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St. Athanasius' two treatises contra apollinarem

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A B S T R A C T

Since the closing years of the 19th century the two treatises of St Athanasius Against Apollinaris have been regarded by some scholars as spurious. This view has been a matter of considerable debate because of its implications for the interpretation of St Athanasius' Christology. The first part of this dissertation examines the history of criticism from the end of the nineteenth century to the present, and outlines the major points of research which has to be undertaken in a reexamination of the case. Accordingly the dissertation proceeds with the examination of the External Witnesses (Part II), the Internal Evidence (Part III), the Style (Part IV), the doctrine of the Death of Christ (Part V), the doctrine of the Soul of Christ (Part VI) and finally the Christology of Athanasius and the two disputed treatises (Part VII). Particular emphasis is placed on the theological issues raised in this connection. Part V contains a reexamination of all the Athanasian texts on the Death of Christ, as well as in the two works under investigation. Part VI contains a full critical analysis of the modern scholarly debate on the Soul of Christ in Athanasius. Finally Part VII (the longest section of the dissertation) reexamines all the works of Athanasius on Christology with particular reference to the doctrine and terminology of the Incarnation. The above researches establish the conclusion that there are no fundamental problems to the traditional Athanasian paternity of the two Contra Apollinarem. The external Witnesses are many and important. The internal evidence shows that Athanasius is the possible author. The Style presents no divergencies. As for the doctrine it has been shown that it is Athanasian in outline and in many significant details.

ST. ATHANASIUS' TWO TREATISES

CONTRA APOLLINAREM

(The Questions of authorship and Christology)

By

V. REV. GEORGE DION. DRAGAS, B.D., Th.M.,

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Ph.D.

Dissertation

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1983



Καί ὡς ἐλάλει μοι περὶ σωτηρίας ψυχῆς,
ἦλθεν χρῆσις τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου τοῦ
ἀρχιεπισκόπου Ἀλεξανδρείας· καί λέγει
μοι ὁ γέρον, ὅτι ὅταν εὔρης λόγον τοῦ
ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου, καί μὴ ἔχεις χαρτία,
εἰς τὰ ἱμάτιά σου γράψον αὐτόν!

And as he was talking to me about the
salvation of the soul, use was made of
the name of saint Athanasius the Arch-
bishop of Alexandria; and the old man
says to me, "when you find a treatise
of saint Athanasius, and you have not
any paper to copy it on, write it on
your clothes!

John Moschos: Pratum Spirituale



ABBREVIATIONS

- GENT Contra Gentes (P.G. 25:3-96)
- INC De Incarnatione (P.G. 25:96-198)
- CAR1 Contra Arianos 1 (P.G. 26:11-146)
- CAR2 Contra Arianos 2 (P.G. 26:145-322)
- CAR3 Contra Arianos 3 (P.G. 26:321-468)
- CAR4 Contra Arianos 4 (P.G. 26:467-526)
- CAR5 (or INC&CAR) De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos (PG.26:983-1028)
- ILL In illud omnia mihi tradita sunt a Patre meo(P.G. 25:208-220)
- SER1 Ad Serapionem 1 (P.G. 26:529-608)
- SER2 Ad Serapionem 2 (P.G. 26:607-624)
- SER3 Ad Serapionem 3 (P.G. 26:623-638)
- SER4 Ad Serapionem 4 (P.G. 26:637-676)
- SER5 Epistola ad Serapionem de morte Arii:(P.G. 25:685-690)
- EPI Ad Epictetum episcopum Corinthi (P.G. 26:1049-1070)
- ADEL Ad Adelphium episcopum et confessorem (P.G. 26:1071-1084)
- MAX Ad Maximum philosophum (P.G. 26:1085-1090)
- ANT Tomus ad Antiochenos (P.G. 26:795-810)
- APO1 De Incarnatione DNJC Contra Apollinarem 1 (P.G.26:1093-1132)
- APO2 De Salutari Adventu DNJC Contra Apoll/m 2 (P.G.26:1131-1166)
- APOLL Greek Fragments of Apollinaris' works (Lietzmann's collection)
- AMUN Epistola ad Amunem (P.G. 26:1169-1176)
- CONS Apologia ad Imperatorem Constantium (P.G.25:595-642)
- FUGA Apologia de fuga sua (P.G. 25:643-680)
- DION De Sententia Dionysii (P.G. 25:479-522)
- AFRO Epistola ad Afros episcopos (P.G. 26:1029-1048)
- ENCY Epistola Encyclica ad episcopos Aegypti et Libyae (P.G. 25:537-594)
- SYNO De Synodis Arimini et Seleuciaae (P.G. 26:681-794)
- MARC Epistola ad Marcellinum in interpretationem Psalmorum (P.G. 27:59-546)
- DECR De Decretis Nicaeni Synodi (P.G. 25:416-475)
- PARQ De Virginitate
- VITA Vita et conversatio S.P.N. Antonii (P.G. 26:837-976)
- FEST Epistolae Festales (P.G. 26:1351-1444)
- FRAG Fragmenta Varia (P.G. 26:1217-1262)

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P R O L O G U E

The Dogma of the Incarnate Son and Logos of God (ὁ ἐνανθρωπήσας Υἱὸς καὶ Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ) with its explicit and implicit content and with all its far-reaching implications for the knowledge of God, man and the world, constitutes the central theme of Greek Patristic Theology. This central datum of the theology of the Greek Fathers is rooted in the Apostolic witness to the Event of God's revelation, whose content and form is the Person, the being and the life of the God-man, Jesus Christ.

That the Dogma of Christ became the object of great intellectual controversies, and indeed passed through several stages of formulation is an indisputable fact, which becomes quite obvious in the light of the Patristic literature which has been handed down to posterity. In fact, the process of the orthodox formulation of the Dogma of the Faith is none other than the history of the struggle between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the conflict between faith and heresy, truth and falsehood. This history is embodied concretely in the life-work of certain individuals and churches, and has found expression in their literary productions, whether private or encyclical letters, treatises or literary debates, creeds or liturgies. The final outcome of this history, or rather these historical movements, has acquired formal expression in the credal formulae, terms and canons of the Ecumenical Synods.

It goes without saying that the understanding of these credal and therefore normative formulae, terms and canons depends a great deal upon the understanding of the historical movements of the conflict between faith and heresy which preceded them. This directly

entails the study of the literary productions of the particular individuals and churches involved in those movements, and especially of those who exercised direct or indirect influence on the Ecumenical decisions.

The documents under investigation belong to this category of Patristic literature and theology. They belong more specifically to the history of the Patriarchate of Alexandria and are directly related to Saint Athanasius the great. Their ecumenical significance is seen in the fact that they were both utilised by the VIth Ecumenical Synod of Constantinople in A.D. 680/1.

That the milieu of the great Athanasius is of primary importance for understanding the Theology of the ancient Church and for the advancement of Theology in its contemporary thrust, has been recognised today perhaps more than ever before. Saint Athanasius, as Dietrich Ritschl has pointed out, could most fittingly become a focal point in a much needed re-examination of Eastern Christianity and especially the Eastern Christian understanding of Greek Patristic Theology, which suffered loss, in one way or another, at the hands of a later Western tradition, since it was approached and interpreted in terms of 'augustinian' conceptuality, and perhaps by making use of mediaeval spectacles.⁽¹⁾

Whether or not these treatises are authentic works of Saint Athanasius, their content is of primary importance for Christology and Soteriology. Though the thesis of this dissertation is that the two treatises in question are in fact authentic works of Athanasius, yet, it is to their content that it is primarily seeking to draw attention. For not only do they ask crucial questions and deal with

central problems of the formulation of the Christian faith, but also draw the lines, explicitly and implicitly, along which theological science should proceed. Regrettably their content has not been adequately studied before, since attention has almost exclusively been paid to the questions of authorship and literary style. But, as the older studies have shown, this content is a rich mine of theological intuition not only with respect to the problems of the actual formulation of the Dogma of the Incarnate Son and Logos of God, but also with regard to the problems of methodology and epistemology connected with it. Besides, this content is crucial to the history of Christology in the Alexandrian tradition and particularly to the Christology of Saint Athanasius the great. Normally Athanasian scholars begin their investigations into Athanasius' work with the study of his juvenalia GENT and INC. Though this is certainly commendable, it must also be said that Athanasius' final works on the subject of the Incarnation must be equally taken into account, if justice is to be done to a living thought which developed in a context of controversy and theological formation. In my opinion, Athanasius' EPI and the two APO, his final works on the Incarnation. (Contra Apollinarem), represent the great doctor's most mature doctrine on the subject of Christology and therefore, should be given as important a place in Athanasian research as his early work on the Incarnation. When this is done, then, the picture of Athanasius' Christology appears to be quite different from that rather confusing and certainly hypothetically construed presentation which is designed to serve the schematisations of the historians of Dogma. The De Incarnatione (Contra Apollinarem), whether it is taken as a proto-Athanasian, or deutero-Athanasian

production, excludes the current hypothesis of an Athanasian 'Apollinarism'. To my mind, the Christology of this work represents the natural explication of the inner logic of Athanasius' Christological teaching, and as such, offers us a clear clue to the fundamental contribution of Athanasius to the Christology of the ancient Church. It also shows us that Athanasius was the father of Orthodoxy par excellence in the Tradition of the ancient catholic Church, because he was primarily the father of Christology and Soteriology.

This study of the two treatises "against Apollinaris", consists of two main parts.

The first part is a review of the works of the critics, which seems to be lacking from the manuals of Patrology, if one judges them from their conclusions. Since the work of the critics was written in various languages, including Latin, German, French and Greek, I have reviewed the most important and detailed studies in the form of a paraphrase, but I have also provided my own evaluations. The picture that emerges from this critical and comprehensive review is opposite to that currently entertained in the manuals of Patrology, inasmuch as it is shown that the majority of the critics have upheld the Athanasian paternity of the two APO!

The second part of the dissertation deals afresh with the question of authorship. Here I have sought to examine all the data provided by the texts, paying special attention to the vocabulary, the phraseology and the contents of the treatises under investigation in a comprehensive manner. To this end I have provided complete Concordances of both treatises in order to facilitate the investigation. Müller's Lexicon Athanasianum was useful here, but I found that I had to make

Concordances to individual works of Athanasius, particularly ^{to} ~~es~~ his following treatises, INC, CAR1-5, SER1-4, ANT, EPI, ADEL, MAX, and, of course of AP01, AP02, and APOLL. Obviously it is quite impossible to append these Concordances to the dissertation, since they run, literally, into several thousands of pages! They are stored in a disk at Durham University and could be easily made available. The only regret in this investigation is the absence of a critical Athanasian text, which has not yet appeared, though it has been announced as forthcoming by Professor Tetz of Bochum University. As for the text of AP01 and AP02, I am grateful to Professor Tetz for assuring me that the Greek Mss do not exhibit many divergencies but that the only noticable difference appears in the old Latin version preserved in Cod. S. Marco 584.

Particular emphasis has been paid on the theological section of the second part of the dissertation. The key questions concerning the death and the soul of Christ, or Christology as a whole, have been thoroughly investigated with reference to both, the texts of Athanasius and the expositions of the scholars. The well known essay of the renowned French patristic scholar, the late Marcel Richard, on the psychology of Christ in the Arian-Athanasian debate, which has become a common place in every essay on Athanasius' Christology, has been analysed and critically assessed in detail for the first time. Finally, a review of the contemporary interpretation of Athanasius' Christology is provided with the view to making suggestions for a re-appraisal of the whole subject.

I would like to acknowledge here my gratitude to various scholars who assisted me in my research. First and foremost I should mention Professor T.F. Torrance of Edinburgh who suggested this topic to me and

acted as my supervisor for two years. It is from him and from Father George Florovsky of blessed memory, that I learned to give the priority to the Fathers themselves and their texts together with the available historical data, attempting to understand them primarily out of themselves and only secondarily from their interpreters. Interpretations and points of view on the Fathers and generally Patristic Theology, however important and valuable and even necessary they may be, should never substitute a detailed study of the texts and the primary sources. Such substitution would entail a serious abrogation of academic objectivity. Indeed, all interpretations, including one's own, should be tested again and again on the ground of the actual texts and historical data and also the thought world of the given authors, by means of a rigorous scientific investigation and interrogation. Textual criticism and study of thought should never be divorced, but as word and thought are inseparable, likewise these two should complement each other in any attempt to determine the truth of a given case.

I must also express my gratitude to Dr. I.A. Moir of New College Edinburgh, Dr. Nigel Palmer of Oriel College, Oxford, Dr. H.F. Tibbals of the Computer Unit at Durham (now in Euston, Texas) and Dr. M. Lamont of the Department of Computing at Durham (now at Newcastle) for assisting me in the programming and use of Computers in the compilation of my Athanasian Concordances. Last, but not least, I am grateful to my colleague at Durham University, Gerald Bonner, for all his encouragement and assistance.

Abbey House, Durham
18 January, 1983, The feast of St Athanasius and St Cyril.

G.D.D.

I

THE HISTORY OF CRITICISM

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1. The first studies

The Greek texts of Saint Athanasius were collected and circulated from the middle of the fifth century onwards, usually in two groups of writings, the apologetic and the dogmatic.⁽¹⁾ The two principal collections of Patriarch Photius of Con/ple (9th c.) and of Nicholas Doxapatres(11th c.) formed the basis for the Mss which were utilised in the production of the first printed editions of the Greek text which appeared in Europe in the seventeenth century.⁽²⁾ The first printed edition, produced by the Calvinist Jerome Commelin and edited by Peter Felckmann at Heidelberg in 1601, saw the light of various editions, notably that of 1627 (Paris) and 1686 (Cologne). The decisive edition was produced by the French Benedictine scholar Bernard de Montfaucon and his Maurist collaborators Antoine Pouget and Jacques Loppin at Paris in 1698. This edition reprinted with additions by N. A. Giustiniani at Padua in 1777 is identical with the text which was incorporated in the well known Patrologia Greca of J.P.Migne published at Paris in 1857. J.C.Thilo's edition of the principal dogmatic texts of St Athanasius, published at Leipzig in 1853 was also based on Montfaucon's text.⁽³⁾ In all these collections and editions the two treatises Contra Apollinarem (AP01&2) were included as authentic Athanasian works.

Montfaucon's edition provided one of the first critical introductions to AP01&2 and was reprinted in Thilo's and Migne's editions. Its four paragraphs stress the following

points:

(i) There are a number of external witnesses to the Athanasian paternity of AP01&2. These include Proclus's speech at the Synod of Con/ple in A.D. 553, where reference is made to "books of St Athanasius against Apollinaris"; Leontius' book "Against the frauds of the Apollinarists", which actually cites from the two APO; the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Synod of Con/ple (A.D. 680/1), which also quote from APO as from Athanasian writings, and finally the explicit citations from the same treatises included in the writings of John Maxentius and John of Damascus.

(ii) A two-fold argument can be construed in defence of the Athanasian origin of AP01&2. On the one hand the many and ancient codices unanimously ascribe these documents to Saint Athanasius and on the other hand their diction is unmistakably Athanasian. The argument from diction is supported by means of three examples: (a) In the first treatise (AP01,6) the author refutes the error of those who argue for a heavenly body in Christ on the ground that it is worshipped with Him, in the same way and even by the same words as in Athanasius' letter to Adelphius (ADEL). (b) In AP01,10 the statement $\tau\acute{\iota} \tau\omicron\iota\upsilon\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\phi\epsilon\sigma\theta\epsilon$ 'Απειανοῖς finds its exact parallel, almost verbatim, in Athanasius' letter to Epictetus (EPI). (c) Similarly AP01,12 contains the Orthodox accusation against the Apollinarists that the latter believe in a "quaternity" rather than the Trinity

(τετράδαν ἀντί τριάδος ἑμολογοῦντες) which also appears in Athanasius' letter to Epictetus (EPI). On the whole, Montfaucon argues, if one was to compare AP01 and AP02 with the other Athanasian writings and especially with EPI, ADEL, and MAX, he would find so many passages with similarities, that he would be compelled to conclude that they derived from the same author.

(iii) AP01&2 do contain certain phrases and terms which are not found in Athanasius' earlier writings. This, however, is to be expected, since, whenever new heresies arise, new words and new sentiments are bound to appear in the writings of the disputants. In the case of AP01&2 the neologies are slight and therefore no conjecture of νοθεΐα should be deduced, especially if one keeps in mind that it is a friend who is being answered here and who had probably reviewed for St Athanasius his discussions with the Apollinarists. In his reply Athanasius does not adopt sentiments of his own but those of his friend and the 'Apollinarists', so that he almost becomes one of those who are disputing. This is more apparent in the beginning of AP01, but subsequently, none to whom the style of Athanasius is well known, would fail to notice that it is the great bishop of Alexandria who is speaking here.

(iv) Lastly, Montfaucon offers a brief and general discussion of the contents of AP01&2. The point of dispute is the Person of Christ who is erroneously conceived by

the Apollinarists (Christi personam errarent Apollinaristae). In fact, there is no unanimity on the subject among them; some are of the opinion that the Logos of God assumed flesh only in appearance, while others suppose that the human mind, being addicted to sins and evil thoughts was least of all assumed by the Logos; this was in fact the bond of friendship of the sect of the Apollinarists, which under pressure from the Orthodox was modified by the admission of a 'vital soul' in Christ.

This is briefly the way in which the Benedictine editors of Athanasius' texts thought of AP01&2. Montfaucon dealt with them again in his extensive Vita Sancti Athanasii and dated them in the year 372, i.e. one year after the composition of EPI. (4)

Other early critical introductions to AP01&2 are to be found in the works of L.-S. Le Nain de Tillemont⁽⁵⁾ C. R. Ceillier,⁽⁶⁾ D. Schram,⁽⁷⁾ and others. All of them regarded the two treatises in question as genuine Athanasian productions.

Tillemont discussed the two APO in the eighth volume of his magnum opus under the general rubric, "divers écrits de Saint Athanase sur l' Incarnation contre les Apollinaristes". He regarded them as Athanasian on the basis of the external witnesses and placed their composition in the year 369. He ended his account with the observation that Athanasius in no one of his anti-Apollinarist writings mentioned the name of Apollinaris because the latter had not yet

declared himself an opponent of the Church. This, Tillemont wrote, was supported by an existing fragment of a letter of Apollinaris to Serapion, mentioned by Leontius, which indicated his approval of Athanasius' EPI; also, it was supported by the fact (reported by Facundus) that Athanasius had recommended to Damasus of Rome Timothy the disciple of Apollinaris, who later became one of the strongest opponents of the Orthodox.

Ceillier's discussion of AP01&2 assumes that they were written by Athanasius in 372, as Montfaucon had suggested. Ceillier began with the observation that the manner of commencement in AP01 is common with that exhibited in the other Athanasian writings. But, since the treatise was a response to a friend, who had asked certain questions regarding Apollinarist errors, Athanasius made use of the expressions of his friend and of those of the Apollinarists with whom he was in dispute. Hence, the variety in style which marks the beginning of this treatise. In all the rest, however, Ceillier wrote, the genius of Athanasius is apparent. This is confirmed by the witnesses of Leontius of Byzantium, Proclus of Con/ple, John Damascenus and John Maxentius. The fact that Apollinaris is not mentioned can be explained by the fact that he had not declared himself as defender of the various doctrines which Athanasius combats. Ceillier's account concludes with a brief examination of the contents of AP01&2 which enumerates the mistakes combatted and the

positive arguments employed by Athanasius.

In D. Schram's work no doubts are expressed as regards the Athanasian origin of the two APO. The tradition of the codices together with the similarity of their contents to those of EPI, MAX and ADEL are regarded as sufficient evidence. Schram's study is remarkable for its lucid and orderly exposition of the contents of the two treatises. This exposition and that of Abraham Scultet⁽⁸⁾ constitute the best presentation of the structure and contents of APO.

The Athanasian authorship of AP01&2 was upheld by the majority of Athanasian scholars during the nineteenth century until its closing decades. A J. Möhler, writing his great study of Athanasius' dispute with the Arians, assumed their authenticity.⁽⁹⁾ In England, John Henry Newman, who had established himself as the best Athanasian scholar of the country in the first part of the nineteenth century, was of the same opinion. This was made apparent in his famous two volume translation of the Contra Arianos (CAR1-4) as well as in his other Patristic essays, especially that on Apollinarism.⁽¹⁰⁾ Particularly telling are the extensive annotations of Newman to his translation of CAR1-4, in which AP01&2 are cited alongside with other Athanasian works and establish many important literary and theological connections.

In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the great Athanasian scholars in England, William Bright and Archibald Robertson remain firm on the traditional view

concerning the authorship of APO1&2, in spite of the critical questions which are being raised against it in Germany. Bright was responsible for the volume Later Treatises of St Athanasius Archbishop of Alexandria with notes, Oxford 1881, in the series "A Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church anterior to the division of the East and West" edited by E.P. Pusey. Apart from the two APO this volume included introductions and translations with extensive footnotes of Athanasius' ANT, JOV, EPI, ADEL, and MAX. In the introduction to APO1&2, Bright supplied a short but well-documented and useful exposition of Apollinarism and the time of its commencement and made the following perceptive remarks about the two treatises:

" The two books 'Against Apollinaris' were against a number of Apollinarian opinions as held by a school or party; and the venerable writer, who seems in some passages to have left his first draft uncorrected, refrains from censuring his former friend by name. Referring to doubts which had been entertained as to the genuineness of the work the Benedictines say that its affinity to the letters to Epictetus, Adelpius and Maximus is so manifest as to be decisive ". (11)

Robertson's work of saint Athanasius in the Library of the Nicene/post-Nicene Fathers also upheld the traditional view. His crucial remarks are the following:

" The Athanasian authorship has been doubted chiefly on the ground of certain peculiar ex-

pressions in the opening of Book I; a searching investigation of the question has not been made, but on the whole the favourable verdict of Montfaucon holds the field. He lays stress on the affinity of the work to Letters 59-61 (EPI, ADEL, and MAX). I would add that the studious omission of any personal reference to Apollinaris is highly characteristic⁽¹²⁾.

2. The First critics and their successors

2.1 JOHANNES DRÄSEKE

The first challenge to the Athanasian authorship of the two APO was advanced by the German scholar Johannes Dräseke in 1889. Dräseke wrote an essay entitled "Zwei Gegner des Apollinaris" which appeared in his volume of independent essays, Gesammelte Patristische Untersuchungen.⁽¹³⁾ The same essay also appeared in the periodical Theologische Studien und Kritiken under the title "Athanasiana, Untersuchungen über die unter Athanasios Namen überlieferten Schriften wider Apollinaris von Laodicea".⁽¹⁴⁾ The "Zwei Gegner" are Didymus the Blind of the Catechetical School of Alexandria and Ambrose, Athanasius' pupil, who, according to Dräseke were the authors of APO2 and APO1 respectively. Since this is the first critical work against the Athanasian authorship of APO1 and APO2, its argumentation will be closely examined.

Dräseke begins with the external historical evidences for the authorship of AP01&2. He mentions the Synod of Constantinople of AD 680 which names AP01 as *περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως λόγος καὶ κατὰ Ἀπολλιναρίου*, and AP02 as *δεύτερος λόγος κατὰ Ἀπολλιναρίου*. He then refers to John of Damascus, who quotes from AP01 as from *λόγος κατὰ Ἀπολλιναρίου* (De Orthod. Fidei, III, 6) and as *λόγος περὶ σαρκώσεως*. He also mentions the Codices Basiliensis and Anglicanus, which had been followed by the Benedictine editors of Athanasius' Opera in the Paris edition of 1698, which referred to AP01 as *περὶ τῆς σαρκώσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ κατὰ Ἀπολλιναρίου*, and to AP02 as *περὶ τῆς σαρκώδους ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ*...

In spite of isolated doubts, he remarks, the Benedictines accepted the genuineness of these witnesses and maintained the Athanasian authorship of these writings. Their view was adopted by all subsequent students of Athanasius, including the Germans, Voigt, Hagenbach, Dorner and Kölling. Voigt accepted the genuineness of AP01&2 on the basis of their general similarity to EPI, which, according to Voigt's opinion had been written against "Apollinarism". Dorner held that AP01&2 combatted "Apollinaristic" notions and not Apollinaris' own teachings and he dated them c. AD 371. Dräseke's objection to Dorner's view is connected with Proclus' testimony which states that AP01&2 were written after the death of Apollinaris, i.e. after 395. But it is to Böhringer that Dräseke turns to borrow arguments for his first thesis which argues that AP01 and AP02 could not have been written by the same author, in spite of the report of the Acts of the Vth ecumenical Synod of Constantinople which suggest that AP02 is a continuation

of AP01. Following Böhlinger again, Dräseke listed three main reasons in support of his thesis respecting the diversity of authors. (i) AP01 was addressed to a particular man who is called ἀγαπητός, but AP02 has no such addressee. (ii) AP01 has introduction and conclusion but AP02 has not. (iii) The accounts concerning the Christology of the heretics attacked in AP01 and AP02 are very similar. They would have been unnecessary had they been written by the same author, because only one of them would have sufficed. Dräseke seeks to strengthen yet further the diversity of authors by referring to diversity in style and textual notifications. He compares AP01,3 to AP02,4 (a question of norm), AP01,22 to AP02,19 (a question of epistemology) and AP01,13 to AP02,14 (a question of theology and particularly the meaning of death) and finds apparent inconsistencies which suggest diversity of authors. Then, he proceeds one step further, as he puts it, contesting that these treatises not only did not originate from a common author, but neither could have derived from Athanasius.

Dräseke seeks to support this contention by means of a three-fold argument. Firstly he argues about the doubtful character of the external witnesses to the Athanasian authorship of AP01 & AP02. Secondly, he contests that the style of AP01&2 is non-Athanasian and lastly, he argues that the two treatises could not have been written before Athanasius' death because they presuppose a document which was written after AD 375.

As regards the doubtful character of the external witnesses, Dräseke refers mainly to Proclus' mistake. Proclus referred to AP01&2 as works of Athanasius in his speech at the Synod of Constantinople of 553, and he added that they had been

written after the death of Apollinaris! That he was clearly mistaken is shown by the fact that Apollinaris died in AD 390(according to Caspari and Voigt) or 392(Jerome) whereas Athanasius died in 373. In trying to explain why Proclus made such a mistake, Dräseke asserts that by the time of Proclus AP01&2 had been placed in the Athanasian body of writings and hence many were deceived. This was also the case with Leontius who must have found them in an Athanasian collection and did not occur to him that they might have been inserted into it for some reason. To strengthen the possibility of deliberate ascription of AP01&2 to Athanasius, Dräseke refers to the well known frauds of the Apollinarists who circulated Apollinaris' works under the name of Athanasius. So successful was the fraud, Dräseke contends, that even Cyril was deceived. So, he argues that, if Cyril could have been deceived about non-Athanasian works, how much more could this be the case with Proclus and Leontius who were further removed from the time of Athanasius? In view of this, Dräseke concludes that the external evidences do not really support the Athanasian authorship of AP01&2.

As regards the argument from style which was positively employed by the Benedictines, Dräseke expresses his scepticism. Style, he argues, can be very deceptive. The three examples adduced by Montfaucon in his admonitio (the parallel between AP01,6 and ADEL; the expression τὶ τοίνυν μέμπεσθε Ἀρειανούς, and the idea of "quaternity", τετραάς), and his general observation that AP01&2 are in content and form parallel to EPI, ADEL and MAX, can be explained in other ways and not merely by supposing identity of authorship. Why should we,

look, Dräseke asks, to EPI for the idea of "quaternity" and not to Gregory Nyssen's Antirretikos, 42, which supplies us with another clear parallel? Dräseke further contests that Montfaucon's first example can be explained, as Böhringer had suggested, with reference to a student of Athanasius who had used the letter to Adelphius. This possibility seems to Dräseke to be more probable than Montfaucon's. So, he concludes that the stylistic parallels between AP01&2 and other genuine works of Athanasius do not prove identity of authorship.

But it is the third argument which Dräseke puts forward as his strongest weapon against the traditional view regarding the Athanasian authorship of AP01&2. AP01&2 are based on documents, which were published after Athanasius' death and this must be taken as decisive for the rejection of their alleged Athanasian origin. Dräseke points out that this remarkable fact has not been noted by Athanasian scholars because the study of Apollinaris' chronology and particularly the chronology of his works had not been previously undertaken. To this issue he turns next and makes the following points.

Voigt's and even Böhringer's observations were faulty precisely on the point that they did not clarify the order in which the Apollinarian works were written. Voigt was able to point out the parallels between AP01&2 and Gregory Nyssen's Antirretikos, but he did not notice that these passages were based on writings of Apollinaris which had been written after the death of Athanasius. Böhringer's work is equally deficient at this point, because he discussed Apollinarism before discussing the council of AD 362 held at Alexandria. He failed to see that Apollinaris' teaching was developed

much later. Had it occurred to Voigt and Böhringer that Apollinaris' works combated in APOL&2 had been written after the death of Athanasius they would have long ago determined the non-Athanasian derivation of these writings. Dräseke was conscious here that his argument could be turned back to him, because the same conclusions could be reached about EPI, ADEL and MAX which in spite of the parallels with Apollinaris' works (particularly the later ones) were undoubtedly Athanasian. So he was careful to suggest that the notions combated in EPI, ADEL and MAX were not Apollinaris' but his disciples'. To strengthen his case here he refers to Apollinaris' letter to Serapion which expressed his approval of EPI.

But Dräseke's main contention here is the late development of the Apollinarian heresy and the late production of his heretical Christological works. In support of this contention he advances various proofs which are lifted from his extensive book on Apollinaris. He refers to Apollinaris' letter to Basil written about 362 which (Dräseke had argued elsewhere was to be considered as genuine) made no reference to Christological deviation. He also refers to Athanasius' Tome to the Antiochenes (ANT) which, to Dräseke's mind does not indicate any disputation against Apollinaris on Athanasius' part. Then, he also points out that in the 360s Apollinaris was busy arguing against Eunomius and had not developed his Christological notions which occurred one decade later, viz. the late 370s. Besides, in 373 Basil does not register any complaint against Apollinaris and as late as 376 he expresses his love for Apollinaris to Patrophilus.

In addition to Basil, Dräseke mentions Epiphanius.

Epiphanius, writing his Panarion in 376, did not know of the divergence of Apollinaris. He quoted the teachings of Apollinaris, which he had learnt from his pupils, but referred to him in a complimentary fashion, and his way of writing indicated that he was disposed to believe that Apollinaris' pupils had not been able to understand the deep thoughts of their learned and competent teacher. These statements from such a heresy hunter like Epiphanius are only comprehensible, says Dräseke, if he had not read the Apodeixis, Apollinaris' major Christological work. Other evidence from Epiphanius is his query concerning Basil's view on Apollinaris' Christology sent in 376, which at that time had begun to gain support - a request which had not actually been answered by Basil owing to "illness and tiredness of disputes". Before Epiphanius' letter, Basil had received a similar letter from two monks from the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem who raised questions about Apollinaris' Christological notions. In his answer Basil had refused to make any additions to the Nicene Creed on the point of the Incarnation and encouraged the monks to make peace, rebuking them in a mild manner for defending Apollinaris' notions or explaining them in such a way that he could not be condemned. The demand of these monks for a Christological addition to be introduced into the Nicene Creed regarding the doctrine of the Incarnation had arisen as a result of their reading Apollinaris' Apodeixis - a fact not known to Basil. So Dräseke concludes that on the assumption that the Apodeixis was written in 376 and that it was known to the authors of AP01 and AP02, Athanasius could not have been one of them. Dräseke feels that the first part of his assumption, i.e. the publication of Apollinaris' Apodeixis in 376, has been

plausibly defended. But the second part of his assumption, namely, that the authors of APO1 and APO2 knew and used the Apodeixis, remains still to be shown. It is to this that he turns next and develops the most complicated and elaborate part of his essay.

First of all he observes that the author of APO1 does not attack Apollinaris himself, but the Apollinarists, and he substantiates this by adducing examples from chapters 9, 10, and 7. This is ascertained by the consideration that some of the key-notions attacked in APO1, such as the homouousia of the "flesh" to the Godhead, or the heavenly derivation of the "flesh", had already been attacked by Athanasius in his EPI, and in fact Apollinaris had expressed his full approval of Athanasius' refutation as he confessed in his letter to Serapion. It would therefore be unfair to attribute these notions to Apollinaris himself. It is true, however, that the prominent ecclesiastics at that time, did not know how far these, or such notions, were Apollinaris', or his disciples'. Dräseke also mentions the case of the two Gregories (Nazianzen and Nyssen) who, in their great zeal to combat Apollinarism, accused Apollinaris of heresies for which he had not been responsible. Dräseke dwells on this point and attempts to substantiate it yet further by citing and comparing texts from Gregory Nyssen's Antirretikos attributing certain notions to Apollinaris and texts from Apollinaris' letters to Dionysios and Terentius which show that such notions found him fundamentally critical.

But APO1 did not simply combat Apollinaristic notions derived from Apollinaris' disciples. It also included

the refutation of notions derived from Apollinaris' great book, the Apodeixis. This is obviously the most crucial point in Dräseke's argument and as such it ought to be as clear and as lucid as possible. Yet, Dräseke does not exhibit this desirable clearness and lucidity. This becomes apparent in his statement which follows his crucial claim that AP01 also combats notions deriving from the Apodeixis. He states that these notions "are not reproduced literally but freely". In other words he admits that he cannot produce direct literary evidence, but can only provide indirect allusions. Yet he claims that these allusions are to be considered sufficient illustrations, or even proofs, of his point! In fact, he mentions only three such allusions. First of all, he refers to the notion of the "quaternity" which is found in AP01,12 and also appears in the Apodeixis. Secondly, he refers to the notion of the "uncreated flesh", which is found in the Apodeixis and also appears in AP01,3-6 and in Gregory Nyssen's Antirretikos being there misrepresented (on the evidence of Apollinaris' Κατὰ Μέρος Πόστις and his Letters to Flavianus and Diodorus written after AD 373). But these allusions do not really support Dräseke's argument since - as he himself has acknowledged in the same essay - the notions contained in them also appear in the genuine Athanasian writings and are duly censured.

The third allusion in support of Dräseke's claim is somewhat more substantial, or at least can be considered as such, because, in spite of its indirect character, it contains a notion that appears in the Apodeixis and not in any genuine "anti-Apollinarianistic" work of Athanasius. This allusion is the statement that "instead of the inner man in us there was in Christ a heavenly mind" - a statement which certainly goes back to

Apollinaris and occupies the entire second part of APOI to be discussed and refuted. Dräseke claims that the author of APOI, who refrains from addressing Apollinaris himself, but addresses the Apollinarists instead, has most certainly borrowed this notion from Apollinaris' Apodeixis. Yet his claim is considerably weakened by the acknowledgement that "this sentence does not appear in so many words in Gregory Nyssen's refutation of the Apodeixis". In support of his claim Dräseke refers to "allusions" from the Apodeixis as the latter is reconstructed from Nyssen's Antirretikos. He cites the following two texts: Πῶς Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται μὴ μεταβληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι Θεός, εἰ μὴ νοῦς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ κατέστη (Antirretikos, 56); Also, οὐκοῦν ἴσος ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐστὶν τῇ θεότητι, εἴπερ καθὼς φησὶ ὁ Ἀπολλινάριος, νοῦς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεία φύσις ἐγένετο (ibid. 1). Dräseke observes that Gregory's refutation does not deal with Apollinaris' ideas extensively, as the numerous fragments of the Apodeixis preserved elsewhere indicate. Such fragments come from the anti-Apollinarian works of Gregory of Nazianzus who knew only two writings of Apollinaris, the Treatise on the Trinity and the Apodeixis. Nazianzen's references to the Apodeixis indicate that Apollinaris must have extensively developed in it the notion of the substitution of the mind by the Logos. Here he cites another example from Nazianzen which clearly illustrates his point: εἴτα κατασκευάζει τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀνωθεν ἤκοντα τὸν νοῦν μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν θεότητα τοῦ μονογενοῦς, τὴν τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν ἀναπληρώσαν μέρους γενέσθαι τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου συγκράματος τὸ τριτημόριον, ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντων, νοῦ δὲ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐκείνου τρόπον ἀναπληροῦντος.

This extract clearly indicates that Apollinaris used the expression "heavenly mind", which is found in APO. Dräseke stresses here the fact that this notion was connected with Apollinaris' exegesis of I Corinthians 15:47, which was also included in his Apodeixis. To substantiate this point, and particularly the Apollinaristic understanding of the Pauline expression ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος as equivalent to νοῦς οὐράνιος, he refers to a fragment from Apollinaris' works which has been preserved in Leontius: Ζῶν δὲ Χριστὸς σῶμα θεόπνουν καὶ πνεῦμα ἐν σαρκὶ θεϊκόν, νοῦς οὐράνιος, οὗ μετασχεῖν εὐχόμεθα κατὰ τὸ "ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν". The same point is made in another extract from Apollinaris to the Bishops of Diochaesarea: Ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν, οὐκ εἰς ἄνθρωπον ἅγιον ἐπιδοδημηκέναι τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον, ὅπερ ἦν ἐν προφήταις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τὸν Λόγον σάρκα γεγενῆσθαι, μὴ ἀνειληφότα νοῦν ἀνθρώπινον, νοῦν τρεπόμενον καὶ αἰχμαλωτιζόμενον λογισμοῖς ρυπαροῖς, ἀλλὰ θεῖον ὄντα νοῦν ἄτρεπτον οὐράνιον. These texts certainly show that the notion of the heavenly mind combated in APO1 is Apollinarian, but do not establish literary connections between APO1 and Apollinaris' Apodeixis. Yet, according to Dräseke, such literary connection must be inferred!

The same type of argument is developed by Dräseke concerning APO2. He adduces two texts from APO2 and compares them to two texts from Apollinaris' Apodeixis (the first from the fragments of the Apodeixis preserved in Theodoret and the second from the fragments of the same work preserved in Nyssen's Antirretikos), implying that they are clearly parallels and therefore constitute proofs of his claim that APO2 was based on the Apodeixis. But the texts are allusions

of an indirect nature and not direct quotations.

This can be seen in the texts themselves:

1)
Apollinaris

Τὸ μὲν οὖν "Κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου" ὡς πρὸς ἄνθρωπον λέγει· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἀεὶ καθημένου ἐπὶ θρόνου δόξης, καθὸ Θεὸς Λόγος εἴρηται μετὰ τὴν ἄνοδον τὴν ἐκ γῆς· ἀλλὰ τῷ νῦν εἰς τὴν ἐπουράνιον ὑψωθέντι δόξαν καθὸ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς οἱ ἀπόστολοι λέγουσιν· "Οὐ γὰρ Δαβὶδ ἀνέβη εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς· λέγει δὲ αὐτὸς, εἶπεν ὁ Κύριος τῷ Κυρίῳ μου, κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου" ἄνθρωπον μὲν τῷ πρόσταγμα, ἀρχὴν τῆ καθέδρα διδοῦν· θεῖον δὲ τὸ ἀξίωμα τὸ συγκαθῆσθαι Θεῷ, ἡ λειτουργοῦσιν αἱ χίλια χιλιάδες καὶ παραστήκουσιν αἱ μύρια μυριάδες [καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα.] Οὐ γὰρ ὡς Θεῷ ὑποτάσσει τοὺς ἐχθρούς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ ὥστε τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ Θεὸν ὁρώμενον καὶ ἄνθρωπον.

2)

Τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τουτέστι τὸν νοῦν Θεὸν ἔχων ὁ Χριστὸς μετὰ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐλκότως ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ λέγεται. Καὶ ὁ Παῦ-

AP02

Ἄσύμφωνος τοίνυν ταῖς ἀγίαις γραφαῖς ὁ ὄρος ὑμῶν, καὶ ἀνάμοστος τῆς πληρωθείσης οἰκονομίας ἢ γνώμη ὑμῶν. καὶ τὸ "Κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου" οὐκ ἀνθρώπου μὲν ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ Θεοῦ. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀξίωμα ἀνθρώπου ἀξίωμα γέγονεν, ἵνα τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀξίωμα Θεοῦ ἀξίωμα πιστευθῆ, εἴρηται "Κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου" καὶ "Δόξασόν με Πάτερ, τῆ ἀιδίῳ δόξῃ", οὐ χωρισθεὶς τῆς δόξης τοῦτο λέγει, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀδόξῳ σώματι γεγονώς, ἵνα δείξῃ οὐ χωριζομένην τῆς θεικῆς δόξης τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφήν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ἐπιδεικνυμένην.

Ἐπουράνιος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Κύριος, οὐχὶ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιδειξάμενος, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ γῆς ἐπουράνιον συστησάμενος

λος τὸν πρῶτον Ἀδάμ ψυχὴν διὸ καὶ οἶος ἐπουράνιος, τοιοῦ-
καλεῖ μετὰ σώματος οὔσαν. τοι καὶ οἱ ἐπουράνιοι κατὰ τὴν
Ἀλλὰ ὁ δεῦτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ αὐτοῦ μετοχὴν τῆς ἀγιότητος, διὸ
οὐρανοῦ πνευματικὸς λέγεται. καὶ οἰκείωται τὰ τοῦ σώματος.
οἶος γὰρ ὁ ἐπουράνιος, τοιοῦ-
τοι καὶ οἱ ἐπουράνιοι.

The first case seems to exhibit some parallels but the second does not. In any case the texts cannot be used as proofs of literary connections. Yet Dräseke draws the conclusion that the texts in column B imply knowledge of the texts in column A, which means that the author of APO2 was arguing against the Apodeixis and therefore he could in no way be identified with Athanasius.

The final chapter in Dräseke's study addresses itself to the question of possible authors. First he establishes the view that APO1 and APO2 must have originated in Alexandria. Then he recalls Böhringer's suggestion that they could have been written by pupils of Athanasius. The very fact that they had been included in the collection of Athanasius' works indicates their Alexandrian origin. They were attributed to Athanasius, because they were written simultaneously and both presented similarities with Athanasian writings, such as EPI, ADEL and MAX. They were also transmitted together and fitted very well the commonly accepted picture of Athanasius as the protector of the Church's faith from heresy. With regard to the Alexandrian origin of these documents Dräseke discusses the mysterious Rhetorius who is mentioned in APO1, 6. He particularly draws attention to his designation κατὰ λεγόμενον and recalls the views of Fabricius, who had identified Rhetorius with the rhetorician

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Themistius on the grounds of the latter's teaching that the Divinity was pleased in multiplicity of speculations on divine matters. But Dräseke rules out this view as a possibility, because Themistius was a contemporary of Athanasius and the note would imply an earlier figure. For the same reason, Dräseke rejects the possibility of Rhetorius being Didymus' son (in Libanius). However he regards Philasterus of Brescia's report on Rhetorius as the man who praised all heretics (De Haeresibus, xci) as supporting the reference to him in AP01 and therefore rejects Augustine's suggestion that Philasterus was mistaken about Rhetorius. The reference to Rhetorius however places AP01 in Alexandria. As regards AP02, Dräseke asserts that although it does not supply any internal allusions to an Alexandrian milieu, it is in fact, as Montfaucon had also pointed out, closer to Athanasius than AP01. On this account, it must be placed in an Alexandrian setting. Having specified Alexandria as the home of the two treatises, Dräseke turns to their contents to find clues regarding their authors. He observes that their primary concern is not to refute Apollinaris' teaching but to combat various errors, which are to some extent related to Apollinaris, and particularly to offer as complete as possible a defence of the Christian Faith! He describes AP01&2 as summae of Christian Dogmatics on the basis of AP01,1 and AP02,4. This description fits the picture of Ambrosius' (Athanasius' disciple) De Dogmatibus adversus Apollinarem or Didymus' De Dogmatibus which are both mentioned by Jerome in his De viris illustribus. Dräseke is aware that there are several problems connected with this suggestion and tries to alleviate them. The volumen multorum versuum

mentioned by Jerome with regard to Ambrose's work seems to be hardly applicable to the case of APO, but it should not be ruled out as impossible, because the standards of that period with regard to literary bulk were quite different from the modern ones. In the case of Didymus, Dräseke refers to his De Trinitate and to the allusions contained therein to antiapollinaristic writings. He acknowledges that the linguistic analysis does not contribute very much to the Didymian attribution, but Mingarelli's analysis of the Didymian method of argumentation certainly does. Particularly important here is Didymus' habit of moving from topic to topic without linking them together, the dialectical form of his arguments, and the fact that Apollinaris is not mentioned in his writings as an opponent. The Stoic elements of APO1 and the detailed references to the Manichaeans also fit the picture of Didymus, and so does the fact that the views of the opponents are all summed up in the beginning of the treatise and then refuted - a fact fitting Didymus' blindness. Lastly, the Didymian hypothesis is strengthened by the Origenism of the author of APO1 which comes up in a general sense in chapter 5 and especially in the appraisal of the universal effect of Christ's death - a doctrine peculiar to Didymus as the reasearch of Hagenbach has shown.

With these ascriptions, APO1 to Didymus and APO2 to Ambrosius, Dräseke concludes his study recalling again his main theses:

- 1) that APO1 and APO2 were written by different authors,
- 2) that neither of them could have been written by Athanasius,
- 3) that both of them originated in Alexandria,
- 4) that their possible authors were Didymus and Ambrose.

Our critical assessment of Dräseke's essay can only be brief, because it is to a large extent satisfactorily provided in the works of competent scholars who took up the research on the question of authorship and continued the argumentation for or against the Athanasian ascription in works which will be reviewed hereafter. First of all, Dräseke's thesis that APO1 and APO2 could not have been written by the same author does not seem to us to have been adequately defended. His first two reasons, borrowed from the work of Böhringer, rest on the presupposition that APO2 is a continuation of APO1, a presupposition rejected by Dräseke himself! His third reason, also borrowed from Böhringer, is incorrect, because the notions controverted in APO1 are not similar to those which are refuted in APO2. (The evidence for this will be given later in this work). Dräseke's argument from style and the notification of texts rests on only three examples, and not on an examination of all the data. Montfaucon had found other examples which exhibited similarities suggestive of identity of authors, and Dräseke's argument against them could also be turned against his own examples !

Dräseke's second thesis defending the doubtful character of the external witnesses is weaker still. He does not carefully evaluate all of them, but refers only to Proclus' "chronological error", which, however, is possibly to be explained differently, i.e. as implying circulation of the works in question and not compilation. His reference to the frauds of the Apollinarists as possibly indicating fraud in the case of APO1 and APO2, is totally unacceptable since APO1 and APO2 are not heretical documents, and there is no similar orthodox fraud recorded in this period.

Dräseke's third thesis rests on two assumptions. Firstly, on the assumption that the Apodeixis of Apollinaris was written after the death of Athanasius (he died in AD373), i.e. c.376 or later; and secondly, on the assumption that the authors of APO1 and APO2 were actually arguing against notions of the Apodeixis. But such assumptions are not self-evident and are neither historically nor textually substantiated. On the contrary, they would seem to rest on mere conjectures. The first one is connected with the chronology of the Apollinarian heresy. But this chronology, and particularly the dating of the works of Apollinaris, continues to be obscure to this very day, in spite of new seminal studies on the subject.⁽¹⁵⁾ The second assumption is based on indirect and therefore inadequate evidence, and besides, it is possible, if accepted, that it could be used for redating the Apodeixis, rather than dating the APO1 and APO2. But the evidence is really so inadequate that a lot of room is left for different explanations of the doctrinal connections between APO1&2 and the Apodeixis. The more we examine Dräseke's argument, the more it appears that he constructs it in order to defend a preconceived hypothesis, or at least to put to question a preexisting thesis.

2.2. HERMANN STRÄTER

A few years later Dräseke's hypothesis was challenged by Hermann Sträter, who dealt with the authorship of AP01 and AP02 in the context of his major study of Athanasius' doctrine of Redemption. The treatment is quite extensive and deserves careful study and evaluation.⁽¹⁶⁾

Sträter began his investigation of the authorship of the two APO by indicating their importance for the whole doctrinal question of the Apollinarian Christology and particularly for its relation to the Alexandrian tradition. It was with this in mind that he came to regard the authorship and chronology of AP01&2 as crucial points of research. His first judgment is concerned with the external testimonia to the Athanasian paternity of the two APO, which he regards historically reliable. He mentions the Sixth Ecumenical Synod of Constantinople in AD 680/1 and the testimony of Proclus of Byzantium, and also the testimonies of Leontius of Byzantium, John Maxentius and John Damascenus. He remarks that their reliability was accepted not only by the Benedictine editors of Athanasius' texts, but also by such eminent scholars as Mansi and Möhler. Sträter simply recorded the external witnesses to the Athanasian paternity of AP01&2 and contradicted the opinion of Dräseke, but like the latter he refrained from undertaking a careful and critical evaluation of the actual texts.

Sträter turns next to a discussion of Dräseke's thesis about diversity of authors in the case of AP01 and AP02. He finds it quite untenable and outlines four reasons in support of his judgment. (i) That the basic ideas and the logical development of

thought are the same in APO1 and APO2 (Cf. the case of sin and how it is said to have been abolished in APO1,15 and in APO2,6);(ii) that the teaching about death, and particularly about Christ's descent into hell, is the same in both writings (APO1, 13,14,&17, compared to APO2,14-17); (iii) that the same heretics are cited in both writings as predecessors to the "new heretics" (Arius, Sabellius, Paul of Samosata, Marcion, Manichaeus and Valentinus, APO1, 11,12, 15,20,21, compared to APO2, 3,5,8,12,&19);(iv) that the sources are used in the antirretical arguments of the two writings in the same manner (APO1,15 compared to APO2,4).

Apart from these connections Sträter finds one basic Athanasian idea as the guiding thought of the contents of APO1 and APO2 : the soteriological stand-point for evaluating and developing doctrines (APO1,5,7,14,15,16,17, 18,19, and APO2,6,9,11,13,15,17). He asserts that the author of APO1&2 argues like Athanasius, in that he warns that the neglect of either the divine or the human side of Christ implies an incomplete soteriology. He thinks that Dräseke was wrong in deducing from the similarities of the two works diversity of authors on the grounds that the same author would not have repeated himself, particularly if the APO2 was regarded ,as the Vith ecumenical Synod had stated, as a continuation of APO1. The similarities are not identities and besides, the statement of the Council of Constantinople does not suggest the "continuation" which Dräseke has presented. This latter point is obvious, when one compares the actual titles of the two APO. The former is entitled *Περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως Λόγος* and the latter *Δεύτερος Λόγος*

κατὰ Ἀπολλινάρου (Mansi, l.c. vi, 762 & 754). John Damascenus' references also distinguish between AP01 and AP02, and so do the references of Montfaucon and the Maurists to the Ms. tradition. That the similarities are not identities becomes clear when we compare the contents of AP01 and AP02. The former is written calmly and more systematically than the latter. It is a treatise written to a friend in reply to a request of his, and it clearly has a beginning and an end. AP02 however is written in a more general fashion, and resembles the structure of CAR. This is more apparent in the fact that the heretical notions are individually listed and refuted in AP02 and are never listed together as those of AP01. But even AP01 is not a systematic treatise as Athanasius' juvenalia GENT and INC.

As regards the style of AP01&2, Sträter finds it similar to that of CAR1-3. He points out that the arguments tend to be aphoristic and not strictly systematic and that the same liveliness, "fire" and use of rhetorical figures is exhibited (e.g. CAR3,39 compared to AP01,5). But despite the great similarity in the treatment of AP01 and AP02, the treatment of the subject stands independent, uncontrived and natural. A pupil of Athanasius, who could be considered as a possible author of these treatises, would merely have followed his master more slavishly, and not so freely. So Sträter concludes that "everything in these books is Athanasian, including the free brilliant comprehension and refutation of the false theses".

Sträter seeks to strengthen his conclusions about the Athanasian style with the argument from the Athanasian

conceptuality and doctrine. He asserts that the content of ideas, taken as a whole or in detail, is unmistakably Athanasian, and goes as far as to claim that even if the tradition had not afforded any evidence for determining the authorship of these treatises, the contents themselves would have left no doubt for attributing them to Athanasius.

This claim is strengthened by the following points:

the heresy is attacked in AP01&2 with absolutely the same arguments (in style), the same dogmatic premises and the same Christian consciousness as in CARL-3 and as in EPI, ADEL and MAX. Further there are certain verbal and noetic parallels between AP01&2 and EPI, ADEL and MAX, which, as Montfaucon rightly had observed, point to the same direction (AP01,6// ADEL,3; AP01,12//EPI,8,9; AP02,7//MAX,3). To Sträter nothing in AP01&2 is unworthy of Athanasius. Further, the clear connections between them and EPI, ADEL and MAX place them within the milieu of Athanasius and perhaps in the early 370s.

With these considerations Sträter believes to have shown the inadequacy of Dräseke's first thesis. But with regard to his argument that the notions combated in AP01&2 are post-Athanasian, he acknowledges that closer argumentation is required. It is to this end that he devotes the rest of his essay. Basically he finds the thesis unfounded. He stresses the inadequacy of the historical data regarding the chronology of Apollinaris' writings and particularly the order of their compilation, and points out that no scholar has been able to date with certainty the rise of the Apollinarian error, and especially the introduction of Apollinaris' trichotomic anthropology into his Christological

doctrine. As far as Dräseke's attempt to date Apollinaris' works is concerned, Sträter simply regards it as "a brilliant hypothesis". He does, however, give him credit for certain general observations, as for example his assertion that the trichotomic anthropology came later than the dichotomic. But he believes that specification of dates regarding the transition from the one anthropology to the other, or regarding the publication of the Apodeixis, cannot be supplied with certainty. This is due to a number of obstacles, as for example the ambiguity as to whether Apollinaris' elaborate notions were developed before they were published, and not least to the unclear texts. The unclear text of the Apodeixis is apparent when one attempts to collate into a comprehensive entity the fragments supplied by Gregory Nyssen, Theodoret, Justinian and Anastasius.

Sträter next contests the view that certain notions refuted in AP01 and AP02 arose after 373. He points out that AP01&2 differ from EPI only in the trichotomy of man and the corresponding Christological theory of the replacement of the human spirit by the Logos in Christ. Everything else is mentioned and refuted in the same way, as for example the notion of the "quaternity", or the notion of the "uncreated flesh", or the claim that the "body became identical in nature with the Logos". The notion of the "heavenly mind" does indeed appear in the Apodeixis, as Dräseke has shown by citing various texts; but this occurrence does not rule out an earlier one. Furthermore, Sträter disagrees with Dräseke's date of the composition

of Apollinaris' Apodeixis. He observes that Dräseke's late date is due to his failure to perceive the special Christological position which Apollinaris developed from the middle 360s onwards, and also his failure to distinguish between the time when Apollinaris wrote his works and showed them to a small circle of disciples and friends, and the time when these works became publicly known. At this point Sträter also refers to the Christological statement of the Alexandrian Synod of 362, but refrains from expressing a view as to whether that statement was directed against Apollinaris. He obviously mentions it as supporting indirectly his early dating of the Apollinarian development. This reference leads him to discuss in greater detail the whole issue regarding the Apollinarian chronology by reviewing the existing evidence. His intention is to make a case for an early development of the full Apollinarian scheme and particularly of the application of trichotomic anthropology to Christology.

First of all, he refers to Apollinaris' Confession sent to Jovian in 363, which had falsely been attributed to Athanasius under the title *Περὶ τῆς σαρκώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου*. Sträter quotes the following: 'Ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸν κατὰ πνεῦμα· υἱὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ σάρκα .. ἀποθανὼν μὲν τὸν ἡμέτερον θάνατον κατὰ σάρκα.. ἀθάνατος δὲ καὶ ἀκράτητος τῷ θανάτῳ διαμείνας διὰ τὴν θεότητα, and points out that *πνεῦμα* and *θεότης* are not clearly distinguished in Christ, but seem to be identified. This seems to Sträter a clear allusion to Apollinaris' so-called "later identification of the spirit in Christ with the Logos"

and implies that the full Christological theory peculiar to Apollinaris had been developed in the early 360s.

Sträter makes the same point on the basis of another text of Apollinaris, the Confession, written by him and his pupils a few years after his Confession to Jovian at a certain Apollinarian conciliabulum, a text supplied by Dräseke himself. Σάρκα ὁμοούσιον τῆ ἡμετέρα σαρκί προσείλη - φεν ἀπὸ τῆς Μαρίας ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ ζῶν Λόγος καθ' ἑνωσιν τὴν πρὸς θεότητα ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συλλήψεως τῆς ἐν τῆ κρθεένφ, καὶ οὕτως ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν· ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ γενέσθαι σάρκα τὸν Λόγον, τὸ ἐνωθῆναι πρὸς σάρκα ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπειον πνεῦμα· καλεῖται γὰρ καὶ ὁ καθ' ἡμῶς ἄνθρωπος σὰρξ. Here again it is obvious that in Apollinaris' doctrine of the incarnation there is no distinction between θεότης and πνεῦμα.

Sträter moves next to the 370s. On the basis of Apollinaris' Περὶ Τριάδος and particularly the way in which he refers in this book to the Catholic defenders of the faith (εἵπατε οἱ τὸν Χριστιανισμὸν σχηματιζόμενοι...), Sträter argues that Apollinaris was not in complete harmony with the Orthodox. Now, EPI was written in the 370s at the very latest, and the false theses refuted in this letter are so close to Apollinaris' teaching, that Epiphanius uses the letter in his Panarion as a means of refuting Apollinarism. Indeed, it appears, from the context of the words of Epiphanius, that Athanasius had written EPI against pupils of the Laodicean. The point Sträter wants to make here is that Apollinaris was not on good terms with the Orthodox in the early 370s. To strengthen this point of view even further, he provides some

additional facts. St Basil writes to Meletius in 373 that Apollinaris had been accused of Sabellianism. In 376 the same Basil speaks of numerous works which Apollinaris had written recently, showing that he had read some of them. Epiphanius, who commenced writing his Panarion in 374, according to Petavius wrote section 66 in 376, which suggests that section 77, dealing with Apollinarism and his school, must have been written in 376 or 377. This fact, coupled with Epiphanius' complimentary reports about Apollinaris, has led scholars to the conclusion that Apollinaris developed his heresy in 376/7; but Sträter deduces from this same fact the conclusion that Apollinaris' school only then acquired a special position, having in fact developed much earlier. This is suggested in the presence of a whole series of theses presented and refuted in Epiphanius' account, which are said to derive from pupils of Apollinaris and not Apollinaris himself. At the centre of all these theses, however, was the thesis of Apollinaris himself, and its central characteristic, as Epiphanius presents it in chapter 2ff, was the trichotomic anthropology, and its application to Christology. The account of Epiphanius, taken in its entirety, suggests to Sträter that the Apollinarian school had by 376 grown old, and therefore its roots must be sought in an earlier period.

Sträter is aware that his case for an earlier dating of the Apollinarian breach is open to the objection that the heresy should have been noticed by the great Fathers earlier on. To this he replies by expounding the real character of the Apollinarian school. Apollinaris, he writes, had been gathering pupils around him since the middle of the 360s, but his

school took an isolated position in the Church. Apollinaris' intention was not to divert the faithful from orthodoxy or from from the great Orthodox Fathers. His was principally an exegetical school which taught philosophical and theological techniques from the point of view of Aristotelian dialectics, as Harnack pointed out. The Apollinarists' concern was not the presentation of a special theological system. They rather intended to understand dogma more clearly and apply Greek dialectics to the faith of the Church. Dialectics came first, dogma followed. This is why the theses of the school are manifold and divergent. Most of them were kept within the small circle of the school and their writings were not widely known. Because of this, Apollinarism never became popular and the Apollinaristic works were lost. Arianism flourished under Valens (364-378) when Athanasius went to his fifth exile. The defenders of the teaching of the Church would have welcomed any comrade who would be able to support the cause of Orthodoxy. Apollinaris was such a comrade because of his erudition and dialectical competence. Busying themselves with the refutation of Arianism, the great Fathers simply did not notice Apollinaris' peculiar teachings. Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome, Basil and Damasus all corresponded with Apollinaris. It was only from 370 onwards that the heretical views originating from Apollinaris' school became generally known. The trust between Apollinaris and Athanasius began to waver. We hear laments about the new teaching. Certainly his pupils did not understand all he said and did not draw all the conclusions he had intended. So, we should not be surprised at his acceptance of EPI which, in the eyes of

Apollinaris must have been a misunderstanding of his views. It does not contradict the historical facts and documents to place the Apollinarist threefold division in anthropology and Christology in the last years of Athanasius' life. Even though it only became known in 375/6 that Apollinaris had expressed heretical views about Christ, and even though the Apodeixis became accessible in 376, it is possible that this false doctrine was proposed by the Apollinarists several years earlier and had become known to Athanasius orally, or in writing, compelling him to argue against it. Moreover it is not so surprising if this thesis should not have been mentioned anywhere else in the writings of the early 370s, or that it took time to cause concern in wider circles. Many people have criticized the Apollinarists for attempting to deceive the Orthodox with ambiguous views, particularly concerning the trichotomy and the corresponding teaching regarding the "mind-Logos" in Christology. Though it may be good to leave aside the question of the Apollinarist intentions, it is historically attested that Pope Damasus and Epiphanius considered Vitalis to have been a true believer. Vitalis was the Apollinarian Bishop who recognised the integrity of the two natures in Christ, but was later found to have in fact been contrary to the teaching of the Church because he taught that the human spirit in Christ was replaced by the Logos. Vitalis had accepted a complete humanity in Christ only because of the union of the Logos with it. Without the Logos the humanity of Christ was to him incomplete. Epiphanius writes at this point, that Vitalis τὸν λογισμὸν τὸν ἴδιον ἀπεκάλυπτε τῆς διανοίας.

In the light of this understanding of the Apollinarian development, Sträter concludes that it is possible that Apollinaris put forward his doctrine in his own school unhindered for a long time, and that he expressed it in writings which did not initially become public, and that Athanasius heard of this before his death and responded in his AP01&2.

Lastly, Sträter evaluates the evidence evoked by Dräseke in support of his contention that AP01&2 refute notions which derive from documents written after 373. He feels that since many of these notions (as Dräseke has admitted) are also refuted in EPI, ADEL and MAX, there is no need to refer to later writings of Apollinaris. Further, the texts from AP02 and the Apodeixis relating to Psalm 109,1 do not indicate dependence of the former on the latter, and it must be noted that the one passage states the opposite to that stated in the other. The verse from the Psalm was a favourite one in the school of Apollinaris and was used in writings earlier to the Apodeixis, as for instance in the Confession, which was wrongly attributed to Athanasius, where it was again used in relation to the humanity of Christ. It is quite possible that the same passage was also used in other writings. Athanasius rejects this habit of applying the Psalm passage to the humanity of Christ in an abstract sense. But even if the mutual dependence of the extracts supplied by Dräseke could be proved to be correct, the argument could still be reversed on the view that Apollinaris fights AP02.

Sträter argues that the same consideration applies to the

texts relating to the interpretation of I Cor.15:47.

Νοῦς ἐπουράνιος, ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος were slogans used by Apollinaris and his pupils, just as the Arians had similar ones to be readily used in argument, and therefore cannot be considered as "new notions" first appearing in the Apodeixis.

Sträter adds the fact that Apollinaris is not mentioned in AP01&2, as evidence militating against Dräseke's views concerning their late compilation. If we were to suppose that the books were written after Apollinaris' break with Orthodoxy by two authors who were formerly friends of his, it would be difficult to explain why, unlike Gregory of Nyssa and Epiphanius, they refrained from mentioning the name of Apollinaris. On the contrary, Sträter argues, that on the Athanasian hypothesis it would seem natural that the holy Father, had either heard that the signs of the new teaching had appeared in the writings of his former friend, or had actually read heretical writings by him, written before his break with Orthodoxy, or even that he simply intended to refute a series of false statements, which had been made by various people and particularly by pupils of Apollinaris, without knowing Apollinaris' personal involvement in this heterodoxy.

Sträter's general conclusions are summed up as follows:

- (i) Tradition unanimously attributes the two Books under investigation to St Athanasius.
- (ii) Internal reasons deriving from the character and contents of the Books support the correctness of the Tradition.
- (iii) The counter-arguments supplied by Dräseke are not

insoluble.

(iv) There are no reasons why tradition should be rejected.

(v) The two books were written by Athanasius shortly before his death. In doing this, the great Father of Orthodoxy clearly prepared the battle against Apollinarism, which was to break out a few years later and he left to the Church strong and mighty weapons for this battle.

Sträter's contribution is certainly formidable. He exposes the inadequacies of Dräseke's hypothesis and the questionable character of his argument. He also provides a clear insight into the Apollinarian-Athanasian relationship, which makes the traditional view, in both its ancient and modern form, at least possible and, indeed, more plausible than that of Dräseke. However, Sträter's treatment of the question moves on the same general level as Dräseke's, even though it contains specific references to the text. As such, it is not conclusive, but invites further research.

2.3. ALFRED STÜLCKEN

Four years later, in 1899, Stülcken published his study on St Athanasius entitled: Athanasiana, Literar- und Dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchungen in the Series Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, edited by O. Gebhardt and A. von Harnack. This study consisted of two parts, one dealing with the history of the Athanasian literature (Literarhistorische Fragen) and another with the history of the doctrine of the manhood of Christ according to St Athanasius (dogmengeschichtlicher Teil. Die Menschheit Christi nach Athanasius). In the fourteenth chapter of the first part Stülcken discussed the problem of the authorship of the two treatises "Against Apollinaris" traditionally ascribed to St Athanasius. (17)

First of all he referred to the scholars who had rejected the Athanasian paternity of AP01&2, who had by then exceeded in number those who defended it. J. Dräseke, O. Zöckler, V. Schultze, N. Bonwetsch, A. Engelbrecht, G. Krüger, H. Gelzer, Q. Bardenhewer and Fr. Loofs were against, and F. X. Funk, H. Sträter, Fr. Lauchert were for the Athanasian paternity. Stülcken agreed with Dräseke that the two treatises did not constitute a literary unity, and he referred to the confusion of the order of the writings in the Mss. He also referred to the addressees, who were apparently different persons. He found that the same themes were treated in both writings and the same conclusions reached, but that the order of the particular subjects was different. Like Dräseke, Stülcken considers the similarity of AP01 and AP02 in content as suggestive of diversity of authors.

In the second place Stülken^c argued that the style of APOL&2 was not Athanasian. He remarked that Montfaucon's and Sträter's observations about literary and theological similarities between APOL&2 and the Letters EPI, ADEL and MAX proved nothing but the fact that the authors knew the writings of Athanasius and that they were probably students of his. This was also the case with Sträter's claim that everything in APO was Athanasian, since the "anti-Apollinarianistic" argument of these writings was essentially the anti-Arian argument of Athanasius in regard to the Person of Christ, to the life of the God-man, to the deification of the human nature, and to all other aspects of the Christ-event.

Stülken^c found the beginning of APOL most astonishing and described Montfaucon's and Sträter's explanation (namely, that Athanasius had acquired the style of his addressee) as a desperate one. He argued that it could only be valid if there were at the same time no differences in style and terminology in the rest of the text. But the decisive argument against the Athanasian paternity of APOL&2 was, for Stülken^c, provided by Dräseke. It was the fact that in the two treatises references were made to the texts of Apollinaris which were only written and became known after the death of Athanasius. Stülken^c argues that if in 373 Basil knows nothing of a deviation in the teaching of Apollinaris, and if in 376 Epiphanius does not appear to know the most important Christological writings of the Laodicean, and if APOL&2 refer to these texts, then it must be considered impossible that these writings were written in 372.

Stülken's statements here are quite amazing, because he does not seem to have carefully weighed the value of the evidence adduced by Dräseke in support of his contention. He seems to have too lightly dismissed Sträter's counter-arguments and particularly Sträter's contention that one ought to distinguish the period when Apollinaris developed his thought and made it known to a small circle of followers from the time when he publically announced his opinions through writings.

Stülken goes on to provide several internal reasons against the Athanasian paternity of APO1&2. First of all he points out that in EPI 5,6, Athanasius speaks as if there was no human soul in Christ. This can be seen in his exposition of death as a separation of the Logos from the body which He had assumed at the Incarnation. Athanasius saw the body being placed in the grave, while the Logos descended ad inferos. Unlike this conception of Christ's death, the author of APO1 emphasises that the death of Christ must have been no different from the death of every other human being and therefore must be understood as a separation of body from soul. The body of Christ was laid in the tomb, the soul of Christ descended ad inferos, but the Logos remained united with both of them. Such a doctrinal divergence must presuppose different authors.

It is obvious here that Stülken bases his argument on the thesis that Athanasius did not include in his Christology a human soul, but simply thought and taught about the Incarnation as the assumption of a soulless body or flesh by the Logos of God. This is in fact the main point that Stülken

defends in the dogmengeschichtliche part of his Athanasiana. The crux of his exposition of the Athanasian doctrine of Christ and particularly Christ's manhood, is the thesis that the body assumed by the Logos at the Incarnation is not a specific (Einzeleib), but a generic one (Gattungsleib), which excludes the existence of a soul in it. This is eloquently expounded in eight paragraphs under the title, "The relation of the Logos to the body" (Das Verhältnis des Logos und des Leibes).

It should be underlined here, that the critics, who by that time rejected the Athanasian paternity of AP01&2, were unanimous in regard to the thesis relating to Athanasius' Christology. This thesis was introduced by F. C. Baur in his important and influential book, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit u. Menschwerdung Gottes (Tübingen, 1841). Baur had argued that Athanasius' Christology did not include a human soul in the human nature, or human side, of Christ. This fitted very well his theory of Christological frameworks and particularly the basic proposition that the Alexandrians conceived of the Incarnation as a $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma\text{-}\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ or $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma\text{-}\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ union, whereas the Antiochenes understood it to be a $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma\text{-}\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ union. Indeed, as Lauchert observed, it was this basic dogmen-
geschichtliche thesis which led several critics to doubt and consequently to deny the Athanasian paternity of AP01&2. It appears that the schools of the history of doctrine were allowing their particular view-points and theories to bear upon the question of the authorship of AP01&2.

This was equally true of both sides in the dispute. But, since F.C. Baur's party prevailed in the interpretation of the history of Patristic Christology, it was in a sense inevitable that the majority of the scholars would side with those who rejected the Athanasian paternity of AP01&2. Nevertheless, the opposite view continued to be held, and the question was often raised as to how far should general interpretations, advanced in the context of the Dogmengeschichte, be allowed to influence and indeed to determine the understanding of historical issues. If it is true that the general theory and the particular facts often play complementary roles in our scientific understanding, it seems reasonable to argue that both must be taken seriously and examined rigorously without subordinating the one to the other. This is especially true in the case of the historical particulars, which may be partially and therefore inappropriately examined because of general considerations. Stülken^c is undoubtedly a cautious and able scholar, but he gives the impression, when he comes to investigate the authorship of AP01 and AP02, that he is partial, because of general dogmengeschichtliche considerations. This is apparent in his treatment of the question of the soul of Christ.

Apart from the question concerning the soul of Christ in Athanasius and AP01&2, Stülken^c pointed out other dogmatic 'inconsistencies'. The first relates to the passion of Christ and particularly to the relation of the divine nature of Christ to it. He observed that whereas in EPI, 10 Athanasius teaches that "God was crucified", in AP02, 11 the phrase θεός διὰ σαρκός ἔπαθεν is rejected in favour of the διὰ θεοῦ

ἐν σαρκὶ τὸ πάθος γέγονεν, which is unheard of in Athanasius. The second inconsistency refers to the name "Christ" (cf. the extracts from EPI9, APO1,10,13 APO2,2 and CAR4 ,30). Thirdly, Stülken refers to neologisms in APO when compared with other Athanasian works. The terms οὐσία, φύσις, ὑπόστασις are to be found only in APO extensively employed and with non-Athanasian meanings. Only in APO is the human side of Christ regarded as "nature" (φύσις) and only here do we find the expression ἔνωσις φυσικῆ and the term οὐσιστις applying to the human being. Much of this terminology has indeed its origin in the author's opponents (such as the expression "natural union") but the fact remains that he is more familiar with psychology or at least has thought more about it than Athanasius.

Lastly, Stülken mentions what he considers to be a "decisive datum" for the rejection of the Athanasian hypothesis. It is the use of the term ὁμοούσιον not in opposition to anything but as a presupposition or prerequisite, which becomes the stand-point for arguing that, τὸ ὁμοούσιον τὴν μὲν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν τελειότητα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιδεικνύεται (APO1, 9.) and also, τὸ ὁμοούσιον καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον θανάτου πρὸς τὸ ὁμοούσιον ἔνωσιν καθ' ὑπόστασιν οὐκ ἐπιδεχόμενόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν, καθ' ὑπόστασιν δὲ τὴν ἰδίαν τελειότητα ἐπιδεικνύμενον (APO1, 12). According to this text a unity between ὁμοούσια is only possible according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and not according to hypostasis (καθ' ὑπόστασιν); but this means that the author represents the neo-Nicene terminology and stand-point, which is obviously non-Athanasian.

It is clear that Stülken^c adduced most of his arguments from Dräseke, though he agreed only partially with the latter's conclusions. He did not agree concerning the diversity of authors, nor concerning the supposition that the one was Ambrose and the other Didymus. His argument falls into two parts, the first dealing with textual objections and the second with doctrinal inconsistencies. Almost all the doctrinal inconsistencies are Stülken's^c own contributions, but they emerge from the Baurian interpretation of the Christology of Athanasius in the Dogmengeschichte^c. This means that they are raised in a general way and not with particular reference to the Athanasian texts. The following comments may be made here by way of evaluation.

Though it is true that "the soul of Christ" does not appear in Athanasius' anti-Arian writings, it is at least textually attested by the later treatises and particularly by his Tomus to the Antiochenes. It is also textually attested that Athanasius' anthropology does not involve a radical separation between body and soul and that Christ's body is regarded as identical with the human one (ὁμοιον, ἡμέτερον). Finally, it is textually attested that Athanasius affirms throughout his texts the becoming man of the eternal Son and Logos of God and His assumption of a human body or flesh in the strongest possible realistic terms (φύσει, κατὰ φύσιν, ἀληθῶς, ὄντως). The notion of an Athanasian soulless body of Christ has no textual foundation. It is an inference drawn from an argument e silentio which has no concrete warrant in the Athanasian text and moreover, stands in direct contrast to the explicit positions of Athanasius' Soteriology. Certainly, the place of the soul in Athanasius'

Christology and anthropology is a proper question, but it inevitably raises the methodological question, whether it can be treated in defiance of Athanasius' explicit doctrinal positions from a rigid^{ly} linguistic-semantic point of view. Stülken's^c observations reinforce the impetus for further investigations. Such investigations have in fact taken place and continue to be pursued; for the Baurian dogmengeschichtliche point of view has been reaffirmed again and again, but so have the objections by Athanasian scholars to it, whenever Athanasius' principles have been taken seriously, namely, κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστου τῶν σημειωμένων φύσιν τὰ γεγραμμένα διαγενώσκειν (DECR. 10), or ἐρευνᾶν διατὶ καὶ πῶς ταῦτα γέγραπται (CAR2,12)! This issue will be discussed later; but for the time being it should be pointed out that Stülken's^c argument is not convincing, since his premise of a soulless Athanasian Christ is and has been highly contestable.

As regards the conception of the death of Christ, Stülken's^c fails to observe that the author of APOL accepts both the notion of death as the separation of the Logos from His body and as the separation of His soul from His body. This means that Stülken's either-or is inapplicable. The two notions of death may be conceptually different, but not logically incompatible, because they seem to represent two aspects of the one event, emerging from two anthropological conceptions, man's finite creaturehood and man's natural composition.

On the question of the passibility of Christ, there is clear evidence in Athanasius' texts that God suffers in the flesh of Christ and not in His Godhead, which shows that Stülken's^c alleged divergence is exaggerated. The same must be said

about the meaning of the term 'Christ'.

Finally the argument from the so-called Neo-Nicene terminology is again contestable. The distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις is not unknown to Athanasius. It appears in the De Synodis and especially in the Tome to the Antiochenes. Athanasius' notion of divine οὐσία is essentially apophatic, as evidenced in his constant rejection of οὐσία = body (i.e. "concrete stuff"), a charge which Athanasius himself employs against the Arians and Nazianzen against the Eunomians. The kataphatic content which Athanasius gives to the divine οὐσία is fundamentally connected with the notion of φύσις and this is clearly shown in his insistence that the ὁμοούσιον should be understood in terms of the κατὰ φύσιν generation of the Son. It should not be forgotten that Athanasius' dispute with the Arians was not centred on the term ὁμοούσιον but rather on the notion of the divine οὐσία

Stülken's arguments of doctrinal inconsistencies are based on scanty textual evidence and not on a thorough investigation of the entire textual data. They seem to derive almost entirely from his general dogmengeschichtliche standpoint, which views Athanasian Christology as determined by a Logos-flesh (body) scheme, which asserts Christ's full divinity but fails to do justice to His full humanity. Such a standpoint ignores Athanasius' Logos-man Christological statements and particularly his frequent affirmations of the true and real becoming man of the eternal Son and Logos of God.

2.4. KARL HOSS

Apart from Stülken's confirmation of Dräseke's views one finds

a similar approach in Karl Hoss' Studien über das Schriftum und die Theologie des Athanasius.⁽¹⁸⁾ Hoss did not simply argue against the Athanasian authorship, but defended the thesis of a diversity of authors. In his brief argument he referred to three main problems; (i) the difference between APO1&2 and the genuine Athanasian writings in language, style and manner of thought; (ii) the theological differences existing between the author of APO and Athanasius, particularly on the subject of the "full humanity" of Christ - accepted by the former but unknown to the latter; and (iii) the confusion in the titles of APO1 and APO2.

Hoss' arguments were simply taken from the books of his predecessors who belonged to the same school as himself. He does not seem to have made any original attempt to solve the problem of authorship.

2.5. EDWARD WEIGL

The year 1914 saw the publication of Edward Weigl's great work, Untersuchungen zur Christologie des heiligen Athanasius. It was composed of three sections, the second of which dealt with the two treatises "against Apollinaris". Since this has been one of the most thorough treatments of the subject, it is appropriate to examine its argument in detail.⁽¹⁹⁾

Weigl begins his discussion with an orientation (Orientierung). On the one hand he recalls the basic questions which have been raised in connection with the authorship of APO and on the other hand he identifies the two groups of critics which were formed in the course

of the critical investigations. He mentions four basic questions: (i) whether APO is Athanasian; (ii) whether APO is connected with the earlier or the later stages of the Apollinarian controversy, (iii) whether the style of APO is Athanasian; and (iv) whether the Christology of APO is inconsistent with the Christology of Athanasius. The first group of critics favouring a non-Athanasian paternity is mainly composed of Protestant scholars, who stand in the tradition of Baur, Böhringer and Dräseke, though certain Roman Catholic scholars adopted the same views (Bardy, Voisin, Cavallera and Bardenhewer). The second group following the traditional Athanasian ascription, is mainly composed of Roman Catholic scholars among whom the most important are Pell, Atzberger, Funk, Sträter and Lauchert. Weigl mentions the names because he wants to emphasize that the question regarding the Athanasian paternity of APO goes far deeper than the mere fact of authorship; it relates to the exegesis and place in the history of doctrine of Athanasius' Christology. The rest of Weigl's orientation is occupied with the enumeration of the ancient historical testimonia for the Athanasian ascription. His contribution here consists of the addition of three new testimonia which had not been previously mentioned by other critics. The first two are connected with the Patriarch Ephraim of Antioch (527-545) and Eulogius the Alexandrian and are both cited by Patriarch Photius of Constantinople in his famous Bibliotheca. The third one comes from the Doctrina Patrum of Anastasius Sinaita. A last paragraph in this section of orientation offers a short summary of Stülken's

doctrinal contradictions and also Voisin's arguments for rejecting the Athanasian authorship of APO.

The second chapter (Der Ideengehalt der Schriften), deals with the ideological content of AP01&2. Here Weigl asserts that the ideological contents of the two treatises are connected with those of the three Athanasian Letters to Epictetus to Adelphius and to Maximus. The ecclesiastico-political situation is the same. The Apollinaristic and Antiochene ways of thinking, which in Weigl's opinion have been in circulation since AD 350, apparently lie behind the sentences of APO. The author is closely in touch with the Apollinarists of his day and acutely perceives that their Christological notions are extremely dangerous and need to be decisively refuted. Weigl acknowledges that Athanasius wrote in his Ad Epictetum that he was not intending to write more about the problems which he had refuted therein (cf. his phrase ἐκ τῶν θείων Γραφῶν ὀλίγα μνημονεῦσαι (EPI ,3) γράψαι τὰ ὀλίγα ταῦτα (EPI ,12)). Yet he must have foreseen that this novel view was extremely dangerous and therefore in need of a thorough and authoritative treatment. Besides, the basic theme of AP01 is the Faith of the Church, which is threatened by the rise of the new heresy. The answer provided, whether in its negative or its positive aspects, betrays a person of authority and prestige. Who would fit into the picture more perfectly than Athanasius, the great defender of the Faith?

The only 'new' notion in these writings, when compared with EPI, ADEL and MAX, is the anthropological trichotomy, which in fact is not at all new. Epiphanius mentioned it in his

Ancoratus in 374, which indicates that it could have been in circulation during the preceding years 372-4. Furthermore the doctrine is much older than that. The Tomus ad Antiochenos (ANT) shows how the anthropological dichotomy was rejected as early as 362. In view of this, Weigl argues, Apollinaris is most likely to have developed his trichotomic solution in the years immediately following. But those who answer this question negatively seem deliberately to avoid mention of ANT and focus the attention on EPI, which did not contain the anthropological trichotomy. But EPI is based on a certain protocol (synodal acts), which obviously did not raise the question of the anthropological trichotomy and its application to the doctrine of Christ. Weigl argues that, since point after point in the arguments of EPI follow such protocol, it seems reasonable that EPI cannot be used to substantiate the claim that the trichotomic anthropology had not at that stage been applied to Christology. This is clearer still if one takes into account the habit of the Apollinarists to conceal their notions and hide them in orthodox terms. This is perhaps the reason why the Alexandrian Synod of 362 and also the synod, which is presupposed by this protocol (370?), omitted this particular question from its discussion. Athanasius was not present in this last synod; but he must have been alarmed, when he received and read the protocol.

Weigl argues against his opponents that Basil's ignorance of the Apollinarist error in 373 does not prove anything. In 376 Basil wrote that he had read very little of Apollinaris' writings. He also wrote that the question, "whether the assumed man was perfect or imperfect", did not seem to him

to be so important. As for Epiphanius, it is obvious that he knows the same Apollinarist ideas as the author of EPI.

Weigl next discusses the alleged literary connections between APO and Apollinaris' Apodeixis. He affirms that no such relation exists and sets against it the clear relations existing between APO and the three Athanasian Letters, EPI, ADEL and MAX. He argues that there is no basic difference between the 'Apollinarism' presupposed by the three Letters and the 'Apollinarism' opposed in APO1&2. On the contrary the 'Apollinarism' of the treatises APO1&2 and the Letters presents significant differences from that of the Apodeixis. Weigl refers to five such differences:

(i) The error of regarding the flesh of Christ as being homocousios with the Godhead is refuted both in APO and EPI. The main implication of this doctrine is that the suffering Christ is not a real, but a docetic appearance. Now this conception of the homocousios regarding the flesh of Christ is also refuted by Gregory of Nyssa in his Antirretikos; but whereas in the former writings it is clearly stated that the Apollinarian students speak of a mutation (τροπή) of the Divine attribute into the 'human nature', in the latter case the implication of the homocousios is drawn from the affirmation of the heavenly flesh of Christ. Gregory's rejection of the expression μία σὰρξ συνουσιωμένη και σύμφυτος indicates that Apollinaris avoided the term homocousios in his Apodeixis in preference to the term συν-ουσιωμένη. But the author of APO does not know this obviously significant nuance; hence he cannot have based his criticisms of Apollinarism on the Apodeixis, but on

Apollinarist teachings deriving from an earlier stage than that of the Apodeixis. Weigl seeks to strengthen this conclusion, which entails the distinction between the stage of Apollinarism envisaged in APO, EPI, ADEL, MAX and the stage reflected in the Apodeixis, by taking recourse to the following considerations: In APO1&2 the Apollinarists make open and even crude use of the terms ὁμοουσιον, ἀλλοίωσις, τροπή, etc., whereas in the Apodeixis the Apollinarist Christological thought is more coherent and tends to avoid the use of such terms. Apollinaris' Letters to Dionysius and Serapion in which the crude use of the homoousion and the pre-existence of the flesh are rejected, do not prove that Apollinarism could not have included such notions at an earlier stage of its development. This, according to Weigl, is the stage presupposed by APO.

(ii) In its earlier stage, envisaged in APO1&2, Apollinarist thought included both the notion of the "heavenly flesh" and the one of the "deification of the flesh" without attempting to reconcile them. But in the Antirretikos no such conception appears and no argument is advanced against it. (iii) The texts APO1,2,20 and APO2,11 indicate that Apollinarist thought of participation in Christ in terms of μίμησις and ὁμοίωσις, was taught at that stage. But this conception does not at all appear in the Apodeixis as far as it can be known from the Antirretikos. (iv) The problem arising from the adoration of the flesh of Christ, which is fully discussed in APO1&2 has acquired a weaker and subtler nuance in the Apodeixis. In the latter document it is stated that worship is offered to the person /

of Christ (ἐν πρόσωπον, ἐν ζῶον) and not as the Orthodox stressed, to the Logos with the flesh (Λόγος μετὰ σαρκός), and the Orthodox are not charged with idolatry as in APO.

(v) In APO1&2 the Apollinarists do not consider Christ as being Θεός καὶ ἄνθρωπος, but in the Apodeixis there are clear allusions to such designations. This appears more clearly in Apollinaris' Letter to the Bishops of Diocaesarea where he states εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἐκ τριῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐκ τεσσάρων, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ ἀνθρωπόθεος. Also, in APO2,4 there is no knowledge of the expression ὡς ἄνθρωπος, an expression which appears in the later writings of the Laodicean, especially in the Peri Sarkōseōs and in the Apodeixis. Now, the term ἀνθρωπόθεος occurs in the Apodeixis and Gregory refutes it in his Antirretikos as introducing mixture of natures. Since no references to this word are found in APO and the Athanasian Letters EPI, ADEL and MAX, it is natural to place them in the later stage of Apollinarism when this term was still acceptable. In the early stages, Weigl goes on to argue, Apollinarism avoided the designation of Christ as 'God and man' because of its opposition to Antiochene Christology, while at a later stage it was able to develop similar terminology to express its own peculiar notions. The Apollinarism of the later stages employed both Antiochene and Orthodox language and built into it its own conceptions. This kind of 'weakening' of thought appears in the Apodeixis, and stands in contrast to the kind of Apollinarism presupposed by APO and EPI, ADEL, MAX.

On the basis of these five differences Weigl rejects Dräseke's thesis which propounds a direct relation or

dependence of the two treatises "Against Apollinaris" on the Apodeixis. Fundamental to his argument here is his theory that the stages in the development of Apollinarism should not be differentiated by the introduction of the anthropological dichotomy or trichotomy into Christology, but rather by the evidences of the historical data and the doctrinal nuances connected with them. It is obvious then that Weigl's Dogmengeschichte and especially dogmen-geschichtliche epistemology is quite different from that of the Tübingen tradition. This is more apparent in Weigl's book Die Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius bis zum Ausbruch des nestorianischen Streites, which appeared a few years later.

Weigl next argues against Voisin's contention that APO must have been written after 375 because Epiphanius' account of the condemnation of Apollinarism supplies a decisive argument ex silentio. Epiphanius only knew the Synod of 362 and the Letter to Epictetus as anti-Apollinarist documents. For Weigl such an argument should also exclude the Athanasian paternity of ADEL, since no mention of it is made by Epiphanius. Besides, Epiphanius' choice of EPI as an Orthodox reaction to Apollinarism should not exclude the existence of other such reactions. EPI was chosen because there was a synod behind it which probably took place in AD 370. Epiphanius knows this and wants to associate Athanasius' name with this synod, particularly in view of the fact that Athanasius' letter to Epictetus presupposes the Ἰπομνήματα of this synod. Epiphanius'

choice of EPI as a refutation of Apollinarism is due to the 'synodal' significance and character of this Letter. The same consideration applies to the frequent references to EPI in subsequent anti-Apollinarian reactions which wished to invoke the name of the Great Bishop of Alexandria. In addition, Weigl stresses the consideration that AP01&2 were written privately and their character was deliberately 'secretive'. ADEL and MAX were also private in the same way, hence the late testimonies to their existence.

Another point of significance for placing APO at an earlier stage of the Apollinarian development is the absence from it of any reference to Apollinaris himself. Weigl argues that if the author had known and had in mind Apollinaris' Apodeixis, he would have mentioned the name of Apollinaris, which was connected with the movement of Apollinarism as early as A.D. 370 according to Epiphanius' testimony. But it is true that no reference is openly made to it and that Apollinaris at first remains in the background of the movement. This was known to Jerome in 373 when he visited Antioch. Epiphanius also expresses doubts in 377 as to whether the "new heresy" can be fully traced back to Apollinaris. On this evidence Weigl feels that the heresy spread at first by means of sermons, explanatory catechisms, discussions, etc., and not by means of formal theological treatises. Hence the author of AP02 can write $\delta\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\acute{\nu}\ \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\eta\acute{\nu}\ \gamma\ \epsilon\ \gamma\ \rho\ \acute{\alpha}\ \phi\ \alpha\ \tau\ \epsilon\ \sigma\ \epsilon$, having probably in mind an Apollinarian catechism.

On the question of "Christ's suffering" and generally all the vicissitudes of his life, Weigl observes that APO offers a soteriological answer, which is identical to that expressed in CAR. This is particularly to be seen with regard to the subject of Christ's death and descent ad inferos. Weigl sees full agreement on this subject in the doctrine of CAR, EPI and APO. The basic doctrine of EPI at this point is the idea that the Logos did not change into bones and flesh (εἰς ὄστέα καὶ σάρκα τέτραφθαι τὸν Λόγον). If that was the case, there would have been no need of a grave, since the body would not have died, but would have gone by itself to preach to the spirits in hades. Thus the separation of the body from the Logos is introduced in order to exclude the idea of a mutation of Logos and body. But this is not a radical separation, as the expression μὴ χωρισθεῖς αὐτοῦ of the 5th chapter indicates. On this evidence Weigl concludes that when Athanasius speaks of the Logos as "departing from the body in order to preach to the spirits dwelling in Hades," the soul is not excluded, but implicitly inheres in his thought. He also remarks that in EPI Athanasius' manner of writing is more aphoristic in tone and character, whereas in APO he develops positively the doctrine of Christ along soteriological lines and therefore his references to the human soul in Christ become more explicit. Weigl does not fail to recall here Voisin's and Stülken's argument that the expression μὴ χωρισθεῖς

αὐτοῦ was interpolated. On this point he finds the textual explanation of the Benedictines to be sufficient. Further, he claims that there is ample evidence that the thought of the Logos remaining in touch with the body at the death of Christ is well known in the Alexandrian theology.

In the third chapter of his essay Weigl examines the 'problems' of terminology. First of all he affirms that from 362 onwards Athanasius' Christological terminology underwent considerable development because he was confronted with new Christological problems. The more acute the problems became, the more radical was Athanasius' development of Christological terminology. The acuteness of the doctrinal problems and the urgency for Christological clarification are perfectly illustrated in APO1, where Athanasius is asked to reply to several questions. It is no wonder that his terminology here presents a better form of unity. The expression of that unity should have become more intensive, but he finds more adequate terms to express it, such as ἔνωσις φυσικῆ, or φυσικὴ γέννησις, which already appeared in his EPI. This new terminology is the direct result of his attempt to express the unity and diversity in Christ in a way which cuts through the two rival Christologies of the period, the Antiochene and the Apollinarist. On the one hand he rejects the separation of the divine and the human sides (anti-Antiochene) by emphasizing the unity, and on the other hand he avoids the confusion of these two sides (anti-Apollinarian).

Having emphasized the idea of development in Athanasius' Christological teaching as a possible explanation of neologies, he goes on to claim that the argument from terminology against the Athanasian paternity of APO is not decisive. Whether one assumes an Athanasian or non-Athanasian paternity for APO, the terminology will present the same problems, as long as one is prepared to accept that APO originated from Alexandria and has many affinities with the Athanasian literary style and theological thought; and even more so, when a disciple of Athanasius is supposed to have been the author.

Weigl illustrates these problems by examining the distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, the meaning of the ὁμοούσιον and the notion of "God's suffering", which were also discussed by Stülken. With regard to the former he argues that it is not foreign to Athanasius, since it appears in his AFRO in the formula τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. With regard to the second, he argues that the controversial passage mentioned by Stülken, where ὁμοούσια is interpreted as ταυτότης τῆς φύσεως brings out the trinitarian formula of the SYNO 53, and DECR 23 and 24, as well as CAR5,4, CAR5,15, and CAR5, 19. In this sense, he argues, the ὁμοούσιον is understood in terms of ταυτότης and ὁμοφυής. One and only one οὐσία is presupposed for the Godhead. In APO1&2 Athanasius applies the same terminology to Christology, because of the Apollinarist claim of the ὁμοούσιον for the body as well.

Lastly, with regard to the opposing notions about

Cyril. Hom. 8.

(P.G. 77, 572a)

δυό πραγμάτων
ἀνομοίων κατὰ τὴν
φύσιν ἐν ταυτῷ
γέγονε σύνοδος
θεότητος δηλώνουσι
καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος·
εἷς δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν
ὁ Χριστός.

Cyril. Ep. I.

(P. G. 77, 28)

οὐκοῦν ἐκ δυοῖν
μὲν πραγμάτων ὁμο-
λογουμένως θεότητος
καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος ὁ
Ἐμμανουήλ. Πλὴν
εἷς Κύριος Ἰησοῦς
Χριστός εἷς τε καὶ
ἀληθῶς Υἱός, Θεός
τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀνθρω-
πος

Cyril. Ap. c. Orien.

(P. G. 76, 332b)

ἀλλ' ἐκ δύο πραγμά-
των ἀνομοίων, θεό-
τητός τε καὶ ἀνθρω-
πότητος τὸν ἕνα
γενέσθαι Χριστὸν
καὶ Κύριον διαβε-
βαιούμεθα πανταχοῦ.

AP01, 13.

(P.G. 26, 1116b)

ὅτι Χριστὸς μονο-
τρόπος οὐ λέγεται,
ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ
ὀνόματι ἐνὶ ὄντι
ἐκατέρων τῶν πραγμά-
τῶν δείκνυται σημα-
σία, θεότητός τε
καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος·
διὸ καὶ ἀνθρωπος
λέγεται ὁ Χριστὸς
καὶ Θεὸς λέγεται ὁ
Χριστὸς καὶ Θεὸς καὶ
ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶν ὁ
Χριστὸς καὶ εἷς
ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός.

AP01, 10.

γνώσεσθε ὅτι εἷς ὁ
Χριστός, καὶ Θεὸς
καὶ ἀνθρώπος ὁ αὐτός

AP01, 16.

ἵνα εἷς ἦ...Θεὸς
καὶ ἀνθρώπος ὁ αὐτός.

De Sent. Dion. 9.

(P.G. 25, 493a)

γέγονεν ὁ Κύριος
ἀνθρώπος· καὶ εἷς μὲν
ἐστὶν ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων
σημαινόμενος· ὁ γὰρ
Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο,
τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς
θεότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ
τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως
εἰρημένα ῥήματα ἰδίαν
καὶ κατάλληλον ἔχει
τῶν λεγομένων τὴν
ἐρμηνείαν.

The first texts from Cyril contribute an entirely new point of research, put forward by Weigl himself. In this text Cyril gives a quotation from the writings of Athanasius (ἐν ἰδίῳις

συγγράμμασιν). It is freely quoted and modified to fit the point which he is discussing. The question for us is, what writing of Athanasius did Cyril have in mind? Weigl argues that the texts from APO seem to be closer to Cyril's than the text from the De Sent. Dion. Weigl seeks to strengthen his thesis by providing a full page discussion of the literary connections exemplified in these three groups of writings.

Other literary connections between these treatises and the writings of St Athanasius can be shown with regard to the terms ἀπαρχή, πρωτότοκος, ἐκκλησία. The Apollinarists connected these terms, and also the entire notion of salvation, with the human nature as such, but Athanasius understood them soteriologically, in terms of Christ and the nature which the Logos assumed. This soteriological understanding is as distinctly present in these treatises as in the other writings of Athanasius.

Weigl also points out that the term Christ is not employed in APO univocally (μονοτρόπως) but to describe the divine-human Being (gottmenschlichen Wesens) and His operation (und seine Tätigkeit). This is also the case in the letter to Epictetus (ch. 12), in CAR⁴, 35, 30ff and in the INC&CAR, 12.

As far as the assumption of the human nature is concerned, APO², 11 gives the same answer as INC&CAR, 11, namely, that it took place for us and not for God, according to 2Cor. 8:9. The expressions πῶς οὖν and πῶς ἔτι employed in this connection are distinctly Athanasian.

Lastly, Weigl draws attention to the Athanasian conception

of sin, according to which sin is accidental rather than essential to being, and which is clearly expressed in the two APO. Sin in APO is connected with the history of salvation and is never considered as φυσική or as σύμφυτος ἀμαρτία . The notion that man's nature is not sinful by nature, but only δεκτικὴ τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ , is typical to Athanasian thought.

In the fifth chapter (charakteristische Redewendungen) Weigl discusses characteristic stylistic expressions of APO which establish stylistic connections with genuine Athanasian literature. Here are the basic expressions which he puts forward as proofs of stylistic identity.

1) The heretics are accused of becoming un-Christian.

πῶς Χριστιανοί... οὐκέτι Χριστιανοί...

2) The heretics are charged with abandoning the norm of the Holy Scriptures, the Prophets, the Apostles, the Evangelists, the Fathers and the teaching of the Church.

3) The statements of the heretics are characterised as ἀσεβῆ , their teaching as ἀσέβεια and their activities are described by the verb ἀσεβεῖν .

4) The usage of the verbs ἐρυθριάζειν, ἐρυθριοῦν, αἰσχύνεσθαι, is distinctly Athanasian.

5) Athanasian are also those terms which describe the shamelessness and arrogance of the heretics, ἀναιδής, αὐθάδης, ἀναΐδεια, πρόφασις, ἀναΐσχυντος, αἰσχύνη, ἀναισχυντία.

6) The foolish activity of the heretics is described in the Athanasian terms, τολμᾶν, τόλμημα, τόλμη, τολμηρός..

7) The same applies to the irrationality and stupidity of the opponents, ἀπόνοια, ἀνόητοι, οὐ νοοῦντες, ἐπίνοια,

ἀπάτη, ἀτοπία, βλασφημία, παραφροσύνη, ἀφροσύνη, νόσημα,
 ἄνοια, κακόνοια, ἄτοπον, μανία, μανικός, μαινέσθαι..

8) The heretical teachings are described as phantasies or products of imagination.

9) The opinions of the heretics are designated as sophisms, inventions, errors, self-contradictions, ἐπινοήματα, σοφίσματα, ἐπινενοημένα, παρατροπαί, ἐπίνοια, ἀσεβείας, ἐφευρέται τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐφεύρεσις, πλάνη, εὔρημα, μάχεσθαι, διαμάχεσθαι, περιπίπτεσθαι, καταγιγνώσκεσθαι..

10) The stereotype expression which Montfaucon pointed out, is τὶ τοίνυν μέμφεσθε Ἀρειανοῦς.

11) The Christological errors are regarded as blasphemies and as obscure deviations, which get the people drunk, αὕτη ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ἢ θεοῦ ἀνατροπή, ἣν ποτίζετε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους..

Other points of stylistic connections between APO and the genuine Athanasian literature refer (i) to the tactics of the heretics in appealing to the simple; (ii) the usage of the term θεόσις (usually in the dative θεόσει) as a description of the docetic interpretation of the Incarnation; (iii) the refutation of the consubstantiality of the body by reference to Christ's birth from Mary; and finally (iv) the general way of argumentation and the art of writing. Weigl will not accept the last point as an indication that the author was possibly a disciple of Athanasius. The chapter concludes with the question, how could a disciple of Athanasius, supposing that such a person had written the two APO, have imitated his teacher so slavishly, without referring to the name of his distinguished teacher, which would have strengthened his argument?

In the sixth chapter (Anlage und Beweisgang) Weigl offers another able discussion on method and treatment of false doctrines in APO and in the genuine Athanasian writings. The outline of APO is found to be more or less the same with that of EPI. EPI consists of three main parts, i.e. the Synodal decisions, the presentation of the heretical notions, and lastly the orthodox answer to these notions by means of a point to point examination. The structure of APO1 is not very different. It begins with a personal introductory chapter, and then the author enumerates the decisions of Nicea and the errors of his opponents, and that is followed by a point to point examination and refutation of these errors. Crucial here is the fact that in both cases we get a comparison of the new ideas to the tradition of Nicea. Both the author of EPI and the author of APO share the Nicene standpoint and consider it the primary norm for settling theological and Christological questions. Also common to both authors is the custom of relating the heretical notions to the older errors, such as Marcion, Paul of Samosata, Arius, Sabellius, the Jews and Valentinus, and especially to the Manicheans; and further, the custom to contrast the norm of the Scriptures, the Prophets, the Apostles and the Evangelists, the Fathers and the teaching of the Church with the subjective norms of the opponents.

In the seventh chapter (Der Eingang contr. Apoll. 1 c. 1) he discusses the much disputed literary character of the introductory chapter of APO1. Though it has been

regarded as non-Athanasian, he says, in fact, it exhibits many Athanasian characteristics. In EPI, ADEL and MAX Athanasius begins with the thought of εὐσεβεία and σέβειν contrasting it to the impiety of his opponents. Exactly the same approach appears in the introductory chapter of APO1. The thought of piety is followed by the thought of orthodoxy (ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν), which is unmistakably an Athanasian mark. The word that has presented certain problems to the critics, especially with regard to meaning, is the adjectival noun τὸ πᾶν. Weigl argues that it can have four possible meanings: (i) it can mean everything that God has ordained and maintained, viz., the whole order of things; (ii) it can mean a specific whole, τοῦτο τὸ πᾶν, which is implied in the writing; (iii) it can mean all the problems mentioned by his friend; and (iv) it can mean "in every case" as τὰ ἀπτά can mean ταῦτα. Apart from these connections Weigl observes that the introduction includes the usual Athanasian norm of the prophets, apostles, evangelists, etc. And lastly, he emphasises the fact that the whole chapter is written with a view to meet the specific situation. The author hopes that his arguments will be taken seriously by his opponents, that they will reject their errors, and that the heresy will not affect others in the Church. This hope particularly fits into the first stage of Apollinarism, and is parallel to the similar hopes entertained in the three afore-mentioned letters of Athanasius. The expression κατὰ δύναμιν is typical of the Saint.

In the eighth chapter Weigl argues that neither Didymus nor Ambrose could be the authors of the two treatises. While it is true that Didymus does not mention Apollinaris by name in his refutations of Apollinaristic doctrines, and does not regard sin as essential to being or nature, and while it is his peculiar habit to deal with particular heresies and not with heresy in general, all this is not really sufficient evidence for establishing the thesis that he wrote APO2. These similarities are general and apply to the whole milieu of the period. Leipold and Bardy rejected this thesis on the basis of style and terminology. The characteristic words and expressions of Didymus do not occur in these writings. The art of writing is more lively and full of temperament. The habit of reducing the thought of his opponents ad absurdum is a characteristic which the author shares with Athanasius and not Didymus. Didymus is on the whole peaceful, when he deals with heretics. Further, Didymus' Christology is different from that of APO2. Didymus likes the use of the terms ἀτρέπτος and ἀσύγχυτος. Though these terms appear in APO2, they are scarcely used Christologically. Besides, the terms διαίρεσις and φυσικὴ ἔνωσις do not appear in Didymus' writings, but they are employed in APO2. Also, Didymus' understanding of the term "Christ" is very different from that of the APO2. Lastly, the author of APO2 has more intimate knowledge of the Christological problems than Didymus who, though conscious of such problems, does not enter into the Christological debate, as one gathers from his writings. As to the

heilsgeschichtliche way of arguing ,which appears in APO2, though known to Didymus, it is not typical of him, since he prefers moral arguments.

In the second part of this chapter Weigl argues against Dräseke's thesis that Ambrose, Athanasius' disciple, was the author of APO1. His arguments are the following:

There is not even the slightest literary evidence for such a contention. Even if Basnage is right and this Ambrose is the author of the writings of Ambrose of Milan, there is still a very noticeable difference between these writings and APO1. The "one nature" which is the characteristic of the 'writings' of Ambrose does not appear in APO.

But the supreme objection to Dräseke's thesis is for Weigl the fact that APO1 and APO2 were written by the same author.

In a footnote he gives the following reasons in support of this fact. (i) Both deal with the question of the soul in Christ in a similar fashion , though APO2 deals with it more extensively than APO1. (ii) Both deal with similar points of doctrine and supply parallel answers, e.g. the name "Christ", the anointing of Christ, the expression "God in Nazareth", Arius and his rejection of the human soul in Christ, sin and the new creation in Christ, etc. (iii) Both exemplify a similar form in the structure of their contents and the central answer to the Christological problems.

The latter is apparent in the common expression φυσική γνώσις . Though expressions such as ἄνθρωπος ἄμορφος, σὰρξ ἄμορφος may cause some concern, they should rather be understood as a natural result of the author's discussion.

The conclusions finally reached by Weigl may be summed up as follows:

(1) The Athanasian paternity of AP01&2 was rejected on the basis of internal reasons. But this argument fails totally. To place these writings later than AD 370-3, would mean to contradict directly the actual dogmengeschichtliche frame which is presupposed by both. Other kinds of objections are not conclusive.

(2) Both AP01&2 belong to an early period in the development of Apollinarism. Not only the anthropological trichotomy, but several doctrinal points and nuances mark this stage and distinguish it from later stages of Apollinarist doctrine. These characteristics are reflected both in AP01&2 and in EPI, MAX and ADEL. It is clear that the author of APO has EPI in mind with regard to the way of arguing and the structure of the document which deals with the novel controversial issues.

(3) The traditions of the sixth century have generally regarded St Athanasius as the author of these treatises. This tradition does not come unexpectedly but existed for many decades previously. Particularly instructive here is Cyril of Alexandria's witness to the Athanasian paternity of APO, proved by the fact that he made use of them in his Christological terminology from 429 onwards and referred to them in his Homily No 8. Further, Cyril's formula μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη and especially his claim that it came from Athanasius' writings [from his de rect.fid.ad Reg. P.G.76,1212a ἐν τῷ περὶ σαρκώσεως λόγῳ, and his Apologet.c.Orient. ibid.76,1212a ἐν τοῖς περὶ

σαρκώσεως λόγοις] should not be so easily dismissed by making reference to the Apollinarian milieu. The περί σαρκώσεως which Cyril mentioned as Athanasian could not have been an Apollinarian writing. This is supported by two witnesses, Patriarch Eulogius of Alexandria and the Antiochene Patriarch Ephraim. Eulogius traces the "one nature" formula to Athanasius' περί ἐνανθρωπήσεως and the quotation he supplies is also found in APO. The evidence for this is supplied by Photius in his Bibliotheca. The same Photius of Constantinople supplies the evidence for Ephraim's witness which speaks of the expression μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη as Athanasian and observes that it did not imply confusion but emphasized the unity of Godhead and manhood against Paul of Samosata and his ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος .

(4) The inner evidence in APO is decisively Athanasian. The objection to the old age of Athanasius is not serious, for how could he write EPI and not APO1&2? This inner evidence includes, the way of expressing theological arguments and thoughts, the temperament, the vigorous argumentation, the knowledge of the Bible and its consistent application in the argument, the respect for the traditions of the Church and especially the faith of Nicea, the inexhaustible fullness of argument which is nowhere artificial and the richness of theological knowledge. The author must have been a great theologian well known to the Apollinarists. Who but Athanasius would

fit this description?

(5) It is possible to conceive that Athanasius could have given these thoughts to some student of his who would commit them to writing. But it is impossible to suppose that Athanasius would not have afterwards reviewed them.

(6) As to the chronology of APO, it is more likely that they were written immediately after the letter to Epictetus. They witness to the fact that Athanasius was not only involved in the Christological struggle with the rising Apollinarist school, but also that he was able to see deeper into their implications for the future. This is perfectly exemplified in APO, which elevates his theological prestige. It almost looked as if Apollinaris had surpassed Athanasius, but in these writings the pastoral and scientific Athanasius has surpassed the speculative and philosophical Laodicean. When Apollinaris in his sublime speculations abandons the orthodox faith and leads his students to do the same, the great defender of Nicea stays on the real practical ground and fights in a way entirely different from that of his pupil.

Weigl concludes that in APO we witness the blossom of the Christological thought of Athanasius. Here the Apollinarists are gripped at the most vulnerable points of their doctrine. Their notions of the homousion and the co-eternity of Christ's flesh on the basis of the kenosis of the God-head are decisively attacked and refuted. Athanasius introduces as an alternative to all these notions the ἴδιος κατὰ φύσιν and the ἀδιαίρετος κατὰ ἔνωσιν.

From the Apollinarist thesis of the heavenly flesh and the imperfection of the human nature Athanasius draws the consequences of docetism and relativism with regard to the Incarnation of the Son and Word of God, and the "impious, strange notion" of the quaternity. In APO Athanasius fully dealt with the current teachings of the Apollinarists exposing their heretical notions by exaggerating their strength on purpose.

Weigl's treatment of the authorship of APO is thorough and impressive. He has hardly left undiscussed any question raised by former critics. His particular arguments are plausible and persuasive. His comparison of APO with EPI and APO with the Apodeixis in chapter two is good, but not as thorough as his other investigations. His conclusion that APO and EPI presuppose a different type of Apollinarism from that of the Apodeixis is tenable but not fully proven. His answer to Voisin's argument e silentio emerging from Epiphanius' ignorance of APO is quite evident. Equally evident is his argument regarding the understanding of death in EPI and APO. Though he did not observe that APO contains two models of death, the one found in EPI and the other connected with the body-soul anthropology, he did rightly point out that the doctrinal intention behind both was not anthropological but soteriological, the former intending to emphasize the Person and the latter the object (complete manhood) of salvation. His views on the terminology (ch.3), the conceptuality (ch.4), the phraseology (ch.5), the methodology (ch.6), the introduction of APO1 (ch.7), the common authorship

of APO1 and APO2(ch.8) and his final conclusions are all plausible and convincing. The only point which raises doubts is his claim that Cyril was aware of APO. Though not impossible, it is basically hypothetical and not clearly supported by the evidence.

On the whole, what is particularly interesting in Weigl's essay is his underlying theory of fourth century Patristic Christological developments, which views Athanasius' position as developing between the Apollinarists and their Antiochene opponents on the basis of traditional soteriological principles. This theory is in line with the one accepted in the Early Church, which is confirmed by the two great theologians in the Athanasian tradition, Epiphanius and Cyril, and which was officially endorsed by the subsequent ecclesiastical Councils. This theory stands in direct contrast to the nineteenth century theory of Christological frameworks which goes back to Baur's application of Hegelian philosophy to Patristic theology and which is represented today by A. Grillmeier. The most impressive account of this theory of the development of Patristic Christology in Athanasius and the Fathers of the fourth century is given in the last section of Weigl's book, and also in his other great book Die Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius bis zum Ausbruch des nestorianischen Streites (Munich, 1925).

2.6. ANTON STEGMANN

Weigl's challenge to the views of Dräseke, Stülken and Hoss was countered by Ant. Stegmann of Tübingen, six years later. Stegmann, who had argued in 1917 against the Athanasian paternity of Contra Arianos IV, claiming for it an Apollinarist paternity, now wrote an essay entitled Die zwei (21) 'athanasianischen' Bücher gegen Apollinaris, in which he restated the theses: (i) that the two treatises APO1 and APO2 were written by different authors and (ii) that they could not have derived from Athanasius. It is no wonder that in the opening paragraph he spoke of the question regarding the authorship of APO as a Desiderium der Wissenschaft, particularly after the publication of Weigl's Untersuchungen. Stegmann's arguments are well stated and deserve close analysis and evaluation.

His initial contention is that Weigl's study is not conclusive in spite of its thoroughness. Hence his article which simply seeks to vindicate this contention rather than solve the problem. His only concern is to show that the question of the Athanasian paternity of APO has not been settled.

He starts his investigation with the order of the treatises in the MSS regarding it as a clue to their interrelation. He distinguishes two main groups of MSS, (i) Codices S, G, F, D, where APO1 precedes APO2 and (ii) Codices B, Vi, A, L, O, B, G, M, T, R, Mo, O, E, W, P, D, C, V, where APO2 precedes APO1. This diversity in the order of their

publication indicates that no conclusions can be drawn as to which is first and which is second chronologically. Equally uninformative at this point is the external evidence. The testimony of Leontius who refers to APO1 &2 and the testimony of the Acts of the Third Ecumenical Synod of Constantinople seem to take us no further. The title δεύτερος Λόγος κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου for APO2 does not refer to chronology. The only point that can be deduced from it is that APO2 followed APO1 in the MSS of the 6th century available to Leontius and the Synod of Constantinople. This means that only arguments from internal criticism are available for determining the original interrelationship, if any, of the two APO.

The external testimonies to the Athanasian paternity of APO go back to the 6th century. That of APO1 probably goes back to Cyril of Alexandria, as Weigl has shown. But the argument ex silentio reduces the reliability of this evidence considerably. The most crucial application of the argument e silentio is the case of Epiphanius' treatment of Apollinarism in his Panarion LXXVII, 2, according to which Athanasius had refuted Apollinaris only in his EPI. No reference is made by Epiphanius to extensive refutations such as APO1 and APO2. So Stegmann argues that if the two APO are ex professo and in intenso refutations of Apollinarism; and are derived from Athanasius, it is surprising that Epiphanius in his account of Athanasius' reaction to Apollinaris does not refer to them but to EPI which is not expressly anti-Apollinarian. Stegmann argues

in a footnote that Weigl's theory, which takes Epiphanius' choice of EPI as Athanasius' reply to Apollinaris as a consequence of the fact that it was connected with a synod, is not only improbable but wrong. Stegmann draws attention to Epiphanius' phrase ὁ ἀεὶ ἡμῶν ἀγαπητὸς καὶ τῷ μεγαρίτη πάππῳ Ἀθανασίῳ... Ἀπολιναρίου and argues that Epiphanius had good reason for using such phraseology. By saying this he creates the impression that Athanasius had taken up a new position at the outset of a new heresy. Just as in the case of Marcellianism Epiphanius chose to refer to Athanasius' reply to this heresy, he now does the same in the case of Apollinarism, choosing EPI. The critical point here is, why he failed to use APO1&2 for Athanasius' reaction. If the books were written by a pupil of Athanasius, a satisfactory answer can be provided. Epiphanius either did not know them, or if he did, he deliberately ignored them, because they did not contribute to his Athanasian argument. Thus, Stegmann agrees with Voisin, who remarked that it was a pity that Montfaucon did not refer to tanti valoris testimonia but to tot veterum testimonia; and he concludes that only positive proofs can show that the extant testimonies were wrong. Here also, he points out that only after the appearance of the first objections to the Athanasian paternity of APO did people begin to doubt the value of the external testimonies and to disagree particularly with the point of the presence in APO of references to Apollinaris' writings, which were written after Athanasius' death.

Stegmann also acknowledges Weigl 's contention that it is no longer convincing to refer to the anthropological trichotomy and its application to Apollinaris' Christology to separate chronologically the stages of the Apollinarian development. For Stegmann the novelty in APO is not the trichotomy but the foundation of the basic error of Apollinarism on two arguments, namely, that two perfect things cannot become one and that where there is a perfect man there is also sin. These premises are not mentioned by Athanasius elsewhere, and yet this negative evidence cannot rule out the possibility of his familiarity with them. The most likely writing in which to expect to find them would be Athanasius' EPI, but EPI is not necessarily anti-Apollinarian but refers to errors which were debated in Corinth. So, according to Stegmann, we cannot know on the basis of the evidence available to us when the Apollinarists made public their Christological views. The interval 371-373 was large enough for Athanasius to have learned of any new feature of Apollinarist thought and to have deemed it an imperative to refute it in writings like APO. This is particularly suggestive in the the phrase, *τις ἡ αἰτίασις τῶν ὁρθῶς φρονεῖν νομιζόντων, οἵτινες ἀμετρία πολλῇ τὰ ἄθεσμα φεγγόμενοι οὐ δεδοίκασιν* (APO1,1).

Stegmann goes on to observe that the opponents of the Athanasian attribution have not succeeded in proving that the author of APO had used documents written by Apollinaris. There are no passages in APO which indicate this. Quite the opposite is the case of CAR1-3 ,where we find

many passages which are obviously extracts from written documents. In APO1 the views of the author's opponents are mentioned in chapter two only in a general sense and do not suggest written documents.

With regard to the opening of APO1 and particularly the phrase τὸ σιωπῆ σέβειν τὸ πᾶν, Stegmann finds no problems. To him the phraseology implies that the addressee is a monk (especially the expression κατὰ μόνας), because it is parallel to similar phraseology in Athanasius' Vita Antonii (especially the phrase κατὰ μόνας δοκεῖσθαι which appears in chapter three). The introduction then should not be considered as strange to Athanasian style, particularly because of its gnostic connotations which were present in Athanasius ever since his youth (cf. ἡ περὶ τῆς θεοσεβείας καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄλων ἀληθείας γνώσις ..of GENT ch.1, or καὶ τῶν ὄντων αὐτὸν (τὸν ἄνθρωπον) θεωρητὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα ..κατεσκεύασεν..ἵνα..ὑπερεκπλήττεται κατανοῶν τὴν δι' αὐτοῦ (τοῦ Θεοῦ) εἰς τὸ πᾶν πρόνοιαν of GENT.ch.2. The phrase ἡρώτησας περὶ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν πίστεως..etc. suggests that the addressee regarded the author as a person of authority in matters of faith and well informed about the belief and the practice of the heretics. The best known opponent of heretics and exponent of orthodox truth was at that time Athanasius. Since similar requests were made to Athanasius by monks, it is not surprising to see here another monk raising questions concerning orthodoxy.

On the basis of the points made above, and particularly the fact that the theology and theological terminology of APO is wholly Athanasian (apart from the phrase μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις), Stegmann concludes that one might be tempted to agree with Sträter that even if tradition had given no clues regarding the authorship of APO, one would have no hesitation to ascribe it to Athanasius, particularly on the evidence of internal criticism. Nevertheless he hesitates to yield to this temptation because he finds one, fundamental to him, stumbling-block, the non-Athanasian style of APO. He contends then that the more closely one compares APO1 with the genuine works of Athanasius, from his juvenalia to EPI, the less likely it seems that this book was written by Athanasius himself. The introduction, which is reminiscent of Athanasius with regard to content is from the point of view of style wholly unlike him. Similarly the list of heretics mentioned in EPI is entirely different from that of APO1&2. Athanasius' style is generally rounded, flowing and simple, whereas the style of the author of APO1 is frequently complex and tortuous, constantly seeking variety of expression. A key characteristic of this style is a special preference for nouns and for strange expressions formed from nouns. The following illustrations are advanced with the general comment, that they are Athanasian in content, but not in form:

APO1, 1: (α) τὴν ἰδίαν ἀναστροφὴν ἐν κρίσει τίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν φροντίδι.

(β) ἀμετρίας τύφος καὶ κακίας πλῆθος.

ΑΡΟΙ,3 (α) γίνεται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁμολογία καὶ τῆς πλάνης ἢ ἔλεγεῖς.

(β) φαντασίαν τὴν δεῖξιν καὶ τὴν ἀνοχὴν τοῦ πάθους ὑπολαμβάνοντες.

ΑΡΟΙ,5 εὐφῆμψ λέξει ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄρνησιν.

ΑΡΟΙ,6 (α) τὸ σῶμψ τοῦ Κυρίου οὐ κτιστὴν ἀποφέρεται τὴν προσκύνησιν.

(β) καὶ ὅλη τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ θανάτου ἢ πραγματεία εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ζήτησιν καὶ ἀνάκτησιν θεωρεῖται.

ΑΡΟΙ,9 (α) οὐ συνορῶντες διπλὴν ὑμῖν γενομένην τὴν ἀπάντησιν τῆς ἀσεβείας.

(β) ἵνα τὸ διπλοῦν κήρυγμα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδημίας εὐαπόδεικτον ἔχη τὴν πεισμονὴν τοῦ τε πάθους καὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας.

ΑΡΟΙ,13 (α) τίς οὖν ἢ τοσαύτη ὑμῶν φιλονεικία τῶν ἐφευρέσεων;

(β) ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὀνόματι (Χριστῷ) ἑκατέρων τῶν πραγμάτων δεῖκνυται σημασία, θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος.

ΑΡΟΙ,17(α) ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἡμετέρῃ φύσει καὶ τῆς εὐρέσεως ἢ μάχη ἔτι γίνεται καὶ τῆς ἐπισπορίας ἢ προσχώρησις διὰ τὸ ἡμῶν ἀσθενές.

(β) τὴν ἔκπνευσιν οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι θεότητος μετέστασιν, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς ἀποχώρησιν

ΑΡΟΙ,21 ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν πάντα ἐπινενόηται, ἵνα μίαν τῆς ἀρνήσεως κατασκευάσητε γνώμην.

Stegmann disagrees with Weigl's opinion that the author of APO was striving to find new ways of expression in order to achieve greater degree of clarity. Rather, he holds, the variety of expression is indicative of youth. As to the numerous examples adduced by Weigl for establishing literary connections between APO and the genuine Athanasian writings

he regards them to be insufficient, though impressive , because they are not characteristic of the author but apply to other authors too. He does not, however, offer any examples in support of his judgement, not even in the case of the phrase τὶ τοίνυν μέμπεσθε Ἀρειανοῦς which he, like Dräseke, regards to be foreign to Athanasius' style. Stegmann therefore takes the similarities between APO1 and Athanasius' works as suggesting a pupil of the old bishop, who might even have written the treatise at his teacher's command.

With regard to APO2, Stegmann argues that it must be incomplete, because it fails to offer a detailed discussion of the errors which are listed in chapter 4 . On the other hand, he acknowledges that it is neither a rough draft, nor a fragment of a larger work. Chapter 19 can certainly be taken for the concluding chapter, since it enumerates and summarizes the views which were previously considered. The introduction is more difficult to explain. However, the Ms . tradition does not suggest an abridged or dismembered work. Chapters 1 and 2 contain a definition of Christ as the decisive norm of Christology, particularly because this definition originates in the Gospel. In chapter 3 we have a description of the erroneous views which contradict the orthodox faith and of the people who hold them. At the close of chapter 3 and the beginning of chapter 4 the 'Apollinaristic' theses are quoted and criticized. The following chapters combat these notions without naming the opponent. Thus although some kind of order seems to run through the document,

it is neither orderly nor coherent.

With regard to the relation of APO1 to APO2 Stegmann agrees with everybody else, that they are distinct books, but he finds the view of their derivation from a common author, held by some, to be highly questionable. He defends this by means of the following arguments:

- (i) APO1 names Christ not only as Κύριος but also as Δεσπότης whereas APO2 uses the latter term only once and that with reference to God and not to Christ.
- (ii) The author of APO1 likes to use the particle ἐπεὶ instead of γὰρ, but this never occurs in APO2.
- (iii) APO2 uses the term σύστασις to refer to man's constitution in six occasions, whereas APO1 does not use it at all.
- (iv) The rule of faith is named and esteemed in APO1, but in APO2 it is expressed differently and not as emphatically.
- (v) With regard to style APO2 contains more word-plays and unusual expressions than APO1.
- (vi) With regard to structure of contents APO1 discusses the errors of Apollinarianism in an ordered list. Whereas APO2 does not do so.
- (vii) Though the theology is basically the same, i.e. Alexandrian and Athanasian, the phrase of APO2 διὰ Θεοῦ ἐν σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ πάθος γέγονεν in preference to θεὸς διὰ σαρκὸς ἔπαθεν is at least odd, and strikes us as neutral in its import and therefore non-Athanasian in thought. This is

of course the case, if the phrase is considered to be an integral part of the Christological terminology of APO2 and not just an occasional and rather unsuccessful product of the author's opposition to the tempting view of the suffering God, represented in the Apollinarist phrase ὅτι Θεός ὁ διὰ σαρκὸς παθὼν καὶ ἀναστάς (APO2,12). It is certain that this expression is unusual here, since the author's basic view is in line with that of the Alexandrians which is shown by the formula ὁ Χριστὸς παθητὸς ἐπειδὴ ἄνθρωπος, ἀπαθὴς δὲ ὡς Θεός (cf. APO2, 12 and also APO2, 2 where it is said that God and man are united in Christ ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ πάθους ὁμολογουμένου ἀληθῶς, ὁ αὐτὸς παθητὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς εἶναι συνομολογῆται ἀληθινῶς and also APO2, 18). The crucial question here from the point of view of the relation between APO1 and APO2 is why such a neutral phrase did not occur to the author of APO1 when dealing with similar matters, if he was really identical with the author of APO2.

(viii) Furthermore, the disposition and contents of APO1 and APO2 speak against common authorship. The two authors share a common aim, namely, the impersonal attack on the new heterodox who have not yet formally been expelled from the Church as heretics and grouped together with Marcion, Manichaeus, Valentinus, Paul of Samosata and Arius. Indeed they would not have wished to be, although they hold similar views as the aforementioned heretics, and their error demands their inclusion within that company. Both authors describe the main Christological error of their

opponents as amounting to the claim that the One Christ is not the unchanging God the Word who is incapable in his divinity of suffering and death and not the real and complete man, but the God who has assumed an incomplete humanity or a humanity of mere semblance. As the author of APO1 puts it, οὗτοι δὲ ἢ ἀλλοίωσιν τοῦ λόγου φαντάζονται ἢ δόκησιν τὴν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πύθους ὑπολαμβάνουσιν (ch.2). Or, as the author of APO2 puts it, ὡς τοῦ λόγου τροπὴν ὑπομείναντος εἰς σαρκὸς μεταποίησιν ἢ ψυχῆς ὁμοίωσιν ἢ ὡς φανταστικὴν τὴν δεξιὴν ποιησαμένου τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μορφῆς (ch.2 and also cf. ch.5). The basic error, according to the author of APO2, is the denial of the true and unspoilt nature of Christ, which results in serious consequences which are put forward by him as charges against his opponents in the following way: οὔτε τῆς ἀμαρτίας τὴν κατάκρισιν δεῖξαι δύνασθε, οὔτε τοῦ θανάτου τὴν κατάλυσιν, οὔτε τῆς ἀναστάσεως τὴν τελείωσιν, οὔτε τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀτρεπτότητα (ch17). Chapters 5-17 are occupied with the elaboration of these charges and they are quite similar to chapters 3-19 of APO1, and chapter 19 which provides a similar summary as chapter 17 of APO2. Stegmann lists the most striking parallels between the two treatises:

APO1,13+2= APO2,2+4

APO1,20 = APO2,3

APO1,14+8= APO2,7-8,14+15

and especially, APO1,15 =APO2,6. On the whole he finds that APO2 does not contain any major point which is not

mentioned in APO1, and observes that the ideas which are peculiar to APO1 are essentially of a formal nature and result from the way in which the specific and detailed errors of the opponents became known to the author in different formulations, or were written down by him in his own words. So, for example, APO2 does not mention those who call the body of Christ ἄκτιστον or ὁμοούσιον, nor does he mention the heretical thesis ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ (APO1,2). But this corresponds roughly to what APO1 has to say in chapters 3-6,9-12,and 13-19. It is therefore improbable, to Stegmann , that the same arguments would have been expressed differently by the same author. The heretics attacked in APO1 are more clearly Apollinarian, since it is only here that we find the characteristic Apollinarian expression ὅπου γὰρ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖ καὶ ἁμαρτία and δύο τέλεια ἐν γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται and only here that we find ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ. But why do we find so little agreement in the ordering of ideas so that there are hardly any formal parallels between the two works, if both derive from the same author? Even the best parallel of APO1,15 to APO2,6 indicates that the agreement in content is not agreement in style.

With these momentous questions Stegmann concludes that neither treatise can be considered as an improved or extended version or even addition to the other. Given that

both attack the same views in different literary styles they must be the products of different authors. It would seem wholly unlikely that the seventy-seven year old Athanasius would have allowed himself the leisure and inclination to write such an opus supererogatorium! It can be assumed then that APO2 was written in Alexandria in the mid-seventies and that shortly afterwards the two books came to be grouped together because of their similar intent and content. Thus Stegmann comes very close to the affirmation of Athanasian authorship for APO1 but not for APO2. What is significant, however, is that both APO contain Athanasian theology and are written at least under the shadow of inspiration from the great theologian. Stegmann has certainly moved a long distance from Dräseke who had so categorically placed the two APO in the late seventies and curiously neglected the Athanasian associations. Most interesting in the case of Stegmann is his silence regarding the dogmengeschichtliche arguments of Stülken^C, and particularly Baur's thesis of an incipient Apollinarianism in Athanasian Christology, mainly with respect to the human soul in Christ. Stegmann seems to have been influenced by Weigl's work, but we suspect that he had read Voisin's great article on the Christology of Athanasius which had decisively attacked the Baurian tradition in the interpretation of Athanasian Christology. Though his conclusions are not definite, Stegmann has contributed in several ways towards a general return to the verdict of the Benedictines.

Concerning the particulars of Stegmann's article the following critical response may be made here:

Stegmann agrees with Weigl that the external testimonies concerning APO1 go back to Cyril; that APO1&2 do not presuppose any writings of Apollinaris; that the discernment of development in Apollinarist doctrine should not be attempted on the basis of dichotomic or trichotomic anthropology; that the chronology of Apollinarism cannot be determined and therefore not be used as an argument, when investigating the authorship of APO; and finally, that APO1 is not conceptually foreign to Athanasius, and hence APO1 could in fact be considered, unlike APO2, as possibly being derived from the pen of the great Alexandrian Doctor.

There are three main areas in which Stegmann disagrees with Weigl, firstly with Weigl's evaluation of Voisin's argument e silentio, emerging from Epiphanius' description of the rise of Apollinarianism; secondly, with Weigl's way of establishing the Athanasian style of APO; and thirdly, with Weigl's contention, that APO1&2 originate with the same author. In fact, it is in these three areas that Stegmann produces extensive arguments, that deserve special evaluation.

Stegmann simply restates Voisin's argument without really offering a critical assessment. The only critical point he makes is that EPI is not anti-Apollinarist as Weigl suggests. Therefore Weigl's explanation of Epiphanius' choice of EPI rather than APO for his account of Athanasius' reaction to Apollinaris is unsatisfactory. Stegmann's contention obviously turns against the evidence afforded by Epiphanius' account of Apollinarism. Was he really mistaken in choosing Athanasius'

EPI as a reply to the Apollinarist Christological errors? Why does Stegmann trust Epiphanius' silence and not his explicit testimony? The fact that a copy of EPI was sent to Apollinaris by Serapion and that Apollinaris felt obliged to write that he agreed with it, strongly suggests that the debate in Corinth had something to do with Apollinaris' Christological positions. This testimony is confirmed by the Acts of later Councils which quote EPI as anti-Apollinarian. But more important still, later Apollinarians quote as Athanasian a phrase from EPI, which also occurs in APO1. Stegmann, of course, might be prepared to connect this reference with APO1 only, which would prove Weigl's thesis without any reference to EPI or Epiphanius.

Stegmann's contention that APO exhibits a non-Athanasian style rests on two arguments. Firstly, that APO prefers nouns and combinations of nouns, whereas Athanasius does not; and secondly that Weigl's stylistic parallels between APO and Athanasian texts though impressive, are too general to be taken for stylistic at all. Stegmann is right about the high frequency of nouns in APO1, but he has not provided any conclusive evidence in support of his claim, that such a phenomenon is not Athanasian. Again no evidence is supplied for his second contention regarding the insufficient character of Weigl's examples.

His final contention of diversity of authors for APO1&2 rests on eight arguments which require close evaluation.

The frequency of δεσπότης in APO1 is not high enough to establish an argument. Κύριος on the other hand has great

frequency in both APO1 and APO2. It occurs 32 times in APO1 and 23 times in APO2.

Stegmann is simply wrong about ἐπεὶ. It occurs twice in APO2, 8. APO1 uses it only 5 times. In any case, ἐπεὶ should not be examined apart from its synonymous ἐπειδὴ, which occurs twice in APO1 and 9 times in APO2. Ἐπεὶ and ἐπειδὴ together have a frequency of 7 in APO1 and 11 (or 12 because of the ἐπειδὴπερ) in APO2. Does this really establish evidence for stylistic argument?

Stegmann is right that οὐστας appears only in APO2 at 6 places and not once in APO1. But why should one refer to this difference and not to the major difference connected with the other anthropological term of νοῦς which appears 16 times in APO1 and not once in APO2? After all οὐστας occurs together with the adjective νοσπᾶ and the noun φύσις which combined together seem to be peculiar to the heretics of APO2 and yet synonymous to νοῦς which is peculiar to the heretics of APO1. Does this not suggest that the notions opposed in APO1 and APO2, though parallel, are in fact verbally different and hence terminologically disparate as regards the responses of APO1&2. It seems that Stegmann makes too much of an argument from a rather limited piece of evidence which has not been sufficiently scrutinized. Incidentally, it is interesting to point out here that both APO1 and APO2 make use of the verb συνίσταται in the same anthropological context.

The fourth argument is weak and the fifth too general. Should not the total vocabularies of APO1 and APO2 be examined and compared before one establishes a more or less of this or that

linguistic trait ?

The sixth argument does not say very much, because it is not taken into account that AP01 and AP02 are addressed to different persons and treat of distinct though not unrelated cases.

Stegmann's seventh argument is incorrect. Athanasius does not state that God suffered; Christ did! AP01, 2 and 12 bear witness to this and Stegmann himself refers to it. But God is not said to suffer. In EPI, for instance, it is the body which suffers, and the passion is said to be Christ's because of His body (EPI, 6.10, 11, etc.). Why should the phrase $\delta\iota\alpha\ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\ \epsilon\nu\ \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\epsilon\nu$ be regarded as strange to Athanasius, given the particular context of the heretical, theopaschetic claim? Is it not more true to the text to take it for an attempted reformulation of the heretical statement using the same terminology?

Stegmann's eighth argument regarding the diversity of authors in the case of AP01 and AP02 is unconvincing, because it lacks thorough examination and careful comparison of the notions combatted in the true treatises. Though similar in their final consequence, these notions are not the same. The opponents of AP02 know nothing about "a heavenly flesh", or "a body consubstantial with the Godhood" which appear to be major themes in the heretics' system underlying AP01. Instead, the opponents in AP02 know of "a God born in Nazareth". As to the anthropological side in Christ which is discussed by both, the opponents in AP02 speak of "an intelligent nature", or just "nature", whereas the heretics in AP01 speak of a "mind" or a "heavenly mind". It seems that AP01 and AP02 oppose different though not unrelated doctrines.

The nature of the doctrines is such that no orderly response can be given. It also seems clear that both authors try to respond to the two groups of heretics using the heretical terms and not terms of their own.

On the whole Stegmann's arguments are useful but not thorough enough to establish his thesis. Weigl's treatment, though limited, appears to be both more thorough and more conclusive.

2.7. C.E. RAVEN

No one of the critics approached the two treatises so negatively as Charles E. Raven did, when he touched on the subject in his book, Apollinarism, An Essay on the Christology of the Early Church, published at Cambridge in 1923.⁽²²⁾ This was probably due to his strong dogmengeschichtliche presuppositions which in many ways were those of the liberal school stemming from F.C. Baur. This is clear in his statement that Athanasius was able to avoid and even oppose the Christology of Paul of Samosata "by accepting the traditional Gnosticism of Alexandria, by making the Godhead the centre of Christ's personality and by denying tacitly but indubitably His possession of a human soul". Equally revealing is his statement that in Athanasius "the manhood of Christ is described ...and is called only His body, His shrine, His instrument, and never is it regarded as complete or personal...clearly the conception of a perfect manhood and a human soul was not needed so long as the idea of Godhead expressed by the term Logos prevailed.. so Athanasius ..definitely rejected it and ..persisted in so doing at least until his last years".

Raven disagreed with Dräseke and Hoss about the diversity between AP01&2. He argued on the basis of style, thought, identity of content and method that the two treatises could not have been written by different hands as Dräseke so gratuitously proposed. But he asserted that only AP01 was complete, while AP02 was "an appendix and restatement, compiled after new Apollinarian material had come into its author's possession".

Raven treated each book separately and reached similar conclusions. Regarding AP01, he claimed that it was certainly based on Athanasius' EPI, and that it was in fact little more than an expansion and paraphrase of it with the insertion of anti-Apollinarist sections between the treatment of Gnosticism given at the beginning and the treatment of Ebionism given at the end. "The arrangement", he wrote, "is the same; the same heretical opinions are attacked; there are constant similarities of phrase; and the doctrinal stand-point is not widely different". Yet in spite of these similarities, Raven claimed that the book had little to do with Apollinarism, since "much of it is occupied with criticism of ideas (Manicheans, Arians, Marcion, Rhetorius, Valentinus, Sabellius) which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be supposed to touch Apollinarius". Raven also claimed that the arguments "are a curious medley of miscellaneous and rather threadbare remnants, suggesting that the original material of EPI had been eked out with patches collected from such works as the letters to Cleodnius and the Antirretikos". These, however, appear to be mere suggestions, since Raven does not offer any concrete evidence in support of his claim. It is only AP01,2 that he considers to be a brief but brilliant statement of Apollinarism. He even goes as far as to say that it is probably a quotation from some Apollinarian writings, or at least a statement based upon genuine sayings of the Laodicean. Yet, when the discussion of these Apollinarian notions is offered in paragraphs 13-16

the result is very disappointing. The author of the treatises makes a travesty of them, since, instead of clear understanding, he offers "hesitations, quibbles, and inconsistencies", which Raven attempts to expound. But his exposition is nothing but a selection of a few phrases which are twisted around according to Raven's ideological bias.

As far as the second treatise is concerned, Raven claims that "the same quality is still more plain". The new material of Apollinarism which the author used for writing this unfinished treatise, which lacks a proper beginning and a proper end, derives from Apollinaris' Anacephalaisis. As evidence for this he cites APO2,4 APO2,6 and APO2,7 in English and suggests that they be compared to ANAC.9,28, ANAC.10 and ANAC.2 respectively. He even claims that the last case is almost verbally identical. That this claim is far from certain can be shown by simply citing the Greek texts:

(1) APO2,4

ἄνθρωπον λέγουσι τὸν Χριστὸν
θεοποιηθέντα. Καὶ τοῦ τὸ ἐν
ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος; καὶ ὅτι λαβὼν
μορφὴν δούλου ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος,
ἢ ἄνθρωπὸν φησι μετὰ Θεοῦ ὄντα
ἢ ἄνθρωπὸν φησι Θεῷ συμπλακέντα
ἢ ἄνθρωπον ὑπὲρ κόσμου ἀποθα-
νόντα, ἢ ἄνθρωπον τῆς ἁμαρτίας
οὐ χωρισθέντα, ἢ ἄνθρωπον ἀγγέ-

ANAC.9,28.

9. ὁ ἐξ ἁμαρτίας σῶζων ὑπὲρ
ἁμαρτίαν ἐστίν· καὶ σῶζει
Χριστός· οὐδεὶς δὲ ἀνθρώπων
ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτίαν· οὐκ ἄρα ἄνθρω-
πος ὁ Χριστός.

28. Προσκυνεῖται ὑπὸ ἀγγέ-
λων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ οὐ; ἀλλ' εἰ
μὲν οὐ προσκυνεῖται, διὰ τὸ
ἐν αὐτῷ θεῖαν ἐνοικῆσαι

λων δεσπόζοντα, ἢ ἄνθρωπον
ὑπὸ τῆς κτίσεως προσκυνού-
μενον,

δύναμιν, πῶς ὑπὸ τῶν λεί θείαν
ἐχόντων δύνάμιν ἐνοικοῦσαν; Καὶ
ἡμεῖς δὲ προσκυνήσομεν τὸν
ἄνθρωπον ἢ οὐ;

(ii)
APO2,6

ANAC.10

εἰ πάντα ἔλαβε, πάντως δῆπου
καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους λογισ-
μοὺς εἶχεν· ἀδύνατον δ' ἔστιν
ἐν λογισμοῖς ἀνθρωπίνους ἀ-
μαρτίαν μὴ εἶναι· καὶ πῶς
ἔσται χωρὶς ἀμαρτίας ὁ

Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος διάστασιν ἔχει
σαρκὸς πρὸς νοῦν. Χριστὸς δὲ οὐκ
ἔχει· οὐκ ἄρα ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστὸς.

Χριστὸς;
(iii)
APO2,7

ANAC.2

Εἰ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστὸς, μέ-
ρος ἔσται τοῦ κόσμου· μέρος
δὲ κόσμου σῶσαι οὐ δύναται.

Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος μέρος κόσμου καὶ
οὐδὲν μέρος κόσμου αἶρει τὴν
ἀμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου. ὑφ' ἧς καὶ
αὐτὸς κεῖται· Χριστὸς δὲ αἶρει·
οὐκ ἄρα ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστὸς.

It is true that the third case is closer to the point because the same thought is expressed and almost in the same terms, yet the syntactical construction is quite different. Case (ii) and more so case (i) are further removed from the point Raven is making, since there are differences both in the syntax and in the terms. Further the texts of APO2 suggest a controversial and dialogical situation, whereas the texts of the ANAC. suggest abstract logical reflection. Lastly APO2 contains many more possible

quotations from a document of the opposition which do not appear in the ANAC. It seems therefore unlikely that the author of APO2 made use of Apollinaristic notions from the Anacephalalosis.

Raven reached the conclusion that the two APO must be considered as spurious, and therefore their Athanasian paternity should be totally disclaimed. For him, Athanasius, "whose mind is charitable and clear, whose style is pleasant and orderly, and whose intimacy with Apollinarius is undisputed, could not have written against him works so full of bathos and inexactitude, obscurity and vituperation". Raven also claims that the external evidence is even more conclusive as far as the spurious character of the treatises is concerned. Proclus' testimony, that the books were written by Athanasius after Apollinaris' death is a direct indication against the Athanasian origin. Leontius' citation from APO1 does not mention anything about the author, and the testimonies of the VIth Ecumenical Synod, of John Maxentius and of John of Damascus and a few Latin authors are less than worthless. "They tell decisively against them". Lastly the argument from silence based on the fact that the two APO were not mentioned before the sixth century indicates that they do not belong to the fourth century, but must be considered as forgeries. "They belong to the large class of compilations based upon the writings of the Fathers in an age when the circumstances of their times had been forgotten, by men who had collected relevant passages from their works and paraphrased them to suit a

new day. This author (for they are obviously by the same hand) has got hold of the Ad Epictetum and possibly other familiar fourth-century writings, and a fragment or two of Apollinaris. He has studied the time well enough to know something of the prevailing heresies and possibly a few of the mannerisms of Athanasius. And he sets himself to produce a piece of work which shall be passed off as authentic. Close parallels to it can be found in the letter to Caesarius, also supposedly an attack upon Apollinarius, and ascribed to John Chrysostom, which is even more certainly a forgery, though by an abler hand, and in the pseudo-Athanasian Sermo Contra Omnes Haereses, which has several points in common with these books. As we have seen, the two books are works of small importance and only their traditional authorship makes them worthy of detailed mention". The lack of positive evidence in Raven's positive conclusions clearly indicates their speculative nature and therefore their minimal worth. It appears astonishing to the reviewer of the critical studies on APO that Raven's position should be so remote from the positions of the rest of the critics.

In the last paragraph of his study of APO Raven claims that there are three significant doctrinal inconsistencies in its teaching. (i) APO1 makes mention of Valentinus and understands him to have taught that the Father and the Holy Spirit "wore flesh" (APO1,2) and that "the passion was common to the Trinity since the flesh was part of the Godhead" (APO2,3,12). (ii) The stress on Adam and the Fall, common to both APO, rather fits in with the later period of Pelagianism but not with the period of the Apollinarian

controversies. (iii) The Christology of APO is obviously influenced by the ideas current in the Nestorian controversy. This is particularly obvious in the expressions "natural union", "identity of nature", "enhypostatic", "natural birth", "indissoluble union", "division of persons" . . . etc, and also in the adjectives of the Chalcedonian formula, "inconfusable" (APO1,10), "inseparable" (APO2,14), "inconvertable" (APO1,3,11 ; APO2,2) and "invisible" (APO2,2 and APO1,6,12), as well as in the use of the name Christ as indicative of the term *Χριστός* ; Finally most conclusive is the distinction plainly drawn between *ἔνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν* and *ἔνωσις κατὰ φύσιν*, which belong to the period of the monophysite controversies.

We have already responded to Raven's contention about literary connections between notions opposed in APO2 and the Apollinarist work Anakephalaiosis. His claim about similar connections between APO and EPI, or APO and the Epistola ad Caesareum, or APO and Sermo contra Omnes Haereses are not substantiated. That there are connections is obvious. What is not obvious, and what Raven does not provide, is a specification and evaluation of such connections. One would have thought that it would have been far more appropriate for Raven to have pursued this path, rather than the production of the minutiae of doctrinal-historical inconsistencies in APO. These minutiae are so unscientifically presented and so speculatively and haphazardly assessed that they amount to nothing at all. The Valentinian view of the Incarnation and its corollary, the divine suffering, are not investigated scientifically. No attempt is made to find out the sense

in which Athanasius or any of his predecessors understood it and then compare it to the way the author of APO understands it and presents it. The stress on Adam and the Fall is typical of Athanasius and Raven's claim that it only belongs to the Pelagian period is a gross generalisation. As for the alleged Nestorian terminology and conceptuality of APO, Raven is begging the question. The terms which he singles out as Nestorian were already being used in Apollinarian and anti-Apollinarian contexts in the second half of the fourth century. Besides, there is terminology in APO, especially Mariological, which would not fit into the Nestorian milieu. In any case one does not find two contesting parties (one Alexandrian and another Nestorian) in APO. Rather, the Alexandrian author of APO is condemning both Apollinarism and its early Antiochene ('Nestorian') alternative! On the whole, apart from a few partial details (mainly the literary connections between APO1 and APO2 and between APO and other Apollinarian and anti-Apollinarian literature), Raven's account is confusing, because it blurs the real issues, which had been in a limited but careful fashion exposed by the German critics, of which he appears to have known very little. If anything Raven's account about APO's paternity and doctrine epitomizes the character of his whole book, which is a dogmengeschichtliche in a rather historicist fashion. Baur's views were hypothetical and tentative. Raven gives the impression that his hypotheses are facts. But the sinister side of Raven's approach becomes obvious, if one compares his essay to that of Weigl. Weigl found the doctrine of APO as representing the flowering of Athanasian

thought. Raven saw it as a demonstration of bathos, inexactitude, obscurity and vituperation!

2.8. JOSEPH LEBON

A few years after Raven the French scholar Joseph Lebon dealt with the two treatises in his essay Une ancienne (23)
opinion sur la condition du Corps du Christ dans la mort.

In this essay Lebon reached the conclusion that St. Athanasius understood the death of Christ as a separation of the Logos from the body which He had assumed at the Incarnation. He found this understanding of Christ's death in INC, CAR and EPI. In this last writing he found that he had to examine the controversial phrase $\mu\eta\ \chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ which stood in direct opposition to his thesis. After a detailed and careful examination he concluded that this phrase had later been interpolated into the text of EPI. The last obstacle to his thesis was Athanasius' two APO which, though disputed with regard to their Athanasian origin, were still believed by many to be Athanasian. Lebon found that in APO Christ's death is not conceived as a separation of the Logos from his body, but rather as a separation of the soul of Christ from his body. This obstacle forced Lebon to consider the question of the authorship of APO.

He started by supposing that APO had really been a literary production of St. Athanasius and that it had been written at the closing years of his career. On this supposition he proceeded to argue that we could explain the difference of INC and APO on the understanding of Christ's death by assuming that Athanasius had not paid particular attention to the question of Christ's death, when he wrote the former,

but that he did so when he wrote the latter. And he went on to say that this assumption could not be applied to the comparison of APO with EPI, particularly if the former was written in 371-2, as the defenders of the Athanasian authorship assume. Thus, he writes, on ne peut pas supposer qu' Athanase aurait changé si complètement d' avis sans s' en rendre compte. However, although this observation is not tendentious and could therefore be used against the Athanasian ascription, it is not conclusive.

Thus Lebon is led to raise the general question regarding the origin of APO, with particular reference to the historical testimonies. To him the scholars seem to decide on the basis of the schools they belong to. Stülken^ξ can claim against Montfaucon that the "ancient testimonies" are not valid because they go back only to the sixth century. Raven can add to this contention of Stülken^ξ a series of alleged internal contradictions (une serie de pretendues raisons internes) so as to reckon these documents as deliberate forgeries perpetrated by a supporter of Chalcedon who was attacking monophysite exaggerations probably in the early years of the sixth century. To Weigl, on the other hand, Cyril appears to have utilised these documents considering them as Athanasian in A.D. 430.

Lebon finds Raven's conclusions not only apparently contrary to the internal data, but also contradictory to the facts, i.e. the historical testimonies. He feels that

Raven ignored the external testimonies. He sees this in Raven's claim that Proclus' testimony going back to 553 was the first external testimony to APO, though he also records the testimony of John Maxentius - which is of an earlier date, namely AD 519. Obviously, Raven did not examine the historical testimonies but simply cited them from Montfaucon's Monitum. The reproduction is so substantial and so little care has been taken, that he copies the reference Conc.V,459 to the testimony of Proclus and writes before it the name MANSI without noticing that it was not from this collection of documents that the testimony in question was given by Montfaucon. Also Raven ignored the fact that almost twenty-five years before the Synod of 553, APO1 was extensively quoted by Severus of Antioch and Julian of Halicarnassus in the letters and refutations which they exchanged in their disputations over the incorruptibility of the body of Christ. Julian cites APO1,6 under the title "The logos against Apollinaris of St. Athanasius", and Severus cites APO1,5,6,11-12,14,15-16,18. The introductory formulas to these citations always name Athanasius as the author of the writings out of which they have been taken. The designations of APO1 are "The λόγος περί πίστεως to which the phrase "against Apollinaris" is attached, or the phrase "against the impious Apollinaris", or the phrase "against the φρενοβλάβεια of Apollinaris".

APO2 is not cited in these polemic writings of Julian and

Severus; but the same Severus attests the existence and circulation of both treatises under the name of Athanasius around the same time as John Maxentius. In his book "Against the grammarian John of Caesarea" he cites several passages from both APO1 and APO2. These passages are the following: (i) APO1, 11-12, 10, and the introductory formula is, "in the λόγος περὶ πίστεως with the addition "against the impious Apollinaris". (ii) APO2, 13, 14, 15, 14, and the introductory formula is "in the other (or, "in another") discourse against the partisans of Apollinaris, who think corruptively on the subject of the salutary manifestation of Christ", and "in the treatise against the opinion of the impious Apollinaris on the subject of the salutary manifestation of Christ".

The two logoi, which Severus mentions are of course attributed without any hesitation to St Athanasius, but he considers them as two distinct logoi and not as parts of one book. The distinction is clearly marked by their specific titles. The first one is the λόγος περὶ πίστεως against the impious Apollinaris, while the second one is known as "the other" or "another" logos against the partisans or against the opinion of the impious Apollinaris περὶ τῆς σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Thus Lebon remarks:

Il serait intéressant de rechercher
ce qu'il pourrait rester des titres
primitifs dans ces données, dont
certains éléments se sont conservés

dans la tradition grecque (Cf. PG. XXVI 1093, n.38 et 1131, n.1). En tout ces détails confirment l'opinion que A. Stülken s'était déjà formée d'après d'autres indices; "Aus alledem folgt mit zwingender Notwendigkeit, dass man I und II weiterhin als ein zweigliedriges Werk betrachten darf". Cette conclusion s'appuyait, entre autres, sur le fait que divers manuscrits offrent notre second livre avant le premier; aux témoins de ce phénomène signalés par Stülken, on pourrait en ajouter d'autres, comme le Cod. Basil. A. III, 4 et le Cod. Vatic. graec. 400.

The separate existence as regards the origin of the two APO is equally attested by the state of the ancient translations. The Armenian literature, for example, has preserved a version of APO2, which bears the title : On the salutary manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ against Marcion, but there is no trace of APO1 in it. On the contrary a Syriac version mentioned in A. Baumstark's Geschichte der syrischen Literatur, has preserved a version of APO1 without any reference to APO2.

In addition to this Lebon mentions that in sixth century Christological debate both Catholics and Monophysites were in agreement with regard to the Athanasian paternity of the two APO. This unanimity presupposes, according to Lebon, an earlier tradition, which goes back to the fifth century as Weigl correctly stated. To show that

this has an objective foundation, Lebon furnishes a piece of information which attributes AP01 to the great Doctor of Alexandria and derives from the period 460-470. This information is contained in the large work against the Council of Chalcedon of Timothy Aelurus, the monophysite bishop of Alexandria (circa 454-477). In this book, Timothy cites three passages from AP01 under the designation "from the discourse against Apollinaris of the blessed Athanasius, Archbishop of Alexandria". The Armenian text of this book, the only extant version of the Greek original, was published by K. Ter-Mekerttschian and E. Minassiantz in their Timotheus Aelurus' des Patriarchen von Alexandrien Widerlegung der auf der Synode zu Chalcedon festgesetzten Lehre, Leipzig, 1908, and dates from the sixth century, i.e., only one century after the death of St. Athanasius. The citations come from AP01, 18 (entirely quoted), 5 and 7, and the order in which they appear indicates significant variations from the Greek original, since they also appear in the Syriac version Add. Ms. 12156 of the British Museum, which is independent of the former version. The introductory formula of the Syriac version of these citations corresponds to the Greek ἐκ λόγου or ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, but in the Armenian version the corresponding formula is ἐκ τοῦ λόγου κατὰ Ἀπολλιναρίου.

Such evidence, according to Lebon, renders impossible even the slightest confidence in Raven's opinion about the

the origin, date and composition of the two APO. The refutation of Raven's theory would be complete if one regarded Weigl's claim that Cyril had used the APO in AD 430, as reasonable and objectively sustainable. But this, as Lebon goes on to show, cannot be entertained simply on the basis of the texts which Weigl adduces. The expression ἐν ἰδίῳ συγγράμματι is very vague. The text is not obviously a quotation, but simply exhibits similarities in the terms. The arguments from the Περὶ Σαρκώσεως which Cyril and Photius refer to, and the Περὶ Ἐνανθρωπήσεως which Eulogius cites, are not acceptable. Therefore, Lebon concludes: Il ne nous paraît donc nullement prouvé que saint Cyrille d' Alexandrie ait connu le Contra Apollinarium, et qu'il l' ait cité en 430 sous le nome de saint Athanase. However, the testimonies to which Lebon refers, incontestably enrich, according to his own opinion, the patristic attestation that these writings were brought forward into the milieu of the fifth century from an earlier period.

Thus, says Lebon, one should, on the basis of such ancient traditions, reject the thesis of inauthenticity, But on the other hand, one is confronted with certain inexplicable difficulties. How could Apollinaris have asserted in 373 or 374, by writing to the confessors of Diocaesarea, that he had received γράμματα τιμῆς from St. Athanasius, and ἀφ' αὐτοῦ, on the evidence of these letters, his good relation to the great Archbishop of Alexandria?

(Cf. οἷων ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ μακαρίου ἐπισκόπου Ἀθανασίου, εἰδότος ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῖς δόγμασι συμφώνους αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ πάντα πειθηνίους). Further, how could Eriphanus have written in 377 in his Πανάριον about ὁ πρεσβύτερος καὶ σεμνοπρεπής, ὁ ἀεὶ ἡμῖν ἀγαπητός, καὶ τῷ μακαρίτῃ πάπῃ Ἀθανασίῳ, καὶ πᾶσιν ὀρθοδόξοις, Ἀπολλινάριος ὁ ὑπὸ Λαοδικείας? Weigl's explanation based on the private character of these writings is not convincing. So Lebon concludes with the following statement:

Quant aux données internes, que l'on allègue comme des indices ou preuves d'authenticité, nous croyons qu'on les explique suffisamment en admettant que les deux écrits, originaires distincts, qui formèrent ensuite le Contra Apollinarium, ont pour auteur un disciple d'Athanase et ont été composés peu de temps après la mort du saint évêque.

Lebon's basically literary contribution is undoubtedly very valuable. It was not only the Greek East but also the Syriac and Armenian Orient which knew the two APO to have been Athanasian productions. Particularly valuable is Lebon's textual-critical comment that the quotations from APO in the fifth century monophysite documents seem to vary. Unfortunately this present study does not envisage such textual critical investigation, and since no critical edition of the Greek text has been yet produced we can only note the inevitable limitation of this work from the textual point of view.

Lebon is not entirely right about Athanasius' perception of Christ's death exclusively as a separation of Logos and body. But in any case, APO1 at least, employs this allegedly exclusive Athanasian model along-side the soul-body model and therefore strongly indicates that Lebon's contrast of these two models is unacceptable. As regards his question concerning the relation of Athanasius to Apollinaris he seems to have been unduly sceptical. APO, in spite of the title Contra Apollinarem (which is not original after all), does not condemn Apollinaris directly. It condemns a number of Apollinaristic notions (especially APO1) which could not be attributed to Apollinaris if one were to judge on the basis of the extant Apollinarian literature. Indeed, Apollinaris could probably have agreed with APO1 and if, in fact, he had been its recipient, he could certainly have claimed in his letter to the Bishops of Diocaesarea that as a matter of fact he had received γράμματα τιμῆς from Athanasius and that he had been σύμφωνος αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ πάντα κεθήνιος . Further, Epiphanius could have been aware of the fact that Apollinaris had privately communicated with Athanasius and had even agreed with him. Obviously there are Apollinarian notions which APO1 did not touch. It is more than probable that Epiphanius had hoped for Apollinaris' "return" to the orthodox Alexandrian camp when he wrote against the Dimoiretai in his Panarion. He cited EPI because it was an open and not a private letter (a response perhaps to a synod as Weigl put it) with which Apollinaris had agreed! We cannot help assessing Lebon's questions as unduly sceptical as regards the prolongation of the Athanasian

and Epiphonian sympathy towards Apollinaris even after the first open outbreak of the Apollinarian crisis.

As regards the interpolation of the phrase μή χωρισθεῖς αὐτοῦ , like the other crucial doctrinal phrase τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις , we are of the opinion that it should not be used to introduce an insoluble either/or. Why should we exclude the supposition that it could have been added afterwards by Athanasius himself when this came to be a disputed issue? It could also have been added by Athanasians in accordance with the general drift of Athanasius' teaching. As τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις could easily have been introduced into Athanasian texts after the decisive synod of Alexandria in AD. 362, so the phrase μή χωρισθεῖς αὐτοῦ could have been added after Athanasius' encounter with the subtleties of the Apollinarians. In any case, Athanasius' doctrine of death should not be restricted to one rigid model because of an interpolated (if this is indeed the case) phrase. The circumstances of this "interpolation" are unknown and therefore it would be unwise to speculate too much and too decisively about it. Athanasius had clearly argued in his earlier writings that the body of Christ assumed at the Incarnation did not see corruption, or was not touched by death, because of the Logos' power. We would think that from this doctrinal detail and from the general drift of Athanasius' doctrine of death the notion of separation should at least be put in inverted commas. We tend to believe that had Athanasius (or those who executed the "interpolation") known of inverted commas, perhaps

the addition of the controversial phrase would have been unnecessary and the argument advanced by Lebon would not have arisen. In any case, Lebon has not really shown what the precise circumstances of the interpolation would have been. This means that the phrase in question could not be regarded as an interpolation which distorts, any more than an addition or correction which clarifies. It is more to the point to assert a literary obscurity than to handle the linguistic problems narrowly and reductively. In spite of these rather refined criticisms, Lebon's contribution is admirable for its style, and from a purely material point of view quite substantial.

2.9. P.G. DEMETROPOULOS

The last investigation of the Athanasian authorship of the two APO was P.C. Demetropoulos' essay, Τὸ πρόβλημα τῆς γνησιότητος τοῦ "Περὶ σαρκώσεως τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου λόγοι δύο", τοῦ Μεγάλου Ἀθανασίου.⁽²⁴⁾ Demetropoulos was working on the anthropology of Athanasius, when he observed that APO exhibited many and important Athanasian features which corroborated the Patristic witness to their Athanasian origin. Since the opinion of the specialists in Athens on this issue was divided, Demetropoulos engaged in the investigation of the question of authorship. His work was not comprehensive, because, as he himself acknowledges, it was not intended to be. However, he felt that he had gathered enough evidence to present a strong case for the Athanasian paternity of APO and claimed "that a comprehensive and objective investigation of the problem would certainly result in the same conclusion".

The critics (or rather the bibliography which Demetropoulos consulted), were divided into two camps. Those who rejected and those who accepted the Athanasian ascription. The former included Dräseke, Stülken, Hoss, Voisin, Lietzmann and the Greek patrologist Balanos. The latter included Funk, Robertson, Sträter, Lauchert, Kattenbusch and the Greeks Androutsos and Stephanides. The absence of Weigl and Stegmann is striking.

but Demetropoulos was not really concerned with the history of criticism as such, nor did he attempt in his essay a full discussion of all the questions raised by the critics. This becomes apparent when he basically argues against the theses of Dräseke and Stülken^c and gives a number of references to Lietzmann's observations. This limitation does not, however, deprive his work from originality and gravity. On the contrary, it raises central issues by presenting concrete literary and historical facts in a lucid and independent way.

The essay begins with the observation that those who rejected the Athanasian authorship of APO, developed arguments from internal criticism. On this basis Dräseke concluded that AP01 and AP02 did not constitute a literary unity and were in fact written by two authors. In support of this thesis, Hoss added the confusion in the minutes of the Lateran Council of 649 about the identity of AP02, 18, which was cited as deriving from Athanasius' Epistola Dogmatica Ad Antiochenos, and Stülken^c referred to the confusion in the Codices regarding the order of the two APO.

Regarding the non-Athanasian origin of APO Demetropoulos cites from Le Brachelet (i) the argument from the use of "hypostasis" in the sense of "person", (ii) the argument from Christ's complete human nature, (iii) the argument from style, and (iv) the argument from the refutation of Apollinarist notions developed by Apollinaris after Athanasius' death.

To Demetropoulos' mind, the identity of authors is not threatened by the fact that AP01 and AP02 do not constitute

a literary unit . He observes that the former was written as an answer to a friend's question , whereas the latter was addressed to many persons, possibly an ecclesiastical congregation. Also, APO2 could have been a sermon delivered at a Church gathering for the purpose of informing the faithful about the heresy of Apollinarism which had been gaining interest since 360. But the real test for the identity of authors in the case of the two APO consists in the comparison of their style, terminology, method of argumentation and manner of drawing conclusions. Such a comparison leaves no doubt that both of them derived from the same author. To illustrate this conclusion, Demetropoulos lists the following parallels:

1) Ἡ γὰρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἔνωσις πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Λόγου θεότητα ἐκ μήτρας γέγονεν· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀνεστήσατο ὁ Λόγος, ἐξ οὐρανῶν ἐπιδημήσας· οὐ γὰρ προ- πάρξασαν τῆς τοῦ Λόγου ἐπιδημίας, ἢ τῆς Θεοτόκου Μαρίας, μόνης ἐκ τοῦ Ἀδάμ καταγομένης καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Δαβὶδ γενεαλογουμένης (APO1,4)	Ἐπάρχων πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων Λόγος Θεός, ἐκ Ναζαρετ ἄνθρωπος ᾤφθη, γεννηθεὶς ἐκ Παρθένου καὶ Πνεύματος ἁγίου, ἐν Βηθλεὲμ τῆς Ἰουδαίας, ἐκ σπέρματος <u>Δαβὶδ καὶ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ τοῦ</u> <u>Ἀδάμ ὡς γέγραπται· πάντα</u> <u>λαβὼν ἐκ Παρθένου</u> ὅσα ἀρχῆθεν ὁ Θεὸς εἰς σύστικιν ἀνθρώπου ἔπλασε καὶ ἐποίησε χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας. (APO2,5)
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Also,

Οὐχ ὁμοούσιος ἡ σὰρξ τῆς τοῦ
Λόγου θεότητος ὡς συναίδιος·
ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ κατὰ φύσιν γενομένη
καὶ ἀδιαίρετος κατὰ ἔνωσιν, ἐκ
σπέρματος Δαβὶδ, καὶ τοῦ Ἀβρα-
ὰμ καὶ τοῦ Ἀδάμ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ
ἡμεῖς γεγεννήμεθα. (APO1,12)

2) γεννήσεως τῆς γυναικὸς
ἀνασχέσθαι ἀβξήσεώς τε
ἡλικίας (APO1,5).

τῆς γεννήσεως τῆς ἐκ γυναικὸς
καὶ ἀβξήσεως τῆς ἡλικίας
(APO2,10).

γεννήσεως τῆς ἐκ γυναικὸς
καὶ ἀβξήσεως τῆς ἡλικίας
(APO1,17).

πρὸς τῇ γεννήσει τῇ ἐκ γυναικὸς
καὶ ἀβξήσει τῆς ἡλικίας
(APO2,18).

The next paragraph is dedicated to the problem of terminology, and more particularly to the meaning of the term ὑπόστασις . The neo-Nicene sense of this technical term, which also occurs in the two APO, has been used to furnish an argument against the Athanasian authorship. But, Demetropoulos observes , the same argument has been used against the authenticity of various other works traditionally attributed to Athanasius, such as his work "On the Incarnate manifestation of the Word of God, against the Arians", or his work "On virginity and training". That this argument is not valid was shown by Goltz's De virginitate, eine echte Schrift des Athanasius, who proved that this work is Athanasian in spite of the occurring expression "three hypostaseis, one godhead". Goltz showed that the above expression could have been added by the author himself at a later revision of his work, or it could have been put in by others at a later stage when the doctrine was more expressly clarified. In neither of these cases is the Athanasian character of the document undermined. Yet, Demetropoulos asserts , in the case of

APO we have the definite information that the author (i.e. Athanasius) knew the use of hypostasis in the sense of a distinct or concrete being and that, as such, it could be applied to the doctrine of the Trinity. This is evidenced in his works "Epistle regarding the procedures in Ariminium." and "The Tome to the Antiochenes". In the former Athanasius cites an Arian confession which was adopted by the Arians at the Synod of Antioch in 341, and after demonstrating the dogmatic errors he adds: Πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος· δηλονότι, Πατὸς ἀληθῶς Πατὸς ὄντος, Υἱοῦ δε ἀληθῶς Υἱοῦ ὄντος, τοῦ δὲ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἀληθῶς ἁγίου Πνεύματος ὄντος, τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐχ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲ ἀργῶς κειμένων, ἀλλὰ σημαίνοντων ἀκριβῶς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐκάστου τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ὑπόστασιν τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ δόξαν· ὡς εἶναι τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἓν (23,26). It is absolutely clear that the expression τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαίνοντων ἀκριβῶς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐκάστου. ὑπόστασιν and εἶναι τῇ ὑποστάσει τρία, are synonymous with the expression τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις which reappears in the same work in chapter thirty-six, [ἐκ ποίας δὲ Γραφῆς καὶ αὐτοῖ..καὶ τρεῖς εἰσὶν ὑποστάσεις]. Demetropoulos refers to other similar cases in the De Synodis which leave no doubt that Athanasius did regard the expression "three hypostaseis" as orthodox, (cf. 38, 37).

As regards the Tomus ad Antiochenos , which was written immediately after the Synod of Alexandria in 362, it is

stated explicitly that the expression "three hypostaseis" had been already used by some fathers, though others had opposed it as unwritten and suspect (ἀγραφοὶ καὶ ὑποκτοί). At the Synod it was established that the former had employed the expression because they believed in the Holy Trinity not only nominally, but truly in existence and subsistence (οὐκ ὀνόματι .. ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς οὔσαν καὶ ὑφαστῶσαν) and also in the Father who truly exists and subsists (ἀληθῶς ὄντα καὶ ὑφαστῶτα) and the Son who truly exists in the same existence and subsists (ἐνούσιον ὄντα καὶ ὑφαστῶτα) and the Holy Spirit who subsists and exists (ὑφαστῶς καὶ ὑπάρχων). They also explained that by this phrase they did not mean three gods or three principles. The Synod also established that the fathers who used the phrase "one hypostasis" did not understand it in a Sabellian sense, i.e. disregarding the Son and the Spirit by considering the former to be ἀνούσιος and the latter to be ἀνυπόστατος. They also explained that their term was synonymous with οὐσία, and that in speaking of "one hypostasis" they meant to emphasise the homoousion of the Son with the Father and their identity of nature.

Thus Demetropoulos concludes that the argument from the term "hypostasis" against the Athanasian origin of APO is incorrect. Although he acknowledges that it is not clear what Athanasius' position had been before 362 or in the context of the two contesting parties, he refers, however, to Athanasius' Ad Afros,⁴, where the Athanasian views regarding the interrelation of the terms "hypostasis" and

"ousia" had been specified. "Hypostasis" was synonymous with "ousia" because it signified being. But "hypostasis" and "ousia" could both mean concrete existence, "hyparkhis".

['Η δὲ ὑπόστασις οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαίνομενον ἔχει, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν· ὅπερ Ἱερεμίας ὑπαρξῆν ὀνομάζει λέγων, καὶ οὐκ ἦκουσα φωνῆν ὑπάρξεως. Ἡ γὰρ ὑπόστασις καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὑπαρξίς ἐστίν].

In the third paragraph Demetropoulos deals with the Christological questions in Athanasius and APO. He argues that the supposition of a fundamental difference between the Christology of Athanasius and the Christology of APO is without real foundation. This view of Stülken and Hoss is based on the assumption that for Athanasius Christ's humanity was no more than a series of attributes or characteristics, a kind of abstract nature (of a Platonic sort), which was carried to and fro by the Logos, and which, as such, was never really human. But this judgment is altogether wrong. Nowhere in his works does Athanasius appear to uphold such docetic teaching regarding the Person of Christ as Shapland correctly argued.

Then Demetropoulos goes on to point out the limited scope of the arguments from style. To his mind the differences in style and terminology do not constitute an inerrant criterion on which one could base final conclusions especially in the case of authorship. The style and language of any given author develop, and many a time the distinct nature of the problems discussed requires a different style and language.

Further , if one considers that the two APO were written around 371/2, that is, fifty years after Athanasius commenced writing, a difference of style and language between APO and the earlier Athanasian works is fully justified. Yet, in spite of these differences, the similarities are much more numerous. Generally speaking, the structure of the two APO, the way of argumentation, and the method of combatting the heterodox opinions of the enemies of the Faith are the same as those appearing in the treatises "Against the Arians". Besides, the author of APO has the same consciousness of theological responsibility and pastoral oversight as the author of CAR. The abruptness of the style and the acuteness of expression of this author is typically Athanasian, as one can easily gather from the Athanasian polemic writings. Also there is a distinctive literary homogeneity between the two treatises and the other works of Athanasius. The preposition $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ in the opening sentence of the majority of the Athanasian writings is a special stylistic indication of identity of authors. It appears in APO1 and indicates the long established habit of the author's with respect to syntax of this particle, and as such , it testifies to the literary homogeneity between this and his other works.

Apart from the style and syntax Demetropoulos observes that a number of typical Athanasian expressions are employed by the author of APO, and strongly indicate identity of authors. He lists the following:

1) CAR2,67.

πῶς δὲ εἴπερ κτίσμα ἦν ὁ Λόγος
τὴν ἀπόφασιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λύσαι δυνα-
τὸς ἦν, καὶ ἀφεῖναι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν;

also, CAR2,67.

οὐκ ἔστι κτίσμα οὐδὲ τῶν γεννητῶν
ἄλλ' ἴδιος Λόγος, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς
τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας, τοῦ καὶ κατὰ
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀποφνημαμένου καὶ ἀφι-
έντος μόνου τὰς ἀμαρτίας. Ἐπειδὴ
γὰρ εἴρηται ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ· γῆ εἶ καὶ
εἰς γῆν ἀπελεύση· ἀκολουθῶς δι'
αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ
ἐλευθερία γίνεται.

2) EPI,7.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐ φαντασία ἡ σωτηρία
ἡμῶν, οὐδὲ σώματος μόνου, ἀλλ'
ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ψυχῆς καὶ σώ-
ματος ἀληθῶς, ἡ σωτηρία γέγονεν
ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ. Also, ANT,7.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶον τε ἦν, τοῦ Κυρίου
δι' ἡμᾶς γενομένου ἀνθρώπου, ἀνό-
ητον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ σ'
σώματος μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν
αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ σωτηρία γέγονεν.

3) CAR1,42

Οὐ γὰρ ἠλαττώθη ὁ Λόγος σῶμα
λαβών.

AP01,14.

τῷ μὲν γῆινω εἰρηκῶς· γῆ εἶ
καὶ εἰς γῆν ἀπελεύση· καὶ
οὕτω ὑποδέχεται φθορὰ τὸ
σῶμα, Δεσπότου ἀποφνημαμένου.

Διὰ τοῦτο χρεῖα γέγονε τοῦ
ἀποφνημαμένου, ἵνα αὐτὸς δι'
ἑαυτοῦ λύση τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπό-
φασιν.

AP01,15

Τελείαν τὴν σωτηρίαν κατεργά-
σηται ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ψυχῆς
λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ἵνα
τελεία ἦ καὶ ἡ ἀνάστικτος.

AP01,12.

ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, οὐχ ἵνα
ὁ Λόγος μηκέτι ἦ Λόγος.

4) CAR1,49

AP01,14

Διὰ τοῦτο χρεΐα Θεοῦ ἦν, ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ κατάραν γενο-
μένους αὐτὸς ἐλευθερώσῃ.

Διὰ τοῦτο χρεΐα γέγονε τοῦ ἀποφηναμέ-
νου, ἵνα αὐτὸς δι' ἑαυτοῦ λύσῃ τὴν
ἑαυτοῦ ἀπόφασιν.

5) Both the authors of AP01 and AP02 and Athanasius use the verb ἐπισπεΐρω in connection with the devil's sowing of sin in the souls of men.

Demetropoulos regards the above texts as establishing incontrovertible literary and conceptual connections. He proceeds to argue that a comparison between AP0 and the texts of Athanasius, which attack Apollinarist notions, reinforces this conclusion. Style, language, terminology, conceptuality, expression and logical method are almost identical. A good example is the question of the quaternity which is discussed both in AP01,12 and EPI,8.

Here he compares the following parallels:

EPI,2

AP01,12

Τίς δὲ τὴν ἀθέμιτον ταύτην ἐπενόησεν ἀσέβειαν, ὥστε καὶ εἰς ἐνθύμησιν ἐλθεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὁ λέγων ἐκ Μαρίας εἶναι τὸ Κυριακὸν σῶμα, οὐκέτι Τριάδα, ἀλλὰ τετράδα ἐν τῇ θεότητι φρονεῖ;

Εἰ δὲ οὕτω καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὁμολογεῖται ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὡς τὴν σάρκα τὴν παθοῦσαν. Καὶ τί ἔτι ἡμᾶς μέμφεσθε, ὡς τετράδα ἀντὶ Τριάδος λέγοντας, αὐτοὶ τετράδα ἀντὶ Τριάδος καὶ ἄκοντες ὁμολογοῦντες, λέγοντες ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τῇ Τριάδι τὴν σάρκα;

EPI,4

AP01,10

Εἰ ὁμοούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ σῶματι ἐκ γῆς ἔχοντι τὴν φύσιν, ὁμοούσιος δὲ ὁ Λόγος τῷ Πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν Πατέρων ὁμολογίαν, ὁμοούσιος ἔσται καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πατὴρ τῷ σῶματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς γῆς γενομένῳ. Καὶ τί ἔτι μέμφεσθε τοῖς

Ἄλλὰ λέγετε, Ὅμοούσιος γέγονε τοῦ Λόγου ἡ σὰρξ. Πῶς γέγονεν ὁμοούσιος; Εἴπατε Ὅμοος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πνεῦμα γέγονεν. Εἰ δ' ὅπως γίνεται θεότης ἐκ μεταποιήσεως ἢ μὴ φύσει οὕσα θεότης, τί τοίνυν μέμφεσθε Ἀρειανοῖς ταύτην περὶ

Ἄρειανοῖς λέγουσι τὸν Υἱὸν
κτίσμα, λέγοντες αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸν
Πατέρα ὁμοούσιον τοῖς κτίσμα-
σι;

ΕΡ1, 8, 9.

Ἐρυθριάσουσι δὲ μεγάλως οἱ
ὄλως ἐνθυμηθέντες δύνασθαι ἀντι-
τῆς Τριάδος γενέσθαι τετράδα,
εἰ λέγοιτο ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας εἶναι
τὸ σῶμα. Ὁμοούσιον γὰρ εἶ-
πωμεν, φασί, τὸ σῶμα τῷ Λόγῳ, μέ-
νει ἢ Τριάς Τριάς, οὐδὲν ξένον
εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπιφερομένου τοῦ Λό-
γου· εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον εἴπωμεν
τὸ ἐκ Μαρίας σῶμα, ἀνάγκη ξένου
ὄντος κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ σώματος
καὶ ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ τετ-
ρὰς ἀντὶ Τριάδος γίνεται διὰ
τὴν τοῦ σώματος προσθήκην. 9.
Ταῦτα οὕτω λέγοντες, οὐ νοοῦσιν
ὅπως ἑαυτοῖς περιπίπτουσι. Καὶ
γὰρ κἄν μὴ ἐκ Μαρίας λέγωσι τὸ
σῶμα, ἀλλ' ὁμοούσιον αὐτὸ τῷ Λό-
γῳ, οὐδὲν ἦττον. τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν
ἑαυτῶν ἔννοιαν δειχθήσονται λέ-
γοντες τετράδα. Ὡς γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς
κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας ὁμοούσιος ὢν
τῷ Πατρὶ, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς ὁ Πα-
τήρ, ἀλλὰ Υἱὸς πρὸς Πατέρα λέγε-
ται ὁμοούσιος· οὕτω τὸ ὁμοούσιον
σῶμα τοῦ Λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς
ὁ Λόγος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον πρὸς τὸν
Λόγον, ἑτέρου δ' ὄντος κατ' αὐτοῦς
ἔστι ἢ αὐτῶν Τριάς τετράς. Οὐ γὰρ
ἡ ἀληθινὴ Τριάς δέχεται προσθή-
κην ἀλλ' ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν ἐπινενοημέ-
νη.

τοῦ Λόγου προβλλομένοις τὴν
ἔννοιαν;

ΑΡΟ1, 12

Ἡμεῖς τὸν ἐκ Μαρίας λέγομεν ὁμο-
ούσιον τοῦ Πατρὸς... Πῶς οὖν ταῦ-
τα λέγοντες οὐκ ἐρυθριάτε τὴν
σάρκα, τὴν ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ
γενεαλογουμένην, ὁμοούσιον τοῦ
Λόγου ἀποφινόμενοι; Ἡ πάλιν
ὡς ἔφαμεν, λησῆτως ταῦτα λέγετε,
οὐ νοοῦντες, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοούσιον τὴν
μὲν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως ἔχει, τὴν
δὲ ἰδίαν τελειότητα ἐπιδείκνυται.
Ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς, ὁμοούσιος πρὸς
τὸν Πατέρα ὁμολογούμενος, τέλειος
πρὸς τέλειον ὁμολογεῖται, καθὰ καὶ
τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα· ὁμοούσιος γὰρ ἢ
Τριάς. Δώσατε οὖν καὶ τῇ ὁμοουσίῳ
σαρκὶ τὴν τελειότητα πρὸς τῇ τοῦ
Λόγου τελειότητι· ἔστι δὲ καθ'
ὑμῶν τετράς ἀντὶ Τριάδος καταγγελ-
λομένη.

EPI, 9.

Καὶ πῶς ἔτι Χριστιανοί, οἱ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν ὄντα Θεὸν ἐπινοοῦντες; . . . Εἰ, διὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι ἐν ταῖς Γραφαῖς, ἐκ Μαρίας εἶναι καὶ ἀνθρώπινον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Σωτήρος, νομίζουσι ἀντὶ Τριάδος τετραδά λεγέσθαι, ὡς προσθήκης γενομένης διὰ τὸ σῶμα, πολὺ πλανῶνται τὸ ποιῆμα συνεξισοῦντες τῷ ποιητῇ.

Also the following parallels are quite instructive.

EPI, 4.

Πάσης γὰρ αἰρέσεως πλεον εἰς ἀσειβειαν ἐξεκλίνετε.

EPI, 6.

Αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ πάσχων· πάσχων μὲν ὅτι τὸ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ ἔπασχε σῶμα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἦν· μὴ πάσχων δὲ ὅτι τῇ φύσει Θεὸς ὢν ὁ Λόγος ἀπαθής ἐστι.

EPI, 7.

Οὐδὲ σώματος μόνου, ἀλλ' ὅλου ἀνθρώπου, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀληθῶς, ἢ σωτηρία γεγονεν.

AP01, 12.

Εἰ δὲ ὁμοούσιος τοῦ Λόγου ἡ σὰρξ καὶ συνκείμενος ἐκ τούτου ἐρεῖτε καὶ τὰ κτίσματα συνκείμενα τῷ πάντῃ κτίσαντι Θεῷ. Καὶ πῶς ἔτι Χριστιανοί, οἱ τοιαύταις συμπλεκόμενοι στραγγαλιαῖς;

AP01, 11.

Καὶ γεγονάτε ἰσοβέστεροι πάντων αἰρετικῶν

AP01, 11.

Αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ παθὼν καὶ μὴ παθὼν τῇ θεικῇ φύσει ἀπαθής καὶ ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀνλλοίωτος, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ παθὼν.

AP01, 15.

Ἴνα τελείαν τὴν σωτηρίαν κεργάσῃται ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος.

A comparison of the above texts shows that they share the same notions, that their logical and philosophical method of refutation is the same and that there are many stylistic similarities, such as,

EPI

οὐκέτι Τριάδα ἀλλὰ τετράδα ἐν τῇ θεότητι φρονεῖ.

Τί ἔτι μέμφεσθε τοῖς Ἀρειανοῖς λέγουσι τὸν Υἱὸν κτίσμα;

ὁμοούσιος δὲ ὁ Λόγος κατὰ τὴν τῶν Πατέρων ὁμολογίαν. . . ὡς γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς κατὰ τοὺς Πατέρας λέγεται ὁμοούσιος.

κατ' αὐτούς ἔσται ἡ αὐτῶν Τριάς τετράς.

AP01

τί ἔτι μέμφεσθε ἡμῖς, ὡς τετράδα ἀντὶ Τριάδος λέγοντας;

τί τοίνυν μέμφεσθε Ἀρειανοῖς ταύτην περὶ τοῦ Λόγου προβηλομένους τὴν ἔννοιαν;

ὡς γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς ὁμοούσιος πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ὁμολογεῖται

Ἔσται δὲ καθ' ἡμῖς τετράς ἀντὶ Τριάδος.

καὶ πῶς ἔτι Χριστιανοὶ οἱ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν ὄντα Θεὸν ἐπινοοῦντες;	καὶ πῶς ἔτι Χριστιανοί, οἱ τοιαύ- ταις συμπλεκόμενοι στραγγαλιεῖς;
ὄλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος.	ὄλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος.
αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ πάσχων.	αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ παθὼν καὶ μὴ παθὼν.
ὁμοούσιον σῶμα τοῦ Λόγου	ὁμούσιος γέγονε τοῦ Λόγου ἡ σάρξ.

Lastly, Demetropoulos discusses Dräseke's thesis that APO pre-supposes Apollinarist documents written after Athanasius' death. To him APO combats Apollinarian notions which belong to both 'stages' of the Apollinarist Christology. Besides, Dräseke's theory that the second stage of Apollinarism, i.e. that based on a trichotomic anthropology, began after Athanasius' death is totally hypothetical and gratuitous. Following Lietzmann, Demetropoulos argues that AP01&2 oppose notions based on literary evidence which has now become extinct (especially AP01,2 and AP02,5,7,8,9). The Synod of Alexandria in AD 362 rejected both forms of Apollinarism, the dichotomic and the trichotomic. This means that the trichotomic form was developed before AD 362. Further evidence for Athanasius' rejection of the trichotomic form of Apollinarism can be deduced from the treatise *Περὶ τῶν ἀζύμων*, (P.G. 26, 1328B), which states that "the body which came from the holy Virgin was perfect, i.e. with soul and mind, and not as the heretic Apollinaris said, namely, that it was a mere body".

In the final section of his essay Demetropoulos examines the external testimonies to the Athanasian paternity of APO. He mentions five theologians and two synods. The theologians are Proclus of Constantinople, John Maxentius, Leontius of Byzantium, Justinian the emperor and John Damascene. The synods are, the Sixth Ecumenical Synod of Constantinople in AD 680 which quotes

from both APO regarding them as works of Athanasius, and the Lateran Synod of AD 649 which cites APO2,18 attributing it to Athanasius' Epistle to the Antiochenes (ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀντιοχεῖς ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ Ἀθανασίου). Since this last Epistle is not the famous Tomus ad Antiochenos, Demetropoulos attempts to identify it and propounds two theories. (i) APO2 was originally a letter addressed to the Antiochenes which contained the Athanasian reply to the Apollinaristic Christological positions. The only problem here are the orthographical mistakes in the text and the loss of the original title. (ii) APO2 and the Epistle to the Antiochenes cited in the acts of the Lateran Synod are two different documents. The Lateran Synod used the second which has now become extinct. Whatever the case this Epistle to the Antiochenes is witnessed to by Peter of Alexandria (373-381), Athanasius' successor, and Facundus of Hermiane. Particularly interesting are Facundus' remarks, sunt multa similia in hac Epistola adversus Apollinaristas dicta (P.L. 67,800B). For Demetropoulos Athanasius could have written this Epistle either before or after APO2. But whatever view is correct the fact is that quotation from this document in the proceedings of the Lateran Synod constitutes another witness for the Athanasian paternity of APO.

In conclusion we may summarize Demetropoulos' research in the following way. Following Le Brachelet, he has singled out four problems concerning the authorship of APO which sum up the work of the critics; (i) that APO1 and APO2 were written by different authors; (ii) that the use of the term hypostasis in the sense of person implies a non-Athanasian author; (iii) that

both APO1 and APO2 teach the completeness of the humanity of Christ which is unknown to Athanasius; (iv) that the notions combatted in APO were developed after Athanasius' death.

Demetropoulos' reply to the first question is not adequate. His parallels are good but limited. His reply to the second question is substantial, especially his references to the De Synodis and to the Tomus. His reference to the De Virginitate and to the De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos are correct, but these works are still disputed with regard to their Athanasian origin. His response to the third question is altogether inadequate. He simply negates Stülken's view without discussing it or arguing against its material content. As regards literary style, Demetropoulos' contribution is substantial, but restricted to a number of similarities of phrase. Although most of these similarities are positive, they are not in the last analysis sufficient for establishing the Athanasian paternity of the two APO. Like many other critics, Demetropoulos has drawn general conclusions on the basis of particular examples. He is, however, the first Orthodox scholar to address himself to the question of the Athanasian authenticity of the two APO. Finally, on the topic of the external witnesses Demetropoulos' contribution centres on the citation from APO2 (?) in the minutes of the Lateran Synod. His suggestions about the lost Epistola ad Antiochenos are interesting but not proven. His reference to the Περὶ ἄζύμων is not of much value, since the work has not been accepted as Athanasian. On the whole the weight of the validity of the external witnesses falls in Demetropoulos' mind on the authority of the Councils and the Fathers.

3. General evaluation of the work of the critics

Our review of the work of the critics concerning the authorship of the two APO has at least shown that the question of the Athanasian origin is not at all closed, and that a good case can still be made in its favour. In any case the critical challenge to the traditional view has by no means been conclusive. Neither Weigl's nor Demetropoulos' arguments have been adequately refuted. Stegmann and Lebon have in fact contributed to the credibility of the Athanasian origin in spite of their scepticisms. Thus the over all impression one gets from the survey of the work of the critics seems to point to a gradual movement away from the excessively critical opinions of Dräseke Hoss Stülken and Raven, which has not been noticed by the authors of the recent general manuals of Patrology.

More particularly the work of the critics points to two fundamental questions concerning APO: 1) whether APO1 and APO2 are derived from the same author, and 2) whether this author could be Athanasius. Such questions are determined differently by the different critics, but there are certain areas of research which provide arguments. These areas are:

(i) External witnesses: The critics have supplied here significant details of information, but apart from one or two exceptions no one in particular has assessed critically and carefully the value of these details. The evaluation seems to depend on whether one accepts or rejects the Athanasian origin of the two treatises under discussion. Thus those who argued against the Athanasian paternity tried to discredit the avai-

lable external witnesses by placing them as late as possible. On the contrary those who fought for the Athanasian paternity attempted to place these witnesses as early as possible. Neither of them engaged in serious investigation of the precise content or context of these witnesses. Perhaps the only exception was the essay of Lebon, who in any case did not set out to write on the APO directly but on EPI and particularly on a phrase which appeared to have been interpolated into that text.

(ii) Stylistic analysis: Every critic had something to say about style, that of APO and that of Athanasius. Yet the sum total of the stylistic criticism represents a rather confusing picture. No clear method and no clear criteria for stylistic analysis can be extracted from the critical productions. The critics examined the language, the phraseology and even the rhetorics (method of argumentation), but they did this in such a limited and even haphazard way that the end result is null and void. Weigl is an exception, but only quantitatively and not qualitatively. There is value in the stylistic observations of the critics in the sense that they indicate areas of stylistic re[^]search. But there is little value in the sense of establishing stylistic identity. In all the cases the facts are carefully chosen to prove or disprove the traditional Athanasian paternity of APO and one gets the impression that the arguments are construed to prove predetermined cases. No one (not even Weigl, whose stylistic material is most extensive) attempted to examine the stylistic issue objectively by investigating all the stylistic data available in the entire texts of APO and ATHAN. Especially in the case of ATHAN style was

taken for granted. The criticism relating to the style of APO and ATHAN, instead of proving actually anything, rather raises the fundamental question concerning the nature of style, and the question concerning the choice of the right criteria which establish true stylistic identity.

(iii) Investigation of the notions opposed in APO: Some of the critics defended and others refuted the general claim that the heretics behind APO1 were the same with those behind APO2. The arguments were based on what APO1 and APO2 say or suggest about these notions. In most instances arguments were based on a comparison of certain notions extracted from APO1 and certain other notions extracted from APO2. No one of the critics attempted the obvious, namely, to extract all the notions out of the texts and compare them in their totality to one another and to the Apollinarian literary corpus. Closely connected with the above issue was the larger issue of the chronological development of the Apollinarian heresy and especially the precise location of the particular Apollinarian notions in this development. The handling of the chronology of the Apollinarian controversy in the determination of the chronology of the two APO was by and large doctrinaire and biased. Those who argued against the Athanasian paternity tried to fix a date for the development of the Apollinarian notions which appeared in APO as late as possible. Their opponents did the exact opposite. The decisive date which divided the two sides was the year A.D. 373, the year of Athanasius' death. How desperate these attempts became could be illustrated by recalling Dräseke'

s contention that Apollinaris' Apodeixis was written after A.D. 374 (!), or Weigl's contention that the Apollinarian school of thought really emerged in the 350s (!). Both claims were based on wishful thinking, and yet they were both positively employed in the argumentation as if they represented indisputable facts. The hard fact is that to this day the chronology of the development of the Apollinarian heresy remains a desideratum. This is particularly the case with the majority of the extant Apollinarian treatises including the Apodeixis. Even the date of Apollinaris' death still remains an enigma.

(iv) Christological issues: Perhaps the most important and even crucial argument of the critics who disputed the Athanasian origin of the two APO was their contention that the Christology of these treatises could not have been Athanasian. This contention was based on two types of argument: a) arguments from doctrine; e.g. that the notion of Christ's death as the separation of His soul from His body or the explicit reference to the human soul of Christ - both central to the two APO - were apparently absent from the genuine works of Athanasius; and b) arguments from theological terminology; e.g. APO's non-Athanasian use of such terms as homocousios, ousia and hypostasis. Here most, if not all, of the critics were guided by the general view in the history of dogma regarding Athanasius' Christological position. According to this view Athanasius belonged implicitly, if not explicitly, to the Apollinarian camp, inasmuch as he emphasized the Godhead of Christ against the Arians and therefore never reached any proper appreciation

of Christ's humanity. Over against this excessive theocentricism in Christology one would place the Antiochene position which fully acknowledged the humanity of Christ and asserted it against the reductionist teaching of Apollinaris. This view saw two alternatives in the Christological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. A Christology "from above", which was theocentric and mythological (since it implied God's becoming or conversion of His substance), or docetic (because it often chose to deify the flesh which was assumed at His Incarnation in a way that it became absorbed by the Divine substance), and whose logical conclusion was Apollinarianism; and a Christology "from below" which was anthropocentric and adoptionist and whose ultimate conclusions were reached in Nestorianism. As no middle position was envisaged Athanasius, the anti-Arian champion, had to be placed with the former and the Cappadocians with the latter! What is astonishing in the investigation of the Christology of APO by the critics is the total lack of any objective approach independent of the general schematic and scholastic concerns of the Dogmengeschichte. One would have wished these documents to have provided a concrete particular case for assessing the conclusions of the general positions advanced by the historians of dogma. But, alas(!), none of the critics attempted an objective and comprehensive study of the Christology of APO for its own sake. The Protestant critics were taking for granted the schematisations of the nineteenth-century general histories of the patristic doctrine of Christ, and the Roman Catholics, who favoured the traditional view,

attempted to prove that APO and Athanasius represented Chalcedonian orthodoxy. We are of the opinion that both approaches were inadequate; the former because it made nineteenth-century dialectical (Hegelian) hermeneutics determine early patristic doctrine, and the latter because it exhibited a traditional hermeneutical anachronism. We shall come to this later in this study. For the moment we would note the need for careful and objective study of the Christology of APO and indeed of the Christology of Athanasius for their own sake. Only on such a basis should general views, whether modern or traditional, be brought into play. The concrete historical facts - in this case the documents of APO and ATHAN - always retain and claim priority over the general assessments of the general situation. As far as the particular questions about theological terminology were concerned, none of the critics attempted to grapple with the semantic intricacies of such terms as hypostasis and ousia, or physis and sarx, or soma psyche and thanatos, etc., in APO and ATHAN on the basis of a total examination of all the available data. This partial attitude was bequeathed to later scholars and as a result Athanasian studies have today become contradictory and obscure than ever. There is formidable critical literature, especially on the question concerning the soul of Christ in Athanasius, which exhibits all the features of an unresolved either/or impasse - an impasse reached because the criticism rested on partial data and relied too much on dogmengeschichtliche or traditionalist dogmatic concerns. The result is an urgent

need for a fresh approach to the Athanasian data and especially to the two traditionally Athanasian APO.

In the last analysis the work of the critics as a whole remains inadequate. Though it provides useful observations, it fails to lead towards a final solution and moreover, seems to suggest that the subject is ultimately an insoluble enigma. In our opinion this is partly owed to the fact that the theological positions of the scholars on the development of Patristic Christology were allowed to play decisive roles in their research, consciously or unconsciously; but it is also caused by the lack of clear methodology which would take into account all the textual data provided by the two APO and the Athanasian literature commonly accepted as genuine. From a thorough-going point of view the methods implicit in the works of the critics were partial, because they sought to build a final case only on a few decisive or representative arguments rather than on an examination of the entire textual evidence. Modern methodology requires a holistic approach which investigates all the available literary data from as many as possible critical angles, i.e. stylistically, structurally, conceptually, etc.

In spite of its obvious limitations, however, the work of the critics constitutes a good starting-point for a fuller, more objective and comprehensive research. Taken as a whole, this work points to the main pattern of a fresh and thorough investigation, namely: (i) the external witnesses, (ii) the internal evidence (e.g. contents and structure, addressees and notions opposed, other allusions, etc), and (iii) the theological issues

(e.g. the death of Christ, the soul of Christ, the Christology in general, theological and Christological terminology). These are in fact the themes of the investigation which follows - an investigation which has sought to take into account as many literary data as possible, and as much critical work as seems crucial. The general dictates of Dogmengeschichte were not brushed aside, but priority was given to the original texts.

II

External Evidence

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- 1 Peter II of Alexandria (AD 373-381)
 - 2 Cyril of Alexandria (d.A.D.444)
 - 3 Proclus of Constantinople (AD 434-446)
 - 4 Timothy Aelurus of Alexandria (AD 454-477)
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 - 6 John of Caesarea (the Grammarian, c 6th cent.)
 - 7 Severus of Antioch (AD 465-538)
 - 8 John Maxentius (first half of 6th cent.)
 - 9 Eulogius of Alexandria (AD 579-607)
 - 10 Ephraim of Antioch (AD 527-545)
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 - 12 Leontius of Jerusalem (c.AD 532-6)
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 - 14 The Lateran Synod (AD 649)
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II.1 Citations

There are three kinds of external witnesses: (a) references to or citations from APO1&2 in patristic literature; (b) the extant manuscripts of the two APO; and (c) ancient versions of these works in other languages. In the following section we shall collate arrange chronologically and evaluate the information produced by the critics of APO1&2 in the above area making at the same time our own additions.

(a) APO1&2 in patristic literature:

1) Peter II of Alexandria(AD 373-381). It was P.Ch.Demetropoulos who claimed that Peter of Alexandria, Athanasius' successor, knew APO2 as a work of his great predecessor. However the examination of the evidence produced in support of this claim points to its dubious character. Demetropoulos argued that the anti-Apollinarian "Dogmatic Epistle to the Antiochenes" of Athanasius, which, according to Facundus' report (Cf. Facundus' Pro Defensione trium capitulorum, lib.xi, cap.ii), Peter II of Alexandria knew, was in fact APO2, or at least was a document closely connected with APO2. This conclusion was based on the observation that in fact such a "Dogmatic Epistle to the Antiochenes" was mentioned in the minutes of the Lateran Council of A.D.649, and that a citation from this document was nearly identical with APO2,18 (Cf. Mansi, Concilia vol.10,1101E, or Labbe's Concilia, vol.7; 309c). The critical question here is whether Demetropoulos was right in identifying the Epistle to the Antiochenes mentioned by Facundus with the other one mentioned in the minutes of the Lateran Council. A closer look at Facundus' extracts from Peter II of Alexandria's Epistola ad Episcopos Aegyptios Fidei

causa exsules (cf. Migne P.G.33,1291/2) undoubtedly indicates that Peter II's reference to the Athanasian Epistola ad Antiochenos is in fact the so-called Sermo major de Fide, since the citations from the former can be traced in the latter and none of them is from APO2 (Cf. Facundus' Pro Defensione.. lib.iv, cap. 2 and lib.xi, cap.2 in the new critical edition of Corpus Christianorum, series latina, Turnholti, 1974, vol. XCA, pp.109f and 334f). It should perhaps be added here that the reference to APO2 as to "the Dogmatic Epistle to the Antiochenes" in the minutes of the Lateran Council is unique and raises two questions: i) whether APO2 is related to the SERMO also known as Epistola ad Antiochenos (Cf. R.P.Casey's edition in Studies and Documents vol.XV, London 1947); and ii) whether APO2 represents a third Epistle of Athanasius to the Antiochenes next to ANT and SERMO which are clearly attributed of him in the tradition. Only in the former case would Demetropoulos's argument have some value, but there is no evidence either in the citations or in the manuscripts of any likely connection between SERMO and APO2.

2) Cyril of Alexandria (d.444). Weigl claimed that Cyril knew APO1 to be Athanasian (Cf. his Untersuchungen..p.114f) and he provided two textual evidences, consisting of obvious literary connections between certain references to Athanasian writings in Cyril's Homily viii and APO1. There is no need to repeat here the precise texts which were mentioned in our review of Weigl's contribution to the Athanasian origin of APO. We must note however that in spite of Lebon's scepticism (cf. Lebon's essay Une ancienne opinion.. op.cit. p.36f) these evidences

must be given at least an implicit value. Admittedly it is rather curious that Cyril would cite from APO as from "Athanasius' own writings" (ἰδίους συγγραμμάτων) without making a more explicit reference to his source. But then, we know from other cases that he does not always make explicit his Athanasian sources: e.g. Contra Orientales 14, 65-67, 115 etc.

As for Weigl's attempt to identify APO with the Athanasian περί σαρκώσεως mentioned by Cyril on the basis of Eulogius' testimony, we should probably regard it as futile. APO1 is introduced in the manuscripts under the rubric λόγος περί τῆς σαρκώσεως . . . (Cf. the Mss U, N, W, L, Q, B, K, S, O, H and G). But most of Cyril's references to Athanasius' περί σαρκώσεως are connected with the μία φύσις formula which is not to be found either in APO1 or APO2. In any case, Weigl's claim in this case has been conclusively refuted by Joseph Lebon (Cf. his essay Une ancienne opinion. . . op.cit. pp.37-40). So then, as regards Cyril's testimony to the Athanasian paternity of APO (or more specifically APO1) we must conclude that it has no explicit foundation except only an implicit value.

3) Proclus of Constantinople (434-446). That Proclus of Con/ple knew of the two APO as Athanasian is accepted by all the critics on the basis (apparently) of Montfaucon's report: Libros adversus Apollinarium ab Athanasio conscriptos memorat Proclus, oratione sua in synodo secunda Constantinopolitana, Tom.v Concil.p. 459 (Cf. P.G. 26,1091/2). Yet, when the original text of the Second Council of Constantinople (A.D. 553) is sought for the purpose of verification, one finds that Montfaucon's report is simply

erroneous. The Minutes of the Fifth Act of this Council do contain extracts from Proclus' Tomus Ad Armenios and Epistola ad Johannem Antiochenum, but none of them includes the scholion on Athanasius' letters to Apollinaris, which most probably was "by mistake" associated with the preceding extracts from Proclus", and which reads as follows: Et Athanasius diversas epistolas ad Apollinarium scripsit tanquam eadem in fide sapientem; et tamen postea libros integros etiam post mortem Apollinaris scripsit adversus eum, cognitis illius in scripto blasphemis. et nihil Apollinario profuerunt quae antea ad illum tanquam eadem in fide sapientem scripta sunt (Cf. Mansi vol.ix,p.272, or Labbe vol.vi,106, or (best text) Schwartz ACO,vol.iv,i,p.114,3-6). It is quite incredible that none of the critics verified Montfaucon. And more incredible still is the fact that everybody assumed that Proclus was present at the Ecumenical Council and even made a speech in which he referred to Athanasius' APO! How careless the scholars have been here can be seen from two examples: Raven, who writes (Cf. his Apollinarianism, 1923, p.248) that "the first mention of them (the two APO) is to be found in Proclus, who, speaking at the Council in 553, declared that Athanasius had written these books after the death of Apollinaris—presumably therefore from heaven" (and Raven cites:Mansi,Concil. v,455 - lifted from Montfaucon— which is just wrong). The other example is that of Demetropoulos who mentions Proclus as a witness (Cf. his essay Τό πρόβλημα ...p.455) and cites him with the rubric: Λόγος εἰς τὴν δευτέραν σύνοδον τῆς Κων/λεως, ὄρα Montfaucon, παρὰ Migne P.G.36,1092)! As from our part we

have searched Proclus' extant texts and have found no reference to Athanasius' APO. The text from the Fifth Act of the Concilium Constantinopolitanum II (AD 553) about Athanasius' epistles to Apollinaris must be regarded as a sixth century scholion referring indeed to the two APO. But the information that these epistles were written after the death of Apollinaris seems to have been, in our opinion, an erroneous comment owing to the general belief at that time that Apollinaris was actually condemned after his death (Cf. on this Justinian's report in his Τύπος περί Θεοδώρου Μοψουεστίας , P.G. 86-I,1089D).

4) Timothy Aelurus of Alexandria (454-477). According to Lebon who supplies this testimony (Cf. his essay Une ancienne opinion. pp.84ff), in citing three passages from AP01 in his book Against the Council of Chalcedon and using the rubric: "the blessed Athanasius, Archbishop of Alexandria, in his Discourse against Apollinaris", Timothy Aelurus monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria and successor to Dioscorus witnesses to the Athanasian paternity of AP01 one hundred years after Athanasius' death. These passages, which appear in a florilegium of Patristic quotations are as follows:

AP01,18 (the entire chapter), PG 26,1125A-C

AP01,5 (only an extract), PG 26,1100D-1101B

AP01,7 (only an extract), PG 26,1105A

Their original text (and Timothy's book) was in Greek, but it now survives only in a sixth century Armenian version which was published by K.Ter-Mekerttschian and E. Ter-Minassiantz as: Timotheus Aelurus des Patriarchen von Alexandrien, Widerlegung

der auf der Synode zu Chalcedon festgesetzten Lehre (Armenian version), Leipzig, 1908. The extracts from APO1 are to be found in pages 10-12. Lebon has also shown that the last two citations reappear in a Syriac version preserved in a Syriac Ms of the British Museum Add. 12156 (S.vi).

5) Julian of Halicarnassus (d.after 518). Lebon again supplied the information that Julian of Halicarnassus in his controversy with Severus cites from APO1,6 as from "St Athanasius' Discourse against Apollinaris". The evidence is to be found in the Syriac fragments of Julian's works published by R.Draguet: Julien d' Halicarnasse et sa controverse avec Sévère d' Antioch sur l' incorruptibilité du corps du Christ (Syriac text and Greek translation, pp.34 and 70), Louvain 1924. This version, based on Cod. Vat. Syr. 140, was translated from the Greek original in A.D.528.

6) John of Caesarea (also known as the Grammarian, an opponent of Severus in the beginning of the sixth century). John cites two extracts from APO2 in his Adversus Aphthartodocetas (Cf. Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 1, Turnhout 1977, pp.71f), namely:

APO2,17 (an extract only) P.G. 26,1161B12-C1

APO2,15 (an extract only) P.G. 26,1156C12-1157A3.

The rubric John uses to introduce these extracts is this:

᾿Αθανασίου κατὰ ᾿Απολιναρίου.

7) Severus of Antioch (465-538). Lebon has pointed out (in his essay Une ancienne opinion..op.cit. p.33) that Severus cited in his Contra Impium Grammaticum (John of Caesarea - Brit.Mus.Syr. Ms.Add.12157) several extracts from APO1 and APO2 as Athanasian.

In the first case he used the rubrics: "from the discourse on the faith (Λόγος περί Πίστewας) against the impious Apollinaris", or "against the opinions of the impious Apollinaris", and cited:

AP01,11-12 P.G. 26: 1112C-1113A

AP01,10 P.G. 26: 1109 B-C

In the second case he used the rubrics: "in the other treatise against the partisans of Apollinaris who think in a corrupt way on the subject of the saving manifestation of Christ"(περί τῆς σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας), or "in the discourse against the opinion of the impious Apollinarians on the subject of the saving manifestation of Christ", and cited the following:

AP02,13 P.G. 26: 1153B

AP02,14 P.G. 26: 1156B

AP02,15 P.G. 26: 1156D-1157A

AP02,14 P.G. 26: 1156B-C

R. Draguet has shown that Severus also cited six fragments from AP01 in his controversy with Julian of Halicarnassus (cited by Lebon in his essay Une ancienne opinion..op.cit. p.32, but see also Draguet's Julien d' Alicarnasse et sa controverse avec Sévere d' Antioch, Louvain 1924). Here he used the rubric: ὁ Λόγος περί Πίστewας and added to it "against Apollinaris", or "against the φρενοβλάβεια of Apollinaris", or "against those who follow the opinion of Apollinaris", and cited the following:

AP01,5 P.G. 26: 1101A

AP01,6 P.G. 26: 1104B

AP01,11-12 P.G. 26: 1112C-1113A

AP01,14 P.G. 26: 1117C-1120A

AP01,15-16 P.G. 26: 1121A-C

AP01,18 P.G. 26: 1125B

Christopher (now Symeon) Lash having the advantage of a good edition of the works of Severus has provided a full list of all the Athanasian extracts in Severus' works (Cf. his essay in C.Kannengiesser's (ed) Politique et Théologie chez Athanase d' Alexandrie, Paris 1974, pp.377-387) and confirmed Lebon's and Draguet's findings. Lash's list as far as AP01&2 is concerned reads as follows:

Contra Impium Grammaticum

Or. Secunda	3	(CSCO III, 71.)	AP02	26, 1149
Or. - ^o -	37	(CSCO III, 293)	AP01	26, 1104
Or. Tertia	33	(CSCO 101, 144)	AP01	26, 1112
Or. - ^o -	- ^o -	(CSCO 101, 149)	AP01	26, 1109
Or. - ^o -	- ^o -	(CSCO 101, 149)	AP02	26, 1153
Or. - ^o -	- ^o -	(CSCO 101, 149)	AP02	26, 1156
Or. - ^o -	- ^o -	(CSCO 101, 180)	AP02	26, 1156

Contra Julianum

Crit. of the Tomus	CSCO 244, 66	AP01, 5	26, 1101
- ^o -	- ^o -	CSCO 244, 127	AP01, 6 26, 1104
- ^o -	- ^o -	CSCO 244, 127	AP01, 11 26, 1112
- ^o -	- ^o -	CSCO 244, 244	AP01, 5 26, 1101
Contra Additiones	CSCO 295, 128	AP01, 18	26, 1125
- ^o -	- ^o -	CSCO 295, 131	AP01, 15 26, 1121
Adv. Apol. Jul. 5	CSCO 301, 202	AP01, 6	26, 1104
Apol. du Philal.	CSCO 318, 10	AP01, 6	26, 1104

8) John Maxentius (first half of the sixth century). John Maxentius, presbyter and Archimandrite, subscribed to the synodal Letter of the Council of Constantinople A.D. 520 as "Provinciae Scythiae Metropolitanus" (Cf. Labbe iv, 1525). He supported with other Scythian monks the phrase "one of the Trinity was crucified in the flesh" as essential to the exclusion of the heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches. Maxentius drew up in the name of these monks his famous manifesto De Christo Professio which was approved at the Council of Rome in A.D. 532 (Labbe iv, 1761), and eventually by the Second Council of Constantinople

in A.D. 553 (ibid. v, 575). In his De Christo Professio, written c. A.D. 520, Maxentius cites from Athanasius' AP01, 10 (Cf. P.G. 26, 1109B and P.G. 86-I, 79BC or Schwartz ACO, iv, ii, p. 5, 15-18). Maxentius Latin version seems to be closer to the Greek original when compared with the Latin translation of AP01 included in the Migne edition.

Maxentius:

Beato Athanasio dicente:
"verbum caro, non verbum factum est. verbum autem caro factum dicitur, quia verbi facta est caro et non alicuius hominis; hoc est, deus homo factus est et dicitur caro, ne praeteritis carnis nomen. cur ergo non sufficit vobis naturalis unio verbi ad propriam carnem et quia deus homo factus est? "

Migne, AP01, 10 (Latin):

Verbum caro factum est, non dictum est, Caro Verbum facta est, sed, Verbum caro factum est; quia Verbi facta est caro, et non hominis ejusdam; id est, Deus homo factus est, ne carnis nomen praetermitteretis. Si itaque vobis non sufficit naturalis illa sine confusione Verbi cum propria carne unio: et quod Deus homo factus sit;

Migne, AP01, 10 (Greek):

ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ γέγονεν, οὐχὶ ἡ σὰρξ Λόγος γέγονεν, ὁ Λόγος δὲ σὰρξ γέγονεν, εἴρηται ὅτι τοῦ Λόγου γέγονεν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου τινός· τουτέστιν ὁ Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔγενεν· καὶ λέγεται, Σὰρξ γέγονεν, ἵνα μὴ παραδράμητε τῆς σαρκὸς τὸ ὄνομα. Εἰ τοίνυν μὴ ἀρκεῖσθε τῇ ἀσυγχύτῳ φυσικῇ ἐνώσει τοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ γενομένην σάρκα καὶ ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ἄνθρωπος γέγονε.

9) Eulogius of Alexandria (579-607). In Photius' account of the homilies of Eulogius of Alexandria we find the following text:

ὄρα δέ καί ᾿Αθανάσιον , οἷα περί τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Λόγου γράφων κατά τῶν τᾶ ᾿Απολιναρίου νοσοῦντων ἐκτίθεται. Λέγων γάρ διά τοῦ ἐκάτερα τό δύο παρ' οὐδενός τῶν εὐσεβῶν εἰσάγειν ὑπενοήθη διαίρεσιν. Λέγει δέ, ᾿Αλλ' ὁ ὢν φύσει Θεός γεννᾶται ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα εἷς ἦ τᾶ ἐκάτερα τέλειος κατά πάντα Θεός καί ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός (P.G. 103,1053CD).

The underlined text seems to be a combination of two closely related texts of AP01:

α) AP01,7 ᾿Αλλ' ὁ ὢν φύσει Θεός γεννᾶται ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα εἷς ἦ τᾶ ἐκάτερα τέλειος κατά πάντα, φυσικήν καί ἀληθεστάτην τήν γέννησιν ἐπιδειξάμενος.

β) AP01,16 ᾿Αλλά καθ' ὕπαρξιν ἀνελλιπή· ἵνα εἷς ἦ τᾶ ἐκάτερα, τέλειος κατά πάντα, Θεός καί ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός.

Eulogius also includes an indirect allusion to AP01, which is of great significance because it is derived from Apollinarian circles! His text is as follows:

καί Πολέμων δέ (τόν ᾿Απολινάριον δέ διδάσκαλον οὗτος ἀνευφήμει) τούς ἱεροῦς ἡμῶν Πατέρας αἰτιώμενος ἅ τοῦς ἐν Καλχηδόνι οἱ ἀπό Σεβήρου, ὄρα τί φησιν: "οὐδέν χειρόν ἐννοῆσαι κάκεῖνο. Θεόν γάρ λέγοντες καί ἄνθρωπον τόν αὐτόν οὐκ ἀισχύονται μίαν φύσιν τοῦ Λόγου σαρκαωμένην, καθάπερ μίαν σύνθετον ὁμολογοῦντες. Εἰ γάρ Θεός τέλειος καί ἄνθρωπος τέλειος ὁ αὐτός, δύο φύσεις ἄρα ὁ αὐτός , καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Καππαδοκῶν εἰσηγεῖται καινοτομία καί ᾿Αθανασίου ἡ οἴησις καί τῶν ἐν ᾿Ιταλίᾳ ὁ τύφος. Καί σχηματίζονται μέν, ὡς δῆθεν ἡμέτεροι, φρονεῖν τᾶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πατρός ἡμῶν ᾿Απολιναρίου, κηρύττουσι δέ καθάπερ οἱ Γρηγόριοι τήν τῶν φύσεων δυάδα (besides Photius, P.G. 103,1045B, see also

Lietzmann's Apollinaris von Laodicea, p.274; The same text with minor modifications appears in Doctrina Patrum, Justinian and Leontios of Jerusalem).

The question here is whether the above points to the following

text from AP01,16:

καὶ οὕτως ἂν λέγοιτο τέλειος Θεός καὶ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός.. ἵνα εἷς ἦ τὰ ἑκάτερα τέλειος κατὰ πάντα, Θεός καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός. If there is a connection here - as it seems most likely - we have the earliest and most remarkable witness to the Athanasian paternity of AP01.

10) Ephraim of Antioch (527-545). This testimony is mentioned by Weigl , but without much substantiation. Ephraim's surviving texts in Photius' Bibliotheca do contain references to Athanasius and his works. Among them allusions to the terminology of AP0 are not wanting, but in the last analysis such allusions constitute indirect and rather faint witnesses to the Athanasian paternity of this work. The most important allusions are the following:

P.G. 103: 989C , Συμπαρατίθησι μέντοι καὶ Γρηγορίου, καὶ Βασιλείου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ εὐχαριστίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Σωζοπολίτας ἐπιστολῆς καὶ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀπολιναρίου, ναὶ ὁ καὶ Ἀθανασίου τοῦ πολυάθλου ἐκ διαφόρων λόγων.

P.G. 103:993A , Ἐπιρῥαπίζων δέ καὶ τὸ ἀνόητον τῆς ἐκδοχῆς, αὐτός τὸ, ἐσκήνωσεν, ἀναπτύσσει σαφήνειαν εἶναι τοῦ, Ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἔλεγχον τῶν τροπῆν τινα καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν τοῦ Λόγου μελλόντων κατηγορεῖν. Καὶ γὰρ εἰπὼν ὁ εὐαγγελιστής ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, εὐθύς συνῆψε, καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, τὴν τρεῖς μίαν ὑπόστασιν σύνοδον καὶ τὸ ἀμετάβλητον τῆς ἑκατέρας φύσεως δι' ἑκατέρας ἐκδιδάσκων φωνῆς. Οὕτω τὸ λόγιον θεωρήσας, τὸν τε Χρυσόστομον μάρτυρα καλεῖ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ Κύριλλον καὶ Ἀθανάσιον καὶ τὸν θεολόγον Γρηγόριον, παραπλησίως τὸ ῥητὸν ἐννοήσαντας. (Cf. AP02,1: πῶς..τὸ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν νενοήκασιν.).

P.G. 103:997 , Λέγει γὰρ ἡ αἴρεσις ὡς τὰ δύο τῶν ἄρθρων προτακτικά, ὁ Θεός καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δύο προσώπων εἰσὶ καὶ ὑποστάσεων παραστατικά, καὶ σχέσει μονῆ τὴν ἔνωσιν σχηματίζουσιν. Ἀλλὰ

τό ἀναιδέες τούτων ᾿Αθανάσιός τε καί οἱ Γρηγόριοι καί ᾿Επιφάνιος καί ὁ Χρυσόστομος καί αὐτός ὁ Κύριος καταισχύνουσιν, ἴσαις φωναῖς καί ὁμοίαις καί αὐτοῖς πολλαχοῦ χρησάμενοι... Τά αὐτά δέ καί ὁ πολὺαθλος ᾿Αθανάσιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Πίστewος Λόγω, καί ὁ θεολόγος Γρηγόριος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Κληδόνιον β' ἐπιστολῇ. (An allusion perhaps to APO2,2: οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων ἢ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ φυσικῇ γεννήσει καί ἀλύτῳ ἐνώσει? or perhaps an allusion to APO1,12: Τό γάρ ὁμοούσιον καί ἀπαθές καί ἀνεπίδεκτον θανάτου, πρὸς τό ὁμοούσιον ἔνωσιν καθ' ὑπόστασιν οὐκ ἐπιδεχόμενον ἐστὶ ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν, καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἰδέ τὴν ἰδίαν τελειότητα ἐκδεικνύμενον? Does Ephraim mean APO1 when he speaks of the Περὶ Πίστewος Λόγος as his contemporary Severus does?).

11) Justinian the Emperor (483-565). In his Tractatus contra Monophysitas the Emperor Justinian cites from APO2 as from Athanasius' Λόγος περὶ τῆς σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας. The text represents a combination of two extracts from APO2,11 and APO2,5 and reads as follows:

Justinian, Migne P.G. 86-I,1108B

APO2, P.G. 26:1152A,1140BC

Πῶς δέ πτωχεύει πλούσιος ὦν, λέγει ὁ ἐν ἀγίοις ᾿Αθανάσιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας λόγῳ, ὅτι τὴν πτωχεύσασαν φύσιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀνελάβετο ἐν ἰδίᾳ δικαιοσύνῃ ταύτην προβαλλόμενος ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων πάσχουσαν, καί ἐξ ἀνθρώπων οὔσαν καί ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων φανερωθεῖσαν, καί Θεοῦ ὄλην γενομένην, ἵνα καί ἄνθρωπος ἦ ὁ Θεός ἀληθῶς, καί Θεός ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς. Θεοῦ τοῦ μονογενοῦς εὐδοκῆσαντος,

ὅτι τὴν πτωχεύσασαν φύσιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀνελάβετο, ἐν ἰδίᾳ δικαιοσύνῃ ταύτην προβαλλόμενος ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων πάσχουσαν, καί ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων οὔσαν καί ἐξ ἀνθρώπων φανερωθεῖσαν, καί Θεοῦ ὄλην γενομένην....
..... ἵνα καί ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦ Θεός ἀληθῶς, καί ὁ Θεός ἦ ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς, ἵνα ἦ καί ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς καί Θεός ἀληθῶς. οὐχὶ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς

τῷ πληρώματι τῆς θεότητος αὐ-
τοῦ τὴν τοῦ Ἀρχετύπου πλάσιν
ἀνθρώπου καὶ ποίησεν καινὴν ,
ἐκ μήτρας παρθένου ἀναστήσασθαι
ἐαυτῷ φυσικῇ γεννήσει καὶ
ἀλύτῳ ἐνώσει .

τόν Θεόν ὄντος ὡς ὑμεῖς συκο-
φαντοῦντες λέγετε , διασύροντες
τό τῶν Χριστιανῶν μυστήριον ,
ἀλλά Θεοῦ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς ἐν-
δοκῆσαντος τῷ πληρώματι τῆς
θεότητος αὐτοῦ τὴν τοῦ ἀρχε-
τύπου πλάσιν ἀνθρώπου , καὶ
ποίησιν καινὴν , ἐκ μήτρας
Παρθένου ἀναστήσασθαι ἐαυτῷ
φυσικῇ γεννήσει καὶ ἀλύτῳ
ἐνώσει .

12) Leontius of Jerusalem (c.532-6). In his Contra Monophysitas
Leontius cites from APO1,16 as from a work of Athanasius:

Ἀθανασίου: θεός καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός, εἷς ὢν καθ' ὑπαρξιν
ἀνελλιπῆ τὰ ἑκάτερα. Τί δέ ἐστὶ τάδε τὰ ἑκάτερα, καὶ τί θεός
καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἶπατε εἰ φύσεις, ἢ οὐχί; (M.P.G. 86-II,1817C).

In APO1,16 and APO1,7 we find the same language:

...ἀλλὰ καθ' ὑπαρξιν ἀνελλιπῆ· ἵνα εἷς ἢ τὰ ἑκάτερα, τέλειος
κατὰ πάντα, θεός καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός. (M.P.G. 26,1124A)

ἀλλ' ὁ ὢν φύσει θεός γεννᾶται ἄνθρωπος, ἔν' εἷς ἢ τὰ ἑκάτερα,
τέλειος κατὰ πάντα, φυσικὴν καὶ ἀληθεστάτην τὴν γέννησιν
ἐπιδειξάμενος. (M.P.G. 26:1105B).

Further on in the same work Leontius alludes to APO2, when
he writes:

προσδιαμαρτυροῦμεθα δέ ὅμως ὅτι ἐν καταχρήσει ἔτσι πολλάκις
μεταγενόμενα εὐρεῖν καὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως
καὶ προσώπου ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας· οὐ γάρ κυρίως ἀεὶ κεῖ-
ται. Ἀθανάσιός τε γάρ ὁ μέγας καὶ προσώπων ἔνωσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ
Χριστοῦ διεσχυρίζεται" (M.P.G. 86-2,1852AB).

Cf. APO2,2, M.P.G. 26,1133C ...οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων
ἢ ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ φυσικῇ γεννήσει καὶ ἀλύτῳ ἐνώσει.

Further on in the same work we find Polemon's reference to
Athanasius' anti-Apollinarian teaching of two natures in Christ,

which we have already found in Eulogius (Cf. M.P.G. 86-2, 1864CD-1865A).

Perhaps we should also mention here Leontius' reference to Isidore of Pelusium's testimony to Athanasius' teaching of two natures in Christ; which could be easily regarded as an allusion to the teaching of APO:

ὅτι δέ ὁ ἀληθινός καί ἐπί πάντων θεός ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν, οὔτε ὁ ἦν τραπεῖς καί ὁ οὐκ ἦν προσλαβών, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν εἷς ὑπάρχων Υἱός ἄτρεπτος καί ἀναλλοίωτος πρόσφατος καί ἀίδιος, οὐδ' ἄν αὐτός ἀρνηθείης, πλείστας ἔχων τοῦ ἁγίου Πατρὸς ἡμῶν τοῦ μεγάλου Ἀθανασίου περὶ τούτου συναυνέσεις (M.P.G. 86-2, 1828CD).

Should one include amongst these συναυνέσεις the following statement (cited by Leontius and many others)?

...οὐ τραπεῖς εἷς ἀνθρώπου μορφῆν, οὐδέ παριδῶν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπαρξάν, ...ἐν εἷς ἢ τὰ ἐκάτερα, τέλειος κατὰ πάντα...

(M.P.G. 26, 1105B).

13) Theodore of Raithu(?) (c. 581-607). In his De Sectis - a work not written by Leontius of Byzantium as most critics assumed- Theodore of Raithu (the most possible author) provides citations from APO1&2 as from Athanasius' "Discourse against Apollinaris" and from "the other Discourse":

α) ὁ δέ ἅγιος Ἀθανάσιος, ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου λόγου, ὅτι "Διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὁ Κύριος, νῦν ἡ ψυχὴ μου τετάρακται. Τό δέ νῦν τοῦτό ἐστίν, ὅτε ἠθέλησεν. Ὅμως μέντοι τό ὄν ἐπιδεικνύται οὐ γάρ τό μή ὄν ὡς παρόν ὠνόμαζεν, ὡς δοκῆσει γινομένων τῶν λεγομένων· φύσει γάρ καί ἀληθεῖα τὰ πάντα ἐγίνετο."

β) πάλιν ἐν ἑτέρῳ· ὅτι "Κἄν μή ἠττήματι φύσεως συνέβαινε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξει ὑπάρξεως ἐγίνετο τὰ γινόμενα." (M.P.G.

86-1, 1260D-1261A and 1261A). These texts come from APO1,16 and APO2,13 as follows:

α) Διά τοῦτο γάρ καί ὁ Κύριος ἔλεγε· νῦν ἡ ψυχὴ μου τετάραται, καί κατώδυνός ἐστί. Τό δέ νῦν, τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτε ἠθέλησεν. Ὅμως μέντοι τό ὄν ἐπεδείκνυτο· οὐ γάρ τό μή ὄν ὡς παρόν ὠνόμαζεν, ὡς δοκῆσει λεγομένων τῶν γινομένων· φύσει γάρ καί ἀληθεῖα τά πάντα ἐγένετο (M.P.G. 26, 1224A)

β) ἀλλά γάρ κἄν μή ἡττήματι φύσεως συνέβαινε τά λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξει ὑπάρξεως ἐπράττετο τά γινόμενα. (M.P.G. 26, 1153B).

In spite of the variant readings there is little doubt that the texts cited by Theodore as Athanasian are derived from APO1 and APO2.

1) The Lateran Synod (A.D. 649). The Minutes of the Fifth Act of the Lateran Synod incorporates Pope Martin's patristic florilegia which contain a number of references to Athanasius' writings. Among them we find an extract from APO2,18 which was discussed by Demetropoulos in connection with his claim that Peter of Alexandria knew APO2. An examination of this extract seems to be in place here:

Lateran (Labbe, vii, 309BC):

Migne P.G. 26:1164

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀντιοχεῖς δογματικῆς ἐπιστολῆς.
Διά τοῦτο θεολογεῖται μέν ὁ Λόγος, γενεαλογεῖται δέ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα πρὸς ἑκάτερα εἴη ὁ αὐτός φυσικῶς καί ἀληθῶς. Θεός μέν πρὸς τῆ ἀϊδιότητι τῆς θεότητος καί τῆ δημιουργία τῆς κτίσεως, ἄνθρωπος δέ πρὸς τῆ γεννήσει τῆ ἐκ γυναικός, καί τῆ ἀξήσει τῆς ἡλικίας, καί θεός μέν ταῖς ζωτικαῖς ἐνεργείαις, ἄνθρωπος δέ πρὸς ταῖς ὁμοιοτρόποις συμπαθείαις καί ταῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀσθενείαις.

διὰ τοῦτο θεολογεῖται μέν ὁ Λόγος, γενεαλογεῖται δέ ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα πρὸς ἑκάτερα ἦ ὁ αὐτός φυσικῶς καί ἀληθινῶς. Θεός μέν πρὸς τῆ ἀϊδιότητι τῆς θεότητος, καί τῆ δημιουργία τῆς πίστεως· ἄνθρωπος δέ πρὸς τῆ γεννήσει τῆ ἐκ γυναικός καί τῆ ἀξήσει τῆς ἡλικίας. Καί θεός μέν πρὸς ταῖς ζωτικαῖς ἐνεργείαις καί δυνατός ταῖς θαυματουργίαις, ἄνθρωπος δέ πρὸς ταῖς ὁμοιοτρόποις συμπαθείαις καί ταῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀσθενείαις.

The difference between the two texts is not very significant. The only possible exception is perhaps the term ζωτικαῖς ἐνεργεσίαις instead of ζωτικαῖς εὐεργεσίαις which might be regarded as a deliberate emendation (!) given the doctrinal context of the citation: the controversy regarding monenergism. Thus Demetropoulos' speculations about the origin of the text of the Lateran Council, as from a document different though closely related to APO2, seem unnecessary. What does however remain curious in this testimonium is the rubric ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀντιοχεῖς δογματικῆς ἐπιστολῆς. Is this a clue to the original character of APO2? Is APO2 connected with Athanasius' Dogmatic Letter to the Antiochenes also known as Sermo Major De Fide? Or is it just a mistake in the florilegium? The first option must be regarded as unlikely because no other instance of such a rubric is recorded in the testimonia or in the Manuscripts. The second option cannot be sustained, as we have already remarked in discussing Demetropoulos' speculations, since no extracts from APO2 are to be traced in SERMO. Indeed Labbe's comment at this point seems very apt: Non est hic locus in Epistola ad Antiochenos, quae extat tom. 1 oper. Athanasii p.574 (i.e. ANT) sed neque in ea leguntur alia, quae ex ipsa recitat - Facundus p. 469, Harduinus (i.e. SERMO). It is the third option then, which, in our opinion, seems to be applicable to this case. Yet the faint possibility of a connection between APO2 and a third Epistle of Athanasius to the Antiochenes cannot be totally ruled out.

15) The Sixth Ecumenical Council (Con/ple III, A.D. 680/1).

In the minutes of the Eighth Act of the Council Macarius of

Antioch cites five extracts from APO2 using the introductory formula: "from the second discourse of Athanasius against Apollinaris"; and one extract from APO1 using the rubric "from the discourse on the Inhomination of the holy Athanasius Archbishop of Alexandria and against Apollinaris".

1) Macarius: Labbe, vi 781ABC
Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου δευτέρου λόγου. δὴλον γάρ, ὅτι προϋπάρχων Θεός Λόγος πρό τῆς ἐν σαρκί ἐπιδημίας οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλά Θεός ἦν πρός τόν Θεόν, ἀόρατος καί ἀπαθής ὢν. οὔτε οὖν τό Χριστός ὄνομα δέχα τῆς σαρκός προσάγεται, ἐπειδή ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τό πάθος καί ὁ θάνατος· τοῦ μὲν Λουκᾶ γράφοντος, εἰ παθητός ὁ Χριστός, εἰ πρῶτος ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν· τοῦ δέ Παύλου λέγοντος· τό πάσχα ἡμῶν ὑπέρ ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός· καί ὅτι ἄνθρωπος Χριστός Ἰησοῦς, ὁ δούς ἑαυτόν ὑπέρ ἡμῶν, οὐχ ὅτι οὐ Θεός ἀλλ' ὅτι καί ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός. διό, μνημόνευσε Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν ἐγγεγενημένον ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυίδ, γράφει. διὰ τοῦτο ἡ γραφή ἐκατέρων τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖται τήν προσεγωγήν ἐν ἐπιδείξει ὑπάρξεως, ἀοράτως μὲν Θεοῦ νοουμένου, καί ὄντος ἀληθῶς· ὁρατῶς δέ ἀνθρώπου ψηλαφωμένου, καί ὑπάρχοντος ἀληθῶς· οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων ἢ νοημάτων, ἀλλά φυσικῇ γεννήσει, καί ἀλύτῳ ἐνώσει. ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ πάθους ὁμολογουμένου ἀληθῶς, ὁ αὐτός καί παθητός καί ἀπαθής νοοῖτο ἀληθῶς.

Athanasius, APO2, 1-2 (P.G. 26, 1133BC)
Δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι ὁ προϋπάρχων Θεός Λόγος πρό τῆς ἐν σαρκί ἐπιδημίας οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλά Θεός ἦν πρός τόν Θεόν, ἀόρατος καί ἀπαθής ὢν. οὔτε οὖν τό Χριστός ὄνομα δέχα τῆς σαρκός προσάγεται· ἐπειδή ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τό πάθος καί ὁ θάνατος, τοῦ μὲν Παύλου γράφοντος· Εἰ παθητός ὁ Χριστός, εἰ πρῶτος ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν· καί ἀλλαχοῦ λέγοντος· τό Πάσχα ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός· καί ὅτι ἄνθρωπος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, ὁ δούς ἑαυτόν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπέρ ἡμῶν. οὐχ ὅτι οὐ Θεός, ἀλλ' ὅτι καί ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός. διό, μνημόνευσε, φησίν, Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν ἐγγεγενημένον ἐκ νεκρῶν, ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυίδ κατὰ σάρκα. Καί διὰ τοῦτο ἡ Γραφή ἐκατέρων τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖται τήν προσεγωγήν ἐν ἐπιδείξει ὑπάρξεως· ἀοράτως μὲν Θεοῦ νοουμένου καί ὄντος ἀληθῶς, ὁρατῶς δέ ἀνθρώπου ψηλαφωμένου καί ὑπάρχοντος ἀληθῶς οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων ἢ ὀνομάτων, ἀλλά φυσικῇ γεννήσει καί ἀλύτῳ ἐνώσει· ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ πάθους ὁμολογου-

δούλου μορφή οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὑπο-
κειμένη, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ δυ-
νάμει τὴν ἀναμαρτησίαν ἐπι-
δείκνυται, διαλύσασα τὸν τῆς
ἀνάγκης ὄρον, καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀ-
μαρτίας νόμον, καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀ-
εἰχμαλωσίας τύραννον ἀεχμα-
λωτεύσασα, ὡς φησὶν ὁ προ-
φήτης· ἀνέβη εἰς ὕψος, ἤχμα-
λώτευσεν ἀεχμαλωσίαν. τὴν
γάρ μορφήν τοῦ δούλου κατὰ
τοῦ ἐχθροῦ προβαλλόμενος ὁ
λόγος τὴν νίκην πεποιῖται
διὰ τοῦ ποτέ ἡττηθέντος.
διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πάντα πειρα-
σμόν συνετέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς
ὅτι πάντα ἔλαβεν τὰ πειρασ-
μοῦ πεῖραν ἐσχηκότα, δι' ὧν
τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν νίκην πεποιῖ-
ται λέγων· θαρσεῖτε, ἐγὼ νε-
νίκηκα τὸν κόσμον. οὐ γάρ
πρὸς θεότητα ἤρατο ὁ διάβο-
λος τὸν πόλεμον, ἦν ἡγνόησεν,
οὔτε γάρ ἐτόλμα· διὰ τοῦτο ἔ-
λεγεν. εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ
θεοῦ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, ὃν
πάσαι πλανῆσαι ἴσχυσε, καὶ
ἐξ ἐκεῖνου εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώ-
πους ἐξέτεινε τῆς κακίας αὐ-
τοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τῆς δὲ
τοῦ Ἀδάμ ψυχῆς ἐν καταδίκῃ
θανάτου κατεχομένης καὶ βω-
σης πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτῆς δεσπότην
διὰ παντός, καὶ τῶν εὐαρεστη-
σάντων τῷ θεῷ, καὶ δικαιοθέν-
των ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ νόμῳ συγκα-
τεχομένων τῷ Ἀδάμ, συμπεν-
θούντων τε καὶ συμβούωντων, ἐ-
λεήσας ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,

δούλου μορφή, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὑπο-
κειμένη, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ δυ-
νάμει, τὴν ἀναμαρτησίαν ἐπι-
δείκνυται, διαλύσασα τὸν τῆς
ἀνάγκης ὄρον, καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀ-
μαρτίας νόμον, καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀ-
εἰχμαλωσίας τύραννον ἀεχμα-
λωτεύσασα, ὡς φησὶν ὁ προ-
φήτης· Ἀνέβης εἰς ὕψος, ἤχμα-
λώτευσας ἀεχμαλωσίαν. τὴν
γάρ μορφήν τοῦ δούλου κατὰ
τοῦ ἐχθροῦ προβαλλόμενος ὁ
λόγος, τὴν νίκην πεποιῖται
διὰ τοῦ ποτέ ἡττηθέντος.
διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πάντα τὸν πειρα-
σμόν συνετέλεσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς,
ὅτι πάντα ἔλαβεν τὰ πειρασ-
μοῦ πεῖραν ἐσχηκότα, ὁ δ' ὧν
τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων νίκην πεποιῖ-
ται λέγων· θαρσεῖτε, ἐγὼ νε-
νίκηκα τὸν κόσμον. οὐ γάρ πρὸς
θεότητα ἤρατο τὸν πόλεμον
ὁ διάβολος, ἦν ἡγνόησεν,
οὔδέ γάρ ἐτόλμα· διὰ τοῦτο ἔ-
λεγεν· εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ
θεοῦ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, ὃν
πάσαι πλανῆσαι ἴσχυσε, καὶ
ἐξ ἐκεῖνου εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώ-
πους ἐξέτεινε τῆς κακίας αὐ-
τοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τῆς δὲ
τοῦ Ἀδάμ ψυχῆς ἐν καταδίκῃ
θανάτου κατεχομένης, καὶ βω-
σης πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτῆς δεσπότην
διὰ παντός, καὶ τῶν εὐαρεστη-
σάντων τῷ θεῷ, καὶ δικαιοθέν-
των ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ νόμῳ, συγκα-
τεχομένων τῷ Ἀδάμ, συμπεν-
θούντων τε καὶ συμβούωντων, ἐ-
λεήσας ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,

ὃν ἐποίησεν, ἠὲ δόκησε διὰ μυστηρίου φανερώσεως καινότητος σωτηρίαν κατεργάσασθαι τῷ γενεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ καθαίρεσιν μὲν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ διὰ φθόνου ἀπατήσαντος ἐχθροῦ, ὕψωσιν δὲ ἀσυλλόγιστον ἀναδείξει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆι πρὸς τὸν ὕψιστον ἐνώσει καὶ κοινωνίῃ, φύσει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ. διὰ τοῦτο ἦλθεν ὁ Λόγος Θεός ὢν καὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνθρώπου δημιουργός, γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπος, εἰς ζωοποίησιν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καθαίρεσιν δὲ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἐχθροῦ. καὶ ἐγεννήθη ἐκ γυναικός ἐκ τῆς πρώτης πλάσεως τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων μορφήν ἐαυτῷ ἀναστησάμενος: ἐν ἐπιδείξει σαρκός δὶχα σαρκικῶν θελημάτων καὶ λογισμῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐν εἰκόνι καινότητος, ἥ γάρ θέλησις θεότητος μόνης· ἐπειδὴ καὶ φύσις ὅλη τοῦ Λόγου ἐν ἐπιδείξει μορφῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης σαρκός τῆς ὀρωμένης τοῦ δευτέρου Ἀδάμ, οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπάρξει θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ προσῆει ὁ διάβολος τῷ Ἰησοῦ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ· μή εὐρίσκων δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς παλαιᾶς αὐτοῦ ἐπισπορᾶς γνῶρισμα, μητέ τῆς πρὸς τὸ παρόν ἐπιχειρήσεως προχώρησιν, ἡττάτο ἀσχυρόμενος· καὶ νικῶμενος, καὶ ἀτονῶν ἔλεγε· τίς οὗτος ὁ παραγενόμενος ἐξ Ἐδώμ; τουτέστι τῶν ἐκ γῆς ἀνθρώπων διαβαίνων μετὰ ἰσχύος. διὸ καὶ Χριστός ἔ-

ὃν ἐποίησεν, ἠὲ δόκησε διὰ μυστηρίου φανερώσεως, καινότητος σωτηρίαν κατεργάσασθαι τῷ γενεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ καθαίρεσιν μὲν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ διὰ φθόνου ἀπατήσαντος ἐχθροῦ, ὕψωσιν δὲ ἀσυλλόγιστον ἀναδείξει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆι πρὸς τὸν ὕψιστον ἐνώσει καὶ κοινωνίῃ φύσει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ. διὰ τοῦτο ἦλθεν ὁ Λόγος Θεός ὢν καὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνθρώπου δημιουργός, γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπος, εἰς ζωοποίησιν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καθαίρεσιν δὲ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἐχθροῦ· καὶ ἐγεννήθη ἐκ γυναικός, ἐκ τῆς πρώτης πλάσεως τὴν ἀνθρώπου μορφήν ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἀναστησάμενος, ἐν ἐπιδείξει σαρκός δὶχα σαρκικῶν θελημάτων καὶ λογισμῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἐν εἰκόνι καινότητος. Ἡ γάρ θέλησις θεότητος μόνης· ἐπειδὴ καὶ φύσις ὅλη τοῦ Λόγου, ἐν ἐπιδείξει μορφῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ σαρκός τῆς ὀρωμένης τοῦ δευτέρου Ἀδάμ, οὐκ ἐν διαιρέσει προσώπων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπάρξει θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ προσῆει ὁ διάβολος τῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, μή εὐρίσκων δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς παλαιᾶς αὐτοῦ ἐπισπορᾶς γνῶρισμα, μηδέ τῆς πρὸς τὸ παρόν ἐπιχειρήσεως προχώρησιν, ἡττάτο ἀσχυρόμενος καὶ νικῶμενος· καὶ ἀτονῶν ἔλεγε· τίς οὗτος ὁ παραγενόμενος ἐξ Ἐδώμ, τουτέστιν, ἐκ γῆς ἀνθρώπων διαβαίνων βία μετὰ ἰσχύος; διὸ καὶ ὁ Κύριος ἔ-

λεγεν° ἔρχεται ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, καί ἐν ἐμοί εὐρήσεται οὐδέν°.

4.) ibid. 785CD

Ἡ ἀγία σύνοδος εἶπεν° ἰδοὺ πανάγαθε δέσποτα καί πάλιν τήν χρῆσιν ἀπέκοψε. τὰ γάρ μετὰ τήν χρῆσιν κατὰ κέλευσιν τοῦ ὑμετέρου κράτους ἀναγιγνωσκόμενα δείκνυσι τήν αὐτοῦ συνεσκιασμένην παρεμβολήν, ἃ τινά εἰσιν ἐν τούτοις τὰ ἀποκοπέντα ὑπὸ Μακαρίου, καί Στεφάνου ἐκ τῆς παρουσίας χρήσεως: "καί τοι καί σῶμα, καί ψυχὴν, καί ὄλον εἶχε τόν πρῶτον ὁ δεύτερος Ἀδάμ. εἰ γάρ περί ὑπάρξεως ἀνθρώπου ἦν τό οὐδέν, πῶς τό σῶμα εὔρε τό ὀρώμενον εἰρηκότος τό οὐδέν; ἀλλ' οὐχ εὔρεν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὦν αὐτός εἰργάσατο ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Ἀδάμ· καί οὕτως κατελύθη ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ· διὰ τοῦτο καί ἡ Ἰραφή μαρτυρεῖ· ὅς ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὐδέ εὐρέθη δόλος ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτοῦ. πῶς οὖν λέγετε, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστίν ἀναιχμαλωτιστον γενέσθαι τόν ἅπαξ αἰχμαλωτισθέντα ἄνθρωπον· ἵνα τό μέν ἀδύνατον τῷ θεῷ προσαγάγητε; τό δέ δυνατόν τῷ διαβόλῳ, ἀκατάλυτον αὐτοῦ λέγοντες τήν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς καί οἱ ἄλλοι αἵρετικοί· καί διὰ τοῦτο ἐληλυθέναι τήν θεότητα τήν μή αἰχμαλωτιζομένην ἐν δ-

λεγεν° ἔρχεται ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, καί ἐν ἐμοί εὐρίσκει οὐδέν.

4) ΑΡ02,10-11, ibid. 1149

... Καίτοι καί ψυχὴν καί σῶμα, καί ὄλον τόν πρῶτον μεμαθήκαμεν ἔχειν τόν δεύτερον Ἀδάμ. Εἰ γάρ περί ὑπάρξεως ἀνθρώπου ἦν τό, οὐδέν, πῶς τό σῶμα εὔρε τό ὀρώμενον εἰρηκότος οὐδέν; Ἀλλ' οὐχ εὔρεν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὦν αὐτός εἰργάσατο ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Ἀδάμ· καί οὕτως κατελύθη ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν Χριστῷ· διὰ τοῦτο καί ἡ Ἰραφή μαρτυρεῖ· Ὅς ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐδέ εὐρέθη δόλος ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτοῦ. Πῶς οὖν λέγετε, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστίν ἀναιχμαλωτιστον γενέσθαι τόν ἅπαξ αἰχμαλωτισθέντα ἄνθρωπον; ἵνα τό μέν ἀδύνατον τῷ θεῷ προσαγάγητε, τό δέ δυνατόν τῷ διαβόλῳ, ἀκατάλυτον αὐτοῦ λέγοντες τήν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς καί οἱ ἄλλοι αἵρετικοί· καί διὰ τοῦτο ἐληλυθέναι τήν θεότητα τήν μή αἰχμαλωτιζομένην, ἐν δ-

In the Tenth Act of the same Council Pope Agatho's Patristic Florilegium on two wills and two energies in Christ includes an extract from AP01,15 under the rubric, "from St. Athanasius Archbishop of Alexandria's discourse on the Inhomination against the Apollinarists".

Labbe vi, 841E-844A

AP01,15, Migne P.G.26:1120

ἔτι ἀνεγνώσθη ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
κωδικίου χρῆσις τοῦ ἁγίου ᾿Αθα-
νασίου ἀρχιεπισκόπου ᾿Αλεξαν-
δρείας ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ἐνανθρωπήσε-
ως λόγου κατὰ ᾿Απολιναριστῶν, οὗ
ἡ ἀρχή:" ὁ μὲν τρόπος τοῦ εὐσε-
βοῦς" ἔχουσα οὕτως:

"ὅτε τὸν ᾿Αδάμ ἀρχῆθεν ἔπλασεν
ὁ θεὸς μὴ τί γε σύμφυτον αὐτῷ
δέδωκε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; τίς οὖν ἔτι
χρεία τῆς ἐντολῆς; πῶς δὲ αὐτόν
κατεδίκασεν ἁμαρτήσαντα; πῶς δὲ
καὶ πρό τῆς παρακοῆς οὐκ ἐγίνω-
σκε καλὸν καὶ πονηρόν ὁ ᾿Αδάμ
ὃν ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ ἀφθαρσίᾳ
καὶ εἰκόνι τῆς ἰδίας ἀϊδιότητος;
ἐποίησεν αὐτόν φύσιν ἀναμάρτη-
τον καὶ θέλησιν αὐτεξούσιον".
ἦτις χρῆσις ἀντεβλήθη ὁμοίως
πρὸς βιβλίον ἐν σώμασι κροκω-
τοῖς τῆς βιβλιοθήκης ὑπάρχον
τοῦ ἐνταῦθα εὐαγοῦς Πατριαρχεί-
ου, καὶ ἐστοίχησεν.

"ὅτε τὸν ᾿Αδάμ ἀρχῆθεν ἔπλασεν
ὁ θεός, μή τι γε σύμφυτον αὐτῷ
δέδωκε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; Τίς οὖν ἔτι
χρεία ἦν τῆς ἐντολῆς; πῶς δὲ αὐ-
τόν κατεδίκασεν ἁμαρτήσαντα; πῶς
δὲ καὶ πρό τῆς παρακοῆς οὐκ ἐγί-
νωσκε καλὸν καὶ πονηρόν ὁ ᾿Αδάμ;
ὅν ἔπλασεν ὁ θεός ἐπὶ ἀφθαρσίᾳ
καὶ εἰκόνι τῆς ἰδίας ἀϊδιότητος,
ἐποίησεν αὐτόν φύσιν ἀναμάρτη-
τον, καὶ θέλησιν αὐτεξούσιον.

There is no need to repeat here the significance of this external witness, which has been adequately appraised by P.Ch. Demetropoulos. The reference to βιβλίον ἐν σώμασι κροκωτοῖς most probably refers to the yellow colour of the pages or to material made of leopard's skin. Whatever the case, AP01 is well

attested by the official Patriarchal Archives of Constantinople. Thus APO1 and APO2 are known as Athanasian in the seventh cent. in three great Patriarchal centres: Rome, Constantinople and Antioch.

16) Anastasios Sinaita (c.700). The ὁδηγός, Anastasios Sinaita's great dogmatic manual, contains many allusions to APO1 and APO2 (cf. the new critical edition in the Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, vol.VIII, 1981, p.395 "index fontium") and one explicit reference to APO2,10 which is cited by the Acephali (Cf. Corpus..op. cit. p.215).

Anastasios, XIII,2

APO2,10, Migne,P.G.26:1148C

οὐ ταύτην δέ μόνον τήν χρῆσιν
προφέρουσιν ὡς τοῦ ἁγ. Ἀθανασίου,
ἀλλά καί ἑτέραν τινά
φάσκουσιν ° Χριστόν σαρκωθέντα
δίχα ἁμαρτίας καί σαρκικῶν θε-
λημάτων ° Ἡ γάρ θέλησις, φησί,
θεότητος μόνη°, ὥσπερ καί ἡ
οὐσία μόνη τοῦ Λόγου.

...δίχα σαρκικῶν θελημάτων...
ἡ γάρ θέλησις θεότητος μόνης.

It is not clear whether Anastasios has actually identified the above extract as coming from APO2. Indeed his comment which follows the citation (Ταῦτα τίς εἴρηκεν, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν..) suggests that he did not. This however, does not minimize the witness of the Acephali to the Athanasian paternity of APO2. What is interesting here is the change of Athanasius' μόνης to μόνη which suggests the extreme monophysite point of view - a point clearly perceived by Anastasios who argues in a way reminiscent of APO2 : Ταῦτα τίς εἴρηκεν, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν ° ἐκεῖνο δέ ἐπίσταμαι καί κηρύττω, ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος μόνην οὐσίαν τοῦ

Θεοῦ Λόγου κηρύττων ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ οὐκ ἔχει τινά κληρον, οὐδέ μέρος ἐν Χριστῷ, ὡς ἀρνησάμενος τό ἡμέτερον φύραμα καί τήν καθ' ἡμᾶς φύσιν, ἣν ἀνέλαβεν ἐκ τῆς ἀγίας παρθένου καί θεοτόκου Μαρίας (ibid. p. 215. Cf. APO2, 5, or APO1, 9 and 20).

17) John of Damascus (AD. 675-749). John of Damascus' great book Πηγὴ Γνώσεως contains two citations from APO1 and APO2 although it is not explicitly stated that APO1 and APO2 are two books. These citations are as follows:

1) Migne, P.G. 94:1089BC

APO1, 16, M.P.G. 26:1124

ὅτι δέ ἀληθῶς ἐδειλίασε, φησί
ὁ ἱερός Ἀθανάσιος ἐν τῷ κατὰ
Ἀπολιναρίου λόγῳ· διὰ τοῦτο
ὁ Κύριος ἔλεγεν· νῦν ἡ ψυχὴ
μου τετάρακται. Τό δέ νῦν τοῦ-
τό ἐστίν, ὅτε ἠθέλησεν, ὅμως
μέντοι τό ὄν ἐπιδείκνυται· οὐ
γάρ τό μή ὄν ὡς παρόν ὠνόμα-
ζεν, ὡς δοκῆσει γινόμενων τῶν
λεγομένων· φύσει γάρ καί ἀλη-
θεία τά πάντα ἐγίνετο.

Διὰ τοῦτο γάρ καί ὁ Κύριος
ἔλεγε· νῦν ἡ ψυχὴ μου τε-
τάρακται, καί κατώδυνός ἐστί.
Τό δέ νῦν, τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτε ἠθέ-
λησεν. Ὅμως μέντοι τό ὄν ἐπε-
δείκνυτο· οὐ γάρ τό μή ὄν ὡς
παρόν ὠνόμαζεν, ὡς δοκῆσει λεγο-
μένων τῶν γινόμενων· φύσει γάρ καί
ἀληθεία τά πάντα ἐγένετο.

2) ibid.

APO2, 13, M.P.G. 26:1153

καί μεθ' ἕτερα, Οὐδαμῶς δέ θεό-
της πάθος προσίεται, δέχα πάσ-
χοντος σώματος, οὐδέ ταραχήν
καί λύπην ἐπιδείκνυται, δέχα
ψυχῆς λυπούμενης καί ταρασσο-
μένης· οὐδέ ἀδημονεῖ καί προ-
σεύχεται, δέχα νοήσεως ἀδημο-
νούσης καί προσευχομένης. ἀλλά
γάρ κἄν μή ἡττήματι φύσεως συ-
νέβαινε τά γινόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεί-
ξει ὑπάρξεως ἐγίνετο. Τό δέ
ἡττήματι φύσεως μή συμβαίνειν

Οὐδαμοῦ δέ θεότης
πάθος προσίεται δέχα πάσχοντος
σώματος, οὔτε ταραχήν καί λύπην
ἐπιδείκνυται, δέχα ψυχῆς
λυπούμενης καί ταραττομένης·
οὔτε ἀδημονεῖ καί προσεύ-
χεται, δέχα νοήσεως ἀδημονού-
σης καί προσευχομένης· ἀλλά
γάρ κἄν μή ἡττήματι φύσεως συ-
νέβαινε τά λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐπι-
δείξει ὑπάρξεως ἐπράττετο τά
γινόμενα.

τά γινόμενα, τό μή άκουσίως
ταῦτα ὑπομένειν δηλοῖ.

A third citation from AP01 is contained in the same author's

Περὶ τῶν δύο θελημάτων:

3) Migne, P.G.95:161A

έν αρχῇ γάρ πλάσας ὁ θεός τόν
άνθρωπον, έποίησεν αυτόν φύ-
σιν άναμάρτητον καί θέλησιν
άυτεξούσιον, καθώς φησίν ὁ
ξερός ᾿Αθανάσιος.

AP01,15, M.P.G.26:1120

ὄν έπλασεν ὁ θεός επί άφθαρ-
σίῃ καί ελκόνι τῆς ἰδέας άϊ-
διότητος, έποίησεν αυτόν φύσιν
άναμάρτητον καί θέλησιν άυτε-
ξούσιον.

II.2 The Manuscript tradition

Critical work on the manuscripts of Athanasius' writings began with Bishop Frederick Wallis at the turn of the century and continued with contributions by Kirsopp Lake, von der Goltz, Georg Ludwig, Anton Stegmann, Joseph Lebon, E. Schwartz, Hans Lietzmann and R.P.C. Casey, until Hans-Georg Opitz produced the fundamental work Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung der Schriften des Athanasius, Berlin and Leipzig 1935. George J. Ryan outlined the history of this critical work on the Mss of the Athanasian writings in his De Incarnatione of Athanasius, Studies and Documents, vol.xiv, 1945 (pp.5-17), and provided therewith the first critical evaluation of Opitz' conclusions producing at the same time his own alternative classification of the available Mss. Further critical reappraisal of Opitz and Ryan were provided by the Scandinavian scholar Henric Nordberg in his Athanasiana, Helsinki, Helsingfors 1962, whilst Martin Tetz, C. Kannengiesser and Wilhelm Schneemelcher have made considerable additional contributions.

As our purpose here is not to examine, and far less to get involved with, the intricacies of textual criticism, we can use the fundamental work of Opitz, which lists all the Athanasian Mss and their contents, to discover the place which APO1 and APO2 have been given in the various Athanasian collections. Our aim will be to find out whether these writings are well attested in the Ms tradition of the Athanasian corpora and what precisely the value of such attestation really is.

In Opitz's general classification of the Athanasian Mss seven groups are distinguished, which we shall present here putting into parenthesis those Mss which contain our two APO. This will give us a general idea as to the strong or poor attestation of the two APO in the Ms tradition.

1) The W-Sammlung

T x t y z (U) (N) C (W) (M) (L) (Q) M T b Amst.12

2) The Doxapatres text

(B) Q (K) (A) (Y) (F) m d Vindobonesis theol.gr.2

3) Group φ (15th century Mss of limited number of works)

4) R-S Sammlung

R (S) H E P (O) (H) Parisinus gr.475, Genevensis gr.29 No3

5) Group ω (which hand down only the two works DION and ENCY)

6) Single Collections (not belonging to a group)

C (G) Z D (V) n v f p l b k

This listing clearly shows that APO1 and APO2 are well attested in the Ms tradition of Athanasian literary corpora. Important though this evidence is, it is not as crucial as some of the testimonia which we listed in the previous chapter, since

the latter go back to the 4th and 5th centuries AD, whereas the best and oldest of the available codices do not seem to go back beyond the seventh century.

Another interesting piece of information deriving from the Codices is the order of the two APO in which they appear, and also the titles which are used for their identification. A quick investigation into the data provided by Opitz gives us the following picture:

W-Sammlung:

(U) APO2 περί σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου.

APO1 περί τῆς σαρκώσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου

(N) The same as (U)

(W) APO2 Λόγος κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου

APO1 Περὶ τῆς σαρκώσεως Χριστοῦ κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου

(M) (L) and (Q) are all the same as (W)

The Doxapatres text

(B) and (K) are the same as (W) in the W-Sammlung

(A) APO2 Λόγος κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου

APO1 without a title

(Y) is the same with (A)

(F) APO2 κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου

APO1 λόγος δεῦτερος κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου

R-S Sammlung

(S) APO1 περί τῆς σαρκώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου

APO2 περί τῆς σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ
κατὰ Ἀπολιναρίου

- (O) APO1 περί τῆς σαρκώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου
APO2 περί τῆς σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ καί
κατά Ἀπολιναρίου
- (H) APO1 περί τῆς σαρκώσεως Χριστοῦ καί κατά Ἀπολιναρίου
APO2 περί τῆς σωτηριώδους ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ καί
κατά Ἀπολιναρίου

Single Collections

- (G) the same as (O)
- (V) APO2 Λόγος κατά Ἀπολιναρίου
APO1 without a title

These data indicate that APO1 and APO2 are not two parts of the same work, nor is APO1 to be regarded as the first and APO2 as the second orations dealing with the same subject; and finally that both APO1 and APO2 are refutations of Apollinarian doctrine.

II.3 Versions/Conclusions

Orientalists have discovered several early versions of APO1 and APO2 in Syriac and Armenian. Both works were known to Syriac and Armenian Monophysite circles from the fifth century onwards. Complete Oriental versions of APO1 have been found only in Syriac and of APO2 only in Armenian. The former have been edited by R.W. Thomson in his Athanasiana Syriaca, part iii, Louvain, 1972, on the basis of four Syriac Mss: a) B.M. Or.8606 (the first part of which is to be found in Milan under the name MS Milan No 46), which was made in A.D. 723 in Edessa. b) B.M. Add.12156 written on vellum in a fine Edessene hand of the sixth century (before A.D.562). c) B.M. Add. 18813 written on vellum in a regular hand of the seventh century and containing only fragments from APO1. And d) M.B. Add. 14531 written in vellum in a good Estrangelo hand of the seventh of eighth century. The Armenian version of APO2 is contained in E.Tayeci's Discourses, Letters and Dialogues of Saint Athanasius (in Armenian), Venice, 1899.

In the light of the above investigation we may conclude that the external witnesses to the Athanasian origin of the two APO are considerable and positive. Most clearly they go back to the later part of the fifth century and particularly to the monophysite/dyophysite disputes. It is also quite possible that they were known as Athanasian productions in the fourth century, as it is indicated in the indirect yet clear allusions to them in such authors as the Apollinarian

Polemon, Cyril of Alexandria and Isidore of Pelusium.

It is rather significant that they are extensively employed by sixth century monophysites and dyophysites alike in doctrinal disputations (for instance Julian of Halicarnassus and Severus of Antioch). More significant still is the fact that they appear in the seventh century Archives of Constantinople, Antioch and possibly Rome, and are given a prominent place in the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. There is absolutely no indication anywhere in this period as to the inauthenticity of the Athanasian origin of these works, although critical work has been undertaken (notably by Leontius) and a number of false Athanasian attributions were exposed. Finally the Athanasian paternity of AP01 and AP02 is clearly attested in the Ms tradition which goes back to the seventh century.

III

Internal Evidence

pp 177-227 III.1 Addressees and notions opposed

- 1) Addressee/s of APO1
- 2) Notions opposed in APO1
- 3) Addressees of APO2
- 4) Notions opposed in APO2
- 5) Comparison of Addressees and
and notions opposed in APO1 and APO2
- 6) The notions opposed in APO1&2 and
those in EPI
- 7) The notions opposed in APO1&2 and
those of Apollinaris

pp 228-239 III.2 Allusions

- a) Paul of Samosata
- b) Marcion
- c) Valentinus
- d) Sabellius
- e) Manichaeus
- f) Arians
- g) Rhetorius
- h) Other

pp 240-241 III.3 Conclusions

1) Addressee/s of APO1

The first direct allusion to an addressee is found in the opening sentence of the treatise. Ἀγαπητέ denotes a person who is intimately associated with the author. The following sentences of the opening chapter note how the addressee had "become aware of a very heavy weariness among those who seem to be saying the same things", how he turned to the author with a request for an exposition of the faith, and how the author has written this treatise as a response. The expression περί τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν πίστεως implies that both the addressee and the author belong to the same theological camp. The fact that the addressee turned to the author with such a request, asking for the right exposition of the faith and for an analysis of the cause (αἰτίασις) of the allegedly orthodox opinions, suggests that the author must have been a person of authority in the Church. There is also a sense of pastoral urgency attached to the request resulting from the fact that many unstable believers were led astray from the faith (ἀπαχθέντες οἱ ἀσθήρικτοι) to doctrine procuring "blindness of excess and multiplication of evil". The urgency is acknowledged by the author who writes about the absolute necessity (ἐπάναγκες) mainly for the refutation (τόν ἔλεγχον) of those who promise a different understanding of Christ. Reference to the "Fathers" and particularly phrases like ὁμοούσιον (τόν Υἱόν) τῷ Πατρὶ - Θεόν ἀληθινόν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ - τέλειον ἐκ τελείου - κατελθόντα διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν, σαρκωθέντα, ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα - τό ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον τοῦ Υἱοῦ μετὰ κρίματος διορίζονται, which are direct quotations from the Nicene Creed of A.D. 325 and are introduced here in contrast to the heretical Christological notions, betray the Nicene standpoint of the author

as well as the addressee.

From APO1,1 to the middle of APO1,3 the author speaks of heretics in the third person plural (τῶν ὁρθῶς φρονεῖν νομιζόντων - οἵτινες - οἷς - οὗτοι δέ φασίν - αὐτῶν - τούτοις - τούτων τὰ νοήματα...), but from that point onwards he addresses these people directly as if the treatise was really addressed to them. This change runs consistently throughout the document and only breaks down in the final chapter where the author designates this heretical group of people as οἱ ἐρεσχελεῖν βουλόμενοι ταῖς ἐφευρέσεσσι καὶ οὐ λογιζόμενοι again in the third person plural. This suggests that APO1 is addressed not only to a certain "beloved", but also to certain "heretics" who in the author's mind seem to be distinct from the former although somehow connected with him. The direct mention of these "heretics" which consistently runs through the main body of this treatise, implies that the author expected them to receive his views most probably through the "beloved".

Expressions such as πῶς λέγετε; πῶς ὀνομάζεστε; βλασφημεῖτε - περιπίπτετε - ὑπολαμβάνοντες - ὑποτίθεσθε - τί μέμφεσθε - πόθεν διδαχθέντες - ἀλλὰ πάλιν λέγετε - μή λαλεῖτε ἀλλὰ στοιχεῖτε - τί διαμάχεσθε - ἐπιχειρεῖτε, etc., taken together with the theological statements which go with them, suggest a close familiarity of the author with this group of heretics and their teachings. There is no suggestion however, as to how this familiarity has been acquired. It is possible that the "beloved" referred to in APO1,1, had communicated these teachings to him, or it is possible to suppose that the author had had a document at his disposal, which originated from this group. If the latter were the case, it would be surprising that no direct allusion

to such a document is made in the treatise. Two things, however, seem clear. The author knows the heretical notions of his opponents fairly intimately, and these notions appear to be the views of a group of people, ^{rather} than a single person.

It is not clear from the text what the relation of the beloved friend and these heretics is. It is implicitly obvious that he was involved in discussion with them, hence his request to the author for guidance. Further, he, like them, seems to be a Nicene. The notions propounded by the group are decisively anti-Arian in as much as they emphasize the Godhood of the Logos and make extensive use of the Nicene term homousion to present their peculiar Christological bent. Their Nicene stand-point is explicitly acknowledged in the phrase τί τοίνυν μέμπεσθε Ἀρειανοῖς and also in the ways in which the author accuses them of approximating and even arriving at the Arian position regarding the doctrine of Christ: ἴσα γάρ φρονεῖτε τῶν ἀσεβῶν Ἀρειανῶν (APO1,12) - μάτην οὖν Ἀρειανοί σοφίζονται... μάτην δὴ καί ὑμεῖς καθ' ἑτέραν ἐπίνοιαν τὰ ἴσα τούτοις φρονοῦντες (APO1,15) - ὥσπερ δέ Ἀρειος ἀπολισθήσας...τόν αὐτόν τρόπον καί ὑμεῖς (APO1,21).

Particularly significant is the phrase καί ὑμεῖς συκοφαντοῦντες λέγετε ἡμᾶς δύο λέγειν υἱοῦς καί ἀνθρωπολάτραις ἡμᾶς ὀνομάζετε (APO1,21), because it implies that this group, although anti-Arian, had in fact turned against the Nicenes amongst whom the author must have been included with accusations which did not really apply. It also reveals that the author could not have been an Antiochene because he resists being associated with the doctrine of the two Sons regarding it as συκοφαντία. It is not clear from the text whether the author included the beloved

in the ὑμεῖς of the above statement. But this is quite possible in view of the fact that the second and last reference to the beloved occurs almost immediately after the above phrase (i.e. the, ταῦτα ἔγραψα ἀγαπητέ...ἐπειδὴ ἠρώτησας, APO1,21). This last sentence is so impersonal, or sounds so impersonal, that makes one think whether the author includes the beloved with the heretics he opposes or consciously avoids mentioning names in the hope that his addressee/s who belong to the same camp with him might respond positively to his arguments.

It must be underlined that the identity of the beloved is very puzzling. Firstly because of his anonymity; secondly because he is only mentioned twice in the whole treatise; thirdly because his position is neither directly nor indirectly clarified - instead it is simply stated in a general and vague manner that he inquired of the author concerning the faith and especially concerning the new notions propounded by certain people with respect to the doctrine of the Incarnation and who also remain anonymous; fourthly because of the opening sentences of the treatise which definitely refer to him in an admonitory tone as they remind him of the orthodox believer's approach (ὁ τρόπος τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς). This admonitory tone, and in particular the reference to the orthodox approach, recurs once more in a totally unexpected and even concealed fashion, as to imply a deliberate attempt of the author to disguise his personal message to his beloved. This occurs in APO1,13 where the word εὐσεβής is employed once again in the third person singular (διό οὐ δεῖ τὸν εὐσεβοῦντα τοιαύτως χρῆσθαι ἐπινοοίαις), although the context demands the third person plural, since what precedes and what follows this statement in the discourse is a direct argument

and discourse presented to a group of people. It seems that the author intended his admonition for his beloved and not for the group which he was openly though anonymously opposing. This becomes incontestably obvious, when one observes how the author, while he is addressing a group of people in the first person (cf his statement τί γάρ ἕτερον παρ' ὑμᾶς εἶρηκε Μαρκίων... τί δέ ἄλλο εἶρηκε Μανιχαῖος) abruptly changes the direct form of address into the third person plural with the introduction of the little phrase, τοιαύτη τούτων ἡ δόσβεια, which would have been very odd, had he not intended to contrast τούτων to τόν εὐσεβοῦντα, which follows immediately. This is in our opinion a strong allusion to the author's concealed intention to admonish his anonymous beloved indirectly by combating the notions of a group of people which was closely and openly associated with him. In view of the fact that the controversial notions opposed in this treatise are of an Apollinarist provenance, it seems highly probable that the beloved, who is admonished to be "pious" in his mind and doctrine, is in fact Apollinaris himself, as tradition has always affirmed by inserting in the original title of the treatise the supplementary phrase κατά Ἀπολιναρίου. It is also notable that some Mss have preserved the same supplement but put in the plural, κατά Ἀπολιναριστῶν, which, in the light of the contents, is certainly justifiable and not at all contradictory to the former.

That the beloved is probably Apollinaris and that the notions opposed are those of the Apollinarist school is further strengthened by two clear allusions to Antiochene opponents of the present group. The characteristic phrase, καί οἱ λέγοντες,

which comes up twice, in AP01,12 and AP01,21, is undoubtedly designatory of a group of people propounding and defending diametrically opposite views from those of the Apollinarists. The first reference (ὅτι ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ παθὼν Υἱός, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ μὴ παθὼν) relating to the suffering of Christ, represents the a typically Antiochene proposition. The same must be said of the second reference which represents the so-called prophetic Christological model of Antiochene Christology (ὡς ἐπὶ ἕνα τῶν προφητῶν ἐπιδεδημηκέναι τὸν Λόγον). These two obvious allusions to Antiochene Christological teaching and the negative response to it both by the author and his opponents elucidates further the latter's identity. The author's opponents are diametrically opposite to the Antiochene theologians and must be placed in the group of the Apollinarists. As for the author, we have already noted his Nicene stand-point; this fact together with the reference to the so-called Rhetorius's heresy, indicate that the author belongs to the Alexandrian school as represented by the great Athanasius. The identity of the addressees, and more precise conclusions about the circumstances of AP01 can be further determined by means of a close examination of their Christological tenets which are so decisively opposed by the author of the treatise.

2) Notions opposed in AP01

The best way to summarize these notions is to provide first a list of the actual statements, phrases and terms related to these notions and directly cited or alluded to by the author. We shall denote such Christological data by using the number of the chapter and the letters of the alphabet.

◦ ՏՅԵՆՈՂԵՎ ՎՈՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԱՆՎՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՄԻՐՈՒ յՈՒ ՅԻ
ԱՄԻՆՓՈՒԿԱՒ, «ԱՊՐԻԵԹՐՈՒԹՅՈՒ ՏՈՒՄԻՄՈ ՏՐԻԿԵԹԱԿ ԱՐԻ ԱՍՆՈ յՈՒ
ԱՒԱՒ յՈՒ ԻՍԻՅՈՒ յՈՒ ՅԻ ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒ ԽՈՐՈՒ ԱՄԻՆՅԱՆ ԱՄԻ

◦ ՏՅԵՆՈՂԵՎ ԱՄԻՆՅԱՆ ԱՍՆՈՒ ԱՐԻ ԱՅՐՈՒՆՈ ՎՈՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԱՄԻ p

◦ ՅԵՅՆՊՈՒՆՈՒ ՎՈՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԱՐԻՆՅԱՆ ՕՐ ՏՐԻ o

◦ ՅԵՅՆՊՈՒՆՈՒ ԱՐԻՆՅԱՆ ՎՈՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՕՐ ՏՐԻ q

◦ ԱՐԻՆՅԱՆ ՎՈՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԽՈՐՈՒ ԱՅՆՎՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՄԻՐՈՒ ԱՅՐՈՒ e°z

◦ ՏՐԻՆՏՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻՄՈՒՅԻ ՏՐՈՒՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԻՍԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՄԻՐՈՒ յՈՒ ԻՍԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
-ԻՄՅԻ ԱՐԻՆՅԱՆ ԱՐԻ ՏՈՒՄԻՄՈՒՅԻ, «ՏՐԻՆՏՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՄԻՆՅԱՆ յՈՒ, «ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ
յՈՒ ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՄԻՆՅԱՆ ԱՄԻ ԱՄԻՐՈՒ ԱՐԻ ՏՈՒՄԻՄՈՒՅԻ ՅՐ ԱՐԻ
ԱՐՈՒՄԻՔԻՅԻ, «ԻՍԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐՆԵՐ ՏՐՈՒՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԱՄԻՆՅԱՆ ԱՐԻ ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ
ԱՅՐՈՒ, «ՏՐԻՆՏՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
-ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ յՈՒ, «ՏՐԻՆՏՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
ՏՈՒՄԻՄՈՒՅԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ, «ԽՈՐՈՒ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
ԻՍԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ՕՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ, «ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ, «ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ, «ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ, «ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ
ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ, «ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ, «ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
-ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
-ՅԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
-ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ
-ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ

q°z

◦ ՏՐՈՅԵՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ ՏՐԻ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ՅՐ ՅԵՅՆՊՈՒՆՈՒ

◦ ԽՈՐՈՒ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ ՏՅԵՆՈՂԵՎ ԱՒԻՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ յՈՒ ՎՈՐՈՒՄԻՔԻ z°a

- 4.a ἀλλά λέγετε ὅτι ἄκτιστος γέγονεν τῇ ἐνώσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἄκτιστον.
- b εἰ ἄκτιστος τῇ ἐνώσει γέγονε...
- c ἄκτιστον ἀκούων τὸ τοῦ Κυρίου σῶμα...
- d εἰ ὁ ἄκτιστος ἄκτιστον σῶμα ἀνελάβετο...
- 5.a τὴν ἄκτιστον παθητὴν λέγειν
τὴν παθητὴν (ὑπαρξιν) ἄκτιστον ὀνομάζειν
- 6.a πόθεν οὖν διδαχθέντες λέγετε ἄκτιστον;
- b εἰ τοίνυν φύσις ἐκ μεταποιήσεως ἄκτιστος γίνεται
- c εἰ ὁ ἄκτιστος ἀκτίστως ἐπεδήμησεν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς
- d ἀλλά πάλιν λέγετε ὅτι ἡμεῖς κτίσματι οὐ προσκυνοῦμεν
- 7.a πῶς ὑμεῖς πάλιν λέγετε ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα;
- b μάτην οὖν φαντάζονται οἱ ἀλώμενοι καὶ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ λέγοντες τὸ σῶμα.
- 8.a καινός τις ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανῶν ἐπιδημήσας
- 9.a καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὴν σάρκα τῆς θεότητος λέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖτε
- b ἡμεῖς τὸν ἐκ Μαρίας λέγομεν ὁμοούσιον τοῦ Πατρὸς
- c τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ γενεαλογουμένην ὁμοούσιον τοῦ Λόγου ἀποφαινόμενοι
- 10.a ἀλλά λέγετε ὁμοούσιος γέγονε τοῦ Λόγου ἡ σὰρξ
- b εἰ δὲ ὅλως γίνεται θεότης ἐκ μεταποιήσεως ἢ μὴ οὔσα φύσει θεότης, τί τοίνυν μέμφεσθε Ἀρειανοῖς ταύτην περὶ τοῦ Λόγου προβαλλομένοις τὴν ἔννοιαν;
- c ἀνειρεῖν βούλεσθε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ὄνομα ἢ τὸ ἔτι λέγεσθαι ἄνθρωπον τὸν Χριστόν
- 11.a εἰ οὖν ἐκ τῆς ὁμολογίας τοῦ ὁμοουσίου ἀναιρεῖτε τῆς σαρκὸς τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι τὸν Χριστόν Λόγον δὲ καὶ Θεόν καὶ Υἱόν Δαυίδ, εἰ κατὰ διαίρεσιν βούλεσθε θεωρεῖν δύο καθ' ἡμᾶς ἄν λέγοιντο

12. a εἰ δέ ὁμοούσιος τοῦ Λόγου ἡ σὰρξ καὶ συναΐδιος
b τί ἔτι ἡμᾶς μέμφεσθε ὡς τετράδα ἀντί Τριάδος λέγοντας
αὐτοὶ τετράδα ἀντί Τριάδος καὶ ἄκοντες ὁμολογοῦντες
λέγοντες ὁμοουσίαν εἶναι τῇ Τριάδι τὴν σάρκα;
13. a λέγοντες ἀντί τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος
ἐν Χριστῷ
b τί οὖν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρεῖτε ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ
ὁ ἔξωθεν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, τὸ αἷμα καὶ
τὴν σάρκα;
14. a φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν λέγοντες
15. a λέγετε... τῷ περιέχοντι σχήματι, τουτέστιν τῷ ὀργανικῷ
προσκεχρηθῆσθαι τὸν σωτήρα, ἀντί δέ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν
ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ
16. a σαρκὸς ἀνοήτου... θεότητος ἀτρέπτου
17. a πῶς οὖν λέγετε ἀντί τοῦ ἔσωθεν τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν, νοῦς ἐπου-
ράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ;
20. a ἀλλὰ πάλιν λέγετε ἡμεῖς Θεὸν λέγομεν τὸν ἐκ Μαρίας
b ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς λέγετε νοῦν ἐπουράνιον ἐν σῶματι ἐμψύχῳ
c μάτην οὖν φαντάζεσθε τοῦ φρονοῦντος καὶ ἄγοντος τὴν
σάρκα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δύνασθαι τὴν καινότητα κατεργάζεσθαι
οἰόμενοι διὰ μιμήσεως
d ἐν δέ Χριστῷ σαρκὸς μόνης καινότητα ὁμολογοῦντες
21. a καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ μετάφρασιν ποτέ μὲν νοῦν παράφρονα
ὀνομάζετε ποτέ δέ ἁμαρτίαν ἐνυπόστατον, ποτέ δέ ὡς
ἐργάτην τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐξωθεῖτε καὶ τὴν σάρκα ποτέ μὲν
ἄκτιστον ποτέ δέ ἐπουράνιον ποτέ δέ ὁμοούσιον τῷ Λόγῳ
b καὶ ὑμεῖς συκοφαντοῦντες λέγετε ἡμᾶς δύο λέγειν Υἱοὺς
καὶ ἀνθρωπολάτρας ἡμᾶς ὀνομάζετε, ἢ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἀνθυποφέ-
ρετε.

The above texts point to the following Christological notions:

1) Christ's flesh is uncreated (ἀκτιστος) or heavenly (ἐπουράνιος) or consubstantial with the Godhead (ὁμοούσιος τῇ θεότητι), and became such either on account of the union (τῇ ἐνώσει) with that which is uncreated (the Logos), or on account of a transmutation or conversion (ἐκ μεταποιήσεως).

2) Christ is a heavenly man (ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος), because He has a heavenly mind (νοῦς ἐπουράνιος) instead of the inner man (ὁ ἔσωθεν ἄνθρωπος). This means that Christ is not a perfect man (τέλειος ἄνθρωπος) like all other men, because a) perfect man implies sin and b) two perfect things cannot become one. Put otherwise, He is not perfect man, a) because He does not exhibit in Himself that which decides and leads the flesh in man (τό φρονοῦν καί ἄγον τήν σάρκα, i.e. the human mind) and thus He is sinless, and b) because He assumed what is deprived of mind (τό ἀνόητον) so that He might be the mind in it. In this sense the flesh assumed by the Logos in Christ is mindless (from the human point of view) and divine.

3) Christ exhibits in Himself newness of flesh according to likeness (καινότητα σαρκός καθ'ὁμοίωσιν) but not newness of mind; the latter is exhibited in Christians by imitation assimilation and abstinence from sin.

4) The soul is identified with the blood, or is subsumed under the name of the flesh. Yet it can be employed metonymically (κατά μετὰφρασιν) to denote man's "mindless mind" (νοῦν παράφρονα) or "the concrete basis of sin" (ἁμαρτίαν ἐνυπόστατον).

5) The alternative to the above Christology can only be a division (διαίρεσις) between the Logos and the Son of David, or a doctrine of "two Sons". This would imply anthropolatry (ἀνθρωπο-

λατρεία) and Quaternity instead of Trinity (τετράδα ἀντί Τριάδος).

Where do such notions come from? Before we attempt to answer this question we shall examine the internal evidence concerning the addressees^{of} and the notions opposed in APO2.

3) Addressees of APO2

APO2 begins with an open and direct challenge to the author's opponents, who are addressed in the third person plural: οἱ...μή...ὁμολογοῦντες...λεγέτωσαν, πῶς...ὕπειλήφασιν, ἢ νενοήκασιν... The next reference to them is also indirect and occurs in APO2,2: ὡς τινες πεπλανημένοι λέγουσι. But following immediately after this, a direct question is put by the author to his opponents: ἢ ἐρεῖτε... i.e., "or will you say that..". From this point on all the references to these opponents are direct ones and take two forms, either citations of doctrinal statements deriving from these opponents, or doctrinal questions put by the author to his opponents as a result of their statements. Here is a listing of them:

(3)¹ εἶπατε τοίνυν πῶς...ὕπειλήφατε

(3)² ὑμεῖς δέ τίνι πρόσκεισθε, ἢ τίνι βοηθεῖν βούλεσθε; Ἡ κάμφυλοι γέγονατε; Πᾶσι γάρ τοῖς προειρημένοις αἰρετικοῖς συνηνέχθητε ἀπιστήσαντες τῇ ἐνώσει· καί ἀντιλέγοντες...κεχωρήκατε...προφασιζόμενοι.

(4)¹ Τί τοίνυν προφασιζόμενοι σοφίζεσθε; τί ὑποκρινόμενοι ὑποκαλύπτετε καί οὐ φανερώς λέγετε...

(4)² ταύτην παρέχει τὴν πεῦσιν ὑμῶν ὁ λόγος, προφάσει λεγόντων ὁ αὐτός καί ὁ αὐτός

(4)³ καταλέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖτε συκοφαντοῦντες καί λέγοντες...

(4)⁴ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ἡ θολερὰ ἀνατροπή, ἣν ποτίζετε τοὺς ἀνθρώ

- (11)¹ πῶς οὖν λέγετε, ὅτι...ἵνα τό μέν...προσάγητε...τό δέ...
λέγοντες
- (11)² ἀλλά λέγετε
- (11)³ πῶς οὖν λέγετε...ἀρειανῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα τολμήματα
- (12)¹ οἱ τοίνυν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος τήν ὁμολογίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι
πῶς εἰς πάθος καθέλκετε...εἰς πάθος καθέλκοντες...καί...ὁμολο-
γοῦντες
- (12)² εἰ δέ ταῦτα οὕτω νοεῖν βούλεσθε...
- (12)³ εἰ δέ μὴ πιστεύετε, ὅτι...ἀλλά στενοχωρούμενοι λογίζεσθε,
ὅτι εἰάν ὁμολογήσητε...λέγετε...ἀνάγκη ὑμᾶς...λέγειν, κατά Μαρτί-
ωνα καί τούς ἄλλους αἰρετικούς, ἢ κατά Ἄρειον καί τούς κατ'αὐτόν
- (13)¹ εἰ γάρ ἀναγινώσκοντες τάς θείας Γραφάς κατενοήσατε...
- (13)² πῶς γεγράφατε, ὅτι "...", εἰ γάρ ἐρεῖτε καί...
- (14)¹ ὑμῶν τήν διάνοιαν, οἷαν ὡς μὴ φοβουμένων...μήτε πειθομένων
- (14)² ἐψευσμένῃ ὑμῶν ἢ εὐφημία ἀπαρνούμενοι μέν τήν ἀλήθειαν,
κατά δέ τῆς θεότητος φθεγγόμενοι...
- (14)³ ὑμεῖς δέ τό ἔμπαλιν λέγετε...
- (15) ἀσύμφωνος τοίνυν ταῖς Γραφαῖς ὁ ὅρος ὑμῶν, καί ἀνάρμοστος
τῆς πληρωθείσης οἰκονομίας ἡ γνώμη ὑμῶν
- (16)¹ πῶς οὖν λέγετε...
- (16)² ἀλλά πάλιν λέγετε...
- (16)³ εἰρήκατε γάρ ὅτι...
- (16)⁴ διά τοῦτο γάρ καί Θεόν παθόντα λέγετε, ἀκολούθως ἑαυτοῖς
φθεγγόμενοι, μᾶλλον δέ συμφώνως τοῖς Ἄρειανοῖς· τοῦτο γάρ
ἐκεῖνοι δογματίζουσιν
- (16)⁵ ἔσται δέ καί...καθ' ὑμᾶς
- (17) Ἐμεῖς δέ σάρκα μόνην προσομολογοῦντες, οὔτε...δύνασθε, οὔτε
...ἐπειδὴ ἔξω τῶν ἁγίων Γραφῶν βεβήκατε, λαλοῦντες ἅ Ἄρειανοί
σοφίζονται.

These references reveal distinctive features of the teaching and indirectly of the identity of the addressees. This teaching represents a novel heresy which is related to previous heresies (3², 4⁶, 4⁷). It is secretive (4¹). It is based on pretence and makes use of accusation (4², 4³, 5³). It is a fatal deviation which deliberately misleads (4⁴). It represents private as opposed to ecclesiastical opinion (4⁷, 5¹, 14¹). It exhibits common features with the teaching of Paul of Samosata (5¹), Marcion and the Manichaeans (5¹, 8¹, 12³), and stands in direct opposition to the mind of the holy Scriptures (9¹, 9², 13¹, 15, 17). Though it purports to be anti-Arian and therefore Nicene, it is in fact equal to the Arian heresy in a number of ways (9³, 9⁴, 9², 11³, 12³, 16⁴, 17). Perhaps the most important of the above references are those occurring in 8² and 13² as they imply that the author had seen or possessed written documents of his opponents.

The above general features simply reveal that the addressees belong to the Nicene camp although their views on the humanity of Christ and especially on the Incarnation are now putting to question their good-standing. Nothing else is revealed concerning their particular identity. This however, can further be clarified by a close examination of their Christological teaching.

4) Notions opposed in APO2

As in the case of APO1, so here, it is of convenience to try and single out the statements phrases and terms of the author's opponents. It is even more necessary to do this in this case since the author alludes to written documents of his opponents in chapters 8 and 13.

1. a Ἄρα ὡς τοῦ λόγου τροπήν ὑποκείμενους εἰς ἄρκον μεταφο-

2. a οὗτε οὖν τὸ Χριστὸς ὄνομα δίχα τῆς ἄρκου προσαρτάται

β ἢ ὡς οὖν λέγουσιν Χριστὸς ὁ λόγος, θεὸς ὢν, ἄρτι γένηται

3. a εἰ μὲν γὰρ θεότητος ἴδιον τὸ Χριστὸς ὄνομα δίχα ἄρκου,

β εἴπαται τοίνυν, ἢ ὡς ἐν Νικαίᾳ λέγουσιν ὑπελάμβαντες;

4. a τί ὑποκρινόμενοι ὑποκαλύπτετε καὶ οὐ φανερῶς λέγετε ὅτι

ὄχι ἁπλῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο ὄνομα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὡς ἔστιν

β ταύτην ἀρετὴν τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς ὅτι, προφασίαι λέγονται

γ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς

δ οὐδ' οὗτοισι πᾶσι ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι καὶ λέγοντες, ἄρτι

λέγουσιν ὅτι Χριστὸν ὄνομα ἔστιν ἄρτι

β (ἢ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι καὶ λέγοντες), ἄρτι

ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι

ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι

ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι

ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι

ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι

ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι, ἢ ἄρτι οὗτοισι

5. a ἢ ὡς ἐν Νικαίᾳ λέγουσιν; παρονομαστὶ λέγουσιν;

β ἢ ὡς ἐν Νικαίᾳ λέγουσιν; παρονομαστὶ λέγουσιν;

ԱՄԻՔԱԾԱՆՈՒ ԼՄԻՔԱՒ ԴՆԱ ԽԵՐԻՎԻՄ ԻՅՉ ԼՊԱ . ԻՍԼԵՓՉԻՐՈՐԻՉ ԾՆՆԻԾՈՒՄԻՐ

ՏՄԻ ԼՄԻՐՈՒՄ ԼՈՒՔԱՅՓՈՒ ԴՆԱ ԾԵԼՈՐԴՆԻՎՅՈՐԾԻՔ , ԼՄԻՔԱՒ ԻՄԻՋԵՍԵՆ

ԾՆՆԻՔ , ԼԻՐՈՒՓ ՈՒՄՄԹԹԱՐ ԴՐՈՒ ԼՐԹՅՈՒ ԼՄԻ ԼՈՒՔՐԵՆ ԼՈՐԾԵԼՅՔԹԱՔ

Գ

• ԼՄԻՔԱՒ ԼՄԻ ԾԹՈՒՆՅԱՆՐ ԾՆՆԻՐ ԴՆԱ (ԼՄԻՔԱՒ ԼՄԻ) ԼՄԻՐՈՒՄ

• ԼՄԱՄԹԹԱՐ ԼՄԻ ԾՆՆԻՔ ԾՊ ԾՐՈՒՐԻՔ Թ ԴՆԱ

ՅՐ ԻՄՈՅՅ . ԼՈՒՄԱՆՐՈՐ ԼԻՐՈՅՉ Թ : ԻՍԼՆԻՔ ԾՆՆԻԾՈՒՄԻՐ ԾՆԻՔԱՒ , ԼՄՆԻՔ

- ԽՅՅՐՈՐԻՉ ԾՆՆԻԾՈՒՄԻՐ ԾՄԻ ԼՄԻՔՐՈՐԻՉ ԼՄԻ ԴՆԱ , ԾԻՐՈՒՓ ԼՄՆԻՔՈՒՅԷԼ ԾՈ

- ԴՆԱՐԻՔ ԾՄԻ ԹՆՅԹԼԼԱՍ ԼՅ Լ ԻՄՈՒՄՆՐՈՐ ԾՄԱ ԴՆԱ . ՅԵԼՅԷՎ ԼԻՎՐԱ ՔՆՎՐ

Ե՝ Գ

: ԾՈՒՄԹԹԱՐ ԾՈՒՄՅՈՒՅԷԼ ԼՈՒՔՐՈՒՔ ԻՅՉՈՒՓ ԴՐՈ ԾՐՈՒՐԻՔ ԼՊՈ ԾՄԱ

Գ

• ԻՄՈՒՄՆՐՈՐ ԴՐՈ ԻՄՈՒՓ ԼՈՒՔՐՈՒՔ ԼՈՒՔՐՈՒՔ ՅՐ ԾՐԾՅԻՄ . ԼՈՒՔՐՈՒՔ

ԴՐՈՒ ԻՄՈՅՅ ԾՐԾՅԻՄ ԾՐՈՒՐԻՔ Թ ԾՈՒՄԹԹԱՐ ԴՅ . ՅԵԼՅԷՎ ԼԻՎՐԱ ՔՆՎՐ

Ե՝ Լ

ԴՆԱՐՈՒՄ ԼՄԻ ԼՅ ԴՆՆԻԾՈՒՄԻՐ Լ ԼԹՆԻՐՔԱՅԻՄԱՔ

ԾՄԱ , ԼԹՓՈՒ ԴՆՈՒՄՆԻՐՈՒՄՆՐ Լ ԻՐՈՒՓ ԼՐՈՐՈՒՄՆԻՐՈՒՄՆՐ ԼՄԻ ԼՅ ԼՄԻ ՅՐ ԴՅ

• ԾՈՒՄՅՈՒՅԷՄԱՔ ԼԻՄՈՒՄՆՐՈՐ ԼՅԹՄԻՔՐՈՐ ԼՄԻ ԼՊՈ

Ր

• ԾՈՒՄՆԻՐՈՒՄՆՐ

ԼՄԻ (Ե:Տ ՍՈՐ I , ԼՈՒՐՈՐՈՐԻՉ ԴՐՈՒ ՄԼՅՅ ՔԻ) ՅՈՒՅՅ . ՅԵԼՅԷՎ ԼԻՎՐԱ ՔՆՎՐ

Գ

: ԾՐՈՒՐԻՔ Թ ԾՈ

- ԴՆԱՐԻՔ ԾՆԻՔԱՒ ԻՄՈՅՅ ԾՄԱ ԴՆԱ . ԻՍԼՆԻՔ ԼՄԻ ԼՄՆԻԾՈՒՄՆՐ ԾԻՐՈՒՄՄԹԹԱՐ

ԾՆՈՒՄՈՒՅԷԼ ԼՅ ԼԻՐՈՅՉ ՅՐ ԼՈՒՄԱՆՐՈՐ . ԼՅՒՆԻՔ ԾՆՈՒՄՈՒՅԷԼ ԾՈՒՄՆՐ

- ԹՐՈՒՄ ԾՆՈՒՄ ԴՆԱ ԼՈՒՄՈՐ ԾՄԼՎՐԱ ՅԹՎՅՅ ՄԼՎՐԱ ԴՅ ԻՊՈ ՅԵԼՅԷՎ ԼԻՎՐԱ ՔՆՎՐ

Ե՝ Գ

• ՅԵԼՅԷՎ

ԾԵԼՆՈՒՄՆԻՐՈՒՄՆՐ ԾՆՆԻՐ ԾՊ ԾՈՒՄՆՐ ԼՐՅԹ ԼՐՈՒ ԾՐՈՒՔ ԼՈՒՄՄԹԹԱՐ ԴՆՈՐ

Ժ

ԾՈՒՄՆՐՅԻՅՐՈՒՄՆՐ ԼԻՐՈՒՄՈՒՄՆՐ ԾՈՒՄՆՐՅԹ ԾՄԻ ԼՊՈ

Թ

• ԻՄՈՒՄՆՐՅԻՅՐՈՒՄՆՐ ԾՐՅԹ Թ ԻՅԹՈՒՄՆՐ ԿՅ ԾՄՅՈՒՄՆՐ ԼՄԻՔՐՈՐ ԹՎՐ ԼՊՈ

Ր

• ԻՅՈՒՄՆՐ

ԼՅ ԾՊ ՄԼՎՐԱՅԷՅՐ ԿՐՈՒՄ ԾՐ ԼՄՆԻՐՅՐ ՄԼՎՐԱՅԷՅԷԼ ԼՐՅԹ ՅԵԼՅԷՎ ԼԻՎՐԱ ՔՆՎՐ

Ր

• ԼՈՒՄՄԹԹԱՐ ԴՆԱ ԼՐՅԹ

13. a πῶς οὖν γεγράφατε, ὅτι θεός ὁ διὰ σαρκός παθών καί ἀναστάς; εἰ γάρ θεός ὁ διὰ σαρκός παθών καί ἀναστάς, παθητόν ἐρεῖτε καί τόν Πατέρα καί τόν Παράκλητον, ἑνός ὄντος τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς θείας φύσεως.
14. a οὐδαμοῦ δέ αἷμα θεοῦ εἶχα σαρκός παραδεδώκασιν αἱ Γραφαί, ἢ θεόν διὰ σαρκός παθόντα καί ἀναστάντα.
- b φωνῆς δέ γενομένης καί ψυχῆς σημασινομένης, οὐ χωρισμόν θεότητος δηλούσης.
- c μήτε τῆς θεότητος τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῷ τάφῳ ἀπολιμπανομένης μήτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ ᾄδι χωριζομένης.
15. a οὔτε ἡ νέκρωσις καί τοῦ πνεύματος ἀποχώρησις θεοῦ ἀπό σώματος ἦν μετάστασις.
- b εἰ δέ ὁ θεός ἐχωρίσθη τοῦ σώματος, καί οὕτω ἡ νέκρωσις ἐδείκνυτο...
16. a Πῶς οὖν τόν δημιουργόν τῶν λογικῶν φύσεων λόγον λέγετε, σάρκα ἐαντόν συγκεράσαντα, λογικόν ἄνθρωπον γεγονέναι; καί πῶς ἄτρεπτος καί ἀναλλοίωτος καί οὐχί λογικήν τήν τοῦ δούλου μορφήν συστησάμενος γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα καί ὁ λόγος ἄτρεπτος ἦ μένων ὃ ἦν, καί λογικός ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπί γῆς ὁραθῆ θεός ὢν; ἐπουράνιος γάρ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Κύριος, οὐχί ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τήν σάρκα ἐπιδειξάμενος, ἀλλά τήν ἐκ γῆς ἐπουράνιον συστησάμενος.
- b ἀλλά πάλιν λέγετε ὁ πῶς τόν Κύριον τῆς δόξης ἐσταύρωσαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τόν λόγον ἐσταύρωσαν καθ' ὑμᾶς;
- c Πῶς οὖν ἴσχυσαν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι λῦσαι ναόν θεοῦ καί τήν ἄλυτον σύγκρασιν τῆς σαρκός πρός τόν λόγον γενομένην χωρίσαι, εἶγε καθ' ὑμᾶς ἔσχε τοῦτον τόν τρόπον ἢ τοῦ σώματος νέκρωσις.
- d εἰρήκατε γάρ, ὅτι σάρκα τήν ἀνυπόστατον συγκεράσας ἐαντῷ

ὁ Λόγος, ἔδειξε τὸν ὄντως λογικὸν καὶ τέλειον ἄνθρωπον.

e εἰ τοίνυν ὁ Λόγος ἀπεχώρησε τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὕτως ἡ νέκρωσις γέγονε...

f εἰ Θεοῦ χωρισθέντος ἡ νέκρωσις τοῦ σώματος γέγονε

g διὰ τοῦτο γάρ καὶ Θεὸν παθόντα λέγετε.

17. a εἰ γάρ ὁ Λόγος ἐν θανάτῳ γεγονώς χρεῖαν εἶχε τοῦ ἐγείροντος αὐτὸν ἐκ θανάτου, οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἔσται ἡ νίκη, ὕμεῖς δέ σάρκα μόνην προσομολογοῦντες...

18. a οἱ δέ σάρκα προσομολογοῦντες ἀρνοῦνται αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἐπίδειξιν.

b ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτοὶ λέγειν μεμαθήκασι° τίς ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ Μαρίας, Θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος; εἶτα εἴαν εἶπη, ἄνθρωπος, ἀπιστήσῃ αὐτοῦ τῇ θεότητι, σύμφωνας γινόμενος τοῖς ταύτη ἀπιστήσασιν αἰρετικοῖς° εἴαν δέ εἶπη, Θεός, ἀρνήσεται αὐτοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τὴν γέννησιν καὶ συναχθήσεται τοῖς ταύτην ἀπαρνούμενοις αἰρετικοῖς. εἶτα δ' αὖ πάλιν° τίς ὁ παθών; τίς ὁ σταυρωθεὶς; Θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος;

10. b εἰ γάρ περὶ ὑπάρξεως ἀνθρώπου ἦν τό οὐδέν (cf. John 14:30, ἔρχεται ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου καὶ ἐν ἐμοί εὐρίσκει οὐδέν), πῶς τό σῶμα εὔρεν τό ὀρώμενον εἰρηκῶς οὐδέν;

The above texts point to the following Christological notions:

1) Christ is not from God and from man, but from God alone.

This must be understood in terms of the Logos of God undergoing a certain change (τροπήν) in his Godhood leading to a "transmutation or conversion into flesh" (σαρκὸς μεταποίησιν),

or "likeness of soul" (ψυχῆς ὁμοίωσιν). An other way of putting it is to say that the Logos of God divided Himself (καταμερίσας

ἑαυτόν) for the sake of an "exhibition of flesh" (σαρκός ἐπί-
δειξιν) and a "likeness of soul" (ψυχῆς ὁμοίωσιν). The impli-
cation of the above doctrine is that the name Christ really
refers to the Logos of God and His Godhood.

2) Following from the above, Christ's birth in Nazareth must be
understood in purely theological terms. It must be stated as
follows: "God was born in Nazareth"(θεόν ἐν Ναζαρέτ γεγενῆσθαι),
or "God was born from a Virgin", or "God showed a beginning of
birth from Nazareth", or "God showed a transmutation of Godhood
in Nazareth"(μεταποίωσιν θεότητος). Another way of stating the
above is to say that the Logos simply appeared as a man (ὡφθη
ὡς ἄνθρωπος).

3) The above Christology opposes the view that the Logos became
man by taking the form of the servant. It is argued that if this
was the case , then two realities would be present in Christ: God
and man (ὁ αὐτός καί ὁ αὐτός) . In fact Christ would not be God
at all but simply a man. He would be a man "who is with God",
or "twined together with God", or "one who died for the world",
or "one who is aprt of the world", or "one who is not separated
from sin", or "one who rules over the angels", or "one who is
worshipped by Creation", or "one who is Lord and Lord of glory
though He was crucified", or "one who hears, Sit at my right
hand", or finally "one who is coming to deliver judgment". In
the last analysis Christ would not be one but two (οὐκ ἔτι ἓνα
ἀλλά δύο). It is probably in the pursuit of the above argument
that the notion of "the division of persons" (διαίρεσις προσώ-
πων) is condemned and instead "the existence of God" (ὕπαρξις
θεότητος) is introduced as the only proper Christological cate-
gory. Such an emphasis on the ὕπαρξις θεότητος helps us to under-

stand the curious phrase σάρκα τὴν ἀνυπόστατον συγκεράσας ἑαυτῷ, which means that in Christ the Logos diluted (συγκεράσας) as it were His Godhood into a kind of flesh which had no real human creaturely existence, i.e. it was ἀνυπόστατος ! Particularly interesting here is the author's position which condemns both the διαίρεσις προσώπων and the one-sided ὑπαρξίς θεότητος , and puts forward his μία ὑπαρξίς (he could also have said μία ὑπόστασις) θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος. (cf. the extract 10.a).

4) That in Christ the Logos did not become man by assuming the form of the servant or the human nature, but by appearing to be a man by way of transmutation of His Godhood (ἀνὴρ ἐκ μεταποιήσεως θεότητος ὀφθεισόμενος) is defended by means of the following arguments:

a) If Christ is a man, then He must be a part of the world; but then a part of the world could not be the Saviour, because a part of the world cannot save the world.

b) Human nature is sinful; Christ was sinless; therefore Christ could not have assumed human nature. To the objection that Christ's sinlessness was the sinlessness of the assumed human nature which had sinned owing to the union of the latter with the Godhood, the reply is provided that this kind of sinlessness is not pure righteousness because it is the result of necessity and bias. Pure human righteousness , it is argued, can only be shown by the Godhead appearing in the likeness of flesh and soul and remaining uncaptured by sin; the captured man could never deliver himself from his captivity. It is an implication of the above doctrine, that man's salvation is not rooted in the renewal or new beginning of his human nature and man's participation in it, but in man's imitation of God in Christ.

c) The particular form of the general argument which states that the Divine Logos could not have assumed sinful human nature is connected with the notion of "human thoughts" (ἀνθρώπιναι λογισμοί) or "the mental nature of man" (ἡ νοερά τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις) which are regarded as the seat of sin. It is argued that the sinless Christ could not have had "human thoughts" or "mental human nature" which are sinful in themselves. In other words Christ could not have had a mental soul; hence the soul which He exhibited out of Himself was simply "fleshly" (σαρκική ψυχή).

d) Following from the above, there is the argument that the death of Christ is to be understood as the separation of the Logos from the body which He fashioned by transmutation and out of His divine Godhood. In other words the death of Christ could only be the death of God.

e) Closely connected with this is what may be called the biblical argument, which states that "the crucified Lord of Glory" (I. Cor. 2:8) can only be understood in the sense that the Lord appeared as a man out of Himself and as such He was crucified; otherwise, it is argued, it would have meant that He was crucified in His assumed human existence (ἀνθρωπίνη ὑπαρξις), and therefore it would not have been the Lord of Glory but a man to whom the Lord of Glory had been conjoined (πρός ἄνδρα συνήφθη).

5) Comparison of the addresses and notions opposed in APO1 and APO2

APO1 is addressed to ^a single person referred to by the name "beloved". Yet it may also be said to have been addressed to a group of people who shared the same doctrine and who are directly addressed in the text. It seems obvious that the "beloved" is connected with this group, and that what the author writes is really intended both for him and for them. The bulk of the treatise is

intended to be a refutation of "new doctrine". As regards the identity of the group, we have already observed that (i) they are anti-Arians and (ii) that they hold views about Christ's flesh and indeed about the Incarnation which collide with the Nicene definition. These views are summed up in two primary theses, one about the meaning of the name Christ and another about the peculiar or even divine character of the flesh of Christ owing to its union with the Divine Logos. The flesh is qualified as uncreated heavenly and consubstantial with the Godhead, whilst Christ is understood to represent "a new man" who is heavenly and consists of a "heavenly mind" (the Logos) and a human mindless and ensouled flesh.

APO2 is addressed to a group of people and is intended to be a refutation of their views on Christ. It is clear that they too are (i) anti-Arians and very likely Nicenes as to their Logos doctrine, and (ii) that they hold heretical views concerning the Incarnation. They see Christ as being essentially Divine - in fact God the Logos - who simply appeared as man by way of a transmutation of His Godhood into "a show of flesh and a semblance of fleshly (as opposed to intellectual or mental) soul". Over against this purely divine Christ the author holds that Christ is perfect God and perfect man without any implication of division of persons or existences.

These general descriptions of the doctrinal Christological positions of the two groups of heretics opposed by APO1 and APO2 leave little doubt that both groups are closely interrelated and most probably belong to the same theological school. Both raise similar Christological questions and both advance similar general answers, although they seem to differ in the details. Their precise interrelation can further be elucidated by a comparison of their

particular notions as they can be gleaned out of the texts of APO1 and APO2. Such particular notions have already been listed in the previous chapters of this section of the Dissertation by means of consecutive extracts from the texts, and it is to a comparison of them that we shall now turn.

(i) The notion of a conversion (μεταποίησις) in Christ. Extract APO2,1a seems to be parallel to extracts APO1,6b and 10b, particularly in view of the term "transmutation" or "conversion" (μεταποίησις) which occurs in all of them. Yet a closer examination reveals a significant difference. The APO2 extract envisages a "conversion of the Logos into flesh", whereas the APO1 extracts insinuate a "conversion of the flesh into the divinity of the Logos". The "conversion" envisaged in APO2,1a is further clarified by a careful examination of extracts APO2,3a, 5c, 11b, 12a, 16a, and 16d. APO2,3a reveals that the conversion does not involve real human flesh (δίχα σαρκός ἀνθρωπίνης) but simply a show of flesh caused by the division of the Logos Himself (ἑαυτὸν καταμερίσας εἰς σαρκός ἐπίδειξις). APO2,5c stresses that it is the Logos' own flesh that is shown (ἰδοὺσαν σάρκα δεῖξαντα) which the author takes to mean "mere semblance" (ὡς ἐν δοκῆσει). APO2,11b strengthens this understanding as it states the arrival of the Godhood "in the likeness of flesh" (ἐληλυθέναι τὴν θεότητα ἐν ὁμοιώσει σαρκός). APO2,12a adds that Christ's flesh is a flesh transmuted by the Logos Himself out of Himself (ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μεταποιήσας σάρκα ὁ Λόγος), and APO2,16a calls it "flesh from heaven" (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιδειξάμενος). Finally APO2,16d asserts that this flesh is unreal (not human) because it was diluted as it were out of the Logos Himself (σάρκα τὴν ἀνυπόστατον συγκεράσας ἑαυτῷ ὁ Λόγος). These extracts show

that beyond any doubt the conversion of the Logos into flesh envisaged in the Christology of the group opposed in APO2 is an undiluted docetism and amounts to a blunt denial of the reality of the Incarnation.

The conversion envisaged in the Christology of the group opposed in APO1 is quite different. Here the flesh is really human - at least initially. It is the passible human flesh which has "bones and blood and soul and the entire constitution of the human body which is tangible and visible" (APO1,3a); or it is a flesh that derives from the seed of David (APO1,9c). It is not by nature identical with the Godhead (APO1,10b) and is used by the Lord as an external human instrument (APO1,15a). But the most distinctive notion of this group concerning the flesh of Christ, which is real flesh ensouled with an irrational or mindless soul, is that it undergoes a conversion or transmutation into an uncreated or heavenly condition and even becomes consubstantial with the Godhead, and all that because of its assumption by or union with the Divine Logos (APO1,3b, 4a, 4a, 6b, 10b).

In view of the above clarifications we may conclude that the important term "conversion" or "transmutation" and its application to Christology is common to the two heretical groups opposed in APO1 and APO2, but the notions which these groups attach to it are diametrically opposed to each other.

(ii) The notion of the "birth of Christ".
Extracts APO2,3b, 5a, 5b, 5d, and 18b appear to have a similar import as extracts APO1,9b, 9c, and 20a. Both speak of "God's birth", presumably meaning the Logos' birth. But here again as in the case of the previous notion, there seems to be an important conceptual divergence between them. The APO2 extracts

interpret the "birth" as a mere appearance of God the Logos - which, incidentally, fits very well with the understanding of "the show of flesh and the semblance of the soul". Contrarily the APO1 extracts seem to emphasize the involvement of the Logos in the birth of the flesh which is from Mary, placing such an emphasis on the resulting "union" (ἔνωσις) - a term which never occurs in APO2 - that the flesh is deified and the one born of Mary is God. It must be said however that it is not clear when this deification of the flesh actually takes place. The suggestion is that it took place from the very beginning of the conception, but a reference to the whole economy of Christ and particularly to the resurrection should not be excluded. Obviously the end result in both Christologies is the same, but the procedure is diametrically different.

(iii) The notion of "Christ as man".

In APO2 we are clearly told that Christ is the Logos of God who "appeared as man" (ὡφθη ὡς ἄνθρωπος), but not by assuming the form of the servant (APO2,4a) and indeed not by assuming a particular man (APO2,4bcd, 5f, 9a, 10b, 12b, and 18b). It is argued that if the latter was the case, there would be separate realities in Christ, the Logos and a man (APO2,4b), and Christ would be a man who became deified (APO2,4c), or a man who was with God or combined with God (APO2,4d,9a), or even a man related to God (APO2, 5c). Also this would imply that a man died for the whole world even though he would be only a part of the whole (APO2,18b) - a proposition wholly unacceptable (APO2,7a). The meaning of the statement "He appeared as man" is clarified by three other statements. Firstly the statement that "He appeared a man out of Himself (ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, APO2,9a). Secondly that "He appeared a

man by a transmutation of His Godhood" (ἄνδρα ἐκ μεταποιήσεως θεότητος ὀφθεισόμενον, APO2, 8e). And thirdly, that "He did not take up a particular human existence" (ἀνθρωπίνην ὑπαρξιν, APO2, 9a), i.e. real humanity. In other words "Christ as man" is for the group opposed in APO2 only a semblance of the Godhood of the Logos as man. Further clarifications of this point are provided by the extracts APO2, 16a, 16c, and 16d, all of which imply the unreality of the manhood of Christ, or the docetic appearance of the Logos of God as man.

When we turn to the heretics of APO1 the picture is different. They hold that the Logos could not have become perfect man (οὐ τέλειον ἄνθρωπον αὐτόν γενέσθαι), because, "Where there is a perfect man, there sin is" (APO1, 2b). By perfect man they mean a particular human flesh or body which includes in it "that which thinks and rules the flesh", i.e. "the mind" (APO1, 2b). For these people then, Christ does not exhibit a human mind (APO1, 16), but rather the Logos Himself acts as heavenly mind within the human flesh (APO1, 2b). It is on account of such a notion that the flesh ceases to be like every other human flesh and exhibits a newness (σαρκός καινότητα, APO1, 2b, and 20d). In this sense the flesh of Christ (or the body) becomes "uncreated, heavenly and even consubstantial with the Godhood" (APO1, 2a, 3a, 3d, 4abcd, 6ab, 7ab, 9abc, 10ab), and Christ is "a new man from heaven" (APO1, 8). He is also "the uncreated One, who sojourned on earth in an uncreated manner" (APO1, 6c). But this means, as the author of APO1 puts it, that in the last analysis both the name of "the body of the flesh and of man" are denied to Christ (APO1, 10c).

It is obvious that both groups of heretics behind APO1 and APO2 are concerned with the unity of Christ and both seek to

establish it by making the Divine Logos the ultimate reality of Christology. Consequently, when they speak of "Christ as man" they explain away the manhood by appealing to the Divine Logos. But, whereas the heretics behind APO2 explain the manhood of Christ by means of a docetic transmutation of the Logos into a semblance of a man, the heretics behind APO1 explain it in terms of a really human body which undergoes divine transformation on account of its union with the Logos. We may say that the former view entails the notion of a human (albeit, docetic) exaltation of God, whereas the latter deteriorates into a divine exaltation of man or a perfect realisation of manhood in God. In both cases however, the manhood is really incomplete - "mere flesh" or "flesh ensouled with a mindless or irrational soul" in the case of APO1, and "a show of flesh together with a likeness of soul" but without "human thoughts" in the case of the other. The end result is the same, but the procedure is distinguishable.

(iv) ^{ca}Reasons for defending a Logos-centred as opposed to a man-centred Christology provided by the heretics behind APO1&2:

We noted above how the two heretical Christologies in APO1 and APO2 reject the notion of a real or complete flesh in Christ because they wish to safeguard Christ's Godhood and unity. The particular reasons or arguments in defence of their contentions may be summarized as follows:

1) The argument from sin:

The heretics of APO2 argue that, if Christ is sinless (a traditional premise), then He cannot be said to possess human nature which is subject to sin and especially those human properties which constitute the seat of human sinfulness. Extract APO2, 8a (cf. also APO2, 9b) states that there is an inherited habit of

sin in the human nature. Extract APO2,6a speaks of "human thoughts as the seat of sin". Further extract APO2,8e states "that the perception of the human mind (διάνοια) dwells on evil since man's youth". Finally extract APO2,9c asserts that "man is imprisoned in sin and cannot be freed". The result of such reasoning is that Christ only assumed what is sinless in man, namely, "flesh" - but even that, as we have seen, was a sort of human appearance of Godhood.

The heretics behind APO1 employ a similar argument. For them Christ could not have become a perfect man, because where there is a perfect man, there is also sin (APO1,2b). Had the Logos become a perfect man in Christ, He would have had in Himself the same kind of battle with sin which goes on within men, and He would have been in need of the same cleansing as men (APO1,2b). It is further argued that since sin is located in "that element in man which thinks and leads the flesh", i.e. "the human mind", the sinless Christ could not have had such human properties. This reasoning presupposes the principle that "sin is natural", or that "it is inherent in man's nature" (APO1,14a), or that "the mind is mindless" (νοῦν παράφρονα APO1,21), or that "sin is enhy-postatic, i.e. real existence (ἀμαρτίαν ἐνυπόστατον, ibid).

It is obvious that the argument from sin as employed by the two heretical groups constitutes an incontestable proof of their close association or their common logical and theological ancestry. Of particular interest is here the close connection of the terms "mind" (νοῦς), "nature" (φύσις), "subsistence" (ὑπόστασις) and "existence" (ὑπαρξις). They all seem to denote the same thing, though they may have particular shades of meaning. The term "subsistence" only occurs indirectly. It is contained

in the term ἀνυπόστατον (APO1,21a) and ἐνυπόστατον (APO2,6c). The former refers to sin, the latter to the flesh of Christ. The underlying term "subsistence" refers simply to particular or concrete human existence.

2) The argument from Soteriology:

The application of this argument is rather confused, so that no clear picture of the heretical Soteriology can be constructed. First of all it is said that Christ could not have consisted of Logos and man, because a man is a part of the world and a part cannot save the whole (APO2,7a, cf also 4d). Closely connected with this is the view that the death of a man cannot avail for the salvation of all men. Hence the suggestion that Christ was not a man, but a sort of divine or heavenly man. That the Saviour Christ is a heavenly man and not real man is further defended by the argument from his sinlessness and the understanding of salvation as imitation. According to the former if Christ had a sinless human nature it would have been such by divine necessity and bias and therefore it would not be saving. According to the latter Christ saves men by providing them with a perfect example. Men must believe in Him and try to assimilate to Him or imitate Him and thus be saved for otherwise pure righteousness cannot be achieved. (APO2,11a).

A parallel theory of salvation is propounded by the heretics behind APO1. The same terms "assimilation and imitation" are employed (APO1,2b and 20c), though nothing is mentioned about "the part and the whole", or the divine "necessity and bias" in Christ. But the little that is said, constitutes a clear indication of the common theological ancestry of both groups of heretics behind the two APO.

3) The rational argument:

This argument presented through the statement, "two perfect things cannot become one", and hence Christ could not be the perfect Logos conjoined to a perfect man, occurs only in APO1,2b in a casual way and therefore it is neither discussed nor refuted by the author of APO1. It is clearly an Apollinarian logical argument which appears both in Gregory Nazianzen's First Epistle to Cledonius and in Gregory of Nyssa's Antirrheticos.

4) The argument from theopaschitism:

The heretics behind APO2 speak of "God who suffered and was risen through (or by means of) a flesh" (APO2,11b,11c,13), presumably meaning by that, that God suffered in His Godhood. A parallel view seems to have been held by the heretics of APO1. Extracts APO1,3d and 5a also speak of a "passible Logos". Yet, it is not difficult to discern an important divergence in the actual conception of this divine passibility, which is, in fact, in line with the distinctive trends represented by the heretical groups. The theopaschitism of the heretics behind APO2 is decisively connected with the Divine flesh and entails a doctrine of death which is rooted in the separation of the Logos from the Divine body. Thus the suffering the death and the resurrection are divine, but their precise context is the divine humanity of the Logos who became Christ by transmutation. On the contrary the theopaschitism of the heretics behind APO1 is connected with the Logos inasmuch as it refers to His flesh which has been united with Him. Here again the death and the resurrection are understood in terms of the separation and reunion of the Logos and the creaturely flesh and the result is the latter's deification.

In both cases Christ's suffering is somehow the suffering of God the Logos because Christ cannot be understood otherwise but only with reference to Him. The movement of thought is different in the two cases, but the end result is the same.

(5) The question concerning the soul of Christ

Both groups of heretics applied the term soul to Christ, and although they seem to have understood it similarly, in fact there are significant differences between them. APO2 contains three references to the heretical conception of the soul. Extract APO2,1, which speaks of a "transmutation of the Logos into flesh", also speaks of a change (τροπή) of the Logos into "a semblance of soul" (ψυχῆς ὁμοίωσιν). But extracts APO2,8b and 8d, which speak of a "fleshly soul" (ψυχὴν σαρκικὴν), indicate that this notion is the irrational soul which animates the body (cf. the extract APO2,11b), and has no human thoughts (λογισμοὶ ἀνθρώπινοι, 8a). In APO2,8b and 8d Christ is denied "the mental nature of man" (τὴν νοεράν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) or simply "the intelligence of man" (τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου). Thus, APO2,18a suggests that the heretics behind APO2 reject altogether the presence of a soul in Christ.

The heretics of APO1 also seem to subordinate the concept of the soul to the concept of the flesh. APO1,3d speaks of the flesh as "consisting of bones and blood and soul and indeed the entire body". APO1,13b links the soul with the body and regards these two together as "the outer man". It also suggests that the soul-body pair is synonymous with the pair of blood-flesh, and therefore implies that soul here is treated as a synonym to blood. APO1,20b speaks of "ensouled body", which suggests a purely physical use of the term soul, and which is to be contrasted to a "mindless^{ψαυλ}".

The heretics of APO2 provide

Answers employing similar terminology and reasoning even though the material content of their arguments often seems to differ. Generally speaking, they agree on the fundamental point that the divine Logos is the key to Christology and therefore both attempt to explain away the human economy on the basis of the Logos. The explanations they advance are different but the end result is almost the same. The weight of their argumentation seems to be carried by the argument from sin - an argument which does not allow the presence of a sinful mind in Christ - but other arguments, especially those concerned with soteriology and theopaschitism seem to be equally central. In the last analysis the main difference between the two groups lies with their conception of the humanity of Christ, which is commonly referred to by the names "flesh" or "body", and which may include an irrational soul (a physical entity) but never an intellectual one (i.e. the mind). The heretics of APO1 emphasize the exaltation and deification of this flesh to the extent that it becomes essentially divine, whereas those of APO2 emphasize its mere human semblance or docetic appearance.

There can be little doubt that the school to which these two groups belong is that of Apollinaris, and that it is to the history of this school that one should turn in order to establish their chronology and dogmatic identity. The evidence from the texts of APO1 and APO2 is not sufficient for reaching precise conclusions. It simply corroborates the already existing general evidence on dissensions and dogmatic divergencies within the Apollinaristic school of thought. What is important for our investigation is the conclusion that from the point of view of the notions opposed in APO1 and APO2 it is possible that one

single author could have compiled these two works in order to deal with two different sets of arguments.

What now remains to be done is to compare the two sets of notions opposed in AP01 and AP02 to similar notions opposed in Athanasian writings and to notions deriving from Apollinarist circles.

6) The notions opposed in AP01&2 and those opposed in EPI

We are obliged to undertake such a comparison because certain scholars have claimed that the notions opposed by Athanasius in his EPI are the same with those opposed in AP01&2 and therefore Athanasius could not have been the author of the latter. The claim of such scholars seems to be firmly established, if one recalls Athanasius' statement in EPI,³ which suggests his unwillingness to write anything more on the same subject: "..."now that my letter has reached this point, it should be well to write no more..." But it has not been critically examined whether the notions opposed in EPI and AP01&2 are in fact identical.

The best way to proceed with our task is first to extract and arrange the notions opposed in EPI in the same way as we did with the notions opposed in AP01&2, and then to undertake the comparison. Thus we can single out the following data from EPI relating to the heretical notions opposed by Athanasius therein:

- 2.a Ποῖος ἄδης ἠρεύξατο ὁμοούσιον εἶπεῖν τό ἐκ Μαρίας σῶμα
τῆ τοῦ Λόγου θεότητι,
- 2.b ἦ ὅτι, ὁ Λόγος εἰς σάρκα καί ὀστέα καί τρίχας καί ὄλον
σῶμα μεταβέβληται καί ἡλλάγη τῆς ἰδέας φύσεως

- τόν Υἱόν καί ἄλλον τόν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον;
4. a Πρόθεν ἡμῖν ἐπήλθεν εἰπεῖν ὡς οὕτοι ὁμοούσιον εἶναι
τό σῶμα τῆς τοῦ Λόγου θεότητος; (cf. 2. a)
4. b εἰ ὁμοούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ σώματι ἐκ γῆς ἔχοντι τήν φύσιν
(cf. 2. a, 4. a.).
4. c καί εἰς ἑτέραν ἀσέθειαν μετερχόμενοι φάσκοντες εἰς σάρκα
καί ὀστέα καί τρίχας καί νεῦρα καί ὄλον τό σῶμα μεταβεβλή-
σθαι τόν Λόγον, καί ἠλλάχθαι τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως (cf. 2. b)
4. d ὁμοούσιον λέγοντες τόν Λόγον τῷ σώματι (cf. 2a, 4a, 4b)
4. e τό δέ εἰς σάρκα μεταβεβλήσθαι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου τροπήν
φαντάζεσθαι (cf. 2b, 4c)
4. f εἰ γάρ ὁμοούσιος ὁ Λόγος τῷ σώματι (cf. 2a, 4a, 4b, 4d)
4. g εἶ γε καθ' ἡμᾶς ὁμοούσιος ἐπί τῷ σώματι (2a, 4a, 4b, 4d, 4f)
5. a οὐ γάρ ὡς τινές ὑπενόησαν ἡ οὐσία αὕτη τοῦ Λόγου
τραπεῖσα περιετμήθη (2d)
6. a ὁ μάλιστα δείκνυσι τήν ἀνοιῶν τῶν λεγόντων εἰς ὀστέα καί
σάρκα τετράφθαι τόν Λόγον (2b, 4c, 4e, 5a)
7. a οὐ θέσει ταῦτα ἐγένετο (μή γένοιτο), ὡς τινές πάλιν
ὑπέλαβον (cf. 2c)
7. b οἱ τολήσαντες εἰπεῖν εἰς σάρκα καί ὀστέα ἠλλοιωῖσθαι
τόν Κύριον (2b, 4c, 6a)

So far Athanasius has opposed theses 2. a, 2. b, 2. c, and 2d. In EPI, 8 he writes that it is not necessary to discuss the rest of the theses. They all relate to the "body" in which the Lord came to be, and they can all be reduced to the two fundamental theses:

8. a μή ὁμοουσίου (τοῦ σώματος) τῆ θεότητι
8. b μή τραπέντος (τοῦ σώματος) εἰς ὀστέα καί σάρκα, ἀλλ'
ἐν σαρκί γενομένου.

However, Athanasius does go on to controvert the notions 2.f and 2.l, which suggests that his statement περιττόν τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτεσθαι in EPI,8 may refer to other notions mentioned in Epictetus' ὑπομνήματα but not listed in the general catalogue drawn by Athanasius himself in EPI,2.

8.c οὐ τραπεῖς εἰς σάρκα (cf. 2b,4e,5a,6a).

8.d καταγνώσκονται ἑαυτῶν πάντες οἱ νομίσαντες πρό τῆς Μαρίας εἶναι τὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς σάρκα, καὶ πρό ταύτης ἐσχκέναι ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην τὸν Λόγον, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πρό τῆς ἐπιδημίας ἀεὶ γεγενῆσθαι

The above thesis is related to those in 2.f, 2.h, 2.i, but it appears to be somewhat new in as much as it mentions the word "soul". Unfortunately the author does not develop his opposition to this thesis. He considers his preceding comment about the σάρκα ζῶσαν and the ἐπαγγελίᾳ which is not τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων as a sufficient answer. The presence of this quotation implies that the author did not treat all the subjects contained in the ὑπομνήματα of Epictetus.

8.e παύσσονται δὲ καὶ οἱ εἰπόντες μὴ εἶναι δεκτικὴν θανάτου τὴν σάρκα, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως εἶναι ταύτην (cf. 2e).

8.f οἱ ὅλως ἐνθυμηθέντες δύνασθαι ἀντί τῆς Τριάδος γενέσθαι τετράδα, εἰ λέγοιτο ἐκ Μαρίας εἶναι τὸ σῶμα. Ὁμοούσιον γὰρ εἴαν εἶπωμεν φασὶ τὸ σῶμα τῷ Λόγῳ μένει ἡ Τριάς Τριάς, οὐδέν ξένον εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπιφερομένου τοῦ Λόγου· εἴαν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον εἶπωμεν τὸ ἐκ Μαρίας σῶμα, ἀνάγκη, ξένου ὄντος κατ'οὐσίαν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ Λόγου, τετράς ἀντί Τριάδος γίνεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος προσθήκην (cf. 2g).

- 9.a καί γάρ κἄν μή ἐκ Μαρίας λέγῃσι τό σῶμα, ἀλλά ὁμοούσιον αὐτό τῷ Λόγῳ... (cf. 2a, 2f, 2h).
- 9.b εἰ διά τό εἶναι... ἐκ Μαρίας εἶναι καί ἀνθρώπινον τό σῶμα τοῦ Σωτῆρος νομίζουσιν ἀντί τῆς Τριάδος τετραδά λέγεσθαι ὡς προσθήκης γινομένης διά τό σῶμα (cf. 2g, 8f).
- 10.a καί οἱ ποτέ εἰπόντες τόν ἐκ Μαρίας προελθόντα μή εἶναι αὐτόν τόν Χριστόν καί Κύριον καί Θεόν... (2k)
- 10.b καί οἱ πρότερον ἀρνούμενοι τόν ἐσταυρωμένον εἶναι Θεόν ἐσφάλθαι (cf. 2j)
- 11.a περὶ δέ τοῦ φαντάζεσθαι τινας καί λέγειν ὅτι, ὡσπερ ἐφ' ἕκαστον τῶν προφητῶν ἐγίνετο, οὕτω καί ἐπί ἓνα τινά ἄνθρωπον ἐκ Μαρίας ἦλθεν ὁ Λόγος. (cf. 2k).

Most of the notions opposed in EPI are summarized in EPI,12. They can be classified into two rival groups: a) those which explain the Incarnation in purely Divine terms and understand the body or flesh of Christ in terms of the Divine Logos and His Godhood, and b) those which distinguish the Divine Logos from the man who was born from Mary. The first group includes the following specific points: 1) The body of Christ is consubstantial with the Godhood of the Logos. 2) The opposite way of stating the first point is to say that the Godhood of the Logos was changed into body, i.e. flesh and bones and hair and all the corporeal components of humanity. 3) In whatever way one sees this, the important point is to perceive that the body which the Lord put on at His Incarnation was not real (i.e. naturally human) but docetic (a conventional appearance). 4) As a consequence of the above , one should say: that the Godhood was crucified, or that the body is not from Mary, or that the Logos made up a passible body out of his own substance, or that

the body is Lordly body and not from Mary, lest there is a Quaternity and not a Trinity in the Godhead, or that the body is coeternal with the Godhood of the Logos because it was actually made from its substance. All these statements amount to one basic conclusion: the blunt identification of the body of Christ with the Godhood of the Logos. We have seen that such an identification is indeed envisaged in the teaching of the two heretical views opposed in APO1 and APO2. And yet the positions of the latter are far more refined than the former, which seem to be rather crude. From the purely literary point of view the notion of "a divine body which is homocousion with the Godhood of the Logos" opposed by Athanasius in EPI, is closer to the notion of "a heavenly body consubstantial with the Logos" opposed in APO1. But from the point of view of conceptuality the "divine body" of the first group of heretics opposed in EPI seems to be closer to the "divine body" of the heretics opposed in APO2, which is substantially identical with the Logos' Godhood and is actually formed out of the latter by virtue of a certain transmutation, although in this case the language of consubstantiality is not employed. That conceptually the "divine body of Christ" in EPI is identical with "the divine body of Christ" in APO2 can be conclusively shown from the statement of EPI, 2.f: ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας μετεποίησεν ἑαυτῷ σῶμα παθητόν ὁ Λόγος which is parallel to the statement of APO2, 12a: ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μεταποιήσας σάρκα ὁ Λόγος μέχρι πάθους κενώρηκε. Such a blunt and crude docetism is not present in APO1, where the consubstantiality of the body of Christ with the Godhead is explained with reference to the union of the body: (which is acknowledged to be from the seed of David and from Mary) with the Godhead of the Logos (cf. the

extracts APO1,4a and 4b). In APO1 it is the μή οὐσα φύσει θεότης that becomes θεότης ἐκ μεταποιήσεως (cf. the extracts APO1,10a). But on the whole the notions opposed by Athanasius in EPI, although they have clear affinities with the notions opposed in APO1&2, they have nothing of the refinement or the richness of the latter. With the exception of the Mariological argument and the argument from the Quaternity, and perhaps a dim echo of the notion of theopaschitism (i.e. that the Lord of glory suffered on the Cross) nothing is said in EPI concerning the soul or the mind or the arguments from soteriology, logic, hamartiology and even theopaschitism.

The basic tenets of the second group of heretics opposed in EPI are as follows: 1) The Christ who suffered and was crucified on the Cross was not the Lord and Saviour and God and Son of the Father (cf. 2j and 10b). 2) Indeed, Christ is one and God's Logos is another; or, the Son born of Mary is different from the Son born of the Father before the ages; because in Christ one should not see the Logos becoming man by taking the body from Mary, but the Logos coming to a holy man as He previously came to the prophets (cf. EPI,2k, 10a, and 11a). Such views are also echoed in APO1 and APO2 but in a much more technical manner. APO1,10d distinguishes the Logos from the Son of David and speaks of it in the technical way of a διαίρεσις, whereas APO1,21b speaks of the δύο Υἱοί more directly. In APO2,4b we find the formula ὁ αὐτός καὶ ὁ αὐτός, which corresponds to the ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος of EPI,2k, but we also have a clear reference to the man conjoined with God in Christ (APO2,4c, 4d, 9a, and 18a), or to the technical phrases διαίρεσις προσώπων (APO2,10a) and οὐκ ἓνα ἀλλὰ δύο (APO2,12b).

In general the comparison of the notions combatted in APO1 and APO2 with those opposed in EPI does not imply repetition and therefore incompatibility of common ancestry of authorship. The developed views of the heretics behind APO1&2 demand something beyond EPI. Indeed one could argue that they seem to have taken into account (mainly those behind APO1) some of the models of Christology advanced by Athanasius in EPI in developing their own heretical positions. It must be also noted that, unlike APO1&2, EPI is an open Epistle and betrays Athanasius' pastoral hesitation to condemn and discuss fully every detail of the two rival Christologies provided by the Memoranda of Epictetus. As he says in EPI,2: "Now I am writing thus, after having read the Memoranda sent to me by Your Reverence, which I wish had never been written, so that not even a remembrance of such things might be transmitted to posterity..." And a little further, he adds: "And although it would have been right to impugn these views at greater length, and thoroughly to expose the folly of those who have entertained such notions; yet now that my letter has reached this point, it were well to write no more; for one ought not further to work out and minutely examine opinions which have been so clearly shown to be bad, least they should be regarded by contentious persons as still matters of question..." It is understandable why Athanasius would employ such an attitude in writing a public encyclical letter on a newly instituted heresy. But would he not regard it necessary to deal with such a heresy more thoroughly if it continued to persist and if it was in fact spreading amongst people who belonged to his own Nicene persuasion? It seems quite reasonable to suppose that Athanasius could have written APO1 and APO2 to deal with what seems to be similar to the first error opposed

in his EPI, but is in fact a much more sophisticated and closely argued theory as to demand a thorough refutation. Athanasius' EPI does not embarrass in any way the Athanasian ascription of the two APO. On the contrary it makes it more plausible and even necessary.

7) The notions opposed in APO1 and APO2 and those of Apollinaris

In this section we have attempted to compare the Apollinarist Christological views behind APO1 and APO2 to those views represented in the extant Apollinarian literature conveniently collected in Lietzmann's monumental work, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule, Tübingen, 1904, reprinted by Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim 1970 (pp.167-322). It would be a colossal task to compare every detail. Therefore we have here concentrated on the fundamental notions without neglecting the significant details. We shall deal first with the notions opposed in APO1 and then with the analogous ones in APO2.

1) The notion of σώρξ ἀκτιστος

In his De Unione,² Apollinaris speaks of the body of Christ as communicating in the designation of ἀκτιστον and θεϊον which, properly speaking apply to God: οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδέως κτίσμα τό σῶμα εἰπεῖν, ἀχώριστον ὄν ἐκείνου οὗ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἀλλά τῆς τοῦ ἀκτίστου κεκοινώνηκεν ἐπωνυμίας, καί τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ κλήσεως ὅτι πρός ἐνότητα θεῶ συνῆπται (Lietzm. 186,3-6). This is similar to extracts APO1,4a and 4b, but there is an important difference. The "uncreated body" of the De Unione is rooted in a strong sense of communication of names owing to the Incarnation, whereas the similar notion of APO1 is based on an ontological change of the body into the substance of the Godhead.

A little further, in the De Unione, 5, Apollinaris' thought becomes clearer: ὁμολογεῖται δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τό μὲν εἶναι κτιστόν ἐν ἐνότητι τοῦ ἀκτίστου, τό δὲ ἄκτιστον τῇ συγκράσει τοῦ κτιστοῦ, φύσεως μιᾶς ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους συνισταμένης (Lietzm. 187,5-8). Clearly what is envisaged here is a strong sense of communication of names owing to the unity of one nature but without any explicit ontological implications. The key thought is the fact that Christ should be understood as constituting an indissoluble union of two parts, one created and another uncreated, which does allow the resulting union to be called both created and uncreated without dividing the parts or the names (οὐ διατέμενται γάρ οὐδέ πράγματι οὐδέ ὀνόματι, ibid. 187,2f). Apollinaris' further statement in De Unione, 6 about the ἄκτιστος θεός κτιστῇ περιβολῇ φανερούμενος (ibid. 187,21) excludes the view that his communicatio notionibus can deteriorate into an ontological monism involving ontological change or confusion. The same doctrine is found in Apollinaris' Πρὸς Διόδωρον Κατὰ Κεφάλαιον Βιβλίον, Fragment 132, which states that: οὐδέ ὁ Σωτὴρ κτίσμα προσκειμένου τῷ ἀκτίστῳ Θεῷ τοῦ κτισματοῦ (Lietzm. 239,19). Fragment 143 comes very close to the extracts AP01, 4a and 4b, when it states: πῶς τό κτιστόν ἄκτιστον; ὡς ἐνωθέν τῷ ἀκτίστῳ (Lietzm. 241,31). But Fragment 144 leaves no doubt that only an unequivocal communication of names is envisaged here: ἀλλά... λεγέτω πῶς τό τῷ Θεῷ καθ' ἐνότητα προσώπου συναφθέν οὐχί Θεός σὺν αὐτῷ; πῶς τό τῷ ἀκτίστῳ καθ' ἐνότητα ζωτικῆν ἐνωθέν οὐκ ἄκτιστον σὺν αὐτῷ; εἰ γάρ οὐ κοινή ἡ ἐπωνυμία, οὐδέν οὕτως ἔσται τό συγκεκρωμένον (ibid. 242,2-5). A little further he clarifies his thought: καὶ εἰ θαυμάζει πῶς τό κτιστόν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀκτίστου προσηγορίαν ἐνοῦται, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἕτερος θαυμάσει

δικαίως, πῶς τὸ ἄκτιστον τῆ προσηγορίᾳ τῆς κτιστῆς σαρκὸς ἐνοῦται (Lietzm.242,9-12). Finally Fragment 145 of the same work states the following: εἰ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ὠνόμασται διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν, ἔπεται καὶ τὴν σάρκα Λόγον ὀνομάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν· ὡς δὲ Λόγος οὕτω καὶ ἄκτιστος, ἀλλ' ὅτι Λόγος ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως ἀπεφάνθη (ibid. 242, 14-17). The same thought is conveyed in Apollinaris' Letter to Flavianus, Fragment 148, where it is stated that the body of Christ οὐ μετέπεσεν ἐκ τοῦ πλαστόν εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἄκτιστον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦνωται τῷ ἀκτίστῳ, καὶ Θεὸν ὄν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Λόγου ἔνωσιν ἄκτιστόν ἐστιν, ἧ Θεός (ibid. 247,3-5).

Further evidence on the Apollinarian use of the "created" and "uncreated" in Christ is found in Apollinaris' First Letter to Dionysius. Chapter 1 speaks of the Samosatean use of these adjectives which applies the one to the man from the earth and the other to the God from heaven (Lietzm. 257,1-6). Chapters 2ff expound the position of those who accept the Incarnation of the God from heaven but speak of two natures, and over against them advances a defence of a monophysite view of the Incarnation (ibid. 257,7ff). In this latter view Christ consists of two parts, the Godhead (τὴν θεότητα) from heaven and the flesh (τὴν σάρκα) from the woman which are combined into one whole (ἐν, τὸ ὅλον). In such a perspective it is obvious that: οὔτε τὸ κτιστόν σῶμα ἔζη χωρὶς τῆς ἀκτίστου θεότητος, ἵνα χωρίζῃ τις φύσιν κτιστήν, οὔτε μὴν ὁ ἄκτιστος Λόγος ἐπεδήμησεν χωρὶς σώματος ἵνα μερίζῃ τις ἀκτίστου φύσιν. εἰ δὲ ἔν ἐκάτερόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν καὶ τὴν σύνοδον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὴν ἀνθρωποειδῆ, ἔν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τῷ συνθέτῳ προσεφαρμόζεται, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς θεότητος τὸ ἄκτιστον ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ σώματος τὸ κτιστόν... (Lietzm.259,29-261,3). A little further Apollinaris states what seems to be the diametrically opposite view to the notion of the

"uncreated flesh" of APO1: ...καὶ πάλιν τό ἀκτίστον οὔτε τὴν σάρκα ἀκτίστον ποιεῖ, οὔτε μερικῶς ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος μόνης λέγεται (ibid.261,9-10), and also, ἔν τε τῇ συνθέσει μένει καὶ τό σῶμα σῶμα καὶ ἡ θεότης θεότης... (ibid.261,16f). What is particularly interesting here is Apollinaris' indirect allusion to those who fail to understand his dogmas and engage in fruitless discussions: Does his admonition to such people (μενέτωσαν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ τὰς περιττὰς συζητήσεις ἐκκλίνοντες, ibid.) possibly refer to monks of his who held views such as those opposed in APO1? If not in this Letter, certainly in his Tomus Synodicus Apollinaris has in mind people who hold views like those opposed in APO2, for he states: ἀνάθεμα οὖν ὁ μὴ λέγων ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας τὴν σάρκα καὶ τῆς ἀκτίστου φύσεως λέγων αὐτήν καὶ ὁμοούσιον τῷ Θεῷ (Lietzm. 263,10-12).

2) The notion of the flesh which is homoousios with God:

It is again in the sense of the communication of names resulting from the union of the Logos with the flesh that Apollinaris regards the flesh of Christ as being homoousios with the Godhead. This is made clear in his De Unione,⁸ where he states: οὕτως καὶ Θεῷ ὁμοούσιος κατὰ τό πνεῦμα τό ἀόρατον, συμπεριλαμβανομένης τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ τῆς σαρκός, ὅτι πρός τόν Θεῷ ὁμοούσιον, καὶ πάλιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμοούσιος, συμπεριλαμβανομένης καὶ τῆς θεότητος τῷ σώματι, ὅτι πρός τό ἡμῖν ὁμοούσιον ἠνώθη (Lietzmann 188,9-14). Particularly significant is the explanation: οὐκ ἀλλαπτομένης τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως ἐν τῇ πρός τόν Θεῷ ὁμοούσιον ἐνώσει καὶ τῇ προνοίᾳ τοῦ ὁμοουσίου ὀνόματος, ὥσπερ οὔδέ ἡ θεότης ἥλλακται φύσει ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου σώματος καὶ τῇ ὀνομασίᾳ τῆς ἡμῖν ὁμοουσίου σαρκός (ibid. 188,14-18). It is clear then that for Apollinaris the flesh of Christ is called homoousios with the

Godhead on account of the union with the Logos, or because Godhood and manhood constitute one undivided whole; but this flesh is and remains homoousios with our own, so that on its account and because of His union with it, the Logos Himself is in turn called homoousios with us. No confusion is envisaged here, but only a strong affirmation of the communicatio notionibus or communicatio idiomatum, which works both ways, from the Logos to the flesh and from the flesh to the Logos. Exactly the same point is made in Apollinaris' De Fide et Incarnatione 3,4, and 6 (Cf. Lietzm. 194,15-19, 195,17-22 and 197,17-19). In his $\Sigma\upsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ Apollinaris argues against the consubstantiality of the Logos with the body on the ground of their union (Cf. Fragment 112, Lietzm. 233,32f), or on the ground of the visibility and tangibility of the body (ibid. 234,1-6), or even on the ground of God's incorporeality (ibid. 234,6-7), and he also stresses the point that the Son remains consubstantial with the Father even when He becomes united with the flesh (ibid. 234,8-10). The central thesis of this book as far as the application of the term homoousios to Christology is concerned, is that on account of the union one does not shrink from calling God consubstantial with man or man consubstantial with God (ibid. Fragment 114 234, 25-29); but in the last analysis and in spite of this double exchange of attributes, one should unequivocally state: $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\rho\alpha \delta\mu\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\acute{\iota}\nu\omega \tau\acute{o} \theta\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\omicron\nu$ (ibid. Fragment 115, 235,16f).

The above statements of Apollinaris clearly demonstrate that in his view of Christ there is a double sense of consubstantiality, one human and another divine, which is owed to the union of the Logos with the flesh. This however, does not involve a confusion of substance, but is to be understood as a communicat-

ion of two sets of names resulting from the combination into a certain unity of two sets of realities. This view-point is repeatedly asserted by Apollinaris and the following texts can be singled out as witnesses: Fragment 126 of Apollinaris' Letter to Diodorus (cf. Lietzm. 238,9-12); Fragments 159, 160, and 161 of Apollinaris' Epistola ad Serapionem which acknowledges Athanasius' EPI (ibid. 254,3f, 254,19ff); Fragments 162 and 163 of Apollinaris' Letter to Terentius (cf. ibid. 254,31 - 255,9 and 255,11-14); Fragment 164 of Apollinaris' Letter II to Dionysius (ibid. 262,13-16), and finally Apollinaris' Tomus Synodicus which anathematizes "whoever says that the flesh is not from Mary but from the uncreated nature and regards it as homoousios with God" (ibid., 263,10-14, cf. also 262,28-30). The last three texts reveal that Apollinaris' views on the application of the homoousion to Christology were misunderstood in his own circles and therefore he had to clarify his position using very precise language and arguments. There is no doubt that the keys to his views here were on the one hand the union of the Logos with a creaturely human flesh in a way that neither could be seen separately, and on the other hand the ensuing communication of idioms. St Gregory Nazianzen in his Epistola CCII to Nectarius speaks of a πυκτίον τοῦ Ἀπολλιναρίου which teaches that the flesh of Christ was not ἐπέκρητος κατ'οἰκονομίαν, but was in the Son from the beginning : ἐτύγχανε προαιώνιος καὶ συνουσιωμένη (Cf. Lietzm. 263, Fragment 115). This view does suggest that Apollinaris did hold at some time an heretical understanding of the homoousion applicable to Christology, but such a suggestion finds no warrant in the extant works and fragments of Apollinaris. Should one suppose that Gregory's πυκτίον represents early

Apollinarian literature? Or should one just assume that such heretical views as envisaged by Gregory and Apollinarius were in fact derived from Apollinarian circles who failed to understand their teacher's doctrine? We are inclined to accept the latter alternative on the basis of two considerations; firstly on the consideration that Apollinarius' statements did lend themselves to misunderstandings; and secondly, on the observation that there is explicit reference to this effect in the literature of Apollinarius' disciples. Perhaps the best evidence for the former consideration is Apollinarius' Fragment 153 from his Discourses, which represents an extreme statement of communicatio idiomatum:

ἀναμάρτητος οὖν ὁ Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός ὡς Θεός καί μετὰ τῆς σαρκός ὁμοούσιος τῷ μόνῳ Θεῷ, προαιώνιος δημιουργός· ἡ δέ σὰρξ ὡς Θεοῦ σὰρξ Θεός, ὡς ὁμοουσίου τῷ Θεῷ, μέρος ἠνωμένον αὐτῷ ὁμοούσιον τῷ Θεῷ οὐ κεχωρισμένον· οὐδέ γάρ κεχωρισμένως οὐδέ κινεῖται ἰδιαζόντως ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον αὐτενέργητον· ὁ μὲν γάρ Θεός κοινωνία τῆς σαρκός ὁ μή ἔστιν καθ'ἑαυτὸν ἄνθρωπος, ἡ δέ σὰρξ κοινωνία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ μή οὔσα καθ'ἑαυτήν Θεός. καί τὰ μὲν σαρκί ἐπόμενα πάντα ἐνόηται σαρκός ἔσχει ὁ Θεός, τὰ δέ Θεοῦ ἴδια τῇ πρὸς Θεὸν ἐνώσει προσλαμβάνει ἡ σὰρξ (Lietzm. 248,18-27). As regards the evidence for the heretical application of the language of consubstantiality to Christology among the disciples of Apollinarius we may cite Vitalis' De Fide (cf. Lietzm. 273,14-16), Timothy of Berytus' Letter to Honorius (ibid. 277ff, cf. also 279,1-8 and 285,20-24), Jovius' testimony (ibid. 286,19-287,9) and most importantly Valentinus' Κεφάλαια ἀπολογίας πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας φάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὁμοούσιον τὸ πᾶμα τῷ Θεῷ (ibid. 287ff).

This last Apollinarian work contains very important information, not only because it exposes the heretical understanding of the

homocousion by the Apollinarians Timothy and Polemius (cf. 288, 12-17 and especially 23-26), but also because it reveals that this issue was a great cause of division among the early disciples of Apollinaris, even before Timothy and Polemius, to such an extent that Apollinaris himself had to intervene (ὁ γὰρ τρίς μακάριος διδάσκαλος ἡμῶν Ἀπολλινάριος βλασφήμους καὶ μανιώδεις ἐγγράφως ἀπεκάλεσεν τοὺς λέγοντας ὁμοούσιον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου τῆ Θεότητι ibid. 291, 13ff) and so did Athanasius & most obviously a reference to Athanasius' EPI, because it contains the phrase, ἔλεγεν ὡς ἐξ ἄδου ἀναφανέντας τοὺς τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν ὁμοούσιον τὸ ἐκ Μαρίας σῶμα τῆς θεότητος, which appears in EPI, 2 (cf. Lietzm. 291, 16ff). The reference to Athanasius' EPI might lead one to ask why Valentinus made no mention of APO1 which discusses the heretical understanding of the homocousion that Timothy and Polemius seem to have held. Does this not constitute evidence that APO1 was not Athanasian, or perhaps that it was not even known to Apollinarians? The answer must be negative. Valentinus had good reason to refer to EPI and not to APO1 because the former had condemned only the heretical notion of the homocousion , whereas the latter had also condemned the most distinctive Apollinarist thesis concerning the replacement of the mind by the Logos in the humanity of Christ which Valentinus upheld. Indeed it seems that for the same reason Apollinaris himself referred to EPI when he wrote to the Alexandrian Bishops exiled at Diocaesarea shortly after the death of Athanasius.

Before closing this chapter we must note that the extant Apollinarist literature nowhere speaks of an ἐκουράμιον σῶμα as APO1 does; but the notion is not impossible to Apollinarist doctrine and especially to its strong application of the

principle of communicatio idiomatum.

3) ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα

This notion cannot be traced in Apollinaris' literary remains. In his De Fide et Incarnatione Apollinaris explicitly denies that "the flesh of the Lord is from heaven" (Lietzm. p.194,15ff). In his Anacephalaisis he does say that "no man's flesh is said to be from heaven, as Christ's flesh is", but he immediately explains that this is said "on account of the Godhood which assumed the flesh", and he also concludes with the statement, οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ λέγεται διὰ τὸ ἠνωσθαι τῷ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (Lietzm. p.243, 20-24). Fragment 154 states that it is not the flesh and Godhood together that are from heaven, but that the flesh is united with the heavenly Godhood and thus is called heavenly and is worshipped on account of the worship which is rendered to the heavenly God (Lietzm. p.248,30ff). In his Letter to Terentius Apollinaris even anathematizes those who say "that the flesh came down from heaven and not that it was united with Him who is from heaven (Lietzm. p. 255,11-15). We could cite many more examples from Apollinaris' texts to illustrate the above point, but this is not necessary. What we might add here is a reference to Apollinaris' familiar notion of Christ as "the man from heaven", which, as he explains, does not involve a crude notion of a "flesh from heaven" (ibid. 209,13ff, or 259,5ff), but that there is in Christ "a heavenly mind which is united with human flesh and soul" (ibid. 210,23ff). What however, Apollinaris denies, some of his pupils seem to have held. Timotheus in his Epistle to Prosdocius condemns those who say "that the flesh is from heaven" (Lietz. p.285,20ff), and so

does Valentinus in his Capita Apologiae for those who hold the view that "the flesh is from above and eternal" (Lietzm. p.289,18).

4) μεταποίησις

This word does not occur in Apollinaris' extant literature and Fragments. Indeed the notion suggested by it seems to have been explicitly condemned by the Laodicean (Cf. Lietzm. 261,1ff, or 192,2ff and especially 247,3ff).

5) τετράδα ἀντὶ Τριάδος

This argument does not appear on the pages of Apollinaris' literary remains, but it does have a place in the literature of his disciples (Lietzm. 296,8-9 and 12-15).

6) ὁ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος

There is no such expression in the Apollinarian literature whether that of Apollinaris himself or his disciples'.

7) νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ

The actual phrase does not occur in Apollinaris' works, but the thought is plainly presented and occupies a prominent place in his doctrinal Christological system. In Fragment 25 Apollinaris says "that Christ has God as mind" (Lietzm. p.210,23), which is conjoined to soul and flesh and is thus called heavenly man. In his Letter to the Alexandrian Bishops exiled at Diocaesarea, Apollinaris openly states "that the Divine Logos did not assume a human mind which is changeable and easily captivated by dirty thoughts, because He himself was a divine immutable and οὐράνιος νοῦς (Lietzm. p.256,5-7). But see also Fragments 69,71-76 and 97 of the Apodeixis which clarify Apollinaris' understanding of the heavenly mind in Christ (Lietzm.pp.220-222 and 229).

8) τὸ ὀργανικὸν περιέχον σχῆμα

The actual phrase does not appear in Apollinaris' works but the notion of the body as ὄργανον of the Logos is well known to the Apollinarian theology (Cf. Lietzm. pp. 205,23, 206,3, 235, 24ff, 236,2 and 246,3).

9) φυσική ἢ ἁμαρτία

Again the actual phrase does not occur in Apollinaris, but the thought that man is sinful and that Christ as Saviour could not be a man, is certainly his. (Cf. Lietzm. pp. 222,11-12, 228,25ff, and 243,14-16). It should be also pointed out that there is no trace of the phrase ἁμαρτίαν ἐνυπόστατον in Apollinarian literature either.

10) δύο τέλεια ἐν γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται

The argument is present in Apollinaris' literary remains, although it is expressed variously (Cf. Lietzm. pp. 224,16-17, 228,14-15, 232,17ff). Indeed for Apollinaris Christ is τέλειος Θεός but not a perfect man.

11) τὸ φρονοῦν καί τὸ ἄγον τὴν σάρκα

The closest Apollinarian phrase that we could find to the above one is τὸ κινεῖν καί ἄγον which occurs only once (Lietzm.p.232,11).

12) Θεός ἐκ Μαρίας

The actual phrase does not occur in Apollinaris but it is not impossible to his way of thinking as we can gather from statements from Anacephalalosis, 17 (Lietzm. p.244,19-21) and Ad Jovianum (ibid. 251,13ff).

13) καινότητα διὰ μιμήσεως, ἢ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν σαρκὸς καινότητα

The word καὶνότης appears only once in Apollinaris' extant literary remains (Lietzm. p.244,20). Μίμησις does not occur at all, while ἀπολόσις appears a few times in the context of soteriology as in APO1 (Cf. Lietzm. pp.168,9, 179,7, 208,9 and 263,9).

14) Finally the argument against the notion of δύο γιούς in Christ in APO1 can be traced in Apollinaris' own argumentation (Lietzm. pp.257,3 and 253,5).

As far as the notions controverted in APO2 are concerned we have found no traces in Apollinarian literature to most of them. The thought and the basic tenets have a certain Apollinarian ring about them, but the phraseology does not match with anything that is available. As an example we may mention here the understanding of the term "Christ" in APO2 and in Apollinaris. APO2 states that Θεότητος ἴδιον τὸ Χριστός ὄνομα. What we find in Apollinaris on the other hand is a series of arguments in defence of the contention that οὐχ ἄρα ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός (Cf. Lietzm. pp. 242,29 243,3f, 243,12, 243,16, 243,20, 243,22, 243,26, 243,29 etc). But Apollinaris' syllogisms on this topic can be quite confusing. In Anacephalaisis, 17 (Lietzm. p.244,6ff) he seems to be saying on the one hand that Christ is God and man and on the other that He is God. The statements here comply to a certain kind of rhetorical dialectic, which is common to Apollinaris' way of thinking and arguing, but one can easily perceive how such rhetorical statements can be misunderstood by incompetent disciples who may then find themselves defending the crude notions of APO2.

III.3 Allusions

Both APO1 and APO2 make a number of allusions to various heretics and their particular doctrines. With the exception of one reference to Rhetorius in APO1 and to Photinus in APO2, both treatises allude to Paul of Samosata, Marcion, Valentinus, Arius and the Arians, Sabellius and Manichaeus.

Do such allusions contribute anything to the question of identity or diversity of authors? Also, could any of them be traced in or be parallel^{ed} to any of Athanasius' texts? In the following lines we shall attempt to answer these two questions.

a) Allusions to Paul of Samosata

ἢ πῶς λέγετε θεόν, ὡς Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατεύς; τοῦτο γάρ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀσεβείας τό πρόσχημα, θεόν ὁμολογεῖν τόν ἐκ Μαρίας, πρό αἰώνων μέν προορισθέντα, ἐκ δέ Μαρίας τήν ἀρχήν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐσχηκότα. Λόγον δέ ἐνεργῆ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καί σοφίαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖ, πλεῖον παρ' ὑμᾶς χαριζόμενος κατὰ τήν ἐαυτοῦ ἀσέβειαν ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς λέγετε νοῦν ἐπουράνιον ἐν αὐματι ἐμψύχῳ. (APO1, 20)

... ὡς Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατεύς θεόν ἐκ τῆς Παρθένου ὁμολογεῖ, θεόν ἐκ Ναζαρέτ ὀφθέντα, καί ἐντεῦθεν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τήν ἀρχήν ἐσχηκότα, καί ἀρχήν βασιλείαν παρεληφότα ὁ Λόγον δέ ἐνεργόν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, καί σοφίαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖ ὁ τῷ μέν προορισμῷ πρό αἰώνων ὄντα, τῇ δέ ὑπάρξει ἐκ Ναζαρέτ ἀναδειχθέντα ὅτινα εἰς εἴη φησὶν ὁ ἐπί πάντα θεός ὁ Πατήρ. Τοῦ- αὐτῆ τούτου ἡ ἀσέβεια. (APO2, 3)

Σαβέλλιος δέ τοῦ Σαμοσατέως Παύλου καί τῶν κατ' αὐτόν ἐπι- δέδεικται τήν γνώμην, δεδοικῶς γάρ τήν ἐξ Ἀρείου διαίρεσιν, τῇ ἀναιρετικῇ καταπέπτωκε πλάνη. (APO2, 3)

Εἶπατε τοίνυν, πῶς λέγετε θεόν ἐκ Ναζαρέτ γεγενῆσθαι, τῆς θεό- τητος ὡς ἀρχήν γενέσεως ἀπαγγέλ-

λοντες κατά Παῦλον τόν Σαμοσατέα... (APO2,5)

...τοῦ δέ Σαμοσατέως Παύλου καί τοῦ λεγομένου Φωτεινοῦ καί τῶν κατ'αὐτούς δι'ἀπιστίαν θεότητος ἐκπεσόντων (APO2,19).

Obviously the above statement from APO1,20 is strikingly close to the first one from APO2,3. The fact that they are not identical suggests identity of authors. Now, Athanasius alludes to Paul of Samosata in CAR1,25,38, CAR2,13,43, CAR3, 26, DECR,10,24, SYNO,43³,45⁶, 47, ENCY,4, HISTO,14, APOL/CAR,6, ANT,3,6, MAX,3 (we may also mention here CAR4,30,31,32,34,36). Many of the Athanasian references seem to be close to the thought of the above extracts from the two APO, but the closest parallel is to be found in SYNO,45:

Ἐπειδή γάρ ὁ Σαμοσατεύς ἐφρόνει μη εἶναι πρό Μαρίας τόν Υἱόν, ἀλλ'ἀπ'αὐτῆς ἀρχήν ἐσχηκένας τοῦ εἶναι, τούτου ἕνεκεν οἱ τότε συνελθόντες καθεῖλον μέν αὐτόν καί αἵρετικόν ἀπέφηναν... τήν φροντίδα...

Other important Athanasian allusions to the Samosatean which imply connections with the allusions from APO1 and APO2 are the following:

Εἰ μή ἄρα κατά τόν Σαμοσατέα μηδέ εἶναι αὐτόν πρίν ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι εἶποιεν (CAR1,25) .

...ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοῖς μηδέ εἶναι πρό τούτου αὐτόν, ἀλλά τόν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι φύσει, καί μηδέν πλέον. Ἄλλ'οὐκ ἔστε τοῦτο τῆς Ἐκκλησίας τοῦ δέ Σαμοσατέως ἐστί καί τῶν νῦν Ἰουδαίων φρόνημα (CAR1,38).

Εἰ μέν οὖν νομίζουσιν, ὅτι καί πρίν γένηται ἄνθρωπος καί σταυρόν ὑπομείνη οὐκ ἦν Κύριος καί Βασιλεύς καί Σωτήρ, ἀλλά τότε

ἀρχὴν ἔσχε τοῦ εἶναι Κύριος ὁ γινώσκων ὅτι τὰ τοῦ Σαμοσατέως ἐκ φανεροῦ πάλιν φθέγγοντα ῥήματα (CAR2,13).

τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πάλιν τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἀκούοντες καὶ βλέποντες ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις, ἐπελάθοντο τέλεον κατὰ τὸν Σαμοσατέα τῆς Πατρικῆς θεότητος τοῦ Υἱοῦ... (CAR3,26).

ἀκόλουθον δέ πάλιν ἦν σωματικῶς αὐτόν χρηματίζοντα μὴ κρύψαι τῆς θεότητος, ἵνα μὴ ὁ Σαμοσατεὺς πρόφασιν εὔρη ἄνθρωπον αὐτόν λέγων, ὡς ἄλλον ὄντα παρά τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον (MAX, 3).

(b) Allusions to Marcion

Τί γάρ ἕτερον παρ' ὑμᾶς εἶρηκεν Μαρκίων; οὐχὶ οὐρανοφανές τὸ σῶμα ἐν ὁμοίωσει ἀνθρωπίνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθεία; (APO1,12).

Πῶς τοίνυν λέγετε ὡς Μαρκίων Θεὸν ἐπιδημήσαντα καὶ Θεὸν ἀθιγῶς προσεληλυθότα, φύσιν ἔχοντα ἀνεπίδεκτον σαρκὸς ἀνθρωπίνης; (APO1,20).

Μαρκίων δέ καὶ Μανιχαῖος Θεὸν ἐπιδημήσαντα ἐκ Παρθένου καὶ ἀθιγῶς προσεληλυθότα καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτως ἔχοντα κοινωνῆσαι φύσει ἀνθρωπίνῃ, τῇ ἀποπεπτωκυῖα τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ καὶ ὑποκειμένη τῷ ἄρχοντι τῆς κακίας ὑποκεισεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας ὁ Χριστός· ἀλλ' ἴδιαν σάρκα ἐπίδεδεῖχθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ὡς ἠθέλησεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ὀφθεῖσαν καὶ εἰς οὐρανοῦς χωρήσασαν καὶ θεότητι ὄλην οὔσαν (APO2,3).

... ἢ τῆς σαρκὸς τὴν γέννησιν ἀρνούμενοι κατὰ Μαρκίωνα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους αἰρετικούς (APO2,5).

... ταῦτα καὶ Μαρκίων ἐφρόνησε· ταύτην καὶ Μανιχαῖος εἰσηγήσατο τὴν γνώμην τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν σάρκα καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν γέννησιν ὑπὸ τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς κακίας τάσων, καὶ ἐξουσιαστήν τοῦτον ἐπιγραφόμενος. Ἐπειδὴ ᾧ τις ἠττηται τοῦτω καὶ δεδούλωται (APO2,8).

... ἀνάγκη ὑμᾶς ἢ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πάθους καὶ τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως δοκῆσιν λέγειν κατὰ Μαρκίωνα... (APO2,12).

Μαρκίωνος μὲν δι' ὑπερβολὴν βλασφημίας ἐκκλίναντος... (APO2,19).

Here again we find that the extracts from APO1,12 and APO2,3 suggest the same author handling the same topic and most probably citing from memory. As regards Athanasius' references to Marcion they are to be found in DECR,26, ENCY,4, CAR1,26, CAR2,21, CAR3,15, SYNO,52, and ADEL,2. All of them refer to either Marcion's rejection of the Law or the division of the Divine Monarchy into two or three principles and gods. Only ADEL,2 gives us an allusion to Marcion's Christology which resembles a little the extract from APO2,12. ADEL,2 reads as follows:

ἡ τοιαύτη αὐτῶν κακόνοια Οὐαλεντίνου καὶ Μαρκίωνος καὶ Μανιχαίου ἐστίν, ὧν οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ ἀληθείας δόκησιν εἰσηγήσαντο, οἱ δὲ διαίρουντες τὰ ἀδιαίρετα ἤρνησαντο τὸ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.

(c) Allusions to Valentinus

οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Πατὴρ σάρκα ἐφόρεσεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα ὡς οἱ κατὰ Οὐαλεντῖνον ἀσεβοῦντες φαντάζονται. (APO1,11)

Οὐαλεντῖνος δὲ πάλιν κοινόν τῆς Τριάδος τὸ πάθος λέγει τῆς θεότητος μέρος τὴν σάρκα φανταζόμενος. (APO2,3).

ἔσται δὲ κοινόν τῆς Τριάδος τὸ πάθος κατὰ Οὐαλεντῖνον (APO2,12).

Οὐαλεντῖνον δὲ διὰ πρόφασιν γνώσεως πλανηθέντος (APO2,19).

The above statements from APO1 and APO2 are certainly conceptually related even though the wording differs. Athanasius makes mention of Valentinus in CAR1,3,56, CAR2,21,70, CAR3,60³,64,65²,66,67, SER1,10,11, SYNO,16,52, ANT,3,6, and ADEL,2. The Athanasian allusions which resemble those of APO1 and APO2 are CAR2,70: καὶ ἔλαβέ γε ἀληθινὴν σάρκα κἄν μαίνηται Οὐαλεντῖνος, and

SYNO, 6: ὡς Οὐαλεντῖνος προβολήν τὸ γέννημα τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐδογματί-
σεν.

(d) Allusions to Sabellius

οὕτω δ' αὖ πάλιν Σαβέλλιος ἀνυ-
πόστατον τὸν Υἱὸν ἐννοήσας καὶ
ἀνύπαρκτον τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, δι-
αίρεσιν θεότητος καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ
θεῶν ἀρίθμησιν κατατιωμένος τῇ
'Ιουδαϊκῇ στήριζεται γνώμη
(APO1, 21).

Σαβέλλιος δὲ τοῦ Σαμοσατέως
Παύλου καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτόν ἐπι-
δέδεικται τὴν γνώμην δεδοικῶς
γάρ τὴν ἐξ Ἄρελου διαίρεσιν
τῇ ἀναιρετικῇ καταπέπτωκε
πλάνη (APO2, 3).

Here again the wording is different but the thought and the
point of doctrine are the same. Athanasius alludes to Sabellius
in ILL, 5, CAR3, 4, 36, (CAR4, 2², 3, 9, 13, 17², 25), DECR, 25, 26², DION,
5, 9², 10, 13³, 25², 26, SER1, 28, SER4, 5 SYNO, 16, ANT, 3, 6², 11. The
relevant allusions are:

...ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ὦν ἐστίν ὁ Πατήρ
οὕτως ὁ ὦν ἐστίν ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων
θεός ὁ τούτου Λόγος. Καὶ τὸ
Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον οὐκ ἀνύπαρκτον
ἀλλ' ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑφἑστήκειν ἀλη-
θῶς. Καὶ οὔτε ἔλατταν τούτων
φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, ἵ-
να μὴ εἰς τοὺς νῦν κατὰ Καϊώ-
φαν Ἰουδαίους καὶ εἰς Σαβέλ-
λιον ἐμπέση. (SER1, 28)

...μή ἴσα ὡς Σαβέλλιος φρονεῖ
οὕτω καὶ οὗτος λέγουσιν ἐπὶ
ἀναιρέσει τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ
ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἢ ὡς ἀνοουλου
ὄντος τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἢ ἀνυποστάτου
τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος; (ANT, 6)

We might also mention here as an interesting allusion CAR4, 9
which states : Σαβελλίου τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τὸν αὐτόν Υἱὸν καὶ Πατέρα
λέγοντος καὶ ἐκάτερον ἀναιροῦντος.

It is clear from the above texts that Athanasius and the author
of APO1 and APO2 have the same knowledge and understanding of
Sabellianism.

(e) Allusions to Manichaeus

τί δέ ἄλλο εἶρηκε Μανιχαῖος; οὐ θεοειδές, οὐ τό σῶμα ἐν ὁμοιώσει τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς μόνῃ, ἀλλότριον δέ σαρκός ἀνθρωπίνης, ἥς τήν φύσιν ἀμαρτίαν λέγει ἀσεβῶν καί οὐ τήν πρᾶξιν; (APO1,12).

τί γάρ περί ἀμαρτίας ὀρεζόμενοι, ταῦτα λαλεῖτε, φυσικήν εἶναι τήν ἀμαρτίαν λέγοντες, κατά τόν ἀσεβιστατον Μανιχαῖου; (APO1,14).

...οὐδέ γάρ φύσεως ἄν εἴη δημιουργός ὁ διάβολος κατά τήν τῶν Μανιχαίων ἀσέβειαν. (APO1,15).

...οὕτω δὴ Μανιχαῖος ἀπιστήσας τῇ σαρκώσει καί ἐνανθρωπήσει τοῦ Κυρίου ἀσεβῆς κατά πάντα γέγονεν λέγων δυοῖν ὑποκεῖσθαι δημιουργοῖς τόν ἄνθρωπον πονηρῶ τε καί ἀγαθῶ (APO1,21).

...καί Μανιχαῖος θεόν ἐπειδημήσαντα ἐκ Παρθένου καί ἀθιγῶς προσεληλυθότα καί ἀνεπιδέκτως ἔχοντα κόωνωνῆσαι φύσει ἀνθρωπίνῃ τῇ ἀποπεπτωκυῖα τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ καί ὑποκειμένη τῷ ἄρχοντι τῆς κακίας ὑποκεῖσεται καί οὐκ ἔσται χωρίς ἀμαρτίας ὁ Χριστός ὁ ἀλλ' ἰδίαν σάρκα ἐπιεδεδείχθαι ἐξ' ἑαυτοῦ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ὡς ἠθέλησεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ὄφθεῖσαν καί εἰς οὐρανοῦς χωρήσασαν καί θεόδητι ὄλην αὔσαν (APO2,3).

ταῦτα καί Μαρκίων ἐφρόνησε ὁ ταύτην καί Μανιχαῖος εἰσηγήσατο τήν γνώμην τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τήν σάρκα καί αὐτήν τήν γέννησιν ὑπό τόν ἄρχοντα τῆς κακίας τάσων καί ἐξουσιαστήν τοῦτον ἐπιγραφόμενος. Ἐπειδή ᾧ τις ἠττηται τούτῳ καί δεδούλωται (APO2,5).

Μανιχαίου δέ δι' ὑπόνοιαν ἀμαρτίας ἐκτραπέντος (APO2,19).

Again these are clear connections between the doctrine and terminology of the above. As for the Athanasian allusions to Manichaeus, we find them in CAR1,2,38,23,53², CAR2,39,40,41,43, CAR3,15,35,50², (CAR4,23), VITA,68, ENCY,16, SYNO,13,33, ANT,3,6, ADEL,2², EPI,7, MAX,3. The most relevant of these for our present purposes are in order of importance EPI,7:

εἰ γάρ θέσει ἦν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὁ Λόγος κατ' ἐκείνους, τό δέ θέσει λεγόμενον φαντασία ἐστί, δοκῆσει εὐρυσκεται καί ἡ σωτηρία καί ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λεγομένη, κατά τόν ἀσεβέστατον Μανιχαῖον. (EPI,7).

καί ὡσπερ οὐκ ἀκολουθία φύσεως ἄνθρωπος γεγένηται, οὕτως ἀκβ-
λουθον ἦν σῶμα λαβόντα αὐτόν δεικνύσαι τὰ ἴδια τούτου ἵνα μή
ἡ φαντασία τοῦ Μανιχαίου κρατήσῃ (ΜΑΧ,3).

οὐκοῦν ἔδει καί τὰ θεϊκά βλέποντας αὐτούς ἔργα τοῦ Λόγου ἀρνή-
σασθαι τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ τήν γένεσιν, καί λοιπόν καί Μανιχαίους
ἑαυτούς συγκαταριθμεῖν (CΑR3,35).

εἰ δέ καί τοῖς ἀθέοις Μανιχαίοις ἑαυτούς ἐγκαταμίξαντες ἀρνοῦνται
τῆ, ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, καί τήν ἔνσαρκον αὐτοῦ παρουσίαν μή
προφερέτωσαν τὰς Παροιμίας· ἀλλότριον γάρ καί τῶν Μανιχαίων
τοῦτο (CΑR1,53).

οὐκοῦν κατά τοῦτο Μανιχαίους οἱ θαυμάσταί λοιπόν προσετέθησαν.
Καί γάρ κἀκεῖνοι μόνον ἄχρις ὀνόματος ἀγαθόν θεόν ὀνομάζουσι
καί ἔργον μὲν αὐτοῦ οὔτε βλέπομενον οὔτε ἀόρατον δεικνύειν
δύνανται· τῶν δέ ἀληθινόν καί ὄντως ὄντα θεόν τὸν ποιητὴν
οὐρανοῦ καί γῆς καί πάντων τῶν ἀοράτων ἀρνούμενοι, παντελῶς
εἰσὶ μυθολόγοι (EΝCΥ,16).

ἵνα καί τῶ εἶναι κτίστην τὸν θεόν ἀρνήσονται καί λοιπόν μετὰ
Μανιχαίων κυλιῶνται (CΑR1,23).

κατὰ Μανιχαίους λοιπόν ζηλοῦσιν οἱ ἄθλιοι. Κἀκεῖνοι γάρ τὰ μὲν
ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ βλέποντες ἀρνοῦνται αὐτόν τὸν μόνον ὄντα καί ἀληθι-
νόν θεόν ἕτερον δέ αὐτοῖς ἀναπλασσοῦσιν (CΑR2,39).

...ὡς οἱ Μανιχαῖοι πλάττοντες ἑαυτοῖς ἕτερον καί τὸν ὄντα θεόν
ἀρνούμενοι (CΑR2,40).

ἀκουέτωσαν μὲν αἱ ἄλλαι αἰρέσεις καί Μανιχαῖοι, ὅτι εἷς ἐστίν ὁ
τοῦ μὲν Χριστοῦ Πατὴρ τῆς δέ κτίσεως Δεσπότης καί ποιητῆς διὰ
τοῦ ἰδίου Λόγου (CΑR2,41).

(f) Allusions to the Arians

Μή τις δέ τολμάτω περὶ τῆς θεότη- "Αρειος δέ σάρκα μόνην πρὸς
τος τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐννοῆσαι, ὅτι ὡσπερ ἀποκρυφῆν τῆς θεότητος ὁμολο-
αὐτός ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὕτω καί ἡμεῖς· γεῖ· ἀντὶ δέ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν
καθάπερ οἱ ἀσεβέστατοι Ἀρειανοὶ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου, τουτέστιν τῆς
(AΡO1,5). ψυχῆς, τὸν Λόγον ἐν σαρκὶ

ἵνα, εἰάν εἴπη θεός, (ὁ παθῶν),
βλάσφημον πρόηται ῥῆμα κατά τοὺς
ἀσεβούντας Ἀρειανούς (APO2,18).

... Ἀρελου δέ διὰ μανίαν βλασφημῆ-
σαντος (APO2,19).

The conceptual and literary connections between these allusions are quite obvious, and they are clearly suggestive of identity of authors. But not all these allusions can be traced back to Athanasius. The Arian notion of a passible Godhood and a passible generation of the Son which involves partition and emanation are easily traceable in Athanasian writings, but the notion of a soulless flesh assumed by the Saviour is nowhere else mentioned.

(g) The allusion to Rhetorius

Δώσετε γάρ πᾶσιν αἰρετικοῖς κατά τήν τοῦ ποτέ λεγομένου Ρητορι-
ου ἔννοιαν ἀσεβεστάτην, οὗ καὶ τήν ἀσέβειαν ἐξελεπτεῖν φοβερὸν
(APO1,6).

As we have seen in the first part of this dissertation Rhetorius is a rather mysterious person. Philasterus (Haer.91) tells us that he was an Egyptian who praised all heresies, asserting that all walked rightly and that none were in error. Augustine, who copies this account (Haer. 72) cannot believe that anyone could have held such an absurd opinion. But this allusion does indicate that the author of APO1 must have been connected with Egypt.

(h) Other allusions

Given the doctrinal controversial character of the two treatises we may also include here the allusions to the Bible and the doctrinal norms which are employed here in order to establish

the orthodox view-point.

...παροδεύουσι τῶν προφητῶν τὰ μηνύματα καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων τὰ διδάγματα καὶ τῶν πατέρων τὰ παραγγέλματα καὶ αὐτάς τὰς ἐναποδείκτους τοῦ Δεσπότου φωνάς. (APO1,1).

ἀντερωτήσαντες...εἰ τοῖς προφητικοῖς μηνύμασι συνάδουσι, εἰ τοῖς ἀποστολικοῖς διδάγμασι ἀκολουθοῦσι, εἰ τοῖς τῶν πατέρων παραγγέλμασι στοιχοῦσι καὶ τὰς ἐναποδείκτους τοῦ Δεσπότου φωνάς οὐκ ἀθετοῦσι, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν προφητικῶν μηνυμάτων καὶ τῶν ἀποστολικῶν διδαγμάτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου πληρωθέντων πραγμάτων γίγνηται τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ ὁμολογία καὶ τῆς πλάνης ἡ ἔλεξις (APO1,3).

...οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνθρωπίνου λογισμοῦ διαγραφῆσεται...οὐδέ γὰρ προφήτης οὐδέ ἀπόστολος οὔτε τις τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν ταῦτα ἐφθέγγετο, ἄ ὑμεῖς λαλεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖτε... (APO1,13).

Διὸ καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος τοῦ Δαυὶδ προφήται καὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ εὐαγγελισταί γενεαλογοῦσι τὸν Χριστὸν τὸ κατὰ σάρκα... (APO1,9).

τοῦτο καὶ προφήται καὶ ἀπόστολοι μαρτυροῦσι (APO1,17).

ὁ Ἀπόστολος λέγει (APO1,4,8,10,5,10).

προκεῖσθω τοῖνυν... καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πίστεως ὁ λόγος καὶ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ὁ ὅρος καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων τὸ κήρυγμα καὶ τῶν προφητῶν ἡ μαρτυρία, καὶ τῆς πληρωθείσης οἰκονομίας ἡ κατανοήσις (APO2,4).

ὑμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἔμπαλιν λέγετε, ὡς σοφώτεροι τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ μυστικώτεροι τῶν προφητῶν καὶ ἐξουσιαστικώτεροι τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν ἢ καὶ αὐθεντικώτεροι τοῦ Κυρίου (APO2,14).

οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀγίων Γραφῶν ἔστιν εὐρεῖν τοῦτο, οὔτε ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λογισμῷ (APO2,8 and cf. APO2,12).

εἰ ἀναγινώσκοντες τὰς θείας Γραφάς κατανοήσατε, ὅπως ἐν νόμῳ καὶ προφήταις εὐαγγελίοις τε καὶ ἀποστόλοις πανταχοῦ... (APO2,13).

τίς ἡ διὰ προφητῶν ἐπαγγελία ἡ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἡ μαρτυρία ἡ τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν ἡ γενεαλογία ἡ... (APO2,13).

ὁ Ἀπόστολος λέγει (γράφει)... (APO2,1,4,5²,6²,8,11²,14,15).

ὁ Κύριος λέγει (ἔλεγεν..)
(APO1,4,6²,8,10⁴,11²,13,15,16³,21) ὁ Κύριος λέγει (ἔλεγεν...)
(APO2,8,10,14,16 17³).

παρά τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπινοεῖτε λαλεῖν (APO1,6).	ποίας Γραφῆς ἐστὶ ὅρος (APO2, 7).
ἕτερα παρά τὰ γεγραμμένα λα- λεῖν βούλεσθε (APO1,8).	οὐ τῷ εὐαγγελικῷ στοιχοῦντες ὄρω ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖν θέλοντες (APO2,5).
λαλεῖν τὰ μὴ γεγραμμένα (APO1, 9).	
εἴ μαθηταὶ ἐστε τῶν εὐαγγελί- ων (APO1,8).	κατὰ τὸν εὐαγγελικὸν ὄρον (APO2, 5).

The above parallels are not identical but stand in very close relationship. In certain cases there are exact parallels in phraseology, which suggest identity of authors. Turning to Athanasius' writings we find exact parallels to the references to the Apostle (e.g. CAR1,4,12,16,47²,54,55²,57,58, and 59², CAR2,1³,3,7²,9,10³,11,14,16,35,42,47,49,53,55²,56,59,60,63²,65²,67,74,75²,76,79, CAR3,13²,25,28,31,34,47³,52,59,61, and 65, SER1,1²,3,7,9,13,14²,15,23,25,30,31, SER2,4, SER3,1,2,3,4, SER4,1,4,13, EPI,5,6), and to the Lord (CAR1,9,13,36²,46,47,250, CAR3,3,9,21,23,29,42,45,46,47, ADEL,5), and τὰ γεγραμμένα (CAR2,1,7,16²,36²,43, CAR3,1,15,24,48, SER1,5,9,17², SER2,5,7, SER3,1⁵,7,18, SER4,2²,7). It is true that we do not find in Athanasius prophets apostles evangelists and the Lord grouped together, but there are indications that such a grouping or groupings are not unknown to Athanasius. Thus we come across:

ἔρωτήσατε δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις καὶ ὧν ἔγραψαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι (SER1,6).

ἴδωμεν...καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς παράδοσιν καὶ οὐθασκαλίαν καὶ πίστιν τῆς καθολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας, ἣν ὁ Κύριος ἔδωκεν οἱ δὲ ἀπόστολοι ἐκήρυξαν καὶ οἱ Πατέρες ἐφύλαξαν (SER1,28).

ὁ μὲν χαρακτήρ οὗτος ἐκ τῶν ἀποστόλων διὰ τῶν πατέρων (SER2,8).

Perhaps the most striking of all the parallels between Athanasius and the two APO, as far as the dogmatic norms are concerned, are the references to the Scriptures. The actual phraseology is as follows:

ἡ Γραφή	AP01,1,10	AP02,2,6,10,11
	CAR1,28,36,39,58,	CAR2,4 ² ,6,15,23,30,32,35,
	39,46,59,63,72 ² ,79,	CAR3,28,29 ² ,30,59,60,
	SER1,3,12,14,25,31,	SER2,8 ² ,12, SER3,5,
	SER4,16	and EPI,5.
ἡ θεία Γραφή	CAR1,28,36,39,58,	CAR2,5,17,31,39,45,46,53,58,
	SER1,4,5,7,20,	SER2,7, SER3,1,14.
αἱ Γραφαί	AP01,11 ²	AP02,14
	CAR1,1 ² ,4,8 ² ,10 ³ ,13 ³ ,14,	30,49,52 ² , CAR2,16,24,
	29,49,55,73,	CAR3,16,29,60, SER1,3,6,11 ² ,15,
	16,17,19,25,	SER4,1,3 ² , EPI,4,8,9.
αἱ ἅγιοι Γραφαί	AP01,4	AP02,9,14 ² ,15,17 ² ,18 ²
	CAR1,11,	SER1,8,33 ² ,
αἱ θεῖαι Γραφαί	AP01,1,6,10,	AP02,14,
	CAR1,4,9,22,28,52 ² ,55,62,	CAR3,6 ² , SER1,13,21,
	32,	SER4,5,21, EPI,1,3,4,7,8,10.

III.4 Conclusions

In this section we have established that neither the Addressees of APO1 and APO2, nor the doctrinal views controverted in these two treatises are identical. APO1 is addressed to a certain unknown individual who is designated by the author as "beloved", and also to a group of people who claim to be Nicenes and anti-Arians but are in fact heretical in their Christology, and who are known or related to the "beloved". APO2 is addressed to a group of people who hold similar heretical Christological views with the previous group but not identical. The close scrutinization of the doctrinal views of these two groups of people who are suggested by the two APO has shown that they stand in close relationship with the doctrine of Apollinaris. They are Apollinarian in sentiment, inasmuch as they deny the presence of a human soul and a rational mind in Christ, and inasmuch as they employ typical Apollinarian syllogisms in order to establish their particular doctrines. But in the last analysis they seem to depart from the Apollinarian position by developing two opposing and extreme Christological theories which degrade or render unreal the flesh of Christ. On the whole the notions opposed in APO1 seem to be closer to those of Apollinaris, whereas the notions opposed in APO2 are crudely docetic and could never be identified with the position of the great Laodicean.

In view of the distinct doctrinal positions controverted by APO1 and APO2, it is possible for the same author to have written both treatises. Indeed it has been established from our close

examination of the range content and character of the allusions to other literary and theological sources made in the two treatises, that most probably they derive from the same author and that this author could easily have been Athanasius himself.

IV

Stylistic Investigations

- 243-284 IV.1 Vocabulary and Grammar
- Vocabulary peculiar to AP01&2
 - Grammar in AP01&2
 - Verbs
 - Nouns
 - Adjectives
 - Adverbs
 - Prepositions
 - Conjunctions and Particles

 - Words peculiar to AP01&2 not appearing in ATHAN
 - Prepositions in AP01&2 and ATHAN
 - Improper prepositions in the above
 - Conjunctions and particles
- 295-301 IV.2 Phraseology
- 302-311 IV.3 Discourse Construction
- The construction of AP01&2
 - The construction of CAR1-3 and EPI
 - Comparison of the above
- 312-313 IV.4 Conclusions

Generally speaking there are three methods for determining literary style: (a) a grammatical syntactical method⁽¹⁾ which examines language grammar and sentence structure, (b) a logical rhetorical method⁽²⁾ which examines patterns of argumentation and discourse construction, and (c) a stylometrical method⁽³⁾ which examines the statistical facts inherent in literary compositions. It is obvious that not all three methods apply to every piece of literature with the same degree of appropriateness. Their application depends on what stylists call the specific register or characteristic genre of a given literary production. But often stylistic criteria are drawn from all of them. Yet, there is by no means universal agreement as to the choice of criteria and their validity. Usually it turns out to be the case that general rules do not take us very far and that the key is to be found in the number of data that one can get out of the particular literary piece of his investigation. Perhaps today, more than ever before, it is recognized that no writer remains absolutely constant in his style and that style in general is a nebulous concept which generates an immeasurable cluster of possibilities. This recognition has made scholars more modest in reaching hard and clear-cut conclusions from style especially on questions of disputed authorship. Style can be important in such cases, but it is not always easy to find its identity, and usually it needs to be put along-side with other criteria from internal criticism in order to produce conclusive arguments.

In this investigation we have followed R.Chapman's broad definition of style which comprises the three basic elements of vocabulary, syntax and discourse construction. but we have also taken into consideration the contributions advanced by the critics

and examined in the first part of this dissertation. Care has been taken so that a holistic approach may be undertaken which examines all the available literary data.

IV.1. The Vocabulary and the Grammar

The text length of APO1 is 38.840 words and its vocabulary comprises 873 distinct words, ie. verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, pronouns, and other particles except articles. The text length of APO2 is 32.846 words and its vocabulary comprises 801 distinct words. A comparison of these two vocabularies reveals that 470 words are common to APO1&2, 403 are peculiar to APO1 and 331 are peculiar to APO2. The question immediately arising is whether these vocabularies point to stylistic divergence. To determine this we obviously need to compare the contents of these vocabularies taking into account their rate of occurrence. We shall do this first with reference to the peculiar vocabularies and then with reference to the common vocabulary. Having done this we shall turn to the Athanasian vocabulary for further comparisons.

The data of the vocabularies peculiar to APO1 and APO2 are as follows:

ἀβλεπτέω	1		
ἀγαπητός	2		
ἀγευστος	2		
ἀγιάζω	2		
		ἀγιότης	1
		ἀγνοέω	1
ἄγω	5		
ἀγών	2		
		ἀδεῶς	1

ἀδημονία	1		
ἀδικία	1	ἄδικος	2
		ἄδοξος	1
ἀεΐ	1		
ἀθάνατος	3		
ἄθεσμος	2		
ἀθιγής	1	(ἀθιγῶς)	
αἰρέω	1		
		αἴρω	2
		αἰσχύνομαι	1
αἰτίαισις	1		
		αἰχμαλωσία	2
		αἰχμαλωτεύω	2
		αἰχμαλωτίζω	3
ἀκαταδίκαστος	1		
		ἀκατάλυτος	1
		ἀκέραιος	1
		ἀκολούθως	1
ἄκοπος	1		
ἀκράτητος	1		
		ἄκρον	1
ἄκτιστος	30		
ἀκτίστως	1		
ἄκων	1		
		ἀληθινῶς	2
		ἀληθῶς	8
ἄλληλοι	1		
ἄλλοιόω	1		
ἄλλοίωσις	1		
ἄλλομαι	1		
ἄλλοτριος	4		
		ἄλυτος	5
		ἄμαρτητικός	3
ἄμαυρόω	1		
		ἄμέριστος	1
		ἄμεταθέτως	1
ἄμετρία	3		
ἄμῆν	2		
		ἄμορφος	2

ἀνάβασις	2	(ἀναβαίνω)	
ἀναβλαστάνω	1		
		ἀνάγκη	8
ἀναγράφω	5		
ἀναδέχομαι	4		
ἀναιδής	1		
(ἀναιρῶ)		ἀναίρεσις	1
-"-		ἀναιρετικός	1
ἀναίτιος	1		
		ἀναιχμαλώτιστος	2
		ἀνακαίνησις	1
ἀνακαινίζω	1		
		ἀνακαλέω	1
ἀνάκλησις	1		
ἀνακλίνω	1		
ἀνακρίνω	1		
ἀνάκτησις	1		
ἀναμάρτητος	7	(ἀναμαρτησία)	
		ἀνανεόω	1
ἀνανήπτω	1		
		ἀνάρμοστος	1
ἀνάστημα	1		
ἀναστροφή	1		
		ἀνατροπή	1
ἀναφέρω	3		
ἀνελλιπής	1		
ἀνεπισία	1		
ἀνευδεής	1		
ἀνεπίδεκτος	5	(ἀνεπίδέκτως)	1
ἀνέχομαι	5		
ἀνθρωπολάτρης	1		
ἀνθυποφέρω	2		
ἀνίατος	1		
ἀνόητος	6		
ἀντάλλαγμα	1		
ἀντερωτάω	1		
ἀντιδίδω	3		
		ἀντιλέγω	1
ἀνύβρισιος	1		

ἀνυμνῶ	1	ἔξιωμα	5
		ἀοράτως	1
		ἀπαγγέλλω	1
ἀπάγομαι	1		
ἀπαραιάλυτος	2	ἀπαρακαλύπτως	1
		ἀπαρνοῦμαι	2
		ἀπαρχή	2
		ἀπειθέω	1
ἀπεκδύομαι	2		
ἀπελεύνω	1		
ἄπιστος	1		
ἀπόγονος	1		
ἀποθνήσκω	4	ἀποκρυφή	1
		ἀπολιμπάνομαι	1
ἀπολισθαίνω	1		
		ἀπόλυσις	1
ἀπολύτρωσις	1		
		ἀποπίπτω	1
		ἄπορος	1
ἀποστολικός	2		
ἀποφαίνομαι	3		
ἀπόφασις	2		
ἀποφέρομαι	1		
ἀποχή	1	ἀποχωρέω	2
ἀπρεπής	1		
ἀπρονόητος	1		
ἄπτω	1	ἄπωθέω	1
ἀρετή	1		
ἀρίθμησις	3	ἄρμονία	1
ἄρνησις	3		
ἄρρητος	2		
ἄσεβής	16	(ἄσεβοῦντες)	
ἄσύκριτος	1		
ἄσύγχυτος	1		

		ἀσυλόγιστος	2
		ἀσύμφωνος	1ᾶτε
		ἄτε	1
		ἀπονέω	1
		ἀποπία	1
		ἀπρεπτότης	1
αὐθάδης	1		
		αὐθεντικός	1
αὐτάρκης	1		
αὐτεξούσιον	1		
αὐτεξέλεγκτος	1		
αὐτοτελής	1		
		ἄφευκτος	1
ἀφίημι	1		
		ἄφραστος	1
		ἄφραστότης	1
		ἄφράστως	1
ἄχραντος	1		
ἄχρις	3		
βαθύς	1		
		βαίνω	1
βαρύς	1		
		βασιλεία	1
βασιλεύς	1		
βαστάζομαι	1		
βδελύσσομαι	1		
βεβαιότης	1		
		βία	1
		βίαιος	1
βίβλος	1		
βοή	1		
		βλάσφημος	2
		βοᾶω	1
		βοηθέω	1
βόθρος	2		
βουλή	1		
		βρῶσις	1
(γενεαλογέω)		γενεαλογία	1
γέ	3		
		γένος	1

γεύομαι	1		
γῆϊνος	1		
		γνώρισμα	1
		γνώσις	1
		γοῦν	1
		γραφίς	1
Δαβίδ	2	(Δαυίδ)	
		δειλία	1
		δεξιός	4
		δέομαι	1
δεσμά	5		
		δεσπόζω	1
δέω	1		
		δηλος	2
		δημιουργέω	2
(δημιουργός)		δημιουργία	2
		δήπου	1
διαβεβαίδομαι	1		
διαβλέπω	1		
		διαδέχομαι	1
διαιρετός	1	(διαιρέω/διαίρεσις)	
διακλώω	1		
διάλυσις	2	(διαλύω)	
διαμάχομαι	1		
		διαμέτρησις	1
		διαπαντός	1
διαπήγνυμι	1		
διαρρήγνυμι	1		
διασπάω	1		
		διασύρω	1
διατί	1		
διαφεύγω	2		
διαφθείρω	1	(διαφθορά)	
		διάφορος	1
διαχέω	1		
δίδαγμα	3	διηγέομαι	1
		δικαιόω	2
διπλοῦς	3		
		δίστομος	1

δειχῆ	2	δείχα	2
δείψα	1		
		δόγμα	1
		δογματίζω	1
δοκέω	2	(δόκησις)	
		δόλος	1
		δοξάζω	4
δυσφημέω	1		
		έγκαινίζω	1
		έγκαταλείπω	1
		έγκατάλειψις	1
		έγκειμαι	1
		έδωμ	1
		έθνη	1
		είγε	1
		είδος	1
είκότως	1		
		είτε	2
		είωθα	1
έκαστος	1		
έκδεικνυμι	1		
έκλαμβάνω	1		
		έκουσίζω	1
		έκπίπτω	1
έκπλήρωσις	1		
έκπνευσις	1		
		έκπνέω	1
		έκτείνω	1
		έκτρέπω	2
έλάττωσις	1		
έλεγξις	1		
έλεγχος	1		
έλέγχω	1		
		έλεέω	1
έλπίζ	2	έλευθερωτής	1
		έμαυτός	1
έμμένω	1		
		έμπαλιν	1
έμπλεος	1		

1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	(επιθεωρητής)	1	(επιθεωρητής)
3	επιθεωρητής	3	επιθεωρητής
1	(επιθεωρητής)	1	(επιθεωρητής)
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	(επιθεωρητής)	2	(επιθεωρητής)
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
2	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
2	επιθεωρητής	2	επιθεωρητής
2	επιθεωρητής	2	επιθεωρητής
1	(επιθεωρητής)	1	(επιθεωρητής)
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	5	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	(επιθεωρητής)	3	(επιθεωρητής)
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	(επιθεωρητής)	3	(επιθεωρητής)
1	επιθεωρητής	1	επιθεωρητής
1	(επιθεωρητής)	1	(επιθεωρητής)
3	επιθεωρητής	3	επιθεωρητής

1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
		1	მედიკალინა
		1	მედიკალინა
1	მედიკალინა	1	მედიკალინა
2	მედიკალინა (მედიკალინა)		(მედიკალინა)
1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
2	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
		1	მედიკალინა
		2	მედიკალინა
		2	მედიკალინა
		1	მედიკალინა
		2	მედიკალინა
		2	მედიკალინა
		1	მედიკალინა
		1	მედიკალინა
		1	მედიკალინა
1	მედიკალინა		
		1	მედიკალინა
		2	მედიკალინა
2	მედიკალინა		
1	მედიკალინა		
		1	მედიკალინა

θεοτόκος	3		
θέσις	1		
θεωρέω	6		
(θνητός)		θνήσκω	1
		θολερός	1
		θύω	1
ἰδιοποιέω	2	(ἴδιος)	
ἱερόν	1		
ἴσως	1		
		ἰσχύς	2
		ἰσχύω	3
καθά	1		
καθάπερ	1		
καθαρισμός	1		
καθαρότης	1		
		καθαρός	2
		καθέλκω	2
καθολικός	1		
καθόλου	1		
καθώς	7		
		καινοποιήσεις	1
καινοποιέω	1		
κακεῖνος	1		
κακῶς	1	(κακός)	
κάλλος	1		
καλέω	1		
καπηλεύω	1		
		καρδία	1
		καρπός	1
καταβάλλω	1		
		κατάβασεις	1
καταγινώσκω	4		
κατάγομαι	1		
καταιτιῶμαι	1		
		κατακλείω	1
		καταλέγω	1
κατάληψις	1		
καταλλαγὴ	1		
(κατάλυσις)		καταλύω	2

		καταμερίζω	2
		καταναλίσκω	1
		κατανοέω	1
		κατανόησις	1
καταπίπτω	2		
κατάρρα	1		
καταφέρω	3		
καταχρηστικῶς	1		
κατέρχομαι	2		
κατήγορος	1		
κατώδυνος	1		
(κήρυγμα)		κηρύσσω	3
κινέω	1		
		κληρονομέω	1
		κοιλία	1
		κοιμῶμαι	1
		κόλπος	1
κόπος	1	κοπιᾶζω	1
κόψεις	1		
κράζω	1	(κράτησις)	
κρατέω	3	κρεμάω	1
κρίμα	1		
(κρίσις, κριτής)		κρίνω	1
κτίσμα	1	(κτέζω)	
κτιστός	1	κτίσις	4
κριτής	1		
		λείπομαι	1
λέξεις	1		
λοιπόν	1		
Λουκάς	1		
λυτήριον	1		
λύτρον	2	(λυτρόω)	
μαθητής	1		
		μαλακία	2
		μανθάνω	5
		μανία	1
		μανικός	1
(μαρτυρώ)		μαρτυρία	4
μάτην	4		

Ματθαῖος	2	μάχαιρα	1
		μάχομαι	1
μάχη	2	μέγας	2
		μεθύσκω	1
μέλλων	2		
μέλος	1		
μέντοι	3	(μέν)	
μερίζω	1	μέρος	3
μεσίτης	3		
μεταμέλομαι	1		
μετάπτωσις	1		
ματασχηματίζω	1		
μετάφρασις	1		
(μετοχή)		μετέχω	1
μέτρον	1		
μηδέν	1	μηδέ	2
μηδέπω	1	μήποτε	2
μηκέτι	1		
		μήτηρ	1
μικρός	1		
μῖσος	1		
μνηστεύω	1		
μόνας	1		
		μονογενής	1
μόνον	2		
μονοτρόπως	1	μονότροπος	1
(μορφή)		μόρφωμα	1
		μυστήριον	4
		μυστικός	1
		Μωσῆς	1
		ναός	1
		Ναζαρέτ	6
(νεκρός)		νεκρόμαι	3
(νέος)		νεότης	2
νῆκος	1	(νίκη)	

		νοερός	5
νόημα	3	(νόησις, νοέω)	
νοητῶς	1		
νοῦς	16		
νῦν	3		
		ὀδεύω	1
		ὀδός	3
		οἶδα	1
οἰκεῖος	1	οἰκειόμαι	1
οἰκειότης	1		
οἶομαι	1		
οἶχομαι	1		
		ὀλισθαίνω	1
ὀλόκληρος	1		
ὄλως	5		
		ὅμοιος	1
		ὁμοιότης	2
		ὁμοιότροπος	1
ὁμοίωμα	1	(ὁμοίωσις)	
		ὁμοίως	1
		ὁμοουσιότης	2
ὅμως	2		
		ὀπλίζομαι	1
		ὅποτε	1
ὀνειδίζω	1		
ὄρατός	5	ὄρατῶς	1
ὀρθῶς	1		
ὀρίζω	3	(ὄρος)	
ὀσιότης	1	ὄσιος	1
ὀστέον	6		
ὅταν	2		
ὅτε	3		
		οὐδαμοῦ	2
οὐδέπω	1		
οὐκέτι	1		
οὕπω	1		
οὐρανοφανής	1		
οὐσία	2		
(παθητός)		παθητικός	3

		παιδίον	2
		παῖς	1
		πάλαι	1
παλαιότης	1	(παλαιός)	
		παλαιόω	1
		πάμφυλος	1
πάντη	1	πανταχοῦ	1
παράγγελμα	2		
		παραγίνομαι	1
παράδοσις	2	(παραδίδωμι)	
παρακοή	3		
παρανομία	1		
παράνομος	1		
		παραπλησίως	2
παραπορεύομαι	1		
		παρασημαίνω	1
		παράστασις	1
παρατρέπω	1	παρατριβή	1
παρατρέχω	1		
παρατροπή	4		
παράφρων	1	παρέρχομαι	1
παρίστημι	1		
παροδεύω	1		
παροράω	1		
		πάσχα	1
πείνα	1	πεινάω	1
		πεῖρα	2
		πειράζω	1
		πειρασμός	2
πεισμονή	1		
		περαιτέρω	1
περιαιρέω	1		
περίεργος	1		
περιέχω	2		
περίκειμαι	1		
περιπίπτω	1		
περιποιούμαι	1		
περιτομή	1		
		περίσσεια	2

		πεῦσις	1
πιστός	3		
πλάσμα	2		
πλαστός	1		
		πλεονάζω	1
		πληγή	1
πλήθος	1		
		πλήρωμα	2
		πλούσιος	1
		πλουτέω	1
ποίημα	2	(ποιέω, ποίησις)	
		πόλεμος	1
πολιτεύομαι	2		
		πονηρία	1
		πορεύομαι	1
		πόσον	1
		ποτίζω	1
		ποτέ	3
πούς	3		
πρᾶγμα	5	(πραγματεία)	
		πρακτικός	1
πρᾶξις	6	(πράττω)	
		πρίν	3
προάγω	1		
		προαιρέω	1
προγενέστερος	1		
		πρόδηλος	3
προεξευρίσκω	1		
προκαταγγέλλω	1		
		πρόκειμαι	1
προκοπή	1		
		προλέγω	1
προμηνύω	1		
προορίζω	1		
		προορισμός	1
		προσαγορεύω	1
(προσάγω)		προσαγωγή	2
		προσακτής	2
		προσεπίδίδω	1
		προσηλώ	1

προσέρχομαι	2	προσήλωσις	1
προσθήκη	1		
προσκαλέω	1		
προσκαταλείπω	1		
προσκύνησις	2	(προσκυνῶ)	
		προσλαμβάνω	1
προσοικειδομαι	1	προσομολογέω	2
		προσποιεητῶς	1
		πρόσφατος	1
πρόσχημα	1		
προσχράομαι	1	πρότασις	1
		προϋπόσχομαι	1
προτίθημι	1	προφασίζομαι	2
		πρόφασις	2
προφητικὸς	2	(προφήτης)	
		πρωτεῶν	1
πρωτόπλαστος	6		
πτῶμα	1	πτωχεΐα	1
		πτωχεύω	3
		πῦρ	1
ρεῦσις	1		
ῤητῶριος	1	ῤύσις	1
		σαρκικὸς	3
σαρκδομαι	1	(σάρκωσις, σάρξ)	
		σαφῶς	3
σέβω	1		
σημασία	2	(σημαίνω)	
σήμερον	1		
σιωπέω	1		
σιωπή	1		
		σκηνοῶ	1
σκιώδης	1		
		σκολιὸς	1

		σοφός	1
σπάργανον	1		
σπείρω	1		
(σταυρός)		σταυρόω	4
		στενοχωρέω	1
στερεός	1		
στηρίζω	2		
στραγγαλιά	1	στραγγαλιώδης	2
		συγκατέχω	1
		συγκεράννυμι	2
		σύγκρασις	2
		συγχωρέω	1
		συμβαίνω	2
		συμβοάω	1
Συμεών	1		
		συμμέτοχος	1
σύμμορφος	1		
		συμπενθέω	1
συμπολίτης	1		
σύμπτωμα	1		
		συμφθείρω	1
σύμφυτος	1		
		σύμφωνος	1
		συνάγω	1
συνάδω	1		
συναΐδιος	4		
		συνανέχομαι	1
		συνάπτω	1
συνάφεια	1		
		συνεπίστημι	1
		συνήθεια	1
		συνθνήσκω	1
		συνομολογέω	1
		συνσταυρόω	1
συνοράω	3		
συντάσσω	1		
συντέλεια	1	συντελέω	1
		σύσωμος	1

		σύστασις	6
σφραγίς	1		
σχῆμα	2		
σχολάζω	1		
		σῶζω	6
σωματικός	1	(σῶμα)	
σωτήρ	2	(σωτηρία)	
(σωτηρία)		σωτηριώδης	1
ταπεινώσις	1		
		τάσσω	1
		ταφή	1
τελειότης	10		
(τέλειος)	24	(τέλειος)	2
τελειόω	1	τελειώσις	2
τελείως	1		
τετράς	1		
Τιμόθεος	1		
τιμωρία	1		
(τολμάω)			
		τόλμημα	2
τομή	1	τομός	1
		τόμος	1
		τότε	1
τρέπω	2		
τριχῆ	1		
		τροπή	1
τυρρανικῶς	1	τύρρανος	1
τύφος	1		
ὑβρις	1		
ὑδωρ	1		
		ὑμέτερος	1
ὑπάγω	1		
		ὑπερβαίνω	1
		ὑπερβολή	1
ὑπερισχύω	1		
ὑπερορᾶω	1		
		ὑπερπερισεύω	1

ὑπισχνέομαι 1
ὑπνος 1
ὑποβάλλω 1
ὑποδέχομαι 1

(ὑπολαμβάνω)

ὑπονοέω 1
ὑπόστασις 2

(φανερὸς)

φαντασία 3

φιλανθρωπία 1
φιλονεικία 1
φοβερός 1
φορέω 1
φθάνω 1
φροντίς 1

χαρίζω 1
χεῖρες 1

ψευδής 1
ψεῦδος 1
ψηλάφησις 3

ὑποκαλύπτω 1

ὑποκρίνομαι 1

ὑπόληψις 1

ὑπομένω 1

ὑπόνοια 2

ὑψιστος 2

ὑψος 1

ὑψωσις 1

φαίνομαι 1

φανερῶ 2

φανερῶς 1

φανέρωσις 1

φανταστικός 1

(φαντάζομαι)

φεῦ 1

φοβοῦμαι 1

φυλακή 1

Φωτεινός 1

χρῖσις 5

χωρέω 3

χωρίζω 11

χωρισμός 1

(ψεῦδομαι)

(ψηλαφῶ)

ψηλαφητός	2		
ψυχικός	5	(ψυχή)	
(ὡς, ὥσπερ, ὥστε)		ὡσανεὶ	1

An examination of the vocabulary peculiar to APO1 reveals that the distribution of the 403 words is as follows:

287 words have 1 occurrence	6 words have 6 occurrences
57 - ^ω - - ^ω - 2 occurrences	2 - ^ω - - ^ω - 7 - ^ω -
30 - ^ω - - ^ω - 3 - ^ω -	1 word has 1 - ^ω -
8 - ^ω - - ^ω - 4 - ^ω -	2 words have 16 - ^ω -
9 - ^ω - - ^ω - 5 - ^ω -	1 word has 30 - ^ω -

Since all 403 words have 673 occurrences the peculiar vocabulary of APO1 represents 1,8% of the total text length of the treatise. The question emerging here is whether any one of the peculiar words in APO1 has stylistic value and could be used against a common author for APO1 and APO2. Obviously only words of notable frequency can be considered here. These are the following:

ἀκτιστος	30	ἄγω	5
ἀσεβής	16	ἀνεπίδεκτος	5
νοῦς	16	ἀνέχομαι	5
τελειότης	10	ἀνόητος	5
ἀναμάρτητος	7	δεσμός	5
καθώς	7	ἐξουσία	5
ἐπινοέω	6	ὅλως	5
θεωρέω	6	ὄρατός	5
ὀστέον	6	πνευματικός	5
πρᾶξις	6	πρᾶγμα	5
πρωτόπλαστος	6	ψυχικός	5

With the exception of ἀσεβής and καθώς the other words have no stylistic value. Their occurrence is incidental because it is demanded by the author's opponents who employ these terms to defend their notions. Ἀσεβής is an adjective applied by the author

either to heretics (Valentinus, Marcion, Arians, etc.) or to heretical notions. The author of APO2 mentions the same heretics and their heretical notions without however qualifying them with the same adjective with the only exception of the two references, τοιαύτη τούτου (τοῦ Παύλου τοῦ Σαμοσατέως) ἡ ἀσέβεια (APO1,3) and κατὰ τοὺς ἀσεβούντας Ἀρειανούς (APO1,18). Καθώς occurs three times in the general formula καθὼς γέγραπται (APO1,4,17, and 20), once in the general formula καθὼς εἴρηται (APO1,19) and once in the formula καθὼς εἴρηκεν ὁ Κύριος (APO1,13). The other two occurrences belong to the text of John 4:24, which is cited and discussed in APO1,6. It seems however that the author of APO1 prefers on the whole the parallel formulae: ὡς γέγραπται which appears 7 times (APO1,3,6,12,13,17,20, and 22), εἴρηται (APO1,7, 10,16,18) and εἴρηκώς (APO1,14 and 16). The same applies to the author of APO2. ὡς γέγραπται appears 7 times (APO2,1,3,5,8,15, 16, and 18), εἴρηκώς 4 times (APO2,1²,8,17), εἴρηται once (APO2, 15), and εἴρηκεν once (APO2,1). On this evidence no stylistic problem seems to arise here. We may then safely conclude that the vocabulary peculiar to APO1 does not imply stylistic divergence from APO2, with the only exception perhaps of the adjective ἀσεβής which is a weak case.

The examination of the vocabulary peculiar to APO2 renders similar results. Here is the list of occurrences which helps us to identify the distribution of these words:

240	words	have	1	occurrence
57	- ^{oo} -	- ^{oo} -	2	occurrences
17	- ^{oo} -	- ^{oo} -	3	- ^{oo} -
6	- ^{oo} -	- ^{oo} -	4	- ^{oo} -

5	words have	5	occurences
3	"-"	6	"-"
2	"-"	8	"-"
1	word has	9	"-"

What is the stylistic value of these words? To establish this we need to examine the significant ones which are:

δείχα	9
ἀληθῶς	8
ἀνάγκη	8
σώζω	6
σύστασις	6
Ναζαρέτ	6

Δείχα is proportionately spread throughout the discourse occurring in chs 2², 3², 10, 13³ and 14. It is most likely that it derives from the author's opponents. This becomes apparent in texts like: οὔτε τὸ Χριστὸς ὄνομα δείχα σαρκὸς προσάγεται (APO2,2), or οὐ δείχα σαρκὸς ἀνθρωπίνης ὁ Λόγος Χριστὸς γέγονεν (APO2,3), or better still, οὐδαμοῦ δὲ αἷμα θεοῦ δείχα σαρκὸς παραδεδώκασιν αἱ Γραφαί, ἢ θεὸν διὰ σαρκὸς παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα (APO2,14), where the author negates statements of his opponents.

The same considerations apply to the word ἀνάγκη. It appears for the first time in chapter 9 in the middle of a quotation from the author's opponents (πάλιν γὰρ λέγετε· εἰ ἡ ἀμαρτήσασα φύσις ἐν θεῷ γέγονεν, ἀμαρτίαν μὴ ποιήσασα, ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατέχεται· τὸ δὲ ἀνάγκη κατεχόμενον βίαιον ἐστίν).

Ἀληθῶς occurs seven times in only two cases in chs 2 and 5, in the same construction. It does not therefore have special stylistic value. Besides, in APO1 we find occurrences to synonymous terms, ἀληθῆς, ἀληθινός, ἀλήθεια, which also occur in APO2.

Σώζω appears for the first time in a heretical contention cited in the beginning of chapter 7. The other 4 occurrences come up in the same chapter in the discussion over this same contention. The sixth occurrence also belongs to a heretical statement cited in chapter 11.

The first two occurrences of the word *σύστασις* appear in chapter 1 where it is said that *σύστασις τῶν ἀνθρώπων = νοερά φύσις + ὀργανικὴ κατάστασις (σῶμα)*. In APO2,2 we are told that the Logos assumed from the womb of the Virgin the entire nature (kind) of man's composition (*τὸ σύνπαν εἶδος τῆς ἀνθρώπου συστάσεως*). The occurrences in chapters 5 and 18 are similar. In chapter 6 we get the 5th occurrence in a negation which suggests that it probably derives from the author's heretical opponents: *οὐ τὴν ἀρχῆθεν σύστασιν κατμερίσας*. However, it must be said that it is not clear whether this term derives from the vocabulary of the author or from that of his opponents. The statements *πῶς οὐχὶ λογικὴν τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφήν . . . συστησάμενος* (ch.16) and *τὴν ἐκ γῆς (σάρκα) ἐπουράνιον συστησάμενος* (*ibid.*) could derive from either. In any case the word seems to belong to this specific discussion and therefore should be divested of any particular stylistic value.

Finally *Ναζαρέτ* comes up because of the debate with the heretics.

Obviously the Vocabularies peculiar to APO1 and APO2 do not present stylistic problems, and this can certainly be taken as evidence against a diversity of authors. The same could be said for the whole vocabulary, if the common one did not differ either. In order to investigate that, the first obvious

task is to arrange the vocabulary of APO1 according to frequency and juxtapose to it the vocabulary of APO2, so that they can be compared.

<u>words</u>	<u>frequency</u> <u>in APO1</u>	<u>frequency</u> <u>in APO2</u>	<u>words</u>	<u>frequency</u> <u>in APO1</u>	<u>frequency</u> <u>in APO2</u>
καί	397	324	ὅτι	38	42
ὁ	136	131	οὐ	37	30
λέγω	102	90	εἰς	32	25
τό	102	75	Κύριος	32	23
δέ	106	101	μέν	32	29
ἐν	99	114	πῶς	32	38
εἰμί	98	98	ἀμαρτία	31	34
γίνομαι	91	76	διά	30	42
θεός	87	117	ἑαυτός	30	21
ἐγώ	75	67	υἱός	30	13
κατά	73	47	οὖν	28	17
αὐτός	72	85	ἴδιος	27	8
σάρξ	72	53	οὕτω	26	12
ἐκ	69	82	τίς	26	22
λόγος	67	56	θεότης	25	35
γάρ	65	51	ἐπί	24	12
ἦ	64	65	ἔχω	24	11
Χριστός	60	35	ὁμοούσιος	24	1
οὗτος	56	58	οὐκ	24	18
ἀλλά	53	56	πᾶς	23	22
ἄνθρωπος	51	112	γράφω	22	17
σῶμα	50	41	πνεῦμα	22	13
θάνατος	46	25	ὁμολογέω	20	16
εἶ	45	37	πρός	20	20
ἵνα	43	31	ἄν	19	5
ὅς	43	21	δείκνυμι	19	9
ὥς	42	36	ἕτερος	19	1
ψυχή	41	34	ποιέω	19	15
φύσις	40	33	ἀδάμ	17	9
ἦ	39	46	ἀνθρώπινος	17	9
μή	38	27	εἶς	17	12

πατήρ	17	12	προφήτης	9	11
ἐπιδείκνυμι	16	16	φημί	9	15
ἄγιος	15	11	αἷμα	8	5
τέλειος	15	2	ἀνίστημι	8	10
τί(;)	15	5	ἀπόστολος	8	15
πάθος	14	27	βασιλεύω	8	2
ὑπέρ	14	14	γραφή	8	8
μορφή	13	18	διάβολος	8	10
τοῖνυν	13	11	δίδω	8	7
τε	12	9	μίμησις	8	1
ὥσπερ	12	5	μόνος	8	5
ἄδης	11	14	ὄνομα	8	11
ἐννοέω	11	1	παθητός	8	7
ἐπουράνιος	11	4	πλάσις	8	2
ἔσωθεν	11	1	τάφος	8	8
καινότης	11	4	τριάς	8	2
νοέω	11	7	ἀλήθεια	7	7
οὐρανός	11	4	ἀμαρτάνω	7	12
πάλιν	11	10	ἀνάστασις	7	23
παρά	11	6	δύναμις	7	4
περί	11	12	ἡμέτερος	7	7
πότε	11	4	κόσμος	7	8
φρονέω	11	3	Μαρία	7	4
ἀντί	10	3	νόησις	7	3
γῆ	10	4	νομίζω	7	1
Ἰησοῦς	10	12	ὄρα	7	18
λαλέω	10	4	πίστις	7	4
μήτε	10	10	πολύς	7	3
οὐχ	10	7	προσκυνέω	7	1
τουτέστι	10	3	πρῶτος	7	6
ἀσεβεια	9	1	σπέρμα	7	7
γέννησις	9	13	τοιούτος	7	9
Δαυίδ	9	7	τόπος	7	1
δύο	9	2	ὥστε	7	4
ἔνωσις	9	4	ἄλλος	6	6
πάρειμι	9	3	ἀπαθής	6	3
πίσχω	9	15	ἀρνέομαι	6	5

ἄρτεπτος	6	4	κτίζω	5	1
αὔξησις	6	3	Μανιχαῖος	5	2
ἀφθαρσία	6	7	μάταιος	5	1
βούλομαι	6	6	νεκρός	5	12
δεκτικός	6	2	ὁμοίωσις	5	5
δημιουργός	6	4	ὀνομάζω	5	4
ἐθέλω	6	2	ὄπου	5	2
εἰκών	6	3	παρθένος	5	6
ἐπιδημέω	6	1	πρό	5	5
ἔρχομαι	6	9	τολμάω	-5	3
καταγγέλλω	6	1	τυγχάνω	5	1
λύω	6	10	ὑπαρξις	5	9
ὄλος	6	3	φυσικός	5	4
οὐδέ	6	5	ἀληθής	4	1
οὐδεῖς	6	5	ἀναλλοίωτος	4	4
οὐχί	6	6	ἀνθρωπότης	4	2
πραγματεία	6	1	Ἄρειανοί	4	7
ρῆμα	6	3	βλασφημέω	4	1
ταράττω	6	2	γενεαλογέω	4	2
ὑπό	6	4	δῆ	4	2
φαντάζομαι	6	1	διαίρεσις	4	4
φθορά	6	2	δόκησις	4	2
χρεία	6	3	δόξα	4	7
Ἄβραάμ	5	2	ἐλευθερόω	4	1
ἀκούω	5	3	ἐντολή	4	2
ἀληθινός	5	2	εὐεργεσία	4	2
ἄρα	5	5	εὐρίσκω	4	7
γεννάομαι	5	7	θέλησις	4	1
γιγνώσκω	5	3	κατεργάζομαι	4	2
δεσπότης	5	1	μέχρι	4	1
διδάσκω	5	2	οἰκονομία	4	10
ἐκότερος	5	3	παράβασις	4	1
ἐκεῖ	5	4	πείθομαι	4	1
ἐπεῖ	5	5	πιστεύω	4	11
ἐπίδειξις	5	14	πλάσσω	4	1
ἐπίνοια	5	1	σωτηρία	4	2
καίτοι	5	3			

ὑπάρχω	4	3	λυποῦμαι	3	1
ἀδημονῶ	3	2	μέμφομαι	3	1
ἀδιαίρετος	3	3	μένω	3	5
ἀθανασία	3	4	νόμος	3	5
ἀναιρέω	3	1	πλανᾶω	3	4
ἀντίλυτρον	3	2	πλάνη	3	1
ἀπιστέω	3	6	ποιήσεις	3	3
ἀρχή	3	7	προάγω	3	9
ἄρχων	3	4	πρωτότοκος	3	6
ἀσθήρικτος	3	1	σάρκωσις	3	1
ἀσώματος	3	1	σταυρός	3	4
γένεσις	3	2	στοιχέω	3	1
γνώμη	3	4	συνίστημι	3	2
γυνή	3	3	τίθημι	3	3
δεύτερος	3	3	τοσοῦτος	3	2
διαφθορά	3	1	φρόνησις	3	1
δικαιοσύνη	3	5	χάρις	3	7
δυνατός	3	2	χωρίς	3	7
εἰσέρχομαι	3	1	ᾧ	3	1
ἐπίβασις	3	1	ἀγαθός	2	2
ἐπιδέχομαι	3	1	ἄγγελος	2	5
ἐπιδημία	3	2	ἀδελφός	2	4
ἐπιχειρέω	3	2	αἰδιότης	2	1
ἔργον	3	3	αἵρετικός	2	12
εὐαγγέλιον	3	5	αἰών	2	2
ἡλικία	3	3	ἀλλαχοῦ	2	2
θεῖος	3	4	ἀνατέλλω	2	1
θεϊκός	3	1	ἀνυπόστατος	2	2
Ἰουδαῖος	3	6	ἀόρατος	2	2
καθίστημι	3	2	ἀποχώρησις	2	2
καινός	3	2	ἀρχέω	2	1
καταδικάζω	3	2	ἀσθένεια	2	1
καταδίκη	3	2	ἀσθενέω	2	2
κεφαλή	3	3	δεῖ	2	1
κρείττων	3	3	δείδω	2	1
λαμβάνω	3	13	δεῖξις	2	1

δέχομαι	2	1	μαρτυρώ	2	3
δηλώ	2	3	μεταποιήσεις	2	3
διαιρέω	2	1	μήτιγε	2	1
διάνοια	2	3	νέος	2	1
διορίζω	2	1	οἶος	2	4
δοῦλος	2	14	ὁμολογία	2	1
εἶν	2	7	ὄντως	2	1
εἶτα	2	2	ὄπως	2	2
έκεῖνος	2	6	ὀργανικός	2	3
έκκλησία	2	3	ὄσος	2	2
έκλέγω	2	1	ὄστις	2	2
έλεύθερος	2	1	παλαιός	2	2
έγνοια	2	1	παρὰδίδωμι	2	3
έπειδή	2	9	πυρέχω	2	1
έπισπορά	2	2	πληρώ	2	4
έργάζομαι	2	4	πόθεν	2	1
εὐαγγελιστής	2	2	ποιητής	2	1
εὐδοκέω	2	2	ποῖος	2	2
εὐφημία	2	1	πονηρός	2	2
έχθρός	2	3	πρόβατον	2	1
ζωή	2	5	πρόειμι	2	2
θνητός	2	1	προὔπάρχω	2	1
ἴσος	2	1	σημαίνω	2	2
Ἰωσήφ	2	1	σόφισμα	2	1
κἄν	2	2	σύμπαν	2	1
κατακρίνω	2	2	ταυτότης	2	1
καταργέω	2	2	τρόπος	2	2
κατέχομαι	2	2	ὑπολαμβάνω	2	3
κίχημι	2	1	ὑποτίθημι	2	1
κράτησις	2	1	φέρω	2	4
λογίζομαι	2	1	φθέγγομαι	2	3
λογισμός	2	10	φθόνος	2	1
λύπη	2	1	φωνή	2	2
λυτρόω	2	2	Χριστιανός	2	1
μᾶλλον	2	2	ἀδύνατος	1	7
Μαρκίων	2	5	ἀθετέω	1	4

ἀθέτησις	1	1	ἐρυθριάζω	1	1
ἀθιγῶς	1	1	ἔσχατος	1	1
ἀΐδιος	1	1	εὐαγγελίζομαι	1	2
αἰώνιος	1	1	εὐαγγελικός	1	2
ἀκολουθέω	1	1	ζάω	1	2
ἀναβαίνω	1	1	ἦττων	1	1
ἀναγιγνώσκω	1	1	θαυμασιός	1	2
ἀναδείκνυμι	1	2	Ἰουδαϊκός	1	1
ἀναλαμβάνω	1	1	Ἰσθημι	1	2
ἀνήρ	1	3	Ἰωάννης	1	3
ἀνοχή	1	1	καθαίρεσις	1	2
ἀπάθεια	1	2	καθέλω	1	2
ἀπατάω	1	1	κακία	1	4
ἀπάτη	1	2	κακός	1	2
ἀπιστία	1	1	καλός	1	2
ἀποκτείνω	1	5	κατάκρισις	1	1
ἀπόλλυμι	1	1	κατασκευάζω	1	1
ἀπόνοια	1	1	κατοχή	1	1
ἄρειος	1	4	κῆρυγμα	1	1
ἀρμόζω	1	2	κλίνω	1	1
αὖ	1	2	κοινός	1	1
ἄφθαρτος	1	2	κοινωνέω	1	1
βεβαιόω	1	1	κοινωνία	1	1
βηθλεέμ	1	1	λογικός	1	9
βλασφημία	1	5	λύσις	1	5
διαβαίνω	1	1	μάλιστα	1	1
διαδοχή	1	1	μετά	1	2
διαγράψω	1	3	μεταποιέω	1	1
διαμένω	1	1	μετοχή	1	1
διό	1	9	μήτρα	1	2
δύναμις	1	2	μνημονεύω	1	1
ἐγείρω	1	9	νέκρωσις	1	8
ἐκεῖσε	1	1	νίκη	1	4
ἐκκλίνω	1	1	νικάομαι	1	2
ἐλευθερία	1	1	ξύλον	1	1
ἐνανθρώπησις	1	2	ὄθεν	1	2
ἐνεργής	1	3	ὄμνυμι	1	2

ὄρος	1	6	Σαβέλλιος	1	1
Οὐαλεντῖνος	11	3	Σαμοσατεύς	1	4
πάντως	1	2	σοφία	1	1
παρλαμβάνω	1	1	σοφίζομαι	1	2
Παῦλος	1	8	στόμα	1	2
Πέτρος	1	3	συκοφαντέω	1	2
πλήρωσις	1	2	συμπάθεια	1	2
πόσον	1	1	συμπλέκω	1	2
πού	1	2	σύν	1	1
πράττω	1	2	συνίημι	1	1
προλαμβάνω	1	2	ταραχή	1	1
προβάλλομαι	1	2	τίκτω	1	1
προβολή	1	1	τρέις	1	1
προέρχομαι	1	1	τρίτος	1	1
πρόσειμι	1	2	τρῶσις	1	1
προσεύχομαι	1	2	ὑπόκειμαι	1	4
πρόσκειμαι	1	1	ὑποπίπτω	1	1
πρόσληψις	1	1	φανερός	1	1
προσφέρω	1	1	φθαρτός	1	1
προσχώρησις	1	2	φυσικῶς	1	1
προυπάρχω	1	1	ψηλαφάω	1	1
ρῆσις	1	1			

Only eleven words out of this vocabulary common to APO1 and APO2 present a relatively great divergence as to the rate of their occurrence and should therefore be investigated.

These are:

ἴδιος	27	8	ἔσωθεν	11	1
ὁμοούσιος	24	1	ἀνάστασις	9	23
ἄν	19	5	λαμβάνω	3	13
ἕτερος	19	1	αἵρετικός	2	12
τέλειος	24	2	δοῦλος	2	14
ἐννοέω	11	1			

The terms ὁμοούσιος, ἕτερος, τέλειος and ἔσωθεν appear among the notions of the authors' adversaries and therefore need not be further examined. We may then turn to an examination of

the rest of the terms.

The term ἴδιος appears in APO1 in the following constructions:

- (α) τὰ ἴδια πράξεις APO1,1²
- (β) ἡ ἰδέα φύσις τοῦ Λόγου, APO1,5²
- (γ) τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα (τοῦ Λόγου), APO1,6², 17, 18
- (δ) ἡ ἰδέα σάρξ, APO1,5, 7, 10, 12³
- (ε) τῆς ἰδέας ἀϊδιότητος εἰκῶν, APO1,7, 15
- (ς) ἰδέα ποίησις (τοῦ Λόγου), APO1, 15
- (ζ) ἰδέα ψυχῆ, 5, 14, 16², 17, 19
- (η) ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλῶν, APO1, 22
- (θ) ἴδιος θάνατος τοῦ Λόγου, APO1, 18.
- (ι) ἰδέαν τελειότητα (τοῦ ὁμοουσίου), APO1, 12

In APO2 the constructions (β), (δ), (ς) and (η) reappear; for (β) see ch.6; for (δ) see chs. 3 and 5; for (ς) see ch.6²; and for (η) see ch.5. Apart from these APO2 gives us two further constructions and the whole picture is as follows:

- ἴδιον θεότητος τὸ Χριστός ὄνομα, APO2, 2
- (δ) ἰδέαν σάρκα, APO2, 3, 5
- (η) ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖν, APO2, 5
- (β) ἰδέα φύσει, APO2, 6
- (ς) ἰδέαν δημιουργίαν (οἱ ἰδέαν ποίησιν), APO2, 6²
- ἰδέαν δικαιοσύνην, APO2, 11

That leaves us with (α), (γ), (ε), (ζ), (θ), and (ι). But (γ) and (ς) can be discarded because they are nearly synonymous to (δ), which brings the number of divergencies down to (α), (ε), (θ) and (ι), i.e. a total of only 4 peculiar constructions of ἴδιος for APO1 and just 2 such constructions for APO2. Obviously no stylistic argument could be established on this basis.

The case of the particle ἄν is similar to the previous one. APO1 employs it 3 times in statements of the author's opponents and in the following constructions:

- (1) as the apodosis of conditional sentences , chs. 1 and 14
- (2) οὐκ ἄν τις εἶποι (APO1, 5, 18), or ὡς ἄν τις εἶποι (ch. 13)
- (3) πῶς ἄν γένοιτο (ch. 5), or πῶς ἄν ἐγεγόνει (ch. 19)
- (4) τίς οὐκ ἄν ὁμολογήσειεν (ch. 9), or οὕτως ἄν λέγοιτο (ch. 16),
or οὐκ ἄν λέγοιτο (ch. 20)
- (5) οὐκ ἄν νομισθεῖη (ch. 16), or ἄν νομισθεῖη (ch. 16)
- (6) οὐδέ ἄν εἶη (ch. 15²)
- (7) ὅπως ἄν... ἐνδύσῃται (ch. 17).

Cases (1), (3), (4) and (6) reappear in APO2; for (1) see ch. 16, for (3) ch. 11, for (4) chs. 2 and 11, and for (6) ch. 12. This leaves only three cases which represent 6 occurrences of ἄν in APO1 which find no parallels in APO2, and on which it is obviously impossible to base any stylistic argumentation.

The case of ἐννοέω does not present any problems as no particular term or mood of the verb seems to be employed extensively so as to indicate stylistic character. APO1 employs the infinitive ἐννοεῖν 5 times (4 of which belong to the construction τοῦτο ἐννοεῖν ἀσεβές), but this rate of occurrence is too low. APO2 does employ the infinitive once in a similar way (ch. 15).

The case of ἀνάστασις provides no stylistic criteria because APO2 simply discusses the subject of death and resurrection more extensively than APO1 does. The divergence in the rate of occurrence here is just incidental and there is no peculiar stylistic construction which employs this term in the text.

Out of the 13 occurrences of λαμβάνω in APO2, 5 of them are the participle λαβών and 4 of them the aorist ἔλαβεν . None of them is sufficient to provide stylistic criteria. The ἔλαβεν appears twice in APO1 (chs. 2 and 5).

οἱ ἄλλοι αἵρετικοί , or οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν αἵρετικῶν appear 5 times in APO1. Such constructions do seem to have some stylistic value but the rate of occurrence is still low to be of critical signi-

ficance. The construction πάντες αἱρετικοί appears once in APO2 and twice in APO1.

Finally the word δοῦλος appears 13 times out of a total of 14 in APO2 in the well known Pauline formula μορφή δούλου. The two occurrences of this term in APO1 are again connected with the same formula, and hence no problem can be detected here.

The vocabulary common to APO1 and APO2 represents the vast length of these treatises and does not seem to give rise to any problems of style. But to be certain on this we need to look more closely to the grammar of this vocabulary and its various characteristic constructions.

Grammatically this vocabulary can be arranged as follows:

1) Verbs	266	6) Adverbs	32
2) Abstract nouns	145	7) Pronouns	27
3) Concrete nouns	100	8) Prepositions	43
4) Proper Nouns	26	9) Particles	40
5) Adjectives	105		

A close examination of the verbs and their forms reveals no serious problems to style. Most verbs have a very low rate of occurrence and are therefore stylistically insignificant. Among the verbs of high rate of occurrence we are more likely to find stylistic features, and the most important of them are the following: λέγω, εἰμί, γράφω.

The verb λέγω is employed in the following parallel constructions in our two treatises under investigation:

ἀλλά λέγετε...	APO1,4,10,	APO2,6 ² ,11.12
ἀλλά πάλιν λέγετε...	APO1,6,20,	APO2,7,8,16
πάλιν λέγετε...	APO1,6,7,	APO2,9,14
πῶς λέγετε...	APO1,20,	APO2,5
πῶς οὖν λέγετε...	APO1,6,17	APO2,112
πῶς τοίνυν λέγετε...	APO1,20	APO2,5

ὕμεῖς συκοφαντοῦντες λέγετε,	AP01,21	AP02,5, and 4
πῶς δέ καί ὁ ἀπόστολος λέγει,	AP01,4	AP02,6
ὡς ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ ἀπόστολος,	{ AP01,10 AP02,5 AP02,14	
ὡς καί ὁ ἀπόστολος λέγει,		
καί ὁ ἀπόστολος δέ λέγει,		
Also,		
καί ὁ Κύριος δέ λέγει	{ AP01,10 AP02,16	
καί ὁ Ἰωάννης δέ λέγει		
and		
τά λεγόμενα...τά γινόμενα...	AP01,16	AP02,13
εἶπατε τοίνυν	AP01,3	AP02,3,5,6,9.

The only divergence we observe in the usage of the verb λέγω is the middle form λέγεται, which appears 13 times in AP01, but only once in AP02. A closer look however at the 13 occurrences shows that they are all connected with 7 main statements (AP01, 4,5,8,10,12,13 and 20) five of which are connected with the presentation of abstract principles and therefore naturally demand this form of the verb.

The verb εἰμί:

The infinitive εἶναι is used 7 times in AP01 and 6 in AP02.

in one of these cases the usage is almost identical:

...ἐρεῖτε δεκτικὴν εἶναι θανάτου...

...ἐρεῖτε δεκτικόν εἶναι θανάτου...

The construction ἵνα ... ἦ ... is fairly characteristic and appears equally frequently in both treatises (AP01,2,6,7²,12³,15², and AP02,2²,5²,16²,18). Most notable are the cases:

ἵνα εἷς ἦ τὰ ἑκάτερα τέλειος κατὰ πάντα φυσικὴν καί ἀληθεστάτην...

(AP01,7) or ἵνα εἷς ἦ τὰ ἑκάτερα τέλειος κατὰ πάντα θεός καί ἄνθρωπος (AP01,15), which should be compared to the following

ἵνα πρὸς ἑκάτερα ἦ ὁ αὐτός φυσικῶς καί ἀληθῶς θεός μὲν... ἄνθρωπος δέ... (AP02,18), ἵνα καί ἄνθρωπος ἦ ἐν τῷ κάθει καί ἄτρεπτος ἦ θεός ὢν (AP02,2), ἵνα καί ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦ θεός ἀληθῶς καί ὁ θεός ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς καί ἵνα ἦ καί ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς καί θεός ἀληθῶς (ch.5).

Finally the texts:

ἵνα τελεία ἦ καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις , (APO1,15)

ἵνα τελεία ἦ ἡ ἀνάστασις , (APO2,16).

The verb γράφω presents the strikingly identical construction
 ὡς (καθώς) γέγραπται { APO1,3,4,6,12,13,17²,20²,22
 APO2,1,3,5,8,15,16,18.

The nouns do not present any particular difficulties. The only two cases where divergence in rate of occurrence suggests difference in style - namely, the case of ἀνάστασις (7/23) and δοῦλος (2/14) have already been discussed.

The same must be said of the adjectives which can be conveniently listed as follows:

ἴδιος	27	8	θεϊκός	3	1
ὁμοούσιος	24	1	καινός	3	2
ἀνθρώπινος	17	9	κρείττων	3	3
ἅγιος	15	11	πρωτότοκος	3	6
τέλειος	15	2	ἀγαθός	2	2
ἐπουράνιος	11	4	ἀνυπόστατος	2	2
μόνος	8	5	ἀόρατος	2	2
παθητός	8	7	ἐλεύθερος	2	1
πολύς	7	3	θνητός	2	1
πρῶτος	7	6	ἴσος	2	1
ἀπαθής	6	3	νέος	2	1
ἄτρεπτος	6	4	ὀργανικός	2	3
δεκτικός	6	2	παλαιός	2	2
ἀληθινός	5	2	πονηρός	2	2
μάταιος	5	1	ἀδύνατος	1	7
νεκρός	5	12	αἰδῖος	1	1
φυσικός	5	4	αἰώνιος	1	1
ἀληθής	4	1	ἄφθαρτος	1	2
ἀναλλοίωτος	4	4	ἐνεργής	1	3
ἀδιαίρετος	3	3	ἔσχατος	1	1
ἄσπληντος	3	1	εὐαγγελικός	1	2
ἀσώματος	3	1	ἥττων	1	1
δεύτερος	3	3	θαυμάσιος	1	2
δυνατός	3	2	ἰουδαϊκός	1	1
θεῖος	3	4			

κακός	1	2	λογικός	1	9
καλός	1	2	φανερός	1	1
κοινός	1	1	φθαρτός	1	1

From all these adjectives ἴδιος has been discussed. Also ὁμο-
οὔσιος, τέλειος, and ἐπουράνιος derive from the notions defen-
ded by the author's adversaries.

The adverbs common to APO1 and APO2 are the following:

πάλιν	11	10	ἀθελῶς	1	1
πότε	11	4	ἐκεῖσε	1	1
ἐκεῖ	5	4	πού	1	2
οὔπου	5	2	φυσικῶς	1	1
ὄντως	2	1	ἔσωθεν	11	1
πόθεν	2	1			

Πάλιν is used characteristically with ἀλλά in the construct-
ion ἀλλά πάλιν or the equivalent καί πάλιν which appears in
APO1,6,11²,14, and 20 and APO2,7,8,15, and 16. APO1 does also
include the distinctive construction δ'αὖ πάλιν (ch.21) which
reappears twice in APO2 (chs. 3 and 18).

Ποτέ is used in two senses in both APO1 and APO2: firstly, in
the sense of ποτέ (APO1,6,12 and 19 and APO2,8,9, and 15); and
secondly as the interrogative particle ποτε (APO1,2²,21⁶ (4
times in the formula ποτε μὲν ... ποτε δέ) and APO2,11).

Finally the ἔσωθεν does not belong to the author of either
treatise but to his adversaries.

The prepositions common to APO1 and APO2 are as follows:

ἐν	99	114	περὶ	11	12
κατά	73	47	ἀντί	10	3
ἐκ	69	82	ὑπό	6	4
εἰς	32	25	πρό	5	5
διὰ	30	42	μέχρι	4	1
ἐπί	24	12	χωρίς	3	7
πρός	20	20	μετά	1	2
ὑπέρ	14	14	ὄθεν	1	2
παρά	11	6	ἀπό	4	10

The preposition ἐν

It is used with the dative of a noun or a pronoun in both APO.

The preposition κατά

It is used with the accusative in every case, with the only exception of the phrase καθ' ἡμῶν of APO2,17 where it is used with the genitive and has the sense of "against". Notable parallels in the usage of this preposition in both APO are the following:

καθ' ὑμᾶς or καθ' ἡμᾶς	{	APO1, 2, 3 ² , 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11
		APO2, 8 ² , 16 ³ , 17 ² , 18
κατά σάρκα	{	APO1, 3 ² , 8, 9 ²
		APO2, 2, 8, 13, 14 ²
κατά φύσιν	{	APO1, 5, 6, 7, 12 ³ , 13, 17 ²
		APO2, 8, 9 ² , 12

The preposition ἐκ

It is used with the genitive and the most notable parallels are the following:

ἐκ σπέρματος	APO1, 8, 9 ³ , 10, 12 ²	APO2, 2, 8, 13, 14 ²
ἐκ Παρθένου, or ἐκ Μαρίας	{	APO1, 4 ⁵ , 6, 9 ² , 12, 13, 17, 20 ³
ἐκ μήτρας Παρθένου, or ἐκ γυναικός		APO2, 2, 3, 5, 5 ³ , 8, 10, 13, 18 ³

Other phrases like ἐκ νεκρῶν or ἐκ Θεοῦ or ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν λαλῶν, etc. are more predictable. Only the phrase ἐκ Ναζαρέτ which appears 5 times in APO2 and not once in APO1 presents a notable divergence but it is explainable from the fact that it belongs to the notions defended by the author's adversaries.

The preposition εἰς

This preposition is used with the accusative and presents no special features in the two treatises.

The preposition διὰ

It is used with the genitive of a pronoun or a noun and especially in the most striking construction διὰ τοῦτο which appears

in APO1,14,15³,16, 17² and 18 and in APO2,1,2,3,4,5,6³,8,9³,10³, 11,14,15,16², and 18². APO1 also uses the construction διὰ τῆ δέ but employs it only five times.

The preposition ἐπί

This preposition is used with the accusative and the genitive in both treatises, but APO1 includes three cases of ἐπί dative.

The preposition πρός

Πρός + accusative is equally used in both APO1 and APO2, but πρός + dative appears 4 times only in APO2.

The preposition ὑπέρ

Ἐπὲρ + genitive is the commonest construction in both APO, but there are a few examples in both treatises of ὑπέρ + dative where this preposition is employed comparatively and indicates superiority. The most notable construction here is the ὑπέρ ἡμῶν which appears in APO1,6², 10,11,12,16, and 20 and in APO2,1,2,7,12,14, 16 and 17. APO2 also uses the equivalent phrase ὑπέρ ἀνθρώπων (chs. 5,9,11, and 13), whilst APO1 uses the similar phrases ὑπέρ ὄλου ἀνθρώπου (ch.17) and ὑπέρ τοῦ παντός (ch.19).

The preposition παρά

APO1 uses παρά + accusative mainly in the comparative construction ἕτερος παρά + accusative which conveys the sense of "than". All the 11 occurrences of this preposition in this treatise are of this kind. In APO2 we come across the above usage only twice in the phrase παρ'αὐτούς (APO1,15) and παρά φύσιν (APO2,8). The remaining 4 occurrences employ παρά + genitive which conveys the sense of "by" or "from". The rate of occurrence however is too low to provide us with a case of stylistic discordance. In any case APO2 does know the construction of APO1, which in fact can be reduced to 8 cases because παρ'ἡμᾶς appears twice and παρά τᾶ

γεγραμμένα thrice.

The preposition περί

Περί + genitive is used consistently in both APO1 and APO2 at an equal rate of occurrence and without any special construction.

The preposition ἀντί

Ἀντί + genitive used in the sense of "instead of" is common to both treatises. APO2 employs it mainly in the phrases ἀντί τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου and ἀντί ψυχῆς, both of which appear in APO1, the former 4 times and the latter once.

The preposition ὑπό

APO1 uses ὑπό + genitive, whilst APO2 uses the same and also ὑπό + accusative. The latter construction is used only twice and therefore no argument can be built on it.

The preposition πρό

Πρό + genitive is used in both APO1 and APO2 and the notable phrase πρό αἰώνων (or its equivalent πρό τῶν αἰώνων) is used 4 times in APO1 (chs. 13² and 20²) and 2 times in APO2 (chs. 3 and 5).

The preposition μέχρι

Μέχρι + genitive used in both treatises presents no problems.

The preposition χωρίς

Χωρίς ἀμαρτίας is used by both APO1 (chs. 2, 17) and APO2 (chs. 3, 5², 6, and 8²).

The prepositions μετά and ὅθεν

Finally the preposition μετά + genitive and the deductive ὅθεν, present no problems or special features.

The above investigation shows that the use of prepositions in APO1 and APO2 contributes positively to the case of identity of authors.

What remains now to be done is to examine the use of the

Conjunctions, which are as follows:

καί	397	324	οὐκ	24	18	οἷ	4	2
δέ	106	101	ἀν	19	5	ᾧ	3	1
γάρ	65	51	τι	15	5	ἀλλαχοῦ	2	2
ἀλλά	53	56	τοίνυν	13	11	ἐάν	2	7
εἰ	45	37	τε	12	9	εἴτα	2	2
ἵνα	43	31	ὥσπερ	12	5	ἐπειδή	2	9
ὥς	42	36	μήτε	10	10	κἄν	2	2
ἦ	39	46	οὐχ	10	7	μᾶλλον	2	2
μή	38	27	τουτέστι	10	3	μήτιγε	2	1
ὅτι	38	42	ὥστε	7	4	ὅπως	2	2
οὐ	37	30	οὐδέ	6	5	αὖ	1	2
μέν	32	29	οὐχί	6	6	διό	11	9
πῶς	32	38	ἀρα	5	3	μάλιστα	1	1
οὔν	28	17	ἐπεὶ	5	5	πάντως	1	2
οὕτω	26	12	καίτοι	5	3	οὖν	1	1

The conjunctions καί and δέ have been employed with good results in stylometric analyses and we shall apply the same test here, although we believe that such tests represent only approximations. The principle which we shall employ here is to divide the number of occurrences by the number of pages of text, using for our numbering of the pages the standardised Athens edition of the text of Athanasius. To be able to compare our results from APO1 and APO2 we shall apply the same test to the dogmatic works of Athanasius. Our data are as follows:

<u>work</u>	<u>conjunction καί</u>			<u>conjunction δέ</u>		
AP01	397/16	=	24,81 per page	106/16	=	6,6 per page
AP02	324/14	=	23,1 - ^{vv} -	101/14	=	7,2 - ^{vv} -
CAR1	1.584/54	=	29,33 - ^{vv} -	441/54	=	8,1 - ^{vv} -
CAR2	1.976/70	=	28,2 - ^{vv} -	525/70	=	7,5 - ^{vv} -
CAR3	1.684/56	=	30 - ^{vv} -	413/56	=	7,3 - ^{vv} -
CAR5	487/17	=	28,6 - ^{vv} -	107/17	=	6,4 - ^{vv} -

SERL-4	1.569/59 = 26,5	481/59 = 8
EPI	199/8 = 24,8	56/8 = 7
ADEL	130/5,5 = 23,6	31/5,5 = 5,6
MAX	50/2,5 = 20	16/2,5 = 6,5

These figures indicate that the average number of $\kappa\alpha\iota$ and $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ per page in Athanasian works lies between 20-30 occurrences for the former and 5,6-8,1 for the latter. The figures relating to APO1 and APO2 are both very close to each other and fall within the range of occurrence which we established for Athanasius. These are positive indications of identity of authorship although other additional criteria are needed in order that such a view is taken.

Similar results can be observed with the conjunction $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$:

	CAR1	336/54 = 6	
	CAR2	421/70 = 6	
APO1	65/16 = 4	CAR3	381/56 = 6,8
APO2	51/14 = 3,64	CAR5	88/17 = 5
	SERL-4	355/59 = 6	
	EPI	44/8 = 5,5	
	ADEL	20/5,5 = 3,63	
	MAX	13/2,5 = 5,2.	

The occurrences of $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ in APO1 and APO2 do fall within the Athanasian range of usage and , as in the case of $\kappa\alpha\iota$ and $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ so here the rate is closer to the later works of Athanasius, EPI and ADEL, which are chronologically closer to our two treatises.

As regards the other conjunctions we have found no discordance in their usages but rather important parallels which we have listed below:

εἶ δέ	{ APO1, 8, 10 ² , 12 ² , 14 ² , 15, 16 ³ , 18, 19. APO2, 6 ² , 9 ² , 12 ² , 15, 16, 17.
εἶ μή	{ APO1, 5, 7, 13, 19 APO2, 2, 9, 11, 14, 16
εἶ γάρ	{ APO1, 9, 13, 18, 20 APO2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 13 ² , 16, 17
ἵνα καί... καί	{ APO1, 6 ² , 8 ² , 12, 14, 17, 20 APO2, 2, 5, 7, 16
ὡς γέγραπται	has been already mentioned in connection with the verb γράφω
ἦ...ἦ	{ APO1, 1, 2, 3 ² , 5 ² , 6, 9 ³ , 11, 12, 14 ² APO2, 1, 3, 4 ⁴ , 12 ⁶ .
λέγω + ὅτι (i.e., λέγετε ὅτι, λέγεται ὅτι, or εἴρηται etc.)	{ APO1, 4, 5, 6 ² , 10, 12, 13, 18 ² , APO2, 1 ³ , 4, 6, 8 ² , 9, 11, 16.
καί ὅτι	{ APO1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 18 APO2, 2, 4, 16
οὐ γάρ	{ APO1, 2, 6, 8, 12, 16 APO2, 5, 6, 9, 11
καί οὐ (or οὐκ, or οὐχ or οὐχί) μέν...δέ	{ APO1, 3 ² , 10, 12, 17, 18, 20 ² , 22 APO2, 3, 5, 11 ² , 14, 16 ² , 17, 19.
	is extensively used in APO1 (23 times) and in APO2 (22 times) to denote either equilibrium (APO1, 2 ² , 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 ² , 13 ² , 14 ² , 17 ² and APO2, 2, 3 ² , 6, 14, 15, 17, 18 ⁴) or antithesis (APO1, 3, 4, 8 ² , 13, 18, 20, 21, and APO2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 ² , 16, 17, 18 ³).
πῶς οὖν	{ APO1, 4, 6 ² , 9 ² , 14, 17, 20 APO2, 2, 7, 9, 11 ² , 13, 16
πῶς...+ λέγω (or πῶς λέγετε, λέγεται etc.)	{ APO1, 3, 4, 6 ² , 7, 9 ² , 14, 17, 20 ² APO2, 5, 6, 11 ² , 16, 17 ² .
καί πῶς	{ APO1, 9, 12, 15, 18 APO2, 2, 6 ³ , 8 ² , 11, 15, 16.
πῶς δέ, or πῶς δέ καί	{ APO1, 4, 15 ² , 19 APO2, 6, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17 ³

διὰ τοῦτο οὖν	{ APO1, 15 APO2, 6
ὄσατε οὖν	{ APO1, 9 APO2, 9, 16
καὶ οὕτω(ς)	{ APO1, 2, 13, 14 ² , 15 ² , 16, 17 APO2, 6, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17
οὕτως καὶ	{ APO1, 5, 12, 16 ³ , 17 APO2, 1, 3, 6.

striking perhaps are the parallel phrases :

εἰ δέ ταῦτα οὕτω νοεῖν βούλεσθε (appearing in APO2, 12) and
εἰ δέ τοίνυν ταῦτα οὕτω νοεῖν οὐ βούλεσθε, (APO1, 16).

τί ἔτι μέμφεσθε { APO1, 3, 10, 12,
APO2, 9, Interesting also are the following:

τί πρός ἡμᾶς διαμάχεσθε (APO1, 8) and
τί ἔτι ἑαυτοῖς μάχεσθε (APO2, 9).

It should also be observed here that APO1 does use the construction διὰ τί 6 times (APO1, 6, 7, 8, 21³) which never appears in APO2. But is the number of 6 occurrences sufficient to establish a stylistic divergence?

The conjunction τοίνυν presents a very interesting case. APO1 uses the conditional construction εἰ τοίνυν 5 times (chs. 4, 6, 8, 10 and 16), whilst APO2 uses it only once (ch. 16). On the other hand APO2 prefers the construction εἴπατε τοίνυν which appears 4 times (chs. 3, 5, 6, and 9), whilst APO1 knows this construction but uses it only once (ch. 3). Finally both APO1 and APO2 use the interrogative construction τί τοίνυν only once (APO1, 10 and APO2, 4). Although these are interesting facts they are relatively infrequent and as such cannot establish stylistic arguments. In any case APO1 knows all the constructions which APO2 uses.

As regards the conjunction τε , it is rather significant that both APO1 and APO2 know the relatively unusual construction οἷόν τε APO1, 2, 17 and APO2, 6, 15). Interesting also is the fact that

that both treatises employ the construction τε καί... καί (APO1, 3³, 21 and APO2, 2, 9, 13, and 17).

Finally we may note the parallel construction μήτε... μήτε appearing in APO1, 1, 4, 8 and 9, and also in APO2, 6, 14 and 18. The rest of the conjunctions used in our two treatises present no special features or problems.

We may then conclude that the examination of the vocabulary common to APO1 and APO2, both from the point of view of the rate of word occurrence and from grammar, give no cause for diversity of authors. This is positively strengthened by the presence of a number of phraseological parallels in the texts of the two treatises, which we shall list in the next chapter. Before we do this however, we shall try to answer the question whether the vocabulary of APO1 and APO2 agrees or disagrees with that of Athanasius. To do this we shall compare the vocabulary of the two APO to that of Müller's Lexicon Athanasianum eliminating, of course, from the latter the words deriving from the spurious works and the words which belong to our two treatises. Such a comparison renders the following data:

Words peculiar to APO1 and not appearing in Athanasius

ἀβλεπτέω	1	ἀκτίστως	1	ἀνελπισία	1
ἄγευστος	1	ἄλλωμαι	1	ἀνεπίδεκτος	5
ἀδημονία	1	ἄμαυρόω	1	ἀνθυποφορέω	2
ἄθεσμος	2	ἄμετρία	1	ἀνίατος	1
ἀθιγής	1	ἀναβλαστάνω	1	ἀνοήτως	1
ἀθιγῶς	1	ἀναγράφω	3	ἀντάλλαγμα	1
ἀτίτλασις	1	ἀνακλίνω	1	ἀντιοδίδωμι	3
ἀκαταδέκαστος	2	ἀναμάρτητος	7	ἀνύβριστος	1
ἄκοπος	1	ἀνανήφω	1	ἀπαρακάλυπτος	2
ἀκράτητος	1	ἀνάστημα	1	ἀπεκδύωμαι	2
ἄκτιστος	30	ἀνελλιπής	1	ἀπολισθαίνω	1

ἀπολύτρωσις	1	ἐξουσιαστικῶς	1	παρατρέχω	1
ἀποχή	1	ἐπαισθάνομαι	1	πεῖνα	1
ἀριθμησις	3	ἐπάναγκες	1	πλάστης	1
ἀρχέτυπος	2	ἐργάτης	1	προγενής	1
ἀρχῆθεν	2	εὐαπόδεικτος	1	προεξευρίσκω	1
ἀσθήρικτος	3	εὐκρινής	1	προσκαταλείπω	1
ἀσύγχυτος	1	εὐφημος	2	προσοικειδοῦμαι	1
αὔξεισις	6	εὐχάριστος	1	προσχράομαι	1
αὐτέλεγκτος	4	θεοειδής	1	προσχώρησις	1
διαβλέπω	1	καινοποιέω	1	ρεῦσις	1
διαπήγνυμι	1	κάλλος	1	Ρητόριος	1
διχῆ	2	καταιτιάομαι	1	σκιώδης	1
δίψα	1	καταλλαγή	1	σπάρργανον	1
ἐκδείκνυμι	1	κόπωσις	1	στραγγαλιά	1
ἐκπλήρωσις	1	λυτήριος	1	συμπεῖθω	1
ἔκπνευσις	1	μετάπτωσις	1	σύμφυτος	1
ἐλάπτωσις	1	μετάφρασις	1	τριχῆ	1
ἔλεγξις	1	μήνυμα	3	τυραννικῶς	1
ἔμπλεος	1	μονοτρόπος	1	ὑπερισχύω	1
ἐναπόδεικτος	2	ὀφειλομένως	1	ὑπισχνέομαι	1
ἐνυπόστατος	1	παραπορεύομαι	1	ψηλαφητός	2
ἐνυποστάτως	1	παρατρέπω	1		

Words peculiar to APO2 and not appearing in Athanasius

αἰχμαλωτεύω	2	ἐπίκληρος	1	πρότασις	1
ἀκατάλυτος	1	ἐτέρωθεν	1	προὔπισχνέομαι	1
ἄλυτος	5	εὐπροχώρητος	1	προσχώρησις	2
ἄμαρτητικός	3	ζωοποιήσις	1	πτωχεύω	3
ἄμορφος	2	ζωτικός	1	ρῦσις	1
ἀναδείκνυμι	2	ἥττημα	1	στραγγαλιώδης	2
ἀναιχμαλώτιστος	2	θαυματουργία	1	συγκατέχω	1
ἀνεπίδεκτος	1	περὶσσεια	2	σύγκρασις	2
ἀφραστότης	1	πλήρωσις	2	συμβοάω	1
ἀφράστως	1	πρακτικός	1	συμμέτοχος	1
διαμέτρησις	1	προορισμός	1	συμπενθέω	1
ἐγκατάλειψις	1	προόεπιδιδωμι	1	συνεπισταμαι	1
ἔνδειξις	1	προσηλῶ	1	συνθνήσκω	1
ἐνεργός	1	προσηλωσις	2	ὑποκαλύπτω	1
ἐξουσιαστικός	1	προσομολογέω	2	φανταστικός	1
		προσπονητῶς	1	ῶσανεῖ	1

Finally there is a number of words which are common to APO1 and APO2 and which do not appear in Athanasius' vocabulary. These are the following:

ἀθιγῶς	διαγράφω	μονότροπος
ἀναμαρτησία	ἐξουσιαστικῶς	νέκρωσις
ἀνοχή	ἐπισπορά	πραγματεία
ἀπαρακαλύπτως	καινοποιέω	πρόσειμι
ἀποχώρησις	καινοποιήσις	ρήσις
ἀρχέτυπος	μεταποίησης	στραγγαλιά
ἀρχῆθεν	μετάστασις	στραγγαλιώδης
δᾶϊξις	μονοτρόπως	συμπάθεια
		τρῶσις

What emerges from the above data is the comparatively low frequency of peculiar words. As to their number in the context of the Athanasian vocabulary, it should not come as a surprise. There is hardly any work of Athanasius which does not contain any hapax legomena in his over all vocabulary. Our own investigations have rendered the following results concerning the Athanasian hapax legomena of each Athanasian work:

GENT	81	AFRO	2	CAR4	23
INC	49	CONST	37	CAR5	8
ILL	9	FUGA	23	SER1	16
ENCY	16	SER5	4	SER2	1
APOLO1	100	HIST	59	SER3	1
DECR	24	CAR1	39	SER4	15
DION	19	CAR2	36	SYNO	69
DRAC	7	CAR3	35	VITA	93
ORSI	6	AMMO	2	EPI	4

The above figures indicate that no argument can be built on the number of neologisms in Athanasius. It is interesting that the richness of his vocabulary changes according to circumstances.

Out of the 98 peculiar words in APO1 which do not appear in Athanasius, about 40 seem to derive from the adversaries, and another 10 from the Scriptures, whilst the rest of them appear just once. This means that the non-Athanasian vocabulary of APO1 is but a tiny fraction of 1% of the total vocabulary! The same observation can be made with regard to the non-Athanasian element in the vocabulary of APO2.

As regards the vocabulary common to Athanasius and the two APO, we have found no important differences. It is true that grammatically speaking APO1 and APO2 seem to make greater use of participles and abstract expressions than seems usual in Athanasius, but their frequency is very low and Athanasius' habit on this varies greatly according to circumstances and especially according to the character of his addressees. His style of CONS and FUGA for instance is quite different from the style of CARL-3 and so is the style of VITA when seen from the point of view of verbal and abstract expression. If we take EPI as the Athanasian writing which stands closer in time and character to the two APO, we find in it the presence of nearly half the number of abstract nouns and verbal expressions to those appearing in APO1 and APO2. This makes good sense, if we consider that the text length of EPI is 19.347 words, i.e. almost exactly half the size of APO1.

As regards the use of prepositions and conjunctions as well as other particles in Athanasius, we have gathered together the following data:

Prepositions

	ΑΡΟ1	ΑΡΟ2	ΕΡΓ	ΑΔΕΛ	ΜΑΧ	SER1	SER2	SER3	SER4	CAR1	CAR2	CAR3
ἀνά	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	--
ἀντί	10	3	5	-	-	-	1	-	2	8	9	2
ἀπό	4	10	9	8	2	30	4	3	5	60	55	47
διά	30	42	25	18	6	100	19	20	49	210	301	224
έως	32	25	25	11	10	83	14	19	72	140	246	140
ἐκ	69	82	64	15	5	81	11	31	35	205	171	156
ἐν	99	114	54	42	10	351	55	85	117	264	439	549
ἐπί	24	12	16	7	9	52	9	9	33	80	90	70
κατά	73	47	23	9	3	45	13	2	25	108	168	100
μετά	1	2	10	8	3	39	1	4	13	34	68	41
μέχρι	4	1	-	-	-	2	-	1	1	11	2	3
παρά	11	6	12	9	7	32	4	6	23	108	135	98
περί	11	12	5	3	2	68	-	11	23	118	120	91
πρό	5	5	7	-	-	5	1	1	1	36	78	35
πρός	20	20	15	5	4	47	5	8	22	83	91	63
σύν	1	2	1	-	1	2	-	2	2	6	5	3
ὑπέρ	14	14	9	5	4	2	1	1	5	27	31	18
ὑπό	6	4	-	6	1	10	-	3	4	16	15	11

Improper Prepositions

ἄχρις	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
εἵνεκεν	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	2	-	-
ἔμπαλιν	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	3	-
ἔνεκα	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	2	1	7	2
ἔνεκεν	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
ἕως	1	1	2	-	-	5	-	-	2	3	12	6

Conjunctions and Particles

	APO1	APO2	EPI	ADEL	MAX	SER1	SER2	SER3	SER4	CAR1	CAR2	CAR3
ἀλλά	53	56	45	22	10	16	26	17	57	228	365	231
ἀλλαχοῦ	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ἄμα	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	6	2
ἄν	19	5	4	2	1	51	14	12	23	84	97	70
ἄρα	5	3	4	2	1	23	-	-	9	48	39	30
αὐ	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
γάρ	65	50	44	21	13	174	39	37	93	337	421	382
γέ	3	-	1	1	1	11	-	-	2	22	20	12
γοῦν	-	-	4	1	1	6	4	5	-	27	31	22
δέ	106	101	56	31	16	251	55	41	134	441	525	413
δή	4	2	2	-	-	4	2	-	3	6	8	5
δηλονότι	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-
δήποτε	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
δήπου	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
διατί	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
διό	11	9	2	1	1	8	1	3	3	22	18	11
διόπερ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
διότι	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	-
δίχα	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
εἰάν	2	7	1	5	1	9	1	-	6	21	26	20
εἶ	45	37	22	11	8	77	18	21	32	165	225	166
εἶγε	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
εἶπερ	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	5	3
εἶτα	2	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	5	11	11
εἵτε	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	24	5
ἐπεὶ	5	2	2	-	2	7	1	1	5	11	14	18
ἐπειδὴ	2	9	1	5	-	11	9	7	13	30	36	29

	APO1	APO2	EPI	ADEL	MAX	SER1	SER2	SER3	SER4	CAR1	CAR2	CAR3
ἐπειδὴν	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1
ἐπειδὴπερ	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-
ἔπειτα	2	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	-	1	5	4
ἔτι	13	-	6	-	-	8	1	1	10	11	9	9
εὐθύς	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	19	8
ἐπέκεινα	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
ἦ	40	42	22	8	2	66	5	1	26	137	116	99
ἦδη	4	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	6	6	3
ἦν ἴκα	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	5	-
ἦτοι	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
ἵνα	43	32	19	-	10	44	12	8	24	109	135	142
καθὰ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
καθάπερ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	8
καθώς	7	-	1	-	1	2	-	1	1	3	8	28
καί	397	324	199	130	50	803	206	145	415	1584	1976	1684
καίπερ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	5
καίτοι	5	3	-	1	-	4	-	-	5	8	15	3
καὶν	2	2	3	4	1	10	1	3	6	33	33	25
λοιπόν	1	-	3	4	1	4	4	1	17	24	38	26
μᾶλλον	2	2	1	4	-	7	-	1	7	49	37	45
μάτην	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	1
μέν	32	28	25	19	9	100	28	13	65	210	269	193
μέντοι	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	5	4	5
μή	38	25	34	21	12	98	23	18	42	128	211	161
μηδέ	-	2	3	4	2	15	-	2	-	13	15	17
μηδέπω	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	2	-	-
μηκέτι	1	-	-	3	1	3	-	1	3	2	8	11
μήν	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	3	1

	ΑΡΟ1	ΑΡΟ2	ΕΡ1	ΑΔΕΛ	ΜΑΧ	SER1	SER2	SER3	SER4	CAR1	CAR2	CAR3
μήποτε	-	2	-	2	2	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
μήπω	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	1	2
μήτε	10	8	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	23	10	12
μήτεγε	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
όθεν	-	2	1	-	2	3	-	-	4	3	9	3
όμως	2	-	1	-	1	4	1	1	6	16	9	12
όπηλικά	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-
όπου	5	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-
όπουγε	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	3	2
όπως	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
όταν	2	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	9	11	21	9
ότε	3	-	1	-	1	8	3	4	4	51	39	27
ούδέ	6	5	5	6	3	36	11	7	11	58	125	76
ούδέποτε	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
ότι	39	42	23	12	7	63	16	15	32	138	186	192
ούδαμοῦ	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	1
ούκέτι	-	-	1	-	-	6	-	-	2	12	6	1
ούκοῦν	-	-	1	1	-	8	1	1	10	15	25	22
ούν	29	15	5	7	-	37	10	4	32	69	68	74
ούπω	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	4	1
ούποτε	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
ούτε	21	19	-	6	-	18	5	3	12	35	49	53
ούτω	14	3	10	1	-	28	4	6	15	43	72	76
ούτως	12	9	9	6	-	34	16	14	21	71	69	77
πάλιν	11	10	7	4	2	51	-	7	15	91	90	101
τε	12	9	3	1	2	24	4	2	21	55	84	44
χωρίς	3	6	-	-	1	1	4	-	-	17	18	5

	APO1	APO2	EPI	ADEL	MAX	SER1	SER2	SER3	SER4	CAR1	CAR2	CAR3
ώρ	42	35	35	16	9	68	19	23	61	186	256	262
ώσαύτως	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-
ώσελ	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-
ώσπερ	12	5	5	3	1	21	12	8	6	49	80	61
ώστε	7	4	4	3	--	6	-	2	6	21	27	9

IV.2. Phraseology

The following striking parallels in the phraseology of APO1 and APO2 have been singled out:

APO1

-ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυίδ καί τοῦ
Ἀβραάμ καί τοῦ Ἀδάμ (ch.12)

-ἵνα γένηται πρωτότοκος ἐν
πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς (ch.20)

-Χριστοῦ δέ κατά σάρκα ἐξ ἀν-
θρώπων ἀνισταμένου ἐκ τῶν ἀ-
δελφῶν ἡμῶν ὡς γέγραπται...
(ch. 3)

-καί ψυχῆς λυπομένης καί τα-
ραττομένης καί ἀδημονούσης
(ch.5)
ἀλλά ψυχῆς νόησιν ἐχοῦσης καί
λυπομένης καί ταραττομένης
καί ἀδημονούσης καί νοητῶς ἐ-
παιθανομένης τοῦ πάθους (ch.
11),
λυπούμενος καί ἀδημονῶν καί
προσευχόμενος (ch. 15)

-καί λέγεται κρείττων γενόμε-
νος τῶν ἀγγέλων, οὐκ αὐτός ὁ
ποιητής τῶν ἀγγέλων λόγος
κρείττων γέγονεν, ὡς ἦττων
ᾧ ποτε ἀλλά ἡ μορφή τοῦ
δούλου ἦν αὐτός ὁ λόγος ἰδι-

APO2

ἀλλ' ἐκ σπέρματος τοῦ Δαυίδ καί τοῦ
Ἀβραάμ καί τοῦ Ἀδάμ ὡς γέγραπται...
(ch. 8)

... ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυίδ καί Ἀβραάμ
καί τοῦ Ἀδάμ ὡς γέγραπται...(ch.5)

καί πῶς πρωτότοκος γέγονεν ἐν πολ-
λοῖς ἀδελφοῖς...(ch. 11)
εἰ γάρ μὴ πρωτότοκος ἐγεγόνει ἐν
πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς... (ibid.)

περί δέ τῆς ἐν σαρκί αὐτοῦ ἐπιδημί-
ας προφήτην ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμῶν λέ-
γει ἀναστησόμενον τόν Κύριον...
(ch.14)

οὔτε ταραχήν καί λύπην ἐπιδεικνυται
διόχα ψυχῆς λυπομένης καί ταραττομέ-
νης, οὔτε ἀδημονεῖ καί προσεύχεται
διόχα νοήσεως ἀδημονούσης καί προσευ-
χομένης (ch.13)

οὐ πάντως ὁ ποιητής τῶν ἀγγέλων
λόγος κρείττων γέγονεν, ὡς ἦττων
ᾧ, ἀλλά τήν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνατείλασαν
τοῦ δούλου μορφήν κρείττονα τῶν
ἀγγέλων ἢ καί πάσης τῆς κτίσεως
ἐπιδειξάμενος (ch.15)

ἢ πῶς λέγετε θεόν, ὡς Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατεύς; τοῦτο γάρ τῆς ἐκεῖνου ἄσεβειας τό πρόσχημα, θεόν ὁμολογεῖν τόν ἐκ Μαρίας, πρό αἰώνων μὲν προορισθέντα, ἐκ δέ Μαρίας τήν ἀρχήν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐσχηκότα. Λόγον δέ ἐνεργῆ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καί σοφίαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖ... κατά τήν ἑαυτοῦ ἀσέβειαν (ΑΡ01,20)

Πῶς τοίνυν λέγετε, ὡς Μαρκίων, θεόν ἐπιδημήσαντα, καί θεόν ἀθιγῶς προσεληλυθότα, φύσιν ἔχοντα ἀνεπίδεκτον σαρκός ἀνθρωπίνης; (ΑΡ01,20)

φύσει γάρ καί ἀληθείᾳ τά πάντα ἐγένετο (ΑΡ01,16)

καίτοι οὐκ ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρός ἀλλ' ἐκ Πνεύματος ἁγίου γεννηθείς (ΑΡ01,8)

πῶς δέ αὐτόν κατεδίκασεν ἁμαρτήσαντα; (ΑΡ01,15)

ἵνα ὥσπερ δι' ἐνός... ζωὴν αἰώνιον (ΑΡ01,17)

ἀντί τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ (ΑΡ01,2 and 13, 15, and 17)

οὔτε γάρ ὁ ἄδης ἤνεγκεν ἀπαρκαλύπτου θεόειτος ἐπίβασιν τοῦτο καί προφηταί καί ἀπόστολος μαρτυροῦσι (ΑΡ01,17)

εἶπατε τοίνυν πῶς θεόν; ὡς Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατεύς θεόν ἐκ τῆς παρθένου ὁμολογεῖ, θεόν ἐκ Ναζαρέτ ὀφθέντα, καί ἐντεῦθεν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τήν ἀρχήν ἐσχηκότα, καί ἀρχήν βασιλείας παρεληφότα^ο Λόγον δέ ἐνεργόν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, καί σοφίαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖ^ο τῷ μὲν προορισμῷ πρό αἰώνων ὄντα, τῇ δέ ὑπάρξει ἐκ Ναζαρέτ ἀναδειχθέντα... τοιαύτη τούτου ἡ ἀσέβεια (ΑΡ02,3)

Μαρκίων δέ καί Μανιχαῖος, θεόν ἐπιδημήσαντα ἐν Παρθένω καί ἀθιγῶς προσεληλυθότα καί ἀνεπίδέκτως ἔχοντα κοινωνῆσαι φύσει ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἀποπεπτακυῖα τῇ ἁμαρτία, καί ὑποκειμένη τῷ ἄρχοντι τῆς κακίας (ΑΡ02,3)

ἠὲ δόκησε κατεργάσασθαι... φύσει καί ἀληθείᾳ (ΑΡ02,9)

ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ σπέρματος ἀλλ' ἐκ Πνεύματος (ΑΡ02,8)

πῶς καταδικάζει τόν ἁμαρτήσαντα; (ΑΡ02,6)

ἵνα ὥσπερ δι' ἐνός... ζωὴν αἰώνιον (ΑΡ02,6)

Ἄρειος δέ σάρκα μόνην... ὁμολογεῖ ἀντί δέ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου τούτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς, τόν Λόγον ἐν σαρκί λέγει γεγονέναι. (ΑΡ02,3)

πῶς δέ καί ἀπαρκαλύπτως ὀφθεῖς ὁ Λόγος ἐν τῷ ἄδῃ ἐνομισυθῆ ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ ὡς ἄνθρωπος; (ΑΡ02,17)

καί πῶς εἰς ᾧδου κατήλθεν
ἀπαρακαλύπτῳ τῇ θεότητι;
(APO1, 18)

οἳ Ἄρειανοί σοφίζονται
(APO1, 15)

τί τοίνυν μέμφεσθε ἄρειανοῖς
(APO1, 10)

τοιαύτη τούτων ἡ ἀσέβεια
(APO1, 12)

οὕτω δ' αὖ πάλιν (APO1, 21)

ἐπεὶ τίς ἦν χρεία θεῶ γεννή-
σεως τῆς ἐκ γυναικός ἀνασχέ-
σθαι; αὐξήσεώσ τε καί ἡλικίας
καί ἐτῶν ἀριθμήσεως τῷ ποιητῇ
τῶν αἰώνων. (APO1, 5)

ὅσα μὲν αὐτὸς συνέταξε θελή-
σας τῇ φύσει, εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνε-
δέξατο, ὅσα ἠθέλησε, τούτέστι
γεννήσεως τῆς ἐκ γυναικός, αὐ-
ξήσεώσ τε ἡλικίας, ἐτῶν ἀριθμή-
σεως, κόπου, πείνης καί δίψης,
καί ὕπνου καί λύπης καί θανάτου
καί ἀναστάσεως. (APO1, 17)

δεῖξαι δύνασθαι (APO1, 14)

φαντασίαν τὴν δεῖξιν καί...
ὑπολαμβάνοντες (APO1, 3)
σκιώδη τὴν δεῖξιν ἐποιεῖτο
(APO1, 7)

Δώσετε οὖν... (APO1, 9)

οἳ Ἄρειανοί σοφίζονται
(APO2, 17)

τί ἔτι ἄρειανοῖς μέμφεσθε
(APO2, 9)

τοιαύτη τούτου ἡ ἀσέβεια
(APO2, 3)

οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν (APO2, 3)
εἶτα δ' αὖ πάλιν (APO2, 18)

ἀλλά λαβόντα τὴν τοῦ δούλου
μορφὴν ἐν ἀνοχῇ τῆς γεννήσεως.
τῆς ἐκ γυναικός καί αὐξήσεως
ἡλικίας τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς, ὡς φησιν
ὁ Ἀπόστολος. (APO2, 8)

ἄνθρωπος δέ πρὸς τῇ γεννήσει
τῆς ἐκ γυναικός καί τῇ αὐξήσει
τῆς ἡλικίας. (APO2, 18)

δεῖξαι δύνασθαι (APO2, 17)

φανταστικὴν τὴν δεῖξιν...
ποιησαμένου (APO2, 1)

Δώσετε οὖν... (APO2, 9)

καὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ποίησιν τὴν ἐν
ἑαυτῷ καὶ θεοῦ καὶ θανάτῳ
διακρίσεισαν ἐν ἐαυτῷ σωτηρία-
σθαι ἐν αἰῶνι καινότητος;

(AP01, 5)

... γέννηται ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα εἰς
ἡ τὰ ἐκείνα τέλειος κατα-
πάντα φουικὴν καὶ ἀληθεύσῃ
τὴν γέννησιν ἐπιβεβαιώσῃ.

(AP01, 7)

ἵνα εἰς ἡ τὰ ἐκείνα, τέλειος
κατὰ πάντα, θεός καὶ ἄνθρωπος
ὁ αὐτός. (AP01, 16)

καὶ ἐν ἐπιβάσει ἄου (AP01, 7)
καὶ ἄου ἐπιβάσει (AP01, 12)

καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐρημένον ἔσται
συνιδεῖν (AP01, 8)

τὰ ἴσα ἐκείνοις φρονούντες
(AP01, 15)

φουικὴ γέννησει
(AP01, 6, 10, 12)

φουικὴν καὶ ἀληθεύσῃ τὴν
γέννησιν (AP01, 7)

γενεαλογουσι τὸν Χριστὸν τὸ
κατὰ σάρκα (AP01, 9)

τοῦ ἄου γέννησιν καὶ ποίησιν
καὶ τὴν ἀνεστῆατο (AP01, 13)

τὴν ἄνθρωπον μορφήν ἐν ἐαυτῷ
ἀναστήσει ἐν αἰῶνι καινῷ-
τητος. (AP02, 10)

... ὁμοιωθεὶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα
πρὸς ἐκείνα ἡ ὁ αὐτός, φουικῶς
καὶ ἀληθινῶς θεός μὲν πρὸς τὴν
ἀϊδιότητα τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὴν
ὁμοιωθεὶς τῆς κτίσεως, ἄνθρωπος
ὁ πρὸς τὴν γέννησιν τῆς ἐκ γυναικὸς
καὶ τῆς αὐθιχῆς τῆς ἡλικίας.

(AP02, 18)

τὴν εἰς ἄου ἐπιβάσει (AP02, 7)
τὴν εἰς ἄου ἐπιβάσει (AP02, 15)

ἐκ δὲ τῆς ρήσεως ταύτης ἔσται
συνιδεῖν (AP02, 14)

τὰ ἴσα ἐκείνοις φρονούντες
(AP02, 9)

φουικὴ γέννησει καὶ ἀντὶ ἐνωσει
(AP02, 2, 5)

γέννησιν... φουικὴν (AP02, 5)

γενεαλογουσι τὸν Χριστὸν τὸ
κατὰ σάρκα (AP02, 13)

γὰρ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ποίησιν καὶ-
τὴν ἐκ τῆς κτίσεως παρθενοῦ ἀναστήσει
(AP02, 5)

σεν ὁ θάνατος ἐν μορφῇ ψυχῆς
ἀνθρωπίνης παρῶν ὁ θάνατος
ἐπιδείξεται τὴν ἀθανασίαν.
(APO1,17)

Πῶς ἡ κράτησις τοῦ θανάτου
τελείαν ἐλάμβανε τὴν λύσιν.
(APO1,19)

ὕμεῖς συκοφαντοῦντες λέγετε
(APO1,21)

ὕμεῖς συκοφαντοῦντες λέγετε
(APO2,5)

τὰ λεγόμενα...τὰ γινόμενα
(APO1,16)

τὰ λεγόμενα...τὰ γινόμενα
(APO2,13)

οὐ γὰρ ἕτερός ἐστι παρά τόν
Λόγον ὁ τόν θάνατον καί τὸ
πάθος ἀναδεδειγμένος, ἀλλ' αὐ-
τός ὁ ἀπαθῆς καί ἀσώματος Λό-
γος γενέσεως σαρκός ἀνθρωπίνης
ἀνασχόμενος τὰ πάντα πεπλήρωκεν.
(APO1,12)

ἢ καί αὐτόν ἀπαθῆ καί ἀσώματος
Θεόν Λόγον καί πρό τῆς σαρκώσε-
ως καί ἐνανθρωπήσεως ἐρεῖτε δε-
κτικόν εἶναι πάθους καί θανάτου;
(APO2,14)

IV.3 Discourse Construction

The construction of the two APO was first analysed by the Calvinist patristic scholar Abraham Scultet in his meticulous Medullae theologiae S. Patrum . With regard to AP01, Scultet discerned a four-fold structure based on the refutation of four heretical theses: (a) that the flesh of Christ was uncreated and heavenly, (b) that the flesh of Christ was homousios with the Godhood, (c) that the soul was replaced in Christ by a heavenly mind, and (d) that the Logos was in Christ as He was in the prophets. These four disputations formed the four main parts of AP01 and were preceded by an Introduction and followed by an appropriate Epilogue. Within each part Scultet saw a number of objections raised from the side of the author's adversaries which provided the basis for further subdivisions within the four main parts of the treatise. The over-all conclusion from this analysis was that AP01 was a carefully planned and written treatise.

The case of AP02 was quite different. Here Scultet saw a perplexing, intricate and rather obscure structure. AP02 was a disputation based on various Apollinarian loci taken from Apollinarian writings, which stressed the view that the Logos did not become a man but appeared as a man. Scultet did not provide a clear diagrammatic analysis of the structure of AP02 as he did in the case of AP01. He simply distinguished three main Athanasian arguments and three objections raised against them by Athanasius' adversaries. The arguments were as follows: (a) Christ being in the form of God assumed the form of the servant, and therefore He is both God and man; (b) The Logos

became flesh means that the Logos became man without ceasing to be God; (c) The name Christ is not applicable without the name of the flesh, and the passion and death which are connected with it. These theses were controverted by the Apollinarians by means of three main objections: (i) If he assumed everything, then He must have assumed a human mind and human understanding; hence He must have assumed sin! (ii) If Christ is a man, He must be a part of the world, but since a part of the world cannot save the world, Christ cannot be a man. (iii) It is impossible for the human nature not to be sinful. If Christ assumed human nature, He must have of necessity assumed sin and therefore must have been sinful. These views are paralleled to those held by earlier heretics, such as Paul of Samosata, Marcion, Manichaeus, Valentinus and Arius.

The next scholar to deal with the construction of APO1 and APO2 was the Greek theologian Emmanuel Karpathios who attributed (5) (without giving any reasons) APO1 to Didymus the Blind and APO2 to an unknown author. Unlike Scultet, Karpathios saw a parallel four-fold structure in both treatises which consisted of (i) an Introduction, (ii) a polemical part, (iii) a dogmatical part and (iv) an Epilogue. His actual analysis can be briefly and schematically presented as follows:

APO1

1- 3 Introduction

- a) Characterisation of the Apollinarists
- b) Presentation of the subject-matter
- c) The author's task

3-16 Polemical Part

- a) Against the error that the flesh of Christ is uncreated
- b) Against the error that the body of Christ is heavenly
- c) Against the error that the flesh of Christ is homoousios with the Godhead

- d) Against the error that there is a heavenly mind in Christ

16-21 Dogmatical Part

- a) On the union of the two natures in Christ
- b) On the sinlessness of the Saviour
- c) On redemption
- d) On the death of Christ
- e) Dogmatic conclusion
- f) The Church's doctrine of the Incarnation

22 Epilogue

- a) Warnings
- b) Recommendations

As for APO2 Karpathios saw the following structure:

APO2

1- 4 Introduction

- a) Subject-matter: Christ the God-man
- b) The manner of Christ's manifestation as understood by the Orthodox
- c) The manner of Christ's manifestation as understood by the various heretics

5-12 Polemical Part

- a) Against the error that God was born from the Virgin and not God and man
- b) Against the error that "God born of a Virgin appeared a man by being conjoined to a man
- c) Against the error that God suffered and was raised again through flesh

11-18 Dogmatical Part: The Doctrine of the Incarnation

- a) The manner of the Incarnation
- b) The death of Christ
- c) The purpose of redemption and the necessity of the human soul of Christ

18-19 Epilogue

- a) Recapitulation of the Orthodox teaching
- b) Conclusions about the heretics
- c) The causes of heresies
- d) Final admonitions

On the whole Karpathios seems to have imposed his own structure upon the two APO, although his presentation of the contents is quite close to the texts. This particularly applies to AP01, and his analysis of this treatise resembles that of Scultet.

Taking into account the above two scholars' contributions and analysing afresh the contents of the two treatises we have adopted the following structure:

AP01

1-3a Introduction

- 1 Two ways of thinking, the orthodox and the heretical.
The character and scope of the present treatise
- 2 The patristic understanding of Christ contrasted to the heretical one by means of two series of statements
- 3 Evaluation of the heretical understanding of Christ on the basis of orthodox doctrinal presuppositions.

3b-6 The First heretical thesis

Heretical thesis: that the flesh of Christ is uncreated
Orthodox reply

- 4 First heretical objection: that the flesh became uncreated by virtue of its union with the Logos
Orthodox responses : a) the time of the union between flesh and Logos, (b) the increase of the body incompatible with the alleged "uncreated"; (c) the meaning of the union; (d) the heretical implications of the notion of the "uncreated";
- 5 (e) the Son is not from God as we are from Him; (f) the meaning of the term "uncreated"; (g) the two natures united in the Logos should not be equated; (h) the soteriological implications of the union; (i) the heretical notion of the "uncreated nature" of Christ refuted.

Second heretical objection: that Christ is from heaven
Orthodox response: Christ can be touched.

7-8 The Second heretical thesis

Heretical thesis: that the body of Christ is from heaven
Orthodox reply: (a) the human body in Adam and Christ;

(b) the human body in Christ; (c)

8 (c) the second Adam contrasted with the first; (d)
epistemological errors of the heretics

9-13a The Third heretical thesis

Heretical thesis: that the flesh of Christ is homousios
with the Godhead.

Orthodox reply

10 Heretical objection: that the flesh became homousios.

Orthodox response: the statement "He became flesh" cannot
be reversed; that the flesh must be taken seriously.

The duality of Christ: God and man

11 The duality of Christ shown in His passibility-impassibi-
lity, death-resurrection.

12 The same one suffers and does not suffer. The statement that
He became greater than the angels really refers to His flesh.
The flesh became God's by nature and not homousios. The
union of things which are homousia. Further inconsisten-
cies in the notion of the homousios flesh with the God-
head. The notion of the uncreated flesh is similar to the
Arian, resting on the false sense of "became". It is also
similar with the notions of Marcion and Manichaeus which
13 are to be clearly distinguished from the orthodox view.

13b-19 The Fourth heretical thesis

Heretical thesis: that a heavenly mind took the place of
the inner man in Christ.

Orthodox reply: the meaning of the name Christ; the soul and
the inner man; the soul and the death of Christ.

14 The presupposition to the Fourth heretical thesis: that God
was not fully united with humanity because of sin.

15 Orthodox response: nature and sin; the problem of the fall;
the Incarnation as the solution to the problem of the fall;
that the flesh assumed by the Saviour was not without a mind,
but had a soul endowed with mental faculty.

16 The implications of the heretical notion of the mindless
flesh of Christ: docetism and blasphemy; salvation is
achieved by the blood of His flesh and the mindful movement
of His soul; Christ is perfect God and perfect man and yet
He is One; Christ's sayings indicate the existence of

- an human soul in Him, because He did not speak docetically.
- 17 The sinlessness of Christ; the contrast between "newness" and "oldness" of humanity
- 18f The heretical notion of the heavenly mind in Christ refuted by means of the substitutionary and saving death of Christ.
- 20-21 Further Contentions
First contention: that He who was born of Mary is God: (1) the Manichaeon, (2) the Samosatean, and (3) the present understanding of this statement.
The orthodox response.
The soteriological argument: two kinds of imitatio Christi, the heretical and the orthodox.
- 21 The other contention (Antiochene?): that the Logos came to dwell in Christ as in the prophets.
A summary of the heretical errors in so far as they relate to the humanity (soul and flesh) of Christ.
- 22 Epilogue
The sufficiency of the Gospel tradition for the affirmation of the right faith in Christ

APO2

- 1 Introduction: the orthodox doctrine of Christ contrasted with the heretical. The One Christ is God and man (or, from God and from man), rather than God converted into a man, or God appearing as man.
- 2 The orthodox doctrine defended on the basis of the meaning of the word "Christ". The name does not refer to the Godhood (as the heretics hold), but to the Godhood and the manhood.
- 3a Same subject continued: the anointing implied in the name "Christ", and how the Logos became Christ.
- 3b "God was born in Nazareth" as understood by Paul of Samosata, Marcion, Manichaeus, Valentinus, Arius, Sabellius and the author's adversaries.
- 4 A summary of arguments deriving from the author's adversaries in support of their contention that Christ appeared as a man.
- 5 The heretical understanding of the statement "God was born from Nazareth" contrasted with the orthodox understanding,

which asserts that He assumed everything that belongs to the manhood.

- 6 Presentation and refutation of heretical arguments opposing the orthodox God-man Christology:
First heretical argument from sin and sinlessness: The Logos could not have assumed human thoughts because they cannot be sinless, whereas He is.
- 7 First heretical argument from soteriology: If Christ is a man, He is part of the world and as such cannot save the world.
- 8 Second heretical argument from sin and sinlessness: Since sin is transmitted in nature by inheritance, if Christ took up human nature He could not have been sinless.
- 9 First heretical argument from anthropology: If He assumed all that pertains to man, He was joined to a man, and Christ is but a man.
- 10 Third heretical argument from sin and sinlessness: It is impossible for man who was once enslaved in sin to become disenslaved; therefore Christ not have been a man.
- 11 Second heretical argument from soteriology: The believers are saved by assimilation and imitation and not by renewal and new beginning.
First heretical argument from theopaschitism: that God suffered and was risen through a flesh.
- 12 An excursus on the orthodox understanding of the passion of Christ and the impassibility of God.
- 13-15 Further discussion of the heretical statement "God suffered and was raised through the flesh" with particular reference to Christ's death and resurrection.
- 16 Second heretical argument from anthropology: that the Logos became rational man by combining flesh with Himself.
Second heretical argument from theopaschitism: that the Logos Himself was crucified.
The orthodox understanding of the death of Christ
- 17 Further exposition on the death of Christ
- 18-19 Epilogue
- 18 The various heretical Christological positions contrasted with the orthodox.
- 19 The old and the new heretics, and final admonition.

The structural patterns of APO1 and APO2 emerging from the above analyses are as follows:

APO1

Introduction

The subject-matter

First heretical thesis

Reply

Heretical objection

Responses

Heretical objection

Responses

Second heretical thesis

Reply

Third heretical thesis

Reply

Heretical objection

Responses

Fourth heretical thesis

Reply

Heretical presupposition

Response

Heretical implications

Further contentions

Orthodox responses

Epilogue

APO2

Introduction

The subject-matter

First heretical notion

Orthodox reply

Heretical objection

Orthodox response

Heretical objection

Orthodox Response

Second heretical notion

Orthodox reply

Third heretical notion

Orthodox reply

Heretical objection

Orthodox response (in extenso, i.e. discussion of heretical implications)

Fourth heretical notion

Orthodox reply

Heretical presupposition

Orthodox response

Sixth heretical notion

Orthodox reply

Rival heretical notion

Orthodox reply

Epilogue

The question that arises here is whether such parallel structures could be considered as Athanasian. To reply to this we need to examine the structures of such Athanasian works which exhibit the same controversial dogmatical character. As examples we may consider here CARL-3 and EPI which span the whole period of Athanasius' engagement in controversies. As detailed analyses of these works will be provided in the Christological section of this treatise we shall only give here the broad structural outlines.

CAR1

Introduction
Subject-matter
The fundamental Arian thesis
Orthodox Reply
Four heretical logical theses
Reply to the first
Reply to the second
Reply to the third
Reply to the fourth
Three Arian Biblical arguments
Reply to the first
Reply to the second
Reply to the third
Epilogue

CAR2

Introduction
Arian heretical notions refuted
1) The Son as High-Priest
2) The Son as Lord and King
3) The Son as unique creature
4) The Son as Mediator
5) Christological titles
The basic Arian text: Prov.8:22
First Arian interpretation
Second Arian interpretation
Third Arian interpretation
Fourth Arian interpretation
Fifth Arian interpretation
Sixth Arian interpretation
(There is no Epilogue)

CAR3

Introduction
Arian exegesis of John 14:10
Orthodox reply
implications
Arian exegesis of Jn.17:11,20=23
Orthodox reply
Four Arian biblical arguments
Reply to the first
Reply to the the fourth
Reply to the third
Reply to the second
Further Arian claims
Reply
Epilogue

EPI

Introduction
Heretical Christological notions
General reply
First heretical thesis:
Orthodox reply
Second heretical thesis
Orthodox reply
Third heretical thesis
Orthodox reply
Fourth heretical thesis
Orthodox reply
Fifth heretical thesis
Orthodox reply
Sixth heretical thesis
Orthodox reply
Epilogue

The above general structures of CAR1-3 and EPI stand in close relationship to the structures of APO1 and APO2. But it is not only the general structure which betrays the same manner

of approach to controversial doctrinal issues. The actual details of argumentation are strikingly similar. Biblical, logical/rhetorical, theological and historical/doctrinal arguments are all employed to defend the orthodox point of view and expose the incompatibility of the heretical notions. On the whole the argumentation is rigorous and decisive, and the author does not conclude his work before he has satisfied himself that he was able to tackle the fundamental problems connected with the theses of his adversaries.

IV.4 Conclusions

In this section we have attempted an initial but thorough investigation of some of the most fundamental elements of the literary style of APO1 and APO2 and have compared them to each other and to their parallels in Athanasius' works. Thus we have been able to establish firstly, that the words peculiar to APO1 and APO2 vis-á-vis each other represent a very small percentage of the total text length of the two treatises and that such words are to a certain extent derived from the adversaries opposed in these works. The peculiar words of APO1 and APO2 considered both separately and together vis-á-vis the vocabulary of Saint Athanasius' generally accepted works has again been shown to be a very small entity, partly owed to the specific subject-matter of the two treatises under discussion. Also, we have shown that practically every work of Saint Athanasius contains a number of neologisms or Athanasian hapax legomena if compared to the total literary output of the great Alexandrian. On such evidence we could conclude that the argument from neologisms which certain critics have used against the Athanasian paternity of the two APO does not have any real basis on the texts.

In the second instance we have established that the grammatical features of the vocabulary common to APO1 and APO2 present no significant divergencies, but rather point to a stylistic homogeneity. This view we have further strengthened by citing various phrasal parallels in the two treatises which exhibit a high degree of similarity without being absolutely identical. And we have also turned to the grammatical features of Athanasius' total vocabulary and compared them to those of the two APO finding again that no significant divergencies can be detected but rather

an over-all concordance. A lot more work has been done in this area, which could not be fully incorporated into this dissertation without making it even longer than it is already. Our intention was to move on the level of fundamentals and leave the particular details for other occasions.

The examination of some of the most basic grammatical features of the vocabulary of the two APO and their comparison with those of Athanasius, has convinced us of no significant disparity or divergence in their respective literary styles. We have also confirmed this conviction by showing that the structure of APO1 and APO2 is parallel to that of some of Athanasius' controversial works which belong to the same literary register.

Although we admit that our^r stylistic investigation is fundamental rather than exhaustive, we hope that we have supplied enough evidence for concluding that the argument from style against the Athanasian paternity of the two APO cannot be seriously sustained.

The Death of Christ

- V.1 Introduction
- 315-389 V.2 The death of Christ in the
Athanasian texts:
- (i) GENT
 - (ii) INC
 - (iii) CARL
 - (iv) CAR2
 - (v) CAR3
 - (vi) EPI
 - (vii) ADEL
 - (viii) MAX
 - (ix) Conclusions
- 390-406 V.3 The death of Christ in APO1
- 407-418 V.4 The death of Christ in APO2
- 419-420 V.5 Final comparisons and conclusions

V.1. Introduction

The doctrine of the death of Christ as expounded in APO1 and APO2 has been seen as one of the major obstacles to the Athanasian paternity (1) of these two treatises. It has been claimed, particularly by Stülcken, that, whereas in Athanasius the death of Christ is generally understood in terms of the body and the flesh, and more particularly as the separation of the Logos from His body, in APO1 and APO2 the death of Christ entails the separation of the soul of the Logos from His body. In recent years Dom Lebourlier, arguing against Jean Daniélou's claim that APO1&2 had been used by Gregory of Nyssa, defended a divergence between APO1 and APO2 with regard to the doctrine of the death of Christ, and on this basis suggested a diversity of authorship for the two treatises. (2) Lebourlier's views were readily adopted and restated by Grillmeier, who saw in the case of APO2 an Antiochene movement of (3) thought.

In spite of such claims as the above, the fact remains that no thorough study of the death of Christ either in Athanasius, or in the two APO has been done, since no one has examined all the available texts, particularly in the doctrinal context within which they appear. As it is obvious that such claims as the above cannot be properly evaluated without a thorough and comprehensive study of the texts, we have undertaken to examine here the doctrine of death and suffering in both Athanasius and the two APO with the ultimate view to determining whether such a doctrine can indeed be an obstacle to the case of identity of authorship. We shall begin with Athanasius' texts and then proceed with the APO1&2.

V.2 The Doctrine of death in GENT

The subject-matter of GENT is the knowledge of God (theology) and the truth about the world (cosmology). There are two main sections to GENT which deal respectively with (i) the problem of theology and cosmology as it is expressed in the development of idolatry (chs.2-29), and (ii) with the ways of solving the problem through purification and natural contemplation (chs. 30-47). The key notion to both sections is the Logos of God.

In the first section Athanasius develops a Logocentric doctrine of creation with particular reference to the creation of man and expounds the doctrine of man's fall in terms of his turning away from the Logos and inventing evil. It is this fall which gradually results in the problem of idolatry and its consequences, corruption and death. Here then, we find the first references to suffering and death, particularly in the early chapters, within a distinctly anthropological context.

In the second section Athanasius argues that the truth about God and the world can be known through the restoration of man, firstly through the purification of his soul or heart, and secondly through natural contemplation of the providence operating in the world. The first method is related to the restoration of the Image of the Logos in man (τό κατ'εἰκόνα) and the latter to the discernment by man of the presence of the Logos in the world through His works (τά ἔργα). In this second section the doctrine of death becomes more explicit, particularly in chapters 33 and 34, but the context is still distinctly anthropological and creationist. Here , as in the previous section, the dualistic language of "soul" and "body" seems to be prevalent , but the "mind" also occupies a central place.

After these general observations we may now turn to the particular points of doctrine. Athanasius sees the fall of man as a turning away of the mind (νοῦς, διάνοια) of his soul (ψυχῆ) from the contemplation (θεωρία), perception (κατανόησις) and longing (πόθος) of God, and his attachment to himself, or to his belongings (ἐαυτῷ, τὰ ἴδια). This disorientation is described in various ways, as, for example, a turning away from the vision of those things which are the greatest (τὰ κρείττονα) to those which are nearer at hand (τὰ ἐγγυτέρω), or from those which are perceived by the mind (τὰ νοητά) to those which are sensible and are connected with the senses of the body (τὰ αἰσθητά or αἰ αἰσθήσεις τοῦ σώματος). Above all, man's fall is a turning of the soul to the desires of the flesh (αἰ ἐπιθυμίας τῆς σαρκός) and the pleasures (ἡδοναί) of the body. The mind then, which was entirely integrated and transcendent (ὅλος ἐστίν ἄνω ἐαυτῷ συνών), lost its integrity and transcendence. Men became aware of themselves (ἐαυτοὺς κατανοεῖν ἤρξαντο), understood the body and its pleasures and fell into self-desire (εἰς ἐαυτῶν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔπεσαν) and their soul became confused and troubled. Falling into the desires of the body, they knew that they were naked (i.e. deprived of the vision of divine things), and the perception of their mind had turned to the contrary (πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία). Trapped into the desires of the body and considering pleasure (ἡδονή) to be good, they became afraid of losing them and so their soul acquired the habit of fears (φόβοι), pleasures and of thinking mortally (θνητὰ φρονεῖν). ~~Not~~ ^{not} Wishing to be separated from the pleasures, it feared death and the separation from the body (GENT, 3). Clearly, in the light of the above teaching, suffering and death are connected with man's fall, and, given the soul-body model

of man's constitution, suffering and death are caused by the inversion of the movement of the soul within the body. More particularly, death seems to be connected with the separation of the soul from the body.

These insights, given in chapters 3, 7, 8, 9ff and 22, become more explicit in chapters 33 and 34, where the soul is defended against those who deny its existence. Here the first point to be emphasized is that the soul has been made immortal (ἀθάνατος γέγονεν ἡ ψυχὴ), whereas the body is by nature mortal (φύσει θνητόν). Thus when death occurs, it is not to the soul, but to the body, that one should look, because the body really dies when the soul departs from it (οὐ γάρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀποθνήσκουσα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ταύτης ἀναχώρησιν ἀποθνήσκει τὸ σῶμα). Strictly speaking, death is not the separation of the soul from the body, but the result of this separation on the body. This is in line with the statement which regards the soul as a life-principle or motion-principle, which animates and moves the body, and as such cannot be connected with death. Athanasius clearly states that the soul is self-moved (αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν) and as such is immortal. The notion of death then, is closely, and we might even say, crudely, and physically, connected with immobility. As the soul is a principle of self-movement which moves the body, it is the body that actually dies when the motion-principle of the soul departs from it (τότε θάνατον τοῦ σώματος εἶναι, ὅτε τῆς κινήσεως παύεται). Athanasius also points to the condition of sleep to indicate this contrast between the movable soul and the immovable body, but ultimately he looks to the separation of the soul from the body as the best proof for this contrast. The soul continues to live after the death of the body (καί μετὰ θάνατον τοῦ σώματος ζῆσεται) and at that state acquires a clearer know-

ledge of immortality (φανερωτέραν ἔξει τὴν τῆς ἀθανασίας γνῶσιν). It seems that Athanasius emphasizes the immortality of the soul for apologetic purposes, because he wants to stress man's responsibility for his fall and for his return to his creator Logos. That his doctrine is not ^{quite} identical with the Greek philosophical doctrine of the immortality of the soul is made clear in what he says about the relation of the soul to the creator Logos. The soul, he says, will not cease to live after the death of the body, because God made it thus through his own Logos (οὐ παύσεται τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τὸν οὕτως αὐτὴν ποιήσαντα Θεὸν διὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ Λόγου τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ). Similarly Athanasius says that the death of the body is ultimately linked with the creator Logos. It is, he writes, by the gesture (νεῦμα) of the Logos that man is made to live and dies again, simply because all things are given soul and movement by Him. Ultimately God gives and God takes. The death of the body is not 'evil', but natural, in as much as it occurs by the will of the Logos, who is the only and ultimate ground of all creaturely existence. It is obvious that the Greek soul-body model of the human constitution is modified in the Athanasian thought because it is placed in the context of a Logocentric creation.

What emerges from GENT concerning death can be summed up in the following statements:

- (a) Death refers to the body and not to the soul, for the latter was made immortal by the Logos.
- (b) Death means immobility, but it is preceded by passion, separation division and corruption.
- (c) The death of the body is natural to it. It occurs when the soul is separated from it. But this separation does not occur without the

will of the Logos, nor without man's responsibility. The implication is that the body would not have died, if the soul had not subjected herself to it (the body) instead of the Logos.

(d) The separation of the soul from the body in death is symptomatic and not constitutive of death. The constitutive aspect is probably the soul's subjection to the body and corruption through pleasure, or the rejection of the Logos and the vision of God as the primary purpose of the soul's life-movement.

These points of doctrine certainly raise a number of critical questions concerning the more precise clarification of the inner cohesion of the various nuances attached to the terms soul and body, mortality and immortality, vision of God, etc. Athanasius does not provide enough statements for such a clarification. It seems that his language is quite flexible, and that his main concern is to develop a general theory about man's creation and fall with the view to presenting the Incarnation as the appropriate means of salvation. GENT does not provide a clear doctrine of suffering and death, but a series of points relating to these topics, which call for further clarifications.

(ii) Death in INC

The first references to death in INC are anthropological and occur in chapters 3ff where Athanasius develops the doctrine of man's creation.

In INC³ Athanasius provides one of his clearest statements on man's creation. Here he connects mortality with the human race and immortality with the grace of God which is bestowed on man. The human race, he says, being creaturely, i.e. having come into being out of nothing, could not have remained in existence for ever. Yet God had had mercy on them. He made them in His Image and Likeness and thereby gave them the possibility to escape mortality which was inherent in their creaturehood. Athanasius explains that creation in the Image and Likeness of God involves both the knowledge of the Creator Logos and the gift of His power which ensures eternal life. It is as if men can possess 'shadows of the Logos', whereby they become assimilated to Him and therefore enjoy the life of blessedness. Athanasius further explains that this creation in the Logos is not automatically realized but involves man's free choice to coordinate Himself with the Logos, since the Image is also connected with the free will of men (ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων προαίρεσις). To assist men in their choice, God placed them in a paradise and gave them his commandment (ἐντολή) to obey. On this basis, God gave both the promise of incorruptibility (ἀφθαρσία), and the warning of corruption in death by nature (τὴν ἐν θανάτῳ κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰν) in the event of man's disobedience. So man in spite of his mortal corruptible creaturehood, was given the option and

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the promise to remain in existence through his obedience of the commandment which safeguards man's association and assimilation to the Logos and his reception of the latter's eternal power. The other option however, namely, that of man's subjection to natural corruption through death, also remained a live possibility. The clear message of this teaching concerning death and the man of creation is that whilst the former is a possibility inherent to the nature of the latter, it does not however constitute a necessity, thanks to God's eiconic grace which renders it ineffective. Thus, in the context of creation, human death is a possibility inherent in man's nature, but it can be averted by grace. For man to die a natural death means to fall from the grace of the Logos. Looked at from man's side, it implies man's failure to obey the commandment and therefore to be assimilated to the Logos. From God's side however, it appears to be God's just condemnation (κατάκρισις) of the man who defies His order of creation by grace. The transgression of the commandment is the outward expression of man's inner failure to coordinate himself with the life-giving power of the Logos. This occurs because man turns to and chooses creaturehood instead of the Creator, or to put it otherwise, because man's freedom is by inversion turned towards man's nature and thereby loses its transcendent communion with God. A careful study of Athanasius' language and conceptuality leaves no doubt that the 'legal' language, borrowed from the Bible, points to existential theistic dimensions of man's creaturely constitution which imply a theocentric view of man. There is then

in Athanasius' doctrine of man a profound interconnection between commandment (ἐντολή) and grace (χάρις), or Law (Νόμος) and Logos. The former safeguards the latter, but the latter which is none other than the free coordination of man's existence with God's power in grace, remains ultimate and primary. The rejection of this life=perspective through the transgression of the safe-guard inevitably, and we might add 'legally', leads man to the corruption of his nature in death. One could go further at this point and argue implicitly, i.e. by drawing out further logical implications from Athanasius' doctrinal notions, that the κατάκρισις and particularly its issuing in death and corruption , is paradoxically, yet another safeguard of God's grace which is allowed in order that human race may not be extinguished, and that in due course the grace of redemption and resurrection may bring about its restoration. We might say that this sounds like 'free predestination', as opposed to 'deterministic predestinarianism'. But this is exactly what Athanasius' Logocentric free creation ultimately implies.

In INC4 similar points of doctrine are made. The connection between Logos and Nomos is further spelt out as man's mortality is said to rest with man's loss of the knowledge of the Logos. Knowledge here is not just intellectual activity, nor is it just knowledge of an object. It is connected with the notion of creation in the Image and Likeness of God , which is man's coordination with the Creator Logos and the reception of His grace. In this chapter Athanasius speaks of the grace of creation in the Image (τὴν τοῦ κατ'εἰκόνα χάριν) whereby man is assimilated with the Logos (διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Λόγον ὁμοιότητος) and averts his

natural corruptibility . This is also called participation in the Logos (literally "being-with-the-Logos", μετουσά τοῦ Λόγου) and indicates the theistic principle of Athanasius' doctrine of man.

INC6 stresses the fact that corruption and death have been introduced into mankind because of the Fall and have held universal sway. Death has come to rule over men by means of a law (νόμῳ ὁ θάνατος ἔσχε καθ' ἡμῶν). The law here is related to the κατάκρισις of the fallen man by God, which, however, like the ἐντολή, does not constitute the primary cause of death. Indeed this law, or this death by law, seems to be preventative of ultimate death, or return to the nihil, out of which the human nature was called into existence.

In INC7 Athanasius explains this point further, by positing, in an anthropomorphic fashion, a dilemma in God, who has to decide to save man and yet remain true to his legislation about death (ἡ περὶ θανάτου νομοθεσία). He knows that man's repentance is not sufficient for a solution to man's fall, not only because it would make a mockery of the legislation (and by implication, of the existential-ontological order of creation), but also because man's transgression (παράβασις) was not just a minor offence (πλημμέλημα) without the grave implications of corruption. The transgression was in fact the rejection and loss of the eiconic grace (τὴν τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα χάριν ἀφαιρεθέντες), which resulted in captivity to the corruption of nature (εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰν ἐκρατοῦντο). Here, at least two points are clear, 1) that the strength of death in God's Nomos has its efficient cause in man's transgression

of God's commandment, but its ultimate cause is to be located in man's rejection and loss of the grace of the κατ'εἰκόνα ;
2) that the salvation of man from the shackles of death and corruption could only be achieved , if the eiconic grace were to be restored , which in turn would fulfil the ἐντολή and therefore destroy the νόμος of death by death!

On these considerations and on the premise that all men have rejected the grace of the Logos and share responsibility for the reign of death over them (in INCS this responsibility is spoken of in terms of τό ὑπεύθυνον πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τόν θάνατον , or in terms of διὰ τό πάντας ὑπευθύνους εἶναι τῆ τοῦ θανάτου φθορᾷ), Athanasius proceeds to argue that only the very Εἰκὼν of God , the Divine Logos, could recall the grace, because He made all and is related to all as their Head. Consequently, only He who is above all (ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων) and for all (ὁ ὑπὲρ πάντας) could regain all and could suffer for all (ὑπὲρ πάντων) and mediate between them and the Father (πρεσβεῦσαι περὶ πάντων).

The crucial element in the Athanasian doctrine here, is that death and its overcoming through the restoration of the eiconic grace concerns the whole mankind (τά ὅλα, πάντας, τό γένος). This manifests the catholic dimensions of Athanasius' soteriological perspectives, which comprise both the Logos and the whole humanity, ie. the individual human beings in their generic and racial solidarity. This 'catholic' dimension is already apparent in the Athanasian doctrine of creation. Particularly in Athanasius' exposition of the eiconic grace, it is quite obvious that the Logos is the principle which governs the true life of all men and brings them together under

one Head. So it is no surprise that here also, it is to the Logos that Athanasius turns as the only one who can save the whole (τά ὅλα). There is, however, a difference in the act of the Logos in the two contexts of creation and salvation. In the first context, the Logos acts as God the Creator. In the second context, however, the Logos has to act from the side of creation, as a creature, or more particularly, as a man. He has to act as a mediator (πρεσβεῦσαι), i.e. to suffer for all and mediate on behalf of all, in order to fulfil and destroy the law (πληρωθῆναι καί λυθῆναι τόν νόμον) of condemnation or the law of death.

This act for and on behalf of all was needed, because all were responsible for the loss of grace and the incursion of the law of death. Besides, the transition from the universality of death to the universality of restoration to life could only be effected by the Creator Logos, who is the universal head of all creation. Athanasius' thought on this point is crystal clear. As the transcendent and immortal head of all, the Logos alone could fulfil the need for total restoration. But this could only be done, if the universal law of death was both fulfilled and abolished. In Athanasius' mind, that could only be done by a sort of universal substitutionary death of the Logos. But this death required the assumption by the Logos of that which dies. It is here that Athanasius introduces again the human body as that which dies, and argues that the Logos could only act for all in death, if He had a mortal body, since in Himself He was by nature immortal. In a sort of dramatic language Athanasius speaks of the Logos, the universal Creator, forming a body in the Virgin, making it His own temple (ναόν),

appropriating it as His own instrument (ὄργανον), revealing Himself in it and indwelling it. This implies a double activity on the part of the Logos. There is first a transitive activity which refers to the assumption of the human body (τό ἡμέτερον λαμβάνει σῶμα), but there is also an intransitive activity which refers to the Logos' presence and manifestation in our own human territory (παραγίνεται εἰς τήν ἡμετέραν χώραν, or παραγίνεται συγκαταβαίνων τῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ φιλανθρωπίᾳ καί ἐπιφανείᾳ , or as in some instances τῇ αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ). It is by means of this double activity that the Logos can represent all men to the Father and die for all and destroy death entirely . He has acquired what men have (a mortal human body identical with theirs) and has personally condescended to be in it and act through it on their behalf. The precise content of the term body is not clarified here. It seems to be holistic and be used kata synekdochen to denote the entire human being. (4) One thing however is clear, that it is used objectively , since the subject active in and through it is the Logos Himself. Athanasius makes it clear that his primary concern is to exclude from the Incarnation the assumption of a particular human subject, (5) but at the same time, he wants to emphasize the integrity of the humanity of the Logos, ie. the integrity of the body. The main thought is that the Logos who is subjectively related to all the human persons by virtue of His headship in creation and on the basis of the grace of the Image, can only act for their salvation, if He shares their nature in which mortality and death and therefore the need of salvation have been manifested. It is τό ὅμοιον as he says, that the Logos needs to take from our side (ἀπό τῶν ἡμετέρων... λαβῶν), so that He may deliver it to death instead of all (ἀντί πάντων αὐτό θανάτῳ παραδιδούς) and thus

bring it to the Father. The phrase παραδιδούς τῷ ἁνθρώπῳ suggests yet another transitive activity which follows from the former ἔλαβεν . It suggests a free act as opposed to an inevitable one. Athanasius has already argued about the necessity of the death of the Logos as man as the only way for fulfilling and abolishing the universal law of death which ruled over all humanity. But the crucial point here, is that , as the necessity of the law of death or the law of condemnation, arose from the free act of men (τό πάντων ὑπεύθυνον), likewise the saving death of the Logos is rooted in His own free act which fulfils the law and annuls its claim. The παράδοσις of the Logos' body has the character of a deliberate and free offering, rather than an act of necessity. It is the reverse activity from that which led mankind to the law of death.

As Athanasius unfolds further and further his doctrine of the death of Christ, the term "offering" (προσφορά) is employed a number of times and its sacrificial-liturgical character, reminiscent of the OT priestly functions, becomes apparent. It is clear that the offering of the body to death by the Logos results in a substitutionary death for all (ἀντί πάντων). But it is important to note that the inner logic, as it were, of this substitution is not to be traced to an abstract principle of legal sacrificial transaction, but to the Headship of the Logos in creation whereby He is related to all men . The substitutionary offering of the one body for all rests on the fact that it is the Dominical Body (τό κυριακόν Σῶμα), i.e., the Body of Him who is ὁ ἐπί πάντων or, ὁ ὑπέρ πάντα, and therefore of Him who alone can act ὑπέρ πάντων and ἀντί πάντων . This sacrificial language coupled with the High-Priestly Person of the

Logos is perhaps the clue to Athanasius' choice of the term body to expound the Incarnation and its soteriological implications.

It is clear that the primary purpose of the Incarnation in the mind of Athanasius is the fulfilment and abolition of the law of death which results in the restoration and renewal of the eiconic grace. This is spelt out in the following text which recapitulates some of the key notions of Athanasius' understanding of Christ's death:

And lest what had been created should perish and the work of the Father among men should be in vain. He took to Himself a Body, and that not foreign to our own; for He did not wish simply to be in a Body, nor did He wish merely to appear..for He was able, if He only wanted to appear, to make His theophany by some other greater means. But He takes up our own, and that not in a simple manner, but from a pure and immaculate Virgin who had no experience of man, a body which was pure and truly immaculate of male intercourse. For He was able, being the creator of all, to make the body in the Virgin His own temple and to appropriate this as an instrument, becoming known in it and indwelling it. And thus having taken from us that which is ours, and since all were responsible for the corruption of death, He brought it to the Father having delivered it to death instead of all, and He was doing this out of love for men, so that all of them having died in Him, the law of corruption which was against men might be dissolved having its authority fulfilled in the dominical body and therefore having no place any longer against men who were like Him. And as men returned to corruption. He might bring them back again to incorruption, and bring them back to life from death, abolishing death from them as a reed from the fire by the appropriation of the body and the grace of the resurrection.

The Logos having seen that the corruption of men could not be dissolved otherwise, unless He died, and that being the Logos He could not die, because He was immortal and the Son of the Father, for this reason He takes up to Himself the body which can die, so that by its participation in the Logos who is over all, it might become a sufficient substitute for all in death and it might remain incorruptible on account of the Logos indwelling it, and so the corruption might cease from all by the grace of the resurrection.

Hence bringing forward to death the body which He Himself had taken as a sacrifice and an offering (lit. victim) free from every stain immediately vanquished death from all the same bodies by the offering of the appropriate (substitute). Because the Logos of God, being for all, obviously, by bringing His own temple and His own corporeal instrument (as an offering) as a substitute for all (ἀντίψυχον ἀντί πάντων) fulfilled what was due to death and thus being together with all (men) through the same (body), obviously, the Son of God clothed all men with incorruption by the promise of the resurrection. And now, no longer does the corruption involved in death holds sway over men because of the Logos who dwelt among them by means of a body identical with theirs.

INC8-9.

The language is distinctly liturgical and reminiscent of the OT sacrificial traditions. But here the sacrificial body is not only pure and spotless, in that it was not derived from male intercourse, but from an untouched and spotless Virgin, but is also identical with ours, in that it was derived from our side (ἀπό τῶν ἡμετέρων τό ὅμοιον). Further and more importantly, it is the Dominical Body (τό Κυριακόν Σῶμα), which truly can be offered for all, because it is truly the body of the Lord who is Head of all. It is the Lord's own temple (ναός), where God's law is truly fulfilled, and death is vanquished and men regain incorruption. The sacrificial language is quite striking in a phrase where the body offered to death is called ἱερεῖον καί θῦμα παντός ἐλευθέρου σπείλου and is regarded as κατάλληλον τῇ προσφορᾷ. Nor are these phrases incidental. They reappear a number of times in the De Incarnatione and seem to be fundamental to Athanasius' doctrine. For example, he speaks of the προσφορά τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος, or, he says that σῶμα καί αὐτός ὁ Λόγος ἔλαβεν διὰ τήν περί τῶν ὁμοίων σωμάτων θυσίαν, or again τῇ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος θυσίᾳ καί τέλος

ἐπέθηκε τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς νόμῳ καὶ ἀρχὴν ζωῆς ἐκαίνισεν, (Cf. INC10).

Elsewhere he says, παραγενόμενος τὴν θυσίαν τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἐπετέλει, παραδιδούς τὸ σῶμα τῷ θανάτῳ καὶ ἀνιστῶν αὐτό (INC 16) and again, ὑπὲρ πάντων τὴν θυσίαν ἀνέφερον ἀντὶ πάντων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν εἰς θάνατον παραδιδούς (INC 20), or ὑπὲρ πάντων προσφερόμενον εἰς θάνατον (INC 31). Lastly INC37, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν καὶ τὸ σωματικόν ὄργανον προσάγων ἀντίψυχον ὑπὲρ πάντων, or ἀντίψυχον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα εἰς θάνατον παραδιδούς. Particularly interesting is the phrase ἀντὶ πάντων ἀντίψυχον , which is not clarified but certainly implies the substitutionary aspect of the offering of the body of Christ.

The offering of the body is made to death, but also to the Father, in as much as the law of death was imposed by the Father's law of condemnation. The term ἀντίψυχον indicates that the term ψυχὴ is subsumed under the term σῶμα and the suggestion is that the strong term is the body but the soul is not excluded from it.

In INC9 Athanasius explicitly states that the crucial element in the substitutionary death of Christ is the Lordly Person of the Logos. The substitutionary efficacy of the body is not rooted in any abstract legal principle, but in the Lordly person of the Logos. This point of view is brought out in the phrase ἵνα τοῦ ἐκὶ πάντων Λόγου μεταλαβῶν , ἀντὶ πάντων ἱκανόν γένηται τῷ θανάτῳ . Not only the act of substitution, but the exchange of mortality for immortality in the dominical Body is rooted in the Person of the Logos: καὶ διὰ τὸν ἐνοικῆσαντα Λόγον ἄφθαρτον διαμείνη καὶ λοιπόν ἀπὸ πάντων ἡ φθορὰ παύσεται τῇ τῆς ἀναστάσεως χάριτι . The same teaching is apparent in the statement: ὑπὲρ πάντας γὰρ ὧν

ὁ Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκότως τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ναὸν καὶ τὸ σωματικὸν ὄργανον προσάγων ἀντίψυχον ὑπὲρ πάντων, ἐπλήρου τὸ ὀφειλόμενον ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ καὶ οὕτως συνῶν διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁ ἄφθαρτος τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς εἰκότως πάντα ἐνέδυσεν ἀφθαρσίαν. The formulae ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, or ὁ ὑπὲρ πάντας, or ὁ πάντων Δεσπότης καὶ Σωτὴρ τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς (in INC 24 he speaks of ἡ τῶν πάντων ζωὴ), refer to the Logos' headship over each and all men in creation. The formulae ἀντί πάντων, or ὑπὲρ πάντων, or πάντων ἐν αὐτῷ, or συνῶν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἐνεικήσαντα τὸν Λόγον ἐν τούτοις (τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) refer to the Logos' personal involvement with us and His personal priestly act before God for us through the Incarnation.

In INC 10 Athanasius reveals the Biblical basis of his exposition of the doctrine of the death of Christ as the substitutionary death of the Creator for all His creatures. This entails a) 2 Cor. 5:14-15, where the formula εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν occurs, b) Hebrews 2:9, which contains the formula ὑπὲρ παντός γεύσεται θανάτου, c) Hebrews 2:10, αὐτός δι' ὃν τὰ πάντα καὶ δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἔπρεπε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀμενεγῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γευσάμενης φθορᾶς, and d) Hebrews 2:14-15, which speaks of the blood and the flesh which were taken up by the Saviour. Particular emphasis is placed on I Cor. 15:21-22, which is used in the substitutionary argument of Athanasius' doctrine. As death came through man, so death should be driven out by man. This is precisely what has been achieved by the Incarnate Logos, 'the Man for all men'. Such is Athanasius' conviction concerning the realism of the abolition of death by

the death of the Incarnate Creator that he can produce the following unequivocal assertion. "Since Christ's death, we do not die as judged, but in order to rise again". Human death is no longer the sign of creaturely weakness, but rather a sign of victory. It is the prothalamos of the resurrection. Through Christ's death something utterly and radically new has taken place as regards the relationship between God and man. There is no κατάκρισις any more. Sin has lost its power while grace has become superabundant since it has embraced even death itself! Thus, the abolition of death and the laying of the foundation for the universal resurrection (τὴν κοινὴν τῶν πάντων ἀνάστασιν) is called by Athanasius the first cause of the Incarnation.

In INC 13 Athanasius explains that initially man's death was not an unavoidable necessity. It would not have occurred, if man had kept the eiconic grace. However, when it occurred, it occurred in accordance with the nature of the body, in the body. For this reason the very Eikon of God took up a mortal body and destroyed death in Himself, so that death may no longer have any power over men and men may be renewed in the eiconic grace.

In INC15 it is said that the resurrection of the Saviour shows that He alone is true Lord and God's Logos, who has mastered even death (τόν καί τοῦ θανάτου κυριεύοντα). He became man, appeared as man, died as man and rose again as man to undo the works of men and lead them back to His true Father. The work of universal salvation has already been achieved in the sense that the law of death has been abolished and replaced by the law of resurrection. It is this new law which now forms the perspective of human life and destiny.

In INC 16 Athanasius particularly emphasizes the universal range

of the Logos' power and reign, which is demonstrated in the destruction of death by His death. The Logos, he says, has stretched Himself everywhere. He is above (as Creator) and below (as Incarnate) and in the depth (as having descended into Hades) and in the breadth (as having embraced the whole world). By His economy He destroyed death and showed Himself to be the Logos of the Father and the King of all.

In INC17 Athanasius associates incorruptibility with the Logos and corruptibility with the body, and makes the former the basis for overcoming the latter. It was the incorruptible Logos, he says, who enlivened and purified the mortal body.

In INC 18 he says that although it was the body that suffered, yet it was the Logos who was said to have suffered, so that He appears to have a body in truth and not in mere appearance. Obviously the attribution of the passion to the Logos should not be explained in terms of a passible Godhood, but rather in terms of the passible body.

In INC 19 Athanasius speaks of the Cross as the trophy of victory over death, on the basis of which creation confessed that He who was in the body and suffered was not simply man but God's Son and the Saviour of all.

In INC 20 Athanasius argues that only the Creator could change the corruptible into incorruptible and only the Eikon of the Father could recreate that which was made in its image. Further, only the Life itself (αὐτοζωή) could turn what is mortal into something immortal. Indeed, only the Logos of the Father, His true and only begotten Son, could teach about the Father. Only He who is truth could repay what was due by all, namely, death. First of all He showed Himself to be God and then He offered the sacrifice of his

own temple to death as a substitute for all (ἀντί πάντων, or ὑπέρ πάντων τὴν θυσίαν ἀπέφερεν ἀντί πάντων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ναὸν εἰς θάνατον παραδιδούς) in order to free all from the responsibility of the ancient transgression and show Himself to be greater than death and the firstfruits of the universal resurrection by means of the immortal body. Even though it was derived from a Virgin by way of a new miracle, His body did have the same substance as ours, and as such was mortal and died following the predicament of the other bodies. But because of the Logos' intervention, it was not corrupted in accordance with its own nature, but was delivered from all corruption. Two events took place simultaneously in the Dominical Body: the death of all was fulfilled, and corruption was abolished because of the Logos who was co-existing with it (συνόντα). In this chapter Athanasius recapitulates his earlier teaching on the substitutionary death of Christ. Death for all (ὑπέρ πάντων) was required to meet what was due by all. Since the Logos could not die as Logos, because He was immortal, He took to Himself a body which could die, in order to offer it to death as a substitute for all and accordingly deliver men from the fear of death, as Hebrews 2:14-15 teaches.

In INC21 Athanasius explains further the universal effects of Christ's death in saying that, since the common Saviour of all died, men no longer die as previously under the threat of the law (κατὰ τὴν ἀπειλήν τοῦ νόμου). The condemnation has ceased, and men are dissolved according to the nature of the body; but this is applicable only for a time, until they participate in a greater resurrection. Death then, is at the present time a sowing unto resurrection according to the teaching of I Cor. 15:53-55.

In the same chapter Athanasius inquires into the manner of Christ's death. Why, he asks, did He die a death by crucifixion and insult, and not naturally as other men do? Men, he says, die out of weakness of nature, which makes it unable to withstand time, but the Lord who is self-Life, did not suffer death because of weakness. As life and power He strengthened the body to overcome its natural weakness. But He died by accepting death from others, so as to perfect the sacrifice. At the same time, He endured the suffering and the death of His body, because He did not want to hinder the resurrection. The body died as a ransom for all (διὰ τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων λύτρον), but it did not see corruption. It was raised up in its entirety, because it was the body of Life.

The exposition of the same theme is continued in INC22; Being Himself Life, says Athanasius, the Incarnate Logos could not lead His body to death by Himself. On the other hand it was not fitting that He should avoid the death imposed on Him by others. So, He accepted it in order to destroy it. He accepted it from others in order that He might fulfill the salvation of all. In as much as He did this, He did not abolish his own death (His own in the sense that He Himself was responsible for it), but human death. He fought death in His own body, which He raised up incorruptible as the trust (ἐνέχυρον) and revelation of the forthcoming universal resurrection (τῆς εἰς πάντας ἐπομένης ἀναστάσεως).

In INC 23 Athanasius explains that death had to precede the resurrection, and this is why Christ endured death. He also explains that this death had to be a public one, so that its reality could be clearly demonstrated and the same might be applicable to His resurrection. This is connected with the notion of παρουσία, i.e.

the indisputable open demonstration of immortality through the abolition of mortality.

In INC24 Athanasius points out that Christ died an ignominious and dishonourable death to show that He did not fear any death at all. In this chapter it is also stressed that He did not cause His own death, but accepted it from His enemies (παρ' ἐτέρων, παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν) in order to destroy it entirely and abolish its strength. Finally, in an interesting statement, Athanasius links the sacrificial body of Christ with the body of the Church. He did not die, he says, a death by mutilation, but kept the entire body intact in order that He might leave no excuse for those who attempt to divide the Church!

As in INC10, so in INC25, Athanasius cites a whole array of verses from the Scriptures, which are connected with death, and so provides an impressive biblical justification for his doctrine. Christ dies by crucifixion to destroy the curse (Deut. 21:23, Gal.3:13) and also to destroy the middle wall of partition (Eph.2:14) by joining with His outstretched hands the old people and the nations in Himself (John 12:32). He died to ransom all (λύτρον πάντων .. λυτροῦσθαι τοὺς πάντας); caused the devil to fall (Eph.2:2) and opened the way to heaven through the παραπέτασμα of His flesh (Hebr. 10:20). In as much as He died by crucifixion, He was raised up in the air and thus destroyed the leaders of the air joining at the same time heaven and earth and opening the gates of heaven (Ps.73:7).

In INC26 Athanasius stresses the necessity of Christ's death on the Cross for the salvation of all. On this Cross, he says, creation witnessed the Creator's Presence (τὴν τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ παρουσίαν) as

He showed His body to be dead , by allowing death to be mingled with it (τῆ τοῦ θανάτου πρὸς αὐτό συμπλοκῇ). But He did this only for a short while, because He raised it up again from the dead three days later bringing with it the trophies of victory against death, namely the incorruptibility and immutability of the body. In dramatic language Athanasius points out that death had to touch as it were the body (ἐψαυκέναι), so that a real resurrection might be demonstrated. This is the reason for the three days interval between the death and the resurrection of Christ. It was not the result of a weakness of the Logos, but of His plan to destroy death in the death of the body.

In INC27 Athanasius concludes that through the Cross death was abolished and death is now dead (τόν θάνατον καταλελύσθαι.. καί εἶναι νεκρόν)! The Christian attitude to death is a clear demonstration of this event. The Christians who die are not lost, but live and become incorruptible through the resurrection. Athanasius also says that the devil who introduced death is also dead, because the pains of death have been loosened. The evidence for this is the Christian martyrdom which shows contempt for death (I Cor. 15:55).

In INC29 the victory of Christ over death is further emphasised as it is asserted that men who are weak by nature no longer fear death, nor the corruption of death, nor even the descent into Hades (τάς ἐν ᾧδου καθόδους), but rather invite death with a willing soul (προθύμῳ ψυχῇ).

Similar points are made in INC30 and 31 where it is rhetorically asked that if Christ was dead how could He perform such marvellous deeds after His death? Here also the mortality and immortality of

Christ is explained once more with reference to the offering of His mortal body and the indwelling of His immortal person.

In INC32 Athanasius explicitly asserts the inner connection between the incarnation, the crucifixion and the resurrection. Christ, he says, was born in order to die and rise again.

In INC34 Is.53:3-5, Is. 53:6,8 and Acts 8:32-33 are cited as Scriptural evidence that Christ did not die for Himself, but endured death to bring immortality and salvation to all men. The passion of Christ does not imply that He was a common man (κοινός άνθρωπος), but, as a unique event, it implies a unique generation (Is. 53:8-10).

The same point is made in INC37, where it is underlined that He who suffered for all was not designated in the Scriptures as a mere man (οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄνθρωπος ὁ σημαίνόμενος ἐκ τῶν Γραφῶν). According to Deut.28:66 He was the Life of all even though He was like men with respect to nature (..ζωή πάντων, κἄν ὅμοιος κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐτύχανε). According to Is.53:8 He is of unknown genealogy (ἀγενεαλόγητος). He is the Life of all, who as the Lamb for the salvation of all delivered His own body to death as a substitute (ἀντίψυχον).

In INC38 Athanasius again speaks of Christ as the one who suffered for all (ὁ ὑπὲρ πάντων παθών) and illustrates this point by recalling Is. 65:1-2 and 35:3-6. In INC39 he cites Dan 9:24-25 to stress the same point.

INC44 discusses at some length the corruptibility and mortality of the Body of Christ and stresses the fact that the Logos was the Life which conquered these weaknesses. Particularly important here is the thought that both death and the Logos (or Life) were mingled (συνεπλέκη, συμπλακῆναι) with the body, so that the final outcome,

namely, the exchange of corruption with incorruption, remained intrinsically present in the risen body. Death, which operates from within the body, was utterly destroyed for ever, because it was not averted by a simple command of the Logos, but by His very presence inside the mortal body. In this chapter it is made unequivocally clear that death does not appear apart from a body (θάνατος καθ'ἑαυτόν οὐκ ἂν φανεῖη εἰμῆ ἐν τῷ σώματι) and that the Lord's human body was mortal according to the law (logos) which governs all bodies (θνητόν καὶ φθαρτόν κατὰ τὸν τῶν σωμάτων λόγον). In contrast to that, Athanasius sets the God-Logos who is incorporeal and therefore immortal. It is in the union and communion of the former with the latter that corporeal mortality is abolished and replaced by an eternal corporeal immortality and incorruptibility. It is obvious that the terms body and incorporeal Logos stand for the creaturely and the Creator, and that the soteriological principle which is here promulgated entails the union of the Creator with the creature, i.e. deification. Death is not explained physiologically but is seen as a theological problem, which can only be solved theologically, i.e. in terms of God's union and communion with His creature.

In the final chapters of INC nothing new is added to the doctrine of Christ's death , but a few statements echo the preceding teaching. INC47 states that Christ alone persuaded men to discard death and be convinced about immortality (φρονεῖν ἀθάνατα). INC48 refers to the faith of immortality (τῆς ἀθανασίας τὴν πίστιν) of the choir of the Christian martyrs. INC50 points out that Christ's death drove away the demons, and INC53 stresses the universality

of the resurrection caused by the same death (διὰ τοῦ θανάτου ἡ ἀθανασία εἰς πάντα ἔφθασε).

Conclusion

The teaching of the De Incarnatione links decisively the notion of human death with the human body and makes no reference to the human soul. This death of the body is caused by sin which is understood in terms of men's rejection of the grace of the κατ'εἰκόνα or the grace of the Logos. The κατ'εἰκόνα is not explained psychologically, but simply as men's μετουσία τοῦ Λόγου, or as ἡ χάρις τοῦ Λόγου. As for the body, it does not refer simply to a constituent part of the human nature, but is in most cases used κατὰ συνεχδοχήν to refer to the entire human creaturehood. It is clear that in this treatise Athanasius is not so much interested in the physiology of death, as he is in the theology of death, i.e. in death as a theological problem. So, he is quite satisfied with presenting the physiology of death in terms of its most obvious manifestation, namely the natural corruption of the human body (he does also refer to death as a κρᾶτησις of the human subject in Hades)⁽⁶⁾, and concentrates on expounding its theological meaning, namely, God's condemnation on man's self-willed rebellion and fall from the grace of the Creator Logos. It is above all, the inevitability and inescapability of human death which constitutes the essence of the problem. As a creature, man is by nature mortal. Yet, his mortality is not a necessity, since he has been co-ordinated with the immortal God in a way that he can remain immortal. The problem is that man has forfeited this possibility by forfeiting his coordination with God.

Looked at from this angle, death is a theological problem

caused both by men's free failure and by God's just condemnation. Thus Athanasius attempts to explain that man's physical death has become an inescapable necessity because of men's theological problem, which men themselves have caused and from which only God the Creator can save them. Athanasius' interest in the event of human death as a theological problem becomes obvious in his presentation and exposition of the death of the Creator Logos as the only decisive solution to this problem. Interconnected with this death is the event of the Incarnation, i.e. the assumption and appropriation of human creaturehood by the Creator Logos. The Logos' death is not connected with His Godhood, but with His manhood. It is human natural death, the death of His human body, which He appropriated to Himself through the Incarnation. As such, this body not only dies but conquers death by death because it is the Dominical Body. This conquest has universal implications for all men, because its death was in fact the Logos' offering of a substitutional sacrifice for all men. Inasmuch as the death was for all, the resurrection of the same has had universal implications. Athanasius clearly teaches that the Logos' death and resurrection as man were not undertaken for Himself but for all men. They are in fact the means of the death and resurrection of all humanity. The key to this event is the Person of Christ, i.e. the Creator Logos, who is 'over all' and 'for all' men. Who He is, makes what He has (i.e. the body, humanity) and what He does (i.e. the offering of the body to death and through this the abolition of death and the establishment of the resurrection) of universal effect. Obviously the notion of Christ's sacrifice is central for Athanasius' solution to the theological problem of death. This is plainly rooted in the biblical data, not only conceptually but

also linguistically. It is no accident that the language of the body is so dominant, for this is the import of the biblical statements which Athanasius cites. What Athanasius has contributed in his treatise is the systematic exposition of the biblical data on Christ's death in the context of a Logocentric doctrine of man's creation and fall which demands the Incarnation of the Logos as the only decisive solution. Whatever our evaluation of this systematic exposition of the biblical data, the fact remains that Athanasius' exposition of death and especially Christ's death, does not focus on a particular physiology of death, but on its theological character. Human death is a theological problem which requires and receives a theological solution in the death and resurrection of Christ . instead of, and for all men. In view of this fact, it must be stressed that Athanasius' language should not be pressed beyond its theological intention and signification, which means that no clear views concerning the Athanasian understanding of the physiology of death can be extracted.

(iii) Death in CAR1

The first references to death in CAR1 are Christological and occur in chapters 38ff. Athanasius is discussing the exaltation of Christ and particularly the ὑπερῴωσεν of Philippians 2:9 against the Arians who take it as clear evidence for affirming his creaturehood. Athanasius argues that Christ's exaltation follows from his obedience unto death (ὅτε γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου ..τότε ὑπερυψῶσθαι λέγεται, CAR1, 38), or from His humiliation which is connected with the flesh and the death (τό ταπεινόν τῆς σαρκός καί τοῦ θανάτου ,ibid. 41). Before His Incarnation, the Logos was highly exalted and worshipped by Abraham in the tent (Gen.18:1ff), by Moses in the bush (Ex.3:1ff), whilst Daniel saw Him being ministered to by thousands of thousands of angels (Dan. 7:10). So, to be exalted and worshipped after death, should not be taken as meaning that He was not exalted before, but, that He was exalted as man when He humbled Himself and died. Athanasius' most comprehensive statement on this comes in chapter 41, where he interprets the death of Christ in terms of His vicarious sacrifice for all men and His exaltation as His vicarious victory for all humanity:

ἐπειδή οὖν εἰκὼν ὦν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἀθάνατος ὦν ὁ Λόγος, ἔλαβε τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφὴν καὶ ὑπέμεινε δι' ἡμᾶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ σαρκί τὸν θάνατον, ἵν' οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν διὰ τοῦ θανάτου προσενέγκῃ τῷ πατρὶ, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λέγεται ὑπερυψοῦσθαι, ἵν' ὡς περ τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἡμεῖς ἀπεθάνομεν ἐν Χριστῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Χριστῷ πάλιν ἡμεῖς ὑπερυψωθῶμεν.

This statement is clearly reminiscent of the teaching of INC with the only difference that here the emphasis is even more decisively placed

on the Person of Christ, since the offering is spoken of as the offering of Himself (ἐαυτὸν προσενέγκη τῷ Πατρὶ) rather than the offering of His body which is more customary in INC. Christ's death is not just the death of the body but of Himself (τῷ θανάτῳ Αὐτοῦ). What is particularly significant to observe here is that again the physiology of death is not explained, but the interest is theological and soteriological. To be sure, Christ's death is human in its physiology (ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός ἀπέθανε καὶ ὑψώθη), but the point is that this human death has universal soteriological implications in as much as this man is not just a mere man as Paul of Samosata and the Jews would have him (Cf. CARL, 38 : ..τό ὅλον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι φύσει καὶ μηδέν πλεόν . Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, τοῦ δὲ Σαμοσατέως καὶ τῶν νῦν Ἰουδαίων τό φρόνημα), but Lord, God, Son and Logos. Athanasius does not contest the human character of Christ's death, but the wrong theological understanding of this death which results from or leads to the wrong understanding of Christ's Person. As we saw the central Athanasian affirmation on Christ's death is the statement that, "By His death all of us died in Christ and thus in this Christ we shall be highly exalted". But this affirmation presupposes, or is internally and logically connected with, the other equally central affirmation of Athanasius on the Person of the Saviour:

Αὐτός (ὁ Υἱός καὶ Θεός) υἱοποίησεν ἡμᾶς τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ ἐθεοποίησεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γενόμενος Αὐτός ἄνθρωπος (ibid. CARL, 38).

Here Athanasius' concern is to affirm that the becoming flesh and the suffering in the flesh of the Divine Logos does not obscure

the glory of His Godhood, but results in the glorification of God the Father, in as much as man, who was made by God and was being lost, is brought back to life and re-made the temple where the Father is truly worshipped and glorified (τό γενέσθαι σάρκα τόν Λόγον καί θάνατον ὑπομεῖναι σαρκί οὐκ ἐπ' ἀδοξία τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, ἀλλ' εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ Πατρὸς. Δόξα δέ Πατρὸς ἐστὶ τόν γενόμενον ἄνθρωπον καί ἀπολόμενον εὐρεθῆναι καί νεκρωθέντα ζωοποιηθῆναι καί ναόν γενέσθαι Θεοῦ ,CAR1,42).

It is important to note that Athanasius' terminology on the physiology of death is quite flexible. His language indicates that he is not working with rigid semantics concerning the divinity and the humanity of Christ. His main concern is to keep these two aspects in full play in his exposition of the apostolic kerygma and to make the Divine the basis for the salvation of the human. So He connects death with the flesh, or the body or the form of the servant, or even with Christ Himself as man, but the basis for overcoming death as an anthropological problem is theological, rooted in the Creator Logos Himself. The following statement makes this crystal clear:

εἰ καί ὡς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται τεθνηκέναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ζωὴ ὣν ὑψώθη τῇ ἀναστάσει, ὃ γάρ καταβάς αὐτός ἐστὶ καί ὁ ἀναστάς, κατέβη γάρ σωματικῶς, ἀ- νέστη δέ ὅτι Θεός ἦν αὐτός ἐν σώματι (ibid. 44).

In the same chapter Athanasius contrasts the death of Christ with that of all other men from Adam onwards, and emphasizes the uniqueness of the former in as much it resulted in the resurrection.

He says that ,

οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι ἀπὸ Ἀδάμ καὶ μέχρι νῦν
ἀπέθανον καὶ ἔμειναν νεκροί, οὗτος δὲ μόνος
ὀλόκληρος ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀνέστη. (ibid.)

The ὀλόκληρος is particularly significant, because it points to the integrity and entirety of Christ's manhood, although it does not draw out its precise content.

Similarly Athanasius contrasts Christ, the second man from heaven, with all other men, who came from the ^{first} ~~second~~ man Adam, by saying that death could not hold Christ in its grip, whereas it ruled over all the others.

οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι μόνον ἐξ Ἀδάμ ὄντες
ἀπέθανον καὶ τὸν θάνατον εἶχον βασιλεύοντα καὶ ἀυ-
τῶν, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ
ἐστίν, ὁ γὰρ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. . διὸ οὐδέ κεκρά-
τηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐταπεινώσεν ἐ-
αυτόν , συγχωρήσας μέχρι θανάτου φθάσαι τὸ ἴδιον
ἐαυτοῦ σῶμα, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ δεκτικόν θανάτου,
ἀλλ' ἐκ γῆς ὑπερυψώθη διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτόν ἐν σώματι
Υἱὸν Θεοῦ, ὃν ὁ Θεὸς ἀνέστησεν λύσας τὰς ἀδύνα-
ται τοῦ θανάτου, καθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν κρατεῖσθαι
αὐτόν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (ibid.)

Here Athanasius' dramatic language , which almost personifies death, or treats of it as an objective force, strongly indicates his theological-soteriological interests. He sees death as having established such a mastery over men that only God can save them. But, as he explains, to do this, God needs to become man and abolish the mastery of death ^{in and} through His own manhood. The dramatic language has one basic intuition, God's becoming man and meeting death and dealing with it in its own territory!

ἐπειδὴ Θεὸς ὢν γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος. . διὰ τοῦτο δυνατόν

οὐκ ἦν κρατεῖσθαι αὐτόν ὑπὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἀνθρώπῳ
ὁ δὲ δυνατὸν οὐκ ἦν τοῦτο κατορθῶσαι, ἴδιον γάρ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁ θάνατος, διὰ τοῦτο θεός ὢν ὁ Λό-
γος γέγονεν σὰρξ ἵνα θανατωθεῖς σαρκί ζωοποιήσῃ
πάντας τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμει (ibid.)

It is obvious that Athanasius is concerned with the universal soterio-
logical fact of God the Logos undergoing death for all as man in
the flesh or in the body, and not with the precise way in which
He became man and died as man. The 'mechanics', as it were, of the
Incarnation and the death are not in his mind, and therefore his
teaching should not be analysed from a strict point of view.
To be sure, the Logos died as man in His manhood, but the physiological
'how' of this death is not envisaged in this discourse.

The same soteriological outlook is to be seen in the following
chapter (CARL, 45) where the death of Christ is spoken of as the
λύτρον τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀμαρτίας καὶ ἡ κατάργησις τοῦ θανάτου,
and as the way in which the resurrection and the ascension have
been granted to all humanity. And this is repeated in all the
subsequent statements concerning the death of Christ right down
to the last chapter.

In CARL, 48 we read: δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν γέγονεν
καὶ γέγραπται, ἵνα ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος ὁ Κύριος
θνητούς ὄντας καὶ προσκαίρους ἡμᾶς ἀθανάτους κα-
τασκευάσῃ.

Also in CARL, 51: ἐπειδὴ γάρ ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος
᾿Αδάμ ἐτράπη, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος εἰ-
σῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, διὰ τοῦτο ἔπρεπε τὸν δεύ-
τερον ᾿Αδάμ ἄτρεπτον εἶναι.

And in CARL, 59: τότε μὲν ἀπὸ ᾿Αδάμ μέχρι Μωϋ-
σέως ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσεν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ Λόγου παρου-
σία κατήργησε τὸν θάνατον. καὶ οὐκέτι μὲν ἐν τῷ
᾿Αδάμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκομεν, ἐν δὲ τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες
ζωοποιούμεθα.

And finally and most clearly in CAR1,60 : καθ' ἣν (διαθήκης διακονίαν) ὁ ποτέ βασιλεύων θάνατος καταργήθη. . . . ἄρτι δέ ὁ Λόγος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐδέξατο τὸ κρῖμα καὶ τῷ σώματι παθὼν ὑπὲρ πάντων σωτηρίαν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἔχαρίσατο.

In conclusion then, we may say that the teaching of Athanasius on Christ's death in CAR1 does not differ from that of INC. The dominant thought is soteriological-theological and the key to it is the Person of God the Logos. Christ suffers human death as man, but inasmuch as He is not a mere man, He destroys death and brings about the resurrection and the ascension.

(iv) Death in CAR2

Athanasius' teaching in CAR2 is similar. The first statement occurs in chapter seven and brings out in the clearest way the substitutionary and priestly character of the death of the incarnate Logos, whilst emphasizing, as in CAR1, the personal aspect of this offering.

Ὁ Λόγος ὡς Ἰσαακ τὸν ποδῆρη, οὕτως αὐτὸς ἔλαβε τὴν ἀπὸ γῆς σάρκα, . . . ἵνα ἔχων τὸ προσφερόμενον αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀρχιερεὺς, ἑαυτὸν προσενέγκῃ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν καθάρσῃ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νεκρῶν ἀναστήσῃ.

In the following chapters (CAR2,8 and 9) Athanasius clearly states that his thought is governed by the teaching of Hebr. 2:14-18 and especially the phrase ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου καταργήσῃ τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου, whilst his reference to ἡ κατὰ νόμον ἱερατεία which χρόνῳ καὶ θανάτῳ παρήμειβε τοὺς προτέρους implies the contrast between the unique priesthood of Christ and the old priest-

hood of Israel.

In chapter 14 the personal offering of the Son to the Father through death, as well as its universal implications (delivery from theological deceitfulness and corruption) is once again brought forward in unambiguous soteriological language:

Ποτεῖ τόν ἑαυτοῦ Υἱόν ἐνδύσασθαι σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον
καί γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον. . ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ ἑαυτόν προ-
σενέγκας ὑπέρ πάντων τούς πάντας ἐλευθερώσῃ ἀπό
τῆς θεοπλανησίας καί τῆς φθορᾶς. .

In chapter 15 he contrasts the Jewish expectations of an impassible Christ with the Lord's own teaching which states ὅτι τόν Χριστόν δεῖ πρῶτον παθεῖν. And then, he proceeds to explain that , although the Scriptures proclaim the Christ to be Lord, God, immortal and giver of life, He had to suffer and to die in order to overcome our suffering and our death. Christ's human suffering did not diminish His Lordship or Godhood, etc. (οὐκ ἡλαττώθη τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ πάθει) because it was related to His manhood and its real purpose was our salvation. Particularly interesting here is the phrase ἀνθρωπίνῳ πάθει, which implicitly rejects the theopaschêtic formula.

In CAR2,55 Athanasius returns to the vicarious intention of the death of Christ and focuses on the resurrection of men as the result of this death: καί ὑπέρ ἡμῶν ἀναδέξασθαι θάνατον καί διὰ τό ἀναστῆσαι τούς ἀνθρώπους. The resurrection, he says, would not have taken place if the death of Christ had not occurred. Also, the death would not have occurred if Christ did not possess a mortal body (εἰ μή τό ἀποθνήσκον ἐσχῆκει σῶμα). In support of this he recalls Hebrews 2:14-15 and I Corinthians 15:21 and concludes: οὐ δὲ ἑαυτόν

ἄρα, ἀλλά διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ καταργηθῆναι τὸν θάνατον. Obviously the language and the doctrine here are identical with those of INC. Death is connected with the body and the victory over death with the Logos. As in INC, so here, the terminology is determined by the biblical texts which are cited and which make the term body of primary significance. The key however to this doctrine is soteriology and theology. Only the Logos can save, and His act of salvation must be mediated through a human instrument, since it is humanity that needs salvation.

In CAR2,61 Athanasius explains the meaning of the Christological designation "first-born from the dead". Death is here predicated of Christ because of the body which appears in the background. But again the main thought is, as previously, distinctly soteriological.

καὶ πρωτότοκος λέγεται πάλιν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν οὐχ ὅτι πρῶτος ἡμῶν ἀπέθανε· προεπεθνήκειμεν γάρ ἡμεῖς· ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναδεξάμενος θάνατον, καὶ τοῦτον καταργήσας, ἀνέστη πρῶτος, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναστήσας τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα. Λοιπὸν ἀναστάντος ἐκείνου, καθ' ἐξῆς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν ἐγειρόμεθα.

In CAR2,65 the death of Christ is contrasted to that of Adam and the basic terms employed in both cases are those of flesh and blood.

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη ἡ διὰ τοῦ Ἀδάμ ὁδὸς ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ παραδείσου ἐξεκλίναμεν εἰς τὸν θάνατον.... διὰ τοῦτο ὁ φιλόανθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος βουλήσει τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνόησεν ἑαυτὸν ἐκτεθεῖν σὰρκα ἵνα ἦν ἐνεκρώσεν ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως ταύτην αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αἵματι τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος ζωοποιήσῃ καὶ ἐγκαινίσῃ ἡμῖν ὁδὸν πρόσφατον καὶ ζῶσαν., ὡς εἶπεν ὁ ἀπόστολος, "διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος, τουτέστιν διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ" (Heb.10:20).

IN CAR2,66 Athanasius links death both with Christ's self-offering (δέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν τῷ θανάτῳ) and with His body (τοῦ γὰρ σώματος ἴδιον ἦν ὁ θάνατος) and explains it as follows: ὡσπερ τοῦ σώματος ἴδιον ἦν ὁ θάνατος, οὕτω καὶ τῆς σωματικῆς παρουσίας ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον. This demonstrates once again, on the one hand the lack of precision in the physiology of death and on the other hand, the personal theological interest in Christology. Two more aspects of the doctrine of death are emphasized in this chapter. Firstly that man became dead on account of sin (ὁ ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν τῆ ἁμαρτίᾳ νεκρὸς) and secondly that the Incarnation and the death of Christ were substitutionary and had had one ultimate intention, the gift of immortality and the way of paradise: ὁ τέλειος τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος τὸ ἀτελές περιτίθεται σῶμα καὶ λέγεται εἰς τὰ ἔργα κτιζέσθαι ἵνα, ἀνθ' ἡμῶν τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἀποδιδούς, τὰ λείποντα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δι' ἑαυτοῦ τελειώσῃ. Ἐλειπε δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ ἀθανασία καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν παράδεισον ὁδός. The achievement of this purpose as an indisputable event is underlined in chapter 67: τετελειώται οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀποκατεστάθη, ὡσπερ ἦν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν γεγονὸς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος καὶ μείζονι μᾶλλον χάριτι· ἀναστάντες γὰρ ἐκ νεκρῶν, οὐκέτι φοβούμεθα θάνατον, ἀλλ' ἐν Χριστῷ βασιλεύομεν αἰεὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

In CAR2,69 Athanasius advances once again a statement which presents his theological perspective in his exposition of the doctrine of death. He says that, "if the Son was a creature then man would have remained mortal (θνητός), for he would not have been united with God (μὴ συναπτώμενος τῷ Θεῷ)." By implication, this means that, for Athanasius, the Godhood of Christ remains the primary focus of his thought, although Christ's humanity is equally stressed. The critical

point here seems to be the humanity of God. The Son of God became son of man by taking creaturely flesh into union with Himself, so that, since all men were debtors to death (πάντες εἰσὶν ὑπεύθυνοι τῷ θανάτῳ), and He was other than all of them, He might bring forward to death His own body and thus all might die through Him and all might become free from the word of condemnation and enjoy immortality and incorruptibility:

ἐπειδὴ πάντες εἰσὶν ὑπεύθυνοι τῷ θανάτῳ, ἄλλος ὢν τῶν πάντων, αὐτός ὑπὲρ πάντων τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα τῷ θανάτῳ προσενέγκη, καὶ λοιπὸν ὡς πάντων δι' αὐτοῦ ἀποθανόντων, ὁ μὲν λόγος τῆς ἀποφάσεως πληρωθῆ (πάντες γὰρ ἀπέθανον ἐν Χριστῷ), πάντες δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ γέωνται λοιπὸν ἐλεύθεροι μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τῆς δι' αὐτὴν κατάρας, ἀληθῶς δὲ διαμείνωσιν ἐσαεὶ ἀναστάντες ἐκ νεκρῶν, καὶ ἀθανασίαν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ἐνδυσάμενοι. τοῦ γὰρ Λόγου ἐνδυσάμενου τὴν σάρκα, καθὼς πολλάκις δέδεικται, πᾶν μὲν ὄνμα τοῦ ὄφους δι' ὅλον κατεσβέννυτο ἀπ' αὐτῆς· εἴ τι ἐκ τῶν σαρκικῶν κινήματων ἀνεψύετο κακόν, ἐξεκόπτετο καὶ συνανηρεῖτο τούτοις ὁ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀκόλουθος θάνατος.

But the whole paragraph hinges upon the phrase ἄλλος ὢν τῶν πάντων. It is this otherness of the Logos (i.e. His being ἀνυπεύθυνος τῷ θανάτῳ) as God-become-man which accounts for Christ's human victory over sin and death.

In CAR2,70 Athanasius emphasizes the union of God and man in Christ without which the problem of death could not find an ultimate solution:

μέσος ὢν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑποπτος ἦν αἰεὶ τῷ θανάτῳ μὴ ἔχων ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁ οὐ συναφθεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἐλεύθερος παντός φόβου γένηται.

His best statement on this union and its significance is

the following:

Διὰ τοῦτο γάρ τοιαύτη γέγονεν ἡ συναφή, ἵνα τῷ κατά φύσιν τῆς θεότητος συνάψῃ τὸν φύσει ἄνθρωπον καὶ βεβαίᾳ γένηται ἡ σωτηρία καὶ ἡ θεοποίησις αὐτοῦ (ibid.)

and again:

οὕτω γάρ δι' ἡμᾶς θεμελιούται , τά ἡμῶν ἀναδεχόμενος, ἵνα ἡμεῖς ὡς σύσσωμοι συναρμοζοῦμενοι ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τῆς ὁμοιώσεως τῆς σαρκός, εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον καταπτήσαντες, ἀθάνατοι καὶ ἀφθαρτοι διαμείνωμεν (CAR2,74).

The two statements quoted above indicate that the language of the σῶμα and the language of ὁ φύσει ἄνθρωπος are synonymous! The emphasis, however, is placed on the συναφή and on the αὐτός, i.e. on the conjunction of the Divine Logos and humanity.

The last references of Athanasius to Christ's death in CAR2 deal with the familiar theme of the abolition of death and its corollary the revelation of life:

κατά τὴν ἰδίαν πρόθεσιν καὶ χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ προχρόνων αἰωνίων, φανερωθεῖσαν δὲ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καταργήσαντος μὲν τὸν θάνατον φωτίσαντος δὲ τὴν ζωὴν (CAR2,75)

or again:

ἀναστάντες ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς ὀλίγον θανάτου , αἰωνίως ζῆσαι δυνηθῶμεν (CAR2,76)

or again:

ἀλλ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀληθινὴν σοφίαν ἐποίησε σάρκα λαβεῖν καὶ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον, θάνατόν τε ὑπομεῖναι σταυροῦ, ἵνα διὰ τῆς ἐν τούτῳ πίστεως πάντες λοιπὸν οἱ πιστεύοντες σώζεσθαι δύνωνται... καὶ μετὰ τὸ καταργῆσαι τὸν θάνατον καὶ σῶσαι τὸ γένος ἡμῶν

ἔτι καί πλεον ἀπεκάλυψεν ἑαυτὸν τε καί δι' ἑαυτοῦ
τόν Πατέρα. (CAR2,81).

By way of conclusion it may be said that in CAR2 Athanasius advances the same doctrine concerning Christ's death as in INC and CAR1, although certain refinements and clarifications are apparent. The soteriological-theological interest remains the central concern. The language is quite flexible and follows the biblical data. It becomes clearer that he uses 'body' kata synekdochen to denote human nature in its creaturely constitution. As regards death, it is quite obvious that in no case is Athanasius concerned with the physiological 'how' of death, but rather with death as a theological problem which can only be given a theological answer.

(v) Death in CAR3

The first statements on corruptibility and death in CAR3 appear in chapter 23 where Athanasius expounds the theme of the unity of the Christians in the body of Christ. No one among men, he says, would have been perfected, but all would have remained corruptible, if the Son of God had not come and put on their body. Having taken their body and having become man, the Son and Logos of God worked out the perfection of men, i.e. their redemption from sin and their immortality (λυτρωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκέτι μένουσι νεκροί). These are typical points of Athanasian doctrine. The emphasis is placed both on the Person of the Divine Logos and on His Incarnation, as well as on His vicarious work of redemption on behalf of all men with its universal and far-reaching soteriological implications.

In CAR3,31 Athanasius points to the statement of I Pet. 4:1 in order to argue against the Arians that Christ's sufferings for us are connected with His human flesh and not with His Godhood. It is because of the Incarnation, he says, that, on the one hand the sufferings of the flesh, including the cross and the death, are said to be of the Logos (τά ἴδια ταύτης αὐτοῦ λέγεται), and on the other hand the works proper to the Logos as God, are said to be performed through the body (τά δέ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου ἴδια ἔργα οἷα ἐστὶν τό ἐγείρειν τοὺς νεκρούς.. ..διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος ἐποίει). He did not just heal our infirmities, but upheld them in His body, so that men may never again be left responsible to death (ἐβάσταξεν..(οὐχ ἀπλῶς) ἐθεράπευσεν τὰς ἀσθενείας ἡμῶν, ἵνα μή.. ὑπευθύνους πάλιν τῷ θανάτῳ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καταλείψῃ).

This mild sense of "communicatio idiomatum" from the impassible Divine Logos to the human creaturely flesh is further stressed in CAR3,32. Since the Logos was not outside the flesh and the flesh was the object of sufferings, the passion, he says, is attributed of the Logos, but this attribution does not imply that the sufferings touched upon the Lord's Godhood: τῆς σαρκὸς πασχούσης οὐκ ἦν ἐκτός ταύτης ὁ Λόγος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ λέγεται τό πάθος... ἔπρεπε δέ τόν Κύριον ἐνδιουσκόμενον ἀνθρωπίνην σάρκα, ταύτην μετά τῶν ἰδίων παθῶν αὐτῆς ὄλην ἐνδύσασθαι, ἵνα, ὡπερ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον εἶναι τό σῶμα, οὕτω καί τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη, ἴδια μόνον αὐτοῦ λέγηται, εἴ καί μή ἤπιετο κατὰ τήν θεότητα αὐτοῦ.

However, what is important for Athanasius is the fact that the same Person (the Divine Logos) is attributed of both the passion and the victory, or the grace, since it was not a man who suffered for us and saved us, but the Lord as man: οὗ δέ λέγεται τά πάθη, οἷα.. ὁ θάνατος καί αἱ ἄλλαι τοῦ σώματος ἀσθένειαι, τούτου καί τό

κατόρθωμα καὶ ἡ χάρις ἐστὶ (ibid. CAR3,32).

In CAR3,33 Athanasius cites Rom.5:14 and speaks of the stronghold of death by which men were kept mortal and corruptible receiving the passions open to their own nature. And then, by contrast, he goes on to stress the fact that, since the Logos became man and made His own all that belongs to the flesh (τὰ τῆς σαρκός), these passions no longer touch the body of the Logos, and, by implication, men no longer remain sinful and mortal on account of their passions, but being raised by the power of the Logos, they remain for ever immortal and incorruptible. "We no longer die in Adam in accordance with our first generation, but ever since our generation and all our fleshly weakness were transferred upon the Logos, we are being raised from the earth, because the curse which came through sin has been abolished by virtue of Him who is in us and was made a curse for us. So, as all are from the earth and die in Adam, likewise all become reborn by water and Spirit and are being vivified, because the flesh is no longer earthly, but of the Logos" (λογοθεΐσης σαρκός). Yet, in spite of all the stress on the Person of the Lord, the flesh which the Lord assumed remains equally crucial for soteriology. This is clearly brought out in the statement: εἴ γάρ τὰ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ λόγου ἔργα μὴ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐγίνετο, οὐκ ἂν ἐθεοποιήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

The 'crude realism' of Athanasius' statements affords no speculative explanation of either the nature or the solution of the problem of human passion and death. His doctrine remains somewhat harsh and unrefined, but its theological intention is unmistakable. All men die in Adam, suffering death in their earthly body. The Creator Logos has taken the universal problem of death to Himself

by taking up an earthly body like that of other men and delivering it to death. By doing this the Logos has worked out a universal solution to the universal death of all men. Men are now able to be reborn in Christ and be revived through Him, because their flesh is no longer earthly but conjoined to the Logos. The death of the body is no longer an inescapable inevitability, because of Him who has been united with it:

Λοικόν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκέτι κατὰ τὰ ἴδια πάθη μένουσι ἀμαρτωλοὶ καὶ νεκροί, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Λόγου δύναμιν ἀναστάντες ἀθάνατοι καὶ ἄφθαρτοι αἰεὶ διαμένουσι... οὐκέτι κατὰ τὴν προτέραν γένεσιν ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ ἀποθνήσκομεν... ὥσπερ ἐκ γῆς ὄντες πάντες ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ ἀποθνήσκομεν, οὕτως ἄνωθεν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος ἀναγεννηθέντες ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιούμεθα.

In CAR3,34 Athanasius returns to the statement of I Pet. 4:1 to emphasize once more the fact that Christ did not suffer for us in His Godhood, but in the flesh, and that the passions, such as hunger, thirst, ignorance, distress, etc, are not natural to the Logos but to His flesh. Athanasius insists on this point to the extent that he personifies the flesh and makes it state his doctrine so as to remove all doubt about the impassibility of the Logos:

Δυναμένης τότε τῆς σαρκὸς ἀποκρίνεσθαι πρὸς τὸν οὕτω φιλόνηκον αἰρετικόν, Εἰμί μὲν ἐκ γῆς κατὰ φύσιν θνητή, ἀλλ' ὕστερον τοῦ Λόγου γέγονα σὰρξ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐβάσταξέ μου τὰ πάθη, καί τοι ἀπαθῆς ὦν· ἐγὼ δὲ γέγονα τούτων ἐλευθέρα, οὐκ ἐφιεμένη δουλεύειν ἔτι τούτοις διὰ τὸν ἐλευθέρωσαντά με Κύριον ἀπὸ τούτων. Εἰ γάρ ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀπηλλάγην φθορᾶς, ὄρα μὴ ἐγκαλέουης, ὅτι ὁ

τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος τὴν ἐμὴν τῆς δουλείας ἔλαβε μορφήν.
Ὡς γὰρ ὁ Κύριος, ἐνδυσάμενος τὸ σῶμα, γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι παρὰ τοῦ Λόγου
τε θεοποιούμεθα προσληφθέντες διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ
καὶ λοιπὸν ζωὴν αἰώνιον κληρονομοῦμεν.

Finally in CAR3, 35 Athanasius sums up his doctrine in a pivotal statement which reveals the fundamental perception of his Christology. "We have examined", he says, "these things, so that, if we see Him acting, or saying something in a divine manner (θεϊκῶς) through the instrument of His own body, we might know that, being God, He does these things; and again, if we see Him speaking or suffering in a human manner (ἀνθρωπίνως), we might not ignore that by taking flesh He became man and as such He does and says these things (εἰάν ἴδωμεν αὐτόν ἀνθρωπίνως...πάσχοντα, μὴ ἀγνοῶμεν ὅτι σὰρκα φορῶν γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὕτω ταῦτα ποιεῖ.). Thus, knowing what belongs to each side, and seeing and perceiving both to be performed by One and the same person, we may believe correctly and may never be led astray". Two Christological perspectives are seen here, a theological one and an incarnational one, which are interconnected through one subject in as much as they are attributed of one. Firstly, He is God and acts as God; and secondly, He has also become man and therefore acts as man. Obviously these perspectives are not alternatives, but are affirmed together, so that He who is and He who has become, are not opposed to each other, nor is the one resolved into the other, but stand and fall together in one and the same person. There is no antinomy between the being and the becoming of this person, because the former refers to His Godhood and the latter to His flesh or manhood. Thus, at this point Athanasius repudiates three types

of Christological heretics: (a) one who, looking at the divine acts of the Logos, denies the body (and explains that such were the Manichaeans); (b) one who, looking at the things of the body, denies the incarnate presence of the Logos (τὴν τοῦ Λόγου ἔνσαρκον παρουσίαν), which obviously refers to Paul of Samosata, though he does not mention him here. (Cf. CAR3, 51, 21, or CAR1, 38); and (c) one who, on account of the human attributions thinks of the Logos in a debased manner (ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ταπεινὰ περὶ τοῦ Λόγου φρονήση- this is the case of the Arians who fight God because like Jews they regard the Cross to be a scandal and like Greeks regard the kerygma to be foolish).

Athanasius' main objective here is to clarify and maintain the right Christological perspectives (ἀμφοτέρα ἐξ ἑνὸς πραττόμενα βλέποντες καὶ νοοῦντες ὀρθῶς πιστεύομεν - or, τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς πίστεως ἔχοντες ἐπιγινώσκωμεν ἃ διανοοῦνται οὗτοι κακῶς, ὀρθὴν ἔχοντα τὴν διάνοιαν ibid.). It is this objective which governs Athanasius' discussion of the suffering and death of Christ, and not a particular interest in these subjects as such. It is crystal clear that the point of dispute between Athanasius and his Arian opponents against whom he writes this treatise, is not the nature of suffering and death, but whether the fact of suffering and death implies that Christ is not who He has been claimed to have been, namely, Son and Logos of God and God.

It is the same objective which governs the discussion over Christ's ignorance and particularly the ignorance exhibited in the raising of Lazarus, in CAR3, 37 and 38. Athanasius states his position in the same general way defending the perception of the Incarnation of the divine Logos: ὅτι τῆς σαρκὸς ἐστὶν τὸ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτός, δέ δ

Λόγος, ἢ Λόγος ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι γινώσκει (CAR3, 38).

In the case of Lazarus, Athanasius argues that a closer look at the text indicates that the same Lord who was wondering about Lazarus' burial place, the same one ^{who} said that Lazarus ^{had} died and specified the place of his death, even though He was not present to witness the event, but remained at a distance! (Cf. CAR3, 37 ὁ Κύριος ὁ πυνθανόμενος τοῦ Λάζαρος κεῖται, αὐτός εἶπε μὴ παρών ἀλλά καὶ μακρὰν ὄν, Λάζαρος ἀπέθανε καὶ τοῦ ἀπέθανε). What Athanasius is keen to stress here is that οὐδέ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος πέπαιται τοῦ εἶναι Θεός, οὐδέ ἐπειδὴ Θεός ἐστὶ φεύγει τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, (CAR3, 38), or as in CAR3, 46, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, μετὰ ἀνθρώπων πεινᾶ καὶ διψᾶ καὶ πᾶσχει, οὕτω καὶ μετὰ ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ οἶδε, θεϊκῶς δὲ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ ὄν Λόγος καὶ Σοφία οἶδε, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστὶ ὃ ἀγνοεῖ. Being God and becoming man are to be maintained without any opposition, even if this means that Christ is both ignorant and knowledgeable! The justification for this double and seemingly 'contradictory' or paradoxical attribution is the fact of the Incarnation. As Athanasius himself puts it, ἀλλά μᾶλλον Θεός ὄν, προσελάμβανε τὴν σάρκα καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄν ἐθεοποιεῖ τὴν σάρκα (ibid.). Athanasius argues that one should not see only the 'ignorant humanity', but also the 'miraculous humanity,' which has authority to raise Lazarus from the dead. In other words, Athanasius wants to say that Christ's true humanity exhibited in His ignorance, should not obscure His divinity which is exhibited in His divine act through the same humanity. He is both weak and powerful in it, because He acts as man and as God through it. The death shows the true flesh and the resurrection the true Godhood. This is clearly stated in a text which is of particular

importance for the Athanasian doctrine of death:

Καί γάρ ὡσπερ ἐν αὐτῇ (τῇ σαρκί) ἐπυνοθανετο, οὕτω
καί ἐν αὐτῇ τόν νεκρόν ἤγειρε, καί πᾶσιν ἔδειξε
ὅτι ὁ νεκρούς ζωοποιῶν καί τήν ψυχὴν ἀνακαλούμενος
πολλῶ μᾶλλον τά κρυπτά πάντων ἐπιγινώσκει καί
ἐγίνωσκε ποῦ κεῖται ὁ Λάζαρος.

Here Athanasius uses three phrases for describing the resurrection of Lazarus, ἔγερσις νεκροῦ, ζωοποίησις νεκροῦ, ἀνάκλησις ψυχῆς, which seem to denote three models of death and which exhibit a gradual transposition from the most obvious to the most obscure imagery. Firstly we have the κατάκλησις τοῦ νεκροῦ, which suggests the laying down of the body and the burial, i.e. the crude fact of a living body turned into a corpse. Then, we have the ἀφαίρεσις τῆς ζωῆς, which suggests the loss of the breath of life, i.e. a sort of clinical or biological death; and finally we have the ἀποχώρησις τῆς ψυχῆς, i.e. a psychological model of death. The precise content of these three models, the physical the biological and the psychological, is hard to determine. The important point however is that, as they stand in the text, they seem to be working models, which in their particular ways express a common fact, the fact of death, which is the primary subject matter of the discussion. It is particularly significant here to observe that Athanasius is capable of using a variety of models without having to explain to himself or to others their interconnections. To attempt to work out the various possibilities of such interconnections without clear Athanasian statements would be a matter of purely hypothetical speculation. which not only would lead beyond the explicit intention of Athanasius' discourse, but

could also lead to the misunderstanding and falsification of this intention.

The more one examines Athanasius' statements about suffering and death, all the more one realizes that the intention is not the explanation of the physiology of the case, but the theology, and especially the affirmation of the Christological solution to the problem of suffering and death. God the Logos took the problem to Himself in taking up human flesh and becoming Himself a man, but, in as much as He did not cease to be God in becoming man and suffering death as man, He worked out men's salvation and the abolition of death. Over against this position Athanasius places the Arians who, on account of Christ's assumption of the human things, divide the Logos from the Father and deprive humanity of the grace (τόν μὲν Λόγον διαιροῦμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὡς ἀτελῆ καὶ χρεῖαν ἔχοντα τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπότητα τῆς χάριτος ἐρημοῦμεν CAR3,39). The consequence of this position, says Athanasius, is that men remain γυμνοί, δεῖλατοι καὶ νεκροί οὐδὲν κοινόν ἔχοντες πρὸς τὰ δοθέντα τῷ Υἱῷ (*ibid.*). In other words, the problem of man's nakedness, fear and death has not been overcome, because God has not been united with humanity. The problem of human death, like every other aspect of the human problem, can have only a theological solution, since its root is 'theological'. Man's alienation from God can only be overcome by God's appropriation of humanity. This is precisely what Christ as the God become man actually achieved. As Athanasius puts it in CAR3,40:

ἃ εἶχε Λόγος ὢν, ταῦτα καὶ γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος
καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀνθρωπίνως εἴληφέναι
λέγει, ἵνα δι' αὐτόν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς

γῆς ὡς κοινωνοί γενόμεθα θείας φύσεως λοιπόν ἐξουσίαν ἔχουσι κατά δαιμόνων, ἐν δέ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ὡς ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπό τῆς φθορᾶς, αἰωνίως βασιλεύσωσι..... λέγεται ὁ ἐν νῦν ἀνθρωπίνως ὅτι ἔλαβεν, ἵνα τῆς σαρκός ἐν αὐτῷ λαμβανούσης λοιπόν ἐξ ἐκείνης καί εἰς ἡμᾶς διαιμείνη βεβαίως.

It is on this incarnational basis and with reference to Christ's humanity that Athanasius understands the passion of the incarnate Logos. He clearly affirms in the following chapter that τῆς σαρκός ἴδια τά πάθη and, τά γούν ἔργα τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τῆς σαρκός ἐποίει, καί οὐδέν ἦττον πάλιν τά πάθη τῆς σαρκός ἐδείκνυτο ἐν αὐτῷ... ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἔργων ἐγνώριζεν ἑαυτὸν Υἱὸν τε τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τὸν ἑαυτοῦ Πατέρα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τῆς σαρκός παθῶν ἐδείκνυεν ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐφόρει σῶμα καί ἴδιον ἦν αὐτοῦ τοῦτο (CAR3,41). Restating the case of Lazarus in CAR3,46 Athanasius gives us another text particularly important for his doctrine of death. Having said that in becoming man the Logos suffers and ignores as man, but in remaining God He does not suffer and He knows, Athanasius goes on to say: οὕτως καί περὶ Λαζάρου πάλιν ἀνθρωπίνως πυνθάνεται ὁ ἀπελθὼν ἐγεῖραι αὐτόν καί εἰδῶς πόθεν ἀνακαλέσεται τὴν Λαζάρου ψυχὴν, μεῖζον δὲ τό εἰδέναί ποῦ ἦν ἢ ψυχὴ τοῦ εἰδέναί ποῦ ἔκειτο τό σῶμα. Here he works with a psycho-somatic model of death and his intention is to defend the same Christological balance, namely the ignorant humanity and the knowledgeable Godhood of the God-man. As he puts it himself: ἀνθρωπίνως ἐπηρώτα ἵνα θεϊκῶς ἀνεγείρη (*ibid.*). But a little further down, in CAR3,48, he employs a single model for death and resurrection, based on the term "flesh": λοιπόν γάρ ἦν ἡ σὰρξ ἀναστᾶσα καί

ἀποθεμένη τὴν νέκρωσιν καὶ θεοποιηθεῖσα. The psycho-somatic dualistic model of death and the monistic model of the death of the flesh are not contradictory, because "flesh" includes the psycho-somatic wholeness of humanity. Besides, the context within which they appear is not the discussion of the meaning of death, but whether the fact of the death of Christ contradicts His real Godhood. The Arians see this as a contradiction. Athanasius sees it as a soteriological necessity. But neither of them defends their conviction on the basis of a particular model of understanding death. The debate does not rest on models of death but on the meaning of the Incarnation and particularly the divine status of the Incarnate Logos in view of His suffering and death. Athanasius not only balances out the weaknesses, sufferings and death of Christ with the works of power and the resurrection, but also relates the former to the flesh and the latter to the Godhood. There is only one subject of attribution in Christ, the divine Logos, who is God and has also become man without ceasing to be God. The coordination of divine being and human becoming in the one Christ, the incarnate Logos, is the perspective within which the objections of the Arians are placed and criticised. For the Arians no such coordination is possible. Therefore the weaknesses the sufferings and the death of Christ imply creaturehood, and the strengths, Godhood, which cannot be brought together in a sort of ontological atonement. So the Arians relate the former to the Logos and the latter to God the Father making a distinction in being between the Logos and God the Father. For them, the Logos cannot be the subject of both the weaknesses and the strengths in Christ. The weaknesses are properly His and

characterize His creaturehood, but the strengths are the results of God's grace.

In CAR3, 53ff the question of the growth in stature (ἡ προκοπή) of Christ is discussed with the same ultimate intention, namely, the determination of the divine status of the Logos. Athanasius restates his theological soteriological and incarnational perspectives and makes a number of references to the suffering and death of Christ which become particularly illuminating. For him the προκοπή of Christ is in fact the προκοπή τῆς σαρκός. It is none other than the deification and grace of the flesh which results from the abolition of sin and corruption. It is on account of the ὁμοιότης καὶ συγγένεια of the flesh of the Logos and that of other men that the latter partake of deification and grace. Thus Athanasius introduces a parallelism between the προκοπή and the death of Christ: καὶ ὡςπερ εἵπομεν ὅτι σαρκί πέπονθεν καὶ σαρκί ἐπέινα καὶ σαρκί ἐκοπίασεν, οὕτω καὶ εἰκότως ἂν λέγοιτο ὅτι σαρκί προέκοπτεν (CAR3, 53), or further on: οὐκοῦν ὡςπερ, προκοπτοῦσης τῆς σαρκός λέγεται αὐτός προκόπτειν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἰδιότητα, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ θανάτου λεγόμενα, τὸ παραχθῆναι, τὸ κλαῦσαι, χρῆ λαμβάνειν τῆ αὐτῆ διανοίας (CAR3, 54). The διάνοια here obviously refers to the humanity of Christ and the fact of His becoming man by assuming it to Himself. In discussing the τὰ περὶ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ θανάτου λεγόμενα, Athanasius expounds further his Christological incarnational perspective which stands in opposition to Samosatean psilanthropism. If he was a mere man(ψιλός ἄνθρωπος), says Athanasius, then, let Him weep for and be afraid of death as man, but if He is the divine Logos in the flesh, then, as God He has nothing to

fear. And again Athanasius asks: Why did He fear death if He was life and if He could save others from death?.... or, How did He fear mortal human hegemony, He who helped others not to be afraid? If He Himself came forward against death, then how did He dread death? This kind of reasoning follows Athanasius' general rule of balancing out the Christological statements of weakness with the Christological statements of power and connecting the former with the flesh and the event of the Logos' incarnation, and the latter with the Logos' Godhood. It is in his unfolding of this theme that Athanasius gives yet another text of ^{Singular} ~~single~~ importance for his doctrine of death, since he employs in it the psychosomatic model of death in a Christological context:

Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀσεβές λέγειν τοῦτον δειλιᾶν τὸν θάνατον ἢ τὸν ᾄδην ὃν οἱ πυλωροὶ τοῦ ᾄδου βλέποντες ἔπτηξαν; Εἰ δὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐδειλία ὁ Λόγος, διὰ τί πρό πολλοῦ λέγων περὶ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς τῶν Ἰουδαίων οὐκ ἔφευγεν, ἀλλὰ ζητούμενος ἔλεγεν: "Ἐγὼ εἰμί", καὶ γὰρ ἠδύνατο μὴ ἀποθανεῖν ὡς ἔλεγεν, "Ἐξουσίαν ἔχω θεῖναι τὴν ψυχὴν μου καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχω πάλιν λαβεῖν αὐτήν" καί, "οὐδεὶς αἶρει αὐτήν ἀπ' ἑμοῦ". (CAR3, 54)

This text plainly shows that Athanasius is capable of employing a psychological model of death to defend his incarnational Christology. Thus for Christ to die and rise again means to lay down the soul and to take it up again (τό ἀποθανεῖν = τό θεῖναι τὴν ψυχὴν). Particularly interesting here is the fact that this model is introduced immediately after the imagery of Hades had been employed. The suggestion is that as the death of the body is connected with the grave, so the death of the soul is connected with Hades. But

the fact remains that the argument does not rest on the psychological model of death as such. The model is introduced in order to defend the authority of the Son of God in death and resurrection. It serves to counter-balance the τό δευλιᾶν τόν θάνατον ἢ τόν ᾄδην with the τό ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν θεῖναι. . . καί πάλιν λαβεῖν. Even the last statement οὐδαίς αἶρει αὐτήν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, which is borrowed from John 10:18, has no other intention than stressing the absolute and divine ἐξουσία of the incarnate Logos and thereby bear witness both to His Godhood and to the fact of His Incarnation. This intention is well summed up in the following sentences:

Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἦν ἴδια φύσει τοῦ Λόγου ταῦτα, ἦ Λόγος ἦν.
Ἐν δέ τῃ ταῦτα πασχούσῃ σαρκί ἦν ὁ Λόγος ὃ Χριστο-
μάχοι καί ἀχάριστοι Ἰουδαῖοι. Καί γάρ οὐκ εἴρηται
ταῦτα πρό τῆς σαρκός, ἀλλ' ὅτε ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο,
καί γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, τό τηνικαῦτα καί ἀνθρωπίνως
εἰρησθαι γέγραπται ταῦτα (CAR3, 55).

Thus Athanasius returns to his main argument which counter-balances his opponents' references to the sufferings of Christ with the references to His divine acts, attributing the former to the body and the latter to the Godhood.

Ἐξεσσι γάρ αὐτούς ὁρᾶν, πῶς ὁ τά ἔργα ποιῶν ὁ αὐ-
τός ἔστιν ὁ καί τό σῶμα παθητόν δεικνύς. . . ἀφιέναι. . .
τά ἴδια τοῦ σώματος ἐν αὐτῷ φαίνεσθαι. Ἐκ μέν γάρ
τοιούτων ἐγνώριζεν ὅτι θεός ὢν ἀπαθής, σάρκα παθητήν
ἔλαβεν. . . ἀκούοντες δέ ὅτι. . . πέπονθεν, οὐκ ἐνορῶσι τῷ
σώματι (*ibid*).

In CAR3, 56 Athanasius expresses the same principle even more clearly: τά μέν ὡς περί Θεοῦ γέγραπται, τά δέ διὰ τό ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ σῶμα λέγεται, and he goes on to stress that the body was φθαρτόν καί θνητόν because it was derived from saint Mary who was θνητή, and as

such was responsible for Christ's suffering. As for the fear and the prayer that the cup may pass, they should be understood with reference to the humanity and not to the Godhood of the Logos: οὐκ ἦν ἡ θεότης ἡ δειλιῶσα, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἦν ἴδιον καὶ τοῦτο τό πάθος (ibid.). It is attributed of Him, though He does not suffer anything as God, ὡς αὐτοῦ μέντοι πάλιν.. καίτοι μηδέν πάσχοντος, ἀπαθῆς γάρ ἦν ὁ λόγος (ibid.). So, it is heretical to say that the Lord feared death. Rather death, like a dragon, runs away from Him whom the demons tremble and the sea dreads.

The final references to Christ's suffering and death occur in CAR3, 57 and 58. They repeat the same doctrine, but add a few very important clarifications, particularly with regard to the psychological model of death which, as we have seen, Athanasius readily employs in the case of men, but makes meagre use of ^{in the} in the case of Christ. The occasion is provided by the discussion of the precise Christological import of the saying recorded in Matthew 26:39, "If possible, let this cup pass". Straight away Athanasius balances out the meaning of the saying by pointing out that Christ had come for this cup, as it is elsewhere asserted, and therefore one should infer that the fear belongs to the flesh (τοῦ μὲν ἦν τό θέλειν, ἐπί τοῦτο γάρ ἦλθε, τῆς δέ σαρκός ἦν τό δειλιῶν, διό καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἔλεγε τὴν τοιαύτην φωνήν). He insists that both the willingness and the hesitation to drink the cup must be taken into account, because both are said by the Lord and it is in both running their course together that men's salvation from death has been wrought. Καὶ ἀμφοτέρω παλιν παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγετο, ἵνα δείξη, ὅτι θεός ἦν θέλων μὲν αὐτός, γινόμενος δέ ἄνθρωπος εἶχε δειλιῶσαν τὴν σάρκα, δι' ἣν συνεκέρρασε τό

ἑαυτοῦ θέλημα τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἀσθενείᾳ, ἵνα καί τοῦτο πάλιν ἀφανίσας
θαρραλέον τόν ἄνθρωπον πάλιν πρὸς τόν θάνατον κατασκευάσῃ (CAR3, 57).
Here is the true paradox: the fact that οὗτος τῆ νομιζομένη δειλία
θαρραλέους καί ἀφόβους τούς ἀνθρώπους κατασκεύαζεν! The Apostles
looked down on death and the Martyrs suffered death on the understand-
ing that it was a μετὰβασις εἰς ζωὴν! So, Athanasius argues, the
witness of the Apostles and the Martyrs clearly shows ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἡ
θεότης ἡ δειλιῶσα, ἀλλά τὴν ἡμῶν δειλίαν ἦν ἀφαιρούμενος ὁ Σωτήρ.
The soteriological principle which governs this exchange of human
weakness with God's power in the mind of Athanasius is stated as
follows: ὡς γάρ τόν θάνατον θανάτῳ κατήργησεν καί ἀνθρωπίνως πάντα
τά ἀνθρώπινα (i.e. the weaknesses), οὕτω τῆ νομιζομένη δειλίᾳ τὴν
ἡμῶν δειλίαν ἀφηρεῖτο, καί πεποίηκε μηκέτι φοβεῖσθαι τούς ἀνθρώπους
τόν θάνατον. Ἔλεγε οὖν ταῦτα καί ἅμα ἐποίησε. In other words, the
critical point in this case is not that Christ said "Let the cup pass",
or "why has Thou forsaken me?", but that He did drink the cup and
did take up death and He did this ἀνθρωπίνως; whilst, simultaneously,
the same Christ also acted θεϊκῶς, making the sun dark and raising the
dead. Ultimately, Athanasius insists that the critical principle
for establishing true Christological doctrine is the right coordination
of the human sayings and deeds with the divine sayings and deeds of
Christ recorded in the Gospels, because, in the last analysis, it is
this coordination that results in the salvation of men. Therefore,
the isolated treatment of the human sayings and deeds of Christ is
not only dangerous but heretical. Athanasius' principle is rooted
in a theological soteriological 'necessity' which becomes critically
apparent in the following most important juxtaposition in which

the language of the soul is reassumed.

Πάλιν τε λέγων ἀνθρωπίνως
νόον ἢ ψυχὴ μου τετάρακτας
(John 12:27).

ἔλεγε καὶ θεϊκῶς, Ἐξουσίαν ἔχω
θεῖναι τὴν ψυχὴν μου καὶ ἐξουσίαν
ἔχω πάλιν λαβεῖν αὐτήν (John 10:18).

The contrast here is between the human soul of the Logos and the Person of the Logos. The Logos is troubled in His soul as man. But in as much as He is divine in His Person, He has (in His Godhood) the resources (the ἐξουσία, the δύναμις and the βούλησις) which can support His soul to withstand and overcome the trouble and the death. Athanasius clarifies his thought here by transferring this contrast, between Christ's soul and Christ's divine person, to another contrast, between Christ and other men. He says that men (i.e. human persons) do not possess any such divine resources and therefore die both by a necessity of nature and unwillingly (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀνάγκη φύσεως καὶ μὴ θέλων ἀποθνήσκει). This is probably the necessity created by man's fall), whereas the Logos who has divine ἐξουσία καὶ βούλησις can be separated from the body and take it up again without having His soul abandoned in Hades nor His body seen corruption, as David says in Ps.15:10. It^{is} obvious that in employing the psychosomatic model of human flesh or human nature in order to speak about Christ's suffering and death, Athanasius' true purpose is the defence of the Godhood of the Logos and His true Incarnation in accordance with the Gospel data as the only basis of man's salvation. His language on man and manhood, particularly as far as Christology is concerned, is quite loose and plastic. The integrity of Christ's humanity is clearly presented, but the divinity of His person is equally stressed. The contrast between Christ and other men indicates a distinction in person rather than a distinction in nature. (7) Other men are mere men (ψελοί)

but He is also divine, in as much as He is God become man. It is possible, by implication, to work out a number of ontological insights into the Athanasian Christology, but this would be unrealistic if not dangerous, since his intention is different. The matter under discussion between Athanasius and his opponents is not the ontological structure of the Incarnate Logos, or more particularly His humanity, but the divine status of the Logos in view of the human weaknesses which are in the Scriptures attributed of Him. The Arians relativise Christ's Godhood, but Athanasius insists that there are two sets of attributes, human and divine, which are due to the Incarnation and which should not be confused on account of their being attributed of one and the same person. Ultimately, Athanasius' difference from the Arians lies in his soteriological conception of the Incarnation, which is reaffirmed in chapter after chapter and in argument after argument. (8) In CAR3,57 he states it as follows: ἔπρεπε γάρ φθαρτὴν οὖσαν τὴν σάρκα μηκέτι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν μένειν θνητὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ἐνδυσάμενον αὐτὴν Λόγον ἄφθαρτον διαμένειν. Ὡς γάρ αὐτός γενόμενος ἐν τῷ ἡμῶν σώματι, τὰ ἡμῶν ἐμιμήσατο, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς δεξάμενοι αὐτόν τῆς παρ' ἐκείνου μεταλαμβάνομεν ἀθανασίας.

In CAR3,58 Athanasius draws his doctrine to a conclusion. The Arians, he says, pretend to be scandalised by the fact that the Logos was troubled and wept. In fact, they think that He did not have human feeling (ἀνθρωπίνην αἰσθησιν), because they ignore the human nature and what belongs to it. They should rather wonder at the miracle of the Logos being in such a passible flesh and not hindering those who plotted against Him and not retaliating against his attackers, but forbearing His own body to suffer and die even though He

prevented the death of others and even raised others from the dead. They should not forget that He came precisely for this reason, namely, that He may suffer in the flesh and therefore the flesh may be rendered impassible and immortal, or, that He may take to Himself the insult and the suffering so that men may no longer be touched by them but remain incorruptible in the age as the temple of the Logos. This soteriological perspective of the Incarnation is called by Athanasius the *σκοπός ὁ ἐκκλησιαστικός*, and is regarded as the anchor of the faith which prevents the believer from shipwreck.

Athanasius' teaching on Christ's death in CAR3 is basically the same as that of INC, CAR1, and CAR2. There are however, very important clarifications here, even though they are made in an incidental way. In fact, it is their uncontrived and incontroverted character which makes these clarifications particularly valuable, in as much as they point to the author's habitual way of thinking. These pertain both to the theological, as well as the physiological aspects of Christ's death. With regard to the former, they make clear the manward direction of the communicatio idiomatum in Athanasius' doctrine of the Incarnation, which guards against heretical monophysitic and theopaschitic Christologies. This means that God's uncreated being comes to bear through its powers upon man's creaturely and weak being in a saving manner. It also means that the attribution of human properties to God owing to the Incarnation, should not be made with reference to the Divine nature, not to a Divine-human nature (the Monophysite model), but to His Divine person become human. In other words they are not said of Him as God, but as man, because of His human nature.

With respect to the physiology of death, CAR³ has shown that Athanasius is capable of working with a variety of models (somatic, psychic, psychosomatic and personal), the content of which ranges from the crude biological terrestrial level, to the elaborate 'mythological' and subterranean model connected with Hades. These models can be classified into two types, those which are monistic and those which are dualistic in conceptuality. In the former type we have the use of comprehensive terms as σάρξ, σῶμα, ἄνθρωπος, ἀνθρώπινον, ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις. In the latter we have the use of the dyads, σῶμα-ψυχή, σῶμα-αὐτός (person), ψυχή-αὐτός (person). No rivalry is implied between these two types, though, it seems clear that Athanasius prefers the 'monistic' type because it serves in bringing out more forcefully the duality of the Incarnation and particularly the Divine person of the Logos as the key to it. On the human level, the person (i.e. the particular concrete man) was usually located in the soul. Indeed at the the time of Athanasius, soul seems to be often used kata synekdochen to denote a person. It was perhaps for the purpose of avoiding the complication of explaining how the Divine person can exist in a human soul that Athanasius avoided the dualistic model, which Paul of Samosata and the Arians had used in different ways. With all these clarifications in view Athanasius seems to be saying that the death of Christ was primarily connected with His humanity no matter what particular model one uses to describe it. It was also attributed to the Logos in as much as the humanity was personally His own.

(vi) Death in EPI

The Letter to Epictetus contains Athanasius' reaction to a debate on the Incarnation which had been conducted in Corinth and about which Athanasius had been duly informed.⁽⁹⁾ Here Athanasius offers a critical examination of a number of rival views held by two main parties involved in the debate, and concentrates on the notion of "the body of Christ" in particular which was regarded by some as homouosios with the Logos. It is in the course of this critique that Athanasius supplies a number of statements concerning the suffering and death of Christ, which are important for our present investigation.

The first statements of interest occur in EPI,5, where Athanasius defends the human integrity of the body of Christ against those who taught that it had been formed out of the divine substance of the Logos by conversion. Here the substance of the Logos is clearly differentiated from the body as unchangeable and immutable (ἀναλλοίωτος οὐσα καὶ ἄτρεπτος). Also, over against the view that the body is out of the Logos, it is asserted that the Logos was in the body: ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ περιτμηθέντι σώματι, καὶ βασταχθέντι, καὶ φαγόντι, καὶ πιδόντι, καὶ καμόντι καὶ ἐν ξύλῳ καθηλοθέντι καὶ παθόντι ἦν ὁ ἀπαθής καὶ ἀσώματος τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος. The participles περιτμηθέντι.. καὶ παθόντι bring out the human integrity of the body, whilst the adjectives ἀπαθής and ἀσώματος clearly differentiate the Logos from the body. This differentiation is strengthened by a statement which is related to the death of Christ: τοῦτο ἦν ἡ ἐν μνημεῖῳ τεθέν, διὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκορευθή, μὴ χωρευθεὶς αὐτοῦ, κηρυχθῆναι καὶ τοῖς

ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν ὡς εἶπεν ὁ Πέτρος (I Pet.3:19). Whether the phrase μὴ χωρισθεῖς αὐτοῦ belongs to the original text, or not (as literary critics, such as Ludwig in 1911 and Lebon in 1922 and again in 1935, have asserted)⁽¹⁰⁾, the intention of the statement is absolutely clear. The body of Christ is not of the divine substance of the Logos. The Petrine model of death, which sees the body as being laid in the grave while the Logos goes to Hades to preach, is employed here with the sole intention to bear witness to the distinction between the passible human body and the impassible divine Logos. This becomes apparent in EPI,6 where the same model is re-employed and Athanasius' intention is more clearly expressed. The body, he says, is not the Logos, for otherwise it would have gone by itself to preach to the spirits in Hades! Rather, according to the biblical data, the body was deposited in Golgotha having been wrapt in linen by Joseph, whilst the Logos Himself went to preach. So Athanasius concludes: καὶ δεδεικται παῖσιν ὅτι μὴ τὸ σῶμα ἦν ὁ Λόγος, ἀλλὰ σῶμα ἦν τοῦ Λόγου . It would be only by tresspassing on the direct intention of the text, that one could infer here that the death of Christ is conceived as a separation of Logos from body as opposed to soul from body. Perhaps, it was for the purpose of rejecting this wrong inference that the phrase μὴ χωρισθεῖς αὐτοῦ was added (if indeed it was !) later on to the text. The fact remains that in the light of the context, with or without the controversial phrase, Athanasius' statement is not made with the purpose to specify how the death of Christ actually occurred, but to defend the distinction between the body and the Godhood of the Logos by using a biblical model of Christ's death. The scholars who took this text as explaining how Christ died (as

for instance A. Stülcken) were in fact searching for textual Athanasian evidence to confirm their thesis that the Athanasian Christology had no place for a human soul in Christ. This is certainly untenable here, not only because such use of the text is arbitrary and unrelated to its immediate intention, but also because the inference is drawn only e silentio and in spite of the clear Athanasian statement in EPI,7 : ὅλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἀληθῶς ἡ σωτηρία γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Λόγῳ.

However, Athanasius not only distinguishes here between the humanity of the body and the Godhood of the Logos. He also defends and explains the biblical custom of attributing of the Logos all the weaknesses or properties of the body. As he puts it, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδιοποιεῖται τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἴδια ὡς ἑαυτοῦ ὁ Λόγος ὁ ἀσώματος. It is not merely a matter of attribution but of appropriation (ἰδιοποιήσις). He illustrates this by means of a number of biblical statements and concludes by saying that this appropriation is based on the fact that the Logos made the body His own (τό ἴδιον σῶμα). It is on this basis that Athanasius understands why the passion of the body is often referred to the Lord Himself in the scriptures. He states this in a text which again, as Lebon showed in 1935, presents textual variations in the history of the transmission of the text of EPI.

ἃ γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἔπασχε τοῦ Λόγου ταῦτα συνὼν αὐτῷ ὁ Λόγος εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνέφερεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς τῆς τοῦ Λόγου θεότητος μετασχεῖν δυνηθῶμεν. (Ludwig)	ἃ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἔπασχε τοῦ Λόγου, ταῦτα σὺν αὐτῷ ὁ Λόγος ἔφερεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς τὸ τοῦ μονογενοῦς Θεοῦ πάθει σωθῶμεν. (Bedjan)
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Even if the Bedjan Greek text was original, the doctrinal content of the two texts is not different. The intention is to refer the

passion of the human side of the Logos to the Logos on account of the fact that it co-exists with Him in accordance with the soteriological purpose of the Incarnation. This is clearly shown in the statement which follows and which is common to all textual traditions:

καὶ ἦν παράδοξον , ὅτι αὐτός ἦν ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ πάσχων· πάσχων μὲν ὅτι τὸ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ ἔπασχε σῶμα, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἦν· μὴ πάσχων δέ, ὅτι φύσει θεός ὣν ὁ λόγος ἀπαθής ἐστι.

The same applies to the following sentences which again exhibit linguistic but not doctrinal variations:

καὶ αὐτός μὲν ὁ ἀσώματος ἦν ἐν τῷ παθητῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀφανίζοντα τὰς ἀσθενείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος (Ludwig)

καὶ αὐτός μὲν ὁ ἀσώματος ἦν ἐν τῷ παθητῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἦν τοῦ ἀπαθοῦς θεοῦ λόγου (Bedjan in Lebon).

Finally the whole mind of Athanasius is expressed in a text which brings out explicitly Athanasius' doctrine of appropriation and the various ^{phases} ~~phases~~ of its soteriological significance: 'Ἐποίησε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτως, ἵνα, τὰ ἡμῶν αὐτός δεχόμενος, καὶ προσε- νεγκῶν εἰς θυσίαν, ἐξαφανίση, καὶ λοιπὸν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ περιβαλῶν ἡμᾶς, ποιήσῃ τὸν ἀπόστολον εἰπεῖν, "Δεῖ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύ- σασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν, καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀθανασίαν". The phrase τὰ ἡμῶν.. refers to the passion which the Incarnate Logos receives from men and which He uses to effect His vicarious sacrifice for them. In doing this He also effects the saving exchange, namely the clothing of our body which suffered and died in sacrifice with His own perfections of incorruptibility and immortality (τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ). It is crystal clear that Athanasius' primary intention in speaking here about the body of Christ in its distinction from and appropriat- ion by the Logos, is none other than the refutation of the heretical

understanding of this body as homocousios with the Logos. He does this in the context of his general understanding of the Incarnation which is dominated by theological and soteriological considerations.

The same doctrine is defended in EPI,7, where Athanasius stresses the reality and totality of men's salvation in the Incarnate Logos. Here again, in arguing that the Logos was not changed into flesh and bones, as some had stated at the debate in Corinth, he asserts that the Logos possessed flesh and bones, both, before His death and after it in the resurrection.

In EPI,8 Athanasius recapitulates his argument and sets it in the general context of the classical biblical statement of the Incarnation John 1:14. Here he asserts that the ἐγένετο of John 1:14 does not imply that the Logos was changed into flesh (οὐ τραπεῖς εἰς σάρκα), but that He assumed flesh and became man (ἀλλ' ὅτι σάρκα (ζῶσαν) ἀνέλαβε καὶ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος). Here also, he repudiates those who say that the flesh preexisted before Mary and that even some human soul preexisted before it and was perpetually united with the Logos. Though it is not absolutely clear, it seems that, by implication, Athanasius holds that the body which the Logos assumed from Mary included within it a human soul. Indeed this is also suggested by the term ζῶσαν, which qualifies the flesh and which seems to be original, even though it does not appear in all the versions, as Lebon has shown. However, what is interesting for our investigation here is the statement about the death of Christ which appears in the context of this general discussion on the Incarnation. It runs as follows: Παύσονται δὲ καὶ οἱ εἰπόντες μὴ εἶναι δεκτικὴν θανάτου τὴν σάρκα, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως εἶναι

ταύτην. Εἴ γάρ μή ἀπέθανε πῶς ὁ Παῦλος παρεδίδου Κορινθίοις, ὃ καί παρέλαβεν, "ὅτι Χριστός ἀπέθανεν ὑπέρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν κατὰ τὰς Γραφάς;" Πῶς δέ ὅλως καί ἀνέστη εἰ μή καί ἀπέθανεν;" The obvious meaning of this statement is that the death and resurrection of Christ refer to the flesh and not to the Godhead and that the death occurred on account of men's sins.

In EPI,9 Athanasius draws out the same distinction between the flesh and the Godhead of the Logos , because, as he says, the creature can never be equated with the Creator. The Logos did not become flesh by the addition of the Godhead!, but in order that the creaturely human flesh might be raised up. It was the human body (and not the Godhood), he says, which was redeemed and vivified by the Logos; the body which was mortal and became immortal. It was psychical (ψυχικόν) and became spiritual (πνευματικόν). It was from the earth and yet it was made to enter the gates of heaven!

The same doctrine is asserted in EPI,10. The body, says Athanasius, was nailed on the Cross and suffered, though it was filled with the Godhead as its temple. This body, having a mortal nature, was raised above its own nature on account of the Logos who was in it. And thus, says he, the natural corruption ceased from it and it became incorruptible because the Logos , who is above man, put it on.

In EPI,11 Athanasius repudiates with the same force the prophetic model of Christology, which asserts that the Logos was in Christ as He was in the prophets. The Logos, says he, did come to the prophets and yet He was never made the subject of attribution of their life experiences including their death. No prophet's death is said to be for us, he says, but Christ's alone. So in the case of Christ

the attribution of the human experiences, including death, is made of the divine Logos, because He Himself became man. This is the last point that Athanasius makes in EPI concerning Christ's death.

What then is the Athanasian doctrine of the suffering and death of Christ in EPI? It is clear that both suffering and death refer to the humanity of Christ which is designated by the terms flesh and body understood in a holistic way as denoting whatever belongs to the human nature. Theopaschitism is decisively excluded, but at the same time the suffering and the death of Christ (as indeed the resurrection) are attributed of the divine Logos, because Christ is none other than the Logos in the flesh, or the Logos as man, rather than a man in whom the Logos dwelt as in the prophets. The attribution of the suffering and death of Christ of the Logos is rooted in the saving mystery of the Incarnation which Athanasius describes here as the personal appropriation (ἰδιοπρολησις) of all that belongs to humanity (including the passion and the death) by the Logos. The end of it all is the deification of humanity, i.e. the establishment of the incorruptibility and immortality of the flesh, through the human sacrifice of suffering and death and through the divine act of the resurrection. This doctrine is not different from the one which Athanasius developed in arguing against the Arian theses. In the case of the Arians the attribution of the human weaknesses of the body or flesh or humanity of the Logos was made the basis for questioning and finally rejecting His Godhood. In this case the opposite error seems to be promulgated. The Godhood of Christ is asserted in such a way that the integrity of His flesh is relativized and even denied. Athanasius' answer in

both cases rests on a general exposition of the Incarnation guided by clear soteriological concerns. This particularly applies to the economy of the suffering and death of Christ, which, though it belongs to the flesh or the humanity of Christ, also belongs to the Logos, inasmuch as He is its sole subject and governing principle. As ⁱⁿ the case of CARL-3, so here, Athanasius does not show any speculative interest in the physiology of death, but speaks about it in a way which is appropriate to refute the heretical thesis. Thus, to work out a physiological model for the death of Christ out of the present teaching would be a distortion of Athanasian doctrine. Unfortunately, the claims of many eminent scholars seem to fall into this category.

(vii) Death in ADEL

In his Letter to Adelphius, probably the Bishop of Onuphis on the Nile Delta, who sat at the Council of Alexandria in A.D. 362, Athanasius deals with the Arian contention that the Orthodox worship of Christ with His creaturely body lends itself open to the charge of idolatry. This provides Athanasius with the occasion for expounding the Orthodox doctrine of the worship of Christ by setting it within the context of the Orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation.

As he explains, the object of the Orthodox worship of Christ is not the human nature of Christ as such, but the Incarnate Logos of God, or more specifically, His Incarnate presence, through which His Godhead is revealed. In developing this doctrine Athanasius makes some passing references to Christ's death, which have some bearings on our present investigation.

In ADEL 5, Athanasius speaks of the flesh which the Logos assumed in order to free men and raise them all up from the dead and redeem them from sin. He also asserts rhetorically that the Logos took up flesh from the Virgin to redeem us from death and sin, and that He came to be in a body, so that He may take upon Himself the death on our behalf. Further on, Athanasius says that those who divide the Logos from the flesh in fact deny the redemption from sin which has taken place, or the abolition of death which has been accomplished. Clearly then, Athanasius refutes the contention of his adversaries which is centred on the body or flesh of Christ, by referring to the saving significance of this body or flesh demonstrated in its vicarious death. He uses this language not only because his opponents use it, but also because it is an acceptable biblical usage. This

clearly comes out in ADEL,6, where Athanasius cites the Petrine statement "Christ therefore suffered for us in the flesh" (I Pet.4:1) and elaborates the theme of Christ's self-offering on our behalf, which could not have been achieved without the flesh. Athanasius insists that it was by bringing forward the flesh that Christ gave Himself for us, so that by accepting death in it, He might abolish the devil who had the power of death (ἐν ἐκείνῃ τὸν θάνατον ἀναδεξάμενος). The doctrine here is strikingly similar with that of INC and particular stress is placed on the soteriological aspect of the death of Christ which is typical of Athanasius' mind. The death is the death of the flesh, but the flesh is the flesh of the Lord. In these two facts we have the two principles of Athanasian soteriology rooted in the two basic aspects of the Incarnation, the Incarnate presence of the Creator Logos and the reality of the human flesh. His pivotal statement here reads as follows: ἡ γὰρ ἕνσαρκος παρουσία τοῦ σωτῆρος θανάτου λύτρον καὶ κτίσεως πύσης σωτηρία γέγονεν. In other words, without God's incarnate presence the death of the flesh could not be a ransom of death nor salvation of the whole creation. In ADEL,8 he puts it even more clearly: κτίσμα ὑπὸ κτίσματος, οὐκ ἂν ποτε σωθῆι. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ κτίστης ὢν ὁ Λόγος, αὐτὸς δημιουργὸς γέγονεν τῶν κτισμάτων· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων τὸ κτιστόν αὐτὸς ἐνεδύσατο, ἵνα πάλιν αὐτὸς, ὡς κτίστης ἀνακαινίσῃ καὶ ἀναστῆσαι τοῦτο δυναθῆι.

The following points emerge from these statements concerning the death of Christ.

(a) The death of Christ is in fact the death of His creaturely body or flesh which He assumed at His Incarnation. It is the death of human creaturehood.

(b) In as much as this body is inseparable from Him, or He is irrevocably present in it, its death is a saving event undertaken for the salvation of all human flesh.

(c) The death of Christ is His human offering for the abolition of human sin.

(d) It is also the human death of God which leads to the universal renewal of all humanity because of the Divine presence.

(e) Though nothing is said about the physiology of Christ's death, it is strongly suggested that it was human, and that this was necessary so that the victory that came through it might be shared by all humanity.

(f) Finally, it is evident that Athanasius' intention in speaking about the death of Christ is theological in an incarnational and soteriological sense.

(viii) Death in MAX

The short letter to Maximus the philosopher, an acquaintance of Athanasius unknown to posterity, most probably not to be identified with Maximus the Cynic, is on the whole a direct repudiation of Christological errors arising from a Judaizing Christological tendency. This becomes obvious in the introductory chapter, which refers to Pilate and the Jews and contains such statements as, "may such persons no longer join those Jews who passed by in reviling Him who hung on the Tree..", or "let them learn that Christ who was crucified is the Lord of Glory, the Power and Wisdom of God".

In MAX,2 the prophetic model of Christology is repudiated in a very interesting argument, which also includes reference to the death of Christ. If the Logos, says Athanasius, was in Christ as in the Prophets, then He did not die once for all for the completion of the ages, but died again! (ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον γεννώμενος καὶ πάλιν ἀποθνήσκων φαίνεται). The suggestion here is that the Incarnate Logos' death is unique, in the sense that it relates to His person in a way that the death of the Prophets in whom He dwelt, could never be attributed of Him. This doctrine is further clarified in MAX,3. Here Athanasius insists on the statement that it was the Logos who became corporeally a man (γενόμενος σωματικῶς ἄνθρωπος) for our salvation, so that He may be able to make the offering for us and save us, who on account of the fear of death, were in all our life estranged in slavery. It was not a man, says Athanasius, who offered Himself for us, since every man is a debtor to death. And it was not a creature who did this, since as such He would be suspect of change. Rather it was the Logos Himself who brought forward His own body

so that our faith may not be in a man but in God the Logos. It is precisely because the Logos is not a debtor to death that in presenting His own body to it as a sacrifice for all, He abolishes death and establishes men's salvation from it.

Obviously the death of Christ here is a human death in that it is connected with the offering of the human body, but at the same time it is the Logos' death, because this human body is His own and not a man's. As such the human death of the Divine Logos which is undertaken on behalf of all is turned into a saving event for all. As Athanasius puts it, ἃ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπέμεινε, ταῦτα ὡς Θεός ἐμεγάλυνε. And he adds: "if one is scandalized at what God the Logos does through the body, let such one believe in what He does as God".

In the last analysis Athanasius tries to stir a middle course between the two rival options of Manichaeus and the Samosatene. The former, he says, concentrates on Christ's Godhood and denies τὰ ἴδια τοῦ σώματος, such as the birth, the growth, the suffering..etc and ends up with a total rejection of the Incarnation. The other one, concentrates on the ἴδια τοῦ σώματος and turns Christ into a man who is other than God the Logos. Obviously, Athanasius deals with the suffering and death of Christ from a soteriological angle which is logically interconnected with the event of the Incarnation. This is clearly and comprehensively stated in MAX,4: καὶ ἐσταυρωμένος σαρκί, νεκρούς ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σαπέντας ἠγειρε· καὶ δέδεικται πᾶσιν, ὅτι οὐ δι' ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἡμᾶς ὑπέμεινε πάντα, ἵνα ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασι ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ἐνδυσάμενοι διαμενῶμεν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. It is because the Incarnation is normally expressed in terms of the human body or the human flesh that the suffering and the death of

Christ are also expressed in the same language. This doctrinal terminology 'necessity' is already apparent in holy scripture, which remains Athanasius' primary source. But it is also necessitated by the doctrinal debates, which Athanasius follows closely. On the whole the doctrine of Athanasius on the death of Christ is once more developed in the strict context of particular Christological questions and not on any speculative interests. Three particular points emerge from MAX: (i) That the death refers to Christ as the Logos become man, and not to a man. (ii) That it has a sacrificial character, and as such is expounded in terms of the offering of the body to death by the Logos. (iii) Finally it is no necessity for the Logos as Logos, but for men and their salvation, and it is for this purpose that Christ accepted it in Himself. The theological and soteriological interests are particularly emphasized.

(ix) Conclusions

Our investigation of Athanasius' texts relating to the death of Christ has resulted in a number of very important conclusions. Above all Athanasius' concern is not to explain the physiology of Christ's death, but to expound it as the ultimate solution to the universal problem of human death. Two primary elements stand out in this exposition, both of which are closely interconnected with Athanasius' Christology and Soteriology. First of all there is the fact that the death of Christ is not the death of a particular man but of the universal head of all men, the Creator Logos and Son of God who became such a man by assuming human creaturehood. And secondly, there is the fact that in Christ's death it is not the Logos as Logos who dies, but the Logos as man who acts for and on behalf of all men, and that the death really refers to the body or flesh or humanity or the form of the servant or even the human nature of the inhominated Logos. The former element answers to the Soteriological principle that only God the Creator of all can be the Saviour of all, and the second element brings out on the one hand that in this instance the Creator has to act from our side as man, and on the other hand that salvation does in fact involve the destruction of actual human death. It is within such Soteriological=Christological parameters that one has to understand Athanasius' particular language concerning the death of Christ, which, in the last analysis, is coordinated with the biblical data and accommodated to the questions put to him by the heretics.

Our present exposition has shown that Athanasius is quite

flexible and free in his speaking about death, and he can vary on this according to the circumstances. His fundamental model is what may be called the subject-object model which involves the Logos as subject, and the body (or flesh or humanity or human form, etc) as object. As long as this model is maintained his language - particularly that which relates to the objective side of the model - can vary considerably. Thus, as we have seen in CAR3, Athanasius does not hesitate to speak of death in terms of Logos-soul, or even in terms of Logos=body+soul. The crucial point here is that such linguistic variations can never be the basis of Athanasius' thought, for such a basis is his doctrine of the Incarnation as it is understood from the stand-point of the Church's traditional presentation of the Apostolic scriptures and the Apostolic kerygma. In view of this we can confidently conclude that Athanasius could easily have employed the language of the body-soul, or flesh-spirit to speak of Christ's death, if circumstances had demanded it, provided, of course, that he would not have to compromise his two fundamental intuitions: a) that the only subject to whom the death of Christ would finally have to be attributed would be the inhominated Logos/Son of God as opposed to a particular man, and b) that this death would not refer in any kind of way to the Logos' Godhood but to His manhood.

(11)

V.3 The Death of Christ in APO1

The first references to the suffering of Christ are found in chapter two, immediately after a short but comprehensive and distinctly Nicene Christological statement. "Christ is the Son of God, homocousios with the Father, true God of true God and perfect from perfect, who afterwards came down for our salvation and as such suffered and rose again. According to the Fathers the suffering and the resurrection do not imply that the Logos was altered".

Against this Patristic Christological perspective the author sets out the heresy of his opponents according to which the suffering of Christ can be explained in two antithetical ways, either as an alteration of the Logos (ἀλλοίωσιν τοῦ Λόγου) or, as a mere appearance (δόκησιν τῆν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πάθους). These views correspond to the double heretical contention according to which the flesh of Christ is sometimes regarded as "uncreated and heavenly" and sometimes as homocousios with the Godhead.

In APO1,3 the author speaks again about these two antithetical notions of his opponents and calls them respectively "a transmutation of the Godhood of the Logos into flesh" and "a mere appearance of the economy of the suffering the death and the resurrection". For him only the Godhead of the Trinity is uncreated everlasting and unchangeable, and therefore the notion of heavenly and uncreated flesh is utterly unacceptable. The flesh of Christ was raised from the side of men and not from the side of God (Deut.18:15 and Acts 3:22) and as such it is said to be passible. It is on account of it that He is said to be passible and first born of the dead. Thus it is

wrong to make the "uncreated Godhead passible and the passible flesh uncreated". In stating this distinction the author refers in passing to the content of the "passible flesh" by saying that "it is made up of bones and blood and soul and our entire body" (τὴν παθητὴν σάρκα, ὀστέοις τε καὶ αἵματι, καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ ὅλου τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς σώματος ἀρμοσθεῖσαν). The phraseology is curious, but it is clear that it is intended to claim for the term "flesh" a wider meaning than the term immediately suggests. As he implies in another statement, which comes at the end of this chapter, the flesh is the entire human form. So far, the main doctrine of the author concerning the death and suffering of Christ is that both refer to His flesh and not to His Godhood which He shares with the Father and the Spirit.

In APO1,4 the author continues his attack on the heretical notion of the "uncreated flesh" and argues in particular against the idea that the flesh became uncreated on account of its union with the Godhead. For the author the flesh becomes ἰδέα τοῦ ἀκτίστου Λόγου.. but not ἀκτιστος. In APO1,5 the author repeats that only the Godhead is understood to be an uncreated existence and therefore it is impious to call the uncreated passible and the passible uncreated. The created nature of humanity (ἡ ποιηθεῖσα φύσις τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος) is only ἰδέα τοῦ Λόγου; it would be quite irreverent to regard it as ἀκτιστον or even to equate it with the divine nature. It is the Logos' own nature because of His union with it, but it has not always been the Logos' own from everlasting. Here again in speaking of the flesh as the human nature which the Logos assumed in union with Himself, the author also speaks of blood and bones and of a soul which can be sorrowful and troubled and anxious.

Σαρκός γάρ καί αἵματος καί ὀστέων ἐπίδειξιν ἐποιήσατο Κύριος, καί ψυχῆς λυπούμενης καί ταραττομένης καί ἀδημονούσης. Ταῦτα δέ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι φύσιν εἶναι θεότητος· ἴδια δέ Θεοῦ κατὰ φύσιν γέγονεν, εὐδοκήσαντος τοῦ Λόγου ἀνασχέσθαι γεννήσεως ἀνθρωπίνης, καί τήν ἑαυτοῦ κοίτην τήν ἐν ἁμαρτίᾳ καί φθορᾷ καί θανάτῳ διαχυθεῖσαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ συστήσασθαι ἐν εἰκόνι κεινότητος. Again the phraseology seems to be unclear, particularly as the term flesh is not employed in a comprehensive sense but is set out in parallel with blood, bones and soul. But the intention is crystal clear. Sin, corruption and death are not proper to the Godhead but to the humanity of the Logos. They are said to be His because the humanity which presupposes them has become His through human birth.

It is on the same basis that the author argues in AP01,6 against the heretical notion of "an uncreated flesh by transmutation", and indirectly supplies further insights into his doctrine of Christ's suffering and death. The transmutation of the flesh from a created to an uncreated state would have rendered it invisible and immortal not by passing through death, but by becoming inadmissible of death (οὐκ ἔκ θανάτου ἀλλ' ἀνεπίδεκτος θανάτου). But then, asks the author, how did the Lord die, or how did the uncreated appear uncreatedly on the earth and was seen and touched? On the biblical evidence, says he, one cannot escape from the biblical notion of the "created body of the Lord" (τό ποιηθέν σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου), which is worshipped and venerated not as divine and uncreated, but as the body of the divine Logos (θεός γάρ ἦν ὁ Λόγος οὗ τό σῶμα ἴδιον τυγχάνει). This body, the author goes on to explain, was taken by the Logos from the Virgin, by means of a natural human birth (φυσικῆ γεννήσεως).

so that it may be human by nature and may also be undivided from the Godhood of the Logos by nature. And thus Christ died in the sense that the body received death by nature and the Logos endured it by will, He Himself of His own authority bringing forward His own body to death so that He might die naturally for us and rise again divinely for us. Οὕτω γάρ καί θάνατος ἐγένετο τοῦ μὲν σώματος κατὰ φύσιν δεχομένου τοῦ δὲ Λόγου κατὰ θέλησιν ἀνεχομένου καί ἐξουσιαστικῶς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα εἰς θάνατον προϊεμένου, ἵνα καί πάθῃ φυσικῶς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, καί ἀναστῆ θεϊκῶς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. It is important to observe here how the author changes from the language of the flesh and the nature to the language of the body in expounding the Incarnation and the death of Christ. The thought is exactly the same. The change occurs only in the terms which the author employs. But this certainly means that his semantics are flexible whilst his doctrine remains constant. Previously he argued that the death belongs to the flesh. Here he says that it belongs to the body. He also argued that the death was attributed of the Logos because the flesh became His own. Here he says that the death does not take place apart from His will and His authority. In both cases the guiding principle in his doctrine is the idea of salvation which is clearly summed up at the end of AP01,6. Καί ὅλη τῆς γεννήσεως καί τοῦ θανάτου ἡ πραγματεία εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ζήτησιν καί ἀνάκτησιν θεωρεῖται.

The same doctrine reappears in AP01,7 where the author continues his attack on the heretical notion of a "heavenly body in Christ". Here he says that if the body was indeed heavenly, then, Christ changed the impassible and immortal into passible and mortal. But then,

there is no difference between Adam and Christ, i.e. no difference between the σύμπτωμα τοῦ Ἀδάμ and the ἀσύγκριτον ἀνάστημα τοῦ Χριστοῦ. In fact, says the author, Christ appeared in the likeness of sinful flesh and condemned sin in the flesh. He lived on earth with the flesh and demonstrated it to be inadmissible of sin, unlike Adam who in the first creation was given sinless flesh but made it admissible of sin on account of the transgression and subjected it to corruption and death. The truth is, says the author, that what Adam brought down to earth from heaven, that Christ brought back to heaven from the earth. And again, what Adam brought down to corruption and death through sin and condemnation, that Christ raised up incorruptible and made it the means of abolishing death (λυτήριον θανάτου). As a result Christ has authority on earth to forgive sins and demonstrate incorruptibility from the grave and freedom from the bonds of death and finally to declare the resurrection to all men.

In contrast to the previous chapter the author speaks here of the Incarnation and the death of Christ in terms of His flesh. There is however no difference whatsoever in the doctrine which is firmly rooted in soteriology and theology. This becomes particularly apparent in the closing sentences of APOI,7 which sum up the history of salvation in incarnational Christological terms.

"God created man for immortality, and made him an Image of His own eternity, but by the devil's envy death entered into the world; and when he was under the rule of death unto corruption, He did not overlook him (man), but He Himself became man, not by turning Himself into the form of man, nor by making the demonstration shadowy by neglecting the existence of man; but being by nature God He is born a man that these two may be One (ἓν εἶς ἦ τὰ ἑκάτερα), perfect in all respects, demonstrating a natural and most true birth. Hence it is written, And He granted Him a name which is above every name, to rule over the heavens and to have authority to make judgement.

In AP01,10 the author continues his argumentation against his opponents' conception of the body of Christ. He particularly argues against their contention that the body became homoousios with the Logos because of its union with Him. He cites a number of biblical statements in order to argue that this contention not only denies the biblical content of the term body, but ultimately refuses to accept the biblical designation of Christ as man. Over against his opponents' views the author develops his own Christology in a statement which is particularly interesting for the doctrine of Christ's suffering and death. He says that Christ is One and that He is the same God and man. ἵνα τό διπλοῦν κήρυγμα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδημίας εὐαπόδεικτον ἔχη τήν πειρασμονήν τοῦ πάθους καί τῆς ἀπαθείας, ὡς ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ ἀπόστολος, "Ἀνθρώπος Χριστός Ἰησοῦς, ὁ δοῦς ἑαυτόν ἀντίλυτρον, ὑπέρ ἡμῶν, ὁ ὢν ἐπί πάντων Θεός εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, Ἀμήν. In other words, the kerygma includes both the passibility and the impassibility of Christ. The former relates to His body and the latter to His Godhood, but both are attributed of one and the same person because of the Incarnation.

Thus, he continues in AP01,11, to use the term homoousios in this way is to cancel out the name of the flesh and that Christ is man. In turn this means that either you do not declare His death till He comes (I. Cor. 11:26), or you also declare the death of the consubstantial Father and the Holy Spirit! And all this because the mortal flesh is made consubstantial with the Logos. This, says the author, is the position of Valentinus who held that not only the Logos but the Father and the Spirit also put on the flesh and exhibited the entire economy.

Over against this theopaschétism the author states that Christ is both God and man. He is such, not in the sense that there is a division in Him between divinity and humanity (οὐ διαιρέσεως ἔνεκεν), but in the sense that He truly died, and therefore His death can be declared till He comes (in accordance with I Cor. 11:26), and that His suffering and death might be understood with reference to the flesh of the Logos, whilst He Himself might be believed to be immutable and unchangeable (ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς σαρκός τοῦ Λόγου τό πάθος καί τόν θάνατον ὁμολογῶμεν, αὐτόν δέ τόν Λόγον ἀτρεπτον καί ἀναλλοίωτον πιστεύωμεν). Thus the same one is said to be passible and impassible (ὁ παθῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ μὴ παθῶν), impassible immutable and unchangeable in His divinity and passible in His flesh as Peter said in I Pet. 4:1 having willed to taste death.

In AP01,12 the author also repudiates those who divide between the Son who suffered and the one (the Logos) who did not suffer (ἄλλος ὁ παθῶν Υἱός καὶ ἄλλος ὁ μὴ παθῶν). The Son, he states, who undertood the death and the passion, was not different from the Logos. It was the impassible and incorporeal Logos who took up birth of human flesh and fulfilled all things, so that He may have something to offer on men's behalf. The flesh which the Logos took up could not have been homousios with Him, because what is homousion and impassible and inadmissible of death does not admit of a union with another homousion, which is according to hypostasis, but of a union which is according to nature. If the flesh which suffered is homousios with the Son, then the Trinity must be a quaternity! Obviously the author argues against his opponents using their own terms. In the last analysis, however, he stresses their failure

to understand correctly the meaning of John 1:14 as the root of their errors. It is in his attempt to expound the right meaning of this statement that he throws further light on his doctrine of the suffering and death of Christ. The Logos, he says, did not become flesh, so that He may no longer be Logos, but in order to be in the flesh . Thus, the Incarnation means that the Logos remaining always Logos has also acquired human flesh. It is in this flesh that He took on the passion and the death in the human form, and went as far as the grave and hades. And it is also in this flesh that He wrought the resurrection from the dead, having demonstrated in Himself the flesh and the blood and the soul, i.e. the seed of David without being divided from the flesh (σαρκός καί αἵματος καί ψυχῆς τήν ἐπίδειξιν ποιησάμενος ὁ Θεός Λόγος διὰ ἰδίας καί ἀδιαιρέτου σαρκός).

Here death is still decisively connected with the flesh in a way that theopaschétism is decisively excluded , but it is also attributed of the Logos in as much as the flesh is His and that it remains undivided from Him even in death. Interesting but not clear is the way in which the author links here death with the Logos' ἐπίβασις to the grave and to Hades, and also the way in which he expounds the meaning of the term flesh by employing the term human form, or the terms flesh and blood and soul. The ἐπιβάσεις of the Logos are said to be performed through the flesh, or through the human form, but no clarification is made as to whether this entails the psychosomatic model.

So far the author has presented Christ's suffering and death in terms of the human flesh and body of the Logos which He assumed at His Incarnation. His references to Hades and to terms like blood

and soul and the entire body, do not alter his fundamental perception, although they suggest there is perhaps greater depth to it than it appears. In APO1,13ff however, he introduces a new way of speaking about the suffering and death of Christ based on a 'dualistic psychosomatic model' of humanity. A careful analysis of the text suggests that this change is necessary in view of the new argument of the author's opponents which concentrates on an aspect of humanity rather than humanity as a totality. But the basic doctrinal perception remains the same, and therefore the 'monistic models' of the suffering and death employed in the first part of the treatise should not be seen as opposing the 'dualistic model' of this second part. This will become clearer once the teaching of this second part of the treatise is analysed in some detail.

The new thesis of the author's opponents is that no human mind could have existed in Christ. The author explains that His opponents operated with a distinction between the ἔσωθεν ἄνθρωπος and the ἔξωθεν ἄνθρωπος, identifying the former with the νοῦς and the latter with the σῶμα and the αἷμα (or ψυχὴ). They saw Christ as consisting of a heavenly mind, i.e. the Logos, and a human body and soul, i.e. flesh. Nothing is said as to the relationship between the notion of the heavenly flesh which was discussed previously and the new notion of the heavenly mind. But the author does employ the same type of argumentation in both cases. As he dealt previously with the nature of the flesh and the body, so he deals now with the nature of humanity beginning with the distinction between the inner and the outer man. For him the inner man is the soul, which includes the mind, (in accordance with Matth. 10:28), whilst the outer man is

the body and the blood. This, he says, can be also seen in the death of Christ: ἀλλά καί ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ θανάτῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐδείκνυτο· τό μὲν τοῦ (σῶμα) μέχρι τάφου φθάσαν, ἡ δέ (ψυχῆ) μέχρι ᾗδου διαβᾶσα. The author explains that the grave and Hades are two localities differing from each other to a great extent (διαίρετῶν ὄντων τῶν τόπων πολλῷ τῷ μέτρῳ) and admitting of two different approaches (ἐπιβάσεις), one which is corporeal and another which is incorporeal. For the author it is the Logos who in His death makes the two approaches, through His own body and soul. The body goes as far as the grave and the soul as far as Hades. It is obvious, that whereas previously, in dealing with the heretical notions of the flesh and the body of Christ, the author expounded the Christology of the NT in using only those terms, now that he is faced with a different challenge, he introduces the body-soul language in order to cope more adequately with the new doctrinal context. The terms appear to be new and seemingly contradictory, but in fact they are used to defend the same fundamental doctrinal perspectives, although they add to them greater depth of perception.

In APO1,14 the author elaborates further his conception of Christ's death in terms of His body and soul. He argues that, if Christ had no human soul, death would not have mistaken Him for a man, when He went to Hades, nor would He have been able to present the resurrection to the souls, which were in bondage there, through His own soul which remained unbound. Behind the author's argument there is the same soteriological principle as in the previous arguments, which hinges upon both the Logos and His humanity. Whereas previously this humanity was presented in terms of the flesh and the body, now

it is presented in terms of body and soul. As he puts it, ἵνα ὁ πλάστης καὶ ποιητής τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ καταδίκη τοῦτον ὑποβαλῶν, αὐτός παρών, ἐλευθερώσῃ δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἐξ' ὀλοκλήρου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν μορφῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ. Οὕτε γάρ θάνατος ὑπερισχύσας ὑπηγάγετο ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην τοῦ λόγου ψυχὴν εἰς δεσμῶν κατοχὴν, οὔτε πάλιν ἡ φθορὰ τυραννικῶς διαρπάσασα τὸ σῶμα ἐνεργεῖ εἰς διαφθοράν, ὡς ἀπρονοήτων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων. Or, as he says further down in the same chapter, Διὰ τοῦτο χρεῖα γέγονεν τοῦ ἀποφνημαμένου, ἵνα αὐτός δι' ἑαυτοῦ λύσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπόφασιν, ἐν μορφῇ τοῦ καταδικασθέντος ἀκαταδικάστῳ καὶ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ὀφθεῖς, ἵνα ἡ καταλλαγὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον γένηται καὶ ἡ ἐλευθερία τοῦ παντός ἀνθρώπου δι' ἀνθρώπου ὑπάρξῃ, ἐν τῇ καινότητι τῆς εἰκόνης τοῦ Υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν.

The author recalls here Gen. 3:19 and 2:17 to defend the view that death involves the division of man into two, body and soul, the former suffering corruption in the grave and the latter bondage in Hades. He almost personifies death and corruption and regards them as forces which fight man and capture his body and soul (θάνατος ὑπερισχύσας ὑπηγάγετο ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν. . καὶ ἡ φθορὰ τυραννικῶς διαρπάσασα τὸ σῶμα ἐνεργεῖ εἰς διαφθοράν).

Obviously the question which naturally emerges here is concerned with the precise relationship between this elaborate and almost 'mythological' conception of Christ's death and the simple and rather crude conception of Christ's death presented in the first half of the treatise. If one is to avoid the charge of inconsistency, one should accept that the author's models of Christ's death, which for the sake of argument we may call the 'monistic' and the 'dualistic' models, are not incompatible, but complementary and used for different purposes.

The first

model is used to condemn the error that the death or the passion are attributed to the Logos as Logos, and to defend the truth that this attribution is made of the Logos Incarnate and has a primary reference to the Logos' flesh and body. The second model is used to combat a similar but more subtle error. If the death of Christ is to be conceived as the separation of the inner man from the outer man, then, the inner man is not the Logos but His soul, and the outer, His body. In other words, the Godhead was not separated from the body at the death of Christ, because it was not the Logos qua Logos who died, but the Logos as man. Both cases combat theopaschëtism and both cases defend the immortality of the Logos and His real involvement in death owed to His real assumption of mortal humanity. The only difference is that this humanity is designated monistically or dualistically in these two cases respectively to controvert different errors.

In AP01,15 the author condemns as Manichaeism the contention of his opponents according to which Christ did not have a human mind, since He was sinless, and the human mind is sinful by nature. For him, sin is in no way inherent in man's nature (σύμφυτος). Sin is an unnatural turn of nature due to transgression (φύσεως παρατροπή ἐκ παραβάσεως). It was on account of sin that death was introduced into man by the devil's envy. Therefore, the author argues that the Logos raised in Himself the same sinless nature (τὴν ἀναμάρτητον φύσιν), which Adam led through sin to death, in order to annul the works of the devil and man's sins and deliver humanity from the grip of death and corruption. Christ, he says, effected a perfect salvation or a perfect resurrection of the entire man, i.e. of rational soul and body, because He assumed a perfect humanity.

On this basis the author repudiates both the Arian and his opponents' theopaschetism, by saying that both of them for different reasons attribute the νόησις τοῦ πάθους to the ἀπαθῆς θεότης. He also repudiates the notion of a "heavenly mind" in Christ by pointing to the sorrow and the anxiety of Christ and stressing the fact that these do not belong to either ἀνόητος σάρξ, nor to an ἄτρεπτος θεότης, but to a ψυχῇ νόησιν ἐχούσης, λυπούμενης καὶ παραπτομένης καὶ ἀδημονούσης καὶ νοητῶς ἐπαιθανομένης τοῦ πάθους.

The same argumentation is pursued in AP01,16 with the only difference that here the soteriological presuppositions in the author's mind are fully exposed. The author points to the Gospel statements "Jesus was troubled in the spirit" of John 11:33 and "My soul is troubled" of John 12:27, and claims that spirit and soul refer to the human mind of the Logos. But his strongest argument is distinctly soteriological. The Lord, he says, exhibited in Himself a mental activity of soul (ψυχῆς ἰδίαν νόησιν) in sympathy with our own (εἰς συμπάθειαν τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς) that we may understand that the passion is His and at the same time confess that He is impassible! And he concludes: "for as He redeemed us through the blood of His flesh, likewise by the mental activity of His soul He demonstrated the victory which He won for us.." And further down.. "and as the blood could not be regarded as common..but as saving (σωτήριον), likewise the so-called mental movement (ἡ νόησις λεγομένη), does not indicate human weakness but God's nature. And thus Christ could be called perfect God and perfect man.. that both things (divinity and humanity) may be One (ἓως), perfect in all respects, the same One God and man. It was on account of this says the author that the Lord said, "Now is

my soul troubled and full of sorrow". And this "now" signifies nothing else but the time when He willed to enter this experience for us.

In APO1,17 the author consummates his argument about the sinlessness of Christ and states that He assumed all the things which belong to human nature and rendered them inadmissible of sin. Such things include the sorrow, the suffering and the death of Christ. In this way He worked out men's salvation. He met the human problem in all its aspects through His own humanity. He brought forward His own body where the body of man was corrupted, and His own soul, where the soul of man had been held captive in death, and He did this to destroy the grip of death and to give men incorruptibility and immortality. Here the author combines such statements as Rom.5:14, I. Cor.15:53f, Rom.5:12 and 5:21 to support his soteriological perception of Christ and concludes with a similar statement which makes use of the imagery of the ransom. It was not proper, he says, that he should offer a different ransom as substitution for another. So He gave body instead of body and soul instead of soul and a perfect existence for the sake of the entire man. This, he says, is the exchange of Christ which the Jews reviled on the Cross.

In APO1,18 the author points to the death on the Cross and particularly to the phrase "He delivered the spirit" of John 19:30 in order to argue that this was not θεότητος μετάστασις, but ψυχῆς ἀποχώρησις. His main point is that, if the former was the case, then the Logos did not die our death, but His! Also, if this was the case, then how could one conceive of the descent of the uncovered Godhead in Hades? But, the author clearly states, it was our death which He took to Himself and His own soul which was offered for the

the sheep (John 10:11,15).

In AP01,19 the author restates the soteriological argument based on the imagery of the ransom which he advanced in AP01,17. Perhaps the only difference is to be seen in the terminology. Whereas previously he spoke of νόησις ψυχῆς (especially in AP01,16), he now speaks of φρόνησις ψυχῆς. Also, he states the argument against the view that sin had taken hold of nature in a way that the Creator could not take it up. For him sin is an act of nature, whilst salvation is the ἀθέτησις of this act through the same nature, which thus becomes renewed: περιαιρεῖ τοίνυν τὴν πράξιν (τῆς ἁμαρτίας) καὶ καινοποιεῖ τὴν πλάσιν.

In AP01,20 the author argues against other minor contentions of his opponents and clarifies further the language of the soul. It is in the course of doing this that he refers to the passion of Christ. He affirms once more that He suffered as man for us and redeemed us from suffering and death as God. Thus, he says, He worked out the newness (καινότης) of the whole man, the outer man and the inner man, the flesh and that which leads the flesh (the soul). It is not enough, he says, to accept the newness of the outer man and simply leave the newness of the inner man to men's imitation of the Logos. The renewal of men, says the author in AP01,21, is not only imitation but also participation in the perfect newness of Christ!

Conclusion:

The teaching of AP01 on the suffering and death of Christ can be summed up as follows;

(a) The suffering and death of Christ refer to His humanity and not to the Godhood.

(b) However, they are rightly attributed of His Person, i.e. the Logos or Son of God, because the humanity is His own.

(c) Both the suffering and the death of Christ have taken place with the Logos' own decision and with the purpose that humanity may be delivered from them. The key to their saving character is to be found in the act of the Logos, which has a double character, divine and human. He acts as man to abolish sin and acts as God to abolish the consequences of sin, namely, corruption and death.

(d) The author uses two main models for presenting the humanity of Christ, which find their corollaries in two corresponding models of death. The one model is 'monistic' and is denoted by such terms as "flesh", "body", "human form", "human nature", even "man", or "the entire man" (used in the abstract form). The second model is 'dualistic' and is denoted by such terms as "body-soul", "flesh-soul", "flesh-spirit", "inner man - outer man". The term "body", or "outer-man" in this second model can also be rendered by the terms "flesh" or "flesh and blood", or "flesh and blood and bones", whereas the term "soul", or "inner-man" can also be rendered by the term "rational soul" and can also include a number of other terms such as "mental activity of the soul", or "volitional activity of the soul". The two models are not rivals but clearly the one complements the other. Both are used in different contexts to defend the same Christological and soteriological perception.

(e) On the basis of the first model of humanity, death is the death of the flesh or the body, and is closely linked with the notion of corruption. On the basis of the second model death is the separation of the soul from the body and is closely linked with the notion

of the corruption of the body in the grave and the imprisonment of the soul in Hades. In the first model Christ's death is saving because of its vicarious nature and especially because of the divine act of the Logos. In the second model the saving character of the suffering and death of Christ is based not only on the divine act of the Logos but also on the sinlessness of His manhood.

(f) Finally it must be stressed that the key to the doctrine of APO1 on Christ's suffering and death is the doctrine of the Person of Christ. Christ is the eternal Logos or Son of God who became man without ceasing to be God. The Logos is the sole subject active in Christ. But He acts both as man and as God because two things are united in this one Person, humanity and the Godhead. It is in the coordination of these acts through the One Person of the Divine Logos who became man that the key to the saving character and power of the Incarnation, the suffering, the death and the resurrection of Christ is found. The Incarnation and the atonement are inseparable because both are united and have their common focus in the Person of the Logos.

V.4 The Death of Christ in APO2

In APO2,1 the author opens the discussion by setting out his Christological perspective. The Lord Jesus Christ is One, both from God and from man. This is explained in terms of Phil.2:6-7 and John 1:14. He was God and became man. He was in the form of God and assumed the form of the servant. It is further explained that the form of God is the Godhood and the form of the servant the soul and the flesh, and that there are two things in manhood as human death demonstrates. In human death, says the author, the soul departs from the body and the body loses its form (μορφοῦν). The chapter concludes with the clarification, that before His incarnation God the Logos was not a man and as such he was both invisible and impassible. He became visible and passible only through the form of the servant which he assumed. It is already clear that the author attributes the death and the passion of Christ to his manhood and not to his Godhood, and that he understands death as the separation of the soul from the body.

In APO2,2 the author explains that "the name Christ applies to the Logos with the flesh, which is passible". This means that "when Paul speaks of Christ's suffering, or death, or rising from the dead, or being sacrificed for us, or giving Himself as a ransom for us, he does not imply that Christ is not God, but that he is also a man". Obviously behind the author's mind, there is the fundamental assumption of the doctrine of the impassibility of God. This doctrine is not rejected by the suffering, death and resurrection of the incarnate God. Rather, as the author states, *ἵνα* =

much as He is both God and man, Christ should be acknowledged to be both passible and impassible, ἵνα ὁ αὐτός καὶ παθητός καὶ ἀπαθής εἶναι συνομολογῆται ἀληθινῶς, or, as he says further along, ἵνα καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἦ ἐν τῷ πάθει, καὶ ἄτρεπτος ἦ θεός ὢν .

The same point is made in APO2,3 , where the author asserts that it is the form of the servant and not the form of God which is involved in the passion, the resurrection and the entire economy of Christ. He asserts this over against a number of heretics who had attributed the passion of Christ to the Godhood. He actually mentions Sabellius, who is said to have followed the opinion of Paul of Samosata, the Valentinians, who are said to have attributed the passion to the Trinity, and the Arians, who are said to have attributed the passion to the Logos, since they thought that He took the place of the passible soul. The author's challenge to his addressees to state where they stand in relation to these heretics, indicates that they too must have attributed the passion to His Godhood.

In APO2,4 , where mention is made of the alleged views of the author, or his party, which were being advanced by the author's opponents, the subject of Christ's passion and death reappears once more. It is alleged that according to the author, "a man suffered for the world" (ἄνθρωπον ὑπὲρ κόσμου ἀποθανόντα), or "a man was crucified, who was the Lord of Glory" (ἄνθρωπον σταυρωθέντα καὶ Κύριον τῆς δόξης ὄντα). This again implies that the author's opponents must have held the suffering of God in Christ.

In APO2,5 the author replies to these allegations of his opponents by pointing to the vicarious soteriological character of the passion, death and resurrection of Christ, which he connects with

the creaturehood of the archetypal man , which the only-Begotten God took up at his Incarnation, ἵνα τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων σωτήριον πραγματεῖαν ποιήσῃται ἐν πάθει καὶ θανάτῳ καὶ ἀναστάσει τὴν σωτήριαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατεργαζόμενος. What becomes clear here, is that both, the author and his opponents, would attribute the passion and death of Christ to the Logos, but whereas the former would explain it in terms of His humanity , the latter would refuse to make this clarification and consequently would imply a doctrine of the passibility of God.

The precise way in which the author's addressees would explain the death of Christ becomes clearer in APO2,6, where the author argues against their refusal to accept a rational nature in the humanity of Christ on the grounds of Christ's sinlessness and ^{ση} the _α assumption that human rational nature is by nature sinful. This means, that for the author's opponents the Logos had taken the place of the rational nature of his humanity, and therefore in the death of Christ one should see the separation of the Logos from his body and on this basis speak of the death of the Logos. The author attacks first the premises of his opponents. He argues that the law of sin, and therefore the death which was incurred by it, was the devil's work, which was introduced into human nature from outside, and therefore it could in no way be described as natural. Man did not sin by nature, but by yielding to temptation , or by accepting the devil's deceit, which is sown into man's intellectual and rational nature from outside. It was precisely for this reason , says the author, that the Son of God came into the world, to

loosen the works of the devil. He did not come to loosen the natural constitution of man, but to reject the rejection which had been sown into it and grew. Clearly the author links the incarnation with soteriology, and emphasizes the rational and intellectual aspect of the humanity of Christ, because it was on this aspect that the error of his addressees was focused. His point is that Christ's humanity did not lack any aspect belonging to its natural constitution. This, he saw to be the obvious implication of the Pauline statement, "as through a man sin entered the world and through sin death, likewise through one man Jesus Christ the grace might reign through righteousness unto life eternal" (Rom. 5:12,21).

But the theological objection of the author to his opponents' view of the death of Christ is advanced in APO2,7, where he argues that God does not admit of death, and therefore is not Himself in need of resurrection, but rather raises from the dead. On this theological premise, the author points out the need for the incarnation, or, as he puts it, the need for God to have something to offer for us in death and life and which He may use to save. This, says the author, is the humanity, which the Logos of God assumed and thereby became man and Saviour. Clearly, for the author it is God the Logos who is the Subject active in the economy of Christ, but the subject-matter of the economy, which includes the death and the resurrection of Christ, is the humanity of Christ. This seems to be the inner core of the author's dispute with his opponents, and particularly the integrity of the humanity of Christ. For the

author any curtailment of the humanity of Christ would imply curtailment of the integrity of the economy of salvation. If Christ did not die and did not rise again from the dead as man, then, human death has not been abolished, nor is the resurrection of humanity achieved. The reference in APO2,8 to a "fleshly soul" (ψυχὴν σαρκικὴν) in Christ as part of the vocabulary of the author's opponents, may well have been an attempt on their part to explain the death of Christ in human terms, but as the author points out, their rejection of an intellectual nature from Christ's humanity (νοεράν φύσιν, or διάνοια) indicates, that this death is not really human. Besides, the distinction between "fleshly soul" and the "mind" is not a scriptural one. Matthew 10:28, I Pet. 3:19 clearly indicate that the only distinction which can be maintained, is that between the soul which cannot be killed, and the body which can be so. However, the separation of the soul from the body is described by the author as the condemnation of death (τῆς δέ τοῦ Ἀδάμ ψυχῆς ἐν καταδίκῃ θανάτου κατεχομένης APO2,9).

In APO2,11 the author states that the faith in Christ envisages passibility in impassibility, corruption in incorruption and mortality in immortality (τό παθητόν ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ, τό φθαρτόν ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ, τό θνητόν ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ). He interprets this in incarnational soteriological terms. God the Logos took up the human nature which was passible, corruptible and mortal, and in his own righteousness He put it forward to suffer for all and be for all. This human nature appeared from the side of men, but it was entirely the humanity of God the Logos. In this way the Logos became the firstborn among many brethren and the firstborn

from the dead. So it is the passibility corruptibility and mortality of the humanity of the Incarnate Logos which is displayed in the impassibility, incorruptibility and immortality of the Logos' Godhood. In view of this, it is utterly wrong, says the author, to say that God suffered through the flesh (θεός διὰ σαρκός ἔπαθεν, or ὁ θεός ὁ διὰ σαρκός παθών), as his opponents do, and accepts the statement that the passion took place in His flesh through God (διὰ Θεοῦ ἐν σαρκί αὐτοῦ τό πάθος γέγονεν). Here again it becomes obvious that God is the subject active in the suffering of Christ, but it is the flesh of Christ which undergoes this suffering.

In APO2.12 the author accuses his opponents of predicating the passion of Christ to His Godhood and by implication to the Trinity (i.e. they end up following the Valentinian position). For him Christ is passible, because he is man, and impassible, because he is also God. (ὅτι παθητός ὁ Χριστός, ἐπειδή ἄνθρωπος, ἀπαθής δέ ἐπειδή θεός.). The author's opponents could not accept this view, because for them the double confession of the Godhood and manhood of Christ could only imply that Christ was not one. The author replies by drawing out the negative implications of the position of his opponents. They, he says, have but two options, concerning the death and resurrection of Christ, either to regard them as unreal phenomena (δόκησαι), as Marcion and the Gnostics, or to call the Godhood of the Logos passible, as the Arians did. Clearly, the dispute is primarily related to the Incarnation and its soteriological aspects. But the crucial point in it seems to be that of the impassibility of God. For the author God can be the subject active in suffering but never the object. For his

opponents God can be both the subject and the object of suffering.

Following up his argumentation the author claims in APO2,13 that in the Scriptures the passion is introduced when the Lord is designated as man. He is said to be the Logos of God the Father, who is born in the flesh by the assumption of the form of the servant and with the purpose to bear away the passibility, corruptibility and mortality of men. In no case is mortality, or passibility, or any of these qualities attributed to the Godhead without the mortal and passible body (οὐδαμοῦ δὲ θεότης πάθος προσίεται δέχα πάσχοντος σώματος). No trouble or sorrow are exhibited without a human soul (οὔτε παραχῆν καὶ λύπην ἐπιδείκνυνται δέχα ψυχῆς λυκουμένης καὶ παραττομένης), and no anxiety or prayer is mentioned without a mind (οὔτε ἀδημονεῖ καὶ προσεύχεται δέχα νοήσεως ἀδημονούσης καὶ προσευχομένης).

The same point is emphasized in APO2,14, where it is observed, that the Lord Himself attributed the passion to Himself as Son of man (Matth. 17:12), and therefore to the flesh (καὶ ὁ Κύριος δὲ τὸ πάθος ἐπὶ Υἱοῦ ἀνθρώπου Ἰσθησι, δεικνύς δὲ τὸ κατὰ σάρκα). The Scriptures never speak of the suffering of God through the flesh, but of the blood, or the suffering, or the resurrection of God's body! (αἶμα δὲ ἅγια Γραφαί.. αἷμα καὶ πάθος καὶ ἀνάστασιν κηρύττουσιν σώματος Θεοῦ). The shedding of the blood points to the flesh, whilst the cry on the cross signifies the soul which is separated from the body and causes its mortification. For the author's opponents it was the Godhood which left the body in the death of Christ, and therefore the Godhood that died! But for him the Godhood cannot die, and besides, the Godhood remained united with the body which was left in the grave and the soul which descended into

Hades. This he sees as being the prophetic Christological statement, "You will not abandon my soul in Hades, nor will You give Your holy one to see corruption" (Ps. 15:10).

Three basic terms are used here to expound the death and resurrection of Christ: "the soul", "the body" and "the Godhood". Death involves the separation of the soul from the body, but the Godhood remains united with both. Thus the Godhood remains the crucial element in the whole economy of the death of Christ, and eventually becomes the cause of His resurrection. It is in its presence that the body is maintained incorruptible in the grave, and the soul descends into Hades and exhibits her freedom by preaching to the souls imprisoned there and rising triumphant from Hades' grip. Thus "man was not separated from God, nor did God abandon man in the death of Christ. The mortification of the body and the departure of the spirit could not be interpreted as the transposition of the Godhood from the body, but as the separation of the soul from the body, since it was our human death which was described there. If God was separated from the body, says the author, then how did the body exhibit the incorruption? and how did the resurrection from Hades occur? These events could not be attributed to God, for this would be contrary to the witness of the Scriptures. The Scriptures attribute these to the Incarnate God, because in Him the passion took place and He is the Liberator of man from the passion and death.. and He is the firstborn from the dead.

In APO2,16 the author returns to his attack on the conception of the incarnation which excludes the rational nature from the flesh and therefore claims that God Himself was crucified! Far from

suggesting a crucified God, the death of Christ demonstrates the defiance of God (τόν Θεόν ἠθέτησαν), because the flesh and the soul were God's. It was the temple of God which was attacked at the death of Christ (according to John 2:19), or it was the soul of the Logos which was delivered to death (according to Is.53:12, and John 3:16). The mortification of the body of Christ was caused by the departure of the human spirit or soul of Christ (according to Luke 23:46 and John 19:30). On this basis the author vehemently rejects the view that Christ's death implies the separation of the Logos from the body (ὁ Λόγος ἀπεχώρησεν τοῦ σώματος). Two conclusions, he says, can be drawn from this view, both of them unacceptable and Arian! The first is that God suffered (Θεόν παθόντα), and the second, that the Jews were able to oppose God and cause the dissolution of the indissoluble comixture of the Incarnation (κατὰ Θεοῦ ἴσχυσαν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι λύσαντες τὴν ἅλυστον σύγκρασιν). Had that happened, the body would have been corrupted in the grave and the resurrection out of Hades would not have been achieved.

The same discussion is followed in APO2,17. Here the author sums up his previous arguments and brings in new Scriptural evidence in support of his earlier claim, that the spirit which departed from the body of Christ at the cross was His soul. He basically argues that according to the Scriptures the spirit and the soul are synonymous terms (τὴν ψυχὴν πνεῦμα οὖσαν σαφῶς αἱ ἅγια Γραφαὶ διδάσκουσιν). Thus he concludes once more that the mortification of the body took place contemporaneously with the departure of the spirit (soul), whilst God the Logos did not

alter His position towards either of these two constitutive elements of the human nature, or towards God His Father whereby He exhibited His immutability (Θεοῦ τοῦ Λόγου ἀμεταθέτως ἔχοντος πρὸς τε τὸ σῶμα, πρὸς τε τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὸς τε ἑαυτὸν ὄντα εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐν ἐπιδείξει ἀτρεπτότητος). He rounds up this conclusion with a comprehensive soteriological statement which presents Christ's death in terms of the human form which He assumed at His incarnation:

"And in that form which is ours, and which was made in Him, He there depicted our own death, so that in It, He might also demonstrate the resurrection which should take place on our behalf, by exhibiting His soul on returning from Hades, and His body from the grave, that in death He might destroy death by the exhibition of a soul, and in the grave might abolish corruption by the burial of the body, exhibiting immortality and incorruption from Hades and from the grave, having traversed our path in the form which is our own and unloosed that hold which pressed heavily upon us. And herein lay the wonder, for in this the grace was bestowed".

In AP01,18 the author recapitulates his doctrine on the suffering and death of Christ, as he exposes the dialectical way of thinking and arguing of his opponents. They ask in a dialectical fashion, he says, "whether the one who suffered and was crucified is God, or man", because they really want to deny both alternatives, by accusing the former as Arian and the latter as Jewish, and to introduce their own middle position. For the author, however, the truth is not established in this way. The way is the N.T. kerygma in which the divine, who sprang ineffably from the Father, is said to have been also born eschatologically from the Virgin. Thus

neither God is disbelieved, nor the birth of the flesh is denied - whilst by the term flesh the whole harmony of the constitution of man is meant with the exception of sin. And the author goes on to add that in the scriptures the passion is interconnected with the name of man , whereas the immortality and ineffability of the Logos is clearly confessed and therefore the Logos is declared to be God and also to have been generated as man, so that the same One may be related to both God and man naturally and truly. He is God in His vivifying beneficence and miraculous power, and also man in His human com-passions and weaknesses. As God He exhibits immortality, incorruptibility and immutability. But as man He is n^oiled to the Cross, and sheds blood, and His body is buried, and descends into Hades and rises again from the dead. Thus, Christ has been raised from the dead and as God He Himself raises up the dead.

In AP01,19, the concluding chapter of this treatise, the author includes two statements touching upon the subject of this investigation. Firstly he repudiates those who attribute the passion of Christ to the Godhead as vain. And finally he says that, "since Christ suffered for us in the flesh everyone should arm himself with the same mind and do not exert himself (with dialectical mental gymnastics) any further so as to reject the truth.

Two main points of doctrine emerge from this treatise concerning the suffering and death of Christ, which are emphasized by the author against the Christological errors of his opponents.

(a) Both the suffering and death of Christ are attributed of Him as man. They refer to His humanity which is invariably described as flesh or the form of the servant and includes both soul and body.

More particularly, Christ's death is to be understood as involving the separation of the soul from the body, although neither of them is separated from the Godhead of the Logos. This psycho-somatic model of death is defended against the models of the author's opponents, which clearly imply theopaschétism and even entertain the notion of the death of God!

(b) In as much as Christ is God who has also become man without ceasing to be God, Christ is also impassible and immortal. This primarily refers to His Godhood which remains the real basis of His victory over suffering, corruption and death as man.

Obviously this doctrine on Christ's suffering and death is closely interconnected with the author's doctrine of the Incarnation which is centred upon the unity of Godhood and manhood in the One Person of the divine Logos, the God-man. Indeed it should be said that without this Incarnational context this doctrine of suffering and death would not have been developed.

V.4. Final Comparisons and Conclusions

It is obvious that the doctrines of death in APO1 and APO2 are very closely connected, both conceptually and linguistically. The only difference between them is to be seen in the fact that whereas APO1 uses two linguistic models, the "monistic" model of "body" or "flesh" and the dualistic model of "body-soul" for describing the death of Christ's humanity, APO2 uses only the second model. The use of two models in APO1 is actually demanded by the debate of the author with his adversaries. The first one is used against the notion of an uncreated flesh or body which is regarded as heavenly and homousios with the Godhead, and the latter, against the view that the flesh of Christ was mere flesh deprived of a soul or the inner man, the mind. The fact that APO1 can use such models in the same work demonstrates that for him terms are not his primary consideration. His basic intuitions are two, namely, that the death of Christ is truly human, and that it is attributed to the Logos because the flesh (body-soul) in which it occurs is His and He is the Christ. The author of APO2 shares exactly the same intuitions, and the fact that he only employs the body-soul model for describing the death of Christ's humanity is simply based on the demands made on him by his opponents.

The two basic theological concerns of APO1 and APO2 relating to the understanding of the death of Christ are identical with those of Athanasius as we have already seen in our previous investigations. The only difference is that in APO1&2 we have linguistic material which is not available, though not impossible, in Athanasius. Could this not be explained by reference to

the fact that the questions which APO1 and APO2 are attempting to answer had not been put to Athanasius when he wrote the works which expounded his understanding of Christ's death? If the language of death in APO1 and APO2 is not impossible for Athanasius, and if there is no evidence that the question of the human soul of Christ in death had been put to him, and if the basic intuitions of the doctrine of the death of Christ in APO1 and APO2 are thoroughly Athanasian, and finally if, generally speaking, Athanasius does not work with rigid linguistic models, should we not conclude that the doctrine of Christ's death in the two APO cannot be used against their Athanasian paternity as it was claimed by various critics?

