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ABSTRACT

This work examines three areas of contributory factors that shaped the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) response towards two international crises in regions which traditionally fell within the Chinese sphere of influence : the Korean War (1950) and the American War in Vietnam (1965-66). It analyzes and isolates the domestic and international political aspects which shaped the foreign policy towards the two conflicts including the conflict between Mao Tse-tung and others in the CCP over China's socialist construction; it also considers the specific relations with the two former vassal states. Once decision-making factors are identified, the formulation of the foreign policy output in both cases is described. A broader historical perspective is provided through a discussion of imperial Chinese attitudes towards Korea and Vietnam and through an insight into the effects of Western and Japanese encroachments in the two areas.

The study uses the two periods to gauge the success achieved by a newly independent China's efforts towards gaining international status, creating spheres of influence and avoiding domination by the Americans or the Soviets over the first decade and a half of the People's Republic's existence. The significance of the two former vassals is placed in this context. The study concludes that although decision-making with regards to the Vietnam conflict was freer from foreign influence than in the case of the Korean War, the improvement in Chinese international standing and effectiveness in international politics was nominal, although a better use of deterrents and diplomatic communications can be observed.

TITLE :

DECISION MAKING FACTORS IN CHINESE FOREIGN
POLICY CONCERNING KOREA (1950) AND VIETNAM
(1965-66) : THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
TWO FORMER VASSAL STATES.

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
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INTRODUCTION

When one surveys Chinese history, it becomes evident that events within the regions which border China have continually been of great concern to the Chinese elite, be they Imperial mandarins or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres. An understanding of the factors which created the Chinese response to these events can tell one a great deal about the political conditions within the country; it can also lead to a comprehension of how the leading political figures viewed themselves, Chinese society, and the significance of China within the world power matrix at the time. It is the object of this study to achieve such an understanding by identifying and analyzing the decisive factors which, during the first two crucial decades of the major contemporary Chinese state, the People's Republic of China (PRC), shaped Chinese policy-making with regard to two globally significant conflicts in what have been traditionally viewed as key border nations.

Korea and Vietnam were both vassal states of the imperial Chinese court and remained, though to varying degrees, under its influence for most of their histories. They constituted an integral part of the Chinese mechanism of foreign relations known as the tributary system. There was no doubt in the perception of the Confucian Chinese elite that they fell within what was naturally China's sphere of influence. The Chinese attitude towards them was a clear expression of the chauvinistic, sinocentric nature of Chinese foreign policy during the imperial dynasties. It is therefore logical that a thorough investigation of the decision-making factors which contributed to the CCP's foreign policy output vis à vis crises in these nations can indicate how much, if at all, the communist leadership was influenced by traditional teachings on



international relations. Therefore, this study begins by describing how imperial foreign policy manifested itself in China's dealings with these two bordering states. This is reflected in the attitudes it engendered within the native elites in the vassal states and provides us with a firm foundation from which to gauge the interactions between the Chinese and the rulers of the former vassals during the post-imperial period.

Any appreciation of how the CCP views China's global position - and of how this view differs from that of its predecessors - must be put within the context of the Western encroachments on the Chinese Empire and its vassals which began in earnest with the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars of the nineteenth century. This significantly undermined the Chinese world order and had an effect on the Chinese concepts of international power relations. It proved to be a shock to the Chinese national ego that transformed their self-image radically. The Chinese Revolution which culminated with the founding of the PRC in 1949 can be seen as the era of this transformation. Those involved in the CCP saw it as the regeneration of Chinese greatness; they saw it as China having "stood up" after years of Western subjugation. Therefore, their reaction to further Western activities in their vicinity, represented primarily by the United States' (US) position in the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, can provide us with an intimation of how this feeling of national rejuvenation displayed itself in foreign policy decisions. An analysis of the factors which influenced these decisions can not only give us an indication of the significance which former vassal states have had in post-Liberation foreign policy, it also tells us something of what the CCP believed China's role to be as an Asian, and as a global power.

The events which led to the Chinese incursion in the Korean War in 1950 and to the formulation of the PRC's response to the American War in Vietnam in the mid-1960's provide us with two other vantage points from which to understand the development of Chinese international behaviour. As mentioned above, they can be put into the wider context of Chinese reaction to a long period of Western domination; they can also help chart the development of Chinese foreign policy over approximately the first decade and a half of the PRC's existence. The PRC's role within a global system dominated by the two post-World War Two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, obviously evolved - but was this evolution one towards greater sophistication and skill in international relations? In other words, what were the factors that can account for the CCP's ability to avoid a direct involvement in the more prolonged US action in Vietnam but not to do so during the US-led United Nations (UN) reaction to the Korean conflict? A comparison of the decisions which formed the Chinese policy towards the two conflicts may indeed show that more consummate skills in the areas of crisis management and the use of deterrence had developed.

Of course a proper investigation into what inputs produced a foreign policy response cannot avoid an analysis of the internal political elements which may have contributed. It can be argued that many external conflicts are not only a reaction to internal pressures, both social and economic, but in some cases are manufactured for the effect which they could have on domestic politics.¹ Therefore, it is imperative that when identifying the factors which led to a foreign policy output in relation to the two conflicts in question, that all of the relevant domestic considerations are taken into account. As will be shown below, the domestic political situation

in China in 1950 was radically different from that which existed during the mid-1960's. This means that the degree and nature of the domestic political capital that could be gained from foreign adventures also differed. Therefore, if this study is to effectively identify the crucial factors involved, it must portray the balance between international and domestic considerations during the two periods.

Every aspect of post-Liberation Chinese history has to be put into the context of the thoughts and actions of Mao Tse-tung. Even the events since his death in 1976 must be seen in relation to his effect on the Chinese nation. Obviously, he was also the primary figure in the decision-making process which created CCP policy towards the US activities in the wars in former vassal states. Consequently, his thoughts and what influenced them must be identified and understood if the factors which led to the foreign policies with which this study concerns itself are to be coherently comprehended. Moreover, any shift in foreign policy behaviour between the two wars must be placed within the context of Mao's ideological development. For example, the rejection of the Sino-Soviet alliance, formulated in February 1950 a few short months before the PRC entered the Korean War, produced many foreign policy constraints in the mid-1960's which must be considered as contributory factors in the CCP policy towards the Vietnam War. The rejection of the alliance, as will be shown, was a direct product of the shift in Mao's attitude towards desiring a more pure Chinese road to socialism and a state of greater independence from any foreign power. In light of this, one must take note of the long history of internecine conflict between Mao and his CCP colleagues dating back to many years prior to the founding of the PRC,² and, consequently, the

degree to which intra-CCP politics affected foreign policy decision-making during the periods in question must be determined.

The formation of foreign policy decisions by Mao and the other major figures in the CCP involved in international relations did not occur in isolation from the wider global atmosphere that prevailed during 1950 and the mid-1960's. Foreign policy responses by the PRC must be seen in relation to the state of world affairs at that time. Any of the decisions which were reached concerning the tumultuous events in Korea and Vietnam had to take into account the effect which they would have on China's position within the international community. Obviously, in a world dominated by two powers the relationships with those powers must be given the most weight; yet, if the CCP truly desired to restore China to her rightful position in the world then its foreign policy decisions had to take into account what effect, if any, policies would have on the PRC's position amongst the underdeveloped, or "semi-colonial" countries with which the Chinese felt an identification.

In a more specific case, the relationship between the PRC and the governments in control of the former vassals which were in combat with the US is an important indicator which may allow a much wider interpretation of the events to be achieved. An analysis of the interaction between the respective governments can provide an effective indication of the extent to which any vassal-like situation remained. In other words, were Vietnam and Korea considered to be satellites that were to be protected because of a policy of patronage, or were they simply considered to be strategic buffers that would protect China from a direct attack? It will also have to be determined whether the CCP had any ideological influence over

the two former vassals in order to discern the strength of the bonds between them, a factor in decision-making which cannot be ignored.

One may ask why this study is time-specific, especially in the case of the CCP's response to the American War in Vietnam. While it is easy to comprehend that the PRC entered the Korean conflict in 1950 and that all of the relevant decision-making factors were present in that particular year, it is also easy to question why the time period of the analysis of the Vietnam War is centred around 1965-1966 when direct American military involvement lasted until 1972. In fact, it can be said that the probability of war between the US and China was also high in the later period of the war when the Nixon administration initiated intensification of the US air attacks on North Vietnam. Yet, as will be shown below, the pattern of the CCP's response to the war was unquestionably set between 1965 and 1966 and the decision-making factors which kept the Chinese from becoming direct combatants in the struggle in that period were decisive enough to preserve the status quo.

The reader may note that a lot more space has been given to the Vietnam conflict than to the earlier Korean War. There are two main reasons for this apparent lack of balance. Firstly, because of the vicissitudes of scholarly interest, and as a reflection of the Cold War mentality which existed in the early-1950's, less was written about China which was considered to be a mere "puppet" of the Soviets. Interest did pick up over the years, however, and by the time of the escalation of the US involvement in Vietnam a fair range of materials was being produced. Secondly, the chapters concerned with the Vietnam question contain necessary background material which explain the relevant events occurring during the years between the two conflicts.

The transliteration of Chinese used in this study is the Wade-giles system as opposed to the Pin-yin because the sources were written before the latter came into popular use. For the sake of consistency between the quotations and text, the Wade-Giles system of romanization, the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean names, and the standard french transliteration of Vietnames have been used throughout.

FOOTNOTES : INTRODUCTION

1. Liao Kuang-sheng, "Linkage Politics in China: Internal Mobilization and Articulation External Hostility in the Cultural Revolution", World Politics, July 1976, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 592-596.
2. For an example of some of the infighting during the early 1930's see Wilson, Dick, Mao: The Peoples Emperor (London: Futura Publications, 1980), pp. 149-160.

CHAPTER ONE

Korea, Vietnam, the Imperial Chinese Tradition, and the Rise of Nationalism

Korea and Vietnam developed under the shadow of the cultural and political colossus that was Imperial China, but for various reasons Chinese behaviour towards the two vassals varied despite the theoretical equality of their position within the Chinese world order. Moreover, and perhaps as a consequence of Chinese actions, the attitude of the respective leadership of the two states diverged over the centuries. Politics in traditional Vietnam fluctuated between Confucian orthodoxy and other internal and external influences, while the approximately five hundred years' rule of the Korean Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) saw Confucian beliefs become deeply entrenched in government, although native culture continued to flourish. Nevertheless, the two states both saw themselves as being part of the Chinese world system and the Chinese continually showed that they believed these vassals to be integral units within the Confucian international order. The malleable nature of the Chinese approach shows the flexibility of that system and indicates that pragmatic strategic considerations often lay under the implementation of the Confucian code of international patronage.

The ideology behind the Confucian world order has been explained at length in many sources and therefore will not be discussed in detail in this study.¹ Suffice it to say that it was in essence an expression of Chinese chauvinism that relegated all those who refused to pay homage to Chinese civilization to the ranks of barbarians. Submission to the culture primarily entailed the despatching of tribute missions

from the vassal state to the Chinese capital, the adoption of the Chinese dynastic calendar, and the seeking of the Chinese Emperor's approval for the investiture of a new king. It was the ultimate expression of the Chinese belief that the virtue of Confucian ethics placed China at the centre of the world and gave the Emperor the right to claim "all under Heaven", or tien hsia, as his domain.

It is logical that the states within what has been called the "Sinic Zone", those including Korea and Vietnam that had cultural roots closely linked to the Chinese,² were to be considered better than "barbarians" by the Chinese and the sinicized member of their own population. Chinese culture set the standards in that area of the world because its sheer energy and vitality allowed it to spread easily throughout vast regions where there was no other cultural force that could match it. Yet the vassal states also gained concrete benefits from joining the system of tribute: not only did it allow a great deal of trade to be carried out via tribute missions, it also offered the guarantee of protection from hostile third parties.³ A related benefit which proved to be of particular importance to Vietnam's rulers was that it served to protect kings who had loyally sent tribute throughout their reign from internal rebellion.⁴ But it must be stressed that was primarily a sinocentric ideology and that it was Chinese interests which it furthered. The tributary system was not based on equality between nations. The relationship was not between friend and friend, but rather that between a father and son, as seen within the Confucian context. Therefore the protection of the "father" predominated and the use of the tributary state as a buffer from totally "barbaric" nations was quite freely referred to in Imperial writings.⁵ Consequently, the relationship between China and the vassal was shaped

in part by the nature of the threat from which China was being buffered in that particular part of the "Universe".

A state qualified for inclusion within the tributary system by virtue of its willingness to "come and be transformed", or lai hua. Theoretically this was a totally voluntary act: the Chinese Confucians did not espouse an expansionist creed and officially they professed that states joined without coercion.⁶ Nevertheless, the Chinese did actively plant the seeds of the tributary relationship through colonies, in the case of Korea, and through official annexation, in the case of Vietnam, during the expansionist periods of the Ch'in and the early Han dynasties. These injections of Chinese culture proved to be remarkably resilient and in later years, during periods of dynastic instability when political influence over the vassals was not strong, Chinese culture never died, even though it may have been eclipsed at times by domestic or external creeds.

The ancestors of the Korean and the Vietnamese people were non-Chinese tribes that migrated south into zones of Chinese influence. The former were probably North Asians who spoke an Altaic language; the latter were of Mongoloid origins and spoke a Sinic tongue. Chinese influence began in pre-history and the origins of sedentary agriculture in Korea and the rice-based culture of the Red River Basin in Northern Vietnam can be linked to Chinese influences.⁷ Not surprisingly, the first states with recorded histories in both Korea and Vietnam were founded by ethnic Chinese or by clients of the Chinese. These states rapidly adopted the Chinese language for official use and copied Chinese governmental procedure, but they

developed a varying degree of actual unity with the Chinese. North Vietnam was actually included in the Chinese successionist state of Nan-Yueh and was administered from Canton from the third century B.C., around the time of Chinese unification. Yet although the earliest Korean state Choson had been heavily under the sway of the pre-Ch'in state of Yen, and was consolidated in the third century B.C. by a man named Wei Man (Wiman in Korean), who was either actually Chinese or a Chinese client, it was never ruled directly from China.⁸

The reign of Han Wu-ti (141 - 87 B.C.) marked a turning point for both vassal states. In 108 B.C. the expansionist Han Empire succeeded in conquering Nan-Yueh, bringing North Vietnam under central Chinese administration - a situation which was to exist in varying degrees for nearly one thousand years. Three years after the annexation of Nan-Yueh, the Han founded its colonies in Northern Korea, principally the one at Lolang, near present day P'yongyang. These colonies lasted for approximately four hundred years and, although they were eventually defeated by the Korean Koguryŏ state, the lasting influence which they had over the Korean outlook insured that the Confucianism that was being officially patronized by the Han won acceptance in Korea. This trend was to culminate during the Yi.⁹

Obviously, the inclusion of Korea and Vietnam within the Chinese sphere of influence had little in common with the Confucian ideal of a voluntary transformation, and Confucianism seems to have had little effect on the foreign policy behaviour of Han Wu-ti. After the initial expansion into these areas the Han tried

vigorously to sinicize the native elite. In Korea they assiduously attempted to control the early Koguryŏ state (119 B.C. - 668) by fostering its role as a client. This was done via the colonies and entailed the use of Chinese intermediaries who influenced the Koguryŏ chieftains and eventually succeeded in enlisting them in a common struggle against the Hsuing-nu tribes. Chinese domination was so complete that the early Koguryŏ only vaguely recognized their own chieftains as being supreme rulers.¹⁰ Nevertheless, since the area was never officially annexed, the Chinese could not bring the Koguryŏ leaders directly into the central administration, in contrast to Nan-Yueh where they consciously created a Confucian elite that went through the official examination system. This proved to be very successful and officials of Vietnamese origin were eventually posted throughout the Empire.¹¹

Although engulfed in the sinicization process, both nations strove for a degree of freedom in their actions, but because of differing circumstances this manifested itself in distinct ways. Prior to gaining total independence during the decline of the Tang in the tenth century, the Vietnamese strove for self-governing autonomy. Of course there was a great deal of flux in the movement over the centuries, depending on the stability of the central authorities in China. Sometimes, for instance, the Vietnamese would drift slowly into a degree of autonomy because of dynastic political chaos.¹² As a consequence of these aspirations there developed a strong heritage of rebellion against the Chinese - beginning with the revolt led by the Trung sisters in 40 A.D. In the case of the Koreans, rebellion against Chinese domination sometimes surfaced in the form of interstate aggression. Of the three Korean states that existed prior to the unification under Silla in 668 this tendency was most marked in the case of Koguryŏ. The

first evidence of such a trend was in the third and fourth centuries when Koguryō actually tried to gain territory at the expense of the Chinese. This occurred at a time of dynastic decline, though ironically in the long run this did not enhance Koguryō's chances of eradicating Chinese dominance; for not only were they defeated militarily, but the influx of Chinese scholar refugees fleeing the chaos partially caused by these military exploits actually strengthened Chinese cultural influences.¹³ Koguryō assertiveness did not end there. Its battles with the Sui (589 - 618) along the Liao River eventually contributed to the downfall of that short-lived, but important dynasty.¹⁴

With these precedents in mind one is forced to question why the emergence of an independent Vietnam in the tenth century and the unification of Korea in 668 both created states which, seemingly following Confucian tenets, readily and without coercion joined the tributary system and therefore declared their political inferiority to the Chinese state. Was this a confession of cultural inferiority as well? Obviously, one thousand years of Chinese influence had an effect on the developments of both states, yet one must note that both of these events occurred in the era of the T'ang dynasty. The T'ang regenerated the belief of the Chinese themselves in the supremacy of their culture and of their empire. They strove to reassert Chinese hegemony in all of the areas that were within the realm of the Han empire. Consequently, they revitalized the tribute system which had fallen into a very erratic state.¹⁵ The T'ang did not delude themselves - they were powerful enough to influence the world view of Korea to stave off the threat that the mass infiltration of ideas into Vietnam from India and other

Southeast Asian states could irreversibly remove that country from China's sphere of influence. Yet the vassals may have been motivated by the domestic gains which they hoped to procure by joining the tribute system; because by doing so they had access to Confucian institutions for their own internal political use, which proved to be an asset in both cases.

The use of Confucianism as a cohesive factor in the rule of an elite within a vassal state reached its zenith during the Yi Dynasty in Korea. It has been said that the power and the prestige which the tribute system itself gave the Yi, i.e., the moral force which the backing of the Chinese Emperor had within the conscience of the Korean people, was one factor which accounts for the dynasty's long life. They were rather creative in their adoption of Chinese institutions, however, for they gave the Censorate much more power than it had in the Chinese court. But the sheer pervasiveness of Chinese political culture, and the consequences which it had on traditional Korean foreign policy, should not be ignored.¹⁶

After gaining independence the Vietnamese also found adherence to the Chinese tribute system to be expedient. In neither case was acceptance imposed upon them by the Chinese authorities: it was rather more of an instinctive action that had its roots in the centuries of Chinese cultural and political dominance. In addition the constraints placed on them by compliance were minimal. The Vietnamese found the importation of Confucian institutions and mechanisms of government very useful, yet they also found that by the most superficial displays of homage they were able to have

a great deal of freedom in their policies. They received the benefits of protection, as will be shown below, because the Chinese felt that it was their duty as the source of civilization, but they could simultaneously pursue their own path, and even create their own sphere of influence. This became especially evident during the Nguyen Dynasty in the early nineteenth century when Vietnamese expansionism was persistent, and when the Vietnamese court strove to create their own separate tribute system based on the Vietnamese being the "Son of Heaven" in his own right.¹⁷

It is the question of independence in foreign policy which most differentiates Vietnamese and Korean development vis à vis the Chinese Empire. Following the last, brief annexation of Vietnam in 1407 - 1427, during the reign of the Yung-lo Emperor of the Ming, the Vietnamese showed an increasing tendency towards southwards expansion. Paradoxically, the Ming annexation also laid the foundations of an otherwise stricter Confucian state because it imported Neo-Confucian ideas and practices, such as the revitalized exam system, which the Vietnamese eagerly imported for their own internal stability.¹⁸ Notably, it was also during the Ming that the traumas of the Japanese invasion of Korea in the late sixteenth century caused the highly Confucian Yi to become even more orthodox in its approach to foreign relations. The shock caused by the attack resulted in the Koreans seeking security and stability through a stricter adherence to the Confucian world order. Consequently, the Yi became almost totally isolated from the rest of the world and dutifully sought the direction of the Chinese whenever a third party made an approach, as was the case during the nineteenth century, (see below, pp.18-19). It is at this point

that the attitudes of the rulers of the vassals towards Chinese institutions and patronage clearly diverged: the Vietnamese found that Confucianism gave them the internal cohesiveness which facilitated their own territorial expansion; while the Koreans found that Confucian foreign relations allowed them to feel safe in an isolation that was comforting after the havoc of the Japanese incursions.¹⁹

As a consequence of their differing attitudes the Koreans became more faithful and regular givers of tribute than their Vietnamese counterparts. They diligently consulted the Chinese court over procedural matters and during the Yi they became the most frequent tribute-bearing guests, averaging at least three times a year. By contrast, Vietnam (or Annam as it was known from T'ang time onwards) gave tribute only once every three to five years.²⁰ Even though the Yi's main loyalties rested with the Ming, having come to power as explicitly so, they continued to be faithful during the Ch'ing as well. The Ch'ing reciprocated and showed favouritism towards the Koreans by such measures as lifting the time limit on trade following the presentation of tribute that applied to other nations.²¹

Relations between Korea and Imperial China had not always been as close as they were during the Yi, however, and during the earlier dynasties of Silla (668 - 935) and Koryo (935 - 1392) the foundations of a strong native culture had been bolstered. In fact they were not always so loyal a tributary nation because during the Koryo they developed relations with Khitan, Jurchen, and the Mongols which conflicted with their obligations to the Chinese. The Yi, however, being allies to the Ming, rectified the situation.

Even so, they were not sycophantic and the legacy of previous Chinese incursions into the peninsula meant that their relationship with China could be circumspect, especially before the Japanese invasions of the sixteenth century.²²

The Yi came to power as avid converts to Neo-Confucianism, yet they could not eradicate the legacy of native Korean culture - and one doubts whether they desired to do so. The distinct Korean heritage was far too embedded for the Yi to have ever contemplated creating an exact model of China in miniature, no matter how deep their respect for Chinese culture. During the Koryŏ Buddhism had flourished and received substantial amounts of state support at times when it was out of favour in China. Native shamanism had also received official approval and its ceremonies were often attended by the Koryŏ kings.²³ The Neo-Confucian wave that began with the Yi swept out the Buddhist establishment and eroded the official standing of shamanism, yet native Korean culture survived. The music, dress, architecture and cuisine remained intact. Official Chinese ideology may have influenced the Yi elite but the native subculture never died, thus leaving Korea with a distinct national identity despite being dominated by her more powerful neighbour.

Vietnam also retained a distinctive cultural identity, though through a different means from Korea. As mentioned above, the primary contact that Korea had with dynamic foreign culture was through China; the Vietnamese, on the other hand, were geographically placed between two great sources of culture and ideas - China and the Indian subcontinent. Although the classical Chinese language and philosophy were dominant amongst the rulers in the north of the

country, the slow but relentless drive south exposed the Vietnamese to many foreign cultures to which the Koreans did not have access, e.g., the Champa and Khmer civilizations. Consequently, as the Vietnamese annexed greater territories they became less homogeneous and Confucian orthodoxy suffered many setbacks as the people from the more newly incorporated, less sinicized areas strove for power in Hanoi.²⁴

So evident were the non-Chinese aspects of Vietnamese culture that when the Ming annexed Vietnam in the fifteenth century they were convinced that the people there could never be truly civilized, despite their long heritage of sinicization.²⁵ Religion in Vietnam was also distinctive when compared to the Chinese model because Buddhism was imported directly from India and therefore became a popular force before the Chinese had a chance to propagate Taoism or popular Confucianism.²⁶ Hence it is clear that although the Chinese did undoubtedly dominate Vietnam's cultural development, the Vietnamese did not blindly imitate Chinese culture to the extent that they did Chinese government institutions. Their propensity for southward expansion and their geographical situation allowed them a special path of which they were especially proud.²⁷

Thus we have evidence of two vassal states with similar long exposure to Chinese culture and dominance, but with varying degrees of external expansion. Vietnam had a consistent tendency towards imperialism; Korea had almost none.²⁸ Consequently, although the Vietnamese usually felt very little constraint on their actions, they did experience intervention in their internal affairs when it appeared to the Chinese that they may be ready to leave the tributary

system. While the Chinese had no real fears of the Koreans leaving the Confucian order, the degree of independence that the Vietnamese had shown in their foreign affairs meant that the Chinese felt it necessary to ensure that a loyal king ran the Vietnamese court, and they occasionally acted directly in the pursuit of this goal. Generally speaking, the Chinese only intervened in the internal political affairs of the Koreans in order to protect their own security, and this did not occur to any great extent until the nineteenth century when the Japanese were forcing themselves a foothold on the Korean peninsula, as will be shown below. Nevertheless, the two vassal states discovered that the regular sending of tribute gave them sufficient independence in their internal affairs. The Vietnamese found that playing the role of the dutiful vassal generally kept the Chinese at a distance and provided them with the freedom that they needed to implement policies that were sometimes in direct conflict with the Confucian ideal.²⁹

An explanation for this rather benign attitude on the part of the Chinese was the shift towards a defensive foreign affairs posture which accompanied the advent of the Neo-Confucian age during the Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279). The humiliations of the tenth and eleventh centuries which stemmed from the Liao moves against the Sung caused the Chinese to become increasingly introverted and to insist that foreign regimes which desired to become "civilized" come to the Chinese and not visa versa.³⁰ Of course the explorations of the Ming could be seen as an exception to this rule, as could their annexation of Vietnam in the fifteenth century, but essentially the days of conquest such as had occurred during the Han and the T'ang had ended. The Ming annexation of Vietnam is a case in point.

It was simply an attempt to reestablish the Tran Dynasty (1225 - 1400), a vassal regime which had proved loyal to the Confucian order. Their successors, the Ho, had displeased the Imperial Court by "uncivilized behaviour" and looked very unlikely to accept the tributary system wholeheartedly. When the Tran pretender to the throne was executed by the Ho, the sinicized Vietnamese elite requested that the Ming annex the territory in order to restore "civilization". Hence what has often been interpreted as Ming aggression was in fact the accommodation of a people who had professed a desire to remain firmly within the Chinese sphere.³¹

The Ch'ing also showed that they were prepared to act to keep a loyal tributary dynasty in power when they tried to save the Le Dynasty (1418 - 1798) from collapse during the Tyson Rebellion. Nevertheless, when the Nguyen successors promised tribute, and adverse weather conditions allowed it to be claimed that the Le had indeed "lost the mandate of heaven", the Ch'ing promptly called off the operation.³² Once again, as long as a successor regime met the minimal requirement by simply accepting the tributary system the rulers of China were satisfied.

Prior to the Japanese encroachment in the nineteenth century the primary precedent for Chinese intervention in the internal affairs of Korea was the role which the T'ang had played in the unification of the peninsula under Silla in the seventh century. Although this was executed under the justification of protecting Silla's tributary route from Koguryō's attacks, it should primarily be seen as an attempt to replace Koguryō, which had actually moved aggressively against the Sui and the T'ang, with a more

deferential state. Silla had rapidly adopted T'ang institutions and they were the most sinicized state on the peninsula, so they naturally received Chinese patronage. Nevertheless, it was the desire to remove the destabilizing presence of Koguryŏ from the sensitive Northern frontier which was the main T'ang motive in this action - the patronage of Silla simply provided legitimacy. It was this question of security which had no corresponding precedent in China's relations with Vietnam, until, of course, the colonization by the French in the nineteenth century.³³

The outstanding example of the strategic significance which the Chinese placed on Korea was the action of the Ming during the invasions of the peninsula by the Japanese ruler Hideyoshi during the late sixteenth century. It is an interesting period because it not only illustrates how the Imperial Chinese viewed the danger of Korea being in hostile hands, but it also portrays the great respect with which lesser states held China. It is mistaken to believe that the Ming were reluctantly drawn into the conflict - Hideyoshi had made it clear that Peking was his primary objective years before his actual attack. In his perception, the paramount earthly achievement was to become Emperor of China and Korea was merely a stepping-stone towards this goal.³⁴ Although the Ming rescue of Korea could be presented as a noble act of self-sacrifice by an already tottering dynasty, it was more of an act of self-preservation which used Korea as a buffer against Hideyoshi. This presents an interesting comparison with the war in 1950 which will be discussed in later sections.³⁵ Ironically, the financial strains of the campaign hastened the Ming's collapse, yet the indebted Yi gravitated even closer to China as a result. Thus the most perfect Confucian-based international connection in Chinese history

was fashioned out of the collapse of one of China's major dynasties.

As mentioned earlier, the Yi had come to power as a pro-Ming regime and the rigid Confucian orthodoxy which followed the Japanese invasion simply re-enforced an existing trend. They clearly indicated this when Hideyoshi offered them mercy in return for cooperation and they responded by dutifully informing the Ming of the Japanese intentions. Whether this constituted Confucian ethics or a desire for protection is problematic. It is possible that the Koreans were protecting the source of world civilization,³⁶ or they may have wanted to preserve the degree of autonomy which they had enjoyed under Chinese patronage but could not take for granted under Japanese dominance.³⁷

Until the nineteenth century there was no corresponding threat to Chinese security from an invasion of Vietnam. The Chinese may have been wary of cultural influences spreading from Southeast Asia, but their security was never threatened militarily from this flank. It was traditional, in fact, because of the history of invading nomadic tribes across the northern frontier, to treat international relations on the northern boundaries of the Empire differently from those on the East and South. The Manchus institutionalized this division by establishing a separate board for the management of affairs with the Ch'ing's northern neighbours. This is not surprising, however, when one considers that the Manchus themselves originally seized power after invading from the north.³⁸ But the western encroachment changed these circumstances, as it did many others. In the nineteenth century, for the first time, the

the Chinese were under heavy pressure from the North, South and East simultaneously, yet the residual traditional attitudes towards each respective region continued to shape their responses. The pivotal character in the Chinese response to the West, Li Hung-chang, proved that Imperial Chinese foreign policy could be flexible, but only through this ancient tradition of differentiating between frontiers. He may have broadened the parameters of Chinese foreign behaviour, but he did not, in his own perception, breach any of the basic Confucian tenets, keeping in line with the philosophy of the "Self-Strengthening Movement" with which he was associated. He and his colleagues claimed that they were merely adapting basically sound Chinese traditions to new circumstances. Even his much discussed acceptance of the treaty system of international affairs was said to be simply an adherence to the traditional "loose-rein" approach of handling barbarian affairs in a non-rigid manner. There was, however, an element of self-deception in his action: he blindly told himself that the West would have to conform to Chinese ways as other barbarian invaders had done in the past.³⁹ This attitude should be remembered for it was Li who devised the Chinese policy towards Western imperialism in both Korea and Vietnam, and the flaws in his analysis could help to account for the failure to block effectively their forced removal from the tributary system.

The epoch of Western imperialism found the Chinese struggling to adjust to the new circumstances in which international affairs had to be conducted on terms of equality, a totally alien concept which some tried to ignore despite the unavoidable reality that the world had changed. Western politicians resolutely refused to

acknowledge China's cultural strength, which all other "barbarians" had eventually conceded. With the establishment of the Tsungli Yamen, the quasi-foreign ministry, the Ch'ing were forced in 1861 to negotiate on equal terms. Nevertheless, there was no official change in the principles by which foreigners were handled: in internal communications they were still referred to as "barbarians".⁴⁰ Thus the Chinese faced the challenge of foreign imperialism in a dialectical manner in which old concepts were inexorably transformed by a new set of circumstances. But some traditional beliefs lingered longer than others, including the great strategic importance placed on the Korean peninsula in relation to other areas on China's frontiers. This coincided with a faith in the loyalty of the Yi and shaped a response to pressure in that area which was much different from the reaction towards the French presence in Vietnam.

Until approximately the mid-nineteenth century, Korea succeeded in remaining fairly isolated from the Western powers and Japan by resolutely adhering to her role as a vassal. This was aided by a lack of interest on the part of the West. Ironically, it became Chinese policy, as formulated by Li, to force the Koreans to establish official relations with the foreign powers, but under Chinese guidance. Although this could be interpreted as capitulation under foreign pressure, it was in fact an inspired use of traditional Chinese foreign policy methods. Through using the Western powers, who did not represent the primary threat to the vassal, to counter-balance the rising power of the Japanese, who for various reasons felt a great need for a presence in Korea, Li applied the tactic of i-i chi-i, i.e., "using barbarians to defeat barbarians", with

significant, yet temporary, success. By pushing the Koreans towards the West, particularly the Russians and the British, Li deterred the Japanese, who did not feel strong enough in the 1870's to confront the West.⁴¹ Thus Li Hung-chang bought ten years of much needed peace, from 1885 until the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, but the failure to exploit that period by consolidating the Chinese military position vis à vis Korea meant the eventual loss of the vassal state.⁴²

Li was convinced that a foreign presence in Korea represented the greatest possible threat to Chinese security - even greater than a direct assault on some of the coastal provinces of China proper. Interestingly, he cited the Ming precedent as one of the primary factors in his reasoning. Therefore, it is not surprising that he openly told the British ambassador in 1883 that he thought that Korea was uniquely linked to China and inherently different from other vassals such as Annam.⁴³ At the same time he denied that the Chinese desired a presence in Korea greater than that of an advisory level. Nevertheless, following the initial success of his policies in the 1880's, he began to spread Chinese influence and control throughout the Korean bureaucracy in a manner that had never occurred previously. The process was constantly resisted by pro-Japanese elements within the Korean hierarchy and paradoxically it represents the approaching end of the Chinese monopoly over cultural and political influences within the Korean elite that had existed since the Ming.⁴⁴

The resolute nature of Li's policy towards Korea is in marked contrast to the equivocal and ambivalent approach that he adopted

towards the French incursion into Vietnam during the same period. Circumstances did differ in the two cases: the Vietnamese court was not so dominated by Peking; and the security of Vietnam was not considered as essential for the continuation of Ch'ing rule. The French desired the territory as a base for expansion into the fairly peripheral province of Yunnan. Li's primary objective in regard to Vietnam was to protect China's suzerainty without committing Chinese troops, which he realized would be a futile waste of resources.⁴⁵ The protection of Vietnam seems to have been more of a matter of pride and obligation than conviction when compared to the importance that Li placed on Korea. Thus Li vacillated between negotiations and threats, carrying out neither convincingly. The French were not deterred and the War of 1885 was inevitable - as was its outcome, the complete and rapid defeat of the Ch'ing forces.⁴⁶

When put in context the Chinese attitude towards Vietnam during the nineteenth century shows their failure to cope with the unprecedented need to defend most of China's frontiers simultaneously. The Confucian world order was under attack and they stumbled between traditional responses and ineffectual innovation. The image of the Chinese "umbrella of protection" became tattered as rulers and incipient nationalists in the vassal states watched the Chinese being consistently humiliated and saw the impotence of the Ch'ing defence of her vassal states. The doctrine of the strength of Chinese civilization was being questioned in Korea and Vietnam as much as it was in China itself. Moreover, the roots of the nationalist movements in all three countries can be linked to this questioning.⁴⁷

The rise of the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) in China did not bring about an abrogation of the traditional claims to a sphere of influence in the areas of former vassal states. Though Japanese, and later Russian and American, occupation precluded the possibility of this becoming as apparent in their relations with Korea, it became abundantly clear in their dealings with Vietnam. As early as 1905 Sun Yat-sen, the father of the KMT, tried to convince Pham Bai Chan, the early leader of the Vietnamese nationalist movement, that the Vietnamese nationalist movement should become a branch of the KMT rather than an independent organization. In light of the traditional Vietnamese attitude towards Chinese dominance, it is not surprising that Pham flatly refused.⁴⁸

Forty years later, however, the KMT's desire for a presence in North Vietnam became even more obvious. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek occupied North Vietnam, as mandated by the allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, and proceeded to interfere in domestic Vietnamese affairs to a degree rarely matched during Imperial times. Although the KMT initially received universal acclaim amongst the Vietnamese for their refusal to allow the French to regain control, they soon angered the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, by the corrupt nature of their occupation and, paramountly, by their attempts to create a Chinese satellite through patronizing right wing nationalist groups. It has been suggested that the resentment which Ho felt over this treatment continued to influence his attitude towards the Chinese, both KMT and Communist, for decades to come.⁴⁹ This is a factor that can be greatly exaggerated, but it illustrates the point that nationalists in former vassal states showed less of an inclination

towards the acceptance of Chinese dominance than even some of their most rebellious predecessors during traditional times.

The relationship between the Korean and Vietnamese Nationalists and the KMT had little in common with that which existed between the vassal states and the Confucian elite in China during the Imperial period. Though the thoughts of Chinese Nationalists during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did influence the ideological development of the others, especially in Vietnam, they were not the only source of new ideas, and a host of other beliefs, many of them Western in origin, had a considerable effect. Following the 1917 Revolution in Russia many Nationalists in Asia found strength in a creed whose international base was in Moscow: Lenin's promise of liberation from imperialism had a relevance which few in Canton or Shanghai could match.

For various reasons, not least geographical ones, the links between the Chinese and the Vietnamese Nationalists on the whole seemed to be more solid than those between the Chinese and the Koreans. The Vietnamese found it comparatively easy to flee to South China, and in particular Canton, one of the main centres of KMT power, when escaping the French colonial authorities. Here such Nationalists as Pham Bai Chan, who had earlier been inspired by the writings of Lian Ch'i-ch'ao and other early Chinese Nationalists, worked alongside Sim Yat-sen and the heroes of the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Following the initial setbacks for the Chinese Republic the KMT decided to use Canton as a base for campaigns against the warlords in the North, and the city eventually became a "Mecca" for exiled Vietnamese. In the period between the two World Wars as many as

forty young Vietnamese graduated from the famous KMT Whampoa Military Academy. But it was also in Canton that the Vietnamese Nationalists first came in contact with the Comintern advisers sent by Moscow to guide Chiang during the period of KMT-Communist unity. Amongst them was a young Vietnamese interpreter who was later to be known as Ho Chi Minh. He arrived in 1924 to work with the Russian mission led by Borodin and General Bleucher.⁵⁰ As early as 1912 Ho had travelled to Europe and become radicalized through his experience in the West and, though he had always been an ardent Vietnamese Nationalist, he had made a conscious political decision to be guided by Western thought. The Chinese had little to do with shaping his early consciousness, though his later experience with the Chinese Eighth Route Army may have had some effect on him.⁵¹

Another important meeting place for Vietnamese and Chinese Nationalists prior to the Second World War was Japan. It was there that Pham Bai Chan first met Sun Yat-sen and that the two groups held long discussions over relevant issues. Japan was held in some esteem by the Nationalists because the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had proved that the West could be defeated by men of the East. Prior to the Japanese invasion of Vietnam many such as Pham felt that Japan might be a possible model to emulate, a true indication that Chinese prestige in East Asia had waned.⁵² This phenomenon was present within Korean Nationalist circles as well, but pro-Japanese sentiments were present in Korea as early as the 1870's, at the time of Li Hung-chang's interference in Korean domestic politics. Dealings with Japanese became less palatable for the Koreans following the Japanese occupation in 1895 - although those who

looked towards Japan for inspiration did not entirely disappear. Many Koreans in the 1920's were not radicalized by Russian or Chinese, but by Japanese Communists in universities in Japan. Unlike the Chinese and the Vietnamese, however, they were under constant surveillance by the Japanese authorities who, ever wary of a threat to their position in Korea, showed great efficiency in curtailing the activities of the Korean radicals.⁵³ Therefore, Japan was not a place where the Koreans could freely organize and solicit foreign aid and ideas, but unlike the Vietnamese only a few turned to China for such conditions.

Some of the early Korean Nationalists found inspiration and support from the American missionaries in their country, their Christian and liberal attitudes being popular among the young and laying the foundations for the anti-Japanese March First Movement of 1919. Woodrow Wilson's support for "national self-determination" increased American prestige still further; but his failure at Versailles caused a rapid disaffection to occur.⁵⁴ The Koreans then turned to the new champion of "national liberation" - revolutionary Russia. Official Soviet support for their cause and the geographical convenience of Siberia as a sanctuary created the circumstances in which Russia became the main bastion of the Korean Nationalist, and later Communist, movements. The Koreans flourished in two main areas of Siberia, the Maritime Province and the Onsk-Irkutsh Region, where Russian ethnic Koreans provided them with much aid. Many heroes of the resistance against the Japanese, such as the former royal general Yi Tong-hui, went to Siberia thinking that the Soviets offered real hope.⁵⁵ This optimism caused some Koreans to compare the Chinese Revolution of 1911 unfavourably with the Russian achievement. One young Korean activist wrote :

"Whereas the Chinese Revolution passed by completely unnoticed by the broad Korean masses, the Russian Revolution, which from its very first days dealt a fatal blow upon the decaying bourgeois system, woke up the Korean masses." 56

Although there was some Korean Nationalist/Communist activity in China prior to the Second World War, it was marginal when compared to the importance of the Siberian bases. There was even an attempt to set up a provisional government in Shanghai, but by 1923 the activities of this group had almost ceased - its structure having been irreparably damaged by the traditional Korean proclivity for political factionalism and a scandal over embezzled Comintern funds.⁵⁷ The Koreans in China went on to have some strong individual ties with the Chinese Communists, a development which will be discussed below, but as a group their contacts were not substantial.⁵⁸ As in the case of the Vietnamese, the epoch of East Asian nationalism saw the traditional deference towards Chinese political culture dissipate. Chinese influence over the Nationalist movements prior to the establishment of both Korean and Vietnamese independent states had to compete with other, more vibrant foreign movements. It was only in 1949, after the establishment of the Peoples' Republic, that Mao Tse-tung could hope to match the image that others had created. Whether he succeeded and thereby helped to fashion an effective regional foreign policy which could affect the outcomes of great power conflicts in East Asia is a question of integral importance to this study which will be discussed thoroughly below.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER ONE

1. The classic, succinct explanation of the tributary system can be found in Fairbank, John K., ed., The Chinese World Order, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 1-3.
2. *ibid.*
3. The trade benefits are described in Fairbank, John K., and Teng Ssu-yu, Ch'ing Administration : Three Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 137-139. For a discussion of the protection granted to vassals see Walker, Hugh, D., The Yi-Ming Rapprochement: Sino-Korean Foreign Relations 1342-1542, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1974), p. 30.
4. Laffe, Ella, "The Content of Sino-Vietnamese Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century" in Wickberg, Edgar, ed., Historical Interaction of China and Vietnam: Institutional and Cultural Themes (Lawrence Kansas; Kansas Centre for East Asian Studies, 1969), p.20.
5. Walker, Hugh D., p. 30.
6. Lin, Kuo-chung Classical Chinese Concepts of International Politics (University of Oklahoma, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 1974) p. 55.
7. The origins of agriculture in Vietnam are discussed in Chen, King, C., Vietnam and China : 1938-1954 (Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 6. The Korean Case can be found in Fairbank, John K. and Reischauer, Edwin O., East Asia : The Great Tradition (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 402.
8. *ibid.* Also see Reischauer, Edwin O., et. al. East Asia : The Modern Transformation (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), p. 432, for a discussion of the state of Nan Yueh.
Note : Choson was attacked by the Han in 108 B.C. in the events which led to the establishing of the colonies in Northern Korea.
9. Fairbank and Reischauer, p. 405-408.
10. Gardiner, Ken, "Beyond the Archer and His Son: Koguryō and Han China", Papers on Far Eastern History, Vol. 20, September 1979, pp. 57-72.
11. MacAllister, John T., Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution, (London: Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 14-20.
12. Twitchett, Denis, ed., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, (London Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 109. Also see Murakami, Hideo, "Vietnam and the Question of Chinese Aggression", Journal of South-East Asian History, Vol. 7, No. 2, September 1966, p. 23.

13. Gardiner, pp. 80-81.
14. Twitchett, ed., pp. 143-146.
15. *ibid.* p. 32.
16. Hae Jong Chun, "Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ching Period", in Fairbank, ed., p. 111.
17. Woodside, Alexander, B., Vietnam and the Chinese Model (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 240-242.
18. Smith, R.B., "The Cycle of Confucianisation in Vietnam", in Vella, Walter, ed., History in Asian Studies at Hawaii, Vol. 8, 1973, pp. 10-11.
19. The Confucian institutions gave the Vietnamese the strong, centralised state apparatus necessary for an expansionist regime. In the Korean case this state apparatus enabled great domestic stability which accounted for the longevity of the Yi dynasty, although the dogmatic Confucianism eventually became a fetter on creativity in all fields. See Fairbank and Reischauer, pp. 432-435.
20. Fairbank and Teng, p. 175.
21. *ibid.*, p. 175.
22. Walker, pp. 152-153, p. 205.
23. Pratt, Keith, "Politics and Culture within the Sinic Zone: Chinese Influence on Medieval Korea", Korea Journal, Vol. 20, No. 6, 1980, p. 24.
24. Smith, pp. 12-13. As Smith points out Confucianism fought an up and down battle with Buddhism from the fifteenth until the nineteenth century.
25. Whitemore, John K., "Chiao-Chih and Neo-Confucianism : The Ming Attempt to Transform Vietnam", Ming Studies, Vol. 3, Spring 1977, pp. 65-66.
26. Woodside, Alexander B., "Vietnamese Buddhism, The Vietnamese Court and China in the 1800's", in Wickberg, ed., p. 11.
27. It is interesting to note in the light of Gen Giap's statements on the originality of his military doctrine (to be discussed below) that in traditional time the Vietnamese were wont to point to their unique brand of military technique, such as their use of elephants. This is only one example of their manifest desire to show their originality with regards to the Chinese. See Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, pp. 23-24.
28. The Koguryō expansion into Southern Manchuria during the seventh century is the one exception to this generalisation. It opposed both the Siu and the Tang. See Twitchett, ed., pp. 231-234.

29. Truong Bun Lam, "Intervention Versus Tribute in Sino-Viet Relations, 1788-1790", in Fairbank ed., p. 165. For the Korean example see Hae Jong Chin, pp. 110-111.
30. Fairbank and Teng, p. 170.
31. Whitemore, Chao-Chih and Neo Confucianism, : The Ming attempt to Transform Vietnam, pp. 51-52.
32. Truong, pp. 170-179.
33. Twitchett, ed., pp. 233-234, 282-284. Silla was no mere puppet. Once the T'ang had subdued Koguryo, Silla pushed the Chinese out. She then quickly offered herself as a vassal and the Chinese refrained from punitive action because of preoccupations with Tibet.
34. Sanson, George, A History of Japan, 1334-1615 (Folkestone, Kent: Dawson, 1961), p. 562. For Hideyoshi's own views on the matter see Bascro, Adriana, ed., 101 Letters of Hideyoshi (Tokyo: The Kauato Press, 1975), p. 30-31. In his letters to his wife dated 5 July 1587, five years before the invasion, he stresses that Korea is only a means of reaching Peking.
35. Walker, p. 290. Such a comparison will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
36. *ibid.*, p. 313.
37. Park Yune-bhe, Admiral Yi Sin Shih and his Turtleboat Armada (Seoul: Shinsaeng Press, 1973), pp. 30-31. As an indication of the tarnished image of the Chinese in the post-Imperial period of East Asian foreign relations, it is noteworthy that contemporary South Koreans portray the Yi king's actions as grovelling to an untrustworthy ally, although this should be seen in the context of present day political circumstances.
38. Mancule, Mark, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay", in Fairbank ed., p. 74. Mancule points out that the Ching allowed the Board of Rites to continue to conduct tribute relations from the East and South, while the Li-yuan was created for the North-West crescent.
39. Fairbank, "The Early Treaty System in The Chinese World Order", in Fairbank ed., pp. 258, 272-274.
40. Banno, Masatska, China and the West: 1858-1861; The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 9.
41. Like most Chinese policies towards the foreign powers during the nineteenth century, this one was arrived at after a degree of vacillation. The initial Chinese response towards the Japanese aggression was by the conservative elements within the Tsungli Yamen who decreed Korea to be an independent sovereign state. Thus when Li Hung-chang was put in charge

of the Korean problem after 1875 he had to regain lost ground by reasserting the legitimacy of the Chinese role in this area. Once this was established he began to orchestrate the introduction of the Koreans to the West. See Hsü, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China (London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 409-410.

42. The failure of Li's policy can be seen as a flaw in the i-i ch-i tactic itself and is symbolic of the Chinese struggle to make the old ways fit the new circumstances. Both the Russians and the British refused to confront the Japanese over Korea in 1895 and thus Li's plans were invalidated. Li was not dealing with "barbarians" that could be easily manipulated into foregoing their own self interests. *ibid.*, p. 414.
43. Lin, T.C., "Li Hung-chang: His Korea Policies, 1870-1885" in Hsü ed., Readings in Modern Chinese History, pp. 274-276, 285.
44. Hsü, pp. 410-411. One of the primary actors in this move to influence Korean affairs directly was Yuan Shih-kai, the first President of the Republic of China.
45. *ibid.*, p. 399.
46. *ibid.*, p. 403.
47. For an example of this phenomenon and the crises of allegiance which it caused within the Korean elite see Palais, James B., Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 268-270. A similar development can be traced in the evolution of the ideology of Pham Bai Chau, the first prominent Vietnamese nationalist. He realised that Eastern, i.e. Chinese, knowledge was insufficient and that it would have to be mingled with Western political ideas. See Buttinger, Joseph, Vietnam: a Political History (London: Andre Deutsch, 1968), p. 155.
48. *ibid.*, p. 156.
49. The post World War II occupation and its effect on Ho's attitudes are discussed in Chen, King C., "The Chinese Occupation of Vietnam: 1945-1946", in France Asie/Asia, Revue Française des Problèmes Asiatique Contemporains, No. 23, 1969, pp. 3-28.
50. Chen, King C., Vietnam and China, pp. 16-18.
51. Fall, Bernard B., Last Reflections on a War (New York: Shocken Books, 1972), p. 65.
52. Trung Bun Lam, "Japan and the Disruption of the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement", History in Asian Studies in Hawaii, Vol 8, p. 251.

53. Scalipino, Robert and Lee, Chong-sik, "The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (II)", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. xx, No. 2, 1960-1961, pp. 158-160.
54. Reischauer, Fairbank and Craig, pp. 760-762.
55. op. cit., pp. 10-13.
56. Dae Sook Suh, Documents of Korean Communism: 1918-1948, (Princeton N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 47.
57. Scalipino and Lee, "The Origins of the Korean Communist Movement (II)", p. 156.

CHAPTER TWO

Chinese Domestic Politics at the Time of The Korean War Decision

An effective analysis of the CCP's decision to enter the Korean conflict and of that decision's implications for later events in the People's Republic of China's (PRC) history cannot be realized without a clear understanding of the domestic political climate of the period. Obviously, this decision was made when the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) consolidation of its rule over mainland China was hardly completed, and the adverse internal situations must have weighed heavily on the minds of the top CCP leaders as they made the difficult decision to battle the greatest power in the world less than a year after the declaration of the PRC. This raises a mass of questions: Did the Korean War debate cause schisms to develop in the CCP central elite, or were divisions already evident? What did the military, whose domestic role was great at the time, think of embarking on foreign ventures? How could a decimated economy recover while trying to support a foreign war? From these questions, and what we know of later events, it is hard to believe that the decision was unanimous or without dissension in lower echelons. An investigation of the economic conditions at the time, coupled with an attempt to isolate areas of concern within the Party, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in particular, may bring to the surface some of the domestic arguments of relevance to the debate.

The central elite of the CCP was a core of several hundred

high officials who had devoted most of their lives to the Chinese Revolution and had had extensive service within the PLA. As will be shown, the PLA's role in domestic administration in 1950 was necessarily extensive, so the divisions within this elite would have shown themselves most obviously within the context of the PLA command, in which all the luminaries of the day, for example, Mao, Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-Ch'i, can be placed. Therefore, the PLA was the primary link between all those important figures involved with policy making, as it also proved to be in subsequent periods. Moreover, we are discussing a single elite which is not divided up through institutional identities, and "whose political ties and concerns cross institutional boundaries".¹ In other words, in 1950 there was very little differentiation between the Party, the heads of state and the PLA, and therefore any evidence of factionalism will not be found in isolation within three separate bureaucracies. This lack of differentiation could be seen from the lowest levels of authority to the highest heads of state, because the process of consolidating rule following the Civil War can best be described as military personnel walking into positions of civil administration (often using what remained of the KMT organization at the urban level) without, in many cases, relinquishing their military authority or command. It was hard to distinguish a cadre's military role from his civil position in the village; the administrative regions into which the country was divided corresponded exactly to military regions, with the commander of the local Field Army usually in control of both. At the highest level the PLA's ruling body was the People's Revolutionary Military Committee (PRMC), which had Mao as its chairman and Chou En-lai and

Liu Shao-ch'i as its vice-chairmen - all of whom held the highest positions within the Party and the state structure as well.²

Consequently, it could be said that the PRC's domestic politics in 1950 were the politics of the PLA.

Though national reconstruction was clearly the primary desire of the military/administrative figures, there existed residuals, as it were, of decades of strife that had to be dealt with before complete, stable control could be achieved. During 1950 these proved to be a constant concern of the PLA and they certainly thwarted the achievement of other pressing objectives. These residuals came in two forms: major operations to bring traditional areas of Chinese territory into the fold of the PRC, i.e., Tibet, Hainan Island and, it was hoped, Taiwan; and the less massive, yet nonetheless exhausting, mopping up of KMT remnants known as "bandit suppression". A brief description will suffice to show that the PLA had domestic strife to contend with on a significant scale at the time concurrent with the Korean decision.

The invasion of Tibet was prepared for as early as January 1950, though the actual event did not take place until early October, the same month as the presence of Chinese troops in Korea became conclusive. Its decisive battle, the battle of Chamdo, was fought on 10 October. Although the actual fighting proved to be less than intensive, the PLA committed a fairly large number of troops from two Field Armies to the operation. These troops numbered 40,000 and they included men from Liu Po-cheng's Second Field Army and Peng Te-huai's First Field Army. The invasion of Hainan Island took place in April and involved the use of thousands

of junks sent from Kwangtung Province, the southern regional base of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army.³ It is interesting to note that Lin Piao's troops were also garrisoned in Manchuria and were reportedly the first elements to be sent into Korea.

The invasion of Taiwan - the only one of these major military objectives to be thwarted - is of great interest to this study because the Korean conflict interfered directly with its success. It was undoubtedly of the utmost importance to the CCP, as is indicated by the great expenses which were incurred during its preparations, and any decisions concerning Korea must be put into this context. It was reported that five thousand junks had been massed in East China; an army of fifteen thousand paratroopers were also being assembled; and as many as thirty airfields were under construction in Fukien and Chekiang province. It is believed that at least three hundred thousand of Chen Yi's Third Field Army were committed to the invasion.⁴

The problem of "bandit suppression" was also very pressing throughout 1950. Some sources have indicated that the eruption of violence on the Korean peninsula, and the US/UN reaction to it in the summer of that year, actually provoked more sabotage on the part of the remnant KMT soldiers and officials. It is said that the belief that the war would bring US troops into China was prevalent amongst these people and therefore their activities increased in number and in magnitude.⁵ The numbers of these "bandits" were reported to be as high as 800,000, and Lin Piao in a speech delivered on 12 April reported that there were 150,000 in Western Hunan province alone "engaging in continuous sabotage".⁶ Though

the last organized resistance on the mainland sputtered to a halt during March in Sinkiang,⁷ these incidents of espionage continued to plague the PLA throughout the year. One source of havoc did, however, emanate directly from Chiang Kai-shek during this period: air raids on coastal cities continued to endanger vital bridges, water supplies and power plants. Damage to Canton and Shanghai seems to have been particularly intense.⁸ Unfortunately for the CCP, antiaircraft weapons were not widespread at the time.

One means of dealing with KMT remnants, at least those who had operated at an administrative level, was to draw them into the local government bureaucracy that they had run before the CCP victory. There were explicit orders that these people should be allowed to continue their roles as operatives in the civil service, though they did little to please the rural cadres who had liberated the cities and who had an inherent dislike for the city and its bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the rural cadres had trouble with the local dialects and did not usually have the level of literacy needed for the administering of urban centres, so this move proved to be highly expedient.⁹

As the military/civil administrators wrestled with the problem of the troublesome mass of KMT supporters, they simultaneously had to overcome an even more daunting problem - the fragmented state of China's economic base. This battle had to be fought throughout 1950 and on a number of fronts: hyperinflation had to be conquered and money had to regain value; industrial production had to be increased from an exceedingly low level; poor communications

and transport had to be rectified; and agricultural production had to be raised at a time when famine caused by interrupted harvests and national disasters threatened millions. The enormity of these problems is self-evident and, naturally, they must have caused both the regional commanders, who dealt with their effects from a close vantage point, and the state planners in Peking to view a commitment to the Korean conflict as a grave threat to the salvaging of the nation's economy. It is in the economic sphere that the greatest reasons for opposing entry can be found.

Inflation had plagued the KMT throughout the Civil War years and had reached incredible levels by the time of the CCP victory. The fact that the price of wheat in Peking had risen by four thousand five hundred times in the year prior to Liberation attests to this fact.¹⁰ Prices in Shanghai had risen seven and one half million times from March 1946 to March 1949, and by the latter year people would be paid daily to enable them to rush to the markets before their money would be further devalued.¹¹ As Alexander Eckstein states, for the CCP, and all people influenced by socialist thought, the vagaries and instabilities of economic cycles are complete anathema. They were therefore attacked with vigor.¹² Paradoxically, the military men in charge of the PRC saw the decline in numbers of the military as the key to the salvation of the nation's economy.

One of the primary causes of the endemic inflation in China at the time of Liberation, and for many months thereafter, was the cost of keeping nine million people in arms. It is estimated that the military cost the CCP over sixty percent of its budget.¹³

Therefore, the demobilization of the forces was of the utmost importance. It was considered desirable for many reasons. Firstly, the release of able men, whose energies could be channelled into both industry and agriculture, would prove to be an efficient means of combating the low production in both of these areas. In addition, it was politically wise because it would enable highly loyal men of little military capability to work as cadres in the on-going agrarian reform movement. They would also prove useful in security work.¹⁴ In effect, the forces that had militarily consolidated the CCP's rule over China were being freed for constructive work that would advance the social and industrial aims of the movement. Their continued existence in their prior role was having detrimental effects on the achievement of these goals, while their transformation into a productive force was deemed by many in the CCP as an essential element in the recovery of the nation. Sending large armies on foreign adventures seems incongruous when put into this context.

It could be said that a large war might prove beneficial to the domestic economy and to the political stability of the regime, in that the large number of urban unemployed and other potential dissidents in the ranks of former KMT troops could be eliminated or at least occupied.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the degree of inflation mentioned above was unequivocally more of a threat to social order than these factors when assessed in balance. The KMT had lost any claim to legitimate rule in the minds of most of the populous: its corruption and brutality were bitter enough memories for the urban dwellers to give the CCP a chance. If inflation increased incessantly, however, that period of grace would have been shortlived.

Vice-Premier Chen Yŭn, the Chairman of the government's Finance and Economic Committee, designed the CCP's measures for economic stability. These entailed stringent, orthodox fiscal and monetary policy, such as balancing the budget and restoring confidence in the monetary medium through controlling the purchasing power of money and by regulating credit. This confidence was attained by such measures as encouraging savings. Chen Yŭn ensured that the amount of money deposited in a bank would be worth the same value in commodities when it was withdrawn through using a commodity basket unit system whose rate was regularly set. The government also kept prices steady by purchasing commodities through the state trading companies and then dumping them in areas where they were most needed.¹⁶ Nevertheless, prices could not be stabilized unless the supply of goods remained constant, which necessitated increasing agricultural and industrial production - not to mention beginning to face the massive problem of population control. Yet the supply of goods to the existing population could not have been guaranteed unless the means of distribution were vastly improved, primarily through rebuilding the nation's railways, many of which had been destroyed during the war. This project made good progress throughout 1950 because many of the scarce resources available were poured into it and eventually the amount of goods entering channels of distribution was able to expand.¹⁷ However, agricultural expansion, a prerequisite of industrial expansion, proved to be an arduous task, thus hampering progress in manufacturing sectors of the economy.

Throughout the first half of 1950 reports, many of which originated from the CCP itself, indicated that large sections of

the country were facing the possibility of a severe famine. The lack of food was attributed by Western sources at the time to natural disasters in the North and the unsettled conditions in the agricultural centre in the Southern and Central regions of the country. The Chinese government stated that agricultural production was only 75% of its pre-Sino-Japanese War level and that the peasants in some areas had begun to eat valuable seed grain. On 16 March Vice Premier Pi Wu reported the existence of seven million famine victims and blamed the shortages on the destruction of dykes during the war. He also said that some relief was being obtained by the collection of wild vegetables.¹⁸

Although the land reform movement during the immediate post-Liberation period was milder than those that had preceded it, it was by nature disruptive and therefore the food shortages caused its postponement until the August harvest of 1951 in the newly liberated areas of South Central China.¹⁹ Thus it can be seen that bad harvests were causing the CCP setbacks of a very serious nature.

Industrial progress was also severely hampered during 1950, though the CCP's policy of increasing production through encouragement of the national bourgeoisie was not faltering because of any inherent faults of its own. Although the government selected the firms into which resources were invested, and also dictated where products were to be allocated, it put very little pressure on the internal management. It was still, however, saddled with great problems caused by the outflow of capital prior to Liberation, the concomitant exodus of managerial talents, and the lack of foreign currency which traditionally came from overseas Chinese.²⁰ In

addition, the KMT blockade of PRC ports was proving to be very effective at stopping the flow of needed raw materials and food imports to many of the industrial centres, with Shanghai reportedly being particularly hard hit.²¹ But any reliable appraisal of the economy's prospects for real growth at that time would certainly have concluded that chances of an upturn without the inflow of foreign capital were very bleak indeed. Improved harvests might have helped raise the revenue for investment, but, as shown above, agriculture production was also poor. This is an important factor to remember when considering the significance of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950, which will be analyzed below.

Additionally, it must be noted, especially when questioning the strategic importance of Korea in the view of the PRC leadership, that there was only one area within the PRC which promised immediate potential in both the agricultural and industrial spheres. That area was Manchuria. For example, the evidence seems to indicate that agricultural production in this region was doing rather well: there is certainly no evidence to the contrary. During all the reports of famine in 1950, none mentioned Manchuria as an affected area, and, significantly, in a speech dated 18 April Chen Yun listed Manchuria as one of the main areas from which relief supplies were being sent.²² Though one could argue that this is evidence of Soviet aid being channelled through Manchuria, this would only serve as evidence of the very important rail link which would have enhanced the province's strategic value in the eyes of the CCP leadership. This also points to Manchuria's industrial importance, for not only was it the PRC's main industrial base, it was also free from naval blockade because of its access to resources via rail.

Compared to the other sectors of the economy (the traditional agricultural sector and the relatively small industrial sector built around the old treaty ports), the Japanese-built Manchurian industry was a prize asset. Though very badly maimed by the Soviet invasion at the end of the Second World War, it was far from destroyed and it therefore proved to be the one blessing in the post-Liberation economy.²³ Also, it was one of the first areas to be liberated and consequently had enjoyed a period of stability up to 1950 which other areas lacked. One byproduct of this stability, however, was the entrenchment of Kao Kang in a position of great power in the region - a factor which would have repercussions a few years later.

This brief overview has given fairly conclusive evidence that strong domestic reasons did exist for Chinese unwillingness to enter the Korean conflict. It presents an image of a nation facing great difficulties in trying to cope with the ravages of years of war and underdevelopment; it does not seem to have been a nation that was preparing for a confrontation with a far superior military force. Therefore, when the prospects of war suddenly increased, there must have been doubts about it on the part of the military figures who were burdened with the immediate crisis of administering these domestic circumstances. The inclination to resist war at all costs must have been strong and must have had its advocates. As stated before, the politics of 1950's in the PRC were intertwined with politics with the PLA. Any attempt to expose political divisions at the time of the Korean War decision must take this into account, so it is important to discern what, if any, factions or informal groupings existed within the PLA at that time. Moreover,

in order to understand the political circumstances which facilitated the formulation of a war strategy which totally contradicted the Maoist concept of "people's war", as the PLA's Korean campaign did, it is necessary to identify which ideological differences within the military hierarchy affected decision-making vis à vis the hostilities on the Korean peninsula. A description of the prevailing climate at the time would be incomplete without some indication of the groups vying for ideological or other forms of influence. Only then can we conclude whether the decision to embark on a military venture in Korea which ignored the Maoist precepts of "people's war" indicated a refutation of the Maoist approach by another ideological grouping in ascendancy at the time; or rather that it indicated a consensual political atmosphere marked by flexibility on behalf of Mao and his closest colleagues.

The definition of "faction" is not a simple matter. It may be a section within a larger political group that distinguishes itself by receiving the "political spoils" from a particular leader. Those within this section share what Andrew J. Nathan describes as "clientalist ties", which are marked by a close one-to-one relationship between a superior and his or her immediate subordinates. The latter gives loyalty; the former reciprocates with political appointments and other advantages.²⁴ This representation of the working of factions stressed the ideological conformity within the faction, and indeed within the larger group. It states that factions work within a broad ideological consensus which they all share and the boundaries of factions are not defined by doctrinal differences.²⁵ Hence, one is forced to look for regional and historical bonds which can explain the creation of distinct factions.

In the case of the PLA these bonds are shown to be evident in William Whitson's study, The Chinese High Command, in which he asserts that to a large extent the Field Armies developed independently and that some (particularly those from South Central China) continued to be under the same officers and had "retained a distinctive group identity for sixteen to twenty years".²⁶ Despite the non-random nature of the sample, it does show enough evidence of a regional basis for factionalism for this contention not to be totally disregarded.²⁷ Nevertheless, the periods following the Korean War seem to be marked by a great deal of doctrinal conflict which regionalism does not properly explain.

The primary ideological split within the PLA during its history was the well known division between those who favoured professionalism within the military and those who preferred ideological purity over expertise. This difference manifested itself throughout the history of the post-Liberation period of CCP rule by PLA leaders arguing that a compact, highly trained force armed with modern weapons should be the aim of military development, while the Maoists professed to believe in a massive guerilla army using men led by political commissars and armed with Mao Tsetung Thought in battle against sophisticated forces. Some have argued that this was always just a smokescreen to hide an inability to modernize,²⁸ but during periods when the PLA played an important role in society, such as in 1950, this certainly could have been used as an efficient means of promulgating doctrine. This surely was the case during the "Learn from the PLA" movement of the early 1960's. Though this domestic use of Maoist military doctrine should not be overlooked, it must be remembered that the trend in

1950 was demobilization. The goal of making everybody a Maoist soldier was definitely a few years away.

From what is known of the PLA hierarchy during the period immediately following the Civil War, it appears that the "professionals" were in a predominant position. Strong evidence of this phenomenon is provided by the appointment of Nieh Jung-chen as Deputy Chief of Staff towards the end of the Civil War. Nieh had a good knowledge of European military technology and was sympathetic towards the desire for elite armed forces.²⁹ The ascendancy of P'eng Te-huai at this time also points this way. Although he was only a Field Army commander at the end of the war, he is believed to have been second only to Chu Teh within the PLA command and following the entry of Chinese troops into Korea his position strengthened further.³⁰ As the nature of the Civil War changed, and guerrilla war gave way to more conventional tactics, it seems probable that the men with skills in conventional warfare, like Nieh and P'eng, gained greater influence. It therefore is likely that they rode the crest of this wave through the relatively short period between the wars and into the Korean conflict. Whether they represented a loosely-knit ideological group, or men who had strong regionally based faction, or both, cannot be stated with any degree of certainty.

There are differing opinions about the nature of the power structure in the highest circles of the Party at this time. It has been argued that this was a period of general consensus with none of the regionally based factions trying to outpace the others, or indeed trying in any way to upset the existing equilibrium.

This again stresses a lack of ideological confrontation.³¹ The lack of open political debate at the time may be an indication that this was actually the case. Conversely, it could be stated that one ideological faction completely dominated the political scene (e.g., the "professionals") to such an extent that other ideologies were smothered or that a leader of a regional faction which disagreed may have treated a dominant faction deferentially in order to protect his position. Any dissent may have been stated in purely pragmatic terms stemming from a faction leader's knowledge of the difficulties in his region during whatever debate took place over the Korean question.

The lack of known, extensive debate can also be explained by the possibility that there existed a strong coalition between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i from 1945 until the days in the late 1950's of the Great Leap Forward, which transformed itself into an institutionalized power centre without much ideological conflict.³² This would seem to fit the general mood of moderation which the CCP and Mao himself were displaying during the immediate post-Liberation period. A good example of this is the mild nature of the Agrarian Reform Bill of 1949. Also, the Korean War itself was fought in a distinctly non-Maoist manner, i.e., it was fought primarily on conventional battlefronts, with very little of the guerrilla activity which is the "people's war" model which the Maoists credit with the successes during the Civil War. Was this a period when Mao had softened his ideology and had accepted more "professionalism" out of a pragmatic need for national reconstruction? It is interesting to note the lack of sensational purges in the top leadership of the CCP that can be directly related to the Korean

War, which would indicate that dissention on this issue was not dealt with harshly. (Kao Kang's purge a few years after the beginning of the war was never publicly linked to the decision to enter the conflict.) Nevertheless, it is likely that regional and economic interests did cause some disagreement and it has been reported that not all of the generals were in agreement over Korea.³³ Whether the lack of great conflict over this decision can be explained by the dominance of a Mao-Liu coalition or by Nathan's belief that no one faction was strong enough to dominate so that consensus was protected in a more subtle manner,³⁴ cannot be proved. One can conclude, however, that a general consensus does seem to have been present amongst the CCP/PLA elite in 1950. Whether it was caused by the nature of the factional relations or, rather, out of a need for unity in the task of national reconstruction and in the face of foreign threat, is open to speculation.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER TWO

1. Nathan, Andrew, J., "A Functionalism Model for the CCP", The China Quarterly, January-March 1975, p. 53.
2. Gittings, John, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 263-269.
3. *ibid.*, pp. 37-41.
4. *ibid.* pp. 40-41. The Taiwan issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
5. Han Su-yin, The Morning Deluge (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 586. Although this could be interpreted as the author's attempt to rationalize the actions of a government that she shows a strong bias towards, it is also referred to in Vogel, Azra, Canton Under Communism (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 63.
6. The Times, 12 April 1950, p. 6. For a sample of Chinese reference to the "bandit suppression" movement see United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, Summary of New China News Agency Chinese News Despatches, Nos 1-19, June 1 - October 19, 1950, in particular; No. 2, May 29 - June 4, p.4; No. 3, June 5-11, p. 6; No. 4, June 13, pp. 2-4; No. 6, June 23, p. 4; and No. 12, August 15-21, p. 5.
7. Meisner, Maurice, Mao's China (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 74-75.
8. Vogel, pp. 60-61, and The Times, 11 February 1950, p. 3.
9. Vogel, pp. 52-59.
10. Meisner, pp. 85-86.
11. Eckstein, Alexander, China's Economic Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 165.
12. *ibid.* pp. 159-161.
13. Gittings, p. 26.
14. Whitson, William, The Chinese High Command (London: MacMillan, 1973), p. 523. In June 1950 Mao stated: "On condition that it guarantees sufficient forces to liberate Taiwan and Tibet, consolidate the national defence and suppress the counter revolutionaries, the PLA, while sustaining its main forces, should demobilize part of the force in 1950. The demobilization must be carried out carefully, so that the demobilized army men can settle down in productive work when they return home". See US Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 4, p. 5.

15. Rice, Edward E., Mao's Way (London: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 124-125.
16. Eckstein, pp.169-170.
17. *ibid.*
18. The Times, 8 March 1950, p. 6. For CCP references to the 1950 famine see US Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 1, p. 4; No. 2, pp. 1-6; No. 3, p. 1; No. 5, p. 4; No. 6, p. 5; No. 9, p. 7; and No. 13, p. 6.
19. *ibid.*, 16 March 1950, p. 6.
20. Vogel, pp. 72-73.
21. Barnett, A. Doak, Communist China : The Early Years (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), p. 22.
22. The Times, 18 April 1950, p. 3.
23. Eckstein, Galenman, and Lin, Economic Trends in Communist China (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), p. 1.
24. Nathan, pp. 45-46.
25. *ibid.*, p. 52.
26. Whitson, p. 521.
27. Thanks to Mr. David S. Goodman for pointing out to me the non-random nature of Mr. Whitson's sample.
28. Jaffe, Ellis, "The Conflict Between Old and New in the Chinese Army", The China Quarterly, April-June, 1964, p. 125.
29. Whitson, pp. 92-93.
30. Robinson, Thomas W., "Lin Piao as an Elite Type", in Scalipino ed. Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 187.
31. Nathan, pp. 52-53.
32. Tang Tsou, "Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in the CCP Politics", The China Quarterly, March 1974, p. 104.
33. Chow Ching-wen, Ten Years of Storm (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 116. The only purges that can be in any way linked to the Korean War were the Three Antis and Five Anties campaigns of 1952, but these were directed against petty corruption within the bureaucracy and against businessmen who were found profiteering during the conflict. See Vogel, p. 80.
34. Nathan, pp. 46-47.

CHAPTER THREE

The International Political Climate at the Time of the Korean War Decision

The international political climate which produced the great power crisis over Korea was, essentially, that into which the PRC had been born. This period of persistently high international tension was marked by what was interpreted at the time to be an increasingly bi-polar world with lesser nations gravitating towards the power centres of Moscow or Washington. It appeared to Western observers that the new Chinese government in Peking was unquestioningly placing itself in the "Moscow camp"; the myth, as we now know it to be, of Moscow being in complete control of hundreds of millions of Chinese was widely believed. It is evident, however, that the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the period between the founding of the PRC and the beginning of the Korean War did not result from a blind Chinese subservience to the "leader of the socialist camp", but was rather an expedient means towards the achievement of certain well defined national goals, i.e., the construction of a strong economy, national reunification, and the global recognition of China's proper place amongst the world's leading nations. The achievement of these goals was probably perceived by Mao and other CCP leaders as being hindered by Soviet interference or lack of enthusiasm, but not, at this stage, as being directly threatened by Russian dominance. The US, on the other hand, had given many indications that it found the "new China" less than acceptable, and had done so in ways which the CCP thought indicative of blatant imperialism. The US was thought of as a

deadly threat which could only be countered by "leaning to one side", the side of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, this move was accompanied by a distrust of the USSR which stemmed directly from unsympathetic Soviet actions, both in the past and during the immediate period leading up to the formation of the alliance.

At the time when the Chinese revolution was first showing signs of success, the USSR displayed a great preoccupation with Europe. The year which saw the turning point in the revolution, 1948, was also the year of the Berlin blockade and of Tito's defection. Therefore, the eyes of the Soviets were naturally on Europe (they had fought two massive wars there in the last thirty years), and the resources which they were willing to divert to the Far East were limited.¹ Moreover, the unwillingness to divert more was apparently accompanied by the acceptance of a non-communist China, which may be seen as the reason behind Stalin's 1948 directive to the CCP to continue guerrilla war and to refrain from pushing for total victory. At the time this was explained by fears of direct US involvement in the Civil War, but it has been reported that as early as 1945 Stalin had informed US envoy Averill Harriman that he had recognized the Chinese Nationalists instead of the CCP because of the latter's "exorbitant demands for the industrialization of China".² In addition, Stalin and others in the Soviet leadership had grave distrust of Mao's credentials. As Khrushchev later recalled, Mao was regarded by Stalin as a "margarine Marxist" and there was consternation at his unorthodox reliance upon the peasantry.³ Stalin's lack of support for Mao has been attributed to suspicion of any foreign communist leader who was not handpicked by him personally, so Mao, who had no strong

connections with Moscow, had purged excessively pro-Moscow elements of the CCP during the Kiangsi period, and who emphasised his own contribution to Marxist-Leninist thought, was a prime target for Stalin's displeasure.⁴ There are many examples of this displeasure and they must have contributed to any difficulty that Mao had in making his own personal decision to "lean to one side".

The Soviets showed little enthusiasm for the CCP throughout the Civil War and in many ways actually worked against Chinese efforts towards achieving their goals. They certainly did not exemplify the "fraternal ally" which many in the West thought they were. Besides providing little material support for the Chinese Revolution, as manifest by their reluctance to turn over Japanese arms to the Chinese guerrillas following the Japanese surrender in Manchuria,⁵ diplomatically they showed equal reluctance to break ties with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT until the very end of the conflict. It is significant that while all the ambassadors remained in the Nationalist capital of Nanking after it fell to the CCP, the Soviet ambassador fled with the KMT to their capital of Canton. There are reports that as late as May 1949 the Soviets were negotiating with the KMT over Sinkiang, even though the final CCP victory later that year seemed an increasing certainty. It has also been said that following the signing of the Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact with Chiang in 1945, the USSR had the distinction of being second only to the US in its support for the KMT.⁶ In addition, many observers believe that the Soviet Union showed definite predatory designs upon territory in Northern China. They, who include members of the CCP, the Red Guard during the 1960's

and Western commentators, have pointed towards the development of a Soviet sphere of influence in Sinkiang, the uprising in Inner Mongolia in 1946 which PLA troops had to crush, the economic concessions in the Soviet-KMT Pact, and the nurturing of pro-Soviet Kao Kang's position in Manchuria, as all being evidence of Soviet territorial desires in Northern China. It may have been that the Soviets wished China to be comprised of a satellite in the north and of a friendly KMT controlled south. There are also indications that during 1946-1947 the Soviets hinted to Chiang that they would arrange a truce between the KMT and CCP if the former granted the USSR economic concessions and also promised to detach itself from the US.⁷ Though it is not the aim of this paper to prove these points, it can safely be said that, in general, the policy of the USSR towards the Chinese revolution points towards their validity. There is very little that indicates wholehearted support for the CCP, to whom these trends must have been very disconcerting.

The negotiations which culminated with the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on Valentine's Day, 16 February 1950, did not mark a drastic reversal in Soviet attitudes, but they possibly increased the apprehension which Mao and his colleagues felt about the venture. The personal slights towards Mao during the negotiations were many. For example, he was met only by Molotov at the Moscow train station and there were no public messages of greetings (other communist leaders were showered with praise by Moscow on their birthdays, not to mention on their arrival for important discussion), and he was entertained in the less than salubrious Metropole Hotel and not the Great Hall of the Kremlin.⁸ Khrushchev has revealed that Mao even threatened

to leave because he was being neglected for days while he sat isolated in his hotel.⁹ More significantly, the Sinkiang and Manchurian delegations were treated almost as if they were separate entities, and they included Kao Kang, who had signed a separate treaty with the Soviets in July 1949. Nevertheless, the Chinese bargained fairly well and they did extract concessions which they believed to be vital. They conceded to the Soviets on the independence of Outer Mongolia, and agreed to set up joint stock companies in Sinkiang and Manchuria which would develop natural resources at an advantage to the Soviets; but they did receive a guarantee of \$300 million in credits. This was grossly inadequate for the nation's needs and resentment was probably generated by the aid being given as a loan and not as a gift. But, significantly, this was the first step towards achieving international support for a revitalized Chinese economy. In addition, it guaranteed military assistance against Japan and any state in alliance with her, in case of an attack on either of the agreeing parties. This was a great relief to the PRC, as the preliminary unilateral moves by the US towards a separate treaty with Japan, and MacArthur's New Year's Day speech which called for a rearmed Japan, both evoked images of a strong US-Japanese military alliance which was one of the CCP's greatest fears. It is in this fear of US imperialism in coordination with the Japanese that the primary significance of the Sino-Soviet Alliance can be found.

The body of opinion within the CCP against an alliance with the Soviets existed to a very evident degree. An indication of this was the contents of the first issue of the theoretical journal Hsüeh Hsi, which was published just prior to the negotiations which

ended with the signing of the Friendship Treaty. In an article entitled "Soviet Friendship", the anonymous author tackles such questions as: "Why is it only China that has got to lean to one side; why not the Soviet Union as well?".¹⁰ The overriding point to Mao and the CCP leadership was, however, that "leaning to one side" and the consequent treaty provided the PRC with the possibility of an ally when the new state's very existence was at its most vulnerable.¹¹ Many of the doubts which were evident in the above mentioned article were undoubtedly present in Mao's mind as well, but the strategic importance of a link with the "socialist camp" could not be ignored. The threat from the United States, a capitalist nation in an "advanced imperialist stage", was necessarily more of an imminent danger to the PRC than the neighbour to the north, even though the latter had shown a proclivity for putting its own national interests above those of China. The slightest hint of a "military umbrella" from the Soviet Union could only work in the PRC's favour in its stance vis à vis the US. Therefore, no matter how tempting the "Titoist Road" may have seemed, the exigencies caused by the increasing signs of US encirclement ruled out any moves towards non-alignment. From the US-backed moves of the French in Indochina, to the strong possibility of a separate US-Japanese treaty, every indication was that the US would continue the same policy that it had displayed by its support for Chiang Kai-shek during the Civil War, i.e., opposing the PRC's control over all of China and attempting to contain its spread.¹² The US, through its support for the KMT, had become the latest example of an imperialist power threatening Chinese sovereignty. This was anathema to the CCP, for imperialism, more than indigenous capitalism, was perceived as the primary enemy in the struggle for

a strong Chinese state.¹³ This was the lesson learned during the last century or more of the Western encroachment on China. In short, the leadership of the PRC mistrusted the Soviets, but their perception of history caused them to fear the US, especially if it were allied with the last power to invade Chinese territory, the Japanese.

In the US those with influence who believed in the threat of a monolithic communist bloc asserted a great deal of pressure upon the Truman administration in their demand for strong action against the PRC, but concurrently there were officials in the State Department who pointed to Mao's great nationalism and declared him to be an Asiatic Tito. The consequence was an ambiguous policy which engendered more distrust on the part of the CCP. The utmost example of this equivocable position prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was the US policy vis à vis Taiwan. The stated policy toward the Chinese Civil War, after Chiang had fled to Taiwan, was officially to "let the dust settle". It seemed apparent from Truman's 5 January 1950 speech that the administration had decided that the defence of Taiwan was not important to America's national interest. However, the PRC could not take this at face value because there were indications of continued aid to the KMT. For example, the unexpended balance of a \$24 million special fund for arming the KMT was never cut off after Truman's speech.¹⁴ The PRC did not, even so, believe that the US resolve to save Taiwan was great enough to block an invasion, and consequently preparations continued until they were curtailed by the outbreak of war in Korea. It was Taiwan which was the main obstacle towards a bettering of Sino-American relations, because of the insistence

by the PRC that all nations that wished to develop relations with the new state had to cut ties with the "reactionary forces" on Taiwan. In 1950 Britain seemed on the verge of reaching a viable compromise; the US refusal to abandon total recognition of Chiang's government, however, left intact the possibility in the CCP's eyes of foreign intervention.

Another factor in the CCP's decision to seek an alliance with the USSR was probably the unfavourable attitude of the US ambassador who had remained in Nanking following its fall towards the end of the Civil War. The ambassador, Dr. Leighton Stuart, had been President of Peking's Yenching University and the CCP official sent to ask him about the normalization of relations was one of his former students, Huang Hua. Huang was also sent to enquire about the ambassador's willingness to travel to Peking to attend a celebration in honour of his birthday. Stuart asked the US government for authorization, but after a long delay he simply received a message stating that the North Atlantic powers had agreed to a coordinated delay of recognition until after a government acceptable to all the Chinese people had been found.¹⁵ This was not the last conciliatory move on the part of the JCP to be ignored by the Americans. After the fall of Shanghai, Chen Yi, the new mayor and the future foreign minister of the PRC, publically proclaimed that Soviet aid would be inadequate for China's reconstruction and that the US would be welcome to offer assistance as long as it was on terms of mutual equality.¹⁶ This also fell on deaf ears and shortly afterwards Mao wrote his famous attack on Western imperialism in which he castigated all those who believed that China could benefit from the West. The essay, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", scoffed at the idea of help coming from

the British or the US governments by declaring: "This too is naive in these times. Would the present rulers of Britain and US, who are imperialists, help a people's state?".¹⁷ He firmly believed that they would not.

In the CCP's view, it was also the US who blocked the entry of the PRC into the UN Security Council, thereby robbing the new government of a victory of great symbolic importance, for the goal of a new, independent China taking her proper seat amongst the great nations was a matter of dignity for the Chinese. Some argue that the USSR's angry walkouts over the question of the Chinese seat were actually a clever ploy designed at isolating the PRC and forcing the new regime into greater dependence on the Soviets.¹⁸ Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the CCP saw the Soviet moves as their obstacle. It is more likely that they saw the US as employing the same diplomatic technique that they were using towards Taiwan: they were issuing statements which declared a policy of non-intervention, but their actions denoted a continuation of a strong anti-PRC stance. Although the US delegate to the UN declared on 12 January (the same day as Secretary of State Acheson had declared that Taiwan lay outside the US "defence perimeter") that the US would abstain from voting on the admission of the PRC to the Security Council and that he would not use the veto, he followed this by stressing that the US still recognized the KMT government. Not surprisingly, the US-dominated Security Council rejected the motion for a PRC seat.¹⁹ Mao must have felt extreme indignation towards this new move to block "New China's" entry into the world of the great powers.

From this description of both the US and the USSR's moves concerning the newly formed PRC, it may appear that the new government was not given much choice and that both of the two major powers acted to a degree in the role of an adversary. This had led some authorities to speculate that the "leaning to one side" period was simply a modern version of the Imperial tactic of "using a barbarian to control a barbarian".²⁰ But this theory tends to disregard the ideology which both the ruling communist parties shared. Although they may have disagreed on tactics, and Mao's visions may have been too sinocentric for the Russians, they did both see the primary struggle in the world as being between the "socialist camp", which also served the needs of the colonial and semi-colonial people, and the "US-led imperialists". Stalin and his colleagues may not have liked the Maoist leadership, but they certainly would not have made an alliance so unattractive as to force China into the opposite camp in her search for aid in its national reconstruction.²¹ In addition, the Soviets had supporters in the Chinese government, e.g., Kao Kang, for whom they may have had aspirations. Predominant in the CCP leadership's mind at this time must have been the choice between a power that had proved its imperialist nature by pouring \$3 billion into the KMT's fight during the Civil War and thereby interfering in domestic Chinese affairs; and a power which had declared itself anti-imperialist, although it did often tend to have policies dominated by national self-interest. They had a great many reasons for being apprehensive of the Soviet Union, and they had shown that they were not averse to making gestures towards the US in the hope that an arrangement could be made, but at the time, in the midst of the Cold War, "leaning towards the Soviets" was the CCP's only logical stance.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER THREE

1. Beloff, Max, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 6.
2. Simmons, Robert R., The Strained Alliance (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 55.
3. Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1971), p. 462.
4. Ulam, Adam, Stalin : The Man and his Era (London: Alan Lane, 1974), p. 693.
5. Gittings, John, The World and China : 1922-1972 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), p. 149.
6. Kalicki, J.H., The Pattern of Sino American Crisis (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 15.
7. Ulam, pp. 689-690.
8. *ibid.*, p. 693.
9. Khrushchev Remembers, Vol. II (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 287.
10. Gittings, p. 152.
11. *ibid.*, p. 153
12. Kalicki, p. 16.
13. Ojha, Ishwar, Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 89.
14. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), p. 499.
15. Gittings, p. 165.
16. *ibid.*, p. 170.
17. MacFarquhar, Roderick, Sino-American Relations : 1949-1971 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1972), p. 67.
18. Simmons, p. 92.
19. MacFarquhar, p. 63.
20. Simmons, p. 51.
21. Snow, Edgar, Red China Today : The Other Side of the River (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 178-179. Snow's description of the views held by Mao and Khrushchev is very similar to one which could be written about how Mao and Stalin differed on the subject of American imperialism. He

wrote: "Both Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev regarded the United States as the last and dying champion of world capitalism. They differed in their concepts of how the sick man was to be eased out of his misery and who was to administer euthanasia to him to make way for socialist liberation". Stalin and Khrushchev believed that only a Soviet-led bloc offered any hope; Mao saw the reemergence of a strong and vital China as the primary factor in the eventual defeat of imperialism.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Relations Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Leaders of North Korea: 1945-1950

The dominant "Cold War" analysis of international relations at the time of the Korean War has had an adverse effect on present studies of the period. The belief that the Soviet Union directed the policies of all the communist parties involved in the conflict precluded an indepth study by Western analysts of the relations between the CCP and the communist leaders of North Korea which may have revealed a clear picture of the imperatives behind the CCP's decision to enter the Korean War. The paucity of available information on the subject indicates that the decision took place at a time when the relations between the two parties were not close and that national interests and not "socialist solidarity" provided the impetus behind Chinese intervention. A brief description of the poor reception which Korean communists returning from China received from Kim Il-sung's dominant Kapsan faction, and of the nature of interparty relations at the time will further illustrate this point.

The distinct lack of close, formal interparty ties during this period is not indicative of a total lack of CCP influence on sections of the Korean communist movement. Contacts between individual Koreans and the CCP had begun as early as the 1920's, as will be discussed in greater detail below.¹ Moreover, by 1945 there existed a large body of Koreans who had received their political education in Yen-an under the tutelage of the CCP.

After the removal of Japanese authority over Korea in 1945, these individuals began to return to Korea from their exile in China. They also brought back Maoist ideas with them.² They immediately began to build spheres of influence in both US-administered South Korea and in the somewhat more favourable political climate of Soviet-administered North Korea. They are commonly referred to as the Yen-an Faction, and during the immediate post-war period they vied for power with four other factions: the Domestic Communists who had remained in Korea or Japan during the Pre-liberation period and were led by Pak Hon-yong; the Soviet Koreans who were mainly Soviet citizens of Korean descent that had entered North Korea with the Soviet troops in 1945; the popular Nationalists led by Chok Man-sik; and the partisan guerrilla faction known as the Kapsans who were led by Kim Il-sung and who eventually succeeded in subjugating all of the other political groups.³ Although they eventually found themselves devoid of power, before their downfall the Yen-an faction succeeded in gaining support from certain key sectors of society and in having their leaders placed in important governmental positions. Paradoxically, this apparent success in government had simply incorporated the Yen-an Faction's leadership, silenced them as an effective opposition, and left their leaders vulnerable to the purges which culminated in 1950, ironically, the year that the CCP entered the Korean War.

The Yen-an Faction enjoyed some of its greatest successes within the communist front organizations in the South, such as the trade unions, and in the communist created youth movement on both sides of the border. The Korean Democratic Youth Movement was founded on 25 April 1946, and it quickly began to show Maoist

inclinations. The Yen-an Faction's influence over the Youth Movement has been attributed to the lack of charisma that the young, but dedicated, leftists found in both Pak Hon-yong and Kim Il-sung.⁴ For whatever reason, the Yen-an Faction's leaders seemed to have this needed charisma. Possibly it was because their exploits in the ongoing Chinese Revolution had created a certain appeal, or maybe it was because of the distinctive Asian road to socialism which they were advocating, in the form of Mao's strategies. The Youth Movement seems to have been a potential source of great influence for the Yen-an Faction that was never properly exploited.

Nevertheless, the organizations that proved receptive to the Yen-an Faction were, especially in the South, simply fronts for the communist movement which backed them and not proper sources of power in their own right. In order for the Yen-an Faction to achieve real influence, it was necessary for them to gain power within central communist circles. They began this process immediately after their return, using the title of the Korean Independence League. The creation of local support groups all over the North and South was attempted and in many cases achieved a measure of success. Strongholds were developed in certain areas where conditions were especially favourable,⁵ yet although the Yen-an Faction had acquired knowledge of organizational skills from the CCP which was respected by their opponents, they were never able to use these skills to spread their influence into other regions. It must be noted, however, that soon after their initial return to Korea the Yen-an Faction had to face the reality that the Kapsan Faction was enjoying Russian patronage during an era of direct Soviet control. This considered, the Yen-an returnees can

be said to have achieved a fair amount of success in creating their much needed popular support.

The creation of the New People's Party in the spring of 1946 marked a turning point in the development of the Yen'an Faction's power base. In six months it had a membership of 90,000, much of which comprised members of the middle classes, such as the intelligentsia and technicians - the very people that Korea would need for its independent development. Feeling secure because of the initial gains of their new vehicle, the New People's Party, the Yen'an Faction made a tactical error a mere six months after its creation: in August 1946 they merged with the Kapsan Faction to form the Korean Worker's Party (KWP). A similar merger occurred in the South in November. What appeared to the Yen'an Faction as a means towards achieving greater influence by joining with the Soviets' favourites was, in fact, the opportunity which Kim Il-sung needed to consolidate his position. The merger allowed Kim Il-sung to avoid facing a strong united opposition because it alleviated the possibility of the Yen'an Faction siding with his immediate adversaries, Pak Hon-yong's Domestic Communists.⁶ His moves against the Yen'an Faction were simply delayed by this tactic, though eventually they proved to be very effective.

The Kapsan Faction's strategy proved to consist of swift, direct attacks upon the Domestic Communists and the Nationalists, followed by slow attrition against the Soviet Koreans and the Yen'an Faction from within the KWP's structure. The Soviet Union apparently consented to the former action and treated the latter events, which occurred mainly after direct Soviet occupation had

ended, with indifference. The Nationalists had widespread support and represented a major barrier to the Russian influence which they bitterly opposed. The Soviets initially had attempted to curb their power by incorporating them into the power structure where they could be easily dominated. They offered Cho Man-sik the Presidency of North Korea and promised that Kim Il-sung would remain his subordinate in the position of Defence Minister, with the stipulation that he accept the proposed Russian trusteeship over the country. Cho predictably refused, and was placed under house arrest shortly afterwards following public clashes with the Soviets in January and February 1946.⁷

Although they did not have any ideological differences of great importance with Pak Hon-yeong and the Domestic Communists, the Soviets are reported to have come to regard him as representative of the great factional strife which plagued Korean communism in the pre-World War Two period.⁸ Therefore, they were unsympathetic towards his political aspirations and gave their approval to Kim's plans to move the locus of the nationwide communist movement's political activity away from Pak's power base in Seoul and to Kim's base in P'yongyang. Pak protested and did not follow the move until the pro-US Rhee government in Seoul forced him to flee; when he came north he found Kim entrenched and himself isolated.⁹ The Domestic Communists acquiesced by joining the KWP, though from the start they found their position untenable and their power negligible.

The Yenan Faction's fall from power within the KWP proceeded slowly but relentlessly. One of its top leaders, Kim Tu-bong, began his career in the KWP in the exalted post of Chairman of the

Presidium of the First People's Assembly; when the war began he was the head of an insignificant military academy in a remote part of the country.¹⁰ Another pointed example of the Yen-an Faction's plummeting fortunes was the history of Mu Chong, a much admired man in Yen-an who had been a first commander of an artillery regiment in the PLA, was a close friend of Chu Teh, and had served as one of the eight delegates from Yen-an at the Second Border Region Congress in January 1946. As a leader of the Yen-an Faction he had held many high posts within the KWP, but when the Korean War began he was simply serving as a military commander. In December 1950 the great purge of the Yen-an Faction began and Mu was made a scapegoat for the earlier fall of P'yongyang. It has been reported that the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) rescued him from prison and had him transferred back to China.¹¹

It is highly unlikely that Kim's opposition to the Yen-an Faction went unnoticed by the CCP leadership prior to its decision to enter the Korean conflict. Salient evidence of this implicit policy of limiting indirect Chinese influence was displayed by the Korean authorities' initial reluctance towards allowing the Korean Volunteer Army, a substantial force of ethnic Koreans who had been fighting as an integral division of the PLA, to enter Korea via the town of Antung. When they finally relented in 1949, for reasons which will be discussed below, the individuals with CCP membership were carefully screened before they were given their freedom; those with membership in the Soviet party, on the other hand, were granted immediate, unhindered entrance.¹²

Nevertheless, despite repeated insults and aggression towards

former comrades, the CCP apparently never displayed explicit indignation towards the actions of the Kapsan Faction. Although they were undoubtedly interested in the plight of their past associates, the exigencies of the ongoing Civil War certainly narrowed the Chinese leadership's concern with Korean affairs to the extent that they were unable or unwilling to become involved. When the domestic crisis lessened and they were given more of an opportunity to investigate the conditions in the former Chinese sphere of influence, the Chinese were presented with the fait accompli of Kapsan control. All the known evidence suggests that any subsequent efforts at exerting influence was done directly through the existing leadership: there are no indications that they every attempted to work indirectly through the Yen-an Faction.¹³ Although they possibly sympathized with the plight of the Yen-an returnees, the ties with them were not close enough, nor was their interest great enough in the period prior to the Korean War for the CCP to nurture a bastion of Chinese influence actively in opposition to the desires of the Soviets, on whom they depended for future support, as shown in Chapter Three.

Though Kim Il-sung made great efforts to remove from power those who were closest to the CCP, there is, however, evidence which implies that Chinese ideology was not totally abhorrent to Kim. Indeed, some go so far as to say that Kim joined the CCP in 1931,¹⁴ though the North Koreans themselves deny that Kim ever left the country at any time prior to 1945,¹⁵ possibly in an attempt to stress the great nationalism of their leader. Nonetheless, Kim and the KWP did propagate the Thought of Mao Tse-tung prior to the Korean War, and, moreover, openly drew from it in their own

official writings. For example, Kim clearly uses the idea of the "mass line" as outlined in Mao's 1943 essay "On Methods of Leadership" in his own "Report to the Second Congress of the Worker's Party".¹⁶ There were other signs of Kim's admiration for the Chinese movement. Not only were the works of Mao published in great quantity in 1946 and 1947, the North Koreans also showed active support for the CCP's efforts in the Civil War at the time. The best example of this support occurred at the end of 1946 when PLA units fled across the border following the KMT occupation of Antung. The Koreans clothed, fed, and reequipped them until conditions were favourable for their return. The PLA units did not reenter China until 1947.¹⁷

No matter what Kim's past connections were with the CCP, it must be remembered that his rise to power was achieved under the direction of the Soviets. Though he was not as reliable as one of the Soviet Koreans, the Soviets may have favoured him because he had recently been under their tutelage and had a nationalist image that would make him more acceptable to the Korean people. When he was first presented to the Koreans at a rally on 14 October 1945, he was clearly a Russian protege - even his hair was cut in a Russian style. It is likely, however, that his background as a partisan, nationalist guerrilla would have made his total subjugation to the Russians difficult to attain. Incidents such as the reported rapes and lootings in which the Russians engaged when they entered Korea probably provided Kim with a motive for an immediate search for more independence once a native power base within Korea had been achieved.¹⁸ The use of Mao's Thought may have been the first indication of this - a latter day adaptation

of the Confucian tradition of using "barbarians to fight barbarians". But total dependence upon the Russians for aid made any strong deviation from the prescribed path very risky, especially for one who had such a lofty goal as the forceful reunification of his country. Moreover, no matter how much Kim may have wanted to balance his international connections, the Chinese were too busy with their own affairs to facilitate this desire. Although Kim may have had such motives during 1946-47, he showed almost no inclination towards them in the period beginning in 1948. It was his attitudes during this latter period which the Chinese had to consider when they were formulating their policy towards the Korean conflict.

At the official party level, such relations as did exist between the CCP and the KWP from 1948 onwards were indifferent at best, and at times were marked by conflict. The Chinese pointedly did not send a representative to P'yongyang until July 1950 (after the start of the war) and did not send an ambassador until 13 August.¹⁹

Although the period from 1945 to 1948 was marked by some definite acts of inter-party cooperation, such as the harbouring of the PLA units and the signing of a pact concerning the transportation of goods (notably signed with the Transportation Committee of the Chinese Northeast Administration, who was later shown to have strong Soviet connections),²⁰ after 1947 CCP-KWP relations were highlighted by the dispute over the Suphong Dam across the Yalu - the most apparent reason for the subsequent deterioration in cooperation. The dam was damaged by floods in 1946 and was badly in need of repairs. The North Koreans chose a Soviet plan

for the dam's repairs which totally excluded Chinese participation. Moreover, this plan called for the sealing of the gates on the Chinese side and the diverting of all the overflow to Korean territory. The CCP representative in the area protested that half of the river ran through Chinese territory and that a large section of the dam was on Chinese soil. The Koreans, however, began unilateral construction in 1948 which continued into 1949. The Chinese, in turn, responded by barring Korean workers from access to their territory. The dispute over the allocation of the dam's electricity was so bitter that the Soviets had to intervene in early 1949 to ensure that the surplus power was allocated to the Chinese. Nevertheless, reports that the Chinese continued to interrupt railroad shipments of material to the dam persisted throughout 1949.²¹

It seems paradoxical, in the context of the above dispute, that some sources have reported that a mutual defence treaty was signed by the CCP and the KWP in March 1949.²² Although it is possible that Soviet pressure on both sides produced a treaty that was designed principally to provide the Soviets with a surrogate for any future dispute in Korea, it seems improbable that two parties which did not previously exchange ambassadors, and were in the midst of a dispute over power supplies, would embark on such a venture. The Chinese readiness to approve of a Republic of Korea (ROK) presence in North Korea following the September 1950 routing of the DPRK troops, as discussed in the following chapter, also tends to place the existence of such a treaty in doubt.

Thus the CCP decision to enter the Korean War was not based on international socialist solidarity with a fraternal ally of long

standing. What is certain, however, is that this decision was based on a perception of national priorities, and that any assistance given to North Korea was intended to benefit or protect the PRC and not necessarily to save the KWP. It is interesting that the Chinese rarely used "socialist solidarity" as an explanation for their involvement: they always referred to the help and assistance that the Korean people had given their revolution.²³ Further evidence of their preoccupation with national interests is given by their lack of concern over the plight of those Koreans who had helped the most, i.e., the Yanan Faction. There is no evidence that the CCP increased its support for this group even after the events of 1950 forced them to take a more active interest in Korean affairs.

Although the possibility that the Chinese intervened partially to reestablish a presence in an area which was traditionally within their sphere of influence cannot be ruled out, the lack of a consistent, pro-Chinese stand by Kim in the years that followed the war either indicates that this policy was ineffective or that it did not exist. Although Kim did show an increased tendency towards Maoist ideology in the period immediately following CCP intervention, for example by directly copying the "Three Anti's Movement" of 1952-53,²⁴ this may be judged as expediency in that the survival of his regime totally depended upon the presence of Chinese troops in Korea. In the years following the war Kim Il-sung followed an evenhanded approach towards Peking and Moscow. This probably suited the CCP, which at the time sought to be considered as Moscow's equal within the world communist bloc. A good indication of Kim's neutrality is the way in which he purged both

the Yen-an and the Soviet Korean Factions extensively during the 1950's.²⁵ The Kim regime may not have represented a Chinese sphere of influence either prior to or following the Korean War, but neither did it represent a threat to Chinese sovereignty. This is a point which must be considered when questioning the Chinese intervention which saved Kim Il-sung's regime.

Although they probably had very little bearing on the Chinese decision to enter the war, the similarities between the nationalistic attitudes of Mao and Kim are noteworthy. Both leaders stressed their policy of guiding their nations to true independence; both partially pursued this policy by purging foreign influences from their own parties. Mao had displayed this tendency as far back as the 1930's during his campaign against "The Returned Student Group" who had studied in Moscow when he was consolidating his power within the CCP.²⁶ Kim did the very same thing in the '40's and '50's, except that one of the influences he was militating against was Chinese in origin. One major difference was that Kim's moves were made with Soviet consent and Mao's were in defiance of Soviet authority. This does not, however, make Mao more nationalistic than Kim. Nevertheless, when Mao decided to commit the PRC to intervening and thereby saving the KWP, Kim probably realised that this was not an act of altruism but rather one of protecting Chinese self-interests. Given their mutual proclivities and their knowledge of CCP-KWP relations prior to intervention, it is doubtful that either leader conceived of this act in any other way.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER FOUR

1. Lee, Chong-sik, "Politics of North Korea : Pre-War Stage", in North Korea Today, Scalapino ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 4.
2. For a brief description of the origins of the Yenan Faction see Sohn, Pow-key, Kim, Chol-choon, and Hong, Yi-sip, The History of Korea (Seoul: Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 1970), pp. 298-299.
3. Lee, "Politics of North Korea - Pre-War Stage", p. 13.
4. Scalapino, R., and Lee, C.S., Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 267.
5. *ibid.*, p. 334.
6. *ibid.*, pp. 352-355.
7. *ibid.*, pp. 338-339.
8. Lee, Chong-sik, "Kim Il-sung of North Korea", Asian Survey, Vol. 7, (June 1967), p. 378.
9. *op. cit.*, p. 329.
10. *ibid.*, p. 371.
11. Lee, Chong-sik, "Korean Communists and Yenan", The China Quarterly, (January-March, 1962), p. 184.
12. Scalapino, R., and Lee, C.S., p. 400.
13. Suh, D.S., and Lee, C.J., Political Leadership in Korea (London: University of Washington Press, 1976), pp. 181-182.
14. Simmons, R.R., The Strained Alliance (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 26. Interestingly, Scalapino and Lee, in Communism in Korea, one of the most thorough works on the subject, never mention a direct link between Kim and the CCP. As Lee points out, the largely accurate records of the Japanese Consulate in Korea do not even list Kim as a member of the Korean Communist Party in 1931. See, Lee, Chong-sik, "Kim Il-sung of North Korea", p. 375.
15. The Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Korea, Brief History of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Il-sung (P'yongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1969), pp. 19-61.
16. Simmons, pp. 30-31.
17. *ibid.*, p. 32.

18. Scalapino and Lee, pp. 318-325.
19. Kalicki, J.H., The Pattern of Sino-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 28.
20. Simmons, p. 32.
21. Whiting, A., China Crosses the Yalu, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 43-44.
22. Simmons, pp. 32-33. Simmons's only source for this alleged treaty is Kyodo Tsunshin, the major Japanese newsagency, reporting in May 1950. The author himself points out the lack of documentary evidence.
23. Whiting, A., p. 129.
24. Scalapino and Lee, p. 164.
25. Suh and Lee, p. 164.
26. Waller, D.J., The Government and Politics of Communist China (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1970), pp. 28-30.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Korean War : The Decision to Enter the Conflict

As the Sino-Soviet dispute became apparent, and the Cold War fear of monolithic communism subsided, it became increasingly accepted by scholars that the leadership of the PRC had little, if any, part in the planning of the outbreak of hostilities on the morning of 25 June 1950. There are, however, divergent opinions about the motivation behind the deployment of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) and about the amount of information which the CCP was given by Moscow or P'yongyang in the preparations for battle. However, most evidence indicates that the PRC was surprised by the timing of the initial attack and that it was only under what the CCP leadership believed to be extreme provocation which threatened their newly established regime that the PRC became involved in the conflict. A primary factor in the reluctance shown towards involvement was certainly the knowledge that a war with US-led troops would lead to an even greater dependence on the Soviet Union. The decision by the Chinese to become involved was widely interpreted by the Western world to be in strict keeping with her declared "leaning to one side" foreign policy, but, as Chapter Three has shown, the "leaning" was not very steep and the Chinese could have taken cognizance of the possibility that they were basically choosing the lesser of two adverse outcomes.

It now seems fairly certain that the exact date of the North Korean advance into South Korea took the CCP by surprise. While it is widely assumed that the Soviet Union was in control and

therefore made the decision to begin the invasion, there are those who argue that the war was instigated solely by Koreans, and that Stalin himself was surprised by the timing, though he was aware of the plan. Some believe that there was an understanding that the invasion would start in August, thereby giving the PRC time to complete the planned takeover of Taiwan and the Soviets a chance to return to the UN as the presiding nation over the Security Council, as they were scheduled to do. The 25 June invasion occurred, it is argued, because of factional fighting between Korean communists. This theory states that the Kapsan Faction started the invasion in order to catch their opponents the Domestic Faction, which was still prominent in the south despite the fact that its leader, Pak Hon-yong, had fled north, offguard and thereby consolidate its power over the entire country in one swift stroke.¹ The opinion that neither of the two major communist powers knew of the North Koreans' plans for the invasion has also been put forth by Wilbur Hitchcock, a former member of the US military government in South Korea, who as early as 1951 analysed any of the possible reasons for the Soviets to plan an attack in June and found them all lacking. He also concluded that Kim had acted without Moscow's knowledge.² As Chapter Four has shown, Soviet influence over Kim Il-sung's government was evident, though not total, but the PRC did not even have an ambassador in North Korea until July 1950. Therefore, while the theory that Stalin had no idea of the invasion seems slightly tenuous, it appears likely that the Chinese may have been totally ignorant of developments inside Korea.³ It has been said that the plans to invade were so secret that only a few cabinet members in North Korea were informed of them; that even top secret Korean Worker's Party documents covering the period from January to June 1950 made no

mention of them; and that only the highest officers in the Korean People's Liberation Army (KPLA) planned the buildup and the subsequent attack.⁴ It is plausible that the PRC was totally barred from this exclusive cabal.

While it is possible that the Chinese were uninformed about the actual starting date of the invasion, it is unlikely that they did not know that it was probable, if not inevitable. As Khrushchev remarks in his memoirs, the question of Korea was raised during the negotiations which culminated in the signing of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Agreement in February 1950. Mao's reaction to the possibility of war on the peninsula typified the apparent consensus within both Moscow and Peking: he did not believe that the US would enter the conflict because the Americans would view it as an internal struggle, and consequently he favoured an invasion of the South by the North.⁵ Although this statement is attributed to Mao by Khrushchev, who may have harboured personal resentment against him and who could have wanted to show him in error, there is much evidence to corroborate that Mao thought US intervention unlikely. Though there were signs that the PRC was making preparations for a conflict in Korea during the period from late 1949 to mid-1950, these were ambiguous gestures at best. First there was the transfer of approximately 12,000 Korean Volunteer Corps troops who had fought in the Civil War with the PLA in Manchuria to the KPLA command. These transfers occurred throughout the period, and although they could be interpreted as support for the North Koreans' invasion preparations (the view of the US government to a large extent), they could also be seen as a quid-pro-quo for Korean compromises over the Yalu dam dispute.⁶ In

addition, there was concurrently the redeployment of Lin Piao's crack Fourth Field Army from the Southwest, where it was engaged in "bandit suppression", to Manchuria. Although this also could be interpreted as a preparatory move, it was nonetheless done during a period of general demobilization and Lin Piao's troops were being returned to their home base where they could not only back up the KPLA, but also play an important role in the reconstruction of the PRC's industrial heartland.⁷ The evidence, on balance, suggests that the Chinese knew that a war could break out in Korea, but felt that American involvement was so unlikely that they were making only the most minimal of preparations.

The support for the PRC's belief in American non-intervention came, ironically, mostly from American sources. Most salient of these statements with American origin was the famous speech given by the then Secretary of State, Acheson, on 12 January 1950. In this speech he explicitly left both Taiwan and Korea out of the American "defence perimeter" in the Far East. In addition, there were statements made during the debate in Congress on the Korean Aid Bill such as the following from Congressman Donald Jackson, a Republican and a sympathiser of the anti-communist "China Lobby":

"What kind of policy for the Far East would put economic aid into Korea, which bears no relationship to our national defence, and at the same time refuses to put aid into Formosa".⁸

Even General Douglas MacArthur, a main antagonist in this plot, in a 1949 speech which concluded that US air power would turn the Pacific into an "Anglo-Saxon lake", pointedly neglected to include South Korea in the "defence perimeter". The result of these statements was Chinese indignation when Truman's 27 June

announcement following the advance of KPLA troops on 25 June reversed the implication of American policy towards both Taiwan and Korea.

There were, however, hints that the stated US policy was not static. For instance, Truman stressed the words "at this time" when he ruled out the possibility of intervening to save Chiang's position on Taiwan in his 5 January speech. In addition, there was the provocative speech given by John Foster Dulles, then special advisor to the State Department, to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on 19 June when he pledged US support for the ROK "in facing the challenge of communism".⁹ It could be that the inexperience of the PRC in foreign relations precluded any accurate sensing of subtle changes in the American stance; or possibly the Chinese leaders believed that these were simply statements made to placate Truman's Republican critics. Whatever the reason, the PRC leadership was shocked and angered by Truman's 27 June announcement which not only placed a US presence in the Korean conflict, but was also the advent of direct US intervention in the Chinese Civil War in the form of the 7th Fleet patrols of the Taiwan Straits. The latter event was of primary concern to the CCP leadership. Although Truman described the action as "neutralising the Taiwan Straits", to the CCP it was anything but neutral. They perceived it to be a counter-revolutionary act cast in the same mould as the Allied intervention during the Bolshevik Revolution.¹⁰ In the initial period of the conflict it was this involvement by the US in Chinese domestic matters which appeared to the CCP to be the greatest threat to their security. In their perception the US had shown its true imperialist nature for all to see.

The 27 June statement meant that the Chinese plans for reuniting Taiwan with the mainland had to be cancelled, but it remained to be seen whether the statement represented just a tentative declaration by a US President whose words were now highly unreliable. The basic pattern of PRC statements from this time until the full scale engagement with UN troops in mid-November was of showing great moral and ideological abhorrence of Truman's actions while at the same time showing reluctance to fight. It can be presumed that the strategy was designed to give Truman every opportunity to change his mind again.

It must have become apparent to the CCP that while for the foreseeable future the US would effectively block any move against Taiwan, it would not direct its energies towards an invasion of Fukien province. Its actions were being concentrated on Korea and the move concerning Taiwan was essentially to place it officially within the "defence perimeter". The Chinese must have noticed that the actual presence of the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits was minimal, and that the majority of its vessels were in action off Korea and Okinawa.¹¹

While the PRC press did not ignore the hostilities in Korea, the journalistic offensive for much of the initial period of the war was indeed "low-key". A statement by Truman on 30 June proved that the US was going to the extent of bombing targets in North Korea and of imposing a full naval blockade, but this was met by the 14 July announcement in the authoritative foreign policy journal Shih-Chieh Chih-Shih that it would be wrong to assume that Chinese support for the DPRK meant that China would

enter the war.¹² It was this type of announcement which typified most of the statements issued throughout July and lasting well into August. These did not prepare people for war, but they did prepare them for any eventuality.¹³ This was, nonetheless, the period of the KPLA's greatest success, and when the UN forces' Pusan beachhead did not fall, and the USSR showed no indication of sending material for a last offensive, the Peking press became markedly more cautious. Hints of this shift were most pronounced in the 26 August issue of Shih-Chieh Chih-Shih which unequivocally stated: "North Korea's friends are our friends. North Korea's enemies are our enemies ... North Korea's defence is our defence". Nevertheless, it should be noted that the phrase, "North Korea's enemies are our enemies", was deleted from foreign language broadcasts which carried the article.¹⁴ The possibility of conciliation had not disappeared.

The essence of the PRC's moves to compromise was the acceptance of South Korean forces entering North Korea, but not those of the US. The clearest evidence of this stance is contained in the account given by Indian ambassador Pannikar of his famous midnight meeting with Chou En-lai, during which the Premier unequivocally stated that the South Koreans did not matter, but that a US crossing of the 38th parallel would initiate a response by the PRC. Pannikar promptly sent this message to the British ambassador, who relayed it to the Americans. It must be assumed that either Mr. Pannikar was considered suspect by the Americans; that the message was classified a bluff; or that the US did not care to avoid a conflict with the Chinese, for on 7 October they pressed ahead with the resolution in the UN which authorised MacArthur to reunite all

of Korea.¹⁵ This apparent insouciance towards Chinese threats, plus the earlier rejection of Nehru's proposal to remove foreign troops from Korea and to settle the matter within the Security Council with the PRC sitting as a full member, combined to create the impression that the US leadership was willing, if not eager, to fight. Moreover, during this period the UN commander, General MacArthur, had been making a series of increasingly virulent statements which could have only led the CCP to view the situation with increasing alarm.

MacArthur's pronouncements must have been a source of worry for the PRC since his New Year's speech of 1950, in which he advocated rearming Japan - one of the CCP's greatest fears. Although his statements continually contradicted official government statements, it is possible that the Chinese believed that he was indeed voicing the true US position; or that he was a rebel general (something not foreign to the Chinese experience), whose fanatical belief in a "preventive strike" might cause him to invade Manchuria without governmental approval. His close relations with Chiang Kai-shek were probably particularly worrisome. On 1 August 1950 he flew to Taipei without permission to confer with Chiang and promptly promised "effective military co-ordination between Chinese and American forces".¹⁶ However, his most provocative statement occurred in October, after US troops had crossed the 38th parallel. In defiance of an earlier statement by President Truman that only ROK troops would actually reach the Yalu, he denied that non-Korean troops would halt before they reached the river and emphatically stated that his goal was to "clean Korea" in accordance with the UN resolution.¹⁷ It is doubtful

that the CCP was surprised when MacArthur threatened to attack Manchuria following the disclosure that the PRC had intervened.

The PRC, taking cognizance of the UN advances, logically turned to the Soviets in the first test of the February agreement. It has been stated that the Russians, alarmed by the imminent collapse of a buffer state as a consequence of MacArthur's advance, allowed the Chinese to enter in an effort to avoid direct conflict with the US and a possible global conflagration.¹⁸ There is also the argument that they pressurised the Chinese into the conflict, not only for the above reason, but also to increase Chinese dependence on Soviet aid. There is much support for the conclusion that the Russians were working towards both ends. Whatever their motivations, it can be shown that the Russian policies at the time were a source of considerable discontent on the part of the Chinese. In fact, during the initial year of the war there was a noticeable coolness surrounding PRC-USSR relations.¹⁹ This could be attributed to the possibility that not only was the USSR's support for the PRC's defensive intervention too little - it was also too costly.

During the Cultural Revolution documents were released which support the theory that the Soviets used the Korean War to increase their hold on China. Those who hold this theory point to the Soviets' bad management of the move to gain a seat in the Security Council for the PRC as further evidence of Russian attempts to isolate China from the rest of the world. This was the price that Mao had to pay in a bargain which included, on the positive side, protection for Manchuria and a supply of arms. These arms,

however, had to be purchased from the Russians at a considerable monetary cost. There were reports during the Cultural Revolution that the debt was not repaid until 1965. As early as 1957, General Lung Yun, Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Committee, complained that it was "totally unfair for the People's Republic of China to have to bear all the costs of the Korean War".²⁰ It appears that the PRC leadership was forced into the uncomfortable position of being a proxy who had to pay for the privilege.

The amount of arms which the CPV received from the Soviets was far from sufficient. Documents captured from the 26th Army of the CPV during the Chang-jin Reservoir campaign of November 1950 declared how badly equipped the Chinese troops were when the decision to intervene was made. These documents, which cited shortages of transport, escort personnel and food, also stated that the fire power of the entire army was "basically inadequate".²¹ The arms used in the first months were predominantly US-made weapons captured from the KMT during the Civil War. It has also been noted that the USSR did not sell the PRC enough 'planes to counter the UN forces until late 1950. It may be that this paucity of arms can be attributed to the fears that too great a Chinese success could initiate massive US retaliations which could draw the Russians into the conflict.²² But the effect was that the CPV troops were underarmed and that the PRC was dependent upon the Soviets for every piece of new equipment. It can be concluded that the threat to Manchuria must have been perceived as grave for the leaders of the CCP to put the independence of China, for which they had struggled so long and tenaciously, in jeopardy

such a short time after Liberation.

The hydroelectric dams on the Yalu must have also entered into the strategic debate in Peking, but there is inconclusive evidence over the importance they were allocated. It is true that the dams were powering China's industrial base in Manchuria, and that Hanson Baldwin of the "New York Times" at the time of the Chinese intervention stated that a buffer zone around the dams was China's "minimum objective".²³ Moreover, the CCP's willingness to protect China's interests in the dams was displayed during the 1948-1949 disputes with the DPRK over access to the electricity. Conversely, it has been shown that the Chinese press gave very little importance to the dams in the period from 25 June until Chinese intervention.²⁴ In addition, when Chou En-lai transmitted his warning through the Indian ambassador, and stated that the "South Koreans do not matter", he did so without proviso, i.e., he did not state that they had to stay away from the dams. In balance, the evidence is inconclusive. It may be assumed, however, that an actual invasion of Chinese territory was the most pressing worry at the time and the Chinese economic interests in Korea were logically a secondary concern.

There appears to be no clear evidence of factional stances during the debate within the CCP on intervention, but there are a few clues. Essentially, Mao seems to have been in favour of intervention and had the final word on how the battle should be fought after a long discussion within the party.²⁵ The disregard of the shortage of arms certainly bears a Maoist stamp, but the actual tactics were not of the "protracted war" style. This was

not, however, a case of an indigenous army struggling in a war of national liberation: it was, in actuality, an action by a foreign army in another land. It is therefore plausible that the "people's war" tactics which had won the Civil War for the CCP were not applicable and consequently Mao decided to adopt a more orthodox strategy. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that this was a period of ideological compromise on the part of Mao, as discussed in Chapter Two, and it is likely that these factors played a less critical role in the decision making process than the exigencies of repelling the UN advance.²⁶

It was reported during the Cultural Revolution that the economist Chen Yün and General P'eng Te-huai were opposed to the intervention.²⁷ In the latter's case this seems unlikely because it is improbable that a man who opposed the war would be put in command of the armies involved. As for Chen Yün, any evidence at this time is very scant and inconclusive; the accusations of the Red Guards during the polarized political scene of the Cultural Revolution cannot be given too much credence.

There were two men who made strategic statements at the time which definitely bore the Maoist stamp - but in one case the individual involved has been shown to have been more of a believer in the "professional" military ethic than a strictly orthodox Maoist officer. His statements only prove that officials showed respect for Mao's dictates in public, not that a Maoist faction existed which influenced strategy vis à vis the Korean conflict. It only manifests the extent to which ideological factors were of debatable consequence at the time. The man in question was

General Nieh Yen-jung, whose "professional" credentials are discussed in Chapter Two.²⁸ He reportedly told the Indian ambassador, Mr. Pannikar, when being questioned about the possible use of atomic weapons by the Americans, that China lives on farms against which the bomb was useless. He also stated that a loss of a few million people would be of little long term importance to China. This is a clear reflection of Mao's "atom bombs are paper tigers" policy of the time.²⁹ The second to make Maoist comments was Chou En-lai, who was reported to have stated that the PRC was willing to retreat into the interior if the US attacked, and to rely on the Northwest and the Southwest as rear bases during a "prolonged war" against the Americans.³⁰ Of course, this could have been more of a diplomatic warning to the Americans than a profession of ideological purity. Such statements are marked by Maoist phraseology, yet they are not proof that a strong Maoist faction formed around the Korean question.

There is evidence, however, that during the debate Mao may have discussed certain byproducts of intervention which could improve China's position in dealing with other nations, especially the Soviet Union. From later statements, it seems possible that the idea that the prestige that intervention could bring would be useful in negotiations may have been evident. For example, in a 1962 statement to the 10th Party Plenum, Mao declared that it was only after the sacrifices of the Korean War "that the Soviets trusted the CCP and thought of them as true communists".³¹

The CPV crossed the Yalu approximately on 16 October 1950, and the final decision to intervene was probably made around the time

that the UN resolution of 7 October, which gave MacArthur authority to cross the 38th parallel, was passed, although it should be noted that massive buildups began in Manchuria in September following the Inchon landing and the subsequent UN counter-attack. It is also noteworthy that conciliatory moves continued following the crossing of the Yalu. The actual designation of the troops involved as volunteers showed that the PRC wanted to display to the world that it was not solidly committed at the state level. They described the action as being similar to that of the foreign brigades during the Spanish Civil War.³² In addition, the Chinese were reported to have avoided contact from the time when their presence was first known until mid-November, and there are some reports that as late as 23 or 24 November the CPV had released ROK and US POW's with a message saying that they did not want war.³³ When fighting began in earnest, however, the Chinese fought with great resolution and the US Army consequently suffered one of the greatest defeats in its history.

This chapter has attempted to isolate and illustrate some of the prime considerations which must have been in the minds of the PRC leadership when the decision to enter the Korean conflict was made. Their decision was formed in the face of what were perceived as grave threats from an adversary who was showing little responsiveness to the PRC attempts at compromise. This decision was the PRC's first experience in the arena of superpower politics and the impressions which were gathered during this time certainly had an effect on how future international dealings were managed. These ramifications will be analyzed in following sections.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER FIVE

1. Simmons, R., The Strained Alliance (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 102-103.
2. Hitchcock, Wilber, "North Korea Jumps the Gun", Current History, March 1951, pp. 136-144.
3. One analyst, William Stuek, has no doubts that the Russians were in control of the North Korean Military and were completely aware of Kim's plans. See, Stuek, William, "The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War", World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 628-630. It should be noted, however, that he bases his evidence predominantly on the statements of defectors, which are naturally suspect. See, Warner, Geoffrey, "The Korean War", International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, January 1980, p. 100.
4. Scalapino, R., and Lee, Chong-sik, Communism in Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 394-395.
5. Khrushchev, N., ed., Talbott, S., Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), p. 368.
6. Whiting, A., China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 44-45.
7. Gittings, John, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 27-29.
8. Tang, Tsou, America's Failure in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 537.
9. Gupta, Karunakar, "How Did the Korean War Begin?", The China Quarterly, October-December 1972, p. 702.
10. Meisner, Maurice, Mao's China (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 80.
11. Simmons, R., "Comments on Karunakar Gupta's 'How did the Korean War Begin?'" , The China Quarterly, April-June, 1973, pp. 359-360.
12. Simmons, The Strained Allies, p. 150.
13. Whiting, pp. 83-84.
14. *ibid.*, p. 85.
15. Pannikar, K.M., In Two Chinas (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 110-111. American historians writing a few years after the event concluded that Truman and the State Department were convinced that Pannikar was simply transmitting a CCP bluff. It was said that Pannikar had a propensity for

- "crying wolf". See Schlesinger, A., Jnr., and
Rovere, R., The General and the President (London:
William Heinemann Limited, 1952), pp. 132-134. Also note
that as late as 15 October 1950 at the Wake Conference
between Truman and MacArthur, neither the President nor
the General showed serious concerns about a PRC intervention.
See, MacArthur, D., Reminiscences (London:
William Heinemann Limited, 1964), p. 361.
16. Kalicki, J.H., The Pattern of Sino-American Disputes
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 49.
 17. Stone, I.F., The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1952), p. 155.
 18. Warner, p. 99. Khrushchev, who admits that he was not
present, reports that Chou En-lai flew directly to meet Stalin
when it became clear that the North Korean troops had been
decimated. It was at this meeting that Stalin gave his
approval for a Chinese intervention, but it is noteworthy
that Khrushchev makes no mention of any promise by Stalin of
an active Russian role. Obviously, fears of a direct
US-USSR clash over the dispute were a factor in Stalin's
thinking, as he verified to Khrushchev when he refused to
allow Russian advisors to become involved, stating that:
"We do not want evidence for accusing us of taking part in
this business. It's Kim Il-sung's affair". See,
Khrushchev, pp. 370-371.
 19. Simmons, pp. 192, 212-213.
 20. Garthoff, R.L., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York:
Praeger, 1966), pp. 85-86.
 21. Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 133-134.
 22. Yahuda, M., China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom
Helm, 1978), p. 55.
 23. Stone, p. 174.
 24. Whiting, pp. 151-152.
 25. Gittings, p. 121.
 26. See Chapter Two, pp. 46-47.
 27. Guillerman, J., The Communist Chinese Party in Power
(Folkestone: Devon, 1976), p. 68.
 28. See Chapter Two, pp. 48.
 29. Pannikar, p. 108.
 30. Tung, p. 575.

31. Gittings, J., "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", The China Quarterly, July-September, 1964, pp. 43-44.
32. Lawrance, A., China's Foreign Policy Since 1949 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 44.
33. Stone, p. 197.

CHAPTER SIX

CCP Policy on Vietnam: Domestic Political Factors

The years 1965-66 saw the plainest public manifestations of the great intra-CCP conflict that had been developing for almost ten years previously. The political consensus that had marked the summer and autumn of 1950, when the CCP response to the Korean conflict was being formulated, had long since disappeared. Therefore, the domestic considerations involved in the strategic debate over the escalating conflict in Vietnam were of a fundamentally different nature: in 1950 the entire Party was consolidating its power over China; in 1965-66 the doctrinaire Maoists were trying to re-establish their control over the Party. The conflict that was brewing was so pervasive that it necessarily had ramifications for the course that the Chinese government was to follow in its policy towards Vietnam. The Maoists, headed by Mao and his heir apparent, Marshal Lin Piao, felt that their battle was for the soul of the nation, a quasi-religious crusade for the revolutionary purity of the Chinese nation. They perceived the primary threat to their interests to be internal. Nevertheless, this internal threat had international undertones. The origins of the conflict, known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (CR), can be found in the 1950's when Mao rejected the Soviet tutelage that had marked the early part of the decade and strove for an original, purely Chinese means of economic development, as was epitomized by the Great Leap Forward (GLF). When the GLF faltered and opposition towards it grew within the CCP and then surfaced with the attacks of Marshal P'eng Te-huai at Lushan in 1959, it was the implied opinion that Soviet ways were required for China that Mao

found the most disturbing. From Lushan onwards Macist policy, both domestic and international, was to lessen Soviet influence. Beginning in 1965 the conflict became increasingly Sinocentric as Mao looked with vigour towards eliminating those "revisionists" within the CCP who were likely to allow the spread of non-Chinese, i.e., Soviet, influences.

The rejection of Soviet-inspired economic planning was ironic because the First Five Year Plan, influenced by the Russians, had produced some encouraging results. On the surface the First Five Year Plan appears to have been predominate in plans for economic development. The increase in industrial production of the PRC since Liberation had been phenomenal and rivalled some of the most successful economies in the world. Kang Chao, using his own set of economic indices designed to rule out the exaggerations that may have been present in the official statistics, estimates that industrial production rose by an average of 14.4% per year during those five years. Japanese production, by comparison, rose by 15%.¹ According to official Chinese statistics the Gross National Product (GNP) of the PRC grew by 76% during the First Five Year Plan.² The reasons for abandoning such an approach must have been very convincing.

The Soviet aid to China during 1952-1957 was significant in quantity, but far from sufficient to achieve the growth rates mentioned above. The greater part of the investment which fired this growth in heavy industry came from the Chinese themselves, which meant from the agricultural production of the peasantry.³ Therefore, agriculture was the base of the economy, yet it received little or none of the investment. In addition, Soviet aid had to be repaid from 1954 onwards, thus compelling the Chinese to export much of

their agricultural production to the USSR.⁴ In effect the CCP, in a way reminiscent of Stalinist Russia, was draining the peasantry in order to fuel industrial growth. The CCP, however, owed its success to the peasants and could not foresake them. The Chinese quandary was, therefore, how to increase production in agriculture while continuing to expand heavy industry at an intense rate without disaffecting the peasantry. For Mao, the GLF was the answer.

The GLF began in 1958 and its feverish pace was incredible. Mao's belief in the wonders of the Chinese will, his belief in the power of voluntarism, was put into practice with some notable results. The CCP claimed increases in factory production of almost 70% in 1958 alone, though Western analysts put the figure at around 35% - an impressive figure in its own right.⁵ Official reports placed agricultural production at 375 million tonnes, nearly twice the level of the 1957 crop. This figure was subsequently revised to 193 million tonnes, a record harvest, but pale in comparison to the first reports.⁶ The error in estimates was blamed on the over-enthusiasm of the cadres, which in light of the pressure which the CCP was putting on the peasants and the cadres during the campaign to create People's Communes and to increase production is a plausible explanation. At the heart of Mao's vision of the GLF was the belief that by tapping the strength of the Chinese peasantry through "placing politics in command" of a communal system, production could sky-rocket and communism could be achieved by the Chinese far before any other people of the world - including the Russians. It was during this period that the Maoist belief that material incentives were insignificant compared to what could be achieved by a belief in correct doctrine began to be emphasized. Mao thought that the answer to

the contradictions caused by following the Soviet model could be rectified by a mass mobilization campaign coupled with an abandonment of materialism. On the practical level this could increase production without having to give more to the peasants, who would instead receive a "psychic income" from putting Maoism into practice.⁷ At the time the CCP leadership seem to have managed to convince themselves of this, as indicated by Liu Shao-ch'i's declaration of support for the GLF: "Hard work for a few years; happiness for a thousand."⁸

The reasons for the failure of the GLF are many and there is not the space to go into them in detail. There are, however, some salient aspects of its failure that should be mentioned for they had implications for the future. Firstly, 1959 saw the first of the succession of three bad winters that marked the PRC's economic slide. Though there were undoubtedly natural reasons for the disastrous harvests, manmade factors exacerbated the situation. These factors can be attributed to the drastic swing away from the Soviet style of management and centralized planning, and towards an almost totally decentralized system which was characterized by planning calculated by the commune's party committee. Although there had been earlier moves towards a Party controlled economy, such as the introduction of the Harbin system of centralized CCP control,⁹ they did not include the destruction of one-man management of enterprises as was the case during the GLF. During this drive to collectivize management at the local Party committee level, there was a total breakdown of control as all operational details and central economic coordination vanished. Production was being administered by the production brigade cadres who had little ability but an excess of zeal. Consequently, there were many instances of improper implementation as operations were fouled in the name of "self-reliance" and of "redness over expertise."¹⁰

The most dire consequences were seen in the water conservation drive announced by the Central Committee in 1958 which eventually employed 70 million people in canal digging. The production brigade cadres constructed canals without proper geological investigation and eventually destroyed the regular functions of the main rivers and caused roughly 405,000 hectares of arable land to become alkaline.¹¹

As the excesses of the GLF became apparent, the less dedicated Maoists became disenchanted with Mao's non-Soviet approach. Many were angered by the indirect, and at times direct, criticism of their policies which the GLF represented.¹² The first hint of the extent of the Soviets' displeasure was the unilateral abrogation of an agreement made in 1957 (and negotiated by P'eng Te-huai) to supply the PRC with a sample atomic bomb to aid the Chinese nuclear programme. The implication that this had for the military, which under P'eng was firmly wedded to Soviet-style "professionalism," were immense and the fear of losing access to other modern weapons grew. Some of the Party bureaucrats, such as the pragmatic finance minister Chen Yun, also showed signs of alarm.¹³ These anxieties finally surfaced at the Lushan Conference of 1959 when P'eng strongly criticized the GLF and implied support for Soviet policies. Although he was purged for the perfidy, the havoc which the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in 1960 created caused members of the CCP leadership who had originally moved against him to look back favourably towards P'eng's pronouncements. Mao's position in the CCP was tarnished by the post-GFL depression years of 1959-1962 which saw China return to the famine conditions that Liberation was supposed to have eliminated permanently. Consequently, in the period between Lushan and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's position

worsened in relationship to that of the pragmatic Liu Shao-ch'i. Paradoxically, Mao had succeeded in planting his supporter Lin Piao in the position of Minister of Defence as P'eng's replacement and thereby had assured that the waning of his (Mao's) influence was only temporary.

It has been argued that Mao voluntarily allowed Liu to take the commanding role when he resigned from the position of head of state at the Wuchan Conference of 1958. The reasons given for this range from the desire to save the supreme leader from the backlash against policies that had already proved unpopular to the proposition that Mao wanted to groom Liu as his heir in order to avoid the problems of succession that had plagued the Soviets following Stalin's death.¹⁴ Nevertheless, though Mao may have desired a less active role in state affairs, it is unlikely that he envisaged the disregard for his policies that accompanied the rise of Liu. In essence, Liu proved by his actions that P'eng's criticisms at Lushan had not been forgotten and that the "revisionism" that Mao so loathed was gaining strength.

P'eng Te-huai was military professionalism personified and it is not surprising that it was he who defiantly stood up to Mao. Unlike Mao, P'eng's formative years, militarily speaking, were not during the Yen-an years that Mao idealized, but rather during the Korean conflict when he saw at first hand what power arms could have over men. It was at that time that P'eng realized the value of his Russian advisers and modern weapons, and this impression was to last during his tenure as Minister of Defence.¹⁵ He strove to mould the PLA into the shape of the Soviet Red Army and even though he paid lip service to Maoist doctrine, in reality he had

dismissed it as irrelevant. Following the Korean demobilization he created a conscript army that was run by a hard-core professional elite, and many of the veterans of the pre-Liberation days were replaced by young men trained in modern techniques. His reign was marked by other conditions which were anathema to the Maoist ideal: relations between officer and soldier and between the PLA and the civilian populus both worsened.¹⁶ Finally, and possibly most notably, P'eng's copying of the Soviet model led him to dismantle the organizational means by which Party control over the PLA was achieved. The role of the political commissar diminished and by the end of his PLA career large numbers of PLA units were without a Party cadre. On the national level, P'eng saw that the function of the Military Affairs Committee (MAC), the CCP's organ of control over the military, became purely symbolic and he was later accused of trying to replace it with a military commission.¹⁷

It is clear that P'eng represented a threat to Mao and that the Lushan Conference must be remembered when the Cultural Revolution and the role of the military in that upheaval are discussed. P'eng's aversion to "placing politics in command," to quote Mao's famous adage on the control of the military, was not limited to the PLA, but, as Lushan showed, applied to economic planning as well. He opposed every aspect of Mao's collective local party leadership policy, as was well illustrated by his attitude towards the People's Militia. As a part of the GLF mass mobilization drive, the notion of "people's war" and of the universal militia was revived and the militia was placed under the control of the local party committees and not the military. In a concomitant development that increased P'eng's disdain for Party control, the PLA was required to join the

mobilization by devoting a great deal of its energy to civil works instead of to training in sophisticated weaponry.¹⁸ The concept of the CCP as the guiding light for the PLA and the entire Chinese people was sacrosanct to Mao: it was central to his Leninism and to his vision of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, when P'eng presented his so-called "Letter of Opinion" at Lushan and proclaimed that: "Putting politics in command is no substitute for economic principles, still less for economic work...",¹⁹ it was a direct blow to the legitimacy of Mao's doctrine and, by inference, his rule.

Another key element of P'eng's attack was the implied belief that the Soviet leadership of the socialist bloc and of China was still desirable. This diverged sharply with the Maoist analysis at the time that viewed the Soviets as being deficient ideologically because of their accommodating attitude towards America.²⁰ In addition, Mao had evidence which suggested to him that P'eng had consulted the Soviets before his offensive and had coordinated his assault with them. This move was seen as treacherous and it also showed Mao and his supporters just how eager the Russians were to direct developments within China. Khrushchev's attack on the People's Communes four days after P'eng's attack at Lushan was evidence of these desires.²¹ Therefore, P'eng's attack on the GLF and its policies was monumental because it was aimed at the core of Mao's image as the man who defined China's national interests. It attacked his social policy of "placing politics in command" and it scorned the idea that China had a unique means of development by implying that Soviet ways were enviable enough for China to humble herself by accepting Soviet influence, no matter how unsuitable that influence might be. P'eng should be seen as the archetypal

"revisionist" and many of the charges launched during the CR were against those who displayed to some degree the traits attributed to him.

It is interesting to note that following the humiliation of Lushan and in the midst of the failures of the GLF, Mao still commanded enough respect among his colleagues to have his choice named as P'eng's successor. It is possible that P'eng simply struck too soon - the discontent a year later might have made a more successful attack possible. Throughout the period in which his power was eclipsed by Liu's (and some say throughout his career), Mao showed an ability to concentrate all of his efforts on key issues and, by virtue of his position in the view of the public as the person who symbolized the Revolution, to succeed in formulating policies that ran counter to the prevailing trends at that time.²² Following P'eng's purge a short while after Lushan, it is now apparent that Mao planned to make the reform of the PLA such an area. The appointment of Lin Piao marked the true beginning of the period of reform, even though attacks on "professionalism" had occurred sporadically since the mid-1950's. These previous campaigns, however, lacked the concerted effort and drive that Lin's had in abundance.²³ Through his ability to have such an ally in charge of the PLA Mao succeeded in forming a power base in a period when his political position within the CCP had lessened; he thereby laid the foundations for creating a powerful political and social force with which to attack in the future those within the Party who were undermining his doctrine.

Lin Piao's Maoist credentials were impressive and he had continued to gain prominence throughout the 1950's, making him a



logical choice by Mao as P'eng's successor.²⁴ Not only did he show ideological purity during his reform campaign, but Lin also displayed the political skills required to form the PLA into a unified, disciplined and loyal Maoist bastion. This does not mean that there were not vestiges of P'eng's rule - the Wuhan incident in later years would prove that Lin's sway over some of the more conservative elements was not total.²⁵ Nevertheless, Lin combined aspects of ideological indoctrination and some pragmatic buying of loyalty and thereby achieved the desired end, an enclave of Maoist thought throughout the period of Liu's greatest power.

Lin's success in avoiding regionalism in the Field Army commands, and in creating loyalty in the high command, has been attested by John Gittings who points out that the record of continual service between 1960 and 1967 of commanders at both regional and national level was very good.²⁶ Therefore, it can be deduced that his methods of switching the values of the commanders away from "professionalism" and at indoctrinating young officers were successful. If he had not succeeded, and if Whitson's model is valid, then factionalism based on Field Army loyalties, which was a distinct possibility during the period coinciding with the entry into Korea, could have played an important role during this period of reform.²⁷ There is little doubt that Lin did appease the officers and soldiers to an extent. For instance, the yearning for modern weapons by some commanders, such as the obviously more "professional" Air Force officers, was satisfied by the continued importance placed on the nuclear weapons programme and on the building of modern aircraft despite the poor shape of the economy. In addition, the militia and PLA's civil construction work, irritants to many otherwise loyal officers, were praised heavily

in the press around 1965-1966, though there is little evidence that they were revived to their GLF level.²⁸ The average soldier had shown increasing displays of disaffection during the disastrous years following the GLF, when food shortages caused illness amongst the ranks and stories of hardships in the home villages caused anxieties. Lin combatted this by raising the status and material level of the dependents of soldiers and by increasing rations to the troops.²⁹ These practical measures facilitated the acceptance of the indoctrination campaign that began shortly after Lin took office.

The landmark in the process of the reindoctrination of the PLA and of the reintroduction of "politics in command" within the military was the enlarged meeting of the MAC in September and October 1960. Its message was the tightening of political control throughout the armed forces. This began with the strengthening of the MAC and the General Political Department at the upper levels; concomitantly, political commissars and collective leadership reappeared at the basic unit level. In 1960 Lin had already succeeded in making sure that eighty percent of the platoon had party cells.³⁰ Another highwater mark of the campaign of political indoctrination was the 1961 publication of the "Regulations Governing PLA Management and Educational Work at the Company Level" which strongly asserted that all tendencies to borrow foreign, i.e., Soviet, experiences in military training should be strenuously avoided.³¹ These initial moves were sufficient to raise the PLA's morale to a level that enabled the Chinese to defeat the Indian Army soundly in the border conflict of 1962.

The political education of the rank and file soldier grew in intensity until Mao and Lin considered the PLA's ideological soundness at all levels to be worthy of emulation by the public. The PLA soldier's ability to apply Mao Tse-tung's Thought to every aspect of life, and his unyielding sacrifice and conviction were first praised in the press beginning in late 1964 and early 1965. Lin's ability to use intense political study to raise morale even through the darkest periods sparked Mao's imagination and led him to conclude that such a campaign throughout the nation could improve his own image after the hardships of the post-GLF period. Therefore in 1964, as soon as the economic situation began to improve, the virtuous PLA soldier - the epitome of socialist man guided by Mao Tse-tung's Thought and inculcated with the spirit of Yanan - was presented to the Chinese as the member of society that they should most admire. This public relations drive, under the rubric of the "Learn From the PLA Campaign", encouraged people to emulate the soldier's philosophy and life style, with special emphasis placed on the diligent study of Mao's doctrine.³²

In a related move, Lin was also in the process of moving large numbers of loyal Maoist officers into positions of importance in state ministries, especially those concerned with economic planning. It is significant that by 1965 Lin had replaced Chen Yun, noted for his conservatism and pragmatic approach as Finance Minister, as senior Vice Premier in the State Council.³³ One may conclude that during the years leading to the CR, the PLA was being manoeuvred into a position of domestic political importance and that its role was that of Mao's representative in the state and in society. In other words, it was being placed in strategic positions for the struggle against "revisionism" that lay ahead: its energies were being directed towards political battles within China and, as will

be shown below, not towards preparing for a battle with the US over Vietnam. The following section will explain how the initial mobilization following the massive US bombings of North Vietnam were essentially perfunctory. They should be seen as distractions from Mao and Lin's primary targets - the "revisionists" represented by Liu and the other Party bureaucrats who were taking the PRC down the "capitalist road."

The period that followed the disastrous years of 1959 to 1962, when China was in the grips of economic depression, has been described as the time of "recovery and readjustment." The effects of those hard years were substantial: three bad harvests had reduced many to the brink of starvation and the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians with their blueprints had left the industrial sector in chaos. Liu and his colleagues in the CCP bureaucracy moved in to pick up the pieces. The methods they used naturally had to be well planned and coordinated in the face of such adverse conditions. Consequently, many Maoist tenets were quietly disregarded, and the expertise of the manager and the technician again reigned over the "redness" of the cadres, although the opposite virtues were being stressed in the PLA at the time. The period was marked by a general recentralization of economic planning as Party bureaucrats regained order.³⁴ There can be little doubt that the Maoists accepted these moves on the grounds of expediency: the discontent that was brewing amongst the people was evident and some appeasing measures were needed. These included the reappearance of private plots for the peasantry. Nevertheless, Mao continued to make noises about "class struggle", as he did at the 10th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in 1962, though it is significant that no great political moves against the Liu regime occurred until 1964

when the economy was once again placed on a sounder footing.³⁵

The five years of Liu's pinnacle of power provided plenty of evidence for the Maoists that the "revisionism" caused by the power of rigid centralized bureaucracy was widespread. While it cannot be said that Liu and his colleagues made any overt signs of reintroducing Soviet aid and influence (the Russian actions at the time must have damaged Chinese pride on both sides of the burgeoning split), there were subtle hints that many Party bureaucrats would not rule this out as a possible future expediency. The most famous example of this was Peking's Deputy Mayor Wu Han's play, "Judge Hai Jui is Dismissed", which many, including Mao himself, interpreted as a protest against the purge of P'eng Te-huai. There were also some indications that Liu was not opposed to rehabilitating P'eng.³⁶ Moreover, Liu was becoming increasingly blatant in his attacks on Maoist policies. He characterized the post-GLF disasters as being "70% man-made", and his revised 1962 edition of his work "How to Be a Good Communist" removed all mention of Mao's Thought.³⁷ In 1964, when the economy and the PLA were both considered strong enough, Mao launched his first comeback assault in the form of the "Socialist Education Movement", a rectification campaign aimed at bureaucratic tendencies amongst cadres at all levels. Mao pointedly allowed Liu to direct the campaign. The vigor with which Liu and his colleagues attacked the basic level while ignoring the transgressions of the elite added weight to Mao's conviction that his erstwhile associate was following the Soviet path towards "a restoration of capitalism".³⁸ Interestingly it was, in Mao's own words, in 1965, the year that the Vietnam escalation occurred, that Mao decided that Liu represented a grave threat to the PRC's revolution and would have to be removed.³⁹ At that time Mao had definite domestic usage of the PLA in mind.

The Maoists did not rely exclusively on the PLA's support in the coming battle against Liu and the CCP bureaucracy. They assessed the need of keeping the mechanism of state as intact as possible. Therefore, Mao and Lin assiduously gained the support of the CCP's chief organizer and its most skillful politician - Chou En-lai. It is possible that they planned to use the state organs, as opposed to the Party organs, to shield the economy and other vital programmes from the upheavals. Mao realized that Chou was needed for his administrative abilities and to safeguard the PRC's international standing - presumably to keep it from deteriorating even more. Throughout the CR Mao and Lin protected Chou's position, and Chou, in turn, tried to protect the key state ministries from Red Guard attack.⁴⁰ Though Chou was probably in basic ideological agreement with Mao at the time, one of his chief concerns was the protection of the ministries. Therefore, although Chou should be seen as an ally of the Mao-Lin group, it should be remembered that he had his own special administrative concerns.

The prime example of Chou's protection for key areas was his support for the Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi during the 1967 Red Guard assault against "revisionism" in the Foreign Ministry. Ch'en Yi's position seems to be parallel to Chou's: his foreign policy statements were in line with the Maoist line, but he opposed the extension of the Cultural Revolution into foreign affairs. He was an administrator who was striving to retain cordial relations if possible with other states during this period of general isolation that began in 1965.⁴¹ Although he was prone to an elitist style, Mao considered him a close enough ally to shield him from any dire consequences throughout the CR.⁴²

The economy of the PRC at the time of the Chinese entry into the Korean conflict was in a period of recovery: likewise, when strategic decisions in regard to the Vietnam conflict were being made it was just regaining the ground that it had lost during the depression of the early 1960's. However, the position was fundamentally different because, unlike in 1950, the conflict with the Soviets meant that there was no chance of an influx of foreign capital. All investment was generated solely by the PRC's own production and all imported technology from selected Western sources was paid for without credits. Beginning in the early 1960's the Chinese had imported grain from nations such as Australia and Canada, and in 1965 Chou stated that this practice would continue.⁴³ This, in short, was a period of financial constraints and economic growth was necessarily limited to certain specific areas. The Chinese, who in the 1950's had been able to export food to the Soviets, were forced to expend valuable foreign exchange in order to obtain grain. Therefore, quite naturally, the focus of economic planning was emphatically placed on agricultural production throughout the years of recovery and during the period of the strategic debate over Vietnam. The manufacturing plant imported from France, Britain, Italy, Japan, etc., was for the most part planned to augment agricultural production. Only a few areas of heavy industry were picked for expansion during these years and agriculture-related industries, such as chemical fertilizer and tractor manufacturing, were given top priority. The years of universal expansion of heavy industry had ended with the Soviet withdrawal and in the following years, under Liu's auspices, the emphasis was placed only on those areas which were the most essential.⁴⁴ In many of the key heavy industries such as steel, however, production was just limping up

to the highest levels reached during the GLF. In many respects the PRC had lost up to eight years' worth of growth.⁴⁵

One area of outstanding success during the period of interest was in the PRC's level of energy production. By 1966 the amount of coal produced had doubled, as had the level of electricity manufacture. Oil production had increased by a healthy one hundred percent.⁴⁶ The additional energy was helpful in that it allowed the PRC to be self-sufficient and free from a dependence on foreign supplies, but it was only sufficient to continue to run an economy in a chronically weakened state: it did not allow for any great burst of production in other than the already specified areas, and it was not produced in quantities sufficient for large scale export.

Besides agriculture the only other area into which large amounts of capital were being directed was the development of nuclear weapons and sophisticated aircraft. As mentioned before, this can possibly be related to Lin Piao's strategy aimed at buying the PLA's support, but nonetheless the amount of resources directed into these programmes shows how much support they must have had in all quarters of the CCP, indicating international considerations. The nuclear programme may have taken between two and three percent of the entire GNP, a considerable burden for a developing country with scarce technical capabilities and only the minimum of an industrial base.⁴⁷

The degree to which nuclear expenditure interfered with conventional weaponry development and procurement is noteworthy. It has been estimated that the nuclear development programme accounted for twenty-five to thirty percent of the military budget, so it is unlikely that a conventional force necessary for a

confrontation with the US in Vietnam was being funded.⁴⁸ This is the best explained by the domestic priorities of the PLA at the time.

Western observers waited with anticipation for the official announcement of the Third Five Year Plan throughout 1965-1966, yet despite all the speculation they waited in vain. (The GLF to all intents and purposes was the Second Five Year Plan.) As we have seen, the great divisions which culminated in the launching of the CR were evident at the time and the attention necessary for planned economic expansion was probably being diverted towards the initial stages of the struggle. Some of the observers noted that economic growth was being foresaken so that the more desirable achievement of revolutionary purity could be obtained.⁴⁹ In a sense this was true. Even though the economy inherently faced some tangible constraints on growth, no concerted effort could be possible until ideological consensus within the CCP had been reached. The split between the two groupings over the nature of economic growth was exemplified by the dispute between Mao and Liu over the allocation of tractors: the former favouring ownership by the communes in keeping with a policy of self-reliance; the latter favouring the Soviet style state monopoly over farm equipment.⁵⁰ It is this issue of copying the Soviet model that was at the heart of the conflict and by 1966 the issue had still not been fully resolved. There were still elements within the CCP which showed signs of accepting the foreign model which the Maoists found totally unsuitable. It was this struggle which was foremost in the minds of the CCP leadership as the US escalated its commitment in the Vietnam War in 1965 and 1966 and, as we shall see, influenced the Chinese strategic debate over the conflict to a high degree.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER SIX

1. Chao, Kang, The Rate of Industrial Growth in Communist China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 99-104. For the official PRC figures see Ten Glorious Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960)
2. Snow, Edgar, Red China Today: The Other Side of the River (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 198.
3. *ibid.*, pp. 201-204.
4. Eckstein, Alexander, "On the Economic Crisis in Communist China", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, September 1960, p. 657.
5. Chao, see chart on p. 95.
6. Breth, R. M., Mao's China : A Study of Socialist Economic Development (Melbourne: Longman-Cheshire, 1977), p. 61.
7. Eckstein, pp. 658-659.
8. Karnow, Stanley, Mao and China (London: MacMillan, 1972), p. 95.
9. Schurman Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 335-339.
10. *ibid.*, pp. 294-295.
11. Breth, pp. 63-64.
12. Some of these criticisms were subtle, like the naming of a commune the "Sputnik Federation Cooperative", implying that the Chinese had in the commune a weapon as powerful as the Soviets' rocket. Other methods were less subtle, such as the lecturing of the Soviet technicians on the superiority of the GLF. See Karnow, p. 96.
13. Chen was one of the few to voice open criticism of the GLF from the very beginning as well. He has been quoted as saying: "You can't reach heaven in one step." Karnow, pp. 93-94.
14. Neuhauser, Charles, "The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960's: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution", in Baum ed., China in Ferment (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp., 94-95. Also, Macfarquhar, Roderick, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 105-106. Some also argue that Mao stepped down in response to the Hundred Flowers backlash, though it is unlikely that he could have initiated the GLF if this was the case.
15. Whitson, Williams, The Chinese High Command (London: MacMillan, 1974), p. 525.

16. Joffe, Ellis, Party and Army : Political Control and the Chinese Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 72-81.
17. Gittings, John. "Army-Party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution". in Lewis, ed., Party, Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 387.
18. For an example of the PLA professionals' attitude towards the militia see Gittings, John. "China's Militia," The China Quarterly. April - June 1964, p. 107. The role of the PLA in the GLF is discussed in Joffe, Party and Army, pp. 85-88.
19. Union Research Institute, The Case of P'eng Te-huai (Hong Kong: URI, 1968), p. 12.
20. For an analysis of the international scene in 1959, the era of the Khrushchev/Eisenhower summitry, see Chapter Seven. Indicative of the deferential outlook towards the Russians was P'eng's opinion, as expressed around the time of Lushan, that if the policies of the GLF continued, the Soviets would have to send in troops to restore order as in Hungary, i.e., patronizingly sort out a wayward follower. See *ibid.*, p. 40.
21. Bridgham, Philip, "Factionalism in the Central Committee", in Lewis, ed., p. 217. For P'eng's contacts with the Soviets, see Charles, David. "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Te-huai", The China Quarterly, October - December 1961, p. 64.
22. For an interesting discussion of this point see Oksenberg, Michael. "The Political Leader", in Wilson, ed., Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History (London : Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 71-73.
23. Previous moves against 'professionalism' are discussed in Joffe, Party and Army, p. 83.
24. Although Lin did have some 'black marks' against him during his career, most notably by opposing Mao during the Long March on certain issues, his career throughout the 1950's had proven him to be one of Mao's greatest supporters in the PLA during P'eng's rule. See Powell, Ralph L. "The Increasing Power of Lin Piao and the Party Soldiers", The China Quarterly April - June 1968, pp. 40-41. Also see Van Ginneken, Joseph, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao (Hamondsworth : Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 33-34.
25. For an account of the Wuhan incident see Von Ginneken, pp. 118-126.
26. Gittings, John. "The Chinese Army's Role in the Cultural Revolution" Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 44, Fall 1967, pp. 276-277. Lo Jui-ching is the major exception, and his purge will be discussed in the following section.
27. Whitson's model is discussed in Chapter Two, pp. 43-44.

28. Gittings, John. "The Chinese Army's Role in the Cultural Revolution" pp. 274-275.
29. Halperin, Morton and Lewis, John Williams "New Tensions in Army-Party Relations in China: 1965-1966," The China Quarterly, April-June 1966, p. 59.
30. Joffe, Party and Army, pp. 138-139.
31. George, Alexander, The Chinese Army in Action (London: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 205.
32. The admiration that Mao had for Lin's programmes and how they encouraged him to apply similar tactics in the nation and the Party is discussed in Whitson, p. 527.
33. Gittings, John, The Role of the Chinese Army, p. 257. Also Powell, "The Rise of Lin Piao and the Party Soldiers" pp. 48-49.
34. Breth, pp. 90-91.
35. Joffe, Ellis, "Cultural Revolution or Power Struggle" The China Quarterly, July-September 1967, p. 125.
36. Karnow, pp. 131-132.
37. Harman, Richard Snyder, The Maoist Case Against Liu Shao-ch'i (1967): A Leadership Crisis in the Chinese People's Republic (Unpublished thesis: University of Virginia, 1969), p. 46.
38. Baum, Richard, and Teiwes, Frederick, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question" Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 1968, pp. 336-337.
39. Snow, Edgar, China's Long Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 26-27.
40. Robinson, Thomas W., "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution in China" in Robinson ed., The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 174 and pp. 212-213.
41. Gurtov, Melvin, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution" in Robinson, ed., pp. 337-338 and pp. 362-363.
42. Even though Ch'en had slipped once or twice by saying such things as, "These thoughts of Mao Tse-tung are really a Chinese product; we must not take them abroad," Mao strongly supported him against the attack of the leading radical Wang Yi.
43. Snow, China's Long Revolution, p. 190.
44. Ashbrook, Arthur, "Main Lines of Chinese Communist Economic Development" in Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, ed., An Economic Profile of Mainland China (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 33-34.

45. For example, crude steel production had reached a high point of 13 million tonnes in 1960, but by 1966 it was only back up to 12 million tonnes. See Breth, pp. 87-88.
46. See *ibid.*, and also Chou En-lai's pronouncements in Snow, China's Long Revolution, pp. 192-193.
47. Eckstein, Alexander, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 262-263.
48. *ibid.*
49. Jones, Edwin, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revolution in Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, ed., p. 79.
50. Gray, Jack, "The Economics of Maoism in Baum ed., pp. 83-84.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CCP Policy on Vietnam, 1965-1966:
The International Political Climate.

The leadership that formulated the PRC's response to the rapidly escalating commitment to the second Indochina crisis operated from a radically different perception of China's role in world affairs than it had when the decision to enter the Korean War had been made. Generally, there had not been a change of leadership and many of the key figures remained the same, yet their outlook towards China's position vis à vis the two major powers had altered. This is not to say that they were all in agreement over what China's new position ideally should be, but there was a broad consensus that the bi-polar world, and the subservience to the USSR that entailed, was not in China's best interest.¹ The primary significance of this period is that it marked the final death knell of the Sino-Soviet alliance. It also saw overt moves on the part of the PRC towards the formulation of a multilateral international system. This meant that the PRC was intent on finding its own unique spheres of influence and on creating an image of leadership and prestige with which to attract support for its desired position of eminence. The CCP viewed the prerequisites for the achievement of this task as being three-fold: the acquisition of nuclear weapons, mostly as the symbolic gesture of breaking the superpower monopoly; a sphere of influence within the Communist Bloc; and a leading position within the developing world.² The first of these objectives was achieved but it was not, in its own right, significant enough to affect the realization of the other two goals. In other words, the entire PRC drive towards a unique position in the world

was doomed because the CCP simply did not have the political or material capital with which to achieve success. The Vietnam War was a key link in its strategy because it symbolized both the PRC's position in the Communist world and as a champion of developing states. Nothing more pointedly displayed the failure of the PRC's strategy than its inability to retain its influence over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), because it typified the divergence between China's desires and its abilities. (See Chapter Eight). It is that divergence that characterized this period in Chinese foreign policy.

Interestingly, in view of the Sino-Soviet split, this period was not marked by a Chinese shift towards the US. In fact, nothing could be further from the actual circumstances because the US was still said to be the world's most active imperialist power.³ In the eyes of the Maoists it was US imperialism which blocked China's ascendancy, and it had not yet been concluded that a fellow "socialist" country could be an imperialist force.⁴ Significantly, it was the US that mitigated against Chinese irredenta as it was American forces that kept Taiwan separated from the mainland. Also there was an American presence interfering in traditional Chinese spheres of influence - notably Vietnam. Nevertheless, the USSR had committed two cardinal sins: it had placed cooperation with the US above its commitment to the PRC's aspirations; and it had shown an inclination towards trying to dominate China and towards interfering in Chinese internal affairs. The Soviet Union had been tinged with a traitorous hue, and, as always a traitor was viewed with disdain.

The US had played the role of traditional enemy very well during the years between the Korean War and the second Vietnam

crisis. No matter how hated "Soviet revisionism" had become it did not yet overshadow the US as the primary enemy because it had not blocked the Chinese achievement of national goals in the direct way that the Americans had done - it had, however, hindered achievements by refusing to help. The Soviets' crimes were that they bent over backwards to cooperate with the US, which remained the major antagonist during this time.⁵ In addition, the period from 1961 to 1966 was seen by the CCP as being characterized by an escalation of US aggression. This escalation was nowhere more evident than in Indochina where US involvement in both Laos and Vietnam had shown that nothing had essentially changed since the Korean War - "US imperialism" was still active in China's border regions. It is possible that since the Sino-Soviet dispute had erupted largely during this period of escalation, the threat of Soviet betrayal was viewed with greater suspicion and therefore the Sino-Soviet rift intensified in direct relationship to the increasing Sino-US enmity.⁶

The US policy towards the PRC was still based on military containment and diplomatic isolation, as it had been since the Korean conflict. Throughout the fifties and early sixties the PRC saw itself being progressively encircled by the US. It became a primary goal of the PRC to ensure that its neighbours were free of the presence of US bases, but its success at blocking their spread was limited.⁷ Since the creation of SEATO by Secretary of State Dulles, a string of bases had been built from South Korea in the north to Thailand in the south, and in the early to mid-sixties these bases were being strengthened in connection with the US effort in Vietnam. The deployment of B-52 bombers in Thailand was one of the more ominous developments for

the PRC because it created a new threat from the southwest, an area of recurring problems with another rival, India.⁸ The effect which the containment policy had on Chinese foreign policy outlook was great. For a nation with international aspirations, the establishment of a sound sphere of influence within its immediate vicinity is of extreme importance.⁹ The American military presence had placed the US directly in the path of this significant national goal.

Naturally, nothing more blatantly displayed the contempt that the US had for what the Chinese saw as their natural right to a buffer zone free of foreign interference than the US actions in Vietnam. If any one international issue precluded a rapprochement with the US during the 1965-1966 period, this was it. Following the beginning of intense bombing of the DRV in 1965, even the limited goal of a communist North Vietnamese buffer state was threatened. Therefore, the PRC's appraisal of the Vietnam conflict, especially that of Lin Piao and Mao Tse-tung, changed drastically. The war was no longer a civil war, but a war of fully fledged national resistance.¹⁰ In terms of the immediate security considerations, the possibility of a direct war with the US was feared. The CCP recognized its weakness compared to the US, which, at the tactical level, created the need to fight a war by proxy with the US. The international significance of this was considerable because it gave the PRC the opportunity of presenting to the world evidence of the invincibility of Mao's "people's war" in practice, while at the same time limiting the amount of direct involvement. Through portraying the resistance to US imperialism by a proxy armed with Mao's strategy as a victory for the Chinese cause, the CCP was given the opportunity to be militarily cautious, but bold and aggressive in propaganda.¹¹

Though the PRC's military commitment to the struggle was kept at a minimum, its stake in the battle was great. The PRC had no choice but to battle the US using only the validity of Mao's analysis of imperialism and the righteousness of the anti-imperialist cause, yet this had certain advantages. If the governments of the developing world could see the benefits of following this prescribed path, not only of "people's war" but of anti-Americanism generally, then the PRC could make great strides towards her goal of an international sphere of influence. Vietnam was to be the PRC's example to the world of the just nature of the Chinese cause. If this was widely accepted, then the PRC could make progress diplomatically and, if many Asian nations followed suit, remove the US presence from China's immediate area. The danger was that the nations which the PRC wished to influence would perceive the war as being the strategy of the DRV (as the Vietnamese themselves claimed) and that the gains there were made by the use of Soviet arms and not Mao's precepts. The Vietnam War represented a major diplomatic battle, but the PRC entered it with very little protection. Therefore, the CCP continued to hope that the Vietnamese would engage the US in a long war of attrition that would weaken the American resolve globally, and allow the Chinese to claim this as a victory of Chinese origin that deserved praise for Mao.¹² Though the Vietnam War increased the possibility of spreading influence in this manner, it was essentially an ominous development for it proved that the American resolve in Asia had not slackened. If the propaganda battle over Vietnam was lost in the arena of international debate, then, especially in view of the rift with the Soviets, the CCP faced the possibility of isolation and a deteriorating global position.

The US position on Taiwan had considerable implications for the PRC's foreign policy, as it had had ever since Truman had "neutralized" the Taiwan Straits in 1950. The threat to the PRC which this problem represented was, however, mostly symbolic in nature. The CCP's inability to unite what it proclaimed to be its sovereign territory marred its pretence of being a great power. The threat from Taiwan was that the KMT government still existed and, therefore, created a situation in which the PRC presented itself as the preminent revolutionary power of the day, but was unable even to destroy the last remnants of its own indigenous opposition.¹³ The 1954 US-Republic of China Defence Treaty kept Chiang's regime alive and provided a constant reminder of US interference in Chinese domestic affairs. It was because of the insult which Taiwan represented to the CCP's national and revolutionary pride that until the Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970's many analysts continued to conclude that "the issue of Taiwan will be the most likely casus belli between the US and China."¹⁴ As long as the US insisted on recognizing the KMT as the legitimate ruler of all China, peaceful coexistence between the PRC and the US was impossible.

Taiwan, through its seat on the US Security Council, represented a stumbling block in the way of the PRC's attempts at creating its own camp within international assemblies. The one arena in which the PRC could simultaneously rally support for its crusades against the Americans and the Soviets from both the "socialist" countries and the developing world was the UN. The US, however, had annually blocked moves to have the PRC seated in the Security Council and continually beat back the PRC's attempts at becoming a member of the General Assembly. The result of these consistent

defeats was that the PRC began to downplay the importance of the UN and to deride it as a forum dominated by "US imperialism." The CCP, therefore, began to advocate the formation of a new, revolutionary international organization. This, in essence, was the motivation behind the attempted convening of the Second Afro-Asian-Latin American Conference - better known as Bandung Two. This will be discussed in more detail below.¹⁵ Yet, this could be viewed as an example of diplomatic "sour grapes" because admission to the UN certainly had an appeal for the CCP on both sides of its ideological divide. It was realized that diplomatic transactions of the greatest importance were regularly completed within the UN and the PRC's inability to participate in these exchanges belied its claim to be the effective representative of the revolutionary peoples' interests. The CCP's absence denied it the opportunity of rousing the developing countries and of preventing the passage of "non-revolutionary" motions.¹⁶ The PRC's inability to gain admission to the General Assembly, of which the vast majority of members were the very nations that the PRC most wanted to represent in a new multilateral world order, clearly shows the diplomatic obstacle which this represented. If the PRC wanted to disturb the international status quo, no better means existed than to gain admission to the UN. This was another goal that the US had effectively denied the Chinese.

As the above has shown, US policy towards the PRC had remained essentially the same since the Korean War and had given the CCP little reason for changing its assessment of US intentions. Yet the years since the Korean War had seen some evidence of slight movements by the US towards de facto recognition of the PRC's existence. Not only had the US sat with representatives of the

PRC at the Geneva Conferences on Indochina in 1954 and 1961, but ambassadorial talks had taken place intermittently in Warsaw throughout the years since 1954. Long before any detente was contemplated, such sensitive areas as a foreign ministers' conference on Taiwan and an end to the US trade embargo had been discussed.¹⁷ The Kennedy administration and the early part of the Johnson regime actually showed some inclination towards relaxing hostilities. In 1962, when it was believed that the KMT was planning to take advantage of the disorder on the mainland in the wake of post-GLF disorders, the Kennedy government made it known that the US would not support an invasion of the PRC.¹⁸ Subsequently, in December 1963, Johnson's Assistant Secretary of State Hillman made the important remark that he believed that the PRC " was here to stay." Though this speech was strongly qualified by pointing to CCP belligerence, it was the first step towards a recognition of the PRC's right to exist.¹⁹ Unfortunately the Chinese reaction towards the growing US involvement in Vietnam precluded the continuation of this trend. By 1966 the Warsaw talks had simply degenerated into a platform from which the CCP could attack "US imperialism."²⁰ The US continued to be seen as the world's pariah, though the additional domestic reasons for this, i.e., the consequences of the increasingly tumultuous CR, should not be ignored.²¹

While there were no dramatic reversals in Sino-American relations since the Korean conflict, the foundations of the alliance between the CCP and the Soviet Union had been destroyed. A key factor in the Chinese strategic planning when the decision was made to enter Korea, the belief that the Russians would in the final instance act as a safety net, had been removed, and in its place was the open hostility between the two governments.

The Sino-Soviet dispute is a complex, and at times confusing subject. There is not the space for an in depth analysis of its history in this study, but its primary causes and implications for the Chinese response to the Vietnam War will be discussed. It is important to understand what compelled the PRC to take an independent stance from the Soviets and why the idea of some sort of "united action" towards this problem was so abhorrent to the Maoists. What made those in charge of the PRC decide that the threat of Soviet influence was as dangerous as the US military actions in Vietnam? The following will show that the USSR had proven to be almost as much of an obstacle towards the PRC's international goals as had the US and that the ideological polemics which marked the split were simply manifestations of the Chinese objectives being thwarted.

The CCP's international behaviour, especially with regards to the Korean War and the First Indochina conflict, gives evidence that its objectives were never totally subservient to those of the Soviets. The Chinese came to power with distinct national aims which eventually clashed with those of the USSR. The essence of the conflict is succinctly stated by William E. Griffith:

"The primary cause of the Sino-Soviet rift has been the determination of Mao and his associates that China should be a superpower, and the determination of the Soviet leadership to prevent it."²²

In the view of all sections of the CCP, not just the militant Maoists, the just world order was one in which the PRC enjoyed a position of near equality with the two superpowers. All of its actions in international affairs during the first half of the

sixties should be judged in the light of this objective: its desire for a sphere of influence within the Communist Block, the developing world and the international community as a whole; plus the perceived need for nuclear weapons, all stemmed from the highly nationalistic goal of achieving China's "legitimate" position in the world. During the Korean period there was a general acceptance of Soviet leadership, due mainly to the pragmatic need for military and economic aid. But, the period between then and the public split in 1960 saw an ever increasing importance being placed on these national goals. Khrushchev, however, showed reluctance to support the aims of the CCP leadership and therefore became a hindrance, and later a threat, to the attainment of these goals.²³ The major thrust of Chinese foreign policy between 1963 and 1966 was designed to lessen this threat by the development of a new world order in which the PRC could hope to shape its own destiny and to eradicate totally subservience to any foreign power.

In addition the USSR represented an internal threat to the CCP leadership in a way in which the US did not. The Soviets were much more likely to corrupt the ideological foundations of the regime by the spread of so-called "revisionism."²⁴ This, in actuality, was simply the spread of opposition to Mao's leadership and to his policies. For Mao, the idea of a distinct Chinese "road to socialism," as opposed to following the Soviet line, was sacrosanct. This was first displayed during the GLF when the Soviet model was blatantly disregarded in favour of a unique approach.²⁵ Moscow made its displeasure concerning this deviation very well known. Nevertheless, when this displeasure began to have domestic consequences it had an effect on the CCP's, and, primarily, Mao's attitude towards the Soviets. When it became

clear that P'eng Te-huai, who had so vociferously attacked Mao's policies at the Lushan Plenum in the fall of 1959, had previously been in contact with the Soviets the danger to Mao and his colleagues that Soviet influence represented must have become obvious.²⁶

Another injury to Chinese national pride that the Russian had inflicted on the CCP leadership was the indebtedness in which the Chinese found themselves through the less than favourable terms attached to Russian aid. The PRC was almost totally dependent upon the Soviets for the delivery of the complete plant and equipment which was the backbone of its industrialization programme. The Soviets themselves claim to have provided 1,816,000,000 new rubles' worth of aid in the form of long term credits between 1950 and 1962.²⁷ The Maoist dictum of "self-reliance" gained new importance after the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960. The CCP began to explain that economic independence is the foundation of political independence. This certainly implied that the past economic relations with the USSR were a direct threat to China's hard won national sovereignty.²⁸

One of the more disturbing aspects of the PRC's relations with the Soviets was the refusal of the Russians to support the Chinese policy of unyielding opposition to the US. The CCP felt that the Soviets valued the development of detente with the US over their alliance with the PRC, and that all of the obstacles which their erstwhile ally placed in their way could be traced to the growing understanding between the two world giants. The Soviets attempts at limiting the Chinese Communists' access to nuclear weapons and to spheres of influence, they believed, were

designed to protect this new system of Soviet-American cooperation. Mao, therefore, felt he had to attack aggressively the premise on which the new relations were based: he had to show that the theory of peaceful coexistence with imperialism was faulty and that the superpower monopoly over nuclear weapons was tantamount to subordinating the entire globe to the domination of two nations. This necessitated that the Soviets be subjected to propaganda attacks that would clearly indicate the loathsome depths to which they had sunk.

The CCP attacked the Soviets by pointing to a substantial chronicle of events which they claimed proved that the USSR had compromised its support for world revolution in general, and Chinese aims in particular. The first major instance in which the strategic divergence between the two states surfaced was the Quemoy crisis of 1958, an event which saw a rather limp Soviet response to an apparent CCP initiative to regain control of the KMT controlled territory.²⁹ This was followed shortly afterwards by the "Spirit of Camp David" era of Soviet-American summitry, at a time when Mao believed that Soviet superiority in rocketry indicated that the time had come for the West to be treated in an uncompromising manner.³⁰ In 1962, the two events occurred which confirmed the CCP's already strong suspicions about Soviet support: the Cuban missile crisis, in which the Soviets backed down under US threats of nuclear war; and the Sino-Indian border war, during which the Russians stuck to an official position of neutrality, yet continued to supply the Indians with aircraft. This latter action was said to be betrayal of a Bloc member in favour of "reactionary aggressors."³¹ The point of no return, however, was the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

of 1963. This, it was claimed, was the epoch in which Sino-American collusion to "carve up the world" had become official. A further explanation of this claim will be found below.

The battle against Soviet-American cooperation was fought basically on a theoretical level, a possible indication of the PRC's inability to bring strong diplomatic or military forces to bear. Beginning with the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Khrushchev persistently proclaimed that the world struggle had entered a new era, that international capitalism could be killed using unobtrusive methods, and that war between "socialist states" and "imperialist states" was no longer inevitable. He insisted that the strength of the Communist Bloc was so great that the imperialists would realise the hopelessness of war and that war would therefore cease before the death of capitalism. The Chinese found this highly unpalatable, especially since its terminology indicated a revision of Lenin's theory of imperialism which was one of the foundations of the Maoist doctrine.³²

The Maoists in the CCP, conversely, argued that while war between the socialist and the imperialist camps was not totally inevitable, it was still a strong possibility because of US aggression, e.g., as in Vietnam. They stated that the continuing struggle against imperialism was inevitable, but that the centre of this battle would be in the developing world.³³ It was in this area that imperialism would meet defeat; and it was these struggles of "national liberation" that deserved the wholehearted support of the socialist camp regardless of the risks. This proposition is explainable by the CCP's assessment of its future strength as leader of the developing world. Naturally, the

Soviets opposed a Chinese role which they could not control, but they also had strong anxieties over unlimited support for these wars of "national liberation." They believed, and the Chinese scorned, the idea that these conflicts could not be contained and that a nuclear confrontation with the US was possible if prudence was not used. Vietnam was a test case for this proposition: the Chinese were convinced that South Vietnam could fall without further escalation, while the Soviets, until the fall of Khrushchev, viewed the dispute with extreme caution.³⁴ The root causes of these differing outlooks can be found in the views which both sides held on nuclear weapons.

The CCP felt that for symbolic reasons they could not claim a leading position in the world without possessing a nuclear capability. Also, as the Sino-Soviet split worsened, it must have been obvious that the Soviet nuclear umbrella would have to be replaced. From 1954 onwards they tried to acquire the weapons from the Soviets, but a 1957 agreement designed to accomplish this was unilaterally torn up by the Russians in 1959. Soviet stubbornness concerning this matter consequently led to the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 being interpreted by the Chinese as a conspiracy by the superpowers to deprive them of the weapons and to rob them of their legitimate role in the world.³⁵ Khrushchev was motivated by a strong respect for the power of nuclear weapons. He argued that the Chinese were ignorant of this power, and that they should realize that there would be no world on which to build socialism if they had their way. Mao, however, argued that the strength of numbers within the "socialist camp" (i.e., the Chinese population) would ensure that socialism would triumph in the ruins that remained. This, in essence, was at the core of the "atomic

bombs are paper tigers" theory. Mao felt that there was a great psychological need, on both the domestic and international level, to break down the fear of both the great powers and their weapons. Only then could China, a country without the bomb until October 1964, portray an image of strength in her crusade against the global status quo.³⁶

Through his steadfast opposition to the CCP's programmes, Khrushchev had become hated by the Chinese leadership, and his fall in the autumn of 1964 was viewed as the possible beginning of better relations between the two nations. Hopes were soon dashed, however, as it became obvious that the new leadership did not favour capitulation to the Chinese demands but, rather, desired a more determined effort at limiting Chinese influence.³⁷ The CCP began to refer to the Brezhnev-Kosygin policies as "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and the dispute continued to rage with the same amount of intensity as previously. One important factor was the new Soviet leadership's refusal, because of domestic considerations such as the popularity of the Soviet-American detente, to modify the "peaceful coexistence programme" set out at the Twentieth and Twenty Second Party Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).³⁸ "Peaceful coexistence" remained intact, and the Soviets were now more aggressively trying to curb the development of the third bloc which the CCP so highly favoured.

The PRC's strategy towards the development of the multi-lateral system was to persuade other nations that an alignment with the Chinese against the two major powers was in their own national interests. For a while this campaign was also directed at a

third group of nations not included in the "socialist" or undeveloped groups. This was the so-called "Second Intermediate Zone" which included the capitalist nations of Western Europe and Japan. From 1960, when the Sino-Soviet split became public, until 1965, the PRC had some success in this campaign. By the end of 1965, however, the strategy was in ruins. The initial success must be described if the ultimate failure is to be understood.

Any of the Communist parties that favoured autonomous development from the Soviet Union (except the ostracized Yugoslavs) listened sympathetically to the CCP's attacks on the CPSU. The parties included those of the DRV, North Korea, Romania, Cuba (for a short period), and Albania. There was also some support from parties which were not in power, e.g., the Italian Communist Party. The Chinese suggestion was that the USSR was subordinating their economic needs to its own, as it had done with China, and that all economic ties should be based on equality.³⁹ On the ideological level, the CCP derided the CPSU's ideological purity stating that Soviet "revisionism" was capitulating to the US and placing the entire Communist movement at risk. This approach was particularly evident during the "Long Live Leninism" polemics of 1960 that marked the surfacing split. This is not the place to describe all the machinations of the contending sides in the inter-party struggle that occurred during the first half of the 1960's. Suffice it to say that the Communist Bloc seemed so hopelessly divided that by 1964 Khrushchev was intent on having the CCP expelled from the movement. In an indication of the amount of support the CCP had been able to achieve, all attempts by Khrushchev to convene a conference from which to "excommunicate" the CCP met with little support.⁴⁰

In Mao's view, the Chinese-led bloc in the new world order would closely resemble the "united front" set-up of the Chinese Revolution. He believed that the "Second Intermediary Zone" of capitalist nations would fulfil the same role as the "national bourgeoisie" during the CCP's rise to power. It was thought that the ruling class of these capitalist nations would react against US domination of their economies and join the PRC in opposition to superpower preeminence. In the early 1960's some contact was made with Australia and Canada who agreed to sell wheat to the Chinese to help them through a series of bad harvests. But the Chinese moves met with their greatest success in Gaullist France. De Gaulle had similar worries about preserving national independence and the French recognition of the PRC in 1964 was the highwater mark of this diplomatic campaign.⁴¹

Before 1965 the PRC had experienced limited success in finding allies within the developing world. The cordial relations with the DRV at the time, and the implications this had for the image of Mao's doctrine of "people's war" were a bright spot for the CCP. Also, the Chinese had sent advisers to some African nations (e.g., Tanzania and Mali) and had drawn praise for the way in which their engineers and technicians had insisted on living at the same standard as their native counterparts.⁴² The PRC's greatest ally in the developing world, however, proved to be President Sukarno of Indonesia. Its support for his struggle against Malaysia and the amount of aid it had provided his nation endeared Peking to him. He patronized the pro-CCP Indonesian Communist Party and supported the PRC's foreign policy to such an extent that many analysts at the time referred to a Peking-Jakarta Axis.⁴³

Nevertheless, the Chinese attempt to consolidate the above mentioned gains by convening the Second Afro-Asian-Latin American Conference, planned to meet in Algiers in 1965, met with total collapse. This missed opportunity to recreate the goodwill generated by Chou En-lai at the original Bandung Conference in 1954 (which can be linked to the status which the Chinese had achieved during the Korean conflict), was only one of the misfortunes which riddled Chinese foreign policy during 1965 - a year which saw all the previous gains disappear.

Bandung Two's death while in the planning stages was not entirely the fault of Chinese diplomacy. The fall of Algerian President Ben Bella immediately before the intended starting date caused many governments to decline to attend, and, interestingly, the PRC itself used this as an excuse when it realized that it was time to cut its losses. But Bandung Two's demise was simply a manifestation of a trend that was draining away support for the Chinese from the developing world and the Communist Bloc - the ability of the new Soviet leadership to regain the influence that Khrushchev had lost when he decided to concede certain areas to the CCP. The Chinese insistence that the USSR be excluded from the conference placed many nations in the problematic position of avoiding offending the Soviets who were beginning to grant increasing amounts of aid. They simply decided to avoid entanglement and not to attend.⁴⁴ The problem for the PRC was that the only incentive it could offer nations to join its plan for a new world order, besides very limited amounts of aid, was the chance of sharing the Maoist doctrine. In 1965, the Soviets even succeeded in making this doctrine seem hollow.

The blunt Chinese refusal to accept some form of "united action" with the Soviet Union over the war in Vietnam (See Chapter Nine, pages 177-185) caused many to doubt the sincerity of the Maoists' commitment to "national liberation". This, coupled with increasing Soviet aid, certainly had a disastrous effect on support for the Chinese within the Communist Bloc. During 1965 the previously pro-Chinese Korean Workers Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and, significantly, the DRV, had all begun to return to a neutral/pro-Soviet position.⁴⁵ This dwindling support within the communist movement; the fall of Sukarno in Indonesia; and the lack of commitment to the Chinese cause which the collapse of Bandung Two represented, all combined to further isolate the PRC until the one remaining strong backer of its policies was insignificant Albania.

The CCP's response to this trend, probably made with domestic politics in mind, was an increasingly militant sounding foreign policy stance on the part of Mao's allies who dominated the Foreign Ministry. (See Chapter Six, page 107.) This stance was typified by Lin Piao's article "long Live the Victory of People's War," published on 5th September 1965. This statement coupled the theoretical death of the "Second Intermediate Zone" with a call for self-reliance and strict ideological conformity to Maoist doctrine on the part of "national liberation struggles". Considering the foreign policy setbacks of 1965, this clarion call for adherence to Mao's Thought was no more than empty rhetoric.⁴⁶ It was, if anything, a recognition of the PRC's failure to create a bloc of its own supporters. The inclusion of Europe amongst the "cities of the world" which the "national liberation" movements must encircle and destroy in Lin's article, for instance, represented

a tacit admission of the PRC's failure to gain substantial support from Europe. The significance of the "self-reliance" theme was that it was sufficiently militant in tone for the immediate pre-Cultural Revolutionary domestic politics, but that it really acknowledged a low-risk policy that was totally realistic in the light of the inability of Maoist foreign policy to truly effect any changes within the international order. Lin's article was symbolic of the superficially virile, yet essentially impotent, state of Chinese foreign policy at the time.

The attempt to create a new Chinese-led movement failed because the Chinese leadership had nothing with which to attract and then retain a large number of supporters. It hardly had the military strength to defend itself let alone to give substantial military aid to others;⁴⁷ it did not have the ability to match the amount of economic aid that its adversaries could provide; and its doctrine was vulnerable to attack. The PRC had achieved a nuclear capacity by 1964, but its symbolic attractiveness was severely tarnished by two factors: the apparently irrational disregard of the consequences of a nuclear war alienated many governments during the period before the detonation of the first Chinese device and the hypocrisy of spending scarce resources on a nuclear programme after years of calling such weapons "paper tigers" alienated others.⁴⁸ In other words, by 1965 few of the CCP's foreign policy goals had been reached and instead of forming its own sphere of influence the PRC was rapidly sliding into virtual international isolation. Therefore the decisions made concerning the Vietnam war were, unlike the decision to enter the Korean War which had a degree of Soviet consultation, purely Chinese in origin. These decisions, however, were not made from a position of vital, dynamic independence, but were rather

made within the constraints of the failures of foreign policy that had previously occurred. From this one can conclude that the strategic debate over the Vietnam War was, at least in part, over whether the PRC should take the opportunity to formulate a new approach or whether Chinese foreign policy should continue to be burdened by the mistakes of the past. The CR insured that the latter was to be the case for a number of years.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Though many of the figures on the right of the CCP were not as adamant in their condemnation of the Soviets as Mao, Lin, etc., they were still critical to a great degree. For the position of Liu Shao-ch'i on this matter see, Yahuda, Michael, China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 178-179.
2. The last two goals are discussed in Lowenthal, Richard, "Communist China's Foreign Policy" in Tang Tsou, ed., China in Crisis Vol. II (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), p. 4. The desire for nuclear weapons is discussed in Griffith, William E., "Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-1965", The China Quarterly, January-March 1966, p. 4.
3. For example see Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of People's War! (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), pp. 52-58.
4. The USSR was not openly referred to as an imperialist force until after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the CCP began to use the term "social imperialism" to describe Soviet policy. See Yahuda, pp. 216-217.
5. Yahuda, Michael, "China's Foreign Policy since 1963: The Maoist Phases", The China Quarterly, October - December 1968, p. 94.
6. Halperin, Morton H., "China's Attitude Towards Nuclear Weapons", in Tang Tso ed., China in Crisis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), pp. 151-153.
7. One important piece of evidence that indicates just how highly the PRC viewed the absence of US bases as a top priority was Chou's willingness to create neutrality in Laos and Cambodia at the expense of the DRU's aspirations at the Geneva Conference of 1954. See Eden, Sir Anthony, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle. Vol. III (London: Cassel, 1962), pp. 129-131.
8. Hinton, Harold, "China and Vietnam", in Tang Tsou ed., China in Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968), p. 220.
9. Lowenthal, p. 5.
10. Mazingo, D.P. and Robinson, T.W., Lin Piao on People's War: China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965), pp. 3-4.
11. *ibid.*, pp. 17-18. The strategic decisions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine.
12. Zagoria, Donald, The Vietnam Triangle (New York, Pegasus, 1967), p. 83.

13. Limebarger, Paul, "Take Two Chinese", Current History, Vol. 47, No. 277, September 1964, p. 162.
14. Morgenthau, Hans, "The United States and China", in Tang Tso ed., pp. 95-96. The PRC's self-image of being the driving force behind world revolution is discussed in Zagoria, Donald, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 301-310.
15. Lowenthal, p. 5. Here the author points to the importance which the PRC's foreign relations ministers placed on extra - UN international conferences.
16. MacFarquar, Roderick, "Comments on Lowenthal's Communist China's Foreign Policy", in Tang Tsou ed., p. 20.
17. Gittings, John, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", The China Quarterly, July - September 1961, p. 51.
18. Hinton, Harold, China's Turbulent Quest (New York and London: MacMillan, 1972), p. 268.
19. The full text of Hillman's remarks can be found in MacFarquar, Roderick, Sino-American Relations: 1949-1971 (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1972), pp. 201-205.
20. Hinton, pp. 269-270.
21. Hinton, Harold, The Bear at the Gate (Washington, D.C.: AEI - Hoover Policy Study, 1971) p. 89. There had been much debate over whether foreign policy was determining domestic policy or vice versa when the first salvos of the Cultural Revolution were launched. See Chapter Nine.
22. Griffith, p. 4.
23. *ibid.*
24. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy since 1963: The Maoist Phases", pp. 94-95.
25. This may be a common feature of all communist parties that achieved power without Soviet aid. See Chapter Five and Eight. Also see Zagoria, The Sino Soviet Conflict, p. 66.
26. Charles, David A., "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng te-hual," The China Quarterly, October - December 1968, p. 76. Charles believes that this shared experience of Soviet intrigue was one of the factors which drew the Albanians and Chinese together.
27. Gittings, John, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: 1963-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 135-136.
28. Kovner, Milton, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Communism at the Crossroads," Current History, September 1964, p. 133.

29. Hinton, The Bear at the Gate, p. 87.
30. Zagoria, The Sino Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961, pp. 152-165.
31. For details on the Cuban Missile Crisis see Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp. 181-183. In an ironic twist the Chinese caustically accused the Soviets of "adventurism" when the crisis first began, and then accused the Soviets of "collusion" when the tension lessened. When the Soviets accused the CCP of wanting war the Chinese responded through Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi by asking, "Did we ask you to transport the missiles to Cuba? " The Sino-Indian War is discussed in Gittings, *ibid*, p. 175.
32. Burin, Frederick S., "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War", American Political Science Review, Vol. 62., No. 2., pp. 344-345. The Leninist ideal that revolts in colonial nations could spark the worldwide proletarian revolution is closely related to Mao's dictum that the developing nations will be the centre of the world revolutionary struggle.
33. Tang, Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence", Orbis Vol. 8. Spring 1964, pp. 36-41.
34. Tai, Sung-an, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam", Orbis Vol. 9, summer 1965, pp. 427-428.
35. Hsieh, Alice Langley, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963"; in Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (London: Praeger, 1966), pp. 159-166.
36. Powell, Robert L., "Great Powers and Atomic Bombs are Paper Tigers", The China Quarterly, July - September 1965, p. 60. Also see Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, pp. 135-143.
37. The increasing aid to the DRV is a good case in point. See Chapter eight. Also see Tao, Jay, "Mao's World Outlook: Vietnam and the Revolution in China", Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1968, p. 418.
38. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-1965", pp. 59-60.
39. Kovner, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Communism at the Crossroads", p. 134.
40. For the significance of the "Leninism polemic" see Zagoria, The Sino Soviet Conflict, p. 315. Khrushchev's failure to convene an ante-CCP gathering is described in Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-1965", pp. 25-40.
41. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases", p. 99. General de Gaulle's recognition of the PRC is discussed in Erasmus, Stephen, "General de Gaulle's recognition of Peking", The China Quarterly, April - June 1964, pp. 195-201.

42. Adie, W.C. "Chou En-lai on Safari", The China Quarterly, April-June 1964, p. 189.
43. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, pp. 117-118.
44. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-1965, p. 125.
45. Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: 1963-1967, pp. 259-266.
46. Yahuda, "China's Foreign Policy After 1963: The Maoist Phases", p. 103.
47. For an appraisal of the PRC's military strenght at the time see Powell, Ralph L., "Communist China's Military Potential", Current History, Vol. 47, No. 277, September 1964, pp. 137-141.
48. Young, Oran R., "Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", The China Quarterly, April-June 1966, p. 155.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Relationship Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: 1949 - 1965.

Compared with the amount of influence which the CCP had over the Korean Workers' Party at the time of Liberation, the acceptance of Chinese doctrine and policy by the Vietnamese Workers' Party (Lao Dong) was very great. Nevertheless, the leadership did not continue to adhere to the CCP's ways as slavishly as it had done during the first years of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) life, for Chinese influence created problems, both domestic and international, and by 1957 the affinity for the CCP had begun to wane. But, unlike the relative inactivity which marked CCP-KWP relations prior to the Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict, the CCP was actively trying to influence the DRV's execution of its war while the strategic debate was taking place in Peking and the US was greatly increasing its involvement in Indochina. This is an essential difference between the two cases being studied in this work and its ramifications are important when one considers the changes that had developed in the Chinese perception of their world position in the years between these two events. This chapter will explain the vicissitudes that characterized PRC-DRV relations and portray how at the crucial point of 1965 the CCP's sway over North Vietnamese policy towards the burgeoning war quickly dwindled. Though never fully admitted, this was a manifestation of the inadequacies of PRC foreign policy at the time. It was a setback, and although Chinese aid continued afterwards it was not out of dedication to an ally, but simply an action with Chinese defence and world image in mind.

Anti-Chinese feelings come easily to the Vietnamese. The legacy of past Chinese transgressions has produced a traditional suspicion that may never be eliminated. The persistent use of the heroes of past battles with the Chinese as symbols of national identity by the Lao Dong points towards the usefulness of this legacy in the building of nationalistic sentiments.¹ There were, however, many reasons why the traditional enmity was overshadowed by the common bonds between the two nationalist movements which both nations developed in response to Western imperialism during the 19th century. The Vietnamese movement was nurtured by the Chinese experience because it was in China that many of the exiles from French rule formulated their beliefs. This is typified by the revolutionary career of Pham Bai Chau, one of the great Vietnamese nationalists of the early 20th century. Pham, a traditional scholar, believed that Asia would continue to be exploited by the West unless it borrowed western political ideas and technical knowledge and combined them with its own considerable achievements. This paralleled similar conceptual developments amongst the Chinese nationalists at the time and when Pham went to Japan in 1905 he was very impressed by the Chinese exiles he met there. By the time of the 1911 Revolution he was so influenced by Chinese nationalist thought that he favoured a democratic republic for Vietnam, not the reformed monarchy in which he originally believed.² Those who followed Pham in the forefront of the Vietnamese movement found China to be a favourable haven, and many participated in the Chinese political scene of the time. This was especially true during the period of CCP-KMT collaboration, when a similar mixing of Vietnamese nationalism and communism also began.³

The prominent leaders of the Lao Dong all had varying degrees of sympathy with their counterparts in the Chinese communist movement, and in many cases the differences between them can be explained by the nature of their personal attitudes towards the Chinese Revolution. At one end of the spectrum was Truong Chinh, a man who found Maoist doctrine extremely suitable for Asian countries and was the greatest exponent of Chinese influence within the Lao Dong elite. He was probably one of the first two hundred youths brought to Canton in 1925 by the Revolutionary Youth League, founded by Ho Chi Minh.⁴ Conversely, many of the leaders had attitudes towards the Chinese which can best be described as ambivalent. One who felt this ambivalence was Vo Nguyen Giap, the mastermind behind all the major campaigns of the Vietnamese Liberation Army. Although he praised Mao heavily and followed his tactics during the war against the French, he was extremely nationalistic and suspicious of the Chinese. He was an exile in China at the beginning of World War Two, but quickly returned to the mountains of Northern Tonkin in order to create a guerrilla movement.⁵ After the war against the French, Giap became increasingly intolerant of Maoist doctrine and his rejection of Mao's "people's war" strategy in 1965 was a critical development of great importance to this study (see p.156).

The leadership of the Lao Dong throughout the entire period in question was remarkably stable. (Only the demotion of Truong Chinh in 1957 marred this record of consistency. This will be discussed below.) The source of this relatively purge-free history can be explained by the character of the central, pivotal

leadership of Ho Chi Minh. It was Ho who shrewdly balanced all the differing degrees of Chinese influence within his central committee and forged a policy that he though was best for Vietnam. His ability to act as a moderator was apparent on the international stage during the early 1960's when he exploited the rivalry between the Soviets and the CCP in order to reap the most benefits for his country.⁶ Not surprisingly, Ho's attitude towards the Chinese throughout his life was ambivalent, but events in his career can be used to explain his vacillations. He was active in politics in Canton as early as 1925, where he was stationed by the Russians in the position of translator in the Soviet consulate, following extensive training in Moscow. Nevertheless, his actual experience in revolution began with the CCP, and some sources report that he was active within the Eighth Route Army for a time.⁷ The KMT occupation of North Vietnam at the end of World War Two, as agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference, is thought to have soured his opinion of the Chinese; and in 1946 he removed all the Chinese from his entourage and rebuilt his party on more nationalist lines.⁸ The aid which began to arrive from China after PLA forces reached the Vietnam border in 1949, however, became a decisive factor in Ho's war against the French: it also sweetened his outlook towards the Chinese and facilitated the period of Chinese influence which followed the war.

Liberation in China meant a significant change of fortune in the long, arduous war against the French who were trying to regain Vietnam as a colonial possession. In the years between 1946 and 1949 the Vietminh, the national liberation movement coalition under the de facto control of the Lao Dong, had to rely strictly upon small scale guerrilla action. This proved to be a great

annoyance to the French, but was incapable of dislodging them from their strongholds. With the defeat of the KMT, Ho realized the potential ally which the CCP represented: the Chinese were, after all, fighting a battle with very similar objectives - national reunification and independence. The CCP was thinking along the same lines, and on 18 January 1950 the PRC became the first nation to recognize the DRV. On the same day, an agreement was signed that approved the sale of 10,000 American and 15,000 Japanese rifles, plus ammunition, to the Vietminh by the PRC.⁹

The rapid nature of the PRC's response to the plight of the Vietminh when contrasted to the tentative nature of the initial Chinese reactions to the events in Korea leads one to question what Vietnam represented to the CCP that Korea did not. It is particularly striking when the isolation of the CCP from the Vietminh during World War Two and throughout the Civil War is noted.¹⁰ A possible explanation is the apparent lack of Soviet interest in Indochina at the time (unlike Korea, Vietnam shares no common border with the Soviet Union). The vigorous Chinese moves at aiding and eventually guiding the Vietminh were not matched by Soviet activities. Apparently the CCP, probably with tacit Soviet approval, considered Indochina to be within its sphere of influence. In addition, the type of war being fought in Vietnam fitted the example of Mao's tactics of protracted struggle and added credence to the remark made by Liu Shao-ch'i at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries in November 1949 that the Chinese model of revolution was the best one for colonial and semi-colonial nations to follow. This was made even more explicit on 16 June 1950 when "People's Daily"

stated that Vietnam and Malaya were the primary countries in which struggles best fitted the Chinese model.¹¹ This use of the Vietnamese to advance the image of Mao was repeated again in the 1960's - the Vietnamese, however, were less willing at that time to comply with the rules they were being given.

The aid which the Chinese gave the DRV during the war against the French was massive, and few doubt that the Vietnamese could have won without it. The aid increased after the Korean armistice had been signed, from a reported 16 to 20 tons of arms per month during 1951 to a peak of 4,000 tons per month in May 1954, when the Geneva Conference began.¹² Moreover, Chinese influence over the execution of the war grew in proportion to the amount of material aid given. From the way in which the war progressed it seems highly likely that General Giap spoke earnestly in October 1950, when he said after the victory at Cao-Bong that: "From this battle we understand more the greatness of Mao Tse-tung. I hope you all will double your efforts to study his thought..."¹³ With the Chinese province of Yunnan as a rear base, the war was carried through all the stages of Mao's prescribed tactics until the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu when, with the help of thousands of peasants moving material and of Chinese manned anti-aircraft guns, the final blow was struck. At the Geneva Conference the French knew that they had no chance of regaining complete control.¹⁴

The Geneva Conference of 1954 saw the Chinese delegation, led by Chou En lai, seated amongst the representatives of the world's great powers; and particularly in their handling of the DRV delegation, the Chinese behaved more like a major nation looking after its own self interests and spheres of influence,

than a fraternal ally championing the goals of a less influential associate. The attitude of the Chinese at the Conference are described in the memoirs of the Foreign Minister Eden, who co-chaired the meetings with Molotov, when he recalls the Soviet Foreign Minister revealing to him that "the Chinese are very much their own men, as far as these matters (i.e., Indochina) are concerned."¹⁵ As the Chinese bargained with the great statesmen of the world, the DRV watched as the pressure grew upon them to forfeit gains which were militarily within their grasp.

The DRV delegation went to Geneva in the shadow of the CCP. They had little to do with the Soviets (Russian aid only began appearing in Vietnam towards the end of the war) and their closeness to the Chinese was obvious.¹⁶ Yet the Chinese desire to begin their own post-Korean War reconstruction and the knowledge that the Russians were too concerned with the possibility of the creation of the European Defence Community to risk conflict in Asia, caused the CCP delegation to pressurize the Vietnamese into lessening their goals. Therefore, it was Chou En-lai who provided the impetus behind the successful conclusion of the conference by agreeing to the withdrawal of the Vietminh troops from Laos and Cambodia and to the neutrality of the governments in those nations. Elections were postponed until 1956, and the boundary between the two divided halves of Vietnam was placed at the 17th parallel, not the 13th or 14th as the DRV had demanded.¹⁷ The Vietnamese delegation was reported to feel bitter over this blatant disregard of its demands. Both of the major communist powers had foresaken the DRV's interests for their own domestic economic and political development.¹⁸ Both the communist giants were equally culpable in the Lao Dong's eyes, so activities at

Geneva probably had little bearing on the preferences which individuals within the leadership showed vis à vis the CCP or the Soviets following the conference. But, what gains had been achieved had little or nothing to do with Soviet aid and everything to do with Chinese assistance. Therefore the DRV leadership turned to the Chinese for its doctrine and for the material with which to reconstruct their nation. The CCP, having cultivated its first major sphere of influence, was very happy to oblige.

Understandably, the admiration which the North Vietnamese leadership felt for the CCP in the immediate post-war years was substantial. After the settlement, Premier Pham Van Dong, a man who in later years was identified with strong anti-PRC sentiments, travelled to Peking and dutifully lauded the CCP leadership, calling them the "bright sun of Asia."¹⁹ The influence of the sinophile Secretary General, Truong Chinh, was concomitantly also very high and his position almost unassailable. The belief that the Chinese model for socialist development was inherently more suitable for the environs of Vietnam because of its Asian origins was prevalent and Truong was given the authority to imitate the CCP's agrarian reform movement. The relish with which he instigated the process towards collectivizing agriculture was intense. Truong proved to be totally inflexible and the results were disastrous for the DRV economy.²⁰ Yet until this became painfully apparent by early 1957, the CCP enjoyed its greatest period of undisputed influence within the DRV. The Soviet Union gave economic aid, but had basically paid little attention to Indochina during these years. The Russians' apparent indifference was evident in their tacit acceptance of a divided Vietnam after

the proposed general elections were blocked in 1956. In 1957 they made this official by proposing that both North and South Vietnam be admitted to the UN.²¹ There is little doubt that the Kremlin viewed North Vietnam as being within the Chinese sphere until internal events within the DRV produced a more receptive outlook towards the Russians.

The setbacks to Hanoi's economic plans caused by the rigid following of the Mao-inspired land reform programme were substantial; and the DRV, which before the partitioning of the country relied heavily upon imports from the South, was forced to re-examine intensively both its agricultural policy and its economic plans as a whole. The slavish adherence to Maoist tenets had not only failed to increase agricultural production, but had also created such discontent amongst the peasantry that they rebelled violently, especially in the previously strongly pro-Lao Dong province of Nghe An.²² By the time of the GLF, CCP doctrine was in such disrepute that the Lao Dong made little or no official attempt to praise it. Of course, this meant that Truong Chinh had fallen into disfavour, but he was simply demoted and allowed to remain in the Politbureau after a public self-criticism. This can probably be accounted for by the leadership's desire not to offend their benefactor to the North. The foreign policy which developed after this failure of land reform was not one of total rejection of Peking, but rather of neutrality, which allowed the DRV to receive aid from both the Soviets and the Chinese and, as it developed in later years, to reap the benefits of the Sino-Soviet competition for influence within the DRV.²³

The DRV's domestic policy developed in a very different manner following 1957, as the leadership realized that reunification

would have to wait and that the creation of a strong industrial economy in the North was of paramount importance. Though such a policy seems to have blended in well with the Soviet peaceful coexistence trend, which was in its formative stages, it apparently clashed with the "East Wind over West Wind" foreign policy stance which the PRC then displayed. Nevertheless, the CCP did not react strongly against the DRV. One can surmise that this was because of a reluctance to show the world an embarrassing weakening within China's primary sphere of influence. In addition, the moves in Hanoi were executed with the utmost tact to ensure that the Chinese did not feel totally abandoned. For example, the first moves towards Moscow were preceded by polite appeals to Peking for aid which the Chinese could not possibly afford.²⁴ What is certain, however, is that the Chinese wanted a channel to Hanoi to remain open, even though it was now obvious that they would have to compete somewhat for influence within the DRV.

Economically, however, the Chinese could not hope to compete against the Soviets, which meant that any diplomatic offensive would have to wait until propitious circumstances arose. Though the PRC tried in a token manner to back up diplomatic attempts to lure the DRV firmly back into the fold with industrial aid, most notably the seven long-term trading agreements signed in February 1959,²⁵ the Chinese totally failed to match the amounts of Soviet aid. For example, while PRC aid to Hanoi totalled \$200 million in the years from 1955-57, all in direct subsidies and not loans, it only contributed \$100 million in the years between 1958-1960, three quarters of which were in loans. Notably, although they surpassed the Chinese, the Soviets and Eastern Europeans failed to make up the deficit caused by the drop in PRC aid.

Their figures rose from \$119 million, \$19 million of which were in loans, in 1955-1957, to \$159 million in 1957-1960.²⁶ Of course this divergence could be explained by the domestic economic needs of the PRC during the GLF and its aftermath, nevertheless, these figures show a trend towards Soviet inroads into an area which was previously firmly within the PRC's orbit.

The open split between the Chinese and the Soviets in 1960 coincided with a period of grave economic setbacks within the DRV. This produced a paradoxical situation in which Ho strove for diplomatic neutrality more feverishly than ever, whilst at the same time becoming more dependent on Soviet aid. Once again, the post-GLF crisis may have precluded mass Chinese aid. Ho can be seen to have tried to mediate in the increasingly hostile dispute in order to eliminate the possibility of a total rupture which might have forced the DRV to take sides. Though Soviet economic help was necessary, the possibility of conflict within Indochina, especially at this point in Laos, meant that Ho could not break with the Chinese completely.²⁷ The Chinese, during this period of competition for allies within the communist bloc, were anxious to receive any support that was possible from Hanoi.

On the economic front the battle for influence can be seen most clearly in the negotiations between the DRV and the communist giants during the initial stages of the ambitious first five year plan, announced in September 1960. A trip in early 1961 to Moscow and Peking by a delegation led by Nguyen Duy Trinh succeeded in procuring 101,250,000 new rubles' worth of aid from the Soviets and 141,750,000 new rubles'

worth from the PRC. This may initially have appeared to be a sign of a resurgence of Chinese influence; however, the unexpected trip to Moscow and Peking by Premier Pham Van Dong six months later revealed that something had gone wrong. The five year plan was already faltering and a new injection of funds was needed. The lack of sufficient initial funding was attributed to Nguyen's pro-Chinese leanings and, not surprisingly, the pro-Soviet Pham rectified this and was successful in receiving new funds from Moscow. The cancellation of debts and the new aid which were the results of Pham's trip amounted to a total of 650 million new rubles. The greater part of this came from Moscow.²⁸

Nevertheless, from 1960-1962 there was little doubt about Hanoi's diplomatic neutrality as it skillfully maneuvered its way between Peking and Moscow, with Ho Chi Minh in the role of mediator at many points when the dispute was reaching crisis level. This was especially obvious during the Twenty Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when the issue of Albania, a symbol of pro-Chinese opposition to Moscow, caused an upsurge in inter-party fighting. Yet Ho, all the time preaching international socialist solidarity, stuck solidly to the middle ground, and on 7 November 1961 the Lao Dong party organ, Nhan Dong, made this perfectly evident by publicly embracing both Moscow and "Albania".²⁹

The year 1962 was the starting point from which events began to make the DRV's neutrality untenable and the Russian reactions to these events began to make the Soviet commitment to the DRV and its goals seem less than emphatic. Consequently,

the PRC's influence again began to gain ground within the Lao Dong elite. In the South the inept Diem regime was beginning to show signs of crumbling under the weight of popular discontent and Viet Cong guerrilla action.³⁰ Conversely, the US commitment to the South also seemed to be strengthening as more American advisers were arriving on the scene. The increased activity in the South precipitated a renewed interest in reunification on the part of Hanoi, and the increased food supplies which reunification would bring must have contributed to the desirability of this goal. The Soviets, in line with their "peaceful coexistence" preoccupation, successively produced policies which caused their role as the protector of global communist interests to seem open to suspicion; while, at the same time, the PRC was following a belligerent line that more suited DRV needs.

The three events which produced the most anxiety in Hanoi were the Sino-Indian War, the Soviet backdown over the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the agreement reached at the Second Geneva Conference on Indochina which primarily concerned Laos. When the war between India and China broke out the Soviets swiftly found a neutral position, while Hanoi ended its friendly relations with Nehru's government and attacked Indian aggression. Nehru's announced hope of securing Soviet Migs must have produced worries in Hanoi as this conflict had nothing to do with "national liberation", and in reality meant that the Soviet Union was giving tacit support to a non-communist nation against a member of the communist bloc. Though the DRV could not afford to attack the Soviet policy, its statements subtly showed displeasure.³¹

In addition the Soviets' willingness to remove nuclear missiles from Cuba under pressure from the US caused the North Vietnamese to question how far the Russians would support them in their struggles. When in the same year, 1962, Soviet pressure forced both the PRC and the DRV to accept the Laos agreement against their own interests, it became increasingly clear that Sino-DRV policies coincided more than those shared by Khrushchev and Ho.³²

From 1963 until after the beginning of the American bombings of the North in 1965, it appeared that Sino-DRV relations may have been experiencing a renaissance. The similarities with the first Indochina war were many, except, notably, that this time the Soviets were actively seeking detente with the US with little regard for the increasing American activity against the South Vietnamese allies of Hanoi. The state visit of Liu Shao-ch'i to Hanoi in 1963, which followed admonishments from Peking towards Hanoi following the visit of the strongly pro-Soviet Czechoslovakian President Novotny and a Soviet military delegation in January 1963, marked a definite upturn in Sino-DRV understanding. The preparations for the visit were immense, and the welcome very cordial. Most significantly, however, were the speeches of the Hanoi leadership, which came closer to the PRC's line on both India and "Yugoslav revisionism", an unfavourable reference to the thaw in Soviet-Yugoslav hostilities, which symbolized in their eyes the Soviets' increasing willingness to compromise with the forces of "reaction".³³ Throughout the year the two governments found increasing areas of agreement, especially on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which echoed their anxieties over the Soviet

backdown during the Cuban Missile Crisis the year before. The DRV, which had long favoured the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, was heartened by the Chinese acceptance of this policy, though it must have been obvious that this was mainly designed to improve the PRC's image as an opponent of the Treaty.³⁴ It is clear that Khrushchev's policies were becoming less palatable to Ho and his colleagues and that this enabled the Chinese to assert their influence within Vietnam in a manner that had been impossible for the last six years.

Chinese support for the increase in guerrilla activities grew throughout 1963-1964 as Hanoi's support for the war in the South had during the same period. The war in the South was progressing favourably and it suited both the DRV's desire for reunification and the PRC's image as a supporter of "national liberation" - especially when juxtaposed with the Soviets' image of collusion with imperialism. By 1964 North Vietnam was so aligned with the PRC that Khrushchev simply gave up attempting to lure them away. Consequently, both military and economic aid to the DRV dwindled as the Soviets removed themselves from any active interest in the region.³⁵ Conversely, Chinese aid grew in a way that was reminiscent of their support given to the Vietminh, though on an even greater scale. In addition, in another parallel with the earlier war, there were signs of DRV acceptance of Maoist military dogma, as exemplified by an article written by Deputy Chief of Staff Huang Van Thai in which he decried the over-reliance on weapons of the "modern revisionists".³⁶ These developments must have proved gratifying to the CCP leadership because they represented a gain at the Soviets' expense. In

return for this increasing loyalty, the DRV received numerous messages of support in the event of a US attack on North Vietnam. Nevertheless, when the US bombings began in February 1965, the actual substance of this support was put to the test and Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues may have found it lacking.

When the authorized bombing of the North started a multitude of statements were made by the PRC officials which stressed the willingness of the Chinese to fight side-by-side with their Vietnamese comrades. Yet typical of these statements was that of Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi when he announced that the Chinese people would fight with the DRV "when required", with the emphasis placed on "when". This, in effect, implied that the possibility was definitely in the future and not one connected with the immediate crisis.³⁷ Any initial worries which these vague statements created for the Lao Dong were compounded when Lin Piao made the definitive statement on the question in September 1965. The significance of his theme of self reliance will be discussed below.

As the bombs fell on North Vietnam, the developments in Indochina were being watched from the Kremlin by a leadership that had a very different outlook from that of Khrushchev, who had so damaged interparty relations and had allowed the frontline communist combatant in the period's most significant conflict with the US to slip so markedly into the Chinese orbit. Chinese aid for the DRV was far from insignificant in 1965: by the autumn 30,000 to 50,000 Chinese engineers, anti-aircraft crews and other support personnel had entered the DRV and arms and Mig fighters were being supplied, though admittedly the latter were quite aged.³⁸

Nevertheless, the Russians must have correctly judged that when the North Vietnamese faced the awesome air power of the US, they would want more sophisticated weapons than the Chinese could provide. Through offering the weapons to the DRV, the new Soviet leaders believed they could redress the damage done to Soviet-DRV relations since 1962. As the Soviets began to offer powerful arms the PRC countered with a suggestion of increased reliance on Mao's doctrine of "People's War". The North Vietnamese opted for the former.³⁹

There were many reasons for the Chinese pressure on the Vietnamese to follow the military course prescribed by Mao, both domestic and international, yet it was ultimately seen by the leaders of the Lao Dong as more beneficial to the Chinese than to themselves. Eventually Chinese advice was explicitly rejected and, not surprisingly, this rejection originated from the basically pro-Soviet General Giap. During 1965 Giap fired a direct attack on the Maoist doctrine by stressing the difference between the Chinese experience and the Vietnamese reality. For example, he stated, the Japanese could not possibly pacify a country the size of China, while Vietnam was very small and could be easily overrun by the US. He sardonically added that the Chinese also would have found it difficult to triumph against the Japanese without the related actions of the major allied powers.⁴⁰ Throughout the spring of 1965 the North Vietnamese showed strong indications that they were determined to find doctrinal neutrality. The uniqueness of the Vietnamese revolution was portrayed and the originality of the Chinese claim to have devised "people's war" was doubted.⁴¹ The DRV was making it plainly clear that it was

planning its own tactics and that it would not be pressurized into following the Chinese line.

Lin Piao's landmark foreign policy article "Long Live the Victory of People's War" was first published on 3 September 1965 and it can be interpreted at various levels - international, domestic, theoretical, etc. - however, few were as affected by its implicit intent as the Lao Dong leadership. For them it was a direct message that they could not expect Chinese intervention, as it would lessen the revolutionary resolve nurtured by self-reliance. They would have to adhere to the strategy of "protracted war", as described by Mao, in order to achieve final victory over the United States. For the North Vietnamese, Lin's suggestion that they suffer additional years of gruelling conflict for the sake of adhering to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung must have been less than appealing.⁴² The response which the DRV leadership formulated was not immediate: the Lin article was totally ignored and the Lao Dong never mentioned it directly in its official pronouncements. Nevertheless, the policy first stated at the Twelfth Plenum of the Lao Dong in December 1965 was nothing less than an unequivocal rejection of Lin's advice. The Plenum called for "a decisive victory in a relatively short time".⁴³ This was a clear manifestation of the Lao Dong's military planners', in particular General Giap's, increasing conviction that modern weaponry and conventional tactics should be relied upon in order to secure a quick and final success. The CCP's attempt at determining DRV strategy through advice connected with amounts of aid did not work in 1965 as it had in the early 1950's: this time the DRV had somewhere else to turn which could provide greater amounts of material and not stipulate tactics which the Lao Dong found unacceptable.

It can be deduced from Lin's impassioned call that the CCP was not in control of the decisions being made in Hanoi when his article was published. It would have been surprising if this had been the case because the Lao Dong leadership had developed autonomously for many years after the CCP doctrine had been rejected for the most part in 1957. It cannot be ruled out that the numbers of Chinese technicians in North Vietnam had disturbed the Vietnamese and had stirred their natural suspicion of the Chinese in much the same way that the Soviet presence in China during the 1950's had affected the Chinese. The move back to neutrality which followed the start of US bombing was a natural move for Hanoi, and earlier experience had shown Ho how he could use the Sino-Soviet competition to Vietnam's advantage. He astutely analyzed the situation and realized that in 1965 the Soviets were anxious to counter the Chinese influence that had risen since 1963; he must have also realized that the Chinese were too worried about their defence and too conscious of their image as defenders of wars of "national liberation" to reduce their aid to the DRV. For the Chinese, the rejection of "people's war" was a major setback in their attempt to secure a stable sphere of influence and the diplomatic isolation in which they found themselves as the PRC entered the Cultural Revolution can be attributed, in part, to Hanoi's rejection of the Maoist model and of the personality cult of Mao himself. Soon after the rejection of the Chinese advice, the Lao Dong began to praise their own leaders' important place in the development of Marxism-Leninism. The cult of Ho transcended the cult of Mao in the DRV as its independence was being firmly asserted.⁴⁴

This section has described how the PRC achieved one of its great initial successes in its pursuit of a position in the world through its relationship with the leaders of North Vietnam during a large part of the 1950's; it has also shown how the attempts at regaining that sphere of influence when the Vietnamese again required aid ended in failure. Though the aid which the DRV received from the PRC continued in differing degrees of intensity throughout most of the war, it was not a symbol of the reestablishment of the cordial relations of the 1950's. Through the years of the strategic debate within the CCP, 1964-1966, it was quite evident that Peking was attempting to influence the execution of the war in a way that was unprecedented in the months between the outbreak of the Korean War and the eventual Chinese intervention. It is probable that if the CCP had been less rigid and doctrinaire in its approach towards the escalating war then it could have salvaged more of its position in Hanoi than it did. This leads one to conclude that this was less of a priority than other interests of principle. It has been suggested that doctrinaire acceptance of the Maoist line was not the determining factor in PRC foreign policy towards a particular country, but rather that support for the "Chinese programme for radical change in the international system" and the foreign policy vis à vis the US and the Soviets being pursued by the country's government were of the utmost importance.⁴⁵ In 1965 the DRV rejected both the doctrine and the foreign policy outlook of the CCP. Therefore, the preservation of North Vietnam as an entity may have remained important for the PRC, but its position as a fraternal ally was impossible. Though the PRC officially

praised the struggle in Vietnam as a "war of national liberation" for many years to come, the process which ended with the DRV firmly in the Soviet orbit, as it is today, had begun on its inexorable course.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER EIGHT.

1. Honey, P.J. Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), pp. 3-5.
2. Buttinger, Joseph, Vietnam: A Political History (London: Andre Deutsch, 1967), pp. 155-156.
3. *ibid.*, pp. 178-179.
4. Gurtov, Melvin, The First Vietnam Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.2.
5. Honey, pp. 22-32.
6. Donnel, J.C. and Gustov, Melvin, North Vietnam: Left of Moscow, Right of Peking (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1968), pp. 8-10.
7. Taylor, Jay. China and South East Asia (New York: Praegar, 1974), pp. 8-10.
8. The ouster of the Chinese is described in Gustov, p.3, while Ho's reaction to the KMT occupation can be found in Chen, King C., China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: 1945 - 1954 (PhD Dissertation, Penn State University, Philadelphia, Pa., (1962), pp. 101-102.
9. Ou, Hsin-Lung, Communist China's Policy Towards the War in Vietnam: 1965-1973 (PhD Dissertation: Southern Illinois University, February 1977), p. 17. Notably, the USSR did not extend recognition of the DRV until the 30th of the month.
10. *ibid.*, p. 188.
11. Gurtov, pp. 7-8.
12. Rodgers, Francis Elmo, China's Foreign Policy in Indochina (PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1972), p. 28.
13. Ou, p. 212.
14. *ibid.*, pp. 205-209.
15. Eden, Sir Anthony, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden. Vol. III (London: Cassell, 1962), p. 121.
16. The Chinese were even reported to have arranged the dining facilities for the DRV delegation. Honey, p. 43.
17. Buttinger, p. 372.
18. Taylor, p. 18.

19. Chen, pp. 301-302.
20. Taylor, P. 20, also see Donnel, John C., and Gustov, Melvin. North Vietnam: Left of Moscow, Right of Peking. p. 5, and Buttinger, pp. 426-427.
21. Zagoria, David, The Vietnam Triangle (New York: Pegasus, 1976), pp. 41-42.
22. Buttinger, pp. 427-428.
23. Zagoria, pp. 102-104.
24. Honey, p. 48.
25. Ou, p. 26.
26. Lo, Shih-fu, "The Maosits Recent Activities in Southeast Asia", Issues and Studies, June 1972, p. 46.
27. Rodgers, p. 31. The conflict between the Royal Laotian forces and the Hanoi-backed Pathet Lao troops reached crisis proportions in the early 60's and generated a large amount of international interest and concern. As Rodgers states, it was of great concern to the CCP's foreign policy makers at the time - much more so than the insurgencies in South Vietnam.
28. Honey, P. J., "Pham Van Dong's Tour", The China Quarterly, October - December 1961, pp. 42-43.
29. Scalapino, Robert, "Moscow, Peking and The Communist Parties of Asia", Foreign Affairs, January 1963, pp. 328-329.
30. For a description of the corruption and ineptitudes of the Diem regime see, The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers (London: Bantam Books, 1971), pp. 67-72.
31. Chen, King C., "North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute: 1962-1964", Asian Survey, Vol. 4, Part 9, pp. 1025-1026.
32. Ojha, Ishwer, "China and North Vietnam: The Limits of the Alliance", Current History, January 1969, p. 43.
33. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, pp. 154-167. The switch in the DRV line on India can also be attributed to India's attitude within the International Central Commission (I.C.C.) within Indochina, see *ibid.*
34. For Sino - DRV attitudes towards the Cuban Missile Crisis see Chen, "North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet Dispute", p. 1030. The joint stance on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is discussed in Donnel and Gustov, pp. 33-34.
35. Zagoria, p. 43.

36. Donnel and Gustov, p. 35.
37. Rodgers, pp. 185-187.
38. Taylor, p. 48.
39. Mazingo, D.P., and Robinson, T., Lin Piao on People's War (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965), p. 17.
40. Taylor, p. 50.
41. Donnel and Gustov, p. 42.
42. Mazingo, D.P., and Robinson, T.W., Lin Piao on People's War p. 17.
43. Ou, p. 127.
44. Donnel and Gustov, p. 42.
45. Van Ness, Peter, Revolution and China's Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 189.

CHAPTER NINE

The American War in Vietnam: The Chinese Response, 1965-1966

Introduction

In his discussion of the development of Chinese foreign policy, Melvin Gurtov writes that:

".....foreign policy may as often proceed from unpremeditated circumstances as from carefully conceived plans. A foreign policy can be not only initiatory but in reaction to such conditions as local crises or disturbances, or perceived external threats, as in Chinese actions designed to outflank or depressurize externally initiated actions. Chinese reaction in Korea was a specific instance of reactive foreign policy.

Secondly, a foreign policy may be highly ambiguous and uncertain as well as decisive and calculated. For example after the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964... Chinese policy probably was as ambivalent as the Chinese statements, since Peking's choice of responses depended on a wide range of possible US actions and perceived intentions."¹

When the Chinese leadership faced the consequences of the events following the Tonkin Incidents which culminated in the intense US bombings of North Vietnam in February 1965, elements of both the described characteristics were evident. From certain quarters statements were released which implied strong decisive reaction; from others came pronouncements which have been interpreted as indicating an unwillingness to become involved. This evidence of a lack of consensus amongst the high officials of the

CCP can be traced throughout 1965 and most of 1966, ending with Liu Shao-ch'i's last public statement in July. It is not surprising, in light of the incipient Cultural Revolution, that disagreements should exist because they were obviously present over other questions. What is debatable is the amount of opposition to the official Maoist line and to what extent this dissension represented an organized foreign policy faction. In other words, to what degree can the so-called "Strategic Debate" be isolated from the divisions already apparent in the hierarchy? This is a key area of investigation because it is critical to discern why the CCP failed to unite in order to ward off the common enemy.

The circumstances at the time were further complicated by the arduous task demanded by Mao of formulating an effective response to the US threat while at the same time resolutely opposing the Soviets. Though once again the amount of dissension over this two-pronged attack is hard to gauge, the whole concept of "united action" with the Soviets was such a sensitive issue that it can be assumed that Mao and Lin Piao felt that there were those in the CCP who would surrender to the temptation of edging back under the Soviet "strategic umbrella". Perhaps the Chinese leaders were vacillating over which major power represented a more pernicious threat to China's national security. This was an element of uncertainty that was absent during the formulation of the reaction to the events in Korea. At that time there was no question about which nation was the greater threat: the only uncertainty was over how committed an ally the Soviets would prove.² By 1965-1966 Mao's battle against "revisionism" in the CCP, the disease that he felt was endemic in Soviet society, was reaching new heights and any

attempt at letting Soviet influence slip back into China under the guise of aid for Vietnam was to be fervently resisted. As previous sections have shown, the Maoist fight against this "revisionism" had many domestic implications and to that extent the specific issue of "united action" cannot be viewed outside the context of domestic political issues.

Generally speaking the years 1965-1966 were marked by a swing away from aggressive pronouncements about the immediate possibility of Chinese intervention and towards a less combatant tone. Although official statements were consistently phrased in passionate declarations of support, it is widely accepted that the degree of PRC commitment actually declined.³ Analysts have mapped out the course of the "strategic debate" by linking individuals with speeches that have been interpreted as aberrations in this trend. Legitimate anxieties over this use of Kremlinology have been raised and, therefore, it is impossible to accept blindly the clear-cut explanations that some have devised.⁴ One must accept that ambiguities did exist, as Gurtov pointed out above, and that the situation was replete with paradox. This is not surprising insofar as inconsistencies in public statements did not disappear until late 1966, notably when many of the leading victims of the Cultural Revolution had been purged or were tottering on the brink of their downfall. Undoubtedly, during this long procedure some key figures found themselves caught in the middle, possibly on the wrong foot, as the domestic situation became polarized. The length of the discussion over Vietnam was remarkable, especially when one considers the massive escalation of the US role that had occurred. Post-1949 Chinese foreign policy had generally been

aimed at limiting the US presence in Asia: the lack of an immediate resolute stance in 1965-1966 testifies to the complex interchange of domestic and international factors involved in the decision-making process during those years. Consequently, black and white explanations must be avoided.

One factor that may account for some of the ambiguities is the possibility that Mao, and the group he led, were caught off-guard by the rapid escalation of violence in Indochina. In his interview with Edgar Snow in January 1965 Mao said that the war might continue for one or two years, but that the US troops would get bored and finally go elsewhere. He even conceded that the US might settle the conflict by negotiation.⁵ The massive bombings just a month later may have thrown doubt upon his judgement in the minds of his CCP colleagues. This occurred during a period when Mao was being virtually worshipped by his supporters and any questioning of his judgement that existed on such a sensitive issue as Vietnam was of great concern. The vision of Mao's infallibility and of China's place in history as a strong independent force in world affairs clashed with pragmatic concerns by some over the implications of Mao's judgements on national security. If the Maoists gave in and intervened in Vietnam then his opponents' position could have been confirmed.⁶ The incipient Cultural Revolution gave the Maoists every reason to make sure that Mao's position on this and all issues remained intact.

The Strategic Debate Over American Threat⁷

There are two broad theories on the nature of the 1965-1966 strategic debate which must be mentioned at the outset. Although

they both tend to be of the clearcut nature dismissed earlier, they provide a convenient starting point from which an independent judgement can be devised. Firstly, the simple bipolar split described by Uri Ra'anani in which he links Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Chief of Staff of the PLA, Lo Jui-ching together as proponents of a tough line against the US should be explained. He asserts that they concomitantly favoured antagonism towards the US and closer links with the Soviets over the matter of Indochina. On the other side he places Lin Piao, Mao, and Chou En-lai. He defends his inclusion of Chou by pointing to the marked difference between speeches on Vietnam made by Chou and Teng in April 1965. While Teng emphatically supported Vietnamese reunification, Chou stuck to the hitherto accepted line of simply demanding US withdrawal. In addition, Teng is shown as pledging support, "No matter what happens and no matter what cost is involved".⁸ The official Maoist line was typified by P'eng Chen's cautious remark that, "We will go a step forward in supporting them according to their needs."⁹

Donald Zagoria's view is rather more complex but just as structurally rigid. He splits the CCP's divisions into three parts: the "doves," the "hawks," and, what Yahuda calls that "strange ornithological creature", the "dawks".¹⁰ The "doves" are described as being economic pragmatists, such as Teng, who stressed the need for modernization and for non-intervention in Vietnam because of the detrimental effects it could have on China's economic growth.¹¹ They did, however, supposedly support strengthening ties with the Soviet Union in order to extract aid for industrial development. The "hawks", on the other hand, were

the military hardliners and were represented by Lo Jui-ching, who felt that the US threat was great enough to warrant the utmost vigilance and preparation, even to the extent of accepting Soviet aid.¹² The "dawks," or more commonly referred to as the Maoists, demanded strict ideological conformity and strenuous opposition to both the US and the USSR. Although at the time they thought that US imperialism intrinsically represented a greater threat, Zagoria explains cogently that they perceived it to be moribund and as being easily containable in South Vietnam. The need to be alert against the spread of the "cancer of Soviet revisionism" was uppermost in their minds.¹³ The "strategic debate" in Zagoria's view can be seen as a battle between these three well defined groups, yet in both his analysis and Ra'anan's there is a lack of flexibility that produces analytical "blinkers" which can hinder a proper understanding of the decision-making process at the time.

The apparent need to place every key member of the Politbureau concretely in one camp or another during 1965-1966 clouds the issue at the centre of this study: how did those in control of foreign policy in China avoid international conflict over Vietnam while the nation was entering a period of domestic instability? To say that there was an organized opposition is also misleading. It is quite probable, as Japanese observers in 1966 noted, that those who had gained power after the Great Leap Forward debacle, e.g. Liu and Teng, saw no need to fight Mao, only a need to make up for Mao's lack of constructive thinking by "recasting his revolutionary philosophy". This could be achieved by modifying his orders before passing them down. In the extreme cases these orders could simply be ignored.¹⁴

Without a perceived need to organize an opposition faction, the main actors in the "debate" were constrained by bureaucracy and policy-making procedures that only a few uniquely endowed people, such as Mao, could escape. As Alan Whiting has observed, "... only when procedure breaks down under the pressure of crisis is the personal element likely to play an important role as the circle of participants in the policy process narrows and rises to the highest level."¹⁵ The highest level in this case was Mao and Lin, who had carefully cultivated the support and procured the skills of Chou En-lai throughout this period, as described in earlier sections. There is evidence of disagreement over the course of the two years in question, but there is no tangible evidence that it ever realistically altered Maoist policy. Even by March 1966 Chou was able to summarize the state of Sino-American relations without even mentioning Vietnam. He continued to state that as long as the US did not attack China, the PRC would not initiate a war, but he did not directly refer to the Vietnam situation.¹⁶ The Maoists, it can confidently be said, were in control of the implementation of the policy towards Vietnam the entire time and their hold was never seriously in jeopardy, even though dissension could be heard until Liu's final speech on 22 July 1966. The skilful means employed to deter the US, which will be discussed below, required a carefully executed strategy that might have been unsuccessful if it had run an erratic course caused by dissent over policy. The Maoist actions against those who disagreed can be seen as a means of preserving the strategy that was to save China from US attack.

In order to understand fully how Maoist policy developed it is useful to explain how they dealt with the arguments of those

who felt a need for a different course of action. This is typified by the response to the statements by Lo Jui-ching that appeared during 1965. Though evidence suggests that there were domestic issues involved in his eventual purge, since these issues directly concerned the domestic role of the PLA in China, they are related to Vietnam insofar as while the Maoist ideal precluded a major counteroffensive on foreign soil, Lo's model did not. During this period of ideological purity the Korean precedent was irrelevant.

At the heart of the differences between Lo and the Maoist interpretation of the situation in Vietnam is the appraisal of the strength of US imperialism and to what extent it should be feared and prepared against. Mao often remarked that US imperialism was a "paper tiger", and he reiterated these sentiments in his discussions with Snow in January 1965 when he said that "the more American weapons and troops brought into Saigon the faster the South Vietnamese liberation forces would become armed and educated to win victory". He insisted that already the South Vietnamese had no need of Chinese troops.¹⁷ Even though the February bombings may have caused others to doubt this prognosis, statements attributed to Maoist sentiments continued to stress the relative weakness of the US forces, even when compared to the imperialist forces of the past, namely those of Germany and Japan. In May 1965 two articles in commemoration of VE Day appeared side-by-side in Jen-min Jih-pao, one by Lo Jui-ching, and the other by the editorial staff of the paper, generally believed to have been controlled by Mao's close associate Chen Po-ta. The Jen-min Jih-pao editorial insisted that in present circumstances the US

was in a worse strategic position than German fascism in World War Two, and that the possibility of averting a world war had been greatly increased.¹⁸ Lo's position, however, was that although the US was indeed weaker in many respects than the Germans were during the last world war, it could become frustrated by the successes of national liberation struggles and lash out irrationally at China, thus initiating a war which should be prepared for in advance. His assessment of US strength did not drastically differ from the Maoists' - basically he just believed that the threat of US air attacks was more serious than the others would admit.¹⁹ For the Maoists, who were trying at the time to deter the US from expanding the war further by using calculated signals, the suggestion that the US should be treated as an unstable nation that would "go mad to try to save itself from defeat" must have been distinctly unwelcome at that time.

In view of Lo's proposition that the US threat should be taken more seriously, it is not surprising that he should have advocated different strategies to those of the classic Maoist model. In recognizing China's military weakness it is probable that many in the CCP had cause to doubt the advisability of "people's war". Although Lo Jui-ching had impressive Maoist credentials when he took office in the wake of the purge of P'eng Te-huai and his associates, his views may have been transformed by the nature of his position: bureaucracy may have nurtured more pragmatic views than he previously had held.²⁰ Mao's opponents had some convincing reasons for doubting the expediency of the Chairman's military thoughts, especially if they agreed with Lo that US airstrikes were a probable outcome of events in Indochina. What deterrent

was "people's war" if the US forced the Chinese to defend the supply lines to North Vietnam? Also without the Soviet umbrella which was enjoyed during the Korean conflict the US could not be stopped from destroying China's metropolitan areas at will without ever having to send one soldier onto Chinese soil to be "lured in deep and drowned."²¹ The Maoist retort to this suggestion was that industry was in the process of being decentralized and that bombs were no use against an agricultural society. Nevertheless, they also proved that they did not relish the thought of seeing Shanghai, etc., reduced to rubble by the adroit means that they employed to deter the US. Moreover, while Lin was praising the virtues of "people's war"; the PLA which he controlled was strengthening air defences.²² Therefore, one should look at the domestic implications of Lo's strategic proposals in order to comprehend fully the reason for the Maoist opposition to his beliefs.

Lo Jui-ching's call for preparedness was a reflection of how he viewed the role of the PLA. In his VE Day article he suggested that China prepare for an "active defence" in the face of US aggression: regular army forces should be prepared to fall back to defensible positions and to defend cities, while the militia should simply harrass the invaders' lines of communications. This was at variance with the Maoist strategy of retreating to a rural rear base where the army could mix with the populus until the stage when conventional operations were again possible. This was the image of "people's war" portrayed in the Jen-min Jih-pao VE Day article and given further backing by Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War" published in September 1965.²³

The Maoist stress on deprofessionalizing the PLA had some practical aspects with regards to the domestic political campaigns that were brewing. Lo's implication that a strengthened regular army was necessary produced evidence that he would not be a very reliable ally for the coming confrontations with "revisionism".²⁴ Harding and Gurtov have argued that the Maoists, who believed that the US could be deterred from expanding the war into China and that the PLA could remain free for domestic purposes, saw Lo as more of a threat because of these domestic factors, rather than strategic considerations.²⁵ It is significant that two years after his purge articles in condemnation of him failed to mention his position on Vietnam, yet cited his perfidy in "pushing the bourgeois military line" and stressing competitions and military tournaments over the study of Mao Tse-tung Thought.²⁶

The reply to Lo's dissent was embodied in Lin's "Long Live the Victory of People's War", released in September 1965, ostensibly to commemorate the victory over the Japanese twenty years earlier. It can be interpreted in many ways and at many levels and it prompted some Western commentators to remark that it was the Chinese edition of Mein Kampf. Nothing could have been more mistaken. It was essentially a call for self-reliance directed at both the Vietnamese and Chinese people. On the domestic level it was a call for adherence to Mao's Thought by the PLA, but it was also a strong sign that the Vietnamese would have to fight alone, unless China was directly attacked. It was confirmation that the Maoists had assessed the Vietnam situation in light of the American escalation and had had their initial judgement confirmed - the war could be isolated in Indochina and the PRC

could fight a revolutionary struggle by proxy, as it were.²⁷

The Maoists believed this to be the final authoritative remark on the subject and it received a great fanfare and coverage. In an indication of the authority which Mao and Lin had over foreign policy matters, Lo Jui-ching gave deferential treatment to the ideals of "people's war" in his speech commemorating VJ Day a few days later. Gone were any allusions to an alternative strategy and his doubts about the strength of the US were replaced by the resounding exclamation that, "... US imperialism can definitely be defeated because the US is now beset by all the revolutionary peoples waging anti-imperialist struggles..."²⁸ Nevertheless, Lo's hitherto stated uncertainties over the worth of "people's war" and, by extension, Mao's Thought, had already made him suspect in the eyes of his superiors. He disappeared from public view a few months later.

In view of Mao and Lin's plans to mould the PLA into a domestic political force, it is unlikely that Lin's article did not have some pronounced domestic political implications. His remarks concerning the transgressions of Wang Ming in the 1930's can be taken as a case in point. This could be seen as a warning to those in the CCP who were influenced by Soviet ideology, as was Wang. But its more important domestic message was that it ruled out "leftist opportunism" against the US. Though it has been suggested that this was intended as advice to the Vietnamese, and in view of the Maoist desire to use Vietnam as a working model of "people's war" for propaganda purposes this is quite plausible,²⁹ its other intent was to show that attacks against the US were untimely and that the PLA's proper place was in China. In the context of the general portrait of the international situation

put forward in the article, the idea that the major divisions in the world were between the global "countryside", the developing nations, and the "cities", Europe, North America, and "counter-revolutionary Russia",³⁰ a reference to Wang Ming's mistakes is important. It must be remembered that Mao's argument with Wang was over inopportune (or "opportunistic") attacks against the cities during the First Civil War Period. Surely, with regards to the US presence in Vietnam, Lin's message was clear: an attack against one of the "cities" of the world at this time will end in disaster.³¹ It is a clear indication that a war with "metropolitan" US had been ruled out.

The last evidence of a noticeable divergence from the Mao-Lin line can be seen in Liu Shao-ch'i's last public speech in July 1965. When compared to similar statements by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi, both reliable mouthpieces for official policy, Liu shows an inclination for declaring greater support for the Vietnamese than the others. In his words in reply to a plea for support by Ho Chi Minh, he unequivocally says that "the Chinese people have made up their minds" to come to the aid of the DRV "as the Chinese and Vietnamese people deem necessary."³² Conversely, Chen Yi, in a speech delivered on 10 July, quotes Ho's willingness to "undergo sacrifices for 10 to 20 years" in keeping with Mao's vision of protracted war. In addition he stresses the PRC's policy to come to Vietnam's aid "when we deem necessary."³³ This is a clear manifestation of the Chinese acceptance of a struggle that continued indefinitely and their determination to be the sole arbiter of when Chinese aid was necessary. Liu's sentiments were obviously different, showing more of a desire to jump to the Vietnamese side.

Though his domestic policies were of the greatest concern to the Maoists, his opposition to the official line on Vietnam had implications that, when coupled with his more favourable attitude towards "united action" with the Soviets, showed him to be totally outside of the mainstream foreign policy line. The Maoists, who essentially retained control of foreign policy, wanted to avoid a showdown with the US over Vietnam and desired a protracted war in Indochina that would, inter alia, provide evidence of the universality of Mao's strategy that could be useful ammunition in the coming campaigns against "revisionism" in China. In this sense Chou was being quite frank when he said: "At the present moment it is primarily the Vietnamese people's struggle against US imperialism that is a support to us."³⁴

THE QUESTION OF "UNITED ACTION"

In 1965-1966 it must have been painfully obvious to the CCP leadership that China did not have the military or economic strength with which to wage an effective war against the US over Vietnam without some form of outside aid. Her air force was predominately made up of outdated fighters and bombers; her tanks were also insufficient in numbers and sophistication. Logistically, the route into North Vietnam would be untenable, and an effective response to a US invasion of the North would require amphibious assaults which were also beyond the PLA's capability.³⁵ China did possess a token nuclear stockpile, but she lacked any means of delivery that could threaten the US or its forces. In addition, the development of these weapons drained valuable resources away from conventional weapon procurement. In these respects the Maoist policy of non-intervention was a realistic assessment of

the PRC's ability to confront the US. Praising "people's war" may have been an attempt to show strength in weakness.

Economically, the industrial output necessary for a sustained war on foreign soil was also out of reach. Such a war would require a degree of centralization within the economy which was in complete opposition to the ideals that Mao favoured.³⁶ Consequently, for those who disagreed with the Maoists' appraisal of the chances of the war spreading and who believed China must be prepared for such an eventuality, it became evident that the PRC should at least entertain the idea of joint action with the Soviets over the Vietnam question. Once again, this opposition should not be seen as an organized attempt by a faction to fight the Maoist line, but simply as key individuals who were reacting to events by reaching conclusions that diverged from those of Mao and Lin.³⁷ For Mao, however, any hint of jeopardizing his strong anti-Soviet position was totally unacceptable because an agreement over Vietnam risked a new source of Soviet influence in China which could place his entire domestic strategy at risk. When Mao told Snow while discussing Vietnam in a 1971 interview that "compromising with either of the superpowers could then only lead to a split on the home front", he showed how important these domestic considerations were to him.³⁸ Presumably the split he was referring to meant the weakening of those forces loyal to him. He did not trust the Soviets, whom he now regarded as counterrevolutionaries in collusion with the US, and he had no intention of seeing China returned to the Soviet orbit. He therefore favoured a policy which would retain a safe, yet antagonistic relationship with both of the major powers. Non-intervention in Vietnam was a

means of preserving this position and, paradoxically, in this time of ideological dogmatism, a very practical course in terms of the PRC's abilities.

To say that the argument was between those who wanted Soviet aid for modernization and those who did not is over-simplified. The men who had seen the PRC through to relative recovery after the "three bad years", 1959-62, may have considered the possibility of Soviet aid, but they were also wary of aid leading to control.³⁹ Though these individuals, specifically Teng, Liu, and P'eng Ch'en, have been linked with favouring "united action"; they did have a history of anti-Soviet remarks implying that any of their moves towards Sino-Soviet cooperation were simply tentative and exploratory. Their nationalistic pride had no doubt been bruised by the Soviets as well: they simply tended to be less obsessed by their suspicions than Mao. Yet Mao and Lin Piao saw any lack of resolve over this matter as unacceptable. Hence Mao's exclamation, "Your weak-kneed people in Peking!" at a meeting near Canton arranged to discuss the matter of "united action" with a delegation from the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).⁴⁰⁻

The meeting with the JCP in March 1966 climaxed a series of intra-party summits including delegations of the Korean and Vietnamese parties in which the JCP tried desparately to persuade the CCP to accept the concept of "united action" over Vietnam. It seems that they had succeeded in assuaging many of the fears held by the Chinese and that a joint communique in favour of the proposition was about to be released when Mao lashed out and squashed it. The JCP, previously one of the CCP's strongest supporters, had been shocked by the debacle in Indonesia in 1965

and had concluded that no progress could be made in Asia without some form of Soviet assistance. They devised a theory in which the world was divided into the US-led "warmongers" and the "peace-lovers", which included the USSR. Mao countered by saying that the USSR was in collusion with the US and that a war between the PRC and both nations was inevitable. (Obviously this was bravado to make the point perfectly clear.) He graphically portrayed his prediction that both the US and the USSR would invade China, but he emphasized battling the USSR across the Yangtse.⁴¹ He made it emphatic that the Soviets were as much of an enemy as the US and that no compromise was possible.

The JCP delegation returned to Japan without any success. By August of that year they issued a lengthy justification of their stance and blamed the setbacks in Vietnam at that time entirely on the Chinese. They pugnaciously accused Peking of thinking that the US action was merely a preliminary step towards an invasion of China and of making imperialist aggression against the PRC, and not Vietnam, the decisive issue.⁴² Although he could not publicly tarnish his internationalist image, privately Mao may have agreed.

Before they left the Japanese had convinced some "weak-kneed people in Peking" that "united action" was necessary for the preservation of North Vietnam and of Chinese safety. Nevertheless, Mao easily had his way over the final communique at the March meeting and his views were respected with deference. Moreover, those who believe that an organized, pro-"united action" faction existed in the CCP, such as Zagoria and Ra'anah, should take note of the official JCP account of the proceedings. The Japanese claim that

Liu and Teng, who have been portrayed as the greatest advocates of working with the Soviets, were not even present at the crucial meeting.⁴³ This does not mean to say that such sentiments did not exist, only that Mao had the final say on these foreign policy matters and that those who disagreed with him did not feel the need or the ability to resist him actively.

There are those who believe that Mao's position in foreign policy making was consistently preeminent and that his statements on such matters always carried immense weight.⁴⁴ But diverging views over "united action" were indeed evident and even Chou En-lai was said to favour this approach during the March meeting. He quickly found his footing, however, and by the 11th Plenum of the Eight Central Committee he was again emphatically aligned with Mao and Lin.⁴⁵ At the Plenum in July Chou was ranked third, immediately after Mao and Lin in the Party hierarchy and was frequently seated next to them in pictures released during the occasion. The significance which this has for Chou's position on Vietnam is clear because the final communique of the gathering gave firm approval to all the actions so far taken by the CCP in regard to the Vietnam situation. The communique gave Mao and Lin a virtual "blank cheque" for dealing with all aspects of aid and support for the DRV. A general consensus had been formulated over the related issues,⁴⁶ yet some future victims of the Cultural Revolution, e.g. Liu, may have hinted at their misgivings until they were finally purged.

On balance the evidence of consistent support for a rapprochement with the Soviets by those who according to Zagoria and Ra'anan belonged to a definable opposition group is rather

circumstantial. Lo Jiu-ching, for instance, has been portrayed as a convert to the professional military ethic who had long advocated closer ties with the Soviets for the sake of acquiring modern arms. His VE Day article has been characterized as being very soft on "revisionism",⁴⁷ Yet Yahuda, while admitting that Lo had developed a fetish for modern weapons, interprets Lo's statement as castigating the Russians for being too soft on the Americans.⁴⁸ It is quite likely that his purge can be linked to a rather paradoxical combination of views by the Maoists: although his overall outlook towards the Soviets may have been acceptable, his inclination towards military professionalism - the foreign, non-Yenan inspired doctrine that the Maoists so abhorred - was probably the main factor in his downfall. The one individual who does seem to have developed a consistently favourable attitude towards the Soviets, however, was the Mayor of Peking, P'eng Chen.

P'eng Chen had impressive anti-Soviet credentials, but by the time of the JCP "united action" moves he had shown himself to be in support of a modified, less acrimonious relationship with the USSR. It is striking that it was P'eng who coined the concept of the "cities and the countryside of the world", but seemed to favour the blatantly anti-Maoist move of politically resurrecting P'eng Te-huai.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it seems that the disaster that befell the Indonesian Communists caused P'eng to draw the same conclusion as the JCP about the need for Soviet assistance and it was he who was the primary patron of their initiative.⁵⁰ If he was working in concert with Liu on this matter, it seems odd that Liu should leave the country for Burma when he could have remained in China to lobby for the motion.

Though this may have been a ploy by Mao to split the opposition, the Japanese reported that the leaders present at the meeting followed his word because they could see no alternative.⁵¹ There is no reason to believe that Liu, if present, would have reacted differently.

Mao and Lin had indications that Liu Shao-ch'i was leaning towards a softer approach towards the Soviets, but since Mao told Snow that he had decided in January 1965 that Liu had to be removed, it is doubtful whether Liu's position on "united action" in 1966 was a decisive factor in his imminent downfall. It probably only served to corroborate opinions already formed. One salient indication of Liu's soft line is his support for sending a Chinese delegation to the March meeting of communist parties held in Moscow. The Maoists remained adamant over the issue, however, and refused to budge from their hitherto stated position on the "counter-revolutionaries".⁵² Once again there is little sign of strenuous opposition. Liu, nevertheless, probably retained misgivings and in his final public speech in July there was a notable lack of the obligatory reference to "Soviet revisionism."⁵³

It is a commonly held view that Teng Hsiao-p'ing was closely aligned with Liu over the issue of renewed contacts with the Russians. Zagoria and Ra'anah have pictured him as a modernizer ready to sacrifice ideals for economic growth. Conversely, Yahuda has mentioned that Teng was a major actor in the Sino-Soviet polemics and that his statements were not far from the mainstream policy at the time.⁵⁴ Teng's commitment is indeed highly questionable, as is his membership in a faction organized around the issue.

While Liu and others may have sympathized with the concept of "united action" with the Soviets, there is no evidence that they supported the actual proposals put forward by the Russians in the spring of 1965. The Soviet scheme raised questions about Chinese territorial integrity that most of the CCP would find unacceptable. The Russian proposals included: a free access air corridor between the USSR and North Vietnam over PRC territory which would have ended the PRC's ability to monitor the flow of arms then being sent by rail; the building of Soviet air bases in South China; and the garrisoning of up to 4000 Soviet troops for the repair and maintenance of DRV aircraft.⁵⁵ This was a reminder of the foreign bases and the extraterritoriality of the past that all Chinese found distasteful. Mao had resisted Soviet requests for access to PRC soil in the past with the full support of his colleagues. It is unlikely that any CCP member would have persistently fought for this arrangement in 1965-66 when the Soviets were Mao's sworn enemies. As a pro-Chinese Vietnamese has recently said of the CCP's stand on this issue: "... no country would forgo its sovereignty and let a foreign country do things of this kind."⁵⁶

There was a practical consideration concerning the Soviet proposals that should not be overlooked. Throughout 1965-66 the Chinese had combined a series of statements and strong, yet restrained, military tactics to show the PRC's commitment to the DRV but to stress to the US their reluctance to engage in a war over the issue. A Russian presence ran the risk of an escalating spiral of conflict that would have been out of the PRC's control. It could have caused the Americans to resent the existence of a Soviet China sanctuary (as MacArthur had in regard to Manchuria

during the Korean War) and encourage them to adopt a policy of "hot pursuit" of North Vietnamese aircraft seeking refuge in China.⁵⁷ This would have placed the entire strategy of deterrence in jeopardy and therefore would have meant that the conflict would necessarily draw the Maoists' attention away from the domestic concerns which they then found so pressing.

The Implementation of the Deterrence Strategy and the Reasons for its Expediency

Having delineated some of the arguments used by the controlling foreign policy makers, and of those who may have disagreed with them, it is desirable that the process by which the PRC extricated itself from the possibility of direct conflict with the US while preserving the credibility of its commitment to the DRV be analyzed. This was accomplished by a rather adroit balance of manifesting an extreme reluctance to fight while, simultaneously, convincingly showing their resolute determination to fight if the preservation of the DRV was imperilled, or if there were persistent acts of aggression against the Chinese state. During 1965-66 this strategy was established and it set the pattern by which Sino-American relations could actually improve despite the even heavier bombings of North Vietnam to come.

The US, after balancing out the relative costs and gains of its commitment, ruled out a war with China as an unacceptable price to pay almost from the very beginning. This is an indication of a growing awareness of the Chinese as an independent, vital force for, unlike the Korean situation, it could not be argued that the PRC was the Kremlin's "puppet". During the earlier stages some, like Secretary of Defence Rusk, believed that an all-out war in

Indochina was necessary despite any threat of Chinese involvement, yet this was squashed by President Johnson from the outset. He, like others, believed that a level of bombing in the North could be achieved without an adverse Chinese reaction.⁵⁸ The PRC Foreign Ministry had been signalling the US through the mouth of Chen Yi since 1964 a mixture of toughness and calm, rational reluctance to battle. In July of that year, in an interview with the Austrian magazine Kurier, he stated that China had neither the capability nor the intention of starting a war, but that she would enter if the US threatened the Sino-Vietnamese border region. Extra weight was added by the declaration following the Tonkin Gulf Incident of August that "aggression against the DRV means aggression against China."⁵⁹ This was noted by the US and the Johnson Administration accepted the CIA analysis that the PRC would not intervene unless North Vietnam was invaded. By the end of 1964 - early 1965 they had concluded that the Chinese response would be limited to supplying anti-aircraft guns, jet fighters and naval patrol craft. The avoidance of war with the Chinese did, however, remain a high priority. In fact, one chief Department of Defence analyst, when weighing the relative values of certain aspects of the US commitment, gave the value of "keeping South Vietnam out of Chinese hands" a rating of 20% - but the importance of avoiding a humiliating US defeat was given a 70% rating. This was a marked shift from MacArthur's attitude in 1950.⁶⁰ The US had learned to read the PRC's signals and the Chinese continued to reinforce their message.

The CCP leadership may have been lulled into a false sense of security during the lull between August 1964 and the start of

widespread bombings in February 1965. Nevertheless, the Chinese reaction to the bombings was to reinforce their vocalized commitment to the DRV and the period between February and December should be viewed as the time in which bellicose statements and actions intended to deter the US outweighed the signs of restraint in the two-levelled strategy. Yet an unwillingness to fight was always apparent, no matter how pugnacious the superficial image appeared.

The prime example of this approach during 1965 was a March 1965 statement by Chen Yi in which he declared:

"The Chinese people will exert every effort to send the heroic South Vietnamese people the necessary military aid and to dispatch their men to fight shoulder to shoulder with the South Vietnamese people whenever the latter required."⁶¹

The belligerent aspects of this statement were the PRC's pledges of all out support for the Viet Cong in the South, not just for the territorial integrity of the DRV, and that Chinese entrance was said to be a Vietnamese prerogative.⁶² There were, however, some important qualifiers - some of which were present in Chinese statements during the Korean War period. For instance, Chen pledged the support of the Chinese "people", not the government; and he stressed readiness for a future imperative, not for the immediate crisis.⁶³ A few months later, when the Chinese statements had reached a high level of virulence, there were persistent signs of a desire to avoid escalating the crisis. Take, for example, the Jen-min Jih-pao editorial that accompanied Lo Jui-ching's VE Day article. Although it camouflaged its intent by warning against trusting imperialists by relying on negotiated settlements, it made it clear that negotiations were acceptable and cited the

Korean armistice amongst others to show that "the basic interests of the people have not been violated when negotiations have been used."⁶⁴

This basic pattern continued until the last quarter of 1965 when some extremely bellicose statements by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi were issued around the time of Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War" which itself stressed self-reliance amongst national liberation struggles. In view of the tone of the former statements, it is not surprising that some observers misinterpreted Lin's article. Chen and Chou both talked of the strong possibility of war and an important communist newspaper in Hong Kong reinforced this by writing articles that stated that war was inevitable. It cheered its readers by optimistically referring to the fact that from out of the ashes of Pyongyang had risen one of the most modern cities in Asia.⁶⁵ Yet Lin's article, the watershed statement of the period, had been widely interpreted as an indication to Hanoi and the US that the Vietnamese would have to fight alone. As Edgar Snow has said:

"Read carefully...Lin's article is a restatement of Mao's basic strategy in meeting a threatened attack on China itself, rather than any doctrine China intends to impose by force on the Third World."⁶⁶

Throughout 1966 official PRC statements on Vietnam became less frequent and less vitriolic. Obviously the Maoists had become confident that the US had received the message. They were then free to turn their attention to China's domestic situation. The statements on Vietnam paralleled this inward turn: they

became increasingly " Sino-centric" and the shift of emphasis was placed on Vietnam being an initial step towards acts against China, not on the aggression against the DRV itself.⁶⁷ This lends credence to the JCP's contentions at the time, but it provided a useful reminder to the US that while the PRC would not condone excessive attacks on the DRV, its chief concern was China herself. The PRC would not let Ho Chi Minh's government fall - but the US could batter it indefinitely as long as the PRC was not directly threatened.

One important aspect of Sino-American interchange lacking in 1950, but present in 1965-66, was a direct line of communications by which intentions could be voiced. The Warsaw Ambassador-level talks were a means by which both sides could ensure that their counterparts had a clear understanding of each others' beliefs. While every indication is that no secret deals could have been reached because of Polish/Soviet bugging of the rooms used for the interchanges, it is certain that each side used the opportunities to map out the parameters of the conflict. They enabled a tacit agreement limiting the extent of each side's participation to be reached: the US made it known that it had no intention of destroying the DRV or attacking the PRC, while the Chinese were not only able to communicate their desire to avoid war but also their commitment to the DRV. Though not the sole tool by which the PRC delineated its position, the Warsaw Talks were a useful accessory to the process by which war was avoided.⁶⁸

In order to give validity to their threats to intervene, the CCP had to manifest a willingness to fight by constrained, yet forthright military actions. Significantly, alluding to the Korean precedent was a useful means by which the Chinese were

able to suggest that their words were not hollow. During 1965 the threat of a "Korean-type war" was heard frequently in official CCP statements. The message that the US should not forget the Chinese willingness to do battle with a far superior force in the past was clearly just as potent in present circumstances.⁶⁹ This attempt to stir the Americans' collective memory was coupled with the selective downings of US planes and the deployment of 50,000 PLA troops to North Vietnam for engineering, logistic and anti-aircraft purposes. This left no doubt about the Chinese commitment to the preservation of the DRV, yet at every step of the way the PRC made it emphatically obvious that their intention was deterrence, not a catastrophic engagement with US forces.

The first evidence the US had of the PRC's resolve was when Chinese planes began to attack American aircraft that had pursued DRV fighters over Chinese airspace. But although many planes were downed, the Chinese made it clear that they understood the sensitive nature of their actions and that they did not wish any further entanglement. Although they proved that they were prepared to accept the risk of US retaliation, they refrained from excessively publicizing any direct action that occurred with the Americans so that there was no public perception of an increased commitment. This would have been detrimental domestically because it would have strengthened the calls for unity, which Mao and Lin simply could not accept. Therefore, when a US plane was shot down after being pursued over Vietnam the Chinese were at pains to stress that the Vietnamese had destroyed it, though they knew that the Americans realized the truth. Also, when a US plane was accidentally hit by "friendly fire" while over Chinese airspace in April 1965, the

official PRC statement went to great lengths to explain the circumstances of the mishap. Finally, while openly providing repair and relaxation centres for DRV pilots, they made Vietnamese pilots land in Vietnam after combat before flying over the border - thus lessening the chances of US planes straying over China.⁷⁰ The warnings to the US were made obvious, but so was the genuine desire by the Chinese not to become involved in an escalating spiral of violence that could lead to a confrontation which both sides wished to avoid.

The PRC linked these danger signals in the air with a similar deployment of 50,000 technicians and anti-aircraft gunners to North Vietnam. Once again, while this was a considerable commitment it was totally unpublicized, as were similar preparations for war in South China which included the building of airstrips in the province of Yunnan and a limited evacuation of civilians. No attempt was made to hide the presence of the PLA from US reconnaissance, and the use of rails instead of tunnels points to the desire for the Johnson administration to know the size, and the limitations, of the Chinese involvement. The open allocation of men to specific locations clearly defined for the US exactly what the Chinese leaders considered out-of-bounds, i.e., the Hanoi-Haiphong area and the rail links in the border region.⁷¹

It has been established that the Maoists desired a policy towards Vietnam by which they could preserve an antagonistic stance towards both major powers while not becoming directly involved in the conflict. Through Lin's article they expressed a desire for a "protracted war of national liberation" in Vietnam that could last indefinitely. Though the basic arguments used by

the Maoists have been referred to previously, the possible tactical considerations which lay under them have not been sufficiently shown. A brief description of some of those considerations may help clarify why they evolved.

It is apparent that domestic political considerations ranked high in Mao's list of priorities in a way which is incomparable with the Korean period. In the earlier conflict there was a general consensus over the priorities of nation building, but 1965-66 was characterized by manifestations of the inter-Party conflict that would eventually plunge the nation into turmoil. Mao and Lin had definite domestic uses for the PLA in mind and a war on foreign soil would preclude this desired role. Moreover, a protracted war in Vietnam could fit these domestic plans in a utilitarian manner. By providing Mao with a living example of the power of "people's war" the Vietnam War became a testament to the correctness of Mao Tse-tung Thought.⁷² With the collapse of the Communist Party in Indonesia the Maoists had few other struggles which could show the correctness of Mao's strategy. Hence the PRC rejected the stance on a negotiated peace discussed in the Jen-min Jih-pao VE Day article and the Chinese began to strenuously oppose all moves to settle the war at the conference table, even neglecting to mention the Paris Peace Talks in the press for almost six months after they had begun.⁷³ The Maoists were reluctant to lose one of their most potent propaganda weapons.

The Vietnamese now refer to the Chinese policy of supporting a prolonged war in Indochina as a betrayal of the Vietnamese Revolution. They claim that Mao followed his thesis of "sitting on the mountain to watch the tigers fight" in order to weaken the

two belligerent parties while he carried on his Cultural Revolution undisturbed.⁷⁴ With hindsight this now seems plausible. The Chinese assiduously tried to use the conflict for propaganda purposes against the US and the USSR, and, surprisingly, it now seems possible that they intended the war to drag on in order to weaken any expansionist tendencies which Hanoi might have fostered. By bogging down the US and the DRV in a long war the CCP could watch the two belligerent parties damage each other and simultaneously blast the USSR for the perfidy of colluding with the US over the conduct of the war. In fact, it must have been apparent to the Chinese that the one victor in a war between the US and the PRC over Vietnam would have been the Soviets. By avoiding conflict and by trying to keep the war raging, the Maoists wanted to watch attrition take its toll of the combatants while China reserved her strength for vigilance against the Russians. That vigilance necessitated the moral strength that Mao hoped the Cultural Revolution would provide.

In the recent white book on Sino-Vietnamese relations the Vietnamese have charged the PRC with trading the US a divided Indochina for an agreement over Taiwan.⁷⁵ While this may have exaggerated the amount of quid-pro-quo arrangements in the initial Sino-US rapprochement, there is evidence that the CCP did have worries about the strength of a united Indochinese federation. In a 1964 interview in Kurier, Chen Yi showed that the CCP was quite willing to accept a neutral South Vietnam along with the continuation of a neutral Cambodia and Laos.⁷⁶ Ironically, it was the US Under-Secretary of State George Ball who in 1965 first expressed the notion that the DRV's victory would simply allow the

reemergence of traditional Sino-Vietnamese enmity. He stated, while arguing against the so-called "domino theory":

"The most likely result (of a diplomatic solution to the war) would be a vietnamese negotiated deal under which an eventually unified Communist Vietnam would reassert its traditional hostility to Communist China and limit its own ambitions to Laos and Cambodia."⁷⁷

Additional evidence of the PRC's desire to fragment the situation in Indochina is the way in which the National Liberation Front of Vietnam (Viet Cong), the guerrilla movement in the South, was treated as a separate entity within Chinese foreign policy, insofar as the Chinese could attract a group so dependent upon Hanoi. Although the CCP did not launch a concerted, relentless campaign to drive a wedge between the DRV and Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese had misgivings about the dealings between the CCP and the permanent Viet Cong mission in Peking. They obviously felt uneasy about the CCP's commitment to a unified Vietnam and were suspicious of any attempts by the Chinese to influence the Viet Cong and thwart the plans of the DRV leadership.⁷⁸

Some observers in the late 1960s postulated that Mao's relationship with Ho Chi Minh parallels that between Stalin and Tito in the 1940s.⁷⁹ They concluded that Hanoi's tendency towards independence caused Mao to worry about the creation of a "little Balkans" sphere of influence for Hanoi in Indochina. A protracted war could certainly delay this eventuality, yet this strategy depended upon the Vietnamese retaining a reliance upon the Chinese for arms and supplies. But the Vietnamese had begun to turn towards the Soviets as a source of sophisticated weapons in 1965 following the start of the US bombing campaign. This second source of support for Ho

meant that the Chinese could not control the conflict enough to ensure that it was protracted in length. But the fact that they may have desired a North Vietnam drained by attrition as opposed to the expected wish for a stable communist buffer state is an ironic twist which does not match any of the evidence shown about Mao's attitude towards North Korea. There was however no precedent for an expansionist Korea; there was for an expansionist Vietnam. In essence the Maoist strategy towards Vietnam was an elaborate balancing act that makes the Korean decision seem simple in comparison. Domestic, international, and regional factors all combined to produce a policy of what could be called "active isolationism". It was a question of how to remain aloof while at the same time preserving and protecting areas of national interest. The PRC succeeded in avoiding involvement in the conflict but, when one views the resulting Soviet-Vietnamese bonds and the recent Sino-Vietnamese border war, and assesses the questionable value to the PRC of the final US withdrawal from the West Pacific, it is debatable whether or not national interests were in fact served by the PRC's detachment. China may have simply replaced old adversaries with new.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER NINE.

1. Gurtov, Melvin. China and Southeast Asia: The Politics of Survival. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Health and Co., 1971), p. 2.
2. See Chapter Five, pp. 84-86.
3. Gittings, John. "Will China Fight", Far Eastern Economic Review. March 2 1967, p. 360.
4. Yahuda, Michael. "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate". The China Quarterly, January-March 1972, pp. 33- 45 and p. 47.
5. Snow, Edgar. "Interview With Mao," The New Republic, February 27 1965, pp. 22-23. Yahuda believes that Mao may have been lulled into a sense of security following the relative calm after the immediate post-Tonkin reprisals. See *ibid.*, p. 51.
6. Tao, Jay. "Mao's World Outlook: Vietnam and the Revolution in China," Asian Survey, Vol. 3, no. 5, May 1968, p. 431.
7. This section will concentrate on the difference which may have arisen over the U.S. threat to China's security. Although many of these arguments are inextricably linked to the idea of "united action" with the Soviets, this topic will be discussed separately in the following section - some overlapping is inevitable.
8. Ra'anan, Uri. "Peking's Foreign Policy Debate, 1965-1966", in Tang, Tsou ed., China in Crisis. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), pp. 39-40. Chou's position was far from certain as will be shown in the section on "United Action".
9. *ibid.*
10. A general description of these divisions can be found in Zagoria, Donald, The Vietnam Triangle (New York: Pegacus, 1967), pp. 67-70.
11. *ibid.*, pp. 93-94.
12. Zagoria, Donald, "The Strategic Debate in Peking", in Tang, Tscu, ed., China in Crisis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), p. 238.
13. Zagoria, The Vietnam Triangle, pp. 69-70.
14. Uto, Kikuzo, and Shibata, Minohu, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung", The China Quarterly, July-September 1968, p. 60. A prime example of this mode of behaviour is given as Liu's handling of the Socialist Education Movement.
15. Whiting, Alan, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 225.

16. Ra' anan, pp. 62-63.
17. Snow, p. 17.
18. Jen-min Jih-pao, "The Historical Experience of the War Against Fascism", Current Background, No. 761, 12 May 1965, p. 10.
19. Yahuda, p. 60. For a discussion of Lo's worries about the U.S.'s mental health see Harding, H. and Gurtov, M., The Purge of Lo Jui-ching: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning, (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1971), p. 41.
20. Yahuda, pp. 53-54.
21. Tao, p. 420.
22. Harding and Gurtov, p. 60.
23. Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking", p. 245.
24. Harding and Gurtov, pp. 55-59.
25. *ibid*, p. 56.
26. Jen-min Jih-pao, "Big Military Competition is Big Exposure of Lo Jui-ching's Plot, to Usurp Army Leadership and Oppose the Party," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4022, pp. 1-7.
27. Mazingo, D.P., and Robinson, T.W., Lin Piao on People's War. China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965), pp. 17-18.
28. Lo Jui-ching, "Speech at Mass Rally on VJ Day", Current Background, No. 770, 14 September 1965.
29. Mazingo and Robinson, pp. 7-8.
30. Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), pp. 48-49. Though it has been suggested that this analysis was primarily intended to show China's desire to form a united front with any nation against the US, it is unlikely in view of the P.R.C.'s crumbling relations with Third World nations that this was a serious proposition. For an example of this questionable view see Schwartz, Benjamin, Communism and China: Ideology in Flux (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 189.
31. Lin Piao, pp. 15-17.
32. Liu Shao-ch'i, "Statement in Support of President Ho Chi Min Appeal", Survey of China Mainland Magazines, No. 3747, 22 July 1966, p. 27. See Yahuda, China's Role in the World (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 180-181.

33. Chen Yi, "Text of Speech at Peking Rally", Survey of China Mainland Magazines, No. 3738, 10 July 1966, pp. 37-38.
34. Chou En-lai, "Chou En-lai Reiterates China's Support for Vietnam", Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3743, 17 July 1966, p. 28.
35. Armbaster, Frank, "China's Conventional Military Capabilities", in Tsou, ed., pp. 162-164 and pp. 176-178.
36. Keatley, Robert, "Red China's Economy: Continuing Deficiencies May Soften the Course in Vietnam", The Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1965, p. 16.
37. Nathans, Andrew, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics", The China Quarterly, January-March 1973, pp. 44-46. There is little evidence of a pro-Soviet grouping acting in concert to try and unseat the Maoist faction, or any "clientalist" relationship between those who wished to gain political spoils from a rapprochement with the USSR.
38. Yahuda, China's Role in the World, p. 184
39. ibid., p. 45.
40. Ito and Shabata, pp. 59-60, footnote.
41. Yahuda, p. 185. The views of the JCP are explained in Simon, Sheldon W., "Maoism and Interparty Relations: Peking's Alienation of the Japanese Communist Party", The China Quarterly July - September 1968, p. 42.
42. Simon, p. 49.
43. ibid, p. 48.
44. Van Ness, Peter, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 86-89.
45. Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate", p. 68 footnote.
46. Hinton, Harold, in Tsou, ed., pp. 217-218.
47. Zagoria, The Strategic Debate in Peking, pp. 238-243.
48. Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate", pp. 60-62.
49. For a description of P'eng Chen's anti-Soviet militancy see Ra'anani, p. 27. Ra'anani does, however, neglect to note any of P'eng's anti-Maoist moves. For additional references to P'eng's stand, and his development of the city/countryside global dichotomy see Yahuda, China's Role in the World, p. 182.

50. Tao, p. 428.
51. Ito and Shibata, pp. 59-60 footnote.
52. Whiting, pp. 70-71.
53. Liu Shao-ch'i, pp. 26-27.
54. Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate", pp. 43-45. Note: For Zagoria and Ra'anan's replies to Yahuda see The China Quarterly, April-June 1972, pp. 343-350.
55. Harding and Gurtov, p. 27.
56. Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of the Facts about the Militant Friendship between Vietnam and China is Impermissible," Peking Review, 7 December 1979, p. 18. For the official Chinese rejection of the Soviet proposals see Crankshaw, Edward, "China Reveals Vietnam Clash," The Observer, November 14 1965, p.5.
57. Harding and Gurtov, p. 28.
58. Rodgers, Frank E., "Sino-American Relations: 1964-1966", The China Quarterly, June 1979, p. 295.
59. For Chen Yi's interview see *ibid.*, p. 296. A description of the Chinese reaction to Tonkin is found in Whiting. p. 175.
60. The CIA analysis can be found in The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers (London and New York: Bantam Books, 1971), pp. 331-332. See p. 255 for the analyst's perception of the relative weighting of US goals.
61. Rodgers, p. 298.
62. The assignment of the prerogative in regard to Chinese intervention was an indication of the degree to which the CCP leaders felt that the US needed to be deterred. By saying that the CCP was ready to commit troops when the South Vietnamese people require indicates a very strong warning. It is significant that by December 1965, most statements pledged to intervene "when Chairman Mao gives the order." The fact Mao had become the chief arbiter is symbolic of the internal political developments at the time, e.g., the fall of Lo Jui-ching. See Gittings, "Will China Fight?", pp. 360-362.
63. Rodgers, pp. 298-299.
64. Jen-min Jih-pao, "The Historical Experience of the War Against Fascism", p. 5.
65. Whiting, pp. 190-193.
66. Snow, Edgar. "The Man Alongside Mao: Deputy Lin Piao's Thought and Career", The New Republic, December 1966, p. 16.

67. Gittings, "Will China Fight?," p. 361.
68. For the US view of the ambassadorial talks see Young, Kenneth, Diplomacy and Power in Washington-Peking Dealings: 1953-1967 (Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy Studies, 1967), p. 17. An overview of the talks is provided in Whiting, p. 198.
69. Whiting, p. 193.
70. *ibid*, pp. 178-180.
71. *ibid*, pp. 181-192.
72. Ou Hsun-hung, Communist China's Foreign Policy Towards the War in Vietnam (Unpublished Thesis: University of Southern Illinois, 1977), p. 156. Also see Hinton in Tsou, ed., p. 222.
73. *ibid*.
74. The Truth About Sino-Vietnamese Relations Over the Last Thirty Years (Middleton: The Northwest Vietnamese Association, 1979) pp. 6-7.
75. *ibid*. pp. 8-9.
76. Hinton, p. 206.
77. The Pentagon Papers, pp. 325-326.
78. Pike, Douglas, Viet Cong: The Origins and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 335-336.
79. Mazingo, D.P., "Comments", in, Tang Tsou, ed., China in Crisis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), pp. 228-229.

CONCLUSION

This study has been an exercise in which the elements that affected the response of the leaders of the CCP to two important conflicts of international consequence within bordering former vassal states have been identified and analyzed. From this exercise one can begin to understand the traumas of a developing nation state confronted with threats from its primary adversary to its sense of rejuvenation and newly found independence. One can also see that the foundations of the ideology which provided the guidelines for the Chinese response to these conflicts, the ideology of Maoism, were firmly grounded in Chinese nationalism. Hence, an insight has been gained into what motivated the leading figures within the PRC during the periods in question. From that it is possible to deduce certain concepts about the reemergence of China as a vital nation in terms of global significance after years of foreign domination, including to what extent imperial precedents affected modern Chinese international behaviour - especially the degree to which attitudes towards former vassals were influenced by the imperial past. Moreover, the gap of fifteen years between the two conflicts provides a measure for gauging any maturation in the handling of complex international crises as an essentially bi-polar superpower matrix crumbled with the intensifying of Sino-Soviet enmity. The essential question of how and why the conflagration in Korea was avoided in Vietnam a decade and a half later can then be confronted with more certainty.

In addition, it has been made apparent that the debates and deliberations over the two crises occurred within very different internal political climates. The pivotal figure in all policy

making, be it domestic or foreign matters, was, of course, Mao Tse-tung. His attitude towards issues was a key determining element in policy making output, therefore his concerns with regards to matters relevant to the conflicts in question as revealed in this study can provide a greater understanding of how the CCP leadership viewed the historical significance of the "New China" both internationally and in terms of internal development. But, the views of Mao and some of his colleagues diverged radically during the years between the conflicts and therefore foreign policy debates also reflected this trend. The two distinctly variant sets of internal conditions provide one with clear vantage points to judge the degree to which internal considerations can affect international relations with great and lesser powers alike.

It is difficult to state with any certainty the amount of consideration given by contemporary decision makers to historical background, especially when that background stretches over thousands of years. For instance, what importance are the Napoleonic Wars to modern British statesmen wrestling with the current state of Anglo-French affairs? There comes a point in history when old circumstances crumble under the weight of the new, yet there is always an aspect of an awareness of the past in contemporary deliberations. However, that awareness can be shaped and moulded to suit particular needs as yet another situation begins to make its presence felt. This is the case when the CCP response to the American centred conflicts in Korea and Vietnam are analyzed within the background of China's new assertiveness after years of foreign domination. Therefore, one must remember that policy towards both conflicts were formulated during a period of immense pride in the Chinese nation and that much of that pride was fuelled by an

appreciation of China's past greatness. The most important historical reference point for the leaders of the CCP was not the imperial past, but their own personal experiences during the Civil War and the Anti Japanese War. For the new leaders of China the imperial past represented proof of China's rightful position in the world, but it was also tarnished by the old social relations which fettered the initiative of the Chinese people and allowed the years of subjugation by foreigners. The CCP leadership believed that their struggles were restoring China to its former position and a prerequisite of that restoration was seen as removing dangerous aliens from their border regions, including those of Korea and Vietnam.¹ It is at that purely regional strategic level that imperial precedents have their greatest relevance to this study.

The handling of both crises shows the keenness with which the Chinese leadership acted to preserve their secure borders against intrusion by the Americans, the power in both cases that represented the biggest obstacle to their goals. They showed resoundingly that Western encroachment in post-1949 China would not be tolerated. In the case of Korea this meant a massive military action and in the Vietnam period this was manifest in a skillful use of deterrence - but neither action had anything in common with the theory of imperial foreign policy as described in Chapter One. There was no calculation that the dangerous alien could be "transformed" through the greatness of Chinese civilization. The Chinese response in both modern cases was a mixture of the lessons of Chinese humiliations in the past and an appreciation of the realities of twentieth century international power politics. The relative resolve with which these

conflicts were handled offers an interesting comparison with the equivocal nature with which Li Hung-chang handled western advances in the two vassal states during the nineteenth century. He tried to develop a degree of flexibility but was constrained by some reluctance to admit the superiority which Western weaponry represented. For all of his pronouncements to the contrary about the superiority of men over weapons, Mao's actions in Korea; the development of nuclear weapons in the 1950's and 1960's; and the deployment of air defences to South China during the initial US escalation in Vietnam proved that Western standards were being employed.

The CCP leadership measured Chinese greatness using many guidelines which were strictly Western in origin, the achievement of socialism being a prime example of the adopting of an ideal originating from Europe. But the Maoists within the CCP also copied the imperial ethic stressing the superiority of Chinese civilization through the correctness of its ideals, e.g., the wide applicability of Mao Tse-tung's Thoughts. The people towards whom this message was directed were more specifically identifiable than during the days of Confucianism, with the main emphasis being placed on the nations of the developing world, especially those in Asia. The Chinese leadership had identified a global constituency which they considered to be their legitimate sphere of influence, abandoning the "all under heaven" imperial claims to world-wide hegemony. Yet, the actual receptiveness of other nations to Maoism was not widespread and as explained in Chapters Six and Nine many of the foreign policy proclamations on the use of Mao's Thought in other nations were for domestic consumption and were designed to protect the adherence to Mao's Chinese path of internal socialist development.

The cases of Korean and Vietnamese conflicts with the US-led West indicate that receptiveness to Mao's Thought was not an essential prerequisite for PRC support. Many thousands of Chinese died in Korea where Kim Il-sung's Kapsan faction paid only marginal attention to the Chinese doctrine; while in Vietnam during the mid-1960's the CCP stated that the struggle in Indochina was a prime example of Maoism in Action, when in actuality the DRV was moving steadily towards using more conventional military tactics. This shows that the CCP, like their imperial predecessors were very willing to let pragmatism eclipse dogma when it came to the actual application of foreign policy. Just as the imperial dynasties would allow vassals the status of "non-barbarian" after the most cursory proclamations of acceptance of the tributary system, and despite flagrant non-Confucian practices (e.g., the patronage of shamanism in Yi Korea and the creation of an independent sphere of influence by various Vietnamese dynasties through southward expansion), Maoist China developed a pronounced tendency to shape doctrine to fit events.² The way in which the doctrine fluctuated over time reveals much about what actually motivated a foreign policy response at a particular period and also gives an indication of the perception which the CCP had of China's position in the world. In addition, attitudes towards the former vassals of Korea and Vietnam are clearly explained when placed within their broader global context.

During 1950, leading up to the intervention in Korea, the doctrine being expressed by the CCP was one of national salvation and "socialist internationalism". Paradoxically, these two seemingly separate goals were very related. The theme of national salvation had mobilized the peasantry since the Anti-Japanese War, imbuing

them with a sense of national identity which they had not previously possessed,² and carrying through to the period of reconstruction following the proclamation of the People's Republic in October 1949. The "socialist internationalism" was not the alliance with the world proletariat as envisaged during the days of the First and Second Internationals, but was rather a practical means of procuring the economic and military means of consolidating national rejuvenation through a necessary, but always distasteful, period of Soviet tutelage. Therefore Maoism faded slightly into the background and "leaning towards the side of the Soviet Union" predominated. National salvation and rejuvenation was limited to liberal management of the economy backed by some Soviet aid in order to salvage the disastrous wreck left by the years of war and KMT bungling. This, plus the irredentia which the nationalistic goal of reuniting all of the once great Chinese empire required, but which was thwarted by US intervention regarding Taiwan, were the realistic expectations that the CCP could have for China in the short-term. A marginal amount of deference towards the Soviets was required, and spheres of influence in Asian areas which were not of much concern to the Russians were allowed to be established. Notably, Korea was firmly within the Russian sphere and active Chinese influence within Kim Il-sung's ruling faction was nominal; the only area left open to the CCP being the anti-French resistance movement in Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh. At that time China's greatness was judged by its position of importance within the "socialist bloc", which was seen as an achievement in its own right after decades of utter humiliation through the domination by the Western powers and Japan.

This study had shown that there is no proper evidence for the CCP trying to recreate any sort of suzerainty relationship with North Korea, which was left under the Soviets' sway. This is not to say that Kim Il-sung was a mere Soviet puppet: he and his Kapsan colleagues simply had much closer contact with the Russians and, like the DDP, depended upon them for aid. The Chinese, in keeping with the "socialist internationalism" doctrine at that time did not challenge the leader of the bloc in a competition for spheres of influence. Therefore, the Chinese involvement in the conflict in Korea was quite straightforwardly an attempt to preserve a buffer between the important Manchurian industrial heartland and what was thought to be an aggressive imperialist power which was threatening the attainment of Chinese national goals. The behaviour of General MacArthur seemed to add credence to these fears, as did the protection of the KMT redoubt on Taiwan provided by Truman's deployment of the Seventh Fleet. The circumstances had altered drastically, both in terms of doctrine and the strategic importance placed on the former vassal, when, fifteen years later, the US once again seemed to threaten PRC sovereignty through a war in a border region.

In the mid-1960's a Maoist inspired wave of nationalistic fervour was staged to sweep the nation, and the concomitant doctrine of international relations bore its hallmark. The interim between the two conflicts in question had seen the complete rejection by the Maoists of Soviet policy - including both its internal and external consequences for China. The prime example in the eyes of the Maoists of the current insidious stage of Soviet socialist development was its marked characteristic of compromise with US imperialism. The legacy of foreign violations of Chinese social

and territorial integrity in the past had made imperialism - and not necessarily capitalism - the main enemy of the CCP and most of the Chinese nation. This variance from orthodox Leninism which firmly labelled imperialism as a characteristic of capitalism manifested itself in the courting of relationships with "intermediate" capitalist nations in Western Europe and Japan that were not considered to be in league with the imperialist US but more or less under its domination. This was evident until 1964, but the onset of more intensive Maoist campaigns ended this trend after 1965, as shown in Chapter Seven, when all nations that did not openly pay homage to Mao's Chinese road to socialism were ostracized. This was also in a sense recognition of the failure to secure an independent global sphere of influence in the Third World and the communist bloc after the open split with the USSR in 1960. Therefore in 1965-66, when Chinese policy towards the war in Vietnam was being designed, the foreign policy doctrine being expounded was the Maoist dictum of self-reliance, with no pretence of being allied with the Soviet Union in an international socialist movement.

Unlike its relations with the North Koreans in 1950, the CCP desired that Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong be influenced by the teachings of Mao and the degree to which the Vietnamese received their advice had an effect on the relationship between the two countries. The Maoists who controlled foreign policy through an alliance with Chou En-lai wished to portray to the world the image of a vibrant, independent Chinese people advancing to socialism through the guidance of Mao and showing the way for the rest of the developing nations. It is quite certain that through their involvement in the Vietnamese war against the French, and the gap

caused by general Soviet indifference to Indochina, the CCP felt that the region should be a sphere of influence which could add to their international prestige. Indeed, by allowing them to sit at the conference table in Geneva with many important nations it already had increased the PRC's international standing. As Chapter Eight indicates, the CCP openly competed with the Soviets using aid as an inducement for Vietnamese during the late 1950's and early 1960's, after the Russians had decided that any CCP international successes were intolerable. In the mid-1960's, for internal reasons, it became even more desirable that through its war tactics the DRV be portrayed as a showpiece of the applicability of Mao Tse-tung's Thought.

As the American escalation of the conflict in Vietnam began with the bombings of North Vietnam in February 1965, the CCP retained a strong sense of encirclement and encroachment by US imperialism - the same sense that had provoked such a strong response in Korea fifteen years earlier. The feeling of siege was even more intense because of the growing threat from the Soviet "collaborators" to the north. Although the Chinese had accomplished the impressive feat of designing and detonating a nuclear device, this was mostly a bid for international prestige and a fillip to national pride. They were by their own accounts militarily weak - hence Mao's insistence of the strenght of men armed with the correctness of thought being more powerful than weapons. Unlike in 1950 when a sacrifice could be backed by military aid from the Soviets, the Maoists firmly rejected any compromise on their rejection of Soviet tutelage implied by the acceptance of Russian assistance. Then the sacrifice may have proven their worthiness to Stalin through their defence of the "socialist bloc's" interests

and led to increased Soviet support for the Chinese goals of national rebirth and reconstruction; in the mid-1960's a war which led to the need for Soviet aid would have totally negated the Maoist tenets which were being propagated as symbols of that rebirth. Therefore, while in 1950 the CCP's aim was totally to remove US military activity within a border state, in 1965-66 the whole thrust of Chinese policy was to allow a limited amount of such activity in Vietnam - and even to prolong it for as long as possible so that the US nemesis could be weakened through a protracted conflict and the Chinese people could be presented with living proof of the power of Maoist doctrine.

Of course it could be argued that a prolonged conflict could never be tolerated in the case of Korea because of its traditional strategic value and that prevaricating over Vietnam had its roots in Chinese history. The legacy of Hideyoshi remained strong in the late nineteenth century, as the actions of Li Hung-chang as discussed in Chapter One have shown, and they could plausibly have affected the thoughts of a man with such a keen sense of history as Mao. Li Hung-chang's actions vis a vis Vietnam's domination by the French is a clear historical precedent for equivocal attitudes towards the defence of that former vassal. Yet, while there may be historical parallels with the former strategic importance of Korea, motivation during the crisis in Vietnam in the mid-1960's represents a clear break with any previous policy on the defence of a bordering nation within the Chinese sphere.

In the period for the strategic decisions that set the pattern for the Chinese attitude towards the American aggression in Vietnam, China for the first time since the Opium Wars shaped an effective

and skillful reply to Western aggression in an area traditionally within its orbit free from any foreign domination or interference. The 1950 action in Korea was taken with a degree of deference towards Soviet wishes; in 1965-66 the CCP formed a policy from a totally independent stance. The PRC acted as a modern, twentieth century state managing an international crisis with a series of objectives of both domestic and wider strategic significance. Although Korea or Vietnam were not being preserved as vassals in the traditional mould, they had a modified significance in that they both served as symbols to the world and to the Chinese people themselves that the "New China", the resurrected China, had an independent place in the world. The Korean intervention proved that China was no longer in a state of chronic decline and this undoubtedly affected events fifteen years later. The Americans acted with a greater degree of respect towards the Chinese in that the avoidance of a Korean-like war in Vietnam was given a high priority. This time, however, they showed an even greater recognition of the Chinese reemergence for they were fully cognizant of the fact that the 1950 myth of "Soviet puppet" had to be discounted.

This study has shown that the CCP was evidently more adept at international crisis management and the use of deterrence during the Vietnam conflict than in 1950 when it attempted to halt the advance of MacArthur's troops by diplomatic signals. Nevertheless, one must take into account the fact that the nature of the advance towards its frontiers was coloured by the general belligerence of the Cold War era, making deterrence more arduous. Also, except for a few negotiations with the Allies during the Second World War, the CCP leaders were novices at dealing with international diplomacy during a conflict. However, they did try some rather skillful attempts at

communicating their resolve coupled with their general desire for peace through linking their willingness for peace, as transmitted through the Indian ambassador, with their ultimate intention to combat the UN forces if they did not halt their advance - the latter being subtly displayed through the tentative military contact which preceded the full scale intervention of the Chinese "volunteers". Where their judgement seems to have been faulty was in the interpretation of American attitudes through the ambiguous signs being given by Washington. As indicated in Chapter Five there were quite a few reasons for the Chinese to believe that the US would become entangled in Korea or intervene to save Chiang Kai-shek, but these were largely ignored. Hence, the CCP was caught offguard when the US acted. In the crucial period of the American escalation of hostilities in Vietnam, however, this was not the case. The Chinese, under the direction of Chou En-lai, adroitly analyzed the situation and succeeded in extraditing the PRC from the threat of involvement while still leaving the US in no doubt that the North Vietnamese buffer state must remain.

The foreign policy experts in the CCP had had fifteen years in which to acquire the necessary skills with which to handle the Americans. Through diplomatic activities at the Geneva Conferences and at the ambassadorial level talks with the Americans in Warsaw insights were gained - and the 1962 war with India had shown how to use limited military action effectively. The chances of misreading American intentions were thereby greatly lessened.³

In Vietnam the CCP showed the consummate skill in balancing signs of military readiness, such as the deployment of logistic support personnel; support for the integrity of North Vietnam; and

military resolve, as in the downing of US planes over PRC airspace; with a public posture designed not to force the US to escalate further in a bid to save face. Hence, everything was done without publicity that could create domestic political pressures within America that could have led to demands for greater US force. As Chapter Nine has shown, this pattern emerged between 1965 and 1966 and established an equilibrium that lasted throughout the conflict. The CCP did enough from then on to show support for the Vietnamese struggle, thus helping its claim to the Chinese people and the world of its leadership in national liberation causes, yet concurrently succeeded in avoiding antagonizing the US. The ability at reading the signals from the Americans remained constantly high.

One of the greatest differences between the two periods lay in the area of domestic political situations, yet this also reflects a shift in attitude towards China's position in the world. In 1950 the acceptance of a degree of Soviet leadership clearly manifested itself inside China. Besides continuing the process of reuniting all of the territories considered to be rightfully Chinese, the main thrust internally was to create economic and political stability. This was based on sound fiscal management and Soviet aid, plus the building of a political consensus within the CCP which overshadowed any disputes over the exact worth of Mao's Thoughts. National greatness was displayed through the unification of China; any claims to world or Asian leadership were weak as yet.

At the domestic level, all indications are that a war in Korea was considered detrimental to the process of national reconstruction, although the promise of greater Soviet aid through the sacrifice and the unity that a war could create within the nation may have been

factors. But there is little doubt that during a time when internal needs were so great a war was not desired. But when the threat became so great that war was thought unavoidable, the Chinese response gives a strong indication of the state of Chinese domestic politics at the time. There is no reason to believe that there was any dissent within the CCP at the decision to intervene, nor is there any evidence that there was any opposition to the totally non-Maoist tactics deployed on the battlefield. There is no indication of organized factionalism at the time, and the general mood of consensus appears to have been engendered by Mao himself. It is his change in attitude towards China's domestic political scene that had such an effect on CCP policy on the war in Vietnam.

This study has placed heavy emphasis on the nationalistic elements in the doctrine which is loosely called Maoism. Although Mao was definitely influenced by Marx and Lenin (notably with great emphasis on the anti-imperialism of the latter), as far back as the 1930's he recognized a need to create a completely Chinese version of Marxism-Leninism.⁴ The result was eventually to be an ideology which was in many ways very non-Marxist. All emphasis on Marxist socialist internationalism gave way to the primary objective of building a strong Chinese state. As shown above, this was also the objective of the alliance with the Soviets: the goal was Chinese reconstruction, not the furthering of the international proletarian revolution.⁵ This does not mean that the Maoists believed that human progress was not measured by the creation of socialism - but it was the creation of socialism in China, not globally, that was of the paramount importance. It was Mao's struggle for the purity of the Chinese way to the new social order that was the cause of so much strife within China, culminating with the opening rounds of the Cultural Revolution

in 1965-66. As Chapters Seven and Nine have shown, the fight to preserve a wholly Chinese process of development dominated Mao and his followers and greatly influenced the course of the CCP's attitude towards the war in Vietnam. The battle with the internal revisionists predominated over that with US imperialism. In addition, any hint of using the crisis as an excuse for reestablishing ties with the Soviets was categorically out of the question because of the possibility of opening channels for the reintroduction of foreign revisionist influences. Therefore involvement in Vietnam had to be absolutely minimal in order to disarm any domestic opponents of Mao who had sympathy with the concept of such actions.

Through analyzing key decision-making factors in the Chinese response to two different international crises in former vassal states, this study has shown that these nations remained of significance to Chinese foreign policy. Yet nothing more than the most superficial resemblance remained with the old imperial relations between Peking and the two other capitals. Importantly, it must be remembered that although the PRC has symbolized the rebirth of an independent China, the Chinese have not recovered their predominating influence over these two states. Even the small gains made in influencing ideology in Vietnam never truly recovered from the debacles of 1957 described in Chapter Eight. Maoism did not replace Confucianism in Korea and Vietnam - but Russian military and economic aid may have. The age of post-Mao pragmatism has done nothing to reverse this trend.

FOOTNOTES : CONCLUSION

1. Huch, Arthur, The Security of China (London: Chatto and Windus, 1970), p. 28.
2. Harris, Nigel, The Mandate of Heaven: Marx and Mao in Modern China (London: Quartel Books, 1978), p. 214.
3. Whiting, Alan, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), pp. 207-208.
4. Wylie, Raymond F., "Mao Tse-Tung, Chen Po-ta, and the Sinification of Marxism", The China Quarterly, July-September 1979, pp. 455-456
5. Harris, pp. 210-211 and 292.

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