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Nicholas James Calver

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Nicholas James CALVER
Submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts in Theology
1990

**The Charismatic Experience as an Experience of God's Action in the
World: a Study of Karl Rahner's Theology as a Charismatic Theology**

The first chapter of this thesis examines some of the Pauline material concerning charismatic experience and argues that such experience is bound up with the experience of grace. This grace is the grace of Christ and consequently involves self-sacrificial love and a sharing in the sufferings of Christ. The second chapter takes a broad look at Rahner's thought, bringing out his concern with experience of the Spirit and the charismatic nature of his theology. The third chapter examines the philosophical influences behind Rahner's thought. This is an essential task since Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge provides the framework for his understanding of experience of God in grace and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger influences the way Rahner thinks about grace. The fourth chapter shows the importance of love for Rahner's understanding of experience of God and is the philosophical counterpart to the exegetical material in the first chapter. The fifth chapter examines the nature of Rahner's understanding of grace and its christocentric character, picking up a theme started in the second chapter. The sixth chapter questions the adequacy of Rahner's understanding of God's involvement with the world. The seventh chapter develops the notion of charismatic transformation and points to a deficiency in Rahner's thought in this area, due to an inadequate pneumatology and also, a point developed in the previous chapter, the inability to posit change in God which compromises Rahner's understanding of God's involvement with the world. The final chapter examines the corporate nature of the charismatic experience and corrects the individualistic bias in Rahner's thought.

**The Charismatic Experience as an Experience
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**Submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts
University of Durham, Department of Theology**

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INTRODUCTION

The reality of experience of the Spirit is of crucial significance to Rahner's theology and for him: 'the givenness of a genuine, original experience of God and his Spirit is of fundamental importance'.¹ In an interview given in 1974 Rahner recounted how a pentecostalist came to visit him. He told how this man spoke of baptism in the Spirit, about 'breaking through into a final stage of Christian existence' and into the freedom of God. Rahner commented on this as follows:

He was referring to an experience that is conceivable but which with most of us is spread out over an entire life. What drives one to despair about this is how naively such people absolutely identify their inspirations, their sense of peace, freedom, and being led by the Holy Spirit with the immediate and direct intervention of God.²

For Rahner this sort of view is based on poor theology which too easily identifies one's own experiences as direct interventions of God and involves a simplistic understanding of prayer. Rahner is concerned that what is required is a theology that is not rationalistic but rational, that is not clever talk that will deter people from praying or experiencing the Spirit but which will 'ensure that such pneumatic-enthusiastic movements will not simply peter out in the near future'.³

Pastoral concerns motivate this thesis, since it is an attempt to develop an adequate theology of experience of the Spirit in order to help people interpret and understand their religious experience. All too often charismatic spirituality and theology have had damaging pastoral consequences. This is caused by three factors in

particular.⁴

Firstly this may be because of a narrow interpretation of 'experience of the Holy Spirit' which leads to the action of the Spirit being seen in interventionist terms, as miraculous 'signs and wonders', or in other experiences defined as 'religious', as opposed to a much broader understanding of God's action. We shall see how both the Pauline account and Rahner's theology have this broad understanding of experience of the Spirit which means that potentially it can embrace all areas of life. Secondly this may be due to an authoritarian outlook both in personal beliefs, i.e. dogmatism and fundamentalism, and in submission to hierarchical structures and regimes. We shall see how Rahner's theology combines autonomy and responsibility with dependence on God. Thirdly this may be because the charismatic movement uses the language of mature spiritual development and deep mystical experience; it talks of 'letting go' and letting God take over. But in order to reach this level of maturity a clear sense of one's own identity is required, whereas many people get involved in the charismatic movement precisely because they are not sure of their own identity; the result is 'a kind of spiritual act of suicide'.⁵ We shall see that Rahner does not sufficiently develop the aspect of personal development and growth and we will look at another Jesuit theologian, Donald Gelpi, in order to see how his charismatic theology adds to Rahner's, particularly in this area.

As this thesis is examining the charismatic nature of Rahner's theology it is first necessary to obtain a definition of the term charismatic. Therefore the first chapter examines the Pauline material concerning experience of the Spirit and argues that such experience is bound up with the experience of grace. This grace is

the grace of Christ and consequently involves self-sacrificial love and a sharing in the sufferings of Christ. The second chapter takes a broad look at Rahner's thought, bringing out his concern with experience of the Spirit and the charismatic nature of his theology. The third chapter examines the philosophical influences behind Rahner's thought, a necessary exercise since Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge provides the framework for his understanding of experience of God in grace, and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger influences the way Rahner thinks about grace. The fourth chapter shows the importance of love for Rahner's understanding of experience of God, and is the philosophical counterpart to the exegetical material in the first chapter. The fifth chapter examines the nature of Rahner's understanding of grace and its Christocentric character, picking up a theme started in the second chapter. The sixth chapter questions the adequacy of Rahner's understanding of God's involvement with the world. The seventh chapter develops the notion of charismatic transformation and points to a deficiency in Rahner's thought in this area, which is due to an inadequate pneumatology and also, a point developed in the previous chapter, the inability to posit change in God which compromises Rahner's understanding of God's involvement with the world. The final chapter examines the corporate nature of the charismatic experience and corrects the individualistic bias in Rahner's thought.

Notes to Introduction

1. P. Imhof and H. Biallowons, ed., Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 1965-1982, Crossroad, New York, 1986, (hereafter referred to as Dialogue), p.328.
2. Ibid., p.133.
3. Ibid.,
4. J. Ponter, 'First Aid in Pastoral Care, XIV: The Charismatic Movement', The Expository Times, Vol. 96 (May 1985), pp.228-233.
5. J. Ponter, op. cit., p.229; cf. D. Davies, 'The Charismatic Ethic and the Spirit of Post-Industrialism', in D. Martin and P. Mullen, ed., Strange Gifts, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, pp.137-150.

Chapter 1

THE CHARISMATIC EXPERIENCE

Before looking at the charismatic nature of Rahner's theology it is necessary first of all to define what we mean by 'charismatic'. The term is intimately linked with the concept of grace and this link will be seen to be of fundamental significance to understanding Rahner's charismatic theology.

Charisma and grace

Etymologically *charisma* comes from the verb *charizomai* which in turn is derived from *charis*, a common word in the Septuagint and New Testament Greek, basically meaning 'attractiveness' or 'gracefulness' but also able to mean 'kindness' or 'favour'. In the New Testament the word comes to mean favour bestowed upon men contrary to their desert. Basically *charis* denotes action and *charisma* denotes result of that action, i.e. a free or gracious gift.¹ *Charisma* occurs 17 times in the New Testament and all but one in the Pauline corpus, 14 times in Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians (Rom. 1:11; 5:15f.; 6:23; 11:29; 12:6; 1 Cor. 1:7; 7:7; 12:4, 9, 28, 30f.; 2 Cor. 1:11; 1 Tim. 4:14; 2 Tim 1:6; 1 Pet. 4:10).²

Since *charisma* is such a distinctively Pauline word, its usage in Paul's theology needs to be examined, and because of the intimate connection between *charisma* and grace, the concept of grace needs to be looked at first. For Paul grace is the word that sums up the nature and structure of the salvation event, both the past event (2

Cor. 8; Rom. 5:15; Gal. 2:21; Eph. 1:6f.) and the power of the present experience (Rom. 3:24; 5:2, 15, 17, 20; 1 Cor. 1:4f; 15:10; 2 Cor. 6:1; Gal. 1:6, 15; 2:21; Eph. 2:5, 8).³ Also particular ministries or services inspired by grace are referred to as graces and Paul's special grace is his apostolic office (Rom. 1:5; 1 Cor. 16:3, 2 Cor. 1:15; 8:1, 8:4, 6f, 19; Eph. 4:29).

It is only in the context of *charis* that *charisma* can be understood. The *charisma*, the gift, 'is inseparable from the gracious power that bestows it' and that gracious power is the Spirit of God, thus a *charisma* is a manifestation of the Spirit.⁴ Therefore for Paul experience of grace is experience of the Spirit and as such, as shall be shown later in this chapter, sums up Paul's understanding of the Christian experience as being 'in Christ'. The meaning of God's salvation deed in Jesus is expressed by Paul in the phrase 'the gift of grace' (Rom. 6:23) and as we shall see the salvation event becomes present through the gracious gifts of the Spirit, the *charismata*. The centrality and all-embracing nature of the charismatic experience for Paul is brought out in Rom. 6:23 where *charisma* means 'all that God's unmerited generosity accomplishes in and for the believer';⁵ in Rom. 12:1ff. which shows that 'the believer's spiritual (and charismatic) worship involves the totality of his relationships in this age';⁶ and in 2 Cor. 1:11 where *charisma* represents 'the totality of the conferred gift of salvation'.⁷ Therefore James Dunn in his book Jesus and the Spirit can conclude his examination of the concept of grace as follows: 'All grace, including its particular manifestations, is the one grace of God . . . the whole of life is for Paul an expression of grace: all is of grace, and grace is all'.⁸ Since Dunn's book is the most thorough examination of the Pauline material relating to the

charismatic experience we shall refer extensively to this work in the present chapter.

An important aspect of experience of the Spirit for Paul is that it is a shared experience.⁹ A key concept in his understanding of community is expressed in the phrase *he koinonia tou hagiou pneumatos* (2 Cor. 13:13, Phil. 2:1) which is usually translated 'the fellowship of the Holy Spirit' but which actually means 'participation in the Holy Spirit'. This means that Paul understands the Church as a charismatic community and that therefore to be a Christian is to be charismatic, since for Paul being a Christian was to be a member of the body of Christ, to participate in the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12, 2 Cor. 13:13f, Phil. 2:1).¹⁰ That participation is dynamic not static, 'an ongoing event, constantly dependent on the Spirit manifesting his manifold interacting *charismata*'.¹¹ Each member of the body has a contribution to make, however menial and each contribution is a *charisma* (1 Cor. 12:21ff.). All *charismata* are acts of service (1 Cor. 12:4 - 7) given for the common good, for the sanctification of the body (cf 1 Cor. 12:25f., Rom. 12:5). Consequently 1 Cor. 12, the fullest chapter on spiritual gifts to individuals, leads on to the vision of the optimal Christian community. For Paul the growth demanded by the gift of grace is not just individual but communal; 'the corporate dimension of religious experience is integral to Paul's whole understanding of the divine-human relationship' and therefore personal growth is only possible within a communal setting.¹²

According to Dunn, Paul does not understand *charisma* as 'a human capacity heightened, developed or transformed', rather it is always the manifestation of a supernatural power characterised by a 'transcendent otherness'.¹³ Although Dunn considers it important not

to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural in a contemporary interpretation of religious phenomena, he makes it clear that Paul makes such a distinction. As a result of this Dunn makes a clear-cut distinction between natural gifts and supernatural *charismata* and avoids making a link between a person and *charismata*. *Charismata* are seen as specific and particular endowments for particular occasions: 'only the actual deed or word is the *charisma*'.¹⁴ Therefore he also maintains 'there is no immediate causal connection between *charismata* and sanctification'.¹⁵ Although Dunn sees *charismata* as the functionings of the body of Christ given to build up the community, he does not develop, although recognizing, 'the charismatic character of the process of growth'.¹⁶ He wants to separate *charismata* from sanctification, the process of growth. This, however, we will argue, is an essential aspect of the charismatic experience as an expression of grace and we shall develop this in the next chapter.

Although on the one hand Dunn talks about the all-embracing character of grace for Paul, on the other hand he wants to limit it to specific and particular manifestations, not to permanent ministries or offices. Although recognizing that Paul applies the term *charis* to his apostleship, Dunn argues that being an apostle is not a charismatic function.¹⁷ But this sort of approach leads to the narrow interpretation of the experience of the Holy Spirit that we want to avoid and that Rahner is concerned in his theology of grace to avoid.¹⁸ This wider understanding is not only brought about by a different theology of grace. Exegetical evidence would seem to suggest it too.

Firstly, in 1 Corinthians 12 Paul talks about spiritual gifts and, as Dunn points out, there is no distinction between charismatic

gifts and other activities in verses 4-6, *charismata*, services and activities are all charismatic manifestations.¹⁸ Paul then speaks of the body as an analogy of the church which is for Paul, as we have seen, a charismatic community; all within it are charismatic and the gifts of the Spirit are 'the living movements of Christ's body'.¹⁹ But in that case it would seem clear that just as there are eyes, ears, head and feet etc. (vv.14 - 26), so too there are apostles, prophets, teachers etc.; offices or functions are charismatic as much as individual acts.

In this letter Paul wants to distinguish between people and gifts since the Corinthians were boasting about their gifts (1 Cor. 4:7). Elsewhere Paul makes a much closer link between person and gift: 'I am hoping through your prayers to be granted [*charisthesomai*, bestowed as a gracious gift] to you' (Philm. 22; cf. 2 Cor. 1:15).²⁰

Secondly, Dunn contrasts *charisma* and office in a rather disparaging reference to early Catholicism: 'Spirit and *charisma* have become in effect subordinate to office, to ritual, to tradition - early Catholicism indeed!'.²¹ However it does not follow that just because *charisma* is described as 'within' Timothy (1 Tim. 4:14; II Tim. 1:6) that this is proof that '*charisma* has become power of office', as opposed to the dynamic Pauline concept; rather it seems entirely consistent with Paul's view of the Spirit being within believers (eg Rom. 8:9).²²

This is also misinterpreting the function of office in the Catholic church. *Charisma* is not power of office; the human office itself is not charismatic. However, it has, as Rahner points out, a charismatic element which transcends the institutional order, giving the office a charismatic character. Both the institutional and the

charismatic are governed by Christ and consequently both are charismatically inspired:

To that extent, therefore, ecclesiastical office and ministry is charismatic in character, if we understand by charismatic what is in contradistinction to what is purely institutional, administered by men, subject to calculation and expressible in laws and rules.²³

Dunn's argument that the apostolate is not a *charisma* is based on the assertion that 'Paul derived his authority as an apostle not from the inspiration of the present but from the decisive events of the past',²⁴ but this simply does not follow. If the risen Christ appoints apostles, as Dunn would maintain, then it is a charismatic function, since 'one cannot experience Christ except as Spirit'.²⁵ According to Arnold Bittlinger apostles 'must have been conscious of an inner call from Christ, to which the Holy Spirit bore unmistakable testimony, and their call was recognized and endorsed by the church'.²⁶ Although Dunn is technically correct in saying that Paul calls apostleship a *charis* not a *charisma*, theologically it is an artificial distinction when seen in the light of Paul's overall thought. As Donald Gelpi puts it: 'James Dunn has attempted to portray the apostolate in terms that seem to me to reflect better his own reticence concerning the advantages of institutional religion than the Pauline virtues'.²⁷

Thirdly, although technically Dunn is correct in saying that Paul does not call marriage a *charisma*, the implication in 1 Cor. 7:7 is that he thinks of it so. Paul is contrasting celibacy with marriage, arguing that he has adopted the celibate state in order to be able to fully devote himself to the Gospel, whereas others have a different *charisma*, which on a straightforward reading of the text implies marriage. To argue that the gift of celibacy means the ability to suppress specific sexual passions each time they arise

would seem to be an artificial reading of the text.²⁸ In other words *charismata* include permanent vocational calls and are not just the experience of grace 'in a particular instance and only for that instance'.²⁹

Fourthly it is not just a case of there being different models of the Church which can be compared with each other: the Pauline charismatic community, the early catholicism of the pastorals, Johannine individual pietism and the Matthean law-abiding brotherhood. These are not alternatives as Dunn suggests in one place, but as he suggests elsewhere different churches in different situations reflect something of the dominant characteristics of their environment.³⁰ If they are conceived as alternatives then the dynamic (but, for Dunn, probably unworkable) Pauline vision of the charismatic community is contrasted with the other models with their inherent dangers of institutionalism, individualism and legalism. Given such a choice Dunn opts for the Pauline vision, concluding that the biggest challenge for contemporary Christianity:

. . . is to take the Pauline exposition seriously, and to start not from what now is by way of tradition and institution, but instead to be open to that experience of God which first launched Christianity.³¹

Or, as he expresses it elsewhere, to become a one-generation church which organizes not for the future but concentrates on the present, lest the future becomes so burdened with the past that it cannot make the vision of Christian community a reality.³²

But this is to propose a false choice, the primary way to be open to the original experience of God that launched Christianity is by way of tradition and institution. Contrary to Dunn's view that 2 Tim. 1:14 indicates that the *charisma* has lost its dynamic character and is only the power that guards the tradition, it shows the dynamic nature of the tradition, enlivened by the Spirit, a basic

Pauline thought (1 Cor. 7:10; 9:14; 11:2, 23; 15:3; Phil. 4:9; 2 Thess. 2:15).³³ As Rahner puts it:

It goes without saying that as the Church grew, its "machinery" grew too, and the regulations for this were worked out more fully. But this is not proof that in the early Church the wind of the Spirit blew with more vigour than later.³⁴

Therefore for Rahner the Spirit has always inspired the Church, both through official authority and laws and also through such things as the love of martyrdom and monastic enthusiasm. Although Dunn acknowledges the spiritual nature of the law he does not develop the implications of that and thus makes the distinction between the charismatic community and early Catholicism. The Spirit gives law, therefore the law is spiritual (Rom. 7:14), 'in the sense that it derives from the Spirit . . . and was intended to address men at the level of the Spirit'.³⁵ In other words the Spirit is 'the organizing principle of the Christian community'.³⁶ This means that for Rahner, the Franciscans, for example, by their submission to ecclesiastical law through their vows, are charismatics since the submission to law, if really done 'in a spirit of joyous poverty' brings about the self-sacrificial love that is the hallmark of a *charisma*.³⁷ This notion of self-sacrificial love defining a *charisma* is central to the understanding of the charismatic nature of Rahner's theology, as we shall see.

The charismatic experience as an experience of death and resurrection

Although Dunn on the one hand rightly stresses the centrality of the charismatic experience for Paul, on the other hand he can argue that there was nothing distinctively Christian about charismatic activity for Paul. Dunn cites examples of healings, visions, prophecies and

tongues from sources contemporary to the New Testament. He concludes that 'charismatic experience as such does not bring us to the heart of distinctively Christian experience for Paul'.³⁹ Dunn can say that charismatic activity is not distinctively Christian for Paul only because he identifies *charismata* in this context with unusual phenomena of the 'signs and wonders' type, with an otherworldly 'experience of receiving a gift from beyond'.³⁹ Although elsewhere he has a much broader definition of charismatic experience he always works with the concept of *charismata* as a manifestation of supernatural power in specific and particular occasions. This is why he can make no connection between *charismata* and sanctification and can envisage the experience of *charismata* without love.⁴⁰

What is distinctive about Christian experience for Paul, according to Dunn, is that it is experience of the crucified and risen Christ and that therefore it is a manifestation of the self-sacrificial love of God in Christ. The Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus (1 Cor. 12:3; Rom. 8:14ff.; 2 Cor. 3:18; Rom. 8:28f.) and that means that the 'character of the Christ event is the hallmark of the Spirit'.⁴¹ For Paul the 'last Adam became a life-giving Spirit' (1 Cor. 15:45), thus the experience of the Spirit is experience of Christ. (Though it should be pointed out that Paul is speaking 'primarily in existential rather than ontological terms',⁴² that is to say he is primarily concerned here with how Christ is experienced by the believer, since Christ is more than life-giving Spirit (eg. Rom. 1:3f.; 8:34; 1 Cor. 15:24-8); but as far as Christian experience is concerned, experience of the Spirit is experience of Christ (cf. Rom. 8:9-11; 1 Cor. 6:17; 1 Cor. 12:4-6).)

Consequently for Paul the Christian experience is not only one

of life but also death (Rom. 7:24; 8:10, 13), sanctification is brought about through suffering with Christ (2 Cor. 4:7-5:5; Rom. 8:17; 2 Cor. 1:5; Col. 1:24; Rom. 5:2ff.).⁴³ Experience of the Spirit is experience of life through death, the distinctive Christian experience for Paul is experience both of the exalted and of the crucified Christ. This experience of sharing in the suffering and death of Christ is strongly brought out in a number of places in Paul's epistles.

In Gal. 2:19f. Paul uses the perfect tense, not the aorist, meaning 'I have been crucified with Christ and am in that state still'; the perfect is also used in Gal. 6:14 and Rom. 6:5.⁴⁴ In Rom. 8:15-17 the gift of Spirit is linked with suffering and in Phil. 3:10f Paul talks about knowing Christ in the fellowship of his sufferings and 'being conformed' to his death.

But this is precisely what charismatic experience is. Thus Heribert Mühlen can say in his book A Charismatic Theology that 'an initial acceptance of one's own death' is 'the pre-condition for all charismatic activity'.⁴⁵ For any Christian the basic and primary experience of the Spirit is one of suffering and surrender. According to Mühlen 'Jesus' basic charism is his *self-surrender* . . . and out of this all his charisms and therefore ours also flow'.⁴⁶ Again Dunn would recognize that this is the case (Jesus himself, as a man who lived 'according to the spirit' [Rom. 1:3f], by his actions and words and by the whole character of his life and relationships, became 'the charisma of God') but does not develop it, reverting to a narrow definition of charismatic activity that means it is not the essence of Christian experience.⁴⁷

Koenig in his book Charismata: God's Gifts for God's People argues that in 2 Cor. 1:8-11 *charisma* refers not to the deliverance

but to an enlarged share in Christ's suffering. *Charisma* in verse 11 includes 'the death part of his experience as well as the resurrection/liberation part'; the entire event was a *charisma*. To know Christ is to experience 'the fellowship of suffering' and 'the power of the resurrection' (Phil. 3:10).⁴⁹ The charismatic nature of the death experience is also brought out in Phil. 1:29: 'For it has been granted (*eucharisthe* - 'bestowed as a gracious gift') to you that for the sake of Christ you should not only believe in him but also suffer for his sake'.⁴⁹

Therefore charismatic experience is not the experience of 'signs and wonders' nor is it a higher and optional way of Christian experience but it is the very nature of Christian experience. It is the realm not of supernatural interventions but of participation in the sufferings of Christ, brought about through decision, the decision whether or not to suffer with Christ. Thus Dunn can say:

For the gospel faces man (including the Christian!) with a choice: viz., he may choose *how* to die . . . if man chooses to live his own life, then he will die his own death - and that will be that. But if by the power of the Spirit he dies Christ's death now, then he will live Christ's life both here and hereafter.⁵⁰

Therefore Dunn can conclude that for Paul 'religious experience embraces the whole of his life' since every area of life involves decision and choice.⁵¹ This is the heart of charismatic experience and it is here too that we arrive at the heart of Rahner's understanding of the Christian experience. For Rahner, in words that echo Dunn's above: 'It is true that we must die with him. But then nobody escapes dying. Why not with him . . . ?'⁵² He continues:

Every metaphysics of man first becomes concrete here. And it is no longer very important how that metaphysics is or might be 'in itself'. If it is acquired in Jesus, it contains very little, and therefore everything, because it is acquired in death as life; not in speaking about death, but in death, his and one's own.⁵³

The charismatic experience as an expression of love

This means then that charismatic activity is not to be conceived in terms of people being channels of God's grace as if grace could pass through a person, that they could manifest a *charisma*, but would themselves remain unaffected. If charismatic experience is bound up with the decision to participate in the sufferings of Christ and commitment to self-sacrificial love, then the distinction often made in charismatic thinking between gifts and fruit is an artificial one.⁵⁴ Although the New Testament does not specifically describe love as a *charisma*, love is nevertheless 'the greatest of gifts'.⁵⁵ Let us examine this assertion more closely.

Dunn bases his argument that *charismata* can be experienced without love and therefore independently of any sanctification process on 1 Cor. 13. Since this relationship between love and *charisma* is of fundamental importance to our argument it is necessary to have a detailed look at this chapter and the two which precede and follow it, since they represent Paul's most detailed discussion on this issue.

Dunn argues that the word '*pneumatikos*' is an important word for Paul, since it clearly establishes the Christian's dependence on the Spirit.⁵⁶ So in Rom. 1:11, *charisma* and *pneumatikon* are found together (see also 1 Cor. 2:12f.). In 1 Cor. 12:1; 14:1 and probably 2:13, Dunn maintains that *pneumatika* is used in a synonymous sense with *charismata*. Discussing the equation of *pneumatica* with *charismata* Dunn says:

But Paul is not critical of this use of *pneumatika* (as 14:1 indicates), and even if elsewhere he prefers to underline the gracious character of charismatic experience, he fully shares the Corinthian understanding of *charismata* as gifts of the *Spirit* (1 Cor. 12:4) and underlines this belief on his own account (12:7ff., 11).⁵⁷

But though Paul makes a link elsewhere between the two words it

can be argued that it is significant that in 1 Cor. 12-14 he maintains a distinction. This can be shown in three ways.

Firstly, Dunn himself points out that *pneumatikos* was an important word in the gnosticism of the time and this is reflected in Paul's usage in 1 Cor. 2:13ff.; 14:37; 15:44ff.⁵⁸ Also the reference in Eph. 6:12, where *ta pneumatika* refers to evil spirits, highlights the ambiguity of the word.⁵⁹ Consequently *charismata* is Paul's preferred choice (cf. Rom. 1:11; 12:6; 1 Cor. 1:7) as '*pneumatikos* is less able to provide a vehicle for the distinctive Pauline use than *charisma*'.⁶⁰

Secondly, both the situation in Corinth and the way Paul introduces the subject in 1 Cor. 12:1 suggest that *pneumatika* is a word used by the Corinthians.⁶¹

Thirdly, Dunn considers the theory that Paul was not critical of the word *pneumatica* only if 1 Cor. 14:1 was the reworking of an editor who had inserted 1 Cor. 13.⁶² But as he points out the chapter is directly aimed at the Corinthians overevaluation of spiritual gifts, particularly glossolalia, prophecy and knowledge and hence an integral part of chapters 12-14.⁶³ However, if the phrase '*zeloute de ta pneumatika*' (1 Cor. 14:1) is seen as a Corinthian phrase, it can be shown that Paul was critical of the word whilst retaining the integral nature of 1 Cor. 13. Let us examine why the phrase can be interpreted in this way.

In the other occurrences of *zelow* in 1 Corinthians it is used in an unfavourable sense (1 Cor. 3:3, 13:4) and elsewhere Paul normally uses the word in this sense (2 Cor. 12:20; Rom. 13:13; Gal. 4:17; 5:20).⁶⁴ Also it is not likely that Paul would exhort them to strive after the higher gifts, having just exhorted them to be content with their place in the body, however high or low and not all to strive

for the highest gifts. This apparent inconsistency is explained if Paul is either implicitly or explicitly quoting the Corinthians. This interpretation is backed up by 1 Cor. 14:12: 'since you are eager for (*zelotai*) manifestations of the Spirit, strive (*zeteite*) to excel in building up the church'; Paul deliberately changes the Corinthian word to his word.⁶⁵ The word *zeloute*, which occurs in I Cor. 12:31 and 14:1 can either be translated in the imperative or indicative.⁶⁶ Translated in the indicative it means: '*You are striving* after the greatest gifts'. Therefore 14:1 need not indicate Paul's acceptance of the word but is translated: 'Make this kind of love your goal; yet "you are striving for spiritual gifts", but I say rather that you should all prophesy'.⁶⁷

We have already seen that *pneumatikos* in 1 Cor. 12-14 would also appear to be a quote. Thus in 12:1 Paul is addressing a question raised by the Corinthians themselves ('now concerning...'; cf. 7:1, 25; 8:1; 16:1).⁶⁸ In 1 Cor. 14 the discussion is almost entirely about prophecy and tongues. The Corinthians asked about spiritual gifts (*pneumatika*) (1 Cor. 12:1). Paul replies that there are many gifts (*charismata*) (1 Cor. 12:4) deliberately replacing the Corinthian word with critical intention.⁶⁹ Paul's concern is, therefore, to establish early on in this section:

. . . that it is not 'inspired speech' as such that is evidence of the Spirit. They had already known that phenomena as pagans. Rather, what counts is the *intelligible and Christian content* of such utterances.⁷⁰

What matters is not the sort of spiritual gifts (*pneumatica*) they been experiencing but whether they were expressions of gracious love and therefore *charismata*.⁷¹ Thus the sense of 1 Cor. 12:1 is most fully brought out if it is rendered 'Now about what you call the "spiritual gifts"'.⁷²

But why does Paul use '*charismata*' in 1 Cor. 12:31 and

'*pneumatica*' in 1 Cor. 14:1? This can be explained by the fact that when Paul uses a term for spiritual gifts immediately prior to chapter 13 he uses *charismata*, since he is making the point that *charismata* are an expression of love. Therefore 1 Cor. 12:31 is understood in an ironic sense, Paul doing something of which he is fond, namely taking the point of view of his correspondents but directing it in a new way: 'You desire the high gifts (that is in Corinthian terms, the gifts of highest inspiration, but in Paul's terms the gift of self-sacrificial love); very well then I will show you this highest way'. The phrase *kath' hyperbolon*, which the Revised Standard Version translates 'still more excellent' is not meant in a comparative sense at all, therefore the phrase does not mean that Paul affirming striving after spiritual gifts and also proposing a better way, rather he is affirming the only way.⁷³

Dunn maintains that Paul believes that 'it is only too possible to experience *charisma* without love' but the verses he cites (1 Cor. 3:1-4; 13:1-3) do not show this since neither of them mentions *charisma*.⁷⁴ These verses only support this hypothesis if there is no distinction in Paul's mind when he is addressing the Corinthians between *pneumatica* and *charismata*. In 1 Cor. 13:1-3 Paul mentions glossalalia, prophecy, knowledge, faith and self-sacrifice, both of possessions and of one's life, but though Paul would consider that they could be *charismata*, they are only *charismata* when they are an expression of God's gracious love. John Schutz brings this point out, quoting Ernst Käsemann:

For Paul 'the test of a genuine *charisma* lies not in the fact that something supernatural occurs but in the use which is made of it. No spiritual endowment has value, rights or privilege on its own account. It is validated only by the service it renders'.⁷⁵

Arnold Bittlinger in Gifts and Graces makes the distinction

between love and *charisma* and gives the example of a man dying of thirst in the desert being found by a rescue party. They embrace him saying 'Dear brother, I don't believe in gifts just love'.⁷⁶ But this distinction is artificial, *charisma* and love are bound up with each other. Not only is it not possible to have *charisma* without love but neither is it possible to have God's love without *charismata*, since they are concrete expressions of the loving gracious act of Christ. Frederick Borsch expresses it well:

The example of Jesus stands paramount. God's chief ways of reconciliation are through the suffering of compassion, service and humility . . . It is these ways that are the vital *charisms* or fruit of the Spirit in Christian living.⁷⁷

Love is not primarily an emotion but is a concrete thing, love in action, it is 'a caring attitude and an outgoing action to those in need'.⁷⁸ Thus Gordon Fee can say:

Love is primary for him [Paul] because it has already been given concrete expression in the coming of Jesus Christ to die for the sins of the world. Love is not an idea for Paul, not even a 'motivating factor' for behaviour. It is behaviour. To love is to act; anything short of action is not love at all.⁷⁹

This is not to say all good deeds are expressions of this love since outwardly self-sacrificial actions can be done for selfish motives (1 Cor. 13:3), but that this love is only realized by loving actions. This fact is expressed by Paul's use of the concept of 'walking'. Paul uses the verb to walk (*peripateo*) in the sense of the 'walk of life, more particularly in the moral sense'.⁸⁰ Through baptism we 'walk in newness of life' (Rom. 6:4) which is to 'walk by the Spirit' (Gal. 5:16) which is to 'walk in love' (Eph. 5:2) which, in turn, is a very practical affair (Rom. 14:15). For Paul those who were spiritual (the *pneumatikoi* in Gal. 6:1) were not those who had received supernatural gifts or powers but those who were walking

by the Spirit 'and not giving way to self-conceit, destructive and uncharitable criticism of others or envy' (Gal. 5:13ff., 26; 6:3).⁸¹

**The charismatic experience as the experience of
life in the new creation**

For Paul life in the Spirit is the life of the new creation (2 Cor. 5:17), the Spirit is not an additional or unusual phenomenon but the new existence itself, the new community. The decisive event for Paul that separates the new creation from the old is the death and resurrection of Christ. To enter in and live in 'the field of force of the *pneuma*' is to enter and live in 'the field of force of the saving events, i.e. into the community which lives by the cross and resurrection'.⁸² But the Spirit is not just the power that creates faith it is also the norm by which faith lives, 'though a strict distinction need not always be made between them'.⁸³ This is clearly shown in Gal. 5:25 where the first clause indicates that the Spirit is the power that sustains man's life and the second clause indicates that 'man is summoned consciously to acknowledge this fact and to let his conduct be wholly shaped thereby'.⁸⁴ Rudolf Bultmann makes this point strongly:

'If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit' (v. 25) - a sentence open to misunderstanding so far as it seems to imply that there could be a 'living by the Spirit' without a 'walking by the Spirit'. But the purpose of this formulation is to avoid the opposite misunderstanding that there must first be a 'walking by the Spirit' which would then establish this 'living by the Spirit'. The meaning is clear: the faith-bestowed possibility of 'living by the Spirit' must be explicitly laid hold of by 'walking by the Spirit'.⁸⁵

Therefore since for Paul the Spirit is actually the new creation in Christ, not an additional phenomenon and it is through personal decision that man enters into the experience of the Spirit and continues to walk in it. It can be said that the 'sphere of Christ

and the sphere of the Holy Spirit are . . . conjointly regarded as the sphere of personal decision'.⁶⁶

Rahner, however, is concerned to understand the decisive event of Christ in the context of a modern, evolutionary, non-mythological world view. He therefore sees the whole of creation, not just the new, as in Christ.

By the gracious coming of the Logos in the flesh, in the unity of the race, in the one history of humanity, mankind as a whole has become a consecrated humanity, in fact the people of God.⁶⁷

To experience the Spirit is not therefore experience of an additional phenomenon but the experience of decision to consciously actualize and walk according to the reality of being created in Christ. We shall look at this when we deal with Rahner's understanding of grace and the 'supernatural existential'. We shall now, however, look at the centrality of religious experience for Rahner and how he understands the charismatic experience.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. H. Conzelmann, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1964-76, (henceforth referred to as T.D.N.T.), Vol. IX, pp.373-376; cf. J. Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1931, pp.21-72.
2. H. Conzelmann, T.D.N.T., Vol. IX, pp.403-406.
3. Ibid., pp.394-396.
4. J. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit, SCM Press, London, 1975, pp.253f; cf. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. 1, SCM Press, London, 1952, p.291.
5. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.206.
6. Ibid., p.257.
7. H. Conzelmann, T.D.N.T., Vol. IX, p.404.
8. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.204f.
9. Ibid., pp.260-265.
10. Hence the title of the World Council of Churches report on charismatic renewal: The Church is Charismatic, ed. Arnold Bittlinger, World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1981; cf. K. McDonnell, ed., Presence, Power, Praise Documents on the Charismatic Renewal, Vol. 1, Liturgical Press, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1980, p.xliii.
11. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.264; cf. J.Horst, T.D.N.T., Vol. IV, pp.562-567.
12. Ibid., p.260.
13. Ibid., p.255.
14. Ibid., p.253.
15. Ibid., p.254.
16. Ibid., pp.296 and 439 n.202; O. Michel, T.D.N.T., Vol. V, p.141.
17. Ibid., p.279; For examples of the broader understanding of *charisma* see: H. Mühlen, A Charismatic Theology, Burns and Oates, London, 1978, p.126; A. Bittlinger, Gifts and Graces, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1967, p.72; R.P. Martin, The Spirit in the Congregation, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1984, p.37; J. Koenig, Charismata: God's Gifts for God's People,

Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1978, p.126.

18. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.323f.
19. Ibid., p.264.
20. J. Koenig, op. cit., pp.103f.
21. J. Dunn, op. cit. p.349.
22. Ibid., p.348; cf. H. Conzelmann, T.D.N.T., Vol. IX, p.406: 'The inclusion of acts of ministry in the church among the *charismata* initiated a momentous development and posed one of the most difficult problems in the early history of the Church, namely, that of Spirit and office. One cannot accept the well-known distinction between charismatics and office-bearers, or at least not in terms of the way that the early Church viewed itself. This distinction rests on an antithesis between office/law on the one side and Spirit on the other. But the Spirit Himself posits law.' cf. K. McDonnell, op. cit., p.xliii: 'In the first instance charisms are given to the whole church and not primarily to each individual. Therefore there can be no opposition between charism and institution. There must be no playing of charisms and institution against one another. Through the Spirit the institutional is made charismatic and the charismatic is made institutional.'
23. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, Burns and Oates, 1979, p.37; cf. pp.44f and Theological Investigations (hereafter T.I.), Volumes 1-21, DLT, London, 1961-1988, Vol. 12, pp.81-88.
24. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.277 and 279f.
25. J. Dunn, 'Models of Christian Community in the New Testament', in Strange Gifts?, p.8; Jesus and the Spirit, p.323.
26. A. Bittlinger, op. cit., p.67.
27. Donald Gelpi, The Divine Mother, University Press of America, Lanham, 1984, p.77, n.25; cf. J. Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p.251: 'Perhaps the distinction between *charis* and charisma as a foundation for apostolic activity should not be drawn overly sharply. Paul never explicitly ties the apostolic role to the notion of charisma, but the apostle seems to be an important instance of what he regards as charismatic.'
28. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.206f.
29. Ibid., p.254.
30. Ibid., pp.359f; The Church is Charismatic, p.116.
31. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.360.

32. The Church is Charismatic, p.116.
33. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.349; cf. p.277.
34. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, pp.49f.
35. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.208.
36. H. Conzelmann, T.D.N.T., Vol. IX, p.406; cf. J. Schutz, op. cit. pp.257ff.
37. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, p.51; cf. Vincent Strudwick, 'The Role of Religious Communities in Renewal', in Open to the Spirit, ed. Colin Craston, Church House Publishing, London, 1987, pp.120-138.
38. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.307.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., pp.254 and 294.
41. Ibid., p.321.
42. Ibid., p.322.
43. Ibid., pp.326-338.
44. Ibid., p.331.
45. H. Mühlen, op. cit., p.351; cf. p.48; cf. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, p.68: '. . . a charisma always involves suffering.'
46. Ibid., p.109.
47. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.325.
48. J. Koenig, op. cit., pp.142f.
49. Ibid., p.137.
50. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.337f.
51. Ibid., p.339.
52. K. Rahner, The Christian at the Crossroads, Burns and Oates, London, 1975, p.26; (hereafter referred to as Crossroads).
53. K. Rahner, loc. cit.
54. E.g. M. Tay, 'The Charismatic Movement: A Way or the Way of Renewal?', in Open to the Spirit, p.44.
55. C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1968, p.311; cf. M. Green, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1975, pp.195f. n.1.

56. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.207f.
57. Ibid., pp.208f.
58. Ibid., pp.207 and 218f.
59. Ibid., p.411 n.49.
60. Ibid., p.207.
61. Ibid., p.208; D.L. Baker, 'The Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 12 - 14', The Evangelical Quarterly, Vol. 46 (1974), pp.228ff.
62. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.411 n.47.
63. Ibid. pp.266 and 430 n.37.
64. D.L. Baker, op. cit., p.227.
65. R.P. Martin, op. cit., p.34; A. Bittlinger, op. cit., p.73.
66. R.P. Martin, op. cit., p.34; cf. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.430 n.37.
67. Ibid., p.57.
68. cf. A. Bittlinger, op. cit., pp.13f.
69. D.J. Doughty, 'The Priority of *Charis*', New Testament Studies, Vol. 19 (1972-73), (pp.163-178), p.178.
70. G. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1987, p.578; cf. G. Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1987, pp.276-291.
71. cf. G. Lampe, God as Spirit, The Bampton Lectures 1976, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, p.200: 'But it is the Christlikeness of their state that matters, not the mode in which they give it expression in prayer and praise; for the mode, whether this be *glossolalia*, or reasoned prayer, or liturgical worship, or some other way into communion with God which is not any kind of prayer at all, is always determined by the psychological character and temperament of the individual.'
72. D.L. Baker, op. cit., p.230.
73. R.P. Martin, op. cit., p.35; J. Ruef, Paul's First Letter to Corinth, Penguin, 1971, p.141; G. Fee, op. cit., pp.623-5.
74. J. Dunn, op. cit., p.294.
75. Ibid., p.257.
76. A. Bittlinger, op. cit., p.75.
77. F.H. Borsch, 'Guidance of Charismatic Experience: New Testament Evidence and Implications for Today' in Open to the Spirit, p.58.

78. R.P. Martin, op. cit., p.55.
79. G. Fee, op. cit., p.628.
80. H. Seesemann, T.D.N.T., Vol. V, p.994.
81. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.287f.
82. E. Schweizer, T.D.N.T., Vol. VI, p.425.
83. Ibid., p.427.
84. Ibid., p.428; cf. J. Schütz, op. cit., p.253: 'The spirit is not merely gift, it is also norm. It is not merely enabling, it is also regulative. A description of this dialectic is found in Gal. 5:25'.
85. R. Bultmann, op. cit., p.333
86. H. Von Campenhausen, T.D.N.T., Vol. VI, p.427 n.630.
87. K. Rahner, Studies in Modern Theology, Burns and Oates, London, 1965, p.195

Chapter 2

KARL RAHNER'S CHARISMATIC THEOLOGY

The heart of Rahner's theology is experience, in particular mystical experience of the Spirit. His epistemological presuppositions and theology of grace, which we will examine later, mean everyone's experience is implicitly mystical since God, the mysterious horizon of our knowledge, grounds all our knowing and acting. Although this is of crucial importance we will develop an overview first, before going into the details of Rahner's epistemology and theology of grace. As a result of these presuppositions Rahner is able to affirm his fundamental belief that for every person 'there is something like an anonymous, unthematic, perhaps repressed, basic experience of being orientated to God . . . which is "mystical"'.¹ He finds that it is the task of a contemporary mystical theology to provide 'an initiation into man's personal experience of God' and to work out a theology of mysticism that will make explicit to people this unthematic experience of God that lies at the heart of all experience.² Therefore, for Rahner, theology is intimately bound up with religious experience and a theological statement is one that leads into the mystery, i.e. it is mystagogical.³ His emphasis is thus on religious experience: 'the Christian of the future will either be a "mystic", one who has "experienced" something, or he will cease to be anything at all'.⁴ This mystological approach results in him having a positive approach to the contemporary charismatic movement; that is, as long as it is not closed to rationality.⁵

Theology of mysticism and charismatic experience

For Rahner charismatic experiences need to be understood in terms of a theology of mysticism and contemporary charismatic movements need such a theology in order to evaluate their experience.⁶ Like Rahner, Edward O'Connor also makes the link between charismatic experience and mystical experience.⁷ The action of the Spirit is associated with 'the grace of quiet' of traditional Christian mysticism, which corresponds to the 'peace which passes understanding' (Phil. 4:7). This operates at a deeper level than the intellect or will and results in mystics having a profound awareness of the unity of their own being, not through introspection but by awareness of union with God.

He is no longer merely the object of thought or the goal of desire; He is a present person who has united Himself directly and immediately to the substance, even the bodily substance, of the mystic.⁸

Mystics have traditionally described this in terms of touch and this is often the description of contemporary charismatics, expressed for example in the hymn 'He touched me'. This is a touch that is not merely external or internal but transcends them both, the touch of love which leads to 'an awakening of the soul and the entire being with a new sensitivity'.⁹ The person is bathed in love, an experience that does not require conceptual thought (nor allows itself to be hindered by it, as John of the Cross points out).¹⁰

As we shall see Rahner works out his mystical theology in terms of his epistemology but it is his spirituality that lies at the heart of his epistemological and theological considerations.¹¹ That is why we are not starting with his philosophical thought, crucial as it is to understanding Rahner. He has always had an interest in religious experience and it is significant that before he wrote his two philosophical works, Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word

in 1939 and 1941 respectively, he had already written a number of articles concerned with religious experience, in particular the mysticism of Origen, Bonaventure and Ignatius of Loyola.¹² However, it is important to note that Spirit in the World does not signify a break in this interest in religious experience but is an attempt to give Jesuit spirituality a deeper basis. Consequently Rahner could say:

The spirituality of Ignatius himself which we share in through the practice of prayer and a religious formation has become more significant for me than all the learned philosophy inside and outside the order.¹³

Rahner was also interested in the mystical side of Thomas Aquinas: 'Thomas is the mystic who adores the mystery which is beyond all possibility of expression',¹⁴ and he appreciated the mystical theology of John of the Cross and Theresa of Avila,¹⁵ and was influenced by Carl Albrecht's work on mysticism.¹⁶ The Spanish mystics are an indispensable guide for Rahner in his formulation of a mystical theology for today. Finally, for Rahner, as for Origen, all knowledge of God is mystical.¹⁷

But although the writings of these mystical theologians were of great influence on him, the greatest influence was Rahner's own experience of the Ignatian Exercises and his experience of the Spirit through them. It was in his own spiritual experience that his theology was formulated. It is Rahner's mystical experience of God, brought about through the Exercises, that is at the heart of his thought. Ignatius' experience of God has become Rahner's: 'All I say is I knew God, nameless and unfathomable, silent and yet near, bestowing himself upon me in his Trinity, I knew God beyond all concrete imaginings'.¹⁸ That is why Rahner is so suitable as a theologian for studying religious experience. The same is true of him as he says of Aquinas: 'Thomas' theology is his spiritual life

and his spiritual life is his theology'.¹⁹

Aquinas, with whom Rahner constantly engages, was not specifically concerned with mysticism. However he recognized the importance of mysticism and saw it as the fulfilment of knowledge of God and at the end of his life had a mystical experience which made him regard his work as straw. He greatly respected the writings of the fifth-century mystic Pseudo-Dionysius, believing them to be close to St Paul and thus having a kind of apostolic authority. Dionysius described a contemplation which went beyond the senses and the intellect and passed into the 'unknowing' towards the 'Ray of Divine Darkness'.²⁰ The darkness is not a darkness of despair and nothingness but a 'darkness beyond light'.²¹ Dionysius influenced the whole western tradition in the Middle Ages, including the Scholastics; and the image of darkness is further developed by John of the Cross. A comparison of John of the Cross and Rahner makes apparent the strong mystical element in Rahner's theology.²²

Rahner's epistemology and understanding of grace lead him to emphasize the experience of God that is located in the everyday encounters in the world rather than specifically religious activities. John stresses the experience of God in contemplation which occurs to Christians who have committed themselves in prayer and asceticism and passed beyond the beginner's stage to become proficient. God is encountered also in human relationships but for John this is dependent in and subsequent to the contemplative experience. John's mystical experience is brought about by supernatural means whereas for Rahner mysticism occurs 'within the framework of normal grace'.²³ Mystical experience is not of a different order from the ordinary life of grace but rather an intense experience of a universal experience of God.²⁴ Mysticism is

not an intermediate stage between faith and the experience of grace on the one hand and the beatific vision and glory on the other hand. Mysticism is not theologically different but only psychologically different; it is different within the natural sphere only and as such it is able to be learned. Rahner considers every experience of God mystical, what he would call 'natural mysticism', but does consider that the word 'mysticism' is best kept for the psychologically unusual manifestations.

Whereas John of the Cross envisaged a new supernatural mode in the mystical contemplation of God, for Rahner mysticism takes place within ordinary experience. Although mystical experience (in the more specific sense) is qualitatively different, the difference is one of the natural order of psychology or parapsychology, 'phenomena that are unusual but natural in themselves are elevated by grace and put to supernatural use, just as ordinary ones are.'²⁵

Edwards combines the insights of both authors to obtain their mutual defining characteristics of experience of God. Experience of God is: (1) of radical transcendence, (2) general and indistinct, (3) non-conceptual and unthematic, (4) obscure, dark and mysterious, (5) mediated immediacy, (6) subtle and delicate and thus not always noticed, (7) indefinable and ineffable, (8) of loving knowledge, (9) interpersonal, (10) passive and receptive, (11) with effects, e.g. peace, joy, tranquility, and (12) preparation for glory but inferior to it.²⁶

Thus it can be seen how deeply mystical thought and experience has influenced Rahner. His theology is 'mystagogy', facilitating an individual's reflecting upon his own 'transcendental' experience of God that occurs within the whole of his existential human experience, not just one part of his life.²⁷ We shall look much

more fully at this notion of transcendental experience, but a brief explanation is called for here. For Rahner we can only know something because we place it in a wider horizon, which, as it were, gives us co-ordinates to define things by. But that horizon is not itself the object of knowledge, it is beyond us, transcendent and infinite; for Rahner this horizon is God.

His pastoral concern means that the starting point for his theology must be the place where the contemporary person finds himself today, the place where 'life confronts the concrete individual in his own personal and unique situation'.²⁸ The influence of mysticism on Rahner means that he stresses the experience of mystery and begins with the individual's experience of divine mystery, the person standing before the mystery. It is not simply an anthropological approach but a theological anthropology in which the two sides, God and man, are integrally bound up with each other. More precisely, since the experience of mystery is the basis of his theology, it is a mystical theological anthropology. In Harvey Egan's words, for Rahner 'the human person is basically mystic-in-the-world';²⁹ the experience of mystery pervades the whole of life.

Sanctification and charismatic experience

Mystical experience is therefore the experience of grace and, as we have seen, the experience of grace is the definitive factor in charismatic experience. We have also seen that charismatic experience and sanctification are bound up with each other. Sanctification is growth in grace and Rahner develops his understanding of growth in grace with reference to mystical theology. Mystical theology has always seen development in terms of

stages: either it has been the purgative, illuminative and unitive way which has seen mystical progress in terms of an ever-increasing gnosis; or it has been the differentiation of *incipientes*, *proficientes* and *perfecti* (beginners, those who have progressed, the perfect).³⁰ But although there must be progress and growth in the Christian life, Rahner views these traditional attempts to define it as too gnostical in the case of the former and too formal and too artificial in the case of the latter.³¹

Another way of understanding Christian growth, this time in dogmatic theology, has been the doctrine of the inevitable increase in sanctifying grace through good works done in the state of grace and reception of the sacraments. But this sort of understanding is based on 'a quantitative, impersonal conception of grace'.³² It is exactly this static conception of grace as 'a thing', as something to be received, that Rahner wants to avoid. His concern throughout his theology is to make grace an integral part of human experience not an external superstructure and he considers that the traditional ways of explaining growth in grace have failed to do that.

Rahner reinterprets the traditional understanding of growth in grace to show how this growth is in fact 'the law of the existential deepening of acts', which is in fact what tradition knows as the mystical factor in religion.³³ Rahner is concerned to make growth in grace, the process of sanctification, not only an external moral affair but one that affects a person ontologically, in the core of his being, not just his actions. He therefore distinguishes between two different dimensions of intensity involved in human action:

One of these is the measure of the greater or lesser personal depth of an act, while the other measures the intensity and density of the act on a particular personal level.³⁴

So, for example, a moral act is always good in terms of the second

measure, whatever the motives, but in terms of the first measure the act may not involve the person to any great extent in the depth of his spiritual and personal being and so be of little value in terms of growth in grace. Growth in grace is integrally tied up with 'a person's capacity to commit himself existentially', i.e. measured by the law of the existential deepening of acts.³⁵

This is the key to Rahner's understanding of the process of sanctification and it is also, since the two are bound up with each other, the key to his understanding of charismatic experience. We have seen the importance of Ignatius for Rahner and it is to him and his method of discerning God's will that we must now turn our attention as we look at how Rahner understands the charismatic experience in terms of the existential deepening of acts.

Existential commitment and charismatic experience

Rahner's main treatment of Ignatius' method of discerning God's will is in the essay 'The Logic of Concrete Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola'.³⁶ Ignatius envisaged three ways of discerning God's will.³⁷ The first is a clear and explicit call from God, such as Paul's Damascus road experience. The second is through the movement of spirits and the discernment of these spirits through the experience of consolations and desolations, what Ignatius calls the process of making an election. The third is through rational choice, a reasoned, intellectual assessment of all the factors involved. Now, as Rahner points out, the last way is to be considered the exception for a Christian, to be used only as a last resort if the other two are not present. In other words Ignatius 'assumes that a man has to reckon, as a practical possibility of experience, that God may communicate his will to him'.³⁸ However,

Ignatius' world view is the traditional kind that Rahner wants to leave behind. It views thoughts as either coming from within, from one's own free judgment, or else from without, from the good or evil spirit.³⁹ This is the world view that Rahner wishes to reinterpret since it fails to take into account all the psychological, environmental, genetical, social factors, etc., that influence a person.⁴⁰ Rahner's premise is that God's action is through secondary causes, that God does not intervene within the order of causality but upholds the whole chain of causality.⁴¹ Experience of the Spirit in grace during the election process must enter as 'a formative power into a genuine relation to the whole of his life', not as a 'meteorite'.⁴²

The basic principle underlying Ignatius' understanding of election is that 'a moral decision in its individuality is not merely an instance of general normative principles'.⁴³ Rather each individual, in his unique concrete historical circumstances makes an original and unique contribution to the moral decision making process. Consequently a proper understanding of the Exercises is only possible if it is recognized that 'the universal alone does not determine man, that within it there is and must be the unique, the unrepeatable that belongs to history, what is individual and inexpressible'.⁴⁴

The mode of knowledge in the first and second ways of making the election are not of an 'otherworldly kind'; all three ways are of the same nature.⁴⁵ But given this there is nevertheless a distinctly different kind of knowledge in the first and second ways which are progressively higher and more concentrated types of the third.⁴⁶

Rahner does not deal in detail with the first or third method of

making an election but with the second, the experience of consolations and desolations. For Ignatius the discerning of God's will this way, i.e. discernment of spirits, is not simply a matter of judging the consolations and desolations by their fruits but by discerning 'the intrinsic differences between the impulses themselves', i.e. not by fruits but by roots.⁴⁷ For Ignatius this discernment comes about through the experience of 'consolation without cause', i.e. feelings of peace, tranquillity and quiet that come about not through a particular cause but through a non-conceptual experience of God, through utter receptivity to God. 'There is no longer "any object" but the drawing of the whole person, with the very ground of his being . . . into the infinity of God'.⁴⁸

Consolations, in themselves, are not criteria but their divine origin, the fact that they are consolations without cause.⁴⁹ This is done by an 'experimental test' to imagine oneself making a particular choice and then seeing if that decision leaves the experience of pure openness to God intact.⁵⁰ Rahner, however, interprets the discernment of spirits in terms of existential commitment, i.e. 'the free act of a human being in which he has ultimate control over himself before God'.⁵¹ For Rahner the discernment of spirits in the Exercises is interpreted in terms of the 'unity of spiritual experience and existential decision'.⁵² The choice is made between an alternative of rationally and morally good choices according to the 'fundamental feeling he has about himself'.⁵³ This is not an 'otherworldly' experience but, since freedom and love are involved, it concerns 'a concrete person in his innermost centre, as unique, responsible and free'.⁵⁴ There is no special revelation at work but an assessment of congruence with our

deepest sense of God. This determines whether or not it is the will of God for him. When a person comes to a decision not merely on the basis of rational justification and moral principles but also in this way of understanding the Exercises, then for Rahner, he has acted not only rationally and morally but also charismatically.⁵⁵ Thus Rahner can say of the Exercises: 'Ignatius of Loyola constructed a logic of the existential recognition of God's charismatic impulses, but it has not yet been properly assimilated'.⁵⁶

However, it needs to be pointed out that there is plenty of room for self-delusion in this method unless it is realized that for Ignatius it is essential that the decision is made in humble prayer in the context of a progressive identification with, in Paul's phrase, 'the mind of Christ' (1 Cor.2.16; cf. Phil.2.5). The person must be, in Ignatius' terms, 'indifferent'.⁵⁷ That is to say he must recognize that in a decision between two choices God may be leading in either direction and the less attractive, the way that involves personal suffering, may well be the one He is actually leading in. In other words to have the mind of Christ is to take up the cross, the charismatic impulses lead in the way of the cross. Only if this is prayerfully recognized will the danger of self-delusion be reduced.

Ethical decisions and charismatic experience

Rahner develops this process of charismatic decision in terms of ethics in his essay, 'On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics'.⁵⁸ In this essay Rahner says that a man's acts are of not merely spatio-temporal significance, as is the case with material things, but, since he is destined to an eternal life, have an eternal significance; not just morally but ontologically, there is something

'positively individual' in man's personal acts.⁵⁹ The decision-making process of formal existential ethics differs from situation ethics in that it does not deny that universal norms can be applied to concrete individual cases. But at the same time it is not just a matter of perception and application of a universal norm. In formal existential ethics universal norms are applicable but the decision based on them is not simply an application of the universal norm by the conscience. Rather:

. . . there must be some function of conscience which does not merely apply the universal norms to each of my particular situations but which moreover grasps also what has not yet been made absolutely clear by the situation and the universal norms, and which is precisely and as such *what has to be done by me individually.*⁶⁰

For Rahner this is how the Exercises are to be understood.⁶¹ The value of the spiritual theology of Ignatius for Rahner is Ignatius' awareness that the will of God for each person is intimately connected with his own unique individuality, he must choose what is connatural to himself. In the light of the above this can be understood as a charismatic ethic.

The charismatic nature of Rahner's ethics is more fully brought out in the essay: 'The Commandment of Love in Relation to the Other Commandments'.⁶² The commandment of love, which sums up all the commandments, is not a commandment to do something or other but to 'do oneself', to realize one's existence, to become personal. For Rahner this is the point where the Christian doctrine of law merges with the Christian doctrine of grace, where the teaching of the Synoptics on the love *demanded* of man is combined with the Pauline teaching on morality and sanctity in the context of the grace *given* to man. What is demanded of us has in fact already been given to us:

His [Paul's] idea of morality as compared with the morality of the Pharisees is the pneumatic morality of the pure

reception of what is demanded of us, since it is the morality of boundless love as an answer to that absolute and irrevocable love in which God's innermost *Pneuma* gives himself gratuitously to us.⁶³

It is not situation ethics or 'individual ethics' but 'pneumatic morality', charismatic ethics. This can be more clearly understood in a more precise theory of ethics, that of Lawrence Kohlberg.⁶⁴ Kohlberg originally distinguished six stages in human moral development; he subsequently added a seventh. They are as follows: 1. Punishment and Obedience Orientation: moral behaviour measured in terms of good or bad consequences to myself; 2. Instrumental, Relativist Orientation: needs of others taken into account insofar as they affect consequences to myself; 3. Interpersonal Sharing Orientation: increased social awareness, moral behaviour motivated by social approval; 4. Law and Order Orientation: external law becomes basis for behaviour; 5. Social Contract Orientation: the conscience realizes that sometimes the law is inadequate; 6. Universal Moral Principles: acknowledges inadequacy of utilitarian and legalistic solutions; and 7. Morality of Sanctity or of Supererogation: ready to suffer persecution.

Kohlberg's research indicated that most adults (or at least most Americans), did not pass beyond stage four. Joseph Fletcher's book Situation Ethics was an attempt to get beyond this stage four morality.⁶⁵ Fletcher cites John Dewey as an influence, but Donald Gelpi argues that this is misleading because Dewey's morality is a stage five morality committed to rational discourse, that is to say it is a morality committed to shared scientific enquiry as a means for determining moral principles. Fletcher's individualistic situational relativism does not match up to Dewey's reasoned, collective ethical morality. Fletcher's situationism is a legalistic ethic in transition to a social contract orientation, but it has not

yet arrived'.⁵⁶ Although, for Gelpi, Dewey's strength over Fletcher is his commitment to shared enquiry in a community, nevertheless his ethics are thoroughly relativised.

A charismatic morality is at stage seven though it transcends natural morality in that it is an ethics of faith. Decisions are made not only rationally but prayerfully in openness to the dynamic action of the Spirit. Rahner, as we have seen, develops this aspect of charismatic ethics. He does not however sufficiently develop the communal nature of morality. He stresses the aspect of transcending natural morality, ethical decisions are not based purely on rational or moral principles, but his emphasis is individualistic. The only community for truly understanding the charismatic nature of Christian ethics is the charismatic community governed by the moral absoluteness and moral ultimacy that Christ proclaimed and continually inspired by the Spirit. We shall develop this further later.

Self-realization and the charismatic experience

The charismatic nature of ethical decisions is not something that is confined to a particular realm of human existence. Choice and decision are involved in every aspect of life. In fact for Rahner they are the essence of being human. Rahner is aware that human beings are the product of a whole preceding history; a complex network of biological, psychological and hereditary factors affect them and they are immersed in a social, political and cultural infrastructure. But at the same time human beings are not merely the sum of these influences; there is an irreducible dimension to human beings. Humans are only fully understood on the basis of their own spontaneity and interior freedom which results in unique

personal decisions. This is not explainable by the human sciences which in their effort to formalize everything about a human being can miss the essence of a person 'who is always unique and bestowed on himself'.⁶⁷ Rahner sums up these two dimensions of human existence in the following passage:

There is no 'inwardness' which does not also stand open, as it were, to what is without. The ultimate, most personal freedom, which is to be found where man is inevitably himself, without any substitute or any excuse, at the heart of his being (or however we like to express it) - the place, that is to say, where he is virtually the absolute and irreplaceable subject - is where he still has something to do with Christ, and with all other men and women too. For there are no spheres which can be cleanly separated from one another in an existential cleavage.⁶⁸

A person is not explained by either the reducible elements or the irreducible elements, the essence of a person is both; he is 'a spirit fleshed out in society and a particular set of relationships with the world'.⁶⁹

As a consequence of this man experiences himself as 'a task', only achieving himself through his involvement with the world; and it is only in the taking on of this task that he actively discovers the reality of God.⁷⁰ A true knowledge of God in which the reality of God is truly experienced is the result of 'an act which can only be posited by man as a *whole*'.⁷¹ Different 'catchwords' sum up this total commitment or engagement with the world. For Paul it is 'faith', John 'love', the synoptics 'conversion'; Rahner suggests 'love of neighbour' might be most appropriate for the contemporary situation.⁷² James Bacik paraphrases Rahner's description of this self-achievement:

Through our individual decisions we make ourselves to be what we will be forever. Our self is not like a stage on which our individual actions play out their bit parts, only to depart, leaving the stage unchanged. Rather, the self resembles a storehouse in which is gathered the true and abiding significance of all our human activity.⁷³

For Rahner any of the three theological virtues may lead to the realization of the task of man's existence; 'Faith, hope and love constitute that which is definitive and final'.⁷⁴

Love is not a static essence but the expression of the moral and spiritual personality of a person which has its own particular history. By love 'man embarks on the adventure of his own reality'.⁷⁵ Love is not something that is simply present or merely the fulfilling of the commandments. It is the constant self-giving that is never complete:

Love today is, therefore, what it should be today only if it acknowledges today that it is something of which more will be demanded tomorrow. It is true love even for today only to the extent in which it reaches out to become more than it is today, only if it is really on the way and forgets what it is now, reaching out for what lies ahead of it (cf. Phlp.3.13).⁷⁶

Man is not able to comprehend and evaluate from the beginning of this adventure or journey what is actually demanded of him; he is demanded.⁷⁷ It is this dimension of love that is at the heart of Christian ethics but one that Rahner considers is too often overlooked. It means it is impossible to say what is actually demanded by Christian ethics. This is, in Dunn's phrase, 'the charismatic dimension of Paul's ethics' which goes beyond generalized ethical principles.⁷⁸

This total self-commitment can also be described in terms of faith. Through faith a person can find God 'in the world' and yet 'he discovers God only if - radically - he walks its ways right to the end'.⁷⁹ What Rahner means by this can easily be misinterpreted unless it is understood in the context of the pervasive influence on him, Ignatian spirituality. This has two central tenets: firstly it is a world affirming spirituality based on the concept of 'finding God in all things', of 'joy in the world'; secondly it is a piety of

the cross.⁸⁰ When this is combined with Rahner's understanding of grace and creation in Christ it means that radically walking the way of the world to the end is actually walking the way of the cross. It is the way of self-giving which is the way of faith which is actually the way of death. This becomes clearer in the light of Ignatian piety.

This piety is a monastic piety, not in the literal sense of an external arrangement of community life, but in the sense of the monk as one 'who has "put on the pattern of Christ" through asceticism'.⁸¹ A true asceticism is not the moral asceticism of the 'average' or 'bourgeois-Christian' which consists of the suppression of sensual and selfish desires, of self-control and the renunciation of all that is morally unpermissible but which is not a true self-sacrifice.⁸² Nor is it mystical asceticism, a technique adopted for mystical experience which can become a means to attempt to force God.⁸³ Rather, Christian asceticism is when a man undergoes 'personal free grasping-of-his-own-accord of his necessary being-unto-death' and thereby puts himself at the disposition of God.⁸⁴ Although this is also a Heideggerean theme the primary influence on Rahner here is in fact Ignatius. As Thomas Merton points out, Heidegger's thought 'can remind us that the climate in which monastic prayer flourished is not altogether absent from our modern world'.⁸⁵

Thus the same act can be called both 'faith' and 'death', where death is not understood as the event which terminates man's life but as the situation which rules his life.⁸⁶ Death is 'the supreme and most radical act of faith'.⁸⁷ Death is not just passively suffering the biological termination of life but also 'an active consummation from within brought about by the person himself'.⁸⁸ Death is

something that transpires throughout the whole of man's life; life is a 'living death'.³⁹ Death is 'the ever-present, secret essence of all life itself' not something simply at the end.⁴⁰ This living death can either be a renunciation, an act of faith and trust, or an act of desperate clinging on to that which we must inevitably lose, man's running away from, in Heidegger's terms, 'the ontological structure of his being'.⁴¹

The question about death is the question about God. In death man is most obviously confronted with what is beyond his control and comprehension. It is either 'the void of absolute absurdity or the infinitude of the mystery of love'.⁴² God is understood as hope in the face of death.⁴³ If death is accepted as a dying with Christ it becomes the highest act of believing, hoping or loving, a venturing trust into the unknown. Christian asceticism is thus also understood as 'the anticipating grasp of Christian death understood as the most radical act of faith'.⁴⁴ Or as the Didache expresses it, 'a letting-the-world-go-by' so that grace may come.⁴⁵ Thus Rahner can describe his own personal faith as 'the act of letting myself go into the inconceivable mystery' and say with Ignatius that 'Jesus is truly found and God found in him only when you have died with him'.⁴⁶ This, as we have seen, is the essence of the charismatic experience.

As a consequence Christian asceticism, the Ignatian piety of the cross brings about the Ignatian acceptance of the world:

. . . this emptying of self will not be accomplished by practising pure inwardness, but by the real activity which is called humility, service, love of our neighbour, the cross and death. One must descend into hell together with Christ, lose one's soul, not directly to the God who is above all names but in the service of one's brethren.⁴⁷

The same ideas can be expressed in terms of the virtue of hope:

The person who, in a hope which no longer seeks to reassure itself, relinquishes himself in the depths of the mystery of

existence, in which death and life can no longer be distinguished because they can only be grasped together, actually believes in the Crucified and Risen one, even if he is not aware of it (in conceptual terms).⁹⁸

Because of Rahner's theology of grace, hope as surrender to the mystery is an entering in to the death and resurrection of Christ.⁹⁹ We 'give ourselves as a response to God's own giving of Himself to us'.¹⁰⁰ Hope is surrender to the disposing hand of God, as Christ did.¹⁰¹ Hope is the 'letting of one's self go into the mystery of God and when we surrender ourselves in hope 'there alone do we truly understand what, or still better *who* God is'.¹⁰²

Closely related to the concept of hope is the concept of absolute future. Man's transcendence includes a reaching into the future.¹⁰³ Man's life is not a static existence but a becoming. There are no universally applicable programmes of actions; Christianity is not an ideology. Rather, every Christian must be responsible for his own decisions and actions made in faith and trusting acceptance of grace.¹⁰⁴ Christianity is the religion of the absolute future in God; in fact absolute future is another name for God.¹⁰⁵

We say that Christianity is the religion of the absolute future to the extent in the first place that God is not only 'above us' as the ground and horizon of history, but 'in front of us' as our own future, our destination, sustaining history as its future . . . as its innermost principle and ultimate future, who sustains and drives history as his genuinely most ultimate concern, not only distinguishing himself from it as its creator.¹⁰⁶

The characteristic virtue of Christianity as a religion of the future is hope.¹⁰⁷ Anne Carr describes Rahner's later thought in terms of an 'ontology of hope' involving, as it does, a reappraisal of the intellectualist position of Spirit where, as we shall see in the next chapter, the primary structure of human being was knowing.¹⁰⁸ But it could be also described as an ontology of love

or of faith or even of death since it is in fact an ontology of human becoming interpreted in a radically christological sense, since, as we shall see later, for Rahner all anthropology is christology and vice versa.

But this also means that this can also be interpreted in terms of experience of the Spirit since experience of the Spirit is participation in the victorious death of Christ, 'the chalice of the Holy Spirit is identical with the chalice of Christ'.¹⁰⁹ Experience of the Spirit is not an experience of a particular action of God 'from without'; to regard it in this way is, for Rahner, to adopt a mythological interpretation of the relationship of God to the world. Rather it is 'experience of the radical and permanent nature of human transcendence'.¹¹⁰ This transcendental experience of the Spirit is brought about when man freely responds and surrenders himself in faith, hope and love to God; an experience of existential commitment involving a person in the totality of his experience.¹¹¹

The real experience of transcendence in the Holy Spirit accepted in freedom is primarily and ultimately not a matter of theoretical reason, but something that involves the *whole* person in the *concrete* history of his life and freedom. In the last resort then it occurs at the point where it is impossible to stop at any individual reality of life as if it were final and absolute, where a final, autonomous self-defence is abandoned in free and liberated hope unsecured by anything else: in a word, at the point where dying is a passing into the incomprehensibility of God.¹¹²

In the above passage Rahner emphasizes the concrete nature of this experience, involving the whole person in his relationships in the world; it is not some otherworldly experience in a supernatural or transcendent realm. Rahner gives various lists of concrete experiences which bring about this experience of the Spirit, experiences such as unconditional forgiveness, faithful obedience to conscience and sacrificial giving summed up as 'where the one and

entire hope is given beyond all individual hopes' and 'where we rehearse our own deaths in everyday life'.¹¹³ But the lists are only arbitrarily selected examples since there are no blueprints for experience of the Spirit, no 'unadulterated operations of the Holy Spirit'.¹¹⁴ They are only experiences of the spirit as long as 'we experience them in the right way', that is to say we have truly learnt to surrender ourselves, to drink the chalice of Christ, and this chalice 'is drunk only by those who have slowly learned in little ways to taste the fullness in emptiness, the ascent in the fall, life in death, the finding in renunciation'.¹¹⁵

This means that for Rahner, according to the Pauline epistles, *charismata* may be of an extraordinary or spectacular nature or everyday capabilities and responsibilities'.

We may say that all abilities and possibilities of Christian action, inasmuch as it is ultimately empowered, supported and ensouled by the Holy Spirit of God, are *charismata* or gifts of the Spirit.¹¹⁶

This is not to say that whatever we do is charismatic because of the universal presence of grace. The individual's abilities and possibilities only become charismatic when they are empowered and supported by the Holy Spirit and that occurs when a person chooses and accepts one possibility rather than another not merely on the basis of rational or moral principles but on the basis of Rahner's understanding of the Ignatian Exercises and that choice involves the way of the cross. 'Then he acts not only rationally and morally but charismatically'.¹¹⁷

Therefore *charismata* are not 'gifts' in the objectified sense or the direct and unmediated activity of God; rather they are, in Geoffrey Lampe's phrase 'actions of God and man in personal union'.¹¹⁸ As John Koenig points out, the New Testament does not identify particular experiences that must accompany *charismata*; for

Paul each person has his own special 'charisma of God' (1 Cor. 7:7; cf. Rom. 6:23; 11:29):

No gift qualifies as a *charisma* unless the recipient sees behind it the gracious hand of God, for with the *charisma* one receives not simply a package, an objectified thing, but a new relationship with the Giver. One discovers afresh how one is dependent upon, in conversation with, answerable to, God. One learns in a richer way what it means to be a child of God.¹¹⁹

It is this new relationship with God that makes an experience a charismatic experience. When conceived like this there is an inevitable link between *charismata* and sanctification. Therefore Rahner argues that Paul does not distinguish between grace that sanctifies the recipient and grace for the benefit of others which does not however, sanctify the recipient. He only envisages the case where *charismata* both sanctify the recipient and church simultaneously.

For how else could one truly sanctify oneself except by being unselfish to others in the one Body of Christ by the power of the Spirit? And how could one fail to be sanctified if one faithfully takes up and fulfils one's real and true function in the Body of Christ?¹²⁰

Dunn can only argue that 'there is no immediate causal connection between *charisma* and sanctification' because he has an objectified exteriorized concept of *charismata*.¹²¹ Dunn cites Bittlinger to back this up. According to him *charismata* 'are received as presents from God . . . who places his gifts into our unholy hands and takes the risk of our misusing them'.¹²²

But for Rahner grace is not a thing, something that is separate from other things and somehow related to the world. It is not something, even metaphorically speaking, that could be placed in our hands to be used or misused. We do not possess grace as if it were a thing, rather we are possessed by grace. It is not a thing but a mode of becoming and being a person. We can only find it, or rather

be found by it when we surrender ourselves 'in generous outgoing love'.¹²³

Therefore, when talking about priestly existence (though the same is true throughout all Christian existence) Rahner questions the traditional distinction between grace for one's own sanctification (*gratia gratum faciens*) and grace for the sanctification of others (*gratia gratis data*). The preaching of the Gospel demands not just a commitment in terms of time and work etc. but a personal existential commitment; it demands the whole person. Thus the charism of the Spirit needed to inspire preaching is also a charism sanctifying the preacher as well. Consequently the power of the preaching of the Gospel is dependent on the 'fact that the grace which is preached is a reality in the preacher himself'.¹²⁴ The preaching may still be conceptually 'right' in its content but it would not be 'true' since what distinguishes a true proposition from merely a right one is that the former has been fulfilled in action. Ultimately there are no 'propositions in themselves' since they are 'always in their concrete presence an act of man'.¹²⁵

The contemporary charismatic movement and charismatic experience

How then does Rahner understand the unusual experiences referred to as gifts of the Spirit in the contemporary charismatic movement? On a personal level he is writing for people like himself who 'for very different reasons cannot take any personal part in these charismatic movements and practices' but nevertheless can experience the Spirit in the ordinary things of life, digging it out 'from under the rubbish of everyday experience'.¹²⁶ But this does not mean that experiences of a more spectacular or unusual nature are ruled out

from the start. However they are not necessarily experiences of grace.¹²⁷ It is not a question of recognizing them as either 'unadulterated operations of the Holy Spirit' or discounting them completely. We cannot interpret particular psychic events 'unashamedly as charismatic interventions of the Holy Spirit "from without"' partly because we need to recognize that both the categorical content and the impulses that give rise to them are conditioned by social, historical, psychological, and other factors and also because all these phenomena have parallels outside Christianity.¹²⁸ The phenomenon of religious enthusiasm needs to be assessed by such disciplines as psychology, depth psychology and para-psychology.¹²⁹ But they can nevertheless still be vehicles of experience of the Spirit, not by virtue of their particular categorical content but by virtue of the fact that all spiritual experience needs a 'complementary historical expression';¹³⁰ there are no 'purely divine experiences of grace; there are only "incarnate" spiritual experiences'.¹³¹ Our discussion on *pneumatica* and *charismata* in the previous chapter makes the same point from an exegetical point of view.

In the light of the above Rahner can say:

Someone in a moment of religious enthusiasm may have a 'conversion experience' whose content later proves highly questionable and dated, nevertheless it may have been a genuine experience of conversion in the sense that through a very dubious categorical medium a person can achieve a radically free self-determination and an unconditional acceptance of the sovereignty of God.¹³²

Such experiences may be liberating and transforming, opening up new horizons on life and as a consequence 'are quite fit (if you wish) to be called "baptism in the Spirit".'¹³³

Rahner, therefore, is sympathetic towards the charismatic movement in that his own experience of the Ignatian Exercises and

his interest in mystical experience mean that he stresses the importance of experience of the Spirit. However he is critical of interpretations of such experiences that conceive of them in interventionist terms and we have indicated that he avoids an interventionist concept of experience of the Spirit through his epistemology. He is also critical of objectified concepts of grace that are external to a person's existential situation. In order to understand the nature of these criticisms and Rahner's attempt to avoid them we must now examine Rahner's epistemology and philosophical influences.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. K. Rahner, Opportunities for Faith, SPCK, London, 1974, p.125; cf. K. Rahner, T.I., Vol. 5, p.8; Vol. 11, pp.150-153; Vol. 7, pp.14f.
2. K. Rahner, Opportunities for Faith, p.125.
3. T.I., Vol. 5, pp.58 and 60.
4. T.I., Vol. 7, p.15.
5. Dialogue, pp.327f.
6. T.I., Vol. 17, p.99.
7. E.D. O'Connor, 'The Holy Spirit, Christian Love, and Mysticism', in Charismatic Renewal, ed. E. D. O'Connor, SPCK, London, 1978, pp.133-144
8. Ibid., p.140
9. Ibid., p.141
10. The Dark Night, Book One, Chapters 5 and 9, K. Kavanaugh and O. Rodriguez, ed., The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, Thomas Nelson Ltd., London, 1964, pp.335ff. and 346-350.
11. T.I., Vol. 17, p.97 n.8: 'Contrary to B. van der Heijden's opinion in Karl Rahner: Darstellung und Kritik seiner Grundpositionen (Einsiedeln 1973), the present writer's theology of grace is not initially derived historically from a treatise of traditional theology. It is based on much earlier attempts at a theological consideration of the experience of grace, which Ignatian spirituality is particularly aware of, and which is also of special interest to people concerned with that spirituality.'
12. For example: 'The "Spiritual Senses" According to Origen', T.I., Vol. 16, pp.81-103, 1932; 'The Doctrine of the "Spiritual Senses" in the Middle Ages', T.I., Vol. 16, pp.104-134, 1933; 'Eucharist and Suffering', T.I., Vol. 3, pp.161-170, 1936; 'The Ignatian Mysticism of Joy in the World', T.I., Vol.3, pp.277-293, 1938.
13. H. Vorgrimler, Understanding Karl Rahner, SCM, London, 1986, p.57.
14. K. Rahner, Everyday Faith, Burns and Oates/Herder and Herder, London/New York, 1968, p.189.

15. e.g. T.I., Vol. 3, pp.9,280; Vol.16, pp.49,125,131; Vol. 17, p.91; K. Rahner, Opportunities for Faith, p. 123-26.
16. T.I., Vol. 17, p.90 n.1.
17. T.I., Vol. 16, p.96.
18. K. Rahner and P. Imhof, Ignatius of Loyola, Collins, London, 1979, p.11.
19. K. Rahner, Everyday Faith, p.188.
20. D. Edwards, Human Experience of God, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1983, p.88.
21. cf. T.I., Vol. 4, p.57: 'For all insight is based on this transcendence, all light on this orientation towards the inexpressible darkness - if this is how one wishes to term the bright incomprehensibility of God' and T.I., Vol. 4, p.42: 'the lucidity of the Spirit comes from its being open to the divine and truly super-luminous darkness'.
22. D. Edwards, 'Experience of God and Explicit Faith: a Comparison of John of the Cross and Karl Rahner', The Thomist, Vol. 46, (1982), pp. 33-74.
23. 'Mysticism', in Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi, ed. K. Rahner, Burns and Oates, London, 1975, (hereafter referred to as Encyclopedia) pp.1010f; T.I., Vol. 16, pp.43f; Vol. 17, pp.90ff.
24. cf. T.I., Vol. 7, p.15; Vol. 17, pp.95f.
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26. D. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 68-70. (1) John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, 2.8; Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, DLT, London, 1978, (hereafter referred to as Foundations), p.54. (2) John of the Cross, Ascent, 2.14.2; idem., The Spiritual Canticle, 26.8 and 17; idem., The Living Flame of Love, 3.48-49; Foundations, p.53. (3) John of the Cross, Ascent, 2.8-9; 2.15.3-5; idem., The Dark Night, 2.17.3; Foundations, pp.52f. (4) John of the Cross, The Dark Night, 1.9-10; idem., Canticle, 14-15.22-23; T.I., Vol. 4, p.55. (5) John of the Cross, The Dark Night, 2.23.12; idem., Canticle, 19.4, 35.6; Foundations, pp.83f. (6) John of the Cross, Ascent, 2.13.7; idem., The Dark Night, 1.9.4-6; Foundations, p.54. (7) John of the Cross, Prologue to Canticle; idem., The Dark Night, 2.13.1; Foundations, pp.61-65. (8) John of the Cross, Ascent, 2.14.12; idem., The Dark Night, 2.12.4; T.I., Vol. 4, p.43. (9) John of the Cross, Canticle, 35 and 36; T.I., Vol. 13, p.128. (10) John of the Cross, The Dark Night, 1.9.7; idem., Flame, 3.34; K. Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, p.149. (11) John of the Cross, Ascent, 2.24.6; idem., Flame, 3.35; K. Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, p.162f. (12) John of the Cross, Canticle, 14-15.5 and 16; Foundations, p.120.

27. T.I., Vol. 17, p.239.
28. T.I., Vol. 7, p.57.
29. H. Egan, "'The Devout Christian of the Future Will...be a Mystic" Mysticism and Karl Rahner's Theology', in Theology and Discovery: Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J., ed. W.J. Kelly, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1980, pp.139-158, p.154.
30. T.I., Vol. 3, pp.8f.
31. T.T., Vol. 3, p.10; cf. Vol. 17, p.91.
32. T.I., Vol. 3, p.11.
33. Ibid. p.23.
34. Ibid., p.21.
35. Ibid., p.21.
36. K. Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, pp.84-170.
37. Ibid., p.95.
38. Ibid., p.94.
39. Ibid., p.120 n.23.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p.119
42. Ibid., p.128.
43. Ibid., p.110.
44. Ibid., p.112.
45. Ibid., pp.102 and 105.
46. Ibid., p.106.
47. Ibid., p.122.; cf. p.117f.: 'The first thing that may be found striking about these Rules is that Ignatius reckons on psychological experiences, arising in consciousness, which originate from God. This happens, too, in such a way that these divine promptings are distinct and can be distinguished from others which also occur and which have a different origin. They are not just traced back to an origin in God in the sense in which ultimately everything that exists and is at work in man is grounded on God's conservation and co-operation, is subject to his providence and, if good and conducive to salvation, can in a special way be attributed to God, to his grace, his providence and so on. To that extent, of course, all moral goodness would be a 'divine prompting', a motion excited by a 'good spirit'. But clearly that is not how Ignatius understands it.'

48. Ibid., p.135.
49. Ibid., p.157.
50. Ibid., pp.158 and 161 n.43.
51. Ibid., p.164; cf. T.I., Vol. 16, p.25.
52. T.I., Vol. 16, p.33; cf. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, pp.29f.
53. K. Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, p.166; cf. T.I., Vol. 16, p.32.
54. Ibid. p.148.
55. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, pp.29f.
56. Encyclopedia, pp.185f.
57. L.J. Puhl, The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1951, p.75; cf. K. Rahner, Crossroads, pp.67f; T.I., Vol. 17, pp.3-6; Vol. 18, p.130.
58. T.I., Vol. 2, pp.215-234.
59. Ibid., p.225f.
60. Ibid., p.229.
61. Ibid., pp.231f.
62. T.I., Vol. 5, pp.439-459.
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74. T.I., Vol. 10, p.259.
75. T.I., Vol. 5, p.453.
76. Ibid., p.452.
77. Ibid., p.453.
78. J. Dunn, op. cit., pp.222-225.
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80. T.I., Vol. 3, pp.277-293;
81. Ibid., p.281.
82. Ibid., pp.60ff.
83. Ibid., pp.66f. and 80.
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86. T.I., Vol. 3, p.78; cf, p.72.
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88. K. Rahner, On the Theology of Death, Burns and Oates, London, 1961, p.39.
89. Ibid., p.77; cf. T.I. Vol. 7, pp.290 and 153; Vol. 9, p.256; Vol. 18, p.162.
90. T.I., Vol. 6, p.16.
91. T.I., Vol. 7, pp.290f.cf. Vol. 3, p.72; K. Rahner, On the Theology of Death, p.79.
92. T.I., Vol. 9, p.223.
93. T.I., Vol. 13, p.183.
94. T.I., Vol. 3, p.78.
95. Ibid., pp.79 and 287.
96. K. Rahner, Crossroads, p.23; K. Rahner, 'Ignatius of Loyola Speaks to a Modern Jesuit', in Ignatius of Loyola, with P. Imhoff, Collins, London, 1979, p.21; cf. T.I., Vol. 18, pp.157-170.

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114. T.I., Vol. 16, p.47.
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126. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, pp.11 and 21.
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Chapter 3

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Rahner's thought needs to be understood in the context of the philosophical and theological sources that underlie it. Although Rahner rarely explicitly refers to sources apart from Aquinas, he has assimilated them into his theology and they need to be examined before we examine his own thought in more detail. Rahner is a Catholic theologian, standing in the line of transcendental Thomism developed by Joseph Maréchal, who developed Aquinas' thought in the light of Kant's critique of knowledge. But Rahner is also in dialogue with modern German thought, particularly Kant and Heidegger. It is Kant's influence that is the basis for Rahner's transcendental approach and it is to him we must first turn.

Kant's influence - the question about God

Kant's objective in the Critique of Pure Reason was to justify the objectivity of mathematical and scientific knowledge in the face of Hume's empiricism, which Kant considered insufficient to explain the success of Newtonian physics. His basic question was how is it possible that in our intellect we know more than we perceive with our senses? Kant attempts to answer this by his 'Copernican revolution', the theory that objects, so far as we know them, conform to the mind, rather than the other way round, and that the 'what' of

the object conforms with the 'how' of judgment.¹ The structure of human sensibility and mind is constant, and objects will always appear to us in certain ways, conforming to the *a priori* conditions of the understanding. We are thus able to make universal scientific judgments which hold good both for actual and for possible experience. Newtonian science is therefore justified in spite of the empiricist critique.

Kant's approach is a transcendental one, transcendental referring to the *a priori* elements of knowledge, concerned not with objects but with the mode of our knowledge of objects.² In the event of human knowledge sensibility provides the data and the understanding enables the appearances to be thought through concepts. The categories are the *a priori* conditions of objects being thought whereas the forms are the *a priori* conditions of objects being intuited.

Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. . . . The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. . . . Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.³

Objects are thought by means of the categories but without a knowing subject they would not be thinkable. This is achieved by the 'I think' of the knowing subject (the 'unity of apperception') whereby the manifold of representations are united into one consciousness.⁴ There is no *a priori* consciousness of this ego; it is within the consciousness of what is cognitively experienced.⁵ In other words, self-awareness is given in knowledge of the world. The basic point of Kant's critique is, therefore, that knowledge is

limited to experience but it is not entirely derived from experience; empirical knowledge is the 'fertile lowland of experience'.⁶ It is only through experience that any objective reality is given to the *a priori* modes of knowledge.⁷ Thus all our knowledge is limited to phenomenal reality. The thing-in-itself, the noumenon, is not an object of our sensible intuition and thus we have no knowledge of it. The concept is only necessary in a limiting or 'regulative' sense to prevent knowledge overstepping its boundaries and thinking it has knowledge of things in themselves.

It is on this epistemological basis that Kant criticises the three premises of traditional psychology, cosmology and theology, the concepts of the substantial soul, the world as a totality of causally related phenomena and God as the supreme condition of all that is possible. Reason does not need the existence of God, but only the Idea of it as the regulative function of the concept of totality. The totality is not that of absolute existence but only the expression of a definite epistemological postulate; we cannot hypostatise the Idea of the totality of reality as a thing that contains all empirical reality.⁸ It is important to note that in The Critique of Pure Reason Kant is not denying the existence of God or, for that matter, his non-existence but is rather criticizing the means by which he could be known.

In Spirit in the World Rahner adopts the Kantian method of transcendental reflection on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Rahner is asking the same basic question as Kant did: how is metaphysics possible if all human knowledge is necessarily referred to a sensible intuition? Rahner also accepts Kant's basic

premise that theology must be based on traditional metaphysics, i.e. on knowledge of the absolute. But whereas Kant reached a negative conclusion with regard to such knowledge, and allows the positing of God only in the realm of practical reason, Rahner, whilst acknowledging that all knowledge has an empirical element, argues that it can at the same time transcend the realm of sense experience and provide knowledge of absolute being itself.⁹

This is not a knowledge based on an innate idea or an immediate intuition of a metaphysical object. The absolute cannot be known as an object nor can the human mind form an adequate conception of God. Rather, there is a transcendental knowledge of God not as object but as the grounding of all human knowledge and reality. God is known in the pre-apprehension (*Vorgriff*) of being that underlies all knowledge, not in the 'grasp' (*Griff*),¹⁰ in which the existence of absolute being is simultaneously affirmed with knowledge of the world.

Rahner is able to answer Kant's question because he begins from a fundamentally different starting place, the human question concerning being. This is the 'point of departure' for the metaphysical question.¹¹ Man questions, and man questions by necessity; he cannot escape this. He can turn away from individual questions but he cannot avoid the question about being in its totality since 'man exists as the question about being'.¹² This is the 'transcendental question', the question man asks about himself, not just something which is being asked about. The question one asks, or rather the question one is, indicates a knowledge of being

in the one who questions. This starting point results from Rahner's assimilation of Hegel's and especially Heidegger's criticisms of Kant.

Heidegger's influence - man is the question about God

It was Heidegger's rethinking of ontology, the question of Being, that laid the basis for Rahner's thought. Heidegger broke away from the traditional understanding of ontology which was based on the category of substance. For Heidegger being is not some substance or entity, but transcends the ordinary categories of thought;¹³ as such it cannot be defined but it must still be investigated. Since it is not some substance or entity it does not exist on its own but is always the being of an entity. At the same time, there is an 'ontological difference' between being and beings, there is no idealist equation of being with beings.¹⁴ The starting point for the investigation of being is not just any entity in which being subsists (is 'presence-at-hand') but man the questioner himself, since he is not just an entity among other entities but he whose being is an issue for him. '*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being - Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological*'.¹⁵ Man cannot avoid making decisions about the way he lives either explicitly or implicitly.¹⁶ Man (albeit to a limited extent) is responsible and free and determines his own existence, his '*Dasein*' ('being there'); he cannot avoid asking the existential question. In this way *Dasein* exists (stands out) from all other entities.

Rahner approaches the problem of metaphysics from the same anthropological starting point as Heidegger, that of man as the

unique questioner of being.¹⁷ Just as for Heidegger an ontology must start from an existential analytic of *Dasein* so too for Rahner the metaphysical question and the question of man form an abiding unity.¹⁸ This question cannot be avoided either explicitly or implicitly; to attempt to avoid the question is to answer it already and thus to be involved with metaphysics.¹⁹

Heidegger's '*existentiell*' question is how *Dasein* asks about and understands his own existence, his ontical affairs; and the existential question is a theoretical question about the ontological structures of existence. The existential question about being (the '*existential analytic*') takes its starting point from the *existentiell* question *i.e.* the ontological is answered through the ontic.²⁰ The ability to ask the question presupposes an anticipatory knowledge of being. 'Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought'.²¹ And so there is a circular structure to the investigation which implies both the hiddenness and disclosedness (luminosity) of being.²²

Just as for Heidegger the ontological is answered through the ontic so too for Rahner statements about God move from the ontic level to the ontological when they are related to the knowing subject.²³ Just as for Heidegger being remains essentially hidden from *Dasein*, though is manifest in entities and particularly in man, so for Rahner being is an analogous reality in beings and is only fully realized in being itself, 'pure Being', (a point that Aquinas had already made).²⁴ Rahner adopts Heidegger's circular argument for knowledge of being; being is both hidden and disclosed. The fact that man raises the question of being implies he does not know

about being but it also implies he must have some understanding of the concept. As for Heidegger there is a circular nature to the questioning by which the question as a seeking must in some way be guided by what is sought, therefore for Rahner:

The question about being signifies human transcendence towards being, since the metaphysical implies an existing knowledge of being, being and knowing are related in an original unity, there is already an implicit knowledge of being.²⁵

There is a threefold nature to Heidegger's existential analytic of *Dasein's* being-in-the-world, summed up by Heidegger as 'care'. Firstly *Dasein* is 'ahead of itself' constituted by possibilities. *Dasein* achieves its possibilities through projecting them upon the entities in the world and in this way incorporates them into its 'significant' world and thereby 'understands' them. Secondly *Dasein* is already in the world; it is not just constituted by possibilities but is influenced by its facticity. The situation in which it finds itself impinges on *Dasein*; it has to take over what is already given in its particular 'mineness'. Heidegger uses the term 'thrownness' to describe this concept of being 'delivered over' to factors beyond one's own control.²⁶ Thirdly *Dasein* can fail to achieve its possibilities of authentic existence and 'fall' into inauthentic existence, being absorbed into the world. *Dasein* then becomes subject to others and rather than taking its own decisions, they are taken by the anonymous 'they'.²⁷

This threefold structure to *Dasein's* existence cannot be based on any substantive notion of being but is a dynamic concept. To the three dimensions of care correspond the three dimensions of time; the notion of temporality replaces the traditional model of the

substantial soul.²⁸ Temporality is the original being of man but to say that man is temporality does not mean to say that he exists as an object in time. An object has an external relationship to time, moving through time from one 'now' to another. *Dasein*, however, is not simply confined to the now. As projecting he is already in the future and as thrown he has already been; *Dasein* is not just in time but is constituted by the past, present and future. He has 'the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been'.²⁹ Man is thus not simply temporal but also historical, not in the sense of past time but in the sense of being derived from the past and continuing in the future.

According to Heidegger, Kant failed to develop an ontology of *Dasein* in terms of temporality. His failure was his uncritical acceptance of Descartes' basic position, although in many respects he went far beyond him. Descartes had begun the Copernican revolution in thought with his '*cogito sum*' but had failed to develop an understanding of the '*sum*', i.e. provide an ontology of Being.³⁰ Kant's premise that 'Being is not a real predicate' side-steps the issue and thus Being is understood as 'Being-present-at-hand' - i.e. as an entity come across.³¹ Kant's 'I think' as the form of apperception is not meant to be something represented but the formal structure of representation, that which 'binds together'. However this is nothing less than a 'logical subject' and although he does not reduce the 'I' to an ontical substance he has not avoided using it in a wrong ontological sense.³² Kant considers the 'I think' as an 'I think something'. The representations 'accompany' the 'I' and it is nothing without them. However the concept of

accompanying is not made explicit and is based on the subject as being constantly present-at-hand over and against the representations. However for Heidegger, 'I' is neither substance nor subject but the *authentic* potentiality-for-being.³³

In Kant the distinction between ontological knowledge and ontic knowledge is expressed in terms of noumena and phenomena; we only have knowledge of the phenomenon not of the noumenon. The noumenon is an object, but one of which we can have no knowledge since it is not an object of sensibility and only performs a regulative function. Heidegger interprets the transcendental object in terms of the *Vorgriff*, as à 'something' of which we know nothing; it is a Nothing.³⁴ It is the horizon within which things are made thematic and within which truth is possessed. The horizon itself is not however possessed,

There are both similarities and major differences between Heidegger's and Rahner's understanding of man, between Heidegger's being-in-the-world and Rahner's spirit-in-world. Heidegger's existential-ontological analysis of *Dasein* is in terms of the threefold structure of care, in other words in the context of the whole of experience; Rahner's analysis in Spirit in the World is primarily (though not exclusively) confined to the realm of knowledge and is understood in terms of knowing and self-presence.³⁵ However, Heidegger's understanding of *Dasein* in terms of temporality has strong echoes in both Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word. The human knower is already and always in the world and his knowledge is grounded in the world. The possibility of metaphysics is based on this worldliness, in the context and

knowledge of worldly reality, or in Thomistic terms 'conversion to the phantasm'. Human spirit is spirit in relation to the spatio-temporal world and human transcendence is realized in the context of history of mankind.³⁶ Consequently Rahner's difference from both Kant and Hegel lies in his Heideggerian starting point - human questioning in its radical historicity.³⁷

There is a basic difference between Rahner's and Heidegger's thought. Heidegger interpreted *Dasein* in terms of temporality and thus is intrinsically limited and finite, orientated towards death. At the same time *Dasein* is transcendently orientated towards nothingness against which beings are able to stand out. Although Rahner acknowledges both that some commentators maintain that Heidegger's finitude only refers to *Dasein* and does not prejudice a discussion about pure Being and that Heidegger himself states that the question of God is still open, he is not convinced. For Rahner, since Heidegger has answered the metaphysical question in terms of pure nothingness, the question of God is ruled out from the start.³⁸ However, he sees in Heidegger's thought when purged of its atheistic implications, profound implications for religious belief in terms of an existential analysis of man which resists 'the mad and secret Hegelian dream of equality with God' and directs man into the world and history in order to seek a historical revelation.³⁹ It is in these terms that Rahner uses Heidegger's thought in Hearers of the Word. Rahner, however, drawing on Thomistic thought, sees pure being as absolute, infinite and unconditioned, known in unobjective, unthematic consciousness in the pre-apprehension (*Vorgriff*) which underlies all knowing.

The influence of Aquinas and transcendental Thomism -

the question is answered

In Rahner's interpretation of Aquinas the influence of Heidegger's method is apparent. Heidegger understood history in terms of human participation; we can only study history because as historical existents we already participate in it.⁴⁰ History is not primarily to do with the past but to do with man and the possibilities of his existence as coming from the past and orientated towards the future. It must therefore be studied primarily in existential rather than scientific terms, though the terms of investigation are no less rigorous or factual.⁴¹ History is not a study of events that happened just once and for all but is repeated (or better, re-fetched or retrieved in an active sense) to reveal the authentic possibilities of *Dasein* for the present.⁴² Thus Heidegger attempts a retrieval of Kant not simply in terms of 'historical philology' but in a attempt 'to set in motion a thoughtful dialogue between thinkers'.⁴³ Likewise Rahner does not undertake merely to assemble and summarise the statements of Aquinas but 'to reconstruct the original line of reasoning' in a creative and personal way.⁴⁴

Both for Aquinas and for Kant truth lies in the agreement between thought and object.⁴⁵ In Aquinas this takes place in judgment, not merely as a synthesis between two concepts to form a concrete idea; it must also be related to the reality itself. The reality must exist in its own right, not merely on the psychic level. Rahner makes a link between Thomas and Kant in that for both thinkers the act of judgment and the concept both contain two elements, sensibility and thought.⁴⁶ Thus Kant's statement that

'Thoughts without content are empty, perceptions with conceptions are blind' is an expansion of Aquinas' doctrine of conversion to the phantasm.

In his interpretation of Aquinas Rahner is heavily influenced by Maréchal, who, against the trend of neo-Thomism with its emphasis on the *a posteriori* dimension in Thomas' epistemology, develops the less obvious *a priori* element.⁴⁷ Maréchal was the first to see the connections between Kant and the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge. He uses Kant's transcendental method within the context of Aquinas' thought to overcome the deficiencies in Kant's thought. Kant had attempted to resolve the contradiction between empiricism and ontological rationalism, but he limited knowledge to the empirical realm alone. For Maréchal however, the human mind is both an empirical faculty and a possibility for the absolute.⁴⁸ Knowledge is not primarily based in a construction from the parts derived from empirical senses but in the absolute affirmation of being, which is objective and related to what is real; the metaphysical can only be reached if it is already combined in what is given.

Maréchal, approaching from the standpoint of Thomistic metaphysics, makes two criticisms of Kant. Firstly the human intellect is both an empirical faculty and a possibility for the absolute. He agrees with Kant that each judgment expresses the synthesis of what is sensibly given but he also wants to assert that it is not merely categorical, limited to conditions related to space and time. It also refers the categorical synthesis it produces to being in general. For Kant absolute unity was merely a regulative idea, for Maréchal it is a constitutive function.

Categorical synthesis can only be conceived in relation to total synthesis. 'Pure being - or the absolute - is thus comprehended in every judgment as universal unity and posited as absolute end'.⁴⁹

Secondly Kant has too static a conception of the functions of knowledge.⁵⁰ For Maréchal knowledge is not just a psychological event passively undergone by the knower but a dynamic activity. When I know something I am aware that I am doing something. In other words the act of knowing is itself already a kind of reality, knowing is a kind of being. Although Kant used dynamic language he failed to develop it and preserved a rigid division between sensible (*a posteriori*) intuition and creative (*a priori*) intuition. He never went beyond a static conception of human intelligence and in his analysis of human knowing he considered only the content and not the activity through which this content is held. Thus Maréchal emphasises both the dynamism of human intellect and the act of affirmation.

Whereas Aquinas developed a metaphysical critique of knowledge Maréchal develops a transcendental critique, starting from Kant but going beyond him. Maréchal regards knowledge as the act of a knowing subject, involving the immanent unity of knower and known, and then looks for the preconditions which must necessarily be given prior to the act. Following Aquinas, Maréchal describes the human knower as the point of intersection between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge. The understanding contains an active component (agent intellect) which is an *a priori* determination which unifies and orders empirical knowledge in terms of all that is knowable, not just in space and time but the totality of being.

This dynamic orientation of knowledge towards the totality of being is termed 'anticipation'.⁵¹ This involves what Maréchal calls '*une sort d'anticipation metaempirique*', in which human reason transcends the limited beings of its conceptual knowledge.⁵²

This anticipation of absolute being is the basis of an analogical understanding of knowledge. However it is judgment that leads to knowledge rather than just mere appearance. Judgment takes place by affirmation, the dynamic spontaneous striving which affirms the object as over and against the subject in relation to the totality of being, the goal of this affirmation. Maréchal uses Aquinas to show that the goal of this striving is not merely a 'subjective postulated ideal' as Kant maintained but 'an objective necessary absolute reality'.⁵³ Maréchal shows how in Aquinas man's intellect is '*quodammodo omnia*' since in his pre-apprehension he embraces the totality of being and that this is the basis for abstraction. This striving can only be orientated to an ultimate and absolute goal, infinite being, which in Thomistic metaphysics is God himself. This goal, although supernatural, must itself be possible, otherwise the natural orientation of our intellectual nature would become a logical contradiction - the striving after nothing'.⁵⁴

Rahner is heavily influenced by Maréchal's interpretation of Aquinas. Rahner's Spirit in the World is an interpretation of Thomist epistemology and metaphysics as developed by Maréchal in the light of German thought from Kant to Heidegger by way of Hegel in order to go beyond Kant's agnosticism to show that being itself is implicitly reached in the act of knowing.⁵⁵ It is important to

understand Rahner's treatment of Aquinas with this in mind for although he refers to many of Aquinas' phrases he is not understanding them in terms of the traditional Aristotelian understanding of the cosmos and external reality. On the whole Aquinas' approach is objectivistic and cosmocentric but there are hints at a more anthropocentric approach and these are developed by Rahner, following Maréchal. Rahner is arguing against the traditional approach to metaphysical knowledge that either assumes a direct intuition of God or an inference of God from observations of the external world and in this he agrees with Kant that all knowledge must begin with and be mediated by sense experience.

Rahner develops Maréchal's idea of the unity of knower and known into his own concept of the primordial unity of being and knowing, being as self-presence.⁵⁶ He combines Maréchal's notion of the implicit affirmation of being in judgment with his interpretation of Heidegger's *Vorgriff* which is implicitly and simultaneously affirmed in knowledge.⁵⁷ Rahner makes full use of Maréchal's understanding of the affirmation of being implicit in judgment in his own understanding of abstraction.⁵⁸ He also makes use of Maréchal's understanding of the dynamism of judgment, human spirit as 'desire', 'a dynamic orientation' towards absolute being.⁵⁹ There is however a significant difference in starting point. For Maréchal the affirmation of being is made possible as a result of his transcendental analysis of human knowing. Rahner, on the other hand, begins both Spirit in the World and Hearers of the Word with a description of the unity of knowing and being. Maréchal, starting from Kant's theory of judgment, shows that the affirmation of being

is implicit in that judgment; Rahner, following Heidegger, begins from the *a priori* knowledge of being implicit in human questioning, implicit because the mind cannot question that which is totally unknowable.⁶⁰ Therefore Francis Fiorenza can say:

Rahner does not attempt, as does Maréchal, to establish the metaphysical significance of the judgment primarily as a result of a transcendental reduction or deduction, but applies Heidegger's insights concerning the circular structure of human knowledge.⁶¹

Man questions necessarily and since something which is completely unknowable cannot be questioned man as being-in-the-world affirms the questionability of being in its totality. It is in this way that being (as questionability) is able to be known. 'Always and of necessity man posits in his existence the "whence" for an answer, hence implicitly the answer to the question of being itself'.⁶²

The unity of being and knowing, or rather the assertion that the concept of being cannot be separated from the concept of the knowability of being, is a central concept in Rahner's theology. Rahner develops Aquinas' understanding of knowledge to show that knowing is not a 'coming upon' something but that knowing is the being-present-to-self of being.⁶³ Being is originally self-presence, or luminosity in Heidegger's language, a 'knowledge of the act of being which the knower himself is', i.e. being is 'present to itself' in knowing.⁶⁴ The questioner must both be united with being and yet not united: in that he is able to ask he is united, and in that he needs to ask he is not united. Thus, for Rahner, even in Aquinas being is not a static substance or concept, understood in purely ontic terms but is ontological, or as Rahner puts it, relating Aquinas' thought to Heidegger's: Aquinas has an ontological

understanding of metaphysics 'which is quite current today'.⁶⁵

Rahner's thought has been criticised at this point for being too idealistic in its implications. Cornelius Ernst has described the assertion of the unity of being and knowing as 'wholly unacceptable' since it means that 'every entity (every material entity too) is a more or less deficient angel'.⁶⁶ Fiorenza, commenting on Ernst's criticism, points to the need to set Rahner's thought in context at this point. Kant's separation of thinking and being had led to his dismissal of rational theology. If a theologian accepts this distinction between thinking and being then he must either accept Kant's conclusions and all that acceptance entails or show the conclusions do not follow from the premises, which is, as Fiorenza suggests, a difficult task. Rahner therefore, following Maréchal in his attempt to confront the problem posed by Kant, questions Kant's premises in order to avoid his negative conclusions regarding theology. Fiorenza continues:

Therefore, before we as Anglo-Saxons living in a different philosophical tradition label Rahner's position as idealistic or criticize his understanding of the convertibility of being and intelligibility, we should take into account the Kantian problematic with all its implications and consequences.⁶⁷

Human beings are affirmed not in an idealist sense as an absolute identity of being and knowing, which is God, or as a Hegelian absolute consciousness, but as finite self-presence, spirit in the world. Rahner is anxious to avoid being identified with Hegel's idealism, though his emphasis on the dialectical unity of human being and knowing incorporates the Hegelian view of the process character of being.⁶⁸ But as Rahner points out one does

not have to be a Hegelian in order to incorporate his insights.⁶⁹

For Rahner the whole of Spirit in the World can be summarised by Aquinas's phrase 'conversion to the phantasm'.⁷⁰ Human knowledge of self and of the Absolute comes only through sense experience. It is on the doctrine of conversion that Rahner explicitly bases his conviction of the unity of being and knowing. For Aquinas there is only one knowing, 'a knowing-being-with-the-world'.⁷¹ Man in his sense-knowledge becomes one with the material object, 'the knower itself is the being of the other'.⁷² Matter is the 'other' of being through which being can only become 'present to itself' in a subject's knowledge of it, i.e. being is on both sides of the subject-object split and grounds them both.⁷³ Thus the problem of metaphysics is not how to bridge the gap between knower and known but how to distance the two, to create a gap.⁷⁴

The ability to liberate the subject from sensibility is the power of the intellect (agent intellect) through abstraction. Like conversion the agent intellect is a central concept in Rahner's understanding of Aquinas and enables him to assimilate Kant's *a priori* forms of sensibility and understanding and also Heidegger's concept of the revealedness and hiddenness of being. It is in abstraction that self-presence is seen as presence to another. This is contained in Aquinas' understanding of the agent (active) intellect and the possible intellect. The agent intellect is the spontaneous openness of the human spirit for the absolute, absolute *esse* in Aquinas' terms, whilst the possible intellect signifies the receptive capacity of the knower for all empirical objects. The agent intellect is the *a priori* drive towards the absolute, the light

by which what is received from sensibility by the possible intellect is illuminated. The intellect actively produces an abstract concept enabling 'human knowledge to place the other, which is given in sensibility, away from itself and in question, to judge it, to objectify it and thereby make the knower a subject for the first time'.⁷⁵

Rahner understands Aquinas' concept of the agent intellect in terms of the *Vorgriff*. The intellect can only take possession of an object, recognize it as limited if it passes beyond it. The problem is how can human knowledge establish its own limits when a knowledge of limit implies knowledge beyond that limit? The intellect can only know the form as limited if it has a 'pre-apprehension' (*Vorgriff*), a pre-grasp of the infinite horizon of being, an *a priori* power given with human nature.⁷⁶ This is not knowledge of an object but the implicit unreflexive consciousness that makes objective knowledge possible. Man knows of infinity only insofar as he experiences himself surpassing all his knowledge in the pre-apprehension and as open to being in its totality. Being is not objectified; it is not a static essence but 'oscillating as it were, between nothing and infinity'.⁷⁷ It is only when man turns to the world that being can be shown to be present and necessary in all knowing. The horizon needs a world to make it a horizon. In this way man has an unobjective unthematic consciousness of God.⁷⁸

The *Vorgriff* is a central concept in Spirit in the World. It answers the question of how the human person can be spirit, can reach beyond the world to metaphysical knowledge whilst at the same time remaining bound to the world. But what is its 'whither', the

object of the *Vorgriff*? For Rahner there are three possible answers.⁷⁹ Firstly, the answer of the perennial philosophy from Plato to Hegel is that the object is absolute being, God. Secondly, the answer of Kant is that the object is the finite horizon of sense intuition. Thirdly, in Rahner's understanding of Heidegger, the answer is nothing.

Rahner deals with Heidegger's answer first. On a superficial level it would seem that since human knowledge is related to existents, so the *Vorgriff* should relate to some reality and also, at a deeper level of argument, it is only an orientation towards infiniteness that makes finiteness possible (negates).⁸⁰ It is not 'nought that noughtens', as for Heidegger, but it is only in the infinite that the finite can be known. Nothingness is not a horizon. For Rahner, this also invalidates Kant's argument. In this way Rahner argues that the object of the *Vorgriff* must be absolute being, God. In equating absolute being with God Rahner is not attempting an *a priori* proof; rather such a move is only possible in the light of an historical revelation, a point he will develop in Hearers of the Word.

Rahner's transcendental Thomism is central to his theology. It provides an appropriate starting point for answering Kant's negative conclusions about the possibility of metaphysics whilst accepting his basic premise. It is also a good starting point for incorporating Heidegger's ontology of worldliness and temporality.

Rahner's understanding of experience of God

In the second chapter we looked at the relationship between Rahner's and John of the Cross's understanding of experience of God. We are now in a position to examine that in more detail. John of the Cross had a Thomistic understanding of knowledge: all natural knowledge is limited by sense experience and we know through the process of sensation, abstraction and conversion to the phantasm. This, however, is not appropriate for knowledge of God since this knowledge is of a different kind, a supernatural knowledge brought about by God acting upon the passive intellect. Rahner, as we have seen, starts from the unity of being and knowing; knowledge is not merely a coming across something but also self-knowledge. Whereas John envisaged a supernatural action on the passive intellect, for Rahner our non-conceptual knowledge of God is part of the structure of human knowing, given in and as a condition of the process of abstraction by the agent intellect, as the *a priori* horizon and basis of all our knowledge. Rahner's epistemology means that he can incorporate the mystics' affirmation of a direct experience of the Spirit without it being seen in terms of supernatural intervention. This is possible because of God's supernatural elevation of human existence. God 'is always given simply as the ultimate *basis* of experience',⁸¹ but this is only because:

The basic mystery of Christianity is not that God has created a world different from himself . . . but rather that the grace which in the last analysis is identical with God himself, has permeated the world with God's own presence.⁸²

This will become clearer when we look in more detail at Rahner's understanding of grace.

Despite their differences, the views of the experience of God of John of the Cross and Rahner are, as we have seen, actually complementary. For St John, working within the framework of Thomistic psychology, experience of God can be first experienced either in the intellect or the will, but is more often experienced in the will as a movement of love. For Rahner, also, the experience of God can begin from either knowledge or love, but Rahner does not adhere strictly to Thomistic psychology.

In a Thomistic understanding of man there is one substantial form and man is the unity of body and soul, a composite substance. The soul is not somehow alien to the body as in Platonism. But although Aquinas emphasizes the unity of man he holds that there is a real distinction between the soul (the human substance) and its faculties or powers of acting (accidents). Most of the accidental powers of human substance are organic or material but the soul possesses two immaterial, inorganic powers, an intellectual power of conceptual abstraction and judgment (intellect) and a volitional power of free choice and decision (will). Aquinas' approach was an intellectualist one in that he stressed the primacy of the intellect over the will. 'For he maintained that whereas the will tends towards its object the intellect possesses it in cognition, and possession is better than tending towards'.⁸³ But Aquinas' view that man's fulfilment consists of the intellectual vision of God did not exclude love. Complete love is the fulfilment of complete knowledge. Both John of the Cross and Rahner, working within this framework, speak of knowledge through love or loving knowledge.

Both authors believe that union with God involves the activity of the whole spirit, and that intellect and will

are involved in a mutually conditioning way as loving knowledge. Both authors believe that the last word is with love.⁸⁴

Therefore Rahner describes spirit as 'being *one* in the "*perichoresis*" (circumcession) of knowledge and love'.⁸⁵ The act of love is a crucial factor in knowledge of God and one that we have seen to be at the heart of charismatic experience.⁸⁶ We shall see in the next chapter how Rahner broadens his metaphysics of knowledge into a metaphysics of love. It is this development that provides the basis for our understanding of Rahner's theology as a charismatic theology.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan Press, London, 1929, p.22.
2. Ibid., p.59.
3. Ibid., p.93.
4. Ibid., pp.153 and 160.
5. Ibid., p.169.
6. Ibid., p.19.
7. Ibid., p.193.
8. Ibid., pp.494f.
9. K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, Sheed and Ward, London, 1968, p.liii.
10. Ibid., pp.180ff.
11. Ibid., p.57.
12. Ibid., p.58.
13. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, p.22.
14. William Richardson, Heidegger - Through Phenomenology to Thought, Martinus Nijhoff/The Hague, 1974, p.13.
15. M. Heidegger, op. cit., p.32.
16. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959, p.1.
17. K. Rahner, op. cit., p.61; K. Rahner, Hearers of the Word, Sheed and Ward, London, 1969, (hereafter Hearers) p.48ff.
18. Hearers, p.36; M. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.32ff.
19. Spirit, pp.57ff.; Hearers, pp.33f.
20. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.33f. See also Foundations, p. 16, translator's note: 'The two spellings, 'existential' and 'existentiell', follow the German usage. 'Existential', as in

Rahner's phrase 'supernatural existential', refers to an element in man's ontological constitution precisely as human being, an element which is constitutive of his existence as human. 'Existentiell' as in Rahner's phrase 'existentiell Christology', refers to the free, personal and subjective appropriation and actualization of something which can also be spoken of in abstract theory or objective concepts without such a subjective and personal realization.'

21. Ibid., p.25.
22. Ibid., pp.262ff.; cf. pp.105f. translator's note: 'To say that something has been 'disclosed' or 'laid open' in Heidegger's sense, does not mean that one has any detailed awareness of the contents which are thus 'disclosed', but rather that they have been 'laid open' to us as implicit in what is given, so that they may be made explicit to our awareness by further analysis or discrimination of the given, rather than by any inference from it.'
23. T.I., Vol. 9, pp.33-37.
24. Hearers, pp.48f.; cf. Spirit, p.180.
25. Hearers, pp.33f.
26. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.174.
27. Ibid., pp.220ff.
28. Ibid., p.374.
29. Ibid., p.374.
30. Ibid., p.46.
31. Ibid., p.127.
32. See ibid., pp. 496f. n. XIX: 'In spite of their fundamental significance, do not the paralogisms make manifest how ontologically groundless are the problematics of the self from Descartes' *res cogitans* right up to Hegel's concept of spirit? One does not need to think either 'naturalistically' or 'rationalistically', and yet one may be under the domination of the ontology of the 'substantial' - a domination which is only more baleful because it is seemingly self-evident.'
33. Ibid., p.369.
34. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James Churchill, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1962, pp.127ff. Heidegger defines the *Vorgriff* as 'something we grasp in advance - in a fore-conception', Being and Time, p.191. William Shepherd points out that 'conception' is misleading as it implies 'conscious awareness

of'. (W.C. Shepherd, Man's Condition: God and the World Process, Herder and Herder, New York, 1969, p. 110 n.22)

35. A. Carr, op. cit., pp.24f: 'Kant was right, according to Heidegger, in his concern with the *a priori* categories of subjectivity. But he erred in only attending to fully-reflexive self-understanding and to the subject as abstracted from, and prior to, experience. Subject and object, for Heidegger and for Rahner, exist only in experience. But where Heidegger adopts and modifies Husserl's phenomenological method and aim of a regional ontology by extending the analysis beyond the intentionality of consciousness to the intentionality of the whole of experience, Rahner's analysis, for the most part, confines itself to the realm of knowledge. His aim is to thematize the unthematic knowledge of the human being conceived fundamentally as knower.'
36. Hearers, pp.140-149.
37. A. Carr, op. cit., p.259.
38. K. Rahner, 'The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger', Philosophy Today, XIII (1969), pp.135f.
39. A. Carr, op. cit., p.22.
40. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.444f.
41. Ibid., p.195.
42. W. Richardson, op. cit., p.89.
43. M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p.xxv.
44. T.I., Vol. 13, p.15; cf. Spirit, pp.xlixf.
45. Ibid., p.16.
46. Ibid., p.18.
47. Ibid., p.25; cf. Spirit, p.xlvii.
48. Otto Muck, The Transcendental Method, Herder and Herder, New York, 1968, p.40.
49. Ibid., p.42.
50. Ibid., p.70.
51. Ibid., p.91.
52. A. Carr, op. cit., p.48.
53. O. Muck, op. cit., p.95.
54. Ibid., p.102.

55. cf. Spirit, p.lii.
56. Ibid., pp.67ff.; Hearers, pp.31-44.
57. Spirit, pp.142ff.
58. Rahner points out that this is in fact 'the first great starting point which Thomas posits along with every great philosophy from that of the Greeks until Hegel'. Spirit, p.18.
59. Ibid., p.281.
60. Ibid., pp.57-61.
61. Francis P. Fiorenza, 'Karl Rahner and the Kantian Problematic', Introduction to Spirit in the World, p.xli.
62. Quoted from Gerald A. McCool, A Rahner Reader, Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1975, p.4. McCool uses an unpublished translation by Joseph Donceel of the first edition of Hearers. This is often a clearer and more accurate translation than the published English edition of Hearers. (See Thomas Sheehan, Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1987, p.14, n.7). This quote appears on p.35 of the English edition.
63. Hearers, pp.35-44.
64. G.A. McCool, op. cit., p.7; Hearers, p.39; (see note 65 above).
65. Spirit, p.70.
66. Cornelius Ernst, Introduction to Theological Investigations, Vol. 1, p.xiii n.1.
67. F. Fiorenza, op. cit., p.xxxii; cf. George S. Hendry, 'Kant Anniversary', Theology Today, 38 (1981-2), p.367: 'Rahner's most striking divergence from Kant is that he translates natural theology from the cloudland of the transcendent, where Kant had located it, to the dimension of the transcendental, where it functions as 'the condition of the possibility' of the true knowledge of God. In this way he seeks to resolve the apparent contradiction between Kant's denial of natural theology and the dogmatic affirmation of it by the first Vatican council.'
68. T.I., Vol. 13, p.16; cf. Wilfred Corduan, 'Hegel in Rahner: A Study in Philosophical Hermeneutics', Harvard Theological Review, 71 (1977), p.290.
69. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.113f. n.3.
70. Spirit, p.liiii; this literally means based on things, see p.21.

71. Ibid., p.63.
72. Ibid., p.79.
73. Ibid., pp.97 and 84; W.Shepherd, op. cit., p.108.
74. Spirit, p.75
75. Ibid., p.118. Aquinas is not saying that the intellect knows a universal essence then turns to sensibility to ground it. There is only one knowing and the concrete is known first. However, intellect (spirit) is prior to sensibility (world) though blind without it. They are not two concepts but a single process.
76. Ibid., pp.142f.
77. Ibid., p.162.
78. Ibid., pp.181f.
79. Ibid., pp.183ff.
80. A Rahner Reader, pp.17f; Hearers, pp.61f. (see note 65 above) cf. M. Heidegger, 'What is Metaphysics?', in Existence and Being, Vision Press Limited, London, 1949, p.369.
81. T.I., Vol. 8, p.17.
82. Ibid., p.23.
83. F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1955, p.185.
84. D. Edwards, op. cit., p.67.
85. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.42f. Rahner continues: 'But this must ultimately mean that while guarding the distinction between knowing and willing, we must understand the act of knowing in such a way that it will explain why knowledge can only exist in a being when and in so far as that one being realizes itself by an act of love. . . . This consideration is not an attack upon a well thought out Thomistic intellectualism which is also Christian. . . . If one really wishes to be true to Thomist intellectualism, one must understand the intellect in such a way that love is the perfection of knowledge itself.'
86. See above pp.17-22.

Chapter 4

HUMAN BECOMING AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

In Hearers of the Word Rahner broadens his metaphysics of knowing into one of knowing and willing in freedom and love, present in Spirit but not developed. In Spirit knowledge was seen as desire and striving and action, and as such the will was an intrinsic part of the act of knowing.¹ But freedom was also an intrinsic element in knowledge: 'The transcendence beyond the other of sensibility, which is the return of the spirit to itself, can be called Thomistically the freedom of spirit'.² In this way Rahner lays the foundations for his understanding of human freedom and personhood.

Love - the essence of human becoming and of knowledge of God

We have seen how love is the defining characteristic of the charismatic experience; we have also seen the incarnational and practical nature of the charismatic experience, it is to do with 'walking in love' involving decision and choice. We must show how these two aspects are at the heart of Rahner's theology. The basic concept is that man becomes aware of his personhood through his free self-determination and through his responsible behaviour towards God, whether he understands it explicitly as that or not.³ Man's exercise of free decision is understood in a twofold manner, firstly as an act whereby man is either implicitly or explicitly set

before God and secondly as an act by means of which man 'disposes of himself as a whole'.⁴ Human freedom means that 'man begins his existence as the being who is radically open and incomplete' and when 'his essence is complete it is as he himself has freely created it'.⁵ The exercise of freedom then, is not just one particular act among others but is 'a transcendental characteristic of the being of man itself', 'the freedom of being itself'.⁶ Human freedom reveals the same structure of transcendentality as human knowledge, orientation to oneself and orientation towards God:

In its original nature, however, the free act is not so much the delimitation of something different or alien to itself, but is the fulfilment of its *own nature*. A free act is a taking possession by a thing of itself . . . Thus it is a *coming to oneself*, a *being present to oneself*, within oneself.⁷

Whereas the concept of freedom in Spirit was restricted to the possibility of knowledge, in Hearers the concept is extended to man as a person. The argument is based on the same premises but in Hearers Rahner develops his understanding of man's freedom in the context of willing and loving. Although Spirit is restricted to the metaphysics of knowing there is a development in Hearers to consider the human subject as a whole, man who in freedom makes not just individual decisions but implicit in them makes decisions which determine his own nature.⁸

Man's becoming personal consists of a free decision that shapes and determines the whole of what man is and can be before God: 'Thus the free decision tends to dispose of the operative subject as a whole before God.'⁹ This free decision is a 'spiritual act' but not a purely spiritual act because as we have seen man is material spirit, not pure spirit. For Rahner there can be no crude dualism between flesh and spirit. Human spirit as material spirit is

flesh.¹⁰ The dualism that there is is rather a dualism of what man is prior to his existential decision and what he is after it.¹¹ But this is not to be understood in an individualistic sense since the 'other' of Spirit, whereby human being comes to itself, is in reality a 'Thou'. 'The personal spirit is a spirit referred to others', thus man's becoming as personal spirit is only realized through love of others.¹² This is not one act amongst other acts but is 'man himself in his total achievement'.¹³ It is 'the all-embracing basic act of man which gives meaning, direction and measure to everything else.'¹⁴ This act of love for another is the basis of man's transcendental as a knowing and willing subject. Love sums up the person as spirit, it is an opening of oneself, an entrusting to the other, free self-giving and abandonment, an ecstasy (*ecstasis*).¹⁵ In this free self-giving there is the full realization of the human person; freedom has its goal in self-giving love.

Freedom is always self-realization of the objectively choosing man seen in view of his total realization before God. In this way, considered as the capacity of the 'heart', it is the capacity of love.¹⁶

As human knowledge is grounded in God, freedom is only possible in orientation to the absolute horizon. Freedom is the possibility of saying yes or no to God himself. In the same way that in knowledge objects are known in the context of the pre-apprehension of being so too 'freedom towards the encountered individual beings is also a freedom towards the horizon'.¹⁷ But as in knowledge God is not apprehended as one object amongst other categorical objects so in freedom God is not willed or chosen as one object among others. There is a difference between the transcendental horizon and the concrete object. The transcendental horizon is the condition that makes the concrete object comprehensible and it is only in the

concrete object that the horizon is encountered; the transcendental horizon requires a categorical object.¹⁸ In this way the exercise of freedom and consequently of love, if this freedom is used in a positive not negative sense, is a relation primarily to the concrete object, which as we have seen means in terms of human becoming the 'Thou'. On this basis Rahner can say, 'The original relationship to God is . . . love of neighbour'.¹⁹ Not that this is seen in a narrow sense of personal relationships but rather man is understood as a 'political being' for love is understood as a 'political love' which makes all mankind his neighbour and theology must always be political theology.²⁰ This is both because of man's essential constitution as a social being as outlined in Hearers but also because society itself has changed in recent years and has entered a 'post-individualistic' phase.²¹

Rahner's aim in Hearers was to show that historicity is ontologically a part of human being and therefore historical occurrences are fundamentally part of the human person.²² As Rahner argued in Spirit, to say that man is spirit is to say that he enters into the otherness of matter, into the world. In other words man is 'sensate spirituality'; 'man, *precisely as spirit*, lives in this world'.²³ The whole man is spirit; spirit is not a separate element. As such he is intrinsically related to others; he must go out into the world and cannot remain in isolation because that would be a denial of his essential constitution as spirit - 'Man is real only as a part of humanity'.²⁴ For Rahner, as for Heidegger, temporality is the process by which an individual realizes himself. This is a process of self-constitution involving others with whom an individual is essentially related.²⁵

In this way Rahner has concluded his metaphysical anthropology as a metaphysics of an obediencial potency. This is concerned with the whole man, in his knowing and willing transcendence who in history must listen for God. In terms of the later Rahner this is the supernatural existential.²⁶ Metz's notes in the 1963 edition of Hearers indicate the broader understanding of man which is implicit in Hearers which is explicitly developed in the later Rahner. Metz's revision of Hearers involved an attempt 'to bring the Thomistic concept of the concrete world "up to date" with the more original concept of a personal world'.²⁷ In in the later work such as Foundations history is an essential part of man's becoming, whether good or bad. His freedom is mediated by the concrete reality of history and his knowledge of God comes through an encounter with the concrete reality of the world of things and people.²⁸ The emphasis is on the *a posteriori* and categorical rather than the *a priori* and transcendental, on man's historical existence in its totality. It is in this historical context that man becomes responsible for his own salvation, not as something which he receives from 'outside', but his own self-realization and self-acceptance within the concrete possibilities offered him in his history. 'It is in history that the subject must work out his salvation by finding it there as offered to him and accepting it.'²⁹ Since the human subject who is involved in salvation has history as an intrinsic element then history itself is the history of salvation. World history is not identical with salvation but co-existent, salvation history takes place within world history.³⁰ This world history is also the place of God's revelation.³¹

Although Rahner has not moved away from the basic philosophical

foundations of Spirit (knowing) and Hearers (willing) he has developed a more concrete approach to man as an historical, social and personal being. The question in the later Rahner is not so much about the relationship of man's spirit to matter as of the origin of his spirit from matter; the emphasis is more explicitly incarnational. In Spirit Rahner's concern was to show how sensibility originates from spirit. His starting point was spirit which was what is immediately given in self-reflection and he explained its relation to matter, spirit in the world. He is now working from material and historical human nature. The 'early Rahner' (up to the Second Vatican Council) concentrated on the structures of the knowing subject; the later Rahner concentrates more on the subject in his changing and pluralistic historical context. The emphasis on historicity is derived from Heidegger.

We have already seen, both for Rahner and for St. John of the Cross, that love is not only an intrinsic part of human becoming, it is also an integral part of knowledge of God. We saw, when we looked at the link between sanctification and charismatic experience, the distinction between a 'true' proposition and merely a 'right' one. For Rahner there are ultimately no 'propositions in themselves' since they were 'always in their concrete presence an act of man'. Knowledge, therefore, is only realized and fulfilled in actions that express that knowledge, that are 'in sympathy' with it; the same is true of a person's response to another's actions. For a free act to be understood by another person he must enter into sympathy with it, he must love it:

Now this free action of God is luminous for us only when we do not merely take it as fact. We must also ratify it in our love for it, thus re-experiencing it, as it were, in its origin and its production. . . . In final analysis

knowledge is but the luminous radiance of love.³²

Thus since knowledge is understood as the self-presence of a being, a taking possession of oneself, and since this self-presence only comes through a loving entering into the free action of God, then love is seen to be the light of knowledge. Love is not something added on to knowledge but its condition and cause:

Knowledge, though prior to love and freedom, can only be realized in its *true* sense when and in so far as the subject is more than knowledge, when in fact it is a freely given love.³³

Man's love for God is not something that comes after his knowledge of God, it is that which makes knowledge of God possible, and although an essential part of man's being, it can either be accepted by man in his free decisions and actions or rejected. In this way man does not just make good or bad decisions but himself becomes either good or bad. In other words, by performance of human freedom one performs oneself, according to the ontological law of one's being, 'the true order of love'.³⁴ Human transcendence towards God involves a free decision that is not just a consequence of knowledge but determines it. 'The concrete knowledge of God is always determined from the start by the way in which man loves and treasures the things presented to him'.³⁵ Thus a real knowledge of God involves a 'conversion', a commitment of the whole person in a free decision. For Rahner this is merely a philosophical attempt to grasp the meaning of the words: "He who does what is true comes to the light." (John 3:21).³⁶

Rahner's thought is more in line with Blondel's than Maréchal's at this point. Though Maréchal criticized Kant's excessively rationalistic view of the operation of the intellect by arguing that knowing is bound up with the dynamism of willing and thus even

love, Blondel developed this further. Both Maréchal and Blondel reach the Infinite from daily experience but differently - Maréchal in that we affirm and Blondel in that we act. For Blondel action is 'a synthesis of willing, knowing and being . . . the precise point where the worlds of thought, of morality and of science converge'.³⁷

J. Donceel sums up the difference well:

But what Maréchal wins thus in clarity and conciseness, he loses in warmth and existential concreteness. Blondel is nearer to real life, with its activity, its love, its feelings and emotions.³⁸

The similarity of Rahner's and Blondel's understanding of knowledge can be seen in the following passage of Blondel's:

It is not merely by *seeing*, but by *living* that we advance into being as we perform, as it were, a leap of generosity beyond the reach of intellectual justifications. To possess is more than to affirm, but one affirms better only by possessing more: we cannot have a better intellectual grasp of being without grasping it more solidly in our acts.³⁹

Blondel distinguishes between our knowledge of God's existence and knowledge of the being of God. The former is implied in the dynamism of our 'willing will', a given of human nature, it requires no 'option' or choice. We only know the being of God, that God not only exists but is 'for us', 'our God', through our 'willed will', when we act upon and live up to our knowledge of God's existence. This requires decision and action, Blondel's '*option fondamentale*':⁴⁰

Thus, at the very moment when we seem to touch God by a stroke of thought, he escapes if we do not keep him, if we do not seek him through action. His immobility can be aimed at as a steady target only by a perpetual movement. Wherever we stop, he is not; wherever we keep marching, he is. We must always proceed beyond, because he is always further.⁴¹

Therefore Blondel can say: 'Knowledge, which before the option was simply subjective and propulsive, becomes after the option privative and constitutive of being', it is privative in that it

deprives a person of knowledge of God, but it is constitutive in that it establishes a knowledge of God.⁴²

Thus Rahner's metaphysics of an obediencial potency is similar to Blondel's '*option fondamentale*'. Both of these are in essence concern with acting or 'walking' in love and it can therefore be said that Rahner's understanding of human becoming is in essence a charismatic understanding.

**Transcendental experience - the conceptual vehicle for
Rahner's understanding of human becoming
and knowledge of God**

This knowledge of God in freedom and will is bound up in Rahner's thought with the notion of transcendental experience. We touched on this when we looked at Rahner's understanding of experience of the Spirit and we must now look at it in more detail. Whilst in Hearers freedom was the basic fact that man becomes aware of, in Foundations the starting point is man as a person and subject; as in Hearers, so too in Foundations, the primary access to God is man's will and freedom. However in Foundations the transcendental experience of God is more explicitly bound to the categorical encounter with the concrete world, both the world of things and in particular the world of persons, the experience of the Thou of another person.⁴³ In Foundations the transcendence of love defined in Hearers in relation to the essential hiddenness of being is now seen in terms of the Holy Mystery.⁴⁴

At the beginning of Foundations Rahner sums up the basic argument of Spirit but this time concludes his discussion with a definition of the term transcendental experience.

We shall call transcendental experience the subjective,

unthematic, necessary and unfailing consciousness of the knowing subject that is co-present in every spiritual act of knowledge, and the subject's openness to the unlimited expanse of all possible reality.⁴⁵

It is this transcendental experience that constitutes human being as spiritual. But there has been a development in his thought since Spirit. Whereas Spirit started from the knowing subject and affirmed the necessity of God for the objectivity of knowledge,⁴⁶ in Foundations Rahner starts from the knowing subject who already has an implicit 'original knowledge', at a deeper level than conceptual, scientific knowledge.⁴⁷ This original knowledge is not an experience of discovering something that we have not known before. This transcendental experience is not simply awareness of the *a priori* structures of human knowing but an openness to the whole of reality.

Transcendental experience is the experience of transcendence, in which experience the structure of the subject and therefore also the ultimate structure of every conceivable object of knowledge are present together in an identity.⁴⁸

In fact there is ambiguity in his use of the word 'transcendental' and according to one critic it has a twofold meaning; on the one hand it means 'the quality of a particular mode of knowledge' and on the other hand 'the quality of a particular mode of being that is connected with the transcendental mode of knowing'.⁴⁹ According to the first, transcendental refers to the non-objective, unthematic original knowledge in which knowing subjects know themselves, all of reality and God (i.e. it is 'co-present in every spiritual act of knowledge' and of course for Rahner every act of knowledge is a spiritual act). The opposite of this mode of knowledge would be 'conceptual', 'thematic', 'objective' and 'categorical' knowledge. In the second sense transcendental does

not refer to this non-objective sort of knowledge but rather to what Van der Heijden calls the 'transobjective', and the realities to which this second usage relate 'do not coincide with the entire extent of the horizon [of knowledge] and thus can be gathered into basic groups within the horizon'.⁵⁰

Although some ambiguity is present in these usages it is important to understand the distinction between them in order to understand Rahner's definition of experience of the Spirit which he develops in his later work. As we have seen the basic change in orientation in Rahner's thought is from an examination of the transcendental of human knowledge to the transcendental of human acting, in freedom and love. It is the second usage which Rahner uses for his understanding of the experience of the Spirit. However, he does not see them as contradictory but rather the second usage as a more precise use of the first, the first usage referring to the conditions of possibility of experience and the second referring to experience. The following passage illustrates the first usage of the term 'transcendental':

It is an *experience* because this knowledge, unthematic but ever-present, is a moment within and a condition of possibility *for every concrete experience of any and every object.*⁵¹

And the following passage illustrates the second usage of the term:

But there is not just the purely objective 'in itself' of a reality on the one hand, and the 'clear and distinct idea' of it on the other, but there is also a *more original unity, not indeed for everything and anything, but certainly for the actualization of human existence*, and this is a unity of reality and its 'self-presence' which is more, and is more original, than the unity of this reality and the concept which objectifies it.⁵²

Not everyone sees an ambiguity here. K. Weger sees the difference more in terms of the one being implicit and the other being

explicit. So in his definition of Rahner's understanding of transcendental experience Weger says:

It takes place as a very concrete everyday experience, even though it is difficult to express verbally. It occurs anonymously and implicitly in every spiritual activity. It also takes place in a clear and more systematic form in those events in which man, who is usually involved in the individual tasks and objects of everyday life, is to some extent thrown back on himself and is no longer able to deal with everything that otherwise normally concerns him.⁵³

This notion of unthematic or 'original knowledge' in Rahner causes Fergus Kerr to assert that Rahner, 'after having studied with Heidegger, shows very considerable resistance to the master's main thoughts'.⁵⁴ Kerr argues that whereas Heidegger starts from state-of-mind, mood, feeling, 'prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure',⁵⁵ Rahner's starting point is human cognition, in particular the *Vorgriff* as part of human cognition. As a consequence for Heidegger, our judgments, cognitions and volitions are embedded in our emotional response to the way things are and happen to us. Only then does Heidegger introduce the notion of *Vorgriff* but then in terms of the practical understanding that takes place through our involvement within the world and not from any standpoint outside it.⁵⁶ Whereas for Heidegger man is being-in-the-world interpreted in terms of care, for Rahner he is constituted by the *Vorgriff* and all other aspects of his existence are interpreted in the light of that.

If Kerr's argument is correct it undermines our assertion that Rahner's thought is rooted in an incarnational spirituality that stresses involvement and decision, leading to love, the heart of charismatic experience. However, what lies behind Rahner's thought is not cognition but experience of mystery. The purpose of Rahner's mystagogy 'is to enable people to interpret correctly their deeper

experiences', to initiate them into the experience of mystery.⁵⁷ This is not the introduction of something external, but the awakening and disclosure of something already present. It is an encouragement of what Heidegger calls 'primordial' or 'essential' thinking, a more passive thinking that listens, a meditative thinking rather than the busy and active calculative thinking of rational and scientific thought. It brings the deeper questions to the surface, rather than just responding to the superficial ones. This corresponds to what Gilkey calls 'the dimension of ultimacy' and what Tracy calls the 'experience of the uncanny' and is what Rahner calls transcendental experience or unthematic knowledge as opposed to categorical or thematic knowledge.⁵⁸ Consequently Bacik can describe Rahner's notion of transcendental experience in Heidegger's terms as 'a mood or vague feeling';⁵⁹ and Rahner himself can interpret unthematic knowledge in terms of both transcendental philosophy and depth psychology.⁶⁰

Kerr asserts that Rahner 'rapidly leaves time and place behind' but for Rahner transcendental experience is always and necessarily bodily, social and historical; there are '*no purely internal processes in a properly metaphysical sense*'.⁶¹ Thus Rahner can assert:

In reality man as physical and as belonging to the historical dimension actually fulfils the ultimate transcendental structures of his own nature not in the abstract 'interiority' of a mere attitude of mind, but in intercourse with the world.⁶²

Bernard Lonergan would want to qualify Rahner's direct approach to God as the Absolute Mystery who reveals himself as the unobjective horizon in every act of affirmation. For Lonergan a much more detailed analysis of man's consciousness and cognitional structure is required.⁶³ Whereas Lonergan stresses the potential

nature of pre-conceptual knowledge, for Rahner it already has a fullness, since it can never be fully captured by conceptualization.⁶⁴ The differences in thought between the two men are not as great as might first appear. Rahner emphasizes that there is a 'more' or 'fullness' in experience that is not expressible in conceptual terms; it is pre-conceptual. However the 'pre' does not signify that it is at an initial stage prior to being raised to conceptual knowledge, it is not what Kerr calls 'cognitive and incipiently conceptual grasp'. It is in fact the very opposite since it indicates the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge. William Dych suggests that this is similar to Lonergan's treatment of intersubjective meaning.⁶⁵ For both Rahner and Lonergan self-awareness and awareness of the world are both elements in human knowing.⁶⁶ For example a baby learns both to distinguish things in the world by organizing and unifying a mass of stimuli and also to distinguish himself from the world.

A child does not learn as a detached observer, watching life pass by, rather the world of which he is becoming aware is affecting him. He becomes aware of objects and himself in a relationship not as two separate things; there is both awareness and affectivity. There is a unity of knower and known, of awareness and affectivity in concrete life. This is not to deny the difference between them but 'rather to assert their mutual interaction and interdependence in the concrete life of the knower and the concrete process of his knowing'.⁶⁷ There is not just knowledge acquired from 'without', from learning from teachers or books but also knowledge from 'within' from being in existence, communicated not by words or concepts but by life itself. This is Rahner's 'original knowledge',



that experience 'in which what is meant and the experience of what is meant are still one'.⁶⁸ It is not Cartesian individualism nor empiricism but an articulation of the concrete unity of lived experience.

**Holy Mystery - the goal of human becoming
and knowledge of God**

As we have said, human transcendence is orientated towards the Holy Mystery. This Mystery is the goal to which the 'fundamental upward movement of man's spirit leads', thus it is at the root of all knowledge and freedom.⁶⁹ By using the word mystery Rahner is not envisaging a provisional concept that will later be clearly understood.⁷⁰ True knowledge is not a mastery of the objects known; this is a secondary form of knowledge. Rather knowledge is primarily 'the presence of the mystery itself' not a mastering of a reality but a being mastered by that reality.⁷¹ We have already seen how man as spirit, in knowing and willing, is a being of absolute and unlimited transcendence. But the 'whither' of this transcendence is best described not as 'God' because the word implies a conceptual understanding, a secondary reflection on the immediate transcendental experience, which though necessary cannot sum up the absolutely and positively infinite. It implies the concept is at our disposal, whereas the whither of transcendence is 'that which disposes of us silently and ceaselessly at the very moment when we begin to dispose of anything,' i.e. when through judgment we understand something.⁷²

Rahner chooses the term 'holy mystery' to describe this whither of transcendence.⁷³ There are various terms, both theological and

philosophical, that could be used.⁷⁴ The trouble with the theological terms is that they either conjure up in people's minds all sorts of concepts, both from historical tradition and also the individual's own experiences, which distort the true meaning of the word; or else they suggest that people can have a clear conceptual grasp of what is meant by them. The philosophical terms on the other hand are for many people today only empty terms which bear no relation to their experience. Rahner's aim is to find a term that will point everyone to their own experience of transcendence, free from any conceptual baggage and for him the best term is mystery, or rather holy mystery, for what else could we call the ground and horizon of human freedom and love?⁷⁵

Rahner's essay on mystery, 'The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology', marks a significant stage in Rahner's thought whereby his 'metaphysics of knowledge is deepened as theological anthropology into a metaphysics of mystery'.⁷⁶ This transition in his thought 'indicates continuity with the past as well as a new, holistic breadth of thought that surpasses the intellectualism of the early writings' and forms the basis of his mystagogical approach.⁷⁷

It is on the basis of the term holy mystery that Rahner develops his theological anthropology. In his understanding of the traditional concept of the beatific vision:

. . . the 'Perfect beatitude granted to man by God consists in immediate access to God; i.e. God himself is the fulfilment of man. But this immediate vision does not entail a doing away with the mystery but is rather the abiding presence of the mystery.'⁷⁸

Man's transcendental openness is fulfilled in a loving 'ecstasis', a giving away of the self in love to the holy mystery that surrounds us.⁷⁹ The mystery is 'the sole peace' of him who trusts himself to

it, loves it humbly, and surrenders himself to it fearlessly in knowledge and love'.⁸⁰

Rahner's emphasis on mystery has an important application to much contemporary charismatic experience. Often the emphasis on direct experience of the Spirit means that people eclipse the mystery since they believe they have 'a direct and immediate revelation from the deity.' This can lead to a new form of ontologism, which replaces an orientation to the uncontrollable and incomprehensible mystery with a 'controlling, manipulating and demanding attitude'.⁸¹

The strength of a mystagogical approach is that:

. . . it gives us a way to interpret and integrate all experience, it encourages us to raise the fundamental questions of life, it accounts for the infinite longings of the heart, it encourages us to break out of the prison of self, it gives us a language for speaking about the kind of experience which evades scientific analysis, it makes us aware of what is already presupposed in our activity, it encourages the celebration of our hopes and dreams, it offers an explanation of our deepest anxiety, it keeps open the possibility of further self-actualization. In brief, the claim is that a recognition of mystery enriches human life.⁸²

It is in terms of mystery that Rahner interprets experience of the Spirit, the charismatic experience of the cross and resurrection of Christ, an experience not of control or grasp but of surrender to that which is always more than man, to the mystery of God:

The cross means the demand, never more to be veiled, for man's unconditional surrender to the mystery of existence which man can no longer bring under his control because he is finite and guilt laden. Resurrection means the unconditioned hope that in that surrender man is definitively accepted by this mystery in forgiveness and blessedness, that where man lets go completely, the precipice disappears.⁸³

This concept of mystery is the basis for Rahner's anthropocentric approach. It is the mystery that defines both God

and man, it is both the goal and the root of man's knowledge and freedom and hence love. 'Man is there, because his real being, as spirit, is transcendence, the being of holy mystery'.⁸⁴ The absolute mystery is that which underlies our existence, our theoretical knowledge and our actualization of life. This is what is meant by God, not a proven external reality which is then introduced to one's own thought and decision processes but a discovery of an existing element of one's own being.⁸⁵ The substitution of the word 'mystery' for 'God' also enables Rahner to develop his understanding of God's self-communication. God as the mystery is present as our innermost reality whilst at the same time remaining incomprehensible.

Over and above his 'intrinsic' status as mystery, God can be mystery only in virtue of a quasi-*formal* causality in which he makes not some entity different from himself, but rather *himself* . . . the specification of the creature.⁸⁶

In the concept of mystery the anthropocentric and theocentric approaches are united, man's goal in the mystery and the mystery at the heart of creation. The mystery of God and the mystery of man form an abiding unity in difference. Man is the being constituted by holy mystery:

Man is a mystery. Indeed, he is *the* mystery. For he is mystery not merely because he is open in his poverty to the mystery of the incomprehensible fullness of God, but because God uttered this mystery as his own.⁸⁷

In the light of these words we must now turn to the pivotal point of Rahner's theology, that of God's self-communication in grace. It is his understanding of this that lies at the heart of his understanding of experience of the Spirit.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Spirit, p.281.
2. Ibid., pp.295f.
3. T.I., Vol. 2, pp.246ff.; Vol. 5, pp.100f.
4. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.360ff; cf. Vol. 6, pp.185 and 203.
5. T.I., Vol. 9, p.213.
6. T.I., Vol. 6, p.184; cf. p.202.
7. Hearers, p.98; cf. T.I., Vol. 17, p.101.
8. Ibid., p.105.
9. T.I., Vol. 1, p.362; 'The reference here is to the notion, derived from Heidegger, that the personal existent (*Dasein*) contributes to its own being by a preforming comprehension of its own future realizations'. Translator's note, p.362.
10. Ibid., p.367.
11. Ibid., p.369.
12. Ibid., p.287; cf. Vol. 6, p.241; Vol. 13, p.127.
13. T.I., Vol. 6, p.243.
14. Ibid., p.241.
15. Ibid., p.242.
16. Ibid., p.187.
17. Ibid., p.182.
18. Ibid., p.237.
19. Ibid., p.189; cf.p.247.
20. T.I., Vol. 9, pp.188f; cf. p.221; Vol. 6, p.232; Vol. 10, pp.349-370; Vol. 14, pp.314-330, 270-279. Rahner's thought has been criticised as being too individualistic (e.g. Johannes

Metz, 'An Essay on Karl Rahner', Foreword to Spirit in the World, 1968, pp. xvii-xviii. But James Bacik can say in the light of such passages as those cited here that 'although Rahner's deepest instincts remain individualistic, his fundamental theological approach is definitely open to the interpersonal and institutional dimensions of human existence'. J. Bacik, op. cit., pp. 53f; cf. K. Rahner in his introduction to Bacik's book, pp.ixf. Peter Mann can say that Rahner's and Metz's positions are complementary rather than contradictory. 'The Transcendental or the Political Kingdom? II', New Blackfriars, Vol. 51 (Jan 1970), p.13).

21. T.I., Vol. 9, p.221.
22. Hearers, p.16.
23. Ibid., p.129 (italics mine).
24. Hearers, p.133.
25. 'Temporality is taken here in its original meaning, not as the external measure of duration of the presence of an existent thing, but as the inner extension of the existent thing itself into the actualized totality of its possibilities.' Ibid., pp.131f. Compare T.I., Vol.4, p.331: 'Man possesses himself, disposes of himself, understands himself, in and by the anamnesis by which he retains his past and the prognosis by which he lays hold of what is to come'; and M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.437: '*Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual 'there' by shattering itself against death - that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate - that is to say, authentic historicity.*'
26. Hearers, p.10 n.8; see also p.111 n.1; p.113 n.3.
27. J. Metz, Preface to Hearers, p.ix; see also p.133 n.2; also p.138 n.6.
28. Foundations, pp.27, 36 and 52.
29. Ibid., p.41.
30. Ibid., pp.142ff; T.I., Vol. 5, pp.97-114.
31. Foundations, pp.83ff.

32. A Rahner Reader, p.40; (see Chapter 3, note 65 above. This passage does not appear in the 1963 edition of Hearers, see p.100).
33. T.I., Vol. 4, p.43; cf. Hearers, p.101.
34. Hearers, pp.104f.
35. Ibid., p.106.
36. Ibid., p.108.
37. J. Donceel, op. cit., p.95.
38. Ibid., loc. cit.
39. M. Blondel, 'L'illusion idéaliste' in Premiers écrits, 11, p.117, quoted by J. Donceel, op. cit., p.101.
40. Cf. T.I., Vol. 6, pp.186 and 203f.
41. M. Blondel, L'Action: Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique, Alcan, Paris, 1893, quoted in J. Donceel, op. cit., p.103.
42. M. Blondel, L'Action, p.437, quoted in J. Donceel, op. cit., p.112
43. Foundations, p.32.
44. Ibid., p.21.
45. Ibid., p.20.
46. 'And the last known, God, shines forth only in the limitless breadth of the pre-apprehension', Spirit, p.406.
47. Foundations, pp.16ff.
48. Ibid., p.20.
49. Bert van der Heijden, Karl Rahner: Darstellung und Kritik seiner Grundpositionen, Johannes Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1973, quoted from M.L. Taylor, God is Love, AAR Academy Series, No. 50, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1986, p.56
50. Ibid.
51. Foundations, p.20 (second set of italics mine).
52. Ibid., p.15, (italics mine).
53. Karl Weger, Karl Rahner: An Introduction to his Theology, Burns and Oates, London, 1980, p.48.

54. F. Kerr, 'Rahner Retrospective III, Transcendence or Finitude', New Blackfriars, Vol. 62 (Sep. 1981), pp.376.
55. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.175.
56. Ibid., p.191.
57. J. Bacik, op. cit., pp.xiv; cf, pp.17ff.
58. L. Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1969, pp.305-413; D. Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, SCM, 1981, pp.375-364; Foundations, p.20.
59. J. Bacik, op. cit., p.24, cf.p.62.
60. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, p.7; T.I., Vol. 18, p.192; K. Rahner, Mission and Grace, Vol. 1, Sheed and Ward, London, 1963, p.160.
61. F. Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, p.14; T.I., Vol. 3, p.106.
62. T.I., Vol. 10, p.257; cf. Vol. 17, pp.86-89.
63. B. Lonergan, Collection, DLT, London, 1967, pp.202-239.
64. Foundations, pp.18ff.
65. W.V. Dych, 'Method in Theology According to Karl Rahner', in W.J. Kelly, ed., op. cit., pp.39-53.
66. Foundations, pp.17ff; B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, DLT, London, 1971, pp.8f.
67. W. Dych, op. cit., p.46.
68. Foundations, p.17.
69. Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology, Vol.4, ed. K.Rahner with C.Ernst and K. Smyth, Burns and Oates, London, 1969, p.135.
70. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.41ff.
71. T.I., Vol. 16, p.237.
72. T.I., Vol. 4, p.52.
73. Ibid., pp.53f; cf. Foundations, pp.65f.
74. Ibid. p.60.
75. Ibid., p.66.

76. A. Carr, op. cit., p.167.
77. Ibid., p.164.
78. T.I., Vol. 16, p.239; cf. Vol. 4, p.55; Vol. 11, pp.103ff.
79. T.I., Vol. 16, p.239.
80. T.I., Vol. 4, p.58.
81. J. Bacik, op. cit., p.9.
82. Ibid., p.123.
83. K. Rahner, Crossroads, p.26.
84. T.I., Vol. 4, p.74.
85. T.I., Vol. 9, p.140.
86. T.I., Vol. 11, p.107.
87. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.119f.

Chapter 5

THE GIFT OF GRACE - GOD'S SELF-COMMUNICATION TO MAN

For Rahner the essence of the Christian Gospel is that God is not only present 'in the mode of distant presence as the term of transcendence' but also 'really present as one communicating himself'.¹ The former mode shows the hiddenness of God, or rather the ultimate blindness of man's knowledge, the latter that God can actually choose to speak and thus reveal far more of himself than is attainable from human knowledge.² It is here that we arrive at the heart of Rahner's theology; the self-communication of God in grace is the basis of his understanding of the Trinity, creation and the incarnation. As we have seen, the experience of grace is also at the heart of the charismatic experience. It is the centrality of grace for Rahner's thought that makes his theology a truly charismatic theology.

Rahner's basic aim in his theological system is to rethink the relationship of divine activity and human activity in the evolutionary world view. His metaphysics of knowledge provides him with the method, allowing him to make systematic connections among doctrines, and the conceptual vehicle for asserting the universality of grace. In other words his metaphysics of knowledge is the conceptual instrument and his evolutionary view of the world is the conceptual framework for his theological anthropology.³ Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge is linked with his theology of grace. The

identification of the gracious God with the horizon of Being enables Rahner to say that men are the objects of divine grace whether or not they are aware of this. The God of grace is the horizon of all human activity and the condition of knowing.⁴

For Rahner a full understanding of grace can only be attained by using the language of self-communication, of love and personal intimacy.⁵ Grace is the self-communication of God, it is not words about God but God himself; 'the giver in his own being is the gift' present as a 'divinizing' presence in man which brings about its own fulfilment.⁶ Rahner's attempt at a new understanding of grace is motivated by his appreciation of modern man's situation. Modern man's thinking is 'existential'; he is not interested in a 'mysterious superstructure' of an extrinsic understanding of grace, i.e. a concept of grace which is external to him, but in the realities of his own experience.⁷ 'One strives to "experience" the reality of grace precisely there where one lives one's own existence'.⁸ Thus Rahner is attempting to recast the traditional understanding of grace, too often understood in impersonal and static terms, in a way relevant and meaningful to modern man. He is addressing the question: 'How can Catholic theology bring to light the existentialist and personalist elements implicit in the theology of grace in an age in which the real is experienced existentially and socially?'⁹

This self-communication of God does not mean that the mystery has become clearly and unambiguously expressed, but rather that the mystery itself is communicated, God is present as mystery.¹⁰ This means that a person's experiences of God's self-communication are not unambiguous, not open to any other interpretation. However if a

person is offered an interpretation along these rethought Christian lines, he will find a justification for his own decision to trust in the mystery of God, in surrender of his self-centred existence to the forgiving and liberating love of God.

God's gift of grace - the supernatural existential

Grace is not, therefore, an external superstructure but rather the 'innermost *entelecheia*'; the ultimate purpose and fulfilment of grace signified by the beatific vision is already immanent and present in man.¹¹ This is expressed in Rahner's doctrine of the supernatural existential. The term 'existential', used extensively by Heidegger, refers to man's ontological constitution as human being, prior to any free decision; 'It is an aspect of human nature precisely as human'.¹² When this is first discussed Rahner speaks of it in terms of an 'ordination to', 'capacity for' or 'potency for' grace; the supernatural existential is a predisposition towards or desire for grace, rather than grace itself.¹³ 'The capacity for the God of self-bestowing personal Love is the central and abiding existential of man as he really is.'¹⁴ But phrased in this way, it fails to solve the problem Rahner intended it to, that of how grace can be both intrinsic and unmerited. By making it a desire for grace in man's nature 'as he really is' Rahner removed the extrinsic view of grace where man has no natural desire for grace but it is purely and simply a gift of God, but it is hard to see in this way of expressing it how grace remains unmerited. If God has created man with such a natural desire then surely God must necessarily fulfil this desire? Grace would then be merited.¹⁵ However, Rahner's usual formulation of the supernatural existential is somewhat more

successful in the attempt to avoid both extrinsicism and the denial of the gratuitousness of grace.

The supernatural existential in the usual usage is the actual offer of grace itself, which is nothing less than the self-communication of God himself, traditionally called uncreated grace. It is 'the existential of man's absolute immediacy to God in and through this divine self-communication'.¹⁶ Grace is therefore not a 'thing', but an offer, 'a *standing invitation to accept divinization*'.¹⁷ This is not an offer in the sense of something that is not yet given but rather an offer in the sense of a real self-communication that has already taken place, actually present in every person as part of their humanity. 'In this sense everyone, really and radically every person, must be understood as the event of a supernatural self-communication of God'.¹⁸ Therefore grace is a supernatural *existential*; God's self-communication is intrinsic to the whole of creation, it constitutes part of man's nature.¹⁹ The 'self-bestowal of God, in which God bestows himself precisely as the absolute transcendent, is the most immanent factor in the creature'.²⁰

But at the same time this most immanent factor 'is precisely *not* an element of this essence and this nature which belongs to it'.²¹ Grace is a *supernatural* existential. Grace, as God's loving self-communication, must be unexacted. Love, as the free-self-giving of a person, can be refused.²² If it is demanded as a necessary requirement it cannot be love. In order for the grace to be a *supernatural* existential it is necessary that creation is possible without grace; grace must retain its gratuitous character.²³ At the same time grace must not be extrinsic to the

human constitution. Rahner's way round this dilemma is by viewing pure nature as a 'remainder concept (*Restbegriff*)'.²⁴ It can only be used in a theological sense, not in the sense of something actually existing.

Our actual nature is never 'pure' nature. It is a nature installed in a supernatural order which man can never leave, even as a sinner and unbeliever. It is a nature which is continually being determined (which does not mean justified) by the supernatural grace of salvation offered to it.²⁵

But although pure nature is never actually encountered it is nevertheless an essential concept. It does not exist but it is a theological necessity that it could exist, in order to maintain the gratuitous nature of grace.²⁶

As Rahner himself acknowledges his position is similar to Blondel's. Blondel resembles all Scotists in stressing the primacy of the will and love over the intellect, rather than the Thomist view where knowledge and reason are primary, the intellect presenting objects to the will.²⁷ According to the Scotist position:

Human natural desire for God is distinct, not because its desire is 'ontologically' any different from tendencies in material things, but only because the *attainment* of the object of its desire can only be granted by the grace of elevation to the supernatural order.²⁸

Blondel distinguished between the willing will and the willed will. The willing will naturally tends towards its supernatural goal. The willed will is free to respond to objects or courses of action presented by the intellect and to follow the willing will. Only the willed will leads to the ultimate option to open oneself to the work of the supernatural, man's *option fondamentale*, which is the choice or refusal of the supernatural, the choice of life or of betraying one's humanity. This choice requires a supernatural gift from God to be consummated. Thus God is the natural end of man, but

attaining God requires supernatural means. Also since the willing will has a natural desire for the supernatural, nature already has a supernatural 'dimension' in it, it is not pure nature but 'transnatural'. As Blondel expresses it:

What has often been ignored is the fact that previously to habitual grace there is another grace, a first vocation, a state which results from the loss of the initial gift, but which contains a need and an aptitude for recovering it.²⁹

This, as Rahner acknowledges, is similar to his own view of the supernatural existential.³⁰

But on what basis is pure nature distinguished from human nature?³¹ If God's self-communication in grace is the basis of creation, in what sense can creation be envisaged without it? Rahner is not using 'existential' in Heidegger's sense since an existential is an ontological part of man; man would not be man without it. But Rahner wants to insist man could have existed without the supernatural existential, it relates to concrete human beings not human being as such.³² However, Anne Carr presents a solution to this problem by seeing the supernatural existential as:

God's grace in his self-giving *action*, as universally present in an abiding historical *situation*. Nature is the theological term for the conditions of possibility within creation . . . for the reception of Christ and the grace which he mediates.³³

There is an unresolved tension as to whether there is a temporal or a logical difference between nature and grace. Thus nature as a remainder concept, a world without grace, does not exist but is important as a logical concept for our own understanding of ourselves.³⁴ But elsewhere Rahner implies a temporal distinction:

God has created the servant only in order to make him his child; but he was able to create the child of grace, in distinction to his only-begotten Son, only by creating the addressee without claim to sonship, i.e. the servant.³⁵

Rahner works with a concept of 'double gratuity', two distinct gifts from God, creation and elevation. However a concept of double gratuity requires a temporal or a logical (whatever that might be) gap between created and elevated nature. But Rahner seeks to preserve both the primacy of actual historical nature and of its elevation by grace. He wants to deny a temporal difference because he wants to maintain a unified process of development from God's primal decision to create, therefore there can only be a logically possible pure nature, not an actual one. However, a logical explanation is not sufficient, it has no real content and does not solve the problem, it only circumvents it. But, as William Shepherd argues, the concept of double gratuity is not necessary. There is no need to preserve a temporal distinction; rather God can, in one act, 'create a being, consisting of both a natural and a supernatural element'.³⁶ Since creation is in Christ man can exist from the beginning in the situation of both pure nature and supernatural existential.³⁷ Thus as 'a *complex* whole, the created world process is modally supernatural, though not entitatively supernatural'.³⁸ In other words the supernatural existential refers to the mode of God's activity towards the human situation in its entirety, his '*existentiell*' situation in Heidegger's terms; it is not simply a component of his created nature. The supernatural existential nevertheless remains an existential (part of man's constitution before any personal appropriation of it) because it refers to the mode of *God's* activity in creation rather than of man's response.

Shepherd points out that this confusion in Rahner's thought stems from the fact that he works out his technical doctrine of grace in the traditional static framework of the post-Tridentine

scholastic view of the world which is hierarchal and vertical, not an evolutionary framework which is developmental, unified and horizontal. He calls the traditional framework 'loci theology':

Loci theology was appropriate in the context of a *Weltanschauung* which considered that the world order was not unitary and developmental, but rather was a 'stage' between heaven and hell in which there are static epochs differentiated ontologically. Man before sin differed from man after sin. Man after sin but before Christ differed from man after Christ. Souls are created individually by God, and souls are saved individually by God at death. The world is man's arena for soul-saving; it is not an intrinsic and constitutive factor in his very being and his destiny.³⁹

Shepherd draws the distinction between Rahner's doctrine of nature and grace and his theology of nature and grace.⁴⁰ In the technical doctrine man's being is divorced from his situation; man is made up partly by a supernatural element and partly by a natural one.

Nothing in the technical doctrine or in its traditional presuppositions can force the restricted reference of such a concept as the supernatural existential into a broader context. Precious little, therefore, is said about God's activity; the focus is on man's being, his capacities, his constitution.⁴¹

The traditional technical framework tends to separate man from his situation and is concerned with man's being rather than, as in the evolutionary framework, recognizing that 'man is a product of the past (not the product of direct divine interference with natural processes)'.⁴² However in his theology as a whole Rahner works within a modern evolutionary world view, seeing man in the context of his entire situation. Whereas in his technical framework the supernatural existential refers to a component of his ontological makeup, in his theological framework it refers to an aspect of the human condition or situation.⁴³ The supernatural existential is not a 'thing' but a mode of activity; the technical doctrine fails to

bring this out.

Since the supernatural existential really is the self-communication of God then it can be understood in terms of revelation. Therefore, just as the supernatural existential is a part of all humanity, so too revelation must be universally present.

If this is so, then it follows that what we normally call revelation and revelation-history is in reality the conceptually concrete, propositional and divinely controlled 'thematization' of the universal gratuitous revelation.⁴⁴

In fact Rahner's theology of revelation has a double aspect, the universal transcendental and the special categorical.⁴⁵ Transcendental revelation is constituted by: (1) God as the *a priori* horizon of our knowing and loving; (2) the supernatural elevation of human nature. The conceptualization or thematization of this is special revelation. It is only through historical revelation that we can explicitly recognize our unthematic experience and Christ is the yardstick by which transcendental revelation is measured; the Christ-event is the lens through which the light of revelation must pass.⁴⁶ Both are aspects of the one revelation of God. The one God communicates himself to man in Spirit (as universally available grace) and in word (as definite, historical norm).

The supernatural existential can also be understood in terms of objective justification. Before man's free acceptance and actualization of justification he is already objectively justified: 'One is a Christian in order to become one'.⁴⁷

Prior to any subjective appropriation of salvation, man is inwardly determined by a supernatural existential, which consists of the fact that Christ in his death 'justified' sinful man. . . . This intrinsic ability . . . can be simply called the supernatural existential of being (objectively) redeemed or of being (objectively) justified.⁴⁸

Thus uncreated grace, general revelation and the supernatural

existential are different aspects of the same concept. The supernatural existential is understood not in the technical sense but in terms of Rahner's overall theological thought, not as part of man's make up but as the activity of God to man's situation not to his being. God is present to all men in that he forms the condition for man's openness to him. But also, since uncreated grace is the communication of the Holy Spirit, Rahner, 'without perhaps being fully cognizant of it,' equates the Holy Spirit with general revelation, uncreated grace and supernatural existential:⁴⁹

Holy Spirit, uncreated grace, general revelation, objective justification, supernatural existential - all these terms are finally precisely equivalent in Rahner's work; all these are systematically erected from a pervasive Christocentrism; all find their formulations on the basis of a metaphysics of knowledge which speaks of an ultimate 'participative' horizon encompassing all human knowing and acting.⁵⁰

Thus all these aspects of God's self-communication in grace, including experience of the Holy Spirit, are rooted in a Christocentrism which, as we have seen, is the yardstick for all charismatic activity. Rahner, in his understanding of grace wants to maintain that God's self-communication to man constitutes a 'new' relationship. Yet at the same time this cannot involve a change in God, since he is immutable, nor can it involve a change in man, since such a change could only result in the type of relationship that is constituent of man as finite creature, that of being transcendently referred to the infinite; then grace would not be intrinsic. Such a change would be brought about by efficient causality, where the cause is different from the effect.⁵¹ But for Rahner grace is truly God's self-communication and he uses the scholastic notion of formal causality where the cause is the effect, it does not cause something different from itself in the normal

understanding of causality but the cause is a constitutive element in that which is caused; in Rahner's terms the giver is the gift.⁵² The model of formal causality is used only with 'a dialectical and analogous modification' and hence is prefixed with 'quasi' to signify the analogous nature of the concept as applied to God.⁵³ Without this prefix the notion of formal causality could imply a pantheistic type of divinization. It is the model of quasi-formal causality that Rahner uses for his understanding not only of grace, but also the Trinity, incarnation and creation.⁵⁴

God's gift of grace - creation

Rahner understands creation in terms of the concept of 'creative transformation' which means that within the world something totally new arises from the creative process; creation is an ongoing process.⁵⁵ God 'inserts' his divine causality into finite causality and consequently creatures, enabled by God, actively transcend their own reality. But how do the two causal agencies of Creator and creature relate? The answer is in Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge. The condition for any instance of knowing is the horizon of Being, it is the ground of human striving to know and is both a constitutive factor and a transcendent one. Likewise it is the condition and possibility for human action and is involved in it. However, the finite agent actually does the acting. God acts in the mode of final causality not efficient causality, but it is a special mode of final causality because, as in the metaphysics of knowledge, God is not only the condition but is also included in all acts. It is, as we have seen, what Rahner calls quasi-formal causality; Shepherd's term for this is 'actuating causality' and this brings out

the meaning better.⁵⁶

God as most immanent - and yet precisely for that reason absolutely superior to the world - confers on finite beings themselves a true active self-transcendence in their change and becoming, and is himself ultimately the future, the final cause, which represents the true and really effective cause operative in all change.⁵⁷

Rahner understands God's relationship with the world in terms of a dialogue in which man plays an active part; he is not a puppet but 'a real co-performer in this humano-divine drama of history'.⁵⁸ This dialogue is understood in a unique and analogical sense.⁵⁹ In his explanation of this unique relationship of God with the world Rahner wants to assert the truth in both dualism and pantheism and avoid the errors of both. Dualism is wrong if it conceives of God's relationship with the world in terms of two categorical objects, seeing God as a part of the whole. Rather, God is an 'inner constitutive element' in creation; in him 'we live and move and have our being'.⁶⁰ Yet at the same time, against pantheism, God and the world must be different.⁶¹

Expressed another way there is a dialectical relationship between God's immanence and transcendence.⁶² God's immanence must be asserted in order to maintain a genuine *self-transcendence* and his transcendence asserted in order that what is attained is genuinely new; spirit really does come from matter.⁶³ Spirit is not 'a chance stranger on earth' but the goal of creation and man is the point at which 'the basic tendency of matter to find itself in spirit by self-transcendence' is realized.⁶⁴

There is not, therefore, a 'particular factor called God, who makes himself felt as one reality among others'.⁶⁵ In the usual understanding of the word a difference between two objects implies a space in which they can be differentiated. That space, or 'horizon

of the transcendent' is God and is 'the condition of the possibility for all categorical distinctions and divisions'.⁶⁶ God enables the categorical difference to be determined, he 'is this difference in himself' and as such he cannot be differentiated since he is that which differentiates: 'the boundary which delimits all things cannot itself be bounded by a still more distant limit'.⁶⁷ God is therefore not present as something which can be differentiated, and so at our disposal, but present as that which differentiates. He is 'always present only as that which disposes'.⁶⁸ The fact that God establishes the difference, that the creature in its own independent reality is dependent on God, means that genuine, autonomous reality and radical dependence are two sides of the same coin and they vary in direct, not inverse, proportion.⁶⁹ In other words through quasi-formal causality, or actuating causality, a person's actions are totally his own and totally the work of grace since the grace that transforms him is a constitutive principle of his being.

Therefore God is not a cause in the world but causes the world; he is not a link in the chain of causality but is the condition of possibility of the chain. God's presence and actions take place 'precisely in and through the presence of the finite existent'.⁷⁰ Thus 'special "interventions" of God' which take place in the world religions are to be understood as specific manifestations of the underlying ground of the act of loving self-communication of God that is intrinsic to the created order.

Rahner gives the example of seeing a good idea as an inspiration of God.⁷¹ On one level this good idea must have originated from myself. In a causal sense its origin can be traced back to concrete worldly factors that determine my existence,

whether they be physiological, psychological or whatever. In this sense the idea is a product and function of myself not an intervention. However this concrete world and its inner worldly causality is the place where and the means by which my relationship with God takes place. God is not present as categorical object but in and through all categorical objects, he is paradoxically 'everywhere insofar as he grounds everything, and he is nowhere insofar as everything is created'.⁷² The fact that God is present in and through the finite existent means that there is a 'mediated immediacy' of God by the categorical object.⁷³ But this does not mean that every categorical object, by virtue of the fact that it is there, mediates God's presence. Rather it is our attitude towards the categorical object that makes a mediation possible, since it is our attitude which determines whether or not we have a transcendental experience, and it is that transcendental experience that mediates God to us.

Something finite as such, insofar as it appears as a definite, individual thing within our transcendental horizon, cannot represent God in such a way that, by the very fact that it is given, the very self of God is also present *in a way which goes beyond the possibility of mediation in our transcendental experience. . . .* The individual existent in its categorical individuality and limitations can mediate God *to the extent that in the experience of it the transcendental experience of God takes place.*⁷⁴

As we have seen the specific nature of the transcendental experiences 'vary a great deal in individual persons corresponding to the differences in their historical existence'.⁷⁵ But the moment that by my attitude and action I relate to the world in a way that leads to an experience of transcendence then the good idea takes on a new significance. In fact the whole of my existence takes on a new significance. I can and must say of my good idea:

It is willed by God in this positive significance as a

moment of the one world established in freedom by its ground as the world of my subjective relationship to God, and in this sense it is an 'inspiration' of God . . . in this way everything can be regarded as a special providence, as an intervention of God, *presupposing only that I accept* the concrete constellation of my life and of the world in such a way that it becomes a positive, salvific concretization of my transcendental relationship to God in freedom.⁷⁶

Therefore when discussing the nature of prayer as 'a dialogue with God' Rahner does not interpret new insights and impulses as 'charismatic interventions of the Holy Spirit "from without"' since this ignores the fact that primarily such experiences are a person's own, from his or her own psyche and subconscious.⁷⁷ However, though we cannot experience prayer as dialogue with God in the sense that God says something to us, we can in the sense that we experience ourselves as the ones spoken by God:

If we say that what God primarily says to us is ourselves in our decreed freedom, in our decree-defying future, in the facticity (that can never be totally analysed and never functionally rationalized) of our past and present.⁷⁸

It is a relationship of partnership and dialogue but not understood as univocal to human partnership and dialogue. Rahner's theology of grace as the self-communication of God already given in creation and man, though not necessarily actualized, means that a person in his unique and historical existence can admit this and realize that the gratuitous grace of God's self-communication really belongs to his particular concrete existence. Then he does not hear something in addition to himself but 'hears himself as God's address, heavy with God's self-promise, in the grace-filled self-communication of God by faith, hope and love'.⁷⁹

As we said in the Introduction, Rahner does not want to put people off praying but wants people involved in contemporary charismatic movements to get rid of the mythological and

interventionist understandings of God's activity in the world that they sometimes have. In actual fact, this new understanding, which may initially lead to disillusionment, will hopefully be a return to a new sort of naïvety where prayer is again experienced as dialogue with God, 'because that is what it is in truth'.⁸⁰

God's gift of grace - some problems in Rahner's thought

There are, however, a number of inconsistencies and contradictions in Rahner's understanding of grace apart from the one we looked at earlier. Rahner rightly wants to preserve the freedom of God with regard to creation, not to limit God by making creation a constraint of necessity upon him, but he fails to make this clear. Creation without grace is 'only a derivative, restricted and secondary possibility' which is based on the primary possibility of creation with grace.⁸¹ But how can creation without grace be a real option on its own if by definition it is based on the possibility of creation with grace; and how can creation with grace be primary in that everything else is based on it if the secondary possibility can in theory exist without it? Either the primal act is that 'in which everything else is in fact given' or it is not.⁸² As we shall see in the next chapter, creation with grace is creation in Christ, but in what sense, in Rahner's phrase, is Christology the beginning and end of anthropology if men can exist without the incarnation ever taking place?⁸³ How is it true that men 'ultimately exist because the Son of Man was to exist' if men can exist 'if the Logos had not himself become man'?⁸⁴ However, as we shall see, there is a way to avoid them by seeing necessity as an enlarging, not a limiting, factor.

When talking about 'anonymous Christianity', the concept that the

grace of salvation exists in the world and in a person even before it is explicitly recognised, Rahner distinguishes between grace as merely offered and grace as existentially accepted:

Terminologically, however, it is better not to call this existentially (but not *existentiell*) 'Christian' position on the part of every man 'implicit' or 'anonymous' Christianity straight away. Otherwise we obscure the radical distinction between grace merely offered and grace existentially accepted in faith and love.²⁵

Man's free decision makes a real difference to the mode of presence of grace: 'grace is always the free action of divine love which is only 'at the disposal' of man *precisely in so far as he is at the disposal of this divine love*'.²⁶ However, grace is no 'thing' but a 'mode of being' or 'a particular condition'; it is a particular way of being a spiritual person. Grace is not added to the person but only exists because the person exists; grace 'exists by affecting a spiritual, personal substantiality, by being the divinizing condition of the latter'.²⁷ Therefore if grace is the self-communication of God it can only exist if someone exists to whom it can be communicated.²⁸ But if grace really is no 'thing' but a mode of being a spiritual person, it is hard to understand how it can exist, be present, before a person has begun to live that mode of existence, has said 'yes' to God and allowed grace to become the divinizing condition which is the very existence of grace.

Taylor describes the different modes of presence as follows:

On the transcendental level, grace is the gift of God's love that is given in each moment with existence itself and that is unthematically appropriated or, in a self-contradictory fashion, refused. On the categorical level, grace is the event of the explicit appropriation of divine love as *mine*.²⁹

However, Rahner elsewhere argues that there is no transcendent experience without a complementary historical expression. The

experience of transcendence is a dynamic concept given within the experience of categorical objects.³⁰ But how can a something that is in essence a dynamic concept, i.e. is not 'some reified objectivity "in man"', exist and be really present before the dynamic realization of it?³¹ If grace is not 'a neutral state' described by the formal categories of traditional ontology, but requires personal categories of love, personal intimacy and self-communication to describe it, how can it be present in a subject who has rejected such personal categories or is indifferent towards them?³²

The problem is partly caused by the fact that Rahner wants to preserve God's immutability, and avoid positing change in God. So although he uses the language of love and self-communication he uses them in a restricted and less than personal sense. In his effort to preserve the intrinsic nature of grace Rahner emphasizes the 'real presence' of God's self-communication, prior to and irrespective of any response on man's part, as a communication that has already taken place.³³ In other words God has already fully communicated himself; all that matters now is man's response, with no change involved in God. But self-communicating love involves relationship and change; love involves reciprocity and suffering:

It is this side of love which is often overlooked or misinterpreted, and it is of especial importance. It is the other side of the category of individuality. In love we give of our personal being and uniqueness. But we do not love unless our personal being is transformed through the relation to the other.³⁴

Rahner's emphasis on the total givenness of God's self-communication means that although he acknowledges the fact that the experience of grace is radical transformation his overall thought does not bring this out. A common experience in both mysticism and the contemporary charismatic movement is that of experiencing the

love of God, being 'bathed in love', something that surpasses one's own capacity to love. We touched on this in the third chapter when we looked at the link between charismatic and mystical experience. Rahner's emphasis, however, is always on the givenness of God's love, not on the experience of finding a love far greater than one's own. Thus he can say: 'The only ultimate structure of the person which expresses it perfectly is the person's basic capacity for love, and this capacity is boundless'.⁹⁵ But people do not tend to experience themselves as boundless love but rather experience the love of God as something that transforms their own inability to love.⁹⁶

The problem is also caused by the fact that Rahner has an inadequate concept of the personal nature of the Holy Spirit. We will not substantiate this assertion till we examine Rahner's understanding of the Trinity, but what it leads to is the lack of a clear distinction between man's experience as spirit and man's experience of the Holy Spirit. Consequently Rahner talks about 'a nature which is continually being determined by grace', a 'natural spiritual activity' which is characterized by man's essential openness and also about a 'supernatural fulfilment' of this openness.⁹⁷ He then goes on to describe both the openness and its fulfilment in the same terms:

And yet the basic essence of man, his nature as such openness (transcendence) can be perfectly well established. The initial elements of such fulfilment are already present: the experience of infinite longings, of radical optimism, of unquenchable discontent, of the torment of insufficiency of everything attainable, of the radical protest against death, the experience of being confronted with an absolute love precisely where it is lethally incomprehensible and seems to be silent and aloof, the experience of a radical guilt and of a still abiding hope etc.⁹⁸

But in what sense can these experiences be considered as the fulfilment, however partial, of man's essential openness? And in

what sense are they experiences of grace in terms of a loving personal relationship? Dennis Edwards calls such experiences of transcendence 'moments of "grace"' but he uses grace in this sense in a general, not specifically Christian sense, of 'something which comes to us in surprising and mysterious ways', unexpected and unasked for, beyond our expectations and hopes.⁹⁹ He divides these experiences into two groups: firstly experiences pointing to the superabundant richness of life, the awareness that 'all is given' and secondly to experiences of the limitations of our existence. For the former he gives the examples of interpersonal love, childbirth, creativity, forgiveness and the beauty of nature. For the latter he gives the examples of vulnerability, death, failure, loneliness and alienation. Both types of experience are in fact experiences of limit, but in the former type the experience of limit is implicit, and the experience of transcendence implies a limit to be transcended.¹⁰⁰

But to what extent are these experiences experiences of grace? Theology has traditionally distinguished different aspects of grace. The ones which concern us here are: uncreated grace which is the gift of God himself; created grace which is the transforming effect of grace in man; and prevenient grace which is the action of God on man enabling him to respond to God and respond with a new way of life. Such experiences could be considered experiences of grace in a 'specifically Christian sense' if they were to be conceived in terms similar to prevenient grace; but they could not be considered as experiences of grace in terms of uncreated grace since, as we have seen, the loving self-communication of God (i.e. uncreated grace) involves reciprocity and suffering - to be a 'full

communication it requires a response. Using the term in this full sense it can be said:

Grace is not something isolated in itself that stands apart from other things. Grace is a mode of being that things take on when they come into contact with the love of God and are suffused with his mystery.¹⁰¹

Though this is the very thing he wants to avoid, the implication of Rahner's understanding of grace is that grace is a thing in itself rather than the transformation in the creature. By wanting to preserve both the intrinsic nature of grace and the immutability of God he rejects the traditional distinctions in grace as not doing justice 'to the unity and nature of the one grace which divinizes the essence powers and activity of man' and sees that grace in terms of uncreated grace,¹⁰² maintaining that this can exist in the mode of offer, acceptance or rejection. But a reciprocal relationship involves response, whether positive or negative, it cannot exist merely as offer.

The gift of grace - the incarnation and redemption

Grace, for Rahner, has a radically Christocentric nature. Creation and the communication of grace in the supernatural existential are understood in terms of the incarnation. God's loving self-expression in the incarnation is 'the primal act of God', the basis for all other acts. Consequently the possibility of creation is based on the incarnation, even though the fact of creation is prior to 'the actual realization of the self-exteriorization of God in the Incarnation'.¹⁰³

The Incarnation of the Logos (however much we must insist on the fact that it is itself an historical, unique Event in an essentially historical world) appears as the *ontologically* (not merely 'morally', an afterthought) unambiguous goal of the movement of creation as a whole, in relation to which everything prior is merely a preparation

of the scene.¹⁰⁴

The incarnation is not a 'subsequent addition' to creation but rather creation is conceived as the condition of the possibility of the incarnation. Creation and incarnation are not two separate acts of God but two moments or phases in God's self-communication. Through grace in creation God has become an 'intrinsic principle' in this world, the history of the world has become his 'very own history'. The incarnation is consequently both the origin and the goal of creation.¹⁰⁴

Since God's self-communication has both its origin and its goal in the incarnation, grace has a 'radically Christological character'.¹⁰⁶ Rahner is anxious to avoid both the errors of doceticism and monophysitism and assert that Christ was both truly God and man, not God disguised as a man. The doctrine of the incarnation affirms a genuinely autonomous individual, not a 'puppet on strings'.¹⁰⁷ Although the reality of Christ's incarnation is an 'intrinsically unique' mystery, it is to be understood as the ontological, as opposed to merely moral, goal of creation. The hypostatic union that takes place in the incarnation is not so much something that distinguishes Jesus from us but the beginning of the divinization of the world as a whole. Since the world is a place where everything is related to everything else, every action has a 'knock-on' effect in the interconnectedness of the chain of causality, then it is not 'pure fantasy' to conceive of evolution as having its goal in Christ, since when Christ became man he assumed a human history in all its interconnectedness.¹⁰⁸

For Rahner, 'Jesus is the man whose life is one of absolute unique self-surrender to God'.¹⁰⁹ This statement is only fully

understood if it is realized that it presupposes God's self-communication and that therefore an absolute self-surrender enables an absolute self-communication whereby the reality of the communicator becomes the reality of the receiver, in an ontological sense. Rahner immediately qualifies this statement, which could be interpreted as an adoptionist position, by saying that it does not adequately distinguish Christ's relationship with God as unique from all others and therefore ontic statements are necessary. However, without such an ontological formulation the ontic statements easily become docetist or monophysitist.¹¹⁰ They are interpreted in terms of Christ performing a redemptive activity rather than in terms of the deification of the world.¹¹¹

Though the traditional ontic formulations are necessary they still need interpretation. How can the *Chalcedonian understanding of Christ's nature as adiairetos* (unseparated) be preserved along with the understanding of Christ's nature as *asynchytos* (unmixed)?¹¹² How is an unseparated and unmixed unity to be conceived? What is needed is a redefinition of unity. It is not to be conceived as a uniting of two previously existing and separate things, a 'united unity' but a 'uniting unity'. That which makes Christ's human nature exist is the same as that which unites the nature with God, in other words, 'the Logos creates by taking on'.¹¹³ Thus:

When God wants to be what is not God, man comes to be. . . . If God himself is man and remains so for all eternity; if therefore all theology is eternally anthropology; if it is forbidden to man to think little of himself because he would then be thinking little of God; and if this God remains the insoluble mystery; then man is for all eternity the expression of the mystery of God which participates for all eternity in the mystery of its ground.¹¹⁴

Man only exists as an existential being, because God willed to exist. Rahner, following Heidegger's understanding of existence,

does not interpret human existence as an 'absolutely terminated quantity' but 'a reality absolutely open upwards' which receives its full realization in the incarnation.¹¹⁵ Given this essential nature of human existence it is possible that someone 'by being man in the fullest sense (which we can never attain), is God's Existence into the world'.¹¹⁶

The centrality of Christ for Rahner's theology is brought out in William Shepherd's description of Rahner's christological thought: 'Christ is ontologically, noetically and redemptively the determination of reality'.¹¹⁷ Ontologically he is so, in that the corporeal, material embodiment of Christ makes the ontological presence of God and uncreated grace present. Noetically he is so, in that the Christ-event makes it known that the transcendent horizon is the gracious God, general revelation is dependent on special revelation. Redemptively he is so, in that God's forgiveness is not an arbitrary event, but the gift of God from the beginning.

How then are sin and redemption understood if the incarnation is God's original act of creation? The incarnation includes both creation and redemption as two of its moments. Redemption, therefore, is not understood in terms of a moral or legal transaction, such as mere acquittal from guilt but is seen as the communication of God's grace. 'It is not Christ's action which causes God's will to forgiveness', rather redemption in Christ 'was already effective from the beginning of humanity'.¹¹⁸

Thus Rahner can say that, prior to any subjective appropriation through faith, man is already 'justified'.¹¹⁹ Man as an individual is really and intimately connected with Christ, and Christ's death is a constitutive part of each man. Redemption is not simply a matter

of man, if he so chooses, making a decision to involve himself with the process of redemption. It is not a question of two neutral possibilities for man's decision, salvation or damnation; God is an integral part of the decision process, not overriding it but as that 'which effects the acceptance of what it offers'; in a very real way 'God has done something to me *in* Christ before I do anything'.¹²⁰ For Rahner this notion is based on the interdependence of the whole of the created order. Though we can and must of course say that, for instance, 'This chair is not part of my body', when we actually try to define in terms of physics what that actually means, the issue is not nearly so clear. Modern science would seem to support Rahner's view because, since Einstein, matter can be understood as energy and vice versa; ultimately physicists are unable to define matter.¹²¹ Thus Rahner can say:

In a certain sense - and I am exaggerating here, in order to make what I want to say clearer - we are all living in one and the same body - the world. And because this is so . . . something of the nature of original sin, and something of the nature of redemption can exist too.¹²²

There is therefore no pure 'inwardness' that is unaffected by that which is 'without'; there are no spheres of existence that can be completely separated in an existential cleavage:

Two thousand years ago someone died on the cross in all the darkness of his death out of love for the Father. And this took place from the very outset in a sphere which is my own reality. How I am now to react to it is another matter.¹²³

The terms sanctification, divinization and self-transcendence all relate to the same process. Rahner often uses the term self-transcendence but he understands it in the theological sense of growth in grace, of sanctification and divinization. Man as an embodied historical being achieves his transcendence through the

material world. The world is not the arena for displaying internalized goodness or sinfulness but is an intrinsic factor in determining goodness or sinfulness. In other words, 'Sin takes place in sin,' not in 'a merely transcendental interiority of a noumenal subject but in the works of the flesh which are obvious and tangible'.¹²⁴

As we have seen, in freedom man is constantly faced with the choice of saying 'yes' or 'no' to God. In freedom man does not so much 'do *something*' but rather '*does himself*'; he performs himself in freedom.¹²⁵ A person's negative or sinful free decision is therefore a failure to dispose of himself, and salvation and damnation are not the external reactions of a judging or rewarding God but are the product of man's freedom.¹²⁶ Self-realization is a task man cannot avoid, either a self-realization towards God or a self-refusal towards God. A rejection of God's self-communication is in actual fact a rejection of man in himself, it is 'metaphysical suicide' since the purpose for man's creation is divinization.¹²⁷

For Rahner there is a duality between person and nature. Man is a person 'in so far as he freely disposes of himself by his decision' whereas his nature is that 'which must be given prior to this disposal of himself, as its object and the condition of its possibility'; therefore man becomes personal through the process of self-determination through decision.¹²⁸ Sin and guilt are therefore related to a person's decision, to his use of freedom in his personal responsibility before God. But because of the differences in nature due to different historical and social circumstances, heredity, psychological conditioning, etc., we can never be certain, however objectively bad it might be, that an action is a realization, or

actualization, of sin and guilt. No matter how much society needs to judge, and must judge in order to maintain order, we can never be sure that such an action was the result of a culpable decision against God.¹²⁹

Does Rahner succeed in his explanation of the incarnation? In the incarnation the human nature of the Logos is not something that exists prior to His becoming man. Rather this humanity is 'constituted in its essence and existence' by the self-expression, the self-utterance of God.¹³⁰ However Rahner wants to preserve an essential difference between Christ and the rest of humanity. Therefore he maintains that though the 'what' of Christ is the same as in us, i.e. human nature, the difference is that it is Christ's self-expression but it is not ours.¹³¹ But if Christ's humanity really is constituted in essence and existence by God's self-expression it is hard to see how this human nature can be the same in us if what constitutes it essentially is not present. It is understandable, given these presuppositions, that human nature could be the continuing manifestation of the primal self-expression of God and so Christology really could be the beginning and end of anthropology.¹³² This could suggest that there is only a quantitative difference, not a qualitative difference between Christ and the rest of humanity. This is what Rahner implies in places:

He [Jesus] is a moment of the history of God's communication of himself to the world. . . . Jesus is the one who - by what we call his obedience, his prayer and the freely accepted destiny of his death - *has achieved* also the acceptance of his divinely given grace and direct presence to God *which he possesses as man.*¹³³

Thus Christ is part of the ongoing process of God's self-communication which began before the incarnation. The incarnation is therefore only 'in increasing measure' the concrete historical

manifestation of this continuing process of the bestowal of grace on mankind.¹³⁴

But Rahner also wants to maintain that the incarnation is qualitatively different from our experience of grace, that it is a unique event. Thus although the same grace is present in both, the difference is that Jesus is the pledge and we are the recipients of that grace; the incarnation is 'a unique and qualitatively incommensurable perfection', given only once in its essential characteristics.¹³⁵

Although Rahner maintains that our nature and Christ's nature are the same, he seems to imply the opposite in places. Rahner distinguishes between man as the self-utterance of God and man as 'the paradigm of a possible utterance' of God - in order to try and reconcile the fact that God could have created man without the supernatural existential.¹³⁶ But this distinction implies differences in essence. The language of the pledge and the recipients also indicates this. To put it another way the obediencial potency for the hypostatic union is the essence of man and the incarnation is the fullest realization of that. But in Christ it is not the obediencial potency which is the essence of his humanity but the immanent self-utterance of God.¹³⁷ William Shepherd argues in a similar fashion when talking about the relationship between nature and grace:

'Recipient' ('addressee') language in general is specious in this context, for it implies temporal distinction among ontologically different 'epochs'. This sort of language and implication is expressly denied in Rahner's rejection of any historical state of pure nature prior to grace.¹³⁸

If human nature is an obediencial potency for the hypostatic union it is possible to envisage that this could be 'assumed' by the

Logos, whose nature is the self-utterance of God, in order to bring human nature to its full potential, though this could in theory remain unfulfilled; thus grace can retain its gratuitous character. This in places is what Rahner implies.¹³⁹ But elsewhere he is anxious to avoid the concept of assumption since it implies a difference in essence between man and the Logos and the Logos could not assume human nature because this would constitute change in God.¹⁴⁰

Rahner tries to maintain that the incarnation is only quantitatively different and yet at the same time qualitatively different through emphasizing the concrete nature of world history in which the incarnation occurs. Although the hypostatic union is part of the overall process of God's self-communication in grace it transcends this to become 'a unique event in its own essence', it 'attains an irrevocable and irreversible character in history'.¹⁴¹ The instance which is part of the whole world process becomes unique because of a proper regard for history; it is not 'acosmic and purely meta-historical'. Only if history is reduced to mythology can the incarnation be seen as something not unique.¹⁴² It is Jesus' free obedience, prayer and acceptance of his own death, real human actions in the spatio-temporal world, which bring about the uniqueness of the incarnation.

But at other times Rahner disregards the concreteness of time and history in his explanation of the incarnation. Christ has always been involved in history as its innermost entelechy, the possibility of creation, the beginning of anthropology.¹⁴³ However, this view is not without its problems. One can understand how an event in human history can have an effect for all that follows, given the

interconnectedness of human history, but how can this effect be retrospective? Rahner's answer is to conceive of time and history 'theologically' in order to maintain that Christ has always been involved in history. But how can that be the case if the unique and irreversible event in history of the incarnation has not yet taken place, if Christ's humanity and God's self-expression are so united that the life of Christ 'is human reality *and so* God's and *vice versa*'.¹⁴⁴ On the one hand Rahner is emphasizing the traditional doctrine of Christ's pre-existence and on the other he is maintaining it is the concrete nature of Christ's history that brings him into existence.¹⁴⁵

In what sense is Christ's incarnation a unique event in the world if God does not act in the world, if interventions of God are mythological unless understood as concrete manifestations of the intrinsic process of God's self-communication in the world? If God does not act in the world how is Christ 'a reality of God in the strict and real sense'?¹⁴⁶ Rahner is claiming that the incarnation is much more than merely a concrete manifestation of the overall process of grace but this does not fit in with his understanding of God's causality. It seems logical to conclude as Alexander Gerken does:

. . . it would be more consistent if one drew the conclusion from Rahner's view that every historical event, with respect to its ability to bring the graciously elevated transcendental of man to self-realization, is of equal value and that, therefore, even the Christ event and the form of Christ are replaceable.¹⁴⁷

A key way for Rahner of understanding the incarnation and Trinity is the theology of symbol.¹⁴⁸ Symbol is understood not in the sense of a sign of something where the sign and signified exist as two separate realities but in the sense of a genuine symbol

where the symbol and the symbolized are intrinsically connected, where 'the representation allows the other "to be there"'.¹⁴⁹ For Rahner, following traditional scholastic philosophy it is an ontological principle that all things that exist are symbolic 'because they necessarily express themselves in order to attain their own nature'.¹⁵⁰ This is not understood in terms of efficient but formal causality.

The 'form' gives itself away from itself by imparting itself to the material cause. It does not work on it subsequently and 'from outside' by bringing about in it something different from itself and alien to its essence. The effect is the cause itself¹⁵¹

Or to put it round the other way: 'The symbol . . . is the self-realization of a being in the other, which is constitutive of its essence'.¹⁵² The essence of a being is fulfilled in its self-expression, in the symbol which enables it to exist. The symbol is something different from, yet one with the essence. In order for this to be possible the essence is conceived as a plurality in unity, thus unity and difference increase in direct not inverse proportion.¹⁵³ The being of man is 'self-possession' realized by an expression, 'a flowing outwards' and a return whereas material things express themselves but do not return to self.

The Logos is the symbol of the Father, and therefore according to the theology of symbol, in a real and ontological sense, "He that sees me, sees the Father" (Jn. 14:5).¹⁵⁴ It is the incarnation that allows God to exist: 'the Father is himself by the very fact that he opposes to himself the image which is of the same essence as himself'.¹⁵⁵

Rahner attempts to reconcile the doctrine of the immutability of God with the doctrine of the incarnation using this concept of

symbol through the assertion: 'God can become something, he who is unchangeable in himself can *himself* become subject to change *in something else*', God's immutability must be understood dialectically.¹⁵⁶ But is the use of the theology of symbol helpful at this point? If God the Absolute in his 'infinite and abiding unrelatedness' is primary then how can this include relatedness?¹⁵⁷ How can that which is symbolized (i.e. unrelatedness) be present in the symbol? It is a contradiction to maintain that the related can be derived from the unrelated without positing change. The unrelated cannot be both unrelated and related. If the symbol is, as Rahner maintains, a real expression of God's essence then relativity must be included in God's essence.

Rahner refuses to allow mutability in God, ultimately resorting to dogma rather than logical explanation. 'I refuse, in the name of faith, to allow one or the other term [the mutability or the immutability of God] to be dropped'.¹⁵⁸ He also recognizes the limitations of the use of the concept of symbol:

An enquiry into the general sense of the word 'symbol' will show however that the concept is much more obscure, difficult and ambiguous than is usually thought. . . . If then the effort raises many problematical and unsolved points, the fair-minded reader will not be surprised.¹⁵⁹

The concept of symbol only restates the problem without answering it. In what sense is a real symbol really other than the essence and yet one with it?

One way of trying to make Rahner's theology of the symbol more comprehensible is by using Hegel's thought. There are certainly similarities between Rahner's ontology of the symbol and Hegel's phenomenology of spirit in which reality is a dialectical process of self-possession or self-realization through self-alienation.¹⁶⁰ But

there are two distinct points of difference which prevent Hegel's thought being used to clarify Rahner. Rahner avoids positing a temporal difference between the essence and its symbol; there is a logical but not a temporal difference. Being is plural in its unity and that is an ontological absolute, not a unity that becomes a plurality or a plurality that could become a unity. Hegel envisages a temporal process of self-possession through self-alienation.¹⁶¹ Rahner's thought would be logically more comprehensible if understood in a temporal sense but to do so would be to postulate change in God, which he wants to avoid (and, of course, at the same time maintain, hence the contradictions).

The other difference, following from the first, is that Rahner stresses the inner plurality of God as the means by which God can express himself outwardly. 'It is because God "must express" himself inwardly that He can also utter himself outwardly'.¹⁶² But it is conceptually illogical to envisage an inner self-expression, a flowing outwards that does not go out. Hegel maintains that God's self-expression *in the world* is necessary for God's self-actualization. Again an interpretation in terms of Hegel's thought would make Rahner more logical but for Rahner it would mean allowing a change in God in creation. We can conclude, with Martin D'Arcy:

. . . it is high time that God's immutability be reexamined, Karl Rahner does this provocatively; but though he breaks through the shell, no chicken so far as I can see emerges. He leaves us with the cryptic saying: 'God is immutable in himself, but mutable in another.' In the context of a Hegel and perhaps a Heidegger this might be informative, but if it is meant to be a new insight it is too cloudy.¹⁶³

Rahner fails on a conceptual level to explain the incarnation satisfactorily. Ultimately, he would argue, this does not matter

since what is important is an *existentiell* acceptance of the truth of the incarnation,¹⁶⁴ that God has accepted man in Christ and that therefore anyone who accepts his own humanity in full and that of others accepts Christ. This is the *existentiell* truth of the incarnation and thus in a very real way whoever loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law. 'He who is at once nearest to us and farthest from us is always accepted and loved in every neighbour.'¹⁶⁵ The fact that Rahner fails on a conceptual level to explain the mysteries of faith is, in a way, an inevitable result; they are mysteries not scientific concepts. Rahner is well aware of the impossibility of his task:

. . . we should show again and again that all these theological concepts do not make the reality itself present to man from outside of him, but they are rather the expression of what has already been experienced and lived through more originally in the depths of existence. We can to some extent become present to ourselves on a conceptual level, and we can try again and again to relate our theological concepts back to their original experience. Hence what we are trying to do here is both justified and necessary. Should we fail, this failure could only be understood by Christians as the mandate and the task to try again and harder.¹⁶⁶

We therefore need to look at another conceptual framework that can incorporate the intrinsic nature of God's gracious, and as such charismatic, involvement with the world whilst maintaining the loving personal nature of such an involvement. To this we must now turn.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. Foundations, p.119.
2. Hearers, p.82.
3. W. Shepherd, op. cit., p.149.
4. E.g. T.I., Vol. 5, pp.103f., p.209; K. Rahner and J. Ratzinger, Revelation and Tradition, Burns and Oates, London, 1966, p.16.
5. T.I., Vol. 1, p.316.
6. Foundations, p.120.
7. T.I., Vol. 4, p.168; cf. Vol. 1, p.289; Vol. 17, p.66.
8. T.I., Vol. 4, p.173.
9. A.Carr, op. cit., p.199.
10. T.I., Vol. 4, p.56; Foundations, pp.119f.
11. T.I., Vol. 11, p.200.
12. M.Heidegger, Being and Time, p.33 et passim; cf. Foundations, p.16, translator's note.
13. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.376 and 311f.
14. Ibid., p.312.
15. cf. Foundations, p.127.
16. Ibid., p.128.
17. J.Donceel, op. cit., p.111.
18. Foundations, p.127.
19. M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p.127 n.47.
20. T.I., Vol. 10, p.281.
21. Ibid.
22. T.I., Vol. 1, p.123.

23. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.212f and 215; Vol. 5, p.178; Vol. 10, p.281; Foundations, p.197.
24. T.I., Vol. 1, p.313.
25. T.I., Vol. 4, p.183.
26. Ibid., p.185.
27. W. Shepherd, op. cit., pp.58-70.
28. Ibid., p.58.
29. M. Blondel, History and Dogma, p.281, n.1, quoted in W.C. Shepherd, op. cit., pp.69f.
30. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.297f. n.1; cf. Vol. 6, pp.186 and 203f.
31. T.I., Vol. 4, p.183.
32. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.313f; cf. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.33.
33. A. Carr, op. cit., p.201.
34. T.I., Vol. 4, p.212.
35. T.I., Vol. 6, p.75.
36. W. Shepherd, op. cit., p.91.
37. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.217f.
38. W. Shepherd, op. cit., p.256.
39. Ibid., p.223.
40. Ibid., p.238.
41. Ibid., p.241.
42. Ibid., p.80.
43. Ibid., p.98f.
44. T.I., Vol. 6, p.77; cf. Vol. 9, p.162; Foundations, pp.138f.
45. K. Rahner and J. Ratzinger, op. cit., pp.9-25; Foundations, pp.138-175.
46. Foundations, p.131.
47. Foundations, p.306; cf. K. Rahner, Mission and Grace, Vol. 1, Sheed and Ward, London, 1963, p.156.
48. T.I., Vol. 4, p.200.
49. W. Shepherd, op. cit., p.206.

50. Ibid., pp.201f.
51. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.328f.
52. Foundations, pp.120f.; T.I., Vol. 4, pp.65f. and 96.
53. Foundations, p.121; T.I., Vol. 1, p.331.
54. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.173 and 66.
55. K. Rahner, Hominisation, Herder and Herder, New York, 1965, p.80.
56. W. Shepherd, op. cit., p.170.
57. K. Rahner and J. Ratzinger, op. cit., p.12.
58. T.I., Vol. 1, p.111; cf. Vol. 1, pp.126 and 343; Vol. 5, p.104; Vol. 9, p.178.
59. T.I., Vol. 18, p.128.
60. T.I., Vol. 6, p.60; Vol. 5, p.21.
61. Foundations, pp.77f.
62. T.I., Vol. 11, p.224.
63. Foundations, pp.181ff.; Vol. 6, pp.174f.
64. T.I., Vol. 5, p.160.
65. T.I., Vol. 17, p.58.
66. Foundations, p.77; T.I., Vol. 4, p.51.
67. T.I., Vol. 4, p.51; cf. Foundations, p.63.
68. Foundations, p.64.
69. Ibid., p.79; cf. T.I., Vol. 3, p.40.
70. Foundations, pp.86f and 83.
71. Ibid., p.88.
72. Ibid., p.82.
73. Ibid., pp.83f.
74. Ibid., p.84, italics mine.
75. Ibid., p.59.
76. Foundations, pp.88f, italics mine.
77. K. Rahner, Crossroads, p.63.

78. Ibid., p.66; cf. T.I., Vol. 18, p.127.
79. K. Rahner, Crossroads, p.67; cf. T.I., Vol. 18, p.129.
80. T.I., Vol. 18, p.131; cf. K. Rahner, Crossroads, p.69.
81. T.I., Vol. 4, p.115.
82. Ibid., p.176.
83. Foundations, pp.223 and 225; T.I., Vol. 4, p.116.
84. Idem.
85. T.I., Vol. 9, p.146; cf. Vol. 8, p.14.
86. T.I., Vol. 4, p.177, italics mine.
87. T.I., Vol. 10, p.35; Vol. 6, pp.72f.
88. T.I., Vol. 6, p.75.
89. M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p.370; cf. W. Shepherd, op. cit., p.227.
90. T.I., Vol. 16, p.41; Foundations, pp.143f.
91. Foundations, p.126.
92. T.I., Vol. 1, p.316.
93. Foundations, p.128.
94. M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p.291.
95. T.I., Vol. 5, p.456.
96. E.g. A. Bittlinger, op. cit., pp.86f.
97. T.I., Vol. 4, p.183.
98. Ibid., pp.183f.
99. D. Edwards, Human Experience of God, pp.27f.
100. D. Tracy, following Karl Jaspers, refers to the former as 'boundary-situations' and the latter as 'ecstatic experiences', preferring this to Abraham Maslow's phrase 'peak experiences', Blessed Rage for Order, Seabury, New York, 1975, pp.105-109, cf. The Analogical Imagination, pp.357-64, 'experience of the uncanny'; cf. L. Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind, pp.305-413, 'the dimension of ultimacy'.
101. L. Boff, op. cit., p.28.
102. K. Rahner, Encyclopedia of Theology, p.593; Foundations, p.120; cf. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.320-337.

103. T.I., Vol. 4, p.176; cf. p.115.
104. T.I., Vol. 1, p.165.
105. T.I., Vol. 11, p.220; Vol. 10, p.280; Vol. 1, p.165; Vol. 4, pp.213f. This does not mean that Christology is 'an absolute point of departure' in our understanding of the world (T.I., Vol. 1, p.166). This view does not undermine the basic epistemological premise that God is known from the world. Nevertheless to a certain extent we also have to start from God in order to say what the world is since he is the condition of all our knowledge. This means that there is a 'shifting back and forth of the initial terminal points in the process of acquiring knowledge'. (T.I., Vol. 1, p.166; cf. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.28).
106. T.I., Vol. 4, p.176; cf. Foundations, p.197. This is made possible by the similarity between Rahner's theology of nature and grace and Scotist theology: 'Is there anything in Catholic principles to prevent us taking the Scotist point of view and considering the primal act of God, in which everything else is in fact given, as the self-exteriorization of God who is the love which gives itself in the incarnation?' (T.I., Vol. 4, p.176).
107. Foundations, pp.226f; T.I., Vol. 4, p.118; Vol. 1, p.158.
108. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.164f.; Vol. 5, p.160; Foundations, pp.199-202.
109. T.I., Vol. 1, p.172; cf. Foundations, p.195.
110. T.I., Vol. 1, p.173; Foundations, pp.288- 291.
 Rahner uses the terms 'ontic' and 'ontological' in a different sense from Heidegger. For Heidegger an ontic analysis is 'a description of the kinds of experiences human beings enjoy in being in the world, rather than an analysis of the ontological structures of either human being or Being generally'. (L. Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind, p.306 n 1; cf. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, SCM, 1960, p.30). *Dasein's* existence is determined both by choice of a range of possibilities and also by acceptance of the situations it finds itself 'thrown into': 'Only the particular *Dasein* decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or neglecting. . . . The understanding of oneself which leads *along this way* we call 'existentiell'. The question of existence is one of *Dasein's* ontical 'affairs'.' (M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.33).

The *existentiell*, or ontic, question does not require a knowledge of the ontological structure of existence. An enquiry into the ontological structure of existence is not *existentiell* but existential (*ibid.*, *loc. cit.*). When Rahner uses the word ontic he is not using it in the *existentiell* sense of *Dasein's* ontical possibilities. Rather he uses it in the sense of traditional ontology, the ontology of the 'substantial' (*Ibid.*, p.497 n xiv), where being is seen as something 'present-at-hand': 'Merely material for reworking' (*Ibid.*, p.43). Rahner's usage is in the sense of ontical

enquiry about entities, constituted by categories and the facts about them (rather than ontical enquiry about Dasein's concrete possibilities that constitutes the starting point of Heidegger's ontological enquiry into the horizon of possibilities, the existentials). Heidegger uses ontic in this sense when he refers to ontic enquiry as the mode of questioning of the positive sciences; traditional ontology believed an understanding of Being could be derived using this method (Ibid. p.31)). Cf. Foundations, p.16, translator's note.

111. Foundations, p.293.
112. T.I., Vol. 1, p.179; Foundations, p.290.
113. T.I., Vol. 1, pp.181f.; Vol. 4, p.117; Foundations, p.226.
114. Foundations, p.225.
115. T.I., Vol. 1, p.184. The notion of existence which is being used here is derived from Heidegger. It is not existence in terms of 'presence-at-hand' of entities, such as a table, but existence as 'a potentiality-for-Being', i.e. conceived in terms of possibilities or self-realization in the world (M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.67, 276; C. Ernst, Introduction, T.I., Vol. 1, p.xiv). This Being-in-the-world (M. Heidegger, op. cit. p.78) for human existence is really being out, a projection of possibilities 'ek-sistence' into history (T.I., Vol. 1, pp.xvi and 181). In this sense it is the incarnation which enables God to exist (Ibid. p.184 translator's note). In this understanding of existence temporality is an essential and intrinsic element of Dasein's constitution (M. Heidegger, op. cit., pp.374 and 377). As a projecting being the future has a priority in Dasein's constitution (Ibid. p.437).
116. T.I., Vol. 1, p.184.
117. W. Shepherd, op. cit., p.212.
118. T.I., Vol. 5, p.186.
119. T.I., Vol. 4, p.200.
120. K. Rahner, Studies in Modern Theology, pp.198f.; T.I., Vol. 4, p.201.
121. T.I., Vol. 4, p.200; W.J. Hollenweger, 'All Creatures Great and Small: towards a Pneumatology of Life', in Strange Gifts, pp.48-50.
122. T.I., Vol. 17, p.88.
123. Ibid., p.87.
124. T.I., Vol. 6, p.213.

125. Foundations, p.94; cf. T.I., Vol. 1, p.362.
126. T.I., Vol. 6, pp.186f.
127. Ibid., p.210.
128. T.I., Vol. 1 pp.362f. n.2 and p.365.
129. T.I., Vol. 6, pp.213-217; Foundations, p.104.
130. Foundations, p.224; T.I., Vol. 4, p.116.
131. T.I. Vol. 4, p.116.
132. Foundations, p.225.
133. Ibid. p.195.
134. T.I. Vol. 5, p.175; Vol. 11, p.226; Vol.5, p.181; Foundations, pp.190f. and 199ff.
135. T.I., Vol. 5, pp.179, 181ff.; Vol. 1, p.162; Foundations, p.202.
136. T.I., Vol. 4, p.115.
137. Ibid., pp.110 and 115; Foundations, p.218.
138. W.C. Shepherd, op. cit., p.250.
139. T.I., Vol. 1, p.306; Vol.10, p.283.
140. T.I., Vol. 4, p.114.
141. Foundations, p.201; T.I., Vol. 5, p.175.
142. Foundations, pp.201 and 208; T.I., Vol. 1, pp.197f.; Vol. 4, p.112.
143. T.I., Vol. 1, p.167; Vol. 4, pp.176 and 116.
144. T.I., Vol. 1, p.191.
145. Ibid., p.167.
146. Foundations, pp.87 and 202.
147. Offenbarung und Transzendenzerfahrung, p.35, quoted in M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p. 198.
148. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.221-252.
149. Ibid., p.225.
150. Ibid., p.224.
151. Ibid., pp.231f.

152. Ibid., p.234.
153. Ibid., pp.228f.; cf. Hearers, pp.49f.
154. T.I., Vol. 4, p.237.
155. Ibid., p.236.
156. Ibid., p.113; Vol. 1, p.181.
157. T.I., Vol. 4, p.114
158. K. Rahner, Problèmes actuels de christologie, p. 402, cited in M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p. 224.
159. T.I., Vol. 4, p.222.
160. M.L. Taylor, op. cit., pp.173f.
161. T.I., Vol. 4, p.227; M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p.203.
162. T.I., Vol. 4, p.236; cf. p.115.
163. 'The Immutability of God', Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 41 (1967), (pp.19-26), p.19, cited in M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p.207.
164. Foundations, p.227; T.I., Vol. 4, pp.118f.; cf. note 110 above.
165. Foundations, p.228.
166. Ibid., p.17.

Chapter 6

GOD'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE WORLD

Although Rahner's aim is to rethink the nature of God's relationship to the world he does not fully follow through the implications of his thought. In his discussion of dualism and pantheism he rightly argues, on the one hand, against dualism, that God is not a particular entity to be differentiated from other entities in the world and related to it in an extrinsic sense; and on the other hand, against pantheism, that the world and God are not to be equated. But although he wants to assert the intrinsic nature of God's relationship to the world he ultimately fails, as we have seen, because of the negative implications for him both of the concept of change in God and the concept of necessary creation. Although having these contradictions because he always tries to keep one foot in the scholastic camp (and probably one eye on the censors) Rahner's system is 'profoundly different from any system ever conceived within the confines of Roman Catholicism because it wholeheartedly appropriates a modern, evolutionary vision of the world for theological purposes.' It is this appropriation of the modern world view that makes Rahner's theological system a useful one for understanding God's charismatic action in the world. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Rahner ultimately fails to provide a conceptual framework that is able to incorporate the personal and loving involvement of the Holy Spirit. As this sort of

involvement is at the heart of charismatic experience we must look elsewhere for such a framework.

Panentheism - involvement and necessity

A helpful insight from process theology is that involvement, relationship and change can be seen as perfections rather than imperfections. A term used by process theology is 'panentheism' and we shall suggest that with qualifications it is a helpful term for defining God's relationship with the world. It is not a term that Rahner uses, though he expressed sympathy for the concept in a dictionary article he wrote:

This form of pantheism does not intend simply to identify the world with God in a monistic fashion (God = the 'all') but intends to conceive the 'all' of the world 'in' God as an inner modification and appearance of God, even if God is not absorbed into the world. The doctrine of such a 'being-in' of the world in God is false and heretical (*Denziger, 1728*) if and only if it denies the creation of the world by God and the distinction of the world from God (not only the distinction of God from the world); otherwise panentheism is a challenge addressed to ontology to think through more deeply and exactly the relationship between absolute and finite being (i.e. by grasping the reciprocal conditioning of unity and difference that increase in direct proportion).²

In panentheism God both is and transcends the universe. But does this mean that God 'needs' the universe, that the world is necessary for God to be God? The word necessary is ambiguous; it can mean 'unfree, coerced, imposed from without or from within' and in this sense it is considered as imperfection. But it can also mean 'not contingent, unable not to be' and in this sense can be considered as an ontological perfection.³ In this second usage God's act of creation is 'a necessary effect of God's superabundant being and goodness'.⁴ Thus God is God without the universe but he never exists without it; it is a necessity of love, not constraint.

Panentheism asserts that the universe is in God, not in a

spatial sense, but that there are reciprocal relations between God and the world. Traditional theism has not usually admitted this since substance thought equates Being, reality, with essential immutability. There is no potency, capacity for change, in God. But it is possible to conceive of the universe as in God, as both a manifestation of God (a traditional doctrine) but also as a modification of God. It would not be 'the actuation of a potency' but what Joseph Donceel calls 'the result of a superactuality'.⁵ Consequently there is no potency in God; he does not need such relations to be God (against Whitehead, Hartshorne and Hegel). Thus the distinction between the pantheism that Donceel is arguing for and Hartshorne's is that for the latter creation is a necessary enhancement or completion of God and for the former it is a necessary display of the infinite richness of God. To put it another way creation is constitutive of God in the latter and a consequence of God in the former.⁶

Since God creates out of nothing, nothing exists outside of the creative act. In one respect therefore, it can be said that the creative act is identical with God, if we look at it from, as it were, God's side. In another respect, if we look at it from man's side the creative act is the creature. Yet God is not the creatures nor the creatures God, rather in Louis Dupré's formula: 'The creature is the total otherness of God within the total dependence upon God'.⁷

Donceel maintains that Hegel, although not wishing to, falls into the error of pantheism though acknowledging that many Hegelian scholars would disagree.⁸ Nonetheless Hegel more than any philosopher has tackled the problem of the relation of the Infinite to the finite, and his thought therefore is very important to our

discussion. Hegel regards the first principle of the perennial philosophy, the principle of identity 'whatever is, is' as tautological and trite. Hegel's basic principle is the principle of universal correlativity: 'Whatever is is both identical with itself and not-identical with itself' or 'everything is itself precisely by being related to something else'.⁹

There is no doubt that the principle of correlativity applies to all the beings we experience; I am only able to be myself by being related to other people, to the world and to God.¹⁰ But does it apply to God? It would not if it means that God is only God by being related to something else, to the world. But it can apply to God if it is interpreted as meaning that 'everything that exists is related to something else'. God does not need the non-Identity to reach Identity, contrary to Hegel; he is not related essentially, but in Donceel's phrase "supereffluently," because the superabundance of his love leads him to share with them the fullness of his being."¹¹

Rahner is aware of the need to rethink the relationship of God to the world but he does not fully follow through his suggestions. He is aware that the issue of the dialectical relationship between the immanence and transcendence of God in relation to the world needs to be tackled in order to 'attain an immanence of God in the world or an immanence of the world in God'. Rahner rightly maintains that the world is dependent on God but God is not dependent on the world. He points out that in our normal understanding of causality not only is the effect dependent on the cause but, in a manner of speaking, the cause is dependent on the effect, 'it cannot be this cause without causing the effect'.¹² But this is not the case in creation. The world as God's effect is dependent on God as cause, but God is not dependent on the effect,

he remains free with regard to the world; it is a unique relationship.¹³

Instead of explicating this in a similar fashion to Donceel's 'superactuality' Rahner resorts to scholastic thought. God is the absolute and the infinite, 'the "Unchangeable", he who simply *is* - *actus purus* - who in blessed security, in the self-sufficiency of infinite reality, possesses from eternity to eternity the absolute, unwavering, glad fullness of what he is'.¹⁴ He reasserts, because of his desire to maintain the doctrine of the immutability of God, the scholastic principle that 'God has no real relationship with the world, and that it is only the world that has the relationship to him'.¹⁵ All of God's dealings with the world remain free and unexacted; creation can lay no claim upon God, and grace is unmerited and unexacted.

Like Donceel, Donald Gelpi also finds the term panentheism, with qualifications, helpful. Gelpi is very familiar with the work of Rahner;¹⁶ he has also, unlike Rahner, had much personal and positive experience of the charismatic movement. Gelpi provides a helpful balance to Rahner since he not only stresses the christocentric nature of charismatic experience and the concept of entering into the death of Christ but he also stresses the transforming nature of the charismatic experience.

Charismatic transformation - personal relationship and change

Like Rahner, Gelpi wants to rethink the concept of grace. Whereas for Rahner this is done in the framework of his metaphysics of knowledge using the transcendental method, Gelpi does this using the concept of gracious or charismatic transformation.¹⁷

According to Gelpi, from the second to the thirteenth centuries Christian theologians on the whole perceived the world Platonically. Grace was understood in terms of the Platonic doctrine of participation, by which all realities participate in a transcendent form located in the mind of God. Transformation by grace, i.e. divinization, tended to be understood in dualistic terms as the spiritualization of the human person. A Platonic conception of grace conceives of gracious transformation as an assimilation to the transcendent realm of the Spirit. Since this realm is essentially different from the realm of space and time then the experience of grace is understood in dualist terms.

The Aristotelian scholasticism of the thirteenth century, with its rejection of the Platonic doctrine of participation, rethought the concept of grace. The essential form of things resides not in a transcendent divine mind but in the things themselves. Grace must be infused into the soul to effect an essential transformation from the natural to the supernatural. The natural faculties of the soul need to be elevated by grace to the supernatural order, which is an essentially different order. Although the metaphysical dualism of a Platonic viewpoint is diminished in a Thomistic Aristotelian system of accidental transformation it nevertheless leads to formal and static categories of grace.

Gelpi, however, wants to understand grace in terms of a transforming personal encounter with God whilst maintaining the need for a logical account of reality, conceived in relational rather than objective terms. He seeks to outline a metaphysics of grace, conceiving of grace as charismatic transformation, though not of accidents and substances.

In developing his thought in terms of charismatic transformation

Gelpi engages process thought in a critical dialogue. Gelpi works from Alfred North Whitehead's principle that 'apart from the experiencing of subjects there is nothing, nothing, bare nothingness'.¹⁸ All reality is divided into what is experienced and the way experienced realities are experienced. Being is therefore experience and so I do not 'have' experiences but I 'am' an experience. Whereas in substance philosophy act follows being in process theology the reverse is true. Rather than action being the accidental expression of a fixed essential nature, every entity is a self-defining, creative process.

For Whitehead atomicity is the ultimate reality, and only the physical actions that structure experience are finally real; thus the continuities that shape experience are ideal and possible rather than completely and ultimately real.¹⁹ In Whitehead's thought man is a 'becoming', but Whitehead's conception of a person, which Gelpi defines as 'a nexus of many actual occasions with a certain kind of serial order', is inadequate to account for the unity and continuity in personal experience because it is based on a nominalistic construct of experience lacking a concept of generality and continuity.²⁰ It cannot adequately account for the very thing it is attempting to explain, the experience of process. Whilst process thought gives a better framework for understanding the dynamics of personal growth and cosmic evolution, substance philosophy accounts better for individual unity and real continuity in change. However, a substance universe does not satisfactorily account for personal growth and evolution, based as it is on fixed essences, since a stable substance underlies every accidental change. Gelpi moves beyond both substance and process theology to 'a theory of emergence'.²¹

Gelpi uses Charles Peirce to criticize Whitehead's understanding of experience. Whereas Whitehead conceived of experience as dipolar, Peirce conceives of it as triadic composed of three relational feelings: evaluations (qualities) interactions (facts) and tendencies (laws).²² These three realms of 'relational feelings' constitute human experience.

In their experience people make evaluative responses to both themselves and their world by means of concrete sensations, emotions, images, memories, abstract conceptions, etc. They all mutually condition each other and together make up the realm of quality.

Not only do human beings respond evaluatively to reality but reality also has a physical and unavoidable impact on them and we in our decisions and responses have an impact on reality. This is the realm of fact. Whitehead distinguished between initial and final facts.²³ Facts which have an impact on me independently of any evaluative response are initial facts such as physical sensations environmental forces etc. I have no control over these. But these initial facts give rise to evaluative responses which result in personal decisions and actions, where I interact with my environment, these are final facts.

But people are also, in a sense, a law unto themselves, meaning that each person is an autonomous tendency to respond evaluatively or decisively. Laws result from the decisions that express my evaluative responses, i.e. when a belief is fixed concerning a given reality then a tendency or habit to react a certain way is created. Through their habitual tendencies people define the selves that they are becoming.

Therefore people are defined not by some essential form but by

their total history. The basic point is the same as Rahner's but the conceptual framework is different. Each self is the sum total of its history and each self's history is the sum total of its experience. Individual selves emerge out of a dynamic interaction with one another. Each is limited by those that circumscribe it and by which it must define itself in opposition, each exists in relation to the environmental forces that surround it and penetrate it. The character of every individual self is defined not by some essential metaphysical form but by its total history and environment.

In substance thought environment is opposed to one's body. Individuation is by quantification of matter, and quantified matter exists in its environment like a letter in an envelope.²⁴ In Gelpi's 'emergent' world decision individuates and individuals are distinguished qualitatively not quantitatively. The achievement of individuality is a process of self-definition.²⁵ Not only does a person exist in the world but his world exists in him, it makes him what he is. A person does not lose his identity to the world with whom he interacts; people are autonomous individuals, but there is a mutual inexistence or interpenetration. The term 'mutual inexistence' is a translation of the Greek term *perichoresis* which comes from the trinitarian theology of John of Damascus.²⁶ This will become significant when we look at Gelpi's understanding of the Trinity.

Gelpi, following suggestions in Pierce, introduces the notion of plasticity into laws. They do not just represent regularity in activity but regularity for the condition and possibility for change and growth; laws 'endow experience with regularity and continuity *in growth*'.²⁷ Change, however, not understood as an essential transformation but as a 'transmutation'. The subject of the

changing process does not underlie the change but emerges from it. The difference is relational not essential; selves relate to reality differently. Gelpi gives the example that when an artist adds something to a painting the result goes beyond the original painting and what is added. The whole painting changes because the relationship of the colours to each other has changed. In transmutation something analogous to this occurs in every change brought about by the inclusion of new feelings (of quality, fact or law) which change the entire experience into a different kind of experience.²⁸

This has important consequences for Gelpi's understanding of grace and its effects. He conceives of grace as transmuted experience which links individuals with God not by an accidental transformation of their essential nature but by their choosing to enter into the process of self-donation and love. Grace is conceived as participation in God, where participation is not conceived in terms of a metaphysical dualism but as the mutual inexistence, *perichoresis*, of socially interacting experiences.

Through faith, I exist in God and God exists in me in a new way because through our interaction, through God's revelatory self-communication to me and my response in faith to God, the two of us experience one another differently. Grace changes experience physically but that change is here interpreted as transmutation rather than as essential or accidental transformation. In a world of socially interacting experiences, grace results from an interpersonal encounter with a tripersonal God that sets one in a new kind of interpersonal communion with other selves.²⁹

In a world of substance thought the concept of *perichoresis* was something of an anomaly, since while substances can be intentionally present to one another they do not normally exist in one another or interpenetrate one another. In Gelpi's metaphysics, since experience not substance underlies Being, both God and creatures are

experiences and can therefore be described as mutually inexistent, therefore God's relationship with the world can be understood in panentheistic terms. Gelpi gives five assertions that such an understanding ascribes to:³⁰

(1) All things exist in God in the way that they are. There is no error in God's knowledge and experience of the world.

(2) Realities, both people and things, exist in God but are relationally distinct from him and from one another.

(3) People may exist in God naturally, graciously or sinfully. Gelpi considers that a theology such as Rahner's does not bring out these differences. However, although Rahner's terminology is different the concepts are actually similar. For Rahner there is a twofold modality to God's gracious offer of himself; it can exist either merely in the mode of antecedent offer or also in the mode of response, either in acceptance or rejection. This offer as an element in man's transcendental constitution can easily be overlooked but in specific situations, as we have seen, it comes to the fore and man responds either negatively or positively.³¹

(4) The way people exist in God makes a difference to God. Since grace is conceived of in terms of interpersonal encounter, then as we have already seen, this involves change in God. Our actions in the world cause God pleasure or displeasure and our positive or negative responses to God's grace have the capacity to cause greater pleasure or displeasure. Rahner's understanding of sin does not bring out this aspect; sin is seen in terms of failing to achieve self-transcendence, as 'metaphysical suicide'. Though this is helpful in that it gets away from the judicial notion of God, it fails to do justice to the personal aspect of our relationship with God and to the fact that our sinful actions have harmful

effects, and are not just failings in self-realization.

(5) The way we humans exist in God makes a difference to the way God exists in us.

Gelpi is critical of the way process theology understands God's relationship to the world. The divine experience in Whitehead's thought is either atomic in structure or a single actual occasion of experience in process. But if it is the former there is no ultimate unity and if it is the latter it is impervious to outside influence. In process thought experience, and thus God as an experience, is dipolar or 'bi-polar' in Hartshorne's phrase. He is both in abstract terms eternally faithful, loving and perfect in relationships, and also in concrete terms active in these ways within creation. The priority is however not with former aspect ('primordial' in Whitehead's term) but with the concrete ('consequent') instances of his activity. God surpasses himself, becomes a fuller realization of himself within creation. In Hartshorne's panentheism God has an unchanging essence but nevertheless completes himself in an advancing experience; he needs the world to be fully God.³² However the Christian understanding of God's involvement with the world is his salvific transformation of it, he is not involved in order to become God.³³

God's trinitarian involvement

In the light of the above we shall now examine Rahner's understanding of the Trinity. For Rahner, the self-communication of God in grace, according to Scripture, has a threefold nature. God remains transcendent, yet is present or 'is there' and also brings about the acceptance of himself.³⁴ It is because our experience of God is threefold that we develop a doctrine of the Trinity; 'the

mystery of the Trinity is the last mystery of our own reality'.³⁵ If God's self-communication is a true self-communication then what is revealed and what reveals must be the same, in other words: '*the "economic" Trinity is the "immanent" Trinity*'.³⁶ In a real self-communication of God it is axiomatic that 'God can reveal only what man is able to hear' or to put it the other way round, man is 'the addressee who is, of his very nature, demanded by the divine self-communication, which creates him as the condition of its own possibility'.³⁷ Thus not only must what is revealed bear a correspondence to that which reveals but also that which is revealed must bear a correspondence to that which receives the revelation. Consequently that which receives the revelation (man) must bear a correspondence to that which reveals (God).

There are four basic pairs of aspects of man's experience and hence God's self-communication, these double aspects indicating the twofold nature of God the Father's self-communication which leads to the doctrine of the Trinity.³⁸ The four aspects are: 1) Origin-Future - the world is created by God and moves towards its fulfilment in God; man is created, has a beginning and moves towards a goal. 2) History-Transcendence - we experience the concrete object in the transcendent horizon and so a revelation of God 'can occur only in this unifying duality of history and transcendence which man is'.³⁹ 3) Offer-Acceptance - man as a free being must relate to God in terms of an offer and the acceptance or rejection of that offer. 4) Knowledge-Love - knowledge, 'the actuation of truth' is ultimately fulfilled in love, or rather 'the actuation of love', loving actions.⁴⁰ Yet the two must not be confused for although knowledge is ultimately fulfilled in actions and not abstract thought, knowledge and love are still two aspects of man's

existence to which a revelation of God must correspond.

The two sides of the four pairs of aspects represent the two modes of God's self-communication, the two processions of the Trinity.⁴¹ One mode corresponding to the incarnation is that of origin-history-offer revealed as truth. God's self-communication as offer is the origin and ground of creation and hence is the origin of world history. But how is this revealed as the truth? This is so because truth is not to be understood primarily as 'the correct grasping of a state of affairs',⁴² but a revealing in the sense of self-manifestation, a self-positing for others in truth, i.e. fidelity.⁴³ Thus truth is what we do for others. In this sense God's revelation as origin-history-offer is made manifest as truth; it is God's action in the world as a faithful offer.

The other mode, corresponding to the Holy Spirit, is that of future-transcendence-acceptance-love. Future is not understood merely as that which is still to come but the mode of God's self-communication as man's fulfilment, thus making transcendence possible, transcendence understood as man's essential openness to God as absolute future and also the possibility of accepting that future through grace, i.e. an acceptance brought about by God. This is fulfilled in love, for what else but love is this self-communication that gives itself as the possibility of its own acceptance?⁴⁴ Thus the two basic modalities of the one divine self-communication are truth and love, truth in history and love as the promise of the absolute future. The two modalities are neither separate nor the same, but mutually conditioning. Rahner sums up God's self-communication in the phrase '*the divine self-communication occurs in unity and distinction in history (of the truth) and in the spirit (of love)*'.⁴⁵ Therefore to think of God as

spirit is to think in terms of self-presence, knowledge and love, with knowledge and love being the two basic activities of spirit. Rahner's metaphysics of spirit is not conceived of in terms of spiritual substances or entities, but in activities, 'an authentic metaphysics of the spirit tells us that there are two (and only two!) basic activities of the spirit: knowledge and love'.⁴⁶

In our experience of salvation history we experience the Spirit as the one God, the Son as the one God and the Father as the one God; there must be no tritheistic implications.⁴⁷ To say that we experience three persons is a generalization subsequent to our experience which prevents a modalistic understanding and preserves the truth that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity.⁴⁸ They are three not in the sense that they could be added up to make something different but that God is predicated three times, God the Father, the Son and the Spirit.⁴⁹ This is to be understood in the manner of a threefold subsistence, 'three distinct manners of subsisting' rather than as three consciousnesses.⁵⁰ However, Rahner maintains against Barth, that although the language of three persons is misleading, implying three consciousnesses, it should be kept since 1500 years of tradition cannot be overturned.⁵¹

God's self-communication is really a *self-communication*, not a communication of something created through efficient causality and so it must be understood in terms of quasi-formal causality.⁵² If there is a threefold nature to our experience of God's communication then, in order for this communication to be truly a self-communication, there must not only be a distinction 'for us' but also 'in himself'.⁵³ However, Rahner qualifies this real distinction in God, in fact it is only in the dimension of salvation history that 'this distinction is truly "real"'.⁵⁴ He who communicates and he who

is communicated are of the same essence and so the distinctions in God must be relative.⁵⁵

For Rahner the self-communication of God is understood in terms of love and in these terms everything else is understood.⁵⁶ Rahner distinguishes between two types of love, a metaphysical love and a 'genuinely personal love'.⁵⁷ A genuinely personal love is the free self-giving of a person, who is able to withhold this love, not an emanation of a nature.⁵⁸ The distinction of the two meanings for the word love enables Rahner to assert that God is love (in a metaphysical sense) and yet preserve the gratuitous nature of God's loving self-bestowal of grace in creation (personal love). In this understanding the implication is that the personal love is superior to the metaphysical love. Elsewhere he explicitly states this: 'concrete love is something more (not less) than formally analyzed subjectivity (ability and need to love)'.⁵⁹ In terms of human love, the 'act of personal love for another human being is therefore the all-embracing act of man which gives meaning, direction and measure to everything else'.⁶⁰ Thus a refusal of love could be characterized as inauthentic existence, but this seems to be the sort of existence that Rahner considers a possibility for God.

One way of solving this dilemma would be the concept of intratrinitarian divine love. Augustine argued that for God to be love there must have been an eternal uncreated object for his love; there must be one who loves, one who is loved and the love itself between them. Thus the Spirit is the bond of love between the Father and the Son. Karl Barth develops a similar concept:

It is not part of God's being and action that as love it must have an object in another who is different from Him. God is sufficient in Himself as object and therefore as object of His love.⁶¹

But although Rahner was influenced by Barth's concept of 'manner of

being' he does not share his concept of intratrinitarian divine love.⁶² Rahner's starting point for the understanding of the Trinity is the economy of salvation:

Insofar as he has come as the salvation which divinizes us in the innermost center of the existence of the individual person, we call him really and truly 'Holy Spirit' or 'Holy Ghost'. Insofar as in the concrete historicity of our existence one and the same God strictly as himself is present for us in Jesus Christ, and in himself, not in a representation, we call him 'Logos' or the Son in an absolute sense. Insofar as this very God, who comes to us as Spirit and as Logos, is and always remains the ineffable and holy mystery, the incomprehensible ground and origin of his coming in the Son and in the Spirit, we call him the one God, the Father.⁶³

Rahner considers the psychological theory of the Trinity developed by Augustine to be inadequate because it has 'forgotten about' economy of salvation and starts from 'seemingly almost gnostic speculation' about the inner life of God.⁶⁴

If love is understood as the personal free self-giving then Rahner's concept of the distinctions in the Trinity, being the distinct manners of subsisting of the one God, and not persons in the sense of individual centres of consciousness, makes it difficult to envisage a concept of intratrinitarian divine love.⁶⁵ Rahner does in fact talk of God's love for himself but no explanation is given of this.⁶⁶

Rahner criticizes the psychological theory of the Trinity because it is not based on human experience. Experience supplies no model to suggest that 'divine knowledge means an *utterance*, and not simply original self-presence in absolute identity'.⁶⁷ He says in a footnote to this sentence, 'The same should be said about the Spirit as love'.⁶⁸ In other words Rahner is arguing that human experience gives no model for conceiving of love as needing an object of love. But this is clearly not the case as Rahner himself shows in his understanding of human love as a free self-communication.

Furthermore, in his explanation of analogy Rahner says :

It is self-evident first of all that the ground of a reality which exists must possess in itself beforehand and in absolute fullness and purity this reality which is grounded by it, because otherwise this ground could not be the ground of what is grounded.⁶⁹

But if this explanation of analogy is applied to his understanding of love, it can be said that Rahner has failed to provide an adequate grounding for human love by regarding the essence of God's love in non-personal terms; he has tried to ground personal love in non-personal love, the fuller in the lesser. Together with his reservations about the distinctions in the Godhead this leads to a weakness in Rahner's understanding of the personal nature of the Holy Spirit. Let us, therefore, reflect further on the use of person language with regard to the Trinity.

In his summary of the history of the term person in the doctrine of the Trinity, Gelpi points out how it was Boethius, at the beginning of the sixth century, who gave western theology its working definition of the term person as 'the individual substance of a rational nature'.⁷⁰ However in the twelfth century, Richard of St. Victor redefined person not as a substance but as an existence. The term existence brought out the ecstatic nature of a person as being out of itself and beyond itself and the relational character of persons as ecstatic social realities. Richard also conceived of persons as unique individuals, each person having a unique and incommunicable individuality. His definition of a person was 'an intellectual nature existing incommunicably' and consequently his definition of a divine person was 'an incommunicable existence of the divine nature'.⁷¹ The relationships within the Trinity could be understood in terms analogous to human social experience.

Walter Kasper has a similar understanding of the Trinity to

Gelpi and is also influenced by Richard of St Victor. Kasper's starting point for the understanding of the Trinity is not the self-communication of the word but self-communicating love.⁷² Augustine understood the Holy Spirit in terms of the mutual and reciprocal love between Father and Son and the Trinity in terms of the love, the beloved and love itself.⁷³ But he did not fully develop his understanding of the Trinity in terms of the concept of love alone but also of knowledge.⁷⁴

It is Richard of St. Victor who develops the understanding of the Trinity in terms of love, not seeing the Spirit in terms of the mutual love of the Father and Son but seeing God as ecstatic love. God as love exists as Father, the giver of love, Son as gift of love received and then bestowed on the Spirit, the receiver of love. Kasper points out the centrality and importance of this image:

Of the many images which scripture uses in describing the action and effects of the Holy Spirit (breath, air, wind, water of life, fire or tongues of fire, ointment and anointing, seal, peace), the most influential in the history of theology has been the characterization of the Holy Spirit as gift and, in connection with this, as love.⁷⁵

Aquinas also recognized the relational character of the divine persons but still preserved the notion of substance, though not directly applying it to the concept of person. He defined a person as 'that which subsists (distinctly in a rational nature)' and therefore defined divine persons as subsistent relations, a subsistence being 'that which is the subject that "stands under" the nature or substance'.⁷⁶

Both Gelpi and Kasper are influenced by Heribert Mühlen.⁷⁷ He builds on the work of both Richard of St Victor and Aquinas, and draws on the existential philosophy of Martin Buber in order to interpret the Trinity in social terms. Mühlen distinguishes between personal and impersonal causality, seeing the Spirit's work in terms

of personal causality which brings about a personal relationship. Gelpi describes Mühlen's notion of personal causality: 'In it one person affects another but in such a way as to evoke from the other the capacity for free, conscious self-donation in the mutuality of love'.⁷⁸ In other words, as Edward Yarnold puts it, the action and presence of the Spirit is not best conceived as a local presence (i.e. within me), nor even as a dynamic presence (i.e. affecting me), but as a personal presence (i.e. present to me), initiating a personal relationship. As Yarnold points out this relationship involves 'God's transforming love' which effects a change in man.⁷⁹

Rahner, however, is wary of the term 'person' in the Trinity as to him it implies a difference in essence, different self-presences and this compromises the unity of God:

Furthermore, 'person' as a concrete concept, in contrast with 'personality' ('subsistence', 'subsistentiaity') means not formally the distinction as such, but those who are distinct. But ours is a case where we should speak of three persons, yet not think of three who are distinct as multiplied also in their essence, as we may do without any difficulty in other instances, e.g. when we speak of 'three individuals'.⁸⁰

Rahner distinguishes between essential and notional (or relational) realities. Essential realities belong to the divine essence, notional to 'that which refers to the persons in their distinction'.⁸¹ The three persons are not essentially distinct but only relationally distinct, constituted by 'relative oppositions'.⁸² Rahner uses the term 'distinct *manner* of subsisting' to signify not different persons (different subsistences) but different personalities; God is not three persons but 'three-personal'. Thus, Rahner can conclude 'the manner of subsisting is distinct through its relative opposition to another one; it is real through its identity with the divine essence'.⁸³

As we have seen, Rahner's approach to the Trinity emphasizes the

unity of God, and its starting point is the experience of salvation history.

Here we experience the Spirit, and we experience him as God (who is only one); we experience the Son, as God; and the Father, as God. When we generalize and say that we experience 'three persons', we do so subsequently to our experience.³⁴

Rahner's emphasis on unity and his anxiety to avoid the dangers of tritheism mean that the divine persons are moments in the economic self-communication of God, not subjects of an immanent self-communication.³⁵ Although it is axiomatic to him that the economic trinity is the immanent trinity he emphasizes the economic at the expense of the immanent. But if the divine hypostases are not subjects then they cannot act as subjects in salvation history. Although Rahner views the hypostatic union as a unique and unsurpassable mode of self-communication he does not sufficiently define the uniqueness of Christ as the Logos, the second person of the Trinity. The same is true of his understanding of the experience of the Holy Spirit which he sums up as 'the finalization of human existence towards the immediacy of God through God's self-communication'.³⁶ Thus Gelpi can describe Rahner's pneumatology as 'relatively undeveloped' and Jürgen Moltmann can conclude that Rahner's understanding of the trinity 'ends in the mystic solitariness of God'.³⁷

Both Barth and Rahner conceive of person in the modern sense of a self-conscious free centre of activity and individual personality.³⁸ Given this understanding persons are seen as in opposition to each other, hence Barth and Rahner's problem with three-person language. Kasper sums up the argument well:

With the modern concept of person as his starting point, H. Mühlen in particular has taken an important step forward in applying personalist categories to the doctrine of the Trinity. For what Rahner describes is in fact not at all the full modern understanding of person but rather an

extreme individualism in which each person is a centre of action who possesses himself, disposes of himself and is set off over against others. But Fichte and Hegel had already moved beyond such a point of view. Ever since the time of Feuerbach modern personalism, as represented by M. Buber, F. Ebner, F. Rosenzweig and others, has made it entirely clear that person exists only in relation; that in the concrete, personality exists only as interpersonality, subjectivity only as intersubjectivity. The human person exists only in relations of the I-Thou-We kind. Within the horizon of this modern understanding of person, an isolated unipersonal God is inconceivable. Thus it is precisely the modern concept of person that offers a point of contact for the doctrine of the Trinity.²⁹

With this understanding of person Kasper can use the doctrine of perichoresis to understand the Trinity and our relationship with God and with other people. Perichoresis provides a model for the union between Christ and human beings (John 14:20, 17:23) and between human beings themselves (John 17:21). Perichoresis, as a concept of 'dynamic reciprocal penetration', means that it is possible that unity and independence increase in direct and not inverse proportion. Thus,

Here once again it becomes clear that the trinitarian mystery is the deepest ground and ultimate meaning of the mystery of the human person and of the latter's fulfilment in love.³⁰

The mutual inexistence of the persons of the Trinity, rather than being a mode of existence distinct from and unintelligible to human existence, actually exemplifies a mode of existence common to every reality.

Gelpi also understands the Trinity in terms of perichoresis.³¹ Unlike Rahner, however, Gelpi can conceive of the divine persons as autonomous centres of existence for without autonomy they would cease to be persons, since without autonomy they could not initiate activity such as procession, self-donation and mission. Autonomy is not understood in terms of separation since autonomy does not separate but rather dissent does.³² The Godhead as a process of

eternal procession and mutual self-donation is the supreme exemplification of interpersonal communion in love. Thus, 'the fact that the divine experience subsists as an eternal social process provides the pattern, the norm for the historical growing of human experience'.³³ We grow in grace by entering into the process of self-donation and loving. Of course divine persons are not understood in the same way as human persons are. Humans can never experience total mutual inexistence and perfect identity of life in this world. But the mutual love and personal communion of the Trinity is analogous to human love and communion - or rather human love is analogous to trinitarian love. Trinitarian love is the exemplification and perfection of personal existence. We become what we worship and, as Kasper points out, this reveals a serious weakness in Rahner's trinitarian theology. How can a 'distinct manner of subsisting' be worshipped, invoked, adored or glorified?³⁴ But when we conceive of and worship God as the perfection of interpersonal communion:

We are drawn individually and collectively into the supremely perfect communion of the divine persons, into the mysterious divine knowing that is loving, into the purifying fire of a divine self-gift so total that it effects the perfect vital identity of the divine persons and the death of every form of selfish human egotism.³⁵

In other words we enter into a transforming personal relationship, a process of gracious or charismatic transformation.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. W.C Shepherd, op. cit., p.97.
2. K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimmler, Theological Dictionary, Herder and Herder, New York, 1965, pp.333f. Quoted in M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p.228 and J. Donceel, The Searching Mind, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1979, p.173.
3. J. Donceel, op. cit., p.145.
4. Ibid., p.170; cf. J. Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, SCM, London, 1981, pp.105-108.
5. Ibid., p.171.
6. Ibid., pp.172 and 222 n.3.
7. Ibid., p.177.
8. Ibid., pp.177-188.
9. Ibid., pp.185f.
10. cf. T.I., Vol. 6, p.241; Vol. 13, p.127; Vol. 5, pp.189f.; cf. also J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, SCM, London, 1977, pp.66-68.
11. J. Donceel, op. cit., pp.187f.
12. Foundations, p.78.
13. cf. T.I., Vol. 16, p.229.
14. T.I., Vol. 4, p.112.
15. T.I., Vol. 11, p.107.
16. D.L. Gelpi, Life and Light: A Guide to the Theology of Karl Rahner, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1966.
17. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, Paulist Press, New York, 1978, pp.135f. *et passim*; D.L. Gelpi, Grace as Transmuted Experience and Social Process, and Other Essays in North American Theology, University Press of America, Lanham, 1988, (hereafter referred to as Grace), pp.41-95; D.L. Gelpi, Charism and Sacrament, SPCK, London, 1977, pp.97-109; D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, University Press of America, Lanham, 1984, pp.72ff.
18. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.45; Experiencing God, p.64.

19. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.69.
20. Cf. J. Macquarrie, op. cit., p.109: 'We have approached the idea of 'being' through existence, rather than thinghood. This does not mean, however, that we are opposing a purely dynamic idea to the static notion of substance. Just as existence and selfhood imply both stability and dynamism, so the word 'being' (we call it, significantly, a 'verbal noun') has a double meaning, suggesting the act or energy of existing and also the existent entity in which this act expresses and manifests itself.' cf. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp.13ff and 17.
21. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.71.
22. Ibid. p.73.
23. Ibid., p.80.; D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.46.
24. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.79.
25. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.10.
26. D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, p.42.
27. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.74.
28. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.48; Experiencing God, p.81.
29. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.51.
30. D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, pp.95-100.
31. Foundations, pp.118, 128 -132; cf. pp.32f.
32. J. Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, SCM, London, 1971, p.274.
33. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.136.
34. T.I., Vol. 4, pp.97 and 70; K. Rahner, The Trinity, Burns and Oates/Herder and Herder, London, 1970, p.36f.
35. K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.47; cf. Foundations, p.137.
36. K. Ranner, op. cit., p.22.
37. Hearers, p.115; K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.91.
38. K. Rahner, The Trinity, pp.91ff.
39. Ibid., p.92.
40. Ibid., p.93.
41. Ibid., p.94.
42. Ibid., p.95.

43. Ibid., p.96.
44. Ibid., p.97f.
45. Ibid., p.99.
46. Ibid., p.116.
47. Ibid., p.106.
48. Idem.
49. Ibid., p.104 and n.26.
50. Ibid., p.109.
51. Ibid., p.44.
52. T.I., Vol. 4, p.70; K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.36.
53. K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.36 n.34, pp.101f; Foundations, pp.136f.
54. K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.37.
55. Ibid., pp.102f.
56. T.I., Vol. 1, p.310.
57. Ibid., pp.120f.
58. Ibid., p.123; Vol. 9, p.136.
59. K. Rahner, Kleines theologisches Wörterbuch, p.288, quoted in M.L. Taylor, op. cit., p.268.
60. T.I., Vol. 1, p.241.
61. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol.2:1, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1957, p.280.
62. K. Rahner, The Trinity, pp.110 and 74 n.27.
63. Foundations, p.136.
64. K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.119; Foundations, p.135.
65. Cf. J. Moltmann, op. cit., p.156.
66. Hearers, p.100.
67. K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.117.
68. Ibid., p.117 n.42.
69. Foundations, pp.73f.

70. D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, p.108; cf. W. Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, SCM, London, 1979, pp.153f.; cf. St. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, Question 29, Article 1.
71. D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, p.109.
72. W. Kasper, op. cit., pp.195f.
73. St. Augustine, On the Trinity, Book 8, Chapter 10.
74. Ibid., Book 9, Chapters 3 and 4.
75. W. Kasper, op. cit., p.224.
76. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, Question 29, Articles 2 and 4; K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.110; D.L. Gelpi, op. cit., p.109; W. Kasper, op. cit., p.281;
77. D.L. Gelpi, op. cit., p.110.
78. Idem., loc. cit.
79. E. Yarnold, The Second Gift: A Study of Grace, St. Paul Publications, Slough, 1974, pp.58f.
80. K. Rahner, The Trinity, pp.105ff.
81. Ibid., p.78.
82. Ibid., p.79.
83. Ibid., pp.110-114.
84. Ibid., p.106.
85. Ibid., pp.42f. and 84f.; T.I., Vol. 4, pp.100f. Rahner considers tritheism to be rife where people have consciously thought about the Trinity. However, he considers for the most part that Christians do not think about the Trinity much and that therefore monotheism is in fact rife; The Trinity, p.42 n.43; T.I., Vol. 4, pp.79 and 100 n.32.
86. Foundations, p.240, cf. pp.116-120 and 136f.
87. D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, p.81 n.76; J. Moltmann, op. cit., p.148.
88. K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.106.
89. W. Kasper, op. cit., p.289; cf. J. Moltmann, op. cit., p.145.
90. Ibid., p.285.
91. D.L. Gelpi, op. cit., pp.132-143.
92. Cf. W. Kasper, op. cit., p.285: 'For the modern self-conscious person could see in other persons only competitors'.

93. Idem., Grace, p.54.
94. W. Kasper, op. cit., pp.288 and 302.
95. D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, p.140.

Chapter 7

CHARISMATIC TRANSFORMATION

Having established the importance of the notion of charismatic transformation brought about by the dynamic and personal nature of God's involvement with the world, we must now look at this notion in more detail. We will deal first with Rahner, arguing that his thought is weak in this area, and then with Gelpi for whom this area is central to his whole theology.

Charismatic transformation - Rahner's understanding of growth in grace

We have already seen the Christocentric basis of Rahner's theology and of his understanding of grace. God's self-communication in the incarnation was for the sake of our deification:

Grace in all of us and hypostatic union in the one Jesus Christ can only be understood together, and as a unity they signify the one free decision of God for a supernatural order of salvation, for his self-communication.¹

Rahner's notion of the supernatural existential means that a person is 'always a Christian in order to become one'; his relationship with Christ is always present as something a person has to realize and actualize throughout his life. He must come to an *existentiell* realization of his existential relationship with Christ; salvation, the presence of God is present as an undeveloped seed.²

But there is a constant discrepancy in Rahner's thought, between man's transcendental situation and his concrete situation, between his existential situation and his *existentiell* situation. On the one

hand the supernatural existential is a given constituent in human nature, but on the other hand it is a 'mode of being', dynamic concept.³ But it is hard to envisage how a dynamic concept can exist undynamically, i.e. unrealized. This contradiction becomes apparent in Rahner's descriptions of human growth. The essence of human growth for Rahner is entering into a relationship with Christ:

the real truth and reality of Christian existence, and human experience is nothing else but a challenge to entrust oneself to the development of one's own Christian existence in patience, openness and fidelity, and to do this until slowly, and perhaps painfully and with failures, this life unfolds and develops into the experience of a personal relationship to Jesus Christ.⁴

It must be left to each individual to discover in his own life exactly what concrete experiences mediate the experience of his transcendental relationship with Christ; each must discover his own 'existentiell mystagogy',⁵ whereby he comes to an *existentiell* realization of his existential possibilities.⁶

But there is a discrepancy in Rahner's thought as to how this comes about. On the one hand it is seen in terms of the charismatic experience of entering into the death of Christ, emphasizing the *existentiell* aspect and on the other hand it is seen in terms of simply doing one's duty and behaving morally, emphasizing the existential aspect. Examples of the first way emphasize the unconditional and absolute nature of selfless surrender and love.⁷ Loving actions done in this way are not merely rationally justified or in accord with Christian morality but a sharing of the dying of Jesus.⁸ The person 'who responds to the world with genuine *love ipso facto* encounters in it the Cross of Christ and the inconceivability of God'.⁹ Examples of the second way include: the notion of accepting one's existence 'without reservation'; the fact that acceptance of self is acceptance of

Christ; the notion of quietly doing one's duty; and the experience of grace where someone affirms, either explicitly or implicitly, moral values as absolutely binding.¹⁰ Also the affirmation of one's self in duty which affirms some value means that absolute value is affirmed since God is the source of all cognition, volition and action. Moral acts include God as their transcendental condition and God participates in all acts, through quasi-formal causality, making all good moral acts salvific.¹¹

It is the sort of instances found in this second group which cause Gelpi to say that Rahner's theology of grace inspires a complacency and a continuity in a person's relationship with God, rather than the fact that 'a love relationship with the Christian God demands as much the discontinuity of dying as it does the joy of continuous human development'.¹² But to see Rahner's thought in terms of complacency and continuity is to ignore what is really at the heart of his thought, the Ignatian piety of the cross. The following passage from Rahner about experiencing the Spirit makes this clear:

We can seek him only by forgetting self. We can find him only in seeking God and surrendering self in generous outgoing love, and without returning to self. Moreover we must continually ask whether anything like that annihilating and enlivening experience of Spirit is at work in us, so that we know how far we still have to go, and how distant what we presume to call our 'spiritual life' still is from real experience of the Holy Spirit.¹³

The difference between the ways is not in fact as great as it may at first seem. In places the two notions, of acceptance of one's humanity and of the discontinuity of death, are seen as aspects of the same experience:

And the grace of God and Christ are in everything, as the secret essence of all eligible reality: it is not so easy to grasp at anything, without having to do with God and Christ - one way or another. Anyone therefore, no matter how remote from any revelation formulated in words, who accepts his existence, that is, his humanity - no easy thing! - in

quiet patience, or better, in faith, hope and love - no matter what he calls them, and accepts it as the mystery which hides itself in the mystery of eternal love and bears life in the womb of death . . . says yes to Christ, even when he does not know that he does. For he who lets go and jumps, falls into the depths such as they are, and not such as he has himself sounded.¹⁴

Powerful and inspiring words but they need elaboration, something which Rahner never really does. What does the acceptance of one's humanity in full really mean, especially when it is 'no easy thing'? As we have said before, Rahner is always trying to make theology relevant to people's experience, but his challenging and all-embracing words can leave people with a sense of hopelessness, given the complexities of their own experience of their humanity.

Gelpi's strength is that he takes the complexities of human experience more seriously in his account of human growth. To grow in grace one must be able to: 'Know oneself, love oneself, forget oneself'.¹⁵ Rahner stresses the aspect of forgetting oneself and this is, as we saw in Chapter One, the essence of charismatic experience; but if this is done without the first two stages, the result is the sort of spiritual suicide we referred to in the same chapter.

Charismatic transformation - Gelpi's understanding of conversion

The notion of gracious salvific transformation enables Gelpi to understand the whole of Christian experience in charismatic terms. Fundamental to his understanding of charismatic transformation is the link between charismatic transformation and charismatic gifts. In Gelpi's experiential approach connections between gifts of the Spirit and transformation or sanctification by the Spirit are integral since the world is one of mutually in-existent experiences

and each experience has an effect on a person. This means that: 'Far from being unrelated to the process of personal sanctification, a charism of service ought to be its specification and concrete personalization'.¹⁶ Sanctification is conceived in terms of the Pauline phrase 'to put on Christ', that is to become Christlike. Thus charisms, as charisms of service are the concrete specification of the process of personal sanctification or growth in grace. The connection between charismatic gifts and charismatic sanctification does not mean that only the sanctified are charismatic but rather that the process of sanctification is charismatic.

Gelpi defines 'gift' or 'charism' as 'a more or less permanent, enabling call of the Spirit of Jesus' and follows the medieval theologians in seeing the call of the Spirit as twofold, to sanctification and to ecclesial and social service.¹⁷ But they distinguished between the gifts (*dona*) of the Holy Spirit and His gratuitous graces (*gratiae gratis datae*). The last-mentioned corresponded to the Pauline charisms and since, according to St. Paul, these become rubbish if used without love then medieval theologians argued that the gratuitous graces or charisms are not related to the process of sanctification. For them growth in sanctification is growth in faith, hope and love and medieval theologians associated the sanctifying gifts (*dona*) with the seven 'spirits' of Isaiah 11:1f.¹⁸

For Gelpi, however, grace is seen in terms of transformation, or transmutation, a more dynamic concept than perfection. The link between gifts and sanctification is integral: 'In an experiential approach to the gifts, one does not have prophetic experiences, one is a prophetic experience'.¹⁹ And this is true of all the gifts. Thus, since the gift of prophecy engages the whole person, it is,

like all gifts, linked to the process of sanctification. The response to the prophetic impulse remains a human response, the response of someone in the process of sanctification, not already sanctified. This inevitably distorts the truth and full meaning of the impulse. We established this link between gifts and sanctification in Rahner's thought when we looked at self-realization and the charismatic experience in Chapter Two.

The Christian life is a process of gracious transformation through a process of repentance, hope, faith, love, ongoing sanctification and mutual service. Through baptism we enter into the death of Christ and through the power of the Spirit are conformed into his likeness:

To experience God's constant leading as one grows through faith in an understanding of the mind of Jesus is to experience the 'gifts of sanctification'. Such an experience is legitimately termed charismatic, because it is the experience of an enabling and liberated call, a permanent lure of the Spirit of Jesus.²⁰

Gelpi, unlike Rahner, has personal and positive involvement in the charismatic movement. However he sees limitations in much charismatic piety. Charismatic experience focuses on feeling and is informed by faith, and as we shall see the acknowledgment of feeling, of emotive factors, is an important part of experiencing grace. But all too often feeling can be closed to thought with disastrous results. The action of the Spirit can become confused with unconscious fears, resentments and repressions, and experience of the Spirit can turn into a shallow emotional experience.

Receptivity to God degenerates into emotional complacency. And divine sanction and inspiration begin to be claimed for human impulses of rigidity, anger, and apprehension. In charismatic prayer groups, this sad process can bear fruit in fundamentalism, authoritarianism, and sexist discrimination.²¹

All Christians are therefore called to be open to the Spirit's

charisms of sanctification and of service. Charismatic impulses are not seen as 'enthusiastic' and mindlessly emotional, equated with the unusual, the extraordinary or the miraculous. Rather than the charismatic experience being an optional extra to Christian piety it is the essence of the Christian life itself; it is being conformed to the image of Christ.

Gelpi develops the notion of growth and transformation in his theory of conversion. He is indebted to Lonergan's insights concerning the role of conversion in foundational theology, but he sees the need to develop it further.²² Whereas Lonergan defines conversion as 'a transformation of the subject and his world', Gelpi defines it in more specific terms as 'the decision to reject irresponsible choices and to assume personal responsibility for one's subsequent development in some area of human experience'.²³ He also distinguishes more clearly than Lonergan between natural and gracious conversion and between initial and ongoing conversion. Initial conversion effects the transition from irresponsible to responsible behaviour; ongoing conversion means that we need constantly to live out the consequences of the initial conversion.

Gelpi also sees the need to develop Lonergan's theology of conversion further since it does not sufficiently take into account the emotive or affective elements in conversion, remaining intellectualist in approach. Gelpi's understanding of experience recognizes two ways of judging reality, logical inference and intuitive or affective judgments. A Christian pneumatology must be able to incorporate the activity of the Spirit at both levels. This is clearly seen in the common experience of speaking in tongues in the contemporary charismatic movement. Speaking in tongues has what W. Hollenweger calls a 'psychohygenic function': 'Man needs a

non-intellectual means of mediation and release. Certain people find this release through art, others through speaking in tongues'. Arnold Bittlinger also sees this working of the Spirit in the unconscious, as bringing a person to a new wholeness, a new integration of the total psyche, 'a process which the church has traditionally called sanctification'.²⁴

Many of the 'gifts of the Spirit' in the contemporary charismatic movement operate in the area described by words such as 'mood', 'sympathy' or 'empathy'.²⁵ They are to do with non-verbal communication rather than concepts or rational argument.

The charisms of 'tongues', 'prophecy', 'discernment' and 'healing' all evoke dimensions of the human personality which are often hidden or overlooked, opening up areas of personal interaction and providing means of expression at a level that lies 'too deep for words'.²⁶

John Taylor emphasizes that the Holy Spirit works through our bodies as much as our minds. For Greek philosophy reason was the only part of man that could know absolute reality. But there is 'more of a Dionysius than Apollo in the Holy Spirit'.²⁷ Not that Taylor would equate the upsurgings of the subconscious with the movement of the Spirit, but nevertheless this is very often where we experience him, not in controlled rationality but in our intuitive, emotional and irrational depths. This is not to say our experience of God is irrational and, as we shall see, Gelpi sees the need for our rational intellect to 'inform' these areas. Nevertheless these depth dimensions of human experience are very important points of contact for our experience of God and it is an area that Rahner does not really deal with.

Lonergan originally conceived of three aspects of the conversion process: intellectual, moral and religious.²⁸ Although all are interrelated they are nevertheless distinct. He has since

acknowledged the need to add a fourth conversion, psychic (or affective) conversion.²⁹ Gelpi, on the other hand, originally conceived four aspects of the conversion process: affective, intellectual, moral and religious; he has subsequently seen the need to add a fifth, socio-political.³⁰ The first four belong to the area of personal conversion and we shall look at this area first.

In affective conversion a person takes responsibility for his subsequent emotional development, initially principally involving dealing with repressed negative feelings such as unconscious rage, fear and guilt, and subsequently extending to a fuller development of hitherto unexplored regions of his own unconscious psyche. In intellectual conversion people initially take responsibility for ascertaining the truth or falsity of their beliefs and the adequacy or inadequacy of the frames of reference they use to formulate those beliefs, and subsequently go about changing them where necessary. In moral conversion people take responsibility for the motives and consequences of personal decisions. This involves moving away from childish and egocentric standards and recognizing the consequences for others and not just themselves. Gelpi's definition of religious conversion is more precise than Lonergan's and reflects his concern to place the experience of grace in concrete situations. Lonergan defines religious conversion as 'being grasped by ultimate concern' interpreted in a Christian context as the gift of grace through the Holy Spirit; Gelpi defines religious conversion as 'the decision to respond responsibly to the free, gratuitous, historical self-disclosure and self-communication of God' and Christian conversion as 'the decision to respond responsibly to the definitive, free, gratuitous, historical self-disclosure and self-communication of God accomplished in Jesus and in the illuminating

power of the Breath [Spirit] that proceeds from Him'.³¹

Loneragan envisages religious conversion normally occurring first, followed by moral and then intellectual conversion.

I should urge that religious conversion, moral conversion and intellectual conversion are three quite different things. In an order of exposition I would prefer to explain first intellectual, then moral, then religious conversion. In the order of occurrence I would expect religious commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both religious and moral to precede intellectual. Intellectual conversion, I think, is very rare.³²

For Gelpi, as for Lonergan, intellectual conversion informs the other conversions, since, despite the fact that a person operates on far more than a purely rational level, there is still the need for a correct understanding of these other areas.³³ In fact a correct understanding will facilitate growth in these other areas. Gelpi distinguishes five dynamics in the process of personal conversion:³⁴

(1) Affective conversion animates speculative, moral and religious conversion. The emotional side of human nature is bound up with all the other aspects of human nature. Repressed negative emotional attitudes distort our perception of reality, the conscience and the way we react in situations, and inhibits or distorts faith and our experience and conception of God.

(2) Intellectual conversion, through the intellectual disciplines of psychology, ethics and theology, informs affective, moral and religious conversion.³⁵ The affectively converted person needs to understand the laws of healthy emotional development. The morally converted person needs to understand how to apply moral values in complex concrete situations, and the religiously converted person needs critically to understand his experience in order to avoid being a dogmatic fundamentalist.

(3) Moral conversion introduces a sense of responsibility for others to affective and intellectual conversion, preventing them

from being simply selfish self-development or acquiescence into 'an unhealthy infantilism'.³⁶

(4) Religious conversion, especially Christian conversion, transmutes affective, intellectual and moral conversion. Affective, intellectual and moral political conversion can all occur naturally. Emotional, psychological or neurotic conflict can result in affective conversion (initial and ongoing). A natural, humanitarian love of others may result in an intellectual or moral conversion. Affective conversion may need to precede religious conversion as disordered emotional impulses may block the impulses of the Spirit. On the other hand religious conversion enables the transforming power of the Spirit to heal emotional disorders. Created grace is 'the transmutation of human experience in faith', i.e. grace perfects nature, but understood in terms of an entirely new relationship with God.³⁷

Religious conversion always therefore results from the action of uncreated grace (God) and transmutes experience by infusing created grace (the difference in the believer an ongoing life of faith makes).³⁸

Not every human experience is a religious one. Human experience takes on a religious dimension when it asks the ultimate question, 'Does human life have any ultimate meaning or purpose?'.³⁹ A religious act of faith is the decision 'to admit into one's total environment the Spirit of God as a permanent, efficacious, healing and transforming force'.⁴⁰ Infusion of created grace is understood as the transformation of the self resulting from a decisive response in faith to the saving and efficacious impulses of the Spirit.⁴¹ For Gelpi, Rahner's transcendental Thomism and the supernatural existential do not make this clear.

(5) Christian conversion mediates between affective and moral conversion since it begins in the converted heart and ends in

commitment to love in action. Religious experience becomes Christian 'when one is led to affirm Jesus as the normative historical embodiment of divine atoning love and the Spirit of Jesus as the source and agent of such love in the redeemed'.⁴² For Rahner, revelation makes explicit the transcendental orientation of man to God and Christ. However Zaehner's study of mystical experience concludes that experience of God and Christ terminates the mystical quest only if it has been motivated by faith in Christ from the start.⁴³ As far as Gelpi is concerned, although Rahner appeals to experience, experience undermines his view.⁴⁴ Christian mysticism, Gelpi argues, is not rooted in a dynamic orientation of the intellect towards God but is an experience of loving encounter, an experience of the transforming power of love.⁴⁵

The dynamics of the conversion process mean that unless conversion occurs at all the levels it is to a greater or lesser degree inauthentic.⁴⁶ For example a person converted morally but not affectively may well be insensitive to the effect that his decisions have on the feelings of others, justifying insensitivity with abstract moralizations. A religiously converted individual who is intellectually unconverted will be prone to dogmatic fundamentalism and a religiously converted but affectively unconverted person will have difficulty distinguishing neurotic tendencies from the felt impulses of grace.

The above four areas of conversion belong in the personal realm; there is also the realm of socio-political conversion.⁴⁷ Although a person may take responsibility for the consequences of personal decisions for his environment, he may not have acknowledged responsibility for other people's decisions and their consequences for his environment, in other words a responsibility to change that

environment and its structures. A person who has undergone personal conversion but not socio-political conversion will lack full authenticity, and although he may function well at an interpersonal level he will live a privatized existence and will be unable to relate to public and impersonal problems. Socio-political conversion therefore authenticates personal conversion by deprivatizing it.

At the same time personal conversion at all four levels also authenticates socio-political conversion. Affective conversion authenticates socio-political in that prejudice and discrimination in the socio-political realm may well be an expression of emotional problems. Intellectual conversion authenticates socio-political conversion in that unquestioned dogmatism and rigid ideologies lead to oppression and exploitation. Moral conversion authenticates socio-political conversion in that unjust or amoral attitudes create tyranny and oppression. Religious conversion authenticates socio-political conversion in that it relativizes all social and political causes and ideologies by confronting them with the total demands of the Kingdom of God.

Gelpi's understanding of the five aspects of conversion enables him to take far more seriously the complexities of human experience. The inadequacies of Rahner's pneumatology which we drew attention to in the previous chapter means that he fails to provide a conceptual framework that is able to incorporate the personal and loving involvement of the Holy Spirit in human growth. Gelpi's understanding of the nature of conversion through charismatic transformation provides a far more adequate account of Christian experience than Rahner's understanding of how a person comes to an *existentiell* realization of his existential situation.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. Foundations, p.306.
2. Ibid., p.306f.; T.I., Vol. 10, p.33; see also Chapter 5, note 110 above.
3. T.I., Vol. 10, p.35.
4. Foundations, p.307.
5. Ibid., p.59.
6. Ibid., p.16; cf. J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p.34; cf. C. Ernst, Introduction to T.I., Vol. 1, pp.xvf.
7. T.I., Vol. 9, p.159.
8. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, p.30; T.I., Vol.18, pp.209f.
9. T.I., Vol. 7, p.17.
10. Foundations, p.306; T.I., Vol. 4, p.119; Vol. 5, p.8; Vol. 6, p.394; K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, p.55.
11. T.I., Vol. 6, pp.238-241.
12. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.93.
13. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, p.31; T.I., Vol. 18, p.210.
14. T.I., Vol. 4, p.119.
15. L.J. Suenens, Nature and Grace, Malines Document V, DLT, London, 1986, p.48.
16. D.L. Gelpi, Charism and Sacrament, p.64.
17. Ibid., p.28f.
18. The seven spirits being wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety and fear of the Lord.
19. D.L. Gelpi, op. cit., p.82.
20. Ibid., p.57.
21. D.L. Gelpi, The Divine Mother, p.3.

22. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, pp.41-46; The Divine Mother, p.xf.
23. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p.130; D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.102.
24. A. Bittlinger, op. cit., pp.101f.; cf. L.J. Suenens, A New Pentecost?, DLT, London, 1975, p.103: 'In psychological terms, we could say it [praying in tongues] is the voice of the subconscious rising to God, finding a manner of praying which is analogous to other expressions of our subconscious in dreams, laughter, tears, painting or dance. This prayer within the depths of our being heals at a profound yet often perceptible level hidden psychological wounds that impede the full development of our interior life.' Cf. S. Tugwell, Did You Receive the Spirit?, DLT, London, 1972, p.71; Rahner summed up his attitude towards tongues thus: 'I, for example, do not think very highly of speaking in tongues', Dialogue, p.329, indicating his relative neglect of the emotional and psychological aspects of experience of the Spirit.
25. P.S. Fiddes, 'The Theology of the Charismatic Movement', in Strange Gifts?, p.30.
26. Ibid., loc. cit.
27. J.V. Taylor, The Go-Between God, SCM, London, 1972, p.50.
28. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp.237-244.
29. B. Lonergan, 'Reality, Myth, Symbol', in A.M. Olson, ed. Myth, Symbol and Reality, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1980, (pp.31-37), pp.36f.
30. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, pp.97-139; Experiencing God, pp.155-323; The Divine Mother, pp.33f.
31. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p.240; D.L. Gelpi, Grace, pp.106f.
32. 'B. Lonergan Responds', in Foundations of Theology, ed. P. McShane, University of Notre Dame Press, 1971, pp.221f., quoted in R.M. Doran, 'Psychic Conversion', The Thomist, 41 (1977), p.206; cf. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp.267f.
33. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.313.
34. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, pp.107-113.
35. Gelpi follows C.S. Pierce in this, 'Conversion: The Challenge of Contemporary Charismatic Piety', Theological Studies, 43 (Dec. 1982), pp.614f.
36. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.110.
37. Ibid., p.88.
38. Ibid., p.87.

39. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.109; cf. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp.240 and 106.
40. D.L. Gelpi, Charism and Sacrament, p.47.
41. Ibid., p.51.
42. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.113.
43. R.C. Zaehner, Mysticism, Sacred and Profane, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957, pp.182 and 192.
44. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.79.
45. St. John of the Cross talked of 'the burning of love', The Dark Night, Book 2, Chapter 13, see The Collected Works, pp.357-361.
46. D.L. Gelpi, Charism and Sacrament, p.19; cf. B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp.131f.
47. D.L. Gelpi, op. cit., pp.114-138.

Chapter 8

THE CORPORATE NATURE OF CHARISMATIC EXPERIENCE

Linked to the discussion in the previous chapter on socio-political conversion is the need to see charismatic experience in corporate terms, not purely individualistic terms. Therefore in this final chapter we will examine the corporate nature of charismatic experience. As we have seen, Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge is the conceptual apparatus for understanding both grace and the experience of the Spirit, and his transcendental method enables him to assert that God is implicitly affirmed in all our knowing and acting. For Gelpi grace as radical transmutation locates the experience of God in interaction with revelatory events, personally appropriated in faith. Though this may sometimes occur in solitary contemplation through the direct action of God, it is usually mediated through the graced community of believers.¹

The charismatic experience - transcendental and historical

Earlier we argued for the incarnational character of Rahner's understanding of grace. Rahner emphasizes that any experiences of grace that occur outside the visible Christian Church are based on the specific and historical nature of the revelation in Christ, because grace has an incarnational character.² But although Rahner emphasizes the concrete nature of experience of the Spirit and the fact that it involves the whole person in his interaction with the world, he also maintains that it is something that occurs at 'the

innermost core of our existence' and is 'incommensurable with ordinary everyday encounters with specific realities'.³ This is because, on the one hand, he interprets experience of the Spirit in terms of his epistemology, in terms of the *Vorgriff*, and on the other hand, in terms of existential commitment and decision, in other words both in terms of knowledge and in freedom. It is the same ambiguity that we saw when we discussed transcendental experience earlier. We said then that Karl Weger did not see an ambiguity in usage because he understood the concrete experiences to be explicit expressions of the implicit transcendental experience. But experiences that are dependent on both the concrete historical world and free human decision cannot be explicit expressions of an experience which is independent of both, which is simply 'there', before any concrete experience and response to it; the two types of experience are of fundamentally different orders. Rahner gives the example of light from the sun, not the direct light that we perceive when we look at the sun but rather the phenomenon of light. We do not actually see light if we are not looking at its source; we only see objects by means of the light.⁴ Other images are the horizon in which things are distinguished, the measure by which things are measured, the boundary by which things are delimited.⁵ To see it in terms of an explicit expression of something implicit causes this confusion since the two types of experience are of a different order.⁶

According to Rahner it does not actually matter if we cannot answer the question as to whether or not the transcendental experience of the Spirit occurs independently of any concrete expressions since the fact that experience of the Spirit occurs in concrete situations indicates that it also occurs in a transcendental

dimension. 'Everyday reality then becomes itself a pointer to this transcendental experience of the Spirit'.⁷ But the fact that an experience of the Spirit is given within concrete experiences is not proof that it can be experienced without them. Rahner wants to keep this option open, however, because this is how he interprets mystical experience of God.

Rahner's understanding of experience of God is in fact in three stages. The first stage is a universal and unthematic experience which is the basis and condition of all knowledge and to which no categorical object is attached.⁸ The second stage is the mediation of this experience through categorical objects by which man becomes aware of this transcendental experience.⁹ The third stage is a mystical experience of God in the strict sense of the term which is qualitatively different (within the natural order) from the experience of God as horizon of being and knowing, though still based on it.¹⁰

Ignatius saw the impulses of the Spirit discerned in the 'Exercises' as 'from without', but Rahner considers such an understanding mythological, Rahner's problem is how to reconcile the two.¹¹ His answer is in terms of his transcendental epistemology, which means that the three types of experience above are all of the same order. No special intervention of God is required since all three are based on the original 'intervention' of God, His self-communication in the supernatural existential. This is clearly shown in an interview Rahner gave:

If Ignatius of Loyola is convinced that, at least during the Spiritual Exercises, the Creator deals directly with his creature, then there is such a thing as a mystical component to Christianity. If in other words, we do not only have objectivized and verbalized concepts of God in our consciousness - while he himself nonetheless remains at an infinite distance and our thoughts only point in this direction - but if we do have an immediate, preconceptual experience of God through the experience of the limitless

breadth of our consciousness, then there is such a thing as a mystical component to Christianity.¹²

We saw in the second chapter how the immediate experience of God, the consolation without cause, was of fundamental importance for Ignatius' method of making an election. For Ignatius: 'there is no longer "any object" but the drawing of the whole person . . . into the mystery of God'.¹³ This experience is interpreted by Rahner in terms of his understanding of the pre-conceptual and unthematic experience of God that occurs in transcendental experience.

What Rahner envisages taking place in the experience of consolation without cause is that within this one universal mode of knowledge the awareness of the horizon or goal of transcendence can increase more and more and the conceptual object can become more and more transparent, almost entirely disappearing. The goal of transcendence itself becomes the 'focus of awareness',¹⁴ not a conceptual knowledge of God, not ontologism, but a 'becoming conscious of the transcendence'.¹⁵ D. Edwards describes this focus of awareness as that 'which bypasses conceptual cognitive processes, but is still a normal human awareness'. He continues: 'Rahner's transcendental theory allows him to deal with the human experience of God through a normal psychological process (transcendental awareness) which is yet totally other than discursive and conceptual cognition'.¹⁶

By using his transcendental method Rahner has neatly accounted for specific experience of God without resorting to an interventionist understanding of the specific experiences. In fact it is rather too neat. It does not leave room for an experience of the Spirit conceived in terms of personal relationship. Nor does it leave room for the notion of transforming encounter which, when understood in the panentheistic terms that were defined in Chapter

Six, do not involve the mythological interventions that Rahner is so anxious to avoid. Rahner's all-embracing explanation of experience of the Spirit does not leave sufficient room for specific personal encounters.

Rahner's explanation, as we have seen, is based on a particular epistemology. We will now look at a different epistemology which allows a more corporate understanding of experience of the Spirit.

A corporate epistemology versus an individualistic epistemology

Gelpi uses C.S. Pierce to show the deficiencies of Kant's account of the workings of the human mind and consequently of the transcendental method.¹⁷ According to Pierce Kant had assumed that there was only one kind of inference, or argument, that of deductive inference (or predictive), which predicts the concrete data that will follow from a particular hypothetical classification of data. Pierce however considered there to be three kinds of inference. Abductive (or hypothetical) inference classifies data in need of explanation according to a particular hypothesis or rule assumed to be true. Deductive inference clarifies the meaning of the rule by predicting the sort of data that one could expect to find on the basis of the hypothesis. Inductive inference verifies or falsifies the deductive inferences in accordance with reality. Of the three forms of inference, only the second, deductive inference, has logical necessity within the whole process of inference. No abductive inference has any guarantee of logically necessary verification and an inductive inference is always open to modification in the light of new data or a new hypothetical model for understanding reality. As a consequence the transcendental method, using just deductive

inference, cannot be held to have proven anything. It is not possible to deduce *a priori* the universal structure of the human mind by merely reflecting upon one's own thought processes. *A priori* arguments offer only unverified hypotheses. Like any hypothesis the transcendental method needs deductive clarification and inductive verification.

But if Kant's transcendental deduction yields only a hypothesis, not a conclusion, it is actually a hypothesis posing as a conclusion, an abduction masquerading as an induction even as it calls itself a deduction.¹⁸

Pierce's position was one of 'contrite fallibilism'. There is no 'privileged, indubitable starting point for human speculation; rather we begin thinking about any problem *in media res*'.¹⁹

Minds convinced both of their fallibility and of their conditioned historical character do not seek for reality, truth, goodness, and God primarily in the varied and undependable structures of individual human subjectivity. They seek them instead in the social corrective of shared systematic enquiry.²⁰

In defence of Rahner it needs to be pointed out that his starting point for his theology is not the transcendental method. His aim is 'to give people confidence from the very *content* of Christian dogma itself that they can believe with intellectual honesty'.²¹ His starting point for his theology is revelation but his explanation of it is in terms of the transcendental method. He wants to show 'what is experienced aposteriorily as transcendently necessary'.²² Nevertheless Gelpi's criticism of the transcendental method as being too individualistic remains valid.

According to Pierce there are four possible ways of determining one's personal belief: uncritical tenacity, on the basis of a higher authority, taste (personal preference for one belief amongst others) and shared systematic enquiry.²³ Tenacity, authority and taste can all result in a stubborn dogmatism, either because of the refusal to

admit to other beliefs apart from one's own, or of a chosen authority, or because of a canonizing of personal prejudice. A shared systematic enquiry is therefore the most objective way of forming beliefs. In other words it is a communal task, involving personal commitment to a shared systematic enquiry.²⁴

Therefore reason is not the subjective thinking capacity of an individual being but a social process involving dialogue. For Pierce reason 'eschews the "spirit of Cartesianism". It does not seek for truth in the solitude of one's study but in active dialogue with other minds intent on answering the same question'.²⁵

The charismatic experience - individual or corporate?

This has important consequences for an understanding of the charismatic experience for it highlights the importance of the corporate nature of the charismatic experience, or, to put in different terms, the importance of the charismatic community. This, as we have seen, is a fundamental concept for Paul. The shared conscious life of the community transcends and is qualitatively different from the individual consciousness.

Individual consciousness, for example, results from the ability to distinguish one thing from another and to grasp the relationship among distinguished realities. The shared awareness of communities by contrast results from a complex process of investigation, planning and practical collaboration.²⁶

No individual experiences the Spirit in full nor has an indubitable insight into the workings of the Spirit and so needs to be corrected by and learn from the other members, thereby participating in the life of the charismatic community of faith. The charismatic experience, therefore, consists of the mutual sharing and participation in the charismatic gifts of the Christian community which results in the growth of the individuals. The

growth demanded by the call to sanctification is therefore communal as well as individual. The community itself is created by the individuals and the individuals also relate to the community as the source of their own growth in grace. There is therefore a dialectical relationship between the Christian community and the individual:

In a theology of grace as transmuted experience, Christian faith consists in the first instance in the social process by which the Christian community achieves ecclesial self-consciousness through the sharing of all the charisms of sanctification and of service. In the second instance it consists of the achievement of personal self-understanding as a Christian through active participation in such a charismatic community of faith.²⁷

Rahner's concept of anonymous Christians underemphasizes the importance of this with its individualistic approach, emphasizing 'a transcendental theism "in the heart's depths"' and man's individual acceptance of himself as acceptance of Christ.²⁸ This is not to say that Rahner is not open to the communal approach; the transcendental experience is mediated by the categorical and the interpersonal:

The act of personal love for another human being is therefore the all-embracing act of man which gives meaning, direction and measure to everything else. If this is correct, then the essential *a priori* openness to the other human being which must be undertaken freely belongs as such to the *a priori* and most basic constitution of man and is an essential inner moment of his (knowing and willing) transcendentality.²⁹

This understanding of the human constitution means that the communal nature of salvation is also a fundamental concept for Rahner. As we have seen salvation is seen in terms of becoming fully personal. Therefore salvation and involvement with others, as an essential aspect of becoming personal, are bound up together.³⁰ In Rahner's understanding of salvation 'everyone is responsible and significant for everyone else'.³¹ Salvation occurs both in 'subjective interiority' and also in concrete history and

relationships which are the actualization of the former. As Rahner puts it, 'a "transcendental experience" (of God and of grace) is always mediated through a categorical experience in history, in interpersonal relationships, and in society'; thus Rahner can say 'a Christian has to be an ecclesial Christian'.³²

Nevertheless Rahner's basic approach and transcendental method do result in an emphasis on the individual and the private. As James Bacik says from his own acquaintance with Rahner, he has never really integrated the communal and social into his own 'theological psyche'. Even his recent work still uses 'the individualistic conceptual scheme taken from his metaphysics of knowledge in order to explain human transcendentalty'.³³

Gelpi acknowledges that undoubtedly human beings experience mystery, but criticizes Rahner on the grounds that he:

. . . he locates openness to mystery in the powers of the spirit, and especially in the intellectual preapprehension of Being as such. A more psychologically plausible account of the experience of mystery locates it not in the intellect, finite as it actually is, but in imaginative and appreciative forms of knowing. If anything, intellectual activity dissipates the human sense of mystery.³⁴

But the heart of Rahner's understanding of knowledge of God is not an intellectual preapprehension or 'pre-grasp'. The intellect is not fundamentally the capacity to apprehend or grasp anything. Rather it is the 'capacity of the incomprehensible, as the capacity of being seized by what is always insurmountable', or in Aquinas's terms, 'the capacity of *excessus*, as going out into the inaccessible'.³⁵ It is not primarily the power of grasping, of comprehending, rather it is the power of being grasped, the intellect only grasps in the context of being grasped. It is 'only in falling into an unfathomable abyss that we grasp the individual reality to which we think we can cling'.³⁶ We situate and define objects

within frameworks which themselves are not situated and defined. The horizon of our knowledge is the incomprehensible mystery of God. If the experience of mystery is not to be one of meaningless or absurdity then the mystery must not be seen as a barrier to knowledge but its fulfilment and it becomes its fulfilment only by 'the act of self-surrendering love'.³⁷ The two faculties of knowing and loving must be rooted in a primordial unity and find expression in act; knowledge is completed in love. Thus man's awareness of mystery is only completed when it transforms itself in the act of self-surrender by which it accepts the mystery in love.³⁸ As Rahner puts it:

Recourse to God as answer to the question of meaning of man in his wholeness is right and indispensable. But it becomes the creation of a human idol if it does not bring man, forsaking himself, self-surrendering, and blessed only in that way, into the presence of the incomprehensibility of God.³⁹

In conclusion, since trusting surrender to another without reassurance is, for Rahner, the essence of personal love, this means that knowledge of God is not, in essence, intellectual grasp but the risk of love.⁴⁰ This means that Rahner can say that anyone 'who responds to the world with genuine love *ipso facto* encounters in it the Cross of Christ and the inconceivability of God';⁴¹ not only because the grace of Christ is an intrinsic aspect of the world, but also because love is the way to knowledge of God and a genuine response of love is total self-giving. A person discovers God in the world, in the words we quoted earlier: 'only if - radically - he walks its ways right to the end'.⁴² This is the way of the cross, the way of truly charismatic experience. This lies at the heart of Rahner's theology, making it in essence a charismatic theology.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.90.
2. T.I., Vol. 12, p.176.
3. K. Rahner, The Spirit in the Church, p.4; cf. T.I., Vol. 18, p.190.
4. T.I., Vol. 18, p.199; cf. Spirit in the Church, p.17.
5. T.I., Vol. 4, p.51.
6. Ibid., loc. cit.: 'The horizon of the transcendent, since it is of immeasurable extent and thus provides the situation for the individual objects of knowledge and love, does indeed always differentiate itself essentially from all that comes within it as conceptual object.'
7. T.I., Vol. 18, p.199; cf. The Spirit in the Church, p.17.
8. T.I., Vol. 18, p.197: 'mysticism always occurs, concealed and namelessly, in the midst of ordinary life and is the condition of the possibility for the most down-to-earth and most secular experiences of ordinary life'; cf. The Spirit in the Church, p.14.
9. T.I., Vol. 18, p.199: '[this results in] concrete experiences in our existential history in which this transcendental experience of the Spirit always present as such is thrust more clearly to the fore in our consciousness'; cf. The Spirit in the Church, p.17; cf. T.I., Vol.16, pp.28 and 41.
10. T.I., Vol. 16, p.28: 'in which the transcendent elevation of man by the grace of the Spirit is really grasped without the mediation of any categorical, a *posteriori* object coming from without'
11. Dynamic Element, pp.119-122; cf. T.I., Vol. 16, p.29.
12. Dialogue, p.182.
13. Dynamic Element, p.135.
14. Ibid., pp.145f.
15. Ibid., pp.148f.
16. D. Edwards, 'Experience of God and Explicit Faith', The Thomist, Vol. 46, p.62.

17. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.73f.; Experiencing God, p.94ff.
18. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, p.24.
19. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.24.
20. Ibid., p.91.
21. Foundations, p.12; cf. p.131.
22. K. Rahner, The Trinity, p.100 n.18; cf. p.85 nn. 7 and 8; cf. Foundations, p.208-212, 229.
23. D.L. Gelpi, Experiencing God, pp.235f.; Grace, p.24.
24. A point that M. Polanyi would endorse, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1958, pp.4ff.
25. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, p.53.
26. Ibid., p.62.
27. Ibid., p.59.
28. T.I., Vol. 9, p.156; Vol. 6, p.394.
29. T.I., Vol. 6, p.241.
30. T.I., Vol. 9, pp.35f.
31. Ibid., p.176; cf. Vol. 10, p.248; cf. Foundations, p.283.
32. Introduction to J. Bacik, op. cit., p.x; Foundations, pp.344ff.; cf. p.309.
33. J. Bacik, op. cit., p.53.
34. D.L. Gelpi, Grace, pp.77f.
35. T.I., Vol. 18, p.97; cf. Foundations, p.54.
36. T.I., Vol. 18, p.98.
37. Ibid., p.100.
38. T.I., Vol. 6, pp.186-190 and 239-46; Vol. 4, pp.42-44 and 52-59.
39. T.I., Vol. 18, p.104.
40. Ibid., p.101.
41. T.I., Vol. 7, p.17.
42. T.I., Vol. 6, p.18.

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