But ~~it~~ is indeed lofty philosophizing. Others with not dissimilar backgrounds were soon to appear with answers to those more practical questions which the Pilleyian account, by its submersion of method-questions in metaphysics, raises in the mind of the reader. We shall find later

that at least one educationist - another Scot, H.S.N. McFarland⁶¹ - managed to combine humanistic philosophy with educational prescriptions at the teaching level which are not so dismissive of the findings of 'scientific' psychology as the more abstract directives of Pilley.

For the present, we can descend the ladder of abstraction, in order fairly to reflect the message of the literature on the theme of this chapter, before moving to the next section. The theme can be recalled with a quotation from Tibble, as he notes once more the main problems found in the education of teachers:

The gap which can indeed develop between theory and practice is one of the problems: another is the way in which fields of study tend to develop as subjects in their own right.⁶²

This is put dispassionately by one who not only wrote and talked about the problem but who, more than any other, acted to solve it. Yet, for all his level-headed contributions, he is not in a different universe from Pilley. Educational theory to him, too, is a thinking-together of many elements selected according to a criterion which takes seriously the student's needs as a teacher-person, not merely a teacher-technician. The content of this person's education should be chosen, Tibble insists, 'in terms of the attitudes and skills we wish the student to develop as a permanent possession and...these should not be conceived in a narrowly vocational sense'.⁶³

It will be of interest, finally, to apply the concept of educational theory found in this section as a kind of lens for

viewing those journals which occupy the middle ground between the university and college worlds. At this time, surveys of the journals of the Durham, Leeds and Birmingham University Institutes of Education were published which reveal the heterogeneous nature of their content to reviewers whose criteria appear somewhat inadequate in the light of our own enquiry. S.C. Gordon is close to realizing that the three different publications offered by the University of Durham imply the notion, which we shall develop further in the next section, that there are 'levels' of educational theory; but his most relevant observation is, not unexpectedly, that the fields of psychology and history are predominant in the total production of the journals. ⁶⁴ This kind of finding is independently confirmed by P.P. Brown in giving, picturesquely, his:

...conspectus of what the University of Leeds Institute of Education is doing and thinking in the local soil and cellars, in the local school buildings, and in the upper regions of psychology and statistics. ⁶⁵

However, it is the anonymous reviewer of Birmingham's efforts who has the last word in commenting, bluntly: 'So far, little Theory has savoured the mass'. ⁶⁶ With this criticism, whose force depends upon the prestigious overtones of the capitalized but undefined term 'Theory', we can leave 'educational theory' broadly conceived and turn to its more definite sub-species -curriculum theory.

Towards the Logical Centre: Curriculum Theory

Holmes, it will be recalled, identified the curriculum as

the area in which educational theory is given a substance which is relevant to the teacher. This is the core - or close to the core - of theory, once that term has been distinguished from the disciplines which provide merely its descriptive elements. In any concrete educational situation involving a teacher and a learner there must be a content to their transactions; a subject matter selected from the available cultural capital. Prescriptions about the selection of that content, and about the teaching of it, constitute theory at a level which is distinguished from other levels simply by the role occupied by the intended recipient of the advice. Curriculum theory, broadly conceived but still without further analysis of its possible components, is aimed at the teacher not, for instance, the administrator. Though there is for the latter a prescriptive educational theory that is subject to all the logical conditions established so far; but it is peripheral to the present concern or, in terms of levels, at a 'higher' level than the present one.

This is a point which deserves repeated emphasis in view of the two dimensions to 'theory' we have had to identify time and time again in a literature which uses the term both vaguely and ambiguously - the dimensions of prescriptivity and scope. Prescriptive curriculum theory is theory for those persons within education who work in, or close to, the learning situation of children in classrooms. It is the theory concerned with learning. Learning is always learning something; the something is therefore of great importance, but its importance is of a type to be understood only in relation to the learner too. In short, curriculum theory focusses

on those questions about the nature of knowledge and the nature of the child which we have, in other more 'philosophical' contexts, found writers such as Bantock stressing. Philosophy and psychology are - it is evident - the two disciplines which bear very closely on this central area of theory. It is no surprise, then, to find that A.G. Joselyn's almost unique British contribution to this limited area of discussion, in this period, is based on his experience as an educational psychologist whose consciousness of the philosophical aspects of his discipline is in evidence.

He enquires into 'The Framework of Curriculum Development'⁶⁷ and, in the process, provides a reflexive implication for the nature of curriculum theory through the substantive results of his enquiry. That is, he, like many another writer in the literature, bases his views on presuppositions which, once revealed, are of as great interest to our investigation as the more explicitly reflexive statements to be found. The first argument he offers is that 'ground-level' considerations of the 'material' of education is anything but the parochial matter that many commonsensical teachers may consider it to be. To us, this is familiar: its importance here is that Joselyn starts his discussion in, as it were, the parish with the understanding that the parish is intimately connected with the whole wide world. He says:

For the moment we attempt to answer questions relating to the material content of a curriculum we are involved in presuppositions as to the ends of education as well as its means and the phrasing in terms of "material" may well obscure the wider issues.⁶⁸

Thus we note the inevitability of aims in any discussion of education. However, Joselyn's intention is to sketch in that 'middle ground' of theory which links the wider question of aims with the daily work of the teacher; for he is aware of the impossibility, thoroughly discussed in our earlier chapters, of moving straight from philosophy to practice by a 'derivational' method. His middle ground is the curriculum - still not yet analysed into its components of content and method.⁶⁹ His own professional work with students has taught him that they respond to theory which is perceived as abstract and irrelevant by learning it at its own level in order to satisfy authority, while actually practising teaching in accordance with rules of thumb. Therefore, he aims to identify principles for the organization of school work which make sense to intending teachers while still retaining the relationship to larger issues which rules of thumb lack. This is not easy, for, as he says, 'where we attempt to relate principles and procedures to ultimate aims and ends arise many well known issues, some involving deep conflict'.⁷⁰

With this observation, he introduces the major opposition between 'philosophies' of education which underpin conflicting kinds of practice in the schools - that between subject-orientated and child-orientated thinking. In this, he notably anticipates the discussion of the issue which was to come from the analytical philosophers of education in the 1960s. For he, like them, digs up the presuppositions about ends and means of the two approaches with the intention of showing that realistic teaching entails elements

from each; because each stresses just one aspect of the educational process. Further, Joselyn reveals a similar conviction that the necessary improvement in the teaching of a worthwhile curriculum will be effected only through educating students into an awareness of the complex connections between the most concrete practice and the most abstract beliefs and values. Everything, he says, 'hinges on the agency of the teacher'.⁷¹

In the terms of this thesis, Joselyn articulates for the first time in a 'pedagogical' context the normative educational theory we have identified elsewhere and scales it down to curriculum level. He does this, too, while recognizing that the disciplines of education 'provide' the rigorous substance of the relevant thinking. He has in mind ends which are philosophically justifiable but chooses to focus on:

...the principles of organization on which we propose to move towards those ends in practice, not ignoring at this stage the well-attested findings of psychology, sociology and history.⁷²

In this way the logical implications of what is primarily intended as a substantive set of principles for use by colleagues in the business of teacher education shows itself as a kind of muted Pilleyian position, with a marked emphasis on integration in student courses. This is particularly the case when we note the personalistic strain which appears here, as it seems always to appear in work designed to emphasize the need for 'unified' theory. For Joselyn insists that the teacher's grasp of his own in-college studies is not independent of other aspects of his total life as a person -

'the social and personal development of the teacher is at least as important a factor in motivating the learning of children'.⁷³

The importance of this single example of curriculum theorizing in Britain at this time can be underlined if we briefly return to the American literature. There, rational curriculum thinking was already very well-established and in the process of change towards a conception of theory which, in terms established in earlier chapters, is 'scientific' rather than personalistic.⁷⁴ In a word, the renowned Benjamin Bloom appeared with the first volume of his taxonomy, to set out cognitive objectives for education.⁷⁵ This is the introduction of rigour into a core-area of educational theory in which British studies were as 'backward', on that criterion, as they apparently were in the philosophy of education. However, to duplicate the argument already presented in the context of the philosophical field would not serve our purposes. We can merely note that, in the future development of educational studies, the kind of thinking which Joselin was attempting was to survive, with its generalist perspective, the assault of rigourists and to re-appear from the late 1960s onwards in the protest movements mounted against the narrowness of specialist approaches. That said, we can quickly look through the impressive details of Bloom's slim handbook to discern anything of logical interest.

Of immediate significance is the fact that Bloom dedicates his work to the doyen of curriculum theorists - Ralph Tyler⁷⁶ - and, of course, acknowledges the debt he owes to a number of co-workers in a venture which had lasted from 1949 to 1953. Many of these figures were to become known in their own right as contributors

to this sub-field of theory as later developments pointed to it as the central area of educational thought.⁷⁷ Bloom's 'Foreword' puts the project into the kind of context whose discussions at many levels reflect the type of issues we have identified in surveying a whole literature. That is, the problems encountered by the group had been those of disentangling conceptual, factual and valuational questions in order to set up principles for organizing the field of enquiry which would enable a mapping of various domains of 'mind' to proceed. As a consequence of the difficulties - which our own remarks on the claims of both philosophy and psychology on the territory covered by 'mind' and related mental concepts would confirm - the formidable but not impenetrable cognitive domain had been investigated before the more problematical affective and psychomotor domains.

The published handbook gives Bloom's aim for the exercise, which we know to have been partially achieved only in the one sector. In essence it is the definition of clusters of terms which, during the thirty years of American curriculum discussion, have generated spurious agreements and disagreements. Again, it can be noted how this situation reflects that obtaining in philosophy of education where the 'derivational' approach allowed high-level agreements and quite radically opposed concrete practices. Now, following Bloom, the expectation is to be that greater precision will characterize planning at the school level. As he says:

Curriculum builders should find the taxonomy helps them to specify objectives so that it becomes easier to plan learning experiences and prepare evaluation devices.⁷⁸

The sound of this prescription reverberates in educational discussion to this day. But we shall not pursue the relationship of this 'objectives' approach to the continued dominance in American educational psychology of the behaviouristic perspective already examined. ⁷⁹ We can take from Bloom merely the fact that a 'stiffening' of curriculum theory was offered in his work which drew neither on the known interest of philosophers in his domain nor the emerging interest in learning theory centred on school subjects which we have associated with Ausubel. This stiffening, in short, was narrow in its sources; and it therefore points to the fact that the then-existing curriculum theory to which it was directed may well have had a logical structure which was satisfactory enough to be 'improved' without ignoring some of the important elements of that structure in order to concentrate on the most obvious one of 'objectives'. This is a question to be pursued in the appropriate chapter of Period Two, when we shall be able to compare developments in the curriculum-objectives approach with other traditions of curriculum theorizing which are more 'philosophical' in their orientation and, hence, closer to the normative theory that we have delineated.

Of more importance at this moment than further close scrutiny of other literature that is labelled with the term 'curriculum', is to attempt to clarify the suggestion made above: that it is still too broad a term for the purpose of identifying the real centre of educational thinking - the real core of theory which attaches to the class teacher's role. Theory of curriculum and theory of teaching are very close but separate: this was to be the

firm realization of a future generation of general theorists, but it is already indicated in the writings of this period. The distinction does, as mentioned, follow from the difference between the two commonsensical questions about what to teach and how to teach it. These can be considered for a moment.

Subject matter must be selected from the manifold resources of human culture. Not everything can be taught: what is taught excludes what is not; that is, the price paid for any curriculum is the exclusion of all the other curricula which were possibilities. Consequently, the Spencerian question, 'What knowledge is of most worth?', is of great importance to the teacher as a professional person even though he may have little direct say in answering it, particularly in the early days of his career. He will have even less say in answering the question which arises as we move outwards from the curriculum to the wider context in which the content of education is institutionalized; that is, the questions as to what kinds of school society should have, and what kind of schooling system, to 'house' the culturally-preferred content. But, moving in the other direction from 'curriculum' conceived broadly to subject-matter as the vehicle for the teacher's education of his individual pupils, we find him very much in his own realm. This is the central teaching realm, and the theory which relates to it we have at many points discerned within a mass of discussion which tends to obscure it. This is the real core; and we would expect that in this chapter, in particular, there would belong those instances from the literature which illuminate it. There are such instances: what

they provide - often in writings classified under the heading 'theory-practice' - is a rudimentary 'theory-of-teaching' of a type which, so far in this account, has appeared most evidently in the chapter on the psychology of education. This is no surprise, for it has been noted on a number of occasions that when the levels of educational theory are distinguished, the one level that is basic is that at which psychology in one of its interpretations has the strongest claim to relevance amongst the disciplines. We turn, then, to teaching theory - first in importance but, because of the nature of the literature, last to be reached.

Theory-Practice or Teaching Theory

'Pedagogy' has always been a respectable term in Europe. It is there that we find W. Flitner arguing in 'Theory and Practice in Education'⁸⁰ that at the heart of pedagogy is a theory of teaching. A beginning teacher, he says, practises his vocation on the basis of a minimal normative theory which takes into account what is known of the learning and development of children, as the obvious factors which bear on the decisions the teacher must make and the actions he must take each moment. But experience, along with essential reflection on that experience, increasingly dictates 'the application of more specialized theories' as he moves more surely into the most complex of enterprises. Always, though, the specialist knowledge must be assimilated and focussed on the requirements of the individual, practical situation. As Flitner puts it:

...to paraphrase Kant; "Specialised theory without general principles is blind, general theory without a basis of reality is void".⁸¹

In our terms, which we shall see powerfully illustrated when we examine in Period Two European thinkers of whom Flitner is but a minor representative, teaching-learning theory controls and co-ordinates those elements of the descriptive discipline which bear on the classroom. There is not to Flitner as to others what, in relation to the practical activity of the everyday teacher, some claim to identify - an 'independent scientific discipline, a science of education'.⁸² His argument is that 'education' in the sense understood by anyone inside it is just not the sort of activity which can be scientifically described. We find here, then, the distinction between the social science concept and the normative concept of education which is by now familiar from many contexts, and which was explicitly defended in Europe at a time when the claims on behalf of the rigour of specialization were being increasingly heard.

However, it is Collier in Britain who can provide the clearest example of teaching theory in relation to the person of the teacher which has emerged as a major theme of this chapter. He returns to the account with an elucidation of the 'art' of teaching which, as the title of his article - 'The Rhythm of Theory and Practice: An Experiment' - reveals, is conceived in Whiteheadian terms.⁸³ Two types of general principle, he suggests again, underlie this activity: scientific statements and recommendations. These descriptions of the world and prescriptions for altering the world can be introduced

to students in two entirely different ways. As 'theory', they can be verbally taught: in that case they will be verbally learned, in a manner familiar enough to the higher education products of English schools. Collier here echoes the judgement of, for example, Tibble.

In contrast, the principles can be introduced to students in such a way that they 'learn them by seeing them in action and trying them out for themselves'.⁸⁴ In other words, a total course will inter-relate theory and practice in a manner which is meaningful to intending teachers. First, because their major interests, which are professional interests, are engaged and the relevance of the college learning experiences to practical teaching is clear to them. Second, because the internal meaningfulness of the theory - its 'logic' - will be made explicit for them. What Collier describes is, then, a second-order theory about teaching theory to students: it reflects the practical theory which forms the core content of teacher education with similar methods for teaching that theory at the student level. The aim is clear - to avoid the very procedures of college teaching itself contradicting the curriculum-content of that teaching in accordance with the familiar but unspoken premise of 'Do as I say, not as I do.'

It is this feature which makes Collier's scheme Whiteheadian. He is conscious of the inertness of much of the knowledge acquired by student teachers. The charges of irrelevance made particularly against courses which are happy to offer blocks of content from the disciplines and then to leave the student to work out as best he can what actually to do with it are pointers to this inertness.

The students' professional life-interests are not touched. This is, then, a diagnosis by Collier which is not dissimilar to that given by Pilley, in spite of the earlier confrontation of these two different humanists. Each writes under a compulsion to 'integrate' which originates in a philosophy-of-life that takes seriously the educative process in its concreteness as the vital arena for making men.

What they are both against can be emphasized by stating the features it shows which arouse the opposition of all who are general educationists. It is the notion that a teacher is prepared by equipping him with a subject to teach, without reference to the rest of human culture enshrined in a whole curriculum; by then giving him a separate professional training which mirrors, in its own subject-fragmentation, the academic domination of all higher education and lower-level schooling by subject-consciousness and subject-prestige; then by adding to this the kind of teaching practice which is only tenuously related to the major portions of in-college courses and therefore is undertaken with a blindness about the realities of educating which is barely relieved by the poorly-conceptualized and particular tips which fall under the heading of 'method'.

In Collier's case, the rejection of the orthodox pattern of training is in the name of that rhythm of theory and practice which requires an imaginative reconstruction of the total course. His solution in the form of what came to be called Study Practice was, indeed, an innovation whose description would take us too far from the point of just identifying it here. The present writer was to

experience and develop it a decade later, when pressure from the disciplines to structure teacher training in an opposed way was at its prestigious height. What can be said, of relevance to this enquiry, is that it was a scheme which institutionalized the concepts of 'teaching theory' and the 'personal agency' for that theory which emerge in this chapter and, indeed, those which precede it. It is well summed up by Collier in words which echo Flitner's use of the famous Kantian dictum, seen above. He says:

...the idea of a rhythm is to be thought of in terms not only of time allocations but of the intimacy of relationship between the concrete problems faced in the "practice" and the abstract problems faced in the "theory".⁸⁵

Undoubtedly the concept of rhythm makes sense to anyone who cares to test it in relation to any area of thoughtful practicality which is removed far enough from teaching to see it less enmeshed in the kind of discussions we have investigated. In chess, for example, there is both practical play and theoretical study wherever it is taken seriously. The balance between the two elements varies widely between different individuals. Some put great faith in the 'book learning' of opening lines, committing many variations to memory with little understanding of the principles underlying these summaries of past practice, because the relationship of what is 'learned' to actual games played by the learner is never really clear to him. Others 'learn' only from their individual games, rarely reflecting on errors in relation to guidance available in a literature which covers all levels of play with appropriate prescriptions - of an increasingly meaningful kind for the player

who has grasped this notion of 'rhythm'. It is the latter player who improves, for he is in possession of the one great insight into the relationship between thought and action which makes him a good organizer of his own authentic learning. He really understands what grandmaster (and psychologist!) Reuben Fine puts well:

In every field the man who can merely do things without knowing why is at a disadvantage to the one who can not only build but also tell you just why he is building in that way.⁸⁶

Of course, there are great differences between playing chess and educating children, the greatest of which is the one which we have been at pains to stress - that educating is not only a practical enterprise, but essentially a moral one. A 'win' in chess is easily defined; but a 'win' in education is defined only in terms of the whole wide discussion whose logic we have been displaying. Nevertheless, the point which Collier urges with reference to the student holds in this analogy, for it is a point about mind in education rather than morality. It is a point which has to be grasped and implemented for any educational ends to be achieved, because mindless, routine teaching is not teaching at all.

The significance of Collier is, further, that he presents his argument not only with the student teacher in mind but even more strongly the student's tutor - the person whose understanding of the rhythm of educating and its implementation in, for example the scheme of Study Practice, is crucial in improving the whole enterprise. As we have seen on other occasions and will see again,

Collier's teacher of teachers must think together all the disciplines, not think them apart to the organizational advantage of a preferred one of them. He is a generalist, looking at all the stars but, first and foremost, with his feet on the ground. In Collier's words:

...he must be equipped to see the full theoretical implications of the classroom work and bring it out in the discussion periods; otherwise mutual fertilization of theory and practice will not be at a maximum. ⁸⁷

In surveying the 'pedagogical' literature of this period it is not easy to find work on techniques of teaching of equal breadth to that of Collier in what is largely a mass of anecdotal accounts of limited interest. An exception is the contribution of Elizabeth Richardson, as she sets out a position on the training of teachers which she was to develop impressively for many years. Here she shows herself to be a thinker in tune with, say, Morris when she describes her unusual use of J.L. Moreno's psychodramatic techniques with students. ⁸⁸ It is her intention, not the details of the scheme, which bear on our investigation. She affirms more insistently than most others that all teaching is carried on in a context best described as 'inter-personal'. Hence, what psychology can say about that context depends on whether psychology takes inter-personal relationships seriously. Moreno, in her view, appears to; so she takes from him what she thinks is relevant to the particular tutoring situation in which she works and utilises it pragmatically. She finds it is effective in that her students are enabled by it to face a reality that they would otherwise find many ways of ignoring. As she says: 'Many feel that they have been able for the first

time to separate themselves from their own teaching and view it objectively'.⁸⁹ That is, her students develop insight into their own personalities. A technique from psychotherapy becomes educative in a sense which would be recognized by both Pilley with his more metaphysical leanings and Collier for whom such techniques would present no problem of assimilation to his own conceptual scheme.

Again, we can note what this approach is a response to in orthodox education at college and school level. The domination by specialists who, no matter how they set out, end up by ignoring the deep need for meaningfulness in the learner by offering their subject in Morris's 'scholarly' fashion as though all receiving it were destined to become scholars themselves, is evident in her thinking. She knows that the alternative to this orthodoxy, particularly once her sector of higher education is reached by the pupil, requires imagination and flexibility on the part of the teacher of teachers if those teachers, once they have their own pupils before them, are to alter the system. As she says, intimating her recognition of the rigour-relevance issue which we have stressed:

...the problem of the lecturer in an education department is how to bring the two fields of training - the university and the school - sufficiently close together. The psychodramatic method may prove to be one of the answers.⁹⁰

A presupposition of her work is that schools need radical improvement. They will be improved only by the presence of better teachers. Yet these teachers can only be found in the shape of students who are themselves the products of the very system which is judged to be inadequate. As products, they have much 'capital'

stored in their achievements within the system, so that familiarity with its procedures and satisfaction with themselves as part of its outcome stand in the way of innovation. At the same time, these students as persons certainly know that their education has not been primarily aimed at their all-round development; and they have experiences, outside a system which functions largely as a social selection agency, of personal learning which is meaningful, lasting and relevant to life-purposes. Hence, there is an ambivalence in students about preparing to become teachers. Richardson's approach is one which takes advantage of this ambivalence.

Her patient attempts to alter students' conceptions of what education is are therefore semi-therapeutic. They consist in methods which will allow authentic rather than conventional responses to be made because the situations in which they are called for are free from the anxiety which the students have for long experienced as the main motive force for their learning. They are presented with a reality about learning which gradually dispels the illusion which, initially, appears to them to be in their own interests to preserve. The aim is to reveal that the transactions of teaching-learning at any level must be genuinely inter-personal: anything less is at best limited instruction with short-term effects. Thus does she present, like Collier, a reflexive theory of learning-about-learning with the same aim of changing a system which is, in the worst sense, 'academic' into one which subordinates inferior objectives to those centred on the education of the whole person.

Unlike Pilley, however, Richardson works, as it were, with her hands; even though the work is guided by similar broad purposes.

So that another of her inventive techniques is of interest, both as an illustration of the variety which comes with her liberal conception of her task and as an example of the anticipation in this period of 'amateurs' at work which was later to be acclaimed as innovatory. She describes a cheap, graphic method of recording lessons - 'reality practice' as she calls it - which is a kind of interaction analysis without its later behaviouristic underpinnings. Her purpose is simply to ensure that student and tutor have the opportunity of discussing something closer to the reality of a lesson than the filtered memories of each will allow. On this basis, in a non-threatening but unsentimental atmosphere, both together, at their different levels, can become 'increasingly aware of the complexities of the teaching process'.⁹¹ In an inter-personal situation the concept of the person in thought about education is then established as being central: the theory of those processes is this 'embodied' theory, not just statements to be memorized.

With this technique, which places such great emphasis on the discussion of recorded behaviour, Richardson firmly indicates her view that teaching is defined not in the behaviour but in the thought which lies behind it. It is not an activity which can be observed simply: it must be observed with the discrimination and intelligence which the tutor teaches the student to use in his retrospective focus on the recorded lesson. Learning to distinguish the essential from the inessential, by identifying those factors in the teaching situation which make for authentic learning, is the aim of the in-college sessions. The principles of education are approached through a mutual exploration of a particular piece of practice.

Thus Richardson's homely-looking technique would, again, fit well into the kind of framework provided by Collier's Study Practice scheme. The same inter-relating of thought and action is aimed at. Teaching is conceived not as simply doing - even doing which conforms to scheme and lesson planning established by custom - but doing in a thoughtful way. The teacher organizes his work for meaningful learning by a type of thinking which, as we have seen, knows no bounds when it comes to tracing the connections between itself and the wider issues which seem not, at a particular moment of teaching, to be of first importance. Thus, in his person, philosopher and craftsman meet. Richardson and others try to find ways in which the student can realize this truth and be enabled to act more in accordance with it. Once more, she anticipates later work of significance, for her scheme assumes that concept of teaching as an intentional activity which Scheffler himself was to definitively analyze within a few years. Accordingly, she has a comment which is the kiss of death to all those mechanical routines found in the conventional approaches to the planning of teaching which prescribe a set of stereotyped behaviours: 'There are as many good teaching styles as there are good teachers'.⁹²

What the good teacher is, to her, is clear. It is a notion that can be generalized, taking into account not only her comments but the whole trend of those who think like her and whose views we have woven together. The teacher begins as a student whose experiences of schooling have been such as to necessitate his being freed from their effects. Freedom comes through new experiences which allow him insight into himself as a person. From the inside

he learns that learning which is to last, to be of use in living, will not take place under the conditions which he has himself accepted, in a sense, because he has had no alternative. Now, given that alternative, he finds that it is meaningful to him: he 'knows' in a different way what learning is. Knowing, he desires change in the educational system's priorities for experiential reasons which are compelling.

This is the perspective found in this chapter, notwithstanding all the individual differences between Sparrow, Bantock, Holmes, Bibby, Dent, Tibble, Pilley, Joselin, Collier and, finally, Richardson. These are educationists who eschew the single-discipline mirroring in teacher education of the subject-emphasis imposed on the whole educational system from the top to the bottom. It is a perspective which, we have argued, appears in these writers as merely the more explicit form of one to be found elsewhere hidden in the details of other kinds of discussion. But in all contexts, the reflexive debate is really the same: it concerns, as we have repeatedly argued, the nature of educational theory, the nature of its constituent parts, the nature of their relationship, the nature of the theorists themselves and the nature of their application of theory to practice and policy.

But such general comment, summarizing the rich content of the discussion as generated so far, perhaps requires a last reference to the particular object of our enquiry - the pieces of literature themselves. For it is the words of the educationists which are important: it is their answers to our philosophical questions which count. Collier can serve here, as he reviews what was to become

an influential guide to improved classroom practice through the use of sociometric techniques.⁹³ His judgement, plainly expressed, is symbolic of a major theme to be found throughout the whole of this, the first part of our investigation, and soon to be explored in the varied contexts of the second. He comments:

The weakness of the book lies in its theoretical background...unless an educational writer limits himself to simple descriptions of concrete incidents he is bound to become involved in theoretical elements of two kinds: those relating to statements of "scientific law" about human behaviour; and those relating to the value-judgments required for decisions about action.⁹⁴

This is the 'logic' in question. Frankena himself could hardly have put it better. To him and his philosophical colleagues we now return.

Period Two: 1957-1961

General Theory and the Disciplines of Education

. .in studying these disciplines
as they are often presented,
the student is not studying education at all,
but something else.

Ben Morris

Chapter Six

Words and the World in The Philosophy of Education

The year 1957 is significant for the philosophy of education as an identifiable 'field': hence, for all the fields we are investigating. D.J. O'Connor produced, then, his analytical introduction to the subject ¹ which even the conventional overviews of educational studies mention, in spite of their under-appreciation of the other riches of the period. ² His iconoclastic position is, therefore, so well known - both for its anti-metaphysics, its logical empiricist view of value judgements, and its comments on educational theory as well as for the criticism of the latter which it elicited, later, from Hirst - that our purpose will be best served by indicating the variety of contemporary responses to it.

Responses to O'Connor's 'Stony Diet'

O'Connor held a chair in philosophy. This made his views of interest to pure philosophers in Britain who, as we have seen, normally took no interest in writings on education. So, even Mind reviewed the book. Anthony Quinton regards the moderate positivism he finds there as 'a pretty stony diet for the reflective educator'. ³ This urbane dismissive remark would be, to his highly sophisticated readers, more meaningful than to any educationist who happened to come

across it. For Quinton is indicating that British philosophy had long since left behind the illiberalities of 'reductionist' empiricism. But he has a comment to make on the applied field too: 'Starting with a very indistinct idea of what education is Professor O'Connor has rather let the philosophy of education slip through his fingers'.⁴

Unfortunately Quinton himself does not present a distinct idea of education or a concept of the philosophy of education which would count for much in the present account. The fact that he comments at all is the one to be taken, rather than its substance. For in relation to this - to his Oxford critique - we can place the contrasting response of an American commentator, J.E. McClellan, who argues that there was an inevitability in the appearance of such a book written by someone at this point in the development of the subject. British philosophical analysis was bound, he argues, to be brought to bear on education in view of 'the flood of oratory that passes for educational theory'.⁵

These contradictory responses are of great interest. To Quinton, O'Connor is philosophically out of date. To McClellan, O'Connor shows a post-positivistic recognition of the value of ordinary-language analysis⁶ which allows him to characterize philosophy of education as - in McClellan's words - 'the analysis of educational language, particularly the language of educational theory'.⁷ Clearly, the notion that we bring forward from our investigation of Period One, that conceptions of what constitutes pure philosophy are diverse, is relevant to this clash of opinion. 'Real' philosophy is needed in education, but the question remains, 'What is real philosophy?'

Nevertheless, both of these reviewers, in spite of differences

explicable no doubt in terms of the dissimilar contexts in which they write, imply that the 'reflective' educator must have more at his disposal than the tough-mindedness of an O'Connor viewpoint.⁸ McClellan in particular offers a sketch of educational thinking which, not surprisingly, harmonises with that which our earlier investigation of American work revealed. He seizes on O'Connor's dismissal of educational theories as lacking the established characteristics of scientific theories. 'But', he insists, 'nowhere does he try to examine the job that these not-quite-theories actually perform in relation to educational practice'.⁹ Once more, the Frankena-Ottaway concept is identified independently five years before Hirst was to make it central to his programme.

O'Connor is naive, this critic asserts. He does not even try to understand the reasons why educational theory is as it is, because his main objective is to provide an introduction to philosophy of a particular kind - an introduction which could well be for other students than those of education. We can note that McClellan's point is well expressed elsewhere by an English reviewer in a general journal who says amusingly that the book, with minor alterations, might as well have been entitled The Philosophy of Book-keeping.¹⁰ O'Connor accordingly deals in a cavalier fashion, without the subtlety or sympathy which McClellan judges to be required, with the body of writings that he sees only as an outsider with his own axe to grind.

There is a Reidian note in this insistence by McClellan that philosophers who attempt to pronounce on education need to understand education as well as philosophy. It is, then, no surprise to find that Reid is given the job of examining O'Connor's book in the British Journal of Educational Studies, whose readers must have recognized

themselves as the primary target for this aggressive philosopher. Characteristically, Reid praises first before thoroughly criticizing the narrow conception of analytical philosophy that he finds. The praise is, of course, in keeping with his first emphasis of Period One: 'It is good to have, for once, a professionally trained philosopher writing about philosophy of education.'¹¹ At the time, it can be noted here, C.D. Hardie's pioneering work, which we shall touch on in the next chapter, was virtually forgotten and Reid himself was some years from producing his own text at the end of a long career. His regret at not having written it before O'Connor entered the field must have been strong.

Reid has a large number of specific criticisms which add up to the view that O'Connor offers a 'lop-sided treatment'¹² of the issues in the name of just one version of analytical philosophy. Reid, too, is aware of what Quinton could take for granted in the knowledge of his philosopher-readers: that developments in linguistic approaches in philosophy had been such as to make the positivist cry that metaphysics was dead seem premature. He points to the substitution of rhetoric for argument and a dogmatism on O'Connor's part in relation to very complex issues. In fact, so keen is Reid to establish the differences between himself and another philosopher who might be popularly supposed to belong to the same school of analysis, that his observations on O'Connor's treatment of the concept of educational theory become quite secondary in his review. In a sense, O'Connor has lured Reid away from a major issue, for it is this topic of the nature of educational theory which we have noted McClellan picking out as significant to educators; and it was to become the focus, as we have mentioned on a number of occasions, for the philosophical attention of

Reid's protégé Hirst. In brief, all that Reid has to say on the discussion of educational theory by O'Connor is that he gives it too high a priority and it is therefore longer than the subject merits in the particular form that the discussion takes. This seems to be very much an opportunity lost, from our point of view.

It is of interest to find elsewhere the standpoint developed here by Reid against O'Connor developed more systematically for a wider readership in a yearbook whose total contents we shall be examining a little later. In a chapter on 'Problems of Teaching Philosophy of Education' he explicitly develops a major theme which the review of O'Connor typically contains. In education, he re-affirms, it is personal philosophizing, accomodating analytical elements but going beyond them into synthesis, and in all cases starting with the concrete educational problems of the teacher, which is important. We have heard this before, but here he expresses it exactly:

...it will be assumed throughout that "philosophy of education" means philosophical thinking (and the products of that thinking) about ideas arising out of teaching and education, and further that whenever we pursue philosophy of education to any length we become involved in questions of general philosophy.¹³

Such questions are to Reid as broad as the whole of human experience intimates. In contrast with O'Connor, for whom science is the paradigm of knowledge, he is concerned with the fundamental concepts of domains which stretch 'beyond' sense experience. There are many other 'languages' with which the true philosopher must be familiar as he progresses from ordinary language to the more systematized networks of concepts which are found in ethics,

aesthetics and religion as well as in that restricted epistemology which takes scientific truth to be the whole truth. But the mark of the real philosopher is, again, that he will return from all such technicalities 'to think things together again back in their contexts and in their concreteness'.¹⁴ Thus Reid denies the limits set down by O'Connor. The critical and constructive functions of philosophy are inseparable. He rejects the so-called philosophical revolutionary's 'plain denial of the synoptic and systematic endeavour of philosophy',¹⁵ even though he is still firm on the need to stiffen the typical synopses found in much educational writing.

An illustration of his brand of philosophizing to be seen in action can be found in Reid's article of the time on a topic which we have already noted as central to the interests of the new sociologists of education. In an article 'Equality and Inequality' he provides a long, thorough analysis which is of interest here for the world-view which underpins the technicalities. A clear form of personalism becomes evident which is strongly reminiscent of Morris's earlier reservations about the very 'meaning' of the sociologists' empirical findings. For Reid explicitly states what was implicit in Morris and is to be found in much personalistic writing on education that we have yet to examine. That is, that this species of humanism is ultimately defended within a theistic philosophy, so that, in Reid's case, his 'general questions of philosophy' become questions of 'philosophical' theology. The use of philosophical analysis subserves a commitment which, as his own words show, is radically different from anything that appeared in, for instance, the Floud and Halsey investigation of equality. He says:

And what we rather crudely call the "equality" of all men springs from something profounder, namely, the infinite worth of each calling forth infinite love and care, so that the very crucifixion of God is not too great a gift for a person. ¹⁶

Thus, in starting with the so-called 'scientism' of O'Connor, we soon reach this entirely different universe of discourse. But it is not the only universe: Reid is a very 'composite' professional philosopher indeed in what he tries to synthesize. So, for a less idiosyncratic response to O'Connor's restricted view of philosophy's role in education we can turn again to Scheffler; and this will provide a preliminary platform for what he is soon to state at great length and which we shall need to examine carefully. Here, he, like Reid, gives a courteous nod of approval to a fellow professional who has written 'not only a lucid introduction to an important set of problems, but also a stimulating example of philosophical analysis at work'. ¹⁷

However, his real purpose is not to come to praise. After identifying a cautious positivism in O'Connor and the careful discussion of several themes related to this standpoint, he focusses on the topic so surprisingly ignored by Reid. Scheffler raises what he regards as a serious question of consistency in examining what he describes as a 'curious discussion of educational theory'. ¹⁸ His intention, clearly, is less to give a purely descriptive review of the book than to use the occasion in order further to develop views of his own about the nature of philosophy of education - views already set out in the manifesto of our Period One.

He therefore argues that O'Connor vacillates between two conceptions of the field - conceptions which Scheffler illuminates by

the use of two useful metaphors. On the one hand, he says, philosophical analysis can be regarded as a 'sovereign subject with its own territory': on the other, as 'a set of precision tools'.¹⁹ This is a distinction which is not dissimilar, we can note, to Reid's insistence that philosophical beliefs are important in education as well as philosophical techniques. (Where they would differ, of course, is in what territory is covered under the term 'beliefs'!) To Scheffler, O'Connor acts - within the metaphorical territory of the first conception - as an ambassador, acquainting those who are presumed not to know what the virtues of living in that particular country are.

However, what O'Connor does not offer educationists is the set of precision tools which, to Scheffler, is the most valuable gift from contemporary philosophy to any practical enterprise where reflection is necessary - and particularly to education. Scheffler was, we know, some years beyond his earlier announcement of a programme which was to include the development of these tools, in relation to education, as its core; and he would be, at the time he wrote this review, well into the writing of his masterpiece which was to be devoted to this end. We shall consider that work shortly: meanwhile, we can opportunely turn from the diverse responses to this catalytic text, written by the first British pure philosopher to pronounce at book-length on education, to the second philosophy of education symposium to appear in Harvard Educational Review which has, again, many first-rate pure philosophers - certainly equal in stature to O'Connor - discussing the issues in question.²⁰

The Reappearance of Frankena

The question has now been significantly altered from that of the earlier symposium to 'What Can Philosophy Contribute to Educational Theory?'. The existence of the middle-level theory has clearly been demonstrated to the editors of the journal by the earlier symposiasts, and they have sought contributions from a wide range of first-class philosophers to this freshly structured question. Frankena's article once more stands out as throwing fresh light on our theme, so that it and that of a school-orientated commentator on his views will serve the present discussion. First, however, we can offer, as background to it, the ever-present Broudy making his comment on the distinguished views of the eminent Curt Ducasse who, as one would expect, quite happily discusses 'the dimensions of the nature of man' as a preliminary to identifying the corresponding dimensions of education. ²¹

For Broudy uses the occasion to make a comment - an amusingly anti-Ryle comment - on the notion of analytical philosophy which reinforces what we have earlier heard from him. He continues to argue that there are metaphysical as well as epistemological questions which just cannot be avoided in educational theory when this is conceived as essentially philosophical thought about education. Analysis is still not enough. His words are worth quoting in full:

Now, I hate to stir up metaphysical ghosts, especially ghosts that have been officially banished. We are not supposed to raise questions of mind and body, concept and thing because these are supposed to be vestiges of the bad use of language. Nevertheless, these banished ghosts have a way of reappearing and considering Professor Ducasse's many philosophical interests, we are likely to agree that he is one of the very best people to have around in dealing with metaphysical ghosts. ²²

Here, then, is an argument from the authority of philosophy in which that discipline is still understood in a non-Oxford sense. Frankena, as we know, also so understands it. In his contribution he assumes the 'three-part' theory of philosophy of education outlined two years before and now shows himself as a philosopher in action - rather like Reid above, but performing more systematically. He now wishes to make a contribution to the philosophy of education, having said earlier what he thinks that discipline is: 'I shall try to answer the question "What can philosophy contribute to education?" ostensibly, by giving an example ...or a demonstration'. ²³ We can register once more, at this very appropriate point, that ostensive definitions of the cluster of meta-questions we are investigating are to be found throughout the literature of education without that consciousness on the part of their authors of the logic of such definitions which Frankena here makes explicit.

Frankena contrasts his own procedure with that of O'Connor, whose book had just appeared. He therefore links with the responses to O'Connor of our preceding section. He does not offer a disquisition on moral philosophy but philosophizes as a moral philosopher, attempting, as he puts it, 'to work out a whole theory of the ends and means of education myself, so far as this can be done by applying the findings of moral philosophy as I see them'. ²⁴ He thus confirms his view that theorizing about education is essentially a moral undertaking. Though

here he restricts himself to moral education alone - 'character education' as he chooses to call it - in order to make the exercise manageable. Not only does he insist that educational theory is part of moral philosophy, but suggests, following the conspicuous example of Richard Hare, that ethics itself is perhaps only seen in a proper light by considering how we should bring up our children. We derive, that is, realistic moral philosophy from the life-examples found most clearly in the most important human enterprise - education - more surely than we derive the theory of education from the often artificial discussions of moral philosophy undertaken with reference to such classic examples as grading apples, etc.

Thus Frankena, who has clear Deweyian leanings, which show in his 'three-part' view of philosophy as integrating a range of elements within a synoptic perspective, here assimilates the whole post-Deweyian corpus in ethics to his perspective - and does this in a context of educational discussion which in no sense does he regard as a relaxation from his normal work as a professional philosopher. ²⁵ Education is quite central to his interests. So he declares: 'moral education includes teaching, learning and espousing, not a particular morality, but the very art and idea of morality itself'. ²⁶ It can be noted, remembering the dismissive descriptions of the literature of the 1950s which have motivated this enquiry, that the definitive views of Peters on ethics were not to be given for many years after this similar contribution.

Several observations can usefully be made about Frankena, other than that his ostensive demonstration concerning character education applies to all education, for all education is moral. The good life at which education aims does not consist in merely those activities for

which the term 'character' is used, for human dispositions embrace knowledge and skills, too, without which character could hardly reveal itself. And the first observation we make has, clearly, to be related to this 'wider' implication of what he has to say. As we have done before (for example with Burston on the logic of history), we can 'translate' Frankena's discussion of the teaching of morality in schools to the teacher education level which is the main focus of the present investigation. In the following passage, for example, 'the younger generation' of children to whom he refers can be interpreted with profit into 'the younger generation of students', who are those persons we have identified so often as the 'carriers' of the educational theory we have attempted to reveal. He says:

Then one must make what Hare calls a "decision of principle" - one must somehow formulate a rule for dealing with the situation in question. This means that we must not only teach our principles and the knowledge required to apply them, but must also prepare the younger generation for a certain creativeness and originality in solving moral problems.²⁷

This is indeed a fine expression of what the host of generalists have aimed at in educating future teachers - resisting the intrusion into their courses of knowledge-based disciplines whose practitioners do not grasp or do not wish to grasp what is meant in this context by Frankena's terms, 'creativeness' and 'originality'. We can now repeat that teaching problems are solved by means of a far more complex process of thinking than that of becoming just more knowledgeable in one or more disciplines with their descriptive perspectives. But beyond this, Frankena analyzes the more complex case in which a person

says 'I can but I won't'; ²⁸ that is, when he has both the knowledge and the skill in applying it but not the intention so to do. Teaching is nothing if not an intentional activity, as others were to stress heavily in a later period. But it is to Frankena here that the credit must go for identifying the development of dispositions as the best way (because it is a term which incorporates intention) of characterizing the aims of anything we call education - more particularly for us, the best way of describing that cluster of human competencies and the will to use them to achieve the purposes of school education which is the aim of teacher education. ²⁹ In sum, a trained philosopher with a broad concept of his subject systematically underpins much of what less technically-equipped educationists have been pointing to in their emphasis on the person who is the teacher. We can note, too, as a last observation before we come to the commentator on Frankena that the concept of a person found in his philosophizing lacks the theistic connection found elsewhere. It is a central concept indeed which appears wearing so many varied philosophical garments!

In keeping with the plan of the symposium, G.E. Barton comments as an educationist. Ingeniously, as Frankena's critic, he first measures his confessed anxiety concerning the potential threat to the practicalities of education which, on the face of it, philosophical discourse presents, against the above contribution and finds it quite low. We have seen this technique before. Barton has in fact a positive thesis to present and chooses this occasion to present it. For he does not, in his critique, find Frankena's views remote from the question of what to do in teaching. Frankena is not guilty of the charges, but

commenting on his article enables Barton to stress how often other discussion called 'philosophical' is guilty and to explain why.

Focussing on the practical problem of teaching he says: 'anyone who wishes to make a philosophical contribution must, I think, find some way to make his theorizing clearly relevant to the solution of this practical problem'.³⁰ It is plain that with the term 'relevant' Barton is in pursuit of a recognizably logical point. The first danger in high-level talk which he identifies is familiar enough to us from Period One - that of 'passing too directly from one theoretical truth to its application in one corresponding practical precept'.³¹ But it is the related though less obvious danger which, because Barton stresses it, makes this comment of value to us. It is 'the error of drawing principles for philosophy of education from only one field of general philosophy'.³² This is the educationists's resistance to tendencies evident enough at this time - tendencies towards the exclusion of other than favoured approaches as not being 'real' philosophy. Naturally enough, this is the last charge that can be fairly levelled at Frankena; and, as mentioned, Barton finds him not guilty.

Nevertheless, he pursues this issue, which we can note is a reflection, within the context of discussing philosophy alone, of the 'isolationism' found as we have surveyed all the contexts in which disciplines lay claim to bear on education. He argues, with reference to Frankena, that 'adequate principles for moral education, for example, must come not just from moral philosophy, but from all philosophy'.³³ Of course, Frankena would be the first to agree with Barton here; but noting the grounds on which Barton exempts his philosopher colleague from this particular criticism adds something to

our developing argument. This philosopher, unlike the many others against whom the point is really being made, Barton points out, is bringing to the discussion more than he realizes. Whether Frankena (a generalist at his level as confirmed as Barton at his own) realized more than is implied in the following comment is a question that can be left open. Certainly Barton's 'he' in the quotation could be replaced by 'I' to make it an imagined autobiographical insight of Frankena which would not be dissonant with what we know of his thinking from two sustained discussions. Barton says:

I suspect that he is able to do this because he has spent a lifetime thinking about moral philosophy, and has thereby packed into his moral philosophy the results of thinking about logic, psychology, sociology, epistemology, etc., in relation to it. When he directly applies the former to education, he indirectly also applies the latter.³⁴

This comment is quite remarkable, coming from an educationist rather than a pure philosopher, in its anticipation of Edel's later exposure of the 'hidden' elements in Peters' analysis, particularly as it can be found in Ethics and Education.³⁵ But this is mentioned, not to pursue matters which lie outside our period, but merely to further illustrate what becomes plainer in each section: that the logic of educational studies is well understood by generalists of the 1950s. Both Barton and Frankena understand this logic, making their appearance together here a harmonization and not the confrontation that knowledge of their respective starting points in the philosophy seminar and the schoolroom might suggest. So Barton's practical man's criticisms are really directed elsewhere at philosophers whose identity we can guess at, knowing that Frankena is not in fact one of their kind. Our philosophical warranty for generalism has, in a word,

the American educationist's seal of approval. It is not given lightly, as we note in his typical comment:

Yet first-rate philosophers have frequently written second-rate stuff about education, perhaps because, confident in their competence in theorising, they have not adequately considered the philosophical problems involved in making theory relevant to the solution of practical problems.³⁶

We can add to this group 'first-rate scholars' in the other disciplines under review and, in contrast with them as models of the insistent emphasis on 'rigour', establish Barton on this evidence as a model 'relevance' thinker. It was, then, to be expected that he would turn out to be a Deweyian, trying not to become a dated and unreflective spokesman of that synoptic tradition by the effort of coming to grips with the newer approaches in the philosophy of education. As indicated above, he is in the right company in this respect, for Frankena is doing precisely the same thing, though he is housed academically on the 'upper' floor. So, Barton offers a further plea against narrowness, directed now not against the exclusion of branches of philosophy but at the exclusion, in what he perceives as the fashion of the times, of a Dewey-type system of philosophy from a literature which is dominated by the struggle between other than Deweyian 'isms' and the analytical attack on them. His final plea is for liberality rather than partisanship when it comes to bearing philosophy on education: 'we need to work towards a matrix which would help us, without descending to mere eclecticism, to accept guidance from various philosophies in planning course of action in education'.³⁷ Significantly, it is this notion of action that this unusual generalist chooses to leave in the mind of his readers.

From what can be called the Barton-Frankena 'collaboration' we can turn briefly to an opposition between two familiar figures which features in this symposium. Price writes on the phrase 'having an education' and Scheffler comments. This difference of opinion of two major figures will take us into a substantial section on Scheffler who, in any structuring of the literature, would emerge as a dominant philosopher. In choosing such a topic Price, like Frankena, tries to illuminate the symposium theme in an indirect way. In essence, he presents a series of careful analyses of teaching, each one designed to go deeper than the one before and thereby to demonstrate how technical philosophizing of this type 'unpacks' the complexities of a concept.³⁸ He approaches his task in the step-by-step, methodical manner we have earlier commented on. It is this characteristic which his critic selects for comment - a comment which is of value to us for its further indication of what Scheffler himself understands by an analytical philosophy of education.

He immediately says of Price: 'his theory is hopelessly intellectualistic and mechanical - indeed a new "impression" theory of education'.³⁹ This is a clue that Scheffler is, once more, taking the opportunity of preparing the ground for his own positive views which, as we shall see in a moment, were shortly to be published in substantial form. But, before we move completely to Scheffler, we can record Price's conclusion to his own type of prosaic, literal analysis; for it is a pointer to the complexities of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy of education which he thinks can only be dealt with in the manner demonstrated in this article. In a sense, he implies that mapping the logical geography of education-into-philosophy is a task to be undertaken slowly, carefully and without too

much show of the creative 'flair' which has so often led philosophers astray. So, he says of 'teaching':

The ideas employed to explain its meaning, the words used to bring us to its reference, i.e., words like "belief", "disposition", and "capacity" are, themselves, focal points of active philosophical controversy.⁴⁰

We shall be hearing from Price again. Meanwhile, we can note, as we leave a symposium whose philosophical riches have been very selectively displayed, that there is in this quotation an echo, from a philosopher whose style of philosophizing is unmistakable, of the educationist Barton's belief that dogmatism is inappropriate in relating all that is understood by 'philosophy' to the practice of teaching.

Scheffler: Philosophical Territory and Philosophical Tools

'Rationality' is the key term in all Scheffler's work. Against Price he holds a view of rationality which is broad indeed and explains the nature of his criticism. Price is claimed to emphasize facts and skills as the aims of teaching, rather than inclusive dispositions. As Scheffler says: 'Professor Price's model here seems to be the lecture on some factual subject for informational purposes or briefing somebody on a technique'.⁴¹ Whether the charges are well-founded is not our concern: rather, we are interested in this early sign that Scheffler, in working towards the institutionalization of analytical philosophy of education, has a notion of analysis which is different from that of an equally well 'qualified' philosopher. It raises the question in this period, at the start of what is becoming a

'movement', as to whose notion of analysis is correct when there is disagreement - a question to be increasingly asked much later in the literature of education once the limitations of orthodox analytical philosophy of education became evident.

Here, Scheffler has his own 'rationality model' of teaching as an activity which embraces a wide range of methods designed to draw participating pupils into the realm of reason. It is a model which contrasts, in its richness, with the supposedly threadbare alternative presented by Price. The modes of analysis and the results of analysis are intimately connected on the evidence of this critique. From the point of view of the present investigation, this type of answer to the question 'What is philosophy of education?' - that 'Philosophy of education is analytic' - becomes less than convincing when it is seen that what analysis is is no straightforward issue. The suspicion must be that, just as there appeared to Barton to be 'hidden' elements in Frankena's moral philosophy, so there are 'hidden' elements in 'neutral' analyses.

However, these are suspicions that the hindsight which is afforded by a knowledge of later developments could tempt us to pursue too far for the proper handling of our major theme. Suffice it to say that Scheffler would be, in 1958, in the process of writing the book on the language of education which was to give a full exposition of his position; and that the response here to Price is a preview of it only, to be understood in that light. Whether Scheffler's fully developed position is such as to exclude, while emphasizing the need for analysis, a normative philosophy of education apparent in the very act of stating the emphasis, we can doubt on the evidence of the literature as we have so far interpreted it. And, of course, part of

that evidence came from Price himself in Period One. We shall return to this matter later in this section.

But we still have to pause a while before reaching the two major books with which this most renowned of philosophers of education really established his reputation. Another prologue to them which is relevant to our primary interest in the content of teacher education is his article 'Justifying Curriculum Decisions'. Briefly, his deep analysis of 'justification', in relation to the rules for selecting content, reaches the conclusion that the 'guiding principle underlying the following rules is that educational content is to help the learner attain maximum self-sufficiency as economically as possible'.⁴² While he addresses here school teachers with their curriculum problems, we can use again the fruitful device of 'translating' to the level of teachers-of-teachers with their problems - our own problems. What registers immediately is the difference in philosophical tone of this comment to that of, say, a Pilley. For both the learner and the teacher, 'economy' should, in Scheffler's view, characterise their efforts. That is, what appeals to the 'interest' of the learner is not the main factor in the total situation to be taken into account in making curriculum decisions. There are more important factors if the rationality of man, as Scheffler sees it, is to be communicated from one generation to the next. He has thus Pilley's consciousness of the cultural products of civilized life, but places the emphasis on them as impersonal products rather than as expressions of the collective transactions of persons.

These are subtle differences, but significant. The rational Scheffler would not be likely to be sympathetic to the personalist Pilley's view that students, given free choice amongst the great works

of great men, become - through a kind of magical contagion - self-sufficient teachers of self-sufficiency. This would be far from 'efficient' in Scheffler's terms. He has a systematic programme, because his kind of rationality requires a programme for its survival. Hence, in relation to students, a balance must be found between the demand for 'relevance' which reflects students' practical interests and the necessity for that 'rigour' which defines the rational products of man's various activities of inquiry. It can be seen that such a balance is not, in Scheffler's terms, easy to attain. He says:

How to avoid both ignorance and superficiality is the basic practical problem. I should hazard the opinion that the solution lies not in rapid survey courses but in the intensive cultivation of a small but significant variety of areas.⁴³

Relating this observation to our long discussion of the bearing of disciplines on education we can see that it is precisely the 'rapid survey courses' which often characterize those conventional offerings which are motivated by a concern for staking out a place for the specialist subjects rather than a concern for teacher preparation which is 'efficient' in Scheffler's sense. His 'small but significant variety of areas', on the other hand, can only be significant in relation to an objective which is appropriate to the recipients - in this case student teachers. They are areas, therefore, which make sense only as elements within a general theory of education such as we have time and again identified as the proper content of teacher preparation.

However, this is an aside: Scheffler's importance lies in his more direct bearing on the reflexive questions of our investigation. We come to the 'territory' and 'tools' of the present section heading with the first of his books, a collection of readings for which his

introduction and commentaries provide the amplification of the first part of the programme that he announced four years earlier.⁴⁴ Here he draws together and cogently expresses much that we have found scattered about the earlier literature. That is, as so often in educational writings, these are not-unfamiliar ideas at last authoritatively set down in a definitive pronouncement.

He does not present analytical philosophy as another 'ism'. The importance he attaches to this particular intention is significant in view of what was to happen during the next twenty years, to the sub-discipline which he virtually created, in the hands of many who lacked his philosophical stature. The analyst, Scheffler says, focusses on basic concepts which exist already in educational discourse. He abandons that attempt, so often found in the past, to show a relationship between philosophy of education and general philosophy which Scheffler describes as 'mechanical, external, forced'.⁴⁵ This rejected notion that choice can be made between rival 'isms', each with its supposed educational implications, is familiar enough to us from Period One, but Scheffler puts it exactly:

...the temptation to employ philosophy to intimidate educators by the brandishing of "big names" and doctrinal labels has tended to obscure the basic critical analysis of arguments and assumptions, systematic clarification of fundamental ideas.⁴⁶

Again, the comment has to be made that it is precisely the kind of intimidation to which Scheffler refers which was soon to be seen in education from analytical philosophy itself, taken up with great enthusiasm in the context of British teacher training by lesser figures than Scheffler - figures for whom Scheffler himself, in fact, soon became a contemporary 'big name'. The 'politics' of intellectual

production would seem to be so inescapable that we shall, shortly, need to explain it more fully than hitherto.

However, at this point in the establishment of analytical philosophy, the alternative to orthodoxy presented by Scheffler looks promising. As we can recall, it has two elements. Philosophy has a 'territory': that is, there are results of philosophical enquiry undertaken far from the classroom which are available to the educator. In addition, philosophy provides 'tools' for the educator to philosophize with himself. The elements are complementary, the latter being of first importance to Scheffler, as it was soon seen to be to others in Britain who did not develop their views as systematically as Scheffler is now about to do. This is because the results of philosophy can only be appraised by an educator looking to them for guidance in a philosophical way. This is Scheffler's point. It is similar to that made by Passmore on the writing of the history of philosophy from the 'inside' - in the 'problematic' mode which is serving as the model for the present account. To both philosophers, the exploration of the territory of philosophy is essentially a philosophical exploration. Saying this is one thing: but showing it in detail is another; and this is why Scheffler's already-known view expressed here, in the context of available readings which he takes from general philosophy, is a mile-stone in philosophy of education. That is, the first element in his total programme is supportive of the really important second element. General philosophy, as exemplified in his readings:

...must be used not as a substitute for detailed analysis of educational contexts but rather as a source of clues as to how best to carry on this analysis, the success of the whole enterprise to be judged⁴⁷ by the adequacy and fruitfulness of the latter.

Both Reid and Bantock would no doubt applaud this priority. They would appreciate the skill with which excerpts from 'real' philosophy have been chosen and commented upon by someone who clearly possesses both philosophical understanding and insight into the process of education. Scheffler, like them, demonstrates that philosophy of education cannot be deductive: general philosophy is not a set of first principles from which practice can be derived, but a source book for the improvement in comprehension of those who go to it prepared to do their own philosophical work. And the first level of this comprehension is that at which educators see philosophy as technique, not philosophy as beliefs which are entangled in some way with value to provide the passive educationist with his aims. As Scheffler puts it: 'there are no experts in moral sensitivity, wisdom and ethical judgement'.⁴⁸

Accordingly, this book of readings displays the tools of the philosophical trade expertly handled, so that the process is as educative as the products. It gives a view of the kind of philosophical workshop which we saw Edel identify in the earlier chapter on philosophy. In it, first-rate philosophers are at work analyzing concepts, displaying inferences, clarifying how choices are made and making explicit the criteria used in reaching decisions and taking action. Scheffler exhibits them, with comments designed to involve the reader in active response, as using new tools to achieve purposes which are as old as philosophy itself, by focussing on

language, not for itself but in order, as he says, 'to "look through" language at the whole range of traditional issues'.⁴⁹

This guide to analysis reveals the catholicity of Scheffler's tastes⁵⁰ and helps to explain his earlier criticism of Price. 'Analysis' means many different kinds of procedure - rational reconstruction, explication of logical structure, contextual and more narrowly semantic investigations, for example - and a listing of them in close relation to first-class examples of them in actual use is his preliminary to the more original work of his own which was to appear soon as his second book. But, before we turn to that, we can re-introduce McClellan as a critic of the present volume, for one of his observations will clarify for us that 'dialectic' in philosophical discussion, which has emerged in our account without being named and which any attempt to locate so complex a thinker as Scheffler in the literature of education exemplifies. That is, it will point to the existence in this essentially philosophical literature of arguments which are so well conducted - Scheffler's are a model in this respect - that they appear totally convincing until counter-arguments are found by thinkers who are not so easily convinced as most of us. Truth in philosophy is the truth that is found within it, not imposed on it from outside.

McClellan, whose own text in the philosophy of education was not to be written for some years, reviews Scheffler's readings at some length. This fact in itself is significant for what it tells us further about the difference in attitude to philosophy of education between America and Britain at this time: for Scheffler's book was not noted at all in the journals here. McClellan's eventual conclusion is that Scheffler does not quite succeed. The reason is important:

McClellan exemplifies it by subjecting one of the contributions in the book (that by Morgenbesser) to his own type of analysis in order to make a comment on the analytical approach itself which is best given in his own words:

Now quite likely Mr. Morgenbesser or someone else can show that I am confused in one or all of the points in my attack upon his argument. I expressed it here to try to illustrate, as nothing in Mr. Scheffler's collection illustrates, that current philosophical methods, like those of traditional philosophy, are dialectical. They involve someone analyzing something and someone else trying to show that the analysis is not so final as its original author had supposed.⁵¹

This single meta-philosophical point which we have time to take from McClellan is a clear indication, of a kind which McClellan uses on other occasions as we shall see, that the implication which could be easily seen in the Schefflerian programme - that a definitive re-styling of philosophy of education was in progress - should be treated with caution. Putting philosophy into an analytic mode may not have the revolutionary consequences hoped for it. It would be easy to think that it did if the introduction of the new mode creates the impression that, at last, 'real' philosophizing was now possible. For within the new mode, as the wide range of kinds of analysis collected by Scheffler himself indicates, philosophizing will still be subject to the thesis-antithesis-synthesis process which has long been familiar as 'dialectic'. Thus, McClellan, while appreciative of the tapping of contemporary philosophical sources undertaken by Scheffler, reserves his judgement on the grounds that the notion of 'analysis' needs itself analyzing further before it can be welcomed as the cure-all for educational thought.

Scheffler's masterpiece, The Language of Education,⁵² provides,

amongst many other things, such an analysis of analysis. It was a book which appeared in 1960 with the ground well prepared by its author, as we have seen, through half a dozen years of activity. This is the book which provides the philosophical 'tools'; and a view of a master craftsman using them in the hope that others will do likewise. It focusses on 'Educational thought and argument'.⁵³ This can be taken, in our terms, either as the whole range of educational studies or as educational theory in its relationship with the disciplines of education. We shall see in a moment how best to take it: in any event, it is a logical exercise in a sense that interests us which Scheffler is engaged in. We must note immediately that, no matter how impressively developed the argument is here, it is but one of the impressive arguments to be found in the literature available to us. And it is not the first, for already we have reason to believe that Frankena's position anticipates and assimilates that to be found here. In short, McClellan's caution, briefly recorded above, is not likely to be lost on anyone who is familiar with the literature of Period One, even in the presence of such an obviously well qualified philosopher as Scheffler. Our task is to display the logic of the various 'logics' on offer and let it make its own point.

Scheffler philosophizes systematically, complementing the descriptions and examples of analysis of his first book with a further, sustained example written explicitly on education and with an educative purpose. His attention is directed specifically to 'certain recurrent forms of discourse related to schooling':⁵⁴ that is, he judges the practical teaching situation to be the core of the educational enterprise, confirming our own argument derived from generalist writers. Of the modes of analysis found in his earlier

inventory, he consistently uses 'contextual' analysis, thereby showing the post-positivistic standpoint we by now expect of him. It is this emphasis which allows him to be innovative in comparison with all the writers we have so far considered.

The innovation consists in his making explicit the need for, in his words, 'disentangling practical and moral issues from others with which they are often confused'.⁵⁵ For the first time the clarification of rigour-relevance or theoretical-practical issues is made an explicit objective by a philosopher writing on education. Strangely, it is provided by one whose role is to establish the importance of analysis in educational philosophy and who, of necessity, strengthens the arguments of those for whom analysis is merely one part of such a philosophy! For he has to assume the existence of educational discourse of a philosophically unsophisticated kind as the object of his sophisticated comments; and, as we know, this discourse is the very practical and moral discourse which others take to be the normative educational theory that is ultimately justified on the upper levels of a Frankena-type philosophy of education.

Scheffler's concern for emphasizing analysis beyond the emphases to be found in his predecessors results in his making the now-familiar distinction (between receiving, in education, philosophical doctrine from outside and practising philosophy in a technical way inside) sharper than is found in, say, the selected contributors to the Period One symposium on philosophy of education. He argues that, of the two options open to the philosopher - attaining general perspective by the creation of a world-view or 'by analyzing the basic ideas and assumptions recurring in a variety of special fields'⁵⁶ - only the

latter ('analysis of the roots') seems possible in the contemporary world. We would argue, from no other standpoint than that indicated in the literature of philosophy and the Frankena-Edel reflection of it in education, that the inevitability of a world-view is not excluded by the so-called revolution in philosophy. Even stronger, we would contend that the argument that world-views are no longer the concern of philosophy is itself part of a particular world-view, precisely because everyone necessarily has such a general perspective.

As stated, this is the most fundamental argument in philosophy - about 'philosophy' itself. Scheffler's enthusiasm for the power of professional philosophers' analytical techniques leaves his writings in need of that kind of interpretation of certain pronouncements in them which must be made on the assumption of another meaning for 'philosophy' than that which he emphasizes. There is much evidence in his later writings that he would not himself deny the need; but following this up would take us too far from the main line of discussion. Rather, it is his emphasis on the context of educational discourse which is more immediately our concern - an important emphasis no matter what interpretation be put on the effect of context on his own stance at this particular time in the development of philosophy of education.

In short, Scheffler can be regarded as siding with the 'generalist' perspective that we have indicated throughout; even though, on the face of it, he is the founding father of the discipline-approach which is in opposition to that perspective. For it is the use to which the discipline-perspective is typically put by lesser figures in less well-established teacher-training contexts than that of Scheffler at Harvard which has been judged on our account to

be intellectually suspect. Here he shows his clearly relevant view of the conceptual 'landscape' of education:

...education is not only an abstract, intellectual matter but a field of practical endeavour and decision as well, in which institutional programmes are⁵⁷ put forth, criticized, justified and rejected.

Certainly, the analytical philosopher speaks here like a generalist. If this is what education is, then the thinking about it is essentially normative, encompassing the 'abstract intellectual matters' to which he refers. He puts his finger on a central point which others have assumed but never so well expressed: 'educational ideas serve not only "descriptive" functions but also "policy" functions'.⁵⁸ In our terms, Scheffler spells out compellingly, in using here the descriptive-prescriptive distinction, the logic of educational theory. His analysis of theory shows that it is philosophical in the wider sense of philosophy than his own initial commitment to analysis might well imply but for this kind of result of the analysis. Scheffler in deed if not in word agrees with Frankena.

To him, educational discourse straddles many spheres of interest, particularly the scientific, practical and ethical spheres. The words of this discourse mean what the particular context determines that they mean. As education in its concrete embodiment in schooling has the teacher's decisions and actions at its centre, the context is a practical one at least and a moral one in its wider implications. Therefore, the language for thinking about this activity of the teacher is a practical-moral language: educational theory is prescriptive, not descriptive. Even though some of its terms obviously have a use in a scientific or scholarly discipline which exists

separate from the context in question here, the use of such terms in this context alters their meaning.

It follows from this notion of 'contextual implication' that the pronouncements of discipline specialists in the context of teacher education - wherever they are employed - are to be interpreted as contributing to educational discourse, not the discourse of the discipline. Whether they know it or not, specialists make their statements in an institutional setting which confers on them the role of general educationists and on their language the function of contributing to general, normative theory. Our earlier-developed argument on this matter, derived hitherto from a wide range of reflexive discussions, is here supported by careful analysis which is based on the fruitful analytical emphasis of the importance of context summed up in the late Wittgensteinian slogan 'the meaning is the use'.

For example, a historian who thinks himself to be speaking as a historian, when contributing to the education of student teachers, brings to the occasion the implications for his words of the context, whether he is aware of it or not. His own role is that of educationist, just as the role of his students is that of intending teachers whose professional interest is, by definition, such as to be satisfied only by a prescriptive and not a descriptive discourse. Though the historical account appears to be offered as a description of education similar to that which could be given to a non-teacher audience, there is an implicit theory of education into which it is fitted by the normal expectations of the particular audience in question. One objective of Scheffler in offering his analysis is to ensure that more educational theorizing is done explicitly, rather than done unknowingly, with the opportunity which that condition

allows of doing it better.

These are complex issues of the relationship of words to things, where the world of 'things' is understood as that social world with which language is meshed and not just the sensory world which, on the account of an earlier analytical tradition, language merely 'reflects'. It is small wonder that Scheffler's book, which introduces these complexities through the notion of contextual implication, was welcomed by an American reviewer (again, there was no notice of this book, either, in British journals) as 'a truly creative addition to the philosophy of education'⁵⁹ for that feature in particular. For it is a feature which enables Scheffler to distinguish in the language of education, which presents a smooth homogeneous surface to the logically unsophisticated reader, three radically different kinds of statement whose identification allows him to make sense of the complexities for us.

He finds there definitions, slogans and metaphors. At this point, we could with profit, but at the price of enlarging this account to unacceptable proportions, review all our own arguments as developed so far in the light of his powerful distinctions. Much of the literature of education, even its reflexive parts, takes on the appearance of slogan or metaphor once these functional categories of language are revealed. But we must be more selective with Scheffler than with any writer so far if the many minor figures in the literature are to be given the due which an investigation of this extensive kind promises. We can, then, note his work on definitions in education only: this will reinforce those indications already given about the 'translation' of terms in multiple use according to context.

Scheffler distinguishes 'programmatic' from 'descriptive' and

'stipulative' definitions. The third are simply arbitrary: anyone can stipulate and no-one else need follow. The second type constitutes a recognition that language is the result of human convention - of agreement in use. But there are often significantly different agreements of this kind, none of them right or wrong. This is precisely why philosophical analysis is required. 'What do you mean?' is an essential preliminary to further questions, and answers to it may be creatively given or 'mechanically' given as we saw in Scheffler's criticism of Price. But, for all the importance of descriptive definitions here and in the future development of analytical philosophy of education, it is the identification of programmatic definitions which we can best assimilate from Scheffler in the space available.

He offers it as a 'cognitive' version of C.L. Stevenson's historically important concept of 'persuasive definition' which provided one of the foundations on which contemporary ethics was built. ⁶⁰ It illuminates much of our earlier *discussion* of the relationship between educational theory and practice. Practical questions in teaching are ultimately moral questions - as we have argued - for the discussion of which there is a special domain of 'concrete' moral language. This is the language of education in which the key terms are defined programmatically in the sense that they take their meaning from a wider programme of activities which are justified in moral philosophizing. Again, educational theory is confirmed as a species of moral theory. A corollary is, of course, that the reasons for a particular programme of content, methods and system for education are to be found in knowledge of children, of subjects, of society, of the past and of anything else which has been best

articulated within a university type discipline. However, they are reasons for action only within the logically distinct normative theory. Further, the best articulations in the sense of the most systematic of them may not be 'best', at this moment in human history, for schooling as we know it, even though they provide an ideal at which to aim for in the 'relevant' disciplines themselves. Thus does Scheffler throw light on, for example, the conflict in the context of psychology between the 'real' psychologists and the autonomy-seeking educational psychologists whose opposition we described in Period One, as he states the analytical aim: 'to achieve not only the clarification of urgent practical issues of educational policy but also the clarification of fundamental assertions that figure in educational theory'.⁶¹

Scheffler Demonstrates The Tools in Use

We must move on from the description of the tools to their use in Scheffler's hands. The second half of the book analyzes the concept of teaching. It is of quite central importance to Scheffler for reasons which will now be clear. It explains the title of his collected essays of the 1970s - Reason and Teaching - for this symbolizes the fusion of his interest in both the worlds of thought and of action. 'Reason' or rationality is, to him, the giving of reasons, not some reified abstraction dignified with a capital letter. Therefore, it is reasons in which the teacher transacts his professional business. he gives reasons, expects reasons and thus shows himself to be a person whose activities are subject to a constraint of manner which makes any suggestion, such as can be

derived from, say, Skinnerian psychology, that the teacher is a 'technician' trading in mere behaviour conflict with the common experience of mankind which is enshrined in the mental concepts of his common language. So, Scheffler shows in action his own concept of descriptive definition.

Central to the ordinary use of the term 'teaching' is the now-expected condition which opposes all behaviouristic accounts - that teaching is intentional activity. The fundamental concept of the philosophy of mind - 'intention' - re-appears to remind us that, in this philosopher, we find fulfilled the promise of our Period One: that many of the notions expressed by educationists with no technical qualifications in philosophy would emerge later in technical form. Scheffler, like the generalists of earlier chapters, conceives of teaching as an art sustained by whatever science is available to sustain it on its own terms. It is not a business for the mechanical application of supposed rules by unreflective - indeed literally unreasonable - technicians. Morris himself would recognize such an argument. Scheffler puts well the matter of rules and application:

Such rules are, in the case of teaching... at best inexhaustive though helpful, i.e. capable of improving our effort though not capable of guaranteeing success. Improving the practical art of teaching through provision of appropriate rules is one main task of educational research, conceived not as some single science but as the overlap of several related scientific domains.⁶²

Here is indicated the logical position of the disciplines of education, particularly psychology in relation to the level of teaching that Scheffler has in mind in this passage, and other disciplines in relation to other levels of education where 'policy' rather than 'practice' would be the appropriate term to use. If we

recall our discussion of educational psychology again, it is clear that the notion of an 'applied' psychology centred on school learning would best fit this specification. Ausubel's work would be more consistent with this scheme than Peel's, for instance. Indeed the Ausubelian notion of the reflective teacher as action-researcher in his own classroom harmonizes well with Scheffler's views.

However, even if it is granted that educational research can itself usefully be carried on at other levels than that which bears so closely on the classroom, the necessity remains - and is clearly noticeable in Scheffler's analysis - for its products to enter as elements into general educational theory at the teaching level: all is grist to this particular mill. Therefore, the argument for the importance of research which, it is said, will eventually provide a sounder basis for the art of teaching than is currently available is not an argument for the teachers of teachers who happen to be doing some research as part of their composite role to offer this material 'neat', as though it aided the student teacher just because it carries an academically prestigious title. Scheffler's argument for the inevitable 'distance' between researcher and teacher, because the former is in pursuit of non-commonsensical rules, is not an argument for distance between the tutor who is also a part-time researcher and the student teacher whom he is employed to prepare. Any gap in that situation is unnecessary and miseducative.

Thus, it can be seen that Scheffler and Price are, after all, in some agreement. The concept of the 'art' of teaching which is underpinned by partial 'reasons' provided by academic disciplines is held by both. As Scheffler says:

The continued development of such research and its application to teaching practice depends not only on the autonomous development of relevant sciences but on the continued willingness to apply such sciences to practice. ⁶³

We can add that, on the very principle of contextual meaning given by Scheffler himself, such comments are to be taken in the total context of the literature of education that we are examining. When they are, it becomes clear that they have a meaning which is reasonably 'filled out' in many of our other findings in the writings of many other authors. The 'application' which Scheffler stresses can then be interpreted as being effected only through the agency of the teacher-person who possesses a normative theory - the person whose portrait has been sketched from many angles in preceding chapters.

Just as Scheffler's threads can be woven in this way into a total fabric, so can one thread in particular be put to the double use which has become common in this account. To change the metaphor, his definitive analysis of 'teaching that', 'teaching how to' and 'teaching to' - a translation into the educational context of Ryle's original work - can be further translated from teaching children to our level of teaching teachers. It amplifies what we have earlier said about the relationship of knowledge, skills and dispositions in the education of students. We have observed how often teacher preparation has in Period One and, even more, at this time been under pressure to become rigorous by injecting more of the disciplines in undiluted form. Against this 'know that' there is often presented the insistence on simple 'know how' which a too-shallow view of the need for relevance can produce. This is the kind of clash found in some training institutions between tutors who are at the very opposite

poles of pedantic subject-mindedness and naive method-enthusiasm. Such tutors are the caricatures of the protagonists in the serious opposition between rigour and relevance which is one of the central concerns of this thesis. Their postures are not well-grounded in the philosophical reflection that is necessary for rational discussion of the issues.

It is this reflection which Scheffler abundantly supplies. Know-that and know-how are necessary but not sufficient. They need fusing with attitudes into something that is much broader. It is the disposition to teach which is important, as we realize from the work of Frankena. With his elucidation of the term, Scheffler as an analytical philosopher illuminates the problem which, as mentioned, was the primary anxiety of the personalists when they rejected behaviourism, its associated educational technology and its assumed model of the teacher as technician. Scheffler provides his own 'technical' foundation, no doubt unknowingly, for both the gentle humanism of Morris and the passionate personalism of Pilley. His words echo theirs:

...our critique of "behavioristic" interpretations of teaching and of teacher education, our emphasis on acknowledgement of the pupil's sense of reasons, our treatment of educational research, and our analyses of moral education bear on several important issues in educational theory.⁶⁴

To this we can but add that these issues are what we mean by 'logical' issues. In terms of answering our specific question for this particular chapter, 'What is philosophy of education?', we can now see that Scheffler answers it fully, and at the same time, answers a lot of other cognate questions. As elsewhere, it is evident here that all these reflexive-logical-philosophical questions form a complex

network. The material of the present chapter - particularly that found in the major works of this outstanding philosopher - could well form part of the contents of the second chapter on educational theory yet to come. Once more, it can be said that the classification of an Education Library reveals little of logical significance on face inspection. Nevertheless, taking the present chapter heading as a pointer to the last insight we can take from Scheffler, we can note his views on the nature of the sub-discipline.

He indicates three areas of general philosophy - three domains within the total philosophical 'territory' whose neighbourly support for education he argued for in his first book - which are of clear relevance to education. Without his stating them, we could work out what they are from the content of our discussion in Period One. Nevertheless, he names them authoritatively and, in so doing, links them securely with the notion of analytical philosophy as it was soon to be developed by Peters in Britain. First there are notions in the thinking of any reflective educator 'which approach the philosophy of mind as well as the philosophy of knowledge'.⁶⁵ So, philosophical psychology of a technical kind is identified, thereby reinforcing the many observations we had to make in early investigations of the continuing claims made by philosophy to the 'psychological' area. Second, epistemology is identified, recalling our attempts to show that the content of schooling as constituting the material of the curriculum theorist is central to educational theorising.

Other notions, Scheffler points out, 'approach the philosophy of morals as well as social philosophy'. So, ethics in its individual and societal interpretations joins the other two areas to provide the sources for both relevant analyses and models for the process of

analysis - relevant, that is, to the discussion of educational problems and models to enable the educator to participate in such discussion with some legitimate claim to be doing it philosophically. In sum, there exists already, in these areas of general philosophy, fundamental 'educational' concepts which the finest philosophical minds have attended to. The introduction of them into the educational debate is essential. In addition, Scheffler asserts, there are many more explicitly 'educational' concepts which are not analyzed in general philosophy precisely because they are more the concern of the educationist who is closer to the concrete business of schooling. These concepts require analysis by such educationists - whether they are called philosophers of education, educational theorists or just teachers - along the lines to be found in general philosophy where the techniques were developed. Scheffler himself has shown how this is to be done by 'unpacking' the peculiarly educational concept of 'teaching' in the context of a handbook which precedes the thorough example of analyzing by an equally thorough description of the process of analysis.

He has, therefore, produced the tools and started the job. It is a job to be done by all persons in education, even though it is likely to be done as well or badly as any skill in the possession of such a wide range of persons. ⁶⁶ Our final observation on Scheffler, in moving to the many skilled persons who did act on the prescription and produce the piecemeal analyses of single concepts which seemed to be required by it, is that the workmanlike development of his argument and the apparent usefulness of his conclusions must be seen as 'located' within the very wide framework which our inquiries have so far provided. An account of the logic of educational studies could

easily become, once the writings of this most renowned of analytical philosophers is reached, a treatise on Scheffler alone. But, as has become evident, what makes him a key figure in any account is less the stress he places on analytical philosophizing than his own kind of going 'beyond' analysis. It is perhaps no surprise that the first fellow philosopher to whom he expresses his indebtedness in the preface to his magnum opus is Frankena himself!

Concept Analysis: The 'Narrow, Piecemeal Approach'

The section heading quotes from Peters commenting with a note of regret twenty two years after the close of our Period Two. As an appendix to Scheffler's position there are many examples of what we can call his prescription being taken seriously - very seriously - in a manner which the Peters phrase sums up. These can be sampled in a section of modest length before early, enthusiastic Peters is introduced to the investigation. One of the first in the field is Archambault, before long to appear on the British scene with a Scheffler-type volume of readings designed to support the institutionalization of the new approach. He has at this time two analyses which are of interest.

His first, which appeared as early as 1956 as one of the more public signs of that young educationists' interest in analysis which, it will be recalled, Broudy commented on in Period One, analyzes the concept of 'experience' as used in discussions of the curriculum.⁶⁷ It shows both a sympathy for the Deweyian tradition and that keen-ness which we have noted on a number of occasions

for a 'stiffening' of that tradition by reference to contemporary developments in philosophy. It was soon followed by an article which relates more closely to other writers and a more thoroughly investigated topic in the present account. Its title is an immediate pointer to this topic: 'The Concept of Need and its Relation to Certain Aspects of Educational Theory'.⁶⁸ Bantock immediately comes to mind when it is seen that Archambault argues that moral choices are inescapable in the enterprise of education, but that this fact is often concealed in so much educational writing which uses what are taken to be descriptive psychological terms. This, of course, is not new to us; but Archambault's analysis is thorough. It was to be reflected in the 1960s in the work of Robert Dearden, as analytical philosophy of education continued to rediscover the truths we have found admirably displayed in the 1950s. Archambault puts his conclusion in a statement which needs no further discussion: 'the postulation of a hierarchy of basic values must serve as the core for educational organizations'.⁶⁹

Soon R.H. Ennis was examining 'neutrality' in the Harvard Educational Review, providing a sample of an important book which was shortly to be published as a complement to Scheffler's work. Of significance to us in Ennis is the declaration of his analytical allegiance, when we recall the diverse modes of analysis charted by Scheffler. His commitment to ordinary language analysis with its emphasis on paradigm cases and the linguistic and social contexts of the use of a term emerges clearly from his conclusion 'that the ordinary use of "neutrality" and its opposite "taking a stand", presupposes intent.'⁷⁰ We shall have to restrict our comment to

saying that, in his narrowly focussed work, all the technical apparatus of Oxford philosophy at its most Austinian can be seen!

This enthusiasm for technique is much in the mind of Ennis when he acts with Othanel Smith as editor of the first reader in educational concept-analysis mentioned above. The preface of Language and Concepts in Education declares - one could say, almost, 'protests' - 'Although the analysis is often rigorous and searching the aim is neither hair-splitting nor analysis for analysis' sake'.⁷¹ The editors are clearly conscious of the likely response not only of commonsensical educators but of philosophers of other persuasions than their own as they prepare to present the state of the field. And, indeed, their provision of articles on 'experience', again; and 'need' from another philosopher: 'subject-matter'; 'knowing that' in relation to 'knowing how' by a young associate of Scheffler; 'mastery' by Broudy himself in a cautiously analytic idiom; 'teaching' twice, by Smith himself and a further commentator; 'neutrality', as noted, by Ennis; 'equality'; 'the logical and psychological' by McClellan; 'assumptions' by Ennis; 'explanation'; and, finally, 'slogans' by McClellan once more with a colleague - all these show a variety of approach sufficiently removed from any appearance of a 'party line' to fit the Schefflerian prescription, interpreted as in the previous section, with success. These are the kinds of concepts which they think are 'the chief landmarks of the intellectual terrain'⁷² of educational theory. A careful mapping of the logical landscape is, in their view, necessary if the policies, programmes and practice of education are to be well-founded. What they have in mind is the intellectual overhaul of thinking inherited from

the Deweyian days to which we have referred. The post-Dewey revolution in philosophy enables the philosopher in education to take a close look at those concepts which, amongst the followers of Dewey who have settled into an unquestioning acceptance of the relevance of his kind of thinking, have thought to be unproblematical - the 'harder' concepts of curriculum, teaching and learning which tender-minded child-centred educationists have ceased to think about. In sum, it is time, Smith and Ennis assert, 'to take stock of our intellectual capital, to reassess our educational concepts and beliefs'.⁷³

The book is plainly designed to motivate co-operation between older educationists and those with an appreciation of contemporary philosophy. It is another kind of bridge-building exercise. Familiar figures such as McClellan and Broudy appear, as mentioned, alongside young followers of the most technical of contemporary philosophical paths. The whole conspectus is, ostensibly, a complex response to the question 'What is philosophy of education?'. But we can pick out McClellan's two contributions to indicate briefly the connections with our earlier inquiries, bridging in that direction and into the future. For he distinguishes, in the 'logical' as against the 'psychological',⁷⁴ two aspects of any discussion of both teaching and the kind of learning at which it aims, which emerged very much later in the philosophy of education of the 1960s, just as they had already appeared in Period One. Hirst and David Hamlyn⁷⁵ were to share the task which McClellan here 'inherits' from, say, Isaacs with his early account of Piaget's genetic epistemology in relation to progressive education.

In addition, McClellan further analyses the logic of slogans beyond the point at which Scheffler had left it, amplifying and complementing him with a particular type of target in sight.⁷⁶ For there had been published in the same year as Scheffler's seminal work in philosophy another book which was to prove even more influential because of its curricular implications. So, McClellan assembles the critical apparatus for the application of philosophy to such viewpoints as are exemplified in Jerome Bruner's The Process of Education⁷⁷ and affords us another forward link to our second investigation of curriculum theory which is still to come.

However, that sector of educational studies in our inquiries is separated from the present section by the whole range of reflexive literature in both the psychology and the sociology of education for this period - not to mention what remains to be said of philosophy. So, we must pass by the wealth of material in this trend-setting volume to note one more article from another source which illustrates the effect on other American journals of the concept-analysis prescription. Marcus Brown analyses 'knowing' and 'learning' from a point of view which is influenced by both Scheffler and McClellan, whom he cites, but which is in disagreement with them both. It is the fact of his reservation rather than its content which bears on the main point of this small section. As he says: 'Once again, I find myself unable to agree with this approach to the correct use of the concepts here'.⁷⁸

These words signal the start of an excited game-like exchange of analytical opinion which was to last for decades as more and more educationists found narrow, piecemeal analysis to their liking

in its offer of something more precise to be done in philosophy than the declaration of generalities against which the techniques were directed. It is this situation, mirrored in the 1960s in Britain, which Peters, as mentioned above, was to describe later in words which reveal an accurate hindsight: one which, we would be inclined to argue at this point in our investigation, would have been a quite possible contemporary judgement to anyone familiar with the whole range of what was happening in pure philosophy and in the literature of education. He was to say:

The subject, so it now seems to me, was stimulated into life by this initial rush of philosophical blood to the head, but then its arteries began to harden. It settled down to a rather pedestrian period of tidying up and trying to improve on existing analyses and arguments. Few fresh ideas came in from philosophy or from elsewhere... Perhaps, too, the analytic emphasis brought with it a rather narrow, piecemeal approach. Unlike Dewey's philosophy of education, it operated without an explicit theory of human nature, although concepts such as "reason", "autonomy", "needs", "interests" and "learning" were confidently tackled, they drifted on the surface with no general account of man and his place in the natural world and social order to anchor them. ⁷⁹

It is ironic to find ~~that this~~ account, published in 1983 as our own long standing investigation nears completion, confirms much that has been suggested in it about the characteristics of the discipline-approach in the philosophy of education. The moment is right, then, to turn from the lesser figures who are engaged in the small-scale disputes about the nature of analysis and its findings to Peters of our Period Two, at a time when he had not yet entered as a professional into the field of education with an

entirely different perspective from that which his later comment above so plainly reveals.

Richard Peters Discovers Education

In 1958 and 1959 Peters produced two books which were closely connected, both in the philosophical inter-relationship of their contents and in their opening the way for Peters' movement from philosophy into education for his employment. ⁸⁰ His book on motivation is conceptual - a large version of the kind of piecemeal analysis we have just sampled, set in the historical perspective of philosophical tradition. In it, a view of human action is put forward which is that of a philosophical psychologist: any scientific psychologist reading it on the promise of its title would have been, at the time of its first appearance, very puzzled at the contents. It is an exercise in the philosophy of mind which is, in our terms, the kind of technical restatement of much we have seen from non-technical philosophers writing on education. The philosopher retains his great interest in human behaviour: he is sceptical about the claims of scientific psychology. This is not new, as we know, but Peters adds the historical dimension to it:

There is one main tradition which has been repeatedly criticized in this monograph - the tradition stemming from Hobbes that there can be an all-inclusive theory of human behaviour from whose basic postulates answers to all forms of the questions "Why does Jones do X?" will eventually be deduced. ⁸¹

Against Hobbes and his heirs, whom we have viewed in an

educational context in Period One, he offers the goal-directed, rule-governed account of human action which Passmore himself has economically labelled 'neo-Aristotelian'. The distinction Peters emphasizes is that between the explanation of human behaviour by means of mechanical, causal theories of what simply happens to a man and the explanation which stresses that actions have reasons. Peters thus falls in alongside Scheffler leading, as it were,⁸¹ Pilley. He argues that we know from common experience as human beings all that we normally need to know of psychology.⁸² Scientific psychology, waiting for its Galileo, waits in vain. Its proper job is merely to supplement the psychological distinctions embedded in ordinary language when abnormal occasions arise. Freud will therefore clearly turn out to be one of the 'psychologists' against whom Peters raises least objection. So, too, will Piaget; at least for his consciousness of the philosophical dimension to psychological issues.

It is the whole of this considerable thesis on the concept of motivation - part of a philosophical thrust of the times - which lies behind Peters' Authority, Responsibility and Education, his first essay in educational comment. Based on radio broadcasts given between 1956 and 1959, it took him into an area where broad philosophical interests could be satisfied in a less 'academic' way. Unsurprisingly, for the tone and content of Peters' work is of a now familiar type, it was Scheffler who was an influence in his deciding to change role.⁸³ Thus our Period Two is a time of great significance for the logic of educational studies, in that two of the most powerful thinkers in what turned out to be a London-Harvard 'line' in the analytical philosophy of education appear

towards the end of a decade which has much in philosophy to offer that is not confined to their particular brand of rigour. At this point we can say of Peters, as we said of Scheffler, that it is the effect of the stress on analysis which demands that the dismissed tradition of generalist thinking - that which is characteristic of the 1950s and justifiable on broader philosophical grounds than those emphasized in the introduction of analysis - be fully documented. In one sense, the later Peters and the later Scheffler were to moderate their stress on analysis as potentially revolutionary in educational thought, and to allow their substantive position on education as the development of reason to feature more prominently in their writings. But the effect of the emergence of this 'school' of philosophy through its activities at a lower level than that of its leaders - particularly in institutional settings where the 'political' dimension is of importance - was to establish specialization in philosophy as the only academically respectable arrangement.

However, Peters in this small book is worth considering without further reference to the political scene. He philosophizes in it on a variety of topics which fall within the three regions of the philosophical 'territory' which Scheffler also indicated: philosophy of mind, epistemology and ethics and social philosophy. Our interest is mainly in his reflexive comments. He, too, argues against philosophy as a kind of super-science which synthesizes knowledge. He acquaints his readers with the linguistic turn, notes how the revolution is completed in pure philosophy so that attention can be turned to real-life areas of which education is perhaps the

most important. His astronomical image for this is: 'It is time that philosophers supplemented their sun-worship by a bit of star-gazing'.⁸⁴ Bearing in mind the workshop image of Edel, the tools-and-territory image of Scheffler and the various images attached in pure philosophy to the notion of it being a 'second order' discipline, we can see that metaphors and models are never long absent from even the technical analysts' attempts to describe the nature of philosophy. An apostle of rationality thus finds himself needing the arts of persuasion!

The term 'education', Peters argues, has the notion of a standard built into it: to say of a person that he is educated is to make a value judgement. This explains why there is much means-ends talk when we enquire about the aims of education. However, Peters has his own view of this - one which was to become very well-known but which at this point in our own inquiry can hardly appear to be much of an innovation other than by being attached so explicitly to the analysis-of-a-concept mode of philosophizing. Nothing in this argument would be likely to take one of our intelligent generalists by surprise:

Values are involved in education not so much as goals and end products but as principles implicit in different manners of proceeding or producing.⁸⁵

We can comment that Pilley, on the evidence considered, would be happy enough with this emphasis on manner in the transactions of teaching. And when Peters names his principles of procedure - respecting persons and facts, toleration, discussion - the question

to be asked by anyone familiar with the work of writers from Morris to Collier is whether such notions need the justification offered in terms of the ordinary meaning of words in the language of everyday affairs. Peters seems to be drawing out such a lot which others would not dispute in the process of analyzing that they would be likely to wonder what the fuss was about; and to suspect that someone had moved into a field without taking the trouble to find out the point of what was being done there because of a prejudgement that it was not 'real' philosophy.

However, Peters' position is still of interest, both for its substance and for its exemplification of self-conscious analytical philosophy of education. He offers a middle road between the partially true theories usually labelled 'traditional' and 'progressive'. The one stresses end-products of education; the other stresses processes within it. His Aristotelianism steers him to the 'true' position which balances both claims by arguing that those products of human endeavour which constitute the content of education and therefore the vehicle for school learning are to be offered to pupils in a way which does not ignore the nature of mind. This is a familiar theme expressed already by Pilley for example, with his own individual emphasis on the person rather than the manner of the person. In Peters' idiom:

An attitude, a skill is caught; sensitivity,
a critical mind, respect for people and facts
develop where an articulate and intelligent
exponent is on the job. 86

This portrait of a teacher, his values and consequent educational

aims is one which Peters was to continue to retouch but never to alter radically during his rise to ascendancy. And it is one which is so very persuasive in its apparent establishment of philosophy in the concrete world of schooling, rather than up in the air, that the reader could be forgiven for thinking that a new Dewey was painting it. Peters says, for example: 'The crucial question to ask when men wax enthusiastic on the subject of their aims, is what procedures are to be adopted in order to implement them.'⁸⁷

This is Deweyian in its implication that a simple means-ends view of the teacher's work is wrong. Yet Peters is concerned to show that his type of philosophy exposes the inadequacy of Dewey's substance while reflecting its form. Later, the contrast of his own acceptance of the human predicament in which some situations have just to be endured with his famous predecessor's optimistic belief in the power of man to reconstruct his life through science-based problem solving became marked in his writings. Here, early, there is a dissatisfaction with Dewey in some evidence - just as it was in the work of certain of his American counterparts. Yet both Peters and Dewey are certainly against that view of education which Peters was to label 'instrumental'; and there is certainly a distinct Deweyian echo in his statement that 'there is an important sense in which "life" must be for the sake of education, not education for life.'⁸⁸

What, then, is the difference in philosophy of education that Peters wants to make in offering faint praise to Dewey? His analysis of the concept of 'experience' provides an answer of use in the development of the sub-theme of this chapter. For he has a view of

the history of philosophy which sees that the emphasis on experience which is supposedly characteristic of empiricism as against rationalism is really, in fact, a protest about a rigid and unimaginative way - the key Peters' notion of manner again - of passing on what he calls the 'priceless human heritage'.⁸⁹ The making of man, individually and collectively (the two being intimately connected in Peters' view) requires practice as well as precept; and the precept itself must be grasped in such a way as to have application and therefore be capable of being practised. Thus, a truth from philosophy's history, interpreted in a particular way, allows Peters to reveal the concept of experience usually associated with Dewey, and yet to characterize teaching and learning in an alternative way to that found in the progressive tradition, without merely repeating the errors of traditionalism. Already we see the groundwork of Peters and Hirst's definitive student text of 1970 being done. What Peters offers against Dewey is not any return to schooling in which mere 'inert ideas' are justified by philosophical sophistry, but the notion - the remarkably Schefflerian notion - that rationality is developed in each generation only through the medium of the established products of that rationality; and that this development will not take place unless it is in the hands of those adults who have already themselves experienced the same process.

Such a perspective, from an academic working at the time in both philosophy and psychology, is not one to be much impressed with the naiveties found in the lesser literature concerning the 'needs' and 'interests' of children as a basis for education. 'There

is a fundamental ambiguity about this doctrine', ⁹⁰ he says about this; then gives the authoritative amplification of this Bantockian comment which one might expect from the reviser of Brett's definitive philosophical history of psychology. Interests, he says, exist because they have been created, not as a law of nature. There are interests which should be created - interests concerned with the nature of man defined through his achievements. Similarly felt needs are not the only needs: 'needs' is a value term, like so many in educational discourse which are used as if they had the function of descriptions of the world instead of being pointers to the choices we have to make in a moral enterprise.

So, these are all insights from contemporary philosophy which must be taken into account when giving a balanced description of education. They must not be overlooked when approval is given to the anti-authoritarian virtues shown in empiricist philosophy as a whole and in the educational philosophy which has caught its mood. As Peters says, in a clear recognition of one of the two sets of values which must co-exist:

...an educator, like Dewey, who stresses the role of experience in education, is emphasizing the importance of passing on this inquisitive, sceptical, pragmatic attitude of mind. ⁹¹

But there is another side to the story, and it is this which Peters, along with some of those whom we have recently examined, insists on stressing - in spite of the ease with which such an emphasis can be charged with being merely a form of conservatism in education.

Man does conserve: to Peters, that is what makes him man.

A child inherits the products as well as the processes of inquiry. Therefore, in the term which Peters was later to attach to education in the belief that his analysis avoided the partialities of earlier model-making in educational theory, he is 'initiated' into traditions, not left to create his own because this is felt to be the way he will 'grow'. Of course, at this point we have to comment that the extent to which the assumption of the neutrality of such analysis was to be questioned during the years ahead, when analytical philosophy of education became the established form of philosophy in teacher education, has already been intimated and will be touched on again later.

Meanwhile, we can note how Peters' thesis has broad application to the subsidiary concepts which cluster round the central term 'education'. When he says, 'I want to show that there need be no basic conflict between cultivating the intellect and training character',⁹² it is to be expected that once more it is the manner of educating in these two areas, which so often are taken to be antithetical in discussions of educational aims, that he wishes to stress. But here too, the passing on is of both the relevant knowledge and that habit of critical thought which has created the knowledge and without which there would be stagnation. Peters emphasizes how intellect shows, again, in the manner of a person's thinking; and that the only way he can have learned that way of thinking is by taking it from those before him who have grasped the truth that 'A person who can think is a person who has taken the objector into his own mind'.⁹³ Peters does this to make the case for its application to the notion of character. Once more,

dealing with a Schefflerian theme, he shows those qualities of mind which were soon to associate him with the American philosopher and to thereby create a pattern for the organization of philosophy in education which is still dominant. A man has character, he says, not when he is a kind of depository for received moral rigidities but one who:

...follows rules which seem to him to have some point and modifies them intelligently according to differences in circumstances; and the point, to a large extent, is determined by his adherence to certain higher-order principles. ⁹⁴

Therefore, from the earliest years, when parents are the teachers of the child, he needs to have around him, for the proper development of both his 'intellect' and his 'character', adults who possess themselves the characteristics that Peters has in mind when using those terms. And it is in formal educational institutions that society has an obligation to ensure that each child has teachers who fall into this category - teachers whom we can recognize immediately as being Schefflerian, while remembering that they would not be so very different from those in the thinking of, say, a Morris, for him to spot much improvement. What Peters brings to this discussion is the authority of technical philosophy in the shape of an explicit attention to analysis which is offered, as it is by Scheffler, as the traditional tool of philosophy - that which makes the discipline critical rather than merely speculative. In keeping with this assertion of relationship of contemporary techniques to ancient practices, he finds in Plato's teaching of

Aristotle a model for our own times:

The manner of his teaching encouraged the questioning of the matter. This is a paradigm for the point that I have been trying to make - in the spheres of both intellect and character it is the manner that maketh man. ⁹⁵

So, Peters' appearance as an analytical philosopher is in a second-order role to sketch in what is, in fact, a normative theory of education which does not appear to us as totally unrelated to what Frankena had in mind in his use of the term 'speculative philosophy'. Peters and Scheffler are, in this period, in the process of creating an alternative to the educational theorizing which has its roots in either scientific psychology along with implicit value premises, or in Deweyian pragmatic metaphysics with its 'open-ended' view of man. They offer a 'rationality model' of teaching through their analysis of 'education' and the network of concepts which surround it - an analysis undertaken with full knowledge of the findings of modern philosophy in those areas which their reflection shows bear most closely on education.

The main feature of the model is that man is the rational creature, not a mere animal nor a machine. Man the teacher and man the pupil interact within limits laid down by morality, which is an integral part of rationality as they conceive it. The medium of the interaction is the range of 'languages' embodied in the 'literatures' which have been evolved by the only symbol-using creature. It is in this sense that man is, to Peters, fundamentally social, as was indicated most powerfully by Wittgenstein amongst modern philosophers.

It is when Peters directs his attention to education with his background in philosophical psychology in evidence more than his attainments in social philosophy that the more practical implications of this model of teaching begin to emerge. In brief, he presents the view - certainly startling to the present writer who read it as an experienced class teacher in 1959 - that educational psychology has more to learn from teachers than vice-versa. But, of course, this is a clear corollary of his critique of the mechanistic-biological explanations of human behaviour which we noted above. Rule-governed human action is understood from the 'inside' by human beings, particularly by the good teacher. Psychologists - here Peters adds Skinner to Freud - can assist in their various ways only when there are lapses from the normal to be explained.

Our Period One tension between 'scientific' and philosophical claims in this area is here illuminated; for, to Peters, the reason why learning theory has little relevance to the teacher's task 'is intimately connected with the whole concept of psychology as a science'.⁹⁶ The project is, to him, misconceived, even 'dotty'. Psychologists should study education, he argues: thus does a philosopher who is about to move into that enterprise confirm the good sense of much that we earlier associated with Soviet psychology and with Ausubel. The complex learning found in school settings should be the object of inquiry, not the animals in the psychologist's menagerie. 'Psychology', Peters says with Ryleian humour 'has been too long haunted not by the ghost in the machine but by the ghost of the machine'.⁹⁷ Good teachers, in his view, know already the

systematic common sense which is the authentic educational psychology. It has survived the real testing of the classroom as the residue of generations of hunches and conjectures built into a tradition. Only in relation to this body of procedures is the work of the two exceptions allowed by Peters - Piaget and Freud - important; the latter providing 'a paradigm for the progress of psychology'⁹⁸ in the sense that certain problems arise in a practical context which require supplementary explanations.

Peters' programme would thus require a conceptual re-orientation of research. It is a programme which starts to show the implications, at a practical level, of his boldly stated thesis which was originally given as a public lecture at the London Institute of Education where he was soon to inherit Reid's chair. He offers his now familiar prescription:

The different educational techniques - rational instruction, the use of authority, imitation, learning by experience, and reward and punishment, should be distinguished. And they should be studied in relation to the acquisition of all sorts of different skills and the passing on of different types of information and rules.⁹⁹

This radical attack on the very notion of a science of education which is derived from what we have called conventional psychology was, with the other sub-themes to be found in what is a small book addressed to anyone of good sense connected with upbringing and schooling, to become Peters' entrance ticket to the world of teacher training. This world, he was - oddly - to transform with an eventual emphasis on the 'hard' disciplines that, to us, contradicts the implied standpoint of the 'general reader' to whom the small book

is addressed. On this contradiction it can only be said that leadership roles create strange and unpredictable pressures - a fact which must remind us once more of the 'political' aspect of the situation which will need to be given further attention.

Most certainly we can, in leaving the early Peters for a markedly different scene of 'non-analytical' developments in the literature, note the way in which he contributes answers to all the questions we are asking. What is philosophy of education?: What is educational theory?: What is educational psychology?: What are the principles of education? These are some of the questions to which the Peters' model, even in the form of a preliminary sketch tailored to suit a particular audience, and the Peters method of arriving at it, throw light on if taken in the total context of our discussion of a literature with which he was, clearly, not too familiar. His conception of the teacher - as a rational person whose professional intention is that his pupils should learn to be rational themselves - is one which, whether or not he realized it, is consistent with the normative notion of educational theory which we have found already developed in so many contexts within the pre-Peters period whose writings he appears to under-value.

The significance of Peters' appearance at the doorway of British teacher training at this time is then, that a confident, forceful expression of ideas, already existing in diffuse form throughout a literature written by people who were active in the profession, was given. It had the merit of clarity in the way it related itself to a corpus of work in the borderland between philosophy and psychology which only an academic of good reputation could present in such an authoritative way. But it also had the consequent

limitation that it related to preceding work in education - the new field for the author - only in the rather haughty manner of one who has come to teach and not to learn.¹⁰⁰ One point of the present thesis is, indeed, to show that there is much to learn from the pre-Peters literature. We shall continue to find this as we move to another important area of it, noting that between them the two major spokesman for analytical philosophy of education - Peters and Scheffler - have had a fair share of attention paid to them in two large sections devoted to their thought-provoking work.

The Persisting Tradition of Philosophy as System

It should not be forgotten that philosophical analysis has always been an English-speaking perspective, not a universal one. In this period the notion of philosophy as 'system', so evident in Period One as the orthodoxy against which analysis was apparently to be directed, persists as if there were no critics in sight. Our first focus will be on a major volume whose contents for the most part show little recognition that the kind of position taken in philosophy by Peters and Scheffler was being prepared.¹⁰¹ It is a book which, on a classification other than our own, would perhaps fall under 'comparative education' - a field of the literature which, for obvious reasons that derive from our notion of 'levels' of theorizing and for the further reason that we must try to keep the account within reasonable bounds, has not been included in this investigation. The subject matter of this substantial book

would be likely to cause an involuntary start in anyone familiar only with the contents examined in our last two sections.

Holmes reappears with his mentor, Lauwerys, to ask editors' questions which are revealing:

How do philosophical ideas and systems lead to or, perhaps should one say "live in company with" educational theories? How far do these theories then influence the practice of teaching and the treatment of children?...In general, what is the relationship of thought to practice, of contemplation to action, in the area of education? 102

Immediately, in this model, reflexive questions can be heard from the Holmes of an earlier chapter, eager to expand his characteristically generalist perspective to encompass this world survey of 'philosophies'. And, in fact, it soon becomes very clear that the observation with which the present section began is one which these writers are keen to underline as dictating their view of the revolution in philosophy. For they argue that philosophers are 'culture-bound to a greater degree than is usually realized'.¹⁰³ There is a marked resistance to the linguistic turn in philosophy as they quite deliberately approach the sociology of knowledge in focussing on the origin of a philosopher's views.

A philosopher, they remind us, must always be regarded as an individual person, not just the author of words which take on a kind of disconnected authority. His views on man and society are not unrelated to his own biography: 'these views are themselves affected by the personality of the philosophers, by their experiences as children, and by the cultural background of their own

societies'.¹⁰⁴ What they wish to imply is that, given the vast range of contributions to the volume from cultures around the world, the analytical definition of philosophy is seen to be parochial - of limited acceptance even in the West. Cross-referencing our account, we can see that they have the kind of view of philosophy which must have led Barton to comment on the 'life-experience' elements hidden in even Frankena's ostensibly technical moral philosophy.

This support from Lauwerys and Holmes for our recurrent subsidiary theme - that there are other aspects to the arguments and counter-arguments of the reflexive literature of education than appear if they are simply abstracted from the persons who are engaged in them in particular contexts - can be augmented at what is now the appropriate time by going to pure philosophy of a most unusual kind. Ben-Ami Scharfstein's The Philosophers: Their Lives and the Nature of Their Thought is a work of the 1980s which provides a sustained technical defence of the kind of point made over twenty years ago by our two educational authors. Its contents would, one can guess, be anathema to both Peters and Scheffler along with all the Oxford-influenced general philosophers whose training has dinned into them the attitude to such enquiries that is implied in Scharfstein's self-referenced comment that 'Philosophers have long been cautioned against "psychologism", which appears to repel them as much as sin repels (and attracts) theologians'.¹⁰⁵

He presents massive detail and argument about the ways in which the personal experiences of great philosophers, especially when they are children, affect their sense of reality and therefore the content of their philosophies. Giving the biographies of some

'giants' of philosophy from Descartes to Wittgenstein and Sartre, he provides for the first time a psychological history of modern philosophy (he calls it 'infraphilosophy') as a challenge to precisely those strait-laced definitions of philosophy which we find Lauwerys and Holmes rejecting.

They insist on presenting, in their large volume, philosophies which are unconstrained by narrow, technical definition: philosophies which emerge because human nature is that kind of nature which must make a pattern out of experience. Hence, their question in the face of that attitude which we have argued seeks to distinguish the professionals from the amateurs in the application of philosophy to education, is: 'after all, do not all meanings of "philosophy" agree in using the word to denote attempts to see existence, nature, and life clearly and as a unified whole?' ¹⁰⁶ In short, philosophy is to them 'philosophy of life', not an academic study in which there are clear authorities who establish themselves in an institutionalized self-protective system. Therefore, in an educational context, 'philosophical thinking serves to guide action, to enrich and unify vision and thus to strengthen the professional sentiment'. ¹⁰⁷

The voice of Holmes is, as we know, clear in this comment. ¹⁰⁸ Even though each term in it - 'vision' and 'professional sentiment' for example - is a likely candidate for the kind of piecemeal analysis noted above, the authors are not to be browbeaten into moderating their language. Their point is that the personal element in philosophizing needs to be expressed: any criticism of an analytic type of its terms could itself be subjected to the same treatment,

thereby creating the kind of impasse of debate at a verbal level which misses the real point. For a person's world-view, including his view of education in that world, 'depends', they insist, 'upon emotional rather than cognitive attitudes - it is a matter of sentiment rather than reason'.¹⁰⁹ No clearer rejection of the 'discipline' perspective on philosophy in education could be found than this stress, on behalf of the 'amateur' generalists, on the sentiment which takes a person into education for 'reasons' which are easy to deride by those who have not experienced them.

Lauwerys and Holmes are conscious, of course, of the criticism levelled at system-thinking - that it leaves a 'gap' between itself and the actualities of schooling. They offer an unusual comment which underlines their belief that the way out of the difficulty is not to pretend that 'large' philosophical thinking is an aberration to be avoided at all costs. Their view is:

The real difficulty here arises from the weakness of the human intellect or, rather, from the weakness of our logical powers. It seems to be impossible to deduce particularities, uniquely and unequivocally, from general principles.¹¹⁰

They imply the possibility of human intellect and logical powers developing to cope more adequately with the problem: in a sense, the possibilities for man form an 'open set' in Deweyian terms. Their point is that this is more likely to happen if what is to count as 'philosophy' is not subject to the kind of legislation which would rule out the variety to be found in the world-wide contributions which they have edited.

We shall, as usual, have to be very selective in examining these

contributions. It is mainly the reflexive comments of the editors which bear most closely on our theme. Yet two of the individual contributions are instructive. The first, because it in fact attempts to deal with the very problem of the 'gap' between philosophical theory and educational practice which has just been established once more as a central issue, will be examined in the later chapter on educational theory. It will then form a link between the 'philosophical' and the 'theoretical' contexts of what is, as we know, always the same discussion. It will do so effectively, for the author, a new contributor to the discussion, adds a fresh insight to the problem, writing as she does in a mode which appears both analytical and personalistic.

In so doing she will be seen to exemplify what the editors here in their peroration refer to, typically, as 'the one great bond which joins together the teachers of the world'.¹¹¹ This is the bond of knowing that, despite all the differences, disputes and conflicts to be found in education at the philosophical level as at other levels, it is that great enterprise aimed at the good life in the good society which parents on the smallest scale wish for their own children. It is this kind of evangelical thinking which makes the 'General Conclusions' on the whole volume, written on request by a professional philosopher who is known to us, of great interest; for the question provoked throughout to anyone who is familiar with the details of analytical stirrings in educational circles is what the response of a Peters or a Scheffler would be likely to be to this unrepentant volume.

In fact, the commentary is provided by none other than Price.

He notes the diversity with which the relationship between philosophy and education is dealt with according to different conceptions of 'philosophy' and 'relation'; that is, he analyzes in his now familiar, prosaic manner. Within such a wide-ranging tone he finds that there are varied 'concepts of commitment, justification and explanation'¹¹² which a technical philosopher must subject to analysis. It is these which explain the varying emphases of acceptance and rejection of the deductivism which is the primary concern of most of the contributors. Price's final thoughts, in the face of what he plainly regards as a mass of heterogeneous material for which even the concepts he has identified are barely sufficient to introduce the kind of order which would satisfy him, show the politeness of the invited critic. He recognizes that intelligent, committed educationists produce diverse and often surprising beliefs as 'educational philosophy'. In the end he modestly makes implicit reference to the position we know him to have developed and stated in Period One. In so doing, he perhaps chooses words which, without the connotations afforded by his other explicit writings, are ambiguous enough not to be taken by his fellow contributors as dismissive of much of their efforts:

But if vertigo does not win, flight may be avoided. The questions, What is philosophy?, What is education?, and What is the relation between them? can be answered. Indeed, the attempts to answer them, together with those which attend them in the mob, is precisely the enterprise, if not the discipline, of philosophy of education. 113

We can add that another commentator, who is not constrained as a

contributor and who is reviewing for readers who would have been exposed to the Period One symposium which brought together the crème de la crème of philosophy to this very topic, is not inhibited at all. What he perceives is an omnibus, grab-bag collection of non-analytical, descriptive, anecdotal, hortatory material! He can have the last word on a book which was, on the evidence of Lauwerys' and Holmes' quite defiant introduction, assembled with the intention of asserting a definition of 'philosophy of education', explicitly and ostensibly, against the kind of view held by this reviewer - F.E. Ellis - when he writes: 'The wide range of topics and problems covered is staggering to behold, and yet the book is hardly a synthesis of the discipline which we dub philosophy of education'. 114

However, this international yearbook was not the only large scale parade of 'systems' philosophy to appear at a time when they were under attack. Education and the Philosophic Mind, edited by A.V. Judges, is more homogeneous in its contents than the other, being a straightforward introduction to a variety of 'isms' offered originally as lectures at the London Institute of Education, paralleling the lectures examined in Period One on psychology. Judges, too, is conscious of what is happening in the philosophical field which poses a threat to the type of exercise he is editing. Referring to events that had taken place already in the neighbouring territory of political philosophy, he remarks: 'The turn of "philosophy of education" to undergo treatment and, no doubt, evisceration may come next'. 115

Nevertheless, there is offered in his book a parade of Big Names

and Systems - Plato, Neo-Thomism, Existentialism Pragmatism, Behaviourism, Logical Positivism, Scientific Humanism and Dialectical Materialism. ¹¹⁶ The expectation that somewhere within this profusion of philosophical products described in relation to education there will be an elucidation of the 'gap' issue is, however, not met. The editor confesses that 'the implications sometimes had to take their chance'. ¹¹⁷ In other words, the presupposition made in giving the lectures to an audience of educationists was that a descriptive account of systems taken seriously by large numbers of people would be educative in a liberal way, rather than being professional enlightenment. Therefore, this book 'belongs' roughly with the one just examined and can be dealt with in a similar brief fashion by picking out its internal commentator on the reflexive issues. And the 'Price' of this non-analytic anthology is, naturally enough, Reid himself.

He develops his by now familiar theme, describing what philosophy is in terms which are strangely consonant with those used by Lauwerys and Holmes, then moving on to say:

Philosophy of education shares in these general characters of philosophy. Its data likewise are to be found in concrete experience of being and doing and its thought is thought about that experience, and it is to be tested there. ¹¹⁸

We see that, just as the key term in Peters' vocabulary was 'manner', so, in Reid the analyst-plus-synthesist the term 'concrete' appears again and again. It points to the emphasis that is noticeable more in this philosopher of education than in any of the others we have encountered since last touching on Reid himself. This is simply

that it is the philosophizing of the unnamed individuals who work in the concrete educational situations (which constitute the reality of the educational enterprise) that is of ultimate importance, no matter how important the higher-level debates in the literature of education seem. Reid, above all others, never loses sight of actualities by directing his attention too fixedly at either analytical techniques or high level synthetic beliefs. Yet both these focusses are of importance in his writings, in that the only way in which the concrete becomes a cosmic rather than a parochial matter, is by his indicating through analysis that, as he reaffirms, 'The problems of educational philosophy are all, without exception, large questions of life, living, man...the universe'. ¹¹⁹

What is noticeable in the context of this book, in which two of the other eight contributors are professional philosophers, is that Reid alone argues that these embracing questions must begin and end in personal philosophizing about here-and-now situations if they are to have any meaning for teachers. As he says of the student: 'His philosophy has to mature in him; and when it has done so its effects may be so subtle and so manifold an expression of his personality that it is exceedingly difficult to pin-point and demonstrate this...So the student must sometimes sit back, and work upon his thought and let his thought work upon him'. ¹²⁰ This, a professional philosopher's intimation of what we saw as Collier's 'rhythm', has the same personalistic strain to it that we have noted on other occasions. We can turn from these book-length expressions of 'systems' philosophy to see, in the article literature, whether this humanist-existentialist-personalist strain, which

was so characteristic of Period One as the newest 'ism', is further developed as analysis begins to occupy the field.

W.B. Inglis: 'Existence Precedes Essence'

The existentialism propounded by Jeffreys in the Judges' book adds little to his account of earlier times. But a new writer appears elsewhere who makes distinctions within this vaguely defined philosophical position which are relevant to our investigation. W.B. Inglis, an associate in Edinburgh of Pilley, searches the whole field of contemporary philosophy for positions that are still 'living' in the sense of influencing, directly or in more subtle ways, the lives of ordinary people. He first identifies, then sets aside, both Marxism and pragmatism in order to concentrate on two perspectives which allow us to use his article as a link in the chain of our argument. For he says: 'our concern is with personalism and philosophical analysis. The term personalism has been chosen in preference to existentialism'.¹²¹ This is the first explicit use of this term in the literature of education, and it is therefore of significance to see that Inglis harnesses it with analysis. We can expect that the ambiguous relationship between the two on which we have commented in more than one context will be made more comprehensible in this piece of work.

In fact, what Inglis does is to praise personalism by showing its superiority to philosophical analysis, while recognizing the limited virtues of the latter as the less radical innovation in philosophy of the two, but nevertheless as something new to be

valued. In short, he wishes to advocate a philosophical position without being thought to be unfamiliar with a 'rival' position which many would take to be equally critical of all 'ism' approaches, new or old. But, to Inglis, personalism is hardly an 'ism' in the usual sense, for reasons similar to those indicated in Reid's persistent emphasis on the concrete nature of existence. It is this fundamental insight of personalism that makes it unique, in Inglis's view. Men, enmeshed in a palpable existence, have the 'participants' choice at every moment of their lives: only a personalistic perspective, he argues in fine style, 'recognizes that man has no place above the thunder'.¹²² This is, presumably, his way of stating Sartre's existentialist notion that 'existence precedes essence', which we have met before.

However, he is keen to move 'beyond' existentialism which, in his description, is merely part of a broad church that has no real name but an indisputable identity. Existentialists are pessimistic, in his view, whereas personalists are the opposite. They are hopeful philosophers, similar in that respect to the followers of philosophical analysis which itself is a broad church with many sects. Both of these manifestations of the philosophic spirit have in common, Inglis believes, that 'their consequences for educational theory have not been elucidated'.¹²³ For us, this remark is a further indication of the phenomenon of intellectual 'isolation' found so often in the literature of education; for the whole of the present account up to this point is evidence of an elucidation of these very perspectives available to those who seek it.

Inglis' aim is, however, less to indicate the similarities of the two viewpoints than to show the superiority of personalism. This he does by comparing their understanding of science when it is applied to man as the object of enquiry. His conclusion is not new to us. Against the positivistic view of man the personalist believes, in Inglis' words, that 'the person is not fully determinate'.¹²⁴ Thus does the technical position in the philosophy of mind noted earlier in Peters receive again that non-technical expression which we have observed on other occasions: and, of course, it raises the same question as to what overall philosophical framework equivalent to Inglis' personalism the technical analysis implies.

This is an old question which will need to be still further repeated in later contexts. In the meantime, Inglis pursues his own question of the common elements in the two types of philosophy. Analysis rejects metaphysics in favour of a principle of verifiability, he argues; and concurs with the act of rejection but not its substance in a comment which has a distinctly Reidian flavour to it:

The objection to nineteenth century philosophical idealism made by personalism was not that the method was in error, but that the whole enterprise was irrelevant to the perplexities of living.¹²⁵

To justify this remark, he locates personalism in the history of modern philosophy, moving from what he judges to be the overdone 'dread' of Kierkegaard's position with its consequence that, for man, 'everything turns on the acts of personal commitment, on the crucial choices'¹²⁶ to the then recent and definitive work of

John Macmurray¹²⁷ whose optimistic reinterpretation of existentialist themes provides Inglis with his philosophical platform.

Like Peters and Scheffler, Inglis describes philosophical analysis as merely the contemporary manifestation of a long-established philosophical activity in order to identify the real revolution in philosophy as this personalistic version of the original rejection by Kierkegaard of the 'essentialist' abstractions of idealism. The significant philosophical insight is that the person is ontologically of first importance. As Inglis asks, developing this central notion:

Might not the fault lie in the starting point of metaphysical enquiries? Perhaps, the original error occurred in the Cartesian origin of the philosophical tradition, in the Cogito itself. 128

This cryptic question, which must have been a puzzle to many readers of a journal for educationists, has implications which constitute an unusual anticipation of the direction taken by technical philosophy of mind from the mid-1960s onwards. For what Inglis is arguing is that, for the father of modern philosophy - Descartes, with his 'I think therefore I am' - the mind is regarded as having an identity of its own rather than as existing in relation to a world and having an identity constituted by that relationship. It is this 'relational' conception of mind which Inglis attributes to personalism.

So, he argues that man is not an observer-thinker who exists in lonely isolation from other men, but an actor and doer amongst other doers. Hence, the philosophical centrality of 'the personal

agent in relation with other persons who are also agents. The self is not a Cartesian observer trapped in egocentricity, for "I and thou meet as agents"¹²⁹. This could be Pilley writing, both in terms of its Buber-influenced content and the rather heady language. An inevitable response must be to wonder when a philosophy which makes much of being concerned with the world of existence rather than some assumed world of abstractions which lie behind experience will itself come down to earth in a way which would be recognized by the teacher in the classroom. So far as Inglis himself is concerned, we shall see later that he responds to this challenge in full.

Meanwhile, he presses his case against the scientific accounts of man which a psychology based on non-personalistic philosophy attempts, in his view, to foist on teachers. Against behaviourism, he argues that man 'eludes the mesh of objectivity',¹³⁰ bringing to mind the Rogers-Skinner debate of an earlier part of our investigation and thereby illustrating once more the inevitable inter-connections in the reflexive literature. Yet, he does reveal an awareness that the 'hard' positivism that once characterized analytical philosophy and that generated this behaviouristic approach in psychology is itself in process of developing a greater liberality. It is this awareness that allows him to establish the kind of similarity between analysis and personalism which is a feature of this very article. Again, he observes that 'philosophical analysis and personalism have not so far been used as the basis of a systematic theory of education. That they do possess implications for education is indubitable'.¹³¹

For us, it is the harnessing of the two which is of significance, in view of the many occasions when our own discussions of analysis have been forced to touch on the concept of 'person' in many contexts where the logical relationships within the material has not been so explicit a topic as in this essay of Inglis. Nevertheless, his primary purpose is to show the subordination of analysis to a personalistic mode of thinking, even when analysis is seen to be less restricted than it used to be in its work of semantic hygiene. So that his prediction - 'It is possible that with the scope of analysis widening to include ethics and theology, philosophical analysis may in the future be more influential' ¹³² - given in 1959, is in terms of a possibility which even then was being lessened by the emergence of Peters as the likely successor to Reid. 'Neutral' ordinary-language analysis rather than personalistic philosophy was soon to assume a dominance from London which was so complete that thinking in the Inglis mode hardly counted for much in the public philosophy of education for many years to come.

Apart from the attempt to show analysis as a subordinate innovation to his own style of philosophy, Inglis is of interest in revealing the same inclination towards theism as seen elsewhere in personalist writings. He refers to Christianity as a principal ally of this way of philosophizing. Thus his distinction, like that of Reid, between the earlier positivistic analysis and the later linguistic developments - one of which he rejects and the other of which he is prepared to assimilate - is one which allows him to combine a philosophical position with religious belief. This is a phenomenon worthy of notice in an educational context

for its reflection of a common situation in general philosophy connected with the nature of the later Wittgenstein's work.¹³³ Inglis is therefore quite happy to mention the model provided by Jesus, in this philosophical article, without any sign that readers may consider that he is confusing two realms of discourse. But he goes further towards stretching the notion of 'philosophy', as revealed in the personalism which he claims is the heir to the most authentic philosophical tradition, by claiming other allies. Who these are bears closely on our own argument that 'intuitive' generalism is philosophically warranted, even though Inglis has this very individual view of what constitutes the philosophy which issues the warrant. That is, he recruits teachers to his cause: 'The sympathetic teacher who has a deep respect and affection for children is often an unwitting exponent of the values of personalism.'¹³⁴

We can accept this from Inglis without pursuing it further in general philosophy, for there must be some limit to the extent to which we travel that particular path in an educational thesis - even a philosophical one. His notion of the uniqueness of each individual who has to make his own life applies to both teacher and learner and therefore implies, in a fashion which is not dissimilar to that found in Scheffler and Peters, the manner of the transactions between them: 'the educator may recognize that we need a respect for human freedom that applies not only to my freedom, but pays full regard to the freedom of others'.¹³⁵ Personal commitment is thus at the heart of the educational enterprise. This is the conclusion reached from both the starting points of technical and, as here, non-technical philosophy.

In sum, Inglis' interesting attempt to harness his interpretation of the analytical perspective to personalism is a good example of the need felt by an educationist both to recognize the value of disciplinary enquiry undertaken in the profession of philosophy and to attempt to fit its findings into his existing philosophy of life or world-view as this bears on his own profession. Given that we are inquiring into this period from a later point in history, where the subsequent developments in the literature of education from the 1950s onwards are known, we can opportunely introduce a more recent confirmation of Inglis's type of procedure as inevitable in educational philosophizing. One of Scheffler's pupils, having lived through the era of analytical constraints on modes of philosophizing, was to comment in 1978 on attempts, such as we can discern here in Inglis, 'to provide a comprehensive and systematic view of reality, of the total workings of the universe, of our place therein, and of the meaning of life itself'.¹³⁶ Jonas Soltis argues that it is no accident that such attempts have been associated in common thinking with the great philosophers; and that there appears to be a compulsion in all reflective persons to acquire such a philosophy for themselves. His point, as one who had experienced the power and lures of analysis, is that: 'Indeed, analysis and a world-view may work in tandem'.¹³⁷ We can just repeat that this possibility was precisely the hope of Inglis twenty years earlier.

However, in keeping with our policy of showing many sides to the logic of the literature, we need to set other viewpoints against this agreement of two writers who, no doubt, were never aware of each other's existence. In particular, we can hold in focus Inglis's conclusion that the value of analysis in education

is through its assimilation, in the more liberal form that he sees it taking rather than in its narrow 'scientistic' form, within a person-centred 'ism'. His priority here, between analysis and a kind of post-existentialism is not to the liking of all philosophers who attempt a similar exercise in relating the two perspectives. One such is the American general philosopher Walter Cerf.

Cerf's most blunt observation is worth recording even though, as we shall briefly indicate, it is but a preface to his more constructive discussion. He says: 'For better or worse, in this country existentialism appeals mainly to philosophers of mediocre brains and educators of lukewarm hearts. Good brains go analytic and kind hearts idealist'.¹³⁸ We know, of course, that in the Scotland of Inglis, Pilley and Reid this is hardly true. Nevertheless, it is precisely the brains-and-hearts image which seems very relevant to what Peters was preparing to do further south on this side of the Atlantic. Cerf's more positive contribution to the discussion has a title - 'Existentialist Empiricism and Education'¹³⁹ - which shows his belief that brains and hearts can indeed come together.

His argument is naturally complex. It rests on a distinction that he finds in the philosophical and fringe literature between 'academic existentialism' and 'authentic existentialism', to which he proposes to add the concept of 'rational existentialism' - that is, the odd-looking 'existentialist empiricism' of his title. And it is this distinction, - a conceptual necessity according to Cerf - which is of significance in our argument; for it, in fact, supports the view that the notion of a person is central in philosophizing, even though much of the existentialist literature communicates

this truth without proper regard to the other form - empiricism - which philosophy has traditionally taken. The brain and the heart are equally important, according to Cerf. In fact, one without the other is inadequate. As he says, against the movement in the philosophy of education of the two strongest 'isms' away from each other: 'existentialism and a rational type of philosophy can be brought together, and without this synthesis existentialism and the rational style of philosophizing will remain at loggerheads'.¹⁴⁰

That they were at loggerheads in an educational context, apart from the most unusual attempts at fusion which this American and his personalistic Scottish counterpart made, is fully evident at all levels of the British literature. Jeffreys continues to assert his Period One theme, unabashed by Reid's earlier criticism: 'personal values are at the very heart of education...human beings grow, in mind and character, mainly through the influence of one person on another'.¹⁴¹ Sir Herbert Read makes a target of Hans Reichenbach, one of the most formidable of the logical empiricists, in order to commend to educationists his world-view derived from a lifetime's involvement in an area of human experience which seems the antithesis of the science which is of prime importance to all such post-positivist philosophies. As he says, illustrating the broadness of the church which Inglis had identified: 'I hesitate to call it existentialist philosophy because I do not derive it from existentialists, but from long meditation on the facts of art'.¹⁴²

If we move closer now to the workaday world of the teacher trainer, we find the pages of Education for Teaching are laden with 'amateur' philosophers of this tender-minded inclination, from the beginning to the end of the period. One revealing article,

for example, has the title 'Understanding Life' and the assertion that, with reference to the 'softer' of the two philosophical perspectives which have occupied us with a kind of love-hate relationship in this section, 'Both educational practice and applied psychology have suffered...from the lack of a basic metaphysic'.¹⁴³ Another contribution, late in the period, is constituted out of anonymous symposium-discussions around the existentialist question 'Freedom for What?' and examines a number of ideas - 'education for freedom', 'the roots', 'education and religion', 'science and religion' - in a manner which implies that any less wide-ranging conception of what philosophical discussion of education is lacks that insight into the educative process which 'insiders' possess.¹⁴⁴ Once more, the two background interests to this perspective, noted in its emergence in other contexts of the present investigation, are in evidence as they reject the positivist interpretation of what science means for a proper conception of man: 'If the experiences of depth psychologists are any guide, where science is truly science and religion truly religion, they are not opposed'.¹⁴⁵ Written in 1961, this reliance on an essentialist theory of meaning - the notion that there are 'true' meanings for these terms - is a fair indication of the little notice taken in Britain of Schefflerian or even Reidian analysis.

Bibby reappears at this point to make, with reference to this anonymous appeal to the heart rather than the mind, his own kind of analytical comment. He responds as astringently to this emotiveness of the 'lower' world of teacher training as we saw him respond to what he regarded as the academic aridity of the 'upper' world earlier. In his view, 'the article is replete with question-begging

phrases, dubious statements and ambiguities'.¹⁴⁶ To him, this not untypical expression of a vaguely existentialist position, by educationists at the college level writing for each other, cries out for that which his comment's title signals - 'A Critical Analysis'. In a sense Bibby's charge, that such material is riddled with all the formal and informal fallacies which a less warm-hearted conception of philosophizing would avoid, is an echo of Cerf's initial judgement that existentialism appeals to 'mediocre brains'.

Now, in moving towards the end of this section which has attempted to show the continued refusal of the most characteristically modern 'ism' to be silenced by the analytical turn in philosophical fashion - even at the cost of associating with it on occasions - we can lift the discussion back up from the level of educationists acting as philosophers to philosophers of less disputed standing. A review by O'Connor of a rival text book to his own, written in the contrary spirit, will allow us to present a passage which puts very clearly the basic difference between the technical and non-technical conceptions of philosophy which appear under such headings as those chosen for emphasis in this section - 'existentialist' and 'analytic'. He says:

There are two quite distinct senses of the term "philosophy" and they have very little to do with one another. "Philosophy" (sense 1, the popular, non-technical sense) means a point of view on the world, an outlook on life or a set of guiding values. "Philosophy" (sense 2) is the technical sense - a rational discipline for criticizing and correcting and reformulating our concepts. There is indeed a possibility of bringing the two types of philosophy together. We can criticize, correct and reformulate our values; and this may result in revising our philosophy (sense 1). But this is the only point of contact between the two senses.¹⁴⁷

To this valuable statement by the philosopher whose views provided the foundation for the whole complex discussion of this chapter we could either bring to bear the tools of his own philosophy-sense 2 or simply ask what his own philosophy-sense 1 is, of which the statement itself is a part. For, on the first of these options, it would certainly become clear that his last sentence's 'only' carries heavy implications; and, on the second, O'Connor admits that he has a philosophy in that sense - which is all that a 'non-analytical' thinker would want conceded for a more substantive discussion to take place. 148

Generalizing the distinction of professional as against lay conceptions of philosophy, which is the more obvious feature of O'Connor's purpose here, as a distinction which is applicable to the other disciplines that claim to bear on education, we have precisely that argument against which the present account has assembled counter-evidence. The argument of 'real professional' against 'amateur' is, however, particularly odd in the case of philosophy, where it can be shown that philosophers of standing such as Frankena quite explicitly state that philosophy is best conceived as having all three parts and, as we note here in O'Connor, analytical proponents concede the argument in the very act of stating it. Everyone has a set of inter-related beliefs and values. It may be that world-views, in the case of 'amateur' philosophers operating in education, are easily faulted by a professional for not taking into account the findings of technical philosophy. However, this is an argument, not about the nature of the philosophy in question but about the level of competence at which it is thought through - a different argument altogether. Put in this way, the

question then arises as to which philosophers, even at the highest level, are to be regarded as having a competence which is unquestionable, given the enormous variety of philosophical procedures and findings at the professional level.

In other words, behind all the discussions of the nature of philosophy of education to be found in the literature under investigation here is the original discussion prompted by the fact that the nature of philosophy is itself the primary philosophical question. There is not an answer to it in the simple terms with which O'Connor dismisses Fletcher's text book. As this is the case, the 'philosophical' position taken up by any teacher is not so obviously misguided as is often implied in the comments made upon it, or the kind of thinking it is, from 'outside' by those who, in a particular context, feel able to adopt a superior tone which they would not be able to sustain elsewhere. In other words, the argument often advanced for the authority of the professional who is qualified in a university discipline to criticize those aspects of an educationists' work which he, the professional, abstracts from a complex situation seen from the outside, is seen again to be weakened by the fact that there are multiple authorities.

It is this knowledge of the lack of consensus within the disciplines - particularly in philosophy - which draws attention to the need for some explanation of the specialist attack on generalism in education in terms other than the purely intellectual. Claims to superiority are, as we have seen, not so free from the non-intellectual motivations which arise in institutional contexts as the language used to support such claims would seem to indicate.

The point being repeated here was well put by Wisdom himself many years after his asking the depth psychologists in education the question which we have found so useful in other contexts. He too exposes the argument from authority, and thereby clears the way for asking the awkward questions of those who use it in education which we have asked and which we shall develop further. He gives a significant truth about philosophy which confirms our own comparisons of, say, Reid with O'Connor, Scheffler with Price or Peters with Broudy, when he confesses that:

...for every philosophical statement I make or subscribe to, I can name a highly distinguished, intelligent, and competent philosopher within a few hours' distance who would think it false or perhaps even stupid. 149

So perhaps the reflective teacher, creating his own philosophy of education as best he can out of a wide range of experiences, including some that the detached professional philosopher interesting himself only partially in the concerns of education could hardly 'understand', is not intellectually as culpable as is made out in certain criticisms of his attempts. Because the yardstick used to measure his efforts is itself a personal choice of the measurer. The appropriate reasoning would then be that either the measurer knows this, so that his motivation should be further examined; or he does not know this, in which case his own philosophical qualification is suspect. These possibilities can now, however, best be left in order to move on and finish this longest of our chapters by moving back closer to the 'education' from the 'philosophy' in philosophy of education. Not all positions in the

sub-discipline during this period were, like the analytical and existentialist 'newcomers', such as to draw the discussion inevitably towards the deepest concerns of general philosophy. We turn, then, briefly to the persisting orthodox approaches which probably still formed the bulk of taught courses in the institutions of the time if not the bulk of the public literature.

The introduction to the field of S.J. Curtis will serve as an example of a writer who has in mind all the 'isms' which orthodoxy brings to education, without much philosophical conviction and without much consciousness of the difficulties of 'application'. He suggests that teachers adopt a philosophy of life-and-education from what is available: 'There are many philosophies and the majority of them have something of value to contribute'.¹⁵⁰ This familiar eclecticism embraces, for Curtis, personalism itself, but without the passionate commitment we have seen in Inglis and Pilley for this 'way of life' philosophy. The difference brings to mind Passmore's comment on the variety of ways in which philosophy can be regarded. In the words of another philosopher of distinction this is put as: 'No book...can lead its readers into philosophy unless it is a book in, and not merely a book about, philosophy'.¹⁵¹ Curtis's text book is plainly about philosophy and is an example of a genre which featured heavily in the reading lists of training institutions of the time.¹⁵²

Within this approach, for which the terms 'orthodox' and 'eclectic' seem as appropriate as they were for educational psychology in Period One, we can pick out the inventive way of interpreting it devised by the American R.L. Brackenbury. As conscious as was

Oliver in an earlier chapter of the artificiality of the deductive approach, he attempts an ingenious 'inversion' of the elements to be related by starting with practicalities and not the abstractions of the 'isms' - as his title, Getting Down to Cases,¹⁵³ suggests. That is, the sets of practical problems encountered by the teacher in the classroom, which are usually offered as the end-point of the derivational process, are here presented first in concrete detail. His intention is to concentrate the student's attention on that process of philosophizing which many of the writers whom we have examined earlier stress as being of first importance against the mere acceptance of the products of philosophy.

Brackenbury still regards philosophy as providing substantive belief-systems rather than as offering an activity which a person becomes skilled in through practice. Yet he is conscious, from his experience, that students are 'bothered by the tenuous nature of the relationships identified'.¹⁵⁴ What is very evident in his attempt to solve the problem is that the very authenticity of detail in his initial classroom cases makes his attempt to show the link between them and various 'isms' even more artificial than the orthodox procedure which he has hopefully reversed. The grip of tradition has been so strong that Brackenbury appears to be unaware that it is time to approach the problem, not through the impressive ingenuity of getting down to classroom cases, but by getting down to the logical task of comprehending the nature of that educational theory which occupies the middle ground between the philosophical systems and the workaday world.

The same, too, can be said as we turn to Philip Phenix's book

of the period. ¹⁵⁵ He, too, can not break out of the grip of orthodoxy. Stimulating though the questions he asks at both the practical level and a level so abstract that he has a whole chapter on 'the cosmic process' are, what is very evident - in the light of innovative approaches investigated in the earlier sections of this chapter - is the same artificiality with regard to the connection between these levels. His assurance that movement from the teaching-moment to eternity is continuous is not accompanied by any signs that he has succeeded where others have failed - that is, succeeded in spelling out the logic without identifying normative theory of a Frankena type. Small wonder that Reid, reviewing the book, finds no answers to the question of how 'concrete' and 'abstract' are related which can satisfy his philosophical requirements, even though he shows his characteristic dis-inclination to condemn any writing which suggests the importance of ^awide conception of philosophy. His judgement, therefore, is that Phenix's book is 'a goldmine of questions for lecturers on philosophy of education'. ¹⁵⁶ At the time, of course, Reid would be working on what he would regard as his own definitive form for the answers to these questions. But we must now leave him to consider the work of a new though equally unusual philosopher.

Theodore Brameld: The Last Great 'Ism'

In coming to the work of Theodore Brameld, which can appropriately end a chapter on philosophy of education, the notion of orthodoxy is appropriate only in the sense that his perspective on

educational philosophy is rooted, for all its considerable contemporaneity, in the Deweyian tradition of changing the world through philosophy rather than merely describing it. ¹⁵⁷ In other words Brameld offers what can be called a living 'ism', which is fully worked out in the context of education where it was created out of its author's analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of existing public philosophies of education of the conventional type. His philosophy of 'reconstructionism' is important for us, too, in that its creator views philosophy in its cultural context, thereby adopting a position which is in harmony with those pure philosophers (to whom we have made some reference) who do not make the supposed purity of philosophy a major concern. Brameld, that is, thinks in the mode of an Edel rather than a Peters.

Consequently, one of his theses is that what he understands very broadly as 'culture' should be emphasized in teacher training; and culture includes philosophy as a man-made product. He has no wish to be identified as an educational philosopher in any restricted sense; nor does he want that sense of philosophy to be understood, by students in training and their teachers, as being the only way in which education can become rigorous. In his philosophically anthropological way he writes as a man who has 'fused' two disciplines to provide himself with an aim which is, in his view, educationally imperative: 'To help teachers apply the theory of culture in their everyday work is, in one sense, the first objective of this book'. ¹⁵⁸ As we shall see, his main concern is to save teachers from both the attempt to create a 'science of education' on the one hand and the philosophical rejection of that attempt which substitutes

one narrowly defined academic discipline for another. Brameld more than anyone writing on education goes to any material in his 'culture' which can provide him with support: he recognizes no boundaries. Like Armytage, he cites the work of Collingwood - but not just to praise History. Like Scheffler, he acknowledges the work of the polymathic Ernst Cassirer - but not to dismiss it as an aberration of twentieth century philosophy, to be avoided through the analytical insight into the nature of knowledge. He writes himself as a polymath who expects others in education to become polymathic enough with him to do the practical job of teaching in the thoughtful way which the nature of that job demands. In short, Brameld is the generalist par excellence.

Unlike the other generalists we have identified, he is neither 'amateur' nor 'professional' in the terms with which we have related, say, the philosopher Frankena to the philosophically-inclined educationist Collier; for this is a distinction which loses meaning within his comprehensive and multi-levelled perspective. But at the heart of his notion of a professional preparation for teaching is the same type of 'unifying theory' which we have associated with the idea of generalism. He thinks in synoptic, synthetic terms because this is the only way, in his view, that thinking can be related to action in a world which is itself 'seamless'; that is, lacking the divisions which an academic organization of knowledge typically shows.

In a later book, written by this unclassifiable contributor to the discussion, he reveals an approach which links closely with the contrasts and similarities we have expounded when referring to

analytical philosophy and existentialism in this chapter. ¹⁵⁹ He explains why these two types of philosophy emerged when they did in education. 'Progressivist theory' came under attack, he argues, as an easy target for what he calls 'the upholders of mental-discipline and mind-storehouse theories of teaching and learning' ¹⁶⁰ because it had forgotten its Deweyian origins and had become soft-centred with a 'life-adjustment' orientation of a most unreflective kind. At this point, he says, 'several of the abler students of educational ideas turned elsewhere for inspiration - especially to existentialism and logical empiricism'. ¹⁶¹

This is the most explicit diagnosis in the literature and bears out well the developments we have examined in sectors which would not be known to Brameld himself. In his way, he identifies precisely the motivation which led, in Britain, to attempts to 'stiffen' educational studies at a time when the traditional content of teacher-training appeared to have lost contact with a philosophical base. This was just the time, as we know, when such contact needed to be 'visible' if the aspirations of teacher training institutions were to be satisfied. What Brameld adds to the discussion is an optimistic faith in the sufficiency of his own interpretation, which lacks the 'political' dimension of our own account. He, therefore, views the analytical-existentialist turn in educational thinking in purely intellectual terms.

Committed to the philosophical-anthropologist's notion that education, properly understood, can reconstruct society rather than merely reflect its existing values, he notes the similarities in each of the new philosophical positions from that point of view.

Existentialism is, in his judgement, conservatively linked to religious belief and a passive attitude to the potential for change within human culture. And logical empiricism, which he regards as the more introverted wing of the school of philosophical analysis, is conservative in another way by eschewing the impassioned concern for the living issues which are centred on 'the person' which existentialists show. For Brameld philosophy of education, like philosophy itself, must be defined contextually as a Weltanschauung. Both positivism and its antithesis are avoided by thinking things together, incorporating all the necessary elements which academic disciplines seize on to establish as separate, self-defensive subjects. He views philosophy, the social sciences and education as inter-related in human culture. Consequently, there is a role for the architectonic philosopher of education which is closer to, for example, that of Reid than to Peters: it is summed up in Brameld's memorable phrase 'The educational philosopher as "liaison officer".'¹⁶² This is his way of saying that philosophy must count; must be relevant to the great practical enterprise of education by creating the generalist synthesis which, while being sympathetic to the perspectives offered by the disciplines, recognizes their essential partiality and accordingly fuses them into a corporate view. His own words on this are revealing:

It is not to suggest the slightest lessening of tough, thorough study of the field itself. Nor is it to suggest any radical departure from what the philosopher has always tried to do when he has been an influential force. His role of resource critic of assumptions has a tradition behind it of more than two millenia - that of the Socratic gadfly. His

roles as interdisciplinarian and co-researcher are, in the last analysis, those of the maker of Weltanschauung - of steady and harmonious views of the world. Lastly, his role as policy shaper is that of creative visionary - of suggester and projector toward better ways of performing necessary educational tasks. 163

This vigorous passage contains several points of significance for the present investigation. The most obvious is that Brameld holds his embracing conception of philosophy to be consonant with the discipline's major tradition. The argument from ancestry is thus here advanced in support of a notion of philosophy which is at the other pole to that put forward by Scheffler and Peters as both traditionally justified and revolutionary. Secondly, we can note that Brameld's startling breadth of interests, shown in many writings of a substantial kind which are here merely touched on, do not lack parallels in pure philosophers of the highest standing. He is not just an idiosyncratic super-synthesiser, able to propound 'large' views only because he works in an educational field. He is, in fact, representative of a movement in philosophical thinking which has, since the time at which he wrote the material being considered here, grown in strength. Apart from Wisdom, whose comment given earlier came from a recent book whose very title - Philosophy and its Place in Our Culture - has a Brameldian ring to it and a content which is surprisingly supportive of what the educational philosopher was arguing twenty years earlier, there are others to be cited to show that Brameld's position on the philosophy of education is not the undisciplined rhetoric which an analytical disciple might judge it to be!

For example, Edwin Burt, who had the distinction of holding chairs in philosophy at Stanford, Cornell and Harvard, was to write a considerable book as 'an essay in the philosophy of philosophy' ¹⁶⁴ which shows that the Brameld-type notion of educational philosophy has not only justification in the history of philosophy but also has continued justification in some of the best of contemporary philosophy. Burt is quite explicit on a position which we have several times discussed in relation to generalist thinking. He insists that 'Each of us is already a philosopher in his own way'. ¹⁶⁵ Philosophy is conceived by him as it is found in the ancient tradition - philosophy as the search for wisdom in our thought and action. This is the sense in which O'Connor distinguished the ordinary man's philosophy from the 'real' philosophy of the specialist. But it survives, in Burt's unqualified view, the analytical movement's attempt to define it out of existence. As he says: 'the notion long prevailing in many quarters that philosophy is dead now appears to have been somewhat hasty; it may apply only to the kind of philosophy whose death should cause no tears'. ¹⁶⁶

In a word, Brameld is in good company. So, then, are the generalists of whom he is a kind of reconstructed Deweyian large-scale representative, who exemplifies unified thinking in the grand manner. His example, of course, makes the British efforts to defend the educational focus of teacher training against the concerted attempts to re-focus it on specialist studies appear to lack a champion possessed of his vision and his confidence. An appraisal of the time, published in an English journal, of Brameld's equally large-minded predecessor provides us with a tangential comment on the

work of Brameld himself as it has been featured here, in a chapter largely devoted to tendencies in the philosophy of education's self-reflections which are so firmly opposed to his style of thinking.

F.C. Neff says:

Dewey has largely succeeded in capturing our rational allegiance, while, at the moment, our emotional attachments remain elsewhere. If reason prevails, the chances are good that Dewey's influence will survive and grow. ¹⁶⁷

Ironically, it was, as we know, twenty years before the kind of influence on philosophy of education which can be called Deweyian or - better because more aware of the prevailing tendencies in technical philosophy - Brameldian, was to show its survival and start to grow again as the analysis-only movement encountered its internal contradictions.

With this glimpse of the future, we can leave the explicit literature of philosophy of education and turn to another context for philosophy - though, of course, philosophy once more in 'disguise'. This most substantial of chapters has taken us from the 'stony diet' of O'Connor to the rich cultural feast of Brameld. In asking 'What is philosophy of education?', it has inevitably asked amongst other implied questions, 'What is educational psychology?' whenever the questioner has moved just one pace from the narrow platform of concept-analysis. We must now pick up the story of this other discipline - the most clearly 'relevant' of them all for the type of theorizing which the present chapter has shown to be in fact fundamentally philosophical.

Chapter Seven

Scientists, Humanists and Autonomists in Educational Psychology

As stated, it is not that the logic of educational psychology has been left behind way back in Chapter Two for other matters: all the 'logics' are interconnected. Nevertheless, a reminder about that material will refocus the enquiry on what is to follow. The question as to the nature of educational psychology was settled by those for whom psychology is psychology pure and simple by an answer, not really made explicit, that research results are extrapolated to education. Against them were ranged thinkers who were, for convenience and in the light of subsequent developments labelled 'Ausubelian'. Their answer was that the discipline is autonomous, bridging the gap between psychological knowledge and educational practice by starting from the practice-end in the first place. To one side were thinkers whose interests were philosophical rather than scientific; and here 'philosophical' covers the technical and the non-technical humanistic interests which have received much further exploration in the last chapter on philosophy itself.

Such is the background, roughly, of the present chapter. In it we shall, now that general themes have been established on the basis of many individual viewpoints, be looking more for fresh light from new contributors than a repetition of the views of familiar figures; though the latter have some significance in showing the continual re-appearance of a phenomenon which we have observed to be common in the literature of education. So, coming first to

the work on the systematic application of behaviourist psychology to education, we cannot of course ignore Skinner, but we can approach him first through one of his research assistants in the developments since Period One.

From Behaviourism to Educational Technology

W. Hively shows himself to be an uninhibited enthusiast for Skinner in an article on classroom implications which emphasizes the radical nature of his master's method of analyzing human behaviour. He is clearly aware of the humanist critique of Skinner when he says:

In reply to this general method of analysis it will, no doubt, be said that people are not like lower organisms and to treat a child in the classroom like a rat in the laboratory is to deprive him of what makes him distinctively human. But this is just where the implications for education of Skinner's analysis of behaviour seem greatest. ¹

This bold counter-attack against a whole line of writers discussed earlier is supported by his reference to Skinner's new work on verbal 'behaviour' as providing a powerful new tool for educational research. It is only within such a framework, he argues, that educational processes and outcomes can be rigorously analyzed.

So, there comes from the home territory of a special kind of behaviourism that great push into the domain which was to become 'educational technology'. For Hively's main point is that Skinner's theory is not just one amongst many learning theories waiting to be

extrapolated to the classroom: it is a truly revolutionary conception of how to transform schooling, rather than merely tinkering with it, through the provision of more aids for the teacher. It is a conception which is both philosophical, psychological and technological, blurring all such classifications. He thus asserts, against misconceptions, that 'Skinner's analysis is occasionally called a learning theory, but it is not primarily concerned with learning'.²

For this primary concern we can turn to the master, who explains in his article 'Why We Need Teaching Machines' a position for which Hively has provided the introduction. As mentioned, his Verbal Behaviour had appeared, to cries of acclaim and condemnation, since his work of Period One.³ On the basis of this consistent extension of behaviouristic language to language itself, he can offer a far-reaching educational programme of a type which, as we have seen, would make Scheffler and Peters companions in arms against it with Pilley and Inglis. Skinner's own peroration shows why:

As a technology...education is still immature, as we see from the fact that it defines its goals in terms of traditional achievements. Teachers are usually concerned with reproducing the characteristics and achievements of already educated men. When the nature of the human organism is better understood, we may begin to consider not only what man has shown himself to be, but what he may become under carefully designed conditions. The goal of education should be nothing short of the fullest possible development of the human organism.⁴

At this point in a long investigation, comment on such a passage is unnecessary. The voice of scientific psychology has never been so strong. But we have to remember that it is not the only voice - a

point of some importance to us. Other eminent experimental psychologists can now be heard commenting on the relationship between their discipline and classroom practice in ways which will allow us to further develop the 'logical geography' of our first chapter on educational psychology. ⁵ Kenneth Spence is the best example of one who insists on continuing with his basic research in the face of growing demands that 'application' should become the focus. He holds to the simple view that the laws of learning in their pure form need to be known before practical problems can be solved. That is, he is one of Peters' unrepentant 'Galilean dreamers', quite happy to ignore both the strictures of armchair philosophers and the example of premature technologizing offered by his theoretical rival Skinner. The truth will out, he believes, as being in accordance with 'the empirical law of effect' when this is interpreted in the long run of inquiry. So, having given a firm, Hullian answer to the question, he hastens back, as he puts it, 'to my waiting rats and human eyelids'. ⁶

From this paradigm of unabashedly scientific psychology we can glance at the response of that pioneer of analytical philosophy of education whom we named in the last chapter - C.D. Hardie⁷ - writing from afar on this 'necessity' for waiting until the fundamental laws of learning are discovered. This comment will direct us towards the amplification of the work of those psychologists from our first survey who want to distinguish between complex classroom learning and simple laboratory learning. He says that the former learning 'is so much more complicated that it seems to me quite fantastic to look for an explanation...by means of the

latter'.⁸ This unqualified disapproval can be borne in mind as we note that A.W. Melton, another contributor to the symposium which provides the context of this discussion, appears at first sight to be adopting a Spenceian position.

Melton was himself a basic researcher with extensive experience in applying his psychological science in the military field. That is, in a situation where 'instruction' was the appropriate term for the application, he found himself with a successful model which suggested the possibility of further extrapolation to an 'educational' context. Consequently he makes the mid-position suggestion, against Skinner and Spence, that 'it is not difficult to conceive of a truly basic research effort on concept formation which would be conducted entirely in a school setting'.⁹ This is, of course, familiar talk though it comes from an unfamiliar direction. Melton travels in the direction of an autonomous educational psychology by implying an entirely different definition of the term 'basic research' to that understood in orthodox psychology: he is in fact using our 'Ausubelian' language. But his journey stops short of a complete transformation of perspective. He aims at achieving a unified science of learning, to 'cover' the more complex objectives along with the simpler ones, by means of a taxonomy which still attaches importance to the latter, whose characteristic location is the laboratory. His model, therefore is still like Skinner's but without the radicalism, based as it is on the belief that 'the analogy between education and engineering...is one that should be self-consciously adopted and exploited by education'.¹⁰ This

position is, as we shall see later in the chapter, somewhat different from that of an educational psychology which still takes the role of the teacher as of first importance.

Nevertheless, his most explicit statement on learning is useful to record: 'The science of learning properly includes the understanding of any instance of learning, whether it occurs in paramecia, rats, monkeys, children, or human adults'.¹¹ Given the intuitive grasp by the 'good' teacher that the human beings in this rather accommodating list learn well only when they learn meaningfully, we can see how far there is still to travel from Melton to the bridge-builders who look at the problem from the side of education and not the side of psychological science. However, before we investigate them, we can elaborate on the notion of 'technology' that seems to be the inevitable corollary of these three varied positions in scientific psychology.

In the beginning, what is now the vast alternative conceptualization of practically the whole of educational thought known as Educational Technology (with pronounced capital letters) emerged from the above sector as a more limited interest in programmed learning, initially centred on the teaching machine but soon to begin its wider development. In this period appeared the 'milestone' of a volume which collated the psychology and the humbler practical literature of the audio-visual educationists. M. Lumsdaine and R. Glaser's Teaching Machines and Programmed Learning¹² presents for us, not only the foundation for programming in scientific psychology but also alternative bases of a more pragmatic kind

from the 'father' of the movement S.L. Pressey, and from N.A. Crowder, with an early sight of the radical English innovator Gordon Pask.

The massive Appendix provides 'a comprehensive compilation of all known published papers which deal directly with teaching machines and auto-instructional concepts or programs.'¹³ These are fully abstracted to give the reader a final impression of a compendium which is designed to persuade him that a revolutionary change in education has begun. A well founded, efficient technology based upon the science of human behaviour is at last to replace traditional educational procedures. The aim is no less than to change the 'condition of man' by changing man himself through the use of machines which can make available a kind of effortless, teacher-proof Socratic teaching. The hope is that, in this way, persons in teaching will become, as it were, technological replications of the Great Persons of history which the other mode of educational thinking stresses.

This type of optimistic belief is found even at a more official level. L.M. Stolurow examines, in Teaching by Machine, the possibility of ending the public crisis created by the rapidly expanding need for instruction at the beginning of the 1960s. His conclusion is that this 'new concept of instruction as a communication and control process'¹⁴ may well be the answer to the problem as it is seen by the American education agencies. To this we can add that, in pursuit of this ideal of a technology-based system of schooling, R.F. Mager provided the first handbook on the techniques of programming written itself in programmed form.¹⁵ In this now-renowned practical reflection of the 'tough minded' concept of psychology

which dominated the intellectual scene of the time, he significantly argues for a 'neutrality' in his techniques which, for us, is both strikingly similar to the claim of ordinary language analysts about their techniques yet completely contradictory of that claim in its assumption that the manner of teaching does not count. As Mager says: 'The book is NOT about the philosophy of education, nor is it about who should select objectives, nor about which objectives should be selected'.¹⁶

This disclaimer, taken in the context of the contents of the handbook, illustrates the extent to which educationists, ostensibly working in the one field, with its label Education, actually live in different universes of discourse. The assumptions about man, the world and knowledge which are necessary to make sense of Mager's objectives-approach are precisely those that the heterogeneous group of 'philosophical' thinkers whom we have assembled from all areas of the literature challenge. The brave new world of objectives, explicitness, terminal behaviour, observable conditions and criteria for defining success in learning is one which we have seen rejected by humanists from Morris to Inglis; and it will be necessary to pick up again, later in the chapter, this mode of educational theorizing that is centred on 'the technological' as it is judged by the Period Two heirs to the mode which centres on 'the person'. Meanwhile, we move on to the 'non-extrapolation' approach to educational psychology which, it will be recalled, demands autonomy for the subject because its proper focus is the learning characteristics of the classroom.

'Non-extrapolation' Approaches: David Ausubel and His Competitors

First, a new commentator within this perspective is found offering a distant perspective from Australia which has some advantage in that he writes explicitly on 'The Concept of Educational Psychology'. H. Philp is not impressed by the state of the subject as evidenced in the text books and college courses he has examined. As he says:

It is a little staggering to think of the hundreds of thousands of students in the U.S. and Britain alone who are at this time steadily ploughing their way through Cronbach or Lindgren or Peel.¹⁷

We, of course, found more hopeful signs of a logical kind in the reflexive parts of two of these authors than does Philp. Nevertheless, his point is similar to our own - that some more radical 'bridge-building' is required than is to be seen in student texts. He notes that the regrettable diversity of approaches which is characteristic of the sub-discipline rests on a conceptual confusion which merely mirrors that which is encountered in turning from the texts and courses to the fragmented educational 'research' carried out at more prestigious levels.

His conclusion is not unexpected: in educational psychology there is no 'real integration of either theory or practice'.¹⁸ This he expects to be altered as Piaget makes the first attempt since Thorndike to centre enquiry on children. In his view, confirming a theme of our own, such an approach should as quickly as possible replace the established 'development' of the subject by an endless

and pointless acceptance from pure 'research' of new content areas for courses, without any attention being paid to the crucial issue of their relevance to the activities of teaching. He prescribes very much in Ausubelian fashion: 'research must develop educational principles out of real educational problems in their natural complex setting'.¹⁹

This 'first principles' concept of educational psychology is clearly in marked contrast with the retreat from the problem of Spence, the dogmatic re-interpretation of it by Skinner or the ambiguous attitude to it of Melton. It provides a good reminder for this section of the parallel themes of the earlier chapter and thus a preliminary to the work of a powerful new writer in educational psychology whose standing is equal to that of Skinner but whose position is opposed in a way which has importance for our argument. He is, of course, Jerome Bruner, who was moving in this period firmly into education as a major 'cognitive' psychologist.

He relates, in the first of two important articles, how in directing the Harvard Cognition Project which produced the famous A Study of Thinking,²⁰ he and his colleagues found themselves 'observing children in schoolrooms, watching them learning'. And he adds, 'It has been a revealing experience'.²¹ So, he now relates their general psychological findings to the classroom and ostensibly supports a view of it which makes it a different world to that perceived by Skinner. The larger educational implications of this world Bruner was shortly to describe in more detail in the influential The Process of Education²² which we shall note under 'educational theory' to create another internal link in our investigation. Here,

he shows how learning in a 'generic' way allows the boundary between learning and thinking to be crossed. From our point of view, a different kind of educational psychology, showing none of the characteristic language of its 'rival', is being expressed.

This becomes even clearer in the second article whose very title, 'The Act of Discovery', gives an indication of how much closer to the teacher's intuitive appreciation of 'meaning' (as the first condition of children's learning) is Bruner than the psychologists in the extrapolation tradition. It is here that he locates himself firmly within our classification with a comment on Vigotsky which recalls Simon's earlier commendation of Soviet psychology against the misinterpretations of it found in the West. As Bruner says:

A strange irony, then, that Russian psychology that gave us the notion of the conditioned response and the assumption that higher order activities are built up out of colligations and structurings of such primitive units, rejected this notion while much of American learning psychology has stayed until quite recently within the early Pavlovian fold.²³

He names both Skinner and Spence at this point as 'early Pavlovians', but his aim is less to debate the nature of pure psychology against the behaviourists than to indicate the implication for a concept of pedagogical psychology of the cognitive approach which he espouses.

For the present account, brief mention of what Bruner was adding to the non-extrapolation perspective takes us naturally to Piaget, with whom he was so closely to associate as he became a leading educationist dedicated to the notion that educational

theorizing has its core in a theory of instruction. Earlier we left Piaget in the hands of philosopher Mays and progressive educationist Isaacs, both recognizing the significance for general theory of a man whose interests blur the distinction between philosophy and psychology. Now D.E. Berlyne writes about recent developments in Piaget's work in no less orthodox a periodical than the British Journal of Educational Psychology itself.²⁴ He describes Piaget's conceptual scheme in terms which show his realization that his readers are not familiar with anything so wide-ranging. He links it with Gestalt psychology, with Freud and even with neo-behaviourism to 'locate' it as a unifying scheme which is greatly superior to the accepted alternatives. As he comments, echoing Bruner on American behaviourism, 'It is certainly high time that national self-sufficiencies which disfigure psychology...were left behind'.²⁵

But Berlyne's advocacy is light-weight in comparison with that found in the first and most masterly of the books to give a full indication of Piaget's originality and to suggest its relevance to education. J. McV. Hunt's Intelligence and Experience²⁶ comes at the end of Period Two as a commentary which is important for many reasons. Above all, it places Piaget carefully and with full argument in relation to the existing psychological traditions which Berlyne, with a similar purpose, had identified more briefly. However, in Hunt's case, the result is that he creates a conception of what psychology is which, though it is Piaget-inspired, is a synthesis of elements in those other traditions too, and which is as clearly relevant to education as the expectations of, say, the Australian

Philp would lead us to believe. Hunt is, in short, Piagetian without being, as it were, merely Piagetian. For his own educational aim, of importance to our investigation, dictates the use to which he puts the material at his disposal. As he says, the thesis which he has developed 'suggests implications for education and child-rearing that diverge significantly from the practices sanctioned by the assumptions under question'.²⁷ It is these assumptions - of fixed intelligence and predetermined development - which he regards as at odds with the most fundamental purpose of the educator and whose psychological status he attacks so thoroughly.

It is clear that Hunt, like Bruner, has a vision of what education could become; and central to the vision is a concept of educational psychology which focusses its activities on the child and his complex learnings through 'encounters' within the structured environment of schooling. First, though, the psychologist is, in each of these two cases, an educationist, not content to remain in the domain of psychology when the most significant 'application' of it to the world requires some intelligent and knowledgeable commitment. It is no surprise that Hunt was later to direct the Head Start Project. Nor is it that he combines a deep perception of the intellectual problem of relating psychological inquiry to practical action with a recognition of another dimension to the issue which is, in its way, 'political'. For, as he says of the research orientation which would be in keeping with the arguments of his book and the results of the kind of research that it envisages:

Even after the discovery of the ways, if they can be found, the task of effecting the necessary changes within the culture in child-rearing practices and in educational procedures would be Herculean.²⁸

There is little need at this stage to interpret this remark in terms of the content of the present thesis. A phrase of the familiar philosopher McClellan, however, can suggest the likely response in teacher training to the related 'discovery of the ways' of unified thinking by those who argue for the importance of a disciplinary approach; for he hears what few will admit to in the unceasing attack and defence of position in the academic world - 'the squeal of threatened vested interest'.²⁹ We shall see later a less sceptical expression of what truth there is in this kind of belief when we consider the work of Stephen Toulmin on what he calls the 'professional embodiment' of rational enterprises.

Meanwhile, in this period in Britain, the lead of Isaacs in advertising the work of Piaget was being followed. At the level of Froebelian teacher training there was a ferment of discussion. Eileen Churchill wrote up two conferences in which the implications of Piaget for the teacher were vigorously discussed. There was great variety of response as the bearing of this new body of work on the established thinking of progressive educators was explored. All agreed that, as she puts it, 'The necessity for a better understanding of Piaget's theory'³⁰ was clear, as research of a new type was undertaken and a number of publications appeared which focussed in a new way on children and their thinking. And soon, Piaget himself came to give two lectures at the London Institute

of Education, taking the discussion to the prestigious centre of teacher education.

In the first lecture, Piaget signals to British educationists his own fusion of interests as a generalist thinker for whom the conventional disciplinary boundaries and the orthodox scientific methods of inquiry are of little significance. He talks on children's thinking, reported as 'a topic which seemed to him to be central both for pedagogy and for child psychology'.³¹ In his second lecture, there can be seen that philosophical framework within which all his concrete investigations are carried out. The report of it has him stating that:

Empiricist philosophers had long taken their stand on the formula that there was nothing in human intelligence that had not passed through the senses and he wanted to see if it was possible to test experimentally whether that formula was true.³²

Thus he speaks as an epistemologist - a genetic epistemologist. What the philosophers of Mind had heard in Period One from Mays a wider audience now hears from Piaget himself. In this small quotation all the problems of the relationship between inquiries into the origins of knowledge and its validity are raised. In Piaget, the traditionally distinct philosopher's and psychologist's concerns with 'mind' and its network of related concepts come together in one man's thinking as a challenge to conventional approaches and the orthodox division of labour. It was to be twenty years before the philosophers of education of an analytical persuasion were to recover sufficiently from their ambiguous response to this very

individual perspective on philosophical psychology to offer a sustained critique of it.³³ To us, this is a debate of the future. What we can note, as we pass from our second glance at Piaget to a non-extrapolation psychologist whose work on the logic of educational psychology was to prove more consistent than his precisely because his philosophical interests were less extensive, is that the world of the teaching machine hardly seems the same world as that inhabited by these thinkers!

We come again, then, to Ausubel, still unrecognized in this period as a major figure in educational psychology yet, nevertheless, working towards the detailed exposition of his 'first principles' conception of the subject which was eventually to make sense of many of the 'bridging' inclinations to be found in the literature. With the excitement shown in the period about the work of Piaget still fresh in mind we can record Ausubel's later judgement on the better-known figure for the light it throws on the problematic nature of the issue. He was to say: 'The tremendous vogue of Piaget among American educators has led to the largely unfounded belief that Piaget's work has significant implications for educational practice'.³⁴ This quite startling comment on the major figure whose influence we have just recorded in its beginning stage requires some interpretation. It can be given by summarizing Ausubel's developing views of this early period.

He has a theory of the meaningful learning of school curriculum material. His objection to Piaget is that he lacks such a theory of learning, for all the use to which his work is put by, say, the Isaacs of progressive education, as if he actually possessed one.

Ausubel's theory distinguishes meaningful learning from the rote learning which is the common target of 'progressivists' against the 'traditionalist', whose work is reputed typically to encourage it. However, Ausubel relates the dimension of meaningful-rote learning to another which had not been sufficiently well analyzed in the discussions of educational thinking which preceded his work. This is the distinction between 'discovery' and 'reception' learning. Common progressive opinion has it that the kind of verbal learning seen in traditional teaching situations is not meaningful: it is based on rote memorization of the material and leads to the type of 'inert' knowledge against which the intuitive educationist has always protested, wanting the child to 'discover' that knowledge which relates 'meaningfully' to his own deepest interests, needs and the rest. Ausubel, with an 'assimilation' theory in the making, disputes the contrast commonly found in the traditionalist-progressivist debate.

He defends verbal learning on grounds which can be easily seen to equate the 'verbal' with the 'conceptual'. The mind, he argues, is constituted by concepts. Concepts are embodied in languages. School learning can not be other than the learning of these languages; and the most efficient way of arranging this is by instruction which, provided the theory underlying it is grasped, will not be other than meaningful instruction. His own words express clearly the conventional wisdom against which he has developed his theory and which has, erroneously, persuaded educationists who were seeking a systematic psychology to support their views to find it in Piaget because of his obvious anti-'associationist'

orientation, in spite of the fact that learning is a concept which must be read into Piaget. Ausubel says:

It is fashionable in many quarters to characterize verbal learning as parrot-like recitation and rote-memorization of isolated facts, and to dismiss it disdainfully as an archaic remnant of discredited educational tradition. ³⁵

Ausubel's theory is comprehensive, well-articulated and, as stated, unreservedly cognitive in orientation. It is not our purpose to offer it in detail, but to establish what its 'logic' is, particularly here in a context of discussion which throws up the much better known figure of Piaget. The enthusiasm of Froebelians first and then most 'progressive' educationists later for Piaget, and then Ausubel's austere criticism of such a renowned psychologist come together to illustrate well that the mere dissatisfaction of educationists with the inability of orthodox 'scientific' psychology to give clear practical applications, which make sense to those working actually with children, does not itself create the 'non-extrapolation' alternative. This latter has to be worked out from first principles. Ausubel works it out by starting with school learning. Piaget starts elsewhere but appears, given the negative appraisal of other psychologies by educationists, to be relevant to education. But it is only Ausubel who analyzes critically the four terms 'meaningful', 'rote', 'discovery' and 'reception' to produce a theory which is reflective of the findings of cognitive psychology and consonant with the practice of those teachers who have not forgotten that the mind is 'made' of its concepts.

The effectiveness of Ausubel's concept of educational psychology

comes from the single-mindedness with which he presents it and then develops it into a substantive theory. In this period the foundation is being laid for the impressive edifice of the 1960s and 1970s; and the shape of the whole can be seen in its well-planned proportions. If from the last section the name of Skinner can be attached to that notion of behaviouristic technology which in the end tends to replace the teacher, it is Ausubel rather than Piaget (who can mean so easily what his readers take him to mean) who can be taken as representing the opposed though still scientific tradition which puts the teacher even more firmly, because more knowledgeably, at the centre of education.³⁶ However, this knowledge of the teacher is, on the Ausubel model, markedly cognitive, so that we shall need to return to the humanists of our earlier period for whom the emotions are of equal importance in teaching, learning and the psychology which guides them.

Humanists All: From Carl Rogers to Harry McFarland

We left Rogers in deep dispute with Skinner, in an earlier chapter. He now reappears as a high level representative of a humanism which would no doubt feel uneasy, too, at the Ausubelian conception of man as primarily an intellect. The title of an important article by Rogers of this period - 'The Place of the Person in the New World of the Behavioral Sciences'³⁷ - tells how conscious he is of the encroaching world of the teaching machine. Rogers here presents a deep argument suggesting that there are 'profound social, political, ethical, and philosophical problems'³⁸ posed by what he regards as

the frighteningly inhuman goals of those Skinnerian developments which his provocative Walden Two shows as a fiction but which is in danger of becoming a reality. At the root of the problems is the subjectivity-objectivity issue with which we have become familiar in the chapter on philosophy of education. Here, too, philosophy dominates the argument. For Rogers derives his psychological knowledge from the kind of experience in which the 'philosophy' can not be as easily concealed as in the behaviourist's laboratory. He therefore protests, about Skinner's world and the 'education' designed to actualize it, that 'To me this kind of world would destroy the human person as I have come to know him in the deepest moments of psychotherapy'.³⁹ Rogers believes in that existential freedom which to Skinner is but an illusion, but which is already very familiar to us in the arguments of the personalists in teacher training who have written in other contexts. Consequently Rogers must identify the flaw in Skinner's logic: he does so by giving an unambiguous existentialist assertion:

In any scientific endeavour - whether "pure" or "applied" science - there is a prior personal subjective choice of the purpose or value which that scientific work is perceived as serving.⁴⁰

This is not the place to discuss the concept of 'subjectivity' other than in the terms which Rogers displays it here; and then primarily to make the point that he does display it. That is, Pilley and the others have here an ally of great stature. Rogers argues that there is a deep seated paradox in Skinner's work, because: 'A personal, subjective choice made by man sets in motion the

operations of science, which in time proclaims that there can be no such thing as a personal, subjective choice'.⁴¹ Such a contradiction, he argues, shows how limited a value-choice the Skinnerian one of seeking 'objective' truth is: there are alternative value-choices to be made which do not define away that existential knowledge we have of ourselves which no science can refute.

Rogers accordingly offers his value-choice expressed in terms of 'becoming' or 'self actualization'. Given these, the pursuit of 'truth' through science takes place within an entirely different frame of reference. Science can now be geared to finding means to the 'open' ends suggested by Rogers. His model for this difficult set of notions is his own professional work in creating a non-directive, client-centred psychotherapy which he wishes to see influencing an educational system that is increasingly influenced only by technological models. Rogers' clinical experiences convince him that a kind of 'free' behaviour is elicited in such a situation which, were it to become the norm in schools and other social institutions, would produce that 'open' society of real human beings that is the existentialist ideal. This 'process' orientation of his is the inevitable conclusion of deep reflection on, on the one hand, the deterministic aims of science and, on the other, man's intuitive grasp of the fact of his own freedom. What is bedrock, to this giant of psychotherapy who accepts little of the distinction between that enterprise and the enterprise of education, is the existentialist notion of:

...responsible personal choice, which is the most essential element in being a person, which is the core experience in psychotherapy⁴² which exists prior to any scientific endeavour.

Few items in the literature illustrate one of the themes of the present thesis better than this contribution of Rogers: that philosophy permeates educational psychology. He chooses to pitch the discussion at a level which is deep enough to embrace one of the core questions of philosophy. We have not the space to follow in the direction indicated, for there is work at a more homely level which partakes of his kind of perspective that requires notice. But we have to recognize that, in Rogers, we have a paradigm amongst conceptions of learning and education which opposes all those refinements of 'naturalistic' thinking that have led, from the nineteenth century onwards, to the development of varied schemes of scientific psychology. He puts the fundamental ontological question as to what there is in the world - whether there is primarily mind or primarily matter - into a discussion which, without him, would lack a major voice to express it. His view - that man as a total person, not just a creature of cognition, requires all that he 'is' to understand what he 'is' - is a powerful one to introduce into any academic discussion with its tendency to assume that rational thought is 'objective' without qualification. But to introduce it into an educational discussion, which is moving in an academic or disciplinary direction as we have seen, is to reaffirm the realities which existentialists never lose sight of.⁴³

However, these are realities which can be discussed at many levels, not just at the intoxicating level of a Rogers or a Pilley.

We can, for relief, turn again to Collier, who was soon to take on the principalship of a training college and writes in an idiom appropriate to that kind of working situation. Nevertheless, his person-orientated position is clear enough when he says that 'psychology for the teacher means primarily developing that immediate intuitive insight into how a boy or girl is thinking or feeling, without which no good teaching is possible'.⁴⁴ This is achieved, not by offering students units in psychology taught through lectures, but by means which the same 'good teaching' based on the same insight suggests for the learner-teacher in his educational situation. This means that the total thinking of the student - the unified thinking of the whole person - must be involved through courses which engage the student's values and beliefs as these are constituted into his synthesized 'outlook on life'.⁴⁵

We have, of course, heard this from Collier before. He repeats, as Editor of Education for Teaching at a time when that journal featured a symposium on educational psychology, that 'a good teacher not only trains brains, he also cares for and looks after human persons'.⁴⁶ And he is joined by the whole editorial board at this point, early in our Period Two, with a statement which is definitive of the humanist position on educational psychology. They state:

It is dangerous to regard psychological knowledge as so much dessicated information ready to be "applied" to "education", for it involves not only a body of facts but ways of perceiving, ways of thinking, ways of interpreting what is going on in the interaction of human persons.⁴⁷

What emerges from this level of literature is confirmation of the

findings of our first period. The views that are actually printed no doubt reflect much other material that remained unpublished in the course planning and syllabus of the training colleges. They are person-directed, anti-discipline in the now familiar sense of rejecting psychology as planned and taught to psychology students, and characteristic not only of a strong tradition in English institutions but also on the continent where, as we have remarked before, 'pedagogy' has always flourished. An example of this can now be seen in S. Ucko's 'Inter-relation of Pedagogy and Psychology' in which he argues for a synoptic view of teaching in which psychology is assimilated through the person of the teacher, for, as he says, 'man is understandable only in a problem situation vis-a-vis values and their meanings' ⁴⁸ - not as an object 'distanced' from the enquirer and, therefore, not, in a classroom setting, as an object similarly distanced from the teacher. For a teacher's task is to enquire into his learners in order both to understand and to educate accordingly.

However, it is important to establish that the humanist opposition to the dominance of uninterpreted psychology in education takes more than one form. Bantock, the great individualist of British educational studies, is at this point the writer best able to exemplify this. He comments at length on Freud in relation to education in order to criticize the close connection often established, as we have observed, between anti-scientific thinking and depth psychology. ⁴⁹ Bantock is a humanist in a different sense from that defined hitherto. His frame of reference is provided less by a philosophy which centres on the person as a 'free' individual

than on the person whose human development consists in assimilating the products of civilized living.

He therefore can not approve of the standard-less progressive education which, in his judgement, attempts to find some justification for its practices in the so-called 'liberating' insights of Freud. Accordingly, he analyzes Freudian psychology from the same point of view which, in Period One, he brought to bear on the more orthodox scientific psychology, in order to repeat his assertion that this discipline in all its forms has not 'escaped' from philosophy. As he says: 'it has...remained clear that a psychology rests ultimately on an ontology, a metaphysic of man'.⁵⁰ This truth, he argues, was in fact recognized by Freud himself. What Bantock then wishes to show is that the concept of man embodied in Freud's 'metapsychology' requires the kind of criticism which child-centred educationists are not disposed to give it, seeking to support as they do their existing sentiments with any intellectual position which appears to be confirmatory.

The main thrust of his argument is therefore against anyone who blurs the distinction between the educator, for whom children are the rising generation of cultural man, and the therapist, for whom the same children are 'clients' whose personalities can be freed and potentialities can be allowed more effectively to develop without reference to that content of civilization which traditionally forms the curriculum of schools. In a word, Bantock argues for the passing on of a heritage as a consequence of what he considers to be a properly conceived ontology against those who want a fostering of personal growth without much reference to an 'independent' culture.

To him, what we can call the Rogerian position in humanist thought is irrelevant to education, as are all the lower level reflections of such a position. As he says, anticipating once more the views of Peters: 'I cannot, then, think that the teacher is at any time called upon to fulfil a role in any way analogous to that of the therapist'.⁵¹

Bantock's abstention from the majority view with which this section is concerned illustrates once more the great variety to be found in the literature of education, even when its logic is displayed in a form normally concealed by the context of publication. It confirms, in its exemplification of the dialectic of discussion in this field, that we are in fact investigating philosophy, in which nothing is ever finally settled: only the 'residue' of endless debate takes on a form at any point in time which may be found convincing until further argument gradually transforms the conviction. Bantock is a good example of a thinker on education who is always eager to travel in the direction indicated by what he takes to be the good arguments rather than the popular ones. So that we can understand how often his writing of the 1950s appears to be much more modern in content and approach than the date might suggest. Here, as a kind of humanist, he protests as strongly against what we can call the 'extrapolation' to education of uncriticized depth psychology as he did earlier against a behaviourism that he regarded with an equal philosophical scepticism.

However, the kind of vigorous, polemical writing which is typical of Bantock requires some balancing, given the normal connotation of the term 'humanism'. To conclude this section we

can therefore examine the work of an educationist whose distinction is somewhat concealed by the fact that his writing has been largely in the field of psychological and practical text-books for students. Nevertheless, he is philosophical in that wide sense which embraces the polymathic interests that mark him as a philosophical generalist. His contribution could well have formed the conclusion of the last chapter on philosophy of education, but placing it here will provide a useful link between the generalist perspective in two contexts.

H.S.N. McFarland served no official apprenticeship in philosophy, yet everything from his pen is 'philosophical'. An early article on 'The Teaching of Educational Philosophy'⁵² is therefore of a piece with all the 'between the lines' perspective to be seen shortly in his psychological writings. He has no preconceived notions of the boundaries of the field: he encompasses not only philosophy as analysis but as systems of belief; and beyond that takes seriously fictional literature as a medium for 'philosophical' thinking. He has, thus, characteristics that are similar to both Frankena and Bantock. His is a perspective in which there is concern for both rigour and relevance, so that his impressive scholarship is focussed on practicalities of use to teachers, not used to establish an academic reputation. And this viewpoint is already clear³ in his work produced in this period. It was to be amplified impressively into the 1970s up to his death. Our attention to him will accordingly extend beyond the formal limits of this thesis, for McFarland can be taken as a model of those educationists who assimilated the 'disciplines approach' without fuss within their own balanced approach to the actual teaching of teachers.⁵³ The continuity of his purposes

and perspectives during decades of institutional change is therefore evidence of one of the main points that this investigation is designed to make.

He holds the view that 'philosophical considerations are always so intermingled with educational problems that one cannot easily disentangle purely psychological factors'⁵⁴ - a characteristically sober statement of a truth we have seen expressed with passion elsewhere. His view of these considerations is one which aligns him with the many who still regard philosophy as giving a 'world-picture' in which, in his words, there is included that 'general understanding of the nature of man, and particularly of oneself'⁵⁵ which we have seen personalists stressing. Philosophy, to him, cannot escape the 'large' questions just by narrowly defining its own role. To live at all, he argues, commits us to answering the primary questions in the total pattern of our lives of which our utterances are but a small part: as he says, 'in the silent philosophy of the daily round with its unending evaluations and choices, assertions and submissions'.⁵⁶ This is philosophy in action, from which there is no escape; for even to protest against such a view is to provide evidence for its truth in such protestation, which can only be taken as one feature of the general perspective in question.

To McFarland, making explicit what is thus only implicit is important for a rational man. He has faith in the power of reflective intelligence to create, in this way, a philosophy of life which bridges the gulf so often found between thought and action without being seduced into thinking that any one mode of reflection gives us the whole truth. McFarland therefore assimilates the analytical

philosopher's insights into his own wider conception of philosophy, aware that it has 'made us more critical of the hodge-podges of educational fact, error, assumption, special pleading, rhetoric, and personal creed, that may pass for educational philosophy',⁵⁷ but without accepting the sufficiency of its astringent techniques. There is a Reidian tone to his rejection of 'the artificiality and arbitrariness of such a limitation of the philosopher's legitimate scope'.⁵⁸

Given this position on philosophy, with its clear implication that a teacher's 'philosophy' of education is logically as we have discovered it to be in the non-analytic sectors of that sub-discipline, we can predict where McFarland stands on the ostensibly psychological issue of explaining human action. He rejects scientism; but in doing so, he shows a regard for science which contrasts strongly with the polemical anti-positivism of a Pilley. McFarland offers student teachers a sympathetic account of behaviourism which does not suggest that those who believe in it are either fools or evil men. Though, he says, it can be 'interpreted as an attempt to degrade mankind, it can also be interpreted as an attempt to clear the way for a true representation of what is distinctively human'.⁵⁹

This is a kind of humanism which is not antagonistic to empirical inquiry. In contrast with Peters, for example, McFarland does not reject 'scientific' psychology as a misguided enterprise that attempts to do the impossible in improving on our everyday psychological knowledge which is enshrined in common language. He makes few declarations of dogma, but patiently attempts to show the multiple

origins of the knowledge which a person must make his own by synthesizing what he encounters into an individual world-outlook. So, as applied to teaching, this attitude results in his text books for students featuring many and varied references to research. But invariably this 'hard' evidence is interpreted by him - placed within a reflective scheme which reveals the person of an author who has the intention that the person who is the reader will grasp this fundamental message: that a man's 'philosophy' is not just the pale imitation of an abstract 'ism' but a living expression of what he believes in his own unique situation.

'Person' is thus a key term in McFarland's writings as in those of others. He is a member of that broad class of thinkers who emphasize that it is an individual who thinks, feels and acts, as he says, 'in accordance with some explicit or implicit philosophy of life'.⁶⁰ When this individual is a teacher, he can be helped to make explicit what his life already 'shows' as his personal educational philosophy in order to reconstruct it with the aid of any material which has a claim to bear on education. This process of reconstruction, McFarland argues, depends on honest reflection on both personal experience in a concrete situation and the accumulation of the experiences of others which is to be found expressed in public knowledge. This knowledge includes but is not confined to the findings of psychology in all its variations. Intelligent reflection in this way transmutes many elements into a more and more adequate philosophy in a manner which McFarland exemplifies by self-reference. For he is happy to admit, concerning philosophy itself, his own personal and non-academic assimilation

of its content. Students are invited to join him in membership of a class which is vital for education - those 'who, for better or worse, are often self-taught philosophers at a time when English professional philosophers have tended to emphasize their professionalism'.⁶¹

And, of course, McFarland was a Scot. In him, the personalism of that country's philosophical tradition takes on the non-theistic form which his open-mindedness on scientific psychology as it has developed in such a short history implies. Nevertheless, personalism it is for its consistent emphasis on going to those sources we have seen other, more conscious personalists emphasize. In relation to both men and books, McFarland urges the student to seek for 'a great living person' at all times in his self-teaching; a person in whom thinking and acting so clearly harmonize that any academic discussion of what can be learned from his example is mere sophistry. The authentic learner goes in that direction, not towards the inert material of unilluminated academic disciplines proffered impersonally as the entry permit to an economically-advantaged life style. In the end, then, this science-tolerating humanist has the same belief as the science-condemning personalists: only persons can make persons, from generation to generation.

Relating this perspective to the more concrete questions of applied psychology, we see that McFarland has a typically balanced view to take of the kind of consequences of the behaviourism that he does not dismiss out of hand, when it is narrowly converted into an educational technology. He would put Mager, for example, at one of the two poles of educational thinking assumed in his

work. Such a faith in the efficacy of devices and techniques arouses McFarland's scepticism as much as the analytical philosopher's faith in his techniques: both kinds of contribution to the teacher's task are 'mechanical' and miss the point. So, the artificiality of programmed learning can be shown by thinking of it in relation, say, to English Literature rather than to some less complex curriculum material. As he says: 'Programming obviously does not necessitate any neglect of aesthetics, but it could propagate in practice an over-evaluation of what is technical and utilitarian'.⁶²

Again, we can note McFarland's concern to be fair rather than polemical. He has the terms for what he wants to contrast - 'almost every human activity has both an aesthetic and technical side to it'⁶³ - and these fix in the mind the limits of his discussion; but his purpose is educative in drawing attention to the middle ground of theorizing which his wider philosophy implies. It is on that ground that the educated teacher stands, subordinating all the gadgets, no matter how sophisticated they are, to his own reflective judgement. 'Systems' to McFarland offer no panacea, for education is not a matter of hardware or formulae but the most complex inter-personal activity to be found in institutional form. His later work was to provide even more vivid terms for the basic contrast. As programmed learning exploded into Educational Technology, he perceived its origins in what he calls the 'encyclopaedic urge' - 'the notion that all essential learning can be wrapped up in some encyclopaedia, library, text-book, or learning system'.⁶⁴ Opposed to this he identifies the 'apostolic urge' - 'the persistent search for inspiring persons whose discipleship will somehow bring

educational salvation'.⁶⁵ Somewhere between the two, examples of which the present account has identified without the use of McFarland's vivid terms, ordinary teachers, working in a system which requires such a large number of them, must operate with an intelligence that accommodates both of these 'urges' into thinking which is appropriate to an everyday job of more-than-everyday significance.

For such a teacher, then, McFarland's Psychology and Teaching appeared in this period, based upon the belief that students preparing to teach 'progress, in fact, by solving the problems of their own psychology'.⁶⁶ It is little wonder that Morris was to describe the only text of its kind as offering a 'thoroughly humanistic treatment' of educational psychology in contrast with that opposed viewpoint which we have considered in an earlier section. Morris's words echo McFarland's when he says of the latter:

In the end this viewpoint reduces education to a means of manipulating and controlling the development of others. It is, therefore, perhaps, a mercy that educational psychology has so far failed to develop into an efficient technology.⁶⁷

What the teaching machine is to Morris with the aim stated in this review of 'helping others to grow to maturity', the existing classroom practices which purport to achieve that finely-expressed but ill-defined aim are to a Skinner. They seem to live in different worlds!

McFarland's complex position between these two worlds can finally be best shown in his own words. To him a teacher's self-understanding is a precondition of his helping pupils to learn in a

meaningful way; so he declares: 'a general understanding of the nature of man, and particularly of oneself, is not of academic interest only but is also the most widely practical part of psychology.' ⁶⁸ Thus, to him too, scientific psychology is but one element in a wider framework of thinking which embraces not only philosophy but also sociology 'wisely interpreted' ⁶⁹ - any discipline which can provide 'reasons' for the creation of a personal philosophy for 'Psychological ideas are only one part of such a philosophy'. ⁷⁰ And the psychology itself cannot be confined to that school in which explanations are given only 'in terms of what is elementary and observable'. ⁷¹ His final word to the students whom he addresses and was to continue to address in all his writings is, therefore, such as to deny the sufficiency of the very title of his text; for 'psychology' takes on a vastly wider meaning than most of them would expect. He points, in the end, not to the laboratory or even to the classroom, but to the great treasure house of literature that others have spoken of, and to the great persons whose lives are embodiments of the values which literature celebrates. Unqualifiedly he states: 'Without these, educational psychology as a purely academic study would do more harm than good'. ⁷² In the final section of this chapter, now reached, we shall return to those for whom the findings of academic psychology are - as they were so evidently not for McFarland - truths to be put on display for the teacher with little attention paid to the problem of how to 'use' them.

The Unchanging Text-books and Journals of Orthodoxy

We thus revisit the orthodox eclecticism left far above in this investigation. In this period Kenneth Lovell's Educational Psychology and Children appeared to replace Peel's text-book in popularity: it was to run to many editions. Philip Vernon's introduction indicates that the book aims to update the kind of psychological information needed by the student teacher - and indeed his tutor - when he commends it as a text 'which tries to give a balanced picture of recent as well as of classical contributions'.⁷³ It is, in fact, a compendium of the findings of academic psychology, assumed, as the title is meant to imply, to be relevant to the teacher as a practical person, not as just a curious intellectual.

The presence of this assumption is supported by a section explicitly concerned with 'The nature of educational psychology and its relevance to all concerned with the education of children'.⁷⁴ But the striking thing about this section and the whole of the contents of the book is that the mere recognition of the problem of 'relevance' is as far as the author goes. He offers no solution other than the repetition of what we observed in his predecessors in the earlier period - that crude extrapolation is made from psychology to the practical situation. As Lovell says: 'the laws and principles learned in general psychology are applied to all manner of problems in the education and upbringing of children'.⁷⁵ Against the complex background of the discussion of this concept of extrapolation which we have offered at great length, this avoidance

of any analysis of the issue by Lovell, taken along with the fact of his book's popularity, reveals the extent to which the notion of orthodox eclecticism was still accepted by so many.

It was not however accepted by Harold Loukes in reviewing the book from a perspective with which we are very familiar. He asks, with exasperation, 'What is a psychology text-book for?' ⁷⁶ To him, Lovell's contribution to educational psychology is no more than a map of an alien territory, conceived on a scale that allows the size of the domain of general psychology to be viewed in its vastness. But, for a teacher, it contains no relevant discussion, no controversy, no excitement: its dessicated summaries of psychological topics are there to be memorized because they have no evident bearing on the professional task. To Loukes, as to so many we have examined hitherto, psychological insight into education cannot be developed on the basis of overviews of general psychology; for it 'requires the infection of first-hand thought and lavish concrete instances and the very smell of the classroom. And of these there is no sign here.' ⁷⁷

Clearly, Lovell is no McFarland. Neither is the writer of another text-book - the same Fleming whose extension of the content of educational psychology was noted in Period One. Yet her new book, Teaching: A Psychological Analysis, ⁷⁸ appears, even more than Lovell's book, to take seriously the stating of the problem of relevance. For she certainly focusses on the teacher: he is characterized variously as a student of motivation, a promoter of learning, an observer of growth, a craftsman and technician, an experimenter, an administrator and even a therapist of the type

so roundly rejected by Bantock. But the gap between this person (with such multiple roles and the practical activities which accompany them) and the social psychology which it has always been her concern to stress, is not bridged by a teaching-learning theory of the type known to us elsewhere in the literature. She continues to act as if the mere stating of the problem is in itself a solution, without any indication that there are available logical analyses of the issues of some weight. Again, we can note in this the 'isolation' of one writer from another, even within a single discipline, which has to be explained either as due to ignorance or to a personal motivation in the production of a book which would certainly be described in non-academic circles as riding a hobby-horse. For Fleming presents her preferred psychological content-areas with the claim that 'Under these headings there may be subsumed most of the issues essential to understanding of the teaching and learning situation', yet without any indication precisely as to how the teacher, having studied her book and 'understood' that the social dimension of psychology is 'important', then acts differently in the classroom. When she says, 'always return can be made to the human problems implicit in the teacher's thoughts',⁷⁹ any feeling that the rigour-relevance issue is being illuminated soon disappears as the alternative Ausubelian, McFarland-type or even Skinnerian solutions come to mind to be compared with her lack of prescriptions. For they, in their different ways and in contrast with both Fleming and Lovell, focus on the education in educational psychology, not on the kind of psychology which is rightly housed in its own academic department.

However, orthodox psychology has other spokesmen than the writers of these two text-books. At a more prestigious level, for example, Sir Cyril Burt - then at the height of his reputation - describes 'The Impact of Psychology on Education'⁸⁰ by starting with Plato and ending with the notion of a science of education in which the contribution of psychology is central. But this, he argues, is to be psychology created by teachers themselves, because 'Education is no mere appendage of psychology: it is a science in its own right, with a double aspect - pure and applied'.⁸¹ Such an apparent move towards the notion of a school-based theory of learning is, however, not one which aligns Burt with any of the tendencies of an unorthodox kind noted in the present investigation. His view that teachers must 'play an increasing part in building up a sound science of education'⁸² can be appraised only by noting the model he has in mind for the 'science' in question. This is the British Journal of Educational Psychology - naturally enough, given Burt's position. It is the one journal, that is, against whose dominance in studies of education the combined weight of the more 'philosophically' orientated educationists was directed at the very beginning of our inquiry, as we made a point of emphasizing.

In this period the journal has the same appearance, conceptually, as it had earlier. The only reflexive article in it is of interest for its contrast with Burt's satisfaction that the discipline is developing in the right way by taking on the characteristics of normal scientific inquiry. Stephen Wiseman comments, in 'Trends in

Educational Psychology', from an educational rather than a psychological perspective. He is quite scathing with reference to what he calls the 'immediate' stuff - the fragments of 'research' which are unrelated to any discernible conceptual framework that is of relevance to the practical job of teaching. He suggests that such outpourings could be replaced by a different kind of inquiry for which more attention should be paid to creating an accommodating teaching-learning theory - in his words, a 'comprehensive theory which will form the basis for generalized advice and teaching'.⁸³

This we can recognize as an Ausubel-type demand. Wiseman argues that children should become the focus for inquiry, not merely to describe their 'development' as in much orthodox work, but to find out how they learn. The concept of child development as understood in eclectic educational psychology, he maintains, makes no sense unless it emerges from 'a preceding theory of behaviour, which itself must be integrated with and consist largely of a comprehensive learning theory'.⁸⁴ In addition, this learning theory is of a type which avoids the other conceptualization of educational psychology - what Wiseman regards as the excessive humanistic reaction to the exaggeratedly 'scientific' inclinations of orthodoxy. Wiseman, that is, dismisses not only that trend which consists of fragmented inquiries dressed up as science but the sentimental opposition to it such as that examined in the Education for Teaching symposium above. Of the contributors to that discussion he says: 'we have those on the "lunatic fringe" who eagerly embrace the latest fashions'.⁸⁵

His dissatisfaction with the literature of the two worlds of teacher training in the name of an educational psychology which is both rigorous and relevant-based, as he repeats on 'the development of a really comprehensive theory of children's learning'⁸⁶ - echoes the thinking of the 'autonomy'-seeking practitioners in the field whom we have identified: though Wiseman diagnoses rather than prescribes in detail. It is a dissatisfaction which led, in this period, to the appearance of a new journal edited by Wall, who has not appeared in this account since Period One. He both diagnoses and declares an intention to remedy the situation. There is, he says, an 'increasing gap between the worlds of research and the schools'; that is, in our terms, he identifies the problem uppermost in the minds of the 'bridging' theorists of earlier sections. In the periodical Educational Research, Wall declares: 'It is our purpose to bridge this gap'.⁸⁷

By implication, this is a promise that a conceptual framework will be forthcoming that ensures the influence of psychological principles on the teacher's classroom practice. Wiseman, it would appear, is to be satisfied. Wall has in mind the teacher who, in training has been exposed to psychology of a particular kind in such a way as to guarantee that he will regard it as a mere academic exercise to be got through before he can enter a staffroom where other bases for teaching are presented to him. The new journal hopes that its contents will influence teachers not to rely on imitation, intuition, current fashions and staffroom myths. It will offer research which is clearly related to the school situation and which is cumulative, not a succession of isolated small-scale offerings.

The promise is woefully unfulfilled in the pages of the new periodical. It bears all the marks of its origins in the National Foundation for Educational Research, reminding us that the term 'research' is open to the interpretation of a Morris as well as a Wall. It still presupposes that psychology consists of a number of competing theories of motivation, learning and the rest which stands behind the educational enterprise; that it is the orthodoxy which education traditionally uses in the eclectic way so well described a long time ago in this investigation by Simon when he first commended the alternative approach. Though there are ostensibly school-related contributions, both in terms of topics and the fact that occasionally teachers write them, the research journal is research-focussed and not school-focussed in the wider sense in which we can conceive that perspective, with the lessons of the 'logicians' amongst psychologists already learned. The disappointment at realizing that this new venture is the old approach in disguise - a kind of British Journal of Educational Psychology open to the 'other ranks' - is an appropriate response on which to move to the conclusion of a section whose substance shows the continuing inability of those for whom psychology is 'real' psychology first and foremost to refocus effectively on education.

It is a case, then, of this chapter ending more with a whimper than a bang, for the biggest noise in educational psychology was heard at the beginning of it with the technological implications of Skinner being voiced. There is little need to draw out the general implications of the debate between the contending parties in this and the earlier chapter on psychology, for they now reveal themselves

in passing and what becomes of immediate interest is the sheer variety of individual viewpoints held by those who create the literature. The 'scientists', the 'humanists' and the 'autonomists' of this domain present between them a fabric of discussion which is proof positive that they are, as often repeated, in the philosophical sector of the domain. The diversity is, in itself, illuminating. Meshed with the content of the more explicitly philosophical preceding chapter, it becomes a stimulating source for questions to be put to the literature of the sociology of education in its reflexive parts. To this discipline we now return.

Chapter Eight

Sociology of Education or Educational Sociology?

As in the last chapter, we shall here concentrate the account to keep it within the proportions established in Period One, in spite of the beginnings in this period of that explosion in the literature which was to characterize the 1960s. We can do this, having allowed the chapter on explicit philosophy of education to be considerably fuller than in the earlier period in order to show this dramatic expansion in the volume of the literature as a whole as 'reflexiveness' became more common.

We can recall that, earlier, a type of generalist thinking which paid attention to 'social' aspects of education was coming under attack from 'real' sociologists who were very conscious of the claims of what was a relatively new discipline. Now, these sociologists devise and justify a programme for sociology of education to replace the little there was of social thinking in the context of teacher training. The position of these empirically inclined functionalists can best be appreciated by first sketching in the further developments of the two generalists - Ottaway and Collier - whose 'unqualified' work was regarded by them as unsatisfactory.

Practical Prescription From Two 'Social' Generalists

Ottaway contributes two important articles to Institute of Education journals at this time. In the first he comments on the 'present burst of activity' ¹ shown by empirical investigators. His

frame of reference continues to be that which we discussed in detail, so that his assessment of the current work of Glass, Floud, Halsey and Banks is naturally made with its implications for policy in mind. That is, he attends to those who offer both contemporary and historical 'facts' with his own kind of non-descriptive interests much in evidence. To Ottaway, the primary question remains that of deciding what ought to be done with research results, not how methodologically respectable the results are. He makes a very clear statement of the difference in perspective that we are following up: 'An educational theory is not only an explanation of how the process of education "works", it is also a statement of the aims and intentions of the educator'.²

He is thus unrepentant in his 'philosophical' standpoint in the face of a rapidly expanding empiricism. Policy requires value judgement as well as fact. Research, therefore, always has this 'limitation' when applied to an enterprise whose logic is that of purposes, ends-in-view and actions. He reasserts his view that 'changes in our educational and social structure must always be judged in relation to the principles of our moral and social policy'.³ It is, perhaps, ironical that he adopts what is a Ginsberg-type view on the underlying issue of empirical sociology as against moral-social philosophy, when we recall that Ginsberg was, until his retirement in 1954, the great defender of 'philosophical' sociology against the rising demand for quantitative enquiry in the very institution from which the 'real' sociologists of education were deriving their authority. Once more, we can note the fact of multiple authorities.

Ottaway's second article is explicitly on 'The Aims and Scope of Educational Sociology'. It signals the arrival in teacher training of a new 'subject' conceived, as the name of the subject in the title indicates, in Ottaway's terms. His purpose is to translate the generalist thinking of his established text-book into a course programme, giving thereby 'a more definite and distinct place'⁴ to educational sociology. The distinction between social philosopher and scientific sociologist is further emphasized in the scheme - with continued reliance on his original source in that the scope of the new subject results from it being the study of, as he says, 'social facts in Durkheim's original sense of the term'.⁵ Sir Fred Clarke and Mannheim are also cited on the topic of social change. In addition to the work of these broad social thinkers, he embraces other related disciplines, stressing 'the importance of the relationship between sociology and history'⁶ and the significance of both social anthropology and social psychology to the issues he thinks are important for the teacher to study. In sum, he operates still within a large domain which covers 'culture', 'status', 'role' and even 'a need for a systematic sociology of the school'.⁷

The confidence of this article is worth comment. Ottaway writes as an educationist who is very secure in his own standing. He has written the only text-book on the market and clearly thinks that the time is right to take an important step forward in teacher training by using the kind of material it contains. He gives no indication that the innovation he suggests is in a form that will be disputed or that there are forces at work which will shortly

remove from him the leadership role. He seems not to realize that to the Young Turks of sociology he is already one of the Old Guard. Consequently, he happily relates the new, social dimension of educational theory to that central focus of which as a generalist he is always conscious. A teacher, he says, is most naturally interested in the techniques of his job which come from psychology in some sense, but he should have the wider concerns of an educated professional which this new element in his preparation will illuminate. Teachers need to understand 'the effects which their work in schools actually has on the structure of their society, and its bearing on the kind of education required in response to present and future social needs'.⁸

With the three year certificate course in sight, the moment is right, for Ottaway, to 'stiffen' courses in this way. But, as we know, his kind of rigour is not that of those who were gathering around the training institutions ready to condemn the educational sociology associated with his name. So, the various enthusiastic conferences to which Ottaway draws the attention of his readers in this optimistic guide to course development can be seen as constituting, in fact, the first move in the eclipse of this particular form of the subject before it had been really established.⁹ The reason can be readily seen in leaving him with a final word from this hopeful manifesto of a kind which, we know, would not be to the liking of those sociologists whose primary concern was somewhat different from his own. To them, such statements as this would attract their favourite critical epithet - 'hortatory':

The right way to live must still be judged in the light of our moral and ethical beliefs, and these will provide us with educational ends and values which the social sciences can be called upon to serve. ¹⁰

This is a declaration, however, which would very likely appeal to Collier. He reappears now with a full scale book, anticipated, as we saw, in many of his minor contributions to a variety of discussions. A key quotation from it will show that to make reference to its contents in this chapter is merely to opt for the particular context indicated in the title, The Social Purposes of Education; for it could well be included in the next chapter on educational theory with the usual justification that generalist thinking of this type is not field-dependent at all. He says:

I am arguing that the subject of education, taken as a whole, is a subject of great complexity, for which one needs, ideally, to be at home with several of the major disciplines of the human mind...the present book is an attempt to articulate the relations between the disciplines; or, if one looks at the matter from another point of view, to conduct a search for criteria by which to judge educational methods. ¹¹

There are few more explicit or more definite descriptions of the general educationists' 'qualifications' in relation to his practical purposes than this.

In relation to sociology Collier continues, naturally, to stress the place of values in an assimilating socio-educational theory to which the scientific discipline contributes: facts without values prescribe no action. But even given this composite type of 'rigorous' thinking as appropriate to education, there remains the

problem of relevance to the work of teachers on which this 'education' rests; and, with reference to this, Collier's book is unambiguous. The teacher, to him, is that person in possession of educational methods whom we have often identified in the reflexive literature, not least when Collier has been writing. But this person, Collier in particular emphasizes, is in a particular society. His awareness of his own values, without which he is not a real teacher, cannot be divorced from an awareness of the social context in which they operate: he needs 'a clear grasp of the trends of social development'¹² of the complex, rapidly-changing society in which he lives and works. It is this which sociology provides. The teacher then, in the light of sociological as well as other knowledge, 'needs far more than in the past to search into his own mind and heart and to know clearly what in his particular society he really stands for, and how his overall ends in life are related to the educational methods he employs'.¹³

Thus we have this pervasive notion that values and beliefs - particularly beliefs here about the workings of industrial society - are articulated in synthetic thinking which issues in classroom practice: a fabric of thought and action which goes beyond 'individual' factors to include 'social' factors. Collier is as conscious as are the empirical sociologists of the process of rapid change which is the mark of an industrial society. Yet his consciousness becomes part of an educationist's theory that never overlooks the point of teachers studying Education at all - to teach more effectively, with competence as well as understanding. No-one shows greater awareness than he that he is in a prescriptive, not a descriptive occupation. Consequently, no-one stresses more than he

does this necessity to make explicit the value judgements which inevitably run right through educational discourse, and which determine 'educational principles'. At the end of the four chapters in his substantial work devoted to such principles, he refers to his own preceding 'counsels of perfection' which had started long before with an analysis of society, in words which parallel those of Ottaway and make an appropriate turning point to the entirely different kind of sociological thinking that was coming from the highly qualified empiricists. He concludes:

These are all counsels of perfection. To come anywhere near to living up to them one must become a new man, a new person: the test of our vocation is in the perseverance of our efforts to build up a new personality in ourselves. ¹⁴

A Programmatic Trend Report and its Philosophical Critique

From an apparently different world came Floud and Halsey's 'Sociology of Education: A Trend Report' in 1958. ¹⁵ It is a map of the new territory: a comprehensive survey of definitions, reviews, critiques, bibliographies and text-books. The opposition of its editors to non-disciplined social thought about education has become systematic since Period One. They refer to 'an unusually diffuse and heterogeneous literature styling itself "educational sociology"', ¹⁶ with particular reference to the American scene. Their judgement that reformist zeal there, supported by Deweyan thinking which was aimed at the improvement of society through education, 'was to prove a doubtful blessing for the disciplined

development of the field'¹⁷ could, clearly, be transferred to the Collier and Ottaway type of thinking without embarrassment to them, on the argument that we have developed; for their 'field' is unapologetically education first and sociology second.

It is this characteristic - that the 'normative' approach is a branch of education, not sociology - that Floud and Halsey seize on. To them, there is a lack of the detailed research to be found typically in monographs. They compare their own type of British work, in this respect, with the situation in France where 'the Durkheimian tradition - or at least the scientific as distinct from the ethical and philosophical elements in it - had already been lost'¹⁸ long ago. In this way they display a perspective that is markedly in opposition to Ottaway's interpretation of Durkheim. Their interest is in advocating the home-grown studies in demography as the foundation for a real sociology of education. It opens up the possibility of systematically studying the part education plays in producing and perpetuating class differences and promoting social mobility. Of the early foundational work at the London School of Economics they comment: 'Although on a relatively limited scale, this work was of good quality and cumulative both empirically and methodologically'.¹⁹

From our point of view, this contribution has the virtue of revealing itself clearly as committed to what Frankena was to call the 'social science concept' of education. It is their intention to transform the contemporary scene by replacing educational sociology with a sociology of education falling within that scientific conception. Though, as they admit, 'in England, the scale of work

remains restricted and socialist influence on the choice of problems remains strong', ²⁰ the logic of the situation will, they argue, ensure that the rigorous approach will prevail, now that real sociologists have started to take an interest. In America, too, there is 'a vocal group of professional sociologists with purist intentions towards the sociology of education', ²¹ of whom Gross is the most active. We can see that this very trend report is in the nature of a declaration of intent and an encouragement to 'purists' to colonize the relevant educational territory.

It is important for their argument to develop the relationship between contemporary sociology and that of the founding fathers which has been put to 'educational' use by non-sociologists. So, with reference to Durkheim, Mannheim and Weber, they expose the limitations which modern workers within the same sociological tradition will avoid, because they have that professional grasp of the subject which allows them to develop it without undue adulation of its creators. Of the 'Big Names' from the past they say:

Yet none of these writers seems to have faced the fundamental difficulty in the sociology of education; namely, that of presenting an orderly and coherent analysis of a set of institutions which by their nature confound social-psychological and sociological issues, straddling as they do the psychology and the organizational structure of society. ²²

Their point is that complex industrial societies develop schools as specialized agencies and 'the possibility then arises that these may behave as relatively independent variables in the functioning of the social system'. ²³ Hence, contemporary as opposed to earlier functionalism, places an entirely new stress on the fact that

educational institutions can promote or impede social change. Mannheim, for example, did not grasp this, abandoning structural analysis and 'preferring to concentrate on a modern treatment of the traditional problem of individual socialization in the interests of social integration and cohesion'.²⁴ The vital relationship between education and other social institutions and processes is thus unexplored in his work.

Similarly, Durkheim 'ignored the problems raised by the existence of formal and specialized educational institutions'.²⁵ Both fore-runners showed little awareness that the kind of analysis which is appropriate for the uncomplicated structural problems of pre-industrial societies will not now suffice. Such societies have merely the problem of 'genetic psychology' because they lack those processes of social selection and differentiation which mark contemporary society. Ensuring cohesion in a static community is relatively simple, they argue: and it can be simply analyzed. But industrialism creates for educational institutions 'the burdens of mass instruction, promotion of scientific and technological advance, occupational recruitment and social selection'.²⁶

Clearly, this emphasis on the strategic place of the educational system as a major determinant of the character of technological society is one which comes most naturally to commentators from 'outside' education. The education-society relationship is what, to them, needs explaining. Floud and Halsey's argument can be summed up not unexpectedly by stating that it is the disciplined sociology of education which explains it. However, the apparent 'neutrality' of this position has to be measured against parallel claims known

well to us from other parts of the literature. Immediately the comment of Morris from Period One's account of Floud and Halsey's earlier work comes to mind. For this descriptive orientation of the scientific sociology of education is, in fact, made in a context where policy-prescription is implied. There is no need here to repeat the details of this argument, other than to suggest that the keen-ness of Floud and Halsey to present the case for 'real' sociology is not matched by a willingness to distinguish the kind of job done by an educational sociology in which the presence of value judgements is made explicit.

The subsequent history of the sociology of education provides another clue as to how we appraise this confident trend report. The notion of what constituted a proper sociology from which to move into education became, as we know, far more problematical than is in evidence in this declaration of what is required. In this period the dismissal of educational sociology as an inferior attempt to relate a discipline with a practical enterprise looks stronger than it was later to appear, once the great controversies within pure sociology itself about its own nature reached the sociology of education. ²⁷ So, in this period, the problems about 'fact' and 'value' which we have displayed at length with reference to the other 'scientific' discipline - educational psychology - and which are indeed present with this second 'scientific' discipline, are not so easily perceived. But they are there. 'Policy', to which level all the most important material in the trend report points, is a term that is in as much need of analysis as the many ostensibly psychological terms are which appear in educational discourse at the

classroom level. The two science-claims stand in the same logical position, but with sociology appearing at this moment of its development, to lack the internal discord which we saw that psychology had. The competing 'schools' of sociology and their controversies lie in the future, but their origins lie hidden in the present debate. In sum, the 'amateur' commitments of the Ottaways and Colliers of educational sociology are not so easily disparaged as this historic pronouncement would imply once the total picture is seen.

Furthermore, the intention of Floud and Halsey is not just to define the nature of sociology of education in order that its findings, present and future, can carry weight with high-level policy makers. They aim the new discipline at teachers. They consider it vital that classroom practitioners take on a legitimate sociological perspective to their work. That is, they want the teacher's understanding of education to be widened in this way. It is not that there is, initially at least, any suggestion that this subject will directly bear on concrete teaching activities. The teacher is regarded as an educated person with other roles than that which is limited to technical matters; and his education has, in their view, been deficient because it did not provide proper sociological knowledge. In other words, the Armytage-type argument for the study of history is repeated on behalf of the discipline which, as we know, was to supplant history in the educational studies of a later period. So, we can note that the critique of Morris based on showing the different needs of the scholar and the student applies with equal force here.

In addition, once it becomes clear that the new discipline

is being developed, not in a non-vocational, academic context but in teacher training, the earlier arguments summed up in the term 'contextual implication' are relevant to its claims. To repeat the Schefflerian analysis would be uneconomical at this late stage in our investigation. But what it shows is that sociology of education as much as educational psychology, once it is offered by tutors to student teachers on courses of professional preparation, implies a normative theory of education of the type that Ottaway and Collier have made explicit. Therefore the attack on 'educational sociology' is an attack on a logical structure which is unavoidable even for the critics. This being the case, the motivation of the critics in urging so keenly the virtues of their descriptive perspective on education in a contribution which reveals its own prescriptivity calls for a 'political' comment once more.

The comment can now at last best be made in terms of the recent, innovative philosophical work of Toulmin, merely touched on before. His wide notion of 'rational enterprises' includes not only sociology but Education, for his thinking is far from the orthodox, defensive conception of what constitutes academic 'disciplines'. In Human Understanding he distinguishes between 'intellectual disciplines' and 'intellectual professions' in order to stress that what he calls 'the human embodiment' of a discipline is traditionally - but not by him - regarded as irrelevant to the arguments it presents. That is, intellectual life has a 'political' side to it which a proper account, as against a conventional one which is fearful of presenting *ad hominem* type arguments, will expose. In contrast, he argues that 'the institutions of a science, like those of any

collective human activity, develop through the actions of parties and pressure groups.' ²⁸ In propounding such a thesis, this top rank philosopher adds, as we can see, his voice to that of Wisdom, Burt and Scharfstein - in addition to Edel who actually writes in the educational literature - all of whom press for a conception of philosophy in its relationship with other disciplines which takes seriously the social, historical and psychological context in which individuals produce it.

So, applying this Toulminian philosophical-sociological notion of 'parties and pressure groups' to the empirical sociologists, we can see that they are embarked on the second stage of building an academic empire. With the battle won (at least in the London School of Economics, against an older Gindsbergian tradition of 'philosophical' sociology) they seek to extend their influence, in the name of 'real' sociology, to the sub-academic area in which the term 'sociology' is in use, employed by persons whom they judge lack the right to use it. From a Toulminian point of view, what we have long been insisting on is that educational sociology, which the newcomers criticize, is in fact a particular expression of a 'rational enterprise' of equal validity to that of scientific sociology - possessed of its own objectives which are indeed normative, as they must be to be 'educational' in a sense that is of slight interest to the critical outsiders. Toulmin's own words speak for themselves on this issue:

Until recently, of course, scientists have cultivated a public image of disinterestedness; and this has carried with it a pretence that the institutional activities of scientists - forming, as they do, the professional face of a "rational enterprise" - are somehow exempt from the general principles of political and social action.²⁹

Our earlier suggestions at several points that the discipline-emphasis in teacher training is not unconnected with the question of academic status is thus supported by a very thorough and unusual analysis. Arguments for the 'purity' of a discipline are not as disinterested as the tone in which they are typically presented suggests. Toulmin emphasizes that 'the life of science is embodied in the lives of men: exchanging information, arguing, and presenting their results through a variety of publications and meetings, competing for professorships and presidencies of academies, seeking to excel while still vying for each other's esteem'.³⁰ To recognize these dimensions of competition and esteem-seeking in teacher training is important for a proper grasp of what has taken place. The subject Education has always had a difficult time in 'proving' itself in Universities because of the attitude of the 'disdainful colleagues' mentioned earlier, to whom academic excellence is equated with achievement only within established subjects. Consequently, the only way of earning respect is by associating with such a subject - becoming qualified in it and perceived as committed to its advancement.

One obvious way in which this advancement can be made is in extending the subject into areas such as education, all the while insisting that the subject retains its identity while broadening

its scope. For the subjects of philosophy and sociology in particular during this and the preceding periods, a colonizing operation of this kind is clearly evident. Necessary as this so-called 'stiffening' seems to be at the highest level in the domain of Education, it is thought by some at lower levels to be even more necessary if their work is to acquire standing: we have examined some of their views in sections above. But rarely is the operation described in any other than purely intellectual terms - as a demand, as it were, of 'logic' rather than politics. The pressure of what Toulmin describes as a 'career-sequence of fellowships and publications, editorships, university chairs, and committee memberships'³¹ is rarely acknowledged in a literature ostensibly devoted to arguments about the nature of the 'rational enterprises' in question. The effect of this has been that the generalist in teacher training, whose background is likely to have been in the kind of school teaching which gives him the suspicion at that level that specialization is not educative but merely subject-enhancing, is made to feel that any possibility of transmuting his intuitions into a rigorous theory appropriate to his work with student teachers is ruled out as an 'official' strategy. That is, the validation of courses - particularly the lengthened Certificate and B.Ed. course being discussed in this period - is always in accordance with criteria which define 'rigour' in such a way as to include the disciplines of education while excluding 'composite' educational theory. All this has emerged during a long investigation: Toulmin throws a bright light on it.

Returning to Floud and Halsey we can enquire whether they

suggest any sociological content which is at all 'relevant' to the expectations of a class teacher, as the work of generalists clearly is. It is in the very nature of their position that there is very little to be found. They identify two 'macro' levels of content. At the first, students will study the relationship of the educational system to aspects of the wider social structure; that is, 'its value system, its demography, the economy, and the political and stratification system'³² - always with reference to the rapid changes which characterize industrial society. At the second, 'the social structure and functioning of the constituent groups of the system - schools, universities, etc.'³³ will be considered.

So far, then, the course content is predictable from their non-educationist standpoint. As an after-thought they then name, at the 'micro' level, 'the social psychology of classroom and school'³⁴ viewed in an immediate social environment which has itself educational significance. But the clear intention is to have included in teachers' courses the structural material of sociology proper rather than this micro-content, and this is how it in fact developed in the 1960s. Students were offered macro-level material which would have been no different if it had been offered to groups of, say, policy makers or classes of non-vocational students of sociology. For Floud and Halsey believe that a broad understanding based on such studies is necessary: an understanding of the total context in which the sociologist 'comes to the fundamental problems, of social integration through the socialization of individuals, and of persistence and development through the transmission of its

culture. The approach is indirect, but there is no short cut'.³⁵ Once again, we can note the similarity here to the earlier argument for scholarly history of education; and we can see the same problem in limiting the field, for it can always be argued that a 'real' discipline-viewpoint cannot be a mere sampling of what the discipline has to offer!

Accordingly, Floud and Halsey feel obliged to show the limitations of such 'short cuts' by arguing that full and proper sociological inquiry remedies the methodological weaknesses of the kind of structural-functionalism that earlier workers in the field took over too uncritically from anthropology. Its concern was with social equilibrium of a society viewed as an entity rather than as a process; and it assumed shared values and consensus, conducting its analysis 'solely in terms of the motivated actions of individuals'.³⁶ In other words, they feel the need to establish their own approach by repeated reference to the weaknesses of the sociological tradition as it had evolved prior to the coming of empiricism. Contemporary societies, dominated by social change and showing little consensus create a unique problem, they insist; and 'Durkheim and Mannheim both wrestled with the problem; the former had recourse to a syndicalist, the latter to a platonic-totalitarian solution'.³⁷ Neither of these earlier 'giants' recognized the manifold consequences of industrialism for 'other latent and manifest social functions of educational institutions'³⁸ which these two contemporary authors want teachers to become acquainted with in their preparation.

This 'internal' debate, in its rejection of two past sociologists

whom educationists have interpreted with no reference to fine points of difference between species of structural-functionalism, raises again the question of 'points of view' and the political context in which they appear. Another of Toulmin's observations can be seen as bearing on this, when he says that 'we must be prepared to go behind all abstract accounts of scientific change to another level, where the questions have to do with the people whose concepts, theories, and explanatory ideals are under debate, from whose point of view the problems in question are "problematic"'.³⁹ This is particularly the case when we are aware, as we are here, that authoritative-sounding pronouncements which are dismissive of 'old' perspectives in favour of 'new' were to be challenged in a decade or so because they themselves lacked the very elements to be found in the 'old' views. In particular, we know that in the 1970s this confident programme of macro-studies based on Floud and Halsey's own type of structural-functionalism was to be judged wanting in relevance to the tasks of a teacher on grounds which our earlier generalist interpreters of both Durkheim and Mannheim would not have found at all strange. It is a programme which only promises a sociology of the school, for, as Floud and Halsey admit: 'On the whole, the most satisfactory work so far has been done on problems amenable to treatment by the methods of demography and the social survey'.⁴⁰ Plainly these problems are a long way from being what teachers perceive as their problems.

Before long, consistent with developments that are predictable from the Toulminian perspective, a volume of readings in the sociology of education appeared as definitive of the new approach. In the

Introduction Floud and Halsey, again, concede that its contents are 'narrowly focussed on the connection of education in modern society with the economy and the class structure', ⁴¹ bringing to mind the sentence in Toulmin which states: 'One final locus of authority within a science consists in the "standard texts" of the subject; and, by looking at these, we can see more clearly how the intellectual transmit of a discipline becomes the collective property of a profession'. ⁴² To students in training colleges this text was soon to be known simply as 'The Reader' and the courses which used it regarded by many of them with, at the very least, a puzzlement born of an obvious dissonance between their expectations and the sociology tutors' aims. But few would have either the knowledge or the boldness, given their subordinate role, to question whether the bracketing of 'policy-makers, administrators, and teachers' ⁴³ as the target population for 'The Reader' showed a proper grasp of the logic of teaching studies. ⁴⁴

The Empirical Sociologists and Verstehen

We can now move from the significant reader and the trend report to another part of the literature which, while it still features the ubiquitous Floud and Halsey, allows other reflexive comments. The monograph The Teaching of Sociology to Students of Education and Social Work ⁴⁵ is of interest because Ottaway himself is a contributor with the other two, and their different perspectives come out clearly within the one volume. First Floud repeats a familiar theme with a variation. Durkheim, she says, 'professed education

as an applied science',⁴⁶ focussing on what actually to do in schools; whereas Mannheim's diagnosis was much more general. Therefore, she concludes, 'From the teacher's point of view it may have been a weakness that he gave only broad indications of the practical relevance of his findings.'⁴⁷ This reference to 'practical relevance' needs, of course, no comment at this stage of our argument, other than to note that contexts determine arguments and that here Durkheim receives a faint praise that elsewhere is absent. For she implies that recent developments in the sociology of education are Durkheimian in the sense of being relevant to 'practical issues'.⁴⁸ But the following quotation, concerning her repeated emphasis on the fact that the emergence of education as an economically important institution has required a new perspective on it, more than slightly suggests her own unease about the lopsidedness and the practicality referred to in it:

It is fair to say, I think, that in reflecting these twentieth-century developments the approach of contemporary sociology to the study of education, lopsided in derivation and emphasis though it may seem to be, in fact throws much light on the practical issues involved.⁴⁹

In contrast, Ottaway in this discussion has an entirely different notion of 'practical issues' - one which necessitates a search of any potentially relevant disciplines for help with the answers. So, here, as an extension to his known polymathy, he embraces even psycho-analysis in a way which must have seemed strange indeed to his two 'purist' co-contributors. He maintains that, for students of education, concepts from this field 'will be indispensable to

them in explaining and understanding the social behaviour of human beings, which forms the greater part of their sociological studies'.⁵⁰ Furthermore, he supports his argument by reference to the 'old' thinkers whose limitations Floud and Halsey have emphasized. For he continues to believe that social change should be discussed only in the light of a notion of social improvement. It is the transformation of man's 'thought and feeling'⁵¹ in Mannheim's sense which Ottaway thinks is also clarified by psycho-analysis. Durkheim, too, in his view, can be interpreted as thinking along consonant lines, for 'His concept of anomie'⁵² indicates to Ottaway a type of psycho-analytic insight. And, amongst contemporary theorists, he points to American neo-Freudians such as Karen Horney and Erich Fromm whose work, in moving in a 'sociological' direction, is evidence of the close relationship between 'disciplines' which can so easily remain isolated in their academic form.

Thus, Ottaway remains unrepentantly - even defiantly - committed to his own earlier concept of a philosophical 'sociology' which embraces any form of thought that appears to offer insight into the human situation as it is found most problematically in the enterprise of education. But we find that he now defends his position in a new way by referring to a more technical philosophical perspective than that apparent in his earlier work - one with which it will be seen we are familiar from another disciplinary context. He says:

My own point of view is that all the social sciences differ from the physical sciences in the logical nature of their concepts and the type of explanation of reality that they are trying to give.⁵³

Peters writing on motivation comes immediately to mind here and,

indeed, Ottaway makes reference to that work and to the whole tradition within which it appeared. But he throws fresh light on the issue by going back into the sociological side of that tradition in order to show how, from Dilthey and then Weber, the concept of Verstehen emerged as fundamental in that type of explanation which has received its definitive contemporary expression in Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science.⁵⁴

This book we shall return to shortly: meanwhile, what is of importance is the way in which Ottaway relates the long-established and now refined anti-positivist concept of 'understanding' to his own experiences in teaching educational sociology. For his conclusion about the nature of sociology of education is opposed to that of the 'purist' academics precisely because it is based on such wider considerations. He is insistent about the inevitability of synthetic thinking, saying: 'I cannot separate the attempt to face the reality of my inner self from the attempt to find an explanation of social realities, which is the essence of all sociological studies'.⁵⁵

In contrast, this is certainly not an 'essence' in evidence at all in Halsey's contribution to the discussion, in which he attempts to devise a detailed syllabus using the material of the earlier trend report.⁵⁶ Two aspects of it can be mentioned. First, he makes a fraternal reference to 'Kenneth Ottaway' while rejecting his text-book on several grounds, the most relevant to our discussion of which is contained in his remark: 'Moreover, Ottaway puts rather heavy emphasis on American cultural anthropology and group dynamics'.⁵⁷ Halsey's concern to protect the genuinely sociological

perspective as he sees it is clear; and it leads him, in turn to put his own rather heavy emphasis on the post-Durkheimian awareness of the educational consequences of industrialism which we have seen feature strongly in his and his colleague's earlier work. Second, his syllabus, which is complementary to 'The Reader' identified above as part of the systematic move into teacher training courses, still lacks substance in the most 'relevant' area of the sociology of the school. The fact that Halsey recognizes this and hopes for a development of the area once such a programme as he describes has established the importance of the 'macro' level material which largely constitutes it, confirms the judgement made on Floud's similar recognition above. For all the businesslike appearance of these proposals to introduce 'rigour' into sociology of education, the presence of the demand for 'relevance' of an Ottaway can be felt within them.

In bringing these two perspectives closer together in this section, we can move to a key article by William Taylor,⁵⁸ whose subsequent career in both worlds of teacher training was to take him right to the very top. In this period, he acts as the one spokesman for the empiricists who is actually teaching Education in a college. His article 'The Sociology of Education in the Training College', published in 1961, is the counter to Ottaway's article of the year before, and is addressed to colleagues in the journal which all of them would receive as members of their professional association. It would therefore be a more 'public' statement than any that we have yet examined.

In it Taylor attends immediately to the distinction between

'educational sociology' and 'sociology of education'. The subject, he argues must be proper sociology: to him, this means that 'those concerned within the field are, first and foremost, sociologically trained.'⁵⁹ The familiar argument-from-qualification - which, it will be recalled, was attributed first to Taylor in our Introduction - need not detain us at this stage so far as his version of it runs, but its implications still deserve further comment. To him, it is only those who lack proper training in the discipline who espouse the questionable 'synthetic approach'.⁶⁰ That is, he displays no recognition of the fact that behind an Ottaway, say, stands a Durkheim; for his positive thesis is to commend the scientific sociology which has provided the content of his own recent education, and the field is being cleared for that commendation. He acts, that is, as the 'qualified spokesman' for a 'real' disciplinary approach in the field of education with respect to sociology, just as others have acted in a similar capacity for history, philosophy and psychology. With regard to this movement, it hardly needs repeating that the whole of the present investigation is designed to show that a radical logical misconception is involved which the proponents are too busy praising the virtues of their own subjects to see.

When Taylor asserts such things as 'a college course needs to be genuinely sociological, and to employ, in a relevant context and at appropriate levels, the methods and approaches of academic sociology',⁶¹ he is in effect addressing his tutor-colleagues in Education in nothing less than an intimidatory fashion if they do not have either a qualification in 'academic sociology' or the

resilience of a Collier, an Ottaway or a Bantock. For psychological reasons, resistance to the demand for a particular kind of course is likely to be undermined from the start if that course is presented as superior by definition and those who might want to argue about its relevance defined into the inferior status of 'amateurs'. The chance of an 'intuitive' generalist standing firm in his beliefs is slight when he - or typically she - and his methods of teaching Education to encompass all the elements which focus on the classroom situation are described as showing the characteristics of a 'mother hen'! Particularly is this the case when the further implication is that - given the well-known workings of the English system of validation which we discussed at length in Period One - improvement in status for colleges and their tutors through the acceptance of an extended Certificate course which might eventually lead to the creation of an Education degree, demands that specialist knowledge must replace generalism.

But we have said enough for the moment about the 'politics' of the discipline-advocacy. We can just generalize, with Taylor in view, on the oddness of the logic assumed in such advocacy when it is realized that while he argues for sociology, there are others who argue for their disciplines; and this total argument is ultimately directed to the single person of the poor receiving student. As we have observed previously, he is expected to assimilate multiple perspectives of exactly the kind that the discipline-argument states is not possible of attainment for his generalist tutors. That it is possible is of course the message we take from the writings of the persistent generalists whom we have examined, who are what

can be termed 'polymathic-enough' for the task they have to perform - without either pretensions to being multi-specialists but also without the limitations in their thinking implied by one-sided specialist comments. Their position in relation to education certainly has warrant in the 'wider' philosophy that we have been concerned to display; for one strong implication of that view of philosophy is that human beings are generalists in their daily living as persons - as parents, for example, who in this respect provide a better model for the professional educator than do research workers going 'deep' into a limited aspect of life. And a final comment on this matter can be, simply, that 'deep' is a relative term. Once the claim of the specialist is granted, the possibility of a 'deeper' specialist advancing the same type of superiority-claim at another level is wide open - a possibility which illustrates the initial misconception of the educational situation by the specialists.

With this discussion of specialization in mind, we can now examine Taylor's stated aims. Sociology contributes to the personal education of the student by giving him rational insight into the effect of social forces on his own values. It gives him an understanding of the part played by scientific method in social inquiry. He can then grasp 'the nature of the social factors that influence and condition the work of the schools'.⁶² It hardly needs repeating that these are aims in accordance with the Floud-Halsey programme of macro-studies, as useful for, say, school

governors as for practising teachers. It is only with his last aim that Taylor reaches the level which the tradition that he rejects regards as central, even though they grant the importance of the other roles that a professional person must be peripherally involved in. As he says:

Finally, through the study of primary group relations and the social dynamics of the school, the student can be furnished with certain insights and techniques which can be profitably employed in the classroom and school. ⁶³

The point to be made about this observation is that Taylor is referring to social psychology, not structural sociology, in sounding this minor note of 'relevance' for his readers. He is forced to cross a boundary which would not even be noticed by the generalists for whom academic labelling is of no consequence, but which should be consistently observed by Taylor and his colleagues if the main thrust of the empiricists' argument is to be taken seriously by themselves, no matter what the context in which they present it. To a generalist, in whose thinking the perspective of, say, Ausubel had taken root along with those of the 'wider' philosopher-educationists such as McFarland, it would be easy to fit this kind of material into a theory of classroom learning without having to stretch the notion of 'sociology' to cover it, as Taylor must do.

To such a generalist, a theory of school learning which did not recognize that the child brings, in a sense, his world with him to the classroom, would be obviously inadequate. Social factors are important, along with the more 'immediate' cognitive and affective

factors, in the child's learning situation at school; and the type of theory to which we have devoted much attention under the heading of an 'autonomy-seeking' educational psychology accommodates them quite easily. We find, then, Taylor timidly trespassing in areas which his main discussion implies is not sociology, in pursuit of material which can be offered as providing - as he puts it - 'insights and techniques', when this area is already being developed very effectively. This development is not, in its most comprehensive form, to be found even under the heading of the 'rival' discipline of psychology but, in fact, is the composite (because normative) educational theory that in this chapter has taken the 'social' form which Taylor and his seniors reject.

The root of Taylor's difficulty lies in his and his mentors' insistence on the purely scientific nature of sociology - an insistence which is naturally enough resisted by those in education who are conscious of it as a normative enterprise. It is this insistence which is heavily criticized by 'technical' philosophers on grounds which, as mentioned, were discussed in relation to the other supposedly scientific discipline - psychology.⁶⁴ We can now turn to Winch, already mentioned by Ottaway, and further discussion of the notion of Verstehen - one which has no place in the empiricist's point of view. The argument here is that social scientists must make use of their own experience in properly understanding man: the student of human action is himself part of his own object of inquiry, so that this type of empathy or introspection is essential for proper understanding. The important distinction

here is that between 'idiographic' science which explains individual situations in contrast with 'nomothetic' science which generalizes about the natural world. Winch adds contemporary philosophical insights to the kind of thinking based on this distinction in a book which, it is worth noting, appeared just as the scientific sociologists were moving so resolutely into education.

Winch dismisses the Newtonian aspirations of scientific sociology as firmly as did Peters the Galilean aspirations of psychology; and on the same grounds. He warns that 'philosophy must be on its guard against the extra-scientific pretensions of science'.⁶⁵ He argues for the philosophical character of 'any worthwhile study of society',⁶⁶ for 'any worthwhile philosophy'⁶⁷ must be concerned with the nature of the society in which man becomes defined. In short, conceptual inquiries have precedence over empirical inquiries in this domain, because what man-in-society is we come to know by reflection on our everyday experience, which is enshrined in our ordinary language. He says: 'At this point it becomes clearer how the line of approach which I am commending conflicts with widely held conceptions of sociology and the social studies generally'.⁶⁸

Winch is, of course, applying the Wittgensteinian notion of 'forms of life' to the idea of a social science.⁶⁹ Sociology's apparent central problems of accounting for the phenomena which we call 'social' is in fact, on this view, a problem in philosophy; just as, as we have argued, problems of the nature of educational studies are philosophical. Winch says plainly that, 'not to put too fine a point on it, this part of sociology is really misbegotten epistemology'.⁷⁰ The pre-Wittgensteinian background of discussion

which leads to this conclusion is then sketched in with an examination of Weber's contrast of Verstehen with causal explanation. Then Winch, on the basis of both the historical and contemporary insights of this type, makes his claim that there is a logical incompatibility between the concepts of 'science' and those that are ordinarily used to talk about and explain social events: "'Understanding", in situations like this, is grasping the point or meaning of what is being done or said'.⁷¹

For our purposes, this powerful advocacy of 'interpretive' social science gives technical support to those within an educational context who were, because of the lack of scientific 'purity' in their 'social' thinking about the tasks of teaching, under attack from newcomers at this time. The criticisms were, on a Winchian account, based upon a spurious notion of social inquiry. And again, we can note that it was precisely this kind of 'interpretive' (or, often, 'interpretative') approach to sociology which was to challenge the then well-established empiricists in the sociology of education of the 1970s.⁷² The argument-from-qualification once more raises the questions 'Qualification in what, precisely? Which discipline? Which perspective on the discipline?', and draws attention again to the presence in the literature of education of generalists for whom these technical philosophical commentaries were ingredients in 'synthetic' thinking focussed firmly on education. One such thinker, now very familiar for his command of a wide range of sources of this kind, is Bantock, who now reappears to end this section with another of his notable anticipations of themes which were to become more in evidence much later in the development of

educational studies.

Bantock, in an article on educational research of this period, immediately shows his grasp of the logical similarities between sociology and psychology by bracketing them as 'the psychosocial sciences'⁷³ which constitute the object of his critique. His originality is evident in two aspects of the article. First, he relates the Winch-Peters type of material to education itself. Second, he introduces the work of Alfred Schutz at a time that is more than a decade earlier than that in which it became one of the foundations of the 'new directions' in the sociology of education (to which we have made several references during the course of the present investigation as a reminder that a broad knowledge of later developments within the literature of education is assumed in commenting on the early periods).

Bantock's purpose is to show how the inadequate concept of objectivity held by those inquirers who are committed to 'scientism' can be altered:

One of the most interesting solutions to the problem of how meaning-structures which contain a subjective or evaluative element can be made in some measure objective for scientific observation is that suggested by the late Alfred Schutz (Schuetz).⁷⁴

He puts forward a refined Verstehen or 'interpretative understanding' which is arrived at 'by common sense and social acculturation in the ordinary course of events'.⁷⁵ Social scientists, Bantock argues, can begin their attempt to understand with this type of understanding of human actions - in their 'typicality' as Schutz had described the situation. These 'first level constructs', which

we know are those that are emphasized by philosophers in the Winch-Peters tradition, arise from a subjective interpretation of the situation which is inevitable because the inquirer is a human inquirer into human behaviour known to him from 'inside'. However, there can be built on this first level 'the second level constructs of the social sciences'⁷⁶ which offer a fuller understanding that encompasses the initial subjectivity in what can be legitimately called 'objectivity'. That is, models or 'homunculi' - similar to Weber's 'ideal types' - can be constructed for interpreting the social situation. These constructs-on-constructs allow the meanings that the social situation has for human participants to be transmuted into an explanation for which 'objectivity' is the only appropriate term.

For our purposes - here, as elsewhere - the details of this prescription for social science methodology is of less concern than the fact that a 'humanistic' alternative to empirical sociology receives, through Bantock, a 'technical' expression which is based on a source in general sociology that is of at least equal standing to that which was promoting its own case as the real sociology and therefore the real sociology of education. What Bantock adds of his own to the alternative view is of interest. He says: 'Thus can subjective meanings be objectified for the purpose of scientific investigation',⁷⁷ and relates the Schutzian material to his known attachment to the value for students of exposure to great literature - an attachment which we have noted is characteristic of many humanists. For the creation of 'homunculi' can be a mechanical or a sensitive process; and it is the really great writers who, in his view, best

exemplify the latter. His statement that 'literature affords the feel of the "whole man alive"' ⁷⁸ immediately throws light on the somewhat obscure Schutzian concept. For Bantock, the notebooks of great writers and the characters which eventually appear in their finished works, following a complex creative process in which unusual insight into human action is at work, provide a paradigm for the concept. He comments: 'Such insight, controlled by Schutz's postulates of relevance, adequacy, consistency and compatibility, offers a step in the direction of a refinement of type creation'. ⁷⁹

To give a comparison with this most unusual perspective on the understanding of social life in general and education in particular, Bantock examines the new journal Educational Research on which we passed a brief comment earlier. With reference to one empirical investigation into 'teaching' that he finds in its pages, he illustrates how the conceptual scheme that he has taken and developed from Schutz is needed if such inquiries are to produce results about teaching which have any meaning at all to actual teachers. What his analysis implies is that the scientific trappings of empirical research such as fill the pages of this particular journal are misleading; for this type of inquiry is completely irrelevant to finding the truth about that complex human activity called 'teaching'. In this, he confirms our own earlier judgement. It is perhaps significant that this article of Bantock appeared, not in Britain, but in Harvard Educational Review - almost as an indication that one educationist recognized the insularity of the home-based debate! ⁸⁰ We can, then, appropriately end the present chapter by setting the British discussion in the wider context

of a sample of American and European literature.

The Two-Fields Debate in America and Europe

First, we shall investigate the extent to which demands for 'real' sociology were being met in America, where 'educational sociology' was so well established in a great variety of forms, before glancing at Europe to inquire whether humanistic resistance to specialized sociology was as strong as the resistance already noted - from those working within a well-established tradition of general pedagogy - to specialized psychology. A link between the two geographical areas is conveniently supplied by J.S. Rouceck's 'Changing Concepts and Recent Trends in American Educational Sociology' which was written as a trend report for a European readership, and which shows in its structuring and content the author's recognition of the differences in perspective of the two intellectual cultures.

Rouceck traces the development of what he calls the 'hazy field known as Educational Sociology'⁸¹ with the intention of identifying for outsiders the internal groupings of its practitioners. He helpfully distinguishes the largest group from minority positions, throwing light on our own earlier discussion by showing the complexity of the 'party lines'. Of the majority group he says: 'Basically, they are "educationists" more than sociologists and often confuse social philosophy with sociology'.⁸² We can note that this appears to be a confusion which to Winch is no confusion, given his view of the relationship between conceptual and empirical enquiry; and

we shall find that the typical European 'pedagogical' response will be similar to that of Winch. Nevertheless, Rouceck's account makes explicit the philosophical-scientific 'location' of the issue.

His three minority schools of thought include one which parallels the 'extrapolation' position that we have fully discussed in another discipline-context: its practitioners believe their subject to be 'an applied science in the same sense that educational psychology is a branch of general psychology'.⁸³ Rouceck does not indicate what answer this group would give to the obvious question of the 'level' of its application which our own investigation has thrown up. Neither does he discuss the 'logic' of what he calls the 'functional' school which had dominated the Journal of Educational Sociology for years with contributions that offer social research 'as the chief basis for any educational program aimed to meet the social needs of children'.⁸⁴

Of more interest to our investigation is the very diversity of viewpoint to be found under the heading of the 'educational sociology' which hitherto has appeared to be a term for that single perspective against which 'real' sociologists' protest. This is a passing illustration of the Toulminian thesis which need not detain us, other than to comment that it further supports another point which has been made particularly in the context of philosophy of education - that the greater the number of persons engaged in the enterprise of education, the greater the production of literature and the consequent differentiation of group-perspectives. Our main interest is in noting that Rouceck's fourth minority group is the familiar one already associated with Gross in Period One. As he says:

'The smallest group is the "Sociology of Education" school, whose proponents are empiric sociologists'.⁸⁵ For his European readers Rouceck explains how the recent emergence of this group has started a vigorous debate in the many journals and text-books within entrenched 'educational sociology' about the nature of the subject. It is from this observation that we can with profit turn to another of the American symposia which are devoted to this type of discussion.

The Editors of Harvard Educational Review set the scene succinctly:

Increasingly, American educators are looking toward the insights of the sociologists as a major source for providing new light on old problems. Simultaneously, sociologists are becoming aware that educational institutions are an important area for examining major problems of their discipline.⁸⁶

We can, again, pick out Gross as the symposiast to examine, not only to preserve a continuity^f in this account from the earlier period but also because we can shortly turn to another contribution of his of this time which, made in a major text in general sociology, throws an interesting light on the comments he makes here to a readership of educationists. He addresses 'teachers, supervisory personnel, school principals, or school superintendents'; that is, his target population is similar to that of Taylor and the British empiricists in not being confined to classroom practitioners. Yet, similarly, it is to the whole heterogeneous group who occupy different roles within the educational system that he offers those parts of pure sociology which may help them to act as professionals 'in a more realistic and effective manner'.⁸⁷

There is no need to repeat our discussions of such a claim (for the multi-levelled practicality of sociology) other than to note Gross's individual emphases on the relevant content of the discipline for achieving his stated end. He proposes three areas. First is a description of school systems as social systems which reveal 'networks of role relationships within an organizational environment'.⁸⁸ This is of interest because it is the application of a sociological theory of organizations to schools and is thus a development beyond the British work of Floud, Halsey and Taylor because it moves some way towards fulfilling a promise made by them only for future work, while they placed their emphasis on other material, as we saw. Gross then moves from the level of the school to that of the classroom as a smaller social system and then back to a third level, clearly conscious of the questions of relevance likely to be in the minds of his readers. His summary shows this:

It is from these three limited perspectives - the school system as a formal organization, the classroom as a social system, and the external environment of the schools - that we propose to delineate some contributions of sociology to practitioners in the field of education.⁸⁹

Without doubt this material could be fitted into a theory of school learning as 'social variables' much more easily than the content offered to teachers by the British empiricists. It appears that Gross here, as in his contribution to the same journal in Period One, takes more seriously than do his transatlantic colleagues the problems of 'application' which their eagerness to advocate the discipline for itself causes them to gloss over. We

shall discover, in a moment, whether this is an appearance kept up when he writes for sociologists themselves. Certainly here he points out again the dangers as well as the benefits of bringing the fields of sociology and education more closely together, in a tone of voice which is much less imperative than Taylor's was. He claims to be very aware that the professional sociologist, aiming to describe and explain the world in some of its aspects and from just one point of view 'never deals with all the variables that the practitioner probably needs to take into account in his decision-making'.⁹⁰ That is, Gross has in mind the distinction between description and prescription that a Morris, say, would approve. His message to educators on behalf of the contributors to the symposium is, then, appropriately cautious. It is partial insights which sociologists offer. An example given is that the common assumptions made by teachers about the degree of agreement about goals or about roles within the enterprise 'may in fact be tenuous in many school systems'.⁹¹ A trained sociologist's analysis of the situation could reveal 'dysfunctional' elements such as the real disagreements on these matters which, once made explicit, are of value to the teachers concerned.

Examples of a more specific kind relate more closely to the classroom 'level' that Gross has identified. The functionalist analysis of the school class by Talcott Parsons which was to appear in the British 'Reader' looked at above, and suggestions for the use of sociometric techniques by the teacher, are offered as contributions of possible help to those whose immersion in everyday affairs does not typically allow them to see the less obvious

dimensions of their professional work. Another example would be the making available by sociology of the concept of 'reference group' with which a teacher could conceptualize a set of common problems related to groups with their 'clique norms and values'.⁹² He would then be in a position to deal with his problems in a more rational manner, knowing that the reference groups 'constitute "anchoring" points which have to be considered in inducing changed behavior'.⁹³ The point for us is, of course, that prescriptions for teachers who have to deal with, say, troublesome adolescents are more readily derived from this type of sociological concept than from the 'macro' material that was being emphasized in Britain at the time.

Even when Gross moves to the external environment of the schools, reminding us that 'A school system does not exist in a vacuum',⁹⁴ he appears to do so in a manner which is not likely to alienate the educator. Gross avoids, with this particular audience, any suggestion that the business of education is inferior to that of sociology or that the perspective of the latter has to be accepted without a process of assimilation that is necessitated - as we have argued - by the existence of two legitimate interests in the 'social' factors of education. His summary of the relationship between sociology and education is interesting both for its reference to 'intellectual tools' that parallels the work in philosophy of education of Scheffler in particular, and for its recognition that an educator is primarily a decision-maker and doer. As he says:

The basic sociological contribution is to add to the educator's kit of intellectual tools a set of sociological insights and concepts that will allow him to take account in his decision-making organizational, cultural, and interpersonal factors at work in his environment.⁹⁵

So marked is the difference in approach to non-sociologists by Gross here in comparison with Taylor towards his colleagues in the world of teacher training, that the comments we find when Gross contributes 'The Sociology of Education' to R.K. Merton's definitive Sociology Today need explaining for their surprisingly different slant on the same topics. He informs his professional peers that 'there is "gold in them thar hills", but additional prospectors are sorely needed'.⁹⁶ He admits that 'sociological' work in the field of education has the low prestige it has with his readers because it is the product of education departments and 'has little or no sociological relevance, largely consisting of hortative essays'.⁹⁷ On a Toulminian interpretation of this change in tone, we can perhaps save Gross from the charge of speaking - to add another vivid American idiom to the one he has used - 'with forked tongue' by recalling Rouceck's differentiation of the broad field of 'educational sociology' into several sub-fields, some of which are less guilty than others in the eyes of the purists.

A fair appraisal would then be that Gross, genuinely wanting to see educational thinking based on as rigorous a notion as possible of the various elements which enter into it as a synthetic and legitimately different enterprise from the orthodox academic disciplines, dismisses only those 'educational sociologists' who attempt, with this title, to claim a spurious intellectual status

to which they are not entitled. But, for educationists who make no exaggerated claims-by-implication of this type, and who are open to their 'kit of intellectual tools' being supplemented on their terms to do their kind of job, he has the high regard which comes clearly out of his article written specifically for them. In other words, he shows a realistic insight into the very complex relationships which obtain between these two academic sectors and writes accordingly, with the particular context much in mind.

Meanwhile, in Europe the 'politics' of academic life was such as to afford high status to 'pedagogy' in its relationship to a broad conception of philosophy - a conception closer to the non-analytical perspectives we have found unfashionably surviving in the Anglo-Saxon world. An uncompromising statement of the issues we have discussed is found in Martin Langeveld's 'Education and Sociology', written from the generalist point of view which is consonant with the continental tradition. This basis is seen at the outset when he complains that, in English, the term 'pedagogy' has not been retained to distinguish the study of the activity of educating from the activity itself. One consequence is expressed by Langeveld in a statement which admirably sums up the controversy investigated in this chapter, when he says that 'the term "educational sociology" may have the same meaning as "sociology of education" but it may also mean: sociology seen from the point of view of the educationist (as a representative of "pedagogy")'. ⁹⁸

It is the latter which he is concerned to defend against the orchestrated charges of 'methodological superficiality' ⁹⁹ such

as we have identified in Britain and America. Langeveld's focus of interest, which he quite consciously sets up against pressure from the discipline-advocates, is with the practical questions of education which, in his view, cannot wait. That is, he stands on the same ground as an Ottaway or a Collier. It is common ground for those inside education for whom 'the tendency to deal with the burning questions and practical situations of the moment [is] indicative of the wish to come down from the lofty spheres of speculation in order to serve where human needs are strongly felt'.¹⁰⁰ He thus expresses the generalist intuition in the rather grand manner of one writing in what to him is a foreign language.

Nevertheless, he presents a thorough and complex argument. Using the common European distinction between 'nomothetic' and 'individualizing' sciences which we touched on above, he invents the term 'educatiologist' to go with the latter sciences in order to distinguish a legitimate role for people like himself which is different from that of the 'sociologist' who relates to the former sciences. Langeveld wants to stress that material from the autonomous sciences such as sociology must, when claiming to bear on education, be assimilated along with other material from many quarters by the persons whose professional work lies inside education and whose standing is in no sense inferior - a fact which the new term is designed to emphasize. He puts it unequivocally that 'the responsibility for research, interpretation and theory must be in one mind: in the mind of the "educatiologist"'.¹⁰¹

Clearly, Langeveld shows the confidence of a theorist who writes within a long-standing generalist tradition. His views support

that position which, in Britain, was less thoroughly meshed with a higher-level, academically respectable philosophy and which, in America, was too commonly overlaid with lower-level accretions whose intellectual content we found Gross criticizing. For Langeveld, the educational enterprise is the most significant of all human activities and, therefore, the study of it with a view always to improve it, is the most important of all studies. As he says, in a Pilleyian statement: 'Education picks out the fundamental situation in which man is produced as a human being and in which he produces such beings'.¹⁰²

Consequently, the descriptive science of sociology must be subordinated to the normative theory of education which aims at developing 'good, desirable human relations',¹⁰³ not allowed to merely give its account of the human relationships as they actually exist at a particular moment in time as if this were all that was required in making educational thinking 'rigorous'. Langeveld insists that scientific sociology, along with all 'outside' disciplines, must be embraced within an architectonic study of man's most fundamental value-enterprise. Pedagogy to him is the most elevated of all studies, inter-relating fact and value from the most abstract to the most concrete level:

What matters is that these "values" function in education and in a concrete situation, that is: involving human beings immediately. As a situation can be defined as a complex of human experiences in which man must act, it is clear that "pedagogy", as a systematic study of this act and its conditions, is under all circumstances the fundamental determinant in combinations of different sciences with "education" if they are to contribute at all to the field.¹⁰⁴

This rebuff to the disciplines-approach could hardly have been made in such a manner other than on the Continent, where the academic 'pecking order' of subjects was not, as in Britain, such as to confer the lowest of statuses on Education as a subject. In the next chapter we shall see that Langeveld develops his lofty generalist position without the constraint of defending it, as here, against the claims of a single discipline. Meanwhile, we can leave this most formidable of the generalists to end the present chapter by crossing the border to Durkheim's own country in order to bring to a close a discussion which can be said to have ranged around the two interpretations of 'sociology' which different thinkers have given of his work.

J. Ader has a comment, in 'Développements Récents des Rapports de la Sociologie et de la Pédagogie en France', which helps to explain why Langeveld produced his counter-attack in this period; for in France, as elsewhere, 'there are', he says '...increasing signs of a notable tendency to move on from "psycho-pedagogy" to "socio-pedagogy"'. He regards this as a return to the Durkheimian tradition which petered out in the 1920s and which he wishes to remind his readers of:

L'idée de socio-pédagogie est plus ancienne encore: Durkheim ouvrait en 1902 son cours de pédagogie par cette phrase célèbre: "Je considère comme postulat même de toute spécialisation pédagogique que l'éducation est chose éminemment sociale, par ses origines comme par ses fonctions, et que, par suite, la pédagogie dépend de la sociologie plus étroitement que toute autre science".¹⁰⁵

Thus we end the chapter as we began it, for Ader, like Ottaway

and with a similar interpretation of Durkheim, makes clear the view that research on the one hand and the requirements of a practical enterprise on the other create two fields of study. And the 'practical' field is not inferior: if any such type of judgement were necessary, it would, in fact, favour the more complex rational enterprise, not the straightforward descriptive discipline. For, as Ader insists, sociology in education must focus on 'les préoccupations les plus essentielles des éducateurs eux-mêmes',¹⁰⁶ that is, the normative preoccupations that characterize their professional thinking. The sociology of education, like educational psychology, is certainly a part of its parent discipline: it is then no other than a description of an aspect of the world. But educational sociology, when taken to be different (as it has been in several sections of this chapter) is the social-normative theory of education that by now requires no further clarification.

We now, therefore, arrive at a point in our investigation when we can consider again educational theory of this type in that part of the reflexive literature which does not fall under the heading of a discipline. In doing so, we can by now expect that, as the content of for example Collier's and Langeveld's contributions to the present discipline-linked discussion has shown, 'old' theorists will once more be in evidence. Given this inevitable consequence of the nature of educational theory - that it implies ubiquity in its proponents - we shall accept it while still hoping that new voices will also be heard arguing on behalf of the generalist perspective as the discussion moves into the decade in which all such voices were to be muted for a time.

Chapter Nine

The Many Levels of General Theory of Education

It will be recalled that in Period One the chapter on educational theory was the most substantial even though the chapters ostensibly 'on' the disciplines had implicitly discussed the same topic. One reason for its length - apart from the large volume of literature to be taken into account under this general heading - was the need to differentiate the term 'educational theory' into different 'levels' in order to establish the central importance of the level at which it becomes teaching-learning theory. This need remains in the present period, but will be met by an investigation, wherever possible, of new writers who add insights to the logic already displayed, even though the main features of that logic are now clear - that educational theory is normative at all its levels precisely because the levels are inter-connected and the higher levels take it into the domain of ethics. This is a truth which, from Plato to Dewey, has been implied in thought about education and one which the humbler literature of Period One, thoroughly examined, confirmed. It is now further confirmed in the work of the first woman to appear in what is a male-dominated literature.

Helen Adams; The Positive, The Normative and The Pragmatic

Helen Adams, in her contribution 'Theory and Practice', expresses our theme in a very individual way by focussing more clearly on the question of levels of theory than any writer hitherto; and by providing us with some strikingly appropriate terms for what she is doing and what she finds. She is consciously engaged in what she calls 'a sort of meta-theory of theorizing'¹ a perfect description of our own investigation. Her labels for the three levels of theory that she wishes to discuss in relation to practice are, too, meaningful in the light of the present inquiry. She says 'These I will describe as the positive or descriptive; the normative; and the pragmatic or technical.'² Her purpose is to suggest, as a first analytical move, something familiar enough to us but disregarded by many writers in the literature as we have noted: the values that enter into education are not derivable from descriptive psychological knowledge no matter how widespread is the practice of theorizing on the assumption that, once psychology has spoken, what has to be done in education is clear.

A normative theory is required, she argues: 'one which attempts to give a coherent account of the purpose which ought to govern practice.'³ There is little need to name the many writers encountered in our inquiry who would assent to this; but few have emphasized the link between the internal elements of theory as well as she does.

She continues:

It is important to notice that all normative theorizing is likely to be implicated with a good deal of descriptive assertion, and also with a good deal of discussion as to the methods whereby the values it is concerned with can be achieved.⁴

Clearly, Frankena and Ottaway can be singled out from the earlier period as like-minded thinkers - as can Hirst at a later time. This is particularly the case because of the direction in which her argument moves - to an emphasis on the practicalities of teaching within this value frame of reference.

This 'how' of teaching is guided by her 'pragmatic' theory: it differs from normative theory 'in that, although it assumes that various ends are looked to as valuable, it is not concerned to examine what they are.'⁵ That is, it is 'technical' in the sense we have used on occasion. This concern with the means rather than the ends of education will obviously send the teacher-theorist to psychology first: much of the reflexive discussion under that discipline-heading has, in fact, been concerned with establishing this Adams-type pragmatic theory. The 'bridging' attempts examined in that context have been of this kind, though perhaps limited by their authors' close association with the discipline of psychology itself - a limitation not to be seen in Adams' broader discussion. She effectively establishes that the 'neutrality' of pragmatic theory is not that of a descriptive discipline but that of a level of theory which is still essentially prescriptive because it meshes with value-discussions carried on explicitly at a higher level.

At this level, all teachers have a theory, whether they know it or not, and whether it makes conscious reference to psychology or not. In her words, which mirror what we found in McFarland, this theory 'shows itself in all the systematizing of daily observations into rules in order to improve practice.'⁶ She makes an acute observation on the fact that even 'good' teachers tend to resist the notion that they are theorists in spite of the logic of their situation. And again, this reflects the views of another writer considered in an earlier chapter, for Peters' notion that the relationship between what is offered as educational psychology and the 'psychological' thinking of the good teacher needs reversing is paralleled here. What Adams refers to as 'the habit-forming knack of doing the right thing',⁷ which many teachers prefer not to bring into consciousness by the kind of reflection about it which talk of academic psychology would generate to become a 'positive hindrance'⁸ to their activities, points to the source in everyday professional experience of what educational psychology should concern itself with.

Her article thus consolidates in an unusually lucid way a variety of earlier investigations. It does so even more in its next step, which is to link her three kinds of theory to personal qualities found in the kind of teacher she has in mind - the kind who intuitively resists the notion that improvement in theorizing about teaching comes simply by being exposed to her 'descriptive' level as a body of knowledge to be learned. The notion that psychology, for instance, can be taught to student-teachers as a 'subject' in the hope that they will practise their vocation

more effectively is, to her, as naive as it was to Collier. She argues that 'this is too simple a notion, for the terms which appear in the psychologists' conclusions such as "learning", "reading". "adjustment", are ones to which, for the practitioner, various evaluative ambiguities attach'.⁹ The identification, here, of the term "reading" as having Schefflerian contextual meaning for the teacher, as against its meaning for the psychologist, is a mark of her insight into both the practical nature of teaching and its philosophical import.

The philosophy is clearest in the personalistic form that it takes with Adams at her normative level--the level of ends-discussion. A teacher's purposes, she insists, cannot merely be picked from what is available in a kind of philosophical warehouse. The process does not operate in that way, as it did not at the level of means. As she says of the teacher as a person: 'He cannot long evade theorizing for himself, since his whole work is permeated with evaluations from start to finish.'¹⁰ Thus, she dismisses the model of the restrictedly 'practical' man who draws his purposes from the one disciplinary sector marked 'philosophy' and then takes his means from the other marked 'psychology', because it has little place for the reflective, committed man who is the real teacher. We can recall that this earth-bound model is one commonly found in the literature - perhaps in its most unsubtle form in the work of Peel.

Her alternative model is that of the artist-teacher who attempts 'to discover, create or enact what is, in the classic phrase, "right or fine"',¹¹ as an involved total person with an 'aspiration towards an ideal':¹² activity in the arts is, unlike fact-finding, of this type. Not surprisingly, she cites, as we have seen that others in this tradition of educational thought cite, a wide range of literature to support her analysis. For example, on the fact-value issue which is central to the discussion she draws, as did Scheffler, on the pioneering work in ethics of C.L.Stevenson.¹³ Yet she ranges further afield than merely to such essays in technical philosophy, in keeping with her own thesis. Thinkers such as Whitehead, Newman and Rousseau are commended as examples of 'men whose writing on education brings to bear upon it a profound and unified philosophy of man and nature'.¹⁴

In a later article, as we shall now briefly note, she extends this search for gold amongst the dross into ancient as well as modern writings, motivated by the conviction that a person's perspective on what is worthwhile is largely dependent on the literature he is exposed to: his beliefs have an 'intimate relation to the panorama seen'.¹⁵ Thus, the normative understanding of a teacher, which embraces the pragmatic theory necessary for his day-to-day work, is developed only in the person who in his professional preparation encounters the inspiring material of 'the classic accounts of the development of the human heart and mind'.¹⁶ This cannot be developed through the study of orthodox texts which offer merely the current findings of academic disciplines and are uninformed by any consideration of educational relevance.

She annotates a selection of contemporary books in 'educational theory', thereby ostensibly defining the field in accordance with her more explicit analysis.¹⁷ At the same time, she develops her own normative theory through criticism of the very varied texts. At this stage of our investigation, one criticism only need be chosen - and then only for its conclusion - as a final comment from this most incisive critic of 'descriptivism' in educational theory. She reveals a lot about that world-outlook we have called 'personalism' when it is confronted with the 'scientism' which underlies much that we have examined when she says that 'one cannot but feel that the agglomeration of passions and perceptions which used to be referred to as the human soul is left, after Professor O'Connor has done with it, a pretty scorched piece of earth'.¹⁸

Adams is a writer who, like Frankena or McFarland, one does not want to leave, except that there are issues still to be touched on. An indication of her excellence can be given by contrasting her work with that of another woman who writes in the same period on the same topic. Margaret Sutherland, a future Editor of the British Journal of Educational Studies, writes in a metaphorical vein on 'Bi-focals in Education' to explain the 'estrangement between the educational theorist and the practising teacher'.¹⁹ Educational thinking needs to be both short-term and long-term, she argues. Immersed in everyday affairs, even the intelligent teacher finds it 'so much more natural to concentrate on short-term aims and forget general aims whose achievement is uncertain'.²⁰ She therefore pleads for a recognition of this reality by everyone in education-in all sectors and at all levels-so that wider matters

are not forgotten. In short, she operates with the concepts of 'pragmatic' and 'normative' theory as so beautifully analyzed by Adams but without the background so evident in the other's contribution which makes it such a compelling essay in both clarification and substantive philosophy. Sutherland's article is on the 'same' topic but, in its homeliness, illustrates the great differences that are possible in defending a notion of 'relevant' educational theory.²¹ In a sense, the tone of her message belies the philosophical implications of its content and sends the reader back to Adams with an even greater appreciation of such high achievement, in terms of our account, by one so little known.

From Adams we move to the other pole of educational thinking and another new voice, writing not in the educational journals but, characteristically, in the Universities Quarterly. In 'The Empty Prescription in Educational Theory' Edward Best brings pure Oxford-type analysis to bear on well-known writings.²² His recognition that 'indeed, all educational theory is prescriptive',²³ confirms our repeated findings, but his O'Connor-like development of the argument from that point is already indicated in the title of his article. The prescription he finds in much of the literature - for example in Jeffrey's Glaucon,²⁴ which was a very influential text of the time - are empty simply because no descriptions are given of the end-states deemed to be of importance by the authors.

He bluntly comments on the prescription offered in a typical passage from Jeffreys that it 'is so vague that we can neither agree with it nor disagree',²⁵ revealing an aggressive analytical

attitude that is far removed from that of his predecessor in such criticism of Jeffreys - the amiable Reid.

Teachers do not know what to do after reading such theorizing, Best argues: they must respond with the old question 'So what?' Rhetorical commendations are immune from attack (other than Best-type linguistic attack!) because of this lack of description of the ends of the essentially normative enterprise of education - of 'the kind of men it produces.'²⁶ We can see, here, that Best parallels Frankena's emphasis on the 'dispositions' aimed at in education, and anticipates Peters' similar emphasis on the defining features of the 'educated man'. But this association is not what we can take from a writer who is new to the discussion for our purpose, at this late point in the inquiry. Rather, we can glance at the implication of his remark that he himself, in harshly criticizing the persuasive, hortative language of a kind of literature which has widespread approval, is likely to suffer the fate of the iconoclast; for, as he informs us, 'to challenge their propriety is to put oneself outside the educational pale'.²⁷

This, written in 1960, is an interesting piece of evidence in favour of our often repeated comment on the 'isolation' of writers on education such as Best himself. Not only can he be identified by us as one of a large and familiar class of 'tough-minded' analysts, but his targets also fall within a totally different tradition of educational thinking which we have seen developed in many forms, some of which are not so easily disposed

of as a reader of this article alone might suppose. Best's confidence in the uniqueness of his own iconoclasm is, perhaps, not wholly unrelated to the fact that he shows no signs of having a thorough knowledge of all the relevant literature - not only that of like-minded predecessors but also that which, for nearly a decade, had refused to accept the narrow conception of analytical philosophy which he now so enthusiastically commends. His targets are selected in such a way that the total context within which they were offered as meaningful for education is ignored. We, of course, are familiar with that context and, having just examined one high-quality product of it in Adams's work, are not as disposed to applaud the 'rigour' of Best's contribution as he is of his own work. This is not to say that his work too is of a quality other than first-class, given the frame of reference within which it is produced. It is, rather, to question the adequacy of the frame of reference itself on grounds that we now have little need to repeat, and to identify an enthusiasm for philosophical technique in this writer which must be balanced by the measured comments from Period One of, say, Broudy on the 'puppy dog analysis', as he called it, that was quickening the pulse of his young graduate students.²⁸

In providing a comparison with Best we can look at A.M.Kean whom we saw, in an earlier chapter, being sharply critical of O'Connor. In the present period, he wrote forewords to one of the Institute of Education journals which reveal that this sector of the academic world needs to pay particular attention to the various levels of educational theory. Kean, that is, focusses on issues that are discussed by the two women above - issues which

for Best were only secondary to his 'demonstration of philosophical technique for the benefit of a more scholarly audience. Kean has a striking phrase for educational theory: it is, he says, 'a field where school milk and Plato are both important'.²⁹ The practise of teaching 'embodies a whole range of theory'³⁰ to him as much as to Adams. But of most interest to us is the comment that he makes on the relationship between the levels of theory, for it shows that 'logical' observations are made by persons in the thick of things which are in accordance with some of the most rigorous philosophizing we have discovered. Of a teacher's theory he says

... this theory, with its personal and local characteristics, is in structure and content very like the more general theory...It is, as is natural, more bitty, even less integrated, less stable and more vague. But it is a theory and it is the same kind of theory as the more public theory of Education.³¹

About this we can remark that these very words apply to Kean's own meta-comments in relation to the 'grander' expressions of the same notion mentioned in them. Certainly his starting point for the generation of theory is familiar from elsewhere, being what he describes as 'the initiatives, the decisions and the plans of teachers engaged in the successful "practice" of education.'³² We have encountered this so many times and in so many divergent contexts that elaboration is unnecessary. But it provides an appropriate observation on which to turn from the newcomers to the debate concerning the nature of theory (or theories) to an old hand. We continue from the work of Adams, Sutherland, Best and Kean to Morris's The Study and Practice of Education, as

explicit a statement of generalism as can be found anywhere.

This is Morris's inaugural lecture, given on moving from research to a chair in Education. The audience would have been drawn from both worlds of teacher training as well as from the wider university 'of the disciplines', as it were. He comes immediately to the central theme by asserting that, 'in studying these disciplines as they are often presented, the student is not studying education at all, but something else'.³³ This is the Morris of the scholar-student distinction boldly generalizing to subjects other than the history of education. Educational theory, to him, is not constituted in this way precisely because it is the 'personal and moral aspects'³⁴ of the process of studying it which are of primary importance to the personalist we have always found him to be. At this time - 1958 - he is most aware of the growing pressure on the subject of Education from the direction of the behavioural sciences, and he responds accordingly. The salient feature of education which the study of it must distinguish from other features of interest to the descriptive sociologist, for example, is still to him its concern with the value of a person. The study must be 'in terms of the human relationships involved in education, the encounters between the persons engaged in the enterprise'.³⁵ This is his old story, fully told on a unique occasion.

It is not, of course, that Morris is unsympathetic to the attempts being made by academic disciplines to relate more closely to education. But his primary purpose is to show that there is

a different kind of discipline in the general educationist's awareness of that process which he describes as 'an adventure in mutuality'.³⁶ So he puts the question, which is 'in the air', to himself quite explicitly:

Where is its discipline? Apart from the disciplines of its ancillary studies, scientific, historical, etc., which must be involved but which I think we may sometimes be inclined to overstress at present in our teaching, ³⁷ has it any more characteristic discipline?

We are aware already of his positive answer. The discipline in a teacher's thinking consists in his awareness of his own intentions as a participant in a value-enterprise - an awareness which is a result of psychological insight into those intentions, where 'psychology' means something much wider than the orthodox academic subject. This personalistic thinking or theorizing is a mode on its own - essentially 'philosophical' and undoubtedly disciplined, in that the student of education who thinks within it 'is faced with the most exacting of tasks'.³⁸

The Pilleyian foundation of Morris's views is clearly in evidence. Subjects, including the subject of Education, are properly viewed as human achievements, not bodies of knowledge which are 'divorced' from the persons who create and continue to develop them. This emphasis on 'embodiment' provides an interesting link with the later work of Toulmin utilized earlier in our account. Though Morris's language, as when he says of the student's exposure to educational theory 'that his learning of it is a species of communion with those who created it',³⁹ is in

a different idiom to that of Toulmin; and an idiom which, no doubt, a Best or an O'Connor would not have much sympathy with. However, we have noted on a sufficient number of occasions the incomprehension of the tender-minded by the tough-minded. We can leave this splendid inaugural lecture pretty certain that the audience who heard it personally delivered would judge it according to their acceptance of one or the other of these two different criteria - the same criteria attached in our investigation, which has shown that this Morris in a new role is still the old Morris-with-a-message,⁴⁰ to the polarities labelled with the terms 'rigour' and 'relevance'. We turn then, to the main forum for holders of Chairs in Education, in which not just one but all the Professors of Education were discussing the nature of their subject.

The first of two important meetings of the Standing Conference that bear on our present theme was concerned with the relationship between educational psychology, philosophy and sociology; and was focussed on two papers given to over a hundred senior educationists.⁴¹ Peel presents his familiar argument and Roger Wilson offered the equally familiar humanistic point of view from Bristol University, based on the person-emphasis and containing the intriguing comment on the emerging discipline of sociology that it 'was the path only for some. It should be an option, not an obligation'!⁴² But it is the general discussion of the papers which concerns us more, for it exemplifies once more the complications which surround 'intellectual' debates about the nature of disciplines, and their relationship to educational theory, which we have in all nine of

our chapters described as being 'political'. The summary of the discussion records unanimous support for the inclusion of all the specialized areas in teacher training - the specialists being like members of a family working a small-holding, as it is put. However, there follows that comment which centres on the term 'disdain' that we have used throughout this investigation as evidence of the strong perception from 'inside' this world of teacher training of the 'political' realities of academic life. The commentator describes how:

...when the status of the small-holders was examined every eyelid was lifted, though there was always some doubt whether it was the social standing of each individual that each individual was concerned about, or the reputation of their common calling. What was clear, however, was the importance almost every speaker attached to academic respectability as the only armour against disdainful colleagues.⁴³

On this revelation we can, at this stage, content ourselves with no comment other than to recall the insights of Toulmin, Scharfstein, Wisdom, Gellner and like-minded philosophers. A year later, the Standing Conference shifted its focus of debate from the pole of rigour to the pole of relevance and listened to both Morris and Inglis on the achieving of unity in educational theory through the adoption of a personalistic perspective and by starting from the practical situation of teaching and not the academic discipline. Again, comment is not now necessary on this position, other than to pick out the striking phrase or the heightened insight. Morris says, for example, that 'The person is a concrete living reality, as well as a meta-physical concept denoting an ultimate mystery',⁴⁴ thereby presenting his colleagues, no doubt, with a challenging

problem of interpretation if they were still in the frame of mind characteristic of the preceding annual conference. No doubt, too, they responded to the challenge in their own ways!

Inglis, too, offers his already-examined viewpoint. He cites, for his peers, Kierkegaard's rejection of systems in philosophy 'because they dealt with human experience from the point of view of the spectator and not the participant',⁴⁵ and, in so doing, provides us with a useful indirect comment on the two Standing Conferences themselves. For they, in their contrasted emphases - and indeed, teacher training generally as an institution - suggest that advocates of the disciplines-approach are 'spectators' in the enterprise whose primary interest is less in what is viewed than in the manner in which it is viewed. Whereas the arguments of the generalists who are tied to no one discipline can be labelled as those of Inglis-type 'participants' who have a background in the business of educating and who wish to articulate the theory of that enterprise as a 'discipline' in Morris's sense. It was, as we know, to be another decade before the 'participant' emphasis in teacher training was to recover sufficiently from the effects of the 'spectatorial' challenge that the first of these Standing Conferences illustrates to re-assert itself as appropriate to the work done with students preparing to be teachers.

As a 'contextual' addendum to our glance at the deliberations of educationists discussing at the highest level, we can note that personalist thinking looks less at home there than in, say, the

progressive sector of education served by such a journal as New Era which was introduced in discussing depth psychology in Period One. In that Journal, M. Braham's article, 'Becoming and Homecoming: Notes towards a Theory of Education'⁴⁶ reveals even in its title a type of thinking which is far from academic. Basing his views on psychologists such as Fromm, he develops the familiar existentialist notion that 'Man's knowledge of the world is personal, unique and necessarily subjective'.⁴⁷ Then he prescribes a type of educational theory which, by now, hardly needs spelling out - that which conceives of teachers 'not as observers or non-participants in educational theorizing, but as active and concerned persons'.⁴⁸ This is an appropriate observation on which to end this section and to focus, in the next, on the discussion of pedagogy in the British college world as a preliminary to revisiting the formidable Langeveld in Europe.

General Theory in Europe: Martin Langeveld Again

There was an Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education conference, in this period, on the theme of the disciplines in education. It is of some significance because Peters, who was not then in education as we know, was invited to lecture on the concept of a discipline. The conference is, therefore, the equivalent college-based discussion to that of the University-based Standing Conference noted above. In the Education for Teaching report the Editor gives an account of Peters' lecture in which

he had asked whether the subject of Education could be a discipline. She says: 'he appreciated that different subject disciplines were involved if a thorough study of Education was pursued. "It is a matter," he said "of training a person as a philosopher, as a historian and as a psychologist".'⁴⁹ Her own response to this prescription is to doubt whether it can be realized, on the grounds that only good students have the capability it implies.

This is one type of response found in the discussion; and, as is clear, it is an objection, not on grounds of logic but of impracticability. J.D.Browne, however, indicates another type of response, which is closer to our interests, when she asks the question foremost in the minds of many who had listened to Peters at this critical time in the development of training college courses: 'can the aim, implicit in the three year course, of making training college work stiffer and more stimulating, be achieved without sacrificing the value of a truly professional training?'.⁵⁰ Her own answer draws attention to a range of matters which she claims were 'hardly touched on by Dr.Peters', and it is not difficult to identify, from her summary of the members' discussion, educationists whose work we have examined. Collier, for example, would be likely to have urged at this conference the resistance to importing pure academic disciplines into a sector where the stress on personal values of the teacher and the taught was the long-standing basis of courses. This type of resistance is summed up in Browne's description of educational theory as 'a professional discipline, comparable to medicine, rather than a defined academic field'.⁵¹ Certainly Peters' reception by the older generation

of educationists at this level is in marked contrast with the keenness that was to be shown by a new generation - in the expanding world of the 1960s - to embrace the 'discipline' perspective.⁵²

If we look at a letter from a visiting Canadian professor - M.V. Marshall - in the same issue of the journal which carries this conference report, we can see that the tension between the two perspectives was no parochial affair. He asks the familiar question: 'What is Education (with a capital "E")?...What is the pedagogical discipline, if any?',⁵³ and uses the phrase 'down-the-nose-looking'⁵⁴ to describe the attitude of academics to the kind of attempts at an answer which we have displayed as 'generalist'. He thus confirms that in his own country the same 'disdain' as that which we noted the Standing Conference were so conscious of was the norm. But he is no Collier, Morris or any of the other unimpressed listeners to the typical voice of the University. Given the reality of the situation for teacher trainers who want to improve the status of their work, Marshall concludes that Education must be 'either history, or philosophy, or psychology, or sociology, or methodology, or whatever, and not a hodge-podge drawn from several fields'.⁵⁵ But what is a 'hodge-podge' to E.V. Marshall is a metaphysical necessity to the indomitable Langeveld, as we shall now see.

Even the title of his article - 'Disintegration and Re-integration of "Pedagogy"'⁵⁶ - has a clear meaning in terms of the present point at issue. Disintegration to him is what 'differentiation' is to the discipline specialists. But he thinks

on an even broader scale than that assumed in the specialist-generalist dispute, for all the contributors to that presuppose an institutional setting for 'education' which is too narrow for the European mind of Langeveld, who indicts them because '"education", in the Anglo-Saxon horizon, has indeed shrunk to school education, to problems of what a school has to do'.⁵⁷ To him, the didactic emphasis of the whole content of educational thought, from Plato to the emerging specialized disciplines, is tacitly based on the notion that education is largely confined to knowledge-transmission in formal institutions. This is certainly radical comment on the grand scale!

For him, the process of education, which is the focus for many-levelled theory or pedagogy, takes place from the cradle to the grave.⁵⁸ One of its most important episodes is that in which no professional 'educator' is present at all - whether generalist or specialist in his thinking - for in the pre-school period children have their parents as their main teachers. So, one of the presuppositions of Langeveld's position on pedagogy is precisely that a theorist should show the same concern and commitment in his thinking about education generally as he shows in the upbringing of his own children. As we have noted before, and find in this writer emphasized as a major feature of his thinking, the natural commitment of the parent is the model for the really professional educator. Langeveld clearly suspects that much research and theoretical pronouncement on education, particularly when it is offered by specialists in a single discipline, is likely to be

motivated by considerations other than that of ensuring for the next human generation what the educationists in question would want for all children if they were, by a miracle, their own offspring. He thus thinks along lines which are remarkably close to the position in moral philosophy of Richard Hare who argues that the problems of that discipline are best appreciated by simply considering how we ought to bring up our children.

Langeveld casts a dubious eye over the 'conglomerate of educational studies',⁵⁹ remembering the child who is at the centre of all this effort, and pronounces in a language which is permeated with 'generalism'. 'We cannot doubt', he says, 'the necessity of re-integrating these different approaches into the unity and coherence of one theory'.⁶⁰ There is no sign at all that he is inhibited by the prestige of the academic disciplines - no sign that he will compromise a fundamental viewpoint just because convention attaches institutional status only to recognized 'subjects' as the vehicles for 'rigour'. He is intentionally defiant in expressing himself.

...no disintegration can undo the essential unity of the field of education; no human appreciation or depreciation can deny the final belonging together in a well integrated unity of things seemingly so widely apart as e.g. the sociology of the family, the theory of the basic personality...,etc.etc.'⁶¹

We can 'locate' him by suggesting that he has the message of a Collier heightened by his consciousness of a supportive European tradition in philosophy which would provide a Best with material for a lifetime's linguistic analysis!

His work, that is, invites reflection on the two obvious poles within which our investigation has oscillated. He asserts, from the one pole, that pedagogy 'has become the most tragically topical science of our times,'⁶² given the state of the world and the urgent decisions needed as to what improvements in it we want for our children and what methods we can create to achieve those improvements. He refutes the common assumption that schools can only reflect society here, as in his earlier work on the sociology of education. On the contrary, he argues, education - not just school education - transmits our conception of what it is to be human; so, given the features of the world in which we all, specialists included, actually live, 'it is no more the necessity of well integrated research that commands the unifying "pedagogical theory", it is life itself which does so now'.⁶³

In sum, Langeveld is an academic who is anti-academic. There is about his writing something which makes it easy to see why one cause of the opposition between 'technical' and 'philosophy-of-life' educationists, which has been a main object of the present inquiry, is to be found in the influence on the latter group of a continental conception of philosophy which is completely alien to the Anglo-Saxon empirical tradition.⁶⁴ To Langeveld, this conception is the natural one. It determines the extent to which he expresses himself here, on an apparently limited educational topic, in habitual 'metaphysical' terms. Educational theory is not, to him, the adding together of

specialized bits and pieces on offer from institutional departments, but 'the unifying, integrating, coherent, basic theory of interpretation'⁶⁵ of all the knowledge which bears on the re-creation of humanity in the shape of the next generation.

In his idiosyncratic way, he presents the generalist thesis which we saw Frankena present in Period One from within a less oratorical philosophical tradition. What they have in common is breadth; but what remains in the mind from a reading of the European thinker is the strikingly individual way in which the complementary rejection of narrow, single-subject interests in education is bluntly stated, at a time when such interests were threatening to 'disintegrate' the necessarily unified thinking of the 'true' educationists - that is, Langeveld's 'educatiologist' labelled in his earlier exhortation. For what such a professional person has is 'the responsibility that every parent has, the responsibility to point a way and to help the child along it instead of losing the child in the bush of the thousand aspirations of the "specialists",'⁶⁶ With such a lofty reprimand to all those for whom education is less a commitment to a cosmic enterprise than a vehicle for getting on in life, we can end this section and move on to examine educational theory at the more restricted 'level' of the curriculum.

A Great Variety of Curriculum Theory and Theorists.

We noted in Period One that it is this level of theorizing about education which eventually, during the 1960s and 1970s, was to emerge as the preferred focus for those interested in making theory more 'relevant' to practice than it had become in its differentiated forms. It is with this later orientation in mind that we can conceptualize the movements taking place in our literature. There is a later encyclopaedia article on 'Curriculum Theory' by Michael Golby which is useful for this purpose, for it has been found by the present writer to be unique amongst later overviews of the various sectors of educational studies in making sense of the period we are interested in by providing 'labels' that fit quite well our own inquiry. As has been mentioned before, most later accounts are written as if worthwhile educational studies were born about 1960, and they are, therefore, useless for comparison with such a close focussed investigation of earlier years as the present one. From Golby we can take the observation, which already brings to mind familiar material from our many contexts, that 'The traditions I identify may be dubbed the "technocratic", the "liberal-humanist" and the "anthropological-relativist".'⁶⁷

In our Period Two there is something close to his third tradition which is in evidence, forcefully argued in a book of large scope, whereas in Period One it was the reinforcing of the technocratic tradition which we found worth noting. The significance of the second edition of Fundamentals of Curriculum Development by B.O.Smith, W.O. Stanley and T.H.Shores⁶⁸ is, first, that it

appeared at a time when educational thinking generally was under some pressure of that 'technocratic' kind to move away from liberal-humanism: this is not a bad way of describing, in the terms of another commentator, a large part of our whole investigation - not just that concerned with curriculum theory. These three American authors present, therefore, a large alternative to narrower conceptions of theorizing: in its fundamentals it goes back to Dewey and offers a social view of education which contrasts with, say, that of Tyler (who appears in the book only in a footnote.) In one sense, it can be regarded as a massive American equivalent to Collier's book, ranging as it does over the disciplines yet with a primary focus on the content of education.

Its comprehensiveness bears witness to the inter-relationship of all the sectors we have examined separately. Clearly, where curriculum is equated with culture, the breadth of the prescriptive theory of the curriculum will be such as to embrace much material that would fall easily under educational sociology as we have defined it elsewhere, as well as under the heading of other disciplines. In short, the title of this large book invites a scrutiny of it in this section but, by now, we are sufficiently aware of the kind of 'logical homogeneity' of the whole domain of educational studies in its reflective parts that it is no surprise to find that much of its content would have contributed very well to the argument of earlier chapters.

Nevertheless, all the authors' material is gathered in to relate to content-selection as the unifying topic. Content must be selected, they argue, using a social criterion; that is, 'curriculum principles and procedures should be grounded in social reality',⁶⁹ not in God or eternal truths or science or any other alternative that has featured in the history of curriculum-making. Provided that the society in question is a democratic one, then this criterion - which is based on the fact 'that the school is the agent of and derives its authority from the society that maintains it',⁷⁰ - is justified. The proviso about the kind of society is important, for it is only in such a society that man makes himself more human by making himself more 'social' in an Aristotelian sense. Their emphasis, it can be seen, is on a humanism which is significantly different from the 'individual' humanism to be found in the personalistic writers examined at many points above. Man, they insist:

...lives in and through a particular culture. Hence the ends of education are inherently social ends, determined by the requirements, the problems, and the aspirations of the society of which the child is a member. This truth ⁷¹is the rock on which education always rests.

We can pass by the question which might be raised by a Frankena as to how the relativist implication of this statement - that ends are 'desired' - would stand up to a moral philosopher's analysis of that term in comparison with the ethical term 'desirable'. For their main purpose is less merely to assert it as a truth than to translate it into both a curriculum theory which is displayed and defended against alternative theories, and to do so within a meta-theory of theorizing which is of more immediate interest to us.

So, they answer the reflexive question about the nature of theory both explicitly in their incidental discussions and ostensibly by describing and criticizing various forms of curriculum - the subject curriculum, activity curriculum, core curriculum and others. Then, as conscious as they are to the fact of social change as we have seen Collier and the empirical sociologists to be in their contrasted ways, they declare their own commitment to a type of curriculum which takes change and the need to control its nature into account, based on their belief that 'Democratic reconstruction is the business of education - or rather, it is the education process itself'.⁷² Thus, a work in curriculum theory moves, at all points, towards the philosophy of education of a particular type; for with such language as this the all-embracing reconstructionism of Brameld is at once called to mind. The seamless fabric of reflexive educational thought displays itself once more.

The upshot of a very detailed discussion is that all other theories of the content of education - whether they are derived from conventional subjects, from a child-centred perspective or from focussing afresh on knowledge as structured in the academic disciplines - are inadequate in comparison with the one that they derive from their philosophical-sociological analysis. Such a theory provides a curriculum which is centred on significant social problems; one which provides the pupil 'with the necessary bases for intelligent thought and action'⁷³ in relation to the problems. This curriculum is directed not only at the learner's intellect, but at his attitudes too. In Schefflerian terms, the 'social-problems'

curriculum teaches not only know-that and know-how, but also the vital 'know-to' concerning 'the present social situation, with its trends, its problems, and its potentialities'.⁷⁴

Thus, Smith, Stanley and Shores paint on a much broader canvas than other writers we have examined as curriculum theorists. Yet their inter-disciplinary thinking is structured to support prescriptions right down to classroom level for those whose everyday involvement in education does not rule out - indeed, is complementary to - an awareness of how the wider social world both is and ought to be. As mentioned, they are at the opposite pole to the education-mirrors-society thinkers; for as they say: 'In the last analysis the social-problems criterion of curriculum content is a corollary of the function of education embraced by the theory of education as social reconstruction'!⁷⁵ However, the exalted part to be played by schools in this optimistic 'philosophy' is of relevance to our inquiry, not as a proposition to be substantively debated but as a further indication that the wider questions of education are inescapable no matter what the context, and that they are answered at all levels and in all sectors by the reflective educator in equally inescapable generalist language. In this contribution to the debate, which Floud and Halsey would no doubt judge to be sociologically naive, we have the kind of normative theory which was bound to reappear as a force in educational thinking once the specialists' offering had been found wanting.

However, there is little need to go beyond the literature of curriculum theory itself to find a contrast with the comprehensive approach of Smith, Stanley and Shores. At the end of Period Two, G.A. Beauchamp produced a book with the unqualified title Curriculum Theory in which he examined the various traditions in the field. One of his comments is significant for our present theme, particularly in relation to that discussion of it we have just examined. He finds that there is 'no logical and consciously identified set of constructs behind the language being used',⁷⁶ signalling in his own language a perspective which is, if classifiable in the terms we have borrowed from Golby, 'technocratic' in a philosophical way. He wants 'tighter' theory as surely as the discipline-specialists want rigour; but he wants it in the field associated with 'relevance'.

The taxonomies such as we saw emerging in Period One do not satisfy Beauchamp. There needs to be, he argues, the construction of theories and sub-theories within a prior 'curriculum theory model'. This would contain both descriptive and normative assumptions, definitions of technical terms and prescriptions for the design of curricula. Clearly, he wants to make theories which are essentially practical in function more rigorous by analyzing this function in a type of discourse that the field has not yet seen - one with a distinctly 'logical' appearance. The components of his model are displayed as 'neutral' with respect to the various substantive interpretations they could be given, so that a particular curriculum theory would be formulated only when choices were expressed at

this second stage. That is, Beauchamp is meta-theorizing: he is offering a more systematic map than has been available to the wide-ranging curriculum field, as a basis for research to be undertaken in the different sectors identified. His intention, in this technical-looking analysis, is to allow the behavioural sciences to be effectively related to the central practical issues of education by being 'interpreted' into the various sub-theories which constitute global curriculum theory. In sum, Beauchamp here reveals all the traits of a specialist, but in a different cause: and the possibility of curriculum theory becoming itself a highly specialized area with all the Toulminian marks of aspiration to an important place in academic life must occur to any reader who is familiar with the literature we have so closely examined.

That is, Beauchamp moves as ambitiously in the direction of logical systematicity in this book as did Smith, Stanley and Shores in the direction of a reconstructionist Weltanschauung: and both books show this as contributions to that limited sector of educational studies which 'contains' normative theory within the term 'curriculum' as an indication of its very practical intent. The tendency to move 'outwards' in this way - or, rather in these two opposite ways - from the practical affairs of education to the abstractions of theory deemed still to be relevant to them could be taken, on the evidence of these two American books, to be inevitably at the cost of forsaking the intuitive 'good sense' that we have noted is often found in the writings elsewhere of those we can call 'liberal-humanists'. We can, then, return to Britain to consider

a book which is located somewhere within the third of these named traditions of curriculum theorizing. There is no trace of high-powered transatlantic influences in Stanley Nisbet's Purpose in the Curriculum: yet it attempts, in its own way, the similar task of drawing together wide-ranging materials to focus on the central practical issues which characterize the field of curriculum. He puts the matter well:

An attempt has been made to form the multifarious principles underlying existing educational practice into a manageable map. This is not a book on teaching method, nor on educational psychology, nor on educational philosophy, nor on educational sociology, nor on curriculum reform. Rather it is a simple chart of the educational field with a set of practical objectives as reference lines...its aim is rather to arrange existing material into a working system.

In spite of this firm disclaimer concerning the disciplines, and his overt 'traditionalism',⁷⁸ Nisbet displays, for those seeking the logic of theory, a sensible grasp of relationships between the elements which is lacking in many more ambitious contributions to the literature. He offers 'a reasonably comprehensive set of intermediate practical objectives'⁷⁹ within a framework which does not ignore the wider cultural environment yet which affords due weight to the notion of personal growth. He then measures the conventional curriculum against these objectives in order to indicate its limitations. He thus sees himself as providing 'stepping stones to help us to relate theory to practice';⁸⁰ that is, as setting up a useful, realistic, practical theory which is not divorced from the findings of systematic inquiry. His table of studies and

objectives, offered with a 'homely' analytical commentary, is modestly designed to 'assist the reformer, if only because it makes it impossible for him ever to underestimate the complexity of the task'.⁸¹

All in all, there is something about Nisbet's approach, particularly when it is examined immediately after Beauchamp, which must remind the reader of McFarland, an equally 'sensible' writer who does not succumb to the temptation to 'solve' problems by inventing a jargon. For Nisbet is concerned 'not only with techniques but with broad outlook and imaginativeness',⁸² and it is no surprise to find that his book is dedicated to Sir Godfrey Thomson who would no doubt have appreciated its identification of content as the most important element in education because, as Nisbet puts it, 'it is the orchard in which the fruits grow'.⁸³ Neither is it a surprise to find that, when Nisbet moves to the other side of his 'stepping stones' - as he must, given the nature of the exercise he has set himself - he provides a distinctly personalistic solution to the problem posed by there being, as he puts it, 'clear cut paradigms of two types of educational theory'.⁸⁴

These two paradigms are familiar enough from our earlier discussions. Nisbet refers to them as 'pupil-centred theory' and 'community-centred theory',⁸⁵ and uses the term 'internalism' for the view that values are located in persons as contrasted with 'externalism' which locates values in society.⁸⁶ His conclusion is typically Scottish in that, like many of his countrymen whom we have examined, he attaches significance 'not so much to either the individual or his environment as to the occurrence of their

interaction'.⁸⁷ Thus, he derives the philosophy which is presupposed in the unpretentious prescriptions of his earlier sections from such thinkers as Buber and the existentialists, and shows himself of the company of Pilley, Inglis, Morris and Reid, while attempting to bring their kind of thinking close to the realities of everyday teaching.

However, in spite of his very practical aim, the final stress in his work is on what lies 'behind' the everyday business of education if it is to be education at all and not a mere routine. He is content to allow the last word on the nature of educational theory to a thinker who would no doubt be regarded by Beauchamp or even Smith, Stanley and Shores as an odd authority to cite in relation to contemporary curriculum theory. For he concludes: 'When Froebel said that education should make the inner outer and the outer inner, he perhaps gave us the quintessence of educational theory'.⁸⁸ Thus, once more, discussion of education soars inevitably from the mundane to the metaphysical. Froebel, himself so much indebted to the Absolute Idealism of his day and yet so involved in the practicalities of schooling, is here linked with the 'personalist' inheritors and developers of the idealist philosophy. The educationists of different centuries seem to show a common feature in that their commitment to the concrete activities of education is generated by the very substance of their philosophies.

So, Nisbet's normative theory of the curriculum has, for all its modest initial claims, to be embedded in a wider normative theory of education which, taken with justifications of its elements available in the tradition within which its author works, becomes

a full-blown philosophy of education. One step only needs to be taken from a self-satisfied description of existing practice in education and, as we have repeatedly noted and confirm with this book, there is no limit to the journey embarked upon. We can now test this assertion in examining one last contribution to the literature of curriculum theory before we pick up again the theory of teaching which, as we saw that Nisbet himself recognized above, is at an even more 'basic' level.

Lauwerys and Holmes, in contributing to the curriculum discussion, are not likely, as we know, to restrict their analysis as editors of a substantial yearbook in the area.⁸⁹ Their introduction makes this clear, for their 'central concern is a better understanding of the theory of the curriculum'⁹⁰ and to this end they devote both a long preliminary essay and section-introductions in a volume equal in size to its impressive predecessor in the philosophy of education. They see their first problem as conceptual, arguing that the theory of any activity requires some preliminary definition. Their decision 'to use the term in a narrow sense as "a formal system of learning experiences organised for the purpose of integrating the growing child into adult society"'⁹¹ raises, for us, the Schefflerian question as to whether their definition is descriptive, stipulative or programmatic.

That it is programmatic could be guessed from their earlier work and the subsequent discussion confirms this. They have a view of what the curriculum ought to be in order to serve purposes they believe to be morally justifiable. This emerges when they inspect the 'traditional' notion of the curriculum which, in their judgement,

'aims at selecting and training the few. It is aristocratic - an education of elites'.⁹² Clearly, then, their prescriptions will be along lines already quite familiar from the 'democratic' orientation of Smith and his colleagues. And, indeed, just as we noted that the American authors were providing a contemporary statement of a Deweyian philosophy, so the British pair are equally aware of the same tradition and the considerable amount of curriculum thinking associated with it. To it they add another historical element by commending Herbert Spencer as the first philosopher to ask the key question as to what knowledge is the most worth. In this way, they 'locate' their own discussion with reference to Dewey, about whose unique synthesizing work they say:

And through him has been brought into the realistic problem approach of Spencer, an epistemology, a social theory, and a psychology which have given direction to make these curriculum proposals practical possibilities.⁹³

In the light of this prelude to what is clearly to be an optimistic view of possibilities in curriculum theorizing, we can recall the judgement of Beauchamp on the conceptual inadequacy he found in a field dominated by the influence of which Lauwerys and Holmes here approve. This seems a harsh judgement when we note, in this one quotation above, all the elements with which our lengthy investigation has been concerned - philosophy, sociology, psychology and the focus in practical theory. But what is of special interest is that these two authors develop their argument, once it is firmly fixed within the tradition they describe, to a point where the 'need for a science of education'⁹⁴ becomes clear to them. Again,

knowing their backgrounds, we find that this belief comes as no surprise. They believe in 'the Baconian dream that man should control his environment in the light of reason'⁹⁵ and the strength of this belief illustrates the complexities which emerge in any discussion of the nature of educational theory in any of its forms. For the individual viewpoints to be found within it defy the classifications used to introduce some conceptual order into the material and here two writers state a position which is not merely 'technocratic', yet is not, either, 'liberal-humanist' or 'anthropological-relativist'; though the 'scientific humanism' which can be detected in the work is certainly reminiscent of the contribution with that title which Lauwerys contributed to Judges' philosophical systems-survey examined above and which is similarly based on his view that values 'need interpretation in the new context of a technological society based upon science.'⁹⁶

However, our present purpose can best be served by passing from this thorough joint commentary to the individual article on 'Social Change and the Curriculum' by Holmes writing alone, in that it throws more light on the broad perspective within which the prescription of both of them - that the social sciences, including the 'educational sciences', should be developed as a matter of urgency - fits. We can recall that Popper as well as Dewey has influenced Holmes greatly. Hence he is committed to the view that man is responsible for his own normative laws and can change them. As he puts it: 'The position described as "critical dualism"... implies a threefold analysis - first of the normative pattern, then of the institutional configuration, and finally of their

associated context in any country or cultural area'.⁹⁷ Holmes was, of course, to develop this position in relation to other aspects of education than just the curriculum in his many comparative education writings during the years ahead.⁹⁸ Here, we need merely observe that it is a position whose origins we have examined previously in Period One and one which, in the present context, continues to illustrate the truth that whenever any aspect of schooling is under discussion, generalists like Holmes will contribute to it at all levels from the practical core to the philosophical periphery.

Nevertheless, it is important to find that level of theory at which the movement from the 'core' interests of the practical teacher to various zones of less determinate issues is not so rapidly made as in all the varied writings of this section so far considered. We discovered this level in Period One as teaching theory - that kind of theory which, in plain terms, is concerned with the 'method' aspect of a practitioner's job rather than the 'contents' aspect. In most situations, the teacher has, clearly, less decision-making authority with respect to the latter than he has over his actual techniques. His thinking, therefore, takes place most of the time at this level, a level which emerged in our earlier period and in a previous chapter of this period as related very closely to psychology rather than to the other disciplines. We turn, then, to the literature of this level which is not usually classified as 'educational psychology' but which provides a complement to the non-extrapolative work in that subject.

The Theory of Teaching: Towards Harry Knox or Asahel Woodruff?

Much of the considerable literature in this area is based on restricted personal experience which the author wishes to have published: the articles are anecdotal, descriptive and of little theoretical significance. A reminder, then, about the non-extrapolative work in educational psychology will allow us to sift from this mass of writing those contributions which mesh with the whole argument of this thesis. We have noted the emergence of a view in psychology which is best thought of as 'Ausubelian', even though his most systematic exposition of it lies forward in time from the literature under consideration. On this view, teaching is an activity which has to be based on a theory of school learning- the learning of what can be called 'conceptual' material. With this in mind, most of the little contributions to the various British journals appear as sadly a-theoretical and worth little attempt at relating them to such a well-articulated theory. However, the position in America is somewhat different.

There was a lively 'conceptual' debate of the period in the Harvard Educational Review which is both 'method' orientated and of theoretical interest. Behind the contributors can be detected the presence of Scheffler, well-established at Harvard University and presumably in a position to exert personal influence on the protagonists. J.T. Shaplin, an Assistant Dean in the Graduate School of Education there, provided the initial focus for the debate. In an article on 'Practice in Teaching' he argues vigorously against what he regards as the simple positions taken up by those who

over-stress either its practice or its theory. Both, he maintains, 'fail to grasp the complexity of the process of teaching and the subtleties of the learning expected as a result of teaching'.⁹⁹ Their failure can be attributed to the shallowness of their analyses of the nature and tasks of a very practical activity which is, nevertheless, theory-laden. His own analysis is offered as a more rational laying-bare of fundamental assumptions and the great variety in the practice of teaching in order to commend that behavioural orientation which we have examined in a psychological context.

Not surprisingly, then, he is at some pains to criticize the opposed viewpoint, which to him is that which conceives of teaching as an art. His description of this brings to mind many writers from our own survey - such persons as see teaching, in Shaplin's words, 'as a unitary act, the elements of which are inseparable and organized in a highly personal, creative way'.¹⁰⁰ To Shaplin, the arguments of such thinkers are logically impregnable only because they are non-rational. Those who advance them see teachers as actors: they emphasize 'the dramatic, sensational, aesthetic, and idiosyncratic aspects of teaching'¹⁰¹ and thereby exclude from consideration the really important factors concerning the pupil and his learning which are capable of being rationally displayed. In sum, Shaplin is arguing - in a method-work context - for the application of scientific psychology to the problem of learning. Those who oppose him in the ensuing discussion will, therefore, be quick to point out all the objections which we have encountered in other contexts; that there are good reasons to judge Shaplin's own view as too simple, given the controversies about the nature

of educational psychology which characterize the reflexive part of its literature.

Nevertheless, what is of immediate interest is the extent to which the theory of teaching as found at this level of the literature continues, in spite of Shaplin's attempt to rise above the simple polarities within which it is discussed, to be discussed in a polarized way which has been well-recognized throughout our account. For he, thinking to resolve an issue, merely sets a discipline-based view against the 'mystique' of an opposition who assume a close similarity of teaching to the work of the artist. Though no doubt he was not too familiar with all the varied literature we have been examining, his comments are strangely like those to be expected from someone who was acquainted with the work of such personalists as Inglis - as when he, Shaplin, says that 'We will not be helped by the glorification of the intuitive and the personal'.¹⁰²

We shall in fact be returning to Inglis on the subject of techniques in a moment. Meanwhile, we can note the response to Shaplin in the same journal - one of the few which affords the opportunity for follow-up discussions. Two of his immediate colleagues criticize him in terms which show, first, that they are familiar with the current work on concept analysis in the philosophy of education and, second, that the view taken of the status of scientific psychology by philosophers of that persuasion is a sceptical one. D.W. Oliver and J.P. Shaver claim that Shaplin's position 'masks its lack of objective evidence with an imprecision of language'¹⁰³ and charge him with naivety dressed up as

sophistication. His assumptions and arguments are challenged on the basis of their own findings following a five-year search in psychological theory 'for constructs appropriate to the description and organization of teaching methods and materials'.¹⁰⁴ That is, in our terms, they bring to the discussion of teaching the knowledge that between pure psychology and classroom practice there is a gap to be bridged - the problem of 'application' is not, in their view, solved in Shaplin's way. He is, to them, 'deceptively optimistic about the present state of scientific pedagogy'.¹⁰⁵

The suspicion must be that 'politics' as well as the logic of the issue is important to them, given the institutional context in which they all work and the ferment of the times. One passage indicates this strongly and is further support for the Toulminian interpretation we have used elsewhere:

Teacher education as a university institution is relatively young. It is just beginning to reach the point of maturity where those involved in it can frankly admit that the teaching act, or better, the act of instruction, is not only extremely complex, but poorly understood as well.¹⁰⁶

As already mentioned, influencing this kind of observation is Scheffler and the burgeoning discussion of teaching as both act and enterprise which flowed from his work. The two authors imply that the mark of a proper university handling of complex issues is that it patiently moves towards solutions which match that complexity; that real understanding of the issues and real sophistication in dealing with them is possible only when the extent of our ignorance is frankly recognized. They therefore are critical

of Shaplin's confident assertion that he is providing a solution to the problem; and their reprimand echoes one of the arguments of this thesis - that 'rigorous' claims underestimate the complexity of the enterprise about which they are made. However, Shaplin could no doubt counter with the argument that the complexities of teaching and learning cannot wait on the discovery of modes of inquiry which would satisfy his methodologically over-sensitive colleagues, and that his kind of psychology is the best available source for throwing light on those complexities. We would merely add that the absence of an Ausubelian 'third approach' to the discussion is an indication of its 'political' origins in the Harvard institution. Even discussion at what appears to be the highest institutional level can be very parochial! The comments of another respondent, A.M. Kazamias,¹⁰⁷ suggests 'politics' too; for he finds Shaplin's argument weak both in its incomprehension of the teaching-as-an-art view and in its presentation of the opposing teaching-based-on-science view. He claims that the heavy prescriptivity of the article is 'based on mere impressions and general observations rather than reliable research findings'.¹⁰⁸ This observation, set against the criticism of Oliver and Shaver, can be explained most easily by noting Kazamias's explicit reference to Scheffler. We can surmise that his positive intention is to use this occasion of a public debate to declare that the really rigorous analysis of the theory-practice question is that which shows that teaching is an art 'beyond' whatever rules scientific inquiry can produce, but that, nevertheless, it is important for the art that such inquiry be carried out as rigorously as possible. That is, Kazamias is advertising Scheffler's

claim to the best insight into this problem, in citing him and offering a distinctly philosophical comment on the act of teaching with the statement that: 'The performance of the act is, whether we like the term or not, of the nature of an art. We may establish all the necessary conditions but by doing so we have not automatically established the sufficient conditions'. ¹⁰⁹

On this analytic-philosophical note in support of 'the personal' in teaching we can leave an aggressively-conducted debate between colleagues to examine once more an article by the avowed personalist Inglis. His 'Techniques in Education' opens with the cryptic assertion that 'The vice of our times is the insubordination of means'. ¹¹⁰ This sounds very much like the Inglis of the earlier article: yet, he proceeds to argue, in a sense against his other self, by identifying those who, because they stress the importance of ends in education, become implicitly 'critical of means and techniques' ¹¹¹ and thus present a one-sided view of the enterprise. Further, he admits that 'Much of the antagonism to educational techniques comes from personalist sources', ¹¹² so that it looks as if he will have some difficulty in throwing light on the lower level of theory.

However, the admissions of his prologue are merely designed to dramatize his so-far unadvertised belief that the personalist's scepticism about what he now calls 'psychological positivism' ¹¹³ can too easily lead him to evade the practical challenge 'by saying that if the teacher is an educated person, techniques do not matter'. ¹¹⁴ This is now clearly the Principal of Moray House rather than the armchair philosopher writing. To him, the real personalist embraces all levels of educational theory. To operate in education

on any other basis is to misunderstand its nature. 'The argument', he says, 'that because means have become insubordinate, means must be abolished is futile as well as being nonsensical'.¹¹⁵ The whole truth he expresses in words derived from the same Kantian dictum that we have noted on other occasions is used to describe the thought-and-action situation of the teacher:

If it be true that techniques without theory are blind, it is also true that theory without techniques is ineffectual. But we need not choose between theory and techniques. The fascination of the world of education lies in the tension between the existent and the ideal.¹¹⁶

Inglis has here found the right words for the 'fascination' of his calling for the involved teacher. Such a teacher works in a concrete situation whose deficiencies are plain when measured against some notion of the good life for man which requires thinking through at a very abstract level without becoming divorced from the everyday scene which occasions it. This thought-process is what makes teaching the most significant of all occupations when it is present in the mind of the teacher, and what makes it a sham when it is missing. The account of techniques given here therefore ranges wide to provide the proper context - from Marcel, Berdyaev and Heidegger through psychoanalytical research to the experience and judgement of skilled practitioners. In his stress on the multi-levelled nature of educational thinking, Inglis even commends the logical structure of Dewey's total work, for, as he says, 'the practical impact of theories that have been translated by their originator or his disciples into techniques'¹¹⁷ is evidence that

the nature of educational theorizing has been grasped. With this observation we can appropriately turn to text-books for students which are intended to have this 'practical impact', to inquire whether such more extended treatments of 'method' work combine realistic guidance without losing touch with those wider issues that give it 'normative' significance.

Of the two books we shall scan, that from Britain is the Introduction to Educational Method by Knox, whom we last saw very early in this thesis as an outspoken critic of the dominance of statistical psychology in educational studies. Here, too, he eschews psychology as the source of method, preferring an approach to the 'general principles' which is 'more historical and synoptic'.¹¹⁸ And it is not only scientific psychology which he rejects, as having no clear 'application' to the practical job, but also the 'common-sense' psychology of the teacher. That is, neither Peters nor what Peters criticizes in this area would suit him, for he believes that 'the conscious application of systematic knowledge to particular teaching situations'¹¹⁹ relates to that knowledge which has accumulated from the past and not to that which is found in contemporary inquiry or in 'ordinary' experience.

It is the extraordinary persons of history who are his sources for knowledge of successful teaching: 'Such knowledge we may expect to derive chiefly from observation of the practice of successful educators throughout the centuries'.¹²⁰ Teaching method or teaching theory should, he argues, be systematically based on the 'intuitive insight or the psychological perception'¹²¹ of great educators

translated sensibly into a contemporary idiom. That is, Knox offers a plain man's conception of teaching-theory which - if it can be said to relate to any of the disciplines - looks to the history of educational ideas. His account is discursive and shows as little awareness of the mounting pressure from the disciplines in 1961 as it does of the generalist resistance to it of the kind we have pieced together. Though he appears to revere Great Persons, he does so in a prosaic language which lacks the 'inspiration' of a Pilley or even a McFarland. Its value for our purposes is in the contrast it provides with the American text-book that we are about to examine. For while Knox adopts a model perennialist posture in looking to the past so that the teacher who sees what he sees 'has at his disposal a pedagogic capital on which he may draw almost unconsciously',¹²² the other author lives much in the present and is the reporter of a uniquely systematic enquiry into teaching-theory.

This author is Asahel Woodruff and his Basic Concepts of Teaching¹²³ has the appearance of originating in an entirely different world from that of Knox. It is the product of a six-year project undertaken in the University of Utah to provide a rational basis for the reorganization of their teacher-education programme. The core of it is 'a workable set of ideas of what a teacher does when he teaches a class'.¹²⁴ It is therefore as practically orientated as one could wish for; yet Woodruff's purpose is to distil the set of principles of teaching which the book embodies from theoretical notions, but ones which are operational and not, as he puts it, 'theoretical in the dilettante sense'.¹²⁵ He is

much aware of the ease with which an educator can become absorbed in philosophy or psychology in a specialized 'professional' way to the exclusion of the real professionalism demanded by the essentially practical job he does. The theory of teaching must, therefore, take those concepts from the disciplines which fit its own purposes and make an attempt to be 'psychologically sound because, after all, philosophy has to shape itself significantly by knowledge furnished from the sciences'.¹²⁶

Translated into the terms of our account, this means that Woodruff starts from the practical end with an open mind on what the disciplines - particularly psychology and philosophy as he conceives them - can provide which will make that theory-for-practice as well-founded as possible. 'There has never been', he says, 'an adequate marriage between education and psychology'¹²⁷ because those who have attempted to arrange it have not taken seriously enough either the practical nature of education or the philosophy which determines the purposes of that practice. His own prescriptive theory of teaching provides a proper 'marriage', showing the teacher how to operate in the classroom by analyzing the basic learning process in children. It is addressed in very concrete terms to the decision-maker who stands in front of a class under a compulsion to act, and whose actions can be conceptualized without bringing in all the overwhelming 'theory' which claims to bear on education. Of this heterogeneous theory he says: 'The procedural part ought to be singled out, simplified, and reduced to a set of workable ideas'.¹²⁸ It is this that he and his co-workers have accomplished

and this which the title of his book signifies.

The logic of this approach is in marked contrast to that noted, for example, in the debate between Shaplin and his critics. Woodruff's assumption is certainly that a normative theory of teaching can be offered provided the temptation is resisted to draw everyone's attention constantly to the complexities of the activity and the difficulty of grasping it intellectually. He has a realistically 'simple' view of teaching, and of how to prepare teachers, which is born of his frustrating experience with programmes that over-complicate the issues, but which is a view that is not inquiry-rejecting like Knox's. Research is important but not of prime importance: a clear view of the daily tasks of the teacher provides the criterion of selection from the mass of its findings. Woodruff is, then, a 'bridging' theorist choosing not to present his views with the label of 'educational psychology' precisely because there has to be much 'philosophy' as well in general theory at the level that he regards as fundamental - this level of teaching.

He proceeds in the book systematically along this 'simple' path, making continual judicious reference to both philosophy and psychology. An introduction previews all the concepts he intends to explicate and establishes their inter-relationships, ranging from the 'practical' to the 'philosophical'. Thus, the purposes of formal education are discussed to provide the background to his discussion of the processes found in the classroom, where the learning experiences necessary to achieve those purposes must be organized by the teacher. From learning to teaching is the logical step which is central to his position. The teacher's planning of the

experiences presupposes his grasp of what constitutes the learning of concepts, skills and attitudes and the difference between these three. Without this knowledge a teacher just cannot carry out his professional task in other than a hit-or-miss manner. Woodruff, at this point, makes the distinctions and connections between 'know-that', 'know-how' and 'know-to' like a scaled-down Scheffler with his attention on the usefulness of the analysis rather than its nature.

Consequently the analysis issues in prescriptions for the teacher of a very concrete kind: he is offered unit outlines, subordinate schemes of work and a format for the planning of individual lessons. With this material Woodruff then begins to read more like Ausubel, for there is a 'cognitive' emphasis in his systematized advice which results from his conception of learning: the frequency of the term 'concept' in his accounts of both children's learning and the learning of the student teachers who are presumed to be reading his book is very high. In sum, he takes seriously the primary student 'need' for guidance on what actually to do when faced with a class, rather than the presumed need for a theoretical discussion of disciplinary material found in so much of the literature of education ostensibly written for intending teachers.

Thus, he presents a ramified theory to cover all that Inglis had in mind when using the term 'techniques'. And it shows a realistic recognition of the claims of both 'art' and 'science' proponents, while resolutely sticking to that level which

assists the teacher in his daily work rather than confusing him with a parade of scholarship. His conclusion, in its prescription for the thoughtful teacher who wants his thinking to improve his practice, makes a fitting conclusion to this last section on the various levels at which 'educational theory' has been discussed. It both points the teacher towards his own unique experience in the way that has been implied in the personalistic approaches we have investigated at many points, while reminding him that the other materials for his reflection lie in his reading outside the context of his everyday work - not least in psychology and philosophy broadly conceived. In short, Woodruff provides a reasonable position to take for anyone who is familiar with the polarized discussion of an important issue that is found in the multifarious contributions we have examined, when he says:

Teaching is an art in every sense. It is a complicated performance, but in no sense need it be a puzzling one. Real artistry can be attained by teachers who devote themselves to it earnestly...Artistry is developed gradually. Comprehension of the full impact of any given principle grows with experience. Ability to combine all of the principles which apply to any given situation also grows with experience. The most important quality a person can have for the attainment of artistry in teaching is the willingness to review his efforts over and over again, and to think of the implications of fundamental principles as they are used to evaluate what he has done and what he is planning to do. ¹²⁹

It was no accident that this viewpoint on teaching-theory resulted from a large project in which various 'political' pressures within teacher education in a particular context had to be resolved

by Woodruff and his colleagues. We can return, then, to the British scene for a final glance at the relevant 'contextual' literature in order to put into this perspective the discussions we have recorded in this chapter and, indeed, this whole period. In this way, we pick up the account of the parallel chapter in Period One where, it will be recalled, the most outspoken critic of the universities' domination of course-content in teacher training was Bibby.

A Last Look at Contextual Matters...And a Kind of Conclusion

The major fact about the institutional context during this period was that the extension of the Training College course from two to three years was even more intensely discussed than in the earlier period and was then implemented. The discussion was, of course, both within and between the two 'worlds' of teacher training and seen by many at the lower level to be merely the first step in upgrading their work in Education. Meanwhile, before the focus moved to the question of degrees in the subject, the aims, organization and methods of the longer Certificate courses were discussed universally and written about at great length. We can examine only a fragment of the relevant literature,¹³⁰ but this will be sufficient to give a final reminder of the subsidiary theme of this investigation - that the intellectual arguments in the reflexive literature are, to an interesting degree, context-bound.

Tibble's comments can be picked from the mass for two reasons. First, he is a now well-known figure in this account; second, he occupied a key position during this period, as in the previous

one, as a dedicated link-man between the worlds of University and Training College. ¹³¹ His article, 'The Training Colleges and the Three Year Course' of 1957, gives the historical roots of the problem which is implied in comment it contains that 'A certain divergence of view tends to persist...between the "providers" and the "users"'. ¹³² That is, he labels academic as against professional interests here in a manner which is reminiscent of Morris's earlier reference to 'scholars' and 'students'. Training colleges, on his account, have always focussed their work on the practical situation both directly in their types of teaching-practice and in providing the themes for college-based study. Now, Tibble warns, there is the danger that, with more time available, inappropriate ways of making teacher-preparation 'rigorous' will be suggested because 'theory' is conceived only in the terms which are understood in the non-vocational academic world. He considers it to be a universally acknowledged fact which is consciously ignored by tutors in their pursuit of career-objectives that student teachers can make little sense of 'theory' unless it is related to 'a considerable basis of experience' ¹³³ which both student and tutor need to be orientated towards.

Tibble's advice, then, is that the extra time now available should not be filled by more specialized lectures designed merely to amplify traditional content but by courses which focus on an existing understanding of what teaching is about in order to deepen it. As would be expected, Tibble's argument is permeated with generalist terms. To him, the student-learner, like the child-learner he is preparing to teach, has to integrate into his thinking a

wide range of materials through activities designed to give them personal meaning. Reading, discussion, practising teaching and plenty of time for reflection seem to Tibble of far greater importance in achieving the professional objectives of a vocational education than occupying the time with listening to academic lectures. The urgent need, he plainly states to an audience who would take his point, is:

...for some coherent sequence of studies which will keep pace with the student's own development as a teacher and help to relate theory and practice more effectively. What is to be avoided is a series of concurrent studies in watertight compartments designed to meet the needs and interests of members of staff rather than students. 134

This candid observation does not, of course, imply that the 'needs and interests' of staff are irrelevant to the improvement of Education as a subject, but only that clearer thinking about the matter which takes into account the context in which such needs and interests must be met shows that it is both possible and desirable to redefine Education to everyone's advantage. Tibble, in other words, is challenging the orthodox criterion for the intellectual status of a subject. A person who teaches Education on the basis of a qualification in a recognized discipline and other aspects of his total background should assimilate within an educationist's type of thinking the specialized viewpoint which preceded his taking on the generalist role. In this way - as has been illustrated in the varied contexts of the present account - 'relevant' theory of the type that Tibble describes becomes 'rigorous'; that is,

it becomes a subject which is not inferior to traditional university subjects but merely different in its logical features.

Implied in Tibble's comments is the polarized debate to which, at this critical time, very many contributions were made. On his side, we can note for the last time Morris, who gave a memorable address which was reported in a symposium on the three-year course published in the journal of the other 'world' of teacher training to that addressed by Tibble above. Morris, too, focusses the issues on the development of a professional person as the primary objective that is now more surely achievable with more time available. He argues that the whole question of raising intellectual standards is 'an entirely different matter from demanding University degrees for all teachers'¹³⁵ without reference being made to the object of this particular kind of preparation. He recognizes, with Tibble, the ease with which conventional tokens of high achievement can be desired by some without their realizing the extent to which the process of obtaining them does a 'major disservice to the true function of the training college'.¹³⁶ As in his comments on history in our first chapter, he here identifies the psycho-analytical mechanism of rationalization which is at work when status-desires are converted into the public argument for 'improving' the work of colleges by raising their intellectual standards.

In contrast to these two resolute defenders of a familiar cause, College Principal H.D. Wing writes in the local authorities educational journal about 'Training Colleges and University Standards' in a manner which is a model target for Morris's kind of critique. Wing understands the term 'standards' in all sectors of higher

education as referring solely to those which conform to the main University criterion, so that he defines student teachers less as persons who must be in touch with all the 'cosmic' matters we have found inevitably impinging on our discussion than as the possessors of two 'Advanced levels'! Such students would need, on his view, precisely that type of extended college course that we saw Tibble condemn as an irrelevance to a professional education. The distance between the two observers can be realized in noting Wing's view that these students, finding themselves - because of the selective function of the system - in a training college and not in a university, will expect the same kind of intellectual challenge. He really believes that, 'unless they do work of a university standard they are doomed to spend some barren years there'. 137

All that need be said, at this stage in our account, about this plain assumption concerning a worthwhile content for higher education is best left to Tibble once more, this time addressing, as Chairman, the professional association to which both he and Wing belonged. Looking at the history of the issues facing them all at the most important 'political' moment for both the worlds of teacher training, he says:

If this means that in many respects we would like to see the Colleges move closer to the Universities and be more fully integrated with them, it also means that we should like to see the Universities, or at any rate some Universities, move closer to the pattern of the Colleges. Both have something to learn from the exchange. 138

Our last selected comment on the matter can be the most outspoken, coming from the educationist who played the same role as Socratic gadfly in Period One. Bibby's Convocation Address was published challengingly in the Universities Quarterly. His view that, over the years of formal teacher training, there had been a replacement 'of the idea of craft apprenticeship by that of professional preparation'¹³⁹ would be likely to be interpreted by typical readers of that journal in much narrower terms than Bibby had in mind. An orthodox 'stiffening' of courses made on the assumption that the notion of what is proper 'professional' preparation is obvious will clearly not suit the Bibby known to us. His question is not about what further University-type studies can be added to college courses but, bluntly, 'What can the universities gain from the colleges?'¹⁴⁰ He rejects the assumption that excellence exists only where there is 'deep' study in a narrow field such as is found in the traditional Honours School in English Universities. He looks forward again, beyond the contemporary political achievement of extended courses, to the time when the Universities will have learned from the planning and implementation of those courses and will be willing to broaden their criteria of excellence - to the time when, as he says in Pilleyian terms, they will 'consider the recognition of alternative types of degree course, not only more suited to prospective teachers, but in themselves more truly educational'.¹⁴¹ From the perspective of 1984 we know the extent to which this generalist's expression of hope for rationality - in the validation of teacher-education courses which takes into account all the 'logic' that is so convincingly

displayed in the literature we have examined - would soon appear politically naive when compared to the actualities of the 1960s.

But this short section, in concentrating on the institutional context of the discussion of rigour and relevance in educational theory, needs a coda to link it to the much more important intellectual theme of the chapter and, indeed, of the whole thesis. For it is the 'logic' which has dominated the debate and which should remain in the mind now that the debate is to end. And, of all the writers in various contexts who have shown insight into the conceptual issues in educational theory, perhaps none has written so lucidly and with such an assured grasp of both the 'intuitions' of the good teacher, and the point of philosophical reflection in relation to those intuitions, than the woman with whom this chapter began. When Helen Adams distinguished between the 'descriptive', 'normative' and 'pragmatic' levels of theory, she gave us as memorable a set of labels as could be asked for to conceptualize the discussion that we have witnessed within a fascinatingly varied literature of education. With this reminder of these labels we can therefore end an account which has found them appropriate, not only for the grossly under-valued writings of one short decade, but indeed for the literature of education wherever it is to be found - at any time and any place. This can suffice as our conclusion to an argument which, in the nature of the case, has shown a prodigious accumulation of internal conclusions during the whole course it has run. And a short conclusion to such a long discussion seems very appropriate!

