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A comparative analysis of public attitudes to the European community in western Germany and Britain, 1975-1980

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES

TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN

WESTERN GERMANY AND BRITAIN, 1975-1980

by

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts

in the University of Durham

the Department of Politics

1986

30. APR. 1987

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ABSTRACT

The thesis comprises a comparative study of public attitudes in West Germany and Britain to the European Community, analysing the nature and extent of their support for European integration. The historical dimension of their entry and the background political situation is taken into account and also the possible influence of both politicians and the Media.

Aspects of public opinion investigated include the acceptance of further European integration and the degree of adherence to national institutions as possibly overriding the European dimension. Consideration is also given to background social factors and socio-political attitudes, including feelings of well-being and also of liberal or traditional social values. Particular attention is paid to the relationship and conflict between instrumental and idealistic attitudes to the Community. Other topics dealt with are attitudes to new entrants and trust in fellow member States, levels of satisfaction at information available on the Community and views on Community policy priorities. Short accounts are given of the major landmarks, the 1975 British Referendum on Community membership and the 1979 elections to the European Parliament, giving some attention to the historical background. Differences in education and also a possible gender or age factor are included where differentiation is appropriate.

The major statistical data are drawn from European Commission sponsored Eurobarometer opinion polls. Notice is also taken of statistical data provided by other British and German opinion poll organisations. The conclusion is that there is a greater similarity in attitudes in the two countries than has previously been recognised in the literature. Where attitudes differ, an attempt is made to explain such discrepancies or hazard an account as to how they came about.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

And finally I would like to mention the assistance of members of the Department of Politics at my former University, The University of Newcastle upon Tyne.

INTRODUCTION

The thesis covers the period 1975 to 1980, a period in recent political history which saw a landmark in European Community developments, that of the first direct elections to the European Parliament and a landmark in British politics, that of the British Referendum on Membership of the European Community. The two States selected could be considered to be broadly similar, i.e. that they are North European with similar population and a comparable state of economic and social development. Throughout the thesis certain terms will be used. The term 'Britain' will describe both Britain and the United Kingdom and the term 'British' describes the people of these nations; there will be no differentiation. The terms 'Germany' and 'Germans' will be used to describe the State and peoples of the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is a matter of common knowledge that attitudes to 'Europe' do differ considerably. However, are these countries as similar in their views and attitudes as one might expect? I intend to investigate these differences and attempt to account for them. One country, Germany, had in 1975, enjoyed membership of the European Community for around twenty years. The other, Britain, had been a member for barely two years and was, at the start of the year, still arguing about whether Britain should have actually joined or not - by 1980 this was no longer a serious question but one asks oneself whether differences in attitudes were fundamental and did the British draw closer to the Community over the five-year period? Did they increasingly share German attitudes, did they have them in the first place, or did they grow further apart? Certain background factors such as basic attitudes to life and to politics in general will be drawn into the discussion where they are considered important and relevant. Attention

will also be paid to outside international developments which influenced public attitudes, for example, the very different economic situation pertaining to the 1970s. What effect did this have on the two nations? Did it affect them in a positive or negative way in terms of their attitudes to membership of the Community? The internal political situation of each nation will also be another point of consideration.

The major source of information on public attitudes used was that of the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys. These are twice yearly surveys commissioned on behalf of the European Commission. They are systematic and are designed and conducted to a common programme throughout the European Community. Additional material in the form of published research articles and papers were vital sources of information. Other organisations such as Gallup, for example, conducted surveys into public attitudes towards the European Community and some data are included in the thesis.

Consideration will be taken of the media influence, if any, on attitudes towards the Community in the thesis. Information, or the lack of it, can have an important bearing on the formation of public attitudes and on the strengthening or eradication of prejudices which can influence attitudes. Therefore the thesis will incorporate a consideration of whether both nations express satisfaction with media information available on the Community and on Community issues. This might, as a result, offer an explanation for differences in attitudes where they exist. Finally, additional sources of information were provided by various European Community documentation and publications which covered various aspects of public attitudes on a specific and general basis.

In this Introduction, I would now like to draw attention to the historical dimensions which have perhaps caused or had an influence

over the later national attitudes to Europe and the European Communities

and which also perhaps provide an explanation for, for instance,

attitudes to life which coloured people's attitudes to the European

dimension. In September 1946 Winston Churchill, in a speech in Zürich,

Switzerland, called for "...A kind of United States of Europe...".[1]

When, however, discussions took place with a view to creating a system

of closer unity between nations, it was clear that the British had

a very different view of how such a system should be formulated. The

British, after the Second World War, saw themselves still as belonging

to a powerful nation, indeed a World, as well as a European power.

Churchill's concept of overlapping circles of relationships with Europe,

the Commonwealth and the United States of America was a fundamental

belief which went on to colour the views of both public and politicians

for quite a while. The British were with Europe, but not of it.[2]

Britain subsequently refused to join in the negotiations over the

Schuman Plan and the further discussions into economic integration,

preferring instead the creation of a European Free Trade Area which

would not interfere with British trading arrangements with the Common-

wealth, which were still paramount. In 1961 the Conservative Government

of Harold Macmillan made the first British application to join the

European Community; it failed, being vetoed in 1963 by France under

General de Gaulle. In October 1962, Hugh Gaitskell, the Leader of

the Labour Party, gave a speech in which he insisted that Britain must

remain free to plan her own economy and to determine her own foreign

policy and he demanded safeguards for the Commonwealth, E.F.T.A. and

for British agriculture.[3] However, following the General Election

of 1964, the new Labour Government's dreams of rapid economic growth

were to be shattered and a further application to join the Community

was made in 1967. This too was vetoed. It was not until the death

of President de Gaulle and a less hostile attitude towards British membership on the part of the French was to prevail that Britain was able to make a final, successful application to join under the Conservative Government of Edward Heath in the early 1970s. Britain formally became a member of the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973.

Economic reasons and foreign policy considerations had driven Britain into the arms of the Community. Years of economic and industrial problems and a decline in the British role on the World political stage were primary considerations for joining and not an idealistic post-war drive for European unity. After years of watching European Community member countries doing well economically, the British were out for their share of European economic growth. But it was not a case of whole-hearted support for Europe, there were dissenters on all parts of the political spectrum and consideration of the protection of British interests was a major aspect of the Entry negotiations. The changing relationship with the Commonwealth and the subject of British Sovereignty were uppermost in British minds.

The German situation was quite a different one. The United States of America had changed its policy towards the newly-divided Germany after the Second World War, seeing the revival of Western Germany as a bulwark against the U.S.S.R. As a result, rapid economic recovery took place in West Germany. But the French were very worried as they feared being confronted once again by this once-powerful neighbour. A new approach to an old solution was found by Jean Monnet and adopted by Schuman which would see a framework for common action in Western Europe and would embrace this old historical enemy of France. It was an opportunity which the West German Government chose to utilise, as the Federal Republic regained the status of an independent State during the period 1949-1955, and following many negotiations between Germany,

France, Italy and the Benelux nations, Germany was one of the six
original founder members of the European Communities Treaties (Euratom,
E.C.S.C., the E.E.C.). Germany was also in a better economic state
on entry into the European Community and subsequently did well out
of membership in comparison to Britain when she joined, (initially
owing to what has been termed the 'Economic Miracle'). Questions of
sovereignty were not perceived as a problem; Germany had no
Commonwealth, Empire or other ties to consider. She was a new country,
seeking to re-establish herself on the international stage and trying
to put disastrous years of war which had destroyed her credibility
behind her. Britain, initially emerging as a victor in the War had
seen her political and economic situation decline and it was to be
very unfortunate from Britain's point of view that her entry into,
and membership of, the Community was to coincide with the international
recession caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle-East.

A further aspect of the historical factor as a fundamental
influence on public attitudes might be said to be the different attitudes
of politicians in the two countries to the European Community. After
early opposition from the S.P.D. by the late 1950s, basically there
was established a consensus in favour of membership on the part of
West German politicians but this was not the case in Britain, where
there was a confused situation with the Labour Party changing its mind
on the issue. McLean points to the fact that the fluctuating opinion
poll results in Britain over the years, prior to entry, with figures
indicative of support appearing to have no pattern, were related to
party choice. According to McLean, voters tended to share their opinion
about the European Community with their chosen political party. As
the Party's views changed so did their opinions too and, as a result,
their opinions on Europe were the consequences of their party choice.[4]

Dissent was not just confined to the Labour Party stronghold. Initial
Conservative opposition particularly amongst Members of Parliament
and the farming community was strong but was to gradually weaken with
the passage of time, in particular due to deflationary Government policy
and the farmers took note of the European Price Agreements.

British public opinion polls in the 1960s reflected these changes.
An August 1962 National Opinion Poll result produced a majority against
joining the Community, however an opinion poll taken by O.R.C. in early
1966 revealed that a substantive majority were in favour.[5] Probing
questions revealed that the main reasons for wanting to join were
economic and that many British people were distrustful of European
countries. This contrasted very much with attitudes in Germany at
the time, both public and political. The view had spread in West
Germany that it was assumed that Britain would join the European
Community and, increasingly, they were waiting for the entry of their
British colleagues. German basic fundamental support for German
membership of the Community was not under question as British member-
ship of the Community was in Britain, and Germans saw the entry of
the British as being beneficial.

It is important to consider the very different situations
pertaining to each country's entry as a greater understanding of any
differences in public attitude between 1975 to 1980 can be gained.
National and individual circumstances have a distinct influence over
public opinion: a time of prosperity may be said to induce a mood
of greater optimism which will have a spill-over effect on attitudes
to other issues. As economic decline or depression deepens, as it
becomes harder to sell goods, for example, and jobs are threatened,
then a tendency to blame external factors such as European Community
membership develops. Germany entered the Community in the 1950s and

enjoyed years of European Community expansion and development. There

was a mood of enthusiasm and optimism. In 1975 despite economic

problems on the international front, German industry was not in a

state of decline. British industry was not in such a happy position,

however. Industrial dispute had been followed by political instability

in the 1970s, (viz. the election, twice, of a minority Labour Government

which was itself torn by factions with very different views). In Germany

such problems at that time were not prevalent with a relatively high

degree of political consensus especially on the economic front and

international relations. This was not the case in Britain. The 1970s

were a period of political polarisation, of serious economic problems

including inflation and labour relations culminating in such events

as the I.M.F. Loan and the Winter of Discontent.

It was not a good time to become a new member of the European

Community and Britain, in contrast to Germany, became increasingly

one of the poorer members of the Community. Inglehart points to the

quirk of the European Community financial system which has meant that,

in spite of this situation, Britain, together with Germany, contributes

more to the Community's finances than they receive. It was to become

a bone of contention in Britain due to Britain subsidizing wealthier

neighbours and it is important to bear this fact in mind when comparing

public attitudes to the Community, for as a result, there was a growing

tendency to put the blame for the difficult economic situation in the

1970s on the Community.[6] It is also helpful when taking into considera-

tion whether membership had any effect on long-standing British attitudes

to, for instance, other European countries.

Finally, I would like to briefly discuss the role of opinion

polls themselves as the main source of information throughout the

thesis has been data obtained from survey research by the European

Community and Opinion Poll organisations. Opinion polls themselves

first made their appearance in the United States of America just before the outbreak of the Second World War and after the War in the 1950s there was a demand for attitude surveys. They are therefore long-established and are used by business and interest groups as well as political parties and organisations. Blumler and Fox point out that "surveys are sometimes described as providing photographic snapshots of a public's state of mind at a particular moment."[7] The Eurobarometer opinion polls are a system of regular surveys of attitudes using quota sampling in Britain and Germany, the quotas being established by sex, age and profession on the basis of census data. The same series of questions are asked in the European Community nations in order to obtain a systematic record of public opinion thereby facilitating a comparison of opinion. The data obtained from them forms the backbone of the thesis as it provides valuable information on "the thoughts, feelings, hopes and fears of Europeans on the entire spectrum of matters dealt with by the Community or likely to impinge on related concerns: the socio-political climate, attitudes to European unification and Community solidarity..." etc.[8]

According to Riffault and Rabier an international comparison is essential to a real understanding of opinions, attitudes and behaviour patterns in a given country and that international comparison is the key to understanding whether a given survey topic is viewed differently in country A or country B.[9] Certainly in considering British and German attitudes it is important to be able to compare the respective responses to like questions in order to establish whether similar or different attitudes prevail. It has been pointed out, however, that it is always difficult to assess public attitudes towards Europe because so much depends on how the questions themselves are actually framed and Blumler and Fox recognise that "...true compatibility is not necessarily achieved by the adoption of identical question wordings

as respondent's interpretation of the same question may vary somewhat

from one country to another."[10]   Nevertheless the wording of surveys

is basically designed to tap people's general feeling of support or

opposition to European issues and although they are not an absolute

measure of support they do provide a very good idea of the levels of

relative support in either nation especially where questions are uniform

in a given year and over a period of years. Webb and Wybrow concur

by arguing that there is an advantage in maintaining the precise form

of the question in order that the true trend of public opinion can

be measured by the repeated application of it.[11]

They mention the fact that opinion polls for all their apparent

or real faults, are here to stay and that they play an increasingly

important part in the processes of informing the public and can sometimes

lead to having an influence on matters of consequence. In their opinion,

opinion pollsters put their skill and experience into the formulation

of questions and questionnaires to produce the most meaningful and

informative responses which should relate as much as possible to the

true feelings and opinions of the respondents to the topic.[12]

There are limits to the reliability of opinion polls and attitude

surveys but they do provide a valuable source of information and, as

such, are a good guide to public opinion. Although much depends on

how the results are interpreted, clear differences and similarities

do emerge. The reputable organisations offer clear guide-lines to

their interviewers for the carrying-out of surveys and, providing these

are met, the findings offer a high degree of accuracy. The size of

the sample is an important factor too. According to McLean, "if you

have got a fair sample you can make a reliable prediction."[13]   The

one major factor which can affect the results of an opinion poll, or

appear to produce a surprising result, is that of an outside influence,

for instance a national or international event, and, throughout the

thesis, I will take into account and seek to mention any such important

developments which may or may not have had an effect on public opinion

at a particular time.[14]

Let me now turn my attention to the questions I will be considering

throughout the thesis. Before I begin to discuss in detail the compara-

tive aspects of the public opinion in the two nations, Britain and

Germany, I will outline the way in which the thesis will be divided.

I will begin from the position that there were no major differences

in the overall political and social attitudes between Britain and Germany

whilst asking whether German opinion is in fact more united, (with

a greater tendency towards consensus), than a more polarised British

public? In the same vein I will also be considering whether German

opinion is slightly more traditional in its attitudes on socio-political

questions than the British. Secondly, it can be argued that in both

Britain and Germany the public attitude to what one may call 'European

Questions' is heavily influenced by perceptions of national interest

and of national problems. British attitudes tend to focus on two material-

istic themes. There is the perception of negative benefits associated

with British membership of the European Community in general and in

terms of specific policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and

the Budget problems. Coupled with this is, however, the hope that

Community policies might be devised which would deal with such British

economic problems of inflation and unemployment, or that they will

provide tangible benefits on the lines of regional aid. Both sets

of attitudes will be analysed in detail to establish the depth of such

conceptions.

German opinion in contrast, which as I have already mentioned

basically supports membership of the European Community and also further

unification, appears to be grounded in the pragmatic perception of a

satisfactory status quo: i.e. that the Community is producing general

benefits for all its member States and also particular benefits for West Germany. An important factor which I will consider also is that there does not appear to be much 'European Idealism' in either Britain or Germany in the sense that neither seems to be prepared to accept significant sacrifices in the European cause. There is a high degree of general assent to rather vague pro-European sentiments when expressed in largely non-operable statements. British reservations tend to apply particularly whenever pro-European principles are explicitly stated which conflict with national independence and I will investigate whether there is in fact a greater British attachment to existing institutions and ideas of Nation-state than there is in Germany? Additionally, in both Germany and Britain there is a clear contrast between the attitudes and actions of the public when it comes to European matters, for example comparing the intention to vote in the 1979 European Parliamentary Elections and the actual voting behaviour which took place. There is a considerable degree of similarity in public attitudes to trust in other countries and to potential new members in the two nations with, noticeably, a North European bias emerging. When this area of interest is subsequently covered in the thesis, I will take into consideration the possibility that any differences could be explained by reference to the national policy and individual experiences of Britain and Germany, for example, anti-United States of America sentiment in Britain.

Turning to other important factors, it will be necessary to distinguish at the European level between general attitudes versus tangible actions. It will be interesting to see what findings do emerge when these factors are analysed. Linked to this is a consideration of whether in fact there have been any longitudinal changes in attitudes and whether these changes were general? Also one must not forget the possibility of fluctuations in attitudes which could be associated

with specific events such as the 1975 British Referendum on European

Community membership and the 1979 European Parliamentary Elections

and any findings pertaining to these possibilities will be duly brought

to the readers' attention. Finally special attention will be taken

of the influence or otherwise of the Media, looking at how satisfied

the public in both nations was with the available information and

sources of information and whether there is any significant contrast

between the two. The 1975 British Referendum and the 1979 European

Elections will also be covered as separate events.

The various themes which I have been detailing for consideration

constitute specific points which offer a good insight into the comparative

attitudes of the two nations. One cannot look at one area in isolation

or merely consider a factor such as attitudes to membership of the

Community and to further integration of the Community without establishing,

for example, whether both share similar likes and dislikes in terms

of trust in other nations. The theme of 'nationalism' in relation

to the Community appears to emerge again and again and how deep the

public attitude on this issue is may or may not be seen to have a bearing

on attitudes to the development of the Community or to other aspects

of membership of the Community. Is one country going to emerge as

more forward-looking, the other more static in its hopes and aspirations?

It may seem that too much attention is being paid to the socio-

political aspects in relation to public attitudes but it is important

to take into consideration such aspects as the 'Happiness Factor' as

these may well have a substantial bearing in general on attitudes towards

the European Community itself and Community activities. Noticeably

'anti-Europe' attitudes prevalent at a specific time may well relate

to developments taking place in the home country. Such factors also can

explain a marked contrast in attitudes and may well determine curious

gender-related differences which may emerge in public attitudes.

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8. Europe as Seen by Europeans: Ten Years of European Polling, 1973-1983, (European Documentation, Manuscript by J.C. Denheffe, Introduction by J.R. Rabier), Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1983, p.7.

9. Helene Riffault and Jacques-Rene Rabier, "International Dimension in Social Research", Esomar Seminar on Social Research, London, 30 November - 2 December 1977, p.1.

10. Blumler and Fox, The European Voter, p.16.

11. Norman Webb and Robert Wybrow, The Gallup Report; Your Opinions in 1981, London, Sphere Books Ltd., 1982, p.8.

12. Ibid., pp.7, 8.

13. McLean, Elections, p.73.

14. There are various methods of sampling, namely Quota, Random and Probability sampling which are the norm; Quota sampling specifies that the quota obtained must correspond with, for example, the percentage of working-class people in the country in comparison with other classes. Random Sampling, which can involve taking 2,000 names from the electoral register, then seeking to interview them, has the guarantee of the statistical theory that if one takes a very large number of probability samples drawn from the same population, the majority reflect closely the distribution of the characteristic being examined. Sampling error of 2% or 3% also allows for a high degree of accuracy in the results. From Elections, p.74.

Chapter 1

SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES

I shall now enter into a brief discussion of socio-political attitudes in the two nations. For the purpose of the thesis I will make a selective comparison, taking one or two chosen areas as examples. These attitudes may have relevance in the later stages of the thesis. Amongst the areas to be covered are happiness and a personal sense of well-being and a personal involvement in informal politics.

Turning first to the 'Happiness Factor', a European Commission sponsored poll in 1975 saw Germany placed in eighth position and the British in fifth position out of a list of the nine European Community member countries in terms of the 'Very Happy' response, the ratio being 22% to 11% in Britain's favour.[1] British women emerged as consistently happiest, (approx. 25%), comparing Britain and Germany, when both sexes and all age groups were compared.[2] This is interesting as happiness could have a marked bearing on attitudes noticeably as the feeling of happiness is often closely linked with personal aspects of life as lived in a particular culture. A different question, this time concerning feelings of well-being, that of achievement of hopes, was one of the subjects considered in 1978. Whereas most (50%+) German men and women felt that they had achieved the things that they hoped for, in general, most British men and women responded that they had had to be content with less.[3] Thus, in 1975 the British were happier in terms of general happiness but in 1978 they felt that they were not achieving their hopes which was something of a peculiarity.

Firstly, however, one must not forget that although related, these were two different questions and the findings could be open to different interpretation. The situation could have changed with people feeling less happy by 1978 - a longitudinal change perhaps? Or maybe

it was a question of measuring something quite different. Could one

argue that German people were more pessimistic in their outlook than

the British, perhaps having lower expectations of life thus more likely

to achieve their hopes? We now come to people's personal involvement

in politics considering such issues as the propensity to discuss politics,

whether people felt able to exert a socio-political influence, membership

of social organisations and so on. A 1975 European Commission poll

into the propensity to frequently discuss politics revealed that in

both Germany and Britain, age made a difference amongst the men, in

that it was the younger man who talked least often about politics.

A minority in either country responded that they discussed politics

often, the largest minority group being men over the age of 25 (a third-

plus, slightly more-so amongst German men). Women of both nations,

plus young men, were distinctly less inclined to discuss politics and

the propensity to discuss politics often was clearly linked to the

level of education attained.[4]

In 1978 a survey was made into the frequency of political

discussion amongst friends comparing Spring 1975 and Autumn 1977.

The Germans increasingly (up to 60%) over the years stated that they

discussed politics occasionally as did most (up to 50%+) British men;

it was only British women who were divided and increasingly inclined

to respond 'never'.[5] British women also gave the most negative response

in surveys between 1975 and 1977 which looked at whether people felt

capable of persuading others. There was disillusionment in both

nations however with a growing 'rarely' response from German women

and division amongst British men. Only amongst German men was there

some indication of feeling able to persuade others occasionally (45%).[6]

An earlier survey carried out in 1975 into whether people felt able

to exert a socio-political influence perhaps reflected the differences

between the nations and the sexes even more. Most British men remained
consistently supportive of the idea that they could exert a socio-
political influence in contrast to everyone else; there was a distinct
contrast in Germany where age was an important factor. Amongst men,
confidence grew with age (up to 41%) whereas amongst women, confidence
declined with age (down to 24%). British women were more confident
when younger; it was only amongst older (over 55) British women that
confidence declined (to 27%).[7]

Bearing in mind the higher British response in 1975 it will be
important to note whether these subtle personal differences in the
socio-political arena might have had an important influence on external
political European Community attitudes and I will take careful cognisance
of levels of doubt occurring in years where personal disillusionment
was evident. I would like now to discuss briefly participation in
social organisations as some quite distinct cultural contrasts emerged,
perhaps reflecting important differences in the social climate and
social influences, (also perhaps political influences) in the two
nations.

A 1978 survey into membership of, and participation in, social
organisations revealed that men more so than women were members,
German women being the least interested, and of those people who were
active participants, British men were slightly more active members
than German men.[8] Amongst those women who did participate, British
women were more active members. Differences are reflected in Table 1
detailing the first three choices.

The religious influence on German society was evident and was
clearly one of the clearest contrasts between the two nations. German
men, as well as German women, were involved in Religious societies.
Looking at the political arena, the two main Churches in Germany, the
Catholic and Lutheran Protestant Churches enjoyed some political

TABLE 1

BRITAIN:

Men	Women
Trade Unions or Professional Societies	Educational, Artistic or Cultural Societies
Sporting Clubs or Societies	Others (i.e. Non-political/ social action/religious etc.)
Educational/Artistic or Cultural Societies	Sporting Clubs or Societies

GERMANY:

Men	Women
Sporting Clubs of Societies	Religious or Philosophical Societies
Trade Unions or Professional Societies	Sporting Clubs or Societies
Religious or Philosophical Societies	Educational/Artistic or Cultural Societies

influence and in some States there was a religious divide: for

example, in Bavaria which was predominantly Catholic, people voted

for the C.S.U. Party which was attached to the Conservative C.D.U.

Party. One therefore has to consider the question of religious influence

on political and social attitudes to the Community. Could there be,

perhaps, a correlation between a more 'conservative' or 'traditional'

attitude to life and politics, reflected in both sexes in Germany which

could explain discrepancies in attitudes between Germany and Britain?

The religious situation in Britain was different. The churches,

especially in England, had lost their social and political influence,

(declining church attendance being an example, though Scottish attendance

was higher). Apart from the case of Northern Ireland where religion

and politics did mix, the religious influence on the main political

 parties was not as evident, nor as clear-cut as in Germany. Methodism,

too, was no longer the mainstay of the British Labour Party, for example.

One fundamental difference was that in Germany there was a compulsory

Church tax still being levied which most Germans chose to comply with.

Thus religion was clearly continuing to play an important part in

German lives with funds available for religious-based organisations.

The second clear contrast between the two nations was the higher

membership by British women of 'Other Organisations', a term perhaps

covering such institutions as 'The Women's Institute' and the 'Townswomen's

Guild'. It is worth noting as it had already been revealed that British

women showed least propensity to discuss politics amongst their friends

and perhaps this finding revealed a subtle difference in social behaviour

amongst the women of Germany and Britain. These findings now beg the

question of whether indeed German people could be considered to be

more traditional in their attitudes in comparison with the British.

I will take as an example a comparison of attitudes to the involvement

of women in local government and in national parliamentary politics

in both nations; also women's participation in the European Elections.

Such findings could prove to be relevant in the specifically European

context. A survey into whether people considered politics to be more

of a man's business in 1975 revealed fundamental differences in attitudes.

Around 70% of British men and women rejected the idea of politics being

a man's business but in Germany division prevailed with German men

being mostly in favour, (51% with 46% opposed), whereas 51% of German

women were opposed and 42% in favour. Perhaps attitudes were changing

in Germany but there was still strong support for old-established ideas.[9]

A 1975 survey into the respective political roles that men and women

should play perhaps revealed the influence of the age factor in Germany

in terms of social attitudes to change, for only men and women over

the age of 55 objected to women playing the same role, men more than

women expressing a more conservative desire for men and women to play

different roles. In Britain there was high support for men and women

to play the same role in all ages, apart from a distinctly lower level

of support amongst older (55+) women.[10] It is important to note this

anomaly as clearly in Britain the age factor was somewhat different

as indeed the highest support for men and women playing the same role

came from the oldest age group amongst British men. One wonders if

the level of education amongst older people in Germany might have

played a part as the higher the level of education attained the greater

the level of support for the same role concept existed amongst everyone

apart from those with average education in Germany. This is linked

to whether people believed politics was a man's business and perhaps

was an indictment of differences in terms of age in social and political

attitudes. One must bear in mind that the education of many older

people or the lives they led was not that of people brought up post-

war and may reflect into their attitudes towards, for example, European

integration.

I will now consider attitudes to men and women participating in politics in both nations. A survey into confidence in a man or woman as Member of Parliament (comparing 1975 and 1977) produced fundamental differences both between nationalities and sexes perhaps emphasising how complicated attitudes became when specific matters were under consideration. Over 50% of German men had more confidence in a man although 40% said neither the one nor the other. Amongst British men who, initially, were more liberal in that over 50% in 1975 also said that there was no difference, by 1977, 48% had more confidence in a man. German women believed that there was no difference but British women seemed to experience a crisis of confidence as, like their men, they believed initially there was no difference then became more divided.[11] These findings, it is interesting to note, followed the coming into force in Britain (in December 1975) of the Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay Acts and it has been noted that by 1975 British people were expressing some dissatisfaction with life by stating that they felt that they were not achieving their hopes. There were also problems with the British economy and a difficult political situation. Could one therefore expect a correlation between a crisis of confidence amongst the British who, one must not forget, chose to remain in the Community out of a belief that they would gain economic benefit from Community membership, and disillusionment with the European Community as life became harder at home? In later stages of the thesis I will draw out other signs which might indicate such a crisis of confidence especially if they appear to coincide with lack of support for Community membership.

A further example of traditional attitudes was revealed in a 1977 survey where German men and women favoured a more traditional attitude that people prefer to vote for a man whereas in Britain the major criticism was that too few women offered themselves as candidates

(although a third of British men did support the German viewpoint). But perhaps one could also detect a sign of dissatisfaction in Germany in that both sexes did respond that they thought the male candidates got better support from their parties.[12] This received little acknowledgement in Britain but there was an element of discord in Britain between the sexes on attitudes towards the situation which would arise if more women were elected to Parliament as British men were very divided, coming down slightly more (35%) in support of the belief that things would remain the same, in contrast to 48% of British women who believed that things would go better. The German position leaned towards support for the status-quo, 45% of women and 52% of men expecting things to remain the same.[13]

What therefore did people expect would actually happen if more women were elected? The same survey posed this question and found that German people were rather more definite in their replies than were the British. There was far more unity in Germany percentage-wise in the responses, the greatest division being over the belief that the problems of women would get more serious attention, German women clearly having higher expectations than their men. British men and women were more divided over every suggestion apart from expecting that neglected problems would be discussed for the first time; British women too expected women's problems to get more serious attention than did their men.[14] With the advent of the forthcoming first direct elections to the European Parliament (in 1979) people were also asked in 1977 whether they supported the idea of quite a lot of women being elected to the European Parliament. One interviewee in four did not reply, but of those who did, British women were most in favour (60%); 51% of German women and a higher percentage of British men (45% with 36% opposed) also concurred. German men were the most divided of all.[15]

A high level of 'Don't Knows' were recorded in Germany which makes
one wonder if there was some apathy over European issues in Germany
whereas the British were still more inclined to question European
developments, knowing that they had only recently (in 1975) decided
to retain their membership.

The German position on what would happen if more women were in
local councils mirrored that of their expectations for greater partici-
pation of women in Parliament with a response in favour of the status
quo, (44% for 'better'), but whereas British men had been divided over
women's participation in Parliament, 43% of British men responded in
favour of the status quo.[16]

There is one final comparison I would like to make of the socio-
political attitudes of British and German people and that is in their
expectations of the functions and behaviour of their respective
national governments and Members of Parliament, allowing for the
very different systems of national government prevailing in both nations.
Firstly, respondents in the two nations had different attitudes as
to what was the most important function of their national parliaments
as was revealed in a 1977 survey. The most important function for
British respondents was for control of the spending of public money
(64%), whereas in Germany almost equal priority was given to national
parliaments watching over, supporting or opposing the government (47%)
and to the proposal, discussion and passing of laws (43%).[17] Secondly,
a different response was also elicited over the most important function
of national M.P.s, the German response favouring M.P.s helping solve
the problems of individual citizens, whereas, although this was
supported by 35% of British people, they gave priority to M.P.s taking
part in parliamentary debates and to asking questions on the actions
of the government.[18] I will look at attitudes to the actual role of
national parliaments at a slightly later stage in the thesis when I
turn to the issue of European unification.

In conclusion it is possible to discern adherence to 'traditional' long-standing attitudes to socio-political matters in both nations although quite naturally not necessarily to the same things. Indeed, British men, initially quite liberal in certain areas actually appeared to express less liberal viewpoints as time progressed. In terms of attitudes to the European Community it became clear that external factors such as the economic situation and, in Germany's case, the role of religion might have some effect on socio-political attitudes and therefore also play a part in shaping attitudes to Community issues. There were signs of change in a more liberal direction, to a certain extent, in Germany, on certain socio-political fronts but there was attachment to the status quo which questioned the propensity to accept change in a European Community context. However, in Britain, as life became harder, British men especially, were less inclined to accept change in particular where political influence was greatest. This might indicate a level of self-centredness or instrumentalism in attitudes as both British men and women did appear to support issues where they felt that they might benefit and it would not be unreasonable to assume that this will be discernible in the European context also. Did this also apply, I wonder, to Germany too?

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Chapter 2

MEMBERSHIP, COMMUNITY IMAGES AND PROBLEMS

Having discussed differences in socio-political attitudes in
Germany and Britain I will now begin to undertake a comparison of the
two nations' attitudes to the European Community itself. In the
Introduction to the thesis I pointed out that German opinion had been
basically in favour of membership, in contrast to Britain. According
to a Eurobarometer opinion poll published in 1980 with findings for
the years 1975-1980, a pattern emerged of fluctuations in Britain,
with decreasing (under 50%) support. There was only one discrepancy
in Germany, a drop to 48% support for Community membership in Spring
1976, normal support being over 50%.[1] Blumler and Fox, commenting
on membership support noted that Germany, with one exeption, consistently
recorded majorities in favour of membership yielding average support
levels close to 60% and, with the 1976 exception, opponents never
exceeded 10% of those interviewed. Indeed outright opposition to
membership showed signs of waning in pre-European Election surveys.
In Britain they noted that support for membership was much lower,
attitudes were more or less enduringly polarised and that one in three
respondents felt that membership was beneficial for Britain, one in
three remained unconvinced and one in three were more decidedly opposed
to the Community.[2] Butler in discussing the Referendum said that people
who had been in a 'No' mood previously, noted 'Yes' largely because
those political leaders whom they most respected vigorously urged them
to do so which introduces the concept of volatility in British attitudes.[3]
It also brings out a point I expressed in discussing socio-political
attitudes that external factors such as party-political persuasion
could have a direct effect on public opinion. One had a clear example
of the personal attitude and influence of national politicians having

a direct influence on attitudes to the Community. There were bumps

in support in both Germany and Britain for, as Handley pointed out,

it appears that "...when saliency of European affairs is increased by

such events as election campaigns, publics tend to become more

supportive of the European unity ideal."[4]   However, the basic difference

between the two was the continuing support in Germany in contrast to

increasing disillusionment in Britain.

There was an interesting anomaly, however, in that when Eurobarometer

surveys in 1977 and 1978 investigated opinions on membership in vaguer

terms of in ten to fifteen years in the future, there was a notable

increase in support in Britain, the British offering an almost 50%

response to the Community being a good thing.[5]   And in surveys into

scrapping the Community the British response was mainly sorry or

indifferent, (with a quarter relieved), whilst the Germans mainly

declared that they would be sorry.[6]

As I have previously referred to in socio-political attitudes

the British scored higher in a 1975 'Happiness' table and indeed a

Eurobarometer survey which looked at happiness throughout the years

1975 to 1979 revealed that over 50% of people in both nations declared

themselves to be fairly happy.[7]   Indeed a survey into overall life

satisfaction resulted in figures showing 80% or more in Britain

declaring themselves basically satisfied with the lives they were

leading. In Germany they were slightly less satisfied.[8]   Therefore

it is clear that support for the Community was not completely linked

with general well-being and that other factors must have been playing

a substantial part. This high degree of satisfaction, however, might

have been one reason for the more positive viewpoint of the British

towards Community membership in future terms as possibly they still

retained a basic optimism which was reflected in such findings.

When it came to rather more specific questions on Community issues,
varying attitudes between Britain and Germany did emerge. Inglehart,
in a study including the years 1975-1980, made the point that "...in
their hearts the British are as European as [other nations] - but there
is a widespread perception that British economic interests were not
well served by membership in the Community." The problems over the
British contribution to the Community budget and, according to Inglehart,
a tendency to place some of the blame on the European Community institu-
tions could not help but encourage a more negative perceived stance
amongst the British.[9] It was not entirely a one-sided view for a Euro-
barometer survey made at the end of 1978 saw neither nation saying
that their country had benefitted more by being members of the Community.
The British clearly were very dissatisfied with 49% believing that
they had benefitted less and the Germans were very divided with only
a fifth saying that they had indeed benefitted more compared with other
Community countries.[10]

British pessimism had been quite evident when people were asked
in 1976 to attribute the effects of the Common Market on their jobs,
the country's economy, consumer prices and underdeveloped areas in
their country. Apart from responding that there had been no effect
at all on their or their spouses job or profession, the British
responded that there had been a bad effect and many also were very
divided over the benefits or otherwise of the Common Market on under-
developed areas. But the German response had not been much happier
either, for, apart from believing the Community had had a positive
effect on the German economy and no effect at all in terms of work,
Germans were unhappy at the effect of the Community on prices and were
divided as to whether there had been any effect on underdeveloped areas.[11]

It would appear that it was not therefore the British alone who were liable to complain about the effect of the Community on domestic matters such as prices.

I would like at this point to compare the different impressions and images of the Community in both nations. A Eurobarometer survey in Autumn 1975 offered a comprehensive list of images for people to agree or disagree with and the findings did reveal certain subtle differences in attitudes.[12] (see Table 2)

The most striking impression gained from these findings was the high degree of division in Britain barely a few months after the majority vote to retain Community membership in the British Referendum, the consensus appearing to be motivated in a more negative direction. The Germans in contrast enjoyed, apart from one instance, where there was some division, a favourable impression of the Community. Dalton and Duval possibly offer an explanation for this phenomenon. They argue that citizens' opinions are susceptible to change and point out that although public opinion in Britain in January 1975 had been mostly negative, a large proportion of the electorate had been uncommitted. Following the treaty renegotiations, public opinion had turned in favour of continued membership, but after the Referendum favourable opinion had slowly declined.[13] Following the Referendum the balance of Community-related news became steadily more negative and one might well understand that a return to a more negative attitude amongst the British public was feasible; a return to 'normality' following the hiatus of the Referendum campaign bringing with it a return of British scepticism.

In the section on socio-political attitudes I introduced the idea of instrumental attitudes on the part of the British public and I would like to bring this theme now into the sphere of European Community benefits and also question the assumption that it might only apply

TABLE 2

	BRITAIN	GERMANY
The Common Market provides a wider choice of goods for consumers.	60% (Agree)	85% (Agree)
	28% (Disagree)	9% (Disagree)
The Common Market facilitates the sale of industrial products abroad and helps to develop national production.	42% (Agree)	82% (Agree)
	36% (Disagree)	4% (Disagree)
The Common Market stimulates industrial development.	41% (Agree)	72% (Agree)
	36% (Disagree)	15% (Disagree)
The Common Market facilitates the sale of agricultural products abroad.	37% (Agree)	73% (Agree)
	38% (Disagree)	15% (Disagree)
The Common Market curbs price rises by increasing competition.	23% (Agree)	43% (Agree)
	59% (Disagree)	34% (Disagree)

to British attitudes. Butler also seems to hint at the likelihood

of instrumentalism in British attitudes when he discusses the forces

prevalent in 1975. Persuasive arguments with the depressing theme

of no alternative to Community membership - what for instance was the

alternative? - clearly had had an influence on attitudes prior to the

Referendum.[14] The end of days of Empire and years of economic struggle

outside of the Community whilst watching member States benefit from

membership had not conjured up a positive outlook of alternatives to

Community membership in British eyes. But a vote in favour had been

made with a desire for gains from Community membership and not out

of a great desire for European integration and these attitudes were

reflected in an opinion poll taken after the Referendum in Autumn 1975

which looked at the importance attached to problems the Community was

tackling.[15] Both nations considered the problems being dealt with

by the Community to be important, the British more so than the Germans.

The following problems were considered important by both:-

* Reducing the differences between the developed and less-

  developed regions of the Community.

* A common fight against rising prices.

* Co-ordinating the social policies of the member countries

  in the fields of employment and job training.

* Implementation of a common policy on energy supplies.

* Modernisation of European agriculture.

* Introduction of a common policy for protecting Nature

  and fighting pollution.

* Protection of consumers against fraudulent selling and

  misleading advertising.

* Achieving a common Foreign Policy in discussions with

  the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.

There was a desire in both nations for protection of and support
for Community action which would have a direct perceived beneficial
effect on life in the home country. One problem, for example, rated
especially important by the British was that of the modernisation of
agriculture which was a live political issue in Britain relating to
the view of foreign agriculture being a drain on British resources.

Two problems which brought division in both nations did question
the extent to which even Germany was prepared to go in the interests
of the Community at the expense of herself. They were:-

* Replacing the currencies of member countries with a

single European currency.

* Introduction of a common policy on aid to under-

developed countries outside of the Community.

These two problems would involve, on the one hand, actual change in
a fundamental part of the national way of life and, on the other,
specific financial assistance by Germany and Britain, both of whom
were the greatest contributors to the Community Budget which was a
major source of disagreement in Britain. It was an early indication
of the unwillingness on the part of either country to become involved
in direct action on behalf of others where it might involve some element
of sacrifice. According to Inglehart and Rabier "...the formation
of a European outlook is something which develops rather slowly..."
and it is interesting to note that although Germany clearly was more
supportive of the Community after over twenty years of membership,
there were some hiccoughs in attitudes when no direct personal benefit
for the country could be seen.[16] A further Eurobarometer survey made
in 1976 into attitudes to problems people were interested in, reinforced
the assumptions I have made. Certain questions were similar and produced
no change in attitudes.[17] Notably, the importance of the problem of

rising prices, protection of consumers and protection of nature.

A question linked to a common foreign policy, that of defending our

interests against the Superpowers also produced a response that this

was important to both. The British appeared to have come to terms

with their changed political role on the world stage to some extent,

since the Second World War, and were possibly looking to new alliances

in order to protect themselves. The Germans too felt uneasy as Germany

was within direct range of the Warsaw Pact countries. The question

of these being inherently selfish attitudes on their part is, of

course, true in that neither ranked the problems as being unimportant

due to the perceived benefits of such policies by the Community. Other

questions were posed and there were similarities in attitudes with

the following also rated as important by both:-

* To try to reduce the number of very rich and very

poor people.

* Provide for sufficient housing.

* Fighting unemployment.

* Modernise education to meet today's needs.

When membership of the Community was considered in vague terms

as I mentioned earlier there was acceptance and support in Britain

as well as in Germany and one could also see that vague concepts such

as reducing the numbers of rich and poor people received a favourable

response. Community problems which could offer help to inherent

national social issues such as unemployment clearly also found favour.

But one problem which had registered support in 1975, that of reducing

the differences between regions, had assumed greater importance in

British eyes but had declined in importance in Germany and there was

a difference of opinion over the Community controlling the activities

of the multinational or international firms. Germany considering it

an important problem, the British being divided; neither considered
more self-government for the regions to be important. One Community
problem, that of strengthening our military defence against possible
enemies which could have involved direct Community involvement in
British defence strategy, not just being confined to the sphere of
international debate on defence and alliances, was seen as being
important in Britain but there was division in Germany where most
people thought it an unimportant problem. The defence situation in
Germany was very different to that of the British, severe restrictions
having been placed on German defence capacity after the Second World
War by the Allied Powers whereas the question of independent defence
capacity was seen as being important by most politicians in Britain
and the public as well.

Spring 1976 as I have already mentioned had seen a decline in
support for the Community in Germany and it also coincided with the
destabilisation of the European currencies due to French withdrawal
from the European Currency 'Snake'. Rabier and Inglehart, in studies
they have made into public appraisals of Community membership, have
found that economic conditions do seem to have a significant impact
and that their results support the idea that favourable outputs tend
to enhance support for membership in a political community, while
unfavourable ones have the opposite effect, in a loose way. Although
they point out that the recession and inflation of the 1970s were
worldwide phenomena which were probably only marginally affected by
European Community institutions' actions, the publics concerned did
seem to attribute prevailing economic conditions to their membership
in the Community.[18]

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Chapter 3

BACKGROUND FACTORS RELATING TO
EXPECTED BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP

I should like, at this point in the thesis, to discuss
certain factors related to expected benefits of Community member-
ship before turning to consider specific attitudes towards the
unification of Europe. Although I noted a tendency on the part
of the British to consider the Community more favourably in
future terms there were grievances. However, such grievances
were not solely a British prerogative, Germans also sharing many
British attitudes to images of the Community and the problems
being tackled by the Community. In addition, where certain
differences such as in the field of social priorities emerged,
one could see that in both countries attitudes were being influenced
by external factors. Over twenty years of membership had not
prevented Germans from taking a narrow view of Community issues
if there was felt to be some effect on the internal situation of
Germany herself. It may be important to consider whether attitudes
were being affected by such factors as basic attitudes to democracy
and to the system of government itself.

I have already briefly mentioned the cost of living but I
would also like to analyse this factor a little deeper. Depressed
attitudes to membership of the Community might have been linked
to perceptions of living standards since entering the Community
and as it has already been stated by observers of public attitudes,
social factors can have an unfortunate impact on attitudes to the
Community. The implications for attitudes to European integration
must therefore be borne in mind.

In the Introduction, in addition to referring to the possibility
of a perception of negative benefits of Community membership by the
British, I also questioned whether there was a greater attachment
to the Nation-state amongst the British and I shall analyse this
factor as it might be argued that where a great attachment to national
institutions existed one could therefore expect a slightly cool approach
to the concept of further European integration. It might prove to
be that both nations displayed such attachment for, (it has been said),
Germany under Chancellor Schmidt's leadership was displaying more
nationalistic tendencies.[1]

As I stated earlier, a Eurobarometer survey had revealed that
the British had declared themselves to be slightly more satisfied
with life than had the Germans, but were they also as satisfied with
democracy and were there fundamental differences in their basic
attitudes to society? The Community was after all a group of countries
with different political systems but for further European integration
to take place perhaps one might suggest that there should be at least
some basic fundamental political attitudes with which to establish
some sort of base. If there were differences perhaps they might
give an insight into British criticism of Community membership also.

At first glance it might have appeared that in fact both countries
thought alike as Eurobarometer surveys taken between 1976 and 1980
revealed satisfaction with democracy. However, the degree of satis-
faction was in fact very different, over 70% - up to 80% of Germans
declaring themselves to be satisfied whereas the British figures
fluctuated between 51% and a maximum of 62%.[2] A contradiction emerged
for the high point of British satisfaction with democracy was in
1978, a time when British citizens had declared themselves to be
dissatisfied with the achievement of their hopes and also a time

of political instability at home. The main worry concerned fighting

rising prices, (reflected in the list of social priorities for 1977),

but maintenance of law and order had figured highly although by 1980

the number citing this declined significantly. But unlike in Germany

where no worry about giving the people more say in government decisions

had been evident between 1977 and 1980, this became a matter of

increasing importance to the British.

These years which had included some co-habitation between the

Labour and Liberal Parties in government had perhaps resulted in

doubts about the political system in Britain. Yet if the Germans

appeared happier with democracy than did the British they were revealed

to be very divided when surveys were made between 1976 and 1980 into

three basic attitudes to society; reforms, defence against subversion

and revolutionary action. There was no difference between them over

the order of priority in which they placed these basic attitudes.

In neither Germany nor Britain was there much regard for revolutionary

action but the British were quite clear in their minds that they

considered reforms to be the major priority, (between 54% and 67%),

with just 21% to 32% for defence against subversion. Germans had

some difficulty in deciding which was the most important, with

percentages of between 41% and 50% registered for each.[3]

At a time when the British were most satisfied with democracy,

the Germans were most worried about defence against subversion yet

declared themselves very happy with democracy. That there might be

some people in Germany who were not as happy with democracy and the

political system as it appeared was brought out in a study of Germany

and the German people by Conradt. He drew out the fact that in a 1978

nation-wide survey those Germans conceiving democracy to be a system

with frequent extensive and direct citizen involvement in decision-

making perceived Germany to be falling short and those who identified

democracy with economic equality and worker co-determination were also

not satisfied. More Germans saw democracy in procedural terms, (free

elections, competitive parties, etc.), and were quite content with

Germany's accomplishments. But he does make the point that there is

a difference between the ideal and the reality of democracy and that

although there was a high degree of consensus, the consensus dropped

sharply over permitting tolerance of political extremists, for example.[4]

As I stated at the start of this section of the thesis, common

attitudes to democracy, society and perhaps, linked to that, state

security, would need to develop before real European integration could

have a chance of success. Both Germany and Britain appeared not

entirely satisfied with certain aspects of their own society; would

they therefore contemplate further integration on a whole-hearted

basis? Whilst seeking to answer that question, however, I would like

to bring into the discussion other background factors which might also

have influenced public opinion. The British, as I have reiterated,

were increasingly dissatisfied with their membership of the Community

since the 1975 Referendum, a finding revealed by opinion polls other

than the Eurobarometer surveys. An N.O.P. Draft Press Release gave

details of surveys into British opinion on Community membership and

revealed that there was a clear swing against membership, (down to

35% for those saying they would vote 'Yes' in a referendum on membership)

and also showed that Gallup findings too revealed declining support

in 1976.[5] Marquand offers a further insight into this drop in support

by arguing that the Community process was depicted to the British

people,

> ...as an endless struggle between a collection of selfish
> continentals, trying to screw the last farthing out of the
> British Government, and gallant British ministers, saving
> their country from exploitation only by using all their
> teeth and claws...

As he adds in conclusion, "...it was not a good way to persuade people that membership of the Community was desirable."[6] Marquand does point out that consensus in the foreign policy field had not always existed in Germany but Germany, anxious for international acceptance and respectability, had been eager to join the Community in order to be locked into the Western World, hence perhaps the high support for Community membership amongst the German public.[7] However, as I have indicated, German self-interest was evident when the question of helping another Community member country had been raised and indeed Morgan, when analysing attitudes in Germany to the effects on the Community of the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal, stated that this enlargement was seen as contributing to the economic goal of maintaining the prosperity of Germany and her partners and enhancing Germany's and Europe's security. There was a guarded proviso that there were limits to the price which Germany was prepared to pay for such desirable objectives.[8] It was clear that economics were important to both nations which leads me to question the satisfaction in both nations over living standards and the general situation in their countries between 1975 and 1980. They were apparently satisfied with life in general, though the British expressed disappointment over achievement of their hopes. Conservatism was growing in some socio-political areas especially amongst British men as life appeared to be getting worse economically and this was evident in general in Germany. Further European integration, one might expect, would require some willingness to accept change and it might be reasonable to suggest that negative perceptions of change in terms of the home country and in Britain's case especially in the light of recent membership, could not auger well for such integration. So how happy were both nations with their living standards? Various Eurobarometer polls posed questions directly seeking a response to this issue over the years and the findings revealed some contrariness on

the part of the British who, in spite of continuous criticism of

membership of the Community, did appear to grow more optimistic about

their living standards for a time. In 1975 over 80% of those polled

said that their assessment of the general situation in Britain

compared with four or five years ago was that things had got worse,

yet two years later, when one would have expected people to be very

unhappy over living standards as inflation and national government

instability were prominent, the prevailing mood was optimism with

65% expecting an improvement in living standards over the next five

years. Three years later, however, the British were rather more

undecided, 39% believing living standards were declining though over

a third were still optimistic and just under a third favoured the

status quo.[9] It may be that these somewhat contradictory views reflect

the difficulties people experience in assessing their situation in

an inflationary period. Perhaps one could suggest that 1977 was a

sort of watershed and that as the difficulties in negotiations with

other Community countries grew and the internal economic and political

strains began to bite from then on British optimism began to decline.

I referred to the fact that there had been a growth in desire to maintain

the status quo by 1978, particularly amongst British men, and disappoint-

ment over hopes apparent in spite of people declaring themselves fairly

happy and generally satisfied with life. By 1978 Britain was involved

in several disputes with Community members and it was difficult to

see how people could be expected to maintain a positive outlook especially

as they had decided to remain in the Community for economic reasons

and benefits they did not feel were being realised. Perhaps one should

divide British attitudes into two periods, 1975-1977 and 1977-1980?

Was the latter period a time when the British decided the honeymoon

with the Community was finally over and that they had begun to feel

that they had been short-changed? One must remember that 1977 was

also the year in which the transitional period of membership finally

ended and Britain became a full member of the Community customs union.

From then on the situation politically could not be the same and it

was unfortunate that the years which followed were torn with internal

strife as well as inter-Community wrangles. The international scene

was also very difficult with the economic crisis growing globally;

it was therefore far easier to absorb the pessimistic picture which

many British politicians were painting. And yet, notwithstanding the

fluctuating levels of support for Community membership, in 1976 the

Community was seen as being important in terms of their children's

future and support for Community membership was higher when viewed

in terms of in ten to fifteen years' time in 1977 and 1978. Perhaps

despite the grumbles the world outside which had looked a little cold

in 1975 was looking distinctly colder and that despite all the

difficulties, no-one really wanted a more insecure life.

It was certainly not possible to claim that the Germans were

very enthusiastic in their expectations of future living standards.

In 1975, 66% also believed that the general situation had deteriorated

compared with four or five years earlier although perhaps less vigorously

than the British, and slightly fewer, 57%, two years later, compared

to the British expected living standards to improve. They were not

exactly optimistic either as 55% of German citizens in 1980 believed

only that living standards were static.[10] The Germans, as I indicated

earlier, were worried about the cost of living and also the effect

of the growing economic difficulties on their economy. They were not

prepared to be Europe's sole banker, and significantly, in spite of

being supportive of Community membership they had experienced a sudden

drop to under 50% in support for membership in 1976. The inter-Community

wrangles and the economic uncertainty of the 1970s were clearly making even the wealthy German nation feel uncomfortable as, for the first time perhaps since the founding of the Community, there was a slow-down in economic growth amongst the member States.

Germany tended to favour the status quo in socio-political attitudes and perhaps there was beginning to be a crisis of confidence over the future amongst German people? Both nations had already emitted signs of instrumentalism and the Germans were becoming more inward-looking when it came to the benefits of membership, in the sense that they were worrying about the threat to their prosperity and way of life. The unease in both nations was also reflected by surveys made in 1980 into their expectations for 1981. It was not an optimistic picture as most British and German people expected 1981 to be a troubled year. Whereas 48% of Germans thought that 1981 would be about the same for themselves personally, 48% of British people expected things to be worse, but a third of the British people did expect a better year in contrast to 8% of Germans. However, whereas the British were divided over whether they expected an increase in strikes and disputes, the Germans did not expect any change in their good industrial relations.[11]

As I have reiterated, both nations assessed themselves to be fairly happy with life throughout the five years being analysed in the thesis although as I have demonstrated, this basic happiness did mask many anxieties in both nations. It was also a fact that it was not just international problems which were influencing attitudes, more personal factors were also playing a part. But it was growing harder to push to one side the possible effects of internal domestic factors on attitudes to further European integration and Community membership. Growing conservatism and an element of protectionism was apparent as wrangles between the member States occurred. I noted that it was not

just the British who were anxious about their standard of living but was there any significant difference in how well off each nation assessed itself to be?

In 1975 according to a Eurobarometer survey, both nations had different priorities when assessing which was the most important personal problem, the Germans worrying mostly about personal or family problems, the British about prices, wages and the family budget,[12] and a 1976 survey revealed that for Germany unemployment was the major priority and for Britain it was inflation.[13] This is interesting as Germany did not have a major problem over unemployment yet was worried. In Britain one could see the effects of the economic crisis on attitudes and linked to this was a survey made in 1975 which revealed that both British and Germans alike were complaining that prices had risen more quickly in relation to incomes[14] and a 1976 survey saw more Germans and British alike assess themselves to be on the half-way point of a poor-rich scale although a quarter of British people believed that they were poor in contrast to 28% of Germans assessing themselves as well-off.[15] Perhaps everything is relative but it was curious that a relatively rich nation should be so worried about its standard of living whereas it would not be surprising if Britain after years of economic decline and no signs apparent of expected benefits of Community membership should show discontent. Earlier in the thesis I made the point that perhaps the Germans were basically more pessimistic in their nature than were the British and therefore less likely to be disappointed as their expectations were lower. But on the contrary one began to wonder if the Germans after years of few economic difficulties were more inclined to feel threatened by small changes in their way of life than were the British who had not actually grasped the straw of Community membership out of a sense of great purpose rather more out of a feeling of "What else was there?"

Taylor noted the perceived effects of membership in British eyes after the initial period of optimism of 1975. He states that as the condition of the British economy declined, the British became more critical of the Communities which were perceived to be the culprit. The failure of membership to generate tangible returns was a decisive factor and there was a lack of a sense that membership was bound up with grand principles such as commitment to a common destiny which would have countered the disappointment.[16]

The years 1976 to 1977 saw a negative balance in relations between Britain and the Community; there were the problems over the Common Agricultural POlicy and, according to Dalton and Hall, continuing conflicts between the British fishing industry and Community policy makers.[17] Early in 1978 there was negative news about the Community's impact on commerce and industry and 1978 also saw the negotiations on the European Monetary System. There were disagreements on the economic front which according to Taylor affected perceptions of how the E.M.S. would be managed. The British disagreed with the Germans about the adoption of an economic strategy to stimulate growth, believing that Germany and other stronger economies should take a lead in reflating their economies.[18] Clearly the situation in Britain and its political relationship with the Community, in particular the negative impression given to the public by the British Governments of the 1970s could not enhance the public's opinion of Community membership. The new Conservative Government of Mrs. Thatcher had inherited a number of pressures and expectations about the adjustment of Britain's contribution to the Communities Budget. The previous Labour Government had taken the line that it was an important matter and this attitude was to be found in the informed media and in the administration.[19] I shall be considering public attitudes to the Press

and to information on the Communities in the thesis at a later stage
but one cannot escape the possibility of a linkage between the negative
impressions being given of the benefits of Community membership by
politicians and, perhaps too, by the British Media and the rapid
decline in Community support amongst the British public. Perhaps
Germany too in 1976 was subject to negative impressions of Community
developments which were having a distinct effect on public attitudes
towards the Community. The difficulties over the economic negotiations
could not have been enhanced by the fact that as Taylor noted the
Germany of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was more 'nationalist' and prone
to stress short-term interests in Europe than that of his predecessor
Willy Brandt.[20]

I have been discussing the attitudes in Germany and Britain in
terms of a dimension of instrumentalism on the part of the general
public and perhaps one could argue that such instrumentalism as did
exist was encouraged by the attitudes of the political elite. The
Germans clearly were more supportive of the Community than were the
British whose opinion, according to Dalton and Duval, is characterised
by considerable negativism and temporal change. They state that
"the public mood apparently responds to changes in the foreign policy
environment, (- accession, the Referendum, Community policy outputs -)".[21]
But one does detect some similarity in the attitudes of both the Germans
and the British, particularly as I have pointed out where there is
some expectation of national action by them which would have an effect
on their lives. The political situation in the latter 1970s was
apparently not conducive to encouraging Community spirit.

Bearing these findings in mind I would like to briefly compare
a set of general attitudes, that of the German and British long-term
social priorities for their countries which perhaps demonstrate and

Table 3

Aggregate of First/Second Choices: Placed in Order of Priority

Germany		Germany	
1977		**1980**	
Fighting rising prices	(65%)	Maintaining order in the nation	(73%)
Maintenance of law and order	(57%)	Fighting rising prices	(65%)
Giving people more say in Government decisions	(33%)	Giving the people more say in important Government Decisions	(34%)
Protecting freedom of expression	(27%)	Protecting freedom of speech	(28%)
Britain		**Britain**	
1977		**1980**	
Fighting rising prices	(71%)	Fighting rising prices	(67%)
Maintenance of law and order	(64%)	Maintaining order in the nation	(55%)
Giving the people more say in Government decisions	(33%)	Giving the people more say in important Government decisions	(48%)
Protecting freedom of expression	(27%)	Protecting freedom of speech	(30%)

explain apparent attitudinal priorities in relation to Community issues
and problems. European Commission sponsored opinion polls in 1977 and
1980 revealed slight but subtle differences in opinion in the two
nations (see Table 3).[22]

In both nations the issue of prices and therefore, presumably,
the cost of living, was of considerable importance although one must
also acknowledge that over the years, although prices remained top
priority for the British there was a slight fall in the number of
people citing the issue. There were two fundamental changes in both
nations over the years. In Germany, Maintenance of Law and Order had
become top priority, possibly reflecting internal security problems
of terrorism and also the somewhat less stable situation in the
Government whereas in Britain although there was no change in the
order of priorities there was quite a striking increase amongst those
citing Giving the People more say in Government Decisions, with
Maintenance of Law and Order declining as a priority. The British
had undergone a very stressful time in the late 1970s, (I.M.F. Loan;
Winter of Discontent), but perhaps with the election of a new
Conservative Government, (on a Law and Order ticket), a mood of greater
stability was prevailing in Britain in contrast to her Community
colleague.

One might expect to see the repercussions of these attitudes
appearing with relation to Community issues, for instance a feeling
of a lack of internal stability might have led German people to have
a less secure outlook and a desire for greater security and stronger
ties within the Community itself. Having detected signs of instrumentalism
on the part of both Germany and Britain I should now like to elaborate
on this theme somewhat further by discussing the willingness of both
nations to accept some aspect of sacrifice in the cause of the Community

and fellow Community colleagues. How much, one wonders, was a professed

desire to help the poorer nations mere lip-service or was there a

genuine Community spirit prevailing? The European Commission

sponsored opinion polls posed the question of willingness to make a

personal sacrifice, firstly in 1976 when the public was asked whether

if a member nation was in major economic difficulties the other members

should help it. This received complete support in both nations, (over

70%) but as time progressed both countries backed the idea but there

was a decline in 1978 in Germany to 63%, (70% in Britain) perhaps

reflecting Community difficulties and Germany's own role.[23]

Germany was after all the major contributor to the Community

budget and perhaps there was a growing fear that as the economic climate

slowly deteriorated it would be she who would have to make a sacrifice

and not other nations. The British, in view of the fact that they

sought and expected Community help with their financial problems, may

have believed that it could be their country which might be in the

position of needing help and therefore favoured Community assistance

to an afflicted member. It was a clear case of contrasting self-

interest.

In discussing socio-political attitudes I drew out the fact that

it was the British who complained more that they had not achieved

their hopes (in 1978) with an emerging tendency towards self-interest

in social attitudes. It did become clear, however, that the relative

conservatism in socio-political attitudes in both nations was being

rapidly translated into determination to protect the individual country

and therefore its own personal way of life. In spite of criticism

of Britain that she was obsessed with 'Her Money' (viz. the Budget

negotiations) it had to be said that the Germans too appeared to display

a protective tendency when the possibility that Germany might have

to foot a large bill on behalf of a weaker member was envisaged.
There were internal disagreements over Community issues in the 1970s
in the German Government as well as the British Government in addition
to inter-Community wrangles over, for example, the Budget. When one
looks at attitudes to the Community throughout this period (and to
socio-political factors) one cannot help notice the linkage between
the negativeness of the situation and the general and growing dis-
satisfaction in Britain. An I.T.N. Opinion Poll in 1979 also
demonstrated the unwillingness on the part of the British to also
act as some sort of Community benefactor. According to I.T.N. findings,
Mrs. Thatcher had majority support in Britain for her proposal that
Britain should pay no more into the Community than she got out and
that most people would have been satisfied with a substantial reduction
in membership costs.[24]

The picture which appeared to be emerging was one of two nations
who increasingly viewed the Community out of eyes of self-interest and
with socio-political attitudes which had become or remained fairly
traditional. But of course this is an over-simplified summary of
a complicated situation. It would be fair to say that strong strands
of similarity in attitudes were evident but it has to be seen whether
these similarities translated into more specific areas such as
European integration. I pointed out earlier that when the Community
was viewed on a long-term basis, attitudes in Britain grew distinctly
more favourable than when the Community was considered in the short-
term. This was exemplified by a question posed in 1976 into how
important the Community was considered for the future of one's children.
The British, more than any other member country, considered the
Community as being important, the Germans meriting seventh position

(in spite of a 71% response). As only 32% of the Germans, in comparison
with 55% of the British actually rated the Community as very important
for their children's future, it shook the automatic assumption that
the British were biased entirely against the Community.[25]

The Germans had not turned out to be progressive in their socio-
political attitudes and perhaps the arguments of the mid- to -late
1970s were not encouraging them to have an open outlook. Like the
British they had revealed a degree of small-mindedness and it leads
me to question whether the almost continuous support for Community
membership was based on a need for security and not pragmatic idealism.
After over twenty years of membership it would be hard to contemplate
anything else particularly as there was little likelihood of German
reunification, therefore the economic uncertainties were not something
which the Germans could easily shrug off. Although they themselves
were not experiencing the worst of the Recession, perhaps memories
of an earlier 20th Century recession were undermining their confidence.
Only in certain matters specific to Germany such as the industrial
relations climate were they able to display a greater degree of
confidence than the British.

These findings were even more evident in a 1980 Eurobarometer
survey which revealed that the British felt things were going fairly
well for themselves and their spouses whereas Germans were divided
between responding "fairly well" (47%) and "neither well nor badly"
(44%).[26] Matters were no clearer over the ability to make ends meet
as most British people felt that they could just about make ends meet
(with 27% also responding they could make ends meet easily). The
Germans though were divided, 37% believing they could make ends meet
easily and 39% that they could just about manage.[27] Germans appeared
to differ in their view of Germany compared to other countries who

believed she was a rich nation with no need to worry and one could

well imagine that with such an apparently poor assessment of their

situation the Germans would not welcome further integration without

many qualms , especially in the long-term. It was also doubtful if

Germans would feel obliged to help another member country in the

cause of integration, particularly if they believed Germany might

lose out economically. Quite a few Germans had expressed doubts at

making a sacrifice and Morgan pointed out that Germany looked at

integration in terms of possible future prosperity for Germany with

limits to the price she would pay.[28] Where then was the sense of

Community spirit?

One might expect the British with their misgivings about

Community membership to be concerned about internal domestic issues

and clearly the domestic misgivings and lack of support for membership

were part of a general feeling of not gaining, the signs of general

disillusionment having become apparent shortly after the Referendum.

The Germans, however, were held to be European idealists; surely they

ought not to have been so concerned with the domestic situation as

they were? Germans had been happy with the benefits of Community

membership for years but perhaps their reaction to Community

difficulties was a growing sense of hanging on to what they had

gained and not being charitable. A further point which I made no

mention of was that the Community was established in the 1950s as an

economic Community for the enhancement of living standards of the

member nations. A political Community was a far-off goal. There

were major benefits for over twenty years and therefore it is not

irrelevant to consider feelings of well-being or satisfaction of life

for the Community had been expected to enhance these. It became

reasonable to assume that for a member State to have grievances that

the future seemed bleaker and things were not going well would have

direct repercussions on feelings towards the Community itself.

Rabier and Inglehart stated that the Community publics did
seem to attribute prevailing economic conditions to their Community
membership and in Britain's case there was a direct link revealed by
the drop in support for the Community.[29] The Germans displayed it
indirectly through their unwillingness to make sacrifices though
being good Community supporters. In their arguments with fellow
members they seemed to be seeking to protect their own interests
through policies and strategies which would enhance or maintain
Germany. The Germans and the British had different roles in the
Community and different experiences on becoming members. They were
not so different in their socio-political and general attitudes however.
The early implications in terms of attachment to Nation-state did not
seem to reveal great German desire to submerge their culture in order
to become 'European'. A country which felt a desire to maintain its
standard of living and not make sacrifices was not displaying idealistic
tendencies of 'Community Spirit'. In Community terms the British were
not known either for displaying such a spirit. According to Marquand,
movements in a supra-national direction would not be popular in
Britain and he pointed out that British politicians, when opposing
further integration, tended to think in terms of Britain and not the
Community. However, although the Germans may have been more Community
minded than the British, the degree to which they supported integration
was uncertain.[30]

Slater, in discussing the Community in general, drew attention
to integrationist arguments that although a high level of goodwill
towards a united Europe existed amongst the publics of the member
nations, the degree of positive commitment was suspect. The public
appeared to favour European integration in the same way that they

favoured peace; both are desirable goals but the full implications

and costs of attaining a goal of European unification were left

unconsidered and when considered may be found to be less than

acceptable.[31] Surveys in 1975 and 1976 into the problems the

Community was facing, I revealed, showed that there was support in

both nations for unspecific concepts such as helping the poor but that

support teetered when actual direct action might be required. Slater

pointed out that although a majority of Europeans felt a fellow member

State should be helped by the others if in severe economic difficulty,

only a minority were willing, and least of all the Germans (and Italians),

to make such a commitment if it involved personal sacrifice.[32] According

to Inglehart, British support for European integration was far higher

than their utilitarian assessment which perhaps explained the British

tendency to become more positive about the Community when considering

it in general terms in spite of their low assessment of membership.[33]

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Chapter 4

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: ATTACHMENT TO
EXISTING INSTITUTIONS, TRUST

I shall now turn directly to the question of attitudes

to European integration and expansion of the Community whilst also

bringing into focus such background factors as attachment to existing

national institutions and trust in other member nations. These

factors, especially those pertaining to national institutions are

important for the very idea of European integration brings into

question the vexed idea of the Community as a political entity not

just an economic structure. In Britain the question of the Community

in political terms had raised severe doubts and worries over British

sovereignty. The issue had figured prominently in the 1975 Referendum

campaign and was one of the bugbears of the British Labour Party and

of many on the right and centre of the political spectrum also. It

was an issue which coloured British political attitudes throughout

the 1970s thus encouraging the public tendency to volatility.

I shall first consider the issue of trust in other nations as

I believe that this may have a direct link with attitudes to the

Community in general and to expansion of the Community, taking into

consideration previous analysis of attitudes both specific and general.

This will then lead into a consideration of European integration

whereupon I shall draw into the analysis attitudes to the Nation-

state and national institutions. Before embarking on either question

I would now like to briefly analyse the findings of a later 1978

Eurobarometer opinion poll which considered various attitudes of

the public's hopes and fears about the Community prior to the 1979

European Election campaign.[1] Table 4 follow:-

TABLE 4

	Britain	Germany
The fact that we are part of the Community is the best guarantee of political and economic stability:	52% Agree	67% Agree
	39% Disagree	18% Disagree
In the Common Market a country like ours runs a risk of losing its own culture and individuality:	57% Agree	27% Agree
	36% Disagree	58% Disagree
The member countries of the E.E.C. should go much further than they have so far towards economic and political union in Europe:	53% Agree	70% Agree
	29% Disagree	15% Disagree
Whatever agreements or alliances [...] with other countries, national independence should be the overriding consideration:	71% Agree	57% Agree
	18% Disagree	29% Disagree

These findings proved to be a barometer of public opinion in the two nations as the major tendencies were clearly brought out; nationalism, need for security, support for national cultural values, (the British especially). What was quite striking was the German desire for national independence, albeit not as strong as the British desire, but certainly giving credence to Taylor's view of a nationalistic Germany under Chancellor Schmidt. Eurobarometer opinion polls in 1980 had revealed the degree of uncertainty of the future which had developed in both Germany and Britain and as I stated earlier, the world outside of the Community appeared cold which was one reason for the 1975 Referendum decision. The British might not have liked the Community, grumbled incessantly about lack of benefit from membership, but had not moved from the 1975 position querying what alternative to the Community there was. The relationship with the Commonwealth was in decline and there was a need for another market for British goods which was vital in a world of economic uncertainty.

I pointed out in discussing socio-political attitudes that the British appeared to express a greater tendency to cling to traditional values as time progressed. Perhaps the survey findings revealed a desire for continuity not change. The survey demonstrated once again the depth to which either country would go to establish European integration for, although both appeared to accept the idea in principle, one could quite clearly see that the Nation-state per-se had not become an irrelevance although, possibly due to their long-standing experience of membership of the Community the Germans were unworried about the effects of membership on the national culture. However, before considering European integration as such I shall assess attitudes to the other member nations. Had a basic understanding developed after several years' membership? Or rather were any age-

old prejudices evident? Trust between nations would be naturally

important if an entity such as the Community sought to develop or

expand.

It would not be unreasonable to assume that a country which

might persist in a long-standing dislike of a particular nation

might not express whole-hearted willingness to cooperate with that

nation. A 1980 Eurobarometer survey looked at the question of

trust in others and included the newest recruit to the Community,

the Greeks.[2] Table 5 follows below:

Table 5

Trust in Others: The Peoples of the Community and the Greeks

in descending order)

Trusted: (percentages in brackets)

Germany		Britain	
Danes	(70%)	Dutch	(71%)
Luxembourgers	(68%)	Danes	(66%)
Dutch	(68%)	Germans	(60%)
French	(67%)	Belgians	(55%)
British	(65%)	Irish	(51%)
Belgians	(63%)	Luxembourgers	(49%)
Irish	(54%)	Italians	(39%)
Greeks	(40%)	Greeks	(37%)
Italians	(29%)	French	(32%)

One cannot help perhaps reflect at first glance that it would

be hard to discount the fact that age-old prejudices continued to surface,

one very clear example being that of the few British people who

displayed trust in the French; secondly the tendency of neither

country to cite a 'Latin' country in a top three position.

The Germans, possibly due to their long-standing ties and cooperation, post-war, did, in contrast to the British, trust the French very highly. But certainly neither the Italians nor the Greeks secured positions of trust. Age-old loyalties played their part, the Germans trusted the Danes most of all, the British citing the Dutch perhaps due to history and trade. One interesting point was that although they were not placed in identical positions in the lists, almost the same percentage of British people trusted the Germans as did the Germans trust the British.

So what is the point which could be drawn from this survey? Certainly it was clear that possibly neighbourhoodness and history had much to do with trust, the Germans clearly responding more to their immediate neighbours and the British, too, to countries with whom they had long-standing ties, such as the Danes, Dutch and the Irish. It also became clear that membership of the Community alone would not break down barriers which might enhance integration as could clearly be seen in the case of Germany.

Twitchett, in discussing British attitudes to Europe pointed out that the British still considered Britain as being 'in' but not 'with' Community Europe, referring to the historical legacy of separation from continental Europe both geographically and via a deliberate policy of isolation. The peoples of continental Europe were seen as 'foreigners' of a wholly different order to the peoples of old, white Commonwealth countries.[3] Roger Morgan made the point that there were some transient German reservations towards the impending new member countries; (Spain and Portugal), which they had also displayed over Britain, France and Italy but these had involved Christian Democrat fears of left-wing forces in these countries and their possible intervention in the Community (the Christian Democrats being fundamentally supported by

conservatives and Catholics, thus demonstrating my point of a link
between religion and political and social attitudes).[4]

Having considered basic attitudes to trust, I would now like
to consider a survey made in 1976 which raised the question of whether
there were any member nations which they preferred to see leave the
Community. 1976 was the year in which German support for the Community
dipped below 50% and in spite of expressing doubts over membership,
the British had assessed the Community as important for the future
of their children but both had had their doubts over the benefits of
Community membership on prices though they had differed as to the
benefit of membership on the individual nation's economy. It was
therefore striking that it was the British who responded highly that
they had no desire for any country to leave (70%). The German response
was distinctly lower (57%). When considered in detail the findings
provided clear signs of disgruntlement on the part of quite a few
Germans as was shown by Table 6:[5]

Table 6

Countries which Interviewees would like to see leave the Community

in descending order)

(None: 70% Britain; 57% Germany)

Germany		Britain	
Italy	(26%)	Britain	
United Kingdom	(19%)	Italy	(9%)
France	(10%)		
Ireland	(9%)	Ireland	
		France	(7%)
Belgium	(2%)		
		Germany	(3%)
Luxembourg			
Netherlands	(1%)	Belgium	
Denmark		Luxembourg	(1%)
Germany		Netherlands	
		Denmark	

The most striking finding also appears to correlate with the
findings on trust. Italy, the least trusted nation in 1980, was the
country which four years earlier in 1976, slightly more than a quarter
of Germans would have liked to have seen leave the Community: in fact
it was the one country which both nations were very unhappy about.
Britain too was high on the list although by 1980 the Germans were
very trustful of the British. Certainly more people in Germany were
expressing dissatisfaction with other member countries than were the
British. If one ignores the percentages as such and considers the
list in terms of the descending order of nations selected it is
interesting that both Britain and Germany named France, (and also
Ireland) high on the list. Countries which were trusted in 1980 such
as Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, earned minimal support for
the idea of their leaving the Community in 1976. Perhaps one of
the reasons for the low support amongst the British for countries to
leave was that they feared being left in a Community in which they
had no 'natural' allies: one must recall that it was the Dutch who
had sought to bring Britain into the Community in the 1960s and German
opinion for a long time had favoured British membership of the Community
although perhaps the 19% who wanted them to leave were reacting to
the behaviour of the British since becoming members. Clearly by
1980 Germans had fewer qualms about the British themselves. It might
be interesting to note that according to a survey undertaken in 1980
which looked at the European's trust in other Community members both
the British and Germans enjoyed a similar level of trust by their
fellow Europeans; in the League Table the British enjoyed sixth position
and the Germans, fifth. Table 7 below reveals precisely the actual
level of trust:[6]

Table 6

Europeans' Trust in Other Europeans in 1980

	Very Trustworthy	Fairly Trustworthy	Not Particularly Trustworthy	Not at all Trustworthy	No Reply
Germans	20%	49%	19%	12%	11%
British	14%	52%	25%	9%	10%

As one could see there was very little difference in the level of trust that the British and Germans enjoyed and possibly the figures might have been a factor in the fairly positive outlook of the British towards the idea of political union in Europe. Possibly the fact that they were not seen as the 'scourge of Europe' might have played some part in shaking the British age-old suspiciousness of foreigners and encouraged them in expressing trust in their Community compatriots. Certainly their views had not differed too substantially from the Germans in their mistrust of 'Latin' members of Community Europe, (apart from the French). Perhaps they realised that they shared similar opinions as other members in their mistrust of the French and Italians and Greeks, these three nations being placed in the bottom three of the League Table with the Italians at the very bottom. In the 1978 Hopes and Fears Eurobarometer survey the British had been supportive of the idea that the fact that they were part of the Community was the best guarantee of economic and political stability giving credence to the idea of the British need for security, a need exacerbated by the rocky economic climate of the 1970s. Possibly by 1980 the fact that they were, in spite of all the difficulties, seen as a nation to be trusted, encouraged them to trust others and to support European unification in spite of misgivings over the national identity within Europe.

Turning to the question of Community expansion, a 1980 Euro-barometer survey into attitudes to Greek entry, (between 1977 and 1980), revealed an indifferent, (neither good nor bad), response on the part of from 34% up to 43% of the British, with only just over a fifth believing Greek entry was good. The Germans were more positive, 41%/43% (and in April 1980, 46%) believing Greek entry was good, though around a third offered an indifferent response.[7]

A further survey made in 1980 looked, however, at attitudes to trust in the Spanish and Portuguese compared to trust in the Greeks and found in fact that there was great unease in both nations and a high level of mistrust in all three. Table 7 below offers a clear indication of the findings:[8]

Table 7

		Britain	
	Trust	Mistrust	Don't Know
Spanish	34%	41%	25%
Portuguese	35%	21%	44%
Greeks	37%	28%	35%

		Britain	
	Trust	Mistrust	Don't Know
Spanish	43%	48%	9%
Portuguese	33%	52%	15%
Greeks	40%	48%	12%

The Germans, in spite of being quite supportive of Greek entry into the Community were very mistrustful of the Greeks, slightly more so than they mistrusted the Spanish: the least trusted nation was clearly the Portuguese. The British gave a very high 'Don't Know'

response, especially when asked about the Portuguese. The British

responses tended, as a result, to be less clear-cut. The Spanish,

for example, elicited the lowest 'Don't Know' response and were trusted

least by the British. This is especially interesting for the British

still selected Spain as their most popular choice of tourist area and

yet they appeared not to have much trust in the people. Knowledge

of the Greeks and Portuguese was distinctly lower and there did appear

to be a more trustful than mistrustful stance. But certainly there

was no significant degree of trust in either Britain or Germany for

any of the three nations.

I would like to point out at this stage that there was a contrast

between the governmental outlook and public opinion. Both Governments

favoured the Mediterranean expansion of the Community on political

and strategic grounds. It was doubtful if the public shared this

view. Linked to these surveys were surveys made in Autumn 1977 and

1978 which assessed attitudes specifically to Spanish membership and

both nations increasingly over the years expressed the view that

Spanish membership was neither good nor bad for their own country.

The Germans did feel initially that Spanish membership would be good

but were becoming more doubtful about this as time went on, (down to

37% from 48%). The British response was lower with 24% down from

31% believing Spanish entry would be good. In 1978 both nations,

however, believed that Spanish entry would be most beneficial of all

to Spain herself, (72% of Germans and 61% of British people).[9] A

1980 Eurobarometer survey revealed that in fact over the preceding

ten to fifteen years few people had actually visited either Greece,

Spain or Portugal, (66% in Britain and 59% in Germany responding that

they had not). Amongst those who had, Spain was the most visited,

(26% of the British, 29% of the Germans), and only 10% in either

country had visited Greece and about 5%, Portugal.[10] When it came

to the ability to actually name the three countries which had asked

to join the Community, the Germans appeared better informed with 51%

being able to name Spain, 49% Greece and 39% Portugal but 39% responded

'Don't Know'. In Britain 55% of people gave a 'Don't Know' response

and of those who were able to name a country, 37% could name Spain,

21% Greece, and only 16% Portugal.[11]

In spite of lack of first-hand knowledge of the three countries,

both Britain and Germany expressed attitudes to these three Latin

countries which appeared to differ little from views expressed of Italy,

(and of France by Britain). Gertainly they did not trust them even

if in Germany there was slightly higher support for their entry. This

apparent reserve towards 'Latin' nations did not suggest that the

likelihood of European expansion and integration would be a whole-

hearted phenomenon and nor did there appear to be signs of willingness

to submerge personal inherent attitudes for the good of the Community.

The three nations were agriculturally based and as both Germany and

Britain were the major contributors to the Community Budget and therefore

to the Common Agriculture Policy it might be fair to argue that

economics were again playing a part in shaping attitudes, for it could

well be that these countries might require help and neither country,

and the Germans especially, had expressed complete willingness to help

a member nation in difficulty or make a sacrifice to help them. It

was doubtful if vague theories such as helping the rich and poor

were to be turned from theory to reality the same degree of support

for them would exist and as I have noted public opinion did not share

the opinion of their Governments towards Mediterranean expansion.

The British were already critical of the money they had to give

to the Community and, as Morgan said, the Germans saw the inclusion

of the three nations as enhancing Germany's and the Community's

prosperity but there were limits to the price they would pay for such

expansion.[12] The clear high level of mistrust expressed would not

translate easily into idealistic desire for unifying Europe once it

came to a discussion of the actual way in which they might be achieved,

and as could be seen, years of economic uncertainty were not providing

the ideal framework for grand principles to come to fruition, bringing

with them growing desire for self-protection, (in the economic sphere),

and less liberalism coupled with maintenance of traditional values,

(in the socio-political sphere). Eurobarometer opinion polls into

attitudes to European integration between 1975 and 1980 revealed that

in Germany and Britain there was support for the idea of European

unification with percentages of between 74% and 82% in Germany (highest

support occurring in 1979) and between 50% and 63% in Britain, (highest

support in 1978 and late 1980), thus confirming Slater's opinion that

a reservoir of public support for unification existed in Europe and

also that there existed higher levels of support for the more general

goal of European unification compared to support for Community member-

ship.[13] The depth of support for unification was questionable and

certainly when people were asked specifically, (between 1975 and 1979)

to state their opinion on the rate of European integration, the situation

was less clear cut. The Germans either favoured speeding up the movement

towards unification, (between 35% and 47%), or wanted it to continue

at the present rate, (between 34% and 46%). In Britain the response

was more in favour of unification continuing at the present rate, (between

42% and 52%) although between 23% and 28%, (19% in early 1979), favoured

unification speeding up. More British people also wanted unification

to slow down.[14]

A 1975 European Commission sponsored opinion poll compared age

and sex responses in 1975 to unification. British responses in favour

of unification were lower and also strikingly, the lowest response

in favour of unification came from young British people, the older

age groups being more in favour. In Germany, older men proved to be

most supportive, (most supportive of everyone in fact), older German

women being less supportive. The young in Germany, unlike the British

youth, were also highly in favour of unification as were the mid-aged.[15]

Perhaps the greater support among older Germans for unification, (compared

to Britain) was explained, as Noelle-Neumann said, by the fact that

> ...after the horrors of the Hitler period and the 1945
> collapse, the European idea was something like a refuge
> for many Germans, a compensation for their own lost
> national consciousness.[16]

I will discuss education later in the thesis but it is worth noting

that those with highest education in Britain were more supportive of

unification, support increasing with the level of education attained.

In Germany this was the case too, but support was high amongst all

levels of education.

Slater's questioning of the commitment to European unification

was also raised by other political researchers. Opinion research

certainly gave credence to the theory that the British especially

were most critical of the Community. Marquand stated that the

British seemed to be less enthusiastic about belonging to the

Community than any other people.[17] Twitchett argued that whatever

the pros and cons there was considerable evidence to suggest that

despite seven years or so of membership the majority of Britons

did not accept the logic of Community membership.[18] But although

Dalton and Duval also added that the British had been critical of

European integration and that they could not assume that a reservoir

of diffuse support existed in Britain to sustain the Community through

the next steps in the integration process, they did go on to make the

point that the Community itself had undergone a crisis of support

amongst the European mass publics.[19]

Noelle-Neumann commented that the German population assessed the

Community's economic consequences differently, German surveys revealing

that the prevailing answers to questions posed on Community membership

in 1977 and 1978 were that German membership in the Community presented

more of a disadvantage than an advantage compared to 1975 when member-

ship was seen as advantageous. She also uncovered a rising tide of

conservatism in Germany which I detected in the responses to socio-

political questions and which one might reasonably assume was the

consequence of growing difficulties in the Community and in the World

itself in the 1970s.[20] The linkage between attitudes to the home

situation and subsequent worry over the economic and security situation

with attitudes to the Community was unavoidable.

An I.T.N./O.R.C.opinion poll undertaken in June 1979, just after

the European Elections possibly demonstrated well the conflict in

British opinion between desire to pull out of the Community with the

clear need for security overshadowed by a self-centred protection of

British interests. Whilst more people (47%) declared themselves

opposed to Britain being a member of the Community, (with 40% in

favour), when asked if Britain's future interests would be better

served by staying in the Community or by getting out, over 50% of

voters believed that Britain's best interests would be served by

staying in.[21] I shall compare the attitudes in both nations to the

home Parliament and the European Parliament by analysis of Euro-

barometer data but perhaps the results of a question also posed

by I.T.N./O.R.C. offered a glimpse of the attitudes which abounded

in Britain. Firstly there appeared to be either an element of lack

of knowledge or lack of interest for, when asked about what the power

of the European Parliament should be, the response was divided

almost equally between those who believed the parliament should have

more power (34%) and less (33%) with 33% responding that they did not

know. However, convictions were clearly very firm when it came to

what was expected of the European M.P.s themselves and here the self-interest rose cleanly to the surface for a convincing 64% believed that the European M.P.s should be more concerned with protecting Britain's interests, not working for the Community's future.[22] These findings did appear to corroborate the findings of the 1978 Euro-barometer survey into hopes and fears about the Community which revealed a desire for security in Britain but also desire for the protection of their own-interest. Although the I.T.N./O.R.C. opinion poll did not include the people of Northern Ireland it was evident that when their views were also taken into account jointly with the views of people on the British mainland it was clear that these attitudes were basically common to all.

I referred earlier in the thesis to the findings of another survey undertaken in 1979 by I.T.N./O.R.C. which revealed that the British concurred with Mrs. Thatcher's viewpoint that Britain should pay no more into the Community than she got out. Certainly throughout 1979 although people were unhappy over membership they appeared not to be desirous of provoking a situation where Britain might actually get fed up and declare she was leaving the Community. Ultimately they appeared willing to accept a compromise providing the compromise resulted in Britain gaining something for 53% of those questioned believed that Britain should settle for the European proposal that Britain's net cost of belonging to the Community should be reduced by a third.[23] Perhaps the true underlying attitude was demonstrated by the fact that although by November, 40% said Britain ought to pull out of the Community if she did not get what she wanted, a joint total of 44% believed that if the situation arose, Britain should either continue but press for further reductions or, most revealingly, allow the Community to operate but with some British obstruction.[24] Perhaps this, more than anything, sums up British attitudes to cooperation

with other European nations and perhaps was an indicator of possible

future British attitudes which would prevail when European integration

was to become a reality and not just a future proposal. I had already

disclosed that there was a significant difference in attitudes when

integration was merely a theory and when it was considered in specific

terms. I shall make a brief analysis of the 1975 British Referendum

separately but one thing which has a bearing on attitudes to integration

was the fact that in the Referendum the British did vote overwhelmingly

in favour of retaining membership when given a choice, that they had

accepted retention of membership after the terms of British entry

had been renegotiated which perhaps indicated that the British preferred

compromise to an uncertain future. British opinion was very volatile

as has been shown, Butler pointing out that British attitudes to Europe

were extraordinarily fickle with a few consistent Euro-enthusiasts

and a few consistent Empire men and Little Englanders.[25] Marquand

suggested that if another Referendum were held on monetary union or

a strong Community industrial or environmental policy with arguments

for and against openly deployed as they were over membership of the

Community, then the outcome might well be that of 1975.[26]

Butler also suggested that if a further Referendum were held,

pro-Marketeers could probably rely on the forces which worked in 1975.

In spite of the evidence of the 1978-1979 opinion polls which suggested

a majority of voters regretted membership which was leading to

commentators suggesting a scenario of the country withdrawing from

the Community, few people suggested that such a step could be taken

without a Referendum.[27] Judging by the British concentration on

self-interest and desire for security which appeared to dominate

their attitudes whilst being a Community member, the uncertainty of

the outside world did not suggest that the British would happily walk

into an uncertain future. Their viewpoint suggests that basically

they expected measures from the Community which would be of direct help to Britain and it was because these had not been immediately forthcoming that they were disillusioned over membership, not that they had any great desire to 'go it alone'.

Which brings me now to an analysis of the Eurobarometer data which covered attitudes to European integration and also to the Nation-state. I shall then take a look at specific possibilities such as a common currency taking note of the findings of German data and research made by other political scientists. Bearing in mind the growing conservatism in both Britain and Germany and the desire to maintain the status quo in the home parliamentary situation with some divided responses on greater women's participation which revealed traditionalism in both Germany and Britain, I will investigate whether there were indeed great gaps in opinion in both nations when it came to adherence to national institutions. Britain was frequently accused of being too concerned over her sovereignty, but in spite of over twenty years of Community membership were the Germans as truly 'European' as their support for membership might have suggested? A 1976 Eurobarometer survey into the principal policy aspects of European union revealed quite a high degree of accord between the two. It was true that British support was slightly lower than German support, usually around 50% compared to 70% or more for the suggested statements but without doubt the common denominator was national instrumentalism. The Eurobarometer detailed the four main aspects as follows: Common Foreign Policy; Common Economic and Monetary Policy; Common Regional and Social Policy (which would level out differences in favour of less favoured regions and social categories); Common Fundamental Rights (and Laws, allowing each citizen to appeal directly to the European Court of Justice). In both Germany and Britain first and second choice went to Common Fundamental Rights

and Common Foreign Policy, Fundamental Rights eliciting greatest support
(76% in Germany; 62% in Britain).[28]

When one refers back to surveys undertaken in 1975 and 1976 into
attitudes to problems the Community was tackling, it became clear that
a pattern was emerging of support for policies which would benefit
the own country per-se, bearing in mind how each nation pictured
itself; the British seeing themselves as disadvantaged and that they
should be assisted, not pay out; the Germans wanting greater unity
but not at great cost to themselves. As I noted there was support
in 1975 for idealistic principles of helping other countries but a
personal sacrifice to achieve it was not acceptable and nor was it
in order to bring about the unification of Europe. There was a tendency
on the part of the British to view membership of the Community in a
more positive light when it was considered in future vague terms.
The same appeared to be true of attitudes to unification, for whilst
supporting unification in principle, when asked to consider it in terms
of achieving unification by 1980 there was less support, those in favour
amounting to around 34%, those opposed to approximately 40%.[29] Never-
theless although the Germans supported unification being achieved by
1980 they were very divided over the rate of unification. Between
1975 and 1979 there were similar percentages for speeding unification
up and continuing at the present rate.[30]

Before I consider whether both nations shared similar attitudes
to their national parliaments I would like to take cognisance of Eurobarometer
surveys in 1975 into the choice of form of political organisation. Both
nations' primary choice was that of inter-governmental cooperation but
whilst a third or so of the British supported the concept of National
Independence, almost the same percentage of Germans favoured a
European Parliament or Government.[31] Although the British had chosen

to remain in the Community, clearly they were not by any means 'European' in outlook, and the survey also possibly indicated differences in attitudes to the European Parliament itself. But what of their viewpoint on their national parliament? In discussing socio-political attitudes I noted both held firm views over what they expected of their national parliaments and M.P.s.

A 1977 survey revealed that whilst both Germany and Britain regarded the role of their national parliament as important, they had differing views over the future with the British continuing to believe that the national parliament would play an important role and the Germans very divided between those who expected to maintain the status quo and those who believed it had a more important role to play. Neither country, noticeably, expected that their national parliaments were going to play a less important role which did beg the question of how much they would be prepared, either of them, to accept fundamental changes in their national system as they both clearly displayed attachment to the national institution, (however much the Germans may have declared that they wanted cooperation within the context of a European Parliament).[32] Elaborating further, a 1975 Eurobarometer survey posed the direct question of which was the preferred action over a number of issues, that of action by the European Community, or alternatively national independent action. A list is shown below:[33]

* Reducing the differences between the developed and

    less developed regions.

* Fight against rising prices.

* Protection of the natural environment and the struggle

    against pollution.

* Make our presence felt in discussions with the Americans

    or the Russians.

* A policy on energy supplies.

All of these categories received support in both nations for Community action as opposed to national independent action; however German support was higher in every case apart from the reduction of Differences between the regions. At least a third or more in Britain expressed a preference for National action, thus there was a sizeable minority in Britain who did not want European involvement.

The one main conflicting attitude was over action on the modernisation of Agriculture which saw the British favour Community action whereas although the Germans supported it, there was a sizeable minority who wanted National action. Turning briefly to the question of a Community foreign policy which as we have seen was quite acceptable to both nations, a Eurobarometer survey in 1977 offered two options, that of European foreign policy being carried out within the framework of the American Alliance or that Europe should have a foreign policy independent of the United States. Both nations, and especially Britain favoured the latter option.[34] This would seem to give clear credence to the findings of other polls which indicated that the British, in spite of the long-standing 'Special Relationship' between Britain and the United States were not too happy at being too closely linked to the United States. Historically they had enjoyed alliances with European nations as a major European Power. British willingness to submerge her own personal internal security and negotiate agreements for a Community policy was questionable but it did appear that the Community, an economic entity, was not seen as posing a threat to British military interests. The Germans possibly in view of their strategic position with an Eastern Bloc country as an immediate neighbour, supported European relations independent of the U.S.A. with an eye on her security although as I have discussed earlier in the thesis they were divided in 1976 in contrast to the British over the idea of strengthening the military defence capacity against possible enemies

and yet like the British, they believed a common foreign policy was important, Indeed as Herman and Lodge revealed, in analysing the findings of attitudes to a list of possible European Election priority issues in the July 1977 edition of Eurobarometer, defence capacity was of slightly more interest to them than it was to any other member nation and relations with the United States was of greatest interest to them. Without detailing the lists of priorities as such, the main point to be brought out by Herman and Lodge was that the priority issues selected by the respondents reflected national interests, the British for example selecting joint action on economic difficulties as a top priority and in terms of possible subjects for public debate in the European Elections they quoted most frequently the fairer sharing of costs and benefits among member countries and the preservation of national traditions and identity; the Germans as well as seeking more independent relations between the Community and the U.S.A. also were noted for expressing interest in the Community's enlargement though it must also be acknowledged that around 50% of Germans did quote the sharing of benefits and joint economic action; only a third were worried about national identity.[35]

The question of national versus European identity rose to the surface again over the expected party political strategy in the 1979 European Election campaign. The Germans expressed a preference for political parties of the same colour getting together, the trans-national view, whereas the British wanted the national political parties to campaign independently of each other.[36] I shall be discussing the European Elections separately but it is important at this stage in the thesis to draw on some research findings as they offer a good insight into the attitudes of the two nations when confronted with an actual confirmed element in the integration process.

Eurobarometer surveys taken between 1977 and 1979 revealed that
the balance in Germany was tipped in favour of expecting the M.E.P.s
to favour the Community interest whilst over 50% of the British
consistently backed the idea of M.E.P.s following the national interest
when voting.[37] Both nations were in favour of the Election itself
according to surveys made between 1975 and 1978 (with the Germans more
supportive)[38] and both in 1978 believed that the Elections would
lead to a stronger feeling of European citizenship and that they were
an event with important consequences certain to make Europe more
politically unified, although slightly more Germans than British felt
that they were unimportant as the national governments would not be
bound by the votes in the European Parliament.[39] As I pointed out
earlier in discussing attitudes to democracy both nations had expressed
satisfaction with democracy and in their basic attitudes to society
reforms had taken number one priority, although I did expose some
dissatisfaction, especially by the British, with some aspects of
democracy in their home nation. Clearly democracy was an important
matter to them both and in the European context also for when asked
to consider arguments about the Elections it was clear that they shared
basic fundamental support for the democratic institution of elected
Parliaments for both supported highly the idea that the Elections
were necessary in order to decide on the kind of Europe wanted and
both, particularly the British, agreed that the Elections were necessary
to give more democratic control over the Community and the Brussels
officials.[40] However, British concern for the national institution
emerged once again when they agreed that the Elections would lead to
the European Parliament having too much power compared to the national
parliament.[41] It was clearly a contradictory situation for certainly
the British supported the concept of the parliament and the democratic

right of Elections, yet they expected the Parliament to play a restraining

role over Brussels but worried that this institution which they could

see as being beneficial might interfere with the rights of their

national parliament. It was perhaps a case of lack of knowledge

possibly due to the remote image perpetrated by the Community insti-

tutions themselves or perhaps a demonstration of the confused picture

being presented to the British public by the home Media and politicians

which, as I have suggested, continued to portray the Community in a

negative light. In terms of the future M.E.P.s themselves, both nations

considered the candidates' ideas about Europe to be more important

than their party allegiances.[42] Marquand made the point in discussing

Britain's attitude to the Community that as well as the Community

not being popular according to the opinion polls, movements in a

supra-national direction would not be popular either.[43] Certainly

we have seen that there was an element of scepticism in Britain in

spite of fundamental support for integration. A 1976 Eurobarometer

survey considered whether there would be acceptance of supra-national

votes of the European Parliament in the context of the creation of

a European Tax, a European programme for Public Works, Foreign Matters

such as Commercial Treaties and European Employment legislation. The

Germans were happy to accept all of them except for the idea of a

European Tax which produced a divided response and thus again suggested

that the Germans too were prone to express protectionist attitudes

when direct action might be required of them which might not be seen

as being beneficial to their own country and national system.

The British expressed some scepticism but also almost 50% support

for accepting the creation of a European Programme for Public Works

and for Employment legislation, but were divided over the idea of

supra-national parliamentary votes in Foreign matters and were opposed

to the idea of a European Tax.[44] It was very apparent that where

neither nation could see a personal benefit to be gained then they

were not supportive of Community action and that Germany, notwith-

standing her greater support for the Community, would put a limit on

the price to which she would pay for Community integration. With this

thought in mind, I would like to take a look at how the nations felt

in terms of European concepts. Clearly they were both unhappy over

the idea of a common European Tax but was this typical of German

attitudes? How much of the national identity were they prepared

to sacrifice in the name of the Community or was it possible to accuse

them also of attachment to their sovereignty as the British were

frequently so accused? I shall include evidence presented by German

opinion poll data in considering these questions with a concentration

on German attitudes in particular bearing in mind how supportive of

the Community they were supposed to be. Asked to envisage a future

scenario of a United Europe it was interesting that the Germans did

not predict a single European Government, rather, they expected there

to be a superordinate European Government fulfilling certain tasks

with each country having a Government of its own to fulfil special

governmental tasks of the country.[45] Germans responded highly that

they were proud to be German and opposed to the idea of a European

flag, a European currency or even a European Olympic team.[46] They

may have expressed support for the European Parliament but they only

believed that it should have the capacity to advise or make some

decisions on internal politics not have complete autonomy.[47] Possibly

due to their long-term experience of membership they did not believe

that it would be impossible to unite Europe due to the language

differences or that people would lose their cultural and national identity

in a United States of Europe.[48] However, the results of these surveys

revealed, as Noelle-Neumann suggested, no signs of a real enthusiasm

for the European idea and as progress towards unification would require

sacrifices, there did not appear any willingness to make sacrifices.[49]

There was also a breach in the belief in progress, a 1976 survey revealing

that Germans expressed doubt of the existence of a United Western Europe

by the year 2000[50] and between 1975 and 1978 they became pessimistic

about the general belief of mankind heading for a better future.[51]

They did not in 1976 believe that European cooperation had improved

just that it had remained the same.[52]

Germans did not envisage a United States of Europe which would

include the Russians and Eastern Bloc countries and nor did they

assume that anyone else would.[53] It may well have been a correct

assumption for in a Eurobarometer survey taken in 1980 both British

and German citizens expressed mistrust in the Russians.[54] Turning

to a comparison of both British and German attitudes, the Eurobarometer

surveys asked for opinions on the concept of a European passport, a

European judicial area and European radio broadcasts. There was

considerable acceptance of a European judicial area and passports too

gained a favourable response, especially in Germany, but there was

no interest in radio broadcasts.[55] The granting of voting rights to

residents of other member States in the European Elections produced

a very divided response in Britain but acceptance in Germany where

voting rights for Germans living abroad were to become more extensive

than in Britain.[56] Eurobarometer surveys into problems the Community

was dealing with revealed that some common European policies were

supported by both, particularly where they believed they would benefit,

but Eurobarometer also picked up the fact that a common currency might

be a bone of contention in Britain as well as Germany,[57] and there

was British opposition to an actual European Government.

The Germans, according to Eurobarometer were evenly divided

between wanting a national government only and those who wanted a

European Government with the final say on certain issues (corroborating

German findings of support for a government with limited powers).[58]

Carol and Kenneth Twitchett noted that not all the Community's measures

had struck an unsympathetic chord in Britain but there was opposition

to certain proposals such as attempts to introduce the Tachograph

and a harmonized weight limit for heavy goods vehicles for example.

I noted earlier that there was a tendency to blame the Community for

events outside its control, one clear example being British citizens

believing decimalization had been dictated by Community membership.[59]

Inglehart said that supra-national loyalties did exist in Germany

and that people aged over 55 also displayed such loyalties in Britain.[60]

I noted earlier his view that for the British public, support for

integration was far higher than their utilitarian assessment. In

discussing post-materialism, he pointed out that in spite of the

existence of more post-materialist groups, support for European unification

had not expanded in Europe and as I have noted there was a tendency

to cling to traditional values and national institutions in both

Germany and Britain.[61] Germany was noticeably more 'European'

oreintated towards the European Parliament and the work of the M.E.P.s

but was unwilling to accept fundamental changes in certain basic aspects

of German life. Inglehart pointed out that a sense of identification

with one's home town was widespread and ranked ahead of the nation

in Germany thus the 'Nation' was by no means a universal focus of

primary loyalty.[62] Few people felt they belonged to 'Europe' or the

'World' as a whole, but a third of the German public felt they belonged

to a supra-national unit (as either first or second choice) as did

28% of the British. Support for integration, he said, had a fairly

strong correlation with one's sense of belonging and the British showed

a relationship of comparable strength (to the original Six) because

the question of Community membership had been a salient part of British

politics for a long time.[63]

Political orientation was also a possible factor in determining

attitudes to Europe. Inglehart and Rabier pointed out that the

relationship between Left-Right political preferences and support for

European integration was complex but in Germany the electorate of the

Left was somewhat more favourable to the Community and to European

solidarity than the electorate of the Right. However over 60% of those

belonging to Left, Right or Centre political parties in Germany believed

that membership was good, whereas in Britain there was a cleavage.[64]

The differences politically were quite marked. Noelle-Neumann noted

the subject of Europe had no partisan contours in Germany .[65]

In a 1978 German survey into attitudes into the dissolution of

the Community 64% of the responses were pro-European and there was

little difference amongst the political parties, all showing roughly

the same distribution of responses.[66] British opinion polls revealed

consistent cleavages however. According to Gallup poll findings in

1976 and N.O.P. in 1977, for example, the bulk of support for Britain's

membership came from those in the A/B/C1 social classes and from

Conservative voters.[67] Butler had pointed out that the middle class

was more supportive of the Community than the working class and even

the Liberals, the most ardent of Community supporters, were subject

to volatility for in a May 1980 N.O.P. opinion poll into Community

membership, support was lowest amongst Labour voters but only 38% of

the Liberals were in favour (less than the Conservatives).[68] In 1975

a Gallup poll according to Butler, reflected a change in support for

the Community from 64% to 80% of Conservative voters and from 29%

to 64% of Labour voters. There was a far less stable pattern of

support in Britain than there was in Germany, the only persistent

factor being that Market membership was more popular amongst men,

amongst the young, and amongst the middle class and people in the

South East.[69] However Noelle-Neumann noted a lack of support amongst

young Germans and there was an ambivalence to certain political concerns amongst the Left.[70] When asked which were important to them, Germans placed "To prevent Communist influences from advancing in Europe" in tenth position and "The Union of European States" in twentieth. Staving off Euro-Communism had a completely different urgency than had the uniting of Europe.[71] I noted that Germans placed stress on Community foreign relations and were concerned about German security. Perhaps these findings explained German keenness to remain within the Community. But growing conservatism was discouraging support for certain fundamental changes which would affect the German way of life. Neither Britain nor Germany could set aside instrumental attitudes, the British appearing to be demanding a return on their investment and neither was willing to make sacrifices. Each was interested in the benefits to them of Community actions not for the ideal of the Community as a whole. Clearly some of the Community spirit had died in Germany although the groundswell of support for membership remained. Although more 'European' than the British, the Germans were qualifying their support for integration. Certainly economic and socio-political factors were having an impact on attitudes. 1960's research according to Noelle-Neumann showed that the Germans reacted more sensitively to rising inflation than other people and clearly fear of economic problems was playing a part in their unwillingness to make sacrifices in the European cause; Nationalism and Traditionalism were not just British prerogatives.[72]

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Chapter 5

PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE COMMUNITY, THE MEDIA AND INFORMATION, EDUCATION

Finally before considering the special cases of the 1975 British Referendum on Membership of the Common Market and the 1979 European Parliamentary Elections I would like to briefly analyse the extent of personal interest in the Community which existed in Britain and Germany, taking into consideration the effects or otherwise of the Media and how people felt about Media coverage of the Community and also if any marked differences existed in terms of educational attainment which might have had an impact on the attitudes to the Community.

According to Slater, in both old and new Community member States, there was a continuing high level of apathy towards the European Community which showed all the signs of being on the increase. There was little public understanding of or interest in the Community and the work of the Community was not something which had captured the imagination or interest of the public. In addition where it had attracted public attention the publicity was all too often negative and there seemed little doubt that the drift of popular opinion had been towards a view of the community and its institutions as increasingly remote.[1] Bulmer, in comparing British and German political parties and the European Community, offered some interesting comparisons. His opinion was that in Britain electoral competition between political parties stimulated public debate on Community policy. Most Labour and Conservative M.P.s reacted to Community initiatives in terms of 'pro' and 'anti' stereotypes and in consequence parliamentary debate on Community initiatives was conducted within the adversarial traditions of the House of Commons. Looking at the Media he says that whilst Media coverage of party politics in the European Parliament was sparse, reports in Britain were couched primarily in terms of the 'pro' and 'anti' Community stereotypes. In Germany,

in contrast, reports were less salient due to inter-party consensus and
the absence of party conflict meant that policy initiatives from
Brussels tended to be treated on their merits. Community initiatives
were scarcely debated in the German lower house, the Bundestag, which
conducted its work in committees whose work got little publicity.
Thus, the institutional framework of the Bundestag and the consensual
behaviour of the parties led to party attitudes being debated in a
private arena away from public attention.[2] In conclusion, Bulmer
argues that the political parties in Germany failed to mobilise the
electorate over Community matters, the reasons for this lying in both
the structure of Community policy-making and in the German party system.
The behavioural patterns of the Bundestag permeated party policy-
making, and were thus ill-suited to arousing interest in the Community
amongst the general public. German parties discussion of Community
affairs was centred on the domestic institutional level which kept
the discussion of Community issues away from public attention.[3] Handley,
in discussing interest in the Community, looked at the findings of a
country by country investigation and revealed that the highest levels
of interest were to be found not in the original six member nations
(including Germany) but in the three new member States (including Britain)
which, he said, was a direct function of the conflict and debate over
continued membership.[4] Blumler and Fox in discussing the level of interest
in the 1979 European Election campaign said that,

> ...the campaign was regarded as considerably less than
> riveting by many Community electors...and that the diffi-
> culties of awakening widespread interest in the Elections
> were by no means confined to the new member States.[5]

I shall look at interest in the Community Elections shortly but
first I shall now compare the general level of personal interest in
the Community as revealed by European Commission sponsored surveys
undertaken between 1975 and 1978. The main observation was that in

both Britain and Germany the major response was that people were
interested a little in the Community; (from 48% up to 53% in Germany
and from 42% up to 50% in Britain). Of those who claimed to be very
interested there was a steady decline between 1975 and 1978 from 26%
to 16% in Germany and from 35% to 19% in Britain. In Germany there
was a slight upwards trend to 19% in 1980, but in Britain the rise
amongst those saying they were very interested went up quite sharply
to 25% (the third highest response out of the nine member nations.[6]

Opinion polls between 1977 and 1979 sought to measure public
awareness of the European Elections before the event. The situation
was different in Germany compared to Britain, for there was a sudden
sharp rise in those saying they had recently heard or seen something
about the European Parliament between 1977 and 1978, (from 33% to
51%) then a steady increase up to 60%. In Britain, in contrast, there
was a drop in awareness between 1977 and 1978 (from 58% to 44%) though
by 1979 more people were aware and percentages rose to 55%.[7] A survey
which also compared the spontaneous mentioning of the Elections
before June 1979 revealed a greater response over the years in general
amongst the Germans from 18% in 1977 up to 46% in 1979, compared to
fluctuations of around 20% up to 25% in Britain. However, when those
people who had recently seen or heard something about the Parliament
were interviewed, ability to mention the Elections was strikingly higher
also in Germany, (from 54% up to 76%) compared with from 34% to 46%
in Britain.[8] A few months later, after the Elections public awareness
was measured in retrospect. Most people said that they had seen or
heard something about the Parliament but far fewer in Britain (26%)
could remember what it was than in Germany (55%). Strikingly 45% compared
with only 23% in Germany said that they had neither seen nor heard anything
or that they did not know.[9] In fact far fewer in Britain (26%) than

in Germany (54%) could actually recall the Election.[10] Perhaps it

should be borne in mind that in contrast to the 53% of the German

public who, in 1979, considered the Election important, 60% of the

British public public held the opposite viewpoint.[11] But nevertheless,

over 50% in both nations did express prior interest in the Election

results.[12] The situation was certainly not clear-cut in terms of

level of awareness which draws into the discussion comparative attitudes

to information about the Community itself and also to the purveyors

of information, the Media.   A 1975 survey revealed that in both nations

personal interest in information on the Community matched the responses

to interest in Community affairs, that people were interested a little.

A May 1975 poll provided a more detailed look at attitudes as can be

seen in Table 8.[13]

Table 8

	Britain	Germany
I have no time for this and cannot be interested in everything at once	24% (Agree)	41% (Agree)
	67% (Disagree)	52% (Disagree)
The newspapers, radio and television do not say enough about European problems	58% (Agree)	34% (Agree)
	36% (Disagree)	51% (Disagree)
The newspapers, radio and television give only simple summaries of European problems	63% (Agree)	35% (Agree)
	26% (Disagree)	44% (Disagree)
European problems are reported in a biased manner	41% (Agree)	24% (Agree)
	34% (Disagree)	44% (Disagree)

It was clear that the British were less satisfied with the level

of information although the Germans were somewhat undecided on a couple

of issues, including bias. 1975 was the year in which the British

Referendum was held and clearly one might have expected a higher level

of satisfaction in Britain due to the saturation of material. But the

British did not appear happy with the content of the information they

were receiving; they certainly did not appear unwilling to read or see

it. Looking at criticism of the information in greater detail in 1976

a list was drawn up stating the order of classification given to

descriptions applied to information about the Community which is

shown in Table 9 below:[14]

Table 9

Britain			Germany		
1:	Complicated	(65%)	1:	Useful	(55%)
2:	Useful	(53%)	2:	Complicated	(54%)
2a:	Interesting	(53%)	3:	Interesting	(45%)
2b:	Mainly bad news	(53%)	4:	Too rare	(37%)
5:	Too rare	(50%)	5:	Mainly bad news	(32%)
6:	Biased	(39%)	6:	Not interested	(29%)
7:	Not interesting	(33%)	7:	Not biased	(28%)
8:	Not useful	(31%)	8:	Biased	(25%)
9:	Not biased	(28%)	9:	Mainly good news	(24%)
10:	Too frequent	(24%)	10:	Simple	(21%)
11:	Simple	(21%)	11:	Too frequent	(19%)
12:	Mainly good news	(15%)	12:	Not useful	(15%)

It was clear that the British were less happy with the level of

information they were receiving about the Community although even over

50% of Germans complained that the information was complicated.

Interestingly, 53% of the British public complained that the information

presented was mainly bad news and a significant number, 39%, complained

of bias. It is unfortunate that there is no indication of the nature

of the bias which they alleged. Earlier in the thesis I made the point

that the British Media and the politicians were presenting the public

with a negative viewpoint of the Community and clearly the public

appeared to be aware of this and did not like it. Noticeably, 50% also

complained at the rarity of available information. The Germans were

happier but not entirely, with a significant percentage also complaining

that information was too rare and mainly bad news; in neither country

were there many people complaining that the level of information was

too frequent. Whilst the British were basically unhappy with the

information which they received, the Germans were happier initially,

but grew less happy as time went on. An opinion poll compared attitudes

in 1976 and 1978 to the Media. In Britain there was little change in

attitudes, as at each stage the British believed that the newspapers,

radio and television did not say enough about European questions nor

did they deal sufficiently seriously with them and indeed Herman and

Lodge pointed to the fact that the British, together with the Italians

were most dissatisfied of all member nations with information and also

complained of superficiality.[15] Most Germans initially did think that

the Media said enough about European questions but grew more undecided

over the years and after disagreeing that the Media did not deal seriously

with European questions, changed their minds and were divided, becoming

more critical than happy.[16] Equally, in 1978, most people still disagreed

with the idea that they had no time to seek information just as they

had done in 1975.[17] In 1980 further questions were posed as to the

adequacy of the available information. Both complained, with the British

especially believing that they were insufficiently well informed about

the problems being dealt with by the Community (74% compared with 52%

in Germany).[18] Looking at the Media from a more general point of view

both nations also complained that they were insufficiently well informed

about the different national and international problems.[19] Which brings

me now to consider what the main sources of information were and

which was the most popular. Two separate opinion polls in 1976 looked

specifically at the Press and revealed firstly that over 60% of people

in both nations read a daily newspaper but in terms of age the young

were less avid readers, (especially young British women (54%) and

German women (44%) who were the only groups below 69%). 55% of German

men and women and 62% of British people read articles in the press

about the Community and 61% of British people and 57% of Germans watched

television broadcasts.[20]

A further survey in 1980 looked at exposure to all three forms

of Information Media, the Radio, Television and Daily Papers. Most

British people watched the news on television every day and read the

political news in the daily papers every day. They were slightly less

avid radio-listeners as 44% said they listened to the radio on a

daily basis with 22% saying they never listened. In Germany most people

said they watched the news on television daily (although 27% watched

just several times a week) and indeed when it cane to reading the

political news in the daily papers and listening to the radio news they

were very divided with about 44% saying they read or listened every day

and around 24% just several times a week.[21] A more detailed survey was

also made in 1980 into their sources of information on the problems

of the Community. A list is shown in Table 10.[22]

There was a distinct contrast in the two nations in terms of the

percentage of people using the two main Media sources to obtain

information and two other main differences: the fact that more British

people gleaned information from talking with other people in contrast

to Germans who gained information from magazines and periodicals, but

in both nations the written word was a popular source of information.

The most striking finding was the higher number of people who in Germany

Table 10

Britain		Germany	
Television	(82%)	Television	(62%)
Daily Papers	(65%)	Daily Papers	(44%)
Radio	(29%)	Radio	(25%)
Talking with other people	(17%)	Talking with other people	(12%)
Magazines and periodicals	(8%)	Magazines and periodicals	(16%)
Specialist publications	(5%)	Specialist publications	(8%)
Other	(2%)	Other	(1%)
Don't know	(1%)	Don't know	(13%)

responded 'Don't Know'. Handley commented that there was a greater

level of interest in Community affairs in Britain[23] and Noelle-

Neumann also came to the conclusion that although data indicated

support of the Community in Germany, interest in the Community and

Community problems decreased as the 1979 Direct Elections approached

(between 1973 and 1978). She pointed to the findings of a 1977

survey which revealed, she said, how grossly boring the European

machinery must have been for the German population. There might

have been reasonable levels of internalized support and somewhat

lower levels of interest but the level of knowledge was low.[24] A

question posed to German people in 1977 which asked whether people

knew of the existence of a European Parliament revealed that a full

63% of Germans either replied 'No' or 'Don't Know'; only 37%

responded correctly. And of these 37%, only 16% were able to correctly

identify the Bundestag as the appointing agency for German members

of the European Parliament.[25]

To take an example of the level of British knowledge, Blumler

drew attention to the fact that when the British were asked to say

what were the most important issues to emerge during the European

Election campaign, 51% of the sample were unable to name any; 21%

referred to agricultural/fishery and food-surplus questions with 12%

mentioning rising prices and the cost of living. Otherwise there was

only a scatter of references to other topics which attracted less

than 10% endorsement in every case. Among those who failed to vote,

64% were unable to nominate a single election issue.[26]

Herman and Lodge pointed out that the nature of the debate over

the Elections might have led, especially in Britain to issue-confusion.

They, in discussing the European Parliament and the Media, suggested

that whilst press coverage of the Parliament's debates had increased,

(since 1973), it had been inadequate and failed to reach mass audiences

and there had been limited press coverage by even the quality press.

There had been a lack of coverage by the popular press and where there

were 'good copy' items they often dealt with aspects of legislative

proposals such as 'Euro-beer' or with items likely to raise public

indignation. Only the most salient or controversial items were

covered by the Media which were subject to the basic judgement that

general images of the Parliament and its Members were not newsworthy.[27]

The high Media coverage given to Roy Jenkins, a renowned pro-Marketeer,

when the new President of the Commission was, according to Herman and

Lodge, related to general concern over the attitude of the 'recalcitrant'

Labour Government and there was plenty of copy for those who wanted

to speculate on whether his assumption of the Presidency would encourage

a favourable change of attitude on the part of the British towards

the Community. They argued that the Media was not only an important

source of information but that it affected voting turn-out. It had

been shown to be important in turning out many unaffiliated or weakly

affiliated voters who, through exposure to the Media, voted for the

candidate with whom they had become most familiar during the intensive

Media campaign.[28]

They also drew attention to the fact that readership of national

dailies was higher in Britain than in other member States. On the

continent, regional rather than national, and weekly rather than

daily, papers might have been more influential in providing political

information.[29] This tied in with my analysis of the comparative sources

of information which revealed that German people read the news on a

daily basis and there was greater use of magazines and periodicals

in Germany. Herman and Lodge also undertook a comparison of the

Media in both nations and revealed that British radio and television

coverage was higher than in other member States, regional companies

giving the European Parliament greater attention than national companies.

They drew attention to the fact that such nominally European programmes

actually included profiles of local politicians appointed to the

European Parliament although they accepted that programmes of regional

significance might help create public awareness indirectly.[30]

However, in analysing actual television coverage of the European

Parliament's activities in 1976, they found that three sessions were

covered by German television and seven by the British who were the

only ones to film more than half the sessions. But there was no

coverage by anyone of the session when the Parliament was preoccupied

with the Community Budget and film coverage of some sessions was less

than ten minutes. They noted a decline in coverage since 1975 although

they attributed this partly to national political developments such

as the German Federal Elections.[31]

I have made the point at several stages of the fact that the

Media coverage was not conducive to encouraging support for the

Community in Britain but clearly also the Media coverage was not

effective in reducing apathy to the Community or in adequately

informing the publics of either nation who, although expressing some

interest in being informed, were not having their wishes met. Herman

and Lodge pointed out that Media coverage tended to vary with the

newsworthiness of events taking place in the European Parliament,

the 1975 British Referendum and the arrival of the Labour delegation

having stimulated extra Media interest.[32] The 1970s, as I have said,

were dominated with inter-Community wrangles and the coverage or

lack of it on the part of the Media clearly leads one to adopt the

viewpoint that the Media had a distinctive influence in shaping

attitudes, whether of indifference or apathy on the part of the

Germans, or of dissatisfaction over information or criticism of

Community membership in Britain. Attitudes to the problems the

Community was tackling may have been influenced to quite a marked degree by the portrayal of them in the Media with the encouragement of a more instrumental position.

I shall now turn my attention to the question of the level of education attained by the British and Germans and whether there were any marked differences. According to Inglehart and Rabier,

> ...amongst those individual characteristics that show substantial associations with support for European integration, education is probably the most pervasive...[33]

The highly educated were consistently more favourable than the less educated. It could be attributed to the fact that the more educated tended to have higher incomes and more desirable jobs or that education was linked with support for integration because the more educated respondents tended to be of higher social class level. However, they also argued that education is a complex variable that taps many things and is also an indicator or the presence or absence of certain cognitive skills. The more educated tended to move in different circles and read or viewed different Media and thus became exposed to different influences. The apparent impact of education on one's attitude proves, they say, to be stronger than the apparent impact of one's occupation and the fact remained that the more educated were consistently more favourable to European integration than the rest of their compatriots.[34] Referring to the analysis of the adequacy of available information about the Direct Elections, Herman and Lodge pointed out that in 1977 dissatisfaction was highest amongst those people who had received more than an elementary school education who were also more likely to seek information about the Community.[35] Handley in elaborating further on cognitive skills argues that the greater interest of the higher educated was mainly attributable to their higher level of cognitive mobilisation; because of their higher

awareness of social problems they are going to be interested in the Community in any case. However, he noted a downward trend in interest amongst the higher educated and with respect to the age factor, he refers to the fact that younger people were less interested in Community affairs.[36]

I shall briefly take a look at the age factor for according to Noelle-Neumann the younger generation was no more enthusiastic about Europe than the older generation and this lack of any more support amongst the young did not auger well for the future of the Community.[37] Handley noted that in 1975 in four of the eight Community nations, the proportion of favourable responses was greater in the younger age group but by 1979 all but one country had a larger proportion of favourable responses in the mature age-group. Age is indeed an important factor for, as Handley pointed out, the 35-54 age-bracket was the most active electorally with the highest level of turn-out and interest.[38] I have already noted the lower level of readers in the younger German and British age groups and as we have seen the press was an important source of information on the Community. Perhaps one might possibly attribute the apparent growing apathy and continuous lack of knowledge to the disinterest on the part of many younger people? And clearly as we have seen, Media coverage itself did not help shape favourable attitudes to the Community. Looking at the mid-aged Handley suggested that the pro-European cohort of the 1960s (of Inglehart) was not replaced by an equally or more pro-European group.[39] It is an important point to bear in mind for many of these people would be the well-educated who, increasingly appeared to express declining interest in the Community. Also the post-war generation were better educated than their pre-war counterparts yet apathy over Community affairs was growing and also a trend of growing adherence to 'traditional' values in the socio-political sphere was detected particularly amongst those under

the age of 55 which did not auger well for the future of the Community
in terms of change.

Noelle-Neumann also detected a rise of conservatism in the 1970s
especially in Germany although there was a slight decrease in 1978.[40]
The higher educated, according to Handley, tended to have a heightened
sense of cosmopolitan identity and he discussed people's identification
with Europe, referring to the 'learning to be European' process of
Inglehart who had reported a higher level of supra-national identity
amongst the original Six than amongst the Three in the early 1970s.
Britain, he said, registered, (together with Ireland), the greatest
increase in European identity though there was a corresponding increase
in nation identity in Britain. At the end of the 1970s Britain
(and Ireland) were well ahead of most of the Six in the proportion
of European identifiers but in Britain this increase in European and
nation identity was mostly amongst the 'other than' higher educated
segment of the population. Germany alone saw a decrease among its
higher educated group. Age played a part too for in the case of
Britain almost all of the gain in increased identification with
'Europe' and 'Nation' took place, according to Handley, among the
55 and older age group for which he said there was no immediate
explanation.[41]

Having referred to discrepancies in terms of age and education
I would now like to consider the findings of a 1978 opinion poll
which compared the levels of education attained in Britain and Germany
as shown in Table 11.[42] The most striking finding was clearly the
high percentage of German men who continued their education at the
age of 20 or beyond. Otherwise there was little difference between
the nations in terms of the level of education attained, although
fewer German men left school at the age of 15 or under than anyone else.

Table 11

Age on Completion of Full-time Education

	Britain	Germany
Men:		
15 or under	58%	46%
16 to 19	30%	32%
20 or over or still studying	12%	22%
Women:		
15 or under	57%	56%
16 to 19	31%	35%
20 or over or still studying	12%	9%

Germany certainly appeared to have a better educated male population
and yet, as surveys and political researchers have indicated, apathy
had grown in Germany as much as in other member States and the higher
educated were, as Handley noted, decreasingly 'European' and 'Nation'
identifiers.

The points made by Inglehart and Rabier, and also Handley, into
the linkage between level of education and cognitive mobilisation
would possibly suggest that the apathy and low level of interest and
knowledge had more to do with the available information than unwillingness
on the part of the public to inform themselves. As we have noted in
detail there was criticism of the Media of both nations and, in looking
at socio-political attitudes, it was clear that men, and some women,
did discuss politics and joined organisations where politics might
be discussed. Clearly the British might have been critical of their
Community membership but early in the thesis I made the point that
there was also a linkage between the negative impressions of the
Community and Media coverage and there was also criticism of inter-
national news coverage in general. The 1970s were a difficult time
economically and Guido Brunner, the German European Commissioner,
said in 1978 that "The fact is that our European Community is
predominantly regarded as an economic affair by the people in Europe."[43]
I have noted the tendency in both nations to grow more conservative
and perhaps more instrumentalist. Could one not then suggest that
a situation arose where reasonably or well-educated people were
cognitively motivated to absorb information but that the available
information and the attitudes of politicians coupled with the political
framework both in the Community and at home, encouraged both nations
to adopt a short-term viewpoint towards the Community which emphasised
economic gain rather than generating a positive commitment to the
European ideal in the long-term?

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Chapter 6

THE 1975 BRITISH REFERENDUM ON COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

I will now make a brief analysis of the 1975 British Referendum
on Community Membership. As Butler said, it offered not only the
most serious test of attitudes to Europe in Britain, but also one
of the most spectacular general examples of the volatility of public
opinion, with the public responsive to strong cues from the political
parties.[1] According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, it was as
if the campaign had never taken place at all within two months of the
Referendum vote. The total vote itself was 67.2% in favour and 32.8%
opposed and according to the Economist, the geographical spread of
the vote and the adherence of the main party political leaderships
with substantial sections of their followers to the Community made
the Community a non-partisan issue in the then current mainstream of
politics.[2] Shepherd, in discussing party identification and opinions
towards entry prior to the Referendum, commented that of particular
interest to pro-Marketeers was the close correlation which existed
between party identification and opinions towards British entry.[3]
Gallup opinion polls showed that as British entry became more closely
identified with a Labour Government's policy, so Conservative voters
became increasingly hostile to the idea of entry.[4] Harold Wilson
kept the prospect of entry on the political agenda between 1964 and
1970 and a vociferous anti-Europe strand within the Labour movement
helped to legitimise Labour voters' growing opposition to entry in
the 1960s. In the 1970s the Labour Party had come to emphasise a
more populist philosophy, thus the people should be allowed to decide
directly on membership. Shepherd noted that Labour's electoral support
came mainly from the working-class who achieved high ratings in a

'conservatism' index and attitudes of patriotism and opposition

to new ideas were typical of Labour voters.[5] According to Alderson,

Britain's entry into the Community, "...was contingent and paradoxically

became a serious electoral issue only after the event."

Enoch Powell in a speech in Stockport in 1973 opened the

Pandora's Box when he called on anti-Community Conservatives to vote

Labour because the Labour Party would offer the people a free choice

in a referendum, or in a General Election devoted to Community

membership. When the Conservative Government of Edward Heath lost

the February 1974 General Election some said that it was partly due

to Enoch Powell's comments on membership which influenced voters.[6]

The Common Market, according to Särlvik , Crewe, Alt and Fox, played

a subsidiary issue role in the campaign both in its own right and in

the discussion about the causes of increasing food prices.[7] They

pointed out that in the findings of opinion polls there was a

partisan differentiation within the electorate with Conservative

voters more positive to the Community issue than voters from other

parties though amongst Conservatives most people thought the terms

should be changed. The polls showed that in the Spring of 1974 the

British were less than 'glad' about the fact that Britain had ever

joined the Community; there was a widespread feeling that Community

membership had been conducive to an increase in the cost of living.

However, they pointed out that there emerged a majority in the

electorate who were willing to accept continued membership provided

the terms of membership could be improved.[8] Shepherd drew out the

point made by Butler and Stokes that on issues which people perceived

as being of low salience they sought guidance from their respective

party leaders.[9] Särlvik et al. pointed out that whilst an over-

whelming majority of the electorate had a reasonably realistic under-

standing of what the two major parties were standing for on the

Community issue, the Liberal Party was less clearly identified with

any definite policy.[10]   Looking at voting support in February 1974

they showed that voters who switched from Conservative to Liberal

were less favourable to the Community than stable Conservative voters

and those who switched from Labour to Liberal were more positive to

the Community than stable Labour voters thus opinion was most

favourable to the Community amongst consistent Conservatives.[11]   In

August 1974 there was a Gallup poll published which asked people how

they would vote if the Government negotiated new terms for Britain's

membership.   In reply, 54% said they preferred to stay in the

Community which perhaps was a foretaste of the future, also demonstrating

as I said earlier, that if possible the British preferred to compromise

rather than pull out of the Community immediately.[12]   Särlvik et al.

commented that the result of the Referendum in the end came as no

surprise, the opinion polls during the previous two months having

consistently predicted a decisive majority for Britain's staying in

the Community apart from Scotland where the outcome had been more

doubtful and indeed the result showed less impressive majorities in

Ulster and Scotland.[13]   They analysed the factors which they considered

determined the outcome and commented that they had stressed that the

part of the electorate which had unconditionally wanted Britain to

withdraw was really a small minority.   The pre-conditions for a

substantial 'Yes' majority were already formed, provided the Wilson

Government could convince the bulk of its voters that staying in the

Community was what a Labour voter should vote for.[14]   They believed

that after the completion of Britain's negotiations and when the

Wilson Cabinet had announced its decision (with some dissenters) to

recommend the voters to confirm Britain's membership, the final balance

of strength between the 'Yes' and 'No' sides must have emerged almost

instantaneously.[15] An opinion poll made it clear that the Government

could count not only on a 'Yes' majority in the electorate but also

in Labour's voting support.[16] Opinion polls at the end of 1974 revealed

that the overall decision on the Community remained fairly stable

and a picture was drawn up of a public which, whilst not actually

wanting to leave the Community was not particularly happy to have

joined it either.[17] Expectations about the benefits of membership

were not overwhelming but very few people expected Britain to leave

at the end of negotiations. Spence pointed out that the public

became rather more aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the

Community in comparison to those of Britain once Britain had become

a member.[18] A 1973 O.R.C. poll showed that few people believed

Britain had a higher standard of living than other Community countries

and more people believed that Community countries had longer holidays,

higher wages and more influence in the world than Britain.[19] People

had grown ready to accept by 1974 that membership of the Community

was not the main contributor to the rise in the cost of living

and that re-negotiation was an attractive alternative to leaving the

Community. The polls showed those most opposed to membership being

the old, the Scots, the working-class, Labour supporters, women and

in addition, young people.[20] In the Referendum campaign pro-Marketeers

turned their attentions squarely on working-class women, Scottish

voters and 18-24 year olds. An N.O.P. opinion poll in 1975 revealed

that 80% of professional and senior administrative A./B.s were in

favour of continued membership, dropping through 66% of C1s, 50% of

the C2s to only 41% of the D/E.s.[21]

One of the big questions hanging over the Referendum campaign

was how well the public felt informed. According to Spence only a

minority in 1975 felt informed and an O.R.C. poll concluded that

"as an exercise of political persuasion, the Common Market Referendum campaign must be considered as something of a flop."[22] The evidence of opinion polls over the years showed an electorate conscious of its lack of information on many crucial issues, inclined to be agnostic and were waiting for a lead in the Referendum Campaign but they realised no united lead would emanate from political leaders. Throughout the campaign the Cabinet was divided, the political parties were divided as were the experts and television was seeking to be balanced.[23] According to Spence, the facts presented to the public were mutually contradictory, the specialists' views were emotionally loaded and whether Britain should remain a member was a matter of opinion.[24] Looking at the campaign itself, people were, according to Hedges, aware of the leaflets and two thirds of people interviewed claimed to be either very or fairly interested in the campaign. Whether the information people received was very helpful was somewhat doubtful for as Hedges pointed out, more than a third felt that they had not received the information they wanted and a fifth found it difficult to understand. Most people got their information from the television and from reading the newspapers although almost a quarter gained information from friends and relatives.[25] Grimond and Neve drew attention to the fact that collective Cabinet responsibility was suspended and Cabinet ministers were allowed to differ in public. Prime Minister Wilson wrote letters to the anti-Market Ministers saying they were free to campaign against the Cabinet recommendation so long as they did not oppose Government policy in the N.E.C.[26] Thus the public was faced by groups of politicians from all sides of the political spectrum getting together in opposing groups, seeking to put their respective messages across. The picture was more confused by the fact that leading politicians such as Mrs. Thatcher, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Callaghan did not operate within the rival organisations.

According to Butler and Kitzinger none of the people involved in the battle had a strong sense that the particular themes were going through and pro- and anti-Marketeers commented on their sense of boredom with their own speeches. There was nothing new to say.[27] The effect on the public was most interesting. Butler and Kitzinger acknowledged the press reports which made it plain that the public finally switched on in the last ten days of the campaign with attendance at meetings and the general level of interest increasing, but after the campaign nearly two thirds of people questioned believed the amount of coverage had been too much and devastatingly there was a large shift in interest as the campaign wore on; most of those initially interested became bored and a large minority of the uninterested became involved.[28]

There was an increase in knowledge about the countries comprising the Community and according to Hedges, the increase was evenly spread between different population groups, (manual workers having to catch up).[29] Butler and Kitzinger commented that it was not clear just how the public saw the European issue; few electors saw themselves as recording a judgement on the success or otherwise of re-negotiation but the main issue was not how much the terms had altered, but whether Britain should stay in or get out.[30] The background situation was difficult with the Commonwealth becoming less reliable as a means of support. Many reasons for their vote were given by people as Hedges discovered.

There were comments of "We can't stand alone" and "The way the world is going it is better for Britain to be in a larger community" which would suggest a desire for security. Some comments ran on the theme of "Even if we weren't too keen to get in, why bother to get out?"[31] In discussing European integration, I questioned the British

resolve to leave the Community and Hedges pointed to an important

factor, that of the basic conservatism of the British public and its

resistance to change even when the change might be desirable. When

there isn't any solid reason for changing, he said, the British vote

for the status quo, (and one may recall the growing conservatism plus

attachment to national institutions in the 1970s). Prior to 1973

the status quo was outside Europe; after than it was inside.[32] He

commented on the remarks of a respondent who said that,

> the Referendum should have been held years ago and
> we wouldn't have gone in...but the British people
> don't like change so it was a foregone conclusion.

The man was anti-Europe but his views summarised this point of view.

Other comments indicated to Hedges a feeling of when you have

started something you shouldn't give up without a fair trial and

much comment was made about the money it would involve to leave

and the loss of dignity. A key argument was that of the loss of

sovereignty but, as Hedges pointed out, issues on which Britain's

policies and practices had to be aligned to the Community were not

of a kind to catch the public's imagination and the consequences of

loss of sovereignty were not yet seen as burdensome.[33]

Butler and Kitzinger, in assessing the opinion poll results

prior to the Referendum itself believed that opinion polls have

most effect on elections when the outcome is not in doubt. The

fact that the Referendum campaign did not live up to the expectations

that it would be bitter was due to the polls foreshadowing a 2:1

outcome.[34] An N.O.P. poll also revealed a tendency on the part of

anti-Marketeers not to vote in contrast to pro-Marketeers.[35] Pierce,

Valen and Listhaug argued that partisanship was the dominant factor

in the Referendum vote.[36] Bristow also makes the comment that there

was a clear association between industrialisation and the proportion

of electors voting against continued membership.[37] And as was the

case, there was a lower vote in favour in industrial areas than in

the Shires though, as Pierce et al. commented, there was a centre-

periphery aspect to the Referendum.[38]   Butler and Kitzinger, in looking

at the final Gallup poll, revealed that in every sub-group there was

a comfortable 'Yes' vote with the working class and the young yielding

most 'No' votes. These were groups where Labour predominated and where

interest had been least. They were also less inclined to vote.[39]

Perhaps these people were least satisfied with the information, for

Hedges noted that whilst voters and non-voters read the available

literature, there was only a slightly increased tendency to read

leaflets which coincided with people's outlook and the tendency

to read the literature was only marginally higher amongst non-manual

workers.[40] Butler and Kitzinger, elaborating on the saliency of

issues said it was notable that on more abstract issues the public

approved most of Community membership whilst thinking less of it on the

more down to earth issues.[41] According to M.O.R.I. high prices were

the dominant consideration for withdrawing whilst fears of isolation

and economic trouble were the chief pressures to stay in.[42]

There was a feeling of ignorance, notably amongst Labour

voters and this was possibly demonstrated by the fact that special

interviews were arranged with the 'Sun' and 'Daily Mirror' newspapers

after it was pointed out that a large proportion of the uncommitted

were Labour voters and many of them were confused about the stand of

the Prime Minister.[43] Certainly in almost all aspects, according to

Butler and Kitzinger the electorate was remarkably homogeneous in its

reactions, the voters most open to persuasion being disproportionately

working-class and female.[44] They were not concentrated in any

particular region however and those who worried most about unemployment

were the D.E. groups who were most likely to be affected. One other

factor might have been, as King pointed out, that dislike of certain

anti-Marketeers such as Benn, Foot and Shore, probably brought many

Labour voters into the pro-Market camp early in the campaign and if

they were unpopular amongst Labour voters, they were even more

unpopular amongst Conservatives and Liberals.[45] He also reiterated the

point that sovereignty was only of intense interest to a small minority

and anti-Marketeers had to contend with the view that it was risky

for Britain to leave as she was only a small country and could not

go it alone.[46] Possibly in view of the campaign being conducted at

a time of economic difficulty internationally, the British believed

that it was economically advantageous for Britain to be part of a

larger trading unit. The voters expressed a cautious attitude thus

corroborating Hedges' comments that in the last analysis the British

would favour the status quo.[47]

In summing-up Butler and Kitzinger commented that the verdict

of the electorate had to be kept in perspective. It was unequivocal

but also unenthusiastic, support for membership being wide but not

deep. The Referendum was not a vote cast for new departures or bold

initiatives but for the status quo and anti-Marketeers would have

had a better chance of winning a Referendum on the issue of entry not

departure. Far from reflecting high-minded idealism however, about

the European fraternity, most electors seemed to have voted in the

spirit outlined by Sir Christopher Soames, that "This is no time

to consider leaving a Christmas Club, let alone the Common Market."

The Referendum did not gird people's loins for a new European adventure

for throughout the rest of 1975 there was little evidence that the

Government had become more Community minded[48] and as the Economist

Intelligence Unit said, it was as if the campaign had never taken

place.[49]

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Chapter 7

THE 1979 EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

In 1976 the Council of Ministers made a decision to implement

the 1975 Rome Summit decision and hold the European Elections within

May and June 1978. In the event, it was decided to postpone the

Elections until 1979. However, it proved impossible to agree on a

common day or common electoral system and the British, (and three

other member nations) noted on 7 June 1979 and the rest, (including

Germany), on 10 June with only the English, Scots and Welsh not voting

by proportional representation. Fitzmaurice, commenting on the timing

of the Election, pointed out that the timing created difficulties in

Britain, the General Election having taken place shortly before and

the political parties mounted an almost token campaign as a result,

with the voters more apathetic in consequence.[1]

According to Lodge, what the member Governments did not see when

they failed to observe the 1978 date, was that a

> ...confluence of national, regional, and local elections
> and referenda with the European Elections might result in
> political parties being unable or insufficiently imagina-
> tive to campaign on different issues for each of the
> elections, or result in national elections being
> Europeanised.[2]

Indeed, as she commented further, the Community figured prominently

in the General Election as a scapegoat for Britain's economic ills

and, with the advent of the European Election campaign, the electorate

faced the prospect of a lengthy debate without much change in the

issues. In the end, she said, part of the electorate wondered

whether it was participating in another Referendum on British membership

in the Elections.[3]

The response of the British electorate to the European Elections

was one of apathy. In some respects the European contest resembled a

General Election; the same electoral system was used, the familiar

political parties contested the Election and, apart from the

Liberal Party, made little reference to their continental allies.[4]

Fitzmaurice drew attention to the fact that national elections

played an important role in both Germany and Britain. In Germany,

Federal Elections were due in 1980, and it was vital for the F.D.P.

(Liberals) to keep above the 5% mark and for the coalition parties

to hold at least 50% of the vote. In Britain, with the European

Elections coming only a month after the General Election, it was

too early to expect any real change. Labour was demoralised and

divided about Europe and for many leaders and local militants in

the Labour movement there was outright opposition to participating

in the Elections at all.[5] Lodge made an analysis of the electoral

campaigns in the two nations which were noticeably different. As

in other large member States, attention was paid to regional

interests in Germany; there were a wide variety of activities

including street theatre sponsored by the Europa-Union and specially

created Länder committees for the European Elections. Realisation

of the information programme was greatly assisted by the enthusiastic

support of national and Länder governments and bodies. Commenting

that the early and positive involvement of political parties would

prove to be a crucial factor in getting the vote out she drew

attention to the underlying commitment to European integration and

the governing parties support of direct elections in Germany whereas

in Britain the periods immediately prior to the parties' campaigns

and the General Election were conspicuous for their lack of novelty.

Despite the fact that two special offices were set up in Manchester

and Birmingham to bring the Community closer to the people and despite

the fact that there were permanent Community press and information

offices in Edinburgh and Cardiff, the Community's visibility did

not appear to be noticeably improved. None of them managed to

generate enthusiasm amongst the British general public for the

European Elections.[6]

Lodge made reference to the fact that the turnout was considered

disappointing by national standards in Germany as well as in Britain

(65.9% compared with 90.7% in German Federal Elections; 32.4% compared

with 76% in British General Elections). European Election turnout

was lower in other member States also.[7] Blumler and Fox pointed out

that the involvement of voters in the Elections was problematic

from the start. The decision to hold the elections was a deliberate

measure of political engineering in the hope of increasing Community

consciousness among mass publics, but it was always doubtful whether

the Election process would overcome popular indifference. In spite

of cross-national currents of party cooperation, the campaigns were

waged through national systems and Media and it was doubtful if much

voter interest could be aroused by an election which was ambiguously

straddled by a mixture of system levels. It was always possible that

reduced partisan and media commitment would result in weaker voter

and audience involvement and against this background they argued, it

was not surprising that the turnout was lower.[8]

Looking at support for the idea of the European Elections,

European Commission sponsored opinion polls revealed that in 1976

there was strong support for direct elections in Britain as much as

in Germany. However, I noted that they had different views on the

roles of the political parties, the British wanting the political

parties to campaign under national banners, the Germans preferring

political parties to get together.

Blumler and Fox noted that the campaign for the Elections was regarded as less than riveting by many Community electors. In a separate analysis they commented on people's reactions to the Media campaigns which were waged in Britain and Germany, noting the German television campaign evoked a positive response whereas the British campaign provoked more complaint than appreciation. German broadcasters were, for example, determined to give the campaign a fully 'European' flavour, an emphasis which they said, succeeded apparently for exceptionally large minorities of Germans said afterwards that the programmes, "showed me where my party stands on European questions" and "showed me how the European Community is run". In Britain in contrast, viewers complained more often than any other nation of feeling "confused". Many British viewers complained that their television networks had paid too little attention to the Election. In Germany there was more complaint of too much attention by the television.[9] Blumler and Fox suggested that the British reaction to the Media campaign reflected not only their awareness of objectively low levels of party and broadcasting activity but also some frustration over having been asked to vote in an election with very little information to guide them.[10] Lodge noted, in considering the issues in the British campaign that there seemed little difference between the Conservative and Labour parties, both apparently wanting reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, Community Budget, and fishing policies although the Conservatives had detailed proposals and a more positive stance on what the Community offered Britain and the role of the European Parliament.[11]

Blumler referred to the comments of a British news editor who remarked that "compared with a General Election, we have to start from a much lower level of prior awareness and knowledge in members of the public about European affairs" and came to the conclusion

that broadcasters in other States were less constrained than their

British colleagues by the perceived insularity of their audience and

were less obliged to assume a starting-point of zero-knowledge about

European politics.[12]   Lodge, in analysing the failure of the information

campaigns to generate interest amongst the British public, commented

on the fact that one of the reasons for low interest and apathy might

have been the fact that the press advertisements did not make for

scintillating reading in contrast to the rousing German campaign

where there were television advertisements calling on voters to use

their votes.[13]   I have commented in detail earlier in the thesis on

the respective attitudes and expectations of the publics of Germany

and Britain to the Elections and to the European Parliament and

brought out the fact that national interests were very prevalent in

both nations though the Germans were more 'European' minded.   Noting

this, Blumler and Fox pointed out that the Germans viewed the Elections

in terms of greater European cooperation, in contrast to the British

preoccupation with agricultural issues which was clearly a concern

about European agricultural policies.[14]

Both nations revealed very contrasting reactions in terms of

level of interest in the Elections.   Germany, of all the Community

countries, stood out in having experienced the most invigorating

election campaign and the German electors were highest in campaign

interest, exposure and evaluation as well as voting turn-out and they

performed creditably as regards issue awareness also.   The British

were at the other extreme in that British efforts elicited consistently

low-key responses from many electors who tended to lack interest in

the campaign, followed it cursorily, gave low marks to television

coverage and had little to say about the issues.[15]   Blumler and

Fox also commented that the pro-European Germans managed to name

Election issues whereas British electors could think of few issues that had emerged from the campaign.[16]

An I.T.N. Press Information Bulletin offered an interesting insight into British attitudes. Taken after polling, it commented that the main reason people stayed at home was that they just did not know what it was all about.[17] According to Blumler and Fox some British broadcasters did concede that they might have under-estimated the appetite of audiences for campaign material and "helped to make the Election not only dull but incomprehensible."[18] Inglehart and Rabier discussed interest in the Elections and noted that rising public support was manifest for a directly-elected parliament and that there were absolute majorities supporting the idea by 1977. Commenting on the fact that the Community publics were not very aware of the Elections they noted that Britain was an extreme case. Six weeks before, in a Gallup opinion poll, only 55% said that they had heard or seen anything about the European Parliament, 25% were able to mention the Elections, although one week before, the British were noticeably better informed with 42% now able to mention the Elections.[19] Ironically, in 1977, far more British people had believed that it was important to go and vote in the Elections than had the Germans; in Germany there were fluctuations in determination to vote over the years although the basic fundamental determination to vote was there. In Britain in contrast, after being at comparable German levels for many years, there was a drop in 1979 amongst those determined to vote and indeed there was a low turn-out.[20] Ironically the British recollection of voting was markedly higher by about 20% compared to those who had actually voted. In Germany the difference was marginal.[21] Butler also noted the earlier British determination to vote. A May 1978 opinion poll revealed that 45% had said that they would certainly vote and 27% that they probably would, which

was fairly typical for the Community as a whole.[22]

Rabier and Inglehart held the view that the fact that the British Labour Party failed to conduct any campaign worth mentioning had more to do with the low rate of turn-out. They noted that the information level of Labour Party supporters was about ten points lower than that of Liberals and Conservatives which was probably a reflection of the fact that the latter parties made an effort to mobilise their electorate. They drew attention to opinion polls which revealed that 89% of Germans in comparison with 47% of Britons were able to mention the Elections even though they had not noticed it, (40% of the British) and 68% of Germans had read or heard something about the European Parliament though they could not specify the Elections, (38% of the British).[23] Dreyfus pointed out, commenting on the size of the audiences for the electoral debates which were broadcast, that there was a lack of enthusiasm in Germany as well as Britain over the electoral campaign. But there was a fundamental difference in approach to the Elections too.[24]

As Blumler and Fox noted, the national campaigns gave rise to different issues, and reflected that German electors were unique in mentioning the need for further cooperation more than any other issue and also to a lesser extent saw the Election in terms of rival ideological visions of the future. In contrast, 45% of the British were concerned with agricultural policies.[25] Butler and Marquand commented that in contrast to the race between the Christian Democrats and Socialists in Germany the difficulties which faced Labour candidates had unexpected echoes in the Conservative Party in that it was difficult to arouse interest in a campaign where, they said, one of the contestants had largely withdrawn. The absence of a Labour campaign was damaging according to a successful Conservative candidate. Commenting still further on British attitudes they noted

that the voters were not choosing the future Government of Europe

and everyone knew it. They could not see what relevance the Parliament

had and were only aware of the limitations of its powers.[26] Inglehart

and Rabier made the point that those individuals with pro-European

attitudes were more likely to vote[27] and as Dreyfus commented, the

Labour Party, which contained few 'Europeans' suffered a very high

percentage of abstentions.[28] Butler and Marquand also suggested that

a more strident Labour campaign might have stimulated working-class

Conservatives to vote as well as working class Labour supporters.[29]

Commenting on partisanship in Britain, Blumler and Fox noted that

Conservatives developed more interest in the campaign, followed it

more avidly, and voted more often than did Liberal supporters who

were, in turn, more involved than Labour supporters. They also noted

a tendency for relatively weak or irregular associations between age

and campaign interest to crystallise into stronger relationships when

the turnout was examined and this was marked in Britain and among

German Social Democrats.[30] Also German findings provided a good

example for the appearance of an influence of election exposure on

turnout to become much stronger at lower levels of interest in the

campaign as most of the 'very' and 'quite' interested Germans voted

but, noticeably, amongst those not at all interested, turn-out rose

from 21% to 73%.[31] Drawing further on the age-factor, Blumler and

Fox made two points. First, Britain was typical of a case where

older electors may have been drawn to voting less through promptings

of interest than through life-long socialisation to the habit of voting.

Secondly, the British were more likely to hold pro-European attitudes

if they supported the Conservative Party, had stayed at school longer,

were males and of greater age.[32] Inglehart and Rabier commented on

the low electoral participation in the Elections by British workers,

(predominantly Labour voters).[33] The Germans deviated in terms of

age for whereas youthful abstention was widespread throughout the

Community, the more particular failure of older Germans to vote might

have reflected their generational detachment from the pro-European

mood of the post-war period. With respect to gender, a dutiful

outlook on voting which mainly characterised older people was in

Germany a feature of male electors. (Note, the lower numbers of older

male Germans alive in contrast to older women.)[34]

     Finally, in Germany and Britain pro-Marketeers were reached

by more channels of communication than were anti-Marketeers and Britain

stood out, according to Blumler and Fox, as the only country where

opponents were less likely to have participated than those who

considered the Community 'neither good nor bad'. In Germany turn-

out among opponents was nearly 20% lower than among supporters; in

Britain the difference was 37%.[35] As Herman and Lodge noted, two

Labour voters abstained for every Conservative whereas Germans were

more pro-European.[36] In contrast to British hostility to supra-

national conceptions, Dreyfus, and also Herman and Lodge, noted

the fact that the major German parties were enthusiastically pro-

European and approved supra-national conceptions.[37] The British were,

in general, less supportive of Community membership and, as Blumler

and Fox said, those who were clear in their minds that membership

was a bad thing abstained even more frequently than people who

responded 'Don't Know'. In contrast, in other European countries,

it was the 'Don't Knows' who were less inclined to vote than respondents

in any other opinion category.[38]

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CONCLUSION

A very widely held view was expressed by Bibes, Menudier, de la Serre and Smouts who wrote that Germany was rightly considered to be one of the most pro-European countries in the Community, being willing to consider supra-national solutions and not opposing the idea of a possible extension of the powers of the European Assembly elected by universal suffrage. Party squabbles did not disguise the broad consensus between the parties on the need to unify Europe and on the way Europe should be organised and there was agreement in explaining to the voters in the European Election campaign that Germany gained many advantages from the Community which fully justified their commitment to it.[1]

Contrast this with their opinion of Britain where they questioned whether they could speak of a 'national' attitude towards Europe when it was in Britain that the principle of Community membership aroused the most passionate divisons? Rather than experiencing a positive attraction towards the European ideal, the British felt it was important not to be excluded from the Continental group on their doorstep in order that they could influence its development. The British remained unwilling Europeans and after more than five years of membership, the preparations, events and results of the European Election showed that Britain was not a European country like the others.[2] Public opinion was disposed to blame the Community for many of Britain's ills, as the opinion polls confirmed and there existed, they added, a specifically British approach both pragmatic and defensive in its view of Europe with regard to the development of the institutions and policies of the Community. The Europe the parties envisaged was one of cooperation not integration.[3]

But not all commentators agreed completely. Marwick, for example, commenting on British attitudes to Europe, wrote that despite the Referendum, it was not easy to generalise on British attitudes,

> ...but without doubt, in the middle seventies, there
> were many manifestations of closer contact with Europe
> and of a greater cosmopolitanism allied perhaps with
> greater insecurity and less insular pride.[4]

The evidence I have presented in the thesis suggests that in the period 1975-1980, the situation was not, in some respects, as straightforward as the above statements might suggest. Certainly Germany was more supportive of Community membership and was more favourably disposed to the developments in the Community especially in terms of further integration. Much of their established attitudes were probably due to the actual experience of over twenty years of membership and yet there were some question marks which could be posed over their attitudes especially with regard to the length of their membership. They increasingly showed insecurity in terms of their future prosperity and position though they were keen supporters of Community action. But there was a clear worry about there being any detrimental effects on Germany herself. Nationalism was evident however much there was a desire for integration. It might not be incorrect to suggest either that it was selfish reasons of desire to resurrect herself from the ashes of War which brought her into the Community in the first place and she certainly enjoyed a leadership role within the Community. Therefore was it surprising that she continued to manifest instrumentalist attitudes? Bibes et al. did refer to German nationalism. They noted that in the (European) Election campaign traditional conflicts over domestic political issues arose in just the same way as in a normal legislative election.[5] Attitudes in Britain appeared to be still those of the Winston Churchill

quote that "We are with them, but not of them".[6] Bibes et al.

comment on the British desire for cooperation did, I would argue,

reflect British attitudes; cooperation with their Community colleagues

in order to get a good (in their eyes) deal for Britain.

I made a specific effort in the thesis to compare socio-political

attitudes and I do not believe they were irrelevant. The 1970s was

a period of great economic uncertainty and one cannot discount the

effect on people's willingness or unwillingness to support Community

issues. Depressed personal feelings were manifest and even Germany,

in spite of her wealth, was not excluded. Social factors too played

their part in determining attitudes as did the conscious or unconscious

absorption of the attitudes of politicians. A major British criticism

was lack of information about the Community. It manifested itself

clearly in the European Election campaign but as we have seen was

evident throughout the years. Germans were better informed but it

would be wrong to say that British attitudes were inherently uninterested

merely that there was no encouragement from politicians or the Media

to help them become better informed. And this lack of information

clearly had an effect on attitudes to the Community. As Bibes et al.

and others have suggested, the British were prone to blame the

Community for their ills. But Marwick's point about British

insecurity rang true for both nations in some respects. The Germans

too were uneasy at times.

The spectre of nationalism certainly was a feature of British

attitudes but it also was found in Germany to quite a strong degree.

Bibes et al. suggested that in Germany there was a demand for faster

and more complete implementation of common policies which too often

were held back by the crises of recent years.[7] But were they, as it

would appear, prepared to go very far down the road to integration?

I would argue that desire for common policies was an example of a

widespread German desire to protect their own interests. Support

was expressed where there were clear benefits but they were not, as

we have seen, prepared to submerge national identity completely.

Hence continued support for the German flag and consistent national

pride. The British did not believe that they were doing well out

of Community membership but perhaps the reason for this displeasure

could be seen in their attitudes to Community actions. They expected

more action on the part of the Community in terms of proposals to

help the British economic situation and one could see that there

was support for Community behaviour when they felt that they were

gaining.

Perhaps there was some truth in claims that the Community

was being seen in mainly economic terms: I certainly would suggest

one could apply this epithet to both nations. I would argue that

there was a clear tendency in both nations to indicate high degrees

of instrumentalism in terms of European development and integration.

Many Germans were worried about the international situation and

foreign policy. One might well suggest that they supported integration

in order to protect themselves - "an insurance network of nations".

The British, in spite of opposition to membership, clearly wanted

to benefit from membership. Rather than voting en masse for anti-

Community parties however they expressed apathy and complained of

lack of knowledge in the European Elections. It may well be that the

constant criticisms of the Media reflected their own confusion and

ambivalent situation about the Community.

They viewed Community membership out of self-interested eyes

and one gained the clear impression that the volatility of the

British public would manifest itself in favour of the Community if

there were signs of major economic benefits. And their insecurity

of the world outside was evident. There did not appear to be any real desire for entering the harsh world outside of protective Community tariffs and politically the British shared many attitudes on foreign policy with the Germans. The British and the Germans shared many similar attitudes, perhaps not to the same degree but their general outlook to life did not appear significantly different and nor did their basic inherent relatively traditional and conservative attitudes to politics.

I commented that the British had no desire to change the status quo, nor I would suggest did the Germans. British one-sidedness was a factor to consider and it did dominate British attitudes to the Community, being very visible in what was expected of the newly elected M.E.P.s; in British eyes especially they were expected to work for national interests before Community interests. The far greater degree of polarisation in British politics made it far less likely that any consensus view would emerge on European integration. The British appeared to be caught between two stools; they were unhappy over membership yet considered the Community important and indeed anticipated that they might still be members at the end of the century. This is illustrated by their surprisingly favourable long-term views about the future of the Community. Paradoxically they did not like change and much as they wanted the Community to develop along lines which they preferred, at the same time they worried incessantly at the effects of the Community on their own country. But it was doubtful if, given the chance, they would not take the same 1975 decision to remain as this would not only bring insecurity but also upset the new status quo. The picture of the British with their backs to the wall defending their national insti-tutions yet being willing to claw as much as they could from their

membership in terms of money and benefits was one with more than a

small ring of truth in it.

What of the Germans? They accepted further unification and

progress in that direction more than the British but it would seem

as much out of a sense of self-interest as idealism, and they were

actually the least supportive of helping Community members in trouble

if personal sacrifices were required. The Germans were happy to

accept Community policies in principle and would work for unity

but not if it involved too much German sacrifice. Both clearly had

instrumental outlooks which manifested themselves in different

ways. Perhaps one could say that the fundamental situation was that

of German determination to support the Community and make changes

where she might gain, (expansion equalling security). For the

British it was a question of, "We're in the Community, we won't

change, let them change to suit us so we get some benefit out of

membership."

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