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THOUGHT STYLES AND CULTURE: AN ANALYSIS OF TEXTS

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy
at the University of Durham, Department of Psychology.

April 1990

ABSTRACT

The thesis is an analysis of the nature and characteristics of French and English "thought styles" - named rationalism and empiricism respectively. Although the term is reminiscent of one used by the German sociologist of knowledge, Mannheim, the thesis develops a model of the styles with the help of Moscovici's (1985) idea of social representation and Bourdieu's (1979) idea of the internalization of social structure. Thought styles thus emerge not as sui generis phenomena, but as distilled from culturally specific thought-environment complexes. The thesis argues that contrasting socio-political substructures are crucial to the genesis of the different thought-environment complexes and thus of the distinct thought-styles. The two thought styles are isolated in their ideal typical form (Weber 1949), and the point is made that they are most commonly encountered as basic designs or "motifs".

The nature and characteristics of the rationalist and empiricist thought-styles are seen through a series of examples drawn from the Arts, the Sciences and the Human Sciences. The model of the two distinct thought styles thus developed is applied to recent socio-historical literature on madness. More specifically, the model is useful to the understanding of how the writings of theorists as such as Sartre and Foucault have been assimilated into the Anglo-Saxon tradition. A series of preliminary interviews with French and English students suggests that the model of thought styles may be applicable to the spoken explanations used by members of the two academic communities, as well as written academic texts.

The final chapter shows how the differences in thought and expression, attributed to the French and English thought-styles, are perpetuated by educational systems which are the product of different socio-political contexts.

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I certify that none of the material presented here has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other University.

INTRODUCTION

In anticipation of 1992 and the proposed unification of Europe, philosophical speculations as to the nature of European identity and it's origins have multiplied. A recent series of programmes broadcast by the BBC, chose to introduce the idea of "Europe" by stressing the unity between the member countries, in terms of a host of factors ranging from climate to political attitudes. Roger Scruton, speaking on the serious intellectual chat-show hosted by Clive James, voiced opinions on the European merger which were, perhaps, more typical of the staunch independence that has characterized the British in their discussions about the dissolving of national boundaries. Britain, he argued, has always distanced herself from her Continental neighbours and should continue to do so. His argument revolved around the incompatibility of her institutions which Scruton failed to see as part of a broader cultural phenomenon or cultural "complex",¹ distinguishing her politically, artistically and intellectually.

The thesis involves my understanding of the intellectual differences between France and England. My research indicates that they have a long history, with perhaps the most obvious example being the centuries old debate between Anglo-Saxon and Continental thinkers, advocating opposing

empirical and rational solutions to philosophical issues. The problem is framed as one of different ways of thinking, or different "thought styles", leading to different ways of looking at the world. That these differences are inextricably linked to underlying socio-political factors is another point that the thesis makes, accounting for their strength and persistence.

The study of how *mentalité* - ways of thinking or mental character - relates to societal structures, is a field of inquiry which dates back to the first sociologist of knowledge, Montesquieu, and is still alive today. In his study of the English, Montesquieu associated their individualism and love of civil freedom with the English constitution. As the laws of the constitution applied equally to all citizens, none would fear another, making the nation as a whole "proud" and "arrogant" as "pride of kings is only founded on their independence" (Montesquieu page 169 1973). Montesquieu seemed aware that the English State was Lockean in nature, that it was "contractual" as opposed to "organic" as the French State was to be. The individualism that this generated made for uneasy social relations, with the result that Englishmen lived solitary existences. Investigations into the link between the social and the psychological have been continued into the twentieth century in the work of the neo-Durkheimians. The concept of social representation, described by Moscovici (1985), a French

representative of the tradition, proved useful in specifying what exactly was meant by the concept of thought style.

The thesis is particularly pertinent at a time when French theorists such as Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari are offering an English audience their thoughts on madness. They present novel perspectives on a subject which has, until recently been dominated by the writings of American psychoanalysts and sociologists. The latter have been more popular than their academic British colleagues. The works of the Americans are more accessible than those of their French counterparts because of the shared language, as well as, to be argued later, a similar "thought style". The usual result of reviewing the works of the Frenchmen is a qualified praise, a recognition of valuable ideas, despite different methodologies and terminologies. For example, historians of science and sociologists acknowledge that a great debt is owed to Foucault for his revolutionary approach to the history of the Human Sciences, yet extensive criticism has been made of the style and content of his work (Couzens-Hoy 1986, Bynum et al 1985). Similar, perhaps even stronger criticism has been made of the other writers mentioned. The conclusion to be drawn from the thesis is that these do not stem from any fault inherent in the works themselves, rather a failure to recognize that the authors on different sides of the channel are working within different traditions of thought, each possessing distinct goals and valuing different characteristics. These traditions and their

thought styles provide a framework within which to think about certain issues in contrasting ways. Here, the specific example considered is madness.

A reading of popular writings on madness, in the anti-psychiatric literature of the nineteen fifties and sixties, as well as more recent historical works, reveals different ontological and methodological approaches which can be described as macro-social in the case of the French, micro-social in the case of the English. The English writings tend towards methodological localism. A discussion of the anti-psychiatric literature of the period demonstrates how this micro-social approach is suited to a focus on the individual, experiential component of madness. Conversely, the French work within a tradition which tries to get away from the individual, conducting their large scale analyses in terms of a priori forces and strategies. Their macro-social approach is appropriate to their different aim: outlining the socio-political function of madness as part of a large-scale analysis of power. It is in this context that criticisms of the French perspective should be understood. Following a suggestion by Quinton (1982), the link has been made between ontological/methodological individualism and empiricism and ontological/methodological collectivism and rationalism. Thus the contrasting social perspectives become manifestations of the fundamental difference in thought styles.

My concern in this thesis is to demonstrate the existence of the thought styles and to characterize them. I have chosen to name the thought styles rationalism and empiricism after the philosophical traditions which have predominated in the countries of interest here: France and England. In an introductory chapter, I shall specify what I am trying to capture by the term "thought style", as well as the kind of theory I am developing, with the help of well known conceptual tools: social representations, epistemes and ideal types. Furthermore, using the example of philosophy and the differences which have persisted in this area, I shall 1) suggest that these intellectual differences have been long-standing 2) specify precisely what I mean by the terms empiricism and rationalism and 3) outline what is meant by a "tradition of thought", an expression of the historical continuity of thought styles.

The second and third chapter have been conceived with the dual aim of 1) isolating the core characteristics of the thought styles and 2) supporting the claim made in the opening chapter that the properties of the thought styles originate in socio-culturally^2 specific thought-environment complexes. Chapter two focuses on national differences in art, music and literature. Chapter three is a historical chapter on the development of French and English science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The idea of the "classical" versus the "intuitive" scientist (Crosland 1980) is related to the rational-empirical distinction and

examined in the context of the differing scientific communities of the two countries. The latter were the product of socio-political differences – the result of the existence of a strong interventionist state in France and a weaker, non-interventionist state in England. This disparity, responsible for shaping the communities, has been a stable point of contrast since the absolutist French monarchy.

The fourth chapter deals with the presence of different thought styles in the Human Sciences, both diachronically, using historical examples, and synchronically, looking at their manifestation in twentieth century social psychology and psychoanalysis. In this chapter, the important manifestations of empiricism as individualism and rationalism as collectivism are highlighted. The argument is that the going beyond the evidence of the senses, advocated by rationalism, is necessary to conceptualize large social objects as entities in themselves. This is distinguished from a more empirical approach that considers social objects as logical constructions from individuals. The point to be made here is that the thought styles generate traditions of social discourse which capture the underlying political differences of which they are a product – outlined in the previous chapters – and which sustain them.

In the following chapter, I look at the popular anti-psychiatric and socio-historical literature on madness, to

see how it has been influenced by the "thought styles". Even in the most cosmopolitan English texts, such as those written by Laing and the Post-Modern English historians, a close reading indicates that the native "thought style" affects the way the problem has been dealt with. Showing the existence of two distinct "thought styles" helps explain the criticisms writers from the different traditions encounter. A possible reproach may be that the selection of popular literature may not be representative of differences in thinking about mental illness. However, it is a product of audiences' selective preference for that which is most consonant with the native styles. Furthermore, despite orthodox psychiatry's attempts to establish universal discourses/practices to enhance cross-cultural dialogue, evidence from the classification literature suggests that different traditions of thought exist here as well. In an article concerned with the conceptualization of the atypical psychosis, Manschreck and Petri (1978) distinguish between a Central European and an Anglo-Saxon tradition of thought. The former, strongly influenced by the German psychiatrists Jaspers and Kraepelin, recognizes categories of "reactive" and "cycloid" psychosis – the second of which is a category coined by a pupil of Kraepelin, Kleist. These, however, remain virtually undiagnosed in the Anglo-American literature on the subject. Moreover, a familiarity with psychiatric history indicates that different ways of conceptualizing disorders have been long-standing and inextricably linked to socio-political factors – and hence

to "thought styles". Two examples of such instances are the popularity of the concept of moral contagion in France and of phrenology in Britain. The former was adopted by psychiatry as a strategy to foster links with a state which had a tradition of employing a "medical police" to cope with epidemics. The "epidemic paradigm" thus became the obvious method for the developing nineteenth century discipline of psychiatry to legitimize its utility (Goldstein in Geison 1985). The success of phrenology in English psychiatry was partly due to the rudimentary state of pathological anatomy. The latter was the result of local, as opposed to state patronage having led to a bias against structural anatomy and an emphasis on superficial, appealing cures designed for a competitive market. To Sydenham, the doctor's only obligation was to "cure desease and to do nought else" (in Cooter 1981). These differences, past and present, are perhaps not surprising as it is now widely acknowledged that both scientific and medical practices are tied to culture (Crosland 1978, Lesch 1984, Geison 1985, Postel and Quetel 1985).

In a final chapter, I have crystallized my own experience of the educational systems of the two countries, arguing that education is important in perpetuating the different thought styles. The chapter also returns to the theme of thought styles as generated by culturally specific thought-environment complexes. The two educational systems are products of different socio-political substructures. The

French interventionist state practises what I have called a politic of intellectualism, which through its manifestations in the curriculum, cultivates the properties associated with the rationalist thought style by its emphasis on the powers of the mind. On the other hand, the English curriculum seems to perpetuate the empirical thought style.

The point of the thesis is suggestive and can only claim to make a modest contribution to this area of intellectual history. The subject matter of such a project is potentially limitless (Hughes 1967).[3] The thesis revolves around selected examples which illustrate the nature of the different thought styles. The latter help explain how:

> *All of us French and Anglo-Saxon pedants as well as peasants, operate within cultural constraints just as we share conventions of speech. So historians should be able to see how culture shapes ways of thinking, even for the greatest thinkers. (Darnton 1984 page 6)*

Following Darnton, the thesis tries to make explicit cultural constraints on thought, indicating their possible origins and reasons for their persistence.

Finally, a reference should be made to a problem this study has repeatedly encountered when considering "English Thought". Unlike its French counterpart, which possesses a strong national identity, the English tradition of thought has been fertilized by related, but slightly different, outlooks. These include ones originating inside the British Isles and more recently from the U.S.A. This explains

necessary references to "British" empiricism and the need to discuss "American" social thought in a chapter dealing with English and French social discourse. This eclecticism can be attributed to an "empirical" attitude, prepared to adopt any theoretical outlook which agrees with its pragmatic, "commonsensical" approach to knowledge. On the other hand, it can be explained by a weak non-interventionist state, showing little interest in cultivating a national cultural identity. As will become clear, both these explanations are consonant with the argument developed in the thesis.

1. The idea of "complex" refers to a whole composed of many parts, which cannot be easily isolated or studied separately.

2. Culture or civilization refers to a complicated pattern of socially transmitted thought, speech, beliefs and institutions. These issue from the cultural complex which is a product of a number of social and physical factors - for example political structure and climate.

3. Hughes, looking at late nineteenth and early twentieth century European culture and consciousness, was aware that:

> *History of this sort* [intellectual history] *deals with the thoughts and emotions of men... with reasoned argument and passionate outbursts alike. The whole range of human expression as revealed in writing, speech, practice and tradition falls within its orbit.* (Hughes page 3 1967)

CHAPTER ONE

EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM: WORKING WITHIN A TRADITION

> *Any system or body of beliefs is the expression and*
> *formulation of certain relations selected from the*
> *experienced world in a definite intellectual*
> *language, with a vocabulary and grammar of its own.*
> *The expression and formulation always has a history*
> *of development and modification as men learn to*
> *face new problems and old ones in novel contexts.*
> *(Randell page 71 1963)*

A well worn discussion in philosophical circles is the
contrasting approaches to philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon
world and in Continental Europe. That the French philosopher
Descombes   (1980)   wrote   "Modern   French   Philosophy"
specifically for an English readership, and more recently,
Harland (1985), a similar work outlining the philosophy of
the   structuralists,   testifies   to   the   existence   of   a
dichotomy. It seems as though one can either accept that
there are genuine conceptual and methodological differences,
leading to such articles as Jacques Bouvesse's (1983) "Why I
am so Unfrench", or one can argue, as Rorty (1982) did, that
the differences are superficial, amounting to no more than
different ways of formulating the same ideas.

This introductory chapter presents certain parameters, the first of which is an attempt to conceptualize a "thought style", using various social psychological ideas. This will be followed by a discussion of the philosophical differences which have existed between the countries, allowing definitions of the terms "empiricism" and "rationalism", used to name the "thought styles". The focus will then shift to the idea of a tradition of thought and the implications of working within one.

THE CONCEPT OF A THOUGHT STYLE

The concept of a "thought style" emerged out of my own experience of the different ways of thinking and articulating ideas/concepts present in the two cultures considered. The phenomenon governs the presentation of scientific ideas and artistic images, as well as the structuring of, and approaches adopted in, new academic fields. Several concepts were considered to help capture this complex phenomenon, presented here as different frameworks of thought or thought styles.

A national episteme in the Foucauldian sense would imply the existence of an underlying system of rules, specific to the culture considered, constraining discourse and thought.

> By episteme, we mean the total set of relations that unite a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences and possibly formalized systems...The episteme is not a form of knowledge (connaissance) or type of rationality, which crossing the

> *boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the
> sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period, it is
> the totality of relations that can be discovered for a given
> period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the
> level of discursive regularity. (Foucault page 191 1972)*

Epistemes are the crystallization of internal and external
forces operating on discourses. Among the external
constraints, Foucault includes (1972) 1) avoiding mad
discourse 2) institutions and their prohibitions on what can
and cannot be said 3) the will to truth, especially
characteristic of the sciences. The internal constraints
include 1) commentary 2) academic disciplines 3)
qualifications of the speaker. Hence the possibility of
national variants following national variations in these
forces. However, the notion does not suit the idea of a
thought style as epistemic constraints would, because of
their absolute nature, preclude cross-cultural dialogue,
which in practice does occur - this dialogue is discussed at
various points in the thesis. This is not to say that there
is no evidence for the epistemic nature of thought styles.
For example, it could be argued that a strong Cartesian
episteme in eighteenth and nineteenth century French science
precluded scientists understanding the Newtonian basis of
Dalton's atomic theory.

Social representation as developed by the French neo-
Durkheimian Moscovici (1985), shares certain crucial common
features with the idea of thought style. Moscovici stresses
the idea of conditioning involved in social representation,

the   unconscious   acceptance   of   prior   conventions.   Social

reality is predetermined in that:

> *Nobody's mind is free from the effects of the prior*
> *conditioning which is imposed by his representations*
> *language and culture. We think by means of a language; we*
> *organise our thoughts, in accordance with a system which is*
> *conditioned, both by our representations and by our culture.*
> *We see only that which underlying conventions allow us to*
> *see, and we remain unaware of these conventions. (Moscovici*
> *in Farr and Moscovici page 8 1985).*

As   such   representations,   like   thought   styles,   are

prescriptive,   imposing   themselves   through   cultural

structures such as language, which are a "combination of a

structure which is present before we have begun to think,

and of a tradition which decrees what we should think" (page

9 1985). The concept of a tradition will be dealt with later

in the chapter because of its centrality to the idea of

thought style. As will become clear, intellectual traditions

do not merely bequeath certain concepts or even ways of

thinking,   but   are   complex   sociological   phenomena.   This

explains their prescriptive force: thinkers are not only

constrained by intellectual tools such as language, but also

institutions   which   embody   value   systems   sustaining   the

thought   styles.   Representational   thinking   owes   more   to

memory than to reason, more to traditional structures than

to   any   intellectual   fad.   This   implies   a   historical

dimension, or cultural inheritance which epistemes do not

possess and which thought styles do. This historical

dimension is embodied in the idea of a "tradition of

thought":

> *Social and intellectual activity is, after all, a rehearsal*
> *or recital...Our past experiences and ideas are not dead*
> *experiences or dead ideas, but continue to be active, to*
> *change and to infiltrate our present experience and ideas.*
> *In many respects the past is more real than the present. The*
> *peculiar power and clarity of representations - derives from*
> *the success with which they control the reality of today*
> *through that of yesterday and the continuity which this*
> *presupposes. (Moscovici in Farr and Moscovici page 10 1985)*

Representations are a product of consensual universes - the consensual universe being Moscovici's equivalent to the Durkheimian collective "mind". Like thought styles, the representations which issue from them are culturally specific ways of thinking, and thus of understanding and communicating. Consequently, they pertain to a certain socio-cultural milieu. The link between the social and the psychological aspects of cultural representations, i.e. between the consensual universe and underlying societal structure, has been elaborated by Bourdieu (1986):

> *The cognitive structures which social agents implement in*
> *their practical knowledge of the social world are*
> *internalized, 'embodied social structures'....Being the*
> *product of the incorporation of the fundamental structures*
> *of a society, these principles of division are common to all*
> *the agents of society and make possible the production of a*
> *common, meaningful world, a common-sense world. (Bourdieu*
> *page 468 1986)*

An important property of social representations is their fluid, changeable nature, another point of contrast with the episteme:

> *Representations, obviously, are not created by individuals*
> *in isolation. Once created, however, they lead a life of*
> *their own, circulate, merge attract and repel, and give*
> *birth to new representations, while old ones die out.*
> *(Moscovici page 13 1985)*

With the help of the social representation analogy and Bourdieu's important point about the internalisation of "social structures", it is possible to see thought styles as culturally specific thought frameworks, enhancing understanding and communication in the cultural environment from which they originate. Following Bourdieu's (1979) link between the social and psychological, this thesis explores how the different thought styles are related to the contrasting political substructures of the two countries in question. These substructures are responsible for the differences between the thought-environment complexes which are used to explain the differing properties of the thought styles. These complexes are thus specific to contrasting socio-cultural milieus. Thus thought styles can be conceptualized as distillations of culturally specific thought-environment complexes, or "life styles" to which they are suited. Assuming an identity independent from the social reality of which they are born, thought styles are transmitted by cultural structures such as educational institutions. These, a product of the same socio-political milieu as the thought styles, embody the necessary prerogatives to perpetuate the thought styles. As a result of their long history, thought styles survive as nationally specific repertoires - an idea to be elaborated in the section on tradition - upon which thinkers draw to a lesser or greater extent. The thought styles impose themselves unconditionally through language - as cultural constraints

on thinking and expression - and conditionally through
institutions. Both institutional and linguistic constraints
reflect the value systems of the different cultural
universes which are also embodied in the thought styles.

Belonging to different traditions of thought may entail
differences in approach and emphasis when dealing with
specific issues, leading to mutual criticism and even
misunderstanding. Both the criticisms and misunderstandings
can stem either from logical differences or rhetorical ones.
Logical differences revolve around issues of precise meaning
or conceptual differences, whereas rhetorical are a
consequence of different sets of priorities. Rorty (1982)
judges the latter less important, dismissing them as
differences of "expression". In fact, as this thesis
demonstrates, they betray different value systems which can
lead to contrasting perspectives on a problem such as
madness. Most of the differences investigated, perhaps with
the exception of science, are rhetorical in nature.
Rhetorical differences are possible even when an
understanding of the cultural representations or thought
styles have been achieved, as will become evident in the
study of Laing's writings and the two examples at the end of
the chapter. This indicates that an awareness of foreign
constraints does not mean that they are necessarily
observed. Instead, ideas are often modified to suit the new
thought style. This modification occurs both overtly to suit
the expectations of the new audience and covertly by

translating ideas into a language which embodies another set of cultural constraints. It is important to remember Durkheim's remark concerning bodies of belief:

> It is not enough that they be true to be believed. If they are not in harmony with the other beliefs and opinions, or, in a word, with the mass of the other collective representations, they will be denied: minds will be closed to them; consequently _it will be as though they did not exist._ (Durkheim page 318 1951)

The thesis aims to make explicit certain features of the two "thought styles". The examples used to typify them are mostly cases which are nationally generated and where the thought styles are exhibited in idiosyncratic forms - eighteenth century art of the two countries, British utilitarianism and French positivism. This has resulted in a characterization of two polar ideal types (Weber 1949). The purpose of ideal types here is to bring out certain characteristic features - which need not all occur in each example considered - and to illustrate where the strengths of each tradition lie:

> The goal of the ideal typical is always to make explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of the individual phenomena. (Weber page 101 1949).

> Only through ideal typical constructions do the viewpoints with which we are concerned in individual cases become explicit. Their peculiar character is brought about by the confrontation of empirical reality with the ideal typical. (Weber page 110 1949)

The examples of possible modifications of the polar types - the French interpretation of English Empiricism as

Ideology,[1] Impressionist painting, Laing's interpretation of Sartrian philosophy and post-modern English disciples of Foucauldian history - show how certain core characteristics of the national traditions are retained. They illustrate how the thought styles are usually encountered as recurring "designs" or "motifs" (Rayner page 10 1989) which can be understood in terms of the polar types isolated.

PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES.

Philosophical differences have been remarkably consistent throughout French and British history. In the seventeenth century, Locke was in no doubt as to his opinion of Continental rationalism. Of Malebranche, admittedly one of the more obscure members of the tradition, he says:

> *Wherein, I confess, there are many expressions, which carry with them to my mind no clear idea, are like to remove but little of my ignorance by their sound. Here again I must confess myself in the dark... and methinks if a man would have studied obscurity, he could not have writ more unintelligibly than this. Far be it from him to indulge in such obscurity. My appearing in print being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers as I can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than anyone not accustomed to abstract speculation, or preposessed with different notions, should mistake or not comprehend my meaning. (in Hazard page 281 1964)*

Locke has set a precedent for this kind of criticism, as well as the emphasis on thinking in accessible, concrete terms. On the other hand, seventeenth century French writers

were not complimentary of their English counterparts, as Coste demonstrates:

> *The English writers were obscure; they transgressed rules of logic, their ideas needed to be coordinated; they were diffuse and needed pruning; they were inelegant and in need of refining. (Coste in Hazard page 88 1954)*

The idea of "transgressing the rules of logic" can be related to subsequent criticisms referring to the lack of structured, methodical and sytematic thinking in England. In the eighteenth century, adopting a more conciliatory attitude, Leclerc maintained:

> *... I have never come across people better calculated to get on together than the French who give careful attention to the theory of what they are considering, and the English who avoid getting lost in the abstract by giving concrete expression to their ideas with an independence of mind we should do well to imitate. (in Hazard page 75 1954)*

Leclerc pointed to features which have become characteristic of the two different traditions of thought, empiricism and rationalism - although Rorty (1982) has replaced the latter by the term textualism, due to the recent directions taken by Continental philosophy. These features are the rationalist penchant for theory which is accompanied by a priori reasoning in terms of models/principles - second order abstractions. This contrasts with empirical thinking, emphasizing the immediacy of experience, resisting speculation, appealing instead to "commonsense". The association that Leclerc made between English thinking and "concrete expression" and French thought and "abstract" theory recurs in the thesis. The "concrete" thinking of

empiricism relates to a commonsensical attitude, and is taken to refer to thinking in practical terms of what is immediately available to the senses. "Abstract" rationalist thinking, on the other hand, values theory over practice and is a way of thinking which relies little on pictorial representation. There are, however, problems with the use of blanket terms such as empiricism and rationalism. De Toqueville, a contemporary of Spencer, points to these when writing on the Americans in the nineteenth century:

> *But I go further and seek among these characteristics the principle one, which includes all the rest, I discover that in most of the operations of the mind each American appeals only to the individual effort of his own understanding. America is therefore one of the countries where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and best applied... (in MacLuhan page 7 1962)*

This is similar to a description of the English given by Montesquieu two hundred years previously, and seems to be an Anglo-Saxon characteristic. The terms rationalism and empiricism have been used in several contexts, ranging from descriptions of styles of philosophical discourse, to references, such as Halls' (1965) in his treatise on French education, to rationalist French society. They are used here to describe different thought styles. In view of their philosophical origins, these terms are best understood from studying the work of the proponents of the two schools of thought. Descartes states in his meditations:

> *I find I have insensibly reverted to the point I desired; for since it is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone; and since they are*

not perceived because they are seen and touched, but only
because they are understood... (Meditation 2 page 119 1974)

The emphasis on the mind and reason embodied in Cartesian

philosophy is essential to the meaning of the term as it is

used here. As Cottingham (1984) points out, what the three

great rationalist philosophies – those of Descartes, Spinoza

and Leibnitz – and the tradition they spawned have in common

is the assumption "that thought is an independent source of

knowledge, and is moreover a more trustworthy source of

knowledge than experience" (Page 102 1984).

Locke's reaction to Descartes was to base his whole

philosophy on what Descartes refused to trust, experience:

> *How, then comes the mind to be furnished? Whence comes it by*
> *that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man*
> *has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has*
> *it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I*
> *answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our*
> *knowledge is founded and from that it ultimately derives*
> *itself. (Locke page 1 1690)*

Scruton (1984), whose praise of his philosophical

inheritance is quite candid, maintains that empiricism is

seeing human understanding as confined within the limits of

human experience. Straying outside those limits is to fall

victim to "scepticism or to lose itself in nonsense"

(Scruton page 83 1984). Furthermore, although he does not

see empiricism as predominant in England, it remains – which

is more important – "more truly characteristic of the Anglo-

Saxon genius than any specific outlook to which it might

lend its aid..." (Scruton page 83 1984). Scruton's point is

one   this   thesis   emphasizes,   especially   in   chapter   five:
empiricism   is   an   Anglo-Saxon   strength   -   just   as   rationalism
is   a   French   one   -   not   that   it   is   necessarily   omnipresent.

Descartes   and   Locke   offered   the   possibility   of   juxtaposing   a
cult   of   reason   with   one   of   experience.   Empiricism   and
rationalism,   because   of   their   different   emphases,   led   to
different   ways   of   formulating   ideas   on   the   same   issues.   This
explains   Leclerc's   remark   concerning   the   relative   strengths
of   French   and   English   thinkers.   In   the   nineteenth   century,
the   empirical   distrust   of   Cartesian   philosophy   spread   to
Hegelian   collectivist   rationalist   metaphysics,   an   outgrowth
of   Spinoza's   pantheism,   and   arguably   the   most   influential
post-Kantian   philosophical   doctrine   in   nineteenth   century
Continental   Europe.   Yet   the   Hegelian   tradition   has   never
been   understood,   "let   alone   favoured"   in   Anglo-Saxon
countries   (Harland   1985).   Significantly,   Anglo-Saxon
empiricists   reacted   against   the   Cartesian   "I   philosophy",
taking   this   "other   European   tradition"   as   "a   madder   and   more
mystical   development   of   the   same   thing"   (Harland   page   70
1985).   Hegel's   philosophy,   through   the   intermediary   of   Marx,
is   at   the   root   of   much   European   social   philosophy.   However,
in   England,   it   never   became   such   an   ideological   force.
Hegel's   ontological   and   methodological   collectivism   is
evidenced   in   references   to   "the   self   consciousness   of
nations"   which   he   saw   as   the   means   of   development   of   the
collective   spirit.   These   ideas   were,   and   still   are,   at   odds
with   the   ontology   and   methodology   of   liberal,   voluntaristic

Anglo-Saxon social thought. The emphasis on the individual
and his rights, or individualism, which the latter generates
contrasts with the collectivism and determinism of the
French positivistic outlook. The opposition is restated as
psychologism versus sociologism by Quinton (1982), and with
it a link is suggested between the former and Anglo-Saxon
empiricism, and the latter and Continental rationalism. That
individualism stems from resisting the conceptualization of
social objects - too large to be perceived or to be amenable
to empirical investigation - as entities in themselves, to
be understood without reference to individuals, is
corroborated by Harland's (1985) description of the
"paradoxical" philosophy of the structuralists:

> *This is a paradoxical way of thinking and especially
> paradoxical in relation to Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking. For
> it is in Anglo-Saxon countries that the assumed priority of
> the individual has past over into a kind of plain man's down
> to earth common sense. Anglo-Saxons have a feeling of having
> their feet firmly planted when they plant them upon the
> seemingly solid ground of individual tastes and opinions, or
> on the seemingly hard facts of material nature. (Harland
> page 10 1985)*

Empiricism, with its focus on the immediacy of experience,
does not lend itself to conceptualizing large a priori
social constructions, and leads to reductionism. Social
objects such as the "state" are not realities in themselves,
but rather a collection of individuals. Ayer states quite
fervently that "The English State is a logical construction
out of individual people" (Ayer in Quinton page 19 1982).
The opportunity is then open to study these social entities
through the intermediary of their constituent parts by

empirical means such as surveys. The individualism of empiricism is often criticized. It is, however, a reflection of the fundamental values which the "liberal" Anglo-Saxon state has fostered. At the 1988 Conservative party conference, Mrs Thatcher captured over four hundred years of English social philosophy in her remark that there was no such thing as Society, only Individuals. On the other hand, the strong state in both France and Germany has been coupled with a collectivism[4] and a belief in the "social" as an independent realm. The ability to accept the existence of hypothetical social entities relies on the ability to go beyond the senses using thinking of the rationalist type, present in both countries. The proposition is that social and philosophical discourses reflect contrasting political substructures. As the discourses originate from specific thought styles, they are formulated in a manner that is a product of a specific cultural milieu and are suited to describe the milieu in question.

TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT

Moscovici (1985) stresses the importance of tradition in his discussion of social representations. A "tradition of thought", as it is described here, embodies his idea that thought styles, like representations, "control the reality of today through that of yesterday". Many authors recognize the dominance of a certain tradition of thought in different countries, particularly the pervasiveness of empiricism in

the Anglo-Saxon world and of rationalism on the Continent.
Quinton (1982) summarizes the commonly accepted account of
the development of British philosophy. After Hume - with the
exception of Mill - British philosophy "closed down" until
Bradley. It did not properly start up again until the
Bradleyans Moore and Russell "broke out" of the wrappings of
their philosophical education. Finally, "God said "Let there
be Wittgenstein" and all was light." (Page 178 1982). At the
end of the nineteenth century, Durkheim praised the
rationalist heritage, testifying to a persistent faith in
the French rationalist approach to knowledge:

> *No doubt, Cartesianism is an archaic and narrow form of
> rationalism, and we must not rest content with it. But if it
> is necessary to transcend it, it is even more necessary to
> conserve its principle. We must fashion for ourselves more
> complex ways of thought, but must keep this cult of distinct
> ideas which is at the very root of the French spirit.
> (Durkheim page 651 1900)*

The significance of traditions is not to be underestimated,
as Lamont (1987) argues in an article entitled "How to
become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques
Derrida":

> *Heidegger, Husserl, Nietzsche, and Hegel are among the most
> prestigious philosophers in what is seen in France as
> perhaps the most prestigious philosophical tradition -
> German philosophy (Wahl 1962: Descombes 1980). By carrying
> on a dialogue with these classics Derrida acquires some of
> their prestige and positions himself in a theoretical
> tradition defined as important. Had he worked on Hume,
> Locke, or Mill, the story would have been rather different
> and for reasons relatively unconnected with the actual
> substance of his analysis. (Lamont page 593 1987)*

It is difficult to formulate in precise terms what exactly constitutes the legacy of a tradition of thought. The definition most appropriate here is one suggested by Randell:

> *A persistent body of ideas tied together by subtle associations as well as by logical relations, which persists over the generations and dominates and colours the thinking of those who for one reason or another have been brought up in it. A philosophical tradition is that type of historical continuity which enjoys a career, in the sense that its course - its 'life' one is tempted to say - can be traced from the beginning, through the various vicissitudes it has undergone as men have turned to it facing and trying to deal with their specific problems of adjustment. (Randell page 48 1969)*

Cases of philosophical/conceptual differences are even found in the Natural Sciences, negating the widely held assumption that scientific discourses are universal. As Randell points out, the difference between English and German scientists has been, that since Locke, the English have accorded priority to sense images and were best able to reason with the aid of visual models. The Germans, involved in constructing mathematical systems, preferred to think in terms of equations and formulae. Although Randell chooses the Germans, the same comparison could well have been made between the French scientist and his English counterpart as chapter three will demonstrate (see the comparisons which have been made between the mentalities of the French and the Germans by Tonnies (1974) and Markham (1952), outlined in footnotes to chapter four). Philosophical biases contribute towards explaining the contrasting ideas of Dalton and Berthollet on atomic matters, and the different ways of

reasoning about the same problem. Dalton reasoned in terms of Newtonian solid massy particles, using pictorial models to help him in his task. These particles were unacceptable to the French who insisted on thinking in terms of Cartesian forces (Cardwell 1968).

Randell's "body of ideas", which "dominates and colours our thinking", is reminiscent of Moscovici's cultural "conventions" which "constrain vision". Philosophical questions - generated, for example, when fundamental beliefs/assumptions are confronted by socially or culturally significant conflicts - are solved by using a culturally specific "toolbox", or set of intellectual instruments. These are products of the representational thought styles and are inherited to deal with the problems. Each tradition of thought has its own pitfalls and is better at dealing with some problems than others. The language used by the philosopher to formulate the solutions, part of the toolbox, selectively emphasizes features of the world judged to be the most central to the tradition (Randell 1969). This is pertinent to the discussions of chapters four and five which draw on the idea that traditions of social discourse favouring either collectivism or individualism reflect differences in political structure. The conclusion is thus that the language used has its own cluster of ideas which:

> ...exhibit certain characteristics and persisting
> assumptions: each has its own starting-point, approach,
> method and concepts. Each has a type of problem it is best
> suited to deal with, and each confronts a set of

intellectual difficulties peculiarly its own. (Randell page 52 1969)

Consequently, as was pointed out earlier, there is an immediate modification when ideas are translated into a different language. Language embodies the same set of cultural constraints as their thought styles, a reflection of the value systems of their cultural environments. Certainly, the rationalist thought style, as characterized in the thesis, is facilitated by the structured, logical nature of the French language with its abundance of abstract words and general terms. The strength of the English language lies in a rich, "concrete" vocabulary, suitable for vivid and imaginative description (see Taine in James 1872 repr. 1987).

Not only does a tradition confer or bequeath ideas, concepts and language, but also means of expression, reflecting the assumptions thinkers make about their position/role, assumptions generated by their social environment. Hence, the opposition of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical "journeyman" and the Continental "pontiff", so often used by Ayer. The concept of the philosophical under-labourer in English philosophy dates back to Locke, who thought it adequate that a philosopher should set himself the task of "removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge" (in Natanson page 474 1963). The philosopher becomes an adjunct to the scientist, getting rid of metaphysical problems. Science was of supreme value to an empiricist like Locke, as

it dealt with observable, material reality, as opposed to
the   abstract   problems   of   metaphysics.   This   assumption
persists into the twentieth century with Ayer, who maintains
that philosophy should not be brought into competition with
the natural sciences:

> *Believing as they do that the only way to discover what*
> *their world is really like is to form hypotheses and test*
> *them by observation which is in fact the method of science.*
> *They are content to leave the scientist in full possession*
> *of the field of speculative knowledge. Consequently they do*
> *not try to build systems. The task of the philosopher as*
> *they see it is rather to deal piecemeal with a special set*
> *of problems. (Ayer page 471 in Natanson 1963)*

Much of Anglo-Saxon philosophy concentrates on mimicking the
natural sciences, using tools such as logic, in the hope of
of legitimizing its usefulness (Rorty 1982). The position of
philosophers across the channel is different, as Foucault is
aware. Talking of the impact of the philosopher-historian
Canguilhem:

> *Everyone knows that in France there are few logicians but*
> *many historians of science; and that in the 'philosophical*
> *establishment' - whether teaching or research orientated -*
> *they have occupied a considerable position. But we[French*
> *academic circles] know precisely the importance that, in the*
> *course of these past fifteen or twenty years, up to the very*
> *frontiers of the establishment a 'work' like that Georges*
> *Canguilhem can have had for those very people who were*
> *separated from or challenged the establishment? Yes, I know*
> *there have been noisier theatres: psychoanalysis, Marxism,*
> *linguistics, ethnology. But let us not forget this fact,*
> *which depends, as you will, on the sociology of the French*
> *intellectual environment, the functioning of our university*
> *institutions or our system of cultural values: in all*
> *political or scientific discussion of these strange sixty*
> *years past, the role of the'philosopher' - I simply mean*
> *those who had received this university training in*
> *philosophy departments - has been important: perhaps too*
> *important for the liking of certain people. (in Canguilhem*
> *page ix 1970)*

This is another reflection of the rationalist cult of ideas as opposed to the empiricist cult of sense experience, important in the light of the later link to be made between rationalism and the French politics of intellectualism. Institutions, embodying distinct social values, are responsible for perpetuating the traditions. In France, educational establishments present a remarkably stable environment for philosophy, providing continuity of philosophical outlook amidst change (Descombes 1980).⁵ A review of the development of mainstream British philosophy, suggests that empiricism is similarly entrenched in academic institutions (Quinton 1982). These institutions, especially educational ones, are likely to perpetuate thought styles which embody the values and assumptions on which they are based, as both are the product of the same cultural milieu.

These strongly institutionalized thought styles impose their "design" on ideas/methodologies which are a product of another tradition. Not only are they translated into another language - the source of unavoidable cultural constraints - they are also moulded to suit new institutionalized restrictions. These ideas will be developed in selected sections throughout the thesis. The two examples considered here, 1) the transplanted form of English empiricism - the French philosophy of ideology 2) English Hegelianism - nineteenth century British idealism, have been chosen to illustrate an additional point: how, adopting ideas from

foreign traditions, stems from the need for a framework to criticize the establishment.

The philosophy of Locke, with its accompanying value of liberalism, was used in pre-revolutionary France to challenge the absolutist monarchy. Its emphasis on the senses and lack of system made it the antithesis of Cartesianism. Locke's doctrine was recast as "Ideology". Ideology is often considered as the philosophy of the French Revolution and responsible for many changes in post-revolutionary scientific thought, not least those which initiated the clinical approach in psychiatry. One of the most famous proponents of Ideology was the Abbé Condillac who, together with Cabanis, is credited with laying its foundations. Despite his repudiation of rationalism, in many ways, Condillac remained within the tradition (Brehier 1987). He used empiricism, and its methods of analysis, to discover how the mind obtains knowledge from sense-data, and to uncover the structure of reason, the same reason with which Descartes was obsessed. Furthermore, his method was more reminiscent of Descartes' than Locke's, when in "Logic II", a logical mathematical solution to the problem he is dealing with, is adopted. Condillac thought that a treatise on sensation could be compared to "the solution of an equation which precedes from one entity to another in order to reveal the unknown..." (Brehier page 81 1967). This is an example of what Randell identifies as rationalism's

obsession with abstract reasoning in terms of using formulae and equations.

The brief success of idealism in the nineteenth century was due to the challenge it posed to the dominant individualistic, empirical utilitarianism. It fulfilled both a religious and a political requirement. Subsequent to Darwin's attack, religion had to protect itself against a certain amount of scepticism, and Hegelianism was to provide the means for doing so. Hegel had succeeded in preventing a collision between science and religion by reinterpreting elements of faith which scientific developments had destroyed and by postulating an abstract spirituality of the world. Further, Hegelianism could be interpreted in opposing evolutionary terms to Darwinism. Evolution was not the result of an accumulation of accidents selected for by environmental pressures, but a matter of rational necessity (Quinton page 196 1982). The political dimension advocated a policy of state responsibility, challenging the *laissez-faire* ideology and criticizing the exploitation common in capitalist England. The idealist Green[7] and his pupils came to regard themselves as political reformers. They created a philosophy which was geared towards the pragmatics of social reform. This strong pragmatism modified the academic German system. Furthermore, the extent of Hegel's influence on the idealists is a matter of dispute. Even Green's idealism, the most staunchly Hegelian of them all, is tinged with individualism: "The life of nations has no real existence

except in terms of individuals" (page 193 1921). Hegel is open to this interpretation, as Copleston (1964) notes. However, an indication that a difference does exist between the German master and his English disciple, is the exalted terms in which the former speaks of the "State". Moreover, idealism in England suffered a strange fate, returning to utilitarian individualism under the guise of the personal idealism of MacTaggart:

> *But if what I have said is true, it will follow that,*
> *whatever activity it is desirable of the State to have, it*
> *will only be desirable as a means, and that the activity and*
> *the State itself, can have no value but as a means. And a*
> *religion which fastens itself on a means has not risen above*
> *fetish-worship. Compared with the worship of the state,*
> *zoolatry is rational and dignified. A bull or a crocodile*
> *may not have great intrinsic value, but has some for it is a*
> *conscious being. The state has none. It would be as*
> *reasonable to worship a sewage pipe, which also possesses*
> *considerable value as a means. (MacTaggart page 109 1934)*

MacTaggart's emphasis was placed on developing personality as the key to a personal view of reality.

CONCLUSION

Having clarified what is to be understood by the term thought style, attention was drawn to the most important terms around which the discussion of thought styles will revolve. Rationalism and empiricism, the names chosen for the two styles, have philosophical origins relating to some of the properties to be explored in the subsequent chapters. A special manifestation of the thought styles in social

thought was considered, to be drawn upon extensively in the thesis - the link between ontological/methodological individualism and empiricism and ontological/methodological collectivism and rationalism - as was the idea of a tradition of thought, and the interchange which occurs when two traditions meet.

1. Ideology was an Enlightenment philosophy emphasizing naturalism and materialism to overcome clericalism. The political ideology it favoured was that politics had to conform to the essence and aims of society and not to the whims of rulers. In this way, it modified Locke's emphasis on the individual.

2. Commonsense refers to a resistance to unecessary speculation about, and questioning of, certain ideas which have been agreed by common consent.

3. Liberal in this context refers to the Lockian idea of the emphasis on the individual and his liberties in society. It is interesting to note, as Sedgwick (1982) does, that the Anglo-Saxon concept of "libertarian" is different from that of Continental Europe. here it has a meaning bequeathed to it by anarchism. It is seen as an attempt to synthesize the demands of the individual with that of the collective by "collective and even communist forms of organizations" (Sedgwick 1982). In the Anglo_Saxon world, "libertarian is usually associated with hard headed *laissez-faire* ideology.

4. French collectivism is found in both right wing and left wing political ideology. An instance of right wing collectivism is the post-revolutionary pro-monarchichal philosophies. The difference has been that right wing collectivism has been spiritual in nature, left wing collectivism, materialist. (see Copleston 1974)

6.

The university site of philosophy is marked by concentric highly centralized formation. The Lycées provide the universities with the bulk of their audience in the form of future secondary teachers. These Lycée teachers are, in theory recruited by competitive examination system. Given that the context of these examinations (aggrégation capès) is a function of the sixth form (classe de philosophy) syllabus, the teaching of philosophy in France is more of less determined by the nature and function of that syllabus. Officially, the Syllabus, this masterpiece of rigor and coherence, is fixed/unanimous consent. In reality, it is the outcome of a compromise between the various prevailing tendencies, and this is the way the much celebrated Masterpiece is so frequently overhauled. Charged by some with propagating a reactionary ideology, by others with eliminating whatever still remained of authentic philosophy in the preceding syllabus, successive versions reflect the momentary balance of political forces, not only within the teaching body itself, but also the country at large.

Few people claim to be satisfied with the Syllabus as it stands, and many call for its reform. Nobody, however, questions the need for a Syllabus of some sort. This cult of the Syllabus by the French, which, never fails to astonish foreigners, is explained by the French veneration for the institution of the baccalauréat, that incarnation of the egalitarian ideal. (Descombes Page 5 1980)

This has implications for education as will be outlined in a later chapter.

6. As Brehier points out Condillac was closer to Decartes that he thought. In the regulae Decartes also tried to explain combinations of "complex natures" through the properties of simple natures (Brehier page 76 1967). Condillac's definition of simple natures was, however, different in that they were derived from the senses as opposed to the intellect.

7. T. H. Green was influential in nineteenth century idealist liberalism, critical of utilitarianism which had been modified into hard headed *laissez-fairism*. He was particularly critical of the empirical assumption governing utilitarianism, that feelings were the basis for action. To this he preferred the motives of a rational consciousness.

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONAL THOUGHT STYLES IN ART

There is a spirit of an age, and there is a
national character. The existence of neither can be
denied, however averse one may be to
generalizations. The two can act in accordance with
one another until one seems to black out the other
completely. (Pevsner page 21 1956)

An investigation into the manifestation of thought styles in
the arts offers a quasi-empirical starting point in a thesis
geared towards an academic analysis. This chapter develops
the characteristics of the ideally typical empirical and
rational thought styles, mentioned in the last chapter,
using examples drawn from art, music and literature. In the
sections on the visual arts and music, the claim that these
characteristics originate in culturally specific thought-
environment complexes will be substantiated. The example of
literature illustrates how different sets of priorities,
implicit in the two languages, have generated two literary
traditions. The assumption governing the chapter is that the
way universal symbols are incorporated into national art is
related to thought styles - hence the characteristics of the
styles can be isolated using artistic examples. Thus they
become suited to the "taste" (Bourdieu 1983) of members of
the "consensual universe" (Moscovici 1985) of the society

considered. Artistic languages made up of these symbols are cultivated by institutional frameworks which embody value systems specific to the society in question. Moreover, the significance of artistic examples to a thesis of this kind is highlighted in the following quotation from Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge:

> *In analysing a painting, one can reconstitute the latent discourse of the painter; one can try to recapture the murmur of his intentions, which are not transcribed into words, but into lines, surfaces, and colours; one can try to uncover the implicit philosophy that is supposed to form his view of the world. It is also possible to question science, or at least the opinions of the period, and to try to recognise to what extent they appear in the painter's work. (Foucault page 193 1972).*

The quotation at the beginning of this chapter is drawn from Pevsner's (1955) discussion of the "Englishness of English Art" a study in the so-called field of the "geography of art".[1] Pevsner's essay is valuable not least for its sensitivity to the problems facing the researcher embarking on an exploration into "the impermanent and ambiguous" of cultural specifics and national identity. He refers to the contradictions which occur in the basic design of national heritage/identity. After arguing that the English are not a sculptural nation, Pevsner accounts for the number of important English sculptors in the twentieth century, by saying that:

> *National character is not a procrustian bed. There is nothing stagnant in national qualities. They are in perpetual flux. New possibilities may at any moment be thrown up and force us to revise our categories. (Pevsner page 194 1955)*

This is in agreement with what Moscovici (1985) sees as the fluid and changeable nature of cultural representations, and reinforces their appropriateness in helping to characterize nationally specific thought styles. Despite this, Pevsner argues for the importance of a certain cultural entity which he believed is stronger than race in determining the style of art.

The chapter opens with a detailed comparison of two eighteenth century paintings. This comparison introduces certain themes which will be elaborated with other examples. The central point is that rationalist French art is concerned with the technical, structural and formal aspects of what is to be conveyed. This is opposed to the more immediate, empirical approach of depicting what is perceivable. In the visual arts, the emphasis on perception has traditionally been accompanied by a talent for observation and recording, resulting in an unstudied, spontaneous approach. Rationalist French artists go beyond what is perceived, using symbols and specific formulae to capture what they are trying to express. Their's is a theoretical, academic approach (Schneider 1925) where, for example, the "realistic"* depiction of "life" - both natural and social - is secondary to the deployment of theoretical tools, philosophical and formal consideration, and a particular artistic language - usually with political undertones (Coppleston 1983, Bryson 1980). Such an approach led to the Grand Manner in art which the English generally

avoided, giving as an excuse its pretension. Both in art and
music England has been the home of the miniaturist,
concerned with minute details as opposed to large scale
planning. The same emphasis on form and theoretical
concerns, such as isolating a new language of expression, is
found in French music (Lockspeiser 1974). In terms of
structure, it is intimately related to language and
contrasts with the freer English style. Similarly, two
traditions of literature can be discerned. One is concerned
with "realism", dramatic and psychological (see footnote 2).
The other is more speculative and attributes greater
importance to general issues, both philosophical and social.
This together with the important structural role it
fulfills, explains the importance of philosophy in French
literature. Both the music and the literature sections cover
a broader range of material than the fine arts section. The
differences between the arts in England and France are
eloquently, although contentiously, captured by the musician
Gray in the following:

> *The fineness of Peter Warlock's achievement is typically
> English; he was a superb miniaturist, like his Elizabethan
> forbears and like most English artists in other spheres. He
> realized and accepted the fact of his incapacity to create
> in the larger forms, and thereby accomplished more work of
> lasting value than his more ambitious colleagues were able
> to do.*
> *Clifford Bax is absolutely right. A complete anaesthesia to
> formal considerations is the most conspicuous common factor
> exhibited by English artists in every age and in every
> medium, and one which is shared by the public for which they
> create. The greatest of all English artists, possibly the
> greatest poet and dramatist who ever lived, is so completely
> lacking in any sense of form and design that one cannot even
> say that it is a defect. Shakespeare just blandly ignored
> all formal considerations whatsoever, and all the problems
> thereby involved... This Anglican indifference to form, in*

fact, is a positive quality in the hands of a master - it is
perhaps the supremest manifestation of genius, this capacity
to dispense with form, and simply to move as the spirit
moves one, without preconceived destination or arrière
pensée, living from moment to moment and trusting in divine
providence, a deus ex machina, to bring things to a
satisfying conclusion. And it may be a weakness in the Latin
artist that he is too concerned with formal considerations
at the expense of the other qualities which are possibly
more valuable. (Gray page 12 1948).

STYLE IN THE ARTS (VISUAL AND SCULPTURAL)

Bryson (1981) writes that Greuze was influenced by Hogarth.

Taking this to be the case, whatever he drew from Hogarth

was certainly modified in accordance with his national

orientation. The difference in artistic styles become clear

when two paintings such as "Marriage à la Mode: Shortly

after the Marriage" (fig. 1) by Hogarth and "L'Accordée du

Village" (fig. 2) by Greuze are compared. Hogarth's mastery

of small conversation pieces - to which he returned after

his attempts at the grand style had failed - is clear in

this painting. The piece has to be understood in terms of

Hogarth's attempts to depict life in his morality painting,

and testifies to his relaxed, unstudied brushwork, with its

"sumptuous fluidity" (Pevsner 1955). This is suited to

Hogarth's aims: to paint to tell a story and to portray life

as it was lived. Hence his meticulous attention to mundane

details. These abound in "Shortly after the Marriage", where

a little dog plays with his master's coat, an open book and

playing cards are strewn across the floor, and a frustrated

servant exits with a host of unpaid bills. Clearly,

Hogarth's forte, or his weakness (Stinton 1969), is his descriptive ability which, coupled with his unstudied approach, brings the subject matter to life.

Narrative of sorts is also present in Greuze's painting "L'Accordée du Village", but as the stylized "drame bourgeois". Greuze's priority is to depict the ideal of "happiness", and the story in "l'Accordée" is sacrificed to its depiction. A family gathering such as is presented here, "the body observed under genetic time" (Bryson page 127 1981), is merely a vehicle to communicate Greuze's thoughts on the subject. This symbolic domestic scene conveys a different impression to the Hogarthian narrative. The deployment of formulae is betrayed by his use of stereotypical characters. His scenes and characters are "ideal", in the Weberian (1949) sense of never being exemplified in real life. In "l'Accordée", the prosperity and radiance of youth is almost out of place in the rustic poverty in which the scene is set. This is, however, of no importance to Greuze, providing the seminal concept of happiness is portrayed. The stereotypic characters together with the studied brushwork, lends an air of formalism and academicism to the painting which contrasts with Hogarth's fluidity. Form, balance and structure feature prominently in the composition of this painting. The happy couple are without a doubt the central characters, not only placed in a prominent position on the canvas, but also the centre of attention: all body movements and gazes are directed towards

them. The composition is pyramidal, increasing the sense of order. Thus Greuze's work is essentially a static structure. This again contrasts with Hogarth's work, where the dispersal of the characters causes one's gaze to move around the canvas in a much more haphazard way, helping to generate the impression of activity.

The characteristics of French and English painting which generated the above differences are tied to institutional practices (or lack of them). The features contributing to the "Englishness" of English art include an "aversion to structure", "amateurishness" and "single-minded self expression" (Pevsner 1955, Stinton 1969, Burke 1976). Interestingly, they parallel those of early English science to be examined in the next chapter. "Single minded self expression" is another way of describing the sporadic development of English art, a contrast to the logical, continuous development of the French national school established in the seventeenth century (Schneider 1925). Both the characteristics of amateurishness and single-mindedness can be attributed to a distrust of institutionalized academic practices. The official art of the Academy was scorned as a foreign import (Pevsner 1955, Bryson 1980). This scorn combined with the lack of state patronage - which, among other things, resulted in badly administered academic institutions - transformed the visual arts into a gentlemanly pursuit. Consequently, a much weaker tradition of institutionalized academic art has been

produced when compared to its French counterpart. "Amateurishness" is in no sense to be interpreted pejoratively. In Gainsborough's art it was associated with a talent for creative, albeit, informal experimentation with the effects of light, different types of paper and other materials - another example is his use of broccoli to help him depict trees. This not only contributed to the "Englishness" of his painting, but made him one of the greatest "picturesque" English artists.[3]

In England, the distaste for the Grand Manner was combined with the inability to imitate it. The Grand Manner was a style which predominated in France, Spain, Italy and Germany in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and needed ordered planning. This weakness was coupled with the mastery of the miniature. In the visual arts, the English artist was more concerned with the art of portraying characters and stories which appealed to the observer's experience than with structure. Both Hogarth and Gainsborough were masters of small conversation pieces (Stinton 1969, Burke 1976). The stylistic difference between the two men can perhaps be best described in terms of Hogarth's Lockean realist empiricism and Gainsborough's Humian, phenomenalistic empiricism (Stinton 1969) (fig. 5). The attention to circumstantial evidence which storytelling entailed, made unity in composition difficult, and undermined many attempts at structuring - structure being essential to the Grand Manner. The resulting lack of order

stems from weak technique and allowing the subject matter to reign supreme. Stinton (1969) sees these as failings common to Hogarth, Gainsborough and Reynolds. They are however advantages when trying to bring to life the narrative. The art of the narrative requires a talent for detailed observation and quick recording, found in the work of numerous English artists, including Constable (fig. 6), Gainsborough, Romney (fig. 4) and even Reynolds, whose artistic ideals were very different to those of Hogarth.[4]

In the twentieth century, English art has continued to follow a different path to that of its Continental neighbours. English art, playing a relatively minor role in the intellectual and overtly political modernist movements such as "Dadaism", "Futurism" and "Cubism" at the beginning of the century, was instead dominated by the influence of Impressionism and Post-Impressionism. It has thus not been committed to "abstraction", as Continental art has. The spontaneous brushwork and phenomenalistic approach was retained in the portraiture of Augustus and Gwen John (fig. 8) and the landscapes of Graham Bell. English artists of this century have maintained their love of landscapes - Bomberg's Spanish landscapes - and their attention to detail, epitomized in the work of Lowry and Spencer. The best example of the perceptual dimension of English art of this century is the tactile sculpture of Moore and the visual painting of Bacon (fig. 9). Bacon's paintings deal with "man's predicament" and his paintings are an attempt

"to make a certain type of feeling visual...Painting is the pattern of one's own nervous system being projected on the canvas" (Bacon page 28 1949). Bacon's art is designed to be emotional and visceral not intellectual.

French art is intellectual, "il pense plus qu'il n'observe" (Schneider page 1 1925). Although structured formalism is not a feature of English art, it is strongly felt in its French counterpart. This can partly be attributed to the internalization of classical ideals, particularly evident in paintings of the seventeeth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Formal consideration in the works of artists as diverse as Poussin, Le Brun (fig. 16), Delacroix, and David (fig. 14), were all important to the communication of ideas/messages. Poussin devised theories of transmitting mood through gestures, pose and facial expression. These were codified into formulae of correct procedure by Le Brun, whose painting, as the director of the Royal Academy, was a form of pro-sovereign, or at least pro-state, propaganda (see Champaigne's portrait of Richelieu fig. 15). Everything for him had a meaning to be conveyed, to be read by his observers. His studies show him experimenting with how character traits associated with animals, e.g. slyness of a fox, could be conveyed through human faces. His ordered experimentation differed from Gainsborough's imaginative investigations, and culminated in the creation of a system of meanings. Le Brun was doing in the visual arts what La Fontaine was doing in poetry: creating certain codes[5] for

his audience. The studied art of Le Brun contrasts with the spontaneity typical of English art (Pevsner 1955, Stinton 1969). Indeed, the attention to form and studied elegance - leading to the same lack of spontaneity - was present in the sensuous, dreamy paintings of the "rococo", typified by the work of Watteau and Boucher and conceived as a reaction against classical rationalism. They are properties which are associated with a neglect of the story or narrative. To Greuze, the depiction of life was secondary to the rhetorical function of his paintings, essays on domestic morality or pictorial dramas. The aim was not to provide an accurate portrait of eighteenth century society, but to convey eternal truths about "man's" existence. Hence, the importance of making his paintings legible and his use of stereotypes/formulae. Children bear exaggerated marks of childhood - faces that are too chubby, heads that are too big - because "carrying" these marks further than nature guarantees "legibility of the stereotype" (Bryson page 127 1981).

Institutional practices explain the theoretical academicism of the French style, as well as its discursive, political nature. Art in France was intimately tied to the state, hence its discursive political nature. As such, and in contrast to its English counterpart, the French Academy exerted a monopoly over national art. Louis XIV's minister, Colbert's, policy of centralization towards the arts, bringing them into closer relation to the state, made the

Academy the centre of artistic activity. Both Colbert - the minister who contributed most to this policy of centralizatiion - and his King, Louis XIV believed that it was a wise investment to subsidize the arts. Whatever promoted the King's image "enhanced the prestige and strength of the nation" (Isherwood page 152 1973). Artists had originally been happy to submit to the authority of the Crown as a viable alternative to the domination of powerful guilds. Once within the institution, they were assured greater artistic freedom. Throughout history, membership of the Academy has remained an aspiration of most French artists as well as the condition for their success. Although consciously conceived of as a reaction against academic painting, Impressionism was quickly absorbed into the institutional structure, ensuring its public acceptance. That art could be, and at this stage was, used as a form of state propaganda gave rise to its highly discursive nature and the attention to the classical ideals of order, form, harmony and proportion, as opposed to the subject matter itself - Schneider (1925) refers to "Platonic" French art. During this phase of absolutism, classicism was coupled with authoritarianism. Identification with the glorious Greco-Roman period emphasized France's classical heritage, a strategy to glorify the state. That French painting was both studied and lacking in spontaneity is understandable in the light of the academic environment of the state Academy. Students attended regular courses on subjects such as anatomy, perspective, geometry and other discourses held at

the academy. In addition to the rigorous artistic training,
the established painters under Louix XIV were expected to
publish long treatises on art analysis, using Le Brun's
categories of invention, proportion, colour, expression, and
composition, transforming art into a quasi-scientific
enterprise:

> *These discourses attempted to establish precise rules for*
> *each category... Believing that all proper paintings should*
> *be didactic the academicians stressed the analysis of*
> *historical and allegorical subjects and Félibien even*
> *established a value scale of subjects ranging from still-*
> *lifes at the bottom to historical scenes at the top. Under*
> *the category of expression Le Brun presented a precise*
> *discourse correlating different bodily movements, especially*
> *facial expressions, with the entire panoply of human*
> *emotions. (Isherwood page 161 1973)*

Activity in the Academy was a highly structured affair, and
in 1666 a list of priorities of the dominant artists of the
time could be isolated.

Le Brun	Bourdon	de Champaigne
disposition	light	grouping
design + proportion	composition	expression
expression of passion	proportions	colour and chiaroscuro
perspective	expression	
	colour	
	harmony	

(Bryson 1981)

In eighteenth century France, art was obviously too important a weapon to be left unsupervised. Though no longer used as a source of state propaganda, art has kept its political overtones and assured itself a source of patronage. Thus it retains its concomitant theoretical academicism. Furthermore, although the subject matter may no longer be classical, attention to form and structure has remained with French art, as has its rhetorical nature. The emphasis on form and relationships, as opposed to objects, is a feature of the "Fauvists", "Cubists" and "Symbolists". While the Fauves continued to explore colour relationships, the cubist doctrine revolved around the assumption that only the most abstract geometrical relations were adequate to capture the patterns of thought and sensation (fig. 10) - a competent description of Braque's analytic Cubism is to be found in Coppleston (1983). From the seventeenth century - during which the national school emerged - French artists have adopted an intellectual approach to art, transcending their subject matter to communicate ideas: "In perfect form, this painting would not be physical at all, but the communication of ideas from one consciousness to another across an image that is altogether transparent" (Bryson page 61 1981). In conclusion, there is an opposition between a visual art that has to be read and one that can be more readily felt or perceived i.e. "experienced". This dichotomy is a function of the positions which art has occupied in the respective societies. It has been generated by thought

styles whose features originate in thought-environment complexes specific to certain socio-political milieus.

The visual arts offer examples of how thought styles are often encountered as basic designs or motifs. Both the art of the English eighteenth century painter Reynolds and that of the nineteenth century French Impressionist school demonstrate how inherited "tools" mould outside influences into a new forms which can be identified with the native thought styles. As with the philosophical examples covered in the last chapter, this appealing to outside influences can be related to the need to legitimize a reaction against native practices.

Reynolds, unlike his contemporary Hogarth, was cosmopolitan in outlook, possessing knowledge of, and professing admiration for, the art of Continental countries. Furthermore, as head of the Royal Academy, he did not share Hogarth's distrust of academic institutions. The resulting stylistic differences are demonstrated in their self-portraits. Reynolds' "Englishness" - some features of which have already been referred to - was betrayed by the fact that he never painted poses that he had not observed (Burke 1976). His art has to be understood as a modification of national style by the Continental classicism he so admired. This admiration is clear in the words of wisdom he imparted to his students which included, "study the great masters", "don't be a mere copier of nature", "don't amuse mankind

with the minute neatness of your imitations", "endeavour to impress them with the grandeur of your ideas" (in Pevsner page 58 1955), a conscious negation of the strengths of his forefathers and contemporaries. Despite his affinity with foreign art, Reynolds' art differs from it in fundamental ways. His weak technique and command of form (Stinton 1969) was accompanied by a superficial use of the classical idiom. Reynolds' art lacks the formal studied approach found in the French style, and some of his portraits are steeped in English sensuality and spontaneity (see fig. 3). Classicism was a device Reynolds' employed to raise the status of his sitters and took the form of depicting his sitters in classical dress with classical expressions i.e. subdued restraint. He also used classical allusions such as that in "Mrs Siddons as a Tragic Muse" to the Prophets of the Sistine Chapel. The alternative to this "mimicking" would have been to study, internalize and rework classical principles, so that they became incorporated into a personal style. Interestingly, Reynolds was also given to parodying the classical art he professed such admiration for in a similar manner to Hogarth.

The intellectual academic approach in French art has survived throughout the centuries, even in what was potentially the most spontaneous of all periods of French art: Impressionism. Despite a recognized debt to the Englishman Turner (fig. 7), the Impressionists drew on the techniques of French masters such as Delacroix and Ingres

with whom some had studied - Morisot with Ingres and Fantin-Latour with Delacroix - and others admired - Renoir and Cèzanne (fig.13) professed admiration of Delacroix, Pissaro of Ingres. Many also studied the work of foreign masters - Manet, the Spanish masters; Renoir, Veronese; Pissaro, Raphael - incorporating elements of their techniques into the new artistic language. This was not merely a recording of the evidence of the senses, but encompassed a pseudo-scientific study of the juxtaposition of tones and the effects of light - the former started by Delacroix - to help depict the outdoor. The study of the juxtapositions of colours was central to Manet's work and led him to simplify his palette. Following Delacroix's idea that grey was the enemy of the artist, he tried to convey shadow by means of the colours themselves. Both became central areas of interest for the other impressionists. Experiments in colour juxtaposition continued into Post-Impressionism in the painting of Gauguin and then into Fauvism, a movement inspired by his work. Gauguin is famous for his *synthetisme* or simplification of forms, and *cloisonisme* or search for pure tones. Of his art, he said:

> *J'obtiens par des arrangements de lignes et de couleur, avec le prétexte d'un sujet quelconque emprunté à la nature, des symphonies, des harmonies ne représentant rien d'absolument réel au sens vulgaire du mot, n'exprimant directement aucune idée, mais qui doivent faire penser comme la musique fait penser, sans le secours des idées ou des images, simplement par les affinités mystérieuses qui sont entre nos cervaux et de tels arrangements de couleurs et de lignes. (Gauguin in Dayaz-Distel page 58 1979)*

Gauguin was part of Post-Impressionism's attempt to intellectualize and systematize Impressionism (fig. 12).

Monet, Pissaro and Renoir were particularly interested in the study of light and its effects. This led eventually to the use of a fragmented brushstroke and a dissolution of form. Monet, a specialist in this area, became obsessed with light, painting the same image at different times of the day. Eventually, his feelings towards what he was depicting became more important than the recording of the image (fig. 13):

> *je pioche beaucoup, je m'entête à une série d'effet différent...plus je vais, plus je vois qu'il faut beaucoup, travailler pour arriver à rendre ce que je cherche 'instantanéité', surtout l'enveloppe, la même lumière répandue partout, et plus que jamais les choses faciles venues d'un jet me dégoûtent. Enfin je suis de plus en plus enragé du besoin de rendre ce que j'éprouve. (Monet in Dayaz-Distel page 78 1979)*

The fragmentation of the image was formalized in Seurat's "Pointillisme". It was the result of his research into Delacroix's theory of harmony which led him, like Manet, to reduce his palette to four fundamental colours. This was combined with a reading of scientific theories of colour developed by men such as Chevreuil. The resorting to scientific abstraction brings to mind the earlier Bryson quotation concerning Le Brun. Of the Impressionists original aims i.e. to record sense "impressions", perhaps the best description was that given by Schneider (1930): "un beau mensonge".

STYLES IN MUSIC

The language of music, like that of the visual arts, shows
how features associated with national minds are intimately
bound to socio-political factors.

Classicism in French music, again tied to its function of
glorification, meant that it was always part of a general
spectacle, married to dance and opera. This led to
restraining the horizontal (counterpoint) and to developing
the vertical (harmony/colour) with a view to clarity and
lightness of expression. Later French composers', such as
Berlioz, Debussy and Messiaen, have all been noted for their
unusual approach to colour and timbre. Clarity of expression
is one of the features valued by the French, which is a
point of contention between the philosophers of the two
countries. Messiaen in particular has spent much time
formally categorizing aspects of his musical language,
ranging from the relationship of harmonic colour to visual
colour, to the structure and representation of bird-song.
Unlike Schoenberg, another great figure in the development
of twentieth century music, his techniques are juxtaposed
and superimposed against one another in a collage, where the
music develops as a series of "discussions" and "arguments"
between different types of material, without any desire to
delve deeper into the nature of the material itself. The
effectiveness of the music must therefore rely on the art
with which these predeveloped blocks are placed in relation

to each other - which we might understand as the rhetoric of
the music - and not on the organic growth of a single idea.
A good example of this type of musical argument is found in
the opening to the second piece in his large-scale piano
work "Catalogue d'Oiseaux": "Le Loriot". Here we see the
clear opposition between two musical structures (labelled A
and B in fig. A), contrasting both in colour and rhythmic
vitality. Further, as the music develops over the course of
the example the content of B is gradually developed over
successive appearances whereas that of A remains constant
with the only change occurring at its fourth repetition
before the introduction of new material, where its
characteristic rising movement is reversed thereby
completing the movement's first musical sentence. A new
birdsong that proceeds immediately after this example is
distinct from A and B in its harmonic content, but
nevertheless shares something of its quirky rhythmic content
with B. A hierarchy is therefore created between the various
types of material presented, but one that owes nothing to
traditional structures of tonality and rhythmic cohesion
that usually bind together to determine the formal
architecture of music. This example emphasizes the
rhetorical nature of French music, language and rhetoric
being two French concerns. It also betrays the attention to
form and structure - structure involving the juxtaposition
of blocks.

The use of the idée fixe in Berlioz's Symphonie Fantastique proceeds not by a gradual growth and development of thought, but by the variety of environments in which the idée is placed i.e. block structure. Figure B shows two of its settings, one from the first movement, one from the last. The two environments in which the idée fixe is presented could not be more diverse. Despite the fact that there has been virtually no development or overall change in the melodic line itself - true the second is an extremely compressed version - the instrumentation is so different that there is nothing which seems to indicate that they come from the same piece of music. In the first example, the melody is presented in an expanded form, consisting of broad strokes and phrases that are well suited to the almost "cool" combination of violins and flute. The accompaniment is almost Beethovian, and clearly stems from the Viennese tradition so dear to Berlioz's heart. However, the second example, played on the high pitched E flat clarinet and accompanied this time entirely by a grouping of wind instruments directly reflects the programme provided by the composer, at this point a witches' sabbath - perhaps a little too literally at the expense of a true musical coherence, or at least the coherence found in the works of Germanic composers. Indeed, it is Berlioz's commitment to literature and the formal designs of literary narrative that mark him out as perhaps the first great Romantic composer. Berlioz is an especially interesting case, as his obsession and admiration of the formal integrity of Beethoven's music

still brings forth a result that is entirely French in its
approach.

English "classical" music has always incurred a powerful
input from the folk tradition. Indeed, the emphasis on a
"tuneful" melodic line is something that remains fairly
constant in much English music up to the present day. It can
be traced from the unusual melodic use of the cantus firmus
in Taverner's Western Wynde mass (see fig. C the cantus
firmus is shown by the bracket marked with an X), where the
listener's interest becomes centred on the treble line
throughout each movement of the mass - something extremely
unusual for its time but a procedure that certainly looks
forward to the simple melodic designs and formulae of
Italian composers of the early Baroque such as Caccini -
right through to Vaughan-William's use of folk material and
even the composers of the Manchester School (Birtwistle,
Maxwell Davies, Goehr) in the late fifties and sixties and
their experiments with melodic lines and units. The example
cited for Taverner is, as has been noted, fairly unusual.
However, the majority of his music together with the work of
his English contemporaries formed a style of polyphony
clearly discriminable from Continental sacred music, and has
long been noted by many critics for its apparent amorphous
content, lack of clear and well balanced contrapuntal lines
and general rhythmic complexity and diversity. Much of this
criticism results from a mere surface appreciation of the
music's qualities and formal design, yet even a cursory

comparison of the music of the English composer John Brown
with that of the French composer Dufay (fig. D and E
respectively) shows how this interpretation can arise.
Although the sound world of Vaughan Williams and Birtwistle
could hardly be more different, fig. F (an excerpt from
Vaughan Williams' Symphony in D) and G (a passage from the
opening of "Down by the Greenwood Side") show a remarkable
consistency in texture and formal outlook. Both consist of
simple melodies offset against and balanced by equally
simple counter-melodies, whose smooth and lyrical contours
unfold at a leisurely pace. This makes them suited to a form
of descriptive narrative, the lack of a strong rhythmic
pulse in both examples reflecting a certain lack of inner
tension and active formal design. The term narrative was
mentioned earlier in connection with the Berlioz examples,
but there the form and direction of the narrative was
imposed by the pre-compositional design of the literary
programme provided by the composer, whereas here the formal
design appears to unfold "as the spirit moves" (Cecil Gray).

Indeed, it is just this emphasis of one single dimension on
the horizontal plane - as opposed to a many-layered
polyphony - that would appear to be responsible for leading
the music away from the abstract, away from rhetorical
gesture and didactic argument, towards forms of narrative
expression and description. This perhaps does the same thing
for the ear that the narrative did in painting for the eye.
Moreover, one might argue, this concentration on a single

aspect with its direct and straightforward gratification of the needs of the listener, accords well with the apparent English desire and emphasis on the practicalities of musical form and expression and one that would seem to relate directly to the amateur status of the composer in English society.

Under the Ancien Régime in France, music served the Royal Establishment by proclaiming classical perfection of the French kingdom. Even before the reign of Louis XIV, an era when artistic politicization was at its height, the Academy had the specific task, not so much to popularize the music, but to create a specific style to be safeguarded by the governing elite. Thus:

> ...French music, provided the sonic glitter for ceremonies designed to inspire public awe of the ruler and for splendid theatrical diversions designed to impress foreigners and occupy courtiers. Above all, this music was the medium by which the King's grandeur and his glorious adventures were accounted to all the estates. (Isherwood Page 352 1973)

Music was thus transformed into the "handmaiden" of absolutism (Isherwood 1973). It is interesting to note that, in the nineteenth century, the revival in French music coincided with a profound nationalistic feeling and an attempt to enhance the image of the new Republic. The belief in music's potential power stemmed from the Platonic idea that it could influence the psyche. Incubation within a national Academy, designed for the specific purpose of glorification, led to, as in the visual arts, the

internalization   of   certain   classical   values   such   as   the

attention   to   balance,   harmony   and   structure.   It   also

entailed   a   studied   intellectual   approach   to   the   art,

manifested by the wealth of theoretical treatises published.

The first musical academy, L'Académie de Musique et Poésie,

stressed the ethical value of music,[7] and because of this

stated that is would specialize in musical composition which

followed Plato's rules of harmony, melody and rhythm.

By the reign of Louis XIV, strict adherence to antique

values had given way to the use of the antique as a form of

analogy - in the opera's written under the absolutist

monarchy of Louis XIV, the heroes of antiquity were used to

symbolize the King. The music of the new Academy did however

retain   certain   classical   ideals,   such   as   the   marriage

between words and music. This explains the rhetorical and

the literary character of French music which reached its

heights in Berlioz's music. Like the Academy of Arts, the

Academy of Music became "an aristocratic dictator" but this

time of "music and poetical style". Members of the Academy

included Rameau and the court composer Lully, whose operas

found a safe haven within its walls.[8] Rameau received

notoriety   through   his   theoretical   treatise   on   harmony,

treating music as "a physiomathematical science" (Harman

page 250 1959).[9] Like other French academies, the Academy of

Music and other state centres of research offered, and still

do, a rich source of support to French musicians. They

continue to play a central role in musical training and

offer extensive research facilities. Centres such as IRCAM allow theoretical development in the area of musical expression, a central concern to contemporary musicians such as Boulez and Messiaen.

English musical activity, like artistic activity, has never been confined within the limits of an academy, and has lacked the state patronage of its French counterpart. Even under the Tudors, great lovers of music, and indeed under whose reign the blooming of English music occurred, musical activity was not the exlusive property of the monarchy. It is interesting to note that during this period musicians lamented the decline of musical activity.[10] Morley complained that music had fallen into "the nature of a mechanical arte rather than reckoned amongst other sciences", as it was in France. He was remarking on a feature of English music which has remained relatively constant: the importance the practical aspect of the art assumes over the theoretical. Indeed, when looking at the musical treatises of the period, there does seem to be an emphasis on technique, playing and composition. Morley went on to advise musicians to study other things, advice which Boyd (1940) claims they have heeded ever since.

Morley was speaking at the time of the Reformation. The Reformation delt a severe blow to English music as it entailed the loss of a crucial source of support to a tradition which did not enjoy official state patronage.

Music had thus to make itself appealing to the wider public
- upper and middle classes aspiring to "gentlemanly status".
It could only do this by emphasizing the practical (playing)
aspect of the art. Talents which became particularly valued
were improvisation of vocal parts and sight-reading. Music,
like painting, became a gentlemanly achievement, which is
why Morley was concerned that it would become purely
"mechanical". The emphasis has continued to be on musical
practicalities - composers in British society do not enjoy
the same degree of recognition as men such as Boulez in
France and Stockhausen in Germany - and, despite the dearth
of internationally renowned musicians in nineteenth century
England, London in particular remained a centre of musical
activity drawing musicians from all over Europe (Price
1973). Not only did musical activity in England not enjoy
extensive state patronage, but it was also not used as a
weapon by the state. Thus it did not remain confined within
the walls of academic institutions and was never a slave to
classical ideals. This explains perhaps the frequent
incursions of folk music into the "classical" tradition,
accounting for the abundance of "tuneful" melodies, as well
as its freer and unrestrained nature (Price 1981).

STYLES IN LITERATURE

Quinton (1982) draws attention to the disparity between the English and continental use of philosophy in literature. Of the British he says:

> *The plain fact is that general ideas have never been a central preoccupation of British novelists. Straight forward reforming propaganda is an occasional supplementary feature, most notably, of course, in Dickens, but the nearest thing to a modern British novelist of ideas that comes to mind is Aldous Huxley and in his case the ideas are presented in a very externally attached, conversational, not to say brains-trust, form; the development is not the bone structure but rather the obtrusive surface of his fiction. (Quinton page 56 1982)*

"Nice Work" (1989) by Lodge is a contemporary illustration of Quinton's point. Quinton's remarks do not apply to French authors. Furthermore, writers like Gide, Malraux and Camus pose serious problems to the English in terms of categorization: are they philosophers or writers? In "Notes sur L'Angleterre" (1872), reviewed by Henry James, Taine evaluates the relative strengths of English and French writers. Taine describes the English love of "facts", and their resistance to theories, inferences and conclusions. He refers to their disdain towards "the more or less irresponsible play of conjecture, opinion and invention" (Taine in James repr. 1987), manifested through the paucity of abstract words and general terms in the English language. In the previous chapter, reference was made to the differences between the French and English languages. The assumption was that language selectively emphasized features

which the intellectual tradition and its thought style
judged most important. The argument presented here is that
the two literary traditions can be seen as making explicit
the cultural priorities implicit in the different languages
and their thought styles - a reflection of those of their
respective socio-political milieus.

The surface versus deep structural role that philosophy
plays in fictional writing can be related to what has been
previously said about rationalism's commitment to
structure.[11] This structuralism, inherent in the French
language, has classical origins - classicism was
institutionalized in the French Academy as it was in those
of Music and Arts. General philosophical and social ideas
are the chief concern of French writers - a priority which
as reflected in the abundance of abstract general
terminology of the French language. This contrasts with the
concern for narrative "realism" found in British literature,
and which stresses the personal and psychological. In
practice, this produces on the one hand, an emphasis on
recording what is known through experience - made easier by
a rich, descriptive vocabulary, which possesses an abundant
psychological terminology (see chapter four) - and on the
other, a more speculative approach where story and
characters are secondary to the expression of grand ideals
or the voicing of the author's social critique. This is
usually at the expense of dramatic and psychological
realism. Indeed, a reproach made to Sartre's literary and

dramatic writings - an extreme example of the importance philosophy plays in literature - by Anglo-Saxon critics such as Aronson (1980) is that his characters are conceived with the sole purpose of expounding ideas and enacting conflicts. As such, they are two dimensional and do not correspond to the reader's possible experience of "real people". "Le Diable et le Bon Dieu", perhaps one of Sartre's plays where the dramatic action is the most contrived, deals with the problem of idealism and realism in political action. It centres around the central character's - Goertz's - struggle to find the most efficient way of becoming an "engaged" individual. The play's lack of dramatic success stems from the abundance of rhetorical devices. At the end of the play, as Aronson points out, an intellectual struggle has been resolved and a moral choice made. Yet the protagonist's character, rather implausibly, remains unchanged. This is because the main action is philosophical and is not an investigation of lived experience.

Concern with general ideas as opposed to psychological/dramatic realism is found throughout French literature, from Corneille to Sartre, from Voltaire to Camus. Corneille is often regarded as his French equivalent, although clearly more limited in scope. His work is steeped in classicism, betrayed by the overwhelming attention not only to structure, but also to restraint - a parallel is often made between the painting of Poussin and the drama of Corneille (Schneider 1925). The artificiality of the drama

is accentuated by both its classical settings and the use of
rhyming verse with classical metres. A comparison, indicates
that the characters in the French plays are again "ideal
types" (Weber 1949). Their psychologies are of secondary
importance to their structural role in the play and their
function as conveyors of grand ideals/emotions – in
"Polyeucte", tragic heroism.[1] Shakespeare provides not only
a more lively and interesting storyline – the insertion of
comical scenes often supplies a calculated and welcome
respite from the drama – but also characters that are
"human" in terms of displaying complex, multidimensional
personalities.[2] This is true even in historical plays such
as "Henry V" and "Richard III". Gray's claim that
Shakespeare was not concerned with form is contentious, and
can probably only be upheld in a comparison with the extreme
formalism of the Frenchmen. Scenes and characters often do
have specific functions, but structural considerations never
compromise the psychological and dramatic interest.
Furthermore, the different weighting of the structural and
narrative realism, generates the same opposition between the
static and the dynamic as was observed in the Hogarth/Greuze
comparison.

The portrayal of lived experience has indeed been a forte of
English women writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Taine remarked – and James agreed – that the
English gift for psychological observation has no
correlative in France (James page 63 1987). Austen and the

Brontë sisters are famous for their depiction of the lives and sensibilities of women, although Austen did so in a less romantic and more factual way. Austen's fiction was a portrait of English life, and much of her material was based on her own experience of it. Her writings also betray an intense interest in human nature and the psychological. Central to her works, for example, was the theme of "self knowledge". This encompassed a knowledge of the effects of societal expectations, as well as the more psychological themes of trying to achieve an understanding of one's own character and the motives of others.[14] This emphasis on recording life as it is lived, and attention to matters psychological, can be contrasted with a more speculative French genre, as represented by Flaubert's classic "Madame Bovary".[15] Neither of these concerns were crucial to this novel which is primarily a critique of bourgeois mores. A century later, Mauriac made Thérèse Desqueroux the centre of his critique of bourgeois society. Although he described the psychological trauma of a woman who was a prisoner of a stifling family environment, it was secondary to the general points made in the book concerning French bourgeois society.

Related stylistic differences are found in two authors who shared a taste for social criticism, Balzac and Dickens. Besides occasional excursions into romantic sentimentality, for the benefit of his Victorian audience, Dickens' critique revolved around a detailed recording and satirical description of Victorian society, implementing a Hogarthian

approach to literature. Balzac's writings are more akin to Greuzes' "drame Bourgeois" - particularly good examples of these are Balzac's "La Cousine Bette" and "Eugénie Grandet". The stylistic differences are clear in Balzac's and Dickens' novels dealing with the French Revolution. Balzac's "Les Chouans" is a historical epic, where romanticism is coupled with a naturalism which forshadows Zola.[16] The central characters are stereotypes, conforming to romantic conventions, helping Balzac articulate his critique of the aristocracy of Eastern France. "The Tale of two Cities" may be atypical of Dickensian novels in terms of length - it is shorter - and thus the amount of detailed description which is included. However, it retains certain Dickensian features. These include the reluctance to speculate about the unknown, betrayed by his focus on two cities with which he was acquainted. His characters are grafted from real life - Merchant Defarge is based on Carlyle's depiction of a real wine merchant - or the result of autobiographical projection. Dickens' book, quite characteristically, provides an interesting story, where the comic and the tragic are carefully intertwined.[17]

The idea of thought styles as a basic design or motif persisting over time, can be illustrated in literature by considering two authors such as Zola and Lawrence - Lawrence has often been judged untypical of English literature. Writing in different centuries, they are interested in the same Nietszchian theme - namely the decadence of

civilization. They deal with this theme in a manner which is consonant with their native thought styles. The lives and feelings of Zola's characters and the story line are used to communicate his ideas on general social issues relating to the conditions of the working classes.[18] Both narration and psychological experience are more important in Lawrence, as is evident if one compares the opening pages of "The Rainbow" or "Sons and Lovers" with those of "L'Assommoir" or "Germinal", where working communities are also the focus of attention. Zola's opening descriptions are impersonal, consonant with his desire to portray a general social problem. The Lantier family depicted in the first pages of "Germinal" is anonymous, a typical French working class family.[19] "Sons and Lovers", however, begins with a description of a specific mining community.[20] Lawrence engages in "scene setting" to introduce his characters. Furthermore, "Sons and Lovers" deals with psychological issues, being a detailed analysis of the interpersonal relationships between parents and children in a mining community. Lawrence's greater interest in the psychological is evident in his work on psychoanalysis where he examines the complex psychological issues which appear in his fictional work. One of these issues, which is examined in "Lady Chatterley's Lover" is how to achieve emotional/sexual satisfaction at different stages of a marriage.

Perhaps, the differences outlined above are best captured in an interchange between the French author Maupassant and the

American Henry James. James is famous for his portrayal of late nineteenth society. He defended the importance of the psychological method in fiction against the attacks of Maupassant. Maupassant favoured a genre which "avoids with care all complicated explanations, all dissertations upon motives..." (Maupassant in Beach page 126 1918). To this James responds:

> *It is as difficult to describe an action without glancing at its motive, its moral history, as it is to describe a motive without glancing at its practical consequence. Our history and our fiction are what we do: but it is surely not more easy to determine where what we do begins than to determine where it ends - notoriously a hopeless task.... If psychology should be hidden in life, as, according to M. de Maupassant it should be in a book, the question immediately comes up, 'From whom is it hidden?'...For some people motive, relations, explanations, are a part of the very surface of the drama, with the footlights beating full upon them. For me an act, an incident, an attitude, may be a sharp, detached, isolated thing, of which I give a full account in saying that such and such a way it came off. For you it may be hung about with implications, with relations and conditions as necessary to help you recognize it as the clothes of your friends are to help you recognize them in the street. (James page 238 1987)*

The assumption that "psychology is hidden in life" was important to French social discourse, as chapter four demonstrates.

CONCLUSION

What becomes apparent when dealing with the artistic material from the two countries is the different methods used to describe them. In the case of the French work, it is much easier to refer to structural and formal elements, where one is reduced to description in the case of the English. This alone indicates a fundamental difference: that of perceptual versus rhetorical art, typical of the thought styles of empiricism and rationalism respectively.

This chapter illustrates how the differences between rational and empirical art are the result of distinct "styles". The latter are distilled from thought-environment interaction and as such are specific to certain socio-political milieus. Furthermore, it provides evidence that the styles are sustained by particular institutional environments. Other points made in the first chapter were also substantiated, such as the occurence of thought styles as designs or motifs based on the ideally typical models, and the use of outside influences to legitimize a critique of native practices. Rationalist art, used in the past as a weapon by the French State, has retained strong political undertones, accounting for its discursive, rhetorical and symbolic nature. It enjoyed, and still does, considerable state patronage. The centrality of state institutions with their classical values in its development explains its emphasis on the academic and theoretical. In England, art

has never enjoyed such extensive state patronage, and has thus never been polarized by institutions. Hence its perceptual, practical approach. Britain is described as the land of the miniature and the amateur, and its art is spontaneous, descriptive and concerned with the art of the narrative. In literature, the rationalist concern with structure and general ideas - ideals and broad socio-political issues - contrasts with the empirical emphasis on describing lived experience which is accompanied by a concern for interesting narrative and psychological realism. The opposition between a tradition focusing on general social issues versus one more concerned with the experiential and the psychological is an enactment of the respective linguistic constraints, and will prove important to the chapter on social discourse.

The formal, theoretical aspects of rationalism, its concern with generalities as opposed to specifics - which are important to empiricism - will emerge more clearly in the subsequent chapters. In the following chapter, the dissimilarity between the academic/intellectual French style and the intuitive British one is examined in connection with eighteenth and nineteenth century science.

1. Pevsner (1955) differentiates between the "history" and the "geography" of art. The former deals with historical development of art by categorizing this development into periods with specific features. The geography of art is interested in isolating the persistent characteristics of national style.

2. The noun realism as it is used in this context, embodies several ideas (this applies to the adjective realistic and to the noun real):
a) accurate representation without idealization
b) attention to what is known through experience - sensual, psychological experience. This may involve describing that with which one is familiar - a point to be made in connection with Dickens - to avoid speculation and idealization.

3. Gainsborough was admired by "the apostle of truth to nature" (Burke page 221 1976), Constable, despite his dismissal by the head of the British Academy as "chaotic" and "uncouth" (see Burke 1976).

4. Concerning the issue of structure, in other artistic pursuits, the inability or avoidance of structure in the visual arts, becomes an aversion to it. For example the English love of landscape gardens contrasts with the French preference for the geometrical organization of "Versailles" and "Les Tuileries". Like Constable's paintings, the English landscape gardens embody the assumption that it would be presumptuous to impose order on nature. Whereas the English worked to make their gardens as natural as possible the French transformed them into logical contructions, a display of man's intellectual mastery of the natural world.

Another example of aversion to structure is in the perpendicular style of most English parish churches. The churches are noted for their compartmented, square appearance which is due to their being built block by block. Churches are coordinated as opposed to moulded, like those on the Continent, which are built to an integral plan. A comparison between the thirteenth century cathedrals of Chartres and Salisbury indicates that this difference is due to national "taste" not that the two churches are at different stages in architectural development.

5. Codes are culturally specific symbol systems which have meanings attached to them dependent upon the thought styles. The latter, as has been argued, are a product of specific societal substructures. Thus the symbolic meaning is dependent upon substructure as the chapter shows.

6. The students at the French Academy attended drawing classes and lectures on what Colbert referred to as the "préceptes positifs" of art (Isherwood page 160 1973), given by notable artists such as Le Brun. Successful students – in terms of the competitions run by the Academy – had the coveted opportunity of studying at a branch of the Academy set up in Rome. They would thus become thoroughly acquainted with classical culture at a time when the classical metaphor was being used as a political analogy by the French State.

7. Baïf and his circle – members of the first Academy of music and poetry – believed that to instill morality, music had to allow textual material to be audible and provide an interesting harmonious accompaniment. They advocated the classical ideal of the marriage between words and music, as opposed to one dominating the other (Isherwood 1973).

8. Lully modified the Italian opera, emphasizing opera's literary aspects and moulding the music both to suit this requirement and the taste of his French audience. He combined the element of spectacle desired by the court with a music which simplified the Italian operatic style to serve the words better. The literary considerations of French opera stood in opposition to the Italian attitude towards the form. The Italians believed that musical embellishments demonstrating the performer's prowess, were of essential importance.

9. Rameau's treatise tried to classify music scientifically and philosophically. Rameau believed that music was dependent on " reason, nature and geometry", and that thus it was "a physiomathematical science". In addition he thought – and was right about the music of the late Baroque and the French *Style Galant* – that harmony followed from melody: "melody is born of harmony". (Harman page 250 1959)

10.
> *But what saie I, musicke? One of the seven liberal sciences? It is almost
> banished from this Realme. If it were not the Queen's majestie did favour this
> excellent science, singing men and choristers might goe abegging, together with
> their maister the player on the organs. (Boswell in Boyd Page 17 1940)*

11. The surface versus deep structural usage of philosophy can be illustrated by extracts from Forster and Sartre. In "The Longest Journey", Forster uses philosophy "as a subject matter" (Quinton 1982) for his writing. The second extract is from Sartre's play, "Le diable et le bon dieu", where in a short excerpt political issues are discussed within a philosophical framework.

*'The cow is there', said Ansell, lighting a match and holding the carpet. No one
spoke. He waiting until the end of the match fell off. Then he said again, 'She
is there, the cow. There now.'*

'You have not proved it,' said a voice.

'I have proved it to myself.'

*'I have proved to myself that she isn't,' said the voice. 'The cow is not
there.' Ansell frowned and lit another match.*

*She's there for me,' he declared, 'I don't care whether she's there for you
or not. Whether I'm in Cambridge or Iceland or dead, the cow will be there.'*

*It was philosophy. They were discussing, the existence of objects. Do they exist
only when there is someone to look at them? or have they a real existence of
their own? It is all very interesting, but at the same time very difficult.
Hence the cow. She seemed to make things easier. She seemed so familiar so
solid...*

(Forster, The Longest Journey page 3)

NASTY

Les hommes de Dieu détruisent ou construisent et toi tu conserves.

GOETZ

Moi?

NASTY

*Tu mets du désordre. Et le désordre est le meilleur serviteur de l'ordre établi.
Tu affaiblis la chevalerie entière en trahissant Conrad et tu affaibliras la
bourgeoisie en détruisant Worms. A qui cela profite-t-il? Aux grands. Tu sers
les grands, Goetz, et tu les serviras quoi que tu fasses; toute destruction
brouillonne, affaiblit les faiblesses, enrichit les riches, accroît la puissance
des puissants.*

GOETZ

*Donc, je fais contraire de ce que je veux? (Avec ironie). Heureusement, Dieu t'a
envoyé pour m'éclairer. Que me propose-tu?*

(Sartre, Le Diable et Le Bon Dieu page 93)

Nasty gives a dramatic in depth analysis of the situation, revealing the unforeseen
consequences to Goertz in an analysis of the genre that has become the hallmark of
structuralist philosophy. The formal, almost pontificating, style is certainly not one to
expect from a conversation between friends - indicated by the first person pronoun.

12. Polyeucte deals with the theme of tragic heroism. A young Armenian Lord becomes a
martyr to the christian cause. Although this is the main theme, others include honour and

the problem of conflicting loyalties - Polyeucte's young wife marries the Armenian instead of Roman guard because her father wishes it. The play opens with Polyeute's account of his young wife's premonition of his imminent death and how she has begged him not to go out of the palace.

Je sais ce qu'est un songe, et le peu de croyance
Qu'un homme doit donner à son extravagance,
Qui d'un amas confus des vapeurs de la nuit
Forme de vains objets que le reveil détruit;
Mais vous savez pas ce que c'est une femme:
Vous ignorez quels droits elle a sur toute l'âme,
Quand, après un long temps qu'elle a su nous charmer,
Les flambeaux de l'hymen viennent de s'allumer. '
Pauline, sans raison dans la douleur plongée,
Craint et croit déjà voir ma mort qu'elle a songée;
Elle oppose ses pleurs au dessein que je fais,
Et tàche à m'empecher de sortir du palais.

(Corneille, Polyeute act 1 scene 1)

13. What has been said about the French playrights is also of true Anglo-Saxon writers such such as Shaw and Wilde. They, however, are working within a particular genre - satire - where the audience does not expect realism.

14. "Sense and Sensibility" centres around the clash of sense, embodied in Elinor and sensibility, embodied in Marianne. Marianne is deceived by Willoughby. His true colours are revealed to her by Colonel Brandon, who eventually becomes her husband.

Marianne Dashwood was born to an extraordinary fate. She was born to discover the falsehood of her own opinions, and to counteract, by her conduct, her most favourite maxims.

(Austen, Sense and Sensibility page 333)

15. Flaubert's speculative approach does not succeed in developing the same feelings of intimacy with the leading protagonist as, for example, Charlotte Bronte does in Jane Eyre or Austen does in Emma or Sense and Sensibility. Flaubert's is clearly a portrayal from

the "outside". His description of what Madame Bovary experiences after she starts an affair with her lover Rodolphe, illustrates the point. Flaubert uses an extended metaphor to describe her feelings in a highly romanticized fashion.

Elle se répétait;"J'ai un amant! un amant!" se délectant à cette idée comme à celle d' une autre puberté qui lui serait survenue. Elle allait donc posséder enfin ces joies de l'amour, cette fièvre du bonheur dont elle avait désespéré. Elle entrait dans quelques chose de merveilleux où tout serait passion, extase, délire; une immensité bleuâtre l'entourait, les sommets du sentiment étincelaient sous sa pensée, l'existence ordinaire n'apparaissait qu'au loin, tout en bas, dans l'ombre, entre les intervalles de ces hauteurs.

(Flaubert, Mme Bovary page 191)

16. This passage indicates the stereotyped qualities of Balzac's characters, as well as how they are used for voicing his opinions on social issues - in this extract the social position of women and how this contrasts with their emotional power. One of the themes of "Les Chouans" is the important role women played in the French revolution. As such the character of the republican Marie de Verneuil is far more developed than that of her royalist lover, the Marquis de Montauran. This is a dialogue between them.

- Mademoiselle, dit-il avec une émotion mal déguisée, êtes-vous fille ou femme, ange ou démon?

- Je suis l'un et l'autre, reprit-elle en riant. N'y a-t-il pas toujours quelque chose de diabolique et d'angélique chez une jeune fille qui n'a point aimé, qui n'aime pas, et qui n'aimeras peut-être jamais?

- Et vous trouvez-vous heureuse ainsi? dit-il en prenant un ton et des manières libres, comme s'il eût déjà concu moins d'estime pour sa libératrice.

- Oh! heureuse, reprit-elle, non. Si je viens à penser que je suis seule, dominée par des conventions sociales qui me rendent nécessairement artificieuse, j'envie les privilèges de l'homme. Mais, si je songe à tous les moyens que la nature nous a donnés pour vous envelopper, vous autres, pour vous enlacer dans les filets invisibles d'une puissance à laquelle aucun de vous ne peut résister, alors mon rôle ici-bas me sourit; puis tout à

coup, il me semble, et je sens que mépriserais un homme, s'il était la dupe de séductions vulgaires.

(Balzac, Les Chouans page 167)

17. The above contrasts with the vivid, satiric Dickensian scenes.

Funerals had at all times a remarkable attraction for Mr Cruncher; he always pricked up his sense, and became excited, when a funeral passed Tellson's. Naturally, therefore, a funeral with this uncommon attendance excited him greatly, and he asked of the first man who ran against him:

'What is it, brother? What's it about?'

'I don't know,' said the man. 'Spies! Yaha! Tst! Spies!'

He asked another man, 'Who is it ?'

'I don't know,' returned the man, clapping his hands to his mouth nevertheless, and vociferating in a surprising heat and with the greatest ardour, 'Spies! Yaha! Tst, tst! Spies!'...

The idea was so acceptable in the prevalent absence of any idea, that the crowd caught it up with eagerness, and loudly repeating the suggestion to have 'em out, and to pull 'em out, mobbed the two vehicles so closely that they came to a stop. On the crowd's opening the coach doors, the one mourner scuffled out of himself and was in their hands for a moment; but he was so alert, and made such good use of his time, that in another moment he was scouring away up a by-street, after shedding his cloak, hat, long hatband, white pocket-handkerchief, and other symbolical tears.

(Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities page 185)

18. Zola's leaning towards broader social issues is stated in an outline of his plan for "Germinal":

> *J'ai toujours, dans la série des Rougon-Macquart gardé une large place à l'étude du peuple, de l'ouvrier, et cela dès l'idée première de l'oeuvre. Mais ce n'est qu'au moment de L'assommoir que, ne pouvant mettre dans ce livre l'étude du rôle politique et surtout social de l'ouvrier, je pris la résolution de réserver cette matière, pour en faire un autre roman. Et, plus tard, ce projet s'est précisé, lorsque je me suis rendu compte du vaste mouvement socialiste qui travaille la vielle Europe d'une façon si redoutable. Le cadre d'une grève s'est imposé naturellement à moi comme le seul dramatique qui devait donner aux faits le relief nécessaire. Germinal est donc le complément de L'Assommoir, les deux faces de l'ouvrier.*

19. The opening scene of "Germinal" plunges us straight into the narrative drama. The description he gives of the Lantier family is "impersonal" in the sense that their identity is of no importance. They represent a typical working class family, living anywhere in France.

Quand Gervaise s'éveilla, vers cinq heures, raidie, les reins brisés, elle éclata en sanglots. Lantier n'était pas rentré. Pour la première fois, il découchait. Elle resta assise au bord du lit, sous le lambeau de perse déteinte qui tombait de la flèche attachée au plafond par une ficelle. Et, lentement, de ses yeux voilés de larmes, elle faisait le tour de la misérable chambre garnis, meublée d'une commode de noyer dont un tiroir manquait, de trois chaises de paille et d'une petite table graisseuse, sur laquelle traînait un pot à eau ébréché.

(Zola, Germinal page 10)

20. At the beginning of "Sons and Lovers" Lawrence describes in detail the miners dwellings, and then introduces the Morels who are to be the focus of the story.

"The Bottoms" succeeded to "Hell Row". Hell Row was a block of thatched, bulging cottages that stood by the brookside on Greenhill Lane. The brook ran under the alder-trees, scarcely soiled by these small mines, whose coal was drawn to the surface by donkeys that plodded wearily in a circle round a gin. And all over the countryside were these same pits, some of which had been worked in the time of Charles II, the few colliers and the donkeys burrowing down like ants into the earth, making queer mounds and little black places among the corn-fields and the meadows. And the cottages of these coalminers, in blocks and pairs here and there, together with odd farms and homes of the stockingers, straying over the parish formed the village of Bestwood.

Then, some sixty years ago, a sudden change took place. The gin-pits were elbowed aside by the large mines of the financiers....

The Bottoms consisted of six blocks of miners dwellings, two rows of three, like the dots on a blank-six domino, and twelve houses in a block. This double row of dwellings sat at

the foot of the rather sharp slope from Bestwood, and looked out, from the attic windows at least, on the slow climb of the valley towards Selby.

(Lawrence, Sons and Lovers page 1)

Hogarth, W. Marriage à la Mode: Shortly after the Marriage fig.1

Greuze, J.B. L'accordée du Village fig.2

Reynolds, J.   The Laughing Girl   fig.3

Gainsborough, T.   Mrs Siddons   fig.5

Romney, G.   Miss Martindale   fig.4

Constable, J.G.   Flatford Mill   fig.6

Turner, J.M.V.   The Fighting Temeraire   fig.7

John, A.   Colonel T.E. Lawrence   fig.8

Bacon, F.   Three Studies for Figures at
the Base of a Crucifixion   fig.9

Braque, G.   Bottles and Fishes   fig.10

zanne, P.   The Black Clock   fig.11

net, C.O.   Rouen Cathedrale   fig.13

Gauguin, P.   A Vase of Flowers   fig.12

David, J.L.   Portrait of Jacobus Blauw   fig.14

Champaigne, P. de   Triple Portrait of Cardinal
Richelieu   fig.15

LeBrun, C.   Le Chancelier Séguier   fig.16

FIG. A   THE OPENING OF 'LE LORIOT' FROM MESSIAEN'S 'CATALOGUE D'OISEAUX I'

FIG. B   TWO EXTRACTS FROM BERLIOZ'S
          SYMPHONIE FANTASTIQUE

FIG. C   THE OPENING OF THE GLORIA FROM TAVERNER'S WESTERN WYNDE MASS

FIG.D   EXTRACT   FROM   A   CAROL
BY   JOHN   BROWN

FIG. E THE OPENING OF THE KYRIE FROM DUFAY'S MASS 'SE LA FACE AY PALE'

CHAPTER THREE

SCIENCE IN NATIONAL CONTEXT

Important scientific results have emerged from a variety of contexts - from isolated geniuses as much as scientific societies, from practical men as well as theoreticians, from wild speculations and from severely disciplined reasoning. In different countries and different periods the methods and goals of science have covered a range of possibilities. (Gay Lussac in Crosland page 43 1978)

The previous chapter focused on the features of the nationally specific thought styles, and substantiated various other claims made in the first chapter. This chapter concentrates on validating the proposition that the thought styles issue from culturally specific thought-environment complexes. As such, the emphasis will be more on linking the characteristics of the thought styles to the different cultural environments. The fundamental argument is that features of the national thought styles are sustained by communities with different structures and functions. These communities internalize contrasting ideals of knowledge, products of national political difference.

The example of science is a particularly interesting one because of the assumptions attached to it. In the past science has been considered a progressive, universal, value-

free study with absolute truth as its attainable goal.
Progressiveness and the teleological model have been
seriously challenged by alternatives such as Kuhn's idea of
development through successive revolutions and paradigm
shifts, and Popper's model of conjecture and refutation. The
notion of value-freedom is no longer tenable either, since
it has become obvious that social, economic and political
factors affect the development of science. Thus there have
been many attempts to account for the complexity of the
relationship between science and culture - an early example
can be found in Sears (1950) work. The assumption that has
proved the most resistent to criticism is that of
universality - science as a universal enterprise built upon
common ideals, sharing theories and methodologies. In a
volume entitled "Science and Society", edited by Kaplan
(1965), Cardwell maintains that unlike art, law and
literature, science is truly international, a view shared by
de Beer in the same volume.' That scientific achievements of
one country are a function of its neighbours is, some would
argue, unquestionable (see Jenner quoted in de Beer (1965)):
the chemist Lavoisier built his chemical revolution on the
discoveries of Priestly and Black, and Darwin's single
greatest predecessor was the Frenchman Lamarck. What is more
tenuous is to suggest that cultural factors exert a
negligible influence on the development of the scientific
enterprise. Over the centuries, consistent differences in
political structures have affected the organization of, and
the values incorporated into, the English and French

scientific communities. These macroscopic factors have had repercussions for the methods and ideas of the individual scientist. Rephrased in terms of the thesis, macroscopic factors are responsible for different thought styles which have initiated contrasting scientific approaches.

Randell (1969) has pointed to distinct traditions of scientific thought. Other references are to be found in the biographical literature on scientists of both countries. Crosland (1978), in his comparison of the scientists Gay-Lussac and Davy, proposes the opposition between the "classical" and the "intuitive" scientist. Furthermore, research indicated that during the era of scientific professionalization, the classical/intuitive distinction was widespread among French and English scientists. The classical or French scientist, as he is portrayed in the literature, was both an intellectual and a professional. A lover of systematicity and analysis, he was concerned with the theoretical aspect of science. Going beyond the evidence of his senses, the French scientist used general, scientific principles to structure and order the various disciplines. The English scientist used his intuition and perceptual intelligence to provide novel and interesting insights into scientific research, preferring the practicalities of experimentation. The different attitudes went so far as to govern the materials these scientists studied (Crosland 1979). Like the artistic types, these scientific ones are ideal in that not all English and French scientists

conformed to the models. However, they capture the relative strengths of the scientists in both countries.

This distinction, the starting point, is then related, following Greenaway's (1956) assumption that scientific education is of great importance to the understanding of the scientist's mind, to the scientific training of the two countries. Education is just one of the ways in which the scientific communities in France and England have differed over the centuries. A description of the eighteenth and nineteenth century scientific establishments stresses that they were a product of a stable political difference: the strong interventionist French state versus the weak non interventionist English state. This contrast dates back to the dawn of absolutism in France. Contrasting the two communities serves to highlight some of the consequences of these different political systems. The contrast was responsible for the institutionalization of the amateur versus professional approach to science in England and France respectively, a difference hinted at in the previous chapter in connection with art. The link between empiricism and amateurishness is regularly made in the literature on English education (Halls 1965, Dancy 1968). Secondly, it gives us an insight into the origins of the contrasting pragmatic and intellectualist approaches to knowledge - to be explored in later chapters - typical of the rationalist and empirical thought styles respectively. An account of the genesis of both these properties adds support to the idea of

thought styles as distilled from thought-environment complexes. Finally, the discussion highlights the origins of the "structure" in French society, which is commonly attributed to the philosophical bias of the Cartesian mind (Halls 1965). An alternative explanation is given for the presence of structure in French society and its absence in England - an explanation to be elaborated in a later chapter on education. This leads to the conclusion that certain psychological differences are not only sustained but also mirrored at the social level.[*]

SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES

The work of historians, such as Crosland, Mckie and others,[*] makes it possible to offer the opposition of the intuitive, perceptive English scientist against the systematic Frenchman as a workable hypothesis, capturing the relative strengths of the scientists of both nations. Chemists are the focus of attention because of the abundance of available comparative material. There is potential to extrapolate and to see whether similar differences arise between scientists working in other fields. Here biologists will be used, chemistry and biology being the two areas in which major scientific revolutions occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Hartley, in a collection of essays on key figures in chemistry, describes Lavoisier as lacking in "qualitative

intuition" (page 32 1971), but refers to his "systematic mind" (page 20-21 1971). Furthermore, "he relied on measurement and lacked the superb qualitative instincts" which lay behind the discoveries of Priestley (Hartley page 4 1966). Hartley talks about Priestley's "enthusiastic energy", "curiosity", his "keen observation", "exceptional visual memory" and the "ingenuity and enterprise with which he devised and carried out new experiments with the simplest means" (Hartley page 17 1971). Mckie (1952), in a biography of Lavoisier, refers to Priestley as "one of the greatest scientific experimenters of his time" (page 85 1952). The work of Lavoisier and Priestley does differ, supporting the characterizations of their biographers. Priestley's innovative experimentation is translated into the type of apparatus he used and the format his experiments took. These were explorations and discoveries, and Priestley himself says about his investigations into the nature of air:

> ...I will frankly acknowledge, that, at the commencement of the experiments recited in this section, I was so far from having formed any hypothesis that led to the discoveries I made in pursuing them, that they would have appeared very improbable to me had I been told of them;...(Priestley in Leicester and Klickstein page 113 1968)

In the same paper - "Of Dephlogisticated Air, and of the Constitution of the Atmosphere" - he apologizes to his audience for repeating how "surprised" he was at his findings. His discovery that plants purify air was the result of "casual" observation (Priestley in Leicester and Klickstein page 123 1968). Priestley's experiments contrast

with   the   meticulously   planned,   precision   analyses   of   his French   contemporary.   Before   carrying   out   experiments   on   the calcination   of   tin   in   closed   vessels,   Lavoisier   "reasoned   to himself"   about   Boyle's   findings.   Judging   them   inconsistent, he   set   about   his   own   meticulous   investigations.   These   were carried   out   in   a   logical   stepwise   manner   with   the   utmost care   and   ·accuracy.   Lavoisier   was   concerned   with quantitative,   analytical   chemistry,   as   the   multiple   tables and   frequent   references   to   precise   measurements   testify,   not with   interesting   experimentation   which   appealed   to   the imagination   and   the   senses.

Moving   to   a   later   generation   of   chemists,   the   contemporaries Gay-Lussac   and   Davy   have   been   the   subject   of   a   detailed comparison   by   Crosland   (1980).   Davy   emerges   as   an imaginative   innovator   who   regarded   science   as   an   adventure: a   romantic   scientist   (Crosland   1980).   Gay-Lussac,   on   the other   hand,   was   a   disciplined   investigator.   He   searched   for the   principles   underlying   his   scientific   discoveries   and   is remembered   for   his   method   of   volumetric   analysis   and   his   gas laws: a   classical   scientist   (Crosland   1980).   Crosland   (1978) also   remarks   on   the   few   quantitative   experiments   which   can be   accredited   to   Davy,   besides   the   number   expected   of   a chemist   in   the   generation   after   Lavoisier.   If   historians   are to   be   believed,   Davy's   genius   lay   elsewhere.   Hartley   (1966) refers   to   his   "clear   penetrating   vision",   "genius   of experiment"   and   his   "quickness   of   perception"   which   was "often   led   astray   by   faulty   measurements".   The   work   of   this

pair displays contrasting features similar to those of their forefathers. Indeed, Davy does show a neglect of quantitative measurement. A series of papers on alkalis, in particular one on their decomposition - visually quite spectacular - betray how taken he was with the perceptual aspect of these experiments, referring to "the beautiful effect of continued jets of fire". Gay-Lussac's papers are similar in style to those of Lavoisier. They contain careful theoretical consideration of the subject matter to be investigated. This is followed by extensive quantitative analyses, presented in neat tables so that the measurements can be easily checked.[4]

Dalton's strengths lay in his "powerful pictorial" and "concrete" imagination. These were great assets as, "it so happened that the nineteenth century thrived when it was pictorial and languished when it tried to be subtle" (Farrar in Cardwell page 290 1968). That he reasoned in concrete, perceptual terms is suggested by his ball and stick atomic models, and the depiction of atoms in all his work as solid little balls. Indeed, as Farrar notes, "there was never anything shadowy or metaphysical about his atoms; too small to see but very real", which is probably why they were unacceptable to the Frenchman Berthollet. This, however, was not the only respect in which the two men differed. Dalton, despite his speculative atoms, was committed to empirical investigation. In a paper on the theory of the absorption of gases, his opening words were "From the facts developed in

the preceding articles, the following theory of the absorption of gases by water seems deducible" (Dalton in Leicester and Klickstein page 209 1968). Berthollet, in a treatise on chemical affinities, starts from general theoretical considerations - as Gay-Lussac points out in a memoir on the combination of gases (in Leicester and Klickstein page 295 1968). He arrives at the principle that combination does not depend merely on elective affinity, but also on mutual proportions. This is followed by experimentation to prove his point and confirm its universality.

Already in the seventeenth century, clear differences had emerged between English and French chemistry. The English school was oriented towards gaseous experimentation, the French towards theoretical issues, precision analysis, description and classification of compounds. The English preferred a more qualitative methodology, the French a more quantitative one. The contrast can be accounted for in terms of the types of scientists who made the major discoveries (Leicester 1956). In England, the leading lights were scientific amateurs, whereas on the Continent discoveries were made, in practical chemistry, by pharmacists and in theoretical chemistry, by physicians. Men coming to chemistry had some form of scientific training which accounted for their insistence on theoretical considerations, analysis and systemization, as opposed to the intuitive and perceptive strengths necessary for

innovative experimentation. Rouelle, Lavoisier's teacher, was famous for his systematic methodical approach exemplified in his work on the classification of salts (Partington 1964). The latter consisted of arranging salts into classes according to ease of crystallization. Most French chemists seemed to have been similarly interested in analyses which they recorded in lengthy theoretical treatises. The other French chemist of note in the era preceding Lavoisier was Geoffroy, who compiled, again from studies of salts, a widely used table of chemical affinities. This is not to say that there were no quantitative British chemists. But, as Hartley (1964) notes of one such chemist, Hales, whilst he drew up quantitative measurements of the amounts of air released by heating various solids, he ignored the qualitative differences in the airs themselves, as well as the significance of the apparatus he used. It was left to Priestley, the "qualitative scientist par excellence", to use the latter to its full potential.

If the era before Lavoisier's revolution was the one where qualitative chemistry thrived (Boas 1958, Farrar 1968) it was also the one that produced many famous English chemists. Boyle's success lies in his qualitative approach, in a period where obsessive quantitative measurements were as yet unnecessary (Boas 1958). He could have made his experiments more accurate, but it would not have made any difference to the interpretation. The significance of Boyle's work lay in

the approach not in the results, which was the exact
opposite of his systematic French contemporaries. He was
unable to coordinate his many brilliant experiments into a
coherent whole. Boyle's confused writings betray a method of
working and thinking which made it difficult "to draw up
comprehensive, systematic treatises" (Boas page 206 1958).
Boyle was, however, not alone in this failing. Men such as
Hook and Wren, in true amateur fashion, often did not even
record their thoughts, never mind systematizing them.[*]

The systematic approach in French chemistry continued
through the chemical revolution into the nineteenth century.
There are indications that by the end of the eighteenth
century, there were at least two differing currents within
the discipline: the analysis of compounds by men such as
Vauquelin coming from a pharmaceutical background, and the
use of a more speculative theoretical approach.[*] Berthollet,
coming to chemistry from medicine, was more interested in
theoretical aspects of the science and formulated an atomic
theory which differed from Dalton's, but proved more
acceptable to his French public. This was largely because he
worked within a Cartesian rather than a Newtonian framework,
i.e. reasoning in terms of abstract forces of attraction and
repulsion instead of solid massy particles. Moreover,
Dalton's "rules" of chemical combination contrast with
Berthollet's "law" of chemical affinity, and point to other
differences in scientific outlook. The former were of
practical value to guide investigations, and could be

applied to "facts" which had already been ascertained. The latter were universal truths. Dalton's rules were convenient summaries of data where Berthollet's laws captured the underlying scientific reality, to which specific cases could be fitted. This distinction is a good example of the consequences the different thought styles had on scientific thinking.

French chemists seemed to have been obsessed with accuracy, which is probably why they were such good quantitative scientists. However, it appears that they had the wherewithall to cater for this obsession. Lavoisier astonished the English scientist Young by the amount of precision equipment he had at his disposal, and to which he frequently referred. In a paper on the calcination of tin, Lavoisier comments on a precision balance, built by the inspector of coinage as probably "the most perfect of its kind". His laboratory, described by Mckie, (1952)⁷ must have been a necessity for a scientist of Lavoisier's standing: member of the Academy and as such a government official. Gay-Lussac followed in Lavoisier's footsteps perfecting gaseous analysis, a more accurate method than the gravimetric analysis. Such accuracy did not leave a lot of scope for speculation and imagination. In addition, French chemists in the nineteenth century, and perhaps even earlier, were constrained by institutional factors, making it unacceptable for a scientist to use his imagination, and allow his intellect to roam free. Indeed, as Crosland points

out, there would have been no place for Davy in French science, committed as it was to a scientific methodology of accuracy and precision. The sobering effect of institutional pressures can be related to the rationalist/empiricist dichotomy in science. They resulted in the different conceptions of science held by the two men which in turn affected their methods of working. Clearly "For Gay-Lussac chemistry was discipline, for Davy it was an adventure" (Crosland page 115 1978).

A comparison between Darwin and Lamarck is consonant with the picture which has so far emerged. Despite their deeper knowledge of comparative anatomy and morphology, Darwin's colleagues, "the systematisers", failed because they refused to use their imagination and speculate about ultimate questions such as the reasons for particular patterns of creation (Himmelfarb page 131 1959). Indeed, Lamarck's greatest concern was structuring the discipline of zoology:

> *Experience in teaching has made me feel how useful a philosophical zoology would be at the present time. By this I mean a body of rules and principles, relative to the study of animals and applicable even to other divisions of the natural sciences; for our knowledge of zoological facts has made considerable progress during the last thirty years. (Lamarck page 1 1984)*

Uninhibited by his meagre training, when Darwin encountered tropical geology for the first time, he did not "do what most amateurs would have done in the circumstances - that is devote the first bewildering weeks to sorting out and analyzing the composition of rocks". Instead, he "...leaped

to the highest stage of enquiry, the problem and meaning of geological phenomena" (Himmelfarb page 82 1959). In fact, Darwin's success rested on his boldness in speculating about what he observed, and spontaneity uncurbed by institutional pressures. What is clear about Lamarck is that he was a "French" scientist according to the way he has been portrayed in this thesis. His philosophical zoology was a teaching aid in which he attempted to organize and synthesize his biological knowledge by abstracting principles. These principles and general laws - a similar emphasis on "laws" as is found in the work of Berthollet - were systematically deduced from principles derived from laboratory experiments. They were 1) that increased use of organs increased their strength 2) that fluid motion modifies cellular tissue and 3) the evidence of an inner power or élan vital (page 5 in Lamarck 1984). Lamarck was formulating second order generalities, in contrast to Darwin whose ideas all stemmed from direct observation. Using these generalities, he intended to:

> ... observe nature, to study their productions in their general and special relationships, and finally endeavour to grasp the order which she everywhere introduces as well as her progress, her laws and the infinitely variable means which she uses to give effect to that order... (Lamarck page 10 1984)

He admits to treading between philosophy and zoology in order to discover great truths. Both the process of scientific discovery of biology and the systematic thinking of philosophy were necessary to establish a zoological

system. The freedom to speculate in the way Darwin did, was not open to Lamarck. True, Darwin was responsible for the "law" of evolution, but this law was arrived at by different means: extensive empirical observation and uncontrolled speculation. Darwin was anxious to deflect accusations of conjecture, maintaining that his theory was based on hard facts. However, conjecture played an important part in its genesis, as his notebooks testify. They also show his method of working: moving from "fact" to theory. The Beagle notebooks are collections of descriptive observations and are followed by the red notebook, transitional in that it incorporates both facts and theory. The post voyage notebooks are theoretical in orientation.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENCES FOR TWO MAJOR SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

The different characteristics of the scientists discussed had important implications for the two major scientific revolutions of the nineteenth century. The Frenchman, Lavoisier, using a set of general intellectual skills (Hartley 1971), brought order and clarity to the wealth of chemical knowledge. Moreover, he applied logical reasoning to refute the inconsistent "phlogiston" theory. The central tenet of this theory was that heating a metal caused a metal oxide to be formed, letting off "phlogiston". Lavoisier reasoned that it was improbable that a metal upon heating would release a substance while forming a heavier compound.

This is why Hartley (1966) refers to Lavoisier's application of the principle of the balance sheet – that outgo equals income – to chemistry, a principle he also applied to his research at his experimental farm at Fréchines:

METAL   –   CALX + PHLOGISTON ↑

↑

Substituted

METAL + OXYGEN → METAL OXIDE + CALORIC HEAT

Having refuted the "phlogiston" theory, he then undertook, with the help of Guyton de Morveau, to structure and systematize the discipline of chemistry. For this he needed a new language:

> *A well composed language adapted to the natural and successive order of ideas will bring in its train a necessary and immediate revolution in the method of teaching and will not allow teachers of chemistry to deviate from the course of Nature: either they must resist the nomenclature or they must insistently follow the course marked out by it. The logic of the sciences is thus essentially dependent upon their language. (Lavoisier page 5 1790)*

Further:

> *If after having considered languages as analytic methods, we consider them merely as a collection of representative signs, they will afford us some observations of another kind. In this second aspect we shall have three things to distinguish in every physical science, the series of facts that constitute the science; the ideas that call the facts to mind and the words that express them. The word should give birth to the idea; the idea should depict the facts; they are three impressions of one and the same seal; and as it is the words that preserve and transmit ideas, it follows that science can never be brought to perfection, if language be not first perfected, and that however true the facts may be, and however correct the ideas to which they give rise, they will still transmit false impressions if there are no*

> *exact expressions to convey them. (Lavoisier page 5 1790*
> *reprint 1965)*

There is an emphasis on systematization and the wish to formulate a theoretical framework within which to work. Biologists had already attempted systematization, most notably Lamarck. In biology there was a need for unconstrained, imaginative speculation as well as a return to hard data - most of Lamarck's observations were made in his laboratory on dead material. This is what Darwin brought to biology:

> *I have continued steadily reading and collecting facts on*
> *variation of domestic animals and plants, and on the*
> *question of what are species. I have a grand body of facts,*
> *and I think I can draw some sound conclusions. The general*
> *conclusion to which I have slowly been driven from a*
> *directly opposite conviction, is that species are mutable,*
> *and that allied species are co-descendants from common*
> *stocks. (letter from Darwin to Jenyns in Murray page 175*
> *1908)*

NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES

In this description of the two scientific communities, spanning the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, it emerges that scientific differences stem from the different social organization of scientific knowledge in the two communities. These contrasting communities were generated by a stable political difference between the two countries. A strong interventionist state in France, cultivated an intellectual bureaucracy for a number of politically strategic reasons to be elaborated later (see chapter six).

Among other things, the bureaucracy served to glorify the state, which housed it in a highly centralized network of institutions – hence the structure inherent in the community. This was not the case in England, where the weak state had not manifested comparable interests. Non-interventionism led to an unstructured scientific community where leading scientists discriminated against government intervention.

1) EDUCATION IN THE TWO COMMUNITIES

In outlining the national chemical traditions, reference was made to the different training prominent scientists had in the two countries. This training was just part of, on the one hand, a system designed to produce a bureaucratic elite, on the other, a system which nurtured a much more "amateur" approach.

In pre-revolutionary France, there was no scientific profession in the sense that there was subsequently in the Napoleonic era. The structure of education and subsequent careers were – with the exception of medicine – not as yet formalized. However, even at this stage, scientific education was different in England and France. By the time he was twenty, Lavoisier had studied the classics, literature, law and science with the leading scientists in the country at some of the best institutions: Rouelle in chemistry, Jussieu in biology and Guettard in geology. As

Mckie notes his literary training was not wasted (1952). It made him aware of the importance of language as a tool of thought, and helped him express his ideas in a clear concise fashion. Lavoisier was no exception as regards being highly trained. Men of lesser calibre, like Fourcroy and Berthollet, came to chemistry through medicine, combined with a broader scientific knowledge provided by the lectures at the Jardin du Roi and the Collège de France. Berthollet, from a cultured bourgeois family, studied first at the Collège de Provinces, then at the University of Turin and finally at the Ecole de Médecine in Paris. His interest in chemistry grew out of his medical research. Fourcroy was an instance of someone who had come from humble beginnings and thanks to a good education - Collège d'Arcourt in Paris followed by L'Ecole de Médecine - became one of the most influential scientists of his day.

After the French Revolution, France saw the creation of schools such as L'école Polytechnique - a college of higher education - providing scientific education "which was complete and yet general enough to provide the foundations for all possible applications" (Crosland 1978) - the aim of French scientific education to this day. Curricula were rigidly structured to cover all scientific disciplines, and the teaching was of the highest quality. During the first two years, undergraduates were expected to study a) mathematics, to enable an appreciation of the form and movement of bodies b) physics and chemistry, to enable an

appreciation of the form and composition of matter (Crosland 1978). This was a translation into curricular terms of the Cartesian emphasis on general principles. The hours allotted to each subject were carefully calculated in terms of percentage time.

SUBJECT	HOURS	PERCENTAGE TIME
Mathematical Analysis	48	8.8
Mechanics	72	13.3
Fortification	54	10.0
Public Works	54	10.0
Mining	27	5.0
Physics	60	11.0
Chemistry (technical)	30	5.5
Chemistry (experimental)	30	5.5
Architecture	45	8.3
Drawing	120	22.0

(Crosland 1978)

Furthermore, the course at the Polytechnique allowed the more brilliant students to stay on for another year for research purposes. After the Polytechnique, post-graduate studies for engineers were available at the Ponts et Chaussées, where teaching was more informal - conducted by older students and visiting speakers. Gay-Lussac, was an example of how successful this system could be.

In a discussion of Dalton's education, Greenaway (1972) points out how few leading English scientists had enjoyed higher education. The pattern was the exact opposite to that found in France. The most important scientists, men such as Faraday, Priestly and Dalton, were virtually self-educated. In nineteenth century Britain, eight out of fifty prominent scientists went to universities, eight had grammar school education, but went no higher. Eighteen were apprenticed or entered family businesses at an early age (Greenaway page 55 1952). Faraday's education consisted in little more than the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic. Having mentioned Gay-Lussac's education, it is of interest to compare it with that of his British rival, Davy. Educated in a preparatory school in Truro, he was introduced to science by a Quaker saddler, Robert Dunkin. Davy's education was not, according to Greenaway's survey, as rudimentary as that of John Dalton. After leaving school at fourteen, Dalton became a personal tutor.

Darwin's education seems to have been an equally haphazard affair. His father, having described him as a very ordinary boy, sent him to Edinburgh to attempt a medical career. This failed, and Darwin then went to Cambridge, to prepare for the priesthood. At Cambridge he did not "distinguish himself" (Ruse 1979) and did not even take honours. Despite this, it was there that his interest in science was kindled through his acquaintance with such figures as Henslow, the botanist, Sedgewick and Whewell, although this was mostly at

an informal level (Ruse 1979). Perhaps one could suggest that, without the academic training that was available in France, English scientists did not develop systematic analytic thinking and had to rely on different aptitudes: their intuitive and perceptual abilities.

2) SCIENCE UNDER THE OLD REGIME

An article by Gillespie (1984), concerning the development of ballooning in England and France, shows how intimately the amateur versus professional distinction is linked to institutional contexts. The article also conveys very succinctly the organization of the two scientific networks and how they affected the development of the same activity in the two countries. Whereas in France, ballooning was seized upon by the scientists of the official body of the Academy of Science, who provided it with funds and transformed it into the science of aerostation, in England, it fell into the hands of adventurers. This was largely a result of the disinterest shown by The Royal Society. Consequently, in both countries, ballooning became identified with distinct social classes. In France, it became associated with scientists and the Academies as a legitimate field of experimentation, in England with adventurers, alienating institutionalized science. As ballooning was considered a legitimate scientific discipline, experimental failures in the case of the French were interpreted within a scientific framework as one of the

hazards involved in experimentation. In Britain, where ballooning had become the province of adventurers, failures confirmed suspicions of charlatanism:

> *Natural knowledge in the Old Regime was highly centralised and coordinated through the agency of national societies, engineering schools, provincial academies, and government departments. Members of the French scientific community were experienced in applying expertise to matters of national importance and in exploiting established procedures. Government sponsored research aimed at the technical development of industry thus formed a scaffolding on which French aerostation was built. Four aspects of this institutional structure were particulary important. First, academies actively sought skills and techniques from artisans and amateurs, people lacking the social status necessary to be members of the society. Second, individuals such as Pilâtre who showed a tendency towards showmanship and might otherwise have conducted their own adventurous flights, were assimilated into more scientific experiments. Third, the Paris Academy embraced both science and its technical applications was responsible for inspecting new inventions and granting patents, and did not consider the development of aerostation an improper activity. Finally, these institutional structures constituted a powerful motivating force in their own right, since provincial societies sought to emulate the Paris Academy. (Gillespie page 267-268 1984)*

A highly structured procedure existed whereby new projects could be made legitimate and enjoy state patronage, a sharp contrast to the situation in Britain:

> *...the British government did have scientific advisers for problems it deemed of national importance. The Royal Society under Banks coordinated voyages of scientific discovery and assessed methods of determining longitude, and Banks orchestrated research aimed at the more efficient exploitation of Britain's colonies. However, these efforts reflected the expression of Banks' own interest and personal patronage more than an accepted role for the Royal Society. The comparative weakness of scientific institutions enabled a wealthy and influential man like Banks to dominate the entire scientific scene; specialist societies would soon be formed to challenge this hegemony. The lack of scientific organisation in London permitted Banks' opinions on new machines to go unchallenged. As a result, aerostation was never considered important to the nation. (Gillespie page 268 1984)*

This picture can be elaborated by referring to the differences between the two Royal scientific institutions: the Academy of Sciences in Paris and The Royal Society. Intellectual life before and after the Revolution was centred in Paris, home to numerous academies. Among them was the prestigious Academy of Sciences. A rigidly organized institution, it was established in 1666 by Colbert with the specific aim of fostering a link between science and the state. It was subsequently reorganized in 1699 by Louis XIV, who gave himself the exclusive right to select members from lists presented to him by the academicians. The members became salaried government officials and advisors – hence why they could afford expensive laboratory equipment – deriving both power and prestige from their positions. Fontenelle, quoted in Hahn (1971), compares the Academy with its English counterpart. He is careful to acknowledge that the French institution, unlike its English counterpart, had two masters – science and the crown. Despite the King's control, academicians had the right to publish documents without consulting him, a considerable privilege under an absolutist regime. This strange mixture of control and complete academic freedom has often been a characteristic of French academic life. In Article 31 of its statutes, dated 1666, the King granted the Academy monopoly over certifying new machinery.¹ Although the highest rank in the Academy – members were divided into several grades – was made up of noblemen, an emphasis was put on intellectual achievements

as a condition of membership. Furthermore, their members activities were organized so that research was conducted with maximum efficiency. Most disciplines were represented - from sciences such as mechanics, astronomy, geography, physics and medecine to architecture, drawing, metallurgy, painting, agriculture and navigation. Each academician, for purposes of efficiency, had to specialize in a field of study and then give an account of his research to "enrich those composing the Academy through his wisdom [*lumière*] and to profit from their remarks" (Huygens in Hahn page 23 1971).

The Royal Society had altogether more modest beginnings. Its origins may be traced to a series of informal meetings,'' which took over fifteen years to become formalized into the Society. Although it had the Royal seal of approval, it was not submitted to the same close control as the French Academy, did not possess the same powers or receive the same funding. The latter helps explain why, for over two hundred years, being a "gentlemen" became almost a prerequisite for membership. Gentlemen of the leisured classes had the time to dabble in scientific matters and the money to support the Society. Even under the Old Regime, with no scientific profession in the modern sense of the term, French men of science were salaried government officials, whereas in England membership of the most prestigious institutions was confined to the amateur gentleman. Another important consequence of the lack of state patronage was that the

activities of the Society could be determined by the
opinions of one man, such as Banks.

3) MODERN SCIENCE: THE BIRTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROFESSION

> *I wish simply to suggest that science in France had certain features not present in science in other countries and that national educational patterns and institutions in France provided a general encouragement for the pursuit of science but in certain directions rather than others. Prizes offered by the Academie des Sciences for research topics were only one way in which latent genius was encouraged to express itself. Within such a system valuable scientific work was done. The intellectual, religious and political environment of the French was different from other countries. Methods of teaching, social support, and economic stimulus were different. Science in France was highly structured, with career patterns marked and membership of the Academie an unbelievably important goal. (Crosland page 10 1977)*

The differences isolated previously survived the political
upheaval of the French Revolution. In fact, the contrast
between a highly structured community in France and an
unstructured one in England was accentuated by the new
policies of centralization under the Napoleonic government.

A) FRANCE

The following hundred years saw the establishment of what
can properly be described as a scientific profession. If
anything, the Revolution boosted the already flourishing
scientific activity. According to the Ideologists, whose
philosophy inspired many key revolutionaries, the future of
the new society lay in science. The scientific profession
became part of the large scale restructuring of intellectual

and professional life over which the state was to have tighter control. Science became incorporated into a wider movement creating a professional state bureaucracy centred on Paris. In this new scientific community, structure was maintained by the highly centralized network of state institutions, providing education and research facilities for the new bureaucracy. The Napoleonic era saw the proliferation of specialized schools for the training of scientific professionals. The newly created Université Impériale de France incorporated a career structure based upon academic merit and "good conduct" (Fox in Geison 1985), explaining the educational differences outlined previously. A strict hierarchy of degrees determined accessible posts and teaching positions. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, "patronage" and the "cumul" were two factors increasing the structure of the French scientific community. Patronage also played an important role in determining a successful career. However, during the course of the nineteenth century, training and education assumed an increasing importance as the status of the scientist changed from political bureaucrat to intellectual civil servant (Fox in Geison 1985).

After the Revolution, new specialist scientific schools, such as L'Ecole Polytechnique, provided scientific education alongside the schools of the Old Régime i.e. L'Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, L'Ecole des Mines. Research institutions such as the Collège de France and the Jardin du Roi also

survived, but the latter was transformed into the Musée Nationale d'Histoire Naturelle. These were the institutions referred to by Hahn (1971) as "capturing the leading edge of research". There was an abundance of Societies which conducted science's public relations (Hahn 1971). Two of the most important were the Philomatique and the Société d'Arcueil, integral parts of the Parisian community, acting as stepping stones to membership of the Institute - the new name given to the Academy - thus increasing the cohesion of the community. It was here that young scientists came into contact with the doyens of science and made a name for themselves through publishing research in the various periodicals and memoirs. The Société d'Arcueil was set up by the chemist Berthollet for the specific purpose of fostering links between older, experienced scientists and the young blood. He, for example, was influential in determining the success of his protégé Gay-Lussac. Berthollet, like Laplace and Fourcroy, had been a leading scientist during the Monarchy and continued to be employed by the state under Napoleon. Not only were these men scientists and teachers, but they also acted as statesmen and government officials. As such they were able to exert political pressure to further the careers of their pupils. A system of patronage was established which, together with the ability to use the educational system provided - i.e. obtain educational qualifications in the top institutions - formed the prerequisite for an official position. This system had an element of mutuality about it, benefiting both pupils and

teachers.[12] Despite being often referred to as one of France's most neglected scientists, Lamarck held many official positions: a much coveted chair at the Institute, a chair at the Faculty of Sciences, and a lectureship at the Musée d'Histoire Naturelle. Thus, in theory Lamarck, had the potential to disseminate his ideas. However, in practice, he remained on the sidelines of organized science. This was because his philosophical style did not generate sufficient research material to attract brilliant research students and it became easy to ignore his achievements. As Ostram points out, "Able protégés, after all, were useful in keeping the patron before the public eye" (Ostram page 36 1980).

Intimacy with the state held the potential danger of stringent control over, not only the organization, but also the nature of academic activities, as took place during the July Monarchy. This bad experience, in fact, led to an unprecedented bid for freedom by scientists who appealed to industry for support. The result of this move was intellectually damaging. The advantage of state patronage was not only that scientists basked in ministerial favour, but also that it created a space for research, free from utilitarian concerns (Hahn 1971, Fox 1985). Moreover, institutions in France have continued to play a role in nurturing disinterested academic research and "... legitimise the place of intellectuals in modern French Society as distinct from their utilitarian roles as teachers and applied scientists" (Hahn page 310 1971). The French non

pragmatic approach to science which was generated in this academic environment had advantages as well as drawbacks. Gay-Lussac applied his skills to Industry and urged his countrymen to concern themselves with practical issues. He acknowledged the importance of theoretical research but thought that French scientists lost themselves in abstractions. Gay-Lussac praised the English who understood the utilitarian value of science and applied their ideas (c.f. Leclerc's comparison cited in chapter one). It was not until the end of the century, when the much resisted links with industry were formed, that French science came down to earth. The effects of the alliance with industry remains with the physical sciences to this day in that they are, in an intellectual and academic sense, held in much lower esteem than the mathematical sciences (Halls 1969).

The patronage system declined towards the end of the century as did the "cumul". The latter, another typical feature of the French community, refers to multiple membership of research and teaching institutions which again contributed to the cohesion of the community. Leading scientists such as Fourcroy, Berthollet and Laplace functioned as teachers, lecturers and examiners simultaneously in different establishments as well as being active in politics - Laplace was Minister of the Interior. The decline of "patronage" and "cumul" can be linked to a change in status of the scientist. The nineteenth century acted out a conflict between the incompatibility of the "intellectual" and

"bureaucratic" conception of the scientist (Fox in Geison 1985). The ever-increasing educational potential meant that academic credentials became the crucial factor in determining professional success in a greatly expanded scientific community. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a scientist in government employment retained, and still does, intellectual prestige by virtue of his training at the top academic establishments. As a Faculty member, he had to hold a doctorate, and had a precise career mapped out for him. Access to the highest positions was dependent on a good record in teaching and research which would be a recommendation to the Minister of Public Instruction. Only very rarely was he guaranteed any political power (Bourdieu 1979, Fox in Geison 1985).

B) BRITAIN

While the official body of French science, housed in the Institute, was renowned for its scientific excellence and competence, The Royal Society in Britain was still in the hands of amateur gentlemen. Indeed, many an English scientist agreed that Paris was the place to nurture the talents of budding scientists. "If a man is thought to display talent, he is turned to Paris, as the only soil where it can be nourished or admired" (Lleyel in Crosland page 102 1977).[13] By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Society had already acquired a bad public image.[14] With no state patronage, it needed the wealthy

dilletantes as a source of income. This kept to a minimum the number of members who could make any genuine contributions to science. Furthermore, The Royal Society suffered during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because 1) it did not have the popular appeal of establishments like The Royal Institution and The London Institute and2) it had no visible utilitarian function as most industrial innovations were made outside institutional settings (Lyons 1944). The professionalization of science, because of the lack of state intervention, took longer in Britain, and thus during the nineteenth century scientific education was still rather primitive. In fact, British education in general could in no way be compared with the system being established in France. With the exception of the private system of the upper classes, education was still dominated by philanthropic initiative. Universities, because of their association with the upper strata of society, were less interested in academic success than in providing a gentlemen's finishing school.[15] As such the teaching of science at Oxford and Cambridge was amateurish. Chairs were held by notable figures such as Whewell and Babbage, who expressed a deep "love" of science which "they communicated or not as the case may be" (Ruse 1979) to their students. Science lectures at the time were not compulsory. This state of affairs led to the "Crisis in Science", motivating the foundation of The British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1831. At this point it is pertinent to remark that it was this kind of association which was the

foundation of the scientific profession in Anglo-Saxon countries, not the government. This was another factor which contributed towards creating an unstructured community.

Ironically, whilst the French provinces were complaining about the centralization of science in Paris, the English were arguing that they did not possess the network of provincial scientific institutions that the French did! The Association was aimed particularly at the promotion of science in the provinces, meeting every year in a different city. The history of its creation highlights three important features of the English scientific enterprise a) its amateurishness b) that most valuable scientific research was conducted outside institutional settings (c.f. the link with artistic activity) and c) the resistance in England to state intervention for which there was no precedent (Orange 1972). The second feature is important in the light of what was said about institutional pressures affecting scientific methodology. The "declinists" - those maintaining that English science had declined - men such as Brewster and Babbage, Professor of mathematics at Cambridge, saw it as their task to remedy the poor condition of English science. This had been made worse by institutions like The Royal Society, victim of "... years of misrule... managed by party or coterie... [who] have invariably opposed all improvements... all change in the mode of management (Babbage in Orange page 153 1972)". Universities were not spared their scathing attacks. This alienated academics such

as the geologist Whewell who refused to have anything to do with the first meeting at York. Brewster, quoting Babbage, asserted that none of the major scientific activities could be credited to leading institutional establishments (in Orange 1972), confirming the earlier impression that the most important scientific discoveries in England were the achievement of men with little formal scientific training, working outside institutional settings. The "depression" of science was due to governmental neglect. Scientific organizations were badly run, and not only did scientists not enjoy the same privileges as their French counterparts, in addition they were "persecuted" by the patent laws (Brewster in Orange 1972). It would be the task of the Association to remedy this by 1) systematizing scientific practice 2) ridding science of the practice of patenting and 3) marshalling government support by bringing science into the public eye. However, academics such as Whewell were against state intervention and wanted no part in an organization which sought to influence government policies. The "dignity and utility" of science was better served by "abstaining from any systematic connection with the government of the Country and depending on their own exertions" (Whewell in Orange page 166 1972). Academic freedom appeared to be more important then government intervention. Disagreements between the various parties, compromised the aspirations of the Association so that there was a modification of the original aims. These were transformed into 1) bringing science to the attention of the

public 2) promoting dialogue with other scientific communities and 3) creating a more systematic direction for English science (Ostram 1972).

Scientific activities encouraged the formation of societies in Britain, as in France, although these were perhaps less plentiful and certainly more informal. In the absence of an interventionist state i.e. a regulating authority, they nevertheless proved to be more influential in determining the course of science. An example of such a society was the X Club, whose history is documented by Jensen (1970).[18] The sway of such informal bodies - if Jensen is to be believed, the X club was quite an effective body during the nineteenth century - contributed to the unstructured nature of English scientific activity.

Finally, it is pertinent to end with an example which illustrates particularly well one of the main points of this chapter: how the characteristics isolated as typical of national scientific schools were sustained by institutions which were products of a particular political system. The lack of financial support from the British government meant that scientific institutions were at the mercy of wealthy patrons, usually merchants and industrialists. Science had thus to be both appealing and useful. The London Institute (1819-1840), funded by merchants and financiers is a case in point. It was created to foster bonds between science and commerce - the belief behind the enterprise was that science

and commerce could derive mutual advantages from a collaboration. Without each other "Science loses all her utility; commerce all her dignity" (Butler in Hayes page 47 1974). Pragmatic themes were one of the factors which governed the content of the lectures. A lecture course by Brande in 1835, for example, included topics such as soap making, dying, and manufacturing gunpowder and vinegar. To attract large public audiences, to make the institution pay its way, natural science and zoology were also used as lecture topics. Their popularity can be understood in terms of intense theological discussions, preceding the Darwinian Revolution. Whilst the biological sciences interested the spiritually inclined, electricity and astronomy appealed to everyone because they were perceptually exciting. Mechanics and machinery had the dual advantage of:

> ...again appealing to the eye - while at the same time they were symbols of the Industrial Revolution that very union of commerce and science which the Institution vowed to pursue" (Hayes page 161-162 1974).

Furthermore, despite the utilitarian orientation of the London institution, it demonstrated "persistent faith in the amateur man of science" (Hayes page 160 1974).

CONCLUSION

The contrasting scientific approaches provide a particularly clear example of the relationship between different thought

styles and their socio-political environments. The systematic theoretical approach of the "classical" French scientist was related to scientific training – one of the features of a community enjoying extensive state patronage. Even before the Revolution, the interventionist state policies in France provided a network of institutions where science was conducted in an academic environment, protected from utilitarian concerns. In England, the "intuitive" scientist worked outside institutions, and, in general, lacked the scientific training of his French counterpart – this discrepancy becoming particularly noticeable during the nineteenth century. The English scientist's fortes were perceptual abilities and the art of experimentation. The perceptual aspect of science in England was also important because it had to appeal to the patrons who supported the scientific enterprise in the absence of public funding. Academic French science, on the other hand, had no need to compromise itself in the same way since it had financial backing from the state. Both the structure of the respective scientific communities and the ideals of knowledge they advocated were products of underlying political differences. Both in this chapter and in the previous one, the thought styles have been identified through clusters of characteristics: French scientific thinking emerged as academic, political and professional whereas its English counterpart was perceptual, coupling academic freedom with amateurishness and anti-interventionism. It becomes particularly clear in this chapter that the multifaceted

nature of the thought styles is attributable to their origin in thought-environment complexes.

Finally, one could ask what bearing such historical comparison might have on science in the twentieth century, regarded as a universal enterprise. The key lies in education. In England, science to this day, is taught in a way which emphasizes empirical investigation and discovery, retaining to a certain extent, Davy's idea of scientific adventure. In France, however, the approach is more theoretical and abstract. Experimentation plays a much less important role: theory is learnt then applied. Moreover, in France, a hierarchy exists in which mathematics, the language of science, reigns supreme. Physics comes next and experimental chemistry comes lower down on the list of priorities. These points will be returned to in a later chapter on education.

1.

> *It is, of all human activities the most truly international, for it is only in a trivial sense that we speak of "English science". Per contra when we speak of "English law", "French literature", "Italian art" etc., we may well be noting, indeed emphasising, significant differences from the practices of other countries and other peoples. But the language in which a scientific memoir is written is of no importance, it loses nothing in translation. Therefore, to a greater extent than in the cases of other intellectual activities scientific achievements of any one country are a function of its neighbours. (Cardwell page 3)*

His views are supported by such writers as de Beer in the same volume. In his article "Science was never at War" de Beer quotes Jenner:

> *The unity of European ideals and culture was such that France and Britain subscribed to identical principles of respect for truth and independence of learning. Scientists enjoyed complete freedom in their work and were above the battle* [the Napoleonic Wars]. *(de Beer page 17 in Kaplan 1965)*

De Beer deals with the exchanges which occurred, during this period, between two famous chemists Gay-Lussac and Davy.

2. Geison (1985) details the methodological problems envolved in conducting historical research on aspects of foreign cultures. His volume, "Professions and the French State" (1985) redresses an important mistake: the neglect of the importance of the nation state and centralized bureaucracy in the history of professions in France. This he sees as the result of grafting the model of the weak/"passive" Anglo-Saxon state onto Continental countries. As he notes, Anglo-American researchers have found it difficult to repress their "suspicion" (Geison page 3 1985) of centralized political authority and the bureaucracy it created. This makes it hard for Anglo-Saxon researchers to understand the association between "the malign process of bureaucratisation and the benign process of professionalization" (Geison page 3 1985). In the past, the Anglo-Americans have adopted a Parsonian model of the professions. This entails viewing them as an occupational group possessing a set of attributes including "an intellectual foundation in the research university". Their power lies in their supposed expertise and is not in any way political. This model may be appropriate for Anglo-Saxon countries, but it does not apply to those of the European Continent, as this chapter demonstrates. Although seriously questioned the Parsonian model continues to exert an influence on the Anglo-American conception of the free professions.

The Continentals, on the other hand, have neglected the so-called professions, analyzing them within broader social divisions - this is not confined to Marxism, but is also

typical of the Durkheimian perspective. The Marxist framework deals with professions under the divisions of landowner, capitalist and labourer. They thus become "a subsidiary category within the much broader rubric of social stratification" (Geison page 4 1985):

> In French discourse, whether Marxist or not the concept "profession" lacks some of the distinctions and salience that it holds for English and especially American scholars. In the social vocabulary of the Old Regime "profession" was but one term in a rich and shifting "corporate idiom" that included such culturally specific terms as corps, confrérie, communauté, état, and métier. If that "corporate idiom" now sounds archaic, it is nonetheless the case that French discourse continues to lack precise equivalents for the current Anglo-Saxon usage of profession. (Geison page 3 1985)

This is evidence for the different political cultures the thesis is arguing for. As Geison points out, the essays in the volume share a single conclusion, that:

> ..., in the French context by contrast to standard Anglo-American assumptions professional "autonomy" or success often went hand in hand with dependence on the "State" and its bureaucracy. In France, professional groups in search of fiscal support, social legitimacy and some measure of intellectual/dependence discovered that the most effective way to attain their goals was through cooperation or even "collaboration" with central state and its bureaucracy. (Geison page 4 1985)

In practice members of the professions became salaried civil servants who were recruited and financially dependent on the state.

Geison's remarks not only have implications for historical methodology but also validate the discussion in the chapter on thought styles in the Human Sciences.

3. Many early works in the history of science were written for scientists by scientists, documenting the development of individual disciplines. As well as being rather dry and unimaginative, the accounts were lacking in other respects, not least their tendency to give a very nationalist perspective. This is one of the reproaches that Crosland levels at them:

> Sometimes British and American authors seem to have presented a distinctly "Anglo-Saxon" view of the history of chemistry, as the works of great men led by Boyle, Newton, Dalton. Partington refers to "the jungle of the theory of Phlogiston" [a German invention] which he contrasts with "the path of true discovery opened by Boyle, Hooke and Mayow". (Crosland page 393 in Porter and Rousseau 1980)

Crosland is one of several historians who have attempted to remedy this situation by placing science and scientific ideas within a broader social context. The tendency is to

focus on biographies and the historiography of scientific professions and institutions, as opposed to writing the history of individual disciplines. Crosland's (1978/79) research on science in national context and Gillespie's outline of the differential development of ballooning in France and England, proved invaluable, as did a collection of essays edited by the American Geison (1985) "Professions and the French State" 1700-1900". Other useful source material included Hahn's (1971) extensive work on the Paris Academy, various writings by Schofield (1963,1980), Mckie's (1952) aclaimed biography of Lavoisier, Lesch's research on the development of French physiology (1984) and works by French historians such as Sadouin-Goupil (1977).

The introduction to Sadouin-Goupil's volume on the French chemist Berthollet, testifies to the large amount of cross-channel cooperation which exists in the field of the history of science:

> *Notre gratitude va aussi vers les grandes institutions étrangères qui nous ont rendues les mêmes services: Royal Society et Wellcome Institute de Londres, ..., en nous transmettant aimablement les photocopies des lettres de Berthollet, nous ont permis d'établir les catalogues de sa correspondance. (Sadouin-Goupil page 3 1977)*

Similarly, in the prologue to the same volume, R. Taton acknowledges the contributions to the history of science made by his Anglo-Saxon colleagues. Most of those he mentions have been useful in compiling this chapter:

> *A coté de quelques travaux de chercheurs français, au premier rang desquelles ceux d'Hélène Metzgeret et plus récemment, ceux de Morris Dumas, les recherches des Écoles Americaines et Britanniques animées notamment par Henri Guerlac, Charles C. Gillespie et Roger Hahn et Douglas Mckie, Morris Crosland et William Smeaton ont progressivement pris une prépondérance dans un domaine auquel plusieurs historians Sovietiques ont également apporté d'interessantes contributions. (Sadouin-Goupil page 7 1977)*

Cooperation has the twofold advantage of reducing the danger of nationalism and increasing the quality of the research by giving access to a wider range of data.

4. Crosland (1978) describes Gay-Lussac's work as displaying the characteristic of clarity and completeness. As he also points out, Gay-Lussac's papers were "classic in another sense of the term; in the sense in which Ostwald included two of his research papers among his Classics of Science i.e. they constituted a standard or model" (Crosland page 115 1978). Gay-Lussac's work was meticulous, thorough, and a continuation of the work of Berthollet and Lavoisier. Crosland, however, stresses that he did not possess Davy's originality. Of interest in Davy's paper on the decomposition of alkali is his cautious

assessment of Lavoisier's "refined and ingenious" anti-phlogiston theory which he employed, even though he was not convinced of its "truth or permanence".

5.

> *Boyle's inability to present his work in a succinct cogent form was something of a seventeenth century fault, especially among English Scientists. One only has to think of Hooke whose Micrographia is a mine of ideas and experiments tenuously connected with microscopical observations thrown out without any connecting link, and whose scattered broadside lectures and essays were on such a wide variety of topics that there was no hope of assembling them into a coherent whole. Or one thinks of Wren, who seldom bothered to do more with his brilliant ideas and experiments than describe them to others, so that we are indebted primarily to the registers of the Royal Society and to the references from his friends for the possibility of realizing what an important scientist he was. (Boas page 205 1958)*

6. Crosland also refers to two currents within French chemistry. Vauquelin's focused on salt analysis and the preparation of new compounds whereas Berthollet "did not believe that the chemist's work should rest on the multiplication of species." (Crosland page 80 1968).

7.

> *Lavoisier's laboratory at the Arsenal, his to visits which Arthur Young records with pleasure, was indeed, remarkable. Up to that time, there had been nothing to compare with it and many years were to pass before such a collection of precision instruments and chemical apparatus would be put together as working tools of a laboratory, probably not until the rise of the modern research institutions. This statement was not exagerated; for the inventories made by the revolution's agents after the confiscation of Lavoisier's property show that his laboratory contained 30000 items of glass and other chemical apparatus and specimens, valued at 7000 livres, together with 250 physical instruments, which included three precision balances, one by Fortin and two by Meguée, valued at 300 500 livres, the historic instruments used in the work of the Commission of Weights and Measures for the determination of the gramme... (Mckie page 195 1952)*

8. In Lavoisier, we find the incarnation of all French education's aspirations. Posessing a set of non specific intellectual skills, he applied them a to, variety of tasks. Hartley (1971) describes Lavoiser's ability to apply economic reasoning to chemistry and physiology (Hartley page 21 1971). Conversely, he applied principles of experimental chemistry to improve the agricultural yields at his experimental farm at Fréchines. These general intellectual skills were also characteristic of Gay-Lussac, whose interests, both theoretical and practical, extended over the scientific disciplines of physics, chemistry and physiology. (Crosland 1978)

9. Davy's scientific education was continued as an apprentice to a surgeon in Penzance where he learnt pharmacy.

10.

> *The Academy will examine, if the King so rules, all machines for which a*
> *privilege has been requested from his Majesty. It will certify whether or not*
> *they are new and useful, and the inventor whose work has been approved will be*
> *held responsible for leaving the Academy a model of his invention. (in Hahn*
> *1971)*

11. The beginnings of the Royal Society were described by Wallis in the following terms:

> *About the year 1645 while I lived in London (at a time when by our civil wars*
> *academical studies were much interrupted in both our Universities) besides the*
> *conversation of diverse eminent devines as to matters theological, I had the*
> *opportunity of being acquainted with diverse worthy persons inquisitive into*
> *natural philosophy, and other parts of human learning; and particularly of what*
> *hath been called the New Philosophy or Experimental Science. We did by*
> *agreement, diverse of us, meet in London on a certain day and hour, under a*
> *certain penalty and weekly contribution for the charge of experiments, with*
> *certain rules agreed amongst us to treat and discourse of such affairs... (in*
> *Boas page 5 1958)*

12. Frankel (1978) has conducted a detailed study on the secret of J. B. Biot's "early and outstanding success", unaccountable, according to Frankel, purely in terms of academic brilliance. In considering J. B. Biot's special case, Frankel was particularly struck by his rapid rise to eminence. A mere seven years separated his graduation from the Ecole Polytechnique 1796 to his membership in 1803 of the first class of the Institute at the age of twenty-nine. The latter was the highest position an academic scientist could aspire to. This Frankel sees as a product of hard work, patronage and of the career opportunities available after the revolution as opposed to, academic brilliance. (Frankel page 36 1978)

Ostram (1980) details the mutual benefit of the patronage system. As she points out, not only did it benefit the young scientists, but their patrons as well. The system accounts for why some scientists such as Berthollet and Laplace became so successful where as others, like, Lamarck failed:

> *Both Laplace and Berthollet, for example, achieved success, reputation and*
> *pupils by establishing a patronage network based upon their own personal and*
> *peculiar accumulation of different kinds of power through institutional*
> *affiliations, through affiliations with Napoleon, through financial independence*
> *based upon state employment and power to influence the organs which disseminated*
> *scientific knowledge. (Ostram page 32 1980)*

13.

> *After he had produced his atomic theory Dalton did not go unrecognized in*
> *England. Davy offered him a nomination to the Royal Society in 1810 but Dalton*
> *refused. This proposed membership of what was not yet the high elite of today*

cannot be compared to the signal honour conferred by the Academie des Sciences
in making him a corresponding member in 1816. (Greenaway page 5 1958)

14. An article appearing in the 236th issue of Tatler October 12th 1910 claimed:

> There is no study more becoming a rational creature than that of natural
> philosophy, but as several of our virtuosi manage it, their speculations do not
> so much tend to open and enlarge the mind as to contrast and feed it upon
> trifles. This, in England, is in great measure owing to the worthy elections
> that are so frequently made in our Royal Society. They seem to be in a
> confederacy against men of polite genius, noble thought and diffuse learning;
> and choose into their assemblies such as have no pretence to wisdom...when I
> meet a young fellow that is a humble admirer of these sciences, but more dull
> than the rest of the company, I conclude him to be a fellow of the Royal
> Society.

15.

> They [scholars of Oxbridge] were expected to read a little mathematics, mainly
> Euclid, a little classics and a little religion. Plenty of time was left for
> other pursuits, frequently involving dogs, horses and foxes. University was
> looked upon as a gentlemanly way of passing from schoolboy to adulthood. (Ruse
> page 20 1979)

16. The following anecdote of Huxley's, dated 1894, gives an insight into the type of body
the X club was:

> I believe that the "X" had the credit of being a sort of scientific corpus or
> ring with some people. In fact, two distinguished scientific colleagues of mine
> once carried on a conversation (which I gravely ignored) across me, in the
> smoking room of the Atheneum, to this effect: I say, A, do you know anything
> about the "X" Club? Oh yes, B, I have heard of it. What do they do? Well, they
> govern scientific affairs; and really on the whole, they don't do it badly.
> (Jensen page 72 1970)

The aim of of the Club - composed of influential men of science - was to overcome
conservative scientists and theologians who were hindering the progress of the scientific
enterprise. Although Jensen compares the X Club to the Societé D'Arceuil - a body geared
towards organized scientific research - it differed from the society in its informality.
In this it was reminiscent of the association which gave rise to the Royal Society.
Despite this informality, the Club seemed to have exerted a considerable influence on the
course of nineteenth century English science (see Spencer in Jensen 1970)

CHAPTER FOUR

THOUGHT STYLES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES

*As a particular form of government gives a certain
turn and a certain disposition to the [citizen's]
minds... you change the former without the latter
[i.e. the mind] following you, you join the new
government to the manner of thinking
[characteristic of] the old; and this produces very
bad effects. (Montesquieu in Stark page 12 1961)*

In the previous chapters, both the nature and the
characteristics of the thought styles have been outlined.
The different thought styles were even evident in what is
usually considered to be the universal enterprise of
science. It is not surprising then to find them manifested
in the Human Sciences which are more intimately bound to
culture. Glucksman (1974) refers to two traditions of
thought when talking about the different definitions of the
term "structure" in anthropology and sociology. She
illustrates her points with examples drawn from works
belonging to the two traditions. The British anthropological
tradition thought of social "structure" as a convenient
summary of gathered data: "We cannot study persons except in
terms of social structure, nor can we study social structure
except in terms of persons" (Radcliffe-Brown). French
sociology and anthropology, on the other hand, did not
define structure in such a specific way. Instead, they

conceived of it in more "abstract" (Glucksman 1974) terms as "the principles of operations underlying observed data and governing relationships" (Page 31 1974): "The entire purpose of the French school is an attempt to break up the categories of the layman, and group the data into a deeper sounder classification" (Levi-Strauss).'

The disparity that Glucksman outlines can be reformulated in terms which relate to this thesis. The two intellectual traditions she isolates have provided different accounts of social phenomena. The Anglo-Saxon tradition has preferred impressionistic accounts of social phenomena where the French have gone beyond these impressions to isolate essential social categories. This chapter's argument is that this consistent contrast between the two traditions can be related to a particular manifestation of the thought styles in social discourse: the link between rationalism and ontological/methodological collectivism and between empiricism and ontological/methodological individualism. Quinton reformulates this contrast in terms of sociologism versus psychologism, hence the obvious parallel with between the differences outlined in the second chapter between the two traditions of literature. Like the literary traditions, native social discourses render explicit certain implicit linguistic constraints: the cultural priorities internalized in the thought styles. For example, French language does not possess the extensive reflexive terminology of English, nor does it possess such a rich vocabulary to describe

individual behaviour. There is no noun for the "self" or equivalents for adjectives such as self-conscious, self-control, self-contained or self-educated.[2] "Motif" and "croyance" - the literal translations of "motive" and "belief" - are never used in accounting for individual behaviour, particularly since "croyance" has much stronger religious connotations than "belief".

The first section of this chapter provides evidence that individualism is a property of the empirical thought style and that collectivism is a property of the rational style. The discussion centres around how collectivism and individualism have affected the way social theorists from the two traditions have dealt with certain key issues 1) early philosophical ideas on the state, justice and morality 2) the application of the scientific model to early nineteenth century social thought 3) approaches to morphology and 4) the interpretations of Durkheim. Empirical individualism emerges as pragmatic and reluctant to speculate about what cannot be documented or verified with "concrete" evidence - concrete is used as in Harland (1987), when he refers to the level of the individual social agent as a concrete reference point. Rational collectivism, on the other hand, having accepted the "social" as existing apart, has stressed the need for a systematic methodology to analyze this realm, independently of the individual. The emphasis is on developing general, theoretical frameworks as opposed to empirically investigating specific instances, and

the analysis is in terms of a priori laws, categories and structures. Moreover, empirical individualism generates a micro-social perspective with a tendency towards reductionism - as when society is seen as a collection of individuals by the philosopher Ayer - which contrasts with the macro-social, synthetic holism of rational collectivism. As Halls (1967) notes when talking about these different approaches:

> *On one principle, however, both the French traditionalists*
> *and reformists agree: the English system of specialization*
> *at the top academic secondary level is not adequate to*
> *educate an intellectual elite. It does not give 'the ability*
> *to situate oneself' in relationship to a whole which one*
> *cannot master in all its parts, to quote Valéry's dictum*
> *(Halls in Capelle page 6 1967)*

A cautionary note is in order here. The historical examples discussed make the contrast between the two traditions explicit. What amounted to clear conceptual differences have been reduced to contrasting emphases and modes of expression. The origins of society are no longer attributed to human nature and the "motives" and "drives" of individuals. However, Anglo-Saxon writers continue to emphasize the importance of "social selves", their "attitudes", "beliefs", "practices", "motives" and "intentions" (Goffman 1983, MacIntyre 1977/1985). Moscovici (1985) refers to this as a difference between tracing how psychic mechanisms become social and how social mechanisms become psychic. The consequence is that Anglo-Saxon discourse tends to view social behaviour as "situated", French social discourse as "determined". On the one hand,

individuals are presented as taking an active part in social life, on the other, they are overwritten by social ideology. This should not be misconstrued as a chapter which covers all the various schools of social thought within the two countries. It is merely interested in what can be considered to be two native traditions of social discourse. Therefore, most of the social theorists selected to bring out these points have been chosen because of their impact on, or membership of, what can be considered as two nationally specific schools of social thought: British utilitarianism, and French positivism. In the section on thinking in the twentieth century, reference is made to American social theorists in view of 1) their impact on English social thought generally and 2) their influence on sociological conceptions of madness, the subject of the next chapter. This compatibility is explained by a common empirical individualistic perspective.

The second section looks at the continuing existence of two thought styles within the Human Sciences. The example chosen to illustrate this point is psychoanalysis. The national schools of the two countries retain the characteristics of the thought styles manifested in social discourse. For example, there is a continuing disparity between English, pragmatic individualism and French, theoretical collectivism.

TWO TRADITIONS OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE

1) HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES IN CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL OBJECTS

The rise of Social Science as we know it today, occurred in the nineteenth century, while areas dealing with psychological and sociological issues were formalized into coherent disciplines (Tonnies 1974).[3] Before the nineteenth century, social and political thought was incorporated into philosophy. Hobbes can be said to have laid the foundations for a utilitarian social philosophy through his ideas on the state and society, Hobbes believed that an understanding of man and his "appetites" [4] was necessary to elucidate the origins of society (see Macpherson 1968). Self-interest, he concluded, drove men to form a "covenant" which would secure a state of peace. This state of peace enabled men to safeguard their "natural" rights to "life, limb and property" (Hobbes Lev. II chapter 30 1985). What seems contradictory, is that while in the convenant individuals have to completely submit to the power of a sovereign, yet the cement of the convenant is individual self-interest - there is no specification of any other form of social bonding. This becomes less contradictory when it is understood that:

> The obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right that men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. (Hobbes Lev. II chapter 18 page 273 1985)

In the end, the individual's "natural" rights were more important than the sovereign - in effect only the "means" whereby each member of the community had protected his rights. Although the Hobbesian totalitarian state is sometimes likened to Hegel's (Copleston 1964), there is a fundamental difference between the two. For Hobbes, the underlying assumption is that subordination was not by virtue of the state being the "State", but because it safeguarded individual interests. A social organism had been created, but one that could be disembodied when its usefulness was spent. Furthermore, Hobbes' state was liberal and non-interventionist: it secured conditions of peace so that the individual could make the fullest use of his own property (Lev. II chapter 18 1985). The Hegelian idea, on the other hand, led to the interventionist Continental conception of the state.

Locke's theory of social contract continued the utilitarian slant found in Hobbes' work, but brought the individual and his liberties to the fore. Like Hobbes, he believed that society's function was to safeguard natural rights of "life, liberty and estates": "commonwealths" are "chiefly" created to preserve property (Locke page 180 1988). However, his greater emphasis on the individual is highlighted in his definition of "commonwealths" - the result of social contract - as the "society of men". The legislative power it

possessed was "supreme" but not arbitrary, and could under no circumstance touch the "natural" right to property:

> *For it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature before they entered into society, and gave it up to the community... (Locke page 184 1988)*

Lockean society emerges as a collection of individual property owners, agreeing to live together for utilitarian reasons. Again, there was no indication of any other form of social bonding. Given this framework, it is understandable that morality was interpreted in an individualistic fashion. Combining elements of the divine with a nascent ethical hedonism, he reasoned that good is what confers pleasure and morality is to mould one's actions to the law so that one becomes a good law-abiding citizen. As for justice, it was a product of experience, a standard, in no way an eternal law. This betrays Locke's empirical bias against positing hypothetical universals.

Hume expanded Locke's ethical hedonism. He chose to focus on how the mind leapt "illogically" from fact to moral judgement. Like Locke before him, Hume avoided an a priori moral sense in the Kantian vein. Instead, the key to moral sentiment became usefulness, and sympathy the basis of moral approbation:

> *The hypothesis we embrace is plain. It maintains, that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence: We consider all the*

*circumstances, in which these actions agree: And thence
endeavour to extract some general observations with regard
to these sentiments. If you call this metaphysics, and find
any thing abstruse here, you need only conclude, that your
turn of mind is not suited to the moral sciences. (Hume page
261 1898)*

A similar pragmatism governed his idea that society is an *artifice* or convention initiated by individuals when they "become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it". Moreover, it is..."entered into by all Society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave everyone in the peaceable enjoyment of what he acquire in fortune and industry..." (Hume page 265 1898). The idea of "convention" embodies a sense of common interest, and self-interest became the basis of social conduct and of a sense of justice. Justice depended upon laws which, in political society, are designed "to be *useful* in that particular situation" (Hume page 167 1898). Hume's thoughts on "convention" betray his Lockean heritage, and his emphasis on utility made his philosophy the forerunner of nineteenth century Benthamism.

Meanwhile on the Continent, a pattern of thought was developing which stressed the need for new methods of analysis which concentrated on the morphology of the social realm. The latter was to be conceived as an entity in itself i.e. greater than the sum of its constituent members, which led to a different idea of society from that of the Hobbesian organism. The main tenet of Rousseau's thesis was similar to that of Hobbes and Locke: man's salvation lay in

forming a collective body. The nature of this collective
was, however, different. It was an independent entity with
its own will or "La volonté générale" - which Rousseau
distinguished from "La volonté de tous" on which the Lockean
contract rested - and morality. By stressing the importance
of the former over the latter, Rousseau's analysis steered a
different course from Locke's: towards the collective rather
than the individual:

> "Each one of us puts into the community his person and all
> his powers under the supreme direction of the general will;
> ...." Immediately, in place of the individual person of each
> contracting party, this active association creates an
> artificial and collective body composed of as many members
> as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act
> that body acquires its unity, its common ego its life and
> its will. (Rousseau page 62 1968)

This "being" was the "salutary organ of the collective will"
and dictated to each citizen the "precepts of public
rationality" (Rousseau 1968). The differing emphases on
"individual rights" and "public rationality" brings out the
contrast between ideas of social contract as described by
Locke and Rousseau. The "general will" solved Rousseau's
greatest problem: how to reconcile his idea that society
conferred freedom on its citizens while requiring them to
submit to dictatorial forces. His resolution of the paradox
differed from Hobbes' in that it involved the rejection of
the concept of "natural rights". By submitting himself to a
force greater than himself, man became free of the influence
of the other members of society. This freedom was further
increased in that man was no longer a slave to the selfish

natural drives which formed the basis of social living to the English philosophers. In society, the laws man obeyed, the source of his liberty, were social laws originating from the body politic and made for the body of the state. His actions were guided by "justice", a product of these laws, as opposed to "instinct", thereby acquiring a moral quality. Morality was thus defined in social terms as opposed to Locke's individualistic definition (Book I page 18 1968).

A parallel concept to that of the general will is Montesquieu's "soul of the State". His concept of the "organic State", was reused by both Comte and Durkheim where it emerges as an integral, permanent entity. Both these theorists made frequent reference to his work and Durkheim judged Montesquieu's ideas important enough to make them the subject of a treatise. In "L'Esprit des Lois", Montesquieu was interested in isolating "general" laws of societal development:

> *J'ai d'abord examiné les hommes, et j'ai cru que, dans cette infinie diversité de lois et de moeurs, ils n'était pas uniquement conduits par leurs fantaisies.*
> *J'ai posé les principes, et j'ai vue les cas particuliers s'y plier comme d'eux-mêmes, les histoires de toutes les nations n'en être que les suites, et chaque loi particulière liée avec une autre loi, ou dépendre d'une autre plus générale. (Montesquieu page 5 1973)*

Montesquieu embarked on a comparative, historical study of laws and government, proposing second order generalities or "principles", which would enable a holistic explanation of social development. His speculative laws depended on social

and physical factors ranging from economics to climate and were used to conceive a priori models of different societies: a republican government based on principles of civic virtue, a monarchical government based on honour, and a despotic government based on fear. Hence the origins of a morphology geared towards the understanding of what lay behind social organization, using theoretical notions such as "types" of society. In this "social" framework, liberty was conceived as a balance of social forces as opposed to something inherent in nature. The importance Montesquieu attached to a coherent methodology led him to create "social statics" to which Comte later added "social dynamics".[65] Like his successors, Montesquieu's method was geared towards fitting data to hypothetical general laws which explained social organization without referring to individual social agents.

The difference generated by the contrasting philosophical perspectives is perhaps best captured by Hume's concern with "general observations" and Montesquieu's with "general principles". The former betrays a concern for the specific and impressionistic, the latter for the underlying and the universal. It is a difference reminiscent of the contrasting anthropological definitions of structure isolated by Glucksman but also of Dalton's emphasis on "rules" which were summaries of data and Berthollet's desire to isolate underlying universal "laws".

2) APPLYING THE SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM TO NINETEENTH CENTURY
SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE CASE OF ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM AND
FRENCH POSITIVISM

Both utilitarianism and positivism were the result of the
nineteenth century's obsession with applying the scientific
paradigm to the social realm. Both were philosophies of
reform, occupying similar positions on the political
spectrum, which makes the comparison all the more
interesting. English utilitarianism retained the
reductionist conception of society as understandable in
individualistic terms. Its underlying biologism and
psychological hedonism is betrayed by the emphasis on
"drives" - such as pain and pleasure - as the basis for
social action. Despite his frequent allusions to structural
biology, Comte modelled his sociology on physics with its
laws and general principles. Indeed, Comte used social laws
to analyze society in a framework which continued to stress
its independent identity. Conceived with idealistic aims,
contrary to the pragmatic spirit of utilitarianism,
positivism was a speculative philosophy which valued theory
divorced from praxis.

After Hume, English philosophers had two options open to
them: they could either give up philosophy and become
psychologists like Hartley, or respond to Hume's treatise as
the Scottish did (Quinton 1982). The first course was the
one chosen by English utilitarian social philosophers, hence

the inherent psychologism and focus on the individual. The initiator of the utilitarian tradition was Bentham. One of the cornerstones of his thinking was the principle of ethical hedonism, derived from Hume and codified in the "pleasure principle": man is governed by the motives of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain and can do nothing to overcome them. The "pleasure principle" and "the principle of utility" led to the idea that:

> The only true foundations of society are the wants and the fears of individuals. It is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together; that demonstrates the necessity of this union; and that therefore is the solid and natural foundation, as well as the cement of society;... (Bentham page 425 1977)

Governments were "necessary" to keep order and to ensure the happiness of a community where political life became a function of man's search for pleasure and society was held together by self-interest, habit and fear (Bentham page 426 1977). In this framework, morality became "the principle approving an action which increases the happiness of the party in question". Bentham's simplistic reductionism has to be understood in terms of his reformist aspirations which were more important than formulating a complex social theory.

Despite his admiration for Coleridge, whom he praised for his emphasis on culture and history, the main influences on Mill's writing remained associationist, hedonistic psychology and the utilitarian philosophy with which he was

brought up.* This is clear from his view of morality, deeply rooted in the "concrete", "commonsensical" approach of Locke and Hume:

> *It is a fact in human nature, that we have moral judgements and moral feelings. We judge certain dispositions to be right, others to be wrong; this we call approving and disapproving them. We have also feelings of pleasure in the contemplation of the former class of actions and dispositions - feelings of dislike and aversion to the latter; which feelings as everybody must be conscious, do not exactly resemble any other of our feelings of pleasure and pain. (Mill page 18 1987)*

Although Mill made a qualitative distinction between moral feelings and feelings of pleasure, he did not judge it necessary to postulate a hypothetical moral imperative. It was just a psychological "fact" that we possess moral reactions to certain objects. Mill's analysis of justice in his essay "Utilitarianism" (repr. 1987) is interesting not only from a conceptual point of view, but also in terms of the style and approach. Starting from an analysis of what is usually understood by the term "justice", Mill concludes:

> *The idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule. There is involved, in addition the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement; whose rights (to use the expression appropriate to the case) are violated by it. And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be the animal desire to repel, to retaliate a hurt or damage to one's self or to those with which one sympathizes widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of intelligent self interest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its morality; from the former, its peculiar impressiveness and energy of self-assertion. (Mill page 326 1987)*

This is an example of an individualistic analysis which concentrates on the most immediately intelligible aspect of justice.

Saint Simon, following Montesquieu and Condorcet, believed in the deterministic historical development of society through different stages, as a product of certain laws. The changes which occurred during the various stages took place on both an intellectual and a material level. It is clear from his writings that Saint Simon, like his contemporary Hegel,[10] was trying to transcend the mind-matter duality, and thought that materialism, explaining synchronic changes in mind and matter by scientific laws, was the solution to his problem. The hypothetical laws making up his positive philosophy, the result of historical investigation, were to be helpful in constructing the new post-revolutionary French society. The latter could only be understood by studying these laws.[11]

Saint Simon bequeathed to Comte, the so-called founder of sociology, 1) the idea that society could be studied using positive laws 2) that these laws would be derived from a study of history 3) the idea of a society as an organic whole and 4) the link between intellectual and material progress. The last point is captured in the law of the three states: all societies pass through three phases, the theological, the metaphysical and the positive or scientific. The corresponding structures of society are ones

in which the priesthood, the military and the industrial administrators successfully rule. Comte was clearly continuing the global, morphological analysis of Montesquieu, in terms of general, a priori social laws. His achievement did not lie in conceptual novelty - many of his ideas were derived from Saint Simon - but in the definition of a "space" for his social physics and his attempt to develop a theoretical methodology with which to analyze it.[12] His sociological method had to be different from psychology and biology, sciences of the individual.

In a comparison between Mill, Spencer and Comte, Durkheim commented that only the latter contributed any methodological innovation (Durkheim page 1 1966).[13] This judgement is in keeping with the French rationalist emphasis on the importance of a theoretical framework within which to conduct analysis. Indeed, Comte rejected "naive empiricism", which resisted the use of theory in an attempt to be impartial, as "thoroughly irreconcilable with the spirit of the positive philosophy". This rejection was coupled with a dismissal of the utilitarian basis of society:

> ..the social state would never have existed if its rise had depended on a conviction of its individual utility, because the benefit could never have been anticipated by individuals of any degree of ability, but could only manifest itself after the social evolution had proceeded up to a certain point. (Comte vol. 4 page 458 1977).

Comte's sociological method had two components: social statics, concerned with the structure of society, and social

dynamics.[14] The latter, following Condorcet,[15] was the historical study of society and became the focal point of his philosophy. Furthermore, the science of sociology, like physics:

> contemplates each phenomenon in its harmony with co-existing phenomena, and in its connection with the foregoing and the following state of human development: it endeavors to discover, from both points of view general relations which connect all social phenomena: and each of them is explained, in the scientific sense of the word, when it has been connected with the whole of the existing situation, and the whole of the preceding movement. (Comte vol. 2 page 240 1977)

The model of society used in social statics was that of an integral social organism whose smallest unit was the family.[16] Despite his use of a biological analogy, Comte was acutely aware of the difference between the social and the biological organism, as is exemplified in his discussion of social "cementing factors" such as language and religion. These contrast with Bentham's "cementing factors" - the wants and fears of individuals. Morality in Comte's philosophy became subject "to rules, emanating from the intellectual unity of the time" (Comte vol. 4 page 831 1977). As to the individual and his social behaviour, it could be understood through social phenomena (Comte vol. 1 page 29 1977).[17&18]

Although it would be untrue to say that utilitarianism and positivism were the only traditions of social thought in existence in the respective countries, they were culturally specific ways of applying the scientific paradigm.

Interestingly, one of Mill's criticism of the Frenchman, whom he admired, was Comte's despotism of society over the individual. This difference of opinion was once again accompanied by the contrast between rationalism's concern for the underlying and the universal - Comte's general relations - and empiricism's adherence to more impressionistic specifics - Mill's analysis of "common" meaning.[19]

3) MOVING INTO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MORPHOLOGY.

A) CONTINUING THE TRADITIONS

Spencer, whose philosophy represented the culmination of the utilitarian tradition, presents problems in terms of the characteristics isolated as typical of the thought styles. He is one of the few Anglo-Saxon philosophers who tried to create a systematic philosophy. Furthermore, he used the biological metaphor to capture the structure and development of society. What Turner (1985) sees as Spencer's emphasis on social morphology leads him to make a comparison between Spencer and the descendant of the Comtian school, Durkheim. However, despite his systematic approach and interest in the principles governing societal organization, Spencer's thinking differs from that of the Frenchman - as Durkheim (1933) recognized - in his strict use of the biological metaphor, tied to his empirical individualism. Spencer's

analysis involved a direct grafting of biological ideas onto society, and did not interest itself in new theoretical notions to grasp its essential social essence.

The concepts Spencer used to explain social development included the biological ideas of differentiation, regulation and coordination. A more extreme example of his biological thinking is exemplified in his analogies between 1) the merging of cities and the merging of organic tissues possessing similar functions 2) industrial monopolization and the monopolization of certain tissues by others 3) the concentration of trade in specific areas and an increase in spatial closeness between tissues possessing analogous functions (Spencer 1878). Spencer's law of social evolution was couched in terms of "The integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogenity" (Spencer 1898). This clearly indicates that natural scientific reasoning was being applied to society. In fact, Spencer's biological analogy was a concrete way of thinking about "abstract" (Quinton 1982) social objects. He legitimized the direct grafting of what Comte considered a science of man onto society by the claims that "...cardinal traits in societies are determined by cardinal traits in men" and that "properties of the units determine the properties of the aggregates" (Spencer page 52 1878). Thus Spencer's biologism was clearly associated with

his individualism, the individual being the "concrete" (Harland 1985) starting point of his perspective:

> *Turn we now from the indirect influence which Biology exerts on Sociology, by supplying it with rational conceptions of social development and organization, to the direct influence it exerts by furnishing an adequate theory of the social unit - Man. (Spencer page 332 1878)*

This individualism led to the conceptualization of a less cohesive social organism. The difference between the organism (man) and super-organism (society) was captured in a principle which stated that all parts of the social organism are "independent", "conscious", "goal-seeking", and "reflective", whereas "only one unit can potentially be so in organic bodies" (Spencer 1878). "In the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate. In the other, it is diffused throughout the aggregate..." (Spencer page 119 1971). Hence the idea that each structure could be isolated and studied separately:

> *As then, there is no social sensorium, the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of the units, is not an end to be sought. The society exists for the benefit of its members, not its members for the benefit of society. It has ever to be remembered that great as may be the efforts made for the prosperity of the body politic, yet the claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals. (Spencer page 119 1971)*

By subscribing to a reductionist view of society i.e. the absence of a collective "sensorium", Spencer legitimated his modelling sociology on biology. His science described a social organism which differed from Rousseau's "Being" and its Comtian/Durkheimian equivalent.[2021]

In keeping with his positivist background, and despite his image as an empiricist, Durkheim remained a rationalist whose faith in the use of reason to solve society's ills was undaunted. Working within the social space created by Comte, he continued the collectivist morphological approach, setting out his methodology in "The Rules of Sociological Method" (1933). Like his predecessors, Durkheim reasoned in terms of theoretical a priori; an example of a hypothetical device which enabled him to think of societal development without reference to the individual, was the concept of the "horde". Although he used biological terminology – aggregation and differentiation – his analysis revolved around the idea of "social facts". These emanated from "the collective consciousness" and its representations, another hypothetical social entity whose autonomous existence was demonstrated by the constraining actions of "social facts" on social agents. Durkheim shared Rousseau's conception of society as a "being" – the possessor of the collective consciousness. This "being" resulted from "individual minds, forming groups by fusing to give birth to a being, psychological if you will, but constituting a psychic individuality of a new sort:..." (Durkheim page 89 1966). For Durkheim, there was a "collective sensorium" which had "specific characteristics which make it a distinct reality" (Durkheim page 79 1933) – these specific characteristics being translated into the collective representations. The existence of this collective "being" – society – explains why Durkheim had to provide a properly "social" analysis:

"The determining of social facts should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of individual consciousness" (Durkheim page 111 1966). Durkheim came to this conclusion after statistical studies had shown that a "social fact" such as suicide cannot be explained by non social factors such as age, race and gender. This, to him, contravened Spencer's assumption concerning cardinal traits. His "functional" analysis was to help him think about these social categories in their social context. For example, in his study of suicide, it led him to distinguish between anomic and egoistic suicide, underlying categories which were "normal" and "general" for the society considered.[24]

Durkheim's emphasis on isolating general, underlying principles/categories is clear from his insistance that it was "norms", not their modified forms "mores", which were the proper study of sociology. He wanted to outline "moral precepts" in their pure, impersonal form, "uncontaminated by individual practices". This type of approach was very different from Mill's individualistic analysis of morality, which concentrated on the individual's understanding of the term. Durkheim's collectivism, which precluded such an analysis, was coupled with a holism which distinguished his social philosophy from Spencer's:

> *But, in reality, this activity which he [the individual]*
> *manifests is not really his. It is society, it is race*
> *acting in and through him; he is only the intermediary*
> *through which they [societies] realize themselves. His*

> *liberty is only apparent and his personality borrowed.*
> *(Durkheim page 404 1933)*
>
> *No doubt each individual contains a part, but the whole is*
> *found in no one. In order to understand it as it is, one*
> *must take the aggregate in its totality into consideration.*
> *(Durheim page 26 1974)*

The differing Spencerian and Durkheimian perspectives had important consequences for their respective morphologies. Although Durkheim did use biological analogies, he thought of society in social terms. In order to analyze its substructure, he defined second order a priori categories which he judged to be the proper subject matter of sociology. Spencer's individualism precluded this type of "social" analysis, and his use of biology to capture societal organization and development remained a descriptive analogy.[25]

B) SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Symbolic interactionism has proved a powerful force in Anglo-Saxon sociology and social psychology. An outline of the assumptions governing this outlook is necessary to understand both Anglo-Saxon, neo-Durkheimian functionalism and the sociological conceptions of madness it generated, to be examined in the next chapter. Furthermore, there are interesting parallels to be drawn between Mead's philosophy - central to the symbolic interactionist perspective - and that of MacIntyre,[26] typified later as characteristically Anglo-Saxon. Both Mead and MacIntyre emphasize the

importance of the social agents in the construction of social reality/meanings. For Mead:

> *The human experience with which social science occupies itself is primarily that of individuals. (Mead page 309 1964)*

> *We have to recall that experience to become aware that we have been involved as selves, to produce the self-consciousness which is a constituent part of a large part of our experience. (Mead page 145 1964)*

Mead was interested in the way meanings were generated through social interaction, in particular how the individual's self is built up by taking over the attitudes of others. According to Mead, social selves were engaged in continuous social interaction. They defined social situations together, creating a symbolic framework or generalized other, the source of social "meanings". For Durkheim, social structure was preestablished and had a permanence which was independent of individual society members. However, for Mead it emanated from social actors and formed the basis of joint social actions. The latter view of societal structure is more compatible with the concept of society characterized as typically Anglo-Saxon, namely that society is no more than a collection of individuals. Both Locke's idea of "social contract" and Hume's idea of society as a "convention" are founded on this assumption. The Meadian ideas of "structure" and of a "symbolic" basis for social action have led social psychologists to compare Mead with Durkheim. As in the comparison between Spencer and Durkheim, there are, however,

disparities between the two philosophies. These disparities stem from the same source as before: the focus on the individual as opposed to the social aspect of society. Durkheim's symbols, originating in the collective consciousness, were general, cultural a priori guiding social interaction. Meadian symbols were endemic (Deutscher 1985), agreed meanings between interacting selves. As Deutscher points out, it is the opposition of symbols as "social facts" to "changing interpretations". This once again illustrates French rationalism's interest in underlying universals, and Anglo-Saxon empiricism's contrasting interest in impressionistic account which reflect the experience of individual social agents. The different Meadian and Durkheimian viewpoints have important implications for the way issues such as socialization, social change and social disintegration are dealt with. For Mead, social disintegration was the result of the inability to effectively mobilize joint social action, not the result of the disintegration of a structure as it was for Durkheim.

4) NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN NEO-DURKHEIMIAN THOUGHT

The Parsonian "systems" approach has exerted a considerable influence on American and British social thought. Despite Parsons claim to a Durkheimian heritage, his functionalism differs from that of the Frenchman. This is the result of it having been modified by Anglo-Saxon influences such as

Spencerian utilitarianism and Meadian symbolic interactionism.

In a volume on American sociology, Parsons (1968) describes sociology's task as "the functional analysis of systems", outlining their structure and integration. The subject of sociology becomes "the institutional aspect" of social action, the "norms" and "rules" constraining it (Parsons 1968). Like Durkheim, Parsons agrees with the existence of a separate social reality, but thinks of it in Spencerian terms. It is composed of structures or subsystems, to be studied separately - as opposed to holistically. Furthermore, he makes the distinction between "individual" and "social systems", to be studied in interaction.[27] Thus he minimizes the importance of the collective.

Parsons emphasis on "norms" and "rules" constraining social action indicates the centrality of social actors to his thinking. This is made explicit in his definition of a "subsystem", which like Radcliffe-Brown's idea of "structure", is a summary for "the relationships among actors, individuals as subject and object of social interaction" (Parsons page 1968). Furthermore, "there is a sense in which all action is the action of individuals" (Parsons page 6 1966), and Parsonian collectivities are "*collectivities* composed of individuals" (Parsons page 324 1968). Clearly the emphasis is different from Durkheim's. Parsons does, however, concede that "both the organism and

the cultural system involve essential elements which cannot be investigated at the individual level" (Parsons page 6 1966). Hence the relevance of functional analysis, which is an attempt to address the complications introduced by the interaction of a multitude of actors. It is not, as it was for Durkheim, the analysis of the function of essential second order social categories. Furthermore, Parsons could not accept Durkheimian determinism. He modified the utilitarian claim that personality was merely the product of selfish drives. Following Mead, he argued that it was affected, during socialization. by the expectation systems of society. It was not "borrowed" from society, as Durkheim and his structuralist heirs maintain.

Moscovici (1985) is aware that the Parsonian "systems" approach contrasted with that of his transatlantic neo-Durkheimian colleagues.[oo] He illustrates his point by referring to attribution theory, which deals with explanations of social causality. Attribution theory, he maintains, is limited because of its individual, inductive frame of reference and its artificial distinction between the two forms of causality it postulates: internal and external or personal and situational (Moscovici 1985).[oo] The idea of alternatively ascribing causality to internal and external factors, he describes as "ridiculous", recommending that his Anglo-Saxon colleagues remedy their approach by a) switching from the individual to the collective sphere and b) re-instating social representations as necessary

mediators. These representations are at the centre of
Moscovici's social psychology:

> *Sociology sees, or rather, has seen, social representations
> as explanatory devices, irreducible by any further analysis.
> Their theoretical function was similar to that of the atom
> in traditional mechanics, or of the gene in traditional
> genetics, that is atoms and genes were known to exist, but
> nobody bothered about what they did, or what they were like.
> Similarly one knew that social representations occurred in
> societies, but nobody worried about their structure, or
> about their inner dynamics. Social psychology, on the other
> hand, must be pre-occupied solely with both the structure
> and the dynamics of representations. (Moscovici in Farr and
> Moscovici page 16 1985)*

Moscovici's interpretation of Durkheim leads him to focus on
underlying social categories, rather than on the "norms" and
"rules" governing the actions of social agents, as is found
in Parsonian functionalism. Unlike attibution theorists, he
is not interested in individual categories of explanation,
but those of the "thinking society" (1985), mediated by
social representation. This globalism not only leads to a
more complicated conceptualization of the social process -
in terms of what can be understood through experience - but
also one which is not easily amenable to "concrete" (Harland
1985) empirical validation. However, the academic nature of
Continental social science would make this form of
validation a secondary concern.

As with previous examples, there is evidence to suggest that
the properties of the thought styles manifested in social
discourse are not *sui generis*. This is best discussed with
reference to the social scientific methodology used within

the two traditions. In the nineteenth century, the increasing interest in Social Science was related to the need to understand the problems of the newly industrialized society. In Britain, social scientific research was born out of the necessity to improve the lot of the urban poor. Hence its pragmatic orientation and distrust of speculative theory, evident in the attitude of The London Statistical Society which from 1841 was to advise the government on its censuses (Glazer 1959). The Society maintained that there was a growing distrust of mere hypothetical theory and a priori assumptions. In Social Science, principles are valid for application only inasmuch as they are legitimate inductions from "facts, accurately observed and methodically classified" (Glazer 1959). Shaw (1975), links the pragmatism and empirical bias of Anglo-Saxon social science to its utilitarian/reformist origins. As he points out, it was only codified into a pure academic discipline - sociology - in the nineteen sixties (Shaw page 58 1975). On the Continent, however, philosophers - Lerner (1959) cites as examples of these, Marx and Comte - were much more inclined to formulate large scale, idealistic reform plans, based on "sparse and non-systematic selection from the universe of relevant observations" (Lerner 1959). Indeed, before Comte, Montesquieu had advocated a social methodology which fitted data to general principles.

The bias in favour of empirical investigation in the Anglo-Saxon world is most evident today in the form of individualistic social survey methodology - England and the U.S.A. are the leaders in this area of data collection. The importance of social survey techniques in promoting the image of professional scientific competence and utility is particularly important in America, where academics have become freelance intellectuals, deploying their skills in the service of big business (Rorty 1982). Techniques and scientific identity also explain the specialization characteristic of Anglo-Saxon Social Sciences:

> *The re-division of the social sciences into more and more narrow fields, which continues apace, admirably serves the purposes of the academic structure of social knowledge. The more narrow the definition of the field, the more specific the technical forms of research can be, the more rigid both the formal and the substantive standards which operate. In addition, of course, re-division... satisfies the specific financial and prestige requirements of rising intellectual groups. (Shaw page 53 1974)*

This is contrasted with the more academic and interdisciplinary aspects of Continental Social Sciences, thriving on theoretical doctrines. Here, clever philosophical systems are the secret of recognition, legitimation by empirical "fact" gathering being of secondary importance.

THE CASE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

There seems to be a consensus as to the schools which best reflect culturally specific interpretations of the Freudian corpus. Rycroft notes that:

> ... in between these largely, but not quite exclusively foreign and German-speaking groups was a third largely English-speaking group which was at first definable only in negative terms. (Rycroft page 120 1985)

This was the Independent or Object Relations School. Modier (1981), reviewing psychoanalysis' history in France, maintains that without Jacques Lacan "... la psychanalyse ne serait jamais advenue" (Modier page 22 1961)". Modier's remark is corroborated by Bowie (1979) who claims that "Lacan has made Freud properly readable for the first time in France" (in Sturrock 1979 page 150). Psychoanalysis provides perhaps the clearest example of the expression of national thought styles because, as Turkle (1978) points out, "... psychoanalysis can be a screen onto which a culture projects its preoccupation and values. (Turkle page 48 1978)".

The British school of psychoanalysis, as represented by Rivers, Suttie and Fairbairn has been noted for its 1) biological 2) fact orientated 3) individualistic approach (Brown 1961). The biological, fact finding approach, an ideal of British experimental psychology, was typical of British social thought. The biological orientation was

evident in Rivers' analysis of the reaction of soldiers to danger, described in terms of flight, immobility, collapse, aggressive [fight] and manipulative action, i.e. in terms of primitive animal responses. Suttie emphasized the importance of maternal love, placing the mother/child relationship at the centre of his theorizing. The need for a mother was not seen primarily in terms of gratification, but "as a need for company and as a discomfort in isolation" (in Brown page 64 1961).

The empirical individualist inclination described by Brown is prominent in the work of The Independents, who also draw upon Suttie's emphasis on the importance of the maternal relationship. The biological orientation has been retained in Bowlby's work, and to a lesser extent that of Rycroft. They both use the insights provided by ethology. A problem such as "Woman and her Discontent" (Gillespie 1988), is discussed in terms of oedipal relations with the father, complexes associated with sexual organs. The use of biology is displayed in a reference to fish behaviour.[30] Klein, however, is the source of the school's most important concepts: the transactional object and the idea of a transitional realm. These are concepts which are of pragmatic value in explaining individual development and implementing therapy. The aim of therapy is to recreate the transitional realm and to provide a space where childhood conflicts can be mastered. The emphasis on the experience of individuation and the importance of therapy explain both the

individualistic interactive and the pragmatic clinical dimensions of the school's work.[30]

The ability to interact successfully with external objects depends on the creation, during development, of a transitional realm, midway between objective (external) and subjective (internal) reality. Objects in this realm[31] - such as play, culture and art - are both external and internal in that they are other, but can adapt to conceptions imposed upon them. Interacting with transitional objects thus gives a sense of control and security, so that the individual is able to initiate a creative relationship with the outside world. Following Klein, The Independents believe that the individual gradually emerges out of the individual-environment complex. The centrality of the mother - a legacy of Suttie's - and of the transformational/transactional process to this development is captured below:

> *In the first place, the mother assumes the function of the transformational object; she constantly alters the infant's environment to meet his needs. That the infant identifies the mother with transformation of being, through his symbiotic knowing, is not a delusion, but a fact; the mother actually transforms the infant's world. In the second place, the infant's own emergent ego capacities - of perception, motility, integration - also transform his world. The acquisition of language is perhaps the most obvious such transformation, but learning to handle an object, to differentiate objects, to remember objects that are not present, are transformative achievements; they result in ego change that alters the nature of the infant's object world. It is not surprising that the infant identifies these ego achievements with the presence of an object, and the failure of the mother to maintain provision of the facilitating environment, through prolonged absence or bad handling, can bring about ego collapse and psychic pain. With the infant's creation of the transitional object, the transformational*

process is displaced from the mother-environment (where it originated) into countless subjective-objects, so that this transitional phase is heir to the transformational phase, as the infant evolves from experience of the process to articulation of the experience. (Bollas in Kohon page 85 1988)

Besides the emphasis on the mother, the characteristic features of The Independents' theorizing are a fairly clear notion of self/ego as well as an emphasis on the interactive framework in which this self develops. An interesting trait is the appeal to common knowledge through the use of words such as "obvious". This is linked to another feature of the school: a distinct bias against dogmatic theorizing related to a strong emphasis on the pragmatics of therapy. Many of the papers in a volume edited by Kohon (1986) deal with therapeutic problems, such as the issues of transference/countertransference. Theoretical ideas are illustrated with empirical evidence or appeals to common knowledge. Rycroft speaks of Bowlby, a Kleinian by training, as favouring simple commonsensical explanations. This has the unavoidable consequence that his findings are "boringly" straightforward and "precisely what warm-hearted but naive non-intellectuals have always thought". Indeed, a reading of his trilogy "Attachment and Loss" (1973) leaves the reader with the impression that Bowlby is codifying in experiments what mothers intuitively know. His conclusions are based on a judicious review of the relevant literature and his own extensive experimental work. Rycroft makes a similar praise-criticism of Winnicott's work, relying as it does on intuition and observation, a handicap when trying to

formulate ideas and present them in a coherent, systematic form. Winnicott's naivety is even more evident when he discusses issues outside his field as some of the essays in "Home is where we start from" (1971) demonstrate - particularly one on Democracy. Despite these criticisms, Rycroft concludes that Winnicott is responsible for the "single most important contribution to psychoanalysis in the last thirty years: transitional reality". This contrasts sharply with his appraisal of Lacan and French psychoanalysis. After admitting that some of Lacan's philosophical mentors - Hegel and Nietzsche - "are not in his bones", Rycroft vents his impatience with the Frenchman:

> *Apart from the single fact he would like psychoanalysis to be rewritten from the point of view of linguistics I found his writings a real load of rubbish. (Page 5 1985)*

Rycroft's appraisal of Winnicott makes sense in the light of the latter's acknowledged approach to psychoanalysis. Therapy and the therapeutic relationship were more important to Winnicott than abstract theorizing. Theories acted as a backbone to the therapeutic enterprise, and were merely codified experience. In his "Therapeutic Consultations in Child Psychiatry", he warned:

> *Dogmatic interpretation leaves the child with only two alternatives, an acceptance of what I have said as propaganda or a rejection of the interpretation and of me and of the whole set-up. Actually I do claim that these interviews are dominated by the child and not by me. (Winnicott page 10 1971)*

His consultations are examples of "communication with children" where the aim was not to support a theory, but to help a child. Rycroft betrays the same pragmatic attitude, and states:

> I must at some point abandon the idea that there was I, a scientist observing material presented to me by a patient. I must have gone over from that view which seems to be implicit in Freud to the idea that I was having a relationship or an encounter with someone and that the raw material or basic data, of my science was the relationship I was having with the patient...for a long time my practice was better than my theory. I always did just simply start a relationship with the patient, and explored how the relationship developed. If I wrote something in terms of psychic apparatus, I was really only making kow-towing movements towards classical theory. (Rycroft page 11 1985)

Subsequently, Rycroft dropped Freudian jargon, referring to it as "an intellectual masturbating machine".

Lacanian psychoanalysis is philosophical, literary, political and theoretical in orientation with a focus on the unconscious, neglecting the ego of the English school.[33][34] The emphasis on theory, as opposed to the pragmatics of therapy has been noted by many writers on the Lacanian school. As Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) emphasize, the British society is much more clinically orientated than the French, to which clinical material only makes sense within a rigid conceptual framework.[35] This remark is born out by a reading of Lacan's "Ecrits" (1977), where speculative, philosophical/literary reasoning is but rarely backed up by his own clinical research. The titles of the chapters in the "Ecrits" (1977) point to the difference which exists between

the two schools: "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectics of Desire", "Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious". A chapter entitled "On the Possible treatment of Psychosis" includes an extensive theoretical discussion in terms of Saussurian linguistics and Lacanian symbols, as well as reference to the classic Freudian case of Schreber. Again, there is a dearth of clinical material - which would presumably have figured extensively in an equivalent chapter in the English literature. As Bowie (1979) points out, Lacan's systematizing of the discipline separates him from Englishmen like Laing and Cooper, who merely exposed its faulty premises. By systematizing psychoanalysis, Lacan brought intellectual rigour to the discipline, his original aim. Lacan's obsession with making psychoanalysis into a pure science led him to develop "mathemes", the result of applying mathematics to psychoanalysis, and an attempt to look for a theory of the human subject based on the science of linguistics. The combination of linguistics and mathematics offered the possibility of reducing psychoanalysis into a series of formulae. For Lacan, formalization, more than empirical validation and usefulness, was the key to the success of a science.

Lacan is known for dictums such as "the unconscious is structured like language" and "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other", both betraying his overwhelming interest in the unconscious. Lacan wanted to isolate its laws of operation and underlying structure with the help of

Saussurian linguistics. De Saussure's analysis of meaning or "the signified" - that it is not an absolute concept to be found in the thoughts or the words spoken by the individual, but "in the relation of the words to themselves and to the system of signs itself" - is grafted onto man. Hence he is no longer the absolute ego, but subject to laws and rules, in particular those of language reflected in the structure of the unconscious. Language is introduced as a social component, Lacan's thesis being that by acquiring language, the individual is introduced into a pre-existing symbolic realm. This then applies pressure on the libido (or désire), and structures it.[37] Talking about Levi-Strauss' anthropology, he exclaims:

> *Isn't it striking that Lévi-Strauss, in suggesting the implication of the structures of language with that part of the social laws that regulate marriage ties and kinship, is already conquering the very terrain in which Freud situates the unconcious. (Lacan page 73 1977).*

To explain the other dictum it is necessary to refer to the three orders of the "Symbolic", the "Imaginary" and the "Real" which play a similar role in Lacan's work as the "Id", "Ego" and "Superego" do in Freud's. The Imaginary is intimately connected with the "mirror phase" and the formation of the illusion of the coherent ego. It is the stage at which the child of between six and eighteen months, as yet neurologically immature and uncoordinated, identifies himself with the coherent image he sees in the mirror. This process of identification, once initiated, continues throughout life, maintaining the illusion of a unitary

self/agent, which Lacan rejects. The Imaginary order is made up of fantasies whereas the symbolic is constituted by social and cultural symbols, including most importantly language. It is through this order that a true conception of the subject can be derived. The child's entry into this realm is made when he accepts the parental metaphor - Le Non du Père, the "non" and the name of the father, is alternatively termed the "Other" - and internalizes the rules of society. Finally, the Real is beyond the other two domains. It is what is already there and that which has gone before us. It is a chaos, structured by language, "the world of words that creates the world of things - the things originally confused in the hic et nunc of all the processes of coming-into-being" (Lacan 1977). The Other, the symbolic "non" of the father, the speaker of full speech or subject of the unconscious, is what the analyst is trying to reach in therapy.

The ego as it is developed by The Object Relations School - a therapeutic tool, and an idea that helps explain individual development - has a certain stability as a concept. This is not true of the Lacanian ego, which many argue does not exist, or if it does, only as a decentred dialectical process (Bowie 1979). According to Lacan, it is an "intermittent image", where the notion of the ego as a fixed reference point is replaced by the notion of a subject realizing itself through the symbolic matrix:

*This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child
at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and
nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary
situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated
in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the
dialectic of identification with the Other, and before
language restores to it, in the universal, its function as
subject. (Lacan page 2 1977)*

Only through the unconcious which is structured like
language, can the "Subject" realize itself.

Within Lacan's Freudian framework, modified by Saussurian
linguistics, the oedipal drama is not acted out between
people. Instead, it is described in terms of the interplay
between general cultural symbols. The oedipus conflict is
about the child's capacity to enter the symbolic realm
structured by social discourse, and consequently into a new
relationship with language and the world. It is resolved
when repression - translated into linguistic terms as a
process of metaphor formation - substitutes the father's
name (le nom du père) for the desire of the mother. One
signifier is substituted for another, yet the signified, the
phallus, remains the same.[38] To more politically committed
analysts such as Deleuze and Guattari, the Lacanian analysis
is incomplete. Lacan attempts, but fails to place "desire"
in the social field: to Lacan, "desire" is the key to the
relationship between the Subject and the Other - the
symbolic "non" of the father. All Lacan does is formulate
the oedipus complex in more general terms.[39] To overcome
Lacanian familialism, Deleuze and Guattari propose to

replace psychoanalysis by schizoanalysis. The latter would lead to a view of the psyche as fundamentally social. It is likened to curing rituals in primitive societies, where healing requires a political, social and economic analysis of the community as opposed to an oedipal solution. It is a process of decoding where the aim is to analyse how the social field is animated by unconscious desire:

> *La schizoanalyse ne se propose pas de résoudre Oeudipe, elle ne prétend pas de résoudre mieux que ce que fait dans la psychanalyse oeudipienne. Elle se propose de désoeudipianiser l'inconscient, pour atteindre aux véritables problèmes. Elle se propose d'atteindre à ces régions de l'inconscient orphelin, précisément 'au dela de toute loi'... (Deleuze and Guattari page 97 1972)*

Desire is the essence of subversion and revolution, that which the schizophrenic is in touch with. His privileged position stems from the fact that his unconscious has not been structured by the process of "oedipization", the instrument of capitalist repression and mediated by society's agent – the family. This enables him to retain contact with the primitive truths of society, and as such his language reveals the real connections between the languages of race, repression and other political forces. Deleuze and Guattari's highly theoretical political ideas are again divorced from detailed empirical investigation. The language they use betrays their Lacanian heritage. They adopt his notion of a "therapeutic text" which must not merely transmit knowledge to the reader, but challenge his assumptions about the idea of knowledge itself. It is a

language which supplies further evidence of rationalism's love of intellectual game playing.[40]

French psychoanalysis requires a certain kind of literary performance, and Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari certainly provide it (Bowie 1979). Theirs is a language which is specifically designed to speak to the unconscious. This explains the word play and abundance of associations, and contrasts with the straightforward approach of the pragmatic English analysts who are addressing the self/ego. In fact, as a discipline, French psychoanalysis differs markedly from its English counterpart. It is a clever theoretical framework which uses formulae to systematize ideas into a concise clear form. Lacan speaks in more general social terms, interested not in relationships with the father, but in the symbolic entity, the name of the father - a symbol in the Durkheimian sense of a general cultural symbol. The fluid nature of all Lacanian structures, not only the ego - another example being the realm of the Real, conceived using the analogy of throwing a dice - makes them difficult to isolate and study empirically. Furthermore, rationalism gives a more conceptually difficult perspective on the dynamics of the psyche, just like it did of the social process and for the same reasons: its academic orientation and disinterest with empirical validation.

The characteristics of the two schools can, once again, be understood in terms of their genesis from culturally

specific thought-environment complexes. For example, the biological element in British psychoanalysis can be understood through its continuing dialogue with psychiatry - both Winnicott and Rycroft had psychiatric training. Its focus on therapeutics relates to the pragmatic origins of the discipline. After the Second World War, in Britain, psychoanalysis coexisted with psychiatry, its position having been secured by the failure of traditional psychiatric practice to explain post-war syndromes such as shell shock (Stone 1985).[41][42]

In France, psychoanalysis was part of a broader subversive philosophy - structuralism - which replaced the post-war philosophy of existentialism.[43] It was a tool in a radical critique, promoting a left wing political ideology of change. Hence French psychoanalysis' socio-political dimension (see chapter six for an elaboration of this point) and anti-individualism.[44] From the point of view of this thesis, the most interesting feature of psychoanalysis' institutionalization in France, was the pressure on it to become an academic discipline. The theoretical nature of Lacan's psychoanalysis, whilst it can be related to its function as social criticism - rather than being a therapeutic enterprise - can also be explained by the attempt to legitimize it as a discipline within the university setting.[45] Unlike his Anglo-Saxon counterparts, and in keeping with French academicism, Lacan believed that a science was not defined by the specifics of praxis, but by

the generalities of a theory abstracted from it. The
emphasis on purely academic theory has been a permanent
feature of rationalism, and the best place for this type of
theoretical development was the university. Hence Lacan's
desire for psychoanalysis to become part of formal academic
life. He was seconded in his views by other members of his
school such as Laplanche, who "hopes that university will
keep psychoanalysis pure" (Turkle page 173 1978).[46 & 47]

CONCLUSION

National features isolated with the help of the artistic and
scientific enterprises of the countries, have also been
found in the Human Sciences. For example, there was evidence
for the continuing disparity between the rationalist search
for underlying, universal principles to explain societal
structure, and empiricism's preference for impressionistic
explanations. Hence parallels exist with the differences
outlined in the chapter on science. Rationalism was again
coupled with a theoretical academicism, empiricism with a
pragmatic emphasis. The origin of these manifestations of
the thought styles was located in culturally specific
thought-environment complexes. Thought styles internalize
certain constraints specific to the culture in question. The
traditions of social discourse the thought styles generate,
reflect the existence of these constraints, making them
suited to describe the socio-political structure of the

culture considered. The integral concept of the French social organism can be linked to the strong bureaucratic, interventionist, French State, whilst individualism and the disembodied social organism can be related to the weaker non interventionist British one. The possibility of interchange between American and British thought styles - and thus social discourse - stems from their emergence from similar thought-environment complexes: ones fostered by similar political cultures, built on the "liberal" concept of the state.

The different characteristics of the thought styles have permeated recent developments in the Human Sciences, so that contrasting perspectives of the social process are echoed in those of the ego in psychoanalysis. The concepts of the ego of the two psychoanalytic schools also reflect the underlying social differences. Non-interventionist policies have led to a stress on the individual in society and his liberties. This is translated into the stable empirical concept of The Independents, designed to be of practical value: to capture the experience of individuation. This concept of the ego is very different from its amorphous French counterpart, overwritten by social ideology.

1. In a survey of the different anthropological definitions of the term "structure", Glucksman highlights the difference between the conceptualizations in the British functionalist and the French structuralist literature. The French saw structure as capturing the underlying social reality of the societies they were studying. The British, committed to inductive scientific investigation, saw structures as convenient summaries for observable data, a clear sign of their empiricism. The only definition which comes close to Levi-Strauss' idea of an underlying "grammar" or "syntax", structuring social relationships, according to Glucksman, is that developed by Firth in his "Tikopia". Levi-Strauss's "structure", in keeping with Durkheim's social morphology, is not a model or analogy, but a reality, the proper subject matter of anthropology. These different interpretations are the result of the Anglo-Saxon's selective emphasis on the concept of observable "facts", neglecting the existence of the social as reality in itself (Godard in Glucksman page 74 1972). Godard refers to the reluctance of the British intellegentsia since the nineteenth century to engage in any critique of the totality of social life. He links this to their "conceptual blindness" with respect to the analysis of underlying structures (Page 62 1972). The different conceptualizations of the terms are related to different anthropological approaches. The English are eclectics, strongly emphasizing the practicalities of fieldwork as opposed to theorizing. The greater interdisciplinary overlap in French Human Sciences, as well as a "penchant" for theory and aversion to fieldwork explains the philosophical and linguistic influences on French anthropology. Working with data which had already been collected, French anthropologists, such as Durkheim and Mauss, produced second level theorizations, capturing "essential properties" as opposed to striking empirical descriptions (Glucksman 1972). There is thus evidence for a coupling between rationalism's attention to a priori general structures and a theoretical academicism. Conversely, empiricism is biased towards practical investigation and a focus on the "concrete", individual level of society, leading to a more specific definition of the term.

Zito (1984) commenting on the few inroads which structural linguistics have made into Britain offers an explanation; that it was not seen to offer anything above the literary analysis offered by modernists such as James Joyce. Its success on the Continent, Zito attributes to the fact that Durkheimian collective representations are particularly amenable to semiotic analysis, hence the impact of structuralist theory on neo-Durkheimian sociology and anthropology. He concludes that;

> *"Structuralism" had to confront the same epistemological problems that produced*
> *the present impasse in the social sciences; the nature of causality and*
> *intentionality, the distinction between social things and things of other kinds,*
> *methodological procedures and the culture versus structure problem. It was able*

to do so with considerable ease, although the results were not sufficiently utilitarian to warrant its institutionalization at the American and British unversities. Its neglect of the empirical dimension, an unpardonable sin to the heirs of pragmatism, made it "speculative", and therefore to be ignored as unscientific. In addition, the idea of system it employed is so obscure compared to those traditionally employed by the social sciences, that it appeared "unsystematic", if not haphazard. (Page 6 1984)

Zito's analysis corroborates my claims about rationalism's emphasis on academic theory which contrasts with empiricism's pragmatic utilitarian slant.

2. The literal translation of "the self" is "le moi" not commonly used. The translations of other reflexive terms include self-assertive : authoritaire

self-confidence : aplomb

self-conscious : embarrassé, gêné

self-contained : indépendant

self-educated : autodidact

self-important : suffisant

self-possession : sang froid

self-expression : libre expression

self-esteem : amour-propre

3.

The shift in a great proportion of research effort in the natural sciences towards the phenomena of life and of social life has thus determined all scientific endeavour in the nineteenth century. It had to be taken, once commerce and communications were expanding and metropolitan and internal living condtions began to predominate. In the process, large scale phenomena of increasing complexity had to be mastered, yet there remained the closer and equally pressing human problems which are deeply alloyed with all naive or imaginative or religious opinion. For just this reason the new development, heralding a new slant on psychology, signified a need for renewed efforts in mental and moral philosophy. (Tonnies page 63 1974)

4. As a result of his study of human nature, Hobbes concluded that; 1) men had an innate aversion to death 2) that they were incapable of behaving to secure their long-term interests - rather being motivated to immediately gratify their appetites and 3) that the "natural state" of man was to be at war.

5.

Locke believed that laws and constitutions were created through a free, arbitrary agreement of wills. Montesquieu introduced into the study of legislation the natural method which links facts together in a series so that, starting from an initial fact - a given historical situation or certain physical conditions - one readily recalls the others. Here he was faithful, to the degree

*that his subject permitted, to the spirit of the century. That is why, to use
the language of a later era, he created a social statics dealing with the
simultaneous groupings of facts and the equilibrium of forces in a stable
society at each given moment; in the same way Condillac created a psychological
statics and the authors of natural series a biological statics, but Montesquieu
had no notion of social dynamics the genetic succession of forms we find in
Vico. (Brehier page 68 1930)*

6. Bentham was critical of his idealistic French counterparts. For his criticism of the French constitution - he questions the terminology using an analysis of meaning which foreshadows twentieth century British linguistic philosophy - see Pareth (1973).

7. Rights and obligations in society are explained by the idea of services, and expression of how dependent individuals are upon each other when they live together. Services generate happiness, and it is the task of the government to specify a compulsory system of services, i.e. those that are so vital to our social existence that they cannot be left to chance. From a view that pleasure and pain were motives of social actions and that the pleasure and pain of others should motivate our actions, Bentham moved to the essential role of the law and morality (Ryan 1987).

8. The principle of utility was to provide a standard of good and bad laws, and following this, a simple understandable code which everyone could use. Knowing one's rights would prevent injustices and the infringement of the individual's liberties. Bentham's definition of laws contrasts with that of his French counterparts; they were simply "rules" governing actions.

9. This adding of a qualitative aspect is a feature of Mill's writing. He developed it in his discussion of feelings of pleasure, explaining how sometimes qualitative considerations can outweigh the quantitative aspects of pleasure - an example of a quantitative aspect was the number of people pleased or displeased:

> *It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that
> some kinds of pleasure are more desirable than others. It would be absurd that
> while, in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as quantity,
> the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
> (Mill Utilitarianism page 279 1987)*

10. Tonnies believes in the fundamental compatibility between the French and the German "mentalities". He illustrates his points by referring to the cross-fertilization which occurred between German idealism and French positivism:

> *What was more Hegel's own contemporary Saint Simon had become the centre of a
> group of people which were earnestly seeking a more profound view of cultural*

> *development. Since it held that "organic" periods are of necessity putting forth*
> *their own negation in a "critical period", and that the "critical period" gives*
> *way to a new and heightened "organic period", this view would have fitted the*
> *Hegelian schema with the least constraint. (Tonnies page 74 1974)*

Tonnies then analyzes the many parallel conceptions which exist in German idealism and French positivism. Markham elaborates on the relationship between Marx and Saint Simon, supporting Tonnies case:

> *At first sight Marx and Saint Simon are poles apart. Saint Simon did not believe*
> *in an inevitable class war between capital and labour. He believed that the*
> *determining factor in human development was not merely material and economic,*
> *but the "progress of ideas". But what Marx found interesting in Saint Simon was*
> *a complete philosophy of history, explaining the development of the human race*
> *in terms of the rise and fall of classes according to changes in the state of*
> *society. Moreover, Saint Simon had a conception of a science of history based on*
> *discoverable laws, producing inevitable and predictable results independently of*
> *human wills. When Marx had substituted the economic factor for Saint Simon's*
> *"progress of ideas", and applied the Hegelian dialectic to the theory of classes*
> *he had arrived at the conception of historical materialism. (Page XLIV 1952)*

Further parallels between German and French thought are drawn by LaCapra (1972), in his comparison of Durkheim and Marx. Despite Durkheim's rejection of Marxism, LaCapra argues that there are many similarities between the two theorists: 1) their attempt to integrate German speculative philosophy and the French socialist tradition into a theoretical framework explaining the genesis and function of society 2) they saw history as the story of the genesis of social pathology and 3) they understood the danger of a value neutral conception of social science.

The idea of compatible mentalities has been used to explain the easy integration of Marxism into French thought. An alternative explanation given by Geison (1985) was outlined in the footnotes to the previous chapter. Geison (1985) maintains that the failure of Marxism in the Anglo-Saxon world is due to its inability to explain different political structures to the ones on which the theory is based - those possessing a strong Hegelian State. Whatever the explanation, the compatibility of the German and French mentalities could be predicted from the proposed concept of "thought styles": similar political structures are linked to similar mental structures (Bourdieu 1979).

11. Saint Simon's materialism was used by Marx to temper his Hegelian roots. The Frenchman's dialectic foreshadowed Marx's. It supported the idea of historical determinism while urging individuals to play a part in their own destiny by intellectual improvement.

12. All societies pass through three phases: 1) the theological where causes are attributed to supernatural beings 2) the metaphysical where they are attributed to abstract forces 3) the positive or scientific, where the search for absolute causes is abandoned for the study of laws.

13.

> *"Mill it is true, has dealt with the question at great length; but he has only refined with his dialectics what Comte had already expounded without adding anything original"* *(Durkheim page 1 1966)*

His positive sociology was an important aid to observation, and made it possible to estimate social phenomena not amenable to direct investigation by "scientific relation to others already known" (Comte vol. 4 page 458 1977).

14. Not only did Comte seek a new method for his sociology, but he was also aware of the intrinsic difficulties of the discipline and its methodology. Sociology, he realized, could never fully imitate the scientific model;

> *Unlike the sciences, the subject matter to be investigated is determined by the theory which is used to investigate it. No real observation of any kind of phenomena is possible except insofar as it is directed and finally interpreted by some theory. (Comte vol. 2 page 242)*

and;

> *I am not blind to the vast difficulty which this requisition imposes on the institution of positive sociology obliging us to create at once, so to speak, observation and laws, on account of their indispensable connection, placing us in a sort of vicious circle; from which we can issue only by employing, in the first instance materials which are badly elaborated, and doctrines which are ill-conceived. (Comte vol. 2 page 248)*

What Comte was stating was a problem which has occupied social scientists ever since: the problem of hermeneutics.

15. Comte hints at the importance he attributes - like Saint Simon before him, to historical determinism and the historical dimension of the study of society, social dynamics;

> *Condorcet it was who grasped the general conception of the operation fitted to raise politics to the rank of the sciences of observation. He saw clearly that civilisation is subject to a progressive course, every step of which is strictly connected with the rest by virtue of natural laws; discoverable through philosophic observation of the past, and which determined in a positive manner*

for each epoch, improvements adapted to the social state as a whole, and to each
position of it. (Comte appendix page 70)

16. The unit of study was a "social" organism whose smallest unit was the family:

..., I shall treat the social organism as definitely composed of the families
which are the true elements or cells, next the classes and castes which are its
proper tissues, and lastly of cities and communes which are its real organs.
(Comte vol. 2 page 242)

It would be a mistake to liken this to Spencerian ideas, as Comte uses this biologism to
emphasize the unity of the social organism, not to enable him to focus on the individual.

17.
In all social phenomena we perceive the workings of the physiological laws of
the individual; and moreover something which modifies their effects, and which
belongs to the influence of individuals over each other - singularly complicated
in the case of the human race by the influence of generations on their
successors. (Comte vol. 1 page 29 1977)

18. There is interesting link to be made with Maupassant's idea, cited in chapter two,
that psychology is hidden in life

19. It is pertinent at this point to mention an essential difference between Comtian
positivism and the Twentieth Century logical positivism of English language philosophers.
Both Comte and the English philosophers share the idea - or at least Comte did during the
first phase of his philosophy - that all genuine human knowledge is contained within the
boundaries of science. Thus there is no need for metaphysics. Comte, used physics as a
model to create a theoretical structure, positive sociology. It was hoped that this new
discipline would provide, for the first time in history, a scientific basis of the
reorganization of society. His priority was to isolate fundamental laws which captured the
development of society - laws which could not be refuted by empirical experiments or
experience. Together with this grandiose rationalist aim - which Ayer sees as typical of
Continental pontiffs - his postivism contains other very Cartesian elements, such as the
idea of the unity of science. Hence the impossibility of practicing one without the
others.

English ordinary language philosophers use logical and mathematical theory in the hope of
systematizing empiricism - they have the desire for sytematicity in common with Comte.
However, not only do they dislike grandiose philosophical systems, their aim is much more
modest than Comte's and very much within the Humian tradition. Their priority is to apply

mathematical propositions to language in the hope of proving that there is no such thing as a statement which cannot be verified by experience. What is quite often meant by "experience" is sense data.

20. The utilitarian means-end framework of analysis was applied to the social organism and its parts:

> ... the clustered citizens forming an organ which produces some commodity for national use or which otherwise satisfies national wants, has within it subservient structures like those of each other organ carrying on each other function... it has a set of agencies which bring the raw materials...; it has an apparatus of major and minor channels through which the necessities of life are drafted out of the general stocks circulating throughout the kingdom; it has appliances... for bringing those impulses by which the industry of the place is excited or checked; it has local controlling powers, political and ecclesiastical, by which order is maintained and healthy action furthered... (Spencer page 59 1985)

21. It is pertinent here to mention the case of the developmental psychologist Piaget who was influenced by Spencer. However, in his sociological thinking on dialectics and structuralism, he voices his broad agreement with leading French sociologists/philosophers such as Sartre, Levi-Strauss and Althusser. When discussing Althusser's and Godelier's structuralist view of Marx, he quotes a paragraph from Godelier with which he agrees and concludes that:

> For structuralism of this sort, structure and function, genesis and history, individual and society are - once the instruments of analysis have been refined - inseparable, the more so the more it perfects its analytic tools. (Piaget in Gruber and Voneche page 779 1977)

This, as I shall show in the following chapter, is the conclusion of Sartre's reading of the German philosopher. The thesis has important consequences for the understanding of Piaget's work.

22. Societies are made up of primary social units or hordes - a horde being a hypothetical concept, much as Rousseau's state of nature. It was a speculative device which gets rid of of the individual in the analysis of the origins of society:

> Once this notion of horde ...has been established - whether it be conceived as a historic reality or as a hypothesis of science we have the support necessary for constructing our complete scale of social types. (Durkheim in Hirst page 132 1975)

23. Durkheim proposed to document the change in society, from mechanical to organic solidarity, by using "laws" which did not originate from the individual, but the collective - as Rousseau had thought. "Laws" were examples of "social facts", constraining the action of individuals. In mechanical solidarity, the aggregate of hordes is held together by a network of beliefs or collective consciousness, and only repressive laws exist. With an increase in moral density i.e. population, the change to organic solidarity occurs. This entails a differentiation in the social organism and an interdependence between its parts. Organic solidarity is also characterized by the appearance of restitutive laws and freedom from the collective consciousness. This freedom is generated by the creation of a state, generator of restitutive laws and of morality. Whereas repressive laws are a function of the collective consciousness and as such carry with them a certain amount of "moral impulsion", restitutive laws are rationalized and implemented by the state: punishment is in proportion to the offence and each side of the legal commitment is specified. Of special interest here is the idea that the state confers freedom, reminiscent of Rousseau's thinking on the issue.

24. Egoistic suicide was a symptom of the change from mechanical to organic solidarity, and resulted from the disintegration of collective values. Without a properly established alternative system of values, this disintegration led to a sense of the meaningless of life. Anomic suicide was accounted for in terms of economic changes which destabilize people's lives.

25. English sociology has felt the influence of continental Marxism and of American social theory. A hint at a possible difference between the English and French Marx - Marxism is usually deemed to be a universal language - comes from an article by Little (1967). In this Marx is an advocate of empiricism, revolting against his idealist background (Little 1987), a reading of Marx opposed to that of Twentieth Century French thinkers. I do not wish to imply that all English Marxism makes the same assumptions, however, Little's article suggests that different thought styles will affect readings of foreign writers. According to Little, Marx rejected a priori methods of analysis. To substantiate his point, he quotes Marx:

> *Events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings led to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being suprahistorical. (Page 215 in Little 1987)*

Little recognizes that Marx was not a naive empiricist relying on inductivism without theoretical guide but he emphasizes the sharp distinction between Hegelian a priorism and Marx's reliance on evidence to validate his claims. However, as Farr (1987) points out in a critique of the article, Marx uses certain categories which do not enter the empirical vocabulary, yet are crucial to his multi-layered geological approach. Examples of these are "essences" and "appearances", laws of history and social relations.

French Twentieth Century writers have interpreted Marx within the rationalist framework. French social thought continued to emphasize the importance of revealing the underlying reality of society. Concepts such as Sorel's diremption, Merleau Ponty's Gestalt and structural analysis all strive to achieve this. In formulating these concepts Marxism proved a key influence in all French twentieth thought. All of them are primarily of academic interest. Empirical validation would have proved difficult, particularly in the case of a concept such as Sorel's "diremption". Inspired by Marx with whom he enjoyed a somewhat problematic relationship, Sorel developed new concepts to help social explanations. "Diremptions" were models/explanations which were abstractions from social contexts. They were ideal types, merely attempts at capturing the "fluid character of reality". As such, Sorel warned about taking these explanatory concepts too seriously and believed that any rigorous definition would be in contradiction to the fluid nature of the realm they were describing. In social sciences, he argued, one should proceed by feeling one's way; one should try out partial hypotheses and be satisfied by provisional approximations, so as always to leave the door open to progressive correction (see Hughes Page 174 1958)

26. Although MacIntyre's thought is compatible with American social thinking – not surprisingly since he has lived there for twenty years – it displays a certain parochialism which makes it typically British. The distinguishing feature between the British and the Americans seems to be that the former have an even less idealistic and more pragmatic outlook. The difference between the two Anglo-Saxon nations emerges more clearly through examples such as the one in the next chapter; Sedgwick's critique of Goffman.

27.

We will consider social systems in their relations to their most important environments. I will contend that the functional differentiations among the three sub-systems of action other than the social – the cultural system, the personality system, and the behavioural organism – and the articulation of two of them with the two environments of the entire action system, constitute very major references for analyzing the differences among social systems. That is, my

analysis will be developed on the basis of the fundamental system-and-environment relations. (Parsons page 8 1966)

28. Moscovici's ideas of a "consensual universe" could also be related to the Meadian "generalized other" - symbolic universes issuing from the social interaction between individuals. The difference between the philosophies of Mead and MacIntyre and that of Moscovici, as Moscovici himself recognizes, is a matter of emphasis. Mead and MacIntyre stress the importance of the individual social agent and his understanding of social reality - MacIntyre shares with American attribution theorists the idea that man is an amateur social scientist. Moscovici's "social representations" are social structures which are independent of the individual level of society. They mediate "social" explanations specific to the society in question, and thus specific to the individual members of that society.

29. If behaviour conforms to the expectations given by a prototype - the result of a correlation between behavioural cause and effect - then the attribution is situational or external, if it does not, it is internal or personal. The same problem is addressed in more global terms in Moscovici's theory of social representations, which resulted in a different explanation of the internal/external dichotomy. Moscovici sees the different attributions in terms of right and left wing causality, which are related to different social realities. He then goes on to outline an alternative, bi-causal, view of social causality, distinguishing between attribution and inference on the basis that:

> *On the one hand, by seeking a subjective order behind apparently objective phenomena, the result will be an inference; on the other, by seeking an objective order behind apparently subjective phenomena, the result will be an attribution. On the one hand, we reconstruct hidden intentions to account for a persons behaviour: this is a first-person causality. On the other hand, we seek invisible factors to account for visible behaviour: this is a third person causality. (Moscovici page 48 1985)*

The two types of causality act in concert and transitions continually occur between the two.

30.
> *Whatever psychological significance, if any, one may be prepared to attach to the contrast between a female fish and a woman, it cannot be denied that the evolutionary process that produced the mammals has called for a profound internalization of female sexuality, and that this has had very far-reaching psychological consequences, some of which take the form of resentment and dissatisfaction with the female role. Other consequences, of course, are of an opposite kind and can afford intense satisfactions which men cannot share except by identification and empathy. There is clearly a difference of opinion in analytic circles between those who would agree with Freud that the girl who*

31. It is difficult to characterize The Independents as they are an eclectic group of thinkers - eclecticism was also characteristic of earlier psychoanalytic figures, Rivers and Suttie. However, Kohon (1986) identifies one concept as central to the Independents' thinking: the transactional object. This was derived from Kleinian psychoanalysis. Klein's theory makes use of the idea of instinct, but unlike the ego psychologists, she focused upon Freud's late opposition between life and death instincts. Klein uses these to outline the innate ambivalence between the two emotions of love and hate, which the child experiences first towards the mother's breast. The child seeks to introject the good securing breast and projects its aggression onto the bad frustrating breast. Through this, and similar processes of projection and introjection, the child's ego, a rudimentary entity at birth, gradually grows. By introjection, the relationship between the child and a real object can be conceived in symbolic terms. The libidinal stages in Klein are replaced by two positions: the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive. These positions play the same role in Klein's theory as the Oedipus Complex does in Freud's. The paranoid-schizoid position results from the process of internalization of the good breast and rejection of the bad. The depressive position occurs when the child learns to accept that the good and the bad are aspects of the same whole i.e. comes to terms with ambivalence. The centrality of the processes of internalization and projection have led Independents like Rycroft to argue that it is the division between inner and outer worlds that is central to Klein's theory, not the distinction between the conscious and unconscious. This idea of inner and outer worlds has been important to their idea of an intermediate, or transactional realm, whose formation is crucial to the healthy development of the child and its concept of self.

Although Klein's theory uses instincts, it is not perceived by Rycroft and other Independents as exclusively an "instinct theory":

*actual experience of mothering, this being overshadowed in the Kleinian view by
the infant's difficulties in overcoming its innate ambivalence towards the
breast. (Rycroft page 16 1985)*

The stress on the mothering "experience" should be noted and is the result of Suttie's influence.

32. The individual is considered to be primarily object seeking as opposed to pleasure seeking, which leads to the conclusion that the most basic fear is not frustrated oral gratification but of the loss of significant persons - Suttie's influence is felt here.

33. The importance of literature to French Freudian psychoanalysis is partly explained by its having spent its early career incubated in literature and art. As Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) explain, the prominence of philosophy can also be accounted for in educational terms (see chapter six).

34. Lacan's theory relied on his extensive philosophical education. Heiddegger is the source of two central Lacanian concepts; "la parole pleine" (full speech) and "la parole vide" (empty speech). These mirror Heiddegger's distinction between "rede" (discourse) and "gerede" (idle talk). Rede brings the hearer closer to the disclosure of true being and is the way in which we articulate "significantly" the intelligibility of being in the world. Gerede is just a manifestation of ordinary everyday being. Lacan maintains that, in the therapeutic consultation, the analyst has to get beyond everyday speech - gerede - to have a dialogue with the unconscious, source of "la parole pleine" or rede. The art of the analyst is to discover what part of the general flow of speech is meaningful:

*He takes the description of an everyday event for a fable addressed to whoever
has eyes to hear, a long tirade for a direct interjection or,..,a single slip of
the tongue for a highly complex statement or even a sigh or a momentary silence
for the whole lyrical development it replaces. (Lacan Ecrits page 44 1977)*

35. Despite the cultural consonance between Lacan's theory and the French mind, this did not stop an awareness that Lacanianism was becoming an abstract, albeit clever, academic theory. This was the opinion of political supporters and patients alike. Turkle quotes one young communist:

*I don't think that any of all those Lacanian-trained philosophers know anything
about mental illness or hospitals or how to run them, and I don't think they
care. I think they are interested in theories and whether you are doing the
young Freud or the old Freud, the young Marx or the old Marx. The party is a
serious operation, it needs to care about people's real problems. It has to*

*protect itself from all this theorizing when it comes to practical political
action. (Page 162 1978)*

and a patient of Lacan's:

*When I began my analysis, there was absolutely no chance of my going into
treatment with a Lacanian. I was terrorized by the very idea... afraid that I
wasn't of a sufficiently high intellectual level... that I wouldn't be
interesting enough... I said to myself: "I am not an interesting case, suffering
an illness is not interesting". (Turkle page 203 1978)*

36. The idea of working within a conceptual framework is taken up by Bowie (1979), who
refers to the importance of Lacan's "loosely moored conceptual mobiles", which capture
Freudien theory in a few linguistic concepts.

37. In his analysis of the unconscious, Lacan applied the Saussurian signifier/signified
distinction. The algorithm used is S/s, and Lacan argued that the signified or meaning
slips beneath the signifier, defying our attempts to locate it i.e. that the quest for
pure meaning is futile. This is reminiscent of the Foucauldian claim that the quest for
absolute truth is pointless. Instead, we have to look at what he called the signifying
chain as a clue to structure. Thus the unconscious becomes a kind of multilevelled poetry.

38. The relationship between the signifier - the desire for the mother - and the signified
- the phallus - is mediated by the name of the father. The desire of the mother is pushed
down to an unconscious level, and a chain of signification is built up whereby the name of
the father becomes attached to the phallus through the invisible mediator of the desire
for the mother. Lacan's clever use of language and word-play is evident in his
reformulation of the oedipus complex. He talks of 1) père-version (father aversion and
perverse), le nom du père (the name of the father and the "no" of the father) 2) le désir
de la mère (the desire for the mother and the mother's desire). The internalization of the
name of the father leads to the father saying no to the child's desire for the mother. The
desire of the mother carries the dual implication that the child does not only want to be
cared for - to be the object for the mother's desire - but also desires the mother to
complete her, to become her phallus.

39.

*...on a beau remplacer le papa-maman traditionnel par une function-mère, une
function père, nous ne voyons pas bien ce qu'on y gagne, sauf à fonder
l'universalité d'Oedipe au-délà des images. (Deleuze and Guattari page 98 1972)*

40.

Chapter I. The Desiring Machine

*It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits
and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake
to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is machines - real ones, not figurative
ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines,
with all the necessary coupling and connections. An organ-machine is plugged
into an energy-source machine: the one produces a flow that the other
interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine
coupled to it. The mouth of the anorexic wavers between several functions: its
possessor is uncertain as to whether it is an eating-machine or an anal machine,
a talking-machine or a breathing-machine (asthma). Hence we are all handymen
each with his little machines. For every organ-machine an energy-machine: all
the time flows and interruptions. (Deleuze and Guattari in Turkle page 148 1978
for French version see Capitalisme et Schizophrénie 1972)*

Unlike Lacan, however, Deuleuze and Guattari do not think about schizophrenia in such a
rigid intellectual structure. To an even greater extent than Lacan, they emphasize the
socio-political aspect of the problem. Their ideas have been used by sociologists such as
Castel (1982), to criticize Lacanian anti-psychiatry, revealing its function in social
control. Castel uses them to question the psychoanalytic notion of a "continuum" between
the normal and the pathological which allows a number of behaviours to be judged pre-
pathological. Deleuze and Guattari have also inspired active political, anti-psychiatric
organizations such as "Les Guardes Foux". The latter was responsible for uprisings in
asylums during the seventies. "Les Guardes Foux" believed that Western society is in
crisis and that the political activist would understand his situation better, if he
compared it to that of the schizophrenic. The latter is expressing social malaise because
he is the capitalist subject in crisis. To these more pragmatically orientated
organizations, Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophy was a welcome alternative to Lacanian
intellectual poetry. However, in the eyes of Anglo-Saxon thinkers, their ideas appear
theoretical and of little empirical value. (Turkle 1978, Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986)

41.

*Traditional approaches to mental disorder were challenged and new ones adopted
and adapted in a medical setting dominated by military social relations and by a
particular mode of industrial warfare. The criteria governing this reformulation
of psychiatry did not revolve around a set of scientific judgements of an
"abstract ideological kind", but around a set of practical problems. These were
related to the undermining of army discipline, the existence of a large number
of service men unfit for any kind of work - military or otherwise - and the
accumulation of substantial pension bills... (Stone page 266 1985)*

42. In France, a strongly institutionalized somatic psychiatry precluded any dialogue with
Freudian psychoanalysis. Moroever, any psychological elements within psychiatry were
catered for by native theorists such as Charcot and Janet. Thus psychoanalysis in the
Freudian mode became confined to literary and artistic circles. Despite these modest

beginnings, the nineteen sixties saw a psychoanalytic explosion, which Turkle (1978) attributes to the crisis in French society. Lacanian psychoanalysis presented the French, who had seen their whole way of life change, with a new philosophy of life.

43. Existentialism was a product of the war years, and dealt with issues such as alienation under extreme situations which were no longer relevant. The new philosophy of structuralism criticized all aspects of culture - much as the Ideologists had done in the eighteenth century. The philosopher-historian Foucault explained the success of the movement in terms of a consonance between their goals and that of the students:

> *What the students are trying to do... and what I myself am trying to accomplish... is basically the same thing., what I am trying to do is grasp the implicit systems which determine our most familiar behaviour without our knowing it. I am trying to find their origin, to show their formation, the constraint they impose on us; I am therefore trying to place myself at a distance from them and to show how one could escape. (Foucault in Turkle page 78 1978)*

Foucault then went on to reveal and analyse underlying social power "structures".

44. French psychoanalysis' critique was levelled at society in general and at medical and psychiatric practice in particular. The anarchic and subversive aspects of Lacanian psychoanalysis distinguished it from its American analogue which helped Lacan gain student support. It also contrasted with the inclination of the Independent school. As far as political commitment was concerned, the Independents can be best described as moderate, left-wing libertarians. Winnicott sowed praise for mothers and democracy. Rycroft, a Marxist while still at university, describes his early politics thirty years later in terms of "what it was fashionable to do" i.e. start on the left and move right with age. He maintains a socialist commitment but stresses:

> *I have come to think of civilisation as a much more fragile thing than I did when I was young. It could take generations to recover violent change. (Rycroft page 8 1985)*

Radical politics are not of great relevance to their therapeutically orientated discipline.

45. Although academic institutionalization is a prerequisite for intellectual progress in French society, it proved to be the demise of psychoanalysis' subversive potential. Perhaps Lacan should have learnt from the American experience which, according to Bettelheim (1982), demonstrates how psychoanalysis becomes denatured in academic settings:

*Although Freud is often quoted today in introductory psychology texts, his
writings have only superficially influenced the work of the academic
psychologists who quote him. (Bettelheim page 19 1982)*

Turkle's (1978) analysis shows how psychoanalysis has been incorporated into the academic
structure - it is now an option in the philosophy course taught in schools, and can be
taken as a subject in the baccalauréat examination. Turkle concludes that the consequence
of its introduction into the academic system is that psychoanalysis has been "normalized"
and "trivialized", so that what began as a radical politic of change has degenerated. This
she says occurs in all societies:

*But the Parisian concentration of students, intellectuals and ideologists
creates a particularly charged hothouse atmosphere, where radical thought turns
easily into radical chic. (Turkle page 163 1978)*

46. These contrasting interpretations of Freud's work are of interest not least in view of
a recent book published by one of his last remaining followers, Bruno Bettelheim, entitled
"Freud and Man's Soul" (1982). Bettelheim decided, after years of practising
psychoanalysis in America, that it was high time to correct the interpretation given to
Freudian works in Anglo-Saxon countries. He rightly claimed a privileged understanding of
the latter in view of his shared background with the Master. Bettleheim's argument centres
around the mistake Anglo-Saxon writers make in translating Freud in a crudely materialist
and clinical way. They thus neglect his essential "humanism" - meaning both concern for
humanity and classical culture - and "literary genius". In transforming psychoanalysis
into an empirical, therapeutic science, they have mistranslated Freud. They have
transformed his words into a scientific terminology which fails to communicate the complex
philosophical meanings of Freud's classical metaphors. For example, Bettelheim says:

*In his work and his writings, Freud often spoke of the soul - of its nature and
structure, its development, its attributes, how it reveals itself in all we do
and dream. Unfortunately, nobody who reads him in English could guess this,
because nearly all his many references to the soul, and matters pertaining to
the soul, have been excised in translation. (Bettelheim page 4 1982)*

The translation of Freud's tripartite structure into "Id", "Ego" and "Superego" is
inaccurate, and should be read as the "It", the "I" and the "Over-I", a more personal
terminology. These mistranslations, Bettelheim notes, do not occur in other languages such
as Spanish and French. Use of commonsense terms is to be understood as:

*Whenever Freud thought it possible, he tried to communicate his new ideas in the
most common terms, words that his readers had used since childhood. His greatest
achievement as a stylist was to imbue these words with nuances, meaning and
insights that have not been part of their everyday use. When he could not*

> *communicate sufficiently by using readily familiar terms, he would create new*
> *words from common ones, sometimes by combining two words which is standard in*
> *the German language. (page 10 1982)*

Of his literary genius he says:

> *Language is all-important to Freud's work; it is the supreme instrument of his*
> *craft. His use of the German language was not only masterly, but often poetic -*
> *he nearly always expressed himself with true eloquence. Hermann Hesse praised*
> *Freud because his work "convinces both through its very human and very literary*
> *qualities" and added that his language while "completely intellectual is*
> *beautifully concise in its definitions". (page 8 1982)*

Freud's literary/philosophical influences included Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Schnitzler.
Furthermore, Bettelheim refers to the importance of Freud's metaphorical writing in
"arousing emotions" and "touching a human chord". He points out that the Anglo-Saxon
cultures, no longer in contact with their classical roots, "lose the suggestive and
referential richness" of terms such as the Oedipus complex and the psyche. These terms
operate at many levels by overt and covert references to the Greek myth and the issues
dealt with in Sophocles' play.

Lacan has shown a meticulous attention to conveying the particular meaning behind Freud's
writings. Lacan remedied the mistranslation of the German "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" -
usually translated into English as "where the Id was the Ego shall be". He corrected "Le
Moi doit déloger le ça" to "Là où fut ça, il me faut advenir". Capturing the complex
multi-levelled nature of Freud's metaphors is accomplished in Lacan's work by subtle use
of language and terminology. Not only does this necessitate a command of his own language
and stylistics, but also a detailed knowledge of the Freudian corpus, which he seems to
possess. Lacan betrays the same philosophical interests as Freud. Lacan's analysis of the
link between the mechanism of the unconscious and rhetoric parallels Freud's analysis of
the link between dreams and hieroglyphic scripts. As Bowie (1979) points out, both Freud
and Lacan are interested in the comparison between hieroglyphs/rhetoric and the language
of the unconscious, because they are fascinated by how such a brutish entity can be so
cunning in the manipulation of its structures.

Lacan, like Freud, possesses a concise, intellectual language of expression. Philosophical
speculation and clever manipulation of language does not prove be to a similar central
concern to the pragmatically orientated English school. We saw what type of analysis an
issue such as" Woman and her Discontents" yielded. There is a paradox here. Although Lacan
addresses many of the questions which Bettelheim maintains are neglected by the Anglo-

Saxon writings, I don't think they appear any more "humanistic" than a work such as Winnicott's therapeutic consultations with children. If anything, the convoluted theoretical philosophical framework in which he works detracts from any intrinsic humanism, which Bowie maintains his ideas embody. This is of course if humanism is taken in the sense of concern for humanity, as opposed to an interest in classical culture, which Lacan undoubtedly possesses.

47. Structuralist analysis has exerted a considerable influence on art criticism in the Anglo-Saxon world. To present an alternative to this school of thought, Fuller (1980), in his work entitled "Art and Psychoanalysis", decided to draw on the ideas of the native psychoanalytic school - particularly on those of Rycroft. Comparing this approach with that of the structuralists brings out the points made in this chapter. For example, when analyzing why we are still able to appreciate and respond to paintings of past centuries, Fuller turns to an explanation in terms of universal physiological responses, a material/biological explanation. It is individualistic analysis which relies on the assumption of the existence of an immutable human nature.

CHAPTER FIVE

SARTRE AND FOUCAULT: THEIR ASSIMILATION INTO ANGLO-SAXON
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MADNESS

> *Mental illness is a social construction; psychiatry*
> *is a social institution, incorporating the values*
> *and demands of its surrounding society. These*
> *conclusions and their supporting argument, deserve*
> *to be placed in the forefront of all teaching*
> *material aimed towards those who seek guidance on*
> *the problems of mental illness. Foucault and Laing,*
> *Goffman and Szasz, Scheff and Lemert, should be*
> *made part of the curriculum for all aspirant*
> *therapists, nurses and social workers in this*
> *field. (Sedgwick page 25 1982)*

During the nineteen fifties and sixties, the dilapidated
state of asylums and the deplorable conditions in which the
inmates lived, led to a widespread critique of orthodox
medical psychiatric practice. Anti-psychiatry, as the
movement became known, generated sociological perspectives
on madness which accompanied a new rationale of treatment:
community care. These sociological analyses offered an
alternative to the biological model of mental illness used
by psychiatry and addressed the social and political issues
attached to insanity. The concern in this chapter is to show
how the national thought styles have influenced these
sociological writings on madness. This is brought out by
exploring how two French thinkers, Sartre and Foucault, have
been read by English writers. The first part of the chapter

opens with an exposition of Sartre's philosophy. This is followed by an outline of the use to which it was put by Laing. The second part consists of a summary of Foucauldian thought. The model of the thought styles is then used to explain the current polemic inspired by his work, as well as the modifications which have made it suitable for its new users. The first section covers some general philosophical objections to Foucault, the second deals with the methodological objections of social-historians together with the alternatives they propose.

Once again Anglo-Saxon empirical thought style is associated with an individualistic micro-social perspective and a practical orientation. French rationalism, on the other hand, shows a preference for a macro-social theoretical approach. The anti-psychiatric writings, the subject of the first part of the chapter, show a clear coupling between a concern with the "stable" empirical self - described in the last chapter as characteristic of perspectives concerned with the experience of individuation - and a methodological localism or micro-social approach. The methodological differences and the contrast between the concepts of self developed within the two thought styles relate to their different aims: attending to individual experience (Lemert 1951, Laing 1964, Goffman 1961) and generating a general social critique (Foucault 1968, Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Lacan 1977). This in turn explains why French anti-psychiatry was interested in the analysis of the underlying

socio-political function of madness and generated a political message (Turkle 1978, Sedgwick 1982, Busfield 1986), while Anglo-Saxon writers coupled an investigation into the experiential aspect of insanity with a moral message. The previous chapter indicated that, within Anglo-Saxon social discourse, morality has been treated in different terms from the collectivist social French conception - leaving it with an individualistic connotation which makes it suitable for this "personal" analysis. The moral message seems to be a product of Anglo-Saxon libertarianism, which, whether right or left wing, conveys a distrust of authoritarian, interventionist grand systems/structures (Sedgwick 1982). This distrust of interventionism was highlighted in both the chapters on art and science and is reflected in British social discourse by its emphasis on the individual and his liberties.

The second part of the chapter emphasizes how different aims have affected the historical writings on madness. Foucault's macro-social collectivism has been modified to suit the demands of a tradition which has been accustomed to referring to historical agents, and which is committed to detailed empirical research. The latter entails a more focused approach on issues that Foucault deals with on a grand scale. In some of the historical literature on madness the introduction of an "agent" in history deflects part of the responsibility for the treatment of insanity away from bureaucratic political structures. This modification is

probably appropriate in the light of the political difference discussed in previous chapters.

THE MEETING OF TWO TRADITIONS

1) SARTRIAN PHILOSOPHY: A BRIEF OUTLINE

As with Foucault's, Sartrian thinking is usually discussed as two separate periods: his metaphysical, dualistic, individualistic phase, and his later Marxist thought. However, as with Foucault, the distinction obscures the underlying continuity in Sartre's work, both in terms of method and theme: the consistent use of a dialectic method outlined first in "Being and Nothingness" (1958) and the centrality of human freedom. In both cases the continuity stems from the fact that the first period constitutes the working out of a philosophical system which is then practically applied to politics - a characteristic of rationalist thinking, it has been argued, is that theory precedes praxis. The concern with politics was necessary for the philosophers to fulfill their role as "pontiffs". Their philosophical systems, designed to help people live their lives, had to contribute towards the power struggle between the dominated and the dominating.

The roots of Sartrian existentialism lie in the idealism of Hegel, the phenomenology of Husserl and Heiddegger, and the existentialism of Kierkegaard. This Sartre combined with a

reading of the works of Brentano and the Frenchman Bergson, whose ideas on the primacy of intentional intuition closely parallel those of Sartre concerning intentional consciousness. His rationalism is clear in both the method and aims of his first philosophical period, culminating in "Being and Nothingness" (1958). In her account of Sartre's philosophy which concentrates on his first period, Warnock (1965) characterizes Sartre as an empiricist, obsessed with the "particular" and the "concrete" - in this Warnock seems to be a typical particularizing Anglo-Saxon. Thus she sees him as making philosophical overgeneralizations on the basis of specific instances (1965). These overgeneralizations originate in Sartre's rationalist epistemology. In "Being and Nothingness", his aim was to establish the timeless, underlying structures of "Being" from which he would systematically deduce the consequences for human life. Sartre's metaphysical speculations generated within this framework were subsequently supported by anecdotes drawn from "concrete" life situations. In this, Sartre's method was identical to Descartes', who used examples such as melting wax to validate his deductive argument concerning the unreliability of sense data.

"Being" was the fundamental substructure to be analyzed. The starting point of Sartre's study was that of an intentional consciousness which held the key to these universal truths. This was because it "derived from being" (Sartre page xxxii 1958).' Consciousness was thus a necessary reference point

for his study and as such is usually related to Descartes'
thinking "Cogito" (for detailed discussions of this see
Warnock 1965, Aronson 1980). Intentional consciousness is
always directed towards something, and is always aware of
itself. It was to be the origin of man's freedom and the
source of meaning imposed on the external world. "A Sketch
for the Theory of Emotions" (1962) was devoted to a
theoretical analysis of the structure of consciousness and
how it was able to magically transform the world.

The freedom of consciousness lay in its power of imagination
- the possibility of going beyond the present - considered
in "Being and Nothingness". It enables one to make projects
for the future which if implemented, change one's situation.
It would be wrong to interpret Sartrian freedom as absolute.
Even at this stage Sartre accepted a view of freedom that
incorporated an element of determinism which was to grow
throughout his theorizing. The projects man makes are always
constrained by his situation in the real world - his class,
race - factors over which he has no control:

> The for-itself *is*, in so far as it appears in a condition
> which it has not chosen, as Pierre is a French bourgeois in
> 1942, as Schmidt was a Berlin worker in 1870; it *is* in so
> far as it is thrown into a world and abandoned in a
> 'situation'; it *is* as pure contingency inasmuch as for it as
> for things in the world, as for this wall, this tree, this
> cup, the original question can be posited: 'Why is this
> being exactly such and not otherwise?' It *is* in so far as
> there is in it something of which it is not the foundation -
> its *presence to the world*. (page 79 1958)

The "In-itself"/"For-itself" dichotomy was designed to capture the distinction between objects which are determined by laws and subjects who are free and are defined by "lack". The For-itself, or metaphysical self, is nothing but a void, originating in the negation of the In-itself. The In-itself is the empirical self of which we are aware in our day-to-day activities. It is like material objects: determined by outside constraints and is not free. The metaphysical self, because of its freedom, is that which Sartre is more concerned with. To overcome a dualism intrinsic in this separation - the parallel has been drawn between Descartes' *Res cogitans* and *Res extensa* - Sartre makes the for-itself dependent on the in-itself:

> ...*The For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic connection which is nothing other than the For-itself itself. the For-itself, in fact, is nothing but the pure nihilation of the In-itself: it is like a hole of being at the heart of Being.* (page 617 1958)

> ...*the For-itself has no reality save that of being the nihilation of being. Its sole qualification comes to it from the fact that it is a nihilation of an individual and particular In-itself and not of a being in general.* (page 618)

These quotations, drawn from the conclusion of "Being and Nothingness" emphasize that what Sartre is interested in is the totality of "Being". The For-itself and In-itself are merely heuristic devices necessary to reveal its structure. They are, however, essential to his dialectic approach outlined here and brought to fruition in the "Critique of Dialectic Reason" (1976). The dichotomy also enables him to translate the Hegelian master/slave conflict into his own

terminology. It is presented as a struggle between the subject or For-itself and the "Other", who because of his consciousness deprives the For-itself of freedom by reducing it to an object of consciousness.[4]

"Being and Nothingness" is also the work where Sartre defines concepts such as "anguish", "bad-faith", "viscosity" and "nausea" which he dealt with extensively in his literary work. It is clear from a reading of "Being and Nothingness" and his theory of emotion that Sartre is not an empiricist in the Anglo-Saxon sense. His ideas on emotion were a product of philosophical reflection and as such only work well when applied to negative emotions, such as anguish and fear, which dominated his thinking. As for "Being and Nothingness", although it includes anecdotal evidence, its function is merely to support convoluted philosophical analyses of the structure of "Being", using the a priori concepts mentioned above. Although perhaps "anguish" and "bad faith" are intelligible through experience, "nausea" and "viscosity" are not. "Anguish" and "bad faith" manage to capture the moral dilemmas which may be experienced by social agents. These agents may indeed experience discomfort in choosing between alternative courses of action - "anguish". They may resort to the options of "bad faith": for example behaving as an "in itself" i.e. as if determined by uncontrollable outside laws, or a "for others", taking on assigned roles. What is rationalist here is not Sartre's concepts but his method of expressing them: using specific

"trademarks" (Lamont 1987) and complicated metaphysical arguments. The "viscous" and "nausea" are metaphysical descriptions, to be understood intellectually. Viscosity is designed to capture man's relationships with "things in themselves" and sometimes his projects. He wants to control them but they elude him, sometimes even controlling him. "Nausea" is the expression of what man feels when he realizes his contingency in the material world which he can only escape through imagination. Unlike anguish or bad-faith, it cannot be maintained that either viscosity or nausea are actually experienced.

The "Critique of Dialectic Reason" (1976) has been the subject of similar polemical discussions as Foucault's "Madness and Civilization", and for similar reasons: it is a long work whose style is difficult and convoluted to Anglo-Saxon audiences. Again like "Madness and Civilization", many criticisms have been made of the "Critique" both in France and Britain, although it has not been widely read in this country. What Sartre says in the "Critique" is often contradictory, and is best understood in conjunction with the "Search for a Method" and his later biography - so called, although it is perhaps better described as a work in psychohistorical speculation - of Flaubert. The "Critique" is best seen as an application of the dialectic developed in "Being and Nothingness" to a Marxist study of history. Sartre's Marxism has to be understood as a reaction against the stark materialism of Stalinist Russia and the objective

determinism of French positivism, the "Search" and the "Critique" are attempts to modify both by introducing "Human praxis" as subjective component. This does not make him guilty of the individualism which Aronson (1980) accuses him of. Two things at least have to be remembered which go against Aronson's accusation: 1) on page 36 of the "Critique" Sartre pronounces that man is dead and 2) he maintains that his ideology of existentialism was only possible within a Marxist framework. More to the point, Sartre acknowledges that, as "consciousness" was before it, "human praxis" was only a heuristic device, an alternative inroad into the problem of history. The real object of the work was to examine the interaction between "human praxis" and "Totalisation" an equally a priori concept. "Human praxis", the source of creativity in history was analyzed in similar terms to consciousness, the source of "human freedom". Human beings find themselves in specific objective situations. These they interpret subjectively which enables them to transcend the immediate situation to a new objective situation. What is, however, crucial is that the projects an individual makes are dependent upon "the totality" i.e. determined by living in the world at a particular time. Man, the author of "human praxis" is a creative force in history but is determined by it:

> Only the project, as a mediation between two moments of objectivity, can account for history; that is, for human creativity. It is necessary to choose. In effect: either we reduce every thing to identity (which amounts to substituting a mechanistic materialism for dialectical materialism) - or we can make of dialectic a celestial law which imposes itself on the Universe, a metaphysical force

which by itself engenders the historical process (and this is to fall back into Hegelian idealism) - or we restore to the individual man his power to go beyond his situation by means of his work and action. This solution alone enables us to base the movement of totalization upon the real. (page 99 1963)

At no time did Sartre want to separate the individual and society, and he was even critical of American sociology for doing so. The need was for a "totalising" perspective to understand historical meaning, which properly revised Marxism would be. In essence, he agreed with the Marxist aim of giving a single meaning to history in which a unified proletariat would bring to an end the class struggle. However, the Marxist dialectic as it stood was inadequate because it became obsessed with the material "mode of production". Sartre's argument, retaining the distinction between the "In-itself" and "For-itself", was that man was mediated by things just as things were mediated by man. However, the "practico-inert", is a concept which symbolizes how men in society are dominated in the capitalist world of "scarcity" by a product which is the work of all. The repository of meanings and actions, the "practico-inert" the equivalent of the mode of production with a subjective component added - determines the activity of a collection of "serial" individuals, i.e. individuals living side by side. The Sartrian analysis culminates in a view that holds that man's salvation i.e. the overcoming of scarcity, lies in the activity of the "fused group" which requires complete identification with the "Other" - the enemy in "Being and Nothingness". This group forms a new

self-conscious "being" with a capacity to achieve a common goal. Although freedom is ever present in human action, because of its power to overcome capitalist alienation , the "fused group" is the ultimate symbol of freedom. After the introduction of the fused group, Sartre's study is given over to developing a priori concepts to describe "the moving totality of the working class" (Poster page 100 1975). The focus is no longer "Human praxis", which further contravenes claims of individualism. In effect, the "Critique" was a theoretical understanding of history using the dialectic of "Being and Nothingness". It was to provide categories which would reintroduce subjectivity into history. Poster in 1975 argued that their validity still had to be established through empirical investigation.

In the "Critique", Sartre was still resisting positivism's rigid determinism. In his last work on Gustave Flaubert, an encounter between an individual and history, this had been replaced by a more positive statement of determinism. Flaubert was portrayed as being produced by a particular set of historical conditions, exteriorising them in his work. It is an idea which is familiar to Hegelian idealism and Comtian positivism, and foreshadowed structuralism. Thus Sartrian "individualism", if it exists, is of a different kind to that found in Anglo-Saxon literature. The clearest demonstration lies in the concepts of "self" generated at different periods. As mentioned above, Sartre first tried to isolate the structures of "Being" or *Etre*. The key tool in

this process was consciousness which is not "self". The In-itself, what man is aware of in his social dealing - the equivalent of Mead's social self - is nothing but an illusion. The For-itself, or metaphysical self, is defined by nothingness. There are no words to describe it as it is an epistemological category not an experiential phenomenon. The concept of "self" thus becomes a myth:

> *Selfness represents a degree of nihilation carried further than the pure presence to itself of the pre-reflective cogito - in the sense that the possible which I am is not pure presence to the for-itself as reflection to reflecting, but that it is absent-presence. (Sartre page 143 1958)*

Sartre gives credence to this non existence by making consciousness which is not self the centre of his analysis, and the For-itself, the real self, a void. The definition of the "subject" - or author of individual praxis - in "The Search for Method" - a preliminary to the "Critique" - forshadowed that later used by structuralists like Lacan. It is defined in linguistic terms, emphasizing that the real meaning of the "subject" lies in culture and common "praxis": man has become both the signifier-signified and signified-signifier (Sartre page 156 1963).

2) LAING: A CASE OF TRADITION TRANSCENDED?

Laing aimed to use Sartre's radical philosophy to provide an alternative to the biological model of schizophrenia used by orthodox psychiatry, which he judged as dehumanizing in its reductionism. Interestingly, at the beginning of "Reason and

Violence", written by Laing and Cooper in 1964, Sartre praises them for their accurate interpretation of his writings. Despite this, Sartre's thinking appears in a modified form in Laing's writings: Laing interprets Sartre from within an empirical tradition which emphasizes individual experience. Thus he concentrates on the personal experiential component of madness using a clinical empirical method to capture the "mad" experience. This methodology, appropriate to his aims, generates a micro-social perspective which also betrays his confessed distrust of macro-social systems (Sedgwick 1982). In this way he arrives at a different position to that of his critics, Deleuze and Guattari, similarly inspired by the French philosopher. The argument is that, despite his accurate interpretation of Sartre's thought and his use of phenomenological terminology, the emphasis of his work and its methodology is more closely related to that of his American colleagues who possessed similar interests.

Laing attacked psychiatry's objective scientific framework which would never allow communication with the patient. This was because it treated the patient as a biological object not as "a whole person". Laing used existentialism to contextualize schizophrenia and make it intelligible:

> The mad things said and done by the schizophrenic will
> remain essentially a closed book if one does not understand
> their existential context. (Laing page 18 1960)

In "The Divided Self" (1960), Laing used the philosophy of "Being and Nothingness" (1958) to develop the concept of "ontological insecurity". According to Laing, a sane "ontologically secure" person:

> ... *will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people's reality and identity. (Laing page 38 1960)*

Failure to develop ontological security results in a split into an internal and external self. The internal self, which may be experienced as nothing more than a void, perceives the body and its actions as external. The behaviour of the external self is a defense mechanism against "engulfment" of the internal self. At this point, Laing steers a different course to Sartre. Laing is interested in the breakdown of this stable identity which leads to schizophrenia, not the metaphysical void which does not relate to experience. An important consequence of Laing's focus on personal experience is that the individual and society are separated. The schizophrenic is rendered "mad" by the "bad" world. He is retreating from the threat of a society, which Laing depicts as a unitary and "out-there" concept (Jaccoby 1975, Banton et al 1985). It is society's "out-there" nature which makes the Laingian "radical trip" (Sedgwick 1982) possible. The idea that the schizophrenic is sane on a voyage of inner discovery and that society outside is mad is impossible in Sartrian ontology. For the Sartre of "Being and Nothingness", there is no inner universe: man and society

are fused into "the universe of human subjectivity" (page 55 1948). In the "Critique", the individual and his actions can only be understood in terms of the "totality". Thus, where Sartre projected the individual outwards, Laing turned him inwards.

Evidence for Laing's empiricism, lies in a tendency he shares with his psychoanalytic colleagues - to simplify terminology (Sedgwick 1982). A comparison of Laing's account of the development of self-consciousness and Sartre's analysis of consciousness in "Being and Nothingness" illustrates this point:

> ... an awareness of oneself by oneself, and an awareness of oneself as an object of someone else's observation...These two forms of awareness of the self as an object in one's own eyes and as an object in the other's eyes are closely related to each other. (Laing page 106 1965)

> Consciousness is the revealed-revelation of existents, and existents appear before consciousness on the foundation of their being. Nevertheless the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness. An existent can not be stripped of its being; being is the ever present foundation of the existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere. (page xxxviii 1958)

By simplifying terminology, Laing makes Sartre's ideas amenable to empirical validation i.e. verification using case histories. For example, in "The Divided Self", his ideas on self-consciousness are illustrated with reference to the case history of the schizophrenic Peter.

That Laing's clinical empiricism was tied to his focus on the experiential, comes to the fore in "Sanity, Madness and the Family" (1964). Here, he moves from the personal to the interpersonal, analyzing the problem of schizophrenia in the broader context of the family. In the introduction, he maintains that his ideas on group interaction were derived from Sartre's "Critique of Dialectic Reason" (1960). Sartre helped him to conceive of the family as an independent structure or "nexus", not bearing to the individual a relationship of whole to part (c.f. Sartre's idea of the "fused group"). Such an analysis, would, according to Laing, require a methodology which would allow 1) the study of each person in the family 2) the relation between persons in the family and 3) the family itself as a system. However, the clinical method that Laing eventually uses, relying on interviewing family members in groups and individually — does not capture the independent nature of the family system which he has argued for. Instead, it details the experience of the patients and the other family members, making the "nexus" equivalent to a complex set of interpersonal relationships, as he himself admits:

> As such, the focus remains somewhat on the identified patient, or on the mother-daughter relationship, on the person in-a-nexus, rather than on the nexus itself? This we believe to be historically unavoidable. That this study is transitional is both its weakness and its strength, in that we hope it will constitute a bridge between past and future efforts in the understanding of madness. (Laing page 27 1964)

Despite realizing this methodological failure, Laing and his colleagues, Cooper and Esterson, did not conceive of an alternative, as Esterson's "The Leaves of Spring" (1970), a study identical in format, demonstrates. That the clinical empirical approach is perhaps unsuited to the study of nexuses, would not be a problem if Laing had not assumed that his study proved that "the behaviour of schizophrenics is much more socially intelligible than has come to be supposed by many psychiatrists" (Laing page 27 1964). By introducing the word "social" in a study focusing on family interaction, Laing left himself open to the reproach of "familialism", i.e. of not addressing the broader issue of the role of the family in society, voiced by the two French authors Deleuze and Guattari (Guattari 1972)[7] and echoed by Anglo-Saxon Marxists (Jaccoby 1975, Sedgwick 1982). Laing's strong leaning towards a familial explanation of madness can be accounted for by several factors. It was certainly partially the result of his work with Americans such as Bateson (1956) who advocated this type of interpersonal analysis. However, Laing's case is complicated by his Scottish heritage. In view of the moral nature of his message, the pull towards a familial explanation might have been accentuated by the centrality of the family to the Protestant morality of his upbringing. Whether the family or society is the critical unit of study is a matter of debate that has transcended national boundaries. Indeed Deleuze and Guattari likewise accused Lacan of familialism. What unites Deleuze and Guattari with Lacan against Laing is the primacy

of political and epistemological concerns - also Sartre's - which contrast with Laing's experiential and moral ones: in other words, they have different goals.

Laing shares his commitment to the personal and the experiential with his psychoanalytic colleagues of the Independent school. Like them, Laing was interested in the empirical self - of pragmatic use in explaining the success or failure of individuation - and not the Sartrian epistemological category. Furthermore, in his later work, "Conversations with Children", he adopts an approach reminiscent of Winnicott's by its emphasis on uncontaminated, naturalistic observation:[*]

> *After pondering over it a lot, I have decided not to introduce their conversations with a theoretical essay on them nor to footnote them in the many places where I have felt tempted to do so. The best order I think is to let them stand on their own, and for them to be read, in the first place with the fewest possible theoretical presuppositions. (Page viii 1978)*

Laing's work also shares features with American authors on the subject of mental illness - authors whose works have been popular and influential in this country. These include methodological localism (Jaccoby 1985, Sedgwick 1982, Busfield 1985) or a micro-social perspective which is associated with the detailing of individual experience. Followers of Sullivan located mental illness in interpersonal relationships. The functionalist thinkers, following Mead, developed operational definitions of self in

interaction with society. Goffman, like Laing, focuses on the subjective, experiential component of madness. Again like Laing, his definition of self is of empirical value in capturing the "mad" experience and contrasts with those of the macro-social French, referred to in the last chapter in the section on Lacan.

Bateson (1956) and Lidz (1958/1960) influenced Laing's analysis of schizophrenia. They adopted Sullivan's approach of looking at the disorder in terms of interpersonal relationships. Sullivan had read the German phenomenological psychiatrist Jaspers, and credited him with a perceptive insight into the schizophrenic problem. He, like Laing, refused to treat schizophrenic patients as just so many incurable cases. Instead, Sullivan felt, he, and psychiatry more generally:

> ... *must deal with disordered living of subject-persons in and within their personal complexes. It is not an impossible study of an individual suffering mental disorder; it is a study of disordered interpersonal relations nucleating more or less clearly in a particular person. (Sullivan page 258 1962)*[9]

This is the point that Laing tries to make in all his key writings, the interpersonal relations he chooses to focus on are those of the family. Bateson concentrated on the role of disordered communication, the genesis of the illness. His concept of the "double bind" refers to ambiguous communication situations where the verbal and non-verbal communications are discrepant. Lidz focused on the "schism".

generated during parental conflict, and the "skew", when one
partner dominates the other. The double bind, schism and
skew situations result in family conflict and a concomitant
neglect of the child's development.[10]

Academic sociologists of the functionalist school - or
affiliates to it - such as Parsons (1951), Lemert (1951) and
more recently, Scheff (1966/1984), have chosen to focus on
"social selves in interaction" in their analysis of the
genesis of madness - hence their methodological localism.
There are two slightly different perspectives on the
issue.[11] However, in both cases, the authors are trying to
analyze how meanings are generated or acquired through
social interaction and the way in which the individual self
is affected by taking on the attitudes of others. In the
introduction to the second edition of his "On Being Mentally
Ill", Scheff (1984) praises Laing, Goffman, Lemert and Szasz
for developing an approach that "gives more emphasis to
social processes than does traditional psychiatric theory
yet does not neglect the individual aspects" (page 8 1984).
Although his research is centred on the social processes,
this is merely to complement the individualistic approaches
of psychoanalysis and psychiatry. Scheff argues that
individual and social systems act in concert to generate
madness. Thus, like Laing, Scheff clearly distinguishes
between the individual and society. There is "interaction"
as opposed to "fusion" implied in the dialectical methods of
Sartre and Foucault. Social action is, once again,

"situated" not "determined". There have been many criticisms of this form of social reductionism. More recently the writers of "The Politics of Mental Health" (1985) have accused Scheff of transforming people into judgemental dupes by his over simplistic analysis. However, labelling theory's continued attractiveness lies in its amenability to empirical verification. The empirical studies that have tried to establish the validity of the labelling theory include most notably West's (1973) on a group of deviant London boys.[12]

In a more literary narrative vein, Goffman shared the concern of academic functionalists - namely the effect of social interaction on the self concept. He combines a greater emphasis on the individual's experience of mental illness with an analysis of face-to-face interaction or "interaction orders". The preferred method of study of these "orders" is microanalysis (Goffman page 2 1983). Goffman's reason for promoting research into face-to-face interaction is not only that such encounters can have a profound effect on social structure (page 10 1983), but also "that in them and them alone we can fit a shape and dramatic form to matters that aren't otherwise palpable to the senses" (page 9 1983). Goffman openly acknowledges the subjective, experiential dimension that this type of analysis entails.

In "Asylums" (1968), face-to-face interaction is analyzed in the context of the workings of a total institution. Goffman

develops the concepts of a "moral career", and "primary" and "secondary" adjustment. Primary adjustment refers to the internalizing of an "institutionalized" self, secondary adjustment, to the stage when the individual can stand apart from his alloted role.[13] "Asylums" is typical of Goffman's mastery of micro-social, contextual analysis.[14&15]

"Stigma" (1970) is specifically orientated towards studying how interpersonal interaction affects concepts of self. Of particular note in this passage are the ideas of individual "will" and "psychological integrity", akin to Laing's idea of identity, and the focus on "norms" constraining "individual action" typical of American functionalism.[16] The idea of psychological integrity is particularly important in the light of MacIntyre's (1985) comparison between Sartre's and Goffman's concepts of the "social self". MacIntyre argues that they are fundamentally equivalent; both are defined in terms of a collection of roles. However, MacIntyre also draws our attention to the fundamental difference between the Frenchman and the American when he says that "in Goffman's anecdotal descriptions of the social world, there is still discernible that ghostly "I" the psychological peg to whom Goffman denies substantial selfhood" (page 32 1985). Sartre's metaphysical language of "Being" is more successful at dismantling this "psychological peg".

Goffman's success lies in his descriptive abilities and attention to detail which explains his continuing popularity, despite his work being dated.[17] He has been influential in inspiring two Englishmen, Wing and Brown (1970), to carry out similar studies. Their efforts are described favourably by Sedgwick (1982), who considered their "focus on the minutiae of specific patients lives" - counting underwear in backwards - as a better pointer to hospital theory or policy than Goffman's "tragic eloquence". This "hard nosed" investigation, even more empirical in orientation, appeals to Sedgwick's Englishness. Evidence for Sedgwick's and Wing's similar outlook on the problem of mental illness can be found in Sedgwick's "Psychopolitics" (1982), and Wing's "Reasoning about Madness" (1978). Both considered mental illness as a crippling reality, and were not prepared to dismiss it as the result of labelling or social construction while empirical evidence and personal experience suggested to the contrary.

Goffman's eloquence is not his only failing, according to Sedgwick. Oddly, after praising the focused approach of Wing and Brown, he criticizes Goffman's "methodological localism" and "individualism" which preclude him from attaining the status of a critical theorist. Ironically, Goffman does not pretend to talk about broad social issues, and blatantly states his interest in the individual and experiential component of mental illness. Goffman's excuse for this

orientation resembles Laing's for his interpersonal analysis
of schizophrenia:

> *I am not addressing the structure of social life but the
> structure of experience individuals have at any moment of
> their social lives. I personally hold society to be first in
> every way and any individual's current involvement to be
> second; this report deals with matters that are second.
> (Goffman in Sedgwick page 65 1968)*

Society may be "first", but individual experience is what is
most important, precisely the message conveyed by Laing's
writings. Besides, deep structural analysis of social life
may be inappropriate because "From the perspective of the
physical and biological sciences it [social life] is only a
small irregular scab on the face of nature, not particularly
amenable to deep systematic analysis" (page 17 1983).

HISTORICAL TRADITIONS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

1) FOUCAULT

Although recognized as influential by Anglo-Saxon
historians,[18] Foucault's work has not met with unqualified
praise. Foucault has to be understood against a tradition of
Continental thought (Rajchman 1985, Harland 1985).[19] His
roots in Hegelian philosophy appear in his concept of the
episteme, usually related to that of the Zeitgeist (Harland
1985). His Durkheimian heritage, on the other hand, is
evident in the continuing emphasis on the unthought, a
priori foundations of society. Foucault's thinking is also

firmly rooted in the French tradition of the epistemology of science, developed by Cavaillès, Bachelard and Canguilhem. When Foucault's mentors have been studied in this country, they have been interpreted from within a different thought style, an additional reason perhaps why Foucault's philosophy remains somewhat alien to his Anglo-Saxon audience.[20] To complicate matters, besides his very different intellectual background, Foucault's philosophy is judged to be incoherent due to the split between his archeological and genealogical periods, a discontinuity which is more apparent than real (see section on Sartre). Whereas in the Archaeology, the focus is on the "episteme" governing the formation of discourses, in the Genealogy, the notion of the "power-knowledge" complex, another hypothetical concept, is developed to articulate his critique. In fact, the episteme is retained in the genealogical study, "Discipline and Punish" (1977), where a distinction is made between the different forms of power deployed at different historical stages.[21] Moreover, both periods use the notion of historical discontinuity and are, in keeping with his rationalist, Durkheimian heritage, characterized by being histories of categories and terms, not of people. In fact, Foucault moves even further away from the idea of a subject or agent than the social philosophers referred to in the chapter on social discourse. Like other members of the structuralist movement, Foucault believes that one can only talk about individuals in terms of social beings overwritten by social ideology.

The problem has been for many readers that Foucault goes beyond "abstract" collectivist structures such as the state and class, focusing on a deeper level in his attempt to avoid the crucial stumbling block of social science methodology: the subject-object dilemma. Foucault's aim - like Lacan's - is primarily to develop a coherent theoretical framework for social criticism:

> *The use of concepts of discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series, and transformation present all historical analysis not only with questions of procedure, but with theoretical problems. It is these problems that will be studied here (the questions of procedure will be examined in later empirical studies - if the opportunity, the desire, and the courage to undertake them do not desert me). These theoretical problems too will be examined only in a particular field: in those disciplines - so unsure of their frontiers, and so vague in content - that we call the history of ideas, or of thought, or of science, or of knowledge. (Foucault page 21 1972)*

Thus Foucault's critique of psychiatry in "Madness and Civilization" (1967) was only part of a larger critique of social power. "Madness and Civilization" belongs to his archaeological period, devoted to the analysis of discourses: the conditions of their emergence and their field of operation. Foucault isolated the concept of the episteme or underlying structure of discourse, a hypothetical concept and the cornerstone of his archaeological thought. In "The Order of Things" (1970), Foucault explicitly distinguished between a) the Renaissance episteme built around resemblance b) the Classical episteme built around the principle of classification c) the Modern episteme, conceptualized as a volume defined by three

dimensions, namely mathematical sciences, philosophical reflection, and the science of language and production: the era of positivism and d) the Post-Modern period of structuralism, the period of abstract forces of signification. That discourses are governed by different epistemes at different periods was important to Foucault, because he believed that they are what shape and control social life. Assumptions such as the existence of a universal "human nature" ignore the power social forces exert over individuals. For example, what are usually considered as biological entities, sexual desires, are not merely the product of physiology and choice, but are structured by systems of discourse that develop a certain aim, shape and content for the desires (Foucault 1978). Furthermore, epistemic differences were also important because they stressed discontinuity in history and eliminated the necessity to refer to a coherent subject:

> *On the contrary, my aim was to show what the differences consisted of, how it was possible for men, within the same discursive practice, to speak of different objects, to have contrary opinions, and to make contradictory choices: my aim was also to show in what way discursive practices were distinguished from one another; in short, I wanted not to exclude the problem of the subject, but to define the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse. (Foucault page 100 1972)*

After "The Order of Things", Foucault went on to define the "archive" in "The Archaeology of Knowledge" (1972). In the same work, he outlined the conditions of existence of the "statement" and its practical field of application – the archive being a collection of such statements which exist in

a particular period of history, and in a particular culture/society. This is in keeping with his aim of isolating a "general theory of production" (see footnote 22). Finally, in "The Birth of the Clinic" (1973), Foucault analyzed how discursive and non-discursive factors interact to form disciplines such as psychiatry and scientific medicine, which look at human beings in terms of objects of knowledge over which power can be deployed. "The Birth of the Clinic" announced the Genealogy.

In the Genealogy, Nietzsche's influence became more important and Foucault's attention was turned to the relationship between power, knowledge and the body:

> *'Effective' history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge, even under the banner of history does not depend on 'rediscovery' and it emphatically excludes the 'rediscovery of ourselves'. History becomes effective to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being – as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself. 'Effective' history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature...It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity, This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting. (Foucault in Rabinow page 89-90 1984)*

Foucault is still interested in discourses as instruments of power, but looks at how these interact with non-discursive factors, in the generation of subtle and diffuse repressive

strategies, deployed throughout the social system. A typical argument is that found in "The History of Sexuality" (1979) where "sex" is discussed as a cultural object, created by psychological discourses, and subsequently deployed as a strategy of bio-power to control bodies. Hence the idea of the knowledge-power complex, another hypothetical social concept, and a better way of capturing the link between discursive and non-discursive factors. Like madness analyzed in the Archaeology, sex is only part of a wider social critique of power.[223] Foucault's power is another non empirical, a priori entity, not equivalent to the idea of law or "droit", emanating from a sovereign figurehead or state. It is described as a series of strategies deployed in a variety of subtle and diffuse ways throughout the social system, which are inextricably linked with knowledge and were embodied in buildings such as the panopticon:[224]

> ...'police' is the ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channeled growth of wealth and the conditions of preservation of health 'in general'. (Foucault in Rabinow page 277 1984)[225]

It is interesting to compare Foucault's account of the sequestration of the insane with that of Szasz, of lasting popularity in Anglo-Saxon countries.[226] Szasz combined Rylian philosophy and Spencerian sociology to provide an alternative method of challenging the orthodox progressive model of psychiatric practice in "The Manufacture of Madness" (1972). He agreed with the Foucauldian idea of psychiatry as a form of power. However, his critique depends

on a human motive - that of scapegoating - the reason for its existence remaining unexplained (Szasz 1972). Psychiatry is a new form of inquisition where the scapegoat is no longer the witch, but rather the mental patient. Foucault, by his negation of a historical agent could not accept such an analysis. His challenge to progressiveness lies in the episteme. The treatment of the mentally ill at each historical period has its own form of rationality and has to be understood as a function of the episteme of the period. In this epistemic analysis, madness becomes the prisoner of the classical episteme which is dominated by the value of rationalism. The conditions under which it is imprisoned are those of the emerging bourgeois capitalist society. The Foucauldian analysis is aimed at discovering the strategies of power of contemporary society. Not being as blatant as those of the past, they are all the more dangerous. His message is in keeping with his political aims and consequently different from Szasz's moral one. Furthermore, Foucault's political aims contrast with those of a theorist such as Goffman who focuses on the personal dimension of individual experience. This is why Foucault wanted to create a theoretical system in which social events can be analyzed, instead of meticulously describing and contextualizing them as Goffman did.

2) SOME OBJECIONS TO FOUCAULDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Sedgwick's (1982) criticism of Laing, of not locating schizophrenia within a historical context, is dealt with by Barham (1985) in "Schizophrenia and Human Value". Having worked with Laing, Barham set himself a similar task: to making the schizophrenic's experience intelligible by contextualizing it and isolating a suitable discourse to capture it. Such a discourse, Barham believes, can only be formulated with a thorough understanding of the "historical embedding of the lives of the scientists who studied schizophrenia and the schizophrenics themselves". Hence the relevance of Foucault's work. New scientific terms are needed "in which to articulate the enterprise of schizophrenic lives and thus to extend the bounds of community so as to help us grasp schizophrenia as one of the forms of tribulation with which in any actual human community schizophrenics and non-schizophrenics alike have to contend" (Barham page 48 1984). The pragmatic orientation of Barham's work - he is interested in the problem presented by schizophrenia in everyday life in the "community" - steers Barham away from an impersonal, sociological analysis. The importance of pragmatic and experiential components influenced Barham's choice of a strategy for this project of historical understanding. While recognizing the value of Foucault's approach, Barham follows Rorty's (1980) recommendation of adopting an approach to social science which "emphasizes the utility of narratives and vocabularies rather than the objectivity of laws and theories" (Barham page 54 1984). According to Barham, what:

> *...the concept of narrative can do is to help give us our*
> *bearings, to further our understanding of the terrain within*
> *which human lives are lived and efforts at human*
> *comprehension are carried out, and to grasp the connection*
> *between the form of human action and the appropriate form*
> *for the understanding of human action. (Barham page 55 1984)*

The "structures of culture" approach of MacIntyre and Rorty is favoured over the impersonal "structures of power" approach to social science used by the Frenchman. The latter emphasizes how power structures use the social sciences as disciplinary forces and fails to capture individual experience, Barham's interest. The "structure of culture" approach, however, acknowledges that scientific understanding "... is more closely connected with ordinary human understanding than has generally been supposed" (page 7 1984). It allows a description of life, life "in the sense of "getting to know someone" across a range of circumstances and settings, or of the "coming-to-grasp" of a situation from within as it is lived" (page 77 1984).

His interest leads him to develop a concept of self which combines two Anglo-Saxon ideas: the narrative and Winnicott's dynamic emergence of self. It is a concept designed to capture the "historical continuity of human life" (Barham page 88 1984) and to be of use to Barham in his empirical investigation of the lives of schizophrenics. Following Winnicott, the failure in early childhood to develop personal narratives - a set of narratives with which to interact with the larger narrative of life - necessary to

a conception of self, accounts for the origins of schizophrenia. More generally, the narrative allows us to recognize "... the interplay between individual and setting, agent and story, separateness and union, we can no longer rest content with simple-minded conceptions of "the individual"" (Barham page 99 1984). It could be argued that this is a dialectical notion of ego, equivalent to Lacan's - indeed Barham refers in detail to Lacan in his chapter on selfhood. The difference lies in that Barham, like Laing, focuses on the individual/experiential component of the self and madness, Lacan on the political/social aspects. Foucault's similar emphasis to Lacan's governed Barham's dismissal of his structures of power approach. Barham's different viewpoint generates a clear notion of the self, designed to help understand the actions of "agents" in their social context, and contrasts with the amorphous, transcendent self generated by the French perspective of Sartrian and Lacanian ontology.

Barham (1985) chose to articulate his analysis using MacIntyre's concept of the narrative in preference to Foucault's "structures of power" approach, of limited value when trying to understand the experience of individuals. This is because Foucault is not interested in this, but is concerned with general social criticism. The MacIntyrian narrative is both more suited to Barham's project and more accessible to his audience. MacIntyre provides an alternative to Foucault's discussion of complex theoretical

categories/structures. He maintains that an understanding of the beliefs of individuals, as well as the setting in which these beliefs arise, is essential to the understanding of social action.[27] MacIntyre starts from the premise that man is a storytelling animal, constructing narratives to understand his behaviour and that of others. The individual in interaction becomes an amateur social scientist - also the premise of attribution theory - who constructs narratives to understand social action. The concept of the narrative involves the idea that social agents do not interact with individuals but with histories of "intersecting actions and beliefs" (see Barham 1985). Like Mead's "generalized other", the idea of "intersecting narratives underlines the importance of the consensus between individual social agents as a basis for social action. This emphasis on the beliefs/practices of social agents was explicitly rejected by Durkheim. However, for MacIntyre, they are essential to our understanding of the nature of social objects: the conception of social objects is intertwined with "the beliefs and practices informed by belief of its members" (page 5 1971).

The narrative is used to undertake a critique of the Natural and Social Sciences. Science becomes another form of story telling, resolving in different ways, at different times, certain crises of understanding. Natural science, MacIntyre argues, is used as a model by social scientists in their efforts to get rid of amateur social theories - an

enterprise doomed to failure (MacIntyre 1970). Instead, the social scientist should refrain from social objectivity, questioning instead the categories used in social explanation. Making the self understanding of individuals the subject of research, as the social sciences do, has to include the idea that it is "deeply interwoven with their understandings of the social settings of their lives, with, that is to say, their amateur social theories... (MacIntyre 1977)".

MacIntyre's framework is one in which Anglo-Saxon thinking is comfortable. It strives for meaningful explanations which refer to some kind of agent/self in interaction. The difference between the Foucauldian and MacIntyrian style of criticism aids the understanding of some of the philosophical objections which have recently been levelled at Foucault. Hacking (1986), who is not unsympathetic to the Frenchman, points to what he considers to be the circularity of Foucault's arguments. When discussing, his new type of bourgeois power, Foucault isolates its various components: two of these are the disciplinary aspect and the manufacture of new kinds of truth. Truth is the ordered procedures for the production, regulation and operation of statements, and is linked in circular relations with the system of power which produces and sustains it. It is an "abstract" (Hacking 1986) element which takes its place alongside Foucauldian knowledge and power:

> *We are specifically enjoined not to think of all this in terms of ideology and Marxian superstructure... the truth, knowledge and power are on the contrary conditions of possibility for the bourgeois mode... most readers have a hard enough time making sense of Foucault's anonymous knowledge, discourse with a life of its own, Unknown power is even more mysterious. (Page 35 1986)*

This is a problem with the Foucauldian style which is the result of his negation of a subject. It is also the aspect of Foucault's work with which Taylor (1986) finds fault, maintaining that "purposefulness without purpose", as found in Foucault's work, requires explanation in terms of an agent of some sort:

> *²⁰......It is certainly not the case that all patterns issue from conscious action, but all patterns have to be made intelligible in relation to conscious action. (Page 87 1986)*
>
> *... of course you don't explain it by some big bad man/class designing it, but you do need to explain it nevertheless, that is relate this systematicity to the purposeful human action in which it arose and which it has come to shape. You cannot evade this question by talking of the priority of structure over element, of language over speech act. What we want to know is why a language arises? (Page 88 1986)*

What Taylor doesn't seem to realize is that Foucault is not interested in the why, but the how question. Taylor wants an explanation in the MacIntyrian vein, of past actions in a way that is meaningful to us, in other words, referring to some form of agent. Foucault wants to get at the substructure of our society and alert us to the dangers of the subtle deployment of power, using a historical analysis. Disagreements with the Foucauldian style are a consequence of the meeting of two traditions of thought with different methods of explanation. These traditions are linked to

different sociological discourses which more generally reflect the differing value systems of the social milieus to which they pertain. It is a good example of a rhetorical misunderstanding as defined in the introduction.

2) THE CRITICISMS OF THE HISTORIANS

In modifying their historical methodology, Anglo-Saxon historians of Science and the Human Sciences have been considerably influenced by Foucault. Here, the focus will be on the latter. Certain philosophical objections to his concepts have already been mentioned. What historians focus on are methodological issues, particularly the lack of "hard" empirical research - usually concerning the lack of detailed archival work. The editors of the recent "Anatomy of Madness" (1985) praise Foucault's "magisterial" "la Folie et la Déraison" (translated and abridged as Madness and Civilization). However, they caution, "it would be a mistake to assume that, as many topics, it's roots in historical evidence are very secure" (Bynum et al. vol. I page 4 1985). Stone makes similar criticisms to these, referring to his "abstract" and "metaphorical" expression, "unconcerned with historical detail and documentation" (page 174 1985). Sedgwick (1982) refers to his goals as "purely intellectual" and because of this his explanations give priority to ideas over historical events. These criticisms have been attributed by Gordon (1990) to one important factor: most English critics have concentrated on an abbreviated form of

the original work. They would, he maintains, be considerably enlightened by a reading of the full work. What is not taken into account by Gordon's article is that both Sedgwick, who relied on a reading of the abbreviated work, and Porter who has read the whole of the "Folie", reach the same conclusion. This is because - as the thought styles model predicts - both the style and the content of Foucault's work is unacceptable to its Anglo-Saxon readership. A reading of the whole of the "Folie" would make Anglo-Saxon historians more convinced of this.

Concerning matters of content, the universality of the "Grand Renfermement", as implied in the "Folie" is certainly doubtful. The model may fit the happenings of Continental Europe, but it is questionable in Anglo-Saxon countries with their different political structures. Because of the political differences outlined, the "Grand Renfermement" - a universal phenomenon according to Foucault - may not have occurred to the same extent in England. The *laissez-faire* ideology, "The Trade in Lunacy" (Parry-Jones 1972), governing mental health practice in eighteenth, and to a lesser extent, nineteenth century Britain, made it difficult for an equivalent governmental control.

Criticisms of style and content are linked. Foucault's global, macro-social approach, which was responsible for misconceptions such as the above, have led to accusations of "totalization": indiscriminately applying concepts,

formulated as part of his philosophical framework, irrespective of appropriateness. This, historians argue, is no real advance on Whiggish history (Stone 1987, Bynum et al, introduction to vol. I 1985). The indiscriminate use of global concepts blinds the researcher to aspects of the problem not incorporated in the philosophical outlook (Stone 1987). The analysis of disciplinary methods presented in "Discipline and Punish" is found wanting by O'Brien (1982), due to the Foucauldian obsession with "normalization" and the "power-knowledge" complex. Her work extends that of Foucault, highlighting omissions in his analysis. As she points out, Foucault does not consider how the nature of the prisoner caused variations in the technology of power. Children, for example, were not isolated in cells, but sent away to penal colonies. O'Brien also considers how the prisoners' reaction to authority, revolting against the governors, contradicts the Foucauldian passive submission theory. Foucault does not claim that prisoners were compliant, however, neither does he examine their behaviour in prisons to make sure his assumptions are correct (Poster 1985). This is because Foucault's macro-historical perspective does not allow him to consider the fate of particular groups. His approach has to be understood in terms of his aim: doing history for the sake of the present, essentially a political one:

> *What we need is a new economy of power relations - the word economy being used in a theoretical and practical sense - to put it in other words: since Kant the role of philosophy is to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of what is given in experience; but from the same moment - that is*

since the development of the modern state and the political
management of society - the role of philosophy is also to
keep watch over the excessive powers of political
rationality. Which is a rather high expectation. (Foucault
in discussion with Rabinow in Dreyfuss and Rabinow page 210
1982)

Essentially, Foucault applies a theoretical analytic method,

which he has developed through structuralist discourse

analysis to undertake a radical critique of society - a

rationalist approach to the problem.

Anglo-Saxon social historians set themselves a more modest

task. Like their anti-psychiatric colleagues, they want to

contextualize madness, this time in an accurate historical

context. For example, the recent publication "The Anatomy of

Madness" is conceived around a similar criticism as

O'Brien's (1985) and Stone's, namely that Foucault's large

scale analyses make over-generalizations about psychiatric

history, not supported by detailed research. They follow

Stone's recommendation i.e. to concentrate on 1) histories

of institutions 2) detailed archival research and 3)

documenting the history of ideas about madness. All the

pieces concentrate on specific issues, in accordance with

the aims of the volumes:

Taken together, the score or so essays printed here do not
aim to draw morals from key events in the history of
psychiatry, but rather to present a sequence of encounters
in which scholars grapple with different kinds of often
unfamiliar evidence and ponder the hermeneutic problems
cluttering up the crossroads where the sufferers and their
experiences meet the physicians with their savoir-pouvoir.
The history of madhouses, mad-doctors and madmen still needs
opening up, above all, on new flanks, further detailed
information, continuing pluralism in approaches, and well
informed, concentrated discussion, all of which we hope,

will be stimulated by this ~~collection of~~ original and wide ranging collection of essays. (Bynum et al. vol. I page 20 1985)

The value of the essays in this volume lies particularly in the variety of new empirical detail which they present. They offer no sweeping generalizations but demonstrate the profusion of sources touching on the history of psychiatry. As always, they uncover new questions in answering the old ones, but they also show the value of patient historical inquiry in understanding the roots of psychiatry's contemporary dilemmas. (Bynum et al. vol. II page 13 1985)

The authors are conducting detailed empirical investigations qualifying Foucauldian insights. The quality and the value of the presented research is not in question, but it has to be understood as the reaction of British historians to Continental large scale, speculative history.

The historians writing in "The Anatomy of Madness", and Anglo-Saxon historians more generally, can be classified into two broad categories, differing slightly in their perspectives. Writers such as Scull, Ignatieff, Donelly and Rose adopt a more sociological orientation, trying to apply a Foucauldian type analysis to their own, more empirically orientated research. Others such as Porter, Digby and Allderidge recognize the value of Foucault's work, correcting inaccuracies with detailed archival research. Their work is less overtly political, but both types are in fact realizing Agassi's (1964) hopes for the history of science, within the human sciences: providing an accurate historical context for the events studied. Of the two, the second is more interesting, because it is more critical of Foucault, perhaps because of firmer roots in British

historical empiricism. Jones (1972) reflecting on the latter, concludes that it has led to a hundred years of "arrested intellectual development, and conceptual poverty". During the era of positivism in the nineteenth century, history had become a science studying "facts" analogous to scientific "facts". Where the scientist used tools such as microscopes, test tubes and experiments, the historian had at his disposal those of philology, archaeology and textual criticism. That English positivism was different from the French equivalent is evident in Comte's poor reception across the channel. His large scale historical accounts of society, using deterministic laws as explanation of societal development, was unsound and not grounded in "facts": "events" or the actions of individuals within institutional "frameworks". Both men and institutions were manageable units which could be subjected to empirical investigation. The focus on individuals found a home in the dominant nineteenth century ideology of liberalism (Jones 1972). History thus became the story of great men, while intangible social and political forces, inaccessible to empirical investigation, were neglected.

The heritage of the writers in "The Anatomy of Madness" is evident in the focus on "individuals" and their beliefs in volume I and institutions and their socio-political context in volume II. It is a distinction which parallels that made by Scheff (1984) between "individual" and "social" systems in his anti-psychiatric writings, and is associated with a

more localized, micro-social approach to the issues dealt with by Foucault (vol. II page 8 1985). The concept of a historical agent is reintroduced, and with it a dimension of moral responsibility: the treatment of the insane was also the result of the work of individuals in society as well as of impersonal bureaucratic political structures. The writers of "The Anatomy" subscribe to an "externalist" position, which Foucault's teacher, the French historian Canguilhem (1978)[30] criticized as "impoverished marxism".[31] From their side, the English historians argue that, although Foucault has launched the work of criticism, he has not addressed the task of "actually finding out". Consequently, we remain ignorant about most aspects of "madhouses, mad-doctors and madmen" – this being what they seek to remedy. Allderidge's witty essay on Bethlem, sets itself the task of destroying the wild exaggerations conjured up through the ages about the mistreatment of patients at Bethlem. She dismantles the false impression that Bethlem's history is well researched, claiming that the reason why there have never been any substantial inquiries in this direction is because Bethlem is more useful as a cliché.[32] In the same volume, Digby's archival work qualifies the Foucauldian perspective on moral treatment as relentless oppression. She remedies his failure to consider the link between religion and moral treatment, crucial to the case of the Quaker Tuke – the recognized initiator of this form of treatment in Britain.

MacDonald's "Mystical Bedlam" (1981) is work which has been received as a welcome alternative to the Foucauldian approach (Stone 1987). MacDonald makes use of Foucault's idea of discontinuity in history, and agrees that the medicalization of insanity during the eighteenth and nineteenth century was a disaster. However, MacDonald chooses a different approach, relying on extensive archival material. He acknowledges Foucault's "Madness and Civilization" as being of great value, however, its major weaknesses are that "abstractions confront abstractions" and his description of "how real men and women thought and acted is often fanciful" (MacDonald page xi 1981). MacDonald's arguments parallel those of Foucault, but are philosophically and methodologically at odds with the Frenchman's approach to history. Whereas Foucault "focuses his attention on the ways in which madmen were perceived and treated by intellectuals and officials" (MacDonald page xii 1981), MacDonald looks at popular beliefs and what insanity meant to the populace. He does this by placing their experiences in a historical context, reconstructed by means of diaries, religious writings and imaginative literature. The manuscripts of the physician Napier, allow him to depict seventeenth century mental health practices. MacDonald's book is foremost an empirical study - including such details as maps of Napier's practice - dispensing with the philosophical complexity so often present in works of French historians. His conclusions, however, are very similar, although stated in a much more straightforward fashion.[33]

Whilst the work mentioned above specializes in redressing the erroneous conclusions drawn from Foucault's work, that of the sociologically orientated historians is an empirical complement to it. Their's is a modified Foucauldian analysis, using his ideas as a background to their own more empirically orientated research. A reading of texts such as "A just Measure of Pain" (Ignatieff 1978), "Managing the Mind" (Donelly 1982) and "The Psychological Complex" (Rose 1985) points to differences between the English writers and the Frenchmen whose influence they recognize. The subtitles, "The Story of English Penitentiaries", "A Study of Medical Psychology in the Early Nineteenth Century" and "Psychology, Politics and Society in England: 1869-1939", respectively, indicates the more focused nature of the works, useful for purposes of empirical validation, but precluding a general historical analysis in the Foucauldian vein. The importance of accuracy for the Post-Modern Anglo-Saxon historians is evident when these works are compared to the much longer "Histoire de la Folie à L'Âge Classique" (1972). It is manifested by the greater number of direct quotations from primary historical sources set aside from the main body of the text. In the "Folie", they are incorporated into the body of the work and seem secondary to the general philosophical analysis. Moreover, in "The Psychological Complex", Rose offers a Foucauldian conclusion, after a detailed description of asylum practices.[34] He then elaborates the point using further empirical details. This practice is found in the writings of both the other authors

mentioned, necessary it seems to deflect criticisms of the type levelled at Foucault. However, Foucault's forte is his speculative style of analysis, which includes the abundant use of philosophical ideas and literary and artistic allusions, blended into the socio-political framework. There is an impression that a comprehensive knowledge of philosophy, politics, and literature is being used to formulate new ways of thinking about - as opposed to documenting - social issues, however conjectural these may be:

> *La déraison, c'est tout d'abord cela: cette scission profonde, qui relève d'un âge d'entendement, et qui aliène l'un par rapport à l'autre en les rendant étrangers l'un à l'autre, le fou et sa folie.*
> *La déraison, nous pouvons donc l'apprehender déja dans ce vide. L'internement, d'ailleurs, n'en était-il pas la version d'éxclusion, ne régnait-il pas entre le fou et la folie, entre la reconnaissance immédiate, et une vérité toujours différée, couvrant ainsi dans les structures sociales le même champ que la déraison dans les structures du savoir. (Foucault page 223 1972)*

> *Dans l'oeuvre de Shakespeare, les folies qui s'apparentent á la mort et au meurtre: dans celle de Cervantes, les formes qui s'ordonnent á la présomption et à toutes les complaisances de l'imaginaire. Mais ce sont lá de hauts modèles que leurs imitateurs infléchissent et désarment. Et sans doute sont-ils, l'un et l'autre, plus encore les témoins d'une expérience tragique de la Folie née au siècle, que de ceux d'une expérience critique et morale de la Déraison qui se developpe pourtant à leur propre époque. (Foucault page 49 1972)*

This passage, typical of Foucault's style, helps explain MacDonald's accusation of "abstractions" confronting "abstractions" in his work. Interestingly, the stylistic difference between the "Folie" and the English works cited, is akin to that between Hogarth and Greuze. Foucault is

relating the "drama" of madness' imprisonment, the Englishmen are recounting a factual story, paying attention to the accuracy of historical details.

That Foucault's Anglo-Saxon disciples apply a prethought-out intellectual approach, tailoring it to the requirements of the empirical thought style, is perhaps best exemplified in the collection of essays entitled "The Power of Psychiatry" (1986), edited by Miller and Rose, and "Decarceration" (1977), by the American Scull, also widely read in this country. The debt to Foucault is particularly clear in the former, where the editors write that:

> *This contemporary psychiatric system extends far beyond the medicalized institution. It comprises a widespread but loosely related assemblage of practices that seek to regulate individual subjectivities and manage personal and social relations in the name of the minimization of mental disorder and the promotion of mental health (Miller and Rose page 3 1986)*[35]

The issues dealt with in the volume include psychiatry and racism, psychiatry and sexism, psychiatry in prisons, and the psychotherapy of unemployment, themes with practical implications.

This approach can be contrasted with that of the French pupil of Foucault, Donzelot. He retains the French macro-historical orientation which accords priority to conceptual novelty - a requirement for intellectual success within the rationalist tradition (Turkle 1978, Bourdieu 1979, Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986). Talking about the conceptual fluency of

French thinkers such as Foucault, Lacan and now Donzelot, Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) note the benefits of French philosophical education which fosters certain thinking skills and provides a vocabulary with which to argue elegantly. Furthermore, it encourages critical thinking and stimulates reflection. Philosophy "... tried not to be a technical speciality, but a general survey of the whole of life" (page 199 1986). Donzelot locates himself firmly in the French tradition of social thought, acknowledging a debt to Foucault, Ariès and Flandrin. The a priori analytic category he develops, "the social", is a term sufficiently alien to a foreign readership that, in the English edition, it necessitates a preface "In order to make the reading of a book like this easier for a public far removed from its milieu of origin" (Donzelot page xix 1980). Donzelot's method is described in the introduction by Deleuze:

> *Donzelot's method consists in isolating pure lines of mutation which acting successively or simultaneously, go to form a contour or surface, a characteristic feature of the new domain. The social is located at the intersection of all these little lines. But the milieu on which these lines act, investing and transforming it, still needs to be defined. (Deleuze page xi in Donzelot 1980).*

The whole of the study "The Policing of Families" (1980) is aimed at bringing to the fore this complicated, albeit, fundamental realm, families acting as a useful vehicle to help the reader grasp concepts:

> *By and large, the procedures of transformation of the family are also those which implant the forms of modern integration that give our societies their particularly well policed character and the celebrated crisis of the family, setting the stage for its liberation, would appear then not so much*

> *inherently contrary to the present social order as a*
> *condition of possibility of that order's emergence.*
> *(Donzelot page 8 1980)*

This is perhaps one of the best examples of the political
conception of the family which exists in French social
literature, and helps to explain the Lacanian political
familialism which was contrasted with Laing's moral
approach. Family and society are inextricably linked. Thus
the crisis of the family and the rise of the social are
products of the same underlying social discourses/forces.
The purpose of analyzing the "crisis" or the "rise" lies in
making history "...tell us who we are" (Donzelot page 8
1980), the same macro-social concern - doing history for the
sake of the present - as Foucault.

THOUGHT STYLES AND TALK ABOUT MADNESS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

1) DATA

So far this chapter has dealt with written material. But,
were the differences found between academic texts mirrored
in the way members of the two academic communities thought
and expressed themselves verbally on the subject of madness?
To answer this question, I conducted a short empirical study
using two small groups of English and French students. The
interviews were to illustrate how the two thought styles
influenced - or did not influence - the thoughts about
mental illness expressed during the conversations. The

interviews were not designed to be representative of the population at large. At the very least they represent the views held within the two academic circles - remembering that the thesis is concerned with academic/intellectual thought.

The group of English students was composed of three male second year undergraduates, and one female first year undergraduate: D T, R O, B C and S D. The French group consisted of three young French *lecteurs* who had just finished university and were teaching in this country for a year, one male and two females: J-L D, H F and D C. Any advantage the French students possessed in terms of age should have been outweighed by the fact that the English undergraduates were doing a subsidiary course in psychology and should thus have had better command of the vocabulary needed to discuss the topic of mental illness. I prepared a number of questions on the issue. However, not all of them were used, as they were merely a precaution to ensure that a group discussion was initiated. The discussions revolved around the topic of mental illness - what is mental illness, how do we define it, what are its causes - and the care of the mentally ill. At the outset, I asked the students whether they had read any of Foucault's work: none had. This was because one of the questions I asked concerned Foucault's idea of psychiatric discourse as a form of power. In general, after having asked a question, if the discussion was going well, I did not interrupt. The pattern in both

cases was that someone put forward a point and the other members of the group qualified it. Below are the essential points which emerged from the two 40 minute discussions.

A) THE ENGLISH GROUP

The group held the view that when discussing the idea of mental illness, it should be born in mind that there was no such thing as normality. Normality, was defined in terms of society's norms. The members of the group differentiated between the "incurably" mentally ill, those who had organic disorders, and those who had been rendered mentally ill by the "environment". They also thought that the treatment should be matched to the disorder, in other words, that it was legitimate to use physical techniques with those who had an organic illness, but that psychotherapy was preferable for the other category of disorders. When asked how one could differentiate between the two categories, B C proposed that one should be able to identify the nature of the disorder by administering physical treatments and seeing whether they worked. If they did not, one could infer that the disorder was psychosocial. An interesting question then arose, as to how one could differentiate between criminal and mentally ill behaviour. The case of child abuse was considered, and I asked them what they thought of the idea that offenders could not help reoffending. D T thought that this was an explanation that the individual used to excuse perverted behaviour. This excuse, when used often enough,

led to "self-belief that the offender could not stop offending". The topic then moved to institutional versus community care. The group favoured care within the community. The reason D T and R O gave was that the outside environment provided more "stimulation", thus encouraging people to make an effort to get better and to "problem solve" for themselves. R O then made the point that community care should be awarded to those who made an "effort" to get better and the other members of the group agreed. There was unanimous agreement that people were too readily institutionalized. There was also agreement that the state should subsidize the care of the mentally ill, whether in the family or in institutions. I then explained to them the Foucauldian idea that psychology and psychiatry could be used as forms of controlling power. They were not convinced by Foucault's analysis. If this was the state of affairs, it had not consciously been created. The members of the group held a very positive view of the medical profession. They agreed that it had special powers which were liable to be abused. However, they had gained these through lay people. Through the government, lay people could influence the laws which invest the profession with various powers, including the power to commit people. They were quite happy that medical professionals were the best people for the job. What the group was less happy about was that the individual might lose some of his "individual" rights. The only right they thought he should lose was the right to leave the institution, if he was dangerous.

B) FRENCH GROUP

Again, the conversation opened with a discussion of the nature of mental illness. They mentioned several works that they had read - Bettelheim's "Regard sur la Folie" about autistic children and the account of an anorexic's struggle against her disorder, "Le Pavillon des Enfants Foux". They were less willing than their English counterparts to distinguish between physical and social causes of mental disorders. To illustrate the intimate link between the physical and the mental, J-L D cited Freud's discovery that physical symptoms had psychical origins. They were also very concerned that different types of disorders should be distinguished. There then followed a discussion of "le snobisme de la dépression", concerning the social acceptability of mental illness among certain social strata. What was surprising was how conversant they were with psychiatric terminology which they said encompassed "toute une rangée de troubles nerveux" - les psychopates, les névrosés, les troubles affectifs. They were particularly intent on classifying disorders when it came to considering the care locus. H F thought community care within "le milieu sécurization" was a good idea, then immediately corrected herself, saying "attention il faut savoir de ce qu'on parle, car la famille peut-être la cause des problèmes". J-L D, who had visited two English residential schools for the mentally handicapped, was in favour of residential care. State finances were better utilized in this environment than in

the family. Teams of specialists could work with the parents for the child's good. The institutions also had "des moyens techniques" which families did not possess. Furthermore, residential care did not preclude fully experiencing life, provided the patients received regular visits from outsiders. J-L D cited the example of how a mother was breastfeeding a baby in the middle of the corridor. H F then decided that institutional care was preferable, even in the case of non organic disorders such as depression, which she thought could be contagious: it might exert a negative effect over the rest of the family members. J-L D then made two interesting remarks concerning the institutions he had visited. He said that he had had the impression that the parents and the carers were learning as much as the handicapped children. He then went on to mention "le renversement des roles" which occurred in this environment: the mad were those who fitted, the visitors were those who were abnormal. This, he maintained, demonstrated how the judgement of mental illness was dependent upon a particular frame of reference. J-L D also stressed the importance of the role of the untrained worker. They were probably even more crucial to the wellbeing of the child than the professionals. As to how to determine who should receive institutional care and what rights the mentally ill should have, they all said that that was the province of "la loi" and could not comment on it. They, however, agreed that abuses of "la loi" could be counteracted by "des formations" or offical bodies, representing the parents and the patients

themselves. When I asked about the Foucauldian idea of psychiatry as power, although they specified that they were not qualified to elaborate on it, they agreed that his was a plausible analysis of the abuse of psychiatric powers.

2) COMMENTS

The discussions did not only differ in content, but also in style and emphasis. The English group seemed dissatisfied by psychology's inability to establish whether mental illness was physical or psychological. Quite a long period, 10 minutes, was spent discussing how psychology could conclusively prove the nature of mental illness by experimental means. The French group much more readily accepted the difficulties attached to psychological diagnosis. They spent less time deciding whether to ascribe the causes to the individual or the environment, and were more interested in discussing social aspects of the problem, such as the "snobisme de la dépression". What was also quite striking was the onus the English group put on the individual's responsibility to get better. The French were more qualified in their praise for this form of care. After J-L D had described his visits to British institutions, the group seemed to agree that good institutional care was preferable because it represented more effective use of "public resources". The discussion concerning the rights of the mentally ill and the Foucauldian idea of power raised some interesting differences. The English group did not

agree with the Foucauldian idea, and thought that if there was abuse of power, we were all responsible for it. This was because we were all responsible for the laws which affected the mentally ill. The government was merely carrying out our wishes - this seems a Lockean idea. The Foucauldian idea seemed to make sense to the French group, particularly D C and J-L D. J-L D had made several philosophical points before the discussion of Foucault which were in agreement with the Foucauldian analysis. For example the idea of role reversal - that in institutions we were the misfits we were "malalaise", "les foux". Despite their disagreement with the Foucauldian analysis, the English group was concerned about the loss of rights which the individual might suffer. The French group was less so, and thought that this could be safeguarded against by the collective action of certain bodies. The French group did not hold such a positive attitude towards the "helping professions". At one point, the discussion drifted a little, and turned towards "psychology". Although the group had quite an impressive knowledge of psychoanalytic theory, they confessed to not knowing much about "les psychologues". H F said that recently a friend of hers had tried to get a job as a "psychologue du travaille" - an industrial psychologist - but had met with a bad response because in France there is as yet no such thing. The group felt that this was a desirable state of affairs, as the psychologists would be working for political ends and not for the workers' good.

The French group was more sensitive to the social and political aspects of mental illness. They were also more conversant with psychoanalytic theory and the psychological jargon used to describe various types of disorders. This was suprising in view of their confessed ignorance of the subject they were about to discuss. The English, who were doing a subsidiary course in psychology, quite often used slang words such as "nutty" and "mad" to describe the mentally ill. It has to be said that they were, in general, less eloquent and not as good at putting forward an argument and making a case for it. The French group seemed to be more intent on using examples drawn from the literature they had read and the films they had seen to make their arguments coherent. Whereas, the French group's perspective on mental illness was influenced by a philosophical reading of Freud, the English group had quite obviously grafted the nature/nurture dispute onto their analysis of the nature and causes of mental illness. The importance the English group ascribed to individual rights and their view of society was in agreement with what was discussed in chapter four.

Finally, the validity of my interpretation of the data is questionable at this tentative stage. However, the results obtained, even with such small groups of students, seem to be in broad agreement with the thesis. It is important to emphasize that the data is illustrative: it illustrates the way the differences generated by the thought styles might

emerge in spoken discourse, rather than showing a clear contrast between strictly comparable groups.

CONCLUSION

Both the anti-psychiatric and historical writings on madness betray consistent differences in approach to the problem, in keeping with national differences in social thought. The contextualization of madness - in both its social and historical contexts - by the Anglo-Saxon writers contrasts with the theoretical framework developed by the French, in which madness acts as a vehicle for social criticism. This difference stems from the dichotomy discussed in the previous chapter: the micro-social versus macro-social treatment of social issues, resulting from the thought styles of empiricism and rationalism respectively. Furthermore, the disparity between a style of thought which emphasizes the impersonal and general, and one interested in the individual and impressionistic, is again prominent in this chapter in the form of an impersonal socio-political analysis of madness versus an experiential one. This difference parallels those isolated in the first chapter when discussing the two traditions of literature. The experiential component of the Anglo-Saxon anti-psychiatrists and the interest in recording of lived experience of English authors betray the same concern for explaining the individual's sentience. This contrasts with the more

impersonal French approach in both areas, which focuses on general social/philosophical issues. The contextualization of madness by English historians which has been distinguished from the more speculative French treatment of the issue, is reminiscent of the different treatment the French revolution received from the authors Dickens and Balzac. These parallels suggest that thought styles generate a cultural pool of resources on which writers draw, to a greater or lesser extent - one resource which they are forced to use is a language which embodies a given set of priorities/constraints. This pool of resources, or cultural "toolbox", explains why writers such as Laing and the post-modern historians retain the design of their intellectual heritage.

In the anti-psychiatric literature, the empirical interactionist perspective is associated with the development of a stable, empirical notion of self which contrasted strongly with the fluid, amorphous, rationalist structures. This difference has already been hinted at in the previous chapter, but becomes more obvious here. It is related to the contrasting functions of the concepts: those of the Anglo-Saxon are designed to capture experience rather than being purely theoretical constructs.

The empiricism of the British historical tradition may have been modified, but there remains a difference between English and French historians of the Human Sciences, even if

this is only in terms of their relative strengths. The English are masters of empirical investigation and the contextualization of madness. The most interesting research qualifies existing theoretical concepts, drawing attention to their shortcomings. In many cases, this results in detailed narrative of events. French theorists, on the other hand, give priority to developing general frameworks for purposes of socio-political analysis/critique. They accord priority to theoretical development in keeping with their rationalist biases.

The empirical data gathered suggests that the influence of the thought styles is not limited to academic writings, but affects the ways in which student members of the community think and express themselves on the subject of mental illness.

1.

> *Before consciousness there was nothing except "a plenum of being of which no element can refer to an absent consciousness" (page xxxi 1958).*

2. This occurs when the paths to our goals, prescribed by the "Hodological map" we have made, are blocked. We then fulfil our desires by magic instead of by ordinary means.

3.

> *But the peculiar possibility of being – that which is revealed in the nihilating act – is of being the foundation of itself as consciousness through the sacrificial act which nihilates being. The for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found itself as consciousness. (page 82 1958)*

4. It is presented as a struggle between the subject or "for-itself" and the "Other". Unlike material objects, the "Other" possesses freedom as the subject. The subject becomes an "in-itself" or object in its phenomenal field. In this field, the suject becomes aware of itself as object:

> *.. the Other has not only revealed to me what I was; he has established me in a new type of being which can support new qualification. This being was not in me potentially before the appearance of the Other, for it could not have been found any place in the for itself. (Sartre page 222 1958)*

Having lost his freedom, the subject wants to regain it. By regaining it however, it is the Other who becomes an object and attempts to retrieve his freedom.

5.

> *The meaning of human labour is that man is reduced to inorganic materiality in order to act materially on matter and to change his material life. Through trans-substantiation, the project inscribed by our bodies in a thing takes on the substantial charateristics of the thing without altogether losing its original qualities. (page 178 1958)*

6. The group is a living body of practices, whose objectives need to be stated and restated with an internal threat from the individual freedom of each member of the group. This is overcome at the price of the oath which destroys the spontaneous nature of the group. It differentiates, and eventually becomes a hierarchical institution like the Stalinist communist party

7.

> *He would like us to become one with the cosmos, break out of the humdrum of everyday life. But his method of reasoning cannot detach the subject from the familial grasp; though he sees it only as the starting point, it catches up with him again at every turn. He tries to resolve the difficulty by taking refuge in Eastern style meditation, but that cannot withstand the intrusion of capitalist subjectivity, whose methods are nothing if not subtle. (Page 50 1984)*

8. "Conversation with Children" is a work written when Laing had moderated his radical left wing position.

9. Sullivan, like Laing, was critical of biologism. Of psychobiology he says:

> *Psychobiology, if it is anything but a body of intellectualized absurdities and self-contradictory rationalizations, misnamed neurology or endocrinology, or various philosophizing with empty words, is a study of human persons* in dynamic interrelation with other *persons* and with *personal* entitities (culture, tradition, man made institutions, laws, beliefs, fashions, etc.) (Sullivan page 258 1962)

10. Bateson's double-bind theory has stimulated a wealth of empirical laboratory research into disordered family communication (see Sedgwick 1982). Hirsh and Leff (1975) conducted a review of the empirical work that had been done on the "double-bind" theory. They concluded that double-binds were not exclusive to the families of schizophrenics. They also found that it was difficult for investigators to agree on when the double bind was occurring. (see Wing 1978)

11. Parsons and Lemert argue that mental illness is another example of deviancy or rule breaking, and describe it in terms of "primary" and "secondary" deviation. Primary deviation refers to the deviant behaviour, secondary deviation, to acting in accordance with a "role". The latter is alloted by society as a result of the initial deviance. Scheff and Becker (1963) focus on the "labelling process", arguing that deviancy, and consequently mental illness, is not the result of rule breaking, but is an action to which a label has been successfully applied. Once he is labelled as mentally ill, the individual knows how to behave as if he is mentally ill because of the availability of cultural stereotypes. These stereotypes provide evidence that mental illness is a social role which reflects the status of the insane in the social structure.

12. West (1970) studied a group of delinquent boys living in South London, 20% of which were prosecuted. This 20% belonged to a "vulnerable group" which could, at an early stage, be identified as potential court cases. The crucial determinants in a susceptibility to "recognized" deliquency were factors such as family size, low intelligence and poor parental behaviour. This susceptibility became a career through a process of social network socializing, supporting the deviancy, as opposed to direct labelling.

13.

> *When an individual cooperatively contributes required activity to an organization and under required conditions - in our society with the support of institutionalized standards of welfare, with the drive supplied through incentives and joint values, and with the prompting of designated penalties - he is transformed into a cooperator; he becomes the "normal", "programmed", or built-in member... I shall speak in these circumstances of the individual having a primary adjustment to the organization and overlook the fact that it would be just as reasonable to speak of the organization having primary adjustments to him.*
> *I have constructed this clumsy term in order to get to a second one, namely secondary adjustments, defining these as any habitual arrangement by which a member of an organization employs unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting around the organization's assumptions as to what he should do and get and hence what he should be. Secondary adjustments represent ways in which the individual stands apart from the role and the self taken for granted for him by the institution. (Goffman page 188 1961)*

The reference to clumsy terminology should be noted, as it is in agreement with Goffman's self-confessed aversion to needless theorizing. In fact, Goffman's strengths are his outstanding observational powers and sensitivity to individual experience.

14. The asylum is an institution which reinforces any forms of existent pathological behaviour, creating a vicious circle whereby once inside people may never get out. Everything a patient does that conforms to hospital requirements is labelled "treatment", anything attempted independently, i.e. not specified in the rules, is correspondingly a sign of disturbed behaviour:

> *... the more inadaquate the equipment to convey the rejection of the hospital, the more the act appears to be a psychotic symptom, and the more likely it is that management feels justified in assigning the patient to a back ward. (Goffman page 215 1961)*

Inmates are thus completely controlled.

15. Goffman describes how the apparently "deranged" patients in asylums use secondary adjustments to flesh out their drab life, giving at the same time a picture of the flourishing hospital underlife:

> *In order to work a system effectively, one must have an intimate knowledge of it; it was easy to see this kind of knowledge put to work in the hospital. For example, it was widely known by the parole patients that, at the end of charitable shows at the theatre hall, cigarettes or candles would probably be given out at the door, as the patient audience filed out. Bored by some of these shows, some patients would come a few minutes before closing time in order to file out with the others; still others would manage to get back into the line several times and make the whole occasion more than ordinarily worthwhile. Staff were of course aware of these practices and late comers to some of the hospital-*

wide patient dancers were locked out, the assumption being that they timed their
arrival so as to be able to eat and run. (Goffman page 207 1961)

16.

Persons who have a particular stigma tend to have similar learning experiences
regarding their plight, and similar changes in conception of self - a similar
"moral career" that is both cause and effect of commitment to a similar sequence
of personal adjustments. (The natural history of a category of persons with a
stigma must be clearly distinguished from the natural history of the stigma
itself - the history of the origins, spread and decline of the capacity of an
attribute to serve as a stigma in a particular society, for example, divorce in
American upper middle class society.)

...the norms dealt with in this essay concern identity or being, and are
therefore of a special kind. Failure or success at maintaining such norms has a
very direct effect on the psychological integrity of the individual. At the same
time, mere desire to abide by the norm - mere good will - is not enough, for in
many cases the individual has no immediate control over his level of sustaining
the norm. It is a question of the individual's condition, not his will; it is a
question of conformance, not compliance. (Goffman page 152 1970)

17. More accurate recent accounts of institutional life inside mental hospitals are to be
found in the "The Politics of Mental Health" (1985). One of the descriptions of
institutional life, based on first-hand experience of a mental hospital, is a portrayal of
the depressingly flat atmosphere which sometimes characterizes these establishments. There
is no evidence of the dehumanization of patients or of their loss of individuality.
Instead, the emphasis is on the mutual dependence which developed between patients and
carers.

18. In the nineteenth century, the differences in thought which existed in the
philosophical and social discourses of the two countries, spread to history:

Between the 1890s and the 1920s, Europe experienced an intellectual revolution
in the human sciences. The significance of the work of Freud, Weber, Durkheim,
Pareto, Croce, Simmel, Dilthey and Sorel for the study of history hardly needs
comment. At the very least, it made a decisive rejection of the more simplistic
assumptions of mid-nineteenth century positivist methodology, and raised history
once more from the lowly ideographic status to which historians themselves had
consigned it. Significantly England did not participate in this movement, it in
fact remained virtually unaffected by it. (Plant Page 101 1972)

Perhaps this explains why, in their search for conceptual renewal, English historians of
the Human sciences turned to the Frenchman Foucault.

19.

The reference is to two major developments in French history going back to the
early part of this century, each in its own way linked to Marxism, and both have
been brought together by Foucault's teacher, Louis Althusser: 1) a rich

> *tradition in the history of sciences, in which Bachelard and Canguilhem are*
> *influential figures. This tradition, which influenced Foucault, sought to*
> *challenge the universal objective and progressive image of a unified science*
> *inherited from the Enlightenment through the attempt to cover an irreducible*
> *plurality of "territories" and "objects" of knowledge, characterized by*
> *anonymous tacit procedures, and succeeding one another through breaks and*
> *ensuing ruptures - a discontinuous history 2) the "new history" identified with*
> *the annales, which tried to put "battle treaty" narrative to rest..., thus*
> *opening up new areas and new kinds of sources. (Rajchman page 53 1985)*

Additional influences have succeeded in rooting him firmly in the Continental tradition of
social thought:

> *From Weber he inherits a concern with rationalism and objectification as the*
> *essential trend in our culture and the most important problem of our time. But*
> *by converting Bavarian science into genealogical analytics, he develops a method*
> *of rigorous analysis which has a central place for pragmatic concern and*
> *presupposes, rather than paradoxically opposes, it as a necessary part of the*
> *intellectual enterprise. Like Heiddegger and Adorno, he emphasises that the*
> *historical background of practices, those practices which make objective social*
> *science possible cannot be studied by context free, value free, objective*
> *theory; rather, those practices produce the investigator and require an*
> *interpretation of him and his world. Having learned from Merleau-Ponty that the*
> *knower is embodied, Foucault can find the place from which to demonstrate that*
> *the investigator is inevitably situated. (Dreyfus and Rabinow page 166 1982)*

20. As Harland points out, the philosophy behind Foucault's genealogy is at odds with the
Anglo-Saxon interpretation of Nietzsche. For example, the Nietzschian concept of desire
used in "The History of Sexuality", is at variance with Anglo-Saxon thinking about the
body. To the origins of sexuality, lodged in our biological desires and repressed by
bourgeois society, Harland juxtaposes Foucault's desire:

> *... lodged in our most secret nature, "demands" only to surface; that if it*
> *fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of*
> *a power weighs it down, and it can finally be articulated only at the price of*
> *some kind of liberation. We believe in the full constancy of individual life,*
> *and imagine that it continues to exert its force indiscriminately in the present*
> *as it did in the past. But a knowledge of history easily disintegrates this*
> *unity, depicts its wavering course... we believe, in any event, that the body*
> *obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and that it escapes the influence of*
> *history, but this too is false. The body is moulded by a great many distinct*
> *regimes. (Harland page 158 1985)*

(see the discussion of how the thought styles have affected the interpretation of Marx,
oultined in the footnotes to the previous chapter).

21. During the Renaissance, punishment relied on the display of power by the sovereign in the form of torture and public execution: "for all to see the power relation that gave the sovereign his force to the law". During the Classical period, punishment depended much more upon representation. There was a correspondence between the crime and the retribution. The representation of the crime thus became more important than its corporeal reality.

22. The agenda of the Archaeology is best captured by Foucault himself:

> The word archeaology is not supposed to carry any suggestion of anticipation; it simply indicates a possible line of attack for the analysis of verbal performances: the specification of a level - that of the analysis of the statement and the archive; the determination and illumination of a domain - the enunciative regularities, the positivities: the application of such concepts as rules of formation, archaeological derivation, and historical a priori. But in almost all its dimensions and over almost all its crests, the enterprise is related to the sciences, and to analyses of a scientific type, or to theories subject to rigorous criteria.
> Moreover, in their deployment and in the fields that they cover, archaeological descriptions are articulated upon other disciplines; in seeking to define, outside all reference to a psychological subject or constituent subjectivity, the different positions of the subject that may be involved in statements, archeology touches on a question that is being posed today by psychoanalysis; in trying to reveal the rules of formation of concepts, the modes of succession, connexion, and coexistence of statements, it touches on the problem of epistemological structures; in studying the formation of objects, the fields in which they emerge and are specified, in studying too the conditions of appropriation of discourse, to touch on the analysis of social formations. For archaeology, these are so many correlative spaces. Lastly, in so far as it is possible to constitute a general theory of productions, archaeology, as the analysis of the rules proper to the different discursive practices, will find what might be called its enveloping theory. (Foucault page 207 1972)

23.

> What is at issue, briefly, is the overall "discursive fact", the way in which sex is "put into discourse". Hence too, my main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of behavior, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure - all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also incitement and intensification: in short, the "polymorphous techniques of power." And finally, the essential aim, will these effects of power lead one to formulate the truth about sex or, on the contrary, falsehoods designed to conceal that truth, but rather to bring out the "will to knowledge" that serves as both their support and their instrument. (Foucault "the History of Sexuality vol. 1 in Rabinow pages 299-300 1984)

24. The surveillance implemented in the panopticon enabled a system of data collection on the individuals within its walls. The system provided the information necessary for the creation of new discourses to manipulate and control them.

25. Foucault's concept of power is not "negative" and "repressive" but "positive" and "constructive". He argues that sexual repression in the nineteenth century was "constructive", in that it generated more discourses on the subject than there had ever been before.

26. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that much of Szasz's work has been severely challenged and discredited, his book, "The Myth of Mental Illness", is still more widely available than Foucault's works.

27. Barham captures the difference between the Foucauldian and MacIntyrian approaches:

> *Another way to say this is that, whereas writers who emphasize "structures of power" help us to identify and understand a history of abuse, they fail to locate their criticisms against an adaquate countervailing conception of human lives. (Barham page 76 1984)*

28.

> *The undesigned systematicity has to be related to the purposeful action of agents in a way we can understand... the reason for this requirement is that the text of history, which we are trying to explain, is made up of purposeful human actions. Where there are patterns in this action which are not a purpose, we have to explain why actions done under one description or purpose also bear this other, undesigned action. We have to show how the two descriptions relate: a strategic pattern cannot just be left hanging, unrelated to our conscious ends and projects. It is a mistake to think that the only intelligible relation between a pattern and our conscious purpose is the direct one where the pattern is consciously willed... (Taylor page 87 in Couzens-Hoy 1987)*

29. The negation of the subject - leading to a focus on abstract structures - as well as the idea of discontinuity embodied in the episteme, have become the hallmarks of Foucault's historical analysis. Neither of these central articulating strands have gone without criticism. Merquior (1985) argues that the model Foucault proposed for the development of the Human Sciences, does not apply to the Hard Sciences i.e. physics and chemistry. Using examples drawn from both these disciplines, he demonstrates the existence of "epistemic lags" and "dialectic returns" to previous ideas. Their existence is inconsistent with the idea of successive epistemes which come and go, each breaking sharply with the other. In fact, examples of epistemic lags can be found in the arts as

well; music always lags on the visual arts, although proceeding through similar developmental stages.

30. For Canguilhem, Foucault's mentor, the appropriate approach to the history of science was to see it as:

> ... une prise de conscience explicite, exposée comme théorie, du fait que les sciences sont des discours critiques et progressifs pour la détermination de ce qui, dans l'experience doit être tenue pour réel. L'objet de l'histoire des sciences est donc un objet non donné là, un objet à qui l'inactement est essentiel. En aucune façon est-elle histoire naturelle d'un objet culturel. Trop souvent, elle est faite comme une histoire naturelle, parce qu'elle indentifie la science avec les savants, et les savants avec leurs biographies civiles et académiques, ou bien parce qu'elle identifie la science avec les résultats pédagogiques actuels. (Canguilhem page 18 1978)

This is the approach which Foucault grafted onto the Human Sciences.

31. Canguilhem was critical of Anglo-Saxon historians. He saw their discussions as centred around whether to adopt the "internalist" or the "externalist" approach to history. The externalist position, according to Canguilhem, is a kind of impoverished Marxism. It isolates the social and economic factors which might affect scientific development. The internalist position, on the other hand, is a form of naive empiricism:

> L'externaliste voit l'histoire des sciences comme une explication d'un phenouéne de culture par le conditionment du milieu culturel global, et, par conséquent l'assimile à une sociologie naturaliste d'institutions, en negligeant entièrement l'interpretation d'un discours à pretension de vérités. L'internaliste voit dans les faits de découvertes simultanées (calcul infinitésimal, conservation d'énergie) des faits dont on ne peut faire l'histoire sans théorie. Ici par conséquent, le fait d'histoire des sciences est traité comme un fait de science selon une position épistémologique qui consiste à priviligier la théorie relativement au donné empirique. (Canguilhem page 15 1978)

32. The only two works are based on research from primary sources are:

> ...the practically unreadable Story of Bethlem Hospital by E. G. Donohue, published in 1914, and the practically unknown Bridewell and Bethlem section of the Charity Commissioner's Report of 1838 by F. O. Martin. (Allderidge page 17 1985)

> The throwaway nature of the Bethlem reference puts it firmly in the category of "well known facts", not to be lingered over, but dropped in for good measure, since everybody knows it, the scene will look more convincing if it is there; and I doubt whether many people would think it worthwhile even to question its accuracy. (Allderidge page 19 1985)

33.

> the governing elite... treated insanity as a medical problem. Asylums proliferated all over the country in the century after the English Revolution. This phenomenon was the consequence of a new consensus among the governing classes about how pauper lunatics should be treated. For the asylum movement was begun and sustained largely by private entrepreneurs with very little direction from the government. The dominance of medical therapies over other kinds of psychological healing was embodied in the regimens of private and public madhouses, and as their members grew more and more, mad people were subjected to physical restraint and confinement. (MacDonald page 230 1981)

34.

> The domination involved in moral treatment was thus the most powerful of all - not force ensuring submission but authority assuming mastery - a contestation in a moral space in which the madman is bent to the will of the doctor and comes to accept this will as his own. (page 25 1985)

35.

> Such an analysis would not view power as some kind of monolithic and malign presence, to which we must oppose ourselves and which we must strive to abolish. Rather, it would analyse the power of psychiatry in terms of what it allows us to aspire, the new types of problem it allows us to conceive, the new types of solution it inserts into our reality. This broadens the focus of analysis from a concentration upon medicine and the mental hospital to a consideration of the development of techniques of social regulation animated by psychiatric themes. (Miller and Rose page 2 1986).

36. Like Foucault, Donzelot aimed to get away from:

> The epic register, that narrative loftiness where the inscription of meaning in history proceeds through the recounting of Manichean confrontations... (Donzelot page 7 1980)

CHAPTER SIX

ON NATIONALISM IN EDUCATION

*"We remain for the most part, however, woefully
ignorant about the adult education activity in
France, our nearest neighbour. It is perhaps
generally true that the basis of French thinking
and social living is more different from our own
than many countries further away" (Titmus page 1
1967)*

As Bourdieu (1979) emphasizes, education is a cultural
practice. In a study of the effects of social class on
student life, he describes how the assimilation of knowledge
is tied to "cultural values". This chapter will concern
itself with an outline of the different academic systems and
their goals. Subsequently, the differences between the
systems will be related to political factors. It begins by
exploring the properties of the curricula which foster the
two thought styles. The French interventionist State,
practicing a politic of intellectualism,' has created an
educational system geared towards the development of the
intellect and the mind, perpetuating the rationalist thought
style. Conversely, the non interventionist English State has
promoted a system which fosters empiricism.

Education is crucial to an understanding of the properties of the national styles and how these are perpetuated. This is why it is central to this thesis as a whole. The theory and practice of education is one of the most important ideological machines society possesses. Through its institutions, education attempts to inculcate certain qualities valued by the culture in question, by intellectually "shaping" individuals. What exactly is meant by such shaping is difficult to define. The definition most fitting to this thesis would be the creation of a symbolic system (Moehlman 1965), a "thought framework" which the individual uses to understand, and communicate about, the world around him. The case of education is interesting as every aspect of the French and English systems seems to cultivate the national thought styles of rationalism and empiricism respectively. The educational systems are structured by the societies in which they are embedded. Consequently, they embody certain cultural ideals, specific to their respective socio-cultural environments. This ensures that they provide the intellectual training necessary to perpetuate the thought styles, which are likewise a product of the different milieus (Bourdieu 1979). The factor responsible for the different structures of the French and English educational systems is the contrasting political structures of the two countries: a strong interventionist nation state in France and a weak non-interventionist one in England. This persistent disparity, the thesis has argued, helps account for the existence of

the two national thought styles and suitable institutional
environments to sustain them. Although I have written myself
out of this chapter, the discussion - particularly that part
of it concerned with curricula - is based on my personal
experience of the two systems: I have been educated in the
English and French systems. In this way, the following
chapter is a fitting end to a thesis which examines
academically, a phenomenon best understood through
experience.

A LOOK AT CONTRASTING EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS: THE CURRICULA AND
THEIR AIMS

Education in the Western world has changed through the ages
according to universal trends. The Middle Ages were
characterized by scholasticism and the Renaissance by
classicism. The seventeenth century, however, marked the
beginning of a period of modernization, leading to the
creation of national systems of education in the eighteenth,
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although differences
between the systems existed previously, it is in the later
centuries that they became pronounced. That these trends are
universal within the Western world is not disputed, but the
argument is that with this synchronic movement across the
centuries, there has been a diachronic contrast in each
culture: specific codes of practice, promoting national
features of thought. Culturally specific codes are a product
of local socio-political factors and of the thought styles

generated by these milieus. The codes are consensual in that they are agreed sets of practices and values between those who teach and those who are taught (Bourdieu 1979). These local codes, unlike the general trends, have remained relatively stable over the centuries, perpetuating a national mind in the Durkheimian sense, and a concomitant national thought style.[*]

Rationalism, it has been argued, is a style of thought characterized by a structured, systematic and theoretical approach to knowledge. It goes beyond immediately available (perceptual) evidence to general underlying principles, symbols and structures. This is accompanied by an interest in language and rhetoric, necessary to express the complicated ideas rationalism generates. Empiricism, by contrast, manifests an aversion to formal academicism and theoretical speculation. Intuition and imagination are two fortes of a more perceptual form of intelligence, favouring impressionistic explanations and concerned with the practical aspects of knowledge. Educational strategies with different goals and values, translated into curricular differences, are responsible for perpetuating these features. That of the French is geared towards cultivating the intellect and the mind and thus is rationalist in the traditional philosophical sense of the word. A consistent feature of its English counterpart has been the holistic development of persons which, Dancy argues, has had an adverse effect on English education:

> *The whole stress on character has inevitably been at the*
> *expense of intellect, and has resulted in an amateur,*
> *empirical and anti-scientific approach which is out of place*
> *in a technical age. (Dancy in Halls page 5 1967)*

The contrasting goals of the two systems is a frequent

discussion point in the education literature. French

education is based upon the belief that everything is a

function of the mind:

> *It is not the function of secondary education to prepare*
> *pupils who have a definite profession in mind nor even to*
> *point them towards one or other of the great intellectual*
> *roots in which the activities of man deploy themselves. It*
> *does something more and better: its task is, without*
> *preparing for anything specific, to make pupils apt for*
> *everything. It forges in them, with the care and diligence*
> *of the artist, conscious of the surprising difficulty of his*
> *task, the powerful and delicate tool for their future*
> *conquests, that is, a vigorous and fine intellect, ready for*
> *all the beautiful adventures of the mind... (Kandel page 19*
> *1931)*

> *Education, [in France] indeed, has been almost exclusively*
> *an intellectual adornment, but it has consistently developed*
> *praiseworthy skills in the use of words and in self*
> *expression, a realm of accomplishment in which the French*
> *have no peers. (Kneller in Moehlman page 192 1965)*

The English stress is on the "whole man" and on "character".

Indeed, English educational goals have never been conceived

uniquely in terms of nurturing "intellectual qualities":

> *We have always so far seen education as being chiefly*
> *concerned with the all round development of persons and not*
> *merely as a matter of instruction of classes. The survival*
> *of this vital and fundamental idea is something in which we*
> *can take an immense pride. (Miller page 60 1951)*

The aim of the new national curriculum is still to provide an all round education furnishing the individual with the necessary skills to take his place in society.

These different educational patterns have historical roots, dating back at least to the seventeenth century with philosophers such as Locke and Condillac.[4] Furthermore, educational differences appear to be firmly established in the top educational institutions of both countries - public schools and Lycées. Public schools embody:

> *The good old tradition of godliness and good learning was overlayed in Victorian times by the cult of Muscular Christianity which laid stress on character training (which mainly meant organized games to the detriment of hard work). (Morrich page 52 1963)*

Academic work was, and still is, conceived as another "form of discipline", the implicit assumption being that a pupil "should work hard;...that he should play hard;...that he should attend Chapel" (Wilson page 75 1961). The Lycées implement a policy of rigid academicism, where:

> *The function of the teaching staff, by contrast, is solely to teach... intellectual discipleship, the devotion that Alain for example, inspired in his pupils, most certainly exists. But the 'pastoral relationship' that exists between master and pupil in many English academic schools is conspicuously absent. This may be no bad thing, for it concentrates attention, particularly in the top forms, on study. The highly qualified "agrégé", who enters his classroom, delivers a brilliant lesson, and departs again as the next hour is striking - for he is not obliged to stay on the school premises beyond the fifteen hours actual teaching he is committed to give -... (Halls page 118 1965)*

In England, the attention to pastoral activities goes hand in hand with a focus on character. That these differences are entrenched in the top institutions is important because, as Bourdieu (1979) notes, all teaching of culture (even scientific culture), presupposes a body of knowledge, skills, and modes of expression which constitute the heritage of the cultivated classes (Bourdieu page 21 1979).

The French curriculum stresses the study of non-utilitarian disciplines such as the classics and philosophy which are thought best to develop the highly valued thinking skills. It embodies both Cartesian and classical ideals, giving it the necessary properties to foster the rationalist thought style (Prost 1968, Bourdieu 1979). Its rationalism is manifested in the form of an emphasis on abstracting general principles/types from specific instances, as well as an interest in universals as opposed to specifics. The encyclopaedic nature of the curriculum is designed to produce a holistic perspective and generate the impression of unity in knowledge, another Cartesian ideal (Halls 1965). The classical legacy can be seen in the importance given to expression, rhetoric and the ability to structure and present a good argument. Practical subjects, such as typing and woodwork – domestic sciences and other crafts play no part in the French curriculum – were offered as GCE subjects in England. In France, they are reserved for those unable to cope with the more demanding academic subjects who are isolated in a separate stream at sixteen. The English system

guards against a rigidly academic approach to knowledge. The newly implemented national curriculum - not implemented until recently because of fears that it would curb "creative" teaching - has introduced the GCSE exam as an alternative to the more theoretically orientated 'O' levels.[5] It emphasizes to an even greater degree the importance of guided discovery and the practical aspect of knowledge. This is manifested by the centrality of original project work to the exam. Furthermore, suggestions to parents as to how they can help with their childrens' education included 1) for primary school children, buying plants and animals so that children can learn about "the conditions necessary for healthy living" and 2) discussing health matters with secondary school children and allowing them to take decisions concerning their families' diet and recreation.[6] It is more important for a French child to learn his times tables and his grammar than to explore what constitutes the healthy living conditions of plants and animals. Finally, the compartmentalization of the English system, or the pigeon-holing of knowledge - which contrasts with the French encyclopaedic approach - is another feature promoting empiricism (Halls 1965, Capelle 1967).

French education is founded on the Cartesian assumption that any problem can be solved using the power of reason. Children are thus taught *l'art de bien penser* i.e. how to reason correctly using abstract principles (Halls 1965, Prost 1968). This *art de bien penser* is merely one of the

"arts" that a child must master. The others are *l'art de persuader, l'art de bien dire et de bien écrire,* the classical emphasis on rhetorical prowess. *L'art de persuader* refers to the correct and fine usage of the French tongue. These various arts are part of the more general *culture de l'esprit* and, recently, *culture générale,* an intrinsic part of French educational philosophy. The definition of *culture générale,* according to Georges Duhamel, was "a totality of notions not susceptible to immediate application", and to Herriot (1927) was "what remains when all else has been forgotten" i.e. general intellectual powers or learning how to learn. This brings to mind the difference between expression and conceptual manipulation which has been stressed by English authors when writing about their French colleagues (Harland 1985, Bowie 1979, Benvenuto and Kennedy 1984, Turkle 1978), and also explains Mckie's (1952) reference to the chemist. Lavoisier's mastery of the French language. A theory like Lacan's requires a certain kind of literary performance, and indeed Lacan's discourse is full of clever word play and other literary devices (Bowie 1979). It also helps to explain the conceptual fluency I was trying to capture when comparing Foucault and his English followers, as well as the eloquence of the French students I interviewed. These arts are best cultivated by what are collectively known as *Les études desinteressées* or non-utilitarian studies which includes classics, philosophy and nowadays languages – also grouped under the alternative heading of *Les lettres.* They were, and to a great extent

still are, thought to be better for the development of "l'esprit", than empirical sciences such as physics and chemistry. Against these various "arts", one can juxtapose the pragmatic English approach of the 3 R's - reading, 'riting and 'rithmetic - to which the 3 A's have been added - age, aptitude and ability. Pragmatism in educational knowledge has been a feature of English education, even in elitist institutions such as public schools. The importance of useful learning and of giving a good all round education, was stressed in the nineteenth century by the Headmaster of Rugby and educational reformer, Thomas Arnold[7] (in Kandel 1931). Intelligence is cultivated in accordance with this pragmatism (Morris 1951).[8]

The emphasis on disinterested studies was codified by Napoleon. During the Napoleonic era, classicism was at its height because of the political analogy between the French and Roman Empire. Although he "liked" the Physical Sciences, they represented a partial application of the mind. The study of "letters", however, was a complete education. Philosophy nurtures the powers of thought and expression, promoting the ability to "synthesize and arrange material verbally into new and interesting ways" (Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986). As Bowie (1979) points out, Lacan's genius lies in his ability to capture using only a few linguistic concepts what Freud needed several models for. In recent years, there have been moves in France to reduce the number of hours that pure philosophy occupies in the curriculum.

However, this has been done by integrating it into the study of the French language through the writings of men such as Pascal, Voltaire and Baudelaire. This has meant that children from the age of fourteen become acquainted with their philosophical heritage. It should be noted that the philosophy syllabus does, however, encompass German writers, most recently Freud. Hence the French students use of philosophical/psychoanalytic explanations in their discussion of mental illness. Through textual analysis, pupils become aware of the underlying philosophical structure of the text as well as the core ideas, an approach differing from the study of literature in England which centres around revealing the logic of the narrative drama. In depth analysis tends to be psychological in nature, i.e. character analysis. Taking into account what was said about the differences in literature, both approaches seem appropriate to their respective subject matter. It is interesting to speculate to what extent this training develops a predisposition towards explaining issues in individualistic/psychological terms as opposed to broader/social terms, typical of the two traditions of social discourse.

The classics in France and Britain are, to a certain extent, retained as status symbols. In this capacity, they are now only taught extensively in the top British institutions. The English ultilitarian approach abandoned them much earlier as part of general secondary education. The sciences were

favoured over humanities, because of their practical utility in an increasingly industrial age. This change occurred without any of the heated debates on "modernization" which took place on the Continent (Prost 1968). In the new English national curriculum, sciences assume an even greater importance. The "core" subjects to be taught in secondary schools are English, mathematics and the sciences.[*] In France, classics have been more important both because of their potential in the "education of the mind" and because classicism has become ingrained in French culture through its past use as a political tool. Interestingly, Bourdieu (1979) comments that:

> *It is known, for example, that educational achievement is strongly dependent on the (real or apparent) ability to manipulate the abstract language of ideas and that the students most successful in this area are those who have studied Greek and Latin. (Bourdieu page 14 1979)*

Mckie (1952) remarks on how classics were an excellent preparation for a scientific mind like Lavoisier's, and Hartley (1971) refers to his general intellectual skills which were a product of this education.

The tendency towards analysis initiated by the study of Latin and the classics, is now retained in the very French notion of *explication de textes*, the drawing out of general ideas from a mass of detail, a characteristic of rational thought mirrored in French educational principles:

> *L'enseignement français, d'autre part, ne se propose que des buts universels; les vérités générales sont seules objets d'enseignement. Derrière les cas particuliers, on cherche*

> *les lois et les types, et il est vrai qu'abstraire et*
> *généraliser sont deux opérations fondamentales. (Prost page*
> *339 1968)*

These have been consistent features of French thinking and were particularly well illustrated in the chapter on the Human Sciences in rational collectivism, although they were also a feature of Lamarck's approach to biology. The importance of general, universal laws, governed Comtes' choice of physics as a science on which his sociology had to be modelled. The analytic tendency is evident in areas as diverse as nineteenth century science and twentieth century Foucauldian archaeology.

Classicism is manifested in a more subtle way in the teaching of French essay writing. The student is taught precise rules of composition, to construct an argument and present his ideas in a coherent, logical form. Great stress is put on the structure of the essay, and when the student is beginning to master the art of writing a *dissertation*, half the marks are awarded for structure and organization, the rest is devided between originality, spelling/punctuation and any other factors which the teacher deems important. This kind of training enhances the capacity to present a coherent verbal argument which again contributes to the conceptual fluency of the French. In England, teachers are, at the GCSE stage especially, given to emphasizing the importance of creative, imaginative thinking in essay writing. Before being creative, the French

child has to have a near perfect grasp of the language and the structural principles of composition. The importance of structure is also evident in the overwhelming concern for the grammatical principles of the French language, a subject sadly neglected in Britain. It is taught so rigorously, that by the end of the first three years of secondary school, the child has learnt the conjugations of all French verbs by heart, even those which are no longer in use.

Although Napoleon classified mathematics alongside the Physical Sciences, in practice it has persistently been judged more important, since it nurtures clear logical thought, *l'esprit Pascalian*. In the final year of the scientific stream, *baccalauréat C*, mathematics was awarded nine hours a week as opposed to the six alloted to the sciences of chemistry and physics.[10] Maths and classics may seem an extremely dull and dry combination, but interest is considered secondary to training, and anyway, it can be derived from deep understanding of the subject matter in question (Halls 1965). Capelle (1967) - a high official in the Ministry of Education - elaborated on the significance of the "three communicators" - mathematics, the mother tongue and foreign languages. Mathematics was important because it was the symbolic language of science. All foreign languages, ancient and modern, provided an essential insight into other cultures - French children now start learning another modern language from the age of six. Languages, whether scientific or otherwise, are important because they

are the symbol systems within which thinking occurs. Hence Lavoisier's emphasis on finding the suitable language to structure chemistry.

As mentioned above and previously in chapter three, mathematics as the language of science is accorded priority over the more empirical sciences - chemistry is the lowest ranking of all the physical sciences because it was the least systematic and most experimental. Furthermore, when practical scientific disciplines are taught, they are moulded to suit rationalist ideals. Taking the example of technology, children do not acquire this form of knowledge by linking it to a specific occupation as one would expect in a more empirical approach. When the teaching of technology appeared in French schools in the nineteen sixties, it was taught as a collection of general concepts with a limited amount of practical work. It was an approach which demonstrated foresight: as industrial practices were changing so rapidly, there was little point in extensive applied study. The thinking behind it was that:

> ...technology no longer belongs to the training or empiricism of an out-of-date artisan system. It has a rich and active potential both in the scientific training of young people and in their education as human beings. (Capelle page 98 1967)

Capelle goes so far as to state that technology is the new form of humanism, infinitely creative and proof of great genius - he cites Leonardo da Vinci to illustrate his point. In technology, as in other areas of the curriculum, the

French educational system has been committed to combating empiricism and utilitarianism:

> *L'enseignment technique, par example, n'imagine pas qu'on puisse passer à la pratique avant un cours, qui l'éclaire et la fonde. Dans le secondaire, l'enseignement du latin se refuse à la méthode empirique qui bornerait son ambition à lire sans relâche des textes: il va, dans sa forme ancienne, des règles à la langue par le thème, puis, après la réforme de 1880, il remonte des textes aux règles: dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la médiation rationelle est nécessaire. La même méthode est transposée à l'école primaire dans l'enseignement du français, et justifie l'importance accordée à l'analyse grammaticale... (Prost page 339 1968)*

Prost's remark betrays the familiar stress on theory over practice found in all rational thinking. The differences between English and French scientific education have a bearing on what was discussed in the science chapter – particularly the non-pragmatic orientation of French scientific knowledge and the stress on creativity and imagination in science in England. The new English science GCSE's stress creative, imaginative thinking which contrasts with the French praise of disciplined, ordered, logical reasoning using principles – a disparity which was evident in the chapter on science. Summarizing the differences between the old and the new exams, a student of the English public school Charterhouse claims that, in 1955, the answer to an 'O'level question, 'Compare and contrast an amoeba with a single cell of a *Spirogyra* was given by a boy as "The first one is flat like a poached egg, and the second one's cylindrical like a tin of beans". This infuriated his biology master and would have scored nothing at 'O'level. Now, however, the student maintains, it would have scored at

least four points at GCSE, demonstrating initiative, awareness of mathematical forms, culinary experience and knowledge of simile.''

The holistic rational approach as opposed to a narrower empirical one, a difference particularly salient in the sociologically orientated chapters, is reflected in an important aspect of the French curriculum: its encyclopaedic nature. It is the result of the Cartesian ideal which attributes importance to the unity of knowledge, facilitating a synthetic perspective. The latter is another necessary skill when thinking in holistic, collective terms, as opposed to "localized" or "narrow" individualism (Halls 1965). The English "narrow culture in depth" is unique and contrasts with the French idea of *culture générale.* It betrays the empirical ideal of categorizing and reducing everything to small distinct units, amenable to empirical study. The French aim, although admirable, means in practice that the sheer mass of knowledge to be accumulated compromizes the much cherished intellectual skills, and reduces learning to memorization by rote. Critical thinking is encouraged, contributing to an originality of thought in those bright enough to cope with the work load - original thinking should be distinguished from the imaginative thinking described as typical of empiricism, as it refers to the clever manipulation of ideas in new and interesting ways, not to creative insight. However, many are reduced to extensive note-taking, and submerged under a mass of

material to be learnt. The style of presentation is of no
help here, usually relying on "abstraction and symbols"
(Halls page 138 1965). There is much to commend the training
of the *esprit*, although it is often the more utilitarian
approach which is able to tailor its needs to the
individual.'*

SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TWO SYSTEMS AND THEIR
VALUES

Nowhere does French intellectual elitism stand out better
than in the following statements of educational goals:

> *That an 'élite' is necessary it is not for democracy to
> deny; that an 'élite' is necessary not only to maintain the
> prestige of society, but for the direction of the nation –
> on this point, I believe we can come to an agreement. The
> object of secondary education is the intellectual training
> of an 'élite' which is destined to become directive and must
> be prepared for its social role. (Steeg (Secretary General)
> 1911 in Kandel page 212 1931)*

> *Our task, in fact, is constantly to create an 'élite'. I,
> for my part, feel that keenly. At a time when other forces,
> less noble, seek to establish themselves, the educational
> system has the glorious privilege of maintaining the
> prestige of the spirit, the sovereignty and independence of
> the idea. It has the duty of courageously teaching
> democracies that no greater danger menaces them than
> misunderstanding of the role of the 'élite', or, in other
> words, the danger of leveling downward. Our system by
> examinations and by competitions maintains the most
> justifiable method of recruiting... Is it not in the
> educational system that the republican ideal must be
> realized first, and hence spread through the whole state?
> (Herriot (Minister of Public Instruction) 1927 in Halls
> 1965)*

It is this intellectual elitism which is responsible for
perpetuating rational thinking, and explains why academic

education is so highly valued in French society. The prestige attributed to exam success - failure being regarded as a major disaster for any bourgeois family (Halls 1965) - testifies to the importance of French education. There is no denying that high standards of education are available in Britain for those who have the money and the inclination to study. However, perhaps because there have not been any officially recognized privileges attached to it, high intellectual training has not acquired the prestige it has in France or Germany. Kandel remarks that, whereas the Germans attach great value to knowledge and the French to the possession of a state certificate as evidence both of knowledge and culture, the English have always placed character and personality first (Kandel page 386 1931). French exam certificates are rightly highly valued, as they are obtained within a highly competitive system, which is designed to select academically brilliant students. On the issue of what role competitive examinations will play in the new English system, Wagg reports:

> *The School Examinations and Assessment Council which is responsible for testing aims is anxious to stress that tests aim to help children show what they can do, and diagnose weaknesses. However, some politicians, the Prime Minister included, want a more competitive pass/fail system. The first approach seems likely to dominate...(Wagg page 57 1989)*

The respective statuses of education - and of intellectualism in general - in France and in Britain, can be understood in terms of the contrasting political histories of the two countries. The meritocratic French

society, which has existed since the absolutist monarchy, seems to be at the root of the difference. During the period of absolutist development, the King created a centralized state bureaucracy. It acted as a buffer between him and heriditary nobility, freeing him of their influence. This bureaucracy was - and still is - recruited on the basis of educational credentials, from the middle classes or bourgeoisie:

> As a consequence institutions of higher education in society took on the function of training candidates for state service; as a result of this the status of elite education increased to the extent that its possessors came to see it as, in Mannheim's words, 'an honorific substitute for nobility of birth'. (Hickox page 264 1977)

Education thus enabled the bourgeoisie to achieve a prestige and status equivalent to that of the traditional nobility, by providing access to state offices. Indeed, France had a tradition of ennobling its civil servants, creating a host of "noblesses", in contrast to the English single category of the Landed Gentry.[15] The relationship between the state and the bureaucracy was a symbiotic one in the sense that the bureaucrats derived power and prestige from their alliance with the state, and the latter freed itself from pressures of the hereditary nobility. It housed these intellectual bureaucrats in glamorous institutions, where they were guaranteed high academic standards through rigorous training. This elite and its institutions were thus transformed into instruments of state glorification (these points have been highlighted in chapters two and three).

Today it is the role of the prestigious *Grandes Ecoles* of Paris to educate this bureaucracy. Academic qualifications have retained their significance, and Bourdieu in 1979 points out that:

> ...what academic qualification guarantees is something much
> more than, and different from, the right to occupy a
> position and the capacity to perform the corresponding job.
> In this respect the diploma (*titre scolaire*) is more like a
> patent of nobility (*titre de noblesse*) than the title to
> property(*titre de propriété*) which strictly technical
> definitions make of it. (Bourdieu page 81 1979)

In Britain, however, the comparatively haphazard development of an intellectual tradition can be linked to the failure to evolve a separate middle class education linked to a centralized state bureaucracy. This "may ultimately reflect the fact that Britain did not go through the absolutist phase of nation state development" (Hickox page 265 1977). Furthermore, when a state bureaucracy was created in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was a modified version of the Continental model, developed in a contrasting social context. Thus different qualities were favoured by the competitive examinations for entry into the civil service. While appearing to give advantage to academic merits, they selected for the characteristics produced by public schools, in other words, those traditionally associated with the English gentleman - general, practical intelligence, moral integrity and strength of character. (Dancy 1963, Kalton 1966).

As chapter three indicated, state patronage in France created a space where academic research could be conducted away from purely utilitarian concerns. This explains the non pragmatic approach to knowledge seen in French educational notions such as *études désinteressées*. The importance of academic intellectualism was captured in Hahn's (1971) remark concerning French institutions cited in chapter three, and is reiterated by Bourdieu (1979). He underlines the importance of academicism and sheds further light on the origins of the characteristics of the French approach to study:

> *Adherence to the values implied in the academic hierarchy of performances is so strong that individuals can be seen to be drawn towards the school careers or competitions most highly valued by the educational system, independently of their personal aspirations or aptitudes. This is one of the factors in the otherwise often inexplicable attraction exerted by the aggrégation and the grandes écoles, and more generally by abstract disciplines to which great prestige is attached. Perhaps it is the same principle that inclines French academics and intellectuals in general to assign the highest value to works in which the theoretical ambition is most manifest. (Bourdieu page 69 1979)*

This is why it is so important for intellectuals such as Lacan to get their theories introduced into a university setting. The centrality of education to French society led to its being incorporated into the very meaning of democracy.[14] This legitimized state control in an area which was to be the key to the liberty of French Republicans. An example of how state control in France contrasts with its absence in England is usefully illustrated by the current discussions concerning the national curriculum. Since Henry

IV in 1586, the French State has increased its control over what is taught in educational institutions. Because of the strength of the private sector and public opposition on the grounds of academic freedom, state intervention was, until recently, unthinkable in Britain (Kandel 1931). It was a similar situation to that which had existed in nineteenth century English science. Changes are now being implemented, but the Ministry of Education in Britain still does not have the same powers as its French counterpart. This is due to the fact that it must still communicate with local educational authorities which are responsible for the recruitment of teachers and the financing and implementations of policies in schools.[15]

THE PERVASIVENESS OF RATIONALISM AND EMPIRICISM IN EDUCATION

The political structures have produced different educational practices, permeated by empiricism and rationalism. Three areas have been chosen to illustrate this: educational planning, educational thinking, and teacher training. These practices mirror the thought styles, in particular the rationalist insistence on academic, theoretical structuralism and the empirical resistance to theory and emphasis on pragmatic "learning from experience". The contrasting approaches to education are usually attributed to philosophical differences. It is, however, essential to see them in their socio-political contexts. Here, it is clear that educational practices nurture the thought styles

which in turn perpetuate the practices. More generally, one can conclude that the thought styles are structured by specific cultural universes and sustained in appropriate institutional settings. The thought styles then replicate these settings, ensuring their continuity and the creation of a "tradition of thought".

Although both systems have undergone many changes, commentators have consistently remarked on both the structure in French education and the lack of it in its British counterpart. Schueler (in Moehlmann 1965) refers to the lack of pattern in English education, and Miller (1951) in "The Pioneers of English Education" is visibly proud that, in Britain, the priority has been to provide institutions not develop principles. The British approach is pragmatic, striving to provide enough good schools for every child not producing a system which is completely systematic. Institutions are valued because they are effective, not because they conform to a rationale. Hence the plethora of educational establishments to be found in this country - grammar, private (public) and comprehensive schools. This contrasts sharply with the unity which has characterized the French system since Napoleon - Jesuit school structure was at the root of this policy of centralization. The bureaucratic, pyramidal structure of French education is often presented in the older literature, as the result of the Cartesian mind and its obsession with logical processes (Halls 1965, Kneller in Moehlmann 1965). The central control

that the Ministry of education exerts over the system is responsible for this order and structure. The regulations which it issues covers all aspects of education: when subjects are taught and the number of hours they must be taught for, the teaching methods, the prescribed texts and exercise books which are to be used. At the beginning of each term, parents are supplied with a list which prescribes the number and type of exercise book which are required in each subject. The new English national curriculum allows teachers to choose their own teaching methods and materials.

The idea of a rational versus empirical approach to education occurs frequently in the literature on educational planning. Systematic rationalism replaces one set of prethought-out structures by another when the first set has proved ineffective, whilst the British rely on gradual changes and reluctance to revolt. Hence Miller's (1951) reference to English education as "a movement" rather than "a system". It is tempting to offer the idea of a gradual Darwinian evolutionary approach as opposed to a Lamarckian development by successive revolutions. In 1924, Graves referred to the "gradual" evolution of British education: the French tendency "to cut short the social and educational processes and to substitute revolution for evolution" did not accord well with the British mentality (Graves page 33 1924). Forty years later, Halls made similar observations. The weakness of French Cartesianism, he claims, is that old institutions are destroyed when new ones are created. On the

other hand, English empiricism modifies old institutions so that there is a danger that their "whole structure may in time become so ramshackle as to be ineffective" (Halls page 18 1965). We are witnessing the disadvantages of English empiricism's "gradual" approach: the chaos which has accompanied the implementation of the national curriculum. In France, the new structures have the same characteristic formalism (Prost 1968). Hahn (1971) makes an interesting remark concerning the origins and potential usefulness of the French commitment to structure - structure not only being a feature of the educational community, but also of the artistic and scientific ones:

> *This penchant for the classical 'values' of order and structure may be the counterweight necessary to offset France's frequent and radical political changes. (Hahn page 318 1971)*

Structure and order is the result of state planning in France, and has been avoided in Britain.' What is interesting is the way that the adjectives "empirical" and "Cartesian" are used to describe different approaches to education. In fact, the terms convey a totally different politics of education which is related to the role education has played in the different political societies. Not being of such central importance in England, education - secondary education at least - was dominated by the private sector (Graves 1927, Kandel 1931). This is why any attempts at reform, made by the government, were slow and gradual. Conversely, the considerable state planning in France can be

linked to the acceptability of state control in an area too important to be left to chance development. The first "plan" was conceived to cover the post-war period, and was designed to ensure that education received its fair share of the civil budget.

Another piece of evidence exemplifying the importance of education in French life is the early development of an academic field concerned with theoretical issues – *Pédagogie*. It has a long history (Lapie 1927), further evidence of education's centrality to French culture. Philosophers, throughout the centuries, have preoccupied themselves with ideas on how to educate children. Intellectualism is characteristic of the theorizing in this academic area, which developed separately from psychology. Rousseau's philosophy, for example, is at the root of the concept of "cycle", an intrinsic part of the national system, conveying his idea that education has to be structured in distinct stages (Lapie 1927). However, despite certain practical applications, the separate theoretical development of the field has meant that it has fallen pray to a rationalist trait: indulging in discussions with sister academic disciplines instead of influencing praxis. Miller's (1951) claim that the English are not a nation of great educational thinkers, is seconded by Morris in the introduction to this volume. Indeed, the essays indicate that British educational thought has been tied to the pragmatics of social reform – betraying its strong

philanthropic roots - and was not conceived as an academic discipline. Consequently, educational thought has accorded priority to practical needs, such as those created by expansion, and not to educational theories or plans. Key educationalists have included the civil servant Shuttleworth and the utilitarian philosopher Bentham. Shuttleworth played a central role in the establishment of a national program of education which was to rescue the nation's children from squalor and disorder.[?] The strong link between social and educational theory perhaps explains why the British educational system has been "forged on the anvil of social necessity" (Miller in Judges page 47 1951), and not planned out using first principles as the rationalist approach would have it - again there are parallels to be drawn with the development of the scientific communities dealt with in chapter three. A case in point is the creation of the comprehensive schools to achieve a social and political end, as well as an educational one: namely the breaking down of class barriers (Burgess 1983).

The empirical and rational practices govern teacher training - an important area because teachers are part of the machinery responsible for perpetuating the intellectual traditions (Bourdieu 1979). In England, not only is the training more practical - the one year postgraduate course is heavily biased towards teaching practice - but the thinking behind its organization is as well. In 1962, three objectives were decided upon to improve teaching standards:

1) to increase the teaching force 2) to fill the need for a flexible teaching force, adaptable to educational developments and 3) to produce a high quality teaching force (Richmond 1971). The institutional framework and courses were organized around these propositions, high quality being ensured by a considerable degree of practical experience. In France, training is much more theoretically orientated and geared towards academic excellence. The teaching profession, like other civil service functions, is highly structured. Its priorities are to maintain rigorous academic standards in its teaching force through competitive examinations - *capes, aggrégation* - necessary to produce the educators of the élite. The *concours d'aggrégation*, governing the recruitment of teachers, is an initiation rite during which the teachers are transformed into "civic minded state missionaries" (Descombes 1980). These future educators occupy a more prestigious social position than their English counterparts, in keeping with their more important function. This again reflects the different statuses given to education in the two countries.

CONCLUSION

This chapter constitutes a fitting end to the thesis. Not only does it give an insight into the origins of the thought styles and how they are maintained, but it once again emphasizes how intimately linked the styles are to their

respective cultural milieus. The educational communities/practices of the two countries - like the scientific ones - display features mirroring their thought styles. A rigidly structured framework, geared towards producing a highly cultured intellectual "élite", can be contrasted with an unstructured one, based upon empirical considerations, whose ideal is to produce the well balanced all rounder. The educational structures, products of different socio-political environments, embody the ideals and values necessary to produce the characteristically English and French thought styles.

1. Intellectualism in this context can be defined as an overwhelming emphasis on the powers of the mind. Its reasoning/thinking powers are valued over learning through experience - i.e. guided discovering - imagination and creativity. As Kneller (1965) points out, in France students are taught to use their language with "polish" and "finesse". Moroever, the emphasis has been on moulding the mind into an "instrument of precision and brilliance". This has meant that, in theory, French "pédagogie" has emphasized intelligence over knowledge, although in practice "subject matter" has become an important thing in itself. (Kneller in Moehlman 1965)

2. Durkheim, speaking about French education, says:

> *Au formalisme grammatical de l'époque Carolingienne, au formalisme dialectique de la scholastique, succède maintenant un formalisme d'un nouveau genre: c'est le formalisme litteraire. (Durkheim page 38 1938)*

3. That educational systems do differ nationally is humorously captured by Halls (1965), who refers to the English cult of the Gentleman, the German of the Spartan warrior and the French of the cultivated citizen, imbued with civic virtues. Halls' (1965) idea of nationalism in education is underlined by Lapie. In his book on French *Pédagogie*, he explicitly states:

> *La Pédagogie française, c'est la pédagogie de Rabelais et de Montaigne, de Décartes, de Port-Royal, de Fénélon, de Rousseau, de la Révolution, de Michelet et de Quinet, de Duney et de Jules Ferry (Lapie page 27 1926)*

French education, according to him, is thus deeply rooted in French thought.

4. Locke, for example displayed the same holistic approach:

> *Due care being had to keep the body in strength and vigour, so that it may be able to obey and execute the orders of the mind, the next and principle business is to set the mind right. (in Boyd page 23 1917)*

In France, Condillac emphasized the importance of rational capacities, his reasoning being:

> *that the faculty of reasoning appears as soon as our senses begin to develop; and that we have the use of our senses at an early age only because we have reasoned at an early age. (in Boyd page 33 1917)*

5. See the "Observer" colour supplement September 3ʳᵈ 1989.

6. The "Observer" colour supplement page 59 September 3rd 1989.

7. Arnold believed:

> *...that education should be, we think, to render the afterlife of the pupil most useful to society and most happy to himself; the next should be to render the life of the pupil as happy as possible. (in Kandel page 308 1931)*

8. Morris, in "The Pioneers of English Education", quotes with pride from the Consultative Committee report preceding the 1944 education act:

> *The forming and strengthening of character; the training of the tastes which will fill and dignify leisure; the awakening and guiding of the intelligence, especially on its practical side. These are the ends which we had in view... (Morris page 54 1951)*

9. The "core" subjects – English, mathematics and science – are to be distinguished from the "foundation subjects" – technology and design, history, geography, music, art, physical education, plus a modern foreign language. The difference between "core" and "foundation" subjects is that pupils will spend longer each week on core subjects. There will be additional time allocated for subjects outside the national curriculum – latin and the "technical and vocational initiatives".

10. These two paragraphs relate my own experience.

11. The Carthusian page 1 July 1989.

12. Finally, it is interesting to look at two views of national curricula which convey some of the points made above. The 1952 NUT report on the curriculum of secondary schools betrays the unfortunate divisions which occur in the English curriculum:

> *The conception of the curriculum as the sum of many isolated parts is an unfortunate development, especially as it leads a teacher to limit his teaching to a narrow "subject" field. The curriculum should move away from a restrictive subject treatment and towards integration. It should be "of a piece", its parts related, its whole having pattern, meaning and purpose. It is for this reason that we prefer to consider the content of the curriculum in terms of areas of activity rather than in terms of separate subjects. Though we believe that curriculum may be weakened by overcrowding or by the construction of artificial subject barriers, we desire that, within a simplified organization of the curriculum, a pupil may sample as wide a range of different forms of activity as possible. In a new activity, he may find an interest, a talent, an unsuspected opportunity for self-fulfilment and success, an enthusiasm which may lead him to new fields of worthwhile endeavour. (In Richmond page 76 1971)*

This can be compared with the much more Cartesian view expressed by Liard (1902), talking about the two "cultures" which had come to exist side-by-side:

> There are two types of culture, the classical and the scientific... Classical culture, which in France has been traditional since the Renaissance, and which has been one of our honours, one of our glories, teaches how to understand the full meaning of words and their exact relation to ideas, to arrange them with beauty and correctness, to appreciate the sentiments of the soul in their most delicate shades of meaning, to marshal words in varieties of expression corresponding to the infinite variety of sentiments, to appreciate and to have a taste for the most varied forms of beauty, to see in every question that which is general and human. Finally, it transmits from age to age, through the classical texts and the works of philosophers an old fund of truths, of wisdom, of generosity which are the heritage of centuries that have gone to new stages of thinking and feeling humanity.
> Side by side with this culture, there has gradually found a place, with the continued progress of the sciences, scientific culture in the large sense of the word. This too, whether it be history, geography, mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural history, teaches how to combine ideas, but in their necessary or real relations. Its end is the establishment of facts, the knowledge of the laws which unite them, in a word, the proof of the truths that result. It is an instrument of method, of precision, of exactness, of discipline, individual and collective; it reveals his power to man and shows him its extent and limits; at the same time it is in its way philosophy, and if the bold interpretation of metaphysicians are unknown to it, it teaches that all phenomena, even though seriously contradictory, are bound together by constant relations and that by the network of its laws, the world is harmony and unity. (Board of Education, Special Report on Educational Subjects page 206 1911 in Halls 1965)

13. To give a few categories cited in the French encyclopaedia Larousse: a) La noblesse de cloche, a title acquired on becoming a mayor; b) La noblesse de robe, in charge of court finances; c) La noblesse d'épée, hereditary nobility.

14. The *baccalauréat* was conceived to embody the French, republican ideal of equality:

> As regards philosophy, to sit the baccalauréat consists in ... on the same day, at the same time, hour and for the same length of time, all candidates are required to commit similarly worded answers to identical sheets of paper in response - until quite recently - to a single question drawn from the Syllabus. (Descombes page 3 1980)

15. In France, local delegates are directly responsible to Paris and the Ministry. In theory the Minister of education controls all appointments, prescribes syllabuses, timetables, examination and teaching methods. Napoleon III's minister is famous for boasting that all the children in the land were doing a latin unseen at the same time. In England, it has been the responsibility of the head teacher to devise curricula and decide on teaching methods, and it is still the function the local authority to sack and appoint teachers. Even after the instalment of the national curriculum, the English State will not

have the same extensive control over education as its French counterpart. This is because it still will not have any control over what is taught in the numerous private schools, and there are no plans to abolish the local educational authorities. Furthermore, there are differences between the curricula themselves. Although the core and foundation subjects are alloted a fixed number of hours, there is time to study other subjects outside the curriculum. In France, only subjects which form part of the national curriculum are provided in schools. Teachers in England will have to teach the prescribed subject for the prescribed number of hours to ensure that their pupils will pass the state exams. However, "creative" teaching will not be compromized. They can decide what teaching skills are appropriate and choose their own teaching materials. In France, these are precribed centrally. This combined with the teacher training - not aimed at developing creative teachers, but ones responsible for producing the next generation of intellects - ensures that teaching methods are relatively uniform.

16. This planning helps 1) to anticipate the proportion of the budget necessary to education and 2) to structure the system in order to increase its economic efficiency. The rationale behind this idea of planning, according to Halls, is partly philosophical:

> *French rationality loves to construct theoretically new forms of social institutions by first setting up new frameworks deduced from first principles. This ultimate Cartesianism is diametrically opposed to English Empiricism, in which all institutions are in perpetual evolution and are being constantly modified by experience. (Halls page 52 1965)*

17. Shuttleworth was of the opinion:

> *If they [the working class] are to have knowledge, surely it is part of a wise and virtuous government to do all in its power to secure to them useful knowledge and to guard against pernicious opinions. (in Judges page 112 1951)*

A sharp contrast to the French ideal of education for equality as expressed by Gal (1956):

> *We term ourselves democrats, but we allow the majority of our children to be deprived of the knowledge, methods and qualities which would allow them not be second-class citizens, a slave to propagandists, or merely indifferent to and uncomprehending of the world which is being created. Democracy will not exist without a genuine education of all its citizens. (Gal page 35 1956 in Halls 1965)*

CONCLUSION

*The most interesting witness of English life, about 1850, is
Ralph Waldo Emerson... Time and again, it will be seen, he
picks out traits which seem eternally typical of the English
and which have therefore found their various places in this
book. There is no better summing up of his arguments than in
his words. 'The practical common sense of modern society...
is the natural genius of the British mind." "The bias of the
nation is a passion for utility'. 'The English mind turns
every abstraction it can receive into a portable utensil'.
'The Englishman has acute perceptions', but 'shrinks from
generalizations'. He has a firm 'belief in the existence of
two sides' and 'a supreme eye to facts'. But the logic of
Englishmen is a logic that 'brings salt to soup... oar to
boat. Their mind is not dazzled by its own means, but locked
and bolted to results'. 'They have difficulty bringing their
reason to act, and on all occasions use their memory first'.
There is, in 'this all-preserving island', a dreg of inertia
which resists reform in every shape. 'Every one of the
islanders is an island himself, safe, tranquil,
incommunicable'. He is 'never betrayed into any curiosity or
unbecoming emotion'. 'Inspiration' to him 'is only some
blowpipe or a fine mechanical aid'. (Pevsner page 202 1954)*

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of the thesis, an analogy between thought

styles and social representations was used. The more

important points that emerged from the comparison included

1) the origins of thought styles in, and specificity to,

certain socio-cultural environments and 2) the permanence of

the thought styles through accumulated historical weight.

One aspect of the social milieus which seems to be crucial

to an explanation of the differences between the rational

and empirical thought styles is their contrasting political

structures. The thought styles outlined in this thesis are shaped by socio-political environments, which perpetuate them. Their continued existence is ensured by embedding them in institutions, which embody the necessary values to sustain them. These are the values of the social milieu generating the thought style in question - values which produce the rationalist bias towards disinterested knowledge and empiricism's pragmatism. Hence the idea of historical weight, acquired through this self perpetuating system. The historical continuity of the thought styles is also captured in the complex sociological phenomenon of a tradition of thought, described in chapter one. The suggestion was made at the end of the first chapter that certain perspectives generated by particular thought styles can be incorporated into another tradition of thought. Theorists draw on a set of inherited resources to modify the perspectives in accordance with their national thought style. These imports are then often used as form of critique of national practices. In painting, the Impressionists, for example, adopted some of Turnerian practices to modify the inheritance of Delacroix and David. Yet, they still retained some of the basic qualities of their native tradition.

The idea of thought styles as distilled from thought-environment complexes helps to explain why, despite the use of blanket terms such as empiricism and rationalism, the manifestations of the thought styles have been described as two clusters of characteristics. The terms attributed to

them retain their philosophical meanings. In the case of empiricism, this involves adhering to evidence of the senses. In the case of rationalism, the emphasis is on the use of the mind in reasoning systematically with the help of a priori principles. However, the philosophical definitions have to be transcended to capture the styles completely. Empiricism is associated with features such as pragmatism, amateurishness and a love of what appears to be concrete, manifested in social theory as individualism (Quinton 1982, Harland 1985). Rationalism, on the other hand, is coupled with an academic intellectualism, professionalism and collectivism (Bourdieu 1979, Quinton 1982). In fact, the thought styles embody the features valued by their respective socio-political environments, confirming the importance of the latter in structuring them. The inseparability of the social and the psychological, implied in Bourdieu's (1979) idea of internalizing social structures — an idea crucial to the understanding of thought styles — explains why many of the features of the thought styles are manifested at both levels. This dual manifestation has led to references to the "Cartesian" approach to education and "rationalist" French society. This choice of terminology is designed to capture the omnipresence of "structure" in French society — mirroring structured French thought — which is often related to the rationalist philosophical bias towards planning from first principles (Halls 1965). In the education chapter, the structured, Cartesian educational

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practices were contrasted with an empirical unstructured approach, emphasizing the value of pragmatic experience.

The idea of thought styles, developed in the thesis, makes explicit how the reasoning about, and conceptualization of, what would seem to be the same ideas, differs within the two traditions. That thought styles affect conceptualization is evident both in the Natural and Human Sciences. The former is perhaps more surprising because of the assumption that the Natural Sciences transcend cultural barriers. But, as we saw, the different traditions of thought precluded agreement between the two chemists, Dalton and Berthollet, on how to formulate atomic theory. Examples of differences in conceptualization in the Human Sciences include the Hobbesian/Spencerian and Comtian/Durkheimian ideas of the state and the Rousseauian and Lockean ideas of social contract. For Hobbes, the English State was an impermanent organism, capable of being dismantled as soon as its usefulness had been spent. For Comte, it had a much more integral nature, possessing an intrinsic morphology which the discipline of sociology was conceived to analyze. The crucial factor to Locke's social contract was the agreement between individuals. For Rousseau, it was the creation of a social entity, a "being", which was separate from the individual social agents. These contrasting interpretations reflect the underlying differences in the socio-political milieus. For instance, the strength of the interventionist French State is translated into unity and integrality,

whilst in the non-interventionist Anglo-Saxon State, it is translated into impermanence. More recent differences exist between the concepts of the ego/self outlined by the two traditions. The empirical thought style describes a stable entity, of use in articulating individual experience. This contrasts with the amorphous rational subject, particularly common in twentieth century French writings, and not required to serve any empirical purpose. Again, these different conceptions reflect different political values, notably the strong ideology of individualism of Anglo-Saxon countries which, since Locke, have concentrated on the individual and his liberties. These contrasting formulations of the state and the ego within the two traditions, outlined in chapters four and five, serve to emphasize how the thought styles give rise to discourses which describe their respective cultural environments. It has been argued that both social discourse and literary traditions can be seen as acting out cultural constraints implicit in language: those of specific cultural milieus.

The concept of thought style encompasses an explanation of certain features often cited as characteristic of the thinking of the nations in question. Frequent references are made to the political nature of French thought generally, as well as to its pessimism. The political dimension of French anti-psychiatric texts, where madness is treated as a political phenomenon, was contrasted with the moral and experiential components of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.

Morality has traditionally been conceived in individualistic terms in Anglo-Saxon social discourse, and is thus compatible with the individualistic inclination of Anglo-Saxon anti-psychiatry. Both properties - political nature and pessimism - are translations into thought of the political differences outlined in the thesis. The inherent pessimism can be explained by a feeling of submission and of powerlessness engendered by a strong state, which a weak state, with its emphasis on the individual agent, would not produce. The latter leaves the way open for optimism, exemplified in an extreme form in the Anglo-Saxon colony which became the U.S.A. The more political character of French writings merely reflects the pervasive influence of a strong interventionist state in all aspects of culture.

Furthermore, the model of different thought styles explains why certain philosophies are more readily adopted in certain countries than others. The case of Marxism is particularly interesting. Its lesser popularity in Anglo-Saxon countries is explained by Geison (1985) in terms of the theory's inability to explain the functioning of different political structures to the one on which it is based - a strong Hegelian state on the French and German model. Tonnies (1979), on the other hand, offers an explanation in terms of similarities between the French and German mentalities. He notes that Hegel and Comte were influential in the neighbouring countries of Prussia and France at the same time. These were countries whose mentality had so much in

common "it was as though they were differently refracted rays of the same light" (Tonnies page 83 1974). An explanation in terms of thought styles would argue that Geison's idea entails Tonnies', following Bourdieu's idea of the internalization of social structure. An interesting area of investigation following from this, would be a comparison of the German and the French rationalist thought style.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The model developed is of predictive value. It offers the possibility of predicting and subsequently isolating subtle differences in the writings of celebrated figures - for example, a pair of philosophers such as the American pragmatist William James and French metaphysician Bergson. These men entertained a lively correspondence, through which they became convinced that they shared a very similar view of the world. This is not entirely surprising considering that James had been partly educated in France and was certainly acquainted with French culture and thought style. Both philosophies advocated the primacy of experience, or as James describes it, the immediate "flux" of life, which provides the material for our thoughts. The emphasis on immediate experience comes through in a concept central to Bergsonian philosophy, intuition. This is opposed to reason or scientific thought, which is concerned with analyzing and formalizing the material world in order to master it. The idea of science as a pragmatic tool is also found in James,

who saw it as a "successful satisfaction of an interest".
The shared focus on experience seems to imply the
possibility of a shared empirical thought style. However,
there was a fundamental difference in the nature of the two
forms of empiricism, best captured by Bergson himself:

> *But what true empiricism aims at is to follow as closely as*
> *possible the original itself, to deepen its life and, by a*
> *kind of 'spiritual auscultation', to its soul pulsate, and*
> *this true empiricism is true metaphysics. (Bergson in*
> *Kolakowski page 26 1985)*

This was not an experiential empiricism of the same kind as
James', but, like Sartre's, a metaphysical one. Metaphysics,
according to Bergson, was the proper method of analyzing the
spirit. The metaphysician takes as his starting point the
intuitive awareness of the spirit in its living reality.
Intuition is not satisfied with perceiving immediate
experience, but goes beyond, revealing the direct meaning,
not perceptual/sensual meaning, but meaning unmediated by
analytic categories. The difference between the two
philosophers is highlighted by their discussion of the
concept of self. Bergson distinguished between the
"profound" and the "superficial" self. The latter was part
of the spatial universe, a social manifestation of the
former, which was indescribable in language. Bergson was not
hindered by the inadequacy of language, and, in his attempt
to express the profound self, he equated it with his idea of
"pure time" or becoming, *durée*, also perceived by intuition:

> *the form taken by our successive states of consciousness*
> *when our ego lets itself live, when it abstains from making*

> *a separation between its present and preceding states.*
> *(Bergson page 100 1910)*

The profound self was important to Bergson's concept of freedom as "to act freely, is to regain possession of oneself, to get back into pure duration" (Bergson page 20 1910). James conceived of a similar duality between the empirical aggregate of the "Me" and the core self of the "I", equivalent to the Bergsonian profound self. James used a wealth of description to capture the Me, whereas the difficult concept of the I was treated but briefly, as that which perceives the unity in the Me:

> *This Me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively*
> *known. The I which knows them cannot be an aggregate;*
> *neither for psychological purposes need it be an unchanging*
> *metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the*
> *transcendental Ego, viewed as 'out of time'. It is a*
> *thought, at each moment different from that of the last*
> *moment, by appropriation of the latter, together with all*
> *that the latter called its own. (James page 216 1910)*

Again the problem is expressing the I in linguistic terms. James' definition was more empirical, or experiential, in that the I was not equated to some metaphysical entity to be perceived by intuition, an aspect of the *élan vital* or life drive, permeating the universe. In the end, James remains closer to pure experience by not positing an a priori, metaphysical entity to capture what he is describing. Despite these differing philosophical perspectives, as Rorty (1982) would argue, the two men were trying to express similar ideas. That they did so in dissimilar ways makes

this another example of rhetorical difference as defined in the first chapter.

Another possible area of research along similar lines, would be applying the idea of thought styles to an analysis of psychiatric texts. Cultural differences in orthodox psychiatric thought were outlined in the introduction, using historical examples and instances from the classification literature. The influence of culture on psychiatry is the theme of the post-Foucauldian, "Nouvelle Histoire de la Psychiatrie" by Postel and Quetel (1985). They link the development of national psychiatric schools to political, intellectual and ideological factors which have been important in shaping them.'

FINAL REMARKS

The aim of the work can best be understood in terms of what Moscovici (1985) says about social representations, echoing Darnton's remark quoted at the beginning of the thesis. Moscovici maintains that one can never be free from cultural constraints, but that through them:

> *We may, with effort, become aware of the conventional aspect of reality, and with this, evade some of the constraints which it imposes on our perceptions and thoughts. But we should not imagine that we could ever be free of all convention, or could eliminate every prejudice. Rather than seeking to avoid all convention, a better strategy would be to discover and make explicit a single representation. Thus, instead of denying representations, conventions and prejudices, this strategy would enable us to recognise that representations constitute, for us, a type of reality. (page 8 1985)*

An awareness of national constraints is crucial to access the deep meaning of all aspects of a culture, as Bourdieu (1986) points out in connection with art:

> *The work of art has meaning and interest only for someone who possesses the cultural competence, that is, the words, that are available to name visible things, and which are, as it were, programmes for perception. A work of art has meaning and interest only for someone who possesses the cultural competence, that is, the code, into which it is encoded. The conscious or unconscious implementation of explicit or implicit schemes of perception and appreciation which constitutes pictorial or musical culture is the hidden condition for recognizing the styles characteristic of a period, a school or an author, and, more generally, for the familiarity with the internal logic of works that aesthetic enjoyment presupposes. (Bourdieu page 2 1986)*

Bourdieu's idea is important, although his priority of "code" over "style" runs counter to my use of the terms. Code, as a means of communication or expression, is dependent upon the representional "style". Interestingly, the etymology of the terms would suggest the priority of "style" over "code", where the latter is derived from *codex* or tablet, the former from *stylus* or writing implement. The style would thus be the "author" of the "code". This thesis has tried to make explicit these cultural codes, or constraints on thought and expression, which many take for granted, or sometimes simply ignore. Recognition of national differences in thought/representations, their origins and any prejudices that result from them, becomes even more urgent as 1992 approaches. An understanding of national thought styles makes Mrs Thatcher's reactions to certain European issues at least understandable, and at best,

predictable. Her reaction to the proposed European bureaucratic unification was that it proved the existence of a "socialist" Europe. Her resistance to joining the centralized European monetary system was a reaction against collectivist ideology. Opposition parties may disagree with her, yet the left wing of British politics was not particularly European minded until Europe became a weapon to use against the government. Moreover, the British left wing has not been, and still is, no friend of Continental utopian collectivist politics, as such English reformist movements as the Fabians, for example, testify.

There are several difficulties with the thesis which have to be addressed. The greatest problem facing an investigator in an area such as this – essentially an analysis of national differences – is choosing a convenient starting point or inroad into the problem. This relates to the artificiality of framing the issue in terms of "thought". A weakness of the term "thought style" is that it implies thought governed practices while the thesis outlines environmental origins, without exploring the complicated issue of the priority of thought or action. The thesis is content to illustrate how the psychological properties are sustained by socio-political environments. It has, however, led to a picture of the thought styles as not *sui generis*, but embedded, and even reflected, in cultural structures. As it was argued in chapter one, they issue from culturally specific thought-environment complexes, or "life styles", to which they are

suited and whose values they embody. The term "thought style" was chosen because the thesis focuses on the properties of thought and expression of the two traditions. Furthermore, in accounting for the difference between the two styles, I have only considered one factor responsible for generating the contrasting thought styles: the contrasting political substructures of Britain and France. Nonetheless, this factor has proved to be of crucial importance in accounting for the origins and persistence of the two styles. Another problem, which perhaps has not been accorded sufficient attention, is the link between thought and language. The only firm claim that the thesis makes is that there exists a consonance between the two: both thought style and language embody the same set of culturally specific constraints. This, however, supports the conclusions of cognitive theorists such as Piaget and Vygotsky. These thinkers are often presented as holding opposing viewpoints on the issue of priority of thought and language. However, they reach very similar conclusions: Vygotsky's is that thought and language are interdependent, while Piaget's is that they are linked in a genetic circle.

Although the representation analogy has served the thesis well, there is an important difference between thought styles and social representations. Representations emphasize the cultural constraints on ordinary/commonsense thinking/discourse, thought styles are concerned with those of rationalized academic/intellectual thinking/discourse –

the students interviewed belonged to the French and English academic communities. They are institutionalized modes of conjuctive thinking for particular experiential communities (Rayner 1989), imposing their design on art, science and political ideologies.

Finally, not only does the nature of the subject allow for many different presentations of the problem, but also the material to be drawn upon to illustrate the points made is enormous - an example which Darnton deals with in his book is the different forms of humour which exist in the two countries. This is why the thesis provides a kaleidescopic, as opposed to a comprehensive, picture of a phenomenon that I have been aware of from a position between the two cultures. There is also the problem of finding truly comparable contrasts - two writers, painters, authors etc always differ in more than thought style. The difficulties of presentation and of choice of material stem from the attempt to put in a concise, academic, "rationalist" form, a complex issue which can only be fully understood through "empirical" experience.

1. Talking about English psychiatry, Postel and Quetel say:

> *La décentralization du pouvoir allait de pair avec l'importance accordée à la liberté individuelle et la (relative) tolérence religieuse. La philosophie de John Locke (1632-1704) consacra un empirisme épistémologique qui continua à recevoir l'agrément rétorique des philosophes et docteurs pendant presque toute la periode qui nous occupe. Les docteurs appreciaient le pragmatisme des connaissances, au point de vue de la thérapie, et les réputations professionnelles dependaient plus des nuances du beau monde et d'une clientèle influente que la poursuite rigoureuse d'un nouveau savoir. Le laissez-faire économique s'étendit jusqu'au domaine médical où il se traduisit par la diversité des chemins pédagogiques possible pour les étudiants en medécine et l'absence de lois nationales controlants entièrement la profession médicale avant 1838. Les hôpitaux étaient généralement financés par des contributions voluntaires de citoyens aisés, qui pouvaient en retour commander des voisins importants des serviteurs ou des employés comme objects convenables de cette charité. (Postel and Quetel page 252 1985)*

This corroborates my preliminary research into how *laissez-faire* ideology dominated early British practices towards the mentally ill.

2. Rayner's article deals with the philosophy of Mannheim who was also concerned with different styles of thinking. Mannheim's ideas are, however, different from those expounded in this thesis. Mannheim's theorizing is firmly located within the neo-Kantian tradition. The latter emphasizes the existence of separate cognitive structures for scientific and artistic thinking. This thesis has been devoted to showing how national "style" is manifested in all cognitive activities, using Moscovici's (1985) idea of social representations and Bourdieu's (1979) idea of the internalization of social structures. Thus, whilst his work adopts a neo-Kantian orientation, the thesis leans more towards the positivist/materialist tradition, and explores the link between the cognitive and the social. This is not to say that links between this thesis and Mannheim's ideas could not be made.

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